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UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

REMARKS ON A
PAMPHLET ENTITLED
" < THE LATEST FORM OF INFIDELITY
EXAMINED."

By ANDREWS NORTON.

CAMBRIDGE:
PUBLISHED BT JOHN OWEN.
1839.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1839, by Andrews
Norton, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of
Massachusetts.

CAM BKIOGE:
KOLSOM, WELLS, AND THURSTON,
PRINTEKS TO THE UNIVERSITY.

REMARKS

An anonymous pamphlet, entitled " ' The
Latest Form of Infidelity ' Examined," has
lately appeared, addressed as a letter to me.
It was occasioned by my Discourse, delivered
before the Alumni of the Theological School
at Cambridge. Had the writer confined him
self to an examination of my reasoning, I
should not have thought that there was any
call upon me to take notice of it. But it bears
throughout the character of a personal attack ;
and a considerable portion is expressly occu
pied in charging me with grave errors. These
charges are urged with great confidence, and
relate to such topics, that the generality of
readers cannot be supposed able to judge for
themselves of the correctness of what is assert
ed or implied. I have thought it right, there
fore, to enter into some explanations, which

4 REMARKS
will enable every one to do so. It is unpleas
ant to engage in a discussion that has so much
of a merely personal character, and is so apart
from the subject to which I wished to call pub
lic attention. But it has seemed to me due to
my friends, and to all who may think and feel
with me on the great question at issue.
The occasion being thus presented, I shall
also make a few preliminary observations, I can
hardly say in explanation of the reasoning of
my Discourse, but observations that may serve
to show, how much that reasoning has been
misapprehended by the writer of the pamphlet.

Preliminary Observations.
I have said in my Discourse, (as quoted by
the writer of the pamphlet,*) " that the divine
authority of him whom God commissioned to
speak to us in his name was attested, in the
only mode in which it could be, by miraculous
displays of his power ; " that Christianity offers,
" in attestation of the truth of the facts, which
it reveals, the only satisfactory proof, the au
thority of God, evidenced by miraculous dis
plays of his power ; " and that " no proof of the
* p. 31.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET.

divine commission of Christ could be afforded
but through miraculous displays of God's pow-

I

er."

These propositions the writer of the pam
phlet controverts in a long argument, and cites
many authorities in opposition, as he represents,
to what I maintained.* He particularly con
tends, that they imply a rejection of the in
ternal and collateral evidences of Christianity,
or, in other words, of all evidence, except the
historical evidence. It is unnecessary to follow
him in his argument ; but the subject itself is
important, and the truth respecting it may be
made clear iu a few words.
A Christian believes, that Jesus Christ claim
ed to be a messenger from God to men, com
missioned to make known to them, by author
ity from God, facts of which men's reason had
not given them, and apparently never could
give them, assurance. His firm belief of those
facts rests on his faith in Christ. But why
does he believe Christ to have been commis
sioned by God to make them known ? No one

* Among those authorities, he quotes (p. 73) one passage writ
ten by myself, to which he might have added many more. One
other he gives, as supposing it written by me ; but I was not the
author of the Review of Verplanck's " Evidences of Revealed
Religion," from which it is taken.

6 REMARKS
can be less entitled to credence than he who
claims to be a special messenger from God
without being able to authenticate his claims.
He who affirms, that he is such a messenger,
affirms that God has in him wrought a miracle ;
but this is a miracle of which no other human
being can have cognizance, and which is not to
be believed without the most decisive proof.
What, then, is the proof required ? Manifestly
it is the attestation of God to the authority of
him whom he has commissioned. A miracle of
which we have no cognizance can be attested
only by miracles of which we have cognizance.
If the proposition be clearly stated and under
stood, that a miraculous revelation can be au
thenticated only by miracles, I am unable to
perceive how it can reasonably be controverted.
It is but stating, in other words, the proposi
tion, that we can have no ground for believing
in any thing miraculous, where nothing miracu
lous appears.
But what the proofs are, which we have at the
present day, that a divine revelation, so authen
ticated, was made by Christ, is a very different
question. There is an obvious and perfectly
intelligible distinction between the evidence
necessary to authenticate the fact of a divine
revelation, and essentially implied in the exist-

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 7
ence of the fact, and the evidence which we
may now have, that such a revelation, so stamp
ed with the seal of God, has been actually
made. Of the proofs existing at the present
day the historical is first to be considered ; for,
if there were no historical proof, there could
be no other. Even as regards the historical
proof, however, many considerations concur
to give it validity, which are not connected
with common historical testimony. But, beside
this, there is a vast amount of internal and col
lateral evidence. The whole history of Jesus
bears an ineffaceable character of reality. It is
impossible that it should have been a human
fiction. The religion in its revelations and
moral teachings is throughout worthy of God.
In proportion as we better understand the writ
ings of its apostles and evangelists, new evi
dences of its truth are continually appearing.
Its reception and diffusion can be explained
only on the supposition, that it was authen
ticated by miracles as coming from God. It
has shown itself to be from God by its influence
on the hearts and lives of even its imperfect
disciples, and on the whole condition of civ
ilized man. This is a most brief and imperfect
enumeration, but it is unnecessary to go on.
A religious philosopher can hardly make him-

8 REMARKS
self acquainted with any fact illustrating the
first history and promulgation of our religion,
its essential character, the opinions and con
dition of men before and after its introduction,
or the constitution of human nature itself,
without perceiving evidence of its truth. This
evidence breaks upon us from many different
sources ; and we may be satisfied very long be
fore we have exhausted it. I know not that the
mere intelligent reading of the Gospels, accom
panied with a common knowledge of the facts
concerning them, is not amply sufficient to pro
duce a thorough conviction of the divine origin
of our religion. But all the evidence of which
I have spoken, so vast in amount and so various
in its character, bears upon one point alone ; —
that a revelation from God to men, authen
ticated by miracles, was made through Jesus
Christ. I state these considerations on account of
their intrinsic importance. It is not worth
while particularly to point out their bearing
upon the different erroneous representations
given of my opinions by the writer of the pam
phlet. But I may here observe, that there is a mode
of speaking of the internal evidence of Chris
tianity, which, strange as it may appear, goes

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 9
to destroy the worth of all evidences of Chris
tianity, as a revelation from God.
It is said, that the truths of religion are di
rectly perceived by the mind ; that they neither
require, nor admit of, any additional evidence ;
but that these truths are the truths of Chris
tianity, and, therefore, that there is a direct
perception of the truth of Christianity. These
propositions embody opinions which are the
basis of some modern systems of religion.*
I answer, that a truth is the expression of a
fact. With this understanding, it is not neces
sary to dwell on the metaphysical absurdity of
supposing the direct perception of facts existing
neither in the sensible world, nor in our own
minds ; as the fact, for example, of man's im
mortality. This will be obvious to every one
accustomed to think clearly. But, taking a
more popular view, we may say, that the prop
ositions laid down would seem to have been
framed by one who knew nothing of men as
they had been, or as they existed around him,
and who was speculating on the imaginary in
habitants of some other planet. What correct
and assured belief of the fundamental truths of

* Those, for example, of Fries and, as will hereafter appear,
of his follower, De Wette. 2

10 REMARKS
religion existed among the great mass of man
kind before Christianity ? How much belief of
those truths now exists, which is not to be
traced to the influence of Christianity ? In
how large a number, in any Christian country,
does it exist beyond the sphere of those who
rest their faith on Christianity as a revelation
from God ?
But it is further to be observed, that this pre
tence of placing Christianity upon unassailable
ground, upon what is called, falsely, its internal
evidence, — this theory, that the facts which it
reveals are directly perceived by the mind, — is
utterly inconsistent with any belief in Chris
tianity as a revelation from God. No rational
man can suppose, that God has miraculously
revealed facts, which the very constitution of
our nature enables us directly to perceive.
I have said all that seems to me necessary
with regard to the reasoning of the pamphlet
under notice, and will now proceed to mat
ters of a personal nature. Some interest may,
perhaps, attach to these from the explanations
respecting various subjects to which they will
give occasion. The charges of error made
against me relate to Spinoza, Schleiermacher,
and De Wette. I shall consider them in this
order ; and first of

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 11

Spinoza.

I spoke of Spinoza as an atheist. The
writer of the pamphlet says, that this was an
early prejudice, but that it is one to which
" few scholars, conversant, even in a slight de
gree, with philosophical studies, would now
give their sanction ; " * and, after various pro
fessed quotations from Spinoza, further says,
that I " shall now perceive, that he was not an
atheist, in any sense ; nor a pantheist, in the
sense in which that word is commonly used." f
The system of Spinoza has been talked
of by many, who apparently have known lit
tle concerning it, and mistaken its character.
Hence we find such notices of it as some of
those collected from different authors by the
writer of the pamphlet.t I shall endeavour,
therefore, to give a correct account of what
alone concerns us at present, or, indeed, is in
itself of much interest, — his conceptions re
specting God.
According to Spinoza there is but one sub
stance existing. This is possessed of infinite
attributes. All the phenomena of what we call
the created universe, that is, all finite beings,
* Pamphlet, p. 120. f p. 125. J pp. 126 seqq.

12 REMARKS
with their properties, acts, and affections ; with
their moral qualities, good or bad ; with their
joys and sufferings, are but modifications of the
attributes of this sole substance, or, in other
words, of this substance itself. This substance
has existed from eternity. It could be pro
duced by no other ; for one substance cannot
produce another; — creation is impossible.* It
is "the immanent cause of all things, not a
transitive cause." f These terms are technical
and require explanation. An immanent cause
is that which produces effects only in or upon
itself. A transitive cause is that which passes
out of itself, as it were, to produce, or to act
on, something else. The sole substance of the
universe is the God of Spinoza ; and in the
exposition of his system he early begins to
denote it by that name. J
To this substance, considered in itself, dis
tinct from the effects produced by it in itself,
and as the cause of those effects, he gives the
name also of Natura nalurans, which may be
explained by the equivalent term, causal Na
ture; while to the modifications produced by

* These principles are stated in the first fifteen propositions
of the First Part of his Ethics, in which Part he treats of God.
f Ethices P. I. Prop. 18. Opp. II. p. 54, ed. Paulus.
i This name is first given to it in the eleventh proposition.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 13
it in itself, that is, to the phenomena of the
universe, he gives the name of JYatura naiurata,
for which we may substitute phenomenal Na
ture* To this substance considered in itself, to his
Natura naturans, that is, to his God, regarded
as ihe cause of all things, he expressly denies
both intellect and will, and argues at length
against ascribing them to God. " I will show,"
he says, " that neither intellect nor will belong
to the nature of God." t
But, though this denial of intellect to the
* As this is an important point in his theory, I quote the pas
sage at length in which he explains his views.
"Antequam ulterius pergam, hie, quid nobis per Naturam
naturantem et quid per Naturam naturatam intelligendum sit,
explicare volo, vel potius monere. Nam ex antecedentibus
jam constare existimo, nempe, quod per Naturam naturantem
nobis intelligendum est id, quod in se est et per se concipitur,
sive talia substantias attributa, que Bternam et infinitam essen-
tiam exprimunt, hoc est, Deus, quatenus, ut causa libera, con
siderate. Per Naturatam autem intelligo id omne, quod ex
necessitate Dei natures, sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum
sequitur, hoc est, omnes Dei attributorum modos, quatenus con-
siderantur, ut res, qua? in Deo sunt et quas sine Deo nee esse,
nee concipi possunt." — Ethices P. I. Prop. 29. Schol., pp. 61, 62.
By causa libera Spinoza means nothing more than a cause
unconstrained by any other; as he explains in the demonstration
of the seventeenth proposition of the First Part, and in the corol
laries to it, pp. 51, 52.
t " Ostendam, ad Dei naturam neque intellectum, neque volunta-
tem pertinere." Ibid. Prop. 17. Schol., p. 52.

14 REMARKS
Deity is a fundamental characteristic of the sys
tem of Spinoza, there are other positions in his
system, which seem at first view irreconcilable
with it. Whatever may be the number of the
divine attributes, Spinoza supposes that but two
can be known by man, and these two are infinite
extension (extension being considered by him
as the essence of matter*) and infinite thought, f
In the Second Part of his Ethics, (in which, it
may be observed, he' is professedly treating not
of God, but of the human mind,) he says,
" Thought is an attribute of God ; or God is a
thinking thing," (res cogitans.) % He says, that
God understands or knows himself, (seipsum
intelligit.) ^ He repeatedly speaks, in this Part
and elsewhere, of the intellect of God. And
what is remarkable, he makes no express at
tempt to reconcile these apparent contradictions.
But the solution which he does afford,- without
expressly recognising the contradiction, is alto
gether consistent with his denying intellect to
God, considered as the cause of all things.
This solution, I shall first state in my own
* See particularly the scholium to the fifteenth proposition of
the First Part of his Ethics.
t These alone are specified in his Ethics ; and that these alone
can be known, he says in his 66th Letter. Opp. I. pp. 673, 674.
% Ethices P. II. Prop. 1. § Ibid. Prop. 3. Schol., et alibi.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 15
words, thus : All nature, the universe, con
sidered as an effect, consists only of infinite
modifications of the one infinite substance, the
God of Spinoza. But whatever may be affirmed
of the modifications of any being, may be af
firmed of that being itself. Phenomenal Nature
(Natura naturata) is equally God as causal Na
ture. Now in the infinite universe there is
infinite thought and intellect, and a knowledge
or understanding of God (for according to Spi
noza, there is nothing else to be known or
understood but God * ) ; and all this may be
predicated of God, considered not as a cause,
but as phenomenal Nature. I shall now quote
to this effect the words of Spinoza himself.
" Jlctual intellect," he says, (" not that I
allow," he adds in a scholium, " the supposition
of any potential intellect,") whether finite or
infinite, as also will, desire, love, &c, must be
referred to phenomenal Nature (ad Naturam
* " Intellectus actu finitus, aut actu infinitus, Dei attributa Dei-
que affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud."— Ethices P. I.
Prop. 30. Spinoza here, as elsewhere, uses debet in the sense of
must, as implying logical necessity. Thus he begins the demon
stration of this proposition with saying ; " Idea vera debet con-
venire cum suo ideato."
I add the forty-seventh proposition of the Second Part (p. 120. ) :
" Mens humana adequatam habet cognitionem sterna? et infinite;
essentia? Dei."

16 REMARKS
naturatam) not to causal Nature (nee vero ad
naturantem.) *
This ascribing of intellect to phenomenal and
not to causal Nature is a main point in the
system of Spinoza ; and from ignorance of it,
or inattention to it, I suppose his doctrine con
cerning God to have been often misunderstood.
I shall, therefore, produce other passages to the
same effect as that just quoted.
"Will and intellect have the same relation
to God as motion and rest, and generally as all
natural phenomena (omnia naturalia), which
are necessarily determined by God to exist and
operate in a certain manner." f
" Will does not more pertain to the nature
of God than other natural phenomena, but has
the same relation to it as motion and rest, and
as all other natural phenomena." f
That is, will and intellect may be affirmed
of God, only as motion and rest may be affirmed
of him ; that is, only of God considered as
Natura naturata, phenomenal Nature.
In the Second Part of his Ethics, there are
many passages, that involve the main idea of
the following.
* Ethices P. I. Prop. 31., p. 62.
t Ibid. Prop. 32. Coroll. 2., pp. 63, 64.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 17
" A knowledge of whatever takes place in
the human mind necessarily exists in God, so
far as he constitutes the nature of the human
mind." *
Though the expression of the following is in
some respects obscure, it is clear as regards
our present purpose.
" It appears that our mind, considered as
intelligent, is an eternal mode of thought, which
is limited by another eternal mode of thought,
and that again by another, and thus to infinity,
so that, altogether, they [that is, human minds,
or minds like the human,] constitute the eternal
and infinite intellect of God." f
" I think," he says, in a letter to his disciple
de Vries, " that I have clearly and evidently
shown that intellect, though infinite, belongs to
phenomenal and not to causal Nature.'''' %
* P. II. Prop. 12. Demonstr., p. 88. Conf. Prop. 11. Coroll. ;
Prop. 38. Demonstr. ; Prop. 40. Demonstr. ; Prop. 43. Demonstr ;
P. III. Prop. 1. Demonstr.
f " Ha?c sunt, qua? de Mente, quatenus sine relatione ad Cor
poris existentiam consideratur, ostendere constitueram: ex quibus
et simul ex Prop. 21. p. 1. et aliis apparet, quod Mens nostra,
quatenus intelligit, a?ternus cogitandi modus sit, qui alio a?terno
cogitandi modo determinatur et hie iterum ab alio et sic in in
finitum ; ita ut omnes simul Dei sternum et infinitum intellectum
constituant." — P. V. Prop. 40. Schol., p. 297.
I " Quod autem ad rem attinet, puto me satis clare etevidenter
demonstrasse, intellectum, quamvis infinitum, ad Naturam natu-
3

18 REMARKS
There is no doubt, therefore, that Spinoza
denies to his God, considered as the cause of
all things, both intellect and will. I shall now
state his further positions concerning God, so
considered. All phenomena in the universe are the result
of an inevitable necessity; of the necessary
operation of the laws of the divine Nature, or,
in other words, of causal Nature. Nothing
could be otherwise than as it is.* Spinoza,
himself, does not explain what are the laws of
this Nature, divested of intellect and will. But
there is only one answer which the question
admits. They must be the laws according to
which the phenomena of the universe actually
are produced ; that is, what we call the laws of
nature ; — these laws being supposed to have
intrinsic power, and the laws of the moral
world to act with as inevitable necessity as the
laws of the physical.
With these principles, Spinoza proceeds to
deny that there is any benevolent purpose in
Nature, that his God proposes to himself any
purpose, or that there is any plan in the uni-

ratam, non vero ad naturantem pertinere." — Epist. 27. Opp. I.
p. 524.
* Ethices P. I. Prop. 33, pp. 64 seqq.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 19
verse.* These suppositions would evidently be
wholly irreconcilable with his principles.- " Men
commonly suppose," he says, " that all things
in nature act for some end, like themselves ;
and even maintain, as indubitable, that God
himself directs all things to some certain end." f
He first undertakes to explain the origin of this
prejudice, and then to prove its falsity. " The
prejudice," he says, "has become a supersti
tion, and struck its roots deep into men's minds.
Hence every one strives earnestly to understand
and trace out the final causes of all things. But
in endeavouring to show that nature does noth
ing in vain, (that is, nothing but for the use of
men,) they seem to have shown only that nature
and the Gods are as foolish as men." J He
commences his second head by saying ; " Not
many words are necessary to show, that Nature
proposes to itself no end, and that all final
causes are nothing but human figments." ^
"The opinion of those who subject all things,"
to what Spinoza calls " a certain indifferent
will of God, and maintain that all things depend
on his good pleasure, is less wide from the
truth," he says, " than that of those who main-

* P. I. Appendix, pp. 68-76. Conf. P. IV. Pra?f., pp. 200, 201.
t Appendix, p. 69. | Ibid. p. 70. § Ibid. p. 71.

20 REMARKS
tain that God does all things with reference to
gc

X00d." *

This is the system which I called atheism ;
but which the writer of the pamphlet, doubtless
through a mistake of its character, affirms, that
" no one who understands the subject will ac
cuse of an irreligious tendency, it being re
ligious even to mysticism ;"f and which Cousin,
whom he regards as an authority, describes as
" a mystic hymn, an ejaculation of the soul
toward the Supreme Being."!
A few remarks remain to be made on the
statements in the pamphlet, concerning this
subject. The system of Spinoza cannot be understood
without understanding the meaning of the terms
in which he defines the causality ascribed by
him to that substance which he calls God. A
knowledge of the meaning of these terms is as
necessary to comprehend him, as a knowledge
of the terms sine and tangent in studying the
properties of the circle. I have already ex
plained them. " God," according to Spinoza, " is
the immanent cause of all things, not a transi-

* P. I. Prop. 33. Schol. 2, p. 67. t Pamphlet, p. 126.
t Ibid. p. 130.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 21
tive cause;"* that is, a cause acting on itself,
and not one producing, or acting on, any thing
out of itself. This proposition is quoted by the
writer of the pamphlet with the insertion of
two other epithets (not in the original f) in the
following terms : " God is the permanent and
indwelling cause of all things, not the transient
and temporary cause." J By translating imma-
nens, " indwelling," its essential meaning is
changed. An indwelling cause acts on something
not itself, — that in which it dwells. A common
acquaintance with the Latin language might not
have prevented the writer from rendering imma-
nens by "indwelling"; but it might, as one would
think, have prevented his giving " transient,"
as the meaning of transiens. By these two
errors, and by the insertion of the epithets
"permanent" and " temporary," he makes Spi
noza affirm, what no Christian theist will con
trovert, that " God is the permanent and in
dwelling cause of all things ; " and to deny,
what surely was never maintained, " that God

* "Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens ; non vero tran
siens."— P. I. Prop. 18, p. 54.
f These additional epithets are as little to be found in the 21st
of Spinoza's Epistles, from which also the writer of the pamphlet
(p. 123) professes to quote them.
t Pamphlet, p. 122.

22 REMARKS
is the transient and temporary cause of all
things." This fundamental error appears not
only in his professed rendering from the Latin
of Spinoza ; but, what I cannot account for, in
a professed translation from the German.*
In my Discourse I mentioned an account
which Le Clerc says he had from a person of
credit who had stated to him the fact in
writing. The writer of the pamphlet says, re
specting it,
"The idle story which you quote from Le Clerc,
that Meyer induced Spinoza to substitute the word
God for Nature, where the former now appears, is
without foundation. Even if it had more satisfactory
external evidence for its support, it would be contradicted
by the whole spirit of Spinoza's writings. The substitu
tion of the word Nature for God could not now be made
without destroying his system. "f
This passage is hardly important enough for
notice. But the following extract may throw
some further light on the opinions of Spinoza.
" I have shown," he says, " in the Appendix J
to my First Part, that Nature does not act for
any end. For that eternal and infinite being
which we call God or Nature acts by the same
necessity by which it exists." — "The reason,
therefore, or cause, why God or Nature acts,
* Pamphlet, p. 129. f Ibid. p. 123.
J See the citations from this Appendix, before given, p. 19.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 23
and why it exists, is one and the same. As it
exists for the sake of no end, so it acts for the
sake of no end."*
Any further quotation to show the error of
the writer of the pamphlet would be superfluous.
What has been before said is, indeed, sufficient
to make it evident.
It is not necessary to go through his remarks
in order to particularize other misconceptions
of the system of Spinoza ; but there is one
professed extract from him of a character not
to be passed over without notice. The follow
ing is given as a quotation from Spinoza.
"The intelligence and will which we should regard
as constituting the essence of God, must differ entirely
from human intelligence and will. The intelligence of
God, so far as it is conceived as constituting the essence
of God, is indeed the cause both of the essence and of
the existence of the Universe. The intelligence of God,
then, is the cause both of the essence and the existence
of our intelligence ; and must therefore differ from it,
as that which is caused differs from its cause, namely,
in that which it receives from its cause. f "
* " Ostendimus enim in Prima? Partis Appendice Naturam prop
ter finem non agere ; a?ternum namque illud et infinitum Ens, quod
Deum seu Naturam appellamus, eadem, qua existit, necessitate
agit." — " Ratio igitur, seu causa, cur Deus, seu Natura agit et cur
existit, una eademque est. Ut ergo nullius finis causa existit,
nullius etiam finis causa agit" — Ethices P. IV. Prafatio, p. 200.
" f Ethica, pars i. prop, xvii." Pamphlet, pp. 124, 125.

24 REMARKS
This passage, which is adduced to prove that
Spinoza ascribes intelligence and will to God,
is composed of sentences, altered from the
original, which have been taken from a portion
of his work before referred to, in which he
says, " I will show, that neither intellect nor
will belong to the nature of God," * and then
proceeds in his proof of this proposition. I will
explain, as far as is necessary, the course of his
argument, and show how the passage is con
structed, which is given as an extract from
him. " If intellect and will belong to the eternal
essence of God," says Spinoza, reasoning against
the supposition, " something must be under
stood by each attribute different from what
men commonly mean. For the intellect and will
which would constitute the essence of God must
differ entirely from our intellect and will ; nor
can there be any correspondence between them
except in name ; that is, no other correspondence
than exists between the constellation called the
Dog, and a dog a barking animal ; which I will
thus prove." f
The words italicized being part of a passage

* P. I. Prop. 17. Schol., pp. 52-54. See before, p. 13.
f Ibid. p. 53.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 25
in which Spinoza is laboring to prove, that we
cannot ascribe intellect and will to the Deity
in any intelligible sense of the words ; that is,
that we cannot reasonably ascribe them to the
Deity at all, is thus quoted, with an interpola
tion, in the pamphlet before us, as expressing
his opinion, that we should ascribe intelligence
and will to the Deity.
" The intelligence and will which we should
regard as constituting the essence of God, must
differ entirely from human intelligence and
will." After the words which I have last quoted
from Spinoza, he thus proceeds to the proof of
what he had affirmed in those words. I shall
give this proof in an abridged form.
" If intellect, says Spinoza, " belongs to the
divine nature," then, " as God is prior in causal
ity to all things," all things are what they are
because the conceptions of them, such as they
are, existed in the divine intellect. " Conse
quently the intellect of God, so far as it is
conceived of as constituting his essence, is truly
the cause of things, both of their essence and
existence ; which seems to have been observed
by those, who have asserted that the intellect,
will, and power of God are one and the same."
But " an effect," he continues, " differs from its
4

26 REMARKS
cause precisely in that which it has from its
cause." I omit his argument in proof of this
strange proposition, as foreign from our purpose.
But having, as he conceives, established it, he
goes on. " But the intellect of God," (according
to the supposition that intellect belongs to God,)
" is the cause of the essence and existence of our
intellect, therefore the intellect of God, so far as
it is conceived of as constituting the divine
essence, differs from our intellect, both as re
spects its essence and its existence ; and can
correspond with it in nothing but in name.
Which it was my purpose to prove. The same
reasoning, as every one will readily see, applies
to will," as ascribed to God.
Here the argument concludes. It was of
course the purpose of Spinoza to prove the
proposition which he had laid down at its com
mencement, that "neither intellect nor will be
long to the Divine Nature." I have again ital
icized the passages which go to form the last
two sentences of the professed quotation from
Spinoza given in the pamphlet. Words, it will
appear, have been put together, so as to make
him express the direct opposite of that for which
he is contending.
The account which I have given of the system
pf Spinoza may be of some interest, as almost

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 27
every one has heard of his name. There are
few writers, — none, perhaps, of the same pe
riod, — who have had so much influence upon
the infidel philosophy and theology of Germany.
As respects the authors, whose opinions con
cerning his system the writer of the pamphlet
has quoted, there is none of them, even in
cluding Tennemann, whom, for myself, I should
regard as an authority on the subject. I have
not examined the quotations to see whether
they are correctly made ; and this is a point,
which, as may appear from what has been
already shown, is not to be assumed.
I proceed to what is said by the writer of the
pamphlet respecting SCHLEIERMACHER.
His remarks relate to my account of Schleier-
macher's " Discourses on Religion." In the
passage * on which he comments, I have given
a brief abstract of some of the more remarkable
positions in that work, — positions which ap
peared to me, as they must to every Christian,
wholly irreligious. The only proper answer to
* Discourse on the Latest Form of Infidelity, pp. 43 seqq.

28 REMARKS
my account, supposing that it admitted of an
answer, would be to compare it with the book
itself, and to show, that what I affirmed that
book to contain was not to be found in it. But
this is not attempted. No error in my account
is specified. The most obnoxious of the doc
trines which I have mentioned are unequivocally
taught in Schleiermacher's work. Should any
one expressly assert the contrary, it would be
of little consequence what he might afterward
assert or deny. Nor, if the book were easily
accessible in English, would any one venture
to make such remarks on my account of it as
are found in the pamphlet under notice. Those
doctrines are not inculcated incidentally or apart,
so as not to enter into the main purpose of the
author. It would be absurd to suppose this of
a work, treating only of religion, and in which
the Discourse, that all my quotations were taken
from, treats " Of the Essence of Religion." * On
the contrary, they are characteristic features of
the system of pantheism developed in the work.
The writer of the pamphlet, indeed, indirectly
asserts in one passage, that I am in error in
charging Schleiermacher with denying the doc
trines of a personal God, and personal im-
* Its title is " Ueber das Wesen der Religion."

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 29
mortality.* I made no charge of this kind
against him, except by simply reporting what
is found in his Discourses. Any error I com
mitted must be in this report. His words
imply, therefore, that I committed an error
in quoting what Schleiermacher says of a per
sonal God and personal immortality ; but I trust
I do him (whoever he may be) no more than
justice, when I say, that his words imply what
he would not directly assert.
The views of religion given in Schleiermacher's
book I adduced as exhibiting a system drawn
up by a professed Christian, and left it to my
readers to judge what resemblance they bore to
Christianity. Of the author, or his opinions,
I gave no further account, except that I classed
him with unbelievers in Christianity as a miracu
lous revelation. If I correctly stated the doc
trines maintained in his Discourses, every reader
can determine for himself whether or not he
is to be regarded as a Christian, in a proper
sense of the word.
It may seem, therefore, as if nothing more
were to be said on the subject. But the writer
of the pamphlet, without directly denying the
* "You charge the author with denying the doctrine both
of a personal God and of personal immortality. You were prob
ably led into this error," &c. — Pamphlet, p. 135.

30 REMARKS
correctness of my account of Schleiermacher's
work, introduces a series of remarks and asser
tions, the purport of which is to produce the
impression, that I have in some way misrepre
sented him ; that he was a " strenuous advocate
of the supernatural origin of Christianity;" that
" his whole life was a controversy against the
Rationalist school,"* and that he was a believer
"in a perfect revelation through Christ," to
which " the revelation of God in nature, and in
the human soul, is only a preparation." f Of
these remarks and assertions, it is necessary
to my purpose to take some notice.
"You attempt," says the writer of the pamphlet, "to
support your allegations by the citation of detached pas
sages from one of Schleiermacher's earliest writings,
without the qualifications which guard them where they
stand, and without any reference to his subsequent pro
ductions, in which his theological views are more fully
and distinctly expressed. In this way, you have pre
sented an erroneous idea of his position as a theologian,
and treated with injustice the character of one of the
most sincere and exemplary men, who have ever devoted
their lives to the service of truth." J
If by " detached passages " the writer of the
pamphlet means passages expressive of doctrines
that do not enter as fundamental propositions
* Pamphlet, p. 139. f Ibid. p. 142. $ Ibid. pp. 131, 132.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 31
into the system of Schleiermacher, what he
states is a grave error. Of what qualifications
or explanations such doctrines may admit,
it would be hard to conjecture, and he no
where throws any light on the subject. I shall
have occasion hereafter lo recur to it. At pres
ent, I shall take notice only of the representa
tion, that the " Discourses on Religion " were
one of Schleiermacher's earliest writings, and,
therefore, as is implied, that it is unjust to
quote them in evidence of his settled opinions.
It might be sufficient to say, that I entered
into no history of Schleiermacher's opinions,
and quoted his Discourses only to show what
sort of a substitute had been proposed for
Christianity. But a further answer is to be
given. The facts respecting the book are these.
It was originally published in 1799, when the
author was thirty years old. In 1806, a sec
ond edition appeared, in the Dedication of
which the author professes to have revised it
throughout, for the purpose, among others, of
removing all occasion for the gross misunder
standings to which it had been exposed, caus
ing him to be represented as a fanatic by infi
dels, and an unbeliever by bigots. In 1821, a
third edition was published, again revised, with
many changes of expression, and accompanied

32 REMARKS
with copious notes, to explain more fully the
writer's opinions. And in 1831, three years
before his death, a fourth edition was issued,
being that which I used. In the Preface to
the third edition, (which is retained, without
any additional notice, in the fourth,) he again
refers to " the numerous and in part very won
derful misconceptions " of his meaning, and to
the consequent charges of atheism and mysti
cism, which had been brought against him,
" almost in the same breath." He had likewise
been charged with inconsistency between this
and his other writings. But he says, that his
" mode of thinking on the subjects in question
had remained unchanged (since the publication
of the work), except that, with years, it had
acquired greater maturity and clearness in its
form." It is unnecessary to say any thing fur
ther respecting the implication, that this work
should not be used in evidence of his opinions,
because it is one of his earliest writings.
But there are other reasons given, why it
should not be thus used. They occupy several
pages,* but they are not stated clearly, nor
brought definitely to bear on the point for
which they are alleged. I was mistaken, it is
* Pamphlet, pp. 132 seqq.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 33
said, in regarding the work as elaborate or sys
tematic. " Nothing could have been further
from the author's intention, than to present any
thing like an elaborate or complete system of
speculative doctrine." It is " filled with bursts
of impassioned eloquence," — "expressly dis
claiming all pretensions to an exposition of doc
trine." I have fallen into " a misapprehension of
the design of the book," which " an accurate
knowledge of the literary history of the period,
in which it was written, would have prevented."
And the inference to be made is, that, if I had
understood the occasion, design, and character
of the work, I should not have made use of it
as I have done. It is admitted by his admirer,
Liicke, and, one would suppose, admitted by
the writer of the pamphlet, for he quotes
Lucke's words as if adopting them, that it
does present " the appearance of pantheism, and
here and there a decided expression of it " ; *
and I repeat, that it does teach the other
connected doctrines, which I have formerly
stated. But it is alleged, that, when it was
first written, infidelity generally prevailed in
Germany, and what there was of religion wa.s
of the poorest kind. The author " felt himself
* Pamphlet, p. 136.

34 REMARKS
impelled to go forth " — " for the restoration of
religion ; to present it in its most sublime as
pect, free from its perversions, disentangled from
human speculation, as founded in the essential
nature of man, and indispensable to the com
plete unfolding of his inward being." *• And,
therefore, — for this is the conclusion which
the writer of the pamphlet is maintaining, —
the book is not to be taken for an exposition of
his opinions concerning religion. " In order to
recognise every thing which is really religion
among men, and to admit even the lowest de
grees of it into the idea of religion, he wished
to make this as broad and comprehensive in its
character as possible."! And, therefore^ when
he asserts the doctrine of personal immortality
to be an irreligious doctrine, and maintains,
that religion consists only in the sense of the
union of the individual with the Oae and All,
we must regard him as but striving to make
the idea of religion as broaxl a^id cafciprehensive
in its character as possible.
Butthe main argument against the use made
by me of Schleiermacher's h<%ok",'~»n argu
ment, however, rather implied than expressly
stated, — is, that the doctrines 1 quoted from
it are explained in the notes to the third edi-
* Pamphlet, p. 133. t Ibid.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 35
tion. To complete the argument, it must be
understood, that they are so explained as to give
his language a sense different from what ap
pears at first sight. Schleiermacher was skilled,
when he so wished, to obscure his meaning,
and to palter with words used in senses very
remote from their common import. It has been
said, that the signification of his name, Schlei
ermacher, that is Veil-maker, expressed his char
acter. But I do not perceive, that he explains
away, in those notes, what I quoted from
his text ; — a text, which, as it appears in the
third and fourth editions, was in the most ob
noxious passages carefully revised, with various
alterations and softenings of expression. Had
such a process been carried on, as the writer of
the pamphlet represents ; had Schleiermacher
taught irreligion in his text, and explained it
into religion in his notes, the readers of the
pamphlet might reasonably have desired to see
some specimens of his manner of interpretation.
I will quote what is said concerning the sub
ject in the following very remarkable passage,
which I give with the capitals used by the
writer of the pamphlet.
" I regret, that the explanations referred to are of
such a length as to forbid their insertion in this place.
It may be seen, however, from the following extract,

36 REMARKS
that the conceptions which Schleiermacher renounces as
essential " [the sense obviously requires " unessential "]
"to religion, are only those which are taken from human
and earthly relations, and which consequently pervert
every spiritual idea of God and immortality. ' As the
conception of the human personality of God usually pre
supposes a consciousness that is not morally pure, the
same thing may be assumed in the conception of im
mortality, which represents it after the manner of the
Elysian fields, only as a new earth of greater beauty
and extent. And as we must admit an essential differ
ence between the inability to form such a human and
personal conception of God,' [verbally, "to conceive of
God as in such manner personal,"] 'and the denial of
the existence of a Living God, — which last alone can
be designated as atheism ; in like manner, he who does
not incline to such a material conception of immor
tality, is very far from discarding the genuine hope of
immortality. And as we may call every man reli
gious, who believes in a Living God, we may also call
every one religious, who believes in the Everlasting
Life of the Soul, without wishing to define the way
or the manner, in which it must be conceived.'* "
Schleiermacher, then, was a believer in the
Living God, and in everlasting life. He had a
just view of the importance of these doctrines.
He regarded them as essential to religion. His
only purpose was, to free them from debasing
conceptions derived from things human and
earthly. But this is directly contradictory to

"* Reden, p. 141." Pamphlet, pp. 137, 138.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 37
my statements concerning the opinions main
tained by him in the book in question. What
account is to be given of the matter ?
The account to be given is, that language
cannot be used more deceptively than it is in
the passage I have quoted from the pamphlet.
The impression which every unsuspecting read
er must receive is, that Schleiermacher regard
ed the personality of the Deity as a funda
mental truth of religion. He denied, indeed,
his human personality. The phrase may not be
well understood, but if trust be reposed in the
writer of the pamphlet, it will be thought to
mean, that Schleiermacher, maintaining the per
sonality of God, only rejected certain erroneous
conceptions connected with it, founded upon
some supposed analogy to human imperfection.
To one who examines for himself, and attends
closely to the meaning of words, it will indeed
be evident, that personality is but of one kind,
admitting no modifications or degrees ; that the
word must have the same meaning, whether
used of man, or an angel, or the Divinity ; that
consequently to deny human personality to God,
or personality like that of man, is to deny a
personal God ; and that, in the phrase " human
personality," if the qualifying word " human "
have any meaning, and be not merely used as a

38 REMARKS
disguise, it must be intended to imply, that per
sonality, so far as our knowledge extends, is
the attribute only of finite beings, like man.
Three pages before the passage quoted from
him, Schleiermacher says ; " As it is so difficult
to conceive of a personality truly infinite and
impassible, a great difference should be made
between a personal God and a living God. It
is the latter conception alone, which properly
forms a separation from material pantheism and
blind atheistic necessity." * In his Discourses,
(as I have formerly mentioned,) both in the
text and notes, he reasons against the supposir
tion, that the belief of a personal God is essen
tial to religion. I will add but one quotation,
to show further his views on the subject.
" I am firmly convinced, that, through what
has been said, the conception of the personality
of God will not become more uncertain to any
one who holds it, nor will any one be better
able to free himself from the almost unalterable
necessity of adopting it for his own, because he
knows why he lies under this necessity. Among
truly religious men there never have been zeal
ots, enthusiasts, or fanatics for this conception ;
and, so far as by atheism is meant, as is often
the case, nothing more than a shrinking back
* Reden liber die Religion, p. 138.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 39
from it, and doubt concerning it, a truly pious
man will regard the charge with great tran
quillity."* But, it may be asked, does not the passage
at least prove, that Schleiermacher, at the time
of writing it, regarded the doctrine of the im
mortality of the soul, in the common sense of
the words, as an essential doctrine of religion ?
I answer, that Schleiermacher, by the term,
" the everlasting life of the soul," expresses a
conception, which would never enter the mind
of a reader unacquainted with his use of it.
Religion, according to him, consisting in the
renouncing of personality and the blending of
the individual with the One and All, the pious
man, in his union with the Infinite and Eternal,
enjoys while on earth everlasting life ; and this
notion of everlasting life he puts in direct con
trast with that commonly entertained.
" I believe," he says in his Discourses, "that
I have fully set before you the manner in
which every pious person bears about in himself
an unchangeable and eternal existence. For
when our feeling cleaves to nothing individual,
but embraces as its sole object our relation to
God, in which all that is individual and perish
able is swallowed up, then is there nothing
Ibid., p. 117.

40 REMARKS
perishable in it, but only what is eternal ; and
it may truly be said, that the religious life is
that in which we have already sacrificed and
renounced all that is mortal, and actually enjoy
immortality. But the manner in which most
men conceive of immortality, and their longing
after it, appear to me irreligious, and directly
contrary to the spirit of piety. Nay, their wish
to be immortal has no other ground than an
aversion to what is the aim of religion." The
'great aim of religion, he goes on to say, (as I
formerly explained his doctrine,) is the divesting
ourselves of our personality, and the becoming
one with the Infinite. But those, he proceeds,
who receive the common doctrine of immortal^
ity, struggle against this ; " they are anxiously
concerned about their personality ; and thus, far
from being willing to seize their only opportuni
ty to rise superior to it, — that afforded them by
death, — they are anxious how they shall take
it with them beyond this life ; and aspire, at
most, for eyes of wider vision and better limbs.
But God speaks to them, as it is written, ' He
who loses his life for my sake shall save it, and
he who would save it shall lose it.' The life
which they would preserve is one not to be
preserved." — "The more they long after an
immortality which is none, and which they are

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 41
not even capable of conceiving, (for who can
succeed in the effort to represent to himself an
existence in time as eternal ?) the more they
lose of that immortality which they might ever
possess, and lose with it this mortal life, by in
dulging thoughts, that cause vain anxiety and
distress."* — "The aim and character of a re-
* Schleiermacher, as I have said, knew how to mock with some
lip-phrase ; and, conformably to this, he here introduces a pas
sage, which it is proper to quote.
" He who has learned to be more than himself, knows that he
loses little, when he loses himself. Only he, who, thus re
nouncing himself, has become blended, as far as in his power,
with the whole Universe, and in whose soul a greater and holier
desire has sprung up, — only he has a right to, and only with
him may there really be, any further discourse of those hopes
which death gives us, and of the immortality to which we may
infallibly raise ourselves through it."
It would be idle to inquire, what hopes and what immortality
Schleiermacher would hold out to a being whose personal exist
ence is to cease with death.
An expression which I have used above, in connexion with
the whole subject, brings to my mind a passage of touching
beauty from a late poem.
" Is it a boon, when Dissolution's strife
Hangs — trembling — o'er the bed of Child or Wife,
And the fond Sufferer turns amid her pain,
And looks, and strives to say, ' We meet again ; '
Is it a boon to stand in anguish by,
And meet with some lip-phrase that clinging eye,
While the sad Skeptic Heart makes no reply ?
Or, bending o'er the tomb to which she sank,
Present to feel — and Future — one mere Blank ! "
Kenton's Rhymed Plea for Tolerance,
6

42 REMARKS
ligious life is not such an immortality, as many
wish for and believe in ; — or, perhaps, only pre
tend to believe in ; for their desire to know too
much of it makes their belief very suspicious ; —
not that immortality which is out of time and
after time, or rather only after the present time,
yet still in time ; but the immortality which al
ready, in this temporal life, we may immediately
possess, and which is a problem, in the solution
of which we are continually engaged. In the
midst of fiuiteness to become one with the In
finite, and to be eternal in every moment, —
that is the immortality of religion." *
Such is the conclusion of one of Schleier
macher's Discourses on Religion. In his note
upon the passage I have quoted, he says, " I
wish nothing more, than that every man may see
himself not only divested of all the foreign ap
parel, for which he is indebted to the outward
circumstances of life, but also after having laid
aside these pretensions to an endless existence,
in order that he may determine, when he re
gards himself such as he really is, whether
these pretensions be any thing more, than such
a title as the Mighty of the Earth often deck
themselves with, to countries which they have
never possessed, nor will possess." t
* Reden iiber die Religion, pp. 118 - 121. + Ibid., p. 141.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 43
This last extract occurs about half a dozen
lines before the passage of Schleiermacher,
which is quoted in the pamphlet to prove that
he cherished the Christian's hope of immortality.
Alike deceptive with the paragraph on which
I have remarked, is another, in which the writ
er of the pamphlet professes to give a general
account of Schleiermacher's opinions respect
ing Christianity.
" According to Schleiermacher, the revelation of God
in nature, and in the human soul, is only a preparation
for a perfect revelation through Christ. The purpose of
God in the creation of man is completed in the Christian
revelation. This is a new, original communication of
divine truth, a fresh manifestation of the divine life in the
person and works of Jesus Christ. He is appointed by
God to be the Redeemer of the world ; hence he needed
not redemption himself; and, agreeably to the universal
doctrine of the Church, was originally distinguished from
all other men, and endowed with divine power from his
birth." — p. 142.
After the explanations already given of
Schleiermacher's opinions, and the proofs that
have been set forth, of the manner in which the
pamphlet is written, it is not necessary to go to
any length in remarking upon this paragraph. It
may be sufficient to compare it with what has
been already said. But I will add a few more
illustrations of Schleiermacher's opinions. The
passage naturally conveys the impression, that

44 REMARKS
he believed in the Christian revelation in the
common sense of the words ; in a miraculous
revelation of God, through Christ, of the fun
damental truths of religion. With this impres
sion, may be compared the following passages
from him.
" What is a miracle ? " " A miracle is but
the religious name for an event. Every one,
the most natural and the most common, if it be
of such a character, that it may be prevailingly
viewed under a religious aspect, is a miracle.
To me, all is miracle ; and in your sense, as
meaning something inexp'cable and strange,
only that is a miracle which is none in mine." *
In his note on this passage,! added in the
third edition, he says :
" The expression, that a miracle is but the re
ligious name for an event in general, and thus,
that all that happens is a miracle, may readily
fall under the suspicion of being intended for a
direct denial of any thing miraculous ; for, to
be sure, if every thing is a miracle, then, on
the other hand, nothing is a miracle."
The explanation of Schleiermacher is, that
the distinction between the events which we
call, rind those which we do not call, miracles,
is founded, not on any intrinsic difference, but
* Reden iiber die Religion, p. 105. f Ibid., p. 135.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 45
solely on the manner in which they are regarded
by the human mind ; that, if we regard an event
in immediate relation to the power of God, by
which it is produced, that event is to us a mir
acle ; that, if we regard it as occurring in the
ordinary course of nature, it is not a miracle.
With these views, he says, that, in his " Doc
trines of Faith," " notwithstanding the denial
of absolute [proper] miracles, the religious in
terest in the miraculous is regarded and pro
tected." Revelation, in its religious sense, Schleier
macher explains to mean " every original and
new communication of the universe, and of its
inm'ost life, to man." * He who has not such
revel; tions, " he who does not for himself see
miracles from the point of view whence he con
templates the world," " who does not, in the
most important moments, feel, with the most
vivid conviction, that he is under the control of a
divine spirit, and that he speaks and acts from a
holy inspiration ; or who, at least, (for less than
this is nothing,) is not conscious of his feelings
as immediate influences of the universe, so as to
recognise something peculiar in them that cannot
be from imitation, but is a pledge of their pure
source in his inmost nature, — he has no re-
* Ibid., pp. 105, 106.

46 REMARKS
ligion. To know one's self to be possessed of
this, is the true faith. On the contrary, what
is commonly called faith, the reception of what
another has said or done, the being willing
to think over and feel over again what an
other has thought and felt, is a hard and un
worthy service ; and instead of being, as men
dream, what is h'ghest in religion, must be dis
carded by every one who would penetrate into
its sanctuary. To have and to hold such an im
itative faith proves, that a man is incapable of
religion ; to seek his religion from others proves,
that one does not understand what it is." Men
must " stand on their own feet, go their own
way," and "hearken to themselves," though,
"with the exception of a few, select individuals,
they need a guide and an exciter to awaken
their sense of religion from its first slumber, and
give it its first direction." Being thus awaken
ed, " every one must then see, with his own
eyes, and himself bring a contribution to the
treasures of religion, or he deserves no place in
her kingdom, and has none. Ye are right in
thinking meanly of those poor repeaters of others'
sayings, who derive their religion wholly from
another, or attach themselves to the dead letter
of a book, swear by it, and bring their proofs
from it." *

* Reden iiber die Religion, pp. 107, 108.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 47
I might adduce more to the same purpose.
But what has been quoted can leave no intelli
gent man in doubt concerning Schleiermacher's
opinions. He regarded that as no genuine reli
gion which rests on external support, on faith
in the revelation from God through Christ. The
religious man, according to him, sees miracles
for himself, has his own revelations, and his
own inspiration. He needs no instructer, no
external assurance of truth. Religion cannot
be taught. To seek it from another proves that
one knows not what it is.
I have thus, as far as the occasion required
or admitted, given some account of the opinions
of one, in whose works the writer of the pam
phlet says, that " our studious young men, if
they are inclined to German Rationalism, will
find a corrective ; " * and of whom he adds,
that " there are many who will welcome the
principles of his school as the vital, profound,
and ennobling theology which they have earn
estly sought for, but hitherto sought in vain." f
One more charge of error respecting Schleier
macher remains to be noticed.
In the first note to my Discourse,! I have
» Pamphlet, p. 140. f lb- P- 149. | p. 45.

48 REMARKS
said, incidentally, for the purpose of explaining
a quotation, that " the disciples of the new
school are in Germany called Rationalists or
Naturalists." The term Rationalist occurs no
where else, either in my Discourse, or in the
notes to it. But the author of the pamphlet rep
resents me as having committed an " extraor
dinary error," a " whimsical mistake," in having
classed Schleiermacher with Rationalists or
Naturalists. " He was," says the writer, " a
strenuous advocate of the supernatural origin of
Christianity." *
It is unnecessary to add any thing to the evi
dence already adduced, to show how deceived
a reader would be, who should understand
these words in their ordinary sense and impli
cation. " His whole life," says the writer of the pam
phlet, " was a controversy against the Rational
ist school." The writer quotes Rohr, a Ra
tionalist, to prove his " hatred to Rationalism,"
and Liicke, (whom he calls orthodox,) to show
that it received from him " a deadly wound." f
These statements are adapted to lead the
readers of the pamphlet to suppose, that
Schleiermacher was a strenuous defender of

* Pamphlet, pp. 138, 139. f Ibid., p. 139.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 49
Christianity as a miraculous revelation (in the
proper sense of the words), and a zealous op
ponent of those who denied its claims to divine
authority. The writer would be understood
as using the word Rationalist in its widest
acceptation, as equivalent to Naturalist, (with
which term I connected it,) that is, as denoting
one who, rejecting revelation, founds his faith
on natural religion. But, in the quotations from
Rohr and Liicke, it is used in a restricted sense,
to denote those holding the principles, and re
taining the character, of the earlier German
Rationalists, to whom the name was first given ;
and Schleiermacher's controversy with them
was consistent, as I am about to show, with his
having as little belief as they had in the di
vine authority of our religion.
Speaking of De Wette, the writer of the
pamphlet says :
"I ought not, perhaps, to leave this topic, without
showing the injustice you have been guilty of, in classing
De Wette with the Naturalist school. To do this, I
should need only to adduce passages from almost any one
of his writings ; but I am spared the task, by the careful
and discriminating account of De Wette's theology,
which is already before the public in one of our religious
Journals [The Christian Examiner]." — pp. 153, 154.
Before meeting with this reference, I was not
7

50 REMARKS
aware of the existence of such an account.
But it has been a convenience to me to be re
ferred to it, as affording an undisputed author
ity, and one which, so far as I shall quote it, I
believe to be essentially correct.
De Wette says, as translated in this ar
ticle : *
"It is not long since Jacobi, Fries, and Schleier
macher have discovered this truth, and it is by far from
being universally acknowledged, that faith lies originally
in feeling, is nothing but feeling brought forth into clear
consciousness. These men were the first who pointed
out in the human mind an original principle, a faith or
religious feeling, which precedes every perception of the
understanding, and they therefore assigned to every such
perception a subordinate place. The penetrating Ha-
mann alone had earlier indicated the same principle."
Of the controversy between this school and
that of the earlier Rationalists, De Wette gives
the following account.f
" The opposite party, the Rationalists, most violently
oppose the doctrine of the origin of religion in feeling,
and on the ground, that they deduce every thing in reli
gion from the understanding, and judge all truths by the
understanding merely. They mark our doctrine with
the opprobrious name of Mysticism. We are very well

* Christian Examiner, for May, 1838, p. 155.
t Ibid., p. 163.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 51
satisfied with this name, if it is'taken in its original sig
nification. Mystic means mysterious, sacred to or sig
nificant of him initiated into mysteries, belonging to mys
tery. According to what we deem the just view, there
is in the human mind something dark and mysterious,
accessible only to the faithful heart, and from which the
clear light of the understanding is excluded; this view
may be called Mysticism. In general, every feeling is
mystical, because that as such it cannot be clearly con
ceived of ; a doctrine, therefore, which places religion in
feeling, may be well called mystical. But if those are
called Mystics, who, disinclined to clearness of under
standing, withdraw religion from all free investigation and
scientific treatment, and would surrender themselves ut
terly to obscure feelings, then we justly refuse this epithet,
since we, quite as much as the boasted Rationalists, are
champions of free thinking on all subjects of faith. We
distinguish ourselves from these theologians, in that we
do not, like them, regard the perceptive understanding or
critical intellect as the fountain of religion, nor as the
highest aim of religious culture, but deem it subordinate
to feeling." This was the point at issue between the
" Mystics," including Schleiermacher, and the
earlier Rationalists. But whether religion is to
be founded upon the understanding alone, or
the feelings alone, whether its truths are only
to be reasoned out, or only to be felt out, the
authority of revelation, as teaching the funda
mental facts of religion, is equally rejected.
I have not remarked on every thing in the ac-

52 REMARKS
count of Schleiermacher given in the pamphlet,
that may lead the reader into error; for it
would have been trifling and wearisome to do
so ; but enough, I trust, has been said to show
what degree of confidence may be reposed in
the representations of the writer. In the con
clusion of his account, he quotes various pas
sages from Ullmann, whose religious character
I suppose to be different from that of Schleier
macher, to prove what Schleiermacher believed,
by showing what Ullmann believes. It must
be obvious to every one, that if the writer had
been able to produce any thing to his purpose
from Schleiermacher's own writings, he would
not have had recourse to such indirect evi
dence. I now come to the criticisms of the writer
of the pamphlet on my translations from
De Wette.*
These criticisms he regards as likely to affect
my reputation seriously. He asserts, that in
twenty-one lines, I have committed fourteen
errors ; but, as he specifies only those in four
passages, it is only on them I can remark.
* Pamphlet, pp. 149 seqq.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 53
I.
I translated thus : *
— the essence of what is proposed for reli
gious faith " is not in propositions which are ob
jects of knowledge, but in a pious apprehension
of things, purified and enlightened by knowl
edge." f
The writer of the pamphlet translates : J
— "its essence is not in scientific propositions,
but in the pious consciousness, purified and en
lightened by the influence of science."
Having quoted the words of De Wette as an
example of vague and unmeaning language, I
felt myself bound to translate them into as
plausible English as I could command. It would
have been easy to render the disputed clause
verbally thus :
" The essence of the doctrines of faith does
not consist in scientific propositions, but in a
pious apprehension of things, scientifically pu
rified and enlightened."
And, strange as this sounds in English, I do
* Discourse, pp. 40, 41.
f — « ihr Wesen nicht in wissenschaftlichen Satzen, sondern
in dem wissenschlaftlich gereinigten und erleuchteten frommen
Bewusstseyn besteht."
| Pamphlet, p. 151.

54 REMARKS
not know why the original is not as strange in
German. But in order to preserve the antith
esis with which the sentence concludes, without
the baldness of expression, I substituted for
" scientific propositions," what I supposed to be,
as the words were used, an equivalent term,
" propositions which are objects of knowledge."
Scientific propositions are propositions which are
objects of knowledge; and whether, in changing
one term for the other, I did any injustice to
De Wette, may be judged of by the following
extracts from the article on his theology, before
referred to, in the Christian Examiner.
There are, according to De Wette, " three
modes of conviction of which man is capable, —
Knowledge, Faith, Sentiment.'" " The second
mode of conviction, faith, cannot, like the first,
be called knowledge, without confounding terms,
and designating things opposite by the same
name. It is by rising above worldly knowl
edge, that cannot satisfy us, that we soar to
this lofty faith." As for religious sentiment, " as
soon as it is excited, the reign of actual knowl
edge ceases, the critical intellect should hold
reverent silence." " Faith and sentiment belong
to religion, but positive knowledge is a stran
ger to it." *

* Christian Examiner, for May, 1838 ; pp. 158 - 160.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 55
The account, given in the pamphlet, of the
manner in which the passage translated is
introduced, is altogether a misrepresentation.
The two leading ideas by which it is preceded
are, that " faith, as such, is free from doubt ; "
and that, when " we come to treat of convic
tions concerning what man sees not and yet be
lieves, or supernatural objects of faith, doubts
enough arise which are opposed to faith."
By way of correcting my translation, the
writer of the pamphlet renders the German
word Bewusstsein, " consciousness." The word
has a nebulous meaning, of which that of
" consciousness " forms only the nucleus. It
comprehends, also, the senses of " perception" ;
of " reflection," in its metaphysical use ; of " in
tuition" ; and of " knowledge," in its stricter
sense.* De Wette, in the passage in question,
* Itis defined by Heinsius, in his large Dictionary of the German
language, which I suppose the best, to be " the state in which a
man has knowledge of himself and other things," — " der Zustand,
da man sich seiner und anderer Dinge bewusst ist ; " and in the
Conversations-Lexicon, to be "a knowledge of being," — " Wis-
sen um das Sein." In the latter work, it is said, " The first degree
of knowledge (Bewusstsein) is immediate or sensible knowledge
(Bewusstsein), the perception (Bewusstsein) of objects, and, in
its developement, of the external world;" ''Die erste Stufe des
Bewusstseins ist das unmittelbare oder sinnliche Bewusstsein,
das Bewusstsein der Objecte, und in seiner Ausbildung der
Aussenwelt" Strauss, speaking of the theological system of Horst, one, of those

56 REMARKS
intends by it, I presume, the supposed " feel
ing," or direct perception, of religious truth,
which lies at the foundation of his system.
We have no word in English specifically denot
ing this imaginary faculty, and perhaps the
term I used, " apprehension of things," in the
connexion in which it stands, comes as near
the meaning as any that could have been em
ployed. On the other hand, consciousness de
notes a " knowledge of what passes in one's
own mind," * or a knowledge of the present
state of one's own mind. This has been its
well-settled, and is, I conceive, its only proper
meaning. Taking it in this meaning, it will
appear, that De Wette has not gained in clear
ness or sense by the new translation, which
makes him say, that " the essence of the doc
trines of faith consists in the pious knowledge
of what passes in one's own mind," &c.
I am aware, that in some of the incorrect
writing of the day, the word " consciousness "

symbolical expositions of the history of Christ, which prepared
the way for his own, says, (Das Leben Jesu, II. 760,) " Diese
Ansicht traf zunachst von Seiten des kirchlichen Bewusstseins
der Vorwurf," &c, where Bewusstsein, I suppose, may be repre
sented in English by " conception.'' " On the side of the con
ception of the Church, this view encountered the objection," &c.
* Locke and Johnson.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 57
has before been used in a wide and vague
sense, as it is by the writer of the pamphlet.
This has been caused, I think, by the influ
ence of German speculations and phraseology.
In the German language, as must be evident to
one accustomed to think with precision, the sig
nifications of many words are more unsteady and
uncertain, than in our own, or in the southern
languages of Europe. Their outline is unde
fined and varying. They have not been de
termined to precise meanings by habits of accu
rate usage, and associations long connected with
them. They do not, equally as with us, when
standing in certain relations to other words
and ideas, present invariably and instantane
ously the true sense required by the connexion.
The associations and implications connected
with one signification of a word become con
fused with those connected with another ; and
even significations widely distinct are con
founded together. Thus, to illustrate from the
word immediately before us : — " Conscious
ness," as properly used, implies certain knowl
edge; but Beiousstsein answers, in one of its
meanings, to " consciousness " ; in another, it
is employed, as we have seen, to denote a sup
posed faculty of immediately perceiving the
facts of religion ; and to this supposed faculty,

58 REMARKS
as being denoted by the same name, the idea
of certainty, belonging to the first signification,
is transferred. To take another example,
equally to our purpose : — The same word in
German, Wunder, signifies either a miracle, or
merely a wonder,' & "wonderful natural object
or event " ; and the rejection, by the German
Naturalists, of the miraculous character of Chris
tianity has been facilitated, perhaps, by nothing
more than by the ease with which they could
pass from one of these very distinct meanings
to the other, on account of their being both
expressed by the same word.* But, as I have
formerly remarked, f almost all the words ex
pressive of ideas of revealed religion have ad
mitted of being abused in a similar manner;
and this abuse, as may be seen by such produc
tions as the pamphlet under notice, is making
inroads upon our own language. It is necessary
jealously to guard it ; or its whole meaning in
* I may give one example from the science of metaphysics.
Each of the German words sinnlich and sensual combines the
meanings of "sensible," (that is, "belonging to," or "percepti
ble by the senses,") and of "sensual"; and these two mean
ings have been confounded together. It has been attempted
to introduce into our language the barbarism of using " sensual,"
as if it meant sensible, or founded on the senses ; and we have
heard, in consequence, through a series of errors, of the sensual
philosophy of Locke.
f Discourse, p. 10.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 59
the higher departments of thought will be
broken down, the cultivation and growth of
centuries will be destroyed, and it will be re
duced to a waste, in which the wildest specu
lations may flourish. But this is a digression,
suggesting many thoughts that cannot be pur
sued. I must return to smaller matters.
II.
According to my translation,* De Wette
says :
We should not rest " the truth of Christian
faith, as if it were a duty so to do,\ upon com
mon, naked, historical truth."
According to the writer of the pamphlet :
We should not rest " the truth of Christian
faith upon common, naked, historical truth, as
if it were a legal title.'''' X
This sentence, as every one perceives, is, in
itself, unintelligible. De Wette, as the writer
of the pamphlet remarks, alludes, in the four
words in question, (etwa wie ein recht,) to what
he had said, some pages before, that "the his
torical faith of Christians, according to the old
system, rests on the Bible, very much as the
common civil law is founded on the Corpora
* Discourse, p. 41. f — " etwa wie ein Recht."
t Pamphlet, p. 152.

60 REMARKS
Juris." * His full meaning, therefore, would be
thus expressed : We should not rest the truth
of Christian faith upon common, naked, histor
ical truth ; as if it were the duty of a Christian
to refer to the history of Christianity to settle
his faith, as it is the duty of a lawyer, where
the civil law is in use, to refer to the Corpora
Juris to settle the law. The allusion is of
no importance, and could not have been ex
pressed intelligibly without substituting an
explanation for a proper rendering. The
whole essential meaning of De Wette is given
in my translation. III.
I rendered De Wette, thus : f
The new rational theology must " renounce
what has hitherto been customary, the poor
and unscientific appeal to miraculous evi
dence." %
The writer of the pamphlet translates :
— " renounce the miserable and unscientific
mode of conducting the argument from miracles,
that has hitherto been used." ^
The point made is this ; that the original of
* Pamphlet, p. 152. f Discourse, p. 42.
\ " Insbesondere verzichte sie auf die bisher gewohnliche so
kleinliche und unwissenschaftliche Fiihrung des Wunderbe-
weises."
, § Pamphlet, p. 152.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 61
De Wette, like the latter translation, leaves an
opening for the supposition, that he believed,
that there was some mode of conducting the ar
gument from miracles, that had not " hitherto
been used," or rather, that had not " hitherto
been customary," by which it might be made
available. It did not occur to me, in translat-
ing? that this point would be raised by any one,
or I might have been more scrupulously literal.
A transposition would have saved me from re
mark. If I had rendered thus : — "to renounce
that poor and unscientific appeal to (verbally,
management of,) miraculous evidence which
has hitherto been customary," — my translation
would have had all the verbal ambiguity of the
original. But, whatever equivocal language any
expositor of De Wette may employ, it is unde
niable, that, according to his views, what we
regard as the miraculous evidence of Chris
tianity, is of no value.
The system of De Wette I conceive to be
this. The truths of religion are immediately
perceived or, as he expresses it, felt by the
mind. They need, or rather admit of, no other
evidence than this intuitive perception. This
alone affords that certainty which is necessary
to faith. Faith cannot rest on reasoning, or ex
ternal testimony, or historical knowledge; for

62 REMARKS
all these sources of evidence necessarily involve
doubt. The connexion between faith and his
torical Christianity consists in the fact, that the
influence and spirit of those truths, which are
internally perceived by faith, were perfectly de
veloped in Christ, the pattern, or model, man,
the God-man ; who founded a community to
which he transmitted that influence and spirit,
and in which they have continued to be devel
oped. His history is properly no object of reli
gious faith. No new warranty of those truths
is given by their having been taught by him.
The earlier Christians did not believe them for
this reason.* The outline of his history is
true ; but, as regards the accounts in the Gos
pels, there is much that is questionable, when
critically examined. These accounts are to be
regarded rather morally and spiritually, than in
their literal meaning. They are to be viewed
as symbolical of the ideal in religion, by which

* Speaking of the earliest times of Christianity, he says: "The
warranty of these truths did not consist in their having been
taught by Christ; for how seldom does the Apostle Paul appeal
to the declarations of Christ." "A properly historical knowledge
and examination of what Christ may have taught belonged not
at all to the conditions of the original Christian faith.'' The last
sentence is distinguished as emphatic by the mode of printing in
the original. — See the article by De Wette, in Ullmann and
Umbreit's Journal, (formerly quoted by me,) pp. 143, 144.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 63
De Wette seems generally to mean the universal
truths of religion, or what relates to them. The
accounts may thus have abstract truth without
historical reality ; and, apart from all inquiry
into their authenticity, may serve for spiritual
edification. The ascription of a symbolical
character to the Gospel history is a distin
guishing characteristic of the opinions of De
Wette ; and, in adopting and applying this
principle, he is one of the writers who have
prepared the way for the extravagances of
Strauss, of which I formerly made some men
tion.* Agreeably to this theory, the mira
cles of Christ, whether true or not, may be re
garded as symbolical. They may be resolved
into the ideal.
" The original, innocent belief in miracles," f
says De Wette, " was nothing but a branch of
the moral faith, that a man with purer, diviner
power of spirit and life, the pure, ideal man had
appeared, — a faith that needed not for its as
surance any speculative historical proof, but
simply the practical proof from the excitement
and direction of life received from him." J
I quote another connected passage of some
* Discourse, pp. 46, 47.
¦j- " Der urspriingliche, unschuldige Wunderglaube."
\ Article by De Wette, (before quoted.) p. 145.

64 REMARKS
length, which it would be easy to compress, but
which it may be more satisfactory to have in
his own words.
" The historical circumstances immediately
connected with the death of Christ were but
incidental, and were believed more on account
of their inward significance, than on account of
the outward phenomenon, which, beside, did
not demand historical investigation. This was
more demanded by the fact of the Resurrection,
as being in the highest degree marvellous and
incomprehensible. Is one disposed to a physi
cal investigation of it, the question arises re
specting the possibility of such a fact, which
breaks in upon our theoretical knowledge of the
relations of nature. Thus it is known what a
stumbling-block it has been in our times ; so
that the credibility of the event has been sub
jected to a strict examination, and attempts
have been made to prove or disprove its possi
bility according to the laws of physiology. To
this investigation, the first Christians were not
disposed ; and there are no clear traces, that
doubts concerning this wonderful fact were
openly avowed, and became a subject of atten
tion. Manifestly in the view of the Apostles,
the ideal aspect of it was, sometimes at least,
the prevailing one, and always a principal con-

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 65
sideration. It is known, that the apostle Paul
so closely connects the truth of our own resur
rection with that of Christ's resurrection, that
they must stand or fall together. But if we
receive the resurrection of Christ as a physical,
historical fact, there is, according to this doc
trinal view, so important a difference between
it and the general resurrection hoped for, that
this connexion ceases to be tenable. For, ac
cording to the clear accounts in the Gospels,
the body of Christ, after his resurrection, was
of an earthly, tangible nature, so that he even
took food. But we cannot ascribe such a body
to those who rise from the dead, without fall
ing into the grossest contradictions ; and Paul
himself did not conceive of the body that was
to rise as so material. Thus it is clear, that
the Apostle regarded the fact of Christ's res
urrection, apart from any consideration of the
physical, historical How, as a pledge of the
ideal truth, that we shall rise from the dead,
and consequently more under its ideal than real
aspect. Accordingly, nothing more remains for
pure Christian faith, than that, in the historical
experiences of the Apostle concerning Jesus,
there was an event which appeared to him
the realization of the truth of the future
resurrection of the good, — a truth which be-
9

6Q REMARKS
fore had been believed only ideally, but was
now apprehended really* The inquiry, what
was the character of this fact, as regards its
physical and historical relations, does not prop
erly belong to the province of Christian
faith." f
I suppose every intelligent reader is satisfied,
that I did no injustice to De Wette, in repre
senting him as rejecting the miraculous evi
dence of Christianity. It would be inconsis
tent, not only with his views of the accounts
of miracles in the Gospels, but with what is
fundamental in his system, to believe him to
attach any value to those accounts, as affording
proof of the facts on which religion is founded.
The writer of the pamphlet, however, says :
" You make him say, that the argument from miracles
should be renounced ; he actually says, that it should
not be conducted in the miserable and unscientific mode
that has been usual. The importance of this is deeply felt
by many theologians beside De Wette. Still they value
the miracles, when presented in their true light. They
would not renounce all appeal to the evidence derived
from them. Neither would De Wette. His writings are
full of examples to show the power with which the Divin
ity of Christ is illustrated by his miracles." — pp. 152,
153. * — " der vorher nur ideal geglaubten, nun real gefassten
Wahrheit." f Ibid., pp. 146, 147.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 67
In the last sentence, the word " illustrated "
occurs, where the purpose of the argument ap
pears to require " proved " ; but the writer, I
suppose, was aware, that the latter word could
not be correctly used. Miracles, symbolized
into the ideal, may illustrate any thing, but
can prove nothing. The short preceding sen
tence, according to which, De Wette " would
not renounce all appeal to miraculous evi
dence,'''' seems to have been more carelessly
written, if it is to be understood in the com
mon sense of the words. IV.
" The last office of the new Rational the
ology," says De Wette, according to" my trans
lation,* " is to make the might of the commu
nity of Christians again effective, and to plant
faith in living power in the living life."
This is explained by the following passages
in the article quoted. The main thing, ac
cording to De Wette, in historical Christian
ity, " manifestly is, that Christ, the central
point or author of a new, holy, blessed life, a
man furnished with all the qualities necessary
for the work of salvation and redemption, as

* Discourse, p. 42.

68 REMARKS
wisdom, spiritual power, purity, and union
with God, or, in other words, the God-man,
truly lived, worked, founded a new and holy
community, and bequeathed to it his divine
spirit" *
" The Christian should not believe in the
Bible, but in Christ. He should not learn his
convictions from a book, but win them with a
lively inspiration in life and through life. The
reigning spirit in the Church, the faith that pre
vails in it, the warm vital breath of love that
divells in it, should seize upon and penetrate
whoever enters it as a member. The Bible
should, indeed, be used and read, but not that
faith may be properly founded upon it, or first
derived from it." f
I add one quotation from the account of De
Wette in " The Christian Examiner." J
" The kingdom of God, as a purely holy and
blessed community of spirit, began at the mo
ment when Christ, as a divine intelligence and
sinless man, was recognised as the begin
ning and head of this kingdom, and those ac
knowledging him gathered in faith and love
around his person. And what Christ did for
* Article by De Wette, before quoted, p. 143.
t Ibid., p. 149. \ For September, 1838 ; p. 17.

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 69
the foundation of his kingdom on earth consists
in this, that he established this moral and reli
gious community, through which ihe Eternal
Spirit is realized upon earth. This community
is in will and deed ; and has no other form
than life itself, and an historical connexion
with its founder."
The words which I rendered as before given,
are thus translated and commented on by the
writer of the pamphlet.
" De Wette actually says, that ' an improved theology
should restore the importance of Christian communion
and plant faith in its vital power in actual life.'
" The ordinances of the church have fallen into unmer
ited neglect ; an improved theology would give them a
new significance ; excite a deeper interest in their ob
servance ; and restore them to their place in the con
cerns of life, and the affections of Christians. This is a
favorite idea with De Wette, and one surely which calls
for no very severe condemnation." — p. 153.
I suppose, that from this translation and
comment most readers, unacquainted with the
German, may have received the impression,
that by the word (Gemeinschaft) which I have
translated " community," and he has translated
"communion," is meant the communion of
our Lord's Supper. They will, therefore, be

70 REMARKS
surprised to learn, what every one acquainted
with the German knows, that the word has
not that meaning ; that the writer of the pam
phlet does not suppose it to have that mean
ing ; and that the passage has no more refer
ence to the ordinances of the Church"' than it
appears to have in my translation. It is im
possible to say, therefore, what representation
he would directly oppose to my translation of
the passage, which I have already explained
and justified.

I have now, I believe, said all that is neces
sary to defend myself against the charges of
error brought against me ; and in the Prelimi
nary Observations, I have taken notice of every
thing else in the pamphlet which seemed to
me to deserve consideration. It has appeared in
those observations, that what there is relating
to the main subject of my Discourse is founded
upon an entire misconception of the state of the
argument. Should the writer of the pamphlet
attempt a reply to what I have said, perhaps
I may remark on it ; for circumstances which
I cannot foresee may render it proper for me
to do so ; but at present I think it very im-

ON A LATE PAMPHLET. 71
probable that I shall. The expositions which I
have made in these Remarks, though relating to
subjects not familiar to most men's thoughts, are
such, I believe, as may be fully understood by
every intelligent reader. Whatever represen
tations, therefore, the writer of the pamphlet
may hereafter bring forward, or whatever con
fidence he may assume, every such reader can
judge of the degree of credit to which he is
entitled ; and, should I take no further no
tice of what he may affirm or imply, no one
will suppose in consequence, that I admit its
correctness. I should regret exceedingly, if the irrel
evant topics, that occupy the greater part
of these pages, should become blended with
the consideration of the momentous subject
which I endeavoured to treat in the Dis
course, on which the writer of the pam
phlet remarks. In that Discourse, I wrote as
a Christian, feeling the inestimable value of
Christianity as a divine revelation, — not in
the sense of those who may quibble andv say,
that this, or that, or every thing, is a rev
elation of God, — but in the true sense in
which a Christian uses the words. This,
however, is not the place to resume the sub-

72 REMARKS ON A LATE PAMPHLET.
ject, and I have only to repeat my hope, that
attention may not be diverted from it by the
incidental discussion that has arisen out of
what I have written concerning it.

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