HHH^^HHBHHHBBpBHBHHIHBiHil^Hi Goodwin, Daniel fi. Syllabus of Lectures on Systernatit Divinity. ... S Philadelphia, 1875. YAiLE-'VMnivEiasinnr- SYLLABUS OF LECTURES SYSTEMATIC DIVINITY. APOLOGETIC S, AHD ON THE CANON, INSPIEATION, AND SUFFICIENCY OF HOLY SCRIPTURE. DANIEL E. GOODWIN, CHURCH OF THE HOLY TRINITY PROFESSOR IN THE DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH, IN PHILADELPHIA. PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE STUDENTS:— NOT PUBLISHED. PHILADELPHIA: GAXTON PRESS OF SHERMAN # CO. 187 5. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875, By DANIEL R. GOODWIN, In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D C. SYLLABUS DR. GOODWIN'S LECTURES SYSTEMATIC DIYINITY. CONTENTS. INTRODUCTORY. General Definition, Defence, History, Distribution, etc., PAGE . 1 THEOLOGY PEOPEE, OE THE DOCTEINE CONCEENING GOD. i. Existence of God, ii. Definition of God, ... iii. Attributes of God. (a.) Natural, " " (B.) Moral, . . . 8 iv. Providence Of God, ... ... .15 v. Unity of God, . . . .21 vi. The Trinity, . ... ... 22 A. Intimations in the Old Testament, . . .23 B. Eevelation in the New Testament, ... .24 (i.) That there are three in the unity of the Godhead, . . 24 (ii.) That the Father is God, .24 (iii.) That the Son is God, . . . . .24 (iv.) That the Holy Ghost is God, ... 25 0. The " three " are one and the same God, . . . 25 D. The " three " are Distinct Persons, . . . 26 E. The Procession of the Holy Ghost, . . 28 P. Summary and Dogmatic Conclusions, . 31 G. History of Trinitarianism, ... . .33 H. Errors to be guarded against, . . 36 ADDENDUM— ANGELOLOGY. Angelology Proper — The Holy Angels, Demonology — The Fallen Angels, 37 39 Vl CONTENTS. II. CHEISTOLOGY, OE THE DOCTEINE CONCEENING THE MEDIATOE. PAGE i. The Messiahship, 43 ii. The Logos, . . 44 iii. The Sonship — Eternal Generation, . . '. 46 iv. The Incarnation — Two Natures, One Person, . ... 47 v. The Passion, Death, Burial, and Descent into Hades, . 49 vi. The Eesurrection, Ascension, and Coming Again, . . 51 vii. The Sinlessness of Christ, . ..... 51 viii. The Two "Wills in Christ (in the two natures), ... 52 ix. The Unity of Consciousness in Christ (in the one person), 52 x. The Importance of Christology, .... 53 xi. Errors to be guarded against, ... .53 Athanasian Creed (the Christological p*brtion), . ... 54 III. ANTHEOPOLOGY, OE THE DOCTEINE CONCEENING MAN. i. Man's Original State, .... . . .54 1. His Origin, ....... 54 2. His Nature and Constitution, . . 55 3. His Destination, .... .56 4. His Likeness to God, . . .56 5. Primitive State and Condition, . 58 6. Propagation of the Human Eace, . . .59 7. The Gift of Immortality, ... 60 ii. Man in his Pall, ... ... .61 A. Nature and Origin of Sin, . . 61 B. The Pall, 63 Interpretations of the Mosaic Account, . . 63 1. The Allegorical, . . .63 2. The Mythical, .... .63 3. The simply Literal and Physical, . 63 4. The Literal, but Symbolical and Moral, . 64 Notes, 1-5, . 65 iii. Man's Present, Natural State, . 66 A. Original Sin, or Native Depravity, 66 1. How transmitted, ......... 66 Not (1) by imputation, nor (2) by the arbitrary act of God, but (3) by propagation, 66 2. What it consists in. Not Adam's sin, but ours, . . .70 3. History of the Doctrine of Original Sin, . . . .71 CONTENTS. Vll PAGE 4. Article 9, and Scripture Proof, under five points, . . .73 Notes, 1, 2, 76 B. Actual Sins .77 1. Consciousness of Sin universal, ...... 77 2. Eeveal Original Sin 78 3. Actual Sins, in relation to (a) knowledge, (6) conscience, (c) will, (d) external circumstances, . . .78 4. All Sin proceeds from the heart, . . . ^. 78 5. Degrees of Sin ... 78 6. Moral Eule for their determination, . ... 78 7. Religious Eule, 78 8. Sin against the Holy Ghost, . . ... 79 C. Pree "Will, or Man's Spiritual Impotence, . 79 1. History of the Doctrine, 1-14, 79 2. The Tenth " Article of Eeligion " discussed and proved from Scripture, 82 (1) Man's Natural Helplessness such that he cannot, in his own strength, turn to God ; the slavery of Sin, . . 82 (2) The operation of Divine Grace (a) preventing, (4) co-op erating, . 84 Notes, 1, 2, 3, .... ... 84 IV. SOTEEIOLOGY, OE THE PLAN AND PEOCESS OP HUMAN SALVATION. The relation of God the Pather to human salvation, 88 1. He is its original, absolute source, .... . 88 2. This to be remembered in Christian instruction, . 88 . The relation of God the Son to human salvation, 89 Introductory, . . 89 (1) He is the only Saviour of men 89 (2) Different Dispensations — preparatory, . .89 (3) "Whether any Heathen may be saved (a)-(A), . . 90 1. "What Christ is to us — to all men, 92 (1) The Saviour, (2) the "Way— our Mediator, (3) the Life, (4) the Truth, . . 92 2. "What Christ does for us — his offices and work, . . .94 (1) He is our Prophet, and in what sense, . . . 94 (2) He is our High Priest, making atonement, ... 95 (a) His atonement is made by the offering of himself, . . 95 (6) His atonement has an objective relation and efficacy — rec onciles God to us, 95 (c) It has a subjective efficacy — reconciles us to God, . . 96 (d) Christ's atonement is vicarious, ...... 96 Vlll CONTENTS. (e) In its special fulfilment and application, spiritual and heavenly, ......... 97 (/) Sacrifice on the cross, final, once for all, ... 97 (g) In its design the atonement is universal, .... 97 (h) Effectual only for believers, 97 (i) Objectively, completely effected by Christ's intercession, . 97 (j) Subjectively, effected by the work of the Spirit, . . 98 Notes, 1, 2, 3, 4, 98 (3) Christ is our King, . . 99 iii. The relation of God, the Holy Ghost, to human salvation, . . 100 iv. Predestination and Election, ..... . . 100 1. Not exclusively a Christian doctrine ; what this is, . 100 2. The different Notions analyzed — a, b, c, 100 3. Their various Historical Combinations — a, b, c, d, . 101 4. History to Augustine, . . 101 5. History from Augustine to the Eeformation, . 102 6. Doctrine of the Eeformers, .... . . 102 7. Interpretation to our Article (17th), . . 103 (1) As to the end, 103 (2) As to the moving cause, ..... . 103 (3) Cause of election the crucial test between Calvanistic and Arminian theories, . 103 (4) Is Ecclesiasticism the true interpretation ? . . . . 104 (5) The article not intended to teach Arminianism, . . 105 (6) Contains nothing inconsistent with Calvinistic theory, . 105 (7) The doctrine a source of comfort and of danger, . . 106 (8) To be taught purely as a Scripture doctrine, . . 106 (9) The Practical takes precedence of the Theoretical, . . 106 8. Scripture Proofs, 106 (a) The end of the election, everlasting life, .... 106 (6) The cause, God's mere good pleasure, 107 (c) The elect are called, and obey the calling, .... 109 (d) The final perseverance of the elect, a fact, . . . 109 (e) No positive decree of reprobation , 110 Notes. 1. God's universal foreordination — a philosophical dogma — not the proper shaping principle for all Christian Theology, . . 110 2. Philosophical necessity akin to Pantheism, Ill 3. Possible solution, and escape, Ill 4. Predestinatibn and Poreknowledge^their order logical, and not chronological, Ill 5. The Calvinist's logical advantage criticized, .... 112 6. The Arminian's ^wacificaZ advantage criticized, .... 112 7. In prayer all are Augustinians 113 8. Moral helplessness consistent with moral accountability, . . 113 9. The absurdity of supposing the saving grace given to all to fur nish the ground of man's accountability, .... 114 CONTENTS. IX 10. The Scriptures teach that the saved are saved by grace ; whether the lost have the same grace or not, they do not teach, . 115 11. The two Scripture principles to be harmonized, .... 115 12. Their reconciliation runs up into the mystery of the relation of the infinite and finite, 116 v. Justification, Paith, Good "Works A. Justification, . . .... 1. History of the Doctrine (1)-(14), . 2. Scripture evidence of the meaning of the term 3. Objection answered, .... 4. Justification positive as well as negative, 5. Scripture proofs that it is for Christ's merits, 6. Christ's active and passive obedience, . 7. Paith the instrumental cause of justification, 8. Is justification an act or a state? . 9. The causes of justification, . B. Paith, Introductory Statements ; the question, "What is Christian faith 1. Christian faith is an act of the understanding, 2. Christian faith is an act of the soul, of the heart. 3. Christian faith is an act of the life, 4. Christian faith is an act of religious observance, Notes, 1. The order of elements not essential, 2. Each involves the others, 3. No precise degree of completeness or proport 4. Smallest modicum of either not assignable, 5. All must exist, at least in germ, . 6. " Terms of Salvation " discussed, . " Assurance of Paith " discussed, . "Assurance of Salvation" belongs to hope, Christian Hope described — its office, its object, its foun dation, its security, .... . Good Works, ... ... 1. The consequence, not the cause, of justification, 2. Have no merit, . . . 3. In Christ are acceptable to God — a, b, c, 4. Plow necessarily from faith, . . ... 5. Peed and strengthen faith, .... 6. No good works without faith ; Objections ; Proofs, 7. No merit de congruo in such works, .... 8. They have the nature of sin, ..... 9. No works of supererogation ; History; Objections; Proofs All men, even, 10. The regenerate sin; Proof; Objections — a, b, a, d, e, . B 7. 9. 116116116 119119,120120120 120 121 121 121 121122122122 123 123123 123123123123 124 124124124125125125 125 125 125 125 125 126126 127 CONTENTS. 11. Sins committed after justification may be forgiven ; History ; Meaning of Deadly Sin; Proofs — a-d ; Objections; Falling from grace finally — a-e, ..... 12. The final Judgment according to works — (l)-(4), vi. Eegeneration and Sanctification, . . : . 1. Subjective work of grace needed by all, 2. The Spirit works by means, 3. Exerts his power naturally and supernaturally, using the truth as his instrument, 4. The two parts — Eegeneration and Sanctification, 5. Eegeneration described, ..... 6. Further described — universally needed, 7. Diverse in different cases — infants, 8. Symbolized in Baptism, but not inseparable from it, 9. Proof text of the whole doctrine, 10. Sanctification but a carrying out of Eegeneration, 11. How this work is carried on, .... 12. Errors to be guarded against, 13. Importance, ...... 14. Other works of the Spirit. . . . . 15. Scripture full of the Spirit's work, 16. To be preached, ....... 17. The doctrine of " perfect sanctification " discussed, 128130 130130 130 131 132 132132132132 133 133133 133 134134 13* 134 134 V. ECCLESIOLOGY. General Introduction, ... 136 i. The Church. 1. An integral part of the Divine economy, .... 136 2. Invisible or visible, ......... 136 3. The Church visible taken as distinguished from the Ministry and Sacraments, ... ... . 136 4. Importance of the external in religion, . . . 136 5. The Church's perpetuity, .... ... 136 6. The Church's extension, . ...... 136 7. The Church's comprehension — four Notes : Unity, Catholicity, Apostolicity, Holiness, ........ 137 Particular Churches — their boundaries — their two marks (Art. 19) 139 Church polity an attribute of particular Churches, not of the Church Catholic as such, 141 No salvation out of the Church — how to be understood, . 142 Three important distinctions in regard to the Church, . . 142 8. 10.11. CONTENTS. XI 12. Infallibility belongs to no particular individual or Church ; nor yet to the Church Catholic, either as a body or in General Council, 142 13. The Church of the 19th Article, 143 14. Declarations of the Articles on the Church's fallibility, . . 144 15. "The Authority of the Church;" that is, of the particular national Church, 144 16. Holy Scripture the only supreme and infallible rule, . 144 17. Eeferences, 144 The Ministry, 144 A. Design of the Ministry, ... ... 144 1. For what appointed, .... ... 144 2. The institution of the three orders, Public Worship and Sacraments, 144 3. The distinctive duties of the three orders, . . . 145 B. The constitution of the Ministry, 146 1. Instituted by Christ in the persons of the Apostles, . 146 2. Constituted after the pattern of the Synagogue, . . 146 3. Succession continued to the Eoformation, . . . 146 4. The Episcopal Ministry valid 147 5. The only Ministry allowed in the preface to the Ordinal, . 147 6. No Pope or visible supreme head included in the Scriptural idea of the Ministry, ... ... 147 7. Christ the only High Priest — the only Mediator, . . . 147 C. The Validity of the Ministry, 148 Two Branches, 1. Efficaciousness (l)-(6), ... .... 148 2. Rightfulness or Lawfulness (l)-(6), ..... 149 . The Sacraments, 152 A. The Sacraments in general, ... . 152 1. Instituted by Christ himself, .... . . 152 2. In what sense necessary to salvation, ..... 152 3. Sacraments analyzed — after Art. 25, . . 152 4. Do they confer or originate faith? 152 5. Does an inward change in the unconscious infant accompany baptism? 153 6. God works invisibly by his word also, . . . . . 153 7. How the operation of Sacraments differs from that of the word, 153 8. Sacraments are never a mere opus operaium, . . . 153 9. They are channels or conduits of grace only in a figurative • sense, ........ . 154 10. They are not so much "tremendous mysteries" as loving memorials and symbols of Christ and his redemption ; New Testament use of the word " mystery," . . . 154 11. Two elements in the idea of a Sacrament, the outward and the inward, but ordinarily the outward sign alone is had in mind ; the Catechism contains both views, . . 155 Xll CONTENTS. PAGE 12. The two views reconciled, 155 13. How, in usage, what properly belongs to the outward sign came to be transferred to the thing signified, . . . .155 14. What is essential to the external Sacrament, . . . 156 15. In what sense the " grace of Sacraments " is tied to the re ception of Sacraments, . . .... 156 16. Origin of the term "Sacrament," . . ... 157 17. Efficacy of Sacraments not dependent upon the character of the Minister . 157 B. Baptism, .... ...... 157 1. Its original idea is found in the baptism of adults, 157 2. Baptism analyzed — Art. 27, . 158 3. Points of dispute and of general agreement distinguished, . 158 4. Meaning of the term " Eegeneration " — history of its usage ; the whole discussed under six heads, .... 158 5. Eegeneration, in the sense of an inward, spiritual change, does not ordinarily take place at the moment either of adult or of infant baptism, ... . . 160 6. Dictum of the House of Bishops in 1871, .... 161 7. How reconciled with the expressions of the Liturgy, . . 161 8. The sponsorial system explained and defended, . . . 162 9. Grace actually given is not of necessity simultaneously re ceived and enjoyed, ....... 162 10. More faith and more faithfulness would solve all mysteries, 163 11. Baptismal grace as a seed or germ — true only in a, figurative sense, or of the promised presence of the Holy Ghost — not Scriptural, . 163 12. Is an actual, inward, moral or spiritual change in the hearts of unconscious infants possible, otherwise than as a proper miracle ? discussed, ..... f . . 164 13. Baptism is the Sign or Sacrament of spiritual regeneration ; its relation to repentance, faith, and justification, . . 165 14. What is meant by original sin being forgiven in infant baptism, ........ . 165 15. Baptism of Infants, 166 (1) It is in anywise to be (a) retained as an established cus tom, and (6) as most agreeable with Christ's institution, 166 (2) Scripture Argument : (a) Naturally presumed by the early Christians, with their Jewish associations ; (6) not for bidden in Scripture ; (c) implied in principle, if not in form and fact, in our Lord's words, " Suffer the little children, "etc. ; {d) Household Baptism in Scripture; (e) Objection from "believers' baptism," . . . 166 (3) Historical Argumeut for infant baptism, . . . 168 (4) Baptism of infants dying, . . ... 169 (5) Special objections answered, .... . 169 CONTENTS. xiii PAGE 16. The Mode of Baptism, 170 (1) What is essential, . . 170 (2) One Church's mode ; dipping or pouring, . . . 170 (3) Mode of Primitive and Eastern and Western Churches, 170 (4) Pouring not condemned by either, . . . 170 (5) First denied by Anabaptists in the 16th century, . . 170 (6) Immersion as the only mode cannot be proved from Scrip ture 170 (7) Baptism not into but with water, 171 (8) Baptism does not mean " immersion " ex vi termini, . 171 (9) Immersion difficult to suppose in some cases, . . .172 (10) Classical usage of j&wtj'j'm, 172 , (11) Spiritual significance, not quantity of water, the main thing, . . 172 C. The Lord's Supper, 172 1. Proper names of this Sacrament, ... . 172 2. Doctrine of our Church, the " Reformed," . . . 172 3. She holds the Calvinist doctrine of the real spiritual presence, not the Zwinglian or Eomish or Lutheran, . . . 173 4. This explained; real, not imaginary; spiritual, not bodily, 173 5. Presence not in the elements, but in the soul, . . 173 6. Absurd talk about the " hyper-physical," etc. ; several state ments of Hooker cited, 173 7. Statements of Augustine, etc., 174 8. Article 4; and final note to English Communion office re ferred to, ........ 174 9. Presence through the hypostatic union explained and re stricted ; not of body, as such; a presence of special mani festation and efficacy only, ..... 176 10. The Sacrament refers to the body broken and the blood shed, rather than to a spiritual body, . ... 177 II. Our Communion is with Christ's person, while we remember, and enjoy the effects of, his sacrifice, .... 177 12. At the Institution, " the body " was not yet either broken or glorified, . 177 13. Questions for believers in an external presence, . . . 177 14. "Feeding on Christ by faith " explained; may be without the Sacrament, .178 15. The inward and the outward not necessarily conjoined ; the body and blood "given, taken, and received only in a heavenly and spiritual manner;" not received by the wicked, therefore, 178 16. The " opus operatum " in either Sacrament overthrows its nature ; Transubstantiation an absurdity — shown atlarge, 179 17. The Holy Communion not a Sacrifice, . . . 181 (1) Proved from Scripture, .... . . 181 XIV CONTENTS. PAGE (2) Proved from the Language of the Church, . . . 181 (3) Various Sacrifices recognized, but figurative, . . . 181 (4) " The Oblation " not a Sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ, 181 (5) Use of the word "Altar," 181 (6) Origin and History of the word " Priest;" used by our Church for Presbyter, 182 (7) Caution needed in using these words, Sacrifice, Altar, Priest, 183 18. Why Baptism and the Lord's Supper are the only Sacra ments ; the other five Eites considered, . . . 183 (1) Confirmation, . ... .183 (2) Penance, . . ... . . 183 (3) Orders, ... 183 (4) Matrimony, . . 183 (5) Extreme Unction, . . . . . 183 APPENDIX. 1. Certain General Principles of Ecclesiastical Polity, . . . 184 2. Historical Development, and the idea of the National Church, . . 184 3. The Unity of the Church in the United States, 185 VI. BSCHATOLOGY. This part is not yet ready for the press. Its contents will be given with the text, when printed. AUTHOEITY— THE HOLY SCBIPTUKES. REFERENCES. I. 1. The Creeds. 2. The 39 Articles. II. 1. Pearson on the Apostles' Creed. 2. Bull on the Nicene Creed. 3. Waterland on the Athanasian Creed. III. 1. Burnett on the 39 Articles. 2. Beveridge on the 39 Articles. 3. Browne on the 39 Articles. IV. 1. Harvey's History,and Theology of the Creeds. 2. Hardwick's History of the Articles. V. 1. Stackhouse's Body of Divinity. 2. Elements of Christian Theology, and "The Scholar Armed," by the former Bishop of Lincoln. VI. 1. Hagenbach's History of Doctrines (Smith's edition, in two vols.). 2. Shedd's History of Doctrine. VII. 1. Hodge's Systematic Theology. 2. Especially Knapp's Theology. [Note. — Special references will be given from time to time in connection with particular topics; but the full literature of the different subjects it is not proposed to give. For this, reference may be had, once for all, to Hagenbach's History of Doctrines, or to Malcom's Theo logical Index, or to any good bibliographical Dictionary.] SYSTEMATIC DIVINITY. INTEODUCTOEY. 1. Definition. Systematic Divinity is : (a) An orderly and harmonious digest or summary of the doctrines of the Word of God ; (b) A systematic statement and defence of these doctrines as held by the Christian Church, and particularly as confessed and set forth by our own branch of the Church ; (e) A scientific exhibition of the Christian doctrine concerning God and man, in their mutual relations ; wherein each part is shown to be con sistent with right reason, and in harmony with every other'part, and with the whole scheme. 2. Importance, (a) For our own minds; for clear and con sistent views ; (b) For the confutation of error ; (c) For the pur poses of instruction.* 3. Popular Objections, (a) Systematic Divinity is useless ; (1) Christ and his Apostles had it not. Ans. Christ was said never to have learned letters, and some of his Apostles were illiterate fishermen ; is it therefore best that all his ministers should follow the example ? But (.2) it is said, men can still preach the Gospel effectively without systematic divinity. Ans. Granted, but they might preach better with it ; men can reason without having studied logic, and persuade without having studied rhetoric, and read and write without having studied grammar ; are logic, rhetoric, and grammar therefore useless ? (b) If systematic divinity had been necessary or desirable, it would have been given us in the Scriptures. Ans. The same of the creeds and the cate chism. And if the systematic arrangements of natural science were desirable, they would have been given as such in nature. Or, if it were desirable that men should be clothed, they would have been born with their clothes ready-made like the beasts, (c) Systematic divinity leads away from the Scripture, and perverts the sim- Z SYSTEMATIC DIVINITY. plicity of the Gospel. Ans. The same may be said again of the creeds, and the catechism, and of every sermon which rearranges or develops the ideas ,of Scripture. And it might as well be said that the study of natural science draws away the attention from nature and perverts the simplicity of her facts, (d) Systematic divinity leads to a dry scholasticism. Ans. Only by a perversion of its use. As much may be said of grammar and criticism, and logic and rhetoric, (e) We want Christ and not dogmatics, life and not divinity, facts and not systems. Ans. Eather we want them all without any not. But we cannot preach Christ, or believe in Christ, without preaching or believing some dogma concerning him. We cannot have him as our life, without receiving him as the truth. Facts do not cease to be facts because they are col lected and arranged in a thorough system. 4. Natural Theology is included. This reason requires ; and the Scriptures expressly take it for granted. Even Pearson, although he strenuously insists that our faith in all the articles of the Apostles' Creed is a divine faith, i. e., a belief resting upon the divine testimony as conveyed to us in the Scriptures, has nevertheless been compelled, at whatever expense of consistency, to rest the first article entirely upon the grounds and proofs of natural theology. He could not have done otherwise without a gross petitio principii. But this article is the foundation of all the others, and of " divine faith " itself. See also Cicero (from Aris totle) De Natura Deorum. 5. Sources. The works and word of God. Locke well defines theology, " The direction of all knowledge to its true end, the glory of the eternal God, and the everlasting welfare of the human race." 6. Preparation. As thorough a study and knowledge of them as may be, the more the better ; together with an humble and docile spirit. 7. Method, (a) Observation of facts and analysis of Scripture ; (6) Digesting and arrangement of the material ; (c) Dogmatic conclusions. 8. Treatment, as determined by its end. Biblical, practical, or scientific. 9. Process. Always logical, yet dogmatic rather than specu lative or polemical. 10. History. This science is modern, yet it can be traced from Origen's Principia, Augustine's Enchiridion ad Laurentium, and the Ekthesis of John of Damascus, through the scholastics, to Melancthon's and Gerhard's Loci Communes, Calvin and Turre- tine, Usher and Stackhou6e, and the manifold modern German works. EXISTENCE OF GOD. 6 11. Its natural divisions: I. Theology Proper. The doctrine concerning God in his relation to man. II. Christology. The doctrine concerning the Mediator be tween God and man. III. Anthropology. The doctrine concerning man in his relation to God, as a dependent and sinful creature. IV- Soteriology. The plan and process of human salvation, the economy of human redemption, as designed, effectuated, and administered by the divine wisdom, power, and love ; — God saving man. V Ecclesiology. The doctrine concerning the Church, the external means of grace, the positive institutions of Christianity ; — man working with God for the salva tion of men. VI. Eschatology. The result and consummation of the whole, at Christ's second coming. I. THEOLOGY PEOPEE, OR THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING GOD. THE EXISTENCE OP GOD, i. 6., OE A SUPERNATURAL, SUPREME BEING, ON WHOM MAN AND ALL THINGS ARE DEPENDENT. 1. The argument from the natural and spontaneous presumptions of the human mind. See Tert. De Testimonio Aninwe, cap. 2. The atheist may object that he has them not ; but his may be an ab normal mental constitution or habit ; he may have concealed or effaced the inscription of nature ; or his very denial may imply a confession. Here the appeal is to individual consciousness. 2. The argument from the general consent of mankind. Objec tion : — This consent is not universal. Ans. But the more the mind is developed, the more fully does it appear. It is the most savage and degraded, tribes of.men that are most destitute of the concep tion of God. This really strengthens the argument instead of weakening it. Here the appeal is to the unanimity of the general consciousness. Eemarkable is the saying of Cicero: "Ex tot generibus nullum est animal, prseter hominem, quod habeat noti- tiam aliquam Dei; ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens neque tarn 4 THEOLOGY PROPER. immansueta, neque tarn fera, quse non, etiamsi ignoret, qualem Deum haberi liceat, tamen habendum sciat." 3. Theophanies, miracles, and revelations imply, or at least have always been actually preceded by,' the antecedent belief. And as to education, it is true, that, as a matter of fact, the idea and the belief are ordinarily developed in our consciousness by edu cation ; but in the end we must feel, and we do feel, that they have something more solid to rest upon than the mere fact that our parents have told us so. We — all men — are made so. 4. Arguments a priori or ontological. (1) From the nature of the idea of the ens perfectissimum et realissimum, as logically implying necessary existence, for existence constitutes a part of such an idea. (2) From the bare existence of the idea, as requiring to be accounted for, just as the very idea of externality requires the perception of an external world to account for its existence. (3) From the infinite and eternal, as attributes ne6essarily requiring a substance or being, to which they may belong. See Plato, Anselm, Des Cartes, Leibnitz, Cudworth, Samuel Clarke. 5. The cosmological argument. (1) The world exists in con stant change; but every change, every beginning of existence, must have a cause. (2) But an infinite series or regression of causes is an absurdity ; — a chain of an infinity of links can no more hang upon nothing, than one link can; and an endless circling of causes explains nothing, for, where is the primum mobile f There must therefore be a first cause. (3) As between mind and matter ; if there be a first, mind must be first. 6. This brings us for a fuller development to the teleological argument, which is, that marks of design in the world prove that it had an intelligent author ; it is the argument from final causes. (1) Physico-teleological, — see Paley at large. (2) Psycho- teleological, — in a similar way, from the complex structure of the intellectual faculties, and from their harmonious relations among themselves and to the objects about which they are to be em ployed. (3) The Ethico-teleological, — from the moral powers and their adjustments to the complexity of human relations and to the promotion of human happiness (see Political Economy) ; espe cially from the law of conscience, from the good man's assurance that virtue and happiness must ultimately coincide, and from the bad man's ineffaceable dread of future punishment. There is, then, a moral order ; it must have an author. God must be — must be a person — must have a moral character — must exercise a moral government ; hence retribution, hence the possibility of salvation, hence the credibility and the probability of a revelation. 7. The objections to the teleological argument. (1) That it does not prove enough; it only proves a wise and mighty world-builder, a just and benevolent moral governor, but not an EXISTENCE OP GOD. 5 infinite, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and all-perfect God. Ans. Be it so. This argument might then require to be supplemented by the natural presumptions of reason and the necessary ideas of the a priori argument, or by a positive revelation. In the latter case, we should look to this intelligent and mighty creator, to this just and benevolent moral governor, for a further and more immedi ate revelation of himself. Thus, natural religion would again lead us to revealed religion for its own completion. (2) That the world and its arrangements are a phenomenon sui generis, and that we cannot reason to it by any analogy to the works of human art. This is Hume's objection. Ans. All the analogy required is, that there should be marks of design in the one case as well as in the other ; and that analogy exists. Or, at least, the whole question is, are thereN marks of design? for the major proposition, that marks of design imply an intelligent author, holds true univer sally without any particular dependence upon human art. (3) That in the works of nature we cannot discern marks of design, or apprehend final causes, that we have no right to recognize them or reason from them. Ans. This is much the same as Hume's objection, and it begs the whole question ; it is based upon ma terialistic assumptions ;. and, at bottom, it would be as applica ble to works of human art as to nature. Everything in art can as easily be explained by tracing the proper physical causes, without reference to final causes, as can everything in nature. But from our consciousness we know, that there are final causes, and from our experience we know that they have appropriate marks or effects from which they can be discerned as truly and as surely as any other causes. If the world have no intelligent author, then will there be no marks of design to be discerned in it ; but if it have an intelligent author, then may we expect marks of design in his work. Unless we beg the question we may look for them. „ If we find them, we find their author. 8. The burden of proof lies upon the atheist as much as upon us. It is a question in which he is as much concerned as we ; and he cannot require us to do all the work. But he has never demonstrated that there is no God. There may be a God, then, as he must confess, for anything he knows ; and we affirm that we have, at least, the best probable reason to believe there is. 9. Pantheism, too, is only a philosophical hypothesis. Theism, as a mere hypothesis, has, at least, equal advantages. If Theism could not be proved, that would not establish Pantheism. It may be that neither can be demonstrated. But the human mind cannot rest satisfied with absolute skepticism. It seeks positive truth, even though it be probable only and not demonstrated. And that natural and practical probability is found on the side of Theism. 6 THEOLOGY proper. 10. Man's heart, too, demands a personal God, — yearns for a Heavenly Father. Without him the universe is not only a riddle, but infinite and unutterable darkness, desolation, and gloom ; and man's own moral constitution is a practical lie. See a " Dream " in Eichter's "Flower, Fruit, and Thorn Pieces." 11. For a full history of the literature relating to this subject, to the time of Bishop Butler, see "God in Human Thought," by E. H. Gillett, 2 vols. 8vo., New York, 1874. But see especially Cudworth's " Intellectual System," 3 vols. ii. Definition of God. We have seen that God is, it comes next to show what God is. [Logical order defended.] 1. What God is cannot be defined; because (1) we can have neither of the three conditions of a proper definition, (a) a higher genus, (b) a specific difference, (c) and both in terms clearer than that which was to be defined; (2) we cannot comprehend God, who is infinite. 2. But we can nevertheless have a proper knowledge or notion of what we mean when we speak of God, or of the infinite. (1) We do not here assert a " conception " of God in the sense of an imagination or a comprehension ; God is a spirit, not to be bodied forth in the fancy ; God is infinitely incomprehensible. (2) The " unknown God," of Acts xvii, 23, has nothing to do with this question ; or, if it has, the passage is on our side of the argument. (3) The notion of the infinite is not negative (though etymology might lead us to think so), any more than that of the perfect;. rather the finite is really negative, as being limited out of the infinite. (4) When it is said, we can have no notion of the infinite, it is prob ably meant that we can have no notion of the infinite as finite; and who asserts that we can ? What we say is, we have a notion, and a perfectly positive and distinct notion, of the infinite as in finite. When our notion of the infinite is said to be " inadequate," there seems to be implied a process of approximation, which in volves an absurdity. (5) To say as an expression of reverence or as a means of obviating objections, that we have no notion of God, that God is, but we do not know at all what God is — that of what we mean when we say " God," we have not the slightest conception or notion — is, to surrender to Atheism at discretion ; it is to cut off our own heads in fighting with our enemies ; it is to kill the patient, in order to put an end to all his diseases. (6) If we can have no notion of the infinite, or of God as infinite, no more can we believe in the infinite or in God as infinite (and, of course, we cannot believe in him as "finite) ; for, if our faculties of knowing definition of god. t being finite necessarily limit their object, so must our faculties of believing also, for they are equally finite. And, indeed, it is abundantly evident that our positive belief cannot outstrip the possible notions and apprehensions of the mind. To say we be lieve, but we know not what, is surely to have an empty faith if not a dead one. (7) If we can have no notion of the infinite or of God, then neither God nor the infinite exists for us. Thus, Ham ilton plainly says, " It is evident that nothing exists for us except in so far as it is known to us, and that nothing is known to us except certain properties and modes of existence which are rela tive or analogous to our faculties. Beyond these modes we know and we can assert the reality of no existence." What is this but philosophical nihilism and theological Atheism ? But we, believ ing in the " reality " of the infinite God, assert, therefore, that we have a proper notion of what is meant by " the infinite God," i. e., we have a proper notion of God as the infinite One- — as we must have, if we have any notion of him at all. 3. But how the infinite is related to the finite, we know not — how God, in his existence and agency, is related to the universe, we know not ; on this point we have no belief any more than knowledge. That there are relations and resulting acts and effects we know, but not how they are. The facts we know from reason and from Scripture, but not the modus ; and what this last is, we are not bound to believe or to explain. In like manner that the finite and infinite are related we know (as in the case of space and time), but how they are related we can neither think, believe, nor tell, except to say they are related as finite and infinite. It is not a relation of degree, or of part and whole, or of effect and cause.* It is a relation sui generis ; and it is remarkable how contradic tions emerge as soon as we confound it with any other, — as we so often do with that of degree and with that of part and whole. An infinite approximated by the finite is no infinite at all. An infinite conceived as a rounded whole is no infinite at all. 4. Besides, we may know something definitely of God. Of this information there are two sources, his works and his word, or, as Augustine says, "Greatura et Scriptura." The method from the former is (1) by negation — all imperfections of the creature are denied in God ; (2) by eminence — all perfections of the creature are affirmed as absolute and unlimited in him ; (3) by causality — God must possess all the attributes necessary to account for what ever he has made or done. All these should be combined. The method from Scripture needs no explanation. f The infinite may be related to the finite as cause to effect, but this is inci dental, it is not their relation as infinite' and finite ; and how they can be so related is still a mystery,- — how the infinite can act upon the finite is perfectly inscrutable. 8 THEOLOGY PROPER. 5. We may affirm as Fundamental Predicates — not properly as attributes but as essential in the very idea of God : Infinitude, Self-existence, Personality, Unity. God is one, personal, self- existent, infinite being. iii. ATTRIBUTES OP GOD ; (A.) NATURAL ; (B.) MORAL. 1. God's attributes are not added to his essence, nor (except logically) are they distinct from it, or from . one another. With out them or any of them he would not be God ; , for there is nothing accidental in him. They are he rather than his ; where one of them is, there are all the others, there( is he ; they inter penetrate one another. 2. Of the Divine Attributes there have been various schemes of classification : (1) Proper and Affirmative, or Metaphysical and Negative, (2) Primitive or Derivative, (3) Immanent and Abso lute or Transient and Eelative, (4) Communicable and Imitable or Incommunicable and Inimitable, (5) Ontological or Special ; but the most obvious and useful is that into the Natural and the Moral. A. The Natural Attributes of God. These are fourfold : 1. In relation to time or duration : Eternity, Unchangeableness. These are positive, not negative, attributes ; duration is positive, its termination is its negation ; identity is positive, change is its negation. Time did not first exist, and then God come to exist in it; rather it exists in him ; by his eternal self-existence he con stitutes time. Time and space are objective; they would exist though all finite intelligences should cease to exist ; to say that they would cease to exist if the divine mind should cease to exist, no more destroys their objectivity than it does the objectivity of everything, for then nothing would be left. 2. In relation to space: Omnipresence and Spirituality. God does not exist in space as in somewhat external and independent of himself; rather it exists in him ; by his omnipresence he consti tutes space- absolute. God's omnipresence is not infinite extension or ubiquity ; nor is it mere energy or knowledge everywhere — that would resolve his omnipresence into his omnipotence and omnis cience — God is himself everywhere energizing, everywhere know ing ; his omnipresence, instead of being the result, is the condition of his omnipotence and omniscience. How God is thus essentially everywhere, how the infinite is related to the finite, we cannot know or comprehend. We may speak of his centre everywhere and his circumference nowhere, and we thus give a striking ex- THE NATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 9 pression of the mystery, but we explain nothing. His spirituality, too, excludes all idea of diffusion or expansion in space, all body, parts or passions. But we must remember that it does not ex clude real substance. Spirit is as real and substantial as matter, and has its own appropriate attributes, qualities, and powers. We can no more conceive or imagine the substance of matter as such, and abstracted from its qualities, than we can the substance of spirit. We can never approximate the idea of spiritual sub stance by refining or subtilizing matter; that is only getting less and less matter, and approximating nothing. And lest it should be supposed that substance in both cases is a mere philosophic fig ment, let it be added that we can no more conceive or imagine quality existing as such, and abstracted from all substance, than we can conceive substance without quality. They both really exist, not as abstractions, but in their concrete relations. How the divine spirituality (or God as a spirit) is related to space and to the phys ical universe we can neither know nor conceive. That it is so related we know. How our own minds or spirits are related to or present in our bodies we cannot tell ; though we are conscious of the fact. How much less can we expect to understand the mode of God's spiritual presence in relation to the material world. The divine spirituality we also naturally presume to stand in a special and peculiar relation to the minds, the spiritual natures, of God's intelligent offspring ; but the mode of this relation, or pres ence, or influence, also transcends our comprehension. 3. In relation to finite beings — Omnipotence ; exerted in their creation, preservation, and control. The omnipotence of God does not imply a power to work contradictions, to confound or in vert the principles of truth or right, to lie, to do wrong, to divest himself of any of his attributes, to change himself to a finite being, or to annihilate himself. Omnipotence is a power to do whatever is possible ; but when it is said " all things are possible with God," it must be understood with the limitations that belong to the na ture of the case ; just as when it is said " all things are possible to him that believeth." The best statement for popular use is, that by his omnipotence God can do whatever he will. Creation is from nothing, i. e., from nothing but the creative power of God — against dualism ; — this is required by the divine unity, independ ence, and omnipotence. Creation is not eternal — against panthe ism ; — this is required by the freedom and personality of God. If the creative act must be eternal, then every act of God must be eternal, and the divine personality is for us annihilated. How God can create from nothing and in time, must remain to us an in scrutable mystery. But creation may be an act in time as well as any other act of God. Preservation is but the continuance of the 10 THEOLOGY PROPER. creative energy. As all things were made by God, so all things are constantly sustained and controlled by his providence. So far as God's absolute sovereignty and decrees require further consid eration they are reserved for soteriology. 4. In relation to intensity (or degree) — the divine attributes are infinitude of essence, of glory, and of blessedness. But this has been already included under the " fundamental predicates." Scripture Proofs. (1) Op God's Eternity : Eom. i, 20 ; xvi, 26 ; Gen. xxi, 33 ; Isa. xl, 28; 1 Tim. vi, 15, 16; Eev. i, 4, 8; John iii, 13 ; viii, 58 ; Ps. xc, 2. (2) Op God's Unchangeableness : James i, 17 ; Ps. cii, 27 ; Mai. iii, 6 ; Num. xxiii, 19. (3) Op God's Omnipresence: Matt, x, 29; Ps. cxxxix, 7-13; Jer. xxiii, 24 ; 1 Cor. xv, 28 ; Eph. i, 23. (4) Op God's Spirituality : John iv, 24 ; Eom. i, 20 ; 1 Tim. i, 17; Col. i, 13,15. (5) Op God's Omnipotence: Matt, xix, 26; Ps. cxv, 3; Jer. xxxii, 27 ; Eom. xi, 36 ; 1 Cor. viii, 6. (in creation) Gen. i; Ps. cii, 25, 26; civ, 5; Isa. xl, 26; xlv, 5-12 ; xlviii, 12, 13 ; Matt, iii, 9 ; John i, 3 ; Eev. iv, 11 ; Ps. xc, 2 ; Heb. xi, 3 ; iii, 4 ; Col. i, 16, 17. (in providence) Ps. civ; Isa. xlv, 7; xl, 12-17, 22-26; Ps. lxv; Matt, vi, 24-32; x, 28, 31. (6) Op God's Infinitude : 1 Tim. vi, 15., 16 ; Ex. xv, 11 ; Acts xvii, 24, 25; Job iv, 18; Isa. vi, 3; Ps. xvi, 11; lvii, il. B. The Moral Attributes of God. 1. In respect to intelligence, the divine attributes are Omni science and Wisdom. (1) Omniscience = Knowledge — (a) Of all things past, present, and future, including in the future what is contingent upon the action of the human, or any other will, as well as what depends upon necessary or natural causes. Nothing can be hidden from God. He can hide nothing from himself; for either he must first know what he would hide, or his ignorance would be a state of indefinite uncertainty ; and God cannot divest himself of any of his attributes. (6) We may conceive the divine omniscience to take the past, present, and future all in one immediate view — after the analogy of our consciousness of the present — without succession, progress, change, or increase. God's knowledge is all immediate intuition — is all one. THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 11 (c) The divine omniscience excludes all doubt, danger, or prob ability ; it is always certain. (d) The divine omniscience takes cognizance of all real things as real, and of all possible things as possible ; i. e., what we call real and what we call possible, contingent, and conditional, are alike known to God. Hence (2) His wisdom. In view of all possible ends and means God selects the best ends, and accomplishes them by the best means. That is to say, however ends and means and possibilities may stand before the divine mind, we must thus conceive of God's wisdom from our point of view, if we would think or speak of it at all. Note. — These attributes of intelligence are called moral and not intellectual, according to the proprieties of language in speaking of God. 2. In respect to will or character, the divine attributes are freedom, truth, holiness, love, justice, and righteousness. (1) God's freedom is absolute, impeded or thwarted by nothing from within or from without. It is a positive attribute ; limita tion, obstruction, compulsion are its negations. In general, free dom is a simple idea, which cannot, therefore, be explained, but which must yet be first apprehended, or restraint, compulsion, and enslavement cannot be understood. (2) His truth is also absolute, and is the ground of our con fidence, our hope, and our fear. Truth, too, is positive and simple ; the falsehood, the lie, are its negations ; the meaning of the former must be apprehended before the latter can be understood. (3) His holiness may be considered the centre and the sum of his moral attributes. Etymologically it means separation, purity, completeness. It is a positive attribute. When we name it we express in one word God's absolute moral perfection, or, by a double negation, the absence in him of all fault, imperfection, wrong, or impurity. This is the attribute we need especially to contemplate in the character of God, that our consciousness of im perfection may be deepened, and our characters conformed to God's. Matt, v, 48 ; 1 Pet. i, 15, 16. (4) His love. This, too, may be well regarded as the centre of the divine character : " God is love." This is the attractive aspect of his character. His holiness might deter sinners, but his love encourages and allures ; by, it we are drawn to him. " We love him because he first loved us." God's love, to have its right effect upon us, must be conceived as a real personal affection, not a mere series of acts tending to make us happy. It is more than goodness ; God is good to all his creatures; he loves his intelligent offspring, he loves the sons of men, he loves his redeemed and 12 THEOLOGY PROPER. regenerate children. God's love may be seen in various forms or degrees : (a) His goodness or general benevolence, (b) his com passion for the suffering and wretched, (c) his grace for the sinning and lost, and (d) his complacency for the holy and good. (5) His justice is: (a) objective, and then either legislative or retributive ; — all his laws and statutes, all his rewards and punish ments, are right ; or (b) subjective, the immanent and essential principle of absolute rectitude ; and then it may also be regarded as a distinct attribute, and called (6) His righteousness, God would be righteous in himself, in his own divine essence and self-consoiousness, even if he had no creatures to deal with. Topics of Difficulty and Special Remark, relating to the Divine Attributes. 1. How can the freedom of the human, or in general of the finite will, be reconciled with the divine omniscience? (See Cicero de Divinatione, iij 5-7.) The will is not, indeed, under the laws of physical causation, necessity, or compulsion ; yet it has its appropriate laws, which are perfectly consistent with moral freedom, and in which all its workings, and all its history, may be naked and open to him with whom we have to do. We know some of these laws. We know that the rational will always acts in view of motives; its acts, however free, are not events of pure chance. There neither are nor can be any events which come altogether without causes, and by mere chance. And even if there were, God's intuitive, or im mediate knowledge of the future, would preclude all difficulty of foreknowing them. Besides, in any case, knowledge is not a cause of events. 2. How can the necessity of the divine attributes be consistent with the divine freedom ? This very necessity is the condition of the highest, — of absolute moral freedom ; for it is the condition of absolute moral perfec tion. This necessity is a logical, not a physical necessity — a necessity of character, not of compulsion. That God cannot put off or change the glorious attributes of his infinite being no more diminishes his freedom than his power. To allege that God can not be free or omnipotent unless he can cease to be God is un speakably absurd. God cannot do wrong — God cannot lie ; but this is not because there is anything that obstructs or hinders his wrong-doing or falsehood, but because there is in him no tempta tion, no tendency to them, to be obstructed or hindered ; it is be cause God is holy, just, and true. THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 13 3. Are the true, the right, the good, constituted such by an act of the divine will ? No ; they are constituted by, or are essentially immanent in, the very nature and being of God. They are not arbitrary. . God did not make them, for he never existed or could exist without them; God did not make himself; and his will, necessarily, yet with the purest conscious freedom, conforms to them in all its acts ; hence those acts have a moral character, which in the opposite theory they could not have. It is true that, chronologically, the acts of God's will, his will itself, and his being, are coetaneous — one is as old as the other ; but, logic ally, the being must precede the attributes, and the attributes must precede their operations. 4. As God is an infinite, eternal, and unchangeable being, how can there be separate, and successive acts of the divine will — as acts of creation, or providence, or grace ? We must conceive God, in some sense, to put forth such acts ; otherwise he would stand in no practical relation to our minds. How he puts them forth we cannot say. We know that he does put them forth, because we- know that he is in relation to us. But how he does, involves the insoluble question of the mode of the relation of the infinite to the finite. 5. How can God's infinite love, taken together with his infinite power and wisdom, be reconciled to his punitive justice ? Or, how can his retributive justice be reconciled to his mercy and par doning love ? Though we may never understand the mode of reconcilement, we cannot affirm that any contradiction is involved ; for, as a mat ter of fact, it may be, for anything we know, that God's love could not be infinite without his punitive justice, and that his punishments would not be just without his infinite love. We must not suppose, however, that God punishes with a sole view to the reformation of the particular offender, but with a view to the highest good of the universe, and, above all, to the requirements of his own holy character ; there is a difference between chastise ments and punishments. Nor must we suppose that God's mercy and forgiveness are purely arbitrary; they doubtless have their laws, and laws in perfect harmony with the highest justice, though we may not be able to trace them out. This is the mystery which Christianity has solved, so far as it can be solved, for our minds ; and before the glorious solution we stand in wondering and thank ful adoration. But we must never think to exalt and magnify God's attributes by annulling and contradicting all our possible notions of their nature. We must not think to extol his justice by declaring that it is not subject to our rules and ideas of justice; that, for aught 14 THEOLOGY PROPER. v we know, God can justly do what, according to our best views of justice would be most horribly and detestably wrong ; or, as Pas cal says, that to which "our poor, miserable, human justice" stands utterly opposed. If we think that God's justice can de light in what even " our poor, miserable, human justice" can see to be most abominable, what sort of a- God, then, have we im agined to ourselves ? And if God's justice may be not only essen tially different from, but contrary to all our ideas of justice, what, then, do we mean by God's justice ? Why use the name of justice at all ? Why ascribe to God any attributes, or praise him for any glorious perfections? Do we mean something or nothing by them ? And do we know what we mean ? The truth is, justice is justice ; God's justice is human justice^ — human justice free from all human imperfections. And though we certainly are not to presume to sit in judgment on God's acts, it is not because we do not know what justice — divine justice — is,; but because we do not know all the facts, relations, connections, and consequences in volved in the case on which we should undertake to pass sentence. It is our ignorance of facts, not of principles, which commands our humble and silent submission. When we cannot see, we believe and adore. Scripture Proofs 1. Of God's Omniscience: 1 John iii, 20; Acts i, 24; Heb. iv, 13 ; Matt, vi, 4, 6, 8 ; x, 20 ; Ps. cxxxix, 1-6. 2. Of God's Wisdom : Eom. xi, 33, 34 ; Job xii, 13 ; Eph. iii, 8-10 ; Col. ii, 3 ; Ps. cxlvii, 5 ; cxxxvi, 5 ; civ, 24 ; Prov. iii, 19; 1 Tim. i, 17. 3. Op God's Freedom : Isa. xliii, 13 ; Dan. iv, 35 ; Eph. i, 5, 11.; Eom. ix, 15. 4. Op God's Truth: Eom. xv, 8,; 1 Cor. i, 9 ; 2 Tim. ii, 13; Deut. xxxii, 4 ; Ps. xxxi, 5 ; Ixxxvi, 15 ; c, 5 ; cxvii, 2 ; cxlvi, 6 ; Isa. xxv, 1 ; John vii, 28 ; viii, 26 ; Eev. iii, 7, 14 ; vi, 10 ; xv, 3 ; xvi, 7. 5. Of God's Holiness: 1 John i, 5; James iii, 17; Deut. xxxii, 4; Isa. vi; Job iv, 17, 18; Ps. v, 5; xlvii, 8; lxxxix, 35;~2 Cor. vi, 14-17; Ex. xv, 11 ; 1 Pet. i, 15, 16; Heb. xii, 10. 6. Of God's Love : 1 John iv, 7, 8, 16 ; John iii, 16 ; xvii, 24 ; Matt, v, 44, 48 ; Eph. ii, 4 ; Eom. viii, 39. 7. Op God's Justice : Eom. ii, 6-10 ; iii, 26 ; Eev. xvi, 7 ; 1 Cor. iii, 18 ; iv, 5 ; 2 Cor. v, 10 ; Eph. vi, 8. 8. Op God's Eighteousness : Gen. xviii, 25 ; 1 Kings viii, 32 ; Ps. ix, 4; lxxi, 19; cxix, 142. PROVIDENCE. 15 iv. PROVIDENCE. 1. Definition, (a) The exercise of God's dominion over his creatures. _ (b) God's power, wisdom, and goodness constantly ex erted in his works, (c) His preservation and government of all things, (d) His constant care and oversight of all his works. This requires special consideration as combining and manifesting all the divine attributes. 2. The word is not found in the Scriptures, but they are full of the idea. It implies, by its etymology, the direction of all things with foresight and purpose. The doctrine is sometimes disparaged as if it interfered with the doctrine of grace, or belonged to natu ral and not to revealed religion. This is a mere vulgar mistake. 3. The doctrine is of the highest practical importance to the pious mind and heart, for enlargement, and comfort, and encour agement, and elevation, and habitual communion with God. See the Psalms of David. In fact, the kingdom of grace is but one portion of that of Providence, though to us by far the highest and most important portion. The special consideration of that portion is reserved for soteriology. In another point of view divine providence may be regarded as a part, an element, in the administration of the kingdom of grace ; and, in this sense, it may be called his sovereignty, his predestination, and his special dis cipline of his people. This aspect of the subject, too, is, in like manner, reserved. 4. History. The notions of uncultivated tribes and of early times on this subject were extremely rude, imperfect, and con fused. They generally represented God as a great chief or king. Homer has magnificent expressions of his power, but represents him as overlooking petty things, and being himself subject to iunpa.. In the East, the fatum chaldaicum or astrologicum was placed above the Deity. Among the Greek philosophers the common doc trine before Plato was, that matter limited and fate controlled the power of God ; and even Plato only modified the doctrine of fate. The Stoics are known as strict fatalists ; and the Epicureans abol ished all idea of divine providence by raising God above all con cern with sublunary things, declaring it inconsistent with his peace and blessedness that he should be interrupted and burdened by the labors and cares and petty details, incident to the govern ment of the world. Christian philosophers have generally fallen into three schools in relation to the doctrine of Providence. (a) The occasionalists, — Thomists, Dominicans, Des Cartes, Coc- 16 THEOLOGY PROPER. ceius, Turretine. These regard God as the immediate and only proper cause of the actions of all his creatures, their apparent cau salities furnishing merely the occasion for his real efficiency. This doctrine would seem to annul second causes and human account ability. The problem was how to reconcile the all-pervading agency of the infinite God with the real agency of finite creatures ; and this theory, instead of solving the problem, abolishes it, by denying one of its members, and annihilating the agency of the creature altogether. We must not be led astray by the pious mo tive from which the doctrine proceeds lest we fall into the impious conclusions to which it tends. (b) The mechanists, — Durandus, Scotus, Leibnitz, Baxter. The monadology and pre-established harmony of Leibnitz have given this theory its fullest development. According to it, every monad of existence, including each human soul, and each ultimate par ticle of matter, as one, is absolutely independent of every other monad, and was originally created with its whole future history enwrapped as it were in its primitive germ, to be developed ex clusively from its own internal mechanism and fixed laws ; so that all the apparent interactions in the world,, including human voli tions, and their apparent effects, are only the results of a pre-estab lished harmony, — correspondences as of two clocks constructed to go together, keeping precisely the same time. This theory repre sents the whole work of Providence to have been finished, once for all, in the original act of creation. After that the machine goes on of itself. There is no longer any use for God. He is like an artist who leaves his work when he has completed it, or idly ob serves its movements. Besides, fatalism seems even more insepa rably involved in this theory than in the other. Mere mechanism leaves no room for freedom. Instead of solving the problem pro posed by reconciling its two terms, it utterly annuls it by denying them both. It abolishes the present personal agency of God in the world, and the agency of finite creatures upon one another. Having its machines constructed, it has no more need of' a first cause, and it leaves no room for second causes. (e)'The concurists or co-operationists. These teach that the divine agency always concurs with the agency of second causes. It holds that these latter are real, though not independent, causes ; that their agency exists everywhere ; but that the divine agency is everywhere present with them, interpenetrating and. sustaining them. So that nothing, in Providence, takes place without second and finite causes, and nothing without the present agency of the first and infinite cause. How the infinite cause and finite causes can thus really act together we need not expect to be able to ex plain until we can comprehend, once for all, the relation of the PROVIDENCE. 17 infinite and finite, — which we have already seen to be utterly be yond our comprehension. Thus, this theory, instead of annulling the problem, simply restates and reaffirms it, and, acknowledging its solution to be a mystery, traces it to the fundamental mystery of human thought. The Christian doctrine of Providence is prop erly a Bible doctrine, — a, fact, attested by divine revelation. 5. Proof. (1) From reason : (a) from God's power and will ingness — assuming his personality ; (b) from the intrinsically de pendent nature and the permanent order of created things ; (c) from the demands of the moral faculty; (d) from history. (2) From Scripture : Ps. xix ; xc ; xci ; civ ; cxxxix ; Matt, vi, 25, etc. ; x, 29, etc. ; Acts xvii, 24, etc. 6. Character of the providence taught in Scripture : (1) Uni versal: Ps. civ; cxxxix; Job xxvi; xxxvii; xxxviii; xxxix; Heb. i, 3. (2) Minute : Mai. x, 29, 30 ; Luke xii, 6, 7 ; vi, 25, etc. ; Ps. cxxxix, 15-18. (3) Eightful: Eev. iv, 11 ; Ps. xcvii, 1, 2; cxlv, 17; Job xl, 2; xlii, 23. (4) Gratuitous: Ps.xyi, 2; Acts xvii, 25 ; 1 Cor. iv, 7 ; Rom. xi, 35 ; Job xxii. (5) Benevolent : Ps. cvii, 8, 15, 21, 31 ; cxlv, 7-10 ; xxxiii, 5 ; Iii, 1 ; Rom. ii, 4. (6) Specially for man : Gen. i, 28 ; Ps. viii ; xxiii ; Eom. viii, 28 ; Prov. iii, 11, 12; viii, 31 ; Ps. cxv, 16 ; Acts xvii, 25-29. 7. Divisions : (1) General providence, over all things ; (2) special, over man ; (3) particular, over good men, Ps. xxxi, 19-24. Or better, we may distribute the exercise of God's providence into two modes in relation to our minds : (1) Preservation of creatures and their powers ; (2) government in view of an end. 8. Preservation may be considered : (1) in relation to creatures in general — proved (a) from ¦ the contingent nature of things, {b) from history, and (c) from Scripture [see above] ; and (2) in relation to man in particular, for (a) God is the author of life and health, Acts xvii, 25 ; Matt, vi, 25, 26 ; (b) he determines the time and manner of' death, Ps. xxxi, 15; Job vii, 1 ; xiv, 5, 6 ; James iv, 14, 15; John xxi, 19, 22; Jerem. xv, 2; xliii, 11. Here observe that God's providential purpose differs entirely from Mohammedan fate — second causes are always recognized in the course of divine providence, (c) God gives and continues all our powers and opportunities, (d) He sustains us and works with us in all our free actions, though with the bad he concurs only ma- terialiter and not formaliter. For example, in the utterance of a lie God sustains the mind in its power of volition, and the nerves, muscles, and vocal organs in their vital action, and the air in its normal relation to them, but he does not give the act its form or quality of evil; that it owes to man's will and evil heart alone — God permits it and man performs it. 9. In his government, God controls all with a view to his own 18 THEOLOGY PROPER. glory in the highest good of all. In maintaining this, we assume certain fundamental postulates : (1) Different species of creatures, and different individuals of the same species may be endowed with different degrees and kinds of capacity ; (2) The lower may be sacrificed for the higher, the few for the many, some for the good of all; (3) Happiness may not be absolutely secured to individuals, but may depend upon the fulfilment of conditions. But here men are prone to mistake, (a) placing happiness in just what they have not, instead of contentedly improving what they have, (6) forgetting that the general good is of more importance than their individual benefit, (c) thinking disproportionately of the present moment, (d) charging upon God the consequences of, their own faults. 10. Proof of the general providential government of God for his own glory in the highest ultimate good of the universe : (1) From the benevolent constitution and harmonious progress of the world ; (2) from general and individual experience, — how the most important results often flow from trivial causes and unex pectedly ; — he who is willing to see God's hand will see it ; (3) from Scripture, Matt, vi, 31-33 ; Isa. xliii, 1-7 ; Ex. xx, 12 ; Ps. xxii, 23-28 ; Gal. iv, 1-7 ; Eom. iii, 29, 30 ; Acts xvii, 26-28 ; John iii, 16, 17; 2 Pet. iii, 9; Ps. viii; Dan. ii, 31-45; Eev. xi, 15 ; xxi, 3, 4 ; xxii, 3, 4, 5. 11. God's government in relation to free acts of voluntary beings has already been referred to in a general way. The Divine government and human freedom must be consistent, for both are certain, and both must be maintained intact. How God can govern free actions is not wholly explicable, but may be partially seen from these facts : Our free actions depend (1) upon the powers God has given — the will is not omnipotent ; (2) upon the laws, physical and moral, which he has instituted — the will is not lawless ; and (3) upon external circumstances. It may be that the theoretical reason cannot prove, as it cer tainly cannot disprove, human freedom ; but, in the meantime, the conscience, the practical reason, demands and demonstrates it. That God's government of free, moral beings is righteous, is evident, because : (1) He gives them warnings against evil, and power to resist and avoid it ; (2) He gives encouragements and helps to good ; (3) He rewards good actions and punishes bad, and lets men see it for their instruction ; (4) He sometimes pre vents and , sometimes permits wicked actions, but always leaves men free ; (5) He overrules the results of all for good. This we see to be the fact sometimes, to be probable always ; and no man can prove the contrary. 12. Yet God's government in relation to the permission and PROVIDENCE. 19 permanence of evil must ever remain an insoluble mystery for us. It must be remembered, however, that if we do not know enough to defend, still less do we know enough to arraign, the Divine administration. We do understand enough to answer objectors, in part ; and, in part, our ignorance and their ignorance must be their answer. For , philosophical Theodicies and theories of optimism, see Cicero, Seneca, Leibnitz, and Cudworth ; and Pope's "Essay on Man." SPECIAL' POINTS IN RELATION TO PROVIDENCE. 1. It may be impossible and contradictory in the nature of things, or rather in the nature of God, that the highest moral good should be attained without the permission of evil — observe, we say, the permission, not the commission of evil — not the existence of evil when permitted. 2. That God brings good out of evil no more justifies the evil, or changes its intrinsic nature, than the benefits of suffering an nihilate the suffering itself, or the conscious rewards of disin terested benevolence change it to selfishness. It is only a proof of the inherent good constitution of things which God has estab lished, so that he introduces a new set of causes whereby the natural consequences of the evil, not the evil itself, are turned into a new direction and made to eventuate in good. 3. The vindication of God's providence, therefore, is no justifi cation of human actions; if it were, then would Pharaoh, and Joseph's brethren, and Absalom, and the king of Assyria (see Isa. x, 5-7), and Judas, and Satan himself, be justified, — as well as negro slavery in America and the medieval papacy in Europe. 4. That imperfections should be allowed among created and finite things is essential to their very existence as such, as well as to progress and order. 5. The prosperity of the wicked and the suffering of the good, as a possible and not unfrequent occurrence under God's moral gov ernment, is a problem which has puzzled many; and some, instead of solving it, have denied the facts. But it cannot be shown that the good man is always happier than the bad man, — unless we give to happiness a special and more restricted meaning than properly belongs to it. There are other causes and condi tions and kinds of happiness besides the moral. But this we can show — and it is enough to show — that, intrinsically, virtue is a source of happiness, and vice a source of misery. Still the good man must not expect everything from his goodness, e.g., the riches and honors, the pomps and vanities and pleasures of the world. He cannot consistently seek them, and should not, there- 20 THEOLOGY PROPER. fore, be encouraged to persevere in goodness and hold fast his integrity, in order to obtain them. The intrinsic happiness of virtue is a pledge, and the promise of God is an assurance, of the ultimate and complete happiness of the good and godly. "Many are the afflictions of the righteous, but the Lord delivereth him out of them all." Ps. xxxiv, 19. Temporal rewards were made more prominent under the old dispensation than under the new. But under them both the principle and the highest end are the same. To the Christian this end is secure. " Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." 2 Cor. iv, 17. See Matt, vi, 33 ; Ps. xxxviii ; and Job throughout ; also see John ix, 2 ; Luke xiii, 1-4, to show that special sufferings are no proofs of special wick edness. 6. Miracles, how related to Providence ? They are a part of Providence. Moral ends and laws must be the highest in the universe. That God should work by general laws in nature as much requires a reason, requires to be explained, as that he should interpose with miracles. We may conceive that he ordi narily proceeds according to general laws, as the best means for man's instruction, guidance, and happiness ; and that he occasion ally interposes with miracles, to awaken man from his atheistic perversion (i. e., perverse interpretation) of natural law. Both are to manifest God to man ; and both will be used by divine provi dence according to laws of infinite wisdom and goodness. 7. Prayer, how can it be consistent with divine providence and physical laws ? It may be conceived as a link in the chain of moral causes, one of the conditions upon which God has seen fit to suspend certain results, and upon which those results depend as other results depend upon the ordinary acts of the human will — a moral cause and condition by which the general course and scheme of divine providence are no more disarranged or dis turbed than they are by any acts of free moral agents. Will does not abolish law, or interfere with it, whether it be the human will or the divine will. Prayer for temporal things, as well as for spiritual things, may be, must be, real prayer ; it cannot, with a Christian, be a mere formal exercise, a mere make-believe for sub jective moral"effect. We must always ask with a view of obtain ing from God the objects we ask, i. e., provided it be his will and if it be best for us. If otherwise, we certainly cannot insist, we cannot even desire, that our prayers should be granted. For the most part, therefore, there must be a certain degree of generality about our prayer, we must not insist too much upon precise par ticular things at precise moments of time and under just such and such circumstances ; and this in regard to spiritual things as well UNITY OF GOD. . 21 as temporal things. And as we recognize God's ordinary provi dence as acting always in concurrence with appropriate second causes, we have no reason and we have no right to ask for the end, while we neglect the means, so far as the means are in our power, — and call it faith. Such faith is little less than blasphemy. When we have done all we can, and still are in great need or sore distress, and see no way of escape or relief, then God is our refuge, — a refuge to which every Christian heart must rejoice to flee. Fleeing to him, we leave ourselves in his hands as in the hands of a faithful Creator. Offered in this spirit, prayers in time of sick ness, pestilence, war, famine, etc., can never cease to be made by Christians, however they may be sneered at by infidel scoffers. One thing, however, is to be observed : when we recognize a thing as clearly impossible under the laws of second causes, we no longer pray for it. We do not ask for miracles. We may pray for the recovery of a sick friend until the last moment, for while there is life there is hope ; but when he is known to be dead, we no longer pray for his restoration. So David, with the child of Bathsheba, 2 Sam. xii, 22, 23. 8. Special providences, so-called; these are not miraculous, not really special, but only seeming to us special interpositions, from their rarity, their importance, or their nearness to us. If two men are precipitated from a great height, one of them killed and the other narrowly escapes, there is just as much a special provi dence in reference to the one as to the other, as much in the fall as in the rescue, as much in the case of those who looked on or of those who remained quiet and unharmed elsewhere, as in the case of either of those immediately concerned. But to him who thus escaped, the hand and providence of God are brought imme diately home, and if he would ever recognize his dependence or acknowledge God's goodness, he will do it in such a case. For us such are special providences, they have a special significance, they are to be specially regarded and improved. 9. In general, we must beware of analyzing God's attributes into a mere series of acts in relation to us — the philosophic ex treme ; or, on the other hand, of conceiving them as existing in him just as our faculties and mental states exist in us — the vulgar extreme. UNITY OP GOD. 1. This has already been postulated among the " fundamental predicates " of the very idea of God. The distinction between these and attributes is practical rather than logical. It would seem unnatural to call Unity an attribute of God, for it is evi- 22 THEOLOGY PROPER. dently assumed in the very name " God " as here employed. But, more than self-existence or personality, it requires explana tion and is susceptible of special proof. 2. Unity has a peculiar meaning in relation to God, arising from the very fact of its being a fundamental predicate. It is strictly his uniqueness, his aloneness or soleity,— it is the exclu sion of another or a like. 3. God is not One as an aggregation or complex of simpler elements or parts, or as a species containing individuals, or as an individual side by side with other and similar individuals ; his unity is absolute, simple, identical, and exclusive; he is, and none beside him. His unity extends through . all the logical categories, from the summum genus to the individual, without division or multiplication — ever the same, one, and alone. 4. The Divine Unity is proved : (a) From reason : there can be but one omnipresent, but one omniscient, but one omnipotent, but one infinite ; for, if there were two, they would be either exclusive or inclusive of each other, either of which would be a contradiction. Try to conceive two omnipotents. (6) From nature : from the harmonious arrangements of the universe or cosmos, and from the necessary consequence to unity in the region of causes, (c) From Scripture : passim ; especially, Deut. vi, 4 ; Isa. xlv, 14, 18, 21, 22 ; xlvi, 9 ; 1 Cor. viii, 6 ; Gal. iii, 20 ; 1 Tim. ii, 5, etc. vi. THE TRINITY. ' Introductory. 1. Anticipations from reason: (1) The Platonic or Neo-Platonic , trinity — Tzarrjp, vou? or X6yo<;,