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L E C M RES

DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY, ELECTION, THE
ATONEMENT, JUSTIFICATION,
A*ND REGENERATION.

BY GEORGE PAYNE, LL.D.,
.H
EXETER. '

JkconU Otttoit.

LONDON:
JAMES DINNIS, 62, PATERNOSTER -ROW.
mdcccxxxviii.

WILLIAM TYLER;
PRINTER,
IJOLT-COURT, FLEET-STREET.

PREFACE
TO THE FIRST EDITION.

The volume now presented to the publie was designed to be
explanatory rather than controversial. To a certain extent,
indeed, it could not fail to assume the latter ;characters since
it seldom happens that correct general principles can be de
veloped and established without controversy. The exposition
of truth has, however, been the great object of the author,
and controversy has never been resorted to except when it
seemed to him essential to a full development of the truth.
The writer may be mistaken — he would fain hope that he is
so — yet he has not been able to escape the conviction, that, in
the present day, there does^not exist, among the members of
the church of Christ at large, a sufficiently correct and com
prehensive knowledge of first principles in religion — of the
leading doctrines of the gospel. He is not without his
fears, that even many Christians1 hold rather a form of sound
words — though even the form held by some is not a very
accurate one — than possess an acquaintance with things; nor
can he altogether divest himself of the apprehension, that- if
a moral deluge were to sweep away our accustomed words
and phraseology on religious subjects, it would not, in very
numerous instances, leave many ideas behind it. It is at least
certain that we have less of extensive reading, of vigorous
thinking, and of profound meditation, upon the great prin
ciples of theological science, in all its branches, than in the

IV TREFACE.

" olden times." The days of John Owen and John Howe,
in this respect, are gone by. He is constrained to think, that
this deficiency, result from what cause it may, is most deeply
to be regretted. It is truth, not words, that constitutes the
food of the soul. If the orthodoxy of an individual, or of a
body of Christians, be a mere orthodoxy of phraseology — if
there be not found among the members of the body right
ideas, and correct and luminous thinking, as well as right
words — there can be no spiritual growth. They cannot rise
to eminence in experimental and practical religion. It is a
sentiment whioh deserves to be most seriously pondered upon
by the church in the present day, that the real piety of an
age, though it may doubtless fall considerably short, can never
be in advance of the knowledge of that age. Imperfect con
ceptions of the great system of evangelical truth — obscure
notions of any of its radical principles — a defective acquaint
ance with the connexions of its various parts, will render the
piety of an age — not much less certainly and rapidly than
positive error — deformed, or stunted and dwarfish; It will
give existence to all kinds of monstrosities, or produce a race
of religious pigmies. The generation that has passed away
were men of extensive reading and deep reflection ; but they
were not men of vigorous action. We have become men of
action, but it is to be feared we have partially ceased to be
men of research and meditation. We do more, but we think
less, and know less than our forefathers; and there is conse
quent danger that the present vigour of action may decline, or
that it may become necessary to seek to perpetuate — by the
constant application of stimulants and excitement — those ex
ertions which ought to flow from steady, and enlightened, and
holy principle, and which can be permanently calculated upon
only when they spring from that source. It will be well for
the church of the present day not to undervalue the extensive

PREFACE.

research and xleep-toned thinking of former generations, but
to connect with the knowledge of the past century the activity
of the p'resent — to become more perfectly familiar with the
principles which should keep the whole machinery in motion,
lest we be thrown back again into that inactive and inglorious
position' from which we have scarcely as yet reason to exult
that we have made our escape.
. The author of this volume presents to his readers what he-
hopes will be found to be a correct and luminous exposition
of those first principles in religion on which it professes to
treat. He has endeavoured to avoid that vagueness of state
ment in which some writers, of great eminence and excellence,
have unwisely and unfortunately permitted themselves to in
dulge — to remove ambiguities — to give precision to the defi
nition of terms — to explain the meaning of current, though
often very ill understood phraseology, as well as occasionally
to correct it ; — and, though Calvinistic in his' own views, he
has tried every sentiment, supported in this volume, not by
the statements of John Calvin, but by those of Jesus Christ
and his apostles. He dares not venture to affirm, or even to
hope, that he has escaped all sectional and denominational
prejudices ; but he can honestly say, that he is not conscious
of having been influenced in his statements by any such pre
judices. His sincere desire has been, or he is greatly self-
deceived, to elicit, exhibit, and establish the truth; and,
whether the force of conviction has carried him along in pre
cisely the same course with that in which the great Genevese
Reformer moved, or compelled him occasionally to deviate
from it, has been to him a point of very inconsiderable im
portance. To the law, and to the testimony, he has uniformly
desired to bring his own mind, and the minds of his readers.
If we think not " according to this word, it is because there
is no light in us."

VI PREFACE.
The author begs to say, in conclusion, that the work is not
especially, far less exclusively, designed for those who sustain
the sacred office. He has not the presumption to set himself
forth as the public instructor of a body of men comprising
numerous individuals, at whose' feet he should be glad to sit
and learn. To his younger brethren in the ministry the book
may, indeed, and he hopes will, afford some instruction ; but
the sentiments expressed in the former part of this preface
will prepare the way for the declaration, that his leading
object has been to awaken a greater spirit of reading and
research among the members of the church at large, and to
put into their hands a volume which might tend, with the
blessing of God, to promote generally a more correct and
familiar acquaintance with the great principles on which it
treats than perhaps at present prevails.
To the kind and careful consideration of the members of
the church, and to the blessing of its great and glorified Head,
he commends the volume.
Academy House,
Mai/, 1836.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In presenting this work again to the public, the author de
sires to express his gratitude, that a second edition of a book,
which cannot attract attention by the popularity of the topics
on which it treats, has been so soon called for. He is happy
to regard it as evidence of a growing conviction of the import
ance of a comprehensive and accurate acquaintance with first
principles in religion ; leading to the favourable reception of
a volume which attempts, however imperfectly, to render some
aid on this point. He takes this opportunity of repelling an
offensive charge which an artful — he had almost said, unprin
cipled — reviewer, has attempted to fasten upon him, in con
sequence of the following sentence which occurs in the pre
face to the former edition. " The writer is not able to escape
the conviction that, in the present day, there does not exist
among the members of the church of Christ at large, a suffi
ciently correct and comprehensive knowledge of first principles
in religion." The Editor of " The British Magazine" has con
strued this into a confession, by the author, of the degeneracy
and ignorance of the religious denomination to which the latter
belongs ; and says, in effect, it was this confession which led
him to notice the book. Can any one believe this to have been
a mistake ofthe author's meaning? The reviewer is one of a
class of menivho scarcely, if at all, allow that Dissenters be
long to the Christian church ; — who leave them to the unco-
venanted mercies of God. Does he then really admit, what
his language implies, that the phrase, " the church of God at
large," comprehends Dissenters, and Dissenters exclusively ? —
or did he believe that the author referred to Dissenters exclu
sively ? Certainly not. His statement had not its origin in mis
conception, in which case it would have betokened nothing

viu preface to the second edition.
but dulness of apprehension. It is direct and obvious mis
representation, resulting from an unworthy desire to depreciate
Dissenters, per fas aut nefas, and to make one of their own
body the calumniator. The article is respectful to the author,
but he cannot accept a compliment at the expense of his
brethren. His reference was so obviously to no denomination
in particular, that there can have been no mistake on this
point. If it were proper to refer to the criticisms of the reviewers,
the author would advert, for reasons which will immediately
appear, to the expressed opinion of his friendly critic, in the
"Eclectic Review," that the lectures on regeneration "are far
less elaborate than any of their predecessors." This is, no
doubt, true, in reference to some of those lectures ; nor could
it well be otherwise. In descriptions of the nature and ne
cessity of regeneration, for instance, there is no room for much
originality or elaboration. Yet the author had flattered him
self that there were discussions and statements in other lec
tures of that course, not more unworthy of the reader's atten
tion than any other parts of the volume. Certain it is, that
no questions in theological science have more painfully exer
cised the mind of the author than those which relate to the
nature and mode of that Divine influence which is put forth
in the conversion of men to God. Is it superadded to that
moral tendency or power to enlighten and sanctify which must
ever reside in Divine truth? If superadded, how does it concur
with Divine truth in effecting conversion ? Does it impart ad
ditional moral power to the truth ? or, by some mysterious
operation upon the mind, prepare it to feel the influence of
the truth, and thus secure its triumphs ? If the latter, can any
thing approaching to a distinct account be given of the respec
tive and separate, though united, influence of both in the great
work of regeneration ? These questions will give the reader
some idea of the points on which the author's mind had been
agitated ; and, as he had found rest in certain views, which are,
in some respects, considerably different from those of such
writers as Mr. Fuller and Dr. Williams, with whose general
sentiments on these points his own most nearly accord, it was

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. IX
not, perhaps, unnatural for him to hope that they might afford
some satisfaction to others. He is perfectly aware that he may
have attached undue importance to the statements to which
he refers ; but he would yet venture to call the attention of the
reader to the general statements contained in Lectures XXII.-
and XXIII., on the cause of regeneration; and especially to
the distinction there made between spiritual influence and
spiritual renovation, and between the offices of the truth and
of the Spirit, in the work of regeneration. He hopes he is in
fluenced by no motive in thus specifying particular parts of
the book, save, by one which may be very honourably enter
tained by any author ; — a desire to subject to public investiga
tion statements which appear to him (however the public may
deem him mistaken) adapted to throw some small additional
light over subjects confessedly involved in considerable ob
scurity. Academy House, March 26tk.

CONTENTS.

LECTURE I.
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.
The most general sense of the term, 17 — What is to be traced to sovereignty,
18, 19— How controlled, 19— -What flows from it, and why, 18, 19— Moral
government, how it arose, permits the display of equity, 20 — Controls so
vereignty, and how far, 21 — Sovereignty is not supremacy, nor arbitrariness,
22, 23 — Source of good only, 23 — Respective provinces of equity and sove
reignty, 24 — Restriction of the latter term, 25, 26 — Objections against this
restricted use of the term answered, 26-28 — Manifestations of sovereignty,
28-33.
LECTURE II.
ELECTION.
Meaning of the terms elect, election, 34, 35 — Statement of the doctrine, 36,
37 — Election is not necessarily connected with reprobation, 39-42 — Presup
poses the fallen state of man — Supralapsarianism, Sublapsarianism, 43-46 —
Cause of the Divine purpose to save is not in the saved, 47, 48 — The cause
is not revealed, 49.
LECTURE III.
ELECTION.  PROpF OF THE DOCTRINE.
The proof from reason depends on the point whether God saves man, or man
saves himself, 51, 52 — Election follows as a consequence of the Divine fore
knowledge, 53 — Statements of Mr. Watson, 54, 55 — Scripture proof of
election, 56 — The exclusive points in controversy between Calvinists and
Arminians, 56, 57 — The views of Bishop Tomline and Mr. Watson, 57-60 —
Election is to spiritual blessings, 61-64 — Radical defect of Pelagianism and
Arminianism — The notion of common grace examined, 64-68.
LECTURE IV.
ELECTION. — PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE.
The notion of common grace imparting ability to obey, further examined, 69 —
Distinction between physical and moral power, 70 — Mr. Watson's statements,
71, 72 — Grace communicating power to obey, self-contradictory, 72-74 —
Mr. Watson has not explained the power lost, as he says, by the fall, and re-
communicated by grace, 74-76 — Personal election is unconditional, 77 — Mr.
Watson's views stated, and opposed by scriptural evidence, 77-88.

CONTENTS. XI
LECTURE V.
ELECTION.  OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOCTRINE CONSIDERED.
First, its alleged incompatibility with the Divine goodness, 89 — The objection
considered and replied to, 89-94. Second, its alleged incompatibility with
the justice of God, 95 — The claims of various orders of creatures upon God,
96 — Of accountable creatures — 96, 97 — At the end of their course, 97 — These
general statements applied to the condition of man, 98 — All having sinned,
does equity require the moral Governor to treat all alike ? 99 — What is admit-
ted — special grace emanates from God as a Sovereign — Illustrations, 100-104
— The moral Governor is under no obligation to originate a disposition to
accept mercy, 105 — Consequences of Arminian notions, 106, 107.
LECTURE VI.
ELECTION.  OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOCTRINE CONSIDERED.
Third, its alleged incompatibility with free agency and accountability, 108 —
Is not more incompatible than fore-knowledge, 108, 109 — What is meant by
a free agent, 109, 110 — The Arminian notion of free agency stated and
opposed, 111-114 — Mr. Stewart's notion of the cause of voUtion contro
verted, 115-118 — The amount of freedom possessed by any intelligent^ being,
119, 120.
LECTURE VII.
ELECTION. — OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOCTRINE CONSIDERED.
The preceding statements show tbat predestination does not overthrow free
agency, 121, 122 — nor accountability, 123 — The objection that God is said
to have decreed evil action, considered, 124 — In what sense the crucifixion
of Christ was decreed, 125, 126 — Evil actions in general, 127 — The agency of
God in the ordinary actions of men, 127 — Why punishment follows a wrong
voUtion, 128-130. Fourth, its alleged incompatibility with exhortations to
perseverance, &c, 130 — The amount ofthe objection, 130 — Its validity test
ed, 130, 131— Its fallacy exposed, 131-135.
LECTURE VIII.
THE ATONEMENT.
Its nature, 139— Explanation of the term, 137 — Statement of the doctrine, 137
— Misrepresentation of opponents, 138, 139 — Atonement was required by God,
and rendered to him, as moral Governor, 140 — Supposes that he was dis
pleased, 140 — The nature of that displeasure, 140, 141 — The nature of the
satisfaction which it rendered to God moral, not pecuniary, and the difference
between them, 142-145 — Not effected by Christ's bearing the exact amount
of punishment, 147.

XU CONTENTS.

LECTURE IX.

ATONEMENT.  ITS NATURE.

Proof that- satisfaction was not effected in this way, 148-150 — The precise
nature of moral satisfaction, 151-154 — The amount of suffering which must
be borne by the transgressor to render satisfaction, 155, 156 — By a Sub
stitute, 156, 157 — The connexion between the atonement and forgiveness,
statements of Magee, 158-160.

LECTURE X.
THE NECESSITY OF THE ATONEMENT.
Statements of Magee, 161, 162 — The necessity is moral, and proved by fact,
163— Sentiments of Socinians and Deists, 163, 164 — Pardon not necessarily
connected with repentance, 164-172 — Socinianism and Deism make no pro
vision for repentance, 173, 174.

LECTURE XI.
THE MANNER AND REALITY OF THE ATONEMENT.
Was atonement made by the sufferings of Christ only, or by his obedience also ?
175 — The distinction sometimes made between the active and passive obe
dience of Christ, 175, 176 — Our conceptions of the nature ofthe atonement
must guide our opinions here, 176, 177 — Atonement was made by the entire
work of Christ, pre-eminently by his death, 178, 179 — The nature and ex
tremity of those sufferings, 180-183 — Proof of the reality of the atone
ment, derived first from the state of the Saviour's mind in the endurance of
his sufferings, 184-187.

LECTURE XII.
THE REALITY AND EFFICACY OF THE ATONEMENT.
Proof of the reality, &c, derived, secondly, from the direct testimony of Scrip
ture — First, from those texts which represent Christ as bearing the sins of
men, 188, 189 — Secondly, from those in which Christ is said to have died
for our sins, 190 — Thirdly, from others, in which he is declared to be a pro
pitiation for sin, 191— Fourthly, from those which represent him as «. ran
som, &c; 192 — Fifthly, from those in which reconciliation and peace with
God are represented as the result of his death, 192, 193— Sixthly, from others'

CONTENTS. XU
in which our redemption is ascribed to his death, 195, 196 — Seventhly, from
the passages which connect the remission of sin with his death, 197 — The
reality of atonement argued, thirdly, from the nature and design of ancient
sacrifices, 198-200 — The efficacy of the atonement evinced, first, by the
dignity of his person ; second, by the truths and facts exhibited by his death,
201-203 — Thirdly, by the fact, that the atonement was the performance on
his part of that work which the Father had promised to reward, &c, 203 —
Fourthly, by direct Scripture testimony, 204 — Fifthly, by his resurrection,
205.

LECTURE XIII.
THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.
Opposite views, 206 — Preparatory propositions, 207, 208 — The conclusion to
which they lead — Distinction between the sufficiency and the efficiency of the
atonement, 209. — Between the design of God as a Ruler, and a Sovereign,
210 — The atonement is a general remedy, proved from its nature, 210-213 —
From scriptural invitations, 214, 215 — From the rectoral character of God,
216-219 — Testimonies in support of the general aspect of the atonement,
220, 221 — The design of God in reference to its efficiency limited, 222, 223
— Objection answered, 224, 225 — Mistakes of Arminianism and Ultra Cal
vinism, 226-228.

LECTURE XIV.
JUSTIFICATION.
Its nature, 230 — Distinguished from sanctification, 230 — Defined, 230, 231 —
Wherein Divine and human justification differ, 232 — In what they agree,
232, 233 — Definition of the Assembly's Catechism, 234 — Inquiries to which
it has led, 234 — Justification not eternal, 235-237 — Not a private revelation
of acceptance, 238 — The judicial sentence is in the Scriptures, 239 — What
blessings are included in it, 240-242,

LECTURE XV.
JUSTIFICATION.  THE GROUND OF JUSTIFICATION.
Is not the works of the justified, 243 — Proved by Scripture, and the nature of
the blessing, 243-245 — Is the perfect obedience unto death of Christ, 248,
249 — Improper to distinguish between his active and passive obedience, 250
— Danger of mistake in reference to his representative character, 250, 251 —
Imputation; three statements of its nature, Dr. Crisp's, 252-255.

XIV CONTENTS.

LECTURE XVI.
JUSTIFICATION.  THE GROUND OF JUSTIFICATION CONTINUED.
Mr. Fuller's views of imputation, 256, 257 — The simple and scriptural view,
258 — To count sin or righteousness to an individual is to treat him as a
sinful or righteous man, 258 — This view subverts Antinomianism, 259 —
Imputation of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us, 260 — The
principle involved in the latter, 261 — Illustrated, 261-263 — Import of the
terms Surety, Legal Representative, &c, 264 — Christ's relation to his people
does not identify itself with that of a human surety, 255, 256 — Moral tend.
ency of these views, 2'67, 268.

LECTURE XVII.
JUSTIFICATION.  THE MEANS OF JUSTIFICATION.
Taught by Scripture exclusively, 269 — Proved to be faith, 270 — Faith is be
lief, but belief of the meaning of a narrative or proposition, 271, 272 — Can
not exist without a knowledge of the meaning of the gospel, 273 — Is not
general confidence in God, but the belief of what God says, i. c, the gospel ?
273, 274 — Mistakes of those who include too little in their statements of
faith, Sandemanians, 276 — Faith is not mere assent to the gospel, 276 —
Nor the mere belief of its facts, 277 — But the beUef of their implication, im
portance, and glory, &c, 278. — Mistakes of those who err by redundancy,
assurance does not enter into its nature, 279-283.

LECTURE XVIII.
JUSTIFICATION. — THE MEANS OF JUSTIFICATION CONTINUED.
Faith is an intellectual act or state of mind, not an emotion, 285 — Cordiality,
joy, &c, accompany it, but they spring from revealed excellence, faith from
evidence, 286— -The act of believing is never modified by the truth it receives,
a simple act of faith and of judgment, not, perhaps, radically different, 286 —
Faith is used in its ordinary sense in the New Testament, 287 — Examination of
the phrases, "believing in Christ," ",trustinginhim," &c, 288,289 — Requires
for its existence the special influence of the Holy Spirit, 290 — The difference
between the faith of a Christian and a mere professor, is in the thing or truth
believed, 290 — Different kinds of faith ; from what the notion arose, 290 —
The influence of faith is to be ascribed to the truth believed, and not to the
act of believing, 290-292 — The great practical influence of this distinction,
293-295— Set in opposition to the system of the Rev. J. Caiiile, 296-302.

CONTENTS. XV
LECTURE XIX.
JUSTIFICATION. — THE MEANS OF JUSTIFICATION CONTINUED.
The connexion between faith and justification, 304 — Faith does not justify by
being a perfect fulfilment of duty, the law having abated its claims, 303— Nor
in consequence of its own moral excellence, 304, 305 — The conception that
it does has corrupted the simple and scriptural view of faith, 306-308 —
Dwight's statements exceptionable, 309, 310 — Faith justifies by uniting to
Christ, 311— Statements of Fuller, Edwards, &c, 312-314— Examined, 315,
A distinction without a difference, 315 — To be in Christ, and to beUeve, are
identical, 315, 316— Different senses ofthe phrase, " to be in Christ," 317—
\Jtal union, eternal union, legal union, 317, 318 — Danger of mistake here,
318 — Divine and human suretiship are not identical, 318 — Important quo
tation from John Howe, 319 — The consequences of moral actions extend
by a general law beyond the actors, 320 — Adam and Christ were rather moral
than legal heads, strictly speaking, 321.
LECTURE XX.
JUSTIFICATION.  THE MEANS OF JUSTIFICATION CONTINUED.
Faith justifies by bringing an individual into the body to whom salvation is
promised, 322 — The sentiment unfolded, 322 — The rectoral character of
God requires the establishment of a rule of justification, 323 — Essential to
the manifestation of equity at the day of judgment, that the reward be
bestowed upon those who have compUed with the rule, 324 — Yet not given
in reward of compliance, but of the work of Christ, 324 — Is faith the condi
tion of salvation or justification .' 324, 325 — The different relations of faith to
justification and sanctification, 325 — The new Covenant, 326 — The wisdom
which is developed in connecting faith with justification and sanctification,
327-329 — Objection against gratuitous justification derived from the language
of James, 330, 331 — The reconciling principle between Paul and James,
332, 333.
LECTURE XXI.
REGENERATION.  ITS NATURE.
Distinguished from justification, 334 — MistakeB, 335 — The term indicates a
radical change, 336— And moral, not physical, 336, 337 — Defined — The com
mon distinction between regeneration and conversion not adopted, 338 —
Reasons, &c, no distinct account can be given of regeneration in this re
stricted sense, 338, 339— Is not the scriptural sense of the term, 340— Just
and beUeving apprehensions of Divine things partially constitute regene
ration, 341— Difference between a knowledge of the theory of the gospel,

XVI CONTENTS.
and a perception of its moral glory, 342. — Love to moral excellence another
branch of regeneration, 343— The principle on which this rests, 343 — Sub
jection to the Divine will, an enUghtened and a tender conscience, holy joySj
sorrows, fears, expectations, and pursuits, enter into the nature of regenera
tion, 344-347 — Whether regeneration is previous or subsequent to faith, 347
— Evidences of regeneration, 347 — Inquiries for the reader to make, 348-352.
LECTURE XXII.
REGENERATION.  THE CAUSE OF REGENERATION.
The truth is the proximate or instrumental cause, 353 — To the exclusion of
every other, 354 — Of any additional revelation, 354 — Case of infants, 355 —
Heathen regenerated, 356 — To the exclusion of providential dispensations, 357
— Is adequate to the production of the effect, 358, 360 — The Holy Spirit is the
ultimateand real cause, 360 — Proved by Scripture, 361 — By fact, 362 — The
influence of the Spirit must not be identified with the influence of the truth,
363 — This the error of Socinianism and Sandemanianism, 363, 364 — Does not
give additional power to the truth, 365.
LECTURE XXIII.
CAUSE OF REGENERATION CONTINUED.
Examination of the opinion that Divine influence gives additional power to
the truth, 366-370 — It is direct or not, by means, 370 — Proved by Scrip
ture, and the nature of the case, 370-372 — The controversy between Fuller
and M'Lean, 372— Sentiments of Dwight and Hopkins, 372-378— Dis
tinction between spiritual influence and spiritual renovation, 378 — Divine
influence emanates from God as a Sovereign, proof, &c, 379-381.
LECTURE XXIV.
THE NECESSITY OF REGENERATION.
It is absolutely and universally necessary, 382 — Proof suppUed by Scripture,
383 — By the nature of the case, 387 — The misery of the finally lost grows
out of character, 388 — Regeneration essential to the discharge of the duties
of heaven, 389 — And to the enjoyment of the happiness of heaven, 390.
APPENDIX.
Remarks on certain statements contained in Messrs. Stuart and Haldane's
Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans ; and on the first note attached to
Mr. Gilbert's late work, 395.

LECTURE I.

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD.
The term sovereignty, taken in its most general and com
prehensive sense, denotes, when we speak of God, his right
to do whatever seems good in his sight. It doubtless includes
the prerogative of acting towards the creatures whom he has
formed (we speak not now, it must be observed, of account
able beings) as he pleases. But it clearly comprehends
much more than this : for he had a right to create, or not to
create. That stupendous act of power which gave existence
to the first beings and worlds, was an act of high sovereignty.
No creature can possess any claim upon God before it exists ;
it must, consequently, derive its being from the mere good
pleasure of its Creator. Jehovah owed it to himself alone
to emerge from that state in which he had existed before the
beginning; to exhibit, in the mighty wonders which his
hand has wrought, his own most perfect character ; and then
to form a race of beings capable of appreciating its excel
lence, and of bearing some resemblance to the God who
made them. To Divine sovereignty must then be traced the
determination to create, as well as the subsequent act of
creation itself. Again, when the determination to create, to
speak after the manner of men, had arisen in the mind of the
Deity, it is further manifest that the kind and manner of
existence to be imparted to every creature ; the qualities and
powers to be conferred upon it, — whether it should be con
stituted an organised or an unorganised being, whether it
should possess life or not, — and, if the former, whether it
should enjoy vegetable or animal life, — whether it should
be endowed with instinct merely, or with reason, connecting
with it accountability, — it is manifest that all these points must
have fallen under the exclusive determination of sovereignty.

18 SOVEREIGNTY THE SOURCE OF BEING, &C,
If Jehovah did not owe even existence to the mineral, the
animal, the man, it is even yet more obvious that he could
not owe to the first, organisation ; to the second, life ; to the
third, rationality. Thus, in the bestowment of existence, and
of these varied forms of existence, the Creator exercised his
right to do whatever seems good in his sight.
Further, when beings, endowed with diversified qualities
and powers, have been brought into existence, the Creator
has a right, by virtue of his relation to them, to bestow those
means of enjoyment, and to exact that measure of service,
which he chooses to impart, and to require. The communi
cation of existence, and of a certain mode of existence, to any
being, cannot surely render God a debtor to that being : (still
we speak not, let it not be forgotten, of accountable creatures.)
The bestowment of one favour cannot confer a right upon
the recipient to demand another. It is hence manifest, that
the existence of matter, and the hind of matter, to be found in
any part of the universe, — that the life, and manner of life,
enjoyed by the plant, and the animal, — the faculties, the
comfort, the duration of being, in the case of the latter, are
all to be traced to Divine sovereignty ; they are manifestations
and exercises of God's inalienable right to do whatever seems
good in his sight.
There is thus nothing exterior to God himself to control
the Divine operations. They are, however, controlled by his
own perfections. All those primary acts of sovereignty, to
which reference has been made, were put forth under the
guidance of his own most perfect and blessed nature; and
every subsequent act of sovereignty must, it is manifest, be
in entire accordance with that nature. Now the nature of
God is love; and, consequently, the Divine sovereignty — or
the right to do what he pleases, which we have ascribed to
God — resolves itself into the blessed and holy prerogative to
manifest the essential benevolence of his nature in any way
that seems good to him. Thus, sovereignty becomes the
source of good to the creature, and of good only. It is ma
nifestly impossible that evil should flow, previously to the
existence of a moral system, from the Fountain of perfect

AND OF GOOD ONLY.. 19
benevolence. We must not forget, however, that sovereignty
is the source of good, exclusively of evil; merely on account
of the benevolent character of the Creator, and not on account
of any supposed right to the enjoyment of good on the part
of the creature; for such right can only exist in connexion
with a moral system. God derives his right to do what he
will with the beings whom he creates, from the relation which
he bears to them. It does not rest upon the benevolence of
his character ;¦ it would not be annihilated by a malevolent
character. I am well aware how impossible it is to conceive
of malevolence in connexion with that Being who " is
blessed for ever." Yet an extreme case may be put, for the
sake of illustrating a principle. Let us then admit, for a
moment, the monstrous supposition of a malevolent Creator !
Would he not, even in that case, retain his relation of Cre
ator? — and, with it, a right to do with the creature as he
might choose ? How can it be doubted ? " The potter,"
whatever be his character, " has power over the clay, of the
same lump to make one vessel to honour, and another to dis
honour." It may possibly be objected, that the Creator cannot
have a right to make an innocent creature miserable. We do
not say he has. But the objection falsely and absurdly as
sumes (an assumption overlooked even by Dr. Williams) the
existence of innocence without a moral system ; whereas
nothing can be more manifest than that both guilt and in
nocence owe their existence to a moral system. We never
speak, except figuratively, of an innocent beast, because a
mere animal is not a subject of moral government. The
Creator cannot be unkind to the animal, because he is bene
volent ; but, to deny his abstract right to deal with it as he
chooses, is to remove that right from the foundation on which
the Scriptures uniformly rest it, viz., his relation to it as Cre
ator, and to place it on another ground. The reader is there
fore again requested to observe, that sovereignty becomes th&
source of unmingled good, solely on account of the benevolent
character of the Creator. He is good ; he pleases accordingly
to do good ; and therefore, " his tender mercies are over all
his works."
b2

20 MORAL GOVERNMENT, EQUITY, &C,
The great end of God in creation was to promote his own
glory, i. e., to unfold his character, that it might become the
object of admiration, and love, and confidence ; as well as the
instrumental cause of moral purity, to beings capable of per
ceiving and appreciating its infinite excellence. To secure
this purpose, it was necessary to form a more elevated order of
beings than any we have as yet referred to ; beings endowed
with intellectual and moral powers, with understanding, affec
tions, conscience, will, freedom of choice, &c. The pos
session of these powers — inseparably connected as they are
with accountability — led by necessary consequence to the
establishment of a system of moral government ; the subjects
of which are neither impelled by physical force to fulfil the
great ends of their being, nor prompted by instinct, as in the
case of brutes ; but, receiving intelligible directions from their
Maker in reference to the conduct they should adopt, have
certain inducements presented to their view, adapted to
operate upon the powers with which their minds are endowed,
and thus to secure a voluntary obedience to the law under
which they are placed.
Now it will be perceived that the establishment of a system
of moral government gives room for the development of an
other principle in the Divine conduct ; for the inducements to
obedience, to which we have just referred, are in reality
promises of great ultimate good in case of obedience, and
threatenings of great ultimate evil, in case of disobedience.
In the judgment of the moral Governor, the unerring standard
of moral obligation, this good and this evil constitute what
ought to be experienced by the obedient and the rebellious
subjects of his government. Thus, moral government affords
opportunity for the display of the principle of equity, whose
distinguishing and exclusive office it is, to give to all the sub
jects of the government the precise measure, either of good
or of evil, which they deserve.
It is further evident that the institution of this kind of
government, does not merely afford an opportunity for the
development of equity, but that it brings the: Divine conduct
towards the subjects of that government under the habitual

RESTRAIN SOVEREIGNTY, BUT NOT PREVENT IT. 21
control of that principle. " The whole aspect of God's ways
in regard to them, is changed," says Mr. Hinton, "from
sovereignty to equity. Had nothing existed but his natural
dominion, all would have been characterised by sovereignty ;
but as he has seen good to establish a moral government, of
its whole range, equity is the necessary distinction. Then he
would have treated his creatures as he pleased, that is, with
unmixed kindness ; now he will treat them as they deserve."
Then he might have bestowed upon them any measure of
good which he chose to impart; now he can bestow, except
in special cases, that measure only which they merit by
obedience. It must, however, be especially observed, that though the
establishment of a moral system thus controls the principle of
sovereignty, it does not annihilate it, nor absolutely prevent
its development towards the subjects of that system. Were
the case otherwise, mercy would be totally, and for ever, ex
cluded from the system. The fall of Adam must have en
tailed irreversible condemnation upon the whole race ; since
nothing can be more apparent than that mere equity cannot
save a transgressor. The institution of moral government ,
subjects the Divine sovereignty to control only to that degree /
which is necessary to secure the purposes of that government. '
Within this limit it is perfectly free to expatiate. Sovereignty
may be displayed even where equity would seem to forbid, if j
it; can be done without defeating, or injuriously interfering ;
with, the ends of that government. The great Eternal can
never absolutely give away his right to do good. In the case
of universal transgression, for instance, where the exercise of
sovereignty would seem, at first view, to be absolutely pre
cluded, if some method can be devised by which the efficiency j
of the law, and the consequent stability of the government, /
can be as effectually sustained, while pardon is bestowed upon
a part of the race, as if vengeance had been inflicted upon the
whole, then may the heart of sovereignty indulge its gracious
promptings ; — then may the hand of special grace lead " a
multitude which no man can number," cleansed from their
sins "in the blood of the Lamb," to the foot of the eternal

22 SOVEREIGNTY DIFFERS FROM SUPREMACY;
throne, and into the immediate presence of that great Being
who occupies it.
The preceding statements are adapted to teach us, First,
that we must not confound the sovereignty with the supre
macy of God. There is a nice distinction in meaning be
tween the two terms. God will exercise his supremacy over
fallen angels and apostate men, at the termination of the pre
sent system, but not his sovereignty ; their punishment will
be the unmingled infliction of equity. The term supremacy
points to the rank and station of God. It intimates that he
is possessed of authority over all beings, and all worlds ; that
he exercises uncontrollable dominion over the creatures which
he has formed. It supposes the existence of beings to be
governed, and it is his actual government of them. The term
sovereignty, though doubtless sometimes used loosely to denote
the dominion of God, carries us back, as we have seen, to a
period anterior to the creation. God, strictly speaking, was not
supreme till he had created, — as a man cannot be a ruler
Without subjects, or a father without children ; but he was a
sovereign in the very act of creation. It was his sovereignty,
not his supremacy, which led to the act, — which directed as to
the kind and manner of existence to be imparted, — and which
bestowed upon the different orders of beings formed by him,
all the blessings they enjoyed; for, on account of the infinite
benevolence of his nature, sovereignty becomes to them the
source of unmingled good.
Secondly, that we must be careful not to conceive of Divine
sovereignty as approximating in the slightest degree to arbi
trariness, or capriciousness, in the current acceptation of the
words. It is to be feared that many have fallen into this mis
take; that there has been a proneness, at least in some quarters,
to regard it as a right to act without reason, and even in op
position to law. It becomes us to oppose all such conceptions
of the Divine conduct and government. They are infinitely
dishonourable to God. To act without reason is. the part of a
fool or a madman. That be far from the great Eternal. His
conduct is doubtless often inscrutable to us. How should it
be otherwise ? What but infinite wisdom can comprehend the

IS NOT CAPRICIOUS ; BESTOWS GOOD. 23
plans of an infinite mind? Who but God can explain the rea
sons of his conduct ? No one. Yet he has reasons. The very
highest act of sovereignty, is not a sovereign act in the sense
now opposed, and which too many attach to the term. His
essential and infinite goodness is ever developed under the
guidance of infinite wisdom, and perfect holiness. If he choose
the Jews to be the depositaries of the light of revelation, and
leave the Gentiles for a season in the darkness which they had
chosen ; if he elect one man to life, and permit another to
pursue his own course to eternal death, there is beyond all
question a sufficient reason for these acts of choice; though I
will not venture to affirm that, even by the light of eternity,
this reason will be fully disclosed.
Thirdly, that sovereignty is a source from which, in a moral
system, nothing but good can proceed. It is not a fountain
whence issue sweet waters and bitter. It is never employed
in afflicting, and cursing, and destroying the creatures to
whom it imparts existence, without reason, and in opposition
to law, or even in conformity with law; but in pouring upon
them a stream of blessings, irrespectively of their deserts,
and, in some cases, in opposition to their deserts. It is the
actual source, and it only can be the source of all the good
existing in the system beyond what equity demands; but it
is not required as a cause, nor is it the actual cause, of any
of the evils suffered by those who are connected with the sys
tem. Evil of all 'kinds manifestly springs from another
fountain — the fountain of equity. The punishment threatened
and inflicted, in the whole range of God's moral government, '
is the just desert of the transgressor; and it is the office of
equity, not of sovereignty, to render to any individual his due.
Why should we embarrass ourselves and the subject by retain
ing the self-contradictory phrases, "sovereign justice, sovereign
punishment," (a mode of expression which, in point of ab
surdity, stands on a level with the phrase "equitable mercy,")
and thus represent the punishment as having its source in the
mere pleasure of God, i. e., as not being required by the
nature of the case ? Why do this, when there is another
source — the principle of equity— from which it must neces-

24 THE PROVINCE OF EQUITY AND SOVEREIGNTY.
sarily spring, unless sovereignty lay the hand of merciful
restraint upon its operation ? And how can we venture to
utter so foul a libel upon the God of love, as to affirm that any
suffering can exist in his moral government, which is not to be
proximately traced to some defect or transgression on the part
of the subjects of the government?
It is conceived to be a point of great importance to form
correct conceptions on this subject, and to keep steadily in
view the respective provinces of equity and sovereignty, in the
conduct of God towards rational and accountable agents. The
former gives to all the measure, both of good and of evil, that
is due to them. This is its appropriate and exclusive province.
It cannot move in the slightest degree beyond it; sovereignty
has nothing whatever to do with it. The latter, on the other
hand, bestows good — good exclusively — and good beyond the
desert of its recipient. In a case in which evil is suffered by
a subject of moral government, the Divine proceedings may
develop both equity and sovereignty. Should the full amount
of the suffering due to him not be inflicted, there is a manifest
display of both. Yet, even in this case, the respective province
I of each may be traced with great distinctness. The measure
I of evil which the transgressor endures is inflicted by justice ;
I the portion short of his desert, which is not permitted to over
take him, is held back by sovereignty. Equity punishes,
as far as the punishment goes; sovereignty spares the full
infliction. I beg permission of the reader to fortify my own statements
by the following quotations, which are both adapted to con
firm them, and to throw additional light upon the subject.
" The punishment, even of the guilty," says Dr. Williams,
" (much less of the innocent,) is not an object of Divine
sovereignty. To punish the guilty is the office of equity, which
gives to all their due. For mercy to punish, or justice to
confer undeserved favour, is discordant in thought or lan
guage ; but not more so than sovereign punishment, — without
assuming some other meaning of the term, or disputing about
words. In brief, as equity never disapproves of any creature,
especially a moral agent, where there is nothing wrong, or no

RESTRICTION OF THE TERM. 25
desert; so Divine sovereignty is in no case employed but for
the welfare of its object." (Equity and Sovereignty, 2nd
edition, pp. 126, 127.)
" By sovereignty," says Dr. Fletcher, " I do not mean the
mere supremacy and dominion of God as the natural and
moral Governor of the world ; but I conceive the term is more
appropriate in its application, when restricted to the dis
pensation of grace ; the display of free and unmerited favour
to those who cannot deserve it, and who have, in themselves,
no reason to expect it. It is only in this part of the Divine
administration that any scope can be afforded for the exercise
of sovereignty. In the infliction of punishment, justice takes
its course ; it is the revelation of the righteous judgment of
God ; it is the award of equitable retribution ; the reasons for
that award exist in the character and criminality of the suf
ferer, and it is unnecessary to seek for any other reason." — " In
the determination to punish sinners, as well as in the punish
ment itself, we perceive the process of legal distribution ; the
character of the guilty accounts for their doom. We cannot
resolve this act of the Divine will in the same way in which we
ascribe to that will the bestowment of mercy. It may be the will
of the legislator, the governor, the judge ; but it is not the will
of the Sovereign ; it arises not from the mere good pleasure of
God." In a note attached to a later edition of the admirable
sermon, (Spiritual Blessings,) from which the above passages
are quoted, Dr. F. says, " If the term were in future excluded
from other applications, and considered only as describing that
perfection from which mercy emanates, what injury would re
sult to the system of Divine truth, or to the nomenclature of
theology ? "
To this question of Dr. F.'s, I have no hesitation in reply
ing, that the restriction of the term sovereignty to cases in
which good is communicated without an equitable claim,
would not only prove uninjurious, but would tend to abate the
hostile feeling with which the doctrine of Divine Sovereignty
is apt to be regarded. Much of that feeling has its foundation in
mistake or misrepresentation. It is too commonly thought by
our opponents, that, in advocating the sovereignty of Jehovah,

26 RESTRICTION OF THE TERM.
we practically avow our belief that he has a right to appoint, and
actually exercises the right of appointing, some of the subjects
of his moral government to the endurance of misery — perhaps
final, eternal misery — without any reason on their part for such
an appointment. I take the liberty of assuring them, in the
name of my brethren, that we believe no such thing. We
¦maintain, that conduct, such as they falsely imagine we set
ourselves to defend, would be flagrant injustice, gross and de
testable cruelty, not sovereignty. We consider it utterly im
possible, that, under any righteous moral government, the
subjects of that government should either be appointed to
punishment, or called actually to sustain it, but as the reward
of their crimes.
" The sovereignty of God," says Dr. Russel, " should never
be confounded with his supremacy. The former is the right
he possesses to bestow good of any kind, in any degree, and in
whatever manner he pleases, not only where there is no claim,
but where there is the greatest demerit. It is as absurd, then,
to speak of sovereign justice, as of equitable mercy. The sum
of the whole is, that when men suffer, they do so because they
have sinned, and therefore deserve punishment; and when
they are saved and blessed, they are so of free and sovereign
favour." (Letters, vol. ii., p. 275.)
The sovereignty of God is not, then, the arbitrary inflictor
of evil, for " sovereignty never pains, never punishes at all."
It is, on the contrary, the bestower of good, to which the re
cipient has no claim. It is the blessed source from which the
universe, together with all the life and happiness with which
it abounds, has proceeded. It alleviates the evils which guilt
has brought upon the human race, and secures to the trans
gressor a measure of good which the hand of equity could not
have imparted ; for though the establishment of a moral sys
tem lays a restraint, as we have seen, upon the exercise of this
prerogative, it does not forbid its development when it can
be displayed in harmony with the claims and safety of that
government. It is likely that these views of Divine sovereignty would
have prevailed more extensively than they even do at present,

OBJECTION ANSWERED. 27
but for an objection which has suggested itself to the minds
of some, that, in thus restricting the application of the term
sovereignty, we use a freedom with it which the manner in
which it is employed in reference to earthly rulers does not
warrant. Now it is by no means certain that this would be a
valid objection, even if the case were as it is represented to
be. Divine and human governments are by no means so pre
cisely alike as to render it safe, in all cases, to' reason from the
one to the other. Justification with God is not the same thing
with justification among men. Why might it not, then, be
supposed that the Divine sovereignty is not exactly identical
with human sovereignty? But it may be more than ques
tioned, whether the objection does not rest upon a false as
sumption. When the king signs the death-warrant, he acts in
the capacity of judge ; when he transmits a reprieve, he acts
in the character of a sovereign. He pardons as a king ; he
cannot do it as a judge. Mere equity can only give that which
is due; it cannot, consequently, bestow forgiveness upon a
criminal. And when subordinate judges extend mercy to
an offender, it is done as an exercise of the kingly prerogative,
intrusted to them for the purpose of facilitating and expediting
the proceedings of the court.
Should it be alleged that — in a case wherein certain indivi
duals are selected as proper objects of royal clemency, while
others, guilty of the same general crime, are left to suffer the
sentence of the law — the act of passing over the latter is as
much an act of sovereignty as the act of selecting the former ;
I should be disposed to reply, that it will be found very diffi
cult to support this allegation. There is doubtless an actual
determination on the part of the sovereign to exempt the
former from punishment, since without such determination
they must share the fate of their companions. But what is
meant by the act of passing by the latter ? Does there exist
in the mind of the sovereign a positive volition, an actual de
termination, that they shall suffer? Why, what need is there
for such a determination ? They are condemned already, and
must suffer punishment, without a determination to prevent it.
In what would such a determination, were it ever formed,

28 OBJECTION ANSWERED.
differ from the act of condemning a man already condemned ?
And, in cases where it may be admitted that the chief magis
trate does actually determine that some of the criminals shall
suffer, that determination rests upon their superior guilt; i.e.,
it has its basis in equity, not in sovereignty. A determination
not resting on this ground, if such determination could be
proved to exist, would surely be an instance of that necessary
imperfection which must be expected to mingle itself with all
human proceedings. I again, however, apprise the reader,
that the parallel between the government of God, and that of
man, is not perfect ; and that the term sovereignty will be used
in the following pages, to denote that blessed prerogative,
from which all good, beyond the claim of the recipient, ema
nates; for "in regard to a moral system as such, and every
individual moral agent, whatever is not the effect of equity,
must, of course, be the effect of sovereignty, in the sense de
fined. For to these two principles every thing, as to the
Divine conduct towards such a system, is ultimately reducible.
Abstract from it equitable desert, and sovereign power, and
nothing remains. This position, as it relates to the conduct of
God, to Christian knowledge, and to pious affections, is of the
greatest importance. .But as I never heard or saw it denied,
a formal proof of it appears to be needless. My full conviction
is, that the negation of it, in any given instance, may be re
duced to some absurd consequence." (Williams's Equity and
Sovereignty, p. 126.)
After these general remarks, illustrative of the nature of
sovereignty, it will be expedient to exhibit some of the mani
festations of Divine sovereignty in reference to rational and
accountable beings, for to them, for obvious reasons, our re
marks will be confined.
It will prove, it is imagined, an important guide to just
conceptions to remember that, even in a moral system, sove
reignty is left free, except where it is controlled by equity.
It may act in all cases except where acting is either required
by equity, (for then equity acts,) or contrary to equity. It
cannot, indeed, inflict the punishment upon the rebellious
subject, or bestow the reward upon the perfectly obedient

MANIFESTATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY. 29
subject; for both are required by equity, and what equity
demands, that it does. It cannot, again, except in cases to be
considered afterwards, rescue a transgressor from punishment,
for that is forbidden by equity. But in all other cases God
retains his right, and exercises his right, to do as he pleases —
to manifest his goodness in whatever form or degree it may
seem right to him ; the manifestation being, however, invari
ably guided by the perfections of his most holy and blessed
nature ; and the cases are innumerable in which opportunities
exist, even in a moral system, for the development of sove
reignty. It may, therefore, be desirable to specify a few — ¦
and I merely profess to make a selection — for the sake of still
further illustrating the principle.
First, then, there is room for sovereignty to develop itself
in the bestowment of various kinds and degrees of mental
qualities upon the subjects of the system. Reason, indeed,
understanding by the term those faculties which distinguish
men from animals, without stopping at present to specify
what they are, must be conferred upon all ; and, therefore,
reason is not, in one aspect of the case, the gift of sovereignty.
The Creator did not, indeed, owe it to man as a creature merely,
for he would have done him no wrong if he had not given to
him the human nature, or even not created him at all. But,
determining that man should render to Him an account of his
conduct, the Creator, in this aspect of the case — in reference
to his ultimate* intentions and proceedings towards him —
did owe to him the gift of reason. Now, reason is possessed
by all except idiots and madmen, who cannot be regarded as
accountable beings. No one supposes that the higher powers
of mind — acuteness and vividness of perception, brilliance of
imagination, fertility of fancy, fire of genius, intensity of feel
ing, &c, — are necessary to render man a responsible agent.
No doubt they connect with them higher degrees of responsi
bility, for " where much is given, much will be required ;" but
they are not essential to responsibility itself. All men, with
the exceptions just referred to, possess that kind and degree
of mind which will render it just in God to call them to an
account ; and, therefore, all must appear at length at his tri-

30 MANIFESTATIONS 'OF SOVEREIGNTY.
bunal. Now, as all men, even had they possessed the lowest
grade of mind only, would have been responsible beings, there
was room for sovereignty to develop itself, and it has done so,
in the communication of mental faculties varied in an incredi
ble degree, both as to kind and power. The mind of one man
is marked by infantile weakness, of another by a giant's
strengths Nothing can elevate the former ; nothing perma
nently depress and overpower the latter. His intellect is
comprehensive, 'searching, profound. Scarcely any subjects
elude his notice ; few defy his efforts to unravel and explain
them. In the case of certain persons, the reasoning powers
preponderate ; in that of others, the imaginative. This man
has little judgment, but an exuberant fancy. Another has
received the gift of a piercing intellect, but if it be clear as a
frosty night, it is also as cold. A third is all impetuosity and
fire, but it is a fire that scorches and consumes every thing
that comes in its way. We can account for these diversities
by the principle of sovereignty alone. God " divideth to every
man severally as he will." " He giveth none account of these
matters." He has a right to " do v/hat he will with his own."
Secondly, there is room for the development of sovereignty
in the degree in which providential blessings are communi
cated to men. That inequalities in their external condition
and circumstances, exist, is manifest to all. The questions,
then, which force themselves upon our attention are these:
"Do these inequalities originate with God, or with man?
and, if with the former, are they the results of equity, or sove
reignty?" To attain satisfaction, we must contemplate some
of these inequalities, recollecting, as we proceed, that the
lowest degree of providential good which God has conferred
upon man may be taken as a measure (a large one, no doubt)
of that amount of good, of which equity requires the bestow
ment. God will never give to any subject of a moral system
less than he deserves.
There exists, then, great inequality in the rank or station
of, men. One is a prince, or an emperor, another a beggar
upon a dunghill. Nor in many cases can it even be conceived
that the former was thus elevated on account of his mental or

MANIFESTATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY. 31
moral worth, and that the latter was thus depressed by his
own feebleness or worthlessness ; for the throne is sometimes
filled by a Nero, and the beggar's hut inhabited by one for
whom the Son of God expired on the cross. The cause of
the difference in this case can exist nowhere but in the Divine
sovereignty. And even in other cases, where elevated rank is
gained as the reward of splendid services, or signal worth, very
much of sovereignty is developed. By whom were the talents
necessary to the performance of such services bestowed, or the
disposition which insured their right direction and exercise ?
To whom must we ascribe the needed opportunity for a de
velopment of mental and moral excellence ? Who cleareds
for the one, the way of ascent to the very summit of the hill
of distinction, while, to the other, it remained closed up with
thorns and briers ? Was it not God who placed Pharaoh on
the throne of Egypt ? and is it possible to ascribe his elevation
to any source but goodness, to the exercise of which he had no
conceivable claim ?
There is, further, great inequality among men, resulting
from the different amount of property which they possess.
While some, indeed, are wealthy, vast multitudes are indigent.
And, though we admit that the accumulation of riches is
sometimes the natural, and almost necessary result of fore
thought, penetration, prudence, and steady perseverance, yet
this is not invariably the case. And even where it is so, it
becomes us to recollect, that these virtues themselves, together
with the opportunity for their vigorous and profitable exercise,
are the gifts of Divine sovereignty. Without, however, dwell
ing upon this assertion, it may be asked, why is one man born
rich and another poor ? How is it to be explained, that two
persons, equal in talent and moral worth, obtain such unequal
measures of success ? and especially that the scale of wealth
so frequently preponderates oh that side where there are fewer
intellectual and moral qualities to weigh it down ? The facts
are clearly to be resolved into Divine sovereignty. God is
here exercising his right of bestowing the bounties of his pro
vidence upon men as it seems good in his sight..
There is, finally, great inequality amongst men in regard to

32

MANIFESTATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY

the measure of bodily sufferings they are called to endure.
One man can scarcely recollect the period when his rest and
quiet were not broken in upon by the irruption of disease and
pain ; another cannot remember the day when he suffered a
single attack from either ! Now, if we had found it necessary
to admit that man is the maker of his own fortune, all must
allow that health is the exclusive gift of God. To what
source is it, then, to be ascribed ? To equity, or sovereignty?
Have transgressors any right to immunity from disease and
suffering ? Why, what claim upon God have they for any thing
but suffering ? It is impossible to account for the fact, that
of two individuals, equal in point of moral worth, one is the
constant subject of bodily infirmity, and the other the habitual
possessor of health, but by admitting that the hand of sove
reignty confers upon the latter a measure of good to which he
has no claim.
Thirdly, there is room for a development of sovereignty in
the degree in which religious privileges are conferred upon
men. Great disparity, in this point of view, is to be seen
in the external condition of nations. The Jews were for
merly the depositaries of Divine revelation. " To them per
tained the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants," &c.
Their fertile and peaceful valleys were illumined by the rising
beam of Divine truth, while " darkness covered the whole
earth besides, and gross darkness the people." Nor were
they thus distinguished because they were better than other
nations. If we believe the records of inspired truth, it was
solely because the Lord loved them. The peculiar privileges
they enjoyed were the gifts of sovereignty ; and the language
of acknowledgment on their part should have been, " It is
even so, Father, because so it seemeth good in thy sight."
And to what ultimate cause is it to be ascribed that some
nations in the present day enjoy the revelation of Divine
mercy, while others remain in the darkness of heathenism ?
Is it possible to assign any reason for this fact, except that
God, who may dispense his gifts as it pleases him, has so
operated upon the hearts of his people, and so arranged the
proceedings of his providence, as to make way for its intro-

MANIFESTATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY. 33
duction into one quarter, while he has permitted the barriers
against its progress in another to remain ?
There is, also, a very remarkable difference in the situation
of individuals, as well as of nations, in this point of view.
Some have experienced the high privilege of a godly parent
age, and of early religious instruction; while others, at an
early period of life, were initiated into the mysteries of ini
quity. Many there are who find ready access to the means of
grace, and can avail themselves of an able, and faithful, and
searching gospel ministry ; while not a few are either excluded
altogether, by the infelicity of their circumstances, from the
ordinances of Divine worship, or have access to no ministry,
save that which has never yet been the means of converting a
single sinner from the error of his ways. How is this great
disparity to be accounted for? It will not be denied that the
hand of Divine Providence is to be traced in it. We are con
strained, therefore, to think that that hand is guided in all its
operations and allotments by the principle of sovereignty.
The grand and paramount display of Divine sovereignty,
in reference tc? individuals, is, however, the exertion of that
holy influence upon the minds of the chosen to salvation, by
which they are brought to the knowledge and belief of the
gospel ; together with the Divine purpose to exert this influ
ence, of which it is at once the index and the accomplishment.
It would seem, accordingly, to be necessary to enter here upon
an examination of the doctrine of effectual calling, as well as
of eternal and personal election. Many considerations, how
ever, induce me to confine my attention to the latter, and
merely to aim at illustrating and establishing the former, as
far as its elucidation and proof may be required to strengthen
the chain of evidence in support of the great doctrine of eternal
and personal election.
In the further prosecution of this subject, it may be expe
dient to adopt the following order: — First, to present the
reader with a scriptural statement of the doctrine itself;
Secondly, to adduce the proof which may be appealed to in
support of it; and, Thirdly, to reply to the objections which
have been urged against it.

LECTURE II.

ELECTION.

STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE.

In the prosecution of the proposed plan, I shall, I., endea
vour to lay before the reader a scriptural statement of the
doctrine of Election, as illustrative of the Divine sovereignty.
The verb elect, means to select, or choose. When God is
said to elect an individual, the simple import of the phrase is,
that he chooses that individual ; the ultimate end for which he
chooses him, the blessings which he selects him to enjoy, are
left to be gathered from the context; in reference to this
point, the verb elect itself can manifestly afford us no aid.
The abstract term election denotes, accordingly, either
the act of electing, which may be regarded as its primary and
proper meaning ; or the person or persons elected, which is
obviously a derivative and less proper signification. Without
meaning to deny that the term election is sometimes used
by the New Testament writers in the secondary or deriva
tive sense, (though it may be well to observe that, even in the
cases in which it is thus used, it necessarily implies the pri
mary sense, as a performance implies an act of performing,
— a production, an act of producing,) the reader is requested
to bear in mind, that the word election will be used, in the
subsequent pages, to denote the act of choice on the part of
God, and not the being or beings chosen. I have been more
especially induced thus to fix the sense of the term election,
previously to any attempt to explain the doctrine of eternal
and personal election, by the extremely vague and unsatis
factory manner in which the word is dealt with by one of the
most modern and able defenders of Arminianism in this
country, the Rev. Richard Watson, in his " Theological In-

VAGUE STATEMENTS OF MR. WATSON. 35
stitutes." He fixes upon three senses of the word election,
which, as he conceives, are contained in the Scriptures;
"first, the election of individuals to perform some special
service ; second, the election of nations, or bodies of people,
to eminent religious privileges ; and, thirdly, the . election of
individuals to be the children of God, and the heirs of eternal
life." Now it is especially to be observed, that the term elec
tion, in each of the above instances, is used, and can only be
used, in what I have ventured to call its primary sense. Elec
tion does not mean either the persons elected, or the bless
ings to the enjoyment of which they are elected, but God's
act of electing or choosing them ; and I have not the slightest
doubt that such was the meaning which Mr. Watson, in
writing these sentences, intended to convey. And yet, in the
subsequent discussion, he inadvertently departs from this
sense of the term — now using it to denote the persons elected,
and then, again, the blessings which they are chosen to en
joy — and wandering so strangely from one sense of the term
to another, that he involves the whole subject in perplexity,
" The nation of the Jews were," he says, " deprived of elec
tion ; the election was offered to them first." Now what
can be the meaning of the term election here ? What was
offered to the Jews? Surely a blessing, or a privilege; — not
an act of God. They were invited to enter into the Christian
church. The privilege of sonship was offered to them. Had
they complied with the invitation, that compliance would have
proved that God had elected them to be his sons ; but he did
not and could not offer to them the act of choosing them to
the enjoyment of that distinguished privilege. I do not won
der at this departure from the primary sense of the term
election. It is the tendency of Arminianism to fix attention
more upon what man does when a sinner is converted to God,
than upon what God does in his conversion. If the latter be
brought prominently into view, then, as God's acts are insepa
rably connected with his decrees, (his purposes being his
actions in intention, and his actions his purposes in accom
plishment,) the conclusions of Calvinism can scarcely be avoided.
As an instance of this tendency, I may refer to the Arminian
c2

36 ELECTION IS GOD S PURPOSE
mode of explaining the language of the apostle, " called ac
cording to his purpose." " The term called," we are told,
"sometimes means invited; at other times it means compli
ance with the invitation ;" and this, it is said, is the sense of
called here. I answer, that nothing can be a more obvious
mistake. The words point out not the compliance of man,
but that gracious influence of the Holy Spirit by which the
compliance is secured.
By the term election, then, we mean an act of choice on
the part of God. When the term is used in its most import
ant application, in the sense which it bears in the creed of
those who maintain the doctrine of eternal and personal elec
tion, (which doctrine we now proceed to unfold and establish,)
it denotes, according to the statement usually given of that
doctrine, God's act of choosing some members of the human
family to enjoy eternal life through sanctification of the Spirit,
and belief of the truth ; — the first member of the sentence
exhibiting the end, and the concluding member the means,
through which this end is attained. It may be wished, per
haps, that a statement of the doctrine, more entirely accord
ant with the facts of the case, had been substituted in lieu of
this: for, in strict accuracy, it cannot be said that God
directly decrees that any man shall believe the gospel, and
persevere unto the end, and inherit eternal life ; but that he
determines to visit him with that special influence of the Holy
Spirit which will certainly secure these delightful results. It
is important to observe, that the decrees of God are exactly
co-extensive with the actions of God. They reach as far as
the latter, but they do not go beyond them. " God does what
he decrees, and decrees what he does." Now God does not
repent, and believe, and love, and obey ; he does not accord
ingly decree that repentance, and faith, and love, should exist.
It is man that gives credit to the Divine record — that perse
veres unto the end. That which God does, in the whole of
this business, is the exertion of that special grace which leads
men so to act as to secure their salvation. And this it is that
God decrees to do. Election is, then, God's purpose to exert
upon the minds of certain members of the human family that

TO BESTOW GOOD ONLY. 37
special and holy influence which will secure their ultimate
salvation. Yet, as he knows perfectly what will be the result
of that influence, and as he employs it to secure this result, it
is in harmony with scriptural phraseology to say, that the
result is both decreed and effected by Him. God withdrew
from Pharaoh those restraints of his providence which, while
they remained, prevented the full development of his depra
vity ; but as he foresaw the consequence of that withdrawment,
and, as it is not, perhaps, too much to say, that the with
drawment was designed to afford an opportunity for that
development, he is declared " to have hardened the heart of
Pharaoh." On the same principle, he is said to have chosen
some men to salvation ; i. e., he has chosen them to become, in
his own time and manner, the recipients of that special and
holy influence which will secure their salvation. With this
explanation of the common statements of the doctrine of elec
tion, they may be allowed to stand, and there will be no ne
cessity to disturb the usual phraseology upon the subject.
In proceeding to lay before the reader a more full account
of the doctrine of election, it is deemed advisable to proceed
by the method of calling his attention to the following series
of remarks : —
1st, then, I would request him to notice, that the object
of the electing decree is to secure good — infinite good — to
man, and not evil ; in other words, it is the choice of some to
salvation, (in the sense explained above,) and not the choice of
any to damnation. It is the determination of God to impart
converting grace to certain individuals ; but it is not a counter
determination to deny converting grace to the remainder; far
less a determination, formed without any reference to their
state and character, that they shall ultimately perish. In
short, the electing decree includes none but those who will
appear ultimately around " the throne of God and the Lamb."
There is no reprobating decree ; none at least which can be
regarded as the proper opposite of the electing decree.* I
* I must not be understood here to deny that, since God foresees who will
finally reject the gospel, and since he will condemn them hereafter for rejecting
it, there must have existed in his mind, from eternity, a determination to per-

38 ELECTION IS NOT NECESSARILY
found my confidence in the correctness of these important
assertions upon the fact, that predestination is, by the sacred
writers, uniformly represented as being connected with glori
fication, and not with condemnation. The elect are said to
be " chosen to salvation." There is no election, properly so
called, of any to damnation. " Moreover," says the apostle,
"whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom
he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them
he also glorified."
It is true, indeed, that Arminians are in the habit of affirm
ing that the doctrine of election cannot be consistently held,
without connecting with it the doctrine of reprobation ; since
a decree to save some, as they allege, necessarily implies a
decree to punish, or not to save others. Mr. Watson, for
instance, assures us, that "election involves necessarily the
doctrine of the absolute and unconditional reprobation of all
the rest of mankind." (Vol. iii., p. 68.)
Calvin, also, in the earlier part of his life at least, held, that
election and reprobation are inseparably connected with one
another; and many, it is admitted, in the present day, who
adopt generally that scheme of doctrine which is distinguished
by his name, seem unable to conceive that an actual and un
conditional decree to save some, can be separated from a counter
actual and unconditional decree, to condemn or not to save
others. I am myself fully convinced that the two things are
by no means inseparable — that they do not even seem neces
sarily to involve each other. I think so for the following
reasons amongst others : —
First, the proper opposite of a decree to save some of the
human race only — or rather, that which such a decree neces
sarily involves, and without which it cannot possibly exist —
is merely the absence or non-existence of a decree to save the
rest. This I believe to be the fact of the case. There is a
decree to save some members of the human family, and there
form this specific act of condemnation equally with all other acts. But this
determination, resting on foreseen impenitence, is not the proper opposite of
the electing decree, which is unconditional, and, therefore, must not be regarded
as that reprobating decree which is said to be inseparable from predestination.

CONNECTED WITH REPROBATION. 39
is no decree to save the remaining members of that family.
Any real difficulty in which this statement of the facts of the
case may involve us, if there- should be any, we must, of
course, meet and grapple with as we best can ; for a decree,
comprehending certain individuals only, cannot, of course, in- f^Lnf -¦
elude the others. If God decreed that the present universe,/ .,,,..
only should have existence, he did not and could not decree ^
that another should spring into being. If he decreed that man
alone, of all the creatures in this world, should possess ration
ality, he did not, of course, decree that the beast should be a
rational being.
But it is objected, that the absence of a decree to save the
non-elect does not constitute all that is necessarily implied in
a decree to save the elect — that, in addition to this, it must '
comprehend an actual positive decree not to save them. I
observe, therefore,
Secondly, That this position, or, that a decree to save
some, implies of necessity an actual decree not to save others —
cannot be maintained without the admission of a general prin
ciple, the practical acknowledgment of which would lead to
interminable difficulty, and to great absurdity. God saves
men, as we have seen, by exerting upon their minds that spe
cial and holy influence which infallibly secures their salvation.
This is what he does; this is what he decrees to do. Now
there is no principle on which it can be justly asserted, that
God cannot determine to exert this influence upon the minds
of some, without positively determining not to exert a similar
influence on the minds of the rest, but this, viz., that whenever
he determines to impart a certain blessing to one of his creatures,
he must positively determine not to bestow the same blessing
upon others; or, to generalise the principle yet more com
pletely, that, when he actually determines to perform that one
act — out of thousands or millions of others, all of which are
equally possible to him — which he ultimately does perform, he
at the same time positively determines not to perform the
millions of others he does not ultimately perform. The false
hood and absurdity of the principle, when thus generalised,
becomes perfectly apparent. In reference to man, there must

40 ELECTION IS NOT NECESSARILY
be an actual determination to do that which he does ; there
may also, perhaps, be a positive determination not to do
that which he does not do; but this is not necessarily the
case. In reference to the vast multitude even of contem
plated actions, which are not ultimately performed by us,
there is no positive volition at all in the mind; all that can
be said is, that they awaken no determination to perform
them, and so are not performed. I may determine to relieve
one out of twenty destitute families in my neighbourhood,
without positively determining not to relieve the others ; and
if any one should ask me why others are not relieved, it would
be sufficient to reply, that the giving of actual relief can only
spring from a determination to relieve, which, in reference to
them, does not exist. I may determine to take one book from
the shelf, without a positive determination not to take the
others. There may, indeed, be such a determination, but it
is not necessarily implied in the determination to take ; — and
that is all I am obliged to prove ; — the other books may not
even be thought of.
This reasoning applies with yet greater force to the Great
Eternal. There must exist in the mind of God a determination
to do what he actually does, because his actions are the result
of his volitions, or determinations. But where God does not
act — where he does nothing — he determines nothing. It is
childish to suppose that, because when he acts, there must be
a determination to act, when he does not act there must be a
determination not to act ; since a determination is necessary
to a state of action, but it surely is not necessary to a state of
rest. When Jehovah created the present universe, is it ne
cessary to suppose that there existed in his mind a positive
determination not to create any of the other possible uni
verses which were present to his view? Surely not. He
created the present universe; there must, therefore, have
been a determination to create it. He did not create the
others ; and all that can be said is, there was no determination
to create them. When he communicated vegetable and
animal life to the plant, and to the beast, what did that com
munication imply concerning his determination ? Clearly

CONNECTED WITH REPROBATION. 41
nothing more than that he resolved to do what he has done.
No one can safely affirm, that he positively determined not to
give to either of them rationality. The simple fact of the
case is, that he did not determine to bestow the latter bless
ing, and consequently did not impart it. The determinatioii
to give vegetable and animal life was necessary to the existence
of the plant and the animal ; but a determination that neither
should be rational beings, was not necessary to prevent either
from becoming such: there is, accordingly, no reason what
ever to suppose that such a determination existed. When
God determined to save man, did that volition necessarily
imply a positive determination not to save the angels who
kept not their first estate? No one, it is presumed, will
answer in the affirmative. It implied, indeed, that fallen
angels were not included in the merciful purpose of God —
that there was no volition to save them ; but no degree of
ingenuity can gather any conclusion beyond this, from the
facts of the case. Why then should a positive determination,
on the part of God, to save some of the human family, be
supposed to imply of necessity a counter and positive deter
mination not to save the other members of the family ? Not
to save men, is not to act — it is just doing nothing. Now
what reasonable pretence is there for affirming that — since
when God acts, he must determine to act — when he does not
act, he determines not to act? In confirmation of the pre
ceding remarks, I beg the reader's particular attention to the
following statement, by the late Dr. E. Williams, which points
out very happily the source of the fallacy, in which many per
spicacious minds are entangled upon this subject.
" That election and reprobation are inseparably connected,
takes for granted what can never be proved, that non-election
implies a decree. Non-election is a negative term, not
electing : but to decree a negation is as absurd as to decree
nothing, or to decree not to decree. The notion of decreeing
to permit, involves the same absurdity ; for to permit, in this
connexion, is_ not to hinder ; but to decree not to hinder, is
the same as to decree nothing ; or, as before, to decree not to
decree. The fallacy consists in the supposition, that non-
D

42 ELECTION IS NOT NECESSARILY
election is a positive term, and therefore requires a positive
determination by way of decree. The truth of the case is,
that, on supposition of one million being elected to holiness
as the means, and happiness as the end, the other million is
not elected to holiness and happiness. These two things are
as opposite as doing and not doing; but to suppose an infi
nitely perfect Being to decree what he does not do, is incom
patible; for it supposes him to decree to do what he decrees
not to do. It is, indeed, perfectly scriptural and rational to
say, that whatever is done by an infinitely wise Being is done
according to design, an unvarying purpose, which is properly
called a decree ; but what meaning can there be in his decree
ing to do the contrast to his doing ?
" The same reasoning is applicable to preterition. The
mind, without due attention to caution, is apt to be deceived
by the feeling which attaches a positive idea to the term, or
the thing intended by it. We are disposed by common asso
ciations to conclude, that, as to pass by is an act of a person,
so the object passed by requires a designed determination for
the purpose. But this is a fallacious conclusion. When a
shepherd, for instance, passes by a number of sheep, and fixes
upon one, a voluntary act of choosing that one does not im
ply another voluntary act to pass by others. He knows all
alike, and his wisdom selects the object of his choice, and this
object he actually chooses, the others he passes by ; but what
is thus expressed by a positive term, implies nothing positive
with respect to the objects." And thus, he proceeds to show,
it is with respect to God. He determines to save some, in
the sense already explained ; but that determination by no
means involves a counter determination in regard to others.
There exists in the Divine mind the determination to save,
and nothing else.
If it were necessary to pursue this subject further, an ad
ditional illustration might be gathered from the conduct of
God. It is said, by the objector, that there cannot be a
decree on the part of God to save some, without a counter
decree not to save the rest. Then why should not, I ask, the
act of saving some, necessarily involve the opposite act of des-'

CONNECTED WITH REPROBATION. 43
troying the rest? Why should two opposite decrees more cer
tainly and necessarily involve one another, than two opposite
acts? Now an Arminian admits that God saves those who
are saved, while he denies that he destroys those who are lost.
Any effort, then, which he may successfully make to show
that the former does not include the latter, is just an answer
to his own objection. But,
Thirdly, I oppose the opinion, that there exists in the mind
of God a positive determination not to save the non-elect, on
the ground that such a determination would be altogether
unnecessary, and therefore does not exist. God does nothing
in vain — decrees nothing in vain. Why suppose, then, the
existence of a decree not to save certain members of the
human family, when every member of that family must
finally perish, without a decree to prevent his destruction?
Where would be the use of such a decree ? It would be
like a special decree to permit the fire to burn, or the water
to drown us, when exposed to the unrestrained action of
either of these elements. Would such a decree be compatible
with infinite wisdom? The full influence and tendency of
this statement will become more apparent when the reader
has considered the next general observation, explanatory of
the doctrine of election.
2ndly, I observe, then, that God's act of choosing some of
the human race to salvation — or the electing decree- — pre-sup-
poses the fallen state of the whole race. Since Jehovah is an
immutable Being, all his views and determinations must be
eternal like himself. One decree cannot therefore be previous,
in the order of time, to another decree ; yet in the order of
nature, as we call it, it may be, and indeed must be so. At
all events, it is impossible for us to conceive of the Divine
actions and decrees, but as related to, and dependent upon,
one another. Thus, for instance, we cannot imagine a pur
pose to punish man arising in the Divine mind, except as
subsequent, in the order of nature, to his contemplation of
the sin of man ; and, indeed, as the result of it. It is thus
with a purpose to save man. Such a purpose necessarily
implies that man needed salvation. It could not then have

44 SUPRALAPSARIANISM.
arisen, in the order of nature, previously to Jehovah's concep
tion of man as a guilty and depraved being. I am not ignorant
that the contrary of this has been affirmed. Supralapsarian-
ism, for instance, teaches that the electing decree was passed
without any reference to the fall ; — that the human race were
not contemplated by it as transgressors; — that not only were
some members of that race appointed by it to endure ever
lasting torments, as well as others to enjoy eternal felicity, but
that the appointment, in the case of the former as well as of
the latter, was made without regard to character and desert;
— that, in short, God determined to glorify his justice in the
condemnation of some, as well as his mercy in the salvation
of others; and, to effect this purpose, decreed the fall and
ruin of the whole race.
Now, as it becomes every writer to speak of any sentiment on
which he has occasion to treat, let it have been held by Calvin
or Arminius, or any one else, just as he thinks of it, I feel
myself constrained to add, that I know no term, either in
any living or dead language, sufficiently strong to express
my abhorrence of this doctrine. That it has never been
held, and that it cannot be held, by a Christian, I should,
indeed, be backward to affirm ; but that it is deeply injurious
in its tendency, as well as that it evinces a state of profound
ignorance of the first principles of moral science, and great
regardlessness of the word of God, I can have no doubt. How
can any one contrive to persuade himself that a decree, eman
ating from a moral governor, (and such is God,) and appointing
a considerable number of the subjects of his government to
misery— eternal misery, which is not founded on their trans
gression, can be compatible with justice ? Why, what is jus
tice? Is it not rendering to every individual that which is
his due— what he deserves ? And how can any one but a trans
gressor deserve punishment ? How then can any one who is
not contemplated in the light of a transgressor— who is viewed
merely as a creature— be destined to punishment? Besides,
this notion of the Supralapsarians, incompatible as we have
thus seen with equity, is inconsistent, and grossly absurd.
If suffering were to be inflicted upon an innocent subject of

SUPRALAPSARIANISM, SUBLAPSAR1AN-ISM. 45
moral government — or, what is the same thing, upon one who
was regarded as innocent — it would not be punishment to
him. Punishment is not mere misery, but misery which is
the result of transgression. Condemnation is a legal act —
the act of the judge applying the general threatenings of the
law to the case of the particular individual before him. An
innocent man may, indeed, be unjustly condemned, i. e., he
may be falsely assumed to be guilty ; but, if he be held to be
innocent, he cannot be condemned at all. No judge would
dare to condemn him, or rather could condemn him. An order
to imprison or hang him would be brutal and bloody violence,
but it could not be condemnation ; since this latter is the for
mal declaration of the court, of the amount of suffering to
which an individual has exposed himself by his transgression ;
or, which is the same thing to the argument, his assumed
transgression ; whereas, by supposition, he is held by the court
to be innocent. And yet Supralapsarianism talks of God's
decreeing certain individuals to condemnation and punishment,
who are, at the very moment, held to be innocent. Never
was there a notion more self-evidently absurd than this. It
is something like imagining a man continuing a man, when
bereft of reason ; and a brute continuing a brute, when en
dowed with it.
Sublapsarianism affirms, that the reprobating decree (for
it holds a reprobating decree distinct from the general law of
the Divine government, that " the soul that sinneth shall
die") is founded on foreseen transgression; and that it thus
declares practically what is the due reward of transgression.
There is, accordingly, the broadest and strongest possible line
of demarcation between the two systems ; and it is to me a
subject of deep regret that a man so justly eminent as the
late Dr. Dick should speak as if the difference were slight
and immaterial. There may be difficulties, and there certainly
are difficulties, when we proceed to inquire into the manner
in which the whole race sank into condemnation ; but they
belong to another subject, and should not be considered in
connexion with this. The radical difference between the two
systems — a difference which should never be lost sight of, is

46 ELECTION PRE-SUPPOSES THE FALL.
this ; viz., that the one system decrees guilty, and -the other
innocent, beings to punishment.
The electing decree then pre-supposes the fallen state of
man. I argue this on two grounds.
First, on the ground of what -that decree is in itself. We
have seen that election, accurately speaking, is not the choice
of any of the human race to salvation ; but God's purpose or
determination to visit the elect with that special and holy
influence of his Spirit which, by certainly leading them to
understand and believe and obey the gospel, secures their sal
vation. Now an influence which brings its subjects to the
knowledge and faith of Divine truth, must of course find them
unenlightened and impenitent, i. e., in other words, fallen
creatures ; and, consequently, a decree to visit them with this
influence must contemplate them in this point of view. I
must not, however, forget that a certain class of theologians
attempt to evade the force of this argument by affirming, that
the preceding statements misstate the final end of election, —
that the special influence of the Spirit, to which we have just
referred, is exerted not to recover, but to confirm ; not to
rescue from ignorance, and guilt, and depravity, but to pre
vent a lapse into these evils. The elect, they tell us, never
fell under condemnation ; the object of the Saviour's interpo
sition being to preserve them from this mighty mischief. I
take, therefore, the next ground, and argue,
Secondly, that the electing decree contemplated men as
fallen and condemned, is evident from the current phraseology
of Scripture upon this subject. If the persons comprehended
in that decree had been regarded as sinless, they must of
course have been predestinated to remain in a state of inte
grity ; and then the current phraseology of Divine revelation
must also have been, not that the elect were appointed to be
rescued from sin, and guilt, and misery, but to be preserved
from falling into these evils. Such, however, is not the current
phraseology of Scripture. " For whom he did foreknow,"
says the apostle, " he also did predestinate to be conformed to
the image of his Son." Now, is this language which the
apostle would have thought of using — which the Spirit of God

ITS CAUSE IS NOT IN THE ELECT. 47
would have prompted him to use — if, when the electing de
cree was passed, they had been contemplated as actually con
formed to it ? In that case, must not Paul have said, " For
whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate, that, being
conformed to the image of his Son," they might remain so ?
It is scarcely possible to conceive of any thing more self-evi
dent, than this. Still more conclusive, however, is the lan
guage he employs in his epistle to the Ephesians : " Blessed
be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath
blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in
Christ: according as he hath chosen us in him before the
foundation of the world, that we should be holy, and without
blame before him in love." Who can doubt, on reading these
words, that the choice must have contemplated them as un
holy ? To the same effect, also, is the declaration, that " God
hath from the beginning chosen his people to salvation."
The choice must then have regarded them as destitute of
salvation ; as being in fact the children of wrath, even as
others. 3rdly. The next general remark upon the great subject
of election is, that the cause of the Divine purpose to save
some of the fallen race is not to be found in the elect them
selves. They were not chosen to salvation on account of their fore
seen repentance, and faith, and obedience ; for faith and repent
ance, as we have seen, (and as I shall hereafter show more
at large,) are the fruit and not the root of predestination. We
are " chosen in Christ," not because we were holy, or because
we were contemplated as holy, but that we might become holy.
"As many as were ordained to eternal life believed."
Nor were they selected from the mass of mankind, and
chosen- to become the recipients of special and saving influ
ence, because their sins were less numerous and aggravated
than those of others. Had this been, the case, salvation would
at least have appeared to be' of works; whereas the apostle
declares, that " God hath saved Us, and called us with an holy
calling, not according to our works, but according to his own
purpose and grace, which was given to us in Christ Jesus,

48 ITS CAUSE IS NOT IN THE ELECT.
before the world began ;" and, further, that " it is not of him
that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth
mercy :" or, in other words, that the mercy of God towards
those who are ultimately brought to share in it, is uncaused
by any thing in them. Further, to suppose that the elect
were appointed to salvation because their amount of guilt was
less than that of others, would lay for them a ground of boast
ing, in opposition to the revealed design of God in communi
cating the Gospel to the world, viz., to bring down the lofty
looks of man. Finally, the sentiment opposed is at variance
with the facts of the case. I am well aware what extreme
difficulty is involved in pronouncing a judgment upon the •
comparative amount of guilt with which different individuals
are chargeable ; yet it would be worse than absurd to deny that
sometimes, yea, frequently, individuals are made the subjects
of Divine grace, who had sunk to a lower degree in the scale
of moral worthlessness and degradation than others : and, by
rendering them the monuments of his compassion, Jehovah
shows that he "has mercy on whom he will have mercy."
Paul felt and declared that he was the chief of sinners, yet
he obtained pardon ; and his language is very memorable :
" Howbeit, for this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first
Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern
to them which should hereafter believe on him to life everlast
ing," (1 Tim. i. 16.) It is especially in this aspect that the
doctrine of election so strikingly displays and magnifies the
Divine sovereignty. It affords an example of the communi
cation of good to man — the highest good — spiritual good —
eternal good, which was not attracted towards him by a mani
festation on his part of moral excellence, nor even by a less
full and obnoxious development of moral degradation; and
which, therefore, can only have flowed from the fountain of
Jehovah's infinite compassion. " Oh, the depths of the riches
both of the wisdom and knowledge of God ! how unsearch
able are his judgments, and his ways past finding out !" " Who
hath given to him ? and it shall be recompensed unto him
again. For of him, and through him, and to him are all
things, to whom be glory for ever. Amen."

IS NOT REVEALED. 49
4th, The last general remark, explanatory of the doctrine
of election, is the following, viz., that we must be careful
not to imagine that no cause exists for the sovereign favour
conferred upon the Vessels of mercy, because that cause is
not to be found in them. To maintain the latter — or that
the purpose of God is uncaused by any thing in the saved
themselves — is necessary to secure to Divine sovereignty
the honour of man's salvation. To suppose the former, is
to charge capriciousness and folly upon the Great Eter
nal. " It is one thing for there to be no reason in the
creature for the purpose of mercy concerning him ; it is
another thing for there to be no reason at all." " It is
one thing," says Dr. Burder, " to have a reason, and ano
ther, and a very different thing, to assign a reason." The
latter God has not seen fit to do; yet, though he has drawn
a veil of impenetrable mystery over them, he has reasons
for his conduct. Our opponents, for the sake of gaining an
advantage, may represent our views of election as charging
capriciousness upon God. We maintain that there is, and
can be, no capriciousness ; but merely the absence of revela
tion. And the absence of revelation on this point, being in .
harmony with the Divine conduct in relation to other mat
ters, is what might have been expected. How can we ima-
. gine that the great God would unfold the reasons of his pro
ceedings to men, except where the disclosure might prove
essential to their welfare ? And how do we know that a
revelation of the reasons which led him to choose some men
to life, and not others, would be of any benefit to us ? Had
he taken us into his councils in reference to other things, we
should have been more entitled to expect a similar communi
cation on this point. But has he done it? Why did he
select the present universe, and not create others? Has he
told us ? Why did he give rationality to man, and not confer
it upon the beast ? Has he given us " any account of these
matters ?" Why did he choose some to life ? The question
is, doubtless, unanswerable, but not more so than ten thou
sand others. Where God does not please to give us light,
we may be assured that it is best for us to remain in dark-
E

50 IS NOT REVEALED.
ness. Let us learn to exercise that confidence in his wisdom
and goodness, in this the highest exercise of his sovereignty,
to which all those parts of his conduct which he has been
pleased to explain have clearly entitled him ; and sit down
contented with the assurance, that the Judge of all the earth
will do that which is right.

LECTURE III.

ELECTION.

PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE.

II. We advance now to the second main division of this great
subject, in which we are to state the evidence to which we ap
peal in suppprt of the doctrine of eternal and personal election.
Is there any foundation in reason, or in Scripture, to sustain
the confidence we cherish, that all who shall appear at length
around the throne of God, in the heayenly temple, were des
tined, in the eternal -purpose of God, to occupy that exalted
station? pr — according to that more precise view which we
have given ofthe doctrine — were chosen to be the recipients
of that special and saving influence of the Holy Spirit which
secures their admission into this temple ? Our reply is, that
both reason and revelation supply a solid basis for our con
fidence. I proceed, therefore,
First, to adduce the testimony of reason in reference to
this point. And here I cannot but -think that the answer
which reason gives to the question just stated, must depend
upon the reply which is truly given to another, viz., " Is God
the cause or author of mail's salvation, or is man the author
of his own salvation?" If the latter should be found to be
the case, it would be needless to inquire concerning the
Divine purpose in reference to human salvation. What God
does not do, he does not decree to do. On the supposition
that man extricates himself from the blindness and depravity
of his natural state, the purpose of God— if there were any
purpose of God in reference to his deliverance — could only
be a decree to permit him to work out his own salvation.

52 PROOF AFFORDED BY REASON.
Now to suppose the existence of any such decree is little less
than absurd. Can a being of boundless benevolence be sup
posed to be so inveterate an enemy to the ultimate and eter
nal happiness of his creatures that he must bind himself by
decree not to throw any obstacle in the way of its attainment?
Most manifestly not. If Jehovah be not the cause of man's
salvation, we may rest assured that that event is not the
subject of decree. But if he be, the case is essentially dif
ferent, for, on this assumption, i. e., that it is by special Divine
agency that a sinner is brought to believe in Christ, (an
assumption which will be supported hereafter,)*' the proof that
the salvation of men is the subject of a previous purpose, or
decree, is based upon the moral axiom, that every wise being
acts upon a plan previously digested and arranged. I call this
a moral axiom, for, in point of fact, to act thus is the great
point of distinction between wisdom and folly. The latter
exercises no forethought. Its conduct is left to the direction
of accident, or caprice. Wisdom, on the contrary, looks all
around and before her ; considers what is right and best to be
done, in all the contemplated possible variety of circumstances
in which she may be placed ; and acts in harmony with a pre
vious plan, or determination, formed on a cool, and cautious,
and full investigation of all the facts of the case. It is true,
indeed, in reference to man, that much must be left to the de
cision of the moment, because circumstances may arise which
no human sagacity can foresee. But, in all cases where it is
possible for a wise man to look before him, he never takes a
step of importance without doing so. Can we suppose the fact
to be otherwise in the case of the perfection of wisdom ? —
that Jehovah put his hand originally to the formation of the
material universe, or that he put it subsequently to the more
illustrious work of the new creation, without any previous
thought (to speak after the manner of men) upon the subject
* It will be observed, by the careful reader, that the whole of this is hypothe
tical reasoning. Had the Eclectic Reviewer observed this, he would not have
expressed thq opinion that I should here have entered upon the proof, that
belief is produced by special Divine influence. Every skilful reasoner must
perceive that this is not the place for it.

BY THE DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE. 53
— without previously determining to act as he ultimately did
act ? Is it to be conceived, for a moment, that the creation of
a moral system, pre-eminently developing his character, and
the transformation of a vast multitude of immortal beings into
his holy image, exhibiting the power and plenitude of his
grace, was the work of accident ? Let those believe it who
will, or can. I frankly say that I cannot. Whatever diffi
culties attend the admission of the, in many respects, inscru
table doctrine of election, (and no one who has thought ma
turely upon the subject will venture to deny that there are
difficulties,) I am constrained to think that others of far more
alarming magnitude follow its rejection." Erasing the doctrine
from our creed, we may possibly escape Scylla, but the ques
tion is, do we not fall into Charybdis ?
Further, on the same assumption, the basis of our present
reasoning, viz., that God is the. efficient agent5 in the salvation
of man, the doctrine' of election follows as a necessary ^conse
quence of the Divine foreknowledge. Known unto God are
all his works from the foundation of the world, yea, from
eternity. Since there is no distinction of time, as past, pre
sent, and future, with God, this must be the case. If then
God saves the elect, in the sense formerly explained, the
work performed by him in effecting their salvation must, like
all his other works, have been foreseen from eternity. In
other words, he must have foreseen the exertion of that -special
influence which secures their salvation. But how could he
foresee the exertion of this influence unless he had determined
to employ it ? What foundation of pre-knowledge could there
be but pre-appointment ? The case might have been other
wise if the salvation of man were effected by himself, or by any
one else. Then I am ready to acknowledge, foreknowledge,
on the part of God, might exist without decree ; as he might
foresee that exertion of the power — whether their own, or of
some one else — which saved them. But, since God actually
saves the elect, the certain operation of his saving power upon
them is the only ground of his certain knowledge of their sal
vation. Now there is nothing but his own determination to
exert that power, to render its operation certain. Election is

54 SCRIPTURE. ACCOUNT OF ELECTION,
thus the. ground of certainty and foreknowledge; and, on our
present assumption,. the only ground.
Secondly, we proceed to adduce the testimony of Scripture
in support of the doctrine of ejection.
To elect, is to determine that certain persons shall be brought
to the enjoyment of certain blessings; and it must be care
fully distinguished from the putting of them into actual pos
session of the blessings. Thus, the actual separation of the
Israelites from the Gentile world, that they might become the
depositaries of Divine revelation, was not God's election of
them. His previous purpose to introduce them, into that
special and honourable relation to himself was their election ;
of which purpose their separation from other nations was the
accomplishment. The actual introduction into the Christian
Church of those Jews and Gentiles who received the gospel
was not their election. They constituted the remnant, ac
cording to the election of grace ; but the state of high privi
lege to which they were admitted by God, necessarily imphed
a previous determination to admit them to its enjoyment.
That determination was their election. Were it admitted, for
the sake of argument, that this determination was a con-r
ditioiial one, or founded on their foreseen faith, I should still
maintain that their election was the purpose of God to admit
them to the enjoyment of this privilege, and was not their
actual entrance upon the possession of it.
I am more especially induced to offer these explanatory
remarks, because, in the work of the Rev. R. Watson, there
is obviously, in my apprehension at least, a want of due dis
crimination between the purpose of God, and the accomplish
ment of that purpose; or, rather, a total confounding of the
one with the other. Election, according to his statements, is
the actual separation of the people of God from the men of
the world ; it is, in fact, their calling and sanctification. " To
be elected is," he says, " tp be separated from the world, and
to be sanctified by the Spirit and by the blood of Christ."
(VoL iii., p. 64.) 1 answer, that this is incorrect. Calling and
sanctification are the results of election, but it is a great mis
take to identify them with it. They are God's choice visibly

CONTRASTED WITH THAT OF MR. WATSON. 55
and practically developed, but they are not the choice itself.
To prove that I am not wrong in the charge I now bring
against Mr. Watson, of having, either from heedlessness, or
with the insidious intention of throwing a degree of obscurity
over the subject which may render it more difficult for an
opponent to grapple with him, identified election with effec
tual calling and sanctification, I quote the following para
graph : " Actual election cannot be eternal ; for, from eternity,
the elect were not actually chosen out of the world, and from
eternity they could not be sanctified unto obedience :" (i. e., as
he must mean* they were not actually separated from the
world by a change of views, feelings, hopes, desires, &c, and
were not actually sanctified; because there is nothing to
forbid the supposition that they were chosen from eternity to
be thus actually separated and sanctified in time.) He adds,
" The'phrases, eternal election, and eternal decree of election,
so often in the lips of Calvinists, can, in common sense, there
fore, mean orily an eternal purpose to elect; or a purpose
formed in eternity to elect, or choose out of the world, and
sanctify in time, by the Spirit and blood of Jesus." (Vol. iii.,
pp. 64-5.) I reply, that this eternal purpose to sanctify is
election. Mr. Watson could never have charged our princi-*
pies with maintaining the absurdity that eternal election is an
eternal purpose to elect, unless he had identified election1 with
sanctification, i. e., confounded the cause with the effect: Be
sides, it became Mr. Watson to prove that there is not an
eternal purpose to sanctify those who are actually sanctified
in time. If God gives the new heart and the right spirit,
i. e., if he sanctifies, then he must have designed to sanetify ;
which is, in fact, our election. I hold it to be a moral axiom,
that " God does what he decrees, and decrees what he does."
The Arminian is impaled on the horns of the dilemma, from
which no power in the universe can extricate him ; *' Either
God does not sanctify mams, — or, if he does, ho does it as the
result of a decree to sanctify."
Election is not then the actual bestowment of certain bless
ings upon men, but it is the design or purpose of God to
bring them to their: enjoyment. The blessings are actually

56 .• PROOF AFFORDED BY SCRIPTURE.
enjoyed in time — the purpose to bestow them may have ex
isted, and we think must have existed, from eternity. Now
that the Scriptures do speak of a Divine purpose to commu
nicate blessings of some description unto men, and of a rem
nant — a remnant. according to the election of grace, who will
of course ultimately enjoy them— will,' I suppose, be admitted
by all. Were it possible for any doubt to exist on this point,
the following passages, as well as others, must put it to flight :
" Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,
who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly
places in Christ, according as he hath chosen us in him, be
fore the foundation ofthe world." (Ephes. i. 3, 4.) If words
have any meaning, it is affirmed in this passage, that the saints
at Ephesus enjoyed the spiritual blessings (it is of no conse
quence to our present argument what was their nature) to
which the apostle alludes, in consequence of, and iu con
formity with, a previous choice, or purpose, or determination:
of God, that they should be thus highly distinguished. Again,
writing to the church, at Thessalonica, he says, " Knowing,
brethren* beloved, your election of God;" and, in a second letter
addressed to the same body, he adds, " But we are bound to
give thanks always to God for you, brethren, beloved of the
Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to
salvation." Peter also, adopting the strain of his beloved
brother Paul, denominates the strangers of the dispersion
" Elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father," &c
The whole of these statements, it will be observed, are in
entire harmony with the words of Christ, who prayed not for
the world, but for those whom his Father had given him out
of the world.
It is thus placed beyond all reasonable doubt that there
was, in the Divine mind, a purpose to bestow certain blessings
upon certain individuals. Now it will be found that there is
only one question, or at most two, which can be raised in refer
ence to this purpose. There can be no question in regard
to its date, for that is, and must be, eternal ; all the decrees
of God are so. How can it be otherwise if he be immutable ?
Nor can there be any question in regard to the persons con-

THE EXCLUSIVE QUESTION. 57
templated in this purpose ; for they must be particular indivi
duals. " The personality of election," as it has been justly
said, "arises out of its very nature." Pelagians, indeed, to
whom the notion of personal election is offensive, are in the
habit of telling us that the subjects of this purpose are bodies
of men, or nations. But are not nations composed of indivi
duals? What is a nation but a collection of persons, as a
mountain is a collection of particles? The mountain is not
distinct from the atoms that compose it, the nation is not dis
tinct from the individuals who constitute it. In fact, the
nation is nothing in itself: it is a mere abstraction of the
mind ; not a thing, but a general term invented by us to de
signate the living and rational beings (who only have real ex
istence) that are to be found within certain geographical
boundaries, — as an animal is not a thing, but a general term.
To attempt to overthrow the doctrine, that God's election is
the choice of individuals, by representing it as a purpose to
confer blessings upon nations, is an error of precisely the same
character with that of those who represent Jehovah as having
established general laws, in his providential government, with
out foreseeing the reach and operation of these laws, and with
out intending to produce the individual results which flow,
as we popularly say, from their operation. I again assert,
therefore, that the only questions which can be raised on this
subject, are the two following : " What is the nature of the
blessings which the elect are chosen to enjoy? — are they ex
ternal privileges merely, or spiritual and eternal blessings?"
" And, if the latter, on what ground are they chosen to enjoy
them ? Is it a conditional, or, as far as it relates to them, an
unconditional decree ? " In other words, are they chosen to
enjoy the blessings of eternal life (or, which is the same thing,
to experience that special and holy influence which will cer
tainly issue in their enjoyment of eternal life) on the ground
of foreseen faith, or on some other ground (not in them) which
God has not been pleased to reveal ? Is faith, in short, the
root or the fruit of election ? We . propose to establish, in
opposition to Pelagians and Arminians, that the elect are
chosen to enjoy spiritual and eternal blessings (not intending

58 ELECTION IS TO SPIRITUAL BLESSINGS.
to deny, let it be observed, that there is also an election to
inferior blessings ;) and that they are not chosen to enjoy
them on the ground of foreseen faith and obedience
First, our first object then is, to prove that the Scriptures
speak of an election to the enjoyment of spiritual and eternal
blessings. Our opponents here are the Pelagians, who affirm,
that election is merely the appointment of bodies of men to
the enjoyment of external privileges. Through the influence
of a groundless fear, that the doctrines of criminality and-ac-
countability must be overturned, if it be once admitted that
the eternal destinies of men are in any respect fixed by
decree, they deny that any of the Divine decrees have the
least relation to a future state of existence ; and affirm, not
merely that none are appointed to wrath, but that none are
destined to ultimate salvation. This is precisely the state
ment of Bishop Tomline, in his " Elements of Theology."*
" God is represented," he says, " in Scripture, as having pre
destinated the redemption of mankind, through Christ, before
the foundation of the world; and, when the fulness of the
time was come, he sent forth his Son to execute his gracious
purposes. But it has pleased our Almighty Father, in the in
scrutable councils of his wisdom, to confine the knowledge of
this merciful dispensation, even to this day, to a portion of the
human race, and by his prescience he foresaw to whom these
glad tidings should be communicated. Those who are blessed
with the glorious light of the gospel, according to this scheme
of Divine providence, may be said to be predestinated to life,
because they enjoy the appointed means of salvation. Those
whom God hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, are that
part of mankind to whom God has decreed to make known the
gospel ; and, consequently, to bring them by Christ to ever
lasting salvation, does not mean actually saving them, but
granting them the means of salvation though Jesus Christ."
* Two or three minor criticisms upon the phraseology of the Bishop, which
appeared in the former edition, are not inserted in this, because, by the Eclectic
Review, they have been pronounced to to be "hypercritical." The author
does not even now regard them as such, but he has willingly erased them, as he
has no desire to cast unmerited censure upon any one.

PELAGIANISM OF TOMLINE. 59
Again, " those to whom the gospel was made known, accord
ing to the foreseen purpose of God, are said in the New
Testament to be predestinated, and elect ;" and he proceeds
further to deny that an infallible certainty of eternal happi
ness, in consequence of a Divine decree, is attributed to a
single Christian, throughout the New Testament.
Thus, if Bishop Tomline be a faithful expositor of Pela
gianism, that system maintains that election is merely the
Divine purpose to bestow upon certain individuals the means
of salvation. In this it differs from Arminianism, unless Mr.
Watson has given an incorrect statement of the doctrine of
his own denomination ; for he admits that there is a predes
tination of believing and obedient persons unto eternal glory ;
— that the language of Paul, Rom. viii. 30, "declares that
true believers were foreknown, and predestinated to eternal
glory." And I cannot but think that Pelagianism, in regard
to this point, has greatly the advantage over Arminianism ;
for, if there be a predestination of any to eternal glory, on the
ground of foreseen faith, Mr. Watson ought to allow also a
predestination of others to eternal misery, on the ground of
foreseen unbelief. And, further, if this predestination to
eternal glory be not, in the view of Mr. Watson, identical
with the actual possession of eternal glory, he may be
pressed by the inquiry, " How soon after the external call has
been addressed to an individual (for he affirms its subse
quence to this calling) does God predestinate him to the en
joyment of this glory?" Is it in the first moment of his
believing the gospel ? If it be, then — as he may fall into
unbelief the next day — it must surely follow that, as his tem
porary faith secured him the blessing of predestination to
eternal glory, his subsequent unbelief, though it should be
only temporary, must deprive him of this blessing : and fur
ther, that — as, according to the Arminian scheme, there may
be successive periods of standing in the truth, and of rejecting
the truth, to the very close of his course on earth — there
must be successive renewals and abrogations of his predesti
nation. Should this latter notion be found too whimsical
to be admitted, the Arminian may deliver himself from the

60 PELAGIANISM NOT FREE FROM THE
necessity of entertaining it, by maintaining that the predes
tination does not take place till the moment of the departure
of the spirit from the body, when relapse is impossible ; or,
which perhaps would be better still, not till its entrance upon
the possession of eternal glory : only, in the last case, it
would unfortunately happen (i. e., for the system) that the
individual would not need predestination at all !
I leave, however, for the present, the Arminian notion of
conditional predestination to eternal glory, i. e., a predesti
nation founded upon foreseen faith, (a notion which will come
under examination in the proper place,) and, returning to the
true Pelagian, proceed to show that the Scriptures do speak
of an election to the enjoyment of spiritual and eternal bless
ings, as well as of an election to the possession of external
privileges, or means of salvation. It may be well, however,
for the reader to consider whether the latter notion is not
entangled with as many difficulties as the notion of personal
or individual election to eternal life. "The arrangements of
Providence," says Dr. Fletcher, "are involved in the same
perplexities as belong to that economy which limits, to any
assignable extent whatever, the moral efficacy of the means of
grace. If disposed to object at all to the limited distribution
of Divine favour to those who have no claim on its shghtest
manifestations, we might naturally inquire, why should the
Ephesians enjoy the dispensation of the gospel, when some
neighbouring cities and provinces were destitute of it ? " The
existence of inequality in the distributions of Heaven, if an
unequal distribution of unmerited good be ever supposed to
involve in it any difficulty, is as hard to be accounted for as
inequality with reference to the eternal destinies of men.
Besides, it is to be further remembered, that election to the
enjoyment of the external privileges of the gospel dispensa
tion, leads naturally to a difference in the eternal destinies of
men. For what are these external privileges, but the means
of salvation ? Bishop Tomline asserts, that God has confined
the glad, tidings of the gospel, i. e., the means of salvation, to
a portion of the human race; and yet, while contending that
election to eternal life itself would be unjust, he appears to

DIFFICULTIES IT _ URGES AGAINST CALVINISM. 61
write as if he thought no difficulty was involved in the fact
admitted by him, viz., that certain persons or nations only are
elected to enjoy the means of eternal life. Now, since eternal
life is enjoyed in the use of the means, and cannot be secured
without them, what is the objection against Calvinism which
may not be urged with equal force against his own system ?
If it be essentially inequitable to appoint some individuals to
salvation, and not others, must it ' not be equally inequitable
to appoint some to the enjoyment of the means of salvation,
and not others, when none can be saved without the means ?
It is not my present business to obviate the difficulty which
is thus evidently common to both systems. I merely observe,
for the present, that, when our opponent shall have relieved
Arminianism from its pressure, he will have achieved an equal
triumph for Calvinism.
I refer the reader, then, to the following passages in proof
of the assertion, that the Scriptures teach an election, not
merely to the enjoyment of external privileges, but of spiritual
and eternal blessings. It may possibly become necessary to
examine some of these passages a second time, when I pro
ceed to assail the Arminian notion, that the choice of any to
the latter class of blessings is conditional, i. e., founded on their
foreseen faith; as I deem it better for the present to confine
my attention to the specific inquiry, " What is the nature of
the blessings which the elect are chosen to enjoy?" "But
we are bound," says the apostle Paul to the members of the
church of the Thessalonians, " to give thanks always for you,
brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the
beginning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the
Spirit, and belief of the truth." (2 Thess. ii. 13.) The sole
question we raise at present is, " What is the meaning of sal
vation here ?" It surely cannot intend the means of salvation,
but salvation itself, i. e., present deliverance from the guilt and
power of sin, and especially the final enjoyment of the glory of
heaven. Hence the apostle adds, "through sanctification of
the Spirit, and belief of the truth ;" i. e., they are the means
through the influence of which they were to be brought at
length into the full possession of the salvation which God had

62 SCRIPTURE PROOF OF ELECTION
elected or chosen them to enjoy. It is, consequently,, impos
sible that salvation can here denote the means of salvation.
We are saved, in the highest sense of the term, through
Divine influence, and through faith ; but it is not by the belief
of the truth, surely, that we come into possession of the truth,
as a revelation from God. It is not by faith that we are
brought to enjoy the means of salvation. The means of sal
vation must be possessed previously to believing : and, there
fore, we do not arrive at the enjoyment of them through or by
believing. The same sentiment is also clearly taught in the 1st Epistle,
1st chapter, 3rd and following verses. " Remembering your
work of faith, and labour of love, and patience of hope, in our
Lord Jesus Christ, in the sight of God, and our Father.
Knowing, brethren beloved, your election of God. For our
gospel came not unto you in word only, but also in power,
and in the Holy Ghost, and in much assurance," &c. The
3rd and 5th verses are brought forward in proof of the state
ment contained in the 4th. The apostle declares that he
knew, i. e., discovered evidence of the election of the Thes
salonians, in the powerful influence of the gospel upon them,
leading them to abound in " the work of faith, and labour of
love." " Now, if he had meant nothing more by election
than the purpose of God to bring them to the enjoyment of
the means of salvation, or nothing more than their actual pos
session of these means, why should he refer to the efficacy of
those means upon them in proof of that fact ? A man would
give himself very unnecessary trouble who should gravely
set himself to prove that certain persons must have had the
discoveries of the gospel brought to them, because they have
been converted by the gospel. That any are elected, if
elected means put in possession of the means of salvation —
the external privileges of the gospel dispensation — is a point
attested by our senses ; it is not left to be ascertained by a
process of reasoning. The apostle of the Gentiles must have
meant election to spiritual and eternal blessings, or he would
not have referred to their conversion to God in proof of that
election.

TO SPIRITUAL BLESSINGS. 63
Still more conclusive, perhaps, is the language of the same
apostle, in the 8th chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. He
affirms, in the 28th verse of that chapter, that "all things
work together for good, to those that are called according to
the purpose of God." He proves this assertion by showing
that there is an inseparable connexion between calling and
glorification. It is impossible, therefore, to doubt that every
event in Divine Providence must be intended for the benefit
of those who are appointed to enjoy the blessedness of heaven.
All things work together for their good. Of this, as though he
had said, we may be certain, " for whom he did foreknow, he
also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son;
moreover, ' whom he did predestinate, them he also called ;
and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he
justified, them he also glorified." Should any one be able to
show that I have mistaken the object for which the apostle
sets before us the different links of this golden chain, the
mistake would not be of material prejudice to the argument.
The point which it is most essential to remember, and of this
there can be no doubt, is, that predestination and glorification
are linked together in an union which no circumstance what
ever — no agent in heaven, earth, or hell, can dissolve. " Whom
he predestinated, them he also glorified." It is, consequently,
impossible that, in this passage, the term predestination can
merely denote appointment to the enjoyment of the external
privileges of the gospel ; for who will venture to say, that even
the actual possession of these privileges is connected with
glorification? "Many will say to me in that day, Lord,
Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name?"&c. "And
then," adds the Saviour, " will I profess unto them, I never
knew you, depart from me, ye that work iniquity."
In harmony with this reasoning, we learn, that, at the great
day, the Judge will address his people in the following lan
guage, — " Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the king
dom prepared for you from the foundation of the world."
That here is predestination, no one can doubt. It is equally
manifest that it is predestination to spiritual and eternal bless
ings. Were it contended that the choice rests upon the

64 RADICAL DEFECT OF PELAGIANISM.
ground of foreseen faith, (a sentiment which will be examined
at the proper season,) I see not how any one can doubt that
it is more than a mere appointment to enjoy the means of
salvation. Sufficient, I trust, has been said, to show that those Pela
gians, of whom Bishop Tomline may be regarded as the type,
and who deny that God has predestinated any men, or any
ground, to enjoy spiritual and eternal blessings, are in direct
conflict with the word of God. It will be expedient now to
show the essential and radical defect of this system, when
considered in relation to the object which God aims to accom
plish, in the bestowment, upon any members of the human
family, of the means of salvation.
The Pelagianism of Bishop Tomline contends, then, let it
be observed, that the Divine purpose, in regard to man, is
accomplished, and completely exhausted, by the mere act of
sending the gospel to them. Predestination is the appoint
ment of certain bodies of men to enjoy the means of salva
tion. When it has carried to them these means, it has
finished its work. It does not advance a step beyond this.
It does not act in prompting to the use of these means, or in
securing their influence on the mind and conduct. It puts
the gospel, indeed, into their hands, but it leaves them to
work out their own salvation with it as they can ; and so
either practically denies the total depravity of human nature,
or suspends the infinitely important question, whether the
sufferings of the Son of God shall prove ultimately to have
been endured in vain, on the reception which may happen
to be given to the gospel testimony by those who " hate the
light, and will not come to the Ught, lest their deeds should
be reproved." The same defect — and I venture to say that
it is a radical one — attaches to the scheme of Arminianism, as
exhibited by Mr. Watson ; for though he believes in election
to eternal life, it is a conditional election. It is founded on
faith. It exists subsequently to faith; and, consequently,
can have no influence in originating faith. There is no
decree, according to this writer, that any man should believe,
or should became the recipient of an influence which will

THE REPLY INVALID. 65
certainly secure his believing; and, consequently, — since
God does nothing but what he decrees, and since he does not
decree to exert special influence in the case of any to lead
them to believe, — he does not exert any such influence. In
other words, Mr. Watson unites with Bishop Tomline, or he
subverts his own system, in maintaining that what God does
in securing the salvation of men, is confined to the mere act
of sending to them the gospel, leaving the improvement to
them; and, maintaining this, he undermines the doctrine of
salvation by grace, and practically affirms that the regenerated
are born by the will of the flesh, and not by the will of God.
I am aware, indeed, of the reply which both classes of our
opponents — for, in their attempt to evade this obvious difficulty,
they unite together — are in the habit of making ; but, after
repeated examinations of Mr. Watson's statements, I am con
strained to say that they appear to me totally inconclusive,
— to leave every difficulty just where they found it,- — and to
introduce others of more appalling magnitude. I am bound,
I freely admit, to attempt, at least, to justify this opinion, and
I proceed very cheerfully to do so.
The answer of our opponents is substantially the following,
viz., tKat God bestows his Spirit upon all men in a measure
sufficient to enable them to believe the gospel, — that he thus
prevents the utter loss and waste of the blood of Christ, and
secures the praise of human salvation to Divine grace. Upon
this statement I would request the reader's very close atten
tion to the following observations : —
First, if we were to concede the fact affirmed by it, viz.,
that a measure of the Spirit is given to all men, and which we
will designate as the common, in contradistinction from the
special influences of the Spirit, I should still feel compelled to
inquire if it did not necessarily involve the doctrine of elec
tion. This affirmed communication of the Spirit is an act of
God, having, indeed, all men for its objects ; but still, it is an
act ; and, consequently, there must have been a previous pur
pose to perform this act. Would an Arminian venture to deny
the general principle involved in the assertion just made, viz.,
that God decrees what he does ? Or can he point out a dif-

06 THE ARMINIAN NOTION
ference between the actions of God in general, and the specific
action of bestowing the Spirit upon all men, of such a nature
as to warrant us in concluding that, while his other actions
suppose and require a decree, this does not need, and does not
admit of one ? The common sense view of the case certainly
is, that either all the actions of God are the results of a decree,
or that none are the results of a decree. If God gave life to
the beast, and rationality to man, without a previous deter
mination to do either, then he may give the Spirit to all men
without a determination to bestow it ; but if the former can
not be supposed, neither can the latter.
Secondly, the statement totally fails to secure the end which
it is apparently designed to answer, viz., to secure to Divine
grace the praise of human salvation.
God has given his Spirit to all men to enable them to be
lieve. The faith, therefore, of those who receive the gospel
testimony, must be ultimately traced to this donation of the
Spirit ; and thus salvation is of grace. Such would appear to
be the argument of our opponents. I would ask them, then,
whether the Spirit, and an equal measure of the Spirit, is
given to unbelievers (i. e., to those who die in impenitency)
and to believers ? If they reply in the negative — or, in other
words, admit that a special influence of the Holy Spirit is
exerted when a man is converted to God — then God does
more to secure the salvation of some men (in opposition to
Bishop Tomline's axiom that God has equally enabled every
man, born into the world, to work out his salvation) than
of others ; and since he decrees or purposes what he does, (or
he would not be a Being of infinite wisdom,) this notion of
special influence inevitably draws after it the hydra of eternal
and personal election.
If, on the other hand, they reply in the affirmative, i. e.,
maintain that an equal measure of the Spirit is given to all ;
or, in other words, deny that any special influence of the
Holy Spirit is put forth in the conversion of men, then it
follows, that the faith of none is to be ascribed, simply and
exclusively at least, to the influence of the Spirit, — or why
does it not produce faith in all ? — but partly, at any rate, to

OF COMMON GRACE CONSIDERED. 67
the better moral state in which this primary gift of the Spirit
found them, — or to their better improvement of a donation
and privilege common to all ; — an improvement in which they
have no additional assistance from the Spirit of God, for that
would involve in it a special operation, and a special purpose,
or, in other words, the doctrine of eternal and personal elec
tion. But to affirm that the salvation of the saved is to be
ascribed to their own unassisted and better improvement of
the means of salvation, is, in effect, to ascribe the salvation
of man to himself, and to contradict the testimony of the
Holy Spirit, that it is "God that worketh in us both to will
and to do, of his good pleasure."
Or, the argument may be stated in a somewhat different
manner. Sinee some men believe the gospel, and others re
ject it, the faith of the former must be ascribed to themselves
or to God. If Pelagians ascribe it to the former, they rescue
themselves, indeed, from any difficulty which may be sup
posed to be involved in the opinion, that faith is the gift of
God ; but they leave an occasion of boasting to the believer.
If, on the contrary, they ascribe it to God, then it must be
the result of an influence common to all, or special to some.
The latter supposition draws after it the doctrine of eternal
and personal election. They seem, therefore, driven to the
necessity of resorting to the former supposition. But, if a
common and equal operation, or gift of the Spirit, leads to the
existence of faith in the case of some, and not in the case of
others, it must surely be because the former are less averse
to believe, or more disposed to improve the means of grace
than the latter; i. e., they are less depraved, and so require
less assistance from the Spirit of God to work out their own
salvation. And yet, by supposition, they receive as much
assistance as those who are more depraved ; ' i. e., those who
stand in the greatest need of moral help, receive no more
than those who have the least need of it; in opposition to
the axiom of Bishop Tomline, that " God has equally enabled
every man to work out his own salvation." There is an ambi
guity in this assertion which, it is probable, never struck the
mind of his Lordship. An equal measure of aid in working

68 COMMON GRACE.
out our salvation (which we are assured all men possess) may
mean a measure equal in itself; i. e., equal, in all cases, in
degree ;— ror a measure equally proportioned to the need of
those who received it. His Lordship appears to me, therefore,
to be involved in the following inextricable dilemma : Either
that gift of the Spirit which — to preserve even the appearance
of ascribing the praise of man's salvation to God — he is con
strained to acknowledge is vouchsafed to all men, is bestowed
in the first sense of the term equal, i. e., in an equal degree
upon all men : — in which case those who being more obdu
rate, reject the gospel, are less favourably dealt with than
others, inasmuch as the aid they receive is not equally
adapted to meet their moral wants, (a supposition which would
cause all the arrows shot by the Arminian to recoil upon him
self.) — Or the supposed gift is bestowed in a degree which
renders it equally proportioned to the moral need of those who
receive it; — in which case it must effect the salvation of all,
or the salvation of none. It is impossible to conceive that a
measure of influence, equally adapted to subdue the depravity
of two human beings, should succeed in the case of one, and
fail in the case of the other. A power equal to a hundred
would as certainly remove an obstruction amounting only to
eighty, as a power of fifty would remove an obstruction of forty.
That both should succeed is perfectly possible, and, indeed,
absolutely certain ; but that the hundred should fail while the
fifty succeeds, or vice versa, is utterly incredible and incon
ceivable.

LECTURE IV.

ELECTION.
THE PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE.
We have shown in the preceding lecture, that the Armi
nian notion of a dispensation of the Spirit to all men, or of
common grace conferred upon all men, to enable them to
secure their salvation, does really involve in it the doctrine of
election ; and, further, that it does not sufficiently guard the
doctrine of salvation by grace. I now proceed,
Thirdly, to observe, that this notion of common or univer
sal grace is, as held by them, and as far as they have explained
it, a self-contradictory, not to say, an absurd notion. It re
stores to man the ability (such is the view they give of it) to
obey God's law, to believe the gospel, and so to work out his
own salvation. " Man," says Bishop Tomline, "cannot, by his na
tural faculties and unassisted exertions, so counteract and cor
rect the imperfection and corruption derived from the fall of
Adam, as to be able of himself to acquire that true and livelyfaith
which would secure his salvation." He proceeds to state, in sub
stance, that, as it would not be just in God to do more with a
view to effect the salvation of one man than another, this ability
to acquire true and lively faith is actually communicated to all
men, — to those who believe not the gospel, and never will be
lieve it, as well as to those who cordially receive it. In short,
though his Lordship is not a proficient in the art of presenting
an idea in a few unambiguous words, he evidently means that
man has lost by the fall, not merely his disposition to do what
God commands, and to believe what God reveals; but,
in the true, and proper, and literal sense of the term, his
poioer also. This is much more fully and distinctly stated by

70 DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL
Mr. Watson, who, in perspicacity, infinitely surpasses the
bishop, though, I fear, not in candour, especially when Calvin
ism rises .upon his view, which almost invariably produces
misrepresentations so gross, that, if the "Theological Insti
tutes" have exalted my estimate of the intellect of the writer,
I am constrained to add — and I do it with deep and un
affected sorrow — they have diminished my previous concep
tions of the moral dignity of his character.
I have hinted at an ambiguity which lurks in the words,
power, ability, &c, when used in reference to man, and to
what God requires of him. It may be expedient briefly to
illustrate this point, before I lay before the reader the state
ments of Mr. Watson, as that illustration is adapted to show
the inconsistent nature of those statements. A man then, let
it be observed, may be destitute of power to perform a certain
action, in two radically different senses ; — in the sense of being
destitute of the physical capacity of performing the action;
and in the sense of wanting the disposition to perform it. A
man who has not money, cannot give it to the destitute ; a
man who has not the present disposition to be liberal, cannot
give it either, but the cannot in the two cases is radically dif
ferent. No entreaties, or promises, are in the slightest degree
adapted to remove the former, but they are eminently fitted
to remove the latter, cannot; and may, accordingly, be con
sistently employed. Every one recognises and acts upon this
distinction in the every-day occurrences of life ; we require,
therefore, that it should be recognised in religious subjects.
The generality of Calvinistic divines make this distinction.
They maintain that the power to obey God's laws, of which
unconverted men are destitute, is not physical capacity, but
disposition. They affirm, that the Scriptures address no com
mand to the human family at large, with which any man, un
less he be an idiot or a madman, would be unable to comply,
provided he had the disposition to comply. They hold, that
all that Adam lost, for himself and his posterity, was the dis
position, and not the physical capacity, i. e., power, in the pro
per sense of the word, to do what God commands : and, on
the affirmed fact, that the human race, after the fall, retain

AND MORAL TOWER. 71
their physical power to obey God's law, though they may not
choose to obey, they found their belief in the great doctrine
of human accountability.
Mr. Watson, on the other hand, supposes that the race lost
more than disposition — that they lost power, in the proper
sense of the term, to obey; that this power is re-communi
cated to them by what we have designated common grace;
and that this imparted grace is the foundation of accountabi
lity. I refer to the following passages in proof of these state
ments. " All men, in their simply natural state, are dead in
trespasses and sins, and have neither the will nor the power
to turn to God."- (Vol. iii., p. 193.) In an attempt to show
that absolute and unconditional reprobation (which doctrine
I reprobate as strongly as does Mr. Watson) is contrary to
the justice of God, he takes the ground, that " the reprobates
must have been destroyed for a pure reason of sovereignty —
or for the sin of Adam — or for personal faults, resulting from
a corruption of nature, which they brought into the world
with them, and which they have no power to correct." (Vol.
iii., p. 69.) "All except Adam and Eve have come into the
world with a nature which, left to itself, could not but sin."
(Vol. iii., p. 67.) Again, he tells us that the promise of the
Spirit finds man " without the inclination, or the strength, to
avail himself of proclaimed clemency." (Vol. i., p. 242.) Fur
ther, we are assured, (Vol. ii., p. 261,) "That a power of con
sideration, prayer, and turning to God, are the gifts of the
Spirit ; of course it does not exist in the simply natural state
of man." Now let it not be said that these statements of Mr.
Watson contain no more than we every day assert, when we
say that man has lost his power to obey God's law ; because
every reflecting Calvinist, at least, understands the term power
in a sense different from that in which it is used by Mr. Wat
son. With the latter, the loss of power means, if not the loss
of physical capacity, (I use this phraseology for a reason which
will appear presently,) at least more than the loss of disposi
tion. With the former, it is the loss of disposition, and the
loss of disposition only. Yet power to obey God's law must
be possessed by man, even in the opinion of Mr. Watson, for

72 COMMON GRACE IMPARTING POWER,
the unconverted, he himself tells us, " cannot be guilty of re
jecting the gospel, if they have no power to embrace it."
(Vol. iii., p. 110.) And, again, the unconverted are required
to believe for their salvation ; he consequently infers that they
must have power to believe. (Vol. iii., p. 4.) This power com
mon grace communicates, and its communication forms, as I
have said, in Mr. Watson's system, the ground of human ac
countability. The following extracts establish both these
points. " The Scripture treats all men to whom the gospel
is preached as endowed with power, not indeed from them
selves, but from the grace of God, to turn at his reproof," &c.
(Vol. iii., p. 111.) " It follows, then, that the doctrine of the
impartation of grace to the unconverted, in a sufficient degree
to enable them to embrace the gospel, must be admitted," &c.
(Ibid.) "In consequence ofthe atonement of Christ, offered
for all, the Holy Spirit is administered to all," &c. (Vol. ii.,
p. 259.) " The presence of the Holy Spirit is now given to
man, not as a creature ; but is secured to him by the mercy
and grace of a new and a different dispensation, under which
the Spirit is administered," not on the ground of our being
creatures, but as redeemed from the curse of the law by him
who became a curse for us." (Vol. ii., p. 257.) The virtues
of the unregenerate are not, he says, " from man, but from
God, whose Holy Spirit has been vouchsafed to the world
through the atonement." (Ibid., p. 261.) "It is thus," he
adds, finally, i. e., on account of the universal dispensation of
the Spirit, " that one part of Scripture is reconciled to another,
and both to fact ; the declaration of man's corruption, with the
presumption of his power to return to God, to repent, to break
off his sins, which all the commands and invitations to him,
from the gospel, imply ; " without which power, thus communi
cated by grace, Mr. Watson imagines, these commands and
entreaties could not be addressed to him.
Now it has been said, (page 69,) that the Arminian notion
of common grace, imparted for the purpose of communicating
power to man to obey God's law, is self-contradictory, if not
absurd. In support of this assertion, I request the attention
of the reader to the following remarks. First, Mr. Watson's

IS CONTRADICTORY AND ABSURD. 73
notion supposes that Adam could lose, and actually did lose,
his power to obey God's law,> (understanding the term power to
mean more than inclination, disposition, or will,) without losing
his responsibility. I do not know' precisely, indeed, what he
meant by the term power in this connexion. There is reason
to think he had not well defined it even to himself; but it is
abundantly manifest that he comprehended in it more than
disposition to do what God commands ; and that he regarded
it as essential to accountability. But how could Adam lose
for himself, and for the race, what was essential to accounta
bility? He might lose, and he did lose, chartered blessings
— blessings which flowed from sovereignty. Thus he lost
sovereign, sustaining grace : but surely he could not lose any
thing that was essential to accountability ; at least he could
not lose it, and retain his accountability. Mr. Watson's prin
ciples throw him upon this dilemma : He must maintain,
either that when Adam fell he continued a responsible being,
without the essential requisites of responsibility; or, that he
ceased to be a responsible being, on his melancholy lapse, and
remained irresponsible, till common grace had restored what
is essential to responsibility. Secondly, The Arminian no
tion is burdened with the self-evident absurdity, that it is
grace which bestows what is necessary to accountability. No
intelligent man, whose mind is unperverted by system, can
fail to perceive that the essential requisites of responsibility
flow from equity. There is no grace whatever in their be
stowment. God requiring, as he does, the being to give an
account of his conduct, is bound to impart them. Now if it
be of debt, it is not of grace. Mr. Watson says, that man
lost, by the fall, the power to obey God's law. This power
is, however, he thinks, necessary to accountability; so that it
must, consequently, be re-communicated to him. He further
declares that it has been so ; but the most surprising thing of
all, to me at least, is, that he should represent its re-impartation
as an act of common grace. Common grace ! How could any
thing but system veil from the conception of this perspicacious
writer, that it must have been, even on his own principles,
and on any principles, an act of common justice, and not of
H

74 MR. WATSON HAS NOT EXPLAINED
grace? Suppose the Divine Being should determine to elevate
an animal to the dignity of a responsible agent, must he not
bestow upon him rationality? And would the bestowment
of rationality be an act of grace ? Could the gift be equi
tably withdrawn while the moral governor continued to de
mand from the animal an account of his conduct ? Surely
not. Adam could not lose what is essential to accountability ;
nor can it be bestowed by grace.
There remains but one more observation to be made upon
the attempts of the Arminians to evade the difficulties which
attach to the notion of election to the mere enjoyment of
external privileges. This constitutes the Fourth observa
tion, viz., that neither Bishop Tomline, nor Mr. Watson, has
given us a distinct account of what they mean by that power
to obey God's law which, as they teach, was lost by the fall,
and which is re-communicated by grace. My decided impres
sion is, that neither they, nor the Arminians in general,
attach, as I have already said, any definite meaning to the
term. They write as if their conceptions were very loose
and indefinite, and yet as if they did not suspect this to be
the case, — an evil into which all writers are in danger of fall
ing. Because a word is familiar, and we are at no loss in
regard to its general meaning, we are apt to employ it in a
statement of great importance, it may be, without being
aware that even we do not understand it in that particular
connexion. These are not the times, however, in which
indefinite and ambiguous words, or statements, can be per
mitted to go unexamined and unsifted. Certainly, Mr.
Watson's must not thus be permitted to pass. Lamenting, I
can truly say, as much as his friends, that I cannot put the
question to himself, I ask his brethren, then, what was the
power to obey God's law which was lost by the fall ? If they
intend by the term more than disposition to do what the
moral governor required, I respectfully request them to spe
cify distinctly what that term more comprehends. I can con
ceive of two senses only, in which the term power can be
used in this connexion ; if there are more than two, I shall
consider myself much indebted to any individual who will point

THE POWER LOST BY THE FALL. 75
them out. The two senses of which only I am at present
cognizant are those which have been more than once referred
to, viz., disposition and physical capacity. When, therefore,
Mr. Watson affirms that man has lost both his will and his
power to obey God, the language is, to my apprehension,
equivalent with the ¦ declaration, that he has lost his disposi
tion and his physical capacity to obey God. Now, it has
been shown, that if he really did lose his physical capacity,
he must have lost his responsibility; just as accountability
ceases, in any individual, when madness supervenes. But I
now seek for information, whether, in the judgment of the
Arminian, Adam did lose his physical capacity to obey his
Creator? Should he reply in the negative, then I would
further inquire — since the loss was, by hypothesis, more than
disposition, and yet was not physical power — what is that
strange tertium quid, between will and physical power — par
taking of the properties of neither, or rather, perhaps, being
an unnatural mixture of both — which completes the amount
of his loss ? Will any one attempt to explain it ? Is it ex
plicable ? Can it even be conceived ? Should the reply be
in the affirmative, should it be said that he lost physical
power, I would ask whether he lost the whole of his physical
powers, or some of them only? Had the former been the
case, i. e., had he lost sensation, memory, judgment, voUtion,
&c, he must have ceased to be a man ; he must have sunk
even below a brute. If it be said that he lost some of them
only, I ask, which ? Was it the understanding, the memory,
the judgment, the conscience, &c. ? Experience proves that
they all remain. Degraded as man is, he has suffered no
loss of any physical power essential to obedience ; for there
is nothing which God commands him to do which he could
not do if he would. He has not lost the power of loving
God ; for the power of loving God is the physical capability
of experiencing the emotion of love, and which is called
into exercise when an unconverted man loves the world.
He has not lost the power of believing the gospel ; for the
power of believing the gospel is that physical constitution
of mind which renders him capable, in distinction from

76 NOR THE POWER RE-IMPARTED, &C
brutes, of crediting testimony in general, and which is de
veloped every day of his life. Ten thousand absurdities have
been uttered on this subject by those who have theological
words, without theological ideas; whose creed is a creed of
symbols, rather than things. It is high time to begin to
believe in things, rather than in words; and there can be '
little doubt, that all who do this will be prepared to admit
that the loss which Adam sustained was a moral loss
exclusively. The extinction of any of the powers to which
reference was made a short time ago, would have been a phy
sical loss, converting Adam into a totally different being, in a
physical point of view, and rendering it necessary that he
should be subjected to a different kind of government. Be
sides, that which is restored to man, when he is born again, is
moral, not physical, in its nature. Regeneration does not
implant new physical powers ; it communicates " knowledge,
righteousness, and true holiness." The loss of these was,
then, that which Adam sustained by the fall.
I have further to ask the Arminian, what he means by the
power to obey God's law, and to believe the gospel, which he
says was re-imparted by common grace. It is not power in
the sense of physical capacity ; for Adam, as we have just
proved, did not lose power in this sense of the term ; and all
his posterity, even previously to their conversion, enjoy it.
Again, it is not power in the sense of disposition to obey and
believe ; for, in this sense of the term, no man possesses power
till he is renewed in the spirit of his mind. " Ye wiU not
come unto me," said our Lord, " that ye might have life."
" And this is the condemnation, that light has come into the
world, and men have loved darkness rather than the light,
because their deeds were evil." The Arminian, indeed, prac
tically admits this; for the struggling against conviction by
which, as he imagines, the influences of the Holy Spirit are
rendered ineffectual to conversion, is surely the result of the
want of a disposition to do what God requires. In short,
that power to obey, and believe, which, in the creed of the
Arminian, was lost by the fall, and restored again by the dis
pensation of common grace, resolves itself into those physical

THE CONDITIONAL ELECTION OF ARMINIANS. 77
capacities, means, opportunities, &c, which, in the creed of
a Calvinist, are essential to accountability. An opponent,
incautiously setting himself to prove that it comprehends
more, would find himself, when brought to the question,
engaged in an enterprise as difficult as to find his way to the
moon. Having thus shown — that the Scriptures recognise certain
individuals as the elect of God — that there is an election to
spiritual and eternal blessings, in opposition to those Pelagians,
of whom Bishop Tomline is a type, who represent election
as appointment to the enjoyment of external privileges merely,
— and having exhibited the radical defect of this latter system,
I proceed to prove,
Secondly, that personal election to eternal life is not condi
tional; or, in other words, is not founded on the foreseen
faith and obedience of the elect. The doctrine of Mr. Wat
son, and of those Arminians who think with him, is, that all
who are elected to eternal glory were chosen, not as men
merely, but as believing men; and I lay before the reader
the strongest passage I can find in his works in support of
this view of the case. " To choose men to salvation, con
sidered as believers, gives a reason for election which not
only manifests the wisdom and goodness of God, but has
the advantage of being entirely consistent with his own pub
lished and express decree": ' He that believeth shall be saved,
and he that believeth not shall be damned.' This revealed
and promulgated decree, we must believe, was according to
his eternal purpose ; and if from eternity he determined that
believers, and only believers in Christ, among the fallen race,
should be saved, the conclusion is inevitable, that those whom
he chose in Christ before the foundation of the world, were
considered not as men merely, which gives no reason of choice
worthy of any rational being, much less of the ever-blessed
God, but as believing men; which harmonizes the doctrine
of election with the other doctrines of Scripture, instead of
placing it, as in the Calvinistic scheme, in opposition to them.
For the choice not being of certain men as such, but of all
persons believing; and all men to whom the gospel is preached

78 FALLACY IN THE REASONING.
being called to believe, every one may place himself in the
number of the persons so elected." (Vol. iii., pp. 78, 79.)
This reasoning derives any little force it may appear to
possess from the circumstance of Mr. Watson's having forgotten
that, though the Divine Being can form no purpose which is
at variance with the general and revealed law of his govern
ment, — " He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth
not shall be damned," — he may, yea, must entertain a pur
pose in his character as the sovereign Bestower of good, which
shall secure the accomplishment of events which the general
law of his government could not bring to pass. It is impos
sible for Mr. W. to deny this"; since God's " revealed and pro
mulgated decree," as he designates it, did not separate the
Jews from the rest of the world, neither did it bring the gospel
to Britain. There must be a purpose, additional to the general
law of the Divine government, to carry the means of salvation
to those nations who enjoy them. Why, then,, may there not
be an additional purpose still to visit certain individuals with
that special influence of the Holy Spirit which will render the
means effectual to their salvation ? This point will, however,
be more fully illustrated hereafter.
Before I proceed to state the more specific objections which
may be urged against conditional election, let me request the
reader not to forget that it has received an answer already.
This conditional election — an election founded on faith — can
make no provision for the existence of faith. It leaves this all-
important exercise of the mind — on which the salvation of men
depends — to be originated by the grace which is dispensed, as
it is alleged, to every member of the human family. Now this
grace has been shown to be nothing more than physical powers,
means and opportunities of believing; which, left to themselves,
never did, and never will, originate faith in any human heart.
Besides, I must again remind the reader, that as this grace is
common, it cannot possibly account for the fact, that one be
lieves, while another rejects, the gospel. For, if we ascribe
the difference, as Mr. Watson appears to do, to the circum
stance, that the former uses the grace communicated, and the
other does not, the question still returns, why or how does the

ELECTION IS NOT FOUNDED ON FAITH. 79
one use the grace, and the other not ? If the Arminian
should say, that new or additional grace is given to use the
grace previously bestowed, he abandons his system. There
is, in that case, a special operation, and that involves a special
purpose; or, the doctrine of personal election. If he say, on
the contrary, that no new grace is given to use that measure
which had been bestowed upon all, then I maintain, notwith
standing all that has been said, or can be said to the contrary,
that the individual makes himself to differ from others by his
own unassisted use of grace; and though Mr. W. calls this
" a puzzle, used ad captandum," I cannot resist the conclusion,
that this Arminian notion gives the praise of a sinner's salva
tion to himself.
In this manner Mr. Watson's notion of conditional election
may be overturned; but there is a more specific mode in
which the same thing may be accomplished. If, for instance,
we can show that the New Testament teaches that the chosen
to salvation are elected to believe, (i. e., in the sense formerly
explained,) and to be holy, as well as to inherit eternal
life, it will follow that they cannot be elected to salvation on
the ground of their foreseen faith and holiness. To the proof
of this important point I now proceed to direct the reader's
attention. I refer, then, to the following passages, in proof that election
to eternal life is not conditional, i. e., not founded upon fore
seen faith and obedience, but that it is an election to faith
and obedience; or, more generally speaking, to holiness of
character, as the means by which only its merciful purposes
can be accomplished. " Elect according to the foreknowledge
of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto
obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Christ." ( 1 Pet. i. 2.)
There can be little doubt that this passage is elliptical — that
TriartaQ should be introduced after eig vTraKorjv, according to the
full reading which occurs in Rom. i. 5. The strangers of the
dispersion are there said by the apostle to have been elected
" to the obedience of faith," i. e., to yield the obedience of
faith to the gospel, and also " to the sprinkling," i. e., to receive
the sprinkling "of the blood of Christ;" and the blessings

80 ELECTION IS TO FAITH, &C
they were thus elected to enjoy, were to be secured to, them
by the "sanctification of the Spirit," or by that special in
fluence of the Spirit, to which the existence of faith and holi
ness in every human mind must be attributed ; for " faith is
the gift of God."
It is essential, however, to Arminianism to overturn the
preceding plain explanation of the verse. Mr. Watson at
tempts to do it in the following manner : — " Obedience," he
says, " is not the end of election, but of the sanctification of
the Spirit; and both are joined with the sprinkling of the
blood of Jesus, as the media through which our election is
effected; — elect through sanctification of the Spirit, &c.
These cannot, therefore, be the ends of our personal election ;
for if we are elected through that sanctification of the Spirit
which produces obedience, we are not elected, being unsanc-
tified and disobedient, in order to be sanctified by the Spirit
that we may obey : it is the work of the Spirit which pro
duces obedient faith, and through both we are elected into
the church of God." (Vol. iii., p. 76.)
The last words of this paragraph, " elected into the church
of God," are quite irrelevant to the point in hand, and can
only have been introduced by Mr. Watson through inadvert
ence; since, as he himself admits, the whole passage does
not refer to introduction to church membership, but to
heaven. To establish his assertion, that obedience, or the belief of
the gospel, is not the end of electiofl, but of the sanctification
of the Spirit, he removes the comma from the word Spirit,
where it is placed by, I believe, the most correct editions of
the English version, and by the ordinary copies of the Greek
Testament; and introduces it after obedience, where it is
placed by none of them. In the former we read, " through
sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of
the blood of Christ." In Mr. Watson's quotation we have,
" through sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience, and
sprinkUng of the blood of Christ." This mode of pointing,
no doubt, answers his purpose here, and would seem to
have been resorted to with that intention ; for it is somewhat

ELECTION NOT POUNDED ON FAITH, &C 81
curious that when he has not to overthrow the notion of
election to faith, he adopts the ordinary method of punctu
ation. (Vide vol. iii., p. 64.) Now, as punctuation is not of
Divine authority, I should not blame Mr. W. for altering the
common and generally adopted mode, if the construction of
the passage required the alteration, or if a better and more
consistent meaning could be elicited by resorting to it. But
is this the case ? I apprehend not ; yea, that the construction
of the passage will not admit of the alteration. Pavntxpov is
not governed by f v •, it is connected with viraxonv by teat ¦, and
both are governed by tig. If, therefore, Mr. Watson maintains
that we are not elected unto obedience, but sanctified unto
obedience, he is bound, also, to maintain, that " we are sanc
tified unto the sprinkling of the blood of Christ." But that
would be putting the effect before the cause ; for we are not
sanctified unto sprinkling, &c, but sprinkled unto sanctifi
cation ; the sprinkling of the blood of Christ being the cause
of sanctification. Again, Mr. Watson says, that the sprink
ling of the blood of Christ is represented as a medium, toge
ther with the sanctification of the Spirit, by which our election
is effected. I answer, that the construction of the passage
will not bear this sense. The word pavnapov must be in the
dative to admit of it. Had the reading been, tv ayiaapqi rivtvparog
etc vTt-aKoriv, Kai pavntxpt/j, &c, Mr. Watson would have been
correct. But tv ayiaaptp, Hvtvparog, tig viraicoriv «ai pavriapov,
&c, will, if I mistake not, admit of no rendering but that
which makes obedience, i. e., the obedience of faith, and the
sprinkling of the blood of Christ, the joint ends of our
election. And when Mr. Watson says that our election is effected
through sanctification of the Spirit, and through the sprinkling
of the blood of Christ, or that these are the means of our
election, I have no doubt that the language appeared, at
least, to convey some meaning to his own mind, but to mine,
I acknowledge, it conveys none. I understand what he
means, when he says that God elects men to eternal life,
(for he admits that this is the kind of election referred to here,)
on the ground of foreseen faith and obedience ; but I cannot

82 election is WITHOUT means.
conceive the import of the expression that God elects them
to eternal life through sanctification of the Spirit. The words,
I will venture to add, have no meaning. He brings them,
indeed, to eternal life through sanctification, but he doe^ not
elect them to it through sanctification. There may be
media of life, but not of election, any more than there can be
media of creation. I know what is meant by means of instruc
tion, of faith, of holiness, of admission into heaven ; but what
are means of election to heaven, if the term election be taken
to designate an act of choice on the part of God, and not the
actual admission of persons into heaven? God chooses or
elects without means ; but he executes his purpose by means.
The whole of Mr. Watson's statements on this subject
appear obviously to me to result from his having confounded
the Divine purposes with the accomplishment of them. Thus
he speaks of the actual introduction, or admission, of the
Gentiles into the Christian church, as God's election of them;
whereas it was clearly the result of their election — the accom
plishment of the Divine purposes in regard to them. In the
same manner he represents the actual separation of our Lord's
disciples from the world, as the Saviour's choice or election of
them, (for if the words, " chosen you out of the world," do not
refer, in Mr. Watson's opinion, to the separation, but to a
previous purpose to separate, why does he say he could not
have chosen them from eternity?) though it was manifestly
only that choice brought into a state of accomplishment. And
in reference to a passage we are about to examine, in which
the Thessalonians are said to be chosen to salvation through
sanctification of the Spirit, &c, he declares, that the election
is through sanctification, — thus identifying God's choice with
the attainment of its end : since it is salvation, and not elec
tion, that is said to be through this medium. The last re
mark of Mr. Watson upon the passage in Peter to which the
attention of the reader has been led, deserves a passing observ
ation. " It is the work of the Spirit that produces obedient
faith." Very well ; that admission is sufficient for any Cal
vinist ; for if the work or influence of the Spirit produces faith,
was there not a previous decree to exert this influence ? " Yes,"

ELECTION NOT FOUNDED ON FAITH, &C 83
the Arminian may reply, "but it would not have produced
faith in the case of believers unless they had used or improved
the influence." In that case, I answer, it was not the influence
of the Spirit that produced faith, but the believer's improve
ment of it.
The second passage to which I refer, for the purpose of
proving that election to eternal life is not conditional, is the
one contained in the second epistle to the Thessalonians,
(chap. ii. 13, 14,) to which allusion has been already made.
" But we are bound to give thanks always to God for you,
brethren, because God hath from the beginning chosen you
unto salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief
of the truth ; whereunto he called you by our gospel, to the
obtaining of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ." I say no
thing in reference to the phrase, " from the beginning," as it
does not appear to me essential to the argument. The reader
wiU observe that there can be no dispute here, as before, in
reference to the end of election ; that is expressly stated by
the apostle — chosen to salvation, ug o-wnjpuw, and by salva
tion, as we have formerly proved, is meant present deli
verance from the power and guilt of sin, and more especially
the enjoyment of eternal life. Mr. Watson, indeed, admits
that the election here is election to salvation, in the highest
sense of the word ; but he says it is through faith and obedi
ence ; or, in other words, a choice of persons already believing
and obedient into the family of God. It is unnecessary to
repeat what has been said against the notion of election by
means. Election does not admit of means, any more than
creation. It is, as we have already said, the salvation, and not
the election, that is here represented as being by means.
The statement of Mr. Watson, that it is a choice of believ
ing persons into the family of God, is, however, worthy of
remark, as it involves at least an apparent contradiction.
Believing persons are already in the family of God. We
become the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. What,
then, is that subsequent choice into the family of which Mr.
Watson speaks?
The stress of the argument here, however, rests upon the

84

ELECTION IS NOT FOUNDED

term salvation; for as that is the end of their election, they
must have been elected to all that the word includes.
We have shown that it includes more than external privi
leges. Mr. Watson himself admits this in a previous part of
his work, though he seems here half disposed to retract that
admission. Supposing, then, that the term salvation referred
exclusively to the future enjoyment of eternal life, so that the
passage could not be brought forward as a direct proof that
there is an election to holiness of character in the present
world, yet I would ask whether eternal life does not include
holiness of character, as one of its essential, and indeed main
ingredients ? This cannot and will not be denied. The indi
viduals alluded to are said, then, to be elected to it through
sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth, as the
means by the influence of which the blessing is to be secured.
Here is then election to holiness, unless holiness constitute
no part of future happiness ; election to holiness through tbe
instrumentality of certain means. It follows, then, that there
must be a Divine determination to employ these means ; for
when God decrees the end, he decrees the means also. In
other words, these individuals must have been elected to re
ceive the sanctifying influence of the Spirit, and so to become
the subjects of that faith, by which a spiritual transformation
of character is effected, and the subjects of that transformation
are rendered " meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the
saints in light."
Thus, if the word salvation meant exclusively eternal life,
the passage would indirectly prove election to present faith
and holiness. There is no necessity, however, to suppose that
the term is used in this restricted sense. It doubtless com
prehends present salvation, — deliverance from ignorance, pre
judice, unbelief, the love and power of sin, &c, which is, in
fact, glory in the bud, while eternal life, is that bud expanded
into the full-blown flower. To this salvation the Thessalo
nians are said to have been elected. The election then here
spoken, of, is not an election to future glory, founded on fore
seen faith and obedience; but an election to faith and obedi
ence, as necessary pre-requisites to the enjoyment of this

ON FAITH AND OBEDIENCE. 85
glory, or, perhaps, more correctly speaking, as partially con
stituting it.
The next passage to which I refer, with a view to show that
personal election is election to faith and holiness, and not
an election founded upon them, is contained in Ephes. i.
3, 4. " Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesu3
Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings, in
heavenly places in Christ ; according as he hath chosen us in
him before the foundation of the world, that we should be
holy and without blame before him in love." On this pas
sage I observe, first, not entering upon any minute criticisms
which are not essential to the precise point in controversy,
that election here must be understood to denote an act of
choice on the part of God, and not, as Mr. Watson too fre
quently represents it, the result of that choice, or the accom
plishment of God's purpose in time ; for the Ephesians were
chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world. And,
secondly, that the election here spoken of is undoubtedly an
election to faith and holiness. The Ephesians were chosen
in Christ, that they should be holy, &c. If, therefore, the
apostle be here speaking of personal election, his words de
cisively settle the point I am now arguing with the Arminians.
Mr. Watson, indeed, to my inexpressible astonishment, affirms,
that, " if the election spoken of in this passage were personal
election, the Calvinistic doctrine would not follow from it, be
cause," he says, " it would admit of being questioned, whether
the choosing in Christ before the foundation of the world, here
mentioned, was a choice of certain persons, as men merely, or
as believing men, which is surely the most rational." (Vol. iii.,
p. 78.)
Did he forget, in writing this passage, that the apostle -ex
pressly declares that they were chosen, that they should be
holy? He must surely have done so; for if they were chosen
to holiness, they could not have been chosen as holy or be
lieving men. Finding this ground untenable, Mr. Watson,
with the generality of Arminians, maintains, that the apostle
does not here speak of personal election, but of the election of
believers as a body, — the election of believing Jews and Gen-

86 ELECTION IS NOT FOUNDED
tiles into the church of God ; in other words, " the eternal
purpose of God, upon the publication of the gospel, to consti
tute his visible church no longer upon the ground of natural
descent from Abraham," [on which ground I venture to affirm
it never was constituted ; but on the ground of the faith, or
the professed faith, of his natural descendants in the God of
Abraham ; hence, on their manifest departure from that faith,
when they rejected the Messiah, they were cut off from the
church,] " but, upon the foundation of faith in Christ."
Now I dare not venture to say, with some Calvinists, that
the words cannot possibly bear this sense. There are some
expressions in the context, especially in the twelfth verse,
which at first sight seem to favour it ; but I cannot think that
the explanation exhausts the meaning of the sacred writer.
The words will as easily bear the Calvinistic interpretation as
the Arminian : and the former interpretation more fully ac
cords with the strength of the apostle's language. The indi
viduals addressed are said to have been blessed with all
spiritual blessings — to have received the adoption of children
by Jesus Christ to himself — to have been accepted in the Be
loved — to have redemption through his blood — the forgiveness
of sins — to have obtained an inheritance amongst those whom
God hath gathered together in one in Christ, both those who
are in heaven, and who are on earth — to have been chosen in
Christ that they should be holy, and without blame, and
should be to the praise of the Divine glory. Can it well be
supposed that the apostle would have employed language like
this in reference to such as had been merely elected into the
visible church ? Could it be used in reference to the members
of the visible church now ? Does it not seem necessarily to
suppose that the election here spoken of was of a higher kind
— election to eternal life, securing the sanctifying influences
of the Spirit, and thus laying a sure ground of confidence, that
they who were its subjects (and the apostle assumed, exercis
ing a charitable judgment, founded upon the professions and
characters of the members of this church, that they have been
thus elected) were in possession, or would ultimately come
into the possession, of all the mighty blessings to which we

ON FAITH AND OBEDIENCE. 87
have referred ? I cannot avoid drawing this inference. Could
the apostle have thought that the mere introduction of the
Ephesians into the visible church (and their election meant
nothing more in the view of Mr. Watson) would justify him
in declaring that God had blessed them with all spiritual
blessings in heavenly places in Christ — that they enjoyed the
forgiveness of sins — that they had an inheritance with the
members of that large family of which God is the Father —
that they trusted in Christ — had received the sealing of the
Spirit, which is the earnest of our inheritance, or the pledge
of future glory? I think not. I am constrained, by these
and other considerations, to belieye that election, in this pas
sage, means personal election; and, if that be the case, it is
not conditional election ; it is an election to faith, and not an
election founded on faith; for the apostle expressly declares
that the Ephesians were " chosen in Christ, that they should
be holy."
The only other passage to which I think it necessary to
refer, with a view to establish the point, that personal elec
tion is not conditional, is Rom. viii. 29, 30 : " For whom he
did foreknow, he also did predestinate — to be conformed to
the image of his Son." — " Moreover, whom he did predesti
nate, them he also called ; and whom he called, them he also
justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified."
This passage is so conclusive, that it scarcely seems to require,
or even to admit of, many remarks.
The predestination cannot possibly be the choice of certain
individuals into the visible church; nor can the calling be
conceived to mean the external call of the gospel merely, be
cause both are connected, by indissoluble bonds, with glorifi
cation. " Whom he predestinated, &c, them he also glorified."
And the apostle further expressly says that they were pre
destinated, not because they were conformed, but that they
might be conformed, to the image of his Son. In other words,
God determined, in harmony with the views previously given
of the nature- of election, (vide p. 36,) to visit them with that
special and saving influence of the Holy Spirit, which would
certainly lead to their reception of the truth — to their personal

88 THE RESULT OF THE ARGUMENT.
sanctification by it — and thus to their meetness for the glories
of the eternal world.
The reader is now requested to remember the precise point
to which our argument has conducted us. We have proved,
it is humbly hoped, that God has from eternity chosen certain
individuals to the enjoyment of certain blessings, — that at least
some of these blessings are spiritual and eternal blessings, —
and that they were not chosen to the enjoyment of them on
the ground of foreseen faith and obedience ; but were chosen
to be believing and obedient men, that they might thus finally
attain to the possession of these blessings ; i. e., we have proved
the doctrme of eternal and personal election.

LECTURE V.

ELECTION.
OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOCTRINE CONSIDERED.
The course proposed in the discussion of this subject, was,
first, to give a scriptural statement of the doctrine itself;
secondly, to adduce proof in support of it ; and, thirdly, to
reply to the objections which have been urged against it.
Having finished our observations in reference to the first
and second branches of the subject, we proceed,
Thirdly, to repel the objections which have been brought
against the doctrine of election.
" I reject the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination," says
Bishop Tomline, " not because it is incomprehensible, but
because I think it irreconcilable with the justice and goodness
of God."
Objection 1st. — Predestination is incompatible with the
Divine goodness.
Before proceeding directly to repel the objection, it may be
well to observe, that the mode of argument resorted to by his
Lordship ought not to be adopted without the utmost degree
of caution. It is the very method employed by the Unitarians
to bring into discredit the great doctrine of the atonement;
and it is used not more legitimately by Arminians against Cal
vinists, than by Socinians against both. Our ignorance and
prejudice render us very inadequate judges of what is, and
what is not, compatible with the Divine character. It is pos
sible that a certain mode of conduct, presenting to us the ap
pearance of discordance with that character, might, by more
ample means of judging, be made to appear in perfect harmony
with it. I do not venture to assert, indeed, that we are in no

90 election is not inconsistent
case warranted to pronounce upon the truth or falsehood of a
sentiment from the aspect which the Divine character is sup
posed to bear to it; but I confess I think the safest method, in
all cases, is to bring the sentiment, whatever it may be, to the
test of Scripture ; — to collect together the whole of what the
Bible says in reference to it; — and to make it our exclusive
effort to ascertain the literal and grammatical sense of those
parts of Divine revelation which treat of it. This wiU be
found, I believe, to be the best mode of ascertaining its com
patibility with the Divine character ; for we may be assured
that every sentiment resting on scriptural authority must be
in harmony with the Divine perfections, whether we can
clearly discern that harmony or not.
Recollecting the preceding caution, we may proceed to ex
amine the objection, that " the doctrine of election is irrecon
cilable with the goodness of God." It wiU greatly aid us here
to bear steadily in mind what that doctrine really is. In fact,
we have scarcely any thing more to do than to divest it of that
motley and unsightly garb in which its adversaries have been
wont to array it, to obtain our objeet. That it would be at
direct variance with all just conceptions of the Divine good
ness to suppose that Jehovah, when contemplating* a race of
innocent moral agents, appointed some of their number to ever
lasting happiness, and others to everlasting misery, we are
perfectly willing to concede; nor would any one maintain this
position with more decision and firmness than an enlightened
Calvinist. But such is not the predestination for which we
contend. Election, as explained in these pages, and as it is
maintained by a rapidly increasing number of the followers of
the Genevese reformer, (whether maintained by the reformer
himself is of no consequence; neither John Calvin nor John
Wesley ought to have the dominion over the conscience, which
is sometimes given to them,) is the choice and appointment of
certain individuals to the enjoyment of good, and good only.
It is the Divine purpose to bring some of the human race, all
of whom the purpose contemplates as sinners, to faith and
holiness as the means, and to the happiness and glory of
heaven, as the result. It is not a decree to destroy the rest;

WITH THE DIVINE GOODNESS. 91
it is not even, as we have seen, a decree not to save them.
All that can be said is, that there is in the Divine mind a de
cree to save the elect, and not a decree to save the non-elect.
Now, if there had been an obligation resting upon God to
save man, there would doubtless have been a decree to save
all men ; and the non-existence of a decree to save the non-
elect would certainly be a violation of goodness. But if God
were under no obligation to save men ; — if, without any viola
tion of goodness, he might have left the whole race to perish,
which an Arminian must admit, or he makes salvation to be of
debt, not of grace, then there is no principle on which it can
be maintained, that a decree to save a part of the race only
violates goodness, but this, viz., that the goodness which God
manifests to some of his creatures, he is bound to manifest to
all; — a principle which will lead to infinite embarrassment
and contradiction. Mr. Watson agrees with us in his views
of the Adamic dispensation. He admits that the standing or
falling of the race was suspended on the conduct of the public
head of the race ; — that the curse included in it death tempo
ral, spiritual, and eternal. How then can the conclusion be
avoided, or evaded, that the whole race must have suffered all
these consequences of transgression, but for the interposition
of mercy? And, since it was mercy that interposed, there
could not have been any obligation resting upon God to in
terpose; for obligation and mercy 'are totally incompatible
notions. Let us suppose, then, that in these circumstances
God had only so interposed as to open a door of hope, or to
provide the means of salvation, for a part of the race merely,
when he was not bound to provide the means of salvation for
any : would his conduct, in leaving the remaining part to suf
fer the consequences of the' breach of the Adamic dispensation,
have been to them a violation of goodness? Certainly it
would not have been a manifestation of goodness; but how
could it have been to them more truly a violation of goodness,
than the Divine conduct, in providing the means of salvation
for man, and not for fallen angels, is a violation of goodness
towards the latter? When there is no claim to deliverance,
it cannot be said that the non-provision of deliverance, or

92 ELECTION IS NOT INCONSISTENT
of the means of deliverance, is incompatible with the Divine
goodness. Mr. Watson must pull down his own system ; he
must unsay every thing that he has said in reference to the
original covenant with Adam, and to the consequences of its
violation, — which consequences he admits have overtaken the
race, in that state of condemnation and depravity in which
every member of the human family enters the world, — before
he can consistently maintain, that even the provision of the
means of salvation for a part of the race only would be a
violation of Divine goodness, in reference to the rest.
But this, we think, is not the true state of the case. It is
admitted by most modern Calvinists, and in subsequent Lec
tures I shall endeavour to show that they are right in this
admission, that the means of salvation have been secured for
the whole race. God has provided an atonement of infinite
value — " the blood of Christ, which cleanseth from all sins."
He proffers salvation, on the ground of this atonement, to
the whole family of man — to all, at least, who hear the gospel.
All men are invited, and all' are equally welcome to come to
the Saviour; and all who choose to go to him shaU unques
tionably be saved. Election does no more than dispose cer
tain individuals to comply with the invitations of mercy, by
securing that special influence of the Holy Spirit which makes
them willing in the day of God's power. ' " But," it will per
haps be said, "this influence should be exerted upon the
minds of all, since the want of it leaves those to whom it is
not imparted, destitute of the power to avail themselves of the
means of salvation, and every view we take of the Divine good
ness constrains us to believe that such power ought to be
imparted to the whole race." Now, if it were true that Cal
vinistic principles did involve the notion that the non-elect
are left without power to secure their salvation, it might be
fairly doubted whether, even in that case, they would impeach
the Divine goodness ; for, if God were not bound to provide
the means of salvation for any, how can he be bound to impart
power to all to use those means ? Not doing what he is
under no obligation to do, or all that he is able to do, is
not inconsistent with perfect goodness ; or what shall we say

WITH THE DIVINE GOODNESS. 93
of the fact, that there is no provision of mercy for fallen angels?
But we ask the opponents what they mean by the term power
in the objection as stated by them? Do they mean power in
the sense of physical capacities, means, and opportunities of
salvation? Or, power in the sense of disposition to avail
themselves of those means and opportunities ? In the former
sense all men, as we have seen, (vide p. 70,) possess power to
secure their salvation — power to love God; for his character is
infinitely amiable, and they are physically capable of experi
encing the emotion of love; and, consequently, they have
power to do aU that he commands. In the sense of disposi
tion, even our opponents do not believe that all men possess
power to secure their salvation ; for, on their own principles,
numbers do not secure it, because they are not disposed to
secure it. It is worthy of especial remark, that the notion of
common grace, or grace dispensed to all men on the ground
of the atonement, does not relieve the Arminian from any
difficulty on this point, which he conceives to embarrass the
Calvinistic scheme. The only obstacle to a sinner's salvation,
now that the door of hope has been set open to all men by the
atonement, (I leave those Calvinists who suppose that the door
has not been set open to all, to answer for themselves as they
best can ; I am about as far removed from them, as from the
Arminians,) is his want of disposition to be saved: " Why will
ye die ?" &c. ; " Ye will not come unto me," said Christ, " that
ye may have life." Now, if common grace does not restore to
all men a disposition to be saved, (and we have the evidence of
fact that it does not,) it does not remove the only obstacle to
their salvation. It does not impart, we might retort upon
them, the power to be saved. Yes, replies the Arminian, it
gives them sufficient grace or power to be saved, if they im
prove that grace. If they do this ! Well, and does not the
Calvinist maintain that all men have power to secure their
salvation, if they are disposed to use that power as they ought
to do? What advantage, then, has Arminianism, on this
point, over Calvinism ? Surely none at all. The common
grace of our opponents just restores to the whole race what
we contend the race never lost, and could not lose, because

94 ELECTION IS NOT INCONSISTENT
essential to accountability. The only difference is, that the
power of which both parties speak was, as the Calvinist thinks,
bestowed by equity; and, as the Arminian imagines, by grace.
The stubborn, uncompromising fact is, that God has not given
to all men a disposition to work out their own salvation ; or,
which is the same thing, has not exerted upon all men that
special and holy influence which would have certainly led to
the existence of the disposition. (Will an Arminian deny
that he could have done this ? If he should, he has sunk into
Atheism.) The same difficulties, in reference to the Divine
goodness, press, and equally press, (if there be supposed to be
any difficulties at all,) upon both systems. The resolution of
the difficulty appears to me to be this, — that perfect good
ness does not require God to do every thing to promote the
happiness of his creatures, which he is able to do ; nor to bestow
the same measure of aid, and of the means of happiness,
upon all.
I have only one more remark, — not very intimately con
nected, indeed, with the preceding train of reasoning, but yet,
as it appears to me, of some importance, — to make before I
proceed to the consideration of another objection. The
threatening by which the tree of knowledge of good and evil
was guarded did not contemplate the extinction of the race ;
or, to speak more correctly, it was not a threatening that, in
case of disobedience, the race should not exist. Had that
been the case, as Dr. Russell remarks, and the remark is of
great importance, we should exist now only in consequence of
the interposition of Christ, and could have no connexion with
Adam as a federal head. The depravity of a moral kind which
cleaves to us by nature could not be the result of Adam's
transgression ; since the conception of its being such would
involve the absurdity that we suffer something which was not
included in the original threatening. And what is that but
in effect saying, that, if any human law threatens to imprison
a man if he commit a certain offence, it may afterwards justly
hang him for that offence ? The language of God to Adam
was, on the contrary, a threatening that, if he transgressed,
the condition of the race should, in every point of view, be

WITH GOODNESS AND EQUITY. 95
seriously affected by his transgression; — that that sovereign
and holy sustaining influence, which is the exclusive source of
every thing spiritually good in man, should be withdrawn from
him, and withheld from the race, in token of the moral Gover
nor's disapprobation of his sin. The violation of the Adamic
dispensation must, then, have drawn after it universal trans
gression, and universal punishment, but for the interposition
of mercy. Now, if mercy had not interposed, and it was not
obliged to interpose, would universal punishment have been
incompatible with the Divine goodness ? If our opponents
answer in the negative, as they must do, we may further ask
them, how a decree, resting on reasons which are not revealed,
to exempt some from punishment, can be more irreconcilable
with the goodness of God than the actual infliction of punish
ment upon all ?
Objection 2. — Predestination is incompatible with the
justice of God.
In examining this objection, it will be again necessary to
bear in mind what the doctrine of election really is ; and, in
addition to this, to refer to the rule by which the equity of
God's conduct towards moral agents is to be tried and ascer
tained. Till we know what justice requires, it is manifestly
impossible for us to form an enlightened opinion, whether a
particular decree, of a certain mode of conduct, is a violation
of justice or not.
I commence my remarks on this subject, then, by observing
that justice requires a moral governor to give, and is satisfied
by his giving, to every individual what is due to him. When
every person, over whom the authority of the governor ex
tends, has received from him to the full amount of his claims,
every thing has been done that justice requires, and none have
any right to complain. All this is so perfectly self-evident,
that there is no controversy in regard to it; indeed, there
can be none. It is only when we come to specify the claims
which the creature possesses upon the Creator, or to state
what is due from God to man as a subject of moral govern
ment, that any marked and radical difference of opinion com
mences. To this point, then, it becomes us to direct our

96 WHAT IS DUE TO THE CREATURE.
particular attention ; and the following remarks in reference
to it are submitted to the reader.
To a creature, contemplated in that relation exclusively,
the Creator manifestly owes nothing. He might strip him of
all that he possesses, yea, deprive him of existence itself, with
out doing him any wrong. All that he has, even life itself,
must be included in the class of sovereign gifts, (for he could
not merit any thing before he was brought into being,) and a
sovereign gift may at any time be resumed. God does the
beast no wrong when he takes away its life.
To an innocent creature, whose life is destined to be per
petuated, some have said that the Creator owes the means of
happiness. The late Bishop of Lincoln, indeed, in one of the
most remarkable passages of his remarkable volume, affirms
that He possesses an abstract right to destine such a creature,
as innocent, to suffering, either temporary or eternal. Both
opinions appear to me incorrect, (and the latter, as avowed by
an Arminian, self-contradictory and absurd,) for an innocent
creature must be, as we have seen, (vide p. 19,) a subject of
moral government, and so must be contemplated along with
the subjects of moral government.
To an accountable creature the Creator owes a revelation of
the law, or sufficient means of knowing the law, (the equity
of the law as established by God is pre-supposed here,) by
which he is to be hereafter judged; and physical capacities,
or powers, which render him capable of yielding the obedience
required of him. He must have, in contradistinction from
brutes, an intellect capable, if rightly exercised, of under
standing what the moral Governor requires of him. He
must have motives presented to him, — i. e., the promise of
some great good, adapted to his intellectual and moral nature,
if he yield obedience ; and the threatening of some great evil,
if he determine to withhold it, — to induce him to do what is
thus required: for motives are the instruments of moral
government. He must have the power of determining, or
the faculty of choice or volition ; for it is essential to moral
government that the proximate cause of moral actions should
be in the creature; and not in the instinct of the creature, as

WHAT IS DUE TO AN ACCOUNTABLE BEING. 97
in the case of animals, but in the determination or volition
of the creature : and, finally, he must be free from physical
constraint and restraint, or left free to choose what appears to
him good, and to reject what appears to him evil. Were any
thing more than the qualifications just enumerated — such, for
instance, as a disposition to do what the Creator enjoins —
necessary to accountability, it would be impossible, as will
more fully appear afterwards, to erect a system of moral go
vernment at all; or, at any rate, to secure any thing like a
fair trial of the subjects of that government.
Further, such a system having been established, and its
subjects having received every thing that is essential to ac
countability, they would have an indisputable right to require,
at the end of their probationary course, that they should be
judged by the law (and not another) under which they had
been placed; and, on the supposition of their having preserved
their integrity, that all the blessed fruits and consequences of
obedience should be awarded to them.
Let us now apply these general and introductory remarks
to the actual condition of mankind. Have they preserved
their integrity ? Has even one of the race preserved his in
tegrity? What saith the Scripture? When "the Lord
looked down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if
there were any that did understand and seek after God," he
found that all had gone out of the way, that there was not one
that did good, no, not one.*
In these circumstances the creature, at the close of his proba
tionary course, could have no claim upon the moral Governor
to the reward of obedience. Having exposed himself to pun
ishment by disobedience, Jehovah might have executed upon
him the sentence of the law which he had broken. Justice
* It is of no consequence to the argument whether the plan of salvation
contemplated the race as fallen in Adam merely ; or whether it cast a prospec
tive view, if I may so speak, over that universal depravity of the race which
the Divine Being must have foreseen would be the consequence of their fall,
unless mercy should interpose. It is enough for the argument that this plan
contemplated the race as sinners, and was a provision to rescue them from their
prostrate condition.

98 DOES EQUITY REQUIRE THE CONDEMNATION OF ALL
would not have been violated by his so doing; nay, justice
would seem to require him to do so. The condemnation of
all would have been an act of justice. The condemnation of
each separate individual would have been an act of justice, —
an act of justice in itself, without any reference to any other
act, and upon the moral character of which no other act could
effect any change. And, if the condemnation of all would
have been an act of justice, a decree to condemn all would, of
course, have sustained the same moral character; no indivi
dual would have had it in his power to say that wrong was
done to him by a determination that, in his case, the sentence
of the law should take effect.
We advance now to the precise point to which the whole of
the preceding statements have been intended to conduct us ;
for the question, which is in fact the very turning-point of the
inquiry, now presents itself, viz., " Would the act of leaving
some individuals to suffer the vengeance due to their crimes,
which would have been confessedly a righteous act, if aU had
been left, become an unjust one by the act of rescuing others ? "
Is it possible, or conceivable, that an act of mercy to one —
undeserved mercy, of course, for there is no deserved mercy —
arbitrary mercy, if you will, to one, can convert an act of
equity towards another into an act of injustice and cruelty?
Surely common sense, unbiassed by system and prejudice,
must say, that the character of the condemning act must re
main what it would otherwise have been, and that, if any
exception at all be made, it should be made against the
saving act and decree. I appprehend, then, that before Armi
nians can prove that Calvinistic predestination (admitting that
it includes a decree to permit the condemnation of some, or
even a decree that they shall be condemned, resting, as it
must do, on their disobedience) is irreconcilable with the
justice of God, they must be able to show that the condem
nation of all would have been unjust; since, as it has been just
observed, an act of unmerited mercy to one cannot convert
an act of justice towards another into one of oppression and
cruelty. To these statements they will doubtless reply, that equity

UNDER HUMAN GOVERNMENTS ? 99
requires a moral Governor to act with perfect impartiality, —
to make no difference in his treatment of those who equally
deserve the expressions of his favour, or the inflictions of his
wrath. They are in the habit of reminding us, that where
there exists no shade of difference in the guilt of certain indi
viduals, involved in the same crime, the moral Governor cannot
without injustice pardon some, while he condemns and exe
cutes others. They tell us, that what would have been a pure
act of justice towards the latter, if all had been executed, be
comes to them an act of injustice by the unmerited escape of
the former. Here, no doubt, is the point of difficulty on the
Calvinistic scheme, since its tenets teach that the mercy shown
to the elect was not attracted towards them by their superior
worth, or even by their inferior desert of punishment.
Let us, then, examine this point a little more at large. The
moral Governor, it is alleged, must make no difference in his
treatment of those who equally deserve the expressions of his
displeasure. Either all must be pardoned, or all punished ;
but one must not suffer, while the others escape. Now, to
me, I acknowledge, this assertion does not carry the Ught and
evidence of a moral axiom along with it. That none of them
must endure a greater amount of punishment than they de
serve, is abundantly manifest. But that all must suffer
equally — that the moral Governor must make no difference in
his treatment of them, save that which may be supposed to
result from the varied degrees of their guilt, is another and a
very different thing. Still, I am ready to admit, in reference to
a human moral governor, that equity does require him to act,
generally and habitually at least, in the manner stated by our
opponents ; and when he pardons some, who were implicated
with others in the same general crime, to do it on the ground
that the shade of their criminality is a degree lighter than
that of the rest. The great end of punishment, namely, the
prevention of crime, could not be secured unless such were the
general conduct of the governor. Yet there are cases of
exception even in human moral governments, — cases in which
the happiness, and even the safety, of the state require that
juctice should unsheath its sword, and smite some of the guilty

100 ALL TREATED ALIKE BY THE MORAL GOVERNOR,
body, though the nicest casuistical balances may be unable to
detect the slightest difference in the degree of the criminality
of the whole ; but some must suffer for the sake of example :
and the great end of punishment having been sufficiently
secured by their death, the rest, though equally guilty with
their less fortunate companions, may be permitted, and are
permitted, to escape.*
Now the reader is especially requested to take notice, that
the whole force of the Arminian objection we are now con
sidering, rests upon the assumption, that the difference in the
conduct of God towards a lost and condemned race, implied
in the doctrine of election — visiting some of the race with that
special influence of the Holy Spirit which leads them to seek
salvation, and not visiting the rest with that influence — is a
difference in his conduct as the moral Governor of the race.
If we can show, then, that there is really no difference in his
conduct towards the subjects of his government, in that rela
tion, — that, sustaining, as he does, this most important office,
he acts in it with all the impartiality which our opponents, or,
indeed, any one else can possibly desire, we shall obviously
break the force of the objection, if not entirely annihilate it.
What, then, they will be disposed to reply, is it not true that,
on your principles, God decreed to deliver some from the ruins
of the fall, and did not, even on the most moderate statement
* I once thought, and I believe many think, that the end of punishment in the
Divine government, and in the case of human governments, is not the same ; —
that, under the latter, bonds, fines, imprisonment, and death, are not punish
ment properly so called, but mere suffering inflicted by law for the prevention of
crime ; whereas the future misery of the finally impenitent will be strictly and
literally punishment : — and that, on this account, it has come to be considered,
in reference to human proceedings, hard and unjust, that while of two criminals,
equaUy guilty, one is spared, the other should be sacrificed merely for the sake
of example, and to promote tbe general good ; but that, in reference to the
Divine proceedings, there is no basis for this feeling, since punishment with God
is, properly speaking, punishment. I now doubt, however, whether the end of
punishment in the Divine government differs from that of human government.
Surely punishment is not an ultimate end. An infinitely benevolent Being can
have no abstract delight in inflicting it. He must have some object in view.
And what can that object be but the promotion of his own glory by thus placing
a barrier against the inroads of rebellion ?

BUT NOT BY GOD AS A SOVEREIGN. 101
of your views, decree to save others? And is it not further
true, that, on the Calvinistic system, he exerts an influence
upon the former to secure their salvation, which he does not
exert upon the latter ? No, I reply, it is not true that he does
either the one or the other as the moral Governor of the world.
On the contrary, though, in his character as Sovereign, great
disparity may be observed in his conduct towards men, yet,
as a moral Governor, he acts with the most exact equality
and uniformity.
Nor let this distinction between what some have ventured
to call the private and the public character of Jehovah, i.e.,
between the relation sustained by him to mankind as Sovereign
and as moral Governor, be stigmatized as a fiction got up for
the occasion, for it is frequently recognised amongst "men;
and we admit, without the slightest hesitation, that an indi
vidual may do many things, as a man, which he cannot and
ought not to do, as a ruler or a judge. If two persons should
present themselves in a court of justice, suing for the recovery
of what they considered just debts, the judge, sitting on the
bench, must only grant what the law awards to them. Should
they fail to make good in law their claim to what they demand,
no upright judge could award them any thing as a judge, not
even a penny. But if, commiserating their situation, he, as
an individual, were to present them with a sum equal to what
the hard decision of the law had just placed beyond the reach
of their hopes, who could consider this conduct a just subject
of complaint? Or if, as an individual, he chose to befriend
one, and not the other, would the latter be entitled to repre
sent himself as unjustly dealt with? Surely not. The justice
which, as moral governor, he dispenses, is the property of the
community ; every one has a claim to an equal measure of it.
But the wealth which enables him to administer to the neces
sities of the rejected suitor is his own ; and every one feels
that he has a right to do what he will with his own.
Now, it is not in his public, but in his private character, that
any difference is to be traced in the conduct of God towards
the beings whom he has formed. It is not in the relation of
a ruler or a judge, but of a Sovereign, the original source of

102 THE PREDESTINATING DECREE EMANATES
being and of blessedness, who owes nothing to any of his
creatures, as creatures, and has a most unquestionable right
to do what he will with his own. The superior favour, which,
according to the Calvinistic scheme, he manifests towards
some of his creatures, is not displayed to them as subjects of
his moral government, but as the creatures of his power;
upon whom he has a most unquestionable right, as we have
already proved, to bestow whatever measure of good he pleases.
It is difficult to see how our opponents can refuse to accede
to the propriety of this distinction ; for if it be true, as they
affirm it is, that there can be no inequality or difference in
the conduct of God as a moral Governor towards his subjects, —
and if it be further true, as it unquestionably is, that there
exists a great disparity as to the actual amount of good which
different orders of intelligent beings receive from him, how
can they account for the bestowment of the superior measures
of good, without supposing that Jehovah sustains a double
relation to mankind, in one of which relations it may be com
petent for him to do what in the other would either be inex
pedient or improper ?
The point we are now considering deserves, and perhaps
demands, a little more elucidation.
The predestinating decree then, let it be observed, was not
passed by God in his rectoral character, or as the moral
Governor of men. It emanated from him as a Sovereign,
retaining the right, as we have seen, (vide p. 21,) even after
the establishment of a system of moral government, (the
establishment of which merely binds him to render unto all
their due, — and to refrain from doing what might tend to
frustrate the great object sought to be attained by that go
vernment,) to bestow what measure of good upon his creatures
may seem right in his sight. Precisely similar remarks may
be made in reference to the execution or accomplishment of
this decree in the actual salvation of its subjects. Indeed,
election, and effectual calling, are so necessarily the subjects
of the same moral character, that they may be considered as
one act : at all events, the remarks which apply to the one
are clearly applicable to the other. The views, then, which

FROM GOD AS A SOVEREIGN. 103
we entertain upon this important subject may be thus farther
developed.* Contemplating, as Jehovah did, the whole race of man as
lying in a state of condemnation and depravity, iu consequence
of their apostacy, and as being utterly unable to rescue them
selves, he graciously determined, as a Sovereign, to provide
an adequate basis for their salvation. He resolved, on the
ground of an atonement of infinite value to be made in the
fulness of time by his Son, that pardon should be offered to
the human race generally, — that commissioned messengers
should carry the proclamation of mercy to every creature
under heaven, — that they should testify of the value and effi
cacy of the Saviour's blood, — invite all, without exception,
to come and wash in it, that they might experience actual de
liverance from guilt and pollution, — and declare that whoso
ever believed their testimony should be saved, while all who
rejected it should be condemned.
The execution of this astonishing plan led to the establish
ment of a grand system of moral government in the world,
the basis of which is Sovereign mercy. Its laws, designed to
show men their awful state, — its invitations to return back
unto God, — its promises of acceptance with him if they com
ply with these invitations, and its threatenings of future pun
ishment if they reject them, constitute the instruments of this
, government. Now, as the Gospel which contains these pre
cepts, and invitations, and promises, and threatenings, is com
manded to be preached to every creature, and as it would
have been enjoyed by all men, had the church been obedient
to the heavenly command, and had men in general been
as zealous in the pursuit of spiritual, as they are of worldly
blessings, it is manifest that the conduct of God, as the moral
* I cannot but apprehend that a part of the objection which is felt by many
against the doctrine of election results from the following misconception. They
seem to imagine that God's choice of the elect immediately rescues them from
condemnation ; not taking into their account the avowed and recorded senti
ments of most Calvinists at least, that the fall of Adam was succeeded by a
dispensation of mercy which set open the door of hope to all men ; and that
election only secures the deliverance of the elect from condemnation, by dispos
ing them to accept that mercy which is freely offered to all.

104 THE PREDESTINATING DECREE EMANATES
Governor of men, is marked by perfect uniformity and im
partiality. There is not the slightest difference in his pro
ceedings, .towards them in this character or relation. In re
ference to those who possess the gospel, (and we need not
for the present carry our observations beyond them,) it is
manifest that he does not prescribe one law for this man, and
another for that ; that he does not promise mercy to some
transgressors, and not to others; but that, on the contrary, he
requires the same conduct from all : addresses the same invi
tations to all ; offers the same inducements to all ; issues the
same threatenings and promises to all; and, finally, that he will
deal with all that accept the offered mercy, and with all who
reject it, precisely alike at the great day of account. " He that
believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shaU be damned."
If, in addition to this, he touches the hearts of some by his
grace, and so secures the origination of a disposition to sue
for mercy, which Calvinism allows and teaches ; or if he
decrees to do this, which is the same thing as far as the diffi
culties of the subject are considered, he does this, not in his
public, but in his private character, i. e., not as a moral Gover
nor, but as a Sovereign. He does it as Jehovah, the exclu
sive source of being and of blessedness, who did not and could
not deprive himself, by establishing a system of moral govern^
ment, of his inherent right to impart to his creatures any
species or any degree of good which is not incompatible with v
the great ends of that government. Suppose a number of in
dividuals had thrown off the yoke of subjection to a temporal
monarch ; suppose they were tried on the charge of having
been found in arms against the government — were found
guilty and condemned. " They must be dealt with," say our
opponents, " alike. If a proffer of pardon be made to one, on
condition of his sending to the sovereign an humble petition
for mercy, it must be made to all. If one be executed, all,"
they affirm, " must be executed ; since, on the supposition
of there being no shade of difference in their guilt, it would be
unjust to pardon one, and execute the rest." Now suppose we
were obliged to acknowledge the truth of these assertions,
might we not address to the objector the following inquiry ?

FROM GOD AS A SOVEREIGN. 105
The judge who tried these unhappy individuals is obliged, you
say, as a judge, to deal with all alike ; but is he not a man,
as well as a judge ? And if in his private capacity he choose to
use his influence with some of their number (in whom various
circumstances had led him to take especial interest) to induce
them to humble themselves before the sovereign — to confess
their crime, and to sue for mercy, (supposing them to be averse
to do this, which is true of all sinners;) or, if he could go
beyond the power of moral suasion — could touch and subdue
their rebellious spirits by an energy above that which is
granted to man, and thus induce them to implore that pardon
without which he cannot, as a judge, dispense it, — what objec
tion could be reasonably urged against his doing either the
one or the other? What injustice would be done to those on
whom, as a man, he exerted no such influence ? What obli
gation towards them would he violate? All that could be
said would be, that, while he left the latter to the operation of
strict equity, as he had a clear right to do, he manifested un
deserved kindness to the former. And what is this but the
doctrine of election, or of effectual calling, which is the accom
plishment of its merciful decree ?
Should it be said that it is not enough for the moral Gover
nor merely to open the door of mercy, and thus to offer
salvation to all, — that, in addition to this, he must impart the
disposition to accept of it, I answer, that this cannot be the
case, because, in point of fact, he has not imparted this dis
position to all, (to deny that he could have produced the
disposition is to sink into Atheism,) and, therefore, cannot be
under an obligation to impart it. I answer, further, that all
that God is bound to impart are, physical capacities of under
standing, believing, loving, choosing, obeying, &c, — and those
moral means and inducements which are in themselves adapted
to originate the state of mind which he requires^-NOT the
STATE OF MIND ITSELF.
Should our opponents further reply, that they only mean to
affirm that the moral Governor is bound, on the Calvinistic
doctrine of the entire impotence of man to every thing that
is spiritually good, to impart the disposition, I answer, first,
M

106 A DISPOSITION TO OBEY IS NOT DUE
that this entire impotence of man, without the aid of grace,
is claimed by Mr. Watson as an Arminian ,as well as a Cal
vinistic doctrine ; and that the common grace, of which they
speak, does not impart the disposition ; the difficulty is, then,
as great with them as with us. I answer, secondly, that the
objection is founded on the principle, that Jehovah cannot with
any propriety invite, entreat, or command a man to do any
thing which he is morally unable to do, or, in other words,
indisposed to do; for moral inability to do that which is
good, is nothing more than indisposition to do that which is
good. And, maintaining this principle, they must either maintain,
on the one hand, that the word of God addresses no invitations,
entreaties, and commands to sinners; or deny, on the other
hand, that sinners are morally unable to comply with them.
If they choose the former part of the dilemma, they run into
Antinomianism ; if they choose the latter, they virtually deny
the total depravity of man, previous to his conversion to God ;
for if there be in the case of any man power, in the sense of
disposition, to do what is spiritually good, that man is a holy
man. Thus, the notion of common grace does not extricate
them from the objection which they urge against Calvinism ;
for either it gives the disposition to accept the salvation which
God offers to all men, or it does not. If it give the dispo
sition, then a sinner is holy before he is regenerated, which
Arminians do not allow. If it do not give the disposition,
then common grace leaves an individual as much destitute of
power to do what God commands, and to work out his own
salvation, as they are in the habit of contending he is left by
the scheme of Calvinism.
From the whole, it appears that physical capacities — moral
means and inducements — constitute the ground of accounta
bility ; that these the moral Governor bestows upon all men ;
— so that his conduct in that relation is distinguished by
absolute impartiality — obligation being in all cases propor
tioned to privilege.
It further appears, that, without some other influence be
sides that of moral means, sinners will not, in point of fact,

FROM GOD TO THE CREATURE. 107
sue for mercy; — that this influence, it was resolved, by the
decree of election, to put forth ; — that it proceeds from God,
not as a moral Governor, but as a Sovereign — in which cha
racter he is not bound to render an account of his conduct,
and may do what he will with his own ; — and, finally, that, on
these accounts, the objections of our opponents against the
justice of the predestinating decree are null and void.
That there are difficulties connected with this subject, it
would be worse than foolish to deny ; but that both the phi
losophical and scriptural difficulties which embarrass the sys
tem of Arminianism are greater than those which attach to
Calvinism, I have not the slightest doubt.

LECTURE VI.

ELECTION.
Objection 3. — Predestination is incompatible with the free
agency and accountability of man.
The argument of our opponents is as foUows. If Jehovah
has determined what shall be the everlasting condition of all
men, — and if, in addition to this, he has decreed every event
which takes place, every event must be a necessary event,
and it is impossible that man can be a free agent.
Now the reader will not forget, and it is important to remem
ber it here, that the preceding pages do not represent the eter
nal condition evenjrf _the elect as being directly determined
by Divine decree. We have formed our statements upon this
subject under the guiding influence of the moral axiom, " God
does what he decrees, and decrees only what he does." All
that is done by him, accordingly, in effecting the salvation of
the elect — the exertion of that regenerating, and preserving,
and confirming influence of the Holy Spirit, &c, by which
they are certainly brought ultimately (though in a manner
adapted to their intellectual and moral nature) to the glory
of heaven— is decreed by God. But as the ungodly destroy
themselves, — as God does nothing to effect their destruction,
there is no occasion, and, indeed, no room for any decree in
reference to it. We have, accordingly, defined election to
be a decree to save, and not a decree to destroy. In what
respect it may be said that every event is the subject of a
Divine decree, will probably be more fully unfolded in the
subsequent discussion.
Before we proceed to examine the force of the objection, it
may be well to remember, that, if it really present any diffi
culty, we shall not rescue ourselves from its pressure by

ARMINIANISM DOES NOT ESCAPE THE DIFFICULTY. 109
deserting from the Calvinistic standard; unless, indeed, we
proceed to deny the foreknowledge of God; and, in that
case, difficulties of yet more appalling magnitude would rise
up into view. It is manifest that, with a mere change of
words, the same objection may be urged against the system of
those Arminians who believe in_the Divine prescience. "If
God foresees all future events, those events must be necessary
or certain, — and man is not a free agent." A free action, in the
Arminian sense of the term, is one which may or may not take
place, — one which depends altogether on the arbitrary decision
of the will of the actor, — a decision unaffected by, or at any rate
certainly not caused by, motives, for it may be at direct vari
ance with motives. Now such an action must be an essentially
contingent action. It cannot be certainly- future. Contin
gency and certain futurition are incompatible notions. But,
if an action be foreseen, it must be as certainly future as if
it were decreed. Predestination does not, then, more neces
sarily interfere with free agency than foreknowledge.
Before we can estimate the force of this objection against
the doctrine of predestination, it will be necessary to ascer
tain in what free agency consists, and to show when any being
may be said to possess it. With the meaning of the term
agent, all are familiarly acquainted. An agent (limiting the
application of the word to intelligent beings) is the doer or
performer of an action. A free agent is one who is at liberty,
i. e., free to act as he chooses. " Freedom," says Dr. Williams,
" as applied to an agent, in my conception, is properly and con
sistently expressive of a negative idea — not a power or a faculty,
but exemption related to the wiU. It is, properly speaking,
the property, not of the will of a moral agent, but of the moral
agent himself." Every being who is not restrained by physi
cal force from doing what he chooses, and who is not compelled
by the same force to do what he does not choose, is a free
agent. It is, therefore, manifest that all the moral agents of
whose existence we have any knowledge, are possessed of
freedom. God is a free agent; "He doeth whatsoever he
pleases among the armies of heaven, and the inhabitants of the
earth." Holy angels are free agents; fallen spirits are free

110 FREE AGENCY EXPLAINED.
agents ; the whole of the human race, in the great majority of
their actions, both before and after their conversion to God,
are free agents; — because their actions are not compulsatory.
They are under no physical constraint or restraint. Their
conduct is in accordance with volition, or the result of it. They
are not constrained to act in opposition to volition. If the
physical energies of any being are laid under restraint by an
act of power, so that he cannot do the things which he would,
he is not a free agent. But, if he is at liberty to do what he
chooses, he is a free agent, whatever, in point of fact, he may
choose to do. No bias of the will, consequently, however
powerful, to any particular mode of conduct, interferes with
the free agency of any being ; since freedom, as we have seen,
is not properly predicated of the will of an agent. Were the
case otherwise than we have now stated, Jehovah could not be
a free agent; for, so entire and powerful is the bias of his
mind towards holiness, that he cannot do that which is evil.
The devil could not be a free agent ; for, in consequence of an
opposite bias, he cannot do that which is good. Now if Jeho
vah is a free agent, though morally unable to do evil, and if
it is certain that the devil is a free agent, though morally un
able to do good, it cannot surely be denied that man may be
a free agent, although the actual bias of his mind should be
towards evil, only evil, and that continually.
It is of vast importance to form clear conceptions of the
meaning of the term freedom, or, as it is otherwise denomi
nated, free agency, or free will, in its application to a moral
agent. It is essential to remember the statements just made,
that it is a property of the agent himself, and not of his will;
and that the term expresses merely a negative idea, — exemp
tion from physical constraint or restraint. There are some
Calvinists, even, whose conceptions on this subject are exceed
ingly obscure. Adam, they think, was possessed of freedom
in a moral sense when he came from the hands of his Maker,
but he lost it, they imagine, by transgression, — thus evidently
identifying free agency with freedom from a bias to sin, and
ascribing it to the will, and not to the agent himself. But, if
the reader has gone along with me in the previous statements,

THE ARMINIAN NOTION OF FREE AGENCY. Ill
he will at once see that Adam was as truly a free agent after
he had lost his primitive holiness, as while he retained it ; be
cause he was equally free from all physical constraint or re
straint in his actions, and invariably did the things that he
would. And this is in reality the only sense in which freedom
can be ascribed to man.
I do not forget that Arminians are in the habit of attributing
a different, and, as they imagine, a higher kind of freedom to
man than that which has been alluded to above. They com
mit, in short, a double mistake. They ascribe freedom to the
will itself, and not to the agent, — and they attribute to the will
what has been called a self-determining power. When the
strongest motives are presented to the view of an individual,
and are even properly appreciated by the mind, his will, they
say, may choose to be influenced by them, or the contrary. And
this power — the power of submitting to motives, or of resist
ing them — they consider essential to moral freedom. It is not
enough that a man is free as to his actions; his will also must
be free, or he cannot be a free agent.
Every one who has reflected much upon this subject must
be aware of the ambiguity which lurks in the terms, " power
to choose," &c, " the will must be free," &c, employed by our
opponents ; and how much the difficulty of grappling with
them is increased by that ambiguity. In presenting a few
remarks upon this subject to the reader, I will then,
First, endeavour to clear away somewhat of that ambiguity.
The will must be free, say our opponents ; the determination
must not be a forced determination ; the choice must be free,
as well as the action. Now, is it not manifest, that language
is here used in reference to volitions, which can only be properly
applied to actions? An action may be free, or forced, but
by its very nature volition is essentially free. A forced volition
is an incongruous idea. It is compulsatory voluntariness. And
when it is said the choice must be free as well as the action,
we ask whether the term free, in its application to the choice,
is intended to express the same meaning as in its application
to the action.
Supposing them to rely in the affirmative, we say that a

112 THE ARMINIAN NOTION OF FREE AGENCY.
free action is a voluntary action, — an action which is the re
sult of choice. A free choice must, accordingly, mean a vo
luntary choice ; — a choice which results from a previous choice.
But, then, according to their principles, this previous choice
also must, in order to be a free choice, result from a prior
choice ; that again from a former one ; and thus we may go
backwards till we reach the first choice, which could not pos
sibly be free in this sense, because not preceded by a previous
choice. And if the first act of choice be not free, this unfor
tunate circumstance vitiates all the subsequent acts of choice;
not one of them is a free choice ; and, consequently, the man
is not, on their principles, a free agent.
Supposing them to reply in the negative, i. e., to affirm that
they understand the term free, in its application to the choice,
in a sense different from that which it bears in its application
to the action ; I ask them to clear away the ambiguity, which
they have never done yet, and to state the precise sense they
attach to the term. A free volition, or choice, we have been
told, is an unforced volition, or choice. But that, I reply, is
coming back again to the sense of the words free, and forced,
which is now, by hypothesis, abandoned. Perhaps they will
say they mean, by a free volition or choice, an uncaused voli
tion or choice. In that case I would answer, first, that even
the action is not free in this sense of the word ; it is caused, in
the only intelligible sense of the term caused, by the volition,
i. e., it is immediately and invariably subsequent to the volition.
I would answer, secondly, that the notion of the volition being
uncaused contradicts one of those first principles on which we
rest our confidence of the existence of the Divine Being him
self. Nothing can exist without a cause. The universe ex
ists, therefore there is a God. But, if volition may exist
without a cause, why not the universe itself? This notion,
then, of free choice leads directly to Atheism. Thirdly, I
answer, that it becomes the objector to show — since an
action may be a free action, though it has a cause — why a
volition may not be a free volition, though it also has a cause.
I mean, of course, free in any sense which the Arminian can
attach to the term; and I can conceive of two senses only —

THE MOTIVE PRODUCES THE VOLITION. 113
voluntary volition, and uncaused volition. Should it be said,
that though an action must have a cause, yet it may never
theless be accounted a free action, because that cause is in
ternal, or in the actor himself; I would answer, that, on the same
ground, volition may be accounted free, since the proximate
cause of volition in every case is also internal ; it is not the
external good, held up to view by the moral Governor, but the
conception which the mind forms of that good. Hence the
same revelation, and of the same good too, operates differently
upon different minds, because different apprehensions of it are
entertained by those minds. I am utterly unable to conceive
that precisely the same view of an object adapted to awaken
volition should, in the case of two individuals, lead to different
results. I cannot but think that there are laws, of mind, as
well as of matter ; and that the operation of the former is as
uniform and unvarying as that of the latter, — though, as we
know comparatively little of the laws of mind, we are apt to
think that there are no laws, or that they are very irregular in
their operation. Now, if the motive (understanding by the
term motive not the external good merely, but the view which
the mind takes of it) do not produce the volition, or stand in the
relation of cause to it ; — if the mind be so constituted as that
it can choose, determine, &c, and, in point of fact, does deter
mine not only in harmony with the motive, as explained above,
but in direct variance with it, then is it not manifest that there
are no laws of mind, — that mind is entirely beyond Divine
control ?— that God has formed a being over which he pos
sesses no power, and has no possible means of causing it to fulfil
his purposes ? I challenge any Arminian, any philosophical
Libertarian, to show how his opinion that the motive does not
cause the volition, that the mind submits to be influenced by
it, (an expression the absurdity of which becomes apparent the
very moment it is attempted to be explained,) can be reconciled
with the notion of moral government. Moral government is to
be understood in contradistinction from physical and instinc
tive government. The term indicates the nature, not the end
or intention, of the government. It is not called moral govern
ment because it is adapted to promote morality, as I cannot
N

114 THE MOTIVE PRODUCES THE VOLITION.
but think that Bishop Butler has somewhat erroneously stated,
¦ — for there might be moral government under the empire of
Jehovah, if it were possible to conceive of the Governor's being
a malevolent and an unholy beingj (as there actually is moral
government amongst the legions of fallen spirits, who are
under the immediate, though subordinate, dominion of Satan,)
i. e., there might be a government carried on by the influence
of motives, in contradistinction both from physical force as in
the world of matter, and instinctive tendencies as in the world
of animals. Moral government is, in short, the sway of motives^
— the dominion which God thus exerts over intelligent beings
to secure his own ultimate purposes in their creation, though
these purposes are secured, as we shall afterwards see, in dif
ferent ways. Now, if motives, as explained, have no influence
upon the mind,- — if they do not produce volition,-^-if voUtion
arise without a cause, — God has no rule, no authority, no power
over the mind. The certain influence of motives is an essential
ingredient in moral government ; and a man who fancies him
self obliged, on account of the difficulties which appear to him
to embarrass the opinion; to deny the certain influence of
motives, must, to be consistent, abandon with it his belief in
the existence of moral government.
I avOw these opinions in the distinct and full view of the
great arid serious difficulties which press upon them. Now
let not an opponent begin to triumph at this my confession*
that the side of the keenly controverted subject which I feel
compelled to take is not free from difficulty. If he should
tell me that his side presents none, I should think him un
worthy of being argued with. He cannot have examined the
subject. He does not understand it. No candid man, com
petent, from native power of mind, and from a thorough and
Searching examination of the point in dispute, to pronounce
an opinion, will venture to say, that, in reference to it, there
is left for us any thing more than a choice of difficulties. Am
I wrong in avowing this, in reference to the opinion which I
have formed ? If I were writing merely for party purposes
— merely to obtain a triumph over an opponent, perhaps I
should be so. But the interests of truth can never be injured by

MR. STEWART'S STATEMENTS EXAMINED. 115
the confession of a difficulty ; nay, they are likely to be pro
moted by exhibiting it in all its magnitude. The public
attention is, by that course, drawn more directly and in
tensely towards it. More light is, consequently, likely to be
thrown upon it, if it be capable of receiving elucidation ; or,
if not, that fact will be made more clearly apparent, and
writers will more speedily cease to expend useless time and
strength upon a subject which is below " the depth of their
line." And are we not warranted in forming an opinion in
reference to subjects which, on both sides, present great diffi
culties ? Why, in that case, we must refrain from coming to
a decision in many instances where we are constrained to de
cide, and to act too. What are many of our opinions but
the choice we have made between difficulties? Is it not
thus with the fundamental truth of all religion— the exist
ence of God? Does not the belief of the Divine existence
involve in it a violation of a first principle, viz., that nothing
can exist without a cause? for the very conception of God
is the conception of an uncaused Being. Yet, I am con
strained to beUeve that there is a God, because more ap
palling and tremendous difficulties are necessarily involved
in the contrary belief. I frankly acknowledge the difficulties
which embarrass the opinion, that the motive (as explained
formerly, p. 113) is the cause of the volition ; yet they appear
to me less than those which attach to the Libertarian and
Arminian scheme. Mr. Dugald Stewart, I am constrained to
admit, has put the question correctly and fairly, when he
states that the turning point of the controversy between the
two parties is this, viz., " What is the relation which the mo
tive hears to the volition? Is it the cause, or merely the
occasion ?" Maintaining, as he does, the latter, and yet ad
mitting that the voUtion must have a cause, in the true and pro
per sense of the word, he is obliged to search for a cause ; and,
denying it to be the motive, there seems to be no other pos
sible supposition than that which he has adopted, viz., that
the man is the cause. Now, with deference to Mr. Stewart, I
venture to express the opinion, that this is both an unmeaning
and an incompetent solution of the difficulty.

116 mr. stewart's solution incompetent.
It is unmeaning, since no idea can be attached to the phrase
save one which would prove that the man is the cause of all
the emotions of which he is the subject. That idea is, that the
man wills, determines, chooses. In this sense, he may possibly
be said to cause the volition ; but then the man loves, the
man hates, fears, &c. On Mr. Stewart's principles, then, the
man may be said to cause the love, the hatred, the fear, &c ;
yet this Mr. S. would not admit. Now let any one attempt
to attach to the words, " the man causes the volition," any
other definite sense, and he will find himself, if I mistake
not, greatly at a loss. Man is too complex a being to be
represented intelligently as the cause of a volition. When a
certain thought exists in the mind, we never think of ascrib
ing it to man, or to the mind, as its proximate cause. We
should feel, in that case, that our statement of the cause was
not sufficiently definite. How can it be otherwise when man
is represented as the cause of volition ?
But Mr. Stewart's solution of the difficulty is also an in
competent one. The question in every instance, is not
merely, " How comes volition to exist in the mind?" but
" How comes the particular volition of the moment to be
found there ? " To this question, Mr. Stewart's solution can
not afford an answer. We want to know not only why there
was determination, but the particular determination to per
form, or not perform, an action, for instance. Now it obvi
ously gives us no information on that point to be told that the
man determined. Suppose the question were, " Why does a
particular development of the emotion of love, for example,
exist in the mind at a certain time?" would it be a sufficient
answer to say, the man loves ? Clearly not. I cannot regard
the answer as more sufficient when it is brought forward
to account for a particular development of the faculty of
volition. Again, — for as the subject is important, I must be permitted
to enlarge a little further upon it, — I observe, that the views
of Mr. Stewart seem to me to involve a mistake, both in re
ference to the nature of moral government, and of the faculty
of volition. Moral government is, as we have seen, the

MISTAKES THE NATURE OF MORAL GOVERNMENT. 117
government of motives. It effects its purposes by promising
great good as the reward of obedience, and threatening great
evil as the consequence of disobedience. The subjects of
moral government are so constituted as that their actions shall
result from determination or volition: (not as in the brute,
where they result from instinct.) There must, then, be a
tendency or power in volition to lead to or to produce action,
or the being would not be a capable subject of moral govern
ment. In like manner, must there not be a tendency or
power in motives to produce volition? If there were not,
how could the being in this case, any more than in the former,
be a capable subject of moral government ? We do not pre
sent motives to the brute, because they have no tendency to
influence the brute. Now, suppose a being were so con
stituted as to have the physical power of determining, or of
volition, but not so as that motives should have any tendency
to originate or produce volition, what practical good would
result from presenting motives to him? Would a rational
being ever attempt to do it ? Would the being, in this case,
any more than in the other, be a capable subject of moral
government? It seems to me essential to the existence of
moral government, both that there should be in the mind a
physical power of volition, and a tendency or power in the
motive to produce volition. If the latter be not the case,
there is no efficiency in the government. There are, in
effect, no instruments of government. The want of such
tendency in the motive is, to borrow an illustration from the
physical world, something like supposing a want of tendency
in heat to expand bodies, and in cold to contract them ; and
if a similar want existed in all physical causes, then,, in that
case, physical government would be deprived of all its power,
arid the material universe would remain a lifeless, motionless,
mass. Mr. Stewart, though denying that the motive pro
duces the volition, and, of course, that it has any tendency to
produce it, — that it is merely the occasion on which the mind
puts forth the volition, yet maintains that the mind cannot
determine without motives. But why not, I ask, on his prin
ciples? If it can determine, as he thinks, in opposition to

118 MOTIVES MUST HAVE INFLUENCE.
motives, why not without them? One would think it must
be far more difficult to do the , former than the latter.
Is a drunkard really less able to determine to drink when
there are merely no motives to tempt him to commit the sin,
than when there is every motive to restrain him from it?
This is surely not common sense; whether it be philosophy,
I leave the reader to judge. The faculty or power of voli
tion, as we call it, is the power of determining, as the capa^
bility of affection is the power of loving; but an actual
determination cannot, any more than an actual emotion, pro
duce itself; it cannot exist uncaused ; the man, or the mind,
can no more cause the one than the other ; though the mind
both determines and loves. There is the need of something,
in the apparatus of moral government, to produce the volition ;
and, consequently, to deny that the motive stands in the
relation of cause to the volition, is, in effect, to affirrii that the
volition arises without cause, and that man is altogether inca
pable of moral government.
There is an ambiguity in the assertion we often hear made,
which, it is possible, is not apparent to many who use it.
" When we determine in one way, we have, and must have,
the power of determining in the other." This is doubtless
true in one sense. The physical power of determining renders
us physically capable of determining in any way, — as the phy
sical power of loving renders us physically capable of loving
any thing which is adapted, at least, to elicit love. But if the
words be intended to intimate that motives have no such
certain influence upon the mind as that the determination of
any mind, in exactly the same circumstances — having the
same motives presented to it, and taking precisely the same
view of them — might be different from what it is, the opinion
is contradicted, if we mistake not, by reason, and conscious
ness, and experience.
The doctrine now affirmed, that motives produce volition, is,
we might add, further confirmed, were it necessary to say
more, by our current phraseology, and by our constant conduct.
How frequently do we hear such expressions as the follow
ing, " Such considerations caused me to resolve, or produced a

THE EXTENT OF MAN'S LIBERTY, 119
determination," to do so and so. It is surely unnecessary for me
to repeat that the circumstance of the mind's determining,
does not prove that the determination is not producedj (and
yet I fear the language, caused me to determine, has thus mis
led some;) for if that were the case, the fact that it is the
mind that fears, would prove that the fear is not produced^
which no one would allow. And when we seek to govern the
conduct of others, do we not attempt to effect our object. by
presenting those motives which are likely to produce the
volition, or volitions, from which the desired conduct will flow?
And are there not innumerable cases in which We feel per
fectly confident that the inducements we have to present will
accomplish all that we desire ? But how could this be , the
case, if motives possessed no power to produce voUtion ?-*- -if,
in point of fact, they never did produce it ?-^if the mind de
termines arbitrarily, uninfluenced by motives? For to say
it determines to be influenced by it, or to submit to it, is
either to take refuge in obscurity, or rather absurdity, — or to
fall back again upon the dilemma of a voluntary volition : from
which I wish, on behalf of those who are impaled upon its
horns, a good deliverance !
Upon the whole, I have no hesitation in saying, that the
utmost freedom which man possesses, or can possess, is liberty
to act as he chooses — liberty to will as he chooses being an
absurdity in thought, and a solecism in language. I have,
indeed, no objection to generalise the assertion; and, as it
may tend to repel a part, at least, of the objection we are now
considering, I will add, that it is the only degree of liberty
possessed by any intelligent being — the great Being himself
not excepted. Jehovah, indeed, as far as I am able to judge,
at least, possesses liberty in' a higher degree than man ; but
not of an essentially different kind. Endowed with all power,
he is absolutely uncontrolled; possessing within himself all
happiness, his volitions cannot be produced by any thing ab
extra. But are they self-originated, uncaused, unproduced?
Do they not arise out of his immaculately holy nature, and
the perfect perceptions of his intellect? Is it possible to
conceive for a moment that the motives to right feeling and

120 PELAGIAN VIRTUE.
action have not a certain. influence upon the mmd of Deity?
Is it to honour or to dishonour God, to declare that he has the
power of willing to do evil, in opposition to motives, which
must appear to him of infinite weight, to will that which is
good ; but that he does not choose to exert that power, — and
that herein consists his virtue ? Do not our opponents show
that they have formed erroneous conceptions of the nature of
true virtue when they talk thus? Have we been altogether
wrong in supposing that a being is virtuous in proportion to
the impossibility of there arising in his mind an. improper
volition ? If it be honourable to God to be unable to do what
is evil, by parity of reasoning, it must be more honourable. to
him to be unable to will what is evil. And yet a power to
possess and to display wrong and improper volitions, and that
in direct opposition to every inducement to right ones, would
seem to be the essence of Pelagian virtue.

LECTURE VII.

ELECTION.
Objection 3. — Predestination is incompatible with the free
agency and accountability of man.
The lengthened discussions upon which we have entered,
with a view to explain the nature of free agency, are <3f them
selves so directly adapted to show that predestination does not
destroy it, that I need scarcely set myself formally to repel
the objection. How can it be conceived that predestination
leads to this result ? Does it lay any restraint or constraint
upon men ? Does it oblige a Christian to act virtuously and
submissively, when his will is on the side of disobedience?
or an ungodly man to do evil, when he is disposed to do good?
If, indeed, we maintained that, in consequence of the decree of
election, Jehovah puts forth an influence upon men by which
they are constrained to act in opposition to their own strong
and cherished propensities, — or if our opponents could show
that the putting forth of such influence is the necessary
result of this decree, the doctrine of election would be effect
ually overturned. But it is impossible for them to do this.
The decree of election is God's purpose to save the elect ; or,
rather, as we have explained it, his purpose to exert that holy
and gracious influence upon their minds, which disposes them
to seek salvation in the way in which it is to be obtained.
The elect are not, consequently, compelled to go to Christ, and
to enter upon his service ; in the very nature of the case, this
cannot be. But, in consequence of a sanctifying energy
reaching their hearts, or nature, the radical source of dispo
sition, they joyfully go to the Saviour, and cheerfully surrender
their affections to him, who is now discovered to be altogether
lovely. Thus, predestination does not destroy the free agency

122 PREDESTINATION DOES NOT DESTROY FREE AGENCY.
of the saved. And what is its effect, in this point of view,
upon the finally lost? Does it deprive them of freedom?
This, on the principles previously stated, must be seen to be
altogether impossible, since they are not included in its
decree. They are not elected to be saved ; and there is no
election, properly speaking, to damnation.
It is, then, manifest that those who finally perish are not
more affected by the decree of election than the fallen angels ;
and it has never yet, I believe, been pretended that predesti
nation deprives the latter of free agency.
As there are Calvinists, however, who imagine that a decree
to save some of the race necessarily implies a decree not to
save, or to pass by others, I would not dismiss this branch of
the subject without attempting to show that even the views
which they entertain, though I do not regard them as either
rational or scriptural, are by no means fatal to the admission
of the free agency of man. For supposing a decree to pass by
the non-elect had existed, would it have placed them in a posi
tion different from that in which they would have stood, had it
been the determination of Jehovah to pass the whole race by —
or, in other words, not to magnify his grace in the salvation
of any? Conceive for a moment that such had been the
mournful, though, as it must be admitted, equitable (or the
plan of mercy would have been a plan of justice) determination
of God, would that have affected the free agency of man?
Would it have subjected him to the involuntary practice of
sin ? Would it have rendered his disobedience certain and
necessary, in spite of his efforts to prevent it? Would it not
rather have conveyed to us the assurance that he would make
no such efforts? For a determination to exert no influence
to save a race of fallen and sinful beings, is a determina
tion to leave them to follow out the devices of their own
hearts, — to act, in short, as they choose. How such a
determination, even if it existed, could destroy free agency,
though, in point of fact, they might choose to do evil, it
is impossible to conceive. It is leaving them to their free
agency, not overturning it. On the admission, then, that
predestination did include a decree to pass by the finally
lost, it would be impossible for Arminians to maintain that

NOR ACCOUNTABILITY. 123
it destroys free agency ; unless they are prepared to prove
that a determination, on the part of God, to abandon the
whole race of man, as he has done the whole race of fallen
angels, to the consequences of rebellion, would have under
mined it.
I now proceed to consider the influence of the doctrine of
predestination upon the accountability of man. It destroys,
we are told, his accountability. Our reply to this objection
also must of necessity be modified by the views we form of the
doctrine itself. If predestination be not the appointment of
any to •eternal misery, — if it do not even include a decree to
pass the non-elect by, — if the subjects of the electing decree
be the finally saved, and the finally saved alone, — there is
manifestly no ground for the charge that predestination over
throws the accountability of the finally lost. If their accounta
bility were destroyed, it must have been overturned by some
thing else — by the fall, for instance. But that event must not
be ascribed to predestination, since the electing decree pre
supposes, as we have seen, the fallen state of man, and is, in
fact, a purpose to deliver certain individuals from that state.
Nor does predestination destroy the accountability, or the
moral worth and virtue, of those who are included within its
range ; since in the accomplishment of its purpose, it merely
operates upon disposition, the source of moral conduct. It
secures the existence of a right principle of action ; but, in
estimating the character of moral actions, we pronounce them
excellent, or the contrary, according to the principle or the
motive from which they spring, without inquiring into the
origin of the principle itself. The conduct of Christians is
morally excellent, because it flows from a good principle,
though that good principle itself is the fruit of predestination ;
as the conduct of God is morally excellent, because it flows
from right principles, though he possesses right principles by
necessity of nature.
And even if predestination included a decree to pass by the
finally lost, it would not, even in that case, touch the account
ability of man. A determination to do nothing in relation
to them — to exert no influence, of any kind, upon them — to

124 IN WHAT SENSE GOD DECREES
leave them to the unrestrained influence of those evil passions
of which it regarded them as the subjects when it was passed ;
would manifestly leave them subject to the measure of accoun
tability in possession of which it found them. Other circum
stances, indeed, might possibly divest some of their accoun
tability ; but it is idle to suppose that the Divine decree, thus
understood, could take it away.
It may possibly be objected here, though I scarcely know
from what camp the objection would emanate, that God is
said in the sacred volume to have decreed certain evil actions;
and that, consequently, he must, in conformity with the- axiom,.
" He does what he decrees," originate, or cause, or produce
those actions ; and, generalizing the assertion, that he must
originate all those actions which are the subjects of decree ;
i. e., as some suppose, all the actions of the entire family of
man. Now it must not be forgotten, that the preceding pages
have not represented even the holy actions of the people of God
as being directly decreed. In that case I think it would follow
that God performs the actions, or that they are the actions
of God, and not of man.
Mr. Watson, indeed, endeavours to fix upon Calvinism the
absurd notion, that it is God who repents, believes, loves, &e. ;
and it is very possible that some Calvinists have not formed
very distinct notions on this point ; — that they may have con
ceived of faith, hope, love, &c, in their exercise, i. e., the act
of believing, loving, &c, as having been originated in the
mind by a direct act of Divine power and grace. In this case
there would certainly be more foundation for the condemnatory
statements of Mr. Watson. But it is imagined that no Cal
vinist, who has thought closely and maturely on the subject,
conceives of any thing more than that a special and direct in
fluence of the Holy Spirit is exerted upon the mind ; and that,
as the immediate result of this influence, the evidence and
glory of Divine truth are discerned,— from which discernment
the faith and love of the truth flow by natural consequence
and according to the ordinary laws of mind.* The thing'
*Vide Lectures on Regeneration.

EVIL ACTIONS. 125
directly decreed, even in reference to good actions, is only that
an influence shall be put forth which will certainly lead to
their performance.
But, then, since evil actions are said to be decreed, it is
objected, that an influence here, as in the case of good actions,
must be exerted to secure their performance ; and that, con
sequently, God is the author of sin. To meet this objection,
it will be necessary to ascertain in what precise sense and
manner evil actions are decreed; for that some at least (though
several of the passages brought forward in proof of this have
been misunderstood) are said to have been the subjects of de
cree, will scarcely admit of doubt. Let us take the cruci
fixion of our Lord, as an instance which may enable us to
develop the great principle. " For of a truth against thy
holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and
Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel,
were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy
counsel determined before to be done." (Acts iv. 27, 28.)
This is a case, as it is said, in which sinful actions are
spoken of as the consequence of a Divine decree. Now I do
not avail myself of a different collocation of the words, pro
posed by some eminent scholars, which would bring out the
sentiment, not that Herod and Pontius Pilate, &'c, were
gathered together to do what the counsel of the Lord had de
termined, but that Christ was anointed to accomplish all this.
I do not avail myself of this, both because it is unnecessary to
resort to this altered collocation of the words, and because there
can be no doubt that the' salvation of men by the crucifixion
of the Son of God, was a divinely appointed event. But, I ask,
what is the precise concern which the purpose of God had
with the horrible crime of crucifying the Lord of glory ? Is
there any necessity to suppose — is it even possible to suppose: —
that Jehovah determined that event in the same sense and
manner in which he determined tbat the primitive believers
should receive the Saviour ? I answer, decidedly no." In this
case the Divine decree extended to the giving up of the Sa
viour into the hands of his enemies, but not to the treatment
which, when thus given up, he received from them. Known

126 IN WHAT SENSE GOD DECREED
unto God are all his works, and all the power, the thoughts,
the feelings of men, from eternity. He knew the precise state
of mind of Herod and Pontius Pilate, &c. He knew the
precise amount of enmity against his character and govern
ment of which they were the subjects, and which they ulti
mately displayed ; and he perceived, with unerring prescience,
the precise manner in which that enmity, unless restrained by
Divine power, would display itself at all times, and in all pos
sible combinations of circumstances. Possessed of this most
perfect knowledge, he foresaw that, if his Son should appear
in this world in the fulness of time, and should be given up to
the malice of these individuals, he would be called to suffer
the precise measure of shame, and pain, and woe, which, in
point of fact, he afterwards endured. And yet, knowing all
this, he sent his Son into the world, — he determined to send
him into the world, — determined to surrender him to the
malice of his enemies. He perceived that the voluntary ma
nifestations of the ungodly passions of men might be rendered
subservient to the accomplishment of his own most glorious
purposes ; and, therefore, though he did not determine that
men should thus display their ungodly passions, he did deter
mine to expose his Son to their operation. Though he did not
decree that Herod and Pontius Pilate, &c, should bind, and
bruise, and crucify the Saviour, he did decree that the Saviour
should be given up to their cruelty and vengeance. His de
cree, in short, extended to what he did in this transaction, but
not to what men did. There was need for a decree that the
Redeemer should be surrendered into the hands of his ene
mies, but not that he should be treated as he was treated
when brought within their power. A decree that Herod and
Pontius Pilate should crucify him, or be permitted to crucify
him, is clearly inadmissible ; if, for no other reason, because
it was perfectly unnecessary — the event being certain, with
out a decree to prevent it. n It is like supposing a decree to
permit the pestilence to injure when it strikes us. In con
formity, indeed, with Scripture style, in which God is said
to do what, he foresees, from the depravity of men, and the
circumstances in which they are placed, will be done if he

THE CRUCIFIXION OF CHRIST. 12?
does not prevent it, Herod and Pontius Pilate, &c, may be
said to have done what God determined before to be done ;
and thus we may retain the ordinary collocation of the words
in the passage we are now considering. But, in strict ac
curacy of thought, the decree of God extended no farther
than to the giving up of his Son to the malice and power
of his enemies. And such, I apprehend, is the amount of
concern which the Divine decrees have with sinful actions
in general. Jehovah perceives how that principle, which is
the prolific source of all evil, will develop itself, in every con
ceivable variety of circumstances. And it is perfectly easy
for him so to arrange his providential dispensations, as that the
ungodly passions of men shall prove the instruments of accom
plishing his merciful purposes, without decreeing that these
men shall be the subjects of this depravity, or that their unholy
passions shall develop themselves in that particular manner ;
or, I add, without decreeing to permit either the one or the
other. AU that God does in the business is the subject of
decree; all that man does is not the subject of decree.
It may not be irrelevant here to introduce a few remarks
in reference to the part which Divine agency performs in the
ordinary actions of men. In God, it is said, " we live, and
move, and have our being." In every bodily action Divine
agency must, consequently, be put forth. It is by power de
rived from God that the muscles so act as to extend the arm,
in obedience to volition, whether the arm be put forth to save
or to destroy, — to perform an act of obedience, or of sin. But,
in that case, is not God the author of sin ? That, I reply, does
not by any means follow. It is necessary to accountability —
to free agency — that we should possess physical power to do
what we resolve to do ; and, consequently, it is a law of Divine
Providence that such power should be given, and sustained.
The power to move the limbs in obedience to volition is, ac
cordingly, supported by God, of whatever nature that volition
may be. It is like an instrument intrusted to our care by
Jehovah. It may be used properly, or criminally; but we
only are responsible for the manner in which we use it. The
wealth which men enjoy was originally the gift of God ; it is

128 THE CONCERN OF PROVIDENCE WITH EVIL ACTIONS.
preserved to them by his power and goodness; yet who ever
thinks of regarding God as the author of sin, because it is too
frequently spent in the gratification of unholy desires ?
And may we not apply the same principles to volition itself?
Was not that given originally, and is it not perpetually sus
tained, by God? Every consistent theist will acknowledge
this. When motives are presented to the mind, arid operate
upon the mind, must not their influence upon it be ascribed to
the fact, that the mind is possessed of a power, or faculty,
which we denominate will, or volition, and which is sustained
by the conserving hand of Divine Providence? Were volition
to become extinct, in the case of any man, motives would be
addressed to him in vain, and he would cease to be a subject
of moral government. It is, accordingly, a law of Divine Pro
vidence that when the performance of a certain action,, for
instance, appears desirable to an individual, the power to
determine upon its performance should be continued to that
individual. The abstract power to will, and to act, is in. all
cases from God; the obliquity of the volition and of the
action, whenever they are sinful, results from the depravity of
the heart : but that depravity had not its source in Divine ap
pointment and influence.
Still it will be objected that, since the motive produces the
volition, no man can be responsible for his volitions. Now,
without pretending that it is a full and sufficient answer to the
objection, might it not be replied, that, since the conceived
excellence of an object produces the love we feel towards it,
we are not, if this objection be valid, responsible for the love ?
And, if it should be said, that, in all cases in which we love
improperly, immorally, we might have avoided experiencing
the feeling by gaining that juster view of the object which Di
vine revelation has furnished us with the means of obtaining,
— it would be easy to retort, that we might have come to a
different determination, where volition has been sinful, if we
had duly considered the motives which are adapted to originate
a right and holy volition. It is difficult to see what difference
there is in these two cases. But how can it be just to punish
a man who determines improperly, if the volition were not a

WHY PUNISHMENT FOLLOWS A WRONG VOLITION. 129
voluntary one, (the reader must remember, here, the absurdity
which is involved in the supposition of a voluntary volition,
vide p. 112, or he cannot do justice, either to the objection
or the reply,) if the motive caused the volition? The only,
and, as I venture to think, the obvious philosophical reply to
this objection is, that he must be punished to secure a right
volition in future ; since this is the only way of securing that
object. I would warn my readers, who, not accepting this
solution, may be disposed yet further to press the difficulty,
to beware how they proceed; for the objection goes deeper
than perhaps they imagine. It lies not merely against the
propriety of punishment under moral government, but against
moral government itself. I feel some surprise that this
should have been overlooked by most, if not by all, preceding
writers. Moral government is, as we have seen, the govern
ment of motives. And what are motives ? What can they be
but happiness and misery ? happiness as the result of obedient
and holy conduct; misery as the consequence of rebellion?
Rewards and punishments are the only means which moral
government either does or can employ, to secure compliance
with the will of the governor. What then is it to affirm, that,
where sin has been committed, the punishment must not be
inflicted because the motive produced the volition ? Is it not
manifestly to say that Jehovah must throw away the very
means of government? Yea, that he must discontinue this
mode of government altogether? For the non-execution of
threatenings is the destruction of moral government.
A plain Christian man, not disposed to indulge in philoso
phical reasonings — perhaps not prepared for them — will pro
bably satisfy himself with such reflections as the following:
God has given to men a law which is holy, just, and good — .
which they feel and acknowledge to be so ; he has bestowed
upon them sufficient power to obey that law, for all the law is
fulfilled in one word, — love ; and he has formed them capable
of experiencing the emotion of love, while his own character
is most powerfully adapted to awaken it, and would awaken
it were it duly considered ; he sets life and death before theni
as the consequences of obedience and rebellion ; he urges them

130 IS PREDESTINATION INCOMPATIBLE WITH EXHORTATIONS ?
by the strongest motives to embrace the one, and to refuse the
other ; but he leaves them free to act as they choose. If they
choose death, that is their fault. They do it with their eyes
open ; God expostulating, and warning, and entreating, and
commanding them, to flee from the wrath to come. How
then can they expect him — what right have they to require
him — to deprive them of that fruit, though it be everlasting
destruction, which they have deliberately chosen ?
Objection 4th. — Predestination is incompatible with those
exhortations to perseverance, and those declarations of the ne
cessity of perseverance, which are contained in the Scriptures.
I believe the following statement will be found to compre
hend the substance and force of the objection. If a man be
elected to eternal Ufe, he is as certain of its ultimate enjoy
ment as though he had it in possession. Does it not, then,
tend to delude and deceive him, to intimate the possibility of
his falling short of it ? Or, to take the other side of the ob
jection; cautions against apostasy are actually addressed,
by the sacred writers, to societies of Christians, and more
especially to individual Christians; does not this fact prove
that their perseverance and final salvation were not secured
by a Divine decree ? " Give diligence," says Peter, " to make
your calling and election sure." " The salvation of these elect,
of this chosen generation, was, therefore, says the Bishop of
Lincoln, "so far from being certain, that it depended upon
their diligence ; their not falling was so far from being infaUibly
decreed, that it depended upon their doing those things that
the apostle commanded."
Now, before we attempt to point out the irparov mtvdog of
this reasoning, it may be expedient to test its validity by a
case, in which we know that the preservation of certain indi
viduals was decreed, and promised; but in which they were
commanded to do certain things, which are stated to be neces
sary to secure it. And precisely such a case, if I mistake not,
is recorded in the 27th chapter of Acts. It is the account of
Paul's voyage to Rome. The heavens, we are informed,
during their course, gathered blackness. The light of day, and
even the feeble lights of night, were entirely obscured; for

THE OBJECTION TESTED. 131
neither sun nor stars for many days appeared. The tempest
uous Euroclydon continued beating upon the vessel ; and, in
regard to their preservation, the last gleam of hope had disap
peared. In these appalling circumstances, the apostle stood
up in the midst of them, and said, " Sirs, be of good cheer,
for there shall be no loss of any man's life among you, but of
the ship." Here, then, is a case in which the preservation of
certain men was secured by an infallible decree ; for Paul had
derived the assurance which he conveyed to them from an
angel of the Lord. And yet he immediately after declared,
that, unless the sailors, who were about to abandon the ship,
and leave the passengers to their fate, tarried in it, they could
not be saved. Their skill and exertions were necessary to
the management of the vessel ; deprived of them, all must con
sequently perish. According, then, to the Bishop of Lincoln's
mode of reasoning, the preservation of these men could not
have been determined upon by God. The very words which
he employs may be used here : " Their deliverance was so far
from being certain, that it depended upon their own diligence.
Their not sinking was so far from being infallibly decreed,
that it depended upon their doing those things which the
apostle commanded." We know, however, from apostolic
testimony, on the one hand, that their deliverance was abso
lutely certain ; and on the other, that it depended upon means
— upon their own exertions. There is no inconsistency, then,
between the certainty of a temporal salvation, and a necessity
for the use of means. Now, if exhortations to exertions, to
secure a temporal deliverance, fail to prove that that deliver
ance is not rendered certain by an infallible decree, it most
manifestly follows that the admonitions of Peter, to which we
have referred, must also fail to prove, that the " not falling" of
the strangers of the dispersion was not rendered certain by a
Divine decree.
The preceding statements clearly prove that the argument
of the Bishop of Lincoln is faUacious, but they do not show
wherein its fallacy consists. I pass on therefore to observe,
that its radical defect is here. It assumes, that where the end
is decreed, there are no means also decreed by which the end

132 THE FALLACY OF THE
is to be secured. The argument of the Bishop is in reality as
follows. If means are necessary, the end must be uncertain :
or, conversely, if the end is certain, then means are unneces
sary. But if it be the case, that God invariably works by
means, or effects his purposes through their influence, it fol
lows, necessarily, that where the end is decreed, the means also
are decreed; and, conversely, that where the means for se
curing a certain end 'are not employed, the end will not be
attained ; — not because the purposes of God can be frustrated,
but because we may be sure that, in this case, it was not his
purpose that that end should be attained. The correctness
of these statements is so very apparent, and capable of such
varied illustration, that one feels it to be a tax upon one's
time, and patience too, to be called even to notice objections
so utterly and manifestly fallacious. Let us take a very fami
liar illustration : — " God has determined how long the child
before us shall live, for the number of his months is with him.
He will live to the appointed period, and not live a moment
beyond it. Suppose that period be threescore years and ten."
This, then, is the end decreed. But, to secure this end, the
individual must take food, when in health, and medicine when
deprived of it ; and, I may add, they wiU be taken ; for the
decree of God renders the means as certain as the end. If*
in the case of another individual, these means of health and of
life were steadily rejected, we should feel confident that he
must die ; and equally confident that it had not been decreed
that he should live. I cannot refrain from laying before the
reader the following beautiful illustration of this point, by
an eloquent living writer: — " God might carry every one
purpose of his into immediate accomplishment by the direct
energy of his own hands. But, in point of fact, this is not
his general way of proceeding. He chooses rather to arrive at
the accomplishment of many of his objects by a succession of
steps, and by the concurrence of one or more visible instru
ments, which require time for their operation. This is a truth
to which all nature and all experience lend their testimony.
It was his purpose that, at the moment I am now addressing
you, there should be light over the face of the country, and

OBJECTION EXPOSED. 133
this purpose he accomplishes by the instrumentality of the
sun. There is a time coming when light shall be furnished
out to us in another way — when there shall be no need either
of the sun or the moon to lighten the city of our habitation — ¦
but where the glory of God shall lighten it, and the Lamb shall
be the light thereof. But this is not the way at present; and,
therefore, it is both true that it was God's purpose there should
be light over us and around us at this moment, and that unless
the sun had risen upon us this morning, there would have been
no such light. It may be the purpose of God to bless the
succeeding year with a plentiful harvest. He could accom
plish this purpose in two ways. He could make the ripened
corn start into existence by a single word of his power. But
this is not the actual way in which he carries such designs into
accomplishment. He does it by the co-operation of many
visible instruments. It is true, he can pour abundance among
us, even in the midst of adverse weather and unfavourable
seasons. But he actually does it by means of favourable
weather, and favourable seasons. It is not in spite of bad
weather that we receive from his hands the blessings of
plenty — but in consequence of good weather — sunshine and
shower succeeding each other in fit proportion — calm to prevent
the shaking of the corn, and wind in sufficient quantity to
winnow it, and make a prosperous in- gathering. Should it
be the purpose of God to give to us a plentiful harvest next
year, it will certainly happen ; and yet it may be no less true,
that unless such weather come, we shall have no plentiful har
vest. God, who appoints the end, orders and presides over
the whole series of means which lead to it." To apply this
admirable illustration to the case before us, eternal life, it may
be observed, is the end to which God has appointed his
people; faith and perseverance are the means which lead to
it. It follows, therefore, on the principles stated above, that,
unless we endure unto the end, we cannot be saved. And,
since this is the case, it is highly proper, and indeed necessary,
to declare this publicly. It would be so, indeed, if we knew
as certainly who were ordained to eternal life, as Paul knew
it was the purpose of God that no life should be lost in the

134 THE FALLACY OF THE
voyage of which we have been speaking. ¦" Even though such
knowledge were imparted to us, still it would be our part to
say to those of whose final salvation we were assured, ' Believe
the gospel, or you shall not be saved ; purify yourselves, even
as God is pure, or you shall not be saved.' But we are not in
possession of the secret: and how much more, then, does it
lie upon us to ply with earnestness the fears and the consciences
of our hearers by these revealed things which God has
been pleased to make known to us. What ! if Paul, though
assured by an angel from heaven of the final deliverance of his
ship's, company, still persists in telling them, that if they leave
certain things undone, their deliverance will be impossible —
shall we, utterly in the dark about the final state of a single
hearer we are addressing, let down for a single instant the
practical urgency of the New Testament ? The predestination
of God respecting the final escape of Paul and his companions
from shipwreck, though made known to the apostle, did not
betray him into the indolence which is ascribed, and falsely
ascribed, to the belief of this doctrine; nor did it restrain
him from spiriting on the people to the most strenuous and
fatiguing exertions. And shall we, who only know in general
that God does predestinate, but cannot carry it home with
assurance to a single individual, convert this doctrine into a
plea of indolence and security ? Even should we see the mark
of God upon their foreheads, it would be our duty to labour
them with the necessity of doing those things which, if left
undone, will exclude from the kingdom of God. But we
make no such pretensions. We see no such mark upon any
of your foreheads. We possess no more than the Bible, and
access, through the Mediator, to Him who by his Spirit can
open our understandings to understand it. The revealed
things which we find there belong to us, and we press them
upon you. ' Unless ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish.'
' If ye believe not on the Son of God, the wrath of God
abideth on you.' * He that endureth unto the end,' and he
only, ' shall be saved.' "
To this eloquent statement I will only add, that, as faith and
perseverance are the means of salvation, so exhortations to

OBJECTION EXPOSED. 135
continue in the faith are the means of perseverance. God
keeps his people in the faith by means, as well as brings them
to final salvation by means. And those exhortations to dili
gence and watchfulness, — those solemn admonitions against
apostasy, — those earnest and pressing calls to prayer, and
labour, and perseverance, which the Scriptures address to
them, — constitute the means, in part at least, by the influence
of which their will and affections are retained on the side of
God, until he shall come and take them to the eternal enjoy
ment of himself.

LECTURE VIII.

THE ATONEMENT.
The general office of Mediator, assumed by our Lord, imposed
on him the necessity of doing all that was required to repair
the broken bonds of amity between God and man. To effect
this, much was needed to be done on both sides ; for God was
at variance with man, and man was an enemy to God. " The
priesthood of Christ" is a comprehensive phrase, descriptive of
all that was done by him in reference to God himself, with a
view to the healing of the breach. It comprehends the sacri
fice which he presented to God on earth, and the intercession
which he carries on within the veil. The term atonement
designates the first of these great branches of the sacerdotal
office. The following pages will treat of the nature, the
necessity, the manner, the reality, the efficacy, and the extent
of the atonement. I. — THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT.
The inquiry on which we enter here refers exclusively to
the precise idea which the Scriptures lead us to attach to
the statement, that atonement for sin was made by the Son
of God.
A very ingenious writer gives the following explanation of
the word atonement. " Moses," says he, " saw two Hebrews
striving together, and endeavoured to reconcile them. Had he
succeeded, he would have produced a-one-ment. He would
have made them at-one-ment. In plain English, he would

THE ATONEMENT DEFINED. 137
have made them friends again." That this is the primary
meaning and force of the term there can be little doubt. The
phrase, " to make atonement," meant originally to reconcile two
parties at variance. It did not. contain any reference to the
means by which the reconciliation was . effected. Yet as, in
every case of variance, some means must be resorted to by
the mediator to repair the broken bonds of amity, the word
atonement would easily acquire a secondary signification : and
the phrase, " to make atonement," would come to be under
stood as indicative of the employment of those means which
were required by the nature of the case to effect the recon
ciliation at which the mediator aimed. Hence, when we
speak of the atonement of Christ, we do not merely intend to
denote the reconciliation which he effected between God and
man ; but to express the means, also, by which it was accom
plished. We design, in short, to state, " that he has made
peace by the blood of his cross."
The atonement may, then, be defined as that satisfaction for
sin which was rendered to God, as the moral Governor of the
world, by the perfect obedience unto death of our Lord Jesus
Christ ; — a satisfaction which has removed every obstacle, re
sulting from the Divine perfections and government, to the
bestowment of mercy upon the guilty, in any method which
Divine wisdom may see fit to adopt. This definition is suffi
ciently comprehensive, it is presumed, to include all that is
essential to the atonement, while it guards against certain
false conceptions which have been formed of its nature. It
exhibits especially the three following particulars, each of
which it is necessary to keep distinctly in view, if we would
entertain enlightened and correct conceptions of this essential
article of the Christian faith — the character in which Jehovah
requires and receives the atonement, — the nature of the satisfac
tion which it rendered to him, — and the ground on which pardon
Jloios to those who repent and believe the gospel on 'account of it;
or the connexion which exists between it and the forgiveness
of sin.First, the character in which Jehovah requires and receives
the atonement, demands our notice. It might have been sup-
Q

138 WAS RENDERED TO GOD AS MORAL GOVERNOR.
posed, indeed, that there could be no need to consume, on this
part of the subject, a single moment of time; for since sin — for
which the death of Christ was an atonement — is the trans
gression of the law, and since a law necessarily supposes a
lawgiver, few things can be more taanifest than that satis
faction for sin must have been rendered to God in his public
character, or as the moral Governor of the world. The conduct
of our opponents has, however, rendered it necessary to direct
the particular attention of the reader to the point we are about
to consider. Who, that has merely glanced into the produc
tions of Unitarian writers, has not observed how they have
attempted to excite prejudice against the doctrine of the
atonement, not by arguing against it, or not merely by arguing
against it, but by misrepresenting its nature? Who is un
aware of their efforts to fix upon the God of the Calvinists, as
they sneeringly call him, the charge of insensibility, of stern
ness, and inflexibility, — and of their disingenuous and most
unfair attempts to place, hi the light of disadvantageous con
trast, the conduct of Jehovah in requiring an atonement, and
refusing to be satisfied without it, with the conduct of a meek,
and benevolent, and placable man, whose anger never outlives
the acknowledgments of the offender, and sometimes even ex
pires before they are made ? At no very distant period, one
of their main writers was disingenuous enough to affirm, after
our reiterated explanations, that the doctrine of atonement
" distorts the character of God, and represents the Father of
mercies as a being whom it is impossible to love."
Now I maintain, that the very existence of this charge
results from the forgetfulness or the denial of the important
fact, that satisfaction for sin was required by God, and ren
dered to him, not in the relation which a private individual
sustains to his friends and neighbours, but in that in which a
moral Governor stands to his subjects, who must support the
credit and authority of the law, and who could not possibly
do either, were he to suffer it to be broken with impunity. For
when was almost every epithet of abuse lavished against a
human judge, for not suffering (what he is forbidden by his
office to do) the manifestly guilty to escape ? When was such

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF UNITARIANS. 139
a judge stigmatised, even by an Unitarian, as a stern, inflex
ible, implacable being — a being whom it is impossible to love,
— because he officially pronounces an individual a transgressor,
after he has been clearly proved to be such, and passes upon
him the sentence which the law attaches to his crime ? We
may confidently reply, Never. To act in this manner is so
obviously virtue in a judge, that no doubt has ever been enter
tained, or can be entertained, on the subject. A judge must
be inflexible. It is his highest honour to be so. To exercise
mercy — if by that word be meant the extension of pardon to
a transgressor, on the ground of his penitence and promises of
amendment — is beyond his province. He cannot do it with
out injustice; for equity in a judge is the unbending appli
cation of the general principles and decisions of the law to the
particular case in hand. A righteous decision is the law
speaking by the mouth of the judge ; and the law does not
more award pardon to the guilty, than punishment to the
innocent. It is only by dexterously drawing a veil over the relation
which God sustains to man as moral Governor— by diverting
general attention from the important distinction which exists
between the private and the public character of God, that our
opponents can hope to succeed in their attempts to prove that
the doctrine of atonement throws a stigma upon the Divine
Being. This is accordingly done by them. They talk of the
great Parent of mankind — the universal Father, &c ; but in
connexion with their statements, in reference to the atone
ment at least, they do not represent him as their present ruler,
and their future judge. They exhibit him to the view of their
readers as if he sustained the relation to them which a-private
individual bears to those who reside in his vicinity ; and then,
because no private member of civil society is bound to seek
satisfaction for an injury which affects him exclusively, even
when the transgressor is not penitent, and a fortiori when he
is so ; because, as I am not unwilling to add, it then becomes
his duty to forgive him, and to refuse forgiveness would
blemish his character, — they argue that the doctrine of atone
ment, which practically declares that Jehovah does not, and

140 IT SUPPOSES GOD TO BE DISPLEASED.
cannot do this, represents him as a monster whom the world
should join to despise and abhor*
It is, then, in the relation which God bears to men as their
moral Governor and Judge— a relation necessarily sustained
by him — that he requires and receives satisfaction for sin.
Let it be further observed, that atonement is not only ren
dered to God as- a public character, but as displeased, in that
character, with the conduct of men. The requisition of atone
ment so obviously implies, indeed, that ground of offence
had been given by that conduct, and had been actually taken
by the moral Governor, that I should not have introduced the
statement, but for the opportunity which it affords to explain
the precise nature of that displeasure against sin which we
thus attribute to God. This explanation is rendered neces
sary by the prevalence of mistakes in reference to the subject,
and by the obscurity which hangs over the conceptions of
many, who are otherwise evangelical in their views, in regard
to the great subject of the atonement itself.
Bearing in mind the general statements already made, we
shall be preserved from the error, that the Divine displeasure
against sin is akin to that excitement and perturbation of mind
by which we are frequently agitated when treated with mani
fest injustice or cruelty. There will be no need to guard the
intelligent reader against the obvious and gross mistake, of con
cluding that any state of the Eternal Mind must exactly re
semble a certain state of a created mind, because it bears the
same name. He will instantly perceive that there must be a
difference of some kind, though it may not be an easy matter
to state precisely wherein that difference consists, — a differ
ence corresponding with that which exists between the nature
of God and the nature of man.
" The anger of God," says one of the most justly popular
writers and preachers of the present day, " is not a passion,
but a principle." " It is the opposition and aversion of his
nature," we are again told, "to every kind and degree of
moral evil." Both of these statements are true, in one sense,
yet they do not shed so much light over the subject as it is
desirable to possess, if it can be obtained. Let it theu be

THE NATURE OF THAT DISPLEASURE. 14l
most carefully recollected, that by the anger of God we mean
the displeasure which in his pubUc character he bears, and
must manifest, against sin. It is, in short, the necessity
imposed upon him, by the relation in which he stands to
men as their moral Governor, to inflict upon the disobedient
the sentence of his law ; a sentence which exhibits the per
sonal hatred with which, as an infinitely holy Being, he must
regard sin ; — for doubtless there is an irreconcilable aversion
in the Divine nature to every species and degree of moral evil,
and to such a nature the unholy tempers and the abandoned
conduct of the wicked must be unspeakably abominable : —
but when we speak of the anger which sinners aroused against
themselves by transgression, and which was removed by
the atonement of Christ, we do not refer to this necessary
aversion of the Divine nature to sin ; though this important
distinction is greatly too much overlooked. For, in the first
place, had there existed no obstacle to the salvation of men,
but what we have ventured to call Jehovah's personal hatred
of sin, it is not easy to see what need there would have
been of an atonement. That power which rendered Adam a
perfect man, in a moral point of view, could have easily con
verted a world of sinners into a world of saints, and then the
anger to which we now refer must have sunk of itself. And,
secondly, the atonement, producing directly no moral change
upon the characters of men, cannot have destroyed the neces
sary aversion of the Divine nature to sin and sinners; and
hence we are assured, that " God is angry with the wicked
every day." Yet peace was made by the blood of the cross.
God was reconciled to the world by the death of his Son ; re
conciled even to those whose hearts are enmity against him ;
for the intelligence of this reconciliation is, by Divine appoint
ment, to be proclaimed to mankind, that it may win back
again their alienated affections, and convert a world of rebels
into a world of friends. " God was in Christ," says the apostle,
" reconciling the world unto himself," — "and hath committed
unto us the word of reconciliation ;" " we pray the world,"
(therefore,) " be ye reconciled to God."*
* 2 Cor. v. 19, 20.

142 THE SATISFACTION IT RENDERED MORAL,
The anger of God, then, which was actually removed by
the death of his Son, was neither that effervescence of feeling
which, in the case of man, has appropriated to itself the name;
nor that disapprobation with which the holy mind of God must
have contemplated a race of rebellious and depraved beings, —
a disapprobation which could only have been removed by a
radical change of character in those beings : but it was the im
pediment — an impediment which, as it appears to us, nothing
else could have taken away, — presented by his office as moral
Governor, to the bestowment of pardon upon them. In other
words, it was that judicial and absolute necessity, under which
he had been previously placed, to inflict the punishment of the
law upon all who had broken it, while he might feel the tenderest
commiseration for the fate of the transgressors themselves.
Secondly, we proceed to notice the nature of that satisfac
tion which was rendered to God as the moral Governor of the
world. As we proceed, it will be found that the various parts
of this great subject illustrate each other. The statements
concerning the necessity of the atonement, for instance, par
tially explain its nature ; an exhibition of its nature proves,
on the other hand, its necessity. In like manner, the nature
of that satisfaction which it is now proposed to investigate,
must have received some elucidation from the account just
given of the displeasure, on the part of God, which rendered
the satisfaction necessary. The correctness of this statement
will more fully appear in the course of the following remarks.
The previous definition of the atonement exhibits it in the
light of a moral satisfaction. It was stated to be a satisfaction
for sin, rendered to God as the moral Governor of the world.
Now a moral satisfaction is one entirely sui generis. We must
be especially cautious not to identify it in our conceptions
with a pecuniary satisfaction. The common and popular
phraseology on this subject exposes us to the danger of doing
this. Sin is frequently described as a debt, and the atone
ment as the payment of this debt; and, if we were careful to
recollect that these are symbolical or figurative terms, we
should not be misled by the phraseology. But the misfortune
is, that words which are really figurative, and which are em-

o

NOT PECUNIARY. 143
ployed for the sole purpose of illustration, have been under
stood and explained literally. Sin has been represented as a
real debt, and the atonement as a real payment of that debt ;
and the unhappy result is, that darkness of the densest kind
has been made to envelop the whole subject. There are in
dividuals who imagine that Christ rescues his people from the
claims of Divine justice in precisely the same way in which a
generous friend delivers a debtor from captivity, by advancing
the necessary sum on his behalf. Now I would not affirm
that it is impossible for such persons to be saved by an humble
hope in the mercy of God, through Jesus Christ; but I can
have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that they do not
understand the atonement. A pecuniary satisfaction, and a
moral satisfaction, differ essentially in their nature, and pro
ceed on radically different principles. Perhaps no man has
set this difference in a clearer light than the late Mr. Fuller,
whose words I quote : — " I apprehend," says this excellent
writer, " that very important mistakes have arisen from con
sidering the interposition of Christ under the notion of paying
a debt. The blood of Christ is, indeed, the price of our re
demption, or that for the sake of which we are delivered from
the curse of the law ; but this metaphorical language, as well
as that of head and members, may be carried too far, and may
lead us into many errors. In cases of debt and credit among
men, when a surety undertakes to represent the debtor, from
the moment his undertaking is accepted, the debtor is free,
and may obtain his liberty, not as a matter of favour, at least
on the part of the creditor, but of strict justice." " But who
in his sober senses will imagine this to be analogous to the re
demption of sinners by Jesus Christ? Sin is a debt only in a
metaphorical sense; properly speaking, it is a crime, and
satisfaction for it requires to be made, not on pecuniary, but
on moral principles. If Philemon had accepted of that part
of Paul's offer which respected property, and had placed so
much of it to his account as he considered Onesimus to have
owed him, he could not have been said to have remitted his
debt, nor would Onesimus have had to thank him for remitting
it. But it is supposed of Onesimus, that he might not only

144 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO.
be in debt to his master, but have wronged him. Perhaps he
had embezzled his goods, corrupted his children, or injured
his character. Now for Philemon to accept that part of the
offer were very different from the other. In the one case, he
would have accepted of a pecuniary representative ; in the
other, of a moral one ; i. e., of a mediator. The satisfaction,
in the one case, would annihilate the very idea of remission ;
but not in the other. Whatever satisfaction Paul might give
to Philemon respecting the wound inflicted upon his character
and honour, as the head of a family, it would not supersede
the necessity of pardon being sought by the offender, and
freely bestowed by the offended.
" The reason of this difference is easily perceived. Debts
are transferable, but crimes are not. A third person may cancel
the one, but he can only obliterate the effects of the other;
the desert of the criminal remains. The debtor is account
able to his creditor as a private individual, who has power to
accept of a surety ; or, if he please, to remit the whole without
any satisfaction. In the one case, he would be just; in the
other, merciful ; but no place is afforded by either of them for
the combination of justice and mercy in the same proceeding.
The criminal, on the other hand, is amenable to the magistrate,
or to the head of a family, as a public person; and who,
especially if the offence be capital, cannot remit the punish
ment without invading law and justice ; nor, in the ordinary
discharge of his office, admit of a third person to stand in his
place. In extraordinary cases, however, extraordinary expe
dients are resorted to. A satisfaction may be made to law and
justice, as to the spirit of them, while the letter is dispensed
with. The well-known story of Zaleuchus, the Grecian law
giver, who consented to lose one of his own eyes, to save one
of his son's eyes — who, by transgressing the law, had subjected
himself to the loss of both — is an example. Here, as far as it
went, justice and mercy were combined in the same act; and
had the satisfaction been much fuller than it was — so full that
the authority of the law, instead of being weakened, should
have been abundantly magnified and honoured, still it had
been perfectly consistent with free forgiveness. Finally, in

MORAL AND PECUNIARY SATISFACTION. 145
the ease of the debtor, satisfaction being once accepted, justice
requires his complete discharge ; but, in that of the criminal,
where satisfaction is made to the wounded honour of the law,
and the authority of the lawgiver, justice, though it admits of
his discharge, yet no otherwise requires it, than as it may
have been matter of promise to the substitute."*
The preceding statements prove that a broad line of dis
tinction exists between a moral and a pecuniary satisfaction.
They exhibit very clearly the nature of the latter kind of satis
faction, and show that the satisfaction of Christ cannot have
been of this description. The amount of the statements may
be thus shortly given. A pecuniary representative cannot be
refused — a pecuniary satisfaction is made to an individual in
his private character — it precludes the possibiUty of forgive
ness — and, consequently, gives the individual represented a
right to demand his discharge. What sober-minded man, to
adopt Mr. Fuller's language, will venture to say that any of
these notions accord with the Scripture representations of the
substitution and satisfaction of Christ ? The passing remark
of this writer, that if sin were literally a debt, it might have
been remitted by God without any satisfaction, is especially
worthy of attention. Such a representation of sin does most
certainly destroy the necessity of atonement altogether ! For
what is there to forbid the most honourable and upright judge
in the world to remit any personal debts which an individual
may have contracted with him? In no degree would his cha
racter, as a lover of integrity and moral virtue in general, be
compromised thereby ; because a man may always forego his
own private rights, if he chooses so to do: or, if he be
restrained on the ground that his family and friends would
suffer were he to forego them, he ceases to act as an individual.
The rights which he struggles to retain are no longer his own
personal rights. He acts as a public character; and his con
duct is governed by the principles which regula* moral go
vernment in general.
I do not think, however, that Mr. Fuller has very distinctly
explained the nature of a moral satisfaction. It is implied,
* Fuller's Works, vol. iv., pp. 101 — 4.
R

146 MISTAKEN VIEW OF
perhaps, in the statements he gives us; but the language
he employs fails to convey any distinct conceptions to the mind
of the reader. What is meant, for instance, by satisfying law
and justice as to the spirit of them, while the letter is dispensed
with ? In our current phraseology are doubtless to be found
such expressions as, "satisfying Divine justice," "satisfying
the demands of the law;" but this is metaphorical language.
The law is personified ; it stands for the lawgiver ; for satisfac
tion is rendered not to the law, but to the giver of the law ; and
to satisfy the law, is to satisfy the lawgiver. Now, if Mr.
Fuller's statement be tried by this test, their indefiniteness
will instantly become apparent ; "a satisfaction may be made
to the lawgiver, as to the spirit of law and justice, while the
letter is dispensed with."
There is one sense which may be attached to the expression,
"to satisfy the law," (though even in this sense the expres
sion is figurative,) to which I would particularly advert, before
I proceed to explain the nature- of the satisfaction of Christ ;
as it will afford, perhaps, the best opportunity of exposing one
of the most common mistakes which exist, in reference to the
atonement of our Lord. To satisfy the law is to fulfil the
law, either in reference to its precepts or its penalty. The law
may be said (figuratively) to be satisfied, when its commands
are obeyed, or its penalty is endured. Had the whole human
race walked in their integrity ; or, having fallen from it, had
they, without exception, suffered the vengeance of eternal fire,
the law would, in either case, in the sense explained above,
have been satisfied. Now, as the whole of the human family
has become guilty before God — as a part of that family will
ultimately be saved, and so not endure, in their own persons,
the penalty of the law, we have been in the habit of saying
(and very justly, when the language is explained in harmony
with subsequent statements) that the law was satisfied in their
case by the endurance of this penalty by their substitute.
And from hence has resulted a view of the nature of the atone
ment — or of that satisfaction to God for sin — to which I am
about to direct the particular attention of the reader. It is,
perhaps, not radically different from the notion of satisfaction

MORAL SATISFACTION. 147
to which reference has been already made; yet it is so far
modified as to justify, and even require, a separate considera
tion. " The elect" — for whom exclusively Christ is supposed to
have died — " had exposed themselves to a certain amount of
punishment ; this precise amount, this exact number of stripes,
was inflicted upon Christ ;" and, of course, satisfaction for sin
essentially consisted in the endurance, by the substitute, of the
precise amount of punishment which must otherwise have been
laid upon the transgressors themselves.
I do not wonder at the prevalence of this opinion among
the thoughtless and the vulgar. It is just the kind of idea
which is likely to present itself to an ignorant and a con
tracted mind. But I do greatly marvel to find it taking its
place in better company — lifting up its deformed head where
its presence could not have been anticipated. It involves in it
a radfcal mistake as to the nature of the atonement, and to the
manner in which the sufferings of our Lord operated to permit
the escape, and the final salvation of the guilty. But the ob
jections against this view of the nature of satisfaction for sin
must be more fully unfolded in the next Lecture.

LECTURE IX.

ATONEMENT.

ITS NATURE CONSIDERED.

The objections against the notion that satisfaction for sin es
sentially consisted in the endurance, by the substitute, of the
precise amount of punishment, which must otherwise have
been laid upon the elect, are as follow :—
First, That it renders the deliverance of the elect from
punishment a matter of justice to them. They may claim
it as a right. It is, in this point of view, as if the atonement
were the payment of a pecuniary debt, and is not less
incompatible with the notion that grace is exercised in the
pardon of sin. There may, indeed, consistently with this
opinion, have been grace in the acceptance, and in the
provision, of a substitute ; but, surely, if that substitute en
dured the precise amount of punishment which the strong arm
of the law would have otherwise laid upon those whom he
represented, there can be no grace in remitting it afterwards
to them. How can it be thought that a double infliction of
punishment, for the same offence, can exist under the righteous
government of God ?
Secondly, The sentiment opposed renders the high and glo
rious character of the Redeemer of no avail in the great work
of atonement, since it grounds the efficacy of the atonement,
not on the dignity of the sufferer, sustaining the moral power
of the law, by the lustre which his obedience and passion have
thrown both upon the equity of its requirements, and the
justice of its curse; but on the alleged fact, that the precise
amount of punishment which we must have sustained, was

MORAL SATISFACTION; MISTAKES, &C 149
endured by our surety. And, if this were the principle of the
atonement — the manner in which it operated to obtain for
giveness — it is most manifest that any other being could as
easily, and certainly, have atoned for sin, as the Redeemer him
self, if he could have sustained an equal amount of suffering.
Now, since it was only the human nature of our Lord that
suffered — Deity being as incapable of suffering as of sin — who
can doubt the power of Jehovah to have sustained human
nature, apart from Deity, as it exists in one of the ordinary
descendants of Adam, under a burden of suffering equal to
that which was laid upon the Saviour ? I reject the sentiment,
therefore, because it necessarily implies that any man might
have redeemed his brother.
Thirdly, The sentiment opposed is at direct variance with
the declaration that Christ was a propitiation for the sins of
the whole world. It necessarily limits the sufficiency of the
atonement to the elect. It forbids the supposition that it
possesses power to secure the salvation of all men, even though
all men should repent and believe the gospel; and thus it
erects a barrier against their salvation, distinct from their in
disposition to go to the Saviour. These consequences, which
flow naturally and necessarily from the sentiment opposed,
would of themselves determine me at once to reject it. In
dealing with the consciences of sinners, it is of infinite import
ance to be enabled to assure them that the atonement, on
which we invite them to rest their hopes for eternity, is suffi
cient to sustain those hopes; yea, to sustain the confidence
of the whole human family, if every member of that family
could be induced to repose his confidence upon it. But,
according to the sentiment opposed, the efficiency of the
atonement must of necessity be the exact measure of its suf
ficiency. It is utterly impossible that the one can extend in
the slightest degree beyond the other. To hold the opinion,
that Christ saves his people by bearing the precise number of
stripes which they must have endured, and to maintain, in
connexion with it, the unlimited sufficiency of the atonement,
is pre-eminently absurd. There could be, in that case, no
value in the atonement to the non-elect. It is, on this opinion,

150 MISTAKEN VIEW
inadequate in itself to save them. Nothing could render their
salvation possible, and justify the Divine Being in presenting
the invitations of the gospel to them, but a second sacrifice of
himself by the Son of God. To attempt to parry this objec
tion, by alleging that the non-elect are ignorant that no pro
vision is make for their salvation, is to resort, in my opinion,
to a subterfuge which even a man of integrity, and, a fortiori,
the ever-blessed God, must needs abhor.
Fourthly, The sentiment opposed involves in it a most
manifest absurdity, and, indeed, a physical impossibility. It
grounds the efficiency or value of the atonement on the alleged
fact, that the same punishment was sustained by the substitute
which must have been endured by those whom he represented.
Now what was that punishment? Without committing my
self upon a point, the proof of which is not necessary to the
object I have in view, viz., that future punishment grows out
of character and state ; few, I apprehend, will deny that, at
least, among its ingredients wiU be found remorse and despair.
God will punish the finally impenitent by sustaining the powers
of memory and conscience ; and placing them in circumstances
where their unholy principles shall produce in perfection and
exuberance their native fruit; and this fruit will be their
food, and their torment. Now it would be to add blasphemy
to absurdity to affirm, that this part of the punishment of sin
was sustained by the Holy Lamb of God. Certain conse
quences of sin are transferable, but not remorse. No righteous
power in the universe can kindle this flame in the bosom of
innocence. It is impossible that the Saviour can have been
its prey.
Should it be alleged, that punishment, the same in amount,
though not in kind, was sustained by Christ, I would reply,
First, That the admission of any change in the kind of punish
ment is an abandonment of the principle on which, as they
suppose, the atonement proceeded. That principle is, that
the law merely changed the person on whom it poured out its
curse — that it smote the substitute instead of the sinner; but
smote him as it would have done the sinner. If it smite
him differently, whether that difference be one of degree,

OF MORAL SATISFACTION. 151
or of kind, there is more than a change of person ; and
the atonement, if it be efficacious, must proceed on a dif
ferent principle from that which is advocated by my oppo
nents — on the principle to be afterwards illustrated, viz., that
the* sufferings of Christ sustained the power and efficacy of the
moral government of God, while he passes by transgression for
his own name's sake. I would reply, Secondly, That the sup
position of the same amount of punishment having been
endured by Christ, involves in it a physical impossibility.
The degree of suffering from which the atonement of Christ
delivers his people, is infinite — for they must have suffered
for ever. If, then, the principle of the atonement were that
which I am now opposing, i. e., if Christ saves his people by
sustaining the exact amount of suffering which they must have
endured, nothing can be more manifest than that the amount
of suffering sustained by him must have been infinite — infinite
in degree, because it was not so in duration. But, as it was
the human nature of our Lord exclusively that suffered, his
suffering cannot have been infinite in degree, since even Deity
itself cannot sustain a creative nature under an infinite load of
suffering ; in other words, God cannot deify a creature. It is
sufficient to say, that Christ endured that measure of suffering
which was necessary to preserve che efficiency of moral govern
ment, even while pardon is bestowed upon the guilty.
Here, then, we seem to be involved in a difficulty. Pardon
has been bestowed upon transgressors; — it could not have
been granted unless a satisfaction had been made to God for
their sin : they did not make that satisfaction by suffering the
penalty of the law ; and their substitute did not make it, as
we have seen, by enduring the precise amount of punishment —
the same in kind and degree — which would have been to them
the penal consequence of their sin. How then did Christ
satisfy the law for them ? What is meant by satisfying Divine
justice — or, which is the same thing, satisfying a just and holy
God ? What is the precise nature of that satisfaction which was
rendered to him, as it has been stated, by the perfect obedience
unto death of our Lord Jesus Christ ? To these questions, or
rather to this one question, which has been put in different

152 SATISFACTION FOR SIN.
forms to attract towards it more of deliberate attention, I fear
we have been too much accustomed to rest satisfied with dark
and indefinite replies. I am quite free to confess, that, within
the whole compass of my theological reading, I have not met
with any thing which throws all the light upon it which I
humbly think it is capable of receiving. The statements of
Stapfer, an admirable compendium of which is given by a
beloved brother, whose praise is in all the churches,* approach
the most nearly to what would seem to be needed. Still the
definition of satisfaction which is laid down in that work
is too much generalized, to prove of great practical benefit;
and, with deference to our honoured friend, Dr. Smith, I
would suggest, that the phrase, " a compensation for the injury
perpetrated" against a moral governor, does not much less
need explanation than the term satisfaction itself. The ques
tions still recur, " What is a compensation to a being in his
public character, (for compensation to a private individual
involves no difficulty,) and how is it to be made?" On this
important subject, then, I solicit the kind and candid atten
tion of the reader to the following remarks.
To make satisfaction for sin is, then, I would suggest, to do
that which shall preserve to the moral government of God
that powerful control over its subjects which the entrance
of sin endangered, and which its unconditional forgiveness
would have entirely destroyed. In explanation of this state
ment, let it be observed, that the government which God
exercises over rational, and, therefore, accountable creatures,
is moral in its nature; it is the government of motives,
addressed to the understanding, the conscience, and the heart.
The law which he has given to us constitutes one of the main
instruments of this government. It addresses itself to two
of the most powerful principles of our nature ; — to our hopes,
by promising an illustrious reward if we render obedience ; —
to our fears, by threatening to inflict a signal punishment if
we venture upon rebellion. The tendency of this law to pre
vent disobedience is its moral power; and that power must
* Vide Dr. P. Smith on the Sacrifice of Christ, p. 287-8.

EXPLAINED. 153
obviously be proportioned to the confidence which the sub
jects of the government repose on its promises and threaten
ings. If the former are viewed with distrust, they will not
excite to obedience ; if the latter are considered doubtful in
regard to their execution, they will not deter from rebellion.
Now consider for a moment what was the posture of affairs
after rebellion had actually broken out under the Divine
government. The transgressors had exposed themselves to
the vengeance of the law; and the Legislator was put upon his
trial, so to speak, whether the awful threatenings denounced
by him against rebeUion were mere idle, harmless threats
or not. If, in these circumstances, the rebels had been
permitted to remain unpunished, what would have been
the consequence? Is it not manifest that the law would have
lost its moral power; and, the instrument of the Divine
government becoming utterly impotent, that anarchy would
have ensued in every part of his dominions ? It was, therefore,
imperative upon the moral governor to demand satisfaction ;
i. e., (for such appears to me to be the precise idea which we
should attach to the term,) to require that to be done which
should preserve to his law all the power to preserve order
and tranquillity in his government which had been originally
possessed by it. This object might have been secured, or
satisfaction might have been obtained, by the infliction of
the threatened punishment upon his rebel subjects. To have
resorted to this measure would, however, have involved the
utter destruction of the offenders themselves, and preserved the
authority and moral power of the Divine government, merely
that a bloody sceptre might be wielded over myriads of intel
ligent beings, crushed by the rod of the Divine indignation.
To have preserved the authority of the law at this dreadful ex
pense, would have brought no glory to the Divine Being, unless
no other method of sustaining its influence could have been
devised. An expedient was therefore sought and resorted to —
the expedient revealed in the gospel. The Second Person of
the adorable Trinity, in harmony with his own volition, having
authority to lay down his life, was substituted in the place of
the guilty, and by his perfect obedience unto death, made

154 SATISFACTION FOR SIN
satisfaction for their sins ; i. e., he preserved to the law and
government of God that moral power to prevent the inroads
of rebellion which the entrance of sin had enfeebled, and
threatened finally to destroy. This all-important result, viz.,
the preservation of the efficacy of the system of God's moral
government, in connexion with the non-execution of the
threatenings denounced against the transgressor, is secured
by the surpassing honour which the obedience and death of
Christ reflected upon the Divine law ; and the powerful and
decided proof it exhibited, that sin could never be permitted
to pass unpunished. Who does not hear a voice from Calvary,
" If they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done
in the dry ?" It is true, doubtless, that it was only the human
nature of our Lord that suffered ; yet, in consequence of the
ineffable and mysterious union of that nature with the Divine,
it is impossible to look upon his sufferings in the same light
with those of a mere man. Their moral influence upon the
subjects of the Divine government is prodigiously greater than
if they had been endured by Paul, or even Gabriel himself.
When we recollect that he who died for us was a being in
whom " dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," — that
the law was honoured in its precepts by the obedience, and
in its penalty by the death, of a being so exalted and glorious
as the Son of God, it is utterly impossible to escape the con
clusion, that the law must be perfectly holy, just, and good ; —
that the violation of its precepts must be pregnant with incal
culable guilt, — and cannot fail to be followed by the most tre
mendous consequences. It is thus that the atonement of
Christ removes the anger of God, and reconciles the world to
him. It effects no change in the state of his feelings in his
private character ; it does not abate his personal disapproba
tion either of sin, or of sinners ; but it reconciles Him to us,
or, in the language of Scripture, it reconciles us to Him, in
his public character. It removes the necessary opposition of
his government to us. It renders it competent to him to
remit the punishment due to our sins, and even to raise us,
for the sake of his Son, to distinguished honour and happiness,
without destroying or impairing the moral power of his law —

EXPLAINED. 155
the instrument by which the government of the world is
carried on. Yea, more than all this it accomplishes. It
reflects more honour upon the law than could have been seen
encircling it, if man had continued obedient; or, if man had
suffered its penalty, becoming disobedient ; i. e., it has made a (
full and perfect satisfaction for sin.
The general conclusion, then, at which we have arrived, and
which appears to me so important in its bearings upon the
subject, is, that justice, in the case of a moral governor, is satis
fied, or, more correctly, that the moral governor is satisfied, /
when, as the consequence of transgression, an amount of suf- \
fering is endured which will restore to the violated and para- \
lysed law its original power to prevent the inroads of rebellion.
It may not be impossible, perhaps, though I do not regard it
as necessary, to pursue this subject a little further; and to
ascertain the principles which regulate this amount, both in
the case of the transgressor, and in that of a substitute. I sub
mit with much diffidence the following remarks to the candid
consideration of the reader.
That justice is satisfied — or that the efficiency of the law is
preserved — when a measure of suffering is laid upon the trans
gressor proportioned to his desert, is a position the truth of
which will be admitted by all. Yet the statement is indefinite,
and must remain so, till we know the amount of this desert ;
or, rather, till we ascertain the measure by which its amount
is decided. That measure, then, it is further stated, is the
law of God. The transgressor deserves to endure the precise
amount of punishment which the Divine law attaches to his
crime. This statement, also, will be admitted. Yet there is
another question to which it does not appear to me that suf
ficient attention has been given ; it is the following : " What
is it that guides the Great Eternal in the decisions which he
pronounces? By what rule does he walk, in attaching the
amount of punishment to transgression of which we are now
speaking ? " This is not a matter of accident ; the sanctions
of the law are not arbitrary. When the moral governor
declares, in his law, that the transgressor shall suffer a certain
amount of punishment — which is to us the measure of his

156 THE CLAIMS OF JUSTICE ON THE SINNER,
guilt, or desert— he acts under the guidance of certain fixed
principles. What are they? What does a subject of nioral
government — of the" moral government of God, for instance — ¦
deserve to suffer ? Can any other answer be returned than
that he deserves to endure that precise amount of punishment
which is adapted to answer the ends of moral government —
to array the law in those terrors which are calculated to pre
vent, and which, if they were rightly considered, would
prevent, the inroad of sin ? To attach to transgression any
amount short of this, would be folly; and, therefore, useless
cruelty. To attach an amount beyond this would be unneces
sary; and, therefore, malevolence and injustice. The fact is,
that guilt, i. e., desert of punishment, can only exist in con
nexion with a moral system. This is true, also, of its oppo
site, to which we may give the name of moral merit. Both
guilt and moral merit necessarily suppose the pre-existence of
moral government ; for they are, in fact, the claim upon the
head of that government which the conduct of its subjects
gives them to its punishment, or its rewards. There is a dif
ference in this point of view between guilt and merit, and
virtue and vice. The two latter do not seem necessarily to
suppose the existence of moral government. Hence, though
Jehovah is a perfectly holy Being, and perfectly happy on that
account, we never say that he deserves to be so, because he is
not a subject of moral government.
In the case of a transgressor, then, justice is satisfied when
that measure of punishment is inflicted upon him, which wiU
restore to the law its original power and efficiency. So far
every thing seems to be tolerably plain. It is only when we
approach a case of substitution that much difficulty is expe
rienced. Granting that moral government will at all admit
the principle of substitution, (and that it will do this is mani
fest from the fact that it has done it; nor do I see any
difficulty in the case, where the individual presenting himself
in the place of the transgressor has a right to do it — and
where the acceptance of him would equally answer the ends
of moral government,) the question is, " With what measure
of suffering in the substitute will justice be satisfied? Must

AND ON THE SUBSTITUTE. 157
he, in all cases, bear the exact amount which the guilty party
himself would have sustained ?" To this question I reply very
firmly in the negative. The same principles which afforded
direction in reference to the transgressor himself, will guide
us here. Justice, accepting of the substitute, is satisfied with
that measure of suffering, in his case, which will as effectually
secure the honour and influence of the law, and the consequent
safety of the government, as if the transgressor .himself had
been the victim. Should the substitute be greatly superior in
character arid station to the criminal, the ends of moral govern
ment maybe as effectually secured — perhaps, indeed,more so —
by the infliction of a few strokes upon him, as by the laying
of the whole number upon the offender in his own person.
Should the substitute be a being of infinite dignity and glory,
a still inferior degree of suffering would be required; nay, jus
tice might be as completely satisfied by the infliction of a
single stroke upon him, as if not only the guilty individual
himself, but the whole race to which he belonged, had suffered
the full amount of punishment which the law attached to their
crimes ; i. e., atonement would be made for the whole race ;
or, which is the same thing, the obstacles which formerly op
posed the bestowment of pardon upon the whole, or any part
of the race, would be removed. It would be competent to the
moral governor to pardon one or all, without destroying the
influence of his law, and endangering the safety of his govern
ment. I have been exhibiting the substitution of the Saviour
himself; and the important bearing of these statements upon
the extent of the atonement, will be more particularly noticed
when we advance to that interesting branch of the subject.
I would just observe, before I proceed to the next point of
inquiry, that the general views already presented to the reader
will guide to an explanation of the phrase, " the value of the
sufferings of Christ," somewhat different from that which is"
usually attached to it. It is generally, I believe, understood
to denote the intrinsic excellence, or virtue, of the act of our
Lord in offering himself as a sacrifice for our sins. To me it
appears that this intrinsic excellence, though essential to the
value of his sufferings, did not constitute it. That value is

158 THE CONNEXION BETWEEN
rather to be regarded as consisting in their tendency, in con
sequence of their manifestation of the righteousness of the
law, and the danger consequent upon transgression, to pre
serve unimpaired the moral power of the law, even while
pardon is extended to those who have violated it.
Thirdly, we now proceed to show the ground on which
pardon flows to those who repent and believe the gospel on
account of this sacrifice ; — or the connexion which exists be
tween it and the forgiveness of sin.
The observations which would seem to be required on this
particular, have been so completely anticipated, that we might
proceed at once to the following section, were it not proper to
examine the statement of those writers who, maintaining that
the atonement is, in fact, the channel through which forgive
ness flows to the penitent, deny that there is any discoverable
connexion between the one and the other: — or, that it is
possible for us to explain the manner in which the sacrifice of
our Lord operated to procure the pardon of sin.
In this class of writers, we are constrained to place one indi
vidual, to whom all who attach paramount importance to the
doctrine of atonement, are ready to confess the deepest obli
gations. I allude to the very learned and talented Dr. Magee.
I cannot but regard the language of this powerful writer, in
reference to this point, as the greatest blemish in his valu
able work. " The sacrifice of Christ was never deemed by
any who did not wish to calumniate the doctrine of atone
ment, to have made God placable, but merely viewed, as the
means appointed by the Divine wisdom, by which to bestow
forgiveness." (Vol. i., p. 22.) Having advanced this general
statement, which is true in one sense, and false in another,
he proceeds, " But still it is demanded, in what way can the
death of Christ, considered as a sacrifice of expiation, be
conceived to operate to the remission of sins, unless by ap
peasing a Being who otherwise would not have forgiven us ?"
To this he adds, " The answer of the Christian is, I know not,
nor does it concern me to know, in what manner the sacrifice
of Christ is connected with the forgiveness of sins ; it is enough
that it is declared by God that this is the medium through

ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS. 159
which my salvation is effected. I pretend not to dive into the
secrets of the Almighty. I submit to his wisdom", and I will
not reject his grace, because his mode of vouchsafing it is not
within my comprehension." And, after an attempt to illus
trate the subject, by stating that we might put a similar inquiry
in reference to the manner in which the supplications of one
man avail on behalf of others, he adds, " The fact is, the want
of discoverable connexion has nothing to do with either.
Neither the sacrifice, nor the intercession, has, as far as we
can comprehend, any efficacy whatever. All that we know,
or can know, of the one or of the other, is, that it has been
appointed as the means by which God has determined to act
with respect to men." (pp. 24, 25.)
Further occasions for remark upon the statements of Dr.
Magee will occur. In the meantime I cannot but express
the fullest concurrence in the judgment expressed by Dr. P.
Smith, " that some passages in Dr. Magee's work indicate a
material difference from those views which I think it my duty
to maintain upon the real value of the Redeemer's sacrifice — -
its relation to the moral attributes and government of God-
its connexion with the Divine nature of Christ — its efficiency
— and its application." (Vide Note 15th, 1st Edition.)
No doubt can be entertained that it is dangerous to attempt
to be wise above what is written ; yet, with attention to this
maxim, we should blend the practical recollection, that it is as
much a duty to aim at reaching the height of revelation, as to
refrain from every effort to rise above it. Now I cannot think
that the Scriptures are silent on this point; and to me, I
confess, it appears not a little singular, that a writer who en
tertains those views of the nature of the atonement which have
been presented in the foregoing pages, and which seem to be
held by Dr. Magee, should be able to veil from himself the
connexion which exists between the sacrifice of Christ, and
the forgiveness of sin. Did not the atonement of the Saviour
exhibit the righteousness of God — the rectitude of his law —
the impossibility of transgressing it with impunity? Did it
not thus render it possible for the moral governor to pardon
sin, without endangering the safety of his government ? And,

160 STATEMENTS OF MAGEE.
if we maintain this, what do we, in effect, but affirm, in differ
ent words, the tendency of that atonement to secure forgive
ness? If the essential nature of Jehovah is love, and if the
atonement of his Son broke down the barriers which the ne
cessity of supporting his government had erected to prevent
its communication to men, what mystery can there be in its
flowing to them after that event? What connexion can be
more natural — so necessary indeed — as that which exists be
tween the sacrifice of our blessed Lord, and the issuing, in the
first place, of an universal proclamation of mercy; and, in
the second place, the bestowment of pardon upon those who
seek this mercy, in this divinely appointed manner ? Dr.
Magee did not manifest his usual discrimination when he de
nied, in effect at least, that the atonement is founded on the
Divine implacability. He does not make the necessary dis
tinction between the public and the private character of Jeho
vah. It were to dishonour him, to attribute implacability to him
in the one character, but not in the other. A judge ought,
as we have said, to be implacable ? i. e., not capable of being
induced to pardon, when the law says, " Inflict punishment."
It is his honour and perfection to be so. He must listen to
no plea for mercy, which does not bring the case within the
range of those to which mercy may be extended according to
law ; and then it loses, partially at any rate, its character of
mercy. The sacrifice of Christ did render Jehovah placable ;
i. e., it rendered it possible for him, consistently with the
claims and the safety of his government, to show mercy. It
rendered it possible for the essential and infinite placability of
the universal Parent, to develop itself in the actions of the
Judge ; — possible for him to unveil to us his heart of love, by
bringing us to enjoy the unutterable felicities of heaven through
the death of his Son. Still I do not recommend the phrase
ology, that the death of Christ rendered the Father placable,
because it may be misunderstood; and is, in fact, in great
danger of being so; — the word implacability being generally
conceived to imply, though it does not necessarily imply, ma
levolence. This does not, however, justify Dr. Magee in
throwing upon it unmingled contempt and scorn.

LECTURE X.

ATONEMENT.
THE NECESSITY OF THE ATONEMENT.
The different branches of this great subject so far involve
each other, as to render it difficult, or rather impossible, to
avoid, in the discussion of one branch, the introduction of re
marks which appear essential to the elucidation of another.
The statements already made to illustrate .the nature of the
atonement, and the connexion which exists between the sacri
fice of Christ, and the forgiveness of sin, exhibit with a con
siderable degree of clearness the necessity of that atonement.
This important branch of the subject must not, however, be
thris cursorily dismissed. The reader's attention is therefore
called to the following, position, as that which is about to be
defended; viz., that, as far as we are able to judge, there ex
isted a moral necessity for the sufferings and death of Christ,
in order to the forgiveness of sin. This position is to be main
tained, not only against those who altogether deny the doctrine
of the atonement ; but against those others to whom we have
just alluded, who, acknowledging that pardon does flow to us
through the atonement, are backward to affirm, and contend,
indeed, that we have; no right to affirm, that it could not have
made its way to us through any other channel.
The latter appears to be the opinion of Dr. Magee. He
gives the following as the title of one of the notes appended
to his discourses : " The doctrine of atonement falsely charged
with the presumption of pronouncing on the necessity of
Christ's death." (p. 188.) "That men could not have been
forgiven unless Christ had suffered to purchase the forgive-

162 IT IS A MORAL NECESSITY,
ness, is no part," he assures us, " of the doctrine of atonement
as held by the Church of England." Now, if his Lordship had
merely intended to deny that we are entitled to affirm a priori
that men could not have been forgiven unless that particular
mode of satisfying Divine justice which the gospel reveals had
been resorted to, I should not have taken any exception against
his statements. It would be hazardous in us to affirm, that,
by the unsearchable and infinite wisdom of the Deity, no other
mode of effecting this important object could have been de
vised. But the difference is great between denying the neces
sity of satisfaction for sin altogether, and denying the necessity
of a particular mode of satisfaction ; and, unless I have mis
taken his Lordship's meaning, it is of the former that he seems
to intimate doubt. I say seems to intimate doubt, because
the following passage appears to grant, at the conclusion, what
it denies at the commencement. " When, therefore, Grotius,
Stillingfleet, and Clarke, are charged with contending for the
necessity of a vindication of God's honour, either by the suffer
ing of the offenders, or by that of Christ in their room, they
are by no means to be considered as contending that it was
impossible for God to have established such a dispensation as
might enable him to forgive the sinner without some satisfac
tion to his justice, which is the sense forcibly put upon their
words ; but that, according to the method and dispensation
which God's wisdom has chosen, there results a moral necessity
of such vindication, founded in the wisdom and prudence of a
Being, who has announced himself to mankind as an upright
Governor, resolved to maintain the observance of his laws."
(p. 191.) Now, if there exists this moral necessity for such a
vindication, how could a dispensation have been established
which would have admitted of pardon without it? That it is
both absurd and impious " to enter into the councUs of the
Almighty, and to decide what infinite wisdom must have de
termined under a constitution of things different from the
present," we are as fully persuaded as his Lordship. But,
when we maintain the moral necessity of the atonement, we
make no approach to such unhallowed licence. Our state
ments are based upon facts — facts admitted by himself, as well

AND ESTABLISHED BY FACT. 163
as by us. — Jehovah is the head of a system of moral govern
ment — that system has been invaded by sin — the transgressor /
is pardoned through the atonement. It is, of course, on con
templating the entrance of sin, that we affirm the necessity of
satisfaction. That necessity is established by the fact of its
having been made. The necessity of a satisfaction equal in
magnitude to that which was actually rendered, is also estab
lished by fact — the fact, that one of inferior importance was
not presented. Jehovah would not have gone to greater ex
pense than was necessary. Had there been any other medium
for the remission of sin, equally honourable to the character,
and safe to the government of God, not requiring so illustrious
a sacrifice as the death of his Son, then most assuredly the
Saviour would not have died upon the cross. It is by facts,
then, that we justify our statements in reference to the neces
sity of the atonement. By necessity we mean, of course, a
moral necessity; — a necessity originating in the rectoral cha
racter of Jehovah, and the nature of the government which he
exercises over intelligent creatures ; such a necessity, in short,
as is exhibited in those memorable words of the apostle, " It
became Him, of whom are all things, and by whom are all
things, in bringing many sons to glory, to make the Captain of
their salvation perfect through suffering."
There are those, however, who deny at least one of the facts
to which we have now referred, and who, of course, cannot feel
the force of the argument just urged upon those by whom the
whole are acknowledged. Unitarians, who harmonize on this
subject with Deists, join to represent a satisfaction for sin as
unnecessary; and deny, of course, that any such satisfaction
was intended or made by the death of Christ. Dr. Priestley,
in his history of the doctrine of atonement, says, " That the
great object of the mission and death of Christ, was to give
the fullest proof of a state of retribution, in order to supply
the strongest motives to virtue; and the making an express
regard to the doctrine of a resurrection to eternal life, the
principal sanction of the laws of virtue, is an advantage pecu
liar to Christianity. By this peculiar advantage the gospel
reforms the world, and remission of sins is consequent on

164 PARDON IS NOT NECESSARILY
reformation. For, although there are some texts in which the
pardon of sin seems to be represented as dispensed in consider
ation of the sufferings, the merits, the Tesurrectioh, the
life, the obedience of Christ ; we cannot but conclude, upon a
careful examination, that all these views of it are partial re
presentations, and that, according to the plain, general tenour
of Scripture, the pardon of sin is, in reality, always dispensed
by the free mercy of God, upon account of men's personal
virtue, a penitent, upright heart, and a reformed, exemplary
life, without regard to the sufferings or merit of any being
whatever." The Deist tells us, that since obedience must be the object
of God's approbation, and disobedience the ground of his dis
pleasure, it must follow, by natural consequence, that when
men have transgressed the Divine Commands, repentance, arid
amendment of life, will place them in the same situation as If
they had never offended.
" It is lamentable to confess," says Magee, " that the name
of Warburton is to be coupled with the defence of the deist-
ical statement just made. But no less true is it than strange,
that in the account of natural reUgion which that eminent
writer has given in the ninth book of the ' Divine Legation,'
he has pronounced, in terms the most unqualified, upon the in
trinsic and necessary efficacy of repentance ; asserting, that it
is plainly obvious to human reason, from a view of the con
nexion that must exist between the creature and his Maker,
that whenever man forfeits the favour of God by a violation of
the moral law, his sincere repentance entitles him to the par
don of his transgressions."
In opposition, then, to those writers who maintain the ne
cessary connexion between repentance and forgiveness, I argue
that they have taken up a false and a useless position.
1st. It is a false position. Granting that the systems
afforded any security for the repentance of the transgressor,
there are powerful reasons against the supposition that peni
tence will place him in the same situation as if he had never
offended; for,
First, It is manifest that the case of the penitent differs

CONNECTED WITH PENITENCE. 165
very materially ' from that of the innocent man. Is it toot
therefore ODViously most unlikely that, under the government
of a Being who has declared that he will render to all the sub
jects of his government according to their works, the trans
gressor,, though a penitent, should receive the honour and
reward "which the law attaches lo perfect'obedience ? How^ in
that case, could the ways of God be equal ?
Secondly^ In the case of human governments, repentance
does not place the transgressor in the situation in which he
stood before the commission of the crime; nay, it does not
even arrest the descent of:the sword of vengeance. When did
an individualguilty of theft, or murder,ror treason, escape on
account of his sorrow for:what he had done, although his sorrow
were most profound as well as sincere ? When, indeed, was
the plea of penitence,, in bar of punishment, furged by a cri
minal, unless the horror of his situation had unsettled the
balance of his mind? Never. A- moment's reflection serves
to convince us that such a plea could not be regarded; that,
strongly as the personal feelings- of the judge might prompt
him to the exercise of mercy, a regard to his character, his
duty, his office, to the safety of the government, and the wel
fare of the country, ought to lead to their suppression, and
constrain him, as the mouthof the law, to. pronounce the sen
tence which that law attaches to the offender's crime.
Thirdly, In reference to that part of the Divine government
which falls under, our observation, it is not. the case thaVre-
pentance places ah individual in the position which he occu
pied previously to his transgression. " Actual experience of
the course of nature," says Dr. Magee, " directly contradicts
the assertion." *' In the common occurrences of life, the man
who, by intemperance and voluptuousness, has injured his cha
racter, his fortune, arid his health, does not find himself in
stantly restored to the full enjoyment of these' blessings, on
repenting of his past misconduct, and determining on future
amendment. Now, if the attributes of Jehovah demand that
the punishment should not outlive the crime, on what ground
shall we justify this temporal dispensation ? The difference
in degree cannot affect the question in the least. It matters

166 PARDON IS NOT NECESSARILY
not whether the punishment be of long or of short duration ;
whether in this world, or in the next. If the justice and
goodness of God require that punishment should not be in
flicted when repentance has taken place, it must be a viola
tion of these attributes to permit any punishment whatever,
the most slight, or the most transient. Nor will it avail to
say that the evils of this life, attendant upon vice, are the
effects of an established constitution, and follow in the way of
natural consequence. Is not that established connexion itself
the effect of the Divine decree ? Are not its several opera
tions as much the appointment of its Almighty Framer, as if
they had individually flowed from his immediate direction?
But, besides, what reason have we to suppose that God's treat
ment of us in a future state, will not be of the same nature
as we find it in this — according to established rules, and in
the way of natural consequence ? Many circumstances might
be urged, on the contrary, to evince the likelihood that it will.
This, however, is not necessary to our present purpose. It is
sufficient that the Deist cannot prove that it will not. Our ex
perience of the present state of things evinces that indemnity
is not the consequence of repentance here: can he "adduce a
counter experience that it will be hereafter?" (pp. 5, 6.)
Fourthly, The repentance of man is necessarily imperfect ;
it is, on this account, in addition to others, impossible to con
ceive that it should place the transgressor in the same situa
tion as before the offence. Why should our opponents have
represented repentance as necessary to forgiveness, if they had
not felt that some reparation is due to God and his law, for
the injury which sin inflicts upon both ? To make this repa
ration mere obedience is obviously incompetent; for, since
perfect obedience is at all times our duty, present obedience
can exhaust present obligations only. It cannot furnish a sur
plus of merit to set off against past demerit. The opponents of
the doctrine of atonement have been consequently constrained
to throw the penitence of the reformed transgressor into the
scale with his obedience, to give it the greater weight; that, while
his future obedience may exhaust his future obligations, his
penitence may obliterate the former unfulfilled demands of the

CONNECTED WITH PENITENCE. 167
law. Now the present state of the argument does not require
me to dwell upon the inefficacy of perfect penitence, I merely
remind the reader that the penitence of man is necessarily
imperfect ; so that the very element which is recommended
by our opponents, for the cleansing away of sin, being itself
filthy, must, instead of purifying, leave a fresh stain upon the
conscience, when an effort is made to wash with it the former
stain away.
Fifthly, It is impossible to conceive that repentance should
place an individual in the situation in which he stood before
transgression, because, even though it were perfect, it has no
power to remove the obstacles arising out of the character and
government of God against the bestowment of pardon upon
the guilty. To illustrate and confirm this assertion, it will be
necessary to state precisely the nature of these obstacles, that
the essential incompetency of repentance to their removal, arid
the consequent necessity of the atonement, may more dis
tinctly appear.
It is impossible to have it too powerfully impressed upon our
minds, that the obstacles to pardon, to which we have now re
ferred, arose entirely out of the rectoral character of the Deity.
They may all be resolved into the necessity under which he was
placed, as a moral governor, to preserve to the law the entire
efficiency which, as an instrument of moral government, it is
possible for it to possess— which efficiency cannot be sustained
Unless the moral conduct of the governor be such as to evince
the high sense he entertains of the excellence of the law, and
the confidence with which its subjects may rely on the per
formance of its promises, and the execution of its threatenings.
Let us examine this matter a little more attentively. " Sus
taining, as we do, various relations to God and to each other,
there arise out of them, by necessary consequence, various ob
ligations and duties. God is our Creator, our Preserver, our
Benefactor, our Governor. He is the Framer of our bodies,
and the Father of our spirits. He sustains us ' by the word
of his power ; ' for, as we are necessarily dependent beings,
our continued existence is a kind of prolonged creation. We
owe all that we possess to him ; and our future blessings must

168 PENITENCE CANNOT REMOVE
flow from his kindness. Now, there are obviously Certain
affections and actions which harmonize or correspond with-
these relations. To love and obey God manifestly befit our
relation to him as that great Being from whom our existence,
as well as all our comforts, flow.
" We sustain various relations to each other. God has formed
of one bloods all the families of the earth. Mutual loye, and
brotherly kindness, the fruit of love, are required by this re
lation— -'they harmonize or correspond with it. We are children ;
we are loved^ and guarded, and supported, and tended with
unwearied assiduity by our parents. Filial affection and filial
obedience are demanded; by this relation; xio other state of
mind, no other conduct,, will harmonize with it. ; We are, per
haps, on the other hand, parents. InstrumentaUy, at least, we
have imparted existence J;o our children : they depend on us
for protection, support, &c. ; and to render that support, is re
quired, by the. relation we bear to them,:;'— (Elements of. Men
tal and Moral Science, by the Author, p. 512.).
In the attention we pay to these, duties, growing thus neces
sarily out of relations, (the honour : of, God and. ; the' general
good are deeply involved ; and, therefore, they are enforced
by legislative, enactment. God has commanded us to love
him with all our mind, and soul, and strength, and our neigh
bour as ourselves. This ; enforcement of duty is not an arbi
trary act on the part, of God. .On. the contrary,. it is of the
very essence of moral government : the welfare of the universe
imperatively demands it.
Further, it is equally necessary that, these. legal enactments
should be accompanied with penal sanctions to enforce obe
dience to them. Unless this. were the case, what has been
called the authority of the law — or its efficiency as an instru
ment of moral government— its power to regulate the conduct
of men — could not be sustained. . It is, in fact, the sanctions of
the Divine law, as is the case with every other law, in con
nexion with its promises, which, impart to it all the influence
which it possesses. A mere statement of, certain actions to be
performed, and of others to be avoided, though it proceeded from-
the lips of one" who had, a right to assume the reins of govern-

THE OBSTACLES TO PARDON. 169
ment, unless there were presented along with it the pros
pect of some good to be obtained by obedience, and some
evil to be endured as the result of disobedience, would be
utterly devoid of efficiency. It could not, in fact, be an
instrument of moral government; for moral government
is the government of motives ; and nothing can constitute
a motive to action, except the prospect of some good to be
enjoyed, or some evil to be avoided; which is, indeed, the
same thing.
It may also be further observed, on this part of the sub
ject, that penal sanctions are necessary to give the character
of law to such an enumeration of actions as we have just
referred to. " Law," says Jonathan Edwards, " must be
enforced with threatenings of punishment, otherwise it fails of
having the nature of a law, and is only of the nature of
counsel or advice, or rather of a request. For one being to
express his inclination or will to another concerning any thing
he would receive from him, without any threatening annexed,
but leaving it to the person applied to whether he will grant it
or not, supposing that his refusal would be with impunity,
is properly of the nature of a request. It does not amount to
counsel or advice. No doubt, it falls far short of the nature
of law-giving. For such an expression of one's will as this, is
an expression of will without any expression of authority.
It holds forth no authority for us merely to manifest our
wills or inclinations to another ; nor, indeed, does it manifest
any authority over a person applied to, to promise him rewards.
So persons may, and often do, promise rewards to others for
doing those things that they have no power to oblige them to.
So may persons do to their equals ; so may a king do to others
who are not his subjects. This is rather bargaining with others
than giving them laws. That expression of will only is a law,
which is exhibited in such a manner as to express the law
giver's power over the person to whom it is manifested — his
power of disposal of him according as he complies or refuses —
that which shows power over him so as to oblige him to com
ply ; or to make it to be his cost if he refuses." (Vol. viii.,
page 506.)

170 PENITENCE CANNOT REMOVE
Further, the same reason which renders it necessary that
legal enactments should exist — that they should be accom
panied by penal sanctions, enforce? also the execution of these
sanctions. Without this execution, they would be utterly
inefficacious. From them, as we have seen, the law derives,
partly at' least, the moral power which it exerts over the con
duct of men — the fear of punishment constituting one of the
motives to obedience. But, if the threatened punishment
were not inflicted, the sanction would inspire no fear, and the
law would accordingly lose its efficiency. " If the threatening,"
says Edwards, " had no connexion with execution, it would
be wholly void, and would be as no threatening ; and so far as
there is not a connexion with execution, whether that be in a
greater or lesser degree, so far and in such a degree is it void,
and so far approaches to the nature of no threatening, as much
as if that degree of unconnexion was expressed in the
threatening." (p. 507.)
Besides, the issuing of threatenings, by which the legislative
and authoritative part of moral government is rendered com
plete, implicates the character of the moral governor. The
efficiency of any law depends, in a great degree, upon the con
ceptions that are formed of him from whom it emanates — of
the sincerity and degree of his hatred of the conduct which it
condemns, and of the inflexibility of his determination not to
allow it to pass unpunished. Now, if actions condemned by
the Divine law were, even in a few instances, permitted to pass
unnoticed, how would if be possible to prevent the adoption
of the opinion by the subjects of his government, that the
hatred which the Deity bears to sin, is not so deep and uncon
querable as we might have inferred from the language of the
law? — and that transgression would not necessarily be fol
lowed by punishment ? The prevalence of this opinion would
expose to the danger of universal transgression. The immu
nity enjoyed by some would be expected in his own case bv
every individual, and all would go astray.
The truth, as well as the holiness, of God is implicated by
the issuing of the sanctions of the law. " The wages of sin,"
says the moral governor, " is death ;" that is, leads to death,

THE OBSTACLES TO PARDON. 171
and shall be followed by it. " Cursed is every one who con-
tinueth not in aU things which are written in the book of the
la.w, to do them." Unless, then, vengeance be taken upon the
workers of iniquity, or an expedient be devised by which
satisfaction in some other mode shall be rendered to Divine
justice, how can the truth of God be preserved? It is neces
sary to make the preceding distinction, because we, who main
tain the doctrine of the atonement, must in .fairness admit that
the precise threatening of the law is . not executed. That
threatening is directed against the transgressor, immediately
and , exclusively. It is, " The soul that sinneth shall die ;"
not he, or a substitute in his place. , It allots also a certain
measure of punishment to be inflicted upon him. According,
however, to those views of the nature of the atonement which
have been exhibited in the preceding pages, it is not the trans
gressor, but a substitute, who actually suffers; and that sub
stitute does not sustain the precise amount of punishment
which must have been endured by the transgressor himself.
It is, however, perfectly manifest, either that the law must
take its course — or that it must be honoured, and its moral
efficiency sustained, by the death of a substitute — or that the
truth of a moral governor must be abandoned as wholly in
capable of proof ; in that case it would cease to be of any prac
tical use in the moral system. If the law says, "the soul that
sinneth shall die," and it shall prove to be' the case that neither
did he die, nor a substitute for him, who could rescue the law
giver from the charge of falsehood ? And, if the truth of the
moral governor be brought into suspicion, what can . sustain
the efficiency of his law ?
It is, as we have seen, the fear of punishment; in connexion
with the hope of reward — a fear and a hope inspired by the
law — to which it owes all its efficiency. In the case of any
law, this fear cannot exist without confidence in the truth of
the lawgiver ; since his threatenings, which are the direct in
struments of producing it, would be mere idle words, possessed
of no moral power whatever, were they regarded as proceeding
from a being who might possibly curse where he had said he
would bless, or bless where he had said he would curse.

172 PENITENCE CANNOT REMOVE THE OBSTACLES,
Let us apply these more general remarks to the actual pos
ture of affairs between God and man, that we may perceive
more clearly the truth of the position we undertook to defend,
viz., that, as far as we are able to judge, there existed a moral
necessity for the sufferings and death of Christ, in order to the
forgiveness of .sin. Those legislative enactments, which con
stitute a perfect measure of our duty to God and to each
other — enactments guarded by penal sanctions, the non-exe
cution of which would deprive the Divine government of all
influence and efficiency — have been violated by every subject
of that government. " All have sinned, and come short of the
glory of God." " The Lord looked down from heaven, to see if
there were any that did understand and seek after God ; and
he found that all had gone out of the way, that there was none
that did good, no not oij-?(" Thus the whole family of man
had become guilty before God; i. e., in other words, they
were legally exposed to that punishment which must, as we
have seen, be inflicted, or the Divine government will be over
thrown ; his law losing the character of law — becoming a mere
code of advice, with which individuals may or may not comply,
as they are disposed, but being destitute of power to bind the
consciences of any.
Such were the obstacles to the pardon of sin. Now what
tendency, it may be asked, could repentance possess, however
sincere and profound, to remove them? How could the moral
efficiency of the law have been sustained — the moral perfec
tions of Jehovah exhibited and vindicated — by repentance
merely ? The language of the threatening is not, " the soul
that sinneth, and remains impenitent, shall die ;" but, " the
soul that sinneth shall die." If, then, the transgressor had
been pardoned on his repentance, what would there have been
to teach the important moral lesson, that the sinner cannot
escape with impunity ? And unless general confidence be felt
that there can be no impunity to the transgressor, what is
there to prevent the inroads of rebellion ? Few things can be
more manifest to me, than that the certainty of obtaining par
don on repentance would have totally destroyed the authority
of the law, and opened the flood-gates to every thing that is

AND IS NO PROVISION FOR REPENTANCE. 173
degraded and abominable ; for as no rule can possibly be laid
down in reference to the degree of repentance that was neces
sary, men would have contented themselves with a few heart
less professions of penitence when the king of terrors made
his appearance; and thus, having wallowed in sensuality
during their lives, would have gone at length into the presence
of their Judge with a lie in their right hand ; and, for that Ue,
would have expected the reward of eternal life !
The position, then, of our opponents, that there is a neces
sary connexion between repentance and forgiveness is a false
position. It is —
Secondly, — a useless position. There is no provision made,
in the system of Unitarianism and Deism, to secure the repent
ance of the transgressor. That all men have sinned, will
scarcely be denied by the Deist — c -tainly not by the Uni
tarian. Now, if they were able to prove that sincere repent
ance would certainly restore them to the favour of God, and
place them in all respects in the position in which they had
stood previously to their transgression, of what avail would it
be, if, in point of fact, the sinner, left to himself, would never
repent ? — would, on the contrary, proceed with headlong fury
along the path on which he had entered, until he sank into
eternal misery? And yet, if any confidence is to be placed in
the testimony of the sacred writers, the supposition I have
made would certainly be realized. " As well may the
Ethiopian change his skin, and the leopard his spots, as they
who have been accustomed to do evil, learn to do well."
The heart of stone, and such is the heart of the sinner, will
never break of itself. Why should the Saviour have been
exalted to give repentance, if repentance had been a self-
originated principle of the human mind? Why should the great
promise of the new covenant have been, " A new heart will
I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you," if sinners
had been morally able to form and create their hearts anew ?
Does not the volume of Divine revelation uniformly ascribe
" a broken heart," and " a contrite spirit," to Divine and sove
reign influence ? " Except a man be born of water, and of
the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." " The

174 NO PROVISION FOR REPENTANCE.
wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound
thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, or whither
it goeth ; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." Now the
system of our opponents makes no provision for the com
munication of that sovereign influence, from on high, which is
the exclusive cause of repentance in the heart of a sinner.
They tell him — falsely tell him, as we have seen — that, if he
repent, he shall be treated as though he had been innocent ;
but they do not tell him where, and how, he is to obtain repents
ance. They leave him to seek for salvation by the law of peni- •
tence — a law which cannot save him ; " for, if there had been
a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness
should have been by the law," (Gal. iii. 21) — but they do not
direct him to any assistance in fulfilling that law. They leave
him, in short, to perform a task to which he is so thoroughly
indisposed, as totally to forbid the hope that he will undertake
it; and a task which, if performed, would fail to secure for
him the reward which they promise — would leave him for ever
at a distance from, the kingdom of heaven !
From the whole of these statements, the necessity of the
atonement is obvious. It was necessary to remove the obsta
cles to the bestowment of pardon, and to secure the influence
of the Spirit by which the heart is softened and turned to God,
and the sinner is brought to the enjoyment of those invaluable
blessings, for the communication of which the atonement of
Christ presents an honourable channel.

LECTURE XL

ATONEMENT.
THE MANNER OF THE ATONEMENT; ITS REALITY.
I have followed Dwight in the phraseology of the first part of
this division of the great subject, because there does not at
present occur to my mind a better one, though I am not satisfied
with it. The point to which I thought it advisable to devote a
little attention, might perhaps be more appropriately designated
the matter of the atonement, if so barbarous a phrase could be
tolerated. The questions — " In what did the atonement con
sist, or what is to be regarded as constituting a part of it ? "
" Are we to consider atonement for sin as having been made
by the death of Christ exclusively? or, are the previous
sufferings of his life, and the obedience he rendered to the
Divine law, to be regarded as having entered into its
essence ?" — will convey a tolerably distinct idea of the precise
point to which I would, though very briefly, direct the atten
tion of the reader.
A distinction has been made by divines between the active
and the passive obedience of Christ, as they are called ; that
is, his conformity to the precepts of the Divine law, and his
endurance of the penalty to which we had exposed ourselves
by our breach of it. Both of these, including under the
phrase, " the passive obedience," the whole of the sufferings of
his life, as well as the agonies which he endured upon the
cross, are considered by many as having entered into the satis
faction for sin to which we are indebted for our salvation.
And it is not uncommon for men who embrace this general
opinion, to make a very nice distinction here ; and to ascribe

176 ATONEMENT, BY WHAT EFFECTED.
one part of our salvation to the active obedience, and another
part to the passive obedience, of the Saviour. By the latter
he redeems us, it is imagined, from guilt ; by the former he
merits for us the kingdom of heaven. By his death he
restores us to the position which Adam occupied on his entrance
upon his state of probation : by his obedience he places us in
the condition in which Adam would have stood had he resisted
temptation to the end of his course, and thus entitled himself
to all the reward which the dispensation under which he was
placed, warranted him to expect. There are others, again,
who maintain that atonement was made by the passive obe
dience of Christ exclusively; and some, I believe, who imagine
that no sufferings but those which he endured on the cross had
any influence in procuring our salvation. They admit the
necessity of his active obedience, — since the death of a trans
gressor could have possessed no merit to atone for sin ; — but
maintain that it was only requisite to enable him to present
an acceptable oblation of himself upon the cross.
The opinions we form on this subject must necessarily be
guided by our conceptions of the nature of the atonement.
And there are no subjects on which it is more necessary, than
On theological ones, to trace our opinions to the sources from
which they spring. By this means error may be detected, of
whose existence there had been no previous conception ; and
which by no other process could have been discovered. Ac
cording to a celebrated maxim, " To trace an error to its
fountain-head, is to refute it." " The detection of a source of
fallacy, is of more value than the refutation of a particular
error. A truth is but half revealed, when it makes us know
only that we have been in the wrong : the chief revelation is
that which tells us of some principle within us that rendered
the fallacy to us, for the time, a relative truth. We avoid only
one error in knowing that we have been deceived; but we
may avoid many errors in knowing how that one has deceived
us." If we conceive that the atonement proceeded on the princi
ples of pecuniary transactions — or, if we imagine that Christ
saves us by enduring the precise amount of suffering which we

ATONEMENT WAS MADE NOT MERELY BY SUFFERING. 177
must have sustained, — we are driven to the necessity of em
bracing the latter of the opinions stated above; viz., that
atonement was made by the passive obedience of Christ ex
clusively. But if, with Dr. Wardlaw, "we regard it as a
grand general manifestation of the righteousness of God, by
which the claims of justice are, in the spirit of them, fully
satisfied, and the glory of this attribute thus maintained in the
exercise of mercy;" or, if we take the view of it which has
been presented in the preceding pages ; i. e., if we consider it
a scheme, devised by Divine wisdom and goodness, for the pur
pose of rendering the bestowment of pardon consistent with
the honour and efficiency of the law, and the consequent safety
of the government, it will be impossible to avoid arriving at
the conclusion, that the atonement comprehended every thing
which possessed a tendency to secure this important result.
We shall feel compelled to acknowledge that the Saviour made
atonement by obeying the precepts of the law, as well as by
suffering its penalty ; because that obedience tended to honour
the law ; to show that its precepts are holy, just, and good ;
that the Lawgiver entertains the highest possible sense of its
rectitude ; and that, consequently, it cannot be violated with
impunity. That atonement was made by the passive obedience of
Christ exclusively, appears to me an opinion so manifestly in
consistent with the view of its nature, which has been exhi
bited in the preceding pages, that I can scarcely persuade
myself to believe it does not always originate from some of
those mistaken conceptions, in regard to its nature, which have
been already examined: at all events, it harmonizes with them.
" Christ has paid my debt," says one, " and hence I am de
livered." Now what are likely to be the views of this indivi
dual in reference to what we have denominated the manner of
the atonement ? What idea is he likely to attach to the term
debt ? He owes, it is true, a debt of obedience to the Divine
law ; but, were he to include tliat debt in his conceptions, it
would seem to follow, that he is personally released from all
obligations to yield obedience to this law. He accordingly
settles down into the conviction, that it was his debt of suf-

178 ATONEMENT WAS MADE BY THE OBEDIENCE
fering that was paid by the Redeemer; or, in Dther words,
that atonement was made by the death of Christ exclusively.
Again, if Christ rescues his people by enduring the exact
amount of suffering which they must have sustained, there
could manifestly be no atoning efficacy in any thing but his
sufferings. The obedience which he paid to the law must, in
that case, be regarded merely as a preparatory and necessary
qualification for the great work of presenting to God a satis
faction for sin.
Atonement was, then, made by the obedience as well as
the sufferings of our Lord; but the ascription of one part of our
salvation to his obedience, and of another part to his death,
savours too much of the technical theology of the schools. It
is a distinction unsupported by any of the representations of the
word of God. The general statements of the Scripture teach
us to consider the obedience unto death of the Son of God —
(for he obeyed when he suffered, arid suffered when he obeyed)
— the fulfilment, by Him, of all righteousness during his life —
the sorrow and grief which pressed so heavily upon him from
the manger to the cross — together with the bodily and mental
agonies which he endured when he hung upon the tree, as
constituting together that great work by which the Divine
character is glorified, — the honour and efficiency of the Divine
law sustained, — and the safety of the Divine government
secured, while pardon is bestowed upon the transgressor who
believes in him. It has been said, indeed, that the obedience
of Christ vindicates the preceptive part of the law, and his suf
ferings, its penalty ; as if the obedience did not vindicate the
penalty, nor the sufferings the precepts ; neither of which is'
the case. And, with reference to the latter, it may be ob
served, that no vindication of the rectitude of the precepts of
the law can be conceived of, more striking and conclusive, than
that which was supplied by the death of our Lord. A penalty
arisirig out of the breach of unrighteous precepts, would not
have been endured by him. And it is merely because his
death tended more eminently to honour the Divine law — to
preserve its efficiency as an instrument of moral government —
than either the obedience or suffering of his previous life, that

AS WELL AS THE DEATH OF CHRIST. 179
the blessings of pardon, justification, and eternal life, are more
frequently ascribed to it, than to his active obedience. It is
not because there was not atoning influence in the one, — but
more, so to speak, of atoning influence in the other ; for what
is atonement, but the removal of those obstacles, on the part
of the Divine government, which prevented the communica
tion of his grace to man ? Now, to the removal of these obsta
cles, the righteousness of Emanuel contributed as really, if
not as powerfully, as his death. Hence the exaltation and
glory of Christ are represented, not merely as the reward of
his death, but of his previous humiliation and sufferings.
"Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus;
who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be
equal with God ; but made himself of no reputation, and took
upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness
of men ; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled
himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of
the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and
given him a name which is above every name ; that at the
name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and
things in earth, and things under the earth ; and that every
tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of
God the Father." (Phil. ii. 5—11.)
The obedience of Christ, and the sufferings of his life, must
not then be considered merely as necessary acts of prepara
tion for the great work of atonement ; they enter, on the con
trary, into the very essence of the atonement; though we
mainly ascribe that blessed result to his death. The sufferings
by which that important and solemn event was preceded, were
not so emphatically mental sufferings, as those which immedi
ately attended the close of his career of woe. When in the
garden, it is said of him, that his soul was exceeding sorrowful,
even unto death. He manifested there, and especially on
the cross, unequivocal symptoms of the most deep and over
whelming affliction. Just before he yielded up his spirit, he
cried with a loud voice, " My God, my God, why hast thou
forsaken me?" — an exclamation, clearly evincing that the
most bitter ingredient in the cup of suffering, then put into

180 FROM WHAT HIS SUFFERINGS RESULTED.
his hands, was the hiding of his Father's countenance. I am
well aware that it is difficult, or rather impossible, to form
adequate conceptions on this deeply, this awfully mysterious
subject ; but if we regard our blessed Lord, on this occasion,
more in the light of a perfectly holy man, than we are, per
haps, accustomed to do, shutting out of our consideration the
Divinity within, (in which light we are, I apprehend, not only
authorized, but obliged to view him; since it was only the
human nature that could suffer,) we should be likely to succeed
better. Conceive, then, of the Saviour extended on the cross.
He had a view of the evil of sin, incomparably more distinct
and affecting than was ever possessed by man or angel before
or since that time. The intercourse, which, as man, he had
with God, in consequence of the union of the two natures in
his person, was entirely sui generis. It was incomparably
more intimate than had ever been enjoyed by a merely hu-
man prophet. It gave opportunity for the powers of the
human nature to reach a higher point of advancement and
perfection, than could possibly have been the case in other
circumstances. It may be supposed, also, that, for a short
time previous to our Lord's final sufferings, and during their
continuance, there was communicated to the human nature a
more than ordinarily vivid and affecting view of the evil of sin,
— of its irreconcilable hostility to the character, and perfec
tions, and government of God, — of the infinite abhorrence in
which it must be held by Jehovah, — and the awful conse
quences which it justly entails upon all who practise it. It
would be unpardonable to speak with confidence upon a sub
ject like this — a subject on which I have never seen any thing
which folly satisfies my own mind ; but I would suggest, with
much deference to my brethren, whether this peculiarly vivid
view of the evil of sin did not constitute one of the penal in
gredients of the cup which was then put into his hands. It will
constitute, doubtless, an ingredient in that cup of wrath which
is mingling for the finally impenitent in the future state.
Standing, therefore, as the Saviour did, in the place of the
sinner,— conscious of the infinite dignity of his person, (though
the inferior nature only suffered,) — and possessing these pecuU*

STATEMENTS OF DWIGHT. 181
arly vivid and affecting views of the infinite odiousness of sin,
it is not for us properly to appreciate what the Saviour must
have suffered when he was treated as if he had been the sin
ner ;— when he died the death of the sinner, — a death abhorred
by men, and accursed by God ; and this acute and inconceiv
able suffering was aggravated by the withholdment of counter
balancing support. God " hid his face from him ;" i. e., says
a late able writer, " he withheld from him wholly those mani
festations of supreme complacency in his character and con
duct, which he had always before made. As this was itself a
most distressing testimony of the Divine anger against sin, it
is probably implied in the language of the prophet, "It
pleased the Father to bruise him."
¦ *' The views and feelings/' proceeds this writer, "" of . one
mind towards another can produce the highest sense of suffer
ing of which we. are capable. The esteem arid love of intelli
gent beings are, when united, the most exquisite of all enjoy
ments; and are naturally, and, in all probability, necessarily
coveted more than any other, except the approbation of our
own mind. Their mere indifference to us, when they have an
opportunity of being so far acquainted with us as to give
room for being esteemed and loved by them, is ordinarily the
source of severe mortification. In proportion as they are more
intelligent and worthy, their love and esteem are more im
portant to us ; and the refusal of it excites in us more intense
distress." "The complacency of God, whose mind is infinite, and
whose disposition is perfect, is undoubtedly the first of all
possible enjoyments. The loss of it, therefore, and the conse
quent suffering of his hatred and contempt, are undoubtedly
the greatest evils which a created mind could suffer ; evils which
will, in all probability, constitute the primary anguish experi
enced in the world of woes. Omniscience and Omnipotence
are certainly able to communicate, during even a short time,
to a finite mind, such views of the hatred and contempt of
God towards sin and sinners, and of course towards a substi
tute for sinners, as would not only fill its capacity of suffering,
but probably put an end to its existence. In this manner, I

182 FROM WHAT THE SUFFERINGS
apprehend, the chief distresses of Christ were produced. In
this manner, principally, was that testimony of God against
disobedience exhibited to the Redeemer, and ultimately to
the universe, which so solemnly supported the sanctions of the
Divine law, and so illustriously honoured the Divine govern
ment, as to prevent the pardon of sin from being regarded by
intelligent creatures as the mere indulgence of a weak and
changeable disposition in the infinite Ruler."
While there is so much to commend in this generally ad
mirable passage, one cannot but most deeply regret the incau-
tion, to say the least of it, of one or two of its statements. I
refer more especially to the implied assertion, that our Lord
actually sustained the contempt and anger of God. No
sober-minded man can admit this. The fact of the case most
unquestionably is, that the Father did not despise him,— was
not angry with him when he hung upon the cross. Never,
indeed, did he regard him with such ineffable complacency.
How, then, could he manifest that displeasure which did not
exist? The supposition, in the case of God, is impossible.
But he might withhold the manifestations of that complacency
which did exist. Dr. Dwight seems to have departed most
unnecessarily and most unfortunately, from the well-chosen
phraseology with which his statement commences. At the
beginning of the discussion, he says, that "God withdrew
from him" (I would rather say, withheld from him) "those
manifestations of his supreme complacency which he had for
merly made." I apprehend that this, and only this, is war
ranted by the language of the sacred writer. " He hid his
face from him;" words which do not convey the idea of a
positive act of removal, but the cessation of accustomed com
munications. I cannot, therefore, but regret that this respect
able writer should, in the progress of his discussion, vary his
statement so materially from the non-communication of former
manifestations of love, to the actual manifestations of con
tempt and anger. There is no reason to suppose that that
awful cloud which oppressed the mind of our blessed Lord,
when he hung upon the cross, was the result of any positive
act on the part of God. Ceasing to act is all that can, with

OF CHRIST RESULTED. 183
any reason, be attributed to the Father ; i. e., discontinuing
those manifestations of love which he had formerly made to
the Son. It has sometimes, indeed, struck me, that of the
light of his Father's countenance, or his conscious sense of his
favour, the Saviour may have been rather indirectly deprived,
than otherwise. The sun may pour forth its full effulgence,
but we do not see it if a cloud should intervene. May not,
then, the awful and affecting sense of the evil of sin, which, as
we have supposed, was imparted to our Lord during his clos
ing sufferings, — together with the mental agonies which that
sight could not but occasion, — in addition to his deep sense of
shame, and his acute bodily pains, — may not these, combined,
have constituted that intervening cloud ? May they not, for a
season, have absorbed all his attention, and thus, by natural
consequence, deprived him of that exalted enjoyment, which
he habitually derived from a conscious sense of his Father's
favour ? May not this be a sufficient explanation of the man
ner in which God hid his face from his Son ? I merely throw
out this as a suggestion upon a subject which has ever appeared
to me to be as deeply and awfully mysterious as any within
the whole compass of Divine revelation.
The whole of the preceding statements are adapted to show
why the atonement which our Lord presented to the Father
is mainly ascribed to his final sufferings and death. That
these sufferings were heavy beyond all precedent and concep
tion is placed beyond the possibility of doubt; and they were
sustained in honour of the Divine law — to evince the rectitude
of its precepts, and the equity of its curse— to proclaim that
Jehovah is a God of justice and of truth — and to show, that
under his government no sinner can escape with impunity.
Though there was not, then, a single act in the Saviour's life
which did not tend to make atonement, that tendency was
especially apparent in his death. On his cross we see inscribed
in letters of blood, " The soul that sinneth shall die."

184
THE REALITY OF THE ATONEMENT.
The grounds on which our confidence rests, that Christ died
with the intention of making atonement for sin, are the fol
lowing : —
I. The state of mind which he displayed in the anticipa
tion, and in the endurance, of those sufferings by which, as
we affirm, atonement was especially made. Contemplate him
in the garden of Gethsemane, when he had a full view of the
awful baptism with which he was about to be baptized. He
appears to have been perfectly appalled by the sight. Such
was the agony of his spirit, in the prospect of what he was
about to undergo, that it forced from him sweat as it were
great drops of blood falling down to the ground ; or, as some
imagine, produced a literal exuding of blood through the pores
of the skin. If such were the effect of " that agony upon his
body, in the open air, at midnight, and when they who were
not thus exposed found it necessary to defend themselves
against the cold," how intolerable must it have been ! Per
haps no' person, under the mere apprehension of death, was
ever agitated in an equal degree. And now behold him on
the cross. Here his agony reached a higher point of intensity.
It extorted from him the bitter and piercing cry, " My God,
my God, why hast thou forsaken me? " " It marred his visage
more, than any man, and his form more than the sons of men :"
and it is supposed by some, that the sun was clothed in dark
ness, not only as an expression of the Divine displeasure
against his foes, but also of respect for the sufferer, — to veil
the ravages which mental distress had committed upon a coun
tenance, and a form, once adorned by more than human
beauty. Now compare the state of mind which our Lord
displayed in the prospect and under the pressure of these
sufferings, with the conduct of some who followed him in the
path of affliction, — with that of Paul, in the view of a painful
and ignominious death. " And now," said the latter, " behold,
I go bound in spirit unto Jerusalem, not knowing the things
that shall befall me there ; save that the Holy Ghost witness-
eth in every city, saying that bonds and afflictions await me.

THE REALITY OF THE ATONEMENT. 185
But none of these things move me, neither count I my life
dear untq. myself, so that I might finish my course with joy,
and the ministry which I have received of the Lord Jesus, to
testify the gospel of the grace of God." (Acts xx. 22.)
Compare it, further, with the composure of Stephen,
when suffering the agonies of a violent death. " They stoned
Stephen, calling upon God, and saying, Lord Jesus, receive
my spirit. And he kneeled down, and cried with a loud
voice, Lord, lay not this sin to their charge : and when he had
said this, he.fell asleep." (Acts vii. 59, 60.) Compare it, again,
with that of multitudes of the martyrs who stood unmoved
under all the cruelties which were inflicted upon them, who
uttered no complaint, and died without a groan !
How is this manifest difference to be explained? There
appear to me to be only two methods of accounting for it.
We must suppose, either, that the sufferings of our Lord were,
on one account or another, more dreadful than any which
have been experienced by his disciples; or that, in point of
fortitude, and strength of mind, he who came to exhibit what
we should be in spirit and in conduct, might have derived an
example from some of his followers !
The latter of these suppositions is too bold and blasphemous
to be avowed, I believe, by any. It cannot be imagined with
decency, that Christ, who exhorted his disciples not to fear
those who could kill the body only, would be thus pre-emi
nently agitated by the prospect, or even by the endurance, of
a measure of suffering which certainly did not surpass what
has, at least, occasionally, fallen to the lot of man. We are
driven, then, upon the other part of the dilemma; and con
strained to suppose that the sufferings of our Lord must
have been, on some account or another, dreadful beyond con
ception. And yet, if we shut out of our consideration that
agony of spirit which was sustained by him, as we suppose,
in consequence of his standing in the place of the guilty,
what ground is there for the opinion that they can have been
more than ordinarily dreadful? "The bodily sufferings of
Christ," says Dwight, "were not more severe, or even so
severe, as those which have been experienced by many others.
Y

186 PROVED BY THE EXTREMITY
The death of the cross was undoubtedly a very distressing
death. But it was probably less distressing than that expe
rienced by many of the martyrs. Some of them were roasted
by a slow fire — some were dislocated on the rack, and suffered
to expire under long-continued torture. Some had their flesh
taken off piece by piece, in a very gradual manner, with red-
hot pincers. Others expired under various other kinds of
exquisite sufferings, devised by the utmost ingenuity of man,
and protracted with the utmost cruelty. Multitudes, also,
both of martyrs and others, have died on the cross itself, and,
for ought that appears, with bodily anguish not inferior to that
which Christ himself endured." Now, if the bodily anguish
of the Saviour was not more severe than that which has been
endured by others, the entire amount of his sufferings, on the
principles of those who consider Christ a mere man, and deny
the doctrine of the atonement, cannot have been greater.
There is, on their scheme, absolutely no room for the supposi
tion of greater sufferings, if bodily anguish did not render them
so. And, as that has been shown not to be the case, we are
driven back again to that side of the dilemma from which we
were glad to escape a short time ago. We must . impute
defective firmness to him who is the bright example of every
Christian excellence ! This is really done by the Unitarian
system. It libels the Son of God. It represents him as
dying with a view to exhibit the manner in which a martyr
should suffer, and yet as sinking, and in this precise point too,
below the virtues of those who were commanded in all respects
to be conformed to his example ! Were there no other argu
ment against the Unitarian view of the death of Christ, this
would, I acknowledge, be sufficient for me. I dare not thus
degrade the Saviour.
Let us for a moment consider, on the contrary, how
completely every thing is explained on the system adopted
by us. That state of mind, on the part of our blessed
Lord, to which we have just referred, resulted " not from
want of resignation to the will of God, for no other per
son was ever so resigned; nor from the want of fortitude,
for no other person ever possessed it in an equal degree ; nor

of Christ's sufferings. 187
from more acute bodily pain, for anguish of this kind, as
severe, has been sustained by many. It resulted from more
intense mental suffering, — from the burden of our guilt, which
rested upon him, — from that light of his Father's countenance
which then suffered a total eclipse, and led him to cry, { My
soul is full of troubles, and my life draweth nigh unto the
grave. Thou hast laid me in the lowest pit, in darkness, in
the deeps. Thy wrath lieth hard upon me, and thou hast
afflicted me with all thy waves.'" (Psalm lxxxviii. 4 — 7.)

LECTURE XII.

ATONEMENT.
THE REALITY AND EFFICACY OF THE ATONEMENT.
II. In support of the reality of the atonement, we adduce
the direct testimony of the word of God. The proofs which
meet our view are abundant, but the classification of them
is not so easy. After considerable thought, I am led to adopt
the following : —
1st. I refer to those texts which represent Christ as bearing
the sins of men. " Surely," saith Isaiah, " he hath borne our
griefs, and carried our sorrows. The Lord hath laid," or made
to meet, " on him the iniquity of us all. He bare the sin of
many." (Isaiah liii. 4. 6. 12.) " Who himself," says the
apostle, " bare our sins in his own body on the cross." Now
the question is, what is meant by bearing sin ? We under
stand the words in the sense of enduring the consequences of
sin. This we maintain to be the ordinary and current accept
ation of the phrase. " If a man will act improperly, he must
bear his offences ; " we are in the habit of saying. The ex
pression is manifestly elliptical ; it evidently means, he must
bear the punishment, or the consequences, of his offences.
This is, also, beyond all question, the scriptural sense of the
words, " Yet ye say, Why doth not the son bear the iniquity of
the father ? When the son hath done that which is lawful and
right, and hath kept all my statutes, and hath done them, he
shall surely live. The soul that sinneth it shall die : the son
shall not bear the iniquity of the father," that is, not die
instead of the father; "neither shall the father bear the
iniquity of the son,"— not die instead of the son ; "the right-

PROVED BY DIRECT TESTIMONY. 189
eousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wicked
ness of the wicked shall be upon him ;" i. e., each must bear
the consequences of his own conduct. (Ezekiel xvui. 19, 20.)
In the book of Leviticus the expression frequently occurs —
and occurs where its meaning cannot be misunderstood. Thus
of the guilty party, in the case of uncleanness, referred to in the
20th chapter, 17th verse, it is said, " he shall bear his iniquity,"
i. e., endure the punishment of his crime. Thus, also, we read,
Numb. xiv. 33, 34, " And your children shall wander in the
wilderness forty years, and bear your whoredoms, until your
carcases be wasted in the wilderness. After the number of
the days in which ye reached the land, even forty days, (each
day for a year,) shall ye bear your iniquities;" that is, endure
the consequences of your misconduct.
By the editors of the improved version we are, however,
assured that the meaning of the apostle, in the phrase, " He
bare our sins in his own body on the tree," is, that he
removed them, and carried them away : as he is said, they
allege, Matt. vii. 17, to bear our sicknesses, when he healed
them by his miraculous power.
I reply, first — That, granting that they do not misinterpret
the language of the evangelist Matthew, it cannot be in this
sense that our Lord is said to have borne our sins, by Peter.
In the sense of suffering the punishment of our sins, he may,
with great propriety, be said to have borne them in his own
body on the tree. But what meaning can be attached to the
Socinian exposition of the words? How could he, according
to their system, " remove and carry away our sins, in his own
body on the tree? Their hypothesis does not admit of the
supposition that the death of Christ was intended to remove
guilt, — to procure our pardon. It precludes the notion of any
carrying away of sin, but that which consists in the removal
of depravity. Now, can any thing be more manifest than that
Christ did not thus remove and carry away the sin of any, in
his mon body on the tree ? He does it by the power of his
word and Spirit. Unless the doctrine of atonement be ad
mitted, the language of the apostle is utterly unmeaning. I
answer —

190

PROVED BY DIRECT TESTIMONY.

Secondly, That there is reason to think they have misun
derstood the language of Matthew, in the passage to which
they refer. On examining the words of the prophet, it
appears quite manifest that the expressions, " He bore our
griefs — carried our sorrows — was wounded for our transgres
sions, and bruised for our iniquities," are intended to convey
the same meaning. " He was a man of sorrows," says the
prophet ; and we thought, such is the implication of his lan
guage, that these sorrows were his own sorrows — that they
had been laid upon him by the hand of God, as the con
sequence of his own sin. But we were mistaken, — they were
our sorrows which were borne by him ; for, " he was wounded
for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities." The
punishment which he endured — if it be right to call it pun
ishment — was the punishment due to our sins, not his own.
When, therefore, the evangelist Matthew, having described
his miracles, says, " All this was done that it might be fulfilled
which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying, Himself took
our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses ;" we must, to be con
sistent with the prophet, understand his meaning to be — that
these bodily diseases — the consequences of sin — were removed
by omnipotent power, put forth on the ground of the atone
ment. The effect was made to cease, by the removal of the
cause. The sacrifice of our Lord is of sufficient worth and
efficacy to rescue us from all the consequences of sin — bodily,
mental, and eternal. Had not he been about to present that
sacrifice, he would not have healed the sick who applied to
him ; and hence the healing of diseases is called, in Scripture,
" the forgiveness of sins." (Matt. ix. 2.)
2nd. I refer to those passages in which Christ is said
to have died for our sins. Isaiah declares, " that he was
wounded for our. transgressions." The apostle affirms, that
"he was delivered for our offences;" "died for our sins;"
" died for us ;" " suffered for sins." All these expressions
suggest very naturally " the notion of a substitution, in which
the sufferings and death of one person are instead of the suf
ferings and death which the sin of others deserved." The
prepositions used in the above passages are vinp, Sia, vtpi, am.

PROVED BY DIRECT TESTIMONY. 191
All of them are employed by classical writers to denote sub
stitution ; and, without pretending to say that they are never
used in a loose sense — in the general sense of advantage — we
may affirm with confidence, that the notion of substitution, or
that Christ suffered, strictly speaking, instead of the guilty,
"could not have been more naturally and significantly ex
pressed than by these prepositions ; and that the meaning which
a reader, whose mind is unwarped by system, feels himself dis
posed to affix to them, and the violent interpretations which
are necessary, in order to evade that meaning, create a strong
presumption in favour of the orthodox interpretation." Let
any one read Rom. v. 6, 8, and then say how the idea that
the substitution of Christ is intended to be expressed, can be
avoided. " For scarcely for," that is, instead of, " a righteous
man will one die ; yet peradventure for," that is, instead of, "a
good man, some would even dare to die. But God commend
eth his love towards us in that while we were yet sinners,
Christ died for," that is, instead of, "us;" — so as that we,
believing in him, might not die.
3rd. I refer to those passages in which Christ is spoken
of as a propitiation for sin. God sent his Son "to be the
propitiation for our sins." " And he is the propitiation for
our sins." " Whom God hath sent forth to be a propitiation
through faith in his blood." (Vide 1 John iv. 10; ii. 2 ;
Rom. iii. 24.) To propitiate an individual is to turn away his
anger ; to recover his forfeited favour. A propitiation is that
by which his friendship is regained. If, then, the doctrine of
atonement be excluded from our system, in what possible sense
can this term be applied to our Lord? He must have pro
pitiated either God or man, or he could not have been deno
minated, as he is, a "propitiation." Now, that he did not
propitiate man, or the world, is manifest from the fact that the
major part of the world's population is not, even yet, propi
tiated. Besides, he is said to be a propitiation for our sins, —
an expression which decidedly proves that the anger removed
is not our anger against God, but God's anger against us.
He suffered on account of our sins. Moreover, this propitia
tion was effected by the death of Christ, " He hath recon-

192 PROVED BY DIRECT TESTIMONY.
ciled us unto God by his blood." This reconciliation could
not, then, be the removal of our enmity against God, for this
remained after the death of Christ, and is subdued by "the
ministry of reconciliation." Christ was a propitiation for sin
by rendering the pardon of sin consistent with the perfections,
and safe to the government of God.
4th. I refer to those passages in which Christ is re
presented as a ransom for mankind,— "Even as the Son of
Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to
give his life a ransom for many." " Who gave himself a ran
som for all, to be testified in due time." (Matt. xx. 28; 1 Tim.
ii. 6.) The word in Matthew is Xvrpov, which signifies the
price paid for the deliverance of a captive from slavery or
death; to which, among the ancients, a captive was, or might
be condemned. The word in Timothy is avriXvrpov, which
denoted the ransom paid for the life of a captive, by giving up
the life of another person. The Xvrpov might be a sum of
money; the avriXvrpov was life for life. The Xvrpov men
tioned by our Lord, is the same with avrikvTpov. He gave his
life a Xvrpov for us. " I know not," says an excellent writer,
" how the fact that Christ made an atonement could have
been declared in more explicit or more forcible language."
5th. I refer to those passages in which reconciliation and
peace with God are represented as the result of the death of
Christ. " For if, when we were enemies, we were reconcUed
to God by the death of his Son, much more being reconciled,
we shall be saved by his life." " And all things are of God,
who hath reconciled us unto himself, by Jesus Christ." It
pleased the Father, having made peace through the blood of
his cross, by him to reconcile all things to himself," &c. (Vide
Rom. v. 10; 2 Cor. v. 18; Col. i. 19, 20.)
It has been well and justly remarked by a late writer, that
the amount of these expressions is contained in the declara
tion concerning Christ, — " That we are saved from wrath by
him." The nature of this wrath has been explained; it is
the punitive or retributive justice of God, — that necessity
under which the moral Governor is laid to inflict the ven
geance of the law upon all who break it. This wrath has

PROVED BY DIRECT TESTIMONY. 193
been mariifested in the conduct of God, Sodom and Gomorrah
are set forth as an example of it, " suffering the vengeance of
eternal fire." From this wrath the atonement of Christ
rescues his people. The Saviour has " made peace through
the blood of his cross." He has rendered it possible for God
to save the transgressor, without destroying the efficiency of
his law, and endangering the safety of his government; and,
therefore, through him is preached unto all men the forgive
ness of sins.
The Unitarians endeavour to evade this argument in sup
port of the doctrine of the atonement, by maintaining that the
reconciliation which we ascribe to the death of Christ, is not
that of God to man, but of man to God ; — -that the sufferings
of Christ could produce no change in God — that he needed
not to be reconcUed, because he was never at enmity with
man. I answer, first, that the passages to which we have
just referred, as well as others, (vide Heb. x. 28, 30, &c.,)
in which the wrath of God is expressly affirmed, — and, indeed,
the whole of the previous statements, prove most decidedly
that, in the sense formerly explained, Godxlid need to be re
conciled to man ; and that reconciliation in this sense was
actually effected by the death of Christ. I answer,
Secondly, With Hammond and others, that the words trans
lated "reconcile," have a peculiar sense in the New Tes
tament: that, whereas, in ordinary Greek writers, they signify
" to be pacified," and so reconciled ; here, on the other hand,
they have the force of the Hithpael among the Hebrews. They
imply, to reconcile oneself to another ; that is, to appease or
to obtain the favour of that other. In proof of this, the fol
lowing passages may be referred to : — " If thou bring thy gift
to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath
ought against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and
go thy way, first be reconciled to thy brother," &c. (Matt. v.
23, 24.) In this case, the person addressed is not supposed to
have any ground of offence against his brother; but to .recol
lect that his brother has ground of offence against him. His
brother is, in short, the aggrieved party. Yet the language is,
" Be reconciled to thy brother ;" that is, make peace with thy
7,

194 OBJECTION ANSWERED.
brother; remove his displeasure against thee by becoming
acknowledgment and submission ; in this manner restore the
exercise of mutual affections — Again, — " And the princes of
the Philistines were wroth with him, and said, &c — Make this
fellow return, that he may go again to his place, which thou
hast appointed him, and let him not go down with us to battle,
lest in the battle he be an adversary to us; for wherewith
should he reconcile himself unto his master? should it not
be with the heads of these men?" (Vide 1 Sam. xxix. 4.)
Now as Saul, David's master, was the offended party, and
David the offender, the latter could not reconcile himself to
the former by foregoing his own displeasure, but by removing
that of his master. The reconciliation which the lords of the
Philistines dreaded, was the appeasing of Saul's anger against
David. These instances are completely decisive as to that
use of the term for which we contend. When sinners are
accordingly said to be reconciled to God, the expression means
not the relinquishment of their enmity against him, but the
turning away of his displeasure against them. This is further
manifest from 2 Cor. v. 18, 21 ; Rom. v. 10. In the former of
these passages, God's "reconciling the world to himself by
Jesus Christ," is explained by his not imputing their tres
passes unto them : i. e., by forgiveness he brings sinners into
a state of favour and acceptance with himself. As to the
latter passage, its connexion with the preceding verse is suf
ficient to show that the meaning of being reconciled is there
the same ; — " much more then being now justified by his blood,
we shall be saved from wrath through him. For if, when
we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of
his Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his
life." If reconciliation to God by the death of his Son is not
used here as inclusive, at least, of being justified by his blood,
there is neither continuity nor conclusiveness in the apostle's
reasoning. 6th. I refer to those passages in which redemption is as-1
scribed to the death of Christ. Vide Ephes. i. 7, " In whom
we have redemption through his blood :" Rev. v. 9, " Thou
hast redeemed us to God by thy blood :" Gal. iii. 13, " Christ

REDEMPTION BY THE DEATH OF CHRIST. 195
hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, having been
made a curse for us." The original terms are properly ap
plied to the action of setting a captive free by the payment of
a ransom. In these passages, the sufferings of Christ are ac
cordingly exhibited " under the particular view of a price, by
the payment of which we are set free."
To these statements the Socinians object, that the term re
deem cannot be used in its literal sense when applied to the
death of Christ ; for as we were the slaves of Satan, the word
redeem, literally understood, would imply that the price of
redemption was paid to Satan. We must, therefore, they
add, understand it in the secondary and derivative sense of
deliverance : in which sense it is frequently used in the word
of God ; as, for instance, when God is said to redeem his people
from trouble, from danger, death, &c, though no price is sup
posed to have been given. Christ redeems us by delivering
us, through the influence of the doctrines and precepts of the
gospel, from the love and practice of sin.
We reply, that we do not deny that the word has acquired
this secondary and derivative sense ; nor, " that it is the busi
ness of sound criticism to determine, by considering the cir
cumstances of the case, how far the primary signification is to
be retained, or with what qualifications it is to be understood,
in every particular application." But we maintain, that, on
the following grounds, it must not be understood in the deriv
ative sense when used in connexion with the death of Christ.
First, " It is not necessary," says Principal Hill, " to de
part from its literal meaning. Those whom Christ redeems
were exposed to a sentence of condemnation ; they were in
the condition of prisoners waiting for the execution of the
sentence — and the death of Christ rescues them from this
awful state. Deliverance from the dominion of sin, and the
power of Satan, is a secondary effect, a consequence of the
application of- the remedy; redemption of our bodies from
the grave is another effect, still more remote. Both are men
tioned in Scripture ; but the immediate effect of the death
of Christ is our deliverance from punishment, what the apostle
calls the curse of the law ; and this punishment being in the

196 OBJECTION ANSWERED. :
power of the lawgiver by whom it was to be .inflicted,, the
ransom, in consideration of which it is remitted, and the con
demned are set free, may be said to be given to him.
" Secondly, Although a captive may be released without any
ransom, and although Xvu, a verb derived from Xvrpov, may be
employed most naturally to express such -gratuitous release,
yet this extension of the primary meaning of these words is
excluded from the case to which they are applied in the New
Testament, because a Xvrpov is there expressly mentioned.
When a Greek author, in relating the release of a- prisoner,
speaks repeatedly of cmowa or Xvrpa, as Homer does in the first
book of the Iliad, it cannot be supposed that the redemption
was without price. Every one feels this effect of introducing
the noun Xvrpov when the captive was detained by force under
the power of an enemy ; and the significancy of the noun is
not in the least diminished when the prisoner is released
from a captivity which the Scriptures represent as judicial.
The Xvrpov, indeed, in that case, is not a price from which the
lawgiver is to receive any advantage : it is the satisfaction to
justice upon which he consents to remit the sentence; but
still the mention of a Xvrpov is absolutely inconsistent with a
gratuitous remission.
" Thirdly, The Septuagint has used the word Xvrpov, to denote
the consideration upon which a judicial sentence was remitted.
There was the Xvrpa xpvxvs, Exod. xxx. 12 — 16, caUed, in our
translation, the atonement money ; half a shekel given for the
¦service of the sanctuary, by every one who was numbered, upon
all occasions when the number of the people was taken, ' that
there might be no plague among them.' Here, then, is
Xvrpov, which is known to denote, in classical language, a ran
som paid in order to procure the release of a captive, applied
in the Septuagint, by a most natural extension of meaning,
to the consideration given for deliverance from death ; an evil
which the person so delivered could in no other way have
escaped, any more than the captive could have recovered his
liberty without the ransom ; and the same idea is followed
out in the New Testament." We are said, Gal. iii. 13, to
have been redeemed from the curse of the law; in Rev. v. 9,

REMISSION OP SINS, &C 197
to have been redeemed unto God by the blood of Christ.
Here the evil from which we are said to be redeemed, is a
judicial sentence of death; the Xvrpov is declared, to be the
blood of Christ. If atonement be not taught here, it surely
cannot be taught at all.
7th. Those passages which connect remission of sins with
the death of Christ : Eph. i. 7, " In whom we have redemp
tion through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins," &c. :
1 John i. 7, " The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all
sin :" Rev. i. 5, " To him that loved us, and washed us from
our sins in his own blood." This connexion of forgiveness
with the blood or death of Christ, refutes an objection which
might otherwise have been derived from the extended appli
cation of' the words atpiript and atptaig. They may be applied
to the free remission of a debt, and, indeed, are so applied ;
so that if the gospel merely testified concerning the remission
of sins, it might possibly have been said that that reriiission
did not result from any thing done by Christ. The texts,
however, to which I have now referred, preclude this objec
tion. " Be it known unto you," said the apostle, " that
through this man," through the means of this man, " is
preached unto you the remission of sins ;" and the means em
ployed by him are stated in the passage of whioh we have
been just speaking, — " The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth
us from all sin;" and especially the one in Ephesians, ' in
which the remission of sins is introduced as an explanation
of that redemption, or release from the sentence of the law,
which was purchased by the blood of Christ, and both are
ascribed to the riches of the grace of God. " It is plain,
therefore," says the writer last quoted, " that to the writers of
the New Testament there did not appear any inconsistency
between the forgiveness of sins, and the laying of the punish
ment of them upon another; and by declaring the intimate
connexion between these two, they give their sanction to that
leading principle in the statement of the catholic opinion
which distinguishes the act of a lawgiver who, in forgiving
sins, has respect to the authority of the law, from the account

198 ANCIENT SACRIFICES PROVE THE ATONEMENT.
of a creditor who, in reriiitting a debt, disposes of his property
at his pleasure."
The texts to which we have now referred, explain a class
of passages which are abundant in the word of God, — those,
namely, which direct that all our supplications to God be
presented in the name of Christ; and that all the blessings
we implore and need, are bestowed upon us for his sake.
" Whatsoever," said Christ, " ye shall ask the Father in my
name, he will give it you." (John xvi. 23; xiv. 13, 14;
Col. iii. 17 ; Acts xiii. 38.) " Be it known unto you, there
fore, men and brethren, that through this man is preached
unto you the forgiveness of sins." (1 John ii. 12; 1 Cor. vi. 11 ;
Eph. iv. 32.) These passages imply, on the one hand, our
utter unworthiness; on the other hand, that some part of
the Redeemer's conduct is so acceptable in the sight of his
Father, as to be rewarded with the forgiveness of all for whom
he intercedes; and the texts to which we formerly referred
direct us to his death as that act on which, above all others,
the Great Eternal dwells with ineffable complacency : " We
have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of
sins." III. I argue the reality of the atonement from the nature
and design of ancient sacrifices. Many, at least, of those
which were offered amongst the Jews, are declared by infaUi
ble authority to have been types of the sacrifice of Christ. We
derive from them, then, independent proof of the reaUty of
his atonement — proof which is proportioned to the degree of
evidence we have that they were sacrifices of expiation, and
not of mere acknowledgment. In support of the important
fact that they were of the former character, I produce those
passages, and there are more than thirty of this kind, in
which the blood of the sacrifices is said to make atonement for
those who offered it; especially that remarkable language in
reference to blood in general, contained in Lev. xvii. 10, 11,
" I will set my face against that soul that eateth blood, and
will cut him off from among his people; for the life of the
flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the

THE SIN OFFERING — DAY OF ATONEMENT. 199
altar, to make an atonement for your souls; for it is the
blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." The blood
made an atonement because it contained the life of the ani
mal, which life was-considered a substitute for the life of the
transgressor. This will most evidently appear, if we consider
what took place when a sin-offering for an individual was pre
sented. The worshipper, conscious of guilt, brought an ani
mal, his own property, to the door of the tabernacle. He laid
his hands upon the head of the animal; he afterwards slew it
with his own hand; then delivered it to the priests, who
burned the fat and a part of the animal upon the altar, and
having employed part of the blood in sprinkling the altar,
and in some cases the worshipper, poured all the rest at the
bottom of the altar. "And thus," says the law, "the priest
shall make an atonement for him, as concerning his sin, and
it shall be forgiven him."
This wiU, also, more especially appear when we call to mind
the solemnities of the great day of atonement. Upon that
day the high priest first presented a bullock as a sin-offering
for himself and his house; took of the congregation two goats*
upon which he cast lots, and the lots determined which of the
two should be offered, and which should be sent away alive.
There being no individual for whom the first was peculiarly
offered, the high priest himself presented and slew it ; and then
he took the blood, both of the bullock and of the goat, and
carried the blood into the holy of holies, the inmost recess of
the temple, where stood the mercy-seat, the conceived resi
dence of the God of Israel, and distinguished by the Shekinah,
or cloud of glory, the visible symbol of the Divine Presence.
Into this holy place no other person ever entered, and the
high priest only on the day of atonement. The blood which
he carried with him he sprinkled upon the mercy- seat, and
before the mercy- seat, and then came out and sprinkled it, as
usual, upon the altar. Having thus, by the blood of one goat,
reconciled the holy place and the tabernacle, he laid both his
hands upon the head of the other goat, called the scape-goat,
and " confessed over him all the iniquities of the children of
Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting

200 ORIGIN OF SACRIFICES,
them upOn the head of the goat, and sent him away, thus bearT
ing their iniquities, into the wilderness." Now, if any one can
persuade himself that these were not sacrifices of expiation, —
that there was no symbolical transference of the guUt of the
transgressor to the victim, — and that the life of the transgres
sor was not considered as taken away when the Ufe of the vic
tim was taken, I confess I should think it hopeless to attempt
to reason with him.
Much has been said and written in reference to the origin
of sacrifices. I do not intend to enter upon the investigation,
because it does not appear to me that the decision of the
question has so much practical bearing upon the doctrine
of the atonement, as has been sometimes imagined. I
have no doubt myself that they were originally of Divine
appointment, — the language of the apostle, in reference to the
sacrifice of Abel is, to my mind, conclusive evidence of this, —
and that the sacrifices of the heathen world generally are cor
ruptions of a divinely appointed rite. But the point, as it
appears to me, which it is of the greatest importance to ascer
tain, is the end for which they were presented — whether
they were offerings of mere acknowledgment, or of expiation.
And I cannot but regard it as a fact, too well established to be
denied by any one who pays the least regard to candour and
consistency, that in many, at least, of the heathen sacrifices,
the people understood that the victim was substituted in place
of the offerer, and suffered the punishment which the offerer
deserved. I cannot imagine how it can be denied that the
anger of the gods was supposed to be averted by these sacri
fices. Recollecting this, it must be a matter of subordinate
importance to be able to prove that sacrifices were originally of
Divine appointment. It has never been doubted, by any who
receive the Scriptures, that the Jewish sacrifices were so.
Every circumstance in relation to the quality of the victims,
the purpose and manner of offering them, was regulated by
the express appointment of Heaven. Now if it were even
granted— which, however, I am far from doing — that the
Divine origin of sacrifices could not be satisfactorily evinced ;
if it were further conceded, even, that the right of sacrifice

PROOF DERIVED FROM THEM. 201
«
was ingrafted into the Mosaic institutions, in consequence of
Jewish predilections — predilections growing out of the univer
sality of the practice in other parts of the world — it should
be especially observed,, that it would not overturn the argument
for the reality of the atonement, which we have derived from
ancient sacrifices. The case would stand thus ; — a rite which
had been practised in idolatrous worship, was transferred by
Divine authority (whether it is reasonable to suppose that this
was the case, is a question with which we have now no 'con
cern) to the worship of the true God. Amongst the heathen,
as we have seen, it was a rite of expiation. The animal was
offered, in the words of Livy, pacem exposcere deum. When
ingrafted, then, into the Mosaic institute, the Jews, on the
supposition now made, must necessarily have misunderstood
it, if, under that institution, it partook of any other character
than that of a rite of expiation — the light in which, when con
templating the accounts which are given of it, we are con
strained to view it. When we speak of the Jewish sacrifices as
expiatory, the language must of course be understood in a
manner consistent with the imperfection of that dispensation,
" The law made nothing perfect ;" it could not purge the con
science from dead works. " It was not possible that the blood
of bulls and of goats should take away sins." But their de
sign was to shadow forth the great atonement. They were
typical expiations of sin, and were adapted to carry forwards
the views and hopes of the worshippers to Him who was to
" appear in the end of the world," to take away sin really, and
completely, and finally, " by the sacrifice of himself."
THE EFFICACY OF THE ATONEMENT,
In the course of our previous investigations, we have seen
that there were obstacles, resulting from the character and
government of Jehovah, to the bestowment of pardon upon
transgressors ; that the atonement of Christ was designed to
remove these obstacles, and thus to open a channel through
which the great Eternal might honourably cause the riches
of his mercy to flow to men, under the direction of that per
fect wisdom which characterizes all his conduct, as the moral
2 A

202 PROOF FROM THE DIGNITY OF HIS PERSON
governor of the universe. Now, the question — and it Is one
of infinite importance to us as transgressors, is — were these
obstacles removed by the Son of God— is there sufficient rea
son to think that, when he uttered the words on the cross,
" It is finished," he had done all that was necessary to render
the bestowment of mercy consistent with the honour of the
Divine character, and the safety of the Divine government?
To this question I answer in the affirmative, on the following
grounds : —
1st. The dignity of his person affords ground, I think I
may say, of certainty, that this is the case. He was, as we
have seen, " God manifest in the flesh." His grand inten
tion in becoming incarnate was to make atonement for sin;
he laid down his life as a sacrifice of expiation. Can we then
possibly suppose that he failed in this attempt — that he left
unaccomplished, or only partially accomplished, the work
which he undertook. Had the Saviour been less than infi
nitely wise, and infinitely powerful, the mere fact of his
having died with the intention of making atonement would
not have proved that it was efficacious ; but a Being so mys
teriously constituted as the Redeemer of fallen man, could not
die in vain.
2nd. A consideration of the important truths and facts
which were exhibited by the death of Christ, is adapted to as
sure us that there was a plenitude of efficacy in his atonement
to secure the purposes for which it was presented to God.
It exhibited the excellence of the Divine law. Sin is a
practical denial of its rectitude and goodness. Had its sanc
tions been inflicted upon transgressors themselves, that act
would have been a practical vindication of its claims and its
worth. The doctrine of atonement represents the punish
ment of disobedience as having been sustained by the surety
of transgressors. Thus the law was honoured: the rectitude
of its precepts, and the justice of its penalty, were proved, and
practically proclaimed. Nay, in consequence of the dignity
and glory of the surety, all these things were placed in a far
more vivid and impressive point of view, than if the vengeance
due to the ungodly had fallen upon the sinners themselves.

FRQM ITS HONOURING THE LAW. 203
It manifested the holiness of God. On many occasions has
Jehovah displayed his hatred against sin. The destruction of
the old world — the fire and brimstone that laid waste the cities
of the plain — the calamities and captivities of the Jews, are
striking indications of the essential purity of the Divine cha-*
racter. But we must ascend to Calvary to witness the most
vivid, as well as the most unequivocal, display of this perfec
tion. We must see the man who was God's fellow— a being
who, personally considered, was spotless; who was not him
self a sinner, but merely stood in the place of the transgres
sor — stricken, smitten of God and afflicted, — we must see the
rocks rending, and the graves opening, and the dead arising,
in token of the unparalleled nature of the transaction, to form
any thing like an adequate idea of the Divine abhorrence of
sin. In the cross of Christ we see the Father hiding his face
from his Son,— his own Son, his only begotten Son, when
bearing by imputation only the guilt of men, though himself
uncontaminated by depravity ! How unutterably opposed
must, then, be the nature of God to all species and degrees of
moral defilement !
It manifests the justice of God, or his wise and merciful
determination to render to all the subjects of his government
exactly according to their due. What sinner can hope. to
escape with impunity, when he recollects that even the surety
of the guilty — a Being so inconceivably dear to the Father, had
to endure the curse of the law ? "If such things were done
in the green tree, what will be done in the dry?"
It manifests, finally, the truth of God; for though a Sa
viour was not provided for by law, the provision of one was
not contrary, at least, to the spirit and intention of the
law. The penalty of transgression was paid by our substitute,
though not by us ; and thus the credit and efficiency of the
law were preserved. All these considerations are adapted to
show that the atonement of Christ must possess efficiency.
It sustained the moral government, while pardon was bestowed
upon the guilty, i. e., it was efficacious.
3rd. The recollection that the atonement was the perform
ance, on the part of Christ, of that work which the Father

204 FROM THE DIVINE PROMISE.
had promised to reward with the most signal honour, may
suffice to satisfy us in reference to its efficacy. In Isaiah liii.
10 — 12, we read as follows, according to Bishop Lowth's ren
dering of the passage; — "If his soul shall make a propitia
tory sacrifice, he shall see his seed which shall prolong their
days; and the gracious purpose of Jehovah shall prosper in
his hands. Of the travail of his soul he shaU see, i. e., the
fruit, and be satisfied; by the knowledge of him shaU my
righteous Servant justify many ; for the punishment of their
iniquities he shall bear. Therefore will I distribute to him
the many for his portion; and the mighty people shall he
share for his spoil ; because he poured out his soul unto death,
and was numbered with the transgressors, and he bare the
sins of many, and made intercession for the transgressors."
Now, our Lord did make his soul a propitiatory sacrifice.
He performed fully his part in the great work of human re
demption. " He was faithful to him that appointed him,"
says the apostle, " even as Moses was faithful in all his house."
And shall he not then receive his reward ? As the great Cap
tain of salvation, shall he not be permitted to lead many sons
to glory, for the joy of doing which, he "despised the shame,
and endured the cross ? How can it be doubted ?
4th. The direct declarations of the inspired volume are
such as to leave no doubt of the efficacy of the atonement :
Isa. liii. 5, " He was wounded for our transgressions, he was
bruised for our iniquities ; the chastisement of our peace was
upon him ; and with his stripes we are healed." Again, ver.
10 — 12; Rom. v. 8 — 10, "God commended his love toward
us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.
Much more, being justified by his blood, we shall be saved
from wrath through him. For if, when we were enemies,
we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son ; much
more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life." Eph.
i. 6, 7, " To the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he
hath made us accepted in the Beloved. In whom we have
redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, accord
ing to the riches of his grace." Col. i. 19, 20, " For it pleased
the Father that in him should all fulness dwell. And, having

FROM HIS RESURRECTION. 205
made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to recon
cile all things unto himself; by him, I say, whether they be
things in earth, or things in heaven." (Heb. ix. 11 — 14.)
5th. The resurrection of Christ demonstrates the efficacy
of his atonement. The load of our guilt sunk him to the dust
of death. How, then, could he have risen again, had not that
guilt been cancelled by his death ? If the tomb had held him
as its prisoner, it must have been because he was foiled in
his attempt to effect our release. Hence the apostle, writing
to the Corinthians, says, " If Christ be not risen, then is our
preaching vain; your faith is also vain, ye are yet in your
sins ;" i. e., under the guilt and power of sin. And he adds,
that if this be the case, then " they who have fallen asleep in
Christ have perished." But this is not the case. The Re
deemer could not be holden of death. He threw open the
gates of the grave. He rose again on the third day, accord
ing to the Scriptures ; and thereby proved, by resistless power
of evidence, that he had "put away sin by the sacrifice of
himself." It is of importance to observe here, that the evi
dence afforded by the resurrection of' Christ in support of the
efficacy of his atonement, is strengthened by the considera
tion that the power of the Father was exerted in effecting it.
" The God of your fathers," said Peter to the high-priests,
" raised up Jesus." " God raised him from the dead, and
gave him glory." Now, is it conceivable, let me ask, that
such would have been the conduct of the father, if the atone
ment of the Son had been insufficient, and inefficacious?
Would he have thus honoured the surety, if the surety had
not honoured the law? Would he have exalted him, as the
reward of his work, if that work had been inadequately per
formed ? Would he have given the sinner's surety this full
and complete discharge, if the surety had not paid the sinner's
debt? It cannot be conceived of for a moment. No proof
can be more conclusive than the one now contemplated, that
the atonement of Christ is possessed of infinite efficacy ; we
may adopt, accordingly, the triumphant language ofthe apostle,
" But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-
fruits of them that slept."

LECTURE XIII.

ATONEMENT.
THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.
I need not say that no point of Scripture doctrine has given
rise to more disputes than the subject on the consideration of
which we are about to enter. On the one hand, it has been
asserted, that the love of God in the gift of his Son had for its
objects only the elect, that Christ gave himself for them ex
clusively, — that in no sense has he made atonement for
others ; and that, consequently, none but the elect either will
or can partake of those spiritual and everlasting blessings
which flow from what he has done. On the other hand, it is
contended, that God loved the whole world, — that Christ
made an atonement for the whole world ; and that if any are
not saved by him, it is because they do not comply with the
conditions on which the actual enjoyment of the blessings pur
chased by him for all men is suspended. Now, if it were not
almost presumption to express such an opinion in reference
to a point on which men of the greatest talents and learning,
and, I may add, piety too, are to be found in a hostile atti
tude, I should say, that things have been advanced by both
parties in the controversy which it wiU be difficult to reconcUe
with the word of God. It is not uncommon in controversv,
for both of the parties engaged, regarding each other's senti
ments as dangerous, to recede in some measure from the doc
trine of Scripture, in their mutual desire to avoid what they
regard as contrary to it. They fix their thoughts too ex
clusively upon the conceived error ; their minds are thus par
tially withdrawn from the standard of truth ; and they depart

PREPARATORY PROPOSITIONS. 207
in some degree, by almost necessary consequence, from the
truth itself. The remarks which I have to make upon this sub
ject will perhaps be best presented in the form of a series of
propositions, beginning with those which are less disputable,
and proceeding to others which will serve more fully to exhibit
the doctrine of Scripture in reference to it.
1st. The sacred writers invite all men to come to Christ,
and to secure, by that act, those blessings which flow to sin
ners through the channel of his atonement. In the support
of this proposition I need, not enlarge. Isa. Iv. 1, " Ho, every
one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no
money ; come ye, buy and eat ; yea, come, buy wine and milk
without money and without price." " Come unto me," said
our Lord, " all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will
give. you rest." " Whosoever cometh unto me, I will in nowise
cast out." " The Spirit and the bride say, Come. And let him
that heareth say, Come. And let him that is athirst come.
And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely."
(Rev. xxii. 17.) The attempts of certain individuals to show
that these are not indiscriminate invitations — that they are
addressed to Certain characters, or to individuals in certain
states of mind, exclusively, and so afford no warrant to others
to make application to the Saviour for the blessings of redemp
tion, are so directly opposed to every just principle of inter
pretation, that I do not feel ealled upon to spend one
moment of time in exhibiting their fallacy. It is only ne
cessary to say, that the language is in exact agreement with
the manner in which indefinite, unUmited invitations, to
become possessed of any blessing, are, in the every day inter
course of life, addressed to men ; all who choose, or will, may
go and receive it.
2nd. A refusal to go to Christ, and so to receive the
blessings of his salvation, is the ground upon which cen
sure is passed upon sinners now, and it will constitute the
foundation, or cause, of their condemnation hereafter. John
iii. 18, "He that believeth on him is not condemned; but
he that believeth not is'' condemned already, hecau.se he
hath not believed on tiie only-begotten Son of God:" ver.
26, " He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life ;

208 PREPARATORY PROPOSITIONS.
but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but
the wrath of God abideth on him." In harmony with these
general statements, we find our Lord strongly censuring the
Jews for not believing on him, (John v. 39. 43 : vide also
chapter xv. 22. 24,) — upbraiding the cities where most of his
mighty works were done, (Matt. xi. 20. 24,) — weeping over Je
rusalem, (Matt, xxiii. 37,) and saying, " O Jerusalem, Jerusa
lem, how often would I have gathered thy children together, as
a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would
not ! behold your house is left unto you desolate." The same
conduct on the part of sinners, will constitute the ground of
condemnation hereafter. This assertion assumes that all will
not be ultimately saved by Christ, — a fact of important prac
tical bearing upon our subsequent remarks, and supported by
the testimony of experience and Scripture. How often do
we see men terminating a course of rebellion against God in
a manner worthy of the flagitiousness of their lives, — dying as
the fool dieth, — entering with the utmost degree of unconcern
into the presence of Him who has declared that he will render
unto all men according to their works ! And, if we believe
the testimony of Scripture, we can entertain no hope in
reference to their eternal state. They must be " cast into hell,
with all the nations that forget God ;" and the cause of their
destruction will prove to be their rejection of offered mercy.
John iii. 19, "This is the condemnation, that light is come
into the world, and men have loved darkness rather than
light, because their deeds were evil." In harmony with this
declaration of our Lord, the apostle assures us, (2 Thess. i. 7. 9,)
that, at the last day, " the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from
heaven, with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking ven
geance on them that know not God, and that obey not the
gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ ; who shall be punished with
everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and
from the glory of his power." From these propositions, it
seems to me to follow as a necessary consequence, and which
I state as the
3rd Proposition, That while, on the one hand, the Saviour
cannot have intended to secure the salvation of all men by
the act of offering up himself a sacrifice for sin, — yet that.

EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT. 209
that sacrifice must, on the other hand, have been in itself ade
quate to the salvation of all men, so as to become a suitable
foundation for the general and unlimited calls of the gospel.
There is a broad line of distinction between the sufficiency of
the atonement of Christ, and its efficiency; or rather, as I would
say, the sovereign purpose of the sacred Three in reference to
its efficiency ; i. e., in reference to the exertion of that holy
influence upon the minds of men which secures to them the
enjoyment of the blessings which flow through the channel of
the atonement. It may be true (whether it is so, or not, we
shall inquire presently, — my present object is merely to
illustrate the difference between the two things) that Jehovah
did not intend to put forth that influence which would render
the atonement the means of securing the salvation of all men ;
though, as it was to become the basis of moral government, it
was essential that it should be one of infinite worth, and so in
itself adequate to the salvation of all men. This I have long re
garded as the true state of the case. I cannot think that the
intention of God in reference to the application of the atone
ment (as we call it, perhaps not very correctly, though the
language is well enough understood) was general, nor that
the sufficiency of. the atonement — its inherent power, worth,
adequacy, &c, was limited, or particular.
Before we can return an enlightened, or even a rational,
answer to the question, " Did Christ die for all men, or for
some men only?" we must carefully inquire into its meaning, —
a business attended with more difficulty than some individuals
imagine. If it be meant to inquire whether Christ died in
stead of some men, or instead of all men, it will be still neces
sary (though the question is now less ambiguous) more fully
to define the phraseology ; for, on the one hand, he did not so
die instead of any, as that they shall be saved without repent
ance and faith ; and, on the other hand, he so died instead
of all men, as that all men may be saved on their faith and
repentance. If, again, it be meant to inquire whether Christ died with
a design to save some men, or all men, it is possible that even
this question might be regarded by some persons as an ambi-
2 B

210 GOD AS MORAL GOVERNOR
guous one. To save, it might be said, may mean to lay for
men a foundation of salvation, i. e., to supply them with the
means of salvation ; — or again, to render those means effectual
to their salvation : and, accordingly, the answer to the ques
tion must vary, as one or other of these senses is attached to
the words. If the question be, " Did Christ die with the
design of laying a foundation of salvation for all men, or for
some men?" I answer, that, in this sense, he died for aU men.
If the question be, " Did he die with the design of rendering
these means effectual to the salvation of all men, or of some
men ?" I answer, that, in this sense, he died for some men only.
I believe in the unlimited, universal, infinite sufficiency of the
atonement of Christ — I believe that it was the intention of God,
as the moral governor, in giving his Son as a sacrifice for sin,
(and we must not forget that, while men remain rational beings,
it is impossible for God to divest himself of the character of
moral governor, even under a dispensation of grace,) to provide
a remedy commensurate with the disease. I believe, on the
other hand, in the limited application of the atonement. I be
lieve that it was the intention of God, as a Sovereign, to render
that remedy effectual, by special and sovereign influence, in
the case of certain individuals only who are affected with the
general disease, so that the intention of God, as a Sovereign,
and as a Ruler, in reference to the atonement, is different, the
one being general, the other particular.
The truth of the preceding remarks, which have been so
far merely expository, it will be necessary to estabUsh. The
two points to be supported are the foUowing : — that God, in
giving his Son to be a sacrifice for sin, designed, as a moral
governor, to provide, and that he actually did provide a remedy
co-extensive with the disease of men ; — but that, as a Sovereign,
having a right to dispense his favours as it seems good in his
sight, he did not determine to exert that influence which
would render the remedy effectual, save only in the case of
the elect.
I. The first thing to be proved is, that the atonement is
sufficient in itself for all, — that it is a general remedy, co- ex
tensive with the evil which it was intended to remove, —

HAS PROVIDED A GENERAL REMEDY. 211
setting open the door of salvation to the whole family of
man. 1. I derive my confidence of this from the very nature
of the atonement itself. In defining atonement, it was
stated to mean that satisfaction for sin which was ren
dered to God as the moral governor of the world, by which
every obstacle, on his part, to the pardon of sin was entirely
removed. In explaining the nature of satisfaction, it was ob
served, that to make satisfaction for sin is to do that which
restores, and will preserve, to the moral government of God,
that power over its subjects, which the entrance of sin had
shaken, and which its unconditional forgiveness would have
entirely destroyed. Now, if this be the nature of atonement,
the sacrifice of our Lord must have been in itself sufficient for
the salvation of the whole world. To conceive of any limita
tion in reference to its own intrinsic worth or adequacy, is
utterly impossible. To suppose that the death of Christ has
removed the obstacles which must otherwise have prevented
the salvation of some men, and not those which would have ob
structed the salvation of others, is to suppose not only what is
unscriptural, but what is absurd. That satisfaction which
renders it consistent with the perfections of Jehovah, and with
the claims and safety of his government, to bestow pardon
upon one man, must of necessity render it equally consistent
with his character, and his office, to bestow pardon upon all.
It does not follow from this statement that pardon will actually
be bestowed upon all. Previously to the creation, there was
no obstacle resulting from want of right, or power, on the part
of God, to the bestowment of reason upon all the animate
productions of his hands, yet reason was not imparted to many.
There is now, in like manner, no obstacle arising out of the
Divine character and government, to the eternal salvation of
all men, yet the felicity of heaven will not be imparted to
all. There are, doubtless, reasons for this restricted appli
cation of the atonement; but these reasons do not rest
upon a limited sufficiency in the atonement itself. That
there should be such a limitation in an atonement made
by a Divine Saviour is impossible, — considering the nature

212 GOD AS MORAL GOVERNOR
of his atonement, inconceivable. That work, on the part
of the Saviour, which preserves the efficiency of the law in
the bestowment of pardon upon one man, must, in the very
nature of the case, preserve it also in the bestowment of
pardon upon all men. It is impossible, consistently, to reject
these statements, and, at the same time, to retain the views
in reference to the nature of the atonement which have
been developed in the preceding Lectures. I express a firm
conviction, growing out of six and twenty years of close and
anxious thought and observation, that the notions which some
have formed of the limited sufficiency of the sacrifice of Christ,
are usually connected with the opinion, (and cannot well be
otherwise than connected with it,) that he delivers us from
punishment by suffering the precise number of stripes which
we must have endured. * In that case, indeed, there could be
no sufficiency in the atonement itself in reference to any
but the elect. But if his death partook of the nature of a
moral, and not a pecuniary satisfaction, then that satisfaction
which was sufficient for one, must have been sufficient for aU.
* It is possible that the practice of attaching too literal a signification to such
words as head, surety, legal representative, &c, in their application to Christ,
has also contributed to sustain this restricted view of the sufficiency of the atone
ment. If the Saviour were not the surety, or legal representative, of the non-
elect, how can there be, some are ready to say, sufficient efficacy in his blood
to save them, allowing its value to be as great as you please ? Now, I admit
that, if the relation sustained by Christ to his people were absolutely identical
with that which a human legal representative sustains to those whom he repre
sents, the objection would be an insuperable one. But I deny this. I main
tain that it is analogous merely, not identical. The consequences of the work
of Christ are, to believers, as if Christ were their legal representative,- and,
therefore, he may be called so ; the analogy is rather in the consequences than
in the relation itself. (Vide Lectures on Justification.) But the point which I
particularly wish those who urge this objection to observe now, is, that, if they
give up " the measure and weight system," as Dr. Wardlaw expressively calls it,
they must with it, also, surrender their notions, that the relation of Christ to his
people, identifies itself with that of a legal representative among men. Christ
could not, it is manifest, be a literal surety, or legal representative, without
enduring the same punishment — the same in hind and degree — which the elect
must have borne. Christ was, in a certain sense, the representative of the
world ; i. c., in so far as though, without his death, all must have perished, now
all may be saved. He is more filly the representative of believers, because
the consequences of his work will certainly be enjoyed by them.

HAS PROVIDED A GENERAL REMEDY. 213
In the language of Dwight, " If the atonement of Christ con
sisted in making such amends for the disobedience of man as
should place the law, government, and character of God, in
such a light that he could forgive sinners of the human race
without any inconsistency, then these amends, or this atone
ment, were all absolutely necessary, in order to render such
forgiveness proper, or consistent with the law and character of
God, in a single instance. The forgiveness of one sinner
without these amends, would be just as much a contradiction
of the declarations of law, as the forgiveness of a million. If,
then, the amends actually made were such that God could con
sistently forgive one sinner, he might, with equal consistency
and propriety, forgive any number, unless prevented by any
other reason. The atonement, in other words, which was ne
cessary for a world, was equally necessary, and in just the
same manner and degree, for an individual sinner." (Sermon
36.) The amount of D wight's statement is, that Christ could
not, according to the phraseology of some, make a sufficient
atonement for one man, without making a sufficient atone
ment for aU men. I do not recommend the phraseology,
because it seems to imply an intention, on the part of the
Saviour, to apply the atonement to, or to render it effectual in,
the case of all men ; yet the meaning intended to be conveyed
is scriptural, and most important, viz., that the Saviour
set open the door of mercy to all, so that all, without a
second atonement, may, on their faith and repentance, be
forgiven. The conceived implication of the words, " Christ
made an atonement for all men," to which I have just referred,
causes many to startle at the phraseology, and is the chief
ground on which I would avoid it; for, believing, as they pro
fess to do, that, if it had been the intention of God to save all
men, the atonement which his Son presented would have been
sufficient in itself to secure that object, they must believe, to
be self-consistent, that this atonement was, in some sense,
made for all; or it would follow that some may be saved
without an atonement. Strictly speaking, the atonement was
not made for one man, or for all men ; it was made to God for
sin, i. e., on account of sin. It was designed to remove those

214 GOD AS MORAL GOVERNOR
obstacles to any gracious communications from God to man,
which sin had set up. There was doubtless a speciality of in
tention in reference to the individuals to whom the highest
species of such communications should be made, but the
breaking down of the barrier permitted the free access of mercy
to every individual of the human family.
2. I ground my confidence that the atonement is in itself
sufficient for the salvation of all men ; or, in other words, a
general remedy, co-extensive with the evil it was intended to
oremove, on the consideration that it seems impossible to vindi
cate the consistency and propriety of those exhortations and
threatenings to which we have referred, unless this be the
case. All men are invited and commanded to believe in Christ ;
it is promised, that all shall be saved who beUeve; it is
threatened, that all shall be condemned who disbelieve, and
condemned because they disbelieve. Now, how is it possible,
let me ask, to reconcile these facts with the opinion, that there
is not inherent sufficiency in the atonement to secure the bless
ings of salvation to all the world? How can we justify the
propriety of beseeching numbers to be reconciled to God, to
whom he has not been reconciled by the death of his Son; — of
proffering pardon to all men, when the atonement has virtue
only to secure the pardon of some? — of inviting the whole family
of man to the gospel feast, when there is not a sufficiency of
provisions for a part of the family ? If such conduct would be
mean and dishonourable on the part of man — and who would
venture to say it would not? — how can we impute it to the
Great Eternal ? I lack words to express my astonishment that
persons should be found who can give credit to the monstrous
proposition, that there are actually no provisions (which must
be the case if the sufficiency of the atonement is limited) for
multitudes who are, at the same time, invited to partake of
them, and damned for rejecting them !
Will it be said that the atonement would have been suffi
cient for all, if God had determined that all should be saved by
it, so that all may be invited to believe, inasmuch as it will be
found sufficient for all who actually believe ? I answer, in the
First place, That it is absurd to rest the sufficiency of the

HAS PROVIDED A GENERAL REMEDY. 215
atonement upon the Divine purpose in reference to its appli
cation. Its tendency to sustain the efficiency of the law, even
while there seemed, in the pardon of transgressors, to be a
practical denial of its rectitude and goodness, does not depend
upon the mere will of God ; or a man might have made an
ample atonement. It springs out of the reason of the case.
The atonement is, indeed, efficient, i. e., it becomes the means
of actual salvation to certain individuals, because Jehovah de
termines that it shaU be so. But had it not been sufficient,
independently of Divine volition, to secure the object which it
was designed to effect, it could not have been rendered efficient
even in the case of one individual. And if it be sufficient in
itself, it may be rendered (whether such be the determination
of God is another question) efficient in the case of all. But
I reply, Secondly, That, if it were not absurd to rest the sufficiency
of the atonement upon the Divine purpose, with regard to its
application, yet, as that is done by supposition, and as that
purpose is limited, the sufficiency of the atonement is, on the
principles of my opponents, limited after all. It has no inhe
rent power, as they conceive, to secure the blessings of salva
tion to any, save to those on whom the Father had previously
determined to bestow them. And yet all men to whom the
gospel comes, and by Divine appointment it is to be preached
to the whole world, are invited, and, indeed, enjoined by God
to seek these blessings on the ground of the atonement — are
now condemned if they seek them not, and persisting in their
rejection, must bear, and on account of their rejection, the
wrath of God throughout eternity !
If, to get rid of this difficulty, it should be said that no
sinner knows but that Christ died for him, or does not know
but that he is included in the atonement which he has made,
and so may justly deserve punishment for not believing on
Christ, I answer, that I find it utterly impossible to conceive
that the ignorance of the creature should be the basis of the
Divine government ; or that it is befitting the Divine character
to make it the ground of human obligation. On the principles
opposed, viz., that there is a limited sufficiency in the atone-

216 GOD AS MORAL GOVERNOR
ment of Christ, it is manifest, that if the fact, that there are no
provisions at the gospel-feast for many, were known — and
known by these many — they could not be honourably bidden
to the supper; far less condemned for not appearing at it.
3. I ground my confidence that the atonement was a
general remedy, co-extensive with the evil it was intended to
remove, on the consideration, that the provision of such a re
medy was, as far as we can judge, befitting the character of
God, as the moral governor of the world. There is, I think,
considerable reason to apprehend that too many of our evan
geUcal divines partially forget, that Jehovah retains the cha
racter and office of a moral governor, even under the present
dispensation of mercy. At any rate, the sentiment, if it gains
admission into their creeds, does not draw after it its legiti
mate consequences. They view the gospel too much as a
system of pure benevolence, accomplishing its entire purpose
by securing the salvation of those whom the decree of election
had destined to be rescued from the ruins of the fall. When
Adam had sunk into apostacy, and involved in the conse
quences of his transgression the whole of the human family,
Jehovah, in pursuance of that sovereign decree to which we
have referred, determined, they imagine, to appoint a Saviour
specifically and exclusively for them, who should stand in the
relation of a substitute and a surety for them ; but sustain no
relation to that part of the family which was not included
within the range of the decree. For the purpose of bringing
them to the actual enjoyment of the blessings of salvation, the
glad tidings of the Saviour's atonement must be proclaimed to
them : and, as they are mingled with the common mass of
mankind, and cannot be distinguished from others by any
eye but the eye of God, the gospel must be preached gene
rally ; its testimony, and promises, and threatenings, must be
brought before the view of all men ; but then the entire design
of this proceeding is merely to "bring in the chosen to salva
tion. No mercy would be offered to others, no gospel would
be preached to them, no proffer of salvation through the blood
of Christ would be made to them, were it not necessary to
secure the intentions of sovereign mercy in reference to the

HAS PROVIDED A GENERAL REMEDY. 217
objects of Jehovah's everlasting love. Now, if I do not call
this a radically mistaken view of the nature of the present dis
pensation, I have no doubt that it is a radically defective one.
It loses sight of the important fact, that though the gospel is
the means of conveying distinguishing blessings to many, it is
the instrument of moral government to all. According to the
statement opposed, it is difficult to see how God can be said
to sustain the relation of moral governor to any. To the elect
he bears the relation of the sovereign bestower of unmerited
and infinite mercy; to the non-elect, rather the relation of
executioner, than of judge, or governor. He is presented by it
in the attitude of a being who delays, indeed, the infliction of
the penalty incurred by the breach of the Adamic dispensation,
for the attainment of an important end, but who offers no
escape from it ; does not set open the door of mercy to them,
has no intention but to inflict the full penalty, and merely
reserves them to the day of wrath, when the vengeance of a
broken law shall be poured out upon their heads. Now, I
cannot but regard these statements as conveying as incorrect
a representation of the Divine plans and conduct, as can be
given, without a relinquishment of the Scripture doctrine on
the subject altogether. It is not true of any, under the gospel
dispensation, that they stand in no relation to God but that
of criminals, waiting the day of execution, without the possi
bility of escape. Have we not seen that mercy is offered to
all, and that the condemnation of the finally impenitent will
rest on their rejection of it ? How, then, can we so far libel
the Great Eternal, as to suppose that he invites sinners to
leave their prison, and will condemn them hereafter for not
doing it, if he has not set open the doors to permit their
escape ? In consistency with the facts of the case, it is im
perative upon us to believe, that after the fall, Jehovah set
open the door of mercy, not to some men merely, but to all
men ; whether he determined to impart to all a disposition to
avail themselves of this mercy, is another question. And to
open a way of escape to all, it was obviously necessary that
the sacrifice, on the ground of which any receive pardon,
should be in itself sufficient for the salvation of all. Such a
2c

218 GOD AS MORAL GOVERNOR
sacrifice was provided ; and its provision is highly honourable
to the character of Jehovah, if not required by it, as the
moral governor of the world. Contemplate for a moment the
relations which existed between God and man after the origi
nal transgression. The penalty attached to the first covenant
had been incurred ; because, in the view of the law, sin had
been committed by all. Now, in our Lectures on Divine
sovereignty, we admitted the difficulty which attaches to the
Conception, that any difference should exist in the conduct of
God as a moral governor or judge, in reference to the various
individuals who are involved in the same general sentence of
condemnation. We admitted that justice did seem to require
that all should be condemned, or all acquitted; but that it
seemed to forbid that some should suffer, and others be per
mitted to escape, without the intervention of another dispen
sation, under which mercy should be accessible to all, so
that their final state might be in accordance with the rule of
that dispensation. Now, what was the case, according to those
views of the nature and the extent of the atonement which
have been developed in our previous Lectures ? Do they not
manifestly imply, that there was no difference in the conduct
of God, as a moral governor, in reference to men ? He deter
mined to provide a sacrifice of infinite worth, and, therefore,
in itself adequate to the salvation of all, and on the ground of
that sacrifice to invite all to apply for pardon and eternal life,
and to promise that all who complied with the invitation
should enjoy the blessing. This was done partly in his cha
racter as a Sovereign, manifesting unmerited mercy — but still
the same mercy, to all : and partly as a righteous moral gover
nor, grounding, indeed, his requirements in sovereignty ; but
still making the same requirements from all — and, therefore,
as a moral Governor, dealing in the same riianner with all.
For, as it has been more than once observed, the provision of
a Saviour, and the promise of mercy through him, was a vir
tual abrogation of the original curse. It was equivalent to a
universal pardon. It presented spiritual blessings to the ac
ceptance of all the children of men — blessings to be enjoyed
in the same manner— by means of repentance, faith, and obe-

HAS PROVIDED A GENERAL REJMEDY. 219
dience; and, therefore, not more impossible to be obtained
by one than by another. Thus the atonement, if in itself
adequate to the salvation of the world, lays an adequate basis
for that system of moral government which Jehovah is stiU
carrying on — a basis on which rest the invitations, threaten
ings, and promises of the gospel, the instruments of that
government; and which will sustain the rectitude of the pro
ceedings of the great day, when all will receive from God, as
a moral governor, that joyful or dread reward, which the
Scriptures attach to the reception or rejection of the gospel.
"The present dispensation," says Dr. Russell, "is not a
mere charter of privileges, but includes also a system of moral
government, by which God, in the use of appropriate means,
exercises authority over men, as intelligent creatures. In
other words, it is not merely a system of benevolence." And
again, "The atonement of Christ, and the proclamation of
mercy to all who believe on him, have laid the foundation of a
particular exercise of moral government, while they are the
medium of the most exalted displays of sovereign mercy and
goodness." (Adamic and Mosaic Dispensations, pp. 233 — 236.)
r On the other hand, let us contemplate the state of the case,
as it must haye existed, had there been any limitation in the
sufficiency of the atonement itself — had Christ so died for
some men only, as that his death would have been incompetent
to the salvation of all men. In that case there would have
been an obvious difference in the conduct of God, as moral
governor, in relation to individuals involved in the same con
demnation. The sentiment opposed supposes that the original
lapse of the species was followed by no new and merciful dis
pensation, — by no "accepted time," during which God will
hear the supplication of all who implore mercy in the name of
his Son, — and, at the expiration of which, will render to all,
in his rectoral character, according to their reception or re
jection of the salvation which had been exhibited to them; —
but that, without the intervention of any such dispensation, —
a dispensation which might afford an opportunity for a differ
ence of final state being awarded according to the rules of
moral government, — many are left to suffer the sentence of the

220 STATEMENTS OF CALVIN, OWEN,
law which all have broken, while others, guilty of the same
crime, are pardoned.
Though we do not admit human authority in religion, it may
be well to remember that the sentiments which I have ex
pressed in reference to the sufficiency of the atonement, have
been held by individuals whose praise is in all the churches.
I refer to a few, beginning with Calvin himself; for it is his
final opinion on this point which is to be regarded as his real
opinion. In his Exposition of the holy Scriptures, written
subsequently to his Institutes, he says, with reference to
Matt. xxvi. 28, " Sub multorum nomine non partem mundi
tantum designat, sed totum humanum genus." Again, on
Rom. v. 18, Communem omnium gratiam facit, quia omnibus
exposita est, non quod ad omnes extendatur re ipsa. Nam
etsi passus est Christus pro peccatis totius mundi, atque omni
bus indifferenter, Dei benignitate offeretur ; non tamen omnes
apprehendunt." In his last will, also, drawn up by himself
about a month before his death, he refers to the blood of
Christ, and adds, that it was " effuso pro humani generis
peccatis." Dr. Owen, also, who at an earlier period of his life espoused
the notion that the Redeemer suffered the exact quantum of
punishment which the elect must have endured, — an opinion
which necessarily implies that his atonement was not in itself
sufficient for the salvation of all, — in more advanced age
warmly recommended Polhill's Treatises on the Divine Will, —
" the arguments of which," he says, " are suited to the genius
of the age past, wherein accuracy and strictness of reason bear
sway." And yet this treatise argues in the following manner :
" If Christ did in no way die for all men, which way shall the
truth of these general promises be made out ? ' Whosoever wUl,
may take of the water of life.' What, though Christ never
bought it for him ? ' Whosoever believes shall be saved.' What,
though there was no Xvrpov, no price paid for him? Surely
the gospel knows no water of life, but that which Christ pur
chased, nor any way of salvation but by a Xvrpov, or price paid.
If Christ no way died for all men, how can these promises
stand true ? All men, if they believe, shall be saved ; — saved,

POLHILL, CHARNOCK. 221
but how ? Shall they be saved by a Xvrpov, or price of re
demption ? There was none at all paid for them ; the immense
value of Christ's death doth not make it a price as to them for
whom he died not; or shall they be saved without a Xvrpov, or
price? God's unsatisfied justice cannot suffer it, his minatory
law cannot bear it, neither doth the gospel know any such
way of salvation ; take it either way, the truth of those pro
mises cannot be vindicated, unless we say that Christ died for
all men." I do not wish to be understood as expressing ap
probation of the whole of this language. The writer seems to
have entertained obscure conceptions in reference to the nature
of the atonement, — the manner in which the death of Christ
secured the pardon of sin. I merely quote it as involving the
opinion that his sacrifice is in itself sufficient for the whole
family of man ; which is all for which I think it necessary to
contend. The following statements of the great Charnock are espe
cially worthy of attention. " The wrath of God was so fully
appeased by it, (the death of Christ,) his justice so fully satis
fied, that there is no bar to a re-admission into his favour, and
the enjoyment of the privileges purchased by it, but man's
unbelief. The blood of Christ is a stream of which all
men may drink, an ocean wherein all may bathe. If any
perished by the biting of the fiery serpent, it was not for
want of a remedy in God's institution, but from wilfulness in
themselves. The antitype answers to the type, and wants no
more a sufficiency to procure a spiritual good, than that to
effect the cure of the body. He is, therefore, called the Sa
viour of the world. When the apostle says, ' If thou shalt
confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe with thy
heart, thou shalt be saved,' he speaks to every man that shall
hear that sentence. If all the men in the world were united to
him by faith, there would not be any more required of Christ
for their salvation, than what he hath already acted ; for it is
a sacrifice of infinite value, and infinite knows no limits. Since
it was sufficient to satisfy infinite justice, it is sufficient to
save an infinite number; and the virtue of it in saving one,
argues a virtue in it to save all upon the same conditions. If

222 STATEMENTS OF SCOTT.
men, therefore, perish, it is not for want of value, or virtue,
or aeceptabloness in this sacrifice ; but for want of answering
the terms upon which the enjoyment of the benefits of it is
proposed. If a man will shut his eyes against the light of the
sun, it argues an obstinacy on the part of the person, not any
defect in the sun itself." (Vide Discourse on the Acceptable-
ness of Christ's death.)
I add only the following quotations from the exceUent
Scott :—
" It seems to be the decided opinion of his Lordship,
(Bishop of Lincoln,) that the evangelical clergy, especially
such of them as believe the doctrine of personal election, hold
what is called particular redemption, whereas very few of them
adopt it. The author of these remarks, (himself,) urged by
local circumstances rather than by choice, above twenty-four
years since, avowed his dissent from the doctrine of particular
redemption, as held by many professed Calvinists, especially
among the Dissenters." It is to be regretted that Mr. Scott
used the term redemption here. He evidently regarded it as
identical with atonement. This is not the case, however.
Redemption is the effect of atonement. It is the actual deli
verance of its subject from condemnation, sin, and misery, on
the ground of the atonement — or the price of redemption paid
by the Son of God. Redemption, therefore, must be parti
cular ; or, we must admit the unscriptural doctrine of universal
salvation. This is, however, only a mistake as to phraseology.
That Mr. Scott understood redemption in the sense of atone
ment, is manifest from the following passage : — " The infinite
value and sufficiency of the atonement made by the death of
Him who was God and Man in one mysterious person ; the
way in which the Scripture calls on sinners, without distinc
tion, to believe in Christ ; and every circumstance respecting
redemption, shows it to he a general benefit, from which none
will be excluded, except through unbelief." (Reply, &c, pp.
447, 448.)
II. The second thing to be proved, in reference to the atone
ment, is, that Jehovah, as a Sovereign, having a right to dis
pense his favours as he pleases, did not determine to exert

EFFICIENCY LIMITED. 223
that influence which would render the remedy effectual to sal
vation, save in the case of the elect. I confess, I want no other
basis for the confidence I repose in this statement, than the
fact, to which reference has been made, viz., that the remedy
is not effectual in the case of all men. Few things can be
more certain than that what an Almighty Saviour undertakes
he must accomplish ; in other words, that if Christ died with
the intention of rendering his atonement the means of salva
tion to all men, all men must be saved. There are more ways
than one by which we may ascertain the purposes of God ; yet,
perhaps, a more certain mode of accomplishing this does not
exist, than to examine the conduct of God. In our contests
with Arminians, we contend that what he does, he previously
determined to do ; it is, obviously, equally manifest, that what
he does not do, he did not previously determine to do. All
men are not actually saved by Christ ; all were not intended
to be thus actually saved by him. If his purpose had been to
bring all, by effectual and gracious influence, to the enjoyment
of salvation, on the ground of that infinite atonement which
was required as a necessary basis for the unlimited invitations
oflfthe gospel, what could have frustrated his intentions ?
" His counsel must stand, and he will do all his pleasure."
Let us suppose the case, for the purpose of illustration, (and
the case will suit our purposes in more senses than one,) that
the whole human family were the subjects of a dangerous
¦ malady, for which Jehovah provides a remedy — a remedy which
cannot, in the nature of the ease, possess efficiency to remove
the malady in one case, without being able to remove it in all
cases. Its actual efficiency, however, depends upon its being
taken ; and the certainty of its being taken depends upon the
Divine purpose to remove that dislike to it which would lead
to its rejection. Now the question is, must not the number
of persons restored to health by this medicine, correspond, or
rather be identical, with that from whose minds Jehovah de
termined to remove that dislike of which we have been speak
ing? I see not how it can be doubted. Had it been the
purpose of Jehovah to render it effectual universally, what
eould have prevented the perfect restoration to health of every

224 JEHOVAH AS SOVEREIGN DID NOT
individual of the human family ? In harmony with the preced
ing reasoning, we find it stated in Scripture, that " Christ
laid down his life for the sheep," — " that he gave his life a
ransom for many," — and " bare the sins of many," — that the
sacramental wine is an emblem of that blood which was shed
for " the remission of sins unto many." It would be doing
violence to language, to contend that the words " sheep," and
" many," are of equivalent importwith "all mankind." Nor does
it appear to me necessary to suppose this, in order to support
those views of the unlimited sufficiency of the atonement which
have been given in preceding Lectures. The expressions,
" Christ gave himself for the many," " the sheep," &c, denote
that speciality of intention of which we are now speaking.
He died with the intention of rendering his atonement effica
cious to the salvation of many, (by visiting them with that
special influence which would lead them to seek salvation, by
repentance and faith,) — the many, that is, whom the Father had
given to him, and to whom he had the power of giving eternal
life. In opposition to this statement, it will be said, that Christ
is represented as having " tasted death for every man," " for
the whole world," &c. I answer,
That, if the objector understands no more by these expres
sions than that Christ so tasted death for every man, as that
every man may be saved on his faith and repentance; or, that
Jehovah, in his rectoral character, designed to provide an '
atonement sufficient in itself for the salvation of the whole
world ; I most cordially assent to the truth of this statement.
But, if he contend that the truth taught by them is, that Christ,
when he offered up himself, designed to render his atonement
the means of saving the whole world, I answer,
First, That it is not necessary thus to understand the ex
pressions. The terms " all," " every one," &c, are frequently
used in the Scriptures, where they must be understood in a
limited sense. Thus it is said, Mark i. 37, that when Simon,
and they who were with him, had found him, they said unto
him, " All men seek for thee." Again, Col. i. 23 ; " If ye
continue in the faith, grounded and settled, and be not moved

DESIGN TO EFFECT THE SALVATION OF ALL. 225
away from the hope of the gospel, which ye have heard, and
which was preached unto every creature which was under
heaven." (Vide, also, Mark v. 20; Acts xxii. 15; Rev. xix.
17; Phil. iii. 8; Luke xvi. 16; Acts xxi. 28.) Now, as the
signification of these terms is sometimes clearly limited, this
may be the case where they are used in reference to the death
of Christ.
Secondly, I answer, that it is not probable that such is
their meaning. They seem to have been employed in opposi
tion to Jewish notions and prejudices." That nation wished
to confine the goodness of Jehovah to themselves; and ex
pected that the mission of the Messiah was intended for their
exclusive benefit. It is not so, says John, in effect : " He is
the propitiation for our sins," i. e., the sins of the Jews ; " and
not for ours only," he adds, " but for the sins of the whole
world," i. e., of Gentiles, as well as Jews. There is nothing,
then, in these statements, properly understood, to support the
notion that Christ designed to effect the salvation of all men
when " he poured out his soul unto death."
In addition to the preceding reasoning, it may be stated,
that there must have been a speciality of intention on the part
of Christ, in reference to the individuals who should receive;
through Divine influence, eternal benefit froiri his sufferings,
in order to preserve a coincidence and harmony in the coun
sels and ways of God. It was not the design of God, as we
have seen, to save the whole of the human race ; but, permit
ting the sentence of a violated law to overtake some, to rescue
others upon whom his sovereign choice rested, for reasons of
which we can form no adequate conception, from that abyss
of wretchedness to which sin had reduced them. Can it be
conceived, then, for a moment, that the intention of Christ, in
reference to those who should receive eternal benefit from his
sufferings, extended beyond these individuals ? Must not the
special purpose of Christ, in his death, coincide with the
decree of election? However unlimited might be the efficacy
of the medicine in itself, yet, since it was the determination of
the Father to dispose the hearts of sortie only to receive and
take it, must we not suppose that they constitute the "sheep"
2 D

226 ARMINIANISM AND ULTRA-CALVINISM.
of which the Saviour speaks — the " many sons," referred to
by the apostle, — and that our Lord had the special intention
of bringing them to the enjoyment of salvation, when "he
bowed his head, and gave up the ghost?" I do not see, for my
part, how it can be denied.
The views which I have endeavoured to lay before the
reader, in reference to the unlimited sufficiency of the atone
ment on the one hand, and a speciality of intention in rela
tion to its application on the other, seem to me to exhibit the
true reconciling principle between apparently opposing Scrip
ture statements ; and to constitute the middle and safe course
between the opposite and dangerous extremes of Arminianism
on the one hand, and Ultra-Calvinism on the other. The
former rejects any speciality of intention in reference to the
application of the atonement, both on the part of the Father
and the Son; and, rejecting this notion, the system supplies us
with no grounds of confidence that the Saviour may not have
shed his blood in vain. It is right in stating that it rendered
the salvation of all men possible. It is wrong in disregarding
those previous engagements of the Father and the Son, and
that gracious design on the part of the Son — arising out of
them — to lead certain individuals, by special grace, to implore
the mercy that is offered freely to all, (without which no man
can obtain it,) and by which the salvation of some men is ren
dered certain.
The latter system, Ultra- Calvinism, seems to me to con
sider this speciality of intention, in reference to the application
of the atonement, as entering into the very nature of atone
ment, so that there can be no value, no sufficiency, in the
atonement, beyond its efficiency. To taste death for every
man, or for all men, so necessarily means, in the apprehension
of the advocates of this system, to die instead of all men, or
with the design of saving all men, that they feel themselves
absolutely compelled to limit the application of the general
terms, to escape the unscriptural conclusion that all men
must be saved. They forget the important distinction which
exists between the design of God as a Sovereign, and a moral
governor; — that though, in the latter character, he must have

ULTRA-CALVINISM. 227
designed to provide a sacrifice so infinite in its value as to
render it just to himself, and safe to his government, to pardon
the sins of all men for the sake of it, and so to constitute a
basis on which a universal proclamation of mercy might be
made to men ; — yet that he may not have intended, as a So
vereign, to bestow a disposition upon all to implore the mercy
which as a ruler he exhibits to all. They forget that, in the
sense of opening a way for the salvation of all, Christ did die
for all men, (whether that be the scriptural meaning of the
expressions to which I now refer is another question,) or,
rather, their system forbids the supposition that the door of
mercy was set open to all men by the death of Christ. And,
therefore, if they preach the Gospel generally, it is merely on
the principles stated formerly — that the elect are mingled with
the mass of mankind, and so cannot be addressed any other
way. On their part there is no bond fide proffer of mercy to
any, but to those to whose salvation they conceive God de
signs to render it effectual; nor is there any such, as they
conceive, on the part of God himself. The non-elect are, in
no sense, in a state of probation. Their final condition is not
suspended upon their conduct in relation to the testimony of
God concerning his Son. They were brought under condem
nation by the breach of the law given to Adam ; — no way of
escape is set open to them ; and yet, at the great day, they will
be condemned for not resting on that atonement which was
not in itself sufficient to secure their salvation !
Let us, for a moment, view the system we have been ad
vocating, in the light of contrast with the notions of Ultra-
Calvinism. Contemplating the whole human family as con
demned, Jehovah did not determine to inflict punishment on
some, and to pardon others, but to provide a sacrifice of infinite
worth, by which every obstacle to the bestowment of mercy
might be removed; and then, as a moral governor, or judge,
to offer pardon to all who might choose to accept it, in the
only manner in which it could be bestowed. Acting in har
mony with this intention, he deals with men as the subjects of
his moral government. By the threatenings and promises of
the Gospel he brings those motives to bear upon men, which

228 CALVINISM.
are the instruments of moral government. All men may be
saved by Christ who desire to be saved; but all do not desire
to be saved ; and, according to our previous statements, a dis
position to embrace that mercy which is offered to all, is not
necessary to moral government, or to render an individual
an accountable agent. Jehovah, however, while, as a moral
governor, he exhibits mercy to all, as a Sovereign, imparts,
in the case of many, a disposition to embrace it, and thus
secures their salvation. " The others he leaves to their own
free agency." There is mercy for them if they choose to go
and ask for it. He does not determine that they shaU not ask
it ; but he permits them to receive or reject it, according to
the determination of their own minds. With reference to
those whose wills he influences by sovereign goodness to
receive it, he previously determined so to do. They are the
elect, — " the many sons" whom the Father gave the Son, and
whose salvation the latter intended to secure when he hung
upon the cross. I do not say there are no difficulties in these
statements, but they resolve themselves into the point con
tested between the Arminians and Calvinists, whether, when
1 God offers blessings to men, under certain conditions if you
will, he is obliged to impart a disposition to seek and enjoy
them, — a difficulty which the Arminian scheme leaves com
pletely unsolved, since common grace does not really impart
a disposition to repent and believe.

LECTURE XIV.

JUSTIFICATION.
The great blessing indicated by this term comprehends the
whole of one of two classes of blessings, the bestowment
of which upon the chosen to salvation, is essential to the
accomplishment of the Saviour's ultimate purposes of mercy
with respect to them ; — essential, indeed, to his attainment of
that reward, the hope and prospect of which sustained him
under the unparalleled sufferings he was called to endure. It
was to secure to himself the honour of leading " many sons to
glory," that he " endured the cross, and despised the shame."
But the individuals who were to be thus ultimately blessed,
were legally incapacitated to enter into that world where this
glory is to be experienced ; and, also, morally incapacitated
to derive happiness from its possession, even had not the legal
bar placed it utterly beyond their reach. They were both
guilty and depraved. They had broken that most perfect law
whose righteous award is death to every transgressor; and
those unholy propensities which had led to this rebellion, and
which would have prompted them to persist in it, rendered
them totally unfit for heaven. It was, therefore, necessary
that the Saviour should remove both the legal and the moral
barrier, against the accomplishment of his ultimate purposes
of mercy, and the attainment of his own reward. It was
necessary that he should give them, as it is generally stated,
and very properly stated, a title to heaven, and a moral meet
ness for heaven; — that he should pardon their sins, accept
them as righteous, and renew them after his own image, be
fore he could bring them to the mansions prepared for them
above. This he does by conferring upon them the two im
portant blessings of justification and sanctification ; which

230 DISTINGUISHED FROM SANCTIFICATION,
may be regarded, perhaps, as comprehending every thing that
the Saviour bestows upon his people to secure their happiness
and prosperity in this world, and to prepare them for glory.
The first of these blessings is now to form the topic of in
quiry ; and every thing in reference to it, which it is deemed
desirable or important to state,' may be comprehended under
the following heads; viz., the nature, the grounds, and the
means, of Justification.

I.  THE NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION.
Every successful attempt to develop the precise nature of
this exalted privilege, must carefully distinguish it from other
blessings with which it is sometimes confounded. Let it be
observed, therefore, that it is not the making of a person
righteous by producing a change in the moral state of his
mind, — a change from the love of sin to the love of righteous
ness. This is Sanctification, from which it is with great
caution distinguished by the sacred writers. Christ is said to
be made unto us " wisdom and righteousness," or justification,
" and sanctification," &c. Justification, in short, is not a change
of character, but of state ; not a change " of disposition in re
ference to the precepts of the Divine law, but of condition in
regard to the promises and threatenings of that law." The
term which expresses the blessing is a forensic term ; it may,
therefore, be expedient to point out its exact and literal ac
ceptation, when it occurs in reference to the proceedings of a
human court of judicature ; and then to examine how far this
sense of the term will apply to the case of a sinner before
God. To justify, then, in the first of these cases, is to pronounce
a sentence acquitting an individual of some crime which had
been laid to his charge. Justification itself is, therefore, either
the act of pronouncing this sentence of acquittal, or the
acquittal itself. It supposes that an accusation had been
brought against the individual, and that it had been found to
be a false one ; and the formal sentence of the court in which
they utter and record their opinion, that the charge is really

AND FROM HUMAN JUSTIFICATION. 231
false — that the accused person stands right in the view of the
law — that he has not laid himself open to its sanctions, and its
penalty; but that, notwithstanding the attempt to blast his
character, he is fully entitled to receive from the judge, and
the community at large, whatever measure of honour and
reward is attached to perfect obedience to the law, is his
justification. Now, as the condition of an individual, when brought to
believe the gospel, is described by the term "justified," it is
manifest that there must be a sufficient analogy between the
justification of a sinner in the sight of God, and that legal de
claration of righteousness which, as we have said, is uttered
concerning an individual at a human tribunal, to warrant the
application to it of that term. At the same time we must not
venture to draw the conclusion, that justification with God,
and with man, are in all respects identical. Such a conclusion
has, indeed, been drawn by some, and has led them into great
and dangerous errors ; perverting all their views on the im
portant point of a sinner's acceptance with God, and enkin
dling feelings of self-confidence, and pride, and presumption,
from the display of which true Christian humility and piety
shrink back with instinctive abhorrence.
It becomes, then, a point of great importance to ascertain,
and to state distinctly both the respects in which Divine and
human justification agree, and in which they differ ; and, per
haps, one of the best modes of exhibiting the points of agree
ment, is to describe the points of difference. This has been
done very accurately by a late excellent writer, whose words,
for the double purpose of explaining and fortifying my own
views upon this important subject, I quote : " He that is justi
fied in an earthly court, unless it be for want of evidence,"
(which cannot possibly apply in this case, i. e., at the Divine tri
bunal,) "is considered as being really innocent ; and his justifi
cation is no other than an act of justice done to him. He is
acquitted because he appears to deserve acquittal. This, how
ever, is not the justification of the gospel, which is of grace,
through the redemption of Jesus Christ. Justification in the
first case, in proportion as it confers honour upon the justified,

232 DIVINE AND HUMAN JUSTIFICATION.
reflects dishonour on his accusers; while, in the last, the justice
of every charge is admitted, and no dishonour reflected on any
party except himself. Justification among men is opposed
not only to condemnation, but even to pardon ; for, in order
.to this, the prisoner must be found guilty, whereas, in justifi
cation he is found innocent. But gospel justification, though
distinguishable from pardon, yet is not opposed to it ; on the
contrary, pardon is an essential branch of it. Pardon, it is
true, only removes the curse due to sin, while justification
confers the blessing of eternal life ; but without the former
we could not possess the latter. He that is justified requires
to be pardoned, and he that is pardoned is also justified.
Hence a blessing is pronounced on him whose iniquities are
forgiven ; hence also the apostle argues from the non-imputa
tion of sin to the imputation of righteousness; considering
the blessedness of him to whom God imputeth not sin, as a de
scription of the blessedness of him to whom he imputeth
righteousness without works. Finally, justification at a human
bar prevents condemnation ; but gospel justification finds the
sinner under condemnation, and delivers him from it. It is
described as passing from death to life. From these dissimi
larities, and others which, I doubt not, might be pointed out,
it must be evident to every thinking mind, that, though there
are certain points of likeness, sufficient to account for the use
of the term, yet we are not to learn the Scripture doctrine of
justification from what is so called in the judicial proceedings
of human courts, and in various particulars cannot safely
reason from one to the other."
These statements by Mr. Fuller evince the propriety of
the remark by which they were introduced, viz., that one of
the best modes of showing in what respects Divine and human
justification agree, is to point out the respects in which they
differ ; since it becomes now perfectly manifest that the agree
ment is to be traced, chiefly, if not exclusively, in the effects
which flow from them. A man who is justified by his fellow-
men, i. e., pronounced righteous in the view of the law, enjoys
the results or consequences of righteousness. A man who is
justified by God enjoys, in like manner, the results or conse-

ARE ANALOGOUS IN THEIR RESULTS. 233
quences of righteousness; — and, therefore, though the grounds
on which these results are enjoyed in the two cases are
widely and essentially different, — the former individual enjoy
ing them for his own sake, and the latter for the sake of Christ,
— the term justification is applied, and very properly applied,
to both.
To justify an individual, when God is the justifier, is not,
then, to pronounce him innocent, or righteous, since no men
are really so ; nor by any conceivable process whatever can
they be made actually so; but it is either to count him righte
ous, i.e., to treat him (as we shall afterwards see) as if he were
righteous, — or to declare that the Divine government will so
treat him, for a reason, or on a ground, which will be afterwards
noticed. I do not mention it now, simply because it might
tend to embarrassment, by diverting, in' some measure at
least, the thoughts of the reader from the one single point on
which I would fix his attention. And, if such be the mean
ing of the phrase " to justify," it follows that to be in a justi
fied state, is not either to be pronounced just, or to be made
actually just, — for both are impossible in the case of a sinner:
but it is to be treated as if we were just; or rather, perhaps,
to be in the state of those whom God declares that he will
treat as if they were just; i. e., it is to be in the faith of
Christ; for the Divine declaration is, that believers are the
persons who shall be treated as if. they were just. And this
declaration is to be sought for, not in that volume to which no
creature has access, recording the secret purposes of God, but
in that other volume which he has graciously laid open to the
inspection of all, — even that blessed word which says, " He
that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be
damned." "Justification," says Mr. Fuller, "is our standing
acquitted by the revealed will of God declared in the gospel.
As the wrath of God is revealed from heaven, in the curses of
his law; so the righteousness of God is revealed," — "in the
declarations of the gospel. It is in this revelation of the mind
of God in his word, I coriceive, that the sentence both of con
demnation and justification consists. He whom the Scrip
tures bless, is blessed; and he whom they curse, is cursed."*
* Works, vol. vii. p. 410.
2 E

234 THE ASSEMBLY'S. DEFINITION. '
The attention of the reader is especially directed to the
last point affirmed in this quotation, viz., that the sentence
of justification is to be found in that revelation of the mind of
God which is contained in his word. Had this important
statement, than which nothing can be more true, been recol
lected, we should have been preserved from many errors upon
this subject, into which certain writers have faUen ; from some
of whichj even the definition in the Assembly's Catechism is
not, I venture to think, entirely free. "Justification," states
that generaUy admirable summary of Divine truth, 'f is an act
of God's free grace, in which he pardorieth aU their sins,: (i. e*,
of believers,) accepteth and accouhteth their persons righteous
in his sight," &c. The alleged ground of justification it is
not necessary to refer to. Now, with deference to the great
and good men to whom the Christian church is so deeply in
debted, I cannot but think that this definition is framed too
much under the influence of the recollection of what takes
place in human courts of judicature. It describes, with con
siderable accuracy, the happy results of justification ; stating
that the justified man is set free from the punishment due to
his sins, and that he is treated as if he were a righteous man.
The mistake, as it appears to me at least, in the definition — a
mistake which leads to great embarrassment and difficulty —
lies in calling justification an act of God, &c For to pass
over thfe anomalous phraseology, — " an act in which he par-
doneth sin, in which he accepteth and accounteth them
righteous, "-^the terms employed force upon us the inquiries,
" When did this act take place?" "In time, or in eternity?"
"Where did it take place?" "In heaven, or on earth?"
Many, there is no doubt, have been in the habit of using the
word "act" in this connexion, without attaching any idea,
or, at the most, a very vague idea, to it. Others have con
nected with it the notion of a judicial sentence. Justification
is, as they conceive, a judicial sentence, on the part of God,
announcing that an individual is pardoned, and accepted in
the Beloved. In fact, it is difficult, if not impossible, to attach
any other idea to the term " act " in this connexion, than, that
of a judicial sentence pronounced by God; and not recollecting,

ETERNAL JUSTIFICATION OPPOSED. 235
or riot conceiving, that this sentence is, contained in the sacred
Scripture, the individuals who employ this phraseology are
embarrassed by the inquiries to which reference has just been
made, " When and where was this judicial decision pro
nounced?" The conclusion arrived at is not uniform; some
representing it as having taken place in eternity, or believing
that the elect have been justified from eternity; while others
imagine that " it is revealed to the consciences of men in time.
They speak of themselves, and' others, as having been justified
under such a sermon, or at such a time ; apparently meaning
either that they had then a strong persuasion that they were
justified;" or that God gave to them a distinet and per
sonal revelation of that important fact.
Against the first of these opinions, or the doctrine of
eternal justification, the following, amongst other reasons*
may be advanced.
First, It is opposed to the general statements of Seripture
upon the subject, which exhibit justification as being subse
quent, in the order of nature at least, to calling, and repent
ance, and faith. " Whom he did predestinate," says the
apostle, "them he also caUed; and whom he called, them he
also justified ; and whom he justified, them he also glorified."
There is no reason to doubt, that the apostle intended to ex
hibit the order in which the people of God are brought to
the enjoyment of these exalted privileges. They are not
called before they are predestinated, nor justified before they
are called ; but after in each case ; in the first of the cases,
after in the order of time; in the latter, after in the order of
nature. Should any one conceive it possible that the apostle
may not have intended to exhibit justification as thus subse
quent to calling, he will not surely deny that the two blessings
are represented as inseparably connected with each other; —
that he who is justified, is also called. And if this be ad
mitted, it follows, that, if justified, we were also caUed, from
eternity !
Again, " Repent," said Peter to the multitude, " and be
baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for

236 ETERNAL JUSTIFICATION
the remission of sins," &c. (Acts ii. 38.) Now justification
certainly includes the remission of sins; and repentance is
here represented as being previous to remission. The indi
viduals addressed were exhorted to repent «c a<ptaiv apapn&v,
in order to, or that they might obtain, the remission of their
sins. But their repentance was future, (for some of them
afterwards repented;) they could not therefore have been
justified from eternity.
Further, justification is stated to be by faith: "Being jus
tified by faith," says the apostle, " we have peace with God."
Justification cannot, then, be previous to the act of beheving,
much less can it be from all eternity. It must be subsequent
to that act. So manifest is this, that it is sometimes spoken
of as future. " Seeing it is one God who shall justify the
circumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through faith."
" Now it was not written for Abraham's sake alone that it
was imputed to him ; but for us also to whom it shall be im
puted, if we believe on him who raised up Jesus our Lord
from, the dead." " The Scriptures foreseeing that God would
justify the heathen through faith," &c
Finally, The Scriptures declare that God justifieth the
ungodly, or the guilty; and, indeed, ungodliness, or guilt,
must precede justification, for the latter includes pardon, and
none but the guilty can be pardoned. But if the recipients
of this blessing have been justified from all eternity, when
were they guilty? Surely not before eterriity. How could
Jehovah ever regard them as guilty in eternity, (for guilt in
time is precluded by the opinion itself,) when he had con
stituted them just from eternity ? And yet, if there be no
period in which he could regard them as guilty, how could he
justify them, since justification absolves from guilt ? Indeed,
those who hold the wild notion of eternal justification, connect
with it the opinion (we believe) that the elect did not fall
under condemnation, — that Christ died to prevent this. But
if this had been the design of his death, it may be again asked,
" How then could God justify them, since the apostle declares
that he justifieth the ungodly?"

opposed. 237
Secondly, The notiori of eternal justification involves a
great and obvious absurdity, viz., that sin was pardoned before
it was committed, and guilt removed before it was contracted.
Would it be more absurd to say, the earth, and all the works
that were in it, were burnt up before they were created?
And, moreover, this absurdity is increased by the conceptions
which the advocates of this notion form of justification as a
judicial sentence ; for, in that case, " a sentence must have
been pronounced or declared from eternity — before man was
created" — " when no being existed but God himself;" i. e., it
must have been " a decision declared to none ; and, therefore,
not declared at all."
Thirdly, The notion of eternal justification mistakes the
purpose of God to justify, for the accomplishment of that
purpose, i. e., the act of justification itself. We admit fully
that it was the Divine purpose to create, and call, and justify,
and glorify the elect. But why should it be thought that he
actually justified, any more than that he actually created and
glorified them from eternity. They were doubtless " chosen
in Christ before the foundation of the world;" i. e., were so
united with him, in the gracious purpose of God, as to secure
their sharing in his ultimate triumph and glory.. But if their
union with the Saviour fails to prove that they were glorified
from eternity, it fails also to prove that they were justified
from eternity. Justification is one only of the blessings
which the eternal purpose of God secures to his people. Con
version to God, as well as a variety of others, is included,
with justification, in the number of these blessings. How
can it be supposed, then, that the latter has been enjoyed
from eternity, while the former only comes into their posses
sion in time? How can it have been enjoyed when they did
not exist to enjoy it ? Will any one venture upon the attempt
to show why conversion should require the existence of an
individual, and actual justification should not require it ? If
a man must be, in Order to be converted, must he not also be,
in order to be justified? The fact is, that the notion of
justification from eternity is only compatible with the notion
of actual existence from eternity; and there is no way of

238 THE JUDICIAL SENTENCE NOT REVEALED TO THE
supporting it but by maintaining, that a guilty and condemfled
creature (for none others can be justified, since justification-
includes pardon) is, in fact, God possessing one of the incom
municable attributes, viz., eternity, of the Deity.
Perceiving the absurdities which are involved in the notion
of eternal justification, and yet adhering to the opinion that
justification is an act or judicial decision of God, there are
many who would seem to imagine that this decision is passed
by God, when an individual is brought to beUeve the gospel.
But as a secret act of the Divine mind, absolving them from
the guilt of sin, would not amount, in their conceptions, to a
judicial sentence of absolution, they would seem to be driven;
to the necessity of supposing that this declaration is made to
their consciences ; or, that God gives to them a distinct and
personal revelation of their acceptance with him. Now,
although it were admitted that such revelations are ever made
to men, we might still wonder how those who hold this notion
should be able to conceal from themselves, that a revelation
of their acceptance with God, made to them privately, cannot
amount to the notion of a judicial sentence of absolution, in
which, according to their system, the very essence of justifi
cation consists. When a man is justified at a human tribunal,
he does not receive a private intimation from the judge, that
he may retire with an unblemished character; he is publicly
freed from the charge, and declared innocent. We deny,
however, that such revelations are given to men. "There
are, doubtless, things which God reveals unto men, but they
are not those which were previously locked up in the Divine
purposes ; but things revealed in the Scriptures, and which
had been previously hidden from them, as they still are from
unbelievers, by their own criminal blindness. God reveals
his secret purposes in relation to men only by fulfilling them.
To pretend to a revelation or manifestation of that which is
not contained in the Scriptures, is pretending to be inspired
in the same extraordinary manner as were the prophets and
the apostles."
" If justification consist in a manifestation, impression, or
persuasion, that we are justified, condemnation must be a like

CONSCIENCE, BUT CONTAINED IN THE SCRIPTURES. 239
impression, or persuasion, that we are condemned; but this
is not true. The Jews who opposed Christ were under
condemnation, yet so far from being persuaded that that was
the case, they had no doubt that God was their Father. Be
lievers in Christ may, on the other hand, be impressed at
times with strong apprehensions of Divine wrath, while yet
they are not exposed to it. Neither justification, therefore,
nor condemnation, consists in a persuasion of the mind that
we are under the one, or the other. Besides, to make a thing
consist in a persuasion of the truth of that thing, is a pal
pable absurdity. There can be no well-grounded persuasion
of any thing, unless it be true and evident antecedently to our
being persuaded of it." " The sum is, that neither condem
nation nor justification consists in the secret purpose of God,
but in his will, as revealed, as if by a sentence, in his word."
Let it then be remembered, that the sentence, and all the
sentence, which God pronounces upon the state and character
of any individual, or ever will pronounce, till the judgment
of the great day, is to be found in the sacred Scriptures.
He there declares, that all who believe are justified; i. e., they
are in that state in which he will treat them as if they were
truly and personally righteous* for the sake of Him who was
" made the end of the law for righteousness, to every one who
believeth in him." Judgment had indeed come upon all men
to condemnation ; but Jehovah laid "our help upon One who
was mighty to save unto the very uttermost all who come unto
God by him. " God was in Christ reconciling the world to
himself." The atonement of the Saviour removed every ob
stacle, on the part of God, to the bestowment of pardon upon
penitent transgressors. On this, as an adequate basis, he erects
and unfurls the banners of mercy. He invites all to return
from their wanderings, — unfolds the way in which the bless
ings of salvation are to be obtained, — and solemnly and
judicially declares, that all who believe in his Son are jus
tified ; that all who believe not are condemned. This is the
judicial sentence.
Thus justification, if the word must be understood to denote
some act or declaration on the part of God, (and not merely a

240 JUSTIFICATION INCLUDES PARDON.
state of exalted privilege to which certain individuals are
raised,) is not an act, or a sentence, having its date in eternity,
by which men are acquitted from guilt, and accepted as
righteous ; nor is it a secret act or decision (declaration it could
not in that case be called, as that supposes revelation) of
the Eternal Mind, securing these exalted blessings to them;
but it is that revealed act, or declaration, which proclaims that
the individual who has been brought to the faith of Christ
will receive, on a ground to be afterwards pointed out, all
those blessings which he might have secured to himself by
personal and perfect obedience.*
The preceding statements throw considerable light upon a
point, in reference to which there exists no little difference of
opinion. Arminians in general, and some Calvinists, main
tain, that justification includes only the remissions of sins;
while others contend strenuously that it comprehends a right
or title to eternal life. Now, if to justify an individual is to
count, i. e., to treat him as if he were a righteous man, — if the
main analogy between Divine and human justification is to be
traced, as we have seen, in their effects, — it follows,
First, That justification must include in it deliverance from
condemnation, or pardon. A man who is justified, at a human
tribunal, is of course preserved by that act from condemna
tion, and consequent punishment. The indictment preferred
against him was, in effect, an averment that he deserved to
endure a certain amount of suffering. His justification is, in
effect, a counter averment that he does not deserve to endure
it; and, accordingly, he does not endure it. Justification,
then, in connexion with the Divine government, must include
* No one, it is presumed, will understand the author to intimate, that when
an individual is brought to the faith of Christ, he does not become personally
interested in the salvation of the gospel. This is, doubtless, the case. The fact
that he is so is known to God, who reveals it to him by his conduct — his gracious
communications, &c. ; and who will judicially and publicly proclaim this at
the day of judgment. What is meant is, that there is no particular revelation
to this individual of his personal acceptance, — that no private judicial sentence
of acquittal is pronounced, constituting his justification : — 'that he is only jus
tified, in the sense of acquittal by a judicial sentence, by the great and gracious
general decision, " He that believeth shall be saved."

JUSTIFICATION INCLUDES A TITLE TO LIFE. 241
pardon. A believer could not be treated as if he were a
perfectly righteous man, unless this were the case. Nor is
revelation silent on this point. The following passage proves
that justification comprehends pardon. " Even as David also
describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God im
puteth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they
whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered.
Blessed is the man to whom the Lord wiU not impute sin."
(Rom. iv. 6. 8.) But,
Secondly, The blessing of justification secures the certain
possession of all the honour and reward which are attached to
perfect obedience. A righteous man is entitled not only to
immunity from punishment, but to all the approbation, and to
all the substantial benefits, which may be connected by law with
the active and faithful discharge of the duties of citizenship.
The language of the Divine law is, " Do this, and thou shalt
live." Perfect personal obedience, i. e., righteousness, would
have secured to an individual immortal life and blessedness.
It seems to follow as a necessary consequence from this, that
justification must secure an equal amount of good to all who
believe, or they could not be treated as if they were perfectly
righteous men. And the language of the apostle in the fifth
chapter of his epistle to the Romans, ver. 1, 2. 18 — 21, ren
ders it manifest that it does secure this. " Therefore being
justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord
Jesus Christ. By whom also we have access by faith into
this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory
of God." " Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment
came upon all men to condemnation ; even so by the righteous
ness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification
of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made
sinners ; so by the obedience of one shall many be made right
eous. Moreover, the law entered, that the offence might
abound : but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound.
That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace
reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ
our Lord." The language of the apostle, in the 19th verse
especially, cannot be reconciled with the opinion, that justi-
2 F

"42 THE LIFE WHICH IT SECURES.
fication includes forgiveness only ; and this circumstance goes
far to prove that they mistake his meaning in the fourth chap
ter, ver. 6 — 8, who maintain that he represents the imputa
tion of righteousness, the forgiveness of iniquity, and the non-
imputation of sin, as being perfectly identical. To impute
righteousness, is a general phrase, meaning to count or treat
any one as perfectly righteous. It includes in it, as a consti
tuent part of the blessing, the forgiveness of sin ; and, there
fore, though in reality it includes more than this part, the
apostle might very aptly quote language which describes the
blessedness of a pardoned state, in proof of the blessedness of
a justified state.
Justification, then, includes in it a title to life, since per
fect obedience would have given such a title. It is to be re
membered, however, that the life to which Divine justifica
tion raises, is far superior to that to which we could have
attained by our own personal and complete obedience to the
Divine law. It is given in reward of the Saviour's righteous
ness; and his interposition on our behalf — his agony and
bloody sweat — the sufferings of his life, and his death on the
cross, are so unspeakably meritorious in the eyes of the
Father, that they secure, and must secure, a greater revenue
of glory for himself, and for all his people, than they could
have secured for themselves, had they preserved their in
tegrity.

LECTURE XV.

THE GROUND OF JUSTIFICATION.
By the ground of justification is intended to be understood,
that for the sake of which, or as the reward of which, any
members of the human family — all of whom have broken the
Divine law — are now treated, and will hereafter be treated, as
if they were perfectly righteous. On this point I submit the
following observations : —
I. That this ground does not exist in those who enjoy this
blessing ; or, in other words, that none are, or can be, treated
by God as righteous in reward of their own works. This is
rendered certain by the express testimony of Divine revelation,
and by the very nature of the case.
1st. The express testimony of Divine revelation may be
appealed to. Numberless are the passages in which it is dis
tinctly denied that justification is by works of law; or that
the ground of justification is in the partaker of the blessing.
It may be expedient to select one of these, and illustrate it
rather fully; and then show that it is in entire harmony with
the remainder. " Therefore," says the apostle, Rom. iii. 20,
" by the deeds of the law there shall be no flesh justified in
his sight." To perceive the full force of this denial, we must
inquire into the meaning of the terms " flesh," and " law," which
are here employed. The first of the terms ordinarily compre
hends the whole of the human family, the members of which
are so designated on account of the material or fleshly part of
their nature.
The following passages are decisive on this point. " The
end of all flesh is come before me, (Gen. vi. 13,) behold, I
will destroy them with the earth." " The congregation fell
upon their faces, and said, O God, the God of the spirits of

244 JUSTIFICATION NOT FOUNDED ON WORKS.
all flesh." (Num. xvi. 22.) " O Thou that hearest prayer, unto
thee shall all flesh come." (Psalm Ixv. 2.) "The voice said,
Cry; and he said, What shall I cry? All flesh is grass,"
&c. (Isa. xl. 6.) God is said to be "the God of all flesh."
(Jer. xxxii. 27. He has promised to "pour out his Spirit
upon all flesh." (Joel ii. 28.) Christ has "power given to him
over all flesh." (John xvii. 2.) " And all flesh shall see the
salvation of God." (Luke iii. 6.) Now, as this is the ordinary
sense of the term, we might assume, unless circumstances for
bade us to do this, that such is its meaning in the passage now
under consideration. The connexion, however, proves be
yond all doubt that this is the case. The word " flesh " is
evidently employed as equivalent with Jews and Gentiles, who
comprehend the entire family of man. The apostle had just
proved of both, that all, without a single exception, were, as
sinners, guilty before God ; and he draws from these premises
the general conclusion, "that no flesh," i. e., that neither
Jew nor Gentile, " can be justified by law in the sight of
God." And what is meant by the term " law " here ? Pelagians,
Socinians, and other abettors of the doctrine of human merit,
restrict its application to the ceremonial law. The apostle
teaches us, they allege, that mere ritual observances, when
moral duties are neglected, will not insure the salvation of
any man. To this it is replied,
First, That the bare consideration of the passage itself is
sufficient to show, that such is not the meaning of the writer.
He denies that any can he justified by the law to which he
refers. Now, what was that law ? Surely not the ceremonial
laws of the Jews, " because, except the Jews themselves, none
of the human race can either be accepted, or condemned, or
even tried by that law ; since the rest of mankind not only
have never known it, but in many instances have been abso
lutely unable to obtain the knowledge of it; nor were they
ever put under it ; so that where there is no law, there is no
transgression." Secondly, That the law by which no flesh can be justified,
is that by which is the knowledge of sin ; since to impart that

PROVED BY SCRIPTURE. 245
knowledge is, as we are told at the close of the verse, the ex
clusive object of the law. Now, that it is the moral law which
conveys the knowledge of sin, is placed beyond all doubt by
the language which occurs in the seventh verse of the seventh
chapter of this same epistle: "What shaU we say then? Is
the law sin ? God forbid ! Nay, I had not known sin but by
the law ; for I had not known lust, except the law had said,
Thou shalt not covet." Nothing can be clearer than that
the reference here is to the moral law ; since it is in that law
that the prohibition of lust, i. e., covetousness, is contained.
Thirdly, That since the term "law" is anarthrous in the
original, the passage should be rendered, " Wherefore by
works of law," not of the law, " no flesh shall be justified ;"
i. e., by works of law in the absolute sense : no man can be
justified by any works whatever, of any law whatever, whether
natural or revealed.
Finally, That to restrict the appUcation of the term to the
ceremonial law, would totaUy subvert the apostle's argument.
The obvious design of Paul — so obvious, indeed, is this de
sign, that it is wonderful any one should deny, or even mis
take it — is to show the necessity of being justified freely by
the grace of God, through the redemption that is in Christ
Jesus. The 20th verse, the verse now under consideration,
is a part of the premises on which this conclusion is buflt.
But, if we understand by the term " law," the ceremonial law
merely, how would these premises contribute to support the
great general truth which it was the obvious aim of the writer
to establish ? It is useless to show merely that there is one
law by which we cannot be justified, if there exist another by
obedience to which life may be obtained. The term " law"
must be understood indefinitely, universally ; or the reasoning
of the apostle fails to evince the necessity of the gospel method
of salvation. By restricting the appUcation of the term to
mere ritual observances, we prevent the attainment of the
great object of the apostle's Ufe and labours ; viz., to render it
impossible for any to glory in the Divine presence.
The assertion, then, of the apostle in this verse, ig, that the

246 PROVED BY SCRIPTURE.
ground of justification is not to be found in the recipient of
the blessing ; or that none are treated by God as righteous in
reward of their own works. Let us now proceed to show that
this assertion is in perfect conformity with the general current
of his writings. " I do not frustrate the grace of God, for if
righteoushess came by the law," or by personal obedience to
the law, " then Christ is dead in vain." (Gal. ii. 21.) " For as
many as are of the works of the law," i. e., as many as are
expecting and striving to obtain justification as the reward of
their own works, " are under the curse," (since they have not
perfectly obeyed the law,) "for it is written, Cursed is every
one that continueth not in all things written in the book of
the law to do them." (Gal. iii. 10.) With the full recollection
of this important declaration, he says, in the second chapter,
ver. 15 and 16, " We who are Jews by nature, and not sin
ners of the Gentiles, knowing that a man is not justified by
the works of the law, but by the faith of Christ, even we
have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by
the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law; for by
the works of the law shall no flesh be justified." In the ninth
chapter to the Romans, having exhibited the deplorable con
dition of his brethren, his kinsmen according to the flesh, he
proceeds to point out the actual source of all the evils that
had befallen them ; declaring that it was the radical mistake
they had committed in reference to the important point of a
sinner's acceptance with God ; — a mistake which threw them,
in point of privilege, behind the very Gentiles whom they de
spised. " What shall we say, then," is his language, " that
the Gentiles who followed not after righteousness, have at
tained to righteousness, even the righteousness which is of
faith? But Israel, who followed after the law of righteous
ness, have not attained to the law of righteousness. Where
fore ? Because," he adds, " they sought it not by faith, but,
as it were, by the works of the law." (Chap, ix.30 — 32.) In the
commencement, also, of the tenth chapter, having most pathe
tically bewailed the state of his brethren, he proceeds again
to ascribe it to their unscriptural method of seeking justifica-

PROVED BY SCRIPTURE. 247
tion: "Being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going
about to establish their own righteousness, they submitted
not themselves to the righteousness of God."
These passages expressly declare, that it is utterly impos
sible for a sinner, and for that very reason, to obtain justifica
tion by the deeds of the law. The same truth, let it be fur
ther observed, is also obviously implied in those parts of the
inspired volume which declare that man is actually justified
by faith, and not by works; since righteousness comes by
faith, for the sole reason that it could not come by works.
Had there been a law which could have given life, " verily,
righteousness would have been by that law." The very fact,
then, that righteousness is said to come by faith, if it be a
fact, proves, with all the certainty of a moral demonstration,
that men are not justified, and cannot be justified, by law. It
is impossible to conceive that Christ would have died in vain.
Now, what saith the Scripture concerning the mode of justifi
cation ? " Abraham believed God, and it was counted to
him for righteousness. Now, to him that worketh is the re
ward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that
worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly,
his faith is counted to him for righteousness." (Rom. iv. 3 — 5.)
" By the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in
his sight. But now the righteousness of God without the
law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the pro
phets ; even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of
Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe ; for
there is no difference ; for all have sinned and come short of
the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace, through
the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." (Chap. iii. 20 — 24.)
" Therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God
through our Lord Jesus Christ." (Chap. v. 1.)
It is needless to multiply proofs that the notion of the pos
sibility of obtaining justification by the deeds of the law, is
directly negatived by the word of God.
2ndly. The very nature of gospel justification may be ap
pealed to in proof of the assertion, that God does not justify
any on the ground of their own works. If Divine justifica-

248 BY THE NATURE OF THE CASE.
tion were in all respects the same as human, — if it were a
judicial declaration that the sin, laid to the charge of an indi
vidual, had in point of fact not been committed by him, it
would be clearly impossible not only for a sinner to be justi
fied on the ground of his own works, but to be justified at all.
No being in the universe could thus justify a transgressor,
without falsehood. The God of perfect knowledge must mis
take the character of the being at his bar, or the God of per
fect truth must lose his faithfulness, and even his Divinity,
before he could declare the sinner not to be a sinner, i. e., to
justify him, on the ground of his works.
And though Divine and human justification are not iden
tical, the impossibility of the justification of a sinner, on the
ground of his own works, is not less apparent in reference to
that modified view of the nature of the former, which has
been presented in the preceding pages. For the individual
whom God justifies is accounted, i. e., as we shaU see, treated
as if he were perfectly righteous. But aU the members of
the human family are sinners. How then can a God of wis
dom, who cannot form a mistaken estimate of character, and a
God of justice, who will render to all their due, treat any as
righteous, (i. e., for their own sakes, or as the reward of their
own works,) who are sinners; and who have not merely trans
gressed in one instance, but whose " sins are more in number
than the hairs upon their heads, or the sands upon the sea
shore ?" To treat the righteous and the guilty alike, is surely
contrary to our conceptions of that equity which should mark
all the judicial proceedings of the moral governor ! Nay, to
treat the righteous and the penitent alike, being a mode of
conduct powerfully and directly calculated to defeat the end
of moral government, must be equally impossible to the great
Lord of all. No sinner can be treated as righteous for his
own sake. We now pass on,
II. To observe, that the ground of justification is the all-
sufficient and perfect work of our Lord and Saviour Jesus
Christ; including, in that expression, his perfect obedience
even unto death. The following statements sufficiently prove
this declaration : " Therefore by the deeds of the law there

THE WORK OF CHRIST IS THE GROUND. 249
shall no flesh be justified in his sight." " But now the right
eousness of God" (i. e., the righteousness which he has pro
vided)* " without the law is manifested, being witnessed by
the law and the prophets; even the righteousness of God
which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them
that believe; for there is no difference." (Rom. iii. 20 — 22.)
" Being justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath
through him." (Chap. v. 9.) " Therefore, as by the offence of
one judgment came upon all men to condemnation ; even so by
the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men
unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience
many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one shall
many be made righteous." (Ver. 18, 19.) " For they, being
ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish
their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves to the
righteousness of God. For Christ is the end of the law for
righteousness to every one that believeth. For Moses de-
scribeth the righteousness which is of the law, That the man
which doeth those things shall live by them. But the right
eousness which is of faith speaketh on this wise : Say not in
thine heart, Who shall ascend into heaven ? (that is, to bring
Christ down from above,) or, Who shall descend into the deep ?
(that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead.) But what
saith it ? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in
thy heart : that is, the word of faith, which we preach ; that
if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt
believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead,
thou shalt be saved. For with the heart man believeth unto
righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto
salvation." (Chap. x. 3—10.) " But of him are ye in Christ
Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness,
and sanctification, and redemption." (1 Cor. i. 30.) " And this
is his name whereby he shall be called, Jehovah our Righteous
ness." (Jer. xxiii. 6.)
In addition to the foregoing passages, which expressly de
clare that the perfect obedience even unto death of the Son of
God is the ground of justification, we may refer to those
* Vide Haldane's Exposition of Romans on this text.
2 G

250 THE WORK OF CHRIST IS THE GROUND.
which affirm its gratuitous nature, as teaching the same thing.
If we are justified freely, by the grace of God, our own works
cannot manifestly be the ground of our justification. The
man who is treated as righteous because he is actually
righteous, is under no obligation to the moral governor for
thus treating him. He has a claim to justification which
cannot be equitably resisted. Hence the apostle says, " Now
to him that worketh the reward is not reckoned of grace, but
of debt." The reward can only be reckoned of grace when it
is not bestowed on account of the works of him who receives
it ; when it is given without any consideration at aU ; or when,
as in the case of the justification of sinners, that consideration
is the worthiness of another. Then the reward is of grace.
I have exhibited (and the attention of the reader is espe
cially directed to this point) the perfect work of our Lord, in
cluding, in this phrase, his obedience and his sufferings, i. e.,
his obedience even unto death, as constituting the ground on
which the guilty (i. e., in themselves) are treated as if they were
righteous, because I apprehend this mode of statement rescues
us from many of the difficulties in which those are involved
who adopt a more systematic and technical phraseology. It
is the opinion of many, who make that distinction between
what are called the active and passive obedience of our Lord,
to which reference has been more than once made, that atone
ment was made by his death, and that justification flows ex
clusively from his obedience. It is impossible, so it appears
to me, to reconcUe this opinion with the declaration of the
apostle, that we are justified by the blood of Christ. It is
true, he adds, in the same chapter, that we are made righteous
by his obedience ; still that does not contradict or neutralize
the previous declaration: and it ought, moreover, to be remem
bered, that the obedience to which he refers comprehended
his death. I scarcely think it would ever have been doubted,
that believers are treated as righteous, though actually and
personally guilty, for the sake not of one part of the Redeem
er's work alone, but on the ground of the entire work, had
not certain mistakes existed in reference to the public repre
sentative character of our Lord, — mistakes, which appear to

DANGER OF MISCONCEPTION. 251
me to have arisen from incautiously pushing truth into error ;
and which have powerfully contributed to obscure the simple
majesty, of scriptural doctrine and statement. I must be
permitted to dwell at some length on this point, as it is one
of great importance in itself, and is, moreover, adapted to
show in what manner the practice of dividing the one work of
our blessed Lord into separate parts, and ascribing a distinct
office to each of them, originated.
" That the Lord Jesus Christ sustained a public character,
or that his mediatorial engagements were undertaken and per
formed on the behalf, and for the benefit of others, is rendered
manifest by the similitude which the apostle represents, in
the 5th chapter of the Romans, as existing between him and
Adam." Yet it is very possible to misinterpret, the language
in which this most important truth is taught; — to err by
attaching to some of the terms in which we are in the habit
of stating it, too literal a signification; and by permitting
what takes place at a human tribunal, when an individual is
justified, to govern too completely our views in reference to
the justification of a sinner before God. At a human tribu
nal no man can be justified without a perfect righteousness ;
since to justify him is to pronounce him faultless in the eye
of the law. We infer, accordingly, that all who are justified
at the bar of God must possess a perfect righteousness, which
can only be obtained by imputation, their own being imper
fect. The perfect righteousness of Christ, their legal repre
sentative, is therefore, we conclude, counted to them, or
reckoned as theirs ; and hence they enter heaven, and have a
right to enter heaven, as righteous persons. Now if all this
be soberly and not too literally explained; — if the intention be
merely to intimate, by a phraseology somewhat technical, and
allusive to the proceedings which take place in earthly judica
tories, that it is really for the sake, or on the ground, of the
work of Christ, — in token of the moral governor's approbation
of it, or in reward of it — that any who are themselves guilty
are treated, or can be treated, as if they were righteous, no
sentiment can be more just, and certainly none more impor
tant. Unfortunately, however, the statements of which we

252 THE NOTION OF A LITERAL TRANSFER
are now speaking, have not always been soberly explained.
"Gospel truths have been squared," "according to human
measures and models." Resembling processes have been
represented as identical ones. Mistakes in reference to the
relation existing between Christ and his people, as weU as to
the imputation of his righteousness to them, have been com
mitted by numbers, the practical influence of which has been,
in various instances, most deplorable. In the hope of guard
ing the reader against similar misconceptions, and of elucidat
ing the subject more fully, I will call his attention to two or
three distinct views of the nature of imputation.
The first is the opinion of those who conceive of the impu
tation of the Saviour's righteousness to believers, as consisting
not in the mere communication to them of the consequences
of that righteousness — nor even in the legal counting of that
righteousness to them ; but in an actual and literal transfer of
it to them. As a necessary counterpart of this sentiment,
they hold that Christ became actually a sinner. " Hast thou
been an idolater," says Dr. Crisp, " a blasphemer, a despiser
of God's word, a profaner of his name and ordinances, a thief,
a liar, a drunkard? If thou hast part in Christ, all these
transgressions of thine become actually the transgressions of
Christ, and so cease to be thine, and thou ceasest to be a
transgressor from the time that they were laid upon Christ, to
the last hour of thy life ; so that now thou art not an idolater,
a persecutor, a thief, a liar, &c. ; thou art not a sinful person.
Reckon whatever sin you commit, when, as you have part in
Christ, you are all that Christ was, and Christ is all that you
were, as his." (Vide Crisp's Sermons, p. 270.) And again,
" Believers think that they find their transgressions in their own
consciences, and they imagine there is a sting of this poison
still behind, wounding them ; but, beloved, if this principle be
received as a truth, that God hath laid thine iniquities upon
Christ, how can thy transgressions, belonging to Christ, be
found in thy heart and conscience? Is thy conscience
Christ?" (p. 269.)
The pen of the author has literally trembled while tran
scribing, these atrocious passages, libelling, most profanely and

OF CHRISTS RIGHTEOUSNESS EXAMINED. 253
foully as they do, that Holy Lamb of God, who " offered
himself without spot," and, when he endured the vengeance
due to. our sins, " suffered the just for the unjust." Yet Dr.
Crisp was perfectly consistent with himself, and with his
principles, in these shocking statements; for there cannot be
a literal transfer of the Saviour's righteousness to us, without
a corresponding literal transfer of our sin and guilt to him.
If we become really righteous, Christ became really a sinner.
We demand, then,
First, Plain scriptural authority for a sentiment so injurious
in its moral influence upon man — so dishonourable to the
Saviour. The partisans of the system would probably reply,
that God is said to have laid upon Christ the iniquities of his
people;— that the Saviour bare our sins in his own body," &c.
We reply, that the obvious meaning of these passages is, that
Christ endured the consequences, or the punishment, of our
sins ; and hence it is said, in the latter of them, that " Christ
bare our sins in his own body upon the tree." No sober-minded
interpreter of Scripture can imagine that such declarations
were intended to intimate that our pollution and guilt were
literally transferred to Him. But then it is said, we shall he
told, that Christ was made sin for us. Undoubtedly he was, we
reply, but not a sinner, any more than the scape-goat of old,
which no one imagines to have become a sinner. He was
made sin in the sense, as some suppose, of having our sin
legally counted to him, so as that he should endure its conse
quences ; or, as others imagine, in the sense of being made a
" sin-offering" for us. And if it be retorted upon us, that it
is not said he was made a " sin-offering" we answer, neither
is it said that he was made a sinner, but sin; which, it is ob
vious to remark, as naturally means a sacrifice for sin, as a
participator of sin. We observe,
Secondly, That this notion of an actual transfer of character
between Christ and believers, is at utter variance with those
" confessions and lamentations of believers whioh are recorded
in Scripture ;" and with those petitions for forgiveness which
we are commanded to present daUy unto God. " Consistently
with the system opposed," says Mr. Fuller, " these confessions

254 THE NOTION OF A LITERAL TRANSFER
could only arise from the circumstance, that those who uttered
them were under the mistake which Dr. Crisp labours to
rectify; i. e., thinking sin did not cease to be theirs, even
when under the fullest persuasion that the Lord would not
impute it to them, but would graciously cover it by the
righteousness of his Son." (Vol. iv., p. 98.) We maintain,
Thirdly, That the notion is as irrational, and the supposed
literal transfer of righteousness and guilt as impossible, as
we have shown it to be unscriptural. I agree with Mr.
Fuller, in thinking that " guilt and innocence," or sin and
righteousness, " are transferable in their effects, but untrans
ferable in themselves." Surely a moment's reflection upon the
nature of each must convince every rational being that this
is the case. For what is righteousness? Conformity to law.
What was the righteousness of Christ? His own personal
conformity to the Divine law: — the holy exercises of his
mind, together with the unblameableness of his conduct. His
perfect love to God and man, burning with unsulUed purity in
his bosom, and emanating from it in every word he uttered, and
in every action he performed. Now, how can this righteous
ness of the Redeemer become ours otherwise than in its con
sequences ? How can the exercises and feelings of his mind
literally become the exercises and feelings of our minds ? By
the grace of his Spirit he can produce a resemblance between
the habitual state and exercise of our minds, and of his own ;
but still this is only conformity, not identity. The feelings
of the Saviour are his own : his righteousness is his own : by
no process whatever can the latter literally become ours. And
what is sin ? Want of conformity to the Divine law. What
is our sin ? Our own want of conformity to that law ; our
unholy thoughts, and feelings, and actions. How can they
become literally the thoughts, and feelings, and actions of
Christ ? And what is guilt ? Strictly and literally considered,
it is the desert of punishment. To be guilty, in the
proper sense of the term, is not merely to be exposed to
punishment, but to merit it. Guilt, in this sense, can
only belong to the offender. It necessarily supposes actual
and personal transgression; and cannot, therefore, be trans-

of Christ's righteousness examined. 255
ferred to the Saviour. " If," says Mr. Fuller, " Jesus Christ
became by imputation deserving of punishment, we by
non-imputation cease to deserve it; and if our demerits be
UteraUy transferred to him, his merits must of course be the
same to us ; and then, instead of approaching God as guilty
and unworthy, we might take consequence to ourselves before
him, as not only guiltless, but meritorious beings." It is not
denied that, in a looser sense, the word " guilt " may be taken
to denote obligation, or legal obnoxiousness to punishment.
In this sense of the term, guilt may, indeed, be transferred to
Christ, and really was so. But this, correctly speaking, is the
consequence of guilt, rather than the thing itself. A guilty
man is one who deserves, and is consequently legally obnoxious
to punishment. Exposure, or legal obnoxiousness to punish
ment, was transferred to Christ, but not desert of punishment;
i. e., he bore the consequences of our guilt, but did not partake
of the guUt itself : as we receive the consequences of his work,
but did not perform the work ourselves.

LECTURE XVI.

THE GROUND OF JUSTIFICATION.
The second opinion on this great subject, to which the atten
tion of the reader is directed, is that of those who conceive of
the imputation of Christ's righteousness to believers as con
sisting, not indeed in the literal transfer of his righteousness to
them, but in the legal counting of it to them, as a step distinct
from, and previous to, their participating in the consequences
of that righteousness. No one, it is alleged, can be treated
as righteous, until he is considered righteous. The first step
in the process is, therefore, to constitute him righteous, which
is not done, it is admitted, by a literal transfer of Christ's
righteousness to him, and so making it actuallyhis own, (which
is allowed to be impossible,) but by reckoning it to him as if
it were his own ; and then, being thus rendered just in the
eye of the law, the second step in the process is to treat him
as a perfectly righteous man.
This appears to have been the opinion of Calvin. " What
is it," says he, " to place our righteousness in the obedience of
Christ, but to affirm that hereby only we are accounted right
eous ; because the obedience of Christ is imputed to us, as if
it were our own ? " Such, also, was the opinion of Mr. Fuller,
who has illustrated this particular notion of imputation more
happily, perhaps, than any other writer. " It is not," he
tells us, "the actual transference of our sins to Christ, so
as to constitute him really a sinner ; nor the actual transfer
ence of his righteousness to us, so as to constitute us really
innocent and praiseworthy ; but the legal counting of our
sins to him, so as that he endured the consequences of them ;
and the legal counting of his righteousness to us, so as that we
enjoy the blessings which are given in reward of it." In this

imputation, mr. fuller's VIEWS. 257
sense Mr. Fuller thinks we are to explain the language of the
apostle, " He hath made him to be sin for us who knew no
sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him."
(2 Cor. v. 21.) "There is," he says, "an allusion in this pas
sage to the sin-offering under the law, but not to its being made
a sacrifice. There were two things," he adds, "belonging
to this sin-offering : First, the imputation of the sins of the
people, signified by the priest's laying his hand upon the head
of the animal, and confessing over it their transgressions, and
which is called putting them upon it ; i. e., it was counted in
the Divine administration, as if the animal had been the sinner,
and the only sinner of the nation. Secondly, offering it in
sacrifice, or killing it before the Lord for an atonement. Now
the phrase ' made sin,' appears to refer to the first step in this
process in order to the last. It is expressive of what was prepa
ratory to Christ's suffering death, rather than to the thing
itself; just as our being made righteous expresses what was
preparatory to God's bestowing upon us eternal life. But the
word ' made,' " he adds, and let the reader observe this, " is not
to be taken literally, for that would convey the idea of Christ's
being really the subject of moral evil. It is expressive of a
Divine constitution, by which the Redeemer, with his own
consent, stood in the sinner's place, as though he had been
himself the transgressor; just as the sin-offering under the
law was in mercy to Israel reckoned, or accounted, to have
the sins of the people put upon its head ; with this difference,
that was only a shadow, but this went really to take away
sin." (p. 88.)
On the same principles, Mr. Fuller proceeds to deny that
it can be said with any propriety, with any decency even, that
our blessed Lord was punished when he hung upon the cross.
Punishment, he states, in substance at least, and very correctly,
supposes criminality, and the criminality of the person who
sustains it. " If Paul," he adds, " had sustained the punish
ment due to Onesimus for having wronged his master, yet it
would not have been real and proper punishment to him ; but
suffering only, as not being inflicted in displeasure against
2 h

258 TO IMPUTE SIN OR RIGHTEOUSNESS
him." And, in applying these more general remarks to the
atonement of Christ, he says, that " his sufferings, though they
were a punishment, and he sustained it, were really and pro
perly the punishment of our sins, and not his. What he bore was
punishment, i. e., it was the expression of the Divine displeasure
against transgressors. So what we enjoy is reward ; i. e,, it is the
expression of God's well-pleasedness in the obedience and death
of his Son. But neither is the one a punishment to him ; nor
the other, properly speaking, a reward to us." (p. 90.)
There can be no doubt, I imagine, that Mr. Fuller's views,
in reference to the nature of imputation, are not only more
rational, but more entirely in accordance with the whole cur
rent of Divine revelation, than those of Dr. Crisp, and of the
Ultra-Calvinistic school in general. There are many, however,
and I confess myself one of them, who imagine that he has
exhibited a distinction without a difference; or rather, that
he has spoken of, and attempted to describe, two steps in the
process, while there is in reality only one. I proceed, there
fore, to unfold more fully, what has been more than once
briefly glanced at, viz. : —
The third opinion in reference to the nature of imputation,
in relation to the Saviour's righteousness, viz., that it consists
not in the actual transfer of that righteousness to believers ;
nor yet in the legal counting of it to them as a thing distinct
from, and a step previous to, treating them as righteous ; but
that this latter identifies itself with the former, — the scrip
tural sense of the phrases, to count sin, or righteousness, to an
individual (whether it be his own, or that of some one else)
being to treat that individual as a sinful or a righteous man.
To prevent mistake and misrepresentation, I request the reader
especially to observe, that this latter view of the nature of
imputation assumes, that the one perfect work of the Son of
God, is the ground of justification, to the total exclusion of
any, and every other ; though it denies that his righteousness
actually passes over to the believer, or literally becomes his ;
or, that it is legally counted to the believer, i. e., if by that
phraseology he meant any thing distinct from, and previous

IS TO TREAT AS GUILTY OR RIGHTEOUS. 259
to, his being treated as a just man, for the sake or, in reward
of the righteousness of Immanuel.
The reader will hereafter see, also, how completely this view
of the nature of imputation subverts the whole fabric of An-
tinomianism, removing the very foundation on which it stands,
and on which it can alone stand, a literal commutation of per
sons in the case of Christ and his people. We proceed, then,
to an examination of Scripture phraseology, with the view of
showing that the phrases, to count sin or righteousness to an
individual, really means to treat him as a sinful or a righteous
man. In Numbers xviii. 27, we read, " And this your heave-
offering shall be reckoned (counted, imputed) unto you, as
though it were the corn of the threshing-floor, and as the ful
ness of the wine-press ;" i. e., the offerers would be treated as
though they had offered, what in reality they did not offer. In
the address of Shimei to David, we find the following expres
sion, " Let not my lord impute iniquity to me ;" i. e., ob
viously, " Do not punish me." The request cannot have been
that David would count him innocent, (or if it were, counting
him innocent, and not punishing him, are identical,) since he
proceeds to* say, " For thy Servant doth know that I have
sinned." (2 Sam. xix. 20.) In reference to the Gentiles, the
apostle Paul says, " If the uncircumcision keep the righteous
ness of the law, shall not his uncircumcision be counted for
circumcision?" (Rom. ii. 26.) " Now when it is said," very
justly observes Dr. Russel, " that his uncircumcision shall be
counted unto him for circumcision, the meaning cannot be that
it is actually counted to him ; for it is a merely negative thing,
and therefore cannot properly be reckoned to him ; the mean
ing must be, that lie shall be treated as though he were circum
cised, by having granted him all the blessings of the separated
people of God, of whose separation to Jehovah, circumcision
in its highest sense was a sign." " And Rachel and Leah
answered and said unto him, Is there yet any portion of
inheritance for us in our father's house ? Are we not counted
of him (imputed of him) strangers?" i. e., we are treated by
him as strangers ; not reckoned or considered strangers.

260 TO IMPUTE IS TO TREAT AS GUILTY OR RIGHTEOUS.
Hence they immediately add, " For he hath sold us» and hath
quite devoured also our money." (Gen. xxxi. 14, 15.) " To
wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto him
self, not imputing their trespasses unto them ;" i. e., not in
flicting punishment upon them for their sins, but making
atonement. (2 Cor. v. 19.) " Blessed is the man to whom the
Lord will not impute sin ;" i. e., not inflict punishment on ac
count of it. (Rom. iv. 8.)
To impute sin to an offender, or to lay it to his charge, is,
then, to treat him as a guilty person, and is not merely a pre
vious step to his being so treated. Not to impute sin, or not
to lay it to his charge, is not to treat him as if he were guuty.
To impute or count the sin of Adam to us, is to treat us
as if we had committed it. To impute our sins to Christ, is
to inflict upon him the punishment due to them. To impute
his righteousness to us, is to treat us as if we possessed it.
God counted sin to Christ by making him a sin-offering ; for
the offering of the bullock for a sin-offering, is said to be, the
words being literally rendered, " making it sin." (Num. viii.
12.) * God counts righteousness to us, or the righteousness
of Christ to us, by giving us pardon and eternal life, in con
sequence, or in reward of it. When it is said, that faith is
counted to the believer for righteousness, the meaning is not
that God reckons his faith as if it were righteousness; or that
it is reckoned unto his receiving righteousness, (as Mr. Haldane
says, for the words convey no meaning,) but simply, that he is
treated as a righteous person; and, consequently, the three
forms of expression — to be justified by faith, — to have Christ's
righteousness imputed to us, — and to have faith counted to
us unto righteousness or justification, mean precisely the same
thing, viz., to enjoy the blessings which God bestows upon
men, in reward of that work of his Son, which he never con-
* The reader is requested to refer also to chap. xii. 11. The leprosy of
Miriam was the consequence of her sin and that of Aaron. The visitation
upon her of this consequence of sin, was putting the sin upon her. And hence
when Aaron implored of Moses that the leprosy might be removed, he uses the
phraseology, " Lay not the sin upon us :" i. e., let not the leprosy continue to
rest upon us.

THE MORAL GROUND OF PARDON. 261
templates but with ineffable delight; and which constitutes
" a moral basis for the extension of holy benevolence on a most
widely extended scale, to such as in themselves were both
wretched and worthless."
The attention of the reader is particularly directed to the
above statement of the specific mode in which the work of
our Lord operated, to permit the Divine government to treat
the gmlty as if they were righteous. It formed a moral ground
on which pardon, and all the blessings of salvation, might be
imparted to men, in harmony with the claims and safety of
moral government. Man had broken a law, the rectitude, and
honour, and efficiency of which, it became the moral governor
to uphold. Had this been done by the literal execution of its
sentence, the whole of the human family must have perished.
An expedient, therefore, exhibiting the infinite grace of Je
hovah, was resorted to; — an expedient, designed at once to
save the honour and efficiency of the law, the character of
the lawgiver, and the transgressor. The eternal Word inter
posed. He consented to do and to suffer all that was neces
sary to exhibit to the whole of the intelligent universe, in a
most impressive and appalling manner, the infinite evil of sin,
the complete perfection of the Divine law, and the utter fal
lacy of the hope, that under the government of the great
Being from whom it emanated, transgression can ever be per
mitted to pass unpunished; and in this way, to render possible
the extension of mercy to the guilty. To accomplish this
gracious purpose, it was necessary for him to honour the pre
cepts of the law, by obeying them; and its penalty, by suffering
it ; and thus to show that the law was righteous in all that it
enjoined, as well as in aU that it threatened. And it is en
tirely, as we have said, on the ground of this work, or as the
reward of it ; as a manifestation of the infinite complacency
with which the Father rests in the work of his Son, displaying
thereby his paramount regard to righteousness, that any mem
bers of the human family, whom nothing, no not even the
blood of Christ itself, can preserve from the desert of punish
ment, though it does preserve from the punishment itself, are
treated as righteous, i. e., are justified.

262 THE MORAL GROUND OF PARDON.
" The principle involved in this procedure, viz., the prin
ciple of conferring benefits on many, from a regard to the
moral worthiness of some distinguished individual, whom God
highly approved," says Mr. Bennet, (in a passage which I beg
to quote for the purpose of fortifying my own opinions,)
" is repeatedly recognized and exemplified in the scriptural
history of Divine procedure. The children of one family
were blessed of God for their father's sake ; witness the family
of Noah, on account of whose righteousness they were received
into the ark, and so escaped the deluge. The natural descend
ants of Abraham at large were blessed with distinguishing
national favours, and religious privileges, out of God's regard
to his eminent piety and practical obedience, as we find from
Gen. xxvi. 4, 5."
" It is evident, however," he adds, and the remark is of the
highest importance, "that the righteousness of these holy indi
viduals did not pass over to their families and descendants, so
as to render them either subjectively holy, or morally meri
torious in the sight of God. It remained in their own persons,
as the proper subjects of moral worth ; and the commendable
excellency thereof was strictly confined to themselves. Never
theless, in the providential dealings of God with their offspring,
a high and honourable respect was had, and was declared of God
to be had, to the righteousness and moral worth of these indi
viduals ; so that while his favours, conferred on their descend
ants, were unmerited by the recipients themselves, yet from
their intimate relation to them, they were benefited in a
manner consistent with moral rectitude.
" All this, I conceive, may elucidate to us the way in which
the righteousness of the Mediator, joined with his sacrifice, is
the moral ground of the gospel constitution, both in the par
don of sin to the penitent believer, and in his full acceptance
before God. Christ himself perfectly fulfilled all righteous
ness ; and the whole merit thereof rested in him alone ; so as
to found his own righteous claim to the recompence of reward."
— " But with respect to believers, they are said to be 'justified
freely, by grace, through the redemption that is in Christ
Jesus.' Rom. iii. 24. They have no personal merit, nor com-

OBJECTION ANSWERED. 263
plete moral excellency of themselves ; neither does the right
eousness of the Mediator become subjectively theirs ; but, in
all its perfection and moral worth, remains wholly in himself.
They have no participation of his merits as Mediator and Re
deemer; which belong to him personally and exclusively, in
consequence of his having ' trodden the wine-press alone, and
of there being none of the people with him.' " (Isa. lxiii. 3.)
All that passes over, or can actually pass over, from Christ
to believers, is the reward of his righteousness. There is,
indeed, a legal transfer of that righteousness to them. But
this is, at the most, only the counting of it to them, the
placing of it to their account ; and the more frequently and
-attentively these latter forms of expression are examined, the
more full and general will become, as I cannot but think, the
conviction, that they are identical in meaning with treating
them as righteous persons, in reward of the Saviour's work.
I am well aware it will be said, " But must not an indivi
dual be counted righteous, — must not the law consider him
as such, before it can treat him as righteous ? " I answer, that
he cannot be thus treated, without a moral basis for the ex
tension of holy benevolence to him, such as that which is sup
plied by the obedience and sufferings of the Mediator ; but
now that the basis has been laid, the Divine government pre
sents no obstacle to its communication; and, in relation to
the salvation of a being who is himself unholy and guilty, it
will be found, unless we are greatly mistaken, to relieve no one
difficulty, to suppose that the Divine Being first counts the
righteousness of the surety to him, i. e., considers that as
really belonging to him, which in point of fact does not, before
he treats him as righteous. It introduces, indeed, a difficulty
where otherwise there would have been none ; since, as Mr.
Bennet has happily and satisfactorily shown, "the practice
of conferring benefits upon many, from regard to, and as an
expression of approbation of, some eminently distinguished
individual," may be regarded as a law of the Divine govern
ment : while, on the other hand, the procedure supposed, viz.,
considering a person what he really is not, and then treat
ing him as if he had been what he is not, has no analogy in

264 danger of misconceiving the terms
any part of the Divine conduct. If, indeed, the righteousness
of Christ became really and literally, and not merely legally,
the believer's, the case would be different. Dr. Crisp, and his
school, are the only consistent men on this point. The second
opinion in regard to imputation, viz., that it is the legal count
ing of the Saviour's righteousness to the believer, as a step
distinct from, and previous to, the treating of them as righteous,
so far from explaining and justifying the Divine procedure,
only serves, as I cannot but think at least, to involve a plain
matter in obscurity and mystery.
The reception of this simple and, it is conceived, scriptural
view of imputation, has been partially prevented by forgetful-
ness of the important sentiment, that though Divine and human
justification bear a strong analogy to each other, they are not
identical; and by inattention to the precise import of the
terms, surety, legal representative, in their application to
Christ. Here truth, as it was formerly observed, has been
pushed into error. Mr. Bennet, indeed, while contending
that " Christ is to be regarded in the light of a voluntary vic
tim, as having undertaken a legal responsibility on behalf of
sinners, submitted to the judicial effects of their sins against
God, and brought in everlasting righteousness, in a public ca
pacity," denies that he is to be regarded, strictly and literally
speaking, in the light of a legal representative, substitute, or
surrogate ; i. e., " one," he says, " who in law sustains the
person, and acts in the name and place of others ; so that his
acts are to be legally construed aud received as theirs." He
represents it as Antinomian doctrine to contend " for such a
federal and legal union between Christ and the elect, as to
render them one person with him, in all his covenant engage
ments, and mediatorial performances, in virtue of which all
the blessings of salvation are so theirs in him, that they have
a righteous claim upon God for them. When it is said that
Christ was made a sin-offering for us, and that he has entered
for us into the heavenly sanctuary, the words do not mean,"
he says, "that he sustained the character of our legal repre
sentative, and that we in him either were made a sin-offering,
or entered within the vail ; but that, in both cases, he acted

SURETY, LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE. 265
in a public character, and sustained official capacities, the
beneficial effects of which were to terminate in the salvation of
all believers." *
Mr. Bennet maintains, that the terms referred to, viz., legal
representative, surrogate, surety, &c, are never applied to
Christ in the Scriptures ; " nor is any such meaning," he adds,
"adopted in the sacred writings with respect to the media
torial engagements and work of Christ." The propriety of
the use of the terms obviously depends, in a very considerable
degree, upon the sense attached to them. I see no reason for
rejecting them, which would not lead to the abandonment of
the term "justification," as expressive of the acceptance of a
sinner with God. I cannot join Mr. Bennet in his wish to
see them discontinued. They constitute the most appropriate
phraseology that can be employed, though it is absolutely ne
cessary to remember that they must be analogically, and not
literally understood ; since the relation which Christ sustains
to believers, is by no means identical with that which a true
and literal representative, in a human court of judicatory,
sustains to the person represented by him. It is here, as in
the case of Divine and human justification, where, as we have
seen, the analogy existing between them is to be seen in the
consequences of the act, rather than in the act itself. The
elect enjoy the benefit which results from the work of Christ, as
if he were literally their legal representative, (on the prin
ciple described, and therefore he is very correctly denominated
their surety,) as the justified man participates in the conse
quences of justification, as if justification were the act of pro
nouncing him righteous, or were literally making him so. The
consequences of not making this distinction are baneful in
the extreme. There is a degree of approximation, which we
cannot but deplore, towards the wild and shocking system of
Antinomianism, in the case of certain excellent men and
writers ; and this is to be mainly ascribed, if we are not greatly
mistaken, to the fact of their having too completely identified
the relation in which the Saviour stands to his people, with
that of a human legal representative. And, when this identi-
* Vide Gospel Constitution, pp. 117, 118.
2 I

266 DANGER OF MISCONCEIVING THE TERMS
fication is completely made, it is difficult to see how it is
possible to escape the conclusions which Antinomians draw
from it. For, if there were a real commutation of persons in
the case of the elect and Christ, if he endured the curse of
the law as their legal representative, and if they are to be
regarded as having legally borne it in him ; how could they
with justice be called to suffer it ? How could their deliver
ance be an act of grace ? Might they not demand their dis
charge? And, further, if Christ obeyed the law, as their
literal representative,— if they are to be regarded as having
legally rendered obedience in him, how can they be required
to yield personal obedience ? Surely, if, as a literal legal re
presentative, Christ has performed the service which, in the
eye of the law, we owed to the moral governor, the debt is
absolutely discharged ; so that the latter can no more, having
agreed to accept of the substitute, require it a second time of
us, than he could inflict a second time the "sentence of the
law. On the other hand, if the terms of which we have been
speaking are to be understood analogically; if Christ is the
surety of his people, because they participate in the benefits
and blessings of his work, as if he legally represented them;
if his righteousness does not literally pass over to them, and is
not legally counted to them in any sense which is to be dis
tinguished from treating them as if they possessed it ; if all
that really passes over to them is the result of that work;
and, finally, if this result passes over to them, not on the An
tinomian principle of a legal commutation of persons, but on
the principle illustrated by Mr. Bennet, viz., that the media
torial engagements and work of Christ constitute a moral
basis for the extension of holy benevolence to such as were in
themselves both worthless and wretched, then salvation, in all
its parts, is of grace; deliverance from condemnation is altoge
ther a merciful deliverance ; no transgressors, not the elect,
even if they know themselves to be such, can claim it. They
cannot talk, as some have done, of having a price in their
hands to purchase it ; but of a glorious work to plead, which
has so fully satisfied the justice of God, and sustained the

SURETY, LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE. 267
efficiency of his law, as to permit their salvation, but not to
require it ; and they will, consequently, receive the blessings
they implore, with those transports of gratitude, blended with
profound humility, which cannot fail to be inspired by the
self-abasing consciousness, that the blessings of eternal life
have been conferred on those who deserve eternal death.*
In -concluding this part of the subject, I would only add,
that the views which have been presented in the preceding
pages, seem essential to the production of that humility of
character, without which all professions of religion are but as
" sounding brass, and a tinkling cymbal." It is manifest,
that the Antinomian scheme of doctrine does not produce this
state of mind. We cannot associate much with its adherents,
without feeling that the spirit of the sect is the very reverse
of that of the publican. I do not, I confess, wonder at this.
The fact cannot well be otherwise. If a person believes that
the elect are so completely one with Christ, and have been so
from eternity, that they cannot be considered apart from him,
— that in law they are literally regarded as having done and
suffered all that was done and suffered by Christ, I do not won
der that, taking, in his approaches to the throne of the hea
venly grace, the important fact, that he is one of the elect, for
granted; or, believing it on insufficient evidence, he should
assume the tone of one who regards salvation as his due. If
an approximation towards the system could lead the excellent
Bishop Hopkins to utter such language as the following, what
must be the full effect of the entire system upon the indis-
criminating mass who profess it in the present day ? " They,"
i. e., believers, " can plead, Lord, here is a full price, the pre-
* I must particularly request the reader to remember — for I feel that, in re
ference to this point, I am in danger of being misconceived, and possibly mis
represented — that my objection is not against the terms " surety, legal repre
sentative," &c, but against the undue extension of their meaning; against
" moulding and squaring gospel truths and doctrines, by human measures and
models." Divine justification, and suretiship, are analogous to human justifi
cation, and human suretiship, but are not identifical with them. " There is a
resemblance," to adopt the language of Howe, "but not an exact and entire
correspondency." The blessings which result from them are the same ; but
the process and the relation are only analogous.

268 BISHOP HOPKINS.
cious blood of thine own Son. It was thy own free grace that
bestowed him upon us, who is such a boundless treasure. But,
being installed in that, we no longer desire to deal with thee
upon terms of grace; but upon most severe, rigorous, and
strict justice. What mercies we have had, were purchased
for us by this price ; what sins we have committed, were satis
fied for, for us, by this expiation; and, therefore, we stand
acquitted in law. Thus may those who have part in this
heavenly treasure, make up their accounts with a great deal
of confidence, when others, who have nothing to discharge
their debts withal, shall be cast into prison, whence they shall
never return."*
How different, radically different, the language of David !
" Have mercy upon me, O God, according to thy loving-kind
ness : according to the multitude of thy tender mercies blot
out my transgressions." Thus David desired to deal with
God upon terms of grace ; Bishop Hopkins on terms of strict
justice ! Which was right, the psalmist, or the prelate ?
* Pratt's edition, vol. iii., p. 101.

LECTURE XVII.

JUSTIFICATION.
THE MEANS OF JUSTIFICATION.
The atonement of Christ, as we have seen, has laid a foun
dation sufficiently solid and ample in itself to secure the sal
vation of all men ; yet all men are not in a state of salvation.
There remains something to be done by the sinner, ere he
can possess scriptural ground to hope that God will treat him
as if he were a righteous person. " What then is it?" Or,
to put the inquiry in another form, " In what way do we
become so personally interested in the mediation of the Son
of God, as to warrant us to expect, on the ground of the
Divine promise, that those exalted blessings, which are con
ferred upon men as the reward of his infinitely meritorious
work, will be as certainly enjoyed by us, as if that work had
been our own?" This is obviously an infinitely important
question, and a question to which an answer must be sought
for in Divine revelation alone. None but that God who pro
vided the remedy can inform us how far its influence is to
extend. None but the great Being who devised and accom
plished that glorious scheme, which renders it possible for
him honourably to extend mercy to the guilty, can teach us to
whom he will grant it, and on what conditions it will be be
stowed. We may form conjectures upon the subject; we
may exercise our reasoning powers with the utmost degree of
vigour ; but reason and conjecture must be utterly at fault
here. To them it is no disparagement to affirm, that they can
give us no direction. The proper work of God can be per
formed only by God. To Divine revelation, therefore, we at
once repair.

270 FAITH IS THE MEDIUM OF INTEREST.
Our first object must of course be, to ascertain what is the
scriptural answer to the question proposed a short time ago,
viz., " What is the medium of personal and saving interest
in the mediation of Christ?"
On this point nothing can be more explicit than the state
ments of Divine revelation. " Therefore," says the apostle
Paul, (Rom. iii. 28,) "we conclude that a man is justified by
faith, without the deeds of the law." And this he declares,
let it be observed, at the conclusion of a long and a logical
argument, expressly intended to show what, in the very nature
of the case, must be the exclusive way in which transgressors
can obtain acceptance with God. The chain of the argument
is as follows. None can be justified by works, because all
have sinned. If the blessing should ever be attained by
transgressors, it must be enjoyed on the ground of a righteous
ness received, and not a righteousness performed : and, since
the righteousness cannot be received by works, because that
would lay a ground for boasting, " we conclude that a man is
justified by faith, without the deeds of the law."
The same doctrine is taught, also, at the conclusion of the
chapter. " Seeing it is one God who shall justify the cir
cumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through faith."
Again, in the 3rd chap, of Gal. 8th verse : " And the Scrip
ture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through
faith, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In
thee shall all nations be blessed. So then they that be of
faith, are blessed with faithful Abraham." To the same effect,
also, is our Lord's language, (John iii. 16,) " God so loved the
world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever
believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life ;"
to which we may add the words of the commission, " Go ye
into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.
He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that
believeth not shall be damned." (Mark xvi. 15, 16.)
That faith is the means of justification is further proved by
those passages which exhibit it as the hand, so to speak,
which receives the righteousness of the Redeemer — or brings
the sinner into that state in which he is treated as if he were
a righteous man, on the ground of the Redeemer's perfect

what is its nature? 271
work. " The righteousness of God without the law is wit
nessed, &c. — even the righteousness of God, which is by faith
of Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe." (Rom.
iii. 22.) It is again proved by all the passages which state
that faith is counted to the believer unto righteousness.
" Abraham believed God, and it" (i. e., his believing, in the
sense explained, p. 260) "was counted unto him for righteous
ness." " To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that
justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted to him for righteous
ness. Now it was not written for his sake alone, that it was
imputed to him ; but for us also to whom it shall be imputed,
if we believe on him who raised up Jesus our Lord from the
dead." No doubt, then, can be entertained in reference to
the doctrine of Scripture on this point. Faith is, beyond all
question, the means of justification. It will, then, be neces
sary to inquire into the nature of faith, and into the connexion
which exists between faith and justification.
i. — what is faith?
I am disposed to define faith as the credit which is
given to " the record of God concerning his Son " — its
meaning, and evidence, and glory, being unveiled to the
mind by the Holy Spirit. The latter part of the definition is
not indeed essential to it; and, therefore, its strict logical
accuracy cannot perhaps be maintained. Faith, strictly speak
ing, is the belief of the gospel. The mode in which we attain
to a spiritual perception of its meaning, &c, does not modify
the credit we give to it. Faith is faith, whatever be the
manner in which the knowledge of the truth which it receives
is obtained. Now, the latter part of this definition merely
exhibits the agency to which all correct views of Divine truth
are to be ascribed. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as
essential to the definition of faith; and, if not essential, it
must be allowed that, logically considered, it is improper to
retain it. Yet, as it is adapted to guard against one class of
mistakes upon this important subject, I am not prepared to
throw it out of the definition.
When I say that faith is the belief of the gospel, attaching

272 IS BELIEF OF THE MEANING
to the term "belief "the sense which it ordinarily bears, it may
be necessary to add, that I mean, of course, the belief of the
gospel, as rightly apprehended and understood ; for otherwise
it is not the belief of the gospel. Suppose the report of some
remarkable transaction were brought to us by a friend, and
that we, through dulness of hearing, or misapprehension of
the meaning of some of the terms employed, totally misunder
stood the nature of the transaction, — could it be said, with any
propriety, that we believed the report ? Most assuredly not.
We might, indeed, repose confidence in our friend, that he
was stating what he conceived to be the truth. We might
further believe, that a transaction, such as that which we had
falsely conceived to have happened, had really taken place ;
but it would be a gross abuse of language to say that we
believed the report of the real transaction. Nothing can be
more manifest than that a correct apprehension of the mean
ing of the testimony is essential to the exercise of faith in it.
Similar remarks may be made in reference to faith when
the word is used, as it frequently is, in a more extended
sense. Strictly speaking, faith supposes a testimony, and is
the credit we give to testimony'. The term is, however, con
stantly used to express the confidence we repose in the cor
rectness of a proposition, even though its truth does not rest
upon testimony. Thus, we are said to believe that the whole
is greater than its part ; and, that God exists ; though we have
no testimony, strictly speaking, in support of either of these
propositions. We have, indeed, what we call evidence for their
support, — reasons for believing them; and these reasons,
being considered by us as so many testimonies to the truth of
the propositions, we give to the confidence which we repose in
them the name of faith.
Now, when the word "faith" is used in this comprehensive
sense, and we are said to believe any proposition, the import
of the phrase is, that we give credit to the truth which is
really contained in the terms of that proposition. It is the
meaning, in short, that is believed ; so that if the proposition
is not understood, it is not believed. We may, indeed, give
credit to something ; but, if that something were arrayed in a

OF A PROPOSITION. 273
correct verbal dress, it would be found to be a proposition
very different from the one which we are said to receive.
The one testimony of the gospel involves several proposi
tions, and faith, in harmony with the preceding remarks, is
the belief of the meaning of these propositions. It is the
credit which is given to them, when they are properly appre
hended and understood ; and since they are never understood
without Divine influence, (for the natural man receiveth not
the things of the Spirit of God, neither can he know them,
for they are spiritually discerned,) faith, as it is stated in the
definition, is the credit given to these propositions — their
meaning, evidence, and glory being unveiled to the mind by
the Holy Spirit.
Should it be alleged, that since the gospel is the testimony
of Him who cannot lie, we, without understanding, may be
said to believe it, because we exercise confidence in him, that
all which he says must be true, and so that the gospel must be
true, I would answer, that if this statement does not exhibit
a distinction without a difference, the belief of which it speaks
is rather belief in God than in the gospel. Faith, however, is
not the confidence we repose in the Divine veracity, but the
credit we give to what the Divine Being reveals to us. It is,
in short, the belief of the gospel. Hence, it is represented by
the apostle John, as a receiving of the witness, or record, which
" God hath given of his Son ;" while the ungodly are said to
" make God a liar, because they receive not the record which
he hath given of his Son." The same view, also, of the nature
of faith is presented to us by the terms of the commission :
" Go ye forth," said our Lord, "into all the world, and preach
the gospel to every creature. He that believeth," — believeth
what ? manifestly the gospel, — " shall be saved." Besides, the
mighty influence which is ascribed to faith in the inspired
volume, proves that it is not merely a general confidence in
the Divine veracity, but the reception of the gospel itself as
true. It is what God says to us — the paramount and infi
nitely important declarations which proceed from him, — ex
hibiting our character, our danger, and the only way of escape
— all of which are brought into contact with the mind, and
2 K

274 TO HAVE FAITH IS TO BELIEVE.
made to bear upon it with resistless force by faith; (for faith
derives its influence from the truth to which it gives credit;)
it is these declarations, and not a mere confidence in the Divine
veracity, that accomplishes such mighty moral wonders in the
experience and upon the characters of men. On this, as weU
as on other accounts, I cannot but regard the statements of
those, who represent faith as though it were trust or confi
dence in the Divine Being generally speaking, or a disposition
to receive any thing which God may testify, rather than as the
actual reception of what he does testify, as unfounded and
injurious. Faith must be the reception of something which
God testifies, and because he testifies it, or it would not an
swer the purposes of moral government to connect with it the
enjoyment of the blessings of salvation.
To have faith is, then, to believe the meaning of the gospel ;
and, consequently, faith cannot exist where that meaning is
not understood. Now this meaning is not understood by any,
to whom the gospel does not appear possessed of unrivalled
importance, and unspeakable glory ; and, since it is in all cases
the Holy Spirit that causes it to appear in this light, I have
ventured to define faith, " The belief of the gospel, its mean
ing, evidence, and glory, being unveiled to the mind by the
special influence of this Divine agent."
In further elucidation and confirmation of the foregoing
statement, viz., that faith includes in it a belief of the meaning
of the gospel, I refer with much satisfaction to the following
passages from a modern writer. " It is an absolute absurdity
to say that a meaning can be believed without being under
stood ; and, therefore, nothing that has a meaning can be be
lieved without being understood. There are many nominal
Christians in the present day, who would be astonished and
hurt if their Christianity were doubted, who evidently attach
no meaning to the words, judgment, eternity, and justification
by the faith of Christ. Can these be said to believe ? Are
there not many, who can speak and reason orthodoxly and
logically On the doctrines of the gospel, and yet do not under
stand the urgency of these doctrines in application to their
own soul ? These do not believe the meaning of the gospel,

THE MEANING OF THE GOSPEL. 275
surely. And are there not many, who, mistaking the whole
scope of the Bible, see in it merely a list and a description of
duties, by the performance of which a man may recommend
himself to the favour of God ? Those who believe this, believe
their own vain imagination, and not the Bible." " The Jews be
lieved in the Divine authority and inspiration by which Moses
spoke; they had much more reverence for his name and hqpour
than the great bulk of professing Christians have for the name
and honour of Christ ; — and yet He who knew the thoughts of
the heart, declared that they did not believe Moses ; for, says
Jesus Christ, ' had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed
me, for he wrote of me; but if ye believe not his writings,
how shall ye believe my words?' He does not mean here to
question their belief that God had indeed spoken by Moses;
but to deny their belief of Moses's meaning. They did not
understand Moses, and,* therefore, they could not believe
him'; — they believed their own interpretations of his law, not
his own meaning of it."
" I may understand many things which I do not believe,
but I cannot believe any thing which I do not understand,
unless it be something addressed to my senses merely, and not
to my thinking faculty. A man may with great propriety say,
I understand the Cartesian system of vortices, but I do not
believe in it. But it is obviously impossible for him to believe
in that system without knowing what it is. A man may be
lieve in the maker of a system without understanding it, but
he cannot believe in the system itself without understanding
it. Now there is a meaning in the gospel, and there is declared
in it the system of God's dealings with men. This meaning
and this system must be understood, before we can believe
the gospel." *
In the further prosecution of this subject, it may be ex
pedient to refer to some of the mistakes, as the author regards
them, which have been committed by various writers on the
subject of faith. By this means we shall be enabled to ex
hibit more distinctly what we cannot but deem the scriptural
* Erskine's Essay on Faith, pp. 25—29.

276 DEFECTIVE STATEMENTS
notion of faith, by bringing it into the light of contrast with
others. These mistakes may be divided into two classes. In
the first class, the error is one of defect; in the second, of
redundancy. Some writers, it is apprehended, include too
much, and others too little, in their statements of the nature
of faith.
1st. There are writers whose statements of the nature of
faith are essentially defective. Amongst these may be in
cluded, First, Those who represent it as an assent to the great facts
of the gospel, — thus practically forgetting the important senti
ment, that there can exist no saving faith where the scriptural
import and moral glory of these facts are not clearly discerned,
and powerfully realized. This is the extreme to which .San-
demanianism tends, if it has not exactly reached it. The
more spiritually minded advocates of this system may not have
proceeded so far into the frigid zone of Christianity; yet, that
some of its adherents have done so, is unquestionable. Nor is
it to be wondered at. Believing, as they do, that the doctrine
of gratuitous justification would be overturned, were they to
allow that any thing approaching to spiritual feeling enters
into the nature of faith, it is not surprising that they should
carry their efforts to strip it of "holiness, to the point of deny
ing that it contains any thing more than a bare and naked
assent to the facts of the gospel. Such a representation,
however, is doubly defective ; for,
In the first place, true and saving faith is more than assent to
the gospel. It is not necessary to deny that the term " assent"
is ever used as equivalent in meaning with faith, since it is
impossible to doubt, that it is most commonly employed to
denote a state of mind in which an individual does not care to
rouse himself to the effort of contradicting a proposition ; and
such a state of mind must not be identified with believing a
proposition. It is both unauthorized and dangerous to adopt
the phraseology on which we are now animadverting.
Unauthorized; for we have no warrant for it in Scripture.
The New Testament does not say, that if we assent to the
gospel, but that if we believe it, we shall be saved. How is

OF SANDEMANIANISM. 277
it that they, who are in the habit of employing this phrase
ology, do not shrink from the thought of altering terms which
were dictated by the Spirit of God ?
Dangerous; for it is powerfully adapted to foster that spirit
of self-deception, which beguiles so many to their final ruin.
When a minister tells his congregation, that if they assent to
the gospel they shall be saved, he may doubtless mean that if
they believe the gospel, they shall be saved ; but, then, why
does he not say so ? Why, without necessity, does he employ
language at variance with what an infallible, a Divine teacher
has sanctioned? — language which can scarcely fail to mislead
many who hear him, and which is in itself adapted to mislead
aU ? If he does not intend to intimate that any thing short
of the enlightened and unfeigned belief of the gospel will
bring a sinner into personal union with the Saviour, the ques
tion returns, " Why, then, does he continue the use of -such
equivocal phraseology?" If, on the contrary, he really designs
to teach, that a man who does not actually reject and contra
dict the gospel, though he may not sincerely believe it, is in a
state of salvation, he perverts the Scriptures altogether : and
let his intention be what it may, the phraseology adopted by
him can scarcely fail to operate unfavourably, both upon him
self and others ; — to induce, if frequently employed, a partial
forgetfulness of the important sentiment, that nothing short
of that entire and unfeigned belief which brings the truth into
contact with the soul, which enables the mind to feed upon it,
and so to incorporate it into the spiritual system, as that it
shall prove the source of purity, and self-denial, and watchful
ness, and activity, can be of any avail to an individual, either
in this world, or that which is to come.
In the second place, saving faith includes in it not only
more than assent to the great facts of the gospel, but more
than a mere belief of those facts. There are, indeed, many
who do not allow this, — who cannot persuade themselves that
any unconverted man can truly believe the great doctrines of
the Saviour's divinity, for instance, his incarnation, atone
ment, intercession, &c. It were impossible, say the objectors,

278 FAITH IS MORE THAN BELIEF OF THE FACTS, &C.
that they should remain unaffected by these solemn and glori
ous truths, if they really gave credit to them. I am con
strained to think differently. I see no difficulty in supposing,
and no reason whatever to doubt, that, as far as an uncon
verted man can understand the gospel, he may believe it. He
has, indeed, no spiritual knowledge of the gospel, — no proper
conception of the import of its doctrines, of their unrivalled
glory, and infinite importance ; and, of course, he has no faith
in reference to these things. But to say that unconverted
men have no knowledge of the facts of the gospel, — no ac
quaintance with the theory of Divine truth in general, — is to
affirm what universal experience contradicts. Now, if they
possess knowledge, why not faith? Why may they not be
lieve the facts of the gospel, as these facts stand in the view of
their minds, as well as understand them ? They are not more
incapable of faith than of knowledge ; for " the natural man
receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God — neither can he
know them, for they are spiritually discerned." I see no
reason whatever to suppose that certain writers, who have ably
advocated some of the doctrines of the gospel, while, alas ! they
have given us little reason to hope that they were regene
rated men, had the consciousness of hypocrisy in what they
were doing, — were the false advocates of sentiments which in
no sense they believed. Why should it be doubted that their
faith was of equal extent with their knowledge ? But, though
possessing both, they were not saved by either, because after
all they did not know, and consequently could not believe, the
gospel ; since to have faith, as we have seen, is not merely to
beUeve the facts of the gospel, but the meaning of the gospel;
it is to give credit to the gospel, as it appears to an individual
whose mind has been enlightened by the Holy Spirit, to per
ceive its unrivalled glory, and its infinite importance. Nothing
but faith in the gospel thus understood, carries with it any
sanctifying influence upon the heart. The mere belief of the
facts of the gospel will no more sanctify, than a mere know
ledge of the theory of the gospel. Both are vain, uninfluen-
tial, profitless.

REDUNDANT STATEMENTS. 279
II. Secondly, There are writers who, in their statements of
the nature of faith, err by redundancy, instead of defect. In
this class may be placed,
First, Those who contend that assurance, or an unwavering
confidence of personal acceptance with God, enters into the
nature of faith ; so that if a person hesitates to appropriate the
language of the apostle, and to say, in all that fulness of mean
ing which a Calvinist attaches to the words, " Christ loved
me, and gave himself for me," he is destitute of the faith of
God's elect.
Much ingenuity and much mystification have been displayed,
in the attempt to support this position ; yet, it is greatly to
be wondered at, that this view of the nature of faith should be
entertained by any persons to whom accuracy of conception is
not impossible. The foUowing arguments, amongst others,
may be urged against it.
First, The Bible contains no revelation in reference to any
individual, that Christ died with the intention of saving him.
The testimony of the gospel is not that Jesus Christ came into
the world to save John Owen, or John Wesley, or Andrew
Fuller, but to save believing sinners ; and, therefore, the faith
of the gospel is not the belief that John Owen, or John Wesley,
or Andrew FuUer, shaU be saved, but that beUevers shall be
saved. It may, indeed, be a certain truth, that Christ died
with the purpose of saving John Owen, and the knowledge of
that truth may be essential to the permanent peace and hap
piness of John Owen ; but stiU it is not that truth which is
emphatically denominated the good news, i. e., the gospel.
The tidings which appropriate to themselves that delightful
epithet, are contained in the foUowing words of our Lord:
" God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son,
that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have
everlasting life." This is the gospel ; and, accordingly, to be
a subject of faith in the gospel, is to believe this, and neither
more nor less than this. It is not to believe that I am a be
liever, for that, though it be true, is not the gospel ; it is to
believe the good news : and it is not a part of the good news
that I am a believer, but that, if such be indeed the case, I

280 FAITH DOES NOT INCLUDE ASSURANCE.
am personally accepted of God, and that, being kept by the
grace of Christ, I shall at length " appear with him in glory."
In the first act of faith it is utterly impossible that the sub
ject of our faith, i. e., the thing believed, can be that we are in a
state of acceptance with God, because that fact, if it were a
fact, is not revealed ; and faith is not the belief of any pro
position, even though it should be true, but the belief of some
truth contained in the Scriptures — the belief of God's testi
mony concerning his Son ; and that testimony is not that we
are believers, — that we shall be saved; but that Christ died
to save all who put their trust in him. And if in the first
act of faith the subject of our faith, i. e., the thing beheved, is
not our own acceptance with God, it cannot be such in any
subsequent act of faith; or it would follow, that what we
first believed was not the gospel, or that the gospel undergoes
a change after we have given our confidence to it, — which is
absurd. We must, in short, either make a gospel for ourselves,
Or admit that the primary act of faith has no foundation to
rest upon, i. e., exists without a cause, before we can con
sistently maintain that assurance enters into the nature of
faith. There is no intention, in what has been said, to intimate
that it is impossible for an individual to obtain a settled con
fidence of his own acceptance with God; or that the attain
ment is not to be eminently desired. The single fact, that the
apostle exhorts to " show diligence to the full assurance of
hope," proves both that it may be secured, and that it will
repay the labour of acquisition. Nor is it further intended
to deny, that incipient assurance accompanies the first act of
believing ; for that is admitted to be the case. It is probable,
indeed, perhaps certain, that what is ordinarily called assur
ance, and which may exist in different degrees, is invariably
proportioned to the degree of knowledge and faith. The
thing denied is, that assurance is identical with faith — that it
enters into the essence of faith. The thing affirmed is, that
to believe that we are believers, or Christians, or in a state of
acceptance with God, is a different; thing from believing the
gospel; that the knowledge of our own justification must be

MISTAKES OF BARCLAY. 281
gathered as an inference from the fact of our believing ; and
that it is built upon all the evidence, whether of conscious
ness or of experience, which exists in support of that fact.
" Nothing can be more evident," says Dr. Russel, " than
that whatever God calls us to believe must be already true,
and therefore true, whether we believe it or not; and that
before we can believe it, evidence of its truth must be given
us. But it is not true that a man is a Christian, till he believe
the Divine testimony; and therefore his believing that he
is a Christian, or, in other words, that he is a believer, can be
no part of the faith of the gospel." " Our persuasion or con
viction of the fact that we are Christians, is not properly faith
at all," (because not revealed.) " It is rather a knowledge of
this fact, arising from our own immediate sensations or con
sciousness, which springs from the nature of the impressions
made upon us by the general declaration of the gospel, and
not from any thing like a direct testimony from heaven,
respecting us in particular. When this conviction is well
founded, it is the fruit of faith, and not faith itself." (Letters,
vol. ii., p. 128.)
Were we not well aware how difficult it is to analyze any
operation of the mind which is in the slightest degree com
plex, we might feel more astonishment than we do, to find
Mr. John Barclay maintaining, that he, and Christians in
general, gather their assurance of their own justification, along
with their knowledge of the resurrection of Christ, from the
direct testimony of God. Why, how can he do that, seeing
that God has not testified that John Barclay is justified ?
How can he gather from the Divine testimony what that tes
timony does not contain ? How bring out of the Scripture
what is not in it? He obviously confounds an inference
drawn from the testimony of God, with that testimony itself ;
and practically forgets the very important fact, that however
undeniable may be our deductions from Scripture, they are
not Scripture. " All who believe the record," says Mr.
Barclay, " are justified,—/ believe the record, therefore I
believe I am justified." Now, which of the three foregoing
propositions stands on the direct testimony of God ? Obviously,
2 L

282 FAITH DOES NOT INCLUDE
the first' only. In what part of the Bible does the Divine
Being testify, that John Barclay believes the record, and that
consequently John Barclay shall be saved ? He gathered from
consciousness, experience, &c, the assurance of his own faith ;
and then, . since the Divine testimony declares that all be
lievers are justified, he inferred that he, being a believer, was
justified. Secondly, Assurance (i. e., in the sense in which the word is
taken in this controversy) cannot enter into the nature of
faith, because believers are exhorted in the word of God to
seek, that' they may attain it. " Wherefore, the rather,
brethren," says the apostle Peter, (2 Epis. 1 chap. ver. 10,)
" give diligence to make your calling and election sure," i. e.,
obvious, and certain, both to yourselves and others. In the
same manner also the apostle Paul, writing to the Hebrews,
says, " And we desire that every one of you do show the same
diligence to the full assurance of hope unto the end." (Chap.
vi. 11.) Now these exhortations necessarily suppose, that the
persons to whom they were addressed were not in possession
of assurance in this sense, though they were not totally desti
tute of 'hope in ' the great salvation. And yet they were
believers, having attained like precious faith with the apostles;
i. e'., they were exhorted to seek to attain what, according to
the sentiment opposed, they already possessed, it being neces
sarily implied in their faith, or rather entering into its very
nature. Thirdly, Assurance cannot enter into the nature of faith,
because there are many believers who are destitute of it. I
am well aware that the premises here may be disputed, and
therefore the argument shall be put in a different form. It is
obvious, then, that we must either reject the notion, that assur
ance enters into the nature of faith — or deny that any who
are destitute of assurance, are Christians. The latter I find
it impossible to do. Not a few individuals known to me have
given every evidence of conversion to God short of being able
to say with steady and unhesitating confidence, " He loved
me, and gave himself for me." Some of the most holy,
devoted, spiritually-minded persons, with whom it has been

ASSURANCE. 283
my privilege to be acquainted, were seldom able to rise above
a hope that aU would prove well with them at the last. It
is surely not necessary to call the existence of real religion,
in such cases, into question ; though it should be admitted,
that the actual state of mind described, results from mis
takes in reference to some part, or parts, of Divine truth;—
mistakes, however, which rather affect the comfort than the
safety, of such as are unhappily the subjects of them. It is
easy for a rigid adherent of system to affirm, that all who have
not assurance have not faith; but it is not so easy even for
him to believe it. The necessity which, as he conceives, lies
upon him to admit a dogma which would go to unchristianize
so many professing Christians, arises. from confounding two
things which are essentially different, viz., doubting ourselves,1
and doubting the truth of the Divine testimony. It is pos
sible that persons may not be confident that they have the
knowledge and faith which are stated to be essential to salva
tion ; while there exists no shadow of doubt in their minds
that, if this be truly the case with them, they are delivered
from condemnation. That God will save all who repent and
believe, may stand in their minds as an unquestioned fact,
while they have not, it may be, full confidence that they are
penitents and believers. There must be faith in the mind — :
and therefore their state may be safe — or they could have no
confidence of the final safety of penitents and believers, for
it is from faith that this confidence arises. But it does not
follow, that they must possess at the moment satisfactory evi
dence that faith is in the riiind; — at any rate, that faith
which is connected with salvation, and which gives credit, as
we have seen, not merely to the facts of the gospel, but to
their supreme importance, and unrivalled <glory.

LECTURE XVIII.

JUSTIFICATION.
THE MEANS OF JUSTIFICATION CONTINUED.
Having shown that faith is the medium of interest in the
Lord Jesus Christ, we proceeded, in the last Lecture, to in
quire into its nature. On this point it was stated, that faith
consists in the belief of the testimony of God concerning his
Son, the spiritual meaning, and evidence, and glory of that
testimony being unveiled to the mind by the power of the
Holy Spirit. This account of its nature was placed in the
light or contrast with the statement of those writers who err
by defect, and of those again who err by redundancy.
Among the former are to be ranked, it was said, the San-
demanians ; and, among the latter, those who identify faith
and assurance. In the class of writers who, on this subject,
err by redundancy, I also include,
Secondly, those who represent certain affections, which
accompany the belief of the gospel, as entering into the very
nature of faith. It is not here meant to deny, with the San-
demanians, that there is any thing of true holiness in faith ;
nor need we do this to support the doctrine of justification by
grace. On the contrary, as God commands nothing which is
not spiritually good, and as he has commanded men to believe
on his Son, there can be no doubt that faith is a holy act of
the mind ; but then surely it must be an intellectual act, and
not an exercise of the will or affections, though it may be
induced by them. The apostle, indeed, says, that we " believe
with the heart unto righteousness ;" but he obviously means to
represent the faith which is connected with salvation as an
unfeigned faith, in opposition to a mere verbal profession of

FAITH AN INTELLECTUAL ACT. 285
faith. He is not to be understood as literally affirming,
that faith is an exercise of the affections ; for it is not more
absurd to say that we perceive with the affections, and
love with the intellect, or see with the nose, than to maintain
that we literally believe with the heart. There can be no
doubt, indeed, that faith is influenced by the state of the
heart ; or springs out of that primary operation of the Spirit
of God upon the mind, which is the source of every thing
spiritually good in the human character, but, to represent
it as having its seat any where except in the understanding —
or, as that phraseology is unmeaning,^ as being any other
than an intellectual act, or state of mind, is equally at
variance with just views of mental science, and with the
general tenour of Divine revelation. Some writers, indeed,
represent faith as a cordial or joyful reception of the gospel ;
and since these words express an emotion of the heart,
they maintain that faith is not a mere intellectual act, but
that a degree of feeling or emotion enters into its very nature :
there is no need, however, of any very extraordinary powers
of analysis to show that they are mistaken. To prevent mis
conception, let it be observed, that I by no means mean to
deny that there is an acquiescence of the heart in the gospel
method of salvation, wherever the faith which justifies exists.
It is fully admitted, on the contrary, that cordiality and joy
must accompany the admission of the truth into the mind;
but it is not necessary, surely, to represent these emotions as
entering into the nature of faith. They have manifestly a dif
ferent origin. Faith is produced by the evidence — cordiality,
or joy, by the excellence — of the gospel. When the Holy
Spirit takes the veil from the heart of a sinner, he discerns
the evidence and excellence of the gospel at the same moment.
He does not believe it without joy, because it is infinitely ex
cellent and important ; but still the joy does not enter into
the essence of the faith, any more than the faith enters into
the essence of the joy. The latter is kindled by the excel
lence, the former by the truth, of the gospel. As the gospel
is glad tidings, there must be cordiality of heart towards it
when its meaning, and evidence, and importance, are made to

286 FAITH DOES NOT INCLUDE EMOTION,
appear to the mind ; but the act of giving credit to its truth
is not modified by the nature of its tidings. Whatever be the
nature of a report, the act of believing it is the same. It is
not modified by the tidings it brings, be they good or bad; as
the act of seeing is not modified by the objects, we perceive, be
they distressing or delightful. Undoubtedly, the complex state
of mind produced by a report, powerfully adapted to awaken
feeling, is modified by the character of the report. . In addi
tion to faith,- there will, in that case, be cordiality, if the report
announce that certain important blessings are in reserve for
us ; and antipathy, if it be the foreteller of disappointment and
misery. Nor is it less certairi that the delightful character of
the report will render us prone to receive, and the opposite
character to reject it. But stilLthe mere act of believing it, if
the evidence be so overpowering as to vanquish the reluctance
to receive it, is precisely the same in the latter case as in the
former. It is in both cases an intellectual act, and an intel
lectual act alone.
In reference to faith, in general, it has been said, and cor
rectly said, to be a simple act of the mind, of which, of course,
no definition can be given. We must perform the act of be
lieving before it can be understood ; .and none who have per
formed it can be at any loss respecting its nature. Now, if
any one will consult the evidence of consciousness, he must be
convinced, it is apprehended, that faith is an intellectual act or
state of mind ; that as little of emotion enters into its nature,
as into an act of judgment. Indeed, it may be doubted, whe
ther there is so much difference between an act of judgment,
and an act of faith, as is sometimes imagined. Take one of
the simplest cases for the sake of illustration. A report is
brought to us, that a certain individual, in certain circum
stances, acted in a certain manner. We think of the charac
ter of the individual, of -the circumstances in which he was
placed, of the manner in which he is said to have acted, and
we see, or fancy we see, that his reported conduct harmonizes
with his character and circumstances. Now, is it of much
consequence whether vve say we judge, or believe, that the
event happened ? What really takes place in the mind but

BUT IS AN INTELLECTUAL ACT. 287
the recognition of a relation ? The relation of congruity be
tween his reported" conduct arid his character, &c. It is ge
nerally said,' that faith is built upon evidence ; that we first
perceive the evidence in support of a report or a proposition,
and then receive it as true. It may be' doubted, however,
whether we have not, in this statement, words, arid nothing
but words. What is the evidence of which it speaks? What
is it in the illustration employed a short- time ajgo ? Is it any
thing more than the harmony which exists between the cha*
racter, circumstances, &c, and actions of the individual in
question ? And, if this be correct, what is the faith which is
said to be built upon this evidence, but the recognition' ofthe
harmony itself ? that is, the recognition of a relation, which has
never, I believe, been doubted to be an intellectual act or
state of mind.
It will, however, be generally admitted, that the term
" faith," when used in relation to any but religious subjects,
denotes an intellectual act merely ; while it is maintained;
that in the Scriptures there is' a departure from its ordinary
signification. In' the Bible it is thought to include more than
the belief of the gospel ; and, perhaps, the general opinion,
in reference to the additional item, is, that it consists of trust
in Christ for salvation. A distinction is made between believ
ing the doctrines of Christ, and trusting in the person of
Christ ; and, though it is admitted that the former is included
in the latter, it is contended that the belief of the doctrines
does not ripen into saving faith, until it issue in this confi
dence in Christ personally considered. In support of • this
opinion an' appeal is' made to those passages which represent
trust in God, and Christ, as essential to salvation — to others,
which' speak of receiving Christ, and believing in him, &c.
On these statements the attention of the reader is requested
to the following remarks : —
First, It is very unlikely that Jehovah, in communicating
his revealed will to men, would employ words, without neces
sity, in a sense different from that which they ordinarily bear.
The intention of the Divine Being must have been to be un
derstood ; but what could be so likely to frustrate that purpose
as to deviate, without apprising' us of the fact, from the ordi-

288 SCRIPTURE USES WORDS IN TI-IF.IR ORDINARY SENSE.
nary signification of terms, in the revelation which he makes to
us? There is no formal definition of faith in the whole of the
inspired volume. The passage, in the epistle to the Hebrews,
" Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence
of things not seen," is rather a description of faith, a state
ment of what it does, than of what it is. We are left, there
fore, without any rule to form our opinions concerning the
meaning of the term, if we are not to be guided by the sense
which it bears when used in reference to other matters. We
are said to be justified by faith. The apostles were com
manded to preach the gospel to all creatures, and to declare,
that whosoever believed it should be saved. Now, if the word
faith, or belief, in these and in innumerable other cases, means
something very different from faith in its ordinary use, how
shall we clear the language of Divine revelation from the
charge of being adapted to deceive ?
Secondly, There is no necessity to suppose any thing of the
kind. Granting that faith in the doctrines of the gospel, and
trust in Christ personally considered, are different things, yet
as the latter must be inseparably connected with the former,
it is by no means surprising that the sacred writers should de
clare "trust in Christ" to be essential to salvation, (as is obe
dience,) while they may not have intended to intimate, and
we think did not intend to intimate, that it enters into the
essence of faith. " The belief of the gospel is necessarily con
nected with trust in the work of the Saviour. This arises
from the nature of the thing believed, which is good news, and
includes promises the most interesting to us ;" — " so glorious,
suitable, and interesting, are the declarations and blessings of
the gospel, and such the glory of the Saviour's work of which
it testifies, that the belief of it must be accompanied with the
relinquishment of every false ground of confidence, and with
trust in the atonement for the present and final blessedness of
the soul. Persuaded of the truth that salvation is to be had
through Christ, the sinner comes to him, or trusts the salva
tion of his soul in his hands. The one perfect offering of the
Son of God becomes thus the sole ground on which the mind
rests its hopes of mercy." Exhortations to believe in Christ,
and to trust in him, are given indiscriminately in the Scripture.

TRUSTING IN CHRIST, &C. 289
" The latter exercise is, strictly speaking, tlie effect of the for
mer," and the two are always combined. "So long as the truth
is not understood and believed, it will not be confided in ; but
as soon as believed, it will become an object of trust. In Scrip
ture, faith accordingly is considered as having its immediate
issue in coming to Christ; and hence is' treated as the same
thing. A knowledge of the unlimited bounty of Heaven,
and of Jesus, as the dispenser of this bounty, is necessarily
followed by an application to him. In coming to Christ, we
rest our eternity on him as the foundation which has been laid
in Zion, in opposition to all other grounds of confidence.
This calms the mind, and inspires it with the purest principles
of obedience. Having committed all to the Redeemer, we go
forward in the firm persuasion that our all is safe." (Russell's
Letters, vol. ii., pp. 106 — 116.)'
Thirdly, It may be fairly doubted, I think, whether a broader
line of distinction has not been made by riiany writers between
believing the gospel, i. e., the doctrines of the gospel, and
coming to Christ, trusting in him, than the truth of the case
warrants. What is it, for instance, to trust in Christ that he
will pardon our sins, but to believe that he will perform the
promises he has made to those who apply to him ? And is
this any thing different from believing the promises themselves?
What is it not to rest upon our own works as the ground of
acceptance with God, but to believe that God will not treat
any one as righteous for the sake of what he hirhself does, and
so to derive no hope personally from that quarter, i. e., to be
lieve the gospel ? What is it to rest on the atonement of
Christ as j;he only rock of confidence, but to believe, on the
other hand, that, in connexion with his previous obedience, it
constitutes the one great work for the sake of which the guilty
are accepted, and so to derive from this source all our hope of
salvation ? I question much if the phrases, " believing in
Christ," " trusting in Christ," denote more than a belief of the
gospel in its application to us personally, and the latter, perhaps,
hope of individual^salvation as the result of faith. That relin
quishment of every false ground of hope, and trust in the atone
ment of Christ, of which Dr. Russell speaks, seems to' me to
2 M

290 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NOMINAL AND SAVING FAITH
denote ceasing to expect and to hope for salvation from the one
quarter, and beginning to expect and hope for it from the other.
The faith of the gospel is, then, the belief of the gospel,
understanding the term "belief" in its ordinary sense; a belief
however, which requires for its existence the special influence
of the Holy Spirit, without which the doctrines of the gospel
are never understood, and, therefore, will not be believed. The
difference between the faith of a real Christian, and of a mere
professor, is in the subject of faith — the thing believed, — and
not in the act of believing. It is not that there is joy, com
placency, acquiescence of heart, in the faith of one, and none of
these emotions in that of the other; for the act of believing,
like the act of perceiving, &c, must be in all cases the same.
Nor does the difference consist in this, viz., that the Christian
trusts or believes in the person of Christ, while the nominal
Christian only believes the doctrines of Christ; for the latter
is never the case. The difference is, that the one believes the
gospel, and the other does not. The one believes the meaning
which God intended to convey in it, — the other believes the
meaning which he himself has attached to it.
There can be little doubt that the conception of different
kinds of faith, such as speculative and practical, historical and
saving, &c, and, indeed, all the notions which have existed
with reference to a difference in the act of faith itself, as put
forth by a real Christian, and a mere professor, owe their exist
ence to a desire to account for the different effects of faith on
different individuals. Here are two men, both of whom appear
to understand the gospel, and both profess to believe it. The
conduct of one is regulated by its precepts, while that of the
other is not. The conclusion has therefore been, that the latter
individual believes the gospel in the wrong way, or has not the
right kind of faith ; whereas the conclusion should have been,
that he believes the wrong gospel; or, in other words, that the
thing believed is not the truth as it is in Jesus. No mistake
can be greater than that which ascribes the difference in the re
sults, to some difference in the faith, understanding by the term,
the act of believing. For the practical effect of faith is, in all
cases, to be ascribed not to the act of believing, but to the thing

IS IN THE THING BELIEVED. 291
believed. I believe, we will suppose, that there are mount
ains in the moon ; the belief is followed by no results, because
the truth, to which credit is given, is not adapted to produce
any. I believe that the roof of the house in which I am sitting
is about to fall; I immediately rush out, because the truth
credited is fitted to excite alarm, and precipitate retreat. I
believe that God hath reconciled the world to himself by
Christ Jesus ; I rejoice, and the joy springs from the report it
self. It is not to be traced to the act of faith by which it is
admitted into the mind ; for that is only the instrument by
which, in all cases, the truth to which credit is given is brought
into contact with the mind. In vision, it is the thing seen.
and not the act of seeing, which produces the effect upon the
mind. Just so it is in believing. It is the truth perceived
and believed, and not the act of perceiving or believing it, that
effects, in the hand of the Holy Spirit, so mighty a change in
the experience and character of the individual who receives it.
In reference to the three cases just alluded to, it is abundantly
manifest that faith is not inert in the first instance, and active in
the second, because the approaching fall of the roof is cordially
believed, while the existence of mountains in the moon is not
cordially believed ; for if there were cordiality in either case, it
would be surely in the latter, and not in the former. And in
the third case, though there is cordiality, i. e., though the report
of the gospel is welcomed into the mind, the joy which subse
quently pervades the mind is not to be ascribed to the man
ner of its entrance, but to the good news it brings. " The
influence of faith," says Dr. Russell, " arises from the nature
of the thing believed. If we credit good news, we rejoice ;
if bad news, we are grieved. If we believe a threatening,
and are unable to avoid the suspending evil, we are afraid. If
we believe the promise of a trifle, we are little affected ; but if
we credit that of an invaluable gift, we are quite elated; we
rely on him who made it, and we. expect the promised good
according to his word. Thus it is the nature of the thing be
lieved, and the concern we have in it, from which the influence
of faith springs. There is an exact correspondence between
the former and the latter of these, whatever be the object of

292 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NOMINAL AND SAVING FAITH.
belief." And again, "All the glory and excellency of the
gospel is in itself; and, therefore, ought not to be distinguished
from it. The truth, then, cannot be said to be believed, un
less its glory and importance be so. The difference between
believers and others, lies in the different apprehensions which
they have of the same object. In the eyes of one, the gospel,
in its true nature, appears to be foolishness ; in the eyes of the
other, it appears to be full of heavenly wisdom and glory.
The reason why the former deems it foolishness is, that he is
governed by sin; while the latter is brought by Divine teaching
to have a just apprehension of the character of God as revealed
in Christ. That system with which the carnal mind is delighted
cannot be the truth in its genuine purity and excellence, but
a system congenial with some or other of the evil principles of
the heart. To such a mind the true glory of the truth does
not appear, and error is embraced in its stead. The faith of
the gospel is, of course, a conviction of its truth, arising from
a spiritual discernment of such a glory, wisdom, and excellence
in it, as satisfies the mind that a scheme, at once so' glorious
in itself, and so adapted to the relations, both of God and of
man, could of course have no other than God for its author."
(Letters, vol. ii., pp. 102—104.)
Thus also Mr. Erskine: — "A true faith does not properly
refer to the mode of believirig, but to the object believed.
It means the belief of a true thing ; as a correct memory refers
to the accurate representation of the fact remembe.red. It
means the remembrance of a thing as it happened. When
we say, that a man has a wrong belief of a thing, we ought to
mean, merely that he does not believe the thing which really
happened. But," he adds, " is there no such thing as a wrong
or false way of believing what is true? Let us question two
of our acquaintances separately as to their religious belief,
concerning God, and eternity, and their own duties, and their
own hopes: the answers thewgive are, in substance, the same ;
and yet their paths of life are diametrically opposite : the- life
of the one is in harmony with the belief which he professes,
the other's not. They are both incapable of deceit ; how then
are we to account for this difference, except we suppose that

IMPORTANCE OF THESE VIEWS. 293
there is a right arid a wrong way of believing the same thing?
This is certainly a very important question, and it seems to
me capable of a very satisfactory solution. Although these
persons use similar language, and appear to believe the same
things, , yet in reality they differ essentially in the subject
matter of their belief. The one, in short, believes the gospel ;
the other does not."
The' views thus developed of the nature of faith are of great
practical importance. Let us suppose' the case of an indivi
dual who professes to have received the gospel, but is mani
festly not living under its irifluence. He is told by some,, that
he has not believed the gospel aright, or has not the right
kind of faith; by others, that it is not the gqspel that he
believes, or that he has not those views of its excellence, im
portance, and glory, which are possessed, by real Christians.
The tendency of the former exhortation is manifestly to lead
him to look into himself; of the latter, to re-examine the gospel,
that he may discover the nature and source of his mistake.
Now, from which of these modes of procedure is he likely to
derive the most good ? What conceivable benefit can he gain
from the former? Suppose that from self-examination he
should come to the conviction, that he has not cordially
received the truth, not mingled love, or joy, or trust, with Ms
faith ; would he be likely to acquire, or be in the way of
acquiring, these feelings by watching and examining the
exercises of his own mind? As well might a man attempt
to invigorate his physical system by watching, if he could do
it, the process of digestion, instead of taking food. On the
contrary, if he be convinced that the gospel'does not irifluence
his mind, because some radical misconception mingles itself
with his views of its nature, the conviction has a direct ten
dency to send him to the Bible, the only instrumental source
of spiritual knowledge ; and, if at all seriously impressed with
reference to eternity, to the throne of grace, that God would
open his eyes to behold these wondrous things in his law and
his gospel, which have never been apparent to his view, arid
which alone can save him from the love and practice bf sin.
On this point I have great pleasure in introducing the' follow-

294 THE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE
ing statements, with which I most fully coincide, from the
writings of Erskine, Russell, and Wardlaw. " Theological
writers have distinguished and described different kinds of
faith, as speculative, practical, historical, saving, and realizing
faith. It would be of little consequence what names we gave
to faith, or to any thing else, provided these names did not in
terfere with the distinctness of our ideas of the things to which
they are attached ; but as we must be sensible that they do
very much interfere with these ideas, we ought to be upon our
guard against any false impressions which may be received
from an incorrect use of them. Is it not evident that this
way of speaking has a direct tendency to draw the attention
away from the thing to be believed, and to engage it in a
fruitless examination of the mental operation of believing?
And yet, is it not true, that we see and hear of more anxiety
amongst religious persons about their faith being of the right
kind, than about their believing the right things ? A sincere
man, who has never questioned the Divine authority of the
Scriptures, and who can converse and reason well on its doc
trines, finds, perhaps, that the state of his mind, and the tenour
of his life, do not agree with Scripture rule. He is very sensible
that there is an error somewhere, but instead of suspecting
that there is something in the very essentials of Christian
doctrine, which he has never yet understood thoroughly, the
probability is, that he, and his advisers, if he ask advice, come
to the conclusion that his faith is of a wrong kind; that it is
speculative, or historical, and not true saving faith. Of
course, this conclusion sends him not to the study of the
Bible, but to the investigation of his own feelings, or rather
of the laws of his own mind. He leaves that truth which
God has revealed and blessed as the medicine of our nature,
and bewilders himself in a metaphysical labyrinth." (Essay,
pp. 9-11.)
" To the Saviour, as thus revealed, the Scriptures call upon all
to come. Do not, then, perplex yourself with questions about
the manner of believing, but consider what it is you are called
to believe. Instead of disquieting yourself about the manner
of coming to Christ, think on him who invites you to come to

OF THESE VIEWS OF FAITH. 295
him, — think of his atonement and the love there displayed, —
think on the many proofs which have been given of his
sacrifice, in his resurrection and glory ; and in the many pro
mises of salvation through faith in him. You know that you are
no farther conscious of seeing an object than as it affects you ;
and, in like manner, you are not conscious of. believing any
declaration made to you, any further than as what you believe
impresses you. In the former case you are not, in looking at
some interesting object, thinking of the manner of your seeing
it, but of the thing seen; in the latter, you are not think
ing of the manner of believing the declaration credited by
you, but of the thing credited. In like manner, in believing
the gospel, the mind is occupied with the thing believed, and
not with the manner of believing it. We cannot dwell on
thoughts of the mode in which we see an object, without for
getting, in a measure, the object itself; and so, if we are en
grossed with questions respecting the right mode of believing,
the great truth to be believed is lost sight of; and, being so,
it cannot affect us. Of course, there is no wonder that then
we cease to derive peace, comfort, or purity from it. The
mind is conscious of believing the gospel, just in proportion
to the degree of its faith ; or, in other words, in proportion to
the measure in which it is affected by the truth. The great
thing then, is, to keep the soul fixed upon the object of belief."
(Russell's Letters, vol. i., pp. 50, 51.)
" Faith, whether considered as justifying, or as sanctifying,
or as imparting the hope of futurity, derives its appropriate
ness and its efficacy from the nature of the truth believed.
From that it never should be separated in our conceptions of
it ; for from that it never can be separated in actual subsist
ence. There is this difference, amongst others, frequently
observable, between the statements of the Divine word, and
those of human systems of doctrine professedly founded upon
it, — that in the latter there is a great deal said about the
manner of believing, — about what faith is, as a metaphysical
act of the mind, — about how a sinner is to believe, not as it
respects the spiritual and practical influence of his faith, but
as it respects the process of mind in believing ; — whereas in

296 THE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE
the former there is nothing whatever of this kind ; it dwells
upon the matter, rather than the manner ; it teaches us what
we are to believe, rather than how we are to believe it. In
human systems, we have distinctions, without end, of faith into
ever so many kinds, and modes, and actings, such as have often
been found exceedingly perplexing to the mind of the simple
inquirer. It cannot with truth be said of them, as it is said
of the word of the Lord, that their entrance " giveth light
unto the simple." The Scriptures, on the contrary, are occu
pied with the testimony itself. Of it they give a full and
clear exhibition ; but there are to be found in them no
puzzling metaphysics about the mental process of believing it,
and directions as to the manner in which that process is to be
set about and effected. All is plain. The testimony is pre
sented on the authority of God ; — sinners are invited to con
sider and believe it, — and the practical effects are detailed by
which the faith of it must be followed and manifested.",
(Vide Wardlaw's Essays on the Assurance of Faith, &c,
pp. 59, 60.)
The tendency of these views of the nature of faith to send a
mere nominal Christian to the gospel to discover where the
defect lies, — and a real believer to the same source, that he
may obtain the renewal of joy when he has lost it, constitute,
in my judgment, one of their strongest recommendations to
general reception. Not so, however, thinks one of the op
ponents of Mr. Erskine, the Rev. James Carlile, of Dublin.
He says, that the directions which the former gives for cor
recting defects in faith, are of an intellectual kind. Quoting
the following passage from Mr. Erskine, — "Let the reader
pause and ask himself, how far his faith is conversant with
words, and how far with things. If peace, and conformity to
the will of God, do not result from your faith, look again at
the gospel, for you have not yet come in contact with it."
" We hear the gospel with carelessness and indifference, per
haps with scorn and indignation, or we are indolent in the
enjoyment of it. There is no other mode of recovery for a
mind in that state, than the contemplation of the proper
objects, that is, the doctrines of the gospel;" — Mr. Carlile

OF THESE VIEWS OF FAITH. ... 297
V ' . "'
says, " I will venture to say that the most pious of our older
divines would have treated the matter* differently ; and, I
conceive, more scripturally. They would have viewed a man
labouring under this spiritual darkness and insensibility, as the
apostles would have viewed the blind and paralytic persons in
Judea, while our blessed Lord was amongst them. They
would, indeed, have told him the truth respecting Jesus ; they
would have assured him of his mercy, his compassion, his
power, his willingness to open the eyes of the blind ; but the
object of all their efforts would have been to persuade him to
apply to Jesus himself personally, by earnest, believing prayer ;
not merely to bring his mind in contact with the truth, but
his heart with Jesus. And, if he still complained of his blind
ness and insensibility, they might, indeed, have cautioned him
against erroneous views of Christ ; but stiU the burden of their
exhortations would have been, Continue in prayer, go to him
again and again, keep by him, wait his time ; and they would
have assured him of being heard and answered at last.. And,
when they saw him thus looking to Jesus, praying to him,
trusting in him, waiting on him, they would say, not that he
was enjoying the fruits of his faith, but that he was exercising,
or, as they sometimes expressed it, acting faith on Christ;
and when, in answer to his faith and prayers, they saw him
advancing in spiritual light, and peace, and comfort, they
would then have said, Now are you enjoying the fruit of your
faith." (pp. 7—9.)
On this statement I remark,
First, That the comparison instituted between the blind
paralytic, and an individual in the case supposed by Mr. Car
lile, is obviously a most unfair one. There is not so broad a
line of distinction between a sinner's coming to Christ, trust
ing in him, &c, and believing the testimony of God concern
ing him ; as between this paralytic's crediting the reports of
the power of Christ, and going to him for a cure.
Secondly, I observe, that the language of Mr. Carlile seems
to imply that peace, and comfort, and joy, &c, are not neces
sarily experienced in believing, but that they are sovereign
gifts which God may withhold, and sometimes does withhold.
2 N

298 STATEMENTS OF MR. CARLILE.
though he usually, and always ultimately, bestows them as
the reward of faith. He represents a sinner looking to
Christ, praying to him, trusting in him, waiting on him, and
yet as being destitute of spiritual light, peace, and comfort;
but as finally brought to enjoy these in answer to his faith and
prayers. Now, if no more were meant by all this than that
true faith, which receives the gospel as far as it is understood,
may not, at its commencement, in consequence of remaining
darkness, bring all that peace to the mind which brighter dis
coveries of Divine truth will originate, no fault could be found
with the statement. That it does not do this, is strictly ac
cordant with the nature of things. But this, I apprehend, is
not Mr. Carlile's meaning. He thought, with some of the
old divines, that God comforts believers by a direct and so
vereign act of power, so that if they did not venture to say
that comfort might be enjoyed without faith, they did believe
the converse of this, viz., that faith may be possessed without
comfort. I have long regarded this as a mistaken notion,
and, in its practical influence, a very injurious one. Spiritual
light, and comfort, and joy, are doubtless to be ascribed to
God. But then he 'does not originate them in the minds of
men in a manner which is at variance with his usual mode of
proceeding. It is his general practice to work by means. In
the infinite multitude of changes and effects, in the material
and the spiritual world, which are all to be traced to him, I
can only fix upon two that can be ascribed to his direct agency,
— the creation of the material universe, and the new creation
of a soul to God. In both these cases, the idea of instrument
ality, in my view of the case, is utterly excluded. Every
where else instrumentality is quite apparent. God enlightens
us by means of the sun ; he nourishes us by means of food.
In the spiritual world he illuminates, and sanctifies, and com
forts, and makes us meet for heaven, by means of Divine truth.
And the object which the means are intended to secure, is
united with the use of these means, in indissoluble bonds.
We cannot, on the one hand, have the light, and purity, and
joy, of which we have just been speaking, without the belief
of the truth; nor can we, on the other hand, believe the

MISTAKE INVOLVED IN THEM. 299
truth, without the enjoyment of these blessings. There must
be some defect in the views, or in the faith, probably in both,
of that man who has no spiritual light, comfort, and joy. The
proximate cause of the defect is here. Nothing can be more
unquestionable than the statement of Mr. Erskine, that if
peace and conformity to the wiU of God do not result from the
professed faith of an individual, his mind has not come in con
tact with the gospel ; and there is no possibility of bringing
him out of that state, but by bringing him into contact with
the gospel ; and that if the influence of the gospel upon the
heart and conduct of an individual be but partial, there is no
way of recovering him from that state, but by bringing his
mind more entirely into contact with the gospel. It is always
well to guard against using language improperly strong; yet
I am sure we may not say that, constituted as the mind
of man now is, there is no other mode of recovery which it is
competent to God himself to adopt. Omnipotence, we admit,
cannot make us happy without holiness; is it less difficult, I
would ask, the present constitution of the mind remaining, to
render us joyful without something to rejoice in? that is,
without a spiritual and believing apprehension of the gospel.
In dealing with the consciences of men, it is of vast import
ance to show them that the proximate or real cause of any
deficiency of spiritual light, comfort, and joy, or the total
want of it, is in themselves, in the neglect of duty on their
part ; or how shall we fix a sense of guilt in their consciences ?
To show that open transgressors, for instance, are destitute of
holy perceptions and holy feelings, because they neglect the
duty of believing on the Son of God; — that believers have less
knowledge and less enjoyment than it is desirable for them to
possess, because they do not receive with such unwavering
confidence, or contemplate so steadily and perseveringly, or
with a spirit so humble and teachable, and ardently desirous of
instruction and spiritual good, those blessed truths which are
the life and vigour of the soul, as it becomes them to do. In
all cases this is the proximate cause ; it is a cause in the
individual himself, and for the existence and influence of
which he stands guilty before God. No doubt there is a

300 MISTAKE OF . CARLILE, "
more ultimate cause, the neglect of prayer, in consequence
of which Divine influence is not imparted ; and a more ulti
mate cause still, in that sad depravity of our nature which
leads to the neglect of prayer. But still these causes are all.
in the individual himself, and so fix guUt upon him. But,
according to Mr. Carlile, this is not the case. The sinner,
according to him, looks to Jesus, prays to him, trusts in him,
waits upon him,' and still does not enjoy as yet the fruits of
faith in spiritual light, and peace, and comfort; that is, in
other terms,5 the sinner has exhausted his duty, arid yet does
not obtain that which he is commanded to exercise conti
nually ; for the Divine precept is, " Rejoice in the Lord
always; and again I say, Rejoice." On what ground, then,
can we charge guilt upon him ? On the other hand, if it be
the case that Jehovah illuminates, and sanctifies, and com
forts, and carries on, in short, the whole work of salvation in
the hearts of men by instrumentality, or means, which always
lead to the result when rightly employed, we may affirm with
confidence that a sinner is not saved, and that a believer is
not eminently sanctified, because they do not use those means
at all, or do not use them aright, in the use of which alone
God imparts the blessing.
It is a misrepresentation, on the part of Mr. Carlile, of
Mr. Erskine, or at least of Mr. Erskine's sentiments, to allege
that the only directions which he gives for correcting defects
in faith are of an intellectual kind. What is to hinder Mr.
Erskine, according to the system which he adopts, from ex- <
horting the sinner, while he tells him that his heart has not
pome into contact with the gospel, to look to Him who opens
the heart of man to receive Divine truth aright, in earnest and
fervent supplication, for that influence which will bring the
gospel to bear, with omnipotent force, upon his mind ? At
the same time, it is to be wished, that there .had been more of
this kind of exhortation in this devotional, eloquent, acute,
but, in many respects, imperfect and confused production of
Mr. Erskine's pen. Mr. Erskine appears to me to approach
rather too nearly to those who, in their rigid adherence to sys
tem, will not exhort a sinner to pray for Divine influence,

ERSKINE, &C. 301
because it is only the prayer of faith, which at present he is
supposed not to possess, that God can hear. .Now, I admit
the truth of this latter sentiment ; but who shaU say when the
first dawnings of faith begin to existrf in the mind ? If there
be any feeling on the part, of an individual that all is not well
with him, who shall say that the Spirit of. God is not at work ;
with his soul ? . Why negatively forbid such a man to pray, by
not urging him to it ? While directing him to the Scriptures,
as the source Of all spiritual illumination, how can it be wrong
to remind him, (what, indeed, so obviously proper and neces
sary?) that, if his prejudice and depravity be not counteracted
by the mighty agency of the Spirit of God, they will blind
his mind to the meaning of the Scriptures, and so prevent
their influence upon him ; and to urge him, by that consi
deration, to seek the exertion of that agency ? The effect is
likely to be good. The exhortation, while it humbles, will
Console him. " It will foster the rising spirit of dependence
and faith ; and who shall say that his petitions for direction,
though he may have but a very imperfect conception of the
way of acceptance with God — knowing and feeling scarcely
any thing else than that he is a sinner, ready to perish — will
not obtain acceptance ? " The sacrifice of the wicked, which
God abhors," is that of the man who has no humbling con- )£
-.sciousness of ill. desert, — who deliberately places himself, in
the presence of the Eternal, on the ground of merit, not of
mercy. Such sacrifices he must needs abhor.
The sentiments of the writer (Mr. Carlile) to whom I have
more than once alluded, are as follow: — that trust, reliance,
or confidence, enters into the essence of faith, — that belief of
any statement is called faith only when founded upon trust,
or reliance, on the veracity of some person on whose autho
rity the statement is believed, — and that, accordingly, the
very commencement, or dawning of faith in the soul, is trust
or reliance upon the veracity of God, producing belief of his
declarations in the holy Scriptures. In this he differs from
some of the older writers, though professing to agree with
them, because he says he< comes to the same conclusions with
them. " They began," says Mr. Carlile, " with the belief of

302 MR. CARLILE.
the truth, which they regarded as the initiatory or lowest act
of faith; from which they proceeded to trust or reliance on
Jesus Christ." He supposes that trust or reliance on the
veracity of God, is pre-supposed in any belief that can be de
nominated faith. The great difficulty, then, under which
this system labours, is to find a basis for this trust. It is not
Divine revelation, since it is required in order to the reception
of Divine revelation. There would, therefore, seem to be
nothing for its support but that knowledge of God which is
derived from the works of nature. Whether that is sufficient
to produce that confidence in God which wiU dispose to the
reception of the deeply abasing truths of Divine revelation,
the reader may be left to judge.

LECTURE XIX.

JUSTIFICATION.
THE MEANS OF JUSTIFICATION CONTINUED.
The last Lecture having been devoted to a consideration of
the nature of faith, we proceed now,
II. To inquire into the connexion which exists between
faith and justification. On this point it is most especially
necessary to guard against misconception. Some of the sub
sequent observations wUl, accordingly, keep this object more
directly in view.
First, We must guard against the notion that the death of
Christ has procured a relaxation of the Divine law, so that he
who believes in Christ has really fulfilled his duty, and may
claim the promised reward as a matter of right. This is a
very gross form of error indeed, — more so, perhaps, than the
delusion of those who, discarding all confidence in the atone
ment, rest their hope of salvation on the ground of their own
works. It contains all the essential errors of this palpable and
naked system of legality, with additional ones of its own. For,
according to the terms in which this sentiment is couched,
the law of God having abated its demand — the moral precepts
of the decalogue being abolished — and the law of faith having
been substituted in its place, the believer actually performs all
that God requires of him ; and is, consequently, not less en
titled to the reward of life than Adam would have been in
case of his entire abstinence from the forbidden fruit.
And, then, it involves in it the superadded absurdity, that
a radical change can take place in the precepts of a law pre
scribing no duties save those which grow out of the varied rela-

304 FAITH DOES NOT JUSTIFY
tions in which we stand to each other, and to that great'Being .
who is the fountain of all created existence. That another
test of fidelity besides that under which our first parents were
placed might have been employed, and that another test than
that of baptism might have been instituted as the initiatory
ordinance under the Christian dispensation, it is easy to con
ceive. But, to suppose that, in the decalogue, other precepts
might have been substituted for those on which hang all the
law and the prophets, — " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
with all thy mind, and thy neighbour as thyself," — is an ab
surdity too gross to enter into the conception of any whose
judgments are deserving of a moment's regard. The notion,
indeed, that Christ has purchased a relaxation of the Divine
law, in the sense which has been just attached to the words, is
so manifestly absurd, that it is but rarely held speculatively,
in all its length and breadth, by those who have been in the
habit of hearing the gospel. Many there are, indeed, who
talk of faith coming in the room of perfect obedience; but this,
if the language cannot be thought to be a corrupt mode of ex
pressing the true scriptural doctrine, takes place, for the most
part, in the case of those who, being utterly in the dark with
regard to spiritual things in general, attach little or no mean
ing to what they say.
Secondly, We are not to suppose that the efficacy of faith in
procuring justification results from its own intrinsic excellence.
I mean by this statement, that whatever moral excellence
may be conceived to be in faith, and may really be in it, it
would be a radical error to suppose that it is as the reward of
that moral excellence, or on account of it, that God treats the
believer as if he were a righteous person. Certain individuals,
who have not just views of their character and state, but are
yet sufficiently enlightened to perceive that the law of God
cannot require less than that, he should be loved with all the
heart, and our neighbours as ourselves, have fallen into the •
error to which I have now alluded. They do not, indeed, ex
clude Christ altogether from their system, but as little do they
shut out all confidence in themselves ; and, therefore, if they
form any definite conceptions at all upon the subject, their

BY ITS INTRINSIC EXCELLENCE. 305
sentiment is, that faith being the root of all obedience, though
it is not actual obedience,- is rewarded by God, in consequence
of what Christ has done, with eternal life. It is scarcely neces
sary to remark, that, if they had an adequate sense of their
utter unworthiness before God, nothing more would be needed
to convince them, that when eternal life is bestowed upon the
guilty, it cannot be imparted as the reward of the sinner's
obedience, or of the sinner's faith; but entirely and exclu
sively as the reward of the Saviour's work; — that this consti
tutes the only ground on which it is safe to the Divine govern
ment to bestow it, though faith brings them into the number
of those to whom the promise of it is given.
We have shown that the work of Christ is the exclusive
ground of a sinner's justification; he cannot, therefore, be
treated as if he were righteous on. account ofthe moral excel
lence of his faith. The two things are utterly incompatible
with each other — as truly and as directly so, as the doctrine of
salvation by grace and by works. Indeed, the sentiment op
posed is the doctrine of salvation by works. It may be a less
gross and repulsive form of it, but still it is the doctrine.
With the grosser form of it, it is equally opposed to the
declaration of the apostle, that "God justifieth the ungodly;"
for although we do not concede to the Sandemanians that the
language implies, that at the moment of justification there is
no vestige of any thing spiritually good in the mind — that the
individual who receives the blessing, is really and literally as
ungodly as the man who is living in the constant indulgence
of criminal propensities; — a notion which is directly contra
dicted by the fact, that the former is a believer, and by the
existence of all those spiritual perceptions which are pre-sup
posed in faith, and in the order of nature are previous to it ; —
it must certainly and necessarily imply, that they are justified
as ungodly; — that whatever measure of holiness there may be
in faith, it is not that which attracts the blessing — not that,
on account of which, or on the ground of which, it is bestowed.
There, may, indeed, have been lodged in their minds the
germ of better principles and affections ; yet God, in impart
ing the blessings, regards them as ungodly. For such, indeed,
2 o

306 THIS MISTAKE HAS CORRUPTED
they are ; being sinners, guilty, condemned, and in danger of
destruction. Men are not, then, treated by God as righteous
on account of the moral excellence of their faith. Against
this notion, it may be further observed, that it is not adapted
to hide pride from man, todo which, seems to have constituted
one of the great ends at which Jehovah aimed, in all the parts
and steps of the great work of human redemption. And, let
it be observed, that it would equally frustrate that end, whether
justification were bestowed on the ground of a man's works,
or a man's faith. Let him only be permitted to consider that
ground in himself; and such is the pride and depravity of the
heart, it will be impossible to prevent his imbibing the spirit
of the Pharisee, " God, I thank thee I am not as other men,"
&c. As a measure of precaution, it will be practically in vain
to tell him that the faith of which he prides himself was the
gift of God— was wrought in him by the influences of the
Holy Spirit, and that he ought not " to boast of what he has
received, as though he had not received it." It may be true
that this statement ought to extinguish every feeling of pride,
but experience shows that it will not do it. He feels that
that for the sake of which he is treated as if he were a righte
ous man, is in himself; and he lifts up his head in the spirit
of self-gratulation and confidence, in spite of all that can be
said to him.
It is easy to discover the baneful influence which the senti
ment I am now opposing has had in corrupting that simple
view of the nature of faith which has been presented in a for
mer Lecture — a view which seems essential to the manifesta
tion of the fact, if not to the fact itself, that salvation is of
grace. The apostle tells us, in the 4th of Romans and 16th
verse, that the enjoyment of the promises " is of faith, that it
might be by grace ;" an expression which at least appears to
intimate, that if it had not been by faith, it would not have
been, or at least would not have appeared to be, of grace.
Now, if we adhere to those statements of the nature of faith
which have been given, we shall see and feel the truth of this
assertion. " Faith is, indeed, the intelligent, voluntary exercise
of the mind, but it is an exercise of the mind to which we

THE SCRIPTURAL VIEW OF FAITH. 307
never in common life attach any idea of merit; and hence the
reasoning of the Scripture on the difference between justifica
tion by faith, and by works. Whoever supposes that the exer
cise of a malefactor's mind, when he believes that the pardon
sent him has the royal signature, merits that blessing ? And
what more merit can there be in a sinner's believing the mes
sage of reconciliation, which declares that " God was in Christ
reconciling the world to himself, not imputing to them their
trespasses?" As well might a man believe that there is a
merit in his believing that the sun shines, when it is before
him in its meridian lustre. The common sense of mankind
tells them that there can be no merit whatever in believing
the report of a credible witness. (Russell, vol. ii., p. 79.)
Such are the statements of Dr. Russell ; and, though I do
not think they put the case in a perfectly correct and fail:
point of view, since faith is an act of subjection to Divine au
thority, — it could not be said to be the duty of the malefactor
to believe that it was the royal signature that was attached to
the pardon; it is the duty of sinners to believe on the Son of
God : and hence believing is called the obedience of faith ; —
though I do not think, on this account, that Dr. Russell has
put the case quite fairly, it cannot be denied, that, as there is
a radical difference between believing the testimony, and
obeying the commands of God, we are more likely to preserve
the important doctrine of justification by grace untouched by
presenting faith in the light in which it appears in former
statements, than if we included in its nature, complacency,
love, joy, and so represented it as almost another name for the
whole of practical religion.
To this identification, the notion we are now opposing — that
faith justifies on account of its own moral excellence — has very
frequently, if not mainly contributed. There is most mani
fest danger, that individuals who entertain this notion will be
led to include as much of holiness as possible in the nature of
faith. Though there might possibly appear to them some
merit in believing the testimony of God, they could hardly
persuade themselves that it was in its amount at all equal to
the reward of eternal life. Faith was, accordingly, trans-

308 PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING
formed by them into practical religion ; and then the propriety
of connecting eternal life with it, the spirit of legality still
reigning within, became in their view more apparent. " They
do not see how a persuasion of the truth of the Divine testi
mony can save the guilty, and give peace to the conscience,
because they discern not the freeness of the grace of God, and
have mistaken views of the nature of his salvation. In a
word, they look on faith as an arduous and complicated work.
This is, in fact, seeking to be justified by works of law, under
the name of faith, and is but a refined way of perverting the
gospel." (Vol. ii., p. 79.) Again: " Such as oppose the doc
trine of salvation by grace, and yet are unwilUng directly to
teach that it is obtained by works, contend that faith in Scrip
ture is to be understood in an unusual sense, and not in its
ordinary meaning. They include in it most, if not all, of its
effects, even every pious and benevolent disposition of heart ;
which is, in fact, to identify it with the complete fulfilment of
the law. According to this scheme, salvation is of faith, that
it might be by merit. I need not say that this is directly to
contradict the doctrine of Scripture." (Page 80.)
Amongst theological writers of high and deserved reputa
tion, there is also occasionally displayed a more anxious desire
to find a high degree of holiness in faith, than I am able to
sympathize with ; a desire which is almost apt to beget a sus
picion that they have not altogether abandoned the opinion
that the moral excellence of faith has some influence, after all,
in securing for the believer the important blessing of justifi
cation. I admit, indeed, as I have already done, that the me
dium of interest in the work of Christ must be some voluntary
act of obedience to the Divine commands ; for, though Jehovah
is a Sovereign, he does not abandon the character and relation
of moral governor ; and though the reward of his government
is a reward of grace, and though the fidelity of the faithful
servant is the result of grace, yet that reward will be bestowed
according to the rule of rhoral government. I admit further,
since God commands nothing which is not spiritually good,
that this act of obedience must be a holy act. But why, in
as far as justification is concerned, should we be solicitous to

THE SCRIPTURAL VIEW OF FAITH. 309
find more of holiness in faith than is necessarily involved in
this admission ? If we are justified solely on the ground of
the perfect work of Christ, there is nothing to prevent the
justification of all men, without a single thought or act on
their part, but the rectoral character and relation of Jehovah,
which renders it necessary that some rule of justification
should be enacted, that the justice of the Divine Being may
be rendered apparent by his bestowing it upon those, and
those only, who comply with that rule. Now, it is manifest
that any requisition (and it must be a requisition on account
of the rectoral character of God) would secure this object ; it
might be love, for instance : an individual might have been
commanded to love Christ in order to his obtaining that in
terest in him which is essential in all cases to a person's being
treated as if he were righteous for the sake of him. But to
have required love, as the medium of interest, would have
made it appear as if justification had been by works, if it had
not overthrown the doctrine of gratuitous justification altoge
ther. The requisition of love, therefore, which is manifestly
a work of the law — a fulfilling of the law — not being neces
sary, it is not made the medium of interest. Something, on
the contrary, which is an act of subjection to Divine autho
rity, but which, according to the common consent of men,
cannot be confounded with the fulfilling of the law, namely,
faith, is constituted that medium ; and thus regard is had to
the character of God as the moral governor, — justification
manifestly appears to be by grace, — and the interests of holi
ness, as we shall presently see, are perfectly secured. Now,
if any act of obedience might have been made the medium
of interest in Christ, the question returns again upon us, why
should we be solicitous to discover more of holiness in faith
than must of necessity be included in every act of obedience ?
How difficult is it to avoid the suspicion that those who dis
cover this solicitude have not the clearest conceptions of the
grounds of justification ?
There are some expressions in Dr. Dwight's Sermon on Jus
tification which seem to me to intimate that he has felt the
injurious influence of his own views of the nature of faith. In

310 INCAUTIOUS LANGUAGE OF DWIGHT.
f
encountering the false position, that man is absolutely passive
in believing, he argues, that if this were the case, faith, so far
from being praiseworthy, amiable, and capable of recom
mending us to God, would merit and sustain no moral cha
racter at aU. He proceeds, " According to this scheme, there
fore, faith and unbelief being equally and absolutely involun
tary and unavoidable, can never constitute a moral distinction
between men. Faith can never be an object of the approba
tion, nor unbelief of the disapprobation, of God. Much less
can we be praiseworthy in believing, or blameable in disbe-
Ueving. Still less can we on one of these grounds be rewarded,
and on the other punished. Least of aU can we on account of
our faith be accepted and blessed for ever ; and, in consequence
of our unbelief, be rejected and punished with endless misery."
(Sermon 67.) Now, it is freely admitted, that many of these
remarks are correct, and perhaps it might not be impossible
so to explain the whole of them, as to purge them of any ma
terial error in regard to doctrine. Yet I do not like the
phraseology that " faith recommends us to God; that it is the
ground on which we are rewarded by him ; that in conse
quence of our faith we are accepted and blessed for ever."
Nor can I approve of the statements which he afterwards
makes, " that it is honourable to God to annex justification
to virtue, and not to any thing of a different nature — to that
attribute which is the sum of virtuous obedience." The en
tire language would appear to intimate, that the Doctor at
taches more influence to the moral excellence of faith in pro
curing our justification than he is himself aware of. The
proper view of the matter seems to be, not that faith must be
holy to procure justification, but to be an act of obedience to
Divine authority ; since God never commands any thing which
is not spiritually good. As an act of obedience only can it
become a medium of interest in Christ; since the rewards of
God's moral government are given according to the rule of
that government, though not for the sake of compliance with
the rule. It might justify without holiness, if it could be
obedience without it. This is not, however, the case. At
the same time, as justification is appointed " to be by faith,"

STATEMENTS OF WARDLAW. 311
that is, instrumentally, " that it might be by grace," it seems
necessary not to include more of moral excellence in its nature
than is essentially and necessarUy involved in every act of obe
dience to the Divine commands.
" ' Wherefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace.' Its
being by grace is essential to the very nature 6f the gospel :
and its being by faith is represented as securing this essential
point. There is a perfect contrariety between grace and
works ; but there is a perfect, and simple, arid beautiful har
mony between grace and faith. Justification is by the latter,
that it may be by the former. This is fully "brought out in
Paul's reasoning, (Roni. iv. 1 — 8,) ' What shall we then say
that Abraham our father, as pertaining to the flesh, hath
found? For if Abrahaih were justified by works, he hath
whereof to glory, but not before God. For what saith the
Scripture ? Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto
him for righteousness. Now to him that worketh is the
reward hot reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that
worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly,
his faith is counted for righteousness. Even as David also
describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God im
puteth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they
whose iniquities are forgiven, arid whose sins are covered.
Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin.' —
It is impossible that words should more distinctly express the
difference between two things: — and it is obvious, that the
simpler the conception is which we have of faith or believing,
the more fully and clearly will the meaning and the justness
appear of the apostle's proposition in verse 14 — ' It is of faith,
that it might be by grace.' Our believing the Divine testi
mony is the simple medium, appointed by God, of our interest
in Him whom that testimony makes known as 'The Lord
our righteousness.'" (Wardlaw's Essays on Assurance, &c,
pp. 47, 48.)
Thirdly, Faith secures justification, in the opinion of
many writers of great eminence, by bringing the sinner into a
state of union to the Lord Jesus Christ ; which union consti
tutes the basis on which God treats him as if he were

312 FULLER AND EDWARDS'S VIEWS.
actually righteous. " We need not," says Mr. Fuller, " re
duce faith to an exercise of the intellectual faculty in which
there is nothing holy ; but whatever holiness there is in it, it
is not this, but the obedience of Christ, that constitutes our
justifying righteousness. Whatever other properties the magnet-
may .'possess, it is as pointing invariably to the north that it
guides the mariner ; and whatever other properties faith may
possess, it is as receiving Christ, and bringing us into union
with him, that it justifies. In order to be interested in jus
tification, and other blessings arising from the obedience
and death of Christ, we must first be interested in Christ
himself; for it is as having the Son that we have everlasting
life. The benefits of Christ's obedience unto death require
to be received in that same order in which they were given.
As God first gives Him, so we must first receive him, and with
him all things freely. Many would wish for the benefits of
Christ's death, who yet have no desire after Christ. Like him
that was nearest of kin to the family of Elimelech, they
would, on various accounts, be pleased with the inheritance ;
but when it is understood that, in order to possess it, they
must take him with all that pertains to him, and that this
would mar their present inheritance, they give it up."
" Thus it is that justification is ascribed to faith, because it
is that by which we receive Christ; and thus it is by faith
only, and not by any other grace." " Thus it stands con
nected in the Scriptures with union with Christ : ' Of him are
ye in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom and
righteousness,' &c. ' There is therefore now no condemnation
to them that are in Christ Jesus.' ' That I may be found in
him, not having mine own righteousness,' &c. From these
and pther passages we perceive, that faith justifies not in a
way of merit, not on account of any thing in itself, be it what.
it may, but as uniting to Christ. It is that which the act of
marriage is on the part of a female ; by it she becomes one
with her husband, and (whatever might be her former pro
perty) legally interested in all that he possesses. Having him,
she has all that is his. Thus it is, that Christ being heir of
all things, believers in him become heirs of God, not in their

OF THE CONNEXION BETWEEN FAITH AND JUSTIFICATION. 313
own right, but as joint-heirs with him. And as, in a marriage
union, the wealth which an indigent female might derive from
the opulence of her husband, would not be in reward of having
received him, so neither is justification the reward of faith, but
of the righteousness which is of God, i. e., the righteousness
of Christ by faith."
" Great things are ascribed to faith in a way of healing.
Many of the miraculous cures performed by our Lord are
ascribed to the faith of the parties. The virtue, however,
proceeded not from faith, but from him. It is the same in
justification. By faith we receive the benefit, but the benefit
arises not from faith, but from Christ. Hence the same thing
which is ascribed in some places to faith, is in others ascribed
to the obedience, death, and resurrection of Christ." (Works,
vol. vii., pp. 414 — 416.
To the same effect are the statements of Jonathan Edwards.
" When- it is said that we are not justified by any righteous
ness of our own, what is meant is, that it is not out of respect
to the excellency of any qualification or acts in us whatever,
that God judges it meet that this benefit of Christ should be
ours ; and it is not, in anywise, on account of any excellency
or value that there is in faith that it appears in the sight of
God a meet thing, that he who believes should have the
benefit of Christ assigned to him ; but purely from the rela
tion which faith has to the person in whom this benefit is to
be had, or as it unites to that Mediator in and by whom
we are justified." " Here, for the greater clearness, I would
particularly explain myself under several propositions.
" Ist. It is certain that there is some union or relation that
the people of Christ stand in to him, that is expressed in
Scripture, from time to time, by ' being in Christ,' and is repre
sented in Scripture by those metaphors of being members of
Christ, or being united to him as members to the head, and
branches to the stock, and is compared to a marriage union
between husband and wife." Having stated that it is not
necessary to explain this union, he adds, " I do not desire to
determine more about it than all, of all sects, will readily allow ;
viz., that there is a peculiar relation between true Christians
2 p

314 EDWARDS'S STATEMENTS
and Christ, which there is not between him and others; and
which is signified by those metaphorical expressions in Scrip
ture, of ' being in Christ,' ' being members of Christ,' &c.
" 2nd. This relation, or union to Christ, whereby Christians
are said to be in Christ, (whatever it be,) is the ground of their
right to his benefits. This needs no proof; the reason of the
thing, at the first blush, demonstrates it. It is exceedingly
evident also from Scripture : ' He that hath the Son hath life,
and he that hath not the Son hath not life.' (1 John v. 12 ;
1 Cor. i. 30.) First, we must be in him, and then he will be
made righteousness or justification to us. The union of the
members of the body with the head, is the ground of their
partaking of the life of the head ; it is the union of the branches
to the stock, which is the ground of their partaking of the sap
and life of the stock ; it is the relation of the wife to the hus
band, that is the ground of her joint interest in the estate :
they are looked upon in several respects as one in law. So
there is a legal union between Christ and true Christians ; so
that as all ( Socinians excepted) allow, one in some respects is
accepted for the other by the supreme Judge.
" 3rd. And thus it is that faith is the qualification in
any person that renders it meet in the sight of God that he
should be looked upon as having Christ's satisfaction and
righteousness belonging to him, viz., because it is that in him
which, on his part, makes up this union between him and
Christ. By what has been just observed, it is a person's being,
according to the Scripture phrase, in Christ, that is the ground
of his satisfaction and merits belonging to him ; and a right to
the benefits procured thereby. The reason of it is plain ; it is
easy to see how our having Christ's merits and benefits belong
ing to us, follows from our having (if I may so speak) Christ
himself belonging to us, or our being united to him. And if
so, it must be easy to see how, or in what manner, that in a
person which on his part makes up the union between his soul
and Christ, should be the thing on the account of which God
looks on it as meet that he should have Christ's merits belong
ing to him." (Sermon 1st, on Justification.)
Now the attentive reader will immediately perceive that the

EXAMINED. 315
substantial truths so fully and ably developed in the preceding
extracts, viz., that the one work of the Redeemer is the ex
clusive ground of justification ; that justification is received
not by works, but by faith, and yet that it is not bestowed as
the reward of faith, but of the Saviour's righteousness ; — the
reader will perceive, it is imagined, that these truths, which
constitute all that is of radical importance on the subject, are
precisely those which have been unfolded in previous Lectures.
I am constrained, however, to express the doubt I feel, whether
the correctness of some of the minor statements, or, perhaps,
I should rather say, of some parts of the phraseology, can be
sustained. And, in the present day, when every point of
evangelical truth, and when every mode of stating it, are likely
to undergo a more thorough and sifting examination than any
to which they have as yet been subjected, it is of more import
ance than some persons are aware of, not to contend pertina
ciously for any form of expression which will not endure this
test. With every disposition to sit down contented with the
statements of these eminent men of God, I cannot deliver my
self from the impression that they contain more of apparent
than of real information. If the President had not unfortunately
conceived it unnecessary to explain what he meant by union
with Christ, it is possible that his language would have been
somewhat different. Faith, he says, in substance at least, se
cures justification by uniting the believer to Christ, which
union (not faith) constitutes, as he imagines, the basis of the
imputation to him of the Saviour's righteousness. Now this
statement obviously assumes, as the reader cannot fail to ob
serve, that to believe the gospel, and to be in Christ, though
inseparably united, are yet different things, or the latter mem
ber of the sentence would identify itself with the former.
If the phrases, "to be a believer," and "to be in Christ,"
are only two modes of expressing the same thing, the one
statement being figurative, and the Other literal, the President,
in declaring that union to Christ is the basis of imputation,
really says nothing more than that faith is the basis; and,
further, that faith justifies because it is faith. Let, then, the
reader examine the following passages, and ask himself

16 TO BE IN CHRIST, AND TO BELIEVE, IDENTICAL.
whether the two phrases, of which we are speaking, mean dif
ferent things, or the same thing. " But to as many as received
him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even
to them that believe on his name." (John i. 12.) " Salute
Andronicus and Junia, my kinsmen, and my fellow-prisoners,
&c, — who also were in Christ before me." (Rom. xvi. 7.) " If
any man be in Christ, he is a new creature." (2 Cor. v. 17.)
" There is therefore now no condemnation to them who are
in Christ Jesus." (Rom. viii. 1.) Compare this with chap. iii.
26, " to declare his righteousness, that he might be just, and
the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." " He that be
lieveth on the Son hath everlasting life ; and he that believeth
not the Son, shall not see life ; but the wrath of God abideth
on him." (John iii. 36.) Compare with this the language of
the same writer, (1 John v. 12,) " He that hath the Son hath
life; and he that hath not the Sow of God, hath not life." What
can be more manifest than that the language of the epistle
contains nothing more than a figurative statement of the truth
more literally presented to us in the gospel ? And hence, in
the following verse, the apostle adds, " These things have I
written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God,"
&c. (Verse 13.)
Sufficient, it is presumed, has been said, to show that the
expressions, " to have faith — and to have, or receive Christ — to
be a believer — and to be in Christ," are only different modes,
the one simple and the other figurative, of expressing the
same thing. We, indeed, with a certain looseness of phrase
ology in which we are apt to indulge, speak of faith as the in
strument by which we receive Christ, (as if believing the
gospel and receiving Christ were not identical,) or by which
we receive justification. But, in strict accuracy, that which
faith receives is the truth concerning Christ. The blessing
of justification is, indeed, invariably enjoyed in connexion
with the reception of the truth, i. e., God bestows it upon
every believer ; but faith can only be said figuratively to re
ceive it : and the phraseology is evidently open to the objection
which Erskine brings against it, viz., that it supposes our
justification to have been in existence before we believe ; since

DIFFERENT KINDS OF UNION. 317
nothing can be received whose existence is not, in the order
of nature, prior to the act of reception. In harmony with
these remarks, and confirmatory of them, it is observable, that
though believers are, In the New Testament, figuratively
represented as being in Christ, they are not said to-be united
to him by faith; since that would be in effect to say that we
become believers by faith. Nor are " we said to be justified
by being in Christ, but by believing."
The reader must not so misconceive me as to imagine that
I entertain the slightest doubt in reference to the fact that
there exists an union between Christ and his people. The
sole object has been to show that, when President Edwards
tells us that faith unites to Christ, and that the union thus
formed is the basis of justification, he makes a distinction
without a difference, and, indeed, utters an identical proposi
tion ; — since, in ordinary Scripture style, to be a believer, and to
be in Christ, mean the same thing. There are, indeed, other
senses in which the phrase, " to be in Christ," may be under
stood ; but in neither of them would Messrs. Fuller and Ed
wards contend, that " to be in Christ " is the basis of imputa
tion. A vital union, for instance, subsists between Christ and
his people — ran union of heart, if we may so speak. The
thoughts, affections, and prayers of the Christian ascend to the
Saviour ; and the love, and care, and gracious communications,
of the Saviour, descend to him. And since Christ suffered,
not for himself, but for the benefits of others, — and since the
Spirit was not intended to be poured out upon all flesh, so as
to bring all men to the enjoyment of the blessings of his salva
tion, but upon the chosen to salvation exclusively, the latter
may be said to have been chosen in Christ, to have been in
him, " before the foundation of the world." It will not be
pretended, however, that union in this latter sense is effected
by faith. It is in one respect the cause of faith. Nor can
we represent vital union, which in fact identifies itself with
sanctification, as the basis of imputation, without endangering
the doctrine of justification by faith, without the deeds of the
law. What, then, is that union to Christ which, being the

318 LEGAL UNION.
result of faith, must of course differ from it, that is thus repre
sented as the basis of imputation ?
Mr. Haldane, in his late Exposition of the five first (first
five) chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, seems to hint at
the existence of an union which is mysterious and incompre
hensible in its nature. We have heard others express a
similar opinion. It is probable that Jonathan Edwards, ap
plying his notions of the connexion which existed between
Adam and his posterity, to that which exists between Christ
and his people, would agree with them. I am quite free to
say, that I have never been satisfied with the statements of
this writer in reference to that connexion. With Principal
Hill, I am constrained to think, that they " are repugnant to
that distinct agency which enters into our notion of account
able beings, as essential to that character." I wish to say rio
more on this point, than that it ought not to form a recom
mendation of any statement, that it throws unnecessary mys
tery around the subject to which it refers.
Most Calvinistic writers, perhaps, represent faith as effect
ing a legal union between Christ and his people ; and they
further regard this union as the basis of imputation — illus
trating it by the case of Adam. A legal union was consti
tuted between Adam and his posterity, to serve as the basis
of the imputation of his sin to them. A legal union must
also, they conceive, exist between Christ and believers, to
serve as the basis of the imputation of his righteousness to
them. In the former case, the union is effected by the na
tural birth ; in the latter, by the spiritual birth ; or, in other
words, faith is the instrument by which an individual is brought
into that state of legal union to the Saviour in consequence of
which the righteousness of the latter is imputed to him.
Now there is much of substantial and important truth in this
representation; yet it is not perfectly correct in the sense
which they attach to the words they have employed. It ob
viously assumes, what we have already denied, and venture
again to deny, that the relation which Adam and Christ
sustained to their respective seeds, is perfectly identical with

CAUTION OF HOWE. 319
that of a legal representative among men; or that our no
tions in reference to it are to be governed by what takes
place in a human court of judicature. I have long had a strong
conviction that this proneness to identify Divine and human
proceedings is the source of much mistake and mischief in
our theological investigations ; and it has been with no slight
degree of pleasure that, since some of the statements contained
in preceding Lectures were committed to writing, I have met
with a passage in the works of the great John Howe, unob
served before, which most strikingly confirms the views I had
been led to entertain. I very earnestly recommend it to the
careful attention of those who have been led, by our customary
and established phraseology upon this subject, to identify
suretiship in Divine economies, with suretiship among men.
" Much of this carnality appears about such matters when we
are over-intent to mould and square gospel truths and doc
trines by human measures and models ; and to earnestly strive
to make them correspond ; that is, when we aim, beyond what
things will admit, to stretch (or rather to shrink and contract)
God's transactions with men, unto the scheme and model of
our own abstract notions and definitions, or of merely human,
civil, or political economies, administrations, and transactions;
such I mean as obtain among men towards one another ; and
so labour to have the same measures take place throughout, in
reference to Divine things, as do in human. Whereby more
than is needful, useful, (or indeed so much as possible to agree
and quadrate,) of logic, metaphysics, and of civil or other
law, is introduced into theology. Illustrations, indeed, may
be taken thence, but not strict measures. It is impossible
sometimes they should be so.'7 (Let the reader mark this.)
" Divers things are taken among men in such notions as, in
delivering the doctrine of the gospel, cannot have a full and
adequate place; they often will not exactly agree or corre
spond ; as if, in speaking of God's pardoning and justifying a
sinner, we should take our measures of pardon and justification
strictly from what obtains among men, we should find a great
difference, and disagreement." And having exhibited the dis
parity, he adds, " Some resemblance will appear, not an exact

320 CONSEQUENCES OF ACTION REACH BEYOND THE ACTORS.
or entire correspondency." (pp. 466, 467, Westley's Edition.)
In harmony with this great, general, and germinating princi
ple, it may be added, that, if we take our measure of the rela
tion of Adam and Christ to their respective seeds, from that
of a human legal representative, we shall find a great differ
ence and disagreement. The analogy is in the results of the
relation. The whole world experience the effects of Adam's
sin — and believers enjoy the consequences of Christ's right
eousness — as if both classes were, in a literal sense, legally
represented by Adam and Christ.
If it be objected, that, unless Adam and Christ were true
and literal representatives, the consequences of their actions
could not extend beyond themselves, we oppose facts of every
day occurrence to the incautious assertion of the objector.
The instances are innumerable in which this is the case. It
is an ordinary law of Divine Providence that the results of
actions, both virtuous and vicious, should reach beyond the
actors themselves. Moral government resorts to this arrange
ment, as one mode, amongst others, of effecting its own wise
and merciful purposes. A nation suffers from the misconduct
of its rulers ; a parent entails disease, degradation, and poverty,
or affluence and honour, upon his children; wide-spreading
ruin is ofttimes the result of unprincipled commercial spe
culations. Should it be said that these effects follow in the
natural and necessary course of things, it is replied, First, that,
granting this, it still does not alter the fact, that the results of
actions do reach beyond the actors themselves, when the latter
do not sustain the relation of legal representatives in the strict
and literal sense of the term. But, Secondly, if it is inquired,
How it came to be the natural course of things ? Was not
that course determined by God himself? Are not these re
sults brought about by the agency of his providence ? And
does he not so arrange the course of events as that the actions
of one man shall affect multitudes, that he may secure the
great ends of his moral government ? — that he may discoun
tenance and prevent vice, and encourage virtue? — that he
may render the monarch cautious and prudent, the parent
watchful and virtuous, and the tradesman and merchant honest?

RELATION BETWEEN CHRIST AND BELIEVERS. 321
The facts just referred to, to which others might have been
added, present us with undeniable cases, in which individuals
have experienced the effects of the good or bad conduct of
others, — by whom they were not, in the strict sense of the
term, legally represented, — as if they had been thus legally re
presented. By alluding to these facts, I do not intend to intimate
that the relation existing between the parent and his child —
by virtue of which the latter is exalted — is identical with that
which is sustained by Christ to his people. The facts have
been referred to for the mere purpose of repelling the objec
tion, which they certainly do, and that most effectually. It
may possibly prove to be the case that the two relations are
not so radically different as is sometimes imagined; but at
present I am disposed to regard the relation of Christ to be
lievers, as not identifying itself with that of a legal represent
ative on the one hand, nor with that of a parent on the other.
It seems more analogous to those which were sustained by
Noah and Abraham — the results of which did not altogether
reach to their posterity in the natural course of things. Adam
and Christ were rather moral, than legal, or natural heads.
The disobedience of the former, and the righteousness of the
latter, formed the moral ground on which the loss and the
blessing are experienced. As an expression of God's dis
pleasure against the sin of the former," the whole race suffer
many of the consequences of that sin ; as an expression of his
high satisfaction with the righteousness of the latter, believers
experience the consequences of that righteousness. The re
sults are the same as if Adam and Christ had been, strictly
speaking, legal representatives; — as the results of justification
with God are the same, as if it were the same thing with jus
tification among men ; — and, on this account, and in this sense,
they may with great propriety be denominated legal repre
sentatives.

2q

LECTURE XX.

JUSTIFICATION.
THE MEANS OF JUSTIFICATION CONCLUDED.
In the preceding Lecture we have seen that faith does not
justify on -account of its being, through a relaxation of the
Divine law, a perfect fulfilment of duty ; — nor on the ground
of any moral excellence which may be found to exist in it.
We have seen, further, that the statements of certain eminent
divines, that faith justifies because it unites to Christ, contain
more of apparent than real information, inasmuch as to believe,
and to be in Christ, are only two modes, the one literal, and the
other figurative, of expressing the same thing. If, indeed, by
being in Christ were meant nothing more than connexion with
that body, the members of which are justified, and who will be
finally saved by him, "then it might truly be said that we are
thus united to Christ by faith ; but then, as this union is
identical with being justified, it could not be said that we are
justified by virtue of union to Christ. I prefer, therefore, the
following statement of the connexion between faith and justi
fication, viz.,
Fourthly, Faith justifies by bringing an individual into that
body, to every individual of which the blessing of justification
is secured by the promise, and covenant, and oath of God.
The statement may be thus illustrated.
The atonement of Christ was, as we have seen, a general
remedy, co-extensive with the evil to be removed. The whole
of the human race had, by transgression, imposed a moral
necessity upon Jehovah, as a righteous moral governor, to
inflict upon them the sentence of the law. From this neces-

HOW FAITH JUSTIFIES. 323
sity, the obedience and death of his Son, evincing the excel
lence, and sustaining the efficiency, of the law, rescued him.
It permitted, though it did not of itself require, the pardon of
the transgressor. It rendered it competent to him, as moral
governor, to extend the sceptre of mercy to the guilty — to par
don all, or any : and in whatever manner should appear right
in his sight. Yet, as the whole race was not destined to appear
in existence at once, — and, as the moral governor must act in
his rectoral character during the entire period of the existence
of the system, and impart the blessings he bestows according to
some revealed rule of government, it became necessary for him
to establish, and to reveal, the rule according to which these
blessings should be bestowed. That rule is faith. Though
all men, personally considered, deserve death, he promises, on
the ground of the Saviour's work, to bestow life on all who
believe the record he has given concerning him. This becomes
the rule of his government, under the dispensation of mercy
which has been established in consequence of the death of his
Son ; the rule of personal acceptance, and by which the final
condition of all, who enjoyed access to the gospel, will be
decided at the great day of account : " He that believeth
shall be saved ; he that believeth not shall be damned."
Let us carry forward our thoughts to the judgment of the
great day. It is in the character of moral governor, or judge,
that Christ will descend from heaven; and he will come "fo
render to all men according to their deeds " — " to judge the
dead according to their works," (Rom. ii. 6; Rev. xx. 12.)
Beyond all doubt, the reward which is, on that day, to be
bestowed by the judge, will be a reward of grace ; i. e., it will
be given for the sake of Christ alone, — his work constituting
the ground on which it will be imparted ; but still it will be
bestowed by Christ in the character of moral governor; and,
accordingly, conferred upon those only who have complied
with the rule of government; or, in other words, who have
yielded that obedience of faith which the Sovereign had pre
viously declared should place all, who did yield it, in that state
in which they should be treated as if they were righteous, for
the sake of him who really is so. Nothing is said at present

324 MUST BE A RULE OF JUSTIFICATION.
of the influence by which they are induced to yield this obe
dience; that is, doubtless, the special energy of the Holy
Spirit — a circumstance which completes the proof that salva
tion is of grace. But still, though it is the Holy Spirit that
enables them to exercise faith, it is they who believe.
They comply with the revealed rule concerning justification,
though their disposition to do this is the result of holy and
gracious influence. And it is this act of compliance that in
troduces them into the number of those upon whom the judge
will bestow, in conformity with his promise, the rewards of
his kingdom. Let the reader reflect upon the necessity, which
exists for his acting according to a revealed mode of proceed
ing ; how essential it is that there should be the manifestation
of equity in the awards of the great day, — of equity, (in act
ing according to the revealed rule of government,) as well as of
sovereignty ! Now, there could be no display of equity, unless
something had been previously enjoined upon the subjects of
the government, on their compliance with which, the moral
governor had previously declared that the blessings which
result from the death of his Son, should flow to them. Let
him think what would be the consequences to the moral
government of Jehovah, if some sinners, at the great day of
account, having complied with no rule for obtaining the bless
ings of the government, were taken to heaven ; while others,
without having broken any rule, were consigned to hell ! How
could it appear, in that case, that the Judge of the whole earth
did right? It is otherwise now. The death of Christ has
permitted the honourable exercise of mercy. God has accord
ingly declared, in infinite grace to men, that he will save all
that believe ; and at the great day he will act according to his
declarations. It surely must have required some trouble to
involve this plain matter in darkness and mystery.
The preceding remarks will enable us to judge of the pro
priety of the following statements by Dr. Russell : " Faith
ought not to be considered as the condition of the new
covenant. It is necessary that a man eat bread, before it can
nourish him ; not, 'however, as a condition, but because, from
the very nature of the thing, bread cannot otherwise be of

IS FAITH THE CONDITION OF THE NEW COVENANT? 325
service. So it is with the faith of the gospel. The whole
efficacy of faith, in the matter of justification, arises from its
object, in which is contained the real ground of our justifica
tion." (Letters, vol. ii., p. 84.) I cannot think otherwise of
this passage, than that it is a defective one. It seems to me
to contain the germ of the error which stands out in all its
length and breadth in Mr. Erskine's late publication, — the
error of forgetting that man needs a change of state, as well as
of character ; and that, though the perfect wisdom of God has
been displayed in rendering the appointed instrument of justi
fication (i. e., faith) the means also of sanctification, yet that
faith is more directly and specifically connected with the
former than with the latter. It does sanctify, doubtless,
but that is, so to speak, an incidental and additional work;
its grand business is to justify. The parallel which Dr.
Russell institutes, proceeds on an overlooking, for the moment,
of this important sentiment. A hungry man needs nothing
but refreshment, and nourishment; but a condemned man
requires more. If we suppose the case of a number of indi
viduals both hungry and condemned, to whom a promise of
pardon was made if they would consent to eat a species of
provision, which, notwithstanding their desire of food, was
loathsome to them, though admirably adapted to recover
their stomachs to a healthy tone, and finally to restore them
to health, we shall have a fairer parallel than the one which
Dr. Russell employs. But, in that ease, the statements of
this writer would not apply. Eating would stand in relation
to two things — pardon and health, — and would be necessary
to secure each; but it would be necessary on different grounds.
To secure the latter, it would be necessary in the nature of
things, but not the former. With the pardon it would stand
connected as the arbitrary condition on which alone it could
be enjoyed. Now man before conversion is both guilty and
depraved. Faith is the means or instrument of deliverance in
both points of view ; but it stands in different relations to the
guilt, and the depravity, or rescues from them in a different
manner \from the latter, by the natural influence of the truth,
received under Divine influence, upon the heart; from the

326 THE NEW COVENANT.
former, solely in consequence of Divine appointment, or inas
much as it is a compliance with the revealed rule according
to which the blessings which result from the death of Christ
are bestowed upon men. " Believe," says God, in his rectoral
character, founding, however, the rule of his government
in sovereign goodness, " and thou shalt be saved." Faith,
then, secures to us the blessing of justification, because it is
compliance with the rule. Why, then, should it be denied
that faith is the condition of the new covenant, or of justifica
tion ? It may not, indeed, be expedient to adopt that phrase
ology, because it is liable to be misunderstood : but if, by
condition of salvation, nothing more be meant than a sine qua
non of salvation — that act of submission on the part of the
sinner, without which salvation cannot be obtained — then faith
is, beyond all question, the condition of salvation : or rather
the condition of justification: for, if by salvation we under
stand admission into heaven, then, in the sense just attached
to the word condition, persevering obedience, in addition to
faith, is the condition. " He that endureth unto the end
shall be saved." Dr. Russell, indeed, uses the words, " condi
tion of the new covenant," when he denies that faith is a con
dition ; but it is obvious, from the views he entertains of the
nature of the new covenant, that he meant the same as the
condition of justification. There are, indeed, some who re
present the new covenant as a legal contract between the
Father and the Son, the conditions of which were fulfilled by
Christ; so that we have only to reap the fruits of it. Now
there can be no doubt that the Son undertook to lay an honour
able basis, in his obedience and death, for the extension of
holy benevolence to man, and that the Father engaged that he
should see his seed, and bring many sons unto glory. This,
however, is not what the Scriptures mean by the new cove
nant; nor is there any thing of the formal and technical
theology of the schools in those parts of Divine revelation in
which its nature and blessings are fully unfolded. The new
covenant is that edition of the gospel which it is our exalted
privilege to enjoy ; — -that full and complete revelation of
Jehovah's mercy, which announces that " God hath set forth

CONNEXION BETWEEN FAITH AND JUSTIFICATION. 327
his Son to be a propitiatory sacrifice," and which promises that
" all who believe in him shall be justified from all things
from which they could not be justified by the law of Moses."
The preceding statements represent faith as being connected
with both justification and sanctification ; and as forining the
instrument by which both are secured to the believer. They
also partially unfold the wisdom which shines in the appoint
ment of this medium : this is, however, a point which requires
further illustration.
We have seen that the connexion of faith with justification
partakes more of an arbitrary character than its connexion
with sanctification; but even here the connexion is not en
tirely arbitrary. Dr. Wardlaw, in one of the most useful of
his very valuable publications, says, " The connexion of eter
nal life with believing, arises not from any mere appointment
or will that it should be so, but in a great degree, at least,
from the nature of the thing. The gospel is a testimony from
God. In that form it comes to us ; and it demands our cre
dence. It reveals to us certain blessings, to be enjoyed on a
certain ground. How, then, is it conceivable that blessings
thus revealed should be thus received and enjoyed otherwise
than by the reception or belief of the testimony which reveals
them ? ' He that hath the Son hath life ; and he that hath
not the Son of God hath not life.' How, then, in the nature
of the thing, can the life which this testimony makes known,
as the gift of God through his Son, be received in any other
way than by the reception of the testimony which makes it
known ? Now this language, applied as it is to all the bless
ings of salvation, is not strictly accurate. There is no neces
sity, in the nature of the thing, for men to believe in order to
their having the blessing of justification. A criminal con
demned to death might have the pardon, (i.e., be pardoned,)
the intelligence of which was sent to him by the sovereign,
without believing the intelligence, though he could not have
the comfort of it. And hence the Doctor, when he proceeds
afterwards more fully to unfold this general statement, very
properly restricts the necessity, in the nature of the thing, to
the sense of pardon ; he does not apply it to the state of par-

328 CONNEXION BETWEEN
don. Were it not for the rectoral character of God, there
would be no necessity, as we have seen, (vide p. 310,) for a deed
or a thought on the part of man in order to his introduction
into the state of pardon; and that character obviously does
not require this specific mode of introduction. Still the con
nexion between faith and justification is not arbitrary ; for,
First, Since men are justified for the sake, or on the ground,
of what has been done by the Saviour, there seems an evi
dent propriety in making the reception of the testimony.
which contains an account of that work, the medium of in
terest in its blessings. And,
Secondly, It is powerfully calculated to evince the gra
tuitous character of justification. " It is of faith," says the
apostle, " that it might be by grace ;" an expression which
obviously implies, that the appointment of any other medium
of interest would at least have apparently destroyed its gra
tuitous character. Is it .possible to doubt this ? How could
an act of obedience to any precept explicitly commanded by
that law from the curse of which the Saviour came to redeem
us, have been constituted the means of justification, without
seeming to encroach upon the freeness of justification, which
the appointment of faith does not? For though, I am well
aware, it may be contended — since faith itself is an act of obe
dience — that we are justified, i. e., instrumentally, by a work
after all, there is so broad a line of distinction, in the appre
hensions and feelings of men in general, between doing some
thing that we may be treated as righteous, and believing that
the work on account of which alone we can be so treated has
been done by another, that the objection possesses no real
force. It is, however, in the tendency of faith to secure the sanc
tification of men, that the wisdom of God especially appears
in this matter. The human family were condemned. An
expedient was devised by which it became morally possible
for the moral governor to show mercy according to a certain
rule, the establishment of which was required by his rectoral
character. The human family were also depraved, as well as
condemned. They were the subjects of a disease which re-

FAITH AND SANCTIFICATION. 329
quired removal, or the pardon would have been of no avail to
them. Now the wisdom of God pre-eminently appears in the
determination to constitute faith the means of interest in the
pardon, because it is in its own nature adapted to secure the
cure, of the gospel. We are said to be " born again by the
incorruptible seed of the word." * " Of his own will begat he
us, with the word of truth." " Sanctify them," said our Lord,
" through thy truth ; thy word is truth." Thus the blessings
of justification and sanctification are, in Christian experi
ence, inseparably united; and he whose sins are forgiven is
invariably rendered " meet for the inheritance of the saints in
light." I find it impossible to conceive of a brighter display
of wisdom than is here exhibited. Conceive of a number of
prisoners on whom the sentence of death has passed, and who
are at the same time sinking into the tomb through the in
fluence of fatal disease. The sovereign offers them pardon on
certain conditions. Now, it will be at once seen that the per
formance of these conditions, were the persons able and will
ing to perform them, would not remove the malady under
which they labour. Another process would be necessary to
effect this. It is not thus, however, in reference to man as-a
criminal before God. The very same act which is required of
him, by the moral governor, in order to his enjoyment of the
pardon he needs, is also the means of his obtaining the cure
he needs ! The belief of the glad tidings, that " God was in
Christ reconciling the world to himself," reconciles his heart
to God, and thus prepares him for the full fruition of his pre
sence in the world above.
There can be little doubt that the serious error into which
Mr. Erskine has fallen, in his book on Universal Pardon, re
sults from pushing this sentiment too far. The germs of it
exist in one of his former works, where he represents the par
don of the gospel as subordinate to the cure. God does not,
he says, cure that he may pardon, but pardons that he may
cure. In the publication referred to above, he seems to re
present the death of Christ as necessary, not so much to
render the exercise of forgiveness consistent with the claims
of truth, and justice, and holiness, but to afford a display of
2 u

330 HARMONY OF
love so overpowering as to win back the alienated hearts of
sinners to God, that is, to cure their moral disease. Now,
there does not appear to me to be more than a step or two
between this and Unitarianism. It overlooks, with that sys
tem, the relation which God sustains to man as his moral
governor; and where that is lost sight of, one of the most
effectual barriers against that system is removed. The direct
object aimed at and accomplished in the mission, and suffer
ing, and death of Christ, was to open a way for the honour
able exercise of mercy. The glad tidings of what the Saviour
has done are announced to men, that they may enjoy the
benefits which result from his work — may be restored to the
favour and image of God by the belief of the tidings. But I
see no propriety whatever in representing the pardon as sub
ordinate to the cure, or the cure to the pardon.
There is only one other point to which the reader's atten
tion must be directed before we take our final leave of the
subject of justification. It may, perhaps, be best to introduce
it in the form of an objection against the great doctrine which
the preceding Lectures have aimed to support, viz., that " we
are justified by faith, without the deeds of the law." The
objection is derived from the well-known language of James,
" Ye see, then, how that by works a man is justified, and not
by faith only." (Chap, ii., ver. 24.) Luther, we are told, could
not reconcile the two apostles to his own full satisfaction. To
preserve, therefore, the important doctrine of justification by
faith without works, he was for rejecting the epistle of James
as spurious. Others, who adhered to the doctrine of Paul,
have resorted to very unsatisfactory modes of explaining the
language of James, so as to preserve that harmony between
his statements, and those of his brother apostle, which must
exist among persons who wrote as they were moved by the
Spirit of God.
Many imagine that, when James says of Abraham, that he
was justified by works, afterwards extending the same state
ment to men in general, he meant only to intimate that by
our good works we make it manifest to ourselves that we are
in a justified state. " Now I readily grant,'' says an excellent

PAUL AND JAMES. 331
writer, " that good works are an evidence to ourselves that
we are in a state of favour with God, but surely it cannot be
said that Abraham had no evidence of this till he offered up
his son. Besides, to have evidence in our works that we are
justified, is not to be justified by works. The evidence of a
thing cannot be the thing itself; nor does justification here
signify a man's approbation of himself, but the favourable
verdict of another concerning him ; for ' not he that commend
eth himself is approved, but whom the Lord commendeth.'"
Others suppose that Paul treats of justification in the sight
of God, since he uses the expression, "in his sight:" but that
James speaks of it as it appears before men, because he says,
" I will show thee my faith by my works." " Now we readily
admit that a man's faith is rendered manifest by his works, and
that it is our duty thus to let our light shine before men, that
they may glorify our Father who is in heaven. But surely
James, by being justified, meant more than this. And can we
suppose that Paul, who esteemed it so light a thing to be jus
tified or condemned by man, intended to state that it was
only thus that Abraham's faith wrought with his works, or
that he was justified ? James introduces what he says of jus
tification by works with this exhortation, ' So speak ye, and
so judge, as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty;'
in which words he certainly refers to the law of God. We
cannot, therefore, reasonably suppose that he has only the
judgment of men in view ; for that is always fallible, frequently
erroneous, and at best but of small consequence."
Others, again, imagine that Paul means the justification of
our persons, and James the justification of our faith. I agree
with an excellent writer, " that there is not much meaning in
this. Our faith is, indeed, shown by our works, but in no
other way than we ourselves are shown to be believing persons.
No man's faith can be justified abstractedly from his person."
Besides, the apostle does not say that by works faith is justi
fied, but a man is justified. To maintain that he means the
former, is to charge him with uttering nonsense; for what
meaning is there in the assertion. " By works faith is justified,
and not by faith only ? "

332

HARMONY OF

Dr. Dwight tells us that James is speaking of "mere specu
lative faith, and Paul, of that confidence in God from which
all works of righteousness certainly and necessarily flow ;" and
this is perhaps the general opinion. It is, however, most ma
nifestly an erroneous one ; for conceding to Dwight, for the
sake of argument, that there is a right and a wrong way of
believing the gospel, and that justification is not of course
connected with the wrong faith ; he surely will not venture to
contend — in the face of Paul's assertion, that we are justified by
faith alone, without the deeds of the law — that it is not con
nected with' the right faith, — that there must be both the right
faith, and its fruits, i. e., good works, in order to justification.
Now Abraham's faith was the right kind of faith, for it pro
duced works; and James tells us that he was justified by
works, proceeding to affirm the general doctrine that men are
justified by works, and not by faith alone. Dwight makes a
very feeble effort to show that these words may be reconciled
with his doctrine. In my apprehension they are altogether
fatal to it. Some persons, resorting to a subterfuge, tell us
that James did not mean that we are not justified by faith
alone, but by a faith which is alone. I venture to call this a
subterfuge, a very dishonourable one as it appears to me, be
cause we can only judge of what the apostle James meant by
what he says; and he says that we are not justified by faith
alone, but by faith in connexion with works.
It is not possible, therefore, to reconcile the statements of
the two apostles, but by supposing that the term "justification"
is used by them in a different sense. This may accordingly be
regarded as the true reconciling principle. " By justification,"
says Mr. Fuller, " Paul meant the acceptance of a sinner be
fore God ; but James refers to his being approved of God, as a
true Christian." " The meaning of James," says the late
M'Lean of Edinburgh, " is, that believers in Christ, abound
ing in the work of faith and labour of love, are approved of
the Lord as his faithful servants, and shall at last be openly
acknowledged and rewarded by him as such ; not according
to the tenour of the law of works, but according to the consti
tution of grace established in the blood and mediation of

PAUL AND JAMES. 333
Christ." "The true solution of the difficulty," adds Dr.
Wardlaw, " appears to be, that the subjects of which the in
spired writers respectively treat, are not the same. They are
reasoning against different descriptions of persons, and are
speaking of different justifications. Paul's argument is with
those who, in whole or in part, — either without the faith of
the gospel, or in combination with it, — sought, and taught
others to seek, justification by the works of the law. The
argument of James is with another class of persons altogether,
— even those who professed to seek justification by faith alone,
but whose professed faith was unproductive of good works.
Agreeably to this difference of subjects, and of objects, the
two writers, i have observed, speak of different justifications.
The one treats of the justification before God of a sinner con
sidered as condemned by the law ;— the other treats of the
justification of a believer in Christ, considered in that capacity.
Now the former of these justifications is by faith, — the latter
by works. Both are equally necessary, both mutually con
sistent. The affirmation of James in the text I understand
to be, not that the same justification is both by works, and by
faith, — but that there is a justification by works, as well as a
justification by faith, — and that where'there is not the former,
there is not, and cannot be, the latter, — no man being justi
fied by faith as a sinner, who is not also justified by works as
a professed believer." — (Sermons, pp. 118, 119.)

LECTURE XXL

REGENERATION.
The term Regeneration designates the second of the two com
prehensive blessings which include in themselves, or their
consequences, all that the Saviour bestows upon his people
in this world, as a necessary preparation for the glories of the
world to come. The exalted privilege, to which the attention
of the reader has been already called, removes, as we have
seen, the legal barrier against our admission into heaven ;
that, on the consideration of which we are about to enter, the
moral barrier. Justification is a change of state ; regenera
tion a change of character. The former confers upon us a
title to heaven ; the latter a holy meetness for it : and thus,
when bestowed in union, as is invariably the case, they meet
and supply the wants of man as a being who has lost both the
favour and the image of his Maker. The blessing itself is set
before us in such passages as the following. " Except a man
be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." (John
iii. 3.) " Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth."
(James i. 18.) " Being born again, not of corruptible seed,
but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and
abideth for ever." (1 Peter i. 23.) These passages exhibit
manifestly an important change of character, and give rise to
the following inquiries : " What is the nature of the change ?
How is it effected ? Why must it be experienced ? " Or, in
other words, what is the nature, the cause, and the necessity
of regeneration? Under these three inquiries it will be
possible to include all that is thought desirable to say upon
the subject.
I. Our first inquiry relates, then, to the nature of regene
ration. Now it might appear, at first view, expedient, if not

NATURE OF REGENERATION. 335
absolutely necessary, to clear the way for our subsequent
statements, by a preparatory description of certain changes
which do not amount to what is intended by the term regene
ration ; for it often happens that men deceive themselves on
this important subject, and rest satisfied with some partial
change which does not more truly constitute the new birth
than the shadow identifies itself with the substance. Suppose
the case of a man who has diminished his fortune, and shat
tered his constitution, by sensual indulgences. He sees that
his last shilling will soon be spent, and that life will be very
speedily extinguished, if he continue in his present course.
He is wise enough to listen to the voice of reason, and to
desist. But he does not cease to love the criminal pleasures
in which he had indulged. It is, on the contrary, a source of
perpetual annoyance and mortification to him, that he cannot
give the reins to his corrupt propensities as he had been
wont to do. Are we to consider such a man a new creature ?
Surely not. It is the mind that constitutes the man, so that
while the identity of the mind remains, it would not be tnuch
more absurd, because an individual had altered his dress, to
call him a new creature, than so to designate him because he
had made clean the exterior of his character, or rather its
dress, while the interior remained as filthy and abominable as
ever. I do not, therefore, think it an unimportant matter to
show what regeneration is not ; but the most effectual way of
accomplishing this, will, I apprehend, be to state what rege
neration is: and, as we proceed in describing its nature, to
show that those exterior and partial changes which sometimes
take place in an individual, or rather upon him, do by no means
amount to that entire renovation of all the principles and
faculties of the soul, to which the name of regeneration, or
new birth, is attached by the inspired writers, and which must
be experienced by all men, ere they can obtain admission into
the kingdom of God.
Before we proceed to a more formal consideration of the
nature of regeneration, it appears to me desirable to call the
attention of the reader to one or two preliminary remarks :
the first regards the extent of the change denoted by the

336 IS A RADICAL CHANGE, BUT NOT. PHYSICAL.
word ; the second, its nature. First, then, let it be observed,
that the general descriptions of regeneration contained in the
inspired volume imply, that the change of character denoted
by the term is an entire or a radical one. It is evidently not
some minute or uncircumstantial alteration which will justify
us in designating any man a new creature ; but a total revolu
tion of character. There must exist, in the entire renovation
of the heart, an adequate foundation for the use of metaphors
so. bold and strong; or it would be difficult to defend the
sacred writings against the charge of pompous trifling.
Secondly, That the change of which we now speak is en
tirely of a moral nature. It is, indeed, characterized as a crea- '
tion; and the term seems necessarily to imply the produc
tion of something which did not exist before, and by an agency
direct or immediate — like that which brought the chaotic
materials, out of which so much ¦ order and beauty were at
length educed, into existence. We must, however, guard
most especially against supposing that it is the. production of
new natural or physical powers. The defect under which
natural men lie, is a moral defect — and a moral defect exclu
sively. Adam did not cease to be a perfect man, physically
considered, when he became a sinner. He lost no physical
power or susceptibility which distinguishes the nature of man,
in this point of view, from that of beasts; but he lost that
sacred principle of love to God, which had regulated the
exercise of all his physical powers, and led him to consecrate
the whole of them to the Divine glory. He did not lose his
intellect, will, or affections ; but he lost his disposition to
employ these powers in the service of his Maker. It is of
great irnportance to bear these statements in mind, because
there are individuals (the Arminian scheme, as expounded by
Mr. Watson, does this) who give a representation of the doc
trine of the fall which completely overthrows the criminality
and accountability of man. Some have maintained that he
lost his free agency, — a statement not less absurd to those who
reflect upon its meaning, 'than would be the assertion, that he lost
his understanding ; and that the moral government of God is
now exercised over a world of idiots. Man lost, by the fall, the

REGENERATION DEFINED. 337
noly guide, so to speak, of his mind. He lost his disposition — not
his physical power — to fulfil the great ends of his being ; and,
consequently, there is, in every unconverted man, an irregular
and depraved development, and exercise, of all the faculties of
the mind. The understanding calls good evil, and evil good ; it
puts darkness for light, and light for darkness. The affections
cleave to those objects which are adorned by the understand
ing with such alluring, though false attractions; the desires
go out after them as the ultimate and supreme good ; and the
will is set upon doing evil." Now regeneration is not the
act of delivering from this depraved state and exercise of the
various powers of the mind, as some mistakingly suppose, —
keeping their contemplations too much fixed upon the agency
which delivers -them,— but it is the deliverance itself. It is
the giving of light to the understanding — of rectitude to the
will — of purity to the affections ; in short, it is the transform
ation of its happy subject into the holy image of God. And
because there is spiritual knowledge, and holy love, in the
mind of a Christian, which were not to be found in that mind
previously to conversion, the change of which we speak is
called, as we have seen, a creation.
Having made these introductory and explanatory remarks,
I now pass on to a more formal statement of the nature of
regeneration, of which I am disposed to give the following
definition. Regeneration denotes that entire moral change
which is effected upon men by the instrumentality of the gos
pel of Christ. It comprehends the spiritual illumination of
the understanding, the sanctification of the affections, the
renewal of the will, and the purification of the conduct. In
short, it is the commencement of that spiritual cure, which
will be perfected when " mortality shall have been swallowed
up of life."
This definition overlooks a distinction frequently made by
theological writers, between regeneration and conversion;
the former term denoting, as they imagine, that Divine influ
ence by which the change is effected, — or rather that direct or
proximate effect of this influence upon the mind, which is sup
posed to be prior, in the order of nature, to all spiritual per-
2 s

338 USUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN REGENERATION
ceptions and feelings, and, partially, at least, the cause of
them : the latter term denoting that actual and active turning
of the soul to God, which is the more ultimate though certain
result of the Spirit's influence. According to this distinction,
the soul in regeneration is passive, "being the subject," says
one, " on which, or in which, the effect is produced; but' in
conversion it is active; it takes new views of God; exercises
different, i. e., spiritual affections towards him," &c.
Now; without meaning to deny the general correctness of
the preceding representation of what really takes place in the
mind of a sinner when he is converted to God, I do not intend
to adopt this distinction in my subsequent statements, for the
following reasons : —
In the first place, I do not think that I should be able to give
a distinct and intelligible account of the nature of regeneration
in this restricted sense of the term. I have no doubt, indeed,
that the primary operation of the Spirit of God upon the
mind, is a direct operation, i. e., not through the medium or in
strumentality of Divine truth. And I am further thoroughly
persuaded that it must have some permanent effect upon the
mind, — some change in its moral state, predisposing it to re
ceive, and love, and obey the truth. But I am quite free to ac
knowledge that I do not feel able to describe the precise nature
of that change, or even to form any distinct conceptions of its
nature. I have a strong conviction that most of the writers,
in modern times at least, who have attempted to explain its
nature, have employed very inappropriate and unfortunate
phraseology. They have used terms, as they appear to me at
least, not fitted to describe the effect upon the mind of the
primary and direct- influence of the Spirit, but that which
results from the influence of the truth upon the mind, when
its meaning, and evidence, and glory, have been unveiled to.
the view of an individual by the Holy Spirit. Few fhirigs
can be more apparent than that actual love to God, for in
stance, is the result of that knowledge of his character which
is derived from the gospel, — that it cannot exist, without such
knowledge, — and must necessarily be subsequent to it. Yet
some incautious writers have employed language which would

AND CONVERSION NOT ADOPTED. 339
seem to indicate the opinion that love to God is actually kindled
in the mind by the direct influence of the Holy Spirit ; and that
spiritual or just views of the Divine character are subsequent
to the existence of love, and flow from it as their cause.
And what are we to understand by the statements of other
writers, that a holy principle, or a bias to that which is good,
is implanted' by. the direct influence of the Spirit in regenera
tion? I am persuaded that, in the only definite sense which
can be attached to these expressions, they convey more than
the case warrants; — they describe, in short, the effect of the
combined influence of the truth and the Spirit ; instead of ex
hibiting exclusively, as they should have done, the result of the
latter influence. In fact, in the controversy which has been
carried on between those who maintain that in regeneration there
is a direct influence of the Spirit of God upon the riiind, and
those who deny this — affirming that the influence is mediate,
or instrumental, i.e., exerted by means of Divine truth,— the
great difficulty, in the case of those who hold the first of these
opinions, is to describe accurately and intelligibly, not the nature
and manner of Divine influence, but the proximate result of
that influence, — the precise nature of that effect upon the mind
which predisposes it to entertain just apprehensions of Divine
things, and to cherish suitable affections towards them. The
conscious impossibility of doing this, held me to the latter
opinion for many years. Of the nature of that effect upon
the mind, or of that change in its moral state (the direct and
proximate result of the regenerating energy) which is in the
order of nature previous to spiritual perceptions and feelings,
and, partially at least, the cause of them, I could form no dis
tinct conceptions then, and I am constrained to avow that I
have made no further progress now. I am, however, satisfied
at length to let this point remain in that state of comparative
darkness from which I have never witnessed a successful at
tempt to rescue it, and am myself unable to make one. I be
lieve that some change is produced in the moral state of the
mind, by the direct influence of the Spirit of God, leading to
spiritual perceptions and affections, and being, of course, in

340 USUAL DISTINCTION, &C
the order of nature previous to them ; but I pretend not to
be able to describe its formal nature. But,
Secondly, The change to which I have just referred is rather
something previous to regeneration, than regeneration itself.
Whatever be the nature of the change denoted by that word,
it results, beyond all question, from the influence of Divine
truth. " Of his own will begat he us," says James, " with the
word of truth." " Being born again," adds Peter, " not of
corruptible seed, &c, but by the word of God, which liveth
and abideth for ever."
I confess I have always been dissatisfied with the way in
which Mr. Fuller, Dr. Williams, and others, have attempted
to reconcile these passages with the sentiments they hold on
this Subject. James and Peter refer, say they, to regeneration,
improperly so called. The proper sense of the term is ex
hibited in those passages which describe the effect of the
direct agency of the Spirit upon the mind. Now, in the first
place, I apprehend many of the passages to which they
refer, do not exhibit exclusively the effect of this direct
agency of the Spirit, but the results of the combined influ
ence of the Spirit and the truth ; such as, " Create in me a
clean heart, O God; renew a right spirit within me." And,
in the second place, I think I may venture to affirm, that not
one of those passages to which they appeal, as exhibiting the
effect of the direct influence of the Spirit, although none of
them should be excepted against, declares that effect to be re
generation. Mr. Fuller is, therefore, involved in the curious
predicament of affirming a certain effect or change to be rege
neration, in the proper sense of the term, which is never said
to be such; and of denying that a certain other change is,
strictly speaking, regeneration, though it only is designated by
that name in the word of God. We cannot well be wrong
in following the apostles James and Peter — in calling that
regeneration, which is so denominated by them. I believe in
the direct influence of the Spirit of God upon the mind, and
that it produces a radical change in the moral state of the
mind. I further believe that this change is necessary to rege-

THE GOSPEL ENLIGHTENS THE MIND. 341
neration. But it is a precursor; it is not the thing itself.
Regeneration is the whole of that change which is effected
upon men by the instrumentality of the gospel. This defini
tion ascribes the change to the gospel proximately, but it
only ascribes it to the gospel instrumentally. It presents the
Holy Spirit before us as the great Agent, inasmuch as he
operates directly in opening the eyes of the understanding to
perceive and believe Divine truth ; and, indirectly, in rectify
ing the views, and sanctifying the affections of men by the
truth, — the instrument employed by him to accomplish his
ultimate purposes.
In describing more particularly that change which we de
nominate regeneration, we must look at it in detail, and
present it in parts, so to speak ; I observe accordingly,
1st, That the gospel illuminates the understanding, so that
a just and believing apprehension ofthe things ofthe Spirit of
God, constitutes one branch of regeneration, or one feature of
the new creature. " The natural man," we are told, " re-
ceiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither can he
know them ; i. e., he has not a just apprehension of their
nature ; they do not appear to him supremely excellent, im
portant, and glorious. Hence men in a state of nature, are
denominated " children of darkness." Such is the state in
which the gospel finds all men ; but it does not leave them in
it. It brings them out of darkness into marvellous light.
It renders them children of light and of the day, by impart
ing correct conceptions of Divine things in general, — of the
state of man by nature, — the extent and spirituality of the
Divine law, — the evil of sin, — the character, perfections, and
government of God, — the way of salvation through Jesus
Christ, and of the infinite value of those blessings which flow
to the world through his mediation. The conceptions of the
regenerate man, in reference to these subjects, are, we say,
correct ; they must be so, because they are derived from the
gospel. They are, so to speak, the faithful delineations of the
inspired writers, or rather of the Spirit of God, who assumed
the guidance of their pens, transferred to their minds. And
since the excellence and glory of the things of God are ex-

342 THE GOSPEL ENLIGHTENS THE MIND."
hibited in the gospel, there must be an apprehension of that
excellence and glory in their minds. The great facts of the
gospel, in their implication, and bearing, and importance, must
be understood ; and the infinitely important subjects concern-*
ing which revelation treats, must appear to them in an aspect
similar to that which they assume to the holy inteUect of God
himself. How otherwise could their conceptions of Divine
truth, be correct? This perception of the exceUence and
glory of the things of the Spirit of God, constitutes mainly,
if not exclusively, that illumination of the understanding in
which regeneration partly consists. It is possible for an un
converted man to attain to a correct knowledge of the theory
of the gospel, to be able to give an accurate account of the.
doctrine of Scripture in reference to the Divine character, —
the condition of man as a sinner against God, and the way of
salvation through Jesus Christ. He may assent to the great
facts of the gospel. He may even beUeve them, as we have
formerly stated, in the sense which he attaches to them ; but
he does not see them in their moral importance and glory.
He understands that God is holy and just, as well as good ;
but he perceives nothing attractive in this view of the Divine
character. He understands that mankind can only be saved
by faith in Christ, but there is, in his apprehension, nothing
glorious in this plan of salvation. He is like a man destitute
of taste for the beauties of nature. The same objects meet
his view by which others are enraptured and entranced; but
they present not the same appearance to him, as to them,- and
hence produce no effect upon him. On the contrary, an in
dividual into whose heart God hath shined, has had a full
discovery of the depravity of his nature ; he has an impressive
view of the awful evil of sin ; he perceives a glory surrounding
the character of Jehovah, of which he had formerly no con
ception ; and he is free and loud in his acknowledgments, that
so vast and unbounded was the expenditure of wisdom, and of
love, in the plan of salvation through the Redeemer, that
eternity itself will not be more than adequate to express our
gratitude to him, from whose gracious heart it emanated, and
by whose omnipotent arm it was accomplished.

THE GOSPEL PURIFIES THE AFFECTIONS. 343
2nd, That the gospel purifies the affections, as well as en
lightens the understanding, so that love to whatever is morally
excellent, constitutes another branch of regeneration.
Such is the nature of our mental constitution that we can
not love what does not appear excellent, nor fail to love that
which does so appear. It is necessary to express ourselves
guardedly here ; because, though an object should possess un
rivalled attractions, if we do not see them, or if they do not
appear attractions to us, we do not love it. And, on the con
trary, though an object should possess no intrinsic value
whatever, — though it should even be utterly unworthy of the
esteem of a rational and an immortal creature, — yet if our ima
ginations array it in charms which do not belong to it, we in
variably regard it with love. In consequence of the entire
perversion of his moral taste, degraded pleasures appear ex
cellent to the sinner; holiness, on the contrary, unattractive
and repulsive. He accordingly loves the former, and hates
the latter. But when God, by the power of his Spirit, re
moves the veil from his heart, — when he gives him a discovery
of the excellence, importance, and glory of the things of the
Spirit of God ; when he leads him, by an influence which we
cannot explain, to take that view of their nature and super
lative value, which is presented in his blessed word, — then will
the affections of this individual flow to them as naturally, and
necessarily, as they receded from them before. The purificar
tion of the affections, then, not only cannot take place withr
out the illumination of the understanding, which is perfectly
self-evident to those who know any thing of the constitution
of the human mind, but ! it must necessarily result from that
illumination. No sooner is an individual brought to see the
extent and spirituality of the Divine law, and to feel that he
stands before it in the character of a transgressor, than he
prostrates himself in the dust of abasement before Jehovah,
No sooner is he made to discover the infinite evil of sin, than
he begins to hate it with a perfect hatred ; to behold the glory
of the Divine character, than he begins to love it with all his
heart ; to perceive the perfection of the plan of mercy through

344 THE GOSPEL SWAYS THE WILL.
a Redeemer, than he begins to rejoice in it as all his salva
tion and all his desire. At the very instant in which the
matchless glories of the Saviour, as they are exhibited with
full-orbed splendour in the volume of Divine truth, burst upon
his view, he gives his undivided affections to him, and feels
that if he had ten thousand lives they should all be devoted
to him. It is unnecessary to enlarge, by adducing other par
ticulars. In this manner the gospel purifies the affections of
men; it inspires them with love to all things which are
spiritually excellent, and with hatred to all kinds and degrees
of moral pollution; with love to God, — to his Son Jesus
Christ, — to all who bear his image, and are adopted into his
family ; for whoso loveth him that begat, loveth him also that
is begotten of him ; — with love to the word of God — the wor
ship of God — the ways of God. It detaches their affections,
in short, from every thing that is base, ignoble, carnal, and
temporal ; and raises them to " the things which are above,
where Jesus sitteth on the right hand of God."
3rd, The gospel of Christ subdues the natural stubbornness
of the will, so that a ready and an habitual subjection of mind
to the Divine will constitutes another branch of regeneration.
" Father," said our blessed Lord, " if it be possible, let this
cup pass from me; nevertheless, not my will, but thine be
done." Such is the temper of mind which the gospel is
adapted to produce ; for it was designed to conform us in all
things to our exalted Head : and such is the temper which
every being must possess, before his pretension to moral ex
cellence can be recognised as valid. It constituted the tem
per which was actually displayed by man in his primeval
state. He had then no will but that of his Maker. But
since the fall, he has manifested a refractory state of mind.
He has been disposed to murmur at the allotments of Je
hovah, and to rebel against his sovereign authority. The
words of Pharaoh to Moses, " Who is the Lord, that I should
obey him ? " express the genuine feelings of nature : for, in
fact, all the moral evil that is abroad upon the face of the
earth, may be traced to the rebellious and impious determi-

PURIFIES THE CONSCIENCE. 345
nation of the creature, to act according to his own inclinations ;
or to yield obedience to the will of God, no farther thari as it
may suit his convenience, or his desires.
Such, however, are the views which the gospel gives of the
character of Jehovah — and such, of course, the views which
are entertained of that character by every regenerated man; —
so strong is his confidence— a confidence founded on the Divine
perfections, and the Divine promises — that every event which
befalls him is under the direction of unerring wisdom, and im
measurable goodness ; — such is the ardour of his love to him,
and such the singleness of his desire to promote the Divine
glory — that, though there may be an occasional and temporary
mutiny in the citadel of his heart, yet the rebel forces are
soon quelled, and the habitual state of his feelings is exhi
bited in the words, " Father, not my will, but thine be done."
A ready and an habitual subjection to the will of God, consti
tutes another branch of regeneration.
4thly, The gospel operates upon the conscience as well as
upon the understanding, the affections, and the will ; so that
an enlightened and a tender conscience constitutes another
branch of regeneration. It is the province of this faculty to
condemn- its possessor when he acts in violation of the Divine
law. Depravity, however, by its power and prevalence, has
rendered it careless and torpid. It has so completely blunted
its feelings and unnerved its arm, that, in the case of unrege
nerate men, it frequently contemplates the most flagrant
crimes with little or no concern, and without inflicting upon
the transgressor the chastisement which he deserves. Hence
the Scriptures speak of an " evil conscience;" " a defiled con
science ;" " a conscience seared as with a hot iron." The
gospel, however, is the instrument of imparting a pure, en
lightened, and tender conscience. A conscience which mani
fests its sensibility on the slightest departure from the known
path of duty ; and which never fails, by its solemn rebuke, to
render sin its own punishment. This, indeed, is the great
promise of the new covenant. " A new heart," said God,
" will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you ; and
2 T

346 THE GOSPEL IMPARTS NEW JOYS, &C.
I will take away the heart of stone out of your flesh, arid I
will give you a heart of flesh." I cannot refrain from laying
before the reader the beautiful illustration of Mr. Jay; " Take
a stone — feel- it, how cold — strike it, it resists the blow — 'lay
upon it a burden, it feels no pressure — apply a seal, it re
ceives no impression ! Such were our hearts once — thus cold,
senseless, unyielding, impenetrable, and unsusceptible." But
God takes away the heart of stone, and gives a heart of flesh.
An enlightened and a tender conscience thus constitutes one
branch of regeneration.
5thly, The gospel imparts new joys and sorrows, new
hopes and fears, new pursuits and prospects, and these are
all characterized by holiness. Hence holy joys and sorrows,
holy expectations and fears, holy pursuits and prospects, con
stitute another branch of regeneration. Previous to conver
sion, our joys and sorrows are awakened by temporal objects,
at all events, if not by sinful ones. We never joy in God
through our Lord Jesus Christ ; never rejoice in the light of
his countenance; never mourn over the existence of depra
vity in our hearts, or on account of our very imperfect con
formity to the holy image of God. Such, however, are the
mental exercises of all who have been " born again by the
incorruptible seed of the word." Previous to conversion we
never longed for heaven, because it is the abode of holiness,
and, though we might dread punishment, we never feared sin.
But, if we have been made new creatures in Christ Jesus, it is
the holiness of the world above that constitutes, in our esti-
mation, one of the main attractions of the place ; and, though
sin were not to be followed by death, it would still be the
object of our unmingled abhorrence. Previous to our conver
sion, we " walked after the course of this world," indulging
the vices of the mind, — self-righteousness, pride, vain-glory, —
if our conduct were not marked by fraud, impiety, profanity,
intemperance, or unbridled sensuality; nor had we then a
well-founded hope that, at the termination of our course on
earth, we should enjoy an " abundant entrance into the king
dom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. But, if we have

EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 347
been made " new creatures in Christ Jesus," we consider our
selves not " debtors to the flesh, to live after the flesh ;" " we
reckon ourselves dead unto sin, but alive unto God through
Jesus Christ our Lord." We feel and acknowledge that " sin
should not reign in our mortal body ;" " that we should be no
longer the slaves of sin, but the servants of God ; having our
fruit unto holiness, and the end thereof everlasting life."
Such is a brief description of regeneration. We may con
clude, from the foregoing statement, that it is scarcely correct
to say, as some have done, that regeneration is the effect of
faith ; for faith itself, resulting as it does from the truth, may
in one sense be regarded as a branch of regeneration; and,
perhaps, it ought to be so represented. The evidence that
the gospel is the truth of God, is in the gospel itself. When
the Holy Spirit opens the eyes of the mind, we, accordingly,
at once perceive it ; so that the belief of the truth is as much
to be ascribed instrumentally to the truth itself, as the love of
the truth. The perceived evidence of the truth produces faith;
its perceived excellence awakens love. And whether faith be
the effect of regeneration, or not, depends entirely upon the
definition we give of regeneration. If Mr. Fuller's sense of
the term were the correct one, it would doubtless be so. If
the definition given in the preceding pages be the correct and
spiritual orie, it is even more absurd to call faith the effect of
regeneration, than to maintain the converse, viz., that re
generation is the effect of faith. I greatly prefer that state
ment of both, which represents them as resulting from the in
fluence of Divine truth.
I might here close my account of the nature of regeneration,
but as the subject is one of vast importance, and as there are
those, on the one hand, who are harassed with unnecessary
doubts, whether they have undergone the change, — and many,
on the other hand, who satisfy themselves, in consequence of
some trifling alarm on account of sin, that they have experi
enced it, and so are going " down to hell with a lie in their
right hand," it may not be useless to point out a few of the evi
dences of the change, as a farther exposition of its nature, in the
form of a number of questions which the reader may put to

348 EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION.:
his conscience in the solitude of the closet, while he is earnestly
implored to do this, and to connect with the process of self-
examination, most fervent prayers for Divine illumination.
First, then, " Have I been brought to see that eternal con
cerns are infinitely important? One of the characteristic
marks of those " who are in the flesh," is great or total careless
ness about eternity. — Is this the present frame of my mind ?
Or am I giving to the realities of the world to come my para
mount attention ? Have I been brought to feel that, as there
is infinite misery to be avoided, and infinite good to be secured
hereafter, the pursuit of pleasures — which can exist but for a
moment, and the avoidance of evils — which at most can only
continue for a season, and perhaps a very short one — should be
made to give entire place to the desire of escapirig hell, and
rising to heaven ? And have they given place to' this desire ?
Have I been brought to feel that even the lawful gratifications
of the present state are so worthless when compared with the
blessings which eternity presents to our view, that they ought
to be sacrificed without a moment's hesitation, should the sa
crifice be necessary to secure the latter ? And that its, unlawful
gratifications ought not to be tasted, or even thought of?
Have I, in short, been brought to feel that the salvation of the
soul is an object of such transcendant importance, that it
should attract our supreme, and habitual, and exclusive atten
tion to itself? And does it do this ? If this be not the case
with me, I am declared, by the Scriptures, to be "in the
flesh, and cannot of course please God."
Secondly, " Have I been brought to entertain just apprehen
sions of the things of the Spirit of God ? What are my con
ceptions of the Divine Being ? Do I regard him habitually,
as the ever-present Deity — abroad, around, within me ; as privy
to every deed I perform ; every word I speak ; every thought
which arises in the secret recesses of my bosom ? Do I con
template him as a being whose nature is infinitely averse to
all kinds, and degrees, of moral pollution ? Do I believe that
justice, and holiness, and truth, are essential perfections of his
character, and that he can no more act in opposition to these
attributes than he can cease to exist? And does this view

EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 349
of his character appear glorious to me ? What, again, are the
conceptions I form in regard to the law of God ? Do I con
sider it improperly strict, if not unjust, in requiring absolute
perfection, and in pronouncing the sentence of condemnation
agamst those who are the subjects of a single unhallowed de
sire ? Or, am I ready to acknowledge that the law of God is
exactly what it should be? that it ought to extend to the
thoughts and intents of the heart ? That the evil of sin is so
tremendously, so infinitely great, that the justice of God abso
lutely requires that the least violation of its precepts sfwuld
expose the transgressor to everlasting destruction? What,
again, are my views of myself? Do I fancy that I am rich,
and increased in goods? Or, if disposed to admit that there
is some defect in my moral constitution, am I reluctant to be
lieve that it has become totally deranged? Do I hesitate' to
receive the testimony of God concerning the heart of man by
nature, that it is evil, only evil, and that continually ? Or, do
I unfeignedly believe that " the carnal mind is enmity against
God" — that the whole of the human family are by nature
earthly, sensual, and devilish? What, further, are my views of
the way of salvation? Do I indulge the hope of being able
to atone for my own sins ? — or, do I see that the free and sove
reign grace of God must be the source of all my hopes of
mercy? — that transgression has occasioned so wide, and vast,
and apparently so incurable a breach between man and his
Maker, that even the goodness of God, unbounded and infinite
as it is, can find no honourable channel through which it may
flow to men, but the bitter agonies and death of his Son?
And am I actually building upon this atonement as the exclu
sive ground of a sinner's confidence before God?
Thirdly, " Have the views I have been brought to entertain
of the things of the Spirit of God, had the effect of drawing out
my affections towards them, with a supreme degree of attach
ment ? Have I been made to love all things that bear a cha
racter of moral exceUence, and on account of the moral ex
cellence by which they are adorned? What is the state of
my heart towards God ? Is he the object of my habitual
thoughts, and of my supreme regard ? Do I constantly medi-

350 EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION.
tate upon his character, perfections, and government? Do I
love to contemplate his works, especially his work of works,
the work of redemption, tracing it from the moment when the
first promise of salvation beamed upon man, till the period of
its full aocomplishment, as the Saviour hung upon the cross ?
And then, borne forwards by faith and hope, do I anticipate
the arrival of the time when all its blessings will be unveiled
unto my view in the mansions above? With regard to God,
can I adopt the language of the Psalmist, " Whom have I in
heaven, but thee ? " &c. Is He the sweet resting-place — the
home of my affections, to whom, though they should wander
for a season, they invariably return, while the language of my
soul is, Here will I stay, and this shall be my rest for ever?
What, again, is the state of my heart towards the Lord Jesus
Christ? Is he, in my estimation, " fairer than the children
of men," " the chiefest among ten thousand," " yea, the alto
gether lovely?" Do I conceive of every blessing as the effect
of his mediation, and while partaking of the gifts, does my
soul rise in adoring gratitude to him through whose gracious
hands they have been communicated? What, further, is the
state of my heart towards that " one family of which God is
the Father, and Jesus Christ the elder brother?" Do Hove its
members " with a pure heart fervently?" Do I love them
because they bear the image of Christ, and do I love them
" not in word only, but in deed and truth?" What is the
state of my heart towards the word of God ? Is it more pre
cious to me than gold of Ophir? Can I say, with David,
" O how I love thy law ; it is my meditation all the day ? "
Do I love it for the discoveries it gives of the Divine charac
ter and law, of the plan of mercy through Jesus Christ, and
of the boundless and everlasting blessings which flow to the
world in consequence of his mission, and death ? And, conse
quently, is my habitual perusal of it not regarded as a task,
but engaged in with feelings more allied to those of the miser
when surveying his secret hoard of gold, or of the half-starved
wretch who is sent to a plentiful table ? What, finally, is the
state of my heart in reference to the worship and ordinances
of God ? Can I say, with the Psalmist, " One thing have I

EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 351
desired of the Lord, that will I seek after, that I may dwell
in the house of the Lord for ever ? " " How amiable are thy
tabernacles, O Lord God of Hosts, my soul longeth for thy
courts." Fourthly, " Has my will been brought into a state of habi
tual subjection to the Divine will ? Do I fret, and murmur,
at the allotments of Divine Providence concerning me, say
ing, 'Why were not wealth, and honour, and affluence, and
splendour, given to me, as well as to others, who certainly de
serve them no better?' Or, have I so deep a consciousness of
my own unworthiness of the least of all God's mercies, and so
perfect a conviction of his unerring wisdom, and unspeakable
goodness, that I am sensible I ought to be content ; and that
it is my earnest desire, and habitually successful endeavour,
'in whatever state I am, therewith to be content?' Do I
habitually rebel against God, when he lays his hand upon me
— stretches me upon the bed of affliction — touches me in some
tender point — withers some shade-giving gourd ? Ah ! these
are the seasons which, like the blasts of the assayer's furnace,
try the character of what sort it is. At periods like these am
I like a bullock unaccustomed to the yoke, or do I habitually
walk quietly, and resignedly, under the burden which the
hand of God lays upon me ? "
Finally, " Am I yielding cheerful, and implicit, and habitual
obedience to the commands of God ? Let me not forget that
any other evidence I may conceive myself to possess that I
am born again, must be insufficient, if this evidence be want
ing. ' Show me,' said the apostle James, ' thy faith without
thy works ; ' ' perform,' as though he had said, ' the impos
sible task, if you can ; ' ' and I will show thee my faith by
my works.' ' By their fruits,' said One who is greater than
James, ' shall ye know them.' ' A good tree cannot bring
forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good
fruit.' "
Again, then, let the reader inquire, " Is the obedience I
yield to the commands of God, a cheerful obedience ? Is it
the obedience of the heart ? Does it spring from a principle
of love ? Is it the offspring of those grateful and devout
affections, which render a duty a delight ?

352 EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION.
"Is my obedience implicit? Is it really prompted by a re
gard to the authority of God, and does this appear by my
practical regard to all the Divine precepts ?
" Is my obedience habitual, and uniform, — not like a gar
ment which is put on, and worn for an hour or two, and then
cast aside; — does it constitute my ordinary dress? Do the
principles from which it springs, govern my conduct in aU the
relations I sustain — in my ordinary intercourse with society
— in the domestic circle, and in the world ? "
While the reader is putting these questions to his own con
science, let him address God, in the language of suppUcation,
" Search me, O God, and know me, and see if there be any
wicked way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting."

LECTURE XXII.

REGENERATION.
THE CAUSE OF REGENERATION.
We have considered the term regeneration as denoting the
whole of that moral change which is effected upon men by the
instrumentality of the gospel. This definition unfolds, at
once, the nature of regeneration, and the way in which it is
effected. It exhibits Divine truth, when the Holy Spirit
opens the heart to receive it, as the direct and proximate
source of all the views or opinions we are brought to enter
tain of Divine things in general, and of all the holy affections
which are awakened in the mind towards them ; and it further
exhibits the influence of the Holy Spirit, as the direct and
proximate cause of that spiritual perception of the meaning
and evidence of the truth, without which it can manifestly
produce no more effect upon our minds than if it had never
been communicated to the world. Thus the influence both of
the word and of the Spirit of God are necessary to effect the
renewal of a sinner in the spirit of his mind. By some opera
tion, which we pretend not to explain, he is brought to per
ceive the true meaning, i. e., the spiritual meaning of Divine
truth, and the evidence on which it founds its claims to be a
revelation from God. Objective truth, to use rather anti
quated phraseology, becomes subjective truth. The truth in
the word is transferred to the mind. It forms the opinions
and sentiments of the individual ; and operates in the produc
tion of that body of holy affections and desires, and hopes and
fears, and joys and sorrows, which constitute unitedly the Chris
tian character. Thus a distinction is made between the offices
2 u

354 THE GOSPEL THE INSTRUMENTAL CAUSE,
of the truth, and of the Spirit, in the work of regeneration ; yet
the influence of both -is necessary, and it may be fairly ques
tioned whether, in the case of an adult, a single instance of con
version to God can be produced without their combined opera
tion. Without the word, or the truth, we should be destitute
of the means of renovation — there could be no love, at least
rational love, to God, no choice of him as our portion, no self-
dedication to his service; and without the influence of the
Spirit, these means, even when skilfully employed, would be
ineffectual ; because man, left to himself, would uniformly
reject the truth, and thus deprive himself of the holy influence
it would exert upon his mind.
The two points, then, which I shall endeavour to establish
are the following : —
I. That the truth, or the gospel, is the means or instru
ment, and may, therefore, be considered the proximate cause
of regeneration.
II. That it is the especial agency of the Holy Spirit which
insures the success of this means or instrument ; and, there
fore, the Holy Spirit must be considered the ultimate cause
of regeneration.
I. We have to show that the truth, or the gospel, is the
means or instrument, and may, therefore, be considered the
proximate cause of regeneration. In unfolding these general
statements, there are two distinct points to which the attention
of the reader will be directed.
First, That the truth is the instrument of conversion, to the
exclusion of every other ; and, Secondly, That it is in itself
perfectly adequate to the production of the important effects
which are attributed to it.
First, The truth is the instrument of conversion, to the ex
clusion of every other. To the exclusion of any additional
communication from God; for when the Holy Spirit en
lightens the understanding, it is not by imparting a new reve
lation, but by enabling us to perceive the spiritual, i. e., the
real meaning of the old. He takes of the things of Christ,
and shows them to us. It is the entrance of God's word that
giveth light, that giveth understanding to the simple. In like

TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANY NEW REVELATION. 355
manner, when the Holy Spirit subdues the love of sin which
had formerly reigned in the bosom, and kindles within it a
flame of love to God and holiness, he does not accomplish this
by imparting to us a more awful view of the evil of sin than
is exhibited in the inspired volume, or, in any respect, a
different view ; nor by surrounding the character of God with
more irresistible charms than those in which the sacred writers
have arrayed it : but by leading us to take that view of both,
which is presented by the holy Scriptures. The truth is
thus the exclusive instrument of regeneration. To invalidate
this statement, some have referred to the case of children
dying in infancy; and who, as they are the subjects of original
sin, need regeneration before they can be admitted to heaven.
The proper answer is, I apprehend, that, in the full sense of
the term "regeneration," the sense in which it is used in
reference to an adult, comprehending the whole of that moral
change which has been described, infants do not need, and
are, indeed, incapable of, regeneration. In infants there are
no mistaken apprehensions of Divine things to be corrected ;
no actual unholy affections towards them to be subdued and
removed : for, in the mind of an infant, there are, in reference
to these things, no apprehensions, and no affections of any
description. There exists, doubtless, in the mind of every
infant, the germ of that unholy fruit which, unless the grace
of God prevent, will become at length visible ; but the fruit
itself has not as yet made its appearance. As far as they need
regeneration, they are regenerated; i. e., an influence is
exerted upon them, by the Spirit of all grace, which will
insure a holy exercise of the powers of their minds, when
they become capable of moral perceptions and affections.
Some change is produced upon them, of what nature I do not
pretend to say, leading certainly to their subsequent devotion
to God ; but this, so far from being effected by an instrument
different from the truth, is not effected by means at all ; but
by the direct agency of the Spirit of God. And if any one
should reply, that, as this is not regeneration in the sense in
which I have used the term, infants may be admitted to heaven
without regeneration ; I would reply, without being very care-

356 THE GOSPEL THE INSTRUMENTAL CAUSE,
ful to defend the accuracy of the phraseology, that they are
regenerated in the same sense in which they are depraved; — ¦
the germ of sin is removed, — the germ of holiness is intro
duced, — the only change that can be effected by any power
upon the mind of an infant.
Others, again, refer to certain individuals in heathen lands,
who, though they never heard the gospel, have given, as it is
alleged* hopeful evidence of conversion to God. In reply, I
would observe, in the First place, that it may possibly be
doubted whether the alleged facts are sufficiently substan
tiated ; or, Secondly, admitting that they are so, that they do
not contradict the assertion, that no instrumentality, save that
of the gospel, is employed in the regeneration of men. For,
in the instances referred to, where the hearts of individuals, in
regions which have not been visited by the light of Divine
truth, are savingly turned to God, if such instances there
be, it may prove to be the case that some supernatural reve
lation of the gospel was made to their minds, so that the
instrument of personal renovation is the same — it is still the
gospel ; the only difference is in the mode in which the know
ledge of the gospel was obtained. This is the best opinion I
Can form on the subject; it is, however, only an opinion. It
seems to me impossible to conceive of renovated affections, in
the full sense of the expression, as the result of an immediate
and direct, influence of the Spirit of God. While our physical
constitution remains what it is, a spiritual perception of the
Divine character must surely exist, in the order of nature at
least, previously to the exercise of love to it. Were I to
admit, then, that this perception may be the result of direct
influence, somewhat in the same way with the inspiration of
the ancient prophets, though I am aware there is difficulty
even in this supposition, it would still remain a truth that the
hearts of the persons, in the circumstances supposed, are
affected through the medium of the understanding, as is the
case with us. I can easily suppose, indeed, that there may
be persons, amongst the heathen, who have undergone that
change which I imagine is in all cases experienced, even in
this country, as a precursor to regeneration in the full sense

NOT PROVIDENTIAL DISPENSATIONS. 357
in which I use the term ; that this will be followed by their
welcoming those manifestations of the Divine character which
are to be seen in his works, and exercising love to that charac
ter in the degree in which the circumstances in which they are
placed are adapted to develop it ; — and that it would be fur
ther followed by the reception of that testimony concerning
the Saviour which we enjoy, were it presented to their minds.
And, if there are cases of converted heathen who have never
heard the gospel — I speak thus hypothetically, for I do not
feel that I have sufficient data for forming an opinion — the
state of mind which I have attempted to describe is the one
which is, perhaps, most likely to exist. But nothing of this
gainsays the statement that, in the case of the regeneration of
those who enjoy the gospel, no other instrumentality is em
ployed. Further, the truth is the instrument of regeneration, to the
exclusion of those means which Divine providence frequently
employs to rouse men to serious reflection. It sometimes hap
pens that the footsteps of a sinner, going on in his sins, are
arrested by unlooked for and dreadful calamities. The hand
of death suddenly snatches from him the companions of his
guilt, or the power of God stretches him on the bed of afflic
tion", and brings him within view of the eternal world. Con
science shakes off her slumbers, and will be heard. A spirit
of penitence is awakened ; and the delightful issue ofthe visit
ation is, that he " becomes a servant of God, having his fruit
unto holiness, and the end thereof everlasting life." Still it is
not the affliction that turns his heart from sin to God ; afflic
tion is utterly incapable of doing this. It is by " the incor
ruptible seed of the word," and not by any of the mercies or
judgments of God, that sinners are born again. Divine pro
vidence is the minister of Divine grace, but it is only the
minister. It is often employed to awaken serious reflection ;
to recall the neglected truths of God's word to the recollection
of the sinner; to impress them powerfully upon his conscience;
and to fix his attention upon that truth which saves the soul
from death and condemnation. But still it is the gospel of

358 THE GOSPEL IS ADAPTED
God, and not the providence of God, that enlightens the eyes,
and sanctifies the heart.
Secondly, we proceed to show, That the truth is perfectly
adequate to the production of the important effects which are
attributed to it. A very few remarks will be sufficient, it is
¦apprehended, to illustrate the truth of this assertion. Regene
ration, we have seen, consists, partly at least, in the illumina
tion of the understanding. A man who has undergone the
change designated by that word, entertains just views of him
self — of God — his perfections and government — of Christ — and
of the way of salvation through him ; — just views, in short, of
Divine things in general. And is not the gospel, or the word,
or the truth, for the three terms mean the same thing, adapted
to communicate just apprehensions of Divine things? Is there
not in the Bible a correct representation of the state of man
by nature — of the law of God— and of the way of salvation
through Jesus Christ ? Do we need any thing more, in order
to the illumination of the understanding, than to receive with
implicit faith the testimony of the inspired writers in refer
ence to these things ? Surely not. If the mind of any man is
not enlightened by the gospel, it is not because the gospel is
not able to impart light, but because his mind is shut against
it. " The light shineth in darkness, but the darkness com-
prehendeth it not." Regeneration is, in short, as we have
seen, a transference of the light of the word to the mind; so
that every new creature is made " light in the Lord."
Regeneration, we have further seen, partly consists in the
purification of the affections. A man who has been born
again has been brought to loathe himself, — to repent in dust
and ashes, — to hate sin, and to love holiness, — to meditate
with delight on the law of God, — to rejoice in the Divine
character, and to lean upon the Divine arm for support under
the pressure of the heaviest trials. He has been brought to
contemplate, with unbounded delight, the person and the
work of Christ, — to rest his confidence upon his atonement, —
to desire the blessings of his salvation more than his necessary
food, — and to look forwards to the moment when he shall

TO ENLIGHTEN AND SANCTIFY. 359
see him as he is, as the consummation of all that he can hope
or enjoy. Now, is not the gospel, when understood and be
lieved, adapted to effect this extraordinary moral change in
the affections of all who receive it ? What more is necessary
to humble us before God, than to entertain that view of our
character and state which is exhibited in his word? What
more is necessary to kindle in our bosoms the most animated
love to God, than to receive that representation of his charac
ter which is given us in the Scriptures of truth ? What more
is necessary to inspire love to the Saviour, and to lead us to
build upon his atonement, as the ground of hope towards
God, than to possess those views of his person and work
which are presented to us in the inspired volume ? Surely
nothing. I do not refer, at present, let it be observed, to the
agency by which we become possessed of spiritual knowledge,
because that would tend, in this stage of the inquiry, to
embarrass us ; but I ask, whether it is possible for an indivi
dual, who understands the nature of the mind, and the laws
which regulate the exercise of its power, to doubt, when we
are brought to entertain those views of the things of the
Spirit of God, which are presented by every page of the in
spired volume, i. e., when we are brought to regard them as
supremely excellent, that we shall give our supreme affections
to them ? Surely not. Various causes, indeed, may conspire
to prevent an object appearing to us lovely which is really so ;
but it is impossible to prevent the going out of the affections
to that which does so appear. No instrument, then, in addi
tion to the gospel, is necessary to the purification of the heart
of man.
Regeneration, it was further stated, subdues the natural
stubbornness of the wiU, — communicates an enlightened and
a tender conscience, — gives birth to new joys and sorrows,
new hopes and fears, new pleasures and pursuits, all of which
are characterized by holiness. Now, it is manifest that, when
the gospel is understood and believed, when its testimony
stands in the mind as true testimony, and the blessings which
it exhibits appear supremely important and excellent — it
must prove a powerful and an effectual instrument, in the hand

360 THE HOLY SPIRIT THE ULTIMATE CAUSE,
of the Spirit of God, of effecting this change, — of originating
all the holy feelings to which we have just alluded. It is im
possible to illustrate all these particulars separately; — to
show how the gospel, when understood and believed, produces
resignation to the will of God — how it renders the conscience
sensible of the slightest deviations from the known path of
duty — how it causes us to joy in God through our Lord Jesus
Christ — to mourn over the depravity which still cleaves to us
— to fear sin, and to hope for heaven ; — how it leads us to
reckon ourselves to be " dead unto sin, and alive unto God
through Jesus Christ our Lord." The preceding iUustrations
will, I trust, have rendered it. unnecessary to say more than
that, when the understanding of an individual is enlightened
by the Holy Spirit — in other words, when he is brought to
discern the truth, and excellence, and glory, of the things
of the Spirit of God, all the powers and susceptibilities of his
mind must correspond, in their habitual state and exercise,
with the nature of the objects which he contemplates. The
holy seed, when sown in his mind, will certainly germinate,
and produce corresponding fruit. Hence it is said of the
gospel, that " it worketh effectually in all them that believe ; "
that " it is the power of God to their salvation."
II. It is the special agency of the Holy Spirit which in
sures the success of the gospel ; and, therefore, the Holy
Spirit may be regarded as the ultimate cause of regeneration.
On this part of the subject, I propose,
1st. To establish the assertion, that, in the regeneration of
men, the agency of the Holy Spirit is employed ; so that this
Divine agent may be regarded as the ultimate cause of rege
neration : and,
2nd. To offer a few general remarks, with reference to
the nature of his agency, and the manner in whioh it is put
forth. 1st. Then, we are to establish the fact, that, in the regenera
tion of men, the agency of the Holy Spirit is employed ; so
that this Divine agent may be regarded as the ultimate cause
of regeneration.
This assertion is supported by the express testimony of

PROVED BY REVELATION. 361:
Scripture; " To as many as received him, to them gave he
power to become the sons of God : even to them that be
lieve on his name. Who were born not of blood, nor of
the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."
(John i. 12, ia) To be born of God, is to be born of the.
Spirit of God ; for we find our Lord assuring Nicodemus,)
that "except a man.be born of the Spirit, he cannot see the
kingdom of God;" "that," he adds, "which is born of the
flesh is flesh : and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit,"
(John iii. 5, 6.) " Not by works of righteousness which we have
done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing
of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost," (Titus
iii. 5.) " Of his own will begat he us," says James, " with
the word of truth." And these declarations are in agreement
with ancient prophecy. " A new heart," says God, to his peo-:
pie of old, " will I give you; and a new spirit will I put within*
you ; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh,
and I will give you a heart of flesh," (Ezek. xxxvi. 26, 27.)
The assertion is again supported by the testimony of
fact. "Our Lord," says Dwight, in illustration of this point,.
" preached to the Jewish nation at least three years and a
half; if not more than four years. It will be admitted, that
he was the best of all preachers, and that his preaching was
more perfectly calculated than any other to produce holiness-
in the hearts of those who heard him. Yet it will also be ad
mitted, that he was not a very successful preacher. We
naturally ask, why was he not successful ? The apostles, on
the contrary, though certainly and greatly inferior to Christ
in wisdom and persuasiveness, preached still with wonderful
success. St. Peter, by the first sermon he preached to the
Jews, probably converted more to the faith and obedience of
the gospel than Christ during the whole of his ministry. We
naturally ask, whence arose -this wonderfully different efficacy
in the preaching of St. Peter, and that of his Master ? The.
persons whom they both addressed were the same; they had,
been witnesses of the miracles of both. Why, then, were they
perfectly dead to the preaching of Christ, and pricked to the
heart and turned to God by that of Peter? The cause was
2 x.

362 PROVED BY FACT.
not in the preaching. It was not in the hearers; for they
were the same persons. It was, then, an extraneous cause.
It was because the Spirit was not plentifully poured out upon
the world till our Lord's personal ministry was closed. The
success of Peter's preaching he himself distinctly ascribes to
the outpouring of the Spirit."
And to what, we may again ask, are we to ascribe the won
derfully different effects produced by the preaching of the gos
pel in the present day ? Under the same sermon, and, there
fore, by an exhibition of the same truth, while the manner of
exhibiting it is also the same, one perhaps is savingly converted
to God, and another remains totally unaffected. The cause
being the same, how comes it to pass that there is so great a
difference in the effect ? How does it happen that one man is
savingly benefited by the truth, and the other not? It can
only be accounted for in one of two ways. Either Divine in
fluence is exerted upon the mind of the former, — or that mind
is less prejudiced naturally against the gospel than the mind
of the latter, and on that account receives the gospel, while
the latter repels it. The latter cannot be the case for several
reasons. Were it true, it would constitute a foundation for boasting,
in opposition to one of the main designs of the gospel. A
sentiment which necessarily supposes that, in a moral point of
view, one man is naturally better than another, — less invete-
rately prejudiced against the truth, — more accessible to con
viction, — more favourably disposed to admit the gospel testi
mony, cannot be a part of that truth, the grand intention of
which is to stain the pride of man, and to exalt the glory of
God. Unless we suppose that the success of the gospel is to
be ascribed invariably to the influence of the Holy Spirit, it will
be impossible for us to preserve entire the doctrine of salvation
by grace. Should it be said, with a view to neutralize the ar
gument here, that the candour which leads some to receive the
gospel is not supposed to be the mere offspring of nature, —
that it is the gift of grace : I would answer, that this amounts
to the same thing with ascribing the actual reception of the
gospel to Divine influence,— only that it is a more rounda
bout and bungling way of expressing the important fact.

DIVINE INFLUENCE NOT THE INFLUENCE OF TRUTH. 363
2nd. I am to offer a few remarks in reference to the nature
of this agency, and the manner in which it is put forth. It
will, be possible to comprehend all that is requisite to say on
this subject under the following particulars.
First, We must be most careful not to confound the agency
of the Holy Spirit, in regeneration, with the influence of the
truth, as a moral means of illumination and sanctification. It
is not likely that any who concur with me in the previous
statements, will fall into this mistake. They will at once see
how great and flagrant is the error to which I am now refer
ring. Yet it has been committed by many. It is the error
of Socinianism. Divine truth exerts a powerful influence
upon the tempers and conduct of men ; and, since that truth
came from God, its influence upon the mind may be said to be
the influence of God, or the Holy Spirit, upon the mind; just
as the influence of physical causes in the material world may
be said to be the influence of God. Thus will men resort to
unmeaning generalities, or to doubtful analogies, borrowed
from processes as mysterious as the cases they are brought
forward to elucidate, rather than prostrate their understand
ings before the word of God. And, it is not a little curious,
that many of those who resort to this analogy to illustrate, or
rather to explain away, Divine influence, have adopted the phi
losophy of Mr. Stewart — that physical causes possess no power
or efficiency ; — that there are, in fact, no causes, in the proper
sense of the term, in the physical world at all; — that every
change is effected by the direct or exclusive energy of the great
First Cause. Thus they first attempt to exclude from their
system the doctrine of Divine influence so frequently affirmed
in Scripture, by pretending that it means the influence of Di
vine truth, as the moral means of illumination and sanctifica
tion. This influence, they further tell us, may be compared to
the influence of physical causes in the material world ; and
then, with unparalleled inconsistency, they add, that physical
causes have no influence whatever ! Who can deny that their
logic is as false as their theology ?
The error is also committed by the Sandemanians. " All
the Divine power," says Mr. Sandeman, " which operates

3S4 ERROR OF SOCINIANS AND SANDEMANIANS
upon the minds of men, either to give the first relief to' their
consciences, ¦ or to influence them in every part of their obe
dience to the gospel, is persuasive power ; or the forcible con
viction of truth." " The Spirit of God," he adds, " acts as
the soul, sense, or meaning of the words wherein the gospel is
delivered." Now, it is manifest that the latter statement, as
far as it has any meaning, identifies the word and the Spirit ;
and directly opposes the important doctrine, that our first spi
ritual perceptions of the. truth are the result of Divine influ
ence. For, since the sense or meaning of the gospel testimony
cannot, of course, produce any effect upon the mind until it
is perceived ; and since the Holy Spirit acts as the meaning of
the testimony, the perception of its meaning must be previous
to his influence, and so cannot be produced by it. The
apostle tells us, that "the things of the Spirit of God are
spiritually discerned;" but if the Holy Spirit acts as the
sense or meaning of the testimony which exhibits them, he
cannot act in giving us this discernment. Thus Mr. Sandeman's
system provides no answer to the question, "How do men
come to understand and believe the gospel?" Indeed, unless
I misunderstand Mr. Sandeman,. he is fully aware of this; for
in answer to the question, " How do men come to understand
the gospel?" he represents the discovery of its meaning as
being accidental, like the discovery of the "polarity of the
needle, and the virtues of the Jesuit's bark."
To identify the influence of the Spirit, and the influence of
the truth, is, in fact, to hold the doctrine of Divine irifluence
in name, and to deny the thing itself; while to resort to any
of the material analogies to which I formerly referred, with the
intention, at least, of explaining the matter, is, in my appre
hension, little less than absurd. That energy which the Holy
Spirit exerts when a sinner is converted to God, is unlike any
influence put forth in the physical world. It is of a nature
entirely sui generis ; or, if it be supposed to have any parallel
at all, the parallel will be . found in the primary act of crea
tion ; and not in those subsequent acts by which the motions,
fend changes, and all the phenomena of the material universe,
are secured. But of this more will be said hereafter.

DOES NOT GIVE ADDITIONAL POWER TO THE TRUTH. 365
Secondly, It is a mistake, I imagine, to conceive of Divine
agency, in the work of regeneration, as giving increased in
fluence or power to the truth, and by that means securing
its triumph. Many there are who admit that in regenera
tion, an influence is brought to bear upon the mind distinct
from, and additional to, the inherent and necessary tendency
of the truth to enlighten and sanctify ; yet, maintaining that
this influence is not exerted directly upon the mind, but in
directly, through the medium of truth, or rather upon the
truth imparting to it additional moral power, they have fallen
into the error, as I cannot but consider it at least, against
which I am now cautioning the reader. Their mistake re
sults, I feel strongly persuaded, from the circumstance of their
having overlooked an important distinction which exists be
tween spiritual influence, and spiritual renovation, in the full
sense of the term. No one can doubt that spiritual renovation
or the actual illumination of the understanding, and the purifi
cation of the affections, is effected, and can only be effected, by
means of Divine truth. They settle down, accordingly, in this
conviction, which, of course, I have rio wish to shake. But
they very unguardedly, as it seems to me, draw the conclusion,
that spiritual influence, or that Divine energy which is par
tially the cause of just conceptions and holy feelings, is also
by means of Divine truth ; and, consequently, if they retain
the doctrine of Divine influence at all, they are constrained to
believe that an influence or power is imparted to the gospel,
when it becomes the means of conversion, which it does riot
ordinarily possess, and which secures its triumph over the pre
judice, and pride, and carnality of the heart. Against this
opinion there are innumerable objections, which shall be con
sidered in the subsequent Lecture.

LECTURE XXIII.

REGENERATION.
THE CAUSE OF REGENERATION CONTINUED.
In reference to the nature and manner of Divine agency, it
has been stated, that it must not be identified with the moral
influence of Divine truth, — and that it does not secure its
merciful purpose by imparting additional power to Divine
truth. We proceed now to consider the objections which may
be urged against this latter opinion.
First, It throws discredit upon Divine revelation. In all
those cases in which the gospel is not successful, it virtually
ascribes this want of success to the gospel itself; and, by fur
ther maintaining that it cannot enlighten and sanctify the
mind, unless additional energy be infused into it, it charges
Jehovah with folly in having provided incompetent means for
the accomplishment of his merciful purposes. The gospel is
the spiritual medicine of the soul. In numberless cases, cer
tainly, it does not restore the health of the soul ; but let the
blame be cast where it ought to rest. Let it never be forgot
ten that the fault is not in the medicine, but in the indisposi
tion of sinners to take it. In a case where the gospel does
not produce holy perceptions and affections, are we warranted
to suppose that it is essentially incompetent to their produc
tion, even when by the power of faith it is brought to bear
upon the mind ? Ought we not rather to suppose that it has
not been brought to bear upon the mind of this individual, in
consequence of his rejection of its testimony? The latter,
surely, is the true state of the case. I can scarcely imagine
a greater mistake than one which I fear is committed by

MORAL INFLUENCE CANNOT BE AUGMENTED. 367
many, who speak as if they thought that, when the gospel is
scripturally understood, and firmly believed, it is incapable of
raising the affections from sin to holiness ; from the world to
God; — that even in this case some additional influence must
be imparted to it, or that it would remain totally inoperative.
To entertain this notion is virtually to maintain that the sin
ner may not be blameable even while he remains unsanctified,
having by supposition exhausted his duty by believing the
gospel. He has done, on this admission, all that God re
quires of him. He has taken the right medicine — taken it in
the prescribed manner, and yet his spiritual malady remains.
How could we avoid feeling that, if this were indeed the case,
the fault would be in the medicine, and that he would be an
object of pity, and not of censure ? On these accounts, I can
not but strongly object to the phraseology of some who apply
the words, " a dead letter," to the word of God. If the
terms were merely meant to intimate the fact, that Divine
revelation is never understood and received as the record of
God without Divine influence, they would convey a most un
deniable and important truth. But I fear that, in many cases
at least, the words are designed to teach that the medicine
itself is essentially inoperative; and when this idea is con
veyed to the mind of a sinner, it will veil the full extent of
his guilt, by failing to fix his attention upon his own obstinate
rejection of the medicine, as the direct and, indeed, exclusive
cause of his remaining under the full power of spiritual dis
ease. Secondly, It supposes an operation which is not only unin
telligible, but, as far as I can judge, impossible. The influ
ence of the gospel upon the mind is moral influence — moral
influence exclusively. It is the influence of truth, to enlighten
and convince the understanding; and of motives, to excite
and govern the affections. It results partly from the nature
of the gospel, and partly from the nature of the mind to which
its persuasive influence is adapted. It is an influence insepa
rable from the gospel — the present constitution of the mind
remaining — and it is impossible to conceive of its being either
diminished or increased. From the whole of the preceding

368 MORAL AND PHYSICAL INFLUENCE CONTRASTED.
statements it follows, as a necessary consequence, that the
actual influence of the gospel upon the minds of men must
vary according to the different states of ; those rninds. This,
indeed, is the case with all moral causes which, like the gos
pel, operate by presenting inducements to a certain mode of
action. The external motive may, in one state of mind, be
omnipotent; in another, entirely powerless: but there can
not possibly be a greater degree of power, i. e., tendency in
the motive to secure the action, at one time, than at another.
Take for illustration a case of instantaneous conversion. The
gospel exerts no irifluence over the mind one hour — a mighty
and triumphant influence the next. To ascribe this dif
ference to some additional power, imparted to the gospel, is
to lose sight of the difference which exists between physical
and moral causes; and to confound the influence of the for
mer with that of the latter. Additional power may be im
parted to a physical cause which operates by contact, and im
pulse. A battering-ram, when brought into gentle contact
only with the walls of a citadel, would effect no breach ; but
give to it the momentum, which the strength of fifty or a
hundred men can impart, and it becomes irresistible. It is, I
have no doubt, the influence of some such material analogy as
this, which has led to the mistake against which I am now
contending. Perhaps, indeed, not one of those who maintain
a special influence of the Holy Spirit in regeneration, while
they contend, at- the same time, that it is by means of Divine
truth, (thus confounding Divine influence with spiritual reno
vation,) would avow the monstrous opinion that the gospel
operates upon the mind of man after the manner of physical
causes; they would disown the opinion if it were imputed to
them. But I feel persuaded that the material analogy
has more influence with them than they are aware of — that
it has really formed and governed their opinions upon the
subject. The cause, thenj of the mighty influence of the gospel^
when it becomes the means of conversion, must not be sought
for in some supposed change effected in the gospel itself.
"The gospel," as I have said in another publication, "remains

ADDITIONAL POWER NOT GIVEN TO THE TRUTH. 369
what it was. Its motives are unchanged. The mind may be
made to appreciate their excellence, and to feel their force,
but this is surely by something being done to the mind, and
not to the gospel ;" a point, however, to which the attention
of the reader will be more fully directed afterwards.
Thirdly, It would afford, at least, apparent ground, if it
really exhibited the facts of the case, for impeaching the recti
tude of the proceedings of the moral governor. It has been
seen, (vide Lectures on Sovereignty, page 99,) that, in refer
ence to those who are involved in the same general sentence
of condemnation, and who must stand at length at the judg
ment-seat, equity does require that the moral governor should
deal with all alike ; — that the door of mercy (if it be opened)
should be set open to all, — that the command should be to
preach the gospel to all, — that the same objective motives to
receive it, should be presented to all ; — and that at the great
day, when one man is saved through believing, and another
lost through rejecting the gospel, it must appear that the same
substantial and radical inducements to receive it, had been pre
sented to the latter individual, as to the former. Now, on the
supposition that no more moral power is imparted to the gospel
when it is rendered effectual to salvation than it habitually pos
sesses, this is manifestly the case; but it is not so on the contrary
assumption. To recur again to the case of instantaneous con
version, referred to a short time ago, the person, immediately
adjoining the one who is brought to the knowledge of Divine
truth, remains unaffected by the address of the preacher. Now,
if it were possible to conceive of an influence being given at
times to the truth to enlighten and sanctify, greater than that
which is inherent in it, and essential to it ; and if it were the
fact, that to this additional influence should be ascribed the
success of the gospel in this case, would there not manifestly
be a difference in the conduct of God towards these indivi
duals, as the moral governor of the world ? And how could
this be reconciled with the principles of righteous moral
government ? It is in vain to reply, as I have often heard it
done, that, if an influence be exerted directly upon the heart
of him who receives the gospel, the same objection will lie,
2 Y

370 DIVINE INFLUENCE DIRECT,
because a direct influence upon the heart does not emanate
from God as moral governor ; whereas the gospel does. It
is, indeed, the instrument of moral government. It is the
drawing of the Ruler, not of the Sovereign. Now, if there be
a more powerful drawing on the part of the Ruler, in the case
of some than of others, might not the latter complain that
the ways of God are not equal ? On these accounts, as well
as others, I reject the opinion that God renders the gospel
effectual by imparting additional moral power to it. I pass
on, now, to the next general remark in reference to the nature
and manner of Divine agency. I observe, then,
Fourthly, That the influence for which we contend is
exerted immediately or directly, i. e., not by means, upon the
mind. This is intimated, I apprehend, with sufficient distinctness
in the sacred volume. " For God, who commanded the light
to shine out of darkriess," says the apostle, " hath shined in
our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of
God," or rather, to the light of the knowledge, &c, " in the
face of Jesus Christ." (2 Cor. iv. 6.) Few things are more
manifest to my mind than that God's shining into the heart is
represented here as something previous, in the order of nature,
to our attaining the knowledge of the glory of God. It shines
into our heart to give the light — to insure to us the enjoyment
of it : " Except," said our Lord, " a man is born again, he can
not see the kingdom of God." To the same effect are such
passages as the following : — " I will give them a heart to
know me." (Jer. xxiv. 7.) " And the Lord opened the heart
of Lydia," &c. ; expressions which clearly imply, I imagine,
that that Almighty energy from which spiritual knowledge
resulted, was exerted immediately upon the heart, and not
upon the truth, imparting to it additional power, and thus
entering with it, or imbodied in it, into the mind. I add,
further. That in the very nature of the case it must be so. " But
the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God,
neither can he know them, for they are spiritually discerned."
I can form no conception of the meaning of these words, if

NOT BY MEANS. 371
they are not intended to teach us that the mind, in its natural
state, is morally incapable of taking just views of spiritual
things : that their excellence and glory will not appear to it,
because, in consequence of its perverted moral taste, the real
excellence and glory of the gospel are not regarded as such.
Here, indeed, is the great, I had almost said the exclusive
difficulty, which accompanies the regeneration of a sinner.
Give him spiritual and believing views of the things of the
Spirit of God, and it is perfectly easy to account for the whole
of the subsequent renovation which he undergoes ; but to give
him those views — this is the moral impossibility to be accom
plished ! Spiritual things appear to every mind, in an aspect
which is governed by the state of that mind. Depravity of
heart spreads a covering of deformity over the glorious charac
ter of God itself, — as the frost-glass scatters the hoar of win
ter over the verdure and loveliness of spring. Of what avail
would it be, while the interposing glass remains, that some
mighty miracle should array the landscape in charms yet more
exuberant and delightful ? It would only multiply the gloomy
horrors of the scene. On the same principle, we ask, "how
a fuller disclosure of the Divine character .could succeed in
conveying an attractive view of that character, to an ungodly
man while he looks at it, as he must do, through the pervert
ing medium of his own depravity ? " How can it be doubted
that an influence which is not exerted directly upon the mind
would not go to the root of the evil ? It is in consequence of
a defect in the minds of sinners, and not in the gospel, that it
is misunderstood and rejected. It is revealed with sufficient
clearness; — it is accompanied with sufficient evidence of
its truth. Were it possible for it to be stated ten thousand
times more clearly than it is, and accompanied with ten thou
sand times more evidence, that would not relieve the defect
which leads sinners to reject it. They would not repent
though one should rise from the dead. " To suppose," as I
have stated in another work, "that God renders the gospel
successful by communicating some additional and mysterious
energy to it, is to suppose that the defect is in the truth, and
not in the mind which rejects it. It is to suppose that there

372 CONTROVERSY BETWEEN FULLER AND M'LEAN.
is not light enough in the gospel to enlighten, nor purity
enough to sanctify, so that more must be given to it. But to
maintain that Divine influence is exerted directly and imme
diately upon the heart of a sinner, is to suppose that the de
fect is there, and it goes immediately to relieve it. And cer
tainly the defect is in the sinner himself. There are spiritual
objjects to be contemplated and loved ; they are possessed of
unrivalled and infinite excellence ; all their exceUence is ex
hibited as clearly and strongly as language can exhibit it, by
the gospel. But sinners have no eyes for excellence of this
description." There must be an immediate, however inex
plicable, operation of the Spirit of God upon the mind, called
in Scripture, opening the heart, &c, before there can be a
spiritual discernment of the things of the Spirit of God. The
interposing glass must be removed, before their excellence,
importance, and glory can appear such to the mind.
The preceding remarks will throw some light upon a con
troversy which existed a few years ago, between Mr. Fuller
and Mr. M'Lean, in reference to the essential principles in
volved in which, some diversity of opinion, I believe, prevails
amongst Calvinistic divines at the present day. It assumed
rather a technical name in the hands of the above-named gen
tlemen, the question being stated thus, " Is a holy principle
necessary to believing? " I imagine there was more of appa
rent than of real opposition between the parties in this con
test. Still there is an important difference of opinion between
the two sentiments into which this particular question may be
resolved, and which are the following : — " Does the primary
influence of the Spirit of God upon the mind impart just views
of spiritual objects, or produce what, for want of a better
word, we may call a holy susceptibility or relish for those ob
jects, in consequence of which they appear excellent to the
mind ; i. e., in other words, just views of them begin to be
entertained?" Dwight, whose words I quote partly for the
sake of fortifying my own sentiments, and partly also with the
view to elucidate them, has given what I regard, upon the
whole, as a very admirable statement of the two opinions which
have been referred to. I would only premise that he seems

STATEMENTS OF DWIGHT. 373
to regard the word " relish " as conveying more of a definite
signification than I do. " It has been extensively supposed,"
he says, "that the Spirit of grace regenerates mankind by
communicating to them new, clearer, and juster views of spi
ritual objects. The understanding being thus enlightened and
convinced, the heart, it is supposed, yields itself to this con
viction ; and the man spontaneously becomes, under its influ
ence, a child of God. I shall not attempt, here, to describe
the metaphysical nature of the work of regeneration, nor to
define, precisely, the manner in which it is accomplished; nor
the exact bounds of the Divine and human agency in this
great concern. Of these subjects I have not sufficiently dis
tinct and comprehensive views, to undertake this employment
with any satisfactory hope of success. Yet it appears to me
clear, that the account which I have now given of this subject
is not scriptural nor just. Without a relish for spiritual
objects, I cannot see that any discoveries concerning them,
however clear and bright, can render them pleasing to the
soul. If they are unpleasing in their very nature, they can
not be made agreeable by having that nature unfolded more
clearly. He who disrelishes the taste of wine, will not relish
it the more, the more distinctly and perfectly he perceives
that taste. Nor will any account of its agreeableness to
others, however clearly given, and with whatever evidence
supported, render- the taste agreeable to him. To enable
him to relish it, it seems indispensable that his own taste
should be changed, and in this manner fitted to realize the
pleasantness of the wine. Light is either evidence, or the
perception of it; evidence of the true nature of the object
which is contemplated, or the perception of that evidence.
But the great difficulty in the present case is this ; — the nature
of the object perceived is disrelished. The more, then, it is
perceived, the more it must be disrelished of course, so long
as the present taste continues. It seems, therefore, indis
pensable, that in order to the usefulness of such superior light
to the mind, its relish with respect to spiritual objects should
first be changed. In this case, the clearer and brighter the
view of such objects are, the more pleasing they may be ex
pected to become to the mind.

374 STATEMENTS OF
" This, I apprehend, is the true progress of this work in
the human soul. A relish for all spiritual objects, never be
fore existing in him, is communicated to every man, who is
the subject of regeneration, by the Spirit of God. Before
this event, he disrelished all such objects; now, he relishes
them all. Before, he was an enemy of God ; now, he becomes
a friend to God; before, he loved nothing; now, he loves
every thing of a spiritual nature. He who has hitherto been
an enemy to a good man, disrelishes every thing which per
tains to him; his character, conduct, conversation, and opi
nion; his family, his friends, his very looks, nay, even the
spot where he lives ; and, in a word, every thing which is his.
If you undertake to convince him, while this disrelish con
tinues, that the object of his dislike is undeserving of aU this ;
you may, indeed, present to him arguments which he cannot
answer, and silence his objections by the irresistible force of
proof. You may explain to him, in the clearest manner, the
excellences of this object; and set them in such a light, that
he may have nothing left to say against it. Should all this
have been done, his dislike, in the case supposed, would still
continue ; his views, though enlarged, would be of exactly the
same general nature ; and his opposition to the hated object,
instead of being diminished, would rather increase. We will
now suppose this man to cease from his enmity, and to be
come a decided and sincere friend. A moment's thought will
satisfy any mind, that, with the change of his relish, an univer
sal change of his views, also, wiU take place. The very same
things which formerly disgusted him will now please him.
What was formerly odious will now become amiable. The
evidences of worth and excellence, which before silenced, will
now satisfy him. His eye, no longer jaundiced, will see every
thing in its proper, native light ; in its true character, import
ance and desert ; and will discern in what was before unpleas
ing, deformed, or disgusting, a beauty, loveliness, and lustre,
wholly new."
The following remarks of Dwight, intended to illustrate
that state of mind which he conceives to be necessary to just
views of spiritual objects, are worthy of particular remark.
His argument, indeed, only rendered it essential for him to

DWIGHT. 375
represent it as necessary to holy volitions ; but it may be ap
plied to holy, i. e., just perceptions.
" It has been frequently supposed, that the Spirit of God
regenerates man by immediately crsating in him virtuous voli
tions. All the volitions of all moral agents are, in my view,
(as will, indeed, be presupposed by those of my audience who
remember the sermons which I delivered on the nature of the
human soul,) the acts of the agents themselves. The Spirit
of God does not, in my view, when he regenerates mankind,
create in them any volitions whatever ; but merely communi
cates to them* the relish for spiritual objects, which has been
here mentioned."
" When God created Adam, there was a period of his exist
ence, after he began to be, antecedent to that in which he
exercised the first volition. Every man, who believes the
mind to be something beside ideas and exercises, and who does
not admit the doctrine of casualty, will acknowledge, that, in
this period, the mind of Adam was in such a state, that he was
propense to the exercise of virtuous volitions, rather than of
sinful ones. This state of mind has been commonly styled
disposition, temper, inclination, heart, &c In the Scriptures
it usually bears the last of these names. I shall take the
liberty to call it disposition. This disposition in Adam was
the cause whence his virtuous volitions proceeded ; the reason
why they were virtuous and not sinful. Of the metaphysical
nature of this cause I am ignorant. But its existence is, in
my own view, certainly proved by its effects. If the volitions
of man are not immediately created, they are either caused by
something in man, or they are casual. But they are not
casual ; for nothing is casual. And even if some things were
casual, these could not be ; because they were regularly and
uniformly virtuous ; and it is impossible that casualty should
be a source of uniformity and regularity. There was, there
fore, in the mind of Adam, certainly, a cause which gave birth
to the fact, that his volitions were virtuous and not sinful.
This cause of necessity preceded these volitions ; and there
fore certainly existed in that state of mind which was previous
to his first volition. The state of mind, then, this disposition

376 STATEMENTS OF HOPKINS.
of Adam existing antecedently to every volition, was the real
cause why his volitions subsequently existing were virtuous.
It ought to be remarked here, that plain men, with truth, as
well as with good sense, ascribe all the volitions of mankind
to disposition, the very thing here intended, as their true
cause." " In regeneration, the very same thing is done by the Spirit
of God for the soul, which was done for Adam by the same
Divine Agent at his creation. The soul of Adam was created
with a relish for spiritual objects. The soul of every man,
who becomes a Christian, is renewed by the communication of
the same relish. In Adam this disposition produced virtuous
volitions. In every child of Adam, who becomes the subject
of virtue, it produces the same effects."
I think Dwight might also have referred to the case of in
fants, regenerated by the Spirit of grace, for further Ulustra-
tion. The change produced upon their minds does not con^
sist either in just views of Divine things, or holy affections
towards them; for they are physically incapable of either.
But the germ of holiness is implanted; some effect is pro
duced which would lead, were the life of the child spared, to
just apprehensions, and holy affections.
I would also refer the reader to the following statements
of Dr. Hopkins, not that I altogether approve of their phrase
ology, as he will readily perceive; but because they power
fully support the general notion, that in regeneration there is
a direct operation of the Holy Spirit upon the mind, effecting
a change which, in the order of nature, is previously necessary
to all just apprehensions of Divine truth.
" The subject of this operation, in which this change and
effect is wrought, is the will or the heart ; that is, the moral
and not the natural powers and faculties of the soul. As
depravity is wholly in the will or heart, the source and seat of
all moral actions, the Divine operation directly respects the
heart, and consists in changing and renewing that." (Vol. i.,
p. 454.) " This point is particularly observed and stated, to expose
and rectify a mistake which has been too often made, repre-

STATEMENTS OF HOPKINS. 377
senting regeneration as consisting chiefly, if not wholly, in
renewing the understanding, as distinguished from the will ;
and letting light into that, antecedent to any change of the
heart, and in order to it; and by which light in the under
standing, the will is inclined and turned from sin to holiness.
This is turning this matter upside down, and has a dangerous
and bad tendency. It supposes that human depravity lies in
the understanding, and not in the will; or, at least, that it
has its foundation and beginning in the former; and that
when that comes right, the will or heart acts right, of course.
The consequence is, that there is little or no moral depravity
in the heart, that being ready to do its office well, when the
understanding is set right: therefore, man is not blameable
for his depravity, and not being holy; since his blindness,
which alone is in the way of his acting right, is not dependent
on his will, or owing to any disorders in that. It is, indeed,
impossible to give true moral light and understanding to the
depraved mind of man, by any operation whatsoever on the
inteUect, antecedent to the renovation of the will; for the
darkness is in the latter, and consists in the wrong inclination
of that ; and therefore cannot be removed, but by renewing
the heart."
" Others have supposed, that there is in regeneration an
operation on the understanding or intellect first, in order to
enlighten the mind; and then by Divine energy the will is
renewed, and brought to comply with the light let into the
understanding. But this is unscriptural, and contrary to the
nature and order of things ; and tends to lead to hurtful mis
takes, as has been observed. Nothing is necessary but the
renovation of the will, in order to set every thing right in the
human soul ; and if the will be not renewed, or a new heart
be not given, by an immediate operation, no operation on any
other faculty of the soul, and no supposable or possible change
can set the heart right, or renew it in the least degree. The
Scripture makes no such distinction between the faculties of
the soul in treating of this great matter; but represents the
renovation of the will, or giving a new heart, as setting the
wholesoul right in all the powers and faculties of it."
2 z

378 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INFLUENCE AND RENOVATION.
" The Divine operation in regeneration, of which the new
heart is the effect, is immediate, or it is not wrought by the en
ergy of any means as the cause of it; but by the immediate
power and energy of the Holy Spirit. It is called a creation,
and the Divine agency in it is as much without any medium, as
in creating something from nothing. Men are not regenerated
in the sense in which we are now considering regeneration,
by light or the word of God. This is evident from what has
been observed under the last particular. If the evil eye,
which is total darkness, and shuts all' the light out, be the
evil, corrupt lieart of man, then this corrupt heart must be
renewed, in order to there being any true light in the mind,
and previous to it. There must be a discerning heart, which
is the same with a new heart, in order to see the light ; and,
therefore, this cannot be produced by light. The evil eye
which shuts out all the light, cannot be cured, and made a
single eye, by seeing the light : and the light cannot have
any effect, or answer any end, till they are so far made single
to admit the light; therefore, that operation which changes
the evil eye to a single eye, cannot be by means of light ; but
must take place antecedent to any light, or any influence or
effect that can be produced by it. It is said, the Lord opened
the heart of Lydia, that she attended unto the things that
were spoken by Paul. It would be a contradiction, and very
absurd to say, that the word spoken by Paul was that by
which her heart was opened ; for she knew not what he did
speak, until her heart was opened to attend to his words, and
understand them. Her heart was first opened, in order to his
words having any effect, or giving any light to her. And this
must be done by an immediate operation of the Spirit of God
on her heart. This was the regeneration now under consi
deration, by which the heart was renewed, and formed to true
discerning, like the single eye." (Vol. i., pp. 456, 457.)
I will venture again to state, that the difference of opinion
which has existed with reference to the question, " Is that
irifluence which, according to the confession of all orthodox
divines, is exerted in the regeneration of the soul, direct, or
indirect?" is mainly to be traced to the overlooking of the dis-

EMANATES FROM GOD AS A SOVEREIGN. 379
tinction which I have made between spiritual influence, and
spiritual renovation. That the latter must be by means, no
one, I think, can doubt, who understands the nature of the
mind, and the meaning of terms ; and that the former must
be without means is equally apparent to me. I might avail
myself of the argument, that whether Divine influence in
regeneration be exerted upon the mind, as affirmed in the
third general observation, or upon the truth, in the manner
stated in the second, it is still without means. No one can
conceive that it is by any instrumentality that this supposed
additional power is given to the truth; it must be by the
immediate influence of the Spirit. The argument may be
said to be subtle, but I believe it to be correct. Without
dwelling upon it, however, I merely observe, that it is as mani
fest to my mind, that that influence which leads to the conver
sion of the sinner is exerted immediately upon the mind, as
that the actual turning of the affections from sin to God, is
effected by the moral influence of Divine truth.
Fourthly, The influence for which we contend emanates
from God, not in the character of a ruler, but a sovereign.
This statement, it will be observed, is in harmony with
those which occur in the Lectures on Sovereignty. It is of
great importance to recollect here, the nature of moral govern
ment, and in what respects it differs from what we may deno
minate physical government. The latter is exercised over
beings incapable of acting themselves ; or, if they have the
capacity of action, it employs instinct, instead of reason, to
secure the required actions. Moral government is the govern
ment of intelligent beings, possessing the power of action, by
motives exhibited to their view, and adapted to awaken voli
tion — the constituted cause of all those actions for which
such beings are accountable to their Maker — by the good
which these motives present to them. I need not say that
man is the subject of this latter species of government, though
not to the exclusion of the former. The laws of this govern
ment are to be found in the sacred Scriptures. The instru
ments or means of this government, are the threatenings and
promises by which the laws are enforced. The gospel pro-

380 DIVINE INFLUENCE EMANATES FROM
mises the glories of the world above to those who repent and
believe; it threatens with eternal misery all who persist in
impenitence and rebellion. Now the tendency of these pro
mises and threatenings to lead to right volition — to produce
repentance and faith — is the influence which God employs as
a moral governor to secure obedient subjects. It is the only
influence which, in that character, he can employ. He has
formed the mind to will, or desire, that which appears to it
good. He presents good, objectively, to the mind to induce
volition, and consequent obedience. He can act in no other
way in his rectoral character, because moral government is
carried on by the presentation and influence of motives, or
inducements. If the good which He presents to secure the
purposes of his government, should not happen to appear good
to the subjects of that government, it wiU not of course
influence their volitions and their conduct. But, in that un
happy case, the moral governor, in that character, can do no
more to effect his merciful intentions. I do not now mean
that, in point of equity, he should do no more ; but that moral
government has literally exhausted its powers. The head of
the government must not hold out a polluted good to in
fluence the mind; so that, if that good which the gospel
exhibits should not appear good to the subjects of moral
government, he can bring no more influence to bear upon
their minds without giving them another gospel ; i. e., without
promising a greater good if they repent and believe, — and
threatening a greater evil if they continue rebellious ; — both
of which are impossible — the good at present promised being
the eternal enjoyment of himself; the evil at present threat
ened, everlasting banishment from himself !
It follows, then, that the influence which secures the conver
sion of the soul to God, emanates from him as a Sovereign, —
that it is not moral influence, — or moral suasion, as it is some
times called ; and cannot, in the nature of the case, be so, —
that it effects some change upon the state of the mind, in con
sequence of which the good, which the gospel exhibits object
ively, is made to appear good; and consequently, to excite
volition, and lead to obedience ; — but that it is not necessary

GOD, AS A SOVEREIGN. 381
to accountability. To affirm its necessity would lead us into
interminable difficulties. It would constrain us to maintain
that Jehovah is bound to convert all nien. It would prove
that the fall of man could not have taken place ; for while
spiritual objects appear good to the mind, it is morally certain
that they will awaken holy volitions and affections. Were
it the case that Jehovah, on the ground of equity, is bound
not only to bestow upon his subjects a mind capable of distin
guishing between right and wrong — of willing, or desiring,
and loving what appears to it excellent ; were he bound not
only to proffer to them blessings of infinite value, and to unfold
their excellence in terms the most explicit and intelligible, —
but, in addition to all this, were under an obligation to make
these blessings appear excellent to them — then Adam in eating
the forbidden fruit did not commit sin, for unquestionably ab
stinence had ceased to appear desirable before he partook of it;
then men in general, in rejecting the great salvation, do not
commit sin ; for unquestionably spiritual blessings do not ap
pear to them desirable, and hence they do not love and pursue
them. That there are difficulties connected with the state
ments now made there can be no doubt; but if we are not
disposed to admit that God bestows all that is necessary to
accountability, when he presents objects infinitely worthy of
our choice, so adapted to our spiritual and moral nature as to
be capable of affording, whatever we may think of them, the
most perfect blessedness which it is possible to enjoy; and pre
sents them to a mind capable, from its physical constitution,
of choosing the objects to which we now refer, — capable of
making a right choice, and of course capable of making a wrong
one; — if we are not satisfied to regard this as constituting a
basis of accountability, — if we require any thing more, we
shall find ourselves obliged to admit that the entrance of
moral evil directly impeaches the rectitude of the moral
governor.

LECTURE XXIV.

REGENERATION.
THE NECESSITY OF REGENERATION.
When we assert the necessity of regeneration, we intend to
affirm its absolute and universal necessity.
First, Its absolute necessity. Some changes are of such a
nature that it is not a point of great importance whether they
take place or not ; others are eminently desirable ; this is in
dispensable ; — not, indeed, to the possession of health, or the
acquisition of riches, or to the participation of that honour
¦which cometh from men only, — but to the enjoyment of true
happiness in the present life, and to admission into that world
of glory, by which, in the case of believers, it is succeeded.
Into the city of the New Jerusalem, which cometh down from
above, " there shall in no wise enter any thing that defileth,
neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie, but
they which are written in the Lamb's book of life." (Rev. xxi.
27.) " Verily, verily," said our Lord to Nicodemus, " except
a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into
the kingdom of God." (John iii. 5.) The phrase " the king
dom of God," imports the great body of his subjects, — those
over whom the Lord Jesus Christ — to whom the administra
tion of the affairs of this kingdom is intrusted — reigns by his
word, and his Spirit. Some of the members of this body are
to be found on earth ; others have been taken to heaven ; but
neither the militant nor the triumphant branch of this king
dom includes a single person who has not been born again.
Into the visible church on earth, it is possible, indeed, for in
dividuals, by assuming a form of godliness, to obtain admission,
but as the Lord seeth the heart, they cannot pass into the

PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE. 383
church above. To this, regeneration is absolutely essential.
We must certainly and for ever lose all the light, and all the
blessedness, and all the glory of heaven, if, when called from
the present state, we have not been made " new creatures in
Christ Jesus."
Secondly, Its universal necessity. The term which our Lord
employed in his conversation with Nicodemus, comprehends
the whole of our race. The ruler addressed him, saying,
" Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher sent from God," &c.
Jesus answered him, " Verily, verily, I say unto you, except
a man," i. e., any man — whether he be Jew or Gentile, bond
or free, rich or poor, learned or illiterate — whether he be a
prince or a subject — whether his conduct be in harmony with
the letter of the law, or whether it be visibly and grossly pro
fane ; — except he be " born again, he cannot see the kingdom
of God." This solemn asseveration, by the Son of God him
self, of the necessity of regeneration, neither requires proof,
nor is it susceptible of any ; but, as it may help to strengthen
the impression which his words are calculated to produce, I
proceed to show, that the declaration is in perfect harmony
with the entire statements of Divine revelation, as well as with
the conclusions which flow from a consideration of the very
nature of the case itself. The necessity of regeneration is ¦
then attested,
First, By the uniform testimony of the inspired writers.
When Nicodemus expressed his astonishment at the language
of Christ, our Lord replied, " Art thou a master of Israel,
and knowest not these things?" thus intimating that the
doctrine, which has just been stated, was taught so plainly in
the Old Testament Scriptures, that his ignorance of it might
justly awaken surprise. " It is not meant by this that the
particular phrase of being born again, or regenerated, occurs
in the Old Testament writings, or that it is there expressly
said, that no unregenerate man shall be admitted into God's
kingdom. But, that what is in effect the same thing, is
affirmed in innumerable passages." There is not, in fact, a
single page in that important portion of Divine revelation
which does not contribute to teach the solemn truth, that no

384 PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE.
man who persists in a course of iniquity can, on leaving the
present state, obtain admission into the heavenly temple.
We may especially refer to the following declarations as
maintaining it, and as being thus in entire harmony with the
language of our Lord to Nicodemus. The first is contained
in the 29th chapter of Deuteronomy, in which Jehovah is re
presented as making his convenant and his oath, not only with
those who actually appeared before him when Moses sum
moned all unto him, but with those who were not there that
day ; " Lest," he adds in the 18th verse, " there should be
among you, man, or woman, or family, or tribe, whose heart
turneth away this day from the Lord our God, to go and
serve the gods of these nations ; lest there should be among
you a root that beareth gall and wormwood ;" in other words,
lest there should be a man among you who, out of the evil
treasure of his heart, bringeth forth evil things ; " and it come
to pass when he heareth the words of this curse, that he bless
himself in his heart, saying, I shall have peace, though I walk
in the imagination of my heart, to add drunkenness to thirst:
the Lord will not spare him : but then the anger of the Lord
and his jealousy shall smoke against that man, and all the
curses that are written in this book shall lie upon him, and
the Lord shall blot out his name from under heaven," (ver. 19,
20.) " God," says the Psalmist, " is angry with the wicked."
How, indeed, can it be otherwise, since his nature and his
laws are holy, while their hearts are so throughly depraved
that the carnal mind may be said to be enmity itself against
God? He is, accordingly, angry — angry with them evei-y day;
so that the sinner, whether he wakes or sleeps — whether he goes
abroad or remains at home, is an object of Divine displea
sure; and though the forbearance of God is great, yet, adds
the Psalmist, " If he turn not, he will whet his sword ; he hath
bent his bow, and made it ready; he hath also prepared for him
the instruments of death." (Psa. vii. 12, 13.) A still more
awful declaration, exhibiting the same truth, is contained in
the 1 1th Psalm, ver. 5, 6 ; " The Lord loveth righteousness ;
but the wicked, and him that loveth violence, his soul hateth.
Upon the wicked he will rain snares, fire and brimstone, and

PROVED BY SCRIPTURE. 385
an horrible tempest, this shall be the portion of their cup."
The testimony of Solomon, also, is to the same effect ; for
when comparing, or rather contrasting, the death of the right
eous and the wicked, he says, Prov. xiv. 32, " The wicked
is driven away in his wickedness, but the righteous hath hope
in his death." In precise harmony with this, also, is the so
lemn language of Isaiah, " Woe unto the wicked, it shall be
ill with him, for the reward of his hands shall be given him."
(Isa. iii. 11.) The invitations and promises, also, which he
was directed by Jehovah to address to the wicked, set before
us the same solemn truth. " Let the wicked forsake his evil
way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him re
turn unto the Lord who will have mercy upon him, and to our
God for he will abundantly pardon ;"— since the language
clearly implies, that unless he forsake his evil -way, he can
not obtain mercy from God: — arid this implication is still
more strikingly apparent in the corresponding passages in
Ezekiel's prophecy. (Isa. Iv. 7; Ezek.' xviii. 31 ; xxxiii. 11.)
The entire language of the New Testament, as well as the
Old, is adapted to evince the necessity of regeneration. " Not
every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the
kingdom of heaven ; but he that doeth the will of my father
who is in heaven. Many will say unto me in that day," adds the
Saviour, "Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name,
and in thy name have cast out devils; and in thy name done
many wonderful works ? And then wiU I profess unto them,
I never knew you; depart from me, ye that work iniquity."
(Matt. vii. 21 — 23.) In the parable of the tares, also, after
informing us that the tares represent the children of the wicked
one, he adds, (chap. xiii. ver. 40 — 42,) "As, therefore, the
tares are gathered, and burnt in the fire, so shall it be in the
end of this world. The Son of man shall send forth, his
angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that
offend, and them which do iniquity ; and shall cast them into
a furnace of fire; there shall be weeping and gnashing of
teeth ! " In the account of the proceedings of the judgment-
day, recorded in the 25th chapter of Matthew, we are assured
that he will address the unconverted in the following language :
3 A

386 BY THE NATURE OF THE CASE.
" Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared
for the devil and his angels." (Ver. 41.) " And these," it is
added, "shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the
righteous into life eternal." (Ver. 46.)
The apostle Paul declares, also, that at the great day of ac
count, the Judge will render " to those who are contentious,
and do not obey the truth," (i. e., who do not receive the gos
pel, and live under its influence,) "but obey unrighteousness,
tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man," he adds, "that
doeth evil, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile." (Rom.
ii. 8, 9.) To the same effect is his assurance, in the 12th of
Hebrews, ver. 14, that " without holiness no man shall see
the Lord." And in his second epistle to the Thessalonians,
chap. i. ver. 7 — 9, he tells us, " that the Lord Jesus Christ
will be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming
fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that
obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. Who shall be
punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of
the Lord, and from the glory of his power." Nor is Paul the
only apostle who affirms the necessity of regeneration, for
Peter calls the day of judgment, " the day of perdition of
ungodly men." (2 Pet. iii. 7.) Jude, also, must be considered
as supporting the testimony of Enoch, the seventh from
Adam, when he declares, ver. 14, 15, that he prophesied,
saying, " Behold, the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his
saints. To execute judgment upon all, and to convince all
that are ungodly among them, of all their ungodly deeds
which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard
speeches which ungodly sinners have spoken against him."
And, to close this long, list of quotations, John, writing under
the guidance of the Spirit of God, assures us that "into the
New Jerusalem, which cometh down from above, there shall
in no wise enter any thing that defileth, neither whatsoever
worketh abomination, or maketh a lie, but those," and those
only, "who are written in the Lamb's book of life;" and
who, by the power of Divine grace exerted upon them, in
consequence of that circumstance, are made " new creatures
in Christ Jesus."
We have thus seen that the necessity of regeneration is

BY THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 387
supported by the uniform testimony of the inspired writers.
We have brought testimonies to this effect from the Old and
New Testament, from the prophets and the apostles; and
since they all spake and wrote as they were moved by the
Holy Ghost, we ought to consider every passage which has
been quoted, as the voice of God himself, proclaiming in va
rious forms of words the solemn truth, "Ye must be born
again." How fallacious, then, are the hopes of the ungodly !
Since Jehovah is immutable, the day of judgment must find
him as determined to punish those who die in their sins, as
when he issued the first threatening against them. How then
can they escape ? WiU they be able to elude his notice ? Is
it possible for them to be lost in the crowd ? No. When the
whole human family shall appear at his tribunal, every indivi
dual transgressor, in the vast assembled multitude, will feel that
he is as much under the immediate scrutiny of the Judge,
as if he were the only delinquent ! And if it be impossible
for them to escape his notice, can they resist his power ? Can
they pluck the thunderbolts of vengeance from the hands of
Omnipotence ? It were worse than madness to imagine this.
" Let the potsherds of the earth strive with the potsherds of
the earth, but woe be to that man who striveth with his Maker."
He will address them, and accompany his address with an
energy which not the whole universe, were it disposed to
make the attempt, could resist, " Depart from me, ye cursed,
into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.
And these shall go away into everlasting fire, but the righteous
into life eternal."
The declarations of the God of truth ought to convince
every ungodly man that without regeneration he cannot see
the kingdom of God ; yet we know they do not always pro
duce this effect ; I proceed, therefore, to show that the asserted
necessity of regeneration is,
II. In harmony with the conclusions which flow from a con
sideration of the nature of the case itself.
On this subject it is by no means uncommon to find the
grossest mistakes committed by various individuals. There
are persons who seem to imagine that there is no interposing

388 MISTAKE OF UNREGENERATE MEN.
obstacle to the eternal felicity of the ungodly, but the deter
mination of Jehovah to close against them the gates of the
celestial city. They forget that, constituted as man is, misery
is the natural and necessary result of unholy character, — a senti
ment which should be impressed with great earnestness upon the
attention of men. For God himself does not atteriipt the imr
possible task of saving his people in their sins, but from them.
Whatever may be conceived to be the agency of the Judge in
the punishment of the ungodly, it cannot be doubted that the
misery of^ the . damned will result directly arid immediately
from the state of their own minds. The unrestrained indul
gence of all tUo malevolent and angry passions, which God has
rendered it misery to experience,— the never-dying worm of
an accusing conscience,— -the unquenchable fire of self-re
proach, — the maddening influence of despair,— -will constitute
the future hell of the wicked ; and, if the hand of God should
never directly touch them, the doleful abode to which they are
consigned must be the constant scene of " weeping, and waU-
ing, and gnashing of teeth."
These remarks are adapted to show that the sentence of the
great day of account wUl not declare the punishment which, by
arbitrary infliction, the unregenerate are to be made to undergo,
-—but the misery which, considering their mental constitution,
must necessarily flow from the moral disease with which they
are afflicted, — from the inveterate and incurable depravity of
their own hearts. The torments of the damned, in short, will
not result from the place to which they are adjudged, though
it be the place of torment, but from the dispositions which
they will carry into it. The hell of the sinner is in his own
bosom. He -carries it about with him, as his perpetual tor
mentor, wherever he goes ; and, were it possible for him to
enter heaven by stealth, it would accompany him into the
presence of God himself, and poison the very water of life of
which its blest inhabitants are destined to drink ! Yet, though
it is thus impossible for unregenerate men to experience hap
piness hereafter, it is a most difficult matter to lodge this con
viction in their minds. Ignorant of the nature of celestial
bliss, and decking the mansions above with those charms

WHY REGENERATION NECESSARY. 389
which are adapted to their unsanctified taste, they are apt to
imagine that, if the Judge of all, at the great day, could be
induced to treat them with leriity, — or that, if they could elude
his notice, and pass in the midst of a crowd through the gates
of the celestial city, all would then, be well with them for eter
nity. It has never occurred to them that it is possible for any
being to be miserable in heaven. Arid yet such is unquestion
ably the case. We read of the angels who kept not their first
estate ; whose pride, promptirig to apostacy -and rebellion, led
to their dethronement arid ruin. The misery, then, of these
unhappy spirits commenced in the world above. There was
hell in heaven, if we may so speak, before they were ejected
from it ; and the torments which they now endure do not re
sult from the. chains with'which they are bound, but from the
demons of envy and malevolence which reside in their bosoms.
Were it possible, -then, for an unconverted man to enter
heaven, it would yield no delight to him; — its duties would
be irksome — its pleasures insipid and joyless.
1st, Without regeneration, the duties of the heavenly world
would be irksome. Heaven is a land of rest, but not of inac
tivity. While our relations to God, and to the respective
members of the family above, continue, there will' remain
duties to be performed even there. Hence " those who came
out of great tribulation," are represented, in one of the sublime
visions granted to John, as " standing before the throne," and
as " serving God day and night in his temple ;" and the as
cription of blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, unto
him that sitteth upon the throne, arid unto the Lamb, consti
tutes one important branch ofthe service which they render.
Now is this a duty which could yield any delight to an uncon
verted man ? In those statements which are given us by the
ungodly of the objects and exercises which are essential to their
enjoyment, is the service of God ever included? Is it a fact
that they derive pleasure, in this world,- from the celebration
of his perfections, and especially of that illustrious display of
them which is to be seen in the great and glorious work of
human redemption ? Is it not, on the contrary, the case that
they derive no pleasure whatever from such exercises —that

390 REGENERATION NECESSARY
they are indeed a weariness to them ? Is there not abundant
reason to think that they would never voluntarily engage in
them ? Now if such be the case with them on earth, would it not
continue to be so in heaven, were they to enter it with an un
altered state of mind ? How could the mere difference of
place, whatever may be the nature of that difference, produce
any difference in their feelings, in this respect ? Must not the
objects and engagements, which are grateful to an unrenewed
mind on earth, be grateful to it in heaven ? Must not the
engagements, which are destitute of charm to such a mind in
the present world, be equally void of it in the future state ?
No rational being can doubt it for a moment. While the
identity of the inner man continues — while the depravity of
the heart remains unsubdued, no change of time or of place
— not even elevation from earth to heaven, can render a moral
exercise delightful, which had been previously disgusting.
We must be born again, or the duties of the heavenly world
will prove unpleasant and irksome.
2dly, Without regeneration the pure and spiritual delights
of the world above would yield no measure of enjoyment.
I have said the pure and spiritual delights of heaven, for holi
ness is inscribed upon all its duties and enjoyments. The
bliss of heaven does not spring from any of those sources from
which men of the world seek to attain it. It comes from a
quarter from which they never sought it. It is of a nature for
which they have no taste and relish. Were all the streams of
heavenly glory accessible to an unconverted man, in this world,
they would be to him insipid, if not distasteful. How, then,
can they be expected to yield delight in heaven ? The bliss
of heaven is holiness. The perfection of knowledge and
purity, to which the people of God will there attain — their
final and complete deliverance from all darkness of the under
standing, all impurity of the affections, all perverseness of the
will — transforming them, as it will do, into the image of God
— will confer upon them a portion of the same enjoyment
which he himself experiences. " From the perfection of holi
ness which will there be wrought into the soul, there will
naturally arise," as it has been justly observed, " an unspeakable

TO ENJOY THE DELIGHTS OF HEAVEN. 391
complacency and joy, resembling, in some degree, that which
the blessed God possesses in the survey of the infinite and un
spotted rectitude of his own most holy nature." It is manifest
that both Old and New Testament saints possessed this view of
the nature and source of heavenly joy. " I shall be satisfied,"
said a psalmist, " when I awake with thy likeness." And
" when he shall appear," adds the beloved disciple, " we shall
be like him, for we shall see him as he is." Since, then, such
is the bliss of heaven, the necessity of regeneration is apparent.
This will more strikingly appear if we enumerate some of the in
dividual sources of heavenly bliss: and in doing this I observe,
First, That the Scriptures represent the presence and enjoy
ment of God as constituting one of these sources. " As for
me," said David, " I shall behold thy face in righteousness ; "
and he speaks of this as not only essential to perfect enjoyment,
but as conferring it. At the time when he uttered these words,
David had much in possession, and more in prospect. He was
the son-in-law of the reigning monarch ; and he had the
promise of the God of truth that, at the decease of Saul, he
should ascend the throne himself. But worldly possessions,
and worldly glory, could not fill his capacious mind. Nothing
less than the presence, and favour, and enjoyment of the God
who made him, could do this; and, therefore, in all the sacred
glow of confidence and anticipation, he exclaimed, " I shall
be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness." " Blessed," said
our Lord, "are the pure in heart, for they shall see God;" be
admitted to a beatific view of his perfections, and enjoy him
as the portion of his soul. But this assurance is only cheering
to those who love God. To all unregenerate men, God is an
enemy ; and, what is more, he is an omnipotent enemy. He
can destroy both body and soul in hell ! The prospect of
seeing God is no solace to them. They will, on the contrary,
employ all the energies of their minds— will bury themselves
in business, and plunge into dissipation, and run into the most
fearful and shameful excesses, to banish all thoughts of God
from their minds. Rather than encounter their Maker, they
would flee to the very ends of the earth ! How, then, could
the presence of God be a source of joy to such an individual in
heaven ?

392 Regeneration essential to the
Secondly, The Scriptures represent the presence of the
Redeemer, in his glorified state, as constituting another source
of heavenly bliss. " If I go away," said he to the disciples*
with inexpressible tenderness, " I will come again, and receive
you to myself, that where I am, there ye may be also." And
to be with Christ — to see him as he is — and to be made like
to him, must appear, to the holy taste of every converted
man, the very summit of bliss. Hence the apostle Paul, in
the vigour of life, and in the midst of a splendid career of
usefulness, declared, that he had " a desire to depart, and to
be with Christ." Where is the renewed mind which does not
feel— that to see Him, who was once a man of sorrows and
acquainted with grief, exalted far above all principalities and
powers, — to behold the despised and rejected of men, sur
rounded by a bright and countless host of adoring spirits,: —
and to recognise in this exalted one a brother and a friend, —
must prove the source of ineffable and eternal delight ? But
he is not a brother and a friend to such as have not been born
again. To them he is an enemy ; by them he will be found
an inexorable Judge : and though it be difficult to rouse a
lamb to vengeance, there is no wrath so dreadful as the wrath
of the Lamb ! What possible pleasure could the presence of
Christ, in heaven, afford to unconverted men ? How could
they bear to look upon him, whose authority they have con
temned, whose laws they have broken, whose grace they have
slighted, whose ordinances they have treated with contempt ?
In what language but the following could they expect him
to address them, " Because I called, and ye refused; I
stretched out my hand, and ye did not regard ; but ye have
set at nought my counsels, and would none of my reproofs, I
also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock now that your
fear is come?" It is absolutely necessary to be born again, to
derive enjoyment from the presence of Christ in heaven. We
must be made to love his character, and person, and work^
and theri, to be with him, to behold his glory — the glory
which he had with- his Father before the world was — will
prove the spring of perennial and infinite enjoyment.
Thirdly, The Scriptures represent the society of angels,

ENJOYMENT OF THE HAPPINESS OF HEAVEN. 393
and of glorified spirits, as constituting another source of the
happiness of heaven. Without regeneration this would, how
ever, yield us no joy; because that society is holy society.
" Ye are come," said the apostle to the believing Hebrews,
" to the innumerable company of angels, to the general as
sembly and church of the first-born, enrolled in heaven" —
"and to the spirits of , the just made perfect." What is there
in such society as this, — the society of angels who kept their
first estate, of the redeemed from among men, completely trans
formed into the image of God, — to afford enjoyment to an
unsanctified mind? "Two cannot walk together," we are
taught, "unless they be agreed." Where the tastes, and
pursuits, and habits of persons are dissimilar, especially where
they are utterly discordant, instead of finding pleasure in
mutual intercourse, it is manifest that each must feel the
company of the other to be an intolerable nuisance. Con
fine an illiterate peasant with a company of philosophers, or
a philosopher with persons unacquainted even with the ele
ments of knowledge, and who glory in their ignorance, — and,
without the gift of prophecy, it were easy to predict that each
would most earnestly long for the hour of emancipation.
From these general principles we draw the conclusion, that
the holy society of heaven would yield no happiness to an un
converted man. But why should we resort to a process of
reasoning on this point, when fact, whose verdict is still more
unequivocal than reason, proclaims, in a manner not to be
mistaken, that the company of holy angels, and of holy men,
would not prove a source of enjoyment to a person who had
not been renewed in the spirit of his mind ? Do such men,
in this world, desire the company of the people of God? Do
they delight to meet, and unite with them in conversation
which has for its topic the solemn and all-important concerns
of eternity ? So far is this from being the case, that, if the
conscience of such men were to give its testimony, it would
confess that scarcely was any other thing felt to be so weari
some and disgusting. And how should it be otherwise in
heaven ? Imagine, for a moment, an individual whose heart
is enmity against God — and such is the character of every
3 B

394 REGENERATION NECESSARY.
unrenewed heart, — an individual who hates every spiritual
object, and exercise, and duty, and enjoyment — and such is
the state of moral feeling of every unrenewed man; — imagine
such an individual introduced into the company of "the just
made perfect," listening to them for a time, while they dis
course together on the great mystery of redeeming love, and
then, inspired by the sacred theme, strike all at once their
golden harps, and pour forth a noble anthem of praise " to
him who was slain, and had redeemed them by his blood out
of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation ;" — ima
gine him seeing and hearing all this, would he possess a single
feeling in common with them ? Would the sacred inspiration
of gratitude and devotion fill his soul ? And, totally devoid of
congeniality with the heavenly worshippers, could he derive
any pleasure from their society? It is impossible, in the very
nature of the case, that the holy enjoyments of heaven should
yield any delight to an unholy mind. " Except a man be born
again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Fact and experi
ence declare this, — the constitution of the mind, and the na
ture of heavenly glory, the Scriptures, both of the Old and
the New Testament, the law and the prophets, the gospels
and the epistles, the apostles and the evangelists, — all unitedly
declares to every member of the human family to whom their
voice reaches, " Ye must," yes, " must, be born again !"

APPENDIX.

It was my design to introduce, into the body of this work, some observ
ations upon certain statements relative to one of the subjects dis
cussed in it, to be found in Mr. Stuart's Commentary upon the Epistle
to the Romans. It appeared, however, on subsequent reflection, that
to prosecute the intention would lead me too far out of my way. The
character and attainments of this distinguished author clearly entitle his
writings to the candid and serious attention of British Christians ; yet
as truth should be dearer to us than any thing else, I am compelled to
add, that the work referred to above contains statements which I regret
to see — some that appear to me self-contradictory — and one at least
which will not, I trust, be readily admitted by my brethren in the
ministry, or by the churches with which they stand connected. I
allude to the following words : " But where has Paul taught that a man
is justified by faith alone ; and that evangelical good works are not an
essential condition of his justification before God?" (Page 566, third
edition.) The laboured criticism by which Mr. Stuart endeavours to prove that
the assertion, " a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the
law," is not at variance with the passage just quoted, appears to me to
have been suggested, and rendered necessary, by his theology. I can
not resist the impression, that it has too much of the appearance of an
attempt to explain away the obvious meaning of the words. Surely, if,
from the explicit declaration of Paul, " a man is justified by faith, with
out the deeds of the law," we may not draw the conclusion, that simply
crediting the record of God concerning his Son, is all that is essential to
justification, it would be difficult to extract a meaning from any words
whatever. Mr. Stuart, however, tells us that the phrase, " works of
law," means perfect obedience ; and that the amount of what the apostle
intended to say is, that we may obtain justification by faith, even though
we are destitute of perfect obedience. But if tpyav vopov denote, in
the 28th verse, perfect obedience, must not the same meaning be at
tached, in the 20th verse, to the words? And would not the apostle,
in that case, assert — impugning the law, not the obedience rendered to
it — that a man cannot be justified by perfect obedience ? Now, is this
true ? Was it really the intention of the apostle to delare that the law
is essentially incapable of securing justification ? Did he not design to
impugn the obedience of men — not the law, — and to say that such works
of the law as they had, or fancied they had, would not secure justifica-

396 APPENDIX.
tion, because not commensurate with the demands of the law ? The
phrase epyuv vo/mu does, indeed, mean actions which the law requires,
in both the 20th and the 28th verse — and there is obviously no change
in its signification — i. e., personal obedience ; but in neither of the
verses doth it appear to denote " perfect obedience."
My main object, however, in this note is to point out certain incon
sistencies, as they appear me at least, into which Mr. Stuart has fallen,
and which seem to have partially, though not entirely, resulted from
attaching to the term "imputation" more than its scriptural import, as
developed in page 258 of this volume ; and from disregarding the pre
cise sense affixed to it by those who employ it in reference to Adam
and Christ.
In his summary cf the contents of Rom. v. 12 — 19, he explains the
phrase " sin entered into the world," as follows : " Sin entered (com
menced) by the offence of Adam,". — leaving us to suppose his meaning
to be — for such is the significancy of the words — that Adam was the
first sinner. Yet, in page 204, we find a logical and conclusive argu
ment to show that such cannot be the apostle's meaning. " If now," he
says, " it was a principal object with the apostle here, to point out
specifically, and with exactness, the first author of transgression, how
could he omit mentioning Eve ? " who was in the transgression, i. e., he
says, " first transgressed." Notwithstanding this, however, which would
seem to imply that sin entered in a different sense from commencing, —
entered, i. e., in the sense of bringing obnoxiousness to the suffering of
its penal consequences, upon the race, he reverts again, in page 216, to
this rejected sense of commencing, and tells us that the meaning of the
verse is as follows : " By Adam's first offence, sin and death invaded
the world of mankind ; and having thus invaded it, they have been
marching through it, and carrying on their conquests ever since."
In his note upon the Qavarog which was St tvog avQpairov, he ac
knowledges that there is " no philological escape from the conclusion,
that death, in the sense of penalty for sin in its full measure, must be
regarded as the meaning of the writer here." (Page 208.) In com
menting upon the 15th verse, he grants, as he says we must do, "that
¦ the many (all) die (come under sentence of death) through Adam, or
by means of him ; " and he afterwards adds, " In regard to arrtQavov
I must refer the reader to what is said on Qavarog, under verse 12th.
I would merely remark, that if Qavarog means, as I have there stated
it to mean, evil of any hind, in this world or the next :" (any ! Why
this change of phraseology? He had not stated it to mean evil of any,
but of every kind, — declaring expressly that it " is impossible to limit
the word death," — " that it designates the whole penalty of sin," and
that " if Adam's sin was a real sin, and the greatest of all sins, then
death in its most extensive sense must have been the penalty attached
to it") — " then," he adds, "it is true, that Adam did by his offence
cause Qavarog to come on all without exception," &c. Now, one
would certainly have supposed him to mean — what seems to follow irre
sistibly from his premises — that exposedness to death, in its most exten-

APPENDIX. 397
sive sense, or to the full penalty of sin, came upon all men ; — not, in
deed, the actual endurance of death in this sense, because the dispensa
tion of mercy, which immediately succeeded the fall, virtually abrogated
that part of the curse which stretched into eternity, by suspending the
everlasting condition of men on their acceptance or rejection of mercy ;
one should, I repeat, have expected him to mean this : and, accordingly,
in Excursus the fourth, he admits that the " rvirog 0f the apostle may
have respect to the highest penalty on the one hand, and the highest
blessings on the other ;" only, he adds, it must be understood, when
thus extended, not of penalty in the higher sense as actually inflicted,
nor of blessings in the higher-sense as actually bestowed, bnt of exposed
ness to the penalty, on the one hand, and exposedness to blessings, on
the other." (Page 574.) And yet, though his premises oblige him to
admit that the disobedience of Adam (i. e., of itself, and viewing it as
it should be viewed, unconnected with the subsequent dispensation of
mercy) brought exposedness to death, in its highest sense, upon all
men ; and though he further actuaUy admits, in the passage just quoted,
that it did bring this exposedness to death upon all men, he yet, with
great self-inconsistency, as it appears to me, denies, p. 240, that all
men are directly exposed to death in this sense by Adam ; and affirms
that, in the ultimate and highest sense of death, they are only directly
exposed to it by their own acts. The argument by which he attempts
to sustain this latter denial and affirmation, appears to me singularly
illogical ; and to be such altogether as nothing but the difficulty of
maintaining a false position could have drawn from such a reasoner as
Mr. Stuart. " It needs no more," he says,. " be maintained that all are
equally exposed to Qavarog in its fullest, highest, and most awful sense,
without any act of their own, than that all men partake of the xaPtffpo-
of Christ, in its highest sense, without any act of their own," &c. Partake
of the xapwpa of Christ ! Is that the proper opposite of exposure to
death by Adam ? Mr. Stuart should have shown that Christ did not
bring the possibility of life to all men without any act of their own — or,
in his own phraseology — exposure to life. " To say," he continues,
" that ot u-oXXoi aweQavov dia A.$ap,% is not to say that all have the
sentence executed on them in its highest sense." Clearly not. To
sentence a man to death is not to hang him. But who ever supposed
the two things to be identical ? Admitting, as Mr. Stuart does, that all
die in Adam, he should have shown, to sustain his principles, not that
the sentence in its highest sense is not inflicted upon all — which no
one believes — but that all did not become exposed with Adam to death,
in the fullest sense, as far as they were capable of enduring it. Mr.
Stuart, as well as a very recent writer, fails, as I cannot but think, to
make the necessary distinction between what the cup of threatening, put
into the hand of Adam, contained, and what it actually poured out upon
the race ; or between what man, by the original curse, was exposed to,
and what he actually endures, in consequence of it. The interposition
of mercy took the bitterest ingredient out of the cup. The Saviour
having died, no man will suffer eternal death on account of Adam's sin.

398 APPENDIX.
I dare not, however, add with Messrs. Stuart and Gilbert — I cannot but
think it very unwise to take that line of argument — that it would have
been essentially unjust to subject the race, through the one offence, to
a legal exposure to it.
Mr. Stuart has been charged, by some of his own countrymen, with
professedly denying the imputation of Adam's sin to the race, while he
substantially admits it.
Let us see what foundation there is, or if any, for this charge. I be
gin by referring to a few passages in which he seems virtually to acknow
ledge what he subsequently rejects. Remarking upon Romans v. 12,
he says, " Now while this asserts the fact ihat all have become sinners,
and have come under condemnation, it does also intimate by implication,
that the wlwle of what has come upon men, stands connected with the
introduction by Adam of sin and death into the world. I cannot therefore
agree with those commentators who find in this verse no intimation of
such a connexion of all men with Adam." (P. 216.) " In this way, we
see, quite plainly, that Adam was a rvtrog of Christ, because what he did
affected the wlwle ofthe human race, to a certain extent, even without
any concurrence or act of their own." (P. 236.) " If Qavarog means
evil of any kind, in this world and in the next, then it is true that Adam
did, by his offence, cause Qavarog to come on all without exception,
inasmuch as all his race are born destitute of holiness, and in such a
state that their passions will, whenever they become moral agents, lead
them to sin. All, too, are the heirs of more or less suffering. It is
true, then, that all suffer on Adam's account ; that all are brought
under more or less of the sentence of death ; that oi rroXXoi airtQavov."
(P. 240.) " But still you admit," stating the language of an objector,
" that the whole human race became degenerate and degraded, in con
sequence of the act of Adam." " I do so," replies Mr. Stuart, " I fully
believe it. I reject all the attempts to explain away this. I go further,
I admit not only the loss of an original state of righteousness to all,
in consequence of Adam's first sin, but that temporal evils and death
have come, of course, on all by means of it. I admit that all are born
in such a state that it is now certain they will be sinners as soon as
they are moral agents, and that they will never be holy until they are
regenerated," &c. (P. 235.) Again, anticipating an objection that,
admitting all this, he cannot consistently deny that the sin of Adam is
imputed to the race, i. e., that they endure the consequence or the
punishment of it, Mr. Stuart says — " That I have admitted thus much,
in regard to the present world, and sufferings in our present state, and
also the moral degradation of our nature, in consequence of Adam's
fall, I readily concede ; I do fully believe all this ; but this is, after all,
something very different from proper punishment.'' (P. 594.) Why,
whoever dreams, we are constrained to ask Mr. Stuart, of conceiving it
as proper punishment, any more than that the enjoyment, by believers,
of the consequences of the work of Christ is to them proper reward?
All this is aside from the point. The question is not, whether it is
proper punishment to the race, but whether the race — suffering these
consequences of Adam's fall — were not legally exposed to suffer them,

APPENDIX. 399
in consequence of a previous constitution, which determined that the
permanent condition of the oi 7to\\ch should depend upon the conduct
of their progenitor. In the ardour of his zeal to show that the loss of
original righteousness, exposure to sufferings, &c, are not proper
punishment, he actually takes the ground — not professedly, of course,
yet really, or his argument is invalid — that the fall was a blessing ;
because we are now, he states, " notwithstanding the numerous and
dreadful evils occasioned by the fall, under a far more favourable dis
pensation, in respect to an opportunity for making sure of our final
happiness, than we should have been by being placed in the original
condition of Adam." (P. 573.) Now, supposing this to be true, did the
fall bring us into this favourable situation, or the succeeding dispensa
tion of mercy ? Surely the loss of original righteousness can never be
any thing but an evil ; and it is an evil, let it be observed, directly
accruing to the race, by Mr. Stuart's own acknowledgment, in conse
quence of Adam's transgression.
Now what is this but the imputation of Adam's sin to the race, in
consequence of a Divine constitution, that he and they should be
treated as if they were one ? Destitution of original righteousness, in
the case of the race, is the result of the withholding of that special
influence of the Holy Spirit which is the original source and sustainer
of every thing spiritually good in the human mind. Mr. Stuart admits
that the race lost this righteousness (i. e., that the race would otherwise
have had it) by the one offence ; i. e., God judicially withholds from
the race what he judicially withdrew from the head of the race ; (viz.,
sovereign influence ;) in other words, he treats the race as he treated
its head ; or, which is, in fact, the same thing, the sin of Adam is im
puted to his posterity.
But no, Mr. Stuart will not allow this : " Adam's first sin was con
nected with the sin and consequent condemnation of the race," he
admits ; nay, that " it was, in some sense or other, a preparatory or
occasional cause:" but we must not suppose that it was imputed to us,
or that we are obnoxious to punishment on account of it. All this is,
to me, very unaccountable. We suffer the consequences of Adam's
sin, but the sin is not imputed to us ! How, then, do we come to
suffer its consequences ? Is not this suffering of its consequences the
very imputation which is denied ? What does Mr. Stuart understand
by imputation ? Does he conceive it to mean impartation, or implanta
tion ? What does he intend by saving that Adam's sin was an occa
sional cause of our sin? That it might be, on his principles, a
secondary or occasional cause of the future misery of man, by deterio
rating his moral condition, and so exposing him to more imminent
peril of losing eternal life, I admit ; but what idea can be attached to
the statement that it was the occasional or secondary cause of this
deteriorated condition itself? Surely the native want of original
righteousness had the one transgression for its direct, its exclusive
cause ; (i. e., the sin of Adam was imputed to the race ;) since the non-
exertion of Divine influence, which would have given moral integrity to
the minds of the race, as it did to the mind of Adam, cannot, without
the grossest abuse of terms, be regarded as its cause.

400 APPENDIX.
Some of Mr. Stuart's mistakes and contradictions, as I cannot but
deem them, have been recently very severely animadverted upon, by
Robert Haldane, Esq., of Edinburgh, in his Commentary upon the first
five chapters of the epistle to the Romans. This work contains some
admirable expositions of evangelical truth, (blended with other state
ments which appear to me very objectionable,) and it well deserves the
attention of all whose minds have been brought into contact with that
of the American philologist : yet it admits of serious doubt whether it
is adapted to effect the good at which, no doubt, its author aimed.
There is, very unfortunately, an apparent air of dogmatism about all
Mr. Haldane's writings — a seeming consciousness of something like
infallibility — a somewhat unceremonious mode of putting an opponent
out of the way, by telling him, in tolerably plain terms, that he is
wrong, and Mr. H. himself right, which appears to me any thing but
adapted to convince and persuade. These faults have not less than
their usual prominence in this work. He asserts where, as many will
think, he should reason, and rebukes where he should caution ; and,
though it must be admitted that many of his statements demand, as
well as deserve, the most serious attention of Mr. Stuart, and of all
who may be disposed to adopt the theological views of that writer, yet
it is much to be feared that his confident assertions, his unsparing
censures, his fierce denunciations of Mr. Stuart as a heretic of not less
black a hue than " those who troubled the churches of Galatia, whom
Paul wished to be cut of," his uncalled-for appropriation of the insane
censure of Carson, that Mr. Stuart's works are more dangerous among
Christians than the works of Priestley, — it is really to be apprehended
that these and other blemishes will destroy the influence of the book
upon the persons it was intended to benefit, unless, perchance, they
should hiave more of the meek, and patient, and gentle spirit of our
holy religion, — more of tender, as well as holy love, blended with fide
lity, than is possibly to be found in the bosom of their assailant
himself. Mr. Haldane's views of the nature of the connexion between Adam
and the whole of the race harmonize neither with those of Mr. Stuart,
nor with those which have been presented in the previous part of this
volume. Mr. H. seems perfectly sure that he is right ; he writes as if
he could not be mistaken ; as if Ms conception of the vinculum exist
ing between the one offence, and our endurance of the consequence of
that offence, constituted an integral part of Divine revelation ; so that
hesitation to admit the justness of that conception is, in fact, the rejec
tion of the Divine testimony. I must be permitted to doubt whether
this manner of defending even the truth is best adapted to promote the
interests of truth. But still the important question is, Are the con
ceptions of Mr. H. in reference to the vinculum correct, or in harmony
with Divine revelation ? Let us see, first, what they are. The prevail
ing sentiment among Calvinistic divines, at least as far as I have been
able to ascertain it, is, that a connexion was established by God,
between Adam and the race, of such a nature as that the latter were
to share with him in the consequences of that act, on his abstinence

APPENDIX. 401
from which his permanent standing in holiness and happiness was sus
pended. As the result of this connexion, it would necessarily happen
that, when he fell, the race would be treated, as far as it was possible,
as he, the head of the race, was treated ; I. e., his sin would be imputed
to them, or, in other words, its consequences would reach to them.
But does this satisfy Mr. Haldane ? By no means. He maintains
that the sin of Adam was as really and truly theirs as it was the sin of
Adam himself; that every, believer is bound to acknowledge, and con
fess that he is guilty of Adam's sin : and, lest any one should suppose
that by guilty he merely means legally exposed to the consequences
of that sin, he tells us, in effect, that this guilt is previous to the legal
exposure and imputation, and is, in fact, the foundation of the imputa
tion. Adam's sin, he says, " is imputed to his posterity because it is
their sin in reality, though we may not be able to see the way in which
it is so." (P. 440.)
Now, as far as I can understand all this, — which it is, perhaps, im
possible to do, without the opportunity of putting some such questions
as the following to Mr. Haldane — " What do you mean by being guilty
of Adam's sin?" "or by his sin being ours in reality f — questions not
unnecessary, since the term " guilty" has more senses than one, and sin
may be ours in more senses than one, — the writer appears to mean, that
we actually and literally committed the sin of Adam, or ate the forbid
den fruit, and deserve punishment on account of this our own act]
and Mr. Haldane requires us to believe this, " as little children, on the
authority of God." Now, I hope I can honestly say, I would do this,
were I persuaded that it rested on the authority of God ; but the ques
tion with me is, " Is it based- on Divine authority, or has Mr. Haldane
taught ' for doctrines ' the explanation of a man ?" It is to Scripture
that my conscience is to be subject, and not to the conception which
any man may form of its meaning. The Scriptures really say that by
Adam " sin entered into the world,"— that many have died " through his
offence," — that "the judgment was by him to condemnation," — that by
his "disobedience many were made sinners," &C.&C. ; and Mr. Haldane
thinks that these declarations mean that we actually ate the forbidden
fruit, (i. e., if I have not misconceived, him,) and deserve to suffer
punishment on that account. Others, again, with myself, exercising the
powers which God has given to us, consider the meaning of the decla<-
rations to be, that all men were constituted sinners in the sense of legal
exposure to the consequences of Adam's sin. Now, why may not we,
as properly as Mr. Haldane, require others, and him among the rest, to
receive our conceptions of the meaning of the inspired word, " as little
children, on the authority of God?" If he can show any right to do
this, we can possibly produce an equal right. The fact, however, is,
that the right is possessed by neither party. We are all bound to form
our own conceptions of the meaning of God's record. We act properly
in presenting them to the minds of others, — in urging them, by all
rational means, upon the acceptance of others ; but what is it but
Popery, in the Protestant camp, (where, by the way, it is too frequently
found,) to call upon them to admit these conceptions, on the authority
of God, as the undoubted meaning of the Holy Spirit ?
3 c

402 APPENDIX.
Extremes often meet. Thus it is in the case of Messrs. Stuart and
Haldane. Both agree in maintaining the position that, when a person
is not truly and properly a sinner, — when sin is only imputed to him, or
reckoned as if it were his,' — he cannot be justly visited with the conse
quences of sin; Mr. Haldane avows this distinctly, and takes it as the
basis of an argument to prove that we are truly guilty of Adam's sin.
Mr. Stuart might possibly say that he means there cannot be proper
punishment where sin is not actual, but merely putative. In fact, the
current of his argument is, that punishment cannot begin before crime.
But this appears to me mere logomachy. It merely goes upon the
correct or incorrect use of a word, viz., whether the endurance by the
race of the consequences of Adam's transgression (a fact over and over
again admitted by Mr. Stuart) can be correctly denominated punish
ment to them. Suppose I should admit, as I freely do, that it cannot
be so denominated, I would contend that Mr. Stuart has shut himself
out from the possibility of deriving any advantage from this logomachy,
by the very terms in which he has expressed the notion of original sin,
which he sets himself to oppose. " Another theory is, that Adam's sin
becomes ours merely as to the punishment due to it ; i. e.," he adds, —
and let the reader especially remember this, for the subsequent words
are used as exegetical of the former, — " i. e., his sin is ours simply,
purely by imputation, or putatively, while the consequences of his offence
are really and truly ours." (P. 520.) Now, this latter statement con
tains the proposition which Mr. Stuart ought to have set himself to
subvert. He was bound to show that it was contrary to justice to allow
the consequences of sin to overtake a man who is not really and actually
a sinner. Mr. Stuart proves just nothing at all till he proves this ; for
to show, ever so satisfactorily, that he cannot be punished, is merely to
show that a particular term cannot, in accordance with the laws of
language, be properly employed to describe the facts of the case. I
hope I may have misconceived Mr. Stuart, but the impression is forced
upon my mind, that he does regard it as inequitable for the results of
sin to attach where actual sin does not exist. Assuming this to be the
case, I ask him to explain the facts referred to in a former page of this
volume, — facts of every day occurrence, — to explain why the child is
affected by the disease which resulted from his father's sin. I would
remind him, and Mr. Haldane, of what has been previously stated, that
it is an ordinary law of Divine providence*, — i. e., in other words, of the
Divine conduct towards men, — -for the consequences of moral actions to
extend beyond the actors themselves ; and I would ask them whether
this undeniable fact does not prove that it cannot be inequitable for the
whole human race to suffer the consequences of the sin of its head,
though that sin does not become, as it cannot possibly become, truly
and really theirs ? And to Mr. Stuart I would make my especial
appeal, whether the facts of the case, with reference to the human race,
as admitted by himself, do not force him from his position ? What are
those facts ? Why, that results of the one offence, — which would have
been, to Adam himself, punishment, — are experienced by all men— by
infants, as well as others. But infants are not sinners, on Mr. Stuart's
* Vide p. 320.

APPENDIX. 403
principles, in any sense ofthe term; yet they endure the. consequences
of sin ; for surely he will not deny that the loss of original righteous
ness, disease, suffering, and death, previous to the period when moral
agency commences, are the consequences of sin. Mr. Stuart argues
that it were unjust to visit an individual with the consequences of
transgression where sin is merely putative ; but with great self-incon
sistency, as it appears to me, he forgets, in prosecuting the argument,
the fact, admitted by himself, that infants suffer the consequences of
Adam's crime, though they have not, as he maintains, even putative
sin. It would seem to be more difficult to Mr. Stuart to conceive that
an infant, being a sinner in one sense of the term, should suffer the
consequences of sin, than if he were a sinner in no sense at all !
On the whole, a regard to the interests of truth compels me to ac
knowledge, that increased familiarity with Mr. Stuart's writings does
not exalt my conceptions of the value of his theological guidance. I
am induced to think, since his character, talents, great and multifarious
learning, must give him considerable influence with the Christian public
of this country, that there would be rendered an important service to
the church of God if some one, possessed of the necessary time and
qualifications, would enter upon a thorough examination of all that
Mr. S. has written on the great subject of the connexion of Adam with
the race, and the doctrine of original sin.*
The Rev. J. Gilbert, in a note appended to his valuable work on the
Christian Atonement — a note which some will, perhaps, regret to see — in
timates that special and regenerating influence may be imparted to in
fants, without respect to the interposition of Christ. I am unable to
conceive of this in harmony with our views of the Adamic dispensation,
and the facts of the case. Was not the withdrawment from Adam of
sovereign, sustaining influence, one of the judicial consequences of his
sin ? Is not the withholding of this influence from the race the result
of that sin ? And, if this be true, how could there have been a return
of this influence, either to Adam, or to the race, but on the ground of an
atonement ? If, indeed, the deteriorated moral condition of the race
were not the result of the " one offence," that condition might be im
proved without moral satisfaction ; but since it does spring from that
source — and I assume this to be the opinion of Mr. Gilbert — how can a
reversal, to the race, of one of the consequences of the transgression of
its moral head, take place more easily, without an atonement, than the
reversal of all those consequences ? It is worthy of inquiry whether the
statements of this note are not at variance with the leading argument of
the book.
* The feelings which dictated this sentence remain. The author would
earnestly recommend Hodge's exposition of the Romans, lately reprinted by
the Tract Society. He entertains considerable fear of the influence of certain
tenets in transatlantic theology, partially unfolded in the writings of Stuart
and Barnes. If life and health be continued he may make the attempt, should
he see sufficient encouragement, to prevent the deteriorating influence of some
American publications upon that " sober, moderate, scriptural Calvinism,
which has been, from their first origin, the distinctive faith of the Congrega
tional churches of England."

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gelical Mag., August, J.336.

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