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SYSTEM

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE:

BY

DE CAEL IMMANUEL NITZSCH.

TRANSLATED FROM THE

FIFTH EEVISED AND ENLARGED GEKMAN EDITION,

REV. ROBERT MONTGOMERY, M.A. Oxon.,
AUTHOR OF " THE GOSPEL IN ADVANCB OF THE AGE," "THE CHRISTIAN LIFE," ETC. ETC.,

JOHN HENNEN, M.D.,
LICENTIATE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, LONDON, ETC , ETC.

EDINBURGH:
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.
LONDON : HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO. ; DUBLIN : JAMES M'GLASHAN.

MDCCCXLIX.

EDINBURGH:'
ANDllKW JACK, PBIHXER,
MIDDKT STREET.

NOTICE BY THE TRANSLATORS.

The Translators avail themselves of the brief space usually
allotted for notices to the reader, to state distinctly, that in of
fering a translation of Nitzsch's " System oe Christian Doc
trine," they do not hold themselves responsible for, or identify
themselves with, any peculiarities of opinion contained in the
work. Upon the whole, as regards its general spirit and tendency,
the work stands high in the estimation of all competent
judges, both in this country and on the Continent. As a con
cise, profound, and vigorous digest of thought and learning, it
has been long known to every German student of divinity in
Europe, — a work wherein Christian faith and Christian life com
bine in most perfect harmony, and not more remarkable for its
profound learning than for its candour and truthfulness.
With respect to the translation, the Translators have expe
rienced more than the usual difficulties. The work is intensely
German in manner — that is, it is dry, often extremely obscure
and repulsive, and cast throughout in a mode of thought
so totally different from our own, as to bid defiance to any at
tempts to render it, in this respect, different from what it is in
the original. Indeed the author himself, in the preface to a
volume of his Sermons, candidly admits the almost invincible
. obscurity and hardness of his style. If the original, then, be
obscure, how much more must even the best translation
partake of this blemish.

IV NOTICE.
To the mere general reader, and to those unacquainted with
the style, phraseology, and mode of thought prevailing among
German writers, this translation will often appear uncouth and
inelegant ; but that is a censure to which every translation of
works like the present is liable : for the difficulty of rendering
abstract truths by equivalent terms in English, is one that is
often altogether insurmountable. A German has no difficulty
in conveying the meaning he attaches to any philosophical
idea by appropriate epithets, which, for the most part, can
only be rendered into English by paraphrase or cumbrous
circumlocution : a German scholar indeed, may mentally
translate with facility, and understand tolerably well, the mean
ing of a difficult author like Nitzsch; but that is a very different
thing from translating for the press, and conveying in precise
and definite terms, without comment, the ideas of an author, and
unfolding, in perspicuous and intelligible expression, the involv
ed sentences and intractable phraseology of the German school.
The Translators are painfully conscious of the many imper
fections of their labours, nor can they flatter themselves that
they have always been successful in penetrating into the entire
meaning of their author ; but they have conscientiously done
their best to give an honest translation, and have never sac
rificed for mere verbal display the matter of the original.
With a view to its usefulness as a work of reference, they have
taken every pains to secure the utmost accuracy of the nume
rous references to Scripture, according to the English version;
and, in the main, they trust that the work may be consulted
with confidence.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

On the repeated publication of a manual by means of which
I first entered into closer connection with a wider circle of
the Theological public, I have felt a double duty, first, Wher
ever it was possible, to preserve the original character of the
work, whilst farther expanding it, and, secondly, To the best
of my ability, to bestow on it those corrections and improve
ments, which either the progress of my own mind or the expe
rience derived from scientific intercourse may have suggested,
since the last edition. It is hoped that those principles of
faith and science, on which the work was originally grounded,
and which no subsequent experience has tempted me to re
nounce, will be clearly recognised in the additional develop
ments accompanying this edition. Why I have allowed the
system, as such, not only in its ground-work, but also in its es
sential structure, to remain as before, notwithstanding the many
objections that have been raised by some, and the attempts
that have since been made by others, well deserving con
sideration, the work itself will show. In so far as I have
felt a call for systematic theology, it has ever been my aim,
above all things, to comprehend with increasing depth and
fulness, the material for Christian doctrine in its original purity,
and hence it has resulted that my work has necessarily as
sumed an exegetical character with a retrospective bearing on
Biblical Theology. Having found the unity of Christian repre
sentations in Soteriology, that is, in the view of the Divine and
human, as determinated by the existence and ministry of Christ,
I recognised the central point of all doctrines, not in the

VI author s preface.
gnostic element, but in the historical and practical one as
sociated with it, and consequently only in the Redeemer him
self. Accordingly, I have endeavoured to recognise and re
present theoretical and practical Christianity in its original
unity and reciprocal action, and 1 have adopted no doc
trinal material which may not relate to the confirmation, the
nourishment and excitement of Christian consciousness, and
co-operate towards the regeneration of a true church sys
tem. Thus the idea which is rooted in a vital and biblical
representation, and which endeavours to unite itself with science,
in other words, the Christian determination of the general idea
of religion, so far as I was able, and so far as this scientific
unity of the consciousness possessed by the church at the pre
sent day required and admitted, has been fully developed. In
this way, and with such an object, I have pursued speculative
doctrine, which, even in our day, as often as it consciously or
involuntarily retreats upon this standing-point, confers a true
benefit on theology. Opposed to absolute Theo-Logic, I would
gladly occupy the lower stage of reflection and maintain a dia
lectic contrast.
It has been my constant endeavour to supply any deficiencies
occurring throughout the work. Hence, in this edition, the
doctrine onthe Holy Scripture and its interpretation has been
more amply developed, partly in the text and partly in the notes,
so far as space permitted, and with reference to the article on
the same subject, wherein I have criticised Strauss's Dodrme
of Faith. The consideration of the festival of Sunday, which
is a fact of the Apostolical Church, and the idea of the Sab
bath in the New Testament, were omitted in former editions ;
on the present occasion, (§ 194) I have united the doctrine
of the Lord's day with the idea of congregational prayer.
For many reasons I have deemed it necessary to consider
the subject of the prohibition of images, in the manner
it has been handled at page 320. The connection of the
church doctrine of faith with the apostolical standing-
point, which has hitherto been referred to the notes, I

AUTHOR S PREFACE. vii
have more fully enlarged upon in the articles on the Person
of Christ, Preaching, and Baptism; but what has been added
is frequently nothing more than literary and historical no
tices. In general, I have sought to continue the dogmatic
tendency of the work which I have felt advisable to maintain
since its last appearance in 1839; an attempt, which, apart
from the leisure and ability of the author, has been restricted
by its own limits. This work is not and ought not to be re
garded as dogmatic in the full sense of the term. Those
authors with whom I differ in the main I have endeavoured on
every occasion to treat with courtesy; but I have not entered
on the tendencies of the age which appear absolutely foreign to
the subject, as regards faith or science, because this would only
have been to anticipate questions belonging to a region purely
philosophical. Those attacks only which have been directed
against Christian theism are repelled in their proper places ; more
especially when treating on the evidence of the existence and at
tributes of the Deity, on miracles, &c. On this subject, per
haps I may venture to refer to my critical reviews of Strauss' doc
trine which have appeared in the Theologische Studien widKri-
tiken, and to an academical sermon, Christianity and Freedom,
in the fifth selection of my sermons. I have taken no notice of
numerous writings, which, although they start more or less from
a theistical standing-point, degrade the facts and positive doc
trines of Christianity to a mere transient symbol of religious
truth, and my reason is, that the entire tendency of my
work opposes such views. Schelling's professed Bealism, in
deed, 1 might have so far appropriated, inasmuch as he, in
contrast with all modern speculation, fully recognises the dis
tinction and relation of the two great directions of religio-histo-
rica] development, Ethnicism and Eevelation, which my manual
has from the first indicated as the history of passive and active
religious consciousness. I have not, however, made any quo
tations, since I was not in possession of authentic communica
tions. I am desirous, even within the limits of the present
work, of connecting myself with that absolute Biblical realism,

viii AUTHOR s preface.
such as for the most part is fairly represented in Germany by
Beck and Stier; for this tendency is venerable and dear to
me, because it discovers such a multitude of Biblical facts,
connection, and unity, for which exegetical proof is actually
possible, and which in others is wanting; and by means of such
discoveries how does all confidence in Scripture and all love for
its study increase, and how is the shallowness of so many a
learned tradition abashed and subdued! We can acknowledge
this, be thankful for it, and profit by it, and yet not be in a
condition to abridge the history of religious science to the ex
tent required, in order to commence anew at the very letter of
revelation; and this especially when such procedure relates to
physical, empirical, and cosmical questions, in a manner alto
gether different from ethical and metaphysical ones. To me
the relation of faith to natural science is a matter of indiffer
ence, for the blessing of revelation, as the renewer and sancti-
fier of self-consciousness, is independent thereof. Undoubtedly
the idea of religion receives its determinations, realizations, and
immunities from religion as a fact; it indicates itself primarily
through this realization, but as an organ of science and appropria
tion it does not lose thereby the right of its own independency.
Science, however, is not without its history.
The present work has not escaped the charge, from many
quarters, of eclecticism. Eclecticism, in the sense of indiscri
minate selection, deserves, beyond a doubt, to be condemned
on the part of science ; but when we behold an example before
us, that in one and the same criticism of Christianity Bbhme,
Spinosa, Edelmann, Eeimarus, Wegscheider, Schleiermacher,
and Hegel, have organically grown up together into one body,
and thus, accomplished their analytical process: well indeed,
upon the conservative and restorative side, ought an Eclecti
cism, comprehending many elements which have appeared in
succession and in contrast, accomplish that which is appropri
ate to its character.
Bonn, 2ith April, 1844.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

Page.

§ 1. General View,

I. — The Idea and Object of a System of Christian Doctrine.
2. Relation to the Catechism, ... 1
3. Relation to Dogma and Ethics, ... 3
4. Relation to Biblical Theology, • . • • 4

II. — On the Subject Matter of the Christian Doctrine of Religion.
5. Religion and Revelation, A. Of Religion.

6. Idea, .
7. Canse or Origin,
8—10. Original Form,
11, 12. Element,
13. Relations and Distinctions,
14. Defects,
15. Formal Defects,
16. Material Defects,
17. Historical and Positive Religion,
18—21. Natural and Rational Religion,
B. Of Revelation.
22. Idea, .
23. Revelation and Redemption,
24. Originality of Revelation,
25. Revelation Historical,
26. Revelation Vital or All-available,
27. Revelation Gradual,
28. Revelation Possible,
29. Revelation Real,
30. Old and New Testament,
31, Testamentary and Extra-Testamentary Religion,

69
15
2629
31 3339
44 55

60 6265 677073
74 78
7 80

CONTENTS.

32, 33. Evidence of the Divinity of Christianity, .
34. Miracles, .....
35. Prophecy, .
III. — Of the Laws of Cognizing Christian Doctrine.
36. Source and interpretation, A. Of the Holy Scripture.
37. The Word of God and the Spirit,
38. The Spirit and Word,
39. Scripture and Tradition,
40. External and Internal Canon,
41. Scripture Canon,
42. Scripture and Word of God,
B. On the Interpretation of Holy Scripture.
43. Scripture Explicable, its Perspicuity and Unity,
44. Aim of Interpretation,
45. Analogy of Faith,
46. One Sense, ....
47. Medium of Interpretation,

Page. 818386

92

9394
95 97
98 98

101 103
104105
105

IV. — On the Attempts to Construct a Doctrinal System of Christianity.

48. History,
49. Augustin,
50. Gennadius,
51. The Scholastics,
62. The Reformers and their Successors,
58. Hyperius and John Gerhard,
54. Idea Fidei Fratrum,
56. More Recent Attempts,
56. Middle Term, .
67. Principal Divisions,
58. Genetic Connection of the Doctrine of Faith and Morals

108111 112 113113114
117 118 122
126 130

PAET THE FIEST.
OF THE GOOD.
59. Salvation and the Good, . . . .
SECTION THE FIRST.
OF GOD.
60. Existence and capability of being known; Name of God,

133

134

CONTENTS.

§ 61. Divine Essence,
62. God is Spirit,
63. God is Love,
64. God is Lord,
65. Attributes,
66. Distinction of Attributes,
67. Abstraction of God from Finite Existence,
68. Eternity, . . .
69. Spaceless,
70. Relation of God to the World,
71. Omnipresence,
72. Omnipotence,
73. Omniscience,
74. Abstraction of God from the Personal Creature.
75. Wisdom,
76. Majesty,
77. Holiness,
78. Blessedness,
79. Divine Relationship to Personal Beings,
80. Conclusion,
81. One God, Father, Son, and Spirit, .
82. The Father,
83. The Son,
84. The Holy Spirit,

SECTION THE SECOND,
OF THE CREATURE.

85. The World,
86. Creation,
87. Preservation,
88. Government,
89. Personal Creature,
90. Man and Angels,
91. Man,
92. Body and Soul,
93. Earthly Destination,
94. The Good. (£y«S»»,)
95. Wants and Instincts,
96. Order of Goods and Instincts,
97. Flesh and Spirit,
98. Freedom and Conscience,
99. Right and Law,
100. Good and Bad,
101. Virtue,
102. Conclusion of the Doctrine of the Creature,

Xll

CONTENTS.

PAET THE SECOND.
OF THE BAD.

§ 103. The Good and the Bad,

Page. 213

SECTION THE FIRST,

OF SIN.

104. Trial and Temptation,

.

215

105. Seduction and Sin,

.

215

106. Propensity or Bias,

.

217

107. Sin as a Generic Defect,

.

221

108. Sin and the Law,

.

224

109. Degrees of Sin,

.

227

110. Lust and Tassion,

.

227

111. Sins of Commission and their Degree of Imputation,

227

112. Vice,

.

228

113. Degrees of Vice,

.

229

114. The Just and Unjust,

¦

229

115. The World,

• .

232

116. Prince of this World,

.

234

SECTION THE SECOND.

OF DEATH.

117. Sin and Death,
237
118. Guilt and Condemnation,
238
119. Punishment and Justice,
. . •
240
120. Sin as Punishment,.
...
240
121. Death,
• .
241
122. Destruction of the Soul,
243
123. Conclusion of the Doctrine
of Death,
243
PAET THE THIED.
OF SALVATION.
124. Cause, ....
125. Commencement and Completion,
SECTION THE FIRST.
SALVATION FOUNDED ON THE PERSON OF THE REDEEMER.
126. The Messiah,
245
246
247
CONTENTS.

xiii

127. Submission and Self-Abasement,

Page. 248

128. Humanity, ....
129. Without Sin, ....

249250

130. Holy Birth, ....
131. The Anointing with the Holy Spirit,
132. Work of the Redeemer,

253254 259"

133. Testimony of the Truth,
134 — 36. Reconciliation,

262264

137. Foundation of the Kingdom,
138. Exaltation, ....

273274

SECTION THE SECOND.

OF THE APPROPRIATION OF SALVATION.

139. Grace and the Holy Spirit,
140. Order of Salvation, A. On Calling.
141. Election,
142. Calling through the Gospel,
143. Faith and Unbelief,
144. Stages of Faith, B. Of Regeneration.
145. Calling and Regeneration,
146. Justification,
147. Justification by Faith,
148. Repentance and Faith,
149. Epoch,
150. Final Perseverance,
161. Test of Conversion, C. Of Sanctification.
152. Conversion and Sanctification,
153. The Christian Life, (a) Of the Law of the Spirit.
154. The Deepest Motive,
155. Exclusive Duty,
156. Will of the Lord,
157. Wisdom and Prudence,
158. Simplicity, (b) Of Spiritual Discipline and Exercise.
169. Spiritual Poverty,
160. Watchfulness, ....

276276

278 281283289

291
292 293297299 300301

302 303

304305306307 308

308 310

xiv

CONTENTS.

161. Prayer, ....
162. Abstinence, ....
163. Choice of Society,
164. Regulation of Life, (c) Of the Fruit of the Spirit.
165. Righteousness,
166. Earthly and Heavenly Vocation,
167. Heart and Walk,
168. Fidelity in Great and Small Things,
169. Fruit of Innocence and Virtue,
(a) The Innocence of the Christian Life-
1 70. General Idea, ....
171. Esteem of Immediate Personality,
172. Esteem for the Intercourse of Thought and Speech,
173. Regard for Life,
174. Esteem for Sex,
175. Respect for Freedom,
176. Respect for a Good Name, .
177. Respect for Property, (b) A Virtuous Life.
178. General Idea, ....
179. Culture, (Self-love as Self-perfection,)
180. Equity, (Love of our Neighbour in regard to strife),
181 — 83. Goodness, (Love of our Neighbour in need,)
184. Public Spirit, ....

Page. 311313314
314

315316
316
317 318

322323
325 326 330331331
332

334334
335 336338

SECTION THE THIRD.

FELLOWSHIP IN SALVATION.

185. Community of Salvation,

340

186. Church, ....

340

187. Internal and External Church,

341

188. Unity and Plurality,

342

189. The True Church,

346

190. Preaching, ....

348

191. Pledges as Signs of a Covenant,

349

192. Baptism, ....

351

193. The Lord's Supper,

356

194. Common Prayer and the Lord's Day,

357

195. Office of the Keys,

359

196. Ecclesiastical Constitution,

360

CONTENTS.

XV

Page.
197. Ecclesiasticism, . . . qfln

198. Church and Kingdom of God,

361
199. Church and Earthly Calling,
200. Marriage,
201. Parents,
202. Children,
203. Brothers and Sisters,
365
365 369
370371
204. Household under Affliction,
371
205. Domestic Life,
372
206. Friendship,
207. The State,
372372
208. Magistrate and Subject,
377
SECTION THE FOURTH.
THE COMPLETION OF SALVATION.'
207. Blessedness in Hope,
379
210. Hope,
379
211. Fruits of Hope,
380
212. Fidelity,
381
213. Patience,
381
214. Hope in Christ,
381
215. Individual Consummation,
382
216. Return of Christ,
385
217. Resurrection,
387
218. Conclusion,
389
219. Final Judgment,
390
220. Restoration of all Things,
396
221. Eternal Joy,
397
INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. GENERAL VIEW.
An Introduction to a System of Christian Doctrine compre
hends within its scope the following fourfold design : —
1. It assigns to the system its appropriate place in the circle
of theological study, by means of which the Idea of this science
is at the same time determined.
2. It has to define the object of a scientific representation, or
the General Idea of Christianity.
3. It undertakes to give an account of the laws by which a
knowledge of Christianity is acquired.
4. And, finally, it unfolds the history of the Christian system,
and exhibits it in its purest form.

I. THE IDEA AND OBJECT OF A SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN
DOCTRINE.
§ 2. RELATION TO THE CATECHISM.
Christian doctrine, regarded as theological science, is a
species of systematic theology. As such, it is to be distinguished
not only from homiletical and catechetical exposition addressed
to the congregation,1 for which it- should rather provide prepa
ratory instruction relative to a knowledge of the object and
idea of the Christian system ; but it also differs from a
catechism of Christian doctrine; for it cannot be considered, B

2 INTRODUCTION.  1. IDEA.
like the catechism, as a text of the public doctrine and public
confession, such as church communion recognizes, nor can
it be viewed as forming the basis of a general knowledge of
Christianity. Christian doctrine belongs rather to the pro
vince of the theologian who co-operates in expanding the cate
chism,2 and promoting its use, in so far as that object depends
upon the systematic skill of the theologian. Christian doc
trine, or religious doctrine, is, in one point of view, a more
perfect, and in another, a more imperfect species of systematic
theology; and how far this is the case will subsequently ap
pear. 1 Twesten's observation, in his admirable Lectures, (Vorless.
jib. d. Dogm. &c, i. p. 89 seq.), which have exhausted the sub
ject, on the relation of dogma to the doctrinal exposition of the
clergy addressed to the congregation, is equally applicable, to
Christian doctrine, or to the scientific union between the doctrine
of faith and morals. Both, namely systematic doctrine and
homily, are serviceable to the church, and both treat of Christ
ianity. Still, however, the standing point and aim of the former,
the source of the latter, and the matter and form of both, are
somewhat different. Compare Schleiermacher's Olaubensl. 2d
edit. i. p. 123.
2 In a second or third stage of catechetical instruction, we may
venture to recognise Christian doctrine in the unity and totality
of its organic connection. The Palatinate Catechism will ever
remain a model. See Theobl. Grrseber, on a New General Cate
chism in Nitzsch and Sack's Monatschrift f. d. Ev. Kirche, 1848,
p. 329. But upon the basis of even Luther's Small Catechism,
a doctrinal system may be raised, and this hy receiving all the
other principal points into the chief head of the three articles of
the Christian faith, which has been attempted by Seiler, Dinter,
Hebel, and Schmieder. This, however, can only be done accord
ing to methods which are based upon a knowledge of the system
of Christian doctrine.
Remark 1. The use of the term docteine, as signifying a scien
tific system of cognitions of any kind, is justified by usage.
Doctrine of Christianity, Christian doctrine, Christian religious
doctrine, are all possible designations of theological discipline.

§ 3. RELATION TO DOGMA AND ETHICS. 3
We prefer the more definite term, system of Christian doctrine,
or system of Christianity.
Remark 2. We shall not discuss the subject of popular dogma
or ethics, nor of the material for pulpit doctrine, which has been
improperly termed, practical theology; such cannot be regarded
as valid kinds of systematic theology. See Schleiermacher's
Glaubensl. 2d edit. i. p. 172. But we shall endeavour here to
follow the plan advanced by Bretschneider, Handb. der Dogmatik.
3d edit. i. § 5, under the title of Christian Theology, and after
wards accomplished, in his own way, under the title of Religiose
Glaubenslehre, &c. 1843, and which Hyperius has often termed
Methodum Universes Theologies.

§ 3. RELATION TO DOGMA AND ETHICS.
The science of Christian doctrine undoubtedly possesses some
thing in common with the catechism, and still more with eccle
siastical- religious doctrine immediately applied to congregational
purposes; that is to say, the religion of Christians in the inse
parability of perception and action, or in the unity of Christian
life (X.pi<rriu»nTf/to;, o'So? xvgiou, Ssotrefiux ¦^idTta.vuv), serves for
the subject-matter of ecclesiastical doctrine, not of course mean
ing thereby to deny the distinctions naturally existing between
these two elements. But the attempt to unite them, by which
our science recedes from dogma and ethics, and approximates
to the most perfect form of systematic theology, is at all times
both possible and necessary. It is possible,! because Christian
life remains a unity, and between perception and action, a mu
tual dependency exists, similar to that dependency which reci
procates between individual parts of perception and action them
selves ; and it is eminently necessary, because sometimes ethics
forget their dependence upon dodrmal faith, and sometimes
dogma forgets its relation to moral dodrine; and still more is
it so, since the knowledge of what constitutes the very foun
dation and extent of Christianity has been disputed and render
ed insecure.
1 The preliminary proof of this possibility lies in the general

i INTRODUCTION. — I. IDEA.
admission of the fact, that there are points in dogma from whence
the theologian will have to look forward to ethics; and, in like
manner, there are points in ethics whence he will necessarily
have to look back upon the doctrine of faith ; and, further, in the
universal admission that there are doctrines common to both.
Compare Schleiermacher, i. § 26.
Remark. We take for granted that the separate treatment of
dogma and ethics is by no means filled up or supplanted by the
development of a system of Christian doctrine. Compare Steudel.
Glaubensl. p. 88. Kling Tub. Zeitschr. 1834, iv. p. 4.

| 4.' RELATION TO BIBLICAL THEOLOGY.
Christian doctrine, developed within these limits, and in this
systematic point of view, declines the regulating interposition
of symbolic writings, and withdraws itself from all immediate
dependence on the formal system of the churchy and more es
pecially is this the casev because it is the express office of
Christian doctrine to assist and guide the examination,
confirmation, and expansion of the former. Still, Christian
doctrine has this in common with Biblical theology, that they
are both deficient in historical completeness ; and, on that very
account, is a more imperfect species of systematic theology.
Christian doctrine differs, however, from Biblical theology, in
that it does not prominently recognise the expansive progres
sion of the successive stages of revelation, from Abraham to
the apostles; nor does it especially take cognizance of the
unity and multiformity of the various Scripture doctrines,
belonging to one and the same stage ; but rather, it apprehends
the period of completed revelation, and of Christian faith and
life, in its . finished form, just as it was under apostolic
instruction, and in apostolic communion originally and typically,
for all times.
Remark 1. Biblical theology has experienced a defective
treatment, in so much as, instead of being almost exclusively

§ 5. RELIGION AND REVELATION. 5
cultivated in its genetic character, it ought rather to have fur
nished, before everything else, a new system of Christian doc
trine. De Wette's and Von Cohen's labours approximate
very closely to our view in relation to form, although, from the
double state of Hebrewism and Judaism in the Old Testament,
we construct a three-fold one, and embody the element of morality
in a still greater proportion. Baumgarten-Crusius also does the
same, although he endeavours to pursue the internal genesis of
the Bible, in relation to each particular leading Christian doc
trine of faith, and entirely excludes the doctrine of morals.
Remark 2. Just as the History of Dogma is related to the
Dogmatic, and the History of Moral Doctrine to Ethics, so Bib
lical theology is related to the system of Christian doctrine.
See Baumgarten-Crusius' Grimdzuge der Bibl. Theol. Jena
1828, p. 3. "Biblical theology introduces Dogmatic history, as
they are, in spirit, kindred disciplines."

II. ON THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE CHRISTIAN
DOCTRINE OF RELIGION. »
§ 5. RELIGION AND REVELATION.
"What Christianity really is, can only be scientifically under
stood, when in part, its specific resemblances1 to, and in part its
differences from, other forms of man's spiritual fife, are duly
apprehended. To the former appertains the idea of religion;
to the latter, the idea of revelation.2 Now, there is no contra
diction in the fact, that revealed religion, as such, is opposed
to all others, and yet is incorporated into the unity of the idea
and history of religion. The inward operation of the idea mani
fested in all religions, are different from their absolute realiza
tions ; from which again, indeed, the pure conscious idea is deriv
ed; and yet the negative and positive preparatives of this realiz
ation in part maintain a common relation to it, and in part also,
the real and unreal phenomena of the idea maintain a common
relation to the idea itself.
The untrue, the false, are, as such, opposed to the idea.

6 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
The half-true and erroneous are plainly opposed to the absolute
reality of truth ; as, however, the untrue and the false are really
nothing in themselves, they have simply to be reduced back
again to their relation unto truth; and thus these two kinds of
consideration are complete.
1 See my Treatise on the Religious Idea of the Ancients, in
den Studien und Kritiken, &c. Published by Ullraan and
ITmbreit, vol, i. part iii. p. 527-32. Schleiermacher's dogma
(Glaubensl. p. 17), "In order to ascertain, in what the essence
of Christian piety consists, we must pass beyond Christianity,
and take our stand above it, in order to compare it with other
kinds of faith," is, if there be any philosophical theology at all,
an absolutely necessary one. It is apparent in various ways,
from Acts x. 35, xvii. 23; John viii. 47, &c, that Christianity,
even in its immediate life, applies to a piety which precedes it,
and exists without it.
2 A doctrine of religion adapted to Christian theology neces
sarily conducts, hy means of religious history, to the idea of
revelation.

A. Of Religion.
% 6. IDEA.
Christianity is a determinate mode of man's life : it hath this
in common with many other, or all other modes of human life,
namely, it is religious;1 that is, it is a mode of life determined
by its relation to, or conscious dependence upon God.2 That a
religious destiny appertains to human life as such, and to man's
existence in every grade,3 and that it does not exclusively ap
propriate to itself either knowledge, conception, action, or the
will, but conditionates the entire functions arid circle of life
whether existing in a spiritual condition, or capable of doing
so, — are truths not to be disputed.
1 The word Religion, if we merely consider its derivation from
the Latin, may be as correctly derived from religare as from

A. RELIGION. — § 6. IDEA. 7
religere; for in the first place, the third conjugation lies at the
root of many verbs of the first, second, and fourth conjugations,
so that the third might be correctly termed the first, or the other
three alternate with it; for example, the verb optere preludes
optare, whence optio; jurgere (ob) jurgare (jure agere), whence
jurgium; postulere, postulare, whence post ulio; bellere bellare,
whence rebellio, &c. And it would seem that in certain aspects
the word ligere, to bind, is more primitive than ligare, and this
view I concede to licentiate Miiller (Study of Theology, 1835, p.
1 56), and to Dr Hahn (De rel. et superstit. not. et ratione, Vera-
tisl. 1834) in preference to that adduced in my Treatise on the
Religious Idea of the Ancients. But that the word nevertheless
is only derived from religere, religare, to read again, to observe,
&c. appears to philologists incontrovertible, (apart from other
facts of the custom of language adduced by Miiller,) from the old
adage, " religentem esse oportet, religiosum nefas." The objection
of Miiller .and Hahn, that the derivation of the ancients cannot
generally be confided in, is inadmissible; for derivations which are
made with design or at a venture, artificial, individualised, and
manifestly impossible is one thing, and quite another are those invol
untary ones which spring out of the intercommunion of conception
and language, in the form of proverbs, and before the period, cor
rectly speaking, of etymological acumen, and, which, moreover,
are in themselves both possible and even probable. Thus the
idea fundamentally associated with the term religio, is not obliga
tion, or bond; but respectus, observmtia, respect, observation.
Miiller ascribes to the word religere its original signification, —
reflection, thought; and associates this signification with the
fundamental idea of religion as awe, fear, scrupulosity. This
opinion might be harmonised with the rest, but space will not
admit of it here. Since Dietrich has proved (Theo. Stud, und
Krit. 1847, i. 152), that the word Pflicht (duty) is not derived
from flecten (to plait), but from pflegen (to cherish), it cannot
any longer be used analogously for religio, — obligation.
2 Religion is not a mode of perceiving and venerating God,
but rather a form of perception, thought, action, and feeling,
which has the Divine for its object, basis, and aim. The usual,
but not the ancient, abstract definition could only suffice for that
theological period from which the philosophy of religion was as
yet estranged. Such definition explains nothing fundamentally,
but it intimates that there is a manifoldness in the revelation of

8 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
God, or in the developments of the original religious predisposi
tion. Its only commendation consists in combining knowledge
and action, — a commendation which Strauss, while he assumes it
as a starting-point, at once entirely mars by directly sacrificing
the other element colere, — on the other hand, its most essential
defect consists in neglecting to reduce both elements into one,
and overlooking its generic characteristic. The latter is correctly
added by Baumgarten-Crusius (Introduction to the Study of
Dogma, p. 3), who defines religion to be a certain quality, a re
lation of the whole life, &c. The unity of religious action, con
dition, or conduct, is preserved by cultus, agnitio numinis, as
stated by Henke and the ancients; or by modus colendi Deum,
according to Heilmann and Doderlein; for as agnoscere includes
the practical, so on the other hand colere does not exclude the
theoretical. Still more accurately expressed by Ammon, " the
sacred bond of consciousness, &c.;" and by Schwartz, " The scru
pulous consciousness of our own- and the world's dependence on
God;" and by Steudel, "resignation unto God." But who
ever considers the statement of the objective, namely, " depen
dence upon God," too precise, will either (according to the pre
ceding argument,) apply Cicero's Superior Natura quam divinam
vocant, also numen divinum, to SsTbv, (God in general according
to a more modern mode of expression,) or else substitute
with Schleiermacher the. objective for the subjective, "con
sciousness of absolute dependence." The element of required
re-union and re-connection with God, or the supposition of the
fall of man, does not lie in the previous and general idea of reli
gion, although Sack in his Apology, first ed., Hahn in his Com
pendium of Christian Faith, Leonhard Clemens Schmitt in his
Construction of Theological Evidence, and others, are of opinion it
does so. The idea of religion excludes as well as includes in
itself the existence of sin; it is prospective in regard to the mere
possibility of sin, even as it is retrospective in reference to
actual sin about to be removed. But in no case ought we to
adopt the views of those who have recently declared the sub
jectivity of religious conception to be partial. See Leonh. Clem,
Schmitt's Construction of Theological Evidence, Bamberg, 3 836,
p. 15. For God is in no sense religious; the creating,
revealing, and redeeming activity of God is not an act of reli
gion. Although it be true that the Christian supplicates God in
and through God, and approaches God through God; yet that

A. RELIGION. — | 6. IDEA. 9
God adores God is in nowise religion, unless indeed it be the
Ssos h aXhw rgovtji of the Arians ; nor does God's annunciation of
himself to man constitute religion ; but in each element of reli
gion a difference subsists between the object, who is God, and the
subject, which is relative and capable of relation. So that even
in the union of the Christian with Christ in the Holy Spirit, the
divine Spirit, already subjective, becomes again objective, and
thus still less is the objectivity of the Father and the Son dis
solved. Those theologians who desire to represent and to con
ceive religion as a kind of Divine activity, or as a mutually reci
procating activity, should remember that either no logic, or the
logic of speculative pantheism lies at the bottom of their treat
ment of the subject.
According to Hegel and Vatke, religion is a process of the
mind, in which case it can easily be understood, that subjec
tivity can only be an evanishing of the idea under discussion.
He only who teaches this identity of the subjective and ob
jective, will presume to confound the process of revelation, which
is a Divine action, with the process of religion ; for as to such
identity, though it be acknowledged to exist in the essence of
God, it is not recognised in religion, — for to perceive it in religion
would be equivalent to seeing religious dissolution. If religion
were a relationship, or, as some call it, an interchange of relation
(as Klee) between God and man, it would either not be possible
to understand it as a function, or else only as a two-fold one ; and
as these two activities could not be on an equality, but, of neces
sity, in the order of subjection, as the modified and modifying,
or the influenced and influencing, so it would only be possible to
recognise them as divine cause and effect. Religion is rather
a reference and relationship of finite consciousness to the Crea
tor, Sustainer, and Governor, therefore it is man's communion
with God and his adoration of God.
3 The spirit, the personal being, the rational creature-, as such,
is religious, and atheism is only an attempt not to be so.

§ 7. CAUSE OR ORIGIN.
Beligion by no means fills up the circle of human life in such
a manner, as if it emanated, in the first instance, from a cen-

10 INTRODUCTION — II. OBJECT.
tre, upon every incidental occasion; that is to say, it does not
arise so much from experience and sensation, or from reflection
added to the sum-total of experience and sensation, as it does
from an original self-consciousness ; on the contrary, the latter
(self-consciousness) is alone the constant cause and ground of
religion. And although we may venture to assert that man,
by the mutual action and reaction of the external and internal,
and also through experience, revelation, education, and tradition,
may be raised up to a knowledge of God, and that religion
everywhere possesses and promotes a process of improvement,
yet if education were not already preceded by an innate con
sciousness of God, as an operative predisposition,1 there would
be nothing for education and culture to operate upon.
In this dogma all religious philosophers since Kant2 to a
certain extent cbncur, however they may in other respects dif
fer. Moreover, it is in harmony with all the true philosophy
of antiquity,3 as well as that of the middle ages; so that now it
is a comparatively easy problem either to annul or to adjust the
empirical deductions of religion; for the most modern specula
tive school assumes, indeed, in its latest development of reli
gion (in form and substance) its duration and constancy:- —
otherwise a perfected idea would justify the cutting asunder
the vital cord of religion itself. But indisputably, this specu
lative school concedes to religion, in the process of human
consciousness, this necessity of origination, this indwelling in
the spirit, this origin.
Remark 1. The process of religious life undoubtedly exhibits
to us, not merely actions from an internal cause tending to with
out, but also reactions tending to within; and the latter are
always originally modified by the former. Religious association
wields a definite influence over individual life, but this only
occurs after it has itself sprung from the expressive impulse of
original and universal consciousness of God. Pious feeling is
awakened in man by the contemplations of nature and art; (see
Seneca Ep. 51) but the inducing cause these contemplations sup
ply to religion is not an efficient one, and the admonitory power
which the external world exercises is not originally an instruc-

A. RELIGION.  § 7. CAUSE OR ORIGIN. 11
tive one. The same argument applies to reflection. If spiritual
development, on its part, may even be modified by contact with
the external world; yet certain kinds of external experience or
certain qualities of collective experience do not so conditionate
development as to render it religious.
Remark 2. If we derive religion from immediate and original
consciousness, and therefore from facts, and consequently from
experience, it is nevertheless obvious that we do not thereby assign
to it either a temporal or an empirical origin, correctly speaking;
for both kinds of experience agree with each other merely in this
— the exclusion of an origin purely from reflection.
Remark 3. The phenomenon of religion may be illustrated
empirically by deducing it —
a. From certain impressions received from the sensible world,
that is to say, from natural phenomena, exciting dread, or ex
hibiting benevolence, which leads man, by means of his imagin
ation, or reflection, beyond the field of sensible observation.
6. From the contemplation of nature in general.
c. From the useful inventions of a Numa, Lycurgus, &c.
d. From original external revelation, to which reason is
related as a purely passive organ, and heathenism as a feeble
relic. These derivations, in so far as they do not consist in direct
evasion, which infidelity pursues, are however all deficient in phi
losophical seriousness, and are either merely the rudiments of
the true derivation, or else admit in some degree of being vindi
cated by their partial relations to the religiones. And in like
manner we may reason concerning the third or irreligious deri
vation. For otherwise the latter would create far more obscuri
ty than clearness, and would resemble what Thrasymachus says
in Plato v. Republic. 1, concerning hixam, namely, that it is no
thing more than the interest of him who is in authority.
Lucretius does not represent fear as the cause of thankfulness
towards God, but as the origin of a futile veneration for Deity,
which a contemplation of nature is calculated to destroy; in
other respects he would have been as correct had he placed fear
at the head of passive religious excitations, as to represent
reverential awe as the first of the active ones. For in this two
fold point of view deiffidai/iovia, <po/3iTi^ai vb SeTov, eifo&ai, &C,
were applied to religion in general. As to the question whether
fear or love be the earlier element in religion, we refer to

12 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
Koppen's Philosophy of Christianity, 2d edit. vol. i. p. 20.
Schleiermacher, too, (in his Discourses on Religion, 3d edit.
p. 109) has shown how untenable a religion, regarded as merely
originating from the dread of a Being who darts his light
ning or wields his thunder, would have proved. The feeling
of dependence, in its durability, universality, and inexhaus
tible depth, is so much the less capable of being explained
by the power of sensible impressions of an agreeable or dis
agreeable kind, since either one impression obliterates another,
or all are deprived of their absolute force by experience, habit,
or reflection. If these impressions retain this force, then must
the latter originate from some other source, namely, from a per
manent excitability of the original God-feeling through a me
diating world-consciousness. A like argument applies to b.
For it is one thing to grant a physico-theological or cosmologi-
cal demonstration, and quite another to deduce from thence the
ground or cause of religion. The former has its value, indeed
it is said in the Rook of Wisdom xiii. 1 , Mdraioi ph ybg vavng
iLfogwrni <puaei, oTg «xg»ji> &soD ayvaigia, and ovx, re%v<mv sibhai rbv ovra;
but notwithstanding, in v. 8, TidXiv dh ov&' alrol euyyaeroi ; also in
Romans i. 20, avairoXSyriroi. Now if Paul, as well as the pseudo-
Solomon, appear to require from them only a cosmological or
physico-theological inference, still this acknowledgment of such
a requirement is founded upon the hypothesis, that the spirit
may possess an innate capacity and destiny for receiving and
following the motives of its consciousness of God. Besides, other
passages must be compared; as Acts of the Apostles xyii. 27, 28;
Romans ii. 15, with Romans i. 19. In whatever sense we may
interpret rb yw<srbv roZ SsoD and h alntg, Paul maintains categori
cally, V. 21, dibri yv6vTig rhv §zbv oi^ iig §ibv edo^adav, and Melancll-
thon remarks on v. 20, quamquam enim mens ratiocinatur
aliquid de Deo ex consideratione mirabilium ejus operum in
universa rerum natura, tamen hunc syllogismum ratio non
haberet, nisi, etiam Deus aliquam notitiam xara v^Xq-^iv indidis-
set mentibus nostris: et alia mirabilia spectacula rerum KgoXrr^ni
excitant. If experience and the contemplation of nature begets
religion, whence springs unbelief? All men have experience
and testimonies of the works of God. And among these are
many who are not Scythians, but richly endowed with under
standing, and yet deny man's dependence upon God, as for ex
ample Democritus and Epicurus. Now if the guilt of this denial

A. RELIGION. — § 7. CAUSE OR ORIGIN. 13
lies as deep, as Paul in Romans i. 18 assures us it does, then, it
follows, that mere experience apprehended by the understanding
would just as much impede as advance the recovery of religion ;
accordingly as the mind had previously been true to itself or
not. The fourth derivation is alike unsatisfactory; for, in a Chris
tian sense, Revelation always assumes religion to be in a state
of decay; in another and more extended sense, however, religion
must ever be regarded as addressing itself, in its manifestations
or inspirations, to a spirit ; now to this spirit, as such, belongs
not a nude and isolated self-consciousness, but an internal reve
lation of God, of which, clouded though it be, it cannot be de
prived without ceasing to exist.
1 Koppen, in his Philosophy of Christianity, vol. i. p. 22, has the
following remark : " We have no knowledge of a dynamic influ
ence, spiritual or physical, without a dynamic reaction ; in this
case, man was not merely reared in the knowledge of God, but
already possessed a perception of Deity, and became conscious
of his doing so by means of a special preparation."
2 Jacobi, Schleiermacher, Fries, and Clodius, have undoubtedly
contributed more than any others, and each in his own peculiar
way, towards the support of this opinion, so that the immediate
existence of religion in man's self-cOnsciousness, and a higher
and deeper origin of it than either empiricism or reflection could
offer, has again come to be generally recognised; and it might
seem that Kant had as yet no share in this retrogression or progres
sion of the age; nor Hegel, since he treated the doctrine with
contempt. By the former, however, philosophy has been, for the
first time, introduced into the realms of immediate consciousness,
after a long period of dry neglect; albeit such philosophy was
principally merely that of morals. And the latter, although he
advocates a mediating process and a change of direct conscious
ness, in order that the true nature of the objective should reach
the conscience, naturally does justice to mere experience
or reflection (in the form of faith, of feeling, &c), as opposed
to immediate knowledge. (See Encyclopcedia of Philosophi
cal Science, 2d edit. p. 64, where he thus expresses him
self): " It can scarcely occur to Philosophy that she should con
tradict those tenets of immediate knowledge; she ought rather
to congratulate herself, perhaps, that these her ancient tenets,
which express the whole of her general substance, had become

14 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
in so unphilosophical a manner, certain general prejudices of our
age — Tenets — namely, that that which is held to be true. is in
herent in the Spirit, and that truth is for the Spirit." In like
manner do the successors of Hegel reason ; only that one class
of them have resolved more and more upon a philosophical
celebration of a second annihilation of religion; and, in accord
ance with such views, the immediate origin of religion in human
self-consciousness indicates and demonstrates, rather, the un
truth of religious conceptions, than their certainty and truth.
Frauenstadt maintains that Faith and Thought, Religion and
Science, are absolutely irreconcilable contradictions. According
to Feuerbach, religion is a dream of the human mind ; a personal
God, the creation of the fancy and of the mind (of the desire)
nothing objectively real; if not the true essence of man, the
objectively true man himself in the dreaminess of faith. Strauss,
correcting both, says, that religion is the imagined and felt per
ception of the relation between the finite and the absolute, i. e.,
the preliminary and more imperfect stage of-rational perception.
On the other hand, Vatke asserts, (Human Freedom, 1841, p.
20, &c.,) that not the eternal essence of religion, but a certain
phenomenal appearance, is subdued by the incursions of free
thought. — Irreligion can only be an opinion, which religion as
such endeavours to annihilate. Such a view the rational
character must ever utterly condemn. It is the opinion of the
abstract understanding, which speculation is justified in protest
ing against.
3 According to Plato, (in his Phaedon,) ¦ and to Menon, the
knowledge of the beautiful, the good, the just, and the holy, is as
much the reminiscence of a pre-existing state of the soul, as the
knowledge of equals, the greater and the less. On which point
Boethius aptly says (de Consolatione Philos. 3 Met. iv.):
Hseret profecto semen introrsum veri,
Quod excitatur ventilante doctrina.
Nam cur rogati sponte recta censetis,
Ni mersus alto viveret fomes corde?
Quod quisque discit wimenwr recordatur.
In Cicero de Natura Deorum, D. i. Velleius boasts, Solus Epi
curus vidit primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis eorum
notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quae enim gens aut quod
genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem

A. RELIGION. — § 7. CAUSE OR ORIGIN. 15
quandam Deorum, quam appellat vooXq-^iv, Epicurus, i.e., ante-
ceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nee intelligi
quicquam nee quseri nee disputari potest. Joann. Damasc. Exp.
Fid. i. 3, fi yvusig rov ihoii §eb\i pxigixoig r\iJjTv syxarieiruorai. — Innate
ideas or notions. It is evident how very much the acknowledg
ment of the origin of religion from immediate consciousness must,
at all times, have been serviceable to the apologists of Christian
ity and of Christian belief in revelation. But the anonymous
author of the question addressed to me, (Theol. St. u. Krit,
1841, 4, compare 1843, 3, "The harmony of immediate and
certain self-consciousness with the contents of Holy Scriptures,")
has applied the doctrine of immediate self-consciousness in a
manner calculated rather to destroy than to establish the Chris
tian doctrine of faith: Immediate, determinate self- consciousness
constitutes our finiteness and God's existence ; all knowledge of
the existing state of God is merely an apparent knowledge;
Christ is revelation, once for all, because, whilst He impersonated
the highest Norm of faith and life, He has nowhere communicated
information concerning the Essence of God such as would include
a truth incomprehensible to finite minds. The Trinity, Original
Sin, Reconciliation, &c, are transferred, according to this mode
of reasoning, to an assumed Perception, which is grounded upon
no authority, or is merely speculative. Just as if the who, which,
what? (he is uncertain on the point) could have any meaning;
and just as if immediate self-consciousness should be incapable of
development by means of thought and experience. Whereas, let
the source of Christian dogmas in the Apostolic consciousness,
be only compared with Scripture, and the resemblance of this
genesis with that of religion in general will be apparent, and will
constitute a preliminary defence against various questions of a
sceptical tendency.

§ 8. ORIGINAL FORM.
Subordinate to the admitted dogmas of modern philosophy,
although not unimportant, is the question, what really does
constitute this original consciousness in reference to religion,?
Which question, again, resolves itself into another, namely,

16 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
does religion, according to its fundamental, and as it were
legislative form in the conscience, possess in itself a pure and
absolutely simple immediateness, or a certain modification of
the same? — a question which again may be thus expressed —
whether does a determinating precedence in matters of religion
appertain unto faith or to knowledge? Those who uphold the
theory of a simple and absolute immediateness, are wont to
designate the original form of religion, sometimes Intuition,
sometimes Perception and thought, — reason, in contradistinc
tion to understanding or feeling; or they appeal to the totality
and fundamental unity of consciousness, or to a nameless
something, — an X, which they place before perception, feeling,
and will.1 *
Remark 1 . How far from being indifferent to the theologian,
in the present state of science, are these extremely controverted
and difficult questions, will hereafter be apparent from our doc
trine on the formal defects of religion. In order to acquire his
torical information on the very different ideas which the leading
thinkers of our age, particularly since Kant and Jacobi, have
entertained of faith, sensation, intuition, thought, and idea,
and in order to avoid rash conclusions from traditional defini
tions, the student may consult the following works : — Bouterwek,
Rel. der Vernunft — Religion of Reason, Gott. 1 824, First Trea
tise, p. -3, 54; Baumgarten-Crusius' Introduction to the Study of
Dogma, p. 54-76; and C. Hase de Fide lib. ii. Tub. 1825,
Unless we are acquainted with those changes Schleiermacher
and Hegel introduced in the psychological usage of language and
thought (because they were necessary for the period), we are in
competent to discuss those theological questions of the age which
have (for the most part) a progressive and productive character.
There are at the present day two kinds of scientific language,
which occasion much confusion, when they either accord or disa
gree. The modern dialect always understands the ancient, be
cause the latter has nothing either novel or difficult to express.
Sometimes, however, it is unwilling to understand it, The ancient
dialect can only understand itself; but cannot comprehend the
modern. •
Remark 2. In certain respects, the terms, consciousness, mind

A. RELIGION. — § 8. ORIGINAL FORM. 17
&c, are admissible; but only as temporary expedients for
avoiding controversy; for, the inquiry concerning relations,
which in this way are still left undeveloped, must not be entirely
shunned. In consciousness, a condition, an object, and in part
an activity are distinguishable, by means of which the subject
is related to the object; and in part an action can be observed
by which the subject obtains its determinations from the object.
Now, there arise two questions, in reference to religious con
sciousness, which, as original and immediate, we have opposed
to reflection and experience, so soon as religion is traced back
from the mediate life of doctrine, and mode of action, to con
sciousness. (1st.) Whether religious certainty and truth depend
most upon my disposition of mind; how I am touched or ex
cited (upon sensation, subjective consciousness); or upon what
I perceive, observe (on objective consciousness), and in what
way the one is modified or perfected by the other ; and (2d.),
Whether the perfection of religious consciousness consists more
in the free activity of thought and appprehension, as the
mediating principles of the subjective and imparted; or more
in susceptibility for revelation and internal experience ?
In the inquiry above alluded to (Theol. St. u. Kritic 1841-4),
the author represents the substance of this remark as indiffer
ent, and the progress of the question contained in the text as
erroneous. As soon as an immediate religious self-conscious
ness has been admitted, the question, according to that writer,
has only to be put, — What is the nature of this self-conscious^
ness? — in order directly to decide, what perceptions are to be
regarded as authentic, and what are not; or what historical and
speculative dogmas are there in Christian tradition, for ex
ample, that ought to be removed as being destitute of authority.
Besides, he objects to the expression mind, used here in a par
ticular sense, and will not even recognise in the discussion, sen
sation and perception, object and subject, &c. ; but it is impos
sible to argue with a writer who entirely overlooks psychology.
We have proceeded upon the supposition of the Immanence of
religion, in order, beforehand, to render it as independent of
mere empiricism, as of the contingencies of reflexion and specu
lation. The process is merely secured and grounded, but by no
means cleared. The above author, however, reaches no defi
nite point, but applies himself directly to the subject-definition,—
God is. Now, if nothing else be immediately certain, how much
C

18 INTRODUCTION.  II. OBJECT.
more ought the phenomenological form in which this single cer
tainty enters the conscience be determined; and thus we have
asked, for the author's own sake, as Schleiermacher and others
have also done, for the original form of religion. We do not deny,
indeed, that what at first appears in the form of immediateness,
may become, by the intervention of thought, authentic truth, any
more than we deny that we have to assume an act of religion;
and that both functions, — thought and action, belong to it, if the
immediate act shall maintain and manifest its energy, while the
immediate subject-matter at the same time shall acquire and pre
serve its purity and clearness. Cognitions, merely as such, are
always authoritative. The author has even censured this posi
tion, in as much as he rejects all psychological questions. The
mere proposition of direct self-consciousness, as applied to reli
gion, does not by any means preclude the truth and validity of his
torical or speculative dogmas, but merely includes a regulative in
fluence in their explanation, derivation, reduction, and criticism.
Remark 3. The most comprehensive and universal indication
of religious consciousness is faith. It is the unity of sensation and
perception, of susceptibility and spontaneity in matters of reli
gion. It is through Christianity alone that the notion of faith
has so pervaded science and general culture, as to be regarded
as the fundamental character and essential function of religious
life; wherefore faith in its general or philosophical meaning can
only be apprehended according to the analogy of its strictly
Christian meaning. A trace of the correct generalization is to
be found in Hebrews xi. 1. Yet not as though i>ir6eramg and
iXiyxog were merely the energies of reflection and intellectual
syllogising. The usual explanation, that faith consists in main
taining as true the super-sensual derived from subjective yet
conclusive grounds, does not reach its essence. Thus we simply
perceive, that faith in some way differs from opinion inadequate-,
ly grounded, and from knowledge ; but we do not perceive that
it is an original, yet at the same time a free act of the sub
jective spirit, nor that it is a believing with the heart,— K<*g%
y&o mttriverai, x. X. Romans x. 10; nor that v6n«ig 3;<i mgriug, or mani
mitt, Heb. xi. 3, is the earlier or more immediate fact which
precedes and lies at the foundation of dialectic and demonstra
tion ; and in this relation the nature of faith has been strik
ingly treated by Dr David Schultz, in his " Christian Doctrine
of Faith," &c. Breslau, 1834. (A New Treatment of the

A. RELIGION. — § 8. ORIGINAL FORM. 19
question, What is Faith, and who are Unbelievers ?) Faith is
neither a contemplative nor a knowing perception, but a sensuous
one; and yet it is not inferior in certainty and satisfaction to
knowledge or contemplation ; because, in reference to its objects,
it is much more able to render all knowledge and observation
dependent on itself. Therefore Clemens of Alexandria, how
ever defective as an etymologist, justly remarks, in his Stroma-
tum iv. 22, § 145, E' y ouv njn Eir/tfrtyiijjv srupoXoyeTv ;£gj), xul witb r»js
erdseug ' r$v, iirifio\ri\) uiirqg, XtjorsoiT 6V; igrtjgm rj/iwv h rofg itga.yiha.gi
rjjv -ifuyfiii, tiXkori aXKug ffgorsgov pego/tswji/. iigaiirug xul tw <xigriv
irivioXoyjjreoi/ rriv ifggi rb fa gr&gw njg -\myrig fiftuiv. More important
expositions are given by the same writer, (Stromatum, ii. 2-6.),
touching the relation of tierig to yvZgig, to neoaigigig, to vv6-
M-4"S, &c. Faith is the primary and true knowledge of God,
and the Divine ; mgrig irgo'K^ig yvwgetug, gvvro/iog yvugig, ¦mgrrj roimv
h ymeig. It is not disputed that faith endeavours, by means of
thought yvugrq hi q meng, to attain to a knowledge which, as
yet, it neither is nor has. Moreover, Clemens firmly maintained
the believing character of religious knowledge, in opposition to
the Valentinians, who ascribed faith to the vulgar, and know
ledge to themselves ; and at the same time he insisted upon the
scientific nature of faith, in opposition to those who regarded it
as unscientific. Still something more is required for faith; for it
has not cognition (cognoscere Deum, in the sense in which
Abelard even, esteems it above mteUigere,) and just as little does
it disregard understanding and conception; , but strives to attain
them; and this not for the purpose of exalting them to its own
essential principle, but rather that it may, through them, in
part, communicate with the rest of life, and in part protect itself
against a mixture of foreign elements. Accordingly, the exhor
tations of Clemens, Augustin, Anselm, &c, to intelligere, and
their appreciation of ymgig, can be understood. Those who ele
vate conception to the essential principle of religious cognition,
are unsupported by the above writers, although it is to a cer
tain extent defended by Abelard.
In proportion as faith has become understanding and concep
tion, is conviction at hand. Little faith may coexist with much
understanding and conception ; and the reverse is true. There
are yet two elements of the notion of faith, which Clemens
defended against the followers of Basilides. The latter termed
faith a p&axov, which any one by choice might adopt, (an opinion

20 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
which in itself involves a contradiction). On the other hand,
he defended the rb vgouigm*6» of faith. Faith is a cognition,
combined with and derived from recognition, and is ever attended
with love; and does not merely permit and empower, but also
inclines and obligates man to believe; and in this point of view
it is more easy to understand how an obedience of faith exists in
Christianity. Now, although the school of Basilides atoned for that defect,
by terming faith the assent of the soul to the supersensual,
(Clemens i. 1), &<pa,vovg irgayparog hurixw guyxurabegw, still it
neglected the other element, which Augustin expresses by the
terms, creditur testi; namely, that faith is the reception of a tes
timony and a susceptibility for an object, which declares itself,
and at the same time attests and guarantees itself to the con
science. Fides credit aliquid credendo alicui, i.e. Deo testi.
The believer, says Clemens, is dvaoa^arug rrigqnxbg rwv sy%s/g;<r-
Shrav. Hence it may be maintained, that the Christian repre
sentation of Being and Becoming, is not only in a special, but in
a more complete sense, Faith. First, because Christian percep
tion resting especially on the evidence of the Divine Word and
acts, is it a faith in revelation ; and, secondly, is it so, because
the essential purport of this revelation is redemption, which, as
such, corresponds only to a confidence full of requirements. But
if we desire, as we ought, to reduce the notion, which is in itself
Christian, into an idea, or to extend it to an ideal universality ;
in that case it is necessary to define religious faith to be espe
cially a — feeling, practical knowledge, which includes a' trust in
God, as testifying Himself to the conscience, and a confidence in
His kingdom. Man, in his conscious distinction from the world,
and in his union with it, is a witness to himself that God is. This
certainty, as contrasted with mere sensuous self-consciousness,
is confidence. And in this point of view, the same may also be
asserted of faith in the idea, i. e. of faith in God in the idea, in
consciousness. — See Dahne's Development of the Paulin Doctrine
of Faith. Halle, 1835, p. 107.
1 Here we particularly refer to Jacobi and the religious philo
sophers, who concur with and have extensively illustrated his
views. — Weiss on the Living God, 1812. Bouterwek, already re
ferred to, and Hase de Fede, p. 33, who approximates to the
same view. Hicce vero modus Deum animadvertendi intuitus
intellectualis haberi nequit, fit enim neque intuendo, neque

A. RELIGION. — § 9. ORIGINAL FORM. 21
cognoscendo, nee sentierido, neque agendo, sed aliquo x, quod
scientiam, sensum et voluntatem amplectitur, ipsis tamen am-
plius, majusque est, cujus intimam persuasionem, siquidem
singularum facultatum persuasionem fidem vocamus, fidem quo-
que sensu eminenti appellare licet. And Fischer's Introduc
tion to the Dogmas of the Evangelical Protestant Church,
Tubingen, 1828, p. 18. " The true form of the original mani
festation of religion only exists, when it stands forth in har
mony with human entireness, and when it permeates knowledge
and desire in the same proportion as feeling does." In like
manner, Steudel, Doctrine of Faith, &c, Tub. 1834, p. 9, and
Leonh. Schmitt, in the work already referred to, p. 35. But
in other respects origination has only been discussed, when
at the same time derivation ought also to have been considered.
In what then does derivation consist, if the sum total of acti
vities be required in order to represent origination ? A psycho
logy which derives from knowledge, desire, and feeling, three
co-ordinate forms of consciousness, precludes all possibility of
explanation in the matter.

§ 9. SUBJECT CONTINUED.
By means of an independent psychology, and conformably to
it, the primary manifestation of religion has been illustrated in
this point of view, with greater precision, by Schleiermacher.1
Twesten and Elwert concur in the same view, the latter being
its expounder and defender. Fries8 also adopts this view, and
has been followed by De Wette and Henry Schmid. But
Schleiermacher and Fries, although they both admit sensation,
or at least a determinate mode of sensation, to be the original
form of religion, yet differ in the following respects : Schleier
macher supposes that to acquire a conception of religion, no
thing precedes sensation; whilst, on the contrary, Fries conceives
religious ideas to be necessary for that purpose ; which ideas as
sume a living power in this finite existence through the antici
pation and sensitive perception of the Eternal. In opposition
to all this the Intellectualists,3 in their anxiety lest the prepon-

22 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
derance of the subjective in rehgion might prejudice the claims
of objective revelation, education, and dogmatic authority, reso
lutely maintain that piety is at first a mode of perception or
cognition; whilst others, (the disciples of Kant) although they
base rehgion, the necessary hypothesis of the existence of
God, of freedom and immortahty, upon the direct thesis of
moral consciousness, yet, notwithstanding, reject the doctrine of
sensation. But the theory of sensation is chiefly opposed by
the Speculatists,4 with whose views it originally approximated so
closely; as indeed it did with so many other of their develop
ments; for sensation, faith, or whatever other name immedi
ate consciousness of God may be designated by, is regarded by
the Speculatists as a mere formless elementary material of reli
gion, which may, to be sure, constitute its intrinsic substance,
but yet must first be moulded into a conception, as the alone
adequate and absolute form of rehgion, by an exciting dialectic.
1 Discourses on Religion and the Doctrine of Faith, § 8.
" Piety in itself is neither knowledge nor action, but an inclina
tion and determinateness of feeling." N.B. The question here
discussed is neither that of an attendant sensation, nor of one
which would array itself against thought and will, but of an ori
ginal sensation. See Twesten's Lectures on Dogma, &c, p.
2 — 20, where he treats on the nature of religion, and p. 20 et
seq. on the relation of cognition to religion (faith, knowledge,
science). The opinions for and against Schleiermacher's idea of
religion have been fully and skilfully analysed by Elwert, in his
paper on the Nature of Religion, &c, published in the Tubingen
Journal of Theology, 1835, 3d part.
2 New Critic of Reason, ii. p. 267, 274, compare also, his
Knowledge, Faith, and Presentiment, Jena, 1805, and De Wette's
Biblical Dogma, 2d edit. § 3—33, also his Religion and Theology,
2d edit., and Heinrich Schmid on Schleiermacher's Doctrine of
Faith, with reference to his Discourses on religion. Leipsig, 1835.
3 Steudel's Doctrine of Faith, p. 9. Leonh. Schmitt in the
work referred to above, p. 30.
4 Hegel, Hinrichs, Daub, Rosenkranz.

A. RELIGION.— § 10. ORIGINAL FORM. 23

§ 10. CONCLUSION.
As the question concerning the relative order of cogni
tion and sensation, feeling and will; or concerning what is
termed the uniform interpenetration of the perceiving, feeling,
and willing spirit by rehgion, could only arise among those
who explain nothing, or desire to render every thing inex
plicable ; so, in the actual state of religious science, the fun
damental question simply and chiefly comes to this: how are
the two theories of religious consciousness to be rendered in
telligible ; of which, one is termed the philosophy of sensation,
the other, the philosophy of idea ? Both concur in admitting
that the Divine rather excites sensation than reflection, and
that it is internally experienced, rather than externally per
ceived; or, at least they allow, that the process of religious life
can in no wise he conceived, if it have not initially and fun
damentally, something directly belonging to the subjective spirit.
Moreover, both theories admit, that the felt (sensation) may
be thought and acted, discovering itself to cognition, in order
to be reduced to knowledge and practice. There are also
many other points of agreement, which more especially apper
tain to the formative process of the rehgion of communi
ties ; but which do not require to be here discussed. But ac
cording to the doctrine of sensation, the felt is not only the first
religious sense, but also the ruling, abiding, and perfect form
of the religious spirit; so that whatever is known and acted,
and aspires to have a claim upon religiousness, must main
tain its ground and principle in sensation, to which it tends for
its development ; and the sum total of the forces constituting
religious life, simply because it is life, is based upon immediate
self-consciousness. On the other hand, the philosophy of idea,
whilst it recognises religion in general to be a process of the
spirit, but is unacquainted with any other spiritual process, as
a logical one, allows sensation to be only a preliminary form,

24 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
and indeed, in so far as it developes conceptions, the most im
perfect form of the religious spirit. Dialectic, commencing in
sensation, nay even producing and modifying it, may first,
indeed, vary and transform (by means of mutation, aggrega
tion, negation, and affirmation), the substance of religious sensa
tion, as presented to the mind of sense, into an absolute notion,
as the perfect consummation of all the forces in which the idea
of religion attains development. The former theory appears
to sacrifice science to life, and the latter, life to science. With
reference to the first it may be said, that its advocate hath
educed and elaborated more materials for religious thought
than any other of his contemporaries ; and it seems too, as if
this theory only required to be sufficiently explained and de
veloped, to vindicate its claim of superiority over that of
thought and activity. If, in reply to this, the philosophy of
idea asserts that sensation is merely the subjective, the con
tingent, or even the animal state; such an assertion is equi
valent to being unwilling to understand Schleiermacher's doc
trine. For his doctrine has shown in all cases, the possibi
lity and the necessity of religious consciousness proceeding out
of the subjective into the objective, and by this means reaching its
objective condition.; and has pointed out its purifying operation
and confirmation, in the spirit's collected life.1 Nevertheless,
his theory has not yet sufficiently accomplished this object, in
certain respects; for by merely showing that distinct pious
emotions are called forth by the ideas belonging to each, and
then advance to thoughts and impulses, still the , possibility and
necessity of self-improvement, and a self-adjustment of religious
consciousness has not yet been sufficiently and fully pointed
out.2 This first occurs when a process discovers itself in
immediate spiritual life, by means of wbich, the substance
of the original divine feeling becomes permanently objec
tive, and in this permanent state reacts, by a process of
division and purification, upon the varying and blended life of
sensation and perception. The original God-feeling, in its com
bination with sensitive consciousness, has also an original power

A. RELIGION. — § 10. ORIGINAL FORM. 25
to make itself objective, speculatively and transcendentally in
the idea or as idea; and just as the image of this God-feel
ing corresponds to, or is excited by, variable sensation, in
like manner its idea is affected towards permanent sensation.
Sensation has reason, and is reason. The sensible and felt
God-consciousness generates out of itself fundamental cogni
tions, in which it realises itself as true and certain, and by the
power of which it is enabled to rule and to quahfy, independently
of all scientific mediation, the whole realm of images ; just as
distinct Christian consciousness entertains in itself a distinct
Christian idea, namely the Divine word, to which, and with
which, it is directed and regulated. The vivacity of this pro--
cess depends partly upon experience, and partly on the will; and
this leads us to the practical side of religious consciousness,
where a similar relation appears. For not only do isolated
moral impulses, mingled with sensitive ones, proceed from reli
gious sensation; but there is also a conscience by which the
whole realm of impulses is conditionated. Thus, the original
feeling of rehgion is the unity of reason and conscience; and
the living energy of the one function influences the vivacity of
the other. It is solely within the confines of these movements
that all the essential changes and perfections of religious life
take place. From hence, indeed, religious science receives
matter and motive j but then it must also react upon its source
in conjunction with that experience and communion in which
religious culture is concerned ; if what they effect and perform
shall complete the character of a religious state. Within these
limitations, according to which there is everywhere in the origi
nal action of the religious spirit a causal reaction ; or according
to which, in part, the difference of stable and unstable reli
gion, and in part the opposite of passive and active religion, is
acknowledged, — the doctrine of sensation can maintain the posi
tion it has assumed in Theology. On the other hand, the logi
cal doctrine has not yet shown that it esteems faith and piety,
or the essence even of religion itself, for anything more than a
mere channel of spiritual and Divine development; and thus re-

26 INTRODUCTION.— II. OBJECT.
ligion vanishes at the very moment when it ought to have
reached its chmax. The idea of religion in its original form
ought to be commensurate with the idea of hfe. All the func
tions of life proceed from sentient being, and return into it again.
Thought constitutes a distinct part of the Gommon spirit-life, and
action not less so. By themselves, neither can attain being and
blessedness; and, on the other hand, they are only competent
to maintain themselves in this being, by means of a sentient
spirit, a believing and experiencing immanence. A valid theory
of religion must at any rate recognise, that faith does, arid how
it does, lead to blessedness — a faith, the possession of which, apart
from love, constitutes no blissful knowledge of God; and we
must not be left in doubt as to whether a lauding Seraph occu
pies a higher or a lower stand than a speculative devil.
1 See Elwert on the Essence of Religion, above referred to,
p. 61-73, where Hegel's arguments against Schleiermacher are
examined and refuted.
2 See my review of Twesten's Lectures on Dogmatic Theolo
gy, in Theol. Stud, und Krit., 1828, 1st part, p. 205-8, and Christ.
Frid. Schmid. : quatenus ex eccl. evangelicse principiis existere
possit doctrinse Christianse scientia. Tubingen, 1831, p. 42,
sqq. We were desirous of being persuaded, with Elwert (p. 92),
that the theory we advocate concerning the Doctrine of Sensa
tion had been hitherto peculiar to it. We have our doubts, how
ever, on this point, because this doctrine, in the field of dogma
tism, has neglected the idea of the Divine Word.

§11. ELEMENT.
That which constitutes the specific matter of religious feeling,
expressed in the simplest terms, is either consciousness of God,
or the relation of mdividual-self and life to God, — or depend
ence upon God, — or absolute dependence. None of these state
ments require to be directly defended; still each of them
needs farther development. For inasmuch as there ought

.4. RELIGION. — § 11. ELEMENT. 27
always to be added to the real idea of God-consciousness those
determinations which that consciousness obtains through its con
nection with consciousness of self and the world; so, in like man
ner, is it requisite that the idea of absolute dependence be not
considered for itself alone, but as combined with the personality
of man, or in conjunction with his independence of the world ;
or, in other words, that although God may have been substituted
for the dependent instead of the absolute, at the same time the
Divine Being may be recognised in his distinction from the
world. This idea of the nature of religious feeling, since
Schleiermacher adduced it, has often been assailed in a very
erroneous manner j1 but it has not only been fully vindicated in
its genetic connection, hut may be considered, because derived
from the inmost centre of the matter, the most satisfactory view
of the subject.2
1 See, for example, Hase de Fide, p. 27. " Sed vicissim agere,
qui absolute patitur quomodo potest?" F. Delbriick's Examina
tion of some of the Leading Subjects in Dr Fr. Schleiermacher's
Christian Doctrine of Faith, 1827, Section 2. For an attempt to
remove these misapprehensions, see Study and Critic of Theology,
&c, 1828, 3d part, p. 662, et seq., and with these compare my
Review of Rosenkranz's Kritik der Scl. Glaubensl., in the
same work, for 1837, p. 444. There is not any relation of created
personal being to God which includes a complete antagonism
to God. Religion is, in free consciousness, nothing else than
consciousness, free through God and in God, that is to say,
being dependent upon Him. By means of the feeling of not
being constrained by God, and, perhaps, of being able to con
tend against Him, or actually to contend against Him, must, (the
more it continues and becomes intensively perfect in itself,) a yet
stronger feeling of dependence be generated, whether it be in the
form of gratitude or repentance.
2 The author, in his 2d edition, i. § 4, has again most care
fully illustrated the subject with reference to prevailing errors.
See also Elwert, in the work referred to above, p. 75-78, where
in part, the objection to the doctrine of Identity of Religion as
absolute freedom, and, in part, the replies of a more or less
Pelagian character, are refuted.

28 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.

§ 12. CONCLUSION.
That self- consciousness only is more than world-conscious
ness, which, (in so far as it exhibits itself as perception,) in part
opposes the infinite and the finite, (God and the world); in part
conditionates the worldly through Divinity; and in so far as it ex
hibits itself in action, conducts to the opposite of right and wrong.1
All thought and will (whilst they retain their own real charac
ter,) are based upon the assumptions of an unconditional cause
and object; upon an gg ov and sis ov ru ndvru; consequently
they are founded upon religiousness in direct self-consciousness.
Out of the necessary fundamental thoughts of the human mind,
of the eternal, of the good, and the free, (which are all equal
in dignity,) the entire subject-matter is developed in all its rela
tions and bearings, by a kind of presumed consciousness of God,
self, and the world,; and where this is not the case, still each
religious subject-matter must be judged in accordance with
these assumptions. Together with the consciousness of God,
the idea of God is supposed, and consequently the idea of
rehgion in man ; and in accordance with this principle, absolute
rehgion and reverence for God is also inferred. But it does not
by any means follow from this, that the re-action -process of
truth and righteousness, (which is never entirely absent even in
a mind unswayed by religious feelings,) should everywhere pene
trate as such, into the conscience^ or that the Idea of religion
should be developed up to an Ideal; or, however scientifically'
and artistically constructed, be practically and vitally realized.
1 Henke, Lineamenta Institt. Fidei Chr. 1793, § 1. Suppo-
nitur itaque omnes, quibus unquam aliqua religio tribui potuit,
cognovisse a. incertas, inconstantes et mutabiles esse res humanas
b. earum conditionem pendere a nutu aliquo superiori s. a vo-
luntate et cura potentioris cujusdam animse ; c. neque perinde
esse, quid sentias, agas, speres, d. sed propter hanc eandem
potestatem rectricem, cui subes, alia esse observanda alia fugi-

A. RELIGION. — § 13. RELATIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. 29
enda. — And more precisely still by Twesten, p. 3, where the
following remarks especially deserve our attention : "Wherever
that antagonism, God and the Word, is held up, whether it be
through a renunciation of the one or an identification of both
terms, then the applicability of the religious idea ceases; for
Pantheism is only so far compatible with religion, as it also
admits that an opposition exists between God and the world."
And again: "the essence of religion, therefore, materially re
garded, consists in the recognition of a higher Being, dis
tinguishable from the world, and of the dependence of the world
on the same. Thus, that which might otherwise be regarded
as religion, is reduced back to its proper form. Thus, for ex
ample, belief in freedom and immortality partakes only so far
of a religious nature as it refers to that distinction, and to the
relation between God and the world; namely, as it expresses
the acknowledgment of a true reality of finite existence, and
of a timeless relation to the Eternal. Were this relation not
recognised, the view of the soul's immortality would no more
concern rehgion, than does, for example, the admission that
matter throughout all its mutable accidents remains identical.

§ 13. RELATIONS AND DISTINCTIONS.
In order to comprehend how there can exist, notwithstand
ing the source and primal element of rehgion being thus
constituted, a multiformity and diversity of rehgion, among
mankind, the distinction between subjective and objective
rehgion must be taken into account, and thus the contrasted
and reciprocal action of the constant and inconstant in religious
life becomes apparent. Each religious feeling is to be ap
proved or disapproved, according to its conformity to those ne
cessary and fundamental perceptions and determinations of the
human spirit; and indeed, so far, the distinction between true
and false rehgion is to be firmly maintained; on the one hand,
against certain doctrines of intuition ; and on the other, against
certain doctrines of the possible occurrence of an exclusive pro
cess of development of the collective religion of mankind.

30 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
But if we wish (which is, at all events desirable) to form a
general judgment concerning the origin of all that is defective
in religion; in that case, the distinction between passive and
active piety, must not, as has too commonly been the case,
be disregarded.
Remark 1. The difference between intellectual and actual
religion, (intellectualis et actuaUs) has hitherto been universally
admitted. Both originate from the same source, and recipro
cally influence each other. Notwithstanding this, however, the
consideration of action, and the consciousness of being and of
cause, preceding the striving after an object, must be considered.
See Clemens of Alex. Stromatum, iv. p. m. 275. Ti p.aSn?\i rw
vga^ai irgigftbriQiv Igrit' tpuisi y&g b •rga.gguv rouro, 6 vga^ai flouXirai,
ttav'ham ffgonpv. — 'A.gX^ xa' hrifiiovgyog wagrjg Xoyixyjg <ffg&^iug q yvojgig siri
&v."ilgT au hxbrug roiiirri (iSvy ^agaxrrigi^iTai % rrjg Xoyixijg Idiorrig -^vyVig.
Remark 2. The relation of subjective and objective religion
to the opposite of mind and idea, or to the opposite of the in
ternal and external, or of the individual and common, is erro
neous. However, there is some good foundation for this usual
distinction. For in the first place, a certain totality of re
ligious conceptions and modes of contemplation is formed in
every religious person, which in part, is itself, conditionated by
the progressive life, and in part as it operates, opposes the
latter. Here we have primarily an objectivity and subjectivity
in religion. In the second place, that totality of conceptions
and maxims resulting from life, becomes subjective as soon as we
oppose it to absolute and constant religion, or to the fundamental
thoughts and relations which are identical in all subjects. In
this case, the utmost extent of the distinction between the pecu
liar and the general becomes apparent. For a more exact account
of this classification we refer to the work of Baumgarten-Crusius
quoted above, p. 5.
Remark 3. Undoubtedly the antithesis, truth and falsehood,
admits of being applied to religion, provided the original sensa
tion from whence religion proceeds, on the one hand fosters repre
sentations, and on the other, induces a knowledge of its import,
and that not accidentally, but in accordance with a necessary
mode. Indeed,, we do not groundlessly imagine that religion
in its subjective manifestation, is never absolutely false, and

A. RELIGION. — § 14. DEFECTS. 31
never positively true. Even the impure or bloody worship of
Mylitta or Moloch involves elements of truth; nevertheless,
universal heathenism is false in principle, because the relation
which holds as regards the perversion or denial of the ground
work of religious ideas, is quite distinct from its erroneous
rights and applications of them.
Remark 4. The original constitution of humanity is such
that it seeks after God, who allows himself to be found, ZynTv r.
S. igjp^ W~H -Acts of the Apostles, xvii. 27, i. e. man does not
shun God; but ever strives after a more perfect communion with
Him; and this amounts to religio activa (not actualis praetica).
Book of Wisdom, i. 1, 2. pgovijo'ars irtg) xvgiov h <fcyaSoV»j»7 — £j)«jtfars
avrov. on evgigxirai roTg pri irsiga.<£ovgiv ovrbv, xai if/itpuvifyrai roig p,% &mg-
rougiv avrSj. Compare vi. 11, 12. y&Am rods iirftu/Aovvrotg, 15, 16.
Such is the kind of subjectivity which divine revelation always
employs, either in a wider or more confined sense, as its indivi
dual means. Passive or pathetic subjectivity, (passiva pathe-
tica,) which can only be pursued and constrained by conscience
and truth, is alone the cause of unbelief or of superstition. See
Tiber den Religionsbegriff der alien, Studien und Kritiken, &c. ;
Bd. I. Heft. iv. p. 729-32; and Theol. Beantwortung der Philos.
Dogma, von Dr Strauss, Theol. St. und Kritih, 1842, p. 627.

§ 14. DEFECTS.
To this extent sensuous self-consciousness naturally and in
voluntarily continues to develope itself; but not so religious
consciousness ; the development of the latter depends upon the
free elevation of man, which elevation appears to him degrada
tion; so that he prefers a mere semblance of freedom.1 This
reserve and alienation of self, however surmountable it may be
on the one hand, and impracticable on the other, has, never
theless, one consequence ; for it follows inevitably, that man's
inert persistence in sensuous self-consciousness may lead to
a life-development, which either becomes increasing unbe
lief,2 (i. e. a denial of the mind's fundamental perceptions of

32 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
God and the world,) or superstition,3 (i. e. an unlawful separa
tion and intermixture of these perceptions with the facts of
sensuous consciousness.)
1 By this we do not mean to affirm the necessity of our fall
from God, grounded on the absolute constitution of man's nature.
The subject under discussion, so far as the philosophy of religion
is concerned, turns on the occasioning cause and the possibility
of this fall. The consciousness of God abiding in the human spirit,
considered as a mere disposition or power, requires, in order to
attain development and activity, motives and experience,, without
which there is in general no development of the finite spirit. By
means of impressions and experience, however, self-conscious
ness is unceasingly excited at once or primarily in its sen
sitive faculty; and self-consciousness may continue passive or
active, as relates to this Divine feeling incited simultaneously
along with it. In proportion as a feeling of dependence on God,
in a free and conscious manner, is blissful, in the same proportion
is a feeling of a purely necessary and servile dependence unbliss-
ful. Still, a delusion here is possible, and does actually occur;
and the delusion consists in this, namely, the Ego conceives itself
to be more egoistic, more free,, and more blessed, when it excludes
to the utmost extent the feeling of dependence, persists in its
sentient affection, and represses those conceptions and impulses
which only arise out of Divine consciousness. If this occurs,
man is not indeed entirely estranged from religion, but he simply
allows its access, and this may be denominated passive piety.
Man is of necessity religious, for it is. admitted that it exceeds
his power to be devoid of conscience. But against this must, even
the egoistic spirit revolts (Ka'iv b vavra dmtpiguii £<p' tuvrbv, by j-Qp
Philo. qu. deterior potiori insid. §. 10,) and that in two ways:.
First, it makes an effort from whence proceeds unbelief, and then
another effort, out of which arises superstition. In the evil acti
vity of passive piety, man chiefly endeavours to nullify entirely
or partially the facts of. religious consciousness, (Psalm xiv. 1.
Book of Wisdom, ii. 2. . on aiirogx^liag iyem^nf^iv, x. x.) by which
means the phenomena and the reflections arising therefrom come
to his aid, in the manner described by Philo (already referred to),
and in the Book of Wisdom. But in case consciousness of God,
obtrude itself, man rushes from unbelief into superstition, i. e. he

A. RELIGION. — § 15. FORMAL DEFECTS. 33
determinates the Divine to be something human, sentient, and
mundane, and decomposes the Divine feeling into the sensuous,
from whence fanatical representations, sometimes servile, some
times audacious, arise, and in accordance with which his inclina
tions are moulded. See Romans i. 21-25. From this perverted
process is derived Heathenism, which, indeed, is religion, but of
such a kind, that its Element consists in passive religion, and its
Principle in active ayvugia &soD. (See Book of Wisdom, xiii: 1.
apcfola. Plutarch de Superstitione.) For a similar construction
of Heathenism, see Book of Wisdom, xiv. 11-31.
» A term not confined to Holy Scripture; awigrta, occurs in
Plutarch, de Superstitione, 2.
3 According to the strict meaning of the word, Superstitio
implies a superabundance of religion — a supplemental religion
(supersistere). For the primary question that interested anti
quity concerned the established religion, about which the sacer
dotal authorities gave information. Those who added to the mos
approbatus various domestic, foreign, and novel forms of worship
and expiations, were the superstitiosi, as distinguished from the
religiosi, qui faciendarum praetermittendarumque rerum divina-
rum secundum morem civitatis dilectum habent nee se super-
stitionibus implicant : according to Festus. The direct reference
to superstites in Cicero, Servius, and Lactantius, is erroneous.
But the same idea is conveyed by the term Superstition that
Plutarch, though by a false etymology, ascribes to SgJio-as/a,
hgovgyia xardxogog xal mgfcgyts. The Greeks expressed the same
thing by shXo^grigxiia. But the ancients overlooked the fact,
that an excess of superstition is not merely in truth and intrin
sically a deficiency, but even that it may originally spring from
unbelief. Compare Plutarch, de Superstitione i. in. with Romans
i. 21, 23, 25. § 15. FORMAL DEFECTS.
Now some mixture of unbelief or superstition, of false admis
sions or misconceptions, universally arises wherever the defec
tive in religious life becomes apparent, either under a formal or
material relation. The formal defects, indeed, primarily con
sist in the disturbed relation of those functions in whose harmo
nious totality religion ought to pervade life. A partial exagge-
D

34 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
ration of one function produces restrictions and renunciations of
another, whereby either too much frigidity of unbelief, or too
much fervour of superstition, as Plutarch has pointed out, be
come master of the whole. The restriction of religious life to
feeling, or mysticism,1 is in a certain degree the more innocent
and less dangerous defect; whilst, on the contrary, fanaticism,2
or the restriction of religious feeling to fancy and empiricism,
merits the appellation of the worst. Moreover, a partial indul
gence in religious speculation and reflection, — Gnosticism ; and,
on the other hand, an exclusive bias for action, practice, exhi
bition — Nominalism, Pharisaism, and for creeds — Orthodoxy,3
will ever tend to attract towards themselves some fundamental
defect or other.
1 In our day, it is partly ignorance, and partly an actual recoil
from the profundities of knowledge and life, which trifle in a
blameable and senseless manner with the terms Mysticism and
Mystic. On the one hand, this latter word is used synonymously
with "Visionary" and "Fanatic;" although, in truth, it is as
utterly remote from these, and about as dissimilar, as Jan
senism and Loyolism; on the other hand, the term has been
erected as a boundary-mark for the realms of the common
place understanding against every doctrine cognisant of an objec
tive truth, of an immanent thought, or of the immediateness of
Divine operations and communications ; so that not only Herder,
Hamann, and Claudius, but even Lessing, nay, Kant and Fichte,
almost all come under the category of Arch-Mystics. See, in
Theol. Stud. 1828, my account of Twesten's Lectures, p. 199.
Generally, the error under consideration is expressed by the
phrase : To run wild in gloomy feelings (or even to revel in them);
in which this much at least is admitted, that the question, cer
tainly, turns upon feeling, contemplation, and, in general, upon
the mode of cognising what intuition is, whenever the discussion
turns upon the mystical, or mysticism, and upon internal experi
ence. The term is derived from the Greek worship, the most
important part of which consisted in solemn self-communications
of Deity. The Supreme Being had not only bestowed upon a
country and a people, at once and originally, some essential consti
tuents of civilisation, such as law and usage, agriculture and the

A. RELIGION.  § 15. FORMAL DEFECTS. 35
cultivation of the vine, and the active faculties associated with
these, and in the enjoyment of which, fellowship even with Deity
was partaken; but, more than this, He had also instituted perma
nent rules, and bequeathed them to man, from the very foundation
of Theophany; (see Hymn. Hom. in Cererem, 474,) by means of
which particular races, as represented by virtuous individuals,
might partake in the blessing of a full consecration to a higher
life. The consummations pertaining to this, in so far as they were
completions of the human state, and the goal of human efforts,
were called ri\r\, tsXstuI; in so far as they were, in the highest
sense, representative and executive actions, they were denomi
nated %y/a; and finally, when they were concealed and included,
and demanded a denial of common experience, meditation, speech,
and act, they were designated pvsrrigia,. mOw, to wink, /tviu, to
place a person in that condition, i. e., to bring him from a
state of non-sight to sight, or the reverse — to a state of secret
experience. Muotjjs, in this point of view, is one who is experi
enced, one who is initiated. Thus, the matters, actions, and the
conditions appertaining to them, were styled Mysteries. Instruc
tion in these, and a skilful manner of performing them, were, for
example, termed (ivgrixri ig/ttiAia. The mystical, therefore, when
taken in an objective sense, is always Divinity, in the act of
communicating itself to man by means of an external or internal
medium ; as, for instance, by a sacrament. On the other hand,
in a subjective view, it is an especial experience, perception, and
discovery of the same, subjected to peculiar conditions and pro
cesses. For although man, in the abstract, is capacitated and
designed for Divine communions, still there is, at the same
time, essentially associated with this capacity, a certain self-re
straint, ascetic self-denial, and self-renunciation, arising partly
from sensuous, partly only from mental idiosyncrasy, in order
that, while still a member of a common, earthly and temporal
state, he may become acquainted with, and participate in, that
which is uncommon. It is consequently evident, that every reli
gious and believing man, as such, is a Mystic ; for he who has no
consciousness of the Deity is unable either to discern or venerate
Him; and whoever gives God merely a passing thought, unac
companied by love and purity of heart, is incapable of livingly
apprehending Him; far less is he, who desires to see Him
sensibly, capable of discerning Him spiritually. The internal
living energy of religion is always Mystical; and the Christian

36 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
notions of illumination, of revelation, incarnation, regenera
tion, of the sacrament and of the resurrection, are essentially
mystical elements. Whenever the religious and church life re
covers from the effects of external perception and sterile scho
lasticism, and once more refreshes itself from its own pure foun
tains, and directs itself towards its true aim ; then does it ap
pear more and more mystical, giving rise to the outcry, that
Mysticism is gaining the ascendancy. Mysticism is a partial
domination and degenerated form of the Mystical tendency.
Internal perception may already be defective, by renouncing the
historical and ecclesiastical element of true religion ; as for ex
ample, whenever Christians seek after and pretend to an inter
nal light independent of God's word; or when they reject and
c6ntemn the sacrament, in order to indulge a preference for
prayer. This inwardness becomes still farther defective, when,
in the form of exclusive sensitiveness, it opposes the claims of
thought, divests itself of action, and prematurely desires a violent
gratification, partly of intuitive love, and partly of Divine rest.
Instead of intellectual contemplations, there arise empirical fan
tasies; instead of rest in God, indolence and quietism; and what is
worse than all, instead of love for God, there is evinced a wanton
and impure coquetry with natural beauty, and yet, notwithstand
ing this, there exists a pietistic and ascetic sternness towards
the purely human and rational. For a full view of the idea of
Mystic and Mysticism, see Sack's Christliche Polemik., Ham
burg, 1 838, p. 288 seq. These blemishes at least, if they do
not fully attain to the character of degenerations, occur in all
the principal manifestations of mystical religion. Their origi
nal- historical domicile is India and Egypt. When Greek science
was first occupied with religion, and chiefly (as among the Orphi-
cans) with the positive religion of Myth and Symbol, there arose
a mystical interpretation, which was reiterated in Judaism and
Christianity, and a physical Mysticism which rapidly degenerated
in the most abominable manner into Magic and Theurgy. From
the time of Socrates, it became metaphysical, and withdrew
from positive religion. The rational ground of Phenomena
the supernatural idea of Things, was the object towards which
Socrates directed his attention with ceaseless and untiring assi
duity, (Plat, conviv.) The road which conducts to an assimilation
unto Deity, as Plato describes it, lies essentially through and
in science; but this science developes itself into a loving con--

A. RELIGION. — | 15. FORMAL DEFECTS. 37
templation, and to an apprehension of the Divine object, under
invariable moral conditions. Subsequently, the Mystical asso
ciates itself, again, with popular religion. It desires to subjec-
tivate consciousness entirely, which at first is merely historical,
at least, in men duly qualified and endowed, and thus, by means
of a spiritualizing interpretation, exercise, and imitation, to
emancipate it and render it ecstatic. The spiritualizing process, as
explained by the Judaical Philo, the Greek Plotinus (Porphyry),
and the Christian Clemens of Alexandria, is nearly similar, in
as much as they were all under the influence of Platonism, and
contended against the internal experience of an historical re
ligion. Super-sensualism is only introduced by dialectic re
flection ; it is first consummated in the height of pure intelli
gence; but does not occur theoretically without, at the same
time becoming practical. Virtues themselves are only stages
of purification for the contemplation of God ; or rather, (accord
ing to Plotinus) the question turns on hwgig, — on the entrance
of the centre into the centre. See Vogt's Neoplatonismus und
Christenthum, Berlin 1836. The mystical dialect adopted by
the Neoplatonists passed over to the Christians. In propor
tion as the Christian mystics draw from that source, the more
decidedly do they manifest their errors. In Augustin, (Confess.
and de Vita Beatd), the combined elements of mystical and
speculative theology are conspicuous. Hugo von S. Victor,
Richard and Johann Gerson, direct their efforts towards a simi
lar combination; so that the renouncing love of God becomes the
attending complement of science, or the latter, in all its three
gradations (ecstasy, association, repose,) is merely a means of
elevation to the point of affectio amorosa. The Mystics of the
middle ages allmore or less mistake the dignity of faith; con
sequently, there are many who almost contemn the historical
Christ, and especially treat the Divine manhood as a general
relation, and as an idea to be realised hereafter. The relation
of extraordinary Charismata to the common gift of the Holy
Spirit, and the relation of ascetic to Christian life, appears to
them unscriptural. These remarks apply not only to M. Eckart
(see Schmidt Theol. Stud., u. Kritik. Jahrg., 1839, Heft. 3); but
also to Joh. Tauler. Fantastical and sensitive extravagances are
particularly discussed by Ruisbroeck and Suso. Compare Lieb-
ner's writings on Hugo, Richard, and Gerson; likewise the more
modern works of Helffrich and Martensen. In the history of the

38 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
reformed church, the mystical tendency of a Wiegel, whom J.
Arndt made use of, was called forth, through the authority of
external orthodoxy, and by the direct relation between the letter
and the word of God, between justification and sanctification.
In Bohme were united, with a mystical and practical tendency,
Theosophy and natural philosophy. Gichtel and Swedenborg, be
sides this, combined prophecy and a new revelation, together with
a claim to renovate the church. Mysticism and Gnosticism, on
account of their common bearing, are equally related to histori
cal religion; even a self-reflecting faith may labour to impart a
life's breath of love to ideas (Bonaventura). Both may tend in
a more or less degree towards a denial of a personal God, of a
Creator, and of an historical Redeemer; and both may reject
contemplation as well as reflection, and, together with faith, deny
both the active and passive religion of love. The historical idea
of gnosticism has been copiously illustrated by Baur; see his
Christian gnosis, or die Christl. religionsphilosophie in ihrer ges-
chichtlichen Entwickelung, Tubingen, 1835, and Theol. Stud.,
1837, 511. Kritik. Studden, uber den begriff der gnosis.
2 Fanaticus, derived from fanum (a place of divine mani
festation and revelation, where Divinity was experienced or
surrendered up through the senses to sense), was used by the
Latins generally in pejorem partem; hence the simplest and
most prevailing idea of fanaticism is, an exaggerated esteem
for the external and isolated facts of revelation. The fanatic
opposes not only understanding, but is indifferent to, or dis
claims even reason and the inmost sanctuary of man. He says in
his heart, there is no God ; He may perhaps be perceived in this
way or that, or discovered here or there ; there is no atone
ment — it may be attained through this or that ordained expia
tion. The fanatic fills up the vacancy in his understanding
with fantasy, the void of feeling with emotion. Hence it may
be asserted that fanaticism is fantastical or emotional piety
(avary tptey/icchouga., according to Plutarch), at times a frantic
affirmation, originating in an innermost negation.
3 See Lessing's Works, Th. vi. p. 105 (Duplik, v. 1778).
" The orthodoxist (not the orthodox, for he is on my side; I was
not the first to distinguish between orthodoxist and orthodox) ;
the orthodoxist simply affirms," Sack's Polem. p. 141.
Remark. As a preliminary remark— how far removed Chris
tianity is from every partial gratification of any particular

A. RELIGION. — § 16. MATERIAL DEFECTS. 39
function of religious life, may be learned from this: namely,
that all the above-named exaggerations have believed them
selves competent to take possession of Christianity. And
abstractedly it is evident that Christianity demonstrates itself
to be alone, of all religions, just as rich in mystical as in gnosti-
cal elements; to be as practical as it is theoretical, and equally
representative as it is meditative and active. Compare Theremin
Abendstunden. Berlin 1833, p. 103. On the Nature of Mysti
cal Theology, where the equal authority of historical, speculative,
and mystical theology in Christianity is shown from the nature
of the subject and from the sum-total of the requirements to
which Christianity ought to correspond.

§ 16. MATERIAL DEFECTS.
Each of these formal defects necessarily includes a tendency
to some material defect, or so far tends that way, as that each
fundamental thought of the religious Spirit, and some one in par
ticular, is denied, or becomes clouded. In Atheism of any kind,1
in Pantheism,2 and in Polytheism, this defect appertains more to
the idea of the Eternal, or the one Absolute Cause: In Fetich
worship, in Idolatry,* and in a certain kind of Dualism,6 it occurs
more in the idea of the good, and in Fatalism and Casualism, it
tends to the idea of freedom and personality.
1 In reference to Atheism, we must first remark, that in its ,
time, each of the material defects above named has been associated
with this miserable negative title. The barbarian who observed
no religious rite; the citizen who forsook the established reli
gion, (religio civilis,) was regarded by the Athenians or Romans
as a person without God, and eminently godless. Whoever,
like the heathen, confines his veneration of Deity either to the
adoration of nature, or merely recognises the general abstract
idea, rb §*&», is, in the apostle's view, an &§iog; that is to say, one
who stands in no covenant relation to that true God, who has
revealed himself to man by testimonies. A house where idols
were worshipped, was called by the Greek Jew olxov &§iiug.
See Symm. Hos. iv. 15. Whoever did not acknowledge the

40 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
Trinity, or denied the inrag^sm, -the ouova, the existere of God,
obtained also the title of Atheist; and sometimes even those
who critically or sceptically held views contrary to particular
theistical systems, were, in like manner, denominated Atheists.
The title dogmatic Atheist pertains to the physical philoso
phers of antiquity, and to the Gallican sensualists, and even
in those cases is actual Atheism, when it denies, not the exist
ence of God, but providence. As all the defects and excellen
cies of religion are accustomed to control unequally the cogniz
ing and acting subjectivity, on that very account, is Atheism
either extremely rare, or everywhere imperfect; or else, very
general. It is self-evident that Atheism is involved in all other material
defects; for the idiosyncrasy and egoism, which are fundamental
to all the obstructions of piety, are atheistical. Philo Leg. Alleg.
i. p. 72, ed. Lips. tpiXuvrog de xul u$iog b noDs oio/iimg 7gog livui Set?,
xul iroitfo SoxZv h ru itdgyiiy i^iTa^bfhivog.
2 Pantheism, had the ancients ever heard so strange a word,
would in all probability have been understood as signifying, a
veneration for all the gods alike, and not for any one in particular.
We do not deny that a necessity exists for denominating a cer
tain religious habit of thought by the word Pantheism, or an
analogous term; which habit, (hovering between atheism and
theism), when it inclines more to the former, transforms Deity
into an abstract or epitome of the world's properties ; but when
it tends more towards the latter, deduces from the world some
attribute or quality, passion and condition of Deity.
The formula of Pantheism is not that each thing is God, but
that the universe is God. Yet, strictly speaking, it is only the
doctrine of Bruno, (Delia Causa, Principio ed Uno, Ven. 1584),
and Spinoza, that harmonizes . with this formula, and also per
haps the Hylozoistic system ; and if Parmenides imagined the
All-One to be God, still with him that was a matter of course.
But other systems, denominated pantheistical, make so vast a
distinction between God and the world, and teach that the lat
ter is so greatly conditionated by God, that they, in order
to become again theism, merely leave what is defective in a
pure idea of creation; which idea has no existence out of
revelation, and in whose place are substituted doctrines of
development and manifestation. With systems like these the
above formula does not harmonize. And if modes of thought

A. RELIGION.  § 16. MATERIAL DEFECTS. 41
so varied as these are all denominated pantheistic; modes which
either do or do not strictly distinguish spirit from matter, which
separate human thought from divine, and fain would recognise the
former as conditionally free, and the latter unconditionally so, or
not; then is it evident how dangerous and confusing such an ap
pellation may become, if it do not receive a more comprehensive
definition than has hitherto been current. The more religious
Pantheism is, the more it ameliorates, in the region of error
Polytheism on the one hand, and Dualism on the other; yet in
such a manner, as not to remedy their original causes, and it
must consequently readopt their defects. That the ideas of
the Absolute, the Good, and the Free have been outraged, (at
least the two latter), by pantheism, is as certain, as that true re
ligion stands in no need of it, in order livingly to retain the rela
tion of God to things and conditions. In modern times, Jacobi
ranks as the most distinguished opponent of pantheism. In
opposition to the system of an impersonal logical God, and
against the extreme offshoots of the latest speculative schools,
Weise, Fichte junior, and Fischer, have boldly stood forward.
With reference to the accusation, that Schleiermacher has intro
duced Spinosism into Christian Dogma, see Schleiermacher's
supplement to Sack ; Nitzsch and Liicke Sendschrift an Del-
bruck, 1827. As to the question, whether Pantheism, trans
formed into Theopantism, accords with Christianity? see Gabler
de verce Philosophies erga rel. Chr. Pietate, 1836, p. 43. This
view is not supported, at least in 1 Cor. xv. 28, though the con
trary has been maintained.
3 m\i&ita, Gregor. Nyss; ho%a iro\Uhiog, Philo. Jud. The Mo-
notheists show, that the notion of Polytheism is self-contra
dictory; (See Greg, of Nysa, Catech., Introduction) — and, there
fore, even in Polytheism there is associated a species of atheism
or denial of the Infinite, the Good, and the Free, although princi
pally the disavowal extends only to the Infinite. Considered in
its historical manifestation, Polytheism consists in the veneration
of a certain totality of natural powers, to which, in conformity
with the natural philosophy prevailing at any period, the totality
of nature's realms or seasons, conjointly with that of the desti
nies and instincts of human life, corresponds. In a moral aspect,
Polytheism is related to Monotheism, just as the diversity of in
clinations, mutually conditionated, is related to the unity of the
the ruling and rational conscience.

42 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
The less there is of reason in polytheism, the more do under
standing, sensation, and fantasy, enter into it; and, in this
latter point of view, it ranks higher than many forms of Mono-
demonism, or even of abstract Monotheism. Historically, how
ever, the reaction of reason evidences itself even in Polytheism,
partly by a representation of the highest .God, the complement
of the will of the Dei-ties, by means of fate, and by the adoption
of Dii Deseque omnes as an unity for practical religious feeling;
and partly the same reaction is evidenced by an especial dedica
tion of Mens, Virtus, Pietas, Fides, Misericordia, &c. Cic. de
Legg. ii. 8. In the philosophical religious systems of the an
cients, as well as in some yet existing Asiatic religions, poly
theism is only a poetical and mythical aspect of pantheism.
* An idol, in the sense of the Theist or Monotheist, is generally
a false god, or a spurious object of reverence, eTkoiuiiSuXuv. Book
of Wisdom, xiv. 12. xwAbnyyog km'noiu, xv. 4. When, for instance,
Cyprian, or whoever it may be, speaks de idolorum vanitate, he
does not mean thereby the Images, Signa, Simulacra, but evil
beings operative through them; or else the fantastic or delu
sive deities which they represent. And thus we understand the
Apostle when he says, An Idol is nothing, 1 Cor. viii. 4. How
the admission of unreality, ilbaXov obbh lert, can be reconciled
with that of REALITY, 1 Cor. X. 20, & 3is/ ret 'i^vti, daipovtoig Sus;,
is shown in Theol. Stud. u. Krit., i. 4, p. 740. Moreover, there is
a species of idolatry arising out of the cultivation of art, and
the contemplation of nature ; another, which may be regarded as
incidental Fetich worship ; and another again, as Mythical An
thropomorphism. But no form of idolatry can be justified by the
sensuous requirements of man — Cic. de Legg., ii. 11, est qusedam
opinione species Deorum in oculis, non solum in mentibus — or
by his consciousness restrained and capable of discriminating be
tween signs and things; for that requirement arises from unbe
lief, and this 'consciousness is not only transient and untenable,
but even does not remove, where it exists, superstition, or the
spiritual complication of the idea of God in combination with
created being. The self-judgment of heathenism, in this point
of view, teaches us more livingly to feel the inestimahle worth
of the Mosaic prohibition of idols. See concerning the origi
nation and various stages of idolatry, The Book of Wisdom, xiii.
and xiv,
8 A certain kind of Dualism arises in a twofold manner

A. RELIGION. — § 16. MATERIAL DEFECTS. . 43
from amidst Polytheism; and, first, in such a mode, that
Natura, as generally worshipped, is separated into a male and
female principle (Sun and Moon, Fire and Water), whether as
Osiris and Isis, Belus and Astarte, &c, or as Liber and Ceres
&c, the whole idol system being represented in it as a con
junction (avZvyia). See my Theol. Stud., i. p. 44. And secondly,
the useful and injurious deities in their plurality or unity are
antagonistical. The general ground of the latter peculiar kind
of dualism has been sketched by Plutarch, de Iside et Osiride
45, who has alluded to it in a very interesting manner. f;
yag buhh dvamug vtsipuxe ymt&ou, uirluv he xuxov ruya^bv oiix av
ftugdaypi, he? yevigiv ihiuv xul ugxf,v, &gireg uyuSou, xul xuxou rqv adgiv
'iyitv. Now, comparatively, it is rather Eastern than Hellenic
Pantheism which exhibits such opposites, in myth, worship, and
philosophy; for the Hellenic deities all occasionally commit evil
themselves, or leave it to be effected by inferior Genii, or by
Fate. Philosophers,. from the time of Socrates, and the Stoics
absolve the gods from the charge of committing evil, and ascribe
the accusation to Homeric inventions. The Stoics, especially,
represent the gods as entirely innocent and harmless, and con
sider Providence to be pure and single. So long as Plutarch
maintains, in opposition both to those who deny a providence
and to those who dread the gods, and therefore in accordance
with the Stoics — non posse suaviter vivi sec. Epicur. 22 — all
the gods are regarded by him as /mMxioi, u\i%1xuxoi, &c; but
afterwards he again opposes the Stoical doctrine of the One
good causality of the world, and seeks for something correspond
ing to the opposites, Osiris and Typhon, Ormuzd and Arimann,
which he really conceives he discovers everywhere in Plato, Py
thagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, and even in the Greek myth ;
and thus he often confounds the pure negation of the Good, or the
mere possibility of the Bad, with its concentric and positive cau
sality. Indeed, Dualism, according to his accurate explanation,
is always attempered by something, in each of even its most
complete forms. • Either the good causality is only §tbg, and the
other haiftovwv, or there is an ultimate victory achieved by the
good, out of which, spontaneously, a higher essence of causality
accrues to it; or else a third mediating principle restores, even
during this Aeon, a good equilibrium: which principle, Plato
is said to have first clearly propounded in his old age, and
which corresponds to the Mediating Essence of Isis, Mithras

44 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
(according to his explanation ^sovVjjs), and Harmonia. Again,
the sublunary world alone (xoo>os iriglyeiog oSroj xul perk geXqvriv)
is exposed to the influences of the evil deity. According to
Plato and Plutarch, the Bad cannot be altogether subdued.
Orus (de Iside et Osiride, § 55) is himself circumscribed, and
has never yet destroyed Typhon. Dualistic worship, whether it
consist in offering propitiatory sacrifices to the evil deity or not,
is the religion of anxiety and hatred. If this form of religion
does not offer sacrifices to the aforesaid Good Deity, but, on the
contrary, as is the case amongst the heathen of Africa, and
many of the Asiatic and Polynesian Islands, offers them almost
exclusively to the God of Murder, War, and generally to all
demons who work evil, then assuredly does such form of worship
exhibit the most abandoned and most profligate aspect. But it
cannot be denied, that Dualism, particularly in the Zoroastric
system, in its moral earnestness and detestation of evil, far sur
passes in truthfulness the beautiful Greek Polytheism. Greek
ignorance of the Bad and Oriental Polymathy, constitute a con
trast of errors resembling that presented by Pelagian and Mani-
chsean Christianity. See my Treatise on the Religious Notion
of the Ancients. Stud u. Krit. i. 4, p. 746, seq.

§ 17. HISTORICAL AND POSITIVE RELIGION.
It is not to be supposed, nor does experience warrant the
conclusion, that a religious community,1 merely regarded in it
self, (whatever be its origin, and however complete its authority,)
should remedy those defects, and carry out a general and rational
plan to perfection. It is not to be supposed, that religious fel
lowship, when the internal reaction of fundamental conscious
ness upon religious perverted life has proved insufficient, should
be adequate to remove the bias of unbelief or "superstition, to
gether with its effects. For, although it may be imagined that
an individual, in his relation to the community, may be more
co-operative, and that fellowship may be more productive, or
more passive and receptive; yet will his own personal corruption
cooperate in the former case and be comprehended in the lat-

A. RELIGION. — §. 17. HISTORICAL AND POSITIVE RELIGION. 45
ter. It cannot by any means be admitted that individual reli
gion, just on its being imparted, should immediately purify and
rectify itself. We could as easily imagine, that when an oppor
tunity or necessity for action is afforded, either conjointly or re
ciprocally, all the immoral elements of the individual will should
immediately be reduced to a negation or a mystery. For even
experience, from the standing-point of heathenism, testifies to the
contrary, and how much more so from that of Christianity. His
torical rehgions, (i.e. those grounded on myth and symbol,) and
positive rehgions, (i.e. dogmatical and ritual,) renting upon exter
nal authority, more or less permanent, can scarcely be said to
have resisted superstition ; rather may it be asserted that such
rehgions, (as indeed the idea of heathenism, not derived from
them, fully declares,) each in its kind, has become the distinct
seat of superstition, and thus again the exciting cause of domi
nant unbelief.
1 With reference to the relation which individual religion bears
to the religion of the community at large, a subject hitherto but
partially investigated, we refer the reader to Schleiermacher's
Glaubenslehre, i. p. 49; 2d. edit. p. 36, and to De Wette'sBibl.
Dogm., p. 24. The expression church, there made use of, we con
fine to Christianity; although we may here venture to observe,
that Christianity, in behalf of its accordance with the universal
knowledge of religion, and by means of its generic fitness, cannot
do otherwise than extend certain ideas which it has itself gener
ated, to this extent, that they become generic in relation to con
nected religious history, for example, revelation, church, kingdom
of God, &c, and then determine other Ideas, which Christianity
only has taken up and adopted, such as religion, dogma, sacra
ment, liturgy, &c, up to this extent, that they, in their kind,
become new and specific. On Religion, see also Schleiermacher,
2d edit., p. 40. '
Remark 1. The historical and positive are not to be entirely
excluded; for external religious authority could not be maintain
ed without some sacred fact, by means of which the founder of
a religion, or a testimony is authenticated. And, again, sacred
histories, without permanent oracles, pontifical authorities, or un
accompanied with records which are capable and participant of a

46 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
continual interpretation and application, could not preserve a
religious community. Yet, on the other hand, the religion of a
community may be more historical than positive, or vice versa,
and it betrays a narrow view of religious history, if it be asserted
that the distinction alluded to is somewhat arbitrary. Moham
medanism is more positive than historical, although it endeavours
to supply its internal deficiency of an historical element, by sup
porting itself on Judaism and Christianity. The more ancient re
ligious community was ever more dependent on the immediate
operation of facts, and maintained its permanent existence
through myth and poetry ; and partly through the institutes of a
Numa and a Lycurgus, and partly by the aid of mysteries, it
supplied what it required in dogma 'and legislation ; thus the con
trast here alluded to is still farther expressed by the terms Myth
and Dogma; or by sesthetical and ethical religion.
Remark 2. A religious community does not attach itself chiefly
to the universal facts of nature which are everywhere alike (ex-
perientia communis), but to some peculiar and extraordinary
phenomenon; and from this centre, again, attains religious and
comformable views of nature as a whole and in part: and this is
the case partly,, because the limited powers and weakness of
man's nature take that course, and partly because religious
community can only arise in conjunction with other social in
stitutes; and this ever by means of miracle only; that is,
through the introduction of an entirely new relation of man to
nature, differing from that in which he is placed by civilization.
If, then, piety, and a religious contemplation of nature, together
with a pre-eminent regard for certain isolated experiences, are
supposed to precede the formation of a community, then he
who leads and regulates, or follows and yields to such precursors,
and participates in the founding of a commonwealth, cannot do
so without the aid of Deity, and is enabled to effect this object
only by means of some Divine act : a Ceres must appear, and sow
the fields with corn. No Commonwealth or History exists with
out a Theophany; with it a distinct sacred history of a people, a
country, and of the world is acquired. Myth is the oral narra
tion, and then the tradition of whatever has to be told, trans
mitted, and repeated, that is of paramount importance; it is the
language, the remembrance of the manifestations and favours
of the gods. In each peculiar myth, or in such as is funda
mental to some common veneration and constitution, there is

A. RELIGION. — § 17. HISTORICAL AND POSITIVE RELIGION. 47
another theological, or rather theogonic and cosmogonic myth
included, constituting a primeval history, not of a state, but
of the earth and of nature. We cannot discuss the subject of
either philosophical or poetical myth in this connexion.
Myth is religious primeval history : but it differs from pure
history, not merely in its origin, being prior to all fixed chro
nology and records; but in an especial manner because it does
not interrogate and inquire, Qgrogm), but asserts and testifies,
or principally speaks, to produce faith, and not to impart know
ledge ; and it is also distinguished from history by speak
ing, in part, of things which do not admit of the testimony of
eye-witnesses, and in part by delivering the facts, and their
credible apprehension unanalyzed, and the actual and true undi
vided. In this definition, nothing is involved which interferes
with the discovery of myths in the Holy Scriptures, which are
the records of true religion. The rather it may be maintained
that, in certain respects, the Holy Scriptures alone contain
Myths, and heathenism none. But from a different point of
view, on the other hand, it may be asserted, that Myth is not
contained in the Canonical Scriptures, namely, from that point
whence the homogeneity of heathen primitive history, originating
out of fantastic subjectivity, presents itself under the name of
myth, mythology, in contradistinction to theology. But if myth
be considered in the purity with which it excludes intentional or
unintentional fiction, or rather as it includes everything founded
on fact, and on the other hand, represents what is new and
strange in matters of fact, as they are reflected, variously modi
fied, through the child-like subjectivity of the first witnesses,
then is the idea of Myth also applicable to the narrative of the
New Testament. The primitive history of Christianity is a new
primitive history of humanity, involved in a narrative already
historically unfolded. Christ is an impersonated miracle, a
second Adam, and, in his kind, just as much a commencement
as was the first Adam. The actions of Jesus, whom Pilate cruci
fied, as they are avowed in universal history, infallibly demon
strate that such a person existed ; consequently the trace of the
marvellous in his deeds and destinies does not by any means
confirm the prepossession that they were unreal. The actual
and indisputable character of Christianity, as originally experi
enced in man's consciousness, presupposes a kind of origin, in
accordance with which its origination and foundation, could

48 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
not by possibility be an invention. The reality of miracle, or
the miracle of reality, necessarily imparts to history a typical
and poetical, and, to a certain extent, a mythical character. If
the theological criticism of evangelical history discovers elements
of narration which are not founded on testimony, or which per
haps have only a , general on for their basis, and acquire
the vug through an a posteriori inference from attested fact
to the unknown; and thus include more truth of faith than
reality of incident ; or if theological criticism meets with con
tradictions which are inexplicable by reason of the dissimilar
reflex of the event upon the subjectivity of the eye-witness, or
through the different degree of immediateness of the original
witnesses yet left; then is this criticism, according to the condi
tion of things, upon the whole, only necessitated to separate, in
the first place, particular kinds of narration in the New Testa
ment, as for example, previous and public history; or it is required
to adopt a symbolism, not of the idea, but of the fact, a symbol
ism which assumes for its firm basis — the historical verity of Christ
as the Son of God; or it is necessitated to suspend its judgment,
or to separate the apocryphal from the canonical. Upon the
subject of Myth in its highest form, as contained in Sacred His
tory, see Lange, uber d. geschichtlichen Charakter d. Kanonis-
chen Evangelien, &c. Duisb. 1836, p. 29, 41. In reference to
Myth being irreconcileable with living, historical Monotheism,
see Dr Sack's Bemerkungen uber den Standpunkt der Schrift, and
Das Leben Jesu krit. bearb., by Strauss. Bonn 1836, p. 36. Con
cerning the idea of Myth in general, and the incompatibility of
an undesignedly invented tradition with the nature and position
of the primitive .apostolical communion, see Jah. Muller Theol-
Studenkrit, 1836, 3 H. p. 839 — 84. Finally, on the various
kinds of sacred historical narrative, see Schmieder's small but
excellent treatise, Praliminarien zu einer grimdlichen Recht-
fertigung der Biblischen Geschichte. Naumburg, 1837. — In the
presence of history the substance of Myth is represented and pre
served by symbol (conjectura), i. e. by means of that natural or
artificial, real or striking object, which obtains a prominent re
cognition in and beyond itself. Indeed, in one sense, every visible
object, whetherproduced by nature or art, has a symbolical aspect.
For no sooner does an object become apparent, than it imme
diately indicates its evil or good principle, its proximate or higher
aim. . Every thing indicates a something peculiar -to itself that .

A. RELIGION. — § 17. HISTORICAL AND POSITIVE RELIGION. 49
can only be spiritually contemplated. In a more limited sense, the
symbol does not primarily originate the idea; but the idea selects
and creates the symbol; or memory extending overall co-existence,
and contemplation extending over all that is visible, represent and
illustrate themselves in a character calculated to effect their re
conciliation with the present and the sensible; for this purpose the
symbohcal instinct, as well as the intellectual mystagog, grasps
unreservedly at whatever is either the simplest, most vital, and
most fruitful immediately discoverable in nature, or freely com
pounds from them objects not formed by nature, or represents her
as renovated, and under a new aspect, as for example under that
of a Greek idol. But heathenism errs in this, that, in the first
place, it continues unconscious of the distinction between Symbols
and Ideas, as well as of their various properties and qualities;
whereby it converts symbol and myth into magic and divination;
and in the second place, it does not reserve the very highest —
the formless, and the free, for spiritual contemplation. True, pure
symbol, therefore, just as genuine myth, is only to be found in the
region and service of revelation. On the subject of Symbol and
Myth in general, see Creuzer's Symbolik und Mythol. der Alten
Vo'lker I., 1st book, Synopsis, p. 146; and Baur's Symb. u. My
thol. oder die Naturreligion des Alterthums, Part iii. Stuttg. 1825.
i. Remark 3. The idea of positive religion primarily passing
from political economy and jurisprudence into theology, is but
slightly exalted and illustrated, by being exchanged for an arbi
trary constitution, (arbitrium Dei in constituenda religione).
It is with the will in the region of truth and righteousness, as
with contingency : we are compelled in the first place to retract
these ideas again as often as they have been made use of. Ab
soluteness is in no case competent to contend with the necessary
and the free; and the authority of revelation, of the state, and
of law, has ever been most undermined by those, who, like Hobbs
and Thrasymachos, (above mentioned), have endeavoured to sup
port that view. Fischer, therefore, in his Introduction to Dogma,
p. 26, ought not, even preliminarily, to have rejected the grounds
and counter-grounds of rationalism and supra-naturalism, as he
does in the following remarks: "For it becomes us not to desire
to judge what may be suitable or unsuitable for God, or what is
expedient or inexpedient for his divine intentions towards hu
manity;" for we might with just as great propriety assert, that it
does not become us to judge whether anything be possible for God ;

50 INTRODUCTION.— II. OBJECT.
whereby the discussion concerning even physical grounds might
be set aside. It is equally incorrect, in Nigidius b. Gell. N. A.
x. 4, to solve the question of philosophers, <phgei rd foofkuru r\ %'egu,
by another, cur verba possint videri naturalia magis quam arbit-
raria. For the opposite of the positive and natural is less abso
lute than that of the natural and arbitrary. Now, those who
find the positive in whatever may be universally appended to the
natural, appear to acknowledge this. See Baumgarten-Crusius,
already quoted, p. 79. But the question may be asked, How and
wherefore is the addition? If, for example, the particular creed
vi inertia, according to Kant's doctrine of religion, be added to
a pure religious faith, then those who place great stress upon the
difference between the positive and natural may find themselves
dissatisfied. The Opera Supererogationis and productive dogmas
would in that case constitute, for the most part, the positive.
But Schleiermacher claims (Glaubensl. § 19, p. 93) the super
added, but then in another way. If there be, says he, a some
thing added, then the natural must be the same in all; but
on the contrary, as the natural is in every one different, and
consequently the general and abstract is so likewise; so the posi
tive, even, can only be that peculiar determinateness with which
religion exists in each; and, in reference to religious commu
nion — is the original and direct something which is given. In
reply to this, we would ask, Is not the natural, also, imme
diately bestowed ; and does it not, perchance, commence for the
first time to exist and co-operate with comparative critic and
history? Has not the natural, in a peculiar and characteristic
manner, accordingly as the common dogmas have moulded them
selves in each person, an active share? We would defend this
principle, therefore, against Schleiermacher, as Marheineke and
Wegscheider, each in a manner peculiar to himself, assign to the
religion of reason (which is alike in all) the name of positive;
wherein the latter only errs by constructing the positive of the
rational system out of rational truths and the demands of Scrip
ture; since the Scriptures, considered in the light of a Divine
position, cannot possibly furnish any other than that of reason.
Marheineke handles tbfc.subjeet in a different manner. And
beyond a doubt, the natural and positive constitute two prin
ciples, and in some measure two authorities of. religious life,
which are intimately related without absolutely negativing each
other. The character of the natural is intrinsic, that of the po-

A. RELIGION. — § 17. HISTORICAL AND POSITIVE RELIGION. 51
sitive extrinsic; or, to prevent being misunderstood, we seek the
authority of that which is immediately beyond us for the positive,
and for the natural, that which is immediately within us. The
¦desire we feel within us to exalt the subjective to the objective,
is, in accordance with man's destiny for social fellowship, closely
interwoven with a desire to experience the specific in the uni
versal. This holds also in regard to the necessity of interrogat
ing experience and history relative to matters of fact, which
either eonfirmatively correspond to those of consciousness, or
anticipate the developed consciousness by exciting and typi
fying. By means of the argumentum a consensu gentium; by
the universal proposition concerning the indispensableness of ex
perience for the development of self-consciousness, and by means
of the doctrines of the development of reason anticipated by
revelation, and such-like arguments, this relation of the positive
to the natural may be elucidated. Still this view of the sub
ject is not exhaustive. In a strict sense, the positive con
tinually offers novelty and variety, such as at any time was to be
developed from mere reason, and yet only such as, without preju
dice to freedom and spontaneity, is received and adopted, because
it either corresponds to natural inquiries and expectations, or,
in its connection with facts and the testimonies of God, inter
nally or externally, it can trust itself to faith, even before its
assimilation and union with conviction. Thus, then, the positive
exists in religion, in conjunction with what is common, with
what is founded on fact, and with what, in this relation, is
attested by God. — A positive religion claims an especial authority
for Dogmas and Ritus. Dogma is a declaration of the mind
or will, which either exacts obedience and observance, or,
above all, demands, without farther ceremony, assent and'con-
fession. It is only in the former sense that it occurs in the
Septuagint, Daniel ii. 13, vi. 9; Esth. iii. 9; 2 Mace. x. 8;
Luke ii. 1 ; Acts of the Apostles xvi. 4, (where it is used in refe
rence to the Apostolical canon intended for the Gentile Chris
tians,) Acts xvii. 7; Ephes. ii. 15 ; Col. ii. 14. In the latter texts,
Chrysostom and Theodoret have erroneously adopted the other
meaning. But even these Fathers of the church, and before
them Ignatius, Clemens, Origen, and Eusebius of Csesarea,
speak of Christian doctrine (hihugxa\lu dvogrohixfi) as of dogma,
dogmas of the Lord, dogmas of the church; but not in such
a sense as that derived truth, or a scientific idea, or church

52 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
form, or even a subjective apprehension, should be under
stood thereby. But dogmas, in so far as these Fathers found
them in Christianity, and held them in esteem, were consid
ered by them as the fundamental truths of the gospel, which
must first be received, and without their acceptance there
could be no Christian orthodoxy. This phraseology the Fa
thers adopted from the Stoics. Marc. Aurel. hg euvn, 2, 3,
from a Treatise on the Harmony of the World, Tuutu goi dgxeiru,
del hbypuru eg™. Of these dogmas, he says, (4, 3,) they must
be briefly conceived and expressed in order that they may be
readily applied to the conduct of life. They are denominated
by him (3, 6,) the dogmas of vovg, eternal truths founded on
reason. Seneca, Ep. 94, 95, terms them the roots of moral
knowledge and doctrine, the elements of which the body of wis
dom consists, the heart of life, &c. Compare also a phraseology
detected by Baur, (Tub. Zeitschrift, 1832, 4, p. 194,) according
to which hoyfiuru were, in the Pythagorean system, tantamount to
principles, groiyelu. It was just this idea of the first principle and
essential nature of truth, requiring, as it does, faith rather than
dirbfcifyg, which the Fathers expressed by dogma. Even the dis
tinctive contrast between hoypu and xngvy^u, laid down by Basil
(de Spir. S.) as well as that of esoteric and exoteric Christianity,
admits of illustration from Seneca. In short, to prove the oppo
site signification of the word, Marcellus of Ancyra has been ap
pealed to, who, in Eusebius, c. Marc. Ancyr. i. c. 4, blames
Asterius for grounding the doctrine of the Son rather upon the
dogmas of his predecessors, than upon the §e?og Xbyog. And it
is universally admitted, that even this incorrect signification
of the word dogma must necessarily have occurred both among
Greeks and Christians. All scholastic disputation falls back
upon, and proceeds from, recognised fundamental positions.
Even the sceptics, whilst they stopped short of affirmation and
demonstration, or subverted what previously may have been
maintained, still cherished negative canons. Now, as in every
association of doctrine, there appears a manifest inclination,
upon false or unseasonable authority, to accept and to establish
a something; so there arises not simply a highly manifold conflict
between the established principles of the schools, but also a con
test concerning the determinableness of truth itself, and even
hatred and suspicion are excited against the tenets of schools
and churches. Thus, the terms A6y/*u, hoytturileiv, &c, acquire

A. RELIGION.  § 17. HISTORICAL AND POSITIVE RELIGION. 53
their secondary signification, and come capriciously to denote the
human, the non-existent, the arbitrary, the temporal, and the
mutable. The sceptic charges the dogmatist with giving him
ditbyugig, when he asks for dmhsi^ig; and, in -like manner, the
practical man says to the theoretical, I ask for uv6heii*ig vv'ivpurog,
and you give me dvoheifyg eXXrivixri. The Biblical theologian ad
dresses the confessor of the church-creed and requires %e?og Xoyog,
who gives in return hoy/iuru leureguv. Upon the whole, the ancient
church was not aware that doctrines, in their development and
differences, as entertained by bishops, were related to the SeTog
Xoyog, in the same manner as the Greek hiatpwvlu of the schools
was to absolute rational truth ; but ecclesiastical teachers com
pare the scholastic controversies of the Greeks with the contra
dictions of heretics amongst each other; and only such an iso
lated phenomenon, as Gobarus the Monophysite, refers to the
contradictions of even the so-called orthodox. It was equally
unacquainted with the contrast between the direct believing ap
prehension and the scientific formula; for the contrast of vigng and
yvugig, or xqgvypu and hoypu had still another signification than
this. Thus, if the subject discussed related to dogmatibus eccle-
siasticis, and was paraphrased after the manner of Gennadius of
Marseilles, or Isidor of Seville, still doctrines were not intended
thereby, such as the church originally had anything to do with,
nor even the mere forms which she had given to truth; but
only that which she had received with the Divine word, which
she might preserve and hand down, by means of her in
herent authority, as essential. Hence, Vincent of Lerins does
not entitle his work, Ccelestis Philosophice Dogmata, nor Dion.
Petavius his great one, Dogmata Theologica, because they de
sire to quote a mass of the doctrinal opinions maintained by
theologians, but because the latter wishes to describe, after an
historical method, the system of Christian tenets as they are
recognised by the Holy Scriptures, and by ecclesiastical tradi
tion. Now, so far as every catholic paraphrase of Christianity
admits ethical axioms, so the latter also are included by Genna
dius under the idea of Dogma. But as, upon the whole, Chris
tian action is derivative and determinate, and Christian faith is
primary and determining; so the ancients partly opposed, and
partly fused into one whole, after the example of the Stoics, dog
matism and ethics. See Clem. Alex. Peedag. Exord. where the

54 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
Divine Logos in its two-fold function is represented, as hihug-
xuXixbg, hrikanxbg ev ro?g hoypunxotf, and as trguxrixbg and vuihuyta-
ybg. See also Theodoret, z. 1. Ps. Tiveg ph rbi — ri%xr)v rourov e<pa-
guv rbv -^uXjubv irigiixsiv hihagxuXiav' e/iol he oi% nrrov hoyfiunxbg q n$i-
xbg ehofyv eimi. Hence a judgment can now be formed as to
whether Budde and Pfaff were not justified, according to the an
cient usage of language, in opposing and combining theologia dog-
maticaetmoralis; and whether Doderlin, who has many followers,
was not in error, when he says, in his Inst. Theol. Christ., ed. 4,
p. 192, Theologiam theoreticam male nostris . temporibus dici
cceptam esse dogmaticam, auctore haud dubie Buddeo, theologo
alias summse et accuratse disciplinse, Tittmannus I. c. monuit.
Nam theologia dogmatica proprie est, quae agit de placitis et
opinionibus theologorum. Nee enim apud veteres hbypu dice-
batur de doctrina ipsa, sed de sententia doctoris alicujus, &c.
Of all these assertions, apart from the praise bestowed on the
excellent Budde, and without depreciating the merits of Doder-
lein, the very reverse is true.
Remark 4. The above position is subject to an unavoidable
ambiguity, since it may exist under different modifications, ac
cording as Christianity is included or excluded; for, on the one
hand, Christianity being only an historical, common, and imparted
religion, never forming in itself a bulwark against unbelief or su
perstition; and, on the other hand, the more it was embraced as an
historicaland positive religion (which happened in other religions
also), it must incur the charge of superstition, and through this,
of infidelity; yet altogether apart from the distinction of the true
and the hypothetical, there are, with reference to the historical
and positive, the following contrasts between testamentary and
extra-testamentary religion.
a. Whilst the sacred history of the Testaments is linked by an
unbroken chain to the earliest dawn of primitive history, and
comes down to the time of the Roman Augustus, heathen reli
gions can only revert to the mere primeval history of civilization,
and supply their deficiency partly by poetry on the history of
nature and nations, and partly by means of isolated miracles and
magic. They rely on history without possessing any, and they
are destitute of prophecy and fulfilment.
b. The institution of religion coinciding with the foundation
of a state, is, when not sanctioned by testaments, vassalage; but

A. RELIGION.— § 18. NATURAL AND RATIONAL RELIGION. 55
authorised by them, it becomes a governing and conditionating
power, and this in such a manner, that the state appears mani
festly to be merely founded for the sake of religion.
c. In many cases, Heathenism, in proportion as it is historical,
is so much the less positive ; and the less historical it is, so much
the more dogmatical is it. Supported by testaments, the most
intimate connection of both from beginning to end, takes place,
though varying according to the varying stages of revelation.

§ 18. NATURAL1 AND RATIONAL RELIGION.
Although the Idea of religion, abstractedly considered as
true, original, and rational, has not left itself untestified upon
such occasions as have been afforded to it by the contemplation of
nature and by experience ; and has still more, by means of moral
and state education,2 and that through the organ of science and
schools, unconsciously developed itself to a thoroughly conscious
renunciation and struggle against superstition ; (as, for example,
from the time of Socrates among the Greeks, who may be se
lected as an adequate representative of the rest ;) — still, all
improvements achieved by this mode have either directly and
at once degenerated, or else they have, partly in their intensive
and partly in their ex and protensive relation, shown their in
competency to overcome that fundamental evil, which in some
measure is original, or have failed to supply a remedy capable
of victoriously subduing it.
1 The term Natural Theology, with the religion involved
therein, occurs, [especially in contradistinction to mythical and
political, as well as to historical and positive religion], in Varro,
of whose work, de Divinis Antiquitatibus, some extracts are to
be found in Augustin de Civ. 4, 27, 6, 2, 5, 7-9. The Pontifex
Scavola, and Cornutus the Stoic, observed the same kind of divi
sion of theology. See Villoison de Triplici Theologia Mysteriisque
Veterum, appended to De Sacy's edition of Sainte-Croix's Re-
cherches sur les Mysth-es, &c, vol. ii. The natural philosophy of
the ancients was not so universally anti-theological as it was
represented by Epicurus and Lucretius. It did not, it is true,

56 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
become, strictly speaking, theological by acknowledging a my
thic god, together with his attributes, [as interpretated from
the history of natural phenomena] of which Clemens Alex. (Stro-
matum, v, p. m. 244) has cited many examples from the Orphic
philosophy. But Varro preferred to treat of the physical gods in
the higher sense of the Stoics. General natural philosophy and
natural history is the source from whence springs the knowledge
of religion and criterion of truth, but it is not the sole mythic/act*
or especial sacred history; this principle created natural religion
and theology; and in this sense its acceptance appears necessary,
in so far as it is desirable to distinguish it from rational religion,
which is educed from the facts of consciousness. For as soon as
conscience and experience come to be regarded as the insepar
able factors of the origin of religion, both terms, each for itself,
monopolise everything opposed to historical and positive reli
gion, and merely in this antithesis become current as the more
perfect or imperfect, as the ideal interpretation or critical solution,
or as the required preparation of the positive. Augustin blames
Varro for esteeming physical theology as the only true kind,
and yet, at the same time, regarding positive religion (parti
cularly the established) as necessary and useful. Varro, after
the example of the greatest philosophers, did not directly as
sail state religion. The sages of antiquity, for the most part,
contented themselves with allegorising mythic dogma, or with
representing positive religion as a school for rational reli
gion. The same relation occurs in regard to Mysteries ; and
if here and there the same thing be repeated by Christian phi
losophers and theologians, still the followers of Wolfius assumed
the reverse relation; whilst others, as, for example, Ferguson
and Gruner, (Instit. Theol. Dogm. § xii., et Scholion,) regard
reason as a mere formal intellectual faculty, the doctrine of the
light of nature as wavering and confused, and theologia natu-
ralis as empty and null, or as stolen from Holy Writ. These
opposers of natural theology, however, were willing to admit
a rationalis theologia within certain limits; that is to say, a phi
losophy of. the Christian religion, by means of which (according
to Meyer's method, or after the example of the Cartesian theo
logians in Holland,) the substance of Christian mysteries might
be conceived, and, to a certain extent, rendered comprehensible.
Herm. Alex. Roel, Diss, de religione rationali, ed. sexta, Ultrai
1713. J

A. RELIGION. — § 19. NATURAL AND RATIONAL RELIGION. 57
2 If, in this point of view, the Athenian or Roman State,
oratory and the plastic art, or the popular life of the ancients, as
represented in their comedy, be considered, it will then be per
ceived how often they serve to separate the Idea of religion from
common religiousness, to retain it in the region of the beautiful,
the useful, or the suitable, and from thence to secure] for it
a power which in part may counteract gross atheism, and in part
oppose the inert mixture of holiness and unholiness. Comedy
appears to deride all specific gods and modes of worship; and
yet this appears to be done only for the purpose of turning the
devout wicked into ridicule; those who — in animum inducunt
suum, Jovem se placare posse donis, hostiis; et operam et Sum-
turn perdunt — Plant. Rud. v. 22 ; — or else, that by so doing, Ideal
monotheism, which lies at the foundation of Dii Deseque omnes,
might not be injured, but, on the contrary, benefited. And
thus did comedy co-operate with state law, which interdicted
foreign or private religious services, and expiations for what was
inexpiable.

§ 19. SUBJECT CONTINUED.
The proofs of this position consist of indubitable facts:
*. e. upon the path of this reaction, (which reaction being
eminently scientific, and which had been deprived of every par
ticipation of life), atheistical opinions were directly produced,
either by means of a partial and negative Protestantism ; 1 or,
polytheism and idolism, for example, were only corrected in
their moral aspect ; and in other respects, at best but ex
changed for dualism and pantheism f or finally again, the
whole system of superstition was adopted as an integral part of
that religion which is eternal, and universally authentic.3
1 In place of any other examples, see Lucretius, i. 63.
2 Greek philosophy, in its whole range of development, from
Anaxagoras to Plotinus and Porphyry, was restrained within
these two limits of pure theism.
3 See Jamblichus on the Egyptian Mysteries. Porphyry on
Sacrifices, which even the latter defended, though offered to evil
spirits.

58 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.

§ 20. SUBJECT CONTINUED.

Now, if by means of the reaction above described, the tota
lity of rehgious doctrines (admitted by Christians as rational
truth) or pure Theism,1 had been in some way or other brought
to light ; still it did not therefore follow, that it would like
wise have mastered every province of individual and common
life, or even gained for itself an original point, from whence
it could proceed to farther efficiency. But rather we perceive,
that it sought the esoteric form of existence and action, and
that vigorous efforts for rehgious fellowship only first appear
when natural and rational doctrines had entered into a compact
with that positive religion, which had previously been opposed by
them.2 The same condition in which, and by which natural and
rational rehgion essentially consist, (the divesting truth of its facts
and history), renders the religion of nature and reason incapable
of founding a communion through itself, and for itself.3
1 For a view of the doctrine of a World-Creator, who is not a
mere world-constructor; of the doctrine of a personal God, not a
mere SeTov, and of the doctrine of a merely free and good Being,
entirely distinct from the evil, dxgn, and equally so from passion
and fate, see Christoph. Meiner's Hist. Doctrines de vero Deo
omnium rerum auctore atque rectore, p. 1 et 2, Lemg. 1 780 ; and
Bouterweck's Treatise iv. Der reine Theismus.
2 The neoplatonic divines are chiefly zealous for the altar, and
only a Julian employs every possible means to re-establish a phi
losophically reformed priesthood, and a real sacrifice.
3 How unconcerned are Seneca and Marcus Aurelius that the
institutions which inculcate reverence for the gods, and which
they despise, should be destroyed, and how equally indifferent,
that for the reverence they laud, others should be instituted.
§ 21. CONCLUSION.
It would seem, however, that the Idea of religion had, not
withstanding, been on the point of realization, through the
powers of rational thought in the human race ; and this, too,

A. RELIGION. — § 21. CONCLUSION. 59
in the path of Teleology. For it extended so far, as not only
to perceive the evil with which the actual world is afflicted, but
had even advanced to the Idea of redemption, and to inquire
whether the process of the actual redemption of the world
had not already been introduced, at a time when the spiritual
ized and reclaimed course of human life had already been
pervaded by Pythagorean and therapeutic institutes, and had
produced such champions against evil and error as the hero
of Philostratus1 or a Plotinus. Moreover, it farther inquired,
whether science, when it had become wisdom, could not be
advanced to the public spirit of a church, and be competent
to represent the Platonic Son of the Good — the offspring of
God, in humanity. But this was not achieved ; and we can
perfectly understand why it could not have been so. The bad
itself, or evil, is not an idea, but a sign and experience,
obtruding itself upon man during the contemplative and ac
tive operation of his original and ideal consciousness in life,
considered as -such. Hence it happens, that those in whom
the happiness of ideal cogitation has arisen, in order to prevent
it from becoming obscured, conceal and dimmish the greatness
and the depth of human misery to the utmost, or else they en
deavour to represent it either as being natural, as being a
channel for good, or as something altogether isolated and acci
dental. In this unseasonable attempt to triumph over evil, we
find (in comparison with oriental nations) the Greeks especially
involved, and among these particularly, the Stoics, whom we
venture to call Pelagians, before Pelagius. The reverse of this
holds good with Pythagoras and Plato. In them the religious
Idea of the good was sufficiently strong to perceive the prevail
ing evil condition of the world, to confess it, and with deep
earnestness to lament over it, and yet to maintain and to beheve
the possibility of the triumph of the thinking will over seeming
life. Philosophy proposed for its object the welfare of the world,
but that it could not effect.2 It was in some way or other able
to conceive or desire a Saviour, but could neither predict his ap
pearance, nor believe in him before his actual appearance. It

60 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
was able to perceive a few, (and these always increasing in
number) who being qualified to philosophise, ransomed them
selves more and more ; but it could not apprehend actual re
demption, and accordingly could not recognise the origin of
evil; it could not venture to ascribe it to the will — was compel
led to derive its origin from matter — was unable to convey
the holiness of God to the living conscience, or to perceive the
freedom of the will and personality ; and finally, was forced to
naturalise and fatalise the history of the Spirit ; thus imperfect
Teleology and Aetiology mutually corrupted each other, and the
entire truth of rehgion remained entangled in the knot, which
neither history; nor any compensation between idea and history,
could disentangle.
1 Apollonius of Tyana, the Pythagorean, whom Philostratus,
under a poetic and implied kind of parallelism, about the time
of Vespasian and Domitian,?represented as traversing the world
as the messiah of heathenism, and filling it with the marvels of
Indian philosophy and sanctity. See Baur Apollonius von Tyana
und Christus, oder das Verhaltniss des Pythagoreismus zum
Christenthum. Tub. Zeitschrift. f. Theol. 1832, H. 4.
2 Ackermann : Das Christliche in Plato, &c, p. 332, " The
essence of Christianity consists in its remedial power, that of
Platonism in aiming to reach the same." This remark still
continues perfectly applicable, notwithstanding the emendation
essayed by Dr Baur, Das Christliche in Platonismus oder Soc
rates und Christus. Tiib., 1837 — for the efficient and the realized
idea are quite distinct. The latter is not produced by the former,
but by him who created the idea.
B. Of Eevelation.
% 22. IDEA.
If, however, we continue conscious of our immutable destiny
for true religion and for fellowship in it, this consciousness
generates, in union with that experience derived partly from
historical and partly from rational rehgion, the Idea of revela
tion. Undoubtedly this idea itself would be, at the least but
very imperfectly exhibited, and would not, as it now is be at

B. REVELATION. — § 22. IDEA. 61
our command, if its realisation did not precede; for the two
factory of the requisiteness of revelation, which we have just
now pointed out, first exist adequately and vigorously in revela
tion.1 Once only, and that in a very apocryphal manner,
Heathenism dived into futurity, demanding and hoping for
some new and Divine remedy for that religious and moral cor
ruption of the world which had reached so terrific a climax.2
1 Upon the whole, man in a state of heathenism is so far
from desiring or expecting any new development of religious his
tory, in opposition to the one under which he is reared, that, on
the contrary, he only anticipates, either from an increasingly
penetrative philosophy, or from some reawakened ancient theo
logy of mysteries which have been preserved in a state of
purity, if not a remedy, at least some abatement of evil.
Moreover, whatever has perchance been either supposed or ad
mitted by Stoics and Platonists concerning the continual com
munications of the gods, is incompetent to fix the idea of reve
lation. The expression of Marc. Aurel. lib. i. § 17, is remarkable:
he congratulates himself in having been enabled to attain a dis
tinct and operative idea of life, strictly conformable to nature ;
and that, in so, far as it depends upon the gods and their sugges
tions, nothing is wanting to enable him to lead, even now,
such a life: the fault must be attributed only to himself if this
result be not attained, inasmuch as he may not perhaps have
duly attended to the admonitions (bmpvqgeig) of the gods — which,
however, may be unintelligible doctrines (pomovw hihugxuXiui).
Thorn. Gataker adduces on this passage the assertions of Plato,
in Philebus, of Cicero (Tusc. 1.), and Seneca (Ep. 90), where
philosophy is so represented, that if it be not in reality the gift
of the gods, it would be more than all they could bestow. Thus,
philosophical religion, whether it be regarded as a Divine gift,
beyond which nothing is desirable, or as a higher form of human
spontaneity, which bestows the bene vivere just as the gods only
confer the vivere — such religion must, in either case, obstruct
the idea of revelation.
2 See, among the works of Appulejus, the treatise de Natura
Deorum, ed. Elmenhorst, page 90, 93, where may be read a pro
phecy both against and for Egypt, as the holy land of the earth;
which must either be considered a version from Christianity or a
monument of heathenism, essentially surpassing itself.

62 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.

§ 23. REVELATION AND REDEMPTION.
It is at least necessary, if we desire to express the pecu
liarity of Christianity through the idea of revelation, to en
deavour to comprehend it as deduced from, and as combined
with, the doctrine of redemption ; a mode of proceeding which
perfectly accords with the tenour of the previously deduced
Idea; inasmuch as we were compelled to look for the original
cause of degenerated religion in a tendency towards an un
real freedom, which had become a second nature, and which
state man enjoys through the suppression or change of his
higher self-consciousness; consequently, we found, in a moral
point of view, that the entire development of rehgious thought
is checked, from the impossibility of realising its funda
mental idea in a world afflicted with evil. At all events,
the ground, object, substance, and characteristic of revela
tion, regarded in a Christian sense, cannot be defined with
out assistance from the idea of salvation. Undoubtedly,
whenever a revelation is made, our perceptive powers and ener
gies are influenced; but it by no means follows from this that a
revelation from God should be at once declared a Divine (im
mediate, original, supernatural) communication of certain no
tions more or less transcendental.1 Essential changes in hu
man perception, such as are here supposed, can never exclu
sively or directly apply to the separate intellectual or imagi
native faculty. Otherwise, the idea of the unnatural would
rather be given by these, than that of the supernatural. On the
contrary, the essentially new definiteness of this mode of percep
tion originates in the correlative consequence of an activity which
is wont to renew human hfe or human condition, that is  in the
redeeming activity of God; and the fact, which is of great im
portance, enforces this view also, namely, that the word Eevela
tion in the Holy Scriptures indicates, only in a subordinate and
derived sense, Divine, internal, perceptive communications;
whilst, in the chief passages which assert a revelation from God

B. REVELATION. — § 23. REVELATION AND REDEMPTION. 63
it imports a Divine discovery of the decree of salvation, or of
the truth of salvation, communicated, not to individuals, but to
universal man.2
1 It is this idea of revelation around which the controversy be
tween the Rationalists and Supranaturalists has principally re
volved, partly during the Cartesian, and partly during the Kantian
period. The error of the supranaturalists consists mainly in their
only assuming, in the first place, the miracle of knowledge and
then subsequently other miracles. But the correct method of de
tecting this error, and setting it aside, would compel the Natural
ists, or even the Rationalists, (if they desired to use this method,)
to discern their own error, since it is simply the counterpart of the
one into which the Supra-naturalists have fallen. In addition
to the corrections this partial super-naturalistic idea of revela
tion has received from Daub, Schleiermacher, De Wette, Mar
heineke, Bockshammer, C. L. Nitzsch, Martens, Kahler, and
others; see B. Crusius' Einl. in d. St. d. Dogm., p. 93, "A
great institution for all times, for the preservation and bestowal
of the holiest benefits on the souls of men, and, above all, of
faith;" see also Fischer's Einl., &c, § 19-21; but especially
Twesten, p. 345: "By revelation we understand here (where
revelation, in a more limited sense, is the subject) the declaration
of Divine grace for the salvation (e\g gurqgiuv) of fallen man, in
its original operation upon human cognition."
2 The word most directly corresponding to the theological idea
of revelation is duroxuXv^ig, the unveiling of what is hidden, not
direetly pavegoBv, manifestare. For the former is not used when
speaking of the testimonies God gives of his existence and being,
through reason, nature, and universal history; not even by
Matthew, xi. 25, where, on the seemingly opposite assertion by
Knapp, B. Crusius, and Hahn, may be referred to. But the lat
ter is termed (puvegouv, Rom. 1. 19, oux dpdgrvgov euuTbv u<p%xev, Acts of
the Apostles, xiv. 1 7, and purifyiv vdvru, &\ftguvov, Joh. i. 9, in so
far as the essential word of all rational cognition is the medium.
On the other hand, the opinion supported by Baumgarten-
Crusius appears untenable, namely, that fuvtgow may be the more
trivial, for example, the more remote explication of the object
given through uiroxdXv^is. For in the two passages in Rom. xvi.
25, xurd dftoxuXv^iv pugrqgiou %govoi,g a'mvioig gegiyrifi'evov, puvegaftevrog
he vvv hid re ygutpwv <zgo.<pqnx5iiv xur emruyriv rou diuviov 3soC, and in

64 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
1 Pet. i. 20, <puveg uft'evrog he hi: ig%urtw ruv ^givuv hi xjpag is equivalent
to the word otherwise peculiar, only that it refers upon the whole
more to external than internal manifestation. For a fuller dis
cussion on this phraseology see Car. L. Nitzsch De Revelatione
Religionis externa eademque publica, p. 8, sqq., and especially the
first four essays; see also B. Crusius, Bib. Theol. p. 222. A
correct display of the idea of revelation, as contained in the New
Testament, might be comprised under the four following heads:
First, The revealing of the great mystery, namely, the decree of
salvation and its bearings, resulting from the combined opera
tion of the personal appearance of the Redeemer with the Holy
Spirit in the apostles and prophets, is made known to the world
for the obedience of faith, Rom. xvi. 26, compare i. 17; 1 Pet.
i. 20; Eph. i. 9, iii. 9; 1 Cor. ii. 7; 1 Tim. iii. 16; 2 Tim. i.
9-10; Tit. ii. 11. etetpuvri — wugiv dvSguwoig. A public manifest
appearance which the word tj^, for example, in Jerem. xxxiii.
6, also signifies. In so far, however, as this disclosure of sal
vation, and even redemption is to a certain extent incomplete,
and we still stand in hope, there is, in the second place, an
unveiling of the mystery of salvation for our contemplation,
and this, too, in a public and manifest manner, with the return
of Christ, who is now concealed along with our true life. Luke
xvii. 30; Rom. viii. 18, 19; 1 Tim. vi. 14; 1 Pet. i. 5; in the
same manner as the conditionate differs from the condition, so the
revelation of the Son of God and that of Divine wisdom differs ;
which results, in the third place, in the consciousness of faith,
Gal. i. 12, 16; Eph. iii. 3; compare Matth. xi. 25, xvi. 17. Even
this revelation is the act of God or Christ, through the Holy
Spirit. Fourth and lastly, Through God's grace more abundant
developments of that consciousness which is determinated through
Christ, fall to the lot of the apostles, and believers influenced by
their preaching; partly in behalf of doctrine, 1 Cor. xiv. 6 and
26, Phil. iii. 15, partly in behalf of acting, Gal. ii. 2, and still
more particularly for its apostolical and Christian perfection,
2 Cor. xii. 7; in all these bearings [wgrygiov is the object of that
contemplation, which is effected through revelation.
Remark. Nothing has been revealed unto Christ of God, not
even according to Revelat. i. 1, nor Joh. viii. 26, 28, &c; but
Christ is the object and mediator of revelation, and is such be
cause He pre-eminently and originally participates in knowledge
with God, or in an entire fellowship with Him. See Nitzsch De

B. REVELATION. — § 24. ORIGINALITY OF REVELATION. 65
revel, p. 10, 13, and B. Crusius' Bibl. Theol. p. 234; an observa
tion which of itself alone might have obviated innumerable mo
dern definitions and expositions of the idea of Christian revela
tion, or at least have imparted to them another direction.

§ 24. ORIGINALITY OF REVELATION.
Of those elements, from whence arises the idea of Eevela
tion, in its connection with redemption, the first is this, namely,
that nothing save the creation of the rehgious disposition itself is
equal to it in originality; or this, that revelation (despite its per
fect relation to the subsisting development of the first beginning
of rehgion is a new commencement in the religious life of man,
which manifests itself as such, partly in the consciousness of
those who are enlightened by it, 1 and partly in the determina
tions which the world and the world's history receive through it.
If revelation, then, is to be regarded as active in any way in
the world,2 like redemption from the existence of evil which it
is intended to overcome, then nothing can belong to it but
what pertains, in a perceptible manner, and as a co-operative
and developing power, to uninterrupted, progressive, or per
manent, true rehgion.
The element of originality becomes by this means at once
exclusive and antagonistic, so that the universal idea of revela
tion, such as the Gnostic parties 3 among and near to Christians,
or even newer doctrines have commended, is inadmissible.
Remark 1. The element of originality as regards the idea of
revelation, is just as much obscured as it is recognised by such
explanations as those contained in the Red. ub. die Relig. p, 153,
and in Schleiermacher's Glaubensl. i. § 1 9. This theologian has
taken his idea of revelation, not from the Holy Scriptures, but
from the philosophy of the general usage of language; and, in
deed, this is the reason why he considers such as too imperfect
to express the peculiarity of Christianity. The entire immedi
ateness of revelation would appear to him as only perfectly ap
plicable to Christ as an authentic person ; but it is deserving of
remark, that, according to Scriptural guidance, this view is here

QQ INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
inapplicable; for what has been objected to our assertion, as, for
example, by Bohmer— see Pelt's Encycl. p. 251— an dmxuXv-^ig, or
revelation in the above sense, has not occurred to Christ. That he
taught what he heard, is something quite different, for that even
does the Holy Spirit. Moreover, it is utterly impossible to main
tain the idea of revelation, if originality could alone produce it.
See Vatke Bibl. Theol. i. Berlin 1835, p. 88, where he says, " cer
tain religious elements, which maintain in the consciousness of
spiritual heroes a mere objective position, admit of being ex
plained only as revelations of God, who thereby becomes him
self objective;" and, again, at p. 101, "God-consciousness must
be conceived in an especial manner as revelation;" and yet,
at p. 668, he asserts that "the idea of the Old Testament
religion, according to its true import, had been revealed to the
Hebrews." Remark 2. Originality evidences itself subjectively by consci
ousness, (which is indebted to revelation for its determinations,)
at once pointing out that it has obtained such by means of an
especial history, included in history, — by means of a separate
community, and altogether in a mode distinct from the general
creation and preservation of spiritual life; and that these de
terminations maintain within themselves, according to their
value and power, an immediateness, to which the facts of con
science, either merely arise equally, or, (in reference to what they
have become, as simply dwapig without actuality, or through an
irregular development), do not arise equally. Originality also evi
dences itself objectively by the continuity of the preparations, and
uninterrupted operations, by means of which, as from a certain
middle-point of world-history, and radiating from thence, true
religion has become predominant. If, for example, it be sup
posed that an imageless and moral theism indispensably apper
tains to the authority of true religion, still it cannot be proved
that the agency of a Pythagoras or a Zoroaster should essentially
and organically succeed to make its way into the history of the
world's progress in this theistical subjection of superstition or un
belief; but, indeed, it may be assumed, that Abraham and Moses,
by means of their relation to Christ, still advance in an infallible
manner to such a goal, and that all the monotheists in the world
are the spiritual children of Abraham. See Theol. Stud, und
Krit. 1842, p. 638. sq.
1 Hence the originality of revelation is expressed in as strong

B. REVELATION. — § 25. REVELATION HISTORICAL. 67
contrasts to dv^gaiirog, gdg% xul ulpu, aoipiu rou uioivog rolrov; for
example, in 1 Cor. ii., Gal. i. 11, as is the originality of redemp
tion by John i. 13 ; iii. 6. Compare 2 Cor. iv. 6, on 6 Ssi? b s/«i»
ex exoroug fug Xdp*\iui (Genesis i. 3) 'ig eXup-^ev lv ruTg xughiuig ij/Awr,
irgbg <pung/j,bv r?jff yvugeug rSjs ho^qg rou SsoD Iv 'ffgogrimw I»]<roD ^gigrov — a
full designation of the two elements, originality and historical-
ness, which represent the genuine supematuralism of the idea of
Christian revelation; and unanimously with this view, catholic an
tiquity comments, as Origen does, c. Cels. i. p. 5, ed. Hoesch, Xex-
r'eov he n irgbg rovro, 'in egri ng oixeiu dnoheifyg rou X6yov Snorigu -ragd
rriv disb hiuXexnxrig iXXrjvixrjV. Tuvrqv he rriv 'betoreguv 6 dirbgroXog bvopu-
Zpi u-?r6hei%i» irveiiparog xul huvd/jnug. Compare Justin Martyr de
Resurr. init.
2 See Twesten's Vorl. p. 322. " Since the' Divine decree of
redemption and reconciliation is to be considered as an eternal
one, so must its accomplishment also begin simultaneously with
the fall of man."
3 Samaritan and Alexandrian blenders of religion, as, for ex
ample, Simon the Magician, as he is represented in the Homilies
of the pseudo-Clemens. The favourable judgment of a Clemens
of Alexandria on certain Gentiles and ori certain Greek doctrines,
is quite of a different kind. See Neander, K. G. i. 3, p. 919.
| 25. REVELATION HISTORICAL.
If revelation, in reference to the degeneracy and incapacity
of natural faith, operate in a redeeming manner, in that case
it requires to be, not only in its form, but also in its substance,
in a peculiar manner historical, and at the same time to con-
tarn, under certain aspects, something entirely new. For sup
posing that the salvation of the world be an idea of pure rea
son, yet, as evil does not arise from rational necessity, the idea
alluded to can only be termed a deduced one, and as such,
could never be elevated to a necessity parallel with the origi
nal facts of consciousness. But in truth, Christians are con
scious of salvation just as if it had been revealed unto them,
not only through facts, but as a fact. To Christians, indeed,
an eternal decree of salvation has been communicated, but in
separably united with its accomplishment in time, and in

68 INTRODUCTION.— II. OBJECT.
union with the whole higher history of the human race ; and
this in such a manner, that the word of God, upon which
Christians depend differently from what they do on rational
principles, contains, in no stage of revelation, mere qualities
alone of God or of the world, or bare permanent relations, but,
in addition, invariably possesses Gospel and Prophecy. But
the attributes and general relations of God and the world uni
versally maintain, by means of the revealed facts of salvation,
new determinations ; hence we do not entirely concur in that
theological view, which, although in other respects it does jus
tice to the originality and exclusiveness of revelation, only ad
mits it to be a maturing preformation, or a public and actual
introduction and exciting cause, of rational religion confined to
the world.1
Remark 1. The loftiest and purest theistical conception occur
ring in the development of natural religion is ever produced
apart from history, and in opposition to it ; hence the idea
attains the highest popular form in those ambiguous inscriptions
" to the unknown God." The Lord of heaven and earth, as
Jehovah, as the God of Abraham, establishes from the very be
ginning, historically, an imageless and moral worship. And this
peculiar historical character of revelation is admitted, even by
Lessing and Kant, these fathers of modern rationalism, who
have been but too much neglected and disowned.
Remark 2. In natural development, the historical or mythi
cal material in due time recedes altogether, and a purely dog
matical one stands forth, which is incapable of founding a com
munion, and only maintains its ground by a negative contest.
As often as it endeavours to complete itself by history, it is a
natural history, which perchance terminates in a conflagration of
the world, or begins anew by means of it, and into which history
itself is absorbed. The doctrinal contents of revealed religion
are, on the other hand, primarily combined with the ethical his
tory of humanity, to Which physical history is subordinate.
1 With regard to this element of the idea of revelation, which
we call historical, Lessing, (Ueb. die Erziehung des menschenges-
chlechts), and Kant, (Religion innerhalb der Greuzen des blossen
Vernunft), who are opposed to naturalism, as well as supernatu-

B. RELIGION.  § 25. REVELATION HISTORICAL. 69
ralism, deserve more credit than has yet been acknowledged.
Lessing has left quite undetermined under what aspect revela
tion may be considered setiologically ; and has recognised it as
being the perfection of the rational understanding, at once re
plete with Deity and providence. Revelation is an arithmeti
cian, and precalculates results, which are afterwards re-examined;
and thus, in accordance with ancient prejudices, Lessing almost
exclusively sought religion in the faculty of perception, and
education in practice. Kant, who at all times seizes on the
practical point of view, requires, in order to maintain a good
fight against the evil principle, an ethical commonwealth. Now
he deems it a weakness that this commonwealth cannot be real
ized by pure religious faith alone ; but notwithstanding, he
esteems it a proportional gain, that there should exist a reunit
ing church faith. It is a direct consequence of his hypothesis,
that in the sense in which cotemporary theologians spoke of
revelation, he could neither discern its necessity nor its reality.
Proceeding, however, from the undisputed fact, that pure mora
lity never possessed a firmer basis than the monotheism of the
biblical church faith, he insisted on its records, and its use of the
idea of revelation, being so treated, as that the combined effect
of the mysteries, which otherwise were passive and indifferent,
or even injurious, might be accommodated to ethico-theistical
decisions. His doctrine was, that we should avail ourselves of
the Son of God, and his atoning death, &c, as historical expres
sions, as active types and pledges of practical and rational truths;
and thus he sketched out a philosophy of Christianity, which
comprehended the nature of the subject-matter as truly, as it
ever possibly could do from such a point of view; and at least
much more faithfully and intrinsically than any that had imme
diately preceded it. It was just this ingenious retreat into the
positive (as in the mean time the grammatico-historical inter
pretation had begun to make its appearance) that those who too
readily acquiesced in his negations, neglected to enter. As far
as we know, there is only one theologian who has adjusted, not
only these negations, (whilst pointing out in an historico-teleolo-
gical manner the necessity of an external and public introduction
of true religion, by means of revealing and inciting facts), but has
also carried out Kant's attempt, upon the historical stand of the
Gospel, to separate what represents from what is represented,
and to indicate the latter in practical reason ; and this, too, in

70 INTRODUCTION — II. OBJECT. — B. REVELATION.
such a manner, as to form one of the most complete theories
of revelation we possess. Nitzsch most rigidly distinguished
divine, supernatural revelation from religion, and revelation
as the outward form from inspiration, so as to combine a ma
terial rationalism with formal supematuralism. His explana
tory work, Ueber das heil der Welt, " On the Salvation of the
World," Wittenb. 1817; and Ueber das Heil der Kirche, 1821.
His preparatory one, De discrimine legislations et institutionis
divince, Viteb. 1 802 ; and his supplementary essays, De mortis
a Jesu Christo oppetitce necessitate morali, Viteb. 1810, 1811 ;
and De gratice Dei justificantis necessitate morali, Viteb. 1812,
1813, may be compared with his principal work, De revelatione
rel. externa eademque publ. The former treatises have been re
published, together with kindred works, De Antimonismo Jo.
Agricolce, &c. under the general title, De discrimine revela-
tionis imperatorice et didacticce proluss. acad. scr. recogn. et
emend. Carol. Lud. Nitzsch. Viteb. 1830. The theory of
Christian revelation developed in these works, notwithstanding
cotemporary literature has not done justice to its peculiar ex
cellence, is one of the most important in philosophical theology,
and belongs to one of the most remarkable transitions exhibited
in our times. This theory has been the means of preserving
many of its author's disciples, (among whom the present writer
acknowledges his obligations with the fervent gratitude of a son,)
from the entangling contest between neology and palteology,
although some of them may afterwards, perhaps, have suc
ceeded in accomplishing a more extended adjustment. The
theory of Baumgarten-Crusius, in some points, approximates very
closely to that of Nitzsch, without being identical. That of
Dr Cramer of Leipzig has been derived from it.

| 26. REVELATION VITAL OR ALL- AVAIL ABLE.
Although the revealing energy of God commences by effect
ing certain external facts, in which, as in their phenomena, the
kingdom of God is attested; yet would such energy be incom
petent to reform the spiritual tendency of mankind, if it did not
reach, by an awakening and purifying influence, every primary
point of religion and irreligion. A merely external revel*-

§ 26. revelation vital or all- available. 71
tion, though retaining within itself attributes hitherto recognised,
would only produce, if anything, fanaticism; whilst, on the
other hand, mere internal revelation would generate mysti
cism. A revelation from God proceeds in conformity with the
perfection and totality of man's life, whose progress is never to
be considered apart from the reciprocal relation between the ex
ternal and the internal, and partly between that of the .word and
work and partly of the imagination and the will. The combi
nation of revelation with redemption consequently admits, nay
requires, that, upon the whole, Divine manifestation (the Word
in a more extended sense) should precede remembrance; but
between the more early and subsequent gifts of the Word there
must always be supposed a communication of the Spirit, an
original inspiration of the mind; and the exhibition of the Di
vine does not afford an adequate conception, unless the subjec
tive consciousness obtain Divine determinations. Hence the
opposite of Divine manifestation and inspiration, which has be
come of late more prominent than formerly, is important and
true, supposing that the unity of both acts, through reciprocal
relation, be rightly perceived.1
Remark. — This relative determination is illustrated and con
firmed by the Word and Spirit of God,, partly by means of the
distinction between objective and subjective religion, as formerly
laid down, partly through the analysis of the biblical idea of
dmxdXu^ig, already mentioned, and finally, by the doctrine of
the Holy Scripture.
1 In reference to the illustrations which Bretschneider has
given of manifestation and inspiration, in his System. Entw. alter
i. d. Dogma Vorkomm. Begriffe, 3d edit. p. 166, two objec
tions present themselves : In the first place, it appears strange
that manifestation only should be considered as twofold; that is,
first as universal, by means of which natural religion is induced,
and secondly, as especial, by which Divinity is' revealed to the
spontaneous reason through individual facts; whilst, on the other
hand, inspiration is regarded as simple. Whenever we carry
over these ideas into the region of so-called natural revelation,
there are grounds for considering inspiration to be also general
and special. For all the signs of the idea of inspiration adduced

72 introduction. — n. object.
by this learned writer — namely, 1st, that man is passively related
to it, and, Idly, that nothing interposes between God and the
recipient, — can also be applied to the original, general, and con
stant communication of the Deity, through which man is ren
dered a rational being, and possesses religious consciousness.
The symmetry of his entire illustration is deranged, when he
refers to manifestation what, in the latter point of view, is ad
mitted to belong to Divine causality. This appears a strange
explanation to associate with the former, viz. that manifestation
merely tends to the natural activity of reason, but that inspira
tion leads to no spontaneity, and that a combined operation of both
Divine activities is not pointed out. The one or the other energy,
therefore, is either superfluous or insufficient. Its infallible and
necessary connexion may possibly consist in God's inspiring
through the medium of manifestation, and appropriating through
inspiration whatever has already, by any means, become known.
Now, precisely as manifesting facts always retain a certain na
tural and historical connexion, the like is the case with subjective
and objective consciousness newly determinated by inspiration.
And again, these determinations are conformably related to that
freedom and spontaneity for which man was originally called into
existence. With what distinctness is this mutual relation be
tween external testimony and internal assurance expressed, for
example, in 1 Cor. ii. 6-16, xii. 3, Gal. i. 12, compare the 16th
ver. with Matth. xvi. 17; particularly in the former, 1 Cor. ii. ver.
10 and 12. The objective, the Word of salvation and life delivered
to us in the history and person (of Christ), we know and acknow
ledge as such, first through the power of the Holy Spirit — eXdj3opiv
— rb itveujhu rb ix rou %eou, 'iva sihupev rd tmb rou SsoD yugig'&evru qpTv. x.X.
And although, upon the whole, the first act of revelation must be
that whose participation is proclaimed so solemnly in 1 Joh. i. 1 ;
or although the mission of the Son, and the incarnation and in
dwelling of the Logos, with their adjuncts, shall precede and
accomplish the mission of the Spirit, still the latter, with all its
distinct and derived effects, is to be regarded as an original and
Divine causality, through whose instrumentality all faith, lan
guage, knowledge, and interpretation of the Divine word, are
for the first time, (according to 1 Cor. xii. and other passages,)
rendered possible.

b. revelation. — § 27. revelation gradual. 73

§ 27. revelation gradual.
Neither human freedom nor the laws of being are disparaged
by either act of revelation. For the new commencement of
a rehgious life, which we assume with revelation, refers, in more
than one way, to the old, and attracts to itself ah, that in natural
development, is, for the most part, either conformable to its
origin or opposed to its degeneration. The determinations which,
through revelation, fall to the lot of history, as well as those
accruing to consciousness, obey the emancipating law of gradual
progress. Doubtless,1 the God of revelation elects those, on
or through whom his testimonies act, by founding a communion;
but the most select2 agents are ever those who, when God
seeks, respond to His call, or those who bear within themselves
some other trace of exceUence. And even the Son of Man, in
whom the Word has become flesh, must thus far be considered
as the most humanly free in the Divine necessity of his self-
development, where, according to his accomplished work, he
draws all men unto himself (John xii. 32).
Again, God does in truth speak through his Son to all nations
(Heb. i. 1), and to a united world; but not until He had previ
ously, by way of preparation, spoken to a disunited one through
the law and the prophets, attended by local miracles, and had
condescended to assume the form of a servant, and submit to
national customs; not even until he had called those whom he
pleased to inspire (according to the reserved limits of national
ity) by means of the Word, which word, at the same time, was
accommodated to human speech; that is to say, not until he
had addressed their hearing, faith, and obedience, and had
subjected even the heathen to that gradation which conducts
through law and promise to the gospel. And finally, although
this Word includes the Divine history of a kingdom, which
throughout contains new and supernatural truth (arj$ua) ; yet
by its satisfying and developing power, it corresponds to pre-

74 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
existing rehgious knowledge, and this in proportion as know
ledge (upon the ground of consciousness, and by means of candid
reflection, as opposed to falsehood,) has produced and preserved
the universal apprehension (mpik^ugf of the dogmas of God and
Providence, of the victory of good over evil, of recompense and
freedom. It is obvious that, even in this feature, Eevelation
can only be comprehended as it stands in connexion with
Eedemption. Remark. — The element of gradual progress might undoubted
ly be also termed that which is natural or mediate in revelation.
1 Gal. i. 15; Joh. xv. 16.
2 Acts vii. 22, x. 35; Matth. xi. 25.
3 Clem. Alex. Strom, vi. p. 286, sq. Emeg ouv xal xurd liXdruvu
jj irugd rou §eou % vugd ruv txyovuv rou §eou rb uXrfceg expuv^dvuv (Lovug
oTovre, sixoroig nagd ruv Se/wv Xoyiuv ru //.ugrvgiu IxXeybpevoi, rrjv uXffreiuv
uuyoupev exhihugxeg%ui hid rou uiou rou SsoD, <sgo<prjreu^ivruv jiiev rb wgurov,
eireiru "hi xul gupqvi&hrw rd guvegyouvru he nrgbg rrjv eugsgiv rSjj dXrfceiug
ouhe uurd dhoxipu. jj y' vvv (piXogoiplu nrgbvoiuv xuruyyeXXougu, xul rou
j£ev evhuipovog /3/ou rr\\> d/Aoifinv rouh' ub xaxohuipovog rr\v xoXugiv <nigiXqirn-
xug SeoXoye?. rd irgbg dxgi(3eiuv he xul ru eirl //.egovg oux en g&Zer oure ydg
wegl rou uiou rou 3soS, oure ntegl rrjg xurd rqv wgovoiuv olxovopidg, bpoiuig ripTv
hiuXapftuver ou yug rqv xurd rbv %ebv iyvu Sgtjgxiiuv. hioffeg ui xurd rqv
f3ugl3ugov fiXogotpluv digigeig, xuv, %ebv Xeyugiv ivu, xdv %gigrbv uprngi, xurd
HtegiXrfifiiv X'eyougi, ov wgbg uX^eiuv. — Justin and Others: fiiprigig rrjg
uXrfieiug.

§ 28. REVELATION POSSIBLE.
If we understand that religion recommences under the in
fluence of Eevelation, and consequently is supernatural, we
have then to show, in opposition to the views of the Naturalists
(as they have been called, particularly since the time of Kant,
in contradistinction to Eationalists,)1 that revelation is neither
objectively (metaphysically) nor subjectively (psychologically) im
possible. In order to support the view of its objective possibi
lity, it is not sufficient for an opponent to admit that every
phenomenon, in its distinct peculiarity, partly allows and partly

B. REVELATION. — § 28. REVELATION POSSIBLE. 75
requires a reference to the causality of the universe, and conse
quently an immediate reference to Divine omnipotence; for
many Naturalists are willing to receive the mere general propo
sition, all is miracle, in order to enunciate on the other side
of the same truth, their own thesis, that whatsoever happens
is natural; and accordingly, an sesthetical view, at the most, of
the supernatural, will remain, because, as is universally admitted,
some phenomena invite more to a religious relation, others
more to an intellectual one. But beyond all dispute, we are
at liberty to maintain that the Will of the Almighty, although it
will not indeed create anything in such a state of isolation as
to be organically disunited from connexion with the universe,
may, nevertheless, bring forth much to which and on which He
has given to the lower order and stage of things a bare predis
position; so that certain phenomena may be regarded as deve
lopments of a higher nature in a lower, or as creative pheno
mena, or as originations.2 With regard to subjective pos
sibility, on the other hand, there cannot be, in reference to posi
tive proof, any higher claim, made upon the belief of revelation,
than upon rehgious faith in general. Now, we are enabled to
obtain adequate certainty as to whether we are indebted for our
rehgious life to redeeming revelation, or to natural develop
ment, partly through the kind of reception, and partly by the
kind of effect, which that which is received calls into exercise.
1 In reference to the historical determination of the idea of
naturalism and rationalism, Dr Hahn deserves the credit he has
obtained for his work, De rationalismi, qui dicitur, vera indole
et qua cum naturalismo contineatur ratione, Lips. 1827. We fully
concur in his assertion, that the term rationalism was not first
introduced by Kant or Semler, but that it had always been em
ployed, owing to an imperfect use of reason and philosophy, in
Christian theology. We agree also with him in his opinion that
rationalism is related to naturalism much in the same way as
effect is to cause, or form to matter, or as the same things under
different names are related to each other; as is evident, in
fact, from his numerous quotations. It is undeniable, however,
that such phraseology may gradually attain a more definite pre-

76 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
cision, and that even those polemical writers quoted by Hahn
contended for certain broader distinctions between both modes of
thought. Strictly speaking, the nature of the case, and in part
the history of these terms, constitute the ground of their dis
tinction. As regards the former, it is self-evident that faulty
tendencies are denoted by such-like isms, and philosophers or
theologians have invariably, in the first instance, contemned
even ists of any kind, however unwillingly they may afterwards
have declared in their favour. In regard to the latter it simply
refers to the sentiments entertained on Revelation and Chris
tianity, and not to what naturalism and rationalism may pos
sibly signify, or may haye said in the region of religious philoso
phy. The opponents of a revelation, or the revelation, may
primarily be such in a twofold manner : either they already deny
the causative possibility of revelation, or, while acknowledg
ing that, may leave the reality problematical; whilst, on the
other hand, they oppose the reality of a final aim (teleological
reality). In the former case, the question chiefly turns upon the
laws of nature; in the latter, upon the rights of reason. But
it is likewise possible that there are many who do not oppose
revelation on any of these grounds, but, on the contrary, assume
the salvation of the world, and yet may be considered anti-scrip-
turarii and rationalists; and this on the following grounds —
either that they reserve for reason the highest law of truth under
the form of apprehension and cognition, and explain the matter
of revelation as truths rationally anticipated or historically
moulded, or else they at least treat the conceivable mysteries of
Christianity in a manner too much opposed to history, and permit
theology to pass over too much into the philosophy o'f Christian
ity. If schemes the most heterogeneous shall not be all placed
on an equality, it becomes necessary to separate the apolo-
getical phenomenal point of that mode of thought opposed to
revelation, from that kind of thought which may be styled
dogmatical and exegetical. Now, upon the whole, the history
of the name and matter corresponds to this point. The mode
of thinking which has been ascribed to the celebrated Herbert
of Cherbury, was especially denominated Naturalism (also
Deism, see Lechler, Der Englische Deismus, 1841 ; also Free-
thinking). In its more extended development, it stood, in its
relation to Holy Scripture and to history, partly as deriding,
accusing, and refuting, and partly, at least, it was related to

B. REVELATION. — § 27. REVELATION POSSIBLE. 77
Holy Scripture and history in such a manner, that the theis-
tical and ethical contents of the revealed records (as being the
more pure doctrine, and the one the" author had in view,) were
used for the purpose of combating the other contents, according
to the fundamental principles of accommodation and complete
ness. Modern naturalists adopt the latter mode, and in this view
are to be preferred. On the other hand, that mode of thinking
which was founded on the attempts of Descartes' and Spinoza's
disciples, to explain the Bible on grounds in harmony with
reason, and which in many points agrees with Arminian herme-
neutics, has been designated by its admirers Rationalis Theologia,
and by its opponents, Rationalism. In its fuller development,
and particularly in its renovation by means of Lessing's, Kant's,
and Fichte's principles, this mode of thinking was not opposed
to, but admitted, (and this, too, generically,) the common super-
naturalistic idea, and was opposed more or less problematically
to the simple evangelical one ; but whilst acknowledging some
kind of necessity for revelation, and even sometimes recognis
ing the super-naturalism of form, it entered deeply into the
positive doctrine of the gospel, with allegorical or idealistic
explanations. The Naturalist was thus more aetiological, the
Rationalist more teleological, yet in such a way that both were
enabled to approximate. The Naturalist, in whole or in part,
denied the truth of Scripture ; the Rationalist was rather their
philosophical expositor. The extremes in. the school of ra
tionalism, at the Cartesian period, approximated closely, as
they do in the present day. In lamenting that so many who
boast in the title of Rationalists, have ceased to exhibit the pro
fundity which Lessing and Kant have done, in their attempts to
rationalize Christianity, we, at the same time, entertain the
opinion, that those who have exhibited themselves so inimical to
Dr Hahn, are, strictly speaking, only Naturalists, and by no
means Rationalists.
2 We entirely concur in Twesten's defence of the supernatural,
Vorlesung uber die Dogmatik, Part i. 363, Part ii. 117, 171.
Compare my Darstellung des Wunderbegrifs gegen Strauss Theol.
Stud. u. Kr., 1843, i.

78 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.

§ 29. REVELATION REAL.
The only religion which can pretend to reality, in the sense
hitherto described, and which it attains from Divine Eevelation,
is the Christian, or that mode of life depending upon the con
sciousness of the world's redemption, and of a personal Ee-
deemer,1 even Jesus Christ. Hence it is evident that the reli
gion which displays itself in " a virtuous course of life," or " in a
practical behef in immortality and recompense," or " veneration
of the Deity as founded by Jesus and a purified Judaism," are
but very imperfect designations of what ought to be primarily
maintained as the distinctive attribute of Christianity.
Remark. The custom of employing the terms, "religion of
Jesus," "doctrine of Jesus," instead of Christianity, is a clear
sign of the mode of thought which denies or forgets that Chris
tian sentiments and actions are related to Christ in a different
manner from Mahometan sentiments and actions to Maho
met. Christians did not call themselves Jesuits, but "sum
Christus." 1 Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, i. p. 180; Erdmann. Das
Bewusstsein von der Versohnung.
§ 30. OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT.
The title, Christ, does not primarily take into considera
tion those rehgious suppositions, which either did or could
exist among all nations at the tune of the appearance of
Jesus, but only one which was united to a distinct historical
and positive religion, and which Jesus himself indicated when
he decided against the woman of Samaria, " salvation is of
the Jews," John iv. 22. For as in every consciousness of re
demption, recourse is had to its necessity on account of sin,
and through the consciousness of sin to the law, and through
all this to the original destiny of man to God and by
God. So, in like manner, the word of salvation must be re-

B. REVELATION. — § 30. OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT. 79
ferred back to a prophetic and legal word. Hence the Old
Testament, in the unity of decreed salvation, and in the fact of
revelation, is in truth one with the New, but not identical, the
latter being related to the former, just as completion is to pre
paration, restriction to limitation, the direct to the indirect.1
1 We cannot entirely concur, either in Schleiermacher's defini
tions, which narrow the unity of the Old and New Testament
(Schleiermacher Glaubensl. i. p. 121, et seq. Bretschneider
Dogm., i. 72, and Vatke, Bibl. Theol., i. p. 62, 616, &c.) or in
those which amplify it, as set forth by Calvin, (Instit. rel. Chr.
lib. ii. cap. 9-11.)
The modern school designates Christianity absolute religion,
yet in such a way that the religion of the Old Testament is made
relative just as others are ; that is to say, natural and subjective
religion occupy the first rank, and the Old Testament is placed
in the second, (notwithstanding all the pre-eminence accorded
to it, in the fact that it alone recognises the wisdom and holiness
of absolute power,) and thus is in the same category with the
religion of the Greeks. This course is repugnant to the idea
of rehgious history, and riot less so to Christian conscious
ness. Indeed, every notion of religious history is incomplete and
defective, which denies the varied course of rehgion, as mani
fested in the public life of the people, and in the esoteric opinions
of the schools; and the same is the case, with every idea which
persists in a partial consideration of the mere not yet, or in a
confined view of the deficiency in absolute truth, without observ
ing the perversity of the tendencies, or the untruthfulness and
irrationality which have to be subdued. Both the one and the
other defect and partial view, is connected in such a way that
the process of man's religious life is merely regarded in its logico-
metaphysical elements, as if the sentient and willing spirit took
no part in religion. The author of the Book of Wisdom, xiii.,
and the Apostle Paul, Rom. i., philosophised in a far higher
strain than our logicians, concerning the causes of nature-worship;
they recognised in it the element of a passive state, of an inert
will, of infidelity. Supposing, for example, that Hellenism had
contended with and overcome the natural, and had elevated
itself up to the pure subjectivity of the Divine, still this could
only have been the case in its scientific disavowal and inter
pretation of myth ; but not indeed, in its principle, as a popular

80 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
religion: in fact, HeUenism possesses, even as philosophy, the
natural in itself. And how, then, is it possible to ascribe the glory
of originating true religion, otherwise than to Hebrewism, which,
in principle, excludes every form of nature-worship, granting
even, that it is involved in the universality of the subjective? This
logical caprice, indeed, which limits the God of the Old Testament
to the sphere of universality and subjectivity, mars the explana
tion. It is not true, as might on a first view appear, that Jehovah
is an abstract universality, like the Greek Si/ov, or a mere subjec
tivity like Zeus, the Godhead in the highest sense; but Jehovah
is the intimate combination of absolute unity and subjectivity,
and as such, is the concrete personality, which, (whilst it admini
sters itself in phenomena, elections and revelations, and becomes
objective,) clears a way for the revelation of the God-man, in a
manner altogether unparalleled. Whoever is enabled to perceive
that the unity, holiness, and wisdom of God are alone revealed in
the Old Testament, ought also to remember the conditions and
consequences of such a revelation, and not merely discourse on
the connection between the Old and New Testament history of
the world, a connection so entirely contingent and external.

§ 31. TESTAMENTARY AND EXTRA- TESTAMENTARY RELIGION.1
It must be admitted by those who are conversant with the
idea of revelation, that even heathenism, by a certain kind of
approximation and pedagogy, is related to Christianity. For
how could Christianity have otherwise been competent to make
itself so intelligible and estimable to innumerable heathen- Chris
tians, seeing that it so entirely contemned proselytism ? Or
how could the -collected apologists of Christianity, who had to
contend with a yet existing heathenism, have ventured to bor
row so many analogical proofs from heathenism itself? But the
more heathen state-religion, or the stray mysteries and varying
philosophy be considered, the easier can it be shown that there
exists in the heathen mode of hfe, a negative and ideal prepara
tion for a behef in redemption. The completeness of the contra
diction, not the consequence of development, — the wandering of

§ 32. EVIDENCE OF THE DIVINITY OF CHRISTIANITY. 81
contrasts,2 not the firm retention of an only one and original,
not the promise, but the ardent desire3 for the word of God,
makes the heathen a natural catechumen of Christianity, as is so
clearly attested in the biography of a Clemens of Eome, or a
Justin. Hence positive and real preparatives, and the subject-
matter of revelation exclusively belong to the Old Testament.
1 Ephes. ii. 12, %evoi ruv hiu^qxuv rr^g iirayyeXiug — V. 19, o/xeioTrou
§eou — V. 17, roig fj,uxgdv xul roTg eyyug.
2 Heathenism, according to its own self-judgment, presents to
the Christian theologian, a particular apologetic view. See on
the religious idea of the ancients, in Theol. Stud u. Kritiken,
i. 3, 4; which treatise has for its special object, the placing
certain leading points of Greek and Roman heathenism in such
a view, as to admit of their being considered by the Christian
theologian. 3 See Ackermann, Das Christliche im Plato, p. 334, not. i.
Cicero Fin. 5, 24, quodsi ipsam honestatem undique perfectam —
penitus viderent: quoniam gaudio complerentur, quum tanto opere
cius, adumbrata opinioni laetentur ! —
§ 32. EVIDENCE OF THE DIVINITY OF CHRISTIANITY.
The proof that the fundamental truth, by which all the doc
trines preserve their Christian peculiarity is Divine truth, is,
in a twofold point of view, either wanting, or exists only under
one aspect. In the first place,- Because every apologetic demon
stration must rest upon that hving and intuitive syUogism of
the heart, intimated in John vii. 17; Eomans i. 16; 1 Cor. ii.
4, 5,1 10; 2 Cor. iv..6, 13. And in this point of view, the
incapability of demonstrating the truth of Christianity has not-
only been cheerfully conceded, but also willingly maintained,
by those whose faith is strongest ; just as a certain rehgious
phUosopher of modern times rejoices and boasts in his igno
rance. 1 Oux h <ittfho?g go<piug Xoyoig, dXX' ev dftohei^ei ftvebfburog xul huvd-
fimg. The Eranist, by Theodoret, Dial. tom. iv. p. 199, may well
place the demand on the orthodox, uirohnxnxug, oux diro<pavnxug G

82 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
Xgy Xeyeiv r5jj exxXrigidg rd hoy/tarn, for they are still found in the
region of science.

| 33. CONTINUATION.
And, secondly, Because the empirical directions which, go to
complete the evidence of the Spirit, and which, on account of
the force of our imperfections, sometimes take the lead, and
sometimes accompany the proof, do not, taken separately, and
each by itself alone, establish anything, but only demonstrate
something in their due co-operation. In the first place, Jesus
testifies of himself, (John viii. 14, compare v. 31); and his self-
testimony is just as indispensable, (since he must necessarily be
the most experienced and most certain of what he is), and just
as valid, as it would, as he himself says, have been invalid, if it
had been merely left to itself, and isolated. But that his tes
timony is true, is proved by the fact, that there is nothing
contradictory in his personal conduct or sufferings ; for who
can convict him of sin ? John viii. 46 ; but on the contrary,
everything appertaining to him agrees with the evidence ; for
instance, the testimony of the Father, the works he performed,
combined with the resurrection and transfiguration, effected
through God.1 Again, the testimony with which the word of
God, speaking to the patriarchs and prophets,2 witnesses of the
Incarnate Word, and of the sufferings and glory of the Son of
man. FinaUy, the witness of the Paraclete,3 which, whUst it
takes aU that is Christ's, out of fools produces teachers of the
world, out of sinners saints, out of enemies friends, and out of
the world a temple of God.4
1 That the works (for the sake of which the eye-witnesses
ought to believe, according to John xiv. 11, x. 38, even if, in the
first instance, they do not credit the word), if they do not mean
the miracles only, described by Matthew xi. 5, as the distin
guishing marks of the appeared Redeemer, still imply the mi
racles principally, follows directly from the circumstance, that
the Father doeth them, (John xiv. 10), that they are done

B. REVELATION. — § 34. MIRACLES. 83
in the name of the Father, (x. 25), and that partly the same,
and partly still greater works, (xiv. 12), shall be done by^the
disciples after our Lord's ascension. The same also is assert
ed of the signs (xii. 37) which is here assserted of the works.
The egyu rou -^gierou (Matt. xi. 2) are the same characteristic Mes
sianic works which are enumerated at ver. 5; and although the
arm of the Lord (according to John xii. 28) is manifested in them,
still they are as little credited by those who are not of the truth,
as is the preaching.
2 The testimony of the word of God in the Old Testament,
(John v. 39), a) yguful [kugrugougui <xegl l[hou. Moses also wrote of
him, (v. 45). All Scripture testifies of his sufferings and of his
glory, (Luke xxiv. 44). The Spirit of Christ was in the pro
phets, (1 Pet. i. 11), and they "searched diligently" "what
manner of time the Spirit of Christ did signify."
3 The testimony of the Paraclete, (John xv. 26, xvi. 8), his
dependence on Christ, (xvi. 13-15). This testimony, as a gene
ral one, which is given to the world, (1 Tim. iii. 16; Acts ii. 16;
1 John v. 8) ; as an internal and particular one, (1 Cor. ii. 1 2;
Ephes. i. 13).
4 The testimony of vital Christianity and apostleship, (John
xvi. 27). The foolish teachers of the world, (Rom. i. 16; 1 Cor.
i. 27, ii. 6, iv. 15). From sinners, saints, (Ephes. ii. 1-6, iv. 12).
Out of enemies, friends, (Ephes. ii. 14; Gal. iii. 28). Out of the
world a temple of God, (Ephes. ii. 15, v, 27).

•§ 34. MIRACLES.
If a miracle were simply an event opposed to nature's laws,
a something unnatural and incomprehensible, and if the human
understanding, together with entire nature, experienced, through
its agency, merely a subversive shock, then would the de
fence of Christianity, a rehgion established by means of a grand
system of miracles, have to contend against insurmountable
difficulties. But the miracles of revelation, with aU the objec
tive supernaturalness essentiaUy belonging to them, are in truth
somewhat accordant with natural laws, partly in reference to
the higher order of circumstances to which the miracles relate,

84 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
and which order also is a world, a nature of its own kind, and
operates upon the lower order of things according to its mode;
"partly in regard to the analogy with that common nature
which miracles in some way or other retain; and finally, on
account of their teleological perfection. Moreover, the mi
racles of revelation must even, as the homogeneous manifesta
tion of the internal miracle of redemption, not only be expected
from out the standing point of Christian faith already finished,
but also, by means of a connexion existing between the Spirit
and nature, be considered as natural in its kind.1
Remark 1. We distinguish between subjective and objective
miracles. The former consist in such changes as, by reason of
their connexion with other external circumstances or internal
conditions, cause them to forget their natural connexion, and
immediately point to the Lord of nature, who will attest some
thing. If man could, either by means of his perception or his
action, find himself acquainted with the constitution of nature,
miracles in that case would not happen; but since man pos
sesses no such privilege, miracles do occur to his experience ac
cording to his subjective standing-point and relation to nature;
and in a teleological point of view, they involve a complete
supernaturalness. From the notion we have illustrated above
concerning the element of constant progress, it follows, that
even revelation is conformable to temporal and local necessi
ties; and accordingly it does not admit of a doubt, that it also
is accompanied with subjective miracles. Even naturalism ad
mits their occurrence; and rationalism not only requires, but
even looks out for them. See Nitzsch De Revel., &c. p. 219. On
the other hand, a relation to the universal and fixed necessities
of humanity also appertains to revelation, in conformity with the
element of originality, and only the phenomena of objective sup
ernaturalness, as the person of the Redeemer himself, which is its
middle point, correspond to this relation. By and in miracles, "The
Lord hath created a new thing," (Jer. xxxi. 22). ;-R2nn Pfa'f
NTSpP and nW'-to Numbers xvi. 30. AiW/a/s expresses rather
the objective idea of miracle, regug, &c. the subjective, s^e/ov, the
intuitive sign of the spiritual fact of God's kingdom.
Remark 2. Even an objective or causative miracle fs not un-

B. REVELATION. — § 34. MIRACLES. 85
natural, since a full idea of nature has miracle, and a true idea
of miracle has nature for its element. They cannot be separated
in their diversity. The history of science testifies that even
where the ideas of the Creator and creation are excluded, there
arises the necessity (as, for instance, with natura naturans, in
contrast with naturata,) for perceiving an infinite ground, the
absolute ground of creation, and for discriminating it from the
mere series of developments. The crudest naturalism — mere ma
terialism, is alone ignorant of this necessity. The science of
faith in a personal Creator, on the other hand, and in the creation,
or in the Almighty by means of the idea of the so-called creatio
mediata, has admitted originations and miracles into the system
of the existence and history of nature. Though we admit a vital
izing power to exist in vegetable life, and an animating power
in animal-soul life, still, either the creative act or the natura
naturans will be further required, in order to realise the possibi
lity and accomplish the predisposition. A more early day-work
of God does not produce, independently of itself, a later one; the
previous step, corresponding to its adequate cause, does not pro
duce the higher stage, which must again have a cause adequate to
its production. Or if the doctrine of creatio mediata be denied,
still, must it not be admitted that the first historical originations,
contrasted with the laws of generation and germination which at
present exclusively operate, are miracles? At that time, powers,
which are now reposing and have receded, were at work. Just
as at this period, in the identical natural system, laws of an in
ferior kind are annulled by those of higher order. The com
mencements and issues of natural phenomena have another and
a higher legality than that which lies between them. But all
is harmony. There is no more disorder or incongruity produced in
the region of morals or art, by a subversion of the lower laws for
the sake of the higher, than there is in the kingdom of nature.
Two such orders or circles do not absolutely repel each other;
and the existing fundamental relations of soul and body, spirit
and soul, life and death, continue the possibility of miracle.
Remark 3. But the aim of miracle still remains. The ques
tion, indeed, is not whether a doctrine shall be proved by
means of miracles wrought by the teacher. Jesus is the Christ
— is that a mere doctrine ? Salvation is come into the world — is
that a mere development of thought? No, it is a fact; for a
person and a work of God, which is mediated through it, are facts.

86 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
Miracles, considered in themselves, and in their connection with
facts, can only attest something, and thus serve to awaken faith.
But religion, like revelation, presents in general an aspect found
ed on fact. Just as httle as you can prove to me, through any
mode of development of thought, that Jesus is the deliverer from
death, as little can I, by means of any fact, as such, render con
ceivable unto you that which cannot be conceived. (Compare
Fichte Anw. zum sel. Leben 6 Beilage.) Nevertheless, the funda
mental relation of the idea to history remains. The external and
internal, spirit and nature, the arm of God and preaching, abide,
Isaiah liii. 1. But in reference to the doubt whether miracles
be not of the devil, Jesus himself has answered the question,
Matth. xii. 25.
1 See Twesten's admirable Treatise on the Idea of Miracles,
Vorless., &c, 363-79, in which some fundamental thoughts of
Schleiermacher's occur (Glaubenslehre, p. 120): and Sack Apolo-
getik, p. 85-88. Compare also my treatise on Miracle, Theol.
Stud. u. Krit. 1843, i.

§ 35. PROPHECY.
Although the prediction of events depending upon Divine
communication is neither so impossible as Cicero maintained, nor
so useless or even dangerous as Kant attempted to show ; stiU
the. evidence of prophecy, of which Christ and the apostles
avaUed themselves, consists less in an historical characteristic
of the Eedeemer's person, (which, to a certain extent, is an
assemblage of Old Testament prophecies; for with the excep
tion of his descent from David there is an almost total deficiency
of the kind of proof required,) than in the fact of the Old Tes
tament conducting from the beginning, on the ground of the
revelation of the true God and of His covenant sovereignty, to a
holy definitive history, and this, under increasing development,
leading to the expectation of a personal Bedeemer. The dis
tinction, however, between prophecy and type is to be duly ob
served; and this is firmly to be maintained, viz. that the repre
sentations of a manifested Lord, of a suffering Mediator, of the

B. REVELATION.  § 35. PROPHECY. 87
Son of God, and of the Great Prophet, are united only gradu-
aUy with the expectation of a true King, and are for the most
part represented as separated from one another, whilst they
appear in the testament united to fulfilment, as weU by the
actual person of Jesus, as through the prevailing interpretation.
Remark. Divination (/iavrsiu, «gohr{Xtagig, Plutarch, de Oracc.
Pyth. divinatio, prcesentio et scientia rerum futurarum. Cic. De
Divin. 1. i.) obtains an interest from its announcing a result
which, humanly speaking, could not have previously been known,
and so far was accidental. Even when foreknowledge is of no
advantage, yet, as a mere pretext, it is capable of exciting
salutary attention, and, in the event of its being confirmed by
the result, of obtaining a testimony for persons and occurren
ces, and thus becomes further pregnant with design. Every
causative and teleological possibility of divination requires that
it be rarely and temperately exhibited, so as not to destroy
the entire human relation to history; and this so much the
more, because divination, in the cases to which it extends,
can only reach its veritable accomplishment by means of the
most definite statements of the peculiar marks of the fact.
Otherwise, the remark made by Boethus the geometrician, in
Plutarch, (formerly cited, § 10,) is a valid objection, namely, that
divination conceals itself in a mass of dark and strange symbols,
which, perchance, may meet with accidental realization. Aiu<pign
says he, yev'e&ai rb giftev n gjjSSjra/ ro yevr\gb[i,env. And upon that is
added, the just mgohrfKugig is bitou ou [ibvov Xeyerui rb yevrigof&ew, dXXd
xul itug xul icbre xul /isra ri xul y.erd rhog. It foUows, that divina
tion is necessarily frequently accompanied by superstition, and
must be very subordinate when used in the service of revelation.
Divination is a subject of Divine prohibition, Deut. xviii. 10-14.
For a very striking and comprehensive criticism on the popular
supematurahstic idea of the evidence of prophecy, i. e. on the
authenticity of divination, see Ammon's Bib. Theol. ii. Introduc
tion, and also at p. 10, where it is rendered evident how predic
tion in the Old Testament should in some way be conditionated
to suffice the requirements of the popular view.
As used by the heathen, the word Prophet, hypophet, votes,
does not primarily signify one who predicts, but one who enun
ciates. Prophecy, a term exclusively found in testamentary an
tiquity, and never used, for example, by the Greeks (the gods of

88 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
the heathen declare nothing, Isaiah xii. 22, 23,) is the repre
sented future of the kingdom of God, grounded on an internal
perception of the Divine decree, which, ever proceeding from a
definite point of the historical present, points out with more or
less distinctness of detail, the completion of the Divine economy;
and whilst it is conversant with the Divine in history, but not
with the outward matter, characterises reality only in those lead
ing points wherein it especially accords with truth. The represent
ing media of prophecy, therefore, can only be, in a great measure,
analogical and symbolical. Chronology is subordinate. All pro
phetic numbers are, to a certain extent, symbolical; this has not
been sufficiently admitted by Alb. Bengel and Crusius, although
their chief merit relates to prophetic theology; and even in our
own days has" been too little attended to by the more rigorous
apologists. The prophets " have enquired diligently" after the
time, 1 Pet. i. 10. The computation of time has never been en
tirely settled. Types exist partly within and partly out of prophecy.
Type is that element in the word, or history of the Old Testament,
which, by virtue of the law of similitude and development, con
tains, besides its aim for the nearest, lower stage of revelation and
redemption, upon which it first appears, a prognostication of
something which is peculiar to the higher stage. The more the
typical is contained in a prophecy, so much more does it look for
repeated and gradual, for a very near and for a very remote fulfil
ment; as, for example, the prophecies of Ezekiel and the latter
part of Isaiah. But type occurs entirely out of its province
in the Psalms, for example, in the law, and in regard to histori
cal personages and their actions or afflictions. The formula hu
wXngu^p is frequently applied to types, just as if they were pro
phecies. As the narration contained in the New Testament,
and more especially that of the Old, is free from any doubt with
respect to objective miracle in the Divine acts, and (apart
from any scientific distinction of kind,) indicates miracles, the
distinction being expressed, for the most part, by the vari
ous expressions Tegug, gnpehv, huvupig; so, in like manner, does
the apostle typify details on the supposition of the organic
whole of a xiyog •Kgotpnnxbg, of which he has become assured in the
central point of a great epoch of salvation foretold and fulfilled.
The proper idea of type appears, especially in the Epistles to the
Galatians and Hebrews. That there are types, follows even from
the general relation of the Becoming to the Being and of history

B. REVELATION. — § 35. PROPHECY. 89
to Spirit. The general aim of prophecy and type is to unite faith
in revelation with belief in the government of the world ; or to
strengthen, upon a definite stage of Divine revelation, faith in
the presence of the Divine Spirit and word, by means of evi
dence exhibited and prepared, and at the same time to excite
a susceptibility for higher stages. It is true that the first
formation of the apostles' faith commenced independently of
prophetic evidence, and still less was it dependent on any ex
ternal sign applicable to Jesus. Jesus is estimated by them
according to what he is and becomes to them, just as he, in
his reply to the question, Who art thou? merely answers, "even
the same that I said unto you from the beginning," John viii. 25.
The experience of Nathaniel or Peter, those original operations,
both spiritual and moral, elicit Messianic faith afresh and anew.
Through the glorification of the Lord they first receive with the
Spirit, the explanation of the Old Testament. Experience, if
it shaU be received by the heathen and Jews into the joint
historical consciousness, and more especially into religious con
templation, must preserve its indication in the past and its
presage of the world's future course. In the writings bearing
on this subject, those of Joh. Dav. Michaelis, Seiler, Herder,
G. Menken; also in Pascal's Thoughts, and particularly in K. H.
Sack's Apologetik (1829, p. 226,) Fundamental Prophecies in the
Historical Books of the Bible, Prophecies relative to the kingdom
by the Prophets and Typical Prophecies of the Hagiographists,
or, according to the second edition, Grund-P sal/men — und theo-
kratisch-nationale — Weissagungen ; and, farther, in Hoffman's
Prophecy and Fulfilment in Ike Old and New Testament, i. 1841;
ii. 1844, there are rudiments for a theory of prophecy, which,
however, as yet, has not been matured; and there has arisen
a very important controversy between the advocates of Scrip
ture faith and Scripture learning, in which the so-called Super-
naturalists are partly opposed to one another; perhaps this
may lead to a more extensive cultivation of a much-neglected
branch of Biblical theology. Before this period, Hengsten-
berg, in his work, die Authentie des Daniel und die Integri
ty des Sacharjah, Berlin, 1831, p. 187, undertook to defend
historical and characteristic prediction against the preceding
remarks we have made relative to'truth and reality. I pass over
Hengstenberg's remark in reply to my observations, namely,
that Christ himself has even publicly prophesied or predicted

90 INTRODUCTION. — II. OBJECT.
what has no immediate connection with Divine truth; for that
does not affect my position, since I grant there may be pre
dictions in Scripture, only these are subordinate and not en
tirely characteristic of prophecy. His observation at p. 188 is
more important, " whatever is related to reality, in so far as the
same agrees with tmth, has a connecting link in the mind of
man, and consequently may easily be considered as mere subjec
tive presentiment; as, for example, the prophecy of redemption
might be derived in general from the felt necessity of redemption
combined with a knowledge of Divine love." Here there is enun
ciated a very hazardous idea of prophecy, and an erroneous idea
of revelation itself. Dr Hengstenberg, it is true, only appears
desirous of preserving the prediction of particular external cir
cumstances, and of elevating them, so as to constitute an
essential element of prophecy; but, in truth, he argues in such
a way, that prophecy, (in so far as it may be considered Divine,
and as constituting an essential part and intrinsic sign of
revelation,) can only be looked upon as a kind of prediction
and divination. Thus, he infers, that whatever is prophesied
from man's inward feeling of the necessity of redemption and
knowledge of Divine love, can only be natural, human subjecti
vity, and in so far as such kind of prophecy does exist, there is
no criterion of its divinity. But whatever there is, that finds no
connecting link in the human mind, consequently whatever is
entirely external and foreign to subjectivity, such as the predict
tion of a battle, a death, a conflagration, a name, and year, con
stitutes the divine and supernatural of prophecy. In this view
of supematuralism, I confess I do not concur ; but on the con
trary, I consider it very objectionable and dangerous. In the
first place, at least, it is opposed to empyrical psychology, to
maintain' that the possession and the expression of presentiments
of future reality is contrary to the nature of the human mind;
and what Hengstenberg asserts, relative to the presentiment of
redemption (supposing that the question turned here upon pre
sentiment — that it was a something subjective) is equally valid
in the case of the presentiment of actual things. But what is
meant when it said: — truth finds a connecting link in the mind
of man ? Truth in the abstract is ever approved by man, because
he is a rational being. The natural man approves of, and is con
nected with the divine truth of salvation, (which according to our
hypothesis constitutes the invariable contents of prophecy,) only

B. REVELATION.  § 35. PROPHECY. 91
in proportion as he attains a consciousness of his natural deprav
ity, and recognises God as mediating to his restoration. That
an Israelite who worships God does possess such a knowledge of
the love of God in the love of Jehovah to Israel, and such an
assured conviction of redemption, by means of which he is en
abled to view its truth, as one presenting itself for contempla
tion, and to receive the suggestions of the Divine Spirit as a tes
timony and representation of the contemplated salvation, — to
suppose this, pre-supposes the whole question of revelation.
The fact that the Prophet possesses fundamental intuitions,
which are in themselves independently dialectic and syllogistic,
does not necessarily render him idealistic and poetically philoso
phic. The idea of abstract thought is perfectly conscious of its
variance with the history of reality; but the consciousness of the
prophet perceives that it is full of that same Divine word, which
rules and renovates history and nature. Is that perchance, less
supernatural or less divine, because the Israelites, of all the
people of antiquity, alone and exclusively developed their mono
theistic faith in the government of the world, up to the extent
of believing in its redemption, and to the contemplation of a
personal Redeemer, and Mediator of the people of God ? On
the contrary, it is rather first, through this great connecting
prophecy, relative to the Divine realization of truth and good
ness, that ordinary predictions retain their worth and credit,—
predictions, which, if they should appear in the same fulness,
consecutiveness, and precision, as the prophetical supernaturalist
would fain desire, (as Hengstenberg, p. 189, himself, acknow
ledges) would destroy man's fundamental relation to history.
But prophecy in its annunciations, realises the future in reference
to time, place, and individuals, only in a relative manner; only in
the great turning-points of the history of God's people, which
points themselves, again, become typical with reference to the
history of God's kingdom, as represented in the New Testament;
as in the case of Jerusalem and Babylon, and in the restoration
of the house of David ; yet here even, it is only by an analogical
approximation, or statement of particular momenta, which appear
included in the reality, or by the rejection of a unity, which in
the reality melts into the momenta, that prophecy attains reali
zation. But this incongruity between the analogico-symbolical
contents of prophecy and the external fact, preserves, on the one
hand, the relation of man to history, which, in respect of faith,

92 INTRODUCTION. — III. LAWS OF COGNITION.
includes a necessary ignorance of the future; while, on the other
hand, it repairs itself upon the standing-point of fulfilment, by
means of a typological retrospect on the personal, relational, and
verbal types, which have been produced within its circumference
and in its company.
Hence the most distinctive peculiarity of New Testament his
tory contained in the Old Testament, is typified neither in a pro
phetical mode nor in the way of prediction ; but is prefigured in
type, and it is only in this point of view that the Psalms, for
instance, are Christological, or that the lifting up of Christ on the
cross, his resurrection, and ascension, his betrayal by Judas, &c,
constitute the contents of the Old Testament. With reference to
the typical kingdom of Israel, see particularly Bleek., Theol. Stud.
ii. Krit., 1835, p. 453, et seq. Hengstenberg has adopted, in his
doctrine of prophecy, according to the preface to his Christologie
iii., definitions of a more extended and accommodating cha
racter.

III. OF THE LAWS OF COGNIZING CHRISTIAN
DOCTRINE.
| 36. SOURCE AND INTERPRETATION.
It is not sufficient for mankind, that, along with Christianity,
the truth of salvation and the preservation of truth in the world
be obvious, and in some way or other operative. For, as reve
lation, no more than redemption, operates by a constraining
or magical influence, but is united to the free and gradual
progression of human culture ; so, in hke manner, it is exposed
to misapprehension and abuse ; and, consequently, at aU times
the question arises, from whence does the pure fountain of
Christian cognition and action spring? and how can we draw
therefrom? The former question is responded to by the doctrine
of Holy Writ, the latter by the doctrine of its interpretation.
Remark. It is certainly included in the idea of truth, that it
triumphs over, and, like as it were, an eternal light, consumes
those shadows and dissipates those obscurities which, on the
occasion of its appearance, have been generated in persons more

A. HOLY SCRIPTURE. — § 37. WORD OF GOD AND THE SPIRIT. 93
or less susceptible. Eminently is this the case in the idea
of revelation, of the word of God in an especial sense, which,
from the beginning, must act as a healing remedy against fun
damental error, and operate beyond a simple counterpoise or
mere limitation to falsehood and sin. Thus, " one jot or tittle
shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled," Matth. v.
18; and the word of the Lord shall outlast heaven and earth,
Matth. xxiv. 35; an everlasting gospel, Revelation xiv. 6. But
its mode of manifestation must have ever been secured, and its
efficacy established and fixed on a stable basis; for it is equally
true that the greater and more complete an epoch of revelation is,
or the longer its duration, so much the more does it elicit a perse
vering contradiction of its more ancient stages. But opposition
to revelation, upon the whole, resembles opposition to religion in
general, i. e., it passes over from mere unbelieving negation to
an analytical affirmation. Christianity is appropriated, but it
becomes again in the hands of those who embrace and defend it
more or less the same legalized religious institution which ought
to be subdued, it becomes a mixture of heathenism and Juda
ism, or a blending of legends and philosophy, &c. Now, if the
epoch had not only taught or spoken, but also written, every re
formation, considered in its ideal, becomes possible ; and if the
providential connection of history and language has been pre
served, and this through the existence of Scripture, then the key
to the record can never be entirely lost.

A. Of the Holy Scripture.
| 37. THE WORD OF GOD AND THE SPIRIT.
The Word of God constitutes His witness— the witness of His
kingdom, as a history and a fact which interprets and re-as
sumes itself by means of personal organs— a word which has
pervaded the history of the world and human language, but has
been accomphshed in Christ, who, in time, reached his own full
completion. Doubtless the temporal presence of Christ on earth is now
supplied by the mission of the Paraclete, and revelation is pre-

94 INTRODUCTION. — III.. LAWS OF COGNITION.
served, so far as the promise and gift of the Holy Spirit ex
tends, in the preciousness and power of a sinhlar origin. The
gift of the Spirit, however, is itself administered through the
Word proceeding from God, just as it again can only be morally
and hvingly appropriated, and only in a divine way, adopt
ed through the Spirit of truth; a reciprocal relation which
never ceases, so that Christian cognition can never be derived
from a mere internal source, and every appeal to an inner
hght, whilst the external Word is contemned, leads to empty fana
ticism.1 In general this relation corresponds to the connection
between internal and external experience, and between that of
history and consciousness.
1 See Calvin's Inst. Rel. Chr. i. 9, where, on the passages of
Isaiah lix. 21, 2 Tim. iii. 16, John xvi. 13, he animadverts on the
many erroneous admirers of subjectivity. If the apologist of
the Quakers would only accord to the Bible the dignity of mani-
festati verbi fontes, even this determination for restoring the re
lation of things would be insufficient; for wherever the fontes are,
there must the principia also exist. Private revelation, farther
umxuXu-^eig can only be added to the common treasury of truth,
on their standing the test of the canon. Phil. iii. 15, 1 Cor.
xii., xiv., 1 Thess. v. 19.

§ 38. THE SPIRIT AND WORD.
Nevertheless, it whT depend from the very first upon the
correct tradition and pure preservation of the Word of God,
and consequently, in a very especial manner, upon the work of
the Holy Spirit on those whom Christ has commissioned, that
they shaU preach repentance and forgiveness of sins in his
name. Wherever Christ's authority is in fuU force, those whom
he has personally caUed and appointed to await the promise of
the Father, and thereby prepared to be not so much our task- '
masters as our fathers in Christ (.1 Cor. iv. 15), even such must
be held as the authentic sources of tradition, on the grounds of
their peculiar connection with the Eedeemer, and with the

A. HOLY SCRIPTURE. — § 39. SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION. 95
fundamental facts of salvation ; and except through them the
Word of God cannot be received by any one ; 1 just as it is out
of the power of any one to represent them or assume their
office. 1 On the authority of the apostles see Twesten's Vorless.
406-10; and my Protest. Theses., No. 2, 3. Tert. praescr. 6,
apostolos domini habemus auctores — .

§ 39. SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.
But, lest apostolical tradition should lose its originality, and
cease to be authentic, inasmuch as it is transmitted to poste
rity through bishops, synods, and especially by the church, per
verted and intermixed as it is with secular philosophy, it is
preserved, under the gracious favour of Providence in the
same manner hy means of Scriptures, as the Word of God,
which was spoken to the patriarchs, and through the prophets,
and which had acquired a permanent written authenticity long
prior to the period of scholastic and sectarian views of revelation.
But the authority of the apostohcal Scriptures does not rest alone
upon the fact of their being accredited to the church as apos
tolical — to that ' church which had been raised by the oral
teaching of the apostles ; but it rests also upon the fact of their
being even now accompanied by the operation and testimony of
that same Spirit which inspired Christian communities distin
guishing them from the world, and fostering and preserving the
life in Christ beyond every thing else.
Remark. The church of Christ undoubtedly existed before the
Apostolic Bible; it only required the living, oral teaching of the
witnesses of Jesus to become apparent ; but it does not follow
from this that, in order to subsist, it did not continually stand
in need of the immediate teaching of the apostles. The church
is grounded on the Word of God, in apostolical tradition. If the
last apostle has spoken out, then either the authenticity is lost,
or it remains amongst the apostolical discourses which have been
preserved by memory or through writing. The tradition which

96 INTRODUCTION. — III. LAWS OF COGNITION.
shall from henceforth be considered valid, is, on the one hand,
conditionated through the " demonstration" of the apostolical
spirit, and life of its possessor; and, on the other, is subjected to
those Scriptures acknowledged by the church as genuine^ or
rather, the Scriptures themselves determine genuine tradition.
The church, however, has confessedly not made the Scriptures
genuine; but the Scriptures have proved themselves to the
church, and from henceforth made the church genuine. M.
Chemnittii, Examen. Concilii Trid., and Dallseus, de usu Patrum,
have served as a defence for the directive rule and exclusive
authority of the Holy Scriptures against the Council of Trent, and
against the Jesuits. Of the more recent discussions on tradi
tion may be mentioned, as particularly worthy of notice, Marh-
eineke's Abh. ub. den wahren Sinn der Tradition in Kathol. Lehr-
begriff und das recte Verhaltniss ders. z. protest. Lehre. in Daub
and Creuzer's Studd. B. 4; and De Wette, Theoll. Aufssatze z.
chr. Belehrung und Ermahnung, p. 54. With reference to Less-
ing's too comprehensive Theses on the Rule cf Faith, and his
controversy with Gotze and Walch, the Protestant principle has
(on the appearance of Delbriick's Phillipp Melancthon der Glau-
bensleherer, eine Streitschrift, Bonn, 1826,) been recently exa
mined and defended by Sack, Nitzsch, and Liicke, On the Au
thority of Holy Scripture, and its relation to the rule of faith
in the Protestant and the Ancient Church, three theological letters
addressed to Professor Delbruck, Bonn, 1827. See also my Pro
testant Theses (Supplement to the Protestant Reply to Mohler's
Symbolism, Hamburg, 1835, No. 1-16.) It cannot a priori be
maintained that a written communication is a too extensive in
terposition of Divinity, is something too inanimate and too con
tracted, and, considered in the light of an active reflection of
what is determined, is unworthy of transmitting the Word of
God. If oral tradition be separated from its just ground and aim,
from its living conditions, it exhibits similar uncertainty; if
written tradition be maintained in unity with life, its import
ance will be found sufficiently great. An inspired person, in the
sense of the Greeks, is not supposed to write ; the Christian idea
of an inspired condition is altogether a different one. Apart from
the fact that the extent of publicity and duration, for the sake of
which the writer communicates, may be greater, and the inten
sity of the loving will in faith is not enfeebled. So the Scripture
represents the historical momenta of complete life, as, for example,

A. HOLY SCRIPTURE. — § 40. CANON. 97
in the Gospels, and exhibits, it may be, in a letter to the Phir
Uppians, Corinthians, Galatians, the apostle in his entire being
and nature, as completely and as conformably to the object as it
was possible to do, more so perhaps than could have been the case
in any point of oral discourse. And to this may be added, that
the existence of Scripture neither disturbs the word nor the
Spirit, but the question turns on Scripture with reference to its
oneness with preaching, interpretation, the church, catechising,
&c. Compare my Abh. uber die h. Schrift gegen Strauss Theol. St.
u. Kritt. 1843, part ii. p. 378-88, and my Sendschr. an Prof. Del-
briick, p. 62, et seq.

§ 40. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CANON.
These grounds for the authority of Holy writ are reciprocaUy
related, and accord with the idea of a Canon. Originally, by
the term canon, or rule, was understood that internal con
scious criterion, according to which the Christian was enabled
and was bound to examine any assumed form of Christianity;
and partly also it denoted a summary abstract of the main facts,
as they had been promulged, and in which particulars it was
customary, from the days of Christ and the apostles, but more
particularly on the occasion of baptismal confession, to com
prise aU the leading peculiarities of their belief.
Remark. The primary signification of the ecclesiastical term
xuvdiv is not a catalogue of books. Opposed to this error, descended
from the time of Semler, H. Planck has essayed a more correct
explanation: NonnuUa de significatu canonis in eccl. antiqua
eiusque serie recte constituenda. Goett. 1820. The Redeemer
has given a comprehensive expression of the church creed; Matt.
xxviii. 19; Luke xxiv. 47. The Apostles, however, acknowledge
among the gifts of the Spirit, not only prophecies, &c. ; but also
the discerning of spirits, 1 Cor. xiv. 29, and exhort to try the
free doctrine and the teaching Spirit, 1 Thess. v. 21, and 1 John
iv. 1. Now according to what unity of manifoldness, or after
what multiplicity of principles, shaU each gift be tried? To
this question, the New Testament furnishes the critic with a firm
starting-point, without, however, prescribing any precise formula,
H

98 INTRODUCTION. — III. LAWS OF COGNITION.
1 John iv. 2, compare ii. 22, 1 Tim. i. 15, iii. 16, i Cor. i. 22-24,
xv. 1-4. The doctrine of the unity, thus grounded, St Paul de
signates a xuvuv, PhU. iii. 16, a word he derived from the popular
language of the times, although the schools of phUosophers had
already, from the simplest laws of knowledge, employed the term,
of which the canonic of the Epicureans is a proof; and now this
xuvuv dXrfreiug, exXr\giu«nxbg, regula veritatis immobilis et irrefor-
mabilis, was sometimes considered by orthodox divines inexpres
sible and inherent in Christian objective consciousness, and
sometimes was enunciated in the formularies of confession as
well by particular theologians (Irenseus, Tertullian, Clemens
of Alexandria, Origen) as by entire communities and synods.
On this subject, see my Letter to Prof. Delbruck, p. 41 — 61, and
Pearson, King, and Walch, on the ancient creeds, and the
apostolic Symbol, in particular.
§ 41. SCRIPTURE CANON.
Since both these kinds of canon, the vital and spirituaUy
formal, as weU as the directly formal, could only be in part
based upon apostohcal instruction, and partly expanded and
developed by the same, so from the very first, the church was
not only deeply interested in preserving, comparing, coUecting,
distinguishing, and attesting the writings of the apostles, and
those claiming to be apostolical, (in which the external and inter
nal evidences necessarily co-operated,) but it ever regarded the
collected writings of the apostolical Bible, in its connection with
the prophetic one, as standing above aU subjective Christianity,
and which Bible, it simply designated the Canon, as contrasted on
the one hand with the doctrine and literature derived from other
sources, and on the other, as distinctive from actual or possible
heresies, and pretended paradoxes ; apart from the fact, that the
external and internal arguments have ever spoken with equal
force, for each particular writing,
§ 42. SCRIPTURE AND WORD OF GOD.
From the relations arising out of this origin of the Canon

A. HOLY SCRIPTURE. — § 42. SCRIPTURE AND WORD OF GOD. 99
it follows, as a direct consequence, that the existing church is
founded upon a behef in the Holy Scriptures, that is to say, it
rests upon the hvmg conviction of Christians, that Scripture, by
the same Divine act and power, to which we are indebted for
revelation, and the word of God in the apostolic preaching, has
been furnished as a channel of tradition for the word of God,
which in itself is one, intelhgible, and complete. But this
Scripture faith, provided it does not become a hteral one, anta
gonistic to Christianity,1 can never be grounded upon mere
ecclesiastical tradition and supposition, nor upon any inspira
tion, either exalting itself above or rendering itself independent
of revelation, nor can it be founded upon any Divine operation
which absolutely excludes the spontaneity of the writers.2 On
the contrary, the sohd basis of Scripture faith reposes, in a re
ciprocal manner, partly on the indestructible certainty that the
actual being and existing state of these Scriptures are neces
sarily and immediately connected with that, which the apostles
of Christ had been and effectuated, and by means of which
universal history has maintained its Christian novelty, and
partly upon that spiritual experience we have of the internal
agreement, as weU as of the difference of Scripture and the
word of God.3 The difference between the proto-canonical and
deutero-canonical Scriptures, generaUy admitted by the church,
evidences that different kinds and measures of inspiration may
be aUowed to exist in different portions of the canon, although
the whole canon participates in it; whUst the attributes of infal-
hbUity, sufficiency, and perfection only pertain to the whole
as such.
1 John vi. 33; 1 Cor. iv. 20; 2 Cor. iii. 6.
2 See Twesten Vorless. p. 41 7.
3 See Sack, Vom Worte Gottes, eine Christliche Verstamdigung.
Bonn, 1825.
Remark 1. Strictly speaking, it is not merely the existing
church, or the post-apostolical one in general, which is based
upon written records. Christ himself, and the Apostles, neces-

100 INTRODUCTION. — III. LAWS OF COGNITION.
sarUy referred to the Holy Scripture. There never was, in truth,
an absolute interregnum of oral doctrine.
Remark 2. A Scripture faith, in harmony with the belief in
revelation and salvation, as already presupposed, exhibits, withal,
a species and an impress of teleological faith in providence.
Scripture faith requires and presupposes that the God of revela
tion and redemption will, by some means or other, preserve the
originality of the Gospel. Its language is, — Scripture cannot lie,
because God's word is truth : for whoever has once found truth
in those points contained in Scripture, from whence every other
emanates, or to which all tend, which truth again makes him,
together with his entire capacity for it, free — such a one will
either reserve his right and mistrust his own judgment in any
matter offensive or apparently erroneous — in as much as what
ever appears externally to be in organic connexion with a lead
ing point, maybe assumed to be similarly associated internally —
or else such a person wiU act as the original Luther did. In order
to emancipate themselves from believing in the authority of
Scripture, as a rule of faith, some intellectual men, like Lessing
and others, have said; "beeause truth is found in the Bible, it is
not truth for being in the Bible." We have, however, already fre
quently shown, that the first proposition, strictly speaking, con
ducts to the latter. See Theol. Stud. u. Kr. 1832, 2, p. 375. ,
1843, 2, p. 386.
Remark 3. Scripture faith, indeed, is derived from a belief in
revelation ; but with a distinction. For, as the word of God, when
united with the discourse of an apostle or prophet, who address
ed a congregation, is accompanied by very different circum
stances, than when it is contained in a Pauline epistle, which
is read with other Scriptures, and which, in connection, con
stitute the invariable records of revelation ; so in like manner,
an especial economy will be found in each of the two distinct
modes in which the Divine word operates ; and in the history of
the formation of the canon, all the wisdom and grace of the Lord,
which in an especial manner have appeared in the production of
the facts of revelation and of the covenants, have been magnified
in a new and peculiar manner. A record, in the full sense of the
word, always constitutes an essential part of the fact of which it
gives an account. According to the most rigid criticism, although
in a varying mode, this remark may he applied to both parts

B. INTERfEETATION. — § 43. PERSPICUITY, UNITY. 101
of the biblical canon, and to the individual books contained in
each. Let it be remembered, how essentially the recorded
fundamental laws of the Pentateuch are united with the mi
nistry of Moses as the founder of Theocracy; or how the Psalms,
Prophecies, and Epistles addressed to the primitive churches
of Christ, and the descriptions and notices of the most important
circumstances in the Ufe of Jesus, in GalUee and Jerusalem,
are combined with the entire activity of a prophet, apostle, or
evangehst, with an activity essential to the founding and pre
serving religion. Faith in the records is never exhausted, either
by the experience which many, aU, or individuals have of them,
or by the conception of these experiences.
B. On the Interpretation of the Holy Scripture.'
§ 43. SCRIPTURE EXPLICABLE ; ITS PERSPICUITY AND UNITY.
If He who, being in the form of God, nevertheless humbled
himself, and was found in fashion as a man, Phil. ii. 7 ; and if
the Divine word, from the beginning, made under the law of hu
man speech, has worked out its own law, — (for hence it was that
the life should be manifested, and in its appearance be seen,
heard, and handled, 1 John i, 1,) — it would be unreasonable to
expect that the Scripture, as a record of this revelation, would
designedly veU its sense, and become an inexplicable enigma.
Experience, however, teaches us fuUy and incontestibly, in the
first place, that although the original languages are extinct, yet
the key to their knowledge, inherited by cultivated people, is
yet extant, together with that historical perception appertaining
thereto ; and, secondly, that Scripture reveals to the age, peo
ple, and individuals, who appropriately use this key, such an or
ganic whole of ideas, as admits of a definite, and for the spiritual
state in its totality, a changing and instructing appropriation.
Neither is the profundity of Scripture opposed to that perspi
cuity universaUy conceded to it by all candid and skilful critics,
nor does the diversity and difference of its methods and stages
of mstruetion abrogate that unity which rests upon the ground
of its being, and the scope of its operations.

102 INTRODUCTION. — III. LAWS OF COGNITION.
Remark 1. To suppose the records of revelation to be inten
tionally literce opinabiles, or even to be veiled in an obscurity
worthy of Lycophron, is contrary to the very idea of revealed
records. To ascribe to the Deity the jest or earnestness of an
enigmatical communication, may be worthy of a neo-Platonist
like Jamblichus, but not of a Christian. To hope that mere
unintelligible sounds, of inexplicable characters, should ope
rate in a magical or salutary manner, can only be regarded as
a remnant of nature-worship. A revelation of salvation to the
world will, even in its written and original representation, be
directed to the sensus communis and publicus, as that accords
with the circumstances of various people and periods, or be ad
ministered through its medium. Revelation is the great con
cern of universal man. Nevertheless, because it unfolds itself,
in its essence, only to its congenial spirit, and because the evi
dences of its interpretation devolve, in part, on a science in which
all do not participate — it does not follow that a free use of the
Bible should be forbidden to the laity, or that the Protestant
principle of perusing Scripture, and the exclusive authority of the
same, should be impugned. For the laity cannot be regarded as
an abstract atom, as if, on their approach to the sanctuary, they
were independent of tradition and translation. The theologian
does not possess knowledge as the inheritance of his caste; and
the clergy are not masters of a peculiar Scripture spirit, and ex
clusively possess a key to the records by virtue of their separa
tion to their office. A church which shall prove itself worthy of
a belief in Holy Scripture, dares neither refrain from a retrospec
tive appeal to the original languages, nor neglect, by means of a
versio vernacula which is under every possible form of control, to
place the Scriptures in the hands of the people, whereby they
may be enabled to examine " whether these things be so," Acts
xvii. 11, that they "may come and see," John i. 46.
See the testimony of the ancients in reference to the perspi
cuity of Holy Scripture, by Chemnitz im Examen Concil. Trid.
p. 43, sq.; also Augustin and Clemens of Alex, in my Letter to
Delbriick, p. 76, seq. It is in perfect harmony with this perspi
cuity that universal scripture contents, inexhaustible in their
depths, do not admit of being included in the circle of the abso
lute idea, that particular scriptures are reserved in preference
to others for some particular period, and that translations and
expositions (without thereby rendering a solid faith impossible,

B. INTERPRETATION. — § 44. AIM. 103
because in that case the entire relation of posterity to history
might be annulled,) contain something hypothetical. Even the
Apocalypse of John is sufficiently explicable to exercise its
church influence with safety. Compare Liicke's treatise, Versuch
eines Vollst. Eirdeit. in die Off. Joh. 1832, pp. 23, 35, 40.
Remark 2. The Bible canon has proceeded neither from
Apostle, bishop, or councU, but has been produced and pointed
out by synods, after it had, by the providence of God, been form
ed by means of a reciprocal action between the attractive powers
of the writings and historical public sense. From the following
considerations it wiU be apparent that neither syncretism, nor
external convention, but true Catholicism, has recognised the
canon as it is: — Those sects which had set it at variance, and
only acknowledged, after a fastidious manner, certain portions
of it, have disappeared ; and the universal church, which received
the canon, and handed it down in its entireness, has never in its
turn been split into parties, at least by a partial recognition of
the Pauline or Petrine portions, &c. The more modern history
of exegesis has ever decidedly evidenced, that the complete inters
pretation and distinction of parts of Scripture, never impedes the
preservation of one sole church faith. For the longer, the more
keenly, and the more precisely, the prophetical or apostolical
standing-points, peculiarities, systems, and characters, have been
examined by theologians, the more clearly and truly have com
pensating elements of an unfolding process been discovered in
them, as weU as completing sides of contemplated fact and fun
damental idea, the common basis of the prophets as weU as the
apostles ; and in the entire unity — Christ, as terminum ad quern
and a quo has ever been recognised.

§ 44. AIM OF INTERPRETATION.
The leading design in a Christian use of Holy Scripture, is to
generate subjectively the objective sense or thoughts of the se
parate, passages of each distinct writer; wherefore we are correct
in speaking of a grammatical and an historical interpretation.
But inasmuch as we already use the Scripture, according to its
meaning and thought, to regulate by first principles our whole,
and indeed our common character, a necessity arises to re- ex-

104 INTRODUCTION. — III. LAWS OF COGNITION.
plain what has already been interpreted, and not only to compre
hend each portion in the unity of the canon and spirit, but also
to apprehend it in that relation to our faith and practice, which
is universally valid. This kind of interpretation, which deve-
lopes each distinct position, and refers to the higher whole, can
not indeed be termed (as in modern times has been done,) so
much the higher, spiritual, or even productive, stiU less the
philosophical mode, but rather according to Muzel, Carl Ludwig
Nitzsch1), Marheineke, Twesten, and Clausen the theological,
and it only becomes objectionable when it ceases to rest upon a
grammatico-historical exegesis.
1 De discrimine Revelationis Imperatorice et didacticce, fasc. ii.
p. 227, sqq. See also Keil's Elem. Hermen. N.T., p. 190. The
seeming contradictions of Scripture of themselves suggest this
second act of interpretation, by means of which the theory con
tained in the spiritual utterance, as it assumes more or less a prac
tical direction, is rendered intelligible. Hence Nitzsch: Ver
igitur theoria, sive ea rationalis sit sive superrationalis, eruenda
erit per aliam interpretationem, quse quidem improprie sic dici-
tur, quoniam non verba explicat, sed res verbis expressas, prse-
sertim loquendi atque adeo cogitandi modos, scholastics dxgij3iiug
expertes ejusque legibus haud adstrictos. See also Pelt. Theolog.
Encyclopadie, 1843, p. 183.

§ 45. ANALOGY OF FAITH.
The bond of union connecting these two acts of interpreta
tion, or this twofold scope of interpretation, is what has been
denominated the analogy of faith, i.e., the rule of faith applied
to exegesis; and which, in so far as it can itself be only the result
of immediate exegesis, has a retro-active effect on mediate inter
pretation, and is necessarily directive and determinative. For
the knowledge of the unity of an object is, by an unceasing reci
procal action, connected with the knowledge of its manifold
ness.

B. INTERPRETATION. — § 46. ONE SENSE. 105

§ 46. ONE SENSE.
By maintaining an entirely equivocal sense of Scripture, or
admitting several significations, its use as a record of revelation
would be impossible ; and by even assuming the subordination of
the grammatico-historical sense to a higher or deeper one, all
that is positive in revelation, as communicated by Scripture,
would be undermined; and hence, we are justified in teaching
the one sense of Scripture. But the possibUity, nay, the neces
sity of a development, is not by consequence annulled, but, on the
contrary, it is by such a process that this unity is often, for the
first time, restored. Historical knowledge itself often enjoins,
or at least does not interdict such manifold development of the
one sense ; and the necessity for such a development must, on
the one hand, very frequently occur in the Old Testament, as
containing the germ of the New; and a behef in the internal
connexion of the one Divine word and Spirit with the Scrip
ture, cannot, on the other hand, dispense with this development
of Scripture when used by individuals.
Remark. It has been the admission and experience of the
universal Christian church at all periods, that the simple sense
of Scripture and immediate exegesis are adequate to supply the
rule of faith, or the essential key of Scripture, and to ground a
faith necessary to the salvation of souls; which faith itself comes
by preaching the word of God.
§ 47. MEDIUM OF INTERPRETATION.
As soon as the word of God becomes human, historical, and
reduced to speech and writing, a knowledge of the medium
through which it is revealed, that is, of the language and his
tory with which revelation is the most intimately connected,
must become an indispensable condition for the interpretation
of its records. This constitutes the phuological element of
exegesis, which includes the grammatical and logical, as weU

106 INTRODUCTION. : — III. LAWS OF COGNITION.
as the historical and psychological elements. Now if each
object of interpretation be inteUigible in the fuUest degree only
of itself and by itself, and by means of that spiritual analogy
existing between it and the interpreter ; and if revelation also
must necessarily have constructed its own language and his
tory, it foUows that sacred philology, as an especial element,
can only be perfected in a spiritual one.1 Even the evangelical
concurs, in this point of view, with the ancient church to a cer
tain extent in maintaining, that Scripture is its own authentic
interpreter. Both exegetical principles are violated by conceding to rea
son anything beyond a regulative power and co-operation in the
interpretation of holy Scripture, unless we understand by the
term reason the Christian spirit itself, or religious conscious
ness, previously determinated through the Gospel. Were we
to foUow the advice of Kant2 or Fichte, we would wrong the
historical element ; and if we recognised the rules of an Ostorod,
Schlichting, Ludwig Meyer, or even of an Episcopius, we might
be said to forget that subjective reason, which in its spontaneity
is more or less defective, is infected by an antagonism to the
truth of revelation ; and that, on the other hand, objective reason,
even pure theism, ethical religion, ^sotpstss is already repre
sented and preserved, by means of the revealed records, in a
manner far surpassing what any school of phflosophy either has
or ever could effect.
1 See my letter to Professor Delbriick, pp. 79, 80. It must be
conceded that the rational canon, the Holy Scripture, as records
of antiquity, requires to be expounded like any other documents,
according to the laws of general hermeneutics ; and just as it
holds with the fundamental position of Protestantism: Scrip-
tura sui ipsius interpres, is applicable to writings not sacred.
What appertains then, to the law of interpretation, farther than
a penetrating insight into the peculiarity of the author, as also
into the central and uniting point of his representations. A
written spiritual expression can assuredly only, in the first
place, become comparatively intelligible, through a knowledge
of the circle of thought and language, whence it emanates; for

B. INTERPRETATION. — § 47. MEDIUM. 107
example, the New Testament becomes more intelligible through
a knowledge of the general Grecisms or Judaisms, expressed in
Greek; but if such expression be in its place new, in its kind,
highly productive and original, or if, by a free extension and
limitations of the signification of the word, it generates new ideas
and judgments; then the interpreter must absolutely pass over
from the mere comparative representation, into the objective and
immediate one, and can only succeed in the proportion as he
possesses a susceptibility for this spirit, and in proportion as
he is penetrated by it, is he enabled to comprehend the same.
Religious fife knows itself only by, and through itself alone;
hence, arise maxims like the following: — He who has not re
ceived the Holy Spirit, cannot understand one iota of the inter
nal contents of Scripture (Luther). — The process by which Scrip
ture is known, includes the testimony of the Holy Spirit, (Joh.
Gerhard and others): opinions like these fully harmonise with
the scientific claims of exegetical procedure.
2 Religion within the bounds of pure reason, (Religion inner-
hall d. Grenze nd. II. Vern. Ausg. Rosenkr., p. 130, vi.) Church
faith has, for its highest interpreter, pure religious faith. — " Be
sides, an interpretation of an existing revelation requires a uni
versal explanation agreeably to one sense, in accordance with
the general practical rules of a pure rational religion. For the
theory of a church faith is unable to interest us morally, if it
does not conduce towards the fulfilment of all human duties,
considered as divine commands," p. 132. " Moreover, such in
terpretations cannot be charged with unfairness, provided it
be not maintained, that the sense we ascribe to the Holy
books, was the onev exclusively intended; but only that it ad
mits of being so represented, and that it is possible, the author
may be so understood." Here, as elsewhere, Kant has distin
guished not only the practical and theoretical, the moral and
historical; but has also divided and balanced the one against
the other. The Arminian and Socinian interpreters, and Ludwig
Meyer, the anonymous author of Philosophia s. Scripturee in-
terpres, 1666, treated on actual and objective interpretation,
when they all asserted recto ratio, to be in part a sufficient
means, in part an infallibilis norma, against Catholics and
Protestants. But they differed in their interpretations. Epis-
copius, for example, understood sound reason to be merely
the morally free operation of the scientific understanding, as

108 INTRODUCTION. — IV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
being a perfect susceptibUity for the Divine Contents, as they
impart themselves; Meyer, on the other hand, could only ima
gine revelation itself, as simply being developed or objective
reason. On either side, Divine revelation, considered in ab-
straMo, is viewed as Scripture contents; but it was only by the
followers of Spinoza, that, philosophy or reason (apart from the
formal scientific faculty) was assumed to be a universaUy valid
and material principle of cognition, without their venturing, how
ever, to assume that Scripture was anti-philosophical. For the
most acute defence of the law of Protestant interpretation of
Scripture, within the bounds of scholasticism, see Joh. Musaus,
Introductio in Theologiam, &c, 1679, P. ii; de objecto theologise
revelatae formali.

IV. ON THE ATTEMPTS TO CONSTRUCT A DOCTRINAL
SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY.
§ 48. HISTORY.
It is unnecessary to remind the reader, that, from the first,
theological reflection referred Christianity partly to cognition,
and partly to action ; the mutual condition moreover, of both
elements, as well as the dependence, (within the territory of
doctrine) of the latter on the former, I have elsewhere admit
ted.1 But if we demand a theological development, of this un
divided Christianity, or its systematic representation, we need
not be surprised on finding that the only approximation to such
has amounted merely to attempts and hints, and that the system
matic efforts hkewise, however dissimfiar and imperfect at
different times they may have been, have still, regarded as a
whole, retained a great similarity.
Christian theology was originally cultivated as an apologeto-
polemical, and afterwards as an exegeto-historical subject, and
in its earlier period, had not attained a systematic form. It
was only after theology, at first struggling and defensive, had
acquired a solid and durable foundation, (after the age of Au-
gustin) and had, for the preservation of the historical ground-

§ 48. HISTORY. 109
character of Christianity, exhibited the authority of a church and
conventional formula, in defence of each axiom of the creed, it
was only then, that a survey of its acquired territory was attempt
ed, such as we find, for example, in John of Damascus. In his
system, as weU as in those derived from the Scholastics, we
at once see that they have sprung from polemical and not from
exegetical theology. They assume a whole and a unity, and
commence by division and partition; they employ definition
and dialectic discussion, in order to decide those questions pos
sessing practical interest, in the school of the period, or in
church life, whereby the development of the system, from the
original nature of the subject, becomes impossible. It was
precisely this last defect, that the Systematics of the Eeforma-
tion endeavoured to amend, only that they laid, as a founda
tion, the bare unity of Holy Scripture; and by this means,
although they acquired simpler and truer leading ideas, still
these were but locos, articulos, apart from the fact, that they
admitted into their system, on the one hand, the contrast of
the Old and New Testament, of the law and the Gospel, and
yet, on the other hand, did not carry it out at aU ; whUst they
forced into the Decalogue the representation of Christian life.
The chief stress of their labours was consequently directed to
the element of cognition, and the ethics of the system were
entirely neglected; whhst in the prominent points, relating to
ecclesiastical, civU, and domestic life, as for example, in the
ministry, church discipline, the magistracy, and marriage, the
latter were rendered disproportionably obtrusive. The repara
tion of this defect has been ascribed to George Calk, in his
distinct treatment of the subject, and since his time, this de
ficiency has been richly compensated; only that its relation to
Christian Dogma, since that period, has become so much the
more uncertain and contingent, if, indeed, it can be said to re
main at all; and as yet the advice of Ernesti and Putter,2 to
exhibit a reunited representation of Christian doctrine, has been
foUowed with but trifling results.
An English divine, Thomas Burnet,3 has left us an ingenious

110 INTRODUCTION. — IV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
essay, in which he endeavoured to exhibit this unity, — the
Christian rehgion as a combination and interpenetration of faith
and life, Yet this performance can as little be said to solve
the theological problem in question, as can a similar at
tempt by Theremin,4 although the latter proceeds upon the
mere unity of the idea of rehgion. As we cannot, on this oc
casion, enter into the consideration of the catechetical and asce-
tical writings or homileto-practical manuals on this subject, we
must conclude by merely aUuding to hints and outlines, as yet
but imperfectly filled up, such as have been pubhshed by C. L.
Nitzsch,5 Schleiermacher,6 and Schwartz, ;' and to the essay of
H. Karsten.8
Remark. The question here entirely turns on the history of the
Christian system in reference to the union between the doctrine
of faith and morals.
1 In the Shepherd ofHermas, the contrast between hroXui, and
appearances and similitudes.. — CyrUl, Catech. IUum. iv. b rvjg Ssow-
fteiug rgbitog ex hua rovruv guvigrqxi, hoy/idrut iua$(3uiv dxgifieiug xul irgu^-
euv dyu'buv. x.x. — Clemens of Alexandria, in the introduction to
his Pwdagogus, examines the varied relations of the Divine logos
to man's need of salvation. The Logos, indeed, is one and the
same, but it partly conducts man to the contemplation of truth,
as hnXunxbg, ohroxuXwrrnxbg, and partly as irguxnxbg, forms him for
a believing and blessed contemplation. In the latter point of
view, the Logos is in part again tgorgemnxbg, irugog^nxbg (principle
of a preparatory ethic of an apologetical signification,) and in
part nruthuyuybi (principle of a preparatory ascetic.)
2 In the preface to the Christian Religion, in its true connection
and its excellency, by Putter. Gott. 17.79.
3 De fide et ojficiis Christianorum, Londini, 1727, (a work, ac
cording to the preface, printed after the author's .death, for pri
vate circulation among his friends.) The first four sections con
tain an historical constmction of Christianity of an apologetical
tendency. According to our author, there is a religio prima
ceterna, immutabilis, in which all positive religions are rooted.
It appears not simply in the abstract form of philosophy, but also
in the life of individual patriarchs, as of an Enoch, a Noah.
Heathenism, in its public expression, is the grossest disfigurement
of this religio prima. In the Mosaic economy, it is restored, by

§ 48. HISTORY. Ill
Divine authority, yet in a national manner ; unfettered by na
tional restrictions, it has been renovated by Jesus Christ up to a
more perfect development of the hope of a blessed immortality;
but the author does not maintain the absolute perfection and ex
clusive self-sufficiency of Christianity. He describes, in five sec
tions, the Lex Christiana. In the first, he treats on the worship
of God in spirit and in truth, and the simple rites by which it
is embodied in an external and public form. In the second sec
tion, he discusses the highest rule of ethics, and also touches on
rewards and punishments. In the third, he examines the Chris
tian faith in general, according to the apostolic symbol; and, in
the fourth, he considers those definitions of faith, which are espe-
pecially liable to be variously apprehended, such as original sin,
justification, atonement, freedom of the wUl, grace, election,
and in reference to which, in so far as they are conformable or
not to the moral idea, our judgment thereon must be with a re
servation. The fifth section treats on the church, and the form
of church government. Of the personality of the Redeemer, the
author knew nothing. The Godhead of Christ is doctrinal au
thority. WhUst he professes his entire Jbelief in miracles, revela
tion, and in Scripture, yet his exegesis has a rationalistic ten
dency, because he reduces everything to the religio prima, and
with regard to his views of redemption he is a Pelagian.
4 Die Lehre vom gottlichen Reiche. Berlin, 1823.
5 De revelatione religionis externa eademque publica, p. 200, and
Prelusio ii. de antinomismo. Jo. Agricolse, pp. 35 — 38.
6 Glaubenslehre, i. p. 159. Compare Kurze darstell. der Theol.
Studien. 2d edition, § 223—31.
7 Grundriss. der Protest. Dogmatik. Heidelb. 1816, p. xxii. and
Theol. Stud. u. Krit. 1832, p. 107. " Aphorisms for the Union of
the Doctrines of Christian Faith and Morals, with reference to
Nitzsch' s System of Christian Doctrine."
8 Manual of the Christian Religion intended for the upper
Classes of the higher schools. (Lehrbuch der Christlichen Religion
fur die Obern Classen hoherer Bildungsanstalten. Rostock,
1838.)

§ 49. AUGUSTIN.
Andrew Hyperius,1 in a sketch contained in his Theological

112 INTRODUCTION. — IV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
Methodology, has portrayed the most distinguished Ghristian
systems extant, up to the period of the Eeformation. He very
properly commences with Augustin's scheme ; for Origen's book,
de Frmcipiis, is purely and simply dogmatic; and Gregory of
Nyssa's Large Catechism, and even the treatise of Athanasius
on the Incarnation, contain but the germ of ethical Christi
anity; and if the ethical notions of Lactantius be placed in jux
taposition with his ideas on dogma, sapientia, justitia, cultus
vita beata, it wUl be evident that he was far from having any
just perception of an arrangement of Christian doctrine. Now,
Augustin2 proceeds from the idea of subjective veneration of
deity (pietas) and divides it into fides, spes, et charitas ; and
although his Christian Manual, addressed to Laurentius, is
reaUy executed according to this classification (in which the
doctrine of love only is very imperfectly developed, from so
much of the work being devoted to preceding matter), he inti
mates, from the very first, the concealed objective unity of the
system, the person of Christ, and even pretty clearly hints at
the possibility of some other arrangement.
1 De Theologo s. de ratione studii Theologici libri iv. BasU.
1556, vid. lib. iii. p. 445 varise formulae colligendi locos communes
in theologia.
9 De vera Religione, and more fully in Enchiridion ad Laur-
entiu/m Urbis Romce primicerium. Hyperius did not apprehend
with sufficient accuracy Augustin's scheme.

§ 50. GENNADIUS.
Those paraphrases of the entire Christian doctrine, such as
have been given in the form of more extended chinch Sym
bols and doctrinal confessions, by Gennadius of Marseilles and
Isidore of Seville, are whoUy involved in the field of polemical
theology and church discipline. The former, under the title,
de Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis, is found among the works of
Augustin, and the latter, amongst those of Isidore, in his

§ 51. THE SCHOLASTICS. 113
treatise de Officiis Ucclesiasticis. Both include those ethical
dogmas which had, till that period, been ehcited either by pub
lic controversies, or called forth by the necessities of the church
communion. Moreover, the moral elements, as laid down by
John of Damascus, in his exposition of the Ecclesiastical Sys~
tern, are not altogether overlooked.

§ 51. THE SCHOLASTICS.
In the four books of Sentences concerning God, the crea
ture, redemption, the sacraments, and a future life (or upon
earthly and heavenly fellowship in salvation) Peter Lombard
has united dogma and ethic in such a manner, that the entire
moral phUosophy and doctrine of sin, in aU its degrees, is
connected with the doctrine of the second book on the fall; in
the third book, love developes itself out of faith in salvation,
and from love springs the doctrine of duties and morals, and
then foUow the commandments of the decalogue, the law, and
the gospel. Lastly, in his fourth book, he treats of the relative
duties of ecclesiastical as weU as those of civU and domestic life,
although after an imperfect and disproportionate manner. StiU,
in the book of Sentences, we discern the natural order of Chris
tian doctrine much earlier than in the Summa of Thomas
Aquinas, the first part of which embraces the subject of Onto
logy, reserving for the second part, practical Christianity,
and, for the third, the historical doctrines of Christ, and the
ecclesiastical relation.

% 52. THE REFORMERS AND THEIR SUCCESSORS.
The Eeformers and their disciples, notwithstanding the oppo
site bent of their minds, and the entirely different mode of hand
ling the subject, frequently faU back upon the classification of
Peter Lombard, in so far as it corresponds with the apostohc sym
bol, and the nature of the case. We find in the Eeformers the
I "

114 INTRODUCTION. — TV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
same combination of the moral elements with faith, hope, and
love, and with the Decalogue, and a like union of the doc
trines on the domestic and civil state with that of the church.
In a genetic point of view, Calvin's method is more complete
than Melanchthon's; but the simple thought of Luther deserves
to be very forcibly enunciated, i. e., that the Christian scheme,
in the first place, is a doctrine of faith, consisting of two divi
sions — sin and grace; and secondly, a doctrine of love, com
prehending, on the one hand, service, and, on the other,
patience.

§ 53. HYPERIUS AND JOHN GERHARD.
Besides the above, there are two distinguished theologians
belonging to the period of the " methodus localis," deserving
especial notice — Hyperius and Gerhard; the former, because
by means of a thought, on the Christian system, designedly
thrown out for our use, compasses the arrangement which he .
commends to students; and the latter, because in common with
Melanchthon's more elaborate work, the Loci Theologici, appears
to have served as a model to a succession of systematic divines.
Hyperius, in his system, indicates, though delicately, what he
disapproves of in the arrangements of his immediate predecessors
and cotemporaries, namely, that they aUowed the system to be too
much influenced by the questions of the day; which remark, how
ever, was not applicable to the first, simple scheme of Melanch-
thon ; and further, he implies that they had mixed up principal
divisions, xepuhuicc ysvizd/ruru, with sub-divisions. The sum of
revealed religion he expresses in the following proposition: —
Deus condidit mundum et in eo homines, ut ex his constitue-
retur ecclesia, in qua ipse secundum doctrinam legis et evan-
gehi coleretur, ad seculi usque consummationem. Six terms
flow out of this proposition — God, creature, church, doctrine,
sacrament, consummation, and in these are founded the entire
family of Christian doctrines. Of course these terms must ne-

§ 53. HYPERIUS AND GERHARD. 115
cessarily be referred to a unity; ponatur igitur vestibuli vice
locus separates : verbum Dei s. sacra scriptura. With the ex
ception of the first and last article, the antitheses, ante lapsum et
post lapsum, pervades aU the others; for there is implied in
both states, a church, a law and gospel, and a sacrament.
Moreover, in the doctrine, the law or the doctrine of love com
mences, which, after the faU, continues in the decalogue, and
then succeed the doctrines of faith and hope; and in this sub
division, so profoundly and multifariously contrived, is con
cealed, as it were, the true terminus of Christianity. The
idea of salvation — fides concipitur ex evangelio, evangelium
post lapsum — Christus homo factus et mediator, whilst the his
torical antithesis only of the primeval state and faU, which
could not be manifested in this multiplicity, without a state of
grace, runs through aU the doctrine, and yet in such a manner
as not to appear anywhere in the members of the principal
divisions. The defects of this arrangement are striking but
instructive. The idea of the Divine doctrine. is the combina
tion of the -whole, and, at the same time, agrees with the six
members. Instead of doctrina (lex et evang.) standing as the
medium of salvation, salvation simply stands for the content of
the doctrine; and from the content again of the doctrine, the
relations of God to the creature in his attributes and works, to
all appearance, are excluded. The important position he as
cribes to the church is new, the idea of which has been taken
up, amplified, and unfolded, much in the same manner as
" the covenant of God," " the kingdom of God," has been by
other systematic divines.
John Gerhard begins much more simply and less scientificahy,
but proceeds, at least in his Aphorisms,1 with admirable strictness
in the combination. De scriptura, de Deo, de persona et officio
Christi, de creatione et angelis, de providentia, de electione et re-
probatione, de imagine Dei in homine anti lapsum, de peccato
originali de libero arbitrio, de lege, de evangeho, de poenitentia,
de fide, de bonis operibus, de sacramentis, de baptismo, de s.
coena, de ecclesia, de ministerio ecclesiastico, de ordine politico,

116 INTRODUCTION. — DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
de conjugio, de quatuor hominis riovissimis;— these are the sub
jects which he handles aphoristically, *. e., briefly, but not uncon-
nectedly. Except that he treats on the incarnation before crea
tion and redemption (because whatever related to the personality
of the Eedeemer, he considers to be necessarily closely aUied to
the doctrine of God), the connection of his divisions is sufficiently
preserved, and has been presented by the author in a prelimin
ary dissertation M of vigour. But he does not by any means
place the representation of the Christian hfe in the doctrine of
the decalogue; for, in so much as the law is not designed to
realize the Christian life, he treats it merely as the perfection
of obedience revealed for the condemnation of sin. On the
other hand, according to his theory, regeneration is combined
with Divine justification; or from faith, which worketh by love,
proceed good works, and these refer to our duty towards God,
ourselves, and our neighbours; and he holds this threefold cha
racter of the doctrine of duty and virtue so firmly as to dis
cover its expression in the aa><pp6mg, tmuiug xa) svffifiSg. Tit.
ii. 13, as weU as in the anti-pharisaical doctrine of Jesus on
fasting, alms, and prayer. This division appears to be ori
ginal,2 as does also his transition from the doctrine of the
church to that of the final consummation of aU things in
the foUowing proposition — ecclesiam suam Deus hac in vita
subjicit cruci — tandem antem in futura vita earn glorificabit.
And thus, indeed, it may be said, that he finds room for the
comforting doctrine, de cruce et afihctionibus, which has been
more fuUy carried out in the systems of his successors, and par
ticularly by Melanchthon. For Christian hope is the correla
tive corresponding to the idea of the dogma of the consumma
tion of the Church in the glory of the second advent of Christ.
Up to the period when Christian ethics were separated from
dogma, the leading points concerning good works, adoration,
the cross, and the probationary state, are brought prominently
forward in the joint representations of Christianity.
1 Aphorismi succincti et selecti in xxiii. capitibus, totius

§54. IDEA FIDEI FRATRUM. 117
theologise nucleum continentes. — a Job. Gerhardo, Th. D. et Sup.
Heldburg, Jenae 1611. 8.
2 If, perchance, it be not borrowed from Calvin's Institt. iii. 4.

§ 54. IDEA FIDEI FRATRUM.
Even after the epoch of divided ethics, those who followed
the track of Spener's method, as for example, Freylingshausen,
Eambach, and Spangenberg,1 either endeavoured in general, to
approximate the theological system to the catechism, or to give
to those practical points, already constructed, since Melanch
thon's time, the requisite amplification ; and although Spangen-
berg's brief notion is entitled idea fidei, yet between the doc
trines of sanctification and communion, there intervene, as lead-
ingr divisions, discussions on the commands of God, and on the
love of God and our neighbour. Among those who have op
posed the view of an internal connexion, and comprehensive
idea of Christian doctrine, Friedrich Christian Oetinger,2 is
distinguished. His idea of life is that which is developed
through Christianity ; but even admitting that this idea were
just, he has not developed it, at least expressly and scientifi
cally, so as to represent ethical Christianity.
1 Vide Idea fidei fratrum, or Summary of the Christian Doc^
trine of the Evangelical community of Brethren, by August
Gottlieb Spangenberg Barby, 1 779.
2 See, Theologia ex idea vitce deducta, in sex locos redacta,
quorum quilibit, I. Secundum senswm communem,2. Secundum
mysteria scriptural, 3. Secundum formulas theticas nova et experi-
mentali methodo pertractatur. Auctore, Fr. Chr. Oetinger, &c,
Francof., 1765, prsef., and p. 512. 1. Deus estipsissima vita et
dfiuggiu solvi nescia. Creaturse non habent vitam solvi nesciam.
Vita est duplex, physica et spiritualis. — In Deo est utraque vita
una et indissolubilis. — 2. Homo constat spiraculo vitae duplicis.
3. Lex non habet locum, ubi unum tantum est, hinc solus Deus
est sine lege. Unum est et manet unum, nee est deviationis ca-
pax. Ubi lex est, ibi vita ad minimum duplex, solutionis et
aberrationis possibilitatem habens, esse debet. 4. Peccatum est
ipsa aberratio vitse duplicis a primseva colhgatione, adeoque a

118 INTRODUCTION. — IV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
lege, quae solutioni mortem praesagit. 5. Gratia est illud bene-
placitumDei, quo reducendi vitam spiritualem advitam natural-
em certum ordinem constituit. 6. Ecclesia est coetus, in quo est
unitas spiritus, una praesentia Dei in vita omnibus membris com-
muni. Unitas spiritus fundatur in unitate fidei: adeoque vita
spiritualis per verbum rursus vitae naturali est coadunata per
singula membra. 7. Novissima sunt, ubi vita interior tum natu-
ralis tum spiritualis est extraposita; ubi occultum fit manifes-
tum, ut in resurrectione, morte secunda, nova Jemsalem, nova
terra, praeeunte judicio extremo, donee Deus post aeonas aeonum
erit omnia in omnibus.
N. B. — In the execution of the work, Oetinger comprehends
under the doctrine of the law that of sin, and therefore in the
title page, only six loci are enumerated.
§ 55. MORE RECENT ATTEMPTS.
Carl Ludwig Nitzsch endeavoured to show that the idea he
had formed of revelation, as indicated in Scripture, was emi
nently fitted to finally complete the theological structure,1 and
at the same time, denounced the blending of the rational and
historical contents of Christian dogmas, which prevaUs among
both ancient and modern Divines, as the essential cause of the
failure of systems. And in fact, he has shown, how it is
possible to deduce, from the single dogma of Jesus, the Mes
siah, (s. Homine veri nominis eodemque Deifilio,) by means of
an assumed distinction between the idea and fact ; 1st, A doc
trine of rehgion, being that of man, God and of divine
beatitude. Idly, A doctrine of revelation. 3e%, One com
bining revelation and faith.2 Nothing can be more correct
than this statement of a middle term, and neither in the princi
pal or subordinate members, are the excluding or including
terms missed, nor throughout, is the exhausting one ab
sent ; but we cannot acquiesce, according to our view of the
subject, either in the separation of the first and second chief
member, nor in the prominence given to anthropology.
When it is remembered to what an extent Augustin availed
himself of the idea of a kingdom of God, and how much others

§ 55. MORE RECENT ATTEMPTS. 119
effected with that of a covenant God, and how much our predeces
sors and contemporaries included in the term church, we need
not be surprised that Theremin endeavoured to deduce, from
the fundamental idea of the kingdom of God, as declared in
Scripture, not only the doctrine of divine and human qualities,
and the doctrine of redemption; but also the whole doctrine
coucerning virtue, relation, and duty. This admirable effort
has opened out some important views, as regards the union of
ethics and dogma; and, indeed, how could it faU to do so,
since the fundamental idea not only unites God, men, angels,
and worlds, in the highest moral and rehgious idea, but also
appears to unite the loftiest conception of reason, with the truth
of revelation and redemption, together with its realization. The
many and various difficulties, into which the systematic divines
have notwithstanding faUen, cannot in this place be discussed.
Nevertheless there lies concealed in this arrangement an un
doubted iUusion, namely, that that idea of the Divine state,
whence, by an unbroken progression, an entire system of re
hgion admits of being unfolded, is, as it relates to the biblical
doctrine of God's kingdom, an abstract idea, and for which, a
direct and adequate expression is no where afforded by Scrip
ture. But granting that it were so — and the expression may
be found, at least in the stoical doctrine of the highest iroXirsiu,
or BaovAs/a, more directly indicated ; still it would be impos
sible to derive from such a representation, the doctrine of the
positive faU through sin, and of actual salvation.
The biblical idea of the kingdom of God is totaUy different.
This latter idea universaUy brings along with it what Theremin
excludes, namely, the world, the kingdoms of the world, the
kingdom of darkness and of the prince of the world, together with
its opposite ; and hence faUs back upon the more elevating idea
of grace, election, and divine decree of salvation. But even if
the author of the doctrine of a divine kingdom had apphed his
universal idea to the division and memberment of the doctrinal
system of Christianity, by means of the various definitions and
relations which his idea admitted (as, for example, those of the

120 INTRODUCTION. — IV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
natural disposition of the kingdom of God, the fall, the restora
tion, the diverse aspects of the divine state, and of the admis
sion of man into the kingdom of God, &c.) ; stiU, it would be
evident that this cannot correctly be the uniting middle term,
and that aroKtiTPtuo-is, ffarqpfu has a much higher import in
this point of view.
F. H. C. Schwartz, in the dogmatic aUuded to above, does not
fail, on the one hand, in several places (as, for example, J 129,'
32, on the Divine hfe, and § 177, on union with God) to scan
the whole field of Christian ethics ; and on the other hand, to
point out, in brief remarks, a certain paraUelism between the
doctrine of faith and morals. He divides the doctrine of faith
into three — that of God, of man, and of man's relatiori to God.
Now, the mode in which this ethical triad, faith, love, and
hope, corresponds to these divisions, can only become ap
parent by means of sub-divisions. That is to say, there is
combined with the doctrine of faith in God, absolutely consi
dered, the ethical doctrine of the divine law, to wit, the wiU of
God in the conscience ; with the doctrine of faith in God's re^
lation to the world, there is combined the ethical doctrine of
deference for the law (or for individual laws); with the doc
trine of faith in the Trinity there is combined the ethical doc
trine of {he adoration of God as the highest good. With the
doctrine of faith in the Divine image, there is associated— self-
love; with the doctrine of faith in redemption — the love of
our neighbour with that of man's salvation — the love of
God. Finally, in the third division, there is combined with the
doctrine of faith in the operations of grace — a striving after
holiness (moral character) ; with the means of grace — activity
in the kingdom of God; and with eternal salvation — resem
blance to God, as the eternal aim.
FmaUy, Karsten, guided by the doctrinal method pursued by
Schleiermacher, has sketched out and completed a Christian
Manual. The appearance of Christ in the world, as the central
point of devout Christian self- consciousness, is assumed by him
as the ground of the classification, of his view. The. first part

§ 55. MORE RECENT ATTEMPTS. 121
of his work treats on the person of Jesus Christ, in such a way
that the formation of the new hfe through Christ is included
in the second, and the new hfe in Christ in the third part.
However highly we may esteem the decision with which
the actual fact and experimental nature of Christianity has
been throughout maintained, nevertheless, we entertain many
doubts of the correctness both of the plan and its execution.
The appearance of Christ, which constitutes the basis of his
^classification, comprehends the person and works, but there is
no third element mentioned; the divine causahty, which must
re-enter before the new life can be generated in a Christian
individual, is the Holy Spirit, The third element is not at aU
co-ordinate with the two former, and could only be so through
a dialectical treatment of the work of Jesus-Vfor example, self-
representation and self-communication. Whatsoever exceUency
the three performances display, there is still this objection,
that the doctrine of the Divine essence and attributes is se
parated from the objective idea of an immediate revelation
of God in Christ, and is united to the subjective one — Chris
tian devotion.
1 De Revel. &c. p. 200. Nam systema veri nominis, quo uni-
versa iUa doctrina (Christiana), qua materiam et formam, ex una
eademque notione derivetur, multis hodie agnoscentibus et faten-?
tibus, adhuc desideratur.
2 Ibid, p. 201, sqq.
A. De religione rationali divinitus promulgata;
a de homine — qualis esse debeat et qualis sit;
b de Deo ejusque perfectionibus et triplici personalitate ;
c de religiositate interna atque externa.
B. De religionis revelatione:
a de modo revelationis, s. de historia et institutione Jesu
Christi,
b de forma — s. de divina ejus origine atque auctoritate,
c de effectu — s. de ecclesia.
C. De fide revelatione habenda:
a de causis historicis et moralibis huj. fidei,
b de effectu — s. de immutatione morali,
c de caltura huj. fidei, pars ascetica.

122 INTRODUCTION. — IV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.

§ 56. MIDDLE TERM.
The opinion maintained by some ancient and modern theo
logians,1 that a true system of Christian doctrine is neither pos
sible nor admissible, is refuted by a closer definition. Wherever
any peculiarity of hfe and consciousness, of doctrine and word ex
ists, it either merely assumes the appearance of permanency and
individuahty, or there is discoverable in it a state of manifold
ness, and, at the same time, of order, and consequently of unity.
Whether or no this unity be merely simple or synthetical, is
another question. We maintain that it is not merely a simple
unity. Christianity, as a self-realizing idea of rehgion, has,
notwithstanding its divine novelty, and its being founded on
fact, a relation to religion in general. Now, since religion in
general, as being a mode of conception and cognition, instructs
us concerning the being and becoming in existence, up to a
post-finality of being, or may be said to conduct us to a state
of consciousness; so there can be no religious doctrine which
does not bring into relation God and the world, God and man,
with respect to cause and aim, and that, too, ontologically
and teleologicaUy. These are the necessary and infallible
elements or internal relations of universal rehgious thought.
But the question is, whence arises this thinking emotion, and
from what point can the circle be drawn. Now, it is main
tained by some that this point is presented by every dogma;
for, by way of example, the doctrine concerning man being
fully determined, concentrates aU other doctrines; or, the
truth of the scope of history, being sufficiently recognised,
illumines the foundation and commencement of the same.
Now, as in this mode no primary dogma already con
tains within itself its determinateness, for example, its Chris
tian character, but must derive it from some other source,
so we are compelled to extend our inquiries after a more
accurately defining primary dogma, and the system is only
completed by a presupposition of its own. In fact this is

§ 56. MIDDLE TERM. 123
universaUy the case, whenever (as has been done, for example,
by Melahchthon, Hyperius, and others), the Christian system
is founded upon no other unity than that of the holy Scripture
or the Divine Word. Some modern divines have grounded
the system on the idea of " the doctrine of Jesus ;" or, have
combined the dogmas with the systemless holy Scripture, by
means of the idea of Theology, the question then turning on
the objed and subject of the same, and on the causality and
finality of their relation to one another. It is obvious that none
of these methods were sufficient, for none of them make known
the definite perfection of the Christian rehgion, and none ex
hibit a primary, or fundamental or inclusive dogma. By as
signing to the idea of God, or to the idea of the Divine kingdom,
or to the idea of hfe, the source of the Christian scheme, equal
justice was endeavoured to be shown to both claims. The
first case promises to produce the most absolute logic, the
second, the most perfect ethics, and the third, the physics of
Christian theology. In regard to the two last, they are en
abled of themselves to exhibit the object and subject of reh
gion, including the being and becoming, and, at the same time,
to inculcate such bibhcal representations as are confessedly of
importance. Still, the latter (as has been formerly remarked
in reference to the notion of the kingdom of God), is a
mere semblance. For even Xjari aiunog or Zprj requires to be
first extended and generalised over the bibhcal determinateness by
the phUosophical idea, ere it is able to reahse that conclusion, or
represent that unity of the rehgious substance. With regard to
the idea of God, it is not only inclusive, but, at the same time,
remarkably productive, and appears to meet all requirements,
since it can appear in the Christian definition, as the doctrine of
the Trinity. But a great difference exists between absolute logic
and Christian theology; admitting that we apprehend the logos of
God by means of a logical evolution of the idea of God, and also
discern the Spirit of God, and the existence and consciousness
of the world, still the truth of o Xoyog cupS, ly'mro far transcends
this logic. Neither the reality of sin, as a universal condition,

124 INTRODUCTION. — IV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
nor the incarnation of the Son of God and redemption subsist
ing in him, can be deduced from the mere idea of the logos.
The perception of the Christian Trinity is rooted in the know
ledge of Christ, the Son of God, although Christ himself can
only be apprehended by an original and previous knowledge of
God ; a relation which has ever been recognised by Christian
theologians, but yet in an imperfect manner. It cannot, there
fore, be doubted that the idea of a Eedeemer, or the dogma of
Christ, is the primary, fundamental, and inclusive dogma of
Christian doctrine, as such; only the series of Christian dogmas
cannot be developed in one and the same direction from the
doctrine of the Eedeemer; for the mere progressive development
of the dogma of Christ looks back, in aU its elements, upon
other truths, which, indeed, though not independent of Christ,
of his being and state, still, at the same time, are acknowledged,
as suppositions of his personal being and work, by means of a
regressive development. The Eedeemer, as such, refers to the
Divine creation of man, to man's divine and human nature, and
to his original and fallen state; and, in these relations, we
are enabled to recognise those conditions only in him, and
through him, as being the necessary supposition required for
a correct doctrine of justification and sanctification, and
of the means and end of redemption; but even here it is
evident that there. is a twofold aspect under which the Chris
tian system, as founded on the person and work of the Ee
deemer, presents itself. We designate, therefore, the unity of
this system, a middle term, i. e. , such a term as, in the first
place, conducts to certain pre- suppositions, before it admits of
analysis. The redemption of the world by Jesus Christ, is
such a term. There are various facts which afford prelimi
nary proof that, for the foundation of the system, Christ is
requisite and capacitated. How he imparts to all the aposto
lical doctrines their peculiar determinateness, appears from
Eom. i. 17; 1 Cor. i. 30, iii. 10, 11, xv. 3; 1 Tim. iii. 16;
2 Pet. i. 1-9; from the whole tenor of the Epistle to the He
brews, and from the signification of the word gospel, in a man-

§ 56. Middle term. 125
ner not to be mistaken. With regard to the apostohcal symbol
and its occasion, as intimated by Matt, xxviii. 19, it can easily
be proved that its first member, ere it can generate the second
and third, must itself have previously been produced from the
second ; and that baptism into the Father, Son, and Spirit is
the same as baptism in the name of the Lord Jesus, Acts
xix. 5.3
Clemens of Alexandria, and Augustin, clearly enough
ground their system on the doctrine of the Son of God, or sal
vation in Christ; and it is evident why so many ancient dog
matists unite the doctrine of the Eedeemer's person so inti
mately with the doctrine of God.
1 See Melanchthon, Loci, &c, ed. 1543. Preef. p. 7. Planck in
the Theolog. Encyclop. Schwartz Protest. Dogm. p. xxi., N. 8. The
closer definition we desire has already been given in some mea
sure by Melanchthon — In artibustradendis singularicura monstra-
tur ordo partium et indicantur initia, progressiones et metse. Hanc
explicandi formam in philosophia vocant methodum: sed haec in iis
artibus, quae demonstrationibus extruuntur, aliter quam in doc
trina Ecclesiae instituitur. Nam demonstrativa methodus progre-
ditur ab *is, quae sensui subjecta sunt, et a primis notitiis, quae
vocantur principia. Hie in doctrina Ecclesiae tantum ordo quae-
ritur, non ilia methodus demonstrativa. Nam "haec doctrina
Ecclesiae non ex demonstrationibus sumitur, sed ex dictis, quae
Deus certis et iUustribus testimoniis tradidit, &c. Though true
as far it goes, still there is not order without unity; and that the
Christian system possesses some other kind of unity than a mere
formal idea of revelation, he has himself sufficiently indicated,
Loci a. 1521, p. 9, ed. Augusti, and thus agrees with Augustini
Enchirid, § 5. where the proposition, certum propriumque fidei
catholicae fundamentum Christus est, is previously defended
against those who might reply, that in that case, heretics would
be on a par with Catholics.
2 J„ T. Beck has actually undertaken to comprise the whole
scientific doctrine of Christianity according to biblical records
(Stuttgart 1840 i.), under the representation of the fundamental
doctrines of God — as logic, ethics, and physics.
3 See The Analysis of the Apostolic Symbol, in my letter to

126 INTRODUCTION. — IV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
Professor Delbriick, p. 50. We must not forget that the first
member of the creed, denominated apostolic, in its original form,
was only opposed to monotheism, heathenism, and nature wor
ship, and that credo in unum Deum faetorem cceli, &c. only by
degrees gave place to credo in Deum Patrem. In so far even as
this occurred, the term Pater did not at once include the hypos-
tatical signification.

§ 57. PRINCIPAL DIVISIONS.
Since the articulate method has been abandoned, much pains
has necessarUy been bestowed on the arrangement of leading
divisions, and for this object, the mere causal, final, and medial
categories soon became insufficient. We could not revert to
Augustin's subjective arrangement, inasmuch as ethics mean-
whUe had been separated from dogma. Now, those who
were unwilling entirely to surrender the characteristic sign of
Christianity, already existing in the term of the dogmatic prin
cipal division, which sign, by a mere antithesis of the doctrine
of God and man, (according to HeUmann, Henke, and Knapp,)
stiU very decidedly occurred — Such foUowed more, or less,
though, indeed, in a very different manner, a development,
which, to a certain extent, was that of natural order, and which
hes at the foundation of the apostle's creed. The first diver
sity that arose from this, consisted in the retention or analysis
of the Trichotomy. The triplicity, again, could be retained in
a threefold manner, so that either the Father, Son, and Spirit,
or creation, redemption, and salvation, or the state of man by
nature, grace, and his future condition, constituted the funda
mental arrangement. This has, indeed, been realized most
rigidly in the first case, and the same has been done by Mar-
heineke's dogmatic.1 We assume, however, that whatever of
the Trinity may be included in the apostohcal symbol, it is stiU
incomplete, and exhibits rather the dignity of an historical com
bination, than a speculative theological meaning ; and that the
mere doctrine concerning the Divine essence is as little suited

§ 57. PRINCIPAL DIVISIONS. 127
to establish an organism for a system, as is a mere anthropo
logy; which system ought to point out on aU occasions, a re
lation between both sides, as weU as a divine history of the
world and humanity founded by the Son of God, who is the Son
of man. Now, if, according to Doderlein, Eckermann, Am
mon, Wegschneider, Bretschneider, De Wette, Schott, Schleier
macher, &c, a so-caUed Christology, soteriology, or at least a
providentia speciahs (salutaris) according to Grunner, ap
pears as the principal division ; then there immediately arises
the question, by what other principal divisions, or by what
number of them, shaU the system be prepared ? Perhaps by
mere theology; as proposed by Doderlein and Eckermann, but
which is inadmissible, precisely on the same grounds as the
doctrine of God was considered insufficient to supply aU the
leading divisions of dogma. As little can Anthropology or Cos
mology assume to be equal in rank with Christology. But it
is of more importance to inquire whether, on the one hand,
the historical doctrine of Sin, the basis of the doctrine of sal
vation, precedes, and how it does so ; and on the other hand,
whether the preceding ontological doctrines of God and man,
shaU or shaU not be treated in accordance with their Christian
and actual determinateness. In this point of view, there exists
the greatest difference between Eckermann and Augusti, since
the former, in his doctrine of salvation, does not in the remotest
degree premise Ponerology, whUst the latter commences his
leading division from the state of sin. Others include the doc
trine of sin in their Christological leading division, or, like
Schleiermacher, Schott, and Bretschneider, construct the his-
torico-positive part of the system out of the doctrine of sal
vation and sin, and this in such a manner that the two for
mer postpone to the end the doctrine of the Trinity, as the
dogma including aU others, and thus obtain at the very
threshold, a purely theistical2 and extra-historical leadmg
division, or, in so far as it possesses in itself any thing his
torical, a division, that to a cerain extent is Old Testa
mentary. There is still another question, In what way, if

128 INTRODUCTION. — IV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
Christology and Theology be co-ordinate, shall the unity of
the system, as one of Christianity, be preserved ? and on the
other hand, in what manner, if entire dogmatic be preserved to
Christology, can theology, &c, be included in it, or developed
out of it ?
We have in another place,3 suggested a division which pos
sibly may meet aU these requirements. Hitherto the person
and the work of the Eedeemer have been confronted; but the
doctrine of the person of the Eedeemer is that of God and man ;
and primarily, indeed, the doctrine of God's essence, attributes,
and works ; for the logos of God partakes of aU divine proper
ties, and transcends the Angels. Moreover, the dogma of the
Eedeemer is a doctrine concerning his humanity, and conse
quently, by a process of regression, is also one relating to man
in his original and his fallen condition. But the doctrine of
the personal unity of the Divine and human nature, and of their
union in Christ, is also the doctrine of the antithesis of creation
and preservation in connexion with redemption, and consequently
is the doctrine of a Divine decree of salvation, and its gradual
realization. Were it possible in this way, by means of the doc
trine of the Saviour's person, to derive theology, anthropology,
(angelology) and soteriology from Christology, then it is evident
that the remaining leading division of rehgious doctrine, namely,
the doctrine of the work of the Eedeemer, would occasion no
farther difficulty. But even in reference to the first part im
pediments arise. One consists in the dichotomy which pervades
the system, appearing to infringe upon the doctrine of the
Trinity, and has given occasion to certain Systematics, as for
example, Eust and Khng, who found their system on Christo
logy, to divide it, notwithstanding, after a trinitarian method.
The latter proposes to treat, 1st, Of the being of the God-man,
as the image of God and the archetype of humanity. 2o3y,
On the nature (?) and ministry of the Eedeemer. 3e%, On the
work of the Eedeemer as it consists and attains completion
through the operation of the Holy Spirit; in one word of the
Father, Son, and Spirit. In his third division he instructs us

§ 57. PRINCIPAL DIVISIONS. 129
concerning the Trinity in its higher sense, that is to say, onto-
logicaUy. We limit our objections to the foUowing remarks,
namely, that this division, although trichotomic, is only in ap
pearance trinitarian ; that the true trinitarian division is alone
adapted to speculative theology, but not for that of this author;
and farther, (as indeed, the foregoing description of the division
shows) that dogma, considered as a doctrine of the God-man
Eedeemer, cannot be classified in any logico-historical manner
as trinitarian; moreover, the doctrine of the Trinity is se
cured by the dichotomous division, and in such a way that
the ontological Trinity, God, Logos, Spirit, appertains to the
doctrine of the person of the Eedeemer, whUst the economic
Trinity, Father, Son, and Spirit, belongs to the doctrine of the
work of the Eedeemer. Meanwhile there arises a much more
important difficulty, and one which, even by the plan struck out
by Kling, appears to be insurmountable. Kling is obliged to in
troduce his three divisions with a general doctrine of the God-
man; now, the question arises, not only as to what amount of
development this doctrine shall reach, or under what hmitation
and simplicity it shaU be retained, so as not to encroach ; but also
how can this doctrine, when once introduced into the system, con
struct an independent commencement, without at the same time
including its own pre-suppositions. The system of Christian doc
trine does undoubtedly possess its own hypothesis ; but that is
nothing else than Christian consciousness, regulated by Biblical
representation, and sustained by the spirit of the church. Under
the protection and influence of this consciousness, and by means
again of the relation existing between Christianity and rehgion
in general Dogma may inculcate, as before, the order of being-
and becoming, and pass by the order of cognition and reve
lation; in other words, it may commence with the doctrine of
God, and again be associated with the ordinary arrangement,
and teach, in the first synthetical division, the suppositions of
faith in the redemption of the world by Christ, before it teaches
the analysis of faith itself. But the pre-suppositions of the
doctrine of salvation, are God and the creature, or the good,
K

130 INTRODUCTION. — IV. DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.
the absolute, and the dependent, and evU as the common con*
dition in sin and death. Both these doctrines, equaUy condi
tionated, are related to aU the developed members of the doc
trine of salvation. As for the rest, each division of the Chris
tian doctrine of faith which is grounded on the nature of the
object, constitutes, at the same time, a correct arrangement of
the whole Christian doctrine. Nevertheless, in order to render
the proposed union of the doctrine of faith and morals prominent,
— a view we have from the first indicated, — we shaU entitle
our leading divisions, Agathology, Ponerology, and Soteriology.
1 See Twesten's remarks on the Trinitarian classification of
dogmatic, p. 272.
2 On the reciprocal action of the knowledge of God and of faith
in Christ, Clemens of Alexandria has thrown out a spiritual and
striking hint, Strom. V. — Kul i'vu rig ifigreugrj ru uiu, yvuvui he? t-Am
irur'egu ngbg ov xdi b uiog. Aifoig re, hu rbv nrurigu irgoyvu/tev, irigreusui
heT ru uiu, on b rou §eou uibg hihugxei. ex irigreug ydg hg yvuait hid iiiou
xurrig. yyoigig he iiiou xul wurgbg, ij xurd rov xuvbvu rbv yvugnxbv, roi;
rS> ovri yvugnxbv, em^oXr) xui hiuXry^ig Ignv dXrfieiug hid rrjg dXrfietug.
3 Theol. Stud, und Krit., 1832, p. 171. Compare Kling.
What form of dogma most perfectly corresponds, as weU to the
present state of Theological science, as to the principles of the
Evangelical church ? Tubing. Zeitschrift fur Theol., 1834, 4 H.
p. 1.

§ 58. GENETIC CONNEXION OF THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH
AND MORALS.
In order to exhibit a representation of the Christian system,
it is unnecessary to avaU ourselves afresh of the methodus
localis, nor does the mere paraUelism of the dogmatical and
ethical elements tend to this object ; but the nature of the sub
ject in this case appears to admit and to require the genetic
method. For from both the doctrines contained in our first
division, concerning God and the Creature, there emanates
spontaneously a doctrine on the moral nature of man and his

§ 58. CONNEXION OF THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH AND MORALS. 131
original disposition for communion with God; in short, the doc
trine of moral nature. In our second division, there arises out
of the ethico-dogmatical doctrine of sin, the dogmatico-ethical
one of death or of evil, in its most extended sense. Our third
division, under the title " of Salvation," consists of an analysis of
the idea of redemption, that is, the four doctrines concerning
the foundation of salvation through the person and typical na
ture of the Eedeemer, the appropriation of salvation through
the grace of the Holy Spirit, communion in salvation, and
the completion of salvation. The three sections appertaining
to the doctrine of the appropriation of salvation, calling, con
version, and sanctification, are in part associated immediately
and in part mediately, with the doctrine of the origin and de
velopment of the Christian course. Then, in order that the
Christian communion be not considered merely in a dogmati
cal point of view, as a church; but at the same time be
viewed in the hght of a Christian household and commonwealth,
usage has been introduced into the system, apart from the na
ture of the case itself requiring it. Lastly, the ethics of Christ
ian fidelity and hope serve to introduce us to the dogma of the
final history of redemption.
Remark. Most modern systematic writers have either ex
cluded the doctrine of the church or the doctrine of the no-
vissimis of the doctrine of salvation, and then magnified the
one or the other into a definitive leading division. Calvin,
Bretschneider, Storr, and others, concur in the doctrine of the
church and means of grace, and abandon in this point of view
the track of the apostolic symbol; but, in our opinion, on insuf
ficient grounds. Marheineke, Schleiermacher, and Hahn, cor
rectly conceive Eschatology (the doctrine concerning death, judg
ment, happiness, and damnation,) to be the hope of the church,
its completion or redemption. It cannot be disputed that Escha
tology may naturally become the concluding part, and that then
the doctrine of the church, in connexion with the former, may
continue at the same time a subordinate member of the doctrine
of salvation.

PART THE FIRST.

OF THE GOOD.
§ 59. SALVATION AND THE GOOD.
Eedemption cannot be considered merely a restoration, nor
a mere perfected creation, but rather that it is the one
through the other ; at all events, redemption is related to an ori
ginal good, apart from which the bad itself would have no place
and opportunity for existence and continuance, seeing that re
demption is closely and consentaneously related to the bad.
Moreover, the good, in which bad and evil have found opportu
nities for manifestation, and which stood in need of deliverance,
cannot be the same from whence redemption causatively pro
ceeds; hence the presumption of an eternal Good, or a God,
and of a created good or Divine creature is fundamental to
Christian faith and life. A behef in the Eedeemer cannot be
separated from a belief in the Creator ;x but first through a
knowledge of the Eedeemer, does the Creator, together with
aU his work, become known in his perfect goodness and truth.
Remark. Manifold apprehensions are entertained of the danger
of uniting in Christian theology, God and the creature, through
the idea of the good. There are some who will never admit the
ontological idea of the good; and others, again, who do, term it a
Platonic rather than a biblical notion. Meanwhile, be it remem
bered that neither God nor theworld, neither primeval man nor
the human state, is here termed the good, but the conjunction
of the whole, that is, God, as the Creator and Sustainer, and
man, or the human state in its divine condition and conformabi-
lity; and farther, that this occurs merely on account of the pro-

134 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
posed idea of salvation. Besides, Plato's dogma (vide Politeia vi.)
namely, that absolute good is just God, and that the good is the
primary cause of all being and thought, or that it stands over
the bugiu, is not opposed to Christian theology, as appears even
from 1 John iv. 8, 16. The word ayu^bg is applied to God at
least in Matt. xix. 1 7, and that, too, exclusively. See Theodoret's
Dial, de trin. Opp. ed. Schulze v. p. 932, on b §ebg ou xurd iberoyri*
dyu'borrirog (as angels and men) egrlv dya^bg, uXX' durbg ignv dya§b-
rrig. and p. seq. xul xu^SXou itugu v\ d%iu rou Slow xr'igig, (it,ero%p uyu-
Sbrrirog, Xeyerui xui ignv uyuiiri' b he Seos, cpugei Siv dyu^bg, uur&g igriv
dyu^brrjg. And since we comprehend, under the Good, the whole
original condition of things, Christian faith is rather opposed to
the doctrine of Plato than confounded with it.
1 See Clem. Alex. Strom, v. in. and Athan. de incarn. in.

SECTION THE FIEST.
OF GOD.
§ 60. EXISTENCE AND CAPABILITY OF BEING KNOWN.
Name of God.
Indeed " no man hath seen God at any time," John i. 18;
1 Johniv. 12; 1 Tim. vi. 16; and it is only mediately that
his eternal power and Godhead are viewed in his works (Eom.
i. 20), and his paternity seen in Jesus (John xiv. 9.) But
there is a knowledge of God in men; yea in all spirits, as
such, there is a consciousness of the existence of God. Eom.
i. 19, 20; Acts xvii. 23; James ii. 19. For man's conscious
ness is the conscious existence of the First Being. God, not
only as he is in himself, but also as manifested in nature' and
history, is the object of man's consciousness. " In the begin
ning was the word, and the word was with God." The Divine
Being, who is not only self-conscious but self-manifesting and
a God who speaks, created by speaking, and by speaking

§ 60. EXISTENCE. 135
created; thus he produced finite existence and in such, finite
consciousness. "In him (logos) was life, and the hfe was the
light of men." By means of this universaUy divine existence,
there arises a gradual and proportionate apprehension and mis
apprehension of God. " The hght shineth in darkness, and
the darkness comprehendeth it not." John bore witness of
the light, " he came unto his own," " the word was made
flesh:" by virtue of a distinct existence, God has a name,
Exod. xxiii. 21; Levit. xxiv. 11, 16, that is to say, a manifes
tation and presence in his church, imparted to and awakening
faith. Now, although such manifestation is essential and true,
and becomes internal, so that we spirituaUy recognise that
which is spiritual, and partake of the mind of Christ, yet so
httle does this remove what is inscrutable, unfathomable, and
incomprehensible in God, that rather the inconceivable fulness
of his life belongs to what is contained in the knowledge of his
essence and attributes. In a general sense, God is capable of
being known, so far as He allows himself to be known, and in
so far as the receptive faculty of man for such knowledge ex
tends. Remark 1. The biblical tenet — no man hath seen God at any
time — has, for its opposite, either the knowledge of God, which is
in the Son, and revelation through him (ixeivog e%riy?}guro, John
i. 18), for the Son hath seen the Father, John vi. 46), or the
human consciousness of God in love, or the intuitive vision of
God, up to which point it behoves us to be elevated, and which
latter kind of vision, at least, when compared with the present
state of faith and intelligibility, will amount to beholding him.
Still there is a distinction to be made when seeing (bgav) is re
presented under moral conditions, as is done in 3 John 11, com
pare 1 John iii. 6. The finite spirit must needs know God; for
even man's vain idolatry, nay, his hatred and dread, is a kind of
God-worship. Man can also believe on the Word of God, and must
believe that He is, Heb. xi. 6. If man wills what is divine and
doeth it, he recognises God in His revelations, hears, and so
much the more understands His voice, John vii. 17; 1 Cor. viii. 3.
For God is perceived by the heart, Matt. xi. 25 ; and man must
be known of God, in order to know Him, Gal. iv. 9. But if man

136 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
wills not, then he can and wiU know only what he is necessitated
to know, John viii. 47 ; Mark iv. 1 2.
Remark 2. Throughout the whole testamentary Jewish-Chris
tian development, the assertion of John, that God is invisible,
not to be known, and incomprehensible, is affirmed at the same
time with the capability of God being known and revealed. It
is evident that the question by no means exclusively relates to
sensible and corporeal visibility or invisibility. In this point of
view, an inquiry must be instituted into the mode in which the
experiences and doctrines of the Old Testament are reflected
in the Apocrypha, in Josephus, and PhUo. The central point
of the question concerning the internal or external, the physi
cal or logical invisibility of God, is contained in Exodus xxxiii.,
xxxiv.; and universal orthodoxy so far settles the point, that
if any one has known God by actual sight, it is Moses;' but
even Moses only saw a reflex of Deity, and only through a cer
tain medium beheld God. John assuredly includes Moses in his
general denial (even in that contained in chap. v. 37); for
the negations, Exodus xxxiii. 20, 23, apply even to Moses
himself. Concurrent with this is the fable of Isaiah's having
been accused of heresy, and persecuted, in the reign of king
Manasseh, for asserting that he had seen God, against which
Sirach (xlviii. 22), defends the credibility of the vision of the
great prophet Isaiah; and the dvupanxov 'ngutov ascribes to the
soul of the prophet, wrapped in an ecstacy in the highest heaven,
a transcendental contemplation of the Trinity. The Alexandrians,
in reference to Divine appearances recorded in the Old Testament,
did not enter upon the physical element of the appearance and
vision, but upon the logical one. But upon what grounds could
they maintain (as, for example, Philo did), that God was abso
lutely invisible to created beings, and yet affirm the universal ca
pacity for knowing the Creator, to say nothing of the fact that
Moses represents God as visible? Compare Dahne's Geschichtliche
DarsteUung derjud. alex. Religions philosophie, HaUe, 1834, i. p.
1 34 seq. In the first place they supposed purely absolute Being
relationless and devoid of attributes, as God. This view offers
to the perceptive activity of the other no point of union: notwith
standing they attribute to every man, in addition to his being
designed to perceive truth, also the possession of a germ of rela
tionship to God. Doubtless, viewed in his sentient, passive de
velopment (fuge,, Book of Wisdom xiii. 1.) or as a heathen, man

§ 60. EXISTENCE. 137
does not attain unto a knowledge of God, but is, in an emphatic
sense, fidruiog. Instead of wisdom, there is dyvugid Seou, with and
by him. Thus consciousness of God is perverted into a vene
ration for the creature, or, what is still worse, adoration of the
work of man's own hand. He could and ought even pugu attain
to a knowledge of the Creator, that is, from rational inference
drawn from the works, he might have acquired a knowledge of
the Great Architect, ( Sap. xiii. 4, 9). For, since being has dis
closed itself in the world to existence, or as the logos (sophia) is
destined to be the mediating cause of all things, so does every
thing clearly attest and confess His existence. Natural reason
left to itself is only capable of knowing that God is, through a
contemplation of His works, ngogylvreg egyoig, ib. v. 1 ; but hhevui
rbv ovru ex ruv bgup/evuv dya&uv it is incapable of, since no compa
rison can be drawn between created beauty and good and the lv.
It is only by abstracting man's whole spiritual life out of the sphere
of sense and humanity, which process is excited and assisted by
the attractive powers of the Divine Logos (as they disperse them
selves through the world, and here and there become concentrat
ed) — it is only by such a process that man, as a God-related spirit,
is capable of being gradually raised to a higher knowledge, and to
an intellectual contemplation of God ; the first degree of which
has been traced out through Abraham to Joseph, and the loftiest
indicated by Moses. Of the absolute idea, from this point of view,
our knowledge is as imperfect as our language is inadequate;
not, indeed, because the elements of the logical perfection of our
knowledge of God are inseparable from those which are ethical.
In general, the identity of subject-object is nowhere assumed.
Moses himself continues in humanity and perfectibUity. And
what Sirach affirms (xliii. 27, 33,) of the inaccessibility and in
scrutable nature of the Divine fulness and majesty, is not
opposed to the doctrine of Philo.
The subject has, in general, been similarly treated by Christ
ians. Those who, either entirely or in part, deny not only the
comprehensibihty of God, and the capability of his being con
templated, but even of his being recognised, frequently only
do so for the honour of faith; but because they, in the first
place, ascribe unto faith merely the certainty of God's exist
ence, it by no means foUows that they would be altogether
contented with bare existence or being; on the contrary, it
has ever been the Gnostics, the latest academicians, and such

138 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
like, who have placed a mere empty ov, or some absolutely
nameless thing at the head of Entities. Now, since the latter
have expanded this predicateless entity up to relations, those
who maintain the doctrine of an immediate knowledge, or be
lievers, by no means deserve the censure so often bestowed
upon them, as if they desired to know nothing of God. We have
already become acquainted with a doctrine " of immediate self-
consciousness," to which the censure of the speculative schools
might be applicable, p. 17, but this hitherto stands quite alone.
Comprehensibleness rests upon the incomprehensible, thought
upon being, knowledge upon belief and experience. And in this
Absolutes can only change a pretended something. If Clemens
of Alex. Strom, vi. 275, 276, and the Constit. Apostol. 6. 11. ap
pear to maintain the perfect comprehensibility of God and of
Divine things: they do so, not in the mode of an eunomy, but
only in such a way, that thereby the perfect knowledge of God
in Jesus, including the entire novelty and sufficiency of his doc
trine, shall be acknowledged, e. g. v. 248, " God is only by virtue
of revelation in Christ hihuxrog and g^rog." Clemens may thus
be harmonized with numerous later writers on the proportional
incomprehensibUity of God, and his incapability of being known,
for example, with John of Damascus, 1. i., Kurd rb epixrbv ripiv
rr\v euurov Icpuv'eguge yvZffiv — and 2, oure fJtiqv icuviu uyvugru, oure irdvru
yvugrd. It is a frivolous objection wont to be raised in these days
against the incomprehensibility of God, namely, that revelation
has revealed nothing, or has not revealed at all, if it have left
what is mysterious, inexpressible, or unfathomable, unexplained.
On the contrary, we begin only now to live and move in mystery,
because there is a revelation, just as we only then become en
lightened when we are conscious of our ignorance! In the
biblical idea of Revelation there is nothing to justify an euno-
mian position. Revelation conducts to a new region of know
ledge and experience of God, which, as regards the actual state
of mankind, is the highest and most complete; but so far is
it from removing the general limitations to human knowledge,
that it rather effects a blessed consciousness of their future
removal, and produces a not less blessed consciousness of the
incomprehensible fulness of the being and becoming in which we
already stand in our life and nature. Alas! for Revelation, as if
it were nothing more than a logical triumph of opinions and
truth as hitherto prevalent, or, as it were, a clearing away of

§ 60. EXISTENCE. 139
some existing superstition ! Revelation, which is not simply a
universal but rather a special one of fact — a redemptive revela
tion undoubtedly effects a concrete perception of God, i. e. a per
ception which, compared with an abstract or mere logical one, is
absolute, but which nevertheless is free and blissful, not through
a comprehensive knowledge, but by love in faith, and through
faith up to vision. Human perception is absolute only in the
purity of its tendency and in the truth of its foundation, as a
perception proceeding out of God, and tending towards Him ;
but it is not so in the resolution of a theological process, nor is
it to be considered as the identity of the Divine and human. A
negation of knowledge is not happiness, but it is a knowledge
concerning the power of susceptibility and the fulness of what is
communicable, it is the knowledge of the connexion between
what is known and the unknown, — being, feeling, and life. Every
true human idea is a new reversion of a greater and richer
possession. Hence it is incumbent on us to receive in all their
fulness those passages which relate to the completeness or in
completeness of Christian perception, such as, John xvi. 13;
1 Cor. ii. 11; viii. 1-3; xiii. 12; Eph. iii. 18, 19; Rom. xi. 36.
It is a genuine and profound theological truth which is enun
ciated by the simple son of Sirach in these words, (xliii. 31), xoXXd
dwoxgvipd sgn fieifyvu rouroiv, bXiyu yug eugdxu/iev ruv egyav uurou.
Remark 3. The first question in theological science — the ex
istence of God, is also in this sense a question of life, inasmuch
as it presupposes the hfe of the conception — God. For we do
not inquire because we have no conception, but because we have.
The prevaUing opinion of antiquity, that it is as objectionable
to desire to prove the existence of God as to deny it, is one
sided. It is said, that to commence knowledge with doubt or
negation is inadmissible. In that case they at once abolish
science, in its relation to what is already admitted. Faith
itself, according to Heb. xi. 1, is an " evidence" and " sub
stance," and so far emanates from a negation in knowledge, for
God is neither visible nor comprehensible ; and the faith which
is necessary to please God is vigreunv, 'in Ign, Heb. xi. 6. How much
more ought the science of God commence with this question !
The opportunities seized by science for proving God cosmologi-
cally and physico-theologically, &c, resemble those referred to
when discussing testamentary religion. The physical philoso
phers maintained the substance without Godhead, and now

«
140 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
commenced the Socratic school. Belief in Jehovah rejected idols
and the gods of nature as false gods, as nullities, and accused
the heathen heart of being guilty of atheism. Neither the one
nor the other can be carried out unless faith accompanyits proof up
to general human experience and knowledge. Hence, Scripture
preserves the analogue of the aetiological evidence (Rom. i. 20;
compare Book of Wisdom xiii. as well as that of the teleological,
Ps. xix., Ps. viii., Acts xiv. 17; of the practical, Rom. ii. 14; and
of the ontological, Rom. i. 19, 32, Acts xvii. 24.) The proof
which is peculiar to Christianity, independent and historical, is
not indeed, as some designate it, miracle, but the accomplishment
of the passage in Isaiah xl. 9, " Behold your God!" it is revela
tion in an eminent sense; the existence of God in Christ (John
xiv. 9) — Christ. The contingent restraints of faith in God dis
play themselves in a mode different from that under which
science can exhibit them. The ordinary proofs are so far per
fectly valid and true, as they are united with the evidence of the
spirit or consciousness, or are regarded as the dissimilar causes of
the latter. The ontological proof is the first and last. The proof
of God's being is not syllogistic, but is the development of the
consciousness of what is real. In our consciousness of reality,
consists the knowledge of the original existence of the exact
arresting point. See Suabedissen's Sketches of Metaphysics,
Marb. 1836, p. 143. More recent criticisms and amplifications
in the Appendix to Hegel's Rel. Philos. in Daub's Lectures on
Dogma, and Phil. Fischer's Examination of Strauss' Doctrine of
Faith, part 1 . — As in the present day, God, for the most part, is
denied in His eternal personality, because personality and indivi
duality, being often co-ordinated in the grossest manner, cannot
be endured in their absolute being. Thus the teleological proof
again preserves its entire importance ; for the latter does not as
sume God's existence without conceiving Him to be. self-conscious
and omniscient. Fichte d. J. in der Zeitschr. f Philos. u. Specul.
Teol. N. F. v. i. p. 2, " A reciprocal relation between the end and
the means cannot exist apart from a consciousness imagining
and realising this relation. Now, such relation to an end is uni
versally found in the actual world; thus, the absolute in the
realisation of the world must be an absolute that imagines the
world and consciously penetrates it." Compare Trendelenburg,
Logical Disquisitions, towards the end.

§ 62. GOD IS SPIRIT. 141
§ 61. DIVINE ESSENCE.
God is the infinite and personal Being of the good, by and
for whom the finite hath existence and consciousness ; and it is
precisely this threefold definition — God is Spirit, is Love, is
Lord — this infinite personal good, which answers to the most
simple truths of Christianity.
Remark 1. The conceivable expression of the Divine essence
cannot be apprehended in a higher universal, for there is none.
In as much as it can only be said, God is God, as occurs so
many times in Holy Scripture, Isaiah xliii. 13; Exod. iii. 14.
Neither is there any definition of God capable of giving an ex
planatory idea. But a knowledge of what is distinct and defined
in the being of God's diversity is found immediately in our con
sciousness of God. The Divine Being is defined as he who destin-
ates all. Absolute kinds are to define and conditionate other
being, but only that which is purely good and purely free. There
cannot be higher and more equally worthy ug%ui of the Infinite
Being than these, consequently they are the simplest elements
in the conception of Deity, and in them the idea of the Divine
essence is included. What is to be understood by the use of the
word " infinite" is known.
Remark 2. Instead of the expression, " God is love," we could
not substitute the one of St John (1 John i. 5), " God is light,"
however possible it were to discover therein an intimate con
nexion between the intellectual and ethical ug%rj, or — perhaps
only the ethical? Meanwhile, light, as a cosmical and physical
expression, so to speak, is subordinated to the anthropomorphic
one, and cannot be co-ordinate with Spirit and Lord, as love is.
Light, life, truth, are rather such bvbpura, as are related to the
Logos as such. See John i. 4, viii. 12, xi. 25, xiv. 6. Assuredly
Oetinger's definition, " vita absoluta," might be considered the
most appropriate, if the attributes of the Deity could be imme
diately developed out of the idea of the Divine essence.
§ 62. GOD IS SPIRIT.
God is not a spirit, but Spirit; Joh. iv. 24, in other words,
Perfect Life. He possesses the perfection of Being; whence,

142 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
in part, he is distinguished from putative gods, as being the
Living and the True, and in part from other forms of actual
life and being, as the one who alone hath immortahty, 1 Tim.
vi. 16, and who is the creator and annihilator of aU things.
Remark. Spirit, in the passage quoted, expresses absolute
illimitableness, or the being simply perfect in its kind ; although,
primarily, according to its connexion, limitation in space only
appears to be denied. See Oetinger, p. 53: Deus enim dicitur
vivus non tantum in oppositione ad idola, sed etiam in se, quo
niam Spiritus Dei est in actu continue The same holds with
the name Jehovah, and Jabe of the Samaritans ; for although
both, according to Exodus iii. 13 — 16, compare Isaiah xliii. 13,
xliv. 4, 6, Rev. i. 4, signify in the first place the immutability of
being, and at the same time of will, stUl the etymology especially
intimates the most absolute reality, the ovrug bv, or the egrug ac
cording to the Platonico-gnostic notion. It does not occur here
arbitrarily for the first time that the biblical idea of absolute
being is considered analogous to the phUosophical one of
absolute essence. Is it possible that the true, real God shall
have no relation to thoughts, and that idea and science shall
have no susceptibility for Him ? For an answer on this point see
J. T. Beck's Christl. Lehrwissenchaft, sect. 1, p. 66. Hence we
do not mn after strange gods by tracking Deity in the history of
nature or thought. John of Damascus says, xugiuregov of every
thing asserted of God in Scripture is o m. In the same direc
tion, theologicaUy considered, it may be said, that God is Being, or
being Being, or beyond Being, above Being, but never non-being.

§ 63. GOD IS LOVE.
God is love, 1 John iv. 8, 16. The perfect one, Matt. v.
48. The absolutely good, and the only good being, Luke
xviii. 19. The Father, the heavenly Father (compare Deut.
xxxii. 6; Isaiah lxiii. 16; Jer. xxxi. 9). So that nothing can
pertain to His attributes or works, which may not also be de
duced from love. The very fact even of his performing works,
that he creates worlds and consciousness in existence, is not

§ 64. GOD IS LORD. 143
founded on infinity as such, but on the love of the infinite per
sonal Being. For creation, revelation, seff-communication, and
communion, are grounded on love as the final cause of finite
existence. Remark 1. It is mere assertion, that fatherhood, filiation, and
brotherhood are unrevealed in the Old Covenant; the truth is, they
are revealed, but only in a limited and mediate manner. It is
an equally vague assertion to affirm, that the God of the New
Testament is not an indignant God, full of majesty and power,
and that Christians ceased in every sense to be servants; for by
virtue of truth, which is in love, and by righteousness proceed
ing from it, all things even in the New Covenant retain their
respective places.
Remark 2. The thought of the absolute, for finite conscious
ness, has only thereby a permanent necessity, because it is and in
so far as it is the thought of absolute good; and this harmonizes
with our knowing and maintaining that absolute being, only as
such, would not be either creative, revealing, or the Father
of spirits (Hebrews xii. 9.) Thus even Plato and Philo
conceive Being (in so far as it is the effective and creative, enter
ing without envy into communion with non-being), as rdyadbv.

§ 64. GOD IS LORD.
Seeing that God is Father and Lord,1 so through each ap-
peUation of the divine nature, peculiar to revelation, we have
a testimony that God is personal. There appertains to the
personality of God not only his thought and wiU, differing from
the thought and wUl of the visible creature, but also such a
mode of the same as that through them only the entire person
ality of created beings, and aU communion between them as
well as between Him and his church, are fully granted and
conditionated. 1 Even in heathenism the gods of the first rank were revered
as lords. The names, Baal, Moloch, Adonis, are equivalent to
the title lord, as applied to the proper name of the Godhead.

144 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
With reference to others, such as &va%, uvugga, "BugiXeug, Kugtog, &c,
they are general titles applied to the superior gods. See xugioi
iroXXoi, 1 Cor. viii. 5, where we are not to imagine human but di
vine lords as understood. The idea of -^'in and nTf ^"TN
x — : x : x —x
opposes the personality of God to the individuality of many
lords; and strengthens on the other hand the views of relation
ship, peculiar fellowship, and theocracy. Wherever God and
Lord, 'bebg xul xugkg, as in 1 Cor. viii. 6, Elohim and Jehovah are
connected or stand in contrast, the first expresses rather the
causahty of the world; and the other, rather the countenance
as turned towards human society, towards the people and
the church, as founding a communion; or, the former express
rather the God of nature; the latter, the God of revelation.
Oetinger correctly remarks: Jehova ad manifestationem Dei
per fcedus in Jesu Christo, uno verbo ad vitam Dei spiritualem:
Elohim ad manifestationem ejus per opera naturae s. ad vitam Dei
naturalem refertur. Quamvis enim naturalis vita in Deo simul
sit spiritualis indivisim, tamen per nomina diversa innuitur
manifestatio unius vitae prae alia. Deus est — omnium rerum
Elohim, omnium actionum Jehova. With less accuracy does
Philo refer %ebg to the creating and sustaining, xugiog to the go
verning, judging, and punishing huvu/j.ig. With reference to the
modern speculative school here and there teaching that person
ality is an element of the idea: absolute spirit, is God; is cor
rectly expressed; only it must not be understood, as is frequently
the case, that God completes this element of his idea only
through his being individualized in finite spirit and yet is im
personal.

§ 65. ATTRIBUTES.
Man is not destined to possess the consciousness of this
veritable God, who is love, hi its absolute unity and just propor
tion; consciousness, in this pure relation to itself, must either be
come more foreign to man, or else, an abyss of speculation and
longing. Man is destined, however, to reahze this consciousness
in all the vicissitudes of the conditions and circumstances which
surround him, and in the entire succession of his experience and
contemplations. In doing this, he conceives the Divine per-

§ 65. ATTRIBUTES. 145
fections under the mode of attributes. He becomes conscious
of the perishable nature and limited extent of his existence; or
he contemplates, sometimes the main object, sometimes that
which is opposed to it, in the occurrences within his own imme
diate circle; or he feels the guUt or participation in the guilt of
sin; he sees how evU overtakes the unrighteous, or, on the con
trary, how much the righteous are doomed to suffer. By
realizing one and the same idea concerning the essential nature
and personality of true love, in every such condition, he acquires
manifold representations of God, aU of which can only be true
and pure in proportion as they contain and presuppose the in
divisible essence of Deity, and which, again, being regulated and
mutually suited by reflection, furnish the proof of his united re
presentation; precisely as the life of his piety and his faith
manifests itself in the fulness of the reflections and dispositions,
fundamental to the representations referred to.
Remark 1. If this be the vital originating point in our ideas
of the attributes of God, it foUows that the doctrine of the Divine
attributes is necessary, and is not exempted, but only prepared
by the doctrine of the divine essence. Many object, that there
is still another, or rather, only this origination of the notions of
attributes, which exists by means of a continual speculative con
templation of the idea of God, and in a gradual development of
the idea of the Divine nature; and indeed, this mode of proce
dure has always been pursued; consequently, there arise out of
this view, many more conceptions of the attributes of God, than
we allow are to be found expressed in Scripture, or are practical
ly required; nay, there occurs even an indefinite number of such,
whose firm position and limits, with the subordination of the
individual to the universal, have never in any way, not even in
the Scholastic period, been able to succeed. Still further, in
accordance with this procedure, the doctrine of Essence, in its
fundamental principle, is destroyed as an independent one ; for
after the existence of God is supposed or proved, the simplest
and first definition is entered upon, that is — His being — and the
so-called aseitas, as an idea of attribute, is already attained.
With this are combined infinitas, necessitas, simplicitas, spiritual-
itas, immaterialitas, &c, in one way or another. Now, with re-
L

146 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
gard to the former, an illusion exists, in believing that the idea
of Essence can be evaded, for the idea of existence presupposes
the entire neing at least as imagined. It is equally erroneous
if the idea of the absolute is conceived to be secured in propor
tion, as more of its elements are traced out. Precisely the
reverse is the case, since we derive this idea solely from self-
consciousness, and not by means of experience, and we do not
perfect it as an idea, but must and ought in this case, fill up the
deficiency of the intelligible cognition, by feeling and contem
plation. Moreover, it is certain that there is one form of active
conception, by which the essential reality of God-consciousness
may be said to be separated from every other, and from the
essential and identical reality of self and world-consciousness,
and be comprehended in itself; and there is another form which
is designed to determinate the relation of God to the finite, and
as such to the mutable. In the first case, the doctrine of the
Divine essence;. in the second, that of the Attributes, (by means
of both the doctrine of the determinations, — the works of God),
is constructed. Hence, it follows, that for the former, again, a
vital originating point of the idea, the immediate one is to be dis
covered, even if the absolute essence shall no longer be considered,
but the attributes, and that definitions of the attributes must
be abstained from, when the question turns on absolute essence.
Thus, the pure ontological idea does not affirm God is itveupu-
nxbg, but mveufhu. Every adjectival definition does not in- this
place promote perception, but rather impedes and restrains it.
Indeed both these doctrines of God, the ontological and axioma
tical, are not unrelated to each other,% and devoid of mutual
dependence; for who and what God is, is discoverable in every
proof of His existence, and every element in an idea of
the Divine essence, is a connecting link in the doctrine of attri
butes. Yet in such mode, that, in the collective conclusion, each
element in connexion with the rest embodies the confirmation of
an idea peculiar to attributes, and does so in such a way, that
Divine wisdom, omnipotence, and goodness, and what they are,
can only be understood, upon the hypothesis of other attributes,
and thus upon that of the Divine essence.
Remark 2. The preceding deduction of the doctrine of attri
butes has been accused of partial subjectivity, or of limiting the
attributes of God to his relation to the world. See Steudel

§ 65. ATTRIBUTES. 147
Tub. Zeitschr. f. TJieol. 1830, 4. P. 28. But inasmuch as it is
included in the independent doctrine of the Divine essence, it
possesses complete objectivity. In every conception of an
attribute, the Divine essence is in some mode or other, as con
scious and revealed, already supposed. Whoever constructs a
dogma, which does not assert what God is, or by which lie is
barely viewed in the light of Creator and Governor of the world,
before he has been contemplated in his essence, will afterwards
endeavour to recover (as it were), what has been neglected in
the conceptions of his attributes, and thus ontologise in the
wrong place. What is the idea of attribute, if it be not that of
related essence? And where is the religious and vital ne
cessity for the doctrine on divine attributes found, if it be not
discoverable in the manifold elements of the consummation ap
pertaining to the universal consciousness of God? In God
himself, nothing assuredly is separable; nor will it be maintained,
that the nature of God can be known or deduced from the nature
of the creature. But the idea of God discovers itself only under
the mode of an attribute, on occasions when the emotions and
changes in our consciousness of self and the world occur. I do
not assert that a countless multitude of things constitutes God as
omniscient, or proves Divine omniscience, but I become conscious
of God as the omniscient, when I religiously apprehend the
representation of what is concealed, what is innumerable, &c.
This derivation of the idea of attributes is very convenient,
because each purely scientific conception (in so far as it is
religiously indifferent), only in this way admits of being distin
guished from religious and theological ideas, and a definite pro?
vince of the latter admits of being separated. Still the question
might be raised, whether our doctrine of attributes, however
much it may be considered in a religious point of view, does not
recede from the definition as laid down by the word of God in
the Holy Scripture. But this is not by any means the case. For we
universally suppose a God, only in so far as he is cognisable, as a
revealing God; we receive the attribute only as a special com
pletion of the fundamental idea, which has already obtained a
Christian definiteness. The process of the revelation of God,
does not only include Divine operations, which renew a universal
consciousness of the true God, and in this point of view, illu
mine the night of passive religion, but also such as call forth
and confirm a consciousness of God, as especiaUy viewed and con-

148 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
ceived under a mode of attributes; and in the same manner as
we regulate the former by Scripture, so do we the latter also.
Thus we are much less likely to neglect, change, add, or ex
change those conceptions of God under the form of attributes,
which are contained in holy writ.

§ 66. DISTINCTION OF ATTRIBUTES.1
Every such perfect consummation of God-consciousness in
any one especial element of self or world-consciousness, con
sists partly in a separation of the Divine from the created,
and consequently in a much more secure relation of the former
to the being and the state of the latter. But as the one or
other predominates in every single complete idea of God, the
attributes of Divine abstraction and relation, admit of being
distinguished. But we dare not pause here withal ; for since
the Divine essence abstracts itself from the limits of time and
space, since it denies itself to the evU; and again, almightUy
conditionates finite Being, and since, by communicating and
operating it is connected with free existence or with conscious
ness, so great a distinction arises, that the attributes of the one
or other kind become newly regulated according to a double
distinction. Wherefore we distinguish, on the. one hand, the
hmiting and the remote attributes, and on the other, those that
are relational according to the different relations of God to the
creature in general, and to the personal creature in particular;
without thereby entirely depriving the one or other contrast of
its intermediation.
1 The following authors, in particular, have in modern times, la
boured to perfect the doctrine of the Divine attributes, more espe
cially with reference to its exclusive and exhausting arrangement.
Tieftrunk (Censur des Protestantischen Lehrbegriffs, 2 Theil).
Ammon, Bretschneider, Marheineke, Schleiermacher, Bohme, die
Lehre von den Gottlichen Eigenschaften, &c, Altenb. 1821. Steudel
(Tiib. Zeitschrift, 1830. 4. uber Eintheilung der in und an Gott.
zu denkenden Vollkommenkeit, Elwert, in the same work, Ver-
such einer Deduction der gottlichen Eigenschaften), Bruch and

§ 66. DISTINCTION OF ATTRIBUTES. 149
Twesten. Each has attained peculiar results; not one of them
does full justice to the distinction between the doctrine of the
nature of God and that of his attributes. The following are some
attempts, not so weU known, on this subject. Fischer, in his In
troduction to Dogma, p. 50, maintains that omnipotence is not
a Divine attribute, but rather a characteristic of the Divine
essence, and nothing else than infinity; the knowledge of God's
wisdom, holiness and mercy, is first promulgated through revela
tion. But, in point of fact, even Divine omnipotence has first
become known anew by means of revelation; and apart from the
latter, the wisdom and holiness of God has just as perfectly or
imperfectly entered into the consciousness, as has the attribute
of omnipotence. How could it be otherwise, when the indivisi
bility of the object is considered? Apart from this, the whole
doctrine of attributes is either annuUed, or omnipotence remains
a Divine attribute. In this view, it cannot be separated from
omniscience and omnipresence. Nothing definite can be deduced
from the proposition, " omnipotence is the fundamental charac
teristic of the Divine essence." Are there many such character
istics ? or only this one ? It is quite different if omnipotence be
accounted an attribute, the modifications of which constitute the
others — a doctrine which can only be adopted when all the other
doctrines of Schleiermacher are admitted. Nevertheless Elwert's
subtle essay closely accords with that of Fischer's. What is new
and useful in this attempt, will be found in p. 12, where the
attributes wisdom, justice, and goodness are represented as
the destinations of omniscience, holiness, and blessedness, in
which the absolute is related to the restored imperfection or
irregularity of the finite. The entire doctrine of God is made
much more significant and intelligible when Twesten, after
he has rendered conspicuous the two leading elements, power
and love, attends to the existing distinction in the relations
of God; and when we assume Divine causality merely in
itself to be absolute and exclusive, or at the same time,
operative with the finite causes and powers, and through them.
The power of God, accordingly, is omnipotence and omnipre
sence ; love (applied to the opposite of happiness and morality,
indicating goodness and holiness) is determinated, in reference to
the spontaneity of finite being, as justice and grace. To this
basis of Divine government, is added intelligence, i. e., wisdom
and omniscience.

150 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
Remark. The idea of essence and attribute is mixed up with
the doctrine of the ancients on the Divine name, (Dionys. Areop.
John of Damascus.) For they adopted the dvopuru in the widest
sense. A still greater confusion arises from determining the re
lationship of the Divine Persons to each other, as respects their
attributes; when, for example, the definite term dyewr\rog, as
it pertains to the doctrine of essence, appears to conflict with
it as it enters into the idea of the Trinity, a point which
the Arians have taken advantage of. In the first place, the
distinction between negative and affirmative attributes becomes
always prominent, and even Petavius adheres to it exclusively,
although the greatest number of the attributes denominated
negative admit of being expressed positively, or are derived
from the positive attributes. For attributes via negationis,
hi' dpuigegewg, may be discovered and not expressed negative
ly. But if, instead of negation, the idea of illimitableness
be assumed, as this, indeed, is indispensable, then neither the
limiting attributes nor the elevating ones, (which are discovered
via eminentiae), for example, Omniscience, Goodness, will be op
posed; or else the other distinction, (latterly in use) of the active
and passive attributes, must be embraced, and from thence
a transition made to those which have recently been the most
relished, to the natural and the moral. In the last case it soon
happens that the ancient adage, dvSgumg pergov vuvruv, is acted
upon, and the human type, being and thought, feeling, thinking,
and willing, are used for effecting an arrangement (of the attri
butes); as, for example, by Bretschneider, Hase, Hahn. The
latter at least, has also made use of the element of feeling. In
this manner all attributes are to be discovered via eminen-
tiw; for man, absolutely considered, is without sin, and as a
pure personal being does not possess any thing, (except what is
corporeal, temporal, and finite), which could absolutely be de
nied of God. But we say, except finiteness. And thus the via
negationis cannot be entirely overlooked; consequently the
human scheme is not altogether applicable. Moreover, they
distinguish between attributes which are communicable [imitable
withal] and incommunicable. Even this is impracticable. For
if we become participant, according to 2 Peter i. 4, Seiug <pbgeug,
the ethical attributes are incapable of exclusive communication!
The latter also are not absolutely communicable. Thus the ques
tion may arise, whether the passive attributes are really in a state

§ 68. DISTINCTION OF ATTRIBUTES. 151
of repose. The objection raised by Steudel to the attributes in and
of God, or to the attributes of being and possession, is quite un
tenable. In point of fact, by this hypothesis, it is only the posses
sive attributes that can be considered the true ones, and, at the
same time, the difficulty of conceiving a Divine attribute, or perfec
tion, would be quite insurmountable if they were only in part found
of and not in God. That the idea of passive or even natural at
tributes, reduced back into the doctrine of the Divine essence,
is more clearly evidenced if they be designated rather transcen
dental, as by Tieftrunk, or by Bretschneider they are named uni
versal. If this be done, which, however, appears at variance with
the point of view in which the doctrine of attributes ought to be
considered; then, I doubt whether it would not be more consis
tent to develope directly, as Gmner does, all the attributes of
God from the conception of infinite spirit, or with Henke, to de
duce them all from infinite goodness, or to treat the doctrine of
attributes as the immediate continuation of that of the Divine
essence, as done by Marheineke, who conceives the idea of the
Divine Being in the true, eternal, and blessad God, and de-
velopes each of these members into attributes. "There are,"
(he says, Grundlehren der Dogma, 2d edition § 187) " in the doc
trine of the Divine attributes three determinations of the
essential nature, whose existence is absolute knowledge, and
from whence aU the Divine attributes follow, and which are dis
tributed into such as are essentiaUy the existing attributes of
God as the true, the eternal, and the blessed." Whether and how
this Trinity is derived from the unity of absolute knowledge, or
recedes into it, is not distinctly asserted. A more extended an
alysis adopts definitions which we do not admit to be attributes,
such as reality and personality. And again, there are others in
which the trace of biblical representation almost disappears. In
deed the primary attributes, thus denoted, are not radiated
fundamentally out of authentic Christian consciousness. For it
is not to be mistaken, that by means of biblical revelation, om
nipotence, wisdom, and justice, (considered at the same time as
goodness, truth, and grace) encompassed by glory or holiness,
are much more obtrusive than blessedness, or even eternity.
Truth, (dXrfiivog) like life, is an essential or general definition of
being. Passages referring to the whole doctrine in question are
to be met with in the reflections on nature and history for ex
ample, in the book of Job xii. 1 3-16, where wisdom and strength

152 PART I. OF GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
stand forth in all their splendour; or in the solemn invocations of
Jehovah, 1 Chron. xxix. Dan. ii. 20-22, wherein power and wisdom
are exalted. Other passages there are where a particular and. ex
clusive holiness, endless duration, omnipresence, and omniscience
are separately and more exclusively praised, and many in which
justice and truth, goodness and truth, grace, mercy, and long-
suffering are especiaUy extolled, Isaiah vi., Ps. xc. cxxxix., &c.
Exceeding aU in majesty, and seceding from the creature towards
the full causality of the universe of nature and history, are the fol
lowing passages in 1 Tim. i. 17, vi. 15-1 6, and the doxologies of the
Apocalypse. Doubtless, the systematic reflection of later Judaism
on the attributes of God, constitutes the basis of the latter. The
most ancient examples of such a system are found in the writings
of the Judaical Aetiologists, who, into their doctrine of second
causes interwove that of the attributes, partly according to a lo
gical, and partly according to physical philosophy. The Thirty-
two Ways of Wisdom, together with the book jryijfl edited by
Meyer, Leips. 1830, maybe adduced as a cabalistic example;
and in the Book*of Wisdom, vii. 22, 23, we find an Alexandrian
one; only this latter example, which comprehends, under the
form of attributes, twenty-one definitions of the spirit existing
in wisdom, is not incapable of explanation. These definitions
are as follows : " An understanding spirit, holy, one only, mani
fold, subtle, lively, clear, undefiled, plain, not subject to hurt,
good, quick, cannot be letted, ready to do good, kind to man,
steadfast, sure, free from care, having all power, overseeing all
things, and going through all understanding, pure, and most
subtle spirits."
Their number is more easily explained than their position
and arrangement, which, however, may not have been ground
less or without an object. On this subject we refer to Meyer's
preface to Kabbal. Weltbildungsbuche on the numbers twenty-one
and twenty-two. These notions all admit of explanation by the
aid of the Alexandrian aetiological doctrines. The question
principally turns on the essential second cause of the world,
which is not only represented as thought (<rop/a), but in the
thinking being constitutes the operative, formative, sustaining
original life of the world, as well as the spirit of wisdom, which
wisdom is active. God, wisdom, spirit of wisdom, are not defini
tions of attributes, but are essential determinations of the Divine
existence in reference to the causality of the world ; the former

§ 66. DISTINCTION OF ATTRIBUTES. 153
can only flow out of the latter. In the first place, the Divine
element, pervading the inner world, in relation to being, is simple
and yet manifold; it exists in every essence, and yet in the
manifoldness of finite forms, all of which contain a spiritual re
ality, it is manifold. It is, moreover, a thinking element abso
lutely clear and distinct, and, in addition, omniscient and direc
tive (voegbv, rgdvov, gu<peg, iruveirigxoirov) such as is proportioned to a
true causation of the world. With this causation evil is uncon
nected. The spirit of wisdom, which permeates all things, is
good, benevolent, philanthropic. The simple spirit, proceeding
only from love, enters into the finite and the material, in order
to divide acutely (b%u), and in part to regulate; and this spirit
is absolutely immaterial, Xeirrov, yet penetrating aU other essen
ces, even the purest, and is absolutely flexible and active ; and
thus it acts upon materialism, which without hindrance (uxuXurov)
and ail-powerfully (iruvrohuvupov) it elaborates and controls. But
it is not related to this sensuous in the same way as the human
spirit is, in as much as it appropriates the sensuous, partly as
sensrious inclination, and partly as disinclination; it is rather
absolutely holy (dyiov), passionless (uvr\^uvrov); and not only so
(in so far it rules over sensuous existence) but it remains stain
less (dpbXvvrov), and also free from anxiety, secure and firm
(dfi'egifiuvov, fiefiuiov, dgipuXeg.) In many respects this instructive
portion of the Book of Wisdom reminds us of various definitions
of the good regarded as attributes which have been ascribed by
Clem. Alex. (Protr. 6, 72), to Cleanthes, although they appear
merely to embody an abstract of some passage or fragment of his
remains. This Stoic, (whose school especially delighted in ex
hibiting the hrifiiougybv ruv oXuv iroXXuTg irgogriyogmig xuru rug huvd^eig,
for the purpose of explaining polytheism, 'Diog. 1. vii. 1 47), is
said to have arranged together the following attributes : reruytue-
vov, hixuiov, ogiov, eugefi'es, xgurouv euurou (compare Book of Wisdom xii.
18), -xgrigipov, xuXbv, heov (?) augrtjgbv, uu'hexugrov, (dirXouvf), uhi gufiipegov,
utpofiov, uXuirov, XuginXeg, uvuhuvov, utpeXipov, euugegrov, &gtpuXeg, (piXov,
euripov, bpoXoyoupevov, suxXeeg, urutpov, etfipeXeg, irguov, g<pohgov, •/pviQt^e-
vov, upeivxrov, dei hiupfaov. Alexandrian Judaism has confessedly
employed largely the doctrines of Cleanthes and Chrysippus in
physics and ethics. Doubtless, those passages in the Book of
Wisdom referred to, may be almost entirely and exclusively
made use of for aetiological doctrine, and they even betray
a wavering between an evolution of pantheism and dualism,

154 PART I. OF GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
like so many other systems of that kind. Although the
determination xugouv hid itdvruv ntvevpuruv votguv appears again
to annul Pantheism, and to accord to finite Spirit only what
is inherent in the infinite, and thus completely to separate
the identity, yet it is evident that these two leading tendencies
of the doctrine of God contained in the Old Testament, form the
groundwork of this system, albeit apocryphal : the one tending
to spiritualize, in the highest degree, the idea of God, and to ex
empt it from the conditions belonging to the circle of human
experience and conceptions; the other operating by bringing the
Divine existence as livingly and closely as possible to man's cog
nition and contemplation. The intimate connection between
both tendencies produces in Holy Scripture other manifesta
tions; those, for example, of angels and the self-mediations of
the Divine nature, — and it also has its sequence in respect to the
doctrine of attributes, namely, by withdrawing, in the first place,
God, in His relation to the creature, into the absolute, and sepa
rating Him from all created existence, action, and passion; and
in the second place, by bringing Him to the most perfect exist
ence and efficiency for the creature, and for himself in the crea
ture; which twofold division again affects partly the universal
finite, and partly the personal finite; and thus, in the doctrine of
attributes, we are justified in using in this manner the two ele
ments which are at all times prominent, namely, " iUimitable-
ness" and " causality."
On the other hand, Elwert, in his work referred to, p. 5, re
minds us that a middle term is wanting, which, as the ground
of arrangement, ought to appear in both kinds of ablation and
relation, or in what is illimitable and causative. The middle term
is this, — the consummation of the absolutely identical God-con
sciousness in the elements of self and world-consciousness. And
since the emotion which extends to this consummation. does not
lie in the contingent will of the subject, but proceeds from Divine
life, nature, and word, it cannot consequently be said that this
doctrine refers to subjectivity. Because God is and so is, He
produces this emotion, and appears to the conscience from these
and no other aspects, and in these and no other attributes.
Pantheistic dogma continues to deny in an intelligible manner
the Personality of the Absolute Being, as well as the doctrine of
attributes. The real contents of the latter it denominates the
laws of the world. This content cannot be determinated; for

§ 67. ABSTRACTION OF GOD FROM FINITE EXISTENCE. 155
what can be termed absolute in absolute wisdom, goodness, jus
tice, &c, if it be not self-conscious, or is only collected out of
the mass and totality of finite self-consciousness.

| 67. ABSTRACTION OF GOD FROM FINITE EXISTENCE.
A consciousness of the absolute being of God is fundamental
to every complete_act of consciousness of God whether distinct
or under a mode of his attributes. Every representation of
revealed Godhead commences with the ilhmitable distance of
God from finite existence. Now, as the finite in general relates
to time and space, it foUows that God is to be considered as
eternal, before all time and space, in which eternity, his im
mensity at the same time becomes conceivable. But finiteness
is as little without God as above God; it is through and for
Him. The succession and extension of existence as a natural
infinity, is no more than nature a self-sustaining power, which,
in such a case, would be approximated to God, or arrayed
against him. But God is the eternal author of being as weU
as of time and space; consequently, the eternity of God can
only be imagined in unity with his omnipresent and omniscient
omnipotence;1 just as holiness, righteousness, and wisdom can
only be comprehended in unity with the immutability and eter
nity of God; and thus from the very beginning it is at once
apparent that every Divine attribute is necessarily a conception
of the idea of God.
1 Romans i. 20, dihiog huvupig xul Ss/onjs.

§ 68. ETERNITY.
If we reach to a consciousness of God in the manifestations
and sensations of that which is transitory, then is He before aU
and absolute in duration (Ps. xc. 2), as long as we continue in the
representative mode of comparison and contrast. God outhves
every world or age (Ps. cii. 12, 25, 28), is incorruptible, Eom.

156 PART I. OF GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
i. 23, and "only hath immortahty," 1 Tim. vi. 16. But
His life in and with time has no resemblance to that of the
creature; for a thousand years are with him as one day, Ps.
xc. 4; 2 Peter iii. 8. The present, as weU as the negation of
the past and future, constitute his existence. Thus, God is
everlasting utwiog? Eom. xvi. 26; Gen. xxi. 33; that is to
say, He is not only exempted from the succession of time, and
from the temporal limits of being, but is also the efficient
cause of time and of temporal things.

2

1 According to the more accurate language of the Alexandrian
school, as adopted, for example, by a Philo or a Clemens, uluvwg
may rather be considered as the opposite of dthiog. For accord
ing to Philo, what is asserted of God in the language and con
ceptions of this lower world is, uiuviov ovopu. In the Book of
Wisdom xiii. 9, uiuv is finite existence in general contrasted with
God; according to the fundamental idea, it is that infinity of the
finite belonging to Deity, viewed as the uninterrupted being, and
distinguished from whatever hath been. In this infinity the
idea of eternity is involved; and, in like manner, uiuviog in the
passages referred to, and in Baruch iv. 10, 14, 20, is really dthiog.
Immutability, Book of Wisdom vii. 27, is paraphrased //.evougu iv
uurfl suvru xdmgei Augustin. Conf. i. 4, stabilis — immutabilis mu-
tans omnia, nunquam novus nunquam vetus, innovans omnia.
The Divine habitation, Isaiah lvii. 15, 1 Tim. vi. 16, does not
authorize the assumption of a coaeternum Deo.
2 Operator temporum Augustin. Confess. 11, 13. Compare
Schleiermacher, G. L. i. § 67. " The eternity of God is only to
be conceived as almighty eternity, that is, as that which in God
conditionates together with all that is temporal, also time itself."
— BugiXeug ruv uluvuv, 1 Tim. i. 1 7. Compare Tobit xiii. 6, 10, if
this do not rather signify the eternal ruler or even Lord of the
world. In no other mode, except through the operation of time,
and through the revelation of his nature in time, can He partici
pate in succession, however readily, in modern times God in his
tory may have been regarded as a finite God. Compare K. Wilh.
Theod. Voigt, on Freedom and Necessity, as viewed from the
standing point of a Christian and Theistic World. Leipz 1828
§ 31, 32.

§ 69. SPACELESS. 157

§ 69. SPACELESS.
Before we rejoice in any special approach and presence of
God, as for example in his presence in the house of prayer, we
not only maintain, together with his incorporeahty and spi
rituality (John iv. 24; Acts xvii. 24; Isaiah lxvi. 1; Jer. xxxiii.
24), his ubiquity, but also that the entire heaven of heavens
cannot contain him, and that he alone remains the almighty
cause of aU space,1 1 Kings viii. 27.
1 Schleiermacher Glaubenslehre, i. p. 280. " God's omni
presence is only to be conceived as being almighty presence,
namely, as that power which, through God, conditionates all that
exists in space, and even space itself."

| 70. RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD.
God is omnipresent, almighty, and omniscient.
Remark 1. Although the syllable "all," and the idea em
bodied in it, appears to include the relation of the Divine life
and action to the totality of things, still we stand in need of
vivid conceptions corresponding to these attributes, on occasions
when we claim for an individual creation the perfection of Deity,
which conditionates the universe ; i. e. in actual religious life
the question turns rather on His actuating and knowing parti
culars, in the same manner as He does the universal, than on
the absolute self-existing infinity of His power, knowledge, and
existence. Hence the words iruvrohuvupog, iruvrentbitrrig x. X. have
been principally formed in a latter and reflective period.
Remark 2. The knowledge of all these attributes, which more
especially refer to the Ulimitable or causative relation of God to
the creature, corresponds to the cosmological proof of the exist
ence of God. Whilst in this way we know that God is, we at
the same time know that he so is.

158 PART I. OF GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.

§ 71. OMNIPRESENCE.
Withdrawn into our limited condition in space, and especi
ally in our state of isolation and abandonment, the infinite and
invisible God, who is timeless and spaceless, can no more be
escaped from than He can be removed by us (Ps. cxxxix. 7 ;
Acts xvii. 27).1 And just as a life of piety consists in a steady
walk before Him (Gen. xvii. 1), so is He also especially nigh
unto them who thus walk (Isaiah xliii. 2; lvii. 15; James iv. 8).
1 The representations of Deity as the being who fills, pene
trates, extends, and exists in all and through all (Eph. iv. 6;
Book of Wisdom, i. .7; vii. 23; viii. 1.), are merely preparative
for speculative thoughts on the omnipresence of God. The idea
of His omnipresence admits of being supported before assuming
His participation in materiality and locality; first, by the argu
ment that His omnipresence may be regarded in unity with
omniscience and omnipotence, as, for example, in the Book of
Wisdom i. 7; viii. 1, whence the spirituality of the former, and
the dynamic kind of all-being is a natural consequence; and,
secondly, that the boundless (uweg itdvruv) or infinite being is
already assumed by the previous definitions.
Remark 1. Together with power in heaven and on earth, the
Saviour is invested with authority to promise and vouchsafe to
his own His proximity, Matt, xxviii. 20. The consciousness of
his intimate presence, in reference to the Christian conflict with
sin, death, and the world, stands pre-eminently forward.
Remark 2. The omnipresence of God must assume the first
rank among these three relative attributes, in order that, in
the train of His infinity or spacelessness, the connexion with the
ablative attributes, and their distinction from the relative ones,
may be more clearly indicated.

§ 72. OMNIPOTENCE.
In relation to the Ever- Enduring, in so far as He impresses
our freedom, we supphcate the God who doeth wonders, Ps.
Ixxvii. 14, xcviii. 1 ; Matt. viii. 2 ; Ephes. iii. 20 ; or the

§ 72. OMNIPOTENCE. 159
God before whom " there is nothing too hard," Gen. xviii. 14;
Zech. viii. 6; with whom nothing is impossible, Luke i. 37 ;
Matt. iii. 9, xix. 26 ; for God can create a new thing, Jer.
xxxi. 22 ; Num. xvi. 30 ; and as He has made aU things and
upholds them by the word and power of His wiU, Gen. i. 3 ;
Ps. cxv. 3, cxxxv. 6; Eom. iv. 17; Heb. i. 3; neither reality
nor possibUity, but only his will constitutes the measure of his
power.i The idea of Omnipotence arises from the repeated
and especial apphcation of the conception we realize of the
Creator of heaven and earth.
1 Sap. Sal., xii. 18, ntdgegri ydg got orui SeXpg rb huvu&u. A
power transcending the will, which, at the same time, presumes
a distinction between ability and inclination, consequently sup
poses also a wiU which exceeds power, and therefore an imper
fection. The will of God is almighty as the will of absolute
wise love. To be absolutely infinite in power through goodness
— hegirbZen igx^og, B. Wisdom, xii. 18, is true power. But each
attribute of God conveys the idea of God so clearly, that not only
Omnipotence is the basis of the infinite wisdom and love of God,
but is even the " beginning " of divine righteousness and good
ness, according to the expressive remark in the Book of Wisdom,
XU. 16, fj ydg )g-)(ug gov hixuioguvr\g dgyr\ xul rb iravruv ffs hegitoieiv nruv-
ruv <peihe&ui mill. On the other hand, Divine power, considered
in reference to possibility or. reality, has been represented, at
least literally, under a double form of erroneous modification.
By Abelard, Introductio, 3, 5, it is asserted, Deus non potest
facere aliquid praeter ea quae facit; and Origen remarks, accord
ing to Justinian, ireffegugpevri ydg ihui xul rr\v huvupiv rou %ou Xsxrloi/
euv ydg r) uireigog n 'heTa. huvu/ug, dvdyxn uurrjv (trjhe euurr\v voetv. But the
real weight of these expressions is commonly wont to be un
justly estimated. Origen is far from denying or diminishing
the power of the Deity. He observes the philosophic language
peculiar to the period as used by the Pythagoreans and Platon-
ists, in harmony with which the illimitable is represented as
something quite distinct from the absolute. The illimitable is
the indeterminate, ro uogigrov, an attribute that does not quite
reach perfect being. The opposite of limitation and that which
is illitimable does not concern the Grecian, and consequently
does not touch the question of the absolute; and correctly

160 PART I. OF GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
this is so maintained by them. It is altogether a distinct thing
to maintain the limitations of God, and the determinations of
the absolute. God as absolute power, is a determinated, that
is to say, an intelligent, wise, and absolutely a personal power.
Origen does not intend to assert anything essentially contrary
to this, and Justinian, therefore, has no grounds for charging
him with heresy. Abelard, in the first place, only asserts that
God can never act out of proportion with himself, quod ei con-
venit. But he afterwards maintains, and Schleiermacher concurs
with him, that God can only effect the actual, or what He
thinks must also be His act; and if this be his meaning, that
the sum total of phenomena exhausts the conception of the Divine
mind, and that finite existence is an adequate exponent of the
infinite, in that case the position is untenable.

§ 73. OMNISCIENCE.
As the Almighty is present to things, so are they present to
him. God is omniscient. For in reference to the multiplicity
of things (Ps. cxxxix. 16, compare v. 4; Ps. cxlvii. 4) surpass
ing aU the thoughts and experience of man ; and with regard to
the multifarious necessities which incite him to supphcation,
Matth. vi. 8, 32; and in reference to his invisible thoughts and
sentiments, Ps. vii. 10, John xxi. 17, Acts i. 24; and to the
concealment of sin, of innocence, and distress, — we confide in
the knowledge of God, which is complete in circuit, Ps. cxxxix.,
and according to its kind immediate or intuitive, and eminently
perfect, Heb. iv. 13.
Remark. The questions whether Divine knowledge be opera
tive for its object, and in what way Divine foreknowledge of
free actions is consistent with the freedom of the latter, are
questions foreign to the original character of the doctrine of om
niscience. Both have been started when on the subject of the
idea of prophecy and prediction, (and even by Cicero de Divin.)
Indeed, the Omniscient God conditionates all self-life of the crea
ture, and knows it as such. Just as he creates it free, he knows
it to be so. The proper place for discussing these questions will
be when the conditionation of human freedom is especially

§ 75. wisdom. 161
treated; at present they may be dismissed, as has been done by
Augustin, de Civ. Dei, v. 9, de Lib. Arb. iii. 3; and farther by
Anselm, praescit Deus me sine necessitate peccaturum, &c. praes-
cit effectum eo modo eventurum, quo a causa procedit, ut a libera
libere, a contingente contingenter, a necessaria necessario; or
by Schleiermacher, " God foreknows the free, but as free."

§ 74. ABSTRACTION OF GOD FROM THE PERSONAL CREATURE.
God is alone wise, glorious, holy, and blessed.
Remark. By means of the characteristic, that God alone is
something, for example, wise or good, there is also indicated a
peculiar kind of attribute, just as He is something in relation
to the All, although ordinary language cannot fully express this
distinction.

§ 75. WISDOM.
It is in an actuaUy existing world, and in its relations to the
Divine purpose, that we at aU times attain a consciousness of
God ; i. e. we confide in the wisdom of God, or in the perfect con
sciousness of His creating and sustaining love. Now, since the
Divine purpose is nowhere so completely represented in any de
partment of creation as it is in the personal, nor in the individual
so clearly as in the genus, there consequently arises at aU times a
necessity of supposing or inquiring in what manner the physical
world is, not only conformably related to itself, but also how, as
revealing and inciting, and then again as being susceptible and
passive, this physical world is related to the moral one. Ac
cordingly, the wisdom of God is reflected in the aU-original work
of creation1 and preservation. God saw that it was good, Gen.
i. ; Ps. civ. 24; Proverbs viii. 22-31; Jer. x. 12. Never
theless, there can be nothing more antagonistic to the end in view
than evil; and in so far as this exercises its destructive or per
verting- power in the world, the wisdom of God becomes in a
certain measure new, and consequently in the facts of redemp-
M

162 PART I. OF THE GOOD.  SECT. I. OF GOD.
tion from permitted evil it is eminently magnified, and this to
such a degree, that the wisdom of God even in creation appears
more fuUy exalted by the wisdom displayed in salvation. Ee-
medial wisdom is especiaUy "hidden wisdom," 1 Cor. ii. 7;
Ephes. hi. 10; compare Ps. Ii. 6. At one time indeed it estab
lishes in man the entire consciousness of an aim, and reveals it
self through law and promise, Ps. ciii. 7; 1 Cor. ii. 12, 16.
This wisdom too inclines towards the susceptible, in order to
communicate itself unto them, Dan. ii. 20, seq. ; James i. 5 ;
iii. 17. Yet in such a mode, that for the most part it wiU be
recognised in the Divine covenant-history, (Book of Wisdom,
and Sirach), and through this period which is past be especiaUy
exhibited for the future.
It is just the most apparent incongruities in the world's con
dition, with reference to its aim, which should become the most
certain occasions for men to think on the concealed meaning of
the Lord, Isaiah xl. 13, lv. 8, to adore the unsearchableness of
his ways, Eom. xi. 33, and to acknowledge the exclusive sove
reign virtue of Him who is the only wise God, 1 Tim. i. 17;
Jude 25.
Remark 1. Wisdom is the excellency of knowing, consequently
it is neither the quantitative and extensive, but the practical
greatness, the intensive and productive perfection of knowledge.
Hence wisdom is not omniscience, but is to be considered rather
as knowledge absolutely proportioned to its object. Therefore,
when we speak of God, wisdom must be regarded simply as
the love of the Divine self and world-consciousness, or as the
perfect sense and consciousness of the love of the omnipotent
Creator, Preserver, and Governor. The knowledge that God is
wise, corresponds to the physico and ethico-theological evidence
of Divine existence, or is contained in it. Since we conceive
wisdom as the unity of Divine omnipotence and love, and as
being the conscious proportion between the world and the Spirit,
so therein consists the ground for our regarding it as the neces
sary bond of both kinds of Divine attributes which determi
nate the relation of God to the creature in general, or to the
moral one in particular. But inasmuch as we presume that,
together with Divine Wisdom, God is alone wise, or at the same

§ 75. wisdom. 163
time associate wisdom with the felt limits of our own conscious
aim, it is placed at the head of those abstract or remote attri
butes which define the relation of the Lord to personal crea
tures. Remark 2. It is in conformity with these relations of wisdom to
the Divine essence, and to the other attributes, that in the Hebrew
Proverbs, cap. viii. wisdom is personified poetically, and in Juda
ism dogmaticaUy. And in the Testament of expectation, wisdom
must be revered more and more apart as the complete causa
hty of aU Divine communications, in the same degree in which
its members relinquish or spiritualize the hope of the Messiah,
and are content with the past. This view is confirmed by the
Apocrypha. From this position we proceed upon the supposi
tion, that in the law (the Mosaic one) is given the perfect medium
of all Divine revelation and sanctification, just as Moses exhibits
the most perfect stage of human fellowship with God. The law is
the expression and manifestation of Divine thought in the world,
the purport of aU Divine conceivable aims. Hence the personal
self-communication of God is termed vSpog, ygutpn, &c. (just as it was
at a later period designated Xoyog). Now, if it be required for all
Divine cultivation of life, for all glorification of private and public
life, for aU salvation and redemption, that the right sense of the
law be disclosed and communicated, and that it shall rule the
world by means of the people of Israel, their afflictions and their
triumphant fidelity, in that case it is only by knowledge g'uvegig,
<pgovi)gii, gopiu, righteousness and bliss, and Divine knowledge, con
descending to the law and to Israel, in other words, it is wisdom
which can alone be the actual personal self-communication of God.
Even by the cabalistic FTTCDtDft (different from NJ-pS'TltS'to) Per"
sonal wisdom is to be understood as (/.erd^govog %sou, co-regent
(Book of Wisdom, ix. 4, rr\v ruv guv SgSvuv vdgehgov eoipiuv, and v. 10,
dirb ^govou Utyg gov ¦jr'ep-^ov durw) or as guv^govog. It is safer to reject
the derivation from Metator, or at least to doubt that from Mith
ras. But even in the prophetic tendency of the Old Testament, so
firmly maintained, the causality which conditionates the universe,
and which is love, can especially be recognised only as wisdom,
so long as a particular barrier exists, and necessarily continues
to do so. The non-manifested universality of grace, which was
limited to Israel, aUows contrasts which only admit of being re
conciled by the idea of wisdom.
1 Although we cannot admit the exclusive relation of wisdom

164 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
to redemption, which Schleiermacher assigns to it in the follow
ing definition, " Divine self-communication operating in redemp
tion, as that principle which regulates and determinates the
world," nevertheless, we assent not the less to its peculiar connec
tion with love to which J. D. Michaelis, Comp. Theol. Dogm. p. 59,
also alludes. Hence, in redemption, wisdom cannot be exclusively
revealed because the creation and preservation of things is already
the conscious self-manifestation of Divine love. Nature is revealed
wisdom, partly in its relation to spirit, and its fitness to supply
the spirit with impressions and an opportunity for activity; and
partly in itself, as an organism and work of art. Now with
reference to wisdom, pantheistic dogma endeavours to provoke
a conflict between absolute spirit and the personal God, whilst
endeavouring to demonstrate that absolute spirit cannot have an
aim because it has no wants, and that nothing is a mean which
is not at the same time an aim; Strauss, Glaubensl. i. p. 576, a
view which is very unimportant. The propositions, " God has
no want," and " the means proportioned to the aim is the aim
itself," are unaffected, if God's purpose, or a Divinely-purposed
aim, arrangement, or mediation, be maintained ; for any require
ment in a Divine aim does not devolve on God, but on the crea
ture, and is a priori reserved or increases to love, and thus to
perfection. Doubtless, God has in the means an aim, just as the
aim again resembles the basis; God has in aseitas, also adseitas.
He does all things for himself, as Scripture says; for God is truth,
is love. But do we the less on that account require all these
categories in order to develope the idea?
The idea of an order or an organization which is preferred, ef
fects nothing more than a separation of the categorical sides, (of
the question), but nevertheless maintains a distinction. It is in
correct to assert that Divine wisdom, regarded according to the
conceived aim, is again necessitated to transfer its essential ele
ment, namely, its ultimate purpose, to some other attribute,
such as to love. For wisdom resigns itself entirely, as does every
other attribute, to another, or to the totality of attributes, and
yet its peculiar element admits of being distinguished, when the
final aim, as will and thought, and when the theoretical virtue
of action are distinguishable, however inseparable they may be.
The whole inquiry, however, does not in the least affect the
theistical explanation of wisdom given in Remark 1.

76. MAJESTY. 165

§ 76. MAJESTY.
Although God has created angels and men, and destined
them for his communion and similitude, still his freedom, and
the fulness of his absolute self, is in no wise impaired thereby ;
but He is, and continues the long of his people and kingdom, — -
"a mighty God, and terrible," Deut. vii. 21, with whom no
being can be compared in dignity and power. As is ex
pressed in the name Michael, and whose condescensions1 and
revelations ah minister only to this purpose, that through obe
dience and reverence in love He may be still more glorified.
This is the idea of Divine majesty and honour, to which in part
the especial expressions and names, and in part the representa
tions of the Lord as unapproachable and irresistible, correspond,
Isa. vi. 5; Ps. xxxiii. 8, 13-18. What it is to offend God, can
not be mistaken in the region of grace; but there it is only the
more willingly and livingly acknowledged, Acts v. 1-11; Heb.
x. 26-31, xii. 25.
1 In representing the glory of the Lord, the idea of attribute
commences to become personal, just in the same way as in the
Old Testament doctrine of wisdom. That which is infinitely
concealed in His revelation and condescension is analogous to
the Glorious One, the Glory of God, } -^23, Exod. xvi. 10;
xxxiii. 22; Numb. xvi. 42; peyuXoirgetrig hb%u, 2 Pet. i. 17, in
which the usual illustration, i. e. Deus ipse, is altogether insuffi
cient. The subject of a discourse from heaven, or a phenomenon
sensibly administered, could only, according to the then prevail
ing view, be some other second divine subject, or angel of the
Lord. In its communication to the servants and ministers of
the Lord, glory is at once the defence and negation of death,
transitoriness, and corruption. Hence the glorification of Christ
and Christians in the resurrection, John xvii. 22; Rom. vi. 4,
viii. 11-30; 1 Peter iv. 14.

166 PART I.— -OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.

| 77. HOLINESS.
However variously the representations of majesty and holi
ness pass into each other, stiU, upon the whole, through the
latter idea, the Divine Essence is removed from feUowship with
sin1 and sinners, and this to such an extent, that sin, as a spe
cific condition, (profanity), cannot possibly have any connexion
with Deity, nor can God be conceived either as the author,
accomplice, cherisher, or concealer of sin ; and as to the sin
ner, it is merely in proportion as he separates himself from the
common state of the flesh and the world, and in proportion
to his holiness, that he is able to approach God. Thus, what
constitutes the idea of Divine hohness, is not restoring love
condescending to heal, but it is the truth of love, in its con
descension and self-communication, destroying and punish
ing evU, Hence God, as the Spirit of the church, and in-
dweUer of the human heart, is eminently holy.
1 The explanations of Divine holiness, whether it be the love
of God to himself, or the legality and morality of the Divine
wiU, deviate too far from the fundamental view laid down in
the Bible. If, on the other hand, Zachariae and Storr stand
quite alone in their view of incomparabilis, venerandus, Knapp
Vorless. i. 180, has thrown out some well-grounded suggestions..
In point of fact, ft/yip, Isa. vi., and ciyiog, John xvii. 11; also Ps.
xcix. 9, lxxi. 22, may signify an exalted distinction (of the
Deity) from all other personal beings; but the fundamental
meaning of Wip is to be pure; and God is eminently the Holy
One, in relation to the possible or actual impurity of the per
sonal creature, Levit. xi. 44, xix. 2; 1 Pet. i. 14-16; Job. iv-
17. The idea of holiness does not merely rest on these words,
but also on the assertions, that God can neither be the defender
of iniquity, Ps. v. 5, or entertain it in himself, 1 John i. 5 ; Jas.
i. 13, nor either cause or allow it, 1 Cor. vi. 9-20; 2 Cor. vi. 15,
17; Book of Wisdom, vii. 25, oiihiv pipiaftpevov eig uurriv (Personal
Wisdom) irugeiLit'mrei. Wherefore Isaiah exclaims before the face
of the Thrice Holy, " Woe is me, because I am a man of unclean
lips." God is zealous, and consumes. His spirit is grieved by

§ 77. HOLINESS. 167
the evU nature of men, James iv. 5; Ephes. iv. 30. Divine
holiness is consequently the shield of love, the negative of
Divine xoivuvixbv; hence it is unnecessary, in our idea of holiness,
to assume " well pleased in the good." The definition of the
more ancient dogmatist, summa in Deo puritas eandem purita-
tem a creaturis exigens, agrees for the most part with ours. On
the other hand, we are unable, according to Schleiermacher, to
identify the fact of conscience with itself, which indeed is an
actual revelation of Divine holiness. None of the above defini
tions need be withdrawn on account of the objection to negative
dogma. — Strauss, i. p. 592. Holiness belongs only to the wiU
which by possibUity may be unholy; thus it is unrelated to
absolute wUl. For the possibility of evU and good in finite
wiU perfectly suffices or obliges the Creator and Sustainer of
finite will to supply Divine love with the negative or exclusive
element, which is hohness. I am not concerned in the obliga
tion of Deity, because it is by His wiU I ground the obligation
of man, or direct and deny the will of the finite being. The
Holy One, who is he alone that sanctifieth, Heb. ii. 11, is never
he who is sanctified, otherwise than by a knowledge of his holi
ness on the part of those who shall be sanctified. Whoever can
not or wUl not regard that which God determines, knows, and
wills, without resigning Him into the possibilities and contin
gencies of finite self-determination, let him consider how he
resorts to his void and dead Absolute, which cannot but re
nounce the foundation of morality. Should the author, how
ever, conceive that it would be an empty abstraction to imagine
sin as possible in a man such as faith represents Christ to have
been, how much more must the author's possibility, appended to
or desired in his idea of absolute personality, be accounted as
a similar abstraction. For Jesus himself, before he promotes
or permits faith, points to Him who is alone good. In this deci
sion philosophy and rehgion alike concur. And if we under
stand him correctly, the observation of Arnobius wiU signify
little more than this, that wisdom, virtue, and justice, can alone
be affirmed of a being capable of perfection. For a view of the
whole subject, see K. Phil. Fischer's Die Speculative Dogm., von
D. Fr. Strauss, 1 bd. gepriift. Tub. 1841, p. 61.

1.68 - PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.

§ 78. BLESSEDNESS.
The Divine being, as the alone wise, is separated from the
percipient creature ; as the glorious and holy one, He is abstract
ed from the egoistical, and as the blessed, from the sentient.
For as, on the one hand, the perfect unity of the Divine power,
knowledge, and wUl, combined with love, presents the idea of
Divine blessedness, so, on the other, His absolute freedom from
imperfection and evU does the same. ITim. i. 11; vi. 15.
Remark. — Almost the only attribute of the Homeric gods es
teemed as valid, and which they maintain, as contradistinguished
from wretched men, has been incidentally mentioned in the tes
tamentary veneration of God, which, for the most part, is con
cerned in the communicative and ethical attributes. MeanwhUe3
God has no want and "needeth not anything," Psalm 1. 10-14;
Acts xvii. 25. This is an essential definition of God in the
Alexandrian doctrine, dirgogheqg, dnrrn^uvrog, dpegi/tvog, Augustin,
Conf. i. 4, — Semper agens, semper quietus, colligens et non egens
— quaerens cum nihil desit tibi : nunquam inops et guades lucris.
Even His mercy or compassion does not render him participant
of creaturely desire. Philo de Cherub. 122, Mo'vos o Ssos d-^suhug
eogruZei.

% 79. DIVINE RELATIONSHIP TO PERSONAL BEINGS.
The holy love of God, applied to his communion with per
sonal being in general, or to all his exhibitions of the same, is
that which shows him to be just and faithful, or true.
Remark 1. Aixuiog is he who is consistently related to the
position he occupies in the community. Aixuioguvn and |ym when
predicated of God, denote His integrity, justice, and perfect con
duct, and thus immediately neither His goodness nor His impar
tial administration of justice. But since it appertains precisely
to God, who is love, to be good, and gracious, and tender towards
those whom He has created, called, and chosen, in order that He

§ 79. DIVINE RELATION TO PERSONAL BETNGS. 169
may continue like unto himself, Hos. xi. 9, and, as it were, main
tain His position, so are not only the goodness and rectitude of God
very frequently placed together, but the latter is also more espe
cially named in cases where the question more particularly con
cerns the perfect conduct of God in the good, as 1 John i. 9 ; Heb.
vi. 10, if in the latter passage the more limited conception of
justice or just dealing towards him who has acted in such or such
a manner does not prevail. It is not in every passage where
hixuioguvij ^eou occurs, that it signifies a Divine quality, and al
though it may do so in Rom. hi. 26, it does not in Rom. i. 17, or
2 Cor. v. 21 . This genitive is sometimes more closely defined,
(as in irigng §eou, igyov SkoD by xuru §ebv, tig *heov, ex %eou) — conform
able to God, the Divinely effected righteousness of man.
Remark 2. The conception of Divine rectitude is intimately
united with that of His faithfulness and truth. Hence gi^
so frequently appears conjoined with p^jj, and mgrog with hixuiog.
God proves himself, by his uniform conduct towards those who
are called, (1 Cor. i. 9 ; 1 Thess. v. 24 ; Rom. viii. 29), not as
dependent in this respect, but as faithful even towards the un-
beheving, because "He cannot deny himself," 2 Tim. ii. 13. And
He proves himself not less in the harmony of his word and work,
and in that of the past and the future. It is impossible for God
to lie, Heb. vi. 18. No unbelief, no falsehood of man can annul
His faithfulness and truth, Romans in. 3, 4; Numbers xxiii. 19.
From the latter passage it is self-evident how far repentance
pertains to God, Gen. vi. 6, and Jonah iii. 9; Jer. xviii. 1-11.
The Biblical representations of God's repentance, wrath, zeal, &c,
possess reality and validity, but, then, it is that of a Divine, not
a human emotion ; and in like manner we only deny the existence
of a sinful and passive element, but not an active and real one.
Hence Augustin, Confess. 4s, amas, nee aestuas; zelas et securus
es; pcenitet te, et non doles, irasceris, et tranquillus es opera
mutas nee mutas consilium.

§ 80. CONCLUSION.
The justice and truth of God determine themselves mani
foldly, when viewed in their relation to the manifoldness exist
ing in the personal creature. Some determinations regard

170 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
the passive state of the finite moral being, but any special de
termination relates to the spontaneity of each individual. Men
simply viewed in that condition, which is universaUy alike in all,
are necessitous and susceptible beings. God is to them, as such,
good and humane. Psalm cvii. ; Tit. iii. 4; Matthew vi. 26.
Viewed in their proportionate equality and universality, as re
spects their destitute condition, they are suffering, unholy, fallen,
sinful beings ; as such, God is merciful unto them, gracious
and long-suffermg, Genesis xxxii. 10; Exodus xxxiv. 6; Psalm
Ixxxvi. 5, 15. FinaUy, towards aU as free beings, and in re
lation to the contrast between good and bad conduct and feel
ing, God is just — that is, He is a perfect judge and rewarder
of men, Eom. i. 24, 28; ii. 2, xgipu Siov xuru aki&uuv,
7-9; 1 Cor. iv. 5; 2 Sam. xxii. 26, 27.
Remark 1. With reference to goodness, -ftn and y^ it must
be admitted that it also represents other qualities relative to
the passive susceptibility of man, just as sinfulness may also be
considered as a defect and deficiency, though not exclusively so.
The Divine goodness can only be related to the sentient creature
in general, in so far as it has previously been related to the
spiritual and conscious ; for sentient welfare is not the ultimate
aim of goodness acting through wisdom. The good is a claim
upon gratitude, and presupposes a spiritual, thinking creature.
FinaUy, goodness operates, in its wisdom and forbearance, even
under the conditions of chastisement and correction, Heb. xii.
5-11; Psalm cxix. 67, 68. The relation of vveup-u ipiXuv^gunv,
B. of Wisdom i. 6, to the operation of God as the judicial searcher
of hearts, is remarkable.
Remark 2. The doctrine of Divine justice is eminently dif
ficult and important; difficult, because it does not so much pur
sue the \development of God's relation to the personal world,
as it appears to establish something opposed to it ; and import
ant, because it decides on the idea of redemption, of the atone
ment, and justification. The justice of God is a necessary and
inseparable idea of His love, wisdom, and blessedness. It is
precisely in this respect that the God of Marcion fails to be full
and true love ; because, as it were, from an aversion and anti
pathy to punish, He wills neither law nor justice, and from his

% 80. JUSTICE AND TRUTH. 171
disinclination to be a legislator, such a God is not even a creator,
or, at least, not one who originally imparts and reveals. The
erroneous view taken by Marcion cannot be corrected by elevating
the unresolved antithesis of mercy and justice up to the one only
God, or by resolving the alone Divine majesty and honour into
mercy and avenging justice, which is the error of those who
constmct every Divine will and work, after Theodor Beza's
method, out of the duahsm of these attributes. If justice and
law, punishment and rewards, cannot in truth be the effects of
love, then, assuredly must they be considered as merely aeonic
and demiurgic, and inadequate to represent what is truly Divine.
To ascribe to God some other fundamental wiU, contiguous and
external to his love, may be said to create what is incomprehen
sible. Perhaps we are not justified in appealing to Psalm xviii. 26,
" With the pure thou wilt show thyself pure ; and with the fro-
ward thou wilt show thyself froward," for frowardncss and purity
in this passage merely denote a change of relation, not ope of
nature or wUl. The explanation of Leibnitz, that the justice
of God is His goodness wisely directed, includes a truth when
when it asserts that justice is the duration and prosecution of
goodness. Only, in this aspect, justice is too exclusively refer
red to thought (wisdom), and it does not appear why holiness
may not be referable to the will ; and again, if goodness (accord
ing to Marheineke's Principles, first edition) should be considered
as only a wise administration of Divine justice; in that case,
both ideas would lose their independence, inasmuch as they
could only preserve a reciprocal limitation. The explanations
afforded by Nitzch (in unpublished lectures on dogma) and by
Schleiermacher, maintain, in so far as they accord, that jus
tice is the holy will to punish, that it is Divine infliction, and
that goodness is beneficence. But how much soever the con
nection of holiness and love is here to be commended, and the
endeavour to deprive man of any legal claim to reward is acknow
ledged — houXoi dyjx'ioi, Luke xvii. 10, still too much appears effected
for the latter object; for it is evident that goodness and grace are
not estranged in the act of correcting, from benefiting, and, in like
manner also, justice is not estranged from rewarding, supposing
that God has influenced the capacity for reward, and bestowed
the same. Reward has confessedly, as well as punishment,
retained, in the Testament of Grace, its import; and, conse
quently, the complete idea of recompense has retained its value

172 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
also; and that this idea constitutes the purport of justice is
unquestionable. If ever the idea of Divine justice shall ob
tain consistency, it must be in general through the relation of
infinite holy love to the spontaneous and self-determinating
capacity of the personal being, or the relation of Divine per
fection to the existence of the economy in the universe. The
basis of Divine government is love, its aim life and blessedness;
blessedness being perfect feUowship in self-realization, perfect
susceptibility and spontaneity in reference to the good impart
ing itself. The individual shaU progress to a true self-realiza
tion and capacity for communion, and through one individual
to another, and the good determinableness attain to a good de
termination. In this process there is the antithesis of necessity
and freedom, of the individual self and another, of action and
passion, separation and union, consequently the possible exist
ence of bad and evU, of sin and death, of will and contradic
tion. The bad is possible for the realization of the good. But
in God there is an impossibility for the bad, which is the
holiness of his love. John xvii. 11 — 25. But, inasmuch as the
bad is restrained in the world by an abiding reality, and for
ever deprived of its necessity, and, moreover, the good is pre
served in its exclusive eternity; thus it is, that the righteousness
of God evidences itself. This idea embraces all the elements
unfolded in Holy Scripture with reference to law and justice;
there is no region where justice does not operate, attended by,
and by means of, holy love, and wherein it may not become
operative with, and in grace, goodness, and mercy, and where
the latter may not reciprocate with the former. Since holy love
desires a universal realisation, and as it only does so on and in
the world, the universal justice of God, termed by theologians
justitia universalis, is nothing else than the faithfulness of God's
love, or his truthfulness, and consequently in its place is
grace, mercy, and goodness. For wherever, in the preservation
of life, by the gratification of necessity, the separation of the
bad from the good, and at the same time the removal, limitation,
or extinction of the bad, and the animation of the good is al
lowed, there goodness is at the same time justice, and justice
is the preservation of consummate goodness. Hence, as in
1 John i. 9, Heb. vi. 10, Divine acts of pardon, as well as of
punishment, and those of purification and preservation, are to be
ascribed to God, regarded as the Just One. Especial justice

§ 75. wisdom. 173
is in the first place to be viewed as legislative, partly directing
and partly revealing, prohibitive and imperative; then as judi
cial, either condemning or acquitting ; and finally as recompens
ing, either by punishing or rewarding — Justitia legislaliva, in-
dicialis, rependens. The communicative goodness of God ma
nifests that He permits spontaneity and liberty in general. His
goodness and love likewise declare that he is the Author of
blessings, for which he implants a corresponding necessity, and
by these blessings induces spontaneity, and that, too, a com
mon one. His justice is evidenced with reference to possible
bad and good, by his effecting, on the one hand, the subordina
tion of the endowments and emotions, by his setting bounds to
action and passion, and by the preservation of all personalities
against and for each other; and, on the other hand, by applying
all this to consciousness, and expressing it in the conscience.
God is just in his commandments; his laws are perfect; they
shall stand fast for ever and ever, Ps. cxi. 7, 8; cxix. It is ma
nifest that the law, considered as revelation, as assurance, and as
an occasion for spontaneity and activity, is a communication of
the good, and is goodness; as is fuUy declared in the Psalm
last quoted. But, on the other hand again, law is also justice,
that is, legislatively, in the economy of grace, in the reconcUia-
tion and justification of the sinner. For whatever God does, as
the founder of a dispensation or as a lawgiver, (be it vbpog nth-
reug,) whatever he does for the condemnation and enfeebling of
sin, (should that even extend to the pardoning of the sinner,)
is a proof of his justice. Obviously in this sense the institu
tion of the atonement, as a proof of Divine justice, is exalted
in Rom. iii. 25, 26. The mere wdgegig, d<pegig, uvo^, w,ould not
be complete evidence of God's holy love, if it did not point
to a higher development of justice and legality ev ru vuv xuigu.
This righteousness, as generating law and relation, passes into
judicial and compensating justice. James iv. 12. efg ignv b vofi.o-
Sirqg xul xgirrjg, b huvupevog gugui xul diioX'egui. Now the just God
maintains a relation to the actual conduct of individuals. For
judgment and punishment indeed are included in the institution
even of the new covenant through the blood of Christ; because
wheresoever a Divine act passes judgment on the possible or ac
tual existence of sin, there is a consequent condemnation of it,
and because eitiyvugig upugriug, Rom. iii. 20, can alone be com
pleted through iXeyfyg dpugnug, John xvi.-8r But this punish-

174 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
ment is plainly none other than the separation of the sinful
universality from sin, through the passion of the most highly
exalted One, Phil. ii. 9, of the just, 2 Cor. v. 21; and the death
of sin thus brought to pass (by repentance) is a punishment of
grace, a redemption; whence it is apparent that the idea of a ju
dicial and penal justice returns, upon the whole, into that of the
legislative idea. If a state be no more than founded and orga
nised, or is yet in the act of being so, then the individual citizens
are not amenable to judgment ; the judicial function has not yet
realised its object. Even under the old covenant this was so far
the case, that the law exhibited life and death, but still irdgegig,
&<pegig prevailed rather than full punishment. But as soon as the
constitution is fully organised, justice begins its operation, not only
by separating, in one and the same subject of humanity, abstract
bad and good, but also by dividing those who are bad and good.
And here at least an antithetical relation appears to step in be
tween goodness and justice, remission of punishment and call
ing to account, and between grace and law. In truth, however,
this relation is here a genetic one, and the fact of its being
recognised as such constitutes the perfection and truth of Chris
tianity. Mercy and goodness effect all who in their distress are
about to be or are actually punished, not less than does jus
tice, considered as recognising conduct and regulating action
and passion, comprehend all who are pardoned; it being assumed
that the ground and goal of the entire process is and continues
merely eternal love unfolding itself to self-communication. What
is said by Jeremiah, Lamentations iii. 33, ^^ n3J? fc$bTD> *s a*
all times applicable ; and equally valid is the assertion of Philo,
that mewy is more ancient than punishment, or according to
James ii. 13, that " mercy rejoiceth against judgment." It follows
merely from this that hlmu[ug suegyenxit in relation to the interven
ing bad always determinates itself to xginxri, xoXugnxfi, &c, in
order to be authentic, and to recede into itself. The elect, re
conciled, pardoned, justified, and sanctified, are aU punished,
accused, and judged in their repentance. Even in those who
are self-judged, and are therefore not judged, justice is evi
denced. Apart from repentance, and a cry for pardon, there is
no actual forgiveness, as Melanchthon correctly remarks, punitur
contritione homo. On the other hand, God loves whom he chas
tises, and endures with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath,
Rom. ix. 22 ; (he loveth all things that are, and abhorreth nothing

§ 75. wisdom. 175
that he has made, Book of Wisdom, xi. 24, he spares those whose
unrighteousness he hates and punishes, iig dv^guxuv, xii. 8, to
the intent that we as xgivbpevoi should so much the more look for
"tXtog, xii. 22) : only, the representations of a sin to be forgiven
neither in this world or the world to come, of an undying worm,
of an unquenchable fire, an eternal damnation and punishment,
of a vessel condemned to destruction, Matt. xii. 32 ; xxv. 46. Rom.
ix. 23. Rev. xx. 15, (of a seed cursed from the beginning, Book
of Wisdom xii. 11, of a T'egfLU rrjg xuruhixr^g em uurotjg eweX^ov, xii.
27,) only such representations appear to give a firm position to an
ever-enduring contrast, and to exhibit it as an original one;
whilst the pure genetic relation, can only be maintained when
love in its holiness and justice not only permits effects of wrath
and punishment which separate the bad, but conducts them to the
goal of universal redemption from sin and evil. If omnipotence
and wisdom permit a distinction to exist after all between the
blessed and the damned, the will also appears to admit of such a
distinction, and even to be eternally involved in it. And thus
we return again to the position taken up by Beza. But inasmuch
as we are, a priori, unable to imagine an absolutely neces
sary justice as resulting from the naked absolute, from the mere
formal will, not from the true will of the absolute good, so we
confidently trust that the never-ending effects of penal retri
bution, or of a separating and negativing justice, shall con
stitute the victory of the good over the bad, and become the in
terpositions of goodness and mercy. That punishment shaU ap
pear to the convicted themselves just and necessary, cannot be
doubted; that a forced conversion and sanctification is not a
work of love, is maintained by every one; that every death in
cludes in itself a certain cessation and liberation from sin, Rom.
vi. 7, and that in reference to the incapability of doing or will
ing evil, and to the necessity of knowing and acknowledging the
works of righteousness, and that even the condemned share in
redemption, is inteUigible. It would be foreign to our subject to
extend our remarks on this occasion. The point in question is
merely to defend the inter-connection of justice and grace, or the
genetic relation of both attributes.

176 PART I. OF THE GOOD.— SECT. I. OF GOD.

§ 81. ONE GOD, FATHER, SON, AND SPIRIT.
It is only when contemplated in and with the unity of the
Divine essence, that each one of these attributes is true. Of
the " gods many" (voKkoi, 1 Cor. viii. 6,) none could possess
any of these attributes. They are but impersonations and
images of men, by means of which they assume, under a crea
tive form, that of the Everlasting Being, in order to divide
and decompose it. The "gods many," are mere Keyo^ivoi.
God, is the one Lord, who is excepted from aU number, as
weU as aU individuality. Deut. vi. 4; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Ephes.
iv. 6. Jehovah is Elohim, Zebaoth, the Lord of heaven
and earth, and also the Father of Jesus Christ. But this
knowledge of the Divine Being and his attributes, is disclosed to
Christian faith through a knowledge of the Son of God, or of that
Son of Man, and holy servant of God, who, unless he had par
ticipated originally in the Divine nature, or possessed Divine
hfe in himself, could not have reaUy been a venerator of the
Deity. Whilst, therefore, contemplating through faith in Jesus
Christ, the only begotten Son of God, we recognise in him the
incarnate Word, that was from the beginning, by whom aU
things were made ; together with him, we at the same time ap
prehend the Father who has not come into the world, but by
whom, through his Eternal Word, aU things exist, and who has
bestowed the Son upon the world, and of whom the Son testi
fies, and to whom he guides man ; we are also enabled to discern
the Holy Spirit who proceedeth from the Father, and is sent by
Christ, the Lord, through whom we perceive the Father and the
Son, and in the Son are united to the Father; and all this in
such a manner, that in our spiritual being and becoming we feel
our dependence, not on an absolutely single, but on a twofold,
and in his complete development, a threefold Divine originator,
— Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, being, however, one in essence,
and when received into the mind by faith, teaches us to recog
nise the self-relationships and self-mediations of the one God,

§ 81. FATHER, SON, AND SPIRIT. 177
and we are enabled to distinguish the difference and the return
ing unity of God as self-existent and revealed, of God and the
Logos, of God revealed in existence and consciousness, of the
Logos as life and light. Hence it follows that we, regarded in
our universal Being, refer to God, God's Logos and Spirit, to
God the Lord, and the Spirit of God and the Lord, and in this
conception of faith we have a monument of God's inconceivable-
ness, not merely as it is supposed, but as it is the subject of our
thought and apprehension.
Remark 1. If faith in the Father, Son, and Spirit, were merely
a connecting tenet for Christian doctrine, the juxtaposition and
parallel included therein, must exclusively and chiefly be ap
parent in aU cases where the substance of a belief in salvation^
and the aim of its institution are represented by periphrase, as,
for example, in many passages of the Epistles to Timothy and
Titus. The equalization and juxtaposition in question, are, for
the most part, apparent, where the condition of salvation may be
regarded as derived from its highest operative causality. Baum-
garten Crusius, in his Bib. Theol. p. 315, justly remarks, " that
the source, as weU as every blessing, of the gospel is derived from
that Triad." For grace, by which the Christian is consoled, or the
salvation in which he rejoices, is not derived simply from God or
the Father; but, first, simply from the Lord, as, for example, in
2Thess. iii. 18; 2 Tim. iv. 22, compare verse 17 and 18. Secondly,
in the most uninterrupted twofold mode, from God our Father,
and the Lord Jesus Christ, as, for example, at the commence
ment of all the Pauline Epistles; and, lastly, and thirdly, in a
threefold Divine manner, and this in such a way, that in the
last case the Spirit is added to the Lord and Father, or to God
and the Lord, as, for example, 2 Cor. xiii. 14, with which the
other notifications of the twofold (1 Cor. viii. 6,) and threefold
causality, 1 Peter i. 2; 1 Cor. xii. 4, 6; Ephes. iv. 6, are to be
compared. A fourth mode is inadmissible; and both Justin and
Athenagoras have essentially erred, whilst indicating the fulness
of the object of Christian veneration (gifiefoui), and whilst earnestly
desirous of averting the accusation of Atheism alleged against Chris
tianity, they named something, besides the Trinity, as intervening*
between the Logos and Pneuma ; Athenagoras regarding irXrfcog
dyyeXuv xal Xiirovgyuv as belonging to ^teoXoyixov pJigog, Justin con-
N

178 PART I. OF THE GOOD.  SECT. I. OF GOD.
sidering grgurbv dyuSuv dyy'eXm as such. Justin, Apol. i. p. 56.
Athen. .vgegfi. v..Xg. p. 3,6, Rechenb. Compare also Nean der gegen
Mohler Theoll. Stud.u. Krit. 1833, p. 772, and Weisse Theoll. Stud.
u. Krit. 1841, p. 389. From the threefold develqped causality of
salvation it follows, that wherever the Lord only, or the Spirit
only, is mentioned, as effecting salvation, still the co-operation
of the other Person, the preceding or succeeding and com
bined operation of the Father, Son, and Spirit, must be imagined
and believed. Under such circumstances of apostolic doctrine,
baptism also in the name of the Father, Son, and Spirit, (Matt.
xxviii. 19), even if otherwise admissible, cannot be referred to
a paraphrase of the doctrine peculiar to Christianity, but the
catechumen must come by baptism into that communion with
God which is a fellowship of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Faith
in the name, to be baptized in the name, expresses, in Scriptural
language, a covenant with God, which is founded on peculiar re
velations, promises, and duties. Now, if we could hold with the
Arians that we were consecrated to the fellowship of the Father
through the Son in the Holy Spirit, or as Christians had to offer
praise and glory to the Father hid rou uiou iv r$> irviupuri uyiu, (but
apart from the fact that in this case, in conformity with the entire
Biblical mode of thought and expression, it should rather be
said, Glory to God our Father through our Lord Jesus Christ in
the fellowship of the Holy Ghost), still even this economic repre
sentation of the Trinity by no means excludes the other ontolo
gical one, but rather the former cannot perfectly exist without
the latter. For the Son is never barely Jesus of Nazareth, as a
man pleasing to God, but is at the same time also as one who is
revealed, and his equal relation with the Father and Spirit to
foopu. as well as his being coequal with them in all things, causes
the baptized to be bound to the Divine Being regarded as a three
fold causality of salvation and life. In every case it is the rela
tions of God to himself, and not merely those of God to humanity,
which are fundamental to the Christian doctrine of Deity. For
if hid rouX&you John i. 3, hid rou uiou Heb. i. 2, ev auru and hi- durou
Col. i. 16, compare 1 Cor. viii, 6, be referred to the creation of all
things. and not merely to redemption, then the Father cannot
possibly (as the Modalists contend) supply the exclusive relation
ef God to creation, or the Son the exclusive one of redemption.
At least, ;the term Father includes the idea of the fundamental
cause of love in reference to redemption, just as the term Son

§ 81. FATHER, SON, AND SPIRIT. 179
intimates mediating love in the same relation. On the other
hand, the term Logos refers primarily to creation. Strictly
speaking, the Arian view is only another form of monarchism, in
so far as it annuls the coequal essence of the Logos, and subjects
the latter to thej;ondition of a creature, although one highly
exalted. The person of Christ also is rendered incomprehensible,
and the complete conception of the human nature in Christ is
annulled, and they are compelled to resort for succour to the Apol-
linarians. For a union of humanity with some other creature, how
ever exalted, is inconceivable in a person, apart from the consi
deration that such a union is inadequate to the practical necessity
of redemption. Thus Arius essentially corrupted the doctrines of
Dionysius of Alexandria and Origen. Meanwhile, every doctrine
of subordination proved erroneous when it comprehended the
Pleroma of nature's causality, that of the empire of reason and
of the church in three personalities, and, at the same time, also
viewed them as three entities, the highest, the higher, and the
high. The doctrine was right as regarded the error of Sabellius,
but not so in respect to what is true in his system. It diminished
absoluteness in the same persons whilst it increased their energy.
On the other hand, the church was compelled to preserve its
doctrine, as we find it defended by Dionys of Rome, Marcellus
of Ancyra, and finally by Athanasius and Nicaner. The doc
trine of Nicaner, it is true, is out of analogy with the Bible in
its biblical mode of expression and proof, inasmuch as the ex
pressions "begotten" and "proceeding" pertain rather to God's
relation to the world, (to denoting opera ad extra), not to the
relation of God to himself, (opera ad intra) ; an unsuitableness
pointed out by John Augustin Urlsperger, Pastor of the evange
lical church of Augsburg from 1769 to 74, in a connected series
of treatises, (Neue, dem Sinn heiliger Schrift wahrhaft gemdsse
Entwicklung der alten chrisilichen Dreieinegkeitslehre, &c, Frank
furt and Leipzig, 1774 — "A new Development of the ancient
Christian Doctrine of the Trinity, truly conformable to the sense
of Holy Scripture"). The doctrine of the Church, too, is compelled
to take refuge partly in transcendentalism and partly in the
literal meaning of Scripture. But the Church doctrine deserves
the credit of having fully given affirmations and negations, by
means of which the entire preceding disturbances of Christian
consciousness are averted; it had the merit of confirming prac
tical faith in the Father, Son, and Spirit ontologically, and of
vitalizing practically the ontological idea. See the explanatory

180 PART I. OF THE GOOD.— SECT. I. OF GOD.
apology of the doctrine of the church by Sartorius : Apol. des
ersten Artikels der Augs. Confi, Hamburg 1 829 ; and especially
that of Twesten, and likewise my letter to Dr Lucke, ub, die
wesentliche Dreieinigkeit Gottes, Theoll. St. u, Krit. 1841, 301-
307, Urlsperger, on the other hand, absolutely separated the
essentiality of the Trinity from the procession. The being of
the Father, Son, and Spirit,, is not concerned. The one God is
the unity of three Divine powers of absolute spirit, which by no
means generate or proceed from one another; it is even indifferent
whether they be denominated persons. By means of an ever
lasting covenant, and for the sake of creation, redemption, and
consummation of the world, God determines in His three- inef
fable fundamental powers, that the one, as Father, generate the
second as Son, and that the Third proceed from the Father
through the Son. These three Divine forces may be regarded
as Power, Wisdom, and Love. Ought power to be considered as a
distinct force? Upon the whole, nothing more is gained by this
than that the object has been transferred into a new movement.
That exposition of the Father, Son, and Spirit, which affirms God
to have revealed himself through Jesus the Messiah as a holy
being, (vv. dy.), is so repugnant to the grammatico-historical, and,
in other respects, so commendable an interpretation, that we can
not refrain from refuting it in every, possible mode. For the
best treatises on the Biblico-Christian confirmation of faith in the
Trinity, as well as on recognising its practical signification, and
its actual capacity to be the subject of instruction and reflection,
we refer to Sack, uber die Katechetische Behandlung der Lehre
von der Dreinigkeit, "on the Catechetal Treatment of the
Doctrine of the Trinity," (Theoll. Stud, und Krit. 1834, 1); to
Twesten's Vorl. ub. die Dogm. II. B. sect. 1 ; and to Sartorius,
die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe, i. 1840. Compare Nitzsch's
Sendschr. an Lucke, Theoll. Stud., &c. 1841, 2.
Remark 2. The doctrine of the Father, Son, and Spirit, is by
no means to be disassociated from that of the essence and attri
butes of God. But this evident tritheism may be considered as
the consummation and preservation of true theism in all its most
important characteristics. Doubtless the proportionate co-oper
ation stated above, for vitalizing and preserving religion, have
been ceded even to polytheism, pantheism, and dualism; but we
maintain the practical advantages of the doctrine of the Trinity
in quite a different manner; not as if it served only for a relative

§ 81. FATHER, SON, AND SPIRIT. 181
truth without being one absolutely, but as being required for
attaining to a correct knowledge of God, and its services being
inseparably combined with its objective and eternal validity.
Either God is considered as not true and exalted enough, or not
sufficiently good and holy, or not sufficiently effective. These
are the possible defects of the assumed theism. So long as it
merely distinguishes God from the world, and never God from
God, it is ever exposed to a relapse and transition into pantheism
or some other denial of the absolute Being. It is the doctrine
of the Trinity alone that affords a perfect protection against
atheism, polytheism, pantheism, or dualism. For the absolute
distinction between the Divine essence and the world is more
securely and firmly maintained by those who worship the Trinity,
than by those who do not reverence the same. It is pre
cisely those systems of monotheism, which have, in the highest
degree, excluded the doctrine of the Trinity, and have prided
themselves on that very account, the Jewish and Mahometan
for example, that have led, on account of their barrenness and
vacuity, to the grossest pantheism. With the doctrine that the
Word, which was God, became flesh, there arises, likewise, the
same necessity of conceiving God as personally united to man
without sin, as there is a, necessity for absolutely distinguishing
between the Divine essence and human nature. Faith in ever
lasting holy love, which is God, can only be theoretically and
practically realized through the cognition of Him who is the
perfect and eternal object of divine self-knowledge and love; that
is to say, by conceiving the love of the Father to the only-begotten
Son. Finally, the full animating nature and communication of
God, which includes neither a diminution nor restriction of his
essence, can only be preserved by the trinitarian doctrine of the
Spirit. But whatever difficulty the view taken by the church
concerning the Divine persons may involve, as soon as we con
nect it with the personality of the Divine Being, then is this
seeming contradiction not so entirely inexplicable; notwith
standing the ancient orthodox church did not, for a long
time, insist on three Persons, but often only on ihiornreg, uirogru-
geig, &c. It was only the Latin Church, from the time of
Augustin, which sanctified the expression personce by the sym-*
bolum quicunque. Even Augustin himself uses the expression
"tres personae, si ita dicendae sunt." Some will demand, in
order to express the most perfect personality, a Trinity, and

182 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
thereby employ the metaphysics of consciousness as an anolo-1
gical proof; see Schmieder: Colestin, drie Geistliche Gesprache,
1834, i., on the Persons of the Godhead. Others, like Swe-
denborg, only acknowledge the proper personality of God in
that one which by the church, is termed, hypostasis, i. e., in
the Logos, the Son, the Lord. Other writers, again, differ
from these. In every case we ought, according to the admitted
construction of the scriptural passages, not barely to seek the
triad in the subjective representation, nor exclusively in the
economy of revelation, but should acknowledge that immediate
faith here includes the commencement of indispensable specula
tion; not merely because ancient theology, underived from Scrip
ture, generates sure and higher theogoriic conceptions from the
period when such theology appears as a reflective gnosis above
myth, (in the sense in which these theogonic ideas have been
historico-critically treated in my Theoll. Stud, i.) nor solely be
cause Christian theologians of all periods have made possible,
and found necessary a certain rational apprehension of this
mystery; although those phenomena of universal religious his
tory avouch the insufficiency of deism. These attempts, on the
other hand, (see Bretschneider's Dogm. Augs., 3. i. p. 566, seq.),
combined with the church's view, attest the conceivableness of
the Trinity, and its connection with the doctrine of the essence
and attributes of God. No, biblical theologians are here inevi
tably compelled, when they imagine the Logos, who is with God
and is God, when considering. theancient Image, the reflection — *
the Spirit of God who knoweth the deeps of God — to acknowledge
the elements of the essential, immanent doctrine of the Trinity.
For, of explanatory attempts, only those retain a trace of biblical
theogony, which either proceed from the idea of God's self-know-'
ledge and self-love, or from the distinction between God as con
cealed in himself, and that of his manifesting himself, and thus as
admonishing. Twesten has recently illustrated the philosophy of
the doctrine of the Trinity, partly historically and partly enrich
ing its contents, by submitting the Trinity first xurd rbv dwoxu-
Xtysug rgbirov to an analogico-philosophical illustration, then xurd
rgbmv uitdg^eug, and points out how both explications are con
nected. In the first view, he endeavours to effect an accommoda
tion between the ens dbsolutum and the finite world; which never
theless reveals the infinite, and finds this accommodation, in the
.original and typical thought of God. He can only be revealed

§ 81. FATHER, SON, AND SPIRIT. 183
to beings capable of knowledge, and finite beings can only know
God through God. Herein are comprehended, God, Logos,
Spirit, but still only as one God-being. God is the exact coun
terpart of his own revelation. This leads us to another reflec
tion, namely, that the Ego, in order to possess a true living per
sonality, must itself not only become as a second object, but
must also be taken back into itself as a third subject, by means
of another act — must conceive itself as an actual image of itself.
There is nothing arbitrary or accidental in our speaking of an
analogical explanation of the mystery, since human nature, ac
cording to Scripture, is just an analogy of the Divine. Upon
this point Tertullian and Augustin have most reasonably ground
ed their views.

§ 82. THE FATHER.
The Father1 has not come into the world, and Christ does
not say that he is the Father, but that the Father is in him,
and he is in the Father, and that they are one, John x. 30, 38.
Indeed, since the Father sends the Son into the world, and
through him is known of those who beheve in the Son ; and as
through the Holy Spirit, together with the Son, He takes up his
abode with such, and renders them cMldren of God, John xiv.
23, so is the whole gospel, together with the revelation and
communion of God the Father, fuUy and at once declared, and
the entire kingdom of love, in its beginning and end, set forth.
To perceive the Fatherhood of God aright, is at the same time
to apprehend truly the Divine essence, Divine attributes, work,
and promises. But as this Fatherhood, in the Old Testament,
was typified as to his Son, purely in the relation of Jehovah
to his chosen people,2 so is it not absolutely related ahke to
wards the Only Begotten and to all creatures. But God is the
father of Jesus Christ in one sense, and the father of his dis
ciples in another, John xx. 17; or rather, the name Father
everywhere represents the love of God as conjointly condition
ated and administered through the Son. Hence, in the'ac--

184 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
knowledged apostohcal formula, " the grace of our Lord Jesus
Christ" precedes the " love of God."
1 The heathen representation of the Father Zeus, the Father
of gods and men, of Jupiter, Diespeter, Marspiter, Liber Pater,
conveys, primarily, the same idea of the principle of nature and
the world, or of the highest genitor, as the biblical representation
of the Father points primarily to the principle of freedom and
love, or to moral relationship. Both, therefore, must rather be
kept distinct than reconciled. It is not the myth of the sons of
gods, but the Old Testament, in the passages adduced in § 63,
and to which may be added Hos. xi. 1, that prepares us for a
knowledge of what our heavenly Father is. The Jews, according
to the judgment of Jesus, knew him not, John viii. 55, although
they knew the Creator; "and no man knoweth the Father save
the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son wiU reveal him," Matth.
xi. 27. All know the Author of things, although one kind of
knowing differs from another kind. Even the "Father of
spirits," Heb. xi. 9, conveys more than the idea of "Author of
spirits." 2 However the meaning of -fl-fN 1N> Mai. h- 10, has been dis
puted, at all events here, under the expression " one Father," the
universal Author of human existence cannot be understood. Ra
ther might we refer the subsequent ^^ to the founding of the
people according to the instances in Isaiah xiii., Ps. cii. 19. For
throughout the whole passage the point is, the necessary opposi
tion to be maintained between Israel and the heathen, and the ne
cessity of keeping unmixed Israelitish marriages. Other passages
already referred to, which name the Father-God of Israel, are not
doubtful, Deut. xxxii. 18; Isaiah lxiii. 16; Jeremiah xxxi. 9.

§ 83. THE SON.
The Son simply, or the Son of God, (viog, not nccig1 §tov),
the only begotten of the Father, does not indeed convey exactly
the same idea as the Word which was with God from the begin
ning; for the human appearance of the Eedeemer is ever in
cluded in the Son, whUst the Logos admits of being distinguish
ed from this manifestation. Moreover, " the Man Christ Jesus"

§ 83. THE SON. 185
(1 Tim. ii. 5) is undoubtedly he who conditionates aU our know
ledge of the Son of God ; but this human manifestation, Jesus
of Nazareth, is revealed in part immediately and in part me
diately in the conscience of behevers, in such a manner that
it preserves for its Divine principle, not only the Father,
who sends the Son, but also the Son himself, who comes into
the world. For in the first place, as touching the explanations
which Jesus gives of himself, he ever selects such a Messianic
designation of his person, which, [as " Son of Man,"2 or " the
sanctified and sent into the world," John x. 36,] combines and
maintains, together with the indication of the office, a significa
tion of the being or essential character of the only Begotten, ac
cording as httle faith or unbelief afford him occasion thereto ;
not simply the relations of a rational man unto God, nor
merely such as, moraUy considered, might be deemed pecu
liar, but he assumes to himself, in part, a continual heavenly
existence, John hi. 13, a co-existence and exclusive acquaint
ance with the Father, John x. 30, 38, xiv. 1, 9, Matth. xi. 27;
and a dignity inseparable from that of the Father, John v. 23;
and in part a pre-existence with the Father, John vi. 62, viii.
58, xvii. 5. A Divine condition, as regards Christ, the know
ledge of which, according to his declaration, had been prepared
by the revelation of the Old Testament,3 Matth. xxii. 45. The
apostles, from the first, confessed him to be the one Lord,
1 Cor. viii. 6, who, as such, is proved to have become a parti
cipator in the Divine power and glory, through the resurrection,
ascension, and imparting of the Spirit, Actg, ii. 36, 1 Tim. in.
16, 1 John v. 6. But they cannot pause here, inasmuch as
he only could be thus elevated, who, even in the form of a ser
vant, had been marked by something so peculiar, and had put
on this condition after so peculiar a manner; hence the apostles
acknowledge him to be the Lord from heaven, 1 Cor. xv. 47,
and from his very birth recognise the personal combination of
his human .and Divine nature, Col. ii. 9, Eom. i. 4, ix. 5.
Furthermore, they confessed that he proceeded from the Divine
state into the human, PhU. ii. 6, seq., 2 Cor. viii. 9, and, as

186 PART I. OF THE GOOD.  SECT. I. OF GOD.
existing before and surpassing all creatures, he had co-operated
with the Father equally as Mediator in aU the works of God,
(such as those of creation,) as he even now does in the work of
redemption, Col. i. 15-19, Heb. i. 3. Finally and pre-emi
nently, they believe that in him the Word or original principle
of all Divine manifestations, creations, and acts, preparatory to
redemption, and consequently the God of revelation and revela
tion itself, had become man. Hence, in the Son, we are bound to
venerate Love, testifying and mediating itself — which is God.
1 See my treatise, in den Theoll. Studien und Kritiken, &c.
1, 2, p. 331, as to whether iraig Seou signifies servant or Son of
God, in Acts iii. 13. That wuTg §eov, in the Acts of the Apostles,
is equivalent to >i -j^y, and which I omitted to remark in the
observations referred to, had been previously pointed out by
Bengel, in his Gnomon to Matt. xii. 18. Stier and Olshausen
also give their unqualified assent to this being the correct inter
pretation. The relation of the Servant of God to the Son of God
has not hitherto been sufficiently recognized in Biblical theology.
The idea conveyed by the Old Testament regarding the true ser
vice of God, of the religious life of man, and of the Divine com
placency, or righteousness included in that idea, is realized by
the figure — Servant of God. This Servant of God is generally
the subject of divine worship, and as such, is human person
ality, elected, qualified, appointed, and operative, for the medi
ation of true religion to others, and is consequently a passive
personality, and not only a faithful and approved one, but also
one that reconciles, and is finally glorified. A perfect type
comparable to the ideal wisdom of philosophy. The law requires
and demands a. just servant; prophecy seeks, and intuitively
perceives him; and history realizes him. In the relation of Lord
to a nation, Israel is a servant. In the relation of Lord to Israel
Moses is a servant; and whether it be a prophet or king, or the
just and faithful remnant, n^^> Isa- x- 21, they are servants
also. But the perfect future remains still to be realized. Mean
while we may remark, that those subjects which convey the idea
of a just servant, according to any one characteristic, bear the
name, and possess the qualities of the Son of God. Thus the
Lord says, " Behold my servant,, whom I uphold," Isa. xiii. 1-
also Ps. ii., " Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee."

§ 83. THE SON. 187
Israel is a child, son in plurality and unity. Again, the indivi
dual upholders of the theocracy are gods, sons of God. Sonship
and adoption, in the likeness of God, conformable in nature, a
divine substitute, each is distinct, yet in unison with servitude.
This is self-evident; for the fellowship of God is effected in the
Son, as an original Being ; in the servant, as a necessary action
and passion. Hence the contrasts, in which the servile, considered
as the bad or the defective, is related to the filial, are possible,
Rom. viii. 15; Gal. iv. 7; Heb. i. 5, 7, iii. 5, 6. But just as from
the true sonship and adoption, referred to in the New Testament,
there is true, free service and dependence of obedience and of
righteousness, according to Rom. vi. 19, 22; Heb. v. 8, xuinceg uv
vibg, e/j,u§iv — rtjv uvuxbqv. So in like manner the servitude of the
Old Testament includes elements of affection arid love, and a striv
ing after sonship. Even the distinction between servant and
child may entirely disappear in the idea of appropriation and
love, as, for example, in the designations of the people of God in
the Book of Wisdom, (where, however, the ambiguity of the Greek
irulheg must be taken into account.) The servant of God, more
over, as a free or chosen individual, may transcend the abstract
of Israelitish adoption, or mere official sonship and dignity.
Greek etymologists remark, that Segdiruv signifies more than houXog;
that it means the preferred, olxovopog, atriensis, the trusted one;
wherefore Moses, who enjoyed the most intimate and elevated
relationship to God, is called in a peculiar manner by those Jews
who wrote in Greek Segdiruv xugiou. — Josephus, i. ii. lxx. ; Book
of Wisdom, x. 16. Nevertheless, no prophet, as such, is de
nominated Son of God; and the highest realization of religious
personal life, is conceived under the title of Servant of the Lord.
This realization in the Old Testament is indeed present and
past, but far more future. In the New Testament, that person
indicates himself, who manifestly sees himself in the suffering
and action of the just servant, and yet. who realizes this percep
tion, not as a servant, but as a son, as the only begotten Son of
the Father. And why is this? Because the true servant can only
be one in whom communion with God is an original divine inheri
tance, or procession from the Father, and one who has come into
the world. The perfectly religious servant cannot be born ac
cording to the flesh — cannot be represented through the recipro
cal action of the law and the promise, but can only be pre
dicted and typified. The absolute reality of a service and obe-

188 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
dience acceptable to God, regarded as the abrogation of that
which is opposed to necessity and freedom, is only given in the
Son, who surpasses individual servants, sons, and priests, Luke
xx. 13. The Son alone can be sinless, only his reconciliation of
the people, ««*g, because it is at the same time a life-giving
redemption. Only as a Son will he receive not only the Spirit
in full measure, but also baptize with the Spirit and with fire.
As such, he cannot be in a merely external, temporal, and
typical manner the chosen Son ; he must be such after the mode
of natural reality — thus the God-man.
1 The first proper name employed by Jesus is Son of man,
(according to Dan. vii. 13.) It must needs be a Messianic
appellation ; at least it appears from John v. 27, that such was
the meaning of tlie Lord. And again, from the question put
by the Jews, John xii. 34, (compare Matt. xvi. 13), it would
appear that Jesus, in adopting this name, had chosen one not
current at that time. It is not unimportant, that (with the
exception of Acts vii. 55) the apostolic language does not employ
at all extensively the more frequently occurring designation of
Christ. 2 See Justin M. Dial. c. Trypk, p. 221, m. Sylb., 1593.
Mugrugiov he xul dXXo i/f/iiv, u cplXoi, eptjv, dmb rZv ygutfuv hugu, on dgynv
mgb iruvruv ruv xngjitdruv b Ssoj yeyivvrixe nvd ii; euvrou Xoyixqv, ring
xui Ao%u xugiou umb rou mveu/turog dyiou xuXelrui, Tore he 'Tiog, more he
1o<piu, more he "AyyeXog, trors he Debg, more he Kugiog xul Aoyos" more, hk
Ag^igrgurriyov euurbv Xiyei iv dv%gumou /J.og<pjj <puvhru rol rou Nai/Jji 'Iqgou'
'iyei ydg mdvru mgogoto/tdfygSai, ix re rou hmr\geretv ru murgixu /3ouXij[/iuri
xul ix rou dmb rou murgbg %Xrjgei yeyevvr\g%uu It appears from various
facts, that the apostle Paul expressly participates in such a view
of the doctrine concerning God in the Old Testament ; for not
only in his exposition of Israelitish history does he substitute
Christ for the God of revelation, or for Jehovah, 1 Cor. x. 4, 9-
but he assigns unto Christ also the attributes which in the Old
Testament can only be explained as those pertaining to Jeho
vah; for example, in Phil. ii. 10, compare Isa. xiv. 23.

§ 84. THE HOLY SPIRIT.
God is spirit— absolute ; (% 62) for he is eternal, indepen
dent, thinking hfe and action. That God knows himself and

§ 84. THE HOLY SPIRIT. 189
loves, comes to pass through God as spirit, for no one can
understand the depths of God, or what is in God, but the Spirit
of God,1 1 Cor. ii. 11. But God exists not merely for himself
in the plenitude of his self-consciousness. His self-existent
objective state, his eternal image, is the Word, through which,
and the Spirit, in which he creates aU things— through which,
and in which, he produces a finite condition and consciousness
in finite existence. Ought not, then, God, as creator, up
holder, and lord of aU in which his honour dweUeth, be vene
rated also as Spirit? Wisdom and Word, Word and Spirit,
are here to be regarded in their distinction, relation, and unity.
In so far as the Divine breath, even as Divine speech, is the
representation of divinely manifested power, operation, and effi
cacy, there exists between the Logos and the Spirit only a dis
tinction of representation.2 The mere paraUelism of fulness
elicits such an expression as occurs for example in Ps. xxxiii. 6.
In so far as the breath indicates the communication of a pecu
liar essence, it is the especial creator of conscious existence, or
of reason in existence, Gen. ii. 7, and is distinguished from the
Creator of universal existence. Or, in so far as all revelations,
creations, and operations of God have a spiritual import, they
proceed from, and exist for the Spirit; so that every thing external
must be the outward expression of what is inward, and, as such,
is admonitory ; and thus it is evident, that there is already, as
regards the creation, preservation, and government of the world
in particular, a distinct and peculiar operation of the Logos and
the Spirit.3 It is certain that creative operations, even mira
cles (granting that they produce physical or physico-ethical
states and conditions), are sometimes in like manner ascribed to
the Spirit as weU as to the Word, and sometimes to one or the
other in particular, Gen. i. 2, compare v. 3; Ps. xxx. 6; Ps.
civ. 30, compare Ps. cxlvii. 15; Job xxxiii. 4; Isaiah lv. 11.
The same relation becomes more precisely known in the parti
cular works of revelation and redemption. For as under the
old covenant those especial persons through whom the Word of
God was declared in distinct, messages, legislatively and pro-

190 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. I. OF GOD.
pheticaUy, and in whom the theocratic guidance and culture of
the typical people was vested, persons like Moses, the elders,
rulers, priests, kings, and prophets, must have been in a condi
tion of peculiar internal communion with God, and, as spiritual
men, possessed of an inherent fitness for the kingdom of God,
1 Sam. x. 6, xix. 20; Isa. lxiii. 10; Ps. Ii. 13; Hos. ix. If
thus was formed a hope of him who was to possess inspiration
in full measure, Isaiah xi. 1, compare John i. 33, hi. 34, and
of the time which should witness, not single and successive in
spirations of prophets among the people, but a simultaneous in
spiration of the people, and of all flesh, Joel hi.; Ezekiel xxxvi.
26, 27. This period had assuredly not yet arrived when Jesus
desired to kindle fire and baptise with fire, Luke xii. 49; and
so far also "the Holy Ghost was not yet given," John vii. 39.
Moreover, the world, as such, knew him not, and received
him not, John xiv. 17. But as the first Paraclete which had
appeared in the flesh announced John xiv. 1 6 (uKKov kupm-
yfairov), 26, xv. 26, xvi. 7 — 15, that after his departure to
the Father another would come to perfect the communion with
God, among those who believed on the first ; and this came to
pass, Acts ii. And if from henceforth no one could be regarded
as a true participator in Christ and salvation, or be considered a
citizen of the house, and a witness of the honour of God, who
had not received the gift of the Holy Spirit, and beheved in
the baptism of the Spirit, Acts xix. 1 — 5, compare viii. 15, or
could not call Jesus Lord in the Holy Spirit, 1 Cor. xii. 3,
Eom. viii. 9; then must Christian faith be essentiaUy a behef
in the Holy Spirit; and not only do the distinctions of the
Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, from God the Father,
and the Lord Jesus, but also the comparisons of the same, with
these names, persons, and causalities (Acts v. 3, 4; 1 Cor. iii.
16, vi. 19, xii. 4—7; (Lord, God, Spirit,) 2 Cor. xiii. 13, in
dicate that we are bound to adore God, who is love, as the
Holy Spirit, that is, as love equaUy divine, considered as ani
mating communicating and appropriating through the Word ;
and hence, as Christians, we ought to feel ourselves just as

§ 84. THE HOLY SPIRIT. 191
dependent on the majesty and glory of the God Jesus Christ,
revealed in the sanctuary of the heart and conscience, as we
universaUy do on God.5
1 Hence it appears how Synesius was enabled to represent the
Spirit to a certain extent as fi'egov between the Father and the
Son, God and Logos; or how Marius Victorinus describes the
Spirit as the mother of the Son. See my Theoll. Stud. 1816,
pp. 96 and 67 : according to him the Father is esse, the Spirit
~intelligere, the Son vivere, and thus the complete triad, Spiritus
tripotens. 2 Thus, it is apparent that the Shepherd of Hermas is unac
quainted with the Holy Spirit as the third person, and is in general
unacquainted with any third, but rather knows him as the second,
the Logos, Son of God, Sim. v. 4 ; and, in like manner, we can
understand that the Spirit of Wisdom, according to the Book of
Wisdom, i. 7, vii. 22, is the power of God, which sustains, con
serves, and interpenetrates the universe.
3 Hence the Spirit in general is, according to Basilius, huvu/iig
nXeiunxri, and thus generally is external to the economy of re
demption, conditionating the finite spiritual being, from which
it is distinct. Book of Wisdom vii. 23, xul hiu mdvruv ^ugouv mveu-
fidruv voeguv xubuguv Xemrordruv. Compare Augusti's Lehrbuch der
Christ. Dogmengesch., 4th edit. p. 307.
4 From the circumstance of the Old Testament introducing
Divine judgments announced by the prophets under the form —
" The Spirit of the Lord came upon him," or "the word of the
Lord came," we might indeed conclude that a state of inspira
tion in which they were, was not assumed, but rather claimed
fly the Messiah, upon whom the Spirit was to rest and remain.
But the Spirit of the Lord, however, did not fall accidentally and
indiscriminately upon this or that person, but upon qualified in
struments, otherwise the names, interpreter of God, seer, or even
T!Tty"lN would not have been conferred on appointed per

sons. 5 There is as little reason to doubt the personality of the Holy
Spirit, by what the New Testament says of the Spirit's indicat
ing a state of sanctification, or holy definiteness for internal
Christian life, as there is to believe that the words of St John i,
1, 12, he who has the Son has life, or the doctrine of Christ, who
is to take a form within us, do away with the personality of the
Son.

192 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. II. OF THE CREATURE.

SECTION THE SECOND.
OF THE CREATURE.
§85. THE WORLD.
In every element of the Christian idea of God there exists a
relation to a being, that is not God, but is of him, and for him.
We perceive God in his Works, and the world as the work of God ;
whatever is, and is not God, is the creature of God.1 The
regulated universality of things, or the world,2 is not a mere
semblance of existence, but has an actual being, because it has
been created by God, and is preserved, governed, annihUated,
and renewed by him.3
1 n&gu ri xrigig, Rom. viii. 19-22, may signify the human race
as it is by nature, just as in Mark xvi. 15, mankind, may be un
derstood. Inasmuch as the contrasting verse (23) ou pbvov he,
aX^A xul duroi only opposes the spiritually Christian man to xrigig,
we may venture to assume that xrigig can only mean the con
scious personal being, the natural human race. Yet the lat
ter, as Olshausen justly remarks, if the question turns upon a
need of redemption and a waiting for renovation, cannot assuredly
be excluded, but rather appears alone to be taken into account.
Yet the passage, " the whole creation groarieth," cannot simply
be regarded as a prelude to the yet incomplete redemption of
spiritual mankind, verse 23, but the stress lies in its reference to
verse 18, which is intimated by the particle ydg. There will be,
saith the apostle, a h6%u, an dmoxdXu^ig " of the children of God."
Christians are not alone in their suffering. The universe expects
a renovation ; but such can only come to pass by and with the ma
nifestation of the " children of God," and then there is for these
also dmoXurgugig rou gujiurog. Hence we concur with the most re
cent expositors; but still there remains a difficulty in the words
dvr% ^ xrigig ekev%ego&rigerui iig iXeu§eg!uv rSjj hb^rig rm r'exvm rou §eou.
2 In the more ancient Hebrew, there is no single word to ex-

§ 85. THE WORLD. 193
press created universe; for ^n is only y^^, and Q5iy is in
Psalm lxxiii. 12, not correctly translated world. In Judaism, of
a later period, time, or the all of time, appears to have been used
to express the all of the finite, hence dmveg, Heb. i. 2; xi. 3, is equi
valent to — universe; on the other hand, there occurs in the
New Testament, with the circumlocution, heaven and earth, also
the expression xbgpog (mundus), for example, in John xvii. 5, in
which passage it cannot mean, as Schleiermacher supposes, (p.
209,) mankind, because the expression xuru(3oXri does not admit
of this interpretation. With reference to the Greek idea of xog-
itios, see Plutarch de Place. Philoss. ii. § 1. llu^uyogug mgoirog wv6/t»ei.
T7\v ruv oXuv megio^rjv xog/tov, ex rrjg ev uuru rd<*eug.
3 A religious view of the world does not merely consist in our
perceiving in and upon it manifestations and impressions of the
Divine perfections ; for this perception even would be deceptive
and contingent, were we to consider the world not as the work of
God in its complete dependence on Divine causality; in our view
efficient causes are to be distinguished from final ones. If we
refer the dependence of the world to the final ground of its ex
istence, there arises the idea of creation and conservation, to
which the attribute of power pre-eminently corresponds ; if, on the
other hand, we refer it to the highest aim of all-wise love, in that
case the doctrines of providence and government of the world
come into view. An adjustment between the aetiological and
teleological ideas constitutes the doctrine of Divine co-operation
(concursus), although, according to Twesten, (who, differing
somewhat from De Wette, has ascribed to it more importance
than any modern author), the latter belongs rather to aetiology.
Creation does not exhibit a perfect idea of the world's depend
ence, for whosoever considers it alone, can imagine God as if re
ceding from his work, and leaving it to itself; but God must
be a sustainer of the world; thus the religious view does not
exclude, but rather requires, that we should seek the ground of
phenomena in the operation of final causes, so far as they extend.
But even these do not merely operate because God has called
them into being, and sustains them in the same; but they oper
ate as they ought, and that, too, under his influence. For exam
ple, God blesses the operation of remedies. This feature of de
pendence especially demands the idea of a concursus. Still the
question continually arises, whether co-operation be not a some
thing in and on preservation, in and on the government of the

194 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. II. OF THE CREATURE.
world, a necessary relation of both to the self-life of the creature,
rather than something in itself, and co-ordinate with preserva
tion and government.

§ 86. CREATION.
The all of the finite, together with its arrangement and con
formity to its object, has originated alone through the wiU of
God, by his manifestation of -power,1 or his word, consequently,
it has no other source, nor is it self-derived ;2 and because it has
been created by God, it is good.3 That the act of creation has
a perfect unity of object and wUl with that of redemption, is as
sured to us by the fact, that the one God has created aU things,
not through serving mediators or independent agencies, but by
the same Logos who became flesh, John i. 3 ; Col. i. 26 ; Heb.
i. 2; 1 Cor. viii. 6. Consequently the world is not the eter
nal Word of God, but something distinct from God and his Word.
But since it was created by the Word of God, it has been formed
conformably to his revelation, and so regulated as not only to
mediate Divine revelation, but also to partake of it.
1 Genesis i. 3 ; Psalm xxxiu. 6 ; Heb. xi. 3.
2 Even the expression i| o5 rd mdvru does not convey the idea
of an efflux, or an irradiation from the Divine essence, but rather
that of causality. God calleth those things which be not as
though they were, Rom. iv. 17. The old saying, "ex nihilo
nihil fit," is not opposed to, but directly in favour of the idea of
creation; instead of applying it as an objection to the truth of
creation, we ought rather employ it against the mere logical or
ideal ground of the origination of a world.
. 3 Genesis i. 31. Isidorus de Officiis Ecclesiasticis, lib. ii. c.,23.
de regula fidei. Nullam omnino esse visibilem invisibilemque
substantiam, nisi aut quae Deus sit aut a bono Deo bona creata
sit : sed Deus summe et incommutabiliter bonus, creatura vero
inferius et commutabiliter bona.
Remark 1. There are views of the origin, extent, and end of
the world which cannot be clearly represented in idea. Of all
metaphysical questions, the philosophy of time and space is that

§ 87. PRESERVATION. 195
which has been the least determined, and far too little so to cope
With the suppositions of Biblical theism subsisting in this point of
view. A view of the world's origin is indispensable, first, because
the absolute condition of the world's existence through God, can
only thus be represented; the truth of its creation, and the rela
tive distinction between its creation and preservation, can only,
in like manner, be so maintained ; and, secondly, because the infi
nitude of time and the world would deprive the latter, together
with its history, of its real and objective signification, and would
likewise injure the conception of the ultimate aim. Realizations
are either only a semblance, and therefore nullities, or they have
a beginning and an end. The speculative difficulties of an origin
in its relation to the eternal principle of creation have not as yet
indeed been thereby removed, but they are riot greater in regard
to Theism, than they are with reference to Pantheism.
Remark 2. Theologians, especially with reference to the oc
casion of the Mosaic primeval history, namely, to that of the
six days' work, have correctly distinguished between creatio me
diata and creatio prima, immediata. There are central origina
tions of natural life, whose foundation is to be referred to a re
gulating omnipotence, not to an operating nature. Nature, exist
ing and subsisting under human gradation, although corresponds
ing to the creation of man, and susceptible of an act of human
creation, is nevertheless unable to produce man by itself, and
through mere self-development. See Twesten's Vorlesungen, ii.
p. 81. § 87. PRESERVATION.
The created world exists by the same wUl and the same word
from whence it originated, Heb. i. 3. <pipw ra itavra ru popart
rrjg tvvufjusug kutov : whereon two judgments of faith are conse
quent, first, Notwithstanding the self-life impressed on it by
creation, still the creature has no independent existence, and is
in itself altogether mortal and transient, Psalm civ. 29; Luke
xii. 5, 20; xxi. 33. Second, Nothing dies prematurely, nothing
passes away without the wiU of Him who hateth nothing that he
hath made, Book of Wisdom xi. 24, who hath bestowed the means
for realizing the ultimate aim of existence, and who can rescue

196 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. II. OF THE CREATURE.
from death, and has implanted, not in vain, a vital instinct in
his creatures; Psalm cxlv.; cxlvii; Luke xii., &c. Acts xiv. 17;
Heb. xi. 19. *
1 On the importance of the idea of preservation in Christian
Doctrine, see Calvin, Institut. Rel. Chr. i. c. 16 in.; and for a too
intimate union of this idea with that of creation, see De Wette, §
37, and Schleiermacher i. 194. Both views are not perchance
only separated and united in holy Scripture, as, for example, in
Acts xvii. 24-28; Heb. i. 2, 3, because the latter view does not
recognise the abstract idea of causality, which is identical in both,
or the idea of the first motor; but rather must Biblical theism as
such, not only teach the existence of a Preserver, but also that of
a Creator, not only of a Creator, but also of a Preserver. It is
precisely the perfection of aetiology which requires distinction in
the unity of both operations.

§ 88. GOVERNMENT.
Creation and preservation elicit a self-life, and a spontaneity
in the creature which do not correspond to the final causes of
things, mechanicaUy or contingently. We know by faith the
ruhng, permittmg, and preventing, the limiting and directing
efficiency of omniscient and omnipotent love, which, slowly or
speedUy, attaining to either the revealed or. hidden goal, rea
lizes the object of creation and preservation in every element
of the world, and which induces the best self-determinations
through each point of relation between nature and spirit, be
tween the external and internal, the individual and the univer
sal — that love which reduces to order the evU and the bad
which are opposed to order, and displays itself most perfectly
in the fact of redemption, Eom. ix. 11. No result entirely ,
corresponds to human expectation or efforts, Proverbs xvi •
Isaiah xxviii. 29. And since among results, the fact of the'
world's redemption, or of its new destiny, through Jesus Christ
has in the clearest manner manifested Divine administration'
in hke manner Christian knowledge of the Divine govern-

§ 88. GOVERNMENT. 197
ment of the world has been imparted in the highest degree
through the recognition of Christ as the surety of the world's
duration, and as a pledge for its consummation, Matthew xi.
27; xxviii. 18; 1 Cor. xv. 25, 26.
Remark 1. We do not place God's ruling limitation and in
fluence either at the very beginning, nor yet in the middle, nor
exclusively at the end, of creatural spontaneity. The first as
sumption, God governs through the settled constitution of the
world, prcestabilitio, prcedeterminatio, would, were it exclusively
admitted, abolish even the idea of the world's government, that is to
say, it would extinguish its occasioning cause, the self-life of the
creature. Creation and preservation simply constitute the basis,
and necessarily presupposition of the administration of the world.
The second assumption, concursus, influxus suavis, non cogens,
must certainly be added, and possesses, in the distinction of con
cursus adformale and materiale actionum entis creati, a genuine
meaning, (although neither a partial, physical influence, nor a
mutual approximation or co-operation of Divine and finite cau
sality is sufficient). Now, (according to the partial, third as
sumption,) human action can never by any means become the
occasion of Divine ones, and thus pass into nullity and illusion ;
nor can Divine efficiency be limited to miraculous amelioration.
But, after aU, human action, as an empirical act, enters anew
into the conditions of nature and of the world, and is, in its re
sult, out of the power of man. They are bad, and yet take
flight. They consult, yet nothing ensues. Design is from man,
but what the tongue shall speak comes from the Lord. The
truth of occasionalismus does not consist in denying the reality
and freedom of human action, but in its administering to the
whole ; consequently, in all those modes, and in their connection,
we recognise Scriptural features of the idea concerning the
world's government as an all-conditionating agency. That this
conception does not annul again the spontaneity of the creature,
is apparent from the fact of the free action of man being in the
highest degree that in which, and through which, God governs.
But even free action is in general the direct and invariable will
and aim of God. How invariably any new cause is. related to
free action, every point of the circumstance produced by Divine
government shows. Nevertheless, if free action, as a contradic
tion to an aim, cannot be itself the aim, and if it not Only

198 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. II. OF THE CREATURE.
devolves on a limiting constitution, but also on jurisdiction,
which is an element of government, then is it notwithstanding,
related through an executive power to a means. All the ele
ments in which we develope the idea of a rational state serve to
unfold the idea of the government of the world by God.
Remark 2. Divine providence, (uiuviog mgovoia, Book of Wisdom
xvii. 2,) correctly speaking, in the sense of Hellenic antiquity,
foresight, precaution, although at the same time meaning pre-
consideration, is either to be understood as the unity of conser
vation and government, or as the intent of the administrator, or
as government in relation to the possible or actual existence of
evil. We become acquainted With Divine permissions and inflic
tions of pure evil (that is of natural evil) by redemption, as
being preservations, acts of benevolence, and as reactions against
the evil of lust, and as a medium for the revelation of superna
tural good. Moral evil is, in its possibility, natural good ; in its
actual phenomenon as external, it is a counteraction against the
bad of the internal; finally, in its intrinsic reality, although
damnable, it is yet removed by the power of the Redeemer ;
thus being absolutely vincible, as it is in itself groundless. This
forms the essential idea of a Theodicy. See Twesten's Vorless.
ii. 1, who at first, indeed, lays aside the idea of Divine permis
sion, but at the conclusion of his reflections accords to it a cer
tain degree of indispensability.
Remark 3. The idea of a special providence included in a uni
versal one is therefore not to be rejected, because the ultimate
aim of universal being is not in an equal mode and degree de
veloped in all individual being ; and the antithesis of that which
is conformable to, and opposed to the end in view, being first
based on the undetermined, is distinguished by finally becoming
the determinate. Mankind are instruments for promoting the
Divine glory, but some are only passive and resistant, others are
susceptive and spontaneous. Compare the contrasts running
through the Book of Wisdom, cap. xii. and xvi. — xix., and
Romans ix.

§ 89. PERSONAL CREATURE.
The world, considered as created and preserved, governed,
and redeemed by God, does not attam the perfect object for

§ 90. MAN AND ANGELS. 199
which it was designed in aU the creatures, of which it consists,
but only in the personal creature . * For even the honour of God,
or His revelation, would not constitute a sufficient aim for things
created, if they did not minister to rational and free beings,
partly by exciting contemplation, partly as serving for a bond of
communication, and finaUy by providing material for discipline.
1 That, on the one hand, anthropogony concludes the six days
work, and on the other, is especially represented as the work of
a Divine decree, Gen. i. 26, q*^ nt£W3 1S m the Mosaic cos-
mogony fuU of significancy. The plural in Htl^D cannot alone
be referred, as by Philo, who follows Plato, to the co-operation
of inferior agencies, de Opifi Mundi, § 24, ed. Lips. i. 25. On
the other hand, Theodoret opposes, Qucest. xx. in Gen., and quotes
from Theodoras the following instructive passage on the creation
of man: Xlgbht)Xov roivuv, on evu xbgfiov dmoreXegai rb gu/tmuv fiovXrftelg
o Sebg xul muguv rriv xrigiv ix hiu<pbguv pugem gugrdguv, "Svyruv re xul
d^uvdruv, XoyiHuv re xul dXoyuv, bguruv re xul dogdrm, elg ev n gwuyd-
yeiv e^eXqgug, guvhegfLov dmdvruv rbv uv^gumov xumegxeuugev. ourug mdvru
mgbg dvrbv Suvuyuyuv rfj xgeicf, ugre guvrjtj&ui re rriv gu/tmuguv xrigiv iv
nurd, xul fiXiug uurbv hi-^ugov ivugyeg iivui rfi mugrj.

% 90. MAN AND ANGELS.
As the Son of God took not on him the nature of angels, -but
of man, Heb. ii. 16, we refer the design of the visible world
especiaUy unto man, without denying thereby the existence and
aim of the invisible world. The latter, even, has been so far
disclosed, in and by the facts of Divine revelation, John i. 51,
that we possess an adequate knowledge of the existence, praise,
and ministry of angels to animatei our faith, hope, and love, by the
representation of their typical innocence, servitude, and blessed
ness, and of the glory of God in them. But angels, neither
fundamentally or determinately, influence our faith or our love;
hence, strictly speaking, the question cannot be concerning a
behef in angels, (which indeed might be faulty,)2 or concerning

200 PART I. OF THE GOOD.  SECT. II. OF THE CREATURE.
any duty or obhgation to them which we might have to fulfil in
this temporal state and world.
1 Matthew xviii. 10; xxii. 30; Luke xv. 10; IPet. i. 12.
2 Col. ii. 1 8; Heb. i. 7; ii. 5; Revel, xxii. 9. If we admit the
theory of a celestial hierarchy, introduced into Christianity by the
so-called Dionysius of Areopagus from the Neoplatonic school,
and which' theory was more justly estimated by Gregory the
Great than by the theologians of the middle ages, then must
the subject be viewed in a very different light; for, in that case,
the church on earth and the hierarchy could just as little conceive
and venerate Diety, apart from the mediation of angels, as the
laity of the church on earth could do so without its sacerdotal
gradations. Remark. The idea in the expressions, message, charge, then
messenger, servant of God, as occurring in the Old Testament,
has its peculiar ground and origin in ^N^rj""^ It is neither a
descent into polytheism, nor is it adopted from without; for, al
though the Jews acknowledge that their ancestors imported the
terms on their return from the Babylonian captivity, and the
dogma of the object was either due to, or occasioned by that inter
course, stiU the domestic origin is rather confirmed than other
wise by such considerations. It is equally far from being a poetic
luxuriance of Jehovah's encircling pomp. An angel is consequent
to, and the result of the veneration of a supernatural God in local,
peculiar miracles and phenomena, particularly in such as are re
ferable to the founding and preservation of a theocracy. An angel
is not an independent thesis, still less a confirmed perception and
experience, but is the hypothesis of an intelligent, Divine me
diate cause perceived in miracle. Thus it might be said to be
only a subjective representation. If we should attend only to
Psalm civ. 4 ; Heb. i. 7, and to the varied definahleness of the
object, and predicate according to the Hebrew or Alexandrian text,
the dogma might seem to derive its origin from poetry, especiaUy
if we take into account the kindred, Psalm cxlviii. 8, and the
analogous relation of Anger, 2 Sam. xxiv. 1, and Satan, 1 Chron.
xxi. 1. But apart from the consideration, that frequently, a free
poetic use and direction of thought may be referred to a primary
basis of dogmatic conception, still the observation of the subjec
tive genesis of a cognition does not entitle us to deny to it a real

§ 91. MAN. 201
objectivity. Jesus treats an angelic creature, as an existing rea
lity, at a period, and under circumstances where such was denied,
Matt. xx. 30. Jesus represents angels in a parable, Matt. xiii.
39, but they cannot be a parable unto Jesus himself. . Now if,
with the sage of antiquity, we nevertheless speak of an interven
ing cause under a personification, then a question arises, whether
the modern doctrine may not again have changed the actual
and vital into the abstract, and whether or not vivos et intelligen-
tes causce secundce et virtutes are to be considered as presiding
over mankind.

§ 91. MAN.
Man was created in the Ukeness,1 or after the simihtude of
God, James hi. 9; Gen. i. 27, that is to say, a personal being;
but this personahty neither implies absolute immortahty,2 nor
absolute freedom, but indicates that man's fundamental destiny
is to know Him of whom, and by whom he is, 1 Cor. viii. 6, fj^ug
tig avrov, — to know God, Acts xvii. 27; John xvii. 3, to love
himself and his feUow-creatures in God, and to become blessed
in Divine communion with men and angels.3
1 Even the first Adam is the son of God, Luke iii. 38, and, to a
certain extent uovoyhrig, but not the only begotten Son of God; he
was created after the image, but not the image, the brightness
or express image of God, Col. i. 1 5; Heb. i. 2. Judaic gnosis
alone elevates him to absolute, archetypal man, who neither fell,
nor could fall, Book of Wisdom x. 1. Upon the point, that "the
image" does not refer to what is individual in man, but to man
as a whole, Epiphanius has made some pertinent remarks, prov
ing at the same time that such cannot be lost. C. Haer. Ub.
iii. in c. Audian.
2 If God alone hath immortality, then man, even before the
fall, was not fugei immortal, but x^S171 r%s ™" ^70U perovg'iug, as
Athanasius teaches, de Incarn. Tractat. i. § 5, whilst, at the
same time, he harmonizes with the statement in Book of Wisdom
ii. 23.
3 Man's original destiny for fellowship is included in the [idea
of the person, and is acknowledged in the highest and most per-

202 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. II. 0F° THE CREATURE.
feet relation to exist in Christian doctrine. See Theremin's
Doctrine of the Divine Kingdom, 1st and 2d chapter of the 1st
book. Compare Marc. Antonin. elg e ii. 1 6. reXos he Xoylxuv tuuv ro
eme&ui ru rxig moXeug xui moXireiug rrig mgegfivrdrrig Xbyu xul aeg(i,w.

§ 92. BODY AND SOUL.
As the representation or type embodying the idea of person
ality has been primarily derived from the human body, namely,
from the countenance ; so the body is not opposed to the fun
damental destiny of man in himself (Book of Wisdom vi. 15,)
but is conducive and serviceable to the same. Spirit and body, or
soul and body,1 constitute an originaUy good unity, which God
has created and endowed with his holy and wise determinations,
Gen. ii. 7; ICor. vi. 19; xii. 24. True similitude or person
ality, indeed, does not absolutely require corporeal existence;
but since personahty is to be considered both as a natural gift
and as a destination, so the soul requires a temporal and
earthly dwelling-place, and an organic bond of union with
the world, in which, and on which, it may manifest itself as a
personal Being, or Divine resemblance.
1 Upon the whole, Theodoret's remark holds good, Dial. ii. p. 79,
tom. iv. % he 3s/a ygupii fiAuyhhev bu huo "\iv)(us. — that what appertains
to the spirit and to the soul, in the region of morals, may be distin
guished, admits of no doubt, as appears from 1 Cor. ii. 14. But it
may be asked whether, in consequence of this practical considera
tion, we can refer back to the physical or real distinction between
spirit and soul, and how such distinction, according to 1 Thess. v.
23, and Hebrews iv. 12, where it appears fuU of significance, is to
be defined. It is not perhaps sufficient to remember the mere
contrast facultates superiores et inferiores, for the question
equally turns on the unity of being, where it is to be sought, and
whether the soul be rather the adjective of the spirit, a faculty
or power of the spirit; or, on the other hand, whether the soul
of man be spiritual, and have spirit. The soul is the unity of the
spirit and body, the individual life and finiteness of the spirit.
The soul alone presents to us a conception of the individual, with
his disposition for spirituality and true personality. It is the ego

§ 93. EARTHLY DESTINATION. 203
comprehended in its universal primary self-consciousness, in its
general determinableness. But precisely as a human, not as ari
animal soul is it spiritual, rational, and capable of self-determi
nation, and was created and destined for the purpose of enter
ing and being absorbed into the innate consciousness of de
pendence on God, and of its freedom in God on every occa
sion of sensuous self-excitation. -vJ/UY/ao/, mveupu pri scorns, Jude
19, cannot therefore be understood absolutely, but only in the
sense in which we speak of irrational and unspiritual men; be
cause spirit and reason appear as powers existing in them, yet
inoperative. The human, consequently the spiritual soul, must
thus become what it is, must pass out of its mere natural egoism
into actual self-hood and personality, it must become spirituous
xur' dXrfieiuv, and thus spiritual, or achieve the formal. Thus I
am and live, yet not I, but God, the truth, liveth in me. If the
soul achieve, on the other hand, the opposite formal, and does not
elevate itself into the sphere of spiritual self-consciousness, but
continues in the sensuous ; or, by means of that self-conscious
ness, places itself as an individual and egoistic being under the
form of a false divinity, it thus represents more and more the
mere psychological man, who, as such, is no better than a carnal
one. 2 2 Cor. v. 1. h imiyeiog ri/iuv bixiu rou gxrivoug. It is not an expres
sion of sorrow for man's corporeality as such, when the Apostle ex
claims, Rom. vii. 24, rig fi,e gugerui ex rou gufLurog rou %uvdrou rourou,
but for his corporeal existence, in so far as that had been a cause
and an occasion of fleshly opposition to the law of God. The car
nal condition, however, in its rejected state, is that cause and oc
casion, and even corporeality in itself has been so mistaken and
condemned, as occurs in some measure in the Book of Wisdom,
ix. 15, ip^ugrov yug gu/au fingvvei ¦vj/uy^i' xui figfoei rb yeuheg gxqvog vovv
moXutpgovrlhu. § 93. EARTHLY DESTINATION.
Although man by reason of his nature already lives for a higher
and a heavenly destiny, througn the power of which he is en
abled even here to have " his conversation in heaven," and as
a pUgrim to seek his true paternal city; still earthly destinies
are appointed for him by God, which relate to his fundamental

204 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. II. OF THE CREATURE.
destiny, (whether in the way of image or type1) explained in §
91, and require either to be viewed more in the nature of ob
jects and blessings, or as natural means for attaining the highest
good. In marriage and home, state and church, science and
art, these destinations refer to such a preservation and consum
mation of society, that thereby for the most part the right of
every human being to govern his circumstances, and to perform
his duty towards God, is fully attained.
1 A representation uniting the archetypal and the earthly typi
cal occurs, for instance, in the following passages : — m&tu murgid ev
buguvotg xul iml yrtg, Ephes. iii. 15, murglg, Heb. xi. 14, mbXig, verse 16.

§ 94. THE GOOD (uyofoov.)
None of the preceding destinations can be considered as a
mere Illusion of instinct, but for every instinct implanted by
God in human nature there is a correlative true good, which
the inexhaustible riches of God prepares in order that it may
be an inducement to supplication, or that it may serve to ehcit
human spontaneity when directed to that good, and thus con
stitute a means of his tasting the goodness of God, and in its
place complete the feUowship of being. Gen. i. 28, 30, ii. 8,
15, 16; Ps. xxxiv. 9; James i. 17. tow "hoaig uyc&?j x.
A. Luke xi. 5—13, xag yap, 6 cutSv rMftfiavu. 1 Tim. iv, 4,
oubh Kiroft\?iTOii, [Asroi ibyjx.pid'riag \ct(jbfiui>6[//ti>ov.
Remark. With God and through God there is fulness of joy;
this is declared in the Old Testament (Ps. xvi. 11, xxxvi. 9; Isa.
lv. 1-3), by imagery the most suitable and expressive of enjoy
ment. And whUst Jesus, with divine importunity, invites man
to partake in his rest and refreshment, Matt. xi. 28, whilst he
offers a fuU sufficiency, John x.. 11; and promises that he will
for ever appease both hunger and thirst, John iv. 13, vi. 35,
He at the same time attests, first, the Divine aim of human need
in general; and secondly, in a mediate manner, He declares
that those sensuous requirements, employed by him as images,

§ 95. WANTS AND INSTINCTS. 205
are conformable to the object for which they were originally im
planted.

§ 95. WANTS AND INSTINCTS.
Even these destinations do not subsist apart from that de
finiteness of human nature by means of which man meets them
in a mode independent of aU wUl and attribution, namely, through
the necessity of his original want and instinct. And that man
has been especiaUy created with a desire and in reference to
a want is apparent, not only from the simple characteristic of
his original condition, which, according to Gen. n., is alto
gether accounted receptive and necessitous; but it also appears
from this, that in a state of degeneracy or of bias there is uni-
versaUy recognised, and remains, to a certain extent, partly
that which is natural and blameless in the excitation of the
sensuous instinct for preservation and enjoyment, and partly a
higher desire. 1 Cor. vi. 13; Mark vii. 15; 1 Tim. iv. 3; Eom.
vii. 18, 23, viii. 22.1
1 Compare De Wette Chr. Sittenlehre i. § 9-14. 2ajf, SeXy/ia.
gugxbg, em&vftla, ^h> IV") &c-> as often as they are used to express
a propensity, convey at the same time a moral and indifferent
signification applicable to the natural.

§ 96. ORDER OF GOODS AND INSTINCTS.
To the unity and multiphcity of man's destiny there corre
sponds an original order of goods and instincts. This har
mony does not merely consist in the aims and requirements for
preservation being placed before those of enjoyment, Luke xi.
23; 1 Tim. vi. 8., in the goods of domestic and civil society
being pre-appointed for the advantages of refined culture, or in
honour and liberty, being raised above opulence, but it chiefly
consists in this, that the whole of the lower hfe and good, con-

206 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. II. OF THE CREATURE.
sidered as simply mediate, and, to a certain extent, foreign to
man, Luke xvi. 12, is subordinate to the " one thing needful,"
x. .42; or that, what belongs to the earthly or individual hfe
(fii&g, 1 John ii. 16; Luke xxi. 34), is placed under that which
is suited to his true hfe (Zjutj). " Man does not live by bread
alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of
God," Mat. iv. 4. " To every thing there is a season," EccL
hi. 1 — 9, and universally, through the subordination of things,
every thing becomes lawfully ours ; so that apart from this sub
ordination, whatever is useful, beneficial, and right, is changed
into the opposite, 1 Cor. hi. 21 — 23, x. 23.

| 97. FLESH AND SPIRIT.
Two kinds of desire in human nature, which, without violat
ing the ordinary form of speech, we may denominate those of
the flesh and of the spirit, are not in themselves opposed to
each other; for even though the sensuous desire be necessarily
that which is earhest excited, stUl the supersensuous has uncon
ditional claims upon the wiU ; but the capacity for the moral
development and progress of man, consists in this, that these
desires separate and contend under the influence of individual ex
citement. Hence the higher life of a finite moral creature be
comes so much the more perfect in proportion as it embodies the
excitations of consciousness in time, and limits and governs them.
Remark. The antagonism between the higher and lower vital
impulse as represented, in a similar manner, in Gal. v. 1 7, and
in Rom. vii. 22, 23, is a derived, and not an original one, in
its kind. Doubtless, however, their original distinction, and
merely possible opposition, is expressed in these passages refer
red to, by the contrast of the inner man, and of the law in his
members, or in that of the spirit and the flesh.
§ 98. FREEDOM AND CONSCIENCE.
The relation of a personal being to his destiny, or to Divine

§ 98. FREEDOM AND CONSCIENCE. 207
order, can never be perfected by a mere activity of our in
stinct, however excited; for between action and impulse there
intervene thought and wiU, partly modifying action, partly
conditionating the greater or lesser excitation of instinct. In
nate freedom, which is a necessary element in man's persona
lity, consists in this, namely, that man is not compeUed to
execute the requirements of reason by the author of reason,
and that he has the power of thinking, wUling, and acting, in
opposition to the demands of desire. Hence the fact of con
science, or the revelation of Divine righteousness in the human
mind, is a pledge that man's freedom is no mere semblance or
hidden natural necessity,1 Eom. ii. 15.
1 It has often been asserted that before the fall man had no
conscience, and that it consists in a necessary modification of his
moral consciousness, which could only be realized after the fall.
Doubtless, conscience, in one sense, must be distinguished from
conscience in another, as the usual formulae antecedent, conco-
mitans, &c. imply; and conscience, wherein a condemning or
approving prerogative is manifested, is distinct from that con
science wherein justitia legislativa is consummated; conscientia
legis, guvelhrjgig rou ^eXrjfturog rou SsoO, moral conscience in general, is
as necessarily united with the existence of man as such, and with
his development in sin, as it is with his development for obe
dience, or for repentance and conversion. When the woman re
membered, Gen. iii. 2, 3, that God had said and forbidden, she
did not sin thereby, she had not as yet sinned, but she manifests
that she had a conscience.
Remark 1. Although freedom in the New Testament, regarded
strictly as a gift of redemption, and considered as a contrast of
slavish propensity to mere external independence, John viii. 36,
or that of the present oppressed condition of the world, Rom.
viii. 21, or that of compulsion by law and opinion, 1 Cor. vii. 23,
Gal. v. 13, is maintained, recommended, and hoped. Still the
gospel, in general the Word of God, is the strongest testimony
of the original freedom in which, and for which, man was cre
ated, a testimony which continually recurs, partly in the alter
nations of prophecy, Deut. xxx. 15, and in the Divine precepts
in general, partly in the perpetual imputations of sinfulness and
sin, and partly in the continual requirement, " Repent ye, and

208 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. II. OF THE CREATURE.
believe the gospel," Mark i. 15. One of the strongest expres
sions occurs in Matthew xi. 12, "The kingdom of heaven suffer-
eth violence, and the violent take it by force."
Remark 2. At all times the explanations of what is understood
by freedom are either distinguished more in regard to the power
of choosing between the good and the bad, or in respect of the
power of self-determination, independent of motives grounded on
the senses. Schelling and Kant. The above explanation, which
although it seems to be removed from the idea of freedom as re
presented in the New Testament, yet endeavours to do justice to
both, whilst it indicates with the former character a more nega
tive freedom, and with the latter a positive one.

§ 99. RIGHT AND LAW.
The wiU, that necessarily thinks, in the development of the
personal life destined for social action, is that channel through
which Divine legislation enters, and where the wisdom and
majesty of God are revealed in the pre-existing conscience.
The higher instinct of life refers, in all its claims, to the exist
ence and truth of those relations between personal beings,
founded by God ; and whilst it is reflected upon a knowledge of
the same, there arises in man a natural knowledge of law,
Eom. ii. 14 ; and in conformity with which he acknowledges,
" God hath said," Gen. iii. 3. An image of the inviolable
relations and orders of the Divine kingdom impressed on our
consciousness, is presented anew from without in various ways
to the sinner, should the impression be more or less obhterated
through sin. In the inviolableness of that relation consists jus
tice, or the abstract of right1 and duty ;2 and the law speaks
thereon in particular commands, (wrorJi, Eom. vii, 7-9, tbypa,
Ephes. ii. 15), and prohibitions.
1 In the following passages the statutes of the Lord are re
garded as an object of the spirit's internal joy, and as an efflux
of Divine wisdom and grace, Ps. xix. 8, 9, cxi. 3, cxix. Com
pare Rom. vii. 12, 22, guvrfiopui ydg r£j vb^u rou 'htou.

101. VIRTUE. 209

§ 100. GOOD AND BAD.
These rights and laws considered as the object of the highest
satisfaction, or in their perfect conformity to truth and love,
constitute the good,1 in contrast to the bad. That mode of
human life is good in the same degree as it is related through
faith and obedience to the truth of Divine order, as revealed in
the law, or to the Divine wiU ; hence it not only endeavours to
become just to the actual good (uyofoov), but also strives to
promote possible good, and whatsoever is included in a disposi
tion for the same, Mich. vi. 8. The bad, consequently, is that
which, in imagination and effort, in action and permission, per
verts, denies, and mistakes, as far as it can, Divine order ; and
whUe it assumes circumscribed existence for its motive, it pro
gresses from indolent self-love to the love of unbehef and to
unreal freedom of disobedience.
1 I'ltt' Micah vi. 8; Genesis ii. 17. Ti xuXbv, Rom. vii. 18, 21.
Tb SiXrjf&u rou ' §eou rb uyu&bv xul eudgegrov xul reXeiov, Rom. xii. 2 ;
Ephes. v. 10.

§ 101. VIRTUE.1
The image in which man was created has been placed
under temporal limits and trial, in order that it may be buUt
up into a free and blessed likeness, (Eph. iv. 24), under
Divine guidance, by wisdom and righteousness in love ; and in
reference to internal and external opposition, be perfected by
temperance aud perseverance.2
1 The abstract idea of virtue has not indeed sprang from the
religion of the Old Testament, for the latter derives its moral
life pre-eminently from Divine communication and grace, or con
siders it in an especial manner as consisting in obedience,,
righteousness, and fulfilment of the Divine commands. ¦ Hence.
the words dgerri and dgerul are used in a very subordinate sense,
P

210 PART I. OF THE GOOD. — SECT. II. OF THE CREATURE.
and with the special meaning, " power, vigour," 1 Pet. ii. 9 ;
2 Pet. i. 3 ; Phil. iv. 8 ; 2 Pet. i. 5. In the two latter passages
it has a peculiar moral signification in reference to its fitness for
effecting Divine order.
2 Compare Schleiermacher on the scientific treatment of the
idea of virtue, in Abhandl. der Philos. CI. der Konigl. Preuss.
Akad. der Wiss., 1818-19. Berlin, 1820.

§ 102. CONCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE CREATURE.
Doubtless the trial of faith and obedience, Gen. ii. 17, to
gether with aU its possible consequences, formed a part of the
divine education of Adam, or was required, in order to develope
his natural personahty, just as much as the institution of his
relation to the other creatures, and to his social condition was
needed; but he mighti even without the faU, and by means of
an innocent antagonism of flesh and spirit,1 have advanced by
an endless gradation towards perfection.2
1 In reply to objections made to this view, I would observe,
that primeval man presents a contrast of flesh and spirit, and
that, apart from sin, there is an antagonism of this kind. I am well
aware that Scripture does not immediately instruct us concern
ing this antagonism, but either does not permit human nature
to be altogether understood, as it was, according to Scripture,
constituted and created by God, and says nothing of its capacity
for development in sin or obedience; or else, through the con
trast of flesh and spirit, become moral, and which is not a guilt
less one, a natural contrast must be seen to shine, which un
doubtedly was designed to unfold itself in the purest harmony.
This antagonism, however, is nothing more than the combined pos
sibility of sin and obedience. It cannot, in the slightest degree,
be regarded either as the commencement or as the germ of sin ;
although in the present day, many even of our best Dogmatists
ascribe sin unto the original Adam, in a quiescent sense ; just as
the apostle, before an impression from the law was received,
does dpugriu vexgd, Rom. vii. 8 ; or as Bellarmin explained the
fall, and the sinfulness reigning thereby, only by an original con
trast between reason and sensuousness, just as if carnal desire

§ 102. CONCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE CREATURE. 211
had been created as such, and was only restrained by grace.
Compare Schmid, in his strictures on Usteri Tub. Zeitschr., 1830,
4, p. 167-72.
2 The last assertion is only intended to guard against the
admission of the fall being equaUy from the wiU of God and a
necessity, as the creation of man to a personal existence was.
The admission of such a view is founded on the theory, that the
glorious power and grace of God could only be fuUy revealed in
redemption from death, and by the destruction of sin, conse
quently could only be displayed in the existence and actual
being of evil, with which is united the hypothesis, that the
actual is that which is effectuated, arranged, and necessary.
MeanwhUe the dogmatic assertion, that the good requires the
bad for its glorification, is not less exceptionable than the ethi
cal maxim, Let evil be done, that good may arise; or imipevou/tiv
rji d/nugriu, hu ii XH'= mXsovugr), Rom. vi. 1. And what is the hidden
meaning of those who support the former tenet; but, on the
one hand, to maintain the naturalness and dynamic originality
of the bad, and on the other hand, either to complete the natu
ral process of universal restoration, or to realize the terrors of a
God who requires a being capable of sin and fallen, in order to
exercise on both these states His mercy and His wrath, and
thus to effectuate His twofold absolute decree ? These views,
taken together, are irreconcileable with Holy Scripture; but if we
assume the possibUity of Adam's progression to perfection, apart
from sin and the fall, and yet at the same time maintain that
redemption is not a mere restoration, we are not by any means
inconsistent. For to that infinite progress of Adam would have
appertained the essential condition,, that by obedience he might
have become free, and thus, even as God is, acquainted with
good and evil. Now since this condition was not attached to
Adam, either before or after the faU, the child of God possesses,
as appears from redemption, a something, which Adam, as a
mere natural, although sinless son of God, did not possess.

PART THE SECOND.

OF THE BAD.
§ 103. THE GOOD AND THE BAD.
The doctrine of salvation is more closely related to the de
generated condition of the world, which has become a second
nature,1 and to the bad,2 than it is to original good, or to the
natural right conduct of the creature towards God. The bad
became possible with the creation of personality, without; how
ever being necessary, but it has become so very real that the
Heavenly Adam must needs come into the world to destroy
the works of the devU, Eom. v. 14, 1 Cor. xv. 46, that is to
say, sin and death, 1 John hi. 8, Heb. ii. 14, and to renew
the communion of the creation with the Creator.
1 1 John V. 19, xul b xogfiog bXog iv rSi movrjgSi xefrul. Compare
Gal. i. 4; Rom. iii. 19, xul umbhixog yivrirui mug b xbg/iog ru Ssfi.
Ephes. ii. 3, xul qpev rixvu <piigei bgyr\g. Rom. vii. 24, rb gu/iu ruu
Suvdrov rourou.
2 yft, rb movtigbv, rb xuxov, Rom. vii. 21 . malum is not uvugxov,
nor dy'ewrirov, not even yiwrirov, but is that which enters into the
thoughts through the self-determinableness of the will, and is
subsequently imparted to the material world by Divine permis
sion. Thus Basil bf&iX. on oux ignv uiriog ruv xu%uv b Seog. Every
language in which the history and philosophy of revelation is
discussed, contains as intelligible traces of the unity as of the
distinction between bad and evil. Life, considered as deranging,
perverting, arid limiting its own unity, constitutes the bad,
and that which is actually deranged, perverted, and limited,

214 PART II. OF THE BAD.
when experienced, is evil. Disturbance is the unity of both.
Wherefore the bad is an affliction, because man in himself, or pri
meval man, commits it only in a state of unfreedom, and that only
against himself; and since God's ordinance is and continues inviol
able, man only injures himself by such commission. The bad, re
garded as being unnatural and perverse, or as guilt and condem
nation, and thus, at the same time, an internal punishment, is
the greatest and in some measure, the only evil; for every other,
in which there exists a counteraction against the bad, that is to
say, against its principle, is already a proportionate good. 'O movngbg
is one who prepares for himself and others mofoug — euvroug megii-
meiguv bhuvuig mbXXuig, 1 Tim. vi. 10. It is evident, how, in conse
quence of the causative relation between bad and evil, the evU also
is bad. For evil is not only blameable as a violation of the origi
nal and natural, but as a threatening, dreaded, odious thing,
provokes to untolerated or cowardly sin of every kind, or to a
reaction analogous to itself, in so far as it is no longer merely
feared but felt and experienced. Distress, anguish, death, beget
crime, and hold, as it were, the sinner in bondage. This is Daniel
Whitby's fundamental idea, supported by Heb. ii. 15; Book of
Wisdom ii. 1, 19; when, in his Treatise de imputatione divina
peccati Adami posteris ejus in reatum, (published by Semler, to
gether with Felagii Ep. ad Demetriadem, Halle, 1775), he con
tends that mortality and perishableness inherited from Adam is
rather the cause than the consequence of our sinfulness. AU of
which is an argument for the doctrine of sin and death suitable
to the idea of ponerology.
Remark. Christian ponerology is divided into two leading sec
tions, that of sin or the bad participating in guilt, and that of
death or the bad which has participated in the same. Sin and
death are here understood in an extensive sense, as in Gen. ii.
17, Rom. vii. Compare my Treatise ub. den Menschenmbrder von
Anfang, Berl. Zeitsehr.f. Theol. iii. 1822. Pp. 54, 55.

| 105. SEDUCTION AND SIN. 215
SECTION THE FIEST.
OP SIN.
§ 104. TRIAL AND TEMPTATION.
The same limitation (by means of which God, who tempts
none to sin, James i. 13, tries man for good),1 becomes a
means of temptation. Man does not stand the trial;2 but,
on the contrary, suffers himself to be seduced, and that by
God's permission.
1 A trial for good sometimes occurs through meigugpbg and
msigdfyiv, 1 Peter iv. 12; Heb. iv. 15; Book of Wisdom iii. 5. It
must have been so much the more necessary for the first Adam,
since even the second required it for his consummation, and must
needs undergo experiences in a state of obedience, Heb. v. 8.
2 This is not a postulatum, but an experience or knowledge.
§ 105. SEDUCTION AND SIN.
The effectuating cause of man's permitting himself to be se
duced by a lie, and by opposition to God, (which in some way
previously existed,) does not consist either in prohibition, nor in
a Divine economy for developing his freedom, nor in the sen-
suousness, finiteness, or limitedness of his nature. It does not
lie hi a prohibition to be spiritual, holy, just, and good, Eom.
vii. 12, 14, for that, as a Divine communication and influence, is
primarily incumbent upon him. Nor does it lie in the original
economy instituted by God in order to vouchsafe unto man a
transition out of a childish into a chUd-like state; for the ex
perience that man has principally become independent in a sin
ful way, and has escaped from a state of mere determinable-
ness, is no proof that he should necessarUy have commenced
his freedom by sin, but only proves that God, permitting it,

216 PART II. OF THE BAD.  SECT. I. OF SIN.
allowed him thus to be, and to continue determined unto true
freedom. When God says, Adam has become like one of us,
the context evidently shows, that Adam, in the sense of this
declaration, had attained this likeness unto God by unrighteous
means, and in an unlawful way had acquired a knowledge of
good and evU. Human nature was just as far from being pre
destined to be a sinful one, by means of its sensuous excitability,
or of being predetermined to sin. Sensuousness is neither to be
considered as the origin and occasion, nor, as it were, the neces
sary accompaniment of the entire developed hfe of sin, nor the
cause of sin ; for sensible excitation never stands alone. Things
were named and ordered for man by God's word. He was permit
ted to enjoy in one sense, yet not in another, and thus ought to
have desired and enjoyed in harmony with order. FinaUy, the
hmitation or succession of intuition, idea, desire, memory, and
movement of the wUl, or the possibility of erring, cannot be
directly accused of sin. For error, were it indeed not willed,
could only (if it generated actual deflections1) produce innocent
sins. Sin, in representation, can thus only be a he ; in desire,
only lust. The homogeneous principle of falsehood and lust
is egoism, which is only in its origin and causality inexpli
cable, and yet explains everything. Through this egoism arises
a false passivity and activity, that is, an inert shrinking back
from the aim and law revealed by God, and a proud impatience2
in the enjoyment of blessings and of self. The fruit hereof is
sin, that is, the perversion of Divine order which allows the
personal being to become guilty, and through which he revolts
from God, falls out with himself and his neighbour, and com
mits an unrighteousness3 which must be atoned for.
1 The Hebrew, Greek, and Latin words signifying sin nearly
all relate to the fundamental idea of a deviation from the path
and object, to the idea of violated order and a straying from the
aim. But in the German, the word sin (siinde) indicates the
necessity of satisfaction.
2 At first the woman remembers the Divine prohibition, Gen.
iii. 2, 3, then forgets it, only looking at and given up to desire
for the enjoyment of what was to make one wise, ver. 6. Melanch-

§ 106. PROPENSITY OR BIAS. 217
thon by M. Chemnitz, in locc. p. 339, flaeserunt vagantes extra
ordinem in objectis contra mandatum Dei, et Evae voluntas aver-
tens se a voce Dei et vagata extra ordinem haesit in pomo. This
violent haste, of which we have spoken above, or impalientia, is,
according to Tertullian de patientia, the cause of sin, and does
not essentially differ from superbia, to which Augustin was wont
to ascribe all guUt. It might be more critically maintained
with Basil, already referred to, that man had, from a certain
superabundance in heavenly enjoyment, cast his eyes upon in
ferior pleasure, and thus committed dvuxugyg>s dmo Ssou. But
to this haughty impatience we must combine that indolent
shrinking back, above alluded to, if we desire to give an accu
rate account of the origin of human sin, so far as that is gene
rally possible.
3 1 John iii. 4, r) dftugnu egrlv i] dvofitu.

§ 106. PROPENSITY OR BIAS.
Sin occurs in humanity not otherwise than by causing either
a sinful propensity, and with that a fall of the whole human
condition, or it is induced by the previous existence of this bias.
Sin has not entered into the world as a mere example, but as
an active commencement full of important consequences, Eom.
v. 12. Wherefore, that sin by which, primarily, the natural
institutes of the Divine kingdom were frustrated, cannot be en
tirely compared with any succeeding actual sin, even should a
simUar principle be discovered in it. Nevertheless, we still
have in an actual sin, the more completely the entire spiritual
hfe co-operates in its commission, instead of stifling it in the
germ, a simUar fall ; inasmuch as actual sin is accompanied by
a bias, and becomes a principle of action, under a certain
aspect, and a lowering of the spiritual hfe; provided, on the
contrary, it does not perchance induce an elevation of this very
spiritual life into a higher stage than was the previous state of
child-like innocence ; which, however, must first be realised by
an especial suffering of self-wUi, and consequently through an
especial influence of grace. If we correctly imagine the con-

218 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. I. OF SIN.
dition of man before the primal sin as that of a pure determm-
ableness provided with aU means of Divine guidance and cul
ture; and if this state, by a false development of freedom in sin,
becomes one of impure ddermination, then the latter can only-
consist in a constant shrinking of the wiU and thought from the
commands of God, or in an unbelieving inclination and in a
continual precipitancy of the individual appetite for sensual en
joyment, or in some particular lust, consequently can only con
sist in a permanent derangement of the original relation between
flesh and spirit, soul and spirit, that is, in continued sin ; a con
dition, therefore, which, when primarUy viewed as a state of
unfreedom, and one incapacitated for truth and good, and con
sequently to be comprehended as a passion, yet possesses an
apparent freedom, and generates from itself an activity or ef
fort, which, as being egoistic and selfish, is also godless, and
positively bad. Nevertheless, original nature is not abrogated
by such corruption. The idea of disease rather includes the
persistent reaction of nature, or of the original unity of the
vital powers and vital functions, but not the sufficiency of na
ture for remedying the evU. Now, according as man, by means
of his universal activity of thought and will, enters into the in
tent and wiU of reason as antagonistical to the flesh, or passively
resigns himself to the wiU of the flesh, either amehorations or
deteriorations become possible; but distinct vohtions do not
change the constituted wUl of nature, nor the relations of the
vital instinct in general.
Remark 1. The Mosaic Hamartigeny (Doctrine of Sin, an ex
pression used by Pradentius) we regard as true history, but not
as actual. The fall of David or Peter may be described as actual,
that of Adam we could learn only as to its truth, through the
word of God.
Remark 2. Particular opinions concerning the condition of the
Adamic race which are met with in Scripture (for example in Ge
nesis viii. 21, vi. 5, and in some measure also in vi. 3) harmonize
with the above notion of propensity or continued sin; but chiefiv
and immediately upugriu (Rom. vii.) does so, which chapter in-

§ 106. PROPENSITY OR BIAS. 219
eludes the essential characteristic of the above condition. That
dpagria here signifies something beyond actual sin or sensuality,
appears from the foUowing considerations: — 1. It existed before
the law gave the sentence of death, but in the form of huvupig.
2. It generates from itself imfovpiu. 3. It reveals itself as bad, and
is developed as such. 4. It gives rise to the entire carnal con
dition: compare gdg%, Gal. v. 16, 17; John iii. 6. Nothing can be
more inconsiderate than to maintain that sin is at aU times nothing
more than an isolated act, and that the word d&ugrlu can only pro
perly signify this. In every case doubtless an action is presumed,
but not merely the act that is apparent in the error, for it must be
allowed that only what is thought and willed can be caUed sin.
Now, is such human action to be referred to the elective faculty,
as to its own peculiar ground? Is action, viewed as thought and
will, nothing more than an isolated and unconnected thing? No,
it is accompanied with emotions, inclinations, and tendencies, or
other actions, partly as its antecedent, partly as its consequent.
Thus action occurs in a continuous form : hence, if the conditions
and internal dispositions of man are to be understood, the ques
tion necessarily turns upon sin regarded in its origin, foundation,
and nature, in contrast with uncontinued and isolated error. If
action and reaction, the former regarded as bad, the latter as
good, exist cotemporaneously; if there be an objective sin, if
Cain shall rule over sin "lying at the door," if we commit evil
" that we would not," if there be " a sin which is unto death,"
one which is not imputed, &c, in that case we must abandon
that contracted external and superficial idea of sin, of the act
of the wiU, which Pelagianism invented and even Platonism
prescribed. If Scripture be an undeniable witness of the law
of sin, of naturally evil propensities and of indwelling sin, still
one resorts to other assistance. The name of sin, it is said,
is in Holy Scripture transferred to sensuality, and since the
priority of sensuous excitation is precisely the ground of all
human peccability, in so far as the latter has a natural foun
dation, such a transference is a just one. Granting sensuous
ness to be the realization of all the developments of self-con
sciousness, and that it precedes whilst rational activity follows,
still the latter is contemporaneously excited in every complete
element of self-consciousness; and if in consciousness thus deter
minated, not sensuousness but reason takes precedence, in that
case it must be granted that sin had already entered into or

220 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. I. OF SIN.
previously existed in man. If sensuousness had absolute priority
in original man, that would give the idea of continued sin, and
thus, in this case, sin would appear to be not only inborn but
innate. And here there is a point where the extremes of Pela-
gianism and Manichaeism pass into each other* In short, the
existence of continued sin in the Pauline doctrine does not
amount to a metaphorical expression. Touching the antago
nistic representation of a twofold tendency or double principle of
generic change of the human state, Adam and Christ, Rom. v.,
it has been well remarked, that the point of analogy lies in the
dominion of death, or the power of life pervading the human
race, and that death and life are universally represented as un
deserved and unmerited, or as only operative through One for
many; but the question is here far from turning on sin as com
municated by Adam, and as a generic corruption, on sin as a
defect of the species, or, indeed, on the non-existence of the same
in general, and perchance merely turns on the actual sin of the
individual subjects of death. Death has been, to a certain extent,
regarded as merely something peculiar, as a separabile since it
reigned over those who have experienced it, less as a personal
punishment than an affliction, not as the first man incurred
it, from a sin of commission, through a first sin, by transgressing
a definite law. Precisely as life is a separabile of righteous
ness, in so far as all those who have not been obedient, as was
Christ, obtain it only iii fellowship with Him, and as a gift of
grace. Finally, sin remains an inseparabile of death in all who
have not overcome it; for, in the first place, death has entered
into the World no otherwise than as hi' dpugriug, and only exists
thus in the world ; and all have sinned, although not exactly like
Adam, against positive law, consequently sin has reigned in and
over them, and if not as a first act, if not as a commencing act,
or as that of one person, (in which case there would not be a fel
lowship of death and sin, and consequently none of life and right
eousness), then is sin to be regarded, apart from act and prior to
it, as a second nature, as a passive power existing in all, and
which has developed itself as such in actual sin. The exist
ence of continued sin and of a bias in Adamic fellowship is,
consequently, what is presupposed or included in this doctrinal
connexion, which chiefly refers to the dominion of death, and the
communication of life, or to Adam and Christ. For some admir
able and profound inquiries on this subject, see Steudel, Uber

§ 107. SIN AS A GENERIC DEFECT. 221
Siinde und Gnade, Tub. Zeitschr. fur Theologie, 1832, i. p. 125. G.
C. Kern, iiber die Lehre von der Siinde. In the same work, 1833,
ii. p. 57. Christoph. Benjam. Klaiber, Neuetestam. Lehre von der
Sunde und Elosung, Stuttg. 1836; and Schmid, ExegethBemerkun^
gen uber Rom. v, 12, Tub. Zeitschr. 1830, iv., against which the
works of Bretschneider, Grundlehren des Pietismus, &c. 1833, and
David Schulz, Schriftmassige Beurtheilung der Lehre von der Erb-
sm.de, "A supplement to his Christian Doctrine of Faith," Leipzig,
1834, scarcely deserve to be mentioned. For more vigorous and
profound researches we refer to the works of Jul. Miiller, Die
Lehre von der Sunde, 1839; and W. Vatke, Die menschliche
Freiheit in ihrem Verhaltniss zur Sunde und zur gottlichen Gnade,
1841, works which, although repulsive in theory and method,
have nevertheless co-operated in the removal of many prejudices.

§ 107. SIN AS A GENERIC DEFECT.
In the Old Testament, a voice of ardent desire for a com
plete new birth bespeaks, together with the promise of the
people's Divine renewal, (Ezekiel xi. 19, xxxvi. 25, 26; Psalm
U. 12), a consciousness incited by the word of God, of man's
moral incapacity, which has become a natural condition, and.
also indicates a universal state of sin. Although in the Old.
Testament a retrospective view of the fall1 is rarely taken, yet,
what is founded in the Old Testament with reference to law
and promise infallibly proves that the realization of the law can
not result from the mere preservation of the people in their
calling and moral nature, and that the fulfilment of the promise
can only be reahzed by a Divine freedom from sin, and by a
new creation of the heart. Cotemporaneously with the feehng of
justification and experience of an entirely new life of faith in
Christ, there arises, in the clearest manner, a knowledge that
aU who are comprehended in the unity 01ST"n have sinnedj
Eomans i.-iii. v. 12, and also that the sinful development of
each individual refers back to the corruption of the race, in
which he is as much included, with regard to suffering and ex-

222 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. I. OF SIN.
perience, as he is in associated guUt, (Eom. vii. 9, 10; compare
verse 18 and v. 13, 18); and, moreover, that the actual, as
weU as original sins of aU posterity are originaUy connected with
the faU of Adam. Eomans v. 12, 13.
1 Perhaps the Hebrew term in Hosea vi. 7, if not E31N3
here as in Job xxxi. 33; Psalm lxxxii. 7, may be translated,
" like men." Yet in all these passages the question under dis
cussion may be compared with Genesis, chap. iii. The absence
of the article can scarcely be said to decide the question. We
may venture, however, to say that the historical and universal
view are mutually blended. In the prophetic passage I have re
linquished the conjecture O'lM,
Remark. It is only the supposition of all antiquity that moral
dispositions and tendencies are not only implanted by education
and imitation, but also by generation. Thus, too, the supposition
of Holy Scripture, not immediate doctrine, is that Adam's fall
has naturally communicated itself to his posterity; for the pas
sages rixvu tpugei bgyr\g, Eph. ii. 3, or ro yeyevvriftevov ex rqg ffugxbg ffdgi^
ign, John iii. 6, do not immediately assert this. But the natural
or carnal being and existence is only primarily to be regarded as
the negation of the higher Divine life, or as the yet nonexistence
of a state and capacity only conferred by redemption ; so that
both modern views might be compatible, of which the one consi
ders sensuousness as being primarily excited to a principle of
sin, whilst the other supposes the germ of sin, self-love, to have
existed in the original Adam. On the other hand, in consequence
of this mode of expression, it is impossible to imagine actual sin
and sinful habits (vitia acquisita, peccata actualia) in universal
man, considered as unrenovated. Sin has already been stated to
be natural, innate, necessary, and objective; for how could the
question otherwise turn on " the law of sin in the members," and
on "the body of this death," (carnal corruption)? Rom. vii. 23
24. But as sin only entered (hgriX%e) the xbgpog, which in itself
was unsinful, it only enters into the individual existing at
the time, and does not constitute his substance; and so little
so, that sin must rather endure the contradiction of the reason,
and of the internal man. Rom. vii. 18, 23. The ego and
indwelling sin are distinct and separable. It is true that
sin is a nature, but then a second nature, a state of degene
ration. Sin is incomprehensible, if only conceived to be as if

§ 107. SIN AS A GENERIC DEFECT. 223
mgouigenxbv, and an act of the individual, or simply as a habit. It
is affirmed, sin is in the will; but the will itself is primarUy im
parted and natural, and is the inbeing of the ego determinating
itself, together with the earlier or stronger instincts. This bias of
the ego, to passivity, only becoming active in sensuous passivity,
would be, as a mere something imparted, only a bare suffering ;
ruXuSmugog, Rom. vii. 24, and although objectively condemnable,
would yet not constitute guilt, or even, (as was maintained against
the reformers on the subject of concupiscentia) might constitute
a necessary mediation of the free spirit, and become something
good, so that the idea of sin aUuded to would be inappli
cable. A man, who from the first should appear merely ob
jective in sin, not admitting and appropriating, even in thought,
what the perverted will of nature desires, but rather as a think
ing subject standing in a state of reaction, might rather be called
an innocent sufferer, or even a victor. Or a person so created
and constituted, who at the very moment when he feels an in
stinctive bias, and is in danger of falling into sin, and being sus
tained and strengthened by an act of grace, and defended by a
donum supernaturale to contend, at all times, against and to sub
due this bias would, in spite of this propensity and generic sin,
be and remain in a state of innocence. In such a condition did
Bellarmin conceive Adam to be before the fall, and in like man
ner did the author of the Book of Wisdom regard the first man.
For wisdom (Book of Wisdom x. 1, 2,) had preserved " the first
formed" from individual sin (mugumurupurog Ihiou), though not from
sin based on sensuous existence as such, but yet from sin having
the assent of the wUl ; the latter being first imputed to Eve. But
such an Adam is a fiction. Or, if man is conscious, (the more he
is placed by Divine preservations and inducements in a state of
reaction against'his bias), that generic sin has become personal,
he knows, as Augustin remarks, non inviti tales sumus. The
universality of this assent is no more capable of explanation than
is the first sin. Its possibility can alone be explained.
Remark 2. The idea of original sin, if understood in the sense
of Romans vii. 8, involves no contradiction. That the individual
dispositions of the soul are propagated by generation, will scarcely
be disputed. Why not then generic dispositions also? Hence we
cannot but maintain the doctrine of derivation, together with that
of creation.

224 PART II. OF THE BAD.  SECT. I. OF SIN.

§ 108. SIN AND THE LAW.1
The order of things as perverted by sin dweUing in the flesh,
(since the former continues to be in itself indestructible,) never
ceases to oppose sinful man. Not only is man sustained in his
moral nature, but is, at the same time, stimulated and rendered
the subject of fear, shame, arid punishment, by external nature
reciprocating with the internal, so that he continues, in some
way, accessible to Divine legislation, which accompanies and
pursues him on aU occasions. Now the law, under whatever,
form and kind it may speak and operate, is, in principle, good
and Divine, (see § 105,) and is grounded in love; yea more, in
grace, which supposes sin to exist in relation with the kingdom
of God; but primarUy it corresponds only to the righteousness of
God's holy love, and in reference to passible or actual evil,
upholds the inviolableness, the objective necessity of the Divine
wiU, without emancipating the natural wUl of man from his bias,
and rendering him truly free, Eom. viii. 3. It exercises over
the sinner, in its highest activity, a critical power, but not a
mediatorial, reconcihng, or animating one. The law is not sin,
Eom. vii. 7, but it first renders the sin of the carnal tendency,
which was dead and unconscious, actual, conscious sin, Eom.
iv. 15; v. 14, and represents it as universally sinful; that is to
say, as worthy of death, Eom. vii. 7; and whUst it begets a
knowledge of sin, Eom. iii. 20, at the same time effecting a more
active or passive satisfaction in good, Eom. vii. 22, it can
create a longing for redemption, and testify of its future realiz
ation, Eom. iii. 21 . But aU these operations do not include an
abrogation of a bias, or an expiation for sin, or the dehverance
of the wiU, but rather admit the possibility of the law becom
ing the occasioning cause of still more violent lusts, of still more
abundant transgression, and of still more arrogant opposition
and ungodliness.
^he omission in our Manual aUuded to by Dr Schmid of Tu
bingen, in his very valuable Programme de notione legis in Theo-

§ 108. SIN AND THE LAW. 225
logia Christianorum morali rite constituenda, 1882, p. 8, namely,
in regard to the relation between law and sin, has been hither
to, though only partially developed, included under the head of
" Degrees of Sin." We have, however, on the present occasion,
at his suggestion, brought the subject forward in a more promi
nent manner.
Remark 1. The apostle Paul carefully guards himself against
every kind of Gnostic separation of the law from the principle of
the spirit and love; and how much more so does he, against.the most
precise phUosophy of sin, or against the assertion of those, who,
whilst regardless of system, and prior to Carpocrates and Epi-
phanes, or the anti-tacticians, represented or taught the vbpog to be
the same as d/iugriu, Rom. vii. 7, and that law, limitation, dis
tinction and property, are the only, original, and operative causes
of sin ! According to this monstrous gnosis, sin could only be
expiated by sin, and thus become the way to righteousness and
freedom. According to Paul, the law developes sin, only in so far
as the former applies it to the conscience, and inasmuch as it
ever renders the existing internal conflict, which it is unable to
remove, more perceptible and decided. The law is weakened in
its operations upon what is good in the will through the flesh, and
since it cannot repair this defect either by curse, wrath, or threat,
it only stimulates the more the carnal disposition.
Remark 2. The law, considered as that which regulates and is
regulative of the Divine emancipation of the finite will, consists,
in reference to its mode of manifestation and operation, of many
and varied degrees of perfection. Whether written or personally
delivered, it may be reduced back to spirit and religious moral
ity; however mutable, it has an immutable basis; but under
whatever form of completeness, it ever claims human life for the
service of God, is ever opposed to carnal man, and carnal man to
it. Law and the flesh, however, are not perhaps less but more
opposed, according as the former, regarded in its pith and essence
(rd @agvrcgu rou vopou, Matt, xxiii. 23,) or even in its personal mani
festation, is valid. It may indeed be said, the more burdensome
the law the lighter it is, because in its highest degree it must be
approved by the internal man, and obtain the assent of the rea
sonable conscience ; and just as Jesus assures us, that his yoke is
easy, and John represents the commandments of the love of God
as not grievous, 1 John v. 3, even because these commands, as the
injunctions of love, are established at once, being free from all ar-
Q

226 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. I. OF SIN.
bitrariness or partial necessity. In like manner, it appears, (parti
cularly since an enfranchising power is imparted to the truth, John
viii. 32,) as if rational legislation, or even more developed and un
folded law, (for example, in the sermon on the mount,) should ob
tain a more ready obedience than any statutory, and, so to speak, ar
bitrary law. Therefore, a mere legal revelation might suffice for the
redemption, (or rather for the preservation) of humanity. Truly to
know the Divine and the good, is to venerate and love the same;
whoever sees God and the Redeemer, sinneth not, 1 John iii. 6, and
the reverse is true, 3 John 1 1 . But this entire view presupposes the
ideal man, the status integritatis, or man who is born again. The
physical or carnal man contends, in the performance of what is
easy, external, and even of what is supplemental or untrue,
against the truth, the depth, and the greatness contained in the
law. Compare Matth. xxiii. He does not recognise the law as
it ought to be recognised, if it is to be considered as exercising
an enfranchising power, or he does not desire to perceive it in
its entire truth. Hence, in so far as the Logos is only the nomos
(according to an ancient fragment,) or in so far as the Redeemer
is the living righteousness of the heavenly kingdom, the absolute
fulfilment of the law, the standard of man's life, — as such he is
as yet unable to redeem sinners from sin ; in this dignified cha
racter he will especially excite against himself sinners and sin,
call forth their dvnXoym, Heb. xii. 3, experience the replies of un
belief, Luke xviii. 8, and " for judgment" will have come into the
world, John iii. 19, ix. 39; and as those only who were always
enabled, in some honest fear of the Lord, to understand as much
of the law as they perceived, and did their best to fulfil the same,
and rendered themselves both objectively and subjectively tho
roughly intimate with the true legality of life, although under
many demerits and defects, it was only such who attained to a
more perfect knowledge of sin, and to a more humble aspira
tion after redemption. The example of Christ first operates in
a vitalizing manner, although it be more than this; even the Stoic
doctrine of rational autonomy, (granting that it does not serve for
a hypocritical pretext, as it does with those immoral saints men
tioned by Lucian,) is of a kind that renders the example easy,
and which strives against the more difficult one of theonomy.

§ 110. LUST AND PASSION. 227

§ 109. DEGREES OF SIN.
If human evU oppose Divine law, though in some degree it
be restrained by it, in that case evil will proportionably in
crease. Sin wUl ascend not only in degrees which lead from
desire to act, but wiU also advance in these gradations which
conduct from a state of blind delusion up to one of actual denial,
from a condition of imperfection up to vice, yea even from a
state of bondage to that of insensibility.

§ 110. LUST AND PASSION.
The excitations of propensity, or lusts, James i. 15, are aber
rations or perversions of that natural instinct which was direct
ed to the preservation and increase of hfe and activity. This per
version or aberration assaUs more or less every natural instinct,
and is as perceptible in timid aversions as in vain desires, as
much in animal as in devilish appetite. Lusts ascend to pas
sion and surpass themselves, not merely on account of an im
petuosity proportionate to temperament, but also when they have
attained an extraordinary ascendancy by reason of gratification.

§111. SLNS OF COMMISSION AND THEIR DEGREE OF
IMPUTATION.
If lust "which wars against the soul," 1 Peter ii. 11, be
already sin, Exodus xx. 17; Matt. v. 28, then must the act
be regarded as augmenting its degree, and this because between
the act and lust hes the whole difficulty of maintaining the evil
wUl in opposition to reason and conscience. Hence, the more
difficult it is, according to external and internal circumstances,
to conceive and retain a sinful resolution, so much the more is
the act neither error nor lapse, but a crime.

228 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. I. OF SIN.

§ 112. VICE.
The repetition of actual sin produces only a fault or an im
perfection, so long as sin does not reach to the extent of be
coming permanent maxim, sentiment, and character. Where
this occurs, vice, or actual blasphemy against God, predominates.
But wherever vice prevaUs, there, in mutual combination, reign
excess, selfishness, godlessness, and demoniacal wisdom.
Remark 1. The term excess is here to be understood in a wide
sense; in general, it is love of theworld, and " of the things that
are in the world," 1 John ii. 1 5, or a worldly disposition, Phil.
iii. 19. Its manifoldness in analogy with the three temptations di
rected against the Messiah, or according to 1 John ii. 1 6, consists
in disordered propensities for enjoyment, possession, distinction,
and power, or in sensuality, Luke xvi. 19; Phil. iii. 19, (whose
god is their belly,) covetousness, 1 Tim. vi. 9; Matt. vi. 24, (ser
vice of mammon,) and ambition, Matt. iv. 5, 6; or lust of power,
Matt. iv. 8. The internal resemblance between covetousness and
sensuality, is the reason why both vices are often conjointly re
proved, 1 Thess. iv. 3 — 7; 1 Cor. vi. 7 — 9. Since in each of these
vices some one particular earthly good, or earthly good in ge
neral, is the highest object aimed after, so vice, by intervening
worldly policy, furnishes, (though but a phantasm,) still a shadow
of wisdom, which allows all things to remain as they are, or tak
ing advantage of all things, makes a virtue of necessity, Luke xvi.
8, 9.
Remark 2. To a certain extent there is united with the excess
of each vice, the Cain-like evil of hatred and envy, or else that
evil egoism which injures and commits injustice on every side.
Vice is throughout dhixiu and dvo/iiu. In its relation to knowledge
it is partly folly, foolishness, Mark vii. 22, Rom. i. 28, partly de
vilish wisdom, James iii. 15. It is most simply characterized as
dg'efieiu, Rom. i. 18; and as godlessness may not amount to absolute
unbelief, so vice manifests itself also under the forms of supersti
tion and little faith.

§ 114. THE JUST AND THE UNJUST. 229

§ 113. DEGREES OF VICE.
The state of servitude, John viii. 34, Eomans vi. 16, &c.
in which the sinfully developed life is often interrupted by vigor
ous, although not victorious revolts of the conscience, is one
that is to be distinguished from that higher stage of vice where
the latter exhibits its strength, partly in shamelessness, and
partly in hypocrisy, and sometimes by reciprocating both. And
from thence again there is an approximation to that extreme de
gree of obduracy, where not only the Divine law of preservation,
and the feeling of fear and shame ever become more inopera
tive, but the influences of the law and Gospel also ever prove
more fruitless, and where the most immediate acts of enmity to
wards God (blasphemy against the Holy Ghost and sin unto
death,) are rendered more possible.
Remark. For examples of cowardly vice, comprehended in its
progress, we may refer to Ahab, 1 Kings xxi., and to Herod An-
tipas, Mark vi.; of shameless vice to Herodias and Jezebel; of
want of faith, to the Book of Wisdom, cap. ii.; for instances of
falsehood and hypocrisy, to Herod the Great and the Pharisees,
according to Matt, xxiii.; of security and fearlessness, Matt, xxvii.
25; and for a universal example of gradation of vice, to Judas
Iscariot.

§ 114. THE JUST AND THE UNJUST.
It partly arises from the distinction in the degrees of human
smfulness, partly from the gradation of the Divine economy of
grace, and especiaUy in the Divine preservation of the moral
nature, that after the faU the opposite of the just and unjust, of
the devout and godless occurs,1 concerning which not only
do the Scriptures everywhere afford immediate evidences, but
in the history of the descendants of Seth and Cain present a
primeval type. —--

230 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. I. OF SIN.
1 Certainly not in the sense in which Pelagius conceived it ne
cessary to regard Abel, Enoch, Noah, &c. as just, when he wrote,
according to Augustin, de Natura et Gratia, c. 36, 37, (cf. Pelag.
Ep. ad Demetriadem, ed. Semi. p. 22, sqq.) peccavit Eva, Scrip
tura hoc prodidit ; Adam quoque deliquit, eadem Scriptura non
tacuit. Sed et Cain peccasse ipsa aeque Scriptura testata est.'
Quorum non modo peccata, verum etiam peccatoram indicat qua-
litatem. Quodsi et Abel peccasset, et hoc sine dubio Scriptura
dixisset; sed non dixit, ergo nee ille peccavit, quia etiam justum
ostendit. — On which point he is without difficulty reduced by
Augustin ad absurdum. The most recent opposers of the
church doctrine of original sin, as well in respect to its exege-
tical as its dogmatical aspect, proceed far too rapidly when they
consider the doctrine and history of the Old Testament as con
troverting the notion of the innate sinfulness or corruption of
human nature. Were it the case that moral beauty in heathen
ism, what is noble in natural man, what is lovely in chUd-like
simplicity, and, above all, what is holy and pious in the leaders
and mediators of the old covenant, was only required to become
perceptible ; or were it the fact that any one demand of law up
on human will, or any admonition for the government of sin
directed to Adam's posterity, were already sufficient to contra
vene the doctrine of the corruption of human nature, in that
case, indeed, the fathers of the church, the Reformers, and Christ
ians of all times, with whom this doctrine passed current as most
plain and undeniable, could have read the Old Testament with
but little attention, and must have regarded life and history apart
from all sense of truth. In that case, the refutation of their
error would be so obvious, that nothing but depraved hearts or
dull heads could continue to retain it. For what avails the more
than Augustinian and Lutheran learning of the theologians
of the nineteenth century, if they are so acute as to per
ceive in human nature, as described in the Book of Job, in
the Psalms and Prophets, purity and capacity for true good,
and yet not perceive innate sinfulness? Or if they infer, when
God says to Cain, " thou shalt rule over sin," that, therefore,
Cain was by nature free from a sinful tendency ; that when God
said to Abraham, " walk before me, and be thou perfect," there
fore Abraham possessed in his own strength the power of being
so; or if they inferred, because Enoch "walked with God," that
therefore he was not born in sin. Such inferences, on the con-

§ 114. THE JUST AND THE UNJUST. 231
trary, rather exhibit doctrinal oversights which any ordinary
catechumen could easily correct; and how should the learned.
theologian of the nineteenth century, indeed, understand the Old
Testament, if he so vastly mistakes the New, as to consider the
exhortation to Christians who are born again of the Spirit, " let
not sin, therefore, reign in your mortal body," Rom. vi. 1 2, to be
a clear and inteUigible evidence against the doctrine of original
sin? The faults which Augustin commits in his exposition of the
Epistle to the Romans, for example, de spiritu et litera, are not
unknown to us ; but when compared with the doctrine alluded
to, such errors may be considered innocuous. Beyond a doubt,
every idea of upugriu, as laid down in Romans vii., must be re
jected, which neither, on its own account, admits of farther dete
rioration, nor an ameliorating reaction, nor a possible connect
ing point for Divine grace. But the church idea is very far
from depriving us of this possibility, if we will only conceive it,
not as has been done by the Council of Trent, merely from the
shreds and patches of reformed and symbolical representation,
but will comprehend it in its essence. The church has never
maintained a non-existence of rational and conscious activity,
(whilst admitting the universality of corruption,) or an inability
for a varied opposition to the commands of the moral law, or an
incapacity for directly receiving and proving those operations of
God which sustain and excite our moral nature. She has never
denied the opposite of virtue and vice among the heathen, far
less the contrast between unbelieving resistance and susceptible
acceptance in reference to revelation. Precisely as Paul's con
ception of the Adamic inclination which pervades unrenewed
man, did not prevent him from perceiving heathens who do the
works of the law (pugei, or patriarchs and saints of the Old Testa
ment who pleased God by their trust and obedience ; so has the
church, (in the region of the world and its prince, in that of the
Adamic development and preponderating power of the flesh) not
been hindered from recognising a good distinct from moral phe
nomena, and that proportionate good which she designates justitia
rationis, &c. These moral phenomena do not by any means can
cel the church's universal tenet. The church, indeed, attributes
to the righteous, under the Old Testament, the righteousness of
faith, that is to say, the course of life renewed by Divine grace,
and does so in conformity with Scripture. She concedes that the
philosophers of Greece (Augsburg Confession, 20,) have been.

232 PART II. OF THE BAD.  SECT. I. OF SIN.
most ardent in the pursuit of virtue, but nothing which an au
tonomic reaction against sin took from the flesh, nor what The-
mistocles, Aristides, Socrates, or whoever they may have been, or
whatever they did, is with her equivalent to the fruit of the Holy
Spirit in communion with a redeeming God. Virtue, which, in
its brightest manifestations is essentially Egoistic, which is des
titute of humility in love, which only arises from faith, she does
not on that account contemn; she does not place it on a par with
vice which springs from the same soil of natural humanity, but
sthl regarding it in its darker side, and not less so the holiness of
true Christians in their unsubdued defilement, (only viewing the
latter in another aspect,) she considers this virtue as the strongest
proof of innate sinfulness. If, however, the doctrine of the church
in any respect exceeds its polemical direction, in that case it
can be rectified only by its own spirit and under the supposition
of such a fundamental doctrine in Scripture; without which it
could not indeed be a testimony for redemption in Christ, and
could not be adjusted from the standing-point of Stoical and Pe
lagian philosophy. Now this will lead to a procedure such as we
find, for example, in Steudel's Glaubenslehre, or in his Treatise,
iiber Sunde und Gnade. Tub. Zeitschr. 1 832, with which Schulz's
treatise is designed to agree, both in sense and spirit.

§ 115. THE WORLD.
On the other hand, that which is merely relatively just proves
itself to be subject to deterioration and decay, and neither the
natural preservation and care which is shared by the good in
the domestic and civic state, in science and art, nor the especial
guidance of God in law and promise prevents vanity and false
hood from obtaining, to a vast extent, a preponderating domi
nion, and does not hinder humanity from becoming, what, in
an objectionable sense, is called the world, yet not without a
reservation of a certain noble part.
Remark. The bad in humanity may be contemplated in a
threefold mode, and revelation also is distinguished from other
religious systems of the ancient world by its adhering to no
particular mode, but each one teaching and duly conditionat-

§ 115. THE WORLD. 233
ing the other through the doctrine of the good and of salva
tion. According to one mode, the bad may be regarded as an
endowment and an inheritance of human nature, as an inevita
ble consequence of the personality of a sensuous being, leaving
behind much that is good or perchance (especially in later times)
but little. Here the bad, for the most part, appears as weak
ness, as limitation, as the not-yet-being of the good, and whilst
this view (upon the whole the Grecian one) endeavours to main
tain itself, partly by a diminishing and palliating representation
of actual evU, and sometimes by contending against sensuality and
, by exciting to the use of reason, it is by a Scriptural recognition
of Adamic evil, on the one hand confirmed and on the other
confuted. According to the other mode of viewing the subject,
good and bad men are distinguished according as they have be
come such, either by means of an original moral difference of
race, or through the decision of free-will. In the one case,
the existence of Adamic evil, in the other, Divine origination and
a capacity for communion with God is entirely overlooked or
denied. What is necessary and true in these doctrines of a Zo
roaster or Manes, (which are strengthened more or less by the
renovation of the one or extinction of the other), is confirmed in
Holy Scripture by what is indicated concerning Cainitic evil,
1 John iii. 8, 12-15; John viii. 44. Compare Augustin, de Civ-
Dei, xv. 8. The untrue spontaneously separates itself, partly by
a reference to Adamic evil, partly by a regard to the constituted
economy of salvation. Finally, a third view especially directs
itself to a consideration of social evil in so far as it is not an
original state of nature, but an acquired one of the world. There
is, according to a mode of expression in the Nazarine Codex and
other oriental doctrines, various states of life, that is, periods of
human existence, each worse than the other; and where this
doctrine concurs with the Mosaic records, as it does in the spu
rious writings of Clement, (Cotel. p. 676), and elsewhere, the
commencement of evil civilization is regarded as contemporaneous
with the descent of angels, (sons of God, Genesis vi.), to the
daughters of men, which evil state reached its highest point in
heathenism. Unquestionably Genesis vi. contains a peculiar
hamartigeny (S. 4, Esr. 3, 10, Et factum est in unoquoque eorum
— namely, of those sinners who perished in the flood — sicut Adae
mori sic his diluvium), perhaps the limitation of a new develop
ment of evil in humanity, by means of which the contrast, hith-

234 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. I. OF SIN.
erto maintained between the better and worse part of man, tended
to the disadvantage of the former, and this on the occurrence of
sensuous excitement; and now the whole race, as a type of all suc
ceeding ages, became incapable of corresponding to the design of
God laid down for man. Compare Augustin de Civ. D. 15, 22,
23, — facta est permixtio (Sethitarum cum filiabus Cain) et ini-
quitate participata quaedam utriusque confusio civitatis, — and the
view entertained by Epiphanius of the descendants of Seth. That
view, also, is a correct one, which, from every form of civUization
resting upon the mere excitation and co-operation of the natural
powers of the Adamic race, expects, upon the whole, an intenser
degree of deterioration rather than an amelioration. Civilization
can only refine egoism, but cannot eradicate it. StiU it is by no
means the distinguishing principle of world-sin; and the world
lying in wickedness, concerning which John speaks, would not
even be such, if its evil course did not find a constant suscepti
bility in the breast of man. In short, even this view of the bad
regarded in its social and civil aspect, required those closer deter
minations which it receives from the Divine word.

§ 116. PRINCE OF THIS WORLD.
The history of the human race, from its commencement,
presents to our observation an incomprehensible transition from
good to bad, from bad to worse; together with the recognition
of these evil wonders, there arises, by degrees, in those who
view things according to the word of God and through the
medium of revelation, the idea of a being who has faUen
from his creator — God, and who, according to his natural
relations, ranks higher than humanity, and who is related
to aU human sin as its primeval and seductive originator,
1 John hi. 8, John viii. 44; to aU the ancient and modern
developments of the people of God, as an adversary,1 an
envier, an accuser, and a tempter. Gen. hi., compare Eev.
xii. 9: (o Ipuxoid 6 pbyug) Matt. iv. 1, xiii. 39, John xiv. 30;
who stands in relation to the Eedeemer as a conquered enemy,
John xii. 31, Eev. xii. 9; and to the redeemed as an enemy
absolutely vincible and condemned, 1 Peter v. 8, 9, James iv.

§ 116. PRINCE OF THIS WORLD. 235
7; who nevertheless continues to rage and to persecute upon
earth, Eev. ii. 10, iii. 9, and is finally related to universal
heathenism and the world, as weU as to apostate Judaism,
as a patron, prince, and father, John vih. 44, xiv. 30 (apyjuv
rov Koopov) Ephes. ii. 2, vi. 11, 12, who, together with all that
is anti-christian shall be annihUated or dehvered up to eternal
punishment, Eev. xx. 10. Although this view, in our present
stage of knowledge,2 is incomplete, and has not been fuUy
brought out, even in Scripture,3 still, it appears to us, from the
independence and energy with which Christ and the apostles
make use of it, to be one that is necessary, in assisting us, partly
on the one hand, to exclude the bad from having a divine origi
nation and endless duration, and on the other hand firmly to fix
our attention on the central point of its objective existence, as
distinguished from that which is natural and sensuous; and
farther, this view enables us to estimate aU those sinful excita
tions, acts, and tendencies necessarily conspiring to one and
the same anti-christianism, and at the same time assists us
manfuUy to contend against it in its decided weakness.
1 This embodies the fundamental idea of Satan. Even the
Egyptian devU (Typhon) is designated by names signifying one
who hinders, a violator, &c. According to Manetho, Typhon is
Bebaion, Bebon, also Seth. The first name, according to Plutarch
(de Is. et Osir. § 47), should be considered equivalent to xd§e%ig,
xuXugig; the latter the same author translates rb xurafiiutyfievov, ro
xuruhuvugreuov. Compare Acts of the Apostles X. 38, mdvrug roug xuru-
huvugreuopivoug urno rou hiuj3bXou. Perhaps this bad Seth is related to
the Hebrew 1QJ> ruler, idol, *lC5» violence, TJ0 corrupted.
2 Knowledge of the good always commences from above, and
necessarily proceeds from the absolute good. The bad is not
a condition of the good, is neither finite nor created, contin
gent nor necessary. But, however these different cases may be
settled, still, as Clemens remarks in his 19th Homily, the ques
tion must necessarily turn upon movrigog, — elmeTv ydg uurbv ij.fi eivui oi
hwdpe^u. The bad is an experience and cognition. Hence our
knowledge of it must necessarily commence with relative and
subjective evil. Hence it follows, that we can only conceive ab-

236 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. I. OF SIN.
solute evil in its essence under the supposition of its deficiency
either in absolute malignity or true existence. Here the remark
of Thomas Aquinas applies, S. Th. part i. qu. 49, art. 7, patet,
non esse unum primum principium malorum sicut est unum pri-
mum principium bonorum ; primo, quia primum principium bo-
norum est per essentiam bonum, nihil autem potest esse per
suam essentiam malum. Sic (in ente) semper remanente bono
non potest esse aliquid integre et perfecte malum. The biblical,
and especially the practical representation loses nothing by
this. It is enough that there is a deceiver and adversary,
who, in comparison with bad men, is the absolutely bad, and
whose temporal and perishable dominion we, by our sins, main
tain and strengthen. Philosophy, indeed, is as unable to explain
the reality of Satan as the reality of man's fall. Those who
conceive the bad as an element in the development of the good,
may even place the highest development of the bad under that of
the kingdom of God, and in this way obtain a construction of Satan
or of evil beyond man, and external to him. God can alone reveal
himself by subduing the most absolute contrast between His holy
power and love, which might even extend to a conversion of the
devil ; but upon that point Scripture is silent. Whatever popu
lar and illustrative philosophy adduces against the idea of Satan,
whether it refer to the impossibility of an evil will existing, in so
high an intelligence, or to the inadmissibility of such a power and
agency in the region of Divine providence and sovereignty, all is
already decided, partly by the analogy of bad, corrupt men, who,
in their kind, are subject to the internal dominion of the prince
of this world, and which government is, nolens volens, subject to
God, and who in their way also combine spiritual folly with pe
netrating sagacity; and is partly decided by a more correct ap
prehension of the biblical doctrine of Angels.
3 It is precisely those passages which record a superhuman
fall, 2 Pet. ii. 4, Jude 6, that deviate from Satan's history, and
moreover are only found in the subordinate writings of the
canon. But whether the early appearance of Satan in the ser
vice of the Lord, or among the angels or the sons of God, denote
a later change in his relation to Deity, or a mere development
of his representation, is not decided, at least by the only positive
assertions that he continues not in the truth, and was a liar a
murderer, and a sinner from the beginning. In the remark of
Baumgarten-Crusius, Bib. Theol. § 40, " It is impossible to ex-

§ 117. SIN AND DEATH. 237
hibit, from the New Testament, a settled and complete view, or
even to lay down a doctrinal system on this subject: for even, in
accordance with the New Testament, we are not authorised to
treat the matter otherwise than as a form of doctrine, or as an
image derived from the time and people," — we concur only in his
first, but not in his second position.

SECTION THE SECOND.
OF DEATH.
§ 117. SIN AND DEATH.
The fruit and wages of sin is death, Eom. vi. 23, James i.
15, and only by sin has death entered into the world, Eom. v.
12. Now, although in this sequence of death upon sin the
separation of the soul from the body, once for all, is what must
chiefly be understood therein, stiU death, in its connection with
the above tenet, and in accordance with the indisputable lan
guage of Scripture, has a much more extensive signification.
It comprehends the entire fulness of corruption,1 which may or
must be suffered by a sinful, sensuous, and rational being, ac
cording to a Divine decree. It comprehends not only death,
but also aU that is mortal and perishable, whose occasioning
cause is sin, Ps. xc. 7; and not only the last judgments, in
which the world passes away from the sinner, but also every
banishment from hfe in the other world; yea, not only external
evil, which is to be endured in connection with the whole world,
but also that internal condemnation and moral restraint of hfe,
by means of which every lapse into sin is one unto death, and
every advance into sin becomes a new death. There are, as
Augustin says, many kinds of death,2 all of which causatively
depend on sin. Hence death, in general, is the positive ex
pression of evU which is consequent upon the bad; but this
either in such a way that even death, as the limitation of sin,

238 PART II. OF THE BAD.— SECT. II. OF DEATH.
or as a just punishment from God, — who separates sin and life,
— has a good cause; or, inasmuch as Christ died, and the
death of believers is a sleep, and their repentance a death unto
life and the resurrection, it does not proceed from its causative
relation to sin, and continues to be the last enemy of man,
1 Cor. xv. 26; a ban of servitude, under which the devil holds
men as sinners, Heb. ii. 14, and which can only be entirely
removed by a perfect cessation of sin.
1 It is impossible that the Divine threat of death, Genesis ii.
1 7, iii. 3, can be absolutely identical in its import with the sen
tence, " unto dust shalt thou return," iii. 19, — but the serpent is
correct in the sense of asserting that those who enjoy do not im
mediately die, but become, in a corporal sense, mortal ; but the
serpent lies in reference to the Divine threat, for sinners are
actually on the road to death and destruction from that moment,
and a separation takes place between them and life. Although
corporal death, especially when sudden, is the climax of temporal
punishment, and is of all tokens the most admonitory, yet it in
dicates something beyond itself in the language of Revelation.
Romans vii. 10, "and I died; and the commandment which was
ordained to life, I found to be unto death." Ephesians ii. 1,
" And you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and
sins." 2 De civ. Dei xiii. 12, and with reference to the expression
" thou shalt surely die," in the Divine threat, see Philo. Allegg.
lib. 1. fin., hriXuv ou' rbv xoivbv, dXXd rbv dthiov xul xur' i^oxnv^dvurov, '6g lor
-vj/u^jjs ivm/ifim/time mu^egi xal xuxiuig umdguig; and although this ex
planation turns in a one-sided manner upon the moral view, ac
cording to Philo's mode, yet with more point Athanasius takes
the same view, De incarn. ed. Patav. tom. i. p. i. p. 40, rb he Sa-
vdru umo§uvhg§e ri fa uXXo elr) 5) ou pbvov dmoSvygxeiv, dXXd xul iv rji rou
Suvdrou pogoi hiupiveiv. And cap. V. 0/ he dv^gumoi—eig ru rSjs (fiogug
emigrguipivreg. x. X.

§ 118. GUILT AND CONDEMNATION.
The next fruit of sin, or the most immediate reaction of
violated law upon him who violates it, is guUt, or the conscious

| 118. GUILT AND CONDEMNATION. 239
imprisonment of1 our hfe under a law which demands satisfac
tion, Eomans vii. .10, v. 16. Doubtless, guilt, considered as
the first among the effects of Divine justice, (aU of which are
related to the separation of the good from the bad, and the re-
separation of sin from hfe), is not of evU, but the more it is felt
to be free, is even good, and the commencement of godly sor
row, 2 Cor. vii. 10, of repentance and conversion, Luke xv. 21,
xviii. 13. Even shame and dread, feelings which seized the
first sinners, Genesis hi. 7, 8, were to be regarded as the
counteractions of the Divine image against sin, and as the na
tural intimations of a capacity for redemption.2 But as an
anticipative and merely natural and necessary repentance,
Divine accusation, which is felt, is, at the same time, a passive
enmity of the heart against God, and must, unless eradicated,
draw after it new sins on the one hand, Genesis iv. 5-7; Matt.
xxvi. 25, and despair on the other, Genesis iv. 13; Matthew
xxvii. 3-5. Now there are, as prefigured in the immediate
consequences of Adam's and Cain's sin, various degrees of evil
consciousnese, but, in a certain measure, all men, according as
they partake of the miiversal life of sin, are the chUdren of
wrath, Ephes. ii. 3, and are accounted unrighteous before God,
Eomans v. 19. 3
1 This idea, together with its representation, is expressed by
the term, hoxog, Matthew v. 22; James ii. 10, and umbhixog rOi %eu,
Rom. iii. 19. Differently is debitum, ugrigripu, bpeiXyfiu as Culpa.
The former only expresses an action not yet completed, an ob
hgation as yet good and pure; the latter, on the other hand, a
perverted evil obligation arising out of violated duty. Still the
first representation passes into the other, just as conscious sins of
omission are sins, James iv. 17.
2 Ackermann, Das Christliche im Plato, &c. p. 247, "It is
precisely upon his feelings of guilt that his only hope and the
possibility of his restoration depends," &c.
3 The connection between the guilty evil and other kinds of
evU, and between the entire corruption of man, is evidenced by
this, that the wicked adversary, (Zechariah iii. 1), as expressed
in the names Satan, hidfioXog, dvnxei[ievog, xurfiyogog, unites the cha
racter of an accuser with the disposition of a seducer and tempter.

240 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. II. OF DEATH.

§ 119. PUNISHMENT AND JUSTICE.
The internal penal condition of the sinner and sinful world is,
by the wiU of God, confirmed and maintained by an external
one, Gen. hi. 16-19; iv. 11, 12; vi. 13. For together with
this threefold development of sin, as recorded in primitive his
tory, there is also unfolded, in a threefold manner, the penal
justice of God, and this by particular and characteristic marks.
But the measure of suffering must never be taken as a stand
ard for estimating personal guUt or innocence, John ix. 1-3;
Luke xiii. 1-5 . With reference to their occasion through sin,
and as ordained testimonies against sin, all temporal afflictions
are Divine punishments ; but with respect to their ultimate aim
for exciting a higher life, and for kindling aversion to sin and
worldly-mindedness, and for inciting revolt against sin, they
become benefits of Divine probation and chastisement, Psalm
xxxiv. 19-22, 2 Cor. xii. 7, Heb. xii. 5-12, Eev. hi. 19, and
bring with them especial opportunities and occasions for mani
festing the word of God in Christ, John ix. 3.

§ 120. SIN AS PUNISHMENT.
If God, on the other hand, effects such a connexion of the
internal and external life as leads to reactions of conscience after
the faU of man took place, and which are sustained by external
institutes for judicial inquiry and punishment, but, at the same
time, admits a proportional incapacity to return to a higher
stage of hfe, and begets a natural incitation to continue in
the sinful one, then it follows that each succeeding sin im
mediately becomes a punishment to its predecessor. For a
striving after absolute self, and for agreement with self, is in
nate in the rational creature ; whereby he enters into the direct
consequence and self-maintenance of sin. By virtue of a Di-
viue law man is compelled to retract sin either by regret, re-

§ 121. DEATH. 241
pentance, and conversion, from its very beginning and principle,
or else to persevere in its course for his own punishment. The
state of servitude in sin, John viii. 34, that of insensibility for
good, Ephes. ii. 1, 5, of spiritual blindness, Ephes. iv. 18,
Eomans i. 24, 28, and of spiritual incapacity for comprehending
the word of God, Mark iv. 12, Acts of the Apostles xxviii. 26,
John viii. 43, 47, is in an especial manner to be regarded as
punishment. Remark. By no kind of Divine punishment, temporarily in
flicted, is the sinner excluded from the reach of the grace and
mercy of God. For the same wisdom and love of God, which
chastises by the punishment of conscience, and by afflictions,
constrains man, whilst allowing sin to follow upon sin, to com
plete conversion, and whilst impeding a false, or half, ill-timed
conversion, Mark iv. 1 2, stiU more necessitates him to a true one.

§ 121 . DEATH.
Although the existence of the soid and its life with the body
is not. one and the same in the original and pure state of man,
stUl that which is necessary, violent, uncertain, and painful in
its becoming entirely unclothed, once for all, (2 Cor. v. 3, 4,)
together with aU the evUs of disease and age, transitoriness and
the burden of time, Psalm xc, must be regarded as a mark of
a natural state of punishment, Genesis hi. 19,1) in which we
have been placed on account of sin, though, at the same time,
with a distinct regard to our salvation.2
1 In a general sense, the body is the medium for the self-de
veloping life of the spiritual soul, and, in this point of view, is
not a hindering, encumbering, and restraining, but an innate, and
consequently a permanent exigency. Hence the ancient Jewish
phUosophical notion concerning the longing of souls for their ves
ture, a longing not to be explained, according to Plato, as if it were
a decadence and sensuality, or as a punishment, but as a love for
developing consciousness in existence and action ; and hence the
philosophic idea of unhappy and impure spirits, who, by reason of
R

242 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. II. OF DEATH.
their nakedness, have become restless and impassioned, and strug
gle after embodiment and individuality. On the other hand, the
second view, viz. that the body is the just encumbrance of the
spirit, can only be admitted in so far as the soul, by the abuse of
its spirituality, and its own sensual perceptions, is imprisoned in
sin, 2 Cor. V. 4, ovreg h ru gxrivei grevdtyftev Pugobftevoi. But even m
this state we long, as the apostle immediately adds, rather " to
be clothed upon," than to be unclothed; so that unclothing death
is of eviL There was neither fidgog nor " unclothing" for origi
nal man, although he was of the earth. Hence we may assume,
however it may be, that corporeality, which in itself is perishable,
graduaUy or by paroxysms, as it has been said, shaU be glorified
and perfected. The death to which Adam was subjected, must at
all events have been of a different kind, or the mortality of which
he partook must at least have been different from that death to
which he was condemned by Divine judgment. From the words
of Paul, 'ivu xurumo%r\ rb 'itvrirbv umb rrjg Zur\g, we look to a promised
change or transformation of man's original earthly condition, since
it is declared "unto dust shalt thou return." The author of Apost.
Oonstit. does not therefore directly contradict himself, when he
says, on the one hand, (pugixfi fi/ev ignv ri rqg £<wSjg bhbg, emeiguxrog he jj
rou 'huvdroug, 7, 1, and likewise 7, 18, bhbg Suvurou emeiguyuyfi ruv movrr
geav, and, on the other, that there are diverse lands of death, a xurd
yvoj/^riv SsoD, an lg imifiouXqg dXXorgiou. In the primeval world, says
the Book of Wisdom i. 1 3, ii. 23, death was only possible, " for God
made not death;" through the envy of the devU death became an
objective power and entered into the world. Original principles
in themselves are free from mortality-— gurr,gioi ui yevigeig. It is
only sinners who have, as it were, invited, incited, and impor
tuned death. However dark these doctrines are, stUl it is certain
that the question does not merely concern spiritual death, but
turns on the bias of evil for non-being, and the desire to frus
trate and violate all existence, and thus relates to the introduc
tion of corporeal death. Against these modern expositors of the
New Testament, who concede (only in its subjective relation,)
that death, which was ordained and natural in the primeval
world, is unnatural, and as such is a punishment for sin and its
consequences, Krabb defends, and we believe correctly, its objec
tive bearing. See his Doctrine of Sin and Death, Hamb. 1836,
pp. 195-203.
2 As a dissolution (dvuXvgig, 2 Tim. iv. 6,) of the entirely tem-

§ 122. DESTRUCTION OF THE SOUL. 243
poral and penal state, and as the termination of sinful develop
ment in this world, death itself may be regarded as a beneficial
deliverance, Rom. vi. 7, and if viewed as a passage to judgment,
Heb. ix. 27, how much more is it a benefit in another point of
view, Phil. i. 21; nevertheless the dead are doubtless the blessed,
and death, in short, a justifying and sanctifying deliverer, and is,
on the one hand, rather the medium of a crisis and of chastise
ment, of a consummation and redemption ; and, on the other, an
evil from which man shaU be delivered, John vi. 47, 51; viii. 51.

§ 122. DESTRUCTION OF THE SOUL.
But if the soul, being dependent on its Creator, does not
possess absolute immortality, 1 Tim. vi. 16, compare Ecclesias.
xii. 7, this at least is certain, that it has been created and con
stituted to participate in eternal life, and ff it must lose its true
self-life in proportion as it is deserted by truth, love, and bless
edness, it foUows that as sin increases, the soul faces destruction
in heU or its death; Matt. x. 28; Eev. xx. 15.

§ 123. CONCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF DEATH.
Combined with the consciousness of salvation in Christ, there
is, at the same time, a weU-grounded assumption that the whole
national and earthly hfe of man, without the preserving salt
which is imparted to it by Christianity, would be in a state of
continual dissolution, and under the dominion of the devU, and
entirely resigned to the power of death.1
1 According to Hebrews ii. 14, death is the power of the devU,
not merely in so far as he kUls by means of seduction, but also in
asmuch as he imprisons in sin, through the fear of death, those sin
ners who already deserve it. Otherwise I am unable to inter
pret the sentence evoxov elvui houXelug, words, which, as Bleek has
shown, have a connective relation. According to Romans v. 14,
17, death reigns over the race of Adam on account of sin. But

244 PART II. OF THE BAD. — SECT. II. OF DEATH.
since dying is not free but of necessity, and under which, those
even are comprehended who are no longer living under the domi
nion of the prince of this world and of sin, so death is an independ- .
ent power, a last enemy, 1 Cor. xv. 26, 55, and one with Hades,-
or if distinct, yet will be, immediately after the devil, (Rev. xx.
10,) cast into the second death, or lake of fire, (verse 14.) A re
lation which is mythologically represented in the so-caUed gospel
of Nicodemus.

PART THE THIRD.

OF SALVATION.
§ 124. CAUSE.
The original cause of our salvation1 in Christ, is not Jesus of
Nazareth, in his human manifestation and ministry, but the
eternal phUanthropy of God, John iii. 16, 1 John iv. 9, Titus
hi. 4, which sent the Only Begotten, and hath given him up and
" made us accepted in the Beloved," Ephes. i. 4, 6. God is
Saviour, Tit. hi. 4. And, again, the Divine good-wiU toward
men, Luke h. 14, is realized through that which is repeatedly
expressed concerning the revealed Christ, Matt. hi. 17; for
neither the totality of sinful men, nor Abraham, nor David,
who proved a blessing to the typical people, Isaiah lv. 3, nor
human works and merits in general, Titus hi. 5, have so pleas
ed God as to redeem the world.
1 2w«j»/a gdZfiv, xirgugig, and dmoXurgugig, it is true, sometimes
especiaUy signify a full and final redemption of certain godly
members, as well as the whole people, 1 Cor. i. 30, Ephes. i. 14,
2 Tim. iv. 18, or they especially signify redemption from the guilt
of sin, Heb. ix. 12, Ephes. i. 7, or in other passages, as in Acts
iv. 12, Luke ii. 38, Heb. ii. 10, they signify generally a Divine
liberation of the chosen people from their unsuitable condition,
or their elevation into that state whereunto they were called;
and the idea of a miraculous Divine act exceeding all expecta
tion and understanding, (1 Cor. ii. 9,) so entirely belongs to that
of redemption, that the Septuagint at once translates nUTrtl)

246 PART III. OF SALVATION.
Jeremiah xxxi. 22, gurrigiu. The words %dgig, hghni t,m, diuviog,
all apply either to a certain part of salvation, or to the whole.

§ 125. COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION.
Bedemption does not commence with the appearance of Jesus
upon earth, or with the fulfilment of prophecies which point to
the personal Eedeemer, inasmuch as the entire Divine pre-ad-
ministration and preservation of the world must have been per
fectly conformable to the everlasting decree of salvation " be
fore the world," 1 Cor. ii. 7, Ephes. i. 4; iii. 9, 11. For
even the manner in which God punished the first sin, Genesis
hi., besides the law of preservation, and the decree of Divine
forbearance, Genesis vih. 21, 22, together with the founding of
civil hfe (cap. ix.); but particularly the caUingof Abraham, up
on his faith, and the fomiding a promise, Eomans iv., Gal. hi.
16, the separation of Israel by a legal pedagogy, Gal. iii. 23,
Eomans vii. 4, the overlooking and tolerance of sin, Eomans
iii. 25, the manifold address of God to the fathers by the pro
phets, Heb. i. 1; the scattering of the Jews among the heathen,
and the preservation of the mother country under various dy
nasties, up to the period of John's testimony; the birth and
finished work of the Lord, and up to the founding of the first
Christian community, aU are facts of a preparative redemp
tion, and effects of a Divine decree of salvation. But this de
cree was first fuUy reahzed in the world when the Son of God
came, Gal. iv. 4; was perfected by his death and resurrection;
and was manifested through the Holy Spirit, in the hearts of
the first behevers for the formmg of a church. This state of
things, however, only indicates the founding of salvation, and
many of its developments, but leaves the Christian still to hope
for Christ.1
1 Accordingly, the exposition of the Christian scheme of salva-
vation consists in the four following doctrines, namely, The
founding salvation upon the person of Christ; The appropriation

§ 126. THE MESSIAH. 247
of salvation through the grace of the Holy Spirit ; fellowship in
salvation; and finally, the completion of the same.

SECTION THE FIEST.
SALVATION FOUNDED ON THE PERSON OP THE
EEDEEMER.
§ 126. THE MESSIAH.
Jesus is the Christ, 1 John ii. 22, Jesus of Nazareth; born
of Mary, in the city of David, Luke ii. 11; who came out of
Gahlee unto Jordan, and of whom John the Baptist bore wit
ness, John i. 6, 19; "who went about doing good," and
preaching peace; who was anointed by God with the Holy
Ghost and with power, Acts x. 38; crucified under Pontius
PUate, and raised again the third day; seen after his resurrection
forty days, Acts i. 3, 1 Cor. xv. 6, " of those who had been with
him," and, after his visible removal from the earth, was pubhcly
proclaimed at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost ; this Jesus is
the veritable descendant of David,1 the Son of God manifested in
the flesh; the holy servant of God, Acts iii. 13, iv. 27, 30; the
Saviour (ffaiTTjp, Luke ii. 11); the Messiah, or Christ and Lord,
Acts ii. 36, of whom aU the prophets bear witness; who did not
come for the carnal dehverance of Israel according to the flesh,
but, according to prophecy, for the gathering together of the
spiritual Israel, and for the redemption of the world,
1 Romans i. 3, rou yevo/tivou ix gmigyjurog Auuih, xurd gdgxu x. X. an
apostolical passage which has been totally disregarded by
Strauss, in his Leben Jesu Krit. Bearb., i. p. 126, and cannot be
forthwith dismissed with the remark, p. 128. — Son of David is
equivalent to Messiah ; compare 2 Tim. ii. 8.

248 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.

§ 127. SUBMISSION AND SELF-ABASEMENT.
This true Christ came into the world by virtue of a Divine sub
mission of the Son of God, conjointly with that of a self-renun
ciation and self-abasement, John iii. 16; PhiMi. 6;1 Gal. iv. 4;
2 Cor. viii. 9. But not after the manner in which every human
appearance upon earth is related to primitive human nature as an
abasement; but God gave his only begotten Son, or his own
Son, as a reconciling manifestation of humanity in union with
Divinity. For since He came, not to judge but to reeoncUe, it
behoved him to come deprived of the majesty which he had with
the Father, John xvii. 5, and which was his own ; or he was
bound to appear in no other condition than in one of servitude,
and to manifest his glory in a human, legal, and siiffering state
of obedience, and to be glorified by the Father. Hence the
abasement of the Son of God is not a merely moral one, but is,
at the same time, conditional, and included in his incarnation ;
and this in such a way, that in the moral act of his obedience,
even unto his death on the cross, that same free act of mercy is
ever humanly repeated ; through which obedience he was espe
cially, in a divine manner, offered up.
1 For a good exposition of this passage by Stein, see Theoll.
Stud, und Krit. 1837, p. 1 27. iv pogprj §eou umdgxuv may be farther
elucidated by mXougwg 'uv, 2 Cor. viii. 9, and euurov ixevuge, pogpfiv houXou
Xafiuv by imruxlvei- There is in the life of the Redeemer no com
mencing point for a morally free renunciation of the uncon
ditional enjoyment and use of his glory, which was not the com
mencement of his existence in the actual form of a servant;
consequently, upon the whole, the doctrine of the New Testament
will be found to indicate that the incarnation is included in the
condition of self-abasement. If we desire, however, to mark the
distinct stages of this humiliation, (perhaps upon the grounds of
Phil, ii.), they may be stated as follows: 1st, His entrance into
the gug% ufhugriug united with the possibility of his glory being mis
taken; 2d, His being reckoned among the transgressors, Luke
xxii. 37.

§ 128. HUMANITY. 249

§ 128. HUMANITY.
MeanwhUe, if Christ has, on the one hand, not humbled
himself for the Ulusion of his glory, but rather for manifesta
tion, yet for a saving revelation of the same, then, on the other
hand, his human existence itself is neither an Ulusion nor a mere
semblance (1 John iv. 1-3, 2 John 7), but veritable human i
nature. True, in reference to his corporeality, because he was (
born and died,1 hungered and thirsted, suffered want and pain;2
not less true in regard to spirit and mind, for he increased in
wisdom, and was subject to the alternations of pleasure and dis
pleasure, joy and grief; was tempted, Heb. iv. 15; Matth. iv.
I;3 struggled, and became obedient, Heb. v.k8; PhU. ii. Z-8;
Luke xxii. 44. It behoved him to become man in order to be
Mediator, 1 Tim. ii. 5, and ransom man from death, Heb. ii.
14, 17, because aU the redeeming acts upon which salvation
was to be grounded, depended upon his participating in human
nature ; and because the condition of salvation in the redeemed
themselves could only be a brotherhood with the first born, and
must consist in being conformed to his image, Eom. vih. 29.
1 The expression yeueg%ui %uvdrou, Heb. ii. 9, does not, probably,
relate to any view that impairs the truth of Christ's death, but
is to be taken (as in Mark ix. 1) as meiguv XufieTv ^uvdrou, or simply
for "$uve?v. In like manner, umvugug, found in the SibyUine oracles,
cannot be considered as expressing merely apparent death.
2 Differing on this point, like others, and confounding the sin
ful mdSiog with pure natural instinct and necessities, Clemens of
Alex, remarks, Strom, vi. p. 276, etpuye ydg ou hid rb gu/iu, huvd/iei
gvvev6p.evov uyiu' dXX' dig (tri roug guvbvrug &XXug meg) uurou tpgovetv umeigiXSoi'
ugmeg dpeXei ugregov hoxrjgei riveg ourbv me<puvlgufoui umeXufioV ourbg he
dmaj-umXug dmu'hrig riv, eig ov obhev mugeighuerui xivriibu mu%r\rixbv, oure rihovfi
oure Xumn x.x. It appears also that the opinion entertained by Daub,
(Jud. Isch. ii.) on the relation of the idea of duty to Christ and
to love, in his excellent treatise, Gesetz mid Evangelium, does not
entirely accord with the biblical doctrine of the bmuxori of Christ.
3 The historical foundation of the evangelical narrative of the

250 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
temptation of Jesus becomes so much the more secure, when we
compare the relation of the summary sketch given by Mark i.
13, with the developed one contained in the two other synoptical
gospels. The same Spirit which John saw descend upon Jesus,
led him into the wilderness, that he might be tempted of the
devil. (On the Spirit, in this point of view, see § 131.) The
consciousness of being the Redeemer, the promised one, has, up
to this point, attained its full development ; and now, with refe
rence to the precise mode of Messianic action and suffering, his
consciousness must be more fuUy determinated. His desire for
glory, for unencumbered deliverance and happiness, for his ma
nifestation to all people, and to be acknowledged as without of
fence, is just as possible and actual in him, as his aversion to the
opposite. Earthly Messianic dignity was not, therefore, in all
who cherished it, a carnal and secular one. StUl less was there
in the representation of Christ aught that was untrue or sinful;
but into every element of its realization he saw the prince of this
world enter, and in each element of that desire and this aversion
he perceived how the flesh, the world, and Satan threatened to
intermingle. Here this susceptive life ever shut itself against,
and separated itself from, evil and false divinity. The incompen-
sable distinction between the spiritual, the carnal, and secular
course of the Messiah, entered into his consciousness, and his
humiliating, lingering, unparaUeled Divine way of suffering dis
closed itself. In no other mode could the Redeemer be tempted ;
and in this way he must needs be tempted. The human finite
consciousness of which he thus partook had its echoes, Luke
xii. 50, John xii. 27; but they did not destroy the assurance
which certified to that consciousness (John xiv. 30) that the
coming Prince of this world " had nothing in him."

§ 129. WITHOUT SIN.
As the human condition was ordained upon sin entering into
the world, so, for the same reason, the Son of God partook
of the human condition, (Eomans vih. 3, ev o^oiai^art auexog
apugriug).1 But this feUowship with humanity suffering on
account of sin, was in him purely one of suffering, never one of
sin. He had no spontaneous experience of sin, 2 Cor. v. 21,

§ 129. WITHOUT SIN. 251
nor was he ever under the bias of sin, 1 John ii. 5; and al
though in suffering he surpassed aU men, yet with more perfect
truth than the prophet or than Zion, he sUently appropriates
the reality of the Lamentation (i. 12); and although he was, as
far as possible, enticed in every way to participate in feUowship
with world- sin, yet did he, on the one hand, for the first and
only time in history, most perfectly satisfy aU the moral claims
on humanity which God ever raised either by the gift of reason
or by his Word; and, on the other hand, for the first time,
confirmed them ; whUst he was a living and pure model of that
conduct which is pleasing to God, 1 Pet. ii. 21, and developed
himself, "yet without sin,"2 Heb. iv. 15, inasmuch as he was
born without any evU propensity.3
1 These passages, as weU as others, 2 Cor. v. 21, dpugriuv
imoirjge Gal. in. 13, yevb/ievog — xurdgu Heb. iv. 15, gu//.mu^7Jgui
ruTg u&tveiutg compare v. 2, 7, vii. 27, ix. 28, ix heurigou xaS'£
dpugnug, — are misunderstood if they should lead to the con
clusion that the Redeemer, as man and as High Priest, appro
priated sinfulness and was personaUy conscious of it. Either,
as UUman remarks, o/Wayta, Rom. vin. 3, relates to gdg%, but not
to d/iugrlug: God sent his Son, so that he resembled man who was
a sinner; or, according to Tertullian de carne Christi, 16: Ergo,
inquis, si nostram induit, peccatrix fuit caro Christi. Noli
constringere explicabilem sensum: and previously; quod ipsa,
non peccatrix, caro Christi ejus fuit par, cujus erat peccatum ;
genere, non vitio Adae:. quando hinc itiam confirmamus, earn
fuisse carnem in Christo, cujus natura est in homine peccatrix.
But as to the other passages, the Epistle to the Hebrews, indeed,
ascribes to the High Priest of the New Testament udheviiu in the
form of being tempted and of ma§e?v, whereby He alone was
capable of sympathy; but not in the form of dpugriu, which
might have necessitated him to sacrifice msgl Ihiug daugriag. Nay,
according to Hebrews vii. 28, He was exempt from all the d&e-
veiu of the legal High Priest. But had he been made sin, became
curse, and at first appeared not without sin but with it, still
everything testifies, (inasmuch as this freedom from sin is directly
affirmed), its manifestation only, in his suffering on the cross pro
portioned to sin.
2 In the truth of His sinlessness is included the truth of His

252 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
thinking faculty, or His freedom from the imperfections of error,
misconception, want of faith, and superstition. See particularly
UUman on the sinlessness of Jesus, 4th section, entitled Inferences
in relation to the teaching and work of Jesus. The finiteness and de
velopment of His human perception is not abrogated by the Logos
having been incarnated in Him. His Divine knowledge was only
active and efficient in Him and by Him, in conformity with His
human nature. As omniscience, His knowledge is to be under
stood as being in part only potential and in part teleological. It
was necessary that there should be something He did not know,
Matthew xxiv. 36, ouheig olhev; Mark xni. 32, obhe 6 uibg, ei [bfi b
murrig ; compare Acts i. 7. The sect of the Agncetae might cor
rectly teach, that not knowing, especially when conscious of it,
is not ignorance.
3 The Redeemer himself was the most competent witness of
His own sinlessness and specific originality, inasmuch as He,
(who was before all saints and nobles, whether connected with or
apart from testamentary religion, and who was the most incontest
able and undeniable image of Divine truth and purity), never in
any way concealed His humanity, weakness, and dependence;
yet never confessed to being sinful and in need of redemption, or
either of them. His coming to baptism cannot possibly be con
strued into a confession of sin ; for the united accounts which
guarantee the fact, testify, at the same time, that baptism in His
case did not signify a transition out of a sinful state into a pure
and sinless one, but that of a concealed Messianic life into a public
one, — see § 131. If in any one degree He had participated in
carnal propensity, and thus in actual sin, without perceiving and
acknowledging it, then, on the one hand, He would moraUy and
intellectuaUy have been far inferior to many prophets, psalmists,
and Greek and Roman sages, before whom the Divine Law or
ideal of humanity floated with such majestic fulness, that they
must have rejected its moral being and becoming; and, on the
other hand, He must again (insomuch as He claimed to be the
only begotten, the Mediator, the way, the truth, and the life,
because truth and faithfulness are the bond and condition of all)
He must, we say, rather have been a mendacious or fanatical
deceiver of men, and not " God with us," not a Nathanael of Na-
thanaels. Compare my sermon entitled Personl. Werth geltend
zu machen ist Sache der Demuth, in the collection published,
1838, p. 38.

§ 130. HOLY BIRTH. 253

§ 130. HOLY BIRTH.
But the exception of Jesus Christ from sin can only be
regarded as complete and adequate to redeem from sin when
such exception is original. Although Christ himself, : and the
apostles only indirectly, in their pubhc teaching maintairi the
supernatural1 holy origin of His humanity, namely, when assert
ing that He " came from the Father into the world," passed
out of a Divine state into a human one, and that " the fulness
of the Godhead dwelt in Him bodUy," — yet, from the inmost
centre of this testimony, (and especiaUy from faith in the. Saviour
as the only begotten, and as being archetypal,) there emanates
an especial authority for the original Christian narratives di
rectly affirming His miraculous conception; admitting even that
we ought not to concede to these narrations an historical cha
racter and value equal to that accorded to the facts of the public
hfe of Jesus. The original sinlessness of the second Adam is
consequently distinct in kind from that of the first; for, besides
His supernatural generation, the sinlessness of Christ is con
ditionated by his union with the Divine nature.
1 The supernatural birth of Jesus is defended by Origen, c.
Cels. lib. i. c. 9, partly on the grounds of its innocence or moral
supernaturalness ; partly on the analogies of nature, and espe
cially on that of the origin of the human race. On the other
hand, the natural view (although in a different way from Cer-
inthus, Theodoret. Hcer. fab. comp. lib. v. o. 11) appears com
bined with the supernatural one as laid down by Schleier
macher, Glaubenslehre, ii. p. 73, who, moreover, expressly re
marks, p. 74, " it would be fruitless to deprive those narrations
of their literal and historical character merely because a genera
tion apart from male co-operation is inadmissible; for, under
any circumstances, we must still aUow a supernatural genera
tion." But this theologian is in error when he maintains, (ac
cording to Strauss, in the work referred to above, in a manner
so conclusive that the subject is exhausted), that "the same rea
son which renders a merely natural generation insufficient,
renders a partial abrogation of the same also insufficient." Be

254 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
the historical value of the narrative in question what it may, the
sense is this : the Redeemer was begotten without any commu
nication of a sinful nature, not because He may have received it
quantitatively only from the woman, but because He may have
received it apart from the co-operation of the egoistic sexual
instinct, only by means of the maternal sensibility and creative
spirit. Schleiermacher supposes the generation to have been su
pernatural, yet not one out of nature, but in it. At aU events,
the natural activity or passivity of the genitor, according to this
view, must be regarded as changed, restrained, or animated, if
the creative act of God intervene therein ; and it is only in the
Biblical narrative that this qualitative peculiar generation seeks
and finds its representation, and without such representation it
would neither have been discerned, nor conceived, nor taught in
the church. The tendency of the narrative, correctly understood,
does not by any means lead to the mystical dogma of the sinless
ness of our Lord's mother.
2 Krabb avows his opposition to- this tenet in his Lehre von der
Siinde und vom Tode, Sic, p. 234, seq. But in this he overlooks,
1st, That the question only turns on the original sinlessness of
Christ ; 2dly, That the indeterminate possibility not to sin, as it
was peculiar to the first Adam, is something quite distinct from
the determinate freedom of the second Adam to do the Divine
will, and that the Godhead of Christ, if it shall not be separated
from His humanity, as is done by the Nestorians, includes a free
necessity for His holy and pure human development. The ques
tion cannot here be concerning physical necessity which is not
free. The exclusive poterat non peccare suffices only to indicate
the first Adam.

§ 131. THE ANOINTING WITH THE HOLY SPTR1T.
If in a certain region of the most ancient Judaizing Christ
ianity the entire perfection of the true Messiah and the peculiar
union of Jesus with the Divine nature was derived from an in
spiration unparaUeled in its kind and degree, yet were there not
wanting motives for this either in the propheti@al or evange
lical testament. Whatever had always qualified those who
were especiaUy caUed to co-operate either by speech or action

§ 131. THE ANOINTING WITH THE HOLY SPIRIT. 255
towards the preservation and cultivation of the people of God,
was a proportional communion of the Divine Spirit, see § 84,
p. 189. There was a certain ho^oy^ of the prophetic Spirit,
2 Kings ii. 9, 15. The unity in this sequence was the Spirit
of the Messiah itself, 1 Peter i. 2. Or if Xptarov, in this passage,
shaU only be taken objectively, still the great prophet and king
who completed the entire series, must possess Divine perfection,
and equipment in a higher, — in the highest degree, Isaiah xi. 1 .
Herein consisted his anointing, Acts x. 38, us 'i-xgiasv aurov o Ssog
•mivpiuri o\ypiu xai o*vm\kzi. And, in fact, prior to the time that
John the Baptist saw the Spirit descend and remain upon Him,
Jesus performed no Messianic act, and did not reveal his glory
in the work of salvation ; and therein John recognised in that
fact that He was the Son of God to whom the Spirit was
" not given by measure," because He also should baptize with
the Spirit, John i. 33, hi. 34. Immediately upon this it is
recorded by the other Evangehsts, that He was led by the Spirit
into the wUderness, there to undergo the Messianic probation.
But this, especial anointing of Jesus with the Holy Spirit and
with power, in no way contradicts His generation and birth by
the Holy Spirit, far less that He was the Only Begotten, the Son
of God, and that the Logos became man in Him; as ff the one
made the other superfluous, and as if such a birth left no sus
ceptibility nor necessity for such a consecration of the Spirit. The
determinateness which the human nature of Jesus had already re
ceived at birth through union with the Godhead,2 did not exclude
its own peculiar development. But this development itself, (up,
to the point when his consciousness of being the Eedeemer en
tirely realized itself in those contacts which His spiritual life
received partly from the word of God, and partly from the
sinful world), this development, we say, was of another kind
than it appears from this point; a view, according to which, doubt
less, the period when Jesus was baptized, and the entire separa
tion of His pubhc and concealed, His quiescent and active
Messianic hfe would appear to be necessary.
1 Compare my Theol. Studien, 1 15-25 and 139.

256 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
2 Faith in the Divine humanity of the Redeemer has certain
ly been preserved from any essential disfigurement by the to
tality Of the ancient oecumenical formulae, and through their
explanation and justification contained, for example, in the Dia
logues and Syllogisms of Theodoret. The church, by her setting
aside the Monophysitic doctrine, preserved the truth of the Nes-
torian view, and by her rejection of the Nestorian tendency al
lowed the truth contained in Cyril's doctrine. The ethical sig
nification and efficacy of Christian supematuralism was admit
ted by Nestorius, and with perfect justice ; whilst, however, he
admitted the mere union between the Logos and man, and neglec
ted their mutual interpenetration and oneness, he appeared almost
to place Jesus only under the sustaining influence of the Logos;
and thus what corresponded to such a doctrine could easily ac
quire on the side of anthropology, a Pelagian tendency. Hence
the contradiction became requisite. On the other hand, the abso
lute supematuralism of Eutyches and the Monophysites, regarded
merely as an astonishing marvel, is deprived of all ethical opera
tion, of all human mediation, and must, consequently, be adjust
ed in the same way as has been done by Leo and Theodoret.
Nevertheless a certain Monophysitic view has popularly prevailed
even in the Western Church, which is still recognised among
Roman Catholic Christians, i. e. they term Jesus at once, the
Gracious God, the Gracious Lord God ; — hence, in this point of
view, we need not be surprised that Christ's mediating efficacy
recedes, and is ascribed to other names and beings, as, for ex
ample, to the Virgin; nor need we marvel that the church con
sidered as supernatural humanity between Christ and the natural
man, negotiates, and inclusively with Him, effects divinely human
mediations. But even apart from this, the church theory of
John of Damascus assumes the Lutheran doctrine of a communi
cation of qualities in its most developed form, and to such an
extent,, that the human is absorbed by the Divine, or partially
occupies its place. In return, the reformed doctrine and the
xevugig promulged by the Giessen theologians only offer a signifi
cant protest, in order to afford human development ample space.
UntU the time of Schleiermacher, who on this point has given
the question an important turn, it is undeniable that the ethico-
psychological explanations have been too much neglected for the
sake of the physico-logical ones. The two analogies of glowing
iron, and of the unity of the human person in the soul and body

§ 131. ANOINTING. 257
which had been already used by Theodoret, and are at all times
applicable, are scarcely able to explain anything whatsoever.
We must therefore betake ourselves to the region of freedom
and reason. We must not previously take into consideration the
oneness of the soul and body, and only admit that the human
spirit enters into direct union with the logos. The earliest ca
tholic divines, Irenaeus, TertuUian, Origen, even Athanasius and
the two Gregories, were on this right track before the dispute
arose concerning the two natures. The idea of theanthropy was
explained by them through the idea of man abstractedly viewed,
and particularly with reference to his destiny. The Logos always
appertained to man; Seomoirigig was man's destiny; his entire hu
manity was spirituaUy nurtured by the logos, it expected its in
carnation, and through the same was included again with God
the Father. Although but little regarded, Origen especially
renders the unity of the human soul of Jesus with the logos
conceivable (as one existing before the incarnation) and through
it, the possible embodiment, that is, the Son of Man as durogoipiu,
aurouiog, in short, the God-man; whilst, at the same time, he
makes use, analogicaUy, of the passage 1 Cor. vi. 17 ; " He that
is joined unto the Lord is one spirit." De. Prime, ii. 6, 3 ; com
pare Dorner's Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person
Christi, &c, Stuttg. 1839, pp. 53-81. There is a natural divinity
belonging to the human spirit, apart from which we cannot con
ceive the ungodliness and unhappiness of fallen man. . The Di
vinity of the second Adam, through whose fellowship and pro
mise we shall all be made partakers of the Divine nature, 2 Peter
i."4, is indeed something quite distinct; but if the capacity for
Divinity in humanity did not pertain to the idea of human
ity, it would be impossible to comprehend what the latter either
is or could Joe. The true Christian, the child of God, lives in
God and God in him ; whoever cleaves to the Lord is one spirit
with him; here the Divine and human nature is again united;
but then the union is one effected through Christ, and yet, as
such, is incomplete. The language of the Christian is, " I live,
yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." This is a true and va
lid analogy of the personal unity of the Redeemer's divine and
human nature. The distinction between the Divine will reveal
ing itself in human life, and the human will allowing itself to be
Divinely determinated is in him continuaUy annulled by this
immutable tendency of the one will and the other. In Jesus
S

258 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
there is not the ihere sinlessness of the first Adam as was his nar-
ture before the faU, but it is the predetermined (foreordained,
1 Peter i. 20), sinlessness of the only begotten, in whom the
Father wUl reveal himself, as redeeming, in the Son. He at
tains a consciousness partly of his species, partly of his indivi
duality, no otherwise than by becoming objectiTely conscious of
his species as a sinful one, and becoming aware of the distinc
tion between hia species, as the Son of Man, and that of the
children of Adam. This self-consciousness is the continual op
eration of the logos, incarnated in Mm, the effect of his peculiar
origin, his proceeding from the Father. Hence a holy develop
ment of the life of Jesus is absolutely necessary, yet it is not one
of compulsion, nor a necessity which merely leaves a semblance
of human freedom in obedience. Those who are conscious of be
ing incited by the Spirit of God unto a good work, and in any
given instance to be incapable of sinning, are at the same
time conscious of the fullest freedom. When Jesus says e/ie he/
igyuZptfoiui, John ix. 4, he is in a condition of the most per
fect freedom. If the personal Divine humanity of the Re
deemer excludes the possibility of sin, stiU it does not exclude
the participation, of the Divine in the finite, and in a successive
series of conditions. The Redeemer affirms both, " We testify
that we do know, and which we have seen," and at the same time,
" The Son knows not the day." He confesses both, that " All
power in heaven and earth is given unto me," and that " The
Father is greater than I." For the consciousness of God in
Christ's self-consciousness (although it is not only a conscious
ness of God, but is at the same time a Divine consciousness) is
acquainted with His power, glory and wisdom, in such a manner
that it is at the same time acquainted with its gracious self-limi
tation, or with its limitation to revelations and demonstrations in
the humanity of existence. It is indeed the Godhead of his con
sciousness which effects and represents the infallibility and suf
ficiency of his utterances and actions ; but then it is the God
head condescending, reconciling, and become human, and, at the
same time, as such, effecting the limits of its mode of manifesta
tion and operation. For a fuUer explanation of this subject, see
Sartorius's defence of the Lutheran doctrine of the reciprocal
communication of the attributes of the two natures in Christ
in den Dorpater BeitrUgen zu den Theott. Wissench. 1 vol. pp.
306—84, and Dorner on the historical development of Christo-

§ 132. WORK OF THE REDEEMER. 259
I°gy, particularly in modern times, Tub. Zeitschr. f. Theol.,
1835, 4 Compare his History of the Doctrine of the Person of
Christ from the earliest times, &c, Stuttg. 1839, p. 176, where a
critical estimate is given of the view taken by Sartorius.

§ 132. WORK OF THE REDEEMER.
As the personal being and state of the Eedeemer was indis
pensable for his saving work, it could only attain its object in
union with this work as a basis for the salvation of the world.
With regard to salvation as founded upon the person of the Ee
deemer, it may be considered in a twofold point of view. In
the first place, the Eedeemer grounds salvation on aU tho.se
preparatives for his elevation to the Father and for the mission
of the second Paraclete, or through every thing appertaining to
his work and destiny, which belong to his toaitsiu, (in the old
ecclesiastical sense of that word). MeanwhUe, his ministry,
after his departure to the Father, ceases not to be the funda
mental one for the salvation of individuals, and of mankind at
large; and strictly speaking, the doctrines of the grace of the
Holy Spirit, of the church, and of the final doom, are at the
same time those of the Saviour, and of his saving activity, con
tinuing in varied relations up to that period, indicated in 1 Cor.
xv. 28. That is to say, he continues in his state of glory, his
prophetic and sacerdotal ministry, although in a different manner;
just as he exercised in a servile state his regal office, although
in a particular manner. Now the question turns especiaUy on
the founding of salvation (ceconomia originans), in the first
sense, or in relation to His work considered as absolutely
finished. John iv. 34; xvii. 4. This work is nothing else
than his seff-manifestation and development in a sinful world,
and so far, it cannot be considered otherwise, than as operating
upon and influencing the latter; or we should fuUy denote by
this that he hath done the wiU of his heavenly Father, John
iv. 34; or that he has reconciled the world; or, again, that he
bears witness of the truth, John xviii. 37, for the one ever in-

260 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
eludes the other. But the fundamental work of the Saviour
may be especiaUy conceived under three distinct points of view,
as testimony, reconciliation, and a preparatory formation of a
church.1 And to this threefold division, the unexceptionable
classification grounded on Scripture, of His ministry, into the
prophetic, priestly, and regal, corresponds.2
1 The life of Jesus probably does not admit of being divided
chronologically, according to these functions; just as if His recon
ciling or propitiating ministry had first commenced with his spi
ritual conflict, in the garden of Olives, or were to be restricted to
his literal suffering in death. As far as his being " delivered
up," John iii. 16, Romans viii. 32; His becoming poor for our
sake, 2 Cor. viii. 9; His being yevb&evog bmb vbpov, Gal. iv. 4,
reach, to the same extent, does the reconciliation of his testifying
and typifying life also reach. Death is the culminating point of \
his entire ministry, and this in such a manner, that his resurrec- J
tion (which is to be regarded as a free return, and as his work
and will), must ever be taken into account. The distinction of
legal and passive obedience, or of active and passive performance,
was to be approved, in so far as it resisted the limiting of Christ's
mediatorial ministry to the facts o^hiBhisjtoricapDassTon ; but this
distinction led directly into error/when it was at the same time
desirous of becoming one of a twofold imputation, and of a double
redemption. Besides, the contrast of action and passion is on
the one hand, in its phenomenon and time, engaged in a contin
ual transition of the one into the other. His confession, " I am
He," forms his reproach and death, &c; and, on the other hand,
the contrast is internally dissolved. • The process of the life of
Jesus, is such a self-manifestation, or self-development in human
ity, needing salvation, by means of which the new divine com
mon life incorporates itself more and more with the old Adamic
one, and at the same time, assumes the latter more and more
into itself. The former is predominantly an action, the latter a
passion, and both are sinless; hoth reconcile and both redeem!
But as long as this process remains incomplete, the Saviour him
self, as such, is "not perfected," Hebrews ii. 10, hid mu^ti/idruv
reXtiugui. And since he cannot completely effect redemption
in each relation before his glorification in death, but rather can
only thereby continue to attest his existence, and appropriate

§ 132. WORK OF THE REDEEMER. 261
to himself humanity, and to humanity himself, so beyond a
doubt, death is the aim of his life. From this consummation,
he primarily draws all men unto himself, John xii. 32; and the
deepest humiliation will be his exaltation, in which all who
believe in him, derive from him eternal life, John iii. 15. Hence,
in that period when he awakens faith predominantly by word
and deed, he declares the inadequacy of this mode of operation,
and the necessity of his completion, Luke xii. 50. The joint
operation of Christ, thus perfected, is the redemption of the old
life of man in the creation of a new one.
Redemption is a reanimation, which, inasmuch as it cannot
be magical, must be effected by illumination; but before illu
mination can operate spirituaUy by animating, it must operate
by mortifying the flesh, and it effects the one in and through
the other. Vivification itself is justification and sanctification,
which ideas include, together with the positive one of purity and
power of love, the negative of exculpation and expiation. For a
correct view and lucid analysis of the work of redemption, see
Klaiber in der Neutest. Lehre von der Siinde und Erlosung. p.
495—99.
2 The prepossession chiefly emanating from the school of Emesti,
as if this threefold view were an arbitrary selection of Biblical
and figurative signs of Christ's ministry, has been weakened by
several writers, but chiefly, and in the most instructive manner
by Schleiermacher, Glaubenslehreii. § 102, p. 122. Wherever the
most perfect realization of the idea of an office occurs, but by no
means where a mere analogy of the office exists, there nothing
should be expressed by a trope. The acknowledged essential
functions for maintaining the old covenant, were the three above
named; and this in such a manner, that the mission of the pro
phets, which was always openly maintained, was added to the
two other offices, which offices, strictly speaking, were both in
existence before the time of Saul, and this mission was appended
as a third, completing, mediating, progressing, and purifying
office ; whUst the office of teaching in the New Testament is the
primary and fundamental one. The Biblical theology of the Old
Testament will indicate, first, How far all the actual possessors
of these dignities, (which probably existed up to the time of Ne
hemiah,) were from attaining that perfection with which each of
them should be exercised at a future time for the salvation of the
people, according to the individual earlier or later promises.

262 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
Second, It WiU point out how a certain union of several or all of
these dignities in one and the same person, was realized at every
extraordinary period of any new dispensation; and, thirdly, How,
in consequence, the structure of the new covenant was able to
maintain its relation to the old, merely through a prophetic and
everlasting king, who, at the same time, should be " a priest after
the order of Melchisedec." To a certain extent, in an usurping
manner, and with an essential disfigurement of each individual
dignity, this triplicity had already appeared in personal union.
Josephus, whilst commending the go©d fortune of Johannes Hyr-
canus, remarks, De Bello Jud. lib. i. c. 2, p. 81, ed. Lips. Tgfa, youv
rd xgungnbovru [hbvog i/Xl> r^" ri fyx^'' ro^ ^VBUS, xul dgxitguguvriv, xui
irgofrireiuv' u/ilXei ydg durlp rb 'huipoviw, wg psqhhv ruv f&eXXovruv uyvoeh.
x. X. Compare also Philo, De Vita Mosis, who represents the dig
nity of Moses under the same threefold point of view.

§ 133. TESTIMONY OF THE TRUTH.
The saving efficacy of Christ is, in the first place, one that
testifies and reveals ; wherefore, on certain occasion, he states
his whole vocation to be, that of bearing witness to the truth,
John xviii. 37, and ascribes entire salvation to the 'emancipat
ing power of the truth proceedmg from him, John vih. 32.
This is hfe eternal, to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ
whom he hath sent, John xvii. 3; and those no longer sin, and
they become " whole," who have seen and acknowledge him to be
the true Saviour, 1 John in. 6. At aU events, the first consi
deration is the fundamental relations of the eternal kingdom,
which being darkened or denied in the world, are brought near,
typified and evidenced in a new and perfect Way to believing
perception, through him who holds those relations in his hand,
and constitutes their living centre. The law was given by
Moses, but grace and truth come by Jesus Christ, John i. 17.
This " Declarer" of Divine things, verse 18, distinguishes him
self as such, in a manifold point of view, from aU who, either co
temporaneously, .or preceding or succeeding him, teach the word
of God. Once he had no heavenly kingdom to teacb, which, as

§ 133. TESTIMONY OF FAITH. 263
a mere idea, or as a promise, could claim the moral powers of
his auditors ; but in teaching this kingdom, he at the same time
represents it in its relation to God and to man, bearmg witness
through himself and his work, (Matth. xii. 23; xi. 5,) that the
hour of the world's redemption is coming, and now is, John v. 25,
'ipypTou upu, xui vvv \o~riv x. A.; for it is evident that throughout
ah his general doctrines concerning the kingdom of God, (as
they are contained in the sermon on the mount, and parables,)
he only incites humility and ardent desire, but he does not re
quire the immediate consummation of this heavenly order, and
thus it is so much the more natural, that he constitutes himself
the surety and mediator for entrance into the kingdom, and the
essential object of his testimony and of the faith, which he re
quires; and aU he teaches concerning redemption is only true
and certain as connected with himself. From the purport of
this testimony, it is evident, that it consists not in word alone,
but in action and suffering also, and that between both a pecu
liar connection subsists, which he partly makes known by avow
ing that he does not hinder, by any imperfection, the formation
of faith, John vih. 46; and partly through the assurance that
he would, at a future time, draw all men unto himself by his
consummation on the cross, John xii. 32. If this saving tes
timony be fulfilled in his death, John xvii. 4, he stiU continues
it through the glory which he had with the Father, (verse 5, oof os-
eov (iiS,) and through his resurrection from the dead up to the pe
riod when the Paraclete was to come to testify of him, John xv.
27. In this connection between the doctrine and the person of
Jesus, it is at the same time established, that, like a prophet, he
is related as a teacher to the masters in Israel existing in his
time, and among whom he siiffered himself to be numbered;
an authority which, beyond! a doubt, he also: openly claimed un
der peculiar relations, John ii, 15, just as it was ascribed unto
him by the earliest behevers, Luke xxiv. 19, kvqp itpotyqrns,
tivmrog iv epyw xai Aoycq emvriov rou *&&ov xoci tfavrog rov
kuov. But he is distinguished from the prophets, as the finisher
of prophecy in the founding of the new covenant; and from the

264 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
apostles and teachers of the New Testament, from evangelists
and prophets, by the originality of his doctrine, and by the de
pendence in which he places aU those, not permitting them to
lay any other foundation, nor even to perfect it, 1 Cor. hi. 11,
Gal. i. 7. § 134. RECONCILIATION.
The saving- efficacy of Christ consists, in the second place,
in the reconciliation of the world; for reconciliation is not the
whole but a mean for the Divine redemption of humanity. The
Divine decree in Christ includes the reanimation of the world
dead in sin. And as we die in Adam, we shaU five in Christ,
1 John iv. 9; an essential destiny or change ever belongs to man
specificaUy, and whatever shaU be effected in, and for feUowship,
must emanate from a personal mediating commencement, which
possesses in itself a new common hfe and common nature, and
appropriates and manifests the same. By preparative means
it was made known that such a second Adam, new covenant,
and Messiah was to come. That new common 'life was disclosed
in the Old Testament, and to a certain extent appropriated;
especiaUy in that sphere where it was to be manifest, both in
individual personality and reality. Now when such common hfe
actually appears, it has pre-eminently to become known and per
ceived as such. This occurs not through mere self-testimony
in teaching, nor by merely asserting the identity of that which
has arrived, and that which is expected, but, as we have al
ready intimated, through the combined impression of truth and
grace, of Divine feUowship, holiness and blessedness, which im
pression the entire personal phenomenon attests, and whereby
the latter places the susceptible circumstance in salutary de
pendence. If, however, at any period this agency of the Ee
deemer shall be, according to its extent and duration, imperish
able and shall increase; then must it reach its intensive con
summation, even with the most susceptible novice in faith, in
conformity to the temporal, local, or general circumstances of

§ 134. RECONCILIATION. 265
man. Added to this, that the testimony of truth, that the per
sonal testimony of man's translation out of death into hfe, a
transition imparted and necessary, does not only not yield to
obstacles, but even prospers under them, and through them,
up to its imperishable effect. That wherefrom the Eedeemer
shall liberate, namely, sin and death, the world, the flesh, and
the devU, is at the same time a something which wiU maintain
itseffasfree, good, and just, and is opposed to the salutary
affection of human hfe through the manifestation of the Divine
life.1 The claims of the flesh demand a corporeal Eedeemer,
and one connected with the world, and contend along with the
externality of the law and the promise against the truth of a spi
ritual Eedeemer ; so that the whole Adamic hfe, as contrasted
with the Eedeemer, is yet included under unbelief, and with more
or less consciousness of falsehood and sin, remains captive un
der its sentence of death. Thus, the entire process of redemp
tion or reanimation still continues restrained; sin is not yet
perceived, nay, has not yet reached its consummation; far
less has guUt been pardoned and grace fuUy appeared. In
aU truth and love the Eedeemer continues in contrast with the
Adamic hfe, not only from his own testimony that he is the
Eedeemer, but also in powerful manifestation, without in any
respect aUowing the sin of unbelief to return, or permitting him
self to be enticed into it ; but then without interrupting the de
velopment and self-destroying process of world sin by any act of
visible glory and premature judicature. He continues to reveal
himself unrestrictedly to human hfe in the individualism of his
holy love, and to hve in the same ; which action precisely con
stitutes his bitter passion and death ; and what he suffers in such
action, and acts in such suffering, appropriating and reserving
himself for a sinful world, constitutes the substance of his recon-
cUing, and at the same time expiating ministry, into which his
testifying and typifing one passes. For he has not only, in
order to begin this ministry, made himself participative of hu
man finiteness and hmitatidn, and emptied himseff of his glory,
but at the same time, in order to continue and complete it has

266 PART HI. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
partaken of world sin, in his innocent suffering of death and
ignominy. 1 Romans V. 6—10, in farm ripuv d<foemv, »gej3Sv, d/iugnuXuv, l%Sg3»,
— Xgigrbg dmeStuve. This enmity to the light, or even this insuscepti
bility for spiritual salvation, which is to be subdued by divine
love as reconciling grace, was not only in the narrow historical
circle of the Redeemer's operations, (although in very different
degrees and kinds,) a something universal, (for all even the
most susceptible were to some extent unbelieving, had little faith,
and were offended in him, Luke xxii. 31 seq.,) but even the
world in general consists of such Ij^gais — -who, in their guilt, or
passive enmity to God and his truth, require a reconciling ap
propriation of the Redeemer. All sinners as such, entertain the
necessity, that the witness of the truth should die, Luke xviii. 8.
In all men, before they can receive life from Christ, sin must first
be convicted of falsehood, ransomed as guilt, and put to death
as enmity. Sin must be ended, exhausted, and annihUated for
all in the Redeemer. Hence a mere testifying and typifying
ministry does not by any means correspond to man's need of
redemption. The Socinian view limits the redeeming agency
of Christ to teaching and example ; but essential and important
as may be the connection between doctrine and type, for ground
ing salvation, still it can neither directly reconcile, nor be ac
knowledged and apprehended in its truth by unreconciled hearts;
or, in so far as it is recognised, it judges and punishes rather
than heals, and before it is able to improve and sanctify, it must
pardon. Type as such is even to sinners a something strange.
Should it be entirely for us, and not just as much against us,
we must recognise it in the light of a common life bestowed upon
us, as the commencement of our new life, as a pledge of our par
don, and this too in such a manner that its unattainableness
only the more attracts us into its fellowship. But this first
takes place when it is consummated in a reconciling manner.
The Redeemer undoubtedly presents distinct examples, John
xiii. 15, unto those who are or shall be reconciled and sanctifi
ed through him, and is their living precept and example,, 1
Peter ii. 21; but it is not by this means that he reconciles, at
least, his example would have been still more effectual for recon
ciliation, in the Socinian 3ense, if he had had to reconcile TimT-
selt; and had been himself a sinful and. fallible man, as Camillus

§ 135. CONTINUATION. 267
Renatus, whose views assimilate to those of Socinus, is said to have
inconsiderately taught, quod Christus habuerit carnem peccati et
concupiscentiam et ob id sit dictus maledictus peccator, &c, vid.
Illgen. symbb. ad vitam et doctr. Laclii Socini illustrandam,
I. p. 49. — In this case, the example of Christ would have been
an imperfect good, or universal sinfulness would not have been
objectionable, and universal reconciliation would have been un
necessary, and yet a something possible or actual. But if, on
the contrary, Christ is impeccabilis, whilst sinful humanity re
quires to be reconciled through a Mediator, his example as
such is not a reconcUing one, because, even in a formal point
of view, he who is originaUy exempted from sin, cannot be
unto those who are not so a valid example in their behalf, and
for their encouragement. Even in another point of view, re-
concUiation is not to be regarded solely as a part of the in
structive ministry of Jesus. Undoubtedly the Lord testifies that
he had to suffer, in order to reconcile, and claims our faith for
this assurance, Mark x. 45, John vi. 51 . Criticism cannot show
that the doctrine of reconcUiation only occurs in the discourses
of Jesus retrospectively, nor can exegesis remove the representa
tion of the reconcUing passion from those passages which relate to
it, a representation which, in general, was not foreign to the
period. See the prayer of the dying Eleasar, iv. Mace, or iregi
duroxgurogog Xoyigpou, § 6, in Josephi Opp. t. v. Lips. p. 265. But
the real act and event of Christ's passion, is not the mere sealing
of these decisions, nor as such, only a reference to the recon-
cUableness of God to man, but it primarily proves itself to be the
reconcUing consummation for testifying the truth and the life of
Jesus as a mediating and common hfe of humanity.

§ 135. CONTINUATION.
The ultimate ground of this consummation of the Eedeemer,
is that same mediatorial God, who from the beginning, offered
up His Son. It is His wiU, His decree to bring back the alien
ated world in Christ, and to reconcile it unto himself;1 conse
quently to pardon its sins. God does not become reconciled,
but reconciles the world unto himself by Christ, 2 Cor. v. 18 —
21. Ephes. ii. 16. Col. i. 22. Eom. v. 10, 11. The Ee-

268 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
deemer apprehends both from the condition of the world, as
weU as from Scripture, the wUl of the Father who spared him
not, whUst under such circumstances, his consciousness of the
mode of his Messianic procedure and destiny is developed; and
he receives that wiU into his own under the innocent resistance
of his pure human nature. This constitutes his obedience,
Eom. v. 19; PhU. ii. 8; Hebrews v. 8. In this way, the
world indeed appears to be reconcUed, and graciously pardoned
through Christ, yet not for the sake of Christ ; that is to say, in
this mode of manifestation and of testimony; or in such a way,
that the condescension of the Son of God to the world, (continuing
up to his death, and glorified in his resurrection, notwithstand
ing the sinful opposition of that world,) admits of pardon being
rather included and presupposed than effected. For the
gracious wUl of God is directly revealed in the consent and
avowal of Jesus to suffer and to die, and by the efficacious fel
lowship in which he places believers with the glorified one.
But however much of evangelic truth is contained in this view,
it neither constitutes the whole, nor is it independent. Scrip-
tine not only teaches a reconcUiation of the world, (xutuk-
huy7j, reconcUiation), but also expiation for the sins of the
whole world, (iKoco'iJbog, expiatio, 1 John ii. 2); it refers the
act and will of God immediately to the passion and death
of Jesus, 2 Cor. v. 21. The Eedeemer gives himself as a
ransom for many, and the experience that he appeared at his
death in the character of a transgressor, Gal. hi. 13, corre
sponds to the type of the Messiah, that is, to the vicarious
passion of the only chosen servant of God, Isaiah liii. compare
John i. 29, 1 Peter i. 19, ii. 22; and answers to the perfect
sin-offering once required, Hebrews ix. 11; Eomans hi. 25,
by virtue of which a godly people could only then become truly
the servants of God, and have access unto him. The Eedeem
er, since he had not to suffer death for himself, and for his own
sake, as being absolutely innocent, has suffered and overcome
death for others, mgi, mip, and consequently, in their stead
vtsp, um; avrikvrpov, so that he is the end of all condemnation or

§ 136. conclusion. 269
pardon, which otherwise could only have been legal. From
these representations, it is clear that Christ, by virtue of his
vicarious obedience and passion, and through their sufficiency,
is our righteousness or our justification.
1 With reference to the meaning of the word xuruXXdgge&i,
compare 1 Cor. vii. 11, and Doderlein Instit. Theol. Ohr. ii. 326,
seq. Whether and how the words reconciliation and expiation
are originally related to each other, is here unimportant. It is
sufficient that in harmony with undoubted usage, their signifi
cation is just as distinguishable as the signification of reconcilia-
tio and expiatio. The former act can be realized merely
through revelation, and the interpretation of its sense; the latter
can only take place through a work of suffering.

§ 136. CONCLUSION.
The ideas of this substitution, imputation, and satisfaction, are
not, however, to be formed according to the view of a relation
which, as regards the Eedeemer, is to be considered as one
that is foreign and past. The EeconcUer is not representative,
and does not make sufficient satisfaction as an individual for
individuals separately. He does not suffer in experimental re
ality, what, according to abstract necessity, we might have to
suffer, as if he were actuaUy a sinner, which in fact he is not;
he does not surrender himself to a twofold work, first, of right
eousness, and then of the grace of God, as ff the one were
a something which approximated towards the other and against
it; rather must such Antinomian views disappear in the truth
of reconcUiation, instead of being introduced into the Divine or
human nature and into the person of the God-man. Since
scripture acknowledges in God only one and no other ultimate
ground of Christ's passion, than that love in which He sent his
Son into the world, so, from this ground alone can every Divine
compulsion of the Saviour's consenting to die for the reconcilia
tion of the world be understood. That love, denying all origi-

270 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
nal wUl, favour, indifference, or enmity, possesses as such in
aU its communications, even the: most perfect, a defence against
evil and a negation against sin, that is to say, it is a holy and
righteous love; for righteousness by which the bad is ever sep
arated from the good, justice in its higher development of legis
lation revealed, and sin judged, and the sinner punished, is not
without love, but exists in it and springs from it. Accordingly
the world's need of redemption requires such a deliverance, by
means of which it is not only reanimated in its capacity by
God and for God — but is also put to death in its sinful and
carnal character, and is not pardoned without having the same
removed, and without receiving power to punish itself, and to
enter into life through the death of repentance.
This is a power nowhere bestowed upon the world, according
to the flesh and under the law, nor granted during the mere
toleration of a more or less unacknowledged unrighteousness.
Consequently the world requires fellowship with a mediator, a
powerful example for this purpose, who, in the unalterable holy
love of his imparting effort receives death for the sin of the
world's unbelief, in order to give life unto it in the glory of his
conquest over death, and who, by bestowing life upon the world,
kills the flesh and the law which condemns. WhUst the world's
unrighteousness transgresses against the holy and righteous
One, it exhausts itself, and He endures it in the glory of his in
nocence in order to punish it through his spirit in us. Thus,
whUe theworld is sentenced, its sin is forgiven and in its
punishment is reeoncUed. Only in a twofold, reciprocal, pas
sive, and active feUowship, between the world and the Ee
deemer, is it true that he offered himself up to God, and suf
fered death instead of the world. It is only as the power and
possibihty of our actual purification that his obedience unto death
becomes a ransom for many; only in the power of his spiritual
sympathy for the world's corruption^ and of his striving efforts
for its salvation, does the Eedeemer internaUy suffer the punish
ment of its sins. Transferred to him, this punishment assumes
another aspect, and the complete contradiction between his

§ 136. CONCLUSION. 271
merit and destiny, which does not allow, even in his undergoing
death, that he should participate in sin, is solved by redound
ing unto his glory, and being reiterated in us for our salvation.
Thus Christ becomes our righteousness, and the exclusive
principle of aU individual justification. As God, in consequence
of Adam's sin, permitted death, as a punishment, to reign over
those who had not sinned like Adam, on account of that fel
lowship to which the whole race was destined; so, in conse
quence of the perfect obedience of Christ, many — nay, aU, who
have not died nor risen again, like Christ, participate in
justification unto life. Thus, neither the one, (inasmuch as all
have sinned unto death, Eom. v. 12,) nor the other, (since
there is an obedience of faith, which includes a dying and ris
ing again with Christ, Eom. vi.) is excluded, apart from which
individual reconciliation is unattainable.
Remark 1. The idea of " ransom," "payment," if we desire to
carry it out in all its bearings, as represented in Christ's suffer
ing death, is again annulled by other ideas. For no compact exists
between the Redeemer and death, or between the Redeemer and
the devil ; since the latter rather is deprived of his power and prey,
by the former, or Christ is opposed to the enemy in his own right, &c.
However, from the time of Origen the question concerning the
devil's right of possession in matters of redemption was agitated
by the Greek and Latin fathers ; by the former up to the period
of John of Damascus, and by the latter to that of Abelard. Yet
St Bernard was enraged against Abelard for contending against
such right. A transition soon took place in accordance with
Anselm's view, with reference to Divine right and Godhead,
both demanding and paying ransom. The idea of ransom as
such, never regards right, but actual conditions; it refers to a sa
crifice necessitated by love, to an actual deliverance, and especi
ally to what is substitutary and vicarious.
Remark 2. The idea of sacrifice in the Old Testament, as being
a fellowship with God accomplished through resignation and self-
renunciation, is primarily applicable, in its universality, to Jesus
and his death. He sanctifies himself that thereby his disciples
may be sanctified, John xvii. 19. The act of his suffering obe
dience is a consecration to God, whereby his life partakes of a

272 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
perfectly human character in order to effect the sanctification of
the community. Here the condition preceding the sacrifice is only
to be considered as a yet non-existence of holiness and purity.
Those who are sanctified by this sacrifice are now capacitated to
exercise the functions of priests, and to offer themselves up and
all they possess, Phil. ii. 17, iv. 18, Romans xii. 1, 1 Peter ii. 5.
In a special relation, Christ is a sacrifice for the preservation and
renewal of the covenant, a passover, Matt. xxvi. 28, 1 Cor. v. 7,
because in the communion of his death, blood, and body, there
exists a foundation, preservation, and renewal of communion
with God. Here are references to sin, and its pardon, and re-
concUiation ; elg upegiv dpugriuv, Matth. xxvi. 28, Heb. ix. 22, xul
X^g'S uifiiurexxugiug ob yherui acpetrig, because the whole sacrifice
must not only be a pledge for the future, and for obhgation, but
must also terminate the past, a past pertaining to a committed
breach of a covenant not yet expiated. But the relation of the
death of Jesus to an expiatory sacrifice, and to the great sacrifice
of reconciliation is especially admitted, 2 Cor. v. 21, Romans iii.
25, Heb. viii. 9, 10, 1 Peter ii. 24. This idea has God himself
for its leading feature, as revealing and presenting the means
and mode of a reconciliation of the sinner, which is expressed in
2 Cor. v. 21, and particularly in Romans iii. 25, by the term
mgoiSero. It is God who renders it possible for the sinner and
the sinful people under the theocracy to reacquire a capacity
for serving him and for fellowship with him; the same God
who exhibits Christ as the expiatory sacrifice, dpugrluv, and as
the ground and means of reconciling all who have incurred guilt.
This ground is symbolized in the Old Testament. Its elements,
however, diverge in the symbolism as follows : sacrifice and priest,
High Priest and the Holy of Holies, purity of the sacrifice, and
death, blood. The actual expiation which God founds and pre
sents, is the not sparing his Son, who, in fact, is the only inno
cent being; His not sparing the Redeemer who surrendered him
self to God and suffered death for his people, as a pledge for their
sanctification. The act of Christ's holy passion operating and as
suring a spiritual conjunction of the people in death and newness
of life, is itself, again, an operation and manifestation of holy love
or of the righteousness of God, and effects the pardon of sin by a re
trospective causation; that is to say, the pardon of sin, which,
not merely as tolerated but as forgiven, and in forgiveness ren
dered destructible, and destroyed and transferred, as a mere suf-

| 137. FOUNDATION OF THE KINGDOM. 273
fering, to the just about to be glorified, a sin which, being no
longer imputed to the faithful in Christ, corresponds to the hi-
xuioguvri of God. See particularly Klaiber's work already referred
to, on the nature of sacrifice in the Old and New Testament,
although he appears to go too far in his opposition to the theory
of satisfaction and punishment, and to make the distinction
between expiatory and other sacrifices too subjective and internal.
Remark 3. ivheifyg rrig hixuioguvrig, Rom. iii. 25, 26, has been the
chief cause of introducing the idea of justitia retributiva into
the doctrine of reconciliation; and indeed according to some,
the justice of God is apparent in this, that He abolishes the
unrighteousness of men together with their original sin by the
grace they receive in Christ; whilst others, indeed the majority,
perceive in this, that God does not forgive the people their sins
without satisfaction and a fulfilment of the law which shall be
both passive and active. But such ideas of justice have already
been set aside by our doctrine of the Divine attributes.

§ 137. FOUNDATION OF THE KINGDOM.
How limited soever may be the exercise of regal power in
the depressed condition experienced by the Eedeemer, a power
by whose means he purifies unto himself a peculiar people (Tit. ii.
14), and mutuaUy unites those individual members who depend
upon him,1 still such power is not absent. Jesus so decidedly
avows the true royalty existing in his person, that it becomes
an ostensible occasion for the world to condemn and put him
to death, John xix. 19. In the fulness of his power, he
caUs whom he wiU, John i. 44, xv. 16. He confers personal
promises, Matt. xvi. 19. He decrees, by commands fuU of
promises, an external communion of behevers and worship
pers, Matt, xviii. 18-20. He ordains for this communion
federal signs as pledges, Matt. xxvi. 25, xxvih. 18. He
sends and equips chosen persons to invite men to believe, Luke
ix. 2, John xx. 21, and he commands his disciples to remain
together awaiting the promises of the Father, Luke xxiv. 49.
That this mode of action on his part belongs to redemption ap-

274 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. I. OF THE SAVIOUR.
pears partly from this, that it required in aU its results the
whole of Christ's peculiar virtue and glory, and partly because
it was necessary for his entire success, and was a certain
condition also pertaining to the office of Prophet and High
Priest. 1 See Schleiermacher, Glaubensl. ii. p. 269. " For a preliminary
understanding on this point, it must be remembered, that in
Judaism the actual government, the preservation, renewal, and
improvement of the community, was incumbent on the king ; but
the priests administered the immediate and more internal relation
of the people and of individuals to God;" and p. 271, "on the
other hand, however, should we exclude the regal office ; in that
case the other two conjointly, whilst they alone could unite each
redeemed one to the Redeemer, would only produce an unsatis
factory (and more closely regarded) an unchristian separation."
P. 302. " The regal office is not to be considered as only com
mencing after Christ's ascension ; but as he himself says — not
that he will become a king, but that he js, one. And thus he
exercised his regal authority even during his abode on earth;
by legislating for his kingdom, and by the direct power which
he had over the minds of men.

§ 138. EXALTATION.
The Eedeemer himself, who appropriated in this world that
threefold dignity and official ministry, required a certain kind
of justification, namely, that kind which he obtains by his re
surrection, Eom. i. 4, Acts iii. 15, 26, iv. 10; by his
exaltation to the right hand of God, Heb. x. 12; and by the
communication of the Spirit, 1 Tim. iii. 16, slixaiu^ h-rvsv-
[Atzri — iTio-rev^}] h x6o~(aw. In fact it is our justification; for
without his resurrection our faith is vain, and we are yet in
our sins, 1 Cor. xv. 17. But expiation by death only becomes
perfect reconciliation in his resurrection, Eom. iv. 25; or,
according to Heb. vii. 25, x. 12, in his exaltation added to
the express enunciation made by the Father (Xoyog rfc xccr-
uKhmyris), 2 Cor. v. 19. Thus is the Eedeemer first made

| 139. GRACE AND THE HOLY SPIRIT. 275
perfect through suffering, Heb. ii. 10, and then through glori
fication, for which he prayed the Father, John xvii. 5. His
actual exaltation, of which he gave a visible sign, Luke xxiv.
51, Mark xvi. 19, Acts i. 9, and which is testified by the general
knowledge and belief of the apostles, John xx. 17, Ephes. iv. 9,
Col. iii. 1-3, 1 Tim. hi. 16, avaA^SSb? lv Vo\n, Acts iii. 21,
is, in the first place, to be viewed in the light of a miraculous
departure from the world, corresponding to his miraculous
birth, John xvi. 28, and in the second place is to be consi
dered partly as a negative and partly as an affirmative con
dition for perfecting his disciples for their apostleship, and
for a holy community; finally, the Lord's exaltation is to be
regarded as that reward, PhU. ii. 9, Isaiah liii. 10, 12, and
consummation, by which he brings into perfect operation, and
sustains therein, salvation grounded in a threefold manner,
namely, the testimony of truth, reconciliation, and formation of
the community; and this he does not only in relation to time and
space, Matt, xxvih. 20, Ephes. iv. 11, 16, John xvii. 22,
1 John ii. 1, 2, but also victoriously leads his people to a higher
external and internal completion, 1 Cor. xv. 27, 28.

SECTION THE SECOND.
OF THE APPROPRIATION OF SALVATION.
§ 139. GRACE AND THE HOLY SPIRIT.
The perfect mediator of the new covenant, Heb. ix. 15, first
imparts to the souls of men the gift of eternal redemption
through the Holy Spirit who receives all "of His," John xvi.
13, 14. For obtaining salvation is one thing (supstrig kvtpoi-
mug, Heb. ix. 12), imparting it to individuals is another; sal
vation prepared differs from salvation appropriated (to) yjipis-
S'ivrcc nptv, 1 Cor. ii. 12; psro%o/, Heb. iii. 1, vi. 4); the grace

276 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. 11. OF APPROPRIATION.
of our Lord Jesus Christ is distinct from the grace of the Holy
Spirit. Through the former the whole world is reconciled (xuiu
Ivvupiv) 1 John ii. 1, 2; through the latter an ever-increasing
number of individuals is reconcUed unto God, xur hbgyuuv, 2
Cor. v. 20, hofjueSnx, vt\p Xpiff-rou, xccrukXciyrire ru &g£. See
above § 26, % 81, and § 84, on the second and third necessary
causality of salvation.
Remark. Grace is termed the Divine causality of salvation,
first as contrasted with^law, reward, and merit, )Rom. iii. 23, iv.
4; Tit. ii. 11, iii. 7; and secondly, in contrast with (nature and
individual ability,) 1 Cor. xv. 10; Ephes. i. 8. The operation of
the Spirit of grace (Heb. x. 29) is described for example in
Ephes. iii. 16, 19.

§ 140. ORDER OF SALVATION.
As the founding of salvation on the person of the Eedeemer
does not proceed magicaUy, but, whilst availing itself primarUy
of doctrine and testimony, in harmony with that fundamental
relation of man which includes freedom, so the appropriation
of salvation, in hke manner, must first operate by inciting or
calling forth man's free suseeptibUity. This mediation of
grace operating by the word, the church, and sacraments,
does not exclude the necessity of an immediate work of God
on the human heart; and the commencement of a new birth
through the Spirit, when such has actuaUy taken place, does
not impede a constant carrying on of that work up to a point
which is never reached in the present condition of humanity.
To this threefold relation correspond the three leading doctrines,
namely, the calling shiners by the gospel, the new birth through
the Spirit, and the sanctification of human life.
Remark. The scholasticism of the middle ages was unable
rightly to represent the doctrine of the appropriation of salva
tion, because it had in view rather the ecclesiastical course of

§ 140. ORDER OF SALVATION. 277
the Christian life, as it should develope itself in the elements of the
sacrament, than the order of salvation. Meanwhile it contemplated
chiefly preparing and justifying grace, and then baptism, and
repentance after baptism. The latter distinction loses its signi-
ficancy in Protestantism, because every reconversion of a relapsed
man essentiaUy resembles the first. The positive divinity of
the Reformation at first only regarded the article of justification
by faith, and developed it according to circumstances, or rather
only more fully unfolded the idea of faith, as regards spirit,
repentance, works, and love. At a later period, the Reformed
doctrine entered upon the distinction of gratia preparans and
convertans, as well as of sanctificans, conservans, glorificans, or
even regeneratio, renovatio, &c.
The mysticism of the middle ages had the individualizing of
salvation less in view than the extinction of individualism, or
than the stages of unio; and Protestants have erroneously
reckoned this unio mystica as an especial, final point, which it
cannot be, since the true mystical union with God is already
included in regeneration and sanctification. Equally erroneous
is it if an especial reXelueig (according to a false interpretation of
an expression in the Hebrews) be made the conclusion. The
school of Ernesti has not been more successful in criticising the
customary order, than the division of Christ's office; for the
leading distinction, justificatio and sanctificatio, vocatio and
regeneratio, is obvious, in Biblical language. Two series, the
objective and subjective, (uxofi, mens), as proposed by De Wette,
cannot be carried out, and do not assist in solving the problem.
Schleiermacher established a correct arrangement, although it
had been introduced by an older division; gratia prcecurrens,
operans, co-operans, &c. The arrangement must be especially
psychological, yet not in such a manner that the relation of
feeling, understanding, and will, be made fundamental, as done
by Hollaz and Ammon, in which case nothing more remains for
sanctification; but the arrangement must be such, that the con
ditions of the soul, or the spiritual life, with reference to media
tion, principle, and development, be taken into account. We
may refer this threefold division — caUing, justification, sanctifi
cation — to Christ, as Prophet, Priest, and King.

278 PART III. SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
A. On Calling.
§ 141. ELECTION.
Divine calling is not only to be considered as a universal
pubhcation of reconciliation, founded on Christ, and as a
preaching of grace, and an invitation to the banquet of spiri
tual life in general, (as it is shared by the whole world in suc
cessive distinct ages, according to nations and their destinies,
Prov. ix. 1, seq., Luke xiv. 17, Matt. xi. 28, Mark xvi. 15,
Tit. ii. 11, 1 Tim. iii. 16; but it is to be viewed as an in
fluence operating upon our knowledge, heart, and wUl, in its
especial application unto individuals. Divine caUing is related
in a twofold manner to election. It appears in justification, as
the consequence of election, Eom. viii. 29, or is coincident
with election and justification, in such a manner that a con
trast between caUed and chosen does not exist. Moreover, it
brings to hght obduracy or unsusceptibihty, as well as the
non-existent and the undetermined, 1 Pet. ii. 8. For al
though God " wiU have all men to be saved," 1 Tim. ii. 4,
and has created no personal being for damnation,1 stiU the wis
dom of Divine grace, even in those who for a long period, or
for ever oppose it, attains by such its holy purposes, Eom. ix.
17, 22, xi. 33. The gradual entrance of men into feUowship
with Christ, is in harmony with the plan of calling and elec
tion adopted by God, which deviates as much from our opinion
and expectation, (ave^r^vtocirroi at ohot ovrov, Eom. xi. 33), as
it does in excluding the claims of merit and works, ix. 11,
"va fj -/mt \xkoynv itpi&zaig rov §zov fihy, ovx s'| 'ipyaiv, uAK'
Ix rov xaXovvrog. Ever wiU the first be last, and the last first.
According to His own choice, God aUows individuals to attain
hearing, faith, and knowledge, Eom. x. 14, through the gos
pel, which is adapted indeed to aU classes and races of men
without distinction, (ov yap wti huo-roXq iovluwv rs xou iKkqvos,
Eom. x. 12.) But those who do not obey that gospel, whose

A. ON CALLING. — § 141. ELECTION. 279
sound has gone out unto aU the earth, and whose caU is suffi
ciently clear and constant, x. 16-21, have been previously
hardened and rejected of God, in order that through their
holding back, the mercy of a calling and electing God may be
the more glorified, in the uncaUed and the " far off," and
that zeal be caUed forth and maintained in aU, Eom. xi. 8, 24.
Nevertheless, the validity of any original caU suffers no dispa
ragement by an early or late reception of individuals ; for God,
who is rich over aU, Eom. x. 12, desires not to gain the life
of one by the death of another, Eom. xi. 25-32.
1 Nowhere in Holy Scripture is there any mention of an eter
nal decree of damnation " before the world began," nor of a
divine creation for unhappiness, not even when exeun bgyfig xarrig-
ne/jbevu ng dmuXeiuv, are aUuded to in Rom. ix. 22, in whom the
wrath and power of God were to be shown. This passage is
evidently copied from the Book of Wisdom, xi. 20, 'E/ ydg
eX^goug muihuv eou xul b<peiXo[bivog ^tuvdru (gxeuq, bgyrig xurrigrigyfevu eig
dmuXeiuv) [herd rogdurrig irif&urjgug mgogoxfis *«' hei\geug (fj.uxgo§uf/.iug,)
houg xgwvs xa> romov hi' uv dmuXXuyifigi rSjs xuxlag' (herd moerjg
dxgij3eiug ixgivug roug uioug gou, x. X. Both in St Paul's epistle, as
well as in the Book of Wisdom, the subject turns on Pharaoh as
an example of God's mercy and long-suffering towards those
who were to fall under His judgment. The question refers to
the worth and destiny of men, in so far as they are apparent
and complete in this life. There are men in history, as we are
reminded by St Paul, who are destined to have the Divine judg
ment manifested in them. They are vessels of wrath and dis
honour; but even towards such God has shown His patience.
Whence alone it is evident that their existence was not designed
for His wrath to be manifested in them. In direct unison with
similar reflections, the Book of Wisdom has such passages as the
following, (xii.) : — " But thou sparest the Canaanites, for they
were men; for thou lovest all things that are, so that they may
believe that Thy judgment is not unright ; (rbv pn b<pnXovru xoXag-
Srjvug xuruhlxugui), thinking it not agreeable with thy power to
condemn him that hath not deserved to be punished, not that thou
wast unable to bring the ungodly under the hand of the righteous
in battle to destroy them ; for it (jthe Canaanites) was a cursed
seed from the beginning ; neither didst thou from fear of any
man give them pardon for those things wherein they sinned

280 PART III. SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
For who shall say, What hast thou done? or who can stand
against thee for to be revenged for the unrighteous men?" Up
to this fragmentary point of the question, and indeed with the
appropriation of all its elements, the apostle advanced; and
although he compared God, when variously destinating different
men, to the potter, in allusion to the prophetic passage, never
theless he only concluded by asserting, that against God, who is
affected by no law or duty — against Him no law and no com
plaint can be made; apart from the consideration, that the
comparison of the potter and the clay, in all the passages of the
Old Testament, only speaks of that for which the will of God
constitutes man or a people within their historical epoch and
earthly destiny. St Paul certainly reduces the designed des
tiny into the causative ; but whilst, as in Rom. iii. 3-8, he con
tends against the immoral inferences drawn from the destina
tion of liars and the unrighteous, he teaches at the same time
that God's ultimate aim and final cause in the unrighteous can
only be relative ; the apostle here takes his stand upon apologe-
tico-polemical grounds. The question was, whether the universal
calling of the heathen and Jews corresponded to the particular
ism of the Old Testament, and how the particular calling of the
Jews agrees with the Divine word. In the former relation this
may be admitted; there is neither a right of descent nor of works
and merit opposed to the freedom of grace, as may be seen from
the words and history of the Old Testament; and in the latter
relation this may hold, that whether few or many disbelieve, so
far is this from contradicting the power and wisdom of God, that
it rather tends to the glorification of free grace, for salvation,
since it is purely of grace, even in its imputation through the
Divine favour of illumination, awakening and conversion must
especiaUy appear as an act of grace. Hence it comes to pass,
that the extensive limitation of election advances the protensive
and intensive progress of God's work on humanity. Now in such
connexion the following considerations may be especially noticed •
some were ordained unto eternal life, Acts xiii. 48; some were
appointed to take offence, 1 Pet. ii. 8; but, in the first place, we
must accompany this with another view, that the apostle assumes
merely temporal obduracy and rejection, and in order to explain
the not being called, requires the case of those who have not
heard and have not obeyed. *We need only refer to the explan
ation of the same phenomenon given by Jesus, John v. and vi.

A. ON CALLING. — § 142. CALLING THROUGH THE GOSPEL. 281
iii order to perceive how those who cannot, and shall not believe,
do not exclude those who will not believe. Jesus undoubtedly
teaches the attraction of the Father; and only comes to him
whom the Father has given unto him. The Jews could neither
believe, nor understand, nor comprehend the Word, because they
are not of the truth. No unsusceptible, no unrighteous one,
shall believe; God will not subdue his opposition. That unbelief
is a Divine punishment of a previous guilty condition, Christ ex
pressly asserts, John v. 40, " Ye will not come to me." In like
manner, Chrysostom and Melancthon have taught, on good
ground: Deus trahit, sed trahit volentem. In connexion with all
this, Scripture teaches nothing concerning a decision before the
world began — of an eternal decree, consequently all declarations
of the love of God to the world, John iii. 16, of a propitiation for
the sins of the whole world, 1 John ii. 2, and such like, retain their
fuU power, and resist those elaborate attempts which have been
made to particularise generality or universality. On the other
hand, it is from that point which relates to the Paraclete whence
Christians, in their temporal state and weakness, will refer to
God's purpose, and his predetermination to call, justify, and
glorify, Rom. viii. 29, 30. As the Redeemer affirms no one can
deprive him of those whom the Father hath given unto him ; so
this comforting remembrance is afforded to Christians enfeebled
by tribulation, to those who feel themselves placed by persecu
tions, by the delay in the final consummation, and by the de
crease of their first love in a state of wavering and apprehension,
although time wiU not (like whatsoever else that is temporal),
cause their Christianity to disappear, and deprive them of their
inheritance : if ye be only justified, then are ye also glorified and
sanctified ; for inasmuch as ye have obtained the righteousness
of Christ, so far is it from being a mere temporal phenome
non, that it is rather the realization of God's innermost decree,
which is fulfiUed in such as he has called, ordained, and fore
known; compare Joh. Pet. Lange, Doctrine of the Holy Scrip
ture on the Free and Universal Grace of God. Elberfeld, 1831.

§ 142. CALLING THROUGH THE GOSPEL.
Calling, in its operation on the*heart, or on the unity of the
conception and wiU, is both iUumination1 and awakening, Eph.

282 PART III. SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
v. 14, but in either case it is effected by the Divine Word.
No one can attam unto feUowship in salvation who has not been
caUed by the word, nor apart from the inchnation of the Father
to the Son; for even that seizing with violence of which the
Lord speaks, Matth. xi. 12, presupposes the day of John and
Christ, or their calling.2 Faith cometh by hearing, Eom. x. 17.
Now although the entire government of the world is so regu
lated by a Eedeeming God, that it supports the caU of the
gospel by accompanying or preparing, and upholds the espe
cial destiny of individuals in particular, Luke xiii. 1 — 8, yet,
apart from the ministry of the gospel, and external to it, there
is no independent caUing; so that God, where his word remains
altogether inoperative, wUl not beget the result of salvation
by any other means, Luke xvi. 31.
1 Calling has for its object undivided spiritual life, whose
changes are at all times mediated by cognition, and not less so
has it conversion ; and every act of sanctifying grace must again
be one of illumination, to which act (inasmuch as every essen
tial renewal of life is conditionated by a new cognition), the pre
vious call by the gospel corresponds. Christ is the light of the
world, John ix. 5, xii. 36, who of God is made unto us wisdom,
1 Cor. i. 30 : the immediate chastening office of the Holy Spirit,
John xvi. 8; compare iii. 19, 20. The condition of illumination
through existing circumstances, Eph. v. 14, a passage apparently
derived from Isaiah lx. 1. The illumination co-existing with re
generation and justification, 1 Cor. ii. 15; 2 Cor. iv. 6; Eph. iii.
18; iv. 13. Partly in the same passages, partly in James i. 5,
6; Phil. iii. 15, the illumination which operates associated with
sanctification. 2 This suffering violence of the kingdom of God, and this seizing
it with violence upon the part of those who do violence is the re
verse of that time when it was only prophesied, longed, and hoped
for. Primarily, the question only turns on a preference of the com
mencing epoch, and on the standing-point of the New Testament.
The appearance of violence and conquest is a necessary one. Com
pare Luke ix. 62; without such act no one enters into the king
dom of God. The improperly used expression sufficiently ex
plains and justifies itself through other representations of holi-

A. ON CALLING. — § 143. FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 283
ness in worldliness, as in Luke xvi. 8, and the question is not
deficient in connexion, — by the doers of violence being worthy
of praise. Hence, since the appearance of Schweizr's learned
disquisition on the passage, Theoll. Stud. u. Kritick. 1836, i. p. 90,
"Whether in this passage of Matth. xi. 12, praise or blame be
implied?" We do not exclude the view given above and at p. 207.

| 143. FAITH AND UNBELIEF.
Divine calling, as distinguished from election (Matth. xx. 16),
or from conversion and sanctification (Luke xiv. 16 — 23), is
primarUy related to the contrast of believers and unbelievers.
Some who hear the word do not understand, Matth. xiii. 19,
(they could not, indeed, as they are, understand, v. 13, com
pare § 120, Eemark,) or they do not keep the word, v. 21,
or mix it up with the wisdom of the flesh and the world, v. 22,
are disobedient to the gospel in general, Eom. x. 16, since it
is unto them foolishness or an offence, 1 Cor. i. 24. Christ
comes to his own wherever he proclaims himself to man as truth
and grace; but not aU who are his by virtue of their human
nature, or by virtue of his incarnation and passion for them,
and his sovereignty, receive him on their parts, John i. 11.
Since, to a certain extent, the whole world sins against him
rather through unbelief, Eom. xi. 30, 32, those continue in
unbelief who do not permit the light of grace to fall upon
them, because it reproves their sin, and will not allow them
selves to be redeemed, reconciled, and " gathered," Luke
xiii. 34, whUst they prefer the freedom of unrighteousness to
the servitude of righteousness. These unbelievers (vwi ax-
efosiug, Eph. v. 6; Acts xxviii. 24), are to be distinguished
from those who are simply not believers and not Christians,
(anaroi, 1 Cor. vii. 13.) Now, ff unbelief be an essential want
of relation of human spontaneity to the economy of salvation,
which requires faith to such a degree that it even caUs itself
faith, Gal. iii. 23, then a strong point of opposition to grace is
conceivable, and becomes the object of admonition, Matt. xii.

284 PART III. SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
31, to which the unwillingness of unbehef passes from the
merely passive character of indolence and cowardice into one
of the most hateful duplicity, and is no longer opposed to the
mediations of truth and grace in the Son of Man, or in the
gospel, but becomes an unreconciled and irreconcilable blas
phemer against the immediateness of the Holy Spirit.1
1 In the legislation of antiquity, both positive and philoso
phical, a distinction is made between expiable and inexpiable
offences. Cic. de legg. i. 14, scelerum in homines atque impietatum
nulla expiatio est, Plato de legg. x. fin. A crime of a treasonable
character, i. e. such as assails, and, as far as it can, destroys the
foundations of the entire Theocratic policy, does not, according
to the Mosaic legislation, admit of being either pardoned or
expiated ; or rather it must be rooted out of the people by the
punishment of death. Blasphemy against the Divine name is
preeminently a transgression of this kind. Now, if in accordance
with the dispensation of the New Testament there be aught that
is inexpiable and unpardonable, blasphemy against God is its na
tural symbol in the Old Testament; and it does not admit of a
doubt that Jesus, (according to Matthew xii. 31 ; Mark iii. 28 ;
Luke xii. 10), in this aspect, warns against the sin of blasphemy
with a distinction of its various kinds; and it appears particularly
from St Mark, that the Redeemer was desirous of more strictly
defining the Mosaic law, (Levit. xxiv.), or associating himself
with its correct interpretation. The law inflicts, first, ^p,
Q^tlVs (*'¦ e- f°r any kind of blasphemy against divinity), only
punishment in general, ONE)! Nl^ll.); on the other hand,
direct blasphemy of VDtt? was punished by death. This distinc
tion of punishable and unpardonable blasphemy (xuxoXoyid, 1 Sam.
iii. 13, Septuagint) the Redeemer, according to Mark, applies, in
the first place, in such a way, that He represents pardonable
blasphemy as less punishable than blasphemy against Elohim, and
then, according to Matthew, He represents it as blasphemy against
the Divine Ambassador, in this case, against the Son of Man ; and,
in both instances, the unpardonable blasphemy against the name,
against Jehovah, as blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. Olshau-
sen, in his commentary on Matthew xii. is not quite correct in his
endeavours to establish a threefold stage of the sin blasphemy,
namely, against the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The

A. ON CALLING.  § 143. FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 285
question rather turns on blasphemy in general (against Elohim)
than on that against the Father ; neither is he altogether correct
in assuming, that every blasphemy has God for its object; for
the Jewish interpretation of the law regarded the derision and
contempt even of magistrates, judges, and of every human media
tor of Divine authority, as proportionate blasphemy; and the
same is certainly to be understood of the words of the evangelist
Mark, ui fiXugiptipiui, ogug &v j3Xug<pri/M>igugiv. But the point to be
considered is, how there can be in the New Covenant an unpar
donable offence, and in what sense blasphemy against the Holy
Ghost is to be understood. According to Delbriick, (Christenthum,
Betrachtungen und untersnchungen, &c, part iii. 1827), the New
Testament contradicts itself by affirming the universal pardon of
sin, and yet asserting that there is a sin which is unpardonable :
upon this point he has been answered in Theoll. Stud. u. Krit.
1828, p. 649, sq. For does the New Testament subject the recep
tion of forgiveness of sins to no condition ? Does the grace of
God in Christ constrain the sinner to become righteous and
blessed? May there not be also an unbelieving tendency of the
mind which cannot be forgiven, because it rejects all pardon, and,
so far as it can, extinguishes every relation of man unto God?
Were it possible for the New Testament to have refrained from
admonitory hints touching such aggressive refractoriness against
grace? In point of fact there are not a few such hints, whether
they relate to the offensive character of unbelief in the Gospel,
or to the final apostacy in relapse and its accompanying phe -
nomena, Matthew vi. 23, John viii. 24, Hebrews vi. 4, x. 26,
2 Peter ii. 10, 21, 22, 1 John v. 16, Revelation xxii. 11.
Thus, properly speaking, the question is only, whether and how
that which appears to be conceivable merely as a bias and a con
stant, unsubdued tendency, is also to be conceived as being an
isolated act of sin. That Jesus often affirms, as, for example, in
Matthew v. 22, 39, 40, something of acts and of sensuous opera
tions, which clearly can only be understood of modes of disposition
and conduct corresponding to such acts, is, for the most part,
admitted, provided He shall not be regarded as a second Moses,
and altogether distinct and inconceivable. Saying is (according
to a universal, yet an especially eastern, manner of representation)
the symbol of the disposition and continued action; indeed the
evangelist declares, Mark iii. 30, by the words, "they said, He
hath an unclean spirit," that an act of speech had elicited this

286 PART III. SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
judgment of Jesus. However, it does not follow that what had
been the occasion of the censure was at the same time its perfectly
developed object. At all events, Rheinhard's interpretation is
altogether inadmissible, according to which the Jewish cotempo-
raries who opposed Jesus were, by their referring His curing
demoniacs to the devil, accused of blasphemy against the Holy
Ghost. The judgment of Jesus manifestly includes much more
than this, and it appears, on the other hand, to be capable only
of a relative application to the Pharisees of that period, — in so
far as, in a certain sense, scoffing at the Spirit was as yet impos
sible, because Christ " was not yet glorified," John vii. 39, " The
Holy Ghost was not yet given." Whether (according to Ammon,
Handh. der Sittenl. i. 1823, p. xxi. and 425) the Pharisees can
actually be accused of the crime in question, or, as Olshausen,
Tholuck, and others maintain, the charge brought against them
in this respect is to be considered in the light of a warning, or,
according to C. Ludw. Nitzch (de peccato homini cavendo quam-
quam in hominem non cadente, Viteb. 1802) can only be a
warning in general, or an accusation of a particular tendency, —
to form a judgment on this point, presupposes a more accurate
idea of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For some excellent
contributions towards a correct definition of this idea, see Theoll.
Stud, und Krit. 1833, 4; J. W. Grashof, iib d. Blasph. des h. Geistes,
1834, 3 ; Gurlitt, Bemerkk. zu der Abh. des Hrn. Grashof, &c.
1836, 2; Tholuck, on the nature of the sin against the Holy
Ghost. Blasphemy is the matured expression of hateful con
tempt and denial of the Personal object, in this case, God.
Now, the object is to be expressly distinguished [in so far as it
has only affected the subject in a mediate and yet imperfect man
ner] through and in the Messiah, [who is more or less recognised
but, at the same time, easily mistaken], and to this extent is to be
distinguished, in a perfect and altogether unmediate manner, in
the Holy Spirit, even in the Spirit of grace, Hebrews x. A
certain godlessness and want of conscience constitutes the sin in
every case ; but the revelation of God's holy love, as grace, is
offered to the sinner in the appearance of Christ, in order to excite
repentance and faith. Thus man sins anew against God when
he does not come to the light, lest his works be punished : and
yet this does not amount to blasphemy against the Son of Man.
But disbelief in Him is aggravated when the sinner, ceasing from
mere inert passivity, proceeds to active enmity, and advances even

A. ON CALLING. — § 143. FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 287
to the accusation : Thou art a misguided spirit, a fanatic, a rebel.
The extreme case does not yet appear, inasmuch, for example, as
the carnal Christologist or Jewish teacher of doctrine, in his erro
neous view of the mode in which the kingdom and the Son of God
were to be manifested, can bring the ancient law of God to con
tend against the new law, and the temporal promise against the
spiritual; and the emotions inevitably excited in those whose
sin was exposed to light, might, as well as the entire ancient
law, stand in the way of a full illumination of the conscience.
Meanwhile there was an undoubted necessity for warning man
against this extreme case. The desperate contest had com
menced with their better convictions. An inclination opposing
God and conscience had sprung up out of passive neutrality,
and at least the objective, historical power of redeeming revel
ation for the individual is previously supposed, apart from
actual operation. Together with blasphemy against the Son of
man, there is at least that partial suppression of man's spiritual
and moral subjectivity, without which there can be no connect
ing point for grace and salvation. The Divine Spirit in general
is already blasphemed, namely that Spirit who mediates by
legal culture, and through our indelible rationality ; and hence
it is clear how De Wette (on the sin against the Holy Ghost, 1819)
and Ammon, mentioned above, who, previous to the publica
tion of the works alluded to, endeavoured feelingly to render
the severe earnestness of our Lord's warning, which is so
applicable to our times and life, intelligible) ; it is evident how
they discovered the sin against the Holy Ghost, in the insolent
revolt of self-wUl against religious consciousness, or in the sup
pression of the holy idea of God. But there exists no exegeti-
cal right for placing the Holy Spirit, and Spirit and conscience
in general or religious consciousness, on an equality. The latter
may and can acquire a new definiteness through the Divine
truth of the grace of Christ becoming subjective. The Divine
potentiality of this subjective state is the Holy Spirit ; and, as
in its work it completes the operation of God's grace, considered
as condescending to destroy sin, so must man's beginning not only
to grieve, to repel, and to withdraw himself from it, but also to
blaspheme it, — be considered as the consummation of the refusal
of grace and the unpardonable sin. A sin which can only be un
pardonable, because there is combined withal a condition which
no longer allows any commencement or progress of repentance,

288 PART III. SALVATION.— SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
from the manner in which the alone Holy One hath been
pleased to regulate and destinate the world and human nature.
How shall this entire incapacity for repentance, and the ele
ment in concreto inviting it, be comprehended? For in its
entire incomprehensibility, warning also appears to lose its
power. So much is certain, that the most perfect knowledge
of the good ever carries with it the will to love, and neither ad
mits of hatred nor difference, John xvii. 3; 1 John iii. 6. On the
other hand, the sin under discussion, as it appears, can only
enter where all the light of truth which could come to an indi
vidual, (Hebrews X. 26, perd rb Xu/3e?v rrjv imiyvueiv rrjg dXrfreiug,) to
gether with the accompanying good feelings and emotions, have
been rendered inoperative by means of the opposing will; so that,
according to the view of the earlier Lutheran divines, he only
who was in a state of illumination and grace, could commit
that sin. It may be asked whether this contradiction cannot
be accommodated. It must be conceded, a (point which Tholuck
has not sufficiently considered in his tendency to differ from
Gurlitt,) that there is a Scriptural view of a state of grace which
cannot again be lost ; for whosoever is born of God is preserved,
and those who actuaUy fall away never were, according to 1 John
ii. 9, true, regenerate Christians. For if there be a state of im
possible [/.erdvoiu, how should it not be possible that there should
also be an opposite dhbvurov in those whose newly implanted life
is as firmly rooted as it is flourishing? In like manner, it must
be conceded, that a certain fulness of experience in Christianity,
and of excited love and joy, is presupposed in those, who, accord
ing to Hebrews vi. 10, 2 Pet. ii. fall away, so that no room for
recovery remains. But should not such a love, degenerated into ha
tred, rather come under the contingencies of that condition which
we ascribe rather unto the awakened than to the regenerated?
These awakened — (what have they not tasted of spiritual bless
ings, what signs of life have they not already given !) whilst they
esteem themselves, and are regarded as converted, regenerated,
and elected, fall away and suffer relapse, in a moral point of
view, and are in extreme danger of transgressing against the truth
of the Spirit, which alone wills and works regeneration. Thus,
then, the sin of this apostacy is to be viewed as on the verge
of a hateful opposition to the Spirit of tmth; that point,
where heat passes into cold, and where the latter must ever
be regarded as that last state of indifference to Good and Bad,

A. CALLING. — § 144. STAGES OF FAITH. 289
such as Gurlitt endeavours to represent it. However this may
be, (for the endlessness of the individual course is yet, in fact,
but little understood by our dogmatic ideas concerning awaken
ing and regeneration, however necessary such ideas in them
selves may be,) the idea of a final opposition and complete apos-
tacy, or of grace exhausted upon the sinner, remains, just as
everlasting punishment and eternal death remains, a necessary
hypothesis of Christianity; if neither the holiness of God, nor the
possibUity of good nor human unconstrainedness shall be denied,
nor a mere natural process step into the place of the kingdom
of God.

§ 144. STAGES OF FAITH.
Calling in its distinction from election and conversion is,
among other things, related to different stages of faith, in which
consists every essential harmonious relation of man to the
God of salvation, and which behef, indeed, from its commence
ment, is not a mere passive compulsion or capacity of percep
tion,1 but is an acknowledgment, consequently a moral accept
ance of the Divine word.2 That is to say, ff the salvation of
man be so grounded that the Personal Eedeemer comes into
the world, and there developes himself into an operative princi
ple of our death unto sin, and holy return unto hfe; and, far
ther, that the Eedeemer does not impart himself magically or
mechanicaUy to the life of each individual sinner, but is impart
ed by means of testimony; and ff there be a prevenient reconci
liation of the whole world, — in that case the reception of salvation
or beatification can be nothing else than faith in the name of the
Lord, and particularly in the blood of Jesus. This belief, as
the condition of all Divine favour and blessedness, is alike the
same in Abraham or David as in Peter, since it ever includes a
hving veneration for the God of grace, as well as for the God of
truth, and whUst ever renouncing self from a peculiar sense of
power, worth, and right, at the same time consists in its en
trance into every attested and accorded mediation of God,
u

290 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
and not only refers back to that original confidence in God's
invisible nature and works, for which, and with which, man
was created, but also generates from itself every confidence,
every faith and consolation, as opposed to misfortune and trial
in the hour of need and of death.3 Hence there are no vahd
grounds for distinguishing between universal and especial faith,
between the faith of revelation and justification, or faith in the
doctrine and the person of the Eedeemer. For the former does
not exist apart in the actual hfe of faith, or has nothing to do with
the appropriation of salvation. On the other hand, faith, viewed
as a self-restraining principle in man, is quite distinct from re
garding it as the gift of the Holy Spirit ; and faith in the awakened,
differs from faith in the converted. Both distinctions pass into
and modify each other. For, although faith, on the one hand,
inasmuch as it is a command (Mark i. 15) and a praise, must
also be a work and an obedience of man ; so that all truth may
revolve round this point of the co-operative doctrine of the free
dom of the wiU, — yet is it effected by the grace of the calling
God in all its degrees, and in so far as it yet precedes the an
nunciation of the gospel, is effected, induced, and called forth
by the equaUy natural grace of the sustaining God; and yet aU
this occurs in a mediate way, and so, that with every advance
of faith, there is a gradation of human spontaneity, or free sus
ceptibility. Every believer has, therefore, been awakened
unto believing, and yet only in proportion does he approach
near to salvation, or partake in it, as he is awakened or prepar
ed for it. Hence we receive, through a something which we
either are or do, the gift of the Holy Spirit; whether it be caU
ed repentance or faith, Acts ii. 38, Gal. iii. 14; but the entire
blessed confidence in the Eedeemer which is thus imparted to
us, or faith as the actual principle of a new, holy and blessed
life, is a grace immediately bestowed on us, which entirely
excludes all co-operation and every merit, as weU as aU refer
ence to the fact that we have believed, and do beheve.
i Perhaps it is only in James ii. 19, that mtgng occurs in a reli
gious and yet morally indifferent sense. In Romans also, xiv.

B. OF REGENERATION. — § 145. CALLING AND REGENERATION.291
23, it has the unusual signification of a moral conviction, of an
evident consciousness of duty before God.
2 Faith is itself an igyov, and especially a work of man which
God wiUs, and which is well-pleasing to Him.
3 Uigng is, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, particularly in chap.
xi. an especial aspect of sanctifying faith, that is to say, a con
fidence in the finisher of our salvation, in the Redeemer who
keeps his word. The author exhorts, in general, to umopovri, mug-
gr)giu rr\g iXmihog, for fear of a possible aapotacy. The general
statements in verses 1 and 6, declare that the renunciation of the
visible and the present, is the fundamental condition of all fel
lowship with God, and of all life pleasing unto him. The ques
tion is not of justification in the sense of iuugeerrjgai, verse 6, but
the exhortation to confidence in the accomplishment of salvation,
refers farther back than to the necessity of our being justified
from sin through our confidence, namely, (upon the occasion of the
example alluded to,) it refers to the necessity of migng for all that
is good. A similar special view of sanctifying faith, i.e., a victori
ous confidence in the power and assistance of the redeeming God,
our Lord sought to perfect in his disciples by word and deed,
Mark xi. 23 ; because the state of revealed salvation at that time
especially indicated this point of culture, and because the belief
that our prayers and our confidence will procure for us infallible
aid, can as well be a preparatory exercise for the real belief of
salvation, as it can be a direction to, and a development of the
same. B. Of Regeneration.
§ 145. CALLING AND REGENERATION.
The end of the Eedeemer's ministry, regarded as merely caU-
ing, is the commencement of a new tendency in the life of man,
his new birth or creation, John iii. 5, 2 Cor. v. 17, James i.
18, and by means of this new commencement, he enters into
fellowship, as a hving member, (Phil. hi. 10, Eomans vi. 5; vii.
4; viii. 29,) with him who has become a new hfe-spring to the
whole human race. Man's regeneration, or the Divine trans
formation of his spiritual hfe, in its origin, is the unity of the
sinner's justification and conversion.

292 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION. '
Remark. Regeneration is related to the totality and unity of
self-consciousness. The latter is, in one point of view, more in
tuitive, in another, more active, *'. e., idea and wUl. Through
justification the representing self-consciousness is renewed, and
becomes a mode of contemplating God and self; our relation to
God in self-perception is quite a distinct thing. Through con
version the will is changed. But as the complete idea, regenera
tion, considered as vitalizing according to the Spirit, at the same
time finishes or excludes something, namely, the carnal life,
so the like holds with the special ideas, justification and conver
sion ; inasmuch as both deny, and both affirm, something. Jus
tification, in a negative aspect, is the pardon of sin, in a positive
one, it is the adoption and appropriation of an eternal inheritance;
conversion, in a negative sense, is a renunciation, repentance,
godly sorrow, a dying, and hence, mortification; in a positive
sense, it is a resurrection unto righteousness, faith, and love,
and hence, vivification.

§ 146. JUSTLFIOATION.
Upon this boundary hne of conditions man is delivered partly
from the dominion of the guilt of sin, and partly from the power
of sin itself. The former is justification or the appropriated re
conciliation of the world, Eomans iii. 28, vih. 30, Phil. hi. 9,
and is indeed distinct from conversion and sanctification, as an
act of judgment, yet at the same time is a communicating act,
and as such is to be perceived in our peace of conscience,
Eomans v. 1, in the spirit of adoption, vih. 15, in intercessory
prayer which we enjoy from this spirit, vih. 26, 27, and is ex
perienced also in our open access unto God, Heb. x. 22, as
well as in the consciousness of our being " co-heirs" with Christ,
Eomans viii. 17, and participating in his glory, ver. 30. Hence
divine justification is the perfect abolition of a penal state (xocrd-
xpipa) or a justification of life Qiixufao-ig Zpijg) Eomans, v 17
18. Remark. The idea of justification is not only expressed by the

B. OF REGENERATION.— § 147, JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH. 293
term hixuiouv but also by xu^ugiZeiv 1 John i. 7 — 9, xa&uglfyiv rriv
guvelhrigiv, Heb. ix. 14, reXeiugui xurd guvelhrigiv, ver. 9, &C. The same
passages treat on justification in its necessary unity with con
version. Upon the whole, the question turns more on justifica^
tion when it relates to the divine production of regeneration, and
more upon conversion when it refers to human change. It is self-
evident that God justifies no one, without at the same time con
verting and sanctifying him. The individualizing of redemption
is a unity which is partly expressed in the idea of regeneration,
and partly in that of faith. But it by no means follows that the
justifying act should be an especial primary element of the whole
idea. I enjoy the peace of pardon and reconcilation in the cer
tainty that my life is united to that of Christ, and in the certainty
of my belief that he died and rose again for me. This applica
tion of Christ to myself is indeed only true in that belief which,
together with a change of mind, includes also a new will.

§ 147. JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.
Even the divine institution of justification itself some times
bears the name of faith, (Gal. iii. 23, 24, Eomans iv. 14,)
which latter term shows that the reconciliation of the world
is not appropriated to us in proportion to our remaining in
nocence or to our future earnestly desired improvement; nor
is it appropriated by a mere consecration of the church, nor by
a barren admission of the truth by the mind, but only by faith
in Christ, which faith centres its life in a personal confidence on
the conciliating power of his death, and certainly can only justify
in proportion as it opens the mind and hfe to the converting and
sanctifying ministry of the Eedeemer. For the worst of all the
divisions of Christ, namely, into him who reconciles and into
him who sanctifies, is not in the shghtest degree founded on the
fact that union must precede fellowship, birth precede life, and
thus faith be anterior to all imitation. Those who conceive
justifying faith to be only good intention, to be the greatest
moral exertion for which, as such, the pardon of sin is granted,
misunderstand the meaning of the gospel not- less than those

294 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
who would infer a co-operation of love for justification, or an
exclusively justifying power of love, from the preference they
have for moral disposition rather than knowledge, or from their
higher estimation of love, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 2, 13, than
of faith. The former are so far correct in explaining faith in
Christ as the truest and highest moral religious effort, which
faith is, as it were, the central point of the sinner, caUed by grace,
the first difficult commencement of aU good; only they overlook
that faith is so principally either in a negative mode or in one of
self-renunciation, and that it has the mediatorship of Christ for
its indispensable object.1 But the latter mistake, in that we
have not first loved, and could not first love, 1 John iv. 10 ; that
in general we neither acquire nor deserve pardon, for in that
case it would be the result of love, but we receive it, as it must
be the work of faith ; they mistake in that the mediated gift —
love, as a participation in the Divine nature, may certainly be in
itself greater than the mediating gift, and than faith, since God
neither beheves nor hopes, but loves. And, moreover, they
mistake, in that, faith, in which a certain element of love, namely,
truth, humility, desire, and self-denial cannot be wanting, stUl
maintains the entire dignity of the new birth. StUl less is
the exclusively justifying power of faith annuUed by the com
bined operation of good works with faith (avvijpyu James ii. 22).
For Scripture, or the one apostohcal spirit, only corrects an
abuse which crept into the doctrine of grace and faith by means
of this development of a hving basis as the opposite of cause
and effect. Faith, as a hving basis, includes its consequences,
that is, love and its works, and excludes these only in so far as
they could afford a first or second independent basis of subjec
tive salvation. This is the doctrine of the Apostle Paul, a
doctrine altogether free from the supposition of there being
a dead faith, which is yet a faith. But in so far as faith, re
garded as a mere abstract empty basis, is separated from and
renounces works in degenerated Christians and doctrines, so
works which are the living consequences of faith, become of
importance for reanimating this dead basis, and thus arises and

B. REGENERATION. — § 147. JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH. 295
exists the doctrine of St James, which indeed still retains what
is bad and defective of its motive, namely, of the motive through
a corrupt misuse of the promise ; since it is impossible that
good works should be added to mere behef in order to co-ope
rate with the latter: Thus James only explains in this way
the idea of the Pauline faith, much in the same way as ab
stract faith is explained in Eomans x. 10, namely, that a liv
ing and confessing faith is divided into a justifying faith, and
a sanctifying confession " with the mouth."
1 Luther to Agricola, 31st August 1527. Mundus et ratio non
capit, quam sit cognitio ardua, Christum esse justitiam nostram:
ita operum opinio nobis incorporata agnataque et innaturata est.
— The truth of this assertion has again and again been proved
since the period of the reformation, and associated anew with
evangelical theology. But however often it has been necessary
to repair and illustrate the Protestant method of teaching, in so
much that Calixtus, willingly omitted sola fide, Swedenborg al
lowed that a change of mind, and a reformation of life precede
-justification and justifying faith, (Dr J. F. J. Tafel, Vergl.
Dartsell. der Lehrgegensatze der katholiken und Protestanten,
&c, zugl. die erste Darstellung und Begriindung der Unters-
cheidungslehren Swedenborg's, Tubing. 1835, p. 278, seq,) and
farther, Tittmann, de summis principiis confessionis Augustance,
Lips. 1830, denied the forensic idea of justification, only discover
ing therein a new possibility of a state of grace and holiness;
and Schleiermacher represented all separation of God's justifying
and converting efficacy as inadmissible : still the essence of our
evangelical church-doctrine is nevertheless competent to de
fend itself against the objections raised by Mohler and Tafel,
and all such like objections. It is necessary to recognise the
genetic in regeneration, namely, that its primary element is jus
tification, although apart from the other, i. e. conversion, it can
neither be preserved nor. perfected. The sinner as such, is in
active and passive enmity against God, and the one is strength
ened through the other. Sin considered as action, and tendency,
involves banishment from God; this is universally conceded; but
not sufficiently so the other view, namely, that a feeling of ban
ishment and guilt must first be removed, and the will of him
who is called must first enter into the reconciliation offered in

296 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
Christ, if it shall become a new wUl of love, and if the commence
ment of this righteousness shaU take place. Remissio peccatorum
fide recepta fit reconciliatio, reconciliatio regenerat, sanctificat
peccatorem. The uncalled and unenlightened sinner neither
discerns the holiness nor love, neither the righteousness nor the
grace of God, or at least, not so as to admit of this knowledge
changing his life. The caUed and enlightened sinner discerns
in God, as seeking and accepting the world through Christ,
his pardoning judge, and his spiritually-punishing reconciler.
Now, if he acknowledges him, and with his whole heart accepts the
offer of holiest grace — (however much the flesh strive against it,
because it rather shuns the subjection to, and obligation of,
the new covenant, and persists in sin appeased by its own ex
piation or by none, and enjoys the semblance of righteousness
and freedom rather than accept a restoration at once so humili
ating and annihilating) — if he believes, he is justified, Rom. iii.
28, " his faith is counted for righteousness," iv. 5. For the con
sciousness of adoption, and the power of love and of a new obe
dience, is bestowed on the same faith, in the Holy Spirit. The
same faith stirs and changes the whole heart and life. It is not ,
alone, i. e., it is not a mere idea and admission of the truth, it
is not without repentance, love, patience, and hope, but it alone
justifies, as the constant fulfilment and completion of the righteous
ness which is yet lacking ; so that even after conversion, and in
sanctification, that which justifies ever continues to be faith, and
faith only. Such is the Protestant doctrine. Does it then desire
that the believer should only be accounted as justified, whilst in
fact he is unrighteous, or not righteous? Undoubtedly; but only
in so far (as it comes to pass without merit on his part, without
satisfaction from him, and purely of grace) that he is received into
the feUowship of Christ, the just one and the justifier. Every
pardon and forgiveness of sin is a justifying righteousness, and a
righteous justification. But then faith is a righteousness also,
namely, xurd xty", in and according to the relations of the new
covenant; yea, is the only true righteousness of which man is
capable. Only the being in Christ, and possessing him, consti
tutes the righteousness which is valid before God. But how are
we in him, and how do we possess him, if not by going out of
self, renouncing self-glory, and by receiving and accepting him,
ergo— by faith? This faith is the foundation and commence
ment of all our righteousness; all love and sincerity return back

B. OF REGENERATION. — § 148. REPENTANCE AND FAITH. 297
to this principle, and is completed in it. Imputative righteousness,
or righteousness from grace by faith, is not merely putative. The
exception adduced by Swedenborg is very unimportant, namely,
that faith itself even is a gift of grace, and, consequently, the
question arises how faith is appropriated, and whether it may
occur through a previous conversion. But, on the other hand, with
equal justice we might reply, — conversion is a gift of God, and
thus we could never attain to the idea of an appropriation of
salvation. Faith is the gift of God in a very different sense
from that of forgiveness of sins; and this faith, according to
many expressions and passages in Holy Scripture, is the sum
and substance of entire saving subjectivity, and hence is not ne
cessarily a consequens or connatum of repentance, but is as much
the reality of repentance as is love. The instance adduced by
Mohler, namely, that the justifying faith of Protestants only jus
tifies in humility and confidence, and does so in love, and that
therefore love justifies, is not less erroneous, however subtle the
instance may be ; for it is not the love which the believer pos
sesses, but the love he desires to have; it is his hungering after
true love which makes him a believer, and consequently it is
faith. — Compare my Protestantischen Theses, Nr. 69 — 73 — .

§ 148. REPENTANCE AND FAITH.
Eeconciling feUowship with the Lord cannot exist apart from
a perfect change of mind, or conversion. In the feUowship
of his death, Eom. vi. 5, vii. 4; PhU. iii. 10; Col. ii. 11,
we die to that of sin (rw o-u^kti rfjg upapriug) in continued re
pentance, 2 Cor. vii. 10; Eomans viii. 13, or persevering pe
nance, which is not directed to particular faults or defects,
nor to merely moral imperfection. Through the fellowship
of his hfe we hve unto righteousness, Eom. vi. 4, 5, 13,
in a decided longing after the perfection of Christ. The two
elements in conversion are reciprocally generated, and preserve
their mutual connexion. For repentance unto hohness is
distinguished from despair, in that it aUows us continuaUy to
feel the grace and victory of Christ inthe spiritual punish
ment of sin, and either derives the power of repentance

298 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
itself from faith in reconcUiation, or, at aU events, brings no
sorrow for past and present sin which may not be changed
into joy in the Lord, and confidence of victory. Moreover, such
penitence differs from mere sentimental or even worldly re
pentance, in that it demands and requires perfect confidence •
in justification, in order to prevent despair; and that, as a
strengthening principle, it strives, on every new excitation,
after the holiness of the Lord. In his heroic assiduity to
acknowledge and confess his sin in its fullest amount (1
John i. 9), and timely to perceive and to repent of return
ing sin (ii. 1, 2), and, on the other hand, in his freedom
from vain wishes in regard to undoing what has been done, and
a timely return to his former innocence, consequently in the
power of faith, the penitent man is to be recognised in aU this,
as much as in the feeling that the world is crucified unto him,
and in the state of mind which according to Isa. xxxviii. 16,
although not quite according to the text, is expressed in the
ordinary translation. Again, faith on its part, as an apprehen
sion of Christ, Phil. hi. 9 — 12, ever derives from the know
ledge that repentance is necessary, a new renunciation of all
glory (xavy/isig) and consequently a reinforcement of justifying
confidence (Eom. vh. 25); and whUst developing itself unto
thankfulness and love, it must generate from itself by shame
and repentance aU the feelings and works of penitence. From
this relation it foUows that each particular act, repentance
and faith, may be predicated of entire conversion, although
the development of the latter into a twofold form (e. g. putting
off and on, going out and in, turning from and towards), con
tinues as thoroughly grounded on Scripture as it is on the
nature of things, Mark i. 15; Luke xxiv. 47; Acts xx. 21,
xxvi. 18.
Remark 1. It follows from the above, principally, that we can
not altogether admit, as was usually done at the period of the Re
formation, that penitence is derived from the terror of conscience
produced by the preaching of the law, even in the correction
which the formula concordice had given to the usual derivation.

B. OF REGENERATION. — § 149. EPOCH. 299
That penitence effected by the law, as such, whether of the Old
or New Testament, is only but a preliminary one, and is not the
repentance of regeneration and conversion. The latter springs
from the same preaching of the cross and of grace from wlience
faith comes ; and by the correctional office of the same Holy
Spirit, which is a spirit of faith and grace.
Remark 2. We have to consider faith under a threefold rela
tion, as the reception of salvation. It is, in the first place, the
good in the varied relation of those to whom the gospel is an
nounced, and thus, in contrast with unbelief, is good conduct to
wards grace in the Divine word. In the second place, in con
trast with all xuuxnen, which consoles itself with works, it is the
reception of Divine pardon for sin through Christ, and as such,
is the mediate gift of calling grace, whilst the peace of God, and
the purified conscience, are immediate gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Finally, in the third place, it is the reception of a higher vital
power, and the principle of the new life itself, in so far as the
latter cannot be imparted unto us otherwise than through com
munion with Christ.

§ 149. EPOCH.
The regenerated know they are so, but they know it in
faith, and just as httle in an empirical manner as a man is in a
condition to perceive perfectly, at every distinct moment of his
consciousness, the content of his personal being; and that this
lofty point, whence man passes from a state of calhng and
awakening into the condition of conversion, by means of a spi
ritual conflict once occurring and bordering on despair, and to
which conflict a blissful feeling of victory succeeds, — that such a
point is an epoch in the consciousness, or arrests the attention,
is indeed possible, but must in general be so much the less re
quired, as this demand would carry with it a palpable and moral
disadvantage ; on the other hand, it can in no case be assumed
that the posterity of Christian parents,1 in the enjoyment of a
Christian school and a church, should leave the bare neces
sity of improvement and perfection, and be exempt from the
requirement of a conversion, combined with internal struggles

300 PART III. OF SALVATION.  SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
and change of mind. So far as the latter is an act of the hu
man wffl (Luke xiii. 3, 34; James iv. 7—10), it may indeed
be treated as a temporal concern, be delayed, refused, or alto
gether denied, and this procrastination is nothing else than the
sin of sins, and absolute folly,2 since the mere necessity ac
knowledged for the future and end includes a perfect retraction
of this acknowledgment. But it must be assumed that a true
conversion is never too late (Luke xxiii. 43), when, in a spiritual
sense, its most decided moments do not occur at the end of
life, but in some intermediate period.
1 The words of the apostle, 1 Cor. vii. 14, imel &gu r<i rixvu bpwv
dxdSugru ign, vuv he dyiu ignv, cannot here furnish any proof.
Compare de Wette, Theoll. Stud. u. Krit. 1830, p. 669, where the
correct interpretation is given.
2 Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at Ule
Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.

§ 150. FINAL PERSEVERANCE.
Under a confirming and converting power, as weU as under
election, 2 Peter i. 10, the truth of conversion or sanctifica
tion, correctly speaking, can alone be understood.1 For in
the full sense of the word, a second conversion is inadmissible;
but a fall from a state of grace is either a proof that actual con
version had not taken place, or that it was partial, or only an
apparent one. Instances of the first kind occur in Matth. xui.
21, Luke xi. 25, 26. But even the apostohcal warnings against
faUing away from feUowship with Christ, as an irremediable step,
Heb. vi. 4,2 1 John v. 16, in part suppose only a conceivable
case, and in part do not exclude the imperfection of a state in
salvation which could be lost and relinquished.
1 John V. 18, b yevvr^selg ix rou 'heou rijget euurov.
2 Many who had attained Christianity, bore traces of a spiritual
life, and yet fell away; and whilst the apostles contemplated such
occurrences, they only thought on the irreparable loss of the

B. REGENERATION.  § 151. TEST OF CONVERSION. 301
means of grace provided by the gospel, or on the improbability
(which they extended to dhumrbv, such as occurs elsewhere,) that
whoever had lost or trifled away their awakened condition
could regain it, or, that whoever had experienced in vain the
power of salvation could be at all blessed. The contrast of
the two Protestant views in reference to the possibility of a
falling from a state of grace, has, in a practical point of view,
no real consistency. For even the most stringent dogmatic
teaching of the Reformers, — Can. Dortr. cap. v. art. 11, 12, —
warns in a manner, against losses, and that for those who under
go them through their own fault, scarcely any thing remains but
an abstract state of election, or at least no consciousness of peace;
and, on the other hand, even the Lutherans would fain unite a
recovery from the deepest faU of those who stood earlier under
grace only to this earlier condition.

§ 151. TEST OF CONVERSION.
The real signs and sureties which never faU to accompany a
true awakening and conversion, consist in the union of a sincere
confession of sin,1 Luke xy. 21, with a putting off of the actual
hfe of that particular unrighteousness in which sin rules pri
marily, and especiaUy over individual hfe, John vhi. 11, Ephes.
iv. 28; v. 3. and consists also in a union of conduct admitting
of possible restoration in reference to violated justice and laws,
with a wUling reception of the severe duties of patience and
sacrifice, Luke xv. 19, iroiriabv (jm ug ha ruv pia&iaiv gov, Luke
xviii. 2.
1 Not only is there, according to circumstances, often no other
consummation of a change of mind through any act possible than
a cry for pardon and confession; but there is also in aU true pe
nitence a powerful impulse towards confession, which, besides its
going up before God, is also desirous of being poured into the
bosom of pious friendship. See Tertullian De Pcenit. c. 9, 10,
and Luther's Pred. Sonnt. reminiscere, v. J. 1522, on confesr
sion.

302 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
C. Of Sanctification.
% 152. CONVERSION AND SANCTLFICAT10N.
The conversion of a sinner only changes in itself the direc
tion of his hfe, The more genuine it is, the more necessarily
does it advance in holiness and renewal of man; and the more
unremittingly hohness progresses, so much the more genuine
and deep is regeneration.1 The will of sin does not exist, in
deed, in that tendency of heart and development of life which is
given with regeneration by the Spirit, 1 John hi. 6-9, but it
does not foUow that the regenerated in general have not sinned,
or could not sin. Eather there remains in them a struggle of
the flesh against the spirit until their deliverance out of a tem
poral and mundane condition takes place, and they can the more
and more develope, up to this point, the new disposition of their
life, only in reference to sin still existing and stiU prevailing,
yet nevertheless decreasbg; (Eomans vi. 12, 14,) wherefore a
convertible state and daUy repentance, pardon and repeated
supphcation for forgiveness of sin, (1 Johnii. 1, 2; v. 1.6,) are
not contradictory; and the fact that the regenerated man can
not be touched by the wicked one, 1 John v. 18, does not
exempt him from combating with the invisible Prince of this
world, Ephes. vi. 12. It is just the gradual separation of the
external and internal hfe from feUowship with sin, in union with
the progressive culture of aU vital activity for the service of God
which gives the idea of sanctifying grace." The question here
too turns on the operation of grace; for although the positive
essence of a sanctified life is love; consequently is a true and new
spontaneity distinguishable from suseeptibUity in faith; yet is it
to be distinguished, on its part again, from all amendments
and good works, based on self-wUl and individual life, in that
it merely reposes on the fellowship of the Eedeemer, and is the
energy of faith, (Gal. v. 6 .)

C. OF SANCTIFICATION. — § 153. THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. 303
1 Regeneration is not to be considered as if it were a self-evi
dent principle of holiness; nor is sanctification to be regarded as
a thing possible, independently of a previous and original appro
priation of salvation, or as if perchance, it strove only after this
object. But the relation may be illustrated by the parable of the
seed of corn; for not only does the latter come up and thrive,
stalk and blade, but strikes deep into the soil, and both direc
tions of increase and growth conditionate each other. It is only
in proportion as the roots deepen and strengthen that the entire
growth thrives, and the upward growth reacts on the roots. Or
we may select as an illustration the psycological and ethical truth
of the maxim strengthened by a free application. A new birth
can be a true one proportioned to the depth of individual life.
Now, the same individual generally progresses in experience ; for
example, the boy advancing to the experience of the youth, and
the youth to that of the man, and life upon the whole becoming
deeper and fuller. If the principle of the new life in Christ does
not at the same time deepen, if regeneration does not become
truer and stronger, then there arises a danger of spiritual decay.
2 The sanctified or saints are indeed sometimes denominated,
especially with reference to faith and justification the members
of Christ, or else in this relation, Heb. ii. 11; x. 10; xiii. 12. And
this only because there is one faith, one spirit, one Lord, who
effects forgiveness and purification frbm sin, or imparts the en
tire capacity for the service of God. In conformity with the
Pauline doctrine and language, which expressly distinguishes hi-
xulugig and uyiug/j.og} 1 Cor. i. 30, (although not so in vi. 11,) and
in general, in accordance with Scripture, John xvii. 1 7, 1 Thess.
V. 23; iv. 4, 8, 1 John iii. 3 mug — uyviZei euurbv, xa^iig ixeTvog dyvog
ienv — sanctification especially refers to the new formation of Di
vine life, or to the improvement and purification of the Christian
walk in particular. § 153. THE CHRISTIAN LLFE.
Existence and hfe in Christ, in so far as it is separated from
world hfe unto the service of God, is a holy life, Eomans xii. 1, 2,
2 Cor. vi. 16, a spiritual one, Eomans vih. 5, 10, because it is
solely derived from faith, and according to the command of the
spiritual law, does not develope itself unto carnal desire; it is

304 PART III. OF SALVATION.—- SECT. H. OF APPROPRIATION.
heavenly also, Phil. hi. 20, Col. hi. 1, 3, partly in the same
relation, and partly because it is in particular blessed in hope.
We endeavour to comprehend the pecuharity of this Christian
life; first, In the law of the Spirit which it uniformly follows;
and, secondly, In the disciphne by which it is preserved; and,
thirdly, In the fruits of the Spirit wherein it subsists.

a. Of the Law of the Spirit.
§ 154. THE DEEPEST MOTIVE.
Christian hfe is governed by a new, not a literal law, Eomans
vii. 6, by a law of freedom, James i. 25, not of carnal desire,
Gal. v. 13, by the law of the Spirit, Eomans vih. 1, 11. This
law is love, or the perfect self-motion of man created " after
God;" it is the perfection of personal being. But since love,
neither as knowledge nor obedience, neither as gratitude nor
imitation of God, nor as love of God or of man, neither as the
love of neighbour nor of self, attains in us an actual and inde
pendent existence; admitting that the Spirit of Him who died and
rose again for us, kindles and preserves this love in us, still the
love of Christ, both active and passive, (2 Cor. v. 14,) or grati
tude towards the Bedeeming God. Eomans v. 5; xii. 1, Ephes. v.
20, 1 John iii. 1, is the most universal motive of Christian action
and suffering, from which every thing else is developed. And
since the love of God in Christ necessarily includes holy self-love,
1 Cor. vi. 15-20, as well as love of our neighbours, 1 John iv. 20,
and universal as well as especial brotherly love, 2 Peter i. 7, so
in like manner it necessarily excludesjSve of self and the world,
1 John ii. 15, and this in such a way, that in each development
of the Christian disposition, the element of world-renunciation
must appear, a renunciation which is in harmony with joyful
hope on the Lord, and consists not merely in a higher or lower
esteem of possessions, but also in a disinclination for everything

a. LAW. — % 155. EXCLUSIVE DUTY. 305
which cherishes sin and death, without permitting itself to be
pervaded by eternal hfe and redeeming love.

§ 155. EXCLUSIVE DUTY.
It is in perfect accordance with this statement of Christian
motive that the Christian hfe ascends to the sublime of filial
.duty, whose typical expression is found in the words of Jesus,
" wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?"
Luke ii. 49; or unto adoration of God in spirit and in truth,
i.e., unto a veneration of the heavenly Father, which, in refer
ence to local contrast, to that of time, to that of the external
and internal and of relative persons, of fortune and misfortune,
nay even of righteousness and sin, is and continues to be undi
vided. John iv. 23, 24.i
1 The Christian never has to pray where he may not have at
the same time to return thanks and praise; and vice versa, he
never has to return thanks where he has not also to pray;
and this holds both in relation to the earthly and corporeal, and
to the heavenly and spiritual. Even the consciousness of sin
ought to lead to prayer, and not only the consciousness of re
demption, but also that of growth in improvement should equally
prompt us to thankfulness and supplication. The type of this
disposition is our Lord's prayer. Now although" life passes from
a state of contemplation and supplication into one of action, yet
both conditions are subject to the duty of worshipping"m spirit
and in truth, just as they are subject to filial duty or to that of
fearing and loving God above all things, and consequently of
confiding in Him alone. Worship — adoration (mgogxuvfjgig differs
in some degree from mgogeuxri), includes the following elements:
— in itself and substantially it possesses the form of realized
feeling, which is especially developed in prayer (praise, thanks,
supplication), but chiefly through faith and obedience it becomes
a disposition, ever establishing a new reception of revelation and
entrance into the wiU of God. This love of God, however, with
reference to the possibility of the bad and the existence of evil,
possesses the element of the fear of the Lord in the first view,
and the element of confidence in the second.

306 PART HI. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.

§156. WILL OF THE LORD.
Although the love of Christ is a law unto itself, still the re
generated man stands in need, partly of chastisement and
partly of guidance which can ensure him only objective pre
cept. For if he be not yet perfect in love, and consequently
not so in truth, then must he seek for whatever may be the
universal wffl and pleasure of God, in the pattern of Christ's
life and his holy church, or in the word of God. Ephes. v. 17,
Eom. xii. 2.
Remark. The law of God, (6 t6/u>g rou &sou, Rom. vii. 22, 25.)
The purpose inherent in existence, Divine justice, and its word,
can never have been abrogated, nor can ever be so. Even
grace and faith have only appeared in order to confirm and
strengthen law, Rom. iii. 31, Matt. v. 15, seq. The law both
in doctrine and letter (muXuiorng ygdppurog, Rom.|vii. 6) has entirely
yielded, either as a shadow to substance, or as a body to spirit,
or, as a condemning law has yielded to reconciliation through the
blood of Christ, Ephes. ii. 15. The law fundamentally can be
altogether divine, and in its aim of accomplishing the distinc
tion between pure and impure, through the entire use of what is
natural, it can be the eternal will; in its concrete and particular
designs it becomes temporal, especially as it was designed to
inure and draw a people who were carnal and sinful, and to
tame the human will chiefly through the Divine; and since it
was required to be local and popular, it becomes contingent,
and, to a certain extent, transient. Hence, in the Book of the
Law we find a subordination of designs. Some laws were spoken
by the Lord, other were given by Moses, &c, wherein many other
classifications are connected which had become usual among Jews
and Christians, in order to facilitate their application at a later
period. Hence, on the one hand, among those who contended
against the spirit of the law, there was an interpretation which
reduces its external and physical content into a generaUy mo
ral one (the Alexandrians, Philo); and, on the other hand,
there was an admission that the law had been interpolated by
the ancients, or that it even contained falsehood or some mate
rial for the bi moXXol; hence the Pauline doctrine on childlike,

a. LAW. — § 157. WISDOM AND PRUDENCE. 307
elementary, secular institutions, Gal. iv. 3, Col. ii. 8. For the
ancient law had in these institutions a connecting link in natural
religion and in the ethics and government of the world gene-
raUy before. Christ; hence Paul's treatment of the law of meats,
of days and of times, of circumcision, Gal. vi. 15, iv. 10; Rom.
xiv. 14, 1 Cor. viii. 8. Hence the entire apostohcal emancipa
tion of Christians from circumcision, Acts xv. StiU the doc
trinal law is allowed to be used in Christianity, 1 Tim. i. 8, oihu-
f&ev he, on xuXbg b vb/iog, iuv rig aurffi vofiif&ug xgV^' (compare Test.
Nephthalim § 8, ed. Grab. p. 217), eih&g rouro, on hixuiu vopog ou xeirui,
x. X. And besides all this, the sanctified stand in need both of
a divine undivided word which shall not only instruct but im
prove, and of a divine command. But since it is needful in
Christ to pass over the limited conclusion of individual moral
commands and ideas, by searching and questioning the Divine
will, so the will of God affords a much fuller legislation than all
written law hitherto either laid .down or capable of being so.
Since the dogmatic knowledge of faith has a free and ample
capacity for being developed in biblical gnosis (for in Christ
are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, Col. ii.
3); so has also the ethical knowledge of faith a similar ca
pacity (for it cannot, as individual knowledge, be separated
from that which is general.) Phil. i. 9, Col. i. 9, 10. Indeed
not any kind of apostolical determinations can be equalised be
cause they are individual, temporal, or local, (compare C. L.
Nitszch, de judicandis morum prceceptis in N. T. a communi
omnium hominum ac temporum usu alienis, Viteb. Comm. xi.)
but must be reduced back to their principles, and then brought
into analogical application : Canon Law, Acts xv. oath, vesture,
covering the head, marriage, divorce, &c. But just as little can
Christian ethics admit of being casuistically supported, or reach
their ultimate aim by insulating the idea of duty. The material
of human life possesses, in all its unity and invariableness, a
something which is yet mutable, and the will of love is ever de
sirous of revealing itself more perfectly.
§ 157. WISDOM AND PRUDENCE.
In regard to a readiness to recognise the good and perfect wUl
of the Lord in all things, and to incorporate it with his own, the

308 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
Christian is wise, and supphcates for wisdom from above, Ephk
v. 15, 16, James i. 5, iii. 15. With reference to the necessity
and power of apprehending and maintaining external circum
stances and relations, in the sense of wisdom, there is Christian
prudence, Matthew x. 16, 17.

§ 158. SIMPLICITY.i
Both the above qualities are not only combined with sim
plicity, but rest upon it. Christ disarms the tempter by the
most simple repetition of the Divine commands and promises.
For the constant tendency of the mind to the one thing needful,
and a steady walk in truth, capacitates man for easUy seeing
into and fulfilling the subordination of things and events,
2 Cor. l. 12, r\ ydg xubxieig wpuv ubrrj ierl, rb pugrugiov rSjs euvei-
hrjeeug ?)/j,uv, on iv urnXorrin xul eiXixgiveiu §eou (oux iv eocpiu eugxixfi, dXX'
h xtyr> §*<>") dveergdip^ev iv rcB xogpu x. X. Matt. vi. 22, Prov. X. 9.
Compare Herm. Past. init. mdd. and Test. Beniam, § 6, rou he BeX-
idg muv egyov htmXovv igri xui abx exei umXbrriru.

b. Of Spiritual Discipline and Exercise.
§ 159. SPIRITUAL POVERTY.
Sanctification must produce a particular line of conduct which
is directly related to sin, (which is constantly being excited anew,)
and to the necessity for preserving the desired mode of life, and
perfecting it unto preservation. The sum and substance of the
energy required and suited for this purpose, we term spiritual dis
cipline.1 For since redeeming grace cannot reanimate without
chastening us, so that we may deny the world and ungodliness
(Tit. n. 12, ruifovovo-u jpSs), then must we, if we are to be sanc
tified by grace, accept even this office of discipline from it in
order to bring it to bear upon the rude and uncultivated part of our

b. SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE. — § 159. SPIRITUAL POVERTY. 309
life. And the humUity (spiritual poverty, Matthew v. 3) which
rendered our hearts susceptible of faith and the call unto repen
tance, shaU abide in us, not only as a real wall of separation
between our former and present condition, but be operative also
as a spontaneous preserver of the state of salvation. The espe
cial members and instruments of this discipline are vigilance
and prayer, abstinence and labour, and the regimen proportioned
to their united action.2 The more these are realised apart from
an abiding sanctification, so much the more are justification itself,
merit, what is pleasing to God, or even the seal of perfection,
wont to be sought for in them in a manner as vain as it is
obstructive, Isaiah lviii. Matthew vi. 1-17, xxiii. 23, Gal. iv.
9-11, v. 3, 4, Col. ii. 16. A sound Christian self-education is
to be recognised by its maintaining, on the one hand, its corporal
exertions in due connection with its spiritual ones, and in not
seeking to turn the pain and toU of repentance upon the flesh ;
and, on the other hand, in avoiding to make evU distinctions
between lesser and greater commandments, in preserving itseff
from a violation of the natural and universally valid order of
goods and impulses, and, finally, by rather voluntarily submit
ting to, than shunning, that general and special discipline reserved
by the providence of our Lord, 2 Cor. xii. 7-9, Heb. xii. 5-7,
1 BasUius, Proverbs i. 2, 3. "Egriv n muiheiu (l^ip^) dyuyri rig
T
di<peXi(&og rfj -^uxfi, imimbvoig moXXdxig ruv umb xuxiug xriXihuv durtjv exxu-
Suigougu x. X. When Clemens of Alexandria, Strom, iv. p. 230,
teaches that sins before baptism (regeneration) were forgiven,
which, when committed after that event, must be removed by a
purifying discipline, such a view must be received with at least
great caution, or it is in direct opposition to 1 John ii. 1, 2,
(Book of Wisdom xv. 2, 3). He ought rather to have taught
that the regenerated man is first capable of receiving discipline
from God, and under Divine guidance of chastising himself. In
other respects, the ideas n/iuglu, xbXugig, and muiheiu, in various
passages have been extremely well distinguished and explained
by him.
2 This has generally been denominated by the term dexrig/g.
This expression, borrowed from the preparation for the publip

310 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
games, (Casaubon, Exercit. 2, ad Baron. Ann. sect, xiii.), was ap
plied even before Christianity to the so-called philosophical life
(fiibg xurd tpiXoeopiuv), that is, to its separation from the common en
joyment of life. Since many particular observances with regard to
vesture, food, and other restraints from secular usage, passed over
from the philosophers, particularly the Stoics — phUosophia per
abusum in genu3!iQU0ddam vit^e professorium verti ccepta circa
tempora Epicteti, Baco a verulam Augm. sect. vii. p. 355 — to the
Christians (Tertull. de pallio) and hence the names also, dgxygig,
<piXogo<piu, &c. To represent Christian life under images derived
from the gymnasium, the classical passage, 1 Cor. ix. 24, seq.,
added to all this an especial inducement. Meanwhile, Christians
forgot, as well that they were all priests, as that, in the midst of
their domestic and civic life, they ought all to be discliplinarians.
Even in the old Catholic ritual (Apost. Constitutions) under this
title such characters appear, who, in an especial manner, repre
sent the universal Christian calling to spiritual discipline and
exercise, and therefore rejoice in ecclesiastical dignity. Such a
manifestation always exhibits a double character, that is, a better
and a worse aspect. The better one is this, that spiritualism
(Tertull. adv. Psychicos) pervading a community, elicits a moral
reaction, which, in order to testify itself so much the more effi
caciously against offences, formally and externally endeavours to
represent itself; and that, in general also, in times of public
tranquiUity, when martyrs, in a strict sense, are no more, it
desires to expose to the light the power of Christianity to over
come the world. The bad aspect, as respects this manifestation,
consists in this, that extraordinary profession of Christianity is
desirous of separating itself from the common, and assuming the
superiority, and that discipline entirely forgets its character as a
means, and seeks to be great not only in trifles but even in untruth.
Such were the so-called Christian stoics, ridiculed and despised
by Lucian, and such those Pharisees whom Christ condemned as
straining at gnats and swallowing camels, Matthew xxiii. 23, 24.

§ 160. WATCHFULNESS.
Spiritual disciphne, as a precaution against sin1 nigh at
hand, assiduously strives after the circumspection and presence
of the Spirit, which is represented under the image of watch-

b. SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE. — § 161. PRAYER. 311
ing, Matt. xxvi. 41/ Ephes. vi. 18, Col. iv. 2, and by the
perception as weU of external as of internal circumstances,
should be in a condition partly to anticipate the temptations of
the flesh, the devU, and the world, and partly, in connection
with prayer, to resist them. On the one hand, this watching
presupposes another condition, or an awakening from sleep,
Ephes. v. 14, Eom. xui. 12, Isa. Ix. 1; on the other hand,
it fortifies itself, simply by remembering the speedy termination
of this state of probation, Matt. xxiv. 42, xxv. 1; 1 Cor. xvi.
13, 1 Thess. v. 1-8. In the doctrine of spiritual discipline,
watchfulness is to be opposed rather unto an excessive desire for
dissipation and false spiritual security, Luke xi. 25, than to car
nal security.
1 The kind and amount of aU individual discipline is determi
nated by the idiosyncrasy of the individual; and this is alone
cognisable through upright self-examination. Hence entire
moral circumspection, in its earnestness, depends on our insight
into our own inner nature, and on the truth which we observe
towards ourselves. Ephes. V. 13, r<i he mdvru eXeyxopevu umb rou
purbg (puvegourui, 1 John i. 6. AU watchfulness and prayer, all
abstinence, labour, and regimen, preserve their tendency, their
object, and their intention only in truth, when thou acknowledgest
the sin that most easily besets thee, or strivest to perceive it. —
2 What our Lord chiefly demands or denounces, here, indeed,
refers to corporeal watchfulness. He requires, in His general
exhortation, Matt. xxvi. 41, the universal prevalence of Chris
tian watchfulness. However important may be temperance in
corporeal sleep for the sustenance of body and soul, stiU the
defective and corrupt discipline of the earlier periods of Chris
tianity cast itself upon night watching ; and Hieronymus may
not have been so very just towards Vigilantius, when he treated
him on account of his judgment on Vigils, as a Dormitantius.

§ 161. PRAYER.
A true moral presence of the Spirit cannot be conceived
apart from a walk in the presence of God, and all strengthen-

312 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. QF APPROPRIATION.
ing and equipment is a becoming " strong in the Lord,"
Ephes. vi. 10, whose panoply, ver. 11-18, cannot be put on nor
worn without prayer, ver. 18. And hence it is that both these
requirements, watching and prayer, are almost on all occasions
united. Unceasing prayer, 1 Thess. v. 17, 18, Col. iv. 2,
Eom. xii. 12, does not exclude. that ascent and descent of
feeling which is combined with human nature and its constitu
tion, nor preclude the absolute inwardness or passivity of life
in itseff. But whilst the characteristic mark of hfe is
prayer, the thinking and acting life may and ought to direct
itseff outwardly from this basis, if only all natural mo
tives brought from without, as weU as aU especial excita
tions of the Spirit for particular prayer be indeed perceived.
These motives are found under two states of feeling, James v.
13, in every commencing and concluding period of life, and in
the relations of the communion in which God hath placed us.
But these excitations, which in the highest degree conditionate
the fruitfulness and the hearing of prayer, Eom. viii. 26, are
not entirely dependent on external causes, and so much the
less so, since the state of the Christian can in no instant be
conceived as having no want. The aid of the Holy Spirit
and of the name of Jesus in supphcatory prayer, produces, the
more it is accorded, the requisite subordination of benefits and
petitions, or the wisdom of supplication ; and to the misuse of
the doctrine of what is caUed deprecatory prayer, the unde-
terminableness of the Divine wffl cannot be so well opposed by
the human wffl, or by the immutabUity of things, as can rather,
in part, the conditionating power of prayer through the com
munion of Christ, and in part the danger and contradiction
which exists therein of receiving, in the results of urgent and
emphatic prayer, the rewards of confidence and corrections for
mistrust. Here essentiaUy and primarily belongs every supph
catory prayer formed after the sixth petition of the Lord's
prayer, and that one which, according to the model of our Lord
in the garden, enters with resignation into the more or less
revealed decree of the proving God.

b. SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE. — § 162. ABSTINENCE. 313

§ 162. ABSTINENCE.
Spiritual disciphne developes itself in action, fftutppoo-vvri,
<r&i<pp6va>g Zfiv, Tit. ii. 12), and caution primarily does so in a
negative manner, that is to say, by a restraining from the ful
ness of sensuous and worldly enjoyment, which restraint is as
intentional as it is unassuming, and even abstaining from what
is lawful, 1 Cor. x. 23, as much and as often as it serves to
destroy the attraction of what is inadmissible, and to strengthen.
and protect spiritual freedom, 1 Cor. ix. 24-27. The inducer
ments granted to Christians for determining both these kinds,
and proportions of abstinence, he partly in individual quahties,
partly in temporal circumstances, (o~ia ttjv moroiauv avayxriv,
1 Cor. vii. 26), and partly in the particular vocation,
(1 Cor. ix.)
Remark 1. Salutary abstinence not only refers to the subdu
ing the flesh in a more limited sense, but also to the relation of
sUence to speaking, solitude to society, and repose to labour.
For some admirable therapeutic and instructive doctrines on
this subject, see Basil's Homily on the words mgbgexe geuury, x. X.
Remark 2. Fasting stands for a universal symbol of precaution
ary abstemiousness. Nevertheless, it has not been placed in a
just light by the ancients; for example, in Past. Herm., simil. v.,
even when they prescribe it in the first place in its wide significa
tion, vrigreiu dmb rou movngou, and then in its narrow one of restric
tion as to food. Even as a means of saving for the poor, espe
cially when it appears combined with liberality, (as in the par
able of the Shepherd) as an opus supererogationis, it does not
retain its peculiar right. Basil, in his two Homilies, msgl vrig-
reiug, has viewed the subject in a better light, and has made
some admirable remarks against the revels of the Carnival. In
fasting, we should consider sincerity, joy, and freedom. Matt.
vi. 16, 1 8, and at the same time that which is necessary, Mark ii.
20, 1 Cor. x. 7, Rom. xiii. 14. See my sermon Unrechtes Fasten
und rechtes, (Pred. 1833, p. 75.)

314 PART HI. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.

§ 163. CHOICE OF SOCIETY.
Although the Christian cannot and ought not to forsake the
world, 1 Cor. v. 10, in order to escape aU the vexatious influ
ences of society, or to protect himself from the leaven of the
Pharisees and of Herod, Mark viii. 15, but rather is placed
and disposed by God, in such a circle of social hfe, that he
may partly share its amehorating and preserving salt, and
partly receive warning against individual sin in the suffering of
vice; yet spiritual caution summons him, in so far as proxi
mity and distance is a matter of freedom, to shun one society,
1 Cor. xv. 33, and to seek another. He avoids the one,
not merely because he is in danger, involuntarily, of being
strongly influenced by the sins of others, but also because
much that is evU in him only awaits the authority of foreign
example to become strengthened. Every one needs, (however
far advanced he may be), in one aspect or another, an ex
ample that may put him to shame; and although the most
admirable could only be for each other blind leaders of the
blind, if, when giving and receiving, they did not refer directly
to the only Master, still a voluntary humility towards those
who are wiser and better, Psalms cxli. 5, and a susceptibihty
for the personal mediations of Christ's example, consequently a
Christian choice of intercourse, pertains to the entire course of
that prudent walk upon which the present discussion turns.

§ 164. REGULATION OF LIFE.
And aU this combination is held together by the salutary
self-restraint of order, and the love of it. For not only is sin,
in general, actual disorder, and life, according to the law of
the Spirit, nothing else than a continued achievement of pleas
ing order, but there is also a division of time and strength for
which the Christian is assiduously desirous — a division relative

C. FRUIT OF THE SPIRIT. — § 165. RIGHTEOUSNESS. 315
to the existence of sin to be contended agahist and requisite,
in this point of view, for the prosperity of the soul. An ill
regulated kingdom, daUy walk, or property, can neither be
overlooked nor controUed. But a hfe that ever proceeds anew
from devotion, and reposes thereon — which consumes the super
abundant powers of the soul, by the intervention of service
and assiduity — a life which is adapted to a gentler transition,
from seriousness to recreation, from pleasure to pain — such a
walk leaves no room on the one hand for immediate sin, for
impassioned over occupation, or for indolence pregnant with
sin, (2 Thess. hi. 6), but rather finds room for what is una
voidably out of the usual course, and is to a certain extent
identical with the hght of watchfulness and self-knowledge,
with the enjoyment of prayer, with the power of abstinence
and edifying intercourse.

c. Of the Fruit of the Spirit.
% 165. RIGHTEOUSNESS.
If, in fact, this entire prudential contest against yet existing
sin be a fruit of the Spirit, stiU the Christian dialect especiaUy
indicates under the latter the fulfilment of the Divine com
mands in love, Gal. v. 22, the accomphshment of the eternal
Divine order itself, or the righteousness fitted for the kingdom
of heaven, which exceeds and is more genuine than that of the
Pharisees, Matth. v. 20. In Christ or in His feUowship is
truth, (ukrl&utt,, Ephes. iv. 21), effectual renewal of life in aU
its aspects, v. 23, imitation of God, v. 1, and, in reference to
the soul, by which the whole body of action is moved and more
or less pervaded, there is perfectness, Col. iii. 14, 15.

316 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.

§ 166. EARTHLY AND HEAVENLY VOCATION.
This perfectness is especiaUy related to the compass of aU
the natural, necessary, and plastic relations in which human life
participates. For neither by the crucifying power of repentance
(Gal. v. 24; Col. iii. 5), nor by renunciations combined with
spiritual discipline, can the earthly human destiny (recognised
above, § 93) be changed or abrogated in any one point. But
the work of the Spirit and the mind of pure love extends
thus far, that every original disposition and each necessity is
led to a pure development, and becomes an earthly vessel of
heavenly good, and a means of manifold joy in the Lord, and
of varied and associated exultation and reciprocal service in love.
Thus, although we ought to acquire, to purchase, to possessj
and enjoy everything temporal with reserve, 1 Cor. vii. 29-31,
still we ought to shun indifference, and not reject and despise
anything which is grounded on the wUl of the Creator and Pre
server, and which merit our thanks, Col. ii. 16, 18; 1 Tim. iv.
1-6. Every land of acquisition and vocation upon earth is re
lated to our heavenly calhng, if it exclude usury, and includes
service and admits of Divine blessing. The Christian hfe is, of
all modes of hfe, the most domestic, the most civic,1 the most
devoted to art, the most inclined to science, and pre-eminently
the most humane.2
1 Tertull. Apol. c. 42, " We are not gymnosophists nor hermits."
Meminimus nos gratiam debere Deo — nullum fractum operum
ejus repudiamus. Itaque non sine foro, non sine macello, non
sine officinis — cohabitamus vestrum hoc sseculum. Navigamus,
militamus, rusticamur, et mercatus miscemus.
2 Idem ib. c. 39, Fratres etiam vestri sumus, jure naturae ma-
tris unius, etsi vos parum homines quia mali fratres.
§ 167. HEART AND WALK.
None of these relations, and, in general, no motive for moral

C. FRUIT OF THE SPIRIT. — § 168. FIDELITY, ETC. 317
progression, can merely lead to this, namely, that thought or
mind, that action and speech, can preserve a Christian state;
but the fruits of the Spirit always primarily attest themselves in
the completion of the internal temple, in the destroyed lusts of
the flesh, and in the awakened thoughts of love (uvavsov&ut is
r& 7Tvzv[/iKTi rov voog v^w, Ephes. iv. 23). A pure heart
proves its soundness in every way, Matth. vii. 16, 23. Neither
good works nor good words can be so, unless they arise from a
pure source. Nevertheless, all who live in the Spirit walk also
spiritually, Gal. v. 25; and the good tree will be known by the
fruits of the tongue, James hi. 10, as weU as by the fruits of
action, James ii. 16. It is goodness only, pressing on to con
firmation up to the last, which makes the perfect man, James
iii. 2.i
i Compare my sermon uber den Werih der guten Worte im
Christenthume (Samml. 1819).
Remark. The indivisible unity of the speaking, acting, and
thinking man must be presupposed, if such moral precepts as
those which substitute one for the other, (as in Matth. v. 39, com
pare ver. 22-25,) are to be correctly understood.

§ 168. FIDELITY IN GREAT AND SMALL THINGS.
This Christian perfection proves itseff and is tested only by the
entire sacrifice of self, or in great hazards and self-denial, 1 John
iii. 16; John xv. 13; Matth. xix. 21; but the internal value of
these actions consists in and is coincident with that same love, 1
Cor. xiii. 3, which, in the sum total of common and obscure per
formances of duty, proves itself to be faithful. Common vir
tue,1 ff it be but virtue, is as great as uncommon virtue ; and
persevering self-denial, in daUy recurring service, demands, in
certain point of view, a greater measure of strength of love than
any single sacrifice which Christian heroism can offer,8 Luke
xvi. 10.
1 For example, a real desire to oblige, a genuine complaisance ;

318 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF SANCTIFICATION.
the former chiefly in dissimilar and bounden relations, the latter
in free and equal ones, is a great proof of subdued self-love.' In like
manner, the administration of property, carried on in the spirit
of a true community of goods and with the eritire effort of inven
tive wisdom and love, or genuine chastity and moderation in the
marriage state, and especially submission to one another, 1 Pet.
v. 5; Ephes. v. 21; wUl, in proportion to their strength, require
a much larger expenditure of spiritual power, and possess a much
higher value, than all monastic vows.
2 See Fenelon's work, by M. Claudius, vol. i. p. 136. On fide- ,
lity in small things " trifling occurrences are unforeseen ; they re
cur every moment ; they incessantly conflict with our pride, our
indolence, our prejudice, our sudden anger, our fretfulness, and
our contests; they disturb and interrupt in every possible way
our wUls. If we wish to be faithful, nature has no time to pause,
and she must expire with all her inclinations. It is with piety as
with the administration of temporal goods; if we do not exercise
a rigid superintendence, we are ruined more by small expendi
ture than by great items."

§ 169. FRUIT OF INNOCENCE AND VIRTUE.
Each member of the contrasts exhibited in § 167 and 168,
includes both Christian innocence and Christian virtue. For it
is one and the same love which shuns evU and does good, fears
the Lord and imitates him; and we owe unto God, and for His
sake unto aU men this entire love, Eomans xiii. 8. Never
theless, it appertains to the truth of moral action in every fea
ture, that above aU I neither offend nor despise whatever is, in
God's sight, finished good (§ 100); in order to be able after
wards to cherish and promote the good included in the disposi
tion ; and, in conformity with this, the correct doctrine concern
ing the rectitude which is in Christ, demands that the unity of
innocent conduct shaU form the basis upon which the unity of
a virtuous hfe is to be raised; although the vital doctrine, just
as actual life, is unable to refrain from uniting the prohibitory
contents of each particular article immediately with the precep-

C. FRUIT OF THE SPIRIT. — § 169. VIRTUE, ETC. 319
tive one ; as, for example, in the interpretation and application
of the Decalogue. In Eomans xiii. 9, 10, for example, the con
tents of the second table of the law are comprehended positively,
but in James ii. 11, Matth. v. 22, principaUy, only negatively.
Remark. The classification of Christian ethics from an early
period has been so much the more readily deduced from the
Decalogue, as the latter truly Divine record itself is not a mere
decade of propositions, but is bipartite, and each of the two divi
sions may be again subdivided; so that, upon the whole, this
record invites to a genetic development of the Divine precepts.
In point of fact, it was unnecessary, for the setting forth of the
moral law of the New Testament, to add to the Decalogue (as
has been done, for example, in the Constitutt. Apost. vii. 2,) the
command to love one's neighbour, and, for this purpose, to sepa
rate the second; but, according to the Lutheran method of ex
position, everything, namely, 1. The remaining content of the
first table; 2. The entire second table; 3. Every prohibition of
action ; 4. The prohibition of lust, may be deduced from the first
commandment ; or the sum of the law and the prophets, the love
of God and our neighbour (in which latter is included self-love),
may be referred to the superscription or sign of the spiritual in
terpretation. How were it possible that an element of Christian
morality could be exhibited, which would not admit of union
with any direct or indirect commandment in the Decalogue?
The doctrine of the fundamental cause of moral action is enun
ciated in the first commandment; the succeeding commands
unite disposition with word and deed and practice. The com
mand to honour parents includes all the relative duties ; the doc
trine of duties, virtue, and possessions is most intimately united
in subsequent points, and in the latter command spiritual disci
pline still .retains its position, and ascetic subjects find their rela
tion to the first table. But the subject has been carried even
beyond this. David Chytraus, Regular Vitce, virtutum descrip-
tiones methodicce, recens recognitce, Viteb. 1576, exhibits twelve
utilitates decalogi, of which only two enter upon especial moral
doctrine; est regula vitce piorum, and est norma vitce homi-
num in externis actionibus, ut mores honeste regantur. Others
give to the Decalogue dogmatic powers, for example, to con
firm even the resurrection, or philosophical, artistical, and poli
tical effects. On the subject of instructive and dogmatic power

320 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF SANCTIFICATION.
of teaching, see some excellent remarks in Calvin's Institutt. ii.
8, 1. sqq. And this Reformer has, at the same time, whilst
glancing in his wonted manner at the spiritual interpretation of
the ten commandments, partly considered, with his usual vigour,
the justice and necessity of a synecdochical explanation of the
same, as he terms it, and partly weighed the just proportion and
limits of such an interpretation. See the above work, § 7-12.
The Decalogue, however, is but little fitted for a theological, i. e.
a scientific representation of Christian rectitude, although it is of
incalculable importance and value for homiletical and catecheti
cal instruction in morals. The numerical arrangement, and the
inequality of the propositions 'previously blended therewith, op
pose all direct admission of the whole into a scientific adjust
ment; and in the same degree as we welcome such a popular
system of doctrine as that of SeUer, which, under the representa
tion of the first article of our faith, founds the Decalogue imme
diately on the development of ethics, to the same extent must
the much more important work of Chytraus appear constrained,
on which is constructed, from that point of view, a complete
Christian doctrine of virtue.
Remark 2. The omission of the second commandment, namely,
the prohibition of images, as it occurs in the tradition of the
middle ages connected with Augustin, and in Luther's Cate
chism, admits indeed of being explained in the same way as the
subsequent division of the prohibition against lust ; but in the
present day, since we have attained a just knowledge of the
subject, the omission admits of being no longer justified (see
Geffken Ueber d. verschiedne Eintheilung des Dekalogs und den
Einflus derselben auf den Cultus, Hamburg 1838. The entire
blessing associated with the fundamental constitution of the
Old Testament is based upon the prohibition of images. For if
Jehovah (with the exception of CD^HN CD*llb«); could have
been worshipped under any one image, the very idea of God as
the principle of all true religion, and the entire development
depending thereon, would have been lost. Kant (Krit. d. Ur-
theilskr. p. 123), termed the prohibition of images the most sub
lime in the whole Judaical code, and explained the religious en
thusiasm of the Jews as flowing from it. We need not appre
hend that this prohibition will lose its importance in reference
to our circumstances, because our idolatrous inclinations have

C. FRUIT OF THE SPIRIT. — § 169. INNOCENCE. 321
long been subdued. Apart from the fact, that the word of God
shaU yet for long be proclaimed, by preaching and the catechism,
ere the last idol shall disappear from the earth, so there exist even
now general heathen tendencies just as there are Jewish; and
Paganism again so lately commended, may lead to many results
which we scarcely anticipate. Then, again, even in this prohibi
tion, there is nothing to oppose the distinction between coarser
and more refined errors. Even the soul itself conceives false and
forbidden images of God the Lord and his attributes. The ap
plication of the prohibition to that of the image of Christ is
altogether erroneous, and still more perverted is .the condemna
tion of images in general, or the adornment of churches with
pictorial representations of biblical persons and events. It is
only the state of the sixteenth century, and the peculiar views
of Zuinglius (for Calvin and Bucer, not to mention Luther, who
approved of pictures, were, in this instance, free from exaggera
tion,) that render cohlpreherisible what was held and done dur
ing this puristic tendency. See Gruneisen's Rec. ub. d. Geffken-
'sche Schrift Theoll. stud. ii. Krit. 1840-4. Every Christian
technologist must reject, as Well in the name of religion as of
art, the representation of the Trinity under human forms.
Remark 3. It has been objected to our delineation of duties,
that it does not recognise our duty towards God, nor does justice
to the distinction between our duty to God, ourselves, and our
neighbours. To this we reply, 1. That the division which is
missed is a deduction, and, so far, is not a division^ because it
does not consist of co-ordinate members. 2. As a deduction, this
division has not only been taken into account, § 154, but has also
been perfected by the usuaUy neglected relations to the love of
Christ and renunciation of the world. 3. That we teach duty
towards God is abundantly evident from § 1 55, or from our doc
trine on exclusive duty. But if we desire to understand duties
towards God in the pleural, without understanding thereby the
totality of duties, in that case they likewise belong to the gene
ral doctrine of the law of the Spirit, and not to the doctrine of
the fruits of the Spirit. 4. The theology of duties ought and
must reduce back the opposite of duty to self and our neigh
bour, to its unity or to our duty towards man, that is, towards
the Divine image. See §§ 170 and 178; and thus it becomes
possible, that in a general system of Christian doctrine (Where
't happens that the simplest divisions are adopted), the duties
Y

322 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
we owe to ourselves and our neighbour (at least in the doctrine
of the innocence of the Christian life), are inseparable, and are
represented intimately united, that is, according to their indi
vidual relations to the immediate and mediate benefits belonging
to personal being, especially when in the doctrine of ethics as
hitherto treated, their identity has not been rendered sufficiently
apparent. This is precisely what is defective in the usual doc
trines, for example, on falsehood, fornication, calumny, &c,
especially since they do not adequately recognise the coincidence
and parity of self-injury with the injury of our neighbour.

a. The Innocence of the Christum Life.
§ 170. GENERAL IDEA.
Every, thing, by which the Divine image suffers contempt or
injury in any one of its rights, or any one of its original rela
tions, is opposed to the innocence of the Christian life (1 Cor.
xiii. 4 — 6), and whether the injury effects the persouahty of
ourselves or others, makes no difference. Contempt is even
an injury, Matt. v. 22; hatred is murder, 1 John hi. 15; and
aU injuries and contempt are identical in this respect, that
none of any kind can be mere self-injury, and none the mere
injury of our neighbour alone. God's kingdom, man, the
image of God, is injured by every sin, and by every sin is the
whole law transgressed, James ii. 10. 1 Nevertheless, we have
afforded ourselves no room to develop this unity, which should
remain inviolate, up to a due manifoldness, and therefore none
to the deceptive effort of limiting the commandment of love
in its apphcation; and contempt, for example, of corporeal
right and weal is not to be justified, or, on the contrary,
through a false holy esteem for such, is the spiritual element to
be'soJ sacrificed. For, from the doctrine laid down in § 89  99
concerning human nature and its destiny, it foUows incontesti-
bly that an injury done to man in his temporal property, in his
external freedom, or in his honour, is not guiltless in reference
to the personality itself.

a. THE INNOCENCE, ETC. — § 171. ESTEEM, ETC. 323
1 A sophistical trifling with smaller and greater sins, with
minor transgressions which may not be sin, is perhaps what is
reproved in Hosea xii. 8 — 9. On the other hand, 1 John iii. 4,
mug 6 moiuv rr)v dftugndv xul rriv dvofiiiuv moie7.

§ 171. ESTEEM OF IMMEDIATE PERSONALITY.
Christian hfe bears itself innocently towards the being and weU-
being of the soul, with a disregard of all other life. In so much
as the soul is not exposed to arbitrary murder, the Christian is
not withheld from avoiding as a Capital crime even the mere
attempt to injure his fehcity, and is not prevented from finding
in aU sin a share therein, and in all passion and vices a germ
of this offence. Accordingly, there exists a peculiar Christian
aversion for aU works in which an approach to the sin of hatred
and despair is exhibited, or which approximate to the murder
of the soul, and consequently an aversion to cursing' and exe
cration, James hi. 9; Matt. v. 22; to scandal1 and seduction,
Matt, xviii. 6; to contempt of personal persuasion in prosely
tizing, Matt, xxiii. 14, 15; to shutting up the kingdom of
heaven against men; to any wicked attempt to keep the mind
in darkness, — a bigoted and unjust detention of the truth of
grace, Matt, xxiii. 13; an abhorrence of falsifying the gospel,
Gal. i. 9; for every species of idolatry, or for denying the fel
lowship of God in fornication, ICor. vi. 12, 20,z in avarice,
1 Tim. vi. 9, and every other vice.
1 To put a stumbling-block in the way, exuvhdXifyiv, Matt. xvii.
6; Rom. xiv. 21, (the sensible part of the representation is to be
understood from Lev. xix. 14) denotes an actual guilty allure;
ment unto evil, or one intentionally excited. The opposite to
this occurs in Rom. XV.- 1, pugrufyiv rd dg^tevn^uru ruv dhuvdruv —
dgigxeiv elg rb dyuSbv rSi mXfjgiov mgbg oixoho/iriv. Now every exem
plification of evil, every sin is, as an example as it were, a certain
incentive to the next succeeding, at least under certain circum
stances and relations. For social evil reacts phenomenally, as
hateful and offending, on individual evil ; so that the good is
called upon to abide as such (through the evil which directs itself

324 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
in its outbursts), and does not yield to internal evU. Thus the
'precise idea of scandal is realized only in proportion as there
arises a condition of dependence and natural succession, as the
relation of education, in which the force of example is perverted
to the seduction of innocence, or to the depression of moral in
terest. Moreover, from such definite relations of life the arbi
trary and impassioned treatment of one's neighbour effects a vio
lent excitation of pleasure or pain, so that it should not redound
to him as sin, and be as a stumbling-block. Under aU circum
stances, arid "in all relations^ an action or admission becomes
offence, when it represents any connection between good and
evil, and thus exhibits the equal value of both, as weU as the
seeming freedom of evil, and the apparent success of the un
just, and either aids in relaxing the bonds of aversion and shame,
or destroys faith in the operation of the existing means of grace
and virtue. If most offences arise from ignorance and neglect,
still they are more or less intentional and satanic. The guilt of
those who take offence may be as great as that of those who give
it. If absolute innocence and edification, if a perfect motive and
incentive to good (enfeebling all other social offences, as weU as
constituting the basis of all edification, Matt. xi. 29 ; John xiii.
15; 1 Peter ii. 21; 1 John iii. 6, 7), if Christ " is set for the faU
Of many," Luke ii. 34; Matt. xiii. 57; Isa. viii. 14; 1 Pet. ii. 17,
then are those who receive offence just only those who give it,
or they receive it as a punishment, because they wiU not suffer
themselves to be sanctified and edified.
2 The argument used by the apostle, 1 Cor. vi. 1 8, against for
nication would not have had its due weight, if, as sinning
against his own body, it were not to be understood as being in
jurious to his personality. The sensualist rejects the conditions
of exclusive connubial love, of spiritual feUowship, esteem, con
fidence, and mutual resignation, under which alone exists no
thing degrading in the corporeal fulfilment of sexual destiny.
The sensualist converts the entire personality into a means of
gratification. Gluttony and inebriety are essentiaUy allied ex
cesses, being the desecration of the Divine temple, the members
of Christ.

a. THE INNOCENCE, ETC.— § 172. ESTEEM, ETC. 325
§ 172. ESTEEM FOR THE INTERCOURSE OF THOUGHT AND
SPEECH.
Christian intercourse, Col. hi. 9, Eph. iv. 25, not only re
nounces falsehood, in so far as it is injurious, and is a contin
gent means of evU intentions, but because it directly violates
that which is true, or breaks the original bond of personal
being, " for we are members one of another." Here the holi
ness of our faculty of utterance, and the sanctity of truth, de
clares itself to be an inviolable common good. And as the so-
caUed he of necessity and duty never can be consummated with
out a certain feehng of shame, no case can arise or be imagined
where an affectionate forbearance, or any kind of sympathy
in obedience to duty could not prove itself far more truly and
nobly in another way than by falsehood. The falsehood of ne
cessity and service when consummated is ever, under favoinv
able circumstances, still a sign either of wisdom, which is de
fective in love and confidence, or of a love which is deficient in
wisdom. Hence the apology of meekness may be offered, but
never the lofty idea of duty and service.1
1 The austere aspect of ethics has been strongly enforced
by Bohme, Ueber die Moralitat der NotUuge. Newstadt, 1 828.
Compare also Kierkegaard, De Notione atque turpitudine men-
dacii. Goettingae, 1829. With regard to the toleration of
falsehood (falsa significatio cum voluntate faHendi) considered as
self-defence or expediency, many great and moral contemporaries,
such as Basil and Chrysostom, Augustin and Jerome, Calvin and
Luther, Kant and Jacobi, have held very opposite opinions. It
depends upon our idea of what is sin in falsehood, and of what
constitutes the basis of duty in truthful utterance. To be true
in expression subjectively and objectively, is not merely a duty
for the sake of result and effect, but is a direct obligation; hence,
truth both in duty towards ourself and our neighbour is identical,
and if impulsive motives are contained in the idea of what is
useful or injurious, still personality, which is universally inte
rested in the divine and rational object of our faculty for expres
sion, remains the determining motive. Play, war, jest, imitative

326 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
and other illusory arts, acknowledge their delusions, and thereby
cancel the same, or they degenerate into falsehood, and are then so
far sins. The duty of truthfulness cannot be limited to the idea
of rational truth, as that which should surrender the reality of
expression. For even temporal reality claims in its divine con
dition and suitableness, a pure and true apprehension and
transmission. We are certainly not bound by absolute duty to
give utterance to our sentiments, nor to exhibit the full content
of our consciousness. Silence is not falsehood, although there is
often added the explanation, that we desire to be silent, and
thus confess that we know that silence is not lying. There is
not only in the region of art and science, but also in practical
life, a wisdom of allegory and typology which calculates on our
susceptibility and capacity for comprehending the true and the
actual, but which is free from falsehood. If the maintenance of
our corporeal hfe were unconditionated duty, and if in this rela
tion the saying, " necessity is law," or " necessity knows no law,"
were a truly moral one, in that case the idea of a lie of necessity
would be justifiable. As an exception from the rule, as a sus
pension of the fundamental maxim, a lie of necessity is also a
sin of necessity, and consequently is sin. A lie of necessity
must thus pass into one of duty, if it is to be defended ; and now
the idea of personal self-preservation contends with this false
hood, which may be said to be duty towards our neighbour, and
the ministry of love. No concrete case can be pointed out where
those who lie or falsify from affection could not have acted more
wisely and affectionately without such falsehood. The dispro
portion between the frequent minimum of action in speech, and
the maximum of conjectural consequence, between the mere idea
of action and the perception of a terrible reality, renders the
practical difficulty here so great that a secondary effect ever
blends itself with the moral. We ought much rather confess
that we are liars and sinners from imprudence in love, and from
uncharitableness in complaisance, than exempt ourselves from
striving after the perfect man of whom James speaks, James in. 2.

§ 173. REGARD FOR LIFE.
Since corporeal life, the primary condition of all the personal
manffestation and development of human nature, is a creation

a. THE INNOCENCE, ETC. — § 173. REGARD FOR LIFE. 327
of God, which, even in man's sinful condition, can lose nothing
of its original goodness and holiness, Genesis ix. 6, consequently
the commandment "thou shalt not kill," Exod. xx. 13, xxi. 12>
Eomans xiii. 9, is universally valid, without any exception.
But murder, as Calvin remarks,1 is only the strongest charac
teristic of aU sins of lust and wrath imputable to man's moral
insensibility, the characteristic of aU impassioned life in its.
swiftness and fulness, of all the negligence of the health, to which
a disregard for the chief temporal gift of God is fundamental.
And suicide, which is declared to be a crime in the Scripture,
though but mediately, yet with sufficient distinctness, is so much
the more irreconcUable with Christian innocence, since it is as
much a Christian duty to hazard and sacrifice life in the service
of God and man, Luke xvii. 33, John x. 12, xii. 25,2 as it is
to endure it and render it fruitful for the kingdom of God, Phil.
i. 22, 24.
i Institutt. Rel. Chr. ii. 8, sect. 1 0, — Cur autem Deus velut di-
midiis prseceptis, per synecdochas significarit magis quid vellet
quam expresserit, cum aliae quoque soleant rationes reddi, hsec
mihi imprimis placet : quia peccatorum fceditatem (nisi ubi pal-
pabilis est) dUuere et speciosis prsetextibus inducere semper caro
molitur, quod erat in unoquoque transgressionis genere deterri-
mum et scelestissimum, exemplaris loco proposuit, cujus ad au-
ditum sensus quoque exhorresceret, quo majorem peccati cujus-
libet detestationem animis nostris'imprimeret.
2 See my sermon, The Sacredness of Self-preservation, a Christian
exhortation against duelling, Bonn, 1 835.
Remark 1. That the legal punishment of death is to be con
ceived as murder is as irrational as it is unchristian, and there
is no trace of such idea to be found in Scripture records. On the
contrary, the consciousness of the Divine lawfulness of punish
ment, by taking away life, is clearly expressed in Matt. xxvi. 52,
Romans xiii. 4. Here we find, in part, an indication of what is
Divine in the state as an ixhixrjgig, as an dmoxdXu-^ig bgytjg, — and
the symbol of the sword notifies the jus necis, — and, in part, we
refer to the ancient law of Noah and Moses. This again refors
back to the dark and blended phenomenon of right and wrong in
the avenging of blood. Cain expresses his dread because he feels

328 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
himself left to the avengement of blood ; God's voice assures him
this should not be, but that a sevenfold vengeance should at
tend on him. Now, when the haughty isolator and bearer of
the sword, Lamech, relies on the prohibition of vengeance for
blood, then arises the necessity for the law of Noah, accord
ing to which the mere right of the strong or the prudent, the
law of contingency and individual power in regard to human
life is altogether abrogated, and to it is opposed the absolute
injustice of murder, and the absolute justice of its public expia
tion. This justice puts the murderer to death. The first prohi
bition against avengement of blood adduced no reason for its
enactment; the prohibition of murder does so: man is God's
image, the ground of personality. But is this ground for the
punishment of death itself assailed? Does this punishment
commit the same crime which it punishes? By no means; with
as much reason might legal confiscation or imprisonment be
called theft and plunder. Human laws may, perchance, in them
selves, include principles of vengeance, cruelty, and injustice, or
Divine laws may be perverted in their principle, so that capital
punishment may assume the character of murder. But law, in
the necessity of its existence and operation, does not foster any
kind of passion or arbitrary wiU, but punishes both the one
and the other with the reactions of violated and yet inviolable
justice, of which it is a manifestation. Law, punishment, and
state, have indeed proceeded from the source of Divine love,
but, primarily, as phenomena and effects of right and justice.
Sinful humanity, as such, (according to Genesis viii. 21), shaU
indeed be tolerated and preserved, but then "only in so far as
it does not resign the human character, but aUows the state in
general, and indeed primarily admits the abolition of arbitrary
will in reference to personal existence. Thus we understand the
connection of the ninth chapter of Genesis with the preceding
one. The legal and state covenant with God, in all its manifes
tations, more or less complete, may at least be said to exist as a
muihuyuyiu iig xgierbv. That is to say, the state, as a Divine insti
tution, is the possibility of public care for the immediate institu
tions of the Spirit, of religion, and science ; but only so inasmuch
as it is essentially something beyond this, namely, the annihUation
of despotism and injustice, or the representative of personal right
against sinful individualism. The state is consequently not merely
a, theoretical manifestation of abstract natural justice and moral

a. THE INNOCENCE, ETC. — § 173. REGARD FOR LIFE. 329
law, but is the practical act and exercise of actual justice. The real
necessity of right is given with the state, whilst the latter cannot
produce the former considered as free, but only promote it. Thus
the question is not simply, how far the state can prevent actual
transgression, but it must annihilate actual sin in its injustice,
which it can neither prevent nor undo ; it must purify itself from
the transgressor, or ransom and expiate guilt ; in a word, it must
punish. Punishment does not desire a mere temporal indemnity,
which is not always possible, nor does it seek mere security through
indemnification, or by deterring from crime, nor does it aim at
improving the guUty, which by itself it could not accomplish, but
it desires to be the actual manifestation of violated and yet invio
lable law. AU those subordinated or derived objects of punish
ment can only be attained and promoted by realizing abstract
right, and by rendering valid the consciousness of eternal jus
tice. Thus the ultimate aim of punishment is ever an object
of love; and whilst the most recent speculation regards it in
such a point of view, it reconciles the contradiction between
Kant's view of the aim of recompense and Fichte's opinion of the
object of improvement. Christianity, with its principle of recon
ciliation, when adopted into the state, authorises the latter still
further to punish, and even to punish intentional murder by death,
because it more and more perceives that justice is love, and suf
fering by law is freedom, and that punishment is reconciliation ;
just as it ever exempts penal institutions from the charge of
cruelty and an unjust waste of life for the sake of exciting terror-
The principle of pardoning sin, whilst the sin itself is permitted
to exist, is contrary to Christianity. The idea of punishment is
that of law restored in the identity of endured denial. Premedi
tated murder must either remain unpunished or be punished only
with death. If corporeal self-preservation were an altogether
unconditioned good, and the absolute right of personality, in that
case there would be no natural law for the punishment of death;
if the temporal prolongation of life were the exclusive and ade
quate means of conversion, there would exist no Christian right
for such a punishment; but neither of these conditions exist.
Reformation cannot reach the murderer who does not acknowledge
that he is guilty of death, and who does not surrender himself up
to the Divine decree of punishment. If he do not recognise this,
still the decree exists ; the law of God is notwithstanding ful
filled in him, and Divine mercy is not bound with the transgressor

330 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
to the temporal limits of existence. Even a violent death is, to
a certain extent, to be regarded as freeing and purifying. This
view, directed against the author of das Votum der kirche gegen
die Todesstrafe, and against Schleiermacher, Grohmann, and
others, agrees in the main with Daub's treatise on the punish
ment of death, (Daub's Beurtheilung der Hypothesen in Betreff
der Willensfreiheit, &c, herausgeg. von Dr J. G. Kroger, Altona,
1834, p. 218).

§ 174. ESTEEM FOR SEX.
Man's destiny for society appears in the sphere of his medi
ate personality, and especially in the natural distinction of sex.
Man and woman may be said to complete spirituaUy and bodUy
their associate hfe, Genesis ii. 18, 21-25, Matth. xix. 4, and
the natural preservation of the species may be described as be
ing under the influence of inchnation and devoted love. The
only way of preserving our innocence against whatever is sug
gestive of sexual impulse and sexual relation, is consequently
that connubial condition of life which exists in marriage, and out
of it, as weU as in virginity and widowhood ; and universaUy
consists in shame, or the innate defence of personahty against
the destructive egoism of sexual impulse in thought, word, or
deed, being rightly perceived ; in subjecting aU sexual gratifi
cation to the conditions of lawful marriage ; and in maintaining
marriage in the abstract, as well by those who reject, as by
those who enter into that state, inviolate in aU its rights and
destinies. Impurity and incest,1 fornication and adultery, are
consequently as much opposed to Christian life, Ephes. v. 3,
1 Thess. iv. 4, 1 Cor. v. 1, Heb. xiii. 4, as is a state of virgi
nity and cehbacy, which either assumes that condition to be
more pleasing to God, or adopts it from mere arbitrary wffl of
independence, 1 Tim. ii. 15; iv. 3.
1 The substantial ground of prohibited marriage (Leviticus
xviii. and xx.) between blood-relations has been clearly indicated
by the legislator himself. Those who, by virtue of consanguinity

C. FRUIT OF THE SPIRIT. — § 175. RESPECT FOR FREEDOM. 331
possess, and have to cherish peculiar natural endowments of dis
interested love, and particular kinds of feeling shared by man in
general, cannot gain, but must only lose such a possession by the
marriage union. Connubial love can neither destroy nor derange
that whereto it refers, and which it desires to reproduce and pro
pagate. Thus, the horror naturalis is not only to be honoured,
but admits of being understood, and we must diligently strive after
this understanding, partly because of the sophistry of the carnal
mind, which appeals to the example of the Persians, Egyptians,
and Athenians, and partly on account of the modifications to
which the prohibition of marriage within certain affinities is sub
jected, in reference to its wider extension, according to local and
temporal circumstances.

§ 175. RESPECT FOR FREEDOM.
The Christian calling to the service of the Lord, and to
freedom in love, confirms man's original claim to a participa
tion in common external freedom, as well as agrees with aU
the restrictions of that service; and those restrictions which
arise in domestic and civil fellowship are, on that very account,
true expansions and defences of each individual right. Accord
ingly, every performance arid furtherance of adoration to man,
aU plunder or sale of person and talent, aU subjugation and
sedition, wffl separate itseff from Christian life as being unholy;
and this wffl operate to such an extent that the legal condition
where the Christian calling faUs, is, on the one hand, sum
moned forth, and, on the other, is partly loved, and partly
completed by love, Ephes. vi. 8, 9, Gal. iii. 28, PhUem. 17,
1 Cor. vii. 20-24.

§ 176. RESPECT FOR A GOOD NAME.
The duty of hving to the honour of God in Christ, 1 Cor. vi.
20, 1 Peter iv. 11, and of sharing the ignominy of our Lord,
Matth. x. 33, 1 Cor. iv. 13, eradicates from the mind where

332 PART IIL OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. APPROPRIATION.
it exists, aU carnal and secular ambition, by the same powers
which sharpen the mind towards personal worth, and strengthen
esteem for a good name. The same feeling which, in regard
to our Lord, makes the Christian ashamed of his fortune and
his deserts, of his state and rank, compels him, when, remember
ing his scarcely overcome self-contempt, to concede, even to the
most reprobate fellow-creature, the glorified image of reconciled
humanity, and to restore unto him, as far as he can, the merited
loss of the world's esteem, in so far as it can conduce to con
solation derived from the feehng of reconcihation, Luke vii.
37-50, John vih. 10, 1 1, 2 Cor. ii. 10, 1 1 . And the same feeling
which compels the Christian to seek the glory of the Lord alone,
urges him to acknowledge without envy every man's worth, merit,
and office; enables him to contemplate the same in its true sig
nification, Eomans xii. 3, 1 Cor. xii. 22, and renders easy the
payment of that reverence, rightly and proportionably, which
is due unto aU men, 1 Peter ii. 17, and this feehng, too, com
pels the Christian to recognise (2 Cor. v. 11), and yet soberly to
estimate (1 Cor. iv. 3) the advantage of being manifested in the
conscience of his brethren, and of standing weU in their esteem;
and, finaUy, it obliges him so much the more conscientiously
and affectionately to aid in securing to every man against ca
lumny and treachery that moral honour, which, behig 'free and
uncertain, is exposed to danger, and this so much the more, as
it furnishes the foundation, not only of temporal weU-being, but
also the basis of activity for the kingdom of God in this world,
and is an important aid for seff-government and preservation of
the soul.

| 177. RESPECT FOR PROPERTY.
Our natural equahty in poverty and wealth, 1 Tim. vi. 7, no
more abohshes, than does our spiritual equahty, man's earthly
destiny for inheriting and acquiring property, and for administer
ing it, as accountable unto God, and according to his wiU. For

C. FRUIT OF THE SPIRIT. — § 177. RESPECT FOR PROPERTY. 333
even the community of goods in the church at Jerusalem was
and could only be only in part vahd at the commencement, and
in part was a mark and sign of that spirit in which unequal pos
session ought to be regarded and treated in aU times and places
of the Christian's common life, Acts ii. 44, Luke xvi. 9. God's
irrevocable ordinations always reproduce inequahty wherever it
may have been artificially removed, and this, manifestly, as weU
for the bunding up of man in righteousness, as for the glorification
of Christ in giving and receiving, Acts xx. 35, 2 Cor. ix; 7, and
for discipline in indigence and wealth; so that aU actual and legal
continuance of property maintains the authority of a providential
and Divine arrangement, even granting that many a man in the
midst of aU his opulence, (which he neither knows how to ma
nage with secular nor Divine prudence,) should be punished in
a particular manner. In connection with this latter truth, not
only the incapacity of the prodigal, but also of the avaricious, for
respecting property, has been already indicated.1 Since theyj
indeed, do not comprehend in what consists the right of the en
joyment of God and the brethren, and, in truth, with equal lust,
turn God into gratification, or the means of it ; thus, their respect
for worldly goods breaks out into a real contempt and violation
of property. For the self-injury of the avaricious and the spend
thrift cannot be conceived apart from a coarser or more subtle
form of the sin of theft; and the force of the Divine command
ment, " thou shalt not steal," must, according to Ephes. iv. 28,
1 Cor. vi. 8, 2 Thess. hi. 6-12, operate to this extent, — that
the Christian must be purified from aU habits and works of the
parasite, the beggar, or the sluggard, as weU as from the sins
of carelessness, embezzlement, and fraud.
1 Hamann to Jacobi (1 785), " The time to collect and to scat
ter belongs to the secrets of God, and perhaps to the call of each
individual. The worst of it is, that in squandering, avarice is in
evitable, and thus one has to contend against two enemies."

334 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
|3. A Virtuous Life.
§ 178. GENERAL IDEA.
The positive aspect of righteousness for the kingdom of hea
ven, consists in this, that the Christian, partly in the entireness
of his developed life, and partly in his works, ever more per
fectly imitates the love of Christ, and by that means, in opposi
tion to indolent self-will, contributes his share for the realization
of the kingdom of heaven, or of the good appointed by the
Creator and Eedeemer. Innocence consists more in the pre
servation, and virtue more in the perfecting, of every thing that
possesses conditionated or unconditionated value for the typical
being. Hence, in this place, the question no longer turns on
self-preservation, but on culture; and, with reference to our
neighbour, no longer hinges on justice (justitia), but on equity,
or upon affectionate deportment in relation to possible or actual
conflict, and on goodness or affectionate conduct in reference
to indigent humanity.1
1 See, in reference to this arrangement, Sailer's Moral, ii. p.
1 79, and Herbart Einl. in die philos. Wiss. — Ausg. ii. p. 90.
§ 179. CULTURE.
(Self-love as self-perfection.)
In order to become a more and more perfect copy and in
strument for the love of the Lord, the sanctified man labours,
in his inmost life, not only for his daily resuscitation, but also
to this end, that his entire mode of life shaU be in conformity
with his general and particular earthly calling, (1 Tim. i. 18,
iv. 12-16, vi. 11; 2 Tim. i. 6, h. 3, 22, iv. 5,) edifying or
exciting to improvement, Eomans xv. 2, Heb. x. 24, and there
fore that it may become pure and symmetrical. For Christian

C. FRUIT OF THE SPIRIT. — § 180. EQUITY. 335
culture no natural disposition is indifferent, PhU. iv. 8, 9,
whether it be a particular talent, or one common to man in ge
neral. But it is only by the subordination of the objects of
culture that the evU arising from the miseducation of the whole
can be averted.

§ 180. EQUITY.
(Love of our neighbour in regard to strife.)
Cultivated love places the Christian in a condition not only
of doing good, but also of enduring evU, prospectively and re
trospectively, and of overcoming evU with good, Eomans xii. 21.
The saying, " there must need be divisions," is erroneously
founded upon Luke xii. 51, and simUar passages, as if the ques
tion does not here turn on inevitable results rather than on mo
ral obhgation. Emulation in what is good, and an irreconcU-
able contest with our invisible enemy, Ephes. vi. 12, 2 Cor.
vi. 15, must inevitably exist, because every other form of divi
sion, on the basis of enmity previously slain by virtue of Christ's
death, and on the ground of existing reconciliation, must be, on
the one hand, averted, and, on the other, carried on in a recon-
cUable spirit. The general virtue which relates to strife may
be caUed a peace-making disposition, as in Matth. v. 9, or liv
ing peaceably with all men, as in Eomans xii. 18, inasmuch as
both requirements are always understood. In the first place, it
is necessary that we have for our aim a good understanding
derived from love, and not from desire, and hence that we per
sist in attending to the " things" of others as though they were
our own, PhU. ii. 4, 5, and forego our own wishes, in so far as
that may conduce, not to the strengthening of wickedness, but
the softening our adversary by shame, Eomans xii. 20. Thus
we do not prejudice the holiness of that which supplies the
ground of all unity and pardon, but only ourselves. In the
second place, it is necessary that we, being dead unto hatred
and revenge, as unto that which is absolutely contrary to God

336 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. OF APPROPRIATION.
and belongs to the devil, and separating wrath frori sin, Ephes.
iv. 26, know how to contend with the weapons of truth and
love, by the restraint of divine peace, and this never without
mistrust of ourselves, and never without confidence in our
adversary, together with an infinite readiness to forgive, Matt.
xviii. 22.

§ 181. GOODNESS.
(Love of our neighbour in need.)
Since we are indebted to communion with our Eedeemer for a
new consciousness, which essentiaUy consists in a sympathy with
the redeemed and redeemable brethren, we, according to the ex
ample of Christ, Matth. xxv. 42, 46, make aU the real neces
sities of our feUow-creatuf es (not excepting those that are cor
poreal) our own, through love. This is that true phUanthropy
(2 Pet. i. 7) which, distinguished from brotherly kindness, expan
sively and truly sympathises with the poor and sick, the hungry
and naked, the deserted or persecuted, the irhprisoned and con
demned, whether they be guUty or innocent, and even feels for
the dead in relation to then corporeal and spiritual remains ; so
that philanthropy does not mistake what is required by the rich,
the free, and the healthy, and equally observes aU these neces
sities in their spiritual meaning and existence.
§ 182. CONTINUATION.
This phUanthropy, in so far as it springs from faith, is never
an inert sentimentalism, 1 John in. 18, James ii. 16, not even
when, from want of counsel and means, it seeks and accom
plishes, in the consolation of the Divine word, and in interces
sion, the only succour, James v. 13, 18. The service of good
words even sometimes includes a purer and greater amount of
love than the ministry of good works. He ever approximates

C. FRUIT OF THE SPIRIT. — §. 183. CONCLUSION. 337
the nearest to phUanthropy, who, being the most grievously
restrained in its sphere of action through suffering, is farthest
repeUed from the boundary line of that common progress
which belongs to human destiny. As for what remains,
the closer relations of nature, of convention^ of friendship,
and of calling, determine how strength, time, and means are
to be apportioned. Compare Luke x. 36, seq. with Gal. vi. 10.
For the unworthiness of an indigent being does not decide the
measure, but the kind of sympathy which love shall devote
to him. The essence of true philanthropy is anticipative and
disinterested, Matth. v. 46. If we consider its operations, it
ascends from general attention to what belongs to another, and
from a sincere officiousness in trifles, not only unto a charitable
ness that endures and spares, but also up to hazarding all we
possess for the sake of preserving our neighbour, 1 Jolmiii. 16.
Hence phUanthropy is not only just, and plunders not, in order
to give, but it is also wise and great in limiting and determining
benefits, Mark vii. 27, Acts hi. 6. The first limitation is drawn
by the subordination of individual corporeal necessities, one to
another ; the second, by the subordination of the corporeal to
the spiritual ; and the third, by a just attention to any prepon
derance of bounden duty that may exist.

§ 183. CONCLUSION.
Although every act of beneficence becomes an evU one, as
soon as it is only sown to the flesh, or is done at the expense of
spiritual weU-being, still there is a fulness of good actions and
services which are immediately directed towards the suffering
soul, towards spiritual disease or necessity. The Christian, in
all his relations, is caUed upon to be solicitous for souls, and is
as much bound to give instruction as to receive it, 1 Thess.
iv. 18, v. 11, 14; Col. iii. 16; Ephes. iv. 16. That is to say,
the love of Christ constrains him to instruct, to chasten, to
grieve (2 Cor. vii. 8, seq.) his neighbour; to encourage and
z

338 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. II. APPROPRIATION.
console him; it even coristrains him so to lift up and to receive
any deeply-faUen fellow-creature as to reanimate his feeling of
honour and safety, Luke. vii. 37, chapter xv.; John viii. 11.
The Christian, moreover, is constrained to bear the infirmity
of weak consciences, Eomans priv. 15, Matthew xii. 20, and
universaUy to exhibit, by self-control and sanctification, by pru
dence and , fidelity, such works as tend to the glory of his hea
venly Father, Matth. v. 14, 16, 1 Pet. iii. 1, and are pleasing
to his neighbour " for his good to edification," Eomans xv. 2.
Christian zeal, in particular, as regards instructing and convert
ing others, wffl not alone be recognised by its exempting us from
the shame of the gospel, which is accounted foolishness or an
offence, Eomans i. 16, and by its imparting to us courage to
give an answer unto those who demand a reason "of the hope
that is in us," 1 Pet. iii. 15; but it wffl also be distinguished
by our exercising it not less in behalf of our nearest connexions
than for strangers ; in our ranking essential points above sub
ordinate ones, 1 Tim. vi. 3, 4, 20; in honouring personal
capacity for persuasion and faith, (because it is continuaUy
involved in error mixed with, truth ;) in seeking to transfer our
selves into the place and course of thought of those who are in
error, 1 Cor. ix. 20; in not exposing the truth, by passionate or
importunate expressions, to an aversion and hatred that tramples
on it, Matthew vii. 6; and, above aU, Christian zeal wffl be
recognised by its not acting as ff we were able or willing, by our
own strength, or by the measure of grace dweUing in us, alone
to guide any conviction and any conversion promptly unto faith.

§ 184. PUBLIC SPLRIT.
Whatsoever is in accordance with duty and virtue, as respects
the love of our neighbour, is repeated in the relation of the
Christian to society ; whilst it is required that he reduce his
sanctified sympathy from the central point of natural brotherly
love (pAahXtpiu, Heb. xui. 1, 2 Pet. i. 7, John xiii. 34), not

§ 184. PUBLIC SPIRIT. 339
only into the natural feUowship of home, but also be in a condi
tion to extend it unto a genuine popular love and cosmopolitism
(vttip icavruv uvSpairav, 1 Tim. ii. 1), susceptible of every ex
citation appertaining thereto. For attachment to home and
fatherland is assuredly not diminished by Christian culture, but
elevated to prudential perseverance, and maintained by mode
ration and fidelity. But even whilst such attachment renoun
ces the passionate and selfish element of particularism, it be
comes, at the same time, justly and freely participative in aU
the pecuhar gifts and necessities which nature and grace may
have implanted or caUed forth in the condition of our neighbuurs,
of the community, and of nations. In this participation the
unity of manifoldness exists, and by virtue of a due subordina
tion, either the more noble, or the more contiguous, or the more
general in reference to social objects and goods, decide our de
terminations. Although the maxim appears very heathenish,
according to which Caiaphas (John xi. 49-52) (who, besides his
saying more than he meant) decides the relation between a
citizen and that which is most expedient for the people ; still
the pubhc mind of Christians especiaUy manifests itself, not only
in the choice of calhng, but also in its entire view ; not only in
laborious culture for the duties of one's calling, but also in its
administration being full of sacrifice ; not only in dying but liv
ing for one's calling; not only in rare performances or endur
ances for a common object, but also in daily conduct, full of
circumspection in reference to the commonwealth, and its indi
vidual parts.
Remark. Hitherto Christian life has not been considered in the
relation of Christian to Christian as such, nor even in the rela
tions of the duties of earthly condition, as they are usually de
terminated by nature and grace; a consideration which the ex
istence of the Christian church, and the recognition of its consti
tution presupposes.

340 PART III. OF SALVATION — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
SECTION THE THIED.
ON FELLOWSHIP IN SALVATION.
§ 185. COMMUNITY OF SALVATION.
Precisely as human destiny (§ 91) was originaUy designed for
feUowship, in hke manner can redemption only be participated
in as a common one; and although the Christian stands to his
heavenly Father in that peculiar and immediate relation in which
he is placed by the Son in the Holy Spirit, yet the spirit is a
common one, by means of which the Christian is at the same
time peculiarly connected with the entire body of the Lord.
Compare John xiv. 23, with John xvii. 21, 22, Ephes. iv. 4,
1 Cor. xii. 4, 13. This combination or union does not depend
upon a mere identity of condition or internal determinateness,
nor in a mere identity of custom and creed, but consists equaUy
in an effective reciprocity, and is compatible with a boundless
variety of gifts and degrees of Christian culture, Ephes. iv. 7—
16, 1 Cor. xii. § 186. CHURCH.
This feUowship of men caUed and sanctified by Christ, in so
far as it is united with the community of a typical people as its
spiritual development and realization, is caUed the church of God,
(rnj$ 1 Cor. i. 2, the summoned popular assembly of God in
this world; and in reference to its common actions in the pre
sence of the Lord, as well as to its continuous structure, is de
nominated the Church.1 In one point of view, it is an abiding
testimony, Tit. ii. 14; and, in an another, a continual means
for the redemptive ministry of our exalted Eedeemer; and no
one can be in and hve in Christ, unless he be guided in some

§ 187. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CHURCH. 341
way by the vital ministry of the church, and at the same time
be led to take an active share in it, and for it.
1 The church is the Lord's house, and rb xugiuxbv has copied the
name of the BasUica3, uvdxrogov, dvdxeiov, as the heathen temples
were called. In the 13th Canon Concil. Neocses. rb xugiuxbv rSjs
mbXeug, is termed the town church. Likewise 33ip| in Amos viii.
3, signifies both temple and palace, and corresponds to the term
Basilica. Ecclesia is called by the Greeks a popular assembly,
in contradistinction to the assembly of the senate (gbyxXnrog);
the Alexandrians used the term, as well as euvuyuyri, for trans
lating *^pjp, J-f^np; *ke Christians, however, have ever pre
ferred the expression Ecclesia, to that of synagogue, (James ii.
2, Heb. x. 25); first for the sake of distinction, and then because
it had been especially used by the apostle to the Gentiles.

§ 187. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CHURCH.
The church is essentiaUy, and before anything else, the con
gregation of the sanctified, and to this extent is itseff an object
of faith, Ephes. i. 22, Heb. xii. 22, not only because its invi
sible head, together with the congregation of the perfected, be
long to it, but also because, in reference to its personal conti
nuance, and the actual ministry and culture of its members,
it lives a hidden life, which its open hfe can never altogether be
equal or correspond to.
Remark. A rehgious community corresponds to its idea only in
proportion as it inwardly possesses its definite character and spirit,
and does not assume a mere externality, or exercise itself in a
mere representative spirit. If it be objected, — that positive re
ligion must always first be exhibited to its people and exercised
from without; and that absolutely positive, or true, revealed re-
ligion(which is not mediated by natural religiousness,) must be so
before all others, consequently, that the Christian church may pre
eminently be regarded as one that hears, teaches, confesses, and
celebrates sacraments, and for these objects is to be conceived as
ecclesiastically organized, and consequently as an external and

342. PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
visible assembly; to this we reply, that the revelation and in
stitution of the old covenant must assuredly precede that of the
new; but the latter is not like the former, a legal one, — is not
perchance the only general law of God touching worship, morals,
and domestic life. The New Testament is the theocracy of the
spirit, and has, when possessing a hierarchy and aristocracy, es
sentially a spiritual clergy. This internal theocracy is principally
mediated from without by the historical Christ and the word.
That which is mediating, however, is not worship and law, but
doctrine, gospel, and life; the internal theocracy is produced not
by legislation, but by Divine instruction; consequently, the me
dium itself is spiritual, enfranchising, awakening, not determin
ating by sense and by the exercise of violence. Hence it is, that
the church, 'during the sermon on the mount, or on the occasion
of Christ's call and invitation, had not in effect as yet appeared,
but first on the day of Pentecost, after our Lord's departure and
glorification, entered into full existence and reality. The aposto
lical and Christian consciousness must first be fully perfected be
fore the church of Christ can exist. In this first moment of its
existence, it is, and is preliminarily before aught else, a congrega
tion of the sanctified, of believers. Compare my Protestantische
Beantwortung der Symbolik Mbhlers, Hamb. 1835, p. 192, 217,
and my Protestant Theses, Numbers 34-42.

§ 188. UNITY AND PLURALITY.
However, the church of the Lord is not absolutely internal
and invisible, nor absolutely true, only in its invisibUity. But
together with its active life, there is necessarUy associated in a
twofold point of view, a capacity for being external. In the
first place, in so far as an inclination to utterance and confes
sion, which is innate to faith, necessarily produces, for the re
ciprocal influence of Christians, external mediations; and, se
condly, in so far as its communion, as such, desires to influence
the world, and, consequently, must exhibit itself, 2 Cor. iv. 13,
Eomans x. 7-15. For this externality of his chinch, the Lord
himself has not only provided, but at the same time founded, in
commands which have a promise, Matth. xvhi. 15, 20. For if it

§ 188. UNITY AND PLURALITY. 343
be admitted that the continued preaching of the gospel, and
common prayer, that the celebration of baptism and the Supper
of the Lord, and that the exercise of brotherly disciphne and
the office of the keys, are partly our Lord's institutions, and
partly the fundamental and sustaining functions of the church,
in that case He is not only the founder of the kingdom of God,
but is also the founder of the church. But none of these acts of
feUowship has He commanded otherwise than on the assumption
of an already existing spirit of faith and. love; none has He com
manded as a new liturgical legislator; none in such a way, as
that, in general, that determinateness of congregational hfe con
stituting his church, should only be elicited, any where, or at
any time, by the exercise of all these acts ; just as if faith (pre
cisely as it must be derived from the word of God,) could only
(combined with the whole ecclesiastical union and relations as
existing in organized societies,) be realized in the latter, and
primarUy constitute the true church. Eather is the church
that has become external, unlike in many respects to that which
is internal. For the latter is necessarUy at all times one (?5 ix-
xfaiffi'u rov %&ov, oSfjua Xptirrov), the former only so by means
of the latter, otherwise it is a plurality, (raaai ai ixxAqoiai ruv
ayiuv,) a plurality, whose individual members are able, and to
a certain extent are bound to strive after external union, but
in not attaining, or in having lost that union, from tem
poral or local circumstances, yet lose nothing of the essen
tial characters of the church of Christ. The conditions,
stages, and kinds of ecclesiasticism are equaUy unhke in both
relations. Many maintain a high dignity in the true church,
which is one, and are subordinate to aU the distinguished
offices in the church of Ephesus or Thessalonica, in connection
with which their residence may place them ; others scarcely find
in the porches of the one true church a place, yet occupy a
high position in the Christian communion which exists in plu
rality, or mere artificial unity. Notwithstanding this, however,
the different churches cannot altogether disavow their connection
with the one church, and with each other, and must acknowledge

344 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. FELLOWSHIP.
it in proportion as they refer to the original appearance of Christi
anity, and build upon the foundation of the apostles and pro
phets, Ephes. ii. 20, and hold fast the institutions of Christ.
Remark 1. It is not unimportant, that modern theology, the
supematurahstic as well as the rationalistic, has to a great extent
renounced the development of the idea of the Church of Christ,
which was traced in all the symbolical books of the Protestants.
Even Reinhard, Doderlein, and Storr, commence with the whole
body of confessors, and afterwards mention the distinction be
tween the general and particular, true and false, and visible and in
visible church. How have they reached this point ? If the church,
as a united body of confessors, shall have a place in a system
of doctrine and morals, it presupposes that all who confess the
name of Christ with any measure of truth and freedom, must be
supposed to be in some conceivable fellowship of the Lord, and be
regarded in some way or other His members. Otherwise this so-
called historical idea of the church is worthless as regards faith ;
rather does this idea begin to destroy faith, as soon as it conjectures
that Christianity must first be a confession, in order to become af
terwards faith and love, or that Christianity is only fellowship, in
so far as it is confession, worship, and social arrangement. All
this is absolute extravagance, and not derived from Biblical and
Protestant doctrine, and most injurious in its consequences. If
we admit, on the other hand, into the idea " collective body of
confessors," that equally indicated religious and moral interest,
then does the latter only maintain its hold by an indifferentism,
or its better ground by the idea of a communion of saints (be
lievers) being already acknowledged, and thereby finding an
internal point of relation for all the phenomena of Christianity.
On the other hand, many maintain that the congregatio sancto
rum, in the sense of Melancthon, Luther, and all the Reformers,
namely, societas vere credentium, (for which they incline to put
vere emendatoram), societas ejusdem evangelii et ejusdem spiritus
s, qui corda eorum renovat, sanctificat et gubernat, is a philoso
phical conception, or an idea of the church. This conception,
is of all others the most real which can be given, and, fortu
nately, theology, which has lately been termed mystical, has
reinstated it in its original imprescriptible right. See Schlei
ermacher, Glaubenslehre ii. and Marheineke, die Grundlehren der
Christlichen Dogmatik. Augs. i. p. 455, " according to its absolute

§ 188. UNITY AND PLURALITY. 345
idea the church is the fellowship of those who are sanctified
through faith. We are in the church only in proportion as we
are sanctified. The impure and unbelieving are not members of
the church, (or at least are but membra mortua). — Apart from
this idea of the church it is impossible rightly to attain definite
conceptions of it, for the latter only specify what is realised more
or less, in the life of man by the idea, and represent not so much
the ultimate aim of aU our efforts, as the separate attainable
elements and conditions of life in the church, or relations of the
world to it." N. B. Marheineke's view of an idea is altogether
different from that of Wegscheider.
Remark 2. The objection offered by Protestant dogmatists, as,
for example, by Doderlein and Ammon, in common sometimes
with Roman Catholic teachers, to the idea of an invisible church of
Christ, arises from their comprehending the contrast between
the internal and external absolutely, and not as it should be,
relatively. Just as every genuine Christian gives testimonies
and outward expressions of true Christianity, and blends them
with aU his relations ; in like manner, an internally sanctified
congregation cannot remain unwitnessed, either in morals (mores
Christiani) or in custom (mos Christianus) ; it must ever pub
licly declare its belief and preach to the world, even as it must
ever strive after the union of its members in the world, yea, it
is the only vital and invariable cause of all that is visible in the
church; but it never happens that, in connection with its ex
pression and manifestation, it must not be accurately distinguished
from the visible church. The invisible church can never entirely
acknowledge the same expansion or limitation, never altogether
recognise the same members, stages, vital functions, and laws,
which are peculiar to the visible. The relative invisibility of the
church of Christ is laid down in Luther's Catech. maj. art. 3,
credo in terris esse quandam sanctorum congregatiunculam et
communionem, ex mere Sanctis hominibus coactam, sub uno capite
Christo, per Spiritum S. convocatam, in una fide, eodem sensu et
sententia, multiplicibus donis exornatam, in amore tamen una-
nimem et per omnia concordem, sine sectis et schismatibus. On
the relative invisibility and visibility, Melancthon remarks, Apol.
art. iv., Ecclesia est  principaliter societas fidei et Spiritus
sancti in cordebus, quae tamen habet externas notas, ut agnosci
possit, videlicet puram, evangelii doctrinam et administrationem
sacramentorum consentaneam evangelio Christi. The observation

346 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
of the same divine, Loci, 1543, p. 339, in reference to the idea of
an absolutely invisible, unmanifested church, is not opposed to
this view : nee aliam fingamus ecclesiam invisibilem et mutam
hominum, in hac vita tamen viventium : sed oculi et mens coetum
vocatomm, i. e. profitentium Evangelium Dei intueantur, et
sciamus oportere inter homines publice sonare evangelii vocem.
Although Calvin discusses the idea more surely, and fully indicates
the unity as well as the difference of the ecclesia visibilis and
invisibilis, Institt. iv. i. § 7. Compare also Joh. Gerhard, Aphor.
xix. de eccl. 7, 8, Proinde distinctio ilia (in eccl. vis. et invis.)
non introducit duas veluti distinctas ecclesias s. diversos coetus,
sed coetum vocatomm xur uXXov xul aXXov bmoXri^/eug rgbmov, vide
licet ei*oi§ev xui igu%ev considerat. It cannot be said that Protes
tant confession is self-contradictory, because the church finds it
especially or principaliter in believers, and yet preserves itself
from every view entertained by Donatists or Novatians. The
Divine act of the appropriation of salvation is a single one, which
is developed in calling through the Gospel, or in the preventive
grace developed to the grace that justifies and converts; the
single result of this one act is the one fellowship of the faithful;
but it is to be remembered that this act is to be distinguished in
its elements, and that it is possible that the xXnroi are not yet
ixXexroi, although they may become so. The historical and visible
church admits, however, of distinctions also which are held to
gether by the unity of the word and the period of grace. The
real church itself, which, so long as it is historical, is only rela
tively perfect, comprises within itself its possible members, whilst
it refers to the future, which separates the impossible, Matthew
xiii. 24-30, 47-50.

§ 189. THE TRUE CHURCH.
It follows from the above, that, with the outwardness of the
church there is always united a certain untruthfulness; for it is
only by the word and the Spirit of God that the church is pre
served absolutely true. But if exposition and continued preach
ing belong to manifestation in every case, then aU the remain
ing fallibility nd partiality even of regenerated preachers par-

§ 189. THE TRUE CHURCH. 347
ticipate in that, and the infaUibility of the developed life of
doctrine is preserved only through the gift of fouxpurig and trial
of the spirits, 1 John iv. 1, 1 Cor. xiv. 29, 1 Thess. v. 21,
a gift which ever abides with faith. The gift of the Spirit
of truth itself is farther conditionated by the gift of the Spirit
of love; and if it be conceded that ordinary teachers, as such,
are not the more faithful or genuine Christians in every point
of view, then they cannot be the especial possessors of the
Spirit of truth, since Christ, as wisdom and love, cannot be dis
united. Now if it happen that any existing congregation of
saints be an organ of Christ's calling ministry, and supposing
that such knew perfectly how to preserve and distinguish the
condition of the Catechumenists; still the called, dependent,
(Ephes. iv. 12, 13), relapsing, and erring, in order not to
rehnquish their necessary tendency towards sanctification, must
be admitted into their own circle; and from the inabUity of every
existing church government to judge the heart, it must even
cherish and tolerate hypocrites, and suffer from the vicious, 1
Cor. v. 2 Cor. ii. Faction, offence, and corruptions, conse
quently partial falsifications of the church, are in their connection
with the world relatively necessary and useful, Matt. xiii. 25,
29, xvhi. 7, 1 Cor.xi. 19. Nevertheless, the one, true, living
Christian Church remains, by virtue of God's Word and Christ's
authority, for all time in this world, in order to be augmented
from time to time, Eomans xi. ; except that it possesses in its
external condition those attributes only in proportion as it is
purified by suffering, 1 Peter iv. 17,1 and is restored to its
historical and spiritual original by reformations. Even under
the evil circumstance of its contending against renovation, the
trnth, from which it can never be entirely emancipated, may
stiU continue operatively implanted in it, through the opposition
in which it stands with itself.
1 Melanchthon, Loci, p. 498. Plerumque ecclesia est ccetus
exiguus verse doctrinse professionem retinens et sustinens varias
et ingentes serumnas, communes et peculiares.

348 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.

§ 190. PREACHING.
As a fundamental and vital function of the church, our
Lord established the preaching of repentance and forgiveness
in his name, Luke xxiv. 47, Matt, xxvih. 19, Mark xvi. 15,
Eomans x. 14, 1 5, and founded the office of preaching in its
living perpetuity to the end of time, Mark xiii. 10, and this in
aU its manifold gifts and ordinations, Ephes. iv. 11, 1 Cor.
xii. 28. The ordinary or exclusive office of teaching, in so far
as it rests withal upon human caUing proceeding from the con
gregation in connection with the world, is to be regarded as an
advantageous institution, for which the apostles themselves
made the necessary arrangements, 1 Tim. hi., Tit. i. 5. Only
the ministry of the word, apart from which there is no church,
and neither foundation nor preservation of its common hfe,
cannot be absolutely and under all circumstances bound to this
order ; partly because the Charisma, (the gift of testimony and
teaching), and the conscious mission of the Lord, may by pos
sibility reach to a witness, who in his place or time might not be
in a condition to obtain that laying on of hands which he would
seek, and partly because an arbitrary and partial refusal of
approbation may occur in proportion as the gospel might by
possibUity be persecuted and oppressed by an erring, or even
unbelieving administration.
Remark. If we consider the condition of " a regular call"
(Augsburg Confession) valid in the sense of the evangelical idea
of the church, then the order which opposes the fanaticism and
confusion of a Miinzer and the Anabaptists is equally to be pro
tected and guarded against the claims of the legal priesthood
and the Divine office of mediation. If order, which is innate to
common life, since a universal necessity for it remains, has ele
vated itself, by the reflection of wise men, up to an institution,
still the latter is but human, historical, and moveable; and
through the same gift of wisdom, which co-operates for it, must
its real substance be reduced back to the original living order,
and thus may be renewed, expanded, and determinated. Where

§ 191. PLEDGES AS SIGNS OF A COVENANT. 349
the contrary occurs, authority ever becomes usurpation, and
the end is sacrificed to the means. The Lord imparts gifts,
awakens, tries, calls, and sends. He who is called, moreover,
approves himself, to the congregation, is recognised in his gifts
and capacity for being called by the congregation, who exercise
their judgment, and a belief in his Divine vocation is consum
mated and sealed, by the laying on of hands and by prayer.
The caUed knows himself, and is known, in the origin of his
testimony from the word of God, from his apostleship; and since
he could not be a Christian without desiring fellowship, and
fulfilling its duties as a member, so he can as little be called a
genuine successor, if he do not desire to honour the subsisting
and preceding ministry of the word, and place and maintain
himself as a witness in union with the collective body of testi
mony. This is the Divine order in the human. On the other
hand, if we seek the first and last, the absolute criterion of
what is divine in the vocation, merely in the fact of Episcopal or
other established forms of anointing, ordination, &c, then is
the gospel perverted into a mere legal, dead, and mechanical
system.

§ 191. PLEDGES AS SIGNS OF A COVENANT.
If no one can be caUed into the feUowship of the Lord, and
partakes of His Spirit, otherwise than through the power of the
Divine word, then every one requires for his confirmation and
preservation in this internal feUowship an external one of mutual
influence and recognition in the Lord. This external feUowship
itseff, however, universally requires, for each and aU, those seals
and pledges,1 through whose acceptance and attainment, partly
its union with the Lord, partly its distinction from secular and
natural feUowship, and consequently a certain hmitation of
what is prepared and incorporated, is effected. Hence our
Lord has instituted baptism and the Eucharist2 not merely
symbohcal acts, (yet not magical ones),3 but such as change,
by virtue of his compact and institution, wherever they are
performed in his name, and the more their administration

350 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
agrees with his institution, — man's internal relation to him ;
and in proportion to the personal and common faith with which
these acts are repeated, they impart communicatively the fel
lowship of his glorified hfe, and in general amply confirm the
duty of reciprocal brotherly love and Christian relationship.
1 The idea of pignus, as distinguished from signum, is just that
in which the various Protestant Confessions are enabled to unite
their doctrines of the sacrament. See on this point Luther's
Catech. Maj. p. 555, ed. Rechenb. Ideo ad sacramentum acce-
dimus, ut ejusmodi thesauram ibi accipiamus, per quem et in
quo peccatorum remissionem consequamur. Quare hoc ? Ideo
quod verba ilia extant et haec dant nobis. Siquidem propteria
a Christo jubeor edere et bibere, ut meum sit mihique utilitatem
adferat, veluti certum pignus et arrhabo, imo potius res ipsa, quam
pro peccatis meis morti et omnibus malis ille opposuit et oppig-
noravit. If this be commonly assumed, then, is that which is
common more than a distinction originating from peculiar modes
of thinking, of which one prefers the mystical identity of the spi
ritual and corporeal of what is received, and another the mysti
cal simultaneousness of the same twofold act. Other definitions
not agreeing with the above are to be mutuaUy relinquished
because they rest upon an arbitrary and assumed exegesis. The
definition of the Declaratio Thorunensis, v. 7, bordering upon
the evangelical union, concurs with the Lutheran exposition:
Patet, nos nequaquam signa nuda, inania, inefficacia aut tan-
tum notas externae professionis statuere, cum prseter mysticam
ex instituto significationem, certam etiam divinarum promis-
sionum obsignationem, simulque veram et infallibilem rerum
promissarum, modo ipsis convenienti et proprio, exhibitionem
fide viva acceptandam statuamus.
2 It has been justly remarked by Chrysostom on John xix. 34
(upon an incidental occasion of the If ijXSe uhug xui dipu) i% dfupo-
riguv (baptism and the Lord's Supper) jj ixxXrieiu euvigrrixe- xul 'Igugiv
oi pugruyuyou/ievoi hi uhurog ph dvuyevvu/ievoi, hi uipurog he xul eugxSg
rge<pb[ievoi. In the first place, the duality of the sacrament is
firmly grounded upon Holy Scriptures, particularly on the typo
logical passages in 1 Cor. x. 1—5, xul mdvreg iig rbv Muug^v i^umrie-
avro ev rfj ve<p'eXri xui iv r$ ^suXdggrj xul muvreg ro ubrb jSjjS/ta mveu/tunxbv
iipuyov, xul muvreg ro durb miftu mveupunxov emiov — ; and, in the second
place, it is based upon the idea or the nature of the subject • for

§ 192. BAPTISM. 351
if the sacrament be a sign and pledge, a sign and means of ap
propriating that higher life which is derived from Christ, then
it is only the two elements of the birth and preservation of this
spiritual life that admit of being distinguished and compared.
See my Protest. Beantw. d. Symbol, v. Mohler, p. 1 82, and Protest
ant. Thesis, No. 85.
3 With reference to the idea of symbolical and allegorical acts,
and then on either superstitious or mystical ones originating
therefrom, see my treatise on the text and sense of the words
used by our Lord in instituting the Eucharist, " uber den Text
und Sinn der heiligen Einsetzungs-Worte," &c. in Rosenmiiller
Tzschirner's Analecten, &c, vol. iv. st. 2, p. 187 — 90.

§ 192. BAPTTSM.
As a pledge and seal that man may be received into the fel
lowship of the new life in Christ, our Lord, in conformity with
natural and prophetical symbolism (Ezek. xxxvi. 25, Zech.
xiii. 1), instituted baptism, which even by his express word,
John hi. 5, Mark xvi. 16, by the apostohcal practice, Acts
ii. 38, vih. 15, 16, and by other incidental aUusions, Ephes.
iv. 5, v. 26, Tit. hi. 5, is declared to be an external surety of
regeneration by the Spirit. Grace does not require baptism in
order to justify men, but man, as associated with the church on
earth, needs the feUowship of Christ's institutions. Baptism,
by being erroneously or prematurely administered, is not
thereby rendered fruitless, but it is a contempt for what per
tains to its internal and external completion; and where it is
only administered without intentional abuse, and in conformity
with the real institution, and the wffl of the Christian commu
nity, it affords a vahd proof that the baptized, and congrega
tion, are mutually related in the Lord, and that the former
hath entered into the sphere of Christ's redeeming ministry.1
1 If the more ancient Dogmatists (compare Gerhard, in the
work already referred to, xvii. §§ 14, 15) maintained the sacra
mental identity of the baptism of John and that of Christians,

352 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
nevertheless Biblical theology can show, from Acts xix. 3-5,
John i. 33, &c, a distinction, which allows to the former all
the consequence to which it is entitled. On the other hand, it
.belongs to that doctrine of faith which is historically complete
to defend infant baptism, partly from the analogies of Mark x.
14, 1 Cor. vii. 14, and by the facts of nature and experience,
and partly to concede its defectiveness and need of completion.
See Schleiermacher, Glaubensl., ii. § 150, p. 540-545. The
assertion, that the children of Christian parents, as such, may
possess adoption, as far exceeds the limits of truth, as its oppo
nents do, when they, as for example Gerhard, maintain the
proposition, that in baptismo et per baptismum Spiritus S.
fidem accendit in infantibus — quamvis vero non possimus intel-
ligere, quomodo comparata sit ilia infantum fides : tamen non
debemus propterea Spiritus S. operationem negare. Without
doing the latter, we may nevertheless refuse our assent to the
doctrine of fides infantum. Infant baptism, performed accord
ing to God's word, by a believing church, clerically, and in the
presence of sponsors and parents, is a divine fact, in and on the
child's life, an act by and in which he shall believe, after attain
ing, through the word, a knowledge of baptism. Baptism, in
its connection with the fact of the church and the word of recon
ciliation in Christ crucified and raised, is a seal of that common
grace especially appropriated to the child, a seal of his especial
calling and ordination unto eternal life, which as much awakens
and strengthens faith as he will be sustained by faith, and con
firmed by the baptism of the Spirit and its fruits. Compare
Confess. Anglic, art. 1 7, March 6, CoUoq. Lips. " They are
received and adopted into grace according to God's order."
Ecclesiae inseruntur; promissiones — iis obsignantur; fides confir-
matur. These are the only just determinations, and which are
at the same time sufficient for confirming infant baptism; on this
depends our understanding, partly the mutual relations between
the two means of grace, and partly the mutual relation of the
two sacraments in the spirit of the letter and the gospel, in con
formity with human nature and experience. Under the first re
lation, we may venture to concede to Baptists more than the most
recent and gifted apologist of infant baptism has thought it right
to do, (Martensen, d. Chr. Taufe. und die Baptistische Frage,
1843); or rather we may be said to take less from them. There
may be Baptists, and among ourselves many who sympathize in

§ 192. baptism. 353
their views, who endure such a state of subjectivity as to for
get the appropriating act of Christ, and merely regard the
psychological antecedents which are elicited by the doctrine.
Baptism itself is unaffected by this charge. Martensen appears
to think only of the doctrine, or only of the letter in baptism ;
but the question turns on verbum Dei. Does not this, if it awaken
faith, operate as the power of Christ, as a spiritual means of grace ?
Or does the Holy Spirit in the word effect only all pertaining
to gratia prcecurrens, and develope exclusively by the sacra
ment what pertains to gratia convertens ? And must the sacra
ment then, according to the doctrine of the Baptists, be a mere
external superaddition, can it not be the conclusion of the inter
nal operation of grace? Upon the whole, Martensen concedes too
much to the Baptists. Moreover, no view taken of puSrireueiv,
Matth. xxviii., affords any grounds for asserting that the New
Testament recognises those only to be baptised who have given
living signs of their faith. The evangelical standing-point which
excludes a magical or mere legal appropriation of salvation, re
quires that the sacrament should be, not only a signum, a verbum
visibile, but also pignus, a, pignus fidei et promissionis fidei occeptce,
and an exhibitio, in fact, that which essentially co-operates
with the word. We do not find in the apostolical history of
baptism, that he who had not received baptism by water, could
not be baptised and regenerated by the Holy Spirit ; nor that
baptism should be indifferent to him who believes the word and
is justified by faith; nor finally can we gather from apostolic
history that baptism may not be administered to him whose re
generation and conversion are yet incapable of being recognised.
In this latter point of view, the Baptists have manifestly the
apostolical history against them; to say nothing of the fact
that regeneration itself is a fact incapable of being empirically
and infallibly recognised. Compare Martensen, p. 26. Under
that supposition baptism would necessarily be postponed to
an indefinite period. The case stands thus, that the church
may have reason to believe the Divine election and calling of
the person to be baptised, and may perceive no obstacle either
in the mind of the candidate or his personal relations, and that
this may be the commencement of his reception by Christ and
the church's influence upon him. The church is not merely
the invariable product of operations connected with the means
of grace, but is also the constant mediatrix of those means to
2 A

354 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
men. She is not indeed mistress of the communications ^ of
Christ, but she is the servant and administratrix of the Divine
mysteries. According to her idea, she perceives in natural birth
both the commencement of- a sinful development and the need
of a redemption — which is exclusively bestowed in Christ. More
over, in harmony with her views, she equally recognises the in- '
dividualization of salvation to be a gift and act of the Lord, and
that election and caUing must precede justification and sancti
fication. The church, indeed, is not at liberty, in the case of
the adult, whose personality is already developed, and without
a reference to his susceptibility or unwiUingness, to refuse his
desire, or to compel if he declines the ecclesiastical act of appro
priation; neither is she at liberty to question, in the case of the
infant born within the circle of Christian life, its call to the
kingdom of God; for what xXrjgig xur ixXoynv is for an adult
heathen, is in this case an historical and providential ordination
in the Christian circle of nations and families; and St Paul, 1
Cor. vii. 14 (compare De Wette Theol. St. u. Kr. 1830, 3 p. 669),
appears throughout as a witness for the testamentary existence
of a child under those circumstances, to whom, as among the
Jews, a like mgurov is given before the heathen according to
Rom. i. 1 6, ix. 4. Now the church is able to complete this re
lation by conferring the sacrament, and irrespective of the un
developed age ; since human nature in itself is susceptible of
the implantation of the Divine life; since no period in developed
life can be indicated as the absolute commencement of the ne
cessity and susceptibility for salvation; and since the promise is
expressly given that even childhood may be brought and appro
priated to the Saviour; Mark x. 14, there are no grounds for
fearing that the Church's act of faith in baptizing, as connected
with that appropriation of salvation, which must be mediated
through antecedent acts of consciousness, and through con
scious relation to the church may not be serviceable to the fu
ture operation of the Spirit on the baptized, and not obstruc
tive. On the other hand, the church is not at liberty to con
fer baptism where such cannot as yet be the commencement
and surety of a development in its sphere, and which stands in
no living relation to the means of grace in the word. In a region
not yet christianized,- missionary baptism can only desire to
operate; and missionaries are justified in delaying and being
most circumspect in introducing infant baptism. Where a foun-

§ 192. baptism, 355
dation is laid, upon which no development or superstructure can
be expected, and must consequently be surrendered a prey to
desolation and profanation, it is far better that it should not be
laid at all. Baptism ought only to be conferred in connection
with aU other means of grace, and thus only as a basis for con
firmation and communion. Where this is the case, it remains,
at all events, a fact which shaU be farther verified and completed
according to its internal value and tenor, and thus, as a problem
to be realised, cannot be too soon performed. Even before the
Christian era there were two classes ; some sought to postpone, as
long as possible, consecration into the mysteries, inasmuch as,
when once received, it excluded from any voluntary enjoyment
of the world; and in so far as such consecration imparted the
gift of immortahty, others desired to appropriate it as early as
possible, and this even in childhood. Christian practice fluctuated
between both these views in the early ages of the church. At
last infant baptism prevailed by virtue of an internal right ; for
if once there exist a universal capacity for, and need of redemp
tion, and if the treasure of salvation can only be personally ap
propriated by means, then, wherever possible, must its use be
claimed for aU human life called to salvation, and not being in
opposition thereto, and this in proportion to its applicability; and
thus baptism is claimed for infants, not less but rather the more
earnestly, inasmuch as it cannot be preached unto them. A
contradiction between the future walk and baptism is possible,
even when it is only conferred on the instructed. Baptism may
become a dead letter to the unbelieving; but it is peculiar to
Christ, not only to prevent with his grace, but also to be and to
continue faithful, when the baptized is unfaithful, and to pre
serve that whereunto repentance can return. Wherefore the
church has no power absolutely to excommunicate a baptized
person. Baptism, in a season of emergency, when the life of a
child is in danger, cannot be refused on the plea of the former
only having a concern for that life which may' be said to endure
and to be developed in the earthly temporal church. Baptism
corresponds to faith in the unity of the church of Christ here and
hereafter. Nevertheless those who abstain from or considerably
limit baptism, are not on that account to be suspected of contemn
ing the sacrament or denying the exclusiveness of salvation in
Christ. Compare Riitenik on the baptism of necessity, " iiber
die sogen. Nothtaufe," Theoll. Stud. u. Kr. 1836, 2 p. 417. There

356. PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
are granted unto the church in general sacraments, means of
grace which it is bound to preserve uncormpted in their unity;
but to carry out the order of their administration and applica
tion with reference to time and circumstances, is left to those
who, in general, exercise the order of administration.

| 193. THE LORD'S SUPPER.
The Eucharist was instituted by Christ, 1 Cor. xi. 23, x. 16,
as a pledge and seal that a member of the church subsists and
increases in hving feUowship with the Lord. For hke as he
declares, (John vi. 51), that partaking of his flesh and blood,
or the fellowship of his personal hfe, (which assuredly is not
confined to the external celebration of the sacrament), is the
condition of our share in eternal life, and as he has also inti
mated how he alone becomes, through the finished work of
his reconcUing death, the appropriate object of enjoyment and
the perfect means of hfe ; so has he instituted a mystical act,
which shaU not only adumbrate but typicaUy warrant and
mediate such participation and such feUowship, and which,
according to the exposition of the apostle, 1 Cor. xi. 26,
iLygig ov aA% is designed to be perpetuated untU " He come,"
and in a peculiar manner to presentiate unto us our crucified
and raised Lord. Hence all believers, according as they can
come to the sacrament with desires purified by self-examination,
have to unite themselves afresh from time to time with the
heavenly life of their head in the common participation of the
blessed bread and wine with a grateful acknowledgment of His
death.1 1 Luther, Catech. maj. p. 556, Jure optimo cibus animus (sa-
cramentum altaris) dicitur, novum hominem alens et fortifi-
cans. Per baptismum enim initio regeneramur, verum nihilo-
minus antiqua cutis carnis et sanguinis adhseret homini. Jam
hie multa sunt impedimenta et impugnationes, quibus cum a
mundo tum a diabolo acerrime infestamur, ita ut non raro defessi
viribus deficiamus ac nonnunquam etiam in peccatorum sordes
prolabamur. Ideo hoc sacramentum tanquam pro quotidiano

§ 194. common prayer and the lord's day. 357
alimento nobis datum est, ut hujus esu fides iterum vires suas
reparet.  Etenim nova vita ita instituenda est, ut assidue
crescat.  Verum huic contra multse passiones exhauriendse
sunt.  Ad hoc jam datum est solatium, et hjec prjESENtaria
ANIMI LEVATIO ADORNATA.
§ 194. common prayer and the lord's day.
The condition of hving and true feUowship which Christians
shaU have in the Lord, with each other, and with the past and
future church, is common prayer in accordance with the word
of God,1 Matthew xvhi. 20; compare Acts ii. 42, iv. 24. A
community continuaUy offering up thanksgivings and supplica
tions can never cease to intercede for the magistracy, the people,
and the world, with which it is connected, 1 Tim. ii. 1. The
more a congregation prays in the name of Jesus, the truer
it becomes, and as true, is always heard. Individuals ought to
submit to aU the discipline of the Spirit, and to all external
order requisite for their attaining a more and more perfect
common prayer, 1 Cor. xiv. Ephes. v. 19. If they a*re bound
to cherish their assemblies, they are equally bound to consecrate
them in communion. For although the holy day,2 regarded as
an element of the Jewish Law, is no longer binding on
Christians, Gal. iv. 9, stffl it is to be viewed as an element
of a succession of time, as " The Lord's Day," (Eevelation
i. 10, 1 Cor. xvi. 2), which is grounded on creation and
human destiny. On that day (even the day when He rose
from the dead) the Lord has procured rest for His people from
His enemies, hence it is also a public day, and in order that
each individual may discern his share in the change of medita
tion and action, rest and labour, each is bounden to each and
to the community at large.
1 Calvin, interim adultero — germanum, cui adjecta est vera
pacificationis et ecclesiae reformandse ratio, 1549. " Hoc princi
pium recte teneamus, nos non recte orare nisi prseeunte Dei
verbo." The fundamental principles of freedom, truth, com
munion, order, and solemnity, are developed from the evangeli-

358 PART III. OF SALVATION.  SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
cal idea of congregational divine service. Freedom is equally
opposed to mechanical, contingent, and arbitrary divine service.
Truth forbids the partial operation of subjective consciousness,
so far as the latter tolerates freedom, and reconducts to the ob
jectivity of the canon and creed. Communion opposes the pre
dominance of individualism. Order preserves reciprocity of ac
tion, the unity of manifoldness, and development. Finally,
solemnity is the co-operation of all these principles, in so far as
it is directed to the exhibition of faith, an exhibition which
must equally avoid both natural fellowship and secular art. As
respects the principle of truth, that is equally applicable, pro and
con., the use of repeated or traditional prayer. In the first
place, it is not opposed to the use of such, because a verbal ex
pression of Christian common faith may be so excellent in its
kind, that even the most lively devotion of those who respond in
prayer always strives to enter into its spirit and meaning, and
therein to exercise itself. In the second place, the principle of
truth is in favour of such form of prayer, because the expression
of a common feeling must ever be sought in traditional words ;
notwithstanding this, however, it is opposed to the literal, legal,
and exclusive use of a formulary, because the living appropria
tion of such can only take place under the condition of an imme
diate productive power being present, and having room and in
citement to testify itself in the congregation.
2 As the week, like the month, year, and day, affords a natural
division of time, so the law of the seventh day is to the like ex
tent grounded on creation, as soon as we admit that it is man's
destiny not only to live through, but also to consecrate, every
period of natural existence. Hence a day of rest is a natural,
divine institution, which is commended to the conscience by
such an institution in the old covenant, with reference to a true
veneration for, and fellowship with God. If the Sabbath, in the
words of our Lord, be made for man, and not man for the Sab
bath, and if the Son of Man, who has to represent all the aims
and objects of humanity, be also Lord of the Sabbath (Mark ii.
27), then, on the one hand, the appointment of a day of rest, in
relation to the extent of the distinction between a time of labour
and a time of rest, is left to the consideration of evangelical free
dom, and on the other hand is not left to arbitrary wiU. If it
must not comprehend inhuman regulations, as, for example, were
those of the Pharisees, nor absolutely deprive the festival of

§ 195. OFFICE OF THE KEYS. 359
operative love, nor deprive work of rest, then, for the sake of
what is divine in the human festival, or because a day of rest
was made for man, it must be strictly preserved for Christians.
This law is not abrogated, but rather glorified, by the Sabbath
being changed to Sunday. Sunday is the festival of redemp
tion on the day when we celebrate the work of creation. Some
Christians in this respect rather aim at the common enjoyment
of the means of grace, as, for example, Luther, in his catecheti
cal exposition. Others, again, claim this day as being a period
for devotion, and for exclusive attendance on church ordi
nances, so that both parties, by their subtle tendencies, are mu
tually opposed as rigorists and spiritualists, or as legalists and
free: The balance lies, in the first place, in this, that even
the more rigid must admit the idea of works of necessity, and
the idea of recreation, if they do not desire actuaUy to oppose
the explanation of our Lord and the apostles, and admit all days
to be Lord's days, and for the service of God ; and, secondly,
in this, that the free-minded are not at liberty to violate the Di
vine law, which graduates and apportions our time in relation
to our church and spiritual necessities. Hence the univer-
saUy valid precept, — to keep the day of rest in such a way that
common rest from secular occupation may allow opportunity for
common recreation and refreshment, and that each individual
should only participate in such occupations, and sensible recrea
tions, external to the church, as may allow them to participate
in those dispositions of the soul congenial to the Sunday.

§ 195. OFFICE OF THE KEYS.
In the same proportion as the church abides in a pure
gospel and in vital prayer, does it possess not only the right
to declare whether a doctrine be conformable to faith, and
whether a custom accord with the law of love, Matt. xvi. 19,
xviii. 18, but also inherits apostolical authority, to declare
unto some the forgiveness of their sins, and to others the re
verse, John xx. 23. The church never judges man's in
ternal relation to the Lord, nevertheless, it is at liberty law
fully to speak concerning the conformity of the external relation
of its members to Christian fellowship, and this, by warning,

360 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
admonition, and aU the acts of discipline, which open a way for
reunion, and do not cut off admission unto the preaching of the
word, and in no way penally affect secular and civU relations,
1 Cor. v. 3—5, 12, 13. Compare 2 Cor. ii. 5—11. A
church, which does not act as a church, with respect to the
inconsistency between a scandalous walk and the sacramental
confession, which, in general, exercises no discipline, and which
neither will nor can do so, is, although it may cherish in its
communion many living members of Christ, not to be regarded
as a church, but even in the promulgation and hearing of the
Divine word, only a contingent assembly, Matth. xvhi. 16.

§ 196. ECCLESIASTICAL CONSTITUTION.
Every Christian community, in general, which, in any place
or time, practises preaching, prayer, and the administration of
the sacrament, has always to regulate itself on the supposition
of a unity as well as diversity in the visible and invisible church;
and in accordance with this twofold point of view, the commu
nity is bound to strive after the greatest amount of ecclesiasti
cal union, without denying the original equahty of churches ;
it is bound to aUow aU especial spiritual talents (1 Cor. xii. 14)
without sacrificing to any one in particular the universal gift of
the spirit of love which springs from faith; and is equally
bound to admit ranks and degrees of office, without, however,
placing them on a par with those which are alone cognisable
and valid with the Lord, and without detracting aught from
the higher authority of the gospel, the apostles, and Christ,
Gal. i. 1—10; 1 Cor. vii. 12, iv. 15.

§ 197. ECCLESIASTICISM.
Christianity, in relation to an external and mediated church,
cannot be conceived apart from ecclesiastical sentiment and
exertion. The general duties of Christian ecclesiasticism con-

§ 198. CHURCH AND KINGDOM OF GOD. 361
sist, first, in an internal and external contribution towards
founding, sustaining, and perfecting church communion and
confession in general, and towards that union in particular
by which those who are most intimately allied in natural and
civic relationship are the most closely approximated for mutual
edification; secondly, in a due share in the reformation, union
and mission of the church, and cheerful participation in the suf
fering connected therewith ; and, thirdly, in a preventive atten
tion to the order and offices of the congregation, as weU as
subjection to social discipline. The especial duties between
catechumens and those who are of age, between the congrega
tion and the elders, and the congregation and teachers, admit,
accordingly, and in conformity with the Apostle Paul's pastoral
Epistles, of being more fully determined.

§ 198. CHURCH AND KINGDOM OF GOD.
The preparation of the kingdom of God afforded by the Di
vine preservation of the world, is included in the famUy, the
state, and in general worship, which preparation operated in
the Christian church by redemption. Since the highest com
mon good consists in these opposites being fused into the unity
of the kingdom of heaven, but which still abide ; and since the
heavenly kingdom may be regarded as a perfect citizenship, as
weU as a perfect paternal home, it foUows, on the one hand,
that the object of the Christian feUowship of faith and hfe is to
purify and to complete natural feUowship by means of a visible
church; and, on the other hand, that all natural common hfe
founded by God shah conduce, each in its kind, to the preser
vation and advancement of the true church. Consequently
Christian duties, domestic and civic, are most intimately aUied
with the Christian duty pertaining to the church.
1 The arguments adduced by Dr Rothe, in his Commencements
of the Christian Church, (Anfdngen der Christi. Kirche, &c.) Wit-
tenb. 1837, on "the Relation of the Church to Christianity," is

362 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
opposed to the above views, as weU as to the evangelical, nay, to
every dogmatic idea of the church. According to his view,
Christianity, as a religious common life, can only be realised in
a Christian state, and as a Christian confederacy. The church,
in a Christianised state, according to our author's idea, has already
perished, if the Reformation of the sixteenth century is not to be
viewed as a wicked apostacy. The church is a necessary and
auxiliary institution for Christianising public life, and, as such,
participates in an apostolical, and indirectly in a Divine founda
tion ; but regarded in itself it is a temporal form for preserving
and diffusing Christianity, a form destined to decline. — We intend
on this occasion merely to express our objections, but not offer
any formal arguments against the author's views on this subject.
The New Testament and the Confession of the Evangelical
Ghurch recognise no Christian common life which may not equal
ly be a collective Christian life, or a homogeneous element of the
same ; no Christian fellowship, which, as such, is not dependent
on its head, Jesus Christ, by faith in love; no common life which
may not represent itself in the confession of Christ; which may
not seek and obtain mutual edification, preservation, sustenance,
and advancement upon the same grounds of apostolical and pro
phetical preaching, and through the same spiritual means; in
short, which may not be ecclesiastical, in fact, the church. The
church, an assembly of people, a people of God in the new cov
enant, differs from a similar assembly under the legal covenant
of the Old Testament. The church appears at Rome, Ephesus,
Corinth, (under the conditions adduced above,) in continuous iden
tity and unity; for every where there appears the same dependence
on the one Lord, in one Spirit, and on one word ; the same relation
to human nature, the same war against the Prince of this world,
the same tendency to the redeemable and destitute world, conse
quently the same impulse to represent, sustain, and extend Chris
tian life as a common life in conformity with those local and
temporal relations which are grounded on the social constitution
naturally existing; and there is everywhere the same desire to
secure for preaching and edification their permanent effects, and
for separating whatsoever is heterogeneous. The church is
neither older nor younger than Christianity. It is the constant
product and continued medium of the historically true Messiah's
ministry, imparted in the Word and Spirit. It is mere caprice ad
mitting the church only to enter into life where and when it has in

§ 198. CHURCH AND KINGDOM OF GOD. 363
a manner, disappeared, or is forgotten and denied. This occurs,
however, from the very moment it begins to seek, in the multipli
city of its members, its existence in its mode of manifestation, and
does not simply add the latter to the former, but ranks before the
word an hierurgical sacrament borrowed from heathenism, and
elevates ecclesiastical order to the law of God. All the elements of
its idea, truth, unity, universality, and holiness, are from thence
converted into falsehood. This change has not occurred by vir
tue of its own principle, and by consequence of circumstances, but
by the power of a natural secular principle, opposed to the church,
and which has not yet been subdued, a principle partaking of Ju
daism and Christianity. Christianity has regenerated heathenism
to a great extent, and this by ingrafting Judaism upon it. Thus
Christianity has become but a third principle, as an apocryphal
writing of St Peter expresses it. The impulsive energy of the
church, and its power to produce orders, moral systems, and arti
ficial representations, is something quite distinct from its inabUity
to do so without a relapse into legality. True Catholicism, which
vitally cherishes Protestantism, can call forth very much that is
organised and material, without denying the principle of evange
lical freedom, the independence of congregations, or the manifold
kinds of Divine service and customs. What Jews were ever greater
and truer Catholics? Was it those belonging to the Sanhedrim,
who hoped to govern for ever at Jerusalem the twelve tribes
after their own manner? or the Alexandrian Jews, who placed
the central point of unity in every synagogue, or rather in Moses,
who was well understood and acutely expounded, and who be
lieved that the doctrines of the law, by virtue of their truth, must
subject all people to Moses, or rather to spiritualization and di
vination? And farther, it may be asked, whether the idea of
unity and universality was realised more by the extension of the
Romish liturgy to Siam or Peking, or by the combined operation
of evangelical missions to all parts of the world? It will be
readily granted that the unity is much greater, and the univer
sality far more perfect, which bears and endures the greatest
amount of distinctions. Those external and united efforts which
anciently united congregations in political capitals, and always
concentrated more and more towards old or modem Rome,
constitute, as more particularly appears since the Reformation
and the reawakened missionary spirit, but a fragment of the his
tory of the unity and universality of the church of Christ. The

364 PART III. OF SALVATION.  SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
learned author has bestowed abundance of peculiarities upon the
Christian state or confederations, and for that purpose endowed
the church with a semblance of greatness or poverty of identity:
In general it is an error, occasioned indeed by Hegel, to suppose
that ecclesiastical history can only be explained from the oppo
sites of state and church, and of religion and science, and from
these alone. There must be added a third contrast, strictly a
dogmatical one, namely, the church of the Gospel and the
church of the law. By this contrast alone does the process of
internal life, decay and renovation, self-deception and contra
diction of the church with itself, become inteUigible. The evan
gelical church could, (if the world were only the material of nature
and realisation, merely a something susceptive of God, were only
that concerning which philosophers are alone wont to speak,)
from the period of its being first planted, have organised itself far
above the model afforded by the synagogue, and exhibited itself
far more catholic, without losing or denying its evangelical and
catholic character. Hence, the church of the law could not ex
ist if that of the gospel did not constitute its foundation. Phe
nomena, however, which delay, oppose, and falsify, are not based
upon the supposition that Christian feUowship organized itself
against the state, but on this, namelyj that it disregarded the
relation of its order and constitution to its nature, and com
prehended itself in its temporal condition as well as in its es
sence, in its mutabUity as in its permanence. With regard to state
and church, they are not to be so viewed as if they arrogated,
borrowed, lent, or forestalled anything in reference to the mate
rial of human and popular life. They both possess themselves
of this material with a different design, and with a distinct mode
of operation, without their being deficient in an indestructible re
lation. The state itself, as well as the church, must derive all its
material from a third principle, from popular life; this latter
contains in itself the world, sin, and the flesh ; the state is re
lated thereto in a manner quite distinct from that of the Chris
tian church. The state entirely belongs to the concrete morality
of the public mind; but still that is not its idea. The state
(status) is morality in the form of necessity. The necessity of
morality is justice and action. The state, abstractedly viewed,
does not produce anything that is free, but has a potency for
doing so. Whatever popular life effects as a state, and conse
quently by means of law and government, is included in this idea.

§ 200. MARRIAGE, 365
The state guards and protects the spirit of social freedom, and
the enterprises of association; it administers after it has settled
and regulated, it levels and adjusts. He who considers this
view too contracted must, as yet, have recognised but little of
the general order of Divine and human affairs. A Christianised
state at least, understands more than any other, the enfranchising
principle, and knows that it is not in itself that principle; it com
prehends the emancipating condition of the church, through whose
continued operation it ever becomes more completely christian
ised. Ransom is assuredly in the state and through the state, but
it is altogether different from that redemption which is in the
church and by the church ; it is a preliminary, legal, and medi
ate one, and, being very important, the Christian church origi
nates the state where she finds none, and aids to construct and
sustain it. Thus the kingdom of God is not so much the per
fected Christian state and the negation of the church, but the
complete elevation and intervention of this contrast. We here
lay aside the eschatological consideration connected with this
subject. — Compare Petersen, die Lehre von der Kirche, i. 1842,
p. 138, where the distinction and unity of the church and
state with reference to all the particular and extreme views
which have been propounded up to the time of Vinet are pointed
out. | 199. CHURCH AND EARTHLY CALLING.
The members of the Christian church abide in their earthly
calhng, 1 Cor. vii. 20; and in those ancient connexions where-
nnto they have been appointed by God, under the obligation
of so hving therein as neither to deny faith nor love, but sup
port, by Christian innocence and virtue, preaching, by faith,
1 Peter ii. 12, hi. 1, 2; and imitate all natural and secular
feUowship, from a spirit of Christian union, or copy the arche
types of the kingdom of God.

§ 200. MARRIAGE.
The conjugal state must not only be preserved chaste and
faithful, Heb. xiii. 4, 1 Cor. vii. 1-6, compare § 174; and as

366 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
opposed to lust and caprice, be held as indissoluble,1 Matt. xix.
1-9, 1 Cor. vii. 10; but must also strive to embody a common
life, which corresponds by love, esteem, and confidence, to deep,
heartfelt exclusive affection, Ephes. v. 22, 23; although in
relation to exact personality, a perfectly equal honour is due to
the wife as to the husband, Gal. iii. 28, 1 Peter iii. 7, avyxAq-
povofAoi, it foUows from independent natural relations, 1 Cor.
xi. 7, that the husband's love ought to manifest itseff especiaUy
in kind courtesy and considerate esteem, 1 Peter iii. 7, Ephes.
v. 28; and the wife's in obedient confidence and submission,
Ephes. v. 24.
1 The Biblical idea of marriage is that of "one flesh;" the one
common life of the man and woman as instituted by God, and
designed to realize all the objects included in a distinction of
sex, in their purity and subordination, and to preserve them
against the power of carnal lust. As in all common life the more
perfect regaining of individuality by a surrender of peculiarity,
and thus union in God is the most important and most religious
form of life, so holiness is incumbent upon marriage, the root of
all common life, this most intimate personal union, this especial
type of religion and the church; even apart from the object of
preserving the species, or of instruction. Resignation in mar
riage would be opposed to personality were it not reciprocal; if
in this reciprocity there was not confidence and a promise of
fidelity, if it were not of life-long duration, and if there were
any reservation of peculiarity and separation. Hence the Re
deemer developes that view given in primeval history, "eig edgxu
y,iuv" to the universally valid proposition ; marriage, in the ab
stract, is indissoluble (Matt. xix. 8, dm dgxns), what God hath
joined together let not man put asunder. Every marriage, if it be
not in itself null on grounds of fraud or blood relationship, (in
which case, even though consummated, it cannot be held as real)
— every marriage regarded as a fact of regulated social life, pre
supposes that divine institution, and constitutes a divine union,
even admitting that the married pair had not been united spiri
tually in God. For, inasmuch as God, in his providential go
vernment of the world, has allowed man and woman, (who were
or ought to be capable of realizing the true object of marriage),
to enter into that form of relationship instituted by him, it be-

§ 200. MARRIAGE. 367
comes a divine union which man cannot dissolve. On the other
hand, that God may separate by his revealed will, and then bv
means of man, is not to be .denied. Precisely as the prohibition
"thou shalt not kill" does not abrogate that other decree "whoso
sheddeth man's blood, by man -Q"|j>$S" shaU his blood be shed."
T T T
Marriage, as opposed to human caprice, self-love, desire, or disin
clination, is indissoluble, for in its institution and consummation,
it is a mutual receiving and surrendering which can only be
authorised by fidelity; and hence it follows, 1st, That a disinch-
nation to continue in the marriage state, and an inclination to
dissolve it, must necessarily be connected with sin, even admit
ting that this sin antedated the origin of the marriage and its
voluntary consummation; Idly, It follows, that in the Christian
ethics of mind and conversation, there is included a will for
maintaining the holiness of marriage in opposition to desire and
disinclination, for sacrificing unto it sensuous gratification, or
for enduring for the sake of marriage, and for using such en
durance for its glory, on account of so exalted a human common
good, as well as for promoting the personal welfare of the soul.
It by no means follows, however, from all this, that the funda
mental principle of Christianity pronounces an actual marriage
union to be absolutely indissoluble. The question of divorce, if
it is to be Scripturally answered, compels us, amongst other ad
missions, to acknowledge that the New Testament is not a legal
codex, which, as such, would at first only aim at the external
deportment ; rather does it reduce the law back to its ultimate
grounds, and unfolds to us its divine principles for every rela
tion of life; it points out their realizing elements here and
there in concrete action and sufferance; but by no means is this
entirely the case for all times. The material constituting the
relation of earthly life is neither absolutely changeable nor un
changeable. It is only the idea, the fundamental principle that is
immutable. Christian moral culture is at once free and progressive.
We do not say this, as if, in this or that case, an expression of
Christ or the apostles existing in the form of moral requirement
could, as being purely of local or individual import, become invalid
and indifferent as respects our existing moral system. For the
principle is embodied in every moral doctrine, and its mode of man
ifestation retains its proportionate regularity, although it must
first be reduced to its principle, and thus sometimes be extended
and sometimes narrowed. If we include under this supposition the

368 PART III. OF SALVATION,  SECT. III. OF FELLOWSHIP.
entire phenomena, the following results appear to us deducible
therefrom. 1. To seek and accomplish a divorce from disinclination
to an existing union, and from a desire after another, is so very
sinful and unjust, that no mutual agreement, no public approval
is competent to extinguish the unchristian nature of such a pro
cedure. Moses, who, on account of the hardness of man's heart,
permitted him to put away his wife with a bill of divorcement,
has not prohibited, on the plea of adultery, a reunion of both,
but only does so in the case of a divorced woman having, in the
mean time, taken another husband. Deut. xxiv. 1-4, compare
Jer. iii. 1. Moses forbids whatever might approximate to an
exchange of wives or community of women. Catholic canonists
hold that Moses regarded every marriage of a divorced woman
as adulterous. In that case the law would have absolutely warned
man against marrying a divorced woman, which is not the case.
But, if she whom thou hast put away have become the wife of
another, she is unclean unto thee. The Christian fulness of
the law extends farther; it condemns as adultery that disincli
nation in the husband which is consummated in divorce, when
it is combined with a desire for another marriage. Mark x. 1 1,
Luke xvi. 18. It advances still farther ; for it condemns divorce
itself as incurring adultery, unless for the latter crime alone.
Matt. v. 32, xix. 9, and 1 Cor. vii. 10, the Xbyog mogveiug is not
once taken into account. 2. Divorce, on the ground of adultery,
or mogvelu, is not a duty, is not necessary, but permitted. If on
this ground it be not necessary, but permitted, then the idea of
it is indisputably extended to at least the permission of a sepa
ration in all cases where the preservation of personality renders
a dissolution of associated life necessary. 3. Separation may
become a duty; for to surrender body and soul to the sinful
will of another cannot, even within the matrimonial union, be
regarded as a duty, but must be held to be inadmissible. The
apostle assumes many cases of separation, 1 Cor. vii. 10, in
which there may exist a necessary and innocent element of jus
tification, for he says in general — idv he xul x^gie^fi x. X., and
adds, as his own opinion, if your husband will live with you
only on condition of your abjuring, denying, and not exer
cising your faith, you are not bound unto him, but if other
wise, abide with him. 4. Every separated person must refrain
from marrying again as long as the spouse lives unmarried, and a
moral and just reunion be yet possible. 5. If a Christian possi-

§ 201. PARENTS. 369
bility yet exist, under the injury sustained from adultery, of for
giving the adulterer and continuing in the married state, in
that case there is a proportional moral necessity for the innocent
party to remain unmarried during the lifetime of the guilty one.
6. Nevertheless there are Christian grounds for permitting and
consecrating the second marriage of a separated spouse during the
lifetime of the first, supposing even that the separation has not
taken place on the ground of adultery in the usual sense. The
Divine object of marriage is this, namely, that it is a defence
against sexual lust and averts concupiscence and its lawless out
breaks, and reduces inordinate desire into the order of connubial
chastity, 1 Cor. vii. 2. The more this consideration, according to
age and other circumstances, obtrudes itself, and at the same time
the cause of separation has been well grounded, so that it almost
amounts to a declaration of the nullity of the marriage, so much
the more readily may the church consent to a second marriage.
But she must never do so in the case of a person who, in his re
maining course of life, gives no evidence of his being penitent
and subjected to the discipline of the spirit, nor without paying
particular attention to the special care and discipline of the soul.
The universal claim of justice extends in all cases not grounded
on Xbyog mogveidg, only to separation. If the adherents of the
mere letter fortify their views by the absolute peviru uyupog, they
will not only be embarrassed by another literal view, but will
also be opposed by the bu hehouXarui, 1 Cor. vii. 15, because it
would have been self-evident in the case assumed by St Paul,
that the party who had been put away or wickedly deserted,
was not bound to continue the external social life. Ultra posse
nemo obligatur. When he says, bu hehouXurui, it must be under-;
stood as equivalent to heherui, v. 39, iXtU&egov iivui, ib. and Rom,
vii. 2, 3.

§ 201. PARENTS.
Christian parents regard their chUdren as gifts inviolably in
trusted to them by the Creator and Eedeemer. They purify,
through a sense of redemption, their parental feeling from the
vanity, on the one hand, always adherent thereto; and, on the
other, from the sorrow and weakness peculiar to such feehng,
2b

370 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. FELLOWSHIP.
Mark x. 14. They do not take from parental power, by pas
sionate misuse, the glory of love, Col. iii. 21, Ephes. vi. 4, (Ige-
SiZpiv vupopyiZpw),1 but they unite in education, discipline, Heb.
xh. 7, with admonition vovSsiria, and conduct them by such to
maturity in the Lord, by the law to the gospel, and by the lat
ter to the former. Moreover, the conduct of age towards
youth is regulated by the same spirit, as weU as that of in
structors (fathers, 1 Cor. iv. 15, 1 Tim. v. 1,) towards their
scholars. 1 On this text, see Schleiermacher's Sermons on the Christian
Domestic State, which comprehend these relations more profound
ly, and place them in a clearer light than the great majority of
works on ethics.

§ 202. CHILDREN.
Christian chUdren recognise in their parents the absolute and
reverend representatives of the creating, sustaining, and govern
ing God, Ephes. vi. 1, Matth. xv. 4, and they never attain to
such maturity and independence as to cease to be bound to pay
them distinctive service, gratitude, and obedience in the Lord.
The command to which they conform has, not in vain, connect
ed with it, before aU others, the promise of a blessing. It is
not every one who is destined to be a father, mother, brother,
sister, or spouse, but even the orphan is not altogether deprived
of the natural means of instruction in the higher filial sentiment;
and the chUd at least, though he have not all the circumstances
of domestic hfe around him, is not deprived of an immediate
model in the life and conduct of the Eedeemer, Luke U. 49-
51, John xix. 26. From the spirit of filial duty, the deport
ment of youth towards their elders, and of scholars towards their
masters, is duly determined.

§ 204. HOUSEHOLD UNDER AFFLICTION. 371

§ 203. BROTHERS AND SISTERS.
From Christian fiUal conduct there spontaneously arises an ap
propriate state of brotherhood, hence, in this point of view, there
was no necessity for a distinct command. Christian brethren are
by virtue of their common descent, from a parental common
life, peculiarly capacitated and called upon to improve each
other, and cultivate an interchange of heart free from envy, and
a true attachment, devoid of selfishness ; and to exhibit univer
sal types of the love of our neighbour, and the higher form of
fraternal love, to which they can only attain in proportion to
their feUowship with the first-born in the household of God,
John xx. 17, Heb. ii. 11-17. For as aU the bearings of na
tural love among relations most intimately experience the power
of selfish bias, and may be deformed to the extent of finding
place and opportunity for the manffestation of the most unna
tural, that is of aU Cain-like wickedness, even so is the fraternal
relation not only very susceptive of redemption, but stands much
in need of it. The duties of feUowship in office and rank are to
be recognised in a spirit of brotherly love.

§ 204. HOUSEHOLD UNDER AFFLICTION.
A regardful sympathy, not only from the family itself, but
also on the part of neighbours and the congregation, is doubly
due to the sick and aged, to widows and orphans.1 For they
are, by a remarkable provision of God, constantly represented
as objects of love, James i. 27, Luke vii, 12. On the other
hand, they are bound to exhibit thankfulness for the sympathy
they enjoy, and to evidence the holiness of their especial state
of trial by an edifying walk and wffling renunciation, 1 Tim.
v. 3-16.
1 See Draseke, in reference to the one thing needful, in his Ser
mons, 1812, p. 227, "and she was a widow."

372 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. FELLOWSHIP.

§ 205. DOMESTIC LIFE.
To Christian domestic hfe there also pertains a certain com
mon exercise in the word of God, and in prayer, which is an
echo to the public one, and a preparation for it likewise. At
the same time there is a certain surrender of filial and frater
nal sentiriient to domestics, and of parental feehng to masters,
PhUem. 15, &c.

§ 206. FRIENDSHIP.
The inclinations of choice comprehended under the name of
friendship are ahke distinguished from those of conjugal and
from those of brotherly love. They preserve a Christian value,
inasmuch as, through the friendship of Christ, John xv. 13,
14, they partly free themselves from senthnentalism and adu
lation, and partly from the sufferings of sin and mortahty, and
are proportionaUy endowed with the gifts of knowledge, of joy,
and of fidelity in love. Thus refined and cultivated, they ever
more purely exhibit, according as they are divested of earthli-
ness, that whereunto aU unions of pecuhar love, even those of
marriage and brotherhood, are elevated, and in which they shaU
continue in the resurrection, Matt. xxii. 30.'
1 See my sermon on the superiority of the Christian friend
over the blood relation.— Samml. 1819, p. 231.

§ 207. THE STATE.
The state becomes a new and abundant invitation to mutual
holiness and the common exercise of Christianity; an institute
of God the Preserver and Governor, which the gospel finds
either already considerably formed, or at least, everywhere
potential. As the Preserver circumscribes evU in the con-

§ 207. THE STATE. 373
science, in hke manner He wards off destruction from this
transient world by means of laws which maintain an equili
brium, Gen. vih. 22; and from the beginning He has provided
the social state of man on earth, with means of preservation,
Gen. iv. 15 ; ix. 5, 6. Personal right is reciprocaUy preserved,
in order that aU may have the most suitable opportunity for
cherishing the whole of the higher or lower earthly destinies of
man. AU actual phenomena connected with this, aU estab
lishments of a legal commonwealth, partake of the character of
a Divine institution and authority, and neither conquest nor
compact alone, but contemporaneously with these, and by them,
Divine necessity conditionates the institution, by which the evU
doer is punished and restrained, and the weU-doer praised and
advanced, Eomans xhi. 3, 4; 1 Peter n. 14, 15. Precisely as
the Apostle, Eom. vii. 14, ascribes unto the law, in its deepest
ground and origin, the same principle which is revealed in the
gospel, so must the Christian be equaUy as capable, as willing,
to recognise the divinity of the state. There exists a three
fold relation of the state to the church of Christ. If the
Christian first perceives in that relation the prehminary society
of an instituted discipline against sin, then will he not faU to
recognise that the compulsive power of political law absolutely
requires that higher warrant1 which is given together with the
law of the Spirit as an enfranchising one; and that consequently,
the state and church work better together for good, the more
their mode of operation and the nearest objects they propose
for themselves continue distinct, or the less the state, on its
part, attempts what it is unable to effect, and the Church on
her part aims at what she should not. According to the
second relation, the state appears as the protector and cherisher
of those spiritual institutions for which man as such is destined,
and deprived of whose efficacy civU honour and happiness, love
and patience could not by possibility prosper. If, for instance,
church life finds no support for its external development apart
from a legal position being assumed in some form or other, and
must seek and supplicate for this support, (and this constitutes

374 PART III. OF SALVATION — SECT. III. FELLOWSHIP.
the third relation to be taken into account), then is it bound to
recognise in civil hfe a moral power, a more ancient divine alli
ance, against which it is absolutely bound to offerno obstruction,
and in which it must undergo its probation, lPeteriv.15. Even
when the state prohibits the confession of Christ as the Son of
God and Lord of the world, or commands superstitious usages in
which the Christian, on the grounds adduced by Peter, Acts
iv. 19; v. 29, cannot concur, he feels himself bound, both be
fore and after transgression, to conduct himself without defiance
towards the order of the state,2 and under every circumstance
to pay with the utmost promptitude in love whatever tribute and
service may be legally demanded, Eomans xhi. 6, 7 ; and, for
the public good, both to bear and forbear.
1 The religious necessity of the state eminently appears in the
circumstance of its demanding and permitting judicial oaths. In
order to reconcile this institution with the express prohibition in
Matt. v. 34, James v. 12, (a reconciliation which Chrysostom,
Basil, and so many Christians of all ages have held to be impos
sible, morality, by merely distinguishing a private oath from a
public one ; a frivolous and gratuitous oath from one that is se
rious and pious (Augustin, Luther, J. D. Michaelis) ; a promis-
sary one from a testamentary one, (Grotius) ; and common Chris
tianity from that which is perfect, (Balsamon, the Scholastics;)
Morality — does not adjust all the difficulties of the question,
although in each of these points there is a share of truth. The
law of the New Testament finds the taking of oaths already
sanctioned; it is the necessary phenomenon of the religious and
social consciousness in its naturally sinful condition. The law
only reduces the phenomenon to a moral and testamentary order.
The Israelite is to swear in the name of Jehovah, and not swear
falsely, and is bound to keep his oath to the Lord. Under these
suppositions the law specifies even the oath, as, for example in
Exodus xxii. 10, 11. How does the mXrigugig v6/jlou in the gospel
correspond to this? It passes into dWerrigig, and does so likewise
in respect of the jus talionis. Since with the absolute rejection
of talio, even state law as penal law, nay, the state itself,
might be abolished, (an hypothesis totaUy at variance, however,
with Christianity), so it appears in both cases as if the meaning

§ 207. THE STATE. 375
of the gospel amounted to this, namely, that the state, law, and
punishment are only the preliminary, pedagogical phenomena of
justice; that the law of freedom is released from those obligations
or constraints attached to sinful humanity, and in the kingdom
of God there is only a love which tolerates and forgives, and a
plain simplicity of expression. Accordingly we might almost say
with Balsamon, and with those who concur in his views, that an
oath is forbidden to those who are perfect, and only annexed to
that common Christianity which stands in need of discipline and
is developed along with state discipline. Meanwhile the distinc
tion between perfect and common Christianity destroys the unity
and truth of Christian moral law. We ought thus to pass from
this view to the second, namely, that the Christian in his free
private hfe must be far above an oath, although in civU hfe he
cannot dispense with it. The church does not recognise oaths,
the state only does so. Thus the question ever turns upon this
point; — whether the state and the citizen, in so far as they are
actuated by Christian principle, should require or take an oath?
Christ not only rejects swearing absolutely, whether false or true,
but points out the superstition, folly, and sin of doing so. How is
this? 1. His censure (Matt. v. and xxiii. 16 — 22) only relates to the
deceit and falsehood of making a distinction between non-obliga
tory or less-obligatory oaths and those that are binding. 2. It
only refers to the universal obligation to give true evidence, the
denial of which is implied in swearing. 3. In the passage, on ou
huvugui (biuv rgixu Xeuxrjv ri (ifeXuivuv moifigui, it alludes to the irreli-
giousness of disposing of ones self for any possible event, or of
desiring the Creator, Preserver, and Redeemer of man to de
stroy or condemn him under some possible circumstance, or of
wishing ones self not to be saved under certain contingencies.
Every gradation of assurance which, in word or thought, has in
itself this irreligious religion, is evil ; and if there be no formula
of asseveration which, in order to be otherwise useful and for
cible, cannot but partake of this evil, then is every form of asse
veration to be rejected, and the whole institution of oaths abo
lished from the foundation of a Christian state. In the first place,
however, yea, yea, nay, nay, are by no means to be understood as
if every asseveration exceeding the simplest affirmation or de
nial, or every protestation including an element of religious con
sciousness, was sinful; the whole letter and spirit of Scripture
is, so to speak, opposed to such a mode of explanation. Even

376 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. FELLOWSHIP.
the Redeemer's A/ify, d/ufa, strictly speaking, would be inad
missible in this view; and still more so, the frequent as
severation of St Paul, for example, in 2 Cor. xi. 31, o §ebg. xui
murrig rou xugiou ri/iuv I%gou Xgierou bihev b uv ebXoymrbg tig rodg ulSivug,
on ou -^euhopui x. X. What a solemn and religious obligation upon
self to declare the truth! The idea of Christ, however, and the
view of the sermon on the mount, do not allow of our desiring
that he should have confined his heavenly deportment to such
outward and empirical legalism. He is not in general vopoSerrig.
He does not command any actual behaviour, in order thereby
to subject generally man's will to the will of God; but he repre
sents here, as in Matt. v. 22 — 39, the objectionable or necessary
disposition in a concrete form, in the unity of the thinking and
speaking, thinking and acting man. Is the command then of
Christ, " turn the other cheek," or "give the cloak also," &c, not
absolute in every case? Is it not the outspoken word of offence
as Such that endangers judgment and hell fire? So far an exalted
and religious asseveration is not forbidden in the passage referred
to. Christianity even allows of swearing in a pure and edifying
form, which otherwise it prohibits ; for neither is this assumption
Unchristian, namely, that sinful man (whether in a state of con
version or unconversion) is corruptible, susceptible, and fallible,
and never sufficiently mindful of God and his relation unto Him,
so as to keep those laws within which his earthly concerns are en
closed by God ; nor is this other view unchristian, namely, that fal
lible, erring, and susceptible man, when brought to a consciousness
of God and confirmed by his religion, wiU speak the truth.
Rather is that mistrust, as much as this confidence, grounded in
Christianity, and it pertains to the most important rights and
duties of a Christian state, to recognise, invoke, and glorify in
this way the power of religion. Christianity, (even without re
ferring to Hebrews vi. 16,) can only commend this conduct of
the state and of the judge, who, on important occasions of per
sonal right and need of testimony, has recourse to the religious
conscience, and demands a sign that the witness believes in
God, and is conscious of his relation to the omniscient and just
Judge, in order to satisfy under this condition all farther ques
tions. The objection, that in the case where an oath is not
taken, therefore the person is neither supposed nor required to
speak the truth, is here inapplicable. The duty of an especial
divine service, of a fixed confession, by no means annuls the uni-

§ 208. MAGISTRATE AND SUBJECT. 377
versal duty of serving and confessing God. It might indeed
have been better if the Christian state had abolished the word
oath, bgxog and the like, together with the whole train of those
religious ideas of heathenism connected therewith. The ques
tion should and ought to turn on divine testimony, invocation,
reverence for the tribunal, the sacred duty of the witness, &c.
The formula of an oath of this kind would have far less difficulty;
it would depend much more on the whole matter, according to
place and time, being adjusted in a purely religious manner, in
conformably limiting the requirement and admission, and in con
sidering what Christian ethics and policy might have farther to
advise. For one of the most profound discussions on this sub
ject see C. L. Nitzsch. Pragr. de judicandis morum praeceptis in
N. T. a communi omnium hominum ac temporum usu alienis, Nr.
6 and 7.- The pious author of the book, The Oath, a Religious
Treatise, Barmen, 1830, inasmuch as he has only supposed the
idea of an oath, loses sight of its justice in order to represent it
absolutely immoral and anti-christian.
2 Upon the whole, this was the practice of the Christian at the
time when the prohibition of factions had been applied to Chris
tianity. Origen c. Cels. 1, however, fortifies the claims of Chris
tians on the state. When 1 Peter ii. 13 desires submission
to every ordinance of man dv^gumivri xngig hid rbv xugiov, the force of
the command does not lie in the avSgumivri, but in xngig, ordinance,
regulation. The reference to our Lord, who is soon about to
appear and to judge, ought not to prevent the xngig being in it
self honoured and esteemed; but the ordinance to which human
laws relate, and in which they participate, has universally, as
such, a share in that reverence due unto whatever is Divine.
§ 208. MAGISTRATE AND SUBJECT.
The relations of subordination existing in office and station re
dound to the praise of the Lord, when we, as his free men, obey
and serve, 1 Cor. vii. 22, and as servants of Christ, command
and rule, and when we are equaUy as far from eye-service,
(arising from the restraints of conscience and the fear of God,
Ephes. vi. 5, 6), as from imperious desire, (aviivng rqv ursiKtjv,)
and are mindful of the account we have to render unto God.

378 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. III. FELLOWSHIP.
It is the duty of the Christian subject, according to 1 Peter
ii. 17, to honour the king in the same spirit in which the
Apostle caUs upon him to be respectful unto all men, to love
the brethren and fear God. The Christian cannot pay respect
to all men without being ready to show that especial deference,
which is due to the possessor of the highest power emanating
from God, provided the forms of deference are distinct from ex
pressions of adoration. The Christian cannot honour God with
out feeling himself bound to pay inviolable obedience to those
who are God's representatives, to rulers and parents, even
when immediately necessitated by God's command to censure,
delay, or change the exercise of his obedience; and he cannot
love the brethren without loving the head of their earthly com
mon life, without interesting himself by a free hearty participa
tion in aU the necessities, assaults, and responsibilities attached
to the station of that fellow-mortal, or fellow-Christian, who
is his sovereign. Intercession for our sovereign, in the con
gregation, can only be true and worthy, in proportion as it pro
ceeds from this disposition, and as it nourishes and produces
the same. A Christian sovereign, conformably with the bibli
cal idea of a servant of God, who accepts the office together
with aU its ruhng and pastoral duties, is unimpeded by the
dread of opinion and desire to please, humbles himself person-
aUy before his position, renounces, according to his own inclin
ation and wffl, neither the government nor its rights, but, on
the other hand, is ready with aU his personal power to sacri
fice his enjoyments, renown and hfe for his people, and to pre
serve and consecrate himself in their behalf.

§ 211. FRUITS OF HOPE. 379
SECTION THE FOUETH.
ON THE COMPLETION OP SALVATION.
§ 209. BLESSEDNESS IN HOPE.
A Confession of Faith, feUowship, and imitation of the Ee
deemer, do not exempt us in this world from those sufferings to
which we are exposed in this present sinful state; on the con
trary, it is the destiny of Christ's members to be purified and
proved through affliction, Eev. iii. 19, to be made hke unto
Christ through undeserved suffering, 1 Peter ii. 21; iii. 17, to
be partakers of His reproach, 2 Cor. iv. 8; and to bear the
marks of his death as weU as of his life. Yet, notwithstanding,
because the previous knowledge of perfect life and salvation
is assured to every Christian mind inhabited by the Spirit,
2 Cor. iv. 14; Ephes. i. 14; Eomans viii. 17 — 25, there is a
blessed hope belonging to Christian hfe, 1 Peter i. 4; Eom.
vhi. 24; and consequently the claims on the Christian are of
such a nature as to cause him to rejoice always in the Lord,
PhU. iv. 4, to account temptations for joy, James i. 2; and in the
strength of the Lord to gloryin his infirmity, 2 Cor. xii. 9, 10.
§ 210. HOPE.
Christian hope is a feehng determinated through faith in the
future completion of Christ's redeeming work, and is consequently
distinct from that universal longing of the creature for deliver
ance from vanity, Eom. vhi. 22, and from the general admission
that a continued existence after death wffl be a better life and a
compensating eternity. § 211. FRUITS OF HOPE.
The life of the Christian by virtue of this hope, is not only

380 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. IV. CONSUMMATION.
fuU of expectation, but also of ardent desire, and Christian
longing struggles to rise above time and the visible world, Eom.
vii. 24; vih. 19. Phil. i. 21, 23. Since Christian hope, how
ever, does not in the least degree assume the nature of passion1
and enthusiasm, and consequently is most intimately united with
present joy in the Lord, or with joy in the work and being of
the Lord in the world, Phil. i. 21. 2 Cor. vi. 10, and is equaUy
one with the consciousness of the aU-governing wisdom and
mercy of God as with profound hunhlity, so does it present un
to the Lord in this hfe, the fruits of faithfulness and patience.
1 An erroneous reflection on the Christian doctrine concerning
the end of the world is desirous, now-a-days, in opposition
to this doctrine, to prove that Christians ought with passion
ate inquietude and weariness to wish themselves out of this
present world, if it does not constitute their absolute all. But
precisely the reverse is the state of Christian consciousness.
Were there no end of the world, and if we only knew of an end
less duration of this state of existence, and the present division
between the visible and invisible world, then might vexation,
weariness, or rather passionate desire for an hereafter, engross the
Christian mind. But since there is a consummation of thingsin
which the present passes into the future, and the future into the
present, a termination of the world, which, (since we cannot cal
culate its consummation as we do eclipses or the appearance of
comets) is, in its infinite greatness, ever nigh, and hovers around
us; and since also in this world a growing work of the Lord is
present, which does not at one time lift itself into the infinite and
undetermined, and at another destroys itself, but grows to a de
finite dxfjj^i, and ripens for the Lord of the harvest; and since,
moreover, as individuals, we have to expect a consummation in
death, and since, in no relation, as respects the Divine economy,
is there haste or delay, so all the disquietude of the Christian
vanishes, and the impossibility of compensating the opposite of
excessive desire and contentment can never occur. According to
that so-caUed absolute theology, Christian hope would be no
thing but a transient moment of the spirit restored to itself,
whereas it is rather a continuous power of the spirit through
faith, which . presentiates the Eternal, to have the eternal of
the future, or the cessation of faith by sight present.

§ 214. HOPE IN CHRIST. 381

§ 212. FIDELITY.
Through hope Christian love is faithful in aU points ; i. e., on
the one hand it is ready and resolved to 'preserve innocence of
life unto the end, yea even unto death, 2 Tim. h. 9-12, Matt.
v. 11, 12; Heb. xh. 4, and to avoid aU sin, and on the other,
is willing and able, notwithstanding the absence of reward and
thanks, and in spite of a discouraging world, sometimes flatter
ing sometimes threatening, Heb. x. 32-35 ; xi., to continue
the ministry of good works and edifying example, PhU. i.
20-24; 2 Peter i. 13.

| 213. PATIENCE.
Both kinds of faithfulness pre-suppose patience, Heb. x. 36,
i. e., such an agreement of individual wffl with the Divine in
tention of affliction, such a reception of chastisement from God,
and such a striving against dejection, as by means of which
the more violent feehngs of pain are resolved into a filial invo
cation of the Lord and unite with the approval of whatsoever
he doth, Matt. xxvi. 39; xxvii. 46; 2 Cor. xh. 8.

§ 214. HOPE LN CHRIST.
Faith, which is fundamental to aU this state of feehng, con
sists in the certainty afforded by the previous experience of
welfare and by the word of God, that redemption, as yet in
complete, shall be brought to completion, partly in Christian
individual hfe, and partly in Christian common hfe; for Chris
tian hope, or hope in Christ, not only includes the certainty
of an infinite perfecting, or a continual approximation of the
church on earth to the church in heaven, (in which, however,
a distinction and contrast may ever remain,) but also an histori
cal conclusion, by means of which the re-development of sin

382 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. IV. CONSUMMATION.
and death again, together with the present condition of nature,
will be entirely abolished.
§ 215. INDIVIDUAL CONSUMMATION.
The Christian's hope of bliss cannot be extinguished by any
delay, or by aught that is incomprehensible in the universal con
summation of things. For not only is the personality of every
one from whom the world passes away in death, preserved, of
which the Holy Spirit gives fuU assurance, but also aU who die
in the Lord enter immediately into a closer and freer feUow
ship with Him,1 Eev. xiv. 13; PhU. i. 23; Eev. xiv. 1, and
are raised in general to a new and more perfect form of being;'
save that this condition is related to that one, which the end of
the world can only realize, as an intermediate state, and even
includes a great manifoldness both of place and mode of exist
ence. 1 The adoption of such a view of an intermediate, though pre
liminary consummation of individuals, has been rendered some
what difficult by Julius Miiller, (Theoll. Stud. u. Krit. 1835, p. 785,
sq.) and Wetzel, (the same Journal, 1836, p. 965, sq.) and, on the
other hand, much facilitated by John. Pet. Lange, (the same
work, " Biblico-Theological Disquisitions," i. p. 702,) Fichte (Idee
der Personlichkeit, &c.,) and Krabbe in the Journal referred to.
Meanwhile Miiller, although he maintains against Fichte the dis
embodied existence of departed souls on scriptural grounds, and
with special reference to 2 Cor. v. 4, (ixhugufoui,) fully allows that
this state of rest, considered in itself,, cannot exclude the iivui guv
Xgigmip, according to Phil. i. 23. It is impossible, if we regard
the plain alternative of the Epistle to the Philippians : either to
remain in the flesh, (ixhriprjgui dmo rou xugiov, 2 Cor. v.,) and produce
fruit, or depart and be with the Lord hhrnvrieui mgbg rbv xugiov; or, if
we consider Christian consciousness, it is impossible to admit
Weizel's doctrine of the suspension of the more perfect fellowship
with the Lord until the great day. Schleiermacher has pre-emi
nently and accurately explained the Christian consciousness
of those who five and die in the fellowship of the Redeemer,
to this extent, that there occurs no interruption of this re
lation, no cessation or suspension of this enjoyment, although

§ 216. INDIVIDUAL CONSUMMATION. 383
there may occur some essential, purification and perfecting.
Precisely because, says St Paul, Christ is my life, (i. e. the
real signification, substance, and worth of terrestrial exist
ence,) is death my gain. Now, this gain must absolutely
refer to the same object of possession which preeminently im
parts to life its real value. Paul would not have been one
hair's-breadth nearer to the Lord by death, if, before the great
day which restores Christ to Christians then ahve on earth, no
reunion could take place, and if death were not the way to
such. Christ himself promised the apostles individually a mu-
gdXri^ig, John xiv. 3. He prepares places for them, he will
come again to them, and each shall be where is. Hence if, in
order stiU more to widen the distinction between the present
time and the day of judgment, we assume that the hereafter of in-
dividuals,is no gain, then is it a loss, and we dogmatically teach, to
a certain extent, the very solicitude of those whom Paul sought
to console, inasmuch as they thought all the manifestation of glory
was reserved not only for this present world, but also for those
who were then alive. Undoubtedly, the consolation administer
ed to them by the apostle, 1 Thess. iv. 14, 15, u&i reus xoiurfrivrug
— ebv durZ — ij/tis/S — ou /iii fodgufiev rovg xoif&rfi'evrus, includes the re
cognition, that those in the other world (those who are asleep,
vexgol ev xVgTif) are n0* 7e* perfected; but it does not follow, from
any Biblical representation of their condition, whether it be call
ed sleep, death, or rest, that their souls exist only in a state of
solitude or unconsciousness, and that they should not be judged,
punished, or blessed in proportion to their relation to the Re
deemer. Scripture indeed principaUy, as well as universal con
sciousness, represent the dead in Christ as resting from labour
and affliction, Rev. xiv. 13, 1 Thess. v: 10; but if in this view,
not the mere external rest of the grave is represented (TertuUian
de Anima, c. 58, dormire est corporum, non animarum,) but that
souls are exempted from anxiety, then the representation dvd-
muueig, ed^une/nbg, Heb. iv., extends to the state of decided, per
fect blessedness; and, consequently, cannot include the entire
and only characteristic of the intemrediate state; but leaves a
farther positive determination of the same, so much the more
so, as the pious, even in this world, were not consumed by
a Jleeling of strife and anguish, but enjoyed peace in the
Lord, a knowledge of him, a life and work in him, and a mu
tual fellowship which must be conceived as partly augment-

384 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. IV. CONSUMMATION.
ed since their deliverance from anxiety, and which may be
imagined in some way as partly realised in some specific loca
lity. Now some, who are as far from denying a gradation in
the life of the soul when disembodied, as they are from set
ting aside the distinct state of good and evU souls, neverthe
less believe, that every spiritual existence mediated through cor-
porality, and that all reciprocity between the soul and the world,
is contradictory of the idea of an intermediate state. Miiller con
ceives the absolute life of the departed in the same way as Thomas
Burnet has done, (De Statu Mortuorum et Resurrectione Uber.
London, 1726, p. 83, sq.), (it would be particularly useful, now
that eschatologieal questions are so frequently discussed, to refer
to a work of so much importance to philosophers and theolo
gians, and one so rich in subtle and profound observations.)
Burnet is quite correct in maintaining the existence of an inter
mediate state; but his doctrine concerning the absolutely isolat
ed, expressionless, and naked existence of the soul, is not in
accordance with Scripture. How could the souls of those sacri*
ficed for the sake of Jesus, be represented as crying and lament
ing, as clad in white raiment, a3 an assembled host encircling the
Lamb, — how could those representations in our Lord's parable of
the rich and poor man, or those which afforded consolation to
the converted thief, be supposed, — how could God bring with him
those who are perfected on the second advent of Jesus, — and apart
from all this, how could this absolute being of a created spirit
be ever imagined, (which, in order to be with and in nature, must
have a local and formal existence in connection therewith,) if
Burnet's view could be maintained? It is insufficient to assume,
that these passages are poetical, since paradise, at least, the
many mansions, povul, John xiv. 2, especially the alicubi of the
soul, are representations of dogmatic nature. Doubtless, the sub
jects of death are, in respect of their earthy corporality, vexgoi, be
side -^uxul, mvebfiuru, 1 Peter iii. 19, Heb. xii. 23, Rev. vi. 9, and as
such are destined for the final resurrection; but they are only nak
ed simply in reference to the dissolution of their earthly portion,
and in respect to the yet non-being of their heavenly new body.
If this view be maintained, then Bumet himself even does not re
ject the supposition of a corporeal medium for the existence of
the departed, and at p. 88 of his Treatise, concurs in these physio*
logical considerations, which Fichte has adopted on speculative
grounds, and Lange on Biblical ones. Lange is quite right in

§ 216. RETURN OF CHRIST. 385
thus explained 2 Cor. v. 4; " We are not clothed upon, although we
groan to be so, but are first unclothed, although again reclothed."
Hence an absolutely bare existence is excluded. It may well be
asked, however, whether all that Scripture asserts concerning an
intermediate state, can be collectively viewed, and whether all
that has been written, on the one hand, concerning the consumma
tion of individuals, and, on the other, on the consummation of all
things, admits of being concentrated into one single view, as
Lange has attempted to do. But so much is certain, that partly
in reference to xgigig, and partly as regards existence and life ex
ternally and internaUy, and in reference to fellowship and acti
vity, no mere quiescence, but only an incompleteness in the inter
mediate state is admissible. That a judgment follows imme
diately after death, according to Heb. ix. 27, is certain; but the final
judgment is not in consequence set aside. And if the departed
merely live in themselves, how can they be affected by the word
and preaching, according to 1 Peter iii. 19? Weizel rejects these
passages as apocryphal; but upon no tenable grounds. What
Lange says concerning St Paul's doctrine of diverse kinds of bo
dies in the various circles of creation is confirmed in a widely
diffused theory of Jewish antiquity, which is fundamental to the
' Avu^unxov'Hguibu. There Christ remains in his descent to earth
concealed from the princes and angels of each heaven only by his
assuming the pecuhar corporeality and vesture of each particu
lar heaven. § 216. RETURN OF CHRIST.
The end1 as regards the time is unknown, Mark xiii. 32 —
37, 1 Thess. v. 2, ug xAkirrqg h vvxri, and on account of the
particular nature of its prognostications,2 it is ever either pre
maturely expected, or too long deferred. The signs consist
not only in natural convulsions, but also in moral phenomena.
Like as from time immemorial, man's extremity has been God's
opportunity,3 the glorious manifestation of Christ will not ensue,
until, by some repeated course of anti-messianic domination, the
contrast between the church and the world, and the appearance
of anti-christian sentiments have reached their climax, 2 Thess.
ii. 3. Finally, the preaching of the gospel is closed to faith;
2 c

386 PART III. OF SALVATION.- — SECT. IV. CONSUMMATION.
and the announced Eedeemer appears in his glory; and this
In such a way, that whoever may appear, and whether he
have appeared, not the slightest doubt wUl anywhere exist,
Luke xviii. 23, 24, Zechariah xii. 10, Eevelation i. 7,
But he does not come only to conclude the preaching of
the Gospel, but also, to close the duration of the world — to
transform the world of faith, in which dweUeth righteousness
and blessedness, into a world of sight — to awaken the dead —
to change the hving — to judge the hving and the dead, and
to conduct the chUdren of God to the inheritance of eternal
bhss, 1 Thess. v. 23, 2 Thess. i. and ii, 1 Tim. vi. 14,
Hebrews ix. 28, x. 37.
1 Speculation has been so far from opposing the Christian view
of the world's catastrophe, that had there been no doctrine of
eschatology, it must have supplied the deficiency. Christianity
is neither iUustrated, nor is any thing phUosophicaUy gained by
at once perpetuating the elements of eschatology, and presen-
tiating them as eternal. It is unwUlingly admitted, that the
spirit is dependent on time and nature, in its essential destina
tions, and yet it is allowed that this nature and time maintain
their uniform unbroken continuity in the world. Individuahties,
and periods of time as they arise are consumed and overcome;
nevertheless, the collective being, the individualized existence
is never subdued, and the individualizing spirit never ends.
There is none other than a logical glorification, a physical one,
which we should desire and predict, and as such ought to know
and understand is altogether forgotten.. But if nature be the
medium of history, it must renounce all realities apart from an end
and glorification, and can be nothing more than a bare means
or opportunity, and negative reflex of the thinking spirit. If
corruption <p%gd, shall be overcome, as an ancient apocryphal
tradition teaches, then must this yevigig cease. This was better
phUosophy than the phUosophy qf endless history.
2 The Apocalyptic prognostic of the New Testament consists
of acts, which in some degree, more frequently occur before
they become perfect prognoses. So much the more natural
is it, that from the time of the Apostles, the end of things
should appear to the pious, especially at a period of new develop
ments, much nearer than it is. They do not err. in perceiving

§ 217. RESURRECTION. 387
the prognoses, although such continue until the end the object of
presentiment and faith.
3 Quando duplicantur lateres, venit Moses. Compare Luke xxi.
28. There pervades the Apocalyptic doctrine of the New Testa
ment, a more spiritual and more material representation of the
last things; compare, for example, what John says of Antichrist,
and of many antichrists, with the much more plastic and definite
expectation of the Apostle Paul and of Revelation, and in the
same passage, (John v.) the extended with the limited awaken
ing of the dead. Now, if in the general, we are unable to com
bine an entire view from individual points of the plastic represen
tation, then are we still more justified, yea, even necessitated, by
the intervention of the more spiritual doctrine, to distinguish in
each of the Evangelical or Apostolical leading views, the symboli
cal elements from those that are immediately didactic. But the
question here does not turn on the symbols of the idea, but on
those of fact, just as it does in primeval or elemental history.

§ 217. RESURRECTION.
The mere duration and immortality of the soul, or the bare
dehverance from its earthly habitation, does not complete
Christian hope; for the consummation of the individual is by
no means perfect, so long as the entire creation and church are
not consummated with him and he with them. The Christian
waits for the redemption of the body, Eom. viii. 23 ; conse
quently Christians expect the resurrection of the dead; and
Christ's resurreetion is an historical pledge, just as the gift of
the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of glory, is its internal one, 1 Cor.
xv. 20; Eomans viii. 11 ; the body, moreover, of those who are
raised is not the corrupted nor corruptible one. Nature and
body include a great and profound mystery. Nature herself
shall be delivered from that vanity and perishableness to which
she is subject. The coming forth from the grave is only a
type or partial appearance of a glorifying regeneration or trans
formation of our individual hfe, in which we become hke unto
the glorified body of the Eedeemer, after bearmg, in time,:

388 PART HI. OF SALVATION. — SECT. IV. CONSUMMATION.
the image of the earthly Adam, Phil. iii. 21 ; 1 Cor. xv.
35-50. Remark 1. The article of the Apostles' Creed — credo resur-
tectionem carnis — is assumed by Miiller (in the work already re
ferred to) to signify corporis, but is defended by Lange. For the
ever-becoming and transient material does not participate iden
tically in the resurrection; the body (gu/nu) even, is not a mere
form without substance, and there are, according to 1 Cor. xv.
39, many kinds of eug%. In fact, this difference between body
and flesh may be reconciled; for in the one case, it is only the
bare spiritual existence of man in a future state that is denied,
and in the other, the renewed unity of the spiritual and natural
essence that is affirmed, and in both cases the conservation and
renewal of individuality that is maintained.
Remark 2. It solely depends on the view taken of the pre
servation of the individual distinctive character, when the
question turns on the identity of the earthly and future body.
The image of the seed of corn, the idea of a change of the in
dividual, and of another of the like kind, infers personal identity.
But this identity would be without interest or purpose, if a body
expressly adapted were not joined to a soul correspondingly
modified, for its phenomenal expression; for the principle of
individuality is still the soul and not the body. Whatever of
irony may be visited on the corporeal form and appearance of
man— and nothing connected therewith is either contingent or
without intention, — because it belongs to that condition which
may be said to develope itself in the antagonism between the flesh
and the spirit; stiU we may admit, in general, that the indi
vidual body corresponds to the fundamental dispositions of the
soul's individuality, and that the moral formation of character
imparts more and more to the body its other free or definite
form. Whatever exceeds these two elements is peculiarity, and
must be something absolutely perishable. Thus the principle of
the body's identity exists in the identity of the soul. Whoever
imagines the departed to be bodiless before the resurrection wiU
hardly find, in the mere ashes of the mouldered body, a connec
ting-point for the identity of the past and future corporeality.
The medium of identity ought rather to be sought for in that
corporeality in which the departed soul abides, and which,
according to the nature of the cosmical sphere to which it

§218. CONCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION. 389
primarily pertains, and according to the elements of its own in
ternal form, is changed to the point where it reaches its final
state. If it be asked, under such suppositions, what interest
and final cause remain for the principle of a general resurrection
corporeally viewed; and if it be demanded, whether the reunion
of the separated soul with the earth be not rather a resumption
and a frustration of the preceding process; then we answer, that
the earth itself even is no longer the former earth; that the col
lective system of nature is renewed and transformed, and that
the perfect body, like to the body of Christ, shall be immortal
and spiritual, and absolutely proportioned and serviceable to the
spiritual hfe. In the mystical theology of the Jews, the Identity
of the earthly and heavenly body is altogether relinquished. The
spirit, individualized in the soul, lays aside for ever in death its
earthly body, and attains, together with its capacity for renew
ing its corporeality, an entrance at last into the third heaven,
where raiment lies ready for each of the elect. The idea of a
heavenly body is realised through the ethical idea of chastity,
gentleness, &c. for even the virtuous are by consequence of this
doctrine, imagines Dei acquisitce, and in their kind are impres
sions, bodies, clothing. The white raiment of souls in the Apo
calypse is allied to such representations.
§ 218. CONCLUSION.
Unto those who are blessed in hope, the region of this faith
discloses itseff. Considered as a blessed hope, the resurrection
belongs only to the children of God. They have died and are
risen here spirituaUy with Christ, Col. iii. 1 — 4. Their life
is by and with Him, but bidden even as He is hidden. His
manifestation will be theirs, Eomans vih. 18, 19. After they
have foUowed him in death according to the flesh, he wffl
awaken them from the dead on the day of judgment, that they
may reign and hve with him and judge the world. And this
is the first resurrection, Eevelation xx. 6, a resurrection of be
hevers, John vi. 40, of the righteous, Luke xx. 35, 1 Cor.
xv. 23, 1 Thess. iv. 17. With reference to the doctrine of
Christian hope, the question only turns on this resurrection.
In so far as it precedes the general resurrection, it is to be re-

390 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. IV. CONSUMMATION.
garded as partly the commencement of a renewal of nature,
partly as the Sabbath of God's people, or as the most complete
and glorious appearance of the church of Christ that can be ex
pected in this world. The general resurrection brings some to
life, 'and others to judgment and shame, Dan. xii. 2, John v.
29, Acts xxiv. 15. The universality of the resurrection can
only be the necessary preservation2 of all human individual!!
to the extent of their presentation and pubhc separation before
the judgment-seat of Christ, Eomans xiv. 10, Eevelation xx.
13, 14.
1 We follow in this passage of the exposition, which at verse
21, in the words iyeigeiv roug vexgbug xul ^aomoieii, obtains the widest
and most indeterminate idea of the divine power for quickening
the dead, which, at verse 25, principally finds the spiritual, and at
verses 28, 29, the corporeal awakening of the dead, See Liicke's
Commentar. u. Excurs.
2 Undoubtedly, one form of life and judgment is to be distin
guished from another. Those who are raised unto life are pub
licly judged, and their personal and actual worth definitively de
termined, Rev. xx. 1 3, and the active relation of those brought to
judgment does not annul every passive relation; yet even they rise
to judgment, to receive their sentence, and enter anew into a full
individual existence. § 219. FINAL JUDGMENT.
The separation of good and evU, which the word of God, or
which even progressive history and government effect, does not
correspond alone to the Divine decree and to the consumma
tion of the redeemed. Indeed, there is a condition that imme
diately occurs, after death, to every human being, of a judicial
and retributive character, Heb. ix. 27; Luke xvi. 22. But
inasmuch as there is no want of allusions to the fact, that de
parted believers have not yet, through death alone, become
partakers of perfect blessedness, Heb. xi. 39, 40, so are there
traces of a capacity, in another state of existence, for compre
hending salvation, 1 Peter iii. 19, and for a change and puri-

§ 219. FINAL JUDGMENT. 391
fication of mind, 1 Peter iv. 5, 6.1 FinaUy, in the general
resurrection a perfect judgment and discovery of each indivi
dual's personal worth and personal relation to the Divine affi
ance between nature and grace, wffl appear, Matt. xxv. 32 ;
1 Cor. iv. 5 ; Eomans ii. 6. Unto the Son of Man is com
mitted this judgment in the fuU power of God, John v. 22,
27, so that those who were the earher perfected, in proportion
as their righteousness has been manifested with the existence
of the true church in aU consciences, shaU co-operate and take
a part in the judgment, 1 Cor. vi. 2, compare Luke xxii. 30.
At the last judgment aU the children of God shall be revealed
and delivered from all communion with the unholy,2 Matt. xiii.
39^42; xxv. 33. The idea of eternal damnation and punish
ment, Mark ix. 44; Matt. xxv. 41-46, is in so far a necessary
one, inasmuch as there cannot be in eternity any forced holiness
of the personal being, or any blessed unholiness, Eomans ii. 8, 9.
On the other hand, there is no foundation for assuming that the
truth of God's word and the kingdom of God itself, need the
existence of beings everlastingly condemned, or that God
should maintain the existence of a personal being in eternity,
in order to deprive him of the possibility of eternal hohness
and blessedness.3
1 The passages in 1 Peter iii. 1 9, iv. 6, as testimonies of the apos
tolic doctrine of Christ's preaching in Hades, have hitherto re
sisted aU sophistical interpretations, and have not been weaken
ed, even by Weizel's strange and hasty remarks, (Stud. u. Krit.
1836, p. 927, sq.) This learned writer admits the sense of the
Words as far as the fact is concerned; but, because he will not
admit that, in any case, a development of condition can take
place in Hades, far less any change and conversion, so this repre
sentation appears to him as in part only fiUing up a blank in the
Redeemer's existence, and in part as only completing the idea of
the universality of the judgment of Christ exercised over the liv
ing and the dead. But, independently of this, preaching only
three days, and only transitorily, and he might have confidently
added, doing so without an object, would have been without effect,
and devoid of meaning. It is easy to conceive how the passage

392 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. IV. CONSUMMATION.
thus viewed appears to this writer as Apocryphal. But by in
ferring that the whole of the first Epistle of Peter is of a later date
and of apocryphal origin, he betrays how easUy dogmatic pre
judices corrupt criticism and exegesis. It is just the lofty, ge
nuinely apostolical, and canonical character of the epistle, that
assures us that its purport cannot be to maintain so thoughtless
a doctrine, and a fact so objectless and ineffective as the descen
sus ad inferos is, according to Weizel's view. Dogma has not
produced any mere logical inference, nor preserved one through
out Christian antiquity, if aught thereby be understood as indiffer
ent for the idea itself; for not merely the truth of the d ly of judg
ment is reflected therein. The effect and signification of salva-
vation, and the knowledge of the Saviour, extends beyond the
present existence of the human race, in its quickening and sanc
tifying power, because the universality of grace shall be glorified
and adjusted with the unrighteousness of temporal relations. The
question does not here turn on the partial universality of judg
ment, but on the entire relation of individuals to the Redeemer.
The judgment of our ancestors was not morally more possible
and just by the mere notice of Christ, if such could not have be
come in some way or other operative. Even the word in the
second passage (1 Peter iv. 6.) .xgfougi, is so far from being the
leading idea, that it rather serves only as "a medium for %uei,
and Steiger very correctly remarks, that the sense may be, hu
xg&'evreg ph gugxl — Zfiei. The era of heathenism, of sin and sen
suality, is passed away, as the apostle teaches; it has lasted long
enough, — let no one prolong it. Both Christ arid the Gospel ex
hibit, even to the ancient world, a converting aim and effect, so
that the dead, although judged in the flesh, in conformity with
human condition and destiny, and punished with death, still shall
live, in proportion to the work of divine grace, according to
the Spirit. Compare Rom. viii. 10, rb p,ev gupu vexgbv hi d/iugnuv'
rb he mteupu Zuri hid hixuioguvnv. This is the apostolical view — that
for those who were unable in this world to know Christ in his
truth and grace, there exists a knowledge of the Redeemer in
the other state of existence, which is never objectless and inoper
ative; but is either judicial or quickening. It is strange that it
should be wished to contract this operation within the short period
of three days. The notion, however, of an intermediate state, does
not annul the idea of conversion in the other world, for inas
much as it presupposes a life in this world, but does not amount

§ 219. FINAL JUDGMENT. 393
to a full certainty of death and life, of rejection or blessedness on
that account, is it a middle state.
2 This is the reason why the judgment itself, which partially
or possibly excludes from life or blessedness, belongs nevertheless
to the doctrine of hope in Christ. It does not contradict the
idea of representing eschatology as the completion of salvation;
for as Christians we should know nothing of the last things un
less they redounded to the glory of the Redeemer and his church.
The standing point of natural philosophy, which perchance ad
mits a conflagration of the world, or something resembling it, or
the standing point of the natural postulate of a heaven and heU,
is not that of the Christian, or is so at least subordinately. The
possibUity of evU is permitted for the sake of good; but if it be
not absolutely annihUated in its reality by the grace of redemp
tion, yet is it relatively so, and thus redounds to the glory of
grace. If there be an eternity of punishment, then must it
even belong to the consummation of salvation. The redeemed
indeed cannot desire the condemnation of any one ; but they
may long for the judgment as being a manifestation, a final de
cision, a cessation from all dominion of evil, and as being the
abolition of aU mixed and impure conditions.
3 The question is, whether the second death be only, as it
were, a parallel representation of the state of eternal punish
ment, or a definitive feature of that state, and thus be equivalent
to the absolute annihilation of the individual. Scripture, in
general, does not in every case mean by death, non-being, or a
negation of being, but more frequently non-being in being; for
death in sin, the being dead through the fall, does not negative
individual existence. Accordingly the second death may be that
spiritual death, which excludes the destiny and capacity for
spiritual reanimation, without annuUing existence; and when
St John in the Revelation says that the lake of fire and brim
stone is the second death, it appears that a permanent condi
tion is indicated, otherwise the point in question relates to the
unextinguishable fire. On the other hand, the idea of annihila
tion becomes more prominent when we consider that even death
and Hades, (which shaU absolutely be no more), are cast into the
lake of fire. Moreover, the second death, as such, does not as a
total spiritual death refer to a partial oneof this kind, but is related
as a death of the soul to the first corporeal death, and thus to the
opposite of being and non-being in general. The idea of an ab-

394 PART III. OF SALVATION.— SECT. IV. OF CONSUMMATION.
solute immortality of the human soul, as of a purely simple en
tity, has of late been too closely investigated to admit of its op
posing by itself alone such an interpretation of the second death.
The finite, created spirit amounts to this; its immortality is a gift
derived from the grace of God; its absolute individual existence
is the continual operation of a sustaining Godhead. God alone
hath immortality ; if_he withdraws his spirit-breath from the
soul, it ceases to be, and the dissolution of its powers would effect
a death simUar to that which occurs to the body. Those who
never receive the Holy Spirit, that earnest of immortal perso
nality, might, for the same reason, lose their rational spirit, the
spirit in general (wus mveupu) which has already lapsed into pas
sivity through the fall, and thus lose the consciousness of God ;
and what would then remain to human substantiality as such,
after having endured the loss of the soul? But again, it may
be asked, how human nature can be conceived as regards the.
distinction and unity of soul and spirit. Is the human soul ac
tually nothing more than an exalted animal individuality, or an
exalted principle of organic life to either of which the spirit (vous)
is added as a donum superadditum? Or can the human soul
as will and conception, or as consciousness of self and the world,-
in relation to' God-consciousness and what is rational, be con
sidered as only a completing form, so that the separableness of
the spirit and soul constituted from the very beginning the idea
of man? By no means. The human soul as such, is an in
dividualized spirit, which not only substantively inheres in the;
soul, but as the self -determinating ego possesses its own deter-
miriateness and destiny. The soul is a natural personality which,
even in its degeneracy into selfish peculiarity, does not lose its
natural destination to be spirit. Thus viewed, the soul was
created W ' dq&uggiu, Book of Wisdom, ii. 23 ; and the possibility1
of its falling away from God, which at the same time implies the
possibility of its spirituality and of its partaking of a divine na
ture, does not annul when realized, its destiny and its idea. In
ente non deficit bonum ; the bad never absolutely and of neces
sity belongs to the soul, and the latter is relatively immortal al
though it be dead in sin. Now, if we disregard the representation
of the second death, Holy Scripture does not authorize us by any
other view to conceive the human soul as absolutely annihilable-
for the Redeemer opposes to man's fear of death, not the fear
of being kiUed by God; and to his fear of corporeal death not

| 219, FINAL JUDGMENT. 395
the fear of absolute death, Matt. x. 28, Luke xii. 4, 5, not dm<*
xreTvui, but dmoXegui -vj/u^^v, spftuXeiv ng rfy yeevvuv is the megiggoregov
that God^has the power to do. But if dmtiXeiu, <p%gd should be
explained by Suvurog hevregog, and not the latter by the former,
then it is remarkable that even Weisse, who on several occasions,
and again in Stud. u. Krit. 1835. On the philosophical meaning of
Christian Eschatology, p. 271, seq. maintains the cessation of life
and the annihilation of the psychological not of the regenerated
man; a representation of eternal (second) death, which does not
relate to this mortal soul, but to the evil pneumata. It cannot
be biblically maintained that man was despiritualized by the fall,
and that death is natural to this individual so deprived of spirit,
for the psychological man is and remains, by virtue of his origi
nal nature, at the same time a pneumatical one ; the psychological
man is not the characteristic mark of a natural but of an ethical
species, of a direction of the mind and will; and because we all
die in Adam the idea of annihilation does not follow, and be
cause we have been created in him tie ^xnv ZjHeuv, it does not
exclude the spirituality of nature; and thus the spirit which
seals unto us the resurrection and £,ur\ diuvwg is quite different
from mveupu — voug. But the idea of an evil mveupu, as assumed by
Weise, would be, in reference to the last judgment, the idea of
eternal punishment, and a justification of the doctrine of eternal
damnation. And thus again, we have attained to an incompre
hensible idea, as regards its purpose. It is self-evident that Les-
sing's idea of eternal condemnation and punishment, as an in
fallible consequence and endless retribution of evU conduct, is
theologically untenable. For the eternal consequence of their
sins exist, even among the blessed, not, however, as punishment
and condemnation, but as a feeling of grace and thankfulness, and
Scripture does not denote with condemnation and blessedness
the plus and minus of one and the same condition, but rather the
contrast of an absolutely different condition. Meanwhile, it
cannot stand in connection with this dualism without some
thing farther. Scripture teaches the eternal condemnation of
human individuals, because such is a necessary hypothesis, inas
much as grace, being neither compulsory, magical, nor mechani
cal, allows of man's final resistance; perseverance in opposition to
unbelief is possible, consequently, if there be a final judgment
there must be, defuturo, and on this hypothesis, an eternal con
demnation. Absolutely and in concreto the devil alone, that

396 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. IV. OF CONSUMMATION.
incomprehensible and inconceivable individuality, and those who
are his, are eternaUy damned. Neither are post-diluvian sinners
nor persons otherwise historical, absolutely or eternally condemn
ed before hand and by name. But Scripture does not distinguish
between hypothesis and thesis, and eternal damnation, as theti-
cal and hypothetical fact must, in both cases, be realized in
thought. How is this possible? How can the bad as well as the,
good be eternal? The Divine preservation of a being perverted
in wickedness exists, only, as it appears, in so far as such can
pass into redemption; otherwise redemption would be incongru
ous with preservation. If Christocracy altogether ceases, if it
passes entirely over into the absolute power of God, then no
evil spontaneity can remain, no being exist in whom an unre
deemed antithesis could adhere. Thus, eternal damnation is
either only an hypothesis, and as such the unconditionated
necessity of universal conversion, or absolute non-being, or in
conceivable being in non-being, or an individual being with
absolutely passive and exclusive consciousness of redemption and
the kingdom of God, and equally bereaved of every good as of
every evil activity, a ruin which is at the same time a triumphal
monument of holy and true love. In each of these cases it is
apparent, how the apostle who so boldly and resolutely preached
eternal condemnation, yet admits his extreme doctrine of
eschatology, to look and pass beyond this contrast, 1 Cor. xv.
In so far as in this point mysterious doctrines are held by
the church, they do not relate to the contrast of philosophical
and popular knowledge in particular, but partly concern the con
trast of different stages of Christian knowledge, partly that of the
converted and unconverted. For the latter as such, who have
resisted conversion, and remain unconverted, there is in nowise
any hope of conversion and sanctification in the other world.

§ 220. RESTORATION OF ALL THINGS.
Together with the return of the Lord, the awakening of the
just to life, and the consummation of salvation in general, there
is associated a change of the entire condition of the world, or
a renewal of the heavens and the earth, 2 Peter hi. 10  13
Eevelation xxi. 1—14, by means of which death and sin to-

§ 221. ETERNAL JOY. 397
gether with aU their elements and operations are exterminated,
1 Cor. xv. 26,1 Eevelation xx. 14. But with this restoration of
aU things, Acts hi. 21, the moral restoration of all free beings,
and consequently of the devil, or an imaginable anti-christ, is so
much the less to be assumed as a general article of faith, as in
that case the history of the kingdom of God would be changed
into a natural process.2
1 " God aU in aU" is not a Pantheistic idea, nor a so caUed
Theopantism. See page 40. The goal of history is not the dismis
sal of particular species and individuals, nor the return to univer
sality; for in that case God would only be All, not all in all.
Individuality, (created good in its kind, to which as such, deter
mination for freedom and spontaneity is innate,) shall not be in
itself removed, but it shall be abolished in its pecuharity, and
elevated to a personality in God — to a personality which is a
true and perfect feUowship, and an indweUing of God.
2 The thesis of Divine universal grace, after placing its anti
thesis in the spontaneity of man, struggles after the synthesis of
the freedom and blessedness of God's children in their entire
kingdom. On account of the antithesis, and since the element
of wUl is the condition of free development, eternal damnation,
or the second death, continues to be a necessary hypothesis. But
the originality of the thesis just as necessarily opposes an hypo
thesis of universal salvableness. No dogmatism could be endured
in time and history, that would elevate either the one or other
hypothesis to an absolute proposition. Compare Martensen, die
Christi. Taufe u. die baptistische Frage Ui. die Prddestination, p.,
36, sq. AU Scripture and aU Christian dogmatic history warrant
this relation of the subject.

| 221. ETERNAL JOY.
The eternal joy into which the blessed enter, (Matth. xxv.
34,) is partly distinct from that foretaste of the hope of blessed
ness which they enjoy in this hfe, and partly different from that
anticipated joy, in which, immediately after this life, they
rest from their labours without losing their conscious con-

398 PART III. OF SALVATION. — SECT. IV. CONSUMMATION.
nexion with the world, Eevelation xiv. 13. Anticipated joy is
only of that kind (redemption from the body of this death leav
ing an incompleteness), alluded to in Heb. xi. 40, Eev. v. 10,
11, which wffl be abolished through the final judgment and the
renewal of the world. What eternal joy may be in itself, sur
passes every idea we can form of it, and every immediate re
presentation given to us in the Apocalypse, 1 Cor. ii. 9,1 Ps.
cxxvi. 1. But it must resemble its own foretaste, or the joy of
spiritual life on earth,2) and consequently, whUe excluding aU the
evil of sin,* it wffl be a progress in the contemplative and oper
ative, in the susceptive and spontaneous feUowship of Christ, that
wffl float before us in hope,— -a progress in feUowship which at the
same time is a communion with God and a contemplative reci
procity with angels and the elect, including every beatific re
cognition and re-union; and whilst this eternal joy fulfils the
universal and fundamental design of typical being, (§ 91) it
secures in the utmost truth to each, his individuality, and yet
in such a mode, that he shall dweU in God and hold com
munion with Him.
1 " In this passage," (Knapp strikingly remarks, On Christian
Faith, ii. p. 589,) " properly speaking, the question, according to
verse 7 and 8, turns on the Christian doctrine which hitherto
was unknown, and not of human invention. But the whole pas
sage tends to this* — that God decreed this extraordinary condition
through Christ, in order that we may be led to unutterable
felicity." 2 Local representations, e. g. heaven, many mansions in my
father's house, everlasting habitations, city of God, &c, have
their corresponding reality. Those topographical systems, indeed,
which occur in pseudo inscriptions, among the Cabalists, Chris
tian neo-Platonists, Scholastics, and in Oberlin, and others, are
perfectly gratuitous, and destitute alike of either a scriptural
or spiritual foundation. But even the entire denial of locaUty,
or the translation of it into a spiritual condition (Moras), into
Being in God, in heaven (Pfaff), is inadmissible. Gerhard,:
Baumgarten, and others, insist, on just grounds, on an alicubi, for
there must be a new, a second nature and world adapted to spirit-

§ 221. ETERNAL JOY. 399
ual Ufe, but, nevertheless, a nature and world which the saints shall
possess as the material and local medium of their spiritual life.
3 Schleiermacher considers eternal bliss as merely the goal and
limit. To others, and indeed according to 1 Cor. xv. 28, it ap
pears a non-being. In the former view, regarded as an idea of
exaltation, as weU as of limitation, contrasts, and impediments,
it may even comprehend evil. J. D. Michaelis and Reinhard
concur with the latter view of the subject; whilst from the
fieveiv of faith and hope, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 13, they infer an
adverse element which is yet to be overcome. In truth, how
ever, faith and hope (compare 2 Cor. v. 7, 1 Cor. xiii. 12, 1 John
in. 2,) abide only in so far as the believing subject also abides as
a contemplating one in dependence on an object hoped for and
believed in, or in so far as that which is hoped and believed never
passes away from him who believes. He never loses it, and it
never loses itself. But love is greater, because it does not, hke
faith and hope, merely relate to God, but has itself a Divine na
ture, and is participative of Deity. God neither hopes nor
believes, but knows and loves. A fundamental error, how
ever, exists in Schleiermacher's theory, since finality, exaltation,
and progress are inseparable from evil. The ancients correctly
taught a status impeccabilis impatibilis beatorum, Revelation
xxi. 4; 2 Peter, iii. 13. The latter is as far from excluding Be
coming and Increasing, as Love is from excluding desire, Rest,
action and effort, or Intuition Mediation.

FINIS.

INDEX.

I. AUTHOKS REFERRED TO.

Abelard, 19, 160, 271.
Ackermaun, 60, 81, 239.
Ammon, 8, 87, 127, 148.
Anselm, 161, 271.
Appulejus, 61.
Athanasius, 112, 134, 201, 238.
Athenagoras, 177.
August i, 191.
Augustin, 112, 125, 156, 161, 168, 169,
217, 223, 230, 233, 234.
Basilius, 191, 213, 217, 309, 313.
Baumgarten-Crusius, 5, 8, 16, 30, 50,
63,70,177,237.
Baur, 38, 49, 60.
Bellarmin, 210.
Bleek, 92, 243.
Boethius, 14.
Bohme, 148, 325.
Bouterweck, 16, 20, 58.
Bretschneider, 3, 71, 79, 127, 148, 150,
151,221.
Bruno, 40.
Burnet, Thomas, 109, 384.
Calvin, 79, 94, 131, 196, 320, 327, 346.
Camillus Renatus, 267.
Chemnitz, 102.
Chrysostom, 51, 281, 350.
Chytraus, 319.
Cicero, 14, 42, 81, 284.
Cleanthes, 153.
Clemens of Alexandria, 19, 20, 30, 51,
55, 74, 130, 138, 249.
Constitutions of the apostles, 138, 242,
319.
Creuzer, 49.
Cyril of Jerusalem, 110.
Dahne, 20, 136.
Daub, 22, 140, 249, 330.

Delbriick, 27, 96, 285.
Dietrich, 208.
Dinter, 2.
Doderlein, 8, 54, 127, 269, 344.
Dorner, 258.
Eckermann, 127.
Elwert, 21, 22, 26, 27, 148.
Epiphanius, 201.
Episkopius, 106.
Fenelon, 318.
Fichte, 86.
Fichte, junior, 41, 140, 382.
Fischer, Friedr., 21, 49, 63, 149.
Fischer, Phil., 140, 167.
Fries, 13, 21.
Gabler, 41.
Geffken, 320.
Gennadius, 53, 112.
Gerhard, John, 114, 346, 352.
Grashof, 286.
Gregory of Nyssa, 112.
Gruner, 56, 127.
Gurlitt, 286.
Hahn, 7, 8, 63, 75, 150.
Hamann, 333.
Hase, 16, 20, 27.
Hebel, 2.
Hegel, 9, 13, 16, 140.
Heilmann, 8, 126.
Hengstenberg, 89.
Henke, 8, 28, 126.
Herbart, 334.
Hermas, 191, 313.
Hyperius, 3, 114.
Jacobi, F. H., 13,20.
John of Damascus, 15, 109, 138, 150.
2d

402

INDEX.

Josephus, 262.
Isidor of Seville, 53, 112, 194.
Justin, 178, 188.
Kant, 10, 13, 68, 320.
Karsten, 110.
Keil, 104.
Kern, 221.
Kierkegaard, 325.
Klaiber, 221, 261, 273.
Kling, 4, 129, 130.
Knapp, 63, 126, 166,398.
Kdppen, 12, 13.
Krabbe, 242, 254, 384.
Lactantius, 33, 112.
Lange, John P., 48, 281, 382.
Lechler, 76.
Leibnitz, 171.
Lessing, 38, 68.
Liebner, 37.
Lucke, 96, 103, 390.
Luther, 295, 301, 345, 350, 356.
Marcellus of Ancyra, 52, 58, 179.
Marcus Aurelius, 52, 61, 202.
Marheineke, 50, 104, 344.
Marius Victorinus, 191.
Martensen, 353.
Melanchthon, 12, 114, 216, 345.
Meyer, Lud., 107.
Michaelis, John D., 1 64.
Mohler, 295, 342.
Miiller, Jul., 221, 382.
Miiller, J. G., 7.
Musaus, 108.
Neander, 67, 178.
Nitzsch, C. L., 65, 70, 84, 104, 110, 118,
121, 171, 286, 377.
Nitzsch, C. I., 6, 27, 31, 77, 96, 100,
106, 181, 186,317,327,342.
Oetinger, 117, 142, 144.
Olshausen, 186, 192, 284.
Origen, 67, 112, 159, 253, 257.
Pelt, 104.
Petavius, 53, 150.
Philo, 32, 40, 136, 144, 168, 238.
Planck, W. J., 125.
Planck, H., 97.
Plato, 11,36, 134.
Plutarch, 33, 38, 43, 87, 193.
Putter, 110.
Rosenkranz, 22, 27.

Rothe, 361.
Riitenik, 355.
Sack, K. H. 8, 36, 38, 48, 89, 96, 101,
180.
Sailer, 334.
Sartorius, 180, 258.
Seiler, 2, 320.
Schleiermacher, 3, 4, 6, 13, 16, 21, 27,
41, 45,50,65,79, 110, 127, 131, 149,
156, 160, 164, 167, 171, 196, 210,
253, 256, 261, 274, 277, 344, 352,
370, 382.
Schmid, C. F., 26, 221, 224.
Schmid, H., 21.
Schmieder, 2, 48.
Schmitt, 8, 20.
Schott, 127.
Schulz, David, 18, 221, 232.
Schwarz, 8, 110, 125.
Schweizer, 283.
Spangenberg, 117.
Steiger, 392.
Stein, 248.
Steudel, 4, 8, 21, 146, 148, 221, 232.
Storr, 166, 344.
Strauss, 8, 14, 164, 167, 247, 253.
Suabedissen, 140.
Synesius, 191.
Tafel, 295.
Tertullian, 95, 217, 251, 301, 310, 316.
Theodoret, 51, 53, 134, 199, 256.
Theremin, 39, 119, 201.
Tholuck, 286.
Thomas Aquinas, 236.
Tief trunk, 151.
Tittmann, J. C, 295.
Twesten, 2, 21, 26, 29, 63, 67, 77, 86,
95, 101, 130, 149, 182, 193, 196.
Ullmann, 251, 252.
Urlsperger, 179.
Vatke, 9, 14, 66, 221.
Vogt, 37.
Voigt, 156.
Wegscheider, 345.
Weiss, 20.
Weisse, 41, 178, 395.
Weizel, 382, 391.
De Wette, 5, 21, 45, 96, 127, 193, 196,
354.
Whitby, 214.

II. ALPHABETICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS.

Adam, 201, 211, 222, 223, 271.
Adoration, principle of, 305, 357.
ayuS-og, 134; rayuS-ov, 143; ro ayetS-ov,
204.
uitlBSt xieavtos, 1 56.
uvxf&amxov ''Rtrct'taij, 136.
Angel, 201,236.
a&tigoily 159.
a^ro»a.Xv^/Ut 62, 63.
a0x,9)ffis, 310.
Atheism, 39.
Awakening, 282, 289.
Bad, general idea, 213; not necessary,
210; relation to evil, 214; threefold
view of the bad, 232, 233; an expe
rience, 235.
Baptism of infants, 352.
Beginning, incomprehensible, 195; idea
of revelation, 65.
Bias, sinful direction of, 217.
Bible, translation of, 102.
Blood, avengement of, 327.
Body, not essential to personality, but to
individuality, 202; something good,
203, 241; a burden to the spirit, 203;
corporeality of the intermediate state,
384; redemption of the body, 388.
Cain, 31, 230, 233.
Canon, 97, 98.
Catechism, 1, 2.
Child, duty of, 305, 370.
Children, baptism of, 352.
Choice, divine, 278; power of, 209, 216,
280.
Christ and Jesus, 78 ; not a lawgiver, 376.
Christianity, 78; evidence of divinity, 81.
Church, meaning of the word, 341; de
finition of, 340; attributes of, 342;
visible and invisible, 346.
Church discipline, 360.
Civilization, 46, 334.
Cognoscere Deum, 19.
Communion, man's destiny, 201; of the
Christian, 338.

Community of goods, 333.
Concupiscentia, 223.
Confession of sins, 301.
Conscience, 207.
Consciousness, 16, 17; of self, world,
God, 26, 27.
Conversion, late, 300.
Culture, ethical idea of, 334.
Damnation, eternal, 393-396.
Day, Lord's, celebration of, 358, 359.
Death, Biblical idea of, 241; through
sin, 237; before sin, 242; a benefit,
243; repentance, a death, 270; com
pare, 297; second death, 393.
Death of Christ, its accomplishment,
263, seq.; Socinian view of, 266; de
scent into hell, 392.
Decalogue, 319-321.
Destiny, of man, 201, 316; of the Christ
ian, 334.
Dependence, a feeling of, 27.
Divination, 156.
Divorce, 367.
Dogma, word and idea, 5 1 .
Dogmatic, 3.
Dualism, 42, 43.
Duty, exclusive, 305.
Edification, 323, 324.
Education, ethical idea of, 334,
Egoism, 216.
Election, divine, 378.
Elohim, 144.
Enmity, passive towards God, 238, 239.
Enemy, love of, 335.
ipya, %(>nrrov, 83.
ttrras, 142.
Ethic, 3 ; fundamental principles of ethi
cal interpretation, 107, 367.
Equity, 335.
Evil, relation to the bad, 322.
Faith, general idea, 18 ; of the Old
Testament, 289; threefold saving
faith, 299; idea of «nrrn in Epistle to

404

INDEX.

the Hebrews, 291; analogy of faith,
104.
Falsehood, 325.
Fanaticism, 38.
Fasting, 313.
Father, as a heathen and Testamentary
name of God, 183; ontological, 184.
Feeling, Schleiermacher's doctrine of, 20-
25.
Filial duty, 305.
Fellowship, man's destiny, 201; of the
Christian, 338.
Flesh, flesh and spirit as innocent anta
gonism, 206, seq.; as a sinful direction,
219; resurrection of the flesh, 387, 388.
Freedom, 206.
Friendship, 372.
God, existence of, 135, 139; incompre
hensible, recognisable, 1 34-1 39 ; God's
repentance, 169; God all in all, 397.
God-man, 256, 258.
Good, ontological, 133; ethical, 213; the
good, 307.
Goodness, divine, 179; Christian love of
his neighbour in need, 336.
Glory of God hypostatical, 167.
Grace, a divine attribute, 171-175; di
vine operation, 275, 276; relation to
justice, 171, 269, 328.
Guilt, culpa and debitum, 239.
Hades, 244, seq. ; condition in, 382.
Heathenism, 31, 45, 58, 80.
Honour to God, 331.
Idol, 42.
Idols, prohibition of, 320.
Illimitable, distinct from the absolute,
159.
Illumination, 282.
Image of God, 199-202.
Images, prohibition of, 320.
Immortality, 156, 202, 242, Beq., 393.
Individuality and peculiarity, 403, 404.
Infants, baptism of, 352.
Innocence of the Christian life, 31 8, 322.
Instruction, Divine, 342.
Intelligibility of Scripture, 101.
Intermediate state, 382, 385, 391.
Jehovah, 142, 144.
Joy, divine, 204; fulness of, 204.
Justice of God, 169-175; relation to
grace, 171; in the death of Jesus, 269;
idea of the Christian life, 304.
Justification by faith, 292, 295.
Justitia rationis, 231.
K*S«5^ii», 293.

King, Christ, 274; duty of a Christian
king, 378.
Kingdom of God, 119; its suffering vio
lence, 282.
Knowledge, 16-20.
xrini, 192, 377.
Lamech, 328.
Law, general idea of, 208; good, 215;
Divine legislation, an act of love and
goodness, 172; its development, 173,
270; weakness of, 224; validity and
invalidity, 225.
Lie, 325; of necessity, 326.
Life, vita absoluta, 141; 0i« and ?>«,
206; of Jesus, 260.
Life, regulation of, 314.
Likeness to God, 201.
Logos, 135, 182, 194.
Lord, a heathen name, 143; Testamen
tary, 144.
Lord's Day, 357.
Love, ontological, 144 ; automatical,
304.
Manifestation, and inspiration, 71; com
pare, 62.
Marriage, idea of, 366; marriageable
state of Christian life, 330; Mosaic
prohibition of, 331; divorce, 366.
Messiah, 78, 247; earthly Messianism,
250,.
Metatron, 163.
Michael, 165.
Ministry, foundation and necessity of,
349.
Miracle, objective and subjective, 83, 84.
Mission, ecclesiastical duty, 361.
Moses, seer of God, 136; S-sgacrav S-soa,
187.
Murder, 327.
Mystic, mysticism, 34; mystery of the
sacrament, 350.
Myth, 46, 47.
Name of God, 135, 144; respect for.] a
good name, 331.
Naturalism, 75.
Natural theology, 55.
vovs, 394.
Oath, development of the idea of, 374;
how far admissible, 375.
Offence, 323.
Office, 348; offices of Christ, 261; office
of the keys, 359.
Office of teaching, foundation and neces
sity, 348.
Orphan state, 371.

INDEX.

405

Pantheism, 40.
Parents, duty of, 369.
Patriotism, 339.
Pelagianism, 219, 230.
Personality, 198-202; offence against,
323; of God, 140, 145, 181.
Perspicuity of Holy Scripture, 101.
Polytheism, 41 ; Dii Deaeque omnes, 41,
57.
Prayer, 311 ; of supplication and thanks,
312; congregational 357.
Predestination, polemical and paraded-
cal view of the dogma, 279 seq.
Prodigality, resemblance to avarice,
333.
Propensity, 217.
Property, 332.
Prophecy, 86; distinguished from divina
tion, 87.
Prophet, 88; Christ, 261-263.
Punishment, 240; state's right to punish,
328, seq.; of death, 328.
fu<ru, 50, 134, 222, 231.
<p{icri<r$i7a., 150.
Ransom, 271.
Rational religion, 55, 59, 60.
Rationalism, 75.
Reconciliation, means of redemption,
265; difference between xaraxxxyk
and tXafffios, 268.
Reformation, duty of the church, 348,
361.
Regimen, ascetic idea of, 314.
Religion, the word, 6, 7; idea, 5,60; pri
ma, 110; distinctions, 29; active and
" passive, 31, 32; religious community,
46; idea of, 341.
Repentance, God's, 169; human, world
ly, of despair, 297, 298.
Resurrection, carnis or corporis, 388;
identity of the risen body, 388.
Revelation, 5; idea, 60; elements, origi
nal, historical, vital, gradual, 65-74.
Right, divine, 173, 208.
Righteousness of God, 169-175; rela
tion to grace, 171; idea of the Christ
ian life, 304.
Sacrifice, general idea of, 271; kinds of
in the death of Christ, 271, 272.
Sacrament, 349; as pignus, 350.
Salvation, 133, 245.
Satan, 235; as accuser, 239.
Scandal, 323.
Scripture, Holy, 93-106; perspicuity of,
101.
Selfishness, explanation of the sin of,
216.

Self-love, 322.
Servant of God, 186.
Sin, idea, 216; first, 215, 217; compare,
209; cause of, 216; actual, 220, 227;
inherited, 218, 219; against the Holy
Ghost, and unto death, 284; confes
sion of sins, 30 1 .
Son of God, 184-187.
Son of Man, 188.
Spirit, soul, and body, 308; soul and
spirit, 202; spirit and soul, 202, 393,
394.
Spirit of wisdom, 153.
State, idea of, 328, 372; threefold rela
tion to Christianity, 373.
Subject, duty of, 377.
Sunday, a festival, 357, 358.
Superstition, 33.
Supplication, 312.
Symbol, 49; symbolic of the facts of
the beginning and end of the world
387.
Symbolum, apost., 97, 125.
System of Christian doctrine, 1-5, 108,
118; progressive and regressive de
velopment of, 124.
Teaching, office of, 348.
TtXaoZv, 293.
Temptation, 215; of Christ, 250.
Testament, relation of the Old to the
New, 78, seq.; absolute religion in the
Old Testament, 49; two directions of
the doctrine of God in the Old Testa
ment, 154; the just in the Old Testa
ment, 230, 289.
Theism, 58, 180, 276.
Theodicy, 198.
Theocracy, external and internal, 342;
absolute, 396, 397.
Theology, Biblical, 4 ; natural, 55 ; theo
logical language, 16.
Theophany, 46, 136, 140.
Tradition, 95.
Trinity, Biblical, 176; history of the doc
trine, 177; protection of theism, 181 ;
SPIRITUS TRIPOTENS, 191.
Type, 88; ethical in Christ, 259, 266,
334.
Vengeance for blood, 327.
Vicarious suffering, a Jewish doctrine,
268; a Christian one also, 268, seq.
Vice, definition, 228; degrees of, 229.
Virtue, general idea of, 209; virtuous
life, 334; common and uncommon vir
tue, 317.
Unbelief, general idea, 31 ; source of su-

406

INDEX.

perstition, 32, 33; difference of inmt
and aTtiSvis, 283.
Unlimited, distinct from the absolute,
159.
Union, an ecclesiastical duty, 360.
Watchfulness, ascetic idea, 311.
Wisdom, general idea, 162; wisdom of
God hypostatic, 163.

Widowhood, 371.
Word of God, 93, seq., see Logos; value
of good words, 317.
World, ontological, 192; ethical, 232;
renunciation of, 304; citizen of, 338;
end of the world, its necessity, 380; its
philosophy, 380.
Worship in the Spirit, 305.
Whoredom, 324, 330.

ANDREW JACK, PRINTER, EDINBURGH.

WORKS

REV. ROBERT MONTGOMERY, A.M. OXON.

PROSE.
1. THE GOSPEL IN ADVANCE OF THE AGE:
A Homily for the Times. With an Introduction on the Spirit of the Bible
and the Spirit of the Aoe. Third Edition, Revised and Rearranged, with Addi
tional Matter, &c. &c.
2. THE GREAT SALVATION; AND OUR SIN IN
NEGLECTING IT. A Religious Essay, in Three Parts.
3. CHRIST OUR ALL IN ALL. 3rd Edition.
4. REFLECTIVE DISCOURSES. 2nd Edition.
5. THE IDEAL OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH. A
Pamphlet. 6. THE SCOTTISH CHURCH, THE ENGLISH
SCHISMATICS. Third Edition, with Documentary Evidence.
POETICAL.
1. THE CHRISTIAN LIFE; A MANUAL OF SACRED
VERSE. Second Edition.
2. LUTHER ; OR, THE IDEAL OF THE REFORMA
TION. Sixth Edition. (Preparing for Press.)
3. SATAN; OR, INTELLECT WITHOUT GOD.
Twelfth Edition.
4. THE OMNIPRESENCE OF THE DEITY. 25th
Edition.
5. WOMAN. 8th Edition.
6. THE MESSIAH. 10th Edition.
7. OXFORD; with Biographical Notes. 8th Edition.
8. SACRED MEDITATIONS AND MORAL THEMES.
Third Edition.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
Second Edition, price 7s. 6d.
Ittomtirti 6s ^mnfesfon to %ve iWtoat ©wfou» iMajests.
THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.
A MANUAL OF SACRED VERSE.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

" The volume before us is far superior to anything, which has hitherto come from the
author. One remarkable and excelling characteristic of these poems iB, that when treat
ing of the most awful mysteries, the author is at once manly and reverential. With feet
unsandaled, and brow veiled, he stands in the holy mount, not venturing to look upon
God, but listening for the words of his voice. The work is imagined, throughout, in
that peculiar tone of thought and feeling which distinguishes the English character from
all others — that alone which, emanating from, and reflected by, the English Church,
comprises in its rich but sober fulness, loyalty without servility  A volume, there
fore, embodying that spirit which is among the choicest gifts of the Church, is peculiar
ly well-timed at the present juncture  And now, we must bid the work farewell in
our critical capacity; as men and Christians, and as Churchmen, it will ever be our inti
mate friend, and our frequent companion. Often as we shall open this volume for de
light, for devotion, for instruction, or consolation— each time shall we find new beauties,
and derive new blessings; for of all the uninspired collections of religious poetry, which
any poet has ever produced in any church, or age, or country, there is none which, in
our opinion, can venture a comparison — intellectual or poetical — with Montgomery's
' Christian Life.'" — The Church of England Quarterly, April 9, 1849, No. 50, p. 286.
" To our mind— and we speak advisedly — the author of ' The Christian Life' has
only now put forth his justest title to a name that shall live. In other and far more
important respects, this volume is superior to any of its predecessors. The enthusiasm
of feeling which, like them, it strongly reflects, is here corrected by a thoughtfulness
and serious reverence." — The Guardian, Feb. 2, 1849.
" The ideas too are proper, and commonly natural; they are what many readers could
think, and-what all can understand. The result has been a remarkable popularity.
' The Christian Life' has fewer defects, while it seems to possess all the popular merits
of Mr Montgomery. With less ambition in its themes, it appears to us to have more of
true poetry, and on more interesting subjects, than any of his other works."  The Spec
tator, Jan. 6, 1849.
" To eulogize this divine now, as a successful Christian poet, would be to offer an in
dignity to all who have the slightest knowledge of what is passing in the literary world.
His ' Omnipresence' long ago stamped him as one of our greatest poets — a work which
is now in its twenty-fifth edition, and which on its appearance met with the high com
mendation of those illustrious writers, Wilson, Alison, and Sharon Turner. We must,
however, express our honest conviction that the present volume manifests higher and
more intrinsic beauties and excellences than any one of his previous poetic works. And
what will very much enhance it in the opinion of all true Churchmen, is the fact that it
is a thoroughly Church-volume — breathing and inculcating her scriptural and catholic
verities, exhibiting her in the thrilling and beautiful expression of a fond and sacred
mother, who lovingly cares and unweariedly provides for the spiritual wants and com
forts of her children. Whilst all these poems are fraught with deep truth and lofty
Bentiments, portraying in poetical form the Church's creed and character; the duties
and dangers, the hopes and fears, the faults, privileges, and final destinies of a believer
in the religion of Christ  we must declare that we have not read anything more
beautiful and heavenly, more eloquent and pathetic, than the poems on ' Baptism '
' Visitation of the Sick/ ' Burial of the Dead,' ' Commination,' and the ' Eucharist.' No
thing like this volume has appeared since the ' Christian Year,' whether we consider its
style and tone, its sentiments, the variety of its metres, or the harmony of its verse. It
is a ' Voice of the Church,' a kind of second ' Christian Year.' "—The Scottish Magazine
March 1849. '

YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

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