•Y^LE'WMIVEIISSflW- Gift of the HONORABLE HIRAM BINGHAM YALE 1898 JJJ .^//}/j r /j/ s/ ?//:)/:!/'& ////. //s//%fwMjfyf's>. ^ty/.+yjf/SY'yj sr/'Y' '?/// /;//?'f//w/v?///>////ts;w> '*" " "'^1'^^^^^^S§^^S^Kr»'/'//<^S V'MtHtf/n -MtAf^/Mm/ififlx/mt/SMiAHti/fiim !(§&?!'*¦?¦, Art: 2& /Oss?//fr2ff//.Y////>jfj /'//;/ meager was the space alloted to it that many diligent readers of American newspapers doubtless passed it by and have remained in ignorance of the entire affair to this day. But the Wash ington document and the Mexican answer were published in full in the Mexican press with an effect similar to that of the answer returned in August, 1913, from the pen of Huerta's Foreign Minister, Federico Gamboa, to the de mands of John Lind : it strengthened the Mexican Govern ment in the minds of the Mexican people. In diplomatic circles of the United States and Europe, where Lascurain was then unknown, authorship of the Mexican reply was ascribed to Manuel Calero, who had not set out for Washington. It is difficult to understand how the State Department could have remained in error for more than a day or two ; yet the mistake persisted, and the Washington Government made no haste to receive Calero when he arrived in the latter part of the month as Mexico's 196 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO Ambassador. Official utterance was lacking, but the story of a coldness was extensively published in the newspapers. Calero's port of arrival was New York, and there he waited several days for his welcome to mend. The State Depart ment with due deliberation issued a disclaimer of ill will, and the Ambassador proceeded to Washington where he was received with a studied consideration which was an official condonation of his supposed offense. But it was well known in Mexico that Lascurain and not Calero was the author of the reply to Washington, and the performance was applauded, to the very considerable ad vantage of the Government. American residents in Mexico, many of whom believed that as intervention must one day surely come, it would better come at once, nodded their heads sagely, and looked toward Washington for some ex tremely vigorous expression of resentment. European diplomats adjusted their long distance glasses and scanned the horizon for smoke of American war vessels steaming to sustain Washington's demand which Mexico had flouted. What really happened was that the United States communi cated to Mexico the opinion that the answer which had been received was no answer at all; whereupon Mexico replied that there was no other. So the incident closed with the State Department at Washington talking to itself in an empty room. Some one presently came in, however, with the information that Lascurain was the offender, and the Department made a note of it for use on a subsequent oc casion. It was at this time that a climax was reached in the dis agreement between the management of The National Rail ways of Mexico and its American conductors and engineers, and it is quite certain that the irritation which had developed in the diplomatic situation was not without influence in THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 197 the railway affair, the Mexican Government being in voting control of the system. The National Lines system consists of 7956 miles of railway of which 6003 miles are in the merger proper, while the remainder is controlled by lease. The various railway companies which entered the merger or leased their lines to it had begun business with American employees and the merger had retained them. The president of the great bil lion peso company, several members of its board of direc tors, practically all of the superintendents and general agents in all departments, and nearly all conductors and en gineers, when Madero became President of Mexico, were Americans. There had been many American firemen and brakemen, but these grades, by that time, had been filled with Mexicans as promotions, deaths, resignations and discharges had made vacancies. In the grades of conductor and engineer there were, in April, 1912, about 1000 men of American birth. American railway men had long been a feature of the American representation in Mexico. They had, for the most part, begun their railroad careers on the Western and Southwestern roads of the United States, and they carried the social atmosphere of these regions along with them across the border. In the larger towns which marked the terminals of divisions the American social position was built upon the foundation which the families of these railway men had laid. In Mexico City itself the railway element was well represented in the life of the American Colony. The merchants of the capital found the trade of the Amer ican railway men most desirable ; it was liberal, not too dis criminating, and strictly cash. American stores were es tablished to cater to this patronage. Groceries, haberdash ery, clothing, shoes, drugs, books, stationery and special- 198 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO ties, imported from the United States, were dealt in by American concerns formed for the purpose of selling these goods first of all to the railway men whose earnings, es pecially those of the conductors, amounted in Mexican money to good figures. The railway men came to understand their commercial value to the colony and did not underestimate their impor tance in the operation of the big railway system. They did not view with complacence the disposition of the merger management to advance the fortunes of Mexican employees. American engineers grumbled, not without reason, at being compelled to put up with Mexican firemen. American con ductors jeered, with or without reason, at Mexican brake- men. Now and then a Mexican was promoted to be en gineer or conductor, and the sentiments of the Americans were not politely expressed. Early in 1912 notice was given by the railroad manage ment that all American employees must master the Spanish language; in a few months all train orders which had pre viously been written in English, would be issued in the lan guage of the country. This action, whatever may seem to be its justification, was quite correctly taken to be a move to thin the ranks of American employees. Protest in mild terms proved unavailing. The Americans held meetings and passed resolutions which were ratified all over the system, but the management, under orders from the Government, was immovable. On the seventeenth of April, 1912, while the diplomatic courtesies were being ex changed between Washington and Mexico City, the entire body of American engineers and conductors, after having given notice of their intention, quit the service of the Na tional Lines ; and they have never been taken back. During the remainder of that April of 1912, the Madero Government made substantial gains in strategic position. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 199 Huerta moved his army to Torreon and prepared to advance against Orozco. Calero's departure for Washington effec tually disposed of the daily conferences with Ambassador Wilson; the Ambassador was finding it more difficult to make impression upon a government whose cabinet was now for the first time in full accord; his pet claims were stub bornly hanging fire. Francisco Bulnes, whose disconcerting speeches in Con gress had been a daily shock to Madero, was more or less discredited. De la Barra's return from the mission of thanks to Italy had made no stir ; he was now a prominent citizen in private life. Opposition newspapers adopted a tone that was almost patriotic. Some of the indecent weeklies were suppressed. As April glided into May confidence in the Government rapidly increased throughout Mexico. Americans in the capital were saying that Madero " had got his second wind." CHAPTER XI THERE is no reason to believe that the improved posi tion of Madero in May, 1912, was clearly perceived or rightly understood by the United States, by Eng land or by any continental power. If truly sympathetic comprehension existed anywhere, its seat was in the minds of a few private persons, unrelated to one another, pos sessed of no authority and of little influence. Beyond question the passing of the Diaz rule was re gretted by all statesmen whose offices constrained them to take active interest in the Mexican situation ; and to say this is to close the debate. Those who would have wished to reestablish Diaz — or a younger ruler of the same type — were by this preference debarred from an intelligent opinion in the matter of Madero. The rule of Diaz was held to have been favorable to business development. Under his iron hand the alien seeking his fortune in Mexico enjoyed the opportunity to gain the whole world and lose his own soul without peril to his physical existence or his goods, and consequently without giving rise to troublesome inter national complications. This constitutes good government in the eyes of diplomats and the conviction was well nigh universal that Madero would never establish it. The Mexicans, in the view of Europe and the United States, required a strong president, indistinguishable from a king, except by greater scope than is granted nowadays to most that wear a crown. The briefest period of Madero, followed by the closest possible approximation to Diaz — so ran the sentence in the morning prayers of diplomats 200 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 201 kneeling before their antiquated idols. There is no indica tion that the Americans were so much as one century, scarcely a day indeed, ahead of the others. There had been a certain period of anxiety among the European traders, following the accession of Madero, in which the possibility that the United States would see its opportunity and take advantage of it, had excited apprehen sion. Thus far Mexico's trade with the Northern republic though heavy, had been confined to specialties. Europe secured the great bulk of the business in staples — dry goods, hardware, groceries and a good portion of the machinery. Europe also controlled the banking. These advantages had been held in face of the fact that the money investment of the United States in Mexico's industries was greater than that of England, France and Germany combined. That condition had existed under the Diaz autocracy, but could it endure if the United States should employ diplomatic finesse, shrewdly supporting the new order and making the best of it, for the sake of trade advantages which might accrue? Europe's anxiety, however, quickly passed away. With gratification it saw the inharmony between Madero and the American Government increase to dangerous irritation which found voice in threats embittering the quarrel. A well con sidered silence was the policy of onlookers. No European nation made open demands for protection of its people resi dent in Mexico, or of their property; if an Englishman or a German, or a Frenchman was ill-used or his possessions damaged, his Government acted with vigor and despatch, but quietly. Always it was the United States which ad vertised its complaints to the world, and accomplished noth ing. The month of May, 1912, widened the breach between the two governments. On its first day Henry Cabot Lodge 202 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO delivered his famous Magdalena Bay speech in the Senate. There were rumors that the Japanese had acquired or were about to acquire a holding in the Mexican Territory of Lower California on the shores of this bay in which the United States possessed treaty rights. Senator Lodge sounded a note of warning, very inopportunely, for there was no danger. Madero had not entertained and his Government had no intention of entertaining proposals from Japan of any lead ing character whatever. This was not because Madero was held back by friendship for the United States, but because he saw peril in any deal with Japan which would place Mexico between two fires. If foundation existed for the Senator's fears, it lay in the projected operations of an American syndicate which had acquired property on that desolate coast and was said to be negotiating with the Japanese for its sale. The effect in Mexico of Mr. Lodge's remarks was to excite bitter ridicule as at a letting off of " American steam," but published everywhere in the United States the speech was harmful and excited feeling against Mexico as a potential ally of the little yellow men in their unproved but widely credited design to secure a foothold on the Amer ican continent. On the third of the month two Russian Jews, the Ratner brothers, Americanized but not naturalized, were deported from Mexico as " pernicious foreigners " under the famous article thirty-three of the Mexican Constitution. These men managed a mail-order business under the name of the Tam- pico News Company in which at least two members of the American Ambassador's privy council were directors. The offense of which the deported men were guilty was ex tremely grave; they were caught in the act of delivering arms and ammunition to the bandit chief, Zapata. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 203 The accusation was not made public and no trial was held. This afforded opportunity for criticism of the sum mary treatment they received. If it had turned out that the men were naturalized Americans, interesting developments might have resulted placing prominent members of the American Colony in a delicate position. Under a Govern ment less forbearing than Madero's the Ratners might very probably have been executed and their American partners imprisoned for indefinite terms. One of the Americans associated with the Ratners in the Tampico News Company was Emin L. Beck, President of the strictly American Mexico City Banking Company, and chief backer of a daily newspaper printed in the American language ; the other was Burton W. Wilson, an American at torney. Though there was no reason to believe that they knew anything of this sale of arms, they were to some ex tent involved in the unpleasant atmosphere of the transac tion by the mere fact of their business connection; and because they stood so close to the Ambassador, it was in evitable that he should suffer, though unjustly, a further loss of favor with the Madero Government. The whole affair is an excellent illustration of the way in which business, and banditry, and international com plications are related to one another in a disturbed country. The Ratners had moved their business from Tampico in the year 1909, and branched out on a larger scale in Mexico City, occupying one whole building on Calle Palma and a salesroom on Avenida 16 de Septiembre. While the in dustries of Mexico were going at normal speed the mail order business thrived. Fifty young women were em ployed as typists to attend to the correspondence, and dozens of clerks and employees were required for the de tails of the business. Toward the close of 1910 the beginning of the Madero 204 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO revolution curtailed the volume of sales. In the spring of 191 1 the business was still further depressed, and the Tam pico News Company found itself deeply in debt to Mr. Beck's bank. But the Ratners were sharp men. With Mr. Beck's liberal backing they had secured an enormous stock of American firearms — rifles, carbines, revolvers, auto matics, with abundance of ammunition — picked up at bar gain prices in the States. Shortly after it was received in Mexico City the de la Barra Government issued an edict under which consignments of arms to dealers were held in the custom houses. Dealers were permitted to sell the stock on hand but could not replenish it. The Ratners had already brought in their great supply and now they had a clear field with monopoly prices. They advertised widely and their profits were large. With the increase of reported and actual disturbances throughout Mexico, in the months following Madero's inauguration, the firearms sales of the Tampico News Com pany grew steadily. In February, 1912, the Madero Government became suspicious, and caused two secret serv ice men to solicit and secure positions in the Ratners' employ. Using their best vigilance the detectives were un able, for several weeks, to find positive evidence of traffic with the enemies of the Government. But on the night of May 2 their efforts were rewarded; one of them was chosen as an aid to the Ratners in a delivery of arms. After midnight an automobile was brought into an alley alongside the Tampico News Company building on Calle Palma, the arms were placed on board and were conveyed out of the city beyond Tacubaya where the car was met by Zapata and a body of his followers who received the goods. The detective made his report immediately upon his re turn. At daybreak the Ratners were taken into custody, and their remaining stock was confiscated. That day they GENERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA Minister of Gobernacion and Provisional President of Mexico, from Feb. 19, 1913. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 205 were sent to Vera Cruz, and thence to New York on a steamer. The Government discussed arresting the Amer ican directors of the Company, but refrained, upon informa tion that certain Mexicans of standing were also involved. After Madero was killed, the Ratners returned to Mexico, and resumed business at the old stand. In those early days of May, 1912, while the Madero Government was acting with some approach to harmony and not without efficiency in its administrative measures, the opera bouffe pretensions of the Emilo Vasquez Gomez ele ment were much advertised in the United States. The movements and the fulminations of Orozco were also pic tured in American newspapers, along with the operations of Zapata. Vasquez Gomez and Orozco sent separate re presentatives to Washington, but the envoy of the former claimed that his chief was recognized by all as head of the revolutionary enterprise. The Taft Administration took sufficient notice of the assurances of protection to Americans volunteered by these men to make a statement that " until more headway was made in unseating Madero," no com munications from insurrectos would be received. This statement was not well contrived ; it was inter preted as a spur to greater revolutionary activity ; and it seemed to ignore, as the sharp note of April 15 had done, the material gains made by the Madero Government. The Vasquez Gomez people held some border towns, and cer tain affiliated squads of bandits were moving about in northern Coahuila and Chihuahua. Orozco held the state government of Chihuahua. But the border press and cor respondents dealt in exaggerated accounts of minor happen ings which Mexico City regarded as of no moment; for there was confidence in the army sent north under Huerta. The achievements of that army are really notable. Genuine military and engineering ability were displayed in 206 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO the course of Huerta's advance over the 294 miles between Torreon and Chihuahua, along the main line of the Mexican Central Railway. On the 2nd of May, Orozco, then at Jimenez, 150 miles north of Torreon, issued orders for his army of 7000 men to move south to attack Huerta, whose forces amounting to 6000 were divided between Torreon and the town of Mapimi, twenty-five miles north. On the 7th Huerta moved the Torreon force north to join the Mapimi division. On the 8th Orozco moved his head quarters south from Jimenez, forty-six miles, to Escalon, and here he remained, though his army was near Berme jillo skirmishing with the outposts of Huerta's forces seventy-five miles further south. On the 9th Huerta advanced in force against the main body of Orozco's army just north of Bermejillo and on the 10th led a general attack which dislodged the enemy with considerable loss. And the retreat of Orozco's army which began that day steadily continued. On May 11, Huerta advanced to Peronal fifteen miles north of Bermejillo. On the 12th Orozco was driven north another fifteen miles, after twelve hours fighting in which five hundred men were killed. On the 13th Orozco's forces retreated north on the railway, forty miles, to Rellano, the scene of his great victory over Gonzalez Salas. Orozco now moved his headquarters back to Jimenez, thirty-three miles from his army. The Orozco rebels having destroyed bridges, Huerta's advance was slower. On the 14th he reached Yermo, four teen miles north of Conejos. On the 15th he moved ten miles further, rebuilding bridges as he proceeded. Orozco's base was still at Rellano, but his troops were at various points in the thirty miles between that town and Huerta's front. On the 1 5th Huerta advanced to Ceballos, and on the 16th he reported to Mexico City that Orozco's losses in THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 207 killed, wounded and prisoners thus far amounted to 2000 men. The Government was calm; it had expected success. Huerta was cheered on capital streets; Madero stock was daily rising. The active aggression of the Federal cam paign was a revelation of the Government's strength. Rebuilding bridges and relaying track held Huerta from rapid movement, and Orozco reinforced his army at Rel lano. On the 20th Huerta occupied Escalon, within eleven miles of the rebels whose skirmishing parties inaugurated the practise of turning loose box cars, containing dynamite, and starting them down the grade to explode in the Federal camp. On the 21st the skirmishing columns of Orozco's army were driven further north. There was hard fighting at Asunsolo, six miles from Rellano. On the 22nd, the van guard of the Federals under General Rabago attacked Orozco's main body at Rellano. On the 23rd the fight be came general and was the fiercest of the campaign thus far. Led by Huerta in person, with Generals Blanquet, Tellez and Rabago supporting, the Federal army that day washed out the Rellano stain in rebel blood. The spirit of the con queror was in the Madero forces. With irresistible mo mentum they carried the Orozco defenses, occupied his base of supplies and put his men to such precipitate flight that they abandoned arms and ammunition and left six hun dred dead. In twelve days Madero's army under Huerta's vigorous leadership had driven Orozco's troops north more than eighty miles and had defeated them in every engage ment. The difficulties of the pursuit now multiplied. Orozco possessed the immense advantage of a railway in working order as a means of retreat through a section where the railway was the only means by which his adversary could advance. Also he knew that Huerta must rebuild the line 208 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO to keep in communication with his base of supplies which still was at Torreon more than a hundred miles in the rear. Stung by constant reverses and desiring to gain time for recruiting before the battle which must be fought to decide the fate of Chihuahua, Orozco gave orders to turn the railroad behind his forces into as complete a wreck as dynamite could make. Not content with blowing up bridges, culverts and trestles, and tearing up track, his men destroyed the foundation and the grading upon which the track was laid. Ties were burned, the roadbed through cuts was piled deep with rock blasted from the sides, tun nels were rendered impassable and the instructions to " make that railway as if it had never been " were literally carried out. Orozco prepared for the decisive contest at Bachimba, 142 miles north of Rellano and but forty miles south of Chihuahua in which city he established his headquarters, for at all times during this campaign he kept himself well beyond the zone of danger. With 142 miles of indescrib able railway wreckage between his army and the Federals he believed it would be months before Huerta could re build the line and advance to the attack. By that time Orozco hoped to have an army of 10,000 men. But he underrated his adversary's ability. Whatever un- pleasing characteristics Victoriano Huerta later on dis closed to the world, it would be idle to deny the merit of his leadership at this juncture. Compared with famous wars his operations were on a small scale, the number of men in active service under him during this campaign never ex ceeding 7000; but for indefatigable energy, for ability to excite and retain the loyalty of his officers and men, and for resourcefulness in face of staggering difficulties, his record in that advance from Rellano to Bachimba may well be regarded as brilliant. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 209 The Government at Mexico City supported him with constant reinforcements to hold the railway as fast as cap tured, and protect Torreon in his rear. It was no longer difficult to obtain recruits for the Federal army ; enthusiasm for the military service came with success. Thus it was possible for Huerta to garrison the towns as they were oc cupied, and protect every foot of the rebuilt railway from being tampered with by small bands lurking in the moun tains to cut off communication between the Federals and their base. On June 26, one month and three days from the date of the Rellano battle, the vanguard of Huerta's army was within five miles of Bachimba, having advanced 228 miles in forty-six days since May 10th, the date of the first bat tle of the campaign at Bermejillo. Several days were now spent in preparing for the final test of strength. Orozco had 8000 men well supplied with ammunition which had been smuggled across the border, and been paid for by the state revenues of Chihuahua, sup plemented, it is said, by heavy contributions from the Ter razas family. Huerta had only 6500 troops; but what he lacked in numbers was more than compensated for by better equipment of machine guns and by the revengeful ardor of his men who under the guidance of competent engineers had been driven like slaves in restoring the railway which Orozco had wrecked. On July 3 the Bachimba fight began and on the following day Orozco's army was cut to pieces. Refugees scattered across the country. Panic reigned in Chihuahua City, forty miles distant. That night Orozco and such of his sympathizers as could crowd into the cars boarded trains for Ciudad Juarez, leaving the capital of the State of Chi huahua open for Huerta's occupation the following day. The Federal victory was complete. 210 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO The Huerta campaign against the scattered remnants of Orozco's army and the insignificant bodies of men calling themselves Vasquistas, continued for several weeks with sustained success. On August 20, Ciudad Juarez was re captured by the Federals and shortly afterward the main Vasquistas bands were broken up, thus quelling organized rebellion in the north against the Madero Government. But these latter incidents of the campaign were of the com monplace Mexican variety except that they were better done; it is the sweep from Torreon to Chihuahua that furnishes an exhibit of those qualities in this remarkable man, which, the following year, undoubtedly helped to raise him to an unenviable eminence. To belittle the service rendered by Huerta in this cam paign would be to do him less than justice. That his army was superior to that of his adversary in equipment of artil lery and machine guns is saying only that which was equally true of the army which previously, under Gonzalez Salas, went to defeat against the same enemy on the same ground. Dogged determination and inexhaustible energy were the qualities which made superior equipment effective against the obstacles Huerta was compelled to overcome. No other Mexican campaign during the preceding half century can be compared with this as a genuine military achieve ment. The victories which history credits to Porfirio Diaz were never quite free of the suspicion of double dealing. Rare is the occasion when Diaz did not have soldiers in both camps. But the series of triumphs by Huerta over Orozco was a clear record of fair contests conducted with skill and concluded with credit to the commanding general, his officers and the Government that supported him. None was more astonished at the ability Huerta ex hibited than the old line officers who regarded him as an THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 211 excessive user of alcohol, and, therefore, unfit for an im portant command. As in later days he surprised the world by the broad audacity of his methods so in almost equal measure his campaign against Orozco startled the Diaz gen erals who had known him from his youth. Born of Indian parents in the State of Jalisco in 1852, Victoriano Huerta entered the military service at the age of twenty as a cadet. In the Diaz military operations from 1876 onward he was always a dependable but not conspicuous officer. The Diaz principle " shoot first and take no prisoners " was thoroughly instilled into him by this training. Opportunity for application of these military ethics was not lacking during the years in which the Diaz system of rule was making Mexico " safe as a church." Along with many other Diaz officers Huerta acquired the reputation of a man from whom no quarter was to be ex pected. His abilities as an executive were recognized by Diaz who assigned him to departmental duty in organizing the gen eral staff of the Mexican Army and in superintending the preparation of military maps. During this period he be came an inveterate student of Napoleon Bonaparte, whose methods appealed to him as ideal for Mexico. He was made a brigadier general by Diaz in 1902. The Mexican army in the latter Diaz years deteriorated in efficiency through the development of a system of graft which profited most by clothing and arming soldiers who did not exist, and Huerta fell in with the general tendency among the officers to regard active service as of the past. He was considered the hardest and steadiest drinker in the Diaz army and in no way did he distinguish himself dur ing the Madero revolution. Assigned by the de la Barra Government to the task of subduing the bandit, Zapata, Huerta by his methods dis- 212 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO pleased Madero, who caused him to be removed from active service and placed on the waiting list, where he remained until the Madero Government found itself in hard straits in the month of March, 1912. Then Huerta discovered an opportunity to use Napoleonic methods against Orozco. He asked for the chance to " whip the traitor," and so ob tained the prominence which enabled him eventually to succeed the man who set him in the way. When the campaign was over the Madero Government directed Huerta to return to the capital, but he made ex cuses. The reason for this became apparent when he finally reached Mexico City: in accounting for the funds which had been sent to him to pay his troops and carry on the campaign, he was 1,500,000 pesos short in his vouchers. But he had received the popular applause on his arrival in Mexico City ; many banquets were spread in his honor, and when Madero called his attention to the discrepancy in his accounts, he disposed of the matter with grimly amusing nonchalance. " I am no bookkeeper," was the only answer he deigned to make. Manifestly there was nothing to be done. To prefer charges would seem to indicate jealousy. The Madero Government rose to the occasion ; it made him a major gen eral. Victoriano Huerta did not lose his self command in the momentary enthusiasm which his victorious campaign had aroused. He had lifted a government, with whose de clared principles he was not in sympathy, to a position which commanded respect, but he seemed entirely indif ferent to the praise which he received. While the military operations of the Madero Govern ment were making notable successes the Department of Finance was not idle. Reserving details for more extended treatment in a subsequent chapter attention at the moment THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 213 centers upon the loan that was effected in the early days of June. Revenues, according to Government statements, were in creasing in volume but extraordinary charges for " pacifi cation " had made loan negotiations necessary. The fifty millions, gold, that was needed on long time to place the treasury in a strong position was not obtainable for reasons already indicated. It was not wise to ask for Con gressional consent to such a plan until the matter could be laid before the new Congress to be elected in July and to convene in September; and it was not yet possible to ar range with a new banking syndicate in Europe against the adverse influences that were at work. Rumors that Speyer & Company were making difficulties about a loan were denied by that house in a statement to the press on May 1st. Rumors that Limantour was aiding in loan negotiation were denied by the Mexican Govern ment on May 15th. On June 7th a loan was placed with Speyer & Company to the amount of ten millions, in one- year, 4J4 per cent, notes at 98 " less banker's commissions in Europe." This short-time note financing for general treasury pur poses was new in Mexico, and caused much comment. By some it was looked upon as a serious blow to the Mex ican credit ; by the Mexican Government it was stated to be — and the Mexican Congress so authorized it — a special fund for " pacification." But the fact of the matter is that it was the only negotiation which, at that time, could be concluded, and the figure at which it was floated when all charges were deducted was much nearer 94^ than 98, the surface price. The July elections for members of the Chamber of Depu ties, the Mexican lower house, and for one-half of the Senate, were not quite of that open order which had distin- 214 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO guished the Madero presidential election of the preceding October. Yet the time honored Diaz system of " tagging " a Congress into office can not have been followed strictly, for certain of the new members were not those which the Madero Government preferred. The Catholic Party developed unexpected strength, es pecially in the Senate, where half the members still held over from the Diaz times. The new Catholic Party mem bers when acting with the " old regime " men were suffi ciently numerous in the Senate to block the operations of the Madero majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The Mexican custom permits one man to hold as many offices as he can conveniently lay hold of. One of the new Senators was also some months later seated as Governor of the State of Mexico, in a corner of which is the Federal District containing the capital. The man was Francisco Leon de la Barra. CHAPTER XII THE notable thrashing of Orozco, the creditable mod eration of procedure which marked the July elec tions, and the vitality displayed by the Govern ment during the summer, stirred the enemies of Madero into increased activity. Around this unfortunate man there was formed a network of conspiracies, interwoven at cer tain points deliberately by men who understood what they were doing, at other points by blunderers ; and wherever there were two loose ends the fingers of the fates tied them together. Events upon the surface gave little indication of effective causes. It may fairly be said that the comprehension of Mexico affairs from outward appearances ceased to be merely difficult and became impossible in September, 1912. The situation at that time might be presented as a riddle; it was in fact so offered to the world, and very wild were the guesses. As an example of the grotesquely erroneous opinions which were held and widely disseminated it would be possi ble to take the despatches from Beverly, Mass., printed in the newspapers of September 8, and disclosing to the public the alleged and probably the actual view of President Taft, who had just come to that town from the capital. When President Taft was in Washington on Wednesday, said these despatches, he had a conference, it is understood, with Sefior Manuel Calero, the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, on which occasion the President made it more plain to the Ambassador that this Government was 215 216 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO dissatisfied with internal conditions in Mexico, and that the Government of Madero must take more drastic steps to pro tect the lives and property of Americans and of other for eigners in Mexico. " Mr. Taft," in the words of the ac counts, " is opposed to intervention, except in the last resort. It is admitted, however, that conditions in Mexico have become much worse in the last few weeks, and if the Ma dero Government is unable to check the attacks on Ameri can citizens, the United States will be constrained to take some action." I am willing to believe that the conference referred to actually took place, and that Mr. Taft addressed himself to Sefior Calero in the strain described, and with entire sin cerity. What puzzles me is that Calero kept his face straight. Possibly the Sefior's natural regret that the Am bassador of the United States to Mexico was not listening at the keyhole may have sufficed to steady his countenance. For my own part, in the long volume of the human comedy I draw a line beside this scene to mark it as among the most ridiculous, but if one newspaper or one man in public life, north of the Rio Grande, knew Mexico well enough to appreciate the joke, I have not found the evidence of it. Another example, in itself quite unimportant, will serve us well at this point. On a Sunday in that September, one of the more sober and reliable New York newspapers filled a page with an illustrated article by General Orozco, in which he stated with considerable violence his grounds of opposition to Madero, whom he denounced as a traitor to the liberties of Mexico. This publication implies, of course, that the newspaper in question, — and it was one of the best informed, — did not know the essential facts about Orozco, nor even suspect the nature of the considerations which impelled him to become a rebel. Moreover, this newspaper, in common with a thousand THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 217 others, displayed on the same day and for many days suc ceeding, the current stories of the weakness of the Federal arms in Mexico as disclosed by the activity of its enemies in the field. But Orozco himself was the conspicuous and sufficient evidence of Madero's military strength and of the fact that he required only a fair chance to develop and em ploy it. Orozco had led the only formidable force against the Government and he had been beaten out of his boots. He was vox et praeterea nihil, the lonesome leader of a vanished host, even his own whereabouts uncertain, for he was here or there, in Texas, Arizona or Mexico, as the dreams of the correspondents changed from night to night. There was not in Mexico at that time, really existing at the head of an organized band, a leader capable of standing his ground against a very moderate force, with the exception of Zapata; and Madero would never have had any perma nent trouble with Zapata, as is well known by those who understand the heart of Mexican mysteries. It is not my intent to deny that there was grave disorder in Mexico, or that the United States had cause for anxiety as to the safety of its nationals on the other side of the border. The question turns upon a clear comprehension of causes and a right procedure in the circumstances as they actually existed, not as they seemed to be. Far too much importance has been assigned by critics to supposed spontaneous local sentiment, and to what has been made to appear as a universal savagery and love of strife in Mexico's lower classes. Active agencies were at work stimulating sentiment adverse to the Government and caus ing it to develop into overt acts. It was the upper classes of Mexico which promoted and fostered this destructive work. The upper classes were of Spanish or mixed blood. The ingredients of the mixture had been Spanish and native 218 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO or French and native, and the generation of the day looked down from a great height upon the Indian races from which it quite recently had sprung. The upper class families had been enriched by the means which Porfirio Diaz had em ployed to create the feudal system called by the world a strong government, and they now greatly feared that Ma dero would become powerful enough to attack their prop erty rights. These " rights " were, for the most part, infamous wrongs. They were acquired through the remarkable Law of Survey of the Public Domain which was passed or pro mulgated in 1884, in that interval when General Gonzalez, a tool of Porfirio Diaz, was permitted to hold the presidential office. Under this law the President could appoint sur veyors who were entitled to one-third the land they sur veyed and mapped, and to the privilege of purchasing the other two-thirds at a nominal figure. Favorites of Diaz were the surveyors appointed. They did little or no sur veying. The maps they filed were designed in the City of Mexico. The titles created by the Law of Survey swept aside ancient boundaries and rights dating from the con quest. Thousands of Mexican families were despoiled of their property which thus was parcelled out to men who became the bulwarks of the Porfirio Diaz system. Villages, farms, haciendas, waste lands — more than half of the Republic of Mexico — were in this way wrested from families long in possession, or from the Government itself. Corrupt and subservient courts sustained the " surveyors." At the hands of Diaz the despoiled ones got no comfort, except the few who could bring influence to bear or show their power to advance his plans. Landholders became serfs of the great proprietors, who, with their sons, their wives, their sweethearts and their daughters, maintained elegant homes at the capital and spread the fame of Diaz THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 219 in Paris, London and Madrid. Some of these men were Cientificos and some were not, but all were Porfiristas to the core. Terrazas and Creel, who held fourteen million acres in Chihuahua ; Corral, with immense holdings in Son- ora ; Escandon, landed baron of Morelos, were among those who benefited by the Law of Survey. The great landowners had confidently looked for Madero to meet with early disaster, but after the July elections they began to take alarm in earnest, for he now held con trol of the Chamber of Deputies and might be able to coerce the few who made up the opposing Senate majority. A new and drastic law of land taxation, or one conferring power of condemnation upon unfriendly officials of the Government might accomplish dismemberment of the great estates, a move which would bring the millions of discon tented peons crowding back to government support. The federal military victories had disposed of organized rebellion; if the peons could be made to believe that Ma dero's promises to give them land were approaching ful filment, " the little reformer " would become too strong to be defeated, and the day of the land baron would be over. Any enterprise directed toward Madero's ruin could now command the haciendado's active aid. No time was to be lost ; in all the ways by which the men of extensive prop erty could exert influence upon the ignorant, they secretly stirred the peons to revolt. It may be difficult to believe, but it is true nevertheless, that landed men aided and abetted bandits by whose fol lowers the estates of those same proprietors were overrun, even though this result had been foreseen from the begin ning. In many instances, of course, the marauders went far beyond what had been expected, lost control of them selves or of their men, and were the perpetrators of out rages having international significance. If this condition 220 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO had been understood, the remedy would have been seen to lie in the encouragement and support of the central gov ernment; for as long as it should seem to be unstable and to have no friends anywhere, these underhand proceedings must continue, but when its permanency should be reason ably assured, the more discreet of the conspirators would seek to make some composition with it. At least there would no longer be anything to be gained by financing and inspiring brigandage. No sign of the times was more encouraging to the plot ters of all stripes than the apparent attitude of the United States. Conduct calculated to increase the hostility of that country was the plainest business policy for those who wished Madero to be deposed, and this was well and widely understood. As to what would come after Madero's fall there was less clearness, in Mexico and elsewhere. The main thing was to pull away the props that held him up. The women of the " upper class " families aided this under mining all through Mexico, and were at no pains to conceal their contempt for Maderista women, especially for the women of the Madero family. In their social circles they gossiped about them with a bitterness which disregarded veracity altogether. The mother of Madero, who in reality was a woman of high character, was called " La Diabla " and charged with inspiring her sons to all manner of evil. As the Madero women passed along the street, whether walk ing or riding, the women of the old regime who met them hissed the opprobrious term " sin verguenza " — shameless one — through set teeth. The slanders of the Madero women which patrician ladies passed to their servants were spread through ever widening peon circles and blackened their reputations everywhere. Nearly all substantial business interests of Mexico, whether controlled by Mexicans, Americans or Europeans, THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 221 remained solidly opposed to the Madero rule. This influ ence extended through credits of wholesale and retail trade, through discrimination in the employment of labor and _through the never-ceasing discussion of political affairs. There was no support for Madero indicated by the at titude of any European government or by that of the gov ernment of the United States. All nations were coldly critical; all were waiting, some patiently, some fretfully, for the change which would dispose of Maderism and set up a government in Mexico, which to be successful must ybe the " iron hand " of the Diaz order. ^ The secret efforts to promote and solidify opposition to Madero were guided from Paris through three streams of influence. One of these was Cientifico, artfully concealed and guided by the exiled Cientifico leader, Pineda ; another was military, managed by Mondragon. The third may be called financial ; it was also political, exerting a great power in the Mexican Senate. It proceeded in part from the Paris bankers who had been prominent in the loan of $110,- 000,000 gold, in 1910. The security for this loan, as has been stated, was 62 per cent, of the customs receipts. Mexico now desired more money, and these same bankers were willing to increase their underwritings of that coun try's securities, if they could complete their hold by obtain ing the pledge of the remaining 38 per cent, of the customs. They were decidedly opposed to any plan which would pass the control of that 38 per cent, to any other banking syndicate. Anti-Madero senators, for political reasons, were in accord with the sentiments of the Paris bankers, and were prepared to obstruct any competing financial legislation which would strengthen Madero's position. The Cientifico influence worked in harmony with the military ; it supplied the money. When the time should ar rive for work in the open, the military must bear the brunt. 222 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO Porfirio Diaz, the aged ex-dictator, was not associated with any movement. He was finding life in Spain and France and Egypt a grateful relaxation after his long and strenuous career. The intrigues of the Cientifico exiles were secret and far- reaching. They were carried on in Mexico by the men and women of the upper classes as well as by those who had formerly affiliated less prominently with the society of gov ernment beneficiaries. The wealthy landed proprietors were concerned in many enterprises of sedition, such as have been described, schemes which it would be flattery to call questionable. The anti-Madero sentiment which these men fostered was a steadily increasing menace; it made bandits of many who were peacefully inclined. Every empty demand of the American Government for protection of its nationals supported the plans of the Mexicans of property whose object, all too well accomplished, was to prove to the world that Madero could not maintain order. The men of wealth whose haciendas were looted and burned, and the men of business who were robbed, were well assured that when " the little Madero " should have been disposed of, they would be reimbursed. The very men Madero had hoped to benefit were used as instruments to defeat his purpose. Probably no government in the world has ever been more systematically circumvented by its responsible citizens, though the situation is not novel except in its completeness. The military influence directed by General Mondragon from Paris, and afterward from Havana, operated through officers of the Diaz regime who were now either actively in the army of the Madero Government or on the retired list with plenty of time on their hands and deep animosity in their hearts. Disloyalty to Madero was made to assume the guise of patriotism to these men who promoted this THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 223 sentiment in the army as rapidly as they found suitable oc casion ; also " the good old days of Porfirio Diaz " were held up as ideal for army officers, for under a restoration of such rule, they could supplement their pay-checks with a share of " easy money " gained by carrying dead men on the roster. To this method of undermining Madero many failures of the Government arms were due. It was this systematic work through military channels which may be called the proximate cause of February's tragedy, though to speak of it as if it operated alone, as some have done, is highly absurd. The Paris financial influence above referred to was being opposed by government plans. During the period inter vening between the elections of July, 1912, and the con vening of Congress on September 16, Ernesto Madero, Mexico's Finance Minister, through Mexico's Minister to France, Miguel Diaz Lombardo, had been able to make a substantial advance in negotiations for a large loan with a group of French provincial bankers, quite distinct from the syndicate which had figured in the loan of 19 10. For the first time since it was established the Madero government was making headway toward establishing bank ing connections which had not been associated with the treasury operations of the Diaz regime. The surface movement of affairs in Mexico during the months of September, October and November, 1912, was caused by systematic operation of the destructive influ ences which have been described. Although the Federal army was recruited to nearly 60,000 men, and was actively engaged in pursuit of bandits and small bands of rebels, brigandage increased upon the whole. No city or town of importance was attacked, but the looting of small vil lages and isolated haciendas in the north and south was of daily occurrence. In all of these depredations there was 224 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO more or less of bloodshed, accomplished with a brutality which spread terror through many regions. The field for such enterprises was very broad, for Mexico abounds in small hamlets and there are more than fifty thousand haciendas, all of which at that time offered a tempting mark for the plunderer. Some of the operators were very bold ; many bands were overtaken and summarily dealt with; but the Government was contending against no cause in arms, and the defeat of one brigand meant very little to another. The government forces in detach ments of all grades, including the greatly increased rural guards, were moving everywhere against the peon bandits without lessening banditry. Not a single important brigand or rebel leader of consequence was taken; they were kept too well advised through secret channels, mili tary, political or commercial. The relations of the American Ambassador with the Madero administration were at this period unfortunate to the last degree. A superhuman tact on his part would have been required for the establishment of a merely tolerable status, after the innumerable irritations of the past. Surely he should have restricted his contacts with the Gov ernment to the unavoidable, and should have held himself to a careful observance of diplomatic etiquette in order that the personal element might be suppressed in the most ef fective manner. But these obviously necessary measures he neglected, taking the contrary course of incessant and strangely various activity. He supplied advice to the Gov ernment touching its negotiation of loans, tutored it in local policy, and interfered unwisely in the affairs of Americans whose enterprises were the subjects of departmental con sideration, this interference being tantamount at times to the suggestion of practical discrimination between one and another. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 225 Moreover, the Ambassador pursued an injudicious course in the matter of claims, taking up too many, and pressing them inopportunely with detriment to his own dignity, and with no benefit to the claimants whom he rep resented. These demands reached an enormous aggregate; they ranged from the English plantation claim for eleven millions and that of the Chinese for three millions, down to the mere pocket-money of a quarter of a million asked by the American publisher of El Heraldo Mexicano, the evening daily whose edition had been seized on the 25th of March, after the defeat of Gonzales Salas. This journal died in the same manner as the Minister of War, by suicide, for no official word forbade it to continue. There were no issues subsequent to the one that had been suppressed, but the suspension was voluntary. The trifling misadventure of a day was hastily made final; the hopeful heirs of the deceased were prompt, and sods were on the grave of El Heraldo before the breath was fairly out of its body. Thus the publisher exchanged a spend thrift enterprise for a claim against the Government, and El Heraldo' s ghost became a private in that spectral army which, under the Ambassador's command, beleaguered the treasury of Mexico. Madero and his advisers knew the truth; knew also that the publisher was active in that circle of amigos whose center was in the Embassy; and this affair, though empty of genuine importance, still contributed its part to aggra vate the feeling of hostility. This claim appeared in that bill of complaints against the Mexican Government which was presented by the Ambassador under instructions from Secretary Knox, on the 17th of September, and though it was dwarfed by larger item? its inclusion was significant, for Mr. Wilson must have known its history in full. The accusation took the form of a voluminous diplomatic 2,26 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO " note " which was supposed to have been prepared by the Ambassador, from material carefully examined and sifted in Washington. Its text was not published, but there were innumerable references to it, in the newspapers of the United States, before as well as after its delivery. These references dealt, for the most partr with acts of violence against American residents in Mexico. The State Depart ment was said to have investigated many murders, the num ber being variously stated, from forty to " more than a hundred." Persons fairly well informed as to affairs in Mexico did not doubt that the list would be long, and that it would include notable atrocities, which, through the in efficiency and partiality of the administration of justice in Mexico, had entailed no punishment of the perpetrators. There is no doubt that the list was as long as the com pilers dared to make it, that it included every case in which the evidence might have validity under " crowner's quest law." And the true total was seventeen. Four of the crimes complained of were committed prior to the revolu tion of 1910. In three instances there had been convictions in the Mexican courts, and the guilty persons were serving sentences in prison. An analysis of the seventeen cases seems to show that only two have any merit. In one of these the supposed perpetrator was a bandit who had not been caught in the month that had elapsed since the commission of the crime. In the other the difficulty seems to have been that the chief accuser would not identify positively the persons against whom he brought the charge. Upon vague grounds he al leged that the court did not act in good faith. Investiga tion was still in progress five months after the crime, a delay in securing conviction which will not seem long to any one familiar with the criminal courts of New York. The presentation of civil cases was not more impressive. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 227 Great space was given to the British irrigation claim al ready referred to. The Tlahualilo Company, whose capi tal was mostly English, but whose manager was James Brown Potter of New York, sued the Mexican Government in the days of Diaz for damages resulting from the failure to receive a supply of water from the Nayas River suffi cient to irrigate the company's property in the State of Coahuila. In regard to this matter no more need be said here than that the case is extremely complicated, and in every way suitable to illustrate the essential faults and fol lies of legal procedure. It might drag interminably in the courts of any country unless expedited by the corrupt use of money or influence. A protest of certain American oil companies in Tampico against a tax on petroleum was an item in the complaint of the United States. The quarrel of a press association with the Mexican Government was included, and a dispute about the transfer of a packing company's concession. This corporation was financed by British capital exclusively, a fact which British investors had cause to lament. The packing company itself had been the center of a deplorable scandal ; and its failure — which resulted when several millions of its paper, kited on a triangle whose other two corners were in New York and London, went to protest — dragged down to ruin the United States Banking Company of Mexico City, and sent George I. Ham, the bank's presi dent, to Belem prison under a twelve years' sentence. He was released in the jail delivery which was one of the early incidents of the bombardment, in February, 1913. Here was a somewhat unsavory client for the United States; and moreover the packing company's claim had been set tled in its favor before the American note was presented. El Heraldo, from its grave at four cross roads, marched gloomily in the procession — the whole a sorry spectacle, 228 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO surely, when all the attending circumstances are taken into consideration. The Mexican reply was prepared by Lascurain, doubt less with adequate legal advice. He refers to the American note as " dated in this city on the 15th and received on the 17th of September " — which indicates that he supposed it to have been written by the Ambassador. " I must readily confess that the tone of the above-men tioned note has been a source of great surprise to the Mex ican Government," Lascurain writes, " because it never ex pected from the Government of the United States re proaches so much at variance with the spirit of amity in voked in said note and so pessimistic in their conclusions, many of which are based on manifest error or on inexplica ble preoccupation." He then proceeds to review the list of murders, and comes presently to this atrocious deed: "Case of Henry Crumbley, July, 1912. — His death was due to a fight had with a peon who wounded Crumbley because the latter was courting the peon's wife. Investi gation has been concluded, but the defendant, Santiago Al- varado, is at large and his whereabouts is not known." It is to be presumed that following the domestic crisis in the life of Alvarado, another bandit was recruited for the light cavalry of the nearest leader. Ten cases are briefly touched upon by Lascurain, who then proceeds: " There is no data in the Foreign Office in the cases of Caradoc Hughes, Thomas Green and W. L. Randell. With reference to ten cases which have been reviewed, four of which occurred prior to the revolution of 1910, three in 191 1 and three in the present year, judicial investigation has been instituted in each case. The culprits have been THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 229 convicted in three cases. In two cases the accused have been released for want of evidence. " Therefore, the attitude of the Mexican Government with reference to the prosecution and punishment of per sons guilty of violence against American citizens is ad justed by law, and it cannot be made a subject for reproach except under the suggestion of eminently partial and ad verse judgment, which is not in keeping with the proofs of amity previously received and with the course followed by the Government of the United States with reference to crimes committed within its territory against Mexican citi zens." Taking up five cases in which the department alleges injustice the Minister says his Government earnestly re jects the imputation that it acted with unfairness, or mani fested hostility toward American interests, and denies the charge made by the Ambassador that local authorities had taken advantage of their position to satisfy their greed and animosity by persecuting and robbing American interests. He says that the vagueness of the charge and its enormity relieve the Mexican Government from taking the point se riously. The civil cases cited in the note are then discussed and Minister Lascurain concludes with the following remarks upon what seems to have been a serious breach of diplo matic etiquette: " I should consider the matter as closed if it were not that the note I have the honor to answer contains, princi pally in its last paragraph, interlined expressions concern ing the personnel of the Mexican Government, which is seldom given such treatment, by naming it as the adminis tration which in Mexico controls business. Such treatment cannot be understood after the American Government has 230 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO officially recognized the Mexican Government as able to legislate, and then addresses it as if it only governed in the City of Mexico. " Without any pretense to unusual consideration the Mexican Government thought it right to expect from a friendly government that the latter would not, as stated in the note referred to, depart from courtesy toward Mexico and seem to deem it necessary to refer to the personnel of its Government, a form probably without precedent to this day 'in diplomatic courtesy and so at variance with the always just, serene and honest spirit of President Taft, a recognized friend of Mexico. " The personnel of the present Government deplores the incident and forgets it, and as homage to its true friend ship toward the American people and in consideration of the high esteem and respect it has for the American Presi dent and its Government it prefers not to give reply to that portion of the note in the terms in which it is written." The text of the American communication was never given to the press, so far as I know. The most extensive publication I have discovered was made by the New York World, February 24, 1913. It would appear that a copy of the American note was not in possession of the World, but that it had a full and intelligent abstract of Lascurain's reply, from which the essentials of the document to which he was responding could be inferred quite easily. The withholding of the American note from the news papers is much to be regretted. I know of nothing that would have been more influential in moderating the senti ments of Americans toward Mexico, in those last months when it was perhaps not yet too late for popular expression to effect some change in the policy of the administration at Washington, whereby the nation might have kept its hands clean in the tragedy which followed, if indeed that THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 231 tragedy could not have been averted. It is not impossible that by a proper course the term of a legitimate govern ment in Mexico might have been prolonged with some re sulting good, and even though its fall was inevitable, per haps that event need not have been attended by the gratifi cation of private vengeances through murder, nor have been followed by so much of loss in Mexico, so many hu miliations to the United States. It is necessary now to consider the causes which were actively operative against Madero, among them being the military conspiracy. Throughout the summer and fall, the corrupting of the Federal army, under the direction of Gen eral Mondragon and his associates, proceeded through a hundred subterranean channels. The results were wide spread, and the control was loose, as is the rule with Mexi can conspiracies. In them we read whole chapters of the Old Testament over again, seeing revolts so sentimental ized that they are as unstable as panics, cleaving along in numerable planes of personal desire; rashness and sudden spasms of timidity mingling in a manner incomprehensible to the colder Anglo Saxon; and always some impatient person trying to make hay of half-grown grass lest another should secure the harvest in the day of its natural ma turity. In the present instance the premature attempt was made under the banner of Felix Diaz, nephew of the ex-dictator. He had been an officer in the army, and chief of police of the Federal district in the days of his exalted uncle. Per sonally, he had little to commend him as a leader. It seems, however, to have been the plan of Mondragon to put him forward, tentatively at least. His vanity had been stimu lated by this real leader of the conspiracy, and by Rodolfo Reyes, son of the lately revolting General Bernardo Reyes, who was then in prison. With a force barely strong enough 232 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO for his first move, Diaz seized Vera Cruz, the principal port of Mexico, on the 16th of October, hoping that his act would be a rising signal for disloyal officers and men throughout the country. Preparations for concerted action on a broad scale had been grotesquely inadequate. No considerable number of the conspirators knew what to do, and even those that were well disposed toward the attempt did nothing of conse quence. The revolt was a fiasco, scarcely more respectable than that of Bernardo Reyes in the north, a year earlier. Diaz surrendered to General Beltran of the Federal army on October 23, and on the 27th was condemned to death by court martial. But Madero was unwilling to order the execution of Diaz, and he remained in the old Spanish prison of San Juan d' Ullua, in Vera Cruz harbor, till Jan uary, 1913, when he was brought to Mexico City. It had been the hope of Rodolfo Reyes that his father's release would result from the revolt of Diaz. The Govern ment was to be overthrown, Bernardo Reyes installed as provisional president, and Felix Diaz elected subsequently under that constitution which all the rebels profess to love so dearly. Many pitfalls were in the path of this ambitious project beyond the point where the disaster actually oc curred. Some of them were revealed by later events; the others are of no importance now. According to accepted Mexican standards Madero gravely erred in refusing to send Diaz and Bernardo Reyes to death. It is possible that his own life might have been prolonged even to this day, and many grievous incidents in his country's history averted. But Madero, as the sequel will abundantly prove, did not awake until the very last moment to the danger that was in the military conspiracy. He fancied that his clemency would win applause and be regarded as an evidence of strength. More influential in THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 233 his own thoughts than any considerations of policy, was a personal distaste for the alternative course, the cold blooded killing of two men. In fact, he gained nothing by this moderation except the approval of a few private persons. The military con spiracy was considerably encouraged; the Cientificos cared no more for Madero's virtues, such as they were, than for the amiable nature of the President's white horse. These men wished him out of the way, and they continued to intrigue against him with a persistency which could not escape attention. Madero was warned often, but in vain. He conducted his own fight very much in the open, and his enemies had no need of spies to find out what he was about. Even when Mondragon moved from Havana to Mexico City no steps were taken to interfere with his maneuvers, nor were any effective measures devised to check the various cabals, political and commercial, whose operations were so plainly visible to a disinterested observer. Contrasts may profitably be drawn between Francisco Madero, plotted against on all sides and ignoring the plot ters, and Porfirio Diaz arresting or mysteriously removing from the light of day those upon whom there fell suspicion of disloyalty. Madero, on his white steed, rode often un attended through the streets where those who wished him harm were the most numerous, while Diaz was always the center of an elaborate system of personal protection, his carriage strongly escorted by his outriding guards; or in the later days he would use two or even three closed auto mobiles, all driven at high speed, so that no stroke of ven geance could be aimed with certainty against the car that really bore him through his capital. Possibly Madero was protected temporarily by his ene mies' confidence that his downfall was at hand. They were playing a strong game and may have been content to wait. CHAPTER XIII BY December i the new Congress had developed an op position which threatened to defeat the Govern ment's plans of finance, and thus to disarrange the whole administrative program. As has been indicated the majority of the new Chamber of Deputies elected in July were Madero men, or Progresistas ; the Senate was adverse to the Government by a small margin, and must be whipped into line on important measures. These con ditions seemed to involve difficulties not essentially insur mountable, but the Government was not prepared for a minority in the Chamber so aggressive as that with which it soon found itself compelled to deal. The most troublesome member of the minority was Querido Moheno, who a year later became Minister of For eign Affairs under President Huerta. Moheno had been elected to the Madero Congress in 1912 as a Progresista or Administration man ; but before his seat in the Chamber was fairly warm he abandoned Madero, flopped to the Inde pendents, and vigorously attacked every Government meas ure. No one charged him with serving the interests of any man but himself: there was a strain of the Irish in Mo- heno's blood which gave him an hereditary right to be " agin the Government." In fact, he was " agin every thing " and he contributed so violent an opposition that on many occasions the sessions of the Chamber were stormy scenes in which orderly legislation could not be carried on, and the spirit of strife within communicated itself to the 234 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 235 streets, causing mobs to assemble alongside the building, where they remained making noisy demonstrations until dispersed by the police. Moheno was undoubtedly his own man, but unconsciously he was performing heroic service for those who schemed to limit Madero's freedom of action in matters of finance. The Minister of Finance, Ernesto Madero, was the butt against which the sarcasm of Moheno and the others was directed. The Minister was not fortunate in his method of presenting his measures; he laid himself open to at tack. He proposed two loans of twenty million pesos each, then doubled the figures, and finally increased the total to one hundred millions. This progression in his calls upon Congress for authorization to borrow money oc curred during the months of December, 1912, and January, 1913, while Miguel Diaz Lombardo was concluding nego tiations with his group of French bankers, and the Finance Minister's course may have been due to uncertainty as to the amount of long time bonds which could be placed. Moheno, however, challenged the Finance Minister's tac tics and his secrecy as to the bankers with whom he was dealing; he questioned the purposes to which the proceeds of the loan were to be applied, and by his boundless versa tility in attack became a leader of the most various factions — the mere hotheads, the little, selfish opportunists, and those that were already marching under orders which hap pened to coincide with some impulse of the trouble-maker's, so that his coat-tails were their ensign for the moment. Moheno's mischief greatly helped to waste the time so precious to the administration. The finance bill was de layed till January 13, when a five per cent, fifty-year loan of one hundred million pesos at a minimum of eighty-five was sanctioned by the Deputies. If the measure had been promptly passed by a vote such as the Government was 236 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO warranted in expecting, by the political balance in the Chamber, the indication of strength would have been val uable, and must have had some influence in the upper house ^despite the intricacy and efficiency of the control which was being exercised in that body by the invisible powers. In fact, the acrimonious debates in the Chamber had aided the Senate leaders charged with the task of obstruction, and they felt confident of their ability to prevent the passage . of a measure really helpful to Madero. **" For three weeks or thereabouts the bill was discussed in committee, where deft manipulation by de la Barra re sulted in having the amount of the loan reduced below the mark of any real utility. Forty million pesos was the sum named in the committee's report submitted in the first week of February, 1913. Action on this report was deadlocked in the open Senate by a vote of twenty to twenty, and there was much criticism of the provisions of the bill. One senator declared that its vagueness was its most taking characteristic, and that it might be construed to authorize indefinite millions of indebtedness with no precise limita tions as to maturity or cost ; and the purposes for which it was asked seemed to have been constructed of guayule from one of the Finance Minister's rubber properties in the North. The struggle between the Government and the Senate was in progress with little gained on either side, when, on the 9th of February, the table was overturned, the lights were extinguished, and the game was ended. The real merits of the contest, so far as it had pro ceeded, are worthy of brief review. In the open forum of the Chamber of Deputies, no reason was observable why the Finance Minister should not have dealt more frankly with the legislators. All the available dirty linen of the Madero regime, and some brought down from earlier days, was publicly aired in the sessions of the Chamber, and there THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 237 need have been no illusion on the part of inquisitive bankers as to the Mexicans' own view of their deteriorated credit. Charges of having deceived bankers with fallacious state ments were freely made in that Congress, and one able statesman of the body likened its ingenuousness to that of the horse trader who painstakingly details the glaring de fects of his own animal. But Ernesto Madero was in combat with more subtle antagonists than any in the Mexican Congress. He was pitting himself against a powerful financial group in Europe, and there was danger in disclosing certain essen tial features of the Government's plan. The Mexican congressional method of bringing the Min isters and legislators face to face in open session follows the European custom and is theoretically sound. Appar ently its purpose is to expose all facts in important affairs before the public eye. But in the Madero Congress, as often in more dignified bodies, facts were of less conse quence than the advantages gained by political tactics, and the grillings of the Finance Minister became a series of political and personal assaults. These led to a vast variety of conjectures in the city. " A big thing is coming off and the outs are trying to break in on it," is the way the situa tion was confidently stated to me by an American who watched the proceedings with interest. Others made their guesses in my presence as to the figures of the division which Ernesto Madero would be forced to make with the obstructionist leaders before his bill would be permitted to pass. Whatever may have been accomplished in private, no outward sign appeared that any one had broken down the Finance Minister's guard. For weeks the loan measures were quarreled over with rough familiarity and sharp chal lenge of motive, but Ernesto Madero kept his mask in posi- 238 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO tion and fought the Chamber and the Senate as best he might. He had referred repeatedly to bankers of London, Ber lin and New York, with great stress on London; he had insisted on latitude in the matter of price as low as 84 or 85, and he had stood firm for the necessity of authorization to borrow on a basis of payment in gold. The truth is that the negotiations being conducted were for a loan of one hundred million pesos from the beginning, that the Minister was not dealing with London, Berlin and New York but with the " Syndicat des Banquiers de Province " in Paris, that the price definitely fixed was 92, and that the fifty year bonds were to be payable in Mexican currency. Doubtless it was the Finance Minister's plan to report the actual placing of the loan on a basis much more favor able than the minimum terms authorized by Congress, and thus to gain for himself and the government the prestige of able financing; and it was evident to those who under stood the real nature of the fight that he was cloaking his movements in mystery so as to minimize the hazard of adverse influences upon his pending negotiations in Paris. But during the tedious passage of his measures through the lower house he was called upon to listen to much offensive reference to himself and his methods ; and the Finance Minister's attitude was supposed, even by impartial on lookers, to imply that the loan affair was a supreme effort to acquire means by which the benefits of power could be bestowed upon the favored. f Moheno's violent speeches in the Chamber and de la / Barra's quiet maneuvers in the Senate were substantially aided, after the first of January by Manuel Calero, who was called home from Washington at that time for con ference with the President. The conference was in fact to impress upon the Ambassador the advantage of dis- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 239 cretion; and Calero, taking mortal offense, resigned from the diplomatic service and toolc his seat in the Senate to which he had been duly elected. By the middle of Janu ary he had publicly burned the bridges which connected I him with the Madero government. He was an interesting figure, worthy of careful obser vation, as he emerged from the cover of his ambassador ship and became an open enemy of the administration under which he had held important posts. He possessed and still enjoys strong backing in the United States and may be marked for preferment in a propitious hour. We learned something of him while he was Madero's Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ambassador Wilson's intimate friend. We know that during the time he was Mexico's Ambassador at Washington the relations between the two governments were marked by constantly lessening cordi ality. When we come to consider his utterances after his return to Mexico, we see a certain logic in this. If Mex ico's interests at Washington and Washington's interests in Mexico were in the hands of men who understood each other and were not well disposed toward Madero, how could cordiality, in those trying times, be maintained? " I feel that the Republic is approaching an abyss of miseries and humiliations," said Calero on January 13 ; and in the same interview he gave as his reasons for re signing his office that he was " not in accord with the poli cies of the Government." These policies he described as " hitting out at random like a blind man with a stick." After two thousand words of discursive and vehement criticism of the Government, and especially of its Vice President, whose influence he certainly exaggerated, Sefior Calero concluded the interview with this prophetic utterance: !""~ " I consider it blindness to work for the downfall of the President, for at the present moment, with Seiior Madero 240 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO deposed from office, there would be no alternative but a military dictatorship of whose disastrous effects we can judge only by what we have read of the last dictatorship Ngf Santa Ana." On February 3, six days before the outbreak in the cap ital, Calero made the most startling speech ever uttered in the Mexican Senate by a man of his prominence. " I lied to the American Government for ten months," he declared, during a discussion of the loan bill. Later in this speech he said : " In the face of the de plorable failure of the public administration of our coun try, all are calling for the fall of the present Government, some through the violent measures of revolution which may overthrow it, others through financial embarrassment. I am of the opinion that those who hold this view do not weigh the terrible consequences which this would have for the country." Senator Calero then attacked various features of the loan. " The truth of the matter," he asserted, " is that the Department of Hacienda (Finance) has not painted the situation as it really is. We should speak the truth though it destroy us. The truth is that the situation is desperate. The truth has not been spoken here. The condition of the country is terrible." The orator's impassioned plea for truth, following so close upon the announcement of his own astonishing achievement in mendacity, drew instant, uncontrollable shouts of laughter from all factions in the Senate, and re lieved the tension which his speech had caused. The Min ister of Finance may have been tempted to take advantage of the situation by intimating that Calero's sins of duplicity had not been committed upon foreign soil alone; but the open Senate was not the place to tell the whole story. " You were an indiscreet Ambassador and you are a bad THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 241 financier," was the opening sentence of Ernesto Madero's reply, and he kept fairly close to the question of the loan throughout his address. There is, however, an interesting story which might not have been too remote from the subject to have figured in Ernesto Madero's address. It is appropriate here. While Calero was Minister of Foreign Relations and Madero was in hard straits after Orozco's defection, a banker of New York wrote a private letter to Francisco Alfaro, a promi nent lawyer of Mexico City, to the effect that overtures had been made to him by friends of Manuel Calero. These overtures, so ran the letter, outlined a method of pro cedure. If the revolutionists of the North could be suit ably encouraged by means of financial backing the Madero government would be placed in a position where prompt action would cause its retirement. And if at the right moment the financial aid were shifted to Calero, Madero's resignation would be forced, and the Minister of Foreign Relations would succeed to the Presidency. Sefior Alfaro who was not friendly to Calero, promptly handed the letter to Gustavo Madero who took it to his brother, the President. A copy was made, and the orig inal was returned to Sefior Alfaro who doubtless still has it. President Madero, unlike his uncle, the Minister of Finance, was a man of directness. He called in his Min ister of Foreign Relations and held a pointed discussion with him over his intimacy with the American Ambassa dor, and the peculiar matter of the letter. Then he deposed him from the Foreign Office and sent him to Washington as Ambassador. At Washington, Sefior Calero for a time was more cau tious in his methods. But toward the close of 19 12 he spoke quite freely to a friend who also was a friend of Henry Clay Pierce, with the result that a letter detailing 242 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO the interesting features of the conversation was sent from Mr. Pierce's office to James Galbraith, manager in Mexico for the Waters-Pierce Oil Company. Mr. Galbraith made the same disposition of this letter that Sefior Alfaro had of the other; he turned it over to Gustavo Madero, and the result was the calling home of Ambassador Calero for the conference with President Madero which was fol lowed by Calero's resignation. The employment of Calero as Ambassador to the United States after such a scene with the President as that which followed the disclosures by Sefior Alfaro, seems a tech nical error to those who do not understand Mexico's lack of able men. Calero was certainly one of the ablest, and in many ways the best equipped for the work in Washing ton. He could not be ignored, and Madero did not wish him to be in the Senate. As Ambassador he could be called to account, but as a Senator he was above the law. His speeches hurt Madero but made few friends for the speaker. Like Moheno in his smaller belligerence in the Chamber, Calero in the Senate and elsewhere was his own man; but that his utterances helped the aims of the in triguers there is no doubt. Manuel Calero had been closely identified with the Cien tificos and was an intimate friend of Pablo Macedo, a leading spirit of the circle. He was also counsel for the Huasteca Petroleum Company, and the Mexican Petroleum Company, concerns well placed in the Tampico fields and headed by E. L. Doheny of Los Angeles. After the fall of Diaz, Calero believed that he himself was better fitted than any other man to rule Mexico, and was greatly vexed at the delay he experienced in realizing his ambition. Many of the statements he made in the Senate, on Feb ruary 3, were founded on facts. Conditions were bad in Mexico and the Madero Government was making sad THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 243 blunders. Also the loan matter, as previously stated, had not been presented with sufficient clearness to inspire con fidence. Calero struck on the secret of Mexico's internal disorders when, in that speech he demanded, " How is it possible that while the rebels are continually routed by troops of the line and the rurales, the revolution does not end ? How is it that peace is not restored ? " He asked this question with confidence because he knew the, answer, and knew that none within hearing would give it voice. Hundreds of influential men in Mexico were secretly pro moting the disorders. To stop banditry it seemed necessary to shoot Mexico into small pieces as Diaz had done in the early eighties. But the fact is that peace in Mexico was in a fairer way to be restored at the time Calero asked that question, than ever before in the Madero rule, for a bargain had been struck with Zapata. The agreement had been made some weeks previously, and was to go into effect as soon as the loan measure should have been put through. This bar gain with Zapata, in its terms and in the secret story of its consummation, bordered on the fantastic. Incredible as this may seem, it was made in the castle at Chepultepec one night in mid December. Emiliano Zapata, no less, was a guest of the President in that historic castle, and on that night Madero effected a trade with the outlaw chief for the pacification of the state of Morelos, and of all the terri tory south of the capital which made up Zapata's field of operations. By the terms of this treaty, which if Madero had re mained in power would have proved one of the most im portant incidents of his rule, a new governor was to be named for the state of Morelos in the person of Don Miguel Olivares. Zapata was to be Jefe de Armes, or chief in command of the forces of that section. One hun- 244 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO dred and fifty thousand pesos were to be distributed among Zapata's men who were then to be formed into a govern ment body, under Zapata himself, to maintain order. No money was to be paid Zapata ; he had already enriched him self in his own line of business which was banditry. The undertaking also included the turning over of cer tain lands to persons who had been impoverished by the Sur vey Law of 1884. Rather than attempt to accomplish this by harsh government measures, Madero intended to pur chase the properties from the Spanish holders then in possession. This he could not well do until the treasury was replenished by means of the new loan. The incidents and the terms of this treaty, especially the fact that Zapata was at any time in conference with Presi dent Madero in Mexico City or elsewhere, have been stren uously and specifically denied. But the facts are as stated and were quite in order with precedents established by Porfirio Diaz. With Zapata on the government side, the bandit leaders of the South, Genevevo de la O., Zalgada, Miranda and the others, undoubtedly would suspend activity. The bandits of the North also would be disheartened by Zapata's " reformation," and progress toward peaceful conditions would be rapid, notwithstanding the influences at work to encourage defiance of law and government. With this vital matter and so many others hanging upon the floating of the big loan, the Government's anxiety to complete formalities was intense ; but the uses to which some of the funds were to be put must be kept secret. Newspaper exploitation of banditry and rebellion was a definite aid to the development of disorder and the mold ing of opinion adverse to Madero in Mexico and in the United States ; it fed the vanity of bandits and it supported the pessimism of Washington. In Mexico City it was a THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 245 poor day for news when a half dozen " scare heads " were not built in anti-government papers over reports of real or imaginary outrages. From border towns and from Mexico City similar items, always exaggerated, sometimes created from nothing, were despatched through regular press serv ice and by special correspondents to newspapers in the United States. Special correspondents and Association men were not slow to catch the drift ; Mexican matter, un less highly spiced with horror, would not be worth the tolls. The larger newspapers were receiving too much, and editors of every grade on the staff were wearying of the subject. The general tenor of instructions to correspondents on the spot was that only matter of a striking character was desired. The correspondent is a business man and the editor is his customer. The failure of Madero, the increasing dis orders, and the outrages upon Americans were the goods most in demand, and they were sent to market. No well-informed person can read to-day the files of that time, and not perceive that the result of the influences described was a very serious misrepresentation. The Madero Government controlled three newspapers in Mexico City toward the close of 1912 ; one it had had from the de la Barra time, another it acquired in November, 191 1, and the third was bought by friends of the Govern ment about a year later. The first, El Nueva Era, was Gustavo's venture, with Sanchez Azcona, Madero's private secretary, as nominal owner. In this newspaper, which was presently capitalized at a considerable sum, many prominent men were invited to invest. Nothing could have been in worse taste than this, for among the stockholders of El Nueva Era were many Cientificos. The paper car ried no influence whatever; its circulation averaged about 10,000. 246 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO The second newspaper picked up by the Government was El Diario which had a circulation of about 8,000 and was tottering on the edge of the grave when the Government by undertaking to pay the newspaper's monthly deficit, se cured the doubtful return of its editorial support. Under these conditions its circulation did not increase; no one believed anything that appeared in its columns. Finally the Maderos bought control of Mexico's leading newspaper El Imparcial which had been the Government organ under Diaz. Upon its staff were men of real abil ity, and the new owners were enabled to put forward their version of current events in a better manner than before, but from the moment when El Imparcial became a govern ment paper it lost prestige; its circulation declined from the 90,000 of its best days ; and its advertising fell off be cause the best buyers of Mexico ceased to read it. I count the methods of the Maderos with the press of Mexico City among their vital blunders. In the beginning of the de la Barra regime the announcement of freedom to the press and no subsidies was made. In June, 1911, I called upon Finance Minister Madero and congratulated him on this declaration. 1 told him that I was organizing a newspaper enterprise on the strength of it, and with a clear field would try to help make Mexico's free press an honor to the country. Ernesto Madero is one of the most successful listeners I have ever addressed. He sat that day on the red sofa in the inner office of the Finance Department — which Liman tour had fitted up a la Touraine — and with a faultless, infinitely patient courtesy permitted me to expound the benefits of independent journalism. He was pitying me, but I had no suspicion of it, so deeply intent he seemed upon my words. Even when he asked me what concessions I desired, I THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 247 did not realize that he was saying to himself : " This graft ing Gringo has a smooth tongue, but let us come to the point, if there is one." I assured him that I had no concessions to ask for, but only a clear field for an independent newspaper. I wished to erect my building on an unoccupied lot owned by the Government, and would like a fair rental to be named. I hoped also that when my telegraph tolls should exceed 2500 pesos a month, a special rate would be made. " You shall have them all," he declared, and his youthful, handsome face beamed with what I took to be enthusiasm. " I am in full sympathy with your views. Come and see me when you will." I know now that I had not impressed him ; that his agree able interest was compounded of a natural suavity and a politic preference for my good will. He got it, and has never lost it. But I did not get the land that has been re ferred to, because a brother of President de la Barra de manded 8,000 pesos from my builder for " expenses," and I declined to pay. Nor was the special rate on press matter over Government wires ever granted to me, though the tolls that I paid, so they said at the Department of Communi cations, exceeded those of all the other newspapers of Mex ico City combined. And the clear field is best described by the suggestion made one day to my Board of Directors that a " vacation " be voted to the American manager, my self. The intrusion of the Government into the newspaper field of Mexico by its purchase of El Imparcial spurred the opposition press to extremes of attack and caused Presi dent Madero to employ repressive measures which he justi fied in a public speech early in December, 1912. This was the signal for renewed hostilities. From that moment no quarter was granted in the war waged by the newspapers 248 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO inimical to the Government. Attack and defense were nearly equal in the externals of dishonesty, but there was a hidden truth on one side, in the sincere convictions of the President, while upon the other there was nothing so re spectable. Very moderate discernment only was required to see through the turgid rhetoric to the selfish interests behind. El Manana on December 3 in an article of interminable sentences set forth the attitude of the press toward Madero m these words : " The press says to you day after day, Mr. Madero, that you have not the qualifications which are necessary for the high position which you occupy, and that the fall of the fatherland is the consequence. The press which defends you runs to license, but it can hardly be called the Mexican press since it is nothing but a Maderista press." To read this rightly one must know that it ex presses the personal feelings of the Cientifico Deputy, Oliguibel. In these crowded months while the disturbing elements which I have striven to describe were at work in Congress, and throughout the country, and beyond its borders, Presi dent Madero regained the optimism which had always been characteristic of him, and had been for only a little while disturbed. The nervous irritation which had afflicted him in the days of the Orozco rebellion seemed to have disap peared. To what extent he wilfully deluded himself after the manner of the various faith-cure cults, I am uncertain, but the result was very similar to their achievements even in the point of its ultimate fatality. He gained a more assured and cheerful attitude which had a value when he appeared in public, but he suffered the inevitable loss in judgment and in power to think honestly. It became more difficult than before to convince him by the plainest evi dence against a preconceived opinion. He had posted a THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 249 deaf and blind sentry at the gateway of his life to cry " All's well," and there were times when he would hear no other voice. It was impossible to make him take a reasonable view of the conspiracy within the army as an existing thing, but he dealt with it in the abstract when he addressed the graduates of the Chepultepec Military Academy, warning them that army men must not take part in politics. If he had followed up his own idea by practical investigation of the politics inside the army at that moment, or had coun tenanced the efforts made in that direction by some of his advisers, excellent results might have followed. He spoke to the foreign diplomats with calm assurance, saying that if the nationals of their countries had suf fered, they should accept their share of the common ills of the country to which they had come, and should be the more patient now, because in the past they had been bene fitted. The crisis through which the country was passing was nearly over. It had been a wonderful awakening, and general prosperity would promptly ensue. And he was speaking the plain truth as he saw it. Point by point he had seemed to defeat his enemies. The meas ures he had taken he felt sure would give him the upper hand of banditry. The matter of the loan would be thrashed out in Congress and presently would be carried through. Plots were idle gossip, and he declined to give his time to nonsense. The old Cientifico elements were arrayed against him, of course, but they were powerless. The United States was not so friendly as he could wish, but Mexico would survive its neighbor's unkindness, and the situation would improve. There was much visible support for these opinions, but unhappily the President would not see the other side of the picture. Those who pointed to details unwelcome to an 250 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO optimist were sometimes laughed at and sometimes scolded. The President exercised, in this period, a more peremptory command over his assistants in the Government, and the members of his family seemed to be overawed by him at times — a strange thing, for he was at heart so gentle and so amiable. In the early part of December a slight effect for good was produced by the remarks upon Mexico in the annual message of President Taft to Congress, laid before the two houses on the 3rd. I quote as follows: " For two years revolution and counter-revolution have distraught the neighboring republic of Mexico. Brigandage has involved a great deal of depredation upon foreign interests. There have constantly recurred questions of extreme delicacy. On several occasions very difficult situations have arisen on our frontier. Throughout this trying period, the policy of the United States has been one of patient non-intervention, stead fast recognition of constituted authority in the neigh boring nation, and the exertion of every effort to care for American interests. " I profoundly hope that the Mexican nation may soon resume the path of order, prosperity and progress. To that nation in its sore troubles, the sympathetic friendship of the United States has been demonstrated to a high degree. There were in Mexico at the begin ning of the revolution some thirty or forty thousand American citizens engaged in enterprises contributing greatly to the prosperity of that republic and also bene fiting the important trade between the two countries. " The investment of American capital in Mexico has been estimated at $1,000,000,000. The responsibility of endeavoring to safeguard those interests and the dangers inseparable from propinquity to so turbulent a situation have been great, but I am happy to have been able to adhere to the policy above outlined — a policy which I hope may soon be justified by the complete THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 251 success of the Mexican people in regaining the blessings of peace and order." Granting the sincerity of these expressions one can but deplore the existence of the something which prevented happier results than have been placed upon the record. " Your President means well toward us," said Foreign Min ister Lascurain to me, " but he is misled by others." The visit of " Good old Peter " to the United States in dicated greater anxiety over the relations with Washing ton than any member of Madero's cabinet would admit. He was said to have gone to New York on private business but it was quite well understood that he was maneuvering to be officially received at Washington. The sharp retort of the preceding April which had marked Lascurain's debut as a Mexican statesman, and his later achievement in con troversial eloquence were not to be readily forgiven, how ever, and no official notice was taken of his presence in the country until he was about to return. Meanwhile there were persistent rumors of more strained relations between the two countries. The press agents of the trouble-makers sweated at their task. Their masters had detected a spirit of forbearance in President Taft's message, and were de termined to drown in renewed clamor of discord any voice that spoke of peace. Ambassador Wilson had been called over from Mexico City; it was reported that he would have something very like an ultimatum in his pocket when he should return to Mexico. Associated Press despatches under date of December 20 described at length Washington's determina tion to issue a " nearly unanswerable " demand upon Mex ico. These despatches carrying four-column headlines were printed the following morning in the dailies of Mexico City. The next day the headlines were expanded to five columns 252 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO over another Associated Press despatch stating that " the American note is expected to be of historic importance as marking a distinct crisis between the two countries." But the note was not sent. Possibly the Christmas sea son of good will to men may have exerted its influence upon President Taft and Secretary Knox; but I am more inclined to believe that they were dissuaded by the weak ness of the case against Mexico as presented by Ambassa dor Wilson. Be that as it may, there was a Christmas change of heart in regard to Pedro Lascurain, and he was called to Washington, where he talked with President Taft on January 2, and with Secretary Knox on the following day. They must have gained important truths from this moderate, sincere man, full of accurate knowledge of his country. The result, I am sure, was good; the wonder is that it was not decisive, that it did not lead to the adoption of a proper course. Lascurain's clear conception of American indifference and the attitude of the American Government, as well as the duty of Mexicans at that time, are disclosed in the inter view he gave out on January 16, after his return to Mexico City. " The great mass of the American people," he said, " has so far taken no interest in the affairs of Mexico. " Certain political elements interested in an international conflict are the only ones trying to foment a state of feeling adverse to Mexico. Fortunately little has been accom plished as yet. " The American Government and the classes which direct it, will be able to maintain the policy against intervention so long as the events in Mexico do not strengthen those who oppose this policy. For this reason the Mexican peo ple should take serious thought on the actual situation and, inspired by the same patriotism which would make them THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 253 shed all their blood in the event of an international war, should try by all means at their disposal to restore order, pursuing those who break it until complete peace is ob tained. They may then take up serenely the social and economic problems which can never be solved by armed strength. They should do this because it is more meri torious to be able to govern oneself as a nation than to stand face to face with a foreign enemy." The words of Pedro Lascurain are especially worthy of quotation because he was the best friend of Americans in Madero's cabinet, and because he was a member of that cabinet for patriotic reasons only. He had accepted the portfolio of state at a time when the Government seemed doomed ; in doing this he jeopardized his personal standing in Mexico. Never an active Maderista he was under no obligation to undertake what, in the beginning of April, 1912, seemed a sacrifice of himself in a very doubtful cause. But in January, 1913, when this interview was printed he was confident that Madero would succeed. If the benefits of his clear vision had been utilized beyond his own De partment of State in the management of local Mexican affairs, the evil which befell Madero might have been averted. There was another man whose vigilance would have proved a safeguard to the President if his warnings had been heeded; that man was his brother, Gustavo. Since the statement of the practical part he took in organizing and financing the revolution of 1910-11 he has had scant attention in these pages. This is not because of lack of activity on his part, but because of the necessity for cau tion, lest references to him should seem 'to be unfair ; for in all that puzzling Madero regime no figure is more dif ficult to place with accuracy. Advertised the world over as the arch grafter of the 254 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO period, and connected in local gossip with endless schemes for exploiting Government privileges, Gustavo Madero's name is spoken as that of the evil genius of his brother's rule; yet I know of nothing in which he greatly profited, no Government patronage in which he held a share. He may have been willing enough to participate in deals for Government supplies, but if so there must have been more able competitors, for very few of the good things fell to him. Like the unlucky boy in school he was nearest at hand when the teacher turned around, but the other boy had the apple. That Gustavo was heavily in debt when his enemies killed him is the best proof that others made the profits which the public believed had gone to him. The other Maderos, especially those of the elder genera tion, managed matters more discreetly and with greater success. A person named Goodman in Mexico City sup plied Government uniforms; he made them from cloth which came from Madero mills. A man named Jesus Aguilar carried on an armoria in Monterrey. He sold arms of various kinds to the Government. He was a nephew of Francisco Madero, Senior. A man named Antonio Zirion also furnished arms and other needful things. He was a son-in-law of Francisco Madero, Senior. I wish to state in this connection that I can see no im propriety in these transactions, and I have never heard it charged that undue profits were made. It is certain that Gustavo had no share of them. He was a busy man, nevertheless. He was the active manager of the Progresista Party which used the four- story building at Number 75 Avenida Juarez as its head quarters. The more private political affairs of the party were arranged at an office Gustavo maintained in his own home in Calle Londres, Number 14, just off Calle Berlin. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 255 He was elected a Deputy in July, 1912, and held a seat in the noisy Madero Congress in which Moheno baited the Minister of Finance, attacked the President, lamented the sad condition of the country, and made himself generally useful — to those architects of ruin whose work the world has since contemplated with horror. Gustavo was a favorite mark for Moheno's oratory. When no more convenient matter could be 'brought up for discussion, he demanded an accounting for the 700,000 pesos which Gustavo had received in June, 191 1. It was Gustavo's business to steer political detail, maintain the equilibrium of the Chamber, watch the opposition, and keep a cool head. Every hour in the day he was sought by dozens of men with axes to grind or tales of distress to unfold. Unceasing demands for money were made upon him, the general impression being that the contents of the national treasury was at his disposal. Gustavo was the one man ever watchful of the under mining movements that were being engineered through Cientifico and military channels, but his reports to the President of suspicious circumstances fell on the deaf ears of the optimist. Even when Mondragon and the arch Cientifico, Rosenando Pineda, came back to Mexico, the President could not be made to perceive the significance of their return. Gustavo insisted that these men meant mis chief, and were actively plotting to set it afoot. In December, 1912, Gustavo found his position almost intolerable. In some respects the President was what New England people used to call " a trial " to his intimates. He was accused of instability, not without reason. A series of his judgments carefully reviewed would usually show how innocent he was of that consistency which is the vice of fools. If he saw the truth at noon, he would not fail to proclaim it and insist upon it as a rule of conduct, 256 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO though he had pledged himself to the opposite extreme of error over the morning coffee. This virtue was beyond the appreciation of the practical Gustavo who saw nothing in it except that Francisco did not keep his word, a defect which made Gustavo's task as political manager extremely difficult. Yet he was loyal to his brother and had faith in his essential goodness, wherefore it was natural that he should always be relying just once more upon the President's promise, expressed perhaps in a form of words which seemed to be an author ization to proceed with certain negotiations. But in the few days or hours necessary for the completion of the ar rangements, Francisco would have progressed to a new position from which no argument could drive him back to where he had stood before. It would be necessary, therefore, for Gustavo to recall some part of his pledges or by the exercise of ingenuity devise a means to content the men on the other side of the bargain. Thus he was made to seem the unstable one, to the unjust detriment of his reputation. His father at this time was not in harmony with him on all points, and often interfered to prevent him from bringing the President to terms. Besides, there were, of course, a great number of jealous politicians who were working to destroy his power, much of which was mythical. He became a convenient scapegoat upon whose back were fastened many sins of others. He was too shrewd to entertain illusions as to his status in the capital. One day he asked a friend of his, an American, what was the general estimate of his character. Doubtless he had already answered the question himself, but he desired to hear the opinion of this man in whose judgment and frankness he reposed especial confidence. ".You are called a damned thief," was the blunt reply. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 257 Gustavo was silent for some moments, and then asked: " What do you advise ? " " I advise you to leave Mexico and be gone two years," said his friend earnestly. And no less earnestly Gustavo answered : " You are right. I can accomplish nothing here but discredit for my self. Let them run the thing their own way." Without fully disclosing his intention, he secured per mission to visit Japan to carry the thanks of Mexico to the Emperor for his courtesies during the Centennial of 1910. Early in December it was announced that Gustavo would soon depart. But there were many matters for him to arrange and no date was set for his journey, until January, when February 19 was named. As fate willed it, this was the day upon which he was shot to death. About half past four in the afternoon of the 4th of Feb ruary, Gustavo Madero was at his home, Number 14, Calle Londres, in the room that was his office which overlooked the street. By a front window stood an American friend. Gustavo's automobile was at the curb, and standing a few steps away were two men. One was a colonel of the Mexi can army in civilian dress, and the other a young Mexican named Saldana who had been doorkeeper for Gustavo Madero, but had been discharged for exacting fees from men who wished to see him. Saldana had been endeavoring to secure entrance to the house, but had been excluded by the attendant; and now he made a gesture so despairing that it attracted the atten tion of the American who, upon an impulse, went out and asked the men what they desired. Saldafia's companion pleaded for an interview with Gustavo, and the American returned to lay the request before him. Gustavo refused. " These fellows all want money," he said. (It must be understood that he was a kind of politi- 258 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO cal boss, subject to the importunities which the position entails.) But the American had been impressed by something un usual in the manner of the colonel, and he urged upon Gustavo the wisdom of seeing him. " You can never be positive, old man," he said. " This fellow has a story to tell and it may be worth the price." " Oh, well," said Gustavo ; " I'll see him." For some minutes Gustavo and the colonel conversed in lowered tones, but the American by the window heard the officer's story which was really pitiful, and heard also the plea for one hundred pesos at the end. " A hundred won't do you much good, Colonel," said Gustavo, pulling out some money from his pocket. " Take five hundred, and get on your feet." The colonel, almost speechless with genuine gratitude, made the somewhat ridiculous exit which seems inevitable on such occasions, but he remained near the house; and a few minutes later when Gustavo and his friend had gone out, and were about to board the automobile, the officer came toward them. He was very pale as he begged Gus tavo for five minutes more in private. Gustavo was late for an appointment at his office on Avenida Juarez, but the look on the colonel's face was compelling, and he led the way into the house leaving the American seated in the car. Ten, twenty minutes, half an hour, passed and the men did not return. When at last they appeared the colonel went slowly down the street and Gustavo came to the side of the car. The color was all out of his face, and every sign of agitation which is permissible to a gentleman was plainly to be seen. He gave his friend merely a glance and turned to the chauffeur whom he addressed in a low tone, yet with such a mortal thrill in it that the man instinctively THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 259 drew his head down between his shoulders, as if dodging a blow. " Chepultepec," said Gustavo, " and drive like hell." Then he took his seat, and the car leaped ahead into the eye of the setting sun. Gustavo opened his left hand in which was a crumpled paper. The American took it and read a list of names. Perceiving that nearly all of them were men high in the army, he understood in part the meaning of the strange thing that had happened. He did not wonder that Gustavo had been stricken with terror. This must be a roster of chief officers in the military con spiracy, and if it was authentic it spelled ruin, for they could control by far the greater part of the troops then in the Federal District. The American leaned forward and spoke to the chauf feur: " Slow down," he said. " Keep to a usual speed." At this Gustavo nodded approvingly. Under the circum stances it would not do for him to burn the dust on his way to see the President. The spectacle might set tongues wag ging. With his finger he tapped the paper which his friend still held. " There are twenty-two of them," said he, " but one name doesn't count. The colonel's comes off." " Get the tragedy out of your face, if you can," said the American. " And don't forget to return the salute of those fellows," he added, as the car swung around the acute angle from Calle Londres to Insurgentes, and they saw a patrol of mounted police just ahead. Gustavo managed the salute very well, and a smile be sides. And he sat there smiling like a galvanized corpse, staring straight ahead, and saying never a word while they bowled into the wide Paseo de la Reforma and along it. Several cars were encountered on the way, among them 26o THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO that of Pimentel, a corporation-jobbing Cientifico ; and there were other men in the procession who had a keen eye for Gustavo as he passed, and could not have failed to note undue haste on his part. The car rolled through the Chepultepec gates, to the castle's porte cochere. Gustavo took the list of traitors from the American's hand, and went up to see the man whom they were plotting to depose. A very long hour the American waited for Gustavo. When he came, his face was not pale; it was flushed with the excitement of futile contention. " Pancho wouldn't believe it ; he laughed at me," was all he had to say till the men were back in town again, with four walls around them, and the doors well locked. CHAPTER XIV IT must not be imagined that Gustavo Madero had sought the President merely to communicate his fears. He was a man of action, the practical politician of the family. His gifts and experience explain why he believed the colonel's story, instead of rejecting it because of the deplorable revelation of the man's character. Gustavo saw nothing incredible in what had occurred — that this fellow should come whining for money to one whom he was con spiring to destroy, and should then upon an impulse turn about and betray the other party from whose members he had obtained no help in his distress. Human nature in the raw will sometimes look like that. The colonel had convinced Gustavo that the list was authentic, that the men whose names appeared upon it — with one exception, still doubtful as was indicated by a question mark — had pledged themselves for the overthrow of the Government. The date set was March 16. Two of the names were of men then in prison, another was that of a civilian. The officers included could probably control about 12,000 troops, a great majority of the garrisons in and near the capital. Even the commandant of the palace guard stood ready to deliver up the headquarters of the Government at the demand of the conspirators. Eight men of the twenty-two were of commanding im portance; the others were followers. The eight were: General Mondragon — On retired list. Active organizer of the conspiracy. 261 262 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO Rodolfo Reyes — Lawyer. Counsel and guide of Felix Diaz. General Felix Diaz — Confined in the penitentiary in Mexico City under suspended sentence of death for treason. General Bernardo Reyes — Father of Rodolfo. Confined in Santiago barracks in Mexico City under suspended sen tence of death for treason. General Blanquet — In active command of 4,000 troops of all branches. Headquarters at Toluca, capital of the State of Mexico, 46 miles distant from Mexico City. General Huerta ( ?) — Not in active service. Had not positively agreed to join the revolt. General Beltran — The man who " captured" Felix Diaz at Vera Cruz in October, 1912. At this time commanding infantry at Tacubaya, a suburb five miles from the National Palace. General Navarette — Commanding artillery at Tacubaya. Gustavo perceived that in order to break up the con spiracy it would be necessary to deal effectively with the eight men noted. The thing was not impossible, provided that the President would authorize vigorous measures. Felix Diaz and Bernardo Reyes already were in close con finement. Blanquet, Beltran and Navarette could be trans ferred to distant posts, widely separated. General Huerta, who for reasons not quite clear, had given only a qualified pledge to join the plotters, could be, as had previously been suggested, sent abroad to study military tactics. Of the eight there remained but General Mondragon and Rodolfo Reyes who might be arrested ; or, if the President was dis inclined to take such a step they could be placed under such close surveillance that they would voluntarily leave Mexico. General Villar, ranking officer in the capital, and General Figueroa, Chief of the Federal District police, were faith ful; so was General Felipe Angeles in command of troops GUSTAVO MADERO Brother of President Madero; one of tlie most conspicu ous men of the Madero regime, though he held no office except that of deputy in the Congress elected in July, 1012. Murdered Feb. 10, 101:;. Banco Franco -Espakiiil Xj^ju/j,/ uc ret' f/v (?¦*'("' Ml A i s>'nns it SUCCURSALE. OH PARES ,u..C/'i....,-.,, CHF.MIN DE FEB MEIICAIK DU CEBTRE (Ferrocarril Mexicano del Centro) Capital-Actlone: $ 3.000,000'C ,-500,000 francs) C0KSEIL D' ADMINISTRATION Don Francisco Madero, Administrateur de la Banque Centrals Mexicaine (1), President; - Rafael Hernandez, Depute au Congres de l'Union, Administrateur de la Banque Cantrale Mexicaine (l), Vice-President; ( ( ( - Gustavo A. Madero, Industrial a Monterrey, Administrateur-Delegue - Bodolfo J. Garcia Directeur-Gerent de la Banque de Nuevo Leon (2), Administrateur; - Alfonso Madero, Industrial a Monterrey, Administrateur; - Rafael P. Urbina, Secretaire. Letterhead of Henri Kochette's banking house in Paris, which advanced $375,000 to Gustavo Madero on account of an underwriting of bonds of his proposed railroad across the State of Zacatecas. This money Madero used to finance the revolution. Heading of stock-subscription form used by Gustavo Madero in the attempt to float his railway corporation. His fellow directors were not implicated in his misuse of the funds. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 263 at Cuernavaca, only seventy-five miles away. With An geles placed in command at Tacubaya the beginning of a dependable military protection for the capital would be formed. But all these precautions depended for their exe cution upon the President; and it may have been chiefly a foreknowledge of what his brother would do in this great crisis which had shaken the courage of Gustavo for the moment. This foreboding had been abundantly justified, for the President had refused to take the matter seriously. The list, so he assured Gustavo, had been prepared for sale, and Gustavo had bought it. To base any stern procedure upon such evidence would be to make the Government ridiculous, and invite endless complications. The " not certain " after Huerta's name stamped the list as spurious, for Huerta in reality, was the officer most likely to be disloyal. He was not even taking the trouble to hide his sentiments from the public; within a fortnight he had spoken bitterly of his removal from command of the northern army. Huerta, with the unclosed gap in his vouchers staring him in the face, holding back against a general movement of this char acter? It was too absurd to consider. Blanquet and Beltran, the President urged, had proved their loyalty beyond all question. Navarette was a creature of Mondragon, but would not be drawn into a move which would discredit the army. The whole thing was preposter ous, and Gustavo might be better employed than in listen ing to such tales from men who wanted to exchange them for money. Mondragon was a malcontent and a plotter, as everybody knew. But what of it? For an hour Gustavo had begged for some action to be taken, but the stubborn over-confidence of the President had been proof against any argument. Not for a moment could Francisco Madero see himself as others — and espe- 264 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO cially the old Diaz officers of the army — saw him. In his own view he was Mexico ; disloyalty to him was treason. In the view of Porfirista army officers, as well as many others, he was an intruder who was making trouble, and to force him out would be a patriotic act. This was Mondra- gon's doctrine which he had disseminated through the army ; it was Pineda's doctrine which had been made the creed of Cientificos, hacendados and business men of all nations. Gustavo understood the situation but he was helpless; he was dealing with a convinced optimist who would not listen to reason. Far into the night Gustavo and his American friend dis cussed the affair in all its bearings, but they were unable to devise any plan which could be carried out without the President's authorization. The only course open to Gus tavo was to fortify himself with more information in the vain hope that he could succeed in convincing his brother. During the remainder of that week Gustavo was a busy man. He was here, there, and everywhere in the city and its suburbs; but the chief result seems to have been the alarming of the conspirators. His enemies were watching him. Why was he visiting every day the barracks at Tacubaya and the government ammunition works at Santa Fe? He had not been to either place for months. What caused this sudden activity? ' His uncle, the Finance Minister, and his cousin, the Minister of Gobernacion, were inclined to view the warn ing more seriously than the President was, but they were busy men just then in their own departments. The Finance Minister was fighting for his loan measures in the Senate against Calero and the hold-over Porfiristas cleverly mar shalled in opposition by de la Barra. The Minister of Gobernacion in whose department were all dealings with the Governors of the States, and control of the entire sys- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 265 tem of rurales (rural guards) was actively engaged in com bating Cientifico activity over the broad area of the repub lic. There was no time during those vital days from the 4th to the 9th of February, for close attention to a plot which was not scheduled to mature until March 16. These reasons for lack of activity by officials of the cab inet seem inadequate, but it must be remembered that the President's firm stand against recognition of this or any other conspiracy was a strong deterrent. So Gustavo was without aid. Even the cooperation of the faithful chief of police could not be sought, for President Madero had expressly prohibited it. The historical value of the warning which Gustavo re ceived consists, however, not so much in its unheeded possi bilities of salvation, as in the light which the names on the list shed upon subsequent events. Singularly vivid is this disclosure; it stamps the deadly combat that raged for ten days in the heart of Mexico City as wanton slaughter, as a terrorizing exhibit of destructive forces to mark the end of Maderism and destroy the appetite of the people for a voice in their Government. The colonel had warned Gustavo that the word for ac tion might be spoken at almost any moment, but he was somewhat astray in the statement that plans were nearly complete; there were several conflicting elements in that singular conspiracy which then had not been fully recon ciled. Gustavo's constant moving about on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday of that week, the 5th, 6th and 7th of February, had resulted in scaring the leaders of the plot, but it also inspired the chief organizer to undertake a move ment which in effect, was a plot within a plot. As has been disclosed already, the plan had been that when Madero and his Vice President should have been forced out, General Bernardo Reyes should become Pro- 266 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO visional President, and hold office until Felix Diaz could be elected constitutional President for what remained of the six year term begun by Porfirio Diaz in December, 1910. Mondragon himself was to be Minister of War, Rodolfo Reyes, Minister of Justice, and Victoriano Huerta, Com mander in Chief of the military forces. The other offi cers in the conspiracy were to be advanced in rank and pay. General Fluerta had not agreed to this arrangement. He did not approve of Bernardo Reyes as Provisional Presi dent because Reyes had been disloyal to Porfirio Diaz whom Huerta greatly admired, and whom he had personally es corted to Vera Cruz when the Dictator deparfed from the capital; also, he believed in common with others, that Ber nardo Reyes had shown himself deficient in stamina when, having defied Diaz, he meekly accepted the order to study military methods in Europe. Huerta did not approve of Felix Diaz for President at any time because he thought him lacking in the necessary qualities. Porfirio Diaz, who greatly desired to perpetuate the Diaz name in Mexico's Government, had never consid ered his nephew as a possible successor. Felix Diaz was a man to take orders, not to originate and issue them. So Huerta, disapproving of these arrangements planned by Mondragon, had not as yet consented to become actively concerned in the movement. Just what he would approve had not been stated in words, but subsequent history has made it sufficiently clear. Manuel Mondragon believed that his own best interests would be served by the stated program; he believed this because he knew that both Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz would be subject to his adroit manipulations. He knew, of course, that Rodolfo Reyes had achieved a mental ascendency over Felix Diaz, but he was confident of his THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 267 own ability to cope with Rodolfo when the time should come. The stir in the conspirators' ranks which came with the suspicion that Gustavo Madero had learned something of the plot gave Mondragon an opening. If Gustavo had acquired any definite information, the date, March 16, must be part of it, and he would not be expecting the out break for several weeks. By immediate action, the Gov ernment would be taken by surprise and Reyes would be seated. Mondragon would then be in better position to deal with General Huerta. In this plan of operation the insurgent force at the beginning would be small, but with all the men in active command about the capital already committed to the main features of his program, Mondra gon was confident that no really hostile opposition would be met. On the other hand, if action should be delayed for even a week, wholesale arrests might be made and the elaborately planned conspiracy come to an ignominious end. That many friendly eyes were upon his movements Mon dragon was well assured, though none but his intimates knew the details of his plan. This knowledge gave him confidence. All through Mexico, among men of property, word had quietly been passed that something of importance was brewing, and in every state the Cientifico claque was ready to applaud any successful enterprise to overthrow the hated Madero rule. The military plotter knew that opportunity to do this could not rise from the ashes of a present defeat. Madero was more strongly entrenched than the world had been per mitted to believe. His financial plan was being thwarted by a few votes in the Senate: his opponents feared daily that some deal would carry the measure through, and put one hundred million pesos in the treasury. With these ample funds Madero could make friends out of enemies, 268 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO provide employment for the idle, arrange agrarian schemes for the peons he professed to love, and influence public opinion in the United States and Europe. The truth about the revival of business during the recent months had been kept from the world by means not wholly mysterious to Mondragon, yet he marvelled at the success achieved by those who managed the publicity for the solid men. The revenues of the Government for the six months to December 31, 1912, were seventy million pesos, twelve millions more than for any other six months in Mexico's history. Could the world be humbugged indefinitely into believing that all news from Mexico was bad news ? Mondragon was convinced that this systematic black guarding of Madero's government could not be continued successfully after the loan bill should be passed. He did not arrive at this decision all by himself. Pineda helped him to see it, so did Calero and de la Barra. These men may not have known the details of Mondragon's plan, but they did know very well indeed that Madero's fall, if it should come, would be accomplished by the military, and they credited Mondragon with the proper qualifications for a prime mover. By considerations such as have been indicated, Mondra gon was persuaded during those four days that prompt ac tion was desirable. Never again would he find conditions so favorable to his own interests. But the arrangements for his personally conducted insurrection were far from perfect. Results were produced which shocked the world, and are yet to be dearly paid for, but Mondragon merely began the bad work ; the course of events almost immedi ately passed beyond his control. The revolt was a very uncertain affair as it struggled into action on Saturday night, the 8th of February, 1913. Let no one doubt it. Francisco Madero had been close to THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 269 truth when he had assured Gustavo that the captains and lieutenants of the army would not go on record as disloyal to their Government. The lack of coherence in the mili tary plot was more than a division of interest among the leaders; it was a positive disinclination of the lesser com missioned officers to take part. The President had been notably wrong in that he had taken no efficient steps to sustain the right spirit in the army ; yet Mondragon could muster but eight hundred men and three batteries of artillery, in addition to the palace guard, for the opening scene of his drama, — an array that adds another fantastic touch to his effort. Of these forces, let it be recorded to their shame, six hundred were Aspirantes or cavalry cadets from the mili tary school at Tlalpam, a suburb of the Capital. On the other side of the account must be set down the loyalty of the cadets of the Chepultepec Academy, the West Point of Mexico. Not for a moment did these young men waver in fidelity to the established government until that govern ment was definitely superseded under the contract signed in the American Embassy in the interests of what the trad ers called peace. To follow easily the course of events in the small hours of Sunday morning, February 9, it is necessary to know the locations of a few important points in and around Mex ico City. The castle and park of Chepultepec are about two and a half miles to the westward of the National Pal ace. The Avenida San Francisco, the Avenida Juarez and the Paseo de la Reforma really form a single highway from the Palace to the castle. Southward of the Paseo, at a dis tance of perhaps three-eighths of a mile, another broad avenue leads from "Old Mexico" to the castle: this is Avenida Chepultepec, along which — well fenced in — runs one of the heavy trunk lines of the suburban tramway serv- 270 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO ice. Beyond Chepultepec about four miles is the ancient village of Tacubaya, in which is a strong military post. East of the Palace three-quarters of a mile, beyond the solid blocks of ancient one and two-story houses, is the penitentiary in which Felix Diaz was confined. Bernardo Reyes was held in the Santiago barracks, a mile to the north ward of the Palace. Tlalpam, the home of the Aspirantes, is about fifteen miles to the southward. Shortly after two o'clock on Sunday morning an officer of the Forest Guards of Chepultepec, who lived in a pretty brick villa in the park, was awakened by the rumble of artillery passing along the Tacubaya road. The hoofbeats of many horses, the clanking of sabers, told him that a con siderable body of cavalry accompanied the guns, and all were moving toward the city. The officer of the Forest Guards did not believe that this force was upon any errand of the Government's despite the fact that it was waking the echoes of the night within a pistol-shot of the President's bedroom windows. Much more probably this was the military uprising which had been the theme of gossip during the past two days. The officer arose, and for some minutes looked from his window at the dark mass of the castle, but he saw no sign that any one had taken alarm. Adjoining it on the west was the Chepultepec Academy, and there, too, so far as he could discover, all was quiet. Was it possible that the President had not waked, and that amongst the great body of cadets there was not one to hear and understand these warlike sounds? It seemed that this was true, and presently there dawned upon the soldier the light which revealed his personal duty. Presumably he had the usual regard for his own life ; cer tainly he was aware of the extreme risk of interference, and probably this consideration determined his course. He THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 271 might have warned the President, or the Commandant of the Academy, but either of these acts would have been equivalent to publishing his connection with the affair. Moreover, it was probable that he would not be believed, and in fact he had no very solid ground for his conviction. The upshot was that he went to a man in whom he had personal confidence to discover the point where an attack would be made, if any were contemplated. The man was Adolfo Basso, intendente of the National Palace. It happened that Basso had attended a theater, seeing one of those late performances which are given in Mexico City. He had heard in the course of the evening abundant rumors of revolt, and as he was loyal to Madero it is to be supposed that his mind was not at ease as he walked home alone. It was past two o'clock when he came to the plaza that lies before the Palace, and there he met the officer of the Forest Guards and heard his story. The hazard of interference was now transferred to Basso, and he accepted it, but he too sought an individual instead of warning the Government directly. Doubtless he went to the man whom he thought most likely to know what to do, and safest to depend upon for prompt and vigorous action — Gustavo Madero. To Gustavo, at his home in the Calle Londres, Basso made his report. From the Forest Guardsman he had learned that the troops had proceeded eastward on Aven ida Chepultepec. From the rumors which he had heard, Basso thought it probable that they would go on past Belem prison and connect with the aspirantes from Tlalpam on the street called Cinco de Febrero, several squares south of the Palace. Detachments would doubtless be sent to re lease Felix Diaz and Bernardo Reyes, and these operations would consume time. The movement upon the Palace would probably be delayed some hours. 272 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO With these opinions Gustavo Madero concurred. There would be no haste to occupy the Palace with troops from outside, because the guards already in possession were cor rupted. Such being the unfortunate condition of affairs, what could be done ? Gustavo knew no place to get a mili tary force in time, and he was not sanguine as to prompt action on his brother's part if he should go to Chepultepec and lay the matter before him. It was obviously important to prevent the setting up of revolutionary headquarters in the Palace for the sake of the effect on the public mind, and if the house of Government were to be held, Gustavo would have to do it himself, so he decided. He seems to have been in rare form, on this Sunday morning. He was the Gustavo who with picturesque reck lessness in the Diaz days had played a most unpromising hand in the game of revolution against an entrenched em pire, and had organized Madero clubs throughout Mexico under the very noses of the Cientificos. He was Gustavo, the practical politician, who, as leader of the " Porra" or Progresistas, had developed the knack of cajolery to a fine art; who had studied the people and could call the Juans and the Miguels by their first names, and address them in the language which they understood. He was the gambler in long chances who had faced danger too often to be wor ried about it. With his hat a little on one side, and a cigar between his teeth, he sallied forth from home upon his absurd and tragic task — to take the National Palace from four hun dred traitors in arms, and hold it, heaven knew how, against the strong force which would advance upon it at the break of day or thereabouts. He rode in his touring car with Basso beside him, and with Tomas, his much-trusted chauf feur, at the wheel. As to what happened afterwards, I fol low an intimate, detailed account, reliable for all that was THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 273 done and said. If it were desirable I could set down the challenges and orders, and could quote even more exten sively from the extraordinary remarks of Gustavo, as he made a kind of stump speech for his own life and his brother's rule in the dim patio of the Palace, facing the rifles of four hundred men. Gustavo's car, though challenged by the sentries at the central entrance of the Palace, was not halted. It rolled into the patio where Colonel Morelos, the commandant, and all his force were assembled, waiting to admit the troops of Mondragon. " You are under arrest," said Morelos, and gave an order to his men so hastily that it included them all, not a small squad as he had probably intended. The ridiculous result was that the guns of the entire four hundred covered Gus tavo simultaneously. He stood up in his car, the target for all those rifles, and burst into a laugh which may very well have been entirely genuine. There was smothered laughter in the ranks, and Gustavo was quick to seize his advan tage. " You are a perfect host, my Colonel," he shouted, so that all might hear ; " never before have such honors been paid me. I was not an invited guest, but I heard of your little party here and I have dropped in. And see how you have welcomed me ! Let me stand by your side, I beg of you, to greet your brave friend General Reyes and his fat fighting partner, our own dear Felix." He knew what he was doing when he referred to Reyes and Diaz at a moment when he himself had taken the fancy of his audience by a picturesque display of courage. The " bravery " of General Reyes was a joke in Mexico, and Felix Diaz was called a lady's man. Moreover, Gustavo knew that he had private friends in that assemblage, for many a soldier of the guard had thanked him for a much 274 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO needed cinco pesos. Possibly the insubordinate laughter in the ranks was kept going by these men ; at any rate, it con tinued, encouraging Gustavo and proportionately disconcert ing the colonel, who began, not unwisely, to doubt whether he could rely upon his troops. And while the command ant was still uncertain as to his next move, Gustavo went on with his stump speech, treating the soldiers to the rude humor they appreciated. " It isn't fair to you, my dear Colonel," he said, " to keep these hard-working muchachos up all night waiting for our illustrious friends. The beds at Santiago are very com fortable, and a fierce fighting man like General Reyes needs his rest. Tambien, he has to dress for the presidential part. Don Felix, too, you know, must curl his mustaches and oil his hair, and the boudoir arrangements in the bartolinas at the pen are sadly deficient. The escorts have come a long distance ; they are only now arriving in town from Tlalpam and Tacubaya. It will be a good seven o'clock before our guests arrive. Before that time they will have roused all the town with their trampings and tootings, and there will be a fine audience out in front. Keep the boys in condition for the big show ; let them rest their arms." The commandant gave the signal and the rifles came down with a clang on the cement. He did not, in fact, dare to do otherwise, for the continued laughter showed the dis position of the guard. " While we prepare for the grand reception, my dear Colonel," Gustavo went on, " bring these handsome cabal- leros from Tlalpam over to the right side of the patio where I can talk to them like a father. I can't see very well with my left eye." A great shout of laughter went up at this, for everybody knew that Gustavo's left eye was of glass. The men of the regular guard understood the maneuver and were in THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 275 sympathy with it. They resented the presence of two hun dred Tlalpam students who thought themselves superior, and nothing would have pleased the regulars better on this occasion than to have the two parts of the force lined up on opposite sides. The commandant understood also, but he scented mutiny, and was afraid that the peon soldiers would obey Gustavo rather than himself, especially because Gustavo had been shrewd enough to enlighten them at the very outset in re gard to matters which they had not understood. The move ment toward separation had in fact been begun by the regu lars before the colonel gave the order, and within a few seconds it was complete — Aspirantes on the right and the Guard on the left. Into the space between Gustavo walked, and he continued his harangue while the com mandant stood looking helplessly on. \ In a few minutes Gustavo learned that neither the As pirantes nor the Palace Guards had known the part that General Reyes was to play in the affair in which they were engaged. With this he whipped the Aspirantes, who were Felix Diaz men, into line, and within forty minutes from the time he rode through the Palace gate he had gained effective command of the whole guard. Morelos he per sonally escorted to a room of the Palace, constructed for such purposes, and locked him in. At five o'clock he, Gus tavo Madero, a civilian, was in active charge of the Palacio Nacional, and in ordering its guards about was committing one of the gravest of military crimes. The two hundred Aspirantes had been won over for the moment, but could not be expected to fire on their comrades, or even to remain neutral if a fight should ensue, so by common consent they stacked their arms in the patio and were marched to a large court in the far interior of the Palace and placed under a guard of ten men. The two I 276 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO hundred men of the Palace guard were now quietly dis posed for protection to the entrances and for manning of the machine battery of twelve guns on the roof, but the final measures for defense were taken. by General Villar, the post commander, who came to the Palace at six o'clock. As Gustavo had jocularly advised the Commandant, Gen eral Reyes and his escort of two hundred cavalry did not appear until nearly seven o'clock. When they came they moved forward with the confidence of a perfect under standing ; the Palace gates were to be swung wide for them and General Reyes was to be shown at once to the presi dential quarter from which he would immediately issue a manifesto to the nation, denouncing Madero as a traitor and proclaiming himself Provisional President pending the action of Congress. The awakening from this dream of a bloodless victory was violent. Instead of a welcoming salute, the advancing column was greeted at thirty paces' distance by a challenge. General Villar then came out of the Palace and warned General Reyes that the place was held against him, and that bloodshed would result if he advanced further. Reyes did not believe that the guard would offer resistance, and he pressed forward. There was a volley from the guard in the broad entrance of the Palace and Reyes fell dead. His men returned the fire, wounding Villar. Members of the guard dashed from the Palace, and took several pris oners, among them General Ruiz, who had stood near Reyes. Promptly the machine guns on the roof began to sputter in all directions, inflicting some damage on the enemy and very much more on the crowd of peons which had gathered from all over that part of the town. It is said that three hundred persons were hit in five minutes of this firing. Then a few of the machine guns were turned upon the cathedral THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 277 towers, in which a small body of Aspirantes had been sta tioned to pick off any persons about the square who might feel disposed to interfere. The towers were promptly evacuated and the firing from the Palace stopped. While this sanguinary engagement was going on Felix Diaz and Mondragon with their six hundred Aspirantes and their three batteries of artillery came down Cinco de Mayo, and were about to deploy their force in the Plaza when they became properly aware of the hail from the machine guns on the Palace roof. Not caring to advance in the face of this fire, Diaz and Mondragon swung to the left at double quick, and turning into the Calle Tacuba moved rapidly back along this street, which is parallel to the one by which they had advanced. Continuing on this course they passed out of Calle Tacuba into the street called Hombres Illustres, which runs along the northern side of the Alamada. At Calle Balderas, one street west of the Alamada, they swung again to the left six blocks to the Arsenal, of which, after a short parley, they took possession. The Arsenal was the headquarters of Felix Diaz during the ten days of bombardment which ensued. At the Palace enthusiasm for the President, and espe cially for Gustavo, had taken possession of the guard. They had been marshalled among the Government's enemies, they assured Gustavo, through no fault of their own, and had been determined to stand by him from the first moment of his appearance. He looked them over and believed them ; how could these ignorant ones understand the right and wrong of such affairs, and if they did, how could they op pose their commanding officer without a leader? The status of the Aspirantes, however, was different; they were wilful traitors. It would probably go hard with them and with the Commandant of the Palace, who though greatly respected throughout the army, and above the sus- 273 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO picion of having been bought, had done his best to hand over the Palacio Nacional to the insurgents. Many dead and wounded were in the Plaza. The body of General Reyes lay within a stone's throw of the central gates, but no orders were given for its removal or for the relief of soldiers or civilians whose injuries held them where they fell. Gustavo Madero was no longer in command, and he refrained from assuming any further responsibility. General Villar's wound explains his inaction and that of his men. The bullet which had hit him was a very choice missile from the cartridge box of fate. My own opinion is that the whole clan Madero fell at that shot. For Villar was a brave man, not without ability, capable of holding his ambition in check at the demand of honor. To his po sition as commander of the post Huerta succeeded, with addition of authority such as might have been conferred on Villar but for his disablement; and it is not unlikely that he would have saved the State, winning an easy triumph where an abler soldier failed for lack of honest will. The loss was not immediately appreciated by Gustavo Madero, to whom it seemed that the first skirmish had ended very well. The strain of that extraordinary night was now relaxed. One round in the game of life and death had been played through, and the chief loser's stake paid out there in the Plaza. The hour had come when a man might stretch his limbs and seek a little refreshment; and Gustavo ordered his car and rode forth into the morning air, to the home of his friend, Angel Casso, in the Calle Marselle, and sat down with him to breakfast. Over the coffee there arose some question as to the kill ing of the spectators in the square, and Gustavo explained it, saying that it was due to the zeal of the peon gunners who, excepting two or three, had never before fired ma chine guns at a living target, and were curious to learn how THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 279 much destruction they could work by the mere turning of a little crank. Upon the whole, however, they had done so well that no immediate renewal of the assault upon the Palace need be feared. It was not until nine o'clock that President Madero reached the center of the city. At that hour he appeared on Avenida Juarez on the southern side of the Alamada at the head of about one thousand men made up of Chepulte pec cadets and mounted police. At the National Theatre he was urged to go no farther, and as he stood there in plain view he was shot at from one of the upper windows of the great unfinished theater building. Owing to a sudden movement of his horse the bullet missed him nar rowly, and killed a negro on the sidewalk. Turning to the officer in charge of his body guard of ca dets and police, Madero directed him to see to the capture of the enemy in the theater, and then to return to Chepulte pec to await further orders. The officer ventured to ex press astonishment. Was it possible that the President meant to ride the half mile through Avenida San Francisco alone, while the city was ablaze with insurrection? Madero smiled. He turned his big gray horse toward the Plaza and without further parley proceeded on his way, his only attendant being a colonel who rode at his side. He had, however, an unofficial advance guard in an American Jew named Blum, who was apparently seeking personal ad vertisement. Blum was a dealer in horses and their pedi grees, and it was said that in a trade he would often furnish a pedigree much better than the one to which the animal was entitled. His carelessness in the assortment of the two commodities, the horse and the pedigree, had resulted in frequent expulsions from the Jockey Club racetrack, but he would always come back again. And it is quite ac cordant with the grotesqueness of this national tragedy, 280 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO that the well-known Blum — who afterwards sold milch cows to Felix Diaz at the Arsenal — should now precede the President who had just escaped by inches from assas sination, and was inviting another attempt at every move ment of his unguarded progress to the National Palace, on this Sunday morning. Not until he reached the Plaza strewn with dead did Madero realize the seriousness of what had occurred. Hur rying to his official quarters he set in operation the work of succor and removal, personally directing that the body of General Reyes be brought into the Palace. Then the wheels of outraged government began to revolve swiftly. A cabi net meeting passed sentence of death and immediate exe cution upon the captured General Ruis, and Colonel More los, the Palace commandant. The sentence was carried out that afternoon, and before night General Victoriano Huerta, who was on waiting orders in the capital, was summoned to the Palace and placed in chief command of all the troops in and about Mexico City. CHAPTER XV AFTER General Huerta was put in chief command of the Government's forces, on February 9, cannon and small arms were the instruments of pandemonium in the City of Mexico, much property was destroyed, and many persons were killed, up to the time of the coup d'etat on the 1 8th. There were opposing camps, so to speak; the Palace and the Arsenal, the established government under Madero and the revolt nominally under Diaz, were at war. But all this was mere seeming, and differed from the truth in every essential particular. There was no warfare, and even of anything that could be called fighting there was very little. The affair was dishonest, root, branch and twig; dishonest as a squabble started by thieves in a crowd to draw attention from the picking of pockets. The mockery was plainly apparent to many who had no knowledge of military affairs ; it could hardly have deceived any person of intelligence who was not blinded by some prepossession. The usual version of this ten days' riot in uniform, this random bombardment with modern weapons in a densely populated city, is that General Huerta served the Government faithfully as long as he had any hope of success; that the Arsenal in which the Felix Diaz forces were entrenched was found to be impregnable, and that to avoid further bloodshed, Huerta finally agreed to the de thronement of Madero as a compromise for peace. In the process of bringing this about, so runs the tale, his own am bitions awoke to personal opportunity with results now well established in common knowledge. 281 282 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO This version does Huerta's moral nature too much honor and fails in fair credit to his clear Indian brain. The vari ous bodies of troops subject to his orders exceeded ten thousand men, while at no time did the Diaz forces reach eighteen hundred. The artillery at Huerta's command in cluded siege guns and other heavy cannon of the Schneider- Canet and Mondragon-Canet types, while in light batteries and machine guns his equipment was greatly superior to that of Felix Diaz. The report that the Arsenal was " impregnable " reflected credit upon the inventor of that fiction as a person of au dacity and imagination. An attacking force which meant business would have operated from the south or southwest, and would have had no trouble in planting batteries in such convenient positions that the artilleryman who could not have landed every shot in the Arsenal's broad and fully ex posed facade would have been one who had mistaken his calling. The land south of the Arsenal is almost entirely open for the six hundred yards or so to Avenida Chepulte pec, and for a like distance farther to Indianilla, the head quarters of Mexico City's tramway service. Some of this region was alleged to be held by Diaz troops, a gentle at tempt at humor considering the forces which, if their com mander had been so disposed, could have swept the place clean by the simple expedient of walking into it. A force which was operating seriously against the Arsenal would have advanced by way of Avenida Chepultepec to the broad Calle Balderas ; and while a moderate assortment of cannon balls was being fired into the conspicuous stone building six or seven blocks distant, the force would have marched deliberately in wide column along the street named to the desired stations. In the thirty minutes which this advance would have occupied the operating batteries would THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 283 have reduced the building and driven its garrison into the open. Except for the seriousness with which the military opera tions of that ten days were treated in current accounts, I should regard it as superfluous to point out even to this moderate extent the astonishing features of the farce that was carried on. With one-tenth the bloodshed that actu ally occurred, Felix Diaz and Manuel Mondragon could have been driven from their " stronghold " within twenty- four hours from the time Huerta was placed in command, and after that period, supposing that the proper dispositions had been made in the meantime, it could have been done in any designated half hour. The military operations which in reality were carried on during that historic ten days were of decidedly obvious and novel character. Huerta batteries were shifted from point to point in residence and business sections to the north, northeast and northwest of the Arsenal. From none of these points was the building visible. Solid blocks of houses intervened on every range. Diaz placed batteries near his headquarters, and always at points from which neither the Palace nor the opposing batteries were in view. For several hours each day there was firing by both par ties. Buildings were damaged or demolished, inoffensive persons were killed in their own homes, incautious non- combatants in the streets were shot down. Projectiles of various kinds were fired through streets in which no enemy had appeared. Machine guns discharged thousands of bul lets without having any target except some mere unfor tunate who might happen to be in range, the purpose of the fusillade being to excite terror and advertise anarchy. Isolated guns were set up by apparently irresponsible squads, and fired over and over again in whatever position 284 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO the pieces happened to assume after the recoil of the previous shot. And during ten days of this terrorizing riot of blood the Arsenal was struck but once and the Palacio Nacional but twice ! The Madero Government all this time was bringing in troops and cannon from various points — Vera Cruz, To luca, Cuernavaca, and elsewhere. Madero himself gave out bulletins and reports of favorable progress, and spoke with confidence of movements that would bring victory. Under flags of truce, he made demands upon Diaz to sur render. On Sunday night, February 9, he made a mysteri ous trip in an automobile to an out-of-town destination from which he did not return until ten o'clock on Monday morn ing. Whether he went to Cuernavaca, seventy-five miles over mountain roads, to summon the faithful General Felipe Angeles with his artillery and his thousand men, or to Toluca, forty-five miles, personally to beg General Blan quet to hurry in with his forces — which of these things he did that night mattered not at all. Felipe Angeles came in with his troops and was afterward courtmartialed for exceeding his authority; and Blanquet moved his picked regiments part of the way to the capital and left them out side while he went in alone to look things over. And all this time Victoriano Huerta was in close touch with President Madero, consulting him in all his plans, cursing the slowness of the movements, and the inertia of the various branches of the service, but promising, ever promising, the decisive blow which would end the revolt and leave the Government solid as a rock. He had for every question an answer technically cor rect; the one great essential, he said, was to avoid further defections in the army, while welding it together into a really strong and reliable establishment. While the THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 285 traitors still had so many friends in his own camp it would be unwise for him to force his officers to obey repugnant orders; in fact, this was at present impossible, but with prudence and patience the condition would be remedied. It was better that the Diaz force should remain where it was, receiving no accessions, than that it should be dis lodged at the cost of further mutiny. This argument prevailed with the President, who was constantly occupied upon matters not military; and even Gustavo was to some extent deceived, against the evidence of his own eyes — for he was in all accessible parts of the city during this time, and must have seen much that could not be explained by Huerta's sophistries. How ever, the fullest comprehension could hardly have enabled him to accomplish anything important, for he lacked the necessary authority. And so the noisy farce went on to the confusion of the world, and with many odd, significant scenes that passed unnoticed in the midst of the tumult. One of these, which has not yet lost its importance — to the United States especially — merits description here. In view of the precarious position of President Madero if treachery appeared again at the National Palace, the sub- Secretary of Communications, Manuel Urquidi, formed a plan to provide a body guard composed of one hundred men of standing and unquestioned fidelity who would remain constantly with the President until the situation should clear up. Urquidi made his list, personally saw as many as he could, and passed the word to the others for a rendez vous. This was to be in the office of the sub-Secretary at two o'clock in the morning of Thursday, the 13th, and the password formula consisted of the inquiry addressed to the portero at the door: "Has my father arrived?" To this the answer was, " Quien sabef" and the rejoinder, "I am his son." 286 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO No more than twenty-eight out of the hundred men came to this meeting, the sub-Secretary himself failing to ap pear. But Gustavo Madero, with forty-six Mauser rifles and a liberal supply of ammunition packed in the body of his automobile, was on hand. Among the faithful was a member of the Chamber of Deputies, accompanied by an attache of the Japanese legation, who calmly set forth to Gustavo that in twenty-four hours he could muster two thousand Japanese dressed as peons and armed with knives. In the darkness which reigned throughout the city, these men, approaching from various directions, would attract no notice, and as the Arsenal guards, at night when fighting was suspended, were invariably under the influence of pulque, the Japanese could quietly dispose of them with their knives, after which they would rush the Arsenal where the troops were sleeping and knife the entire force, taking possession in the interest of Madero and ending the revolt at once. The offer was rejected, Gustavo Madero announcing that the Mexicans would fight their own battles. From one who was present at the interview I have learned that the temptation to accept was strong, the feasibility of the plan being clear, but that Gustavo was held back by the fear that while the two thousand Japanese were taking the Arsenal, five thousand more which the attache had said he could produce in an additional day, might be occupying the Na tional Palace by the same means and so hold the entire government at their mercy. Gustavo's declination of the Japanese offer is of value as reflecting the policy of his brother's government and demonstrating the lack of foundation for the fears of Sena tor Lodge expressed in the United States Senate that Ma dero might not be wholly unfavorable to Japanese aggres sion on Mexico's Pacific coast ; but it is doubtful if Gustavo THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 287 would have followed the course he did if he had seen en tirely through the clever head of General Victoriano Huerta. The " gentleman's guard " of one hundred was not formed, which may be counted as unfortunate now that one looks back upon it. Day after day during that fatal period telegraph wires and cables were choked with despatches dealing with the desperate efforts of Madero to dislodge a formidable insur gent from an impregnable position. Square miles of news paper space were used in printing this nonsense. The truth is that the defense of the National Palace on the morning of February 9 was the only serious fighting that was done in Mexico City in the interests of the Madero Government. It may be admitted that a few honest but not very effectual shots were fired by the troops of General Angeles. All the others were empty noise, except to the unfortunates whose bodies or property happened to be hit. The cannonade was the long prelude to a bargain ; it served to put the terrorized city into a mood to accept what was to come; served also to bring the conspirators to a proper frame of mind, and to combine the various interests which they represented. Reverting for a moment to the attitude of Huerta, I will add a few details. He declared that the generals under him were lukewarm in the service; that Blanquet was ag grieved because of the death of General Reyes as the result of an order said to have been given by Basso, a civilian. Possessed of these sentiments Blanquet was unwilling to push matters too hard against Felix Diaz. Huerta also re ported that General Navarrette, who had charge of the ar tillery, would not fire directly upon the Arsenal because he feared that he might kill General Mondragon, to whom he owed a debt of gratitude for advancing him in the military service. These statements of Huerta's were, in the main, truthful, 288 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO as were others affecting less important commands, but the real fact behind all was that Huerta himself was secretly applauding and promoting these sentiments. He was not pursuing this course because he grieved for Reyes or loved either Diaz or Mondragon; he was doing so because the master he served was his own ambition. The natural question which here occurs to the surface observer is, if Huerta held the situation in his hand, why did he not take full advantage of it at an earlier date? Why did he wait until some four or five thousand persons had been killed and several millions in property destroyed? The question will not be pressed after a moment's con sideration of the immense personal advantage which he gained by delay. At the time of the outbreak on February 9, Huerta was not regarded as one to be seriously reckoned with. He had had no personal relations with the solid men of Mexico who were backing Diaz and Mondragon, and his knowledge of the remoter figures behind the conspiracy was incomplete. Up to that moment he had had his secret am bitions, but he had never played politics. This he now saw that he must do, if he were to retain the presidency which he was certain he could grasp at any moment. To stand permanently against the Maderistas, of whose numerical strength he was well aware, he must secure the united back ing of Mexico's strongest men and the moral support of the United States. To make a spectacular leap from obscurity to power and be sustained by these influences afterwards, he believed to be among the possibilities of the situation, should his own skill not fail him. When Madero placed him in charge of the Government's defense, it was a play directly into Huerta's hand. From this vantage point he could manage the military movements as a matter of obvious duty, yet with political ends always in view. He analyzed the situation, and chose with uner- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 289 ring discrimination four of its components as the essen tials. First, the general public of the capital, the resident Euro peans and Americans, including diplomatic agents through whom the governments they represented would be influ enced. To all these must be afforded a perfect demonstra tion of Madero's inefficiency and of Mexico's emphatic re jection of Madero's methods. Second, the men who were behind Mondragon and Diaz. These were to be convinced that the man who could mas ter their favorites at all points was now in clear view and must be dealt with before their purposes could be accom plished. The third political element seemed not especially impor tant, but was one to which the Diaz managers were quite evidently catering. This was the element represented by Manuel Calero. While Cientifico in character it possessed little Cientifico strength because Calero was too openly supercilious and overbearing. But it carried a rather strong corporate influence in the United States not other wise to be reached, and it enjoyed the advantage of being in close relationship to the American Ambassador, whose government sustained him in all things, and who was able to influence to a great extent the action of the European diplomatic representatives. The recognition which the Mondragon-Diaz combination was conceding to Calero was not direct; it was applied, and cleverly, too, Huerta thought, through Jorge Vera Estanol, who had been Calero's law partner and was still his warm personal friend despite the most radical difference between them on political issues. What Huerta did not know was that the Diaz-Mondragon managers were slating Vera Es tanol for a cabinet position without his consent. The fourth political element for present consideration 290 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO was de la Barra who was understood to be a close friend of Limantour's and an active supporter of financial plans for Mexico emanating from powerful interests in Europe. Huerta knew that de la Barra was not strong in his own person, but he saw that Mondragon and Diaz were finding it wise to make surface peace with the former provisional president by including him in their scheme of a govern ment which they hoped to set up. By this means also they were planning to add the Catholic Party, and what was more important, the Catholic Church, to their strength. Huerta saw the political wisdom of this very clearly and realized the benefits to follow if he could demonstrate that it was through a man like himself, and not a weakling such as Felix Diaz that the de la Barra element could find what appeared to be an easy way to accomplish the things it had in view. Support of American and European corporations, and of bankers who ranked among the strongest in the world, was included in successfully combining the Cientifico, the mili tary and the de la Barra influences under his standard. If he could accomplish this he would be invulnerable ; he would become a second Porfirio Diaz. Victoriano Huerto must be credited with a liberal en dowment of mental agility because of the demonstration he has since then made before the world, but in nothing has he exhibited more marked political acumen than in holding a tight rein on his ambitions during the days when the Ma dero Government lay helpless in his hands. With an in difference to human misery upon which his military idol, Napoleon, might have deigned to compliment him, he per mitted the wanton slaughter and terrorizing to go on until it had become evident to those whom he wished to impress that he and no other was the man of the hour. Overtures were made to him before two days had passed, THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 291 and the first advances were made by de la Barra. From that time Huerta knew that his reading and his count of the cards had been correct, and that the presidency of Mex ico, with strong support already assured, was to be the re ward for his manipulation of the trust which Madero had reposed in him. In all this callous calculation the pitiable figure is Fran cisco Madero. Knowing how weak in actual military force was the Felix Diaz insurrection, he seemed every day to be on the point of suppressing it and yet was unable to silence the Arsenal guns. He understood that Cientifico influences were behind the Diaz movement, but the apparent strength of the Government forces indicated a broad margin of ad vantage, even taking into account an element of disaffec tion among the general officers of the army. And he was supremely confident of success up to the hour of the demand of General Blanquet that he resign. Before that point was reached, however, the same sug gestion in milder and more courteous form had been made by the Spanish Minister, as representing himself and the American Ambassador. The latter could not well accom pany the Spanish Minister, because his relations with Ma dero had become so strained that a personal call at the President's office was out of the question. It was a fool's errand, and far from edifying. Both the dean of the diplomatic corps and Spanish Minister Cologan would have done better if they had presented their demands, well backed by their governments, to Felix Diaz, the man who most obviously was disturbing the peace; or, if they understood the inwardness of the matter, to General Huerta, who, for reasons of his own, was permitting the peace to be disturbed. Madero's remarks on that occasion reflected the bitterness of his resentment caused by the irritation he had ever experienced at the American Ambassador's hands. 292 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO But Ambassador Wilson had taken that military insurrec tion in Mexico City at a valuation which he thought a true estimate. He knew that the solid men of Mexico were backing it, and the interests of that country, as he viewed them, demanded that it should win. The Huerta over- lordship of the situation, however, was something he prob ably had not, at the time of his colleague's call to ask for Madero's resignation, taken sufficiently into account. He had been an active figure during the insurrection, riding in his car within the field of that preposterous artillery duel, to the rescue of endangered Americans and others; and had doubtless acquired a belief in his personal as well as his official right to be heard on this vital subject. But his share in Cologan's mission seems to me to have been ill advised, like so many other proceedings of his which I have been compelled to criticize, in their official aspect, and with out personal malice toward a man who, I believe, was sadly and often absurdly misled. On February 17 the terms of a bargain were arranged, the parties thereto being Huerta and the representatives of the various elements in the Diaz-Mondragon association. Involved in that bargain were the lives of four men, Fran cisco and Gustavo Madero, Jose Maria Pino Suarez and Adolfo Basso. These men were subsequently murdered, all of them — for the form of a trial in Basso's case has no moral value. The world was shocked by the killing of Francisco Ma dero and Pino Suarez because they had been the President and Vice President of the Republic, and their deaths were taken, not altogether wrongly, as an index of the civiliza tion of Mexico. A government had been overthrown, and its chief had been killed, and this practise, familiar in his tory, is supposed to have been outgrown by enlightened peoples. The crime was naturally charged against the con- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 293 queror, the man who had risen to power in this wreck, Vic toriano Huerta. Now what are the facts? I know far too much about Huerta to defend him as a merciful man, shrinking from bloodshed, governed in his acts by a nice sense of propriety, willing to lose the whole world for an ideal of right. But I know also what he was trying to do, what motives swayed him. He was entirely capable of feeling and yielding to revengeful impulses, but he was sane, requiring to be aroused to vengeance by adequate sense of injury. Toward none of the four men named had Huerta enough personal ani mosity at this time to account for even a loss of temper. The President and Huerta had quarreled about the gap in the vouchers which has been referred to, and in addition there had been some jealousy on both sides. But Huerta knew the right and wrong of this matter, and cared little about it now. He had no love for Madero, and no real hatred. This is abundantly proved by his behavior at the conferences where Madero's life was demanded. He disliked Pino Suarez and would not have lifted a finger to save him, nor would he have made an equal effort in the other direction, to kill him. He was far from having anything against Basso. On the contrary, he owed a debt of gratitude to the intendente of the Palace for his agency in preventing the entry of Gen eral Bernardo Reyes. But Basso was not worth saving at any sacrifice. His demonstrated loyalty to Madero dis qualified him for immediate usefulness to Huerta, and he was not an important figure, like some other loyal men who represented parties and interests, and could be forced, through desire to save their country, into effective service to the new regime. Basso was a pawn in a bad position, and it is said that when his death was angrily demanded, Huerta answered with a grim and cynical smile. 294 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO In the conference on February 17 already referred to, there was plenty of shrill anger and of genuine Mexican desire for vengeance, overruling sober judgment, and blind ing men to the trick which was being played upon them at that very moment. But Huerta was the trickster; it was he that was weaving the emotions of the others into a robe of authority for his own shoulders, and any one who pic tures him as a bloodthirsty soldier rudely gratifying his re sentments in the hour of triumph is absurdly mistaken. A truer picture would be that of an able, crafty, half-educated savage, hiding in his breast the fierce hunger of ambition, and more anxious to devour the men with whom he was at that moment bargaining than to butcher adversaries already overthrown. He did not haggle over Pino Suarez, knowing that the man was unpopular with all parties and that his death would cause no stir. But toward the killing of Gustavo Madero the attitude of Huerta was very different. In the first place he understood thoroughly the motives which actuated those who clamored for Gustavo's death. Gustavo had stood in the way of men who had been making money through graft in army supplies and in other dealings with the Govern ment. This was not the sole cause of animosity against him, but it was the principal one. Huerta was not in the least deceived by this anger of the trousers pocket. He himself was an unscrupulous lover of money. He did not believe that Gustavo's conduct had been unselfish or based upon honesty, — probably did not care whether it had or not ; but he respected Gustavo for his courage and despised many of his enemies as cowards. Personally, his opinion was that it would make less trouble and be in all ways much better for himself, if Gustavo should be sent out of the country with a whole skin. But those in the conference who represented the views THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 295 of Rodolfo Reyes insisted that Gustavo Madero had been chiefly responsible for the death of Rodolfo's father, and ought to die. Certain military men, notably Manuel Mon dragon, supported this view and argued that Gustavo de served death for violating the laws of war by his assumption of command at the Palace. These accusations were ninety- nine per cent, mere expressions of hatred, and Huerta knew it perfectly well, but the indictments were so numerous and disclosed a feeling so deep and so widely shared, that Huerta yielded, solely from motives of policy. He could not be made to believe, however, that a sound policy had any place in it for the killing of Francisco Ma dero which he saw clearly to be an egregious blunder. He at first refused point blank to listen to the suggestion, and the conference was deadlocked on this matter. Argument was long and violent — that is, by the advocates of the measure; Huerta himself said little. It was urged that there could be no peace in Mexico as long as Francisco Madero should be permitted to live. This opinion was ad vanced not only by the hot-heads, but by the more sober advocates of business interests. Unless this blood should be shed, the thirty pieces of silver in the form of renewed national prosperity would not be paid. Against Huerta on this point was arrayed the strongest combination that he had faced. Representatives of all in terests seemed to be united ; and as Huerta surveyed the situation with his own ambition flaring up from his savage breast to light his clever brain, he foresaw the disfavor of many parties, should he stand out for what he knew to be the wiser course. The Diaz-Mondragon-Reyes-de la Barra combination, as represented in the conference, was solid for Madero's death and Huerta stood alone for the man's life. He finally opposed the policy in words, speaking with 296 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO some freedom. The execution of Madero — for it must not be supposed that these acts were discussed as murders, but only in the manner of prejudgments of regular pro ceedings — would hamper the provisional president in many ways. Foreign relations which would be difficult enough at the best, would be seriously complicated by the trial of Madero for a capital offense — with the inevitable result. For his own part, said General Huerta, he would rather take the chances of success with Madero alive and conspiring, than to cope with the protests which would come from va rious nations if Madero should be dealt with in the desired manner. Even in Mexico the execution, he predicted, would provoke strong, dangerous and lasting resentment. Nor did Huerta agree in so many words, at that conference, that Madero should be put to death. With the adroitness of a good bargainer he swung the dis cussion to the cabinet, and quite readily accepted the one that was handed to him ready made, with Francisco Leon de la Barra, as its head, Manuel Mondragon as Min ister of War, Vera Estafiol as Minister of Public Instruc tions, and Rodolfo Reyes as Minister of Justice. In fact, he was well pleased, believing that these four men coming into his Government would greatly strengthen his position with reference to three of the essential groups which his analysis had revealed. As to the other, largest of them all, his own immediate public and the world beyond, there was not much need for fear that they would fail to read the lesson which he had written in letters of blood in the streets of the capital. Two other members of the projected cabinet represented solid strength. These were Alberto Garcia Granados as Minister of Gobernacion and Toribio Esquivel Obregon as Minister of Finance. Believing himself to be the best sol dier in Mexico Huerta reasoned that if he should assume THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 297 the Presidency backed by this strong representation of wealth and power he could laugh at Maderism and the peon element which was its chief asset. And Felix Diaz, the man who stood in the limelight, who had taken all the chances of heading the uprising, and who had been cheered on by his friends and backers as their ideal for the presidential office — what of him ? That question already had been disposed of; Felix Diaz would be the candidate for constitutional president whom all, including Huerta, would support in general elections to be held later on — a most admirable arrangement. Let the election be set, in the privacy of Huerta's mind, for the first Tuesday after the first Monday following the Day of Judgment. For suggestion as to the outward and visible method by which the cessation of hostilities was to be brought about, and the general agreement of peace and amity officially concluded, the conference was indebted to Senator de la Barra. The American Ambassador was the proper per son to carry on the negotiations, and the American Em bassy the place. The Ambassador, in fact, had already agreed to act as mediator, if he should be requested. Let General Huerta make such a proposal to him in formal terms — after the preliminary steps had been taken at the National Palace, consisting of the arrest of the President, Vice President and the members of the cabinet. This suggestion received the hearty approval of all, as pointing to an arrangement of great strategic value which would secure full sanction of their course by the official representative of the United States. But it was urged that certain additional guarantees of Huerta's firmness should be forthcoming prior to such a meeting, namely, the arrest of Gustavo Madero and Adolfo Basso. To this Huerta did not demur; but when the previous 298 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO question was called up to decide the fate of Francisco Madero he evaded it. Dispensing with all formalities and omitting the extravagant expressions of regard usual on such occasions in Mexico and elsewhere, he abruptly rose and departed, leaving the other gentlemen to interpret his action as they saw fit. This conference was held at the meeting place which had been used by representatives of the same interests during the preceding days of turmoil in the city. The meetings had begun on Monday, the ioth, when de la Barra con ferred with Huerta alone; they had continued, with other interests represented, during the succeeding days while progress was made in the general campaign, that strenu ous campaign of popular education which also was to pre pare the mind of Felix Diaz for the inevitable change of program. This meeting place was a room in the great white resi dence building on Calle Bucareli at the corner of Calle General Prin which since the days of President de la Barra had been used as the headquarters of the Department of Gobernacion. It had been erected by a Mexican gentle man who had found it too elaborate a residence for him self, and had made earnest efforts to sell or lease it to the United States Government to be used as an Embassy. Not succeeding in this, the owner had disposed of the property, including its beautiful gardens reaching back to the quiet Calle Limantour, to the Government of Porfirio Diaz while Ramon Corral was playing the dual role of Vice-President of the Republic and Minister of Gobernacion ; but the im posing mansion was not utilized as the headquarters of Gobernacion until Emilio Vasquez Gomez was placed at the head of that department by the treaty between the Mader istas and the Diaz envoys in May, 191 1. The Department of Gobernacion was now, in February, THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 299 1913, headed by Licenciado Rafael Hernandez, the Presi dent's cousin, who since the 9th of the month had re mained at the Palacio Nacional, thus leaving the coast clear, not by design, of course, for the unnoted coming and going of prominent men who might logically have business with the Department. The passing in and out of Senator de la Barra or Sen ator Calero or Rodolfo Reyes would be regarded as peculiar by no one. Mondragon himself might have called without exciting remark. And as for the ubiquitous Huerta — who could challenge the movements or the motives of the Commander in Chief? The location of the Gobernacion building emphasizes its adaptability to these uses. It is isolated by many interven ing city blocks from all other government offices, and it is not more than six hundred feet distant in an air line from the Arsenal which stands out in unobstructed view from its broad front porch. A battery, on the roof of Gobernacion could have torn the Arsenal to atoms, which is one reason why no guns were ever planted there. The events of the following day, February 18, succeeded each other with perfect precision of movement. At twelve o'clock General Aureliano Blanquet, tall, dignified, wearing an elegant black dress uniform and accompanied by En rique Zepeda, a relative of General Huerta's, Lieutenant Colonel Jimenez Riveroll and several other officers of the so-called Government army, entered the private offices of President Madero without previous announcement and ranged themselves before his desk. With the President were several of his military aides and his cousin, Marcos Hernandez, brother of the Minister of Gobernacion. General Blanquet plunged at once into the business which had brought him. He told the President that he must re sign, that the country had gone from bad to worse, that it 300 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO was useless to attempt to take the Arsenal, and that Mexi can soldiers were slaying their brothers in bloody and un necessary combat in the streets of the capital. He said that a change was demanded and that he had come for the purpose of insisting that it be effected at once. The President replied that he could not consent to re sign; that he was willing to arrange for the cabinet and the Vice-President to do so, but that as head of the Gov ernment he should remain at the post to which he had been elected by the free voice of the Mexican people. Blanquet's answer terminated verbal negotiations; it was comprised in the four words, " You are my prisoner." Instantly the military aides drew their revolvers and fired. Lieutenant Colonel Riveroll fell dead, one other of ficer was mortally hurt, and Enrique Zepeda was wounded in the hand. Prompt return of the fire killed Marcos Hernandez out right and wounded two of the aides. A hand to hand struggle followed in which the President and his party were "overpowered and made prisoners. Before one o'clock, Vice-President Pino Suarez and every member of the cab inet except two were placed under arrest. At ten minutes of two Gustavo Madero was arrested at the Gambrinus restaurant on Avenida San Francisco, where he had been lunching with Huerta and others. Shortly before the time set for the arrest a messenger came to call the general away upon some business, real or mythical. " I have no revolver," said Huerta, turning to Gustavo. " Will you lend me yours ? " " Certainly," replied Gustavo, and obligingly disarmed himself. He was arrested a few minutes later; and at half -past two Adolfo Basso was taken into custody. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 301 General Huerta returned to his office in the entresol of the National Palace which he had occupied as military com mander of the capital. His first act was to despatch a note to Ambassador Wilson which began with these words: " I have in my power as prisoners in the National Palace, the President of the Republic and his Minis ters, and having taken this course I beg that Your Ex cellency will interpret my conduct as a manifestation of highest patriotism in one who has no other ambition than that of serving his country." The note ended as follows: " If Your Excellency would do me the kindness of putting the matter before the rebels who are in the cuidedela (arsenal) not only I, but my countrymen as well, would be bound by a new tie of gratitude to your self and the ever glorious American people. " With the same respect which I have always enter tained for Your Excellency, I remain, " Your obedient servant, " Victoriano Huerta." The Ambassador returned two notes, which were received by General Huerta at half-past four. He wrote one of them as American Ambassador, the other as dean of the diplomatic corps. The former concluded thus: " I have also unofficially communicated the events related in your note to General Diaz, and shall imme- \ diately send him a formal note. I have the honor to be Your Excellency's obedient servant, " Henry Lane Wilson." After despatching his note to the Ambassador, and be fore the answers arrived Huerta addressed communications 302 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress, and received authority which he telegraphed at once to the gov ernors of all the states and to the jefes politicos of the territories in these terms: " By direction of the Senate, I have assumed charge of the Government. President Madero and his Cab inet are prisoners in my power." Meanwhile the news had spread throughout the city and crowds were gathering in the streets which opened on the Plaza. They were held back by guards until ten minutes past five, when the sixteen bells of the great cathedral rang out in a wild discord of sound which was generally in terpreted as heralding the dawn of peace. The guards then drew back and that same " many headed monster thing " which had demanded the resignation of Porfirio Diaz and welcomed Francisco Madero as the savior of the people, now rushed tumultuously forward with vivas for the man who held Madero prisoner. At half-past five Huerta and Blanquet appeared on the balcony of the Pal ace, and the Plaza quaked with peon joy as Huerta, the hero of the hour, greeted the multitude with the patriotic announcement : " Mexicans, brothers : there will be no more can nonading. Peace has come." At eight o'clock that same night General Huerta met Felix Diaz in the American Embassy in pursuance of ar rangements made by the Ambassador, and concluded a com pact by which the cabinet agreed upon in the secret confer ence of the previous day was mutually accepted, and Felix Diaz was formally placed on the presidential waiting list. When the document setting forth the understanding in de tail had been duly signed by the contracting parties, they gave out to the press the following joint proclamation: THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 303 " To the Mexican People: " The unendurable and distressing situation through which the capital of the republic has passed obliged the army, represented by the undersigned, to unite in a sentiment of fraternity to achieve the salvation of the country; in consequence the nation may be at rest; all liberties compatible with order are assured under the responsibility of the undersigned chiefs who at once assume command and administration in so far as is necessary to afford full guarantees to nationals and foreigners, promising that within seventy-two hours the legal situation will have been duly organized. " The army invites the people on whom it relies to continue in the noble attitude of respect and modera tion which it has hitherto observed ; it also invites all revolutionary factions to unite for the consolidation of National peace. " Felix Diaz. V. Huerta. " Mexico, February 18, 1913." The downfall of Madero had been accomplished. The influences which had tacitly or actively contributed to this end had now achieved their desires. The knell of Consti tutional government in Mexico had been rung, and Vic toriano Huerto, by virtue of his own adroitness, reigned in its stead. CHAPTER XVI IT has been shown how the new order of things in Mex ico came into existence through a bargain by which the demands of various persons and groups were sup posed to have been met. Among the considerations in the contract were the deaths of four men. Settlement began at once. The signing of a tangible document by Huerta and Diaz, in the American Embassy on the night of Feb ruary 18, marks the completion of the intangible and in visible contract that has been mentioned. Huerta and Diaz signed at 9:15 o'clock, according to the notation on the in strument, but in fact the ,ceremonial was not completed till eleven. At that same hour Gustavo Madero and Adolfo Basso were taken from the National Palace by sep arate escorts to the Mondragon-Diaz headquarters at the Arsenal. At half-past one in the morning, after being held in the Arsenal two hours, and subjected, it is said, to many in sults and even to physical torture, Gustavo was marched from the building by an escort of twelve soldiers, who took him toward the Palace. The story subsequently told by the guards is that the prisoner made a dash for liberty as they were passing the little park close by the Arsenal, whereupon the commander of the escort, a former aide to General Bernardo Reyes, drew a revolver and fired. Gus tavo fell at the first shot, and then the guard fired into his body, which showed twelve wounds, all from revolver bul lets. Later it was carried back into the Arsenal and be- 304 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 305 came item number one in the fulfilment of the " peace pact " made in the conference of February 17. The next item was checked off with greater formality. At three o'clock that morning, February 19, Adolfo Basso was killed by a firing squad in front of the Arsenal. He faced his executioners bravely, tore his coat open to expose his breast, shouted " Viva Mexico " and called upon the men to fire. The first volley killed him, all the bullets en tering his body. The other items of the pact, to wit, the death of Francisco I. Madero and that of Pino Suarez, were delayed in set tlement but there was never a well-founded doubt as to the eventual closing of the account. Assurances from any or all of the opponents of Madero were valueless and to place reliance upon them was inexcusable folly. The two men were in Huerta's power ; it was probable that of his own will when sober he would not order them to be killed but it was certain that he would not effectually protect them from those who desired their death. The crime which shocked the world was in plain sight, just ahead. Huerta's chief interest lay in the matters directly con nected with his own accession to power. For a little while the saving of Madero's life was one of these, and Suarez too was under the same aegis of expediency. The resigna tions of both men were to be obtained. Brief delays occurred in the preliminaries to the organi zation of a government. The agreement signed in the American Embassy was not made public till late the next day, because Jorge Vera Estanol, one of the cabinet named in the document, refused to serve. This had been fore seen, however, and the others addressed themselves to the task of bringing him into line. The post of Minister of Public Instruction was not political, they argued, and his name carried weight. Sefior Estanol had held this port- 306 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO folio, under Diaz and under de la Barra. Surely he would come in now to help at this, the gravest hour in the Repub lic's life. But Estanol (who was counsel for more than forty American corporations including Phelps Dodge & Co., whose legal adviser had been Manuel Calero up to April, 191 1 ) held out for hours. In that same white mansion which housed the Department of Gobernacion and which had been the meeting place of the men who pulled the politi cal wires of the country, the issue with Vera Estanol was fought to an end. To avoid invalidating the agreement which Diaz and Huerta had signed at the American Em bassy, Sefior Estanol finally consented. It was then that the document was published, and the members of Madero's cabinet who had been arrested were released, all excepting Pedro Lascurain handing in their resignations. At six o'clock in the evening of February 19, Congress was ordered in session to go through the formal process of setting up a new government. For three hours the leg islators went through their paces deliberately, but at nine o'clock the proceedings were accelerated and the resigna tions of Francisco I. Madero, Jr., and Jose Maria Pino Suarez as President and Vice-President were submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. There are persons who profess to know how these resig nations were procured, but I do not; no reasonable doubt, however, can exist that they were obtained under pressure and therefore were invalid. But no one at that session of the Chamber thought it prudent to challenge their genuine ness, and it is remarkable that any members should have voted against the resolutions of acceptance which, having been duly prepared in committee, were passed at 10:15 by a vote of 123 to 4. At 10:34 Pedro Lascurain, Minister of Foreign Affairs, THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 307 succeeded to the Presidency, taking the oath before both houses of Congress. His only official act was to name Victoriano Huerta as Minister of Gobernacion and after this appointment was confirmed, Lascurain presented his resignation as President, which at exactly eleven o'clock was accepted by the Chamber with but one dissenting vote. He had been President of Mexico for twenty-six minutes. In regard to the compliance of Lascurain it should be said that he could not prevent the carrying out of these plans, and that he lent his aid in the interests of peace. He had no faith in the new regime, and he left the country as soon as he could do so safely. The proceedings in Congress placed General Huerta in direct line of succession, as there was no Minister of For eign Affairs, and the Minister of Gobernacion stands next in the constitutional order. At 11:15 Huerta took the oath. He then held a short informal reception in the Green Room of the Chamber and departed for the Palacio Nacional escorted by Chepultepec Forest Guards, and tumultuously cheered by the throngs which were massed in the streets. All formalities having been complied with Victoriano Huerta was now Minister of Gobernacion, acting as Presi dent of Mexico. It has since been held that he could not resign the office of Minister of Gobernacion without de stroying his title to the presidential seat, and that in con sequence no other minister of that department could be legally appointed until, or unless, Huerta's right to the Presidency had been established by a legal general election. The case of de la Barra is cited in support of this. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, he acted as President when Porfirio Diaz resigned, but no other minister could be ap pointed, and the foreign office was carried on by the sub- secretary. If this reading of the Mexican constitution is 308 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO correct, the acts of Ministers of Gobernacion in Huerta cabinets are probably invalid. But no one was paying attention to such trifles that night, surely not Huerta, who had attained the seat of power which had been the goal of his endeavors from the moment when Madero entrusted to him the command of the troops on February 9. In ten days of bogus warfare and underhand negotiation — tricking not only the Gov ernment which he was in honor bound to support, but that Government's enemies also; false toward all, and serving his own ambitions only — he had won the coveted emi nence. Those with whom he had bargained did not yet suspect the truth; they seemed to be sharers in the triumph. The deluded city, after the mockery of strife, rejoiced in the succeeding mockery of peace. The foolish public shouted for Huerta, and almost as loudly for Diaz, who had so con fidingly stepped aside in the interests of harmony. With the vivas for these patriots were mingled others for the American Ambassador who had helped to establish order. Many politicians after lean months hoped for an era of spoils; many merchants took their narrow thoughts to bed with them that night and were not kept awake. A few men of broad mind, equipped with intellectual method, easily and accurately analyzed the situation, finding no solid merit in the new regime. They foresaw much that has come to pass, despaired of their country more com pletely than ever before, and sorrowfully resolved to leave it at the earliest opportunity. I have spoken of the resignations of Madero and Suarez as having been secured by unjustifiable means. Among these should be mentioned the promise of permission to depart safely and immediately from the city. It is per haps conceivable that Huerta thought he saw a way to save THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 309 the lives of these men and send them out of the city. It is more probable that the bargain was all the time in force by which their lives were forfeited. Nevertheless ostensi ble arrangements were made for their departure. While the crowds in the streets were cheering for Huerta, Diaz and Ambassador Wilson, on the evening of February 19 an anxious group was waiting in the Buena Vista Station of the Mexican Railway for two persons who never came. In the station shed a special train of two Pullman cars stood ready. It had been there since ten o'clock, and by midnight the passengers for whom it was supposed to have been prepared had arrived, all but the two that may be held the most important. Mrs. Madero and Mrs. Suarez were there, and with them many members of both families. Their baggage was on the train ; the losers in the game of empire were that night to start for Vera Cruz and so to permanent exile. It is useless to speak of the mortal anguish which was endured in those hours of vain waiting. At two o'clock in the morning Pedro Lascurain arrived at the station, ac companied by two lieutenants representing President Huerta. Lascurain brought the heart-breaking news that President Huerta had countermanded the order, and that the train would not leave that night. No explanation was forthcoming to comfort the stricken women, and Mrs. Ma dero broke down for the first time since the revolt began. Unable to walk she was carried to an automobile and taken to the house of a friend of the family. In order to realize the full enormity of what followed, it must be borne in mind that the 20th, 21st and 22nd of February were still to pass before the tragic climax. It is true that the most lamentable error in this affair had al ready been made, as will presently be explained, but there was still time for some intelligent effort at reparation. The 310 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO Foreign Offices of all important nations were advised of the probability that Madero and Suarez would be mur dered. It was recognized, after a fashion, in Washington, and the Government of the United States placed itself on record as objecting in advance to the summary execution of the deposed President and Vice-President. News of this action was given to the Associated Press, with the com ment that in so doing the Government did not feel " that it had departed from its policy of strict neutrality." There is no reason to believe that the timidity revealed by this expression was generally welcomed in the United States, or that it was rightly understood by any consider able number of persons. Various manifestations indicated that active measures to prevent an impending, deplorable crime would have won applause. Out of Texas always comes something new about Mexico, and now — on Feb ruary 21 — more than forty members of the legislature pe titioned their United States Senators, Culberson and Shep- pard, to use their influence to prevent the execution of Madero. " We believe," said they, " that Madero has been a credit to Mexico and far ahead of his people. His merciful, hu mane government is universally recognized and because of his leniency the men have been permitted to live who now desire to destroy him." Meanwhile in Mexico City diligent efforts were made to blacken Madero's character. A copy of the " list of twenty- two " which had been furnished to Gustavo was found in the deposed President's possession, and it was said to carry the ominous title of " Those who should die." Press cor respondents telegraphed this everywhere, and the inference was that Madero was a tyrant who had made up the list himself and labeled it for convenient reference. Madero was also charged with being an epileptic, with being insane THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 311 and with having issued a general, anti-American order to all governors of states. It was charged that he had fired the shot which killed Lieutenant-Colonel Riveroll when the latter entered the President's office with General Blanquet, and that the exe cution of General Ruis, and Colonel Morelos, Commandant of the Palace, was by Madero's arbitrary order without formality. For these crimes he was to be placed on trial. On the forenoon of Thursday, February 20, Mrs. Madero and Mrs. Suarez were permitted to visit their husbands at the National Palace, where they were under guard in the offices long occupied by Intendente Basso, who had been killed in the early morning of the io.th. It does not appear that the ex-President suggested to his wife any important course of action toward his own safety. He expressed hope, but it is extremely doubtful whether he really enter tained any. If he did it must have been based upon the remnants of his peculiar superstitions. He was a spiritualist, and had come by it honestly, for his father indulged similar fancies. The younger Fran cisco had believed from the beginning of his crusade that he was shielded, guided and enlightened by the Divine In telligence working through beings in the world beyond. The inevitable crudity marked these imaginings, and Fran cisco dealt with his Maker through the humble intermediary of a dead Indian's soul. A series of coincidences, helped by the usual forced interpretation of elastic oracles, had seemed to establish a high degree of credibility for this fantastic counsellor. The optimism which I have men tioned was probably a cause rather than an effect of these revelations, and Francisco unconsciously dictated to his familiar spirit those promises in which he placed reliance — promises that his life should be preserved and his mind inspired for honorable and efficient service to his country. 312 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO Doubtless whatever portion of sincerity might be discov ered in the charge that Madero was insane sprang from the story of his hearkening to the dead — which is amusing, in superstitious Mexico. And indeed on the whole face of the footstool there exist but a handful of human beings whose brains are not inhabited by superstitions baseless as his. Every question of the day, widely discussed, provides abun dant proof. To commune with the ghost of an Indian on affairs of state, and to believe, for instance, that nature has an intelligent interest in the proper mating of the sexes, are equally absurd, both being mere survivals of a primitive demonology, but it happens that the former can be more sanely supported than the latter. Mrs. Madero was not a spiritualist, though the fabri cators of Madero myths portrayed her as a medium, the central figure in the seances at her home. The truth is that she was unconvinced but not contemptuous, a moderate disbeliever, loving her husband, and naturally drawn toward anything in which he was interested, but restrained upon the other side by common sense. She had shared with fortitude Francisco's early disappointments, and his perils whenever this was possible. She had sympathized with his hopes, and rejoiced in his sudden and surprising triumph, though not without foreboding. What she had never shared was his conviction that he would be protected, super- naturally or otherwise, from the malice of his enemies. She had beheld him sitting in the presidential chair with a black curtain hanging just behind him, which might at any moment be pushed forward by invisible hands to enfold him and to hide him from her eyes forever. This long, vague anticipation of disaster intensified her fear for him after his fall from power. The murder of Gustavo, too plainly ominous to be mis read, was known to her but not to Francisco. She did not THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 313 tell him. She asked as to his discomforts and what could be done to ameliorate them ; gave him such encouragement as she could, and promised to come again in the afternoon. This she did, but the guards refused to admit her. They told her that the prisoner was now held incommunicado. She then rightly regarded the situation as desperate to the last degree, and after consultation with such advisers as were available, she took the only course which seemed open toward any help. Comprehending Mexico she knew that it would be mere folly to rely upon the word of the men who had risen to power. Protection for her husband, if it were to have the least solidity, must come from outside the arena where prejudice, hatred and ambition had fought out their combat .to its present stage. Her only possible resort was to the representatives of foreign powers in the capital, and the highest of these in rank was Ambassador Wilson. She knew perfectly well that he was no friend of her husband's, but on the other hand it was not to be sup posed that he would countenance assassination. Accompanied by her sister-in-law, Senorita Mercedes Madero, she went to the Embassy, in the afternoon of Feb ruary 20, and entreated Mr. Wilson to prevent the murders which were imminent. She pleaded for the life of Suarez as well as for that of Madero. Mr. Wilson told her that he had received assurances regarding her husband's safety; that the new government did not desire his death, but on the contrary would protect him. As to Suarez, the Ambassa dor declined to express himself so confidently and clearly. Mrs. Madero understood Mr. Wilson to say that Suarez might " disappear," that there was strong feeling against him because he had been a leader of the Porro (contemptu ous term for the Progressives), and that his fate was uncer tain. The effect upon Mrs. Madero's mind was merely to re- 3i4 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO inforce her conviction that there was no uncertainty as to the fate of either of the prisoners ; that both would be killed unless there should be immediate intervention in their be half. She besought Mr. Wilson to give them a refuge in the Embassy, and to protect them under the flag of the United States, and by his own direct and powerful influ ence with the persons who had overthrown the Govern ment of Mexico. The Ambassador responded by repeat ing his previous utterances. Mrs. Madero then begged him to send to the President of the United States a message which had been written by her husband's mother. As the telegraph and cable offices were now controlled by Huerta such a message would have small chance of being forwarded unless in code and with authority behind it. The Ambassador replied that this com munication was unnecessary. He took the writing, how ever, and put it into his pocket. These are the essentials of the interview. Mrs. Madero derived no comfort from Mr. Wilson's expressions because she appreciated the situation, and knew that the Ambassa dor must be relying upon empty words if he really believed that her husband would be efficiently protected by those who had overthrown him. That he did believe what he had said to her there can be no doubt, though his error now seems to have lain at the most distant extremity of reason able judgment, if not beyond. As to what may be called the basis of his opinion, there were assurances given when the resignations of Madero and Suarez were obtained, and upon other occasions, but it is unnecessary to discuss their value. It is possible that Mrs. Madero or some other member of the family would have been able to send a telegram to President Taft without the assistance of the Ambassador, for a message dated February 20, from Luis Manuel Rojas, THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 315 a member of the Mexican lower house, seems to have been received in Washington. Sefior Rojas has exhibited a reply as follows: Mr. Luis M. Rojas, Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Mexico, etc. Sir: The Department acknowledges the receipt by reference hither from the President to whom it was addressed, of your telegram of February 20 requesting that this Government do all it can to save the lives of Francisco I. Madero and Jose Maria Pino Suarez. In reply you are informed that this Department had, as a matter of course, several days prior to the death of Madero and Suarez, and immediately after their ar rest, informed the authorities of Mexico City, through the Embassy, of the unfortunate effect which would be produced in this country by an unjust or improper treatment of the deposed President and Vice-President. I am, sir, etc., (Signed) Knox. No response was ever received to the message asking President Taft to save the life of Madero — that message written by the unfortunate prisoner's mother, and intrusted by his wife to the Ambassador of the United States for transmission two days before the murders. On March 2, eight days after her appeal had been justified by the crime she had striven to prevent, the widow of Madero sent from Havana a letter of inquiry addressed to President Taft, begging to know whether the message of February 20 had ever come to his hands. This also remained unanswered. Doubtless it reached Washington after the accession of President Wilson. These vain pleas have only a passing sentimental inter est. It is not to be supposed that the Washington Govern ment could have been stirred to greater activity by any thing except a better view of the situation in Mexico City, 316 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO interpreted by some peculiarly enlightened patriot who could foresee what price the United States would have to pay for those two lives which might so easily have been saved. Merely to predict their doom required no major prophet, surely not after the murder of Gustavo Madero. Neither should it have been difficult to form an opinion that Wood- row Wilson, who was to succeed to the presidency a few days later, would not recognize Huerta stained by the blood of his predecessor. But these matters fall to be consid ered later. What happened in Mexico City is somewhat obscure as to detail, but is in its essence very simple. Madero and Suarez remained prisoners in the National Palace, and their situation was unchanged by anything that occurred on February 21. On the following day Provisional Presi dent Huerta issued his declaration of iron rule in the fol lowing " MANIFESTO TO THE NATION " In assuming, through the operation of the law, the office of Provisional President of the republic, by virtue of the resignation of the President and Vice-President I must make an appeal to the patriotism of all good Mexicans that they will come forward to cooperate with the new government in the reestablishment of public peace. The country, in the terrible crisis through which it is passing, needs the united effort of all its sons, in order to be saved from the anarchy which menaces it. " In order to assist me in my administrative labors, I have called to my side men of good will without distinction of political parties. They come without animosity for the past, without desire for revenge, without any other aspiration than that of putting an end to the fratricidal strife which is destroying us and of restoring guarantees for the lives and properties of nationals and foreigners throughout the republic. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 317 " I trust that all Mexicans will aid me in this patri otic work which aims at saving our very nationality, which may be jeopardized, and of restoring to the country the tranquillity which it so much needs for the development of its resources, and I also hope that the methods of conciliation which the Government is initi ating will suffice for the end which I propose to myself ; but if, unfortunately, bad citizens, blinded by passion, insist on prolonging the strife or opposing obstacles to the Government by violent means, I shall not hesitate an instant in adopting the measures of rigor that may be necessary for the rapid restoration of public peace. The welfare of our country demands it. " General Victoriano Huerta. " Mexico, February 22, 1913." A few hours later, on the night of Saturday, February 22, 1913, the two remaining items of the " peace pact " were checked off as settled in full. Just before midnight, with some attendant mystery rather crudely contrived, Madero and Suarez were slain. V CHAPTER XVII THE newspapers of Monday morning, February 24, 1913, carried an official statement by the new Mexi can Government which had been issued at three o'clock on Sunday morning, February 23, three hours after the deaths of Madero and Suarez were alleged to have oc curred. The statement was signed by Provisional President Huerto and began as follows: " At 12 :3o o'clock this morning, I called together my cabinet to report that Madero and Pino Suarez, who were detained in the palace at the disposal of the De partment of War, were taken to the penitentiary in accord with a decision as a result of which that estab lishment was placed yesterday afternoon under the charge of an army officer for better security. When the automobiles had traversed about two-thirds of the way to the penitentiary, they were attacked by an armed group and the escort descended from the ma chines to offer resistance. " Suddenly the group grew larger and the prisoners tried to escape. An exchange of shots then took place in which one of the attacking party was killed, two were wounded and both prisoners killed. " The automobiles were badly damaged." The document then described the means which would be employed in investigation of the affair, and closed with these words: " The Government promises that society shall be fully satisfied as to the facts in this case. The com manders of the escort are now under arrest and the facts above recorded have been ascertained so as to clear up this unhappy event." 318 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 319 The British press on Monday morning, February 24, called upon the United States for intervention. The Stand ard stigmatized the killing of Madero and Suarez as " an indefensible crime, imposing a load of infamy on the new Mexican administration," and added that " American in tervention can hardly be longer delayed." The Express urged the British Government to press for immediate ac tion by Washington, saying that " revolution and anarchy do not wait on presidential etiquette." The Chronicle de clared that Madero was done to death by Huerta and asked what the United States would do. The Times was more explicit in its treatment. It said: " Civilized nations will put their own construction on the lame and halting story which the successful conspirators now ruling Mexico have chosen to issue. Unless it can be proved to the hilt, foreign observers will retain the opinion that the removal of the two Maderos and Suarez is only fresh proof that the innate ferocity of Mexican politicians and military adven turers remains untamed. " The most for which the unhappy country can hope is the restoration of a rule not worse than that of Diaz." The last six words were a genuine contribution to critical history which should not be overlooked by any student. For an accurate view of the event which had caused so much noise in the world it is natural that the people of the United States should depend upon their Ambassador whose situation was so favorable to correct vision. He expressed himself publicly as follows: In the absence of other reliable information I am disposed to accept the Government's version of the manner in which the'deposed President and Vice-Pres ident lost their lives. Certainly the violent deaths of these persons were without Government approval, and 320 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO if the deaths were the result of a plot it was of re stricted character and unknown to the higher officers of the Government. Mexican public opinion has accepted this view of the affair, and it is not at all excited. The present Gov ernment appears to be revealing marked evidence of activity, firmness and prudence, and adhesions to it, as far as I have been able to ascertain, are general throughout the republic, indicating the early reestab- lishment of peace. The Government as constituted is very friendly to the United States and is desirous of affording effective protection to all foreigners. For the present, American public opinion should deal with the situation calmly and accept with great reserve the lurid and highly colored stories which are being furnished by some few correspondents. The great majority of the correspondents here are endeavoring to deal fairly with the situation. Within doors at the Embassy, however, Ambassador Wilson was less optimistic. On the afternoon of February 24, during a call from Sefior de la Barra, who was now Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new cabinet, the Ambas sador's voice was raised to an unusual volume in denuncia tion of the crime and of the men who either had encour aged or permitted it. Disregarding the presence of persons in adjoining rooms of the Embassy, to whom his words were distinctly audible, the Ambassador upbraided de la Barra personally for this incident which he said " smelled to Heaven as the blackest of infamies " and would " place the brand of murder upon the brow of every man of authority in the new govern ment." Especially discrediting, he assured the polite Mexi can statesman, would this bloodshed prove to de la Barra himself. Aside from other considerations, the Ambassador declared THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 321 a personal grievance against his caller because of solemn assurance given by de la Barra that Madero's life would be spared. Eloquence and emphasis were so combined in this outburst of wrath that de la Barra, as he left the Em bassy, shrank from the gaze of those who had been drawn from the other rooms by the noise of the encounter and who watched him go away. The call of Sefior de la Barra had followed an official communication which he had issued on Sunday, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed to Ambassador Wilson and the other diplomats, setting forth at length the measures which the Government purposed taking to discover and chastise those who might be found guilty of the deed, and promising to supply the diplomatic corps with minutes of the judicial proceedings. The luncheon to which the Min ister had invited the diplomatic corps for that Monday did not take place. Sensational accounts of the death of Madero and Suarez, at variance with the Government's report, spread through the capital and were telegraphed to newspapers everywhere. One such account declared that both Madero and Suarez were killed in the Palace early in the evening, after having been subjected to torture; and that their bodies were car ried in the automobile to the penitentiary, where shots were fired to give color to the story of attack. The statement to the press by Major Francisco Cardenas, who commanded the escort, differed somewhat from the official account. The two automobiles had been fired upon, Cardenas said, as they were crossing the railway, by men lying down. He had returned the fire with his revolver and had ordered the chauffeurs to put on speed, and the ambush had been passed with no harm done to guard or prisoners. But when the cars approached the penitentiary another band of about twelve men had opened fire and in the resulting 322 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO confusion both Sefior Madero and Senior Pino Suarez had descended from the automobile and run toward the attack ing party. Thus they had come between two fires and had been shot to death. The body of Madero, Major Cardenas said, disclosed wounds which must have been received in the manner de scribed; that is, by a fire from front and rear. He said further that three of the assailants were dead on the field after the affair. This story was contradicted by the report of the autopsy made at the order of the Government, for it was therein stated that the body of Madero showed only one gun-shot wound, the bullet having entered at the base of the skull and lodged in the brain. There were abrasions on the fore head, doubtless due to a fall. No member of the Madero family was permitted to be present at the autopsy. The account furnished by de la Barra on Sunday to the diplomatic corps, mentioned that one person, other than the prisoners, had been killed and two wounded, but that he had not been informed whether these had been of the assailants or of the escort. After painstaking effort to learn the truth I am inclined to discredit the report that the deposed President and Vice- President were killed in the Palace. I have examined va rious accounts which place the crime there, some of them plausible, but none convincing. It is said that a man named Ocon was the chief of the assassins, and that an appropria tion of 30,000 pesos, afterwards asked of the Mexican Congress, was the price of the deed. The hour is set early in the evening, when Huerta was attending a banquet given by the American Ambassador, who had the diplomatic corps as his other guests, the occasion being the birthday of George Washington. As Huerta is not charged with hav ing an actual hand in the murders the alibi is unimportant. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 323 Moreover, I decidedly favor the theory that Madero and Suarez were taken from the Palace alive. Certain defenders of the Government have said that Mrs. Francisco I. Madero, Jr., knew that her husband was to be taken from the Palace to the penitentiary, and that she in stigated an attempt to rescue him. They say further that Madero asked that a certain route be followed. This is supposed to indicate his knowledge of the plot; but the trouble is that the indication is so clear that it could not have escaped the notice of Major Cardenas, who, unless he desired to meet the rescue party, would certainly have chosen another way. In fact, he said that he did. Even to one who feels deeply the shameful nature of this tragedy it is difficult to deal seriously with the Mexican Government's defense. If the story of Major Cardenas is believed, the theory of a rescue must be dismissed, for it is obvious that the rescuers would never have fired upon a moving automobile containing the persons whom they de sired to save. They would have put an obstacle in the way of the car, and would have rushed upon it, after it had stopped, in sufficient force to overawe the armed men whom it contained. I cannot imagine Mrs. Madero's trusting to any Mexican marksman to pick off the chauffeur and miss her husband; and this is not the worst of it, for there re mains the even more forbidding chance that, at the first shots of an assault so ill arranged, the escort would kill the prisoners. A party of twelve men might have had some hope of suc cess at the penitentiary, where the necessary halt could have been counted upon, and the affair managed with sufficient suddenness to snatch the captives away before their guards could shoot them. The difficulty is that Madero and Suarez were killed on the far side of the penitentiary, at a point beyond the entrance. Why they were taken to that spot 324 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO at all, except to murder them more conveniently, has never been explained, but the fact is established, and the question arises, how did the rescuers know where to lie in wait? If they received intimations from Madero's enemies, it would seem that Cardenas must have been in the plot, or he would not have let the car go past the prison. But if he were a party to the attempt, why did it fail ? It is not well to waste words upon this matter. The theory of the rescue will not stand examination from any point of view ; the theory of deliberate murder is supported by every probability. As to the place and time I have the testimony of two young Mexicans of my acquaintance who lived not far from the penitentiary, and who visited the scene about five o'clock in the morning. They saw blood upon the ground, and viewed it closely. I think they are not mistaken in their belief that the bodies of Madero and Suarez had lain upon the spots examined, and that the blood was theirs. Its quantity and appearance negatived the theory that the men were brought there dead, having been killed in the Palace. Except for the fact that the prisoners were carried be yond the penitentiary, it would be easy to acquit Major Cardenas of blame. He would hardly have cared to lead the escort, if he had known that the party was to be fired upon. The etiquette in use for such affairs in Mexico would not have been strained by sending him upon such an er rand unadvised, and stationing a squad to shoot prisoners and guard with one volley or as many more as might be necessary. His escape from injury is rather against him. At last accounts he was alive, and possibly the sole reposi tory of the truth, for the three men who served under him in this expedition are dead. My own opinion is that there was no attack at any point, but I do not pretend to know exactly what took place. The THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 325 details would be a proper subject of police inquiry, in a better ordered state. The single fact of importance in the present record is that Madero and Suarez were killed after the whole world had been warned of the probability, the practical certainty that such would be their fate. The United States has paid, is paying, and will pay for this crime, a price which might appear to be sufficient expiation if exacted from the guilty. The cost of it, the shame of it, might have been avoided easily. Ambassador Wilson should have known, shortly after February 9, that the warfare in Mexico City was a farce, that Huerta had betrayed Madero and was in negotiations with the Mondragon-Diaz-de la Barra coalition probably with personal designs upon the Presidency. He should have suspected that Madero must soon fall, and that he and Gustavo and Suarez and others would be in danger. Per haps the Ambassador might not have felt constrained to protect Gustavo, whose death was not likely to disturb the peace of nations, but he should certainly have foreseen that serious evils would follow the murder or summary execu tion of the President and Vice-President. The exercise of common judgment and the use of his peculiar influence and advantages would have enabled Mr. Wilson to comprehend the bargaining that was under way and the passions and intents of the interested parties, and to perceive that at any moment he might successfully insert a stipulation of his own ; to wit, that when the President and Vice-President should be seized, they should immediately be sent unharmed to the American Embassy, there to re main until such time as they could leave that refuge safely. If the Government at Washington had understood the situation and had looked into the future prudently, the Am bassador would have been' directed to take this course. Ponderous arguments may be made upon the other side, 326 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO but they will be nonsense to any one who knows where the Ambassador really stood ; and if his chief in the State De partment did not know, let him now divide the responsi bility for his ignorance with ex-Ambassador Wilson, upon any arithmetical basis that may suit them both. As to the effect of such a request or demand upon the negotiators in Mexico City, there can be no uncertainty. Huerta might have filled the circumambient air with curses, but inwardly he would have been delighted. His hand would have been strengthened to carry out the very policy which his own mind had formulated. The others in the conspiracy would have been unable to resist, at that critical hour when the fortunes of all of them hung in the bal ance. To sum up, it matters little in precisely what way this blood was shed. The evidence against the actual assassins is not likely to be called for in any court. But it matters very much that the crime was not prevented; that Madero and Suarez were not protected by the American flag. It would be unjust to Mr. Wilson to omit all mention of the praise which he won for his activity in protecting Amer icans and others during the time of the terror in the Mexi can capital. I will say frankly, however, that I think a greater injustice was done him through the foolish exag geration of his heroism and efficiency. The plain truth about this matter would have been much better. Some of his relief work was well inspired and thoroughly done. He was greatly assisted by his wife, who had already won the regard of resident Americans, and who gained deservedly in their esteem by her intelligent, sympathetic and very val uable services in this crisis. The Embassy became a relief center. An idea of what was done may be gained from the following translation of an account in El Diario of February 23 : THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 327 " The American colony in Mexico City gave a new proof of the practical ability of the race during the days when firing was in progress in this city. " Opposite the United States Embassy the Ameri cans established what may be called a city within a house. They there organized an asylum in which per sons of American nationality having their homes in the danger zone might take refuge and at one time there were about 1000 refugees. They founded a provisional bank by means of which they made remittances to the United States. They arranged a red cross hospital for the care of the wounded, in which the best Ameri can surgeons of the city rendered their services, and they improvised a telegraph service, also handling cablegrams. " On the last day of the firing, the American colony were going to receive cablegrams from New York, sent free by the Sun for a small English daily for which a small printing office had been established. " Besides the American refugees there were many persons of other nationalities and even a fair number of Mexicans who were opportunely received into the curious institution in question. " It is said that in the American refuge everything needful was supplied, and no end of persons have thanked the American colony for its timely helpful ness."In this work the Ambassador and his wife were natu rally the leaders. Mr. Wilson went about the city in his car, risking his life within the danger zone, and rendering as sistance to many persons. And because I believe that this work was in itself creditable, I regret the more that it should have been exploited in ways worse than questionable, for political ends by those who were determined not to lose an ambassador committed to the support of the newly risen Huerta administration, if they could possibly retain him. This is not to say that the Ambassador had no friends, no sincere admirers. He had both, and it is much to be regret- 328 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO ted that those among them who possessed some grains of discretion did not succeed in controlling the conduct of the political and business combination which took the lead. At a special meeting of " the colony," held at the Ameri can club on February 28, a committee on resolutions was appointed, the most influential member being George W. Cook, the merchant heretofore mentioned. The commit tee's report contained 300 words in praise of the Ambassa dor, fifty words for Mrs. Wilson, and 200 for all the other workers. Consul General Shanklin, who had been less conspicuous but no less serviceable than the Ambassador, was grouped with the Rosario Dairy and other objects of gratitude in a vote of thanks which held an average of six words for each. The committee's commendation of the Ambassador was cheered to the echo; it consisted of an elaborate preamble with these appended resolutions : " Resolved : that the American colony recognize the fact that to the American Ambassador, the Hon. Henry Lane Wilson, they owe a debt of gratitude the magni tude of which cannot be expressed in words, but which shall remain with them a cherished memory of the noble and patriotic services rendered under most try ing conditions, which stamp him as an American of whom his countrymen may well feel proud, and to whom the American colony extends this humble token of appreciation. " Resolved : That a copy of these resolutions be engrossed and presented to the Honorable Henry Lane Wilson, American Ambassador, and that a copy also be sent to the State Department in Washington." The last line disclosed the object of the meeting. In four days a new administration would be inaugurated at Washington. The resolutions were the signal guns of the THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 329 campaign to be waged for the Ambassador's retention at the Mexico post. On Monday, February 24, the bodies of the murdered President and Vice-President, which had been placed in coffins in the penitentiary with no member of either family present, were buried — Madero in the French cemetery and Suarez in the Spanish. The members of the immediate families were allowed to attend the ceremonies. Directly afterward the Maderos made all possible speed to leave Mexico City for Vera Cruz, whence they sailed for Ha vana, accompanied by the Cuban minister, Manuel Mar- quez Sterling, who declined longer to represent his country at the Mexican capital. In due course the Maderos reached New York, in which city and its suburbs several of them now reside. On that February 24th the portraits and busts of General Diaz and the former ministers and presidents of Mexico which Madero had removed were restored to their original places in the Palacio Nacional. The Governments of Europe and the United States were now perplexed over diplomatic etiquette ; there was no official way in which they could give adequate expression to their sympathy. Neither Washington nor any of the European chancelleries found itself equal to the task of framing offi cial condolence in terms that would not prematurely dis close the condoler's attitude toward the vital subject of rec ognition. The Washington Government had telegraphed Ambas sador Wilson on February 19, commending the part he had taken in ending the Mexican trouble, and that day the As sociated Press described the Washington attitude in the following terms : r" If the constitutional forms are observed and Con gress is freely allowed to elect a provisional President 330 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO and take steps for providing for free general elections then the Washington Government will cordially and sympathetically support the efforts to establish a per- \ manent government." But the killing of Madero complicated matters and no one could be found north of the Rio Grande who was in discreet enough to forecast what Washington's position would be. The Taft administration, however, was well placed for recognition, because its Ambassador had prac tically committed it to such a course by his acts, and by his official statement on February 24, which has been quoted. It is idle to speculate as to the course which the Taft administration would have pursued, if it had remained in office. What it did do was to place some 9,000 troops con venient to the Mexican border and despatch four battle ships into Mexican waters. In deference to the Wilson administration, which was to succeed it nine days after the culmination of the Mexican tragedy, it declined to commit itself on the subject of recognition. It is said, in fact, that this logical method of dividing responsibility in the aggra vating Mexican matter went far to reconcile President Taft to giving up the presidential office. The personal letter of Mr. Taft, written several weeks after his term had closed, to Ambassador Wilson in Mexico, and promptly published by the latter, seems to indicate that the incident of Madero's death had in no way affected Mr. Taft's generously favor able judgment of the Ambassador and his acts. In Mexico itself the killing of Madero gave strong im petus to movements adverse to Huerta, and justified that gentleman's judgment that a dead Madero was the worst of enemies. Venustiano Carranza, governor of Coahuila, and Abram Gonzalez, governor of Chihuahua, strong parti sans of Madero, had been superseded by military officials, THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 331 and on February 28 the first real battle of a new and ap parently endless war was fought a few miles north of Monclova in the state of Coahuila, and the Carranza forces were defeated. The northern belt of Mexico then sprang promptly into action and insurrectionary bands were soon operating in the states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, as well as in the states of Chihuahua and Coahuila. Governor Abram Gonzalez of Chihuahua was a man of character, ability, and judgment. To avoid plunging his state into war he had, after a short delay, accepted Huerta as Mexico's president. But his loyalty to Madero was too well known, and General Antonio Rabago, Huerta's mili tary commander for that section, was directed to supersede him. Armed with credentials from Mexico City, Rabago threw Gonzalez into prison, and took possession of the gov ernor's office. A few days later Gonzalez was placed on a train at night for transfer to another point. When the train had gone a few miles Gonzalez was dragged from the car by seven men, and killed in a manner too brutal for description. In the record of wholesale executions of prisoners that were reported from various quarters, Abram Gonzalez seemed to the general public but one unfortunate among hundreds who fell victims to the revival of the old tyranny ; but many Americans on both sides of the border who had known and greatly respected the man, were decisively in fluenced by this conspicuous instance of brutality on the part of the new government. If helpless prisoners of such quality who had committed no crime were t,o be killed at the pleasure of their guards, the future of Mexico was dark indeed. The development of affairs in the far off northwestern state of Sonora soon became the greatest menace to Huerta's rule. The incidents which placed that state in opposition 332 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO have never been fairly sketched in any printed record. They are of value ih tracing American responsibility. General Huerta, on February 18, telegraphed to the gov ernor of Sonora that he held Madero prisoner. Two days later he telegraphed again, announcing his elevation to the provisional presidency and demanding instant acceptance of the new order. To refuse meant war with consequent loss to many important American interests in that state, and with this in mind Louis Hostetter, United States Consul at Hermosillo, the capital of Sonora, used his strong personal influence to induce the state government to yield to Huerta's demand. He had succeeded in this when the as sassination of Madero and Pino Suarez aroused resentment and overthrew the agreement. At this stage Mr. Hostetter received a telegram from Ambassador Wilson directing him to do everything in his power to induce Sonora to accept Huerta as president, and telling the consul that the majority of the Mexican states had already done so. Hostetter at once applied himself with increased vigor, and made such progress with the authorities that they directed him to request a list from the Ambassador of the states which he positively knew had accepted Huerta, promising that if this list showed an actual majority, Sonora would not hold out against the new ruler. The consul telegraphed this request with its assurances in the full belief that he had accomplished that which the Am bassador had requested him to do; that the list would be immediately forthcoming, and that all would be well. Receiving no reply, Consul Hostetter telegraphed again urging the necessity for detailed information. Still there was no answer, whereupon the officials of Sonora declared themselves unwilling to wait for a trap to be sprung which would find them unprepared. The state congress or legis lature then framed a resolution refusing allegiance to THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 333 Huerta and also voted a leave of absence to Governor May- torena, who was believed to be too complacent toward the attempt of Huerta to reduce the state to a dependency of an absolute military dictatorship. Governor Maytorena de parted for California, and Rafael Pesquiera was made act ing governor in his stead. But Consul Hostetter did not give up his efforts to preserve the peace of the state. For several days he labored with the officials, and finally the legislature passed a resolution which the consul telegraphed to the Ambassador. It pro vided that if Huerta would guarantee to Sonora state rights, withdraw the few Federal troops then stationed there, and permit the state to elect its own officials, a commission would be sent to Mexico City to arrange details. The legislature was strongly influenced toward caution in these negotia tions by the fate which had overtaken Governor Gonzalez of Chihuahua, whose acceptance of Huerta had not been forwarded so promptly as was desired. In his telegram to the Ambassador, Consul Hostetter in formed him that unless the Huerta government could at once send 5,000 troops to Sonora it would be best to accept the terms, as the people of the state, excepting the Cientifico element, were of one mind and would fight hard for their rights. Neither to this telegram nor to several subsequent ones of an urgent character did the Ambassador make answer of any kind then or afterwards. It was Huerta who fur nished the response to these telegrams addressed to the Ambassador by Consul Hostetter, and it was Colonel Gar cia, bearing Huerta's credentials as military governor, who delivered it, backed by a strong force of Federal troops. But when Colonel Garcia arrived, Sonora was waiting for him, and the result was war as bitter and brutal as any that has sprung from these troubles in Mexico. 334 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO Ambassador Wilson's course in this matter invites crit icism. American enterprises in Sonora supplied its life blood, and this is true of the state of Sinaloa, which lies next to it on the south, and which promptly joined Sonora in revolt. None of the Americans who have suffered loss in tho'se states as the result of their Ambassador's strange attitude can regard his management of the affair with com placence. The Ambassador cannot well say that he was unwilling to meddle, for his record in Mexico City shows him very prone to interfere in local affairs. Moreover, he had al ready meddled in Sonora when he asked the consul to sup port Huerta by every means in his power. The Ambassador's relationship to Huerta from the night the compact was signed in the Embassy was very close. If he had induced the dictator to guarantee to Sonora the au tonomy which the Mexican constitution provides, that state would have remained peaceful, Americans and Europeans there would not have been despoiled, and the backbone of Mexico's revolt against Huerta would have been broken. Also this action on Huerta's part would have acted favorably at Washington and elsewhere. The only possible conclusion which can be drawn is that Huerta stood for absolutism pure and simple, and that the Ambassador was unable to dissuade him. While the North and Northwest of Mexico were get ting into action in various ways to demonstrate repudiation of Huerta by force of arms, Zapata and the other bandit leaders to the southward were treating with the new gov ernment. The negotiations came to nothing, but they aided the newspapers of the capital in their diligent efforts to support the new order of things. The press was by no means untrammeled and it was uniformly laudatory of the Government as was extremely fitting when arbitrary im- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 335 prisonment was due to follow sharply upon the utterance of a critical word. Mexico City had cleared its streets as rapidly as possible of the debris resulting from the bombardment. Most of the dead, whose number is variously estimated between three thousand and five thousand, had been carried in carts to vacant fields outside the city, and there soaked in pe troleum and burned. No official attempt was made to ascertain the names of the unfortunates thus disposed of. Persons who possessed the means and could identify their dead could give them private burial, but for the most part wholesale incineration in heaps was the method employed. Very few Americans or Europeans had been killed, and the losses of the Federal and revolutionary forces were small. The great majority of the victims were of the poorer classes of citizens who were drawn into the line of fire by curiosity or by mere stupidity. Almost immediately after the new government was or ganized the matter of finance was brought forward and its pressing nature was emphasized. It became current talk everywhere that the Maderos had looted the treasury, and many declared that killing was too good for them. Cen sure of Huerta was expressed for permitting any of the family or the members of the Government to escape. A report gained credence that only 892 pesos remained of all the Government funds ; and I think the belief still exists, throughout the part of the world which interests itself, that Mexico was bankrupt when Madero was deposed. Let us therefore enter with exactness at this point the report of balances in treasury offices and banks, made by the Huerta Government on February 21, 1913, two days after that Government was officially installed. This is the account in detail, signed by Huerta officials : 22,6 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO National Bank of Mexico: Special account 4% $5,000,000.00 Current account 874,524.48 $ 5,874,524.48 Mexican Central Bank: 5% 1,600,000.00 3% 2,000,000.00 3,600,000.00 Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas 37,5o8.i6fr. 14,521.16 Bank of England 26,000.00 253,822.50 Commission of Money and Exchange. . . 18,821,829.43 Financial Agency of Mexico in London. .. .33,794 3s. id. 329,912.30 Treasury of the Federation 432,363.89 National lottery 392,044.46 National mint 9,720.76 Direction of the stamp 672,973.52 Stamp printing office 28,822.86 Direction of taxes of the Federal district 20,884.85 Treasury of the national Congress 34,910.23 Direction of the post office 533,080.54 Sundry offices of the Federal district. . . 304,410.92 Agencies of the treasury department. . . . 277,079.66 Tax office in Tepic 15,280.06 Custom houses 435,231.11 Provincial branches of the treasury (es timated) 500,000.00 Legations and consulates (estimated) . . . 300,000.00 Total amount $33,078,641.60 This statement was signed by treasury officials and by T. Esquivel Obregon, Minister of Finance. The bonded indebtedness of Mexico on June 30, 191 1, was $440,186,566.25 (Mexican). To this debt, during Madero's administration, were added $20,000,000 (Mexi can) for general treasury uses, and $20,000,000 (Mexican) for maintenance of the parity fund in New York. In fairness to the Madero Government it must be urged that in view of its effort for months to secure permission THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 337 from Congress to make a loan, and in view of the fact that it had been maintaining an active army of nearly 60,000 men, this showing is decidedly to its credit. In no way does it justify the criticisms that have been made. The financial record of the Madero Government cannot be ana lyzed to sustain the random and reckless charges that the treasury was looted or that undue profits were made by Madero favorites. On the contrary, the distribution of available funds among the depositaries, and the operation of fiscal affairs indicate wise financial management. Freely as I have set forth the peculiar and at times wholly disconcerting features of Francisco Madero's method of government, quite as freely do I accord to it a degree of financial honesty which few governments can safely boast. Thirty-three million pesos was too low for its treasury balances while the Government was under extraordinary army expense, but it was far from bankruptcy, far from furnishing ground for the attacks in Chamber and Senate. The reason for those attacks is fairly clear ; the misrepre sentations that have been made with regard to the finances are of a piece with those that were press-agented broadly before Madero's fall to prove his unfitness to the world. Mexico's revenues, as stated elsewhere, were at the highest point when the end came, and it is my firm belief that if Madero had found a way to defeat the loose-jointed mili- tary-Cientifico conspiracy of February, 1913, Mexico to day would be prosperous, and many of those who were most persistently hostile to Madero would be crowding about his standard with professions of loyalty. CHAPTER XVIII MEXICO and the United States experienced a change of administration about the same time. On February 24, Madero, the unsuccessful progressive, went to his grave, and on March 4, Taft, the unsuccessful conservative, departed toward a college professorship and a round of lecturing upon pleasant commonplaces, ex pounded to the taste of the educated simple, and designed to reestablish popularity along safe and sane lines. Two strong and resourceful men had taken the highest seats in the two countries — strong in different ways, con trasted rather than similar in their acumen, widely unlike in experience, and as far apart as possible in their morality. They have been the conspicuous actors in the drama, dwarf ing all others in the popular view, except perhaps the comedian, Pancho Villa. The action of the piece has cen tered on the duel between Huerta and Wilson, a contest much more real than that of a military aspect in which the formidable Indian had recently been engaged — the bom bardment in Mexico City — yet not quite what it seemed, as will hereafter be made plain. The minor characters — Mondragon, Diaz, Calero, Vera Estanol, the survivors of the Madero party, etc. — had little set down for them but exits, which they made when their cues came. De la Barra had a quiet scene or two, and Henry Lane Wilson had the center of the stage for a mo ment. A new personage, Venustiano Carranza, " first chief of the constitutionalists," appeared conspicuously, then got word from Washington and retired for a time. Upon the 338 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 339 whole the performance, as I have already said, had very much the aspect of a duel between the two presidents. The world has been asked to believe that events in Mexico since the 4th of March, 1913, may be accounted for by two causes; the unsettling effect of Madero's at tempt to establish democracy in a country unprepared for it, and President Wilson's refusal to recognize the Huerta Government as de jure. The preceding chapters have been devoted to disclosing the influences which nullified Madero's honest efforts — the influences, not of twelve or thirteen million peaceful, unlettered Indians, but of educated and powerful men in Mexico and elsewhere. These had consented to the wreck ing of the Government, as they might have consented to the wrecking of a corporation in the hope of bettering their own position through a reorganization. Most Americans and Europeans held this view, or at least had been greatly affected by the constant assertions that the Madero rule was not good for business — a kind of panic talk, that had been a weapon of the late President's enemies. The foreigners did not lament Madero's fall; most of them looked upon him as a disturber, and had ac cepted the ten days' battle in Mexico City as a full demon stration of his inefficiency. They were shocked by the mur ders, but hardly a man of them saw what must follow. Nearly all believed that the prospects for an enduring peace had been materially bettered by Madero's death, though the manner of it had been unfortunate. The new govern ment, they supposed, represented all the most powerful cliques. There would be trouble for some time with the Maderistas and the bandits, said the resident foreigners, but they had considerable hope in Huerta as a man capable of reestablishing a Diaz rule — not under Felix, of course — and they were greatly influenced in the new dictator's 340 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO favor by the attitude of the American Ambassador toward him. Severe losses already had been sustained by the foreign ers, the largest, without doubt, falling upon Americans and American corporations. Of the 40,000 Americans, which my special canvass in 1910 had disclosed as permanent resi dents, possibly 20,000 were in Mexico at the beginning of March, 1913. The number had been smaller directly after the great stampede of March, 1912, but the alarm had been false and many had returned. Practically all who had re mained away were heavy losers, and so were many who came back, but the great majority of the English speakers who were in Central Mexico at the time the Huerta Government was set up preferred it to its predecessor, and hoped for better business conditions in the near fu ture. In Mexico City the Americans saw their Ambassador as diligent for the new government as was any man connected with it, from Huerta down. All knew what his attitude had been toward Madero, and some of them understood the inwards of the matter fairly well, and were very glad of the change. A Mexican President pulling one way and an American Ambassador pulling the other make a bad, in fact an impossible, combination as regards governmental stabil ity, and commercial advantages. Some of these men were well satisfied with Ambassador Wilson, personally, others were not. But in one thing they were thoroughly agreed: they did not wish to see another situation like that which they had just passed through, where the dean of the diplo matic corps was hostile to the government. They therefore hoped devoutly, for business reasons which were the only potent ones with them, that President Wilson would retain his namesake, the Ambassador, that nothing would mar the latter's cordial relations with Huerta, THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 341 and that the new administration in Washington would promptly recognize the man who had seized the helm in Mexico. Estimates of American investments in Mexico printed in newspapers of the United States were current about that time and were visibly incorrect in detail although not far from fair in total. Railway investments were overesti mated by fully $200,000,000, as a large portion of the rail way securities originally floated by American bankers had been sold to Europe. Moreover Mexican Government notes and bonds were named among American holdings, but nearly all of these had been disposed of in Canada and Eng land and the European continent. On the other hand American investments in mining properties, rubber proper ties, oil lands and haciendas were greatly understated, and when the small individual holdings of resident Americans are fairly figured, I consider the tptal estimate of a billion dollars, most of which represented actual cash, as not far from correct. These investments now had undergone a great shrinkage, which it would be futile to attempt to estimate. But the element which seems to have made little impres sion upon the men who were inside of the game in Mexico City or the observers in Europe and the United States, was the release from active employment of peaceably disposed peons who presently became recruits for the bands which as " constitutionalists," or without attempt to dignify their occupation, preyed upon property. It is estimated that in 19 10 fully 1,800,000 Mexicans were employed by American companies and individuals and that by March, 1913, not less than 500,000 of them were entirely idle, while as many more were without regular work. In addition to this the decreased patronage of Americans was seriously felt by a host of Mexican Indians who made a living from produce 342 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO which they carried into the towns on their backs and sold to American families. Reduced to the starvation point the unemployed and the little traders made up a constantly increasing menace to the peace. Let no one permit himself to be impressed with the statement that all Mexicans would rather fight than eat, or would choose murder in preference to legitimate employ ment as a means by which subsistence may be gained. Of the great body of Mexicans, totalling fifteen millions, no larger percentage were viciously inclined than of peoples in lands more advanced in culture. Let us be just to the ignorant peons; what precept of morality or righteousness would be likely to induce a million starving men in any country to die of hunger and permit their families to suf fer the same fate rather than steal from those who have plenty ? Without entering deeply into all the elements of the situ ation, the Americans in Mexico addressed themselves with vigor to their home government in support of the new order of things which, viewed through the glasses of expediency, seemed to them roseate with promise. In every way by which influence could be exerted at Washington it was promptly applied. Petitions were made up and mailed, delegations were dispatched, individuals of wealth and standing, and corporation men of financial power visited the American capital on this business, all pressing upon the Wilson administration the two vital decisions, recognition of Huerta and retention of Ambassador Wilson. A political campaign was instituted in Mexico City in the interest of Ambassador Wilson, with the Embassy as head quarters. Americans, Englishmen and Europeans in general were gathered in to join the endeavor. The endorsement of resident Americans was to be made unanimous and the sen timents of other foreigners who appreciated the Ambassa- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 343 dor's efforts during the bombardment, were desirable as a testimonial of high personal regard. The work was overdone and the design which lay behind it could not remain hidden. It was known not only in Mexico City but in the United States, where versions of the story appeared in the newspapers. Doubt was then thrown upon the spontaneity of the movement. But these considerations merely emphasized the opinion which very early began to be voiced in the press of the United States, that the American Ambassador had meddled deeply in Mex ican affairs, and had then endeavored to commit his home government without authority. If these acts of an ambas sador were to be sanctioned, unlimited discretion amount ing to usurpation of executive power would in effect be conceded to Washington diplomatic agents in general. The result might have been foreseen from the beginning, but it was so long in coming that its effect for good was lost. The problem which the Mexican tangle presented to the Wilson administration at the very outset was a severe test of its qualities if solution were to be found on a moral and entirely peaceful basis. Later on in these pages the subject will receive further treatment. What impressed the Ameri can public, as indicated by the experience of interested inr dividuals and the occasional escape of steam in Congress and the press, was the resisting power of the new adminis tration. For four months no man from Mexico could get a hearing. On March 6 a slip in routine at the Washington State Department resulted in cabling a note of commendation bearing the signature of the Secretary of State to Ambassa dor Wilson at Mexico City. Promptly given to the press by its recipient, it was cabled back to the United States and across to Europe. Three days later the Secretary cabled again withdrawing his generous words. 344 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO On March ii President Wilson issued a statement of intent to cooperate with the people of Latin America, and to use the moral force of his Administration in the interest of electoral reform in those countries, to the end that their governments should be based on the consent of the gov erned. He announced his lack of sympathy with revolu tions that served personal ambitions. The statement was regarded in Europe as too vague to commit the Washington Government to non-recognition of Huerta while an Ambassador was held in Mexico City who was exerting all his power through the American consular service and the diplomatic corps at Mexico's capital to sup port the Huerta rule. In the months of April and May, 1913, England, France, and Germany accorded recognition to the new Mexican government. This was the logical procedure from the European standpoint. Bankers and other interested persons could see no hope of settled con ditions in Mexico, should any other course be pursued. If the advice of Sefior Limantour and Lord Cowdray was asked for, it was doubtless supplied — and heeded. Although Lord Cowdray's name and his much misunder stood oil concession in Mexico have figured prominently in news reports since the setting up of the Huerta govern ment, he has said that he refrained from meddling; and Seiior Limantour, in July, 1913, specifically denied having made " intriguing representations to the Powers." It is essential, nevertheless, to consider carefully the positions and the influence of these two men. They had long been regarded by European financiers and statesmen as the chief authorities on Mexican matters. They had been consulted in preference to all others. Limantour's opinion as to Mexican credits, and as to poli tics also, was weighty beyond comparison. Lord Cow dray's knowledge of practical business development in THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 345 Mexico had been obtained from the closest contact, and from the control of large investments. Each of these men had gained in grasp of the situation by his relations with the other during fifteen years of intimate acquaintance re sulting in mutual sentiments of profound respect. It may be confidently stated that neither would have chosen Victoriano Huerta to rule over the country in which both were so deeply interested. " What a spectacle before the world ! " said Limantour in referring to him. Yet Limantour could not view with any degree of tolerance whatever the armed revolt in the North, nor favor by his advice to bankers such action as would precipitate Huerta's fall and put the so-called Constitutionalists into power. The thing to be supported was Mexico; the thing to be averted was a sweeping financial disaster which would pile up the National Railways merger and the Mexican govern ment obligations in a tangled mass of wreckage under which would lie the ruins of every considerable investment that had been made by private individuals. Whatever de gree of reticence may have seemed proper to Limantour in his desire to avoid the appearance of participation in Mexi can politics, he could not have avoided giving to those who consulted him some disclosure of his conviction as to this matter which was uppermost in his mind. In default of any evidence of a constructive policy formed by the United States in recognition of its responsi bilities toward Mexico, Limantour was compelled to regard a measure of support for the de facto government of his country as offering the only hope of staving off disaster. Lord Cowdray must have arrived at a similar conclusion through considering his own interests in the petroleum fields in the Mexican states along the Gulf of Mexico. The boring concession which he had secured in 1907, while not productive of direct results on government land, had 346 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO led him to undertake extensive operations on areas secured from private owners by purchase and lease. These opera tions had produced magnificent results, in sharp contrast to the slow progress he was making in the sale at retail of the refined product in Mexican markets. Production of crude petroleum for export and for fuel therefore de clared itself as the wise business policy, and preparation was made by him to secure immense tracts in the most promising sections of the oil belt. For several years the plans to acquire proprietary or leasehold rights in the oil states were followed with vigor, and the actual area thus brought under Lord Cowdray's control reached, in 1913, the vast total of 1,600,000 acres, about half of which is owned in fee by him or his com panies, and the remainder held under thirty-year leases. Two hundred and eighty thousand acres of land held in fee had been acquired by Lord Cowdray in 1902 as part of his Tehuantepec railway deal with the Mexican govern ment. A tract of 418,000 acres adjoining this he bought from private owners subsequent to 1907. He bought 100,000 acres more in northern Vera Cruz. The 800,000 acres acquired on leasehold necessitated nearly a thousand separate leases, some of them requiring the signatures of more than forty persons. This illus trates the complications of land ownership in those sec tions. The proprietors were of all classes, hacendados, planters, ranchmen, and even the unmodified aborigines whose ancestors had held the land from the days of Moc- tezuma. The enormous labor which this process entailed throws light upon the difficulties that will confront the framer of any equitable plan for redistribution of Mexi can lands. While Lord Cowdray had been laying this foundation for producing oil in quantities beyond the previous record LORD COWDRAY Formerly Sir Weetman Pearson. Head of the world-famous English contracting firm, S. Pearson & Son, Ltd., and of the corporations which own 800,000 acres in the Mexican oil belt and control 800,000 acres more in the same regions through 1,000 leases. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 347 of any individual, others had not been idle. The rights to bore on government land were possessed by him alone, but of purchase and lease of private properties in the oil belt. he held no monopoly, and a host of strong competitors had arisen to demand a share of the wealth which flowed in the strata 1,800 to 2,000 feet below the earth's surface. Lord Cowdray's great unmeasured well, Dos Bocas (two mouths) which in 1909 had exploded and become unman ageable, had startled the oil world. When it caught fire and burned for weeks, laying waste many square miles of property, the truth about Mexico's oil was a trade secret no longer. A year or so later Lord Cowdray's borers " brought in " the gusher Portrero del Llano, which held the world's record till November, 1913, its production for every twenty-four hours that it was permitted to flow amounting to about 700 carloads — by actual measurement 103,000 barrels of forty-two gallons each. In the spring of 1913 the general development of Mex ico's fields had advanced so far that the output of Lord Cowdray's locally organized company, the Mexican Eagle (La Aguila) was barely a half of the total. The heaviest oil concerns in the world were now in the field. The Standard Oil Company, the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, the Southern Pacific Railway Company were large hold ers. The Rothschilds were said to be interested in the reorganization of the Waters-Pierce Company. Such individuals and firms as William R. Hearst, John Hays Hammond and J. G. White and Co. were prominent. E. L. Doheny, of Los Angeles, California, had made a sen sation with his Mexican Petroleum Company and the Huestica Petroleum Company. Maximilian Whittier, Calvin Hunter and other Californians had formed corpora tions. Richard Mestres, a former employee of Lord Cow dray, had made lucky purchases of Indian lands at twelve 348 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO cents to fifty cents an acre, and in association with Ham mond and others had organized strong companies. No pumps were needed; every well was a gusher. Other substantial men had pushed their way in, and many owned producing properties. London promoters were exploiting Mexico oil lands heavily. There were prospects of a boom in oil, approaching that in rubber which had swept through England in 1909. The Mexican Yearbook records the names of 165 corporations operating in the Mexican fields in 1913. Probably as many more had been formed but were awaiting settled conditions be fore actually beginning work. The presence of these other interests, however, did ,not affect Lord Cowdray, so he says, in any injurious way; they were in fact helpful during the development stage. The possibilities of the region could not be less than 1,000,- 000 barrels a day, a volume of output nearly equal to that of the entire world outside. Lord Cowdray's domination of the crude-oil trade depended upon his facilities for handling his own product and that of others in the belt. In 1913 he made a contract with the British government to supply its navy with 7,200,000 barrels of fuel oil a year. With increase of equipment — pipe-lines, tanks, and tank- steamers — his way was open for rapid enlargement of this business to huge proportions, provided always that Mexico's internal disorders could be kept from spreading to the Tampico and the Tehuantepec regions. Here were grounds sufficient for desiring that the vis ible government of Mexico — without regard to its origin or moral qualifications — should receive support, so long as it should be useful as a protective agency. The financial situation of the Huerta government was so serious in the spring of 1913 that all parties interested were compelled to give it their close attention. Luis de la THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 349 Barra, brother of the Minister of Foreign Relations, was sent to Paris via New York to give information to those in the French capital whose aid and advice would be most helpful. Following this a representative of the interna tional banking syndicate which had taken the loan of 1910 and had considered favorably a further undertaking to be secured by the unpledged thirty-eight per cent, of the cus toms, was sent to Mexico to confer with members of the government and report upon the situation. The one-year notes of the Mexican treasury for $10,000,- 000 were maturing on June 10. The one-year notes of the Monetary Commission, endorsed by the Banco Nacional and the Banco Central (both now under French control) and amounting to $10,000,000 were due on August 31. In addition there were obligations of the National Railways of Mexico totaling $23,000,000, to be provided for. Of these obligations $10,000,000 fell due on June 1 and $13,- 000,000 on November 10. The natural recourse at such a moment would have been to ask the bankers to renew, but a syndicate headed by Speyer & Company held twenty millions of the forty-three millions maturing, and they declined to carry the obliga tions further unless they should be amply secured. The other twenty-three millions were due to bankers who were members of the new syndicate then negotiating. The crucial nature of this financial undertaking is empha sized by the fact that if the National Railways should de fault on its obligations, the corporation would fall into bankruptcy and $105,000,000 of its outstanding bonds which bore the guarantee of the Mexican Government would be come a demand obligation upon the treasury of the guar antor. The time may arrive when this default will come, but June or November, 1913, was premature. Before this important financial event occurs affairs must so shape them- 350 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO selves that prompt reorganization may be safely and profit ably effected. The negotiations were conducted with the international syndicate of bankers whose principal members are Morgan, Grenfel & Co., and Henry Schroeder & Co. of London ; Banque de Paris et Pays Bas, Credit Lyonnaise, Societe General, and Banque Francaise of Paris; Bleischroeder of Berlin; J. P. Morgan & Co., Kuhn, Loeb & Co., National City Bank, First National Bank, and Guaranty Trust Com pany of New York. Arrangements for a National Railways loan and a Mexi can Government loan were rapidly consummated with the international syndicate. The Railways loan consisted of $27,000,000 in two-year notes. The Mexican Government loan was a ten-year obligation of 20,000,000 pounds sterling, of which 6,000,000 pounds sterling was a firm underwriting by the bankers at 90, and the balance optional. Speyer & Company were compelled to subscribe to the loan in a sum equal to the maturing notes which they then held. Thus the control of Mexico's cus toms by the international syndicate was made complete, and Speyer & Company exchanged the maturing obliga tions for ten-year bonds secured, as stated, by the customs. They had, however, surrendered their position as fiscal agents of Mexico. Out of the 6,000,000 pounds which the bankers posi tively accepted in the closing days of May, 1913, less than $7)000,ooo reached the Mexican treasury for general uses, the greater part having been devoted as described. No difficulty was experienced with the Mexican Congress in securing authorization of the loan, although the pledge of 38 per cent, of the customs receipts was a feature of it. The effect of the flotation of this loan on any terms was a distinct gain for the Huerta government at home, and as a THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 351 triumph over the United States was greatly relished at the Palacio Nacional. It was a correspondingly distinct shock to the press of the United States, which had sturdily de clared that Mexico could borrow no money until Washing ton accorded recognition. When the administration was interrogated about it no reply could be elicited. Rumors of Lord Cowdray's deals in oil in association with the loan were stamped by him as falsehoods. Rumors of Li mantour influence brought equally emphatic denials. No one could be found, excepting routine Mexican Government officials, who had assisted in any way in the transaction ; the loans had been effected in the ordinary course of business, no deals had been made, no influence used. Where and by whom the most effective persuasion was exerted may be gathered from the fact that, of the loan so far as floated, Paris took one-half and the remainder was parceled out to bankers in Germany, England, Belgium, Switzerland, and New York. While financial arrangement for Mexico had been going forward, Mexico itself had steadily retrograded in stability. Practically all the North, including the states of Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, and Sonora were lost to the Huerta Government. The capitals of all these states except Sonora were still held, and certain posts pf entry on the border, but the states were overrun with bands and armies calling themselves Constitutionalists. Murder, pillage, torture, outrage, all the crimes that barbarous war fare stimulates, were committed daily in these states and in sections of other states both adjoining and remote. The general head of the Northern and Northwestern re volt against Huerta was Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila, to whom most of the bands acknowledged allegiance as " first chief," but the quality of the men who admitted his leadership was such that little faith was placed by most ob- 352 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO servers in any real cohesion when the test should come, and still less in the legitimacy of any enterprise in which they were engaged. Many pitched battles were fought with Federal troops and it must have puzzled the devil to know which side to favor, their ethics being undistinguishable. Wounded men were killed. Prisoners were executed by a firing squad un less they changed allegiance, and many were shot who were willing to fight against their comrades. In the South the Zapata bands overran the state of More los and made frequent excursions into Puebla and Mexico. Frequently their operations were carried on within twenty miles of the capital itself. The general adroitness of these bands was now established and Madero was cleared of charges of lukewarmness in their pursuit. Victoriano Huerta could not be accused of hesitation for sentimental reasons, and he was the best strategist in Mexico besides. In Sonora the war was prosecuted with bitterness. The state troops were joined by the Yaqui Indians to repel fed eral invasion and they nearly always won. The state forces in Sonora were better armed than were the Constitutional ists further east. Border smuggling of munitions of war from Arizona in the United States seemed a far easier mat ter than from Texas into the Mexican states immediately south ; from Arizona the " gun running " was carried on with little or no regard to Washington prohibition. The patrol at this part of the border was too thinly spread out to be effective. Hermosillo, in Sonora, was repeatedly threatened but never taken by Federal forces, a distinction which dignifies it among insurgent capitals. All this was destructive to legitimate business operations in agriculture, cattle raising, mining and all industries in the states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo Leon and the northern part of Tamaulipas. In Sonora there was THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 353 much interference with mining interests except those under the control of the Phelps-Dodge Corporation at Nacozari and Canannea which, except for slight troubles at the be ginning, were not molested. The Southern Pacific Rail way of Mexico, upon which nearly $70,000,000 had been spent and which was nearly completed to Guadalajara to connect with the National Railways, suspended all but tun nel work upon its line and left nearly 1000 miles of com pleted track to the mercy of events. This railway skirts the Pacific coast through Sonora, Sinaloa and a part of Tepic to a point where it swings abruptly into the state of Jalisco of which Guadalajara is the capital city. The 6000 Mexican laborers and operatives whom the company em ployed were discharged. The system of the National Railways of Mexico was dis organized in all the northern states, being used chiefly by Constitutionalists or Federals for the moving of troops. The damage to its lines and its rolling stock by July 1 totaled an enormous sum in addition to loss of income from traffic. No railway line was in operation from Mexico City to the United States border. The only exit from Mexico's capital was by way of the Mexican Railway to Vera Cruz, and thence by steamer. Damage to property belonging to American and Euro pean companies and individuals was of discouraging dimen sions. Injury to Americans was constantly being reported in despatches; now and then an American was killed, not apparently because he was an American, but because he happened to be blocking the course of events. The Wilson administration was doubtless greatly per turbed, but it made no sign. The Secretary of State was absent from Washington the major part of the time lectur ing, the State Department and the Executive Mansion estab lished a quarantine against information on the Mexican sub- 354 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO ject and held their peace. As the middle of July approached conditions grew worse steadily. There were signs of in subordination in Congress which, for the most part, had heeded with meekness the President's request for a free hand. Newspapers in the states along the Mexican border broke out in violent expressions, and newspapers further east were finding it difficult to construct editorial matter which would bear intelligently upon the news despatches in their columns, and yet be sufficiently inoffensive to Wash ington to avoid displeasing the President. The signal for action came from Europe. Various na tions were mentioned as taking the initiative, but the re ports were surmises. The nation from which the inquiry came as to to the course which Washington intended to pursue is a secret of the State Department as yet unre- vealed. But it stirred President Wilson ; and many Ameri cans at home and abroad congratulated the unknown chan cellery for its achievement. It was on July 15, that this mysterious stimulus became effective at Washington, and on the following day the step which seemed to be four months and twelve days overdue was taken — Henry Lane Wilson, Ambassador of the United States to Mexico, was recalled. CHAPTER XIX SO great had been the decline of his importance in the Mexican problem that the removal of Henry Lane Wilson from one side of the primary equation did not change the answer. The apparent policy of the United States was still found to be equal to zero. There was a plentiful lack of haste in the elimination of the Ambassador. He was summoned to Washington on July 16; he arrived there on the 26th. Nine days after ward, the resignation which he had tendered according to the diplomatic custom, at the change of administration on March 4, was accepted to take effect October 14, an ex tension of the usual sixty days to ninety. His public criticisms of the policy of the United States produced no result. If my estimate of that policy is cor rect, the Ambassador did not know what it was. His at tacks were fervid, and perhaps injudicious; his view of the recent chapter of history in which he had figured, seems to me erroneous and his argument unconvincing. These things matter very little. Though he had spoken with the tongues of men and of angels, he would have been just as unsuccessful in affecting the President and the Secretary of State. It is probable that dissatisfaction with his performance as Ambassador to Mexico was not the determining cause of his deletion from the diplomatic service. He was of no use to the administration; the influence behind him had ceased to have political value. With reference to the prob lem as it stood, Henry Lane Wilson had nothing to offer 355 356 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO which was acceptable. He expressed his opinions with be coming moderation before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and made a favorable impression upon some of the members, but there is no evidence that the President or Mr. Bryan was brought to see any way in which the Am bassador could be of the least service to them in what they wished to accomplish. From that time forth Henry Lane Wilson was hardly more influential than Cassius M. Gil lette. What the world saw at this period was the struggle between Woodrow Wilson, in the White House, and Vic toriano Huerta in the National Palace. It seemed to progress slowly, but some of the moves were very unusual and very interesting even to those who did not comprehend the strategy. Mexico was bleeding to death, in the mean time, and shrill cries often drew away the attention of spectators, yet the contest went on. Huerta was at first embarrassed by some of his own offi cial family, and he proceeded to dispense with them in order to secure more freedom of action. His ideas as to the importance of certain men, and of the political factions which they represented, and of the influences behind them, had greatly changed since the days of the terror, when he was reckoning up the elements of strength which must be combined in support of his rule. No bestowal of political patronage, no possible assembling of individuals in govern mental positions under him, could now secure the solid backing of the largest interests. He could not bargain satisfactorily with those interests because he could not give the necessary guarantees. The failure to secure recognition from the United States had greatly weakened him. He was in a position somewhat analogous to that of a business man who is in straits and heavily indebted to his bank from which he cannot now get the accommodation that he needs, THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 357 lacking the requisite security, yet the bank will lend him a few dollars from time to time, not quite daring to let him fail. In these circumstances it was natural that Huerta should see the best chance for himself in the concentration of power in his own hands; and it is quite possible that some of the better men around him either estimated this situa tion with their own brains and found it hopeless, or were enlightened by the superior personages whom they served. Be this as it may, the exodus began and those who were comparatively strong went out with some that were weak and useless yet not wholly tractable. What Huerta now desired was a government all Huerta. In June Garcia Granados resigned as Minister of Gober nacion and Aureliano Urrutia, a full-blooded Xochimilco Indian, was appointed in his place. Urrutia was a surgeon, able and well instructed, a wholly self-made man who had risen to eminence and wealth from the lowest of levels ; but he knew nothing of statecraft or politics, and was looked upon by the Cientifico influences which Garcia Granados represented, as a potentially dangerous ally of Huerta's. As Urrutia came in, Vera Estanol resigned from the De partment of Education, and with him went the active repre sentation of the great American corporations for which he was counsel. On June 23 Manuel Mondragon was disposed of after a manner quite Huerta's own. A banquet of army officers was held, at which War Minister Mondragon and President Huerta were guests of honor. At its conclusion General Huerta informed Mondragon that his presence in the United States was required at once and that a train with his lug gage aboard was in waiting to carry him to Vera Cruz. To Mondragon's expostulations Huerta gave humorous an swers, and calling half a dozen officers from among the 358 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO banqueters, he joined them in escorting Mondragon to the station where he embraced him cordially in farewell and assured him that it was " all for the good of the Father land." General Blanquet was immediately made Minister of War, vice Mondragon resigned. In July, Felix Diaz was sent away, ostensibly en route to Japan on the famous mission of thanks which Gustavo Madero had arranged to undertake, and at the close of the month de la Barra was accredited to Paris as Minister. Ambassador Wilson had already been recalled to Washing ton. Rodolfo Reyes, though shorn of power, held to his seat in the Cabinet until September in the vain hope that Felix Diaz would rise again to a conspicuous place in Mexi can affairs. Thus were the ties severed which had seemed to bind certain influences to Huerta. His cabinet was made up of men whose own wills counted for little ; he could look into a hand-mirror and behold the sardonic visage of the whole Mexican Government. And the same view was more and more clear to observers in other parts of the world, notably in Washington where the obstinate Indian's chief adversary played the odd, dilatory game against him, to the perplexity of all nations. President Wilson's first conspicuous move was made on August 4 when he despatched to the Mexican capital as his personal representative ex-Governor Lind of Minnesota. It was announced that Mr. Lind had gone on a peaceful errand for Mexico's good. August 9 he sailed into Vera Cruz harbor on a warship, with the eyes of the world upon him and the big journals of the United States very anxious about their news facilities, lest these should not operate fast enough to cover the brisk performances of the envoy. On the following day, despite rumors that danger lurked in the tunnels and bridges along the ascent to Mexico City, Mr. Lind made the journey without mishap. His message THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 359 to Huerta was delivered by Mr. O'Shaughnessy, the Ameri can charge d'affaires, and was politely received. Its sub stance was presently cabled back to the United States where it created more perplexity than in Mexico. Neither the partisans of President Wilson nor his adversaries knew what to make of it. Not that the language was in the least degree obscure'; on the contrary it was as clear as a mirror, and as difficult to see through. In the minds of thoughtful editors it begot the question, why should Mr. Lind be sent to Mexico upon a mission that had no chance of success? The communication which he transmitted to Huerta was a summons to surrender, its demands being covered in four items : First. Complete cessation of hostilities (that is, an im mediate peace, or at least a truce, in Mexico). Second. That President Huerta resign in favor of a President ad interim. Third. The fixing of an early date for the Presidential elections. Fourth. That General Huerta should not be a candidate for the Presidency. The task of replying seriously on behalf of Huerta to these suggestions that he expunge himself, fell to Federico Gamboa, who was the Mexican Minister of Foreign Rela tions at that moment. He had been Minister to Belgium for several years, but had been called home by Huerta when de la Barra was accredited to France. Sefior Gamboa was personally unacquainted with Huerta who had sent for him, relying upon his reputation as a successful lawyer in Mexico City and as sub-secretary of the Foreign Office under Maris- cal, who for many years held that portfolio in the Diaz regime. The status of John Lind as confidential agent of Presi dent Wilson operating under indirect credentials might have 360 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO been challenged, but Sefior Gamboa made no difficulty over trifles. He possessed the gift of language and the theme invited his muse. Under date of August 16 he responded in a document of seven thousand words. The paper was summarized for quick transmission of its tenor to Washington. The full text was then translated and forwarded in sections during the three succeeding days. Close study of the English version disclosed obvious and un assailable reasons why none of the four proposals could be acceded to, one of them, the cessation of hostilities, being manifestly impossible. It also revealed a suggestion which was not far from a demand that Huerta be recognized and his Ambassador received at Washington. But the most striking feature of this document was its calm expression of belief that the people of the United States were not of the same mind as His Excellency, their President. Meanwhile Mr. Lind had gone to Vera Cruz to await in structions. These he received on August 24, and the follow ing day he submitted a new set of proposals, substantially modified as to their terms, but holding firm to the demand that Huerta should not be a candidate for the Presidency. Twenty-four hours were allowed for consideration and an swer. By request the time limit was extended one day further, but before the reply was received, President Wilson, on August 27, read a message to Congress on the Mexican situa tion. As it was the first time in a hundred years that an American President had personally addressed Congress on an international subject, the occasion was a decided event, emphasizing the seriousness of the questions at issue. Naturally it was supposed that the President would de clare a more vigorous and definite policy in the Mexican dispute. There was nothing in the United States that might be called general information on the subject, nothing that THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 361 resembled a common sentiment, but probably a majority of those who formed an opinion were inclined toward the belief that coercive measures were contemplated and that intervention would follow. This was the easiest inference from the fact that the proposals which had been made to Huerta were obviously such as he would never willingly ac cede to. Some of the newspapers printed estimates of mili tary strength, and pictures of battleships and generals ; but this display meant little because what the President would say was already known in editorial rooms. His address to Congress was an argument for patience, very impressively delivered. " The steady pressure of moral force," he said, " will before many days break the barriers of pride and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we could triumph as her enemies — and how much more handsomely, with how much higher and finer satisfactions of conscience and of honor." But by way of assurance that the retarded fulfilment of his prophecy of peace should not endanger American lives he added that " all Americans will be urged to leave Mexico at once, and will be assisted to get away by the United States Government through all the means at its disposal." Something notable was omitted from the address, a few words which might have supplemented President Wilson's description of the moral force whose steady pressure was to be relied upon. The omission consisted of a sentence in the amended proposal to which Mr. Lind was that day re ceiving his answer. " If Mexico acts immediately and favorably upon the fore going suggestions," the sentence read, " President Wilson will express to American bankers assurances that the Gov ernment of the United States will look with favor upon an immediate loan to Mexico." The answer returned by Sefior Gamboa was not so long 363 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO as his former paper. It declined the proposals as to the Presidency and the elections, and withdrew the request for recognition. It then disposed of the loan suggestion in these words : " Permit me, Mr. Confidential Agent, not to reply for the time being to the significant offer in which the Government of the United States of America insinuates that it will recommend to American bankers the immediate extension of a loan which will permit us, among other things, to cover the innumerable urgent expenses required by the progres sive pacification of the country; for in the terms in which it is couched, it appears more to be an attractive antecedent proposal to the end that, moved by petty interests we should renounce a right which incontrovertibly upholds us at a period when the dignity of the nation is at stake. " I believe that there are not loans enough to induce those charged by the law to maintain that dignity, to permit it to be lessened." Sefior Gamboa's reply had the effect of strengthening con siderably the position of Huerta. Influential men who had been displeased with the dismissal of their representatives from the cabinet were reconciled, more or less ; some of them spoke out in favor of the new regime. Evidences of popular enthusiasm were not lacking; the number of vol untary enlistments in the army was increased, and in many ways the general apathy was broken by sentimental out bursts. Sefior Gamboa was loudly praised, and Huerta also. The ill will towards Americans was deepened; the reviling and ridiculing of President Wilson began to give promise of the monstrous lengths to which it went a little later. Mr. Lind returned to Vera Cruz to await further orders. His movements from the day of his departure from New York were a subject of keen interest to American news papers. The episode was the strangest journey in diplomacy THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 363 with which editorial writers of the United States had been called upon to deal, surpassing the Hawaiian expedition of Paramount Blount. It is improbable that after the publication of the first demand made by Mr. Lind any extravagant hopes for the success of his mission were entertained by citizens of the United States whose knowledge of Mexican affairs fitted them to form an opinion. But the attention of editors and the public had been drawn to him, negotiations were seen to be in progress between the two countries, and the talk of intervention naturally subsided. By the 28th of August the unpleasant topic had been almost dropped. There was much praise of President Wilson as a guardian of the peace of nations. Certainly he himself showed no irritation as a result of General Huerta's refusal to abdicate. The stubborn Indian might stick to his capital and the cares of office, but that was no reason why Mr. Wilson should do the like. On the contrary he departed from Washington on the 29th for his vacation in Cornish, New Hampshire; and at the same time Secretary Bryan resumed his lecture tour on the Chautauqua Circuit. The Mexican matter was shelved. But the Americans in Mexico — those outside of Mexico City where little attention was paid to Washington's warn ing — were in sad straits. Urged by President Wilson's speech and spurred by Secretary Bryan's announcement, supported by the activity of American consuls, the Ameri cans began a new exodus from all points of departure on Mexico's coasts and borders. Their personal belongings that could not be carried in a hand bag they registered at the nearest consulate and abandoned. Those who had no money made their way in one fashion or another to ports on the Gulf or on the Pacific, and looked about for the transportation which had been promised. In 364 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO due time they discovered it. On the Gulf Coast it con sisted of steerage passage on merchant vessels to the south ernmost ports of the United States ; on the Pacific a trans port traveled along the coast to gather in straggling refugees. These unfortunates were carried a few miles beyond Mexico's Pacific coast line and were set ashore at San Diego, California. President Huerta was distressed at the poverty of the arrangements which President Wilson had referred to as " all the means at the disposal of the Government of the United States." The men who had contributed to Mexico's prosperity, the grim old Indian humorist said, should not travel in the steerage ; Mexico would provide first-class ac commodations for all who wished to return to their native land. And many Americans, be it said in passing, accepted his offer. On September 7 the Department of State at Washington reversed itself; consuls throughout Mexico were ordered to stop the exodus. On the night of October 10, President Huerta emulated the example of Napeoleon Bonaparte by a coup at the Cham ber of Deputies. The Chamber had angered him by insur gent resolutions following the disappearance of Senator Belisario Dominguez, who had delivered a speech violently denouncing Huerta and charging him with responsibility for Madero's death. The Mexican Congress seems to have lost its temper in the matter of Dominguez, and when Huerta perceived this, he lost his own. While Congress was in ses sion on the evening of the 10th, the building was surrounded by a large force of troops. A detachment then invaded the Chamber and one hundred and ten deputies were arrested leaving only members of the Catholic Party exempt. For two hours the uproar within the building continued, after which the one hundred and ten men were taken through crowded streets to the penitentiary and placed in THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 365 cells. The populace sided with the deputies, and attempted to cheer them but were driven into cross streets and hustled out of the way, many persons being injured and a few killed. As soon as the deputies were arrested the Senate which was in sympathy with the Chamber adjourned sine die. Be fore midnight Huerta dissolved both houses by decree and assumed their function in his own person. By the same convenient method he took to himself the supreme judicial power, and completed his dictatorship by absorbing the powers conferred upon the Departments of Finance, War and Gobernacion. The following morning, while Mexico City held its breath not knowing what arbitrary act might follow, Sir Lionel Carden, the newly arrived Minister of Great Britain, presented his credentials to the dictator and assumed the duties of his post. The selection of that moment to complete. England's recog nition of Huerta by the formal presentation of documents was decidedly unfortunate. The incident indicated a new attitude of British representation in Mexico, and it seemed to suggest a forward move at England's Foreign Office. This impression was strengthened ten days later when Sir Lionel was quoted at length in despatches. Much that he said was void of offense, but in one sentence he intimated that Washington was dealing with the Mexican situation superficially, without full knowledge of the real causes of the trouble, and in consequence was complicating affairs rather than contributing to their solution. The fact that many Americans at home, not directly in terested in Mexico, recognized in these remarks a just criti cism of President Wilson's endeavors in the Mexican field, did not soften the Minister's offense. But it presently de veloped that London believed there was an error in the report, an opinion which Sir Lionel sustained a little later by 366 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO denying that he had uttered the words which caused the flutter. The episode passed by with no alarming signs of damage, yet a shock had been felt. The statement that Sir Lionel was a close friend of Lord Cowdray's was declared to be without significance, but it was noted by the discerning few. The Mexican Constitution of 1857 is a remarkable docu ment. It provides more safeguards for those who abide under the shadow of its wing than any other Government charter in the modern world. But somewhere in its tortuous and carefully amended course is successfully concealed the fact that a Mexican ruler, guarded by a careful student, can issue a decree depriving persons of the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and still keep within constitu tional bounds. Deputies are constitutionally exempt from arrest, yet here were one hundred and ten jailed at one stroke; and no power short of overwhelming armed force could release them but the Dictator alone who put them in prison. No law could operate because the Dictator had decreed to himself the supreme judicial power of the State. The student who had guided the Dictator's acts in this af fair was no other than Querido Moheno who had been made Secretary of Foreign Affairs when Federico Gamboa re signed to become a candidate for the presidency, and an object of Huerta's distrust. It grieved General Huerta to inconvenience these gentle men among whom were such old friends as Rodolfo Reyes, who had resigned from the Cabinet on September 12, and Jorge Vera Estanol, once a valued member of the same circle. The dissolution of Congress, Huerta said, was the greatest sacrifice he had been called upon to make, but he could not hesitate because it was for the good of the Father land. He earnestly hoped, he said, for the support of the people, and he called upon them to elect worthier representa- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 367 tives. To provide them with an opportunity for this, he proclaimed a new election of Senators and Deputies to be held on October 26, the date that had already been set for the presidential election. On the day following the publishing of these expressions of policy (October 12), forty of the deputies were re leased; later the doors were unlocked at different times for others, among them Rodolfo Reyes and Vera Estanol who with all convenient speed proceeded to New York. At the time these pages were prepared for the press about thirty of the deputies were still in prison. On October 14 President Wilson invalidated the Mexican elections in advance by informal pronouncement at Wash ington. In no sense could the elections now to be held be regarded as " free " and " in accordance with the Mexican Constitution," which had been the condition President Wil son had insisted upon as pre-requisite to his recognition of the results. President Huerta was not greatly disturbed and his simple election program was not altered in the smallest item. In what may be called the advance puffery, that election of October 26, 1913, was monstrous in volume. The multiply ing of descriptive phrases appropriate to a legitimate con test, passed the limits of common sense and went into ab surdity. The Madero election was the only one ever held in Mexico which could be called " free," and even that was without effective safeguards. The election carried on by Huerta was of the old Diaz order and consisted of an elaborate system of appointments. In certain places a vote was manufactured by signatures of soldiers and of peons gathered in to make up a minimum. In most instances these men made their crosses for few could write ; none of them knew what they signed. Voting, in short, was a negligible quantity in an election where the 368 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO result was made up in advance. A certificate bearing the correct signature was election, whether it was preceded by voting or not. When this certificate had been issued in ac cordance with the will of the chief, the constitution was supposed to have been suitably respected. The Huerta officials in recognition of the broad interest in this election determined that no slip in consistency should mar so solemn an event. " Returns " were reported as coming in slowly, and much uncertainty was expressed as to the result. While the calculations were being made Felix Diaz, who had ventured into Vera Cruz in order to be con stitutionally entitled to receive votes, found it advisable to depart. Helped by the American consul at the port, he was hustled, in the night of October 27, aboard the American gunboat Wheeling lying between the Vera Cruz wharves and the island prison of San Juan d' Ullua. The next day he was placed on board the battleship Louisiana. Some days later he made his way to Havana. An election report was given out early in November at Mexico City and Generals Huerta and Blanquet were said to have been elected President and Vice President. When the new Congress, chosen at the same time, assembled on November 20 it declared its own election valid, but nullified that of Huerta and Blanquet " as a rebuke to the over- enthusiastic people " who in definance of the constitution had insisted upon voting for these men. The constitutional prohibition of a provisional president's being a candidate to succeed himself applied only to Huerta, but Blanquet was included in the nullification act to simplify matters. By this maneuver Huerta had " tagged " a Congress into office and renewed his lease of the dictatorship until July, 1914. Meanwhile President Wilson in a speech at Mobile, Ala bama, on October 27 had made the important declaration that the United States would " never again seek one foot THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 369 of additional territory by conquest." In the same address he dealt at length (and quite incorrectly) with concessions in Latin America. Mexico was not named, but as it had been conspicuous for months, and just then was most promi nently in the public eye, it doubtless stood for the Latin America to which his remarks were addressed. He con gratulated Latin America on its coming emancipation from the concession evil, a trammel upon true progress from which the United States had long been free. President Wilson did not distinguish between concession and monopoly which, in Mexico, are terms by no means synonymous, and his lack of clearness on this point must have obscured the meaning of his remarks for Mexicans familiar with affairs in their country. They supposed that the President meant to warn them particularly against grant ing oil concessions to Englishmen, and to advise them to seek prosperity by heeding the counsels of the United States. But it is a common argument in Mexico that the Latin American countries furthest removed from the influence of the United States are the most prosperous and best gov erned, and that Mexico should hesitate before she turns a deaf ear to all other counsellors, and heeds only the voice of her great neighbor on the north. On the next day after President Wilson spoke at Mobile, Secretary Bryan made announcement that England, France, and Germany had agreed, at the request of the United States, to take no further action with regard to Mexico until the Washington Government should declare its future policy. When the statements of the President and the Secretary of State were pieced together they seemed charged with full assumption of responsibility for Mexico and for all Latin America, on a basis of altruism broader than any hitherto conceived. Also they seemed to prepare the way for armed intervention at any moment. 370 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO There was no sign, however, of any but a verbal aggres siveness in Mexican affairs. Week after week went by without announcement of a Washington policy. Europe held to its bargain and permitted the United States full en joyment of the Monroe Doctrine without official protest. On December 2, President Wilson, in his first annual mes sage to the regular session of Congress, definitely relegated Mexican matters to the doldrums. " Little by little," he said, " Huerta has been completely isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling, and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful wait- ing." It was officially out at last : watchful waiting in the Mexi can affair was the policy of the United States. En thusiasm was hardly to be expected; the American people were not keen for watchful waiting or for any alternative; they had no common opinion on this subject. The press was inclined to ridicule the Wilson policy, but there was no determined attack of such a nature as seriously to disquiet the President. The secret of his procedure in the Mexican affair from the outset of his Administration, though it lay open to every eye, was never seen by friend or foe, if I may judge from my own reading of editorial comment published in the United States and Europe. The London Times in its issue of December 3 contained expressions worth quoting. Under the heading " Mexico in Chaos " the Times dealt editorially with the message in these words : " There is no need, said President Wilson, to alter his policy of watchful waiting. It is just that policy to which opinion in Mexico City ascribes the recent aggravation of the situation and the rapid spread of anarchy accompanied by every sort of horror. If, says THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 371 the despatch from our correspondent in Mexico City, the present tactics continue there are no words too strong to paint the disastrous results which will ensue. " We are convinced that these dangers are realized as fully in Washington as in Mexico City and we shall be surprised if, when Huerta is gotten rid of and the moment for reconstruction has arrived, President Wil son is not found to have thought out and to be ready to apply a plan for restoring order and decent govern ment in the neighboring republic. Presidents, like other heads of States, are not given to betraying their policy in public utterances." It was not possible for all to be so patient and so confident. There were many interested persons not so near Mexico that they could hear the bullets whistle, who found watchful waiting for Huerta to crumble and collapse a joyless ex perience. The United States had shut up Huerta in a supposedly air-tight closet, but he was receiving a little oxygen by the help of local bankers with European connec tions, and foreign corporations which dreaded chaos to follow his extinction. Besides there was more air inside than had been noted in President Wilson's original esti mate. To be explicit, the resources of that part of Mexico over which the Dictator exercised a species of control were very large. In a broad zone across the middle of the country business continued to be done, and the inhabitants could not look to any one but Huerta for protection. They were com pelled to pay for it in various ways. For example, the general commanding Federal forces in a district would call together the representatives of important business interests, and announce that the central government was unhappily a little short of funds, wherefore it devolved upon the general to announce with regret that he must withdraw the troops on the following Tuesday unless $250,000, or some other 372 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO amount appropriate to the particular place and occasion, should be provided by those who were to benefit by their retention. In most instances the money was forthcoming. It must be remembered that though the revolt in the North overran a vast territory, the percentage of inhabitants thus brought under the Constitutionalist banner was com paratively small. If Mexico in the winter of 1914 be thought of as two nations, the one over which Huerta ruled was enormously richer and more populous than that of which Carranza was the reigning prince and " Pancho " Villa the military genius. Conceiving of the two parts as ,at war, under fair conditions, there would seem to be no doubt as to which would win, or which in peace would be the more affluent. This is not to say that in the circumstances as they really existed, there was any hope for Huerta, unless he could get support from outside his borders. His situation was worse than precarious. The financial system, that solid structure of the Limantour days, began to totter early in the Huerta regime. The Mexican peso which contains forty-seven American cents of intrinsic value as silver metal in any broad market, declined from its parity of 49^4 that had been fixed by decree and sustained by deposits in New York and London. Steadily down the grade the exchange and purchasing value slipped. In June, 1913, the peso could be exchanged for gold at a valuation of forty-five. In August it had fallen to forty. In November it dropped to thirty-six. In January, 1914, it was down to thirty-four, and early in March it reached twenty-nine cents. The history of the exchange market during this decline is one long tragedy for merchants and others compelled to convert their silver into gold. The banks of issue which had made use of their circulation privileges, and had put out bank bills to something like the THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 373 limit allowed by the Limantour law, were unable to redeem in coin on demand. The result was a violent shock to credit. In December, 1913, Huerta came to the rescue of the big banks and decreed holidays ; three days first, then ten, then a month. Between Christmas, 1913, and the first of the March, 1914, no bank in Mexico was compelled to meet its obligations on demand. The banks, as a matter of fact, met all the obligations that were actual items of legitimate routine, but checked every attempt to deplete their reserves. No man could present a demand for one thousand or five hundred or even two hundred pesos and receive peso coins for it unless he could prove that the sum was asked for to supply a legitimate need of his business. The half-peso coins, carrying much less proportionate value than the pesos, could be more readily secured, but the days of abnormal financial insecurity were upon the nation, and the result was demoralizing to all honest effort. The every-day-a-holiday-system caused monstrous de rangement of ordinary business relations. Rents in Mexico City were almost impossible to collect; interest on mort gages and similar obligations went unpaid, and creditors found it virtually useless in most cases to take legal action. It is folly to displace a tenant who does not pay and substi tute another who has no money nor means of getting any. Pecuniary distress absurd and cruel afflicted thousands of men and women who were not rightfully poor. Graft and commissions in government supplies were the only healthy and going industries. The commissions and profits of the traders were scaled to bottom levels, but the graft never lessened. War is very favorable to dishonesty in the best ordered nations, and Mexico under such a rule as I have described, was in the throes of civil war. A big army requires arms and uniforms. In Mexico, except about the capital, they are not so particular about shoes, and food 374 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO is left for the women to gather as they can. But forage for horses, and essentials for military service furnished business for dealers who knew the methods. Two of Huerta's sons were supposed to have controlling influence in these matters. If any man had arms or am munition for sale he must see Don Jorge; if it was uni forms, he made his proposition to Don Victoriano, chico. These young men were said to drive hard bargains and to leave a narrow margin of profit for the dealers, after all commissions were paid, but the money was sure. Ac cording to current reports the General and his sons went over the figures of these transactions every morning. Early in the year 19 13, a gambling house was opened which was known in Mexico City as " The President's House," and was said to be conducted upon capital fur nished by Huerta himself who each day called for the win nings. Later on there was a chain of houses, and the sons took charge of the business. There were establishments for all classes of trade distinguished by the minimum wager permitted — the centavo houses for the peons and the peso and five-peso resorts for the opulent. Soldiers lacked their pay sometimes, but the graft and the gambling went merrily on. The bull ring at the capital seats thirty thousand persons. Half of the seats are in the shade. The charge for these is three pesos. The other half are in the sun and the price is one peso. Each Sunday the ring was filled; where the money came from is a mystery which has been observed before but never adequately solved in cities similarly cursed with idleness and empty stomachs. For another aspect of the widespread Mexican disaster we must look to the northward. What may be called the Constitutionalist capital was Hermosillo, chief city of So nora. Here Carranza maintained his headquarters for sev- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 375 eral months, providing himself with a cabinet and other features of an actual government. Hermosillo was a wise selection because the northwest state, Sonora, was the solid- est part of the Constitutionalist territory, and the least likely to be attacked. There was a federal army holding the Pa cific port of Guaymas, less than a hundred miles away, but a much larger force hemmed it in. The selection was wise also because Sonora possesses cer tain revenues which have been available for the Constitu tionalist cause. The State made an issue of fiat currency in July which was followed by a larger issue of Constitu tionalist currency whose recognized trading value in Con stitutionalist territory on the first of March, 1914, was 33% cents on the dollar. Three such dollars were regarded as a fair trade for an American coin of the same name. An other argument in favor of Sonora as the headquarters of Carranza was the ease and convenience with which arms were run across the border from Arizona before the em bargo was lifted. The- border is but an imaginary line and for several months the American patrol was lamentably insufficient along the stretch from El Paso westward to the Pacific. The " gun running " industry in that section thrived mightily and it was not conducted under a bushel, or by the story book variety of smugglers. The deliveries were made in automobiles and the most important concerns in that section were engaged in it. The Phelps-Dodge Corporation and the Dodge Mercantile Company were among those accused. There is no evidence that they were carrying on this busi ness for profit; rather it was thought that they were doing it to assist the Carranzistas, and in the interests of the preservation of order by the only means available. Despite some facts which will be presently set forth, it is not possible to say that the alleged " gun running " for Car- 376 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO ranza by Mr. Dodge's companies was winked at by the United States. In September they, along with others, were indicted for the offense in the United States Courts in Arizona, and although the first indictments were declared faulty, new ones were found. The defendants were dis charged without fine or imprisonment, but the proceedings seem to have been regular. Much of the help which Carranza received from Ameri cans came in the course of plain business. He was a good customer for munitions of war, and there was a combina tion of dealers engaged in supplying the demand. The com bination did what it could and all that it dared to increase the sales and reduce the difficulties of transportation and delivery. Persons profiting in this way will exert influence in fomenting and maintaining disorder in northern Mexico, as long as the possible market seems to justify the effort. There is no sentiment here, no conscience. I do not think it is proved that Carranza is much of a fighting man himself, but he is not a bad manager. Com fortably settled in Hermosillo, with an active junta in Wash ington, he could await the reduction of Chihuahua by Pancho Villa and be prepared with solemn explanations of any departure from modern standards in Villa's military ethics. It is not credible that Carranza evolved this policy unassisted. After Villa captured Juarez and the City of Chihuahua and drove the remnants of the federal army across tlie Rio Grande at Ojinago, thus making himself master of the larg est state in Mexico, the question frequently arose as to whether a man of Villa's successful fighting record and disposition to be nervous under restraint, would long consent to be second to Carranza. If there had been only Carranza in the problem, it is likely that Villa would have thrown off the yoke, light as it doubtless actually was. But THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 377 Carranza plus Washington was a different matter, and Villa was restrained by the obvious advantages that lay in keep ing within the charmed circle which the light of Washing ton's countenance threw around the First Chief of the Con stitutionalist movement. The understanding between Washington and Carranza was maintained partly by means of United States Consuls, notably George C. Carrothers. Another route of communi cation between the State Department and Carranza led through the Maderista headquarters at No. 115 Broadway, New York. Francisco Madero, whose office was at No. 32, had fallen out of favor with Mr. Bryan. The recognized spokesman of the Maderos was Rafael Hernandez, the mur dered President's cousin, a negotiator of remarkable gifts, courteous, cool, and very hard to read. I am speaking now of February and March, 1914, when a coalition of monied interests was formed for the purpose of restoring peace in Mexico. Enormous capital was represented, and the plan proposed was apparently the best of fifty that had been laid before Mr. Bryan. I say " fifty " because that was his own hasty estimate on an occasion when there was no need to be accurate. He preferred this plan to the others, and seriously inclined his ear to its advocates. Congress had been controlled during all these months by a maximum of skilfully exercised authority combined with an irreducible minimum of real information; upon the whole a miracle of management made possible only by a lack of coherent opinion in the legislative body. There had been ebullitions of jingo sentiment, but no appearance of anything solid in the shape of a Mexican policy in either house. On July 22, 1913, the Senate talked Mexican matters in the open, but that night the leaders were counselled, and there was no immediate repetition of the offense. On 378 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO July 31, the House developed symptoms of acute distress over Mexico, but the trouble soon quieted under palliative treatment. On August 8 Senator Bacon declared that the Mexican situation was one of the gravest problems which the United States had ever been called upon to face. After that statement Mr. Bacon subsided and did not again offend. On August 15 Senator Penrose, stirred by the first hand reports of injury to Americans, used strong terms in the Senate Chamber. He promised to resume the following day but was dissuaded. On August 19 the Senate endeavored to press a resolu tion demanding a full account of Mexican matters from the President, but Senators Lodge, Bacon and Stone caused it to be postponed. On November 16, an attempted revolt in the House against the censorship was fought down by Administration men, and on January 27, the Senate, though greatly alarmed over Mexican affairs, was brought into line, and the subject was dropped. Viewed as a political performance it is entitled to rank high, that holding back for months of the floods of ora tory on a subject so inviting, so full of opportunity to stir America with authentic stories of wrong done to its citi zens, of vast pecuniary loss, of insult, dire hardship, and atrocious murder; so full, too, of potential European com plications which always tempt a certain class of orators. The Senators and Representatives who held their peace under such provocation were untrammeled men; many were of the opposition. Never before had a Congress at Washington been so well controlled; never had a Congress bowed to such a master. The foregoing summary is not to be taken as a table of reference; it is designed merely to give an impression. The tale of horrors in Mexico was not told as it would have been if a superior power had not prevented the sub- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 379 ject from being thoroughly opened up. In fact nobody in Congress knew the truth. Certain Senators and Repre sentatives were equipped with lists of outrages, but the lists were not accurate. The State Department may have had better information but it was not available; the records of 1913 on this subject were closed to all. When by chance a resolution calling for the data was passed, the Depart ment met it with a refusal. Close following of Mexican events through private chan nels, supplemented by a not too credulous reading of press despatches, led me, early in March, 1914, to set the number of Americans who have lost their lives by violence in Mexico since January, 1913, at one hundred and fifty. Of these not more than thirty were killed because they were Americans; the others fell victims to a condition which the American Government might have prevented. There have been exaggerations in accounts of Mexican troubles, but much has been missed altogether. What can the comfortably situated readers at a distance comprehend of the suffering and insult barely hinted at in vague re ports of isolated cases or described so crudely that the exaggeration destroys all feeling of reality? What esti mate can*he form of the twenty- four days' reign of terror in Durango, of the looting and the re-looting of Torreon, of the flight of American refugees on foot two hundred miles in mud and rain to Saltillo, of the evacuation of Chihuahua, and the entry of Pancho Villa, the bandit con queror of the north? Who can sit in security and grasp the horrors of the Cumbre Tunnel? Washington was moved by the well authenticated cases of distress ; it issued demands on Huerta and on Carranza and on Villa that the perpetrators of crimes against Ameri cans must be punished. The State Department made a long record of those whom it would hold personally re- 380 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO sponsible for acts of violence. Ever since the awakening which caused the despatch of John Lind, a well supported and clearly meritorious story of mortal injury in Mexico could command a hearing. But with the demand started on its endless journey, the record made, and the hearing over, the incident was closed. The Americans are a patient people. Many thousands of despoiled refugees from Mexico who could get no re dress have found that out. These refugees and their rela tives and friends wondered what dimensions this record of disastrous wrong to Americans must reach before a stir would be caused which resembled purposeful action. On February 17, 1914, they supposed that their question had been answered. The death of one man seemed for a few days to have strained the resistance of the Washing ton Government to the breaking point. The individual in question was William S. Benton, an Englishman. He was killed by the order, if not by the hand, of Pancho Villa, whose immediate chief was Car ranza, over whom was no superior but the Government at Washington. The early accounts of this crime which made it out to have been an execution following a court martial, were hardly more credible than the Huerta government's ac count of the killing of Madero. There had been no one to punish Madero's murderers; it was obvious that Carranza would not and could not punish Benton's. But the formi dable reputation of the British Government for protecting its citizens seemed to make some action necessary on the part of the United States, which was the guardian of Mexico, and in a very special sense the guardian of the Constitu tionalists whose nominal chief was Carranza — now for good cause as truly an impossible as Huerta, unless Villa THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 381 should be brought to book, an outcome not included in any sane man's forecast. It seemed, then, that the United States was cut off from any peaceful contact with Mexico, and was hopelessly in volved in trouble inside its borders. What alternative re mained but intervention ? Yet it did not come. Inquiry as to Benton's death brought fiction after fiction, and a tangle of falsehood and mockery, absurd and offensive. Yet the weeks dragged away, and England waited with unexampled patience, while the United States did nothing that the eye of man could discern, " and did it very well," to quote ap propriately from a familiar lyric of W. S. Gilbert's. Five weeks after the murder of Benton, Villa was still at the head of his army, about to lead it in what promised to be a critical engagement of the civil war in Mexico. And aside from the forthcoming battle at Torreon the chief news from Mexico was that John Lind had resumed nego tiations with Huerta, in the hope that the usurper would consent to efface himself in favor of a new provisional President. Surely this is a remarkable page of history, requiring for its explanation some very careful reading between the lines. CHAPTER XX TORREON fell to Pancho Villa on April 2. From that day the Washington authorities declined to listen to plans for the elimination of Huerta on a cash basis. They pinned their faith to Villa as the man whose destiny it was to drive out the usurper. Much more than had been generally understood they had encouraged the fighting Constitutionalist leader who had been permitted to gain such ascendency that he had become the alternative to intervention. To depose him from command of his army — if that were possible — or even to permit him to be de feated would eventually force an invasion of Mexico, not only from the Gulf ports but from the North. His victory at Torreon was essential. I do not suppose that the Wilson Administration knew what were Villa's plans for subsequent campaigning or how he expected to pay his troops. I prefer to think that the President and his advisers were imperfectly informed as to the character and motives of the leader, and as to the in centives of the great majority of his officers and men. A kind of patriotism, easily exaggerated and misunderstood, animated a few, and all seemed to be fighting for a cause not unworthy. Ample evidence has been furnished that Washington did not believe Villa to be so black as he was painted ; that he was thought to be amenable to control. I firmly believe that President Wilson would have been shocked to learn that the rebel leader would rather fight his way across Mexico to the National Palace in the capital 382 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 383 than to have full possession of the government delivered to him without a struggle. There was a deal of mystery about the Torreon fight which was carried on mostly in the districts north and west of the city itself. At first the attacking force suffered re verses, but after several days of battle they turned the tables and the Federal General Velasco evacuated the city. Losses were very heavy on both sides. Villa's army num bered about 12,000 and Velasco's 9,000. Estimates which are not to be relied upon place Villa's loss from all causes at 5,000, and that of the Federals at 3,000. It would seem that Velasco should have held the city, but he failed, whether from bad tactics, poor troops, deficient ammuni tion, or the superior skill of his opponent. The victory was Villa's and his conquest of Mexico was fairly under way. Torreon is seven hundred miles from the capital, and the richest section of Mexico lies between. Four armies were required to make a lasting success of the southward move ment, and three of them were already in the field. To the east, in the Gulf of Mexico state of Tamaulipas, one large force had been operating for several weeks. It had taken Victoria, capital of the state, and had seriously menaced the port of Tampico which Villa now needed more than ever, for reasons which will presently appear. In the West a Constitutionalist force was active in the Pacific Coast state of Sinaloa, and the territory of Tepic. In the center, under Villa himself, was the remainder of the army which had captured and was now occupying Tor reon. Another army must speedily be raised to act in concert with Villa's own forces in their campaign for possession of the cities on the two trunk lines of railway in Central Mex ico. Recruiting seemed surprisingly easy for Villa. Im mediately after Torreon he was able to send a force toward 384 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO Monterrey in pursuit of the Federals, and start another southeastward in the direction of Saltillo. In addition to these forces pressing east and south there were smaller armies and garrisons in all the border states of the North and in the northwest state of Sonora. I think it fair to estimate that on April 5 the Constitutionalists had 40,000 men in the field, well armed and many of them fairly well equipped. The only visible means of support for this very considerable military establishment was the country in which the various detachments operated. The only discoverable brain directing the widely separated bodies of men and keeping them supplied with arms was under the hat of First Chief Carranza. I can but think this a remarkable showing, not wholly devoid of mystery. Fiat Constitutional currency, well backed by force, ac counted for such of the equipment as could be drawn from local sources. Force alone took care of wages and food for men, and forage for horses. But rifles, sabers, revolvers, automatics, machine guns, cannon and ammunition, to say nothing of cartridge belts and other such necessities for 40,000 men, must come from a source which demands real money. Let us not attempt to answer this riddle other wise than by crediting Carranza and Villa with financial ability of a high order. Doubtless it would be better to say plainly that I believe Carranza and Villa received advice and assistance in mat ters of finance. The propriety of this depends, perhaps, upon the method employed, in regard to which I have no trustworthy information. Certainly Carranza was advised in the matter of withdrawal from active participation in conspicuous military operations, and this resulted in rais ing Villa to such an eminence that some outward alteration in the man became a necessity. After the Benton affair he was constantly under tutelage, by which he was clever THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 385 enough to profit. In the Torreon campaign he also bene fited by advice in military matters. The allegation that American troops fought with him is wholly unsupported, and should require no denial ; but there were a few Ameri can soldiers of fortune under his banner, and three of them were artillerists. Villa had learned something about publicity too, perhaps from his experience with the moving-picture men for whom he had posed at Juarez. A good press agent had been added to his staff, and the official reports to Washington were made by George C. Carothers, confidential agent of the State Department. Thus there were various presenta tions of Villa before the eyes of the world, and various ex ternal sources now contributed to the sum of his apparent qualities. Like other famous men he had become several persons in one. He was no longer a mere individual, he was a syndicate. But in spite of all surface amelioration Villa and his sol diers remained much the same as they had been at Durango and at Juarez. A recital of their crimes would have no end. I do not think the newspaper reports of their cruelties were materially exaggerated; more probably, taking into account the limitations of language, they were less than the truth. From what I have seen and heard I believe that a more accurate mental picture would be gained by magnifying the printed reports some four or five diameters. But it should be remembered that Villa and his men were not created by the government of the United States ; they were found upon the scene, and whatever has been done to influence their behavior toward the proprieties of civilized warfare may count as meritorious. It remains to be said that on April 5 Villa was acquitted of all blame in the Benton affair, by Carranza's court of in quiry whose verdict was in accord with Secretary Bryan's 386 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO frequently expressed belief. Though this decision carried little weight, it helped somewhat to make Villa a more pos sible figure in the design of the Washington government for i the expulsion of Huerta. As has been intimated the cover of Villa's military code had been cleansed, and he had been taught to keep the volume closed in public, whenever he could remember to do so. This saved some lives after the fall of Torreon, but there are' other punishments than death. In the captured city there were good and bad persons, in Villa's estimation, and he drew the line between them with quick decision. The good were inconvenienced but not despoiled. The bad, consisting of Spaniards and every variety of Huertista, were subjected to a forfeiture of goods without delay. More than six hundred Spaniards were driven at the bayonet point into box cars and shipped five hundred miles to El Paso. Their property, both real and personal, was seized. Several thousand bales of cotton valued at about $4,000,000 were among the items which Villa appropriated as spoils of war. The deported Spaniards endured great suffering on the journey to El Paso. Scantily clothed and stripped of every thing negotiable they had been crowded like sheep into the cars, and during the forty-eight hours in transit they had little water and less food. Their condition at the end of their journey was pitiable. The Spanish government asked the United States to look after the interests of its subjects, and accordingly a protest was addressed to Carranza who solemnly replied that the Spaniards had been dealt with very leniently considering their offenses. The spoil from this proceeding must have been large for some of the deported men were rich. Efforts were im mediately made to sell the cotton which had fallen into Villa's hands, but negotiations for its sale in the United THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 387 States failed. Two agents were sent to Europe to find a purchaser, but there was a serious obstacle in the way of closing a bargain. This was the difficulty of transportation. About four hundred cars were required, and so much of the rolling stock of the railways had been destroyed that no such supply was available. Even should the cars be got, and the cotton be carried to El Paso, there would be many chances yet to be taken. The United States government might fear complications with Spain, if it should allow the goods to pass through its territory to the Gulf Coast for shipment abroad. And the railway which should haul the cotton under the known cir cumstances would be in an unenviable position, if the right ful owners should present claims. There was but one al ternative; the purchasers of the goods must take delivery at a point in Mexico and that point must be the port of Tampico. The distance from Torreon was only five hun dred and fifty miles but the port itself was in the hands of the Federals, and the railway route to it led through Mon terrey, a city of eighty thousand people, which had resisted rebel attacks. If the cotton were to be carried to tidewater both Monterrey and Tampico must be captured. The movement against Monterrey was promptly begun. Federal General Velasco with about 2,500 of his men had retreated in the direction of that city after evacuating Tor reon on April 2, the remainder of his forces having fled toward Saltillo. Two days later he was overtaken at San Pedro by General Rosalio Hernandez of Villa's army, and many of Velasco's command were killed. Hernandez, co operating with other generals of the Constitutionalists, then pushed on for Monterrey. The force threatening Tampico was spurred forward, and the city destined to be the greatest oil center in the world was more closely invested. The Federal garrison which 388 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO had held its ground for weeks, was cut off by rail from its base of supplies at San Luis Potosi and had been supported from Vera Cruz, two hundred miles south, by means of vessels plying between the two ports. Great anxiety was felt by the oil interests in the neighborhood. A miracle had saved the Lord Cowdray and Waters-Pierce refineries at Tampico from destruction during the days when the rebels were actively attacking. The same army, substantially re inforced, was preparing for assault, and any day a great disaster might befall the stores of inflammable wealth to gether with the equipment for industrial operation. Threats were made by the rebels against Lord Cowdray's properties because he was suspected of having aided Huerta in negotiations for loans. None of the companies doing business in the oil fields took sides however. If the Waters-Pierce interests hoped for Constitutionalist su premacy they made no sign, and the Huerta forces did not single them out for attack. The Dutch-Schell managers were also painstakingly neutral. Their great well, La Carona, had flowed more than 150,000 barrels in a single day when it sprang into life in November, 1913, distancing Lord Cowdray's famous Portrero del Llano and succeed ing to the world's producing record for a single well. If the course of war should lead over their property the loss would be incalculable. Active business in the oil fields could not continue with skirmishing between the rebels and the defenders going on, but no outside government cared to take the step of landing troops to protect its nationals or the property they owned. The Federal garrison awaited the attack and the besiegers threatened continually. Foreign residents understood that the next vigorous move of the Constitu tionalist forces would place them in great peril and they prepared to take to the ships at short notice. Affairs at THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 389 Tampico were in this state when the incident occurred which brought the United States into armed clash with Huerta to the material benefit of the Constitutionalists' plans. On April 9 a whaleboat from the United States gun boat Dolphin lying in the Panuco River before Tampico, was sent ashore for gasoline, and put in at the Iturbide Bridge. The boat was manned by a crew of nine sailors in charge of an assistant paymaster of the United States navy, and displayed American colors at bow and stern. The men were unarmed. While part of the crew were still in the launch Colonel Hinoza, commanding a detach ment of Mexican Federals placed the American officer and the whaleboat's crew under arrest. Immediately afterward he paraded them through the streets to jail amid the jeers of bystanders and cries of " Death to the Gringos." The American Admiral Mayo, being promptly informed of the occurrence, demanded instant release of his men, an apology in due form by General Zaragoza, the Federal com mander at Tampico, and a formal salute to the American flag, consisting of the firing of twenty-one guns in its honor before six o'clock the following evening, April 10. The men were at once released and the apology offered, but the matter of the salute was referred by wire to Mexico City, Admiral Mayo at the same time forwarding an ac count of the affair to Washington. It seems quite clear that the right procedure would have been instant direction from Washington to Admiral Mayo to enforce his demand to the letter, as this would have tended to restrict the affair. But Washington temporized; directed the Admiral to extend the time one day for the salute to be fired, and took up negotiations with Huerta through the American Charge at Mexico City with the re sult of aggravating the incident. 390 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO The history of Washington's previous demands upon Huerta repeated itself. Temporizing argument was the only response which could be elicited, and day after day the time for firing the salute was extended. What seemed like a division of sentiment among high government of ficials at Washington was indicated by the statements given to the press. Hesitation there certainly was for three days at least. Suddenly on the 14th, the Atlantic war fleet of seventeen battleships was ordered to proceed with haste to Vera Cruz and Tampico. On the 16th formal notice to salute was served on Huerta, and this was followed on the 18th by an ultimatum demanding that the twenty-one guns be fired by 6:00 p. m. on the 20th. On the 19th Huerta made flat refusal to comply, unless the salute should be answered gun for gun which would have condoned the offense and have been con strued as a recognition of his government. That day more ships were despatched for Mexican waters. On the 20th President Wilson laid the case before both houses of Congress in a personal address, reciting the Tampico incident and supplying the additional information that a uniformed orderly from the U. S. S. Minnesota had been detained in the city of Vera Cruz while ashore on mail service for his ship, and also stating that government de spatches from Washington to the embassy in Mexico City had been withheld from delivery until the American Charge d' Affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, had gone in per son to demand resumption of the service. President Wilson, in view of these offensive acts — the two latter being in natural sequence to that at Tampico — asked for quick joint action of Congress in support of his demands upon Huerta. " I therefore come," said he, " to ask your approval that I should use the armed forces of the United States in such RAFAEL HERNANDEZ Minister of Fomento (Promotion) in the Cabinet of Provisional Presi dent de la Barra. Minister of Gobernacion in the Cabinet of his cousin, President Madero. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 391 ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recog nition of the rights and dignity of the United States, even amid the distressing conditions now unhappily obtaining in Mexico." The House, after a stormy session of four hours, passed the following resolution by a vote of 337 to 37 : "Resolved, By the Senate and House of Repre sentatives, in Congress assembled, that the President of the United States of America is justified in the em ployment of armed forces of the United States to enforce the demands made upon Victoriano Huerta for unequivocal amends to the government of the United States for affronts and indignities committed against this government by General Huerta and his representatives." The Senate in a session that same night objected to the naming of one man as an enemy against whom the Army and Navy were to be used. The Tampico affair was called a pretext, in the course of the debate. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge proposed a resolution which recited the wrongs suffered by American individuals, in person and property. Debate was heated. The Senate adjourned over midnight; then reassembled and passed a substitute resolution. The House concurred. This is the text of the resolution as passed by both bodies: " Resolved, By the Senate and House of Repre sentatives of the United States of America in Con gress assembled that the President is justified in the employment of the armed forces of the United States to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends for certain affronts and indignities committed against the United States; be it further " Resolved, That the United States disclaims any 392 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon Mexico." In one respect the President's address was similar to that which he had made to Congress in August, 1913 : it was notable for an omission. On the former occasion he had refrained from mentioning the financial offer which he had authorized John Lind to make to Mexico as a reason why Huerta should resign. The second address contained no reference to the true cause of haste in the despatching of the warships to the Mexican gulf ports. The urgency was due to information that a large shipment of munitions of war was on its way from a German port to Vera Cruz. The cargo included some thousands of rifles, a number of machine guns, and a large quantity of ammunition; and the receipt of these supplies by Huerta would greatly strengthen him against the Constitutionalists, and perhaps against the United States, should war result from the in creasing complications. At the moment, however, this was a move against Huerta and in favor of the Constitutional ists who had been receiving all the arms for which they could pay. On April 21, when the Senate and House agreed upon the resolution, the German ship Ypiranga, carrying the munitions of war, arrived at Vera Cruz. To prevent the cargo from reaching its intended destination a large body of American marines was landed at that port and the cus tom house was seized. The landing party was under or ders not to fire unless fired upon, and to occupy only a small portion of the city in the. immediate neighborhood of the custom house which is on the water front. The marines met resistance of a scattering and irregular sort. The opposition gathered strength as the movement swept up the broad, open pier, and it presently became nec essary for one of the smaller warships lying within easy THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 393 range to shell some of the positions of the enemy, includ ing the naval academy building. Before actual possession of the custom house was secured, four American marines were killed and twenty wounded. The number of Mexi cans killed was about two hundred. " Sniping " or isolated fire from concealment picked off Americans for the next two days. The entire city was oc cupied by the American forces on the 22nd, the Federal troops having retreated several miles to a point on the Mexican railway, a mile of which they tore up. In all, seventeen Americans were killed and sixty-two wounded. " Sniping " being punishable by death according to usages of war, it was reported that forty Mexicans were sum marily executed for this offense. — Meanwhile the republic of Mexico was becoming an un fit place of residence for Americans, and in Monterrey violent demonstrations were being made. On April 21 a Huerta captain commanding a detachment of Federal troops, acting no doubt under orders, tore down and stamped upon every American flag in the city including that over the United States general consulate in which many Americans had taken refuge. That night the con sulate was surrounded by Federal troops and the lives of its , inmates were threatened. On the following day, the United States Consul General, Philip C. Hanna, was taken before a military tribunal, charged with aiding Constitutionalist generals, and thrust into prison where he remained incommunicado until April 24, when the Constitutionalist army under Generals Villareal and Castro entered the city in triumph, the Fed eral forces evacuating the place. The conduct of the Con stitutionalists after this victory, as reported by the grateful consul general, was a decided improvement over that which they had exhibited elsewhere. 394 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO On April 22, Charge O'Shaughnessy of the embassy at Mexico City received his passports, and the same service was rendered in Washington to the Mexican charge, Sefior Algara, who notified the State Department of his intention to leave the territory of the United States. O'Shaughnessy and his family, with the attaches of the embassy excepting interpreter d'Antin, arrived in Vera Cruz on the evening of the 24th, accompanied by Consul General Shanklin and the attaches of the Mexico City consulate. No other Americans were permitted to leave the capital, it having been reported that Mexicans were being detained in Vera Cruz against their will. Two days later, however, Huerta learned that he had been misinformed, and all Americans who desired to do so were allowed to depart. Some were conveyed to Tejera, the Mexican camp near Vera Cruz, whence they were escorted on foot to the American lines under flags of truce. Others were sent to Puerto Mexico, the eastern terminus of the Tehuantepec railway. Excitement throughout Mexico was intense. Americans were everywhere insulted. As fast as possible those in the interior made their way out, the majority going to the capital and thence to Puerto Mexico or Vera Cruz. The United States Government chartered the Ward line steamers to carry refugees to Galveston and New Orleans, and expectation of immediate war was general. Huerta prepared to destroy the railways from Mexico City to Vera Cruz. The United States sent an army brigade of 5000 men under General Funston to Vera Cruz, and the control of the city passed from the navy to the army, the sailors and marines returning to the ships. Fifty-two American war vessels of all classes were now in Mexican waters. Washington denied that war existed, but prepared to supply large bodies of troops at short notice. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 395 In Tampico the demonstrations against Americans were violent, and the American warships in the river and harbor were said to be a menace rather than a safeguard to their nationals in the city. There is some dispute about this, but none at all about the withdrawal of the ships, leaving the Americans to be protected by the German and English vessels. More than five hundred Americans were taken aboard these warships, and transferred to a merchantman which conveyed them to New Orleans, without their previ ous knowledge or consent, as some of them have alleged. The refugees declared further that the American warships had brought down the trouble upon them and had then de serted them while they were in great danger. It was a peculiar incident, not the first of that class experienced by Americans who have lost everything they possessed in Mexico and have found themselves without a country. While these events savoring of tragedy were in progress, Washington's relations with Carranza were disturbed by complications in the vein of comedy. On Wednesday, April 22, the day after the marines landed at Vera Cruz, Mr. Carothers, the State Department's representative with the Consitutionalists, transmitted to Carranza at Juarez, by re quest of Secretary Bryan, a note of explanation of the Vera Cruz incident. The note stated that the landing of troops and the seizure of the custom house " was made necessary by Huerta's refusal to make proper amends for the arrest of unarmed American sailors." The secretary suggested that the " proper attitude " for the Constitutionalists was to " stand aloof," and concluded with the hope that they would " not misunderstand President Wilson's position or misconstrue his acts." This communication I take to be one of the most unusual productions of the State Department, even in the incum bency of Mr. Bryan; but the true comedy resides in the 396 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO unexpected results to both parties. At that time the United States was on the very point of recognizing the belligerency of the Constitutionalists ; the documents, so to speak, were already drawn up; and the communication which has been mentioned was in a sense the forerunner of the recognition. But Carranza had not been advised of the good things in store, and Secretary Bryan's conciliatory despatch took him unawares. In less than three hours after receipt of the message the First Chief of the Constitutionalists sent a communication to President Wilson through Mr. Carothers which amounted to a threat that if the United States did not retire at once from Vera Cruz the Constitutionalists would join in an effort to expel them. He also suggested that after withdrawal of its forces, the United States should recog nize the Constitutionalists as the actual and permanent Mexican government, which courtesy would be requited with as much saluting as might be desired. Pancho Villa was then at Torreon pushing forward his plans for campaigning against Saltillo and San Luis Potosi. Advised of Carranza's action by telegrams from that gentle man and from Mr. Carothers, Villa hurried to Juarez, and at dinner with the State Department's agent quite pointedly reversed the First Chief. Talk of strained relations be tween Carranza and the military genius of the Constitu tionalists was revived. An open break was declared to be imminent, if it did not already exist. This was a situation which Washington viewed with alarm as indicating a lack of cohesion in the Constitutional ist enterprise. But the tactful Carothers restored harmony between the two leaders ; and Carranza slowly shifted his position until it became evident that he and Villa, on the surface at least, were in accord. In the United States there was a disposition to look upon Carranza's reply as prearranged with Washington, but this THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 397 seems to be an error. The truth is that the State Depart ment had put the First Chief into a place where he was compelled to be haughty, in order to preserve his hold upon the Mexicans. He had already gone as far as he dared in obedience to Mr. Bryan's instructions, and his reputation in Mexico was in danger. Thus he was compelled to re ply to Mr. Bryan's note in some manner which should com port with his professions of independence. This was per ceived in Washington, after patient study, and the anxiety was relieved. It was not thought necessary to restore the embargo on arms at the Mexican border, though in regard to this traffic certain precautionary measures were taken, as will hereafter be noted. The actual gain to the Constitutionalists by the Vera Cruz operations was too clear to be ignored. The revenues of Mexico's principal seaport had been cut from Huerta's visible means of existence, and the cargo of war munitions had been turned back to the high seas. Villa certainly per ceived all this, and he was satisfied with the assurances of Carothers that the United States did not desire to advance inland from Vera Cruz. There can hardly be a doubt that Carranza's irritation, if he had really felt any, yielded to the same arguments. But Carranza's vigorous pronouncements had excited the Texans, the Arizonians and the New Mexicans, and preparations for a state of war along the 1800 miles of Mexico's frontier were speedily under way. The War De partment at Washington urged upon President Wilson the necessity for immediate restoration of the embargo on traffic in arms across the border, and adduced evidence to show that in the eight days which had elapsed since April 14, when the war fleet was ordered to Mexican waters, 8,000,000 rounds of ammunition and 10,000 rifles had gone into Mexico from the United States. But the President de- 398 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO clined to replace the embargo in full force. There were several thousand rifles, ten machine guns, and 500,000 pounds weight of ammunition in El Paso ready for de livery across the river. These the War Department was permitted to order withheld. The conversation between Carranza and Villa which resulted from this would, I fancy, throw a bright light on many matters at present wofully obscure. And on the top of it all they had lost, for the time, their recognition as belligerents. On April 25 the Ambassador of Brazil and the Minis ters of Chile and the Argentine Republic at Washington tendered their good offices to the Wilson Administration to bring about a peaceful solution of the Mexican troubles. After consultation with Secretary Bryan, their proposal was formally tendered as follows : (Translation) Legation of the Argentine Republic, Washington, D. C, April 25, 1914. Mr. Secretary of State: With the purpose of subserving the interests of peace and civilization in our continent, and with the earnest desire to prevent any further bloodshed, to the prejudice of the cordiality and union which has always surrounded the relations of the governments and peo ples of America, we, the plenipotentiaries of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, duly authorized thereto, have the honor to tender to your Excellency's government our good offices for the peaceful and friendly settlement of the conflict between the United States and Mexico. This offer puts in due form the suggestions which we had occasion to offer heretofore on the subject to the Secretary, to whom we renew the assurances of our highest and most distinguished considerations. D. Da Gama, R. S. Naon, Eduardo Suarez Mujica. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 399 The offer was accepted by the Washington State Depart ment in a response whose most significant paragraph ran thus : " This government feels bound in candor to say that its diplomatic relations with Mexico being for the present severed, it is not possible for it to make sure of an unin terrupted opportunity to carry out the plan of intermedia tion • which you propose. It is, of course, possible that some act of aggression on the part of those who control the military forces of Mexico might oblige the United States to act, to the upsetting of hopes of immediate peace ; but this does not justify us in hesitating to accept your generous suggestion." On Monday, April 27, the Spanish ambassador at Wash ington, who had acted for Mexico since the breach of diplomatic relations with the United States, announced to the State Department General Huerta's acceptance of the mediation proposals of the " A. B. C." powers of South America. In the interval before the gathering of the dele gates at Niagara Falls to open the conference on May 20 specific charges were made by Huerta that the government of the United States had violated the armistice which had been agreed upon. There seemed to be no tangible founda tion for the charges, but they were annoying. The Huerta delegates, Senores Elguero, Rabassa and Rodriguez, arrived at Washington, May 16, accompanied by their families and immense quantities of luggage. All of the gentlemen were important lawyers of Mexico, of the group which once flourished under the name Cientifico. The United States government provided for their use two private cars from the Florida coast and elaborate suites at hotels. The delegates utilized the cars and the hotel suites, 400 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO but insisted upon paying the charges. One of the dele gates, Sefior Luis Elguero, was a director of the National Railways of Mexico and also of Lord Cowdray's Aguila Oil Company, prominent in the Mexican fields. Mediation as a means of settling the differences between the United States and General Huerta need not be consid ered seriously. It was accepted for the sake of advantages which each party perceived. The United States welcomed the chance to strengthen its position by dividing the gen eral Latin-American sentiment, so that subsequent action with regard to Mexico, if anything forcible should be necessary, might not antagonize all the southern nations of the hemisphere. The move tended to satisfy the numerous advocates of peace, and gave the Constitutional ists more time to overrun Mexico and drive Huerta out, while the United States forces sat quiet at Vera Cruz. Carranza was invited to suspend hostilities and send repre sentatives to Niagara Falls, but it was not within reason that he should accept at that juncture. If he had done so, it might have been a distinct disappointment to the United States. Huerta saw his own importance increased, and the price of his abdication raised. A truce with the United States was valuable; it eventually enabled him to get the ship ment of munitions of war ashore from the Ypiranga while Washington looked on ridiculously helpless. Moreover there was strong pressure upon him to send delegates to Niagara Falls, for mediation inspired the survivors of the old Diaz circle with hope. A prominent Mexican exile described the mediation congress to me as " the last stand of the Cientificos " — with which body he himself had been affiliated. The mediators were all favorable to property rights, and it was unthinkable that any plan of government which they THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 401 might devise would satisfy the desire of the radical Con stitutionalists and the feeling of the masses behind them that the rich ruling class of Mexico should be killed or driven out, and the Catholics oppressed and despoiled. The Huerta delegates, very keen negotiators, went to the con gress for the purpose of tying the United States up in a hard knot. The whole proceeding was manifestly absurd as long as the Constitutionalists were not represented. Without their concurrence no result could be reached which a few more victories by Pancho Villa would not upset. Meanwhile the United States might easily be committed to the plans of the mediation congress so far as to be ih honor bound to back them, even to the extent of armed invasion. And it is conceivable that this was the true goal toward which the Cientificos and the other business inter ests represented by , the participants in the congress were striving. On May 13 Tampico fell to the Constitutionalist forces, the garrison withdrawing to Tuxpan after suffering seri ous losses. Comparatively little damage was done to for eign interests. The Dutch warship had landed a guard to protect the great La Carona well ; but from no other vessel of the foreign fleet were troops sent ashore. The fall of Tampico still further weakened Huerta's position, and the gain of this port completed the Constitu tionalists' line of communication from the interior to the Gulf. The great properties controlled by Lord Cowdray escaped serious damage when Tampico passed into the hands of the Constitutionalists, but that change introduced new com plications for the Englishman. From the advent of Huerta, in February, 1913, to May in the following year, Lord Cowdray's investments in the Tampico oil fields steadily increased at the rate of £50,000 a month — a total 402 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO of about £750,000 added to the great capital already en gaged there. His continued enlargements of operations in the oil field had been regarded as evidence of his confidence in the stability of the Huerta government, and as corrobora tion of the reports that he had aided its financial negotia tions. He was not in good odor with the Constitutional ists, and if they were to have anything like a free hand in setting up a new government, its attitude would certainly be hostile to him. Another important item of Lord Cowdray's relationship to the Mexican government was his interest in the Tehuantepec Railway of which mention has already been made. Unknown to the Mexican people and the Mexican Congress his negotiations with the Madero government for the sale of this railway interest had been concluded, and the agreement covering the transaction was to have been signed on February 10, 1913. The outbreak of February 9 with its fatal consequences to Madero prevented the signing of the papers. This left the Tehuantepec pro posals to be presented to the government of the usurper. Efforts were constantly made during the early months of Huerta's rule to effect a bargain, but a plan was formed by Lord Cowdray, looking toward an alternative, if negotia tions should fail, as they actually did. This plan was intended to enable the Tehuantepec Rail way to do a profitable business despite the competition soon to be introduced by the Panama Canal. The disadvan tages of the Tehuantepec route for Hawaiian sugar lay in the necessity of transhipping from vessel to train at Salina Cruz, and from train to vessel at Puerto Mexico on the eastern coast. Lord Cowdray's idea was to do away with one of these handlings by the use of seagoing barges upon each of which sixteen of the cars could be run, at Puerto Mexico, to be delivered at Galveston or New Orleans. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 403 Orders for eight of these barges were placed, and four were nearly ready for delivery on April 1, 1914. But the partnership of the Mexican government in this railway makes it indispensable to Lord Cowdray that he shall be on fair terms with its officials who, on their part, must be affected by similar 'considerations. The Constitu tionalists, looking forward with confidence to the control of Mexico, might well hesitate to make an enemy of Lord Cowdray, whose favorable influence would be of so great help to them in operations of finance, and whose an tagonism would work powerfully against them in the money markets of the world. For this reason too serious oppres sion of Lord Cowdray in the oil fields by the rebels who at this hour control that region, will be a grave tactical error. The United States on May 18 added two nations to its highest diplomatic grade, thus increasing its embassies to thirteen — which is said to be the President's lucky number. The nations were Chile and Argentina. Ministers to the capitals of those countries were promoted to Ambassador ships. The inevitable result of this would be reciprocal action by Chile and Argentina in favor of their Ministers at Washington. Previously Brazil was the only one of the " A. B. C." nations enjoying this distinction in the Wash ington scheme of statecraft and it was agreed that it would be well if all the mediators were of equal rank. Argentina, with its eight millions of people, and Chile with four and a half are prosperous nations. There is no doubt that the United States would welcome a larger por tion of their trade, and all the usual benefits which recog nition of one nation's worth brings to another. But selec tion of that particular moment to confer these honors carry ing personal benefits to two of the mediators called forth unfavorable criticism. 404 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO The sustained successes of the Constitutionalist arms in April and May did violence to the hopes of two aspirants for Mexico's presidency both of whom had secured backing in New York, including the advice and guidance of eminent counsel. One of these ambitious men was Felix Diaz, well known to fame and misfortune. The other was General Fernando Gonzales, the son of that president of Mexico who held the office from 1880 to 1884 by the permission of Porfirio Diaz. The Felix Diaz enterprise need not be considered at length, although $100,000 was wasted upon it by men who should have known better. But the scheme of General Gonzales, formerly governor of the State of Mexico, was more formidable. Early in April Gonzales left New York for Mexico city with a proposal to lay before Huerta which involved the payment of three million dollars to the dicta tor and certain of his generals in consideration of the ap pointment of Gonzales to a place in the cabinet from which he would succeed to the presidency. Huerta's resignation was to be handed in before the money in the form of drafts on Paris should be paid. Seated as provisional president, Gonzales was to announce an open election in which Car ranza, Felix Diaz, and all and sundry aspiring to the posi tion, should have a fair chance to win on their merits. Gonzales reached Mexico's capital, laid his proposal be fore Huerta, and was not shot ; at least he had escaped that fate as late as May 9, when a cablegram in code was re ceived from him by his counsel in New York. The cable gram conveyed the intelligence that matters seemed to be progressing favorably and might be concluded without violence, but that if violence proved to be necessary, the arrangements for its successful application had been made. If the transaction should be consummated on a peaceful basis, General Huerta was to leave the country unostenta- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 405 tiously via Puerto Mexico, taking passage in a vessel carry ing the French flag. Some thirty millions was to be supplied by loan to Mex ico's treasury to start the Gonzales government. The three millions of cash had been provided for by negotia tions of a large block of an old issue of bonds similar in appearance to those which Gustavo Madero had endeavored unsuccessfully to negotiate on a five-for-one basis in 1910, but of a better quality. These bonds to the amount of $15,000,000, face value, were to be passed over in return for the three millions in money, and were to be acknowl edged by Gonzales when he should have achieved the presi dency. The thirty millions to be loaned to Mexico was to be provided by men of large interests in that country in association with men of New York who hoped by this plan to stave off intervention by the United States with its shock to the security market. The market already was stagger ing under the heavy strain of the tariff and currency meas ures, and intervention in Mexico might break it down. This story, fantastic as it seems, is sober fact, and demon strates the lack of information and judgment among men, otherwise sane, regarding the actual trouble in Mexico and how to remedy it. Pancho Villa's victories and those of other Constitutionalist leaders which have been recorded made the Gonzales scheme impracticable from every point of view, especially the financial. Carranza loomed larger and larger as a presidential possibility, even taking into ac count the lack of adequate provision for Villa in any new government which might be set up. Carranza's platform has been a rather startling one, but I do not find that it has seriously interfered with Washing ton's attitude toward him. Carranza is a Constitutionalist to the backbone and this is the foundation of his creed: every man who has voluntarily aided Huerta must be shot. 406 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO To some minds this may seem objectionable, but if rele gated to the realms of purely academic discussion, by the operation of sufficient restraints, it might not matter. Be Carranza's merits what they may, he was fortunate in having a good laywer which is often better than a good cause. The Constitutionalists were ably served in this re spect at Washington, having a lawyer more successful than Mr. S. G. Hopkins, who had acted for the Maderos. The new attorney, Mr. C. A. Douglas, smoothed the way of the latterday revolutionalists of Mexico over many difficult places. But the elevation of Carranza or any other man of the Constitutionalist party to the presidential chair will be no more than a beginning of the Mexican task. The pressing and vital problem is the finances of the government and of the railways. Few realize the harm that Huerta has done in nullifying the solemn pledge of Mexico's customs re ceipts to bankers as security for loans. It is hard to see how the great sums needed can be borrowed in Europe or America unless arrangements are made to place such pledges beyond the possibility of violation. This will de mand a collector at every port to act as trustee for the bankers. The trustee must be powerful enough to enforce the rules. The United States can permit no other nation to undertake this business. CHAPTER XXI FOR many months the Mexican policy of President Wilson had been the theme of jests, or of serious discussion which was even more amusing. It had been treated by the world as a peculiarly difficult and en tertaining riddle; it had been supposed to hide mysterious and menacing international relations; it had been scoffed at as the mask put on to hide mere indecision. There is a sense, however, in which editorial comment in the United States, with few exceptions, had been constantly favorable. The dread of war, of trouble and expense, of injurious effect on business was constantly in evidence, and as Mr. Wilson's policy seemed to be safe, it may be said to have been praised in all these utterances. Before he took his seat — in the days of the overthrow and murder of Madero — leading articles in thousands of papers began with statements of the Mexican situation which read like the most earnest arguments for interven tion, but almost invariably there was a paragraph or two at the end which deprecated any action on the part of the United States tending toward invasion of Mexico or costly interference with her lamentable condition. When the developments recorded in the preceding chap ter had disclosed the relations of the Washington adminis tration with the Constitutionalists, and had caused the Presi dent to use the armed forces of the United States against Huerta, the tone of criticism speedily became adverse and the President was censured for too much energy and haste by the same pens that had mildly ridiculed him for endur- 407 408 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO ance of the antics of an intolerably bad neighbor. It seemed that the true inwardness of Mr. Wilson's Mexican policy was not understood, even so late ; that it was not seen to have been a perfectly simple device to meet a very ob vious requirement of his situation. There is no doubt that in the latter part of February, 1913, the Mexican question presented itself to the Presi dent-elect in the form of a riddle which, as a public man and as an earnest, intelligent and humane individual, he would have been very glad to answer. But the situation in which he conceived himself to stand with reference to his interests and his highest duty seemed to demand that he should ask not, " How shall I solve that problem ? " but rather, " How long will it wait unsolved ? " The public which he had been chosen to serve was ex cited by the ten days' bombardment in the Mexican capital (a performance not detected as a farce) and by the sub sequent murders, and the peril to American lives and prop erty ; but as to what should be done, the public had no con viction. The tone of the press was decidedly against war like measures. There was no clearness anywhere as to their justification, as to the cost and difficulties that would have to be met, or as to the essential truth that intervention in some form was inevitable, the only real question being, shall the thing be done now or later? Above all there was no sentiment against delay as a policy in itself, harsh and bloody. The absurdity of private comment in high places at that time is beyond belief to-day. It was almost openly said in Washington by influential men that the overthrow of Madero was fortunate for Mexico, that his death though regrettable would make for peace, and that Huerta was' the strong man needed to bring back the days of Diaz. These views are of no importance except as indicating the prev- THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 409 alent mental confusion. There was no unified public opinion tending to influence Mr. Wilson in his choice of a policy, except such as was expressed by the general depre cation of war at a time when the business situation was so unsatisfactory. When President Wilson took office he encountered or ganized pressure exerted for the recognition of Huerta. Ambassador Wilson advocated that course, and went be yond the bounds of propriety in his efforts favorable to the usurper's interest; but the President was unalterably opposed to recognition. He saw Huerta for what he was, vicious, unreliable, treacherous, bespattered with the blood of his predecessor. Personal distaste for such a man was mingled with considerations of another sort, and there was never a chance that Huerta would receive the least support from the government at Washington while Woodrow Wil son was at the head of it. Among the other considerations was the desire to safe guard American interests in northern and northwestern Mexico. Revolt against Huerta was under way in Sonora, Chihuahua and other states. Already some of the more important industrial corporations controlled by Americans were preparing to make terms with the rebels in order to save valuable property from destruction, and avoid the great loss which would result from enforced suspension of operations. Whatever would enable Huerta to carry war into those states would threaten irreparable damage or even confiscation ; but so long as the areas should be securely held by one party to the struggle, business might go on, at the cost of moderate tribute paid to the Constitutionalist leaders. The best way to keep Huerta's armies out of the north ern states. was to cut down his pecuniary resources. This was the immediate necessity in President Wilson's view, 410 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO and it could be met without taking the active measures which he desired to avoid as long as possible. To withhold recognition from Huerta, to prevent foreign nations from giving him aid, to damage his credit in every way that seemed proper under the circumstances — these expedients would suffice to prevent such injury to American interests in northern Mexico as would compel the United States to interfere. The President hoped and expected to solve the Mexican problem, but his first desire was to postpone it. The policy of watchful waiting looked forward rather vaguely to the defeat of Huerta by the Mexican rebels and to the setting up of recognizable government by the Constitu tionalists; but its transcendent merit in the President's mind was that it would enable him to baffle the uncertain and divided advocates of quick action in Mexico, and would give him time to force through Congress those measures of economic reform to which he was pledged. Revision of the tariff, banking and currency legislation, and the anti trust bills were the matters upon which he was determined to focus his own energy, the services of his party in Con gress, and the attention of the country. He believed that these enactments were essential to the nation's welfare, and that the time was ripe. His political future and his place in history seemed to depend upon his success along the lines that have been mentioned. It would have been ex tremely bad strategy to permit the Mexican question to push in ahead of those domestic issues which were, in his opinion, more momentous and more urgent. Any immediate action, even a definite declaration in the Mexican matter would have excited antagonism in Con gress, would have jeopardized the President's authority over the party leaders. His margin of control was narrow and he was well aware of it; he could afford no quarrels. THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 411 And the event has amply proved his sagacity ; the policy of watchful waiting was too bare to be a bone of contention. It could be explained privately, where that was unavoid able, and to each man according to his special need ; but for the most part it excused a mighty silence. From March 4, 1913, until the end of that year it was nearly impossible for any man who had interests in Mexico, and desired light upon the future, to get a single ray of it from the State Department in Washington. It was diffi cult to approach Mr. Bryan on that subject, and the Presi dent was wholly inaccessible. There was a channel of communication open between Washington and Hermosillo, after Carranza had established his headquarters there, and it may be said that from the outset the influence of the United States was exerted in favor of the Constitutional ists; but the policy of giving them direct and undeniable support against Huerta developed slowly. All action in the Mexican matter was postponed, retarded or suppressed, by every possible means, while President Wilson struggled with his Congress for the enactment of those laws which he had set himself to procure. Business in the United States did not improve; the tariff and the income tax had yet to disclose their capacity for revenue. There was trouble with the banks, and with the railroads. The manufacturing interests were suffering serious depression. The tolls exemption repeal, with its veiled threats of international complications, and open as sault on harmony in the Democratic party, presently in truded to make matters worse. The first year of President Wilson's administration was a hard one at home, giving ex cuse for doubt whether time could be spared for setting a neighbor's house in order. But the excuse lost its value through the disclosure that the United States had been meddling with its neighbor's 412 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO affairs for many months. There was war in Mexico, and the United States seriously hampered one of the contend ing parties while giving important support to the other. It would appear, at the date of this writing, that nothing more need be done to insure the triumph of the Constitu tionalists; and that, when this shall have been achieved, the United States must interfere to deprive Carranza and Villa of the usual rewards of victory, or must permit a gov ernment to be set up by them and their adherents. Hav ing gone so far with these men President Wilson can hardly turn his back upon them. The obligations incurred can not be evaded by mediation. By supporting the Constitu tionalists the United States has become responsible in part for their fortunes and their behavior. Despoiled Euro peans are recognizing this ; so are their home governments. It is a very grave responsibility. What pledges have been given by Carranza and Villa I do not know, but as to the value of those pledges I have a very definite opinion, which is that they are upon a par with those given to Am bassador Wilson in the matter of the lives of President Madero and Vice President Suarez. If Madero and Sua rez had been efficiently protected by the United States they would not have suffered death; and the same may be said prophetically of many a Spaniard and abhorred Huertista who will come into Villa's power during his military operations, and afterwards. Those whom the United States succeeds in protecting, whether by arms or threats or promises, will live, and those whose fate depends upon the inward reformation of Pancho Villa will be fortunate if they suffer nothing worse than death. The mediation at Niagara Falls may result in an ex cellent plan for the government of Mexico, but if this shall exclude Carranza and Villa from high office, it must in volve a questionable bargain with them, or must leave them THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 413 cheated by the United States. For something must have been promised them in the course of these prolonged rela tions, otherwise the bare encouragement would have amounted to a promise that they should rule their country when their armies should have conquered it. If a Constitutionalist government shall be established, its chief claim to favor will reside in the projected reform of land tenure. This seems to be President Wilson's convic tion. Samuel G. Blythe, in the Saturday ' Evening Post, May 23, 1914, gives a long account of a conversation with the President on April 27, and the following sentences occur in that article : " He (the President) sketched the conditions in Mexico under Diaz and came to the underlying cause for all the unrest in that country for many years. This, he said, was a fight for the land — just that and nothing more." A considerable assortment of other causes for unrest — causes which the land question can not be said to underlie, and which no reform in that matter alone can remove — were visible to me during my residence in Mexico; but that is another story. The land question, as I have already said, depends for its equitable solution upon a proper method, not to mention the means of putting it honestly into practical operation. This reform was the chief plank in the platform of San Luis Potosi, and Francisco I. Madero believed in it very sincerely, to which fact I bear witness from personal knowledge. But under the circum stances and in the time allotted to him, he did not find an answer to the problems which it presented. No safer wager could be made than that Carranza, Villa and all their domestic counsellors will prove equally inadequate. If the United States is truly committed to that reform 414 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO in Mexico, it must provide the method, and will be ex tremely fortunate if not called upon to provide the power also. But, to speak of the plan alone, Madero would have been devoutly grateful for it; and since land tenure is al leged to have been for many years the sole underlying cause of Mexico's unrest, it seems a pity that the United States did not work out a scheme for the removal of the landless peon's discontent, and give the use of it to the predecessor of General Huerta, thus solving the Mexican question which has cost so many lives, and so much money. For the inauguration of a Constitutionalist president will be the completion of a blood-red circle drawn on the map of Mexico. There may be — though I doubt it — a brief time of quiet afterwards in which to balance the books of the transaction. On the credit side will be the favorable difference, if any may be discovered, between the stability and merit of the new Mexican administration and that of President Madero. I put emphasis on stability, for in de fault of it no land tenure change can be of any value. The peon will not have much profit of his land, if it becomes a battlefield between seedtime and harvest, nor will he dwell upon it, even though the fighting may be miles away. He will have learned to prefer looting to the dull pursuit of agriculture. Let this instruction be the first item on the debit side of the account covering the last two years. There must be added many thousands of Mexican lives sacrificed in bat tles, massacres of prisoners, and incidental murders; the wreck of cities and the devastation of rural districts; the killing of Americans in numbers which it is too early to estimate; the hardships suffered by a multitude of others, and their property loss, very large in the aggregate. Hatred of Americans will be bitter and enduring, and will tend to retard the business recovery of the country, even THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 415 under the best possible conditions. It is an item not to be overlooked. Many of these evils might have been prevented, I be lieve, by more judicious action on the part of the United States after the accession of Madero. He had come to the presidency after a revolution very, mild and brief, yet violent impulses had been in some degree stimulated, and it was not easier to predict that night would follow day than that anarchy would follow another revolutionary over turn in Mexico. Peace, and some degree of permanency for the new government, were the first essentials, and this fact seems to have been recognized in Washington. Madero, though he came unwelcome, treading on de la Barra's heels, was recognized in due time, with kindly ex pressions. I have no doubt that it would be possible to trace the diplomatic relations of the two governments, and find evi dence on which to base a very plausible contention that President Taft was the great and good friend of President Madero. It seems to me that he was hasty and ill advised in his action relative to the disorders which presently ap peared in Mexico, of which the most conspicuous was the wholly mercenary revolt of Orozco. I have asserted for example, that the threat of military interference did great mischief and no good; that it tended vastly to increase the evils which were supposed to have been its justification; that it hurt Mexico's credit, embarrassed Madero in many serious ways, and needlessly excited enmity toward the United States in Mexican bosoms. Yet it may be shown that President Taft's attitude was friendly throughout, that his language was temperate and courteous even when it conveyed threats, and that he never ceased to express a hope that the sister republic would emerge triumphant from her troubles. Along this line I 416 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO will concede all that reason will allow ; but afterwards there will remain one matter in which the United States was per sistently and fatally unfriendly to Mexico from the begin ning of Madero's rule until its tragic end. In regard to this particular matter I assert that there can be no differ ence of opinion, but only of information; that two or a thousand right-minded men will inevitably agree, if they know the facts. President Taft maintained in the capital of Mexico an ambassador who should not have been there; who was lamentably misplaced, unsympathetic, injudicious, and dis astrously harmful. Knowing as I do how narrowly Madero missed a triumph over the extraordinary diffi culties and deadly enemies that beset him, I am constrained to believe that the least value which can be assigned to the unfortunate influence of the American ambassador is still sufficient to have turned the scale. The right man in the place, tactful, well disposed, keenly discerning, a man who earnestly desired the established government to continue because he had the foresight to perceive what must follow its violent overthrow — such a man as dean of the diplo matic corps and representative of the most influential na tion, could have lent enough support to Madero to keep him up until the wave of violence had subsided and the revival of prosperity had turned the minds of the masses toward peaceful means of living. And he could have done it without offensive interference, without going beyond the bounds of diplomatic propriety. If the reader doubts this let him think upon a single phase — upon the situation when Calero was in Washing ton and Henry Lane Wilson in Mexico City. How was President Madero then placed with regard to diplomatic relations? If there was any help that might have been given, what chance had Madero of getting it? Much help THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 417 was possible, at that time and before and afterwards, but I know that it was not forthcoming. The brevity of Madero's term in office, the manner of his fall, and the murders that followed were in the highest degree deplorable. They were evidences of inherent in stability and incitements to all who saw personal profit in such conditions. It was inevitable that there should be a season of violence more serious than any that had gone be fore. I believe that the conditions in Mexico City and in many parts of the country amply justified intervention by the United States, and that the day on which it should have been declared was February 18, 1913, when Huerta seized control of the government. It seemed to me then that, sooner or later, it must come, and I have never changed my opinion. The situation has not improved but has become worse, and intervention as the ultimate answer to the Mexi can question has never been more probable than it is to day. It might come before this book is off the press, and not surprise me in the least ; but should it be delayed a long time I shall still believe that nothing has been gained. It would have cost less time, less money, and fewer lives if it had followed as speedily as possible the events of the day I have just named. The resistance would have been inconsiderable compared to that which will be encountered when the thing is done. Though Ambassador Wilson worked for the immediate recognition of Huerta, such action would have been mani festly improper. President Taft did nothing of importance in the matter, and the Mexican problem was passed on to his successor as it stood, a scandal to the world. President Wilson let it be known immediately that his attitude toward Huerta was unfriendly, yet he retained Ambassador Wilson in Mexico City, and thus gave his administration the appearance of facing both ways, for 418 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO all the world was aware of the Ambassador's efforts in Huerta's interest. It is probable that Huerta's position was strengthened by this dubious procedure, and that he re ceived more aid from interested persons abroad than would have come to him if the Ambassador had been recalled immediately. There was no serious pressure exerted by European na tions, either then or afterwards, to influence the Mexican policy of the United States. There was a certain amount of bluffing, but that was all, despite persistent reports to the contrary. It was believed in Europe, if not in America, that the United States would be compelled to intervene; that its credit would be engaged to ensure payment of Mexico's obligations, including all damage claims. Noth ing better was desired; no suasion was necessary to bring on the fortunate result. Jealousy of one another, and the hazard of their own trade interests were sufficient to deter European Powers from action. Except for the fateful nature of the situation which had come to exist during the administration of his predeces sor, President Wilson was free to answer the Mexican question in various ways. Real non-interference, however, was not within the scope of his choice. There were too many Americans in Mexico, and too many interests inter locking the two countries. It was strictly impossible to contemplate indefinite continuance of disorder in Mexico as endurable by the United States. I believe that the proper course would have been the restoration of peace by the speediest practicable use of the armed forces of the United States; but this action was not favored by the President, for reasons which I have attempted to deduce and set forth. After some months of apparent hesitation he began to accept with gradually increasing definiteness a policy of depending upon the Mexican revolutionists to THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 419 accomplish the pacification of the country through a series of military triumphs. He might have taken sides with Huerta instead. There are those who still believe that if this had been done the rebellion would have been put down promptly; but this is an error. The circumstances under which Huerta had come to power were such that the greater his resources, the longer would be the war in Mexico. It would have been brought to an end only by the intervention of the United States, never in any other way while Huerta lived, and held his seat. There was, however, another procedure possible to Presi dent Wilson. To my mind it was the only acceptable al ternative to immediate intervention. He might have at tempted to solve the Mexican problem peaceably with the help of men who were deeply, vitally interested in the wel fare of the country, and who could exert a powerful influ ence toward satisfactory readjustment even in a situation so difficult. Beyond question the man to be consulted first was Limantour. It would not have been easy to gain his confidence, but it would not have been impossible. If his advice had been sought, accepted, and followed, and his efforts toward the establishment of a stable government in Mexico had been tactfully and strongly supported, a credit able success might have been achieved. My criticism of Limantour's course in the spring of 191 1 will be recalled, but no contradiction will be seen by those who have read with comprehension. I think that so far as the President neglected any oppor tunity to secure information and advice on the Mexican problem, it was a grave error; and that a continuance in this course would be unfortunate. [ With the deepest re spect I wish to say that the President's published utterances on the Mexican question do not reveal a full understanding 420 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO of it. The Mexican people are not fitted for self-govern ment, in the sense in which he seems to use the expression. To stand by willingly while some millions of uneducated Indians, vastly outnumbering the cultivated inhabitants of the country in which they live, try to evolve a working democracy from a state of demoralization only to be re lieved by the exercise of the most highly developed judg ment, would be as cruel and absurd as to wait for a sick child to grow up and evolve the theory and practice of medicine. What the Mexicans really require is a business government much better, much more modern than that of the United States, a business government equipped with every device of science, and above all with the method. There is no doubt as to the duty of the United States; it is the same as that of every organization and every in dividual in relation to the general welfare, and consists in unremitting effort to extend the gains of scientific research and the use of the scientific method into all the details of human life, governmental, industrial and personal. That is what the United States ought to do for Mexico, so far as may be practicableTj The idea that ignorance plus liberty plus providence is the formula for a commonwealth is no more respectable to day than Rousseau's theories of a return to nature and the golden age. And it will be well for the United States to consider in all the long future of the Mexican question that what is really desired is the welfare of the Mexican people, not their mere momentary gratification. The aspiration for liberty has often seemed to come from below, though its real source has usually been in a few elevated minds. The scientific principles upon which, at some future time, the first truly free state will be organized and conducted are just now beginning to come down from above, from the brains of men trained for methodical research. The more THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 421 diligently this fact is remembered in connection with the rehabilitation of Mexico, the better it will be for all con cerned, including the humblest peons who will never be able to understand the source from which will come their help. These remarks seem to me pertinent because I believe that the United States will be compelled to take control of Mexico. At the date of this writing it seems certain that President Wilson will find it necessary to thwart Villa and Carranza, and that war will result. Although the Consti tutionalists have been permitted to become a formidable host, their power will be registered only in the number of the invaders who will be slain, not in substantial military successes. In the end they will be dispersed and driven to the mountains, and the United States, for a space, will rule Mexico. It is then that I shall wish to see politics and all antiquated methods forgotten, and the public affairs of that country administered with real enlightenment. Whoever doubts the eventual restitution of Mexico to its own people, questions the honor of the United States. The obligation will be explicit; the American public will indorse it, and will make it good. If that public will con demn, while the occupation lasts, every worn-out device of politics and every foolish tendency towards sentimentalism, the incident will be brief and the results beneficial. The Mexicans do not need another dictator, domestic or im ported. The era of Diaz is closed. What they need would be better described as a good board of directors to manage the corporation of which they are the stockholders, and a reformed policeman strictly under the orders of the board. If they have an experience of this rule, they may like it so well that they will gladly undertake its perpetuation. That will be self-government. Whatever may be done in Mexico, there will be the same 422 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO need as heretofore that the United States should have a definite and continuous policy toward Latin American coun tries, not one that varies with political changes, or mere shifts of sentiment, in the great northern republic. The questions to which that policy will be directed will be busi ness questions, and should be handled by business men. To permit the development of trade with Latin America to be further retarded through neglect of this plain fact is manifestly unwise. A self perpetuating commission of representative business men should be established to deal with all Latin American relations. Their recommendations would not be final, but radical departures from them would be very infrequent. If such a board had been in existence in 1912 there would probably have been no Mexican revolution in February of the following year, because the men composing the board would have known what was being hatched, and what was to be looked for in Mexico if the mischief should be left unchecked. It is hardly possible that the President and the Secretary of State would have been deaf to the repre sentations sure to have been made by watchful men of sound business training and adequate foresight, serving the government at that time in the capacity suggested. THE END