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19

CARRANZA AND MEXICO

DON VENUSTIANO CARRANZA
AND GENERAL I. L. PESQUEIRA
First Chief and Minister of War

CARRANZA AND
MEXICO BY
CARLO DE FORNARO

[WITH CHAPTERS BY COLONEL I. C.
ENRIQUEZ, CHARLES FERGUSON AND
M. C. ROLLAND]

NEW YORK ' MITCHELL KENNERLEY - IQI5

COPYRIGHT, 191 5, BY
MITCHELL KENNERLEY

PRINTED IN AMERICA

TO
PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON
who discovered
real Mexico to the Americans

CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I The Life of Don Venustiano Carranza 9
II Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 34
III The Madero Revolution, Its Aims and Fail
ures 50
IV Plotting Which Overthrew Madero 60
V Huerta in Power. The Landing of American
Marines in Vera Cruz 77
VI Financial Organization of the Revolution 86
VII Civil Organization of the Revolution 96
VIII Diplomatic Work in Washington 99
IX The Constitutionalists in Paris 102
X Investigation Work in the United States. By
M. C. Rolland 106
XI General Outline of Campaign Against Huerta 114
XII Campaign of General Obregon in the West.
By Col. I. C. Enriquez 118
XIII Villa and His Campaign in the North 132
XIV Campaign of Gen. Gonzalez in the East 142
XV Zapata and His Campaign in the South 146
XVI One Hundred Years' Struggle for Land and
Democracy against Clericalism 157
XVII Attempts at the Solution of the Land Question 166
XVIII Behind the Scenes of the Carranza-Villa Im
broglio 176
XIX The Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico.
By C. Ferguson 184
XX The Foreign Policy of Carranza 192
XXI President Wilson's Mexican Policy 205
Reflections 214
Appendix 219

ILLUSTRATIONS
Don Venustiano Carranza and General I. L.

Pesqueira

Frontispiece

FACING PAGE

Don Rafael Zubaran Capmany

99

Modesto C. Rolland

1 06

War Map of Mexico

114

General Alvaro Obregon

118

General S. Alvarado

132

General Pablo Gonzalez

142

General Benjamin Hill

176

CHAPTER I
LIFE OF CARRANZA
T*\ON VENUSTIANO CARRANZA!
*-* Who is this man, practically unknown to
the American public a year and a half ago, who with
the help of the Mexican Constitutionalists, over
threw the most cynical, murderous, grafting and
powerful military dictatorship that ever existed in
Mexico ?
Concentration of power in Mexico City, the sup
port of the foreigners, of the church, the bankers,
the landowners, the militarists, of foreign bankers
and most foreign nations, with the exception of the
United States Government, were at the disposal of
General Huerta and his regime, but Carranza and
the Constitutionalists eliminated* this nefarious rule
after eighteen months of unbroken victories, sweep
ing finally into Mexico City in a peaceful, orderly
manner. The American public is beginning to realize that
such a thorough victory could never have been
achieved without a popular movement, directed by
a fearless, statesmanlike chief.
Venustiano Carranza, with the exception of Don
Fernando Iglesias Calderon, is the oldest of all the
Constitutionalists, who have fought for the last year
9

io Carranza and Mexico
and a half, with every means in their power, against
the rule of General Huerta and his governmental
camorra. Don Venustiano Carranza was born in the State
of Coahuila in 1859, and is therefore, fifty-five years
old. In spite of the assertion of one of the corre
spondents who interviewed him six months ago for
the Metropolitan magazine, Mr. John Reed, we
claim that Carranza is anything but a " senile old
man," for he rode over 1,500 miles on horseback,
through the States of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Du
rango, Chihuahua and Sonora, visiting the military
camps, organizing all the state and federal govern
ments, and finally settling down in HermosiUo, State
of Sonora, as his capital. Later, after Torreon
had been captured from the Federals, Carranza with
his staff and soldiers again crossed the State of
Sonora into Chihuahua on horseback, a distance of
nearly 300 miles.
We must admit that unless Carranza had lived a
greater part of his life on his farm, he would not
have been able to stand the hardships and rigors
of that famous ride.
His mental training was that of a lawyer, for he
studied in the schools of Coahuila and finished his
law course in Mexico City.
A certain weakness of the eyesight prevented him
from practising law, so he retired on his farm, dedi
cating his time to improving his " hacienda " and
studying history and political economy.

Life of Carranza II
Like the President of the United States, Carranza
is one of the greatest authorities on the history of
his own country.
Just as all student-statesmen, Carranza is the
type of man which makes no direct appeal to the
imagination of the public by a strenuous, romantic
life — it is the quiet, clear, thinking, organizing
brain which creates, commands and achieves, without
the blaze of trumpets, or the help of well-salaried
press-agents. One incident in his life stands out glaringly like
a solitary facet of a diamond struck by sunlight.
Very few Mexicans, and it can be safely said even
a lesser number of Americans, know that Carranza
was the only man who started a local revolution
against General Diaz, during the rule from 1876
to 19 10, and succeeded; — that is to say, continued
to live in Mexico, without sacrificing his life to his
bold attempt.
This strange and seemingly incomprehensible in
cident happened in the year 1893, when Don Venus
tiano was only thirty-four years old.
At that time there ruled over the State of Coa
huila a governor named Garza Galan. With the
exception of Mucio Martinez and General Cravi-
oto, he was the worst governor in Mexico. Garza
Galan used his great power to rob, expropriate
lands by all manner of tricks and stratagems, im
prison, kill those who stood in his way, and went
so far as to kidnap respectable girls.

12 Carranza and Mexico
Everybody expected that Garza Galan would be
eliminated after his two years of governorship, but
when it was discovered that Romero Rubio stood
sponsor for another two years of Garza Galan as
Governor of Coahuila, the inhabitants of that State
were in utter dismay and protested to the President.
At that time Romero Rubio, the father-in-law of
President Diaz, was one of his closest advisers.
He is the originator of the party which later was
called the " Cientifico " party, and of which Liman
tour became the successor.
As Romero Rubio insisted on the candidacy of
Garza Galan for a second term, and as protests
were of no avail with General Diaz, Don Venusti
ano Carranza arose in arms with the assistance of
his brother, Don Emilio, and started on the war
path against Garza Galan. General Diaz sent
some federal troops to quell the revolt, but Don
Venustiano and his brother took particular care to
avoid coming into armed conflict with the federal
troops, while they attacked Garza Galan's state
troops and defeated them repeatedly. This strange,
three-cornered fight lasted longer than was ex
pected; very soon, other wiser counsellors of Gen
eral Diaz pointed out to him that a continuation of
this armed revolt might communicate itself to the
other border States with disastrous effects to the
Federal Government. General Diaz then recalled
the candidacy of Garza Galan, and it was trans
formed into the one of Sefior Musquiz.

Life of Carranza 13
Peace followed, but strangest of all, was the im
munity of Venustiano Carranza and his brother to
persecutions and attempts on their lives.
Carranza was not a novice in the politics of his
country; he served as a member of the legislature
of his native State, as Senator of the Federal Gov
ernment in Mexico City and even as a governor of
his State.
Maybe the wily old dictator, Don Porfirio Diaz,
made a mistake in the case of Carranza. For six
teen years after the revolt against Garza Galan,
Carranza gave further proof of his strength of
character, by accepting the gubernatorial candidacy
offered to him by the people of Coahuila and re
fusing to renounce it in the face of the opposition
of the " cientifico " group in Mexico City, because
Carranza stood for the candidacy of General Reyes
as Vice-President, as against Ramon Corral who
was the Mephisto of the " cientifico " party.
The answer of Carranza to the emissary of Diaz,
who suggested the advisability of his refusal to run
for Governor, was as follows : " Tell General Diaz
that as long as there is a single person, who will
propose and work in favor of my candidacy, I shall
not renounce it, and I shall accept all the conse
quences of my conduct."
After such an unequivocal answer, everybody ex
pected that either the door of the penitentiary would
close upon the bold candidate, or that he would mys-

14 Carranza and Mexico
teriously disappear, in accordance with the policy of
General Diaz.
What saved Carranza from either of these fates,
was the publicity given to this incident in the Amer
ican press, especially a letter of protest against the
meeting which was to take place in El Paso, be
tween General Diaz and President Taft. The pas
sage referring to this incident says:
" Even as I write these lines, the report is wired
from Mexico that General Diaz has ordered the de
mission of the Governor of Coahuila, as the latter
showed a marked tendency in favor of General
Reyes' candidacy. Imagine the Republican Presi
dent of the United States asking for the resignation
of Governor Johnson of Minnesota, because of his
democratic leanings." 1
It is quite logical that a man of the stamp of
Carranza should view with great interest the move
ment which culminated in the overthrow of General
Diaz in 191 1.
Francisco I. Madero wrote his famous book
"The Presidential Succession of 1910," and pub
lished it in San Pedro, Coahuila, in December, 1908.
F. I. Madero, because of his innocence or his
fearlessness, tried to create a working candidacy,
with himself as presidential candidate and Dr. Vas
quez Gomez as Vice-President, in opposition to
General Diaz and Ramon Corral. There was how
ever no intention of rising to arms against the gov-
1 Full text of letter will be found in Index.

Life of Carranza 15
ernment of Diaz, but the policy of the President
made the opposing candidate realize the futility of
his efforts.
F. I. Madero was placed in jail twice for his dar
ing, and after the second time, he was informed that
a third imprisonment would mean his complete elim
ination. Madero took the tip, and fled to San
Antonio, Texas. The slogan of the Madero revo
lution was " Effective suffrage and no re-election "
and not, as many Americans believe, " the land ques
tion." If any one will take the trouble to peruse the long
document of San Luis Potosi, of October 5th, 19 10,
signed F. I. Madero, which contains 2,500 words,
it will be noticed that the land question takes up
very little space, in comparison to the rest of the
Plan.2 General Carranza never hesitated for one mo
ment, and was soon over the border to join Madero,
and formed part of his revolutionary junta. He
was appointed chief of the Military Division of the
States of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas,
and later Secretary of War in the provisional cab
inet of F. I. Madero.
The premature cessation of hostilities and the in
stallation of the clerical candidate, L. de la Barra,
was strenuously opposed by Carranza, who said to
F. I. Madero, " You are delivering to the reac-
2 Full text of the Plan of San Luis Potosi will be found in
Index.

1 6 Carranza and Mexico
tionaries a dead revolution, which will have to be
fought over again." These prophetic words were
not heeded, so Don Venustiano went back to his
native State, and calmly awaited the course of
events, while he offered himself as a candidate and
was elected as Governor of Coahuila.
One of the accusations which was published in the
American papers by the Huerta press agents was
that F. I. Madero, as President, had sent several
hun'dred thousand dollars to Governor Carranza,
for the purpose of arming and increasing the state
militia against the Orozco rebellion. About the
time of the overthrow of F. I. Madero, Don Venus
tiano had been supposedly asked to give an account
ing of the expenditure of the money furnished from
Mexico City. As he could not account for it, it
was said, he had decided to start a revolution against
President Madero. When the Huerta treachery
took place and Madero was murdered, Carranza
took the opportunity to rebel against the provi
sional presidency of General Huerta.
This story may sound plausible to the Huerta
type of man, but the facts in the case dispose of it.
A few months before the plot which overthrew Ma
dero, Don Venustiano Carranza paid a visit to the
President. His watchful eyes and ears detected a
very complicated net of plots and counterplots brew
ing against Madero. The President did not believe
that there were any plots, and doubted any one's

Life of Carranza 17
ability to overthrow him. Carranza went back to
his State and communicated his suspicions to a few
intimate friends. As soon as he heard of the re
lease of Felix Diaz and General Reyes from their
jails, he at once sent several hundred of the Coa
huila volunteers to the assistance of Madero. They
took part in the assault against the citadel, and the
reason why General Huerta lingered so long before
turning traitor is now clear.
Besides the Coahuila riflemen, there were several
hundred Madero volunteers who were loyal to the
President. General Huerta could not arrest Ma
dero and Suarez, and make peace with Felix Diaz
until the loyal Madero troops had been eliminated.
So he cautiously kept his own federal regiments
back, and sent the Madero volunteers and the Coa
huila riflemen to charge the citadel, manned by ma
chine guns, in close formation. The Coahuila vol
unteers who were mostly mounted, and numbered
about 1,150, bravely attacked the guns, but none of
them came back alive; the same happened to the
Madero volunteers.
As soon as Huerta had disposed of the volun
teers, he made his peace with Felix Diaz. What
remained of the Madero and Coahuila volunteers
fled to the standard of Zapata after Huerta came
into power.
On the 18th of February, 1913, Madero and
Suarez were arrested by order of General Huerta.

1 8 Carranza and Mexico
On the 19th of February all Mexico had heard the
fateful news, and nobody doubted the outcome of
the imprisonment.
Don Venustiano Carranza never hesitated one
hour, one minute; he convened at once the legisla
ture of the State of Coahuila, and the following
decree was the result :
Venustiano Carranza, Constitutional Governor of the free
and Sovereign State of Coahuila of Zaragoza, informs its
inhabitants: That the Congress of the State has decreed
the following:
The Constitutional Congress of the free, independent and
sovereign State of Coahuila of Zaragoza decrees:
No. 1 42 1 : Article 1.
We disavow General Victoriano Huerta in his character
of chief of the Executive power of the Republic, which he
claims was conferred to him by the Senate, and we like
wise disown all the acts and resolutions which he may dic
tate under such authority.
Article 11. Extraordinary powers are transmitted to the
Executive of this State in all the branches of Public Ad
ministration, so that he may suppress what he may deem
convenient and that he shall proceed by the force of arms
to sustain the Constitutionalist order of the Republic.
To arouse the Governments of the other States and the
Chiefs of the Federal, Rural and Auxiliary Forces, so that
they may assist the stand taken by the Governor of this
State. Decreed in the room of the Congress of the State, in
Saltillo, on the 19th of February, 1913. A. Barrera, Presi-

Life of Carranza 19
dent of the Legislature. J. Sanchez Herrera, Secretary.
Gabriel Calzada, Secretary.
Let this be printed, communicated and observed.
V. Carranza.
E. Garza Perez,
Secretary.
Saltillo, 19 de Febrero de 1913.
After the imprisonment of President Madero
and Vice-President Suarez in February, 19 13, a year
and a half ago, there were twenty-seven governors
in Mexico, who had the same opportunity to pro
test against the usurper Huerta, and refuse to recog
nize his " coup d'etat," his dictatorship and his cow
ardly murders. None of the governors dared pro
test. Had all the governors in Mexico arisen to
gether with their legislatures and refused to recog
nize the authority of the czar in Mexico, Huerta
with all his money, all his soldiers, all his greed and
ruthlessness, could not have lasted more than three
months. Don Venustiano Carranza was the only governor
in Mexico who had the audacity and patriotism to
challenge the great pirate in Mexico City, who had
raised the black flag with the skull and the cross
bones over the national palace.
The chiefs of the States were too terrorized,
cowed and frozen by the brutality, the cynicism, the
power of the man in the provisional presidency, and
were aghast at the suddenness of the events which

20 Carranza and Mexico
led to Madero's downfall. They had not found out
what had happened behind the scenes, the horror
of the events and their natural consequence had not
dawned upon their paralyzed minds. Carranza as
a real leader and chief never faltered an instant.
Those are the rare and precious moments which
create the national hero.
As soon as Felix Diaz and Victoriano Huerta
heard of the stand taken by Don Venustiano Car
ranza as Governor of the State of Coahuila, they
realized that a formidable enemy had arisen to
spoil their crooked game. They put their heads
together and penned the following epistle to Car
ranza, signed it together, and sent a trusted friend
as emissary to find him and convince him :
Mexico, D. F. 27 de Febrero 1913.
Don Venustiano Carranza,
Gov. of the Free and Sovereign State of Coahuila,
Dear Sir —
By letters of recent date we have informed you of the
plausible reasons which have inspired the army against the
dissolving regime of Don F. Madero, and we have like
wise justified the acts which placed General Huerta in the
office of President of the Republic.
We have been informed that it was your intention to rebel
against the legal authority of the Government. We beg
to insist, in the name of the country and for its exclusive
benefit, that you change your announced attitude not to col
laborate with us in the work of peace which we intend to pur
sue to the end, at any price. If for some personal reason

Life of Carranza 21
you wish to leave the office which you occupy, and if that can
be done without offending or hurting our patriotic end, the
Government will give you all sorts of guarantees and will
pay your salary up to the end of your term.
This letter, as you understand, must be absolutely of a
particular and private character. On this basis we beg to
inform you that on our part there will be no obstacles that
could arise between ourselves, which cannot be solved in
the manner most suitable to you. It would be advisable
for you to retire into the United States (for your greater
safety). We shall make all sorts of sacrifices (should you
demand them) so as to satisfy all your wishes and demands.
Our envoy (agent) will bring you instructions on the sub
ject. He is empowered to arrange matters on the spot.
We beg you to accept our assurance of admiration and re
spect. (Signed) Victoriano Huerta.
Felix Diaz.
Carranza's answer follows : nth March, 1913.
Messrs. V. Huerta y Felix Diaz :
My only answer to the despicable proposals offered to me
in your letter dated February 27th, is that I want to in
form you that men like myself do not betray, do not sell
themselves; that is your function, you who have no other
objects in life than the shameful satisfaction of ignoble am
bitions. Raise the black flag of your tyranny, and over the country
the voice shouts: "Treason and Death."
On my part, with the help of the Mexican people, I shall
lift from the mud into which you have thrown it, the flag

22 Carranza and Mexico
of the country. Should I fall defending it, I shall have ob
tained for my small action in life, the greatest prize which
we honest men can aspire to.
(Signed) Venustiano Carranza.
In the month of March, 19 13, not satisfied with
having defied the powers in Mexico, General Car
ranza published the " Plan of Guadalupe," so called
from the fact that the revolutionary plan was
signed by the officers at the " hacienda " farm of
Guadalupe. The plan is the following:
DECLARATION TO THE NATION
Considering that General Victoriano Huerta, to
whom the Constitutional President, Francisco I.
Madero, had confided the defence of the institu
tions and the legality of his government, on uniting
with the rebel enemies in arms against that same
government, to restore the latest dictatorship, com
mitted the crime of treason to reach power, arrest
ing the President and Vice-President, as well as their
ministers, exacting from them by violent means the
resignation of their posts, which is proven by the
messages that the same General Huerta addressed
to the Governors of the States, advising them that
he had the Supreme Magistrates of the nation and
their cabinet prisoners.
Considering that the legislative and judicial
powers have recognized and protected General Vic
toriano Huerta and his illegal and anti-patriotic pro
ceedings, contrary to the constitutional laws and pre-

Life of Carranza 23
cepts, and considering, finally, that some governors
of the States of the union have recognized the il
legitimate government, imposed by the part of the
army which consummated the treason, headed by the
same General Huerta, in spite of the fact that the
sovereignty of those same States whose governors
should have been the first in disowning it, had been
violated, those who subscribe, chiefs and officials,
in command of constitutional forces, we have ac
corded, and shall sustain by arms the following :
PLAN
1. General Victoriano Huerta, as President of the
republic shall be disowned.
2. The legislative and judicial powers of the fed
eration shall also be disowned.
3. The governors of the states who still recognize
the federal powers forming the actual admin
istration, 30 days after the publication of this
plan, shall be disowned.
4. For the organization of the army in charge of
seeing that our purposes are carried out, we
name as first chief of the army, which will be
called Constitutionalist, Venustiano Carranza,
Governor of the State of Coahuila.
5. The Constitutionalist army on occupying Mex
ico City, the executive power will be provi
sionally in charge of Venustiano Carranza,
first chief of the army, or in charge of that
person who might substitute him in command.

24 Carranza and Mexico
6. The provisional President of the Republic will
convene general elections as soon as peace may
have been consolidated, handing the power to
the citizen who may have been elected.
7. The citizen who may act as first chief of the Con
stitutionalist army in the States whose govern
ment might have recognized that of Huerta,
will assume the charge of provisional governor
and will convoke local elections, after the citi
zens elected to discharge the high powers of the
federation may have taken possession of their
office, as provided for in the foregoing basis.
The plan was signed at the Hacienda of Guada
lupe, Coahuila, on the 26th of March, 1913.
Sixty-four officers of the state troops affixed their
signatures to the protest. Among the most famous
on the list was Lieut. Col. Lucio Blanco, who
fought in Tamaulipas and initiated the sale of lands
belonging to Felix Diaz, among Constitutionalist
soldiers, and Major J. B. Trevino.
As Don Venustiano Carranza was leaving Saltillo
to take the field against the federals, he said to a
friend : " We are going to fight the three years'
war over again."
A coincidence in atavism is that Don Venustiano's
father, Colonel Carranza, fought in the north dur
ing the three years' war under the leadership of
Benito Juarez (1857-60) and assisted him finan
cially as well as politically in the struggle. Later,

Life of Carranza 25
after the Constitutionalist government had placed
Benito Juarez in the presidency through the elec
tions, Colonel Carranza was offered the reimburse
ment of the sixteen thousand odd dollars which he
had contributed to the liberal cause. He refused
the money saying that the victory of the party was
sufficient payment to him.
A further coincidence, amusing to students of his
tory, is found in the case of Gen. Victoriano Huerta,
whose father, Gen. Epitacio Huerta, fought under
the same banner as Colonel Carranza. The history
of the three years' war mentions the name of three
generals: The Constitutionalist Generals Rocha,
Huerta and Arteaga. . . . After the clericals had
been defeated by the Constitutionalists under Benito
Juarez in i860 they invited foreign intervention,
which ended in the courtmartial and shooting of
Emperor Maximilian and Generals Miramon and
Mejia. In the present instance, Don Victoriano Huerta,
when he perceived an early defeat, heaped indigni
ties and insults upon American citizens so as to in
vite an intervention and a quick march of the Amer
ican troops into Mexico City. The clericals which
he represented preferred the presence of Americans
to that of the Constitutionalists in Mexico City.
Luckily for Mexico, the Chief Magistrate in Wash
ington foresaw the move and wisely refused to pull
the chestnut out of the fire for a Mexican monkey.
The first battle of the revolution was fought be-

26 Carranza and Mexico
tween Saltillo and Monclova in a small place called
" Anhelo," which, translated from the Spanish,
means a vehement desire.
The reason for going into certain details of the
march of Carranza across the northern States, is for
the purpose of showing the physical endurance, the
mental activity, as well as the profound and implicit
faith that Venustiano Carranza had in the people
of Mexico.
The personality of Carranza does not seem to
have been sympathetic to foreign newspapermen
who have visited him. His presence and manner
seem utterly cold, intellectual; extremely polite,
non-committal. * When talking, his speech is devoid
of all the superlatives and amenities which made
New York reporters say of L. de la Barra, " He
talked incessantly for fifteen minutes without saying
one word for copy."
Carranza's talent as a good listener made him
the despair of journalists, who preferred the gen
erals who fought, talked, gave orders to shoot a
few prisoners, and between snatches of food, dic
tated incidents from their lives or told what their
plans were for the future of Mexico. Carranza is
more subtle if not sufficiently romantic. The care
ful observer must read between the lines, when the
personality grows on one, like the taste for olives
or the magnitude of the Chief Magistrate in Wash
ington. Some leaders are unattractive because of
their very uprightness, their justice, their integrity,

Life of Carranza 27
their polish; their flawlessness offers no purchase to
a sly attack. Aristides asked an Athenian citizen,
who had voted to ostracize him, if Aristides had
personally offended him, " No, but I am tired of
hearing him called the Just! "
Enemies of Carranza have accused him of being
too much of an aristocrat and a puppet in the hands
of his lawyers' cabinet, or again a jingo for effect
and a rebel for power. His conduct towards his
general staff, his generals, his enemies, his attitude
towards the United States and the foreign powers,
his promises or silence on the question of interior
policy, — his words, speeches, letters and decrees
are his best witnesses to judge him by.
After the defeat at Anhelo, Carranza went to
the border, passing through Cuatro Cienegas, which
is famous as his birthplace, to Eagle Pass.
In the month of July, 19 13, when the Arrietas
and Contreras were attacking Torreon, Carranza
joined them in the hope of success, but even the sec
ond time when Villa attacked Torreon, the victories
were empty, except for the arms, ammunition and
money captured.
Disconsolate but not discouraged, Carranza, ac
companied by about two hundred men, slowly
wended his way across the State of Durango. Gen
eral Huerta was at that period on the highest crest
of success and power, — orders had been telegraphed
all over the north, to the federal and counter-guer
rilla chiefs, to capture Carranza, dead or alive, and

28 Carranza and Mexico
be rewarded with a bonus of $150,000. Abraham
Gonzalez, Governor of Chihuahua, had been ar
rested and assassinated by order of Huerta. Venus
tiano Carranza, therefore, travelled at night and
rested during the day ; his only pilots were the stars,
a small compass and a pocket edition of " Mexico-
Atlas." The chief himself recounts how often dur
ing their night ride, they espied coming towards
them in the distance, the vaguely outlined forms of
peons, men and women carrying their children in
their arms. Scouts were sent ahead to discover if
the peasants were only disguised federals in a des
perate attempt to assassinate the brain of the revo
lution, and capture a kingly reward.
The phantom shadows were " pacificos," who had
walked for miles to greet the chief who was going
to battle for their rights and their lands. They
only wanted to touch his hands, the hem of his coat,
to hear the voice of the great " Jefe," and then they
turned their weary way sending back a salutation:
" May God protect you ! " or " May God be with
you ! " which rang in the silent night like the voice
of the people, the voice of God.
As Carranza kept his itinerary secret, the first
encounter might vhave been accidental, but it hap
pened so frequently that it seemed almost uncanny
and supernatural, this triumphant procession accom
panied by the blessings, the wishes, the yearnings
of the Mexican peons. Carranza himself confessed
that no incident in his life made a more profound

Life of Carranza 29
impression on him, and gave him a deeper insight
of the tremendous faith of the Mexican people in
their champions, pathfinders, and saviors.
Across the mountains in Durango to Tepehuanes,
into Parral in Chihuahua, where he came in con
tact with General Chao, and from there across the
Sierra Madre, a mountain range, dividing Chihua
hua from Sonora, into the small city of Fuerte,
where Carranza met for the first time General Obre
gon and his soldiers.
He reached Guaymas, in Sonora, about the mid
dle of September, 19 13. The little band was tired,
and their clothes were in rags, their shoes in tat
ters, but the goal was reached and they began the
work of organizing the capital of the Constitutional
government. In Mexico the presence of Carranza was known
only to the revolutionists, and as the federals could
not discover the whereabouts of the Chief at that
time, they heralded his disappearance and death.
Everywhere that Carranza had passed with his band
of followers in the small cities, away from the fed
erals who cautiously kept within the city limits and
near the railroads, he invariably organized small
local governments until he was able to communicate
with his chiefs in the middle and east. In the State
of Coahuila, his brother Don Jesus, and Gen. Don
Pablo Gonzalez, had come to an understanding as
to the great strategic outline of the campaign in
combination with General Villa in the north and

30 Carranza and Mexico
General Obregon on the west. In Guaymas a pro
visional cabinet was organized with Don Rafael
Zubaran Capmany, one of the keenest intellects of
the revolution, a lawyer from Campeche, with Fran
cisco Escudero as Minister of Foreign Affairs, as
Minister of Finances F. I. Villareal, Engineer G.
Bonilla as Minister of Communications, and Gen
eral Angeles as Minister of War.
Gen. J. B. Trevino was the chief of the general
staff of Carranza; the chief secretary was G. Espi
nosa Mireles; there was also a staff of officers at
tached to his person. It was in HermosiUo that the
great strategic campaign was outlined with the help
of General Angeles and the general staff. The or
ders to the three chiefs, Obregon, Villa and Gon
zalez, came from HermosiUo.
After the northern States were conquered slowly,
all the city and rural governments were organized,
and although the work was arduous and continuous,
it was not quite as strenuous as the classic ride across
the sierras and the deserts. The daily routine at
headquarters was very simple but efficient. The
chief usually got up between five and six in the morn
ing, and except when he rode across the mountain
took his bath and attended at once to the most im
portant work of the day. At 7 a. m. there was a
light breakfast with whatever could be had, milk,
crackers with peach preserves, or honey and butter.
On the march everybody had to be satisfied with the
national tortilla, made of cornmeal and beans.

Life of Carranza 31
Sometimes they could get fresh eggs, sometimes not.
In HermosiUo they fared better; Carranza had
two Indian attendants, one who did the cooking and
the other who attended to his horses and those of
the general staff. The Mexican cooks have the
most wonderful capacity for being able to light a
fire and cook anywhere under the most distressing
conditions. Thus they were able to get meals and a few lux
uries like boiled and fried meal, vegetables, and the
famous chile with cheese, and a powdered coffee
called " Washington coffee," with milk. Sometimes
they drank a red wine which is grown in the north
of Mexico. Carranza invited at almost every meal,
some friends who had travelled many miles to see
him, or soldiers or civilians belonging to his im
mediate surroundings.
Between the hours of 7 :30 and 1 p. M. the whole
staff was again busy taking orders from the chief,
— writing, telegraphing and conferring. At one
o'clock there was a light luncheon and the work was
resumed until six, when the chief took his daily ride,
accompanied by an aide or a friend. Ten o'clock
was usually the time to retire, unless the " Jefe "
had been invited to a fiesta or a dance, which hap
pened quite frequently as Mexicans are very fond
of dancing, theatricals, speech-making, and are in
general very sociable. Unlike most Mexicans, the
chief does not smoke, or favor the national drink
" tequila," or the Mexicanized cognac, or the ex-

32 Carranza and Mexico
cellent Monterrey and Toluca beer which was ad
vertised in Mexico as " the beer that made Milwau
kee jealous."
By February the chief and his staff packed their
belongings, and the state papers, and crossed the
State of Sonora into Sinaloa in Culiacan, the cap
ital, which had been captured by General Obregon.
After the organization of Sinaloa, the peripatetic
government moved back to HermosiUo and towards
the border, to Nogales. By that time, Torreon had
been captured and Carranza, accompanied by 300
cavalry and 400 infantry, crossed the Sierra Madre
range into Chihuahua, to Juarez, an excursion which
lasted twenty-five days and covered over 400 miles.
They had come from the tropical heat of the deserts
of Sonora to the snow on the Sierra Madre.
From Juarez on, the procession of the Chief
rolled downward to Chihuahua, Torreon, Saltillo,
Monterrey, Tampico, down to Tepotzotlan near
Mexico City. The details of his slow organization
of the civil government of all the conquered States,
of his foreign attitude and of the other details of
this revolutionary rule, will be discussed in separate
chapters. Carranza at first sight makes the impression more
of a Saxon personality than of a Mexican type. The
Spanish blood, which flows in his veins three or
four generations back must have been of Basque
origin, which is pure northern European. He is
about five feet, eight inches high, proportionately

Life of Carranza 33
built, neither too thin nor too stout, and he- carries
himself erect and in a dignified manner. His white
hair and beard contrast with the very dark brown
complexion which is the result of an active, out-of-
door life. The eye-glasses give to his appearance
a slight professional mien. The professorial air is
rather disconcerting at first, for one expects to he-
hold a type of a man different from the quiet, un
assuming, very polite, gentleman farmer, and instead
of a deep, sonorous voice, a rather high and clear
tone of speech. His eyes are hazel, very open,; —
his nose straight, his forehead very high, and he has
the high brow of an intellectual, rather than of a
fighter, his ears are quite large, denoting a strong
constitution and a long life. The whole impression
is of self-restraint, gentleness; nevertheless, the keen
observing eyes prove an alert intelligence, always
watching, weighing, judging and carefully registering.
all the impressions for future use. As all men deal
ing with people politically, Carranza has a very re
tentive memory for faces and names. Being a com
prehending and patient listener he always hears a
great deal more than he says, but when an answer
is required, the words come out slowly, as if chosen
with extreme care to express a thought with as few
words as possible. While speaking in public, the
use of simple language denotes a clear mind which
can express complicated problems in first principles,
and Carranza makes himself understood by cultured
Mexicans as well as by peons.

CHAPTER II
CONDITIONS IN MEXICO DURING DIAZ' REGIME
FT would appear after all that has been written
•*¦ in the United States and Europe concerning
Mexico, that the people ought to possess a clearer
conception of the conditions which brought about
the Madero and the Constitutionalist revolutions,
especially when the latter is nothing more than a
continuation of the former. But the words of the
late Joseph Pulitzer, when he said that to instil
facts into the minds of the people there must be
constant repetition, seem undeniably true. It is not
sufficient to reiterate certain facts; the correlation
of these facts must be understood and explained.
People heard about the peonage system in Mex
ico, about the great power of Porfirio Diaz, about
the abuses of this power, but it was not realized
how vital, how deep, how intimate the solution of
the political problems was to the Mexicans them
selves. To foreigners the Mexican problem was
only interesting in so far as it affected their inter
ests, — no more.
After all the cruelties perpetrated by the Diaz-
Huerta regimes, I have heard intelligent Amer
icans exclaim that the Mexicans needed a strong
34

Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 35
man like; Huerta, and that Diaz after all had
brought railroads, schools, higher wages, money,
improvements and progress. It makes one almost
despair of human intelligence to hear such super
ficial prattle, but it proves the axiom of Joseph Pu
litzer to be very profound and that Porfirio Diaz
had used it to its fullest extent.
Known by few people, Porfirio Diaz used for
years a secret fund amounting to millions solely for
the purpose of advertising to the world that Diaz
was the creator of modern Mexico, that " peace "
and " progress " were his two watchwords, with
which he had put Mexico on a permanent basis of
greatness. Many small newspapers near the bor
der as far as San Antonio were paid as much as
$5,000 a year to speak in good terms about Diaz
and never to mention any trouble or agitation which
might be started along the border by anarchists who
might call themselves Mexican revolutionists.
Great newspaper proprietors in the United
States were given concessions, others were offered
special inducements to publish special Mexican num
bers, which brought from $25,000 to $30,000
worth of advertising; well-known individuals, such
as judges, congressmen and senators, were invited
in an indirect way to visit Mexico, were received
like princes, feted, dined and were offered mining
or other concessions as one gives cigars to a guest
after dinner. When the concessions were not
needed or available, Don Porfirio took particular

36 Carranza and Mexico
care to impress his famous visitor with a set of well
chosen phrases most apt to impress him favorably
as to his greatness, his patriotism and his de
mocracy. One incident, which was related to me, illustrates
the Machiavellian talent of Diaz. A nationally fa
mous librarian paid his visit to General Diaz, who
received him very graciously. No concessions were
asked or wanted and the President did not mention
the great battles he had fought, which were un
known to the gentle librarian, but he spoke at great
length of the extensive school system in vogue since
his ascension to the presidency, and ended the con
versation by declaring: " It is my greatest ambi
tion to be known as the great schoolmaster of Mex
ico." The phrase impressed the scholar and many
people heard the phrase*, and many newspapers re
peated it until everybody believed it.
Pearson's Magazine printed six years ago a ful
some life of Diaz. What General Diaz thought
of it is told in an interview between Ireneo Paz, a
Mexican newspaperman and the President who were
friends for more than sixty years. Don Ireneo Paz
asked the President: " I have been wanting to ask
you if that interview which the papers published a
few months ago was authentic; that one which is
said to have taken place between yourself and one
Creelman, an American journalist?"
"What surprises me is that sagacious men like
you should have been capable of giving credit to

Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 37
such folly (a semejante paparrucha) ," replied
Diaz. " Because I did not believe it, I asked you if it
was authentic."
" It's as true as a dead child. You know me
too well to believe that I could stroll for hours upon
the terrace of Chapultepec, exhibiting the white of
my eyes and opening my nostrils excessively in order
that the Yankee reporter may be able to give wings
*to his fancy. What happened was this : A friend
of mine, a member of my cabinet, came to read me
the article which was already manufactured (con-
feccionado) for an American publication. It
didn't seem bad to me, or rather it seemed very
good, because without compromising me much it lent
a lustre to my antecedents, and put me on a good
footing for the future, so that it gave me all the
facilities which I desired, whether to continue sac
rificing myself for the Fatherland, or to shake off
the dust thereof (zafarme) in time if things should
blow into a whirlwind (a ponerse turbias). I ac
knowledge to you that I thought the writing was
so well dressed up, so much in conformity with what
are not but should be my profoundest thoughts, so
seemly for our luckless proletariat, that I accepted
it unhesitatingly as if it had been inspired by myself,
not making more than a very few modifications on
some entirely Yankee points of view which would
have put me in a very ridiculous position, and I gave
my consent to two things : — that it should be pub-

38 Carranza and Mexico
lished in English and Spanish, and that it should
be amply paid for."
" About how much was the cost of this work? "
" Some fifty thousand pesos." (Como unos cin
cuenta mil pesos.) 1
Toward the end of the Diaz regime and in an
effort to refute the attacks made in a book by the
present writer called, " Diaz, Czar of Mexico," the
cientificos inspired James Creelman to write " Diaz,
Master of Mexico"; whole chapters were also
dedicated in an effort to discredit the expose by
J. K. Turner in his " Barbarous Mexico." Several
books published in the United States and England
were bought by Diaz. One was " Porfirio Diaz,"
by R. de Zayas Enriquez, and the other " Yucatan,
the American Egypt," by Tabor and Frost. The
Mexican government inspired their consul in Cuba,
J. F. Godoy, to write a book, " Porfirio Diaz,"
which had " seventy pages of endorsements of Diaz
written by prominent Americans." Here we have
the case of a man, Mr. Godoy, who actually went
about — or sent about — among senators, congress
men, diplomats and cabinet officers, soliciting kind
words for President Diaz.2 Porfirio Diaz and his
cientifico supporters thought that they could keep
the Mexicans, peons, and the middle class working-
men down if public opinion in Europe and in the
1 From " Mexico the Land of Unrest," by Henry Baerlein.
2 "Barbarous Mexico," J. K. Turner.

Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 39
United States was misinformed about the real con
ditions in Mexico.
The great reputation of General Diaz in Amer
ica and Europe was essentially manufactured
through laudatory articles in the press, magazines,
weeklies and daily papers, by the publication of
books, interviews of prominent Americans who came
back from a visit to the " Great Old Man " in
Chapultepec, who could have said as Macbeth,
" And I have bought golden opinions from all sorts
of people." Judges, congressmen, senators, gov
ernors, members of cabinets, even presidents, princes
and kings spoke in reverence and admiration of
Don Porfirio Diaz.
What chance had any patriotic, democratic, and
free loving Mexican against the avalanche of lies,
deliberate and unconscious falsehoods? Whoever
heard in the United States of the Massacre of
Papantla where 20,000 Mexican peasants, men,
women and children were shot down in cold blood,
and as a result half a dozen villages wiped off the
map of Mexico?
What newspaper in America published the story
of the revolution of Tomochic, when 15,000 moun
taineer peasants in Chihuahua were destroyed and
only forty old men and women were left to tell the
tale? And the murder of 15,000 men, the whole
male population of Juchitan, State of Oaxaca, in
revenge for the death of Diaz's brother, and the as-

40 Carranza and Mexico
sassination of 750 workingmen of the Orizaba cot
ton mills?
Workingmen in Mexico were killed if they at
tempted to unionize or to strike, the peasants were
slaughtered to take away from them their rights
under the law; the Yaqui Indians were deported
and sold into slavery in Yucatan to permit the great
landowners in Sonora to sell their land to American
syndicates. Anybody who protested orally or in
writing was thrown into jail, where imprisonment
was worse than death. We reproduce the descrip
tion by a Mexican of a night passed in the prison
of Belem, Mexico City.
May 16.
I dare not credit the testimony of my senses. I cannot
yet believe all that I have suffered in that horrible night
which has just passed; a night of horrible dreams, a suc
cession of repugnant nightmares, terrific, phantastic, de
moniacal, impossible, inconceivable and nevertheless perfectly
and completely real. I thought the night would be end
less. I fancied myself in the infernal regions, in a hell as
the heated phantasy of the poet of maniacal brain never con
ceived it.
The prison is a sort of a room of 50 yards in length by
6 broad and 5 in height, that is to say 1500 cubic yards.
Within its walls sleep 800 individuals according to my cal
culation. The hygienists claim that 12 by 14 cubic yards of
air are necessary in a dwelling for each person: in that space
we did not even have 2 cubic yards each.
All the ventilation consists in an iron grating at the en
trance at one extremity and a window at the other end.

Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 41
How could 800 persons stay in that small space? It is a
mystery to me; I have seen it and still I cannot explain it,
and I am almost willing to admit the penetrability of the
bodies. The men lie down in two rows, feet to feet and the head
against the wall. Those who arrive first or the strongest
lie on the ground, those who follow do as best they can by
lying between two bodies cradle-wise. Everybody must per
force sleep sideways. For this reason quarrels and fights
are frequent and occasionally they end in wounds and some
times in death.
In this prison there are some revolting W. C.'s. They
are cleaned in the morning, but as the night advances they
are used constantly and as there is no running water, the
fecal matter and the urine run over onto the ground soak
ing those who sleep near them. Some wretches even sleep
seated on those barrels, and bitter fights take place when
somebody wants to use them and for that purpose they are
forced to disturb the sleepers on top of the barrels. Others
prefer to commit nuisance where they happen to be, against
the companions who happen to be near them and that occa
sions new fights.
The atmosphere is so fetid that it almost chokes and
asphyxiates you. It is so dense that you can almost cut it
with a knife.
This dungeon is lighted by some electric lamps whose rays
can barely penetrate the atmosphere. Eight hundred men
habitually dirty, clad in pestilential rags, the respiration of
all those lungs, the emanations of all these bodies, the filth of
those barrels. ... I am horrified at the remembrance of it
all and I am wondering that I am still alive.
Soon after the prisoners have settled to sleep, from the
different walls there starts a downward immigration of

42 Carranza and Mexico
myriads of parasitical insects. One cannot possibly conceive
the innumerable number of bed-bugs, some of enormous size,
lice of all classes, fleas, mosquitoes and cock-roaches. They
assure me that the prisoners become accustomed to all these
parasites and they do not heed them. The truth is that be
sides myself I did not notice anybody paying any attention
to them.
Only three persons were privileged to use cots; the head
keeper and two head men. I could not find a place to lie
down. The head keeper saw me standing and understood
the reason of my perplexity and authorized me to sleep under
his cot. At first I took this offer as an insult; later I un
derstood the full value of that concession which was not
gratis but cost me 25 cents.
It had just struck nine at the prison clock when suddenly
and accidentally all the electric lights went out. The dark
ness was absolute. Immediately a formidable roar arose
from that mob and a fearful struggle began. There were
heard shouts of hatred, fearsome lamentations, blasphemies,
the voices of the head men trying to impose order and shout
ing to the prisoners to keep silent, but without avail. It
was undescribable uproar.
Soon afterwards footsteps of soldiers were heard nearing
the door. An employe arrived with the escort bringing
a lantern along. He opened the grated door with a great
deal of noise and gave order to the soldiers to fire in case
of further disorder. Then everything was silent as if by
incantation. The turnkey asked for the oil lamps hanging
on the walls, lighted them and distributed them to the head
men to place them in their corresponding places. From
time to time the silence was interrupted by some stifled
groans. The turnkey ordered the formation of rows to make ready

Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 43
for the roll call. They brought the register and the prison
ers going into the corridor after their names being called.
Some did not appear, others answered in a dying voice. All
the prisoners able to do so went back to rest. There were
three dead and seventeen wounded. Who are the authors
of these crimes ? They have so far not discovered them, and
those who know the way of the prison claim that they
never will be found. The prisoners no matter how strict
the vigilance and how often they search them succeed in
hiding pieces of bones which form part of the meat rations,
and these bones they sharpen against the stones of the floor
until they become as sharp and pointed as daggers.
Those are the weapons used in their fights. They also em
ploy scissors, and spoons and other instruments which
are used in their different trades and which they manage to
steal. Every time that there is a riot as happens when the lights
go out then some of the most hardened prisoners take ad
vantage of this fact to revenge themselves or to wound those
nearest to them, without any provocation, and it is very
difficult to discover the author of the crime as many are
spattered with blood owing to the crowded conditions of
the dormitory.
Many of the wounds result from the indiscriminate use
of the stick in the confusion and darkness by the head men,
who do so in self-defence or in fear.
After the dead and wounded had been taken to the hospital
they locked us up again calling the names anew and leav
ing two guards at the gate to fire at the first sign of dis
order. I went back to my place under the cot of the head
keeper thinking to myself that the solitary cell in spite of
the " incommunicacion " was preferable to this dangerous and
filthy galley. I did not sleep a wink all night long. At 6

44 Carranza and Mexico
o'clock in the morning they opened the gate and all this sick
ening lee contained was vomited forth.
I was one of the first ones to go out and I nearly fainted
when I felt the fresh air of the morning. Mr. H. . . .
was waiting for me and he invited me to breakfast with him
in the department of distinction. Later he asked to see the
warden so as to get me a permit to go over to his department.
Meanwhile I jotted down those notes although I did not
know how I managed to do so as my head seems to be a
vacuum. I think I have a beginning of fever.
Not only were Mexicans persecuted in their own
country, but when Mexican liberals fled across the
border into the United States, thinking that they
could tell the truth and publish it in the American
press, they were persecuted and imprisoned through
the orders of the Mexican Ambassador in Wash
ington to the Attorney Generals under Theodore
Roosevelt, and William H. Taft. Some of the lib
erals were even kidnapped across the Mexican bor-
s der and sent to rot in the fortress of San Juan de
Ulloa in Vera Cruz. Manuel Sarabia, F. Flores
Magon, L. Rivera and Antonio I. Villareal were
the pioneers of Mexican agitation against Diaz.
" Mother " Jones by suggestion of the writer be
fore his imprisonment for libel against a Diaz of
ficial, induced Congressman W. B. Wilson of Penn
sylvania (Secretary of Labor in the Cabinet of Wil
son) , to investigate the persecution of Mexican lib
erals in the United States by American officials in
19 io. The result was a cessation of these perse-

Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 45
cutions and a renewal of agitation in the southwest
and along the border.
The agitation against the blood and iron rule of
Porfirio Diaz was begun over six years before the 1
Madero revolution; it was the preliminary work of
untold numbers of martyrs who died unknown,
crushed by the ruthless hand of the half-breed Czar.
In every State governors, jefes politicos, and cien
tificos robbed the Indians of the land in their pos
session. By the year 1892 all the great bodies of
agricultural land had passed from the possession of
more than a million small farmers into the hands
of less than fifty rich families and corporations of
the Diaz clique.
The State of Morelos (2,734 square miles) and
a population of 179,614 inhabitants, became prac
tically the property of half a dozen families. In
the State of Chihuahua one family alone, the Ter-
razas, owned as much land as the combined ter
ritory of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland.
Towards the end of the Diaz regime nearly 3,000,-
000 Indians had been despoiled of their native land
and General Diaz had sold over 83,000,000 acres
for the paltry sum of $3,000,000.
The policy of General Diaz was to eliminate the
Mexican Indian peons from valuable land and from
an independent economic life into peonage in great
haciendas, in great mines and factories where they
could be more easily controlled by the rurales and
the soldiers. At the height of Diaz's rule, in 1908,

46 Carranza and Mexico
when all the world was singing the paeans to the
glory of Porfirio Diaz, the writer found out by per
sonal investigation that the average salary for un
skilled labor in the mines near the city of Pachuca
(inh. 40,000) was three cents gold a day, and in
the haciendas six cents gold.
-*" What was the result of this policy of despolia
tion and oppression? Simply that wages in the
great haciendas, mines, and factories were kept as
low as possible, while prices of food stuffs and neces
sities went up by the help of a rigid system of high
tariff. The great haciendados, the foreign owners
of mines and industrial concerns, the same ones who
were reaping a golden harvest and singing the
praise of Diaz's rule were buying labor in Mexico
at a very low Mexican silver rate and were selling
the result of this labor at a gold rate.
* The press agents of Diaz spoke of the perfect
school system inaugurated at the beginning of his
rule. General Diaz never could have crushed Mex
ico in the iron grip of his hand if education had
been as general as was claimed. The percentage
of illiteracy in the thirty-five years of the czar's
rule was lowered from ninety to eighty-six per cent.
but only in the cities. The rural school system was
almost completely neglected, or was turned over to
the care of priests and nuns.
It was this fourteen per cent, of the people who
could read and write, which organized the agitation

Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 47
in Mexico under tremendous difficulties and by un
heard-of sacrifices.
The political advisers of Diaz never dreamed
that every Indian who was expatriated, every work
ingman who saw the murders of his companions,
every Mexican who suffered from an unjust impris
onment, became an incipient rebel, only awaiting the
time that a leader would show them their strength
and the way to break the chains of their economic
and political slavery.
It could never be imagined by the rich foreign
investors in Mexico who had observed the patient
and ignorant peons, that no matter how pacific, how
miserable and subdued a race, the day would come
when they must rebel and evolve into a daring and
independent race.
The same happened in France through the revo
lution. Read the description written by Mirabeau's
father of the savage-looking, long-haired, barefoot
peasants who came down from the mountains, and
the older Mirabeau's prophetic reflections on the
subject. The worst offenders and the greatest enemies to
Mexican political and economic freedom were the
foreigners; they always stood by the oppressors
with their financial and moral influence in Mexico,
in the United States and in Europe. Without this
powerful help Diaz would never have lasted thirty-
five years. Foreigners in Mexico were treated with

48 Carranza and Mexico
a deference and were allowed privileges unknown
to the average Mexican. Porfirio Diaz always
raised the spectre of American intervention when
he wanted to frighten restless Mexicans.
The only friends of liberal Mexico were the So
cialists and the organized workingmen in Europe
and especially in the United States who understood
from the beginning the danger of an enslaved, iU-
paid proletariat across the border. The great agi
tation which exposed the iron rule of Diaz was
helped by Socialists and the proletariat in the
United States, and made it easy for Madero and
his friends to plot and organize a revolution across
the border.
The foreign bankers, concessionaires, " friends
of the friends " of General Diaz, wanted a con
tinuation of peace at any price, even at the price of
subjugation of all Mexican liberties, or if that
failed, by American intervention, and as a result of
it either American conquest or of American police
rule as in Cuba.
The successor of Diaz had been chosen by the
invisible rulers of Diaz, everything about it was cut
and dried, and even the list of members of the Cab
inet of the successor had been drawn up. When a
foreigner was asked about the economic and polit
ical rights of the Mexicans, he shrugged his shoul
ders and answered that Indians and niggers were
not fit to rule themselves. The self-same Ameri
cans who would have started a revolution in their

Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 49
own country if political conditions had been as op
pressive as in Mexico, spoke contemptuously of the
valiant struggle of the middle class Mexicans. To
my utter amazement I heard an American clergy
man inform me after he had listened to a lecture
of mine in favor of the Constitutionalists and the
prophecy of a speedy downfall of Huerta, that he
nevertheless believed Mexico needed strong men
like Huerta and Diaz.
Americans who invest money in Mexico cannot
be blamed for being ignorant of Mexican conditions,
but how about foreigners who live years in Mexico
and come in daily contact with the people? Is it
a wonder that Mexicans are suspicious of for
eigners ?
Porfirio Diaz sold out his country to foreigners I
for a pittance, he made them rich and prosperous,
and he used Mexican labor, freedom, and their suf
fering to raise himself on a pinnacle of fame un
heard of to any other man of his times. Mexico
was only Mexico, but Diaz was its prophet, its
savior, its creator, its superman, and demi-god.
The Mexicans were an unknown, negligible quan
tity and quality, and the fatal pseudo-greatness of I
Diaz was trumpeted across the world by an army
corps of foreign concessionaries, exploiters and
grafters. But the great Diaz myth like a mon
strous Frankenstein destroyed itself in time.

CHAPTER III
THE MADERO REVOLUTION, ITS AIMS AND FAILURES
TN the summer of 1908, when the writer was in
****** Mexico he had heard that a man called F. I.
Madero was writing a book, in which he discussed
the advisability of contesting the seventh presiden
tial election of General Diaz. The book was sup
posed to have been written in collaboration with a
journalist who later was rewarded with the Gover
norship of Chiapas.
"The Presidential Question of 1910," the title
of the book, had about ninety thousand words of
written matter, and began with the War of Inde
pendence down to General Diaz's regime when he
tried to analyze the future political conduct of Diaz.
Of the interview of General Diaz in Pearson's
Magazine of 1908, he said: "We judge a study
of his declarations to Creelman useless, as we do
not believe they are sincere, for they are in mani
fest contradiction with his past acts, as General
Diaz has always made promises which were never
kept, from the Plan of. la Noria down to the last
one." ^
Although few intelligent Mexicans took General
Diaz at his word, they nevertheless caught him for
so

The Madero Revolution 51
the first time in a flagrant political " faux pas "
for not having denied the interview. They saw a
chance to take him at his own words and start the
work of organizing an agitation of the political con
science of Mexico.
Madero's book was a powerful factor in this
propaganda, which was followed by a national or
ganization of political clubs and speechmaking by
a few daring young men of the middle class. This
fearless, open propaganda copied the campaigning
methods of the United States and Madero was the
head of the movement.
At first, Diaz, his political supporters and even
the foreigners laughed at their rash, foolish crusade
which they thought would soon be crushed and de
stroyed. The Diaz clique, the cientificos and the old sup
porters of the czar, men like General Reyes, Gen
eral Naranjo, General Trevino, General Izabal,
General Torres, General Terrazas, Gen. Mucio
Martinez, T. Dehesa, R. Corral, J. Y. Limantour,
E. Creel, Gen. G. Cosio, O. Molina would all
have liked to be president, but they were too much
in awe of the power of the old man in Chapultepec.
Their political work was all done underground, they
were all getting ready for the moment when Gen
eral Diaz should step down gripped by the hand
o*§<death. None of them imagined that any Mex
ican, no matter how daring, could shake the founda
tion of the Diaz throne without the help of the mid-

52 Carranza and Mexico
die class of Mexico. When the old guard ob
served the impunity pf the Madero propaganda
they guessed that it was going to be a repetition of
the events in the presidential elections of 1903-04
when Diaz allowed his foolish enemies to come out
in the open and then destroyed them wholesale and
in detail.
The great strength of Madero consisted in his
peaceful methods of propaganda and his constant
advice to Mexicans to be patient under the perse
cutions of the government agents. He advised
them to suffer even imprisonment and death so as
to awaken the interest of the majority who would
soon follow their example.
Madero was assisted in his campaign by his
brother Gustavo and a young lawyer Roque Es
trada, and was accompanied everywhere by his wife,
even in jail. Roque Estrada wrote about the evo
lution of the Madero revolution and divided it into
four parts:
1. The Awakening of the Mexican political soul.
2. The Concentration of the revolutionary prop
aganda. 3. The Destruction of the Diaz regime.
4. The Reconstruction of the new government.1
The campaign continued under difficulties, when
the supporters of Diaz awakened to the fact that
Madero was growing popular. Then on the 6th
of June, 19 10, came the news of his arrest.
1 " The Revolution and F. I. Madero," Roque Estrada, 1913.

The Madero Revolution 53
It must be added that one of the reasons for the
indifference of the authorities to the Madero prop
aganda was the firm conviction that F. I. Madero
was a fool, an idiot, who was being used by power
ful enemies to initiate a counter campaign against
Diaz. A second reason was the fact that Madero
belonged to a wealthy and politically influential fam
ily of which the head, Don Evaristo, had been Gov
ernor of Coahuila during General Gonzalez' term
(1880-84). Moreover, the Maderos had finan
cial connections in New York, Paris and Lon
don. Besides the head of the family, every member of
the Madero clan had disowned Francisco I. Ma
dero's political activities with the exception of his
wife and Don Gustavo. It was a repetition of the
story of Joseph in the Old Testament: F. I. Ma
dero like Joseph was sold out by this brother's fam
ily. There was a radical wing in the Madero move
ment headed by Gustavo Madero which believed
that all the peaceful methods of agitation were use
less and that the only successful method of over
throwing the dictator was to be effected in the same
way by which he had come into power — by revo
lution. F. I. Madero insisted on peaceful methods, so
Gustavo without informing his brother went to
Paris ostensibly to organize a Mexican Railway of
the Centre. As soon as he cashed the first instal
ment of the moneys for the construction ($375,-

54 Carranza and Mexico
ooo) 2 he used it to buy arms and ammunition for
the revolution which was certain to burst out in a
few months.
In San Luis Potosi, October 5th, 1910, Don F. I.
Madero, who by this time had become convinced
of the futility of peaceful propaganda, wrote the
famous Plan. A few days later he was advised
that there was an order for his arrest which would
be followed by the application of the " Ley Fuga."
Disguised as a common laborer he fled into the
United States on October 7th, and went to San An
tonio. Some New York papers had long accounts
of his flight and plans, sent by their correspondents
but the news was not published.
The Plan of San Luis Potosi was a direct chal
lenge to Porfirio Diaz, and it used almost the same
slogan which General Diaz had written on the Plan
de la Noria against Juarez and later his Plan de
Tuxtepec and Palo Blanco which was : " Effective
suffrage and no re-election."
A great deal has been published about the great
promises of land reform and distribution of great
estates by F. I. Madero and which he could or would
not fulfil.
The exact wording of that famous Article 3d of
the Plan has either been forgotten or misinter
preted. We reproduce the Article :
Article 3d: " As a result of the abuses of the
lands, numerous small proprietors, mostly Indians,
2 "The Political Shame of Mexico," E. I. Bell, 1914.

The Madero Revolution 55
have been despoiled of their lands by common con
sent of the ministry of Fomento or by the decisions
of the Mexican courts. In justice to the old pro
prietors, they should be given back lands which
have been taken away from them in such an arbi
trary manner. The decisions of the Ministry of
Fomento and of the courts will be subject to revi
sion and it will be demanded of those who acted in
such immoral fashion, to return the land to their
original owners, besides paying them an indemnity.
Only in case that the lands should have passed to a
third party before the publication of this plan, will
the original owners receive an indemnity from those
whose spoliation benefitted them." 3
Thus it will be seen that the Plan of San Luis
Potosi aimed first of all to destroy the regime which
had made the land robbery possible.
After the capture of Juarez the whole Diaz Gov
ernment was practically destroyed as a political
force and the Reconstruction would have been easy
with a new government. But the reactionary forces
were at work to arrest the impetus of the revolu
tion. Limantour came back from Paris and pre
pared the way to an entrance of the reactionaries
by threatening to arrest Gustavo Madero for the
misappropriation of money to the use of the revo
lution. Madero's father and brother had *-o accept his
conditions and went post haste to confer with F. I.
3 See Plan in Index.

56 Carranza and Mexico
Madero at the border. Limantour's conditions
were the cessation of hostilities and a constitutional
transfer of the presidential power on the shoulder
of the clerical L. de la Barra. Limantour's clever,
strategic movement arrested the radical impulse, put
a few Maderistas in the Cabinet, and others in the
Governorship, but the inexperience of the new men
and the conscious inertia of ministers, like Ernesto
Madero, Secretary of Finance and Rafael Hernan
dez, Secretary of Fomento, checked all effective at
tempts at reforms. The two radical brothers, the
Vasquez Gomez, were eliminated. Limantour
went back to Paris to watch from a distance and
to direct the tactics of the policy of inertia.
Meanwhile plots were hatched against the life
of Madero. One almost succeeded at this time.
While L. de la Barra was provisional President they
sent F. I. Madero to confer with Zapata who
agreed to meet him on condition that no federal
troops should accompany Madero in Cuautla. Gen
eral Huerta, who was in charge of the federal troops
in Morelos broke the promise, and attacked
Cuautla in hopes that Zapata would kill Madero for
his supposed treachery. The common sense of
Zapata saved Madero's life.
The first conspiracy against Madero happened
when he was in Juarez and the cientificos had plot
ted his destruction by inciting the suspicious anger of
men like Orozco and Villa against him. But Ma
dero's bravery saved him again. The cientifico

The Madero Revolution. 57
plotters were said to be T E. Obregon, F. Carbajal
and Oscar Braniff. T. E. Obregon later became a
member of Huerta's cabinet and Carbajal the pro
visional president following the flight of General
Huerta. As soon as Madero was elected the cien
tificos captured Orozco with money and started him
as the head of a counter revolution before the Presi
dent had been seated a month. Then they pushed
General Reyes and later Felix Diaz and Vasquez
Gomez to revolt against Madero.
These movements although they failed, were
kept up so as to show the world the incompetence
and lack of popularity of the Madero regime.
Zapata started on the war path incited by the cruel
ties of the federal generals and all over the country
rich haciendados (ranchers) gave money to guerrilla
leaders to keep up the anarchy and by attacks on
American property and American citizens to invite
American intervention.
/ Twice the Taft regime attempted or threatened
an invasion of Mexico and once they almost suc
ceeded. The failure was due to the expose of the
little plot which resulted in the resignation of Dick
inson, then Secretary of War.4
It must be remembered that the Attorney General
under Taft was a lawyer who had been a personal
representative of Diaz in the United States, and
among some of the lawyers who had been his part-
/ 4 The New York Call published the first article of the expose, May
5, 1911.

58 Carranza and Mexico
ners was a brother of the President of the United
States. All were interested in Mexico financially
and politically.
The threats of invasion by the Taft regime had
a disastrous effect on the reorganization of the new
government. Madero was surrounded by enemies
at home and abroad. The army, the cientificos and
the clericals were plotting at home. The Mexican
Ambassador Calero had formed an alliance with the
American Ambassador, hoping to step into the
presidency as L. de la Barra had done. Calero
went so far as to telegraph to some French bankers
who were negotiating a loan to Madero, to stop
until further orders; the further orders were sup
posed to come from the new government which
Calero hoped to head.
But meanwhile there should not come any finan
cial assistance to Madero. In Congress men like
F. Bulnes, Q. Moheno, J. M. Lozano headed the
opposition which interfered with any plans of re
form, by cutting off all financial help. Madero was
just beginning to reap the fruit of his policy of con
ciliation. With few exceptions all the old Diaz appoint
ments in the courts, in the States, in the consular
and diplomatic service were kept in their places, and
as a result the old methods were kept in vogue. All
the army officers who had ruthlessly fought the revo
lutionists were left in their positions and the rebel
chiefs were dismissed with thanks.

The Madero Revolution 59
With the new interests created by the Madero
ascension to power there sprang up a hungry crowd
of office seekers and a neo-cientifico regime headed
by Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez. It
would not be supposed even as a fantastic flight of
a poetical imagination that the neo-cientificos would
sincerely attempt a reform of the government. E.
Madero is reported as having said that the financial
system left by Limantour worked like a Swiss watch.
The only reform to men of great interests can be
achieved in their favor, not against them.
Zapata could only be induced to stop his rebelhous
activity by a solution of the agrarian problem in
Morelos. The Cabinet Minister under Madero
only incited the exasperation by sending men of
Huerta's stamp in their midst.
It can be safely asserted that all the government
officials in Mexico were inimical to reforms begin
ning with the Madero clan (excepting F. I. and
Gustavo Madero), down to the lowest officials.
The men who had fought for the revolution watched
in disgust and dismay the disintegration of the revo
lutionary ideals.

CHAPTER IV
PLOTTING WHICH OVERTHREW MADERO
\T7"E have seen in the foregoing chapter the mis-
* " takes which had been made by Madero.
Being surrounded by enemies, he was too lenient
with them, and it proved disastrous.
Orozco, one of his chiefs of guerrilla, should
have been court-martialled and shot in Juarez ac
cording to military rule. The same drastic penalty
could have been applied without injustice against
two other high officers in the Mexican army, who
had rebelled against the authority — Felix Diaz and
General Reyes. But Madero, besides being too hu
mane for such methods, sincerely believed that
leniency was a sign of strength. Assuredly it was,
but only in case the cabinet and the government in
general had been loyal to him. Some cabinet mem
bers plotted quite openly against him — A. G.
Granados, for instance. The headquarters of the
plotters were in Paris and Geneva, with a branch
office in the New York Consulate. In Mexico Ro
dolfo Reyes was the soul of the movement. In
Paris, Limantour and L. de la Barra worked to
gether with General Mondragon to unravel the
60

Plotting which Overthrew Madero 61
threads of the conspiracy in favor of Felix Diaz,
who would represent the old Porfirista crowd, with
the assistance of the clericals and the great land
owners, and bankers, Americans as well as Mexican
and French.
In New York the plotters supported General
Reyes as representing the army, especially the
younger element. To all appearances the con
spiracy was essentially a military mutiny backed by
the cientificos, the landed interest and the clericals.
The most prominent army plotters were General
Mondragon, General Reyes, General Blanquet, Gen.
Felix Diaz, General Beltran, General Navarrete and
General Huerta. Among the civilians were: M.
Calero, A. G. Granados, T. E. Obregon, Vera Es
taiiol, A. R. Gil, L. de la Barra, J. M. Lozano, Q.
Moheno and Dr. Urrutia. The political and mili
tary heads, exemplified in the above mentioned
names, represented the army, the cientificos, the
clericals, the landed aristocracy, — in fact, all the
reactionary powers and none of the liberal or revo
lutionary tendencies of the people.
In utter blindness, innocence and optimism, call
it what you please, Madero scoffed at the idea of
a plot which could overthrow him. He firmly be
lieved that the Mexican people were behind him
and would support him. He forgot that all the
powers of reaction were well organized and that the
Mexican people who supported him were not or
ganized, — that they were at the mercy of a few

62 Carranza and Mexico
political bandits without principles and without
country. These unpatriotic politicians knew from experi
ence that the foreign bankers, the foreign corpora
tions, the American government and especially the
American ambassador, were inimical to Madero,
and hostile to liberal ideas, and would help them to
resist any attempts to reform the land question or
change the financial " status quo " as left over by
J. Y. Limantour.
When Gustavo Madero discovered the plot on
February 4th, and learned of the conspirators, he
took it to his brother, who laughed at him. The mu
tiny started on Sunday morning, the 9th of February.
During five days Madero continued playing with
fate, and when the rebellion, which was dated for
the 1 6th of March, burst out on the 9th, he was
taken by surprise. The plotters were scared into ac
tion six weeks before the date set, because they sus
pected treachery in their own ranks. On one side
there existed the ambition of General Reyes, who
was under the political management of his son Ro
dolfo, on the other side the ambition of Felix Diaz,
whose mentor was General Mondragon. General
Huerta's ambitions were always latent, but were
kindled and managed by his political tutor, Dr. Ur
rutia, who represented the clerical interests, as far
back as the Diaz time.
In the year 1908 a young painter, Dr. Atl, had
to undergo an operation and went to the sanatorium

Plotting which Overthrew Madero 63
of Dr. Urrutia. There he found General Huerta,
who was then unknown to anybody except his own
officers and soldiers. Dr. Atl was a " compadre "
of Dr. Urrutia, and although a radical of the ex
tremest type, Dr. Urrutia and General Huerta only
laughed at him, humored him, but took him into
their confidence. One afternoon as they were dis
cussing political events, Dr. Urrutia exclaimed that
ambitious and able men should prepare the way for
the presidency after the death of General Diaz.
Finally Dr. Urrutia said to General Huerta : " Gen
eral, you look like presidential timber, you are
capable and fearless and you control half of the
army. Why don't you begin to get ready? " Gen
eral Huerta looked at Dr. Urrutia and Dt. Atl
through half closed eyes, expressionless as a graven
image, and after a long pause he said: " It is diffi
cult, but it is not impossible."
During the Reyes-Diaz mutiny in Mexico City,
General Huerta was in charge of the troops. He
was making a great noise and killing off as many
volunteers of Madero and non-combatants as pos
sible. His ambition was to sap the strength of the
Maderists and to terrorize the population of the
city into acquiescence to any future pact.
During these strenuous ten days Dr. Urrutia was
seen going back and forth constantly between the
house of the Bishop of Mexico and General Huerta.
He was advising the soldiers and tying the strings
which would lift the less experienced Huerta into

64 Carranza and Mexico
the presidential chair, backed by the money and the
prestige of the Church. During the ten days of
constant bombardment, the citadel where Felix Diaz
was entrenched was touched but twice by the Huerta
guns, and the National Palace only twice also. An
American officer who happened to be in Mexico
City, backed the claim of General Angeles, that the
citadel could have been taken in a few hours if
Huerta had really been sincere in his attack. Gen
eral Angeles proposed to carry the citadel if F. I.
Madero would only place him at the head of the
government troops. Madero refused for fear of
hurting Huerta's vanity, and hoped thus to prove
that he had faith in his loyalty.
We publish the account of events which followed
the arrest of Madero and Suarez, by Mr. Marquez
Sterling, who tried his best to save Madero's life.
DECLARATION made by the Minister of the Re
public of Cuba in Mexico, Mr. Manuel Mar
quez Sterling, to the Herald.
It was exactly twenty-nine days after I presented
my credentials to President Madero, when the re
volt in the City of Mexico started. I shall not re
fer to the tragic scenes which took place during the
struggle in the city, from the 9th of February to
the ruin of the government, as the same are now
well known to all the world; I shall only refer to
the fall of Mr. Madero, after ten days of terrible

Plotting which Overthrew Madero 65
disorder, during which, automobiles of diverse lega
tions constantly crossed the streets of the city.
On the morning of February 18th, in a confer
ence which I had with the Secretary of Foreign Re
lations, Pedro Lascurain, he assured me that in the
afternoon the revolt would receive a decisive blow,
and that the city would return to the hands of the
government. Precisely at two o'clock in the after
noon, I received notice that General Blanquet had
made the President and his cabinet prisoners. A
short time later we were called to the American
Embassy by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson and informed
of this extraordinary event.
General Blanquet verified the arrest by order of
General Huerta, and as a consequence, the sharp-
shooting in the streets ceased. In the evening, the
Ministers of Chile, Brazil and I visited the Amer
ican Embassy, looking for further news. We there
met General Huerta and Gen. Felix Diaz, who for
several days had fought in the streets of Mexico.
They were accompanied by other persons, such as
the actual Minister of Justice, Lie. Rodolfo Reyes.
Reyes then read in a loud voice, in our presence, a
document in which both Generals agreed upon the
ceasing of hostilities. Huerta and Diaz later
signed this document, "embracing immediately after
wards, while their companions applauded; the diplo
mats did not applaud, remaining as mute witnesses
of a scene which was unexplainable to us.

66 Carranza and Mexico
On the 19th, in the morning, I left the Cuban
Legation and went through several streets, in order
to get an idea of the popular sentiment. I heard
the death of Gustavo Madero discussed, of whose
capture I had already heard, they saying that he
had been assassinated in the arsenal, and that in the
afternoon Huerta would execute the president him
self. They also stated that the Vice-President,
Pino Suarez, had tried to escape. While I listened
to all this, a distinguished Mexican gentleman, whose
name I shall not state, detained me and said: " You
and the members of the Diplomatic Corps are the
only ones who can save Madero."
On returning to the Legation, this idea had taken
possession of my mind, and for that purpose I im
mediately sent a note to the American Ambassador,
communicating the matter to him and proposing to
him that the Diplomatic Corps should take charge
of the same. In the name of my government, I of
fered the services of the Cruiser Cuba (which some
days previous I had requested from my government,
and which was anchored in Vera Cruz) to save them
from danger, taking them away from the country,
in case they should obtain their liberty. I immedi
ately went to the Japanese Legation to see the par
ents of the President, who had heard of the death
of their son, Gustavo, and which they did not credit.
They begged me therefore, to go to Mr. Wilson and
beg him to aid us with General Huerta, to save the
lives of their two sons. The Charge d'Affaires of

Plotting which Overthrew Madero 67
the Japanese Legation accompanied me to the Amer
ican Embassy and we made our proposition known
to the Ambassador.
We there met the Spanish Minister, and he and
I agreed that the situation was more serious than
we had thought, and therefore determined to per
sonally see General Huerta, asking him for the lives
of the prisoners. We went in my automobile, flying
the Cuban flag, but we were not able to see Huerta.
Instead, we were received by General Blanquet, who
treated us with great courtesy, assuring us that they
would respect the lives of the prisoners, and while
this was passing the Minister of Chile arrived, tell
ing us that Madero had consented to resign as
President of the Republic, and that the Secretaries
of State and other persons who had been made pris
oners with Madero and Pino Suarez, had been set
at liberty.
On the morning of the 19th nevertheless, a rep
resentative of Huerta urged Madero to resign.
Madero replied to this messenger that he was
now resolved to resign, provided that he who had
usurped his place should govern according to the
Constitution. While the*y_ were explaining this,
Mr. Lascurain went to see Madero, as a mediator,
to whom Madero expressed the conditions under
which he would resign. Lascurain, in Huerta's
name, accepted. These conditions were: that the
resignation should be delivered to the Minister of
Chile, who would retain it in his possession until

68 Carranza and Mexico
Madero and Pino Suarez should be safely aboard
the Cuba in Vera Cruz. Madero stipulated also
that in the trip to Vera Cruz, they should be ac
companied by the Charge d'Affaires of Japan and
myself, Madero insisting principally in that, before
delivering the resignation to Congress, Huerta
should sign a letter, in which he would promise to
comply with the terms of same.
That same afternoon Madero signed his resig
nation, and further, as Lascurain was present, he
granted, at his indication, that the affair should be
ventilated among Mexicans, handing the resignation
to Lascurain, instead of delivering it to the Min
ister of Chili. It was then stipulated that at ten
o'clock that night Madero and Pino Suarez would
leave for Vera Cruz in a special train, together with
their families, and accompanied by myself and an
official of the Japanese legation, and escorted by a
powerful guard.
Having communicated this arrangement to the of
fice of General Blanquet, I ascended to General
Huerta's department to see him, but I was informed
that he was sleeping. I immediately returned to
the office of General Blanquet, where the Ministers
of Chile and Spain awaited me. We then asked
for permission to see Madero and same was im
mediately conceded to us, going to the four first
rooms, in which he was confined.
Madero warmly expressed his gratitude to me,

Plotting which Overthrew Madero 69
begging me to accompany him to Vera Cruz, which
request I was pleased to accede to.
" When you are ready," he told us, " come to the
palace in order to go to the station. It would be
well if you could come at eight, but at any rate I
shall wait for you until ten o'clock."
I then left, and immediately went to telegraph
to the Commander of the Cuba that he should ex
pect us, being ready to sail from Vera Cruz, and
that he should do what was necessary in order to
receive aboard the Heads of the Government and
their families.
At eight o'clock I was punctually at the Palace,
making my proposition known to General Blanquet.
He ordered one of his aides to accompany me; the
four rooms occupied by Madero and Pino Suarez
were connecting. The door of one of the rooms
faced the yard, and there were many soldiers and
officials in the entrance ; there were also sentinels in
the interior of the sparsely furnished rooms, sen
tinels who, according to what I knew were replaced
each moment. General Angeles, one of the offi
cial favorites of Madero, was also a prisoner in
these rooms. Ernesto Madero was there visiting
his nephew.
Receiving us affectionately, Madero asked me if
I knew anything about his brother Gustavo, and it
could be seen that he did not know of his death. I
evaded the question to the best of my ability. Sud-

70 Carranza and Mexico
denly, Madero asked about the letter that he had to
give to Huerta. None of us had it, and then Er
nesto Madero said that he would go and get it from
Huerta. Almost immediately he returned without
it, but with the news that Lascurain had gone to
present Madero's resignation to Congress.
On knowing this, Madero became very excited,
and from that moment lost all hope of salvation.
" I have fallen into a trap for the second time,"
he said, indicating to his uncle that he should go and
tell Lascurain that he wished him to come immedi
ately. Then Ernesto Madero confessed the truth
to him, telling him that the resignation had already
been presented and accepted by Congress. " This
is a felony of Lascurain," said Madero. " The
agreement was that the resignation should not be
presented until I was aboard the Cuba."
In those moments, we knew by the conduct of
an official that Huerta had just been designated as
Provisional President by Congress.
" This has been the second trap into which I have
fallen," Madero finally said to me. " I am now
convinced that I shall not leave Mexico alive. They
will conduct me to prison this same night, and on
the trip, they will shoot me, or else they will assas
sinate me right here, as soon as we are alone."
Ernesto Madero begged me to remain with him,
telling me that if they succeeded in surviving that
night, that probably the Diplomatic Corps would
be capable of saving them. I decided to accom-

Plotting which Overthrew Madero 7 1
pany them, for how could I have the heart to take
my hat and leave them, being persuaded that these
men would be dead as soon as I was in the street?
Ernesto finally left us, Madero, Pino Suarez and
I remaining in these gloomy rooms.
At one o'clock in the morning he invited me to
rest, indicating to me that he was very sleepy, and
without the least agitation, this man who had just
been deposed from the Presidency, commenced to
prepare two beds with chairs, one for himself and
the other for me.
He had finished his labor, when an official sent
by General Huerta arrived, he having ordered him
to tell us that the train arranged to conduct the pris
oners out of the country was conveniently ready, but
on account of circumstances which he would explain
later, it had been impossible to despatch it. The
same official invited me to retire and wait. And
as, previously, something had been said in regard
to the train being ready to leave at five o'clock in
the morning, I asked the official if this was in the
programme, but he replied that he did not know
anything. As soon as I saw Madero sleep, I went
to keep company with Pino Suarez, first giving a
glance at Madero, who slept like a child. At this
moment, the guards entered and turned out the
lights. From the upper crevices of the windows some
rays of light penetrated, but they did not molest
us. We were so closely guarded, that any phrase

72 Carranza and Mexico
which passed between Pino Suarez and myself had
to be spoken in a very low voice.
At 9 :30 in the morning breakfast was served to
us. Pino Suarez did not wish to take the coffee,
fearing that it might be poisoned, but Madero and
I took it. Then Madero gave the boy who had
served us a dollar, and told him to bring us the
morning papers. We did not permit this, fearing
that he might find out about Gustavo's death. Ma
dero became resigned, lying down on his bed of
chairs, where he slept for twenty minutes.
When he awakened, he said he was prepared for
everything that might happen, but he indicated to
me that I should approach the diplomats in order
to save him, which I promised to do with pleasure.
He also asked me if his wife had also made any
petition personally to Huerta.
About ten o'clock in the morning, the wife of
Pino Suarez arrived, accompanied by a gentleman,
and I then took leave of them.
The balance of that day, February 20th, and the
two following days, we worked to save Madero. I
asked Huerta why he had not given his consent in
this respect, to which he replied that he did not
dare send Madero to Vera Cruz, until he could have
confidence in the military authorities of that place.
I, in turn, indicated to him that he might be sent to
Tampico, where I could have the Cuba sent. He
further showed himself irresolute. Almost all the

Plotting which Overthrew Madero 73
foreign ministers saw Huerta personally that day,
and interceded for the life of Madero.
On the morning of the 2 2d, the ministers thought
the lives of Madero and Pino Suarez to be out of
danger, although we had heard the rumor that they
schemed to place Madero in an insane asylum. At
night all the ministers approached the American Em
bassy to celebrate the anniversary of the birth of
Washington. Huerta and all the Ministers in his
Cabinet were present and they all appeared very
calm. On the morning of the following day, Sunday,
I was very urgently called to the telephone. It
was Mrs. Madero, who was very excited on account
of the news she had received that her husband had
been wounded. I answered that this could not be
true, but a little later I read in the morning papers
the event of the death of Madero and Pino Suarez
at 11:15 tne previous night, on being taken to the
penitentiary. Ambassador Wilson finally tried to obtain per
mission for Mrs. Madero to see the body of her
husband. We then believed that the balance of the
family were in danger, and I hastily proposed to
take them from the country. I personally sent in
a secret manner to Vera Cruz, Francisco Madero,
father of the assassinated president, and his brother
Ernesto, and they embarked on the Cuba.
I later conducted the mother, widow and sister

74 Carranza and Mexico
of the President to the Cuba, leaving Vera Cruz
on February 25th.
Mr. Marquez Sterling has belonged to the Diplo
matic Corps of the Republic of Cuba several
years, and has occupied the post of Minister in Ar
gentine, Peru and Brazil. During the administra
tion of President Palma, he was counsellor of the
Department of State. He presented his resigna
tion as Minister of Mexico after the murder of Ma
dero and Suarez.
In the account of the events leading to the mur
der of Madero and Suarez, Mr. Marquez Sterling
mentions the excitement of the prisoner-president
when he discovered that Don Pedro Lascurain had
turned over the written resignation of Madero into
Huerta's hands.
What happened was told by Lascurain himself.
As soon as General Huerta heard that Pedro Lascu
rain had Madero's resignation in his possession, he
asked to see him and begged him with great insist
ence to give him the valuable paper. Don Pedro
Lascurain was obdurate, so the cunning old Indian,
knowing that Lascurain was a devout Catholic,
fished out the holy medallion hanging by a chain to
his neck. " See this medallion," said Huerta. " It
is the most precious thing I possess; it was given
to me by my mother when I was a little boy. I
promise you on all that is holy and sacred to me, I
swear on the white head of my sainted mother, the

Plotting which Overthrew Madero 75
memory of this holy image, that if you give me the
President's resignation, I shall guarantee his life,"
and as he finished the sentence he kissed the holy
medallion. Don Pedro Lascurain, convinced, handed him the
paper with the resignation of Madero and Suarez.
The next day General Huerta was visited by the
Belgian, Spanish and Japanese Ministers who asked
him to guarantee the life of the ex-President and
Vice-president. Huerta answered:
" Gentlemen, will you guarantee to me that if I
permit Madero and Suarez to go out of Mexico,
that they will not start another revolution against
my government in the United States? " The three
diplomats declared that they could not give such
promises. " Then," he exclaimed, " gentlemen, how can I
be made responsible for their lives ? " The diplo
mats left the general without answering.
As the price of blood, the generals and the civil
ians demanded the heads of Madero and Suarez;
the most insistent of all was Don Rodolfo Reyes,
who called for victims to avenge the death of his
father in front of the National Palace. Adolfo
Basso's life was also sacrificed with that of Gustavo
Madero's. The Huerta Cabinet went into power
like a Black Hand Cabinet, after the assassination
of its enemies. This infamous list should be re
membered by all who are interested in the recon
struction of Mexico, and who speak of amnesty.

76 Carranza and Mexico
General Huerta, Provisional President.
L. de la Barra, Foreign Affairs.
A. Garcia Granados, Interior.
Rodolfo Reyes, Justice.
T. Esquivel Obregon, Finance.
General Mondragon, War.
J. Vera Estaiiol, Instruction.
A. Robles Gil, Fomento.

CHAPTER V
HUERTA IN POWER  THE LANDING OF AMERICAN
MARINES IN VERA CRUZ
XX/HEN we speak of revolutions we must con
sider three facts. First, that in Mexico's
history there have been only three real revolutions :
the revolution which overthrew Spanish rule, the
three years' war (1857-60), and the Madero revo
lution, which began with the overturning of the
Diaz regime and was continued by the Carranza
revolution and the flight of Huerta. Secondly, it
must be remembered that all other political and
military upheavals, of long or short duration, can
not be called revolutions but are in fact either muti
nies or revolts or coups d'etat or as the Mexicans
call them " cuartelazos." And lastly, that no revo
lution can hope of success unless it is backed by the
majority of the middle class, and no successful revo
lution can be organized with foreign and especially
American money with concessionary strings attached
to it.
General Huerta with a soldier's training and tem
perament, and an unsympathetic knowledge of his
country's history, thought that for the sake of get
ting and staying in power the control of the army
77

78 Carranza and Mexico
was the only possible road. Not only Huerta, but
his most prominent supporters made the mistake of
confusing cruelty, brutality and treachery with
power. Huerta's cunning was believed to be statesman
ship, but very soon his Machiavellian " double
crossing " of Felix Diaz, Rodolfo Reyes and Gen
eral Mondragon, pointed to his methods of pro
cedure. The elimination of his more powerful ene
mies and the mysterious disappearance of the less
known enemies, showed that wholesale assassina
tions were as frequent as under Diaz's rule. Never
theless, if Diaz was ruthless he was at least more
careful of public opinion. The foolish excuse that
a rescuing party had been responsible for the acci
dental death of Madero and Suarez, laid bare to
the world the inner circumvolution of Huerta's po
litical brain. *
A simpleton could have advised him that Madero
murdered was much more to be feared than Ma
dero alive. Madero the martyr was remembered
through his virtues and ideals, and all his faults,
weaknesses and blunders were forgotten. What
Madero alive could not achieve, Madero dead,
united under one idea, one effort, one banner.
Huerta's supporters lacked what is essential in
politics, psychological perception of public opinion.
Huerta, the double-edged sword of the clericals, de
stroyed by his blunders the last vestige of clerical
power which supported the militarists and reaction-

Huerta in Power 79
aries. Terrible sacrifices were enacted to strike ter
ror into the hearts of political opponents. Secret
agents lured the political victims into automobiles
to a solitary spot near Mexico City, close to Guada
lupe; then they were stabbed to death and hastily
buried on the spot.
The Huerta executioners were themselves in dan
ger of being murdered for knowing too much, but
their suspicion enabled them to escape death, and
during Carbajal's short rule they were caught and
lived to tell the details of their gruesome work.
Dr. Urrutia, once minister of the interior in
Huerta's cabinet was the chief executioner of the dic
tator. Senator Dominguez because he had at
tacked Huerta in the Senate and accused him of the
murder of Madero and Suarez, and Mr. Rendon
were driven gagged to Dr. Urrutia's sanatorium in
the suburbs. They were put to sleep under the in
fluence of ether, their bodies were atrociously muti
lated and when awakened to consciousness, they
died of the loss of blood and the tremendous nerv
ous shock.
Such savage methods accelerated the disruption
of the reign of terror and drove all elements into
active co-operation under the leadership of Car
ranza. Secret agents were also sent to murder Car
ranza, Villa, Obregon, Gonzalez, but the game was
too risky. The federal General Rabago succeeded
in catching Abraham Gonzalez, governor of Chi
huahua under Madero, and he was murdered by

80 Carranza and Mexico
being pushed under the wheels of a moving train.
A supporter of General Huerta when he foresaw
the end of his friend went into exile. He claimed
that he had escaped two dangers by leaving Mex
ico, one was a term in jail and the other a portfolio
in Huerta's cabinet.
There was never a period in the history of Mex
ico when such a congregation of incompetents, of
grafters, and murderous fools held sway; even in the
world's history there is difficulty in finding a paral
lel. We have to go back to Nero and Caracalla
to find such a depth of infamy, cowardice and
Sadism. Victoriano Huerta appeared as a demoniacal
clown let loose on the political circus of Mexico
City, in an infernal saturnalia of gore, drunken
ness and prostitution. Huerta was the Avatar of
greed, lust and alcoholism, a moral hyena laughing
diabolically at the amazed world, a white-livered sol
dier pickled in cognac, a mental baboon grinning
inanely at his own political antics.
His own cabinet was chosen from among the best
saloons, in the houses of prostitution and from the
prisons. A meeting of the Cabinet was like a con
fab between maniacs, idiots and drunkards. A
prominent Mexican who asked to be heard by the
members of the Cabinet reported that he was in
terrupted by a minister before he could finish:
" This is no time for reforms," said he; " we must
drown the whole country in blood." Another sug-

Huerta in Power 81
gested American intervention as the best method
of uniting the warring revolutionary elements.
" Then," he added, smiling, " the fool gringos will
do the dirty work for us and our lives and property
will be respected." A third member advised a
repetition of the system of reconcentration as was
inaugurated in Cuba by General Weyler.
Cabinet meetings took place in a house several
miles from Mexico City and later in the red light
district and the famous Cafe Colon, whose proprie
tor was made a general. All the ministers were
also made generals and had to appear in their uni
forms. Everybody in the employ of the govern
ment was created an officer in uniform, even the
teachers and clerks. Bartenders were made ser
geants and it was reported that Dona Lupe of the
Salto del Agua was appointed honorary Rear-Ad
miral of a squadron of cruisers. The sons of the
ministers, especially those of General Blanquet and
the sons and relatives of General Huerta received
concessions for running gambling houses, for the
sale of human beings into the army at so much per
head, and contracts for the sale of arms, ammuni
tion, uniforms and victuals to the War Department.
A naturalized American named Ratner was indi
rectly responsible for the landing of the marines in
Vera Cruz. Ratner was the president of the Tam
pico News Co. ; during Madero's time he was caught
selling arms to Zapata and, was deported under Ar
ticle 33 of the Constitution.

82 Carranza and Mexico
When General Huerta became dictator Ratner
came back. Being fertile and unscrupulous in ex
pedients, he became a favorite of the general. One
day he advised the dictator to buy all the arms and
ammunition for sale then in the United States, and
for six months ahead so as to prevent the Consti
tutionalists from getting any at any price. It was
discovered that the sum required for the purpose
was too great so the order was limited to machine
and field guns and ammunition. Twenty-five mil
lion dollars in gold was the price for this corner
in war engines. Ratner engineered the whole
scheme and shipped the material to Odessa in Rus
sia. From Odessa they were sent to Hamburg and
there reshipped for Vera Cruz.
The United States secret service agents, who had
been watching closely the sales of American manu
facturers, did not at first understand the meaning
of the elaborate and expensive shipping and reship-
ping. When the Ypiranga headed for Vera Cruz the
whole matter became clear. Huerta's idea was to
get first all the field guns in the United States so
as to prevent the revolutionists from getting them;
thereupon to force the United States to intervene
in Mexico, counting on the patriotism of the Mex
icans to fight the invaders. His idea was to con
centrate all the revolutionary chiefs in the battles
against the Americans and to eliminate them one
by one when they could be reached more easily and

Huerta in Power 83
without arousing suspicion. If that plot did not
succeed, he had decided to permit the Ameri
cans to occupy Mexico City, knowing that they
would respect the lives and properties of all fac
tions. The Huerta conspiracy fell through because the
Constitutionalists believed in the word and friend
ship of President Wilson and they mistrusted the
word and patriotism of Huerta. It was soon after
wards that the dictator made up his mind to resign.
By the acceptance of the A.B.C. mediation, the game
was ended and he had decided to retire before it
was too late. Ratner had succeeded in his under
taking and his commission was a million and a half
in gold.
Senor Don Fernando Iglesias Calderon related
that while he was a prisoner in the castle of San
Juan de Ulloa he heard that an order had been
telephoned from the Commander of Vera Cruz to
the Commander of the fort, to release, arm and
dress about 300 convicts in civilian clothes. They
were landed in Vera Cruz the night before the
landing of American marines. In the morning
General Maas, his officers and soldiers hastily re
treated to the hills near Soledad.
The blue jackets found no Federals, but the Mex
ican snipers who made such a desperate resistance
were mostly ex-convicts who were promised their lib
erty if they fought the Americans. The shooting
which emanated from the Naval Academy was di-

84 Carranza and Mexico
rected by ex-prisoners and a few cadets who fought
very bravely.
Two days after the landing of the marines Gen
eral Navarrete of the staff of General Maas passed
through the American lines into the fort of Ulloa,
where he tried to induce F. Iglesias Calderon to
join Huerta in Mexico City and publish a manifesto
uniting all factions against the hated Americans.
Don Fernando Iglesias answered that he could
not believe any promises made by Huerta and that
he was quite certain that the Constitutionalists
would not join the dictator even if they were forced
to resist an American invasion in the north. A few
days later the Commander of the fort under the ad
vice of Don Fernando Iglesias released all the po
litical prisoners.
The Vera Cruz incident showed up the Federals
as a despicable, cowardly lot, — they had to arm a
few hundred ex-convicts and civilians to do the fight
ing for them.
The retirement of the Federals to Soledad like
wise proved that there was no serious intention to
resist an advance of American soldiers to Mexico
City, as the general line of march could never have
been taken by way of Soledad, but only through the
Cerro Gordo on the road to Jalapa by the Inter
oceanic Railroad, the same itinerary used by Scott
in 1847. By advancing through the Cerro Gordo,
Jalapa, Perote and Puebla, the American troops
could have ignored or driven the Federals at Sole-

Huerta in Power 85
dad into the mountains and by the capture of
Esperanza cut off their communications in the rear.
That would automatically have forced them to
evacuate Soledad, Cordoba, and Orizaba. The
whole campaign would have been a repetition of
the treachery of Santa Anna in 1847. Fortunately
for the Americans and Mexicans, President Wilson
was too wise to fall into such a trap, and the Con
stitutionalists were too patriotic to play into the
hands of Huerta.

Note. — 'The details about the arming of prisoners in Ulloa and
the landing of American marines in Vera Cruz were ,given to the
-writer by Don Fernando Iglesias Calderdn.

CHAPTER VI
THE FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
REVOLUTION
"INTERESTED observers among the Americans
and foreigners were wondering how the Consti
tutionalists could keep up a revolution against an
organized military dictatorship like Huerta which
had millions at its disposal; and strange to relate
instead of getting weaker the revolutionists grew
stronger and better organized; they seemed to have
money to buy arms and ammunition, to run their
local governments and even to send representatives
to the United States, and Paris, London, Madrid
and Barcelona, as well as social and political inves
tigators into America and Europe. The Huerta
Government was as surprised as the foreigners;
they were certain that after a year of fighting, the
backbone of the revolution would be broken, but
instead, the offensive became so dangerous that Gen
eral Huerta invited American intervention so as to
save himself as well as his partisans from complete
political annihilation.
The Huerta agents in America accused the Con
stitutionalists of having borrowed money from great
trusts or syndicates, and a New York paper pub-
86

Financial Organization 87
lished stolen letters to prove that Carranza had
succeeded in getting loans from corporations. The
letters served no other purpose than to advertise
the lawyer who had been in the service of the Ma
dero revolution, but as far as the source of financial
support, it was as mysterious as ever.
" How can they fight, eat and dress without
money? " was asked. " How can they get the fight
ing material across the border when it is patrolled
by American soldiers? " Everybody asked the
question and nobody could answer it satisfactorily.
But the suspicion was in the air that the revolution
ists with their agents in the United States had re
ceived millions at a high rate and bartered in return
for it oil, mining and railroad concessions. The
senatorial investigation which had labored for
months and published its results in a voluminous re
port did not prove that Madero had financed the
revolution of 19 10 with the help of American
money. The money used by Gustavo Madero to
finance his brother's revolution seemed so small that
the senators looked for greater sums borrowed from
the United States to convince them in their suspicion
that all Central American revolutions were started
in Wall Street. But they forgot that Madero's
revolution was not initialed in New York's financial
centre, and that no great movement can succeed un
less the lower or middle class fight for it.
The fact is clear that no Mexican political leader
or military chief could afford to be linked in any

88 Carranza and Mexico
shape or manner with any foreign corporation, as
that would have discredited him forever in the eyes
of his countrymen.
As a convincing example illustrating this asser
tion, the Madero revolutionary loan can be referred
to. When Francisco I. Madero came into power
his brother, Gustavo, put in a bill for 750,000 pesos
($375,000) for expenses incurred by him during
the revolution. As no vouchers or explanations
were offered as to the origin of the money, accusa
tions were made against Gustavo Madero that he
had borrowed money at a high rate of interest from
an American oil company and given in exchange val
uable oil concessions to the detriment of a British
oil company. After Gustavo's death it was discov
ered that he had misappropriated $375,000 from
the funds of a railroad company, organized in Mex
ico and financed in Paris to build a railroad from
Camacho to Gomez Farias, and instead of using
the money for railroad construction he had sunk it
to buy arms and ammunition for his brother's revo
lution. By his desperate and bold action, Gustavo
Madero had risked his reputation and liberty and
was saved in the nick of time from extradition pro
ceedings by the success of the revolution.
Later, instead of telling the truth, Gustavo Ma
dero kept silent and in Mexico his enemies went so
far as to accuse him of having practically delivered
his brother's government into the hands of a Yankee
corporation. Those accusations cast a shadow on

Financial Organization 89
the whole Madero regime and were a great handi^
cap to its success.
Carranza, who is an older man of political and
financial experience, realized from the beginning
that he could not borrow money from American or
foreign companies and decided to rely entirely on
the resources of his own country. Impoverished as
Mexico was by two successive revolutions, the work
was slower and entailed great loss of lives and for
eign property. Nevertheless, Carranza reasoned
that if Mexico could not organize a revolution with
out foreign help it might as well give up the task
and bend under the yoke of the dictator. The faith
of Carranza in the resources of his country proved
that he was right.
It demonstrated first, that Mexico would go to
any length rather than submit to the murderous
regime of Huerta; secondly by forcing his adher
ents to organize local governments in every con
quered state and city for the purpose of contribu
tion and order, Carranza facilitated and accelerated
the final political reconstruction of the government
when his troops should enter Mexico City, and third
and last he would create for himself and his sup
porters an impregnable position from the foreign
as well as the Mexican enemies of his cause.
Carranza is fifty-five years old, young enough
to take the field personally and wise enough
not to walk into pitfalls and mistakes excusable but
not pardonable in a younger man. The blunders

90 Carranza and Mexico
of the Madero regime were not lost upon him. Two
of the most grievous mistakes committed by the
Madero revolutionist leaders were the acceptance of
foreign financial assistance and a compromise with
the power which was being overthrown.
As revolutions cost money and none was forth
coming or could be had after the murder of Presi
dent Madero and Vice-president Suarez, Carranza
convened the state legislation of Coahuila demand
ing from it the refusal of allegiance asked by Gen
eral Huerta, and a vote to turn over to him the
money of the state treasury for revolutionary pur
poses. Then he rode with a few followers on
horseback through the federal lines across the
mountains of the States of Durango and Sinaloa
into Sonora, a State not connected directly by rail
with Mexico City. Being more free there from mo
lestation by federal soldiers than the other border
States he helped to organize the government and
made his headquarters for a while in HermosiUo,
Sonora. The seizure of the border towns of No
gales and Agua Prieta opened the way to the im
portation of arms and ammunition and to the re
ceipts of the custom houses. As the revolutionary
troops on the border States captured more custom
houses, as happened in Juarez, Ciudad P. Diaz,
Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros and finally the seaport
of Tampico, the revenues increased as well as the
facilities for the importation of foodstuffs, clothing
and ammunition.

Financial Organization 91
Carranza and his sub-chiefs had five different
methods of acquiring financial support in northern
Mexico. 1. The interior war tax, which was paid by Mex
ican and foreign commercial mining and industrial
firms doing business in the northern States, besides
the taxes paid by the " haciendados " or land own
ers, farmers.
2. Custom house duties at all the border towns
on imports and exports, that is to say on foodstuffs,
cattle, ore, metal, clothing, etc., which were paid
in gold as arms and ammunition bought by the rebels
had to be paid in gold.
3. Forced loans from the enemies of the Consti
tutionalists. 4. Voluntary loans by the friends of the revolu
tion such as rich Mexican landowners, capitalists
and miners.
5. The creation of an interior debt by the issue
of paper money to be circulated in all the territory
under the power of the revolution and the prohibi
tion to circulate the bills issued by the Banco Na
cional of Mexico City on February 18th, 1913, at
the order of General Huerta.
In a pamphlet of recent date there will be found
the decrees and other transactions of the Constitu
tionalist army. The official publication born in
Chihuahua, 19 14, prints the date of each one of the
decrees permitting the printing of paper money.
The first issue of paper money was emitted for 5,-

92 Carranza and Mexico
000,000 pesos on the 26th of April, 19 13, the sec
ond one for fifteen miUions on February 28th, 1913,
and the third one for ten millions on February 1 2th,
19 14, for bills of five, ten, fifty and hundred pesos
denominations. As the circulation of those three
issues tended to raise prices in general by paralyzing
the transactions with fractional money, Carranza au
thorized three more issues of paper money. One
for two hundred thousand, the second for eight
hundred thousand and the third for one million, for
five and ten cents denominations, on the 26th of
April, 28th of December, 19 13, and on February
12th, 1914.
Up to May, 19 14, altogether thirty-two million
pesos in paper money were issued to cover the ex
penses of the revolution.
The governors and military chiefs were empow
ered to do the same in the States under their juris
diction: Generals Villa and Chao in the State of
Chihuahua, Governor Riveros in Sinaloa, General
Caballeros in Tamaulipas and Villareal in Nuevo
Leon. When it is considered that the Constitutionalists
had almost 100,000 men under arms, the Madero
revolution by comparison will seem an amateurish
and insignificant affair.
General Obregon was supposed to have 20,000,
General Villa another 20,000, General Gonzalez
22,000, General Carrera 20,000, General Natera

Financial Organization 93
and the Arrietas 6,000, without counting the Zapa
tistas with over 20,000 men.
On an average and in fairly round figures the
revolution cost about $200,000 a week or $800,000
a month. For a revolution which has lasted over
a year and three months the performance is quite
wonderful and shows remarkable organizing quali
ties in Carranza and the amazing vitality of Mexico.
When General Huerta waded through Madero's
blood into the dictator's chair he was able to get
over fifty million dollars in gold from American and
French bankers, besides voluntary and enforced con
tributions from the Catholic clergy, foreign corpora
tions and commercial and industrial concerns with
headquarters in Mexico City and unwilling loans
from Mexican haciendados. Huerta had all the
power of the government concentrated in Mexico
City in his hands, the support of all the foreign
powers with the exception of the United States, and
in spite of all he failed.
American bankers who had hastily but unwisely
loaned several millions to General Huerta in the
forlorn hope that he could prove a second Diaz to
subdue Mexico, lost faith in the dictator's ability
and sent an agent to offer six million dollars to Car
ranza if he would promise to guarantee Huerta's
loans. It goes without saying that the offer was
rejected. Another committee of American bankers sent an

94 Carranza and Mexico
emissary to Mexico City to offer General Huerta
three million dollars if he would only resign and
get out. In the first case the aforementioned
banker learned to his surprise that the revolution
ary chief was a man of principles and could not be
bought; the mistake would have been avoided if
the American financier had read the answer of Car
ranza to Felix Diaz and General Huerta offering
him a huge bribe to retract his challenge against
the dictatorship. In the second instance they of
fered Huerta three millions when he had decided
to throw up the sponge, and instead of accelerating
his exit from Mexico, only retarded it long enough
for Huerta to pocket their money.
In both cases the American bankers have shown
a fundamental lack of knowledge of the Mexican
situation and of Mexican ways.
The Mexican revolution was essentially a Mex
ican affair and even a superficial review of Mexican
history would have revealed a great similarity be
tween it and the Three Years' War. It took the
name of Constitutionalist Revolution from the Con
stitution of 1857, for which the Liberals of that
period were fighting as against the clerical dicta
torship. Even if General Huerta had been able to borrow
150 million dollars in Paris as he expected to do,
he would have been defeated in the end; it would
have taken longer to destroy his power, but the
result would have been the same. It would pay

Financial Organization 95
American bankers to seek the advice of unbiased
observers, men who are in sympathy with Mexican
aims and ambitions, who have a thorough knowl
edge of the people and their history, and not from
agents or individuals who are interested concession
aires and foreigners or Americans who in spite of
their long residence in the country are as ignorant
of Mexican conditions as on the first day of their
arrival in Mexico.

CHAPTER VII
CIVIL ORGANIZATION OF THE REVOLUTION
/^\NE of the causes which defeated the work of
^-^ the Madero revolution, was the lack of or
ganization of civil governments within the States
conquered by the Maderistas. Rebel bands wan
dered hither and thither, taking anything they
needed and signing vouchers to be repaid at the end
of the revolution.
The Judges, " Jefes Politicos " and minor offi
cials, with the exception of marked men, stayed in
office during the revolution, and after Madero came
into power. The machinery of Diaz remained, the
army and all the officials, with the exception of
the President, cabinet members and the governors.
Carranza learned a lesson and decided to or
ganize the local government wherever he went and
wherever the Constitutionalists were masters of
States. As the chief of the revolution, Carranza
directed the movement of the three army divisions,
that is to say, the great strategic lines, and the gen
erals took care of the tactical movements. Thus
was the first chief able to devote his energy to the
creation of civil government, instead of personally
directing or fighting battles. Many critics have
96

Civil Organization of the Revolution 97
wondered what Carranza had done in the Revolu
tion. It is quite comprehensible that the patient,
unremitting task of organizing the civil government
of conquered States, does not appear in the same
romantic light as the attacking and storming of a
city, although it is as important and useful, and
more enduring work.
In many States in the south — Morelos, Guer
rero — where the Huerta officials had all fled and
the only rulers were the Zapatista soldiers, the In
dians had instinctively organized a patriarchal and
tribal rule of their own. Very significant of the
patience, and law-abiding sentiment of the average
Mexican, is the fact that in those regions, where
for over two years no government existed, crimes
were less frequent than where the government held
sway. Carranza began to organize the postal and tele
graph systems in Durango, Sinaloa and Sonora.
Headquarters were in HermosiUo, as the federals
always kept either to border towns or seaports, —
the rest of the State was under the control of the
Constitutionalists. Wherever possible the trains
were run on schedule time, — telegrams and mail
Were sent and received. Judges and all the munici
pal governments of the larger and smaller cities
were created. When the border towns were taken,
a simple system of tariff was enacted working both
ways, for exports as well as imports. The Minis
ter who helped Carranza as Secretary of the In-

98 Carranza and Mexico
terior, was Rafael Zubaran Capmany, who after
wards was sent to Washington as a confidential
agent for the Constitutionalists.
Those who have had an opportunity to follow
the operations of Carranza through the official
paper, El Constitucionalista, and the pamphlet
which contains his decrees, can pursue step by step
all his official acts and his reconstructive policy.
Don F. Iglesias Calderon,. after escaping from the
fortress of San Juan de Ulloa, told the writer that
he crossed the border at Juarez for Chihuahua,
Torreon, Saltillo, Monterey, and back to the bor
der, and very much to his surprise he travelled on
schedule time. At that time the whole north was
in the hands of the Constitutionalists.
The foreign press could not understand why Car
ranza did not hasten at once to Mexico City after
the flight of Huerta. Carranza could not leave a
single State between Mexico City and the border
unorganized, that is to say, without placing Consti
tutionalist officials in charge. Otherwise the Huerta
officials would later have created local strife. The
first Chief had to put new wine in new bottles,
in order to succeed in any future reform which
might be enacted by Congress.
With Carranza it was not only a question of
conquest. His idea was to rebuild, reconstruct
Mexico, not merely conquer it.

DON RAFAEL ZUBARAN CAPMANY
Minister of Foreign Affairs with Carranza, also Representative
of Carranza in Washington

CHAPTER VIII
DIPLOMATIC WORK IN WASHINGTON
T^ROM the inception of the Constitutionalist revo
lution, Carranza appreciated the necessity of
having a representative in Washington. Alberto
Pani and Roberto V. Pesqueira organized a junta
which would counteract the campaign waged against
the Constitutionalists by the Huerta agents in con
junction with the American interests, in the vain
hope of a recognition of the Huerta regime by the
Democratic administration. Pesqueira paid the ex
penses of the office out of his own pocket until Car
ranza was able to devote some of the money at the
disposal of the revolution, to other purposes besides
the buying of arms and ammunition.
The intelligent and effective work done by the
two constitutionalist ambassadors concentrated the
attention of the American public upon a struggle
which had appeared one-sided and hopeless.
After a succession of defeats by the federal gen
erals in the north, Huerta recognized that the great
army at his disposal was swiftly crumbling to pieces,
and the three divisions under the Constitutionalist
generals were determinedly closing in upon him, he
became afraid, and with the same unscrupulousness
99

ioo Carranza and Mexico
of former reactionary despots in Mexico, he plucked
a leaf from the history of Mexico, attempting to
repeat the feat successfully carried out by the cler
icals in 1847, when American intervention was
forced, and in 1861 when French intervention was
deliberately invited, to save clericalism from utter
annihilation. Carranza foresaw the move, as the members of
Huerta's cabinet had openly boasted to bring about
American intervention to save their interests and
their lives. With Carranza in HermosiUo was a
Mr. Rafael Zubaran Capmany, a young Mexican
lawyer from Campeche, who acted as his Secretary
of the Interior in the Provisional Cabinet. Car
ranza picked out Mr. Zubaran as the one man in
Mexico to play the diplomatic game in Washington
which would ward off American intervention, even
after the American troops had occupied Vera Cruz.
It is quite true that the landing of American ma
rines meant intervention, but President Wilson had
declared that it was done against General Huerta,
the Dictator, and not against the Mexican people;
that American soldiers would be satisfied to occupy
the Mexican port until the usurper was driven out.
To make the average Mexican understand this
complicated situation, and to convince the Amer
icans that Carranza's protest was not only neces
sary but was the only manly and patriotic act pos
sible for any Mexican leader, was the task which
befell Sr. Zubaran.

Diplomatic Work in Washington ioi
The lifting of the embargo on arms and am
munition at the border, without arousing the hos
tility of the War Department in Washington, was
another difficult mission.
To prevent the Mexican constitutionalists from
crossing the American border, thereby playing into
the hands of Huerta, was as perilous and risky a
game as putting out a lighted fuse near a powder
magazine. A talented writer and lawyer, Don Luis Cabrera,
ably assisted Rafael Zubaran. The sympathetic at
titude of President Wilson and Secretary Bryan
helped to crown the efforts with success. Also, the
unofficial and friendly co-operation of ex-Governor
Lind was of incalculable value to the Mexican dip
lomats. But any other less experienced and less discreet
personality, a mind less acute, keen and masterly,
would have failed ignominiously. Americans as
well as Mexicans are discovering that diplomatic
victories, although silent and modest, are as effec
tive and useful as military achievements.

CHAPTER IX
THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS IN PARIS
A LTHOUGH the diplomatic and financial bat-
****" **¦*¦** tie for great loans of the Huerta regime was
waged and lost in the United States, as a result of
the attitude of the Wilson administration, Huerta
was nevertheless enabled to make a loan in Wall
Street, ostensibly to pay the interest on the Rail
road Merger. The real battle for financial assist
ance, however, was fought in Paris.
The Parisian bankers were always favorably in
clined to the existing governments of Mexico. Diaz
had always been considered financially solvent, with
Limantour at his side.
The French and English bankers, who had made
fortunes on Mexican loans, always spoke with re
gret and almost pique at the overthrow of " the
grand old man." Foreign bankers not being by
nature sentimental or radical, had no sympathy or
understanding for the tremendous popular upheaval
in Mexico. The whole great libertarian move
ment was quite misunderstood or ignored. The
Huerta regime seemed like a reversion to the good
old fat times under Limantour. Huerta exhibited
all the ear-marks of the strong man on horseback.
102

The Constitutionalists in Paris 103
To the superficial bankers, the Mexican Caracalla
was bound to stay and ask for more loans, and offer
more profits.
In London, the press did not pay much attention
to the Constitutionalists, as the English oil interests
saw to it that stories were circulated about the ban
dits, cut-throats and robbers who were infesting
Mexico under the excuse of fighting against the de
facto government.
As the English oil interests were closely connected
with the English government, they having signed a
contract to supply the British navy with oil, Huerta
gladly gave all the concessions asked for, and con
firmed the previous ones. Although the English
oil interests denied in the press that they were in
volved in politics, certain facts came to the notice
of the Constitutionalists in Paris, which proved the
contrary. Dr. Atl, who was living in Paris, vouches
for the data furnished.
••Dr. Atl had been very friendly to Dr. Urrutia
years ago, as the famous surgeon politician had
saved his life. While Dr. Atl was in the hospital,
he became intimate with General Huerta, and being
a " compadre " to Dr. Urrutia, there were no se
crets between them. After the assassination of.
Madero and Suarez, Dr. Urrutia bethought him
self of the friendship and gratitude of his friend,
and without much ado telegraphed Dr. Atl that one
hundred and fifty thousand dollars were at his dis
posal at the Mexican legation in Paris: he was to

104 Carranza and Mexico
use it to influence the French press. Although Dr.
Atl was broke, as befits a sincere artist, he sent an
answer which is not fit for publication, but which
does credit to his patriotism and his integrity.
Dr. Atl discovered that in spite of the fact that
he was considered almost a confrere among the
French journalists, owing to the fact that he pub
lished an art paper in French, and wrote for most
literary magazines and papers in Paris, — when it
came to offering material on the subject of the Con
stitutionalist cause of Mexico, the pages of the peri
odicals were without exception closed to him.
Finally reporters admitted to him that the English
oil interests had been paying enormous sums of
money, aggregating the sum of seven million francs.
He was even pointed out an agent of the same oil
interests, who had left to the editor of the paper the
sum of one hundred and fifty thousand francs as
a friendly reminder.
After the refusal of Dr. Atl to work for the
Huerta regime, a brother of de la Barra took up the
task. Not a word could slip- into the French papers
about the defeats of the Federals, and strenuous
efforts were being made to finance a loan of one
hundred and fifty million dollars for Huerta. Dr.
Atl had heard that the loan would be effected within
a week. In despair he walked from one office to
the other and succeeded only in getting snubs and
rebuffs. To make matters worse, it rained cats and
dogs. Our peripatetic artist, soaking wet, tired and

The Constitutionalists in Paris 105
hungry, not having eaten a morsel of food for two
days, was on the point of giving up the struggle,
when he decided to try the only newspaper in Paris
which was above venality, the socialist paper,
L'Humanite. He presented himself at the office,
and insisted on speaking to Monsieur Jaures, who
was the editor. The veteran socialist finally con
sented to see him. " I am not representing any
financial interests," spoke up Dr. Atl, " I am only a
poor Mexican artist, who expects you to tell the
truth about a matter of interest, not only to Mexico,
but especially to French investors. Huerta is ex
pected to wind up a loan of 750 million francs; I
want to inform you that Carranza, Chief of the
Constitutionalists, has communicated a letter to the
press in the United States, and to us, that if the
revolution is successful, the French loan to Huerta
will not be recognized by the successful Constitu
tionalists. As I know that you are honest and do
not want to see the French investors risk losing their
money, I beg of you to publish the statement made
by Carranza."
Jaures published the letter the next day. Mex
ican bonds went down ten points, and the loan fell
through. Dr. Atl is now Director of the National
Art School in Mexico City.

CHAPTER X
INVESTIGATION WORK INTO THE MUNICIPAL CITY
GOVERNMENTS AND THE RURAL SCHOOL SYSTEM,
FACTORIES AND INDUSTRIAL CENTRES IN THE
UNITED STATES BY MODESTO C. ROLLAND
"DUTTING aside my humble personality, not of
much importance to the reader, I am going to
relate my life since the Mexican revolution, for in
this manner I can more clearly place in relief some
thing of the history and social conditions in Mex
ico, which should be known by all who desire in
formation on what has taken place and what we
wish to do.
Convinced as we were of the tremendous social
inequality that has existed in Mexico under the au
thority of the capitalists and of the clerical party,
before the apparition of Madero, the idea was
launched of not permitting a re-election with a view
to compelling Porfirio Diaz to verify the necessary
evolution, fearing as we did the effects of a revo
lution. We thought, inexperienced sociologists, that it
was possible to conquer a tyrant by persuasion, so
106

MODESTO C. ROLLAND
Engineer, School Teacher, Member of the Cabinet

Investigation Work 107
as to permit the democratic practices necessary to
choose the President. We made a mistake, and
the anti-re-electionists had to combat a revolution.
Madero expounded the doctrines which were spread
over the country, and was at the head of the revo
lution that imperiously triumphed.
Many of us Mexicans thinking it was time to
take part in public affairs, united and formed an
Engineers' Club with a view to studying national
problems. In a word, we worked for the national
ization of the National Railways, and for the es
tablishment of postal savings. Nearly all of our
efforts were shattered by reason of the inertia dis
played by the Secretary of the Treasury, headed by
Messrs. Ernesto Madero and Jaime Gurza.
The Catholic party, seeing the approach of an
epoch of social reforms which they could not admit,
conspired with the army and taking advantage
through Huerta, for Felix Diaz turned out to be
weak, finally assassinated Madero and grasped the
power. Then they enjoyed their clerical rule and their
laws regarding public instruction. The army
served them to kill the people and to defend their
great estates. The war was kindled with more
fury, headed by Venustiano Carranza. We in the
capital suffered day by day from the insults of the
soldiery. All persons who did not favor the gov
ernment were known to the authorities, and at any
moment were likely to be detained.

108 Carranza and Mexico
After the ten days' tragedy, I went to the Mili
tary College, where I was a professor, with the
intention of speaking for the last time to my pupils.
I explained to them the course that the army would
pursue, and that they would be the instrument of a
traitor to shed the blood of Mexicans. That same
afternoon I was dismissed from my charge. From
that time on I was persecuted.
Being independent and my ideas being known, I
could not long remain free. The idea contrary to
the dictatorial system was what they persecuted
most. At length one day they took me out of my
office and conveyed me to the penitentiary where
they held me in a dark dungeon for a month in
solitary confinement.
My friends arranged for Minister Garza Aldape
to speak with me. I explained to him frankly why
I could not be with the Huertistas for I could not
conform with the politics of the outbreak, and the
consequences of the same. I made him understand
that I was not an active conspirator, for having to
keep in favor with two parties is truly crazy and
like throwing oneself into the wolf's mouth.
He permitted me to go out into the street, but
it was impossible for me to work. My business
affairs were shattered; every move was constantly
watched, and at any time I might be sent back to
the penitentiary, as were many others.
I decided to get out of the country. I went to
Vera Cruz and with some difficulty boarded a boat

Investigation Work 109
as a contraband, and it was in the position of table-
steward that I finally arrived in this country.
This is the history of thousands of men in Mex
ico. Thousands of families remained until they
had nothing left to live on, and even the women
were in danger of being put in jail, as many were.
With great eagerness I went toward the north
of the republic with a view to putting myself in con
tact with the revolution. There I met many friends
who had travelled the path ahead of me, and under
various conditions were serving the cause. There
I could speak with Carranza, first chief of the revo
lution. It was in Juarez City where I was pre
sented by the Hon. Mr. Zulara, Minister of Com
munications. Mr. Carranza spoke with me of the
reconstruction of Mexico. At that period of the
struggle so much confidence was felt in the triumph
of the revolution that the first chief looked ahead
to prepare the era of reconstruction.
He talked with me of the agrarian problem, as
a touchstone of all the social unbalance of our peo
ple, and I was convinced that that serene man,
economist by experience and liberal by conviction
ought to be the personification of the national unity.
He spoke to me above all else of the schools.
The great desire of Mr. Carranza is to develop a
school system in Mexico. He expressed himself
with the enthusiasm of the man who has long been
in contact with the needs of the people, and I was
convinced still further of the necessity of working

iio Carranza and Mexico
without hesitation under the influence of such a man.
The supreme chief being convinced that another sol
dier was not needed in the battlefield, and taking
advantage of my experience as a schoolmaster and
as an engineer, he arranged for me to go to the
United States with a view to studying municipal and
school systems. In this way I joined a body of
students of Administrative service, which Mr. Car
ranza had been forming in this country and in
Europe. I have put my heart in my work, and hap
pily I have found in this nation the greatest facili
ties for attaining our object. I have visited the
principal cities of the East. New York particu
larly has served me practically. SCHOOLS
The Department of Education furnished me with
all the methods for studying the schools, and in this
manner I obtained most interesting information re
garding the organization and educative systems of
these schools, where from the first step a child takes,
he is taught something about democracy. The im
pression which this spirit of the American schools
made upon me will never be forgotten. The con
tinued effort of the teachers to form the free will
of the child is excellent. The soul of this nation
palpitates in its schools. There the body and the
mind are fortified, intensifying the customs of soci
ability. These things are facts, not theories, in the
American schools. The way in which all this edu-

Investigation Work in
cative labor is consummated with ingenuity and
honesty, was what impressed me above everything.
Regarding the material organization it is already
known how able Americans are. Organization is
nearly always the secret of success, and that is above
all what the Latins need to learn.
The organization of the Department of Educa
tion is notable, which makes possible the co-ordina
tion of an infinity of data, so as to see schematically
the working of the mechanism. I can judge at sight
of the weak point so that the same may be perfected.
The weak spot in the Mexican school system being
the rural school system, I was asked by Carranza
to investigate especially that phase in the United
States. The result of my inquiries brought forth
the fact that the States of Wisconsin and Massa
chusetts have the best organized rural system for
schools in America. These two States are going to
be the pattern which will be used for Mexico's Min
ister of Education to work from.
It is well-known that the scholastic family is ami
able over the entire world, but I believe that the
American teacher especially is a model of courtesy.
Wherever I went I was treated with such kindness
that I shall always remember my visits with
pleasure. MUNICIPAL SERVICES
The revolution was eager to change the social
state of Mexico and that naturally comprised the

1 12 Carranza and Mexico
sanitary condition of the people. In Mexico it is
necessary to change the hygienic state of the people
who have been always treated with a spirit of ex
ploitation by the privileged castes.
We know that sunshine on the earth does away
with the services of the doctor, for which we shall
work so that the sewers called casas de vecindad
may be dispensed with; in these tuberculosis pros
pers, while the rich owner assisted through the
lenity of the laws is occupied only in collecting the
rents. Pure water, air and light, — the people
need these and Mexico will give them.
New York has given me great experience and has
furnished a wide field of observation, in respect to
the Municipal services; and I wish to set forth my
report so as to profit by the many good subjects I
have studied. Naturally, here as in other places
there are many matters which have not yet been sat
isfactorily settled, as for example that relative to
the " casas de vecindad," but anyway the efforts of
this people, so materially progressive will help us
in a high degree.
The resolution of the problem of the " casas de
vecindad " as it is understood in Glasgow, is our
ideal and we shall feel proud on the day that we
can present a city with comfort for the poor.
In the conscience of all the revolutionaries is
the profound conviction that to guarantee the tri
umph of the revolution it is necessary to change the
social status of Mexico, and for that reason they

Investigation Work 113
will not hesitate to pass laws affecting the land to
further works of irrigation, to establish schools and
to contribute to hygienic homes.
The example of this nation is valuable for us and
we shall not fail to utilize the same. We are anx
ious to push our people forward through more demo
cratic paths, and are certain that this nation knows
how to appreciate our efforts.
In Mexico, where it may be said that humanity
is making a trial of adaptation, we shall make a
trial of what this country has shown us, and if I
myself put into practice what I have learned here
I shall consider myself happy, welcoming all the
annoying details, for nothing is worth more than
the esteem of a nation.

CHAPTER XI
GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST
HUERTA
'"T"vO get a clear conception of the strategic work
****** achieved by the three divisions of the East,
North and West, it is advisable to look at the map
of Mexico.
Mexico is broadest at the American border and
tapers exactly like a cornucopia at the Isthmus of
Tehuantepec. Mexico City lies in a valley 7,400
feet high, within twelve hours' ride from Vera Cruz,
and being the centre of all the railroads of Mexico,
is therefore of the utmost strategical importance.
Huerta, from Mexico City, could reach all his
troops anywhere in Mexico, either by rail or water.
The Constitutionalists in Sonora were separated
from the Northern division by a high range of
mountains, and the Northern division from the
Eastern division by another range. Zapata could
not communicate very easily with the three north
ern divisions, and was not able to assist them di
rectly. Huerta's strategy consisted in keeping his sol
diers in the large cities, at the border towns, always
hugging the railroad lines. The federals very sel-
114

¦c
p

Outline of Campaign Against Huerta 115
dom attacked in the open, as the lack of horses de
tracted from their mobility.
The Western division had for its object the con
trol of the railroad, starting from Nogales, through
HermosiUo to Guaymas in Sonora, then to Culia-
can, Mazatlan in Sinaloa, through San Bias, Tepic
into the State of Jalisco, to the capital Guadalajara.
Once Guadalajara was captured, the aim of the
campaign was achieved, and Obregon had only to
wait for the arrival and junction of the Northern
and Eastern division near Celaya, to march to Mex
ico City. The difficulties encountered by the West
ern and Eastern divisions were trebled by a condi
tion which did not exist in the case of the Northern
division under Villa, the fact that the seaports on
the Pacific and Atlantic which were always at the
mercy of the federals, could feed and supply and
augment the contingent of soldiers in the ports.
On the Pacific side, the Federals controlled
Guaymas, Topolobampo, Altata, Mazatlan, San
Bias and Manzanillo, — and on the Atlantic side
they controlled Matamoros, Tampico, Tuxpan,
Vera Cruz and Puerto Mexico.
The Western division, under Obregon, captured
one by one all the border towns, and later most of
the seaports, — and in spite of the fact that Guay
mas stuck to the last, the Western division had so
effectively cooped up the Federals in that port, that
they were not interfering with their downward
course towards Guadalajara. General Gonzalez

1 1 6 Carranza and Mexico
acted on the same principle. He first captured the
border towns, and then Victoria the capital of Ta
maulipas. With the fall of Tampico, the Federals
in San Luis Potosi were outflanked.
General Villa did the same. After he controlled
the border cities, he concentrated all his energies
on the capture of Torreon.
The three chiefs of divisions, East, North and
West, co-operated with one another under the di
rection of Carranza. They were supplied with
money, arms and ammunition by the organization
created by Carranza in the different States, and di
rected by the efforts of the members of the provi
sional cabinet.
Zapata by his activity, aided by that of Genovevo
de la O and several other chiefs in the South, forced
Huerta to keep about forty thousand soldiers in the
South. The railroads created new strategic lines —
ist. From Nogales at the border, the railroad
goes almost uninterruptedly through Sonora, Sina
loa and Tepic, with the exception of a gap between
Tepic and Guadalajara.
2d. From Juarez the railroad runs through Chi
huahua, Durango and Zacatecas into Aguascalien
tes. 3d. From Ciudad Porfirio Diaz through Coa
huila into Nuevo Leon, and to San Luis Potosi, and
from Monterrey to Tampico.
They represent the lines which had to be con-

Outline of Captpaign Against Huerta 117
trolled by the three divisions. Then there were
lines connecting Torreon with Saltillo and Mon
terrey, — and Aguascalientes with San Luis Potosi.
The assertion that either one of the three chiefs
of the divisions was solely responsible for the suc
cess of the revolution is absurd and inexact.
Let us admit for instance, that Obregon had
reached Guadalajara, and tried to march through
Celaya to Mexico City alone, before Villa had
taken Aguascalientes, or General Gutierrez taken
San Luis Potosi. He would then have been at
tacked in the rear by the Federals.
In Villa's case, if he had captured Aguascalientes
and tried to march south to Mexico City, without
waiting for Obregon to take Guadalajara, or Gen
eral Gutierrez, San Luis Potosi, he would have also
been attacked in the rear.
General Gonzalez in his turn, could not march
south as long as San Luis Potosi was in the posses
sion of Federals.
The three chiefs had to work together, and the
utter defeat of either of the three separately, spelled
disaster for the rest. It is fortunate for Mexico
that this campaign should have created four strong
soldiers " on horseback " for the danger to Mexico's
liberties always appeared with one man as the hero,
who subsequently turned to be the " villain." When
there is more than one savior or liberator, they are
apt to be so busy watching one another, that Mex
ico's liberties are more likely to be respected.

CHAPTER XII
CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL OBREGON IN THE WEST
BY COL. I. C. ENRIQUEZ
T>ERHAPS the most interesting chapter of the
*¦ Constitutionalist revolt against the dictator
Huerta is the campaign of rebellion led by the brave
citizens of the State of Sonora. When they de
cided to fight the bloody dictator and resist his
murderous deeds, they were confronted by a very
strong and well organized army. The Federal
troops were well equipped with ammunition and
guns. Their positions were well established, while
the Constitutionalists had nothing more than desire
of justice, backed by reckless bravery. They had
neither guns nor ammunition, and certainly no
trained army, and in spite of all this, they were the
victors. After the assassination of Seiior Francisco I.
Madero and Seiior Jose Maria Pino Suarez, a
dreadful feeling of fear spread through the country.
This was especially evident among the civilians.
What but death had they to expect from such a
brutal dictator as Huerta? For this reason alone,
there were at the beginning very few men who were
118

GENERAL ALVARO OBREGON
Chief of the Western Division

Campaign of General Obregon in the West 119
willing to take up arms against him. Even among
the governors, twenty-seven in number, only one
dared to throw down the glove of challenge to the
assassin. He was Don Venustiano Carranza, at
that time governor of the State of Coahuila. Half
an hour after the news of the assassination reached
him, he called the state legislature into session, de
nounced the dictator Huerta and demanded that they
should not recognize Huerta's authority. He was
the only man with sufficient moral courage to openly
revolt against Huerta.
At that time, Carranza was not the only one who
had the historic opportunity of coming out as a de
fender of his country's honor. The same message
was transmitted to Senor Jose M. Maytorena, then
the governor of the State of Sonora, but unlike Car
ranza, he did not take up the cause of his down
trodden countrymen. He saw at a glance the dan
ger of such a move, and realized that the struggle
against Huerta would be a very unequal one.
Thinking of his own safety first, he left Deputy
Ignacio L. Pesqueira as acting governor, and fled to
the United States.
At that time, in HermosiUo, capital of Sonora,
there were five hundred men under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Obregon, who later in the cam
paign became a famous general under Carranza.
Major Salvador Alvarado, now general, had com
mand of four hundred troops of the Yaqui region,
while in the southern part of the State, five hundred

120 Carranza and Mexico
men were under the command of Generals Juan
Cabral, Benjamin Hii and Sosa. Many of the of
ficers and soldiers of this army had participated in
the revolution of 1910, consequently they were op
posed to the dictatorship of Huerta. This marked
the beginning of the Sonora revolution.
Even before the assassination of Madero, there
were a number of chiefs who waged a relentless
war. They were Col. Pedro F. Bracamonte, Col.
Plutarco Elias Calles, and Major Campos. They
began to recruit people on their own authority in the
northern part of the State, and the cutting of railway
communication. They also began an open attack
on the Federals in many places. When the Sonora
revolution was started, the chiefs became united,
and opened hostilities.
At the beginning of the Sonora revolution, the
Federals had a force of 2,650 troops distributed
throughout the State, from the frontier to the coast.
Bearing this in mind, the Constitutionalists mapped
out a careful campaign. General Obregon was ap
pointed to direct the military operations, as he had
distinguished himself in the campaign of 19 12
against the Orozquistas.
The difficult task that the Constitutionalists were
confronted with, was the prevention of the concen
tration and the union of the entire Federal army.
They knew that as long as the Federal army was
divided and spread throughout the State, their
chances were more than equal. Thus they had a

Campaign of General Obregon in the West 121
double task : first, to prevent the union of the Fede
ral troops, and secondly to fight them in small
groups. The main object of the Constitutionalists
was to secure the border positions of the State.
As the revolution progressed and the fighting con
tinued, the Constitutionalists found their plans per
fectly suited to their needs. They marched from
one city to the next, sometimes under terrible diffi
culties, but always victorious. All those in com
mand, and also the troops, fulfilled their duties ad
mirably. Soon, however, they were confronted with
new and unexpected troubles.
The taking of Naco, as also the greater part of the
towns on the frontier, involved many unnecessary
dangers. As it was situated on the international
line, it could only be attacked from the east and
west, — if it was assailed from the south many pro
jectiles would pass over to the American side. The
Constitutionalist chiefs were always careful to re
spect the rights of the American people, and avoided
as much as possible the damage and troubles that a
war waged at such close quarters, would be likely to
occasion them. The Federal generals, realizing the
position of the Constitutionals, took advantage of
their noble intentions and stuck close to the inter
national line. The Constitutionalists did not wish
to attack them in the town — but were anxious to
meet them in the open country, where there would be
no danger of inflicting suffering to families, espec
ially those of American citizens.

122 Carranza and Mexico
Knowing that the Federals intended to join their
comrades of Chihuahua, the Constitutionalists de
cided to lay in wait for them. For more than a
week, they lay concealed behind ridges and in the
mountains, but the blow they had suffered a few days
before was a lesson General Ojeda could not forget,
and all the attempts of the Constitutionals to lure
them out in the open country failed.
The chiefs of the Constitutionalists then decided
not to wait any longer. They demanded of Gen
eral Ojeda, who was in charge of the Huerta troops,
that he come out of the city. They explained to
him the injustice of fighting near a town, where many
innocent people and non-combatants might be in
jured, but Ojeda's reply was characteristic of all the
Huerta generals. As long as he was safe, General
Ojeda said, the whole human race might be slaugh
tered. Furthermore, he would not come out of
his fortified town position — the Constitutionals
could attack him there if they wanted to.
The Constitutionals, realizing that they would
have to attack, although he was entrenched in a
position very disadvantageous to such action on their
part, began preparations for the battle. The Fed
erals were located in a position occupying a semi
circle. Their six hundred men, cannon and rapid-
fire guns, could easily defend their positions. They
could sweep the open country with a deadly fire,
there being no protection for the assailants.
After a few days of reconnoitring, during which

Campaign of General Obregon in the West 123
small skirmishes took place, the final decisive bat
tle took place, on the night of the ist of April. It
lasted more than twenty- four hours, after which the
Federals were forced to their barracks for protec
tion, while General Ojeda fled to the American side.
The remaining troops surrendered, and the fighting
stopped. This victory gave the Constitutionals
complete control of the frontier towns, assuring
them a base of operations.
One of the remarkable features of the Sonora
Campaign was the wonderful manner in which the
Federals after each battle, left behind ammunition,
guns and equipment which the Constitutionalists so
badly needed. The reply of the Constitutional
chiefs to their complaining soldiers usually was:
" Never mind, boys, Huerta himself will give us
arms and ammunition to fight him with." This
statement has proved true all through the revolt.
Before the Constitutionals had a chance to re
cover from the hardships of the Naco victory, a still
greater danger threatened them. A strong force of
Federals, four thousand in number, well-equipped,
was coming from the south by way of the Pacific
coast, General Luis Medina Barron was in charge
of them. Before leaving Guaymas, he pledged on
his " military honor " that he would be in Hermo
siUo in fifteen days. He said he would have the
head of Obregon stuck upon the point of his sword
and that he would banquet at the Hotel Arcadia.
But the Constitutional chiefs were not frustrated by

124 Carranza and Mexico
the boastings of General Barron, and quickly reor
ganizing their army, they took positions between
Ortiz and Guaymas at Santa Rosa, a flag station
on the Southern Pacific Railroad of Mexico.
Confident of their ultimate victory, the Federals
marched towards the Constitutionalists. Early in
the morning of the 9th of May they opened a vigor
ous fire. The attack lasted three days.
The Constitutionalists realizing the value of the
springs and wells in that torrid zone, fought desper
ately for their possession. Once the water supply
was captured, it meant the defeat of the Federals.
On the second day of the battle, this was accom
plished and the Federals were forced back to the
Railroad tanks, which could supply them with water
no longer than one day. After the third day's fight
ing, the Federals, worn out with thirst, retired, leav
ing a large number of dead and wounded. In their
hasty retreat they left behind a great quantity of
armaments and provisions. The boasting General
Barron escaped to Guaymas, wounded by the
enemy, while many of his chiefs were taken to Her
mosiUo as prisoners of war.
While Obregon was fighting against General
Barron, General Hill had not remained idle. He
was appointed to carry on operations in the south
ern part of the State. This he accomplished ad
mirably, especially the wiping out of the " Battalion
of Death." This battalion carried a black flag, with
a skull and cross bones upon it and their method was

Campaign of General Obregon in the West 125
to terrorize the townspeople by killing innocent
women and children. When they met General Hill
in open battle they were completely wiped out.
Later General Hill drove 450 from the town of
Torin, forcing them back to Guaymas, thus clear
ing the southern part of the State. After his suc
cesses in this locality, he joined General Obregon,
in the hope of attacking Generals Ojeda and Barron.
The following move of the Constitutionalists is one
of the most effective of the whole campaign. It
was a decisive battle for the main water supply,
which the troops were badly in need of and took
place at Santa Maria.
The plans of Generals Obregon, Alvarado and
Dieguez once more proved very effective. The Fed
erals, finding the water supply taken, were forced to
assume the offensive. They felt confident of success,
and burdened themselves with all kinds of unneces
sary impediments. But the Constitutionalists were
not to be taken by surprise; instead of waiting for
the Federals to advance, they went out to meet
them: by this manoeuvre the Federals found them
selves face to face with the Constitutionalists much
sooner than they had expected.
For the Federals, it was a fight for existence.
They were face to face with death from thirst, and
felt that unless they regained the wells a miserable
death would be their lot. With them, it was not a
fight for the honor of Huerta — they fought from
sheer desperation. Under such conditions, the bat-

126 Carranza and Mexico
tie could not last long. Four desperate assaults
were made upon the Constitutionalists' positions,
and were repulsed. One of these assaults lasted
more than twenty-four hours, resulting in a hand to
hand fight. In those hand to hand frays one could
not help admiring the remarkable way in which the
Yaquis handled their daggers. The Federal army
was wiped out completely in a very short time.
While much credit is due to the soldiers who
fought in the ranks of the Constitutionalists, many
of their victories are due to the remarkable strategy
of the generals. One instance will illustrate this.
General Alvarado, realizing the terrible thirst of the
Federal soldiers, drove them into a watermelon
field. He knew fully well the result of such a move.
No sooner had they reached the watermelon field,
when all the fighting on their part ceased. The
Federal officers had to force them to fight at the
point of their bayonets, but even that did little good.
Once they had entered the melon field, they were the
easy victims of the Constitutional fire. At the close
of the battle, General Ojeda fled from the scene,
abandoning his officers and soldiers. He was fol
lowed by the officers, while a small group of sol
diers, braver than their chiefs, kept on fighting till
they reached Guaymas.
The Constitutionals did not realize how great a
victory they really had won, and waited a whole
day thinking that the retreat of the Federals was
nothing but a trap set for them. But when they

Campaign of General Obregon in the. West 127
marched forward they found nothing but dead and
wounded, and a great quantity of ammunition and
supplies. They had left behind all the cannons,
twelve rapid-firing guns and sixteen hundred rifles,
also a large number of horses and trappings. But
the Constitutionalists had no time to lose, and they
immediately went in pursuit of the enemy.
While I was overjoyed at our tremendous victory,
pity and sorrow embittered the cup of joy. The
scenes of horror and misery which I saw are still
engraved in my memory. I saw the disastrous re
sults brought about by a tyrannical dictator who, in
his effort to perpetuate himself in absolute power,
was willing to sacrifice everything and everybody.
It was dreadful to see the battlefield littered with
the dead and wounded, men who meant well but who
understood little.
On the other hand there were the patriotic, well-
intentioned men, full of self-sacrifice, willing to die
for liberty and the prosperity of their native country.
Alongside these sturdy young fighters were also the
poor women and children, innocent sufferers in the
great strife. They were the greatest sufferers, —
they bore the greater burden.
The campaign of General Obregon through the
State of Sonora, marks only the beginning of the
great struggle which led him victoriously to the city
of Mexico. This campaign, although never men
tioned by the newspaper correspondents, was never-

128 Carranza and Mexico
theless as important as the campaign of General
Villa. General Obregon not only had to fight an
army much larger than his own, but the geograph
ical location of his territory constantly endangered
his rear wings. Unlike Villa, he was constantly
compelled to guard from rear attacks, as well as
from frontal attacks. This ever existing danger
made the campaign much more difficult, multiplying
the dangers which constantly confronted him.
The remark of General Obregon to Don Venus
tiano Carranza when the First Chief marked out
the three lines of struggle, illustrates the nature of
the fighting General Obregon. When Carranza
was about to depart from Nogales, in February,
1914, Obregon said to him: "First Chief, tell
Generals Villa and Gonzales to hurry up in their
march, for I am going to get busy and get to Mex
ico." And true to his word, several months later,
although beset by many more difficulties than the
other generals, he reached Mexico City before any
of them. After the Federal troops were routed and
driven back in great disorder to Guaymas, the State
of Sonora was practically cleared from Huerta
troops. But that only meant the beginning of the
great fight.
During the months of July and August, General
Obregon was preparing for his advance South. He
had little time to waste, for even before he was
through with his preparations, he was forced to

Campaign of General Obregon in the West 129
advance on San Bias, Sinaloa. A strong detach
ment of Federals were sent up from Mexico City
to reinforce the defeated Huerta troops who landed
at Topolobampo. But General Obregon was not
taken by surprise. Having assigned Generals Hill
and Iturbe to proceed against the Federals, he him
self continued his march further south. His ob
jective point was the city of Sinaloa. In the mean
time Generals Hill and Iturbe had succeeded in de
feating the Federal troops which landed in Topolo
bampo, and joined General Obregon in his attack
upon the city of Sinaloa.
The storming of Sinaloa was one of the fiercest
battles of the entire campaign. It lasted nearly five
days and again, as in all the previous battles, the
Federals retreated so hastily that they did not have
time to take their guns and ammunition with them.
A great quantity of ammunition and provisions were
left behind by them, of which the Constitutionalists
were much in need.
One of the great difficulties which constantly con
fronted General Obregon was the guarding of the
frontier and the positions all along the coast. The
slightest error in the guarding of those positions
might have caused the annihilation of his entire
army by a rear attack. So that, whenever he took a
city from the Federals, he was confronted with the
question of protecting that point. He was forced
to always leave troops behind him, to guard those

130 Carranza and Mexico
conquered cities. Had he not done so, the Federals
might have sent up new forces by way of the Pacific
and re-taken the conquered posts.
The most important of all the battles of the en
tire campaign was the storming of Culiacan. The
Federals, realizing the dangers of Obregon's swift
march, massed a strong force of troops in that city,
numbering about seven thousand. Needless to say,
they were much better equipped than the Consti
tutionals, who always had more men than rifles and
guns. When General Obregon, who personally con
ducted the battle, reached the city, the Federals were
well fortified in their positions. The fight lasted a
whole week, and fighting continued day and night,
almost without cessation. At the end of that time,
the Federals were badly beaten and were forced to
retire to Mazatlan. The taking of Culiacan meant
to the Constitutionalists more than just an ordinary
victory. It meant the success of the operations to
wards their goal, and the weakening and disintegra
tion of the Huerta troops. The winning of this
battle enabled the Constitutional forces to move
further south to the Territory of Tepic, where Gen
eral Obregon took the city of Acaponeta and San
Bias by storm.
The rapidity with which he moved and the per
sistency of his attacks won him most of his battles.
He lost no time, — he did not wait. As soon as he
had taken San Bias, he did not even wait long
enough to give his tired soldiers a good rest. He

Campaign of General Obregon in the West 131
moved on to his destination immediately. With his
characteristic rapid fire action, he moved towards
Guadalajara in the State of Jalisco. The most in
teresting thing about the storming of that city was
the capture of fifty-six train loads of supplies.
Never before had they had such luck. The trains
were packed with all kinds of provisions, guns,
rifles, cannon and ammunition. It was one of the
richest hauls they ever made.
The conclusion of his march towards the capital
was marked by a series of successful battles, in spite
of the difficulties he had in guarding, his base of sup
plies and the frontier towns. After his victory at
Guadalajara, he marched on towards Irapuato,
where he again succeeded in routing the Federal
troops, and thence proceeded to the city of Mexico.

CHAPTER XIII
VILLA AND HIS CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH
CO much has been written about Francisco Villa
k-' that only a few preliminary remarks are neces
sary to describe the personality of the famous gen
eral. The enemies of Villa made the accusation
that the rebel chief was not respectable because he
had been an outlaw under the Diaz regime.
Those who have studied the Diaz rule with a
mind unbiased by profits and interests, will have dis
covered that if Villa was a bandit under the Diaz
reign, he certainly must have been an honest one;
for almost without exception all the officials from
the President down to the lowest Jefe Politico, were
robbers, cut-throats and grafters.
Villa is not better nor worse than the average
Mexican, but his weaknesses are those of his un
fortunate countrymen, and his strength is the latent
strength of his people.
Villa, although directly responsible for the mutiny
at Juarez in 191 1, when with Orozco he almost suc
ceeded in eliminating F. I. Madero, discovered that
the three cientifico agents in El Paso were the in
stigators of the plot. Ever since then Villa re-
132

GENERAL S. ALVARADO
Second in Command under General Obregon

Villa and His Campaign in the North 133
mained loyal to Madero and continued to fight
against Huerta, in memory of Madero.
All the biographers of Villa spoke of him as a
Napoleon, who had created an army out of nothing.
It must not be forgotten that out of one hundred
and thirty thousand soldiers who fought against the
military dictatorship, there were at least forty gen
erals who created armies out of nothing. They,
too, were without money, ammunition, arms and
with even less experience than Villa.
During his ten or more years as an outlaw, Villa
was roaming all over the States of Chihuahua and
Durango, as a leader of lesser outlaws, and his guer
rilla experience was invaluable to him later.
In the case of most other Generals, like Obregon,
Gonzales, Gutierrez, Natera, Herrera, Chao, Cal
les, Hill, Caballero, their experience was insignifi
cant. Most of the chiefs who fought the Federals
were either farmers, lawyers, engineers, clerks who
had never before handled a gun in their lives till
the last revolution.
When Villa crossed the American border into
Mexico in the spring of 19 13, he marched up and
down the States of Chihuahua, Coahuila and Dur
ango. He gathered men, attacking small cities and
doing very much the same as other revolutionists
did — surprising small detachments of Federals in
outlying districts, and capturing the arms, ammuni
tion, and horses which were so badly needed. With
him were co-operating the Herrera brothers, Chao,

134 Carranza and Mexico
Rosalio Hernandez, and in Durango, the Arrieta
brothers, Contreras, Triana, Carrillo and Urbina.
They looted the banks to buy arms and ammunition
from the United States, and stole horses and saddles
to creat a mobile force and killed cattle to feed them
selves. The first important battle won by Villa was fought
in San Andres with eight hundred men against
fourteen hundred Federals, who were defeated on
October 4th, 19 13. He attacked, captured and
sacked Torreon. Near Chihuahua he again de
feated the Federals, but as Juarez was still in their
power, he had to take the border towns before at
tempting to fight towards the south.
How he outwitted the commander of Juarez by
stealing a ride north of Chihuahua on a train loaded
with coal, and surprised and drove the commander
across the border, has been told before.
The battle of Tierra Blanca, when he defeated
five thousand Federals who came from Chihuahua
to relieve Juarez, was his first important strategical
battle, and as far as the campaign is concerned, is
the most important, even without excepting the bat
tle of Torreon, in April, 19 14. Without the battle
of Tierra Blanca, no other successes could have had
any decisive value. In Torreon, Villa had all the
men, arms and ammunition he wanted, and with
great recklessness, he sacrificed his men, counting
only upon results.
After the capture of Torreon, Saltillo and Mon-

Villa and His Campaign in the North 135
terrey automatically fell into his power, for Torreon
was the strategic key which opened the way south
to his army, i. e., the Northern division.
In another chapter, the causes and details of the
Carranza-Villa quarrel will be discussed. The
character of General Villa must be studied, in order
to understand the underlying causes of the quar
rel. Villa, like Zapata, is a man of the peasant class.
Physically strong, with great will power and a good
deal of horse sense. In men of this type, due to
their utter lack of education, and inexperience in
politics, they are an easy prey to their secretaries,
friends, advisers and hangers-on. Being funda
mentally honest, they take it for granted that their
entourage is likewise, and being unable to read or
write, they are constantly deceived by their secre
taries. In the case of the other generals, like Ob
regon, Gonzales, etc., their education and political
experience put them on their guard against petty,
scheming politicians, and unscrupulous tools of the
reactionaries. Villa's ideas outside of stratagems, spoils and
the game of war, are primitive, and not always clear.
His appetites and his contempt for human life is
equal to that of the Apaches and Comanches ; his atti
tude toward life is anarchistic, rebellious. Towards
people he is cunning, suspicious, ostensibly good-
natured and at times tyrannical. An uncontrollable
temper is softened by a keen sense of humor, and a

136 Carranza and Mexico
lavish generosity is encouraged by a propensity to
acquisitiveness. Villa is so terribly suspicious of everything and
everybody, that he has been accused of being not
quite so brave as he wants to appear. General
Maclovio Herrera is admired for his courage and
is nicknamed " the Lion " : Villa has an unbounded
respect for him, tinged with a little envy. Villa's
enemies claim that he went to Aguascalientes escorted
by eighteen thousand soldiers, because he was afraid,
— although the other generals had none but body
guards. When Obregon was sent by Carranza to join
Villa in a solution of the Sonora controversy between
Maytorena and Hill, he went alone. ViUa soon
lost his temper and had Obregon arrested, and
threatened to have him shot by his soldiers unless
he acceded to his demands. Obregon, calm and
cool, answered: " My life belongs to Mexico, — if
you believe that my death is necessary to the solution
of the question, I am ready to sacrifice it. I came
here to meet Villa the patriot: I find a savage
Villa who calls himself the savior of Mexico." The
manly and courageous attitude of Obregon con
quered Villa, who instead of ordering an execution,
gave a ball in his honor.
When Carranza was in Chihuahua with Villa
after the fall of Torreon, he heard that Villa had
ordered the execution of General Chao, Governor
of Chihuahua. Villa was asked to appear before

Filia and His Campaign in the North 137
Carranza, who demanded an explanation. " I have
shot Chao," grinned Villa. Carranza was very in
dignant, and protested vehemently. Then Villa
laughed, and admitted that the order had not been
carried out. Carranza ordered him to free Chao
immediately, and said to him : " You have no right
to arrest and shoot an official not under your im
mediate command, without my authority, especially
a governor who is under my jurisdiction. Am I
the chief of the revolution or am I not? " Villa
was impressed and he ordered the release of Chao.
He excused himself by saying that Chao had
grafted. Later it was discovered that Villa's secre
tary had sent orders to Chao, Villa not being able to
read what he had signed, and the whole scheme was
engineered by Villa's secretary to get rid of Chao,
who was his personal enemy. Villa embraced Chao
as a result.
One of Villa's many wives was enterprising
enough to induce Villa to let her sign some treasury
notes, which were honored by the officials, who did
not dare refuse.
Once, Villa gave an order for the exportation
through Juarez of $5000 worth of material. The
Secretary changed the order from five, to fifty thou
sand, which without his knowledge had been tele
graphed to the official in charge of the Custom
House in Juarez. The honest official refused to let
the goods pass the border, and the irate Villa almost
shot him for disobedience. Finally the matter was

138 Carranza and Mexico
cleared up, and Villa declared that he had ordered
five, and not fifty, thousand dollars' worth. " But
here is the order signed by you," said the official.
Villa had been deceived again, as he has been all
along by his secretaries. The two following tele
grams, one from Villa, and the answer of the Ar-
rieta Brothers, will throw a very clear light on the
attitude of Villa toward Carranza. It wiU also
prove that the majority of the generals do not sym
pathize with Villa, as he is making a personal ques
tion, or better said, an alleged insult to his division,
a pretext to overthrow Carranza, and become the
political dictator of Mexico. TELEGRAM.
Chihuahua, General Headquarters, Sept. 23d, 1914.
Urgent.
Generals Mariano and Domingo Arrieta.
Durango, Dgo.
Venustiano Carranza having deeply offended the honor
and dignity of the Northern Division under my command,
and not being able to tolerate any longer his whims and
inconsequences, which would have sunk our country in
ruins, disseminating anarchy, while creating distrust with
foreign nations, — since yesterday, all my generals and
myself have decided to repudiate him as Chief of the Na
tion. For we are convinced that because of his alliance with the
cientificos and his noted tendencies to favor a certain per
sonal group which surrounded him, and prevented the solu-

Villa and His Campaign in the North 139
tion of the real revolutionists, and to fulfil the promises
made to the people.
As a consequence we have decided to fight only against
the personality of Venustiano Carranza, and to drive him
out of the country, without antagonizing or molesting the
other chiefs who have fought to overthrow the usurping
government which has just fallen. Therefore we repeat
that our movement is solely against the personality of
Venustiano Carranza.
As we have always understood that you have been ani
mated by patriotic sentiments, like ourselves, we address
ourselves to you, showing you the matter clearly, and we
hope that in view of the right which is on our side, you will
be with us, and will help by offering your services to the
cause of the people.
Already the Governor of the State of Sonora and his
forces, have repudiated Venustiano Carranza, and we hope
that you will act likewise and will define your position in
forming us if you are with us or with Carranza.
kWe beg you to answer as soon as possible. Greetings.
The General in Chief,
Francisco Villa.
Answer to the above telegram.
Durango to Chihuahua, Sept. 24th, 1914.
Senor General Don Francisco Villa,
Chihuahua.
We are in receipt of your telegram, in which you declare
that the division under your command has repudiated the
authority as Provisional President, of Don Venustiano Car
ranza, because of insults to the dignity of said Division and
for not having fulfilled the promises made to the people.

140 Carranza and Mexico
We discover in your telegram a certain ambiguity, as
we have no knowledge of the insults to which you refer.
Concerning the promises made to the people, we con
sider your pretentions premature, as a convention has been
named to meet on the first of October, in which clearly and
explicitly the programme of the government will be dis
cussed and studied, so as to solve the various problems which
will benefit the proletariat.
Therefore we would be grateful, if you would communi
cate to us the nature of the insults to which you refer, and
the cause of the people which has been frustrated, so that we
can intelligently come to a decision.
And lastly we appeal to your patriotism and the interest
of the country which through this break would be more
weakened, and be at the mercy of the American nation,
which has not retired its troops from Vera Cruz. We_beg
of you if you are a real patriot, to calm your temper and
meditate on the evils which would befall our country with
this civil war — which would bring about as a consequence
a foreign war.
ist. We are of the opinion that you should sacrifice
your self-love for the good of the country, and you should
not take notice of said insults, even if they existed.
Secondly. That we hope that the Convention which is
to take place on the first of October, when all the Consti
tutionalist forces will be represented, to solve the great
problems of our country, will put them into effect with the
assistance of the arms which we will not relinquish until
our ideals have been fulfilled.
Hoping for an answer to give our definite resolution, we
salute you affectionately. ._, _. .
General Domingo Arrieta,
General Mariano Arrieta.

Villa and His Campaign in the North 141
As an answer, Villa sent General Urbina against
the Arrieta Brothers. Urbina and his forces were
defeated, and the general badly wounded. Inno
cent, well-meaning, but utterly deceived Villa 1 If
he only knew that the Cientificos whom he accuses
of having affiliated with Carranza, are really pull
ing their wires from New York, and using him
(Villa) as the tool to eliminate Carranza, and this
because the first chief intends to carry out all the
radical reforms of the revolution.

CHAPTER XIV
CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL GONZALEZ IN THE EAST
| IKE most of the campaigns in the north of Mex-
*^ ico, where the strategic objectives are the
border towns, so the campaign of General Gonzalez
was fought, first for the possession of Piedras Ne
gras (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz), Nuevo Laredo, Ca
margo and Matamoros, and later for the control
of Tamaulipas.
The first battle of the revolution against Huerta
was fought at Anhelo and ended in a defeat. Then
Venustiano Carranza, with his brother Jesus Car
ranza, and Pablo Gonzalez, took Piedras Negras.
Huerta, as well as his generals, were of the opin
ion that if Carranza was captured and shot, it would
end the constitutionalist revolution then and there.
Therefore, they concentrated all their efforts upon
Piedras Negras, which was defended by four hun
dred men. More than 9,000 Federals were sent
against them, and although the revolutionists were
forced to leave, the enemy did not succeed in cap
turing the leaders.
Then Pablo Gonzalez, with the help of Jesus
Carranza, roamed all over the States of Coahuila
142

GENERAL PABLO GONZALEZ
Chief of the Eastern Division

Campaign of General Gonzalez in the East 143
and Nuevo Leon defeating over twenty Federal gar
risons and capturing the much needed arms and am
munition, which were so scarce and hard to get at
the beginning of the struggle.
It is a fact worth noticing that, in the three cam
paigns in the North, Centre and South, the revo
lutionists captured many cities, and then departed.
To the lay mind it seems absurd to fight so hard
to capture a city, and then to let it go almost im
mediately without even waiting for the Federals to
retake it. Nevertheless, it was good tactics. The
Federal garrisons offered big stores of war material,
while the cities supplied them with food, clothing
and money.
Monterrey was attacked twice without success,
and there was no chance of victory until Torreon,
Piedras Negras, Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros and
Tampico were in the hands of Pablo Gonzalez.
When that was done, Monterrey was automatically
evacuated by the Federals.
Tampico was attacked several times and besieged
by Caballero. The Federals had a great advan
tage, as they controlled the city with their gunboats.
Another drawback was the presence of foreign war
ships, of foreign Consuls and representatives of
the great oil corporations. The Dutch, English and
American Oil Companies protested most vigorously
against the attack on Tampico, and the Federals
took good care to use this protection to great ad
vantage.

144 Carranza and Mexico
When Pablo Gonzalez was ordered to take Tam
pico at all costs, he did so after only four days' bat
tle. When the Federals began their retreat, they
threatened to burn and destroy all the oil tanks and
property of the foreigners, if they were followed by
the Revolutionists.
Like many of the important moves in the cam
paign against Huerta, the great significance of the
capture of Tampico was pointed out by a civilian.
In this instance, the Secretary of the Interior in Car
ranza's revolutionary Cabinet, Don Rafael Zu
baran, was the wise counsellor.
The first reason given was that Huerta had prac
tically given away many very valuable oil conces
sions to an English company, in return for cash.
That the export tax on each barrel of oil was
doubled from sixty cents to $1.20 and calculating
that over half a million barrels of oil were exported
daily, it will be seen what a rich source of income
would have been taken away from Huerta.
The second reason was that the seizure of Tam
pico would eliminate a great source of friction be
tween the foreign powers and the revolutionary
government, besides relieving the anxiety felt in
Washington as to the constant danger of foreign
marines landing in Tampico to protect the interests
of their countrymen.
The third reason was that Tampico, besides be
ing the most important seaport in Mexico after
Vera Cruz, was also a great strategic point. It cut

Campaign of General Gonzalez in the East 145
off Monterrey and Saltillo from the coast, and
endangered and flanked their communications.
Huerta considered the possession of Tampico of
such value that when it was threatened by the rebels,
and he knew that it was lost to him, he decided to
force American intervention by arresting some ma
rines who had landed at the Tampico wharf on
routine business. The action was deliberate and
was meant to concentrate the attention of the revo
lutionists on American aggression, so that they
would discontinue their attacks. The State and
Navy Department very wisely kept the American
warship outside of the Panuco River so as to offer
as few pretexts as possible for attacks. It can be
asserted that the fall of Tampico sounded the end
of Huerta's rule in Mexico.

CHAPTER XV
ZAPATA AND HIS CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH
TTNDOUBTEDLY there is no Mexican who
^ has been talked about, described, praised and
vilified more than Emiliano Zapata, in the last four
years. Now everybody can pronounce his name in
America, for it has become a byword of the revo
lution in Mexico.
Innumerable articles have been written in Amer
ica on Zapata but I have only met two men who had
seen him, — one was a Mexican newspaperman and
the other was a federal major who slept in the same
room with him, unconscious of the fact that a few
feet from his bed there was the man he was sup
posed to capture dead or alive for Huerta, with
three thousand soldiers. When he did discover this
interesting fact, Zapata was miles away. This in
cident proved conclusively that the southern chief
could not be caught by force, and that the Indians
in Morelos would as soon think of committing sui
cide as to betray him.
The nature of the volcanic country in the State
of Morelos makes it very hard for a body of sol
diers to march through it without danger of being
146

Zapata and His Campaign in the South 147
surprised and ambushed almost every hundred
yards. Every peon in Morelos and many other
southern- States is a Zapatista.
No man could have held such power as Zapata
over the population of almost three States, by offer
ing in return only the spoils of war or brigandage.
No bandit ever controlled thirty thousand men on
the mere results or promise of loot or theft. The
Zapatistas, with few exceptions, are all for the
abolition of all forms of slavery and for the distri
bution of lands. Although Zapata is not the intel
lectual leader of the Zapatistas, his name has be
come a legend. Many people claim that he never
existed, others claim that Genovevo de la O was
the braver and more intelligent of the two, and the
real leader.
There were several leaders who fought Diaz be
fore Zapata became prominent, but the Morelian
chief represented the deepest yearnings, the most
profound aspirations and all the unspoken desires
of a miserable, downtrodden, but patient, long-suf
fering and kindly race. Any one who has visited
that Garden of Eden of Mexico, the State of More
los, will bear testimony to the simplicity, morality
and patience of the Morelian Indians, their love of
the soil which is almost a passion, their sterling
qualities. The injustices, robberies and cruelties perpetrated
on the Indians are almost incredible, and almost un
believable in our century. Until the European war

148 Carranza and Mexico
started, civilized people did not believe that sol
diers could be so cruel, reckless and ruthless against
an enemy.
Zapata's and Villa's wholesale shooting of pris
oners, the looting of haciendas, banks and stores in
captured cities, their retaliation against federal of
ficers, now seem like kid-glove, pink-tea affairs, after
the stories of German atrocities. In the light of
these atrocities, Villa might be a Mexican Chester
field, and Zapata a scrupulous Morelian hidalgo of
the most fastidious tastes. Strange to relate, the
most virulent attacks agaihst Mexican civilization,
methods of warfare and revolutionary barbarities,
were written by German editorialists. The Mex
icans had no Treitschkes, Nietzsches, von Bern-
hardis to sing the paeans of war, of the destruction
and annihilation of enemies, and inoffensive non-
combatants in the name of a higher culture and a
greater civilization.
The precedents of cruelties and wanton destruc
tion were created by the federal officers under Diaz
and Huerta. Where the Federals passed, they left
a trail of death and desolation. To prove that they
had fought valiantly the Federals killed peaceful
peons and sent the ears of the Indians as vouchers
to the War Department.
Whole villages passed through fire and sword —
in others all the men were impressed into the army,
and the women and children concentrated in the
cities. Thousands of fruit trees that had been

Zapata and His Campaign in the South 149
growing for years, bearing fruit, and which were
the sole source of income of families of peons, were
ruthlessly cut down to be sold for firewood by
greedy Jefes Politicos. A whole population was
decimated because it would not stay under the leash
of the slave driver on the sugar and tobacco plan
tations owned by half a dozen rich families.
Their day of reckoning has almost arrived, and
no matter what Zapata or any other leader may do
politically, the peons of Morelos know that the lands
are theirs for the taking.
Morelos is one of the smallest States in Mexico,
and one of the richest, and has an area of 2,734
square miles and a population of 179,114. As
many as thirty thousand soldiers with machine guns
and cannon were sent to conquer Zapata and his
army, but Zapata remained unconquered. All the
generals, including Huerta, who had won laurels in
many battlefields, invariably lost them in Morelos.
The Federals fought according to book-strategy,
while Zapata and his chiefs fought with the same
fabian tactics which defeated Hannibal in Italy and
Napoleon in Spain. When the patient, ignorant,
but physically powerful Indians discovered that they
could shoot and fight as well as the trained Fed
erals, and that a few thousand Indians banded to
gether could keep at bay a whole army of Federals,
the struggle for land was won.
But there is the reverse of the medal. As all
strong people have their compensation in some flaw,

150 Carranza and Mexico
so has Zapata a great weakness which prevents him
from becoming the greatest factor for good in his
country. His illiteracy, coupled with a lack of
knowledge of politicians of the middle and higher
class, make him an easy prey to all sorts of schemers
and intriguers.
For years Zapata kept up his guerrilla warfare,
accompanied by a staff of officers and several secre
taries. One of the most famous was a certain Mon
tano, a school-teacher who wrote the first plan which
Zapata endorsed. The second plan, which was
written by a certain Palafox, another secretary, and
was named the Plan of Ayala, which acknowledged
Orozco as the provisional president, when he re
belled against Madero, assisted by Cientifico money.
After Madero's murder, Orozco joined the stand
ard of Huerta, who, true to his usual methods, tried
to use Orozco's influence with Zapata, to eliminate
him. Orozco went to Morelos for the purpose of
conferring with Zapata, but the wily Morelian had
discovered that the meeting was not meant to bring
peace, but to facilitate his capture and murder. As
Orozco was not very brave, and his conscience not
very clear, instead of going personally to the meet
ing, he sent instead his father and two other agents.
As an answer to the contemplated plot, Zapata took
Orozco's father and his two agents as prisoners.
Later they were found dead, after an attack by the
Federals. Orozco vowed vengeance, but he left Cuemavaca

Zapata and His Campaign in the South 151
in great haste under the pretext of going North to
fight the Constitutionalists, where he was defeated
at every encounter. Any one who had read Mex
ican newspapers would have known how discredited
Orozco's personality was, but Zapata's secretaries
wanted a continuation of conditions wherein they
would run the Morelian chief for their own benefit.
When Carranza arrived in Mexico City with the
constitutionalist government, he sent two agents to
Zapata, with power to settle the agrarian question
in Morelos, once for all. The following letter by
Gen. A. I. Villareal will show how Zapata's secre
taries spoiled the settlement. Mexico, Sept. 5th, 1914.
General Emiliano Zapata:
Cuemavaca, Mor.
Esteemed General:
I had the pleasure of receiving the last letter, which
you were kind enough to send through Mr. Reyes and
in which you express the fact that you were to blame for
the incident at Huitzilac. I must advise you that this
matter was not one of much importance, and it seems that
they gave you exaggerated reports of the same. What we
consider a grave affair, and was really a sad one regard
ing which we went to consult you with the object of arriv
ing at an agreement between the revolutionary elements of
the North and the South, was the unjustified conduct and
belligerent attitude of your secretary, Mr. Manuel Palafox,
in respect to whom I intend to speak in this letter with the
most absolute and honest frankness; believing in this way

152 Carranza and Mexico
that I may do you a good turn, not alone yourself person
ally but also the cause of the well-being of the public which
we must all defend and also the peace of the nation.
If you critically analyze the happenings which occurred
during our visit in this city, and to which I beg to call
your attention, you will discover in a moment that all the
difficulties, all the petty misunderstandings, all the threats
of war, emanated principally from Mr. Palafox supported
by Mr. Serratos, who also in our opinion is carrying on
work right in your office that is very far from being patriotic
and loyal.
It is always the case that when various people come to
gether to settle great or small differences which may exist
between them, it is understood if they work in good faith
and the matters treated of are thoroughly talked over, that
some points are ceded by one party and some by the other
party; there must be reciprocity in the arrangements, and
a definite conclusion reached regarding the subject under
discussion. To continue, conferences held with regard to
any matter must not be reduced to the party on one side
imposing a settlement and the parties on the other side
accepting the same without discussing the propositions for
and against and coming to a mutual agreement.
Unfortunately, in our case this which was the rational
and just method of procedure did not take place, because
as you will remember Mr. Palafox, who was the spokesman
during the discussions almost prevented us from setting
forth our side of the subject, and attempted to impose upon
us certain conditions which would have to be accepted un
conditionally as preliminaries before arriving at a resolu
tion. You will recollect that Mr. Palafox demanded as a first

Zapata and His Campaign in the South 153
condition that as revolutionaries of the North we should
accept without discussion the Plan of Ayala as the Supreme
Law of the Republic, declaring that otherwise it would be
impossible to treat of other matters.
This is in direct contradiction to your declarations, that
you had no ambition for power; for in one of the clauses
of the Plan of Ayala it states that General Pascual Orozco
is recognized as leader of the revolution, and in case he is
not able to discharge that task, you will be eligible; and as
our complete submission to the Plan of Ayala is demanded
it would intimate that we ought to place you in the posi
tion of the Supreme Chief of the Nation and in a more
or less covert manner, you would be Provisional President
of the Republic.
I believe in the sincerity of your words when you say
that you have no ambition to command, that all you want
is the settlement of the agrarian question and the economic
betterment of the lower classes for which you have struggled
so bravely. But back of this is Mr. Palafox, who has the
ambition to rule, and who is desirous to see you raised to
supreme power so that he may enjoy a privileged position
in your office in his character of Secretary and Councillor.
The same object animated Mr. Serratos more or less who
also enjoys a certain amount of influence regarding your
affairs, and doubtless awaits the auspicious moment of utiliz
ing the same for his own benefit.
You will remember that Don Luis Cabrera and I set
forth very clearly that we were authorized to accept es
sentially the Plan of Ayala; that is, the land question, the
satisfaction of the popular needs, the betterment of the
poor. We hereby declare that we agree fully with the
principles set forth in the Plan of Ayala, and only desire

154 Carranza and Mexico
that its form may be modified, and that there may be added to
the gubernatorial programme which we might draw up some
clauses relative to the needs of the Northern States and the
States in the centre of the Republic, which are not in the
same condition as those of the south. Messrs. Palafox and
Serratos refused to accept our cordial and just propositions,
and insisted in a blind, unquestionable, despotic manner
that the Plan of Ayala be accepted, without the change of a
word or a comma.
Convinced that the influence of Messrs. Palafox and
Serratos over you would make sterile all our efforts for
coming to an agreement in the form which we proposed, we
declined to start a discussion which only might have served
to embitter our souls and to give rise to more ill-feeling
than what we suffered in the course of our conversation with
you. For our part we found ourselves in a visibly hostile
atmosphere, and we lacked the liberty necessary for the
free expression of our opinions.
When Mr. Sarabia spoke with you for the first time, he
wrote me stating that your attitude was cordial and that he
saw that your propositions of peace were sincere. On the
occasion of our meeting with you our surprise was great
to find you different from what Mr. Sarabia had represented.
This may be easily explained that the first time you
spoke with Mr. Sarabia you were guided by your own im
pulses and by your good intentions, and the second time
you were under the influence of the unhealthy machinations
of Mr. Palafox.
The question then is reduced to the following facts:
On our part the greatest and most sincere cordiality, the
recognition of the justice of your cause, the acceptance of the
principles of the plan of Ayala relating to the division of

Zapata and His Campaign in the South 155
lands and the social betterment; on your part, good impulses,
no ambition for power, and the exclusive desire for the
welfare of the public; and on the part of Mr. Palafox and
Mr. Serratos a spirit of intrigue that distorts the best in
tentions, ambitions for power in your hands with a view
to thriving in your shadow, and a decided object of pro
voking war if their ambitions should not be satisfied.
Is not this sad, General Zapata? Is it not deeply to be
lamented that all the patriotic efforts of honorable men
shall go to pieces before the caprices of two intriguers?
Is it not bitter and even 'shameful that a movement as great
and unselfish as yours after four years of struggle should
degenerate by reason of an instrument of vile ambition and
in an ignoble weapon for bringing war a second time on a
country already exhausted in its struggle for independence?
I make a supreme appeal to your honor, to your patriot
ism, to your love of the people, who would be in the last
analysis those who would suffer most from a war, that you
take into consideration what we said when we were with
you, and which I again repeat in this letter, that we may
arrive at a good understanding with the revolutionaries of
the north and the south, who in reality are brothers.
We know that we have done all in our power to arrive
at a peaceful solution, and if at length it might be found
impossible to reach it, it will not be through our fault.
God grant that to-morrow I may not have to tell you
that through attending to the intrigues of an ambitious party
more than to the dictates of patriotism, you may be to
blame for the beginning of a war which would be thoroughly
unjustifiable, which no one wants and which would do no
one any good!
I believe that after what I have said it is only necessary

156 Carranza and Mexico
to add the following: That while Palafox continues at
your side enjoying the influence that he does, it will be
impossible for us to return to see you at Cuemavaca, nor
for us to send other representatives, for we consider that we
would not have, as we did not, the necessary liberty to treat
with frankness and amplitude the transcendental subject
which is under our discussion.
We would be very thankful to know that you had re
solved to act independently of your harmful counsellor ; and
in such a case we consider that it would be easy enough to
arrive at a settlement.
In place of Mr. Palafox you should be able to consult
your principal chiefs, who have struggled faithfully for the
cause, and you will surely find among them better standards
and better counsel than from your ancient secretary.
I know that the majority of your chieftains hold Mr.
Palafox in scant esteem and do not care for him ; and if they
have not so expressed themselves to you it has been perhaps
through lack of opportunity or excess of discipline. Now
it would be convenient that you consult them regarding this
matter. I trust, Mr. General, in your good judgment and sense
of right, to kindly bear in mind with a spirit of serenity and
justice what we have set before you, and unite your efforts
to ours with a view to realizing the peace which our Re
public needs so much, without lessening the agrarian ideals
for which you have struggled for so long a time.
I am happy to sign myself,
Yours affectionate and loyal friend,
Antonio I. Villarreal.

CHAPTER XVI
ONE HUNDRED YEARS' STRUGGLE FOR LAND AND
DEMOCRACY, AGAINST CLERICALISM
TN August, 152 1, Cortez consummated the con-
*** quest of New Spain and in August, 1821, under
Iturbide, the independence of Mexico was wrested
from the mother country.
For exactly three hundred years Spain governed
Mexico with soldiers and priests. Ten prelates of
the Dominican order, out of a list of sixty-two vice
roys, had ruled New Spain, which was surrounded
with a ring that was mightier than a Chinese wall.
Education, outside of religious teaching, was dis
couraged. Communication with the outside world
was forbidden. Spain fed New Spain commercially,
politically and intellectually.
The Mexican born was allowed no privileges, no
rights. The Spaniards, soldiers, priests and aris-
t6crats monopolized everything; all the offices, the
commerce, the property, were theirs. Four-fifths
of the lands were in the hands of the Church.
In 181 1 an ex-priest, Hidalgo, unfurled the ban
ner of the revolution by the shouts of: " Long live
Religion! Death to bad Government! Death to
the Gachupines ! " (Spaniards). 157

158 Carranza and Mexico
The revolution for freedom from Spanish rule
was initiated by an ex-priest. Morelos, Mata
moros, Dr. Cos, and Navarrete, who continued the
struggle, were all ex-priests. Great personalities
appeared in the ten years' revolution, such as Al
varez, Guerrero, Bravo, Victoria. The Mexican
revolutionists were battling for political liberty and
land. When the Church realized that Mexico was lost
to Spain, it put forward a Spanish officer, Iturbide,
as the Liberator. Iturbide betrayed his own king,
and after accepting the first Constitution, betrayed
the revolution and became emperor by means of a
military " cuartelazo " (mutiny).
The Mexican liberals fought continuously the en
croachments of the Church, which used the army
to support it politically. The military strength cre
ated by the Church and landowners was maintained,
not to protect the nation from foreign aggression,
but to guard the government from the assaults of
the people.
The climax of the struggle took place during the
three years' war, 1 857-1 860, when the liberal lead
ers enforced the laws of the reform, which entitled
the nation to possess all the properties of the clergy,
both religious and secular, and the Church was de
nied the right to own real estate.
Religious orders as contrary to public welfare
were dissolved. Church and State were absolutely

One Hundred Years' Struggle 159
separated, and religious freedom was fully and
firmly established.
Benito Juarez, a pure-blooded Indian, continued
the strife of the Liberals, initiated by Gomez Farias,
Melchior Ocampo and other martyrs of the cause.
After the three years' war, the Church was osten
sibly eliminated as a political power. The land
which had been absorbed by the Church from the
Indians, and known as " egidos," communal lands,
reverted to them, and over three million Indians be
came small landowners.
Defeated but not discouraged, the clericals then
brought about French intervention and placed on
the throne of Mexico a clerical, Emperor Maxi
milian, who met his defeat and death in Queretaro
in 1867.
Porfirio Diaz came into power as a liberal
through a revolution, and ended as a clerical. Under
his regime of spoliation, all the lands which belonged
to the Indians were taken away from them by trick
ery and legal frauds, and distributed among Diaz'
generals and political supporters. Government land
was sold to foreigners.
Through the influence of Carmelita Diaz, the
wife of General Diaz, the religious orders, foreign
priests, friars and nuns, came back to Mexico and
acquired property, and the clericals began reorgan
izing themselves and taking breath for another
struggle which they knew was coming soon. When

160 Carranza and Mexico
Diaz was tottering to his fall, the Church placed the
clerical, De la Barra, in the provisional presidency.
The Madero cabinet was composed of clericals and
neo-Cientificos who sat tight in a passive policy of
non-intervention in Mexican internal affairs, as if
the government reforms were none of their business.
Meanwhile, the clericals were very active polit
ically and financially; they contributed millions of
dollars to the downfall of the Madero government.
As usual, the clericals corrupted the army chiefs,
and succeeded in having the reform government
overthrown. Dr. Urrutia, a pupil of the Jesuit College, was
the instigator and chief plotter. He picked out
Huerta as the most convenient tool for the Church.
Huerta, although a Catholic, was a most unscrupu
lous and ambitious man, and used the Church as a
stepping-stone. He received millions of dollars
from the clergy, from the landowners, and the for
eigners, such as bankers and mining and oil inter
ests. During Huerta's regime, Dr. Urrutia was the
Mephisto and lago of Huerta.
As soon as Huerta was in power and the higher
clergy began to notice the unpopularity of the dic
tator, they began plotting his assassination or over
throw. Huerta, who trusted Dr. Urrutia more
than any other man in Mexico except General Blan
quet, made him Minister of the Interior, and upon
his shoulders fell the responsibility of the murder

One Hundred Years' Struggle 161
of scores, nay, hundreds, of political enemies of the
Huerta regime.
As long as Dr.' Urrutia and his friends, Mora
the Archbishop of Mexico, Jenaro Mendez, Arch
bishop of Michoacan, Eulogio G. Gillow, Arch
bishop of Oaxaca, Ramon, Archbishop of Puebla —
in fact, almost all the archbishops of Mexico, were
plotting with Dr. Urrutia for the elimination of
the enemies of the dictatorship, Huerta seems to
have made no objection. The following letter, ad
dressed to Dr. Urrutia, Minister of the Interior, by
the Archbishop of Mexico City, silences the state
ments made by Catholics in America and Mexico,
that the Church was neutral and did not play
politics. LETTER FROM ARCHBISHOP MORA TO URRUTIA
Mexico, July nth, 1913.
My dear Minister and friend :
Thanking you for the kind terms of your favor of the
9th inst. which I received yesterday, I beg to assure you
once more that all the curates and priests under
my jurisdiction, in compliance with their duty, will make
every effort in order to bring about as soon as possible, the
fulfilment of the aspirations of all the good people in this
republic, who desire the peace and tranquillity of the be
loved country.
I say that they do so in compliance with their duty be
cause the Church desires peace, and to avoid bloodshed, and
that all co-operate to the ultimate object of society, which is
the well-being of all its members.

1 62 Carranza and Mexico
In this sense, I shall continue to animate them to lose no
opportunity to exhort their parishioners to help to obtain
this great boon.
In order to proceed in all justice, I would like, if you have
no objection, to know the name of the person who is work
ing against the government. One word from you on the
subject will be sufficient.
I enclose a Memo, of something which may be of use to
you, and which has come to my knowledge from trust
worthy sources.
With kindest greetings, and assuring you of my thank
fulness, friendship and respect, I beg to remain,
Very respectfully,
Jose, Archbishop of Mexico.
Dr. Urruita, emboldened by his success in elim
inating so many enemies by assassination, and in his
formidable and terror-inspiring position as official
executioner of Huerta, became ambitious. The
high clergy of Mexico encouraged his pretentions,
and began sending out feelers to discover if he
would be willing and ready to oust Huerta and place
himself in Huerta's stead as dictator. But Huerta
was wide-awake, and as soon as he discovered the
plot, he gave orders to have Urrutia arrested.
Urrutia escaped by the skin of his teeth; disguised
as an Indian peon he crossed the American lines to
Vera Cruz, where he was almost lynched by the in
furiated Mexicans.
The following letter from the Archbishop of
Michoacan proves irrefutably that the Mexican

One Hundred Years' Struggle 163
clergy had plotted to place one of the most das
tardly, cruel and infamous men in Mexico, in the
culminating position of Chief Executive of the Re
public, as a protege and tool of the Church in
Mexico. LETTER OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF MICHOACAN TO
MINISTER URRUTIA September nth, 19 13.
My dear compadre:
The timely measures taken by you saved this city from
being ravaged by the rebel gangs which have been concen
trating in these localities to the number of over a thou
sand strong, but now, I think I can assure you that if the
detachment which has just arrived, pursues them, this part
of the State will soon be pacified.
The principal object of this letter is to ask you to relieve
me of a great anxiety under which I am laboring, and which
has been caused by the aggressive and almost scandalous
attitude taken in public by Mr. Calero and a small group
of porristas, against your good self. I can well see that their
object is to tarnish the glory which you have so justly won,
and to alienate your adherents all over the republic.
But they will not accomplish anything, because all the
sensible men know very well the envy and intrigues that
animate these degraded people. Although I am at ease
on that score, my profound sympathy and affection for you
make me fear that these men's intrigues might put obstacles
on the path that Our Lord and His Blessed Mother have
PUT BEFORE YOU TO CLIMB TO THE CULMINATING POSITION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE REPUBLIC, which position

164 Carranza and Mexico
will require of you the greatest sacrifice, but will at the
same time lay before you a vast field in which to exercise
your activity for the glory and honor of God, and for the
benefit of our beloved country.
In the meantime I beg of you to tell me confidentially if
this threat of Calero is to be feared, or whether you think it
will be easy for you to humiliate the efforts of these up
starts. Your compadre etc.,
Jenaro Mendez,
Archbishop of Michoacan.
The flight of several archbishops from Mexico
was not due so much to their fear of the persecu
tions of the Constitutionalists but more to the terror
of the retaliations of General Huerta. The Mex
ican clergy enlisted the sympathy of the American
Catholics and of the Pope in Rome, in their ap
peals for protection. The impression has been
given that the Mexican clergy is a victim of the
persecutions of the Constitutionalists, who want to
destroy religion.
What the Mexican liberals, as well as the leaders
among the Indians, are after, is the elimination of
the clergy from the political arena. The political
activities of the clericals will only result in disas
trous effects — their abstention from it will only en
hance their spiritual supremacy.
At Aguascalientes, one of the delegates of Za
pata, Paulino Martinez, said before the assembled
generals : " The Indian, the peon, the workingman

One Hundred Years' Struggle 165
of all the factories, the artisans in the cities, were
all exploited by that odious trinity formed by the
cacique, the military man and the priest.
Carranza never said a more profound truth, than
when he stated, at the beginning of the revolution
against Huerta — "We are fighting the
Three Years' War all over again."
The religious question in Mexico has to be set
tled once for all by the Mexicans themselves, and
the pernicious interferences by the Mexican clergy,
which tries to enlist the sympathy, influence and in
tervention of the American or foreign Catholics, will
only revert to the disadvantage of all the fair think
ing, just Catholics, who, if they are sincere in their
claims that they do not mix in politics, will find that
the safest and most practical thing to do is to keep
neutral in a family quarrel. Otherwise they might
burn their fingers.

CHAPTER XVII
ATTEMPTS AT THE SOLUTION OF THE LAND
QUESTION
CEVERAL attempts have been made during the
¦^ last four years to solve the land problem in the
States of Morelos, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua. Other
States have followed in the wake in a more or less
radical manner according to the conditions of the
peons and the necessity for cultivating the land to
feed the population.
The most interesting of all attempts was initiated
by Gen. Lucio Blanco who was fighting under Gen.
Pablo Gonzalez in the division of the East. Any
one taking the trouble to look up the map of Mex
ico will observe that the State of Tamaulipas
touches the border of the United States from the
mouth of the Rio Grande (Matamoros) to Nuevo
Laredo. Along the line of that strip, on the most
fertile parts which can be irrigated by the waters
of the Rio Grande, were lands which belonged to
small tenants and in many cases were communal
lands " egidos " belonging to Indians.
Under the Diaz regime in the last ten years of
his rule, Felix Diaz, the nephew of the dictator,
166

Attempts at Solution of the Land Question 167
was able to expropriate most of those lands with
the assistance of the governor and the jefes politi
cos of Tamaulipas. The company which expropri
ated the lands and paid the expenses was under the
patronage of Felix Diaz. Roughly speaking there
were about 75,000 acres under the control of that
company. As soon as Gonzalez's and Blanco's troops had
driven the Federals and the jefes politicos from the
border, Lucio Blanco originated the idea of selling
the lands of Felix Diaz to the peons of Tamauli
pas. He asked the engineers fighting under him to
survey the land in question and divide it into small
lots from ten to sixty acres. Then he offered them
at public auction, giving the preference to the sol
diers under his command. The effect was surpris
ing; peons came from everywhere to watch the pro
ceedings. Most of the land was sold to the highest
bidder at a very low price, on the installment plan,
with a small sum to be paid in cash. The most as
tonishing and significant result of the experiment
was that over 400 peons bought the land besides a
great many soldiers who, having acquired small
lots, refused to continue fighting. Their logic was
irrefutable: they had taken up arms to get back
the land and now that they were in possession of
it, why fight any longer?
The problem was perplexing in the extreme. If
all the generals in the revolution acted on the same

1 68 Carranza and Mexico
principle as Lucio Blanco then all the Constitution
alist soldiers would stop fighting.
This incident proves quite conclusively that the
revolution in Mexico is an economic more than a
political upheaval.
Carranza was informed of this land distribution
and its disastrous results in as far as it touched the
military question and the result was that Gen. Lucio
Blanco had to shift his command to the western
division under General Obregon.
In the State of Chihuahua General Villa began
a distribution of lands. Unlike General Blanco,
he went at the problem in a haphazard, personal
way. As the Terrazas were personal enemies of his
and owners of almost one-third of the State of Chi
huahua, he proclaimed the Terrazas estates confis
cated. The distribution was made among some of
his officer's, civilians on his staff and personal friends.
In Mexico wherever there is cultivation of any
kind there will be found a farmhouse (hacienda)
built like a fortress. The hacienda proper is a
small village, sometimes a small city in itself, con
taining the house of the proprietor, the manager,
the servants and the peons, a church, buildings for
gathering the crops, often a factory, enclosures or
stables for horses, cattle, sheep. The whole is
surrounded by a high and very thick wall which can
stand a prolonged siege and can defy capture by
armed forces. Everything for its protection is

Attempts at Solution of the Land Question 169
found within its walls : gatling guns, rifles, ammuni
tion, food, clothing, and even wells of water.
Formerly some of the haciendados were able to
arm and organize as many as 30,000 men under
their command from their haciendas.
Most of the haciendas are now in the hands of
the Revolutionists, generals, officers and peons who
work the farms for their own benefit.
Land without a farmhouse has not the same
value, as the farmer coming into a piece of land
would have to build a house, unless the land al
lotted to him happened to be near his abode. Be
sides, the haciendas contain everything needed for
the cultivation, such as plows, agricultural imple
ments, seeds, horses, cattle.
When Villa gave land away he incorporated with
it a farmhouse. In that sense he was creating an
other landed aristocracy to take the place of the
old one. Another factor which is important in the
land question is the climatic condition of the State.
In Chihuahua with the exception of the western part
the rest is dry and needs artificial irrigation to bring
satisfactory results. Artificial irrigation has to be
done by the State or the federal government and
cannot be carried on by private individuals unless
they are very rich or backed by capitalists or cor
porations. Most of the Terrazas estates thereupon fell into
the hands of a few scores of individuals instead of
one single family.

170 Carranza and Mexico
When it is taken into account that the population
of Chihuahua is about 405,500, it will be found that
the distribution of the land by Villa only touched
an infinitesimal percentage of the population. Even
if it is calculated that it is necessary that one-third
of the population of Chihuahua may be needed to
sustain the State by agriculture, then 135,000 peo
ple or a third of the State would have to come
into possession of land. Admitting that Villa
should succeed in giving away land to all the sol
diers and officers who have fought under him or
about 25,000 men, still there would be left over
110,000 landless peons who very likely would have
to go to work for the fortunate soldiers of the north
ern division. The peons could justly claim that the
revolution was fought for all the Mexicans and
especially for the peons and not solely for the sol
diers of the northern division.
The solution of the land question by Villa is
therefore unequitable and is likely to bring further
trouble. Zapata on the other side solved the problem in
the most drastic and so far in the most practical
manner. The State of Morelos is a very small State and
has a population of about 1 80,000 inhabitants. The
land is very fertile, needing no irrigation, as the
periodical rainy season and the rivers irrigating
the whole State makes the growth of every kind
of fruit trees, vegetables, coffee, sugar cane, to-

Attempts at Solution of the Land Question 171
bacco, corn, etc., luxuriant in the highest degree.
In fact several crops can be gathered every year.
Zapata did not only include the officers of his
staff and army in the land distribution but every sol
dier who had fought for him and every peon and
every family of peons in the State of Morelos.
In the case of the big sugar plantations Zapata
levied a ransom which was calculated on a certain
percentage of the profits; to feed, clothe and arm
his soldiers. The salaries of the workers were in
creased and the proprietor of the plantation was
protected against depredations and destruction. If
the sugar planter refused to pay, then his machinery,
the buildings and the crops were burned. The
constant threat of and fear of Zapata's army elim
inated the worst form of slavery: peonage.
The rest of the population was empowered to
appropriate and cultivate the land surrounding the
villages or near their dwellings.
In this fashion Zapata's soldiers were fed,
clothed and armed — every ablebodied man, every
peon had his rifle and his ammunition and was al
ways ready to fight the aggressions of the federal
army. Practically the whole male population be
tween the ages of twenty and thirty was under
arms; when the Federals were away it attended to
the crops; when soldiers invaded its territory they
were driven out of it or forced to keep within the
limits of the cities.
Without having any knowledge of French history

172 Carranza and Mexico
the Zapatistas followed in the footsteps of the
French revolutionists.
While the leaders Marat, Danton, Robespierre
were fighting their and their parties' supremacy and
eliminating one another with the assistance of the
guillotine; while the French armies were fighting
the foreign invaders, the French peasants after
burning a few chateaux and driving away the aris
tocratic landowners settled down to work the land
for their own profits. As long as the aristocrat
could not come back to claim the land, the peasant
cared not who ran the government. Napoleon was
able to become Emperor because he wisely left the
peasants in possession of lands which they had con
fiscated from the aristocrats.
In Mexico the identical thing has happened and
continues and will continue until some sort of gov
ernment will be created to satisfy the needs of the
country. The basis of future democracy in Mexico
will be founded on municipal self rule in all the
cities and rural settlements.
When that is a fact there will be little trouble
with the other branches of the government. The
landowners in most of the States have been driven
out and meanwhile the peons are working on the
land in Morelos as well as in most of the other
States. The rich haciendados have left and the
poor peons have stayed behind.
We hear only about battles, the capture of cities,
the ambitions of leaders, the quarrels among the

Attempts at Solution of the Land Question 173
generals, but we hear nothing at all of the peons
working to feed the 15,000,000 inhabitants in Mex
ico, of the thousands of artisans and workingmen
who help to complete the work of the farmer.
There may be 140,000 or 150,000 men under
arms in Mexico, but what is that in comparison to
the 15,000,000 people who continue to live with
out fighting, who have to be fed, clothed and even
amused? The longer the revolution lasts the hap
pier will be the lot of the average peons, for every
added day will decrease the chances of the reaction
ary landowner to come back and through legal
means deprive the Indian of this land.
The French revolution lasted almost ten years.
When the Bastille was stormed about 25,000 aris
tocrats and prelates owned all the land in France.
When Napoleon came into power as Emperor over
half a million people owned land in France.
In Mexico over 65,000 haciendados are in pos
session of the country, but a great majority of them
are not on their haciendas, many are in exile. The
revolution has lasted about four years. The longer
it lasts the more chances there are that the original
proprietors will stay away and the latifundiae will
be divided automatically. The peons are more in
terested in the ownership of the land than the ques
tion of peace, the ballot, or who is going to be presi
dent or governor; they are indifferent as to who
will loan or will not loan money to the Mexican
government; if the Mexican consols are rising or

174 Carranza and Mexico
dropping in value, as long as the haciendados keep
away long enough to give him a chance to claim
the land as his own. A little cultivation will give
him all the food he needs, what he does not need he
will sell and buy with it a few necessities.
For the success of the revolution it is vital that
it should continue until every reactionary element,
the clergy, the landowner, the army chiefs have
been so thoroughly beaten that they will have no
opportunity to come back and play a political game
of which they know all the tricks. The reaction
ary elements must be so fearful of the wrath of
the revolutionists, must be made so poor, that they
will never come back again.
Carranza is right and so is Cabrera when they
say that the land must be taken wherever it can be
found; that the revolutionists must carry out the
reforms with the power of their bayonets or they
will never be consummated. That those who speak
of a constitutional government and of elections are
the reactionaries who want to play the game and
arrest the triumphant march of the revolution.
Madero was elected constitutionally, so was a
congress, so were the senators and the governors.
The ministers sat in council. What happened to
the reforms of the plan of San Luis Potosi? Re
actionaries like Ernesto Madero and Rafael Her
nandez who sat in the cabinet for two years, very
effectively canned all the reforms. The revolution
had to be fought all over again.

Attempts at Solution of the Land Question 175
If Villa backed by the reactionary elements
should control the destinies of Mexico, then it would
be only a question of a few months until a new
revolution would overthrow his regime.
Revolutions are the maladies of nations, they can
not be arrested in their course with impunity, for
then the disease will crop out in a more virulent
form. Mexico at the end of the Diaz regime was as
feudal as France under Louis XVI. Mexico had
the aristocratic landowner, the political clergy and
the military chiefs as well as in France. They will
have to be eradicated as thoroughly as noxious
weeds from a field before cultivation. After a
while order will come out of chaos. Meanwhile
the peon is slowly coming into his own.

CHAPTER XVIII
BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE CARRANZA-VILLA
IMBROGLIO
' I kO make the story very short we could say that
******* Mexican and American reactionary interests
were behind Villa, in an endeavor to exclude Car
ranza as a factor in Mexican politics. But the
story will be more interesting and revealing if we
point out some of the methods used to engineer the
conspiracy. During the first six months of the revolution
against Huerta (1913), few authentic stories were
published about the revolution. Most of the news
came from Mexico City. There was no other po
litical personage who could get more space in the
first page of the newspapers than Victoriano
Huerta. In Europe, the oil interests very effectively si
lenced the press as to the progress of the revolu
tion; in Paris the press was bought outright.,
Although the American press cannot be bought,
there are ways of circumventing it and cheating it
of the truth. The Huertista press agents knowing
the curiosity of the American people, fed them with
176

GENERAL BENJAMIN HILL
(Defender of Naco), under General Obregon

Behind the Scenes 177
stories about Huerta, and with details of his of
ficial and unofficial actions, and more than once his
very thoughts were reported and published. The
refrain was always: No matter how bad Huerta
may be, he is nevertheless President de facto, — he
is the strongest man in Mexico and he should be
recognized. A Mexican and a foreign newspaper
man spent four thousand dollars a week on pub
licity work, while another supporter of Huerta is
known to have spent ten thousand dollars for the
same purpose.
The Huerta agents came in contact with the
felicista and cientifico agents, and they put their
heads together to devise a means of breaking up
the successful revolution. The reactionary junta
watched the events with keen interest. As soon as
Villa had proved his ability as a general, he was
chosen at once as the easiest and most convenient
tool to break up the harmony between the revolu
tionists. All the efforts were concentrated on Villa. He
was furnished with money, ammunition, friends
and advisers. Villa's sincerity, impulsiveness, his
violent temper and cruelty, his utter lack of
scruples and his ignorance, were splendid instru
ments in the hands of the past masters of intrigue.
On May 13th, 191 1, during a mutiny, Pascual
Orozco and Villa almost succeeded in murdering
Francisco I. Madero. This incident pointed out
to the cientifico element, the man who might be in-

178 Carranza and Mexico
duced to repeat, more successfully, the elimination
of another leader of the new revolution.
The Villa press agents began to fill the maga
zines and Sunday papers with romantic stories
about the bandit general, the Napoleon bandit, the
Washington, the Lincoln of Mexico. The life rec
ord of Villa, his personahty and ignorance, forbade
his ever becoming a presidential possibility. That
just suited the junta, as Villa's presidency would
have been fraught with too many dangers for the
cientifico element. Huerta worked very hard to
bring about a break between Villa and Carranza,
while he was in power, but he did not succeed.
Nevertheless, the work of corrosion and strife was
continued by the exiled huertistas, felicistas and
cientificos. During the summer of 19 13, the Villa publicity
reached its zenith. As much as two hundred dol
lars was paid to a writer to get a story on Villa
into a New York Sunday paper. At about that
time everybody began to suspect that Huerta would
resign. Carranza was approached by the interests
which had loaned money to Huerta, to discover if
he would recognize the loan, and as Carranza
would not countenance such a proposition, the for
eign interests united with the Huerta, felicista and
cientifico exiles, with the addition of some of the
Madero clan, to work together, against the Con
stitutionalists. Villa, with all his ability as a guerrilla general,

Behind the Scenes 179
became a marionette in the hands of politicians who
pulled the strings. Even the Aguascalientes Con
vention became a Punch & Judy show managed
from New York, and it was used as a convenient
lever to oust Carranza and place a puppet in his
stead. The original suggestion to acclaim Don F.
Iglesias Calderon as provisional president missed
fire, because of the refusal of that very fine and in
tegral personality to take orders from a single mili
tary division. Suggestions were telegraphed from
New York to the junta's representatives in Aguas
calientes, who, under the guise of radical counsel
lors, were really dictating what Villa should do.
In fact, all the interviews passed through the
hands of an American press agent of Villa, and his
manifestos, proclamations and letters were written
by the agents, and signed by Villa, who was abso
lutely ignorant of the contents of the documents.
The Aguascalientes convention was to be repre
sented by all the generals who had fought in the
revolution. Only one civilian was present: Luis
Cabrera. No soldiers outside of the personal
staffs of the generals were supposed to come near
Aguascalientes. Nevertheless, Villa sent ten thousand soldiers to
the city and had it surrounded by troops, while he
sat in a caboose on a railroad track at the outskirts.
For all practical and illegitimate purposes, the Con
vention was imprisoned — the deliberations were
not free and independent, and were not meant to be

180 Carranza and Mexico
so. Many generals who tried to escape outside
of the ring formed by Villa's soldiers were sent
back to the city; while others managed to slip
through and joined their commands.
A perusal of the cabinet members supposed to
be named by E. Gutierrez, shows that the list was
drawn up in New York. F. Iglesias Calderon, al
though perfectly honest and independent, stands
very high among the members of the Cientifico
Junta. He refused the honor of a portfolio.
Jose Vasconcelos is known to the American public
through the stolen Hopkins letters, where his name
was mentioned as a recipient of American oil money.
E. C. Llorente, who is to represent Gutierrez in
Washington, was a porfirista who plotted against
the Madero regime at the border.
One of the most important reasons for Villa's
caution in not rushing into a fight against Carran
za's generals, is that he did not feel strong enough
to cope against the constitutionalist forces. Fight
ing veteran Constitutionalists is a different propo
sition from fighting Huerta's raw recruits and ex-
convicts, or boys. The defection of Villa's best
generals, Generals Luis and Maclovio Herrera, and
the Arrieta brothers, could not be supplanted by
the support of J. M. Maytorena.
In his anxiety to fight Carranza, General Villa
went so far as to enlist many federal Huerta gen
erals, whom he had fought so bitterly and de
nounced so roundly, and who had escaped from

Behind the Scenes 181
Mexico in fear of Villa's wrath. Poor Villa
seemed unconscious of the fact that he was slowly
being surrounded by all the reactionary elements in
Mexico — the same element of which he was a con
spicuous victim during the Diaz regime. When
these interests that now surround him have achieved
their purpose, they will try to corrupt him, and if
they cannot buy him they will assassinate him.
Villa's blindness could not go any farther. No
reasoning, no arguments, no sense of patriotism or
decency can rouse such an innocent fool, and there
fore, force will have to decide once more the ques
tion of supremacy.
As Luis Cabrera said in a speech before the Con
vention, " In all probability, the only solution at
which the Aguascalientes Convention will arrive,
will be another war, another military action," the
name of Aguascalientes (hot waters), is very sig
nificant as to the trouble which the Convention has
brought Mexico face to face with.
The Cientifico-Huerta-Madero junta in New
York decided a few months ago that if Carranza
could not be eliminated through the Convention, he
could be forced out by another revolution within the
revolution proper.
When it was discovered that the appeal Villa had
sent out to the revolutionary generals on September
23d before the Convention, had not succeeded in
bringing about the desired result, it was decided to
induce the doubtful element in the Convention to

1 82 Carranza and Mexico
join in a supposedly legal procedure. After Car
ranza's resignation had been refused at the Conven
tion in Mexico, the delegates suggested the Aguas
calientes meeting as a means of settling all the ques
tions of reform. Villa's supporters, instead of
keeping to the business on hand, jammed through
the Gutierrez election, published the list of the Cab
inet members, and sent Carranza an ultimatum.
In this way they expected to give a legal appear
ance to their action, and thus accelerate the secession,
throwing the loyal Constitutionalists on the side of
the Villa contingent.
Neither Villa nor Zapata ever harbored the in
tention of handing over their forces to the generals
designated by the convention — their hope was that
Carranza might resign, and then they would con
trol the situation by the mere threat of force, backed
by their success.
It can be safely asserted that if Villa should suc
ceed, he would be the president maker, the virtual
dictator of Mexico. Then Villa and the cientifico
faction would fight for supremacy . . . and de
stroy each other.
However, no matter what the result of the strug
gle may be, the Mexican people are tired of
" strong men on horseback " and the succession of
a Villa tyranny would not be much more advan
tageous than a Huerta or Diaz dictatorship.
The Mexican people, the 15,000,000 who have
suffered so much from military liberators, will very

Behind the Scenes 183
effectively overthrow the pretorian rule of one or
more guerrilla czars, when they discover that the
strings are managed by Mexican and foreign reac
tionary interests.
Villa will only repeat Orozco's treachery and de
fection, and he will pay the price of his foolishness
and ignorance with the contempt and ostracism of
the real revolutionary element.

CHAPTER XIX
THE NEED OF A DEMOCRATIC FINANCE IN MEXICO
BY CHARLES FERGUSON
During the summer of 1914, while Mr. M. C. Rolland
was studying the financial system of the United States for
Carranza, he came in contact with Mr. Charles Ferguson,
who had devoted a year to investigating financial conditions
in Europe. Mr. Rolland suggested the need of a democratic
finance in Mexico, so as to liberate it from the financial
system left over by J. Y. Limantour. The Mexican and
the American investigators exchanged their views, and as
both were on mutual and sympathetic ground with a perfect
understanding of the subject, Mr. M. C. Rolland begged
Mr. Ferguson to crystallize his ideas into an article. The
following chapter is a simple outline of the idea which is
behind the revolutionary reforms of all vital questions in
Mexico. Mr. Charles Ferguson was for a time one of the leading
editorial writers of a well known Metropolitan paper. He
was sent abroad by President Wilson to investigate the
banking system of Europe. Mr. Ferguson is considered one
of the greatest authorities on the subject of finance and
banking in the United States.
JIJNDER the conditions of capitalistic and cor-
^ porate organization and of universal banking
and exchange that have spread throughout the
184

Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico 185
world during the last two or three generations, the
problem of democratic politics has become an en
tirely new problem. The old solutions, the ideas
of Rousseau, Jefferson, Juarez, have become, in
large part, inapplicable.
The change is mainly due to the strength of the
modern business organization. The business organ
ization tends to become stronger than the demo
cratic state, because it deals more directly with the
forces of nature and with the every day interests
of ordinary men.
Everywhere in Europe, in the modern States of
Asia and Africa, and in North and South America,
there is a struggle going on between the business
organization and the economic rights of the peo
ple. This world-wide struggle has shown its acutest
phases in Mexico.
The Mexican problem cannot be solved merely
by the establishment of land reform, a wide suf
frage and a representative parliament. These
things are good and necessary, but they are not
enough. If the banking and credit system of Mex
ico is left to settle back into the general lines ap
proved by Diaz and Limantour, or by the orthodox
financial opinion of Europe, the banks of Mexico
will contravene the work of the political revolution.
And since the revolution cannot be wholly
crushed, Mexico will continue to be a house divided
against itself, and wiU utterly exhaust itself in a con-

1 86 Carranza and Mexico
tinuing series of revolutions and counter-revolu
tions. The modern business system centres in the bank.
If the democratic revolution is to prevail and stand
fast, the business system of Mexico must be de
mocratized. It is impossible to make business
democratic otherwise than by making the bank
democratic. The leaders of the Mexican revolution shall seize
upon the control of the capitalistic forces of the
country. This can be done by improvising — per
haps by executive decree, perhaps otherwise — a
central bank and a banking system that shall mo
nopolize the banking function.
The existing banking systems of the world are in
general based upon public debts and are motived
in their operation by the interest of a creditor class.
Mexico should have a banking system based first,
upon the property rights of the nation — the sum
of the material values that belong not to individuals
but to the Commonwealth; second, upon a capital
ization of the productive powers of the people to
the extent that these can be developed by the civiliz
ing projects of the bank.
Under existing banking systems the National es
tate is either not represented at all or else stands
as debtor or claimant on a footing no higher than
that of private estates. But the bank of the revo
lution should be the responsible legal trustee of the
public estate, exclusively devoted to the improve-

Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico 187
ment of that estate — i.e., to the betterment of the
material status of common citizenship.
Under most banking systems the bankers have
no direct interest or concern with the development
of the natural and creative resources of a country.
Their interest in the processes of production is at
best indirect and incidental. What the bankers aim
at is the accumulation of certificates of indebtedness
against society at large. They are indeed con
cerned that the assets of Society at large shall equal
its liabilities. But they make no effort and take no
risk for the enrichment of society beyond bare
solvency. The general tendency of their finance is to load
the working organization of the world with as heavy
a weight of bond and mortgage as it will stand, and
to vest the ownership of the securities in a compara
tively small class of creditors.
The unsocial and unscientific character of the
world's banking systems is the main cause of that
universal conflict between the business organization
and the democratic state, which has reached its most
poignant crisis in Mexico. If Mexico can work out
a congruity between modern business organization
and the economic rights of the people, it will solve
the essential social problem of our times. It will
win economic leadership in the family of nations.
It will achieve unparalleled wealth and power.
The bank of the revolution should be governed
by a board of directors, got together with a mini-

1 88 Carranza and Mexico
mum of racial bias in the spirit — let us say — of
the university — that is, of the arts and sciences.
There should be a dozen men, more or less, hav
ing the highest reputation and credit as engineers,
agriculturists, sanitarians, administrators, and so on.
They should be paid perhaps on the scale of Cab
inet Ministers, but should derive no other income
from Mexican sources. Their control of the bank
should be disinterested and impersonal — like that
of men in high public office.
Fvery detail of the banking business will undergo
a marked change because of this change of motive.
Yet there need be no serious division of opinion as
to the financial technique that will best promote the
new purpose.
The changes of practice concerning discount rates,
note issues, metallic reserves, etc., will follow log
ically and obviously from the conception that the
business of the bank is not the accumulation of en
forceable claim against the public, but rather the
husbanding of the public estate.
Banking, under any and all systems, is chiefly
a matter of exchanging specific personal claims for
general social claims. The bank receives personal
debt-certificates and gives back certificates of social-
debt or documentary claims against society at large.
Personal credits at the bank are, in effect, charges
against the public. Sound banking consists in not
overcharging the public.
The mystery that shrouds all banking problems

Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico 189
is due to the obscuring of the fundamental fact that
banking has become, under modern conditions, the
most vital social function; it determines the obliga
tions owed by society to the individual and so fixes
every man's status and power.
It is absurd that such a social function should be
performed without social responsibility and solely
for the sake of a speculative private profit. The
proposal is, therefore, that the revohition shall es
tablish in Mexico the first banking system in the
world deserving to be called modern. For no ex
cellence of banking machinery can atone for the
fact that throughout the whole circle of commerce,
private credits and the corresponding public obliga
tions are being measured and registered by men
whose interest is quite separate from that of the
public. The proposed identification of the banking in
terest with the public interest does not necessarily
imply that banks should be administered by political
officials. It is indeed necessary, as an exigency of the
revolution, that the new bank of Mexico should be
backed by the highest political authority. But the
real point is that modern banking will reach a nor
mal development only when banking has become a
responsible profession — in the analogy of law and
medicine at their highest level. In the long run it
will be found that a sound, democratic, financial sys
tem is to be regarded as the creator rather than the
creature of democratic government.

190 Carranza and Mexico
The new Mexican government should take its
bank managers from any quarter — as one might
choose world-famous engineers or physicians to con
quer a devastating plague, or to accomplish a con
structive public work of extraordinary difficulty.
These men should be chartered as directors of a
corporation to set up a central banking institution
in the City of Mexico and a system of branch banks
in provincial towns. The basic capital of the bank
should be a trust deed executed by the Mexican
Government and conveying to the banking corpora
tion such portions of the national estate as are not
needed for the administrative uses of the govern
ment. The State would, of course, retain its right
to annul if necessary the bank charter and trust
deed — after reasonable notice and with due adjust
ment of the equities involved.
The Bank should be the general fiscal and eco
nomic agent of the Government for the enhancement
of its revenues, the funding and amortizing of out
standing public debts and the development of the
wealth of the country.
Through the bank, the government should take
good care of the soldiers of the revolution — giving
them possession of lands on easy terms and assist
ance in capitalizing farms and small business under
takings. Legal means should be taken to cancel or com
pound uneconomic commercial concessions made to
foreigners and other private persons by reactionary

Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico 191
governments in the past. The inordinate foreign
profits derivable from such concessions might be
scaled down by a system of export duties.
It should be understood that the new bank in all
its branches is not to be regarded as a passive or
merely regulative factor in the economics of Mex
ico. It should, on the contrary, embody the highest
possible organization of intelligence and will for
the expansion of the productive life of the people.
Much may be learned for this purpose from a study
of the working methods of the Deutsche Bank of
Berlin.

CHAPTER XX
CARRANZA'S FOREIGN POLICY REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE NATIONAL SPIRIT
FROM the beginning of the Constitutionalist revo
lution the attitude of Carranza as the first
Chief toward the Foreign Powers, was very bitterly
criticised. His uncompromising stand as regards
the European nations was corroborated by inter
views given out to the press. Several reasons can
be given for Carranza's conduct as well as for the
criticisms. The first one is that Foreign Cabinets,
Ministers and Consuls have been so used to the
servile, cowardly and undignified behavior of Diaz
and his Ministers toward Foreign Representatives
that the proud, independent behavior of Carranza
and his Ministers was a shock to European courts.
The foreign policy of the Great Powers towards
small and weak nations, with the exception of the
United States, has been as a rule, that of polite bul
lies and buccaneers. Great nations committed po
litical acts, which private individuals would not dare
perpetrate. If the average standard of the indi
vidual has been raised, that of the nations in their
international policy, has advanced very little from
the times of the cave dwellers. 192

Carranza's Foreign Policy 193
Mexico being weak and torn by civil war since
the inception of her independence, has always suf
fered as much, if not more, from foreigners, than
from her own enemies. The French in the thirties
and sixties, the Americans in the forties, the Span
iards intermittently, have brought trouble to Mex
ico. The Mexicans are always suspicious of the
international policy of the European powers.
When Huerta committed murder in the persons
of the President and Vice-President of Mexico,
France, England, Germany and Spain rushed to
recognize him, so anxious were they to get in at the
trough of concessions. It was this conscienceless,
greedy, sordid behavior which disgusted Carranza
in particular, and Mexicans in general. No action
in the history of the United States has created more
sympathy for the feared Yankees in Mexico and
South America, than the refusal of the recognition
of Huerta on moral grounds. Carranza's refusal
to give an account or to allow Villa to permit an
investigation into the murders of Benton and
Bauche, was correct from an international stand
point. England, who had so hastily recognized the
murderer of a Mexican President and Vice-Presi
dent, became very indignant at the murder of a nat
uralized Britisher who got into trouble through his
own fault, and expected the United States to de
mand satisfaction for it. Carranza, as the first
Chief, insisted that England should protest to him,
as the representative of the revolution, not to Villa

194 Carranza and Mexico
or the United States. The attitude of England,
France, Germany and Spain towards Mexico, was
very arrogant and insulting; their protests to the
United States were quite expressive of their anx
iety to have the United States intervene and police
Mexico in the same manner as had been done in
Cuba. The European powers were quite too busy watch
ing their own frontiers to embark on a foolish expe
dition like the threatened march and occupation of
Mexico City by the allied powers. The American
papers came out time after time announcing the land
ing of European marines in Mexico, in case that the
United States should not deem it expedient to pro
tect their interests. Any one familiar with Eu
ropean politics could have guessed that the alarmist's
warning came either from the innermost circles of
the American military clique which had been itching
for intervention for the last four years, or from for
eign chancellorships who wanted to frighten the
United States into a war with Mexico.
The European powers foreboded a general con
flagration at the end of 19 14. Some of them felt
that the northern republic should do their police
work in Mexico while they would be busy fighting
for their own existence in Europe ; others more char
itably inclined, hoped that the United States might
easily get into a wasps' nest, by intervening in Mex
ico, — especially as Japan stood on the other side of
the Pacific, as a warning of the brown peril, and as

Carranza's Foreign Policy 195
a sympathetic, though selfish supporter of Mexican
integrity. In spite of contrary assertions, Mexican
statesmen and level-headed thinkers dread an Amer
ican invasion into their country; be it for the pur
pose of conquest or an unselfish police-work.
A military offensive or defensive alliance with
Japan is much more dreaded by the Mexicans than
an American intervention. The American Colos
sus, as the United States is called, does not represent
the brutal, military, imperialistic methods of the
Japanese, but a danger of elimination by military
conquest or absorption by political, commercial, and
financial attrition and suction.
All the Mexican politicians, writers and states
men fear American meddling in their internal af
fairs, and although their admiration for the United
States and its greatness is unbounded, nevertheless,
their patriotism is still greater than their neighborly
love. The whole spirit of South America, south of
the Rio Grande, is not Spanish nor Indian — the
spirit is essentially latin and gallic. The mental at
titude of the Zapotec Indian Juarez was neither
Iberian nor Aztec, but essentially of the roman type
of the republic.
The intellectual radicalism of the liberals, Gomez
Farias, Melchior Ocampo, Leandro del Valle, was
of the same pattern as that of the French revolu
tionary Jacobins — the clearest, most advanced and
progressive ideas in politics have been absorbed from
Gallic and Latin sources. The French revolution,

196 Carranza and Mexico
the Napoleonic epos, are the text books of the lib
erals and the ambitious politicians. Roman and
French history was admired and unconsciously imi
tated. The one for the civic virtues, courage and
greatness of its citizens, — the other for the daring,
patriotism and intellectual clearness of its most
prominent men.
Spanish history and philosophy is a closed book to
Mexican thinkers — for Spanish thought was always
in the rear guard of intellectual Europe. The
Spanish spirit is found in reactionary types, like Lu
cas Alaman, — the Don Quixotic characteristic in a
Lopez de Santa Ana, — the Castilian cruelty in a
Miguel Marquez. As a Mexican writer once said:
" Spain has brought us only priests, money-lenders,
bull-fighters and dancers."
Americans were astonished at the outburst of
hatred made manifest in the persecution of Spanish
priests in Mexico, and Spaniards in general, espe
cially in the State of Morelos, by Zapata, and the
deportation of Spaniards in Chihuahua by Villa.
They do not know that the Spaniards have always
been on the side of the dictators, the oppressors,
never with the liberators, and that the active co-op
eration of Spaniards in politics has outlawed them.
After the assassination of Madero and Suarez, the
Spaniards in Vera Cruz gave a banquet in honor of
the tragedy. The Mexicans are not likely to forget
this incident. The Mexicans of the middle class and
the Indians despise the Spaniards. On the other

Carranza's Foreign Policy 197
hand, they do not dislike the Americans, but they
dread the proximity of the Colossus, and the con
stant threats of American armed invasion.
The American public was shocked by the reported
cruelties of the revolutionists in Durango, and other
captured cities. Many reports were exaggerated,
but the Durango stories were utterly false. Several
Americans who came to New York after the capture
of Durango declared that they had witnessed the
entry of the Constitutionalist soldiers, and their be
havior in Durango, and could vouch for the inac
curacy of the news — not only in the general outline,
but in all its details.
The American public, as well as the editors in the
American press, did not suspect then that Huerta
had press agents in New York, who made it a point
of disseminating false reports about the revolution
ists, so as to discredit the movement and pave the
way for recognition of Huerta. Governor Hunt, of
Arizona, wrote a letter to the first Chief, protesting
against the alleged cruelties. Venustiano Car
ranza answered, and the following letter is quoted
as a fair example of the attitude of the Chief and the
Mexican revolutionists on the question of retaliations
and shooting of prisoners. Hermosillo, November 27th, 1913.
Governor George W. P. Hunt,
Phoenix, Arizona.
Esteemed Sir and Friend:
I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your interesting

198 Carranza and Mexico
letter of the 17th inst., written on account of the occupation
of Ciudad Juarez by the Constitutional forces under the
immediate command of General Francisco Villa, — and to
manifest to you my gratitude for the kind phrases which
you express in same, regarding myself.
Recognizing with pleasure in the spirit of frank friend
ship which animated your letter, the personal sympathy of
yourself and of the people of the United States for the strug
gle of civilization and justice, which we are sustaining, I
can only lament that a not entirely perfect knowledge of
the peculiar conditions of the Mexican problems may be
propitious in certain cases (and in spite of that excellent
disposition) to a bad intelligence of some of our acts.
This is probably due to the fact that the criminal acts
with which the struggle was initiated, and the cruel proceed
ings employed to sustain it, have been forgotten. When
Mexico had realized the highest democratic prerogative to
elect its mandataries, and we had the right to expect in the
midst of peace and tranquillity, the periodical renovation of
the public powers, for the expression of the national will
only, the most corrupt balance of the conquered classes have
tried to destroy our political institutions for all time and
by violence or force only have they disposed of the life, the
rights and interests of our countrymen. They have perpe
trated bloody executions without subjection to any law; they
assassinate the Constitutionalists who fall wounded, bat
tling with arms for the liberty of the people, — and depu
ties and senators who defend our democratic institutions by
word, they drag peaceful men and even children from their
homes, obliging them to take up arms against us, and instil
terror throughout, burning entire towns. It has been crimes
of this nature which have made the cause that I represent,
constitute not only a corrective political revolution but also

Carranza's Foreign Policy 199
that it should have the character of an act of peace, and
severe justice which will chastise the guilty, and provide for
the salvation of the Mexican family.
To fill these purposes, within the spirit of our Constitu
tion, without any sentiment of passion, but meditating with
reflection up to what point clemency and magnanimity can
arrive, before an imperious duty of justice and the high neces
sity of assuring peace and the future of the nation, I have
determined that the law of Juarez of January 25th, 1862,
which defines and chastises crimes against the public peace,
shall be put into force.
With strict subjection to that pre-existent law, the Huerta
officials were tried and executed, among whom were some
who had been apprehended in Torreon by the same General
Villa who, in addition to pardoning them, then acceded to
the fact that they should become incorporated in our forces,
in which they tried later, but in vain, to make the men
whose command was entrusted to them, desert — they finally
running away, in order to relapse into their crimes.
It is true that the principles established in international
wars agree to give pardon and immunity to the prisoners,
but in civil struggles the most civilized nations in all epochs
have employed proceedings still more rigorous and bloody
than those which we have been obliged to adopt. In the
case of executions of officials in Ciudad Juarez, the chastise
ment according to the law, of delinquents against peace and
public security must be viewed, as a just punishment, rather
than a cruelty to prisoners of war.
The Mexican people, exhausted in the first phase of this
civil war, headed by Francisco I. Madero, all their clem
ency and all their pardon, experiencing as only fruits of this
magnanimity, tyranny in the interior and the loss of pres
tige in the exterior. To-day it wishes to assure the opera-

200 Carranza and Mexico
tion of its institutions and re-establish peace for all time,
by means of a definite and official guarantee of a national
organism. The events of Ciudad Juarez have been very far from
revesting the individual importance which the intemperance
of our enemies have wished to give it, in the same manner
as was calumnious the statement published by them, that in
Durango more than forty women and young girls commit
ted suicide, for fear of the excesses of the Constitutionalists,
as I could personally verify that in Durango, as in all parts,
our forces have been disciplined and respectable, giving guar
antees to the towns which have fallen into their power.
Before concluding, it gives me great satisfaction to advise
you that I am animated by the same sentiments of humanity
that you possess, and that if I have placed the law of Juarez
in force, in respect to an exigency of national sentiment, of
justice, of public convenience, and the necessity of bringing
peace to my country, — I have at the same time tried to have
this law applied to unscrupulous enemies within the limits of
the most absolute necessity, always authorizing pardon and
immunity to the unconscious ones.
I hope the preceding declarations will be sufficient to es
tablish the attitude of the well understood justice and hu
manity of the Constitutionalists, in order not to detract the
personal sympathy and favorable opinion of the North Amer
ican people from our cause, and you may be sure that I shall
take into consideration your noble ideas, in order to recom
mend greater clemency toward our enemies, always within
the respect of the law.
Assuring you of my highest estimation and respect, and
asking that you will consider me an affectionate and sincere
friend, I remain,
(Signed) V. Carranza.

Carranza's Foreign Policy 201
It would be too much to have asked of the revolu
tionists to pardon and release the federal officers
captured by them. The experiment was tried, and
every time they repeated their treacheries, cruelties
and infamies. They were trained in the school of
Diaz and Huerta — with few exceptions they were
men without conscience, honor or patriotism. They
represented militarism in its lowest, most despicable
and sordid form. A federal officer who had been
fighting in Morelos against Zapata was interviewed
on his arrival in New York. He asserted candidly
that the only manner to eradicate the land problem
in Morelos consisted in killing the whole male pop
ulation of the State and that any other solution was
Utopian. When the American marines landed in Vera Cruz,
the news caused a sensation in Mexico. A gentle
man who was present at the headquarters of Car
ranza describes the excitement of all the Mexican
civilians as well as the soldiers in the camp. With
out a doubt it was the most critical moment of the
revolution; everybody was discussing the news and
the agitation was intense. The only calm and cool
person was Carranza ; he was sitting immobile and
silent, looking straight ahead, without seeing any
body or paying attention to the noise, bustle, gesticu
lations and the shouts of the people.
He was thinking very hard and the only gesture
which gave a clue to his agitation was a slow move
ment of the hand, stroking his beard in a mechanical

202 Carranza and Mexico
fashion. When the Carranza protest was published
there was like an universal sigh of relief after a tense
situation. The Mexicans felt that Carranza had embodied
in his protest their outraged sense of national dignity
and pride.
The protest was a safety valve which prevented a
dangerous national explosion. Huerta, who had
cunningly contrived to bring about American inter
vention, worked feverishly to use this patriotic
wave, and to attract it under his guidance in a for
eign war, which would save him and his army from
annihilation. In the United States many persons were disgusted
at what they called the ingratitude of Carranza.
They forgot to enquire if Carranza had asked for in
tervention, and that an unbidden gift is an unwelcome
gift. They should have demanded the thanks of
Huerta instead. Subsequent events have proven the
assertion of Mexican observers that the occupation
of Vera Cruz by the Americans, instead of helping
the revolution, assisted in keeping Huerta several
months longer in power.
Vera Cruz could easily have been captured by the
revolutionists, and Huerta would have hastened to
flee by the way of Puerto Mexico. The occupation
of Vera Cruz by the Americans prevented the revo
lutionists from attacking the railroad connecting
Mexico City with Puerto Mexico, — as Vera Cruz
had to be used as a base. If the occupation of Vera

Carranza's Foreign Policy 203
Cruz was achieved to prevent the cargo of war ma
terial of the Ypiranga from reaching Huerta, then it
failed in the purpose. It did not accelerate the res
ignation of the dictator, nor did it calm the Mexican
troubled waters.
If, as it is tlaimed, the occupation of Vera Cruz
was the climax or punishment for a series of insults
to Americans, and the upholding of national honor,
would it not have been more in keeping with mili
tary traditions to capture or sink Mexican gunboats
in the Atlantic and Pacific without attempting to land
marines in any port, and to blockade both coasts of
Mexico ?
The ABC Peace Commission would have ar
rived at Niagara Falls by the same road and
achieved the same results. The meddling in Mex
ico would not have cost the American tax payers five
million dollars. The most charitable description of
the incident is that it was a hasty and costly blunder
of the Navy Department.
Let us put ourselves in the place of the Mexicans
themselves. The touchiness of their national pride
and their dignity is well known, as well as that their
patriotism and love of country is as great as that of
the greatest nation. Why criticise a characteristic
of a weak nation which is considered a virtue in a
strong one?
Consider for instance the question as applied to
the United States. If during the Civil War British
marines had landed and occupied New Orleans for

204 Carranza and Mexico
some reason or other, what would have happened?
Would the northerners have protested against Brit
ish intervention, or acclaimed it? Would not the
northerners as well as the southerners have fought
British occupation?
If it is a question of the Monroe Doctrine, we beg
to differ — the Monroe Doctrine, to reach its high
est value as a political tenet, should work both ways,
— in the interests of the United States as well as
Central and South America. If the Monroe Doc
trine is expedient, in the case of the United States,
it should be acceptable to Latin America. Latin
America rebels against a one-sided view of the Mon
roe Doctrine.
When Villa gave out his interview on the occu
pation of Vera Cruz, he was evidently inspired by
his American adviser and Mephisto. He was giv
ing out the American side of the question, — not the
Mexican. Unconsciously Villa acted as Porfirio
Diaz or any other Cientificos would have done, if
they had been in his place. Carranza represents the
Mexican people, although Carranza has never been
anything but a friend and admirer of the United
States. It must be considered that no true friend
ship can exist without self-respect on Mexico's side
and mutual respect on both sides.
The occupation of Vera Cruz has been a source
of irritation for the Mexican and American, and a
constant element of danger. It was a mistake which
turned into a costly blunder.

CHAPTER XXI
PRESIDENT WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICY
' I ''HE attitude of President Wilson towards the
****** Huerta regime was attacked not only in the
European press but likewise in the American news
papers. The French, German, English and Span
ish daily and weekly papers sneered at what they
dubbed the moral policy of a puritan school teacher.
The American papers were divided in their opin
ion; the Republican organs laughed at the reversal
of their beloved " dollar diplomacy," and many so-
called Democratic papers attempted to uphold the
blustering " big stick " policy. With the exception
of the labor and socialistic press there was a great
deal of doubt and misgivings expressed as to the out
come of the new diplomacy.
Even the average American, who is always on the
side of justice and fair play, was rather taken back
by this radical departure in American and foreign
relations. For American diplomacy, although usu
ally equitable, always took into consideration the in
terests of the Americans in a foreign country first
and last, even if they clashed with the fundamental
rights of the natives.
In the case of American interests in Mexico, it
205

206 Carranza and Mexico
was long suspected they had been playing politics
and throwing their all powerful influence in favor
of the government which could give them the best
advantages in a business way, which were in oppo
site relation to the liberal principles and the welfare
of the majority of the Mexicans.
The great corporations have always received ex
traordinary favors from dishonest governments.
The mining and oil syndicates, the railroad and land
concessionaires, acquired great privileges and gave
very little in return for them. For example, an
American oil company in Mexico made as high
as 450 per cent, profit on its original investment
and doubled the selling price of oil and gaso
line. As soon as an English company invaded the
field they fought each other for a while, then realiz
ing that it was an expensive affair which redounded
to the benefit of the Mexican consumer, they came
to an agreement by dividing the territory among
themselves and right away the price of oil and gaso
line went up again.
Scores of cases can be cited to prove that all the
advantages are in favor of foreign investors. The
salaries of the Mexican workingman or peons are
not raised, but the prices of commodities are never
lowered. The great Orizaba cotton mills, all the
factories, the great mining corporations have always
paid the lowest salaries. Whenever there was a
strike for higher wages or for better conditions, the
Diaz and Huerta regimes always protected the for-

President Wilson's Mexican Policy 207
eigners and at the slightest pretext massacred the
strikers. In the rare cases when the government was
fair to the strikers, as happened under Madero and
Carranza, then the foreign investors protested to
their governments that their interests were in danger
of destruction.
With the Mexican laborer and peons it has be
come a conviction that foreign interests are always
on the side of dictators as against the Mexican peo
ple. In Central and South America the new demo
cratic policy was watched with keen interest; the
Latin Americans shrewdly guessed that the attitude
of the Democratic administration would be a test
stone of their relations with the State Department.
So much had been written about the famous Mon:
roe Doctrine by successive American statesmen that
the original meaning of this doctrine had been en
tirely lost to view.
The original Monroe doctrine was uttered as a
warning to the Holy Alliance in its well known de
signs to attempt the reconquest of the provinces lost
by Spain.
The Monroe doctrine was never meant to be an
excuse to coUect debts for American or foreigners
or a pretext to police unruly republics.
With the exception of some Central American
States there has never been a case in a hundred years
when South America and Mexico could not cope suc
cessfully against foreign invaders.
As far back as 1806-07 England attempted to

208 Carranza and Mexico
conquer Argentina and Uruguay when they were still
under Spanish rule. The Spaniards and the natives
fought very bravely and repelled the invaders, who
had already occupied Buenos-Ayres. The native
South Americans did not intend to exchange ma.sters
and soon afterwards they overthrew the Spaniards.
In the early forties France fought the Argentinian
dictator Rozas, but after a two years' war she was
defeated. Later, in 1845, France and England pre
tended that Rozas should open the interior rivers to
international navigation. Buenos-Ayres was block
aded and the war lasted for five years; but England
and France were defeated.
Brazil and Argentina tried to conquer the little
republic of Paraguay. The war lasted five years
( 1 865-70) . The result was that forty-five per cent.
of the male population was killed in battle, but
Paraguay was not conquered.
The Latin American republics feel that they can
take care of themselves, and their nationality against
their neighbors as well as against Europe. No mat
ter what the ambitions, intentions or plans of con
quests of certain European powers may be they know
fully well that there is not the slightest chance for a
permanent occupation by European armies, and that
any conquest by any Asiatic or European nation is
an absurd dream.
It is understood that the Monroe doctrine was
once a very useful moral protection, but it did
not prevent attacks and occupation of South Ameri-

President Wilson's Mexican Policy 209
can territory by Spain, France and England. The
only reason which interfered with the territorial de
signs of European powers was not the help of the
United States, when it was most needed, but the
heroic resistance of the Latin American nations
themselves. The fear is rampant that the Monroe
doctrine might be used as a pretext for aggression by
the United States.
Latin Americans follow this line of argument; the
great American corporations can invest a great deal
of money in South America. They can very easily
send agents to foment revolutions which necessarily
would destroy American property and then a pre
text would be found for American intervention, as
happened in Nicaragua.
There is a very short step from temporary to
permanent occupation, tending to create a very dan
gerous precedent in favor of American occupation
in any country where there is a great deal of invested
American capital.
The thought was expressed by a great many South
American statesmen that President Wilson's Mexi
can policy would be a good illustration of the future
policy towards South America. At the beginning
the expressions of neutrality and non-intervention in
the internal affairs of Mexico were considered rather
suspiciously. Had the President of the United States declared
war on Mexico and sent troops to Mexico City on
any pretext whatsoever, the Latin American nations

210 Carranza and Mexico
would have closed their doors to American capital,
commerce, and would have boycotted American
goods. The thought would have always been pres
ent that the Americans would always use their in
terests as a wedge for interference in their national
affairs. The entrance of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in
a solution of the Mexican-American incident at Tam
pico was a characteristic move exemplifying the new
trend of thought on statesmanship in Washington.
Under a republican administration, England,
France and Germany would have been asked to set
tle the question with the United States instead of the
ABC powers. Without fear of contradiction it
can be stated that Argentina, Brazil and Chile's en
trance into Pan American affairs with the co-opera
tion of the United States proves that the State De
partment has finally learned the A B C of Pan Amer
ican statesmanship. Likewise, that the Monroe
doctrine can only reach its highest efficiency in co
operation with the whole of America from Pata
gonia to Canada.
When the Americans create a Pan American doc
trine, then there is no doubt that Europe will not
dare to challenge it.
At present a challenge to the Monroe doctrine
is in reality a challenge to the American navy. With
a new Pan American doctrine the challenge would
include all Latin American countries, with the United
States and Canada in an offensive and defensive al-

President Wilson's Mexican Policy 211
liance against one or more European powers. At
present it appears as if the defence of the territorial
integrity of all America was shouldered upon the
United States alone. The Latin Americans feel that
they should have a share of this responsibility, for
they believe themselves capable and ready to do
so. There was a great deal of excitement and indigna
tion in South America when the American marines
landed in Vera Cruz. Huerta was not made more
popular by this incident, but the national instinct of
preservation of the Latin races made them uncon
sciously understand that the landing of American
blue jackets was only a wedge to achieve American
occupation and that as long as Vera Cruz was occu
pied, it was only a question of time until American
soldiers would march to Mexico City.
When Roosevelt was in South America he was
feted and banqueted by the most prominent men in
the ABC republics. They were too polite to in
form him what they thought of his speeches on the
Monroe doctrine. The articles and editorials com
menting Roosevelt's theories were very plain if
courteous: that either Mr. Roosevelt had forgotten
the original meaning of the Monroe doctrine or that
he was deceiving himself into an imperialistic mean
ing of the doctrine.
The Latin Americans and Mexico hope fervently
that the unselfish, humanitarian and democratic
diplomacy of President Wilson will bear the brunt

212 Carranza and Mexico
of the tremendous influences that are brought to
bear upon it.
It is a well known platitude that certain American
mining, railroad and oil interests are subterraneously
working against this idealistic policy; that the War
Department has been itching for a war of conquest
or police work in Mexico. An officer of the United
States army in an expansive moment volunteered
the information that intervention in Mexico would
mean an increase from 80 ,to 350,000 men in the
American army and make it possible to organize it
more in proportion with its population. That there
being always a danger of a war with Japan, and the
United States not being ready for it, a war with
Mexico would prepare the army for that eventu
ality. President Wilson has more admirers in Mexico
and South America than any other President or
statesman in the whole history of the United States
has ever had, not even excepting the martyr Presi
dent Lincoln, or Washington.
The popular thought has been deeply imbedded
with the conviction that if the dictator Huerta could
not exasperate and inveigle President Wilson into a
war with Mexico, that no power for evil can achieve
the purpose in the future.
Far seeing Mexicans did not expect a prompt so
lution of the vital problems after the elimination of
Huerta. The dictator was only the greatest im
pedimenta to a realization of liberal ideals; once

President Wilson's Mexican Policy 213
Huerta eliminated the work was a little less ardu
ous, but still of tremendous purport.
The participation of England, France and Ger
many in a struggle for life in Europe has luckily re
lieved Mexico of three great mischief makers. The
great and sombre powers which have kept Mexico in
a turmoil for a hundred years are still at work: the
clericals, the landowners and the militarists; in the
last twenty years the American interests have been
added to the list.
A Mexican thinker concreted the thought thus:
" The great powers for evil in Mexico are : The
Church, the Latifundiae and the Trusts; their great
victims will be President Wilson, Carranza and the
Mexican people."

REFLECTIONS
In the beginning of the revolution against Diaz,
as public opinion seemed to be favorable to what
was called " The Great Constructive Work of
Diaz," there was a vague and superficial impression
that the United States should repeat the policy which
had been inaugurated toward Cuba; a sort of po
litical tutelage which left the independence of the
island in the hands of the natives.
Subsequent events have revealed to the Americans
that although the Mexicans were still groping for
a Constitution more in keeping with their racial char
acteristics, that they had had, in opposition to Cuba,
which gained its independence from Spain in 1908,
a national history for one hundred years, with great
national heroes, martyrs and political ideals which
could not be infringed and trespassed upon by an
uncalled for intervention in their internal affairs.
Thoughtful and well-informed statesmen and poli
ticians have come to the conclusion that a political
tutelage as in Cuba will never be tolerated in Mex
ico, any more than military aggression for the sake
of conquest, or under the hypocritical name of peace.
The average American knows that a Mexican war
would be a war without heroes or glory for Amer
ican arms. 214

Reflections 215
The Mexicans are intensely grateful to President
Wilson for insisting on keeping hands off in Mexico.
The internal struggle of the liberals fighting against
the reactionary powers in Mexico must be settled by
the Mexicans themselves, or it will have to be set
tled all over again.
The impression of a great many Americans is
that Mexico is going towards political disruption,
that is to say, a secession into three entities: the
North, the Centre and the South.
Northern secession is encouraged by the great min
ing, oil, railroad, and land interests in the United
States and by the reactionaries in Mexico. South
ern secession is not only encouraged, but fomented,
by the ambitious and able dictator of Guatemala.
The northern republic would comprise the bor
der states, as well as Lower California, which, even
if independent, would be more friendly to the United
States than a united Mexico. That is the convic
tion of those interested in a Northern secession.-
A Southern republic would mean the absorption
of the States of Yucatan, Campeche, Tabasco, Chia
pas, and the Territory of Quintana Roo, under the
leadership and hegemony of Guatemala.
Working towards that end, and in co-operation
with the Guatemalan dictator, is a gentleman in the
State Department, who was. once U. S. representa
tive in Guatemala.
American interests are allied with the Mexican in-

216 Carranza and Mexico
terests, whereas, the American radicals, socialists
and the labor party are in sympathy with the Mex
ican liberals. The American and Mexican capital
ists are opposed to the American and Mexican mid
dle class and proletariat.
The same class trouble is going on in the Church
in Mexico. The native Mexican clergy is opposed
to the high or foreign clergy. All the oppressions,
cruelties, and treacheries in the fight of the clericals
against the liberals have emanated from the foreign
or high clergy, which used the military element for
that purpose. The unselfish, libertarian struggle on
the other hand, was always actively assisted by the
native priests; by men like Morelos and Hidalgo.
The poor Mexican priest, or better said, the low
Mexican clergy, is first a Mexican, and if that agrees
with his belief, he will be a good Catholic; but if
his faith is pitted against the welfare of his country,
then he will invariably prefer to be a good Mexican
and a poor Catholic, to being a poor Mexican and
an obedient Catholic.
The higher clergy in the United States, by attack
ing the liberal policies in Mexico, and waging an ac
tive campaign against the Mexican revolutipnists,
is placing itself in direct opposition to the lower
Mexican clergy.
From the Mexican point of view, three principles
have been laid down to face and combat American

Reflections 217
aggression, or absorption. The elimination of
predatory American capital, the curtailment of Amer
ican immigration schemes, and the advancement of
European immigration. American methods, on the
other hand, will be encouraged in all the active ex
pressions of life, such as business organizations,
farming and school methods.
There is no doubt that ten years of a complete
and practical rural school system in Mexico will
change the whole social and political character of the
republic. The advancement of woman in life will
also gain a decided advantage for the Mexican, for
no nation can be greater or better than its women.
Oriental immigration cannot be encouraged, as
being dangerous to the best interests of Mexico, not
because of the inferiority of the Orientals, but be
cause of their superiority, which would tend to segre
gate them into colonies.
A Mexican engineer suggested a plan to cut a
canal in Lower California, from Ensenada to the
Rio Colorado, a distance of ninety miles. By this
method Lower California would be made into an
island, and the passage of ships from the Pacific
Ocean at Ensenada, through the Canal into the Gulf
of California would double the importance, com
mercially and politically, of the States of Sonora,
Sinaloa and the Eastern side of Lower California.

218 Carranza and Mexico
Irrigation, and later immigration, in Lower Cal
ifornia, would change the barren island into a garden.
The Mexican revolutionists are socialists without
knowing it; their actions in the economical and po
litical field have proven it; the Marxian theorists in
Europe showed by their attitude in the war, that they
were not socialists, but political trimmers.
The French revolution is being repeated in Mex
ico. Bare feet are pattering up on one side of the
stairway, while patent leathers are descending on
the opposite side.
The Mexican problem is like a sand-bar in the
path of the American Ship of State.

APPENDIX
THE PLAN OF SAN LUIS POTOSI
By F. I. Madero.
DECLARATION TO THE NATION
The people, in their constant effort to bring about the
triumph of their ideals of liberty and justice, have deemed it
necessary at certain historical moments to make the greatest
sacrifices. Our dear country has arrived at one of these times; a
tyranny which the Mexicans had not been accustomed to en
dure, since we gained our independence, oppresses us in such
a manner that it has become intolerable. In exchange for
that tyranny, peace has been offered us, but a shameful peace
for the Mexican people, as it is not based on right but on
might; for it does not have as an object the advancement
and prosperity of the country, but only the enrichment of
a small group who, abusing their influence, have converted
the public positions into fountains of benefit exclusively per
sonal, exploiting without scruples all the concessions and
lucrative contracts.
The legislative power as well as the judicial are com
pletely under the executive; the division of power, the State
sovereignty, the liberty of the municipal government and the
rights of the citizen only exist as they are written in our
Magna Charta; but as a fact, in Mexico it can almost be
said that martial law reigns constantly; justice instead of
219

220 Carranza and Mexico
imparting protection to the weak, only serves to legalize
the plundering committed by the strong; the judges instead
of being the representatives of justice are agents of the ex
ecutive, whose interests they serve faithfully; the House of
Congress of the Union has no other will than that of the
dictator; the State Governors are appointed by him, and
they in their turn appoint and tax in the same way the mu
nicipal authorities.
From this it results that the administrative gear, judicial
and legislative, obeys with one will the caprice of Gen.
Porfirio Diaz, who during his long administration has dem
onstrated that the principal motive that guides him is to main
tain himself in power at all costs.
For many years deep uneasiness has been felt throughout
the republic, due to the above form of mariagement of the
Government, but General Diaz, with great astuteness and
perseverance, had well-nigh crushed out all independent ele
ments, so that it was impossible to organize any kind of a
movement to deprive him of the power, which he had so mis
used. The mischief was constantly aggravated, and the
decided eagerness of General Diaz to impose on the nation
a successor in the person of Mr. Ramon Corral, brought
matters to a crisis and determined many Mexicans, although
lacking political affiliations because it had been impossible to
form them during the thirty-six years of dictatorship, to
throw themselves into a struggle, intending to regain the
sovereignty of the people and their purely democratic right
to the land.
Among other parties which had the same object, the Na
tional Anti-Re-electionist Party was organized, proclaiming
the principles of effective suffrage and no re-elec
tion as the only ones capable of saving the republic from
the imminent danger which menaced from the prolongation

Appendix 221
of a dictatorship each day becoming more and more onerous,
more despotic and more immoral.
The Mexican people actively seconded that party and re
sponded to the call which was made, sending its represen
tatives to a convention, in which also was represented the
National Democratic Party, which also interpreted the pop
ular desires. The said convention appointed its candidates
for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the republic, those
nominations devolving upon Dr. Francisco Vasquez Gomez
and on me, for the respective charges of Vice-President and
President of the republic.
Although our situation was extremely disadvantageous
owing to the fact that our adversaries received the sanction
of all the official element, on which they did not hesitate to
rely, we believe it our duty to accept an honorable appoint
ment like this in order to best serve the cause of the people.
In imitation of the wise customs of republican countries, I
travelled over a portion of the republic, calling upon my
compatriots. My passing from one town to another was
like a real triumphal march, for everywhere the people, elec
trified by the magic words Effective Suffrage and No Re
election, gave evident proofs of their irrevocable resolution
to obtain the conquest of such secure principles. At length,
the moment arrived when General Diaz began to notice the
true situation of the republic, and understood that he could
not advantageously struggle with me in the field of democ
racy, and sent me to prison before the elections, which were
consummated while excluding the public from the primaries
through violence, filling the prisons with independent citi
zens and committing' the most shameful frauds.
In Mexico, as a democratic republic, the public power
cannot have any other origin or base than the national will,

222 Carranza and Mexico
and this cannot be subordinated to formulas consummated
in a fraudulent manner.
For this reason the Mexican people have protested against
the illegality of the last elections, and wishing to employ
successively all the recourses which the laws of the republic
offer, in due form they requested the annulment of the elec
tions before the Chamber of Deputies, notwithstanding the
fact that in that body a legitimate origin was not recognized,
and it being known beforehand that the members of the same
were not representatives of the people and only respected
the will of General Diaz, to whom exclusively they owed
their investiture.
In such a state of affairs the people, who are the only
sovereign, also protested in an energetic manner against the
elections, in imposing manifestations consummated in differ
ent parts of the republic, and if these did not spread through
all the national territory, it was due to the terrible pressure
exercised by the government, which always smothers in blood
any democratic demonstration, such as passed in Puebla,
Vera Cruz, Tlaxcala, Mexico and other parts.
But this situation so violent and illegal could not last
long. I have understood very well that if the people have ap
pointed me as their candidate for President it is not because
there may have been an opportunity of discovering in me the
faculties of a statesman or a governor, but only the virility
of a patriot resolved to sacrifice himself if necessary in the
cause of liberty, and to help the public free itself from the
odious tyranny which oppresses the nation.
From the time when I threw myself into the democratic
struggle I knew very well that General Diaz had no respect
for the freewill of the nation and the noble Mexican people,
and upon attending the primaries I knew also very well the

Appendix 223
attacks that awaited them; but notwithstanding these facts,
the public gave to the cause of liberty a numerous contingent
of martyrs when these were necessary, and with admirable
stoicism met at the polls to receive all sorts of annoyances.
But such conduct was indispensable to demonstrate to the
world at large that the Mexican people are ready for de
mocracy, that they are thirsty for liberty, and that their
present governors do not meet their aspirations.
Besides, the attitude of the people before and during the
elections, as well as after them, demonstrates clearly that
they opposed with energy the government of General Diaz,
and that if their electoral rights had been respected I might
have been elected as President of the republic.
Taking this into consideration and echoing the public
sentiment, I declare illegal the past elections, and as the
republic for that reason is without legitimate governors, I
assume provisionally the Presidency of the republic, while
the people appoint according to law their governors. To
attain this object it is necessary to hurl from power the au
dacious usurpers, who for all the titles of legality boast a
scandalous and immoral fraud.
With all honor I declare that I would consider it a sign
of weakness on my part and treason to the public who have
confided in me, not to place myself in front of my fellow-
citizens who anxiously call upon me from all parts of the
country, to compel General Diaz by force of arms to respect
the national will.
The present Government, although it originated in vio
lence and fraud from the moment that it was tolerated by
the people, yet can hold for foreign nations certain titles of
legality up to the 30th of the coming month, in which their
tenure expires; but as it is possible that the new government
emanating from the last fraud, may not by that time be in

224 Carranza and Mexico
power, at least because the greater part of the nation is
making an armed protest against that usurpation, I have
appointed SUNDAY, the 20th of next November, from 6
o'clock in the afternoon on, for all the towns and villages
in the republic to take up arms against the government un
der the following
plan.
ist. The elections for President and Vice-President of
the republic, Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice
of the Nation and Deputies and Senators, held in June and
July of the present year, are hereby declared null and void.
2nd. The present government of General Diaz is not
recognized, nor the power of any authority emanating from
the popular vote, for not having been elected by the people,
they have lost what little title they did have of legality,
aiding and favoring for their own interests the most scan
dalous electoral fraud ever known in the history of Mexico,
with the money placed at their disposal by the public.
3d. To avoid as much as possible the upheavals incident
to all revolutionary movements, all the laws promulgated by
the present administration and the rules pertaining to the
same, with the exception of those which are found to be
decidedly opposed to the principles set forth by this plan, are
declared to be in force, until such as require adjustment may
be reformed according to constitutional methods. Also, ex
ception is made of laws, sentences of courts, and decrees
which may have been sanctioned regarding the accounts and
handling of funds of all the functionaries of the Porfirista
administration, in all their branches. For as soon as the
revolution triumphs the formation of commissions of investi
gation will be initiated to decide on the responsibilities which

Appendix 225
the functionaries of the State and city federations may be
able to incur.
In all cases the obligations contracted by the Porfirista ad
ministration with foreign governments and corporations be
fore the 20th of the coming month, will be respected.
Abusing the law of waste land, numerous small proprietors,
mostly all quite poor, have been despoiled of their posses
sions, through the connivance of the Secretary of Public
Welfare, or by decrees of the courts of the republic. It
being only just to restore to their former owners the lands
of which they have been despoiled in such an arbitrary man
ner, such dispositions and decrees have been declared subject
to revision, and there will be demanded of those who ac
quire them in such a lawless manner, or of their heirs, to
make restitution to their former proprietors, who will also
pay an indemnity for the injuries suffered. Only in cases
where such lands have passed to a third person before the
promulgation of this plan, the former owners will receive
indemnity from those in whose benefit the spoliation was
accomplished. 4th. Besides the constitution and laws in force, the su
preme law of the republic is declared to be the principle of
no re-election of the President and Vice-President of the
republic, Governors of the States and Municipal Presidents,
while the respective constitutional reforms may be made.
5th. I assume the character of Provisional President of
the United States of Mexico, with the necessary faculties
to make war on the usurping government of General
Diaz. As soon as the capital of the republic and half of the
States of the Federation may be in the power of the army
of the nation, the Provisional President will call for extra
general elections for a month thereafter, and will deliver

226 Carranza and Mexico
the power to the President who may be elected, as soon as
the result of such election may be known.
6th. The Provisional President, before handing over the
authority, will give account to the Congress of the Union
of the use which has been made of the faculties which the
present plan confers upon him.
7th. The 20th day of the month of November, from the
6th of the afternoon on, all the citizens of the republic will
take up arms to hurl from power the authorities which at
present govern them. (The towns which are situated away
from the railway lines will take up arms from the even
ing on.)
8th. When the authorities present armed resistance, they
will be compelled by force of arms to respect the popular
will; but in this case the laws of war will be rigorously ob
served, attention being specially called to the prohibitions
relative to not using expansive balls, nor shooting prisoners.
Also attention is called respecting the duty of all Mexicans
to have consideration for all foreigners and their inter
ests. 9th. The authorities who oppose resistance to this plan
will be sent to prison so that they may be judged by the
courts of the republic, when the revolution may be over.
As soon as each city or town recovers its liberty, there will
be recognized as legitimate temporary authority the principal
chief at arms, with the faculty of delegating his functions to
any other citizen, who may be confirmed in his charge or
removed by the Provisional Governor.
One of the first measures of the provisional government
will be to put at liberty all the political prisoners.
ioth. The nomination of Provisional Governor of each
State that may have been occupied by revolutionary troops,
will be made by the Provisional President. This Governor

Appendix 227
will be under strict obligation to convoke the elections for
the Provisional Governor of the State, as soon as it may be
possible to do so, according to the judgment of the Provis
ional President. There is excepted from these rulings the
States that for two years have sustained democratic cam
paigns for a change of government, for in these the man who
was the candidate of the people will be considered as Pro
visional Governor, of course it being understood that he
is expected to adhere strictly to this plan.
In case that the Provisional President has not made a
nomination of Governor, or the nominee has not arrived to
take charge of his position, or if the person so honored does
not accept for any reason, then the Governor will appoint
by vote among all the chiefs of the army who may operate
in the territory of the respective State, with the understand
ing that his nomination may be ratified by the Provisional
President as soon as it may be convenient.
nth. (The new authorities will dispose of all the funds
that are found in the public offices for the ordinary expenses
of the administration and for the expenses of the war, keep
ing account scrupulously. In case that these funds may not
be sufficient to meet the expenses of the war, loans are to be
contracted, either voluntary or forced. These last to be
consummated only with citizens or national institutions. Ac
count will also be carefully kept of these loans, and receipts
will be tendered in due form to the interested parties, with
a view to making restitution to those who have loaned, the
revolution having triumphed.
Transitory. A. The chiefs of the volunteer army will
hold the rank which may correspond to the numbers of forces
on hand. In case of operating military forces and volun
teers together, the chief of the highest rank will take com
mand of them, because in the event of both chiefs holding

228 Carranza and Mexico
the same rank, the command will be for the military chief
tain. The civil heads will profit by said rank while the war lasts,
and once terminated, these appointments on petition of the
parties interested, will be revised by the Secretary of War,
who will confirm the various ones in their charges, or re
move such as he may see fit.
B. All the chiefs, civil as well as military, will keep their
troops under the strictest discipline, as they will be held re
sponsible by the Provisional Government for anyx misbe
havior of which the soldiers under their command may be
guilty; excepting in such cases where they may justify them
selves by proving that it was impossible to restrain the troops,
and to have imposed on the offenders the merited punish
ment. The severest punishments will be inflicted on any soldiers
who sack any town or kill defenceless prisoners.
C. If the army and the authorities sustained by General
Diaz shoot prisoners of war, the same procedure will not
be observed with those who fall into our hands, as repris
als; but on the contrary, the civil or military authorities in
the service of General Diaz, who may, after the initiation
of the revolution, have ordered, decreed in any form, sent
an order, or shot any of our soldiers, will be shot within
twenty-four hours after a court-martial.
From this sentence the highest functionaries will not be
exempted; the only exception will be that of General Diaz
and his ministers, who in case of their ordering shootings or
permitting them, will receive the same punishment, though
after having judged them in the courts of the republic, when
the revolution may have terminated.
In such cases where General Diaz may decree that the
laws of war may be respected, and the prisoners who fall

Appendix 229
into his hands are treated with humanity, his life will be
safe, but he must explain in the courts as to how he has
handled the funds of the nation, and as to how he has com
plied with the law.
D. As it is an indispensable requisite of the laws of war
that the belligerent troops may wear some uniform of dis
tinction, and as it would be difficult to uniform the numer
ous forces of the people who are going to take part in the
contest, there will be adopted as distinctive of all the liber
ating army, whether they be volunteers or regular soldiers,
a tricolored ribbon, in the cap or on the arm.
Fellow Citizens. If we are called to take up arms
and overturn the government of General Diaz, it is not only
for the offence committed during the last elections, but only
to save the country from the dark future which awaits her,
if she continues under his dictatorship, and under the gov
ernment of the abominable scientific oligarchy, that unscru
pulously and with great rapidity are absorbing and wasting
the national resources; and if we permit them to continue
in power, within a very brief space of time they will have
completed their work; they will have carried the nation to
ignominy and degradation; they will have absorbed all of
her riches and left her in total misery; they will have
caused the bankruptcy of our finances and the dishonor
of our country, which, weak, impoverished and manacled,
will find herself unable to defend her frontiers, her honor
and her institutions.
With respect to me, I have a tranquil conscience, and no
one can accuse me of promoting the revolution for personal
interests, for the whole nation understands that I did all
that was possible to arrive at a peaceful arrangement, and
was disposed even to renounce my candidacy if General Diaz
would only have permitted the people to appoint the Vice-

230 Carranza and Mexico
President of the republic; but dominated by incomprehensi
ble pride and by unheard of haughtiness he was deaf to the
voice of the country, and preferred to precipitate the nation
in a revolution before conceding one jot toward returning
to the people an atom of their rights, before executing, al
though it might be in the last stages of his life, a part of the
promises he made in Noria and Tuxtepec.
The present revolution was justified when he said : " That
no citizen may be charged with and perpetuated in the ex
ercise of power, and this will be the last revolution."
If in the mind of General Diaz there had been more at
tention paid to the interest of the country than the sordid
interests of himself and his counsellors, this revolution might
have been avoided by making some concessions to the people;
but it has not been so — so much the better ! The change
will be rapid and more radical, for the Mexican public in
place of lamenting like a coward, will accept the chal
lenge like a hero, and even if General Diaz pretends to de
pend upon brute force to imposing his ignominious yoke,
the public will rely on the same force for throwing aside
this yoke, for hurling this dismal man from power and for
reconquering liberty.
Fellow Citizens. Do not hesitate a moment: Seize
the arms, throw the usurpers from power, recover your
rights as free men, and remember that our predecessors be
queathed us an inheritance of glory which we must not
stain. Remember how they acted: invincible in war, mag
nanimous in victory.
effective suffrage, no re-election.
San Luis Potosi, October 5, 19 10.
(Signed) Feo. I. Madero.
Note. The present plan will circulate only among the

Appendix 23 1
co-religionists of the greatest confidence up to November
15th, from which date it will be re-printed; the plan
will be prudently divulged from the 18th and profusely
from the 20th on.
PROTEST AGAINST MEETING OF DIAZ AND
TAFT
(Reprinted from The Evening World, September 3, 1909.)
To the President of the United States.
Sir: The national press has lately startled thoughtful
men with the most unusual of announcements. We are told
we may shortly expect to witness the meeting of the popu
larly elected President of this great Republic with the un
crowned Czar of Mexico. Calculated to inspire enthusiasm
in the minds of the ignorant or the falsely informed, this
piece of news brings dismay to those who know the truth
and honor American traditions. For the last thirty years
the world has only heard unchallenged reports of the genius,
the equity and the kindness of Porfirio Diaz. All this being
true, it would only be fitting and proper that the two neigh
boring chiefs should exchange international courtesies.
But as a matter of history Porfirio Diaz represents in
Mexico what Abdul Hamid was to Turkey. On his white
head rests the responsibility for the massacres of over 50,000
Mexican Christians; the slavery of thousands of Yaqui and
Maya Indians who escaped fire and sword; the destruction
of all liberties, personal as well as public; the corruption of
the judiciary; the creation of a financial system which has
mortgaged Mexico to European and American bankers ; for
the persecution of all the Mexican liberals in the United
States, which reached a climax of brazenness and impudence
when a Mexican liberal was kidnapped across the Rio

232 Carranza and Mexico
Grande from an American jail by the help of American
detectives in the payroll of the Czar.
Therefore, I protest in the name of humanity, common
decency and national dignity as distinguished from political
expediency and international courtesy against such an ex
change between the deeply trusted and patriotic President of
the United States and the treacherous, unpopular and bloody-
handed Nero of Mexico.
You might retort that it is no business of mine to couple
your name with an attack seemingly so unwarranted.
My answer is that I speak no more than truth and not
otherwise than I have spoken in a recent book on the real
political conditions in Mexico. I am moved to repeat these
truthful characterizations of Mexico's president and the
rule he stands for, because this pamphlet has been suppressed
by an indictment against me in an American court brought
about by the Mexican Government, which used your own
brother, Henry W. Taft, as their lawyer against me, trans
parently to gain for their case the weight of an implied con
nection between it and the Administration.
You might reply that the American Government cares
nothing about the internal policy of the Mexican govern
ment as long as it behaves and protects American interests.
I answer that if a neighbor be a good neighbor it might
be sufficient unto you; but if your neighbor should torture
or attempt to kill his children would it not be your duty to
protest ?
If the excuse for meddling in another nation's affairs is
only found in the destruction of American lives and their
property, under what pretext did the American Government
protest against the Armenian massacres? What brought
about armed intervention in Cuba? Why did the State De-

Appendix 233
partment undertake to refund the unjust Chinese indemnity?
And how are you to explain the wherefore of the tremendous
struggle to stamp out slavery?
The reason for this system of intervention lies deeper than
in financial and political interests. It proves to the civilized
world that the American nation is something mightier than
a rich, powerful and progressive republic; that it is likewise
a moral entity backed by the conscience of a people.
The propaganda about Mexico has its source in the knowl
edge of the real history of Porfirio Diaz. At the beginning
of his career he concealed his real political face, but the
higher he rises in power and statecraft, the more he uncovers
his fundamental lack of principle.
Even as I write these lines the report is wired from
Mexico that General Diaz has ordered the demission of the
Governor of Coahuila as the latter showed a marked ten
dency in favor of General Reyes's candidacy. Imagine the
Republican President of the United States asking for the
resignation of Governor Johnson of Minnesota because of
his Democratic leanings!
Political evolution in Mexico will move faster in the next
twelve months, inasmuch as the new generation is impelled
by cleaner, more honest and patriotic motives than those of
the malevolent Czar and his infamous camarilla. Porfirio
Diaz is fashioning the tools of his own destruction and as
a last resort is using the handshake across the Rio Grande
to countenance in advance the arbitrary repressions and as
sassinations which are sure to take place in the false elec
tions of next year.
When that period is passed the mask of this master
Machiavelli will have been torn aside. The American peo
ple will then realize with humiliation that their honored

234 Carranza and Mexico
President has exchanged an intimate greeting with the basest
slave-driver of modern times.
Carlo de Fornaro,
National Arts Club.
Translation.
LETTER FROM ARCHBISHOP GILLOW TO
URRUTIA.
Hacienda de Chautla, July nth, 1913.
Sr. Dr. Aureliano Urrutia,
Minister of the Interior, Mexico.
Esteemed Sir and Friend:
I returned to this hacienda yesterday and was informed
that up around Huejotzingo, capital of this District, things
are rather unsettled, due to a few disturbers who molest
the authorities, and consequently disturb public peace. Hav
ing in mind the kind offers which you made to me during
my recent visit in that city, I now take the liberty of ad
dressing you.
The disturbers of Huejotzingo are a certain Luis Pinto
and his brother. They own real estate and small houses
to the amount of may be Three Thousand Dollars each, in
that locality. They put on airs of caciques, and have for
some time even gone so far as to pretend to subordinate
the local authorities. They have become more overbearing
since the time of Madero.
While Mr. Alberto Garcia Granados was Minister of the
Interior, the referred-to Pinto brothers attempted to over
throw Mr. Enrique Acevedo from his position as Governor
of the Province. Mr. Acevedo has maintained the peace
and well-being in this district ever since he came into of
fice. As Mr. Granados, owner of the Hacienda de Chagua,

Appendix 235
near Huejotzingo, knows Mr. Acevedo, he maintained Mr.
Acevedo as Governor, and the Pinto brothers did not molest
him any more until Mr. Granados resigned the secretary
ship. As Mr. Acevedo is well acquainted with the intrigues of
the Pinto brothers, he has kept them well watched, and
they, resenting this, have hostilized him, to the degree of
having trumped up false accusations against him before the
municipality of Puebla. They did not however, obtain their,
end, for they were unable to obtain his removal, though he
was for a time suspended from office, much to the regret
of the honest contingent of Huejotzingo. The Mayor re
placed him during this time.
On the other hand, Mr. Ramon Vargas, Judge of the
Primary Court of Claims of Huejotzingo, has been for
three months working unceasingly to put to date all pending
cases, which had been accumulating, due to the fact that his
predecessors, partly due to indifference and partly to fear
of the Revolution, often absented themselves, abandoning
their offices. Among those who most distinguished them
selves of these last mentioned, was a certain Felipe Ramirez,
whose wife is a Huejotzingo woman, on which account he
was of course interested in holding that position in Huejot
zingo. The mother of the lady in question also found a
way to take advantage of the situation, and arranged things
so that those who wished their cases attended to, had to
have a recommendation from her, if they wanted a favor
able judgment. For this she was of course paid a certain
sum, and she managed to derive quite a fine income.
This by-play came to the knowledge of Mr. Garcia
Granados, and he managed to obtain the Puebla Munici
pality to offer the Judge Felipe Ramirez to transfer him
to Matamoros, which offer he declined, staying in Huejot-

236 Carranza and Mexico
zingo and exercising his profession of lawyer. This Mr.
Ramirez works in harmony with the Pinto brothers, and
the three of them, openly antagonize Acevedo the Governor,
Ramon Vargas, the Judge and Sidronio Primo, Commis
sioner of the Ministry, who is an old employe in this locality
and who works together with the other two last mentioned.
With the foregoing details, and prompted by the desire
to maintain order and peace in this district, I beg you to
exert your good influence with the government of Puebla,
to have Mr. Acevedo return to his post, and to have Mr.
Ramon Vargas the present Judge, and also Mr. Sidronio
Primo, stay in their positions. The presence of Mr. Felipe
Ramirez, who still pretends to occupy the position of Judge
in this District, is very harmful to public interests, as is also
the presence of the Pinto brothers, so that although I har
bor no feelings of personal enmity towards them for I do
not know them except from hearsay, I beg to suggest the ad
vantage of their being removed from this locality, in what
ever way you may deem most appropriate.
Kindly forgive the length of this letter, but I feel justi
fied in giving you all these details, for the sake of the
preservation of peace in this region, which has some impor
tance due to its relations to Puebla and Mexico.
Thanking you in advance for whatever you may deem fit
to do in the interests of the honest citizens who have given
me the above information, and which I transmit to you con
fidentially, I beg to remain, Very respy., etc., etc.,
Eulogio G. Gillow,
Archbishop of Oaxaca.

Appendix 237
LETTER FROM MINISTER URRUTIA TO
ARCHBISHOP MORA.
Mexico, July 9th, 191 3.
Very illustrious Sir —
Kindly allow me to acquit myself of the pleasant duty of
expressing, to you, very sincere thanks for the good assist
ance you have been lending to the Government in the re
establishment of peace, — a task the moire useful because
accomplishing it, as you are doing, with intelligence and
common sense, it might be able to effect a durable benefit
to the country.
In the name of the government to which I belong and
with which you are happily connected, I earnestly beg of
you to continue your good work, if possible, with mcn:e
energy than before.
In this connection and prompted by the confidence which
your kindness invites, I take the liberty of telling you that
some memorial services held in honor of the Madero
brothers, made a bad impression in social circles, and es
pecially on the Government, and therefore I would ask of
you to take such measures as you may deem necessary, to
prevent a repetition of demonstrations of this nature, which
might contribute to retard the success of the work under
taken by the Government in order to put an end to our
internal wars.
I also must call your attention to the necessity of stop
ping at all costs, a certain person in the clergy, from con
tinuing his propaganda against the Government, and this
for the same reasons as above expressed. With your intel
ligence and tact, I am sure you will find an efficacious means
to put a stop to the workings of the person in question.
I remain, etc., etc.,
Urrutia.

GLOSSARY OF SPANISH WORDS.

Carranzista
Casas de
Vecindad
Cientifico

CiudadelaColorados

CompadreCuartelazoDon

Political follower of Venustiano Car
ranza.
Tenement houses.
A group of politicians headed by J. I.
Limantour, who took as a basis of
their political party some of the Comte
theories. They believed in a scien
tific government. The term cien
tifico is now applied to political
exponents of graft in politics.
Citadel.
Reds, red-flaggers. Name given to the
guerrilla troops under Orozco, be
cause besides carrying a red flag they
carried destruction everywhere by fire
and sword.
Godfather, an expression which means
protector, benefactor, — and implies
great obligations and great sacrifices.
A military mutiny. From cuartel, a
military barrack.
Title of courtesy given to people of the
better class. Formerly in Spain,
when addressing a person of aristo
cratic lineage, it was customary to
write before the name, — De origen
239

240

Carranza and Mexico

Egidos Felicista
FiestaFomento

Gachupines GringoHacienda
Huertista Incomunicacion

Jefe Jefe Politico

Lev Fuga

noble — (of noble origin). It was
afterwards abbreviated to D. O. N.
One should be careful to use the Don
only before the first name, or together
with first and second names, for in
stance — Don Porfirio Diaz, never
Don Diaz, as it implies an insulting
meaning.
Communal lands surrounding villages
and cities in Mexico.
Political follower of Felix Diaz.
Holiday, merry-making.
Excite, encourage. Ministerio de Fo
mento: the department for the devel
opment of the country, industrially
and commercially.
Nickname given to Spaniards.
Nickname used in Mexico and South
America to designate Americans.
Plantation, ranch, farm.
Political follower of Victoriano Huerta,
Incommunication. The position of a
man in prison who is not permitted to
communicate with his friends, law
yers or any one from the outside.
Chief.Political chief. Head of a district
under the jurisdiction of the Governor.
Under Diaz they had almost unlim
ited power for mischief.
The Runaway Law — which was re
sorted to for the purpose of doing
away with obnoxious political ene-

Glossary

241

Maderista
Mocho Neo-Cientifico

Pacifico PeladoPeon
Plan De Ayala

Plan De
Guadalupe

mies or agitators; while they were
taken from one prison to the other,
they were shot from the back, and
the pretext was that they had tried
to run away.
Political follower of F. I. Madero.
Contemptible term to designate mem
bers of the clerical party in Mexico.
New scientist. A political party which
was a continuation of the old cien
tifico party. They came into power
under Madero, and were headed by
Ernesto Madero, uncle of Don F. I.
Madero, and by Rafael Hernandez, a
cousin of the president.
A peaceful Indian, one that cultivates
the land and does not carry arms.
" Skinned." Term applied to a very
poor Indian.
Indian worker on plantation or mines.
Written by a school-teacher, Montano,
for Zapata. It was aimed against
the neo-cientificos in the Madero cab
inet, — the provisional president was
supposed to be P. Orozco, and in case
of his absence Emiliano Zapata. The
Plan was essentially an agrarian plan,
local in its ideas of reforms.
A Manifest written by V. Carranza to
rally the Mexicans in the overthrow
of the Huerta dictatorship. It did
not attempt to bring about any re
forms, — only the elimination of
Huerta and his supporters.

242

Carranza and Mexico

Plan De San Was the political plan written by F. I.
Luis Potosi Madero against the Diaz regime on
October 5th, 1910.
Porfirista Political follower of Porfirio Diaz.
Porrista A member of the Porra, a political club
created by the friends of F. I. Madero,
supposed to be headed by Gustavo
Madero, to fight and intimidate the
enemies of the Maderistas.
Religion y Battle-cry of the clericals since the revo-
Fueros lution. " Religion & Privileges."
The Church and the army under
Spanish rule had special courts com
posed of either religious clerics or of
soldiers, which judged members of
the church or soldiers in criminal
cases. The Clericals now demand a
return of their old privileges.
Villista Political follower of F. Villa.
Zapatista Political follower of Zapata.