YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART I.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1841.

LONDON:
FEINTED BY T. R. HARRISON, ST. MARTIN'S LANE.

LIST OF PAPERS.

No.
1. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
2. Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
3. Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
4. Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
5. Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
6. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .
7- Viscount Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby .
8. Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
9. Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
10. Mr. Milbanke to Viscount Palmerston .
1 1 . Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
12. Viscount Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby
13. Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
14. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
15. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
16. Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
17- The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston
18. Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
1 9. Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston .
20. Viscount Palmerston to Rechid Pasha
21. Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston .
22. Viscount Palmerston to Rechid Pasha
23. Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
24. Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston
25. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
26. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
27. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston
28. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
29. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston
30. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston '.
31. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
32. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
33. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
34. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .
35. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
36. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .
37- Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
38. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .
39. The Due de Dalmatie to Baron de Bourqueney .
40. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
41. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
42. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
43. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
44. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
45. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston
46. Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston
47- Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
48. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .
49. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
50. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston
51. Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston
52. Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston .
53. Mr Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston
54. Extract of a Despatch from the Consul-General of
France in Egypt .....
55. Baron Roussin to the Due de Dalmatie
56. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
57- Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
58. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
59. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
60. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
61. The Due de Dalmatie to Baron de Bourqueney
62. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville .
63. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston

Paris, February
Therapia, January
Therapia, February
Therapia, February
Therapia, February
Paris, March
Foreign Office, March
Therapia, February
Constantinople, March
Vienna, March
Paris, April
Foreign Office, April
Therapia, March
Cairo, March
Cairo, March,
Therapia, March
St. Petersburgh, April
Therapia, March
Bryanston Square, April
Foreign Office, May
Bryanston Square, April

Foreign Office,
Therapia, Beyrout, Cairo,
Therapia, Vienna,
Therapia,St. Petersburgh,
Alexandria,Alexandria,Alexandria, Paris, Paris,Paris, Paris, Therapia,Paris, Paris,
Therapia, Paris, Paris,
Therapia,
Therapia, Vienna,Berlin,
Therapia, Paris,Paris,St. Petersburgh,
Aleppo,
Beyrout,
Damascus,
Alexandria, Therapia, Alexandria,
Therapia,Therapia,Therapia,Paris,Paris,
Foreign Office,
Therapia,

May
April MarchApril
April May
AprilMay May
MayMay May MayMayMay MayMay May
MayJune
June May
May June
JuneMayJuneJune June May
MayMay
May MayMayMay MayMay
June June
June May

15, 1839,
27, 
6, 
8, 
12, 
11, 
15, 
26, 
7, 
28, 
8, 
12, 
18, 
11,' 
11, 
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L 
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1, 
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15,- 16,
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27,

Page 12233 3 44 4
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11 1112 12 15
15 16
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16 1819 19
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39535558 707275 7677
8286

IV

LIST OF PAPERS.

Foreign Office, June 25,

No. 64. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris, June
65. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna, June
66. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna, June
67. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, June
68. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris, June
69. Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty .....
70. Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty .....
71 . Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville
72. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .
73. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
74. Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo
75. Instructions to the French Admiral in the Levant
76. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .
77- Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston .
78. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
79. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
80. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
81. Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale
82. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville .
83. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville
84. Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston
85. Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty .....
86. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
87- Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .
88. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
89. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
90. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby
91. Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston
92. Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston
93. Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston
94. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston ' .
95. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
96. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
97- Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
98. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
99. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
100. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston] .
101. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
102. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
103. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
104. Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston
105. Viscount Palmerston to Lord William Russell
106. Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde
107. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston
108. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston
109. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston
110. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston .
111. Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale
112. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .
113. Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston
114. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .•
115. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
116. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
117. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby
118. Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty ....
1 19. Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty .... Foreign Office, July
120. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office, July
121. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, July
122. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh, July
123. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . . ' Foreign Office, July
124. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston , Paris, July
125. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris, July
126. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, July
127- Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . *. Paris, July
128. Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston London, July
129. Viscount Palmerston to the Baron de Bourqueney Foreign Office, July
130. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston , Paris, July
131. Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston . Berlin, July

Foreign Office,
Foreign Office,
Paris,Paris, St. Petersburgh,
Paris, Paris,
Alexandria, Therapia,
Therapia, Alexandria,
Foreign Office,
Foreign Office,
Foreign Office,
Berlin,
Foreign Office,
Paris,Paris,
Therapia, Therapia,
Foreign Office,
Aleppo, Damascus,Beyrout,
Alexandria, Alexandria,Alexandria,Alexandria,
Alexandria,
Therapia,
Therapia, Paris, Paris, Paris,
Berlin,Foreign Office,
Foreign Office,
Vienna, Vienna,Vienna,Vienna,Foreign Office,
Paris,Berlin,Therapia, Therapia,
Therapia,
Foreign Office,

June
June JuneJune JuneJune
JuneMay JuneJune June
June
June June
JuneJuly
JulyJuly
June June
JulyJune June
June JuneJuneJuneJune
June
JuneJune July
July July
July
July July
JuneJune July July July
July July
June June
June
July

25,
25, 24,
24,- 3
TT, 26,28,28, 5, 5, 6,
28,
29,- 29,
26, 2,-1,-2,
12,12, V V
7,-
8,-
H-
16,-16,-18,-19,-16,-
16,- 2,-5,-
5,-
3,- 9,-
9,-
30,-30,- 1,
1,-
13,- 8,-6,-
24,-24,-
24,- 13,-

Foreign Office, July 13,

9093 94
94 95
96
• 101104
¦105¦107
•107¦108 117119
•120 122
122
123 123 124124
124 125
136137138
143
145148
150 152
153 153153
154 155
155 156158159159
160 160
161162162
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166

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18,  167
12,  168
8,  169
16,  169
15,  170
15,  171
15,  171
16,  172
19,  173
22,  175
19,  175
15,  176

LIST OF PAPERS.

No-
132. 133.
134. 135.136.137.138. 139.
140. 141.142.143. 144.145.146. 147. 148.
149.150.151. 152. 153.154.155.156. 157.158.159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164.165.166. 167.
168. 169.
170. 171-
172. 173.174. 175. 176.
177-
178. 179.
180.
181.182.
183. 184.
185.
186.
187.188.189.190.191.192.
193. 194.195.196.197. 198. 199.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office,
Draft of Note to be presented to the Porte by
Admiral Roussin ........

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viseount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . . Foreign Office,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . Foreign Office,
The Due de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney Paris,
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . . Foreign Office,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston . Berlin,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde Foreign Office,
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston Aleppo,
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston Aleppo,
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston . Beyrout,
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston . Damascus,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Campbell to Viscsunt Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston Hertford House,
Viscount Palmerston to the Baron de Bourqueney Foreign Office,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston Berlin,
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston . Berlin,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty ..... Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty ..... Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty ..... Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Sir George Hamilton . Foreign Office,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty  Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . Foreign Office,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . , Paris,
Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff » . St. Petersburgh,

JulyJuly
July JulyJuly JulyJulyJulyJuly
JulyJuly
July JulyJuly
JulyJuly July JulyJulyJuly JulyJulyJulyJulyJuly July July
JulyJuly July JulyJuly
July July JulyJuly July
JulyJuly JulyJuly August
August
August JulyJuly August
August August
August July
July
July July
August August August
August
AugustJuly July
July July
July AugustAugustAugustJuly

Page
15, 1839, 176
15,  177
10,  177
10,
10, 11,-H,11,-12,- 14,- 1,"
V3,
23,-

22,- 8,- 8,-
17,-19,-19,-
26,- 26,-25,-26,-30,- 26,- 30,- 18,-24,- 6,- 6,-
30,- L- V 1,-
V
11,-13,- 13,
29, 1, 1,
1,
10,10, 1,
3, 1,
2,
31,
31, ¦
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5, 5,-
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ii .

— 177
 178
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 180
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 182
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 191
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— 20a
 "201 202 203205206 206
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-223-224-225 •226-227-228-229-233-234
-235 -236-236¦237
-237 •238¦239 239
-240¦240
• 241
-250 •250
-252•254 -255
-256-256 ¦257

VI

LIST OF PAPERS.

No.
200. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston Vienna,
201. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
202. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
203. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
204. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
205. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
206. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston '. . Vienna,
207. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
208. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
209. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
210. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
211. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
212. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
213. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
214. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerstqn . Therapia,
215. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
216. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
217. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
218. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
219. The Due de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney Paris,
220. The Due de Dalmatie to Baron Roussin . . Paris,
221. The Due de Dalmatie to Admiral Duperre . Paris,
222. Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . . Foreign Office,
223. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville t . Foreign Office,
224. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston, . Therapia,
225. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . # Therapia,
226. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
227. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
228. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh
229. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
230 Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston . Berlin,
231. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerstjon . Paris,
232. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
233. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
234. Count Nesselrode to Count Medem . . St. Petersburgh,
235. Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde Foreign Office,
236. Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer . . . Foreign Office,
237. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office,
238. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
239. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . . Therapia,
240. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby. Foreign Office,
241. Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty .
242. Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty ..... Foreign Office,
243. Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell . Foreign Office,
244. Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer . . Foreign Office,
245. Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty ..... Foreign Office,
246. Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. Berlin,
247- Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
248. Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office,
I Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaavale . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Sir George Hamilton . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer . . Foreign Office,
250. Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office,
251. Baron Werther to Count Bresson . . Berlin,
252. Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer . . Foreign Office,
253. Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
254. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
255. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
256. Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston Aleppo
257- Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria
258. Mr. Consul Werry to Vicount Palmerston, , . Damascus
259. Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston . Beyrout,
260. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
261. Colonel Campbell, to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
262. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
263. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . . Therapia,
264. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . . Therapia,
265. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . • Therapia,
266, Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . . - Therapia,

July July
July July
AugustAugust
August August
August AugustAugust
AugustAugust JulyJulyJuly
July
July July August
August
AugustAugust AugustJuly
July
JulyJuly
August August AugustAugust
August August July 25
August 6
August August
August
JulyJuly August

Page
30, 1839, 262
30,  262
30,  262
30,  266
1,  266
1,  269
1,  269

AugustAugust
August

1,
2,8,
9,
12,- 3,
20,. 20,
21,22,- 18,-18,- 6,-
7,-
13,-
IV16,-
27,-
26,-29,-
29,-
10,- 16,- H-18,-19,- 19,-
20'- 20,-
21,-30,-30,- 23,-

Foreign Office, August 23,

August

24,

August

21,

August

23,

August

25,

August

25,

August

27,

August

27,

August

27,

August

25,

August

16,

August

27,

August

26,

July

26,

July

28,

July

30,

July

30,

August

2,

August

3,

August

7,

August

7,

August

8,

August

6,

August

7,

August

7,

August

7,

23,23,
23,

-270
-272-272 -273-274-274¦275¦277-278¦278-280¦283¦283¦286¦288¦291¦291•291¦292
¦292 297 299 301302 302303
303
304308309
311 311311
312 312 313 313
313314314 314
•315 •317-317¦317¦317•319-319¦320¦321¦321-322-329-336-336-338-339-345-346-348-349-349-349

tlST OF PAPERS.

Vll

267- 268.
269.270.271.272. 273.274. 275.276.277-
278. 279.
280. 281.282.283. 284.285.
286.287.288.
289290.
291.292. 293.294.295. 296.
297.298.
299. 300. 301.
302.303.304.305.
306. 307.
308.309310.311.312.
313. 314.
315.316.317.318.319.
320.321.322.
323.324.325.326. 327.
328.329.330.331.332.333.334.335.336.
337.338.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston *. Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. Therapia,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston Berlin,
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby ¦ . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby Foreign Office,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston ; Alexandria,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
The Hon. W. Fox Strangways to Sir John Barrow Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell . . Foreign Office,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston > Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston Berlin,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . „ Vienna,
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby Foreign Office,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . - . Paris,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston .- . Vienna,
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office,
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston . Berlin,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde Foreign Office,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston . Berlin,
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer . . . Foreign Office,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . , Paris,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges . . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer . Foreign Office,
Count Sebastiani to Viscount Palmerston . London,
Count Medem to Count Nesselrode . . Alexandria,
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges . . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to His Highness the Vizier
Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt . . Foreign Office,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston . Jerusalem,
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston . Damascus,
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston Aleppo,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,

August
August
August August August
Sept. Sept.
AugustAugustAugust
August August
Sept. .
Sept.
Sept. Sept.
August August August August
August
August Sept.
AugustAugust August
AugustSept.Sept.
Sept.
Sept.
Sept. Sept.Sept. Sept.
Sept.Sept. Sept.
Sept.Sept. August
Sept.Sept.
Sept.Sept.Sept.Sept.Sept.
Sept.
Sept. Sept.
Sept.Sept.Sept.
Sept.
Sept. Sept.Sept.August October October
Sept.
October August AugustAugust OctoberSept. October October
Sept. October

7, 1839, 350
8,  352
10,  353
30,  354
28,  356
4,  356
4.  357
13,  357
14,  360
15,  360
16,  361
16,  362
6,  365
9,  366
10,  366
13,  370
18,  371
19,  371
20,  371
21,  371
22,  373
22,  373
4,  374
22,  375
27,  375
28,  376
31,  378
3,  379
14,  379
13,  379
13,  380
13,  380
8,  381
8,  382
8,  383
9,  384
18,  386
11,  386
16,  386
16,  392
26,  392
19,  393
19,  393
2,  393
5,  394
18,  395
23,  395
20,  397
20,  398
23,  398
27,  398
26,  401
27,  401
27,  401
5,  402
6,  404
28,  404
28,  406
 409
3,  411

It,

3,  411
10,  411
4,  412
19,  414
30,  415
24,  416
7,  417
21,  419
3,  424
16,  424
22,  425
12,  426

Vill

LIST OF PAPERS.

•No.: 339.340.
341. 342.
343.

Mr. Bulwer to, Viscount Palmerston .
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston

Paris,Paris, Vienna,
Therapia,
Therapia,Therapia, Therapia,
Therapia, Therapia,
Alexandria, Alexandria,
Foreign Office,
Paris,
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde Foreign Office,

344. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
345. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
346. Viscoant Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
347. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
348. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston
349. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston .
350. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby
351. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
352.
353.354.
355.356.

Baron Brunnow to Count Nesselrode
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty
357. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
358. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . . Foreign Office,
359. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
360. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston • Therapia,
361. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
362. Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty ....
363. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
364. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
365. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
366. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby .
367. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby
368. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby .

London,Paris,
Paris,
Foreign Office,

Therapia,
Foreign Office,
Therapia,Therapia,Therapia,
Foreign Office,
Foreign Office,
Foreign Office,

October
OctoberOctober Sept.
Sept. Sept.
Sept.Sept. October
Sept.October
October October October
September 26t
October 8,
October
October

Page
18, 1839, 426

18,14,
21,
30,-30,-30,
30,- 1,"
26,- 6,-
23,-
21,-
25,-

25,
25,.

OctoberOctoberOctober
OctoberOctober October

29, 18,
29, 8,8,-
8,-

369. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
370. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
371- Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
372. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
373. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
374. Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston Aleppo,
375. Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston . . , Damascus,
376. Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
377- The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
378. Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston . Berlin,
379. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
380. Viscount Palmefrston to the Marquess of Clanricarde Foreign Office,

381. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
382. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston .
383. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston
384. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby .
385. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .
386. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville
387- Baron Werther to Viscount Palmerston .
388. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston
389. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston .
390. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston
391. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston

November 3,
October 13,
October 14,
October 14, ¦
November 4,
November 4,
November 4, •
October 25,-
November 4, •
October 16,-
November 8, ¦
October 22, -
Sept. 23, -
Sept. 28, ¦
October 20, -
November 5, -
Nov. Nov.
Nov.
OctoberOctoberOctober
Nov.
Nov. Nov.

Therapia,
Therapia,Therapia,
Foreign Office,
Paris, Foreign Office,
Lower Berkeley-StNov.
Vienna, Nov.
Vienna, Nov.
Vienna, Nov.
Therapia, October
Vienna, Nov.
Vienna, Nov.
Berlin, Nov.
Paris, Nov.
Foreign Office, Nov.
Foreign Office, Nov.
Foreign Office,
Paris,

392. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston
393. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston .
394. Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston
395. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
396. Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges .
397. Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale
398. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby
399. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston
400. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
401. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
402. Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff . . St. Petersburgh,
403. Count Sebastiani to Viscount Palmerston . London,
404. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
405. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office,
406. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
407. Mr. Consul Young to. Viscount Palmerston . Jerusalem,
408. Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston . Damascus,
409. Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston Aleppo

December 2,
Nov. 29,
Nov. 18,
Nov. 22,
Nov. ao 22,
December 4,
Nov. 13,
December 6, ¦
December 6, ¦
October 16, •
October 25,-
October 31,-

13,— 15,—
19,—
26, 
27,—28,—
22, 
18, 
22, 
22, 
H, 
10, 
16, 
30, 
16, 
16, 
20, 
25, 
28, 
28, 

427
-427-428-428-430-431-434¦434•434•435 •436 436
438442

-456¦457¦457 458458
462
464
466

-469 -469
-471-471-471-471-472-472-472-473-473 -474
-475-477-478-482-482-483-483-484-485 487
-489 -489
-490-491-494-495-495-496-497-498-499-500-500-501•501-501¦502•503•504¦506 513514
•514 514514
515

LIST OF PAPERS.

IX

No.
410. Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston . Beyrout,
411. Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston Berlin,
412. Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston . . Berlin,
413. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . Foreign Office,
414. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . .. Paris,
415. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
416. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . . Foreign Office,
417- Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville • Foreign Office,
418. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
419. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
420. M. Wagner, Prussian Consul at Alexandria, to Count
Kcenigsmarck . . . . . Alexandria,
421. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
522. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
423. Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston Berlin,
424. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
425. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
426. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
427- Measures suggested by Baron Brunnow for the settle
ment of the Turco Egyptian Question . ....
428. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . . Foreign Office,
429. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
430. Viscount Palmerston to Count Sebastiani . Holland House,
431. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
432. Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston . Aleppo,
433. Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston . Jerusalem,
434. Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston . Damascus,
435. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
436. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . . Alexandria,
437- Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
438. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . . Alexandria,
439. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston .. Paris,
440. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerstbn . . Paris,
441. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
442. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
443. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
444. Viscount Palmerston to Sir George Hamilton . Foreign Office,
445. Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow . . St. Petersburgh,
446. Count Nesselrode to Count Medem at Paris . . St. Petersburgh,
447. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
448. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
449. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
450. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
451. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
452. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
453. Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . . Vienna,
454. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office*
455. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office,
456. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . , Paris,
457. The Due de Dalmatie to the Baron de Barante . Paris,
458. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
459. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
460. The Due de Dalmatie to Count Sebastiani . Paris,
461. Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston . Berlin,
462. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
463. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
464. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . Foreign Office,
465. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . . Alexandria,
466. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
467. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
468. Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde Foreign Office,
469. Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston . Damascus,
470. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
471. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
472. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
473. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
474. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
475. Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston . Berlin,
476. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
477- Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
478. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
479. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
480. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,

Page
November 7, 1839 518
December 4,  519
December 4,  519
Dec. 10, - - 520

December 9,

521

December 9,  522
Dec. 12,  522
Dec. 13,  523
Dec. 13,  523

Nov. Nov.Nov.
Nov.
Dec. Dec.Dec.Nov.

30,

524

26,  524
24,  526
27,  526
18,  527
23,  527
23,  528
30,  529

January ,
January 3,
Dec. 11,
January 5,
Dec. 16,

Nov. Nov.
Nov.
Dec. Dec. Dec.Dec.

20, 25,28, 19,
20, 21,21,

January 6,
January 6,
Dec. 13,
Dec. 17,
January 5,
January 14,
December 20,
January 1,
Dec. 26,
January 13,
January 13,
Dec. 24,
January 1 7,
Dec. 28,
Dec. 20,
January 12,
January 24,
January 25,
January 20,
January 24,
January 24,
January 27,
January 26,
January 20,
January 8,
January 29,
January 31, ¦
Dec. 27,
Dec. 27,
January 14,
February 3,
Dec. 23,
January 31,
Dec. 30,
January 4,
January 4,
January 6,
February 5,
January 15,
January 15,
February 10,
February 10,
January 18,

1840 529
 533
1839 534
1840 534
1839 536
 536
 540
 -540
 541
 542
 542
 543
1840 544
 544
1839 544
 545
1840 545
 545

1835 P.AZ
TFTo j*°
1839 549
1840 554
 555
1839 555
1840 556
1839 556
 557
1840 559
 560
 560
 561
 561
 564
 564
 565
 568
 568
 571
 571
1839 571
 5^2
1840 572
 572
1839 572
1840 573
1839 574
1840 574
 575
 576
 576
 577
 579
 581
¦  581
 582

X

LIST OF PAPERS.

No. 481. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, January 12,
482. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, January 12,
483. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . . Alexandria, January 13,
484. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, January 14,
485. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . , Alexandria, January 16,
486. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, • January 16,
487. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, January 17,
488. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, January 21,
489.' Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, January 23,
490. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, January 24,
491. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh, January 29,
492. Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston . Berlin, February 12,
493. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . Foreign Office, February 18,
494. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia, January 26,
495. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia, January 28,
496. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston » Therapia, January 28,
497- Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia, January 29,
498. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, February 21,
499. Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges . . Foreign Office, February 25,
500. Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston . Damascus January 18,
501. Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston Aleppo January 20,
502. Mr Consul Werry to John Bidwell, Esq. . Damascus, January 23,
503. Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston . Beyrout, January 29,
504. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, February 6,
505. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia, February 6,
506. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh, February 11,
507- Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . . Foreign Office, March 5,
508. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, March 6,
509. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris, March 9,
510. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh February 24,
511. The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh, February 24,
512. Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office, March 12,
513. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia, February 18,
514. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, March 13,
515. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . . Foreign Office, March 17,
516. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia, February 26,
517- Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia, February 26,
518. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia, February 26,
519. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, March 20,
520. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris, March 20,
521. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, February 12,
522. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . . Alexandria, February 21,
523. Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges . Foreign Office, March 25,
524. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston ,. . Paris, March 23,
525. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia, February 27,
526. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia, March 3,
527- Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, March 24,
528. Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office, March 28,
529. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, March 27,
530. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston ,. Therapia, March
531. Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia, March
532. Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston Berlin, April
533. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, April
534. Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston . Damascus, February 20,
535. Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty ..... Foreign Office, April
536. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office, April
537- Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia, March
538. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, February
539. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . . Alexandria, March
540. Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria, March
541. Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmerston . . London, April
542. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . Foreign Office, April
543. Viscount Palmerston to Nouri Effendi . . Foreign Office, April
544. Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . Foreign Office, April
545. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris, April
546. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, April
547. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris, April
548. Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston Aleppo February
549. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office, April
550. Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris, April
551. Mr. Consul Werry to W. J. Bidwell, Esq. . Damascus, February
552. Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston . Beyrout, February

Page
1840 585
 585
 585
 586
 587
 587
 587
 588
 589
 589
 589
 590
 590
 591
 591
 591
 591
 592
 592
 593
 593
 594
 595
 596
 596
— 597
 597

7,-
n, L-
3,-

598599599 600
603603 604
605 605 605
605606606 607608
609
¦609 609
¦610¦610
•611 ¦611¦615¦616¦617
•617

7,  618
7,  618
18,  619
26,  621
6,  621
20,  622
7,  624
10,  627
11,  627
11,  628
13,  628
15,  628
17,  628
20,  629
21,  629
20,  630
20,  630
27,  630

LIST OF PAPERS.

XI

No.553. 554.555.

556. 557.
558. 559. 560.561.562. 563.
564. 565. 566.567. 568.569.570.571.572.573.574.575. 576. 577.
578. 579.580.581. 582.,583.
584. 585.
586. 587-588.589.590. 591.
592. 593.594. 595.596.597.598. 599.
600.601.602. 603.
604.605. 606.
607. 608.
609.
610.
611.612.613.614615.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
James Stephen, Esq. to John Backhouse, Esq.Downing Street,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston Vienna,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston Therapia,
James Stephen,*Esq. to John Backhouse, Esq.Downing Street,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . . Foreign Office,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston '• . Alexandria,
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty  Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . Foreign Office,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston . Jerusalem,
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston Aleppo,
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston 3 . Damascus,
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston . Beyrout,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,
Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmerston . London,
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . Foreign Office,
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . Paris,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston . London,
Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston . London,
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston St. Petersburgh,

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston . Damascus,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges . Foreign Office,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Mr. Pro-Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston Beyrout,
EarL Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Mr. Bloomfield tojSViscount Palmerston . St. Petersburgh,
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston . Vienna,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville . Foreign Office,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston . . Paris,
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston . Damascus,
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerson . Beyrout,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston . Alexandria,
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty . ... Foreign Office,
Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston . ...
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer . . Foreign Office,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston . Therapia,
Convention concluded between the Courts of Great
Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, on the
one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte on
the other, for the pacification of the Levant,
signed at London July 15, 1840 . . .

April
March
March April August March
May
May
May
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Xll LIST OF PAPERS.
No. Page
616. Separate Act annexed to the' Convention concluded
at London on the 15th of July, 1840, between
the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia,
and Russia, on the one part, and the Sublime
Ottoman Porte on the other . .  694
617- Protocol signed at London on the 15th of July,
1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain,
Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey ........ 698
618. Reserved Protocol signed at London on the 15th of
of July, 1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of Great
Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey ....... 699
619. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby . Foreign Office, July 15, 1840 701
620. Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale . . Foreign Office, July 1 5,  701
621. Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston . London, July j-f,  701
622. Viscount Palmerston to Baron Brunnow . . Foreign Office, July 15,  702

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO

THE AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART I.

No. 1.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — {Received February 18.)
My Lord, Paris, February 15, 1839.
COUNT MOLE, in the course of a conversation I had with him
three days ago, on the affairs of the East of Europe, took occasion to
remind me of the approach of the period of Mehemet Ali's return from his
expedition to the mines of Sennaar, and to express his wish that by
previous communication, the French and English Governments should' be
prepared to act in entire concert, when the Pasha again brought forward
the question of his independence of the Porte, which he would not fail to
do soon after his arrival at Alexandria. His Excellency observed, that
although France and England both aimed at the preservation of peace
between the Sultan and the Pasha, shades of difference existed in the
interests of the two countries on the Oriental Question, which, should no
previous concert be established, might tend to produce a want of unity in
the language and proceedings of the two Governments, prejudicial to the
object which both have in view. In speaking of the variation in the
interests of the two countries, he alluded to Egypt affording a means of
communication and of transit between Europe and the British Empire
in India, which was an object of far greater importance to England than
to France. I replied, that although the facility of communication with
India, through Egypt, was a question in which England had greater
interest than France, I did not see why that circumstance should tend to
a divergence in the measures to be adopted for averting a collision
between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, but that I had no doubt of my
Government giving the most favourable attention to any proposal sug
gested by his Excellency, with the view of securing unity in the language
and proceedings of the two Governments in this matter.
I observed, that they had both protested, as well as Austria and
Russia, against the assertion by the Pasha, of his independence of the
Porte ; and that we had threatened to employ our naval force against
him, if, in spite of their protests, he carried that intention into effect.
Menaces had been successful, at least in suspending the announced
declaration of independence.
Count Mole said he could not rely upon the effect of our menace, if
no hope were held out to the Pasha of an arrangement being made with
the Sultan, favourable to the future position of his descendants ; our
object ought to be, considering the great age of Mehemst Ali, to gain
B

time, and to stave off the crisis in the affairs of the East ; and nothing
would tend more to the attainment of that object, than to indulge the
Pasha in the expectation of the good offices, of France and England being
employed at Constantinople to secure to his son the succession to the
Government of Egypt, on the same conditions on which it is now held by
Mehemet Ali.
The above is the substance of Count Mole's conversation with me on
this subject, and he requested me to report it to your Lordship.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 2.
Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received March 3.)
(Extract.) Therapia, January 27, 1839-
HAVE heard from good authority that advice has been given to
the Sultan, to propose to the Great Powers the formation of a conference
to decide the Oriental Question.
That the Great Council was held on the 22nd, to discuss the question
of peace or war with the Egyptians ; that the Sultan is as much as ever
alive to that question.
That the Riala Bey has been sent to Alexandria in command of the
steamer which took out the Sheik of the Mosque of Mecca, and has been
ordered to obtain the best information of the state of the Army and Navy
of Mehemet Ali.
On the 26th (yesterday), I heard from the same authority, that
rumours continued to increase of war between the Sultan and Me
hemet Ali ; that there is much movement at the Seraskierate ; that a
levy of 80,000 men has been determined to be made throughout the
empire, including the capital ; and that great changes are about to be
made amongst the high functionaries of the Porte, and several of them
will be replaced by men particularly known by their hostility to the
Pasha of Egypt.
Hafiz Pasha has lately shown a disposition to induce the Sultan to
act offensively against Mehemet Ali. Your Lordship will observe, in the
Persian correspondence sent home by this messenger, what is said re
specting an understanding between the Shah of Persia and Mehemet Ali
(a fact I long ago knew and stated).
I have endeavoured, as far as my means permitted me, to counteract
what I knew (previous to the later information) had been doing with a
view to induce the Sultan to deviate from his intention to wait for the
results of Rechid Pasha's embassy to Her Majesty being fully known,
before he should take any steps whatever of importance ; and with this
end in view, I sent M. Etienne Pisani to Riza Bey, to urge the necessity
for acting with the greatest prudence and caution in the difficult and
delicate situation of the Sultan's affairs, when a false step might have
the most serious consequences.

No. 3.
Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 1.)
(Extract.) Therapia, February 6, 1839.
ON the 4th, there was a Grand Council of Ministers and Pashas, for
the further discussion of the question of war or peace with Egypt.
The difficulty Of obtaining from the Mussulman population men
enough to complete the projected levies, was taken into consideration,

a
and a plan for raising Rayah Regiments, to be commanded by Turkish
officers. I am ignorant of the decision of the Council ; the report of it is
gone to the Sultan. I may not be able to ascertain the result, but I
believe, if war be determined on, Hosrew Pasha will be made Bash Vekil
(Prime Minister), he being the most marked enemy of Mehemet Ali.
I have at the same time to report, that the Ottoman treasury is said
to be empty; that the Minister of Finance states his inability to provide
for the most urgent expences, and upon that poverty justifies the con
tinuation of monopolies.
I have written despatches, which will go by the messenger, to
acquaint your Lordship, that I had endeavoured to prevent the adoption
of any warlike measures against Egypt; and it will there appear that I
have been aware of the state of things and mindful of it.

No. 4.
Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 3.)
(Extract.) Therapia, February 8, 1839.
WITH reference to my despatches of January 27 and February 6, I
have to say, that I do not believe the Sultan will commence hostilities
against Mehemet Ali at present. I have just had a communication with
his Highness, and recommended most strongly his observance of the
greatest prudence in his conduct ; and said, that his Highness could not
at this moment have sufficient grounds on which to form a sound judg
ment of his position.
The Sultan thanked me for my communication, and renewed the
assurances he previously gave, that he would do nothing precipitately.
It is certain that Hafiz Pasha has been advising war.
No. 5.
Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 13.)
(Extract ) Therapia, February 12, 1839.
I HOPE the Sultan will avoid committing himself in any way at
present. I omit no opportunity that offers, or that I can create, for
renewing to His Imperial Majesty the counsel not to put anything to
risk. No. 6.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 14.)
My Lord, Paris, March 1 1, 1839.
THE last despatches from Admiral Roussin, represent that the
appearance of affairs at Constantinople is very warlike. The Ambas
sador states that the Grand Signor is intent upon attacking the
Egyptians; and his counsellors, though differing in opinion from the
Sultan, and apprehensive of the consequences of commencing hostilities,
dare not risk incurring the displeasure of his Highness by giving him
advice to remain at peace. On the other hand, Ibrahim Pasha, it is
stated, says he will be cautious not to be an aggressor, but that if
attacked by the Turkish Army, he has no doubt of entirely defeating it,
and that he shall in that case march upon Constantinople immediately.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

B 2

No. 7.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, March 15, 1839.
HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which, as
reported in your despatch of the 12th ultimo, you have held with the view
of inducing the Sultan to avoid committing himself in any way at present ;
and I have to instruct your Excellency to press strongly on the Sultan,
that while, on the one hand, Great Britain would undoubtedly assist him
to repel any attack on the part of Mehemet Ali; it would, on the other
hand, be a different question if the war was begun by the Sultan.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 8.
Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 24.)
My Lord, Therapia, February 26, 1839
THE Ottoman fleet has been brought out of port, and is getting
ready to be employed, if wanted. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 9.
Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 6.)
(Extract.) Constantinople, March 7, 1839.
IT is reported, that some time ago the Sultan sent a Hatti-Sherif to
the Great Council to the following purport: —
" Hafiz Pasha informs me that my Army is able to defeat the
Egyptian Army in Syria. The Capudan Pasha tells me that my Fleet is
strong enough to defeat and destroy the Egyptian Fleet. It remains for
you to be courageous, and to do your duty."
To this Hatti-Sherif the Great Council returned for answer " that his
Highness' Ministers would do everything in their power to act in con
formity with the pleasure of their master."
I have taken every measure within my power to persuade the Sultan
of the advantages to himself that must be derived from patient and
prudent delay of all hostile movements on his part. I hope the Sultan i«
convinced of the truth of what I have said to him, and I expect that he
will not act at present against the Pasha of Egypt.

No. 10.
Mr. Milbanke to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received April 6.)
(Extract.) Vienna, March 28, 1839.
HEARING of the arrival of the messenger Barnard, on his way to
London, Prince Mettemich sent for me to request that I would be the
channel of communicating to your Lordship the substance of a report
which he had just received from the Austrian Internuncio, relative to the
threatening aspect which affairs had assumed on the Syrian and Turkish
frontiers.

His principal object in sending for me, however, was to beg me to call
the earnest attention of Her Majesty's Government to the necessity of at
once putting a stop to these warlike ebullitions, by the united remon
strances of all the Great Powers ; and he said that he was about to dis
patch a messenger to Constantinople, with instructions to Baron Stiirmer,
to state to the Sultan and his Ministers, in the most positive terms, that
Austria would not quietly allow events in the East to assume a character
by which the peace of Europe itself might be compromised. That if the
Pasha of Egypt was the aggressor, as the Turkish Ministers wished to
make out, the Sultan might count upon the assistance of the other Powers
in repelling any attack. But, that if the approach of the. Turkish Army
to the Syrian frontier led to a violation of the established 'status quo, the
Turkish Government must not be surprised if those Powers withdrew
their countenance from the Sultan, and abandoned the Empire to its fate:
Prince Metternich then added, that as he conceived this to be a case
which admitted of no delay, he trusted that your Lordship would not lose
a moment in instructing Lord Ponsonby to concert with his colleagues the
means of warding off the mischiefs which the present conduct of the Sultan
was calculated to produce.

No. 11.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 11.)
My Lord, Paris, April 8, 1839.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 5th of April.
A letter having appeared in the " Journal des Debats" of yesterday,
bearing the date of the 19th of March, from Constantinople, stating that
the hopes which had been entertained of maintaining peace in the East
had vanished, and that a war with the Egyptians was considered to be
inevitable,— I, this day, enquired at the Foreign Office whether the last
despatches from Admiral Roussin confirmed this intelligence?
I was informed, that no despatches of a very recent date had been
received by the French Government from Constantinople, but that Count
St. Aulaire had written from Vienna, that the Russian Ambassador at that
Court had communicated to Prince Metternich a despatch from M. de
Bouteneff, in which it is stated, that although he, M. de Bouteneff, had
declared that the assistance to the Turkish Government stipulated in the
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, could not be claimed, if the Turks were the
aggressors in a war against Mehemet Ali, the Sultan had not renounced
his warlike intentions ; and that it was most desirable that the Austrian
Internuncio at Constantinople should be furnished with instructions to use
the strongest language to deter the Sultan from carrying into execution
those intentions. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 12.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, April 12, 1839.
1 INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch*
from Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, reporting the substance of a
conversation with Prince Metternich, upon the disposition manifested by
the Porte to commence hostilities with Mehemet Ali.
* No. 10.

6

With reference to what is stated in this paper, I have to instruct
your Excellency to continue to co-operate actively with your colleagues in
endeavouring by all means in your power to prevail upon the Sultan to
abstain from any hostile proceedings against Mehemet Ali.
I add a copy of a letter which I have addressed to M. Hummelauer.

Inclosure in No. 12.
Viscount Palmerston to M. de Hummelauer.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, April 10, 1839.
YOU may assure Prince Metternich, that instructions have already
and frequently been given to Lord Ponsonby, to endeavour by all means
to dissuade the Porte from commencing hostilities against Mehemet Ali ;
and that Lord Ponsonby has continued, whenever circumstances required
it, and especially of late, to carry those instructions into execution. I
shall not fail, however, to write again to his Lordship upon this important
matter by the monthly messenger, who is about to set out; and Her
Majesty's Government would fain hope that the united efforts of the
Representatives of all the Great Powers will succeed in persuading the
Sultan to remain quiet.

No. 13.
Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 6.)
My Lord, Therapia, March 18, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of a message I received this day from the Sublime
Porte, and my reply to it. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 13.
Lord Ponsonby to M. E. Pisani.

Sir, Therapia, March 18, 1839.
I HAVE received your note containing the message from his Excel
lency Nouri Effendi, in the following words :
" D'apres les depeches recues a la Porte, de la part de Hafiz Pacha,
de Malatia, ecrites il y a environ vingt jours, un corps tres-considerable
de troupes Egyptiennes, sous le commandement de Kourschid Pacha, est
arriv6 a Adana ; tandis que le corps d'armee a Alep regoit tous les i'ours
des renforts. La distance d' Adana au camp de Hafiz Pacha, est d'environ
soixante lieues. Cet £tat de choses donne beaucoup a penser a Hafiz Pacha
qui a £te conseill6 par les officiers Prussiens employes dans son armee'
de lever le camp, et d'aller occuper certaines positions militaires situ£es
entre l'em placement du camp et Adana. Cette mesure est jug£e neces-
saire par les dits officiers. Les d6p6ches de Hafiz Pacha ont donne lieu
a la tenure d'un Conseil. La Porte ne sait pas quelle reponse elle devrait
faire a Hafiz Pacha, qui attend ses ordres. Elle se trouve dans le cas de
prendre, en cette circonstance, l'avis de son Excellence Lord Ponsonby
Je le prie de me faire savoir quelle serait, dans sa maniere de voir la
meilleure reponse a faire a Hafiz Pacha."
To the foregoing, I request you will reply, in my name, that I am
very sensible of the honour done me by the Ottoman Government, in de
siring my counsel, and that nothing would give me more satisfaction than

to be able to prove my attachment to the interests of the Sublime Porte,
by offering advice that might be of service, but that I value too much the
interest of the Sublime Porte to venture to speak upon a military question,
being myself ignorant of the art of war : and the question proposed to
me is one that belongs exclusively to military men to determine. But I
will, with the permission of his Excellency, take this occasion to renew
what Ihave often and often said, with relation to the political part of the
important matters of which this military question forms a portion, and
again beg of the Sublime Porte to weigh most deliberately its decisions,
and to make prudence and caution its guides. A false step might occasion
irremediable mischief; and it seems to me, that the Sublime Porte can
hardly be at this moment fully and completely acquainted with the pre
cise situation of affairs in all those parts of the world where what is done,
or doing, or to be done, must have a powerful action upon the welfare
of the Sublime Porte. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY,

(Translation of part of the above Inclosure.)
" ACCORDING to the despatches received at the Porte, from Hafiz
Pasha, of Malatia, written about twenty days since, a very considerable
body of Egyptian troops, under the command of Kourschid Pasha, had
arrived at Adana; whilst the corps d'armee at Aleppo receives reinforce
ments every day. The distance from Adana to the camp of Hafiz Pasha,
is about sixty leagues. This state of things gives much anxiety to Hafiz
Pasha, who has been advised by the Prussian officers employed in his
army, to raise the camp, and to proceed to occupy certain military
positions situated between the site of the camp and Adana. This step is
considered necessary by those officers. The despatches of Hafiz Pasha
have rendered it necessary that a Council should be held. The Porte
does riot know what answer it ought to return to Hafiz Pasha, who waits
its orders. It finds itself under the necessity of asking, under these
circumstances, the advice of his Excellency Lord Ponsonby. I request
him to let me know what would, according to his view of the subject, be
the best answer to return to Hafiz Pasha."

No. 14.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 13 .)
(Extract.) Cairo, March 11, 1839.
THE Pasha may be expected here on or before the 17th instant,
which is the 1st of the Turkish month of Moharem.
The Pasha's iron steamer left this for Essouan, five days ago, in
order to convey him to Cairo.
Abbas Pasha, who is intrusted with the Government, during the
absence of Mehemet Ali, has been alarmed by the reports which have
been received from Constantinople, of the warlike preparations of the
Sultan, which are said to be directed against Syria, and in consequence,,
wrote to press the return of the Viceroy to Cairo.
Orders have been given, and are in execution for getting the Pasha's
fleet ready for sea. A considerable quantity of arms has been sent to
Syria ; and it is supposed that 4,000 troops, which have lately arrived at
Alexandria from the interior, are for the same destination.

8

No. 15.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 13.)
(Extract.) Cairo, March 11, 1839.
THE Riala Bey, who arrived here on the 1 4th of February, left this
on the 1st instant for Alexandria, which place he left on the 7th instant
for Constantinople, on board of the Sultan's steamer.
I saw the Riala Bey different times during his stay in Cairo, and he
expressed much desire to see Mehemet Ali, but feared that he should not
be able to await his return to Cairo.
I have not been able to learn that the Riala Bey came here with any
ostensible mission ; and conclude, that the object of his coming to this
country, was merely to observe and to report the result of his observations.
But although the different public establishments here were ordered
to be open for his inspection, and the chiefs of them were directed to
afford to him all facilities and information, he did no.t evince any desire
[to visit] them.
The Riala Bey was attended by an officer of the Egyptian Navy, and
lodged in the palace of Houssein Pasha in this city.

No. 16.
Lord Ponsonby io Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 14.)
(Extract.) Therapia, March 19, 1839.
WHAT I am about to report may have connection with what I had
the honour to communicate in my despatch of March 7, to your Lordship,
and I entertain no doubt of its general truth.
" Hafiz Pasha and his officers are incessant in their demands and
cries to the Porte to march against the Egyptians, alleging that there
will never again be so favourable an opportunity for driving them out of
Syria. The reports were received almost at the same hour with another
report from Rechid Pasha, in which it is said that there is nothing to
be expected from the Courts of London or Paris. The two reports have
given force to the desire to attack Ibrahim, before his father can return
from his journey ; and it is almost certain that on the 17th instant, a
resolution existed of following the advice of Hafiz Pasha."
Your Lordship will understand, that when I say, I believe in the
general truth of what is stated, I do not mean to say that I believe the
Ottoman Government will act in the way described, for on that point I
give no opinion.

No. 17.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received
April 15.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, April 1, 1839.
WITH reference to the apparent probability that war may break out
between Turkey and Egypt, and to the desire of the Sultan to reduce his
refractory vassal to better subjection, I have to report to your Lordship
that Count Nesselrode tells me he is confident the Sultan will maintain
peace, and resign the hostile intentions he cherishes against Mehemet
Ali, provided the Russian and British Ambassadors at Constantinople
hold to the Divan the same language on that subject. '
I stated to his Excellency how assured I was that my Government
would spare no effort to induce the Sultan to maintain peace.

9
My colleagues here are firmly convinced that it is the sincere and
earnest desire of the Emperor that Turkey should remain in perfect
tranquillity : and I see no reason to differ from them in that opinion.

No. 18.
Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 29.)
(Extract.) Therapia, March 23, 1839.
NOURI EFFENDI sent me a message on the 21st instant, indicating
that my advice would be followed. I do not believe it had much weight,
but I think there will be nothing done at present to disturb the peace.
No. 19.
Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 26.)
Monsieur le Vicomte, 1, Bryanston Square, 26 Avril, 1839.
IL y a quelques jours j'ai eu l'honneur de demander a, votre
Excellence qu'elle voulut bien me communiquer le plus tot possible, le
projet de Traits contre les pretentions d'ind£pendance de Meh6met Ali.
Sachant bien que vous n'avez pas perdu de vue cette affaire, je ne
vous la rappellerais pas aujourd'hui si je n'avais pas absolument besoin
de m'absenter pendant quelques semaines ; ce qui me serait facile apres
avoir envoy e ce projet a Constantinople.
Si vous pensiez, M. le Vicomte, que la confection de ce document dut
entrainer quelque d61ai, je vous serais infiniment oblige de me le faire
savoir, pour que, suivant votre reponse, je differe ou avance le voyage
dont je vous ai parle. J'ai l'honneur d'etre, &c,
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de la Sublime Porte,
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire, (Sign^) RECHID.
(Translation.)
Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 26.)
Monsieur le Vicomte, 1, Bryanston Square, April 26, 1839.
I HAD the honour, some days since, to request your Excellency to
have the goodness to communicate to me, as soon as possible, the project
of treaty against Mehemet Ali's pretensions to independence.
Knowing well that you have not lost sight of this matter, I should
not recall it to your attention at present if I were not under the absolute
necessity of absenting myself for some weeks, which I could easily do
after having sent that project to Constantinople.
If you should think, M. le Vicomte, that the preparation of that docu
ment would occasion some delay, I should be greatly obliged by your inform
ing me of it, as 1 shall defer or hasten the journey of which I have spoken,
according to your answer. I have the honour to be, &c,
The Minister of the Sublime Porte for Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador Extraordinary, (Signed) RECHID.

10

No. 20,
Viscount Palmerston to Rechid Pasha.
Sir, Foreign Office, May 6, 1839.
I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter, of the
26th of April, requesting that I would communicate to you, as soon as
possible, the draft of Treaty in opposition to the pretensions to indepen
dence advanced by Mehemet Ali ; and I have to acquaint your Excellency
that I propose to send it to you in the course of a few days.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 21.
Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 29.)
Monsieur le Vicomte, 1, Bryanston Square, 27 Avril, 1839.
M'ETANT toujours fait un devoir de tenir votre Excellence au
courant de la tendance que les affaires prennent a Constantinople, j'ai-
aujourd'hui l'honneur de lui annoncer que les craintes quel'onavait sur
le commencement des hostilites entre l'arm6e de 8a Hautesse et les
troupes de Mehemet Ali, sont tres-affaiblies par la teneur des dep§ches que
j'ai regues aujourd'hui merne; la paix semble desormais assur£e pour
cette ann£e. Je suis, &c,
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de la Sublime Porte,
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire, (Signe) RECHID.
(Translation.)
Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 29.)
Monsieur le Vicomte, 1, Bryanston Square, April 27, 1839.
HAVING always made it my duty to keep your Excellency acquainted
with the turn which affairs take at Constantinople, I have to-day the
honour to inform you that the fears entertained of the commencement of
hostilities between the army of His Highness and the troops of Mehemet
Ali are greatly diminished by the tenour of the despatches which I have
received this day; peace appears to be henceforth secured for this year.
I am, &c,
The Minister of the Sublime Porte for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Extraordinary, (Signed) RECHID.

No. 22.
Viscount Palmerston to Rechid Pasha.
Sir> Foreign Office, May 6, 1839.
I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of the
27th of April, acquainting me that the tenour of the despatches which
you had on that day received, led you to imagine that the apprehensions
of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali were much diminished

11
and that it was thought that peace would probably be maintained during
the present year ; and I hasten to express to your Excellency the sincere
satisfaction which Her Majesty's Gdvernment have derived from this
intelligence. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 23.
Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 27.)
(Extract.) Therapia, April 6, 1839.
THE messenger who was the bearer of your Lordship's despatches to
the 11th of March, arrived late on the 4th instant. That evening I sent
for translation into the Turkish language, the substance of your Lord1'
ship'.s communication to me, " that you were agreed with Rechid Pasha
on the principle of the proposed Treaty, and employed in preparing the
details," and your other arguments. I added the best reasoning I could
use, to iriduce the Porte to abandon warlike policy for the present. I
pleaded for delay, knowing that I should do greater harm than good by
calling for more.
. The Mousteshar Nouri Effendi has replied to my communication,
" that the Sublime Porte could not be satisfied with the Treaty, because it
is not the Treaty that Rechid Pasha wished to make ; that the Porte
desired to destroy the status quo, and the Treaty proposed by Lord
Palmerston not only leaves it in full force, but also binds the Porte not
to take advantage in future of any favourable occasion that may offer ;
that Lord Palmerston's Treaty, with an extraordinary abruptness, stipu
lates, simply, that England shall unite with the Sublime Porte to act
against Mehemet Ali, if he or his successor (of his family) shall declare
his independence, or commit any aggression."
Nouri Effendi has promised to give a written answer to my commu
nication, as soon as he has received the Sultan's commands. I will detain
the messenger that it may be transmitted to your Lordship immediately.
Tahar Pasha (Chief of the Etat Major under the Seraskier) sailed
yesterday in the steamer for Trebizond, from whence he goes to the head
quarters of Hafiz Pasha. He was dispatched after the Treaty in
question had been submitted in the first instance to the consideration of
Nouri Effendi and the Capudan Pasha ; and secondly, to the consideration
of the Council. I have reason to fear the orders of Tahar Pasha are not
of a nature to please your Lordship.
I believe that M. de Bouteneff has been seriously endeavouring to
prevent war ; the Internuncio has done the same, and the French Ambas
sador also; and I have continued unceasingly to recommend to the
Sultan to delay at least, if not to abstain altogether from everything that
may commit him in a perilous enterprize.

No. 24.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 29.)
My Lord, Beyrout, March 14, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the forced con
scription is again in operation in Syria.
The levy to be raised is given out as 9,000 men,— a number, small as
it may appear, the country will have great difficulty in supplying, so
great has been the preceding drain on the population.
Some modification, it is said, is to take place in respect to the manner
of raising the conscripts, who are not to be seized as formerly. An eye-
kj 2i

12
witness, however, informed me that he met recruits betwixt Aleppo and
Damascus manacled.
By advices from Damascus to the 9th instant, Ibrahim Pasha left that
place on the 5th, for the north of Syria, where his immediate presence is
said to be required.
Rumour adds, that the insurgents of the ranges of the Taurus have
been joined by the Sultan's troops on the Aleppo frontier.
At the Ledgea things remain in statu quo.
Up to this day, the authorities here remain without instructions rela
tive to the Commercial Treaty, and the sale of the monopolies proceeds.
In this neighbourhood all is tranquil.
March 15.
We hear to-day that Ibrahim Pasha will remain for the present at
Homs or Hamah. His Highness is making military preparations in con
sequence of advices received from the north. Solyman Pasha is about
leaving Acre to join Ibrahim Pasha.
Affairs at the Ledgea are represented as in a very unsettled state,
notwithstanding the conscription has been remitted, and a free promise of
pardon given to everybody, £ I have, &c,
(Signed) N. MOORE.
March 16.
P.S. — Solyman Pasha is expected to pass near Beyrout this day, on
his way to Aleppo, on urgent military affairs.
March 18.
Solyman Pasha arrived at Beyrout on Saturday evening, and left this
morning for Homs and Hamah. His Excellency spoke publicly of the
probability of an approaching conflict with the Sultan's forces in the
north ; and the troops are all ordered to be in a state of readiness. N. M.

No. 25.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 9.)
(Extract.) Cairo, April 1, 1839.
THE Pasha declares that he will not be the aggressor, but that if
the Sultan does attack him, he will follow him up, and take entire posses
sion of Orfa and Diarbekir, and which nothing will then oblige him to
relinquish. He stated so this morning in my presence, in that of the
Consuls-General of Russia and Tuscany, and of Boghos Bey.
The Pasha added, that he hoped the Sultan would not be so impolitic
as to attack him. I am, however, of opinion that the Pasha was not
sincere in his hope ; and that he does desire a war with the Porte, pro
vided the Sultan were the aggressor.

No. 26.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 16.)
(Extract.) Therapia, April 22, 1839.
ON the 6th instant I reported that, in accordance with your Lordship's
instructions, I urged with the Porte, as arguments against a breach
between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, the facts that you had agreed
with Rechid Pasha on the principle of a Treaty, and were occupied in
preparing the details, &c, &c. I also reported Nouri Effendi's answer,

13
and his promise to give me a further reply in writing, after he had received
the commands of the Sultan, for which I would detain the messenger.
I endeavoured to gain from Nouri Effendi some knowledge of the
Treaty to which your Lordship alluded, in order to be better enabled to
execute my instructions ; but Nouri Effendi's answers were unsatisfactory.
On the 12th, he said, "The Treaty is rather mischievous than useful to
the Porte. We must take time to consider it." He promised to inform
me what was decided upon.
The 13th, I acquainted Nouri that a French merchant had talked of
a Treaty of Alliance being in negotiation at London, between England
and Turkey ; Nouri said, he must have learnt it from the French embassy,
as France was engaged in the affair.
On the 15th, Nouri promised to give me, confidentially, a copy of
what the Porte had received from Rechid Pasha ; and on the 18th he sent
me a copy of the Treaty, which is inclosed.
Your Lordship had considered the Treaty a motive that should
induce the Porte to abstain from hostilities : 1 thought it my duty to
endeavour to counteract those who advised the Porte to reject it ; and
under this impression, I began, on the 18th, a discussion with Nouri,
which I have continued up to the present time, — sending him reasonings,
written in Turkish, to be submitted to the Sultan.
On the 21st, Nouri said he agreed with me in many points, and dif
fered from me in others ; but on the whole, he was convinced that no
Treaty would be of any use to the interests of the Porte, which had not
for its object the destruction of Mehemet Ali, and therefore the Porte
ought not to make any Treaty.
I replied, that the British Government could not be expected to
abandon in such a manner its known policy, and that it was vain to
expect it. That Her Majesty's Government asked the Porte for nothing,
but, on the contrary, gave the Porte by this Treaty a solid security
against danger from any attacks made by the Pasha of Egypt. That the
security thus afforded would enable the Sultan (were he disposed to avail
himself of it) to diminish materially his expences.
Nouri said he valued my opinion very much ; that he felt his responsi
bility and knew his duty ; that he would make a report to be sent in to
the Sultan, together with my observations.
Your Lordship will see that this affair is not yet decided ; but it
may be that the resolution is already taken to refuse the Treaty.
I have not received from the Porte the reply which was promised to
my first communications on the subject of hostilities, and for which I
detained the messenger ; but I have learnt from other quarters enough
to authorize me to believe that no hostile movement will be made at pre
sent by the Porte, and I therefore dispatch him with that statement ; but
your Lordship will observe that I do not speak positively, because a
collision may at any time take place when hostile parties are in juxta
position, as is at present the case.
The Sultan continues to repose confidence in Rechid Pasha. He has
sent him orders to return here, and he will on his arrival resume the
exercise of his functions as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Inclosure in No. 26.

Traduction de la Minute d'un Traite a Stre conclu entre la Sublime Porte
et le Gouvernement de Sa Mqjeste Britannique, contre les projets in-
senses d'independance du Pacha d'Egypte.
[N.B. Cette traduction est faite sur une traduction Turque envoy ee
de Londres par Rechid Pacha.l
ATTENDU la possibilite que le Pacha d'Egypte, qui se considere
comme independant, manque a Paccomplissement de quelqu'un de ses
devoirs auxquels il est oblige en sa qualite de sujet; attendu qu'il est

u
a presumer que par suite du deces du Pacha, ou de quelque autre
evenement, quelqu'un de ses fils, ou quelque membre de la famille du
Pacha, ou quelqu'un autre, se rende coupable de desobeissance a la
resolution et a la volonte de Sa Hautesse, il a ete juge a propos de
con venir des Articles suivans: ARTICLE I.
Le Sultan etant le souverain (Padishah) ,de l'Egypte, de la Syrie, et
dependances, Sa Hautesse permet a la flotte Anglaise d'arr&ter les
batimens de guerre et de commerce du Pacha ; et comme il est probable
que le Pacha se servira de batimens marchands des Puissances Amies qui
resteront neutres, ,pour prendre et envoyer des munitions de guerre et
de bouche, la flotte du Sultan visitera, d'apres le droit clair et evident de
Sa Hautesse, les batimens ci-dessus designs, et, s'il le faut, elle en saisira

les chargemens.

ARTICLE II.
Les Flofctes Ottomane et Anglaise se reuniront, pour agir de concert,
sur les cotes d'Egypte et de Syrie.

ARTICLE III.
Le present Traite sera en vigueur l'espace de annees.
(Translation.)
Translation of the Minute of a Treaty to be concluded between the Sublime
Porte and Her Britannic Majesty against the insane projects of inde
pendence entertained by the Pasha of Egypt.
[N.B. This Translation is made from a Turkish Translation sent
from London by Rechid Pasha.]
SEEING that there is a possibility that the Pasha of Egypt, who
considers himself independent, may fail to accomplish some of the
duties which he owes in his quality of subject; — seeing that it may be
presumed that, in consequence of the death of the Pasha, or of some
other event, some one of his sons, or some member of the Pasha's family
or some other individual, may render himself guilty of disobedience to the
resolution and to the will of His Highness, it has been judged proper to
agree to the following Articles : —
ARTICLE I.
f~ The Sultan being the Sovereign (Padishah) of Egypt, Syria, and
their dependencies, His Highness permits the English fleet to detain the
ships of war and merchant vessels of the Pasha ; and as it is probable
that the Pasha will make use of the merchant vessels of friendly Powers
who will remain neutral, to take and send warlike stores and pro*-
visions, the fleet of the Sultan shall search, in conformity with the clear
and evident right of His Highness, the vessels above described and if
need be, shall seizetheir cargoes.

15

ARTICLE II.
The Ottoman and English fleets shall unite to act in concert on the
coasts of Egypt, and Syria. ARTICLE III.
The present Treaty shall be in force for the space of years.
No. 27.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 16.)
My Lord, Vienna, May 8, 1839.
PRINCE METTERNICH'S last advices from Constantinople assure
him that the Sultan will not attack Mehemet Ali. His Highness has applied,
to Prince Metternich for advice in the very difficult situation in which he
is placed ; and the Prince is drawing Up an answer, of which Prince
. Esterhazy will be the bearer to your Lordship.
The main idea in it seems to be, that the Sultan should run his life
against Mehemet Ali's, denying at the same time the great difficulty of
his situation, if he will but be content with it, and abandon the idea of
improving it by the premature employment of force. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.
No. 28.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 16.)
(Extract.) Therapia, April 23, 1839.
THE Internuncio called on me this day to inform me of the substance
qf a communication he had made, by order of his Government, to the Porte.
The expressions used by the Internuncio were very friendly towards
the Ottoman Government; and the Ministers in return used equally
friendly language, whilst they stated the misery produced by the con
tinuance of the status quo, which they said it was impossible to maintain
without completing the ruin of this country. They said the Sultan had
no desire for a triumph, because it must be bought by the blood of his
people, but that things were hastening to ruin, &c, &c.
The impression of the Internuncio was, that the Porte would not at
present begin hostilities, but that they might be caused by accidents ; and
he is of opinion that the state of affairs in this country cannot be
preserved as it is. He talked of several things that had been suggested
as possible for the remedy of the evils, but without arriving at any
satisfactory conviction.
We both agreed, that to support Mehemet Ali against the Sultan
would be a partition of the Ottoman Empire de facto.
The Internuncio spoke with entire frankness, of the community of
the interests of England and Austria with respect to the preservation of
Turkey. The Internuncio told me, that the Ottoman Minister, in reply to a
question, said, that there were still hopes of the success of Rechid Pasha
in London. He did not ask me what the Treaty was, but talked of one
being in contemplation between the Governments. I said, I thought it
Would be prudent to form some connection with Turkey.

16
. No. 29.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 27.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, May 14, 1839.
COUNT NESSELRODE expresses great confidence in the continu
ance of peace between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt.
His Excellency has shown me the instructions he has sent to Count
Medem, the Russian Consul-General in Egypt, to persuade Mehemet Ali to
withdraw his forces in Syria from their present advanced position ; and
the despatch directing Count Pozzo di Borgo to communicate those
instructions to your Lordship.

No. 30.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 27.)
My Lord, Alexandria, May 4, 1839.
THE Pasha's steamer " Nile" arrived here on the 1st instant from
Beyrout, and brought me a letter from Mr. Consul Moore, of which the
following is an extract : —
"I hasten to acquaint you with the intelligence we have received
here, confirmed by Mr. Werry this morning from Damascus, — his letter is
to the 27th, — that the Sultan's forces have crossed the Euphrates at Bir.
All the troops from every quarter are ordered to the north."
I much fear that this intelligence is true, and that the Sultan, in
spite of the remonstrances of Lord Ponsonby, and of the other Ambas
sadors at Constantinople, has been persuaded by the presumptuous
counsels of Hafiz Pasha, to take this rash step.
The Pasha's fleet is all ready for sea, and I deem it probable that he
himself will very soon be here, if the reports from Syria prove to be
correct. The two sons of Ibrahim Pasha have returned from Syria in the
"Nile" steamer. I have, &.c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 31.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 27.)
My Lord, Alexandria, May 5, 1839.
WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday, I have now the
honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter from Boghos
Bey, together with that of its inclosure.
Your Lordship will see by this inclosure, that Ibrahim Pasha writes
to the Viceroy, that the Sultan's forces had advanced beyond Bir, where
they had erected some fortifications, and that Ibrahim Pasha was going
to Aleppo, which is only about sixty miles from Bir ; and that Mehemet
Ali, evidently in order to prevent any possibility of his being considered
the aggressor, had directed Ibrahim Pasha not to make any movements in
advance. I send copy of this despatch and of its inclosures to Lord Ponsonby
in the hope that it may possibly reach his Excellency before any collision
may have taken place between the armies of the Sultan and Mehemet
Ali, and that the Porte may be induced to listen to the counsels of his
Lordship, and to retire its troops before any hostilities commence ¦ but
still I much fear that the prudent measures of Mehemet Ali may be
construed by the Sultan's General into fear, and that he will advance, and

17
force Ibrahim Pasha into active hostilities ; and, indeed, it is difficult to
conceive that the two armies can remain long so near to each other
without coming into hostile collision.
It appears to me that the present movement of the Sultan's army
must have been formed some time since, and the necessary preparations
made, as by crossing the Euphrates at Bir, they avoid all the fortified
defiles of the Taurus, and will completely come in the rear of them.
Should hostilities take place, I think it very probable that the army
of Kourschid Pasha, which is now in Arabia, will either march on
Bagdad, or come in the rear of the Sultan's army.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 31.
Boghos Bey to Colonel Campbell.

Alexandrie, ce 4 Mai, 1839.
EN execution de l'ordre superieur, le Soussigne a l'honneur de trans-
mettre par la presente, a M. le Colonel Campbell, Agent et Consul-General
de Sa Majeste Britannique en Egypte et dependances, la traduction d'une
lettre du 16 Sefer, 1255 (ler Mai), que M. Artin Bey, premier Secretaire
Interprete, lui a adressee de Chiban, dans la Basse Egypte, par commande-
ment de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi, et relative a ce qui se passe en ce moment
aux frontieres nord de la Syrie.
II saisit avec plaisir cette nouvelle occasion pour lui reiterer les
assurances de sa tres-haute consideration. (Signe') BOGHOS JOUSSOUFF BEY.

(Translation.)
Boghos Bey to Colonel Campbell. Alexandria, May 4t, 1839.
IN execution of superior orders, the Undersigned has the honour to
transmit herewith to Colonel Campbell, Her Britannic Majesty's Agent
and Consul-General in Egypt and its dependencies, the translation of a
letter of the 16th Sefer, 1255 (1st of May) which M. Artin Bey, first
Secretary Interpreter, has addressed to him from Chiban, in Lower Egypt,
by command of His Highness the Viceroy, and which relates to what is
passing at this moment on the northern frontiers of Syria.
He seizes with pleasure this fresh opportunity of renewing to him
the assurances of his highest consideration.
(Signed) BOGHOS JOUSSOUFF BEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

Lettre de Monsieur Artin Bey, premier Secretaire Interprete de Son Altesse
le Vice-Roi, h son Excellence Boghos Bey, datee 16 Sefer, 1255 (ler
Mai), a, Chiban, dans la Basse Egypte.
(Traduction.)
SON ALTESSE le Generalissime vient de faire connaitre par une
lettre particuliere, que les forces du Sultan ont ddpasse Bilegik (appeleV
actuellement Bir), et y ont fait quelques fortifications; Son Altesse le
Generalissime apr&s avoir donne ordre a nos regimens cantonnes en Syrie,
de marcher vers Alep, allait se rendre en personne dans cette ville.
Son Altesse le Vice-Roi ay ant juge que cette conduite de la Porte
D

18
devait avoir pour but de faire tomber la faute sur nous, a eerit a Son Altesse
le Generalissime de ne faire aucun mouvement avant que d'etre sur de
I'avancement des troupes du Sultan, et de se confier en Dieu, et d'agir en
consequence, si I'avancement de ces forces se constatait d'une maniere
positive, Son Altesse le Vice-Roi charge votre Excellence de communiquer de
suite a Messieurs les Consuls-Generaux, ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui
ecrire ci-dessus.

(Translation.)
Letter from M. Artin Bey, first Secretary Interpreter of His Highness
the Viceroy, to his Excellency Boghos Bey, dated \§th Sefer, 1255,
(1st May,) at Chiban, in Lower Egypt.
HIS Highness the Generalissimo has just announced in a private
letter, that the forces of the Sultan have passed Bilegik (now called Bir),
and have constructed some fortifications there ; His Highness the
Generalissimo, after having given orders to our regiments stationed in
Syria, to march towards Aleppo, was about to repair in person to
that city.
His Highness the Viceroy, having thought that this conduct on the
part of the Porte must have had for its object to throw the blame upon
us, has written to His Highness the Generalissimo to make no movement
before he was sure of the advance of the troops of the Sultan, and to
trust in God, and to act accordingly, if the advance of those forces was
positively proved to have taken place.
His Highness the Viceroy instructs your Excellency to communicate
forthwith to the Consuls-General, that which I have had the honour to
write to you above.

No. 32.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 27.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, May 7, 1839.
COUNT MEDEM read to me, yesterday, a despatch of 12th April,
from Count Nesselrode.
Count Medem is directed to intimate to Mehemet Ali, to recall Ibrahim
Pasha from Syria, and to retire the Egyptian troops towards Damascus,
without delay. That as it is clear from the reports received by the
Emperor from Constantinople, and from the Prussian officers in the service
of the Sultan, that the offensive movements of the Egyptian Army have
been the sole cause of the advance of the Sultan's forces, Mehemet Ali
must be the first to retire his troops, and then the Emperor will prevail on
the Sultan to cause his army to withdraw from the Syrian frontier.
Count Nesselrode adds, that a copy of the despatch will be sent to the
different Courts of Europe ; and he directs Count Medem to communicate
it to his colleagues here.
Count Nesselrode appears to have grounded his despatch on very false
data, in assuming that Mehemet Ali was the aggressor. So far from
Mehemet Ali being the aggressor, it is a fact, that for some months past,
the letters of Lord Ponsonby to me, and the despatches from Baron
Sturmer and from Admiral Roussin to their Consuls-General here
mention the hostile preparations of the Sultan, and his intentions to
attack Syria, and the efforts of the different Ambassadors to prevail on
the Sultan not to take so rash a step; and, indeed, I am confident that
the resolve of the Sultan to invade Syria was caused by his opinion, that
upon the appearance of the Turkish Army, the whole of Syria would rise
up in his favour.
As to Mehemet Ali, I can assert confidently, that it never was his

19
intention to be the active aggressor, nor to pass the frontiers of Syria, nor
to attack the Sultan's forces ; and I am borne out in this view of the subject,
not only by the positive declarations of Mehemet Ali, but also by the
opinions of the Consuls-General of the Great Powers.
The Consul-General of Austria has received instructions from Vienna,
similar to those received by Count Medem,
I do not believe that Mehemetx Ali will accede to the intimation of
Russia, either to recall Ibrahim Pasha, or to retire his troops, as in the
latter case, he could not have any security, that after their withdrawal,
the Sultan's army would not enter Syria, and perhaps destroy all the works
erected by Ibrahim Pasha in the Taurus frontier ; and if circumstances
proved favourable, they might advance still further.
I trust to be enabled to communicate to your Lordship, officially, by
Her Majesty's next steamer, the result of the communication of Count
Medem and of M. de Laurin with the Pasha.

No. 33.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 27.)
My Lord, Paris, May 23, 1839.
THE Marshal Soult called upon me this day for the purpose of
informing me that a telegraphic despatch had been received this
morning from Marseilles, communicating the important intelligence that
the army of the Sultan had made . a movement in advance, and that
hostilities had actually commenced between the Turkish and Egyptian
forces, This intelligence was brought by a steamer which left Malta on the
1 6th of this month, and it appears that it had reached that island from
Syra as well as from Alexandria. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 34.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 27.)
My Lord, Paris, Mdy 24, 1839.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 21st of May.
I have not seen Marshal Soult since his communication to me
yesterday, of the intelligence he had just received, by telegraph, of the
commencement of hostilities between the Turkish and Egyptian troops.
When I called this morning at the Foreign Office, his Excellency
was attending a Cabinet Council, which was deliberating upon the
measures to be adopted by the French Government, in consequence of
this intelligence. I had, however, the opportunity of conversing last night with several
members of the Cabinet, and amongst others, with M. Duchatel, the
Minister of the Interior, and with General Schneider, the Minister of
War ; they both seemed strongly impressed with the seriousness of the
danger to the peace of Europe, which may be apprehended from this
invasion of Syria by the Turkish Army. They expressed an anxious desire
that under these critical circumstances, the most cordial concert should exist
between the French and British Governments ; they had no doubt that
the French Government would make great exertion to fit out a formidable
fleet to be sent to the Levant, and hoped that it would co-operate with
the naval force of Great Britain.
I may therefore, I think, give your Lordship reason to expect that
D 2

20

whatever may be suggested by Her Majesty's Government as most expe
dient to be done in the present alarming state of affairs in the East, will
be most favourably attended to by the French Government. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 35.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received May 27.)
My Lord, Paris, May 25, 1839.
A DESPATCH was received yesterday by the French Government
from Turin, stating that an Austrian steam- vessel had arrived at Trieste,
which brought an account of hostilities having commenced between the
Turkish and Egyptian Armies.
The intelligence previously received by way of Malta and Marseilles
being thus confirmed, the French Ministry resolved to propose this day to
the Chamber of Deputies, a vote of credit of ten millions of francs, to
defray the expence of an augmentation of the French naval force in the
Levant, rendered necessary by the rupture of the peace between the
Sultan and Mehemet Ali. (Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 36.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 30.)
My Lord, Paris, May 27, 1839.
THE inclosed " Moniteur" contains the speech of the Minister of
Marine, in the Chamber of Deputies, on Saturday last, when he presented
the demand of a vote of credit to the amount of ten millions of francs, to
defray the eventual expence of an augmentation of the naval forces of
France in the Levant, which the imminent rupture of the peace between
the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, may render expedient.
The Chamber will, without doubt, acquiesce in this demand.
Marshal Soult told me this morning that his last despatches from
Constantinople and from Alexandria, were both dated on the 7th of this
month. Admiral Roussin writes, that the Turkish Ministers still continue to
give assurances that the Sultan will not attack the Egyptians ; but the
unwonted activity in the arsenals of Constantinople, and the extra
ordinary efforts made by the Turkish Government to send reinforcements
to their Army on the borders of Syria, contradict these assurances.
To Marshal Soult, as well as to me, the Turkish Ambassador at
Paris asserts positively that his latest advices from his Government are of
a pacific tone ; and he contends, that if hostilities have commenced, the
Egyptians must have been the aggressors.
On the other hand, the despatches of the French Consul at Alexandria,
state, that according to advices received by Mehemet Ali from Ibrahim
Pasha, the Turkish Army had crossed the military line of demarcation
between the Turkish and Egyptian Forces, and established fortifications
at Bir, on the Euphrates ; that he, Ibrahim Pasha, was in consequence
concentrating his troops at Aleppo; but that Mehemet Ali, under the
persuasion that it was the object of the Turkish Government to throw
the responsibility of aggression on the Egyptians, had enjoined his son to
make no movement, until the Turkish troops had advanced so far as to
put that question out of doubt, and then to trust to God and his Prophet
for the success of his arms.
Marshal Soult and his colleagues, with most of whom I have had

21
the opportunity of conversing upon this subject, express the strongest
desire that the British and French Governments may act entirely in
concert. The Marshal received this morning a despatch from M. de Bourqueney,
reporting the substance of a conversation he had had with your Lordship,
after the receipt of the last intelligence from the East, and was much
pleased with this report ; he understood from it, that the British Fleet in
the Mediterranean, including the reinforcements which might be sent to
it, would amount to ten sail of the line ; and he told me that in a very
short time, no less than eight or nine French sail of the line would be
prepared for the Levant station. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 37.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 30.)
(Extract.) Therapia, May 1, 1839.
I INCLOSE for Her Majesty's Government, the answer His Majesty
the Sultan has been pleased to make to my late communications
respecting Mehemet Ali.

Inclosure in No. 37.

Reponse du Sultan aux communications qui lui ont ete faites au sujet de
Mehemet Ali; communiquee par son Excellence le Mousteshar Nouri
Effendi, a son Excellence Lord Ponsonby, le 28 Avril, 1839.
(Traduction faite sur la copie de la Reponse.)
LES instructions qu'accompagnait un billet de la part de votre
Excellence, ont ete mises sous les yeux de Sa Hautesse, qui en a pris
connaissance. L'Internonce d'Autriche a communique a. la Sublime Porte les
reflexions que le Prince de Metternich vient de faire sur une mesure qu'il
propose, savoir : d'abandonner les preparatifs de guerre diriges contre
l'individu qui se dit Pacha d'Egypte. 11 est meme venu, il y a peu de
jours, au Mabein, pour faire soumettre a Sa Hautesse quelques considera
tions roulant sur la necessite de prendre un terme moyen pour mettre
fin a cette question embarrassante, sans recourir a Ja guerre. J'ai recu
alors de la propre bouche de Sa Hautesse l'ordre de dire a M. l'lnter-
nonce, ce qui suit : " Ce Mehemet Ali n'a cesse, depuis l'affaire de
Conia, de se mettre sur un pied a tout entreprendre. II ruine les pays qui
ont passe sous son commandement, et il reduit les habitans a la misere ;
il leve des troupes, et fait construire des batteries et d'autres fortifications.
Ma Sublime Porte n'avait songe, jusqu'a une epoque recente, a eiever
nulle part des fortifications ; et ce n'est que depuis l'annee passee qu'elle a
entrepris de faire fortifier quelques positions dans les environs de Conia.
Et comme les procedes de Mehemet Ali, et ses folles pretentions, sont de
nature a ne nous laisser l'ombre de securite, on a du prendre les mesures
de defense que les regies de la prudence suggeraient, en envoyant au vu et
su de tout le monde, des troupes et le materiel de guerre necessaire,
vers Sivas et Conia. Si les Grandes Puissances ne disaient pas le mot
contre les actes de rebellion de Mehemet Ali, et elles s'obstinaient, en
m£me terns, a vouloir empecher Ma Sublime Porte d'agir, voila, certes, qui
ne serait ni conforme aux egards que les Gouvernemens se doivent
entr'eux, ni consequent avec les sentimens de bienveillance que Ton pro-
fesse ; et il est clair et evident que si Mehemet Ali commet quelque acte
d'agression, Ma Sublime Porte ne pourra plus rester dans l'inaction. II

22
est egalement clair et evident, que comme Ton ne doit dans aucune
circonstance vouloir I'effusion du sang, qui est une suite de la guerre, si
Mehemet Ali reconnait et pratique les obligations que lui impose sa
qualite de sujet, Ma Sublime Porte ne prendra point le parti de la guerre;
d'autant plus que les pays soumis au Gouvernement de Mehemet Ali,
faisant partie de mes etats hereditaires, la perte d'hommes de part et
d'autre, et les maux qui viendraient fondre sur les pays, et affliger les
populations, et surtout les classes pauvres, ne me toucheraient que
de trop pres. Mais que faut-il faire, lorsqu'il ne reste plus aucune
securite de la part d'un homme devore par l'ambition et l'avidite, qui a
concu des projets perfides ? Tant que cet etat de choses dure, la surete"
et la tranquillite mutuelles ne sauraient exister, et je suis dans le cas
d'entretenir a grands frais, une armee et un camp Imperial. Si Ton
considerait cette question, comme on devrait le faire, sous les rapports des
convenances qui doivent s'observer entre Gouvernemens ; si on l'exami-
nait avec bienveillance et justice, n'est-ce pas que Ton trouverait que la
raison est tout-a-fait de mon cote, et que Mehemet Ali est coupable?
Quant au Prince Metternich, c'est un homme anime de sentimens bien-
veillans, un homme d'un excellent jugement ; je dois done soupconner et
croire que cette chaleur et cette vivacite qui caracterisent le langage qu'il
tient aujourd'hui, ne sont que l'effet du ton sur lequel on lui a eerit, soit
d'ici, soit d'autres endroits. M. l'lnternonce a parie a Nouri Effendi de
terme moyen pour la solution de cette question, sans avoir recours aux
armes ; cela veut dire la rentree de Mehemet Ali dans la position qui lui
convient comme sujet ; mais cette position ne peut se realiser que par la
restitution, par Mehemet Ali, d' Adana, de Damas, d'Alep, de Seyda, de
Jerusalem, et de Naplouse, et par la reduction de ses forces actuelles a ce
point qui seul serait compatible avec sa qualite de sujet. Si les Grandes
Puissances veulent travailler a faire naitre un pareil etat de choses, alors
il serait digne de moi d'y donner mon adhesion Imperiale."
Telles sont les paroles que, d'ordre du Sultan, j'ai rapportees a M.
l'lnternonce. Son Excellence ayant prete une oreille attentive a tout ce
que je lui ai dit, elle m'a assure, que conformement aux ordres qu'elle
avait recus de sa Cour, elle va faire savoir tout ce que je lui ai rapporte
au Prince Metternich.
J'ai egalement recu deSa Hautesse l'ordre de dire, que si le Gouverne
ment de Sa Majeste Britannique veut faire un acte d'amitie et de
bienveillance en adherant a un Traite d'Alliance concu dans le sens ci-
dessus exprime, Sa Hautesse l'acceptera avec plaisir ; et M. l'Ambassa-
deur d'Angleterre est prie de faire savoir a sa Cour cette reponse du
Sultan. (Translation.")
(Translation made from, the Copy of the Answer.)
Reply of the Sultan to the Communications made to him on the subject of
Mehemet Ali; communicated by his Excellency the Mousteshar Nouri
Effendi io his Excellency Lord Ponsonby, April 28, 1839.
THE instructions which accompanied a note on the part of your
Excellency, have been laid before His Highness, who has taken cognizance
of them. The Austrian Internuncio has communicated to the Sublime Porte
the reflections which Prince Metternich has made upon a measure which
he proposes ; namely, to abandon the warlike preparations directed
against the individual who calls himself Pasha of Egypt. He even
came, a few days ago, to the Mabein, to cause some considerations to
be submitted to His Highness, touching the necessity of taking a
middle course for the purpose of putting an end to this embarrassing
question, without having recourse to war. I then received from His
Highness' own mouth the order to say to the Internuncio what follows ¦
"This Mehemet Ali has not ceased, since the affair of Conia, from
putting himself in a position to undertake anything. He ruins the
countries which have passed under his rule, and he reduces the inha-

23
bitants to misery; he levies troops, and causes batteries and other
fortifications to be erected. My Sublime Porte had not, until recently,
contemplated the erection of fortifications anywhere ; and it is only since
last year that it undertook to cause some positions in the neighbourhood
of Conia to be fortified. And since the proceedings and the foolish
pretensions of Mehemet Ali are of a nature not to leave us a shadow of
security, it has been necessary to take the measures of defence which
prudence suggests, by sending openly and in the face of the whole world,
the necessary troops and munitions of war towards Sivas and Conia. If
the Great Powers were to say nothing against the rebellious acts of
Mehemet Ali, and if they were to persist, at the same time, in wishing to
prevent my Sublime Porte from acting, this, certainly, would not be
in conformity with the deference which Governments owe to one another,
nor in accordance with their professed sentiments of goodwill ; and it is
clear and evident that if Mehemet Ali commits any act of aggression, my
Sublime Porte can no longer remain inactive. It is equally clear and
evident, that since the effusion of blood, which is a consequence of war,
is in no case to be desired, if Mehemet Ali acknowledges and performs the
duties which are imposed on him by his quality of subject, my Sublime
Porte will not have recourse to war ; the more so, because, as the coun
tries placed under the Government of Mehemet Ali constitute a part of
my hereditary possessions, the loss of men on both sides, and the evils which
would befall the country and afflict the population, and above all, the
poorer classes, would touch me too nearly. But what is to be done, when
there no longer remains any security with respect to a man devoured
up by ambition and greediness, who has conceived perfidious plans ? As
long as this state of things lasts, mutual safety and tranquillity cannot
exist, and I am obliged, at a great expence, to keep up an army and an
Imperial camp. If this question were considered, as it ought to be
considered, with reference to the relations which Governments should
^maintain with one another ; if it were examined with goodwill and jus
tice, would it not be found that reason is entirely on my side, and that
Mehemet Ali is to blame ? With regard to Prince Metternich, he is a man
animated by kind feelings, a man of an excellent judgment. I am therefore
led to suspect and to believe that the warmth and vivacity which characterise
the language that he now holds, are the effect of the tone which has been
used in writing to him, either from hence or from other places. The
Internuncio has spoken to Nouri Effendi about a middle course for the
solution of this question, without having recourse to arms; that means,
Mehemet Ali's return to the position which becomes him as a subject;
but this position cannot be realized, unless Mehemet Ali restores Adana,
Damascus, Aleppo, Seyda, Jerusalem, and Naplous, and reduces his
present forces to such amount as would alone be compatible with his
condition as a subject. If the Great Powers are willing to labour to bring
about such a state of things, then it would be worthy of me to give my
Imperial assent."
Such are the words which, by the Sultan's orders, I reported to the
Internuncio. His Excellency, having listened attentively to all that I said
to him, assured me that, agreeably to the orders which he had received
from his Court, he would report to Prince Metternich all that I had stated
to him. I likewise received directions from His Highness to say, that if the
Government of Her Britannic Majesty is willing to do an act of friendship
and goodwill by becoming a party to a Treaty of Alliance drawn up in
the sense above expressed, His Highness will receive it with pleasure;
and the British Ambassador is requested to make known to his Court this
answer of the Sultan.

24

No. 38.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received June 2.)
(Extract.) Paris, May 31, 1839.
I CALLED upon Marshal Soult this morning, and I informed his
Excellency that your Lordship had not, as yet, had an opportunity of
bringing under the consideration of the Cabinet, the measures which it
might be necessary to adopt in the event of a collision ensuing between
the army of the Sultan and that of Mehemet Ali. That I had, therefore,
no official instructions upon the subject, but that from a private commu
nication which I had received from your Lordship, it appeared that you
were of opinion that, in the first place, itwas essential that complete
unanimity should exist between the Governments of England and France,
as to the course to be pursued ; that a combined fleet should proceed to
the coast of Syria, and that the orders given to the admirals should be
identical ; the object of such instructions being to arrest the progress of
hostilities, if commenced, between the two parties.
The Marshal said he entirely concurred in this opinion ; and I
gathered from his conversation, that he would be ready to give instruc
tions to the French Admiral, in conformity with those addressed to the
British Admiral.
His Excellency informed me, that he had dispatched two officers, the
one to proceed to Constantinople, the other to Alexandria, with directions,
after having communicated with the French Ambassador and M. Coche-
let, to repair to the head-quarters of the two armies, and to endeavour, by
personal representations to the respective commanders, to prevent the
breaking out of hostilities, and to report the exact state of affairs.
His Excellency added, that supposing the threatened collision should
this time be averted, he considered it would be necessary that the Five
Powers should concert together as to the means of definitively settling
the future relations between the Sultan and the Viceroy.

No. 39.
The Due de Dalmatie to Baron de Bourqueney ; communicated by Baron
de Bourqueney, June , 1839.
Monsieur, Paris, le 30 Mai, 1839.
J'AI regu les depSches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'ecrire
jusqu'au No. 43 inclusivement. Leur contenu etant de nature a me
faire penser que vous aurez bient6t a me transmettre des informations
plus precises sur les vues du Cabinet Britannique, par rapport a l'etat
actuel de l'Orient, je me reserve de discuter alors quelques unes des
opinions que vous a exprimees a ce sujet Lord Palmerston. Je me
bornerai pour le moment a remarquer, que ce Ministre me semble prendre
un peu trop facilement son parti d'une seconde expedition Russe a Con
stantinople, moyennant des garanties peut-etre illusoires ; je crains aussi
qu'il n'apprecie pas d'une maniere suffisamment impartiale, la position
respective de la Porte et de Mehemet Ali. A Vienne, on est a cet egard
dans des dispositions tres-equitables. Avant meme de connaitre les
derniers evenemens, M. de Metternich venait de se decider a une impor-
tante demarche. Frappe du danger dont les chances toujours imminentes
d'une collision entre le Sultan et son puissant vassal, menacaient depuis six
ans la paix du monde, il allait, suivant ce que M. le Comte Appony m'a
annonce de sa part, charger l'lnternonce d'appeler l'attention de la Porte
sur la convenance d'un arrangement qui, en accordant au fils de Mehemet
Ali l'heredite du Gouvernement de l'Egypte, en rassurant par consequent
le Vice-Roi sur le sort de sa famille, calmerait en lui cette agitation
inquiete tant redoutee, dit-on, a Constantinople.
Bien qu'avant d'avoir regu des informations plus completes, et de

25
nous etre concertes avec nos Allies, nous ne puissions evidemment
penser a arr§ter une determination definitive sur la grave question qui
vient de surgir, il est certaines mesures preiiminaires tellement indiquees
par la situation, que nous avons du les prendre sur le champ. On sait
deja a Londres, que nous avons demand! aux Chambres de nous ouvrir
un credit destine a couvrir les frais des armemens maritimes qui pourront
devenir necessaires. L'accueil fait a cette demande prouve qu'elle sera
votee avec empressement. J'ai, de plus, envoye a M. l'Amiral Roussin
et a M. Cochelet, des instructions qui leur prescrivent d'insister pour que
les hostilites cessent, si elles ont commence, et pour qu'en tout cas les
armees rentrent, de part et d'autre, dans les positions occupees par elles
avant la marche des Turcs vers le point fronti^re des territoires respectifs.
Ces instructions seront remises a leur destination par deux de mes officiers
d'ordonnance, qui se rendront ensuite, l'un en Asie Mineure, l'autre en
Syrie, a, l'effet de constater l'etat des choses, et, s'il y a lieu, de faire
entendre avec energie, aux deux parties, des paroles de prudence et de
raison. Enfin, Monsieur, je viens d'ecrire a M. de St. Aulaire, a M.
Bresson, et a M. de Barante, pour les charger de s'entendre avec les
Cabinets aupres desquels iis sont accredites, sur la marche a suivre dans
les conjonctures actuelles. J'ai particulierement recommande a M. de
Barante de s'attacher a p6netrer si le Gouvernement Russe penserait a
etendre la portee du Traite d'Unkiar Skeiessi a, un etat de choses auquel
il ne s'applique evidemment pas, puisque ses stipulations sont for-
mellement congues dans la prevision d'une attaque dirigee contre la
Porte, et non d'une lutte dont la Porte prendrait elle-meme l'initiative.
Je n'ai pas besoin d'ajouter, queM. de Barante devra mesurer son langage
de maniere a. eviter ce qui pourrait faire supposer que nous reconnaissons,
meme dans le sens le plus restreint, la validite d'un Traite contre lequel
nous avons proteste en 1833; comme aussi ce qui donnerait a, croire,
qu'independamment de ce Traite, ou de tout autre engagement formel,
nous fussions disposes a, toierer, soit le renversement du trone du Sultan,
soit le demembrement de l'empire.
Veuillez, Monsieur, donner connaissance a. Lord Palmerston, des
informations contenues dans la presente depeche.
Recevez, &c,
(Signe) DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)
The Due de Dalmatie to Baron de Bourqueney.
Sir, Paris, May 30, 1839.
I HAVE received the despatches which you have done me the honour
to write to me up to No. 43 inclusive. Their contents being of a nature to
make me suppose that you will soon have to transmit to me more precise
information upon the views of the British Cabinet, with respect to the actual
state of the East, I reserve till then the discussion of some of the opinions
which Lord Palmerston has expressed to you upon this subject. I will
confine myself for the moment to remarking that this Minister appears
to me to make up his mind a little too readily to a second Russian expedition
to Constantinople, upon the faith of guarantees, perhaps illusory. I fear,
also, that he does not appreciate, in a manner sufficiently impartial, the res
pective positions of the Porte and Mehemet Ali. At Vienna they are very
equitably disposed upon this subject. Even before being acquainted with
the late events, M. de Metternich had decided upon an important step.
Struck with the danger with which the peace of the world had, during six
years, been threatened by the great probability of a collision between the
Sultan and his powerful vassal, he was, according to what the Count
Appony announced to me from him, about to instruct the Internuncio to
call the attention of the Porte to the expediency of an arrangement,
which, in granting to the son of Mehemet Ali the hereditary succession
E

26
to the Government of Egypt, and in thus satisfying the Viceroy as to the
fate of his family, would calm in him that restless agitation said to be so
much dreaded at Constantinople.
Although, until we have received more complete information, and
have concerted with our Allies, we evidently cannot think of taking a
definitive resolution upon the grave question which has arisen, there
are certain preliminary measures so pointed out by circumstances, that
we have been compelled to take them at once. It is already known at
London that we have applied to the Chambers to open a credit for the
purpose of covering the expences of the naval armaments which may
become necessary. The reception given to this application proves that
it will be readily voted. I have, moreover, sent to Admiral Roussin and
to M. Cochelet instructions, directing them to insist upon the cessation
of hostilities, if they have commenced, and that in any case, the Armies
shall, on both sides, return to the positions occupied by them before the
march of the Turks towards the frontier point of the respective territories.
These instructions will be transmitted to their destination by two of my
staff officers, who will afterwards go, the one into Asia Minor, the other
into Syria, in order to ascertain the state of things ; and if there be occa
sion, to employ with energy towards both parties the language of prudence
and of reason. Lastly, Sir, I have written to M. de St. Aulaire, to M.
Bresson, and to M. de Barante, to enjoin them to come to an understanding
with the Cabinets to which they are accredited, upon the course to be
followed in the present conjuncture. I have particularly recommended
to M. de Barante to endeavour to ascertain if the Russian Government
contemplates extending the operation of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi
to a state of things to which it evidently does not apply, since its stipu
lations are formally conceived in the anticipation of an attack directed
against the Porte, and not of a struggle in which the Porte should itself
take the initiative. I need not add, that M. de Barante will guard his
language in a manner to avoid giving rise to the supposition that we
recognize, even in the most restricted sense, the validity of the Treaty
against which we have protested in 1 833 ; or to the belief that, independ
ently of this Treaty, or of any other formal engagement, we would be
disposed to tolerate, either the subversion of the throne of the Sultan, or
the dismemberment of the Empire.
Be pleased, Sir, to make known to Lord Palmerston the information
contained in the present despatch. Jv6C61V6 &,C.
(Signed) DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 40.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 6.)
My Lord, Therapia, May 11, 1839.
MEHEMET ALI remitted his last tribute to the Sublime Porte,
through the Egyptian house, Anastasi. The chief conductor of that firm,
by name Fuentes, has written to a person here, a letter by the last steamer,
in which he says that the Pasha will not pay the tribute ; that he declares
the vast expences of his army and fleet absorb all his funds, and put the
payment out of his power. I read this letter, and I have no reason to
suppose the writer says anything but what he himself believes to be the
truth, and it is probable he has means of knowing the fact.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

27

No. 41.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 7.)
My Lord, Paris, June 5, 1839
THE inclosed paper contains the essential part of a long despatch
from M. Cochelet, which was received yesterday by the French Govern
ment, and which Marshal Soult read to me this day. His Excellency also
communicated to me a despatch from Admiral Roussin, in the postscript
of which, dated the 17th ult. from Therapia, the Admiral states that
though no account of hostilities having commenced in Syria had reached
Constantinople, he considered them to be inevitable.
I have only time to add, before the departure of the post, that I was
much gratified with the cordial confidence with which Marshal Soult com
municated to me the whole of the despatches he received yesterday from
Alexandria and Constantinople. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 41.
Extract of despatch from M. Cochelet to Marshal Soult.
LE Vice-Roi a declare a M. Cochelet, Consul-General de France,
qu'il s'engage, dans le cas ou les troupes du Sultan qui ont franchi
l'Euphrate pres de Bir, se retireraient de l'autre cote du fleuve, de faire
un mouvement retrograde a son armee, et de rappeler son fils Ibrahim Pacha
a Damas; que dans le cas oil cette demonstration pacifique serait, a son
tour, suivie d'un mouvement retrograde de l'armee de Hafiz Pacha au-dela
de Malatia, Son Altesse rappellera le Generalissime en Egypte. De plus,
Son Altesse le Vice-Roi a ajoute, de son propre mouvement, que si les
Quatre Grandes Puissances consentaient a lui garantir la paix, et s'inte-
resseraient a lui obtenir la succession de sa famille, il retirerait une partie
de ses troupes de la Syrie, et serait pret a s'entendre sur un arrangement
definitif propre a garantir la securite, et adapte aux besoins du pays.

(Translation.)
Extract of despatch from M. Cochelet to Marshal Soult.
THE Viceroy has declared to M. Cochelet, Consul-General of France,
that he engages, in case the troops of the Sultan which have passed the
Euphrates near Bir shall retire to the other side of the river, to make a
retrograde movement of his army, and to recall his son Ibrahim Pasha to
Damascus ; that in case this pacific demonstration shall in its turn be
followed by a retrograde movement of the army of Hafiz Pasha beyond
Malatia, His Highness will recall the Generalissimo into Egypt. More
over, His Highness the Viceroy has added of his own accord, that if the Four
Great Powers should consent to guarantee peace, and to interest themselves
to obtain for him the succession of his family, he would withdraw a part
of his troops from Syria, and would be ready to come to a definitive
arrangement proper to guarantee the security, and adapted to the wants,
of the country.

E 2

28'
No. 42.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 9.)
(Extract.) Paris, June 7, 1839.
I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult. His
Excellency has received no despatches from the East of a later date than
those which he communicated to me on Wednesday last, and of which I
transmitted the substance to your Lordship by the post of that day.
The Marshal expressed his regret, that I had not as yet been able,
to make any official communication to him from your Lordship, in regard
to the instructions to be given to the Admiral of the combined fleet on
the Levant station. He said that the question of these instructions had
been mooted in the Cabinet Council by Admiral Duperre, but that he,
the Marshal, had desired to defer deliberating upon it, until they were in
possession of the opinion of the British Government on that matter.
No. 43.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 9.)
My Lord, Therapia, May 19, 1839.
I COMMUNICATED to Nouri Effendi the substance of your
Lordhsip's instruction of March 15, which gave great dissatisfaction.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.
No. 44.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 9.)
(Extract,) Therapia, May 20, 1839.
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CAMPBELL transmitted to your Lord
ship, copy of a letter, dated May 1st, written by Artin Bey, and commu
nicated to the Consuls. A copy also reached the Sultan, who was so
exasperated, that he gave orders that war should be declared against
Mehemet Ali. Reflection, however, caused that order to be recalled, but
orders were issued to hasten the equipment of the fleet, and to press the
despatch of troops and military stores to the army : both orders are in
execution. The Sultan said he would rather die, than not endeavour to destroy
his rebel subject. The language of those about the Sultan is : " We
hope for success, because all the Syrians are enemies to the Pasha."
Nobody here doubts of war, and the general opinion is, that the Army
of the Sultan will be defeated. My opinion is not worth anything, as I
am not skilled in military matters.
If the Sultan should be victorious, there will be comparatively little
difficulty, and it is enough at present to consider what may be the
probable consequences of his defeat. The common opinion is, that the
conqueror will march for the Capital, having declared himself indepen
dent. It appears to me more likely he will take the Pashalics of Bagdad,
Orfa, Diarbekir, &c, &C
The Great Powers have established, as the criterion of right or
wrong, the abstinence from aggression, declaring the culpable to be
the Sultan or the Pasha, as the one or the other might be the first to
commence hostilities. Judgment has been given by Russia, who assumed
to speak in the name of all, and the Pasha has been declared the
aggressor. The charge of aggression made against him by Russia, is
confined to late acts done by the Pasha; but from the beginning, during

29
the whole period, as well as in this latter hour, the Pasha has always
been the aggressor, and the Sultan has a right to claim from the Great
Powers the maintenance of their own declarations. Passing over all the
acts of the Pasha until the moment when the presumed (which your Lord
ship knows never existed) settlement of Koniah was made, the Sultan
will be found from that hour in a state of quiescence, relying upon the
intervention of the Great Powers for the settlement of differences as to
territorial questions between himself and the Pasha, and for the payment
of the miserable pittance of tribute due to him for the possession of
kingdoms alienated from him. He made no preparations for war ; com
mitted no overt acts indicative of design to use force : he remained in a
state actually inadequate to the defence of his remaining territories, until
he was forced to have recourse to augmented armaments, by the menacing
attitude of the Pasha, who had never ceased to assail the Sultan's power
by intrigues, and had openly fortified all the avenues that lead through
the Taurus into the provinces still under the Sultan's sceptre. The
Pasha had never ceased to increase and perfect his army and his fleet, nor
to push his conquests into new countries for the establishment of his power :
and he made those conquests in his own name ; he openly called on the
Great Powers to sanction his assumption of independence of the Sultan.
Could his intentions be doubted? The Sultan had the right of self-
defence to justify his tardy exertions to guard against danger, and he
had the further right, inherent in every man, be he sovereign or be he
dependent, of placing himself in a position to repel insults.
No one of the Great Powers would have continued in a pacific
attitude so long as the Sultan did, had any one of them been exposed to
even a small part of the danger and the provocations he had to bear with-
Russia has declared a truth — a limited truth ; the Great Powers
cannot deny it ; their repeated declarations engage them to oppose the
aggressor.

No. 45.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 9.)
(Extract.) Vienna, June 1, 1839.,
PRINCE METTERNICH forwards to your Lordship the reports of
the Internuncio, which agree with those of Lord Ponsonby as to the
danger of war.
The Prince seeming to expect much from the arrival at Constantinople
of his advice to the Porte, as to the course they ought to pursue, I observed
to him, that the reply from thence might lead to the commencement of a
negotiation, but it might also announce that of hostilities.
He admitted this, adding, that the only course to pursue was, for the
Four Powers to agree among themselves what line to take.
If Her Majesty's Government should be disposed to enter into the
Prince's views, as to the disposition to be made of Egypt, it will be
necessary to decide whether the succession should be made personal to
Ibrahim Pasha, or extended to his descendants, or to other descendants
of Mehemet Ali. I would further remark, that such , an arrangement, if it
were practicable, would offer the best chance of preserving order in
Egypt after Mehemet Ali's death, which will otherwise be exposed to
many chances.
This first branch of the question being disposed of, I remarked to
the Prince, that in all affairs there is a moment when reasonings
cease, and action begins. He admitted the truth of this, and also,
that in this instance the moment might possibly be arrived. That
it was only then that the real affair commenced ; and that it was probable
that we might now be at the beginning of its end.
Is it not time then, I asked, to foresee, and if possible, to regulate its
march? He said it was ; and that as the first branch of the affair could
only be conducted by the joint moral weight of the Four Powers, so must

30
the second be (if it should present itself), by their combined material action;
neither Russia, nor England, nor France, nor Austria, operating alone,
hat jointly, and in the name of the Alliance.
Being unacquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government
upon the subject, I did not think it advisable to press for anything more
specific ; but I should add, that the Prince said more than once that Austria
would not decline her just share in the operation.
I have thought it my duty thus far to clear up the subject, and hope
feereby to have furnished Her Majesty's Government with sufficient
grounds upon which to determine their line of conduct ; remarking only,
that if war between the Sultan and the Pasha is to be averted, a firm and
early demonstration on the part of the Four Powers, may, perhaps, be
he&t calculated to produce that effect.
I would also observe, that nothing permanent would be gained, unless
©h both sides they are induced to disarm.

No. 46.
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 10.)
(Extract.) Berlin, June 5, 1839.
BARON WERTHER said that the Prussian Minister at Constan
tinople as well as the military officers, had all co-operated to preserve
peace and the status quo. One of them (Colonel Vincke) had drawn
up a memorandum, in which he strategically proved to the Turks, that
the commencement of hostilities must end by their defeat. This docu
ment, his Excellency said, had made more impression on the Turks, than
all the remonstrances of the Foreign Ministers.
Baron Werther said, that no man had laboured more zealously and
sincerely to preserve peace than Count Bouteneff, the Russian Ambassador
at Constantinople ; and he (the Baron) felt convinced that the Court of St.
Petersburgh ardently desired the maintenance of peace in the East. I
share this opinion with Baron Werther.
Baron Werther thinks that the Five Powers should call upon the
Sraltan and Mehemet Ali to retire and disarm their respective forces.

No. 47.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 13.)
My Lord, Therapia, May 21, 1839.
TAHAR Pasha returned on the 19th, in the afternoon, from his
inspection of the Ottoman Army under Hafiz Pasha. A Council was held
to take his Report into consideration.
The best-informed persons concur in thinking war will take place.
The fleet is nearly quite ready : workmen have been employed night
aspd day to fit it out; it may sail, if ordered to do so, in two or three days'
time. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

31
No. 48.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 16.)
(Extract.) Paris, June 14, 1839.
THE telegraph on Wednesday last announced the arrival at Mar
seilles, of a steam-packet from the Levant, bringing despatches which
contradict the report of hostilities having commenced between the Turkish
and Egyptian troops, though some scuffles had occurred between the
soldiers of each army, which had been repressed by their respective
officers. The date of these despatches is not stated in this telegraphic
communication, and they had not reached the Foreign Office at the time
I had an interview with Marshal Soult this morning.
I told the Marshal that though I had no official instruction upon the
Turco-Egyptian Question, I had received private letters from your Lord
ship, which left no doubt in my mind, of the concurrence of Her Majesty's
Government in the view taken by the Austrian and French Governments,
as to the best and most practicable settlement of the question, namely:
that Egypt should become hereditary in the family of Mehemet Ali under
the sovereignty of the Sultan, and that the Egyptian troops should
evacuate Syria.
Marshal Soult said, that in the despatches of Count St. Aulaire from
Vienna, of the 18th and 22nd of last month, and of the 4th of this month, all
reporting the conversations he had held with Prince Metternich on the
affairs of Turkey, it did not appear that the Austrian Minister had
suggested the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians, as forming part of
the proposed arrangement.
I replied that I was not apprised of the communications made by Prince
Esterhazy on this matter, but that your Lordship was under the impres
sion that this was the view both of the Austrian and French Govern
ments ; and indeed it seemed to me, if Syria were to be continued under
the government of Mehemet Ali, no inducement could be found for the
Sultan conceding to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt*
Ibrahim Pasha, on the real or pretended ground of the necessity of a force
sufficient to repress insurrection, will continue to maintain a considerable
army in that country, and the existence of such an army in the vicinity of
Asia Minor would impose upon the Sultan the burden of keeping up a
large military establishment in that province ; and the preservation of
peace, which was the object of all the European Powers, would be as
uncertain as it ever had been, if the question of the occupation of Syria
be only provisionally arranged at this period. Marshal Soult did not
combat these opinions ; but he remarked, that Syria was not the only
Pashalic which was occupied by the Egyptians ; that the Pashalic ia
which was situated the sacred city of Mecca, was held by Mehemet Ali,
and might be a serious obstacle to our arriving at a satisfactory settle
ment ; but on all these matters, his most anxious desire was, that our
two Governments should come to a perfect understanding ; and that if a
conference of the Four Powers (or of the Five, including Prussia,) should
take place on the affairs of the East, the instructions of the Represen
tatives of France and England at such conference should be identical.

No. 49.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 17.)
My Lord, Paris, June 15, 1839L
I APPRISED your Lordship, in a private letter which I wrote hastilj
at the moment of the messenger's setting off for Calais, late last night, of
the substance of the despatches from the East, which had just reached
the hands of Marshal Soult.
I have been informed this morning at the Foreign Office, that tnw

32
despatches were received from the French Consul at Alexandria : one
dated on the 24th of May, and the other on the 27th. In the first, it is
stated, that some Albanians belonging to the Turkish Army, had entered
a village occupied by the Egyptians, and had been driven back by a
detachment of cavalry, and that in the encounter only one Albanian and
one Egyptian had been killed. In the second despatch, M. Cochelet writes,
that Ibrahim Pasha represents the Turkish Army to be in a most
deplorable state ; that it suffers much from the want of provisions ; that the
troops were reduced to less than a demi ration of provisions, that one
officer, and no less than 500 Turkish soldiers, had already deserted to the
Egyptian camp, but that notwithstanding all the advantage which he
could not fail to have in an engagement with the Sultan's Army, he should
not fail to obey implicitly the orders of Mehemet not to be the aggressor.
Admiral Roussin writes from Constantinople, that although Nouri
Effendi assures him, that no orders have been given to commence hostili
ties, little reliance can be placed on the continuance of peace ; new subjects
of complaint against Mehemet Ali have been brought forward. The
Turkish Government assert, that both Orfa and Bassora have been
occupied by Egyptian troops ; but the grievance, which, above all others,
has irritated the Sultan against his vassal, is the expulsion from Mecca,
of two dignitaries appointed by His Highness, in his character of Head of
the Mahometan Church, to reside in the sacred city.
It may be inferred from the despatches received from Alexandria,
that there is not a shadow of foundation for the two first reports.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 50.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 17.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, June 8, 1839.
I WAS informed on the 2nd instant, of a movement across the
Euphrates, of the Turkish Army, by a letter from Mr. Yeames.
I met Count Nesselrode the following day ; and as soon as I mentioned
the subject, he said he believed that there was not a word of truth in the
report : that his accounts from Constantinople were the most recent pos
sible, and they led him entirely to disbelieve the intelligence which had
been communicated to me, and which had appeared in the German papers.
I saw Count Nesselrode again, last evening, and although it is im
possible any longer to doubt that the information which has been re
ceived from every quarter is well-founded, the Russian Ministers will
not admit that it is accurately true; and they maintain the accounts
to be exaggerated. Some assert, that the movement was merely one of
reconnaissance, and a necessary precaution against a surprise, and that
the Turkish Army speedily returned to its proper territory. Others
affirm, that in some parts of the country near Bir, the Euphrates is not
the boundary of Syria, and that the passage of the river does not neces
sarily constitute an invasion of the Pashalic of Mehemet Ali.
The Chancellerie of Count Nesselrode was in great activity on the 3rd
and 4th instant, on the last of which days his Excellency waited upon the
Emperor at Zarskoe-Celoe ; and I believe, (but I do not know it,) that di
rections have been dispatched to Constantinople and Egypt, to spare no
remonstrances or threats to prevent, if it may yet be possible, a conflict
between the troops of the Sultan and the Pasha.
I am convinced that this event has caused surprise and great annoy
ance to the Imperial Government.

33

No. 51.
Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 17.)
My Lord, Aleppo, May 6, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's infor
mation, copies of two despatches, dated the 30th March and 4th instant,
which I have addressed to his Excellency Lord Ponsonby, G.C.B., Her
Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.
Since the latter despatch was closed, nothing further of any interest
has transpired on this frontier, and meriting your Lordship's attention.
The last advices received from the frontier in the direction of B r, is,
that the Sultan's forces continue daily to cross the river, with ammunition,
stores, &c. But we have no advice of the further advance of any of the
Sultan's troops on any other point of his frontier.
His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha is still here, and the Egyptian forces
are daily arriving, and concentrating here from different points.
It is now rumoured, that his Excellency will soon march forward with
his forces towards Aintab and the river Sedjour, there to wait any attack
which may be made against him by the Sultan's forces, for it is reported;
that his Excellency has positive orders not to pass his limits, or be the first
aggressor. But I am very much afraid, my Lord, that these movements will, if
they are not intended immediately to take the offensive, eventually dege
nerate into hostilities.
I shall not fail to watch vigilantly, and forward immediate advice of
all that transpires, to his Excellency the Ambassador at Constantinople,
and to Colonel Campbell in Egypt. I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 51.
Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Aleppo, March 30, 1839.
I HAVE to acquaint your Lordship, that during this month the autho
rities here, and throughout this district, have been actively engaged in
making extensive preparations with regard to the laying in of stores of all
sorts. 4,000 okes of biscuit have been, and are still caused to be, daily
made here, and in every town within this district, which are all being
stored. His Excellency the Seraskier has transmitted positive orders to this
Government, to procure within five days' time, besides the usual allowance
made by the "Shora," 100 cantars of soap, and the same quantity of oil,
and also to purchase all the wheat and barley the Government can procure!
His Excellency, further, demands of the Government here to procure as
many horses and mules as possible, without considerations as to price ; and
directs that neither the animals they purchase, nor those of the artillery
regiments in garrison here, are to be put out to grass until he arrives to
give further orders on the subject.
I hear that of late there has been a considerable quantity of ammuni
tion and military stores brought to this coast from Egypt, part of which
have been landed, and are daily arriving here; the remainder, it is said,
have gone round to Tarsous, and from thence have been conveyed to the
defile of the Taurus and that district.
I am informed that this Government has issued orders to all the forces
at the different points on this frontier, to hold themselves ready; but with
the exception of a regiment lately landed at Suedia, from Egypt, which
I hear is to proceed to Idlep, there is no further movement of anv sort
F J

34
among any of the troops, who, I hear, all continue in their usual positions.
His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha left Damascus after the
Ramazan, and arrived at Hamah on his way to this place, the 4th instant,
where he has been ever since, occupied, it is said, in causing wheat
and barley to be purchased, and all the horses and mules that can be pro
cured. It is also positively stated, that his Excellency Solyman Pasha
(the French Colonel Seves) has arrived at Hamah, from Seyda, in order
to have a conference with the Seraskier, for what object it is not yet known.
His Excellency the Seraskier is now daily looked for here, but it is
uncertain whether he will be accompanied by Solyman Pasha.
I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship, with regard to the movements
of the Sultan's forces, that I learn from persons that have lately arrived
from Malatia, Diarbekir, and Mesopotamia, that very great and extensive
military preparations are also being made by all the Sultan's authorities
throughout the whole line of that country. I have not been able to elicit
to what direction all these are to be directed. The persons from those
parts say, that the most current report even with the troops is, that they
are soon to march to Aleppo ; others again say that they are to act in
conjunction with Ali Pasha of Bagdad's forces, against Ismael Pasha (the
Koord) of Amadieh.
Other reports coming from Malatia, state that there have been very
extensive military preparations making, but that they had very much
decreased, and that there was no particular movement of any sort, not
even among any of the troops; and further assert, that the Seraskier Hafiz
Ali Pasha had been called to Constantinople, and had been replaced by
the late Seraskier Rechid Mahomed Pasha's son, who has taken command
of the Sultan's forces in Mesopotamia and that neighbourhood; that
Solyman Pasha of Marash had also received orders to proceed forthwith to
Constantinople, with two other Pashas, the names of whom I have not
been able to learn. It is stated, that at Marash there are hardly any
troops at all; at Bir there are about 5,000, and at Orfa from 15,000 to
20,000 men ; the forces at Malatia are stated to be about 25,000 to 30,000
men ; for owing to the very severe weather in those parts, and the bad
condition of the barracks, the bulk of the troops are now at Diarbekir.
From all accounts, the military preparations making by this Govern
ment and that of the Sultan in Mesopotamia, and along the whole line of
the frontier, have on both sides been certainly very extensive of late ; but
for the present all their preparations appear defensive, and accompanied
with nothing to denote any aggressive steps on either side. A few weeks
longer will throw a little more light on this subject, and develop more
clearly the reason for which they are pursuing these preparatory measures.
I shall not fail immediately to inform your Lordship of whatever may
further transpire.
Hassan Bey, Colonel of the 2d Regiment of Foot Guards quartered
here, has been put under an arrest by his Excellency the Governor, until
his Excellency the Seraskier's orders are known. There are several
reports respecting his arrest : first, that he was in correspondence with the
Sultan's authorities, and that the Government here had detected letters
which he addressed to the Sultan's Seraskier, inviting him to invade
Syria; the second report is that he was detected in a premeditated plan
to fly with some of his troops over to the Sultan ; but both of these want
further confirmation.
I beg leave to mention to your Lordship a circumstance which has
this moment been reported to me ; that in two or three weeks a considerable
force, composed of foot and horse, are to come to Aleppo ; and the reason
given for this is, that there is to be, under Solyman Pasha, a grand mili
tary review, in which the forces are to go through some military manoeuvres
and evolutions. I cannot vouch for the authenticity of this report, as I
have not heard it from any other quarter. But under the present state of
affairs, and the very extensive preparations making by this Government,
in stores and provisions of all sorts, I consider it my duty to acquaint
your Lordship of this circumstance, although it has not yet been con
firmed.

35

Inclosure 2 in No. 51.
Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Aleppo, May 4, 1839.
I HAD the honour of addressing your Excellency under the 30th of
March ; since then no Tatar has left this to enable me to communicate
with your Lordship ; and as the events that have passed on this
frontier, within the last fortnight, are of great interest and importance,
and such as I consider require that your Lordship should be made
acquainted with them, without loss of time, I feel it my duty, although
I reported the intelligence immediately to Mr. Consul Werry of Damascus,
begging of him to forward advices of the same, vid Egypt, to your
Lordship, to dispatch the present by Hadji Omar, who was formerly in
the service of the Euphrates Expedition, and who has promised me to
deliver this, my packet, to your Lordship, within ten days' time from this.
I represented to your Lordship, in my last communication of the
30th March, that both this Government, and that of the Sultan, in the
direction of Malatia, Orfa, and Diarbekir, were making very extensive pre
parations, in provisions, ammunition, and military stores of all sorts, but
without any movement of troops up to that period.
I now beg leave to acquaint your Lordship, that under the 23rd
ultimo, advices reached this Government by spies, that the Sultan's
authorities had begun to cross troops at Bir, which were stated to consist
of three regiments of Infantry.
The Musselim of this town immediately mounted his horse, and
proceeded to Khan Touman, distant about five hours from hence, where
his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha was, looking after his agri
cultural interests in that neighbourhood, accompanied by Menekly
Achmet Pasha, the Minister of War, who had reached this from Egypt,
under the 16th ultimo, and is said to be the bearer of secret instructions
to his Excellency the Seraskier, from His Highness Mehemet Ali.
The Musselim communicating the intelligence of which he was
bearer, the Seraskier ordered his horse, and, previous to mounting, sent
off a forced post, said to be for Egypt, and then left for this town, which
he reached like wildfire. After holding a divan of his head officers, he
dispatched that same night twelve forced posts, said to be to call his
troops from their different stations, and sent an officer to bring imme
diately the animals of the Artillery Regiment stationed here, who had only
fifteen days ago been sent to grass.
The subsequent advices which reached this Government the following
day are, that 3,000 Irregulars had crossed the Euphrates under Koord
Mahomed Pasha ; and since then, up to this time, that a considerable
force under a certain lsmael Pasha, is reported to have encamped at
about three hours' distance from the banks of the river.
With regard to the number of troops that have crossed, there are
several reports, but the most correct, from the latest intelligence received,
coming from an authentic source, is, that there are no more than 15,000
men under lsmael Pasha, Koord Mahomed Pasha, and Inge Bairactar
Mehemet Pasha, that have passed the river at Bir, with ammunition,
stores, and some few artillery pieces. I am told that the Sultan's troops
find great difficulty in crossing the Euphrates at this period, owing to the
late heavy rains, which have caused it to swell greatly ; so that the eleven.
boats they have there can only perform the service twice a-day, — once to
bring troops across, and then the provisions, &,c, required for them.
The troops that have crossed at Bir, compose part of one of the
columns of the Turkish army, which is advancing on the frontier in that
quarter, and which, it is said, will be joined by Ali Pasha of Bagdad, who,
it is stated, has already arrived at Diarbekir with about 25,000 to 30,000
men. Another column, under the Seraskier Hafiz Ali Pasha, of, it is said,
60,000 strong, is advancing from Malatia, on Roum Kale ; and the third
F 2

36
column of 40,000 men, under Halil Pasha and Solyman Pasha, are
advancing on the Marash line.
I am informed that a post reached this the day before yesterday from
Aintab, bringing intelligence to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, that a
force of about 15,000 to 20,000 men had all at once appeared at the
further extremity of that plain ; but from very strict inquiry that I have
made, I cannot find that either that column, or the other two of the
Sultan's forces, have as yet passed their limits; and I am positively
assured that for the present, and up to the last advices received, they all
continued within their jurisdiction.
It is reported here by some, that the brother of Hafiz Pasha is
advancing with Suffook Bey of the Gerba Arabs, to act with all the
Arabs on the Desert line. This is not confirmed in any way ; from all
inquiry I have made, there does not appear to be anything doing on that
line from Dair to Hamah. I shall not fail to inform your Lordship, if
I hear of any operations on that line.
By last advices from Damascus, I hear that the Haouran insurrection
still continued, and had assumed a more determined character. This
may arise not unlikely from some understanding which may exist between
them and the Sultan's Seraskier, to act in unison with Hafiz Pasha's
brother and Suffook Bey, in any operations which they may undertake to
the South and on the Desert line, to cut off his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha
and his forces to the South, from his operations on this northern frontier.
With regard to the movements on this side, I have to inform your
Lordship, that this Government is actively occupied daily in laying in
with all possible dispatch, provisions, ammunition, and stores of all sorts;
besides those obtained here, there are daily arrivals from Latakia,
landed there from Egypt.
It appears that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha intends to make
Aleppo his head-quarters, at least for the present. Since the advices reached
this, that some of the Sultan's forces had crossed the Euphrates, his
Excellency Ibrahim Pasha's forces are daily arriving here, and are being
lodged in mosques, khans, and every place the Government can procure.
I inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a note of the forces that
have arrived here, and those that are expected.
His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha intends, after the arrival of all the
forces, to have a general review of the whole, and then purposes to march
his forces at about ten or twelve hours' distance, and form his camp in
the plain between this place and Aintab, and near the river Sedjour, and
there wait any attack which may be made against him by the Sultan's
forces ; for I am positively assured, that his Excellency has received
through Achmet Menekly Pasha, the Minister of War, positive orders
from his father Mehemet Ali, not to move out of his limits upon any con
sideration, or to be the first aggressor. Some say that his instructions
are to act on the defensive, and on his own territory to resist two attacks
of the Sultan's forces ; but on the third he gives him permission to advance.
How far this may be true remains to be seen ; as yet, he has no regular
troops nearer the frontier than this. The Annadis, or Bedouin Cavalry,
are the only troops on the frontiers ; they are stationed at the Sedjour',
watching the movements on the other side.
I have to inform your Lordship, that by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays's last
letter, everything was quiet in his district, and among the late mal
contents of the mountains in that neighbourhood. But from some
conversation that I had yesterday with several persons who are well
acquainted, and come into continual contact with the inhabitants of the
whole range of those mountains extending from Beylan to Byass, and
along that continuity to those of the Taurus, I learn that in the
event of any hostilities taking place between the Sultan's forces and the
Egyptians, in which the latter met with any repulse, the whole of that
immense range of mountains would in all probability take up arms
against his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha ; and this is the opinion of many
persons ; but only in the event of Ibrahim Pasha's forces meeting with a
defeat. I am informed by persons that have just come from the Adana

37
district, that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha has a force of Irregular
Cavalry (Bashi Bozuks) and Annadis, say 4,000 to 5,000 men, on the
Byass mountains, and some along the continuity of that range to the base
of the Taurus.
Mr. Vice-Consul Hays informs me, that the mountains in his district
are, for the present, quiet, but there is no doubt that if hostilities com
mence, the Sultan's Pashas will try to excite all the malcontents on that
line to revolt, and take up arms against the Egyptians ; I have begged of
Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to be very vigilant on all that is doing in that
quarter, which I will not fail to transmit to your Lordship.
I am further informed that his Excellency the Pasha has directed
that the force at Adana is not to move, but to be ready to act in the event
of any attack being directed by the Sultan on the defile line. I inclose
for your Lordship's information, a note of the forces at Adana and the
defile of the Taurus.
I have made strict inquiry, but I do not find that for the present
there are any of the Sultan's forces marching on that line.
I am very sorry to be obliged to acquaint your Lordship, that from
inquiry I have made from our merchants, the present critical state of
affairs in this country is causing most ruinous consequences to our
trade ; for since the intelligence received of the Sultan's forces having
crossed the Euphrates, and that the army is advancing on the frontier at
different points, with an apparent hostile intention, — and subsequently
the steps taken by this Government in the concentration of all the Egyp
tian forces in this neighbourhood, — the commerce of this place has been
completely paralyzed, and commercial transactions of all sorts have
entirely ceased; thereby causing great detriment to our British merchants,
who can neither effect sales of the large stocks they have on hand,
nor recover, at this present moment that payments are suspended
under the plea of the unsettled state of affairs, any of their outstanding
debts, of which they have on the place to such large amounts ; moreover,
this suspension of trade is not only ruinous to our merchants established
here, but it also causes considerable detriment and loss to our general
commercial interests.
Mr. Vice-Consul Hays informs me, that under the 30th ultimo, the
Austrian frigate "Medea," arrived there in eighteen daj^s from Smyrna,
bearing the flag of Commodore Bandiera. I believe her visit at Alexan-
dretta is only the yearly one, to obtain all the news from this part of
Syria, for which purpose he sent up a messenger to the Austrian Consul-
General here.
It is, I believe, the Commodore's intention from Scanderoon to, go
southwards. I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 51.
Note of the Egyptian Forces that are at Aleppo.
Infantry. Cavalry.
2nd of the Guards.
3rd ditto 1 st Lancers of the Guard.
2nd of the Line. 1st Cuirassiers.
4th ditto 1st Lancers.
9th ditto 2nd do.
10th ditto 
11th ditto 4 Regiments.
17th ditto
34th ditto
9 Regiments.

38
Artillery.
1st of the Guard.
2nd of Foot.

2 Regiments.
Note of Egyptian Forces expected to arrive.
Infantry. Cavalry.
1st of the Guard.
6th of the Line. 6th.
35th ditto 11th.

3 Regiments. 2 Regiments.
And 6 Regiments of the Line are expected from Egypt.

Inclosure 4 in No. 51.
Note of the Forces at Adana and the Defile of the Taurus.
At Adana.
Infantry. Cavalry.
29th of the Line. 5th.
30th ditto. 7th.

2 Regiments. 2 Regiments.
At the Defile of the Taurus.
5th of Infantry of the Line.
2 Battalions of Sappers.
2 Battalions of Artillerymen.
And 2 Forts and 8 Batteries, mounting in all 150 Cannons.
No. 52.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 17.)
My Lord, Beyrout, May 9, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that accounts have been
received at this place, of the passage of the Euphrates by the Sultan's
troops, at Bir, and that forces under Hafiz Pasha are also advancing on
the northern frontier.
On the other hand, the Egyptian troops have been summoned to
Aleppo by Ibrahim Pasha, from all parts of Syria, and he has encamped
his forces in the immediate neighbourhood of that city. His Highness is
strongly fortifying and entrenching his position, — apparently with the
intention to wait an attack, which is universally believed to be imminent.
The conflict, however, should it take place, will probably be deferred
till after the Turkish moon Saffar, ending the 12th instant, — a season con
sidered inauspicious by the Moslems for commencing military operations.
The maximum of Ibrahim Pasha's force in Syria is estimated at
60,000 regular troops. Report makes that of the Sultan at least double
the amount, including irregulars ; but it is not possible, at this distance, to
number the latter army with any degree of accuracy. And indeed all that
transpires just now, relative to pending events, coming chiefly through the
organs or partizans of the respective parties, must be received with much
caution. The most active preparations are making by this Government to
maintain a prompt communication with Egypt. Couriers from Aleppo
are to reach Cairo the sixth day.

aii

39
The Emir Bechir has received orders to send a force to Damascus and
Tripoli ; and about 1,000 Christian troops will march to each of the above
places, under the command of the son and grandson of the Emir. This is
a measure of precaution, as at neither of the above cities is the Maho-
medan population believed to be well affected to the existing Government.
Indeed any success on the part of the Sultan's troops, it is believed,
would be the signal for revolt not only at those places, but through
out Syria. An exception to this feeling I am of opinion may be looked for
amongst the Christian troops of Lebanon, who certainly entertain fears
that should the Sultan repossess himself of Syria, the Mahomedans would
regain the ascendancy, and once more exhibit their naturally intolerant
and fanatical character towards other sects.
In this immediate neighbourhood all is for the present tranquil, but
much anxiety exists amongst all classes, but especially in the Christian
population, as to the issue of pending events.
An individual whose life is of immense importance to the Egyptian
cause at the present juncture, is Solyman Pasha, perhaps the only person
in Ibrahim Pasha's army possessing the requisite talents for extensive and
combined military operations.
No reliance can be placed on the accounts received respecting the
insurrection in the Ledgea. I have observed that as the monthly period
of the communication with Europe approaches, the authorities represent
them as terminated, and that subsequent information belies those
accounts. A distinguished traveller who has just returned to this place from a
tour along the banks of the Jordan, assures me, that he found the Arab
tribes there all opposed to Ibrahim Pasha, and ardently desirous of an
opportunity of acting hostilely against him. They had, of late, begun to
show themselves in large masses, armed, on this side Jordan, and to enter
the villages, which a little time ago they did not venture to do. The
news of the Sultan's troops having crossed the Euphrates, had not
reached the Jordan, when the traveller alluded to left its banks about
eight days ago ; but he does not doubt the news will afford the liveliest
pleasure to the Arab tribes there, and lead to an open demonstration of
«heir feelings should a collision between the armies take place.
I have, &c,
(Signed) N. MOORE.
r P-.S. — 13th May, up to this day, nothing new relative to the move
ment 6f the armies. N.M.
 ,_  .  _  ______
"> No. 53.
rt-n
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 17.)
My Lord, Damascus, May 10, 1839.
ON the 27th ultimoiil received intelligence from Mr. Pro-Consul F. H.
S. Werry at Aleppo, under date of the 23rd, of the advance of the Sultan's
troops, crossing the Euphrates^ at Bir, and the measures taking by His
Highness Ibrahim Pasha. This information I transmitted the same day
to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, vid Beyrout, and to Her
Majesty's Resident in Egypt, by the Government post.
On the 30th, I received further intelligence from Mr. Pro-Consul
Werry at Aleppo, under date of the 25th and 27th, of the further move
ments of the Sultan's Army and His Highness Ibrahim Pasha's measures,
which I transmitted the same day to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Con
stantinople, vid Beyrout, and to Her Majesty's Resident in Egypt, by the
Government post. And on the 29th, I transmitted vid Beyrout, to Her
Majesty's Resident at Cairo, the information I was in possession of on the
foregoing subjects.

40
I now have the honour to inclose copies of all the intelligence 1
received from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, at Aleppo, to those dates, for your
Lordship's information, as the Pro-Consul at Aleppo may be prevented
transmitting the same to your Lordship.
I make no doubt your Lordship is fully informed of the cause for
which the Sultan's Army is advancing, whether for a demonstration for
a political object, either to cover Bagdad, or for any other political motive
connected with the Sultan's Asiatic provinces and Persia, or for that of
invading Syria. I, consequently, abstain from intruding and fatiguing
your Lordship with speculative opinions thereon.
The Sultan's forces are stated to be 80,000 men and 170 guns; but
whether that number includes all arms and the Irregulars, is not ascer
tained. Lieutenant Lynch, at Bagdad, states the Seraskier's Army to be
35,000 Regulars.
By the latest advices, it would appear that the Sultan's Army would
have its head-quarters, and form the pivot of its operations at Roum
Kale, its left extending on the high road from Bir to Aleppo, with its
extreme left to be supported by the Arab tribes under Suffook Bey,
operating by crossing the Euphrates between Bir, and below Dair. Its
extreme right resting on Marash, to co-operate with the malcontents of
the ranges of the Taurus :
By way of Roum Kale and Bir, against the centre and main body of
the Egyptian Army, the columns of the former turning the Egyptian
positions at Aintab : by way of Marash, to co-operate with the mal
contents of* the ranges of the Taurus, extending to Byass, Beylan, and
Alexandretta, and threatening the left wing and rear of the Egyptian
Army : the Arabs under Suffook Bey acting on the right of the Egyptian
Army, and attacking the flank of Syria, uniting with the insurgents of the
Haouran, and intercepting the desert line from south to north, cutting off
the operations of Ibrahim Pasha therewith, and attacking him in the
rear at Aleppo.
Besides crossing the Euphrates unopposed, and advancing into the
Egyptian territories, and attacking Ibrahim Pasha's Army, the Sultan's
Seraskier has also the advantage of having the population in his favour ;
but as he will be removed from his depots of provisions, or have difficulty
to bring them up in his rear, that latter advantage is counter-balanced,
unless the population, which is not generally armed, rises against the
Egyptians ; such advantage will increase, should the first attack prove
favourable to the Sultan's arms ; but should a general action take place,
and the contrary fate is experienced, the Sultan's Army will have great
difficulty to retreat across the Euphrates ; still the passage is susceptible
of being defended against the Egyptians; this operation both ways will
be difficult of execution, as neither are provided with pontoon equipages,
and the boats available on the river at different points, for common
purposes, are inadequate. Thus, in a military point of view, it may be
said, that should the Sultan's Army be overthrown in a general battle on
this side of the Euphrates, it may be looked upon as lost.
I am without any information of what is going on in the Adana
district, and whether the Sultan's forces are advancing either along the
coast of Caramania, or by the defile of the Taurus.
His Highness Ibrahim Pasha's forces will be twenty-two regiments
of Infantry, twelve regiments of Cavalry, and six of Artillery, Regulars,
say 55,000 bayonets, 10,000 sabres, including the Cavalry artillerymen,
and 196 guns ; besides 6,000 Irregular Annadi Cavalry, the body of
Albanians said to be expected from Candia, and such other irregular
mountain foot as he can collect from the neighbourhood of the Taurus.
There will also be about 2,500 to 3,000 Hauharrah Irregular Cavalry to
protect the desert line.
It appears, from the measures taking by Ibrahim Pasha, that he is
concentrating his troops in the first instance, to cover Aleppo, and that if
he waits to be attacked by the main body of the Sultan's Army from
Roum Kale and Bir, he is placed in an unfavourable and false position
and is exposing his position and both wings of his army, to the imminent
risk of being out-flanked, turned, and taken in the rear ; and the principal

41
attack of the Sultan's Seraskier, if made at all, will not probably be made
until that takes place. What measures Ibrahim Pasha will take to
counteract any operations which the Sultan's Seraskier may undertake
by Marash, and the malcontents of the ranges of the Taurus, whether
by Byass, to intercept Ibrahim's communications with Alexandretta, or in
the plains of Aleppo, I am uninformed. The troops in position at Killis,
though not sufficiently to the left, and for the present of inadequate force,
and seemingly to support the position at Aintab, will require to be sup
ported by a large body of irregulars, foot, and cavalry, should that
position be intended to prevent the irruption of the Sultan's forces into
the plain, with the object to menace the left wing of Ibrahim Pasha's
Army before, or in advance of, Aleppo. Probably the Albanians said to
be expected from Candia under Mustafa Pasha, are intended to act on
that line ; and as the country from Marash, Byass, and Beylan, and to
the plains' of Aleppo, is chiefly mountainous, they may act with
advantage. To protect the desert line, and defend the right wing against the
attacks of the Arabs, whether directed from the Sultan's jurisdiction,
those of the Syrian desert and the malcontents of Haouran, and any
which may be excited to join the Sultan's auxiliaries on that line, it would
appear Ibrahim Pasha can only act by the Annadi Cavalry and other
irregular Cavalry; and it remains to be seen if he has sufficient force of
this kind to direct on these points, to embrace all these objects effectually.
But unless Suffook Bey penetrates to the Syrian frontier, and takes a
decisive part in the attacks on that line, of which there may exist some
doubt, as the Arab tribes in common are too intelligent and cunning to
compromise themselves until they are certain that a general battle has
given a decided superiority to either the Sultan's or the Egyptian Army,
nothing is likely to materially defeat the Egyptian operations on the
desert line, though the marauding Arab tribes will take advantage of
every opportunity to pillage and plunder, which may be partially
restrained by detachments of Annadi Cavalry. Late advices from Bagdad
mention, that Suffook Bey had been in that vicinity, and had made peace
with the Shamma Arabs, and had returned to the north through the
Jesirah, leaving Sengar on the right, to act with the Sultan's Seraskier,
Hafiz Pasha, in his operations on the Syrian desert line. This cannot be
commenced without being on good terms with the Shamma Arabs, who are
on the east side of the Euphrates ; but as the latter are always at war with
the great tribes of the Annarees, who hold the desert between the
Euphrates and the Syrian line, it will be an operation of considerable
difficulty for Suffook Bey to act successfully and combine the whole
against the Egyptian forces or jurisdiction on the flank of Syria.
It does not appear by the progress made by the Egyptian Govern
ment in forming depots of provisions, which generally are at a consider
able distance in the rear of Aleppo, and on the desert line, and by the
tardy operation executing by Ibrahim Pasha, of concentrating the army
on the Aleppo frontier, that his Highness had previously planned to
throw his operations across the Euphrates, and make Mesopotamia the
theatre of his campaign, whether to prosecute the same towards Bagdad,
or to the north. In fact, they would appear to have been planned for
defence rather than for aggression. It may also be remarked, that if the
Egyptian Army is defeated, it has no reserves or force in its rear, or any
means it can rely on, to recruit or recover itself, to hold possession of
Syria. The Haouran insurrection has not subsided; the insurgents have
manifested a determined hostile spirit to the Government. Part remain
in the Ledgea, and most of them commit ravages on the adjacent villages
and passengers of all descriptions. They pillaged the messengers bringing
the intelligence of the approach of the caravan from Mecca, and have
had an encounter with the cavalry force under Shebli Harrian, in which
they were the chief sufferers. They still, however, temporize and nego
tiate with the Government here for pardon, but always retain their hostile
attitude. The Government, with a view to conciliate them in the present
political state of affairs in the north, and spare from devastation the

42
abundant crops in the Haouran district, from which Damascus obtains ite
chief supplies, listens to their propositions, and in most instances appears
to consent to their demands. But I have learnt from a good source, that the
chiefs of these insurgents have received intimation that they may expect aid
from  to maintain them in hostility against the Egyptian Government ;
and that they have sent to say, they await it and will join him. T£us>
I don't see any immediate prospect of this insurrection being extinguished,
and it appears chiefly dependent on the military operations on the Aleppo
frontiers. Though Government to-day gives out, that affairs have been
arranged with them, and the Irregular Cavalry of Shebli Harrian has been
withdrawn from acting against them.
500 or 600 Mutuali horsemen, who fled from the district of tbe
Emir Bechir, between Balbec and the Cedars, infested the road on the
line of Hamah ; orders were sent to act against them with the Christians
of Gebel Akar, and it is said the Mutualis have, for the present, returned
to obedience. The preparations making for the depots of provisions for the army
in the North, have continued with unabated activity here, at Homs and
Hamah. A large quantity of ammunition has been received from Acre,
and sent to Aleppo.
The Treasury here has been drained of funds sent to Aleppo, for the
payment of the troops and the military demands. The Ferdeh tax, which
should not be issued for four months hence, is being actively collected.
The farmers of the Customs' duty, and duty on wine and spirits, have
been imprisoned and menaced with the bastinado, to oblige them to
pay up arrears of the revenue : they consequently made terms with the
Government ; but fresh demands made on them for funds, have caused
them to disappear.
The 2nd Regiment of Guards, and the 14th of the line Infantry, and
the Horse Artillery here, have marched to Aleppo. Two regiments of
Cavalry from Gazza, and 1,000 Annadi Cavalry also left for the same
destination. All the Artillery at Homs, the 1st Regiment of Guards and
one regiment of the line Infantry at Hamah, marched for Aleppo.
The Government here continues to press the departure of all the
Annadi Cavalry as it arrives from Egypt, for the north. 260 camels
have been purchased and sent to the army, to complete the original
number ordered by Ibrahim Pasha.
The Government here has sent to Acre about 5,000 stand of arms,
which had been taken from the population and placed in the castle ; this
measure is taken to place them in safety, in the event of a change of
circumstances, either from the population, or the enemy.
Ibrahim Pasha's Tatar Agha arrived here, to place additional relays
on the road between Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo, by which the service
may henceforward be performed in six days, between his Highness' head
quarters and Cairo.
Damascus and its immediate vicinity continues in a tranquil state,
though the military movements in the north occupy exclusively the
public mind, and create considerable uneasiness. Commerce at Aleppo
and here, may be said to be entirely suspended, and indeed, not only the
British and European interests, but those generally of the population, are
in a precarious and suffering state.
Damascus will be guarded by a battalion of the 25th Regiment,
1,000 Infantry from Jerusalem, about 500 or 600 Invalids, 3,000 Christian
Irregular Foot troops from the Emir Bechir's territories, under his son
Emir Halil, and a body of Irregular Cavalry; and though the Mussulman
population is disaffected, I do not think they dare rise so long as this
force remains here.
The Emir Bechir has also sent troops, under different Emirs, to
guard Tripoli, Beyrout, and the towns on the coast.
I hear that the Chiefs of the Haouran insurgents have arrived here,
and had an interview with his Excellency Sheriff Pasha ; and that pardon
has been granted to and accepted by them ; and that the affair is, at least
for the present, pacified.
I have also just received further advices from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry

43
at Aleppo, and in order that your Lordship may not experience incon
venience from want of such information reaching you, I have the honour
tp inclose copies of the same.
I learn from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, that latterly, 10,000 troops have
arrived at Tarsous and Adana; and that forty guns had arrived there
from Egypt. 1 have, &c,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 53.

Substance of a private letter received April 27, per weekly post, from
Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry, dated Aleppo, April 23, 1839.
AT about an hour before noon on the 23rd, a Government spy
reached Aleppo from Bir, with the intelligence that three Regiments of
the Sultan's Infantry had crossed the Euphrates at Bir, but had not then
advanced, and were still on the Sultan's territory. His Highness Ibrahim
Pasha and Menekly Achmet Pasha were absent at Khan Touman,
occupied with his Highness' agricultural interests there ; and his Excel
lency the Governor lsmael Bey was absent at his villages, engaged in the
same pursuits. The spy communicated the intelligence to the Musselim
of Aleppo, who having consulted with the chief officers there, it was
considered necessary that he should proceed post to his Highness
Ibrahim Pasha to give him the intelligence. His Highness on receiving
it, immediately mounted his horse and came in full speed to Aleppo, and
held a Divan of all the Colonels and Solyman Pasha ; and in the course of
an hour, eight express posts were sent off, it is supposed to call his troops
from different points and stations. His Highness then ordered that the
provisions he had previously commanded should be completed by the
following day at noon, under pain of death to whoever did not comply.
It is stated, that the intelligence his Highness received of the advancing
of the Sultan's troops had very much discomposed him, as it came upon
him unawares, and he did not the least expect it.
There was no Tatar or any other conveyance leaving Aleppo for
Constantinople, by which Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry could transmit
the intelligence to Her Majesty's Ambassador.
The preparations continued at Aleppo as before advised, and
the agent at Latakia informed the Pro-Consul that there were daily
arrivals there of stores and ammunition ; 1,000 cases of gunpowder had
arrived at Aleppo a day or two back from Latakia.
The Pro-Consul was without information if the Sultan's troops were
advancing by way of Marash.
The Government at Aleppo was making great exertion to collect the
revenue. A supply had been prepared to pay the troops at Aintab, which
on the present emergency had been applied for the acquisition of
stores. It is stated that private advices mentioned the arrival of six
regiments of the Sultan's troops at Orfa from Malatia, and it is con
jectured the force that crossed at Bir formed a part of it.

Inclosure 2 in No. 53.

"Substance of a Private Letter, received the SOth April, per an express foot
messenger, from Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S„ Werry, dated Aleppo.,
April 25, 1839,
CONFIRMING the intelligence given under the 23rd, of a body of
the Sultan's troops having crossed the Euphrates at Bir.
He states thexe was uo Tatar to he obtained, or any other con-
G2

44
veyance offering to transmit the intelligence to Her Majesty^s Ambassador
at Constantinople, on which he expresses much regret and anxiety.
He states by the latest advices, the Sultan's troops were still in his
territories. He states that he omitted under the 23rd, to inform me that, in con
sequence of the late reports that his Highness Ibrahim Pasha has posted
a force at the village of Nezib in the Sultan's jurisdiction, Mr. Pro-Consul
Werry had sent his Cawass on horseback the 23rd, to Bir. The Cawass
had been instructed in passing Nezib to make inquiry what force was
or had been there, and what was doing in the direction of Bir.

Inclosure 3 in No. 53.

Substance of a Private Letter received the 30th April, by the Government
Post, from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, dated Aleppo, April 27, 1839.
HE states, that the Sultan's Officer, lsmael Pasha, crossed the
Euphrates at Bir, having, it is said, the command of 10,000 Cavalry,
3,000 of which had crossed ; and that troops, cannon, ammunition, and
military stores, were daily crossing.
That the Musselim of Aintab arrived at Aleppo the night before,
bringing a letter which had been addressed him by lsmael Pasha, and
which the Musselim delivered to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha for his
information. This letter states, that in a few days lsmael Pasha hoped to
arrive at Aintab, and that the Musselim was to have everything in readi
ness for him, as he made no doubt of his fidelity to the Sultan, although
he was in Ibrahim Pasha's service. His Highness, on reading this letter,
desired the Musselim to return to his post, and let them write what they
liked, he was his Musselim, and had nothing to fear.
That on the 26th, two Persian messengers had arrived at Aleppo,
bearers of letters to the pilgrims at Damascus.
They state, that on their arrival at Malatia, they requested from the
Sultan's Seraskier, Hafiz Pasha, tezkerehs ; that the Seraskier replied,
"Wait here six days, until I go in the direction of Roum Kale."
The Sultan's Army advanced, and the messengers followed ; on
arriving at Besne, finding that the Army advanced slowly, they fled
during the night. The Seraskier continuing his march for Roum Kale.
They state that the Seraskier's forces are 80,000 men and 170 guns.
Nothing positive was known at Aleppo under the 27th, except that
the Sultan's forces were marching on the frontiers.
His Highness Ibrahim Pasha had not reinforced his positions on the
frontiers ; he appeared to be collecting his troops at Aleppo. It is stated,
that two regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry had arrived, and four
other regiments were to arrive the following day. His Highness Ibrahim
Pasha had caused all the mosques to be taken note of, except the two
large ones, and has taken many houses and khans to place troops in.
This is supposed to denote that his Highness intends to make Aleppo his
head-quarters. The requisitions of provisions for the Army was so great,
that even bread could not be obtained in the bazaar.
2,000 Annadis, Irregular Cavalry, were the only troops that
have been sent in advance by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, and they are
at the Sedjour River.
The Cawass of the Consulate sent to Bir, returned on the 27th at
daylight, without having been able to proceed to his destination. He met
With opposition, and narrowly escaped with his life. A report the Cawass
was making is promised to be sent.
Up to the latest advices, the Sultan's troops had not entered the
Egyptian territories.

45

Inclosure 4 in No. 53.
Extracts from Copy of Aleppo Journal, brought down from the 18th of
April to the 25th idem. April 18.
; HIS Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha left this at noon for
some of his villages in the neighbourhood of Khan Touman, in order, it
is said, to look into his agricultural interests there. His Excellency
Achmet Menekly Pasha accompanied his Highness in this excursion.
This Government continues to make very extensive preparations in
ammunition, military stores, and provisions of all sorts. April 19.
The late extensive preparations that have been making by this
Government continue to be pursued with great activity. As yet, no
movement of any of the troops has taken place indicating hostile
measures. April 20.
His Excellency Kourschid Pasha left this for Adana, to take the
command of his post as Governor of that district. From a Christian
merchant just arrived from Orfa, I learn that a few days previous to his
departure, six regiments of Infantry had reached that place from Malatia,
part of which were daily expected to start for Birejick. This Orfaleen
further adds, that the Sultan's Authorities at that place, and throughout
the whole line of country, are making very extensive military prepara
tions, which are being pursued with great activity, and that the daily
arrivals of ammunition and warlike stores from the north, are very great
and incredible, all of which were reported as being intended against
Syria. The preparations on this side, by all the Egyptian Authorities,
continue with the same activity and unabated perseverance.
Part of a large quantity of biscuit, ammunition, and other military
stores, that have been landed at Latakia from Egypt, have reached this
place. There is a report in town, that the mission of his Excellency
Achmet Menekly Pasha, is to instruct Ibrahim Pasha from his Highness
Mehemet Ali, that, according to the understanding with the European
Powers, the Egyptian forces are not to pass their limits the first, or be
the first aggressors ; and that, therefore, Ibrahim Pasha is to collect his
forces in this district, and await the Sultan's forces, but on no account to
march forward, or in any way attack the Sultan, unless he is the first
aggressor. April 21.
His Excellency the Governor lsmael Bey left this for his villages, to
look into his agricultural interests there. The late preparations that
have been making by this Government in biscuit, soap, oil, ammunition,
and other military stores, continue to be pursued with great activity.
Received a letter from Mr. Vice-Consul Elias, of Latakia, under
date 16th instant, inclosing copy of his journal, mentioning the late ex
tensive arrivals at that port, of ammunition and stores, and those reported
that are to follow. April 24.
I am this morning informed, from the same authentic source that I
obtained yesterday's intelligence, that another Government spy reached
this place during the night, who left after yesterday's one, and who
reports, that besides the three regiments of Infantry on this side of the
Euphrates, there are 3,000 Bashi Bozuks, or Irregular Cavalry, that have
crossed the river, under Koord Mahomed Pasha.
It is further reported, that this Koord Mahomed Pasha has the

46
command of 10,000 of these troops, 3,000 of whom have only crossed, but
that more are to follow.
This morning, the Annadi troops 'have all been ordered to mount and
proceed to Beglie, a village on the road from hence to Bir, with orders to
reconnoitre and see what is going on, but not to cross in any way the
limits. This forenoon, his Highness the Seraskier dispatched twelve officers,
all of whom have separate missions; said to be, to bring immediately
troops from different stations. An officer also started to bring in the
Artillery horses that are at grass ; and I am positively informed that the
Artillery is all out and ready, only waiting for the animals.
The Dragoman Lewis Hakim tells me, that this day at noon, he was
at the Seraglio, and heard the Musselim give the following orders to the
butchers and bakers : that by command of his Highness the Seraskier,
beginning from the day after to-morrow, 7,500 okes of fresh meat are to
be daily supplied for the troops, and 20,000 okes of flour daily, for the
same purpose. It is also rumoured to-day, that Government are to pay the
troops, officers, and employ6s, nine months' pay.
The Government Authorities are with great activity and exertion
pursuing the preparations ; there is already great scarcity of wood,
charcoal, and grain of all sorts.
Everything continues quiet in the town. His Excellency Solyman
Pasha, who has been, ever since his arrival here, staying at the garden of
bis Excellency lsmael Bey, has now transported his things into town, and
has taken up his abode with his Highness the Seraskier in his palace. April 25.
I am informed, that during the past night, part of the Artillery horses
reached this, from grass.
It is rumoured that the four regiments at present in garrison here,
are to leave this and encamp between Aleppo and Aintab, and that other
three regiments will replace them here.
It is said, that the Pasha has ordered the members of the Board of
Health to go round the town and visit some of the mosques, to find one
suitable as an hospital.
The public report during this day is, that the Sultan's forces are
marching on three columns from Marash, Bir, and the Desert. (This is
not authentic.) At mid-day, the remainder of the Artillery horses reached this.
This Government is actively pursuing the late preparations, and
causing everything to be got ready.
It is reported that late last night, a forced post in forty-one hours
reached this from Beyrout, to the following purpose :
" Jeri verso il tarde una posta da Berutti per 41 ore, giunse qui con
dei dispacj a Sua Altesse Ibrahim Pasha, proveniente d' Alessandria, in
data 5 Sefer, per informarlo degli avisi, che egli avevano da Costantinapoli,
d'aver ordinato il Gran Signor che le sue forze si avicinassero sullefron-
tiere della Soria, dietro tali avisi, il Vice-Re d'Egitto prese diverse misure
per rinforzare la sua Armata che si trova in queste parti, eon delle
istruzioni pero a Sua Altesse Ibrahim Pasha, di non prendere sopra di lui
il principio della guerra, ma solamente di difendersi in caso che fosse
attacato, per la 1°. et 2°. volta, ed il 3°. attacato che dalle forze del Gran
Signor sara fatto agli Egyziani, Sua Altessa Ibrahim Pasha a l'ordine di
fare il suo possibile per battere le Truppe del Gran Signor intor-
nandosi a quel territorio: le forze che il Vice-Re d'Egitto decidasse
giungere quella della Soria, sono davergia fatto marciare 4 regimenti
d'infanteria regolati, partite dall' Egitto, dal 8 ai 20 Moharem, accom-
pagnati anche da diversi Annadi, diedi pure l'ordine a Sua Altessa Mus-
tapha Pasha di Candia, di solecitare la sua partenza per la costa. della
Soria, accompagnato da 16 mille di suoi Arnaouti.
In Alessandria si presero le necessarie misure per farepartire giornal-
mente, delle munizioni di guerra, provisioni da bocca e dei fondi (dei

47
quali si conosce gia diversi arrivi alia scala di Lattachia) sufficient! ai
bisogni delle forze Egyziani che si formerano in queste parti."

The above is publicly reported.
T hear this evening that his Highness the Seraskier has received
advice that several of his regiments have already reached this neighbour
hood from the south, and that he has ordered them to march forward on
the frontiers and await his orders. It is stated that the army that his
Highness is forming to oppose any attack the Sultan may make, will
be composed of 20,000 Irregular Troops, twenty regiments of Regular
Troops, and 16,000 Arnaouts that he is expecting from Candia; this force
is to be under the command of his Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha,
his Excellency Solyman Pasha, and his Excellency Achmet Menekly
Pasha. No further advices have been received here respecting the movements
of i the forces (Sultan's) already crossed.
(Translation of part of the above Inclosure.)
LATE yesterday a post from Beyrout arrived here in forty-one hours
with despatches to His Highness Ibrahim Pasha coming from Alexandria,
dated 5±h Sefer, to inform him of advices from Constantinople, that the
Grand Signor had ordered that his forces should approach the frontiers
of Syria, upon which intelligence the Viceroy Of Egypt took various measures
to reinforce his army in those parts; and with instructions also to His High
ness Ibrahim Pasha not to take upon himself the initiative of hostilities, but
only to defend himself in case he should be attacked, the first and second
time; and on the third attack which maybe made on the Egyptians by the
force of the Grand Signor, His Highness Ibrahim Pasha has orders to
doall in his power to beat the troops of the Grand Signor approaching
that territory. Of the forces which the Viceroy of Egypt had decided
should join those in Syria, four regiments of Regular Infantry had
marched, having set out from Egypt from the 8th to the 20th Moharem,
accompanied by several Annadi, orders being given to His Highness
Mustapha Pasha of Candia to hasten his departure for the coast of Syria
with 16,000 of his Arnaouts.
The necessary measures were taken at Alexandria for the daily
despatch of warlike stores,, provisions, and money- (of which various
arrivals are known to have taken place at the port of Latakia,) sufficient
for the wants of the Egyptian forces which shall assemble in those quarters.

Inclosure 5 in No. 53.

Copy of Aleppo Journal brought down from the 28th April to the 1st of
May, 1839. J
April 28.
THE Government is actively providing provisions, &c, which, with
those arriving from the coast, are being put into store.
I am told that there are daily arrivals here from the coast, of
ammunition. All the bakers and ovens have been seized to work for the Govern
ment, so that not a loaf of bread is to be found in the bazaars.
The French Consul, Mr. Guys, visited his Highness the Seraskier Ibra
him Pasha to-day. I am told that the conversation which took place be*
tween them, was on the late movement made by the Sultan's forces in the
direction of Bir, part of which column had crossed the river, Euphrates^
and which his Highness Ibrahim Pasha said, he considered as indicating
an. intention to attack him, and which obliged his Highness to take
immediate steps to collect his; forces, in. order to be ready to meet any

48
attack which might be made against him ; to which, I am told the French
Consul replied to his Highness as follows : " I am of opinion that there will
be no war between you and the Sultan, for the European Powers are
determined to maintain the peace between you;" to which his Highness
replied again, "All that is very good, but can I have anything stronger, and
indicating that the Sultan has the intention to attack me, when he has
crossed some of his troops at Bir; and that there is another column
advancing at Roum Kale, under Hafiz Pasha, forthe same purpose?"
There are daily arrivals here of regiments, who are all quartered in
the town. April 29.
This Government continues its active preparations, both in the
laying in of stores and military ammunition of all sorts ; as also, of daily
arrivals of troops, which are all lodged in mosques, coffee-houses, &c,
prepared for their reception.
It is rumoured to-day, that a colonel and several subaltern officers;
with 200 men, had deserted from the Sultan's side, and had arrived at
Adana. This requires further confirmation.
It is positively reported to-day, that the son of the late Rechid
Mehemet Pasha, in the direction of Merdin and Moussul, is marching
with a force of 40,000 strong, to join Suffook Bey, Chief of the Gerba
Arabs, who is with a considerable force of Arabs; both of whom are to
advance along the desert, in order to act with the Haouran Arabs to the
South. Received this afternoon a letter from his Excellency Solyman Pasha,*
who states, that owing to the different caravans and communications
between the Sultan's territory and this place, having been lately stopped
by that Government, and not allowed to come to Syria, this Government
had in consequence come to the same determination, of not allowing any
intercourse to take place between this country and the Sultan's territory,
so long as the Sultan's Government impeded the intercourse on their side,
which his Excellency begged might be communicated to the British
merchants for their information.
Circulated this afternoon, the foregoing communication from his
Excellency Solyman Pasha to the British merchants of this place. April 30.
Part of the Horse Artillery from Hamah, fifty-four pieces, reached
this at noon.
It is reported to-day, that Inge Bairactar Mehemet Pasha has also
crossed the river with a force, and that Ali Pasha of Bagdad had arrived
at Diarbekir, with a force intended to act against Syria.
I hear from M. Geoffroy, the French Cancellier, that his Excellency
Solyman Pasha had said, that by the last advices they had up to Sunday
night, only eight battalions of the Sultan's forces had crossed the river
Euphrates at Bir, with six pieces of Artillery ; and further added, that it
is with great difficulty the troops cross, owing to the river being very
high, and only having seven boats, which can only take in and land a
battalion a-day.
His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha's troops are daily arriving
in this town from all quarters.
The desertion of a colonel with 200 men, from the Sultan's territory,
is not yet verified. May 1.
I am informed that Germanoss Bachri, with Shukri.Teggar, went to
day to the Syrian Patriarchs, upon which the head Christian merchants
were sent for ; on their arrival, the purport of the meeting was, that
Germanoss Bachri communicated to them, that his Highness the Seraskier
demanded of them a loan of a sum of money, which the treasury is to pay
in the course of a week ; and that if it could not be obtained by that
means, nis Highness would be compelled to levy the : Ferdeh tax, which

49
he is very unwilling to do, as under the present miserable state of the
poorer classes, it would cause great suffering.
I am informed that a meeting of the principal Turk merchants was
held at his Excellency the Governor's for the same purpose, but I have
not been able to learn yet what amount is required of them.
M. Geoffroy, the French Cancellier, tells me that Mr. French Consul
Guys received to-day a letter, vid Beyrout and Alexandria, from his
Excellency the French Ambassador at Constantinople, under date 26th
March, which states, "You will hear in your neighbourhood on the Sultan's
territory, of a considerable movement of troops, provisions, ammunition,
and stores, having taken place, but you have nothing to fear, for there
will ultimately be no war between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali."
It is to-day reported, that his Highness Ibrahim Pasha called
Abdullah Babinsi, the Musselim, and required of him a guarantee for the
security and tranquillity of the town of Aleppo, during his absence. The
Musselim replied, " If your Highness will leave me 4,000 to 5,000 troops,
I remain responsible that during the time you are in the camp, everything
remains in the greatest quietness here."
The result of this discourse is not known positively; some say that
his Highness refused to leave him more than 2,000 troops, in consequence
of which the Musselim refused taking any responsibility: others again
say, that his Highness promised the Musselim the number he required.
The public report among the Christians of the town is, that the
population is very disaffected against them; and that in the event of
Ibrahim Pasha meeting with a repulse, a rise would ensue here and
throughout the towns of Syria.
By the last advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays and Jones, every
thing appeared quiet in their respective districts. The former writes that
there is still, however, a little discontent among the inhabitants of

Giaour-dagh mountains.

(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 6 in No. 53.
Solyman Pasha to Mr. Consul Werry.
Monsieur, Alep, le 16 Sefer, 1255.
DEPUIS quelque tems les caravanes n'arrivent plus de la Turquie, et
le commerce de ces cotes-la se trouve entitlement suspendu : nous avons
du prendre patience pour ne pas aggraver encore les prejudices que
souffre le commerce; mais depuis qu'une tete de colonne de 1' Arm.ee
Turque a passe l'Euphrate, il parait qu'on a redouble encore de severite,
puisque rien n'arrive plus, ni marchandises, ni caravanes; vu les
circonstances presentes, et malgre tout le deplaisir que j'eprouve a vous
communiquer une pareille mesure, qui peut faire tort aux inter&ts com-
merciaux en general, j'ai l'honneur de vous prevenir qu'il est defendu a
toute espece de caravane, de se diriger vers les frontieres. Pendant
quatre jours, a compter de la date de ma lettre, les caravanes et marchan
dises quelconques seront arretees et renvoyees au point du depart ; mais
apres cette epoque fixee, elles seront confisquees. Aussitot que du cote
de l'Armee Turque on retablira la libre circulation, les ordres seront
donnes pour qu'elle soit immediatement retablie ici. II a ete donn6
connaissance de cet arrete aux Rayas et aux habitans ; et j'ai l'honneur
de vous pr6venir de cette mesure, pour que vos commercjans et nationaux
ne soient pas dans le cas d'eprouver des pertes par ignorance ou mal-
entendu. Je regrette qu'une pareille determination, prise du cote de l'armee
Turque, sans qu'il nous en ait ete donne aucune communication, nous
force a user de represailles, m&ne dans le cas tr^s-possible d'un com
mencement d'hostilites, ce que Dieu veuille eloigner pour la prosperite*
H

50
dupays; laguerre meparait assez desastreuse parelle-meme, pour ne pasy
joindre encore sans motif des mesures desolantes pour le commerce et les
populations en general.
Agreez, Monsieur le Consul, &c,
Le Major- General des Armees Egyptiennes,
Charge des Affaires Europe'ennes,
(Signe) LE GENERAL SULEIMAN,

(Translation.)
Solyman Pasha to Mr. Consul Werry.
Sir, Aleppo, 16th Sefer, 1255.
FOR some time past caravans have ceased to arrive from Turkey,
and the trade with those parts is entirely suspended; we have been
obliged to bear this with patience, in order not to add to the evils under
which trade suffers ; but since one division of the Turkish Army has
passed the Euphrates, stricter measures appear to have been adopted,
and now neither merchandize nor caravans come to us. Under these
circumstances, and notwithstanding that I grieve to communicate to you
measures which may hurt commercial interests in general, I have the
honour to acquaint you, that caravans, of every sort, are forbidden to
approach the frontier. For the space of four days, reckoning from the
date of my letter, caravans and merchandize of all sorts will be stopped
and sent back to the place from which they came, but after that fixed
period they will be confiscated. So soon as free transit shall be allowed
by the Turkish Army, orders will be issued to reallow it here. The
Rayas and other inhabitants have been informed of this decree ; and I
have now the honour of making you acquainted with this measure, in
order that your merchants and countrymen may not be subjected to
losses from ignorance or misunderstanding.
I regret that such a proceeding on the part of the Turkish Army,
without any previous communication with us, forces us to adopt reciprocal
measures, even at a time when hostilities may very possibly commence,
though I pray to God that such a result may, for the good of this
country, be distant : war seems to me disastrous enough in itself, with
out adding to it unnecessarily measures which must be injurious to
commerce and to the people in general.
Receive, Sir, &c,
The Major -General of the Egyptian Armies,
Charged with the European Affairs,
(Signed) GENERAL SULEIMAN.

Inclosure 7 in No- 53.

Rapport de Hadji Hidou, Cavass envoy e a Biredjie, le 23 AvrU, 1839, pom-
examiner felat du local des Anglais de l' Expedition de VEuphrate*
par suite des grandes pluies que nous avons eues cette annee.
LE susdit Hadji Hidou partit d'Alep le mardi matin (23 Avril, 1839),
pour se rendre a Biredjie ; a passe le premier jour, divers villages dont il
ignore les noms, et a l'Asir il s'arr&ta pour prendre un peu de repos a un
village nomme Elkout Serougi, et de la il fut coucher au village dit
Elkhatterin, ou il arriva a l'Eiche. Le lendemain il continua sa route en
passant les villages nomm6s Tchobanbek, Tchamourlou, Maghara, Eche
et plusieurs autres dont il ignore les noms, et il arriva vers le midi a la
riviere appeiee Sagiour, qu'il traversa avec peine ; et en continuant sa

51
route, il a vu plusieurs tentes de Bedouins, et ensuite des villages dont il
ignore les noms, a I'exception d'un seul nomme Emeltel. A I'Asir il entra
a Nezib, ou il ne vit point de trOupe, a I'exception d'une cinquantaine
d'hommes qu'il supposa etre la garnison de ce village ; il fut a un autre
dont le nom lui a echappe de la memoire, et comme il etait nuit, il fut
descendre dans la maison du cheik nomme Ali Agha, pour y passer
la nuit; ce cheik ne se trouvait pas a la maison, mais ses gens donnerent
asile a Hadji Hidou, qui, etant fatigue, s'est couche, mais sans pouvoir
bien dormir; vers le minuit, a peu pr^s, il entendit arriver le cheik, qui, en
entrant, s'est informe du dit Hidou, qu'il voyait dormir la, et il a dit:
" Eh bien, il lui arrivera ce qui est arrive a un homme qui, venant des pays
d'Ibrahim Pacha, a ete arrete comme espion, et le Pacha lui fit trancher
la t&te." A ces mots, Hadji Hidou se leva, et s'est assis sur son lit en
s'informant de l'evenement precite ; alors le cheik commenca a questionner
Hadji Hidou sur le motif de son voyage, et s'il etait muni d'un teskere
de route. Celui-ci lui exposait le but de son voyage, qui etait d'examiner
si les magazins et autres appartenant aux Anglais avaient souffert a la
suite des grandes pluies qu'il a fait cette annee, et qu'il venait de la part
du Consul Anglais d'Alep, dont il etait le cavass (en lui montrant son
baton d'argent), et il lui dit qu'il avait une lettre pour le Musselim de
Biredjie, en outre de son teskere de route ; a tout cela, le cheik lui repondit,
que dans ce moment personne ne connait plus Musselim ni rien, il suffisait
d'etre traduit par-devant le Pacha pour avoir la tete tranchee, et qu'il
avait l'air d'un espion et non pas de cavass d'un consul ; et que comment il
n'avait choisi de venir visiter les domaines des Anglais, que lorsque les
troupes Turques avaient passe l'Euphrate? que, par consequent, il voulait
lui conseiller de retourner d'ou il etait venu, mais que craignant d'ltre
compromis, il devait le garder comme prisonnier ; et il ordonna de suite
d'apporter une chaine, qu'on lui mit aux pieds, en le faisant depouiller
de tout ce qu'il avait de mieux sur lui. Sur ces entrefaites, un Arabe qui
etait dans la maison, et dont l'origine est des environs d'Alep, a ce qu'il disait,
prit la defense de Hadji Hidou, en faisant au cheik des representations;
et sur ce, le cheik fit rendre a Hidou ses effets, et lui dit de retourner
de .suite en arriere ; e'est alors que Hadji Hidou s'est apercu qu'il n'avait
plus de papiers dans sa poche, e'est-a-dire, ni le teskere ni la lettre pour
le Musselim ; il sentit alors la consequence facheuse qui pouvait lui arriver
s'il etait traduit devant quelque autorite sans avoir aucun papier, et il
eut peur, desirant de se debarrasser un moment plus tdt de la main de ces
gens la pour retourner ; alors le cheik, apres lui avoir fait lever la chaine
des pieds, lui dit de partir, mais qu'il devait lui laisser son baton
d'argent; sur ce, 1' Arabe qui etait toujours lade la compagnie, observa au
cheik, que cela n'etait pas a faire, que par la suite il pourrait lui arriver
quelques desagremens; alors le cheik prit de Hadji Hidou toute la
monnaie qu'il avait, consistant en 3 taleris, 2 mamdouckis, et quelques
petites pieces d'environ 5 a 6 piastres; de plus, il lui prit encore la
baguette des pistolets, un paire de souliers, et un vase pour l'eau en cuir,
appele en Arabe matara, et il le laissa partir. Deux heures apres que
Hadji Hidou etait en route pour retourner a Alep, etant nuit et pleuvant
fortement, il vit sur la route trois cavaliers, qu'a peine il distinguait, a
cause de l'obscurite ; il menaca ces cavaliers de leur tirer dessus, s'ils
s'approchaient, ces cavaliers s'ecarterent alors pour le laisser passer;
mais apr^s avoir fait quelques pas, le dit Hidou, de crainte que ces
eavaliers ne le poursuivissent, il traversa les campagnes en quittant la
route, et ayant trouve une espece de gouffre, il s'y mit dedans avec son
cheval, en attendant le jour ; et aussitot que le jour parut, il continua
son chemin sans rencontrer plus aucune difficult^, et il arriva ici a Alep,
le vendredi matin (26 du present mois d'Avril).
N.B. — Le dit Hadji Hidou ajoute, qu'en retournant il n'a vu dans
aucun endroit des troupes Egyptiennes ; il a entendu dire seulement qn'un
avis a ete donne par le Musselim d'Alep, que de la Cavalerie des Bedouins
dits Hannadi devait se rendre sur la riviSre de Sagiour pour inspecter ce
qui se passe.
H 2

52

(Translation.)
t
Report of Hadji Hidou, the Guard sent to Biredjie, on the 23rd of April,
1839, in consequence of the great rains which we have hud this year,
to examine into the state of the locality occupied by the Englishmen
connected with the Euphrates Expedition.
THE said Hadji Hidou left Aleppo on Tuesday morning, (23rd April,
1839,) on his way to Biredjie ; the first day he passed several villages, oi
which the names are unknown to him, and at the time of " El Asser" (two
hours and a half before sunset) he stopped to take a little rest at a village
called Elkout Serougi, and thence he went to pass the night at a village
named Elkhatterin, where he arrived at "El Eiche" (about nightfall). The
next dayhe continued his journey, passing through the villages called Tcho-
banbek, Tchamourlou, Maghara, Kche, and several others of which he does
not know the names ; and towards noon he reached the river called the
Sedjour, which he crossed with difficulty ; and in continuing his journey
he saw many Bedouin tents, and afterwards some villages, the names
of which, with the exception of one called Emeltel, are unknown to him.
At "El Asser" he entered Nezib, where he saw no troops, excepting about
fifty men, whom he took to be the garrison of that village ; thence he
went to another village, the name of which he has forgotten, and it
being night he alighted at the house of the Sheik called Ali Agha,
intending to pass the night there. The Sheik was not at home, but
his servants admitted Hadji Hidou, who", being fatigued, laid himself
down to rest, but was not able to sleep much ; towards midnight he
heard the Sheik arrive, and inquire who the person was whom he saw-
lying there ; the Sheik then said, " Well, he will share the same fate
as the man from Ibrahim Pasha's territories, who was arrested as a
spy and beheaded by the Pasha." At these words Hadji Hidou
raised himself up, and sat on his bed while he made inquiries
respecting the occurrence above referred to. The Sheik then began
to question Hadji Hidou, as to the object of his journey, and
whether he was provided with a teskereh (passport). Hadji Hidou
.explained the object of his journey, which was, to examine whether the
magazines, &c, belonging to the English had suffered in consequence of
the heavy rains which had fallen this year ; and he said that he came by
order of the English Consul at Aleppo, whose guard he was, showing, at
the same time, his silver stick, and that, in addition to his teskereh, he had
a letter for the Musselim of Birejic. In answer to all this, the Sheik said,
that at present no one recognized Musselims or anything else ; that it
was quite sufficient to be brought before the Pasha, to make sure that
one's head would be cut off; and that he looked like a spy, and not like a
consular guard ; and that why had he not chosen to come and inspect the
English property, until the period when the Turkish troops crossed the
Euphrates? that, consequently, he would have advised him to return
whence he came, but that, fearing to compromise himself, he must detain
him as a prisoner ; and he then ordered a chain to be attached to his feet,
and desired that he should be dispossessed of all that he had most valuable
about him. Upon these proceedings, an Arab who was in the house, and
who stated that he came originally from Aleppo, took up the defence of Hadji
Hidou, by making a representation to the Sheik. Upon this, the Sheik
directed the effects of Hidou to be restored to him, and ordered him to
return back at once. At that moment Hadji Hidou perceived that he no
longer had his papers in his pocket ; that is to say, neither the teskereh nor
the letter to the Musselim. He at once felt the danger in which he would
probably be placed, were he to be brought before any person in authority
without having any papers ; and he was alarmed, as he desired to free
himself without a moment's loss of time, from the hands of these people,
in order to set out on his return. Then the Sheik, after having caused

53
the chain to be removed from his feet, desired him to depart, but told
him that he must leave his silver stick. Upon this, the Arab, who was
still present, observed to the Sheik, that this should not be done, as it
might very probably inconvenience him much. The ISheik then took
from Hadji Hidou all the money he possessed, amounting to 3 taleris,
2 mamdouckis, and some small coin in value from 5 to 6 piastres. He
further took from him the ramrods of his pistols, a pair of slippers, an a
leather water bottle, called by the Arabs matara, and then allowed him to
go. Two hours after Hadji Hidou was on his journey back to Aleppo, it
being night and raining heavily, he saw three horsemen on the road,
whom he could scarcely distinguish on account of the darkness. He
threatened to shoot at these horsemen if they approached him ; upon
which they got out of his way in order to let him pass ; but after having
gone on some paces, the said Hidou, being afraid lest these horsemen should
pursue him, cut across the country, quitting the regular road, and having
discovered a sort of hollow, he placed himself there with his horse to
wait daylight. At daybreak he continued his journey, without meet
ing any more difficulties, and arrived here at Aleppo, on Friday morning,
(26th of the present month of April.)
N.B.- — The said Hadji Hidou adds, that in returning he did not see
Egyptian troops in any place ; he only heard that information had been
given by the Musselim of Aleppo, that the cavalry of- the Bedouins was
to proceed to the river Sedjour to see what is going on.

No. 54.
Extract of a despatch from the Consul-General of France in Egypt. —
(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney.) Alexandrie, le 15 Mai, 1839.
C'EST dans ces circonstances que M. de Medem est venu communi-
quer a Mehemet Ali la depeche du Comte du Nesselrode qui le chargeait
d'obtenir un mouvement retrograde de l'armee Egyptienne, et que M. de
Laurin, qui avait aussi re^u une lettre de M. de Stiirmer con cue dans le
m£me but, est venu, ainsi qu'on le lui recommandait, appuyer seulement
par son influence morale, la demande du Consul-General de Russie.
Mehemet Ali a montre en repondant, une grande prudence et beau-
coup de moderation. II adit que tout ce qui s'etait passe en Turquie,
depuis son depart pour le Soudan, temoignait suffisamment des intentions
hostiles du Sultan a son egard ; qu'il n'avait rien fait, cependant, pour
s'attirer son animadversion, et qu'il desirait sincerement que la paix ne
fut pas troubiee. II a ajoute, que si les Turcs repassaient l'Euphrate,
il ferait retrograder ses troupes jusqu'a. Alep ; que s'ils allaient reprendre
leurs positions a Malatia, il enjoindrait a Ibrahim Pacha de se retirer a
Damas ; et qu'enfin si Hafiz Pacha se retirait avec son arm.ee au-dela de
Malatia, il rappellerait Ibrahim Pacha en Egypte.
Mehemet Ali a parie ensuite de la necessite d'en finir avec sa posi
tion. 11 parait avoir renonce a, son idee d'independance, et ne desire rien
de plus que l'heredite pour ses enfans, du pouvoir qui lui est confie.
Du 16 Mai.
P.S. — Je viens de recevoir la note ci-jointe, qui a ete communiquee
par Artin Bey, aux Consuls-Generaux des Grandes Puissances, et qui
confirme le contenu de ma depeche. Le Vice-Roi a declare a M. Cochelet,
Consul-General de France en Egypte, &c, qu'il s'engage, dans le cas ou
les troupes du Sultan qui ont franchi l'Euphrate pres de Bir, se retire-
raient de l'autre cot£ du fleuve, a. faire faire un mouvement retrograde a.
son armee, et a rappeler son fils Ibrahim Pacha a Damas ; que dans le
cas ou cette demonstration pacifique serait a son tour suivie d'un mouve-

#4

ment retrograde de Farmee de Hafiz Pacha au-dela de Malatia, son
Altesse rappellera le Generalissime en Egypte. De plus, son Altesse le
Vice-Roi a ajoute, de son propre mouvement, que si les Quatre Grandea
Puissances consentaient a lui garantir la paix, et s'interessaient a lui
obtenir la succession de sa famille, il retirerait une partie de ses troupes
de la Syrie, et serait pret a s'entendre sur un arrangement definitif propre
a garantir la securite, et adapte aux besoins du pays.

(Translation.)
Extract of a Despatch from the Consul-General of France in Egypt. —
(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney.) Alexandria, May 15, 1839.
IT is under these circumstances that M. de Medem communicated to
Mehemet Ali the despatch of Count Nesselrode, which directs him to
obtain a retrograde movement of the Egyptian Army, and that M. de
Laurin, who also had received a letter from M. de Stiirmer directed to the
same object, supported, solely by his moral influence, as had been recom
mended to him, the demand of the Consul-General of Russia.
Mehemet Ali, in replying, showed great prudence and much modera
tion. He said, that all that had passed in Turkey since his departure for
Soudan, sufficiently testified the hostile intentions of the Sultan with
respect to him ; that he had done nothing, however, to draw down upon
him the Sultan's animadversion ; and that he sincerely desired that peace
might not be disturbed. He added, that if the Turks repassed the
Euphrates, he would withdraw his troops as far as Aleppo ; that if
they took up their positions again at Malatia, he would enjoin Ibrahim
Pasha to withdraw to Damascus ; and that, lastly, if Hafiz Pasha should
withdraw with his army beyond Malatia, he would recall Ibrahim Pasha
into Egypt.
Mehemet Ali afterwards spoke of the necessity of putting an end to
his present position. He appeared to have renounced his idea of inde
pendence, and to desire nothing more than hereditary succession for his
children, with the power which is confided to him. May 16.
P.S. — I have just received the annexed Note which has been commu
nicated by Artin Bey to the Consuls-General of the Great Powers, and
which confirms the contents of my despatch. The Viceroy has declared toM.
Cochelet, Consul-General of France in Egypt, &c.,that he engages, incase
the troops of the Sultan, which have passed the Euphrates near Bir, retire to
the other side of the river, to cause his army to make a retrograde movement*
and to recall his son Ibrahim Pasha to Damascus ; that in case this pacific
demonstration shall in its turn be followed by a retrograde movement of
the army of Hafiz Pasha beyond Malatia, His Highness will recall the
Generalissimo into Egypt. Moreover His Highness the Viceroy has added
of his own accord, that if the Four Great Powers consent to «-uarantee
peace, and to interest themselves to obtain for him the succession of his
family, he would withdraw a part of his troops from Syria, and would
be ready to come to an understanding as to a definitive arrangement
calculated to guarantee the security, arid adapted to the wants of the
country.

55

No, 55.
Baron Roussin to the Due de Dalmatie. — (Communicated by Baron d&
Bourqueney.)
(Extrait.) Therapia, le 16 Mai, 1839
J'AI immediatement adresse Pinstruetion ci-jointe a M. Lapierre,
mais il etait trop tard pour qu'il put voir le Ministre le meme jour; son
rapport ne m'est parvenu que ce matin, et le voici :
" D'apres vos ordres, je suis alie chez Nouri Effendi. Je lui ai lu votre
instruction, ainsi que la copie de la communication de Boghos Bey aux
Consuls-Generaux, et apres avoir entendu ces pieces, il m'a repondu :
"' Dites a M. l'Ambassadeur, qui je lui confirme officiellement que la
Porte n'a aucune nouvelle de cela ; que d'apres celles que nous venons de
recevoir hier par un Tatar d'Hafiz Pacha, I'armee Turque etait encore
loin des confins; la Porte n'a donne aucun ordre d'attaquer, mais si les
troupes de Mehemet Ali attaquent, celles du Sultan se defendront, et
iferont ce qu 'elles pourront.
" ' Ceci est encore une ruse de Mehemet Ali. Ce nom <le Bir n'est
pas connu dans le voisinage de I'armee d'Hafiz Pacha ; e'est Biledjick qui
est dans l'eyalet d'Orfa, lequel appartient au Grand Seigneur ;' et le
Ministre a fait apporter une liste des villes et villages de chaque Gouverne-
ment d'Asie, et m'a fait remarquer, en effet, que Biledjick est peu
eioigne d'Orfa ; ' le Gouvernement d'Orfa,' repeta-t-il, ' appartient a Hafiz
Pacha; il est done hors de doute qu'il peut y avoir place ses troupes sans
rompre la paix. Je vous prie de dire a M. l'Ambassadeur, qu'il doit con-
naitre assez la mauvaise foi de Mehemet Ali, pour ne pas douter qu'il n'en
donne ici une nouvelle preuve.'
" II m'a demande a faire faire la traduction de mon instruction par le
Drogman de la Porte, et a prendre copie de la seconde piece, et j'y ai
consenli. II m'a assure de nouveau officiellement, que la Porte n'a donne
aucun ordre qui puisse commences- la guerre de la part de I'armee
Ottomane, et repete que cette armee n'a pas depasse la frontiere."
Ce rapport ne repondant pas positivement aux deux questions posees
dans mon instruction, j'ai renvoye M. Lapierre pour demander une reponse
plus categorique.
Cependant, on ne peut pas nier que l'observation de Nouri Effendi ne
soit plausible, e'est-a-dire, que le lieu indique dans le bulletin Egyptien est
plutot Biledjick du Gouvernement d'Orfa, que Bir, que je crois beaucoup
plus eioigne vers les sources de l'Euphrate (ce que, d'ailleurs, nos
mauvaises cartes de la Syrie ne me permettent pas de verifier). La
response du Ministre est I 'affirmation qu'il a toujours donnee a, toutes leg
Legations, que " I'armee Turque n'a point attaque, et qu'elle n'attaquera
pas, si elle ne Test elle-meme."
1 1 m'est impossible, Monsieur le Due, de savoir et de vous ecrire autre
chose; si le second rapport du Drogman m'arrive avant le depart du
paquebot (demain), et s'il ajoute au premier, je le joindrai a la depeche.
(Signe) BARON ROUSSIN.
P.S. — 17, une heure avant le depart du paquebot. — Je re^ois un
second rapport du premier Drogman. II confirme le premier dans
son point essentiel. La guerre ne parait pas commencee, mais elle
parait inevitable ; la Porte ne l'a pas decidee dans un conseil, comme
on l'avait dit; elle a, au contraire, conclu a l'eviter et a resister a
I'entrainement du Sultan ; mais cette resistance manque d'ensemble et
d'energie, parcequ'elle pourrait etre dangereuse. La Porte est divisee ;
contre la guerre on compte Reouf, Khosreff, Nazif Pacha, Nouri Effendi,
Sarim Bey, et trois conseillers ; pour la guerre, Said Pacha, Seraskier,
gendre du Sultan, qui soutient que Farmee Ottomane est bien superieure
a celle de Mehemet, quoiqu'il n'ait vu ni Fune ni 1'autre ; Achmet, Capitan
Pacha, qui assure que si on le laisse sortir des Dardanelles avant I'Escadre

56
Turque, celle de Mehemet Ali viendra aussitot se rallier a lui ; enfin Hafiz
Pacha, generalissime, qui n'a jamais fait la guerre comme officier general.
Ce parti se fortifie des familiers du Mabeim et d'un grand nombre de
Ridsals, tant ceux qui aspirent a sa faveur, que ceux qui redoutent les
dangers d'une opposition trop marquee, et ceux encore plus nombreux qui,
ennemis de l'ordre de choses actuelles, voudraient le renverser a tout prix,
fut-ce a celui d'une catastrophe. Tous les uiemas sont de ce parti ; la
perte totale de leur influence qu'ils esp£rent recouvrer, en est le motif.
Toutes les troupes de Roumeiie et de l'Asie Mineure sont dirig'ees et
en marche pour rejoindre le camp de Hafiz Pacha, et ceux de Kutahia. II
reste a peine 8,000 de garnison a Constantinople, ou I'opinion publique est
hostile aux reformes.
Des emissaires arrivent chaque jour d'Egypte et de Syrie, en voyes
secretement par le Sultan ; iis lui rapportent que toutes les populations
sont pretes a s'insurger contre Mehemet Ali, au premier signal. Tahar
Pacha, parti il y a deux mois pour le camp de Hafiz Pacha, avait reelle-
ment mission ostensible d'ordonner de rester en-deca de la frontiere ; mais
il a recu des instructions secretes du Sultan ; on les ignore, mais on les
devine. Le Sultan veut detruire son vassal ou succomber ; il le dit tout
haut. Tel est le resume des derniers rapports. En resume, Monsieur le
Due, on ne sait pas et Ton ne croit pas que Farmee ait franchi la fron
tiere, mais on espere qu'elle en est assez pres pour rendre Fattaque des
Egyptiens inevitable, et le Sultan le desire ardemment.
(Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.
(Translation.)
Baron Roussin to the Due de Dalmatie. — (Communicated by Baron de
Bourqueney.)
(Extract.) Therapia, May 16, 1839.
I IMMEDIATELY addressed the annexed instruction to M. La
pierre, but it was too late for him to see the Minister the same day ; his
report has only reached me this morning, and it is as follows :
" According to your orders, I called upon Nouri Effendi. I read to
him your instruction as well as the copy of the communication from
Boghos Bey to the Consuls-General, and after having heard these com
munications, he replied : —
" ' Tell the Ambassador that I confirm officially that the Porte has no
intelligence to that effect ; that according to the intelligence which we
yesterday received by a Tatar of Hafiz Pasha, the Turkish Army was
still far from the confines : the Porte has given no order to attack ; but if
the troops of Mehemet Ali attack, those of the Sultan will defend them
selves, and will do what they can.
" ' This is another device of Mehemet Ali. The name of Bir is not
known in the neighbourhood of the army of Hafiz Pasha; it is Biledjick,
which is in the Pashalic of Orfa, which belongs to the Grand Signor ; '—
and the Minister ordered a list to be brought of all the towns and villages,
of each Government of Asia, and pointed out to me that Biledjick is, in
fact, little distant from Orfa. ' The Government of Orfa,' he repeated,
' belongs to Hafiz Pasha ; without doubt, therefore.he may have placed his
troops there without breaking the peace. I request you to tell the Am
bassador that he must be sufficiently aware of the bad faith of Mehemet
Ali to have no doubt of his giving a fresh proof of it on the present
occasion.' " He asked my permission to cause the translation of my instruction
to be made by the Dragoman of the Porte, and to take a copy of the
second document ; to which I consented. He repeated officially his assur
ance that the Porte has not given any order which can cause the com
mencement of war on the part of the Ottoman Army, and he repeated,
that this army has not passed the frontier."
This report not giving any positive answer to the two questions

57
proposed in my instruction, I sent back M. Lapierre to demand a more
categorical answer.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the observation of Nouri
Effendi is plausible ; that is to say, that the spot indicated in the Egyptian
Bulletin, is rather Biledjick of the Government of Orfa, than Bir, which I
take to be much further off in the direction of the source of the Eu
phrates, (which however the badness of our maps of Syria does not
permit me to verify.) The answer of the Minister is the assertion which,
he has always given to all the Legations, viz., that " the Turkish Army
has not attacked, and that it will not attack, unless it be itself attacked."
It is impossible for me, M. le Due, to ascertain and to communicate
to you anything else. If the second report of the Dragoman reaches me
before the departure of the packet, (to-morrow,) and if it contains any
addition to the first, I will annex it to the despatch.
P.S. — 17, one hour before the departure of the packet. I have
received a second report from the first Dragoman. It confirms the first in
its essential point. War does not appear to have commenced, but it
appears to be inevitable ; the Porte has not decided on it in Council, as
was reported ; the Porte has, on the contrary, come to the conclusion to
avoid it, and to resist being drawn into it by the Sultan ; but this resist*
ance is deficient in unanimity and in energy, because it might be dan
gerous. The Porte is divided: against the war are reckoned Reouf,
Khosreff, Nazif Pasha, Nouri Effendi, Sarim Bey, and three Councillors ;
in favour of war, Said Pasha, Seraskier, son-in-law of the Sultan, who
maintains that the Ottoman Army is very superior to that of Mehemet
Ali, though he has seen neither the one nor the other. Achmet, Capudan
Pasha, who asserts that if he be allowed to issue from the Dardanelles
before the Turkish squadron, that of Mehemet Ali will immediately rally
round him ; and finally, Hafiz Pasha, Generalissimo, who has never con
ducted a war as General Officer. This party is strengthened by the
partizans of the Mabeim, and by a great number of Ridsals, as well those
who aspire to his favour, as those who dread the dangers of too marked
an opposition ; and also by those still more numerous, who, enemies of the
present order of things, would overturn it at any risk, even at that of a
revolution. All the Ulemas are of this party ; the total loss of their
influence, which they hope to recover, is their motive.
All the troops of Roumelia and of Asia Minor are under orders, and
on the march to join the camp of Hafiz Pasha, and those of Kutahia.
There remain barely 8,000 to garrison Constantinople, where public
opinion is hostile to reform.
Emissaries are arriving every day from Egypt and from Syria, sent
secretly by the Sultan. They bring him word that the whole population
are ready to rise against Mehemet Ali, at the first signal. Tahar Pasha,
who set off two months ago for the camp of Hafiz Pasha, had really the
ostensible mission of ordering the army to remain on this side of the
frontier ; but he received secret instructions from thte Sultan ; they are not
known, but they are guessed. The Sultan wishes to destroy his vassal,
or to fall ; he avows it openly. Such is the substance of the last
reports. TO sum up, M. le Due, it is not known, and it is not believed,
that the army has crossed the frontier ; but it is hoped that it is suffi
ciently near to render the attack of the Egyptians inevitable, and the
Sultan ardently desires it.

m

No. 56.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received' June 17.)
My Lord, Alexandria, May 19, 1833.
I HAD the honour to report to your Lordship, in a private letter of
7th May, vid Marseilles,, the arrival of despatches for Count Medem and
M. de Laurin, and I have now to correct two errors in my letter, whicji
are however of little import ; one in the date of the letter of Count Nes
selrode, which is the 29th of March, and not the 12th of April, — and the
other relative to the despatch to M. de Laurin, which was not from
Vienna, but from the Internuncio at Constantinople.
Those despatches came in charge of a Russian messenger by an
Austrian steamer.
On the 7th of May, Count Medem sent to Boghos Bey a copy of the
despatch from Count Nesselrode, but Count Medem told me that it was not
an exact transcript from the despatch, as he had deemed it necessary,
from the change of circumstances since that despatch was written, to
curtail and modify (e'laguer) some parts ; and Count Medem read to me
part of a despatch to his Court, in which he states his reasons for so
doing. Count Medem also sent to Boghos Bey the original despatch of M.
de Bouteneff; and as Boghos Bey gave those two documents into my
hands, I am enabled to send copies of them to your Lordship.
As Count Nesselrode states that he has sent a copy of his despatch
to the principal Courts, your Lordship will see the changes made in the
copy sent by Count Medem to Boghos Bey.
In consequence of a letter from' Boghos Bey, the Pasha arrived here
On the morning of the 12th instant, and Count Medem and M. de Laurin
had some interviews with him on the 12th, 13th, and 14th instant, at the
last of which he agreed to a declaration in the terms agreed on, and which
the Pasha said he would send to the Consuls-General of the Four Great
Powers, to be by them communicated to their Governments ; and on the
morning of the 15th, Count Medem and M. de Laurin went together to
the Pasha, when the declaration was agreed to ; and on the same evening
a copy was sent, by order of the Pasha,, to myself, and to the Consuls-
General of Austria, France, and Russia.
I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of that
declaration ; and I sent to Viscount Ponsonby, by the French steamer
which left this on the morning of the 17th instant, copies of the despatches
of Count Nesselrode and M. de Bouteneff, and of the declaration of the
Pasha. M. de Laurin has been so kind as to send me the copy of his despatch
on this occasion to the Internuncio, and I have the honour to inclose a
copy of it, by which your Lordship will see the details of the interviews
of M. de Laurin and of Count Medem with the Pasha.
My latest accounts from Aleppo are of the 6th of May, at which date
Ibrahim Pasha was at Aleppo with the main body of his army ; and
Aleppo, Killis, and Hamah, had been reinforced by troops from the
south, but only after the arrival of the army of the Sultan at Bir; after
which, also, the greater part of the horses of the Cavalry and Artillery had
been brought in from grass.
It cannot, therefore, be said that Ibrahim Pasha was the first to com
mence operations indicative of hostilities, as even now he has not reinforced
Aintab, which is the nearest of his posts to the Turkish frontier from
which it is distant about seven hours.
Part of the army of Hafiz Pasha,, (it is said about 10,000 men,) with
some artillery, has crossed the Euphrates at Bir, but has not come on this
side of the Sedjour, which is there the boundary of the territory under
Mehemet Ali; but there is a report, not official, that part of the Sultan's
troops have entered Syria, near Aintab.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry of Aleppo, writes to me on the 6th of May, that
1

59
Ibrahim Pasha intends, after the arrival of all his forces, to have a general
review, and then proposes to march his force ten hours' distance from his
camp, in the plain between Aleppo and Aintab, and there await any
attack which may be made against him by the Sultan's forces ; as he has
received positive orders from Mehemet Ali, not to move out of his limits
upon any consideration, or to be the first aggressor.
Ibrahim Pasha has some Bedouin Cavalry near the Sedjour, to
observe the movements of the Sultan's army ; but I am persuaded (and
his orders from his father are peremptory to that effect) that he will not
move forward to attack Hafiz Pasha's advance, which he might easily
destroy, nor commit any act which can be called aggressive ; and I trust
that the remonstrances of Lord Ponsonby and of the other Ambassadors,
will yet prevail on the Porte to retire the Turkish Army before any action
takes place. It does not, however, appear to me that in the ineffective
state of a Turkish commissariat, any Turkish Army can long have means
of subsistence ; and it must, therefore, either retire or advance, and in
this last case an engagement will be inevitable.
Mr. Consul Moore writes, that the native Christians in Syria dread
success on the part of the Sultan ; and this shows that the Christians are
favourable to Mehemet Ali. But it is far different with the Mussulman
population in Syria, whose affections have been quite alienated by their
sufferings from conscriptions.
Mr. Consul Werry, of Damascus, has stated to your Lordship in his;
despatch of May 10, the bad prospects of commerce from the present state
of affairs in Syria, and from Hafiz Pasha having stopped all the caravans ;
which caused a counter order by Solyman Pasha, copy of which was
transmitted to your Lordship by Mr. Werry.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry writes to me on this subject, as follows : —
" I am very sorry to be obliged to acquaint you, that from what
I hear from our merchants, the present critical state of affairs in this
country is causing most ruinous consequences to our trade ; for since
the intelligence received of the Sultan's forces having crossed the
Euphrates, and that the army is advancing on the frontier at different
points, with an apparent hostile intention, and subsequently, the steps
taken by this Government, in the concentration of all the Egyptian forces
in this town and neighbourhood, the commerce of this place has been com
pletely paralyzed, and commercial transactions of all sorts have entirely
ceased, thereby eausing great detriment to our British merchants, who
dan neither effect sales of the large stocks they have on hand, nor can
they recover, at this present moment that payments are suspended under
the plea of the unsettled state of affairs, any of their outstanding debts,
of which they have on the place to such large amounts.
" Moreover, this suspension of trade is not only ruinous to our mer
chants established here, but it also causes considerable detriment and loss
to our general commercial interests."
I may remark, that the British merchants in Aleppo suffer more par
ticularly, as much trade was carried on by them to Asia Minor and
Mesopotamia. I have &c.
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 56.
Gaunt Nesselrode to Count Medem.

Petersbourg, le 29 Mars, 1839.
LES dernieres nouvelles que nous avons recues de Constantinople,
nous annoncent qu'un changement notable venait de se faire remarquer
dans l'attitude de Farmee Egyptienne en Syrie.
De nouvelles troupes et des depots du materiel de guerre ont et6
portes en avant jusqu'a Alep. De plus, une grande quantite de muni-
I 2

60
tions a ete expediee successivement pour Antab, endroit qui ne se trouve
qu'a une distance de 6 a 8 heures de Marache, de Biledjik, et de Roum-
kala, qui forment les positions les plus avancees que Farmee Turque
est dans la necessite de couvrir, pour se mettre a Fabri d'une attaque
imprevue. Enfin, sur l'extremite meme de la frontiere qui separe les deux
armees, les Egyptiens ont etabli des batteries a Tesbichlir-kouyou ; de
sorte qu'au premier mouvement qu'ils feraient, iis seraient les maitres de
poser le pied sur le territoire Ture, d'envahir Bichisti, et d'occuper
jusqu'a Biledjik et Ourfa, sans que Farmee Ottomane, qui se trouvait a
une distance de 60 heures en arriere de ces positions avancees, aurait ete
en mesure d'opposer le moindre obstacle a une pareille agression.
Cette consideration n'a point permis a Hafiz Pacha, Commandant-en-
Chef de FArmee Turque, de rester dans Finaction, tandis que l'Armee
Egyptienne venait de prendre une attitude menacante et rapprochee des
frontieres. En presence de ce mouvement de l'Armee Egyptienne, Hafiz Pacha
s'est trouve dans Fobligation de prendre, a son tour, des mesures de pre
caution et de defense. De son cote, il a fait avancer des troupes vers
Ourfa, Diarbekir, et Siverek, pour mettre a couvert les positions que les
Egyptiens menacaient.
Ainsi les deux armees se trouvent aujourd'hui en presence. Les
troupes de Mehemet Ali ont ete les premieres a se rapprocher de la fron
tiere. Celles du Sultan n'ont fait que suivre ce mouvement, pour ne point
etre pris au depourvu, et pour pouvoir repousser la force par la force, dans
le cas ou l'Armee Egyptienne se livrerait a des actes d'hostilite.
Tels sont les faits qui resultent des rapports circonstancies que
FEmpereur vient de recevoir de son Ministre a Constantinople, et qui se
trouvent fondes de la maniere la plus positive sur le temoignage des
officiers Prussiens attaches a l'etat-major de l'Armee du Taurus.
En portant un regard attentif sur la position respective des deux
armees, notre Auguste Maitre a acquis la certitude que e'est celle de
Mehemet Ali qui a ete la premiere a faire un mouvement qui, sans etre
agressif, porte neanmoins le caractere d'une demonstration menacante
que rien ne saurait justifier.
Or, une semblable demonstration se trouve ouvertement en contradic
tion avec les assurances pacifiques que vous avez souvent recueillies de
la bouche de Mehemet Ali ; elle est en opposition directe a Fintention
formellement arretee de toutes les Puissances de l'Europe, qui ont una-
nimement resolu de maintenir la paix de l'Orient, et de ne point permettre
qu'elle soit vioiee impun6ment.
Vous connaissez, Monsieur le Comte, les determinations que FEmpe
reur a arretees a cet egard ; elles sont irrevocables. Tous les Cabinets de
l'Europe les partagent, car iis ont tous egalement a coeur de preserver
l'Empire Ottoman du danger d'une nouvelle complication.
Le Pacha d'Egypte, s'il veut examiner murement ses propres inter£ts,
yerra que personne ne devrait eviter, plus que lui, de donner le signal
d'une pareille complication. En effet, troubler Fetat de paix dont il jouit,
e'est ebranler son propre pouvoir; e'est remettre en question tous les
avantages qui lui sont assures par ses arrangemens anterieurs avec la
Porte ; e'est echanger le danger d'une lutte hasardeuse contre le bienfait
d'une possession paisible ; enfin e'est se mettre en opposition avec l'Europe
entiere ; car tous les Cabinets ont hautement frappe de reprobation tout
acte d'hostilite que le Pacha d'Egypte commettrait au mepris des assu
rances pacifiques qu'il a si souvent r6petees de la maniere la plus solennelle.
Ces verites sont trop frappantes, Monsieur le Comte, pour qu'elles
ne soient pas appredees par Mehemet Ali, avec la superiorite de jugement
qui le distingue. Aussi ne doutons-nous pas un seul instant des explica
tions satisfaisantes qu'il s'empressera de vous offrir. Mais les circon-
stances du moment sont trop graves pour que ces explications seules
puissent nous suffire.
Lorsque les armees se trouvent en presence, les paroles les plus paci
fiques ne servent pas a eloigner le danger d'un conflit, que le moindre
incident peut provoquer d'un instant a l'autre.

61
Pour prevenir ce danger, il n'y a qu'un seul moyen : e'est de retablir
de nouveau la distance qui jusqu'ici separait les deux armees.
• Or, comme e'est celle du Pacha d'Egypte qui est la plus rappochee!
des frontieres, e'est elle aussi qui devra etre la premiere a se replier. En
consequence, les nouvelles troupes et les depots du materiel de guerre qui
ont ete portes a Antab et Alep, devront retrograder de rechef vers Damas, .
pour replacer les choses dans l'etat ou elles ont ete anciennement.
Alors, lorsque celle-ci aura repris ses anciennes positions, les Cabinets
amis de la Porte, pourront en appeler, a leur tour, aux sentimens paci
fiques du Sultan, pour inviter ce Souverain a donner a Hafiz Pacha Fordre
de rentrer dans les cantonnemens qu'il vient de quitter, et de faire cesser
les mesures de defense que Fattitude menacante de l'Armee Egyptienne
avait rendues necessaires.
L'Empereur vous charge, Monsieur le Comte, de vous acquitter
immediatement aupres du Pacha d'Egypte, de la communication contenue
dans la presente depeche.
Le Feldjager qui en est porteur, attendra la reponse que vous
donnera Mehemet Ali.
Dans Fintervalle, notre Auguste Maitre m'a charge de porter la
presente depeche a la connaissance de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe. De
m^me qu'ils ont concouru unanimement aux demarches que vous avez
recu ordre de faire en execution des declarations que FEmpereur a fait
emaner a Toplitz, de meme aussi les grands Cabinets, unis avec nous
d'intentions et de principes, sauront veiller au maintien du repos du
Levant, en reclamant, comme nous venons de la faire, la cessation des
demonstrations recentes auxquelles l'Armee Egyptienne s'est portee.
Persuades de l'intime accord qui existe a cet egard entre toutes les
Puissances, nous vous invitons, Monsieur le Comte, a communiquer la
presente depeche a vos collegues, qui ne tarderont pas, j'en suis sur, de
recevoir des instructions analogues de leurs Cours.

(Translation.)
Count Nesselrode to Count Medem.
Petersburgh, March 29, 1839.
THE latest accounts which we have received from Constantinople
inform us that a notable change is observable in the attitude of the
Egyptian Army in Syria.
Fresh troops and depots of warlike stores have been pushed
forward as far as Aleppo. Besides, a great quantity of stores has
been at different times despatched to Aintab, a place at a distance of not
more than six or eight hours from Marash, from Biledjik, and from
Roumkala, which form the most advanced positions which the Turkish
Army is under the necessity of covering to protect itself from a sudden
attack. In short, the Egyptians have established batteries at Tesbichlir-
kouyou, on the very extremity of the frontier which separates the two
Armies ; so that on the very first movement which they might make, they
would be enabled to enter the Turkish territory, to invest Bichisti, and to
occupy even Biledjik and Orfa, without the Ottoman Army, which would
be at a distance of sixty hours behind these advanced positions, having
the means of opposing the least obstacle to such an aggression.
This consideration has prevented Hafiz Pasha, Commander-in-Chief
of the Turkish Army, from remaining inactive, while the Egyptian Army
was taking up a threatening attitude near the frontiers.
In consequence of this movement of the Egyptian Army, Hafiz Pasha
found himself under the necessity of taking, on his side, precautionary
and defensive measures. On his side, he advanced troops towards Orfa,
Diarbekir, and Sivereck, in order to cover the positions which were
threatened by the Egyptians.
Thus the two Armies are at this moment in presence of each other.
The troops of Mehemet Ali were the first to approach the frontier. Those

62
of the Sultan only followed that movement, in order not to :be taken by
surprise, >and to be able to repel force by force, in case the Egyptian Army
should commit any acts of hostility.
Such are the facts which result from the circumstantial reports which
the Emperor has lately received from his Minister at Constantinople, and
which are founded upon the most positive testimony of the Prussian
officers attached to the Staff of the Army of the Taurus.
In attentively considering the respective position of the two Armies^
our august Master has satisfied himself that it is the Army of Mehemet
Ali which first made a movement, which, without being one of aggres
sion, yet bears the character of a threatening demonstration, which nothing
Can justify. But, such a demonstration is openly in contradiction to the
pacific assurances which you have often received from the mouth of
Mehemet Ali ; it is in direct opposition to the formally recorded intention
of all the Powers of Europe, which have unanimously resolved to maintain
the peace of the East, and not to permit that it shall be broken with
impunity. You know, Monsieur le Comte, the determination which the Emperor
has adopted in that respect ; it is irrevocable. It is shared by all the
Cabinets of Europe, for they all have equally at heart the preservation
of the Ottoman Empire from the danger of a new complication.
The Pasha of Egypt, if he will attentively consider his own interests,
will see that no one should avoid, more than himself, giving the signal of
such a complication. In fact, to disturb the state of peace which he
enjoys, is to jeopardize his own power; it is to bring again into question
all the advantages which are secured to him by the previous arrange
ments of the Porte ; it is to exchange for the danger of a hazardous
struggle, the advantage of a peaceable possession ; in fact, it is to put
himself in opposition to the whole of Europe ; for all the Cabinets have highly
disapproved of any act of hostility which the Pasha of Egypt should
commit in defiance of the pacific assurances which he has so often
repeated in the most solemn manner.
These truths are too striking, Monsieur le Comte, not to be appre
ciated by Mehemet Ali with the superior understanding which distin
guishes him. We have therefore no doubt that he will hasten to afford
to you the most satisfactory explanations. But the circumstances of the
moment are too serious for explanations alone to be sufficient for us.
When armies are in presence of each other, the most pacific
language does not remove the danger of a conflict which the smallest
incident may provoke at any moment.
To remove this danger there is but one way ; it is to re-establish
afresh the distance which hitherto separated the two Armies.
Thus, as the Army of the Pasha of Egypt is the nearest to the frontier,
it is that Army which should be the first to retreat. Therefore the fresh
troops and the depots of warlike stores which have been brought to Aintab
and Aleppo, must forthwith return towards Damascus, to replace matters
in the state in which they formerly were.
Then, when that Army shall have resumed its former positions, the
Qabinets, friends of the Porte, will be able, on their side, to appeal to the
pacific inclinations of the Sultan, to engage that Sovereign to give to
Hafiz Pasha the order to return into the contonments which he has lately
left, and to put a stop to the defensive measures which the menacing
attitude of the Egyptian Army had rendered necessary.
The Emperor directs you. Monsieur le Comte, to communicate
immediately to the Pasha of Egypt the contents of this despatch.
The courier who is the bearer of it will wait for the answer which
Mehemet Ali will give you.
Meantime, our august Master has ordered me to bring this despatch
to the knowledge of all the Cabinets of Europe. Just as they unani
mously agreed to the measures which you received orders to adopt in
execution of the declarations of the Emperor at Toplitz, in the same
manner the Great Cabinets, united to us in intentions and principle, will
watch over the maintenance of peace in the Levant, by demanding, as

63
I wee riow da, the cessation of the recent demonstrations which the Egyptian
Army has made.
With the conviction of the perfect agreement which exists between
all; the Powers, we direct you* Monsieur le Comte, to communicate this
despatch to your Colleagues, who will L shortly, I am convinced, receye
similar instructions from their Courts.

Inclosure 2 in No. 56.
M. de Bouteneff to Count Medem.
Monsieur le Comte, Pera, le \% Avril, 1839-
VOTRE dernier rapport sous cachet volant, a Fadresse de Son Excel
lence M. le Vice-Chancelier, en date du -^ courant, No. 6, m'est exactement
parvenu par la voie du pyroscaphe Francais, et je profite du retour de ce
memebatiment pour vous en accuser la reception, et pour vous remercier
de la communication des interessantes informations que vous transmettez
airMinistere Imperial, et que je ne manquerai pas a acheminer sans deiai
vers leur destination.
Sans pouvoir vous donner aujourd'hui des instructions speciales sur
la ligne de conduite que vous avez a tenir au milieu des circonstances du
moment, je ne saurais, Monsieur le Comte, ne pas applaudir a la sage
reserve que vous mettez dans vos explications avec Mehemet Ali, ainsi
qu'au zele avec lequel vous plaidez aupres de lui, la cause de la justice
et du bon droit.
Les assurances du Pacha d'Egypte sont tellement positives, elles vous
ont ete reiterees si souvent, qu'il n'est pas permis d'eiever des doutes sur
leur sincerite sans suspecter la bonne foi de Mehemet Ali. Ces dispositions
pacifiques sont d'ailleurs dans son propre interet, car le Pacha a trop de
perspicacite pour ne pas comprendre, que toutes les consequences d'une
agression contre son Souverain legitime, retomberaient infailliblement sur
leur auteur et consommeraient sa ruine.
D'un autre cote, la volonte bien arr&tee de toutes les Grandes Puis
sances est pour le maintien de la paix, — but constant de leurs efforts et
principal objet de leur genereuse solhcitude. Elles ne souffriraient pas
, quele Pacha d'Egypte veuille la troubler impunement, au prejudice du
Sultan et au detriment du repos general.
¦ D'ailleurs le role de Mehemet Ali, qui doit son elevation a un concours
de circonstances favorables, autant qu'a son merite personnel, est assez
beau, pour qu'il puisse s'en contenter, sans s'abandonner a des reves, dont
la realisation entrainerait un bouleversement total de tout Fedifice de la
politique Orientale.
Pour ce qui est enfin du Sultan, Monsieur le Comte, le Pacha n'aura
rien a redouter, nous en avons la. conviction, aussi longtems que de son
cote il respectera les droits imprescriptiblesde son Souverain, et tant qu'il
remplira fidelement les engagemens qu'il a contractes envers lui. Tout
; recemment encore. Sa Hautesse a proteste, a. deux reprises differentes, de
son desir sincere d'eviter toute collision. Si le Sultan a r6uni des forces
, considerables dans le Diarbekir, ce sont les armemens de Mehemet Ali
qui Fy ont contraint, bien a regret, car Fentretien d'une armee dans ces
contrees lointaines et peu fertiles, sont un pesant fardeau pour ces pro-
; vinces,. comme pour le tr6sor deja si obSre de Sa Hautesse. Loin de vouloir
'. et de provoquer la guerre, le Sultan est au contraire tres-dispose a livrer
;.a un entier oubli ses anciens griefs, et rendre sa faveur a Mehemet Ali
pour peu que ce dernier ne lui fournisse plus de nouveaux sujets de macon-
tentement. Ce serait done, ce me semble, un moment propice pour Mehemet Ali
defournir a son Souverain la preuve irrecusable de la sincerite de ses
intentions pacifiques, dont vous avez recueilli la promesse eventuelle de la
: propre bouche du Pacha, et. qui consisterait h, rapppler aupres de lui son
rfils.. Ibrahim Pacha, at de.retirer Vine partie de son armee de ^yrie, ce qui,

64
dans le present etat des finances Egyptiennes, serait un allegement reel
dans les depenses du Pacha.
Je reserve a votre habilete, Monsieur le Comte, de vous menager une
occasion favorable de revenir sur une sage determination, dont le Pacha
vous a lui-meme suggere Fidee dans ses entretiens avec vous et Messieurs
vos collegues. Recevez, &c,
(Signe) A. BOUTENEFF.

(Translation.)
M. de Bouteneff to Count Medem,
Sir, Pera, April ££ , 1839.
YOUR last report of the -^ instant, addressed under flying seal to
His Excellency the Vice-Chancellor, reached me safely by the French
steamer, and I avail myself of her return to acknowledge its receipt, and
to thank you for communicating to me the interesting information which
you transmit to the Imperial Government, and which I will not fail to
forward without delay to its destination.
Although I am not able now to give you any special instructions upon
the line of conduct which you have to observe under present circum
stances, I cannot but express my approval of the discreet manner in
which you have conducted your discussions with Mehemet Ali, and of
the zeal with which you have advocated before him the cause of justice
and right. The assurances of the Pasha of Egypt are so positive, and they have
been repeated to you so often, that it is impossible to doubt their sincerity
without suspecting Mehemet Ali's good faith. These pacific intentions
are besides calculated to further his own interest, for the Pasha has
too much discernment not to see that all the consequences of an attack
upon his legitimate Sovereign, would inevitably fall upon its author, and
would complete his ruin.
On the other hand, all the Great Powers are firmly resolved to
maintain peace, which is the constant and principal object of their efforts
and of their generous solicitude. They could not suffer the Pasha of
Egypt with impunity, to interrupt peace to the prejudice of the Sultan,
and to the detriment of general tranquillity.
Moreover, Mehemet Ali, who owes his elevation as much to a
concurrence of favourable circumstances, as to his personal merits, has
a part to play sufficiently important to satisfy him, without giving himself
up to the pursuit of schemes which, if carried into effect, might bring on
the total destruction of the political edifice of the East.
And with regard to the Sultan, we are sure, M. le Comte, that the
Pasha will have nothing to fear, so long as he shall on his part respect
the inalienable rights of his Sovereign, and so long as he shall faithfully
fulfil the engagements which he has contracted towards him. His High
ness has quite recently on two different occasions formally avowed his
sincere desire to avoid any collision. If 'the Sultan has assembled a
considerable force in Diarbekir, it is because the armaments of Mehemet
Ali have obliged him to do so, much to his regret, because the main
tenance of an Army in those remote and barren regions, presses heavily
upon those provinces as well as upon the Sultan's Treasury, which is
already overburthened. The Sultan, far from wishing for, or provoking
war, is, on the contrary, well disposed to consign to complete oblivion his
ancient grounds of complaint, and to restore Mehemet Ali to favour, pro
vided the latter gives him no new grounds of displeasure.
It seems to me, therefore, that the present is a favourable moment for
Mehemet Ali to prove to his Sovereign, in a manner which cannot be
mistaken, the sincerity of his pacific intentions, the assurance of which
you received from the Pasha's own lips, by recalling his son Ibrahim
Pasha, and by withdrawing a part of his Army from Syria, which measure

65
would, in the present state of the finances of Egypt, materially lighten
the Pasha's expences.
I leave it to your judgment, M. le Comte, to find a favourable
opportunity to recur to the wise determination, the notion of which the
Pasha himself suggested to you in his conversations with you and your
colleagues. Receive, &c,
(Signed) A. BOUTENEFF.

I nclosure 3 in No. 56.
Declaration made by Mehemet Ali to Colonel Campbell.
LE Vice-Roi a declare a M. le Colonel Campbell, Agent et Consul-
General de Sa Majeste Britannique, qu'il s'engage dans le cas oil les troupes
du Sultan qui ont franchi l'Euphrate pres de Bir, se retireraient de Fautre
cote du fleuve, de faire faire un mouvement retrograde a son armee, et de
rappeler son fils Ibrahim Pacha a Damas ; que dans le cas ou cette
demonstration pacifique serait a son tour suivie d'un mouvement retrograde
de Farmee de Hafiz Pacha au-dela, de Malatia, Son Altesse rappellera le
Generalissime en Egypte. De plus, Son Altesse le Vice-Roi a ajoute de
son propre mouvement, que si les Quatre Grandes Puissances consentaient
a lui garantir la paix, et s'interessaient a lui obtenir la succession de sa
famille, il retirerait une partie de ses troupes de la Syrie, et serait pret a
s'entendre sur un arrangement definitif propre a garantir la securite, et
adapte aux besoins du pays.

(Translation.)
Declaration made by Mehemet Ali to Colonel Campbell.
THE Viceroy has declared to Colonel Campbell, Her Britannic Majes
ty's Agent and Consul-General, that he engages, in case the troops of the
Sultan which have passed the Euphrates near Bir, should retire to the
other side of the river, to cause his army to make a retrograde movement,
and to call back his son Ibrahim Pasha to Damascus; that in case this
pacific demonstration should in its turn be followed by a retrograde
movement of the army of Hafiz Pasha beyond Malatia, His Highness will
call back the Generalissimo to Egypt. Moreover, His Highness the
Viceroy added, of his own accord, that if the Four Great Powers consented
to guarantee to him peace, and interested themselves in obtaining for him
the hereditary succession for his family, he would withdraw a part of his
troops from Syria, and would be ready to come to an understanding as to
a definitive arrangement calculated to guarantee the safety, and adapted
to the wants of the country.

K

66

Inclosure 4 in No. 56.
M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.
M. le Baron, Alexandrie, ce 16 Mai, 1839.
AINSI que j'ai eu l'honneur de Fannoncer a votre Excellence par
mon Rapport du 10 du courant, Mehemet Ali est arrive ici Dimanche
matin, 12 du courant.
Je suis alie le complimenter deux heures apres son arrivee, au Palais
de Rass-el-Tyn, sans l'intention de Fentretenir de la sommation que la
Cour Imperiale de Russie lui adressait, et a laquelle a trait la depeche de
votre Excellence du 29 Avril dernier. Cependant, apres avoir congedie
un nombre de visites, il aborda franchement la question, en me disant, " qu'il
avait ete indignement calomnie (faisant allusion a la Note de M. le Comte
de Nesselrode, dont Boghos Bey lui avait fait part le soir du 7 du courant,
ou il en avait pris connaissance lui-meme) ; que la supposition d'avoir
fait prendre a ses troupes une attitude autre que purement defensive est
tout-a-fait fausse ; que les troupes du Grand Seigneur, sous le pretexte de
combattre les Kourdes, se sont etablis dans le Diarbekir et dans FAsie
Mineure, bien avant que les Egyptiennes se fussent portees en avant ; que
e'est de ces camps des Osmanlis que sortaient continuellement les provo
cations et cris de guerre qui ont ete cause du soulevement du Haouran ;
qu'il est vrai que les incursions des Turcomans dans les Provinces
d' Adana et de Tarsus Font oblige d'y envoyer des troupes pour les
contenir ; mais que F expedition faite, elles ont ete constamment renvoyees
dans leurs cantonnemens ; que meme les faibles garnisons de Gulek et
des Beilans n'avaient d'autre but que celui de preter main forte aux
colonnes mobiles employees a la poursuite des nomades mentionnes ; que
ce n'est qu'au commencement du mois de Zilkade de Fannee 1254 (vers
la fin de Janvier), que quelques renforts, consistant en recrues Egyp
tiennes, ont ete envoyes en Syrie; et qu'alors l'Armee de Hafiz Pacha
avait deja regu une organization. La Porte avait eu des nouvelles sinistres
sur mon sort, disait-il, et croyant pouvoir entrer en campagne avant mon
retour, elle se flattait d'un succes complet; mais voyant que ce projet est
confondu par ma presence, elle pousse des cris de guerre contre l'Egypte,
signe evident de faiblesse, et qui me fait croire, qu'au lieu d'attaquer, on
se bornera a crier, et a chercher du secours a l'etranger. Les nouvelles
de Constantinople sont contradictoires ; celles de la Syrie sont a la guerre ;
j'attendrai dans Fattitude actuelle Fissue de cette complication, et je
n'attaquerai dans aucun cas, mais si Fon m'attaque, je me jetterai sur
Ourfa et Diarbekir, et ne les rendrai qu'a condition qu'on m'accorde
l'heredite." Je laissai parler le Pacha jusqu'a ce qu'il me sembla fatigue; et ne
voulant pas entrer en matiere, je lui dis que s'il est accuse a tort il lui
sera bien facile de se justifier, mais que ses troupes, quoique eioignees de
la frontiere, peuvent etre considers dangereuses, ayant egard aux
pretentions a Findependance dont il n'avait fait aucun secret; que du
reste n'ayant pas l'intention d'attaquer, lui, et la Porte ne pouvant pas le
faire, il serait bon, tant pour lui que pour le Grand Seigneur, de renvoyer
les troupes dans Finterieur et les employer a des travaux publics.
" Je ne demande pas mieux," disait-il, "mais comment me fier a mes
voisins ? iis parlent de la paix en passant l'Euphrate ; je dois bien me
defendre. La sommation de Sa Majeste l'Empereur des Russies, de faire
rentrer les troupes dans les cantonnemens de paix, est venue bien mal-
Ei-propos. Je ne saurais m'y soumettre sans miner mes affaires en Syrie.
Si les demonstrations que l'Armee du Grand Seigneur vient de faire a Bir
ne sont pas aussi dangereuses qu'on le dit, et si ses troupes repassent
l'Euphrate, le camp d'Alep sera leve, et les troupes rentreront dans
leurs anciens cantonnemens ; a cette condition, je suis pret a entrer en
explication avec M. de Medem et avec vous, qui etes charge de
l'appuyer."

67
Je lui dis que nous en parlerions le lendemain matin, et pris conge
delui vers 11 heures.
J'ai fideiement rapporte cet entretien a mon collegue de Russie, qui
se proposa d'aller voir le Pacha le soir meme.
Votre Excellence apprendra du Rapport que M. le Comte de Medem
adresse a sa Cour, les particularites des deux audiences qu'il a eues avec
Mehemet Ali, Dimanche soir et Lundi matin. lis se sont quittes parfaite-
ment satisfaits Fun de Fautre, de sorte que me presentant moi au Pacha,
Lundi le soir, il me regut avec beaucoup d'empressement, et me raconta
qu'il avait declare a mon collegue de vouloir se soumettre au desir de
Sa Majeste Russe tant que le permettront les circonstances actuelles,
essentiellement changees depuis le mois de Mars dernier, — epoque ou Fon
peut avoir provoque la sommation, dont il est question ; et qu'il dedarera
solennellement et par eerit, aux Consuls-Generaux des Quatre Grandes
Puissances, qu'il n'avait jamais eu l'intention de troubler la paix, mais que
connaissant les intentions d'une fraction du Divan de Constantinople, il a
voulu etre pret a repousser l'agression ; que meme il fera rentrer une
partie de son armee de Syrie en Egypte, et en rappellera son fils et sa
famiHe, des que les Puissances Europeennes s'engageront a lui garantir
la paix. De plus, il proposera d'entrer en negociation sous la mediation
de quelque Puissance amie de la Porte, sur un arrangement definitif, base
sur Fequite, si la Porte consentait a lui accorder l'heredite. Je ne
pus m'empedier de lui faire des complimens sur la bonne grace dont
il a repondu a la demande de la Russie, et d'exprimer mes regrets
que les circonstances aient en attendant tellement changees que sa con
cession ne pouvait etre que conditionnelle ; mais qu'ayant pris la resolution
de maintenir une attitude purement defensive, sa conduite sera probable-
ment jugee correcte ; que par cette declaration, on est autorise a croire
que si la Porte cesse de le menacer, il donnera le premier l'exemple de la
soumission, et que les troupes etablies a Antab et a Killis, retourneron
a Antioche et a Balbec.
II me dit que tout cela sera arrange a Famiable, pourvu que la Porte
le met dans le cas de commencer ce mouvement retrograde ; que quant
aux regimens de Killis et d' Antab, iis n'y sont restes que peu de jours
apres les manoeuvres d'automne dernier, et cela parce qu'Ibrahim Pacha
avait hesite a choisir un endroit convenable pour les placer; que
maintenant il n'y a dans ces deux villes que de tres-faibles garnisons qui,
peut-etre a l'heure qu'il est, se sont deja repliees sur Alep.
Nous avons parie sur l'heredite comme d'une chose tout-a-fait
etrangere a la sommation Russe, qui, pour prix de sa soumission, ne lui
offrait que ses bons offices aupres du Sultan pour Finduire a ordonner
a son armee aussi un mouvement retrograde. II convint de cela, mais
il croit qu'ayant offert une concession au-dela de la demande, et qui, en
tranchant toutes les questions qui subsistent entre lui et la Sublime
Porte, pourrait mettre un terme a Fincertitude actuelle et le rapprocher
du Grand Seigneur, on ne saurait pas le blamer s'il fait allusion a un
moyen d 'arrangement que Sa Hautesse a concede a d'autres.
. J'ai rendu compte a M. le Comte Medem de cet entretien ; et voulant
profiter des bonnes dispositions du Pacha, avant que quelques nouvelles
de Syrie, ou quelque autre circonstance, put troubler son humeur, nous
sommes tombes d'accord de nous rendre chez lui ensemble le lendemain
matin, et fixer ce qui avait ete prepare dans les quatre audiences
particulieres. D'apres cela, nous sommes alies voir le Pacha hier matin, et apres
avoir fait quelque observation sur Faddition spontanee qui a trait a
l'heredite, nous nous sommes contentes de la Declaration dont copie ci-
jointe. J'ai enonce a M. le Comte de Medem I'opinion d'accepter cette
Declaration quoique conditionnelle ;
1°. Parce que j'ai consider que la depeche de la Cour de St.
Petersbourg est basee sur un etat de choses bien different de celui dans
lequel Mehemet Ali se trouve actuellement, vis-a-vis de la Sublime Porte ;
que d'agresseur qu'il y est suppose, il est maintenant de fait lui-meme
menace par les troupes du Grand Seigneur ;
K 2 ]

6S

2°. Parce qu'il est raisonnable de supposer, que la dite Cour Implnale,
si elle eut connu la complication actuelle, aurait cru ne devoir pas obhger
Mehemet Ali a rappeler ses troupes, pour ne pas le priver de moyens de
defense, et pour ne pas encourager les Osmanlis a penetrer dans la Syrie,
et en troubler la paix ; et finalement,
3°. Parce que la condition que Mehemet Ali a stipule, de commencer
par faire d'abord repasser les troupes du Grand Seigneur l'Euphrate, est
de peu de consequence a Fegard du Grand Seigneur, qui, peut-etre, n'avait
pas m6me ordonne le passage de ce fleuve, tandis qu'elle est du plus haut
interet pour la tranquillite et le repos de la Syrie, surtout apres une
excitation si forte et si dangereuse que celle qui y a ete produite par
Fapparition des dites troupes en-dega de l'Euphrate.
Agreez, M. le Baron, &c,
(Signe) A. DE LAURIN.

(Translation.)
M. de Laurin to Baron de Stiirmer.
M. le Baron, Alexandria, May 16, 1839.
AS I had the honour to inform your Excellency in my report of the
10th instant, Mehemet Ali arrived here on Sunday morning the 12th.
Two hours after his arrival I went to compliment him at the palace
of Rass-el-Tyn, without any intention of speaking to him on the subject
of the summons addressed to him by the Court of Russia, to which your
Excellency's despatch of the 29th of April refers. Having dismissed a
number of visitors, he nevertheless entered freely into the question, saying,
" that he had been shamefully calumniated (alluding to the note of Count
Nesselrode, which Boghos Bey had communicated to him on the evening
of the 7th, on which day he himself had become acquainted with it); that
the statement that he had caused his troops to assume any other attitude
than one purely defensive, was entirely false ; that the troops of the Grand
Signor had established themselves in Diarbekir and in Asia Minor, under
pretenceof combating the Koords, long before the Egyptians had advanced;
that the provocations and the cries of war which had caused the revolt of
the Haouran, had uniformly had their origin in the Osmanli camps; that it
was true that the incursions of the Turcomans into the provinces of
Adana and Tarsus, had obliged him to send troops thither in order to
control them, but that they had always been sent back to their canton
ments as soon as that object had been accomplished; that even the weak
garrisons of Gulek and of the Beilans had no other object than that of
affording support to the moveable columns employed in the pursuit of
the above - named wandering tribes ; that it was only at the com
mencement of the month of Zilkade, of the year 1254, (about the end
of January,) that some reinforcements, consisting of Egyptian recruits, had
been sent to Syria ; and that at that period the army of Hafiz Pasha was
already organized. The Porte, he said, had received unfavourable
accounts of my fate, and thinking that it should be able to open the
campaign before my return, flattered itself with the hope of complete
success; but seeing the plan defeated by my presence, the Porte now cries
for war against Egypt; an evident sign of weakness, which induces me
to think, that instead of attacking, they will confine themselves to making
a noise, and to seeking assistance from the foreigners. The news from
Constantinople is contradictory ; that from Syria is warlike. I shall await
in my present position the end of these complications, and I shall in no
case be the attacking party ; but if I am attacked, I shall throw myself on
Orfa and Diarbekir, and shall not give them up again except on the
condition that hereditary tenure be granted to me."
I allowed the Pasha to talk till he appeared to me to be tired, and
not wishing to discuss the subject with him, I told him, that if he had

69
been wrongfully accused, it would be an easy matter for him to justify
himself, but that his troops, although removed from the frontiers, might
be considered dangerous when his pretensions to independence, of which
he made no secret, came to be considered; that moreover, as he had no
intention of attacking, and as the Porte had not the power of doing so,
it would appear to be desirable as well for himself as for the Grand Signor, to
send the troops back to the interior, and to employ them in public works.
" I do not wish anything more," said he, " but how am I to trust
my neighbours? They speak of peace while passing the Euphrates ; I must
defend myself. The summons of the Emperor of Russia to cause the
troops to return to their peace cantonments is very untimely ; 1 should
not be able to comply with it without ruining my cause in Syria. If the
demonstrations recently made by the Army of the Grand Signor at Bir,
are not of so dangerous a nature as is supposed, and if his troops repass
the Euphrates, the camp of Aleppo shall be raised, and the troops shall
return to their ancient cantonments ; on this condition I am ready to enter
into explanations with M. de Medem, and with you, who are instructed
to support him."
1 said that we would speak about it next morning, and took my
leave of him about 1 1 o'clock.
I repeated this conversation exactly to my Russian Colleague, who
had the intention of going that same evening to see the Pasha.
Your Excellency will learn from the report which the Count de
Medem addresses to his Court, the details of the two audiences which he
had of Mehemet Ali on Sunday evening and on Monday morning. They
separated perfectly satisfied with one another, so much so, that on my
presenting myself to the Pasha on Monday evening, he received me with
great attention, and told me that he had declared to my Colleague, that
he would submit to the wishes of His Russian Majesty, as far as the circum
stances of the moment would allow — circumstances which had considerably
changed since the month of March, at which period it was to be supposed
that the steps to call forth the summons had been taken ; and that he
would solemnly, and in writing, declare to the Consuls-General of the
four Great Powers, that he never had entertained the intention of
disturbing the peace; but that, being acquainted with the views of a
portion of the Divan at Constantinople, he had wished to be prepared to
repel aggression; and that he would even cause part of his Army to
return from Syria to Egypt, and would recall from thence his son and his
family, so soon as the European Powers would pledge themselves to gua
rantee to him peace. He moreover would propose to enter into negotiations
under the mediation of some Power friendly to the Porte, with respect to a
definitive arrangement founded on equity, if the Porte would agree to grant
to him the inheritance. I could not resist complimenting him upon the good
grace with which he had replied to the demands of Russia, and to express my
regret that circumstances had in tlie mean time changed to such a degree,
as to render his concession only conditional ; that as he had resolved to
maintain a purely defensive position, his conduct would probably be
judged correct; that in accordance with his declaration, there was
ground for believing that if the Porte were to cease menacing him, he
first would give the example of submission, and that the troops which
had been posted at Aintab and Killis, would return to Antioch and Balbec.
He told me all this would be amicably arranged, provided the Porte
should place him in a position to commence this retrograde movement;
that with respect to the regiments at Killis and Aintab, those regiments
had only remained there a few days after the manoeuvres of last Autumn,
because Ibrahim Pasha had been in doubt as to the place where they
ought to be stationed; and that at the present moment those towns were
occupied only by very feeble garrisons, which in all probability, at the
present moment, have already retired on Aleppo.
We spoke on the subject of the inheritance as of a matter
entirely foreign to the Russian summons, which, as the price of his
submission, only offered him the good offices of Russia with the Sultan,
for the purpose of inducing him likewise to order his Army to make a

70
retrograde movement. He agreed in this, but he expresses a belief, that
having offered a concession going beyond that which had been asked of
him, and which, by resolving all the questions at issue between him and
the Sublime Porte, would put an end to all existing uncertainties, and
would bring him nearer to the Sultan, he could not be blamed if he were
to make mention of a means of arrangement which His Highness had
already conceded to others.
I reported this conversation to Count Medem, and wishing to avail
myself of the good disposition of the Pasha, before any new accounts from
Syria or any other circumstance could spoil his humour, we agreed to go
together to him on the following morning, and to record what had been
already prepared in the four separate audiences.
We accordingly went to the Pasha yesterday morning, and after
having made some observations on the spontaneous addition which has
reference to the inheritance, we remained satisfied with the Declaration of
Which a copy is hereunto annexed.
I gave my opinion to Count Medem, that he should accept this Decla
ration, although only a conditional one ;
1st. Because 1 thought the despatch from the Court of St. Petersburgh
to be founded on a very different state of things from that in which Mehemet
Ali was actually placed with respect to the Porte ; that instead of being,
as is therein supposed, the aggressor, he is himself, in fact, menaced by
the troops of the Grand Signor ;
2ndly. Because it is reasonable to suppose that the Imperial Court,
if it had been aware of the existing complication, would not have thought
it its duty to oblige Mehemet Ali to recall his troops, in order not to
deprive him of the means of defence, and not to encourage the Osmanlis
to advance into Syria and to disturb its repose ; and finally,
3rdly. Because the condition stipulated by Mehemet Ali, of commencing
by obliging the troops of the Grand Signor to repass the Euphrates, is of
little moment to the Grand Signor, who perhaps had not even ordered the
passage of that river; while it is of the highest importance for the tran
quillity and the repose of Syria, particularly after so strong and danger
ous an excitement as that which had been produced by the appearance of
the said troops on this side the Euphrates. Accept, M. le Baron, &c,
(Signed) A. DE LAURIN.

No. 57.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 17.)
My Lord, Therapia, May 22, 1839.
BY order of the Sultan, his Excellency Nouri Effendi invited me to
meet him this day at the Kiosk of Calendar. 1 there found the Capudan
Pasha, Nouri Effendi, the Chief Clerk of the Foreign Department, and the
Chief Dragoman of the Porte. I was accompanied by the Chief Dragoman
M. Frederic Pisani.
Nouri Effendi, speaking in the name of the Porte, said that Mehemet
Ali had committed acts that furnished indisputable proofs of aggression
viz : — 1st. He had sent a corps of troops to menace Bassora and Bagdad
and the Porte feared the former place might have already fallen into the
hands of the Egyptians.
2ndly. He had ordered the arrest of seventeen of the chief indi
viduals of Medina, and their transportation to Egypt, where they were
thrown into prison ; and also the expulsion from Medina of the authorities
established there by the Sultan for the administration of vacoufs (that is

71
the lands belonging to the Mosques), accompanied by a notification to
them, that they had nothing more to do with those affairs ; and Nouri said,
this is an act not to be endured by the Sultan, who is bound by so many
ties to the Holy City.
3rdly . His son had ordered the irruption of Arabs in the Pasha's pay,
and forming the advance guard of the Egyptian army, into the villages
of the district of Biredjik, which they plundered; acts (Nouri said) that
established the aggression of Mehemet Ali, without the addition of many
others, even stronger.
His Excellency then said, " We wish to know what is the opinion of
the Government of England upon these matters?" I replied, that the
Government of Her Majesty was ignorant of them, and ignorant that war
was imminent at the time when your Lordship last instructed me, and
therefore I could not reply to his Excellency's question, nor say whether
the war would be considered just or not by my Government ; that Her
Majesty's Government had always counselled the Porte against war, and
that wise advice had been solely founded upon the conviction that war
was likely to have the worst results for the Sultan ; that as to the
aggression of Mehemet Ali, I thought his Excellency should collect every
proof he could obtain to establish the fact.
Both Nouri Effendi and the Capudan Pasha spoke a long time, to
show that it is impossible the Sublime Porte could any longer suffer the
status quo ; and then asked if the British Government might not be disposed
to aid the Sultan to escape from a state of things that ruined him ?
I replied, that it was not consistent with the policy of my Government
to deviate in such a way from solemn declarations and successive acts,
and that my Government would not act except in concert with the other
Great Powers.
Nouri Effendi then said, there are some Legations that give the most
pressing counsels to the Sublime Porte not to undertake war : it will be my
business to reply to them ; but should they pass from words to threats,
will your Government interpose to make them silent ?
I asked his Excellency in what way could he suppose it to be in the
power of the English Government to prevent other Governments holding
what language might be by them considered proper ? He said, " 1 will
then ask if England will permit those Governments to attack us by
force?" To this I said the British Government have always declared and
felt the strongest desire to support the independence of the Ottoman
Government; and I cannot suppose the British Government will ever
concur with, or sanction, any attempt to deprive the Sublime Porte of the
exercise of any of the rights of Sovereignty, as long as the British Govern
ment continues to be at peace with and the ally of the Sultan. Nouri then
asked if the British fleet would attempt, by force, to interrupt the Ottoman
fleet in its route towards Syria and Egypt ? I replied, that I had no
knowledge of any order having been given by Her Majesty's Government
to that effect, and that I had no reason whatever to believe it had been
given. I knew that war had been determined upon by the Porte ; but 1
thought it advisable to ascertain the fact, and I said, that judging from
what their Excellencies had said to me, it appeared that the Sublime
Porte had resolved upon war. Nouri admitted it to be so, and launched
out into an enumeration of the causes that forced upon the Sultan the
adoption of that resolution.
After again expressing the disapprobation I knew Her Majesty's
Government would feel, I said that it only remained for me to hope the
Sublime Porte had taken the best measures to secure success. The
Capudan Pasha shortly afterwards brought a map from another room,
and pointed out Jaffa as the place to which the Ottoman fleet would go ;
and, in reply to my question, said part of his fleet would sail on Friday,
the 24th of May, for the Dardanelles, where some stores are to be taken
in, and that he would follow immediately. I understand he is only
waiting till the great four-decker is ready, and that it will be so in a very
few days.

72
I ought, perhaps, to have mentioned before, that in replying to
Nouri Effendi's demand whether or not Her Majesty's Government would
assist the Sultan to get rid of the Pasha, I took occasion to animadvert
upon the ill-policy of the Porte in having declined the Treaty lately
proposed by your Lordship to Rechid Pasha, which, if accepted by the
Porte, might perhaps have made such a change in the state of affairs as
would have induced the Porte to avoid war. The point was discussed for
some time ; and Nouri Effendi ended by saying, that if the Porte could
succeed in freeing itself from the dangers and difficulties created by
Mehemet Ali, the Porte would make any Treaty with Her Majesty's
Government they might desire to have. I place no reliance upon such
declarations, but I think it my duty to report what was said, as it may
deserve attention.
This long despatch is but a brief abstract of what was said at the
Conference that lasted several hours, but it states the main points ; and I
have only to add, that the impression made upon my mind, by the tone
and manner of the Ottoman Ministers, is that the Sultan looks to Her
Majesty's Government with infinitely more confidence than to any other
quarter. I think he would be much guided by advice from thence, were
he freed from the irritation he has felt against all who have forced him to
submit to the status quo. I have, &c,
' - (Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 58.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 17.)
(Extract.) Therapia, May 26, 1839.
COUNT MEDEM has written to Monsieur de Bouteneff, that he is
satisfied with the explanations given by Mehemet Ali, that the Egyptians
are not the aggressors, as has been supposed by Count Nesselrode.
Monsieur de Bouteneff' is to have, on the 28th or 29th, an interview
with the Ottoman Ministers, to communicate, with the utmost formality
possible, the reply made by Mehemet Ali to Count Nesselrode's note,
delivered by Count Medem to the Pasha. Your Lordship has received from
Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell copy of the above-mentioned declaration.
1 have found the greatest frankness in Baron Stiirmer upon the
affairs of this country, which he has studiously made the subject of
repeated conversations with me. He appears to entertain nearly the same
opinions I entertain, and to have acted much as I have acted. We have
both exerted our best means to persuade the Sublime Porte not to risk a
war, and we both expect nearly the same results from the measure, which
we equally consider to be actually resolved, and certain to be carried into
full execution, unless some sudden change be effected in the feelings of
the Sultan. Your Lordship will see some confirmation of part of what I have now
said, in the extract of a despatch from M. de Stiirmer to Prince Metter
nich, which I communicate to your Lordship.

73

Inclosure in No. 58.
Baron Stiirmer to Prince Metternich.

(Extrait.) Constantinople, ce 22 Mai, 1839.
L'EVENEMENT le plus saillant de la derniere huitaine, est le retour
de Tahar Pacha de l'Armee. Cet officier-general, parti d'ici pour Malatia,
le 5 Avril dernier, est arrive dans cette capitale le 19 de ce mois. Je n'ai
pu savoir encore d'une maniere certaine, quel rapport il a fait au Sultan, ni
quelles seront les consequences de sa mission. Je pense d'ailleurs que la
Porte voudra se donner encore quelques jours pour murir les communica
tions qu'elle aura a faire aux Legations Etrangeres.
A en croire les. avis officiels qui me sont parvenus a cet egard, Tahar
Pacha aurait represente Farmee comme etant dans la position la plus
avantageuse pour commencer les hostilites et pour frapper un grand
coup. D'apres ces memes avis, la resolution de faire la guerre aurait ete
prise dans un Conseil qui a ete convoque a la Porte, par ordre du Sultan,
le 20 de ce mois. Ce qui me fait craindre que e'est effectivement la le
parti auquel on s'est arrfete, e'est que Hosreff Pacha, qui s'est toujours
montre oppose a la guerre, n'a pas assiste, a ce que Fon m'assure, n'a pas
meme ete appeie a ce Conseil.
Ainsiqueje Fai pressenti, et que j'ai eu l'honneur de le mander a,
Votre Altesse des le depart de Tahar Pacha, sa mission n'a evidemment
eu lieu que dans le but de gagner du terns, et de tenir la Porte quitte
pendant six semaines des interpellations des Missions Etrangeres, aux-
quelles elle disait ne pouvoir s'expliquer sur ses projets, avant que ce
General n'eut examine, de ses propfes yeux, la situation des affaires, et
n'en eut rendu de vive voix un compte exact et detailie. Maintenant
on se prepare, dit-on, a. nous adresser collectivement une communication
ou les determinations de Sa Hautesse seront clairement exposees.
Le public, qui jusqu'ici se flattait que les efforts des Puissances
Etrangeres en faveur du maintien de la paix ne resteraient pas sans
succes, est en 6moi depuis le retour de Tahar Pacha ; et le bruit d'une
guerre imminente, peut-etre mfime deja. commencee, est generalement
accredite. La question n'est plus maintenant que de savoir de quel cote
vient Fagression? Cette question est difficile a resoudre. Certes ce
n'est pas toujours celui qui tire le premier coup de canon qui doit avec
justice etre consider comme Fagresseur, et dans ce cas la Porte, en sup-
posant que Fattaque vienne de la part de ses troupes, pourrait bien ne
pas Fetre. Tout le monde connait les actes provocateurs de Mehemet Ali,
et les velieites d'independance et de guerre qu'il a manifestees Fannee
derniere encore. La Porte aurait done eu raison de se mettre en defense
et de travailler des-lors a s'assurer les moyens de lui opposer au besoin
une rigoureuse resistance ? Une pareille conduite n'eut ete que sage et
conforme a sa dignite autant qu'a ses vrais interets.
Les partisans de Mehemet Ali voudraient rejeter la faute de Fagres
sion sur la Porte ; iis disent que Fon s'est trompe en Europe, lorsqu'on a
accuse le Pacha d'Egypte d'avoir pousse ses troupes jusqu'a l'extreme
frontiere de la Syrie, tandis qu'elles en ont toujours ete eioignees a une
distance de 9 a 15 lieues. lis disent, en outre, que bien qu'il ait parie de
guerre et d'independance Fannee derniere, il a depuis remis son epee dans
le fourreau, paye le tribut qu'il devait, et s'est mis en regie envers la
Porte, qui paraissait satisfaite de cette apparente soumission. Les
armemens faits depuis par cette derniere, et pousses avec tant de vigueur,
ainsi que la marche des troupes Ottomanes jusqu'a la frontiere meme de
la Syrie, ne peuvent done etre imputes a Mehemet Ali, et doivent etre
consideres comme Funique cause de la lutte qui se prepare. Ces
L

74
raisons ont quelque chose de spedeux et ne sauraient etre rejetees sans
examen. Quoiqu'il en soit, au point ou en sont venues les choses, il faut esperer
que toutes les Puissances prendront le parti de la Porte et mettront ce
qu'il peut y avoir d'obscur dans son langage, sur le compte de ses
embarras. Si j'ai cru devoir toucher ici la question de Fagression, e'est que de sa
solution dependra la conduite de la Russie, si la Porte se voit obligee de
lui demander du secours ; car d'apres les declarations qui lui ont ete faites
dans le tems par M. de Ruckman, et dernierement encore par M. de
Bouteneff, ce n'est qu'au cas ou elle serait attaquee, que le Traite d'Emir-
ghien* lui donnerait le droit de reclamer son assistance.

(Translation.)
Baron Stiirmer to Prince Metternich.
(Extract.) Constantinople, May 22, 1839.
THE most marked event of the last week is the return of Tahar
Pasha from the army. That General-officer, who left this for Malatia on
the 5th of April last, arrived in this capital on the 19th of the present
month. I have not as yet been able to ascertain what report he has made
to the Sultan, nor what will be the results of his mission ; I, however,
believe that the Porte wishes to afford to itself a delay of some days more,
in order to mature the communications which it may wish to make to the
foreign Legations.
If I am to believe the official reports which have reached me in this
respect, Tahar Pasha must have represented the army as being in the
most advantageous position for the commencement of hostilities and for a
great blow. According to the same accounts the determination to make
war was taken at a Council convoked at the Porte, by order of the Sultan,
on the 20th of this month. That which causes me to fear that this is
really the course adopted is, that Hosrew Pasha, who has always been
opposed to the war, was not at the Council, and was not, as I have
been assured, even summoned.
As I foresaw, and as I had the honour of reporting to your Highness
at the time of the departure of Tahar Pasha, that officer's mission was
evidently only undertaken with a view to gain time, and to free the Porte
during six weeks from the demands for explanation of the foreign Mis
sions, to which it stated, that it was unable to give explanations
as to its intentions, before that General should have examined with his
own eyes the state of affairs, and should have given with his own mouth
an exact and detailed account of the same. At present, a communica
tion to be addressed to us collectively, in which the determinations of His
Highness are clearly explained, is, it is said, in course of preparation.
The public, which had flattered itself that the efforts of the foreign
Powers in favour of the maintenance of peace would not remain without
success, is greatly excited since the return of Tahar Pasha; and the
report of an impending, perhaps of an already commenced, war is generally
believed. The only question remaining is to know from what quarter the
aggression will proceed. It is difficult to resolve this question. It is
undoubtedly not always he who fires the first shot who ought in justice
to be considered as the aggressor ; and in such case, the Porte, supposing
that the attack were to proceed from its troops, might very well not
be so considered. All the world knows the acts of provocation on the
part of Mehemet Ali, and ihe inklings after independence and war which

* Autrement dit de Unk'ar Skelessi.

75
even last year he manifested. The Porte would consequently have been
justified in placing itself on its defence, and in exerting itself to provide the
means of opposing vigorous resistance to such attack. Such conduct
would have only been prudent and conformable, as well to its dignity, as
to its true interests.
The partizans of Mehemet Ali are anxious to throw the blame of
aggression on the Porte ; they say, that a mistake has been committed in
Europe, in accusing the Pasha of Egypt of having advanced his troops to
the extreme frontier of Syria, those troops having always been from nine to
fifteen leagues removed from that frontier. They moreover say, that
although last year he spoke of war and independence, he has since
sheathed his sword, paid the tribute which he owed, and has put him
self in the right with respect to the Porte, which appeared satisfied with
this apparent submission. The armaments which have since been made
by the latter, and which have been carried on with so much energy,
together with the march of the Ottoman troops to the very frontiers of
Syria, can therefore not be imputed to Mehemet Ali, and must be consi
dered as the sole cause of the approaching struggle. These reasons are
specious to a certain degree, and cannot be thrown aside without
examination. However this may be, it is to be hoped that, at the point at which
matters have now arrived, all the Powers will take the part of the Porte,
and will attribute to its embarrassments what may be obscure in the
language it holds.
If I have thought it right to advert here to the question of the aggres
sion, it is because the conduct of Russia, in case the Porte should see
itself compelled to demand the assistance of that Power, will depend on
its solution; for according to the declarations which were made at
the time by M. de Ruckman, and latterly again by M. de Bouteneff, it is
only in case the Porte should be attacked, that the Treaty of Emirghien *
would give to it the right of applying for such assistance.

No. 59.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 17.)
My Lord, Therapia, May 26, 1839.
LATE this evening I received a letter from the Chief Dragoman, who
had been sent for in the earlier part of the day to the Sultan's Palace, of
which I inclose copy. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 59.
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Pera, ce 26 Mai, 1839.
SAID BEY m'a fait chercher aujourd'hui. II m'a parie de FA ffaire
Egyptienne. La substance de ce qu'il m'a dit est absolument la meme
que celle de ce que Nouri Effendi nous a dit dans la derniere conference ;
et par consequent, je me suis tenu dans mes reponses a la lettre de ce que

* Otherwise of Unkiar Skelessi.
L 2

76
nous avons dit. Said Bey a exprime le desir de Sa Hautesse, que FAngle
terre lui donne des secours pour battre Mehemet Ali. Je lui ai donne bien
a entendre que votre Excellence sait que FAngleterre ne veut pas aider la
Porte a detruire le status quo a present, mais que si I'agression vient de la
part de Mehemet Ali, FAngleterre aidera le Sultan a repousser Fattaque.
Said Bey a tache de prouver l'existence de I'agression de la part de Me
hemet Ali, par les memes faits cites par Nouri Effendi et le Capitan Pacha.
Said Bey s'est beaucoup etendu sur la necessite de detruire le status quo.
II a fini par me charger de prier votre Excellence, de la part du Sultan,
d'employer tout votre zeie pour les interets de Sa Hautesse dans les cir
constances presentes, et d'ecrire a, votre Gouvernement en faveur de sa
cause, et cela de maniere a Fengager a rendre a la Porte les services que
Sa Hautesse reclame de Famitie du Gouvernement Britannique.
Said Bey m'a paru extremement penetre de la gravite des circon
stances ; le Sultan ne s'en fait pas illusion non plus.
J'ai l'honneur, &c,
(Signe) FREDERIC PISANI.

(Translation.)
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Pera, May 26, 1839.
SAID BEY sent for me to day. He spoke to me about the Egyptian
affair. The substance of what he said to me is entirely the same as that
which Nouri Effendi said to us at the last conference ; and. consequently
I adhered in my answers to the letter of what we said. Said Bey ex
pressed His Highness's desire that England should give him assistance
to overcome Mehemet Ali. I gave him clearly to understand that your
Excellency knows that England will not aid the Porte to destroy the
status quo at present, but that if the aggression comes from the side of
Mehemet Ali, England will assist the Sultan in repelling the attack.
Said Bey tried to prove the existence of aggression on the part of
Mehemet Ali, by the same circumstances as those quoted by Nouri
Effendi and the Capudan Pasha. Said Bey dwelt much upon the necessity
of destroying the status quo. He finished by instructing me to request
your Excellency, on the part of the Sultan, to use all your zeal for His
Highness's interests under existing circumstances, and to write to your
Government in favour of his cause, in such a manner as to persuade it
to render to the Porte the services which His Highness claims from the
friendship of the British Government.
Said Bey appeared to me to be very much impressed with the im
portance of the matter ; neither does the Sultan deceive himself upon
the subject. I have, &c,
(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI.

No. 60.
Earl Granville to discount Palmerston. — (Received June 19.)
My Lord, Paris, June 17, 1839.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 14th of June.
Marshal Soult again expressed to me his disappointment that 1 had
no official communication to make to him relative to the instructions to
be given to the British an& French Admirals in the Levant ; and he
requested me earnestly to press upon the attention of Her Majesty's

77
Government, the necessity of immediately concerting them. His Excel
lency informed me, that already seven sail of French ships of the line had
arrived off Smyrna, that one was to sail yesterday from Toulon for the
same destination, that two others will speedily follow, and that thus the
French fleet on the Levant station will consist of ten sail of the line,
besides frigates and sloops of war. He concluded, that the British fleet
in the Levant (though it appeared that some ships of Admiral Stopford's
squadron were still cruizing off the coast of Sicily) would not be inferior
in force to that of France ; and he looked forward with great confidence
to the moral effect of the union of the two fleets, amounting altogether to
twenty sail, on the conduct of the Sultan and of Mehemet Ali, as well as
to the power they will have of preventing a collision between the Turkish
and Egyptian squadron, and of suspending the military operations of the
two armies, by cutting off their supplies by sea.
In regard to a permanent settlement of the differences between the
Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, the Marshal was of opinion that it could
only be effected by the concurrence of all the Great Powers of Europe,
and that a conference of their Representatives could alone afford any hope
of their agreeing upon the terms of the arrangement ; and that Vienna
appeared to be the most central and convenient place for its assembling.
Count Medem, the first Secretary of the Russian Embassy at Paris,
informs me, that he has received letters from his brother, the Russian
Consul at Alexandria, which state, that if hostilities should commence, it
will be the fault of the Sultan, for that nothing can be more satisfactory
than the assurances given him by Mehemet Ali, of his determination to
avoid, if possible, a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian army,
and of his readiness to order the retreat of the Egyptian army, and the
recall of Ibrahim Pasha from Syria, if the Turkish army shall retire
from the Syrian frontier. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 61.
The Due de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney. — (Communicated by
Baron de Bourqueney.)
Monsieur, Paris, le 17 Juin, 1839.
JE reponds a la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'ecrire le
14 de ce mois, sous le No. 52.
Ma precedente expedition vous a fait connaitre la reponse du Cabinet
de Vienne a nos premieres communications sur les affaires d'Orient.
Vous trouverez dans les extraits ci-joints de deux depeches de MM. de
Barante et Bresson, les seules donnees que nous ayons encore sur les dis
positions de la Prusse et de la Russie. A Berlin, je vous Fai deja dit, on
est tout dispose a s'unir, pour maintenir la paix, aux demarches des
autres Puissances. A St.-Petersbourg, ou nos communications n'etaient
pas encore parvenues, M. de Barante supposait, d'apres des indices dont
la force ne me parait pas decisive, le Cabinet Russe enclin a saisir tout
pretexte honorable de ne pas se jeter dans les embarras qu'entrainerait
l'application du Traite d'Unkiar Skeiessi.
Les depeches arrivees, il y a trois jours, par le paquebot de l'Orient,
ne nous ont apporte aucune nouvelle tant soit peu importante. Les
armees etaient toujours en presence sur le bord de l'Euphrate ; il y avait
meme eu entre quelques soldats une legere escarmouche; mais rien n'an-
nongait, de la part des chefs, la volonte d'en venir aux mains. S'il faut
en croire, d'ailleurs, les rapports envoyes par Ibrahim Pacha a son pere,
les Turcs seraient peu en mesure de commencer les hostilites. Leur armee
ne s'eieverait pas au-dessus de 36,000 hommes affaiblis meme par le defaut

78
d'approvisionnemens suffisans, et par la desertion. Aussi, commengait-
on a croire a Alexandrie, qu'il n'y aurait pas de guerre ; c'etait meme
I'opinion du Vice-Roi. A Constantinople, on etait moins rassure, parce
qu'a travers les protestations, pacifiques de la Porte, ses intentions hostiles
edataient dans l'empressement qu'elle mettait a chercher jusque dans les
moindres circonstances et dans les bruits les plus invraisemblables, des
griefs contre Mehemet Ali.
Je viens de resumer en peu de mots, Fetat des choses tel qu'il se pre
sente en ce moment, c'est-a-dire, propre a justifier encore de tres-serieuses
inquietudes. Vous en jugerez plus compietement, d'ailleurs, par les
extraits ci-joints de la correspondance d'Egypte et de Constantinople.
Je vais maintenant vous mettre en mesure de repondre aux questions
que vous a adressees Lord Palmerston, sur I'opinion que s'est formee le
Gouvernement du Roi des dispositions a prendre dans le but de pourvoir
aux necessites du moment.
Le Gouvernement du Roi reconnait l'utilite et la convenance d'un
concert entre les Grandes Puissances pour aviser aux moyens d'assurer,
par une attitude et un langage communs, le maintien de FEmpire Ottoman ;
il pense que e'est a Vienne que pourrait etre etabli, de la maniere la plus
avantageuse, le siege des deliberations qui s'ouvriront a cet effet.
II croit que pour empedier les hostilites, si elles n'ont pas encore
edate, ou pour y mettre fin, si malheureusement elles avaient deja com
mence, les escadres Anglaise et Frangaise doivent, en s'arrogeant une sorte
de mediation armee, se constituer maitresses de la mer ; imposer aux forces
maritimes de FEgypte et de la Porte une entiere inaction ; et les determiner
meme a rentrer dans leurs ports, si elles en sont sorties.
L'escadre Anglaise parait devoir etre forte de dix vaisseaux de ligne,
sans compter les autres batimens. La ndtre sera portee aussi a dix
vaisseaux, et comptera, de plus, quatre ou cinq fregates, avec quatre
bateaux a vapeur au moins, et d'autres batimens plus legers. Deja, sept
vaisseaux sont reunis a Smyrne, ou en route pour s'y rendre. Les trois
autres partiront tres-prochainement. II importe que des instructions,
non pas communes, mais inspirees par une pensee identique, et que les
deux Cours se communiqueraient au prealable, soient envoyees, sans
retard, aux commandans des deux escadres pour diriger leurs operations.
Lorsqu'onsaura,dans l'Orient, que de telles forces agissent dans un meme
esprit, et tendent vers le meme but, il n'est pas possible de supposer
que soit la flotte du Sultan, soit celle du Pacha, veuille s'exposer a lutter
contre elles. Je dis plus : leur developpement, en rendant la guerre presque
impossible, otera a la Russie tout pretexte de mettre en mouvement sa
flotte de Sevastopol, ou meme son armee de terre.
Pour mieux atteindre le resultat que nous avons en vue, peut-etre
serait-il a propos que le pavilion Autrichien se montrat au milieu de
l'escadre combinee Frangaise et Anglaise: une ou deux fregates, avec
quelques batimens legers, seraient suffisantes pour cela. II est a re-
marquer, au surplus, que M. de Metternich en a deja exprime la pensee.
Telles sont, Monsieur, les mesures qui me paraissent devoir etre
adoptees sans retard, si Fon ne veut pas se laisser surprendre par les
evenemens. J'arrive a celles qui, lorsque des deliberations formelles
seraient ouvertes entre les Cabinets, pourraient etre prises pour terminer
la crise actuelle, et en prevenir a jamais le renouvellement.
Dans le cas ou nos declarations et Fattitude de nos escadres n'auraient
pu empecher les deux parties de prendre les armes, ou ne les leur auraient
pas fait deposer immediatement, la necessite d'une action commune des
Grandes Puissances deviendrait evidente ; et il n'y a pas lieu d'esperer
qu'on put alors decider la Russie a ne pas intervenir materiellement dans
une question ou ses intents seraient si directement engages. Ce qu'il
faudrait obtenir, e'est que son action fut determine et limitee de concert
avec les autres Cours ; e'est qu'elle se liat a celle que la France et FAngle
terre auraient, de leur cote, a exercer ; e'est qu'enfin, par le fait, une
Convention Europeenne remplag&t les stipulations d'Unkiar Skeiessi. Je
n'ignore pas tout ce qu'un pared projet rencontrerait d'obstacles de la

79
part du Cabinet de St.-Petersbourg, dont la politique a ete constamment
de tenir, autant que possible, ses relations avec la Turquie, en dehors du
droit Europeen. C'est pour le meme motif qu'on est fond£ a craindre
qu'il ne veuille pas se preter a des negociations suivies par voie de con
ferences permanentes. Cependant, il aurait peu d'argumens tant soit
peu specieux a faire valoir pour repousser des combinaisons evidemment
suggerees par le desir de la paix, et appuyees par tous ses allies.
11 me reste a parler du but final de ces negociations, de Farrangement
par lequel il serait possible de placer le Sultan et son puissant vassal dans
une situation plus satisfaisante pour Fun et pour Fautre, plus rassurante
pour la tranquillite de l'Orient que celle ou iis se trouvent depuis six
annees. La necessite de conceder a Mehemet Ali Finvestiture hereditaire
d'une partie au moins de ses possessions actuelles, parait maintenant
admise d'une maniere a peu pr6s generate. On a compris qu'au point de
grandeur ou il est parvenu, le besoin d'assurer Favenir de sa famille, et
de la mettre, apres sa mort, a Fabri des vengeances de la Porte, se fait
sentir trop imperieusement a son esprit, pour qu'il puisse se livrer a des
pensees vraiment pacifiques, tant qu'il n'aura pas obtenu quelque satis
faction a cet egard.
D'un autre cote, on ne peut pas se flatter de l'espoir que la Porte
consente a lui accorder ce surcroit de force morale, si, par compensation,
on ne lui donne pas a elle-meme quelque avantage qui lui fournisse une
garantie materielle contre les entreprises eventuelles d'un ennemi dont
elle aurait ainsi accru la puissance. La nature et Fetendue de cet avan
tage ne sont certes pas faciles a determiner. Lord Palmerston pense qu'il
ne faudrait pas moins que la retrocession de la Syrie toute entiere. A
Berlin, on semble admettre que le Sultan pourrait se contenter d'une
partie seulement de cette province. Quant a nous, Monsieur, nous recon-
naissons que la Porte aurait droit a une compensation redle, mais nous
croyons que le moment d'en fixer la nature et la proportion n'est pas
arrive ; qu'une question pareille ne peut etre resolue que d'apres des
donnees diverses et compliquees dont Fappredation ne peut etre Foeuvre
d'un moment ; et que ce point doit etre renvoye au concert qui, si nos vues
viennent a prevaloir, s'etablira entre les Puissances.
Veuillez, Monsieur, donner lecture a, Lord Palmerston de la presente
depeche. En exposant ainsi au Cabinet de Londres, l'ensemble de notre
maniere de voir sur les graves circonstances du moment, nous lui donnons
un gage non equivoque de la confiance qu'il nous inspire, et du desir que
nous avons de marcher avec lui dans le plus parfait accord. Lord
Palmerston comprendra de lui-meme qu'au nombre des idees que vous etes
charge de lui faire connaitre, il en est d'hypothetiques, et que les evene-
mens ou meme de plus mures reflexions peuvent beaucoup modifier.
Recevez, &c,
(Signe) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

P.S. — Nous attendons impatiemment votre reponse et la communica
tion que Lord Palmerston s'empressera sans doute de vous faire, de la
decision du Cabinet de Londres, au sujet des deliberations communes dont
nous proposons d'etablir le siege a Vienne, aussi bien que des instructions
destinees a FAmiral Stopford.

80

(Translation.)
The Due de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney. — (Communicated by the
Baron de Bourqueney.)
Sir, Paris, June 17, 1839.
I, PROCEED to answer the letter which you did me the honour to
address to me on the 14th of this month, marked No. 52.
My preceding despatch will have made you acquainted with the
answer of the cabinet of Vienna to our first communications upon the
affairs of the East. You will find in the annexed extracts of two des
patches from M.M. de Barante and Bresson, the only data- which we
have as yet with respect to the views of Prussia and Russia. At Berlin,
as I have already informed you, they are quite disposed to join for the
maintenance of peace in the measures of the other Powers. At St.
Petersburgh, where our communications had not yet arrived, M. de
Barante supposed, from indications which I do not consider decisive, that
the Russian Government was inclined to seize every honourable pretext
to avoid involving itself in the ' embarrassments which the execution of
the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would entail.
The despatches arrived three days since by the packet boat from the ,
Levant, have not brought us news of any importance. The armies
were still in presence on the banks of the Euphrates ; there had even
been a slight skirmish between some soldiers, but nothing indicated a
wish on the part of the leaders to come to an engagement. If, moreover,
the reports sent by Ibrahim Pasha to his father, are to be believed, the
Turks were far from being in a state to commence hostilities. Their
army did not amount to more than 36,000 men, and these weakened by
the want of sufficient supplies and by desertion. A belief, also, began to
be entertained at Alexandria, that there would not be a war : it was
even the opinion of the Viceroy. At Constantinople less security was
felt, because, through the veil of pacific protestations, the Porte mani
fested its hostile intentions in the eagerness with which it sought
grievances against Mehemet Ali, even in the most trivial circumstances
and in the most improbable reports.
I have now sketched the state of things such as it exists at the
present moment, that is to say, calculated still to justify very serious
anxiety. You will, however, form a more complete judgment upon the
matter from the annexed extracts of the correspondence from Egypt and
Constantinople. I will now enable you to answer the enquiries which Lord Pal
merston has addressed to you as to the opinion which the Government
of the King has formed with respect to the measures to be taken with a
view to provide for the exigencies of the moment.
The Government of the King acknowledges the utility and the pro
priety of a concert between the Great Powers to provide the means of
securing, by a common attitude and language, the maintenance of the
Ottoman Empire ; it thinks that the seat of the deliberations to be com
menced for this purpose can be the most advantageously established at
Vienna. It is of opinion that, in order to prevent hostilities, if they should
not yet have broken out, or to put a stop to them if they should have
unfortunately commenced, the English and French squadrons, assuming a
sort of armed mediation, should constitute themselves mistresses of the
sea ; should impose complete inaction upon the naval forces of Egypt and
of the Porte, and should induce them to re-enter their harbours in the
event of their having left them.
The English squadron appears to amount to ten ships of the line
without counting other vessels. Our own will be composed also of ten sail of
the line, and will reckon in addition four or five frigates, with at least four
steam-vessels, and other lighter vessels. Seven ships of the line are already
assembled at Smyrna, or on their way thither. The three others will very
soon take their departure.' It is important that instructions, not common

81
but dictated in the same spirit, and which instructions the two Courts would
previously communicate to one another, should be transmitted without
delay to the commanders of the two squadrons for the guidance of their
operations. When it is known in the East that such forces are acting
in the same spirit, and tending to the same end, it is not possible to
suppose that either the fleet of the Sultan, or that of the Pasha, will venture to
contend against them. I say more : the employment of such forces, by
rendering war almost impossible, will deprive Russia of every pretext for
putting in movement her Sevastopol fleet or her land army.
In order the better to obtain the result which we have in view, it may
perhaps be expedient that the Austrian flag should appear among
the combined French and English squadron : one or two frigates with
some light vessels will be sufficient for the purpose. It is to be observed,
moreover, that Prince Metternich has already expressed this opinion.
Such, Sir, are the measures which, it appears to me, are required to
be adopted without delay, if we do not wish to be surprized by events.
I now come to the measures which, when the formal deliberations shall be
opened between the Cabinets, may be taken in order to put an end to the
existing crisis, and to prevent at any time its return.
If our declarations and the attitude of our squadrons should fail in
preventing the two parties from coming to hostilities, or in compelling
them immediately to cease therefrom, the necessity for a common action
by the Great Powers would become evident ; and there is no ground for
expecting that Russia would, in that case, be induced to refrain from a
physical intervention in a question in which her interests would be so
directly affected. What should be obtained is, that her course of action
be fixed and limited in concert with the other Courts ; that she should
bind herself to that which France and England would on their part have
to exert; in short, it is, in fact, that a European Convention should
take the place of the stipulations of Unkiar Skelessi. I am not igno
rant of all the obstacles which would be raised to such a plan by the
Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, whose policy has always been to keep its
relations with Turkey beyond the pale of European law. It is for the same
reason that there are grounds for fearing that that Cabinet will not
lend itself to negotiations carried on by means of permanent conferences.
It will, however, have few arguments of any force to oppose to combinations
evidently suggested by the desire for peace, and supported by all its
Allies. It now remains for me to speak of the final object of these negotiations,
of the arrangement by which it might be possible to place the Sultan and
his powerful vassal in a situation more satisfactory to both, and more
promising for the tranquillity of the East than that in which they have
been placed for the last six years.
The necessity of conceding to Mehemet Ali the hereditary investiture
of a part at least of his actual possessions, appears to be almost generally
admitted. It has been considered that Mehemet Ali, at the degree of
eminence which he has reached, would be too strongly impressed with
the urgency of providing for the future interests of his family, and of
placing them in security from the vengeance of the Porte after his death,
to permit himself to entertain really pacific views, until he shall have
obtained some satisfaction on this head.
On the other hand, it is not to be hoped that the Porte will consent
to grant him this augmentation of moral force, unless some advantage by
way of compensation be given to it, which may afford a positive guarantee
against the subsequent enterprises of an enemy, whose power it will thus
have increased. The nature and the extent of this advantage are not
indeed easy to be determined. Lord Palmerston thinks that nothing less
than the restitution of the whole of Syria would suffice. At Berlin, it
appears to be admitted, that the Sultan might content himself with a part
only of this province. With regard to us, Sir, we acknowledge that the
Porte would be entitled to a real compensation ; but we think that the
moment for fixing its nature and its extent has not yet arrived ; that such
a question can only be solved, according to various and complicated data,
the estimation of which cannot be the work of a moment ; and that this
M

82
point should, be referred to the Conference which, if our views prevail, will
be established between the Powers. .
Be so good, Sir, as to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston. In
thus communicating to the Cabinet of London, the whole of our views
upon the important circumstances of the moment, we give it an unequi
vocal pledge of the confidence with which it inspires us, and of the desire
which we feel to act with it, in the most perfect accordance. Lord
Palmerston will readily understand, that some of the ideas which you are
directed to communicate to him are hypothetical, and that events or even
more mature reflections may greatly modify them.
JvGCGlVC &C.
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.
P.S. — We anxiously await your answer, and the communication
which Lord Palmerston will no doubt hasten to make to you of the deci
sion of the Cabinet of London, upon the subject of the common delibera-
tions, of which we propose to establish the seat at Vienna, as well as of
the instructions destined for Admiral Stopford.

No. 62.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, June 19, 1839.
THE inclosed paper contains the substance of the instructions
Which Her Majesty's Government propose to give to Sir Robert Stopford,
the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediter
ranean, arid upon which they request the previous opinion of the French
Government. The part of these instructions which relates to the possibility of
the English and French squadrons going up to Constantinople in the
event of a Russian force entering the Turkish territory, may require some
consideration. It seems clear that such a measure would, in such case,
be highly desirable, and that it would be the best, if not the only way, of
effectually counteracting the bad consequences which might result from
the entrance of the Russians into Turkey; but if that movement were to
be effected against a vigorous resistance on the part of the Turkish forts
in the Dardanelles, it would be difficult to accomplish it, unless the fleet
were accompanied by some force which could be landed to carry the forts by
taking them in the rear. This operation would not be difficult, and would
not require any large amount of foree; for thoUgh the batteries are
formidable against ships, on account of the narrowness of the channel,
the strength of the current, which sets downwards towards the Mediter
ranean, and because at this time of year the wind sets chiefly the same
way as the current, yet those forts are weak on the land side, and
might be taken one after the other, by any moderate force which attacked
them in the rear.
It is probable, however, that if the Turkish troops were defeated,
and if the Russians had entered Turkey, the Sultan would cheerfully
permit, if he did not actually invite, the British and French squadrons to
go up to Constantinople ; and as those squadrons would come as friends
to protect the Sultan, and not as enemies to attack him, it would be
difficult for the Russians to suggest to him a plausible reason for refusing
to receive such protection. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

83
Inclosure in No. 62.
Substance of proposed Instructions to Sir Robert Stopford.
THE Admiral to proceed with the ships under his command to the Bay
of Scanderoon, or to any other neighbouring part of the coast of Syria
which may be near to the places where the armies of the Sultan and of
Mehemet Ali may happen to be.
If on his arrival off the coast he should find hostilities have not com
menced, and, that, on the contrary, the two armies have made retrograde
movements, and that there is no likelihood of collision, he will then pro
ceed in the execution of such other orders as he may have received from
the Admiralty. If he should find that, although hostilities had not actually com
menced, the two armies, nevertheless, were near to each other, and con
tinued to occupy positions likely to lead to collision, the Admiral should
immediately open a communication with the Commander of each army,
in doing which he will be assisted by, the British Consuls on the coast ;
and the best step to take for this purpose would probably be, to send to
the General of each army an officer, accompanied by a competent
interpreter. The Admiral should earnestly request each General to withdraw his
troops some days' march from their actual position, in order to widen the
distance between the two armies, and thus to give a security that no
collision should take place to interfere with the efforts of the Allied
Powers to effect by negotiation, a permanent settlement between the
Sultan and his vassal. If the Generals should either or both of them
refuse to comply with this request, the Admiral should dispatch a ship of
war to Constantinople or Alexandria, or to both, as the case might be,
to urge the superior Authorities to send the necessary orders ; and he
should express to the Generals the confident and well-founded expectation
of the British Government, that they should suspend all forward move
ments till . they should hear from their respective Governments ; and he
should impress upon them the deep responsibility which they would incur
by any hasty and inconsiderate step.
If on his arrival off the coast he should find that hostilities had
already commenced, he should, as in the former supposed case, imme
diately open a communication with the Generals commanding the con
tending armies, and state to them that he has been specially sent by the
British Government to propose and strongly to press upon them a
suspension of arms. That the British Government, in concert and in
co-operation with Her Majesty's Allies, is going to endeavour to bring
about, by negotiation, an amicable and a mutually satisfactory arrange
ment between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt ; and that it is of great
importance, for the success of such negotiation, that the hostilities
between the two armies should be suspended while that negotiation is
going on ; that the views of the Powers with respect to these arrange
ments must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great
interests of Europe ; and that, consequently, those views could not be
altered by any events which a continuance of hostilities might produce ;
and that such a continuance of hostilities, therefore, would only cause a
useless effusion of blood, without being attended with any permanent
advantage to^either party ; because the final settlement will depend, not
upon the chances of the campaign in Syria, but upon the negotiations
between the Great Powers and the Contending Parties.
If the two Generals should accede to the proposed suspension of
arms, the Admiral will immediately send off a report thereof to Constan
tinople and Alexandria, and also, by the shortest way, to England ; and
he will, at the same time, urgently request the two Generals to withdraw,
their armies to a certain distance from each other, so as to leave a
sufficient space between their respective troops..
It will also be desirable that the armistice should be confirmed by a
formal Military Convention, and that its duration should be without any
M 2 J

,8.4
definite limit of time, and that a month's notice should be required before
it could be put an end to by either party.
If either or both of the Generals should refuse to accede to this
armistice, the Admiral should, as in the former supposed case, send off to
Constantinople, or to Alexandria, or to both, to urge through the Ambas
sador at Constantinople, and through the Consul-General at Alexandria,
that the requisite orders might be sent to the Generals in-Syria, to agree
to the suspension of arms.
If the refusal shall come from the Turkish General, it will, for many
reasons, political and physical, be difficult for the Admiral to employ any
other means than those of persuasion, to procure the consent of the
•Sultan ; for to say nothing of the position in which Her Majesty stands
towards the Sultan, who is Her Majesty's Ally, and who is also the
acknowledged and undoubtedly the rightful Sovereign of the territory
•which is the cause of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations
of the Sultan's Army do not depend upon any communication by sea
between Constantinople and the scene of operations, and that it would
not be easy for the squadron to force its way up to Constantinople for the
purpose of supporting by its presence, the representations of Her Majesty's
Ambassador. But in such case, the Admiral would strongly point out to the Turkish
Commander how uncertain are the chances of war, and how great and
fearful his responsibility would be, if, after he had refused an honourable
armistice, when proposed to him by an ally of his master, for the express
purpose of negotiation, any unforeseen disaster should befall his army ;
and if, instead of finding himself under the security of an armistice at
the head of a strong and unbroken force, he were to be compelled to
retreat with a defeated army, and be pursued by a victorious enemy;
and if he should thus bring upon his country the most serious calamities
through hostilities, the continuance of which he had himself insisted
upon. If, on the contrary, the refusal should proceed from the General com
manding the troops of Mehemet Ali, geographical circumstances would
enable the Admiral to employ more effectual means to accomplish his
purpose ; because the Egyptian Army could not well carry on its military
operations in Syria without a free communication by sea with Egypt;
and because the squadron, by going to Alexandria, could exert a powerful
influence in support of the representations which the Consul-General
might make to the Pasha of Egypt.
In such case, therefore, the Admiral would employ towards the
General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali in Syria, all the argu
ments which have been pointed out as applicable to the General3 of
the Sultan; but the Admiral would further proceed to employ all the
means at his command to produce compliance with his request.
For this purpose, he would, in the first place, prevent all further
communication by Egyptian vessels, whether of commerce or of war,
between Syria and Egypt ; he would turn away all Egyptian ships of
war, and would send all Egyptian transports and merchantmen to Malta,
or to any other place, where they might be held for a time in safe custody.'
He would then leave on the coast of Syria such ships of war as he mio-ht
think necessary for this purpose, and would proceed with the rest of ^his
force to Alexandria, and would lose no time in earnestly pressing Mehemet
Ali to send to Syria, in a British ship of war, positive orders for an imme
diate suspension of hostilities. If Mehemet Ali should comply with this
request, all vessels which might have been detained should immediately be
released ; but the Admiral should remain off Alexandria with his squadron
till he had learnt that the order had actually been obeyed, and he might
then return to the coast of Syria, to watch events, or might remain off
Alexandria, according to his discretion under the then existing circum
stances. ""' '
If the Pasha should refuse to give the order, the Admiral should
then employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing in their
stringency, as he may find necessary, or may think best calculated to
accomplish the desired result.

85
Among the measures to which he might resort, would be a refusal to
permit the Egyptian fleet either to come out, if in port, or to go in, if out
of port ; and he might detain all Egyptian merchantmen, and, according
to his discretion, any Egyptian ships of war.
But it might happen that the army of the Sultan might have suffered
a great defeat, and that measures of extreme vigour might become
necessary to stay the advance of the Egyptians, and to save the Turkish
Empire. In this case, the Admiral would be authorized to have recourse
to any measures of compulsion which he might think to be within his
means, and which he might consider likely to induce the Pasha to give
the necessary orders for stopping the advance of his army, and for
bringing it back within the limits of Syria.
In such an event, it is also possible that a Russian force, either naval
or military, might enter the ports and territory of Turkey with the pro
fessed object of protecting the Sultan, and of repelling the Egyptian
invaders. In such a case, and after the Admiral had obtained from the Pasha
the order for the retreat of his troops, and after he had received certain
information that such order had been obeyed, it would be extremely
desirable that the British squadron should proceed to Constantinople,
and should remain there, or in the Black Sea, until the Russian forces had
evacuated the Turkish territory.
There would be time for the Admiral to communicate on this matter
with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, for the purpose of
ascertaining in what > manner this measure could best be executed ; and
having stated to the Admiral their opinion on this point, Her Majesty's
Government must leave it to his discretion, to determine whether, in the
event of permission to pass not being granted, the force under his com
mand would be strong enough to force the passage without sustaining
such an amount of loss in men, and of damage to the ships, as would
cripple the squadron and unfit it for any useful operation after the
passage had been effected. ,
If the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons should be at sea, the
Admiral should endeavour, as far as he could, consistently with the exe
cution of the foregoing instructions, to prevent a collision between them,
by interposing his squadron in a friendly manner between the other two
fleets, and by urging the respective Admirals to retire to their own ports.
But the first and most important object is to prevent or to put an end to
hostilities by land, because it is the contest by land, much more than a
conflict between the squadrons by sea, that might lead to consequences
disastrous to the Turkish Empire and fatal to the peace of Europe.
These instructions have been prepared with the view of providing
for all the cases which can at present be foreseen ; but unexpected cir
cumstances may arise, and different measures may be required ; the
Admiral, therefore, should use his discretion in departing, if he should
think fit, from the letter of these instructions, provided he adheres to their
spirit. Orders of a nature similar to these, have been given to the French
squadron in the Mediterranean; and that squadron will be instructed
to join and co-operate with Sir Robert Stopford's. The most perfect
understanding has been established between the British and French
Governments upon the great and important matters to which these in
structions relate. The interests of the two countries on these affairs are
the same, their views and objects are identical, and their measures will
be uniform. The Admiral will, therefore, communicate, concert, and co-operate
with the French Admiral, with the utmost confidence and frankness, upon
all matters connected with the execution of these instructions, which he
will show in extenso to the French Admiral ; and Her Majesty's Govern
ment cannot doubt that the same harmony which exists between the two
Governments* will prevail between their Admirals and squadrons.

86

No. 63.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 20.,
(Extract.) Therapia, May 27, 1839.
REPORTS from Syria have been made to your Lordship, of the
hostile feeling of the Mahomedan population towards the Egyptian
Government; similar reports abound here, and they are, I believe, true:
it is thought that these widely extended feelings will ultimately give
success to the Sultan, provided his army shall be prudently directed.
The declaration made by Mehemet Ali, and forwarded by Count
Medem, is public, and, as I hear, is universally considered to amount to
a demand for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. I presume the
Sultan cannot comply with it without ensuring the loss of his spiritual
supremacy — the Khalifat.
The defeat of the Sultan's army by that of the Pasha of Egypt,
would be a less calamity to our interests than the partition of the em
pire as alluded to above, if it were to be established with our concurrence.
We might easily prevent the destruction of the empire by such a
defeat, and, I believe, repair the mischiefs" it would occasion; but the slow,
silent, and perpetual action of universal disorder inherent in the partition
of the empire, would defy our wisdom and baffle our power to resist and
remedy. I inclose extracts from Mr- Vice-Consul Hays' letter to me, dated
May 7, lest your Lordship should not have received the statements
it contains.

Inclosure in No. 63.
Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Alexandretta, May 7, 1839.
THE last advices here from Bir are, that the Sultan's forces had
crossed the Euphrates, and from all appearances, with an hostile intention.
His Highness the Pasha here, with Solyman Pasha, and Achmet Menekly
Pasha, Minister of War, are making active preparations to stand any
attack that may be made against them, for I do not think the Egyptians
will strike the first blow. There are about ten regiments already arrived
here, and twenty more are expected, to form the force which is to be
opposed against the Sultan, should he attack.
The information 1 have been able to obtain is, that the advanced
guard only of the Turkish army, consisting of from 2,000 to 3,000 men,
had, up to the 4th instant, crossed the Euphrates ; they had encamped at
a village about two miles to the eastward of Bir. The strength of the
Turkish army was not at all known, but reinforcements were daily arriving
with great quantities of stores and provisions.
The Egyptian forces were at that time estimated at about 60,000
men, but I have not been able to ascertain the proportions of Infantry
and Cavalry. These forces were stationed between Aleppo and Aintab ;
and 20,000 more men were expected, which it was supposed would con
stitute the whole available force of the country.
On the 1st instant, his Highness Ibrahim Pasha made a demand for a
loan of 1,200 purses from the native merchants of Aleppo, which, however,
was not granted, on the plea of incapacity, and I understand was not
attempted to be forced.
On the 4th instant, about twenty of the Annisee Arabs and as many
Turkish-prisoners, were brought into Aleppo by Mahomed Bey, who was
sent with a party of Irregular Cavalry against the former to prevent their
junction with the Sultan's forces. The former, prisoners were detained,
but the latter were sent back by order of his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha.

87
The Commodore Bandiera received a despatch on the 5th instant
from his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, stating his intention of acting solely
on the defensive; and explaining the necessity he had been under of inter
dicting all commercial communication with the Turkish dominions, irt
consequence of an edict to that effect, in the name of the Sultan, regarding
the Egyptian territories.
A proclamation to the above effect has been issued, I understand, at
Aleppo. I am informed the Albanians from Candia are not to be sent for.
On the 1st or 2nd instant, an order was issued at Aleppo for all
European instructors to hold themselves ready for service at a minute's
Warning, who replied they were ready to do so, only on condition
their arrears were all paid up, which are from ten to sixteen months ; and
up to the 4th not any measures had been taken. The general arrears Of
the army are, I believe, from twelve to eighteen months ; the feeling at
Aleppo appears opposed to this Government, and this has been increased
by the mosques having been appropriated as temporary barracks.
The Egyptian forces stationed at Adana, TarsUs, and on the
frontier of Kulek Boghas, amount to about 15,000 men, a great part of
whom are invalids ; and the Sultan's army on the opposite frontier, I am
told, amounts to about 40,000 men.
All is at present quiet in this district, but the general feeling,
particularly in the mountains, appears to be opposed to this Government.

No. 64.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 24:)
(Extract.) Paris, June 21, 1839.
I RECEIVED yesterday, by the ordinary Calais messenger, your
Lordship's despatches of the 18th of this month, and I this morn
ing received by a special messenger your despatch of the day
before yesterday, inclosing a copy of the instructions Her Majesty's
Government propose to give to the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's
Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, and upon which they request to have
the opinion of the French Government. A Cabinet Council met at an
early hour this morning; and I have not had the Opportunity of commu
nicating with Marshal Soult, relative to the proposed instructions to the
Admiral. I hope to have a conference with his Excellency on this subject
to-morrow, and will re-dispatch the special messenger in the evening, with
the result.

No. 65.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 24.)
(Extract.) Vienna, June 14, 1839.
THE last despatch I have seen from the Internuncio, is of the 30th
ultimo. Prince Metternich will send all his despatches to Prince Esterhazy,
for communication to your Lordship ; but as this may reach your Lord
ship first, I have to acquaint you that the Prince's recommendations seem
to have made little effect upon the Porte, and that the tone of the Turkish
Ministers was decidedly warlike. The only overture to which they seem
to have listened, was one for obtaining the immediate restitution of Syria
to the Sultan, by means of the intervention of the Four Powers. This
overture was made by Baron Stiirmer in his own name, not in that of his
Government, and was to be taken into consideration by the Turkish
Ministers, and to form the subject of a conference.

88
Since I saw him, I have learnt that France has already pronounced
herself upon some of the leading points of the affair. King Louis Philippe
thinks a conference indispensable, and that the place at which to assemble
it is Vienna. He is willing to concur in securing the succession in Egypt
to the family of Mehemet Ali, and the reversion of Syria to the Sultan, after.
the Pasha's death. It will, however, require all the weight of the Four Pow
ers to induce the Two Parties to agree to this — the Sultan demanding the
immediate restitution of Syria, and the Pasha its permanent annexation to
Egypt. It is further to be foreseen that the project, if agreed to, will probably
only produce a prolongation of the same armed truce, which has existed
since the peace of Kutaya; and that the ultimate restitution of Syria will
depend upon the circumstances of the moment, and probably not be effected
without the employment of force. Only one other plan presents itself to
my mind, and this is, the immediate wresting of Syria from the Pasha,
and its restitution to the Porte. It is doubtful how far the Powers could
be induced to concur in this plan, but if it could be carried into effect,
it would put an end to the provisional state which at present exists, and
give a better chance of peace to both the Sultan and the Pasha.

No. 66.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 24.)
(Extract.) Vienna, June 14, 1839.
I HAVE just seen the French Ambassador, of whose confidence and
disposition to co-operate with us, I cannot speak in terms too strong. I
learn from him, that Prince Metternich still deprecates the employment of
the word "conference," representing strongly the inconvenience attached
to it. His wish is, that each Cabinet should send its opinion to its
Representative here, leaving a certain latitude for discussion, and that-
from a comparison of the five opinions should be sought one in which all
might coincide, which, when found, should form the basis of communica
tions to the Sultan and the Pasha.
The points upon which the opinions of the Cabinets are wanted, are :
1st. The securing Egypt to the family of Mehemet Ali, and whether
this should be done by successive investitures, or by the establishment of
hereditary right, reserving always to the Porte its feudal superiority.
2dly. Whether the restitution of Syria should be contingent on
the death of Mehemet Ali, or immediate ; and upon this point, although
Prince Metternich argues the expediency in the interest of the Pasha
himself of making the restitution immediate, he yet allows that there
would be no chance of obtaining his assent to it.
If the plan of restoring Syria to the Porte after Mehemet Ali's death
should ultimately be the one resolved upon, we must expect that the Porte
will demand the guarantee of the Five Powers for its being carried into
effect, and must be prepared what answer to give.
Prince Metternich further stated that he had taken the Emperor's
commands for preparing the Austrian vessels which might take part in the
expedition, and that the son of the Archduke Charles would probably
embark in one of them.
Prince Metternich informs me that although he sends the Inter
nuncio's despatches for communication to your Lordship, he writes nothing
concerning them, as he is expecting your answer to the communications
which have been already made.

89
No. 67.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 25.)
(Extract.) Paris, June 22, 1839.
MARSHAL SOULT paid me a visit late in the evening of yesterday,
and I delivered to him a copy of the instructions which Her Majesty's
Government propose to give to the Commander-in-Chief of the British
Naval Forces in the Mediterranean; but as the translation which he
had directed to be made of these instructions had not been finished at
the time I had an interview with him this morning, his Excellency was
not prepared to enter into any discussion respecting them; he was,
however, satisfied from the general statement I made of their purport,
that the instructions issued by the French Government to their Admiral,
would be in accordance with them.
Marshal Soult read to me a despatch which he had just received from
M. de Bourqueney, reporting the conversation he had with your Lordship,
on his communicating to you a despatch of Marshal Soult's, developing
at some length the opinions of the French Government upon the Oriental
Question. He rejoiced, he said, to find how entirely the views of the two
Governments corresponded, not only regarding the measures to be taken
for preventing or suspending hostilities between the Turks and Egyptians,
but also respecting the' arrangements to be subsequently made for placing
upon a permanent basis, the relations between the Sultan and Mehemet
Ali ; and he was glad to find, that after balancing the advantages and
disadvantages of Vienna being selected as the place of Conference between
the Great Powers, upon the affairs of the East, you were inclined to
accede to the proposal of the Conference being held in that city.
Prince Metternich, he said, was not without apprehension of the
startling effect in some quarters, of the word Conference on Eastern
Affairs, but was, notwithstanding, most desirous that an identity of
purpose and of language to be held to the Porte and to Mehemet Ali,
should be concerted by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers at
Vienna ; and he, the Marshal (provided he had the substance), was quite
willing that the name of Conference should not be pronounced.
Count Appony communicated to the Marshal this day, a despatch
from Prince Metternich, inclosing Reports from the Internuncio at
Constantinople; the communication is probably the same as that which
Lord Beauvale apprizes your Lordship you will receive from Prince
Esterhazy. No. 68.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 25.)
My Lord, Paris, June 23, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, a copy of a
telegraphic despatch from Marseilles, which has been communicated to
me this morning by Marshal Soult. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 68.
Depiche Telegraphique de Marseille, du 22 Juin, 1839, all heures.
LE " Minos " est parti hier au soir pour Malte. Le " Mentor " est
arrive en meme tems. Ce dernier a rencontre le 17, entre Maritimoetla
Sicile, I'Escadre de FAmiral Stopford paraissant se diriger sur Malte
N

90
Les Capitaines du " Scamandre" et du "Dante," dont le "Mentor"
m'apporte les rapports, annoncent le commencement des hostilites en
Syrie; au depart du "Dante" d' Alexandrie, le 7 Juin apportait la
nouvelle de Finvasion du territoire Egyptien par les Turcs qui s etaient
empares de quinze villages dont les habitans avaient ete armes. A cette
nouvelle, Ibrahim Pacha avait fait marcher un corps de 25,000 hommes
contre eux ; des transports etaient partis d' Alexandrie avec des troupes
a bord. L'Escadre Turque etait dans le Bosphore au depart du " Scamandre"
de Constantinople, le 7 courant, avec 7,000 hommes, qu'on disait devoir
operer un debarquement en Egypte. Le bruit courait a Constantinople
qu'une affaire serieuse, dans laquelle les Turcs avaient ete battus, avait
eu lieu en Syrie.
Le Grand Seigneur etait malade.

(Translation.)
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd of June, 1839, 1 1 o'clock.
THE " Minos " started last night for Malta. The " Mentor " arrived
at the same time. This last met on the 17th, between Maritimo and
Sicily, with the squadron of Admiral Stopford apparently directing its
course towards Malta.
The Captains of the " Scamandre" and of the " Dante," whose reports
were brought to me by the " Mentor," announce the commencement of
hostilities in Syria. At the departure of the " Dante " from Alexandria,
news had arrived, on the 7th of June, of the invasion of the Egyptian
territory by the Turks, who had possessed themselves of fifteen villages, the
inhabitants of which had been armed. On this intelligence Ibrahim Pasha
had marched a division of 25,000 men against them ; transports had left
Alexandria with troops on board. At the departure of the '' Scamandre "
from Constantinople on the 7th instant, the Turkish squadron was in the
Bosphorus with 7,000 men, who, it was reported, were intended to effect a
landing in Egypt. A report was current in Constantinople that a serious
affair, in which the Turks had been beaten, had taken place in Syria.
The Grand Signor was ill.

No. 69.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, June 25, 1839.
I HAVE received the Queen's commands to signify to your Lord
ships Her Majesty's pleasure, that instructions to the following effect may
be forthwith addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-
Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.
Sir Robert Stopford will proceed with the ships under his command
to the Bay of Scanderoon, or to any other part of the coast of Syria which
may be near to the places where the armies of the Sultan and of Mehemet
Ali may happen to be.
If, on arriving off the coast, the Admiral should find that hostilities
have not commenced, and that, on the contrary, the two armies have
made retrograde movements, and that there is no likelihood of collision,
he will then proceed in the execution of such other orders as he may have
received from your Lordships.
If he should find that, although hostilities had not actually com
menced, the two armies, nevertheless, were near to each other, and con
tinued to occupy positions likely to occasion collision, the Admiral should
immediately open a communication with the commander of each army, in
doing which he will be assisted by the British Consuls on the coast ; and

91
the best step to take for this purpose would probably be, to send to the
general of each army an officer, accompanied by a competent interpreter.
The Admiral should earnestly request each general to withdraw his
troops some days' march from their actual position, in order to widen the
distance between the two armies ; and thus to give a security that no
hostile collision should interfere with the efforts of the Allied Powers to
effect, by negotiation, a permanent settlement between the Sultan and his
vassal. If one or both of the generals should refuse to comply with this
request, the Admiral should dispatch a ship of war to Constantinople, or
to Alexandria, or to both those places, as the case might be, in order to
request the British Ambassador and Consul-General to urge the superior
authorities to send the necessary orders ; and he should express to the
generals the confident and well-founded expectation of the British
Government that all operations or forward movements should be sus
pended till the further orders of their respective Governments should have
been received ; and he should impress upon the generals the deep respon
sibility which they would incur by any hasty and inconsiderate step.
If, on his arrival off the coast, he should find that hostilities had
already commenced, he should, as in the former supposed case, immedi
ately open a communication with the generals commanding the contend
ing armies, and should state to them that he has been specially sent by
the British Government to propose, and strongly to press upon them, a
suspension of arms ; that the British Government, in concert and co
operation with Her Majesty's Allies, is going to endeavour to bring about,
by negotiation, an amicable and a mutually satisfactory arrangement
between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; and that it is of great
importance for the success of such negotiation, that the hostilities between
the two armies should be suspended while that negotiation is going on;
.that the views of the Powers with respect to these final arrangements,
must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great interests of
Europe, and that those views could not be altered by any events which a
continuance of hostilities might produce ; and that such a continuance of
hostilities, therefore, would only cause a useless effusion of blood without
being attended with any permanent advantage to either of the Contending
Parties. Because the final settlement will depend, not upon the chances
of the campaign in Syria, but upon the negotiations between the Great
Powers and the two parties.
If the two Generals should accede to the proposed suspension of arms,
the Admiral will immediately send a report thereof to Constantinople and
to Alexandria, and also, by the shortest way, to England ; and he will, at
the same time, urgently request the two Generals to withdraw their armies
to a certain distance from each other, so as to leave an ample interval of
space between their respective troops.
It will also be desirable that the armistice should be confirmed by a
formal military convention, and that its duration, should be without any
definite limit of time; and two months' notice, at the least, should be
required, before it could be put an end to by either party.
If either or both of the Generals should refuse to accede to this
armistice, the Admiral should, as in the former supposed case, send off to
Constantinople, or to Alexandria, or to both, to urge through the Ambas
sador at Constantinople, and through the Consul-General at Alexandria
that the requisite orders might be sent to the Generals in Syria to agree
to the suspension of arms.
If the refusal shall come from the Turkish General, it will, for many
reasons, political and physical, be difficult for the Admiral to employ any
other means than those of persuasion, to procure the consent of the
Sultan. For to say nothing of the position in which Her Majesty stands
towards the Sultan, who is Her Majesty's Ally, and who is also the
acknowledged and rightful Sovereign of the territory which is the cause
of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations of the Sultan's
Army do not depend upon any communication by sea between Constanti
nople and the scene of" operations, so that the squadron could not check
those operations ; and that it would not be easy for the squadron to force
N 2

92
its way up to Constantinople for the purpose of supporting by its presence,
the representations of Her Majesty's Ambassador,
But in such case the Admiral would strongly point out to the Turkish
Commander, how uncertain are the chances of war, and how great and
fearful his responsibility would be, if, after he had refused an honourable.
armistice, when proposed to him by an Ally of his master, for the express
purpose of negotiation, any unforeseen disaster should befall his army;
and if, instead of finding himself under the security of an armistice at the
head of a strong and unbroken force, he were to be compelled to retreat
with a defeated army, and to be pursued by a victorious enemy ; and if
he should thus bring upon his country the most serious calamities in con
sequence of hostilities, the continuance of which he had himself insisted
upon. If, on the contrary, the refusal should proceed from the General com
manding the troops of Mehemet Ali, geographical circumstances would
enable the Admiral to employ more effectual means to accomplish his pur
pose ; because the Egyptian Army could not well carry on its military
operations in Syria without a free communication by sea with Egypt,
which communication the squadron could cut off; and because the
squadron, by going to Alexandria, could exert a powerful influence in
support of the representations which the Consul-General might make to
the Pasha of Egypt.
In such case, therefore, the Admiral would employ towards the General
commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali in Syria, all the arguments which
have been pointed out as applicable to the General of the Sultan ; but the
Admiral would, in addition, proceed to employ all the means at his
command to produce compliance with his request.
For this purpose, he would, in the first place, prevent all further
communication by Egyptian vessels, whether of commerce or of war,
between Syria and Egypt; he would turn away all Egyptian ships of war;
and would send all Egyptian transports and merchantmen to Malta, or to
any other place, where they might be held for a time in safe custody. He
would then leave on the coast of Syria such ships of war as he might
think necessary for this purpose ; and would proceed with the rest of his
force to Alexandria, and would lose no time in earnestly pressing Mehemet
Ali to send to Syria, by a British ship of war, positive orders for an imme
diate suspension of hostilities.
If Mehemet Ali should comply with this request, all vessels -which
might have been detained should be released ; but the Admiral should
remain off Alexandria with his squadron, till he had learnt that the order
had actually been obeyed ; and he might then return to the coast of
Syria to watch events, or he might remain off Alexandria, according to
his discretion under the then existing state of circumstances.
If the Pasha should refuse to give the order, the Admiral should then
employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing in their stringency,
as he might find necessary, or might think best calculated to accomplish
the desired result.
Among the measures to which he might resort would be, a refusal to
permit the Egyptian fleet either to come out, if in port, or to go in, if out
of port ; and he might detain all Egyptian merchantmen, and, according
to his discretion, any Egyptian ships of war.
But it might happen, that the army of the Sultan might have suffered
a great defeat, and that measures of extreme vigour might become neces
sary to stop the advance of the Egyptians, and to save the Turkish
Empire. In this case, the Admiral would be authorized to have recourse
to any measures of compulsion which he might think to be within his
means, and which he might consider likely to induce the Pasha to give
the necessary orders for stopping the advance of his army, and for
bringing that army back within the limits of Syria.
If the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons should be at sea, the Admiral
should endeavour, as far as he could consistently with the execution of the
foregoing instructions, to prevent a collision between them, by interposing
his squadron in a friendly manner between the Turkish and Egyptian

93
fleets; and by urging the respective Admirals to retire to their own ports.
But the first and most important object is, to prevent or to put an end to
hostilities by land, because it is the contest by land, much more than a
conflict between the squadrons by sea, that might lead to consequences
disastrous to the Turkish Empire, and fatal to the peace of Europe.
These instructions have been prepared with the view of providing for
all; the cases which can at present be foreseen. But unexpected circum
stances may arise, and different measures may be required. The Admiral,
therefore, should use his discretion in departing, if he should think fit,
from the letter of these instructions, provided he adheres to their spirit.
Orders of a nature similar to these, will probably have been given to
the French squadron in the Mediterranean ; and that squadron will be
instructed to join and co-operate with the squadron of Sir Robert Stop
ford. The most perfect understanding has been established between
the British and French Governments upon the great and important
matters to which these instructions relate. The interests of the two
countries in these affairs are the same, their views and objects are iden
tical, and their measures will be uniform. The Admiral will therefore
communicate, concert, and co-operate with the French Admiral, with the
utmost confidence and frankness, upon all matters connected with the-
execution of these instructions, which he will show in extenso to the
French Admiral ; and Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt, that the
same harmony which exists between the two Governments will prevail
between their Admirals and squadrons. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 70.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, June 25, 1839.
I HAVE stated in my other letter of this day's date, that among the
contingencies which might arise out of the existing state of affairs in the
Levant, and with which Admiral Sir Robert Stopford might have to deal,
" it might happen that the army of the Sultan might have suffered a
great defeat, and that measures of extreme vigour might become neces
sary to stop the advance of the Egyptians, and to save the Turkish
Empire. In this case, the Admiral would be authorized to have recourse
to any measures of compulsion which he might think to be within his
means, and which he might consider likely to induce the Pasha to give
the necessary orders for stopping the advance of his army, and for
bringing it back within the limits of Syria."
I am to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that a
further instruction be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford with
reference to the above-mentioned contingency, and to the following effect :
Sir Robert Stopford should be informed that, in such an event, it is
possible that a Russian force, either naval or military, might enter the
ports and territory of Turkey, with the professed object of protecting
the Sultan, and of repelling the Egyptian invaders.
In such a case, and after the Admiral had obtained from the Pasha
the order for the retreat of his troops, and after he had received certain
information that such order had been obeyed, it would be extremely
desirable that the British squadron should proceed to Constantinople,
and should remain either there, or in the Black Sea, until the Russian
forces should have evacuated the Turkish territory.
There would be time for the Admiral to communicate on this matter
with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, for the purpose of
ascertaining in what manner this measure could best be executed ; and
Her Majesty's Government having stated to the Admiral their opinion on
this point, must leave it to his discretion to determine whether, in the
event of permission to pass not being granted, the force under his com-

94
mand would be strong enough to force the passage^ without sustaining
such an amount of loss in men, and of damage to the ships, as would
cripple the squadron, and. unfit it for any useful Operation after the
passage had been effected.
It is however unlikely that in the case supposed, the Turkish
Government should seriously object to receive at Constantinople a fleet
belonging to a friendly Power, and coming for a friendly object. The
Turkish Government itself could have no motive for refusing to the
British squadron permission to pass the Dardanelles, and if such per
mission were to be refused out of delicacy towards Russia, it is most
likely that the refusal would be nominal, and that no real resistance
would be opposed to the passage. But upon this point Sir Robert
Stopford would receive more definite information from Lord Ponsonby.
The Admiral will show this instruction, as he will the other of this
day, in extenso, to the French Admiral ; and a copy of it will also be sent
to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 71.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, June 25, 1839.
I HAVE to request that your Excellency will state to the French
Government, that the accounts received to-day from Marseilles, of the
commencement of hostilities, have led Her Majesty's Government to send
off the instructions to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, without further delay,
in order that the messenger may not be too late for the Marseilles steamer,
and because your Excellency has stated that the French Government
concurs in the general tenor of those instructions.
If further communication between the two Governments should lead
to any modifications of those instructions, those modifications could
easily be sent out afterwards. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 72.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 27.)
My Lord, Paris, June 24, 1839.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 21st of June.
The Marshal Soult is much satisfied with the general tenor of the
instructions which Her Majesty's Government propose to give to Admiral
Sir Robert Stopford ; but he was not prepared when I saw him this morning,
to communicate to me officially the opinion of the French Government upon
them. His Excellency told me that he was this day to confer respecting
them with the Minister of Marine, that to-morrow they would be submitted
to the Cabinet Council, and that he would then communicate to me a
Memorandum containing such observations as may have occurred to the
French Government upon the consideration of them, and suggesting such
changes as might appear advisable.
There are two points in the instructions on which I collected from
the conversation of Marshal Soult, that it is probable some change will be
suggested. The first relates to the conduct to be observed towards the
Turkish fleet. The Marshal seemed to think that, though the operations
of the Sultan's Army do not depend upon communication by sea between
Constantinople and the scene of operations, it would be nevertheless expe
dient, in the case of the refusal to agree to a suspension of arms coming

95
from the Turkish General, to compel, the Sultan's fleet to return to the
Dardanelles, not so much for the purpose of preventing supplies reaching
the Turkish Army from the coast, as to give to our proceedings the
character of an impartial mediation ; — the other point refers to our fleets
not permitting the Egyptian squadron to go into Alexandria, if it should
be out of port.
I expect also that in the Memorandum some observations will be
made upon that part of the instructions which relates to the combined
squadron proceeding to Constantinople or into the Black Sea. Marshal
Soult talked to me this morning of the danger of cruizing in a sea where
we had no friendly port of refuge. I will not, however, attempt to anti
cipate the contents of the Memorandum, which I shall probably have to
transmit by the next messenger.
I believe I have before mentioned that the Marshal was much pleased
at learning that the Austrian Government were preparing some vessels of
war to act in conjunction with the French and English fleets. This union
of the three flags will, he thinks, have a great moral effect ; if some
Russian ships of war were also to be added to the combined fleet, such
an indication of concert among the Great European Powers could not fail
to have an irresistible influence on the Contending Parties, and ensure the
preservation of peace.
Count St. Aulaire writes from Vienna, that Lord Beauvale has been
endeavouring to persuade Prince Metternich to assemble a military force
of 10,000 men at Trieste, ready to be embarked with a view to operations
in the East ; and that though the Austrian Minister had declined to
accede to this proposition, Lord Beauvale did not, despair of his being
induced to adopt it. Marshal Soult asked me, if I had heard of this
communication between Her Majesty's Ambassador and Prince Metter
nich. He appeared to take great interest in the success of this propo
sition. I answered that, in the last despatch from Lord Beauvale, which
had passed through my hands under flying seal, no reference was made
to this subject. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 73.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 27.)
My Lord, Paris, June 24, 1839.
SINCE I wrote to your Lordship this morning, the French Government
has received the despatches from Alexandria and from Constantinople,
both dated the 7th, which were announced on Saturday by the Marseilles
telegraph. Marshal Soult, who dined here, communicated to me the substance of
their contents.
M. Cochelet writes, that according to the official report of Ibrahim
Pasha, the Turkish troops had advanced beyond the line of the frontier,
and that with a superior force of Cavalry, they had driven out of a village
an Egyptian detachment of Cavalry which had ,been stationed in it, and
which had retired upon Aintab, where some redoubts had been raised by
Ibrahim for the defence of that position. That arms had been distributed
in various villages to the inhabitants, who had been excited to revolt
against the dominion of the Pasha.
Mehemet Ali, on the receipt of this intelligence, had invited the
Consuls of the Five European Powers to attend him, and had laid before
them the despatches of Ibrahim Pasha, and asked their advice as to the
conduct he should pursue. They advised him to act entirely on the
defensive; and upon their remonstrating against the intention he had
avowed of sending his fleet to sea, he gave up that intention.
The despatches from Constantinople state that the Turkish Govern
ment still gives assurances that orders have been issued to the Com-

96
mander of the Turkish Army, not to "commence hostilities, but that no
credit is given to these assurances.
The Sultan Mahmoud had been ill for four days, but had recovered
from his illness. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 74.
Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo. — (Communicated by M- de
Kisseleff, June 27, 1839.)
Monsieur le Comte, St.-Petersbourg, le ys Juin, 1839.
LES dernieres depeches de Constantinople, du ^ Mai, et d'Alexan-
drie, du -^ Mai, nous annoncent que les troupes Ottomanes et Egypti
ennes se trouvaient tellement rapprochees les unes des autres, qu'un
conflit entre elles semblait devenir imminent. Cette supposition acquiert
d'autant plus de probabilite a nos yeux, que le mouvement de Hafiz Pacha
sur Bir, situe a Fextremite des frontieres de la Syrie, semble nous in-
diquer, qu'il entrait reellement dans les vues du Sultan, tout en pro
testant de ses intentions pacifiques, de faire avancer Farmee du Taurus
au point de rendre un conflit inevitable, en Fattribuant a quelque circon
stance fortuite, sans que la Porte ait eu Fair de Favoir provoque.
M. de Bouteneff, a la date de ses derniers rapports, continuait encore
a employer tous ses efforts pour detourner le Sultan de Fidee de se pre-
cipiter dans une lutte, dont les consequences pourraient devenir si graves
pour le repos de FEmpire Ottoman. II se peut que les remontrances de
notre Ministre, jointes a celles de ses coliegues, aient reussi a prevenir
une complication qui semblait prochaine. En ce cas, le danger dont le
repos de l'Orient paraissait menace, aurait ete detourne encore une fois ;
de meme qu'il Fa ete il y a juste un an, graces a I'unanimite qui a
preside alors aux determinations des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.
Mais il se peut aussi que les evenemens aient marche aujourd'hui
avec trop de rapidite pour que les efforts des Representans Allies soient
parvenus a arreter I'execution d'un plan d'agression, que la Porte semble
avoir medite depuis longtems, et qu'elle a su couvrir du plus profond
mystere. A la distance ou nous sommes du theatre des evenemens, les remon
trances que nous adresserions aujourd'hui a la Porte seraient certainement
tardives. Nous ne saurions empecher une lutte qui deja peut s'etre
engagee a l'heure qu'il est. II ne nous reste qu'une seule tache a remplir,
c'est de circonscrire cette lutte dans les bornes les plus etroites possible,
afin qu'elle ne puisse pas devenir compromettante pour le maintien du
repos general de l'Europe.
Je vais, M. l'Ambassadeur, developper clairement cette pensee, et
resumer en peu de mots, les consequences pratiques qui s'y rattachent.
Pour l'Europe en general le danger red n'est pas dans un combat
qui se livre en Syrie entre les troupes du Sultan et celles du Pacha
d'Egypte. II n'y aurait pas de danger non plus pour l'Europe, si le Sultan,
ainsi qu'il le desire et Fespere, parvenait a reconqudrir la Syrie. Le
danger ne commencerait a devenir grave que si le sort des armes venant a
se declarer contre le Sultan, le Pacha d'Egypte profitait de cet avantage
pour mettre en peril la surete de Constantinople et Fexistence de FEmpire
Ottoman. C'est la que se trouve le veritable et unique danger pour le maintien
de la paix gendrale, car des que Constantinople serait menacee, la question
cesserait d'etre agitee simplement entre la Porte et FEgypte. II ne
s'agirait plus d'une lutte engagee entre deux forces Musulmanes;
il s'agirait d'une complication Europeenne qui des-lors nous semblerait
imminente. Pour empgcher que les choses n'en viennent la, il importe de prendre

97:
a tems des mesures pour circonscrire la lutte entre le Sultan et Mehemet
Ali, dans de certaines bornes, afin que cette lutte ne puisse, dans aucun
eas, s'etendre au point de devenir compromettante pour la securite de la
capitale de l'Empire Ottoman.
Dans cette vue, il nous a semble urgent de nous entendre franche-
ment avec les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe qui ont egalement a cceur,
comme nous, de mettre obstacle au danger que nous venons de signaler.
Parmi ces Puissances, la Grande Bretagne est incontestablement celle
qui peut exercer le plus d'influence sur le sort de cette question, et con-
courir de la maniere la plus decisive, a realiser les intentions pacifiques de
notre Auguste Maitre.
Dans cette conviction, Sa Majeste vous charge, M. l'Ambassadeur, de
vous expliquer a ce sujet avec le Cabinet Britannique sans la moindre
reserve. Veuillez lui exposer, qu'il est de son interet comme du notre, de
faire en sorte que la lutte entre la Porte et FEgypte n'acquierre pas un
tel caractere de gravite qu'elle puisse jamais mettre en p6ril la surete de
la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman ;
Que pour eviter une pareille catastrophe, il faudrait etre en mesure,
1°- d'empedier que la flotte du Pacha d'Egypte ne puisse sortir des ports ;
2!- de ne pas tolerer que I'armee Egyptienne, si elle avait des succes
dedsifs comme en 1833, s'avangat comme alors au centre de FAsie
Mineure jusqu'aux portes de Constantinople;
Qu'en consequence, pour mettre d'avance de justes limites a Faction
du Pacha d'Egypte, limites clairement definies, qu'il ne lui soit pas
permis de franchir impunement, il faudrait lui declarer de la maniere la
plus formelle, " que tant qu'il se bornerait a la defense des territoires
qui lui ont ete assignes par Farrangement de Kutahia ; tant qu'il
n'etendrait pas ses operations militaires au-dela des districts de
Diarbekir et d'Ourfa, ainsi qu'il en a donne aux Consuls Allies la promesse
formelle, la Grande Bretagne, d'accord avec les autres Puissances de
l'Europe, resterait temoin impassible de la lutte qui s'est engagee en Syrie ;
mais que d£s qu'il prendrait l'offensive, des qu'il etendrait le theatre de
la guerre au-dela des defiles du Taurus, pour la porter au centre de
l'Asie Mineure, FAngleterre considererait un pared acte d'hostilite comme
s'il etait dirige contre elle-mime, et agirait des-lors comme si elle etait en
guerre ouverte avec le Pacha d'Egypte;
" Qu'elle se regarderait de meme comme en etat de guerre avec lui,
s'il essayait de faire sortir sa flotte pour engager avec le Sultan une lutte
sur mer ; l'intention formelle de FAngleterre etant de renfermer le combat
dans les bornes de la Syrie, et de ne pas permettre, sous aucun pretexte,
qu'il puisse depasser ces bornes, in-evocablement fixees par FinterSt
general de l'Europe, qui veut que I a paix de l'Orient soit promptement
retablie, et que la lutte actuelle, quelles que soient les chances de la guerre,
ne puisse d' aucune maniere mettre en peril la tranquillite de l'Empire
Ottoman." Si FAngleterre s'accordait avec nous pour emettre une declaration
congue dans ces termes, FEmpereur autoriserait son Representant a
Alexandrie a se prononcer exactement dans le meme sens.
Les autres Cours Alliees s'empresseraient sans doute de joindre
leurs efforts k ceux de la Russie et de FAngleterre.
L'accord qui presiderait ainsi aux determinations des Cinq Puis
sances pourrait preserver encore une fois l'Europe du malheur d'une
conflagration gen^rale dans le Levant, en renfermant, pour ainsi dire, les
deux adversaires en champ clos, les obligeant a vider leur querelle en
Syrie, sans leur permettre d'engager le combat sur un terrain plus vaste
dont l'interet general de l'Europe doit les tenir eloigns malgre eux.
Si nous parvenons a obtenir le resultat que je viens d'indiquer; si le
Gouvernement Anglais accueille les idees que votre Excellence est chargee
de lui communiquer ; si nous empedions ainsi la flotte de Mehemet Ali de
sortir de ses ports ; et si nous defendons a son armee de franchir le
Taurus, sous peine de se trouver en guerre avec l'Europe entiere, nous
aurons obtenu tout ce qui est necessaire pour prevenir une complication
serieuse dans le Levant. O

98
Avant tout, il nous faut maitriser les faits, c'est-a-dire, empecher que
la lutte ne devienne menagante pour le repos de l'Europe entiere.
Lorsque nous aurons une fois atteint ce but, les circonstances se
simplifieront d'elles-memes ; alors on jugera avec plus de maturite quelle
sera Fissue du combat et quels devront etre les arrangemens ulterieurs qui
pourront intervenir entre les deux parties, afin de retablir les relations
pacifiques de la Porte avec le Pacha d'Egypte sur une base solide et
durable. Pour le moment, notre prevoyance doit se borner a aller au plus
presse, c'est-a-dire a empedier que la politique mal dirigee du Sultan ne
Jmisse nous entrainer dans une complication qui soit de nature a amener
a chance d'un conflit Europeen.
C'est ce danger que nous sommes interesses a, eloigner de tous nos
efforts ; et c'est dans cette vue qu'il nous a semble indispensable de nous
expliquer franchement avec FAngleterre, en faisant a Londres la
demarche dont je viens, d'ordre de rEmpereur, de vous indiquer le but et
le plan. Elle prouvera au Ministere Britannique, que loin de vouloir
provoquer une complication dans le Levant, nous employons tous nos
soins a laprevenir ; et qu'au lieu de nous prevaloir avec empressement des
stipulations de notre Traite d' Alliance avec la Porte, nous sommes les
premiers a desirer nous-memes d'eioigner le renouvellement d'une crise
qui nous forcerait, malgre nous, a reprendre une attitude militaire sur les
rives du Bosphore.
La certitude que FAngleterre acquerra par la de nos intentions
vraiment conservatrices, ne saurait manquer d'exercer une influence
utile sur les dispositions du Cabinet de Londres. II appreciera, je
l'espere, la loyaute des sentimens qui a dicte la demarche dont vous allez
vous acquitter. Veuillez ne pas tarder un seul instant, M. le Comte, a
nous informer de Faccueil qu'elle aura obtenu de la part de Lord Pal
merston. L'Empereur se plait a croire que cet accueil repondra pleine-
ment a nos vceux, et que Fentente qui s'etablira entre le Cabinet Anglais
et le ' ndtre, pour le maintien de la paix du Levant, servira a la faire
retablir promptement, lors-meme que la politique imprevoyante du Divan
aurait tente de la troubler momentanement. (Signe) NESSELRODE,
(Translation.)
Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo. — (Communicated by M. de Kisseleff
June 27, 1839.)
Sir, St. Petersburgh, June ¦&, 1839.
THE last despatches from Constantinople of the |£ May, and from
Alexandria of the ^ May, apprise us that the Ottoman and Egyptian
troops had approached so near to each other that a conflict between them
appeared imminent. This supposition seems to us the more probable
because the movement of Hafiz Pasha upon Bir, situated at the extremity
of the frontiers of Syria, appears to indicate that it entered really into
the views of the Sultan, all the while declaring his pacific intentions to
cause the Army of the Taurus to advance to such a point as to render a
conflict inevitable, by attributing it to some chance circumstance, without
the Porte appearing to have given any provocation for it.
M. de Bouteneff, at the date of his last reports, was continuing to
employ all his efforts to dissuade the Sultan from the notion of precipitating
himself into a struggle, the consequences of which might become so
serious to the repose of the Ottoman Empire. It may be that the remon
strances of our Minister, joined to those of his Colleagues, have succeeded
in preventing a complication which seemed at hand. In this case, the
danger which appeared to threaten the repose of the East will have once
again been averted ; in the same manner as it was just a year a°-o, thanks
to ths unanimity which then presided at the determinations oAhe Great
Powers of Europe.
But it is also possible that events may have now proceeded with too great

99
rapidity for the efforts of the Allied Representatives to have succeeded in
arresting the execution of a plan of aggression, which the Porte appears
to have meditated for a long time, and which it has contrived to veil in
the most profound mystery. ;
At the distance at which we are from the scene of events, the remon
strances which we might now address to the Porte would certainly be
somewhat late; we should be unable to prevent a struggle, which is.
perhaps at the present moment already begun. There remains but one
task for us to fulfil, that is, to confine this struggle within the narrowest
possible bounds, so that it may not compromise the maintenance of the
general repose of Europe.
I will explain this idea clearly, and recapitulate in a few words the
practical consequences which attach to it.
The real danger for Europe at large is not in a combat carried on in
Syria between the troops of the Sultan and those of the Pasha of Egypt.
Neither would there be danger to Europe if the Sultan succeeded in
reconquering Syria, as he wishes and hopes to do. The danger would
not begin to become serious until, in the event of the fate of arms
declaring against the Sultan, the Pasha of Egypt should profit by this
advantage to place the safety of Constantinople and the existence of the
Ottoman Empire in peril.
That would be the true and only danger for the continuance of
general peace, for from the moment that Constantinople should be
threatened, the question would cease to be considered simply as one
between the Porte and Egypt. There would no longer be question of a
struggle between two Mussulman forces, — there would be question of
a European complication, which from that moment would appear to us to
be imminent. To prevent things reaching such a point, it is of consequence to take
measures in time for confining the struggle between the Sultan and
Mehemet Ali within certain limits, in order that this struggle may in no
case extend itself so as to compromise the safety of the capital of the Otto
man Empire.
With this view, it has appeared to us essential to come to an under
standing, frankly, with the Great Powers of Europe, who, equally with
us, have at heart to prevent the danger which we have just pointed out.
Among those Powers Great Britain is incontestably the one that can
exercise the greatest influence over the fate of this question, and can
co-operate in the most decisive manner in realising the pacific intentions
of our august Master.
With this conviction His Majesty desires you, Sir, to come to an
explanation with the British Cabinet on this subject, without the least
reserve. Have the goodness to submit to that Cabinet, that it is as
much for its interest as for ours, to take care that the struggle between
the Porte and Egypt shall not assume so seriaus a character as may ever
place the safety of the capital of the Ottoman Empire in danger ;
That in order to avoid such a catastrophe, we should be prepared,
1st. To prevent the fleet of the Pasha of Egypt from coming out of port ;
2dly. Not to allow the Egyptian Army, if it met with decided successes
as was the case in 1833, to advance, as at that period, to the centre of
Asia Minor, even to the gates of Constantinople ;
That consequently, in order, beforehand, to set due bounds to
the action of the Pasha of Egypt, — bounds clearly defined which he is
not to be permitted to transgress with impunity, — it would be necessary
to declare to him in the most formal manner, " That as long as
he shall confine himself to the defence of the territories which have
been assigned to him by the arrangement of Kutaya; as long as
he shall not extend his military operations beyond the district of
Diarbekir and Orfa, as he has formally promised to the Allied Consuls,
so long will Great Britain, in conjunction with the other Powers of
Europe, remain a passive spectator of the struggle which is going on in
Syria ; but that from the instant he shall act on the offensive, from the
moment that he shall extend the theatre of the war beyond the defiles of
02

100
the Taurus in order to carry it into the centre of Asia Minor, from that
moment England would consider such act of hostility as if it were
directed against herself, and would thenceforward act as if she were at
open war with the Pasha of Egypt ;
" That in the same manner she would consider herself in a state of
war with him, if he attempted to send out his fleet to enter upon a naval
contest with the Sultan; the formal intention of England being to confine
the contest within the limits of Syria, and not to permit it, under any
pretence, to pass those limits, fixed irrevocably by the general interest of
Europe, which desires that the peace of the East may be promptly re-es
tablished, and that the present struggle, whatever may be the chances of
the war, shall in no manner place the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire
in jeopardy." If England came to an agreement with us to issue a declaration
couched in these terms, the Emperor would authorize his Representative
at Alexandria to hold precisely the same language.
The other Allied Courts would doubtless hasten to unite their efforts
to those of Russia and of England.
The harmony which would thus preside over the determinations of
the Five Powers, might once again preserve Europe from the misfortune
of a general conflagration in the Levant, by confining, as it may be said,
the two adversaries in closed lists, compelling them to settle their quarrel
in Syria, without permitting them to engage on a wider field, from which
it is the general interest of Europe to keep them off in spite of themselves.
If we succeed in obtaining the result which I have described ; if the
English Government accepts the ideas which your Excellency is directed
to communicate to it ; if we thus prevent the fleet of Mehemet Ali from
coming out of his ports; and if we forbid his army from crossing the
Taurus, under penalty of finding himself at war with the whole of Europe,
we shall have obtained all that is necessary to prevent a serious compli
cation in the Levant.
Above all things, we must be able to bring the matter within our
control, that is to say, prevent the struggle from becoming threatening to
the repose of all Europe.
When once we shall have attained this end, circumstances will sim
plify themselves of their own accord ; a more mature judgment can then
be formed as to the issue of the combat, and as to what the ulterior
arrangements which may be made between the two parties ought to be,
in order to re-establish the pacific relations of the Porte with the Pasha
of Egypt upon a solid and durable basis.
For the moment, we must confine ourselves to what is most pressing,
that is to say, to guard against the ill-advised policy of the Sultan dragging
us into a complication of a nature to bring on a chance of a European
conflict. It is this danger which we are interested in removing with all our
endeavours ; and it is with this view that we have thought it indispen
sable to come to a frank explanation with England, by taking in London
the step of which, by the Emperor's orders, I have pointed out to you the
plan and the object. It will prove to the British Ministry that, far from
wishing to bring about a complication in the Levant, we are using all our
care to prevent one ; and that, instead of greedily availing ourselves of
the stipulations of our Treaty of Alliance with the Porte, we are ourselves
the first to desire to prevent the recurrence of a crisis which would compel
us, in spite of ourselves, again to take up a military attitude on the
shores of the Bosphorus.
The certainty which England will thereby acquire of our truly con
servative intentions, cannot fail to exercise a salutary influence over the
disposition of the Cabinet of London. It will, I hope, appreciate the
sincerity of the sentiments which has dictated the step which you are
about to take. Have the goodness, Sir, not to delay a moment in inform
ing us of the reception it meets with from Lord Palmerston. The
Emperor flatters himself, that this reception will fully answer our
wishes, and that the understanding which will be established between the

101
English Cabinet and our own for the preservation of the peace of the
Levant, will serve speedily to re-establish it, even if the short-sighted policy
of the Divan should have attempted momentarily to disturb it.
Accept, &e.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 75.
Instructions to the French Admiral in the Levant. — (Communicated by
M. de Bourqueney, June 29.)
M. le Contre-Amiral, Paris, le 26 Juin, 1839.
DEJA quelques actes d'hostilite paraissent avoir eu lieu en Syrie,
entre les troupes du Sultan et celles du Vice-Roi d'Egypte. Un puissant
interet Europeen existe a prevenir ou arreter les effets d'une collision, et
c'est la le but que se propose la France, aidee de ses Alliees ; c'est celui
que vous devez chercher a atteindre avec l'escadre sous votre com-
mandement, soit isolement, soit par votre co-operation avec l'escadre de
Sa Majeste Britannique et avec la station navale d'Autriche dans le
Levant, si, comme il y a tout lieu de le croire, cette station a I'ordre de
se joindre aux forces navales Frangaises et Anglaises. Vous aurezdonc a
vous concerter avec leurs commandans, sur les moyens de rendre la
co-operation efficace. De son cote, sans doute, Sir Robert Stopford aura
regu des instructions conformes a Finteret puissant qu'ont les deux pays
dans la conduite d'une affaire dans laquelle leurs vues et leur but sont
identiques, et leurs mesures doivent etre semblables.
II doit done y avoir entre les deuxamiraux communication redproque
de leurs instructions, et il doit s'etablir entre eux toute la confiance et
toute la franchise propres a amener dans leurs operations le meme accord
qui existe entre les deux Gouvernemens. Lorsque le cas exigera concert
et co-operation, la direction superieure appartiendra a l'officier le plus
eleve ou le plus ancien en grade.
A la reception des presentes instructions, l'escadre sous vos ordres
devra se diriger vers les cdtes de Syrie.
Dans le cas de la rencontre des escadres Turque et Egyptienne, vous
vous attacherez a rendre impossible une collision, en vous interposant
entre elles, et en pressant les amiraux de rentrer dans leurs ports respectifs ;
et vous empedierez tout arrivage de troupes et de munitions de guerre,
par mer, sur le theatre de la guerre.
Vous devrez chercher a vous mettre immediatement en communication
avec les deux generaux-en-chef, soit dans la baie d'Alexandrette, soit sur
tout autre point le plus rapproche des lieux occupes par les deux
armees. Vous ferez tous vos efforts pour leur faire proposer et accepter une
suspension d'armes, pendant laquelle les Puissances entreront en
negociation pour amener un arrangement mutuellement satisfaisant pour
la Porte et pour le Pacha d'Egypte. II convient de faire remarquer, que
cet arrangement devant etre fonde sur une large appreciation des grands
interets de l'Europe, et non pas sur les eventualites de la guerre, aucune
des deux parties n'a interet a continuer les hostilites qui, quelle qu'en
¦fut Fissue, ne pourraient, en definitive, ameiiorer sa situation; il sera
Egalement important d'insister pour que les deux armees se retirent a une
certaine distance Fune de l'autre.
L'armistice sera constate par une Convention militaire portant que
< la reprise des hostilites, si elle avait lieu, devrait etre denoncee au moins
un mois a Favance.
Ces demarches, ces dispositions, soit qu'elles proviennent d'un des
deux commandans des escadres agissant isolement, soit, en cas de reunion
des deux escadres, qu'elles aient lieu de concert et avec la participation
de Fun et de l'autre, ces dispositions, dis-je, devront etre portees imme
diatement a la connaissance de notre Ambassadeur a Constantinople, et

102
du Consul-General a Alexandrie, et I'avis en sera transmis en France pat
la voie la plus prompte.
Si les deux g6neraux, ou Fun d'eux, se refusaient a acceder a cet
armistice, l'Ambassadeur a Constantinople et le Consul-General a
Alexandrie en seraient immediatement informes, comme dans le cas
precedent, afin qu'ils eussent a reclamer Fenvoi aux generaux en Syrie,
des ordres necessaires pour les faire consentir a la suspension d'armes.
Si le refus ven ait du general Ture, on appellerait son attention sur la
grave responsabilite qu'il assumerait en cas de revers. II lui serait
signifie que des ce moment, la voie de mer serait fermee a tout secours
destine a l'Armee Ottomane, tandisque notre Ambassadeur, informe du
refus, agirait aupres du Sultan pour vaincre cette resistance.
Sirle refus, au contraire, provenait du general Egyptien, des repre
sentations analogues lui seraient faites, et toute communication maritime
entre la Syrie et FEgypte serait immediatement fermee.
Dans Fun ou l'autre cas, les deux amiraux se concerteraient sur la
repartition des forces qu'il serait n^cessaire de placer soit a Fentree du
detroit, soit devant Alexandretfce, soit enfin sur tel point du territoire de
l'Asie Mineure qui serait jug6 convenable pour y etablir un blocus etroite-
ment serre, et ne permettre la sortie d'aucun batiment de guerre ou
autre. Outre le concert etabli entre les commandans des escadres Francaise
et Anglaise, et m^me le commandant de la station Autrichienne, il serait
•possible qu'une eseadre Russe offrit son concours; il doit etre bien
entendu qu'il serait admis dans un but pacifique et conforme aux presentes
instructions. Ces instructions ont pour but, de pourvoir aux eventualites qui ont
pu etre actuellement prevues. II en est d'autres qui, par leur nature et
leur gravite, exigeront des instructions ulterieures : elles vous seront
adressees. Le Roi s'en rapporte, pour tout le reste, au zeie et a l'habilete
du Commandant de son eseadre, aide de ses connaissances locales, et de la
vieille experience de Fillustre amiral avec lequel il va se trouver en
rapports de service.

(Translation.)
Instructions to the French Admiral in the Levant. — ( Communicated by M. de
Bourqueney, June 29.)
M. le Contre- Amiral, Paris, June 26, 1839.
ALREADY some acts of hostility appear to have taken place in
Syria between the troops of the Sultan and those of the Viceroy of" Egypt.
An important European interest is at stake to prevent or arrest the effects
of a collision, and this is the object which France proposes to effect with
the assistance of her Allies ; it is this which you are to endeavour to
attain with the squadron under your command, either separately or by
your co-operation with the squadron of Her Britannic Majesty, and with the
naval division of Austria in the Levant, if, as there is every reason to
believe, this division has received orders to join the French and English
uaval forces. You will, therefore, have to concert with their commanders
upon the means of rendering the co-operation efficacious. Sir Robert
Stopford on his side will, no doubt, have received instructions in confor
mity with the important interest which the two countries have in the
management of an affair in which their views and their object are iden
tical, and in which their measures should be similar.
The two Admirals should, therefore, reciprocally communicate to
each other their instructions, and should act towards each other with all
the confidence and frankness requisite to introduce into their operations
the same unanimity which subsists between the two Governments.
Whenever circumstances may require concert and co-operation, the chief
direction will belong to the officer of the highest rank or of the longest
standing.

103
Upon the receipt of these instructions, the squadron under your
orders should proceed towards the coast of Syria.
In the event of a meeting between the Turkish and Egyptian
squadrons, you will endeavour to render a collision impossible, by inter
posing yourself between them, and by urging the Admirals to re-enter
their respective ports ; and you will prevent any arrival by sea, at the
theatre of war, of troops and warlike stores.
You will seek to place yourself immediately in communication with
the two Generals-in-Chief, either in the Bay of Scanderoon, or at any
other point the nearest to the places occupied by the two armies.
You will exert every effort to induce them to propose and agree to a
suspension of arms, during which the Powers will enter into negotiation in
order to bring about an arrangement mutually satisfactory for the Porte
and for the Pasha of Egypt. It is proper to remark that, as this arrange
ment must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great interests
of Europe, and not upon the chances of the war, neither of the two parties
has any interest in continuing hostilities which, whatever may be their
issue, cannot ultimately improve their situation. It is equally important
to require that the two armies should retire to a certain distance from
each other.
The armistice shall be confirmed by a military Convention, stipu
lating that the renewal of hostilities, if it takes place, should be notified
at least one month beforehand.
These measures and these arrangements, whether proceeding from
one of the two Commanders of the squadrons acting individually, or
resulting, in case of a junction of the two squadrons, from the concert and
participation of both Commanders, should be immediately communicated
to our Ambassador at Constantinople and Consul-General at Alexandria,
and information thereof should be forwarded to France by the most
expeditious channel.
If the two Generals, or either of them, should refuse to agree to this
armistice, the Ambassador at Constantinople and the Consul-General at
Alexandria should be immediately informed thereof, as in the preceding
case, in order that they may urge the transmission of the necessary orders
to the Generals in Syria to consent to a suspension of arms.
If the refusal should come from the Turkish General, his attention
should be directed to the serious responsibility which he would incur in
case of a reverse. It should be pointed out to him that from that moment
communication by sea would be closed to all succours destined for the
Ottoman Army ; whilst our Ambassador, informed of his refusal, would
exert himself with the Sultan to overcome this resistance.
If the refusal, on the contrary, should come from the Egyptian General,
similar representations should be made to him, and all communication by
sea between Egypt and Syria should be immediately cut off.
In either case,, the two Admirals should concert as to the distribution
the forces which it may be necessary to place either at the entrance of
the Straits, or offScanderoon, or in short, at any point of the territory of
Asia Minor which may be considered expedient for the maintenance of a
strict blockade, and for preventing the departure of any vessel, either of
war or of any other description.
Besides the concert established between the Commanders of the
French and English squadrons, and also between them and the Com
mander of the Austrian naval division, it is possible that a Russian squadron
may tender its co-operation ; it must be well understood that its co-opera
tion should be admitted for a pacific object and in conformity with the
present instructions.
These instructions are intended to provide for contingencies which it
has been possible to foresee. There are other contingencies which from
their nature and their importance require ulterior instructions : those
instructions will be addressed to you. The King relies in every other
respect upon the zeal and ability of the Commander of his squadron
aided by his local knowledge, and upon the practised experience of the
illustrious Admiral with whom he is about to act.

104

No. 76.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 30.)
My Lord, Paris, June 28, 1839.
I MENTIONED in the postscript of a private letter to your Lordship,
written on Monday night, that late on that evening, Marshal Soult had
communicated to me, that the French Government, in consequence of the
intelligence received from Alexandria of the commencement of hostilities
in Syria, had determined to send off without further delay, instructions
to Admiral Lalande, commanding the French Naval Force in the Levant.
These instructions, he said, would contain nothing which was not in accord
ance with the instructions which Her Majesty's Government proposed
giving to Sir Robert Stopford, omitting that part on which the French
Government were inclined to propose to Her Majesty's Government some
change or modification.
The Marshal called upon me this morning, and put into my hands a
copy of the instructions sent to the French Admiral, which I do not
inclose in this despatch, having been informed by his Excellency, that
a copy of them was last night forwarded to M. de Bourqueney, to be
communicated to your Lordship.
On reading over these instructions, I observe two points of difference
between them and the instructions transmitted to Sir Robert Stopford.
The one relates to the orders given to the French Admiral to intercept
all transport of troops or ammunition by sea to the theatre of war;
whereas, those addressed to the British Admiral (on the ground chiefly
of the operations of the Sultan's Army not depending upon any commu
nication by sea between Constantinople and the scene of military
operations), direct him only to prevent all communication by Egyptian
vessels, whether of commerce or of war, between Syria and Egypt. The
other point relates to the contingency of a Russian squadron offering to
co-operate with the French and English combined fleet. The French
Admiral is instructed to admit of this co-operation, provided it be offered
with a pacific object, and in a spirit conformable to the Admiral's
instructions. I learnt from Marshal Soult, that he had directed M. de Bourqueney
to propose to your Lordship, that the British and French Ambassadors
at Constantinople should be instructed to bring under the consideration of
the Divan, the entrance of the combined French and English fleet into
the Sea of Marmora, in case a Russian naval and military force shall have
entered the Bosphorus. The Marshal said, he fully concurred in your
Lordship's view of its being desirable that the British and French flags
should appear before Constantinople at the same time with that of Russia ;
but he had doubts as to allowing so important a question as that of
declaring war against Turkey and Russia, to which the forcing of the
passage of the Dardanelles was tantamount, to be left to the discretion of
the Admirals. That question had better, he thought, be reserved for the
consideration of the two Governments. The passage of the fleet up to
Constantinople, he observed, would be a dangerous and difficult operation,
if really resisted by the Turks, unless a military force were attached to
it to take possession of the forts by land, and no military force adequate
to such an undertaking had been embarked on board either fleet. The
fire of the forts was not the only danger to which, he said, the fleet would
be exposed; it might have to encounter in a damaged and crippled state
the hostility of the Russian fleet, combined with that of Turkey, prepared
in the Bosphorus for combat, and aided by the Russian Army.
I observed, that all these considerations would certainly be well
weighed by the Ambassadors and the Admirals who, upon the spot, could
best judge of the practicability and safety of the operation; but I thought
the danger of it would be enhanced, if, by communications with the Divan,

105
we indicated our intention, and allowed a length of time to elapse before
we attempted the execution of it.
The Marshal has not received from St. Petersburgh any official reply
to the instructions he gave to M. de Barante relative to the affairs of the
East; but he showed me the postscript of a private letter from the French
Ambassador, stating that the disposition of the Russian Cabinet was
very pacific and conciliatory. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 77.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 27.)
My Lord, Alexandria, May 28, 1839.
A COURIER of this Government, which arrived here yesterday,
brought to me letters from Aleppo, of the 15th instant, and from
Damascus, of the 20th instant.
Mr. Consul Werry of Damascus, writes to me, that the Haouran
insurrection is entirely pacified, and that everything is perfectly quiet in
Damascus and its neighbourhood.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry of Aleppo, writes to me, that he had an
interview, on the 8th instant, with Ibrahim Pasha, and the following is the
extract of Mr. Werry's letter : " I have just returned from seeing Ibrahim
and Solyman Pashas, with both of whom I had a long conversation. The
former says to me, ' We have at present twenty-three deserters from the
other side, among whom is a Yuzbachi, and a Chawish of Hafiz Pasha,
Who states to me, that Hafiz Pasha had crossed with three regiments ;
but who gives a very poor account of the troops under him.' His High
ness then said, ' Our forces are superior in every way ; and I hear from the
Chawish, that there are only 45,000 to 50,000 men intended to act against
us. The Sultan has fifteen regiments of Infantry. We have eighteen
regiments. He has six regiments of Cavalry; ours are eight regiments.
His Artillery is of 100 pieces ; ours are double that ; so that, if they
attack us, they will fare but badly.' He then turned round to five
Colonels sitting in the room, saying, ' I tell you all, and the English Consul
present, that when the match is placed to the first cannon, from that time,
in half an hour, I am on the other side, and in pursuit of that Khanzir,
(meaning, I suppose, Hafiz Pasha,) and who will see what Ibrahim Pasha
is.' He then turned to me and said, ' I know Hafiz Pasha ; he was at the
Morea; he is nothing: his predecessor, Rechid Mehemet Pasha, was
much superior, quite another man ;' I then told his Highness, that the
European Powers would not allow any fighting, and that all would be
arranged between them without gunpowder. He answered, ' We shall see ;
but if he did not intend to attack me, why is he crossing with these forces?
And, moreover, I will tell you, that I have heard positively, that as the
forces find difficulty in crossing at Bir, the Seraskier had changed his march,
and is bringing them on Roum Kale and on [illegible], which will oblige
him, with his forces, to pass a part of my frontier and limits: why should
he do that? If you will not believe me, and you have courage, mount a
horse and go to Aintab, from where you will see, with your own eyes, if
they put their feet within my territory or not. I shall protest,' his
Highness said laughing, ' against the Ambassadors at Constantinople,
for allowing the Sultan's troops to enter my territory;' and added,
laughing, 'You say that there is no war, how can it be credited?
You Franks are the cause that the Sultan's forces now are crossing
my territory, by — your 'continuing to remain quiet ;' 'you must not act;'
' they will not attack you,' and so forth. But what can be done now ; there
is no remedy. Had you left us without tying us down, the Sultan's
troops would never have dared to cross and enter in any way our
territory.' " I then brought the conversation round to the mountaineers of Pyass,
P

106
and along the continuity of that range to the Taurus extending to
Marash. His Highness replied, ' All is quiet in that part. But I will tell
you one thing, that the Sultan and we must come to blows, for I must
have Marash. I require it for the keeping of these mountaineers in
order ; as it was evident ; the other day they committed all sorts of depre
dations in Giaour Dagh, and that range; I went against them; what
followed ? They merely went on the other side of the mountain, saying,
We are in the Sultan's territory. And, moreover, I will tell you another
thing, Marash I must have, as also along the line to Orfa ; and then all
will be quiet and right in Syria. I shall not then require such a large
force, to keep all these mountains, &c, in order ; and I shall be able to
give my attention to the interests of the country, and to further the
commercial interests of all, and particularly of the English. And all will
go on quietly, and without requiring troops continually, which I well
know, without your telling me, is very detrimental. But so long as
our boundary line is where it is, I must keep a large force to check
both the movements of the Sultan's forces, as also those of the people of
the mountains.' " His Excellency Solyman Pasha, spoke in pretty nearly the same
substance, adding, that he had heard that the Sultan's troops had only
very small rations of bread and provisions supplied to them. His Excel
lency was also of opinion, that war would not take place."
All the reports from the Vice-Consuls of Tripoli, Latakia, Suedia,
and Alexandretta, to their Consuls-General here, mention the arrival of
large quantities of biscuit, wheat, barley, rice, &c., and ammunition, from
Egypt, and from other parts, all of which is immediately forwarded to
Aleppo, at which place also the different troops which were on the coast
and in the south of Syria have arrived.
These troops are abundantly supplied with provisions from the stores,
and thus the peasantry and inhabitants do not suffer. And Mr. Pro-
Consul Werry writes to me, that such is the good conduct of these troops,
that no complaints have to be made against them, and that it could not
be supposed that there were 50,000 soldiers in Aleppo and its
neighbourhood. Upon the 10th instant, there was a grand review of Ibrahim Pasha's
Army at Gibreen, an hour and half distance from Aleppo. The troops
consisted of thirteen regiments of Infantry, four regiments of Cavalry, and
three of Artillery ; in all more than 42,000 men. Ibrahim Pasha slept the
previous night at the village of Gibreen, in order to see each regiment as
it came on the ground.
The manoeuvres are said to have been conducted with good order and
discipline, after which the troops returned to their respective quarters.
The Colonel of the 17th Regiment of the Line having not known the
ground which he was to take up on the day of the review, was condemned
by Ibrahim Pasha to give a dinner for sixty persons, which he did on the
12th May, and the table was laid out in the European manner.
The army of Hafiz Pasha suffers much from desertion, and is said to
be in a very disorganized state ; and the position of this army seems to
offer only a choice of difficulties, as if the army advances to attack Ibrahim
Pasha, it will most probably be signally defeated, and if it retires, the
soldiers of Hafiz Pasha will probably all disperse ; and it does not seem
possible that Hafiz Pasha can have supplies to remain in his present
position. The rash conduct of the Sultan in acting contrary to the advice given
to him by the Ambassadors at Constantinople, will not only have drained
his resources, but will very much have enfeebled his moral influence in all
Turkey; and, on the contrary, the prudent and moderate conduct of
Ibrahim Pasha, acting under his father's orders, and his refraining from
any hostile act, or from destroying the army of Hafiz Pasha, will propor
tionally raise Mehemet Ali, and give him an increased influence in the
opinion of the Turkish Empire.
Syria is now perfectly quiet, and the inaction of Hafiz Pasha has
cooled the part of the Turkish population in Syria which was indisposed
to the Egyptian Government, at the same time that it has fixed the wavering

107
on the side of Mehemet Ali, and has in every v/ay strengthened the party
of the Viceroy.
The Christians in Syria are all in his favour, and they dread any
success of the Sultan : the more as the Turkish population in Syria has
for some time back been threatening the Christians, to whom they have
said that their reign was nearly over.
Mehemet Ali had intended a few days ago to send out his fleet to
cruise off Alexandria, and the order had already been given by him to that
effect, but the Consuls-General of Austria, France, and Russia, as well as
myself, having separately mentioned to him our opinions, that it would be
better and perhaps conducive to the maintenance of peace, that his fleet
should remain in harbour, he immediately acceded to our desires, and the
fleet now remains here ; and it is but justice to Mehemet Ali to say that he
appears to have listened with good grace to the pacific counsels given to
him by us, and upon those points there has been perfect accord and
frankness between my colleagues and myself.
The Pasha has sent two of his steamers to Alexandretta, in order to
keep up a constant communication with Ibrahim Pasha; and he has assured
my colleagues and myself that Ibrahim Pasha will not commit any act of
hostility, nor advance with his army, unless he should be attacked by that
of the Sultan ; and as Hafiz Pasha does not seem -in a state to attack, it
is still to be hoped that hostilities may be avoided, and that the Ambas
sadors at Constantinople may be able to persuade the Sultan to recall his
army from the Syrian frontier. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 78.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 27.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 5, 1839.
IT appears that the Ottoman Army under Hafiz Pasha, is entrenched
to the west-north-west of the point where it crossed the Euphrates near
Bir. It is within the territory to which Mehemet Ali Pasha does not lay
«laim, and there has not been any act of hostility committed by it that I
have heard of.
The Ottoman Fleet, it is said, will sail on the 8th.
The messenger will afford me the means of forwarding intelligence
to your Lordship about that time. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 79.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 27.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 5, 1839.
THE Austrian Internuncio had, yesterday, an interview with the
Ottoman Ministers, and I learn that all his efforts to prevent war were
fruitless. I believe the actual commencement of hostilities will depend
upon the time when all things are ready here, and that there will be then
issued by the Porte a declaration addressed to the Sultan's Allies, setting
forth the grounds upon which the Sublime Porte acts, &c, &c. That may
take place the 8th instant. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P 2

108

No. 80.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 27.)
My Lord, Alexandria, June 6, 1839.
AS in conformity with my instructions I send a special messenger to
Malta, by the French steamer, with the despatches from India, I avail
myself of the same messenger to transmit to your Lordship copies of my
despatches, with their inclosures, to V iscount Ponsonby.
The duplicates of all those I shall have the honour to transmit by
Her Majesty's steamer on its return from Beyrout, to which place it
proceeds to-day.
I have been so much occupied for the last two days, in consequence of
the departure of Her Majesty's steamer for Beyrout, of the French
steamer for Constantinople, and of the letters to overtake our steamer at
Suez, all of which happened at the same time, that my constant avoca
tions have not permitted me to see the Pasha this day, nor to enter so
fully as I should have wished, in my despatches to Lord Ponsonby, into
the important nature of their contents at this critical moment ; but I
believe that I have not omitted anything of moment.
There are two steamers of the Pasha at Alexandretta ; and the one
which returned from thence on the 4th instant, is ready to start at a
moment's notice. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 80.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, Alexandria, June 5, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that yesterday fore
noon, myself and colleagues of Austria, France, and Russia, waited oh
Mehemet Ali by his desire.
The Inclosure No. 1, which was drawn out in common by myself and
colleagues, is the detail of our interview with the Pasha ; and before our
departure we all most strongly urged him to be very particular in his
instructions to Ibrahim Pasha, which we all requested should be in the
most moderate terms, and in which he should be ordered not to commit
any sort of aggression.
Inclosure No. 2 is the translation of the letters from Ibrahim Pasha
to Mehemet Ali, and which are referred to in the proces-verbal of our
conference with the Pasha ; and your Excellency will perceive by it, how
much we have to fear that hostilities will take place.
Soon after we took leave of the Pasha, he sent off a steamer to Syria,
with the letter of instructions for Ibrahim Pasha; and it was only this
morning that my colleagues or myself had a copy of it, and which I now
transmit in Inclosure No. 3.
Your Excellency will perceive that the Pasha writes to his son that
we told him to "repousser la force par la force;" but, as is seen by the
proces-verbal, we said so, in the event only that the army of Ibrahim
Pasha should be attacked in its positions in his territory.
I fear that there is on both sides a strong desire for war ; and in this
case, hostilities cannot long be delayed. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

109
Sub-Inclosure 1 in Inclosure 1 in No. 80.
Proces- Verbal of the interview of the Four Consuls-General with Mehemet Ali.
DANS la matinee du 4 Juin, le Vice-Roi fit inviter par son second
interprete, Hosreff Effendi, les quatre Consuls-Generaux d'Autriche,
d'Angleterre, de France, et de Russie, a se rendre chez lui vers les 10
heures, en conference. Nous fumes tous exacts au rendez-vous. Aux
complimens d'usage, qui consistent a demander des nouvelles de la sante
de Son Altesse, elle nous repondit, qu'elle se trouvait bien de corps, mais
fort mal d'esprit par suite des nouvelles alarmantes qui venaient de lui
parvenir de son fils Ibrahim Pacha. Mehemet Ali nous fit alors part des
trois lettres ci-jointes en copie regues simultanement la veille d'Alep.
Apres lecture faite de ces pieces, qui annongaient que les troupes de Sa
Hautesse avaient definitivement franchi le territoire de Syrie, et avaient
occupe le village d'Ouront, il nous dedara que Fobjet de notre reunion
etait de nous consulter sur les mesures qu'il se proposait de prendre dans
les circonstances du moment, et sur les instructions qu'il allait adresser
dans le courant de la journee au Generalissime.
" Je suis d'avis," nous a-t-il dit en substance, " de faire evacuer
plusieurs villages de la province d'Antab, a Feffet d'empedier une collision,
et de laisser une distance convenable entre mes troupes et celles du Sultan ;•
mais j'autoriserai mon fils, dans le cas ou les villages que j'aurai fait
abandonner par mes soldats, seraient occupes par ceux du Grand Seigneur,
a les en deioger et a commencer les hostilites. Je ferai de plus avancer
le gros de Farmee vers la frontiere, pour eviter que Fapparition des troupes
Turques sur mon territoire ne donne Falarme a la population, et ne
l'encourage, soit a une revolte, soit a des desordres quelconques."
Nous fumes tous d'accord a representer au Pacha que Fapparition
d'une partie de la Cavalerie Turque sur la frontiere de Syrie, ne saurait
nullement etre envisagee par lui comme une hostilite ; que Foccupation
d'un village, et de plusieurs meme, s'ils etaient abandonnes par les troupes
Egyptiennes, pouvait fort bien etre consideree comme un acte de pillage
commis par les avant-postes, mais a Finsgu d'Hafiz Pacha ; que le meil-
leur moyen d'eviter de pareilles irregularis serait de renouveler Fauto-
risation deja. precedemment donnee a son fils, de se mettre en rapport avec
le Seraskier Ottoman, et de demander a ce dernier des explications au
sujet de Fapparition de ses troupes dans les limites de la Syrie ; enfin, qu'il
ne lui restait qu'a prendre une bonne position defensive dans telle ville
de la Syrie qu'il jugerait la plus convenable a la surete du pays, et
attendre d'abord une attaque en regie de la part des troupes de Sa Hau
tesse pour la repousser ensuite par la force.
Apres d'assez longs pourparlers, dans lesquels le ddsir de Mehemet
Ali d'en venir aux mains avec les forces Turques se trahissait visiblement,
il declara qu'il ecrirait a son fils :
1°. De se mettre sans retard en rapport avec Hafiz Pacha, a Feffet de
le prevenir de ce qui venait d'avoir lieu au village d'Ouront, et de Fen-
gager de ne point donner lieu a un conflit, en permettant a ses troupes de
penetrer sur son territoire et d'occuper des villages Syriens ;
2°. Que le Generalissime avait a diriger une partie de ses forces vers
Antab, afin de mettre cette ville dans un etat de defense convenable, et
que ce n'est que lorsque les redoutes qui se trouvent a. quelque distance
de cette place, seraient attaquees par les troupes du Sultan, qu'il eut a
envisager les hostilites comme commencees ;
3°. Que dans ce cas seulement, Ibrahim . Pacha etait autorise a
avancer en personne avec toutes ses forces, et a combattre Farmee du
Grand Seigneur. Le Pacha nous promit de faire remettre a chacun de
nous quatre, une copie de I'ordre qu'il adressait a son fils.
Avant de quitter le Vice-Roi, il nous fit part encore du contenu de
plusieurs lettres qu'il venait de recevoir de ses affides de Constantinople ;
elles etaient toutes a la guerre. L'un d'eux lui annongait la sortie de la
Flotte Turque comme imminente ; un autre Fengageait a profiter des
circonstances favorables qui se presentaient, pour frapper un coup d^cisif ;

no
un troisieme enfin, lui annongait qu'une conference extraordinaire venait
d'avoir lieu entre les Ministres et les Pachas de la Porte, dans laquelle
Tahar Pacha, recemment revenu du quartier-general, avait rendu
compte de l'etat de Farmee Turque, qu'il representait comme fort peu
satisfaisant ; qu'un des membres de cette assembiee avait ete d'avis
que la Question Egyptienne devait etre regiee par le Sultan seul ,' qu'elle
ne regardait que lui, et qu'il ne devait admettre aucune ingerence quel-
conque des Puissances Europeennes dans cette question; cet avis,
ajoute-t-il, avait ete goute par les grands dignitaires de Sa Hautesse.
Mehemet Ali ne manqua pas de manifester a cette occasion quelques
velieites de faire sortir immediatement sa flotte, mais il y renonca
aussitot, sur les observations qui lui furent adressees sur Finopportunite
d'une pareille mesure, et promit de retenir son eseadre dans le port
jusqu'a la reception de nouvelles plus positives sur la sortie de la Flotte
Ottomane des Dardanelles.

(Translation.)
Minute of the interview of the Four Consuls- General with Mehemet Ali.
ON the morning of the 4th of June, the Viceroy, by his second
interpreter, Hosrew Effendi, invited the four Consuls-General of Austria,
England, France, and Russia, to a conference with him about ten o'clock.
We were all punctually at the place appointed. To the usual compli
ments, which consist in asking after His Highness's health, he replied,
that he was well in body, but very ill in mind in consequence of the
alarming intelligence which had just reached him from his son Ibrahim
Pasha. Mehemet Ali thereupon communicated to us the three letters of
which copies are annexed, which had been received together the evening
before from Aleppo. When these documents, which announced that the
troops of His Highness (the Sultan) had actually passed over into the
territory of Syria, and had occupied the village of Ouront, had been read,
he declared to us that the object of assembling us was to consult us on
the measures which he proposed to adopt under existing circumstances
and on the instructions which he was about to address in the course of
the day to the General Commanding in Chief.
" I am inclined," said he to us in substance, '' to cause several
villages in the province of Aintab to be evacuated, in order to prevent a
collision, and to leave a suitable distance between my troops and those of
the Sultan ; but I shall authorize my son, in the event of the villages
which I shall have caused to be abandoned by my soldiers, being occupied
by those of the Grand Signor, to dislodge them, and to commence hos
tilities. 1 will, moreover, cause the main body of my army to advance
towards the frontier, to prevent the appearance of the Turkish troops on
my territory from occasioning alarm to the people, and from encouraging
them either to revolt, or to commit some disorders."
We all concurred in representing to the Pasha that the appearance
of a portion of Turkish Cavalry on the frontier of Syria, could in no wise
be looked upon by him as an act of hostility ; that the occupation of one
village, and even of several, if they were abandoned by the Egyptian
troops, might very well be looked upon as an act of pillage committed by the
outposts, but without the knowledge of Hafiz Pasha; that the best
method of avoiding such irregularities would be to renew the authority
already previously given to his son, to place himself in communication
with the Ottoman Commander, and to require from the latter an explana
tion with respect to the appearance of his troops within the limits of
Syria ; finally, that it only remained for him to take up a good defensive
position in such town of Syria as he should consider most suitable for the
security of the country, and to await in the first instance a regular attack
on the part of the troops of His Highness, in order thereupon to repel it
by force. After a pretty long discussion, in the course of which the desire of

-Ill
Mehemet Ali to come to an engagement with the Turkish forces, clearly
showed itself, he declared that he would write to his son : —
1st. To place himself without delay in communication with Hafiz
Pasha, in order to apprize him of what had taken place at the village of
Ouront, and to urge him not to give occasion for an action, by allowing
his troops to penetrate into his territory, and to occupy the Syrian
villages. 2ndly. That the General Commanding in Chief should move a portion
of his forces towards Aintab, in order to place that town in a suitable
state of defence ; and that he should look upon hostilities as being com
menced, only in the event of the works, situated at some distance from
that place, being attacked by the troops of the Sultan.
3rdly. That in that case alone, Ibrahim Pasha was authorized to
advance in person with all his forces, and to engage the Army of the
Grand Signor. The Pasha promised that he would cause to be delivered
to each of us four a copy of the order which he addressed to his son.
Previously to our leaving the Viceroy, he further communicated to us
the contents of several letters which he had just received from his confi
dential Agents at Constantinople : they were all warlike. One of them
announced to him that the departure of the Turkish fleet was close at
hand ; another exhorted him to take advantage of the favourable circum
stances which presented themselves, to strike a decisive blow; lastly, a
third stated to him that an extraordinary conference had taken place
between the Ministers and the Pashas of the Porte, in which Tahar
Pasha, recently returned from head-quarters, had given an account of the
state of the Turkish Army, which he represented as very little satisfactory;
that one of the members of this assembly had expressed an opinion that
the Egyptian Question should be settled by the Sultan alone ; that it
concerned no one but him, and that he ought not to allow any interven
tion on the part of the European Powers in that Question ; this opinion,
it was added, had been agreeable to the great dignitaries of the Sultan.
Mehemet Ali did not fail to exhibit on this occasion some inclination
to send his fleet immediately to sea ; but he immediately gave up the idea
in consequence of the remarks which were made to him on the unseason-
ableness of such a measure, and promised to keep the squadron in port
until the receipt of more positive intelligence of the departure of the
Ottoman fleet from the Dardanelles.

Sub-Inclosure 2 in Inclosure 1 in No. 80 .
Lettre d' Ibrahim Pacha, d, la date du 14 Rebi-el-evel. — Alep.
(Traduction.) JE vous envoie ci-joint tous les rapports que j'ai regus concernant
Farmee Turque. Parmi eux il y a une lettre du Kaftana Bey, datee du
13 Rebi-el-evel, dans laquelle il m'annonce que la Cavalerie Turque vient
de prendre possession sur nos territoires. Ouront est un village de la
province d' Antab, ou se trouve maintenant la Cavalerie Turque. Le
Bo'i Bey, le chef de ce village, a ete maltraite par eux. Notre Cavalerie
s'est retire vers Antab d'apres leurs instructions. II est evident que
demain iis s'avanceront davantage ; iis maltraiteront les Bois Bey des
autres villages, et nous serons obliges de reculer. Ce systeme peut occa-
sionner une grande revolution dans les provinces qui sont sous notre
autorite. J'ai pense d'envoyer un officier a Hafiz Pacha pour lui
demander quelques explications la-dessus. Mais pour cela ie n'etais pas
autorise. lis ne sont eloigns d' Antab que cinq heures de distance*
cet etat de choses ne pourrait pas continuer ainsi. Je presume qu'avant
que cette lettre vous soit parvenue, le feu de la guerre sera peut-etre
allume. Pour eviter tous les soupgons, et qu'on ne dise pas c'est vous ou
c'est moi qui ait commence les hostilites, j 'attends la reponse a cette
lettre. Pour acceierer la poste, vous pouvez Fexpedier par un bateau a

112
vapeur a Alexandrette ou a Latakie, d'ou elle me parviendra en peu de
tems. P. S.— Je vous expedie aussi toutes les lettres que je viens de recevoir
d'Adana. Leur lecture vous fera connaitre que les intrigues des Turcs y
entrent aussi pour quelque chose. Je peux contrebalancer leur menee
comme je Fai fait a Antab, a Kourd Dak, en y envoyant des troupes.
Mais comment empecher leur avancement? J'ai eerit a Kaftana Bey de se
porter en avant avec 800 Cavaliers, pour proteger les villages d'Antab,
et si les Turcs font encore un mouvement en avant, iis vont se trouver
pres d'Antab a la distance de trois heures ; il ne nous reste lors que deux
moyens, ou se reculer ou bien commencer l'hostilite.

Extrait de la lettre de Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, a la date du 15 Rebi-el-
evel, 1255. — Alep.
JE vous ai fait expedier hier par la poste expresse, tous les rapports
que j'ai regus par differens points. Aujourd'hui encore j'ai regu quatre
lettres de Ferhad Bey, ainsi qu'une lettre de Magioun Bey, que vous
verrez que Farmee Turque a fait avancer des detachmens de cavalerie
vers les villages qui sont sur le territoire d'Antab. J'ai fait acheminer
sur le champ Kaftana Bey avec sa cavalerie pour Antab. Notre cavalerie
se trouve done au village qui se nomme Tel-Bediir ; la Cavalerie Turque
est a Ouront.
Les villages qui se trouvent entre ces deux points ne seront neces-
sairement pas exempts de leurs attaques ; j'ai deja eerit a Kaftana Bey,
ainsi qu'a Magioun Bey, de faire evacuer ces villages, et faire reculer leurs
habitans en-dega de ce district.

Lettre du Kaftana Bey a Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, a la date du
13 Rebi-el-evel.
LA Cavalerie Turque qui se trouvait a Mezar, a fait un mouvement
en avant ; s'est emparee hier soir d'Ouront, d'ou, selon vos ordres, nos
soldats ont ete retires ; les Turcs ont pris et ont maltraite le Boi Bey qui
est a Ouront.

(Translation.)
Letter of Ibrahim Pasha, dated 1 4th Rebi-el-evel. — Aleppo.
I SEND you herewith all the reports I have received concerning the
Turkish Army. Among them there is a letter from the Kaftana Bey,
dated the 13th Rebi-el-evel, in which he informs me that the Turkish
Cavalry has taken up a position in our territory. Ouront where the
Turkish Cavalry now is, is a village of the Province of Aintab. The Boi
Bey, the Chief of that village, has been maltreated by them. Our Cavalry
according to their instructions have fallen back on Aintab. It is evident
that the Turks will advance further to-morrow; they will maltreat the Boi
Beys of other villages, and we shall be obliged to retire. This system may
occasion a great revolution in the Provinces under our authority. I had
thought of sending an officer to Hafiz Pasha to ask some explanation
from him on this matter. But I had no authority to do so. They are not
more than five hours distant from Aintab : this state of things cannot
continue. I presume that before this letter shall have reached you the
flames of war will perhaps be lighted up. To obviate all suspicions, and that
it may not be said that you or I were the party to commence hostilities
I wait for an answer to this letter. To hasten the post, you can send it
by a steam vessel to Alexandretta or Latakia, whence it will reach me
in a short time.

113
P.S. — I also send you all the letters which I have just received from
Adana. The perusal of them will apprize you that the intrigues of the
Turks are active in that quarter also. I can counteract their pro
ceedings: as I have done at Aintab and Kourd Dak, by sending troops
there. But how prevent their advance ? I have written to Kaftana Bey
to advance with 800 horse, to protect the villages of Aintab ; and if the
Turks still make a forward movement, they will find themselves within three
hours' distance of Aintab ; two alternatives will then only remain for us,
either to retreat or to commence hostilities.
Extract of a Letter from His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated 15th Rebi-el-evel,
] 255. — Aleppo.
I SENT you yesterday by express all the reports which I have
received from different points. To-day I have further received four
letters from Ferhad Bey, and also a letter from Maggiun Bey, by which
you will see that the Turkish Army has moved on detachments of Ca
valry in the direction of the villages in the territory of Aintab. I imme
diately despatched Kaftana Bey with his Cavalry to Aintab. Our Ca
valry is therefore at a village called Tel-Bechir : the Turkish Cavalry is
at Ouront. The villages between these two points will not necessarily be free
from their attacks ; I have already written to Kaftana Bey, as well as to
Maggiun Bey, to evacuate these villages, and to cause the inhabitants of
them to retire within this district.

Letter from the Kaftana Bey to His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated 13th
Rebi-el-evel.
THE Turkish Cavalry which was at Mezar, has made a movement in
advance ; and yesterday evening occupied Ouront, from whence, ac
cording to your orders, our soldiers retired; the Turks captured and mal
treated the Boi Bey of Ouront.

Sub-Inclosure 3 in Inclosure 1 in No. 80,
Traduction de la Lettre de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi a Son Altesse
le Generalissime Ibrahim Pacha, a la date du 22 Rebi-el-evel, 1255.
J'AI sous les yeux vos lettres en date du 14 et du 15 du present mois,
ainsi que celle du Kaftana Bey, qui vous a ete adressee, par lesquelles j'ai
eu connaissance que quelques detachmens de la Cavalerie Turque ont
saccage les villages du district d'Antab, et qu'ils ont pris possession
d'Ouront. En consequence, vous me demandez la ligne de conduite a
tenir dans cette circonstance. J'ai sur le champ fait traduire ces trois
pieces, et je les ai communiquees aux Consuls-Generaux des Quatre
Grandes Puissances residans a Alexandrie. Apres avoir longuement
discute leur contenu, iis m'ont dit : — " L'interet de Votre Altesse est
toujours de se tenir sur le pied de la defensive, mais avec cela Votre
Altesse repoussera la force par la force par tous les moyens qui sont en
votre pouvoir; il est done essentiel que Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha
envoie un officier k Hafiz Pacha, pour lui demander des explications de sa
conduite ; et dans cet intervalle, pour proteger la province et la garnison
d'Antab contre un coup de main, fortifiez-la en envoyant le nombre suffi-
sant de troupes ; et si, malgre tout cela, les Turcs persistent dans leurs
menees et marchent vers Antab, la garnison se repliera vers le corps
d'armee qui s'avancera en meme tems, et marcheront a la rencontre de
Q

114
l'Armee Turque. Par cette mesure, la bataille n'aura lieu que sur le
territoire Egyptien ; par la vous prouverez facilement, que la premiere
agression a eu lieu de leur part." Cette explication me parut d'autant
plus convenable qu'elle s'accorde tout-a-fait avec la conduite moderee
que j'ai tenue jusqu'a present a leur egard; en consequence, je vous
invite, mon fils, de vous regler exactement au contenu de la presente
lettre. (Translation.)
Translation of the letter from His Highness the Viceroy to His Highness the
Generalissimo Ibrahim Pasha, dated the 22nd Rebi-el-evel, 1255.
I HAVE before me your letters of the 14th and 15th of this month,
as well as that of the Kaftana Bey addressed to you, by which I have
learnt that some detachments of Turkish Cavalry have pillaged the
villages of the district of Aintab, and have taken possession of Ouront.
You ask me, in consequence, what line of conduct you should pursue
under these circumstances. I caused these three documents to be imme
diately translated, and I communicated them to the Consuls-General of
the Four Great Powers residing at Alexandria. After. having discussed
their contents for a long while, they stated to me : — " The interest of Your
Highness is to continue to maintain a defensive attitude ; but therewithal
Your Highness will repel force by force with all the means at your dis
posal ; it is therefore essential that His Highness Ibrahim Pasha should
send an officer to Hafiz Pasha, to ask an explanation of his conduct ; and
in the meanwhile, in order to protect the province and garrison of
Aintab against a sudden attack, strengthen it by sending thither a suffi
cient number of troops; and if, notwithstanding, the Turks persist in
their machinations and march on Aintab, the garrison will fall back on
the corps which will at the same time be advancing, and they will march
to meet the Turkish Army. By these means, the battle will only take
place on the Egyptian territory ; whereby you will easily prove that the
first aggression was on their side." This exposition appeared to me the
more suitable from being in perfect accordance with the moderate con
duct which I have hitherto observed with regard to them; I therefore beg
you, my son, to regulate your conduct exactly by the contents of this
letter.

Inclosure 2 in No. 80.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Alexandria, June 5, 1839.
IN reference to my preceding despatch, I have the honour to inform
your Excellency, that a steamer of the Pasha arrived late yesterday
evening from Alexandretta, with letters from Ibrahim Pasha to his
father. Those letters, dated the SOth May, from his head- quarters, state that
some Turkish Cavalry of Hafiz Pasha had attacked the Egyptian Cavalry
encamped in front of Aintab, and have excited the villages in the Aintab
district to revolt ; that eleven villages having received arms and ammu
nition from Hafiz Pasha, are now in revolt.
On receipt of those news, Ibrahim Pasha had left Aleppo on the 29th
May, and gone to a small village between Aleppo and Aintab, where he
awaits the arrival of Solyman Pasha with a brigade and with some
Artillery, most probably to drive back the advance which had attacked
his Cavalry. I shall endeavour to procure a copy of the letter of Ibrahim Pasha,
in order to transmit it to your Excellency with this despatch.
Thus it may be said, that hostilities have in some measure begun,
and the only hope which now remains is, that the officer to be ssnt by

115
Ibrahim to Hafiz Pasha, (vide Proces-Verbal in my late despatch,) may
induce the latter Pasha to retire beyond the Syrian frontier.
Admiral Roussin has written to M. Cochelet, to inform him that the
Porte has complained loudly to him that Mehemet Ali had committed the
first aggressions; 1st. In having sent 150 soldiers to Orfa, who had
plundered that town; and 2ndly. That Kourschid Pasha had entered
Bassora with the Egyptian Army ; and Admiral Roussin requests M.
Cochelet to give to him explicit explanations as to those reports.
The Porte appears to mistify Admiral Roussin in many cases, and it
is only to that Ambassador that those complaints have been made. They
are wholly false. And how could Admiral Roussin suppose that 150 troops
were to cross the Euphrates, and plunder a town with a large garrison at
some distance beyond Bir, where there was also a garrison ? It is equally
untrue that any part of Kourschid Pasha's troops have entered Bassora ;
but those allegations of the Porte evidently show its desire for war,
and its natural wish to throw the blame of the aggression on
Mehemet Ali.
That the Porte has many causes of complaint against Mehemet
Ali is an undoubted fact, but he is quite free from the complaints urged
by Baron Roussin.
In fact, the great causes of complaint on the part of the Porte, date
from the peace of Kutaya, and from mutual irritation on the part of the
Porte at the triumph of Mehemet Ali, as also from the semi-independent
and anomalous position of that Pasha. [ have &c.
(Signed) , PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 80.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Alexandria, June 6, 1839.
WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date, to your
Excellency, I have now the honour to transmit the report from Ibrahim
Pasha, which was brought by the steamer from Alexandretta.
Hostilities have now unfortunately taken place, and it is probable
that, before this, a battle of a more serious nature will have been fought
between the armies of the two Seraskiers, headed by themselves in person.
If the inclosed report be true, it is most clearly evident that the Porte
has been the aggressor in the commencement of active hostilities ; as not
only has Hafiz Pasha incited the population of Syria to revolt, and sup
plied them with arms, ammunition, and money, but he has also attacked
a corps of the Cavalry of Ibrahim Pasha, at a point incontestably within
the Syrian territory.
What the measures of Mehemet Ali may be in the event of an action,
and of the defeat of the Sultan's army, which will be the probable result
of it, time alone can show, but he will certainly not abate in his demands
in regard to his independence.
Any measures now to be taken by the Great Powers must, in order
to be successful, be conducted in a complete spirit of unity and accord ;
and it should be borne in mind that it is a certain fact that Mehemet Ali
has a powerful party amongst the great dignitaries of the Porte, and even
in the Divan itself; and I am almost certain that he could at any moment
raise up the Turkish provinces in Europe (certainly Albania) in rebellion
against the Sultan. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Q 2

116
Sub-Inclosure in Inclosure 3 in No. 80.
Extrait des Rapports qui sont parvenus de Syrie a la date du 15, du 16>
et du 17, Rebi-el-evel, 1255.
LES quatorze villages du district d'Ouront dans la Province d'Antab,
ont ete occupes par des troupes de Hafiz Pacha. II a distribue aux
habitans de ces villages des armes et des munitions de guerre. II s'est fait
presenter les vieillards de ces memes villages; il leur a donne des habits
d'honneur. Trois cavaliers Arabes, Hanadis, ont ete pris par les
habitans de ces villages, qui se sont empresses de les conduire pres de
Hafiz Pacha, pour en recevoir le backchiche (pour-boire) promis en
outre. Hafiz Pacha a donne I'ordre a ses troupes, que s'ils rencontrent
des soldats Egyptiens, de les arreter ou bien de faire feu sur eux. On a
fait tirer a Nezib des coups de canon pour annoncer Farrivee de Hafiz
Pacha dans la dite ville. On a fait courir des bruits qu'Ibrahim Pacha
ne peut plus avancer; qu'il sera oblige de se reculer devant les troupes
Turques jusqu'au Caire ; et que le Pacha qui se trouve a Mouche, va
deserter et venir pres de Hafiz Pacha avec la moitie des soldats qui sont
sous son commandement; qu'un Pacha avec onze regimens vient du
cote de Malatia, et qu'aussitot ces regimens arrives, Hafiz Pacha
marchera vers Antab, dans Farmee duquel se trouvent deja 140 pieces
d'artillerie. En outre, on a intimide les habitans des villes et des villages,
en repandant des bruits que le village qui ne se soumettra pas a, tems
a l'autorite de Hafiz Pacha, hommes, femmes et enfans, tous seront passes
au fil de Fepee ; le village de Ouront est occupe par une partie de leur
cavalerie; le Chef de ce meme village a ete appele par Hafiz Pacha; il
lui a fait cadeau d'une montre en or. Lorsque ce chef d'Ouront etait de
retour a son village, il a fait venir tous les vieillards des villages du
district, et leur a enjoint de repousser les soldats Egyptiens. II a fait
reunir les habitans de quatre ou cinq villages dans un seul ; il leur a
distribue des fusils et de la poudre que Hafiz Pacha lui avait envoyes.
Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, par sa lettre du 17 Rebi-el-evel, mande
en outre, que le Pacha qui se trouve a, Marache, excite aussi la population
de Kourd Dak; qu'on a remarque un des chefs des troupes de ce meme
Pacha parmi la tribu Kourde qui avait saccage Boulanick; qu'on repand
le bruit qu'on a a Koniah 16,000 hommes; a Gifte-kan autant sous le
commandement de Ali Pacha de Koniah; qu'on va recruter 8,000 hommes
encore dans ces contrees ; qu'on a 20,000 hommes a Caramanie ; et qu'on
dit que toutes ces troupes sont destines pour le Kuluk-Bogaz. Un autre
corps d'armee marchera vers la Syrie par le district de Nijde. Le corps
d'armee fort de onze regimens, marchera pour Kaisserie; le Pacha de
Marache avec autant de Kourdes et des canons, &c, &.c.
En repandant tous ces bruits, on espere pouvoir exciter la population,
comme on Pa deja fait dans la Province d'Antab.
J'apprends a Finstant par deux expres de Magioun Bey, que cinq
escadrons de la Cavalerie Turque ont attaque le corps de Cavalerie
Arabe sous le commandement du dit Bey, a Tel-Bechir. Notre cavalerie
n'a pu resister a leur choc, attendu qu'elle etait inferieure en nombre, et
que la Cavalerie Turque etait suivie de pres par des regimens d'lnfan-
terie. Pour empecher que leurs intrigues et leurs menees ne soient pas
communiquees aux environs d'Alep, je me suis decide a, aller a leur
rencontre, et je suis arrive a Tel-Chair avec sept regimens de Cavalerie, et
douze batteries d'Artillerie a cheval, en laissant I'ordre au General
Solyman Pacha de me suivre avec le corps d'armee.
(Translation.)
Extract of Reports from Syria, dated the 15th, 16th, and 17th of
Rebi-el-evel, 3 255.
THE fourteen villages of the district of Ouront in the province of
Aintab have been occupied by the troops of Hafiz Pasha. He has distri-

117
buted arms and ammunition to the inhabitants of these villages. He has
caused the elders of these same villages to be presented to him ; he has
given them dresses of honour. Three Arab Horsemen, Hanadis, have
been captured by the inhabitants of these villages, who hastened to carry
them before Hafiz Pasha, in order to receive from him the promised
reward. Hafiz Pasha has ordered his troops, if they fall in with Egyptian
soldiers, to capture them, or to fire upon them. Cannon were fired at
Nezib to announce the arrival of Hafiz Pasha in that town. Reports have
been spread, that Ibrahim Pasha can no longer advance ; that he will be
obliged to retreat before the Turkish troops as far as Cairo ; and that the
Pasha who is at Moosh is about to desert, and join Hafiz Pasha with half
the soldiers under his orders; that a Pasha with eleven regiments is
coming from the direction of Malatia ; and that as soon as these regiments
arrive, Hafiz Pasha, with whose army there are already 140 guns, will
march towards Aintab. Moreover, the inhabitants of the towns and
villages have been intimidated by reports that the men, women, and
children of any village which shall not submit in good time to the autho
rity of Hafiz Pasha, shall be all put to the sword ; the village of Ouront is
occupied by a part of their Cavalry ; the Chief of that same village was
summonedby Hafiz Pasha, who gave him a gold watch. When this Chief
of Ouront returned to his village, he convened all the elders of the villages
of the district, and enjoined them to drive back the Egyptian soldiers. He
collected into one village the inhabitants of four or five villages, and
distributed to them some muskets and powder which Hafiz Pasha had sent
to him. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, in his letter of the 17th of Rebi-el-evel,
further reports, that the Pasha of Marash also is stirring up the popula
tion of Kourd Dak; that one of the superior officers of that Pasha's troops
has been noticed among the tribe of Koords who plundered Boulanick ;
that it is reported that there 16,000 men at Koniah; as many at Gifte'-kan
under the orders of Ali Pasha of Koniah ; that 8,000 more men are about
to be raised in those countries ; that there are 20,000 men in Caramania ;
and that all these troops are reported to be destined for the Kuluk-Bogaz.
Another corps will march towards Syria by the district of Nijde. The
corps, consisting of eleven regiments, will march for Kaisserieh ; the
Pasha of Marash with as many Koords, and the guns, &.c, &c.
It is hoped that, by spreading these reports, the people may be
stirred up, as has already been done in the province of Aintab.
I learn this moment by two expresses from Maggiun Bey, that five
squadrons of Turkish Cavalry have attacked the corps of Arab Cavalry
under the orders of that Bey at Tel-Bechir. Our Cavalry could not
withstand the shock, being inferior in number, and the Turkish Cavalry
being closely followed by some regiments of Infantry. In order to prevent
their intrigues and machinations from being extended to the neighbour
hood of Aleppo, I decided upon advancing to meet them, and I arrived at
Tel-Chair with seven regiments of Cavalry, and twelve batteries of Horse
Artillery, leaving orders for Solyman Pasha to follow me with the main
body.

No. 81.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, June 28, 1839.
I HAVE to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government
have received from Prince Esterhazy, from M. Kisseleff, and from the
French Government, important, and generally speaking, satisfactory,
communications upon the subject of the present state of affairs between
the Sultan and Mehemet Ali ; and the result of these communications
leads Her Majesty's Government to conclude, that the views taken of

118
these matters by the Austrian, French, and Russian Governments, may
be stated shortly to be nearly as follows : —
All three of those Governments appear to be strongly impressed with
the necessity of preventing, if possible, the outbreak of hostilities between
the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, or of putting a speedy end to those hos
tilities, if they should unfortunately have already broken out ; and in
that opinion Her Majesty's Government entirely concur. The Russian
Government, however, in a despatch of which M. Kisseleff gave me
yesterday a copy, states, that the Powers of Europe might be contented
to remain passive spectators of the continuance of those hostilities, so
long as the Contending Parties should carry on their conflict within
the limits of Syria. But in this view, Her Majesty's Government
cannot agree; because it is not so much the scene of action, as the
possible result of the conflict, which may exercise a decisive influence on
the great interests of Europe, and a signal defeat and dispersion of the
army of the Sultan, would be scarcely less disastrous on one side of the
Taurus, or of the Euphrates, than upon the other.
Your Excellency will see, by the instructions given to Sir Robert
Stopford, and which you are authorized to read to Prince Metternich, that
Her Majesty's Government consider, that if hostilities shall have begun,
and if the Egyptian Troops shall have advanced into Asia Minor, the
first object to be aimed at, will be, to procure a suspension of arms, and
to cause the Egyptian Troops to return within the limits of Syria ; and,
therefore, it is unnecessary to state that Her Majesty's Government are
not willing to consent that Mehemet Ali should continue to occupy the
districts of Diarbekir and Orfa ; — districts beyond the Province of Syria,
of considerable importance in a military and political point of view, and
which it has long been the desire of Mehemet Ali to acquire.
Upon the first point, then, connected with these affairs, there appears
to be a general concurrence of opinion, that hostilities between the Sultan
and Mehemet Ali ought to be prevented or stopped. Austria, France,
and England, seem also to feel that the present relative position of the
Sultan and the Pasha is incompatible with the safety of the Turkish
Empire, and with the peace of Europe ; and that some different arrange
ment must be arrived at, in order to avoid serious and extensive
dangers. Some parts of Count Nesselrode's despatch, might, perhaps, be con
strued to imply that Russia is not of this opinion, and is satisfied with
the present state of things ; but there are other passages which appear to
indicate that Russia is not disinclined to take into consideration the
possibility of making some more permanent settlement. France, Austria,
and Great Britain, have expressed a decided opinion that some such
settlement is absolutely required for the safety of Europe, and that the
Great Powers ought, without loss of time, to enter into communication
with each other for that purpose. Prussia would of course concur in such
a proceeding ; and, although Russia has hitherto endeavoured to retain
within her own discretion, everything belonging to her relations with
Turkey, yet the Cabinet of Petersburgh must clearly see that the general
interests of all the Powers of Europe are so directly concerned in the
fate of the Turkish Empire, that no one Power can separate herself from
the rest in her dealings with respect to Turkey ; but that Turkish affairs
must henceforward be considered to be as much an European question, as
any other affairs with which the Cabinets of Europe have been occupied.
The French Government proposed that these matters should be dis
cussed in a Conference of the Five Powers, to be held at Vienna. Prince
Metternich has stated reasons why, in his opinion, these matters cannot
properly be submitted to a formal conference, but he has proposed that
Vienna should be the seat of negotiation on these affairs. Her Majesty's
Government saw many strong reasons in favour of the French proposal,
and some of much weight against it ; the proposal of Prince Metternich
is open to fewer objections, and holds out less advantages.
The informal negotiation proposed by Austria would certainly not
fetter the action of Great Britain as much as a formal conference would do.
Her Majesty's Government, however, are willing to agree to the pro-

119
position of Prince Metternich, provided it shall be acceded to by Russia
and Prussia, as well as by Great Britain and France ; and I have great
satisfaction in stating to your Excellency, that one strong motive which
leads Her Majesty's Government to acquiesce in this arrangement is, the
entire confidence which they place in your ability, discretion, and firmness.
The general view which Her Majesty's Government, as at present
informed, entertain of the affair in question, may be stated as follows :
The Great Powers are justified in interfering in these matters, which
are, in fact, a contest between a sovereign and his subject, because this
contest threatens to produce great and imminent danger to the deepest
interests of other Powers, and to the general peace of Europe. Those
interests and that peace require the maintenance of the Turkish Empire ;
and the maintenance of the Turkish Empire is, therefore, the primary
object to be aimed at. This object cannot be secured without putting an
end to future chances of collision between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.
But as long as Mehemet Ali continues to occupy Syria, there will be
danger of such collision. Mehemet Ali cannot hold Syria without a large
military force constantly stationed there. As long as there is an Egyptian
force in Syria, there must necessarily be a Turkish army in that part of
Asia Minor which borders on Syria. Each party might agree at present
to reduce those forces to a given amount, but neither could be sure that
the other was not, after a time, secretly increasing his amount of force ;
and each party would, beyond a doubt, gradually augment his own force ;
and thus, at no distant period, the same state of things which has existed
of late, would again recur : for the motives and passions wrhich have led
to it would still be in action. Mehemet Ali, or Ibrahim, would still desire
to add more territory to their Pashalics ; the Sultan would still burn to
drive them back into Egypt.
It appears then to Her Majesty's Government, that there can be no
end to the danger with which these affairs menace the peace of Europe,
until Mehemet Ali shall have restored Syria to the direct authority of the
Sultan ; shall have retired into Egypt ; and shall have interposed the
Desert between his troops and authorities and the troops and authorities
of the Sultan. But Mehemet Ali could not be expected to consent to this,
unless some equivalent advantage were granted to him ; and this equiva
lent advantage might be hereditary succession in his family to the Pashalic
of Egypt : Mehemet Ali and his descendants being secured in the Govern
ment of that Province in the same way that a former Pasha of Scutari and
his family were so secured ; the Pasha continuing to be the vassal of the
Porte, paying a reasonable tribute, furnishing a contingent of men, and
being bound like any other Pasha by the treaties which his sovereign
might make. Such an arrangement would appear to be equitable between
the parties, because, on the one hand, it would secure the Sultan against
the many dangers and inconveniences which arise from the present occu
pation of Syria by the Pasha ; while, on the other hand, it would afford to
the Pasha that security as to the future fate of his family, his anxiety
about which, he has often declared to be the main cause of his desire to
obtain some final and permanent arrangement.
It appears to Her Majesty's Government that if the Five Powers were
to agree upon such a plan, and were to propose it to the two parties, with
all the authority which belongs to the Great Powers of Europe, such an
arrangement would be carried into effect, and through its means, Europe
would be delivered from a great and imminent danger.

No. 82.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, June 29, 1839.
I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, a copy of a despatch
which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna*1 ac-
* See No. 8J.

120
quainting His Excellency with the substance of the communications
which I have received from the Austrian Ambassador, and from the
French and Russian Charges d'Affaires, upon the present state of
affairs in the Levant, and also communicating to him a copy of a despatch
from Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo upon the same subject,
which was communicated to me by the Russian Charge d'Affaires on
the 27th of this month*.
It seems to Her Majesty's Government, that the great interests of
the Powers, as regards the affairs of Turkey, can never be considered
as secure, until Mehemet Ali shall have evacuated Syria, and shall have
withdrawn his forces into Egypt.

No. 83.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, June 29, 1839.
I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, an extract of a
despatch from Prince Metternich to Count Appony, which has been
communicated to me by Prince Esterhazy, stating reasons why, in
the opinion of the Austrian Cabinet, the resolution of the Congress of
Aix-la-Chapelle, as to the principles which ought to regulate the esta
blishment of Conferences of the Great Powers, would prevent the
establishment of a formal Conference upon the present state of affairs
in the Levant. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 83.
Prince Metternich to Count Appony.

(Extrait.) Vienne, le 14 Juin, 1839.
UN Protocole signe en 1818 entre les Cinq Grandes Cours a Aix-la-
Chapelle, a etabli, pour les reunions de Cabinets, un reglement sage, fonde
sur le respect qu'il est juste de porter a Findependance des Etats'. Les
Cinq Cours ont arrete entre elles (et dies ont fait part de leur ferme
determination a cet egard a toutes les autres Cours), que jamais des
questions touchant aux droits et a Finteret d'un Etat tiers, ne seraient
abordees par elles en Conference sans que le Gouvernement interesse
n'eut ete invite a prendre part a la reunion. En appliquant cette utile
regie au cas echeant, il faudrait faire intervenir un Pienipotentiaire
Ottoman dans tel lieu que choisiraient les Puissances pour y etablir une
Conference ; et dans ce fait seul se trouverait un obstacle insurmontable
pour la reussite de Fentreprise. Jamais la Porte ne munirait son Envoye
de facultes suffisamment etendues pour queFaffaire put marcher.
Mais il existe d'autres considerations encore qui seraient defavorables
a la reunion d'une Conference pour traiter de Faffaire dujour. Nous
pouvons admettre que plus d'une Puissance ne serait que faiblement
disposee au choix de cette forme, et le Public Europeen y chercherait ce
qui ne doit pas s'y trouver, et ce qui d'apres les sentimens indubitables
des Cinq Cours, ne s'y trouve point en effet. De quoi s'agit-il redlement ?
II s'agit d'empecher que la guerre n'edate entre la Porte et l'Egypte, ou
de mettre le terme le plus prompt a celle qui, contrairement aux vceux
deja hautement et uniformement prononces de ces memes Cours, aurait
deja commence, ou qu'on ne serait plus a tems d'empecher.
Ce n'est point par le moyen d'une Conference placee a distance qu'il

* See No. 74.

121
serait possible d'atteindre Fun et l'autre de ces buts. C'est a Constanti
nople et a Alexandrie que la pensee deja connue des Cinq Cours devra
etre soutenue, sans perte de tems et avec vigueur. A cet effet, il n'est
besoin que destructions fondees sur le principe pacifique, qu'on adresse-
rait aux Representans de ces memes Puissances, et qui leur donneraient
la latitude suffisante pour pouvoir regler leur conduite d'apres les circon
stances et les evenemens. Tout ce qui ne s'ecartera pas de ce point de
vue fondamental des Puissances, tel que nous le saisissons, sera bien, et
devra produire un effet salutaire, si toutefois leurs Representans s'imposent
le devoir de tenir, dans leurs explications, un langage uniforme. Ce n'est
cependant egalement point dans la forme d'une Conference que devraient
s'etablir entre eux des relations tant a Constantinople qu'a Alexandrie ;
c'est) au contraire, dans celle d'une libre entente. Toute Conference qui
ne se trouvera point placee sous la direction immediate d'un Cabinet,
assumera constamment un caractere d'independance des commettans, qui,
loin d'etre favorable a Faffaire dont elle aura a s'occuper, y fera naitre des
embarras, et Fexposera meme au danger de la faire devier (et ne fut-ce
meme que dans des questions de details) de Fobjet qui aura motive la
reunion. (Translation.)
Prince Metternich to Count Appony.
(Extract.) Vienna, June 14, 1839.
A PROTOCOL signed in 1818, between the Five Great Courts at
Aix-la-Chapelle, has laid down for meetings of Cabinets, a judicious rule
founded on the respect which it is proper to entertain for the independence
of States. The Five Courts agreed among each other, (and they commu
nicated their firm resolve in this respect to all other Courts,) that no
questions having reference to the rights or interest of a third State should
be treated by them in Conference, without inviting the Government inte
rested to take part in the meeting. Applying this useful regulation to
the actual case, it would be necessary to call upon an Ottoman Plenipo
tentiary to repair to such place as shall be chosen by the Powers for the
establishment of a Conference ; and in this one circumstance alone, an
insurmountable obstacle to the success of the attempt is to be found.
The Porte will never furnish its Envoy with powers sufficiently extended
to allow the affair to advance.
There are, however, other considerations which would be\mfavour~
able to the meeting of a Conference for the purpose of discussing the
affair of the day. We may admit that more than one Power would be
but slightly favourable to the selection of such a course, and the Eu
ropean public would look to it for things which ought not to be there sought,
and which, according to the undoubted sentiments of the Five Courts, are
in fact not there to be found. What is, in fact, the object in view ? It is
to prevent war breaking out between the Porte and Egypt, or to put as
speedy an end as possible to any war which, contrary to the wishes
already loudly and uniformly proclaimed by those same Courts, may have
already broken out, and which it would be too late to prevent.
It is not by means of a Conference placed at a distance, that it will
be possible to attain either of the above objects. It is at Constantinople
and at Alexandria, that the already known opinion of the Five Courts
should be supported, without loss of time and with energy. To accom
plish this, nothing is requisite but to address to the Representatives of
those same Powers instructions founded on the pacific principle, and
which shall afford them sufficient latitude to regulate their conduct ac
cording to circumstances and events. Every thing which shall not be
alien to this fundamental point of view of the Powers, such as we under
stand it, will be well, and will produce salutary effect, provided always
that their Representatives make it their duty in their explanations to
use an uniform language. Neither should relations between those
Powers, either at Constantinople or at Alexandria, assume the form of
R

122
a Conference, but, on the contrary, should be merely an unfettered under
standing. Every Conference not placed under the immediate direction
of a Cabinet, would constantly assume a character of independence for its
members, which, far from being favourable to the business which would
occupy its attention, would only give rise to embarrassments, and would
even expose it to the danger of causing it to deviate (were it even only in
questions of detail) from the object with which the meeting was convoked.

No. 84.
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 1.)
My Lord, Berlin, June 26, 1839.
COUNT BRESSON showed me a despatch that Marshal Soult had
addressed to M. de Bourqueney, in which he expresses the wish that the
French fleet should co-operate with the English fleet in the Mediterranean,
in order to prevent a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian
squadrons ; and that subsequently, measures should be taken in concert
with Austria, to bring the Eastern Affairs to a final settlement. M. de
Bourqueney was instructed to communicate the same despatch to your
Lordship. Count Bresson told me that he had made known to Baron Werther
the views of Marshal Soult, and that his Excellency approved of them. I
afterwards saw Baron Werther, and spoke to him on the subject. He
said that Prussia had so little influence in the East, that she could in no
way contribute to the maintenance of peace, beyond expressing a wish
that peace should be maintained ; but he thought the Four Powers most
interested ought to prevent war, by imposing their authority on the
hostile armies ; and that afterwards, by the mediation of the same Powers,
an arrangement should be brought about which would prevent a renewal
of the present evil. His Excellency thought that Syria should be ceded
to the Porte, and that Mehemet Ali should be allowed to transmit his
Egyptian possessions to his posterity. I have &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 85.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, July 2, 1839.
WITH reference to my letter of the 25th ultimo, conveying to your
Lordships the Queen's commands as to the instructions to be addressed
to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, I have the honour to inclose, for your
Lordships' information, a copy* of the instructions which the -French
Government have issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the French naval
forces in the Mediterranean, and which have been communicated to me
by the French Charge d'Affaires. I am at the same time to signify to
your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure that a copy of the inclosed instruc
tions be sent to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford for his information; and
further, with reference to the contingency contemplated in the latter part
of the French instructions, that a Russian squadron may join the British
and French squadrons, Sir Robert Stopford should be instructed that
although Her Majesty's Government conceive that such a contingency is
not likely to happen, as the Russian squadron in the Black Sea cannot
well come out through the straits, and it is not likely that Russian
ships of war should be sent round about from the Baltic into the

* See No. 75.

123
Mediterranean, yet if a Russian naval force should offer to co-operate
with Her Majesty's ships, Sir Robert Stopford should accept the offer, for
the attainment of the objects specified in his general instructions.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 86.
Earl Ghrammlle to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 4.)
My Lord, Paris, July 1, 1839, 11 p.m.
MARSHAL SOULT has this moment communicated to me a tele
graphic despatch from Marseilles, by which it appears that the officers
whom the Marshal had dispatched to Constantinople and Alexandria, had
arrived at those places on the 14th of last month.
Accounts had been received at Constantinople, of a slight engagement
in which the Turks had the advantage,' and had taken several villages.
This success had given the ascendancy to the war party in the Divan ;
and on the 9th, an order had been sent to Hafiz Pasha to move forwards
(d'aller en avant). I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 87.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 4.)
My Lord, Paris, July 2, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, the copy of a
despatch from the Consul-General of France at Alexandria, which has
been communicated to the French Government this morning by the
Marseilles telegraph. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 87.
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles .
Le Consul de France a Alexandrie a M. le President du Conseil des
Ministres. Alexandrie, le 18 Juin.
MEHEMET ALI a donne des ordres a Ibrahim Pacha pour s'arreter
partout ou il serait, a Farrivee de M. le Capitaine Caillier, et d'attendre
l'issue des arrangemens que prendront les Grandes Puissances.
L'Escadre Egyptienne est sortie, mais sans but hostile. Elle ira
croiser sur les cdtes de la Syrie. (Translation.)
The Consul of France at Alexandria to the President of the
Council of Ministers. Alexandria, June 18.
MEHEMET ALI has given orders to Ibrahim Pasha to halt where-
ever he may be on the arrival of Captain Caillier, and to abide the issue
of the arrangements which the Great Powers shall adopt.
R 2

124
The Egyptian squadron is gone out, but without any hostile object.
It will go and cruize oh the coasts of Syria.

No. 88.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received July 4.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 12, 1839.
A STEAMER, hired by the Porte, is about to carry Mahomed Ali
Bey, one of the Sultan's secretaries, to Samsoun, from whence he is to
proceed direct to the head-quarters of Hafiz Pasha, to deliver to him the.
Nishan, that is, the mark of his dignity as Generalissimo, to which he has
been lately raised.
Mahomed Ali Bey also carries instructions to Hafiz Pasha, the
main point of which is, that he should not risk any battle in the plain,
but should keep his army in the strong country, and in positions where it
cannot be attacked but at a disadvantage to the enemy.
The accounts from Syria seem to concur in representing the popu- •¦
lation of that country to be very ill-disposed towards the Egyptian
Government; and a Prussian traveller just arrived from thence, has,
described to a friend of mine, the Egyptian army as containing a
vast proportion of boys, and as being inferior in that respect to the
Ottoman army under Hafiz Pasha, though it may be better drilled. He
estimates Ibrahim's army at 60,000 men, and, as I learn, does not appear to
think it on the whole much, if at all, superior to the Ottoman army. The
greatest exertions are making to reinforce the Sultan's army, and to
supply it with everything. It is my belief that Hafiz Pasha will continue
to avoid hostilities till after the appearance of the Ottoman fleet off the
coast of Syria shall have given courage to the partizans of the Porte to
show themselves ; and it may also be intended to wait the results of the
probable collision of the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 89.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 4.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 12, 1839.
THE Ottoman fleet sailed on the 9th instant, under the command of
the Capudan Pasha, for the Dardanelles, where it will remain during six
or eight days, and thence proceed to the coast of Syria, as I am informed.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 90.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
MY Lord> Foreign Office, July 5, 1839.
I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to state to the Porte, that if the
course of events should lead the Porte to ask or to accept military or
naval aid from any European Power, in the contest with Mehemet Ali
Her Majesty's Government trust that the Porte will at the same time
address itself to Great Britain to the same effect ; and your. Excellency
will say, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford has orders to repair with
his squadron to Constantinople, for the purpose of affording to the Sultan

125
physical and moral support, the moment Sir Robert Stopford shall receive
from the Porte, through your Excellency, an invitation to that effect.
Similar instructions will be given by the French Government to
Admiral Roussin ; and your Excellency will concert with Admiral Rous
sin, and you will make your communication on this matter to the Porte
simultaneously with that of the French Ambassador. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 91.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received, July 5.)
My Lord, Aleppo, June 4, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's infor
mation, copy of my despatch of this day's date to his Excellency Lord
Ponsonby, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, together
with copy of a translation in French, of an Arabic report made to me upon
the state of the Sultan's Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's forces on this side of the
river Euphrates, and extract of Vice-Consul Hays' journal, the whole of
which, I hope, will meet with your Lordship's approval.
I have no further advices to lay before your Lordship, beyond what
are contained in the inclosed despatch, which is the latest intelligence I
have up to this moment, respecting the movements of both the Sultan's
and Egyptian forces on the frontier ; but should anything further trans
pire, I shall not fail to forward the same to your Lordship with all possible
dispatch. I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 91.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract j Aleppo, June 4, 1839.
I HAD the honour of stating to your Lordship, in my despatch under
date 4th and 6th ultimo, that a part of the Sultan's troops had crossed
the river at Bir, and the following advices stated that they continued
daily to cross.
I beg now to inform your Lordship, that the subsequent advices
which reached this from thence, brought the intelligence that almost all
the Sultan's troops, together with the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, had crossed
the river and that the column that had marched from Malatia to Roum
Kale by way of Bisne, had also joined the main body of the army that
had crossed at Bir.
It is stated that the total amount of the Sultan's forces under Hafiz
Pasha form a body of 80,000 men ; 56,000 of which are Regulars, and
25,000 Irregular Cavalry. The former consists of Spahis, Militia, and
Regular Infantry and Cavalry, with about 180 pieces of artillery ; the
latter, of Bachi Bozuks and Arabs. This, I understand, is the total
amount of the Sultan's Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's forces; the advanced
guard, which is composed of 6,000 strong, Regular and Irregular
Cavalry, are at Nezib, a village distant four hours from the river. Hafiz
Pasha, with the rest of the forces, has, it is said, formed his camp, which
extends from the banks of the river, occupying a distance of one hour
inland. During the concentration of the Egyptian Army here, I continually
visited his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha and Solyman Pasha ; both of whom
always assured me, that they had no intention of moving, or of commenc
ing hostilities, so long as the Sultan's forces did not invade Syria ; and

126
the Seraskier, on the 27th ultimo, added, that in accordance to hist
instructions, he would not make any hostile movement further forward,
or advance his troops on the frontier, or in any way be the aggressor; but
in the event of the Sultan's forces advancing and considerably surpassing
his limits. I beg further to inform your Lordship, that on the 28th ultimo
I obtained intelligence that some of the Sultan's troops had advanced, and
had passed their limits ; in consequence of which I immediately called on
his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, who informed me that it was the case;
and that he had received a letter from Aintab, and from the Colonel of the
Irregular Cavalry stationed on the frontier, along the river Sedjour, both
of which state, that a part of the Sultan's advanced guard had taken
possession of a village named Orul, distant four hours and a half from
Aintab, and were obliging the inhabitants to supply them with provisions ;
and also attempting to make the inhabitants rise and take up arms against
the Egyptian Government. His Excellency added, " This is not all ; they
found three of my Annadi troops near the village, whom they had seized,
and conveyed to the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's camp." While I was with his
Excellency, an officer came in, to give an account of a mission which he
had been sent on by his Excellency. The Seraskier accosted him with,
"Well, what have you done?" and then turned to me, saying, "Listen to
what that gentleman is going to say ; and then you will see if I can act
with more prudence,, and in accordance to my instructions."
"I have sent off the officer your Excellency desired, with the letter
your Excellency gave me for the Colonel of the Annadis, telling him,
his Excellency the Seraskier's orders are, that you will ride with all pos
sible dispatch to the river Sedjour, and find Maggiun Bey wherever he
may be ; and after ddivering to him this letter from his Excellency the
Seraskier, you will repeat to him verbally, that his Excellency's positive
orders are, that he will not allow a single shot to be fired by any of his
troops ; and that if he sees the Sultan's troops advance and take posses
sion of any other villages, he is to fall back, and evacuate that country,
taking no notice of the advance ; and to continue to do so, falling back
until he has arrived at least two hours in the Egyptian territory; and if
he should then find that the Sultan's troops continue to advance, he will
then stand ; and if fired upon, return it, and send immediate advice to
his Excellency; but repeat to him, that this is only in the event of the
Sultan's troops following him up two hours in our territory."
After which his Excellency observed to me as follows : — " This is the
third attempt of the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, since he has been on this side
of the Euphrates,, to cause my people to rise against me. He first
attempted to make the malcontents of Giaour Dagh rise, in which he
failed, by my sending a force of Irregular Cavalry in those parts, threat
ening them. He then next tried to persuade the Koord Mountain, near
Killis, to revolt, by sending the son of Hadji Omar, formerly one of its
chiefs, amongst them ; but in this he was also foiled, by the inhabitants
replying, that they would have nothing to do with the matter, either one
way or the other. And now it appears he is attempting the same thing
in the direction of Aintab : we shall see how far this will succeed." His
Excellency then called on Achmet Menekly Pasha, sitting in the room, to
bear witness to what he had been saying, and which that Pasha did' by
confirming all his Excellency had stated.
On the 29th ultimo, at about noon, I obtained intelligence that the
Sultan's Seraskier's advanced guard, which had occupied the village of Orul,
had also taken possession of several other villages in that district; and in
the afternoon, I learnt that his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha,
in company with Achmet Menekly Pasha, had just left very suddenly for
Tellisheir, distant about twelve hours from hence, in the plain towards the
river Sedjour, taking with him seven regiments of Cavalry and one of
Artillery (light) of twelve batteries, seventy-two pieces.
The following morning, I called on his Excellency Solyman Pasha
to inquire respecting the cause of this sudden movement of the Seraskier's',
after he had told me, but two days ago, that he did not intend to quit
Aleppo but in the event of the Sultan's troops positively entering his

127
territory. His Excellency Solyman Pasha replied, that the eause of the
Seraskier's sudden departure from Aleppo, arose from his having received
advice, that the Sultan's Seraskier, with the main body of his army,
which had been till now encamped near the banks of the Euphrates, had
moved, and had apparently advanced to Nezib ; and the advanced guard
which was at Nezib, had come further forward near the frontier.
Besides that, his Excdlency had received intelligence that part of this
advanced guard which had occupied Orul, had also taken possession
of several other villages, some of which, it is stated, belong to the
Aintab district, among whom it had distributed 200 muskets and swords,
persuading them to take up arms against the Egyptian Government ; and
that in consequence of this step, the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha thought
that his presence might prevent any further rise among the villages ; and
had, therefore, taken the Cavalry and a regiment of Artillery, and had
gone to Tellisheir, where it was always his Excellency's intention of form
ing his camp, in case of necessity ; but that he, Solyman Pasha, . did not
intend to quit Aleppo, with the Infantry and rest of the Artillery, until
he received orders to that effect from the Seraskier, which would only be
in the event of the Sultan's troops continuing to advance, but which he
did not think would be the case.
On the following morning, at about 6 a.m., it was reported to me, that
the Infantry had all been ordered to get ready to march. As this was in
contradiction to what his Excellency Solyman Pasha stated to me the day
before, I immediately called on him : and upon my entrance, his Excel
lency said, "I told you yesterday that I did not intend to move, but
affairs have changed since then ; for one of his Excellency the Seraskier's
Aides-de-camp reached this an hour ago, bringing me orders from the
Seraskier to join them immediately with all the troops, in consequence of
his having obtained advice that the Sultan's troops continued advancing,
and had crossed the river Sedjour ; and had come as far as Telbashir, two
hours on this side of the river, and five hours to Tellisheir, where his Excel
lency Ibrahim Pasha's camp is ; so that I shall leave this in the course of
two hours with all the Infantry and Artillery, to proceed to Tellisheir,
where his Excellency the Seraskier is."
I learn from the Government here, that the Sultan's troops that have
occupied Telbashir, are principally all Koord Irregular Cavalry. The
following is the report made to me with regard to the assault which took
place ; in which it appears that the Koords employed a.'ruse, or stratagem,
and took the Annadi troops by surprise.
The day before the affray took place, the Koord Irregular Cavalry
during the night crossed the river to the right and left of the Annadi
camp, which was at Telbashir ; and at the dawn of day, some sixty or
seventy Spahis, (Yeomanry Cavalry,) on the opposite side of the river,
came galloping up; upon which the Annadis seeing this, mounted their
horses, with a view of galloping forward also, to check this apparent
hostile demonstration of the Spahis. But great, I am told, was the sur
prise of the Annadis, on turning round, to find themselves encircled
by these Koords, which movement being so unexpected and sudden,
caused great confusion among the Bedouin Cavalry, who, after a. slight
skirmish, and seeing that some thirty of their men were killed and
a great many wounded, escaped in the greatest confusion, galloping;
towards Tellisheir, which place Ibrahim Pasha had just reached, leaving
behind ! them a great many of their tents, among which were those of
the chief, containing valuable horses, &c. Yesterday a post arrived
from the camp, by which I am told his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha
writes, that he would proceed to Kaisserie Salieh, distant two hours
from Telbashir. His Excellency was to take with him all the Regular
Cavalry, a regiment of Artillery, and some of the Irregular Cavalry,
and there remain to watch the further movements of the Turkish
Irregular Cavalry. It is stated by some to-day, that on his Excellency's
arrival at the above-named place, the Koords recrossed the river and left
Telbashir ; others again assert that his Excellency had sent Maggiun Bey
and Caftan Bey, of the Bedouin Cavalry, to Telbashir, to inquire of the

128
Sultan's Irregular Cavalry why they had entered his territory; and that it
was on seeing them approach that "the Koords immediately left Telbashir.
I have to inform your Lordship, that to-day I obtained the following
intelligence from the Governor ; that his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim
Pasha, having been informed that some of the Sultan's troops were
approaching Aintab, sent and ordered the two regiments of the line that
were quartered there, with all the Government officers and employes, to
leave the place, and come to the camp, which they have reached; thus it
appears that Aintab has been abandoned by Ibrahim Pasha, with the
exception of a few men who are in charge of the fort. It is supposed that
this is a ruse of his Excellency. There are a great many reports in town
respecting Aintab, and that it has been taken by the Sultan's authorities ;
but up to this moment, no authentic advices state that.
It is said by many, that Solyman Pasha of Marash, with 10,000
regulars, accompanied by the son of Hadji Omar, one of the late Koord
Chiefs, with as many irregulars, is coming on that line on Aintab ; but
this requires confirmation.
I have not been able to elicit anything further respecting Suffook
Bey with the Gerba Arab Tribe, who, it was said, intended to act on the
Desert line. I beg to inclose for your Excellency's information, a trans
lation in French, of an Arabic Report made to me, on the state of the
Sultan's Army under Hafiz Pasha.
By the latest advices we have from the camp under the Sultan's
Seraskier, Hafiz Pasha, he, with all his regular troops, continued to be at
Nezib, and had not made any further movement either way.
It is also positively asserted, that up to this, none of the Sultan's
regular troops have on any point entered the Egyptian jurisdiction, or
infringed on their territory.
I beg to represent to your Lordship, that since the concentration of
the Sultan's Army on this side of the Euphrates, there has been great
desertion among the troops. It is said, that up to this period, no less
than 1,500 men have come over to this side, who were received by his
Excellency Ibrahim, and after questioning them, his Excellency gave
them the choice of either remaining with him, or returning again to the
other side ; I am informed that they preferred the former, and many have
entered in the Irregular Cavalry, Bachi Bozuks. Desertion has also taken
place among the Egyptian troops, but not to so great an extent as from
the other side.
It is generally supposed that there will be no war between the two
parties. The French and Austrian Consuls here are firmly of that
opinion, and it is to be hoped that this will be confirmed, as both countries
are suffering greatly in consequence of the concentration of so large a
force on one point. The present state of affairs causes great detriment to
our British residents, as also to our general commercial interests.
I received advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, under the 24th ult.,
that some little disturbance has taken place among the mountaineers of
his district; the subsequent advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, say
nothing more respecting it, so that things appear quieter.
I beg to inclose, for your Lordship's information, extract from Mr.
Vice-Consul Hays' Journal under the 24th ult. I beg to inform your
Lordship that I have a Tatar here, whom I will dispatch to you imme
diately anything further transpires meriting your attention.
P.S. — After closing my despatch to your Lordship, I obtained the
following intelligence, coming from Nasri Tegger, his Excellency Ibrahim
Pasha's private secretary, and M. Molinari, the Sardinian Pro-Consul
who both assert that they have read the letter which contained the same
and which I hasten to transmit to your Lordship.
" Last night a horseman arrived to the Musselim of this town
Abdullah Babinsi, from the Boi Bey of Barrak, on the other side of the
river Sedjour, who is father-in-law to the former, and although under the
Sultan's jurisdiction, communicated to his son-in-law, that the Sultan's
Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's powder magazine, consisting of about 10,000

129
cases of gunpowder, had blown up, and that it had destroyed 380 persons
and 400 horses ; and that the maimed and wounded were innumerable."
I am also informed, that by a post which has just arrived from the
camp, there is a letter from his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, who writes,
that he had arrived near Telbashir a quarter of an hour, but that he
could not see anything of the Sultan's Koord Irregulars, neither there nor
anywhere else on the other side of the river. That 200 horsemen had
deserted from the Sultan's Army and had come to him ; but his Excellency
does not say whether regulars or irregulars. And further, that his
Excellency has given orders to the two regiments of Aintab, who had
arrived at the camp, to return again to their posts.
His Excellency Solyman Pasha, with the Infantry, is still at Tellisheir.

Inclosure 2 in No. 91.

Traduction d'un Rapport fait en Arabe au Pro-Chancelier du Consulat Britannique
a Alep, par un homme envoy e aux environs de Biredjik, pour prendre toutes les
informations possibles a Vigard de I'armee Ottomane.
Void son propre Redt :
EN partant d'Alep je me suis rendu d'abord aux environs de la riviere
dite Saggiour, ou se trouve le petit camp des troupes d' Ibrahim Pacha,
postees la pour surveiller les mouvemens de Farmee du Grand Seigneur.
Ces troupes consistent en cavalerie irreguliere dite Hanadi et
Bachi Bouzuk. Les Hanadis, au nombre d'environ 1,500, sont commandes
par leur colonel nomme Magioun Bey, et les Bachi Bouzuk sont com
mandes, 500 par Zeir Aga, et 400 par Kara Beirakdar, ce qui forme en
tout environ 2,400 hommes sans aucune artillerie; ce camp est dresse
sur les bords du Saggiour, a seize heures d'Alep, a un endroit qui porte
le nom de Loulie et Elkoubal, et il s'etend jusqu'a un lieu dit Tel-Bediir,
distance de quatre heures toujours en-dega du Saggiour. Ces troupes
regoivent leurs vivres du Miri, par les villages voisins appeies El Baglie ;
de la. je me suis porte, avec ma marchandise, a un village nomme Barak,
qui est en-dela de la dite riviere du Saggiour, k une petite distance; la
connaissant particulierement le Mussellim, j'ai obtenu de lui un teskere
pour me rendre a Nezib, village a quinze heures du Saggiour. Arrive a
ce village, j'y ai trouve le frere du Mussellim de Barak, qui etait a faire
ramasser des grains pour Farmee du Grand Seigneur, dont le camp
commence a peu de distance de ce village, et s'etend jusqu'a l'Euphrate;
a ce village j'ai fait la connaissance du Nezoul Amini (Fournisseur),
nomme Mehemed Effendi, qui m'a dit que Farmee campee la, avait besoin
chaque jour de 28,000 okes de pain, qui etaient distribuees aux soldats
a raison d'une demi oke pour chacun, et ce, en outre du pain fin que les
Pachas et les officiers consument.
En parcourant le camp, j'ai appris que le nombre des troupes dites
Spahis qui etaient la, s'eievait a environ 4,000 cavaliers, et les Bachi Bouzuk
etaient au nombre de 2,090 cavaliers, dont 1,200 commandes par Aghogia
Dahli Moustapha Aga; 800 par Ali Aga de Malatia; et 90 cavaliers
seulement, sous les ordres de Karagiali Darouieh Aga ; et Fon recrutait
a grand force pour grossir ce corps, parceque, a ce que Fon dit, le
Seraskier Hafiz Ali Pacha, ayant appris qu' Ibrahim Pacha avait reuni
beaucoup de troupes a Alep, et jugeant que son armee n'etait par assez
forte pour tenir tete a l'Armee Egyptienne, il s'etait decide d'augmenter
le nombre de ces troupes dites Bachi Bouzuk, et a cet effet, il avait envoye
des recruteurs dans differens pays, avec des sommes d'argent pour
Fenrolement. Le susdit Seraskier a fait venir aupres d e lui le chef de la tribu
Arabe appeMe Maoualis, qui habite au-dela de l'Euphrate, a environ seize
heures du camp, et il Fa fait vetir d'une uniforme de Nizam, et Fa charge
de r6unir sous ses ordres 1,000 cavaliers de sa tribu, mais il n'avait encore
avec lui que 200 hommes. S

130
Le meme Seraskier a demande aussi de la tribu des Kourdes appere
Berasie, qui est a environ dix heures au-dela de l'Euphrate, encore 1,000
cavaliers, mais ceux-ci ont refuse de fournir ces hommes, et ils ont pris la
fuite en abandonnant leurs terres; alors le Seraskier a envoye des gens
aupres des chefs de cette tribu, pour leur demander s'ils entendaient se
declarer rebelles contre la Porte Ottomane; mais ces chefs ont repondu
qu'ils n'entendaient nullement etre rebelles, ni qu'ils preferaient le
Gouvernement Egyptien, mais que pour fournir des hommes pour la
guerre, ils ne le pouvaient pas, mais que si on leur demandait tout autre
chose, ils etaient prets a sacrifier toutes leurs fortunes pour le service du
Grand Seigneur ; d'apres cette reponse, le Seraskier s'est contente de leur
demander pour le moment 1,000 chameaux, a quoi ils ont consenti; et le
Seraskier depedia un moubacher (intendant) pour faire ramasser ces
chameaux ; et ces Kourdes sont rentes maintenant dans leurs foyers.
Mercredi passe (22 du courant), une bande de vingt hommes, des
Bedouins dits Mouali, s'est portee sur le village de Tedef-el-bab qui est a
la distance de neuf heures d'Alep (du territoire du Gouvernement Egyp
tien), et ont voie dix-huit betes de somme qu'ils conduisirent a Barak,
ou le Mussellim fit saisir ces animaux, et en donna avis au Seraskier de
l'Armee Ottomane, lequel a ordonne de faire de suite retourner ces
animaux au village d'ou ils ont ete enleves.
Au camp de l'Armee Ottomane se trouvent onze Pachas; les noms
que j'ai pu connaitre, sont, Kourd Mehemed, Pacha d'Ourfa; Cherif Pacha,
ci-devant Pacha d'Ourfa; Mirza Pacha, Commandant de Cavalerie; lsmael
Pacha, Commandant les Spahis ; Assad Pacha, Commandant de Nizam
(troupe reguliere), et plus, un nomme Osman Pacha et un autre Cherif
Pacha. Le nombre des troupes regulieres est d'environ 56,000 hommes,
y compris cependant les Spahis et les canonniers; et entre les Bachi
Bouzuk et les Bedouins il y aurait une vingtaine de mille ; a ces derniers
on ne fournit pas les vivres, ils se nourrissent a leurs frais, et chaque
soldat a la paye de soixante piastres par mois ; par ce motif, il regno une
grande disette dans les villages voisins, ou une dragme de pain coute
2 paras; le fromage, 9 paras le rotle; le lait, 3 paras; et le reste en
proportion ; la viande cependant ne conte que 2 paras l'oke, et le beurre
6 paras. Aussi a cause de la salete qui regne dans le camp et les environs,
il existe beaucoup de maladies parmi la troupe: on voit les soldats en
general maigres et pales.
II m'a ete dit, que Amin Pacha, fils de Rechid Mehemed Pacha,
ex-Seraskier, vient du cote de Sivas joindre Farmee avec 10,000
Arnaoutes (Albanais).
Le Seraskier a ordonne de faire evaluer les champs ensemences voisins
du camp, pour en payer le montant aux proprietaires, aux prix suivans,
savoir : le froment, a 150 paras le kel (mesure de 2 chumbols d'Alep) ; et
Forge a 75 paras la dite mesure.
II a ordonne aussi d'estimer les terres ensemencees oil les chevaux de
Farmee sont en paturage, pour en payer egalement la valeur aux pro
prietaires : il y a plus de 10,000 betes de somme qui se trouvent dans les
champs a paturer.
Le Seraskier a fait deja prendre de Barak, 2,000 kels de ble ; 1,500
kels d'orge; et 700 kels de bourghol (ble comasse); qui ont ete'pa'yes,
savoir: le ble et le bourghol a 50 paras le kel, et Forge a. 20 paras; et il en
demande maintenant autres mille kels de ble, mais les habitans du dit
village ont repondu qu'il ne leur en restait pas de quoi vivre eux-memes, et
sur cela, le Seraskier a envoye faire une perquisition dans le village. On
a pris aussi des habitans de Berasie, 6,000 kels de ble, 4,000 kels d'orge,
et 2,500 kels de bourghol, aux prix susmentionnes. Maintenant les dits
habitant cherchent une poignee de farine sans la trouver, et se trouvent
reduits presque a la famine ; et de la crainte qu'ils ont que la cavalerie ne
devaste entierement toutes leurs terres, ils sont a moissonner leurs recoltes
sans attendre la maturite des grains.
II existe au camp environ soixante canons, et il y a deux gros canons
places devant la tente du Seraskier.

131
J'ai appris aussi que la bande de la tribut des Bedouins dits Anazis
qui est sous le commandement du chef nomme Souffouk Bey, vient contre
Ibrahim Pacha au nombre de 20,000 ; ils sont arrives a Zaara (nom d'une
colline), a soixante heures d'Alep sur l'Euphrate, et ils voulaient passer le
fleuve a cet endroit oh les eaux sont basses, mais ayant trouve de la resist
ance de la part d'un corps de 8,000 Bedouins de Horan, appeles Fedaan, que
Ibrahim Pacha a places a ce passage depuis peude tems en leur fournissant
sept pieces de canons, et 200 canonniers, ils se sont retires en donnant avis
au Seraskier de l'Armee Ottomane, k qui ils ont demande la permission de
venir a Biredjik, pour passer le fleuve a. cet endroit; mais le Seraskier leur
a repondu d'attendre un peu, parce qu'a present on etait occupe a faire
passer les munitions et les attirails de Farmee.
Les 8,000 Bedouins places par Ibrahim Pacha sur les rives de
l'Euphrate, dont il est pari! ci-dessus, etaient jadis ennemis des Egyptiens,
et avaient ete battus par Ibrahim Pacha, mais apr£s, ils se sont soumis
en pretant serment de fideiite a Son Altesse, et celui-ci leur accorda la
paix. J'ai appris aussi que le fils de Hadji Omar Bey, de la montagne des
Kourdes, qui n'est pas eloignee d'Alep, a promis au Seraskier qu'il fera
soulever les habitans de la dite montagne ainsi que ceux de la montagne
voisine dite Giaour-dagh, et Faidera par-la a attaquer Alep ; le Seraskier
Fa fait accompagner par le frere de son tresorier pour cette entreprise.
Ce fils de Hadji Omar, Bey des Kourdes, avait 6t6 battu dans un tems par
Ibrahim Pacha, et poursuivi vivement ; il ne dut son salut qu'a la fuite, en
se retirant vers les Osmanlis.
On m'a assure, qu'en outre de Farmee dont je parle, il en existait une
autre de 60,000 hommes, qui est aux environs de Nijde et Elbour, a, dix-huit
heures de Kuluk Boghaz; et Fon dit que ces deux armees avec les
Bedouins allies formeront une armee d'environ 200,000 hommes ; de meme
Fon dit qu'avec les canons que Fon attend, il y aurait en tout environ
300 canons. (N.B. — Le redt de ce paragraphe merite confirmation.)
Jusqu'au jour de mon depart du camp, aucune escarmouche n'avait
eu lieu entre les troupes du Grand Seigneur et celles d'Ibrahim Pacha ;
seulement la veille de mon depart du camp, un cheval de la cavalerie des
Spahis, s'etant ediappe et ayant couru vers le Saggiour, quelques Spahis
ont couru apres lui pour Fattraper, et comme ils s'etaient bien approche
de la riviere, quelques Hanadis (cavalerie d'Ibrahim Pacha) coururent
sur les Spahis, qui, voyant cela, rebrousserent chemin ; mais un d'eux
etant tombe de son cheval, les Hanadis s'avancerent sur lui et lui couperent
la gorge a demi ; les Spahis s'etant apergu de cela, retournerent sur les
Hanadis, mais ceux-ci prirent quelques vetemens de Fassassine et son
cheval, et regagnerent leur camp ; alors les Spahis enleverent le mourant
et le porterent a Nezib, ou il expira en arrivant.
Le Seraskier a publie partout, que celui qui saisirait et reconduirait
a son camp un deserteur de son armee, aurait une gratification de mille
piastres ; et il a fixe les peines suivantes contre les deserteurs, savoir : que
si le deserteur etait un Spahi, il sera noye dans l'Euphrate, et si c'est un
Saouaris, il recevra mille coups de verge ; et si c'est un des Nizam (troupes
regulieres), il sera envoye a Kara Nazam.
Pendant mon sejour au camp, j'ai assiste aux exercices des troupes,
mais j'ai trouve qu'ils etaient loin d'egaler Finstruction des troupes
Egyptiennes : ceux-ci sont infiniment mieux instruits et disciplines.
Lorsque j'ai quitte le camp pour retourner a Alep, j'ai appris a Nezib,
que trois Tatares etaient arrives au camp, et que le Seraskier avait tenu
une assembiee de tous les Pachas ; Mfrza Pacha, commandant la cavalerie
dite Saouari, avait alors fait mettre tous les chevaux de son corps en
paturage pres de Barak ; les habitans de ce village lui ayant represente
que d'apres les ordres du Seraskier, leurs terres qui etaient ensemencees et
qui servaient de paturage aux chevaux, devaient etre estimees pour en rece-
voir le dedommagement, ce Pacha leur repondit que si dans deux a trois
jours il ne quittait leurs terres, il les ferait evaluer; d'apres cette reponse,
et Farrivee des trois Tatares, le bruit de paix se repandit, et j'ai cru a propos
alors de retarder mon depart de quelques jours pour en voir la suite; mais
b 2

132
apres trois jours, ne voyant aucun mouvement ni changement dans I'armee,
je suis parti pour venir vous faire mon rapport.
II se trouve au camp, environ un millier d'Alepins, qui s'etaient emigres
a differentes epoques, et parmi lesquels il se trouve des Aians (gens de
distinction) dont j'ai connu les noms suivans, savoir: AchmedAga,
fils de Hatab, chef des ouvriers en galons ; Cherif Aga, fils de Louessan,
Ex-Metesseb d'Alep (Commissaire de Police) ; et Mehemed Aga, fils de
Khalas, et le fils de Hachem Aga, tous deux ci-devant Yuzbachi dans le
Regiment de la Garde: tous ces Alepins sont nourris par les Osmanlis,
mais aucun d'eux n'est employe.
Avant de retourner a Alep, j'ai voulu aller a Tedef pour voir ce qui se
passait de ce cote-la, et j'ai pousse meme ma course jusqu'a Bachikoi',
village a deux heures de Ik de Tedef; ayant rencontre la trois chameliers
des Bedouins, appeies Sessars, qui venaient du camp, ils m'ont dit que
toute Farmee etait toujours dans sa position, a I'exception d'environ 6,000
cavaliers Spahis et Saouaris, qui, avec les Pachas nomm6s Mahomed Pacha,
Assad Pacha, et Mirza Pacha, se sont portes aux environs des villages
dits Ghermouch et Chetlik, a trois heures de distance du camp, pour faire
paturer leurs chevaux, l'herbe ayant manque a Fendroit ou ils etaient ;
ils n'avaient point avec eux de Fartillerie.
En retournant, j'ai rencontre nonloin d'Alep, de la Cavalerie d'Ibrahim
Pacha (Hanadis et autres) qui vont a Tel-il-Cha'ir, a douze heures d'ici,
pour surveiller ce qui passe.

(Translation.)
Translation of a Report made in Arabic to the Pro-Chancellor of the British
Consulate at Aleppo, by a person sent to the neighbourhood of Biredjik, to
gather every possible information respecting the Ottoman Army.
The following is his Report :
ON leaving Aleppo I proceeded first to the neighbourhood of the
river called Sedjour, where the small camp of Ibrahim Pasha's troops
is placed, for the purpose of watching the movements of the Grand
Signor's Army.
Those troops consist of Irregular Cavalry, called Hanadi and Bachi
Bouzuk. The Hanadis, amounting to about 1500, are commanded by
their Colonel, Maggiun Bey ; and of the Bachi Bouzuk, 500 are commanded '
by Zeir Aga, and 400 by Kara Beirakdar, forming altogether about 2,400
men, without any Artillery. This camp is posted on the borders of the
Sedjour, sixteen hours' distance from Aleppo, at a spot which goes by
the name of Loulie and Elkoubal ; and it extends to a place called Tel-
Bechir, distant about four hours ; all on this side of the Sedjour. These
troops get their provisions from the Miri, by way of the adjoining villages,
called El Baglie ; from thence I went, with my merchandise, to a village
called Barak, which is on the other side of the said river Sedjour, and
at a little distance from it : being well acquainted with the Musselim
there, I obtained from him a teskereh to enable me to go to Nezib, a village
fifteen hours from the Sedjour. On arriving at this village, I there found
the brother of the Musselim of Barak, who was procuring corn for the
Grand Signor's Army, whose camp begins close by this village, and
extends to the Euphrates. At this village I became acquainted with the
Nezoul Amini (Commissary), named Mehemed Effendi, who told me that
the Army which was there encamped, required every day 28,000 okes of
bread, of which half an oke was given to each soldier, and this in addition
to the better kind of bread eaten by the Pashas and Officers.
In going through the camp, I learnt that the number of troops called
Spahis who were there, amounted to about 4,000 horsemen; and the Bachi
Bouzuks to 2,090 men, of whom 1,200 were commanded by Aghogia Dahli
Moustapha Aga; 800 by Ali Aga of Malatia; and 90 horsemen only
under the orders of Karagliari Darouieh Aga. Great efforts were being

133
made by recruiting to increase this corps ; for it was said that the Seraskier
Hafiz Ali Pasha having heard that Ibrahim Pasha had collected a large
force at Aleppo, and being of opinion that his Army was not sufficiently
strong to make head against the Egyptian Army, he had determined to
increase the number of troops called Bachi Bouzuk, and with this view
had sent -recruiting parties into the different districts, with large sums of
money towards the enrolment of them.
The above-mentioned Seraskier sent for the Chief of the Arab tribe,
called Maoualis, who live on the other side of the Euphrates, at about
sixteen hours' distance from the camp, and dressed him up in the uniform
of the Nizam, and ordered him to assemble under his orders 1,000 horsemen
of his tribe, but he had not with him at the time more than 200 men.
This same Seraskier also required the Kourd Tribe called Berasie,
dwelling about ten hours on the other side of the Euphrates, to furnish a
thousand horsemen ; they refused however, and abandoning their lands,
took to flight. Upon this the Seraskier sent to the chiefs of this tribe to
enquire, whether they wished to be considered as rebels to the Ottoman
Porte. But they replied, that they were not rebels, and that they did not
prefer the Egyptian Rule ; but that they were unable to furnish warriors,
though in regard to any thing else, they were ready to sacrifice their
whole fortunes in the service of the Grand Signor. Upon this answer
being given, the Seraskier was satisfied with requiring at the moment
1,000 camels, which they agreed to give ; and the Seraskier despatched a
moubacher (commissary) to collect these camels ; and after this the Kourds
returned to their homes.
Last Wednesday (22d instant,) a body of twenty men, called Mouali
Bedouins, rushed upon the village of Tedef-el-bab, distant about nine
hours from Aleppo, (in the Egyptian territory,) and stole from thence
eighteen beasts of burthen, which they took to Barak, where the Mus
selim caused the animals to be seized, and reported the matter to the
Seraskier of the Ottoman Army, who ordered the beasts to be returned
immediately to the village from whence they had been taken.
There are eleven Pashas in the camp of the Ottoman Army; the names
which I heard were, Kourd Mehemed, Pasha of Orfa ; Sherif Pasha, for
merly Pasha of Orfa; Mirza Pasha, commanding the Cavalry; lsmael
Pasha, commanding the Spahis ; Assad Pasha, commanding the Nizams
(regular troops) ; moreover, one named Osman Pasha, and another Sherif
Pasha. The number of regular troops is about 56,000 men, including, how
ever, the Spahis and Artillerymen : and of the Bachi Bouzuks and
Bedouins there might be about 20,000 : to these latter no pro
visions are given ; they live at their own expense, and each soldier
receives the pay of 60 piastres per month ; owing to this there is a
great scarcity of provisions in the neighbouring villages, where a dragme
of bread costs 2 paras ; cheese, 9 paras the rotle ; milk, 3 paras, and so
on in proportion ; meat, however, only costs 2 paras the oke, and butter
6 paras. Moreover, the filth which exists both within and without the camp,
has engendered much sickness among the troops : the soldiers appear to
be generally thin and pale.
I have been told that Amin Pasha, son of Rechid Mehemet Pasha,
ex-Seraskier, is coming by the way of Sivas, to join the army, with
10,000 Arnaouts (Albanians).
The Seraskier has ordered the fields bordering on the camp, which
were sown, to be valued, in order to pay an equivalent to the proprietors,
at the following prices : viz., for wheat 150 paras the kel (a measure of
2 chumbols of Aleppo) ; and 75 paras for the same measure of barley.
He has also ordered the cultivated lands where the horses of the
army are feeding, to be valued, and to pay in like manner the amount to
the proprietors : there are more than 10,000 beasts pastured in these
same grounds.
The Seraskier has already had from Barak 2,000 kels of wheat ;
1,500 kels of barley; and 700 kels of bourghol (ble comasse); for which
the following sums have been paid : for wheat and bourghol 50 paras the

134
kel, and 20 paras for barley. He now requires a further thousand kels
of wheat; but the inhabitants of the said village say that they would not
have enough left to live upon themselves, and upon this the Seraskier has
sent to search the village. Also, 6,000 kels of wheat, 4,000 kels of barley,
and 2,500 kels of bourghol, have been taken from the inhabitants of
Berasie, at the above-mentioned prices. At this moment, these said inha
bitants seek in vain for a handful of flour, being almost reduced to a state
of famine ; and fearing, as they do, lest the cavalry should completely lay
waste their crops, they are already gathering in their harvest, without
waiting till the corn becomes ripe.
There are about sixty guns in the camp, and two large cannons before
the tent of the Seraskier.
I have also heard that a force of the tribe of Bedouins called Anazis,
to the number of 20,000, commanded by a chief called Souffouk Bey, is
marching against Ibrahim Pasha : they arrived at Zaara (the name of a
hill), at sixty hours from Aleppo on the Euphrates, and tried to ford the
river at a place where the waters are shallow; having, however, met
with resistance from a corps of 8,000 Bedouins of Horan, called Fedaan,
which Ibrahim Pasha had placed at this point a short time before, having
given them 7 field pieces, and 200 artillerymen, they retired, giving notice
of their retreat to the Seraskier of the Ottoman army, from whom they
requested permission to come to Biredjik, in order to pass the river at
that place ; but the Seraskier told them, in reply, to wait a little, because
he was then occupied in transporting warlike stores.
The 8,000 Bedouins stationed by Ibrahim Pasha on the banks of the
Euphrates, as mentioned above, were formerly hostile to the Egyptians,
and had been beaten by Ibrahim Pasha, but afterwards, having taken an
oath of fidelity to His Highness, peace was granted to them.
I have also heard that the son of Hadji Omar Bey, of the mountain of
the Kourds, which is not far from Aleppo, has promised the Seraskier to
raise the inhabitants of that mountain, as well as those of the neigh
bouring mountain, called Giaour-dagh, and will thus assist him in
attacking Aleppo ; the Seraskier has sent the brother of his treasurer to
accompany him in this enterprise. This son of Hadji Omar Bey, of the
Kourds, was formerly beaten by Ibrahim Pasha, and closely pursued ; he
retired towards the Osmanlis, and owed his safety to flight.
I have been assured that, in addition to the army of which I have
been speaking, there is yet a force of 60,000 men in the neighbourhood of
Nijde and Elbour, at eighteen hours' distance from Kuluk Boghaz ; and
report says that these two armies, together with the Allied Bedouins, will
form an army of about 200,000 men ; it is also said, that with the cannons
which are expected, there would be altogether 300 cannons. (N.B. What is
stated in this paragraph requires confirmation.)
Up to the day of my departure from the camp, no skirmishing had
taken place between the troops of the Grand Signor and those of Ibrahim
Pasha ; but the day before my departure, a horse belonging to the Spahis
having got loose and run towards the Sedjour, a few Spahis ran after
the horse to try and catch him ; and having thus got close to the river,
some Hanadis (of Ibrahim Pasha's Cavalry) rode at the Spahis; who
seeing this, turned quickly back ; but one of them having fallen from his
horse, the Hanadis caught him and cut his throat. The Spahis perceiving
this, turned back upon the Hanadis ; but these, having taken the garments
and horse of the murdered man, regained their camp : then the Spahis
took up the dying man and carried him to Nezib, where he expired.
The Seraskier has given out everywhere, that any person who shall
seize and bring back to the camp a deserter from the army shall receive a
reward of 1,000 piastres ; the punishment of the deserters to be as follows:
If the deserter be a Spahi, he shall be drowned in the Euphrates ; if a
Saouaris, he is to receive 1,000 blows; if one of the Nizam (regular
troops), he is to be sent to Kara Nazam.
While I remained in the camp, I was present at the exercise of
the troops, but I found them far from equal to the Egyptian troops, who
are infinitely better taught and disciplined.
After I had quitted the camp to return to Aleppo, I heard at Nezib,

135
that three Tatars had arrived at the camp, and that the Seraskier had
assembled together all the Pashas; Mirza Pasha, commanding the
Cavalry called Saouari, had sent all the horses of his corps to pasture
near Barak : the inhabitants of this village having represented to him
that, according to the orders of the Seraskier, their lands which had been
sown, and were used as pasture for the horses, should be valued, in order
that an equivalent should be given them ; the Pasha answered them, that
if he did not quit, their lands in two or three days, they should be valued.
After this answer and the arrival of the three Tatars, a report of peace
became current, and I thereupon thought it better to delay my departure
some days to see what the result would be; but after three days having
seen no movement nor change in the army, I came away for the purpose
of making you my report.
There are in the camp about a thousand persons from Aleppo, who
emigrated from thence at different periods, and among whom there are
some Aians (people of rank) ; the names which I heard are as follows : —
Achmed Aga, son of Hatab, Chief of the Embroiderers ; Sherif Aga, son
of Louessan, Ex-Metesseb of Aleppo (Commissary of Police) ; and Mehe
med Aga, son of Khalas, and the son of Hachem Aga, both of whom were
formerly Yuzbachi in the Regiment of Guards : all these persons from
Aleppo are supported by the Turks, but they are not employed.
Before returning to Aleppo, I wished to go to Tedef, to see what was
going on there, and I went even as far as Bachikoi, a village two hours beyond
Tedef; having there met three Bedouin camel drivers, called Sessars, who
had come from the camp, they told me that the whole army was still in
the same position, with the exception of about 6,000 Spahis and Saouaris
horse, who had gone with the Pashas, named Mahomed Pasha, Assad
Pasha, and Mirza Pasha, to the neighbourhood of the villages called
Ghermouch and Chetlik, distant three hours from the camp, for the pur
pose of pasturing their horses, because there was no grass in the place
where they were stationed. They had no artillery with them.
As I returned I met, not far from Aleppo, some cavalry of Ibrahim
Pasha (Hanadis and others), who are going to Tel-il-Chair, at about
twelve hours from hence, to see what is going on.

Inclosure 3 in No. 91.

Extract of Mr. Vice-Consul Hays's Journal, dated Alexandretta,
May 24, 1839,
RECEIVED information of the descent of about 300 men from the
Giaour Dagh mountains, on the town of Masis, which they robbed, and
carried off the cattle.
Received information of the descent of about twenty men on, and
the robbery of the village of Archi, one hour and a half 'from
Alexandretta. Was informed by Rushwan Effendi, who returned this morning from
Byass, that the reported attack upon Masis was without foundation, but
that an attack had been made at Borgas, three hours beyond Byass,
on a party of fifty police, during the night, by the mountaineers, in which
two of the police were killed and some horses taken, the robbers getting
off; their force was supposed to be about 100 men; and that in conse
quence of that, and the attack upon Archi, the cutting and trans
porting of timber was to be discontinued beyond the immediate vicinity
of Alexandretta, on the Byass side, and the men and animals employed
in it to be sent to the mountains, on the other side of the Beylan and
Arzous range.
He also said, that by the orders of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, a
body of 700 Irregular Cavalry, as mounted police, were placed under the
orders of Rustan Effendi, Governor of Byass, to patrol from Koork-
golok to Alexandretta, for the protection of the roads and the country,
with orders to put to death on the spot, any robber they may apprehend ;
an equal number of others were also daily expected to join them, so as to
form a police force of 1400 or 1500 men.

136
No. 92.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received July 5.)
(Extract.) Damascus, June 7, 1839:
THE last despatch I had the honour of addressing your Lordship by
the Beyrout steamer, was under the 10th ultimo.
The road between Aleppo and Beyrout continuing uninterrupted and
free, Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry will put your Lordship in possession
amply of all the information relating to the Sultan's Army, and pro
ceedings on that frontier, as well as what is taking place by his Highness
Ibrahim Pasha, and the forces under his command, on both of which
subjects I instructed the Pro-Consul to be full, precise and correct, in the
reports he transmits to your Lordship ; therefore little remains for me to
offer to your Lordship's notice on this very important subject, further
than to be permitted by your Lordship, to make a few cursory observar
tions thereon, inasmuch as it appears to me it is connected with the
general relations of this country.
From the information transmitted me by the Aleppo Pro-Consul,
which I have duly forwarded to Colonel Campbell, it appears the military
measures pursued by the 'Sultan's Seraskier, are in accordance with those
I anticipated in my last despatch to your Lordship, which are in sub
stance, that while the main body of his army, encamped on this side of the
Euphrates between Roum Kale and Bir, makes advances towards
and on the Egyptian territory, this movement is gradual, and in
proportion to those operated by his irregulars and the malcontents on
both wings of the Egyptian Army, and his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's
position at Aleppo. It will be seen by the reports, that with many
influential persons belonging formerly to Aleppo and other parts of Syria,
there are also numerous Syrian partizans assembled at the Sultan's
Seraskier's head-quarters: this denotes the object of his advance to
Aleppo, and corroborates the insurrectionary measures above cited,
and attempting to be extended in the rear and to all parts of Syria.
Those measures are calculated not only to facilitate the success
of an attack of the Sultan's Seraskier on his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's
Army, but to induce a belief generally to the world, that he is invited by
the Syrian population. Your Lordship will observe the immense advan
tage derivable by the Sultan's Seraskier, compared with the advantage
which would have accrued to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, had he at once
taken the offensive or had he thrown his operations on the eastern
side of the Euphrates, in which countries, the same elements would
have favoured his operations to a far greater extent than those of the Sul
tan's Seraskier in Syria, taking into account also that the Egyptian Army
is in every respect superior to the Sultan's. Under such a view of the
question, should these premises be correct, it does not appear to me in
truth and justice, that it can be established in the present attitude of the
rival armies, that the status quo of the Treaty of Kutaya is observed by
the Sultan's Seraskier on the northern frontiers of Syria.
It cannot be doubted, that these movements will produce the most de
structive and disastrous effects to the interests of this country generally,
and particularly to the British ; and unless prompt and final measures
are adopted to settle the pending question between the Sultan and Mehe
met Ali, this country will eventually become a scene of disorder, instead of
a field for commercial enterprize and of prosperity.
I have adverted, my Lord, to the position and proceedings of the
Ottoman Armies and the state of this country, as in point with our imme
diate interests in it, without connecting it with the policy pursued by
your Lordship, in promoting the general pacific relations of the East, from
which it would appear inseparable, but which the assembling of the
Ottoman forces on the Northern Syrian frontier do not for the present, if
they are maintained much longer in their present attitude, authorize the
hooe that hostilities between the rival armies can be averted.

137
I had thus far prepared this despatch to your Lordship, when I
received advices from the Aleppo Pro-Consul, that his Highness Ibrahim
Pasha has quitted, Aleppo with all his forces, between the 29th and 3lst
ultimo, and fixed his head-quarters, and concentrated his army at
Tellisheir, ten hours in advance of Aleppo, in consequence of an advanced
guard of Irregular Cavalry from Hafiz Pasha's Army having occupied
some villages, distributed arms and ammunition to the villagers within
the Egyptian limits, and having crossed the river Sedjour, three hours
on its western side, to Telbashir. The main body of the Sultan's Army
was at Nezib with the Seraskier's head-quarters. These movements
almost preclude the hope of hostilities being averted, unless very prompt
measures are taken to preserve peace.
Damascus is in a tranquil state. I hear that the line of country
between this place and Balbec, from thence to Tripoli, and that country
to Hamah, is infested with the marauding Mutualis, at the head of
whom an Emir of the Harfoush family, deposed from the Mussellimlic of
Balbec, and replaced by a Cousin Emir, is at present at war. The
Government does not appear to take any active part in this feud, and
appears to employ conciliatory measures to appease the parties, and
induce both to re-establish order in the country, through the intervention
of the Emir Bechir, who is contiguous to them.
I hear that the Arabs from the Desert make continual irruptions
into the Haouran district and the surrounding country ; but the Druse
and Fellah population of that district and the country are quiet for
the present. The plague has spread from the south to the Naplous Mountains,
and to the villages to the south of Damascus, a few hours distant. Here
some cases have occurred, and two or three are daily announced. Pre
cautions are taking to prevent its propagation. It is not likely to do
much mischief. Its character is reported mild and languid. The season
is also well advanced, and it is therefore hoped not to be of long
duration.

No. 93.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Beyrout, June 8, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship with the latest
information which has reached this place from Aleppo, under date of the
1st instant. Hafiz Pasha had established his head-quarters at Isil ; and the
Sultan's troops had occupied a village five hours distant from Aintab,
after expelling therefrom a party of Bedouins in the Egyptian service.
Both Ibrahim Pasha and Solyman Pasha had quitted Aleppo with
troops, the former for Tellisheir.
Much anxiety is felt here as to the result of the advance of the
Ottoman forces ; and a battle, it is apprehended, may be the consequence.
In this immediate neighbourhood, tranquillity is maintained; but we
daily hear of robberies taking place in almost every direction.
The Aleppo post, now due, is not yet arrived. I have, &e.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

No. 94.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Alexandria, June 14, 1839,
IN continuation of my despatch of the 6th of June, I have now the
honour to inform your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali received, on the
evening of the 9th instant, an overland courier from Syria, with reports
from Ibrahim Pasha.
Early on the morning of the 10th instant, a steamer of the Pasha
arrived from Suedia, to the south of Alexandretta ; and as I was anxious
for intelligence, M. de Laurin, the Consul-General of Austria, and myself,
went to call on Mehemet Ali.
The Pasha told us, that he had received some details of the attack by
the Turkish Cavalry on his Bedouin Arab Cavalry, within the limits of
his own territory ; and also, that emissaries of Hafiz Pasha were raising
up the people of the villages against him, and distributing arms, ammu
nition, and money to them. And he then detailed to us the substance of
the inclosed reports (Nos. 1 and 2.), of which copies were sent to myself,
and the Consuls-General of the other Great Powers.
The Pasha then told us, that he would immediately send orders to
Ibrahim Pasha, to drive the Turks out of Syria, and to follow them, and
act according to circumstances, and that he would occupy Orfa and
Diarbekir. M. de Laurin and myself urged him, by every possible argument and
entreaty, not to go beyond his own frontier ; but the Pasha said the
danger was too imminent, and the aggression of the Porte too marked
and too manifest, to permit any further moderation on his part ; that he
had done everything to avoid a war, but that now he must give discre
tionary powers to his son, as he was too far distant to refer to him ou
every circumstance and event, and great evils and danger might accrue
from his so doing. And he added, that if his neighbour set his (the
Pasha's) house on fire, he had the right to take measures to punish him
for it, and to prevent his so doing again.
On the evening of the 10th, Messrs. Laurin and Cochelet, and Count
Medem, called on me. The two latter had been to wait on the Pasha, and
had also, in vain, endeavoured to dissuade him from giving permission to
Ibrahim Pasha to pass his frontier ; and the steamer was sent off that
evening to Ibrahim Pasha.
I can assure your Lordship, that everything has been done by myself
and colleagues to dissuade Mehemet Ali from allowing Ibrahim to pass
his frontier; and the most complete accord and harmony has existed
amongst us all on this point. But our arguments were very much
weakened by the positive aggressions of Hafiz Pasha, and by the mode
ration and deference to our advice shown by Mehemet Ali up to the
present moment.
There is also little doubt, that Hafiz Pasha waits only his reinforce
ments, and the march of his different corps, in order to attack Ibrahim
Pasha in front, whilst his other corps act on different points of Syria;
and the fact, that Hafiz Pasha is accompanied by all the Turks who have
emigrated from Syria, particularly from Aleppo, clearly convinces
Mehemet Ali, that the Sultan intends to strike a decisive blow against
him. I think it probable, that a battle will soon take place between Hafiz
Pasha and Ibrahim Pasha ; and I feel convinced, that as the Sultan has
set the example of causing revolt in Syria, Mehemet Ali will follow it in
Albania, and Roumelia, and Bosnia ; and I firmly believe, that he may
cause a conflagration in those places.
I think it also probable, that Kourschid Pasha, from the Nejid, may
turn his views against Bassora, and the more so, as he has an Agent at
Kaouat or Gran, where he has large houses for granaries. He has, also,
another Agent at Muhumrah, who is employed in purchasing provisions
which are forwarded to the former post.

139
The preceding intelligence is given to me, under date of 4th May, by
Captain Hennell, from Karrak.
As to what Mehemet Ali may do in regard to Bagdad, 1 am quite
ignorant ; but the Resident there writes, that the late inundations have
destroyed one-third of the houses of that city, and that the whole of that
Pashalic is in great disorder.
Since writing thus far, I have received a translation of the order
sent by Mehemet Ali to Ibrahim Pasha, on 10th June ; and I have now
the honour to transmit copy of it.
This order has solely been caused by the outrages and the aggres
sions of the troops of Hafiz Pasha, as the previous order to Ibrahim
Pasha merely directed him to drive the Turks out of Syria, but not to
pass the frontier. (Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 94.

Extraits des Rapports adressis auGeneral-en-Chef de V Armee Egyptienne,
, a la date du 18 Rebi-el-evel, 1255.
LES hostilites que les Turcs ont commises contre la Province
d'Antab vous ont ete connues par les derniers rapports du 17 courant.
Depuis, on lit dans le rapport du Kaftana Bey, du Magioun Bey, et du
Mussellim, dates du 17 courant, de Biouk-Kessil-Hissar, ce qui suit : Un
Cavalier Hanadi (Arabe) arrive ventre a terre et nous dit (pour acheter
du pain et d'autres provisions de bouche) : " Nous etions une vingtaine de
cavaliers a Tel-il-Bechir, tout-a-coup nous apercumes de loin un corps
de cavalerie, a peu pres 1,500 hommes, qui venait sur nous a la distance
d'une mille ; ces cavaliers ont commence a faire feu. Nous avons fait un
mouvement en arriere sans resister ; nous avons eu trois hommes blesses.
Aussitot apres ce recit (Kaftana Bey et autres continuent) nous sommes
partis pour aller a la rencontre' de la Cavalerie Turque. Chemin faisant,
nous avons rencontre un cavalier Sari (Arabe) qui etait blesse ; nous a
constate la veracite du fait ; un instant apres, un homme de Mussellim Bey
nous est venu assurer que les Turcs sont encore a Tel-Bechir, et qu'on
envoie a Mezar, qui n'est eioigne d'Antab qu'a peu pres de cinq heures,
des troupes et des canons, et qu'ils sont entres a Kessil-Hissar, grand
village appartenant a la Province d'Antab ; la on a trouve un homme de
Mussellim Bey ; on Fa fait prisonnier, et on a force le Boi Bey de ce village
a se porter vers Antab, pour exciter la population. Le Boi Bey aussi est
venu jusqu'aupres d'Antab, d'ou il a fait avertir le President du Conseil
d'Antab, des intentions hostiles des Turcs contre cette ville ; et lorsque ce
m&me Boi Bey retourna a Kessil-Hissar, il fut enleve par 40 ou 50
cavaliers Turcs et conduit a l'Armee Ottomane. Les Arabes qui se
trouvaient entre Antab et Farmee Turque, se sont retires vers Killis ; de
maniere qu'ils ont laisse le champ libre aux Turcs, qui se sont empares
des villages jusqu'aupres d'Antab ; par consequent, la population d'Antab
est dans une grande anxiete.
Extrait de la Lettre de S. A. Ibrahim Pacha, en date du 19 Rebi-el-evel, 1255.
JE vous ai deja annonce par ma lettre precedente, que j'ai laisse
I'ordre a Solyman Paeha pour me suivre a. Tel-il-Cha'ir. J'ai fait revenir a
moi les regimens qui se trouvaient a Antab et a Killis ; je laisse Solyman
Pacha avec le corps d'armee a Tel-il-Cha'ir, et je me porte en avant a la
rencontre de la Cavalerie Turque, avec sept regimens de la Cavalerie et six
batteries d'artillerie a cheval. Si l'Infanterie Turque ne se porte pas en
avant pour secourir leur Cavalerie, le corps de Solyman Pacha gardera sa
position jusqu'a nouvel ordre, et je renverrai les regimens que j'ai
retires d'Antab. Si au contraire la grande armee Turque fait un mouve-
T 2

140
ment en avant, Solyman Pacha viendra me trouver avec le corps
d'Infanterie. C'est done Farmee Turque qui a passe le premier les limites $
elle a fait devaster nos villages par sa Cavalerie reguliere et irreguliere ;
c'est elle encore qui a fait le feu le premier ; dans l'affaire que la
Cavalerie Turque a eu avec les Hanadis (Arabes), ils ont perdu 60 a 70
hommes ; notre perte est de 20 a 30 hommes. II n'y a plus de doute main-
tenant que I'opinion contre la guerre est entierement echouee. , Puisque
c'est Farmee Turque qui a la premiere commis des hostilites contre nos
villages, il est juste que j'use de represailles, en faisant faire devaster par
nos Hanadis les villages de Barash.
(Note du Traducteur.)
Son Altesse le Generalissime dans cette lettre mentionne, sans aucun
detail, il est vrai, la perte qu'on a eu dans cette affaire entre les Hanadis
et Turcs ; mais nous savons deja par sa lettre du 17 courant, que cinq
escadrons Turcs ont attaque une partie du corps de Cavalerie Arabe sous
les ordres de Magioun Bey, a Tel-Bediir. On peut conclure par la que
nos Hanadis se sont retires en combattant, et que la Cavalerie Turque
s'est avanceejusqu'a Kessil-Hissar.

(Translation.)
Extracts of the Reports addressed to the General-in-Chief of the Egyptian
Army to the date of the 18th Rebi-el-evel, 1255.
THE hostilities which the Turks have committed against the province
of Aintab have been made known to you by the last reports of the 17th
instant. Since then, the reports of the Kaftana Bey, the Maggiun Bey,
and of the Mussellim, dated the 17th instant from Biouk-Kessil-Hissar,
contain the following : a Hanadi horseman (an Arab) arrived post haste,
(to buy bread and other provisions) and said to us: we were about twenty
horsemen at Tel-il-Bechir ; suddenly we saw at a distance a body of
cavalry, nearly 1,500 men, who came upon us from the distance of a
mile ; these horsemen began firing; we retreated without resisting ; we had
three men wounded. Immediately after this account (Kaftana Bey and
the others continue) we set off to meet the Turkish cavalry. On our
way we met a Sari horseman (an Arab) who was wounded, and proved to
us the truth of the circumstance ; an instant afterwards a man from
Mussellim Bey came to tell us that the Turks are still at Tel-Bechir, and
that they are sending troops and cannon to Mezar, which is only about
five hours distant from Aintab, and that they had entered Kessil-Hissar, a
large village belonging to the province of Aintab; there they found a man
belonging to Mussellim Bey ; they made him prisoner, and forced the Boi
Bey of that village to go towards Aintab to excite the population. The
Boi Bey also arrived close to Aintab, from whence he sent information to the
President of the Council of Aintab, of the hostile intentions of the Turks
against that town ; and when this same Boi Bey returned to Kessil-
Hissar, he was carried off by forty or fifty Turkish horsemen and taken
to the Ottoman army. The Arabs who were between Aintab and the
Turkish army have retired towards Killis, so as to leave the field open
to the Turks, who have taken possession of the villages close to Aintab;
consequently the population of Aintab is in great anxiety.
Extract of the letter from His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated the 19th
Rebi-el-evel, 1255.
I HAVE already informed you in my former letter that I have left
orders for Solyman Pasha to follow me to Tel-il-Chair. I have caused
the regiments which were at Aintab and at Killis to return to me ; I leave
Solyman Pasha with the corps d'armee at Tel-il-Chair, and advance
myself, with seven regiments of cavalry and six batteries of horse

S41
artillery, to meet the Turkish cavalry. If the Turkish infantry does not
advance to cover their cavalry, Solyman Pasha's corps will keep its position
until fresh orders, and I shall send back the regiments which I have with
drawn from Aintab. If, on the contrary, the main body of the Turkish army
makes a movement in advance, Solyman Pasha will join me with the
body of infantry. It is then the Turkish army which has first passed
the boundary ; they have sacked our villages with their regular and
irregular cavalry ; they were also the first to open fire; in the affair which
the Turkish cavalry had with the Hanadis (Arabs), they lost from sixty
to seventy men ; our loss is from twenty to thirty men. There is now no
longer doubt that the opinion against the war is completely at an end.
Since it was the Turkish army which was the first to commit hostilities
against our villages, it is right that I should resort to reprisals by
making our Hanadis sack the villages of Barash.

(Note by the Translator.)
His Highness the Generalissimo in this letter mentions, it is true
without any details, the loss sustained in this affair between the Hanadis
and Turks; but we know already by his letter of the 17th instant, that
five Turkish squadrons had attacked a part of a corps of Arab cavalry
under the orders of Maggiun Bey at Tel-Bechir. We may conclude from
this that our Hanadis had retired fighting, and that the Turkish cavalry
had advanced as far as Kessil-Hissar.

Inclosure 2 in No. 94.

Extrait des Rapports parvenus au Generalissime, sous la date du 21 Rebi-el-evel,
et dont il rend compte au Vice-Roi, par sa lettre du 23 du meme mois.
LE nomme Kutchuk Ali Oglou, qui avait passe du cote des Turcs., il
y a deja quelque tems, a ete envoye au village d'Erzin pour faire soulever
les montagnards du Giaour Daghi. Le deserteur Khadje Omar Oglou
aussi a ete expedie a Tchertchil dans le meme but. Mistick Bey est
arrive a Boulanik, et a cherche a soulever les villages dans le district de
Pyass. Les Akkars, qui appartiennent au Sandjack de Tripoli, instigues
par Mistick Bey, ont tu6 leur Mussellim, saccage sa maison, et pilie la
caisse publique ; de maniere que si Fon n'arrete pas cet etat de choses, la
revolte se propagera de plus en plus.
Le 13 Juin, 1839. (Translation.)
Extract of Reports received by the Generalissimo, dated the 21st Rebi-el-
evel, and reported by him to the Viceroy, in his letter of the 23rd
of the same month.
THE ' person named Kutchuk Ali Oglou, who some time ago came
over from the Turks, has been sent to the village of Erzin to raise the
mountaineers of the Giaour Daghi. The deserter, Khadje Omar Oglou*
also has been sent to Tchertchil with the same view. Mistick Bey has
arrived at Boulanik, and has endeavoured to raise the villages in the
district of Pyass. The Akkars, who belong to the Sandjack of Tripoli,
at the instigation of Mistick Bey, have slain their Mussellim, sacked his
house, and pillaged the public chest; so that, if this state of things is
not put an end to, the revolt will increase more and more.
June 13, 1839.

142

Inclosure 3 in No. 94.
Depdche de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi a Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, en date $n 28
ReM-el-evel, 1255.— (10 Juin, 1839.)
(Traduction.) J'AI regu votre depeche du 23 du courant, par laquelle vous
m'annoncez que nos adversaires etendent de plus en plus leur agression
et leur invasion ; qu'ils ont arme les habitans de tous les villages situes
au-dela d'Antab, et ceux de Kessil-Hissar, en-dega des villages d'Antab ;
qu'ils ont eminent de leur c6te les notables d'Antab ; qu'outre qu'ils ont
precedemment et dernierement seduit le territoire de Pyass, la montagne
Kourd-Daghi, et celle de Giaour-Daghi, ils ont excite les insurges a
attaquer Akkar, dependance de Tripoli, et a assassiner et piller le
Gouverneur de Fendroit.
L 'agression de nos adversaires a depasse les bornes ; avec plus de
patience nous ne pourrons plus les arreter, car peu-a-peu ils semeront
partout le desordre. Autant avons-nous ete patiens et circonspectSi
pour ne pas agir contre le gre des Grandes Puissances, autant nos adver
saires se sont avances et ont porte les choses au point ou elles en sont ;
de maniere qu'il n'y a plus de remede. En different davantage, nous
perdrons du tems, ce qui ne convient pas a notre position. Done, uous
n'avons d'autre ressource que celle de marcher sur eux et de les attaquer.
Comme I'agression vient de leur part, Fetat evident des choses demontre
qu'apres tout les Grandes Puissances nous excuseront et nous donneront
raison. En conclusion, a l'arrivee de la presente depeche, vous attaquerez
les troupes de vos adversaires qui sont entrees sur notre territoire, et
apres les en avoir chassees, vous marcherez sur leur Grande Armee a
laquelle vous livrerez bataille. Si par Faide de Dieu, la fortune se declare
pour nous, sans depasser le defile de Goulek-Boghas, vous marcherez droit
vers Malatia, Kharpaut, Ourfa, et Diarbekir.

(Translation.)
Despatch from His Highness the Viceroy to His Highness Ibrahim Paska,
dated the 28th Rebi-el-evel, 1255.— (10th June, 1839.)
I HAVE received your despatch of the 23rd instant, in which you
inform me that our adversaries carry their aggression and invasion
further and further ; that they have armed the inhabitants of all the
villages situated beyond Aintab, and those of Kessil Hissar on this side of
the villages of Aintab ; that they have gained to their side the chief men
of Aintab ; that besides having, from first to last, corrupted the territory
of Pyass, the mountain Kourd Daghi and that of Giaour Daghi, they
have incited the insurgents to attack Akhar, a dependency of Tripoli, and
to assassinate and plunder the Governor of the place.
The aggression of our adversaries has passed bounds ; if we have
patience any longer, we shall be unable to stop them, for by degrees they will
scatter disorder everywhere. The more patient and circumspect we have
been in order not to act contrary to the wish of the Great Powers, the more
have our adversaries advanced, and have pushed matters to the point
where they now are ; so that there is no longer any remedy. By delaying
further, we shall lose time, which would be inconvenient in our position.
We have then no other resource than to march against them and attack
them. As the aggression comes from their side, the evident state of
affairs shows that, after all, the Great Powers will excuse us and do us
justice. In conclusion, on the arrival of this despatch, you will attack the
troops of your adversaries who have entered our territory, and after
having driven them out, you will march on the main body of their army,

143
and will engage them. IS, by the aid of God, fortune declares in our
favour, without passing the defile of Goulek-Boghas, you will march
Siteaight upon Malatia,, Kharpoot,, Qrfa, and Diarbekir.

No. 95.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Alexandria, June 16, 1839.
THE Pasha's steamer, the " Nile," arrived here on the morning of
£he 14th instant, with letters from Ibrahim Pasha, dated Touzel, the 8th
of June. I was with the Pasha when the letters arrived, and he immediately
caused them to be read aloud by one of his secretaries, in the presence of
several persons, and of M. de Laurin, who arrived soon after the letters.
I have the honour to inclose a copy of the report of Ibrahim Pasha,
by which your Lordship will perceive that one of the Pashas of the Sultan,
Solyman Pasha of Marash, has entered into, and taken possession of,
Aintab, the chief town of a district in Syria, and that Hafiz Pasha himsdf
was with that corps. No doubt can therefore remain in regard to the
aggression of Hafiz Pasha on Syria : and up to the last news from Syria,
not a single soldier of Ibrahim Pasha's army had entered the territory of
the Sultan, or committed any aggression.
1 have also the honour to transmit the translation of a letter from
Ibrahim Pasha to Hafiz Pasha, and which was sent to the latter by a
Colonel of Artillery. Your Lordship will see that Ibrahim Pasha states
all his causes of complaint against Hafiz Pasha, and accuses Hafiz Pasha
himself of having approached his camp with a corps of Regular Cavalry.
And the whole letter is couched in terms of great moderation, and, in one
part, of deference to the wishes of the Great Powers ; and the moderation
of Mehemet Ali has been clearly shown in the orders he gave to Ibrahim
Pasha to remain at Aleppo as long as possible, even at the risk of seeing
the insurrection caused by Hafiz Pasha, spread in Syria, and giving
time to the Turks to concentrate their forces and receive all their rein
forcements. The reply of Hafiz Pasha was not yet known.
The fleet of Mehemet Ali is leaving this for the coast of Syria. On
my speaking to the Pasha on the subject, and telling him that I thought
it a bad and useless measure, he replied, that he had not any intention of
meeting the Sultan's squadron, but as the coast of Syria was now almost
entirely without troops, and as the Sultan's emissaries were using all
their.means to cause a revolt against him in every part of Syria, it becam
necessary to send the fleet to the sea-ports to protect the people and the
foreign commercial interests in those towns. f have &c.
(Signed) ' PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure ] in No. 95.

Extrait de la lettre de Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, en date du 27 Rebi-el-evel,
1225, de Touzel— (8 Juin, 1839.)
LES regimens qui se trouvent a Antab ont ete retires par moi, et j?ai
laisse seulement dans la forteresse de la dite ville un bataillon d'lnfan-
terie. Solyman Pacha de Marache est entre a Antab. Pour m'assurer de
ce fait, j'ai expedie Magioun Bey vers la dite ville avec 600 cavaliers Arabes
(appeies Hanadis). Le dit Solyman Pacha avec un egal nombre de cava
liers Turcs irreguliers* sortitde la ville, et un engagement a eu lieu entre
ces deux corps. Solyman Pacha s'est retire dans la ville avec une perte
de 40 a 50 hommes, etnos Arabes ont amenes 15 a 20 chevaux avec eux,
de maniere. que Solyman Pacha se trouve encore a Antab. Le lendemain
de cette affaire, nos Arabes Hanadis ont ajpergu non loin d'ici un corps de

144
cavaliers reguliers de l'Armee -Turque qui a commence a tirer du canon
sur eux. Aussitot j'ai pris la cavalerie et quatre batteries d'artillerie -a
cheval et j'ai marche vers Fennemi. A peine m'ont-ils vu de loin, que les
uns se sont sauves au trot et d'autres au galop. Je me suis assure par
des deserteurs, et des hommes blesses qui ont ete pris par nos Hanadis,
que Hafiz Pacha se trouvait avec eux. J'ai pris des mesures pour expulser
Solyman Pacha d'Antab, et attaquer la cavalerie susdite d'Hafiz Pacha.

(Translation.)
Extract of the Letter of His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated 27th Rebi-el-evel,
1225, de Touzel— (June 8, 1839.)
THE regiments which were at Aintab have been withdrawn by me,
and I have left only one battalion of Infantry in the fortress of that town.
Solyman Pasha of Marash has entered Aintab. To assure myself of
this fact, I despatched Maggiun Bey in the direction of that town with
600 Arab horsemen (called Hanadis). The said Solyman Pasha, with an
equal number of Turkish Irregular Cavalry, came out of the town, and
an engagement took place between the two corps. Solyman Pasha
retreated into the town with a loss of from forty to fifty men, and our Arabs
brought from fifteen to twenty horse with them ; so that Solyman Pasha
is still at Aintab. The day after this affair, our Arab Hanadis perceived,
not far from hence, a corps of Regular Cavalry of the Turkish Army,
which began to cannonade them. I immediately took the Cavalry and four
batteries of Horse Artillery, and I marched upon the enemy. * They had
hardly seen me from a distance, before they made their escape, some at a
trot, and others at a gallop. I ascertained from some deserters, and from
some wounded men who were taken by our Hanadis, that Hafiz Pasha
was with them. I have taken measures for driving Solyman Pasha out
of Aintab, and for attacking the above-mentioned Cavalry of Hafiz Pasha.

Inclosure 2 in No. 95.

Lettre de Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha a Son Excellence Hafiz Pacha, en date
du 27 Rebi-el-evel— (8 Juin, 1839.)
D'APRES les depeches adressees de la part des Grandes Puissances a
leurs Consuls-Generaux residans a Alexandrie, je suis persuade qu'elles
n'approuvent pas la guerre, et que Sa Hautesse, notre magnanime Maitre,
est du meme sentiment. Malgre cela, — 1°. Solyman Pacha de Marache
a envoye un corps de cavalerie, et il a attaque la notre qui se trouvait a
Boulanik. 2°. Vous avez envoye un corps de Kourde Mistic Bey a Payass,
dans le but de soulever la population. 3°. Hadji Omar Oglou a ete envoye
a Kourd-Dagh dans le meme but. 4°. Vous avez attaque sur notre terri
toire, avec la cavalerie reguliere et irreguliere, nos Hanadis. 5°. Vous
avez distribue des armes aux habitans des villages de la province d'Antab
et Solyman Pacha est entre dans cette ville et il s'y trouve encore. Hier
aussi Votre Excellence avec un corps de cavalerie reguliere a fait une
excursion jusqu'a Fapproche de notre camp, et elle a fait jouer son artil-
lerie contre notre avant-garde Hanadi. Jusqu'a present, j'ai souffert
tout cela sans aucun mouvement hostile de ma part, persuade comme ie
le suis, que les hostilites sont contraires a la volonte sublime de notre
Auguste Maitre, comme aux principes et aux intentions des Grandes
Puissances Europeennes. Si Votre Excellence attribue mon inaction a la
crainte, elle se trompe ; mon inaction n'est autre chose que le desir de me
conformer a la volonte de Sa Hautesse notre Auguste Maitre. Au con-
traire, si Votre Excellence a I'ordre de commencer la guerre, pourquoi ces
intrigues, pourquoi ces menees ? Venez, mais venez ouvertement sur le
champ de bataille. Votre Excellence n'aura probablement pas oublie
qu'elle a a faire a des hommes saris peur ; par consequence ces intrigues ne

145
•seront pas souffertes Iongtems. Enfin, je prends la liberte de vous ecrire,
'et de yous envoyer le Colonel d'Artillerie Mahomed Bey, pour avoir une
reponse franche de Votre Excellence. (Translation.)
Letter from His Highness Ibrahim Pasha to his Excellency Hafiz Pasha, dated
27th Rebi-el-evel— (June 8, 1839.)
ACCORDING to the despatches addressed by the Great Powers to
their Consuls-General at Alexandria, lam persuaded that they do not
approve of the war, and that His Highness, our magnanimous Master, is
of the same opinion. Nevertheless, — 1°. Solyman Pasha of Marash has
sent a body of Cavalry, and he has attacked our Cavalry which was at
Boulanik. 2°. You have sent a corps of Kourd Mistic Bey to Payass,
with the view of raising the population. 3°. Hadji Omar Oglou has been
sent to Kourd-Dagh with the same object. 4°. You have attacked our
Hanadis in our territory, with Regular and Irregular Cavalry. 5°. You
have distributed arms amongst the inhabitants ' of the villages of the
Province of Aintab, and Solyman Pasha entered that town, and is
still there. Yesterday also your Excellency, with a corps of Regular
Cavalry, made an incursion near to our camp, and discharged your
artillery upon our advanced guard of Hanadis. Hitherto I have suffered
all this without any hostile movement on my part, persuaded, as I am,
that hostilities are contrary to the sublime will of our august Master, as
Well as to the principles and intentions of the Great European Powers.
If your Excellency attributes my inaction to fear, you deceive yourself;
my inaction is only owing to my desire to comply with the wish of His
Highness our august Master. On the contrary, if your Excellency has
orders to begin the war, wherefore these intrigues, wherefore these
plots ? Come, but come openly to the field of battle. Your Excellency
has probably not forgotten that you have to do with men without fear ; con
sequently, these intrigues will not be long endured. Finally, I take the
liberty of writing to you, and of sending to you the Colonel of Artillery,
Mahomed Bey, in order to obtain a candid answer from your Excellency.

No. 96.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Alexandria, June 16, 1839.
THE French packet-steamer arrived here late in the evening of the
13th instant with Captain Caillier, an aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult.
Captain Caillier was the bearer of despatches, dated the 28th of May,
from the Marshal to. M. Cochelet, directing him to call on Mehemet Ali to
cease all hostilities in the event of their having taken place, and to retire
his army into Syria, if they had passed beyond the limits of that
province. The Marshal says in his despatch, that the Five Great Powers have
resolved to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, they demand
that measures from the Pasha are necessary to Europe, " comme une
nebessite Europeenne," which it will be more to his advantage to conform
to than to oppose, " qu'il vaut mieux respecter que braver;" that Mehe
met Ali having in these late affairs given proofs of good faith, " loyaute,"
and having kept his word, he had acquired fresh titles to the good-will of
the European Powers, and so much the more, as the Porte, on its part,
had evidently been the aggressor ; that France consults at this moment
with England and with the Allies, on the means of employing the united
squadrons of England and France, whose Admirals will, Without delay,.'
receive instructions and powerful reinforcements ; and that measures are
taking to settle the Question of the East on a solid and equitable basis.
U

146
Monsieur Cochelet having explained this to Mehemet Ali, the Pasha,
on the 15th instant, agreed to give a formal letter to Captain Caillier, to
be delivered by him to his son Ibrahim Pasha, in which he directs him not
to pursue the Turks beyond his frontier, in case the Turks should not
already have repassed it, and to halt wherever Captain Caillier may find
him, in case the Egyptian army should already have entered the Sultan's
territory and occupied any part of it.
M. Cochelet had engagedmyself and his other Colleagues, to support
the demand of his Government with Mehemet Ali, and we all did so.
As I had not then a full knowledge of the contents of M. Cochelet's de
spatch, I limited myself, (and my other Colleagues did the same,) to state to
the Pasha, the same as I have ever done, that he should not pass the frontiers
of Syria, as that would be an offensive and not a defensive operation, and
would be injurious to his interests. But the Pasha did not seem disposed
to accede to this, until after Ibrahim Pasha should first have defeated the
Turks, and that he might , remain in the country which he would occupy
after a victory.
But M. Cochelet having accepted what Mehemet Ali offered, Captain
Caillier will leave this with the first steamer to be sent by the Pasha to
Alexandretta or Suedia, from whence he will proceed to the head-quarters
of Ibrahim Pasha.
I believe that if M. Cochelet would have held out a little longer, our
united remonstrances might possibly have prevailed on the Pasha to
accede to the full extent of his desire, to retire the Egyptian troops, in
the event that they were now in the Sultan's territory ; but M. Cochelet
was, I believe, so glad that he had prevailed so far on the Pasha without
the aid of his Colleagues, that he hastened to accept the Pasha's offer, in
order that he might be able to say that France had done everything, and
that her voice was all-powerful.
I hope to be in time to transmit a translation of the letter to Ibrahim
Pasha, of which Captain Caillier is to be the bearer, but which has not
yet been sent to M. Cochelet. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL. June 17.
P. S. — I have just received the document above alluded to, and of
which I now transmit a copy.

Inclosure in No. 96.

Lettre de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi a Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, en date
du 5 Rebi-el-akhir, 1255— (16 Juin, 1839.)
(Apres les titres.)
LE porteur de cette lettre est M. Caillier, Aide-de-camp de Son
Excellence le Marechal Soult, President du Conseil, et Ministre des
Affaires Etrangeres de France. Arrive ici avant-hier, il m'a informe qu'il
est charge de vous voir, tandis qu'un autre Aide-de-camp comme lui, va a.
Constantinople, pour se rendre de la aupres de Hafiz Pacha, Je vous
Fenvoie done par un bateau a vapeur et accompagne de mon second
interprete, Husroff Effendi. Cet officier annonce que sa mission, ainsi
que celle de FAide-de-camp qui se rend aupres de Hafiz Pacha, a pour
objet d'empecher la guerre qui parait imminente ; et il ajoute, que les
Grandes Puissances arrangeront cette affaire.
En consequence, si jusqu'a Farrivee de M. Caillier vous n'avez pas
encore fait sortir de la frontiere les troupes Turques entrees dans nos
limites, cet officier vous fera rester ou vous etes, et apres avoir ete aupres
de Hafiz Pacha, vu FAide-de-camp expedie vers lui, et reconnu ce qu'il
aura fait, il reviendra vous en rendre compte. Si a son retour il vous dit
que l'Armee Ottomane s'est arretee ou elle est, et que les troupes Turques

147
entrees dans nos limites vont etre retirees, vous ne ferez de votre c6te
aucun mouvement et vous vous arreterez ou vous etes. Mais si apres le
retour de M. Caillier avec cette assurance, Hafiz Pacha ne s'arrete pas,
s'il continue les memes mouvemens qu'auparavant, et ne fait pas sortir
ses troupes de notre frontiere, vous marcherez contre lui et le combattrez.
Dans le cas enfin ou a Parrivee de cet officier, vous auriez deja chasse les
troupes Turques entrees dans nos limites, et ou'vous auriez marche en
avant, vous devrez encore vous arreter la ou vous serez, et attendre que
i'arrangeirient que pfendront les Grandes Puissances, soit connu et vous
ait ete notifie par moi.
Je vous annoUce aussi que pour faire cesser Finquietude que causera
I'avis de la sortie de la flotte de Constantinople, je Vais enVoyer ma flotte
sur les cotes de la Syrie ; a cet effet, une portion est sortie aujourd'hui et
le reste sortira demain.

(Translation.)
Letter from His Highness the Viceroy to His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated
5th Rebi-el-dkhir, 1255.— (16th June, 1839.)
(After Titles.)
THE bearer of this lettfer is M. Caillier, Aide-de-camp of His Excel
lency Marshal Soult, President of the Council, and Minister for Foreign
Affairs of France. Having arrived here the day before yesterday, he
informed me that he is instructed to see you, whilst another Aide-de
camp like himself, goes to Constantinople, to proceed from thence to
Hafiz Pasha. I therefore send him to you in a steam boat, accompanied
by my second interpreter, Husroff Effendi. This officer declares that his
mission, as well as that of the Aide-de-camp who proceeds to Hafiz Pasha,
has for its object to prevent the war which appears imminent, and he
adds, that the Great Powers will arrange this affair.
Consequently, if before the arrival of M. Caillier, you have not yet
driven across the frontier the Turkish troops which had entered within
our bounds, that officer will cause you to remain where you are, and after
having been to Hafiz Pasha, seen the Aide-de-camp despatched to him,
and ascertained what he has done, he will return to make his report to
you thereupon. If, on his return, he tells you that the Ottoman Army
remains stationary, and that the Turkish troops which had entered
within our limits are about to be withdrawn, you will not make any move
ment on your own part, and you will remain where you are. But if after
the return of M. Caillier with this assurance, Hafiz Pasha does not remain
stationary, if he continues the same movements as formerly, and does not
withdraw his troops from our frontier, you will march against him and
engage him. Finally, in case you should, on the arrival of that officer,
have already driven away the Turkish troops which had entered within
our bounds, and if you should have advanced, you must still remain
where you may then be, and wait until the arrangement which the Great
Powers may make, shall be known and shall have been notified to you by me.
I also announce to you, that in order to put an end to the uneasiness
which will be caused by the intelligence of the departure of the fleet from
Constantinople, I am going to send my fleet to the Coast of Syria; for
this purpose, a portion of it is gone to-day, and the remainder will go to
morrow.

U 2

148

No. 97.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Alexandria, June 18, 1839.
THE Government post from Damascus has this moment brought to
me a letter, dated 10th of June, from Mr. Consul Werry of Damascus.
Mr. Consul Werry has inclosed to me copy of a letter of 5th of
June, from Solyman Pasha to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, and of which I
have the honour to transmit a copy.
Your Lordship will perceive by this letter, that the Sultan's van-guard
has retired upon the main body, and thus evacuated the territory of
Mehemet Ali, and I sincerely trust that a general action may yet be
avoided. The Sultan's officers, however, continue their intrigues and
efforts to stir up rebellion in Syria, and more particularly towards Beylan
and Pyass, as your Lordship will perceive by the report of Mr. Vice-
Consul Hays, of which I have the honour to transmit copy, and which
shows the efforts of Hafiz Pasha to cause revolt in the lower ranges of
the Taurus extending to Beylan and Pyass. And his plan, therefore,
seems to be to avoid a battle, and to cause revolt, and to move on in the
rear of that movement.
By intelligence from Lieutenant Lynch of the steamer in the river
Tigris, I learn that Ali Pasha of Bagdad was detained at Moussoul by
the spirit of insurrection which had been manifested by the inhabitants
of that place. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 97.
Solyman Pasha to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry. Du Camp de Bahwarta, ,
Monsieur le Consul, 24 Rebi-evel, 1255.
JE remplis avec plaisir la promesse que je vous fis a mon depart
d'Alep, de vous donner quelques nouvelles sur ce qui se passe de ce cote-ci.
A mon arrivee a Bahwarta, pres de Tel-il-Chair avec Finfanterie de
Farmee, j'ai trouve Son Altesse le General-en-Chef qui y etait campe avec
la cavalerie. Le lendemain avant le jour, Son Altesse partit avec ce
dernier corps pour Tel-Bediir, afin de decider Favant-garde Turque qui
devait se trouver la, a un mouvement significatif ; ce but a ete atteint, en
ce que cette troupe, sans attendre nos regimens, s'est repliee sur le gros
de Farmee et ainsi evacue entierement notre territoire. Son Altesse est
a Touzel. Mais en renongant, du moins selon les apparences, a nous faire la
guerre a force ouverte, les Turcs n'ont pas renonce a leur systeme
d'hostilite sourde et constante : vous avez su precedemment leurs menees
sur Fesprit des populations du cote d'Antab.
Maintenant c'est dans le Beylan qu'ils cherchent a nous susciter des
troubles: ils viennent d'envoyer a Payass un certain Mistick Bey, ancien
Mousselim de cette ville, pour essayer de soulever les peuples ; mais un
regiment d'infanterie, un de cavalerie, et une batterie de canons se
rendent a Payass; et leur presence suffira pour etouffer promptement
toutes les guerres de souievement qu'aurait pu repandre cet emissaire.
Hier, 26 cavaliers Turcs deserteurs sont arrives ici ; 30 autres sont
diriges sur Adana par Antab. Agreez, &c,
(Signe) LE GENERAL SOLYMAN.

149
(Translation.)
Solyman Pasha to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.
Sir, Camp of Bahwarta, Rebi-el-evel 24, 125
I FULFIL with pleasure the promise I made to you on my departure
from Aleppo, to give you some news of what is passing in this quarter.
On my arrival at Bahwarta, near Tel-il-Chair, with the infantry of the
army, I found His Highness the General-in-Chief, who was encamped
there with his cavalry. On the morrow before day His Highness set out
with this last corps for Tel-Bechir, in order to ci^se the Turkish
advanced guard who might be there, to make some positive movement ;
that object was accomplished, by that force, without waiting for our regi
ments, falling back upon the main body of the army and thus entirely
evacuating our territory. His Highness is at Touzel.
But in declining, at least as far as appearances went, to make war
upon us openly, the Turks have not given up their system of covert and
constant hostility: you have known previously of their machinations on
the minds of the people in the direction of Aintab.
At present it is in the Beylan that they are seeking to raise up
troubles to us : they have just sent to Pyass a certain Mistick Bey, for
merly Mussellim of that town, in order to attempt to raise the people ;
but a regiment of infantry, one of cavalry, and a battery of guns is
going to Pyass; and their presence will, suffice promptly to suppress all
the insurrections which that Emissary may have occasioned.
Yesterday twenty-six Turkish horsemen deserters arrived here;-
thirty others have gone to Adana by Aintab.
Receive o&c.
(Signed) GENERAL SOLYMAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 97.
Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.
(Extract.) Alexandretta, June 4, 1839.
I TAKE advantage of this conveyance, to inform you that an attack
is apprehended on this side, and of the measures that have been taken in
consequence. Yesterday it was reported, that Mistik Bey had reached a place,
called Boulauk, fifteen hours from Pyass, with a force, stated variously
at from 1,000 to 6,000 men, with the intention of making a descent on
Pyass. This morning I heard he had advanced to Arsine, three hours
from Pyass, to the Governor of whom he had sent notice of his approach
with his forces, in the name of the Sultan, and not as robbers.
In consequence of these reports, 1 went to ascertain the facts from
Rushman Effendi, who informed me, that Mistik Bey had reached
Arsine with the intention of advancing to Pyass, and that the force he
had with him amounted to about 6,000 mountaineers. That the excuse
of advancing in the name of the Sultan was a mere pretence ; the people
he had with him were the mountaineers of Giaour Dagh. The precau
tions taken are to reland 400 of the troops embarked yesterday for
Alexandria, 200 of which are going to Pyass by the " Crocodile" steamer,
and 200 remain here ; and to send 200 Irregular Cavalry, arrived yester
day from Beylan, to a village called Archi, one hour and a half from
Alexandretta, towards Pyass ; and also to retain the remainder of the
troops on board the vessels, amounting to 1,300 men, till orders are
received from Ibrahim Pasha, for which purpose this post is sent. They
are on board the two corvettes that have been some time here, and were
to have sailed to-day.

150

No. 98.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Alexandria, June 19, 1839.
. I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that " El Generoso,"
steamer of the Pasha, arrived yesterday from Alexandretta, with letters
dated, Touzel, 10th June, from Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali.
Ibrahim Pasha was with his army at Touzel, which is not far from
Aintab, and Hafiz Pasha was at about three hours' distance at Nezib, near
the banks of the Sedjour river, but in the territory of the Sultan ; and
Solyman Pasha of Marash was still in Aintab with troops of the
Sultan. The steamer of the Pasha, which left this on the 10th instant with the
order of Mehemet Ali to drive the Turks out of Syria, and to advance on
Hafiz Pasha, had arrived at Alexandretta at the departure of " El Generoso,"
but Ibrahim Pasha had not then received the letter of Mehemet Ali ; and
although no action had taken place between the armies, I much fear that
it would not be delayed long after Mehemet Ali's order of 10th June
should reach Ibrahim Pasha.
I have the honour to transmit the reply of Hafiz Pasha to the letter
sent to him by Ibrahim Pasha, and which is the inclosure in my despatch
of 16th June.
Your Lordship will perceive, that Hafiz Pasha writes in a very
vague manner to Ibrahim Pasha, but does not make any reference to his
reason for stirring up revolt in the villages in Syria, or for taking posses
sion of Aintab ; nor does he say that it is his intention to retire his
army. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.
P.S. — Captain Caillier, the Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, will leave
this in the Pasha's steamer to-morrow morning for Alexandretta, from
whence he will proceed to the head-quarters of Ibrahim Pasha.

Inclosure in No. 98.

. Lettre d'Hafiz Pacha a Son Excellence Ibrahim Pacha, sous la date du 28
Rebi-el-evel, 1255. — (9 Juin, 1839.)
(Apr6s les titres.)
J'AI regule tresor de la lettre que Votre Excellence avait charge le
Colonel d'Artillerie Mahomed Hazik Bey de m'apporter, et j'en ai
compris le predeux contenu. Dans cette lettre, en temoignant une grande
soumission a notre bienfaiteur, au bienfaiteur du monde, notre tout-
puissant et tres-honore Seigneur et Maitre, et en exprimant le desir
d'appeler sur elle le bon vouloir de Sa Hautesse, Votre Excellence est
bien aise aussi de connaitre mon opinion.
Que le Dieu bon daigne conserver le corps de notre Auguste Seigneur
aussi longtems que le monde durera, et qu'il fasse que son ombre
s'etende sur tous les serviteurs et protege ceux qui lui sont devoues.
II est hors de doute que la soumission ne consiste pas seulement dans
les paroles, mais qu'elle doit se manifester par des services effectifs.
Lorsque Farmee Sultanienne est venue a Bir et qu'elle a plante en cet
endroit ses tentes victorieuses, Magioun Akasi, Commandant de la
Cavalerie Arabe (Hanadi), s'est avance jusqu'a demi lieue de Bir, dan
l'intention de faire des reconnaissances, et probablement aussi de saccager
les villages. En effet, a leur retour, ces cavaliers ont ravage les villages de
la Province d'Ourfa, et emmene tous les bestiaux; deux jours auparavant

151
ces memes Hanadis ont voie et maltraite un meunier : ces deux faits
doivent etre a votre connaissance. De notre c6te, forces par la necessite,
et dans l'intention de proteger les pauvres, nous avons fait marcher un
corps de Spahis comme avant-garde. Quelques-uns de ces Spahis ayant
perdu leurs chevaux, et s'etant avanc.es a leur recherche jusqu'au. lieu qui
separe Antab de Bir, ou se trouvaient 300 Hanadis, une trentaine de ces der-
niers se sont separes de leur corps, ont couru sur ces quelques Spahis, en ont
desarme un, Font mis a mort, et non contens de cela, ils lui ont ensuite
tranche la tete. Ce fait, qui est a votre connaissance, ne s'accordarit pas
avec les principes de soumission que vous professez envers notre Maitre,
nous avons ete contraints d'user des represailles. Quoiqu'il en soit, si,
conformement a la loi pure, Votre Excellence fait accorder les faits avec
les pretentions, elle sera un objet d'envie pour tous ses confreres, sous
l'ombre tout-puissante de notre haut Seigneur. C'est comme un aver-
tissement de bienveillance que j'ai pris la liberte d'ecrire cette lettre
amicale, et je vous Fadresse par le Colonel Hazik Bey qui retourne
aupres de Votre Excellence, accompagne par Achmet Bey, un des Colonels
de Farmee victorieuse. Lorsque, par la grace de Dieu, elle vous sera
heureusement parvenue, I'execution de son contenu dependra de la
haute opinion de Votre Excellence. (Translation.)
Letter from Hafiz Pasha to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, dated 28th
Rebi-el-evel, 1255.— (9th June, 1839.)
(After titles.)
I HAVE received the esteemed letter which your Excellency desired
the Colonel of Artillery, Mahomed Hazik Bey, to bring to me, and I have
understood its precious contents. In this letter your Excellency, showing
great submission to our benefactor, and to the benefactor of the world,
our all-powerful and much-honoured Lord and Master, and invoking the
goodwill of His Highness, is so good as to ask my opinion.
May the good God deign to preserve the body of our august Lord
as long as the world shall last, and may he cause his shadow to extend
over all his servants, and to protect those who are devoted to him.
It is beyond doubt that submission does not consist merely in words,
but that it also must show itself in effective services.
When the Army of the Sultan came to Bir, and pitched in that place
its victorious tents, Maggiun Akasi, Commander of the Arab (Hanadi)
Cavalry, advanced to within half a league of Bir, intending to make a
reconnaissance, and probably also to pillage the villages. In fact, on
their return those horsemen ravaged the villages of the 'Province- of Orfa,
and carried away all the cattle. Two days previously, these same
Hanadis robbed and maltreated a miller: these two facts ought to be
known to you. We on our side, forced by necessity, and intending to
protect these poor people, sent a body of Spahis forward as an advanced
guard. Some of these Spahis, having lost their horses, and having pro
ceeded to look for them as far as the place which separates Aintab from
Bir, where there were 300 Hanadis, thirty of these Hanadis separated
from their regiment,- charged these Spahis, disarmed one, put him to death,
and not content with that, afterwards cut off his head. This fact, which
is known to you, not being in accordance with the principles of submis
sion which you profess towards our Master, we have been obliged to
resort to reprisals. Be this, as it may, if, in conformity with the pure
law, your Excellency causes your acts to be in accordance with your
professions, you will be an object of envy to all your Colleagues, under
the all-powerful shadow of our high Lord. It is by way of an intimation
of goodwill that I have taken the liberty of writing this friendly letter.
I send it to you by Colonel Hazik Bey, who is returning to your Excel
lency, accompanied by Achmet Bey, one of the Colonels of the victorious
Army. When by the grace of God it shall reach you safely, the fulfilment
of its contents will depend upon the high opinion of your Excellency.

152

No. 99.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 7.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 16, 1839.
ON the 14th, late, I received the inclosed note from his Excellency
the French Ambassador, and I immediately waited upon him. He read
to me part of a despatch from Marshal Soult, which he had just received.
It contained instructions to apply in the strongest manner to the Sublime
Porte to prevent hostilities, if they had not already commenced, and to
put an instant end to them if they had ; and it directed his Excellency to
communicate with me, and said that the British Government entirely
concurred with the French in everything relating to affairs in this
country; and it appeared that the French Government had not had
communication with the British Government since the arrival in Paris of
the intelligence that gave rise to this instruction from the Marshal to the
Ambassador. His Excellency asked me what I would do. I replied, that having
no instructions, I could not take any steps, under circumstances that
were new, and might occasion new views to be taken by my Government.
His Excellency agreed that I was not authorized to act, but said that he
must immediately apply to the Porte as he had been instructed to do.
His Excellency did send a message, which I understand was to the
effect that the Sublime Porte must, without delay, recall the army of Hafiz
Pasha from the position it occupies, and order it to recross the Euphrates,
and that otherwise the Porte will be considered to be the aggressor.
I am informed that the Ottoman Ministers are excessively angry.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 99.
Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

Ce 14 Juin, 1839.
LE BARON ROUSSIN a l'honneur de transmettre les lettres ci-
jointes a son honorable Collegue, et de lui demander un moment
d'audience; il a regu un officier, aide-de-camp de M. le Maredial Soult,
porteur de depeches de la plus haute importance pour les deux Cabinets
amis, et il desire vivement les communiquer a son honorable Collegue,
qu'il prie d'agreer ses affectueux complimens.
(Translation.)
Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby. June 14, 1839.
BARON ROUSSIN has the honour to forward to his honourable
Colleague the accompanying letters, and to ask a moment's interview with
him; he has received an officer, Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, who is
the bearer of despatches of the highest importance for the two friendly
Cabinets, and he anxiously desires to communicate them to his honour
able Colleague, whom he requests to accept his most affectionate com
pliments.

153
No. 100.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 7-)
My Lord, Therapia, June 16, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter from me to the
Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean,
dated May 22. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 100.
Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.
Sir, Therapia, May 22, 1839.
I HAVE satisfied my own mind that the Sublime Porte has finally
determined upon war against the Pasha of Egypt. It does not appear
that hostilities have decidedly commenced as yet. 1 have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No 101.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 4.)
/Extract.) Paris, July 2, 1839.
I THIS morning communicated to Marshal Soult, Count Nesselrode's
despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, upon the present state of affairs in the
Levant, of which a copy was given to your Lordship by the Charge
d'Affaires in London. His Excellency expressed his entire concurrence
in your opinion, in regard to the impolicy of continuing the present
relative position of the Sultan and of Mehemet Ali, and the necessity
of settling on a permanent footing their relations to each other; but
he was not prepared to assent to your Lordship's proposition that no
settlement would be satisfactory which did not restore the whole of
Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan. He said, that the Court
of Berlin had suggested the plan of the Pashalics of Tripoli and of
Aleppo being given up by Ibrahim Pasha, leaving to him the possession
of the Pashalic of Acre and of Damascus ; that he was not aware of the
views of the Court of Vienna in regard to this matter, and that the French
Government had not yet formed any opinion upon it. Marshal Soult,
however, gave me to understand, that his hesitation to accede to' your
Lordship's proposal, arose from his doubt of the possibility of obtaining
Mehemet Ali's acquiescence in it, rather than from any objection to the
arrangement itself.

No. 102.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 8.)
My Lord, Paris, July 5, 1839.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 2nd of July.
The debate in the Chamber of Deputies, on the vote of credit demanded
by the Government for the augmentation of the French Naval Force in the
Levant, excited a much greater degree of interest than is usually felt in
that assembly upon foreign affairs, and was remarkable for the ability
.X.

154
with which the question was discussed. Not a dissentient voice was heard
against the proposition of" the Government, and a willingness was even
manifested to increase the amount of the vote,, if a larger sum were required,
to enable the French Government to assume an imposing attitude in the
affairs of the East. Many distinguished speakers, of different political
parties, concurred in the policy of maintaining the independence and
integrity of the Turkish Empire ; of rescuing the Sultan from the protec
tion of Russia ; and of resisting, with determination, the pretension of
Russia to the exclusive right of stationing her fleets in the Bosphorus.
The debate lasted three days, and terminated with a vote of 287 to
26 in favour of the proposition of the Government.
The vote will much strengthen the hands of the French Government ;
and the ground on which it was supported by most of the speakers, cannot
fail to show, that France is not less determined than England to resist the
principle of the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 103.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 8.)
My Lord, Paris, July 5, 1839.
ON calling this day at the Foreign Office, Marshal Soult informed me
that the despatches from Alexandria and Constantinople, of which notice
was given three days ago by the Marseilles telegraph, had been received
this morning. His Excellency read to me several from M. Cochelet, and
from Admiral Roussin.
M. Cochelet writes, that intelligence having reached Alexandria, of
the entrance of a detachment of Turkish troops into Aintab, and of sixty
villages having been excited to insurrection by Hafiz Pasha, the
united endeavours of all the Consuls of the Great Powers had failed to
induce the Viceroy to suspend the transmission of orders to Ibrahim Pasha
to attack the Turkish army. That Captain Caillier (the officer who had
been directed by Marshal Soult to proceed to Alexandria, and from thence
to the head-quarters of the Egyptian Army in Syria), had, however, arrived
on the 13th, immediately after the departure of the steam-vessel which
conveyed the order to Ibrahim Pasha ; that he was admitted without delay
to an audience of the Viceroy ; and that having explained to his Highness
the object of his mission, he had succeeded in obtaining an order, of which
he, Captain Caillier, was to be himself the bearer (and a copy of which
M. Cochelet incloses in his despatch) to Ibrahim Pasha, to halt the march
of the Egyptian Army wherever it might be, on the arrival of Captain
Caillier at his head quarters.
M. Cochelet mentions that the Egyptian Fleet had left the port of
Alexandria, but that Mehemet Ali had declared it was sent upon a cruise
for the purpose of exercising the crews, as was usual at this season of the
year, and not with any hostile intention.
Admiral Roussin's despatches confirm the accounts previously
received, of the resolution of the Sultan to go to war with the Pasha of
Egypt, and of the efforts to reinforce the army of Hafiz Pasha. On the
sailing of the Turkish Fleet to the Dardanelles, the French Ambassador
complained to Nouri Effendi of the secrecy which had been observed towards
him in respect to the movements of the fleet, and inquired what was its
destination. To this inquiry, Nouri Effendi distinctly replied that the
fleet would proceed with the troops which were embarked on board of it
to the coasts of Syria. The number of troops embarked is supposed to be
between 8,000 and 10,000 men.
Admiral Duperre expressed two days ago to me his opinion, that the
Egyptian Fleet would have the advantage over that of the Sultan, if an
engagement took place; and the more decidedly so if the latter were
encumbered by having troops on board.

Marshal Soiilttold me that several of the despatches he had received
were in cypher, and had not as yet been decyphered. If, he said, they
contained anything of importance, he would in the evening apprize me of
their contents. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 104.
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 8.)
My Lord, Berlin, July 3, 1839.
M. DE RIBEAUPIERRE (who has taken leave of the King of
Prussia, and leaves Berlin to-day) read me a despatch addressed by Count
Nesselrode to the Russian Ambassador in London, which his Excellency
is instructed to communicate to your Lordship. This despatch suggests
for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, a plan for putting an
end to hostilities between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, and for
regulating the affairs of the Contending Parties. M. de Ribeaupierre told
me, that the King of Prussia had spoken to him three times during his
visit at Potsdam, on the subject of this despatch, expressing the pleasure
he received from the moderate and politic views of Russia, and his hope
that they would be acceptable to the British Cabinet. Baron Werther has
since expressed to me his satisfaction at the language held by Russia ;
concluding by saying, that the question was placed by all parties in the
hands of Her Majesty's Government.
Prussia will take no part beyond that of counselling the maintenance
of peace. Count Bresson showed me some despatches of Count St. Aulaire's,
relating his conversation with Prince Metternich on this subject, when
his Highness had suggested the expediency (in case the Sultan's army
should be defeated) of allowing the Russian Army to occupy Constan
tinople, whilst the English, French, and Austrian fleets sailed up the
Dardanelles. I observe in the despatches your Lordship was good enough to com
municate to me, that the writers all consider aggression as the pivot upon
which the policy of the Four Powers is to turn. This induces me to call
to your Lordship's recollection, the definition of aggression given by
Frederick the Great, previous to commencing the seven years' war. His
Majesty said it was not the Power which struck the first blow that was
guilty of aggression, but the Power which by its armaments forced
another Power to strike a blow in its own defence. The acceptation of
this definition would make Mehemet Ali the aggressor.
I have, &c,
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 105.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord William Russell.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 9, 1839.
YOUR Lordship states inyour despatch of July 3, that M. de Ribeau
pierre had read to you a despatch from his Court on the present state of
affairs in the Levant, and that Baron Werther had expressed to you his
satisfaction at the language of Russia on that subject.
The despatch to which your Lordship alludes, is, I conclude, that of
the -j^-th of June, of which I transmitted to you a copy on the 2nd of this
month. The general tone and spirit of that despatch was satisfactory
to Her Majesty's Government, and the more especially so, as it was a
spontaneous offer on the part of Russia, to enter into concert with the
* X 2

156
other Powers of Europe upon the subject of Turkish Affairs ; and Her
Majesty's Government have no doubt that the result of the communica
tions which are about to take place on these matters between the Five
Powers, will be an unanimous adoption of a common course of policy.
But there were some parts of the particular plan recommended by
Count Nesselrode, to which Her Majesty's Government could not agree.
In the first place, the Russian Government seemed to think, that pro
vided the hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali should be con
fined to Syria, the Powers of Europe might, without any danger to their
general and common interests, remain passive spectators of the contest ;
and might leave the two parties, like gladiators in an arena, to exhaust
themselves, and cripple each other as much as they might choose. But
Her Majesty's Government would regard such a conflict, even if waged
in Syria, with much uneasiness; because it would probably end in greatly
weakening the power of the Sultan, and in rendering him less able to
maintain hereafter his political independence and the integrity of his
empire. Again, the Russian Government proposes, in the event of any marked
success on the part of Mehemet Ali, to leave the Egyptians in possession
of Orfa and Diarbekir ; but Diarbekir is the central key of Asia Minor ;
and whoever is strongly in military possession of that post, will have the
command of the whole country. 'A Turkish Army at Diarbekir, is equally
well placed to defend the approach to Constantinople against an enemy
advancing' across the Taurus from Aleppo ; to repel any invasion by way
of Kars and Erzeroum ; or to protect Bagdad from attack by a force
descending the Euphrates from the frontiers of Syria. As long as the
Sultan's Army is in strength at Diarbekir, the Egyptian Army will be kept
in check. But if that post were taken from the Turks and given to the
Egyptians, the latter would have all those means for attack which the
former now have for defence. Bagdad would immediately fall; for, in fact.
all communication between it and Constantinople would be cut off; and if
ever the time should come, when Russia and Mehemet Ali should deter
mine to co-operate together against the Sultan, a Russian force from
Gumri, united with the troops of Mehemet Ali at Diarbekir, would sweep
through the whole extent of Asia Minor. I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 106.
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 9, 1839.
I TRANSMITTED to your Excellency, on the 29th ultimo, a copy
of a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated
the ^th of June, containing a statement of the opinion of the Russian
Government on the present state of affairs in the Levant, which was com
municated to me by M. Kisseleff, on the 27th of June.
I have to instruct your Excellency, to thank the Russian Government
for this communication. Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate the
confidence thus evinced in the British Government by the Cabinet of St.
Petersburgh, and are rejoiced to find, that the general tenour of the
views which have been taken of the matters in question by the two
Cabinets, should be so much the same. Each Government has manifested
an earnest desire, that hostilities between the Sultan and the Pasha
should be prevented, or should be speedily suspended, if begun ; and both
Governments seem impressed with a conviction, that some 'final and
permanent arrangements should be come to, which, by preventing, for the
future, a recurrence of a crisis like the present, may secure the peace of
Europe from the dangers which might arise from hostilities in the Levant
It is to be hoped, therefore, that Russia and Great Britain, in concert
with the other Great Powers, may be able to agree upon a common course

157
of policy, which may be calculated to accomplish purposes so essential for
the general interests of Europe. The British Government has autho
rized and instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, to communi
cate with his colleagues, and with the Austrian Government, on these
matters, with a view to establish a common understanding about them.
Her Majesty's Government has already taken, in concert with that of
France, the first step which is adverted to in the despatch of Count Nes
selrode ; and instructions have been given to Sir Robert Stopford, to
endeavour, in conjunction with the French Admiral, to bring about a
suspension of arms, and to induce Mehemet Ali to withdraw his troops
within the limits of Syria, if the course of events should have led those
troops beyond the confines of that province. When an armistice shall have
been agreed to by both parties, the Five Powers will be able with better
effect to endeavour to negotiate a.final arrangement between the Contend
ing Parties ; and the views and opinions at present entertained upon that
matter by Her Majesty's Government may be stated as follows.
It seems to the British Government, that there can be no security for
permanent peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, as long as they
have both of them an army in Syria ; for neither of them can look upon
their present state of occupation as permanently satisfactory. Mehemet
Ali has too much, not to wish for more ; and the Sultan has lost too
much, to be able to sit down contented with his loss. Each party,
therefore, must consider his present position in Syria, as a starting point
for an attempt to accomplish the object of his desire ; the one for further
encroachment on the Turkish provinces ; the other for the reconquest of
Syria. The two parties might, indeed, be invited to reduce their respec
tive forces to a peace establishment ; but no confidence could be placed
in such an arrangement, even if for the moment agreed to. Mehemet Ali
could not maintain his authority in Syria without a considerable force ;
and the Sultan would necessarily be obliged to have an equal force at
Diarbekir and its neighbourhood. Each party would suspect the other of
secretly augmenting his force ; and probably their mutual suspicions
would be equally well-founded. In a short time the two armies would
again be in presence of each other ; and the work of pacification would
have to be done over again.
The only arrangement, therefore, which could appear to Her Majesty's
Government to be calculated to secure peace for the future, would be the
evacuation of Syria by Mehemet Ali, and the withdrawal of his authori
ties, civil and military, into Egypt. By such means, the Desert would be
interposed between the two parties ; and the chances of conflict between
them would be almost entirely prevented. But Mehemet Ali would justly
require some counterbalancing advantage, in return for such a concession
on his part ; and Her Majesty's Government conceive, that this might be
given him, by making the Pashalic of Egypt hereditary in his
family. Mehemet Ali has always stated, that the chief considerations which
render him discontented with his present situation, are, first, a feeling of
regret that the public works which he has accomplished in Egypt should,
after his death, be let fall to decay, by being entrusted to the care of an
ordinary Pasha ; secondly, an anxiety for the fate of his family, which
might, after his death, be exposed to poverty and exile.
Now both of these circumstances would be provided for, by such an
arrangement as that above-mentioned. While, on the other hand, the
just rights of the Sultan might be secured by stipulations, that Mehemet
Ali and his descendants should pay tribute to the Sultan ; should furnish
the Sultan with a contingent in time of war ; and should, like the Gover
nors of any other provinces of the Turkish Empire, be bound by all the
treaties and laws which the Sultan, as Sovereign, might make.
If the Russian Government should concur in this general view, and
should instruct its Ambassador at Vienna accordingly, there can be no
doubt, that such an expression of opinion on the part of Russia, would
carry with it all the weight which naturally belongs to the sentiments of
Russia upon such a matter : and if the Five Powers should by mutual
interchange of opinions arrive at a common conclusion, it is reasonable to

158
suppose, that the opinions of the Five, announced to the two parties by
the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople and Alexandria,
would prevail over any reluctance which might at first be felt on either
side ; and that such an arrangement would be carried into effect, as would
be in the highest degree conducive to the maintenance of the peace of
Europe. Your Excellency will communicate this despatch to Count Nesselrode,
and give him a copy of it. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 107.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 11.)
(Extract.) Vienna, June 30, 1839.
ON the 24th instant, the French Ambassador received from his
Government, and communicated to Prince Metternich and myself, the
plan of Her Majesty's Government for operations in the Levant, as laid
down by your Lordship in your conversation with M. de Bourqueney.
I need hardly say that it met with the approbation of Prince Metter
nich in all its parts, being, in fact, the same which he had transmitted to
London and Paris. He doubts, however, the possibility of executing that
part of it which prescribes the interruption of hostilities if they should
have already begun.
His Highness yesterday received a despatch from Petersburgh,
inclosing copy of one which has been addressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo,
for communication to your Lordship.
Prince Metternich had confidently predicted that Russia would take
the same view of the question with himself; and these despatches, written
previous to the receipt of any thing from the Prince, fully confirm his
prediction. It is impossible to refuse the evidence they afford, that Russia
at this moment is frankly pursuing the same conduct as ourselves
with regard to the Turkish Empire. In one case, the Prince thinks
the Russian plan more practicable than that of England and France.
It is that of hostilities having actually commenced, in which event
Russia proposes to confine them within a prescribed limit, — Syria,
and the districts of Orfa and Diarbekir, — not to attempt their total
interruption; — an attempt which the Prince thinks might succeed, though
with difficulty, if Mehemet Ali were gaining the advantage, and which
in that case, it would therefore be desirable to make ; but which must fail
if the Sultan's army were in the course of success, aided, as it would be,
by insurrections in the country.
These, however, he considers as minor points ; and the Five Powers
having now pronounced themselves upon the principles by which they are
directed, he regards them as united, and the danger to Europe, which is
well defined in the Russian despatch, as averted.
One contingency only, the Prince remarked upon, as having been
overlooked at St. Petersburgh, and to that he had, in the mean time, called
the attention of the Russian Cabinet : it is that of all our precautions
failing to preserve Constantinople from the danger of attack ; in which
case, the Prince, adopting our view of the subject, has proposed, that the
French and English armaments should unite with that of Russia for its
defence, Austria joining her flag to the powerful squadrons of her Allies.
He now intends further to propose to Russia, to invite their co
operation in such a case.

159
No. 108.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 11.)
My Lord, Vienna, June 30, 1839.
ON the night of the 28th, Prince Metternich received an estafette in
nine days from Constantinople, confirming the unfavourable account I
gave your Lordship some time back of the Sultan's health. For the last
three months, the Sultan has seen none of the regular physicians, either
Turkish or Christian, who have been in the habit of attending him.
During that time he has confided himself medically to the care of a
Jewess, an old Armenian woman, and two Turkish apothecary's boys.
On returning from a fete at the Valley of the Sweet Waters, he
appears to have become worse, and sent for the Austrian physician who
was sent from hence last year at his special request to attend him. This
gentleman found him in a high state of fever, and a consultation was held
the next day with three other physicians, at which a full investigation of
the state of his Highness's health took place. The result is, that he was
ascertained to have his liver very seriously affected, and tubercles on the
lungs accompanied by high fever. The first efforts of medicine will be
directed to subdue the ; fever, which, (if they fail,) will destroy life very
soon. If the fever is subdued, the other diseases will remain to be com
bated. In this most unfortunate complication, Prince Metternich has
acted with the promptitude and energy which he has shown from the com
mencement of these affairs. He has this day despatched a courier to
Petersburgh, establishing the attitude of Austria in the event of the Sultan's
death. The present courier will carry a similar communication to London
and to Paris ; and he has no doubt but what Russia will unite herself to
his views. I need hardly say, that he counts equally upon the concert of
England and France. These views will best be developed by himself ;
but the principle upon which they are founded is, that of the support of the
Allies to the heir of the Ottoman throne, securing to him his succession in
its full integrity, the Four Powers binding themselves by reciprocal decla
rations, to abstain from the smallest acquisition at the expence of the
Turkish Empire.
If your Lordship will look back to the long period of time, beginning
before the signature of the Treaty of Vienna, during which Prince Metter
nich has steadily and undeviatingly, through all circumstances, kept in
view the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as almost the first interest
of Austria, and combine this with the efforts he is now making for its
support, I think you will be disposed to admit that those efforts have never
at any time been limited, except by considerations of practicability and
prudence ; and his views being now absolutely and entirely identical with
those of the British Cabinet, I have no doubt but what the full confidence
which has been established between the two Governments upon this head,
may be continued, with the greatest advantage to the common object the
have in view. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 109.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 11.)
(Extract.) Vienna, July 1, 1839.
PRINCE METTERNICH haying delayed his courier for a day, I
am enabled to apprize your Lordship that he attaches the greatest value
to an invitation from the Two Powers to the Emperor of Russia to join
his squadron to theirs in the Mediterranean. His reasons are founded on
the great principle which guides him in this affair, — that of its being the

160
joint concern of all Europe. Out of this he sees no safety, and every thing
which tends to consecrate it, and extend its application, is of value in his
eyes.

No. 110.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 1 1 .)
My Lord, Vienna, July 1, 1839.
THE Austrian squadron in the Levant will be reinforced, and will
place itself under the orders of Admiral Stopford.
The Arch-Duke will join the squadron. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 111.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, July 13, 1839.
YOUR Excellency's despatches to the 1st of July, have been
received and laid before the Queen.
With reference to those of June 30 and July 1, I have to state, that
it is undoubtedly true, as observed by Prince Metternich, that the
measures proposed to be taken by the British and French squadrons,
with a view to put an end to hostilities in Syria, would probably not be
as successful if the fate of arms had declared in favour of the Sultan, as
they would be if the first encounters between the armies had been
favourable to the Pasha. But this arises from the nature of things, and
from the difference which exists between the position of the Powers of
Europe with respect to the Sultan, and their position with respect to the
Pasha. But it must also be remembered, that the motive of the inter
ference of the Powers of Europe to bring about a cessation of hostilities,
and the object which they propose to attain by that interference, can only
be the fear of the danger to which those hostilities would expose the peace
of Europe, and an anxiety to avert that danger; but it is evident that this
danger would arise from the success of the Pasha, and not from the,
success of the Sultan.,
Her Majesty's Government, however, cannot but entertain a sanguine
hope that the interference of the two squadrons, backed as they will be by
the exertions of all the Missions at Constantinople, and of all the Consuls
at Alexandria,, will succeed in accomplishing the desired object.
Your Excellency, in your despatch of July 1, announces, that an
Austrian squadron, with an Archduke on board, will be ordered to join
the British squadron, and to place itself under the command of Sir
Robert Stopford. Your Excellency will express to Prince Metternich,
the extreme gratification which the British Government have experienced,
in learning this intention on the part of the Government of Austria. The
Queen is deeply sensible of the high compliment which is thus paid to
Her Majesty by the Emperor of Austria; and Her Majesty's Government
feel the full value of this measure as a public manifestation to all the
world, of the close alliance between Great Britain and Austria, and of the
intimate union which exists between them upon the great and important
matters to which this measure relates.
Your Excellency further suggests, that England and France should
invite Russia to send her Black Sea squadron into the Mediterranean, 'to
co-operate with the combined British, French, and Austrian fleet; and
you certainly urge many very strong reasons in support of that proposition.
But all things considered, Her Majesty's Government are inclined to
doubt the expediency of such a measure at present.

161
In the first place, the object now to be accomplished in the Mediter
ranean, is the suspension of hostilities ; for this, the combined fleet would
be sufficient, and the support which the Russian Agents at Constantinople
and Alexandria will, of course, give to such an endeavour, will afford to
our efforts the assistance to be derived from the weight of her open and
avowed concurrence.
If, indeed, the Five Powers should determine to press upon the Porte
and upon Mehemet Ali, the arrangement by which Mehemet Ali would
have to evacuate Syria, and if the Pasha should demur to accede to that
arrangement, there might then be an obvious advantage in proving to the
Pasha, by the co-operation of the Russian flag with that of Austria,
France, and England, that the Great Powers are unanimous in their
decision. But the negotiations at Vienna have not yet arrived at such
maturity as to admit of such a communication being made to the two
parties. It appears to Her Majesty's Government, that there is a marked
distinction between the co-operation of the four flags in the Sea of
Marmora, or in the Bosphorus, for the defence of Constantinople, and the
junction of those flags in the Mediterranean.
I have adverted to these points, in order that your Excellency may
know the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting them. But the
alarming state of the Sultan's health, as described in your Lordship's
despatch of June 30, creates new dangers, more serious than those with
which the Five Powers have hitherto been occupied. This new cause of
peril requires new and additional measures.
The accounts received by Her Majesty's Government within the last
few days, by various channels, from Vienna and Constantinople, render it
highly probable that the Sultan may already have sunk under his
complicated disorders. What effect his death might produce, Her
Majesty's Government have not the means to foresee ; but it seems pro
bable it would, in the first instance at least, cause a suspension of hos
tilities in Syria, as both armies would naturally wait to see what might
happen at Constantinople, and what might be the policy of the new sove
reign. In this state of things, nothing can be wiser, or more urgently
required, than the measure proposed by Prince Metternich, namely, that
the Five Powers should each make a solemn declaration of their deter
mination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish
Empire under the present dynasty ; and, as a necessary consequence of
such a determination, that none of them will seek to profit by the present
state of things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory, or
any exclusive influence.
Your Excellency is instructed to state to Prince Metternich, that you
are fully authorized at once to make such a declaration on the part of
Great Britain ; and if it should be thought expedient to give to such
declaration a more formal shape, your Excellency is authorized to sign on
behalf of Great Britain, any instrument by which it may be proposed to
record it.

No. 112.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 11.)
My. Lord, Paris, July 8, 1839.
MARSHAL SOULT has read to me the Note which he proposes
should be addressed by the French Ambassador to the Sublime Porte,
requesting that a French fleet may pass the Dardanelles, in case an
Egyptian Army should approach Constantinople, and foreign succour be
required for the defence of the capital. A copy of this Note, the Marshal
told me, was sent the night before last to M. de Bourqueney, for the purpose
y

162
of its being communicated to your Lordship ; and his Excellency ex
pressed his hopes that Her Majesty's Government would instruct Lord
Ponsonby to address to the Turkish Government a similar Note, for the
admission of the British fleet within the Dardanelles, to be presented at
the same time with that of the French Ambassador.
The Marshal said that Count St. Aulaire's last despatches from
Vienna were satisfactory.
Prince Metternich was eager for the junction of the Austrian ships
of war with those of England and of France ; and he had reason to thinki
from the tenour of Count Fiquelmont's reports from St. Petersburgh, that
the Russian Government would acquiesce in the proposal of the combined
fleet being stationed in the Sea of Marmora for the protection of Constan
tinople. The last accounts received at Vienna from Constantinople, state that
the Sultan is very ill ; and that the German physician who attends him is
of opinion, that though he may live till the autumn, he, in all probability,
will die before the expiration of the month. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 113.
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston. — {Received July 12.)
My Lord, Berlin, July 6, 1839;
A FRENCH courier arrived here this morning from St. Petersburgh;
M. de Barante states in his letters, that the proposition made by Prince
Metternich to concert measures at Vienna for the pacification of the East,
has been favourably received by the Emperor of Russia; and M. de
Barante thinks the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh well and sincerely disposed
to act in union with the other Powers of Europe.
Baron Werther thinks that your Lordship has judged right in pre
ferring simple negotiation to a formal conference. His Excellency has
given the necessary instructions to the Prussian Minister at Vienna ; and
he feels convinced that the most perfect harmony will exist between the
Five Powers on this important question.
The latest accounts received here from Constantinople, state that the
Sultan's health is rapidly declining. I have, &c,
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL,

No. 114.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 13.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 24, 1839.
I KEPT the messenger, that I might have means of informing
your Lordship of matters of moment, and have now to acquaint you that
the Sultan's fever continues, and that it is the opinion of his physicians,
that if it is not removed, he will not live fifteen days. The physicians
think the fever will not be removed. The Sultan, it is said, cannot at
any rate live more than two or three months.
The public is now aware of the alarming nature of the Sultan's
illness, but the Ottoman Ministers have not mentioned it to my Colleagues
or to me ; they have, however, begun to consider what shall be done, and
are discussing whether it be best to establish a Council of Regency or a
Council of Government.
The Ministers have, I hear, written to Rechid Pasha to abandon
every affair in England, and return full speed to Constantinople.

163
The Ottoman Fleet is to sail from the Dardanelles for Rhodes, on
Monday the 24th instant. On the 21st (Friday last), the French Ambas
sador had an interview with Nouri Effendi, to receive a verbal reply from
the Porte to his Excellency's Note, demanding the recall of the troops from
the Aleppo side of the Euphrates. The Porte would not give a written reply.
The verbal one was, " That the Ministers had not communicated to the
Sultan the demands made by the French Ambassador."
I had a letter from Sir Robert Stopford, which I inclose. I have
lieard of the arrival of Sir Thomas Fellowes in the "Vanguard," at
Besica Bay.
I think it probable the corps of Ulemas will take a part. It has
great material strength as well as moral influence. The Chiefs are,
perhaps, the best-informed men in the country, and they may be aware of
the weakness of it, and the necessity for acting with the greatest pru
dence. I have taken the only measures in my power to make some of the
influential members reflect upon their real situation, but my means are
extremely limited. I have stated the ruin that might follow any reaction
attended with violence, and that at the present moment the existence of
the Turks, as a governing nation, depended upon Foreign Powers.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 114.
Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.
"Princess Charlotte,"
My Lord, Palermo Bay, June 7, 1839
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's
letters of the 22nd and 27th May, the former acquainting me that your
Excellency had satisfied your mind, that the Sublime Porte has finally
determined upon war against the Pasha of Egypt ; the latter transmitting
the copy of a letter from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays at Alexandretta, dated
7th May, describing the unprotected state of that port, and the danger
to which British property is liable, in consequence of the disturbed state
of that part of the country.
I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency that, although I have
not received any orders from Government to guide my proceedings
with respect to the two belligerent Powers of Turkey and Egypt, I shall
Immediately send the " Vanguard" to the Levant, to be followed by a
sloop of war, for the purpose of observing the proceedings of the two
fleets, giving orders to Captain Sir Thomas Fellowes to observe the
strictest neutrality towards Turks and Egyptians, and to avoid all
communication with either.
I have also the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I have
ordered the " Dido" to proceed to Alexandretta, to protect British pro
perty said to be endangered at that place. I have, &c,
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD,
Admiral

No. 115.
Viscowd Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 13.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 24, 1839.
I HAD sent M. Etienne Pisani to the Capudan Pasha upon business,
which will be elsewhere reported to your Lordship. I received from that
gentleman a letter, which I inclose, as it contains important matter
relating to the Capudan Pasha's orders and intentions, should the French
Y 2

164
fleet attempt to bar his passage. I have to report that the moment I
received the letter, I wrote to M. Pisani, and directed him to accompany
the Pasha as far as Rhodes ; and to use his utmost endeavours to prevent
a collision between the Pasha and the French, by engaging the Pasha to
be calm, and to wait forthe actual exertion of force by the French, before
he attempted to defend himself by arms, and to answer civilly, and state
to the French the purport of his orders from his Sovereign, and that he
must obey them ; and that, doing this, he should continue his route
without resenting anything that might be said. It will, I think, be
fortunate, if my directions reach M. Pisani in time, because I believe
there is nobody with the Capudan Pasha able to interpret well, and
prevent misconceptions of what may be said ; and I also have much
confidence in the prudence of M. Pisani, and in his influence over the
Capudan Pasha.
I made no reply to what the Capudan Pasha said ; but your Lordship
will recollect, that in answer to a question from him and the other
Ministers with whom I had an interview, I said that I had no knowledge
of any intention entertained by Her Majesty's Government to oppose the
Sultan by force; and that I did not think Her Majesty's Government
would ever resort to such a measure.
The report here is, that the French fleet will oppose by force the
progress of the Ottoman fleet. I disbelieve the report, because the
French Ambassador told me when I last saw him, that it was not in the
contemplation of his Government to use force. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 115.
M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extrait.) Dardanelles, le 20 Juin, 1839.
J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence, que je suis arrive ici hier
matin et que je me suis rendu en droiture a bord du " Mahmoudie." Le
Pacha pense parfaitement comme votre Excellence, au sujet de la
quarantaine. II regrette infiniment qu'il ne m'a pas envoye a Constan
tinople sur un de ses bateaux ; et il m'a promis que tant qu'il serait aux
Dardanelles, si je me trouvais dans le cas d'aller a Constantinople, qu'il
me priait de disposer d'un de ses bateaux a vapeur.
Hier, apres avoir fait ma visite au Pacha, le Capitaine Walker, Mr.
Lander, et moi, nous nous sommes embarques sur le petit bateau a vapeur
Ture que le Pacha a eu la bonte de mettre a notre disposition, et nous
sommes alies a bord du "Vanguard," qui se trouve mouilie a. Besik Baie.
Nous sommes restes a bord jusqu'a 5 heures, apres quoi nous sommes
retournes aux Dardanelles.
Le Capitan Pacha se propose de faire voile avec toute la Flotte,
samedi, pour Rhodes. Mais je doute fort qu'il puisse partir avant mardi
ou mercredi, car son batiment ne pourra guere etre pret avant lundi soir
ou mardi matin. Le Pacha trouve que les Francais n'ont aucun droit de
l'empecher de suivre les ordres de son Souverain. Et il dit qu'il a des
ordres positifs de venir en contact avec la Flotte Egyptienne ; qu'il
espere, que cette annee-ci les Anglais demeureront neutres, et qu'ils ne
s'opposeront pas aux voeux du Sultan ; que si les Francais etaient seuls
dans leur demarche actuelle, que cela ne Fempechera pas de suivre ses
plans ; mais que si les Anglais etaient entendus avec les Francais, qu'en ce
cas il se verrait force, bien malgre lui, de se soumettre a leur volonte.
Discours faisant, le Pacha m'a propose de Faccompagner jusqu'&
Rhodes, et des qu'il y serait, il me promettait de me renvoyer sur son
bateau a vapeur. J'ai repondu a. son Excellence, que j'etais reellement
fache de ne pas pouvoir complaire a ses desirs, vu que je dependais
exclusivement de votre Excellence, et que je ne pouvais pas prendre sur
moi de m'absenter sans avoir au prealable demande la permission et lea
ordres de mon Chef.

165
(Translation.)
M. Eiienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Dardanelles, June 20, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I arrived here
yesterday morning, and that I straightway went on board the " Mah-
moudie." The Pasha is entirely of your Excellency's opinion on the
subject of the quarantine. He regrets extremely that he had not sent me
to Constantinople on board of one of his vessels ; and he has promised me,
that so long as he should be at the Dardanelles, if I should have occasion
to go to Constantinople, he would request me to make use of one of his
steam-vessels. Yesterday, after having paid my visit to the Pasha, Captain Walker,
Mr. Lander, and myself embarked on board a little Turkish steam-vessel,
which the Pasha had the goodness to place at our disposal, and we went
on board the " Vanguard," which was anchored in Besika Bay. We
remained on board until five o'clock; after which we returned to the
Dardanelles. The Capudan Pasha intends to sail on Saturday with all his fleet for
Rhodes ; but I much doubt whether he can depart before Tuesday or
Wednesday, as his vessel can scarcely be ready before Monday evening
or Tuesday morning. The Pasha considers that the French have no
right to hinder him from following the orders of his Sovereign : and he
says that he has positive orders to engage the Egyptian fleet ; that he
hopes that this year the English will remain neuter, and that they will
not oppose themselves to the wishes of the Sultan ; that if the French
were alone in their present proceedings, that would not prevent him
from following his own plans; but ,if the English should be agreed
with the French, in that case he should feel himself constrained, much
against his inclination, to submit to their will.
In the course of conversation, the Pasha proposed to me to accom
pany him as far as Rhodes ; and when he should be there, he promised to
send me back in his steam-vessel. I replied to his Excellency, that I was
really sorry to be unable to comply with his wishes, seeing that I
depended exclusively upon your Excellency, and that I could not take
upon myself to absent myself without having first asked the permission
and the orders of my Chief.

No. 116.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 13.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 24, 1839:
ON the 23rd, the Ottoman Fleet was still at the Dardanelles. I inclose
Consul Lander's despatch.
There are two French ships off the Troad, and two ships and a
corvette at Vourla. The Prince de Joinville is on board. The " Van
guard " is at Besica Bay. The English Squadron was expected at Malta,
from Palermo, on the 18th instant. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

166
Inclosure in No. 116.
Mr. Consul Lander to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Dardanelles, June 23, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that the whole of the
Ottoman Squadron are still at anchor between Nagara and these castles ;
and I am informed that it is the intention of his Highness the Capudan
Pasha not to leave these Straits before Friday next, the 28th instant. In
the meanwhile, most of the large ships are daily exercising their guns, and
firing at marks, under the direction of Captain Walker. I have, &c,
(Signed) C. A. LANDER.
No. 117.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 13, 1 839.
WITH reference to my despatch of July 5, instructing your Excellency
to express to the Porte the wish of Her Majesty's Government, that in the
case therein specified, the Porte should apply to Great Britain for naval or
military aid, I have to state to your Excellency, that if the Sultan
should die, and if in consequence of his death, the presence of the British
Squadron at Constantinople should appear useful, your Excellency is
instructed to offer the assistance of the Squadron to the Turkish Govern
ment, in concert with the French Ambassador, who will have instructions
to make a similar offer of the assistance of the French Fleet.
Your Excellency will perceive by Earl Granville's despatch of July 8,
that the French Government have sent to Admiral Roussin the draft of a
Note to be presented to the Porte, with reference to the application to be
made for the admission of the French Squadron ; but Her Majesty's Govern
ment leave it to your Excellency to word, according to your discretion, the
Note which you will present on that subject, simultaneously with the Note
of the French Ambassador.
I have, at the same time, to acquaint your Excellency, that the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty will instruct Admiral Sir Robert Stopford
to go up to Constantinople, if invited to do so by the Turkish Government ;
and will apprize that officer, that the object of his going up to Constan
tinople, either in the case of the request being made by the Sultan, or by
the Turkish Government in the case of the Sultan's death, should be to
afford protection and support to the Sultan's authority, chiefly by the
moral effect of the presence of the fleet ; but further, if actually necessary,
by such measures as unexpected circumstances may require, and as may
be judged suitable by the joint and concurrent opinions of the Admirals
and Ambassadors. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 118.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, July 13, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships, that Her Majesty's
Ambassador at Constantinople has been instructed to state to the Porte,
that if the course of events should lead the Porte to ask or to accept
military or naval aid from any European Power, in the contest with
Mehemet Ali, Her Majesty's Government trust that the Porte will, at the

167
same time, address itself to Great Britain to the same effect; and that
the British Admiral in the Mediterranean has orders to repair to Con
stantinople with his squadron, for the purpose of affording to the Sultan
physical and moral support, the moment he shall receive from the Porte,
through Her Majesty's Ambassador, an invitation to do so.
Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been further
instructed, that if the Sultan should die, and if, in consequence of his
death, the presence of the British Squadron at Constantinople should
appear to be useful, his Excellency is to offer the assistance of that
squadron to the Turkish Government, in concert with the French Ambas
sador, who will have instructions to make a similar offer of the assistance
of the French Fleet in the contingencies above specified.
I am commanded by the Queen to signify to your Lordships Her
Majesty's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford be instructed, under
the circumstances which I have now stated, to go up to Constantinople
with his squadron, if invited by the Turkish Government to do so : and
the Admiral should be apprized that the object of his going up to Con
stantinople, in the case of the request being made either by the Sultan,
or by the Turkish Government, in the case of the Sultan's death, should
be to afford protection and support to the Sultan's authority, chiefly by
the moral effect of the presence of the fleet; but further, if actually
necessary, by such measures as unexpected circumstances may require,
and as may be judged suitable by the joint and concurrent opinions of
the Admirals and Ambassadors.
The Queen's messenger, who will be dispatched from this office on
Monday the 15th instant, can convey to Malta your Lordships' instruction-
to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 119.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords* Foreign Office, July 18, 1839.
WITH reference to my letter of the 13th instant, I have to
request your Lordships to acquaint Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, that
a further instruction will be sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at
Constantinople, stating, that if the Russian Fleet should, for any rea
son whatever, enter the Bosphorus, his Excellency will apply for per
mission for the British Fleet to do the same; and I am to signify to
your Lordships the Queen's commands, that Sir Robert Stopford be
instructed to act upon any invitation which, in consequence of the fore
going instruction, may be addressed to him by the Porte through Her

Majesty's Ambassador.

I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 120.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 18, 1839.
WITH reference to my despatches of July 5 and 13, instructing your
Excellency, under the contingencies therein specified, to offer to the
Turkish Government to bring up to Constantinople the British Squadron

168
I have now to state to your Excellency, that if the Russian Fleet should,
for any reason whatever, enter the Bosphorus, you will apply for permis
sion for the British Fleet to do the same. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 121.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 15.)
My Lord, Paris, July 12, 1839.
I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult ; he told me
that your Lordship had approved of the note which he proposed should
be presented by Admiral Roussin to the Turkish Government, relative to
the admission of the French fleet within the Dardanelles ; and he expressed
much satisfaction with M. de Bourqueney's reports of his late communi
cations with you on the affairs of the East.
I said that M. de Bourqueney had, without doubt, mentioned in his
reports, that he had seen some of Lord Ponsonby 's recent despatches,
which proved that his Lordship had, in conformity to his instructions, tried
to dissuade the Porte from going to war with Mehemet Ali ; and that your
Lordship had sent instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador to co-operate
with Admiral Roussin, and would again write to him to the same effect ;
but I would not conceal from him that you had, in a private letter to me,
intimated that the tone of the communications of the French Government
with that of Turkey was rather too rough and harsh, and that it would
be better, for the furtherance of the objects common to both Govern
ments, if the language used to the Porte were more conciliatory. The
Marshal answered that M. de Bourqueney had apprized him of the appre
hension felt by your Lordship, that the use of strong language might
excite irritation in the mind of the Sultan, and that he had in conse
quence written to Admiral Roussin to consult with Lord Ponsonby before
he presented his Note to the Reis Effendi ; and if his Lordship thought
that there were expressions in the preamble which it might be expe
dient to soften down, to acquiesce in any change in the wording of it,
which might be suggested by Her Majesty's Ambassador.
Marshal Soult informed me that he received yesterday despatches
from Vienna, reporting that Prince Metternich, considering that the life
of Mahmoud could not be much longer prolonged, was very anxious that
the Great Powers of Europe should lose no time in coming to an under
standing to recognise, immediately upon the Sultan's death, his son, as
successor to the Sovereignty of the whole of the Turkish Empire. The
Marshal Soult expressed his entire concurrence in the opinion of the
Austrian Minister. And though the son of the Sultan is scarcely seven
teen years old, he had no apprehension, under the circumstance of all the
Great European Powers at once acknowledging him, of any serious
danger arising from the change of reign.
M. de Barante's despatches from St. Petersburgh give a favourable
report of the disposition of the Russian Cabinet. Count Nesselrode is
much satisfied with the endeavours of the British and French Govern
ments to prevent, or, if begun, to suspend, hostilities between the Turks
and Egyptians ; and expressed a wish that the differences between the
Sultan and Mehemet Ali may be settled by a concert between all the
European Powers. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

169
No. 122.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 15.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, July 8, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's
despatches to the 25th of June.
They have not conveyed to me any instructions with reference to the
late movement of the Turkish Army, or information of the course
which Her Majesty's Government may adopt, in consequence of the state
of affairs in Syria. I have had two or three conversations with Count
Nesselrode upon the subject, and his Excellency asked my opinion upon
his despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, which embodies a proposition for
giving a limit to the probable success of Mehemet Ali's warfare, and upon
the suggestion which, I am told, has been made by Prince Metternich to
Her Majesty's Government, and to the Cabinet of Paris, for settling the
differences between the Pasha of Egypt and the Porte, by restoring Syria
to the Sultan, and granting the inheritance of the Pashalic of Egypt to
the family of Mehemet Ali,
I replied to Count Nesselrode, that I had received no instructions
upon the subject, but that I thought my Government would receive his
communication with satisfaction, insomuch as it indicated a desire to
restore peace, and to check the warfare in Syria. But that the propo
sition in my opinion was defective, as it referred to only one possible
result of the hostilities that had been commenced, and did not settle the
whole question, even if that result should happen.
Count Nesselrode said he had provided for one only issue of the war
in Syria, because he believed that that one was certain to occur.
With respect to the Austrian proposition, I said I thought it likely
to meet a favourable consideration from Her Majesty's Government.
Count Nesselrode offered no objection to it, but rather insinuated a doubt
that it would be acceptable to the Contending Parties, particularly to the
Porte. Upon every occasion, Count Nesselrode has expressed to me the
desire of the Russian Government to obviate the possibility of a casus
fcederis arising under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. His Excellency
has held the same language to all my colleagues ; and I believe this
desire to be sincerely and anxiously entertained.
I have every reason to believe that the Sultan deceived M. de Bouteneff,
and that his commencement of hostilities was as disagreeable to, as it was
unexpected by, His Imperial Majesty.
Upon every account, I am confident the Russian Government are
desirous of avoiding the possibility of a war in Europe ; and Count
Nesselrode thinks there is no probability of such a calamity, unless the
successes of Mehemet Ali should bring him under the walls of Constanti
nople, or menace the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

No. 123.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 16, 1839.
I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency a copy of a despatch
from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, inclosing a copy of a
letter from M. Etienne Pisani, relative to the Capudan Pasha's orders and
intentions, should the French fleet attempt to bar his passage.*

* See Inclosure in No. 115.
z

170
Your Excellency will communicate the substance of this despatch to
the French Government. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 124.
Earl Granville lo Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 1 7.)
My Lord, Paris, July 15, 1839*
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 12th: of July.
The inclosed copies of telegraphic despatches which were received
here on Saturday by the French Government, were sent to me on Saturday
evening by Marshal Soult.
The more detailed reports from Admiral Roussin and from the French
Consul at Alexandria, had not reached Paris at the time I saw Marshal
Soult this day, but are expected to arrive to-night or to-morrow morning.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 124.
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.
Le Consul de France d, M. le President du Conseil
Alexandrie, le 26 Juin*
UN courrier arrive aujourd'hui du quartier-general d'Ibrahim,
annonce a Mehemet Ali que l'attaque contre l'Armee Turque devait avoir
lieu le 21 Juin. (Translation.)
The Consul of France to the President of the Council.
Alexandria, June 26.
A COURIER arrived to-day from the head-quarters of Ibrahim,
reports to Mehemet Ali that the attack on the Turkish army was to take
place on the 21st of June.

Inclosure 2 in No. 124.
Telegraphic Despatch of 13th July, 3 a.m.
ON mande de Constantinople, que le Sultan est gravement malade ;
qu il ne s occupe plus des affaires ; et que les medecins avaient declare que
son existence ne pourrait pas se prolonger plus de trois mois.
Le 26 Juin, on parlait a Alexandrie d'une bataille qui aurait eu lieu
le 21 entre les Egyptiens et les Turcs, mais on n'avait pas de details, et
1 on attendait avec impatience le paquebot de Beyrout.
^ La flotte Turque qui devait sortir le 24, etait encore, le 28, dans le
detroit des Dardanelles ; on attribuait ce tems d 'arret a la maladie du
hultan. L'Amiral Lalande avait envoye le "Trident," "FHercule" et le
"Jupiter," k Ourlac, et se trouvait avec "FJena " seulement a Teredos.
L Eseadre Anglaise, composee de sept vaisseaux, deux fregates une
corvette, deux bricks, et un bateau a vapeur, a quitte Malte le^2 Juillet se
dingeant sur FEgypte et la Syrie.

171
(Translation,)
Telagmphic Despatch of 13th July, 3 a.m
IT is reported from Constantinople that the Sultan is seriously ill ;
that he no longer busies himself about affairs; and that the physicians
had declared that his existence cannot be prolonged beyond three months.
The 26th of June, there was a rumour at Alexandria of a battle
having taken place on the 21st between the Egyptians and the Turks,
but the details had not been received, and the packet from Beyrout was
looked for with impatience.
The Turkish fleet, which was to go out on the 24th, was still, on the
28th, within-the straits of the Dardanelles ; this detention was attributed
to the illness of the Sultan.
Admiral Lalande had sent the " Trident," the " Hercules," and the
" Jupiter," to Vourla, and was alone with the '' Jena" at Tenedos.
The English squadron, composed of seven sail of the line, two
frigates, one corvette, two brigs, and one steam-vessel, left Malta on the
2nd of July, proceeding towards Egypt and Syria.

No. 125.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—- (Received July 17.)
(Extract.) Paris, July 15, 1839.
MARSHAL SOULT, this morning, informed me that he has written
a despatch to M. de Bourqueney, to be communicated to your Lordship,
in which he has authorized the French Charge d'Affaires to declare the
readiness of the French Government to become a party to a general
guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire by the Five Great
European Powers. His Excellency indeed dwelt at some length upon the
advantages of such a self-denying engagement.
The Marshal then spoke to me of a conversation you had had with
M. de Bourqueney, and said to me that he agreed with your Lordship, that
if any Russian ships should propose to join the combined fleets of Eng
land, of France, and of Austria, upon the Syrian coast, their being per
mitted to pass through the Dardanelles for that purpose should be con
sidered as a cas exceptional; — a case in which the deviation from the
established principle of shutting the straits, would be counterbalanced by
the advantage of manifesting that all the Great Powers acted in concert.
With reference to the Sultan's death, and the possible disturbance of
the public tranquillity, the Marshal was of opinion that the Ambassadors,
in case they apprehended danger to the lives and properties of their
countrymen, might call upon the Admirals to station one or two frigates
near Constantinople for their protection, and which might be used as a
place of refuge even for the young Sultan, if any apprehension should be
felt for the security of his person, from the disturbed state of the capital.

No. 126.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 17.)
My Lord, Paris, July 15, 1839, 10 p.m.
I INCLOSE the copy of a telegraphic despatch which I have just
received from Marshal Soult, announcing the death of the Sultan Mahmoud.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Z 2

172
Inclosure in No. 126.
Depeche Telegraphique de Strasbourg, le 15 Juillet, d 6 h. du soir.
Le Prefet du Bas Rhin a M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
LE Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a Bade vient de donner avis a
M. de Bacourt, que le 10, on a regu a Vienne la nouvelle que le Sultan
Mahmoud est mort le 30 . . . .
(Interrompue par la nuit.)
(Translation.)
Telegraphic Despatch from Strasburgh, July 15, 6 p.m.
The Prefect of the Lower Rhine to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
THE Minister of Foreign Affairs at Baden has just acquainted M.
de Bacourt, that on the 10th news was received at Vienna that Sultan
Mahmoud died on the 30th ....
(Interrupted by night.)

No. 127.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. —(Received July 18.)
My Lord, Paris, July 16, 1839.
I TRANSMIT to your Lordship the continuation of the telegraphic
despatch from Strasburgh, of which I forwarded to you the beginning
by the messenger who left Paris last night. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 127.
Fin de la Depeche Telegraphique de Strasbourg, du 1 5 Juillet, a 6 h. du soir.
 que le Sultan Mahmoud est mort le 30 Juin. Son
fils aine, declare majeur par le Divan, a ete proclame Empereur. Le 28,
I'ordre avait ete envoye a Hafiz Pacha de suspendre les hostilites.
(Translation.)
End of the Telegraphic Despatch from Strasburgh, of July 15, 6 p.m.
 that Sultan Mahmoud died on the 30th of June.
His eldest son, declared of age by the Divan, was proclaimed Emperor.
On the 28th orders had been sent to Hafiz Pasha to suspend hostilities.

173
No 128.
Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 2 1 .)
My Lord, Londres, le 19 Juillet, 1839.
JE m'acquitte des ordres de mon Gouvernement, en transmettant
sans retard a votre Excellence, copie de la depeche que je viens de
recevoir de M. le Marechal Due de Dalmatie, sous la date du 17 Juillet.
Le Gouvernement du Roi, my Lord, sait d'avance qu'il trouvera
dans le Cabinet de Sa Majeste Britannique, des principes et des sentimens
conformes a ceux qui dirigent et qui continueront invariablement a
diriger sa politique dans les affaires d'Orient ; mais il attache un veri
table prix a recevoir un nouveau temoignage de cette heureuse conformite.
Je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien m'accuser reception de cette
lettre, et ie saisis cette occasion, &c.
J (Signe) BOURQUENEY.
(Translation.)
Baron Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 21.)
My Lord, London, July 19, 1839.
I EXECUTE the orders of my Government by transmitting to your
Excellency without delay, a copy of the despatch which I have just
received from the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia, dated the 17th of July.
His Majesty's Government, my Lord, knows beforehand, that it will
find in the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty, principles and sentiments
in conformity with those which direct, and which will continue invariably
to direct, its policy in the affairs of the East ; but it attaches a real value
to receiving a fresh pledge of this happy conformity.
I request your Excellency to have the goodness to acknowledge the
receipt of this letter, and I take this opportunity, &c.
F (Signed) BOURQUENEY

Inclosure in No. 128.
The Due de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney.
Monsieur le Baron, Paris, le 17 Juillet, 1839.
DANS la crise si grave ou la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, survenant au
milieu des evenemens qui ont marque les derniers mois de son regne,
vient de jeter FEmpire Ottoman, Funion des Grandes Puissances de l'Eu
rope pouvait seule offrir une garantie suffisante pour rassurer les amis de
la paix. Les communications ediangees depuis quelques semaines, ont
heureusement prouve que cette union est aussi complete qu'il etait pos
sible de le desirer. Tous les Cabinets veulent Fintegrite et l'independance
de la Monarchic Ottomane sous la Dynastie actuellement regnante ; tous
sont disposes a faire usage de leurs moyens d'action et d'influence pour
assurer le maintien de cet element essentiel de l'equilibre politique ; et ils
n'hesiteraient pas a se declarer contre une combinaison quelconque qui y
' porterait atteinte. Un pared accord de sentimens et de resolutions devant
suffire, lorsque personne ne pourra plus en douter, non seulenient pour
prevenir toute tentative contraire a ce grand interet, mais meme pour dis-
siper des inquietudes dont la seule existence constitue un danger veritable
par suite de Fagitation qu'elles jettent dans les esprits, le Gouvernement
du Roi croit que les Cabinets feraient quelque chose d'important pour
l'affermissement de la paix, en constatant dans des documens ecrits qu'ils
se communiqueraient redproquement, et qui necessairement ne tarderaient
pas a avoir une publicite plus ou moins complete, I'expose des intentions que

m
je viens de rappeler. En ce qui nous concerne, Monsieur le Baron, je declare
formellement que ce sont, que ce seront invariablement, les ndtres, et je vous
autorise a laisser a Lord Palmerston une copie de la presente depeche apres
lui en avoir donne lecture. Je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement Britan-
nique, dans la reponse qu'il croira sans doute devoir faire a la lettre par
laquelle vous lui transmettrez cette depeche, n'adhere de son cote de la
maniere la plus formelle a cette profession de foi, si parfaitement conforme a
l'expression souvent reproduite de sa politique. Si, comme j'ai lieu de
Fesperer, les Cabinets de Vienne, de Petersbourg, et de Berlin, repondent
de meme aux communications semblables que je vais leur faire parvenir,
le but que se propose le Gouvernement du Roi se trouvera atteint.
R-6CGVCZ &£X*.
(Signe) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE,

(Translation.)
The Duke of Dalmatia to ihe Baron de Bourqueney.
Monsieur le Baron, Paris, July 17, 1839.
IN the very serious crisis into which the death of Sultan Mahmoud,
occurring in the midst of the events which have characterized the last
months of his reign, has thrown the Ottoman Empire, the union of the
Great Powers of Europe could alone offer a guarantee sufficient to
reassure the friends of peace. The communications which, during a few
weeks, have been interchanged, have happily proved that this union is as
complete as it is possible to desire it. All the Cabinets wish for the
integrity and independence of the Ottoman Monarchy under the Dynasty
now reigning ; all are disposed to employ their means of action and of
influence to ensure the maintenance of this essential element of the poli
tical equilibrium ; and they would not hesitate to declare themselves
against any combination whatever, which might impair it. As such an
agreement of sentiments and determinations must be sufficient, when
there can be no longer any doubt of it, not only to prevent any attempt
being made at variance with this great interest, but even to dispel the
uneasiness of which the mere existence produces a real danger, by reason
of the disquiet which it occasions in the public mind, His Majesty's
Government considers that the Cabinets would effect some thing impor
tant towards the settlement of peace, by recording in written documents
to be reciprocally communicated to each other, and which necessarily
would not be long before they acquired a publicity more or less complete,
the declaration of the intentions which I have just mentioned. So far as
we are concerned, Monsieur le Baron, I formally declare that such are,
and such will invariably be, our intentions, and I authorize you to leave
with Lord Palmerston a copy of this despatch after having read it to him.
I entertain no doubt that the British Government, in the answer which it
will assuredly think it fitting to return to the letter, by which you will
transmit to it this despatch, will on its part adhere in the most formal
manner to this profession of faith, which is in such perfect conformity
with its often repeated enunciation of its policy. If, as I have reason to
hope, the Cabinets of Vienna, Petersburgh, and Berlin, reply in the same
manner to the communications of a like nature which I am about to for
ward to them, the object which His Majesty's Government proposes to
itself, will be accomplished. Receive &e.
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

1?5
No. 129.
Viscount Palmerston to the Baron de Bourqueney,
Monsieur le Baron, Foreign Office, July 22, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the
19th instant, inclosing, by order of your Government, a copy of a
despatch dated the 17th instant, which you have received from the Due
de Dalmatie, relative to the present posture of affairs in Turkey.
I have to express to you, in reply, the great satisfaction with which
Her Majesty's Government have received this communication ; and I lose
no time in authorizing you to assure your Government, that the British
Cabinet, like that of France, desires to uphold the integrity and indepen
dence of the Ottoman Empire under its existing Dynasty ; and is ready
to use its influence and its means of action, for the purpose of maintaining
this essential element of the balance of power in Europe ; and that Her
Majesty's Government, like that of France, would not hesitate to declare
itself openly against any combination which might be conceived in a
spirit of" hostility to the principles above-mentioned. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 130.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 22.)
(Extract.) Paris, July 19, 1839.
ALTHOUGH your despatch of the 16th does not instruct me to
communicate to the French Government the despatch inclosed, in it,
addressed by your Lordship to Lord Beauvale, on the 13th instant, I have
not, I trust, acted indiscreetly, in having this morning put Marshal Soult
in possession of its contents. It appeared to me desirable, that his
Excellency should perfectly understand the circumstances under which
you thought that the co-operation of. Russian ships of war, with the
combined Fleet of England, of France, and of Austria, in the Levant,
might be expedient.
The Marshal expressed his entire concurrence in your view of this
question ; and he adverted to the expression of cas exceptionnel which he
had used, when speaking to me of the advantage of manifesting at this
moment the unanimity of the Great Powers of Europe upon the affairs of
Turkey and Egypt, by the junction of a Russian squadron with the
combined English, French, and Austrian Fleet, as showing that he was
adverse to the opening of the Straits of Constantinople generally for the
passage of ships of war.
Marshal Soult read to me a despatch from Count St. Aulaire,
with a letter inclosed in it from Admiral Roussin to his colleague at,
Vienna. Count St. Aulaire writes, that the Court of St. Petersburgh
adopts unhesitatingly the propositions upon the Turkish Question, which «
the Austrian Ambassador had been instructed by Prince Metternich to,
submit to the consideration of the Russian Government. And Admiral
Roussin states, not only that the order had been sent to Hafiz Pasha to.
suspend military operations in Syria, but that the Capudan Pasha
commanding the Turkish Fleet had been ordered not to quit the
Dardanelles. Under these circumstances, Marshal Soult thought that the prospect
of settling satisfactorily the Oriental Question was much improved.

176

No. 131.
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 22.)
My Lord, Berlin, July 15, 1839.
I COMMUNICATED your Lordship's observations on Count
Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Werther. He approves of the view your
Lordship has taken of the Eastern Question ; and thinks you will find the
Russian Cabinet disposed to agree with the other Powers.
Kiamil Pasha, the Ottoman Minister at this Court, is of opinion, that
a mere settlement of a frontier between Turkey and Egypt can only be a
provisional arrangement. He wishes the British Cabinet to establish a
basis for his country, on which they can construct their regeneration ; if
this is not done, he fears that the internal weakness of the Empire will

soon cause it to fall.

I hf-Vf* _v.o
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No 132.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 23.)
My Lord, St. Petersburgh, July 15, 1839.
WITH reference to the subject of your Lordship's despatch to Lord
Beauvale, of the 28th of June, and of Count Nesselrode's despatch to
Count Pozzo di Borgo, of the -£$ of June, I beg leave to state, that
the impression made upon my mind by Count Nesselrode, in the conversa
tions which I have had the honour to hold with his Excellency upon the
hostilities that have occurred in Syria, and upon his despatch to the
Russian Ambassador in London, was, that he did not intend by the
proposition communicated in that despatch, that the intervention of
England, and other European Powers, should be wholly limited to con
fining the warfare to the Syrian territory ; but that, as the success of the
arms of Mehemet Ali appeared imminent, and as that success, if it
carried him beyond the Taurus, would menace the safety of the Turkish
capital, and thereby occasion a complication of the difficulties of the
Turco-Egyptian Question, and a great chance of war in Europe, that
contingency should be instantly guarded against ; but without prejudice
to ulterior steps, or to such a settlement of the disputes between the
Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, and of their respective claims, as the
Great Powers might afterwards determine upon. In answer to a remark
I made thereupon on one occasion, Count Nesselrode said, "We shall
have time to consider of that afterwards, but what we must do at once, is
to prevent Mehemet Ali from complicating the question, and perhaps
causing a general war by his successes." Your Lordship will observe also,
that Count Nesselrode in his despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, says,
" Avant tout, il faut maitriser les faits, c'est-a-dire, empecher que la lutte
devienne menagante pour le repos de l'Europe entiere." And I believe
that by the words "avant tout," Count Nesselrode meant to imply, that
subsequent arrangements should be entered into, after the precautions he
deemed necessary against the danger near at hand, had been adopted.
I have, &c,
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

177
No. 133.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 23.)
My Lord, St. Petersburgh, July 15, 1839.
SINCE writing my preceding despatch I have seen Count Nesselrode.
Our conversation has confirmed me in the impression I entertained of the
nature and limited extent of the proposition which he made to Her
Majesty's Government through the Russian Ambassador in London.
Count Nesselrode tells me that he has received very satisfactory
intelligence from Constantinople ; the Commander of the Turkish fleet,
and Hafiz Pasha, having been directed, since the death of the late Sultan,
to avoid a conflict with the Egyptian forces, and the latter having been
ordered to retire from the Syrian territories. His Excellency said, that
he had for some time considered it impossible, that a definitive arrange
ment of the matters in dispute between the Porte and the Pasha of
Egypt, could be much longer delayed, and that such an arrangement had
now become necessary. His Excellency proceeded to say, " Austria
proposes, that for the hereditary tenure of the Pashalic of Egypt assured
to his family, Mehemet Ali should relinquish Syria at his death. We do
not object to that arrangement. Your Government say, that Syria
should be immediately restored to the Sultan. We also think that better.
But have you any reason to suppose that Mehemet Ali will accede to such
a proposal?" [ have &c.
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.
No. 134.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 23.)
My Lord, Vienna, July 10, 1839.
PRINCE METTERNICH has received intelligence of the arrival of
his despatches of 14th of June at St. Petersburgh.
Count Nesselrode had informed Count Fiquelmont that he should
reply to them in a day or two, but that in the meantime he was directed
to acquaint him, that they had been laid in extenso before the Emperor,
who had approved of them in all their parts. When Count Nesselrode's
despatch arrives, I shall write more fully to your Lordship. In the mean
time, I would only remark, that there appears to be a certainty of Russia
uniting her counsels and her action to those of the other Powers.
I have, &e.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.
No. 135.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 23.)
(Extract.) Vienna, July 10, 1839.
PRINCE METTERNICH has had the goodness to communicate to
me the Internuncio's despatches. It appears from them, that immediately
upon the Sultan's death, his eldest son was proclaimed.
Orders were subsequently sent to Hafiz Pasha to suspend operations •.
This point then is gained, but the difficulty in inducing Mehemet Ali to
relinquish Syria will remain entire.
Prince Metternich further informs me that, by way of doing a popular
act upon the accession of the Sultan, the quarantines were all thrown
open, which was received with general acclamation.

2 A

178

No. 136.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 23.)
(Extract.) Vienna, July 10, 1839.
I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich your Lordship's letter
to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of the 25th of June.
Before reading it, he remarked to me that the Note delivered by
Admiral Roussin at Constantinople, and the instruction to Admiral
Lalande, were both founded upon the false principle of an equality of
right between the Sultan and the Pasha, — a principle which Austria could
not adopt, and the falseness of which he had pointed out to M. de St.
Aulaire. After reading your Lordship's letter, Prince Metternich expressed
his satisfaction with it in all its parts, and his sense of its completeness
as an instruction. He has since dwelt much to me upon his astonishment
that the French Government, with such an instruction before them, should
have given one varying from it in essential points, incorrect in principle,
and comparatively vague in its provisions.
I did not omit to point out to Prince Metternich the advantage of
your Lordship's instruction over the Russian proposition, for confining
hostilities within a certain district in case of their having commenced, in
which, when he saw the application of the principle as laid down in your
Lordship's letter, he fully concurred.

No. 137.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 23.)
(Extract.) Vienna, July 11, 1839.
IT appears certain that the Sultan died on the morning of the 29th,
and that his death was kept secret for six-and-thirty hours, at the end of
which period the only notification of it was the proclamation of his
successor. The orders to the Commanders, by sea and land, to suspend
operations, were sent on the 28th or 29th. Admiral Roussin was igno
rant, till some time afterwards, of this step having been taken, and he
had received a refusal to his demand to be allowed to send an officer
to the army of Hafiz Pasha. This refusal was founded upon various
pretexts, and accompanied by a request to be furnished with the grounds
of accommodation which he was authorized to propose between the Sultan
and the Pasha. He was told that his first Note had not been laid before
the Sultan, it being impossible to propose to his Highness to revert to the
statu quo ; but that if he would present a conciliatory reply, conveying
a reasonable plan of arrangement, the clemency of the Sultan mi°-ht
probably be extended towards his vassal.
The leading Turkish Ministers have stated to Baron Stiirmer, that
if anything could have deterred them from ordering operations to be
suspended, it would have been Admiral Roussin's tone in demanding it.
They further requested the Baron to apply to Prince Metternich for
his advice how to act ; and Hosrew Pasha stated, that if Mehemet Ali
would restore Syria and Candia to the Porte, and would reduce his
forces, the right of hereditary succession in Egypt might be secured to
his family. The documents, of which I have here given a summary, will be com
municated to your Lordship, and to the French Government.
Prince Metternich's answer to Constantinople will approve of the
suspension of hostilities ; will recommend the Porte to keep its army and
fleet entire, withdrawing them out of the reach of daily collisions • and
will recommend them to await in total stillness the overtures of" the

179
European Powers. To Mehemet Ali, the Prince will give the same
advice, under pain of destruction, if he neglects it.
As to the plan of pacification, Prince Metternich fully adopts your
Lordship's ideas ; but the Porte having itself designated the terms upon
which it is willing to confer Egypt upon the family of Mehemet Ali, he
considers these, consisting of the restitution of Syria and Candia, and the
disarming, as a sine qud non; whereas the restitution of the eastern coast
of the Red Sea, and the terms upon which Egypt is to be held as a fief,
are open to negotiation.
His plan for the conduct of this negotiation is the following. It
must begin at Constantinople, and will be complete when the Porte shall
have agreed with the Five Powers upon the terms to be granted to the
Pasha : this agreement to be consigned to official notes. When this is
done, the Five Powers will notify to the Pasha the terms, and call upon
him to accept them, supporting their intimation by such pressure, in case
of refusal, as may be sufficient to determine his assent. This assent
being obtained, the arrangement to be placed under the guarantee of
the Five Powers. The outline of the terms is already sketched, and may
be considered as adopted by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.
France remains ; and Prince Metternich requests the British Govern
ment to persuade France.
As to the eastern coast of the Red Sea, the amount of tribute, the
obligation of treaties, present and future, entered into by the Porte, upon
the Pasha, and the extent of reduction of force to be required of him;
these, although of minor importance, are yet points which will offer many
difficulties, and which must be regulated with the Porte, before an
ultimatum can be presented to the Pasha. The only difficulty of treating
them will be with France, and it will be for your Lordship to determine
whether to treat them at Paris or here. I shall request Prince Metter
nich, in case your Lordship decides upon the former place, to direct Count
Appony to give all the assistance in his power.
In the question of disarming, it is probable that the Porte will insist,
as it is entitled to do, upon a diminution of Mehemet Ali's fleet, and this
diminution is precisely what will be most unpleasant to France, who has
always looked upon the naval power of Egypt as a reinforcement to her
own, and thereby a counterpoise to our maritime superiority in the
Mediterranean. If, therefore, this branch of the question is to be treated
here, it will be necessary that I should be furnished with instructions as
to the amount of reduction to be insisted upon, and the mode, specifying
whether any part of the fleet is to be given up to the Sultan.
When this is settled, it will be necessary to establish the relations
between the negotiation at Vienna and the Ambassadors at Con
stantinople. It is clear that Vienna in its relations with that place is nearly a
month a-head of London and Petersburgh. It will therefore be for your
Lordship to provide, that when the proposition to be presented to the
Porte has been assented to by the Five Powers, it shall receive the support
of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. The application of the
Porte to Prince Metternich for advice, and the proximity of this Capital,
throw this branch of the negotiation very much into his hands ; nor, consi
dering the identity of his objects with our own, can it be better placed.
The amount of this exclusive direction will be augmented or diminished
in proportion to the number of references which shall be necessary to
London and Paris.
When we come to treat with Egypt, the Maritime Powers must take
the lead ; and the first question will arise upon the mode of summoning
the Pasha to accept the ultimatum of the Porte.
The modes are three, — by the Consuls, by the Admirals, or by a
Commissioner to be sent on board the fleet. If the latter be preferred,
how is the Commissioner to be chosen, and from whence is he to be sent ?
In either of the three alternatives, it will be necessary that the Admirals
should be instructed how to act in case of Mehemet Ali's refusal to accept
the Sultan's offer.
Prince Metternich believes that the moral weight of the Five Powers
2 A 2

180
acting in concert will determine the submission of the Pasha, but if it
should not, I cannot but doubt the efficacy of a blockade to induce him
to evacuate Syria. That country is reported to be provided with warlike
stores for more than one campaign, nor would it be difficult to organize a
transport by camels across the Desert. The Pasha's fleet would be laid
up in port, and his commerce would pass under neutral flags. In such a
case, the Russian proposition to consider ourselves in a state of war might
be found the only one efficacious.
If any part of this second branch of the negotiation is to be treated
from hence, (and I do not see, after an agreement has been come to at
Constantinople, what can be gained by references to Paris and London,)
it will be requisite that the Admirals should be furnished with instructions,
and the negotiation here with directions for its guidance.
I have comprised in this despatch the result of many conversations
with Prince Metternich, with the view of assisting the deliberations of
Her Majesty's Government.
P. S. — I see I have omitted a consideration of much importance ; it
is, that whenever a common proposition shall have been agreed upon by
the Five Powers, all separate communications either from the Ambassadors
or from the Courts should cease.
If Mehemet Ali were to remark a difference of meaning, or even of
tone, between any one of these and the collective language of the Alliance,
the chance of his submission would be much diminished.

No. 138.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 23.)
My Lord, Vienna, July 11, 1839.
PRINCE METTERNICH has received answers from St. Petersburgh,
to his despatches of 14th June. They were copying for transmission to
London and Paris, so that I did not see them ; but the Prince assures me
that they bespeak an identity of views with Austria. The despatches to
which they reply, did no more than convey Prince Metternich's first
communications to Constantinople. Prince Jablonowski, who left this on
the 21st, bearing a private letter from Prince Metternich, recommending
the establishment of a central point of negotiation, had but just reached
Petersburgh before their departure ; a further courier, therefore, must be
expected with the official answer to this proposition; but Russia already
adopts the principle, that everything is to be done in common.
Upon all the details Prince Metternich agrees to your Lordship's
ideas without reserve, and is sure of their adoption by Russia: so that,
according to him, England, Austria, and Russia, are placed exactly upon
the same line, and there only remains to induce France to relinquish her
deviations from it. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 139.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 23.)
(Extract.) Vienna, July IJ, 1839.
I THIS day applied to Prince Metternich upon the subject of the
Austrian squadron. He told me it would consist of nine sail ; that the
Archduke had been ordered to hold himself in readiness to embark ; but
that its sailing would be delayed until an answer should be received from
Paris to an application calling upon the French Government to conform
its instruction to its Admiral to that which had been given by England ;

181
the principle of parity between the Sultan and the Pasha being one which
Austria could uot admit, any more than she could its application to the
equal treatment of their vessels. Till this was done, Prince Metternich
said the Austrian squadron could not join the combined fleet, as it would
not know with whom to act.

No. 140.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 23.)
(Extract.) Vienna, July 12, 1839.
PRINCE METTERNICH has just communicated to me the whole
of his despatches to Paris with their inclosures. They will be laid
before your Lordship. His despatch upon the incorrectness of prin
ciple in the instructions to Admiral Lalande, is a masterpiece of argu
ment. It treats the difference between the French and English Instruc
tions as merely apparent, assuming and proving that the real thought of
the French Cabinet cannot be other than that of England and Austria.
The despatch of Count Fiquelmont is conclusive upon this point,
the Emperor regarding Mehemet Ali only as a rebellious subject.

No. 141.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 23.)
My Lord, Vienna, July 14, 1839.
THE departure of Prince Metternich's courier was suspended, by the
arrival Of an estafette from Constantinople. I inclose Lord Ponsonby's
despatches received by this occasion; those, of the Internuncio will be
communicated by Prince Esterhazy. There are two differences be
tween them. The first is, that Baron Stiirmer mentions it to be intended
by the Porte to apprize Mehemet Ali that the Sultan may be induced to
appoint one of his sons to the Pashalic of one of the Provinces he
(Mehemet Ali) at present holds, which is virtually a relinquishment of
Syria to Ibrahim Pasha. The other, that the Internuncio notifies the
consent of the Representatives of the Five Powers having been given to
support the propositions of the Porte, while Lord Ponsonby only speaks
of their having agreed to notify the facts to the Consuls. There is a
further difference between this overture made by Nouri Effendi and the
one he made to the Internuncio; in that, the evacuation of the Holy Cities
was omitted, as in this, is the disarming.
Prince Metternich intends making no change in the attitude Austria
has taken; on the contrary, the squadron will receive immediate orders
to join the combined one of England and France, in the Levant. He
holds that no difference of sentiment has taken place in the Turkish
Councils ; that the tranquillity now sought to be re-established would not
last ; and that the European Powers having been brought forwards must
carry through the task they have undertaken.
The reasoning upon which this opinion is founded will be laid before
your Lordship, and appears to me to be founded in truth.
I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

182

No. 142.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 24.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 1, 1839.
THE death of His Majesty the Sultan was not expected to take place
so soon, for there had been alleviations of the malady, though not such as
to give well-grounded hopes of his recovery. The event obliges the
Internuncio to dispatch an estafette without delay, and I have no time
to write as I wish to do upon so serious a subject as the state of this
country ; but I did write some time ago to Lord Beauvale, and I have now
written a hasty letter to him, in which I have summarily given such
opinions as I should lay before Her Majesty's Government in an official
form if I had time ; and perhaps Lord Beauvale will have the goodness to
communicate them to your Lordship, if he thinks they ought to be
submitted. I regret that it is not competent to me to suggest any measures to the
Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron, for I am of opinion that the
presence of the squadron at the Dardanelles would be useful, and perhaps
necessary to prevent the occurrence of things that may be disadvan
tageous to Her Majesty's interests in this country. [ have &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 143.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 24.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 2, 1839.
I RECEIVED, this evening, from his Excellency Nouri Effendi, a
note, of which I inclose copy. The meeting probably will not be over in
time to allow me afterwards to write by post, and therefore I will report
now what I have good reason to believe is the substance of the business
intended to be brought forward by the Ottoman Ministers, — namely, a
communication of a resolution taken by the Sublime Porte, to propose to
Mehemet Ali to make the Government of Egypt hereditary in his family
on the terms of vassalage and tribute, provided he consents to restore
Syria, and Candia, and Mecca, and Medina, to the Sultan. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 143.
Nouri Effendi to Viscount Ponsonby.

Mon sieur l'Ambassadeur, Constantinople, le 20 Rebi-el-akhir, 1255.
CHARGE d'ordre Souverain de faire a, votre Excellence une commu
nication importante, je m'empresse de la prevenir du desir que j'ai d'avoir
l'honneur de m'entretenir avec elle, et de la prier par consequent de
vouloir bien se rendre a ma maison de campagne a Emirghienoghlou
demain a 5 heures a la Turque. Agreez, &c,
(Signe) NOURI.

183
(Translation.)
Nouri Effendi to Viscount Ponsonby.
Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, Constantinople, 20th Rebi-el-akhir, 1255.
CHARGED, by order of my Sovereign, to make to your Excellency
an important communication, I hasten to acquaint you of my desire to
have the honour of conversing with you, and consequently to request that
you will have the goodness to come to my country-house at Emirghien-
oghlou, to-morrow at 5 o'clock, Turkish time. Receive, &c,
(Signed) NOURI.

No. 144.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 24.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 3, 1839.
IN pursuance of the desire of the Sublime Porte, the Ministers of the
Five Great Powers assembled this day at the House of the Ottoman
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Nouri Effendi was the only Ottoman
Minister present. He stated, that the Sultan had commanded him to
assure the Ministers, in his Highness' name, of his esteem and friendship
for the Sovereigns they represented, and his warm desire to cultivate by
every means the good understanding that existed between their Govern
ments and the Ottoman Porte. This was handsomely expressed according
to Turkish forms.
His Excellency proceeded to say, he was commanded to make known
to the Ministers of his Allies and friends, that the Sultan, being animated
by the wish to put an end to the calamities which pressed heavily upon
his people, in consequence of the conduct of the Pasha of Egypt, and the
anger he had excited in the bosom of the late Sultan Mahmoud, had
determined to send one of the eminent men of his Court to offer the
Egyptian Pasha pardon for the past, and assurance of favour for the
future (of which the Sultan sent a decoration as the mark and evidence),
and to promise that his Highness would confer upon the Pasha and his
family the hereditary government of Egypt to be held by the Pasha and
his descendants as vassals, on the condition that Syria, &c. should be
immediately restored to the Sultan.
Nouri Effendi asked for the opinion of the Ministers, who replied that
they would rejoice in the restoration of peace, and were warmly desirous
of the prosperity of his Highness; that, being uninstructed by their
Governments, they could not give any opinion as to the terms which the
Sublime Porte was about to propose to the Pasha, but they would not fail
to report to their Governments the communication they had received.
Questions were asked to ascertain precisely the nature of the pro
posal intended to be made to the Pasha, and it was distinctly understood,
that the Sultan would grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government
of Egypt, within the boundaries that were formerly the limits of that
country; that is, as I understand it, the limits that used to circumscribe
the country as a Pashalic.
It was asked if it was intended to leave Mehemet Ali in possession of
Syria, or of Mecca, or Medina, or St. John d'Acre, and the reply was in
the negative. The Ministers thought it right to confine themselves to
inquiries directed solely to the perfect elucidation of what was stated to
them, and not to enter at all into discussion of the merits of the
proposition. Nouri Effendi desired the Ministers «to write to the Consuls of their
respective Governments ; and the Ministers agreed to notify the facts and
what had taken place to the Consuls,

184
I will forward by the French steamer, copy of my letter to Colonel
Campbell. There were questions asked as to the state of the armies in Syria,
and Nouri Effendi said that orders had been sent, which would be received
by Hafiz Pasha in about ten days, peremptorily commanding him not to
engage in any act of hostility ; and he added, that Mahomed Ali Bey had
already carried orders to that officer to avoid attacking the Egyptian
Army, and said the Porte had no intelligence- of any fighting having
taken place of greater magnitude than skirmishes between detached
bodies of Irregulars, and so forth.
The Sultan's measure has the advantage of showing his disposition
to live on friendly terms with the Pasha : he offers pardon and oblivion as
to the past, and favour as to the future. He shows that the Pasha has
not to fear from him the effects of personal hate, as he had from
the deceased Mahmoud ; and takes from the Pasha the excuse that fear
afforded him for his armaments. He throws the defence upon the Pasha
of continued rebellion, and of the disturbance of the peace of the world,
which will be the consequence of his pursuit of projects of aggrandizement
and ambition. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 145.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 23, 1839.
I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a draft of
Note which Baron Roussin has been instructed to present to the Turkish
Government, requesting that if the naval or military forces of other Powers
are invited to Constantinople, the French Squadron may be permitted to
pass the Dardanelles. I am, &,c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.'

No. 146.
Draft of Note to be presented to the Porte by Admiral Roussin. — (Communicated by
Baron de Bourqueney, July 18.) Juillet, 1839.
LE Soussigne, Ambassadeur de France, a regu I'ordre de faire la
communication suivante a Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres de la Sublime Porte.
Les graves evenemens qui viennent d'edater en Syrie, imposent a la
politique des Cours Europeennes Fobligation de prevoir jusqu'aux chances
les plus invraisemblables de la crise qu'ils ont fait naitre.
II est sans doute bien peu probable qu'on voie renaitre aujourd'hui
les dangers qui en 1833 menacaient la capitale meme de l'Empire Ottoman,
et forcaient la Porte a accepter un appui etranger. Sans parler des autres
circonstances qui, depuis lors, se sont tant modifiees, il y a tout lieu
d'esperer que les efforts des Grandes Puissances Europeennes pour arreter
les hostilites a peine commencees, previendront des extremes semblables.
Encore une fois, pourtant, il faut tout prevoir, et l'histoire presente
trop d'exemples d'accidens inattendus qui ont trompe les calculs des
Gouvernemens les plus forts etles plus habiles, pour que la Sublime Porte
puisse considerer comme une injure, Fhypothfese d'un desastre qui Fobli-
gerait de nouveau a reclamer, pour sa defense, l'appui de ses Allies.
Le jour ou l'existence du trone du Sultan serait reellement compromise,
elle les trouverait tous disposes a lui accorder leur concours pour prevenir
une catastrophe qui, en ebranlant Fequilibre politique, mettrait en peril

185
la paix du monde, dont le maintien les interesse tous au meme degre. A
Petersbourg, a Vienne, a Berlin, a Londres, a Paris, il n'y a qu'un senti
ment a cet egard.
Dans un tel etat de choses, la Sublime Porte comprendrait sans doute
que le moyen le plus assure de concilier avec la necessite facheuse oil elle
se trouverait reduite, le soin de sa dignite et meme de sa surete, ce serait
de demander, non pas a une Puissance en particulier, mais a l'Europe
entiere, Fappui qui lui serait devenu indispensable. Un grand Empire ne
dedioit pas, en effet, en se placant sous la protection des grands intents
Europeens. II trouve dans la diversite meme de ces interets, lorsqu'ils se
reunissent pour venir a son aide, la garantie certaine que cette protection
ne pourra pas se transformer en une suprematie dangereuse pour son
independance. Le systeme de conduite que cette consideration puissante indique a la
Sublime Porte est d'ailleurs le seul qui s'accorde avec les convenances et
les justes susceptibilites de la politique des Grandes Cours, dont il lui
importe certainement de tenir compte.
Le Gouvernement du Roi a done la conviction qu'il va au-devant des
intentions de la Sublime Porte en demandant que, dans le cas ou les forces
de terre ou de mer d'une ou de plusieurs des Cours Alliees seraient
appeiees a Constantinople, les ordres fussent donnes pour ouvrir imme
diatement le passage des Dardanelles a une eseadre Frangaise qui viendrait,
de son cote, proteger le trone du Sultan contre les perils dont l'imminence
aurait determine une telle mesure.
Le Soussigne prie Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres de lui faire parvenir le plus promptement possible, la reponse
de la Sublime Porte a cette communication, pour qu'il puisse, ainsi qu'il
en a I'ordre, Fenvoyer sur le champ a Paris. (Signe) BARON ROUSSIN.
(Translation.)
Draft of Note to be presented to the Porte by Admiral Roussin. July, 1839.
THE Undersigned, Ambassador of France, has received orders to
make the following communication to his Excellency the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte.
The serious events which have just occurred in Syria, render it
obligatory upon the policy of the Courts of Europe to anticipate even the
most improbable chances of the crisis which those events have produced.
It is indeed very little likely, that a recurrence should be witnessed
at the present time of those perils, which, in 1833, menaced even the capi
tal of the Ottoman Empire, and forced the Porte to accept foreign support.
Without mentioning the other circumstances which since that time have
been so much modified, there is every reason to hope, that the efforts of
the Great European Powers to put a stop to hostilities which have scarcely
commenced, Will prevent the like extremities.
Once again, however, it is necessary to anticipate everything, and
history offers too many instances of unlooked-for accidents which have
deceived the calculations of the strongest and most skilful Governments
for the Sublime Porte to regard as an insult the supposition of a disaster
which might compel it again to solicit for its defence the support of its
Allies. The day that the existence of the Sultan's throne should really be
compromised, the Porte would find them all inclined to afford it their
co-operation to prevent a catastrophe which, by shaking the political
balance, would endanger the peace of the world, in the maintenance of
which they are all interested to the same degree. At Petersburgh, at
Vienna, at Berlin, at London, and at Paris, there is but one opinion in
this respect. In such a state of things, the Sublime Porte would doubtless under
stand that the surest method of reconciling a regard for its digaity, and
even for its security, with the grievous necessity to which it would find
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186
itself reduced, would be, to request, not from one Power in particular,
but from the whole of Europe, the support which would be indispensable
for it. A great Empire, in fact, is not degraded by placing itself under the
protection of the great European interests. It finds even in the diversity
of those interests, when they unite in coming to its succour, the sure
guarantee that this protection cannot be transformed into a supremacy
dangerous to its independence.
The system of conduct which this weighty consideration indicates to
the Sublime Porte is, moreover, the only one which is consistent with
the duties and the just susceptibilities of the policy of the Great Courts,
which it is certainly important for the Porte to pay attention to.
His Majesty's Government therefore is persuaded, that it meets the
intentions of the Sublime Porte by requesting that, in the event of the
land or sea forces of one or more of the Allied Courts being invited to
Constantinople, orders may be given immediately to open the passage of
the Dardanelles to a French squadron, which, on its part, would arrive
for the protection of the throne of the Sultan against the perils, the immi
nence of which would have led to such a measure being determined upon.
The Undersigned requests his Excellency the Minister for Foreign
Affairs to forward to him as quickly as possible the answer of the Sublime
Porte to this communication, in order that he may immediately send it,
as he is instructed to do, to Paris. (Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.

No. 147.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 25.)
My Lord, Paris, July 22, 1839.
THE inclosed telegraphic despatches, one from the French Ambas
sador at Constantinople, and the other from the French Consul-General
at Alexandria, were sent to me this day by Marshal Soult. The intelli
gence they contain, though coming from opposite quarters, is in substance
the same; and no doubt, therefore, can be entertained of the complete
rout of the Turkish army under Hafiz Pasha.
I was not at home this morning when Count Appony called upon me,
but I have just been told by Marshal Soult, that the Austrian Ambassador
has received despatches from Prince Metternich, containing accounts from
Constantinople of the 3rd, stating that an entire change in the politics of
the Divan had taken place.
The Internuncio writes, that Nouri Effendi had communicated to him,
and also to the other Ambassadors of the Great European Powers, that the
Sultan had determined to accord to Mehemet Ali the hereditary right to
the government of Egypt ; and that he proposed sending an Envoy of rank
and consideration to Alexandria, charged to communicate to the Pasha
this determination, and to deliver to him the decoration of the highest order
in the Turkish Empire, with magnificent presents. The Marshal Soult
was inclined to think that the news of the battle of the 24th of June,
though not divulged, must have reached Constantinople on the 3rd, and
that the intelligence of this disaster caused the sudden veering in the
politics of the Turkish Government; but in Admiral Roussin's despatch
of the 8th, from Therapia, it is stated, that the Porte had only just received
the news of the battle. It is not improbable that the partizans' of Mehemet
Ali at Constantinople, relieved from the terror inspired by the Sultan
Mahmoud, may have gained an ascendancy in the councils of the new
sovereign. It seems, however, that Prince Metternich had instructed the
Internuncio to dissuade, if possible, the Sultan from thus prostrating him
self before Mehemet Ali, and to engage him to rely upon the European
Powers for protection. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

187

Inclosure 1 in No. 147.
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles, of the 22nd July, at 5 a. m.
Le Consul- General a M le President du Conseil des Ministres: Alexandrie, le 6..
L'ARMEE' Egyptienne sous les ordres d'Ibrahim Pacha ayant
attaque Farmee Turque commandee par le Seraskier Hafiz Pacha, a Nezib,
au-dela d'Alep, celle-ci a abandonne le champ de bataille apres un combat
dedeux heures. Tout le materiel, en fusils, canons, et munitions, est tombe
au pouvoir des Egyptiens. Ibrahim a eerit cette nouvelle le 25 Juin, sous
la tente du General-en-Chef Ture. 11 etait de retour a Antab le 28, mais
avait donne ordre a trois regimens d'infanterie et trois regimens de
cavalerie de se porter en avant sur Ourfa et Diarbekir:
(Translation.)
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd July, at 5 a.m.
The Consul-General to the President of the Council of Ministers.
Alexandria, the 6th.
THE Egyptian Army under the orders of Ibrahim Pasha, having
attacked the Turkish Army commanded by the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, at
Nezib, beyond Aleppo, the latter abandoned the field of battle after an
action of two hours. All the materiel, in guns, cannon, and ammunition,
has fallen into the power of the Egyptians. Ibrahim wrote this intelli
gence the 25th of June, from the tent of the Turkish General-in-Chief.
He had returned to Aintab on the 28th, but had ordered three regiments
of Infantry and three regiments of Cavalry, to advance upon Orfa and
Diarbekir.

Inclosure 2 in No. 147.
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd July, at. 3 p.m.
Therapia, le 8.
LA Porte vient de recevoir la nouvelle qu'une bataille a ete livree
dans le voisinage d'Alep, le 24 Juin, et que l'Armee Turque a ete
detruite. Les debris ont repasse la frontiere, et on ne dit pas que FArmee
Egyptienne les ait poursuivis. (Translation.)
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd July, at 3 p.m.
Therapia, the 8th.
THE Porte has just received the intelligence that a battle has been
fought in the neighbourhood of Aleppo, on the 24th of June, and that the
Turkish Army has been destroyed. The remains have repassed the
frontier, and it is not said that the Egyptian Army has pursued them.

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188

No. 148.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 26.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 8, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of a letter to me from his Excellency the French
Ambassador, stating that Ahmed Pasha had sent his second in command,
Osmian Bey, to Admiral Lalande, &c. &c. &c.
I had a long conversation with his Excellency, and he read mC parts
of Admiral Lalande's despatch. Ahmed Pasha accused Hosrew and Halil
Pasha of having murdered Sultan Mahmoud, and of the intention to give
up this country to the Russians. He said he had written on the 2d July
to Hafiz Pasha, to call upon him to march with his army to depose the
present Minister by force. That he (Ahmed) would ask Mehemet Ali for
his support in the undertaking, and announced his intention to take the
Ottoman fleet to Candia. Admiral Lalande said, that Candia belongs to
Mehemet Ali, and it would be to deliver up the Ottoman fleet to him ; and
the Pasha subsequently said he would go to Rhodes.
The French Ambassador communicated what he had heard to the Grand
Vizier, accompanied with assurances of the friendship of the French
Government, &c. I wrote to the Grand Vizier, and said that Her Majesty's
Government would act as a faithful Ally. * I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.
P.S. — I inclose copies of my letters to Admiral Stopford, and to
Colonel Campbell. P.

Inclosure 1 in No. 148.

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby. Therapia, le 7 Juillet, 1839.
Monsieur l'Ambassadeur et cher Collegue,
UN evenement grave vient d'arriver ; j'apprends directement et avec
certitude que le Capitan Pacha est en insurrection avec sa flotte, contre
le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, et est parti pour Rhodes, pretendant que
ce Gouvernement est vendu a la Russie ; il dit avoir envoye un Tatare
a. Hafiz Pacha pour Fengager a marcher avec son armee sur Constan
tinople pour y changer le Gouvernement. Ce Tatare serait parti le 2.
La tentative du Capitan Pacha est folle s'il se borne a rester a Rhodes
avec sa flotte, puisqu'il n'a aucun moyen d'y subsister longtems ; mais il
peut se livrer a Mehemet Ali, a qui, dit-il, il a propose la paix. Si I'avis
qu'il a donne a Hafiz Pacha determine ce General-en-Chef a s'jnsurger
aussi contre le Sultan, ces deux chefs des forces de terre et de mer peu
vent renverser le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse et organiser la guerre
civile. II me semble que la conduite de nos Gouvernemens ne peut pas etre
douteuse dans cette circonstance : ils sont allies du Sultan Abdoul Medjid,
et leurs vceux seront pour lui ; je viens pour le compte du mien d'en donner
Fassurance au Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse. Comme je ne fais pas un
seul doute sur la parfaite intelligence qui existe entre les ndtres, je vous
offre, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur et cher Collegue, de m'unir a vous pom-
nous concerter sur toutes les mesures que nous pouvons avoir a prendre, et
sur les conseils a donner au Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse dans cette
circonstance. A srreez &e.
(Signe) BARON ROUSSIN.

189

(Translation.)
Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby. Therapia, July 7, 1839.
Monsieur l'Ambassadeur and dear Colleague,
AN important event has just happened; I learn directly and for
certain, that the Capudan Pasha is in insurrection with his fleet against
the Government of His Highness, and has set out for Rhodes, pretending
that this Government is sold to Russia ; he says that he has sent a Tatar
to Hafiz Pasha to persuade him to march on Constantinople with his
Army, to change the Government there. That Tatar would have set out
the 2nd. The attempt of the Capudan Pasha is foolish if he only remains at
Rhodes with his fleet, since he has not any means of subsisting there for
a length of time ; but he may deliver himself up to Mehemet Ali, to whom,
he says, he has proposed peace. If the advice which he has given to
Hafiz Pasha determines that General-in-Chief to rebel also against the
Sultan, these two Chiefs of the land and sea forces may overthrow the
Government of His Highness and organize a civil war.
It appears to me that there can be no doubt as to the conduct of our
Governments in this matter; they are the Allies of the Sultan Abdul
Medjid, and their wishes will be in his favour : I have given this assur
ance to the Government of His Highness on the part of my own. As I
have not the least doubt of the perfect understanding which exists
between ours, I propose, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur and dear Colleague, to
join with you in order that we may concert together respecting all the
measures which we may have to adopt, and with reference to the advice to
be given to the Government of His Highness in this matter.
Accept, &c,
(Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 148.
Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.
Sir, Therapia, July 7, 1839.
I INCLOSE for your information, copy of a letter to me from the
French Ambassador ; and I have to add, that his Excellency has assured
the Sublime Porte that it will find in the Government of His Majesty the
King of the French, support, &c. ¦>
I have assured the Porte, that Her Majesty's Government will perform
all that is incumbent upon a faithful Ally.
I have to add, that intelligence has this day been received of the total
defeat of Hafiz Pasha by the Egyptian troops on the 24th June. It is said
that Hafiz Pasha acted in direct opposition to the counsel given him by the
Prussian officers with his army.
These events place us in a most critical situation. I presume to
think that Her Majesty's squadron ought not to be at any distance from
the centre of affairs. I have, &c, ;
(Signed) PONSONBY.

190
Inclosure 3 in No. 148.
Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.
Sir, Therapia, July 7, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of a letter which will inform you of what has
taken place. The statement comes from Admiral Lalande, who was visited
by, the second in command of the Ottoman Fleet, Osman Bey, bearer
of a. message from Ahmed Pasha.
It seems Ahmed asserts, that the Sultan was murdered by Hosrew
Pasha, now Grand Vizier, and Halil Pasha ; that those persons intend
to give up this country to Russia ; that it is necessary to oblige the
Sultan to appoint another Ministry.
The Capudan Pasha proposed to go to Candia: but as Admiral
Lalande pointed out to the messenger, Osman Bey, that Candia belonged
to Mehemet Ali, and that to carry the Ottoman Fleet there, would be to
deliver it up to that Pasha, Osman seemed struck with the remark, and
said the Capudan Pasha would go to Rhodes.
Admiral Lalande said he had no orders to interfere by force with
the movements of the Ottoman Fleet. He has ordered a French brig of
war to observe the motions of that fleet.
The French Ambassador communicated the facts to the Sublime
Porte, and has assured the Sultan of the devotion of the French Govern
ment to the cause of the Sultan, &c. He has advised the Porte to send
couriers in all haste to Hafiz Pasha ; and I believe he has advised that
orders should be given for the recall of the army back to this neighbour
hood. I shall give advice, that the army be left where it is, because that
part of the Empire ought not to be exposed to become the prey of
Mehemet Ali.
The Ambassador has desired the French Consul-General to place
before Mehemet Ali the expediency of his remaining quiet, and to show
him that all the Great Powers must interfere in this crisis, and that his
part is to be acquiescent.
I have to beg of you to say, that the Pasha will do well to reflect
upon the inadequacy of his own means to resist the force of the united
Sovereigns, and that his wisdom will direct him to avoid the consequences
that may attend imprudence.
1 have assured the Porte of the firm support of the British Govern
ment. I have only the shortest time for writing, therefore I confine myself to
the principal facts. It is not easy to believe Ahmed Pasha has taken
this step (unless he be mad) without having some support somewhere;
but as yet there are no signs here of any disposition to make a distur
bance. I think the end may be, that Ahmed Pasha will offer the Fleet to
Mehemet Ali. It is to be seen whether or not he will be able to give it
to him. I have, &,c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 149.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 26.)
(Extract.) Therapia, July 8, 1839.
COUNT KOINIGSMARCK yesterday received intelligence of the
total defeat of the Ottoman Army by Ibrahim Pasha, on the 24th of June.
The Count informed M. de Bouteneff of the fact, who told it to me a few
minutes afterwards.
Count Konigsmarck's information came from the Baron de Vincke
who had received the news from one of the Prussian officers attached to

193,
lire army of Hafiz; and, as I understand, that Pasha had reached Marash
ha his flight.
Count Konigsmarck said, that Hafiz Pasha had acted in direct
opposition to the counsel given him by the Prussian officers ; that he said
it was a disgrace to fight behind ditches and walls; and that he
abandoned his position.
The opinion of the Prussian officers is stated to have been, that
Ibrahim Pasha would have been reduced to great straits had Hafiz
Pasha acted with any sort of skill, and had avoided the most capital
faults. Sultan Mahmoud had given Hafiz strict orders not to risk a
battle in the plain, but to defend his positions. I did all in my power to
cause Hafiz to be subjected to the advice of a skilful man, and to bind
him down by orders, so as to deprive him of the power of producing ruin
by his rashness.
It is said, Ibrahim Pasha desires to push on for Constantinople, but .
that Mehemet Ali purposes to take possession of Diarbekir, and the Pashalic
of Bagdad, &c. If the advance upon Constantinople be made, Russia will
be bound by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to aid the Sultan. If the sup
posed policy of Mehemet Ali be followed, I think Russia will not move.
Before these late events, and after the death of Mahmoud, I told the
Grand Vizier that I thought it very possible the Ottoman Army would be
defeated ; and I advised him in that case to avoid, with pertinacity,
making any concessions to Mehemet Ali, of territory, &c, before the
advice of the Great Powers should be given. He assured me, that he
would not make any concessions before-being informed of the opinion of the
Great Powers. It is not impossible that Hosrew knew, when he answered
me, that Hafiz had been defeated ; but I do not state this as a ground
upon which to form an opinion of what his conduct will be.

No. 150.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 26.)
(Extract.) Vienna, July 17, 1839.
I THIS day received the inclosed despatches from Lord Ponsonby
by an Austrian estafette. It appears to me so desirable that Prince
Metternich's communications should accompany them to England, that I
shall delay a day in forwarding them, to give time for this to be done.
It our Lordship will perceive that the first news of the battle which
reached the Corps Diplomatique at Constantinople, was through, Count
Konigsmarck, who received it on the 7th of July, thirteen days after the
action had been fought. It is not to be believed that the Turkish
Government had not learnt it sooner ; and Prince Metternich is in pos
session of reports which prove to his satisfaction, that the defeat was
known before the overture to Mehemet, and that it decided that measure.
The hasty manner in which it was carried into effect, and the strange
confused letter of the Grand Vizier to the Pasha, indicate the state of
feeling under which it was written.
It is called a battle, but in fact there was none, the whole Turkish
army having run away as soon as the cannonade grew hot.
Prince Metternich's instructions to the Internuncio will be com
municated to your Lordship J but it, is not easy to give directions
for events which so far outstrip all previsions. With regard to the
position of the Powers, it does not appear to me to be much changed
¦fcJy what has happened. By the inclosed precis of a report from the
Austrian Consul at Alexandria, your Lordship will see that the attack
was made by Ibrahim upon the receipt of Mehemet Ali's order to
that effect. Captain Caillier, who bore the counter order, will have
reached the camp within forty-eight hours after the defeat of the
Turkish army, so that we may hope that Ibrahim will have halted upon
the Euphrates. There seems to be far from a certainty of the fleet having
gone over to Mehemet Ali; in which case itis possible that the ultimate

192
loss may only be that of the Turkish army, which is to be considered as
totally disbanded. This state of things, with the assistance of the Five!
Powers, might not be irreparable.

Inclosure in No. 150.
Extract from Colonel Laurin' s Report to the Internuncio.
Alexandria, June 26.
IBRAHIM received the order to attack on the 15th, and a Tatar
sent off on the 19th, by Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali, has just brought
word that the army would be ready to attack on the 21st, and that this
would positively take place on that day.

No. 151.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 26.)
(Extract.) Vienna, July 19, 1839.
IT was impossible not to feel that a new state of things has arisen
since your instructions of 28th June were given. The death of the Sultan
Mahmoud, the accession of a successor, the destruction of the army, the de
fection of the fleet, and the rivalry of the leading persons of the empire, have
totally changed the state of things, and maybe felt by Her Majesty's Go
vernment to require an alteration in their determinations. Under this
impression, I thought it would be useful to transmit to your Lordship the
views of the Austrian Government upon the altered posture of affairs ; and
being prevented by indisposition from calling on Prince Metternich on the
evening of the 17th, I addressed a letter to him. The next day passed
without my being able to obtain an answer ; and as I am still unable to go
to the Prince, Baron Neumann has this instant come to me, from whom I
learn, that he purposes sending a courier in a few days to London, by
whom he will enter into a full consideration of the actual posture of affairs.
I would remark to your Lordship, that it appears highly probable that
the Porte and the Pasha will come to an agreement. The overture, of.
which Akiff Effendi is the bearer, having been sent with the knowledge of
the defeat of the Turkish Army, it is to be supposed that he is authorized
to submit to the Pasha's conditions ; and Mehemet Ali will prefer closing
at once with the Sultan in a moment of defeat, rather than await the
interposition of the Five Powers.

No. 152.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 26.)
My Lord, Vienna, July 19, 1839,
PRINCE METTERNICH has just sent to me, by Baron Neumann,
Prince Esterhazy's report of an interview with your Lordship, in which
you communicate to him your instructions to me of the 28th June and
your views upon the subject of the negotiation at Vienna.
The Prince is highly pleased with Prince Esterhazy's account of his
conversation with your Lordship, and fully satisfied with your views upon
the negotiation. The only thing he begs to suggest in addition, is the

193
necessity of orders to the Ambassadors at Constantinople, and the Consuls
at Alexandria, to abide by what they may receive from hence on the part
of the Five Powers, and not to act independently of it.
I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 153.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 26, 1839.
YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 14th of July, by the Austrian
courier, did not reach me till a late hour on the night of the 23rd instant,
and after the messenger Kaye had been sent off to Vienna from this
office, I have to inform your Excellency, that the contents of your despatches
have afforded the greatest pleasure to Her Majesty's Government.
Those despatches prove that there exists perfect identity between the
views of Austria and those of England, upon the Turco-Egyptian Affair ;
and that full reliance may be placed upon the complete co-operation of
Russia with the other Powers in effecting a permanent and satisfactory
settlement of those important matters.
I have to instruct you to express to Prince Metternich the extreme
gratification which is felt by Her Majesty's Government at this state of
things, and to assure his Highness, that Her Majesty's Government fully
appreciates the enlarged and statesmanlike views which he has been the
first to sketch out upon these matters, and does ample justice to the ability
of the combined arrangements by which he proposes to work those views
out. The Austrian Government shall have the zealous and cordial co
operation of that of Great Britain for the accomplishment of the great
purpose which is aimed at ; and Her Majesty's Government is perfectly
convinced that France will be found to be as zealous and as sincere as
Great Britain, in labouring to accomplish an object of such vital import
ance for the peace of Europe. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 154.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 26, 1839.
I HAVE to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government
fully concur with the Austrian Cabinet in thinking, that the death of the
late Sultan ought to make no difference in the course which the Five
Powers were prepared to pursue for the purpose of effecting a final settle
ment between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; and Her Majesty's
Government, from its knowledge of the sentiments and views of the
Cabinet of Vienna, is also convinced that Austria will agree with England
in opinion, that the objects aimed at by the Five Powers ought not in any
degree to be affected by the defeat which the Turkish Army sustained at
Nezib on the 24th of June.
The result of the battle of the 24th cannot entitle Mehemet Ali to
any greater favour from the Five Powers, but rather the contrary;
because the battle was fought in defiance of the remonstrances and warn
ings of the Five Powers, his army being the assailant, and the field of
action having been beyond the frontier of Syria.
But neither can the results of that battle diminish the force of those
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194
political considerations which have led the Powers to think that the
evacuation of Syria by Mehemet Ali is essential for the maintenance of
the Turkish Empire, and consequently for the preservation of the peaee
of Europe : on the contrary, the results of that battle must tend to give
additional force to those considerations, and to demonstrate the urgent
necessity of not delaying to carry into execution so indispensable an
arrangement. For the results of that battle, by weakening, for a time at
least, the military means of defence possessed by the Sultan, renders it
still more incumbent on the Five Powers to interpose, in order not only
to rescue the Sultan from present danger, but to protect him from a recur
rence of similar danger in future.
Nor, on the other hand, can that battle increase in any sensible
degree the difficulties which the Five Powers may have to overcome in
the practical execution of the proposed arrangement ; for, on the contrary,
in whatever degree the effectiveness of the Egyptian forces in Syria may
have been diminished by the casualties and by the expenditure of stores,
consequent upon the action and upon the operations connected with it, in
the same proportion must the Pasha of Egypt become more sensible how
much his military position in Syria might be affected, if the communica
tion between Egypt and Syria by sea were to be cut off by the squadrons
of the Allied Powers. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON,

No. 155.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 27.)
My Lord, Paris, July 25, 1839.
I HAVE only time before the departure of the post, shortly to state
the substance (which was this day communicated to me by Marshal
Soult) of the despatches which were received late last night from Admiral
Roussin, from M. Cochelet, and from Admiral Lalande, commanding the
French squadron in the Levant. The despatches, at the time of my inter
view with the Marshal, were in the hands of the King at St. Cloud.
The most important part of their contents, namely, the total rout of
the Turkish Army in Syria, was made known to the French Government
by the Marseilles telegraph on Monday last, and communicated, I am
told, to your Lordship on the following day by M. de Bourqueney. Next
in importance to this intelligence is the news of the Turkish fleet having
sailed from the Dardanelles in disobedience of the orders issued by the
Turkish Government. It appears from Admiral Lalande's report, that the
Capudan Pasha sent Osman Bey on board the French Admiral's vessel, to
inform him that, in consequence of the ascendancy of Russian interest in
Constantinople, he would not risk, by returning to the Sea of Marmora,
placing the Ottoman fleet at the disposal of the Russians, and that he was
proceeding with it to the Island of Candia. Admiral Lalande strongly
remonstrated against this intention, observing, in the first place, that he
was acting upon erroneous information ; and secondly, that, under any
circumstances, he had better go to the Isle of Rhodes than to Candia, which
was in possession of the Egyptians, and which, in fact, would be the sur
render of the Turkish fleet to Mehemet Ali. The Capudan Pasha appa
rently yielded to this advice. Admiral Roussin writes, that apprehensions
are felt of insurrectional movements in Thessaly, as well as in Albania.
Mehemet Ali, according to M. Cochelet's reports, is in a state of great
exultation at the success of Ibrahim Pasha, and talks of the necessity of
the Sultan yielding to him the hereditary right, not only to the Govern
ment of Egypt, but also to that of all the Pashalics of Arabia, and the
whole of Syria; and treats contemptuously all idea of a Russian army
being able to thwart his views. Ibrahim Pasha had written to request

195
that vessels should be sent for the transport to Egypt of 6,000 soldiers of
the Turkish Army who had enlisted in the service of the Pasha, and for the
conveyance to Alexandria, of the trophies of his victory. I have, &.C.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 156.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 29.)
My Lord, Paris, July 26, 1839.
I INCLOSE copies of the two telegraphic despatches from Marseilles
which were communicated to me this morning by Marshal Soult. The
first containing intelligence of the Capudan Pasha having proposed to
Mehemet Ali to place under his protection the Turkish fleet which he
commanded ; and the second, stating that Akiff Effendi had arrived on.
the 10th at Alexandria, sent by the Sultan to announce to Mehemet Ali
the death of his father Mahmoud ; to confer upon him, with hereditary
right, the government of Egypt and of Syria ; to propose to him his being
nominated Generalissimo and Supporter of the Turkish Empire ; and to
invite him to Constantinople to preside over the reorganization of the
Administration .
I had not the opportunity of seeing Marshal Soult till nearly 6
o'clock this evening. He was at St. Cloud with the King in the early
part of the day, and was obliged afterwards to attend a debate in the
Chamber of Peers. In the short interview I had with his Excellency, he
read to me several despatches of Admiral Roussin and of M. Cochelet ;
but as he informed me that copies of these papers will be sent this evening
to M. de Bourqueney, to be communicated to your Lordship, it is unneces
sary for me, during the short time I have left for writing before the
departure of the messenger, to attempt giving a statement of their
contents. Your Lordship will learn from M. de Bourqueney also, that the
French Government is of opinion, that neither the disastrous overthrow
of the Turkish Army, nor the traitorous conduct of the Capudan Pasha,
nor the prostrate attitude of the Divan, should affect the course which the
Great Powers of Europe intended to pursue. That any arrangements
made between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali at a moment when the advisers
of the former were either paralyzed with fear, or treacherously seeking to
promote their own interests by the sacrifice of the rights of their Sove
reign, should be regarded as null ; and that a declaration to that effect
should be made to Mehemet Ali. The Marshal said he should write to
the French Ambassador at Vienna this evening, to apprize Prince Metter
nich of this opinion of the French Government, and to urge its adoption
by the Austrian Government.
I did not hesitate to express my belief, that Her Majesty's Govern
ment would entirely coincide in the view he took of this question, and
would be prepared to join with the other Powers of Europe in resisting
the pretensions of Mehemet Ali to the hereditary government of Syria,
and all the Arabian Pashalics, besides that of Egypt, which he seemed
determined to assert. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

2 C 2

196

Inclosure 1 in No. 156.
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.
V Agent des Affaires Etrangeres a M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
Marseille, 25 Juillet, 3 h. du soir.
LE 10, arrivee a, Alexandrie de Akiff Effendi, envoye par le jeune
Sultan pour annoncer a. Mehemet Ali la mort de son pere; le confirmer
dans le gouvernement de FEgypte et de la Syrie, avec l'heredite dans sa
famille ; et lui proposer Foubli du passe, en le nommant Generalissime et
soutien de FEmpire Ture ; et en Finvitant a se rendre a Constantinople
pour presider a la reorganisation de Fadministration.
L'escadre Anglaise croise dans les parages de Chypre, et commu
nique avec Alexandrie.
La " Gazette d'Agra" du 9 Mai, annonce que Runjeet Singh etait
dans un etat desespere.
Ces nouvelles ont ete apposes a Malte par le paquebot Anglais
« FAcheron," parti d' Alexandrie le 14, et M. Fabreguette a profite du
bateau a vapeur Anglais le " Blazer," qui arrive a Finstant, pour me les
transmettre avec une depeche pour vous, que je vous enverrai par le courrier
de demain matin. (Translation.)
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.
The Agent of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Marseilles, July 25, 3 p.m.
AKIFF EFFENDI arrived at Alexandria on the 10th, sent by the
young Sultan to announce to Mehemet Ali the death of his father, to
confirm him in the Government of Egypt and of Syria, with hereditary
succession in his family; and to propose to him to forget the past, nomi
nating him Generalissimo and support of the Turkish Empire, and
inviting him to proceed to Constantinople to preside over the reor
ganization of the administration.
The English squadron is cruizing off Cyprus, and communicates with
Alexandria. The "Gazette d'Agra" of the 9th of May, announces that Runjeet
Sing was in a hopeless state.
These news have been brought to Malta by the English Packet, " the
Acheron," which left Alexandria the 14th, and M. Fabreguette has taken
advantage of the English steam-boat the " Blazer", just arrived, to trans
mit them to me, with a despatch for you, which I will send you by the
Courier of to morrow morning.

Inclosure 2 in No. 156.
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.
L' Agent des Affaires Etrangeres a M. le Pre'sident du Conseil.
Marseille, 25 Juillet, 3 h. du soir.
LE 8, on connaissait a, Alexandrie la mort du Sultan. Le 9, arrivee
a Alexandrie d'une Corvette Turque ayant a bord Negib Bey, Kiaja du
Capitan Pacha, charge d'annoncer au Vice-Roi la presence du Capitan
Pacha a Stankio, se dirigeant sur Rhodes, et de lui proposer de placer la
flotte Turque sous sa protection, pour la garantir contre les troubles a
craindre par suite de la mort du Sultan. On ignore la reponse de

197
Mehemet Ali, qui a expedie le bateau a vapeur la " Mer Noire " au Capitan
Pacha. Le 10, arrivee a Alexandrie d'Akiff Effendi, envoye par le jeune
Sultan pour annoncer a Mehemet Ali la mort de son pere.
(Translation.)
Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.
The Agent of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council.
, Marseilles, July 25, 3 p.m.
THE death of the Sultan was known at Alexandria on the 8th. On
the 9th a Turkish Corvette arrived at Alexandria, having on board Negib
Bey, Kiaja of the Capudan Pasha, having orders to inform the Viceroy,
that the Capudan Pasha was at Stankio, on his way to Rhodes, and to
propose to him to place the Turkish Fleet under his protection, to secure
it against the troubles which it is feared may follow the death of
the Sultan. The reply of Mehemet Ali, who has sent the steam-boat, the
" Mer Noire," to the Capudan Pasha, is not known.
On the 10th, Akiff Effendi arrived at Alexandria, sent by the young
Sultan to announce to Mehemet Ali the death of his father.

No. 157.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1839.
I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 26th instant,
reporting your conversation with Marshal Soult, as to the course
which should be followed by the Five Powers in the present state of the
affairs of the Levant.
Your Excellency will express to Marshal Soult, the great satisfaction
with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt, that the sentiments of
the Government of France upon these important matters coincide so
exactly and entirely with their own; and your Excellency will assure
Marshal Soult, that Her Majesty's Government fully agree with him in
thinking, that neither the overthrow of the Turkish Army, nor the trea
chery of the Capudan Pasha, nor the timidity or submission of the Divan,
ought to alter, in any degree, the course which the Five Powers had pre
viously intended to pursue ; and that any arrangements which may have
been made between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, at a moment when the
advisers of the Sultan were struck down with fear, or influenced by
treacherous motives, ought to be regarded as null ; and that a declaration
to this effect should be made to Mehemet Ali. Her Majesty's Govern
ment will immediately instruct Lord Beauvale to make to the Austrian
Government a communication upon this subject, similar to that which the
French Government has instructed M. de St. Aulaire to make.
Her Majesty's Government sincerely rejoice at the complete identity
of opinion on these most important matters between France and England ;
and they consider this identity as being the more valuable, because it has
arisen spontaneously, each Government having been led to the same
conclusion by its own view of the great European interests which are
involved in these questions.
There can be no doubt, that this perfect union of England and France
will confirm Austria in the course which she was herself one of the first to
chalk out. With Austria, Prussia will go; and it is impossible that
Russia can be unwilling to concur in the same course.

198

No. 158.

The Due de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney. — (Communicated by the Baron
de Bourqueney , July 29.)
(Extrait.) Paris, le 26 Juillet, 1839.
J'AI regu les depeches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'ecrire
jusqu'au No. 68 inclusivement. La reponse faite par Lord Palmerston
a la declaration dont je vous avais charge de lui remettre copie, est de tous
points satisfaisante. Les importantes nouvelles arrivees depuis quelques
jours de l'Orient, ont donne a l'etat des choses un aspect tout nouveau.
Quelque inquietude qu'on put concevoir a Favance sur la gravite des
perils auxquels la politique adoptee en dernier lieu par le Sultan
Mahmoud exposait l'Empire Ottoman, l'evenement a depasse toutes les
conjectures. La mort du Sultan, la defaite complete de l'Armee Turque
en Syrie, la defection de la flotte, ont mis cet Empire dans une telle situation,
que desormais la protection de l'Europe et la prudence de Mehemet Ali
sont les seules garanties qui res tent au trone du jeune Abdoul Medjid.
Les extraits ci-joints de ma correspondance de Constantinople et
d' Alexandrie vous feront connaitre les circonstances de ces grands evene
mens. Vous y verrez aussi que la Porte, peu de jours apres la mort de
Mahmoud, lorsqu'elle ignorait encore la defection de la flotte, mais
lorsque sans doute elle etait deja informee de la defaite d'Hafiz Pacha, a
annonce officiellement aux Representans des Grandes Puissances, l'inten
tion de se reconcilier avec le Vice-Roi, et de lui faire des concessions a cet
effet. Vous y verrez egalement que Mehemet, exalte par le sentiment de
la superiorite que lui donnaient les circonstances nouvellement survenues,
se montrait dispose a de grandes exigences.
La rapidite avec laquelle marchent les evenemens peut sans doute
faire craindre que la crise ne se denoue d'un moment a l'autre par quelque
arrangement dans lequel les Puissances Europeennes n'auront pas le
tems d'intervenir, et ou, par consequent, les interets essentiels de la
politique generale ne seront pas pris en consideration suffisante. Ce
danger est une consequence inevitable de la distance ou nous sommes de
Constantinople et d' Alexandrie ; il n'y a pas moyen d'y remedier d'une
maniere absolue. Je pense neanmoins qu'il convient de persister dans la
marche suivie jusqu'a present, et qui consiste en substance, a subor-
donner a. un concert aussi intime et aussi soutenu que possible entre les
Cabinets, Faction que chacun d'eux est en mesure d'exercer dans la Ques
tion d'Orient. Pour FAngleterre comme pour la France, pour FAutriche
aussi, bien qu'elle ne le proclame pas aussi ouvertement, le principal, le
veritable objet de ce concert, c'est de contenir la Russie, et de l'habituer
a traiter en commun les Affaires Orientales. C'est assez dire que dans les
conjonctures actu elles, il y a lieu plus que jamais de travailler a la
resserrer. Cela pose, je crois que les Puissances, tout en donnant une pleine
approbation aux sentimens concilians manifestes par la Porte, doivent
Fengager a ne rien precipiter, et a ne traiter avec le Vice-Roi que moyen-
nant l'intermediaire et le concours de ses allies, dont la co-operation serait
sans doute le meilleur moyen de lui menager des conditions moins
desavantageuses et mieux garanties.
Je crois qu'a. Alexandrie, ces memes Puissances doivent tenir au
Vice-Roi un langage propre a lui faire sentir que, quels que soient les
avantages qu'il vient d'obtenir, il risquerait de les compromettre en voulant
les pousser trop loin, et que s'il pretendait, dans quelque forme ou sous
' quelque pretextequece fut, arracherau Sultan des conditions incompatibles
avec sa dignite et la surete de son trone, l'Europe entiere interviendrait
pour s'y opposer. Pour qu'un tel langage ait Fefficacite desirable, il faut
que les Consuls soient mis en mesure de le tenir simultanement et en
termes qui prouvent leur parfait accord. II faut aussi que la fermete, j'ai
presque dit la severite, des conseils qu'il exprimera, soit temperee par un
ton de moderation et de bienveillance qui, tout en avertissant la prudence

199
de Mehemet Ali, ne blesse pas trop fortement son orgueil et son ambition.
II y aurait certainement de Faffectation a paraitre croire qu' apres les
succes que vient de lui procurer la folle conduite de la Porte, il n'a rien a
attendre de plus que ce qu'il etait en droit de demander auparavant. Ce
serait meconnaitre Fempire des faits, les necessites de la situation. Si le
Vice-Roi acquerait la conviction qu'il ne doit rien esperer de Fequite des
Puissances, il se revolterait contre leurs representations imperieuses, et
son irritation pourrait amener d'un moment a l'autre, des consequences,
dont la seule possibilite est de nature a effrayer tout esprit prevoyant.
Voila, Monsieur, les premieres impressions que le Gouvernement du
Roi a recues des dernieres nouvelles de l'Orient. Veuillez en faire part
a Lord Palmerston, et lui demander si elles sont conformes a la maniere
de voir du Cabinet Britannique. Je vous ferai bien tot connaitre avec
plus de detail des idees que je n'ai encore eu que le tems d'ebaucher.

(Translation.)
The Duke of Dalmatia to the Baron de Bourqueney. — (Communicated by the Baron
de Bourqueney, July 29.)
(Extract.) Paris, July 26, 1839.
I HAVE received the despatches which you have done me the honour
to address to me, to No. 68, inclusive. The reply made by Lord Pal
merston to the declaration which I directed you to give him a copy of, is
satisfactory on all points. The important intelligence received within
the last few days from the East has given quite a new aspect to the state
of things. Whatever uneasiness may have been felt beforehand as to the
greatness of the dangers to which the policy recently adopted by Sultan
Mahmoud exposed the Ottoman Empire, the event has surpassed all conjec
ture. The death of the Sultan, the complete defeat of the Turkish army in
Syria, the defection of the fleet, have placed that Empire in such a situation,
that henceforth the protection of Europe and the prudence of Mehemet Ali
are the only guarantees which remain to the throne of the young Abdul
Medjid. The annexed extracts from my correspondence with Constantinople
and Alexandria will make you acquainted with the details of these great
events. You will also see therein that the Porte, a few days after the death
of Mahmoud, when it was still ignorant of the defection of the fleet, but
when it was doubtless already informed of the defeat of Hafiz Pasha, offi
cially announced to the Representatives of the Great Powers its intention
to effect a reconciliation with the Viceroy, and to make concessions to him
for this object. You will also perceive, that Mehemet, elevated by the
feeling of superiority which these late events gave him, seemed inclined
to exact a great deal.
The rapid course of events doubtless gives" reason to fear, that the
crisis may be got over at any moment by some arrangement in which the
European Powers may not have time to interpose, and in which, conse
quently, the essential interests of general policy may not be taken into
sufficient consideration. This danger is the inevitable consequence of
our distance from Constantinople and Alexandria. There is no absolute
remedy for this. I think nevertheless that it is expedient to persevere in
the course hitherto followed, and which consists, in substance, in making
the action which each Cabinet is in a state to exercise in the Eastern
Question, subordinate to the closest and most continued concert of all of
them. The principal, the true object of this concert, for England as well
as for France, as also for Austria, although she does not so openly
proclaim it, is to keep Russia within bounds, and to accustom her to treat
in common on the affairs of the East. It is enough to say, that, at the
present conjuncture there is more reason than ever to strive to restrain her.
That being the case, I think that the Powers, at the same time that
they express entire approbation of the conciliatory disposition mani-

200
fested by the Porte, should urge it not to precipitate matters, and only td
treat with the Viceroy through the medium and with the concurrence of
its Allies, whose co-operation would doubtless afford the best means of pro
curing for it terms less disadvantageous and better guaranteed.
I think that at Alexandria these same Powers should hold to the Viceroy
a language calculated to make him feel that, whatever advantages he may
now have obtained, he would run the risk of compromising them by
wishing to push them too far, and that if he attempted, under whatever
form or pretence it might be, to extort from the Sultan terms incompatible
with his dignity and with the security of his throne, the whole of Europe
would interfere to oppose it. In order that such language may have the
required efficacy, the Consuls ought to be enabled to use it simultaneously
and in such terms as would prove their perfect union. The firmness, I
had almost said the severity, of the counsels which this language should
express, should be modified by a tone of moderation and goodwill, which,
at the same time that it gives a warning to the prudence of Mehemet Ali,
should not wound his pride and ambition too deeply. There would
certainly be an affectation in appearing to think that, after the successes
which he has gained through the foolish conduct of the Porte, he is to
expect nothing more than what he was previously entitled to ask. This
would be to misapprehend the power of circumstances, the necessity of the
situation. If the Viceroy were to acquire the conviction that he had
nothing to hope from the justice of the Powers, he would revolt against
their imperious representations ; and his irritation might at any moment
bring about consequences, the very possibility of which is calculated to
alarm any person of foresight.
Such, Sir, are the first impressions which the late intelligence fr m the
East has produced upon the King's Government. Have the goodness to
communicate them to Lord Palmerston, and to ask him whether they are
in conformity with the views of the British Cabinet. I will shortly make
you acquainted in greater detail with the ideas which I have only had
time as yet to sketch out.

No. 159.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 30, 1839,
I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, a copy of a despatch
from Marshal Soult to M. de Bourqueney, dated the 26th instant, which
was communicated to me last night by M. de Bourqueney.
Your Excellency will see that there is a material difference between
the contents of that despatch and the language held to your Excellency
by Marshal Soult, as reported in your despatch of July 26 ; because while
Marshal Soult, in that conversation, declared his opinion, that recent
events in the Levant ought to make no change in the measures of the
Allies ; that a declaration to this effect ought to be made to Mehemet Ali ;
and that the Marshal would send, on the evening of the 26th, instructions
couched in this spirit to M. de St. Aulaire, to recommend this view of
things to Prince Metternich ; the despatch to M. de Bourqueney, on the
contrary, expresses an opinion that recent events ought to make a change
in the course to be pursued by the Five Powers ; and that Mehemet Ali is
entitled, in consequence of his successes, to terms more favourable than
would have been offered to him before.
Her Majesty's Government conceiving that the despatch was written
before the conversation took place, and that the conversation being the
latest in point of time, is to be considered as being the expression of the
.final determination of the French Government, I have replied to the con
versation, and not to the despatch; but I think it necessary to state to
your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government, concurring as they do

201.
completely and entirely in the opinions expressed by Marshal Soult in his
conversation with your Excellency, do not agree with the opinions,
implied, it is true, rather than distinctly expressed, in the despatch.
Mehemet Ali cannot have acquired any fresh claim upon the favour
of the Five Powers by the results of a battle fought by his generals in
open defiance of the repeated remonstrances and positive declarations of
those Powers. The importance which the Five Powers attach to the
maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire
cannot in the slightest degree be affected by the late events ; while, on
the other hand, those events demonstrate still more strongly, how indispen
sably and urgently necessary it is, that the Five Powers should interpose,
in order to maintain the Turkish Empire against the dangers with which
it is threatened ; and, lastly, whatever increase of force the victory of
Nezib and the defection of the Turkish fleet may have given to Mehemet
Ali in a contest to be waged by him single-handed against the Sultan,
those events give him no additional means of resisting the will of the Five
Great Powers. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 160.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 30.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, July 18, 1839.
I WAITED upon Count Nesselrode this morning, to communicate to
him your Lordship's despatch of July 9, and I had a long conversation
upon the subject of it, with his Excellency.
When I had read it, Count Nesselrode said, " That which Lord
Palmerston desires is already done," that is, " I have directed our Charge
d'Affaires at Vienna to state to the Austrian Government, that we prefer
the suggestion of your Government to that which emanated from Prince
Metternich; and that the Emperor will support that proposition, which is
most beneficial to the Porte."
His Excellency repeated to me more than once, that the Russian
Government were ready to accede to any proposal that was favourable
to the Sultan; and that he intended to despatch a courier to London by
the same boat which will convey this despatch, with a communication to
that effect.
But he did not disguise from me, that he had great doubts that we
could prevail upon Mehemet Ali to resign Syria immediately; and he
asked me, whether France would press, or even propose to the Pasha, to
make such a sacrifice. I replied, that I knew no reason to doubt that
France would join the other Powers in any plan that promised to ensure
peace, whatever her opinions upon the precise details of the settlement
might be ; and that that Power had shown the greatest desire to act
sincerely, and entirely in concert with Great Britain upon this question.
Count Nesselrode expressed the satisfaction which the Imperial
Cabinet felt, that their opinion, and that of Her Majesty's Government, as
to what was fitting to be done in the emergency that had arisen, had
been identical. " You," said his Excellency, " commenced the intervention
which we desired, before our recommendation could reach your Govern
ment."

2 D

202
No. 161.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 30.)
My Lord, Berlin, July 24, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's
despatch of the 16th instant, inclosing copies of a despatch which your
Lordship addressed to Lord Clanricarde, on the 9th of July, and one
addressed to Lord Beauvale, on the 13th of July, on the affairs of Turkey
and Egypt.
I read to Baron Werther, the first of the above-mentioned des
patches ; and his Excellency was so much gratified at your Lordship's
view of the state of affairs in the East, and concurred so entirely in your
opinion as to the attitude that should be assumed by Great Britain and
Russia in the present state of things, that he begged of me to leave
the copy of the despatch with him, in order that he might communicate
the contents of it to the King of Prussia at Toplitz. Baron Werther
assured me, that the King would derive much satisfaction from a know
ledge of your Lordship's language to Russia on the occasion ; and although
he had been prevented from taking His Majesty's pleasure on Eastern
Affairs before he left Berlin, yet he felt confident that he might enable me
to assure Her Majesty's Government, that Prussia would entirely agree
in the line of conduct which your Lordship proposed to adopt, in conjunc
tion with the views of the Austrian Cabinet.
I likewise read to Baron Werther, some extracts of your Lordship's des
patch of July 13, addressed to Lord Beauvale, in reply to the observations
and suggestions of Prince Metternich on the same subject. The remark
that I have made on Baron Werther's opinion of your Lordship's despatch
to Lord Clanricarde, will equally apply to your observations to Lord
Beauvale. As your Lordship states, that it did not appear advisable to Her Ma
jesty's Government, to adopt the suggestion of" Her Majesty's Ambassador
at Vienna, and of Prince Metternich, that Russia should be invited to send
her Black Sea squadron into the Mediterranean, to co-operate with the
combined British, French and Austrian fleets, I abstained from touching
upon this point with Baron Werther. But his Excellency seemed highly
to approve of Prince Metternich's proposal, that in the event of the
Sultan's death, the Five Powers should each make a declaration of
their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the
Turkish Empire, and that none of them will seek to profit by the present
state of things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory.
I had written thus far when Baron Werther sent to beg that I would
call upon him, when his Excellency informed me that he had sent off a
messenger to the King, at Toplitz, who is bearer of your Lordship's views
with respect to the affairs of the East, as contained in your despatches to
Lords Clanricarde and Beauvale. He then informed me that he had
received an estafette from Constantinople, and read to me a despatch
addressed to the King by Count Konigsmarck, dated the 12th instant,
conveying the alarming intelligence of the total dispersion of the Ottoman
Army under Hafiz Pasha by Ibrahim Pasha, on the 24th ultimo, and of
the revolt of the Capudan Pasha with the whole of the Turkish Fleet, who
had sailed from the Dardanelles on the 5th instant, and had spoken with
the French Admiral off Tenedos, on the 8th ; and had informed him that
the Sultan had been poisoned by the Russians through the agency of
Hosrew Pasha, who had been sold to Russia; that Abdul Medjid had
been imprisoned ; and that he was about to join the fleet of Mehemet Ali,
in order that they might concert measures together, for the protection of
the Ottoman Empire.
Your Lordship will probably have received this intelligence through
earlier sources than the present, but I may as well add, that Count Konigs
marck informed the King, that the Turkish Army did not withstand the

203
Egyptian attack above half an hour ; that the very first discharge of cannon
spread dismay through the Ottoman ranks, and that the whole army took
to flight; not above a thousand men perished in the combat itself, but
two-thirds of the army were lost or destroyed in the retreat, or rather
flight which ensued. 1 have &c.
(Signed) " GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 162.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 27.)
My Lord, Alexandria, July 6, 1839.
ON the 1st instant I received by Government post, a letter from Mr.
Pro-Consul Werry, of Aleppo, dated 22d June, in which he informed me,
*' That on Thursday, the 20th June, at noon, Ibrahim Pasha, with all his
army, moved forward from Telbashir, and crossing the Sedjour, marched
to the village called Mazzar, on approaching which he observed a body of
the Sultan's Army (cavalry) said to be commanded by four viziers, two
of which are Koord Mahomed Pasha, of Orfa, and Mirza Pasha. Ibra
him Pasha ordered forward the Artillery, and approached ; and at about
5 p.m. opened a fire on the Sultan's camp, which was not, however, of long
duration, for the Sultan's Cavalry gave way, and fled in the direction of
Nezib, where the main army was, leaving behind them all their tents and
provisions, besides the military case containing about 50,000 piastres.
" His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha then halted his troops
to repose ; and after a short time moved forward again in the direction of
Nezib ; and yesterday morning, chemin faisant, he met another body of
the Sultan's Cavalry and Artillery. His Highness ordered forward his
Artillery and Cavalry, and opened a fire on them. The engagement lasted
for almost four hours, and the Sultan's troops gave way, and retreated to
Nezib, leaving behind them fourteen pieces of artillery, ten light and four
large pieces. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha then told his troops to repose,
and ordered two regiments of Cavalry, and one of light Artillery, with his
Annadis (a Bedouin tribe), to be ready, as he intended to advance on Hafiz
Pasha himself, ordering at the same time the rest of his army to follow
him." Mr. Pro-Consul Werry adds, that his informant, who was present at
those two affairs, told him, that the Infantry of Ibrahim Pasha did not
fire a single shot, and that a general action might be hourly expected,
as the army of Ibrahim Pasha was not more than two hours' march from
Nezib, where the army of Hafiz Pasha was with that Vizier.
On the evening of the 3rd instant, at the time when I was with the
Pasha, a courier came with a letter from Ibrahim Pasha, dated from
Nezib, the 25th June. The Consuls-General of Austria and Russia were
also present ; and the Pasha read to us the letter, which only contained a
few lines, from the tent of Hafiz Pasha, to say that he had on that day
attacked the Turkish Army, which had been completely defeated, with the
loss of all its artillery, tents, and materiel ; and that he should send the
details as soon as he could collect them from the generals in command of
divisions. On the morning of yesterday, M. de Laurin received a letter from the
Austrian Consul-General at Aleppo, dated 26th June, and of which I have
the honour to transmit copy and translation, and by which your Lordship
will perceive that many Turkish prisoners of rank have been made, and
also several English amateurs.
I have not the least apprehension for the safety of those gentle
men, as I am confident that Ibrahim Pasha will not detain them a
moment, and that he will treat them with every regard, and give to them
every facility to go wherever they may desire.
The Pasha's steamer has not yet arrived with the details of the action ;
2 D 2

204
but it is probable that some of the Turkish prisoners of rank may be sent
here by the steamer, and which will have delayed the departure of it.
It is probable that Captain Caillier will have reached the camp of
Ibrahim Pasha on the 27th ultimo ; and that, in conformity with the order
of which he was the bearer from Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pasha will not
make any movement in advance after the arrival of Captain Caillier ; but
I learn from my colleagues here, that they have been informed by their
respective Ambassadors, that the Sultan refused to allow the officer sent
by Marshal Soult to Constantinople, to proceed with any mission to Hafiz
Pasha to suspend his operations ; and this is the more to be lamented, as
that officer might possibly have reached in time to prevent the late
battle. As far as regards the issue, no other result was to be anticipated by
_L any military man who had seen the Egyptian and Turkish Armies, and
I compared their discipline ; and I had on different occasions the honour to
report to your Lordship, and to Her Majesty's Representative at Constan
tinople, the opinions to that effect of Marshal Marmont, and of British and
Foreign officers of rank who had seen the two armies ; and I took the
liberty to give my own military opinions as to the efficient state of the
army of Ibrahim Pasha ; and I never for a moment had a doubt of the
result of a general battle.
As to the hopes generally entertained at Constantinople, of a rising
of the Syrian population on the appearance of the Turkish Army, I was
never very sanguine on that point ; and as I had had the experience of
personal observation in that country, I was not inclined to place faith
against my own conviction, in the reports of Syrian discontent made by
British and other agents in that country; and it has now been proved that
the efforts of all the emissaries of the Sultan in Syria, have caused only
very partial and trifling movements, and that only in as far as regards the
Mussulmans ; for I can safely say that in respect to every sort of Christians,
and to the Jews, they dread a return to the old direct rule of the Sultan.
The Pasha's fleet is still cruizing in sight of this port ; and salutes
from the forts and from the fleet have been fired to celebrate the late
victory. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Tnclosure in No. 162.
The Austrian Consul-General at Aleppo to M. de Laurin.
Illmo. Signore, Aleppo, 26 Giugno, 1839, sera:
L'ARMATA di Hafiz Pascia non esiste piu. Jeri dopo una cannonata
di treore ha gettato essa learmi, e abbandonato le artiglierie e munizioni,
fuggendo de tutte le parti. Nessuno potrebbe raggiungere FEufrate, se
Ibrahim Pascia volesse seriamente impedirlo. La citta di Aleppo dirigge
a Ibrahim Pascia delle preghiere accioche faccia in modo che la soldatesca
disarmata sia obbligata a ripassare FEufrate, onde non disturbare la
sicurezza di cui godiamo.
La popolazione di questa citta, si rende in massa sulla strada di
Messir, per scontrare diversi illustri prigionieri che si attendono. Sul
campo furono raccolti diversi dilettanti Inglesi, che la curiosita aveva
spinto in quella parte. Si dicono molto sorpresi di questo poco felice
risultato. II Gran Signore dovra. probabilmente far de'nuovi sagrifizi per
aquietare il suo potente vassallo.
Le poche truppe rimaste qui si sono istradate verso il campo, che e
quello precisamente che jeri mattina occupava Hafiz Pascia con i su'oi.
Domani 6 dopo domani, Favanguardia Egizia, comandata da Osman
Pascia, tentera di passare FEufrate. Tutto indica essere questa
Fintenzione del Seraschiere Egizio.

205
(Translation.)
The Austrian Consul-General at Aleppo to M. de Laurin.
Sir, Aleppo, June 26, 1839, Evening.
THE Army of Hafiz Pasha has ceased to exist. Yesterday, after a
cannonade of three hours, the Turks threw down their arms and aban
doned their artillery and ammunition, flying in every direction. Not one
of them could have reached the Euphrates had Ibrahim Pasha wished
seriously to prevent it. The city of Aleppo has petitioned Ibrahim Pasha
to make arrangements for obliging the disarmed soldiery (of Hafiz Pasha)
to recross the Euphrates, in order not to disturb the security we enjoy here.
The population of this town is proceeding en masse on the road
to Messir, for the purpose of meeting several prisoners of rank who are
expected to arrive. On the field of battle were taken several English
amateurs, who had been brought thither by curiosity, and who have
expressed their great astonishment at the luckless result of the campaign.
The Sultan will probably have to make fresh sacrifices, in order
to appease his powerful vassal.
The few troops left here have set out in the direction of the camp,
which is precisely on the same ground occupied yesterday morning by
Hafiz Pasha and his army.
To-morrow or next day the Egyptian advanced guard, commanded
by Osman Pasha, will commence passing the Euphrates. Everything
indicates that such is the intention of the Egyptian Seraskier.

No. 163.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 27.)
-My Lord, Alexandria, July 6, 1839.
THE Pasha's iron steamer arrived here early this morning, and the
" Boulac," steamer of the Pasha, came in soon after ; both in three days
from Alexandretta.
Ibrahim Pasha had not yet had time to send his detailed report of
the late battle, and we are therefore ignorant of the loss on either side, or
of number, or rank, of prisoners.
The Pasha read aloud the letters which he had received this morning,
and the substance is as follows : —
Ibrahim Pasha writes on the 28th of June from Aintab ; and it may,
therefore, be presumed that Solyman Pasha of Marash had evacuated
that city.
Three regiments of Infantry and three of Cavalry had been sent by
Ibrahim Pasha to take possession of Orfa and Diarbekir, and he was going
to send on troops to Malatia.
Hosrew Effendi, who accompanied Captain Caillier, the Aide-de-camp
of Marshal Soult, to Syria, writes from Alexandretta, on the 23rd of June,
that they were to leave on the next day for the head-quarters of Ibrahim
Pasha, which they expected to reach in six or seven days ; but it is
evident that the troops of Ibrahim Pasha will have occupied Orfa and
Diarbekir, and perhaps even Malatia, before Captain Caillier can have
communicated the order of Mehemet Ali for them to halt.
Ibrahim Pasha demands transports to be sent over to Alexandretta
to convey to Alexandria, 4,000 soldiers of the army of Hafiz Pasha, and
who have enlisted in the Egyptian Army. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

206
No. 164.
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 30, 1839.
SINCE I wrote to your Excellency on the 23rd of this month, t Her
Majesty's Government have received intelligence of the defeat of the
Sultan's Army at Nezib on the 24th of June, and of the supposed defection
of the Capudan Pasha from the authority of the reigning Sultan ; but
those events, however unfortunate they have been, do not appear to Her
Majesty's Government to afford to the Five Powers any reason for alter
ing in any degree the course which they had previously intended to
pursue ; and those events cannot, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Govern
ment, oppose any insurmountable difficulties to prevent the Five Powers
from carrying into effect those arrangements which they may finally agree
upon. The union of the Five must necessarily carry with it a moral force
which will overcome any obstacles they may meet with.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON,

No. 165.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 31, 1839.)
My Lord, Aleppo, July 1, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's infor
mation, copies of two despatches I addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador
at Constantinople, under the 26th and 29th ultimo, accompanied with
copy of a translation of an Arabic report made to me by a person who
was in the Egyptian camp, present when the engagement took place on
the 24th ultimo between the two armies ; as also copy of a letter I
addressed to Captain Davis, of Her Majesty's ship " Dido," under the
26th ultimo.
I hope the above, and the steps I have pursued throughout, will meet
with your Lordship's entire approval.
Since closing the above copies of despatches to his Excellency the
Ambassador, nothing of any interest has transpired worthy of your Lord
ship's notice.
This morning a post reached this, bringing the intelligence, that his
Excellency Ibrahim Pasha had reached Aintab with all the forces, from
whence it is said his Excellency has started for Marash.
I have, &c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 165.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Aleppo, June 26, 1839.
MR. VICE-CONSUL HAYS having informed me under date 22nd
mstant, which reached me on the 24th, of the arrival at that port of Her
Majesty's ship " Dido," Captain Davis, in pursuance to instructions from
Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's
Naval Forces in the Mediterranean ; and further, that Captain Davis was
anxious to receive every, and the latest, information respecting the move
ments of the two armies; I have this day addressed him, transmitting
to him the events that have transpired.
I do not know whether Captain Davis will leave Alexandretta on
receipt of my letter ; but as I am anxious to communicate to your Lord-

207
ship a moment sooner the events that have transpired, I risk these few
lines to do myself the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's
information, copy of my letter to Captain Davis, begging Mr. Vice-Consul
Hays in the event of Her Majesty's ship " Dido" not leaving, to forward
this to your Lordship per Austrian steamer, expected on the 2nd July, by
which opportunity I shall do myself the honour of again addressing your
Lordship, with any further information I may have elicited.
1 have, &e.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 165.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Captain Davis.
Sir, Aleppo, June 26, 1839.
I RECEIVED on the 24th instant, late at night, from C. W. Hays,
Esquire, British Vice-Consul at Alexandretta, the intelligence of the
arrival at the port under the 21st instant, of Her Majesty's ship " Dido,"
under your command, in pursuance to instructions from Admiral Sir
Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in
the Mediterranean. As Mr. Vice-Consul Hays informs me, that you are desirous of
receiving every, and the latest, advice on the movements of the Egyptian
and Turkish Armies, I do myself the honour of transmitting herewith,
for your information, the latest I have thereon.
I beg leave to inform you, that after the occupation of Aintab by
Solyman Pasha of Marash, with the Sultan's troops, advice reached this
on the 22nd instant, that the Egyptian forces under his Excellency the
Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, had advanced on the 20th instant from their
encampment at Tel-Bashir, two hours on this side of the river Sedjour, and
had marched on the village called Mazar, occupied by a body of the
Sultan's advance guard, composed of regular Cavalry ; on approaching it,
a slight engagement took place between them and the Turkish troops, in
which the latter gave way, and were shortly after obliged to fly to a
village named Nezib, distant three hours from thence, where the main
body of the Sultan's Army was concentrated under the Seraskier Hafiz
Ali Pasha, leaving behind them all their tents, provisions, flags, and some
50,000 piastres.
On the 21st instant, the Egyptian troops advancing from thence in
the direction of Nezib, met another small body of the Sultan's advanced
guard, which, after a slight skirmish, was also put to the rout, and
obliged to join the main army. Since then, no official advices of any sort
reached this from the Egyptian camp, respecting any further movement ;
the person, however, employed in the transport of provisions from hence
to the camp, reported that the Egyptian troops had advanced, and had
completely encircled the Turkish Army at Nezib, cutting off their com
munication with Biregik.
This morning, the 26th instant, his Excellency lsmael Bey, Governor
of this town, received a post from his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim
Pasha, informing him that on Monday, the 24th instant, at 5 a. m., the
Egyptian forces advanced on Nezib, where the Osmanli Army was
concentrated, and after an engagement of two hours between them, in
which theArtillery and Cavalry on both sides alone acted, the Infantry not
firing a single shot, the Sultan's Army was put completely to the rout,
and obliged to disunite, leaving behind in the Egyptian hands the
camp composed of all the provisions, ammunition, baggage, and 120
artillery pieces. I inclose for your information, copy of the Governor's
official note to me on the subject, with its translation in French.
The deserters from ,the Sultan's Army are hourly reaching this, in
scores, and taking service under the Egyptian Government, as Bashi
Bozuks, Irregular Cavalry ; they state, that 25,000 of them were taken pri
soners, not including many that deserted to this side at the first onset.

2081
They further state, that the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha seeing his army
routed, fled with some of them in the direction of Roum Kale; but that
the remainder, and greater part of the Turkish Army, were taken
prisoners besides; many of whom threw themselves on the mercy of
Ibrahim Pasha, who, it is said, pardoned them, and sent them forward here.
That Mirza Pasha, General of the Regular Cavalry, and Assad Pasha,
General of the Spahis, with many other officers, such as Colonels, &c,
fell in the engagement ; these latter, it is reported, were killed by the
Sultan's troops themselves, who bore a great enmity to their officers, and
when the order was given to advance, turned and killed their officers, so
as to enable them easier to fly and surrender to the enemy.
I am also told by some of these deserters, that among those who fell
was a certain Morbak Bey, Prussian officer in the Sultan's service, and
attached to Hafiz Pasha's staff in the quality of instructor, against whom,
it is said, the troops bore great enmity, and who was almost the first person
destroyed by them, while he was encouraging them on.
It is impossible, for the present, to obtain correct and full details on
these events, until the arrival here of some European employe who
witnessed the movements that took place.
This success of the Egyptian arms over the Osmanli forces is being
celebrated here, by the citadel two ordnance pieces firing three times a
day a salute of twenty-one guns. The town and bazaars are illuminated,
and are to remain so during the whole night.
As regards the state of the Alexandretta district, and of the move
ments of the mountaineers in that neighbourhood, I make no doubt you
will receive from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays much fresher information than
any I am enabled to communicate to you from hence.
Indeed, the whole of this district has of late been in a very un
settled state ; but I think the events that have taken place on the
frontiers between the two armies, will remove the fears that have been of
late entertained ; and I hope shortly, that this district will again resume
its usual tranquillity.
It was reported about a week ago, that in the direction of Hamah
and Homs, some appearance of plague had manifested itself; but from
strict inquiry I have made, I do not hear it confirmed. I am, &c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 165.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Aleppo, June 29, 1839.
I HAD the honour to address your Lordship, under the 26th instant,
inclosing copy of a letter which I addressed under that day's date, to
Captain Davis, of Her Majesty's ship " Dido," who had reached Alexan
dretta on the 22nd instant, in pursuance to instructions from Admiral Sir
Robert Stopford, informing him of the engagement which took place at Ne
zib, on the 24th instant, between the Turkish and Egyptian forces, in which
the former were completely put to the rout. I now avail of the Austrian
packet " Seri Pervas," expected at Alexandretta on the 2nd July, to do
myself the honour of laying before your Lordship what has further
transpired since that date.
I have to inform your Lordship, that the subsequent advices which
reached this from his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, stated that the
Egyptian forces were encamped at Nezib, and had taken possession of all
that was in the Turkish camp, of which there was a great abundance of
everything, and consequently desiring the Government here to send
forward no further provisions from hence.
His Excellency the Seraskier does not mention anything at all
respecting his movements ; but from the persons, attaches of the Govern
ment, arriving from the camp, I learn that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha

209
had sent a Mussellim to Orfa, and another to Biregick ; and further, that
Maggiun Bey, Colonel of the Annadis, with his troops, Bedouin Cavalry,
had crossed the Euphrates, accompanied with two regiments of Regulars,
for the above-mentioned places ; and that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha,
accompanied with all the army, intended starting about the 27th instant
from Nezib for the direction of Marash, where it is said the Sultan's
Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, with several other viziers, officers, and about 40,000
men, the remainder of his army, with some Artillery, had taken refuge.
It is also to-day asserted, that Solyman Pasha of Marash, who was
occupying Aintab with about 12,000 men, on hearing of the defeat and
overthrow of the Ottoman army at Nezib, retreated immediately to
Marash. It is supposed by some, that this movement of Solyman Pasha's from
Aintab to Marash, and the retreat of the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha there, is
. done with a view of collecting the remainder of the Turkish forces they
have left, and endeavour to make a stand, to oppose, if possible, the further
advance of the Egyptian forces on that line, which is not at all
improbable. It is almost incredible, my Lord, how such a large army as that
under the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, composed of fine strong young men,
judging from the deserters and prisoners arrived here, of which there are
3,000, who have almost all voluntarily enlisted for the Irregular
Cavalry (Bashi Bozuks), should have met in not more than two hours' time
with such a complete defeat.
The details relating to the engagement on the 24th instant are
numerous, and all vary a little. I have compared them all, and I find the
most correct one is that made to me by a person who was an eye-witness
of the whole affair, having been constantly in the Egyptian camp from
the time it started from Telbashir up to the moment, and after the collision
took place between the two armies.
I beg leave to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a
translation I have made of these details, as narrated to me by the party,
which will, I hope, meet your Lordship's approval.
I beg leave further to inform you, that on the 27th instant, in the
evening, M. Caillier, one of Marshal Soult's Aides-de-camp, reached this,
coming from Alexandria in six days. The French Consul here, M. Guys,
tells me that he has a letter by him from M. Cochelet, the French Consul-
General in Egypt, dated the 19th of June, which states that M. Caillier,
bearer of his letter, had reached Alexandria direct from Paris on a mission
to his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, the purport of which is, that he is
not to commence hostilities against the Sultan's troops, and if he has
done so, to cease immediately. Consequently, he leaves this for Aleppo,
accompanied by his Highness's second interpreter, and bearer of a letter
from his Highness the Viceroy to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha,
instructing him that wherever the letter reaches his Excellency's hands,
at that place he is to immediately cease any hostilities his Excellency
may have undertaken against the Sultan's forces under the Seraskier
Hafiz Pasha.
M. Caillier, on reaching this, was, I am told, thunderstruck on
hearing of the sad event that had taken place on the 24th instant between
the two armies ; nevertheless, he left this yesterday afternoon, accompanied
by his Highness Mehemet Ali's interpreter, repairing with all speed in
quest of his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, who, from all accounts, I dare
say he will find between Aintab and Marash.
I have this afternoon seen at the French Consul's here, a M. Petit,
Frenchman, instructor in the Sultan's service, who was at Hafiz Pasha's
camp during the engagement, and was taken prisoner by the Eg3^ptians,
from whose camp he reached this this morning The account he gives of
the engagement agrees in part with what I have herein transmitted to
your Lordship, with the exception as to the amount of troops composing
the Sultan's Seraskier's camp, which he states not to have amounted to
more than 40,000 men of all arms ; and that Izet Pasha, who was expected
with a force of 25,000, had not yet reached the camp when the engage-
2 E

210
ment took place ; and that there were no more than 140 pieces of artillery,
which were all left on the field.
He further states, that Hafiz Pasha left the camp retreating towards
Marash, full one hour and a half previous to the defeat and overthrow
of his troops, taking with him all the cavalry he had — say 5,000 men,
and the military cash chest.
M. Petit also informs me, that a few days previous to the engage
ment, a Mr. Ainsworth and a Mr. Russell (the former was, if I mistake
not, attached to the late Euphrates Expedition), reached the camp coming
from the interior of Asia Minor, where they had been travelling for the
Geographical Society, and making a chart of the same. These two
gentlemen, he says, he saw very early the day the engagement took plaee,
but that he afterwards lost sight of them, and has not since seen or heard
anything of them, except while he was in the Egyptian camp, some
papers were brought to Solyman Pasha, which M. Petit tells me he
recognized as the papers and notes belonging to these gentlemen, and
mentioned the same to his Excellency Solyman Pasha, to whom I shall
immediately write, to obtain the same, and to beg he will cause every
search and inquiry to be made, to obtain tidings of Mr. Ainsworth and
Mr. Russell. M. Petit adds, that they may have followed Hafiz Pasha
with the baggage, &c, to Marash : if so, they are safe, but if not, I am
very much afraid these two talented and good men have fallen a sacrifice
in the collision between the two armies. I shall also dispatch a
messenger immediately to Marash, to see if I can obtain any intelligence
respecting them from that quarter.
By the last advices from Alexandretta, I find that Mustook Bey had
again attempted another descent near Byass, but I hope and trust that
tranquillity will now very soon be re-established in that district.
The town of Aleppo is, I am happy to say, very quiet, although the
Mussulman population of the Emirs have evinced, ever since this affair
has begun, great enmity to all the Christians ; and if Ibrahim Pasha had
met with a reverse, I am afraid the rise here would have been a very
serious one I have, &c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 165.

Translation of an Arabic report given by a person who was on the spot at
the time the Engagement took place on the 2Uh June, between the
Turkish and Egyptian Forces.
ON the 18th instant I left Aleppo for Solyman Pasha's camp, which
was stationed at the villages Dabek and Duebek, nine hours distant from
Aleppo. On arriving, I found it had left, and was informed that it was marching
to Touzel, six hours further, to join Ibrahim Pasha's detachment. I
followed, and when I reached, we were approaching the river Sedjour. I
observed that this is not the road to Touzel ; and, in asking where we were
going, was replied, that a post had arrived from Ibrahim Pasha, informing
Solyman Pasha that he had left that place, and desired to meet him on the
cross of that river, where he would wait for him, to join the two detach
ments in one.
They met, and crossed the river at a place called Mehadit-el-Tuab;
after which a villager came, and informed Ibrahim Pasha, that there was
a detachment of 2,000 cavalry of the Sultan's army encamped at an hour's
distance, commanded by Koord Mahomed Pasha, who, on hearing of
the arrival on the Sedjour of Ibrahim Pasha, marched back to the village
Mazar to join another detachment of 4,000 men encamped there com
manded by the Pasha of Moush.
Ibrahim Pasha hearing this, pushed on with his army, encamped at
the spot which Koord Mahomed Pasha had quitted, and ordered that
ammunition should be distributed to his army.

211
On the 20th instant we advanced towards Mazar, while Ibrahim
Pasha preceded the army with his Annadis, and with them alone gave
the attack. This lasted about forty minutes ; after which the enemy fled,
leaving behind 400 tents and eight pieces of artillery, with ammunition
and provisions of all kinds, of which Ibrahim Pasha took possession, and
pillaged the village. Two of the Annadis were killed, and twenty wounded,
while twenty horses were maimed on Ibrahim Pasha's side.
The fugitives were pursued until they reached the remaining part of
the Sultan's army, which was at Nezib, commanded by Hafiz Ali Pasha.
Ibrahim Pasha perceiving that he was not attacked, retreated his army
back to Mazar.
During three days, for about two hours every day, Ibrahim Pasha
advanced his Annadis, to irritate a general attack, but was repelled only
by the Irregulars on the Sultan's side.
The two armies, at each of these skirmishes, had reciprocally from
twenty to thirty men wounded.
Solyman Pasha having examined the field, perceived that the Egyptian
Army was not in a favourable situation,and advised Ibrahim Pasha to bring
it up to the east of the Sultan's, which was towards Biregik, which he
observed would impede the enemy's intercourse with Biregik, where they
had left a portion of their ammunition.
On the 22d we marched there, and reached the bridge called Ghergin,
which is between two hills, at four hours to the north-east of Mazar. The
pass being very narrow, it was only on the next day, Sunday the 23rd,
that all the army had crossed. It appears that if the Sultan's troops had
placed only 2 cannons and 1,000 men here, Ibrahim Pasha could not have
passed. The whole of the Sunday was spent on the other side of this bridge,
where biscuits and ammunition were given to the army to last three days ;
and each soldier was ordered to prepare for action, which Ibrahim Pasha
announced to them would be on the following day, Monday the 24th.
At midnight we were surprised by an attack from the enemy, which
dispersed our camp, while Ibrahim Pasha repelled them with two batta
lions of Artillery. After an hour, the Sultan's troops retreated, leaving on
the field five cannons, which they took back before daybreak, Ibrahim
Pasha not being aware of it.
Before sunrise, we marched an hour and a half to meet the enemy,
leaving half an hour's space between us. After each regiment was placed to
prepare for battle, Ibrahim Pasha again sent forward his Annadis, which
again were only repelled by the Bachi Bozuks (irregulars). The two armies
remained looking on the scene without either of them attacking with their
regulars, for a space of time. Ibrahim Pasha advanced twice, each time
approaching nearer to the enemy, without the Sultan's troops firing a gun,
and it was only on a third approach that the Sultan's cannons fired,
when he ordered up his Artillery against them, and put his Infantry and
Cavalry in the rear ; the Egyptians twice retreated, when Ibrahim Pasha
drew his sword, and cut down twenty-seven of them with his own hand. At
this moment half of the 3rd Regiment of the Guards, which is composed
principally of Syrians, ran over to the enemy, where they were well
received. Ibrahim Pasha then galloped along the lines, ordering a general
attack. This being executed, the enemy appeared intimidated ; and after
an hour's fire from the first clash, retreated at full speed, blowing up the
powder magazines. There was now a general fire given by the Egyptians,
with an advanced march, pushing the Sultan's troops before them until
they reached the spoil of their enemy's camp and the intrenchments, where
we found about 100 cannons which they had left, 4,000 tents, and an
immense quantity of butter, rice, honey, flour, and provisions of all
kinds, while cartridges, muskets, &c., were to be seen on the ground
like pebbles. When the Regiment of the Guards which ran over to the enemy saw
this general retreat, it began to fire on the fugitives.
On arriving, I asked one of the surrendered cannoniers whether this
is all the cannon they had. He answered in the negative ; adding, that
Hafiz Ali Pasha, their General-in-Chief, had taken with him in his retreat
2 E 2

212
200 pieces, loading the military cash chest and his tent upon mules; but
it is not ascertained whether the cannons were not left in their flight on the
road, for the direction he took is mountainous.
I tried as much as possible to know the exact quantity of killed and
wounded of each army, and found that on the Sultan's side there were
4,000 killed and 1,000 wounded, while of Ibrahim's troops 1,000 were
killed and 2,000 wounded.
That night they remained on the field ; and it was only on the next
day that Ibrahim Pasha ordered each regiment to seek their companions,
bury those they would find dead, and bring into the camp the wounded,
before attending on those of the Sultan's troops.
After this, Ibrahim Pasha marched towards Biregik with three regi
ments of Infantry and two of Cavalry. I followed him.
On his arrival on the Euphrates, opposite Biregik, he sent for camels
to load the ammunition and provisions he found there, and ordered
Maggiun Bey to cross with his Annadis over to Biregik, at which time I
left, and returned to the camp.
I was given to believe that the prisoners taken were from 12,000 to
15,000 men, besides those who fled towards Aleppo, which, I heard,
amounted to 4,000 or 5,000.
This is what I have heard and seen.

No. 166.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 31.)
My Lord, Aleppo, July 1, 1839.
SINCE closing my despatch of this day's date to your Lordship, I
have again seen M. Petit, Frenchman in the Sultan's service, who was at
Hafiz Pasha's camp during the engagement on the 24th ultimo, and taken
prisoner by the Egyptians, from whose camp he reached this.
I beg to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of the
narration made to me by M. Petit, of the details of the engagement which
took place between the Turkish and Egyptian forces, which details I have
every reason to believe and hope are correct. I have, &c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 166.

Relation sur la Bataille de Nezib, par M. Petit, Instructeur a VEtat-Major de
Hafiz Ali Pacha.
LE camp Ottoman etait place au sud de Nezib, sur trois lignes, les
deux premieres d'Infanterie et la troisieme de Cavalerie; FArtillerie se
composait del40 bouches a feu; les troupes etaient de 37,000 hommes,
dont 23,000 d'Infanterie, sous les commandemens des Pachas de divisions,
Sadula Laider et Kourd Mahomed Pacha, 5,000 hommes de Cavalerie
etaient commandes par Cherif Pacha, 3,000 d'Artillerie par Bekir Pacha,
et environ 4,800 Bachi Bozuks (irreguliers), etaient commandes par
Solyman Pacha.
L'armee d'Ibrahim Pacha, composee de 43,000 hommes, etait campee
sur le prolongement de la gauche de Farmee Turque, a 6,000 metres de
distance ; le terrain qui couvrait la gauche de camp Ottoman etait tres-
accidente, ce qui rendait la bataille dans cette direction extremement
desavantageux pour l'Armee Egyptienne.
Hafiz Pacha etant informe que plusieurs regimens composes de
Syriens avaient l'intention de passer dans sesrangs, fitcanonner le 23 Juin,
a 11 heures du soir, le camp Egyptien, pour y mettre le desordre et
faciliter la desertion des dits corps ; a cet effet, quatre batteries d'obusiers

213
du calibre de 24, se porterent dans le silence de la nuit a 1,000 metres du camp
Egyptien, et lancerent 260 obus ; ces projectiles jetterent le trouble et
la confusion dans le camp d'Ibrahim ; les points de direction du tir qui avait
et£ releve a 5 heures du soir par les officiers Europeens de FEtat-Major
de Hafiz Pacha, etaient les tentes d'Ibrahim et Solyman Pacha, lesquelles
etaient faciles a distinguer puisque la troupe Egyptienne n'avait point de
tentes. Ces deux Pachas se haterent de monter a cheval pour empecher
la confusion qui etait devenue tres-grande.
Plusieurs centaines de Syriens deserterent dans le camp Ottoman, et
plusieurs pelotons etaient en marche dans la meme intention ; mais
l'activite que Solyman Pacha deploya aux avant-postes, empecha qu'un
plus grand nombre de fugitifs ne sortissent du camp.
Ibrahim Pacha sentit la necessite d'en finir par une grande bataille ;
en consequence, l'Armee Egyptienne prit les armes a Faube du jour, et
une division en bon ordre sur six colonnes se dirigea sur les derrieres du
camp Ottoman. La Ire colonne etait composee de 60 bouches a feu,
marchant par sections ; la 2de, d'Infanterie, (colonne de direction,) com
posee de 12 bataillons, marchait par divisions a distance entiere ; les 3me and
4me colonnes, d'Infanterie, chaque colonne de 12 bataillons, marchaient a
colonnes doubles senses en masse, a distance entiere de deploiement ; les
5me and 6me colonnes, composees de 9 regimens de Cavalerie, marchaient
en colonnes par escadrons a demi distance.
Solyman Pacha avait intercaie entre les distances de FInfanterie en
tete et en queue, 8 bataillons a colonnes doubles serrees en masse, pour
soutenir les attaques que les Ottomans auraient pu executer sur la tete
ou sur la queue des colonnes ; il avait egalement place en tete 2 batteries
de 12 obusiers du calibre de 36, qui tiraient avec beaucoup de precision.
L'intention de Solyman Pacha fut devinee par un officier d'ordonnance
de Hafiz Pacha ; ce premier avait l'intention de former une ligne oblique
sur l'extreme gauche des lignes Ottomanes; ces lignes avaient fait un
changement de direction a, gauche face en arriere sous un angle d'environ
soixante degres ; mais les tetes de colonnes d'Ibrahim Pacha n'ayant pu se
prolonger a la hauteur du village de Nezib, en ayant ete empechees par le
feu bien nourri de FArtillerie Turque, alors Solyman Pacha donna I'ordre a
toutes les troupes de se former face a, gauche en bataille, et le general
Egyptien manoeuvra sous le feu d'une terrible artillerie Turque (chose
remarquable) avec autant d'ordre que sur un terrain d'exercice.
Dans ce moment un feu tres-vif de 304 bouches a feu s'engagea a 1,200
metres ; ce combat d'artillerie dura 1 heure f ; FArtillerie Egyptienne qui
tirait tres-promptement, ayant epuise ses caissons et coffres de munitions,
fut contrainte de ralentir son feu, en attendant que des munitions de la
reserve arrivassent ; ce moment devint critique pour Farmee Egyptienne ;
seize bataillons de la droite des Ire and 2de lignes avaient deja pris la
fuite dans ce grand desordre ; c'est alors qu'un Europeen, officier d'ordon^
nance de Hafiz Pacha, conseilla a ce dernier de marcher a la bayonnette
sur les Egyptiens ; pendant ce moment d'hesitation du dit Hafiz Pacha,
Solyman Pacha, aide de ses aides-de-camp, le sabre a la main, contraignit
les fuyards a rentrer en ligne sous le feu meurtrier de FArtillerie
Turque. Les cartouches a canons d'Ibrahim Pacha etant arrivees, un feu bien
nourri a, mitraille s'engagea de nouveau a 600 metres.
C'est dans ce moment que les Bachi Bozuks de Hafiz Pacha prirent la
fuite dans le plus grand desordre : Hafiz Pacha et ses officiers d'ordon
nance sabrerent les fuyards pour les faire rentrer ; mais cette energie du
General-en-chef devint inutile ; et les troupes Turques, qui se trouvaient
sous un feu terrible de mitraille, commencerent a lacher pied.
Le desordre grandissait toujours davantage, malgre l'activite et la
bravoure de Hafiz Pacha et le devouement de ses officiers Europeens a
son service ; une grande partie d'Infanterie qui pendant Faction avait
montre assez de sang-froid et de courage, quitta le champ de bataille.
en abandonnant un grand nombre de fusils. La Cavalerie Turque qui
n'avait pas donne, par la mauvaise direction de son General-en-chef fut
en trainee par la fuite des Bachi Bozuks et de FInfanterie ; cependant' elle

214
seule executa sa retraite avec ordre, et le Seraskier Hafiz Pacha se retira
sur Marache avec le reste de son armee.
L'Armee Turque laissa sur le champ de bataille plus de 100 pieces
de canons, ses bagages de campement, et ses munitions ; le tresor,
s'eievant a 45,000 bourses (5 millions et % de francs), fut cependant sauve*.
Sur les cinq officiers Europeens qui etaient au service de Hafiz Pacha,
M. Petit fut fait prisonnier sous une charge de Cavalerie, dans le tems qu'il
remettait en ligne plusieurs batteries qui etaient en retraite, voulant eviter
qu'elles fussent prises par l'ennemi.
On a de fortes raisons de croire que le Baron de Molke, officer dis
tingue de FEtat-Major, a ete tue.
Les Ottomans ont eu 4,000 hommes hors de combat, entre tues et
blesses ; dans l'Armee d'Ibrahim Pacha, 3 200 hommes egalement hors de
Combat, mais les blesses sont presque tous mortellement.
II faut rendre justice a FInfanterie Turque, qui montra beaucoup de
courage et de resistance, mais qui malheureusement ne fut pas secondee.
La bataille fut tres-sanglante, puisque l'Armee Ottomane perdit le
huitieme de son effectif.
La perte de la bataille est attribuee aux causes suivantes :
A ce que les officiers Europeens ne furent pas ecoutes dans les
conseils qu'ils donnerent; 1°. Que les troupes Ottomanes ne devaient pas
quitter un mamelon qui se trouvait a 800 metres en avant du centre de
leur front; 2°. Qu'elles devaient executer la charge a la bayonnette
lorsque l'Armee Egyptienne avait ralenti son feu et avait quatre
regimens en deroute.
A ce que la Cavalerie ne prit pas part au combat ; elle aurait pu en
se deploy ant en echelon par regiment, la gauche en tete, former en ordre
concave sur les tetes de colonnes d'Ibrahim Pacha, et produire une grande
action de force, puisque les trois armes auraient agi de concert sur le
point qui etait le chef de la bataille. (Translation.)
Account of the Battle of Nezib, by M. Petit, Instructor to the Staff of
Hafiz Ali Pasha.
THE Ottoman camp was situated to the south of Nezib, upon three
lines, the two first of Infantry and the third of Cavalry ; the Artillery con
sisted of 140 pieces ; the troops amounted to 37,000 men, ofwhom 23,000
were Infantry, under the command of the Pashas of division, SadulaLaider
and Kourd Mahomed Pasha, 5,000 Cavalry were commanded by Cherif
Pasha, 3,000 Artillery by Bekir Pasha, and about 4,800 Bachi Bozuks
(irregulars) were commanded by Solyman Pasha.
The Army of Ibrahim Pasha, consisting of 43,000 men, was encamped
along the extent of the left of the Turkish Army, at a distance of 6,000
metres ; the ground which covered the left of the Ottoman camp was very
uneven, which rendered the battle, in that direction, extremely disadvan
tageous to the Egyptian Army.
Hafiz Pasha having been informed that several regiments composed of
Syrians intended to come over to his ranks, opened a cannonade, on the
23rd of June, at 11 o'clock in the evening, upon the Egyptian camp, in
order to throw it into disorder and to facilitate the desertion of the above-
mentioned corps ; for this purpose, four batteries of 24-pound howitzers
were carried in the silence of the night to within 1,000 metres of the
Egyptian camp, and discharged 260 shells ; these projectiles threw the
camp of Ibrahim into disorder and confusion ; the points against which the
fire was directed, and which had been determined upon at 5 o'clock
in the evening by the European Officers of the Staff of Hafiz Pasha were
the tents of Ibrahim and Solyman Pasha, which were easily to be distin
guished, as the Egyptian troops had no tents. Those two Pashas lost no
time in mounting their horses in order to prevent the confusion, which had
become very great.

215
Several hundred Syrians deserted to the Ottoman camp, and several
small divisions of Infantry were marching with the same intention ; but the
activity which Solyman Pasha displayed, at the advanced posts, prevented
a greater number of fugitives from leaving the camp.
Ibrahim Pasha felt the necessity of bringing matters to a conclusion
by a general engagement ; consequently, the Egyptian Army was under
arms at day break, and a division in six columns in good order was directed
against the rear of the Ottoman camp. The first column consisted of 60
guns, marching by sections ; the second of Infantry (the directing column),
composed of 12 battalions, marched in divisions at whole distance ; the
3rd and 4th columns of Infantry, each column of six battalions, marched in
double close column, deployed at whole distance ; the 5th and 6th columns,
composed of nine regiments of Cavalry, marched in column by squadrons
at half distance.
Solyman Pasha had placed between the spaces of the Infantry in
front and in rear, eight battalions in close double columns, to sustain the
attacks which the Turks might have made against the front or the rear
of the columns ; he had also placed in front two batteries of twelve
36-pounder howitzers, which were fired with much precision.
The intention of Solyman Pasha was guessed at by a Staff Officer
of Hafiz Pasha ; the former intended to form an oblique line on the extreme
left of the Ottoman lines ; the direction of these lines had been changed to
the left face in the rear at an angle of about sixty degrees ; but the heads
of the columns of Ibrahim Pasha not having been able to reach as far as
the Village of Nezib, having been prevented from doing so by the well-
sustained fire of the Turkish Artillery, Solyman Pasha then ordered all the
troops to face to the left in order of battle, and the Egyptian General
manoeuvred under the terrible fire of the Turkish Artillery (a remarkable
circumstance) with as much order as if he had been on parade.
At this moment a very sharp fire of 304 guns was exchanged at a
distance of 1,200 metres ; this cannonade lasted an hour and three
quarters ; the Egyptian Artillery which fired very rapidly, having exhausted
its ammunition waggons and chests, was obliged to slacken its fire, until
the ammunition of the reserve arrived ; this was a critical moment for the
Egyptian Army ; sixteen battalions of the right of the J st and 2nd lines
had already fled in the midst of this great disorder ; at that moment a
European, a Staff Officer of Hafiz Pasha, advised him to march with
the bayonet against the Egyptians ; Whilst Hafiz Pasha hesitated, Solyman
Pasha, assisted by his aides-de-camp, sword in hand, forced the fugitives
to re-form in line under the deadly fire of the Turkish Artillery.
The cartridges for the cannon of Ibrahim Pasha having arrived, a
well-sustained fire of grape-shot was exchanged at a distance of 600 metres.
At this moment, the Bachi Bozuks of Hafiz fled in the greatest dis
order : Hafiz Pasha and his Staff Officers fell upon the fugitives with
the sword in order to make them return ; but this energy on the part of
the General-in-chief was useless ; and the Turkish troops, who were under
a terrible fire of grape-shot, began to give way.
The disorder increased still more, notwithstanding the activity and
bravery of Hafiz Pasha and the devotion of his European officers to his
service ; a large body of Infantry, which during the action had shown suf
ficient coolness and courage, left the field of battle, throwing away a great
number of muskets. The Turkish Cavalry which had not charged, owing
to the bad management of its General-in-chief, was carried away by the
flight of the Bachi Bozuks and of the Infantry ; however it alone effected
its retreat in order, and the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha retreated upon Marash
with the remainder of his Army.
The Turkish Army left upon the field of battle more than 100 pieces
of artillery, its camp baggage, and its ammunition ; the military chest,
amounting to 45,000 purses (five millions and a -half of francs) was, how
ever, saved.
Of the five European Officers who were in the service of Hafiz
Pasha, M. Petit was made prisoner in a charge of Cavalry, while he was
re-forming in line several batteries which were retreating, wishing to pre
vent their being taken by the enemy.

216
There are strong reasons for supposing that the Baron de Molke, a
distinguished Staff Officer, was killed.
The Ottomans had 4,000 men put hors de combat, dead and wounded ¦;
in the Army of Ibrahim Pasha, 3,200 men were also put hors de combat,
but the wounded were nearly all mortally wounded.
Justice must be done to the Turkish Infantry, which showed much
courage and resistance; but which unfortunately was not supported. . •
The battle was very bloody, for the Ottoman Army lost the eighth of
its effective force.
The loss of the battle is attributed to the following causes : — Because
the advice which the European Officers gave was not listened to, namely,
1°. That the Ottoman troops ought not to leave a hillock which was situated
at 800 metres in advance of the centre of their front ; 2°. That they ought
to have charged with the bayonet when the Egyptian Army had slackened
its fire and had had four of its regiments put to the rout.
Because the Cavalry did not take part in the engagement ; it might,
by deploying en echelon by regiments, the left in front, have formed in con
cave order upon the heads of the columns of Ibrahim Pasha, and might
have produced a great effect, since the three different species of arms
might have acted together upon the principal point of the battle.

No. 167.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 31.)
My Lord, Beyrout, July 1, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, copy of a letter
addressed to me this morning by Mahmoud Bey, the Governor of Beyrout,
announcing a complete victory gained by Ibrahim Pasha over the Ottoman
forces under the command of Hafiz Pasha. ,
The letter of Mahmoud Bey gives no particulars ; but from private
sources, it is understood that the battle took place on the 24th ultimo, at
Nezib, about nine hours from Aleppo, an engagement of minor importance
having preceded it the day before, with some advantage, it is said, to the
Ottoman arms.
The result of the general battle was, the flight of Hafiz Pasha with
the wreck of his army to Roum Kale leaving on the field the artillery (120
pieces of cannon, it is reported), provisions, ammunition, and tents. Most
of the troops are said to have laid down their arms.
According to private accounts from the Egyptian . army, received, by
Bahri Bey, an employe of this Government, high in confidence of Ibrahim
Pasha, his Highness was marching on Koniah.
Public rejoicings in all parts of Syria have been ordered in celebrtion
of the victory of Ibrahim Pasha.
The country, which was daily falling into a state of disorder in every
direction, will doubtless now, on the news of the defeat of the Sultan's
forces, return to a state of tranquillity. I have, &c,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

Inclosure in No. 167.
The Governor of Beyrout to Mr. Consul Moore.
Monsieur le Consul, Beyrout, le 24 Rebi-ahhir, 1255.
JE viens de recevoir a Finstant I'ordre supreme en date du 18 courant,
extrait d'un ordre du Generalissime a Son Excellence Cheriff Pacha, qui
annonce que le jour de Lundi, 13 Rebi, 1255, Son Altesse s'est dirigee a la
tete de l'Armee Egyptienne (que Dieu daigne toujours rendre victorieuse)

217
vers l'Armee Constantinopolitaine, et y sont arrives une heure apres le
lever du soleil.
L'Armee de Constantinople a ete detruite apres une bataille qui a
dure deux heures ; ils ont laisse sur le champ de bataille, canons, muni
tions, et tentes, et ont pris la fuite ; et par la grace de Dieu nous n'avons
aucune crainte. Son Altesse a ordonne la publication partout de cette
glorieuse victoire, afin de la ceiebrer joyeusement, et d'illuminer le pays un
jour et une nuit ; de la saluer par les salves d'artillerie et Faliegresse, que
les habitans s'adonnent a la joie et au plaisir ; connaissant votre attache-
ment et votre sympathie, ainsi que l'union du meme desir, nous vous
annoncons cette nouvelle, afin que vous participiez les heureuses
consequences. (Signe) MAHMOUD BEY,
Gouverneur de Beyrout.

(Translation.)
The Governor of Beyrout to Mr. Consul Moore.
Monsieur le Consul, Beyrout, Rebi-ahhir 24, 1255.
I have this instant received the supreme order, dated the 18th inst.,
extracted from an order of the Generalissimo to his Excellency Sherif
Pasha, which reports that on Monday, Rebi 13, 1255, his Highness pro
ceeded at the head of the Egyptian army (may God deign to render them
always victorious !) towards the army of Constantinople, and reached it
an hour after sunrise.
The army of Constantinople has been destroyed after a battle which
lasted two hours ; they have left on the field of battle cannon, ammuni
tion, and tents, and have taken flight ; and by the grace of God we have no
fear. His Highness has ordered that this glorious victory should be pub
lished every where, in order that it may be cheerfully celebrated, and that
the country should be illuminated for a day and a night, and that it should
be saluted with salvos of artillery, and merriment, and that the inhabi
tants should give themselves up to joy and pleasure. Knowing your
attachment and sympathy, as well as your uniting in the same desire, we
announce this intelligence to you, in order that you may participate in the
happy results. (Signed) MAHMOUD BEY,
Governor of Beyrout.

No. 168.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 31.)
(Extract.) Damascus, July 5, 1839.
I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch
per Beyrout steamer, on the 7th ultimo.
Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry, at Aleppo, will doubtless inform
your Excellency of the important events which have occurred between
the armies of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali on that frontier since I had
last the honour of addressing your Lordship.
Having taken the liberty to address unreservedly your Lordship, on
the circumstances which have apparently led to the collision between the
two armies, I have only now to describe the prospects which this change
of position of the Contending Powers offers, in connection with the imme
diate relations of this country and its interests, which have been thereby
so deeply implicated. The state of the country in the immediate neigh
bourhood of this city, in the centre and in the south of Syria, is from the
result of the defeat of the Sultan's Army, relieved from the effervescence
and degree of disorder into which it was thrown ; and it is presumable
2 F

218
that the malcontents of the north, who had taken so active a part against
the Egyptian Government, will also retire ; but by the latest accounts
from Aleppo, Aintab remained in possession of the Sultan's forces under
Solyman Pasha of Marash, while the battalion of Egyptian Infantry was
shut up in the citadel.
The future movements of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha and his army
are what now engross public attention, and may equally be an object of
the greatest interest on which your Lordship may wish to receive intel
ligence. On this very important point I have no positive information to
offer your Lordship: none but public rumour, and the appearances of the
general state of affairs produced by the untoward event, from which
induction can be made. It is reasonable to think, that in the new position
in which his Highness Ibrahim Pasha is placed, independent of awaiting
fresh instructions from Mehemet Ali, the first objects which will engage
his attention are, to look after the debris of the Sultan's Army ; the second,
to release the parts of the Egyptian territory occupied by the Sultan's
troops in its immediate vicinity; the third, to compose the disturbed state
of the lower ranges of the Taurus, extending from Marash to Byass, and
the vigilant superintendence of the Adana district menaced by the Sultan's
forces from Koniah, embracing the insurrection of the extensive moun
tains by which that province is bordered. Under such a view of his
Highness Ibrahim Pasha's position, it does not appear probable that he
will move either to the east of the Euphrates or northwards, leaving that
river on his right, apart the greatest considerations which the peremptory
commands of the Great Powers may impose on Mehemet Ali in trans
mitting orders to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha to retreat into the Egyptian
limits. It is nevertheless prudent to examine what are the chances for
success, should Mehemet Ali and his son, his Highness Ibrahim Pasha,
flushed with victory, decide on pursuing a direct line of operations, either
north or south from his present position.
By the defeat of the Sultan's Army, the disturbed state of the
northern mountains may soon subside; this will permit him, should his
views be directed northwards, to march by Kaissarieh on Koniah,
ordering the forces in the Adana district to penetrate the defile of the
Taurus, thereby placing the Sultan's Army under Hadji Halil Pasha,
between the two, which would insure its surrender, and leave the road
open to Ibrahim Pasha to Constantinople, at the head of a large army ;
and I am not aware that the Sultan, single-handed, can oppose an army
to prevent it, or at best, only a weak force, the destruction of which
would aggravate the unfortunate position in which the Sultan is
already placed; and it may be here opportunely remarked, that the
population of the Sultan's territories, either north or south, to Constan
tinople, or through Mesopotamia to Bagdad and Babylonia, would
welcome his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's march in the same sense, and with
the same advantage, as the Sultan's Seraskier hoped to possess himself of
Syria. However improbable it may appear, that Mehemet Ali should hazard
the prosecution of a northern line of operations, I am disposed to think,
for his immediate views, he would rather risk facing the measures of
Russia, than, to avert it, incur the anger of Great Britain, by directing
immediately his views to the south through Mesopotamia, to seize the
Pashalic of Bagdad, against which, but from an immediate restraint
from Great Britain, there is nothing to prevent its being now accom
plished. The last advices from Bagdad and Mesopotamia, fully authorize
this induction being made.
From these hypotheses it would appear deducible, that Mehemet Ali
will, to avert the combined anger of the Great European Powers, in
justifying himself for the heavy responsibility he has been necessitated to
incur, in defeating the Sultan's Army, act with that judgment and
moderation which his position demands, and retire within the limits of
his territories, to thereby claim at their hands their intervention, for the
final adjustment of the question pending between the Sultan and himself.
In respect to the occupation of the points on the Southern Arabian
shore, to the Persian Gulf, which formed a preliminary and distinct

219
question between Great Britain and Mehemet Ali, itis presumable from
the same chain of reasoning, that he must have already, according
to our demands, abandoned those appropriations, on the supposition
that the friendship of no European :Power is so dear to him as that of
Great Britain, with whom he is more closely connected than any other,
and on which depends his sole, future, and positive existence.
The Government here, conformable to the previous instruction from
his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, continues its military preparations ; great
exertions are making to raise 3,000 Irregular Cavalry, under five different
chiefs ; but the scarcity of horses and money retards its completion. I
hear 1,500 Irregular Bedouin Cavalry are arriving from Egypt; 1,000
camels are also being purchased; all these preparations are for the north.

No. 169.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Pahmerston. — (Received July 31.)
My Lord, Alexandria, July 11, 1839.
HER Majesty's steamer " Rhadamanthus," Captain Wakefield,
arrived here on the 7th instant, having been sent by Admiral Sir Robert
Stopford to obtain intelligence.
The " Rhadamanthus " left Malta on the 2nd instant with the squa
dron, from which it separated on the 4th, and was to rejoin the Admiral
off the south point of the island of Cyprus.
On the evening of the 8th instant, a Greek vessel came in from Constan
tinople, with positive intelligence of the death of the Sultan ; and the Pasha
despatched immediate orders to Ibrahim Pasha to suspend all hostilities.
He said that he expected a person from Constantinople to announce
officially the death of the Sultan, and that he would send Halil Effendi
to compliment the young Sultan, and to assure him of his (Mehemet Ali's)
fidelity and obedience.
At noon of the 9th instant, arrived here a Turkish corvette, sent from
off Stankio by Achmet Mushir Pasha, the Capudan Pasha, and having on
board Sherif Aga, the Kiaya of the Capudan Pasha, who was the bearer
of a letter from Achmet Pasha to Mehemet Ali. Sherif Aga is father of
the Riala Bey, who was lately at Cairo.
The Pasha told myself and colleagues, that Achmet Pasha had
announced the news of the death of Sultan Mahmoud, and the accession
of his eldest son the Sultan Abdul Medjid, which took place on the 1st of
July. The Capudan Pasha had demanded at the same time of Mehemet
Ali, the permission to come to Alexandria accompanied by his fleet, con
sisting of nine sail of the line, twelve frigates, and some smaller vessels,
and having on board 6,000 land troops. The Viceroy added, that he came
here in quality of a friend, that he had in consequence granted to him the
permission to come, and that he would send his large steamer, the " Nile,"
to convey him ; that the Capudan Pasha did not at all appear satisfied with
the elevation of Hosrew Pasha to the post of Grand Vizier, and might perhaps
have the wish or intention to leave his fleet (to give it over) in Egypt.
Later in the evening we heard from some of the persons about the
Viceroy, that A chmet Pasha was coming to place his fleet at the disposition
of Mehemet Ali ; that he (Achmet Pasha) had declared himself ready to
co-operate for the elevation of Mehemet Ali to the situation of Vekil of the
young Sultan, Mehemet Ali being, in his opinion, the only person capable
of governing the Turkish Empire in the present circumstances; they
added, that Mehemet Ali had received favourably the offers of the Capudan
Pasha, and that he had desired him (engage) to come to Alexandria ; that
however he had not consented to go to Constantinople in person, but
would send there one of his family, quelqu'un des siens, which caused it
to be supposed that he meant one of his sons.
2 F 2

220 *
The Turkish corvette saluted in passing the Pasha's fleet, which is
cruizing in sight of this port. On the evening of the 9th instant, Sherif
Aga returned to the Capudan Pasha in the " Nile " steamer.
The " Rhadamanthus " left this for the Admiral at day-break on the
10th instant, with the foregoing intelligence, and copies of my despatches
of the 6th instant, to your Lordship.
On the morning of the 10th, a Turkish steamer arrived here from
Constantinople with despatches for Mehemet Ali from Hosrew Pasha, and
which were brought by Akiff Effendi, first secretary to the Council.
Before reading those pieces, Mehemet Ali, at our demand, gave us
the following explanations relative to the reports which were bruited the
evening before. " If Achmet Pasha wishes to deliver over to me the fleet
of the Sultan, I will not accept it, and I will send it back to the Sultan ;
if Achmet Pasha wishes my interference to reconcile him with Hosrew
Pasha, I will endeavour to do so ; and if I do not succeed, he may remain
here, and the fleet will depart without him. As to the post of Vekil, you
may well believe that I have no intention of changing my present situa
tion in Egypt for that of Vekil ; and, if I stated the intention of sending
un des miens to Constantinople, it is Halil Effendi to whom I alluded,
and who will be charged to compliment the Sultan in my name."
Having received the letter of Hosrew Pasha, he read it in my presence.
It announced the accession to the throne of Sultan Abdul Medjid, and the
pardon accorded by the Sultan to Mehemet Ali for the differences which
he had had with his father ; that he would send to him the Nichan Iftikhar,
in token of his especial favour, and would also grant to him the hereditary
succession of Egypt and dependencies ; in fine, that the troops of the
Sultan had received orders to retire from the frontiers of Syria, and that
the Sultan engaged the Viceroy to contribute to the prosperity of the
Ottoman Empire, &c, &c.
At the reception of this letter, Mehemet Ali caused an order to be
prepared for Ibrahim Pasha, by which he enjoins him to withdraw his
troops to this side of the Euphrates, and as far as Marash, looking on the
war as now at an end. His son is to occupy this military line until
further orders.
Mehemet Ali says he wishes to have possession of Marash, which is
only about three hours beyond his present frontier, because it gives him
the means of keeping in order the mountaineers of Giaour Dagh, who have
always, although in his present territory, been very troublesome ; and he
says, that he will pay the Sultan for that accession of territory twice the
tribute which that district pays at present.
The Pasha says, that he is confident that all differences will now be
firmly settled without the intervention of the Great Powers ; and he pro
fesses great respect for, and submission to, the young Sultan ; and he
adds, that so soon as the succession and all other points shall be arranged,
he will call Ibrahim Pasha to Egypt, and he himself will proceed to Con
stantinople, in order to pay his personal homage to his Sovereign.
I hope there will not be difficulty in an amicable arrangement between
the )Toung Sultan and his powerful vassal ; and I believe that all the per
sons about the Sultan will contribute and aid in this, as they are all now
disposed to court Mehemet Ali ; and Hosrew Pasha, who was his most
bitter and inveterate foe, now expresses a hope that all old enmities
between them may be buried in oblivion; and, in fact, not only has
Mehemet Ali strong friends in the Divan, but he is regarded by all parties
as the only person who can help the Sultan to sustain the Ottoman
Empire. The step taken by the Capudan Pasha appears to have been caused as
well by his hostility to Hosrew Pasha, and his fear of losing his employ
ment, as also, perhaps, by the wish to supplant Hosrew Pasha ; and his
knowledge of the enmity between Hosrew Pasha and Mehemet Ali probably
led him to believe that the latter might be induced to join him against
Hosrew Pasha.
The forts and the fleet have fired salutes during the last three days

221

in the morning, noon, and evening ; and the Pasha sent orders to Abbas
Pasha to do the same at Cairo, and to illuminate that city in celebration
of the accession of the young Sultan. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 170.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 31.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, July 13, 1839.
I HAVE read with great attention the several inclosures in your
Lordship's despatch, of the 15th of June; and I now take the liberty
to submit to your Lordship some observations which have occurred to me
on a perusal of them.
In the letter of the Reis Effendi to Viscount Ponsonby, inclosed in his
Excellency's despatch, of the 1st of May, the Sultan gives as a reason
for his military preparations and fortifications, the levies of troops
by Mehemet Ali, and the redoubts, &,c, erected by him on the frontier.
But surely the Sultan must have been aware that Mehemet Ali could not,
and dared not to, attack the Sultan, as in such case he would have had
arrayed against him all the Great Powers. The Sultan had consequently
nothing to fear from Mehemet Ali ; and the interest of the Sultan was
clearly to allow Mehemet Ali to exhaust his resources, seeing that he had
nothing to dread from an attack by the Pasha, and by alleviating the
condition of the population of Asia Minor, to contrast their condition with
that of the oppressed Mussulmans of Syria. It was, however, clearly the
object of Russia to urge the Sultan to weaken himself by useless prepara
tions and expences.
Besides, the preparations of Mehemet were defensive, as he was per
suaded that it could not reckon on the support of the Great Powers in
the event of his being attacked by the Porte, and he wished therefore to
be prepared. Sound policy, therefore, should have dictated to the late
Sultan to have allowed Mehemet Ali to have exhausted his resources ;
instead of which the Sultan played the game of Russia, in all except being
the aggressor. In regard to the desire of the Sultan for Mehemet Ali to give up
Adana, Damascus, Aleppo, Seyda, Jerusalem, and Naplous, I do not think
he would have- consented to do so, and at present he will be still less
disposed to listen to such a proposal.
In respect to the opinion of the Sultan's officers, as mentioned in
Viscount Ponsonby's despatch of May 20, "That all the Syrians are enemies
to the Pasha," that is true only in respect to the Mussulmans, on
account of the conscription and the greater favour now shown to
Rayahs; but is far from being the case in regard to the non-Mussulman
population. In respect to the inclosure from M. Cochelet, in Earl Granville's
despatch of June 5, a similar document was sent to me, and forms Inclo
sure No. 3 in my despatch to your Lordship, of 19th May last.
The Pasha has more than once told myself and Colleagues, that he
would not assert his independence, in order to avoid any direct collision
or dispute with any of the Great Powers ; and I know that he has said the
same to M. Cochelet, -in my presence and in that of his Colleagues ; and I
am quite sure that Mehemet Ali never specified England alone as the
cause, although M. Cochelet may have advanced that to his Government
as his own opinion.
I have more than once had the honour to mention to your Lordship
the endeavours of M. Cochelet and of all the French in Egypt to persuade
the Pasha of the desire of England to possess Egypt, and that our
capture of Aden was the preliminary to this object.

222

No. 171.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 31.)
My Lord, Alexandria, July 13, 1839.
NO details have yet been received by Mehemet Ali from Ibrahim
Pasha, of the late general action in Syria, and I have only the report of
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry of Aleppo, which I do not send to your Lordship,
as that gentleman informs me that he has transmitted a detailed account
to your Lordship. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.
p.S. — I transmit a copy of a letter from Solyman Pasha to the
French Consul at Aleppo, giving some details of the late battle.

Inclosure 1 in No. 171.
Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo.
Nezib, 14 Rebi-akhir, 1255.
Monsieur le Consul, (25 Juin, 1839.)
EN apprenant notre depart du camp de Dombek apres qu'Antab eut
ete pris par l'Armee Turque et qu'un bataillon Egyptien y eut ete fait
prisonnier, lorsque sur tous les points les mouvemens de l'Armee Turque
etaient hostiles, et obligeaient Son Altesse le General-en-Chef a se
porter en avant, en apprenant notre depart, dis-je, vous avez du vous
attendre a de graves et rapides evenemens. La journee d'hier a repondu
a cette attente. Avec l'intention d'attaquer l'Armee Turque, des notre
arrivee a Mazar, nous avions trouve sa position trop forte pour Faborder
de front. Nous avons du la tourner. Nous nous sommes done portes
vers la gauche par une marche de flanc, de maniere a venir ensuite la
prendre a revers et tomber sur Farriere de son flanc droit. Notre manoeu
vre a ete heureuse ; et dans la bataille que nous avons livree hier, et qui
a dure de 4 heures a 4 heures et demie, avec une chaleur tres-vive, l'Armee
Turque a ete mise dans la deroute la plus complete. Tous les canons, la
plus grande partie de ses fusils, ses tentes, ses bagages, tout a ete pris.
Je ne puis vous dire encore le nombre des prisonniers : il est si consi
derable que notre camp en est surcharge. Voila un grand resultat.
Je m'empresse de vous en informer, pensant que vous apprendrez avec
plaisir un evenement qui prepare la fin de cet etat de crise et d'incertitude
politique dont souffrent tant d'interets. Veuillez agreer, &c,
(Signe) LE GENERAL SOLYMAN,
Le Major-General de l'Armee Egyptienne.
(Translation.)
Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo.
Nezib, Rebi-akhir 14, 1255.
Monsieur le Consul, (June 25, 1839.)
ON hearing of our departure from the Camp of Dombek, after Aintab
had been taken by the Turkish army, and that an Egyptian battalion had
been made prisoners there, while the movements of the Turkish army on
all points were hostile and obliged His Highness the General in Chief to
advance ; on hearing of our departure, I say, you must have expected
serious and speedy events. This expectation was yesterday fulfilled.
Intending to attack the Turkish army on our arrival at Mazar,
we found its position too strong to attack in front; it was necessary

223
for us to turn it, we therefore proceeded towards the left by a flank move
ment, so as to come upon them from behind and fall upon the rear of their
right flank. Our manoeuvre was successful, and in the battle which we
fought yesterday, and which lasted from four hours to four hours and a
half with great vigour, the Turkish army was put to the most complete
rout. All the cannon and the greatest part of their muskets, their tents,
their baggage, all have been taken. I cannot yet tell you the number of
prisoners; it is so considerable, that our camp is crowded with them.
This is a great result. I hasten to inform you of it, thinking that you
will learn with pleasure an event which prepares the end to this state of
political crisis and uncertainty from which so many interests suffer.
Have the goodness to accept, &c,
(Signed) GENERAL SOLYMAN,
Major- General of the Egyptian Army*.

Inclosure 2 in No. 171.
Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo.
Nezib, 16 Rebi-akhir, 1255.
Monsieur le Consul, (27 Juin, 1839.)
AVANT-HIER, en vous annon£ant le resultat de la bataille de Nezib,
je ne pouvais encore vous predser le nombre de nos prisonniers : il s'eieve
a 10,000. Nous avons ramasse jusqu'a present a peu pres 12,000 fusils ;
mais beaucoup restent encore disperses ca et la ou caches dans la riviere.
La totalite des fusils perdus par Farmee doit aller au-dela de 15,000.
Nous avons compte aussi 104 pieces de canon laissees par elle, mais il nous
en reste sans doute quelques unes a trouver, car l'Armee Turque avait
plus d'artillerie que cela, et je ne pense pas qu'elle en ait rien pu sauver.
Veuillez agreer, &c,
(Signe) LE GENERAL SOLYMAN,
Le Major-General de l'Armee Egyptienne^
(Translation.)
Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo.
Nezib, Rebi-akhir 16, 1255.
Monsieur le Consul, (June 27, 1839.)
IN acquainting you the day before yesterday with the result of the
battle of Nezib, I was then unable to inform you of the precise number of
prisoners we have taken ; it amounts to 10,000. We have collected up to
the present time nearly 12,000 muskets, but many still remain scattered
here and there, or concealed in the river. The whole amount of the
muskets lost by the army, must exceed 15,000. We have counted
also 104 pieces of artillery left by the Turkish army, but, doubtless,
there still remain some for us to find, for the Turkish army had more
artillery than that, and I do not think that it could have saved any.
Be so good as to accept, &c,
(Signed) GENERAL SOLYMAN,
Major- General of the Egyptian Army.

No. 172.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 31.)
(Extract.) Paris, July 29, 1839.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 26th of July.
No intelligence from Constantinople, from Alexandria, or from the
fleets in the Levant, has reached the French Government of a later date

224
*
than that which was conveyed by the Marseilles telegraph, and which
has been already communicated to your Lordship.
Marshal Soult, this morning, read to me a despatch from the French
Agent at Malta, containing accounts from Alexandria of the 14th, from
which it appears that the " Rhadamanthus" steam-vessel had been sent
by Sir Robert Stopford to Alexandria, and must, upon its return to join
the British fleet, have conveyed intelligence of the intention of the Capudan
Pasha to place the Ottoman fleet under the protection of Mehemet Ali.
This intention was communicated to Admiral Lalande on the 8th
instant, by Achmet Pasha ; and Marshal Soult calculates that the instruc
tions sent to the French Admiral by his Government, in regard to the
Turkish fleet, if it should leave the Dardanelles, could not have reached
him before the 12th.

No. 173.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 1, 1839.
I HAVE to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Go
vernment are of opinion, all things considered, that the death of
the Sultan, and the defeat of the Turkish Army, rather increase than
diminish the force of the reasons which had previously led the Five Powers
to think it necessary that Syria should be restored to the direct rule of the
Sultan ; because the end for the attainment of which that measure was in
tended, remains equally important and desirable ; and the dangers which are
to be averted have not been changed by late events. That end is the main
tenance of the Turkish Empire ; the danger by which that Empire is
threatened is the usurped Power of Mehemet Ali ; and if the possession
of Syria was thought to render Mehemet Ali dangerously strong with
relation to the Sultan during the life of Mahmoud, a vigorous and expe
rienced Sovereign, still more must the possession of Syria render Mehemet
Ali too strong with relation to his Sovereign, when that Sovereign is a
minor, and has been enfeebled by the defeat and dispersion of his army,
and by the defection of his fleet.
If indeed the only object of the Five Powers were to determine how
Syria could best be administered, and if they had any right to take upon
themselves the settlement of such a question, much might be said both
ways, as to whether it would be most for the advantage of Syria to be
governed by a Pasha appointed directly by the Sultan, or to be governed
by a person appointed by Mehemet Ali, under an authority delegated to
him by the Sultan ; although it may safely be said that little doubt could
exist on this point, if Mehemet Ali were to continue to subject the Syrians
to the many and severe oppressions which they have hitherto suffered
under his rule.
But this is not the question which the Five Powers have to deal with ;
the object they have in view is to maintain the integrity of the Turkish
Empire ; and they have a right to maintain that integrity, because its
maintenance is necessary for upholding the balance of Power in Europe,
and is essential to the preservation of peace in the world. The Five
Powers therefore, as it seems to Her Majesty's Government, ought not to
consider the integrity of the Turkish Empire as less important, merely
because for the moment the throne happens to be filled by a minor.
They should look to permanent interests and not to temporary accidents ;
and as they possess the means of effectually supporting Turkey, they
ought to employ those means to accomplish that purpose.
The youth of the Sultan is a temporary inconvenience ; his army
his navy, and his finances, may progressively be organized upon a better
system, if Turkey shall continue for some years to enjoy peace under
protection of the Five Powers ; and so long as the territorial integrity of
the Ottoman Empire shall be maintained, there is no reason why that

225
Empire should not occupy a respectable situation among the Powers of
the world ; or why it should not be capable of defending itself, if assisted
by such aid as it would be sure to receive if it were to be attacked.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 174,
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 1, 1839.
THE Five Powers appear to be all equally of opinion, that Syria,
Candia, and Arabia, ought to be immediately restored to the direct rule
of the Sultan, in consideration of the grant of the hereditary Government
of Egypt to Mehemet Ali ; but some of the Five Powers appear to doubt
whether the alliance would have the means of inducing Mehemet Ali to
acquiesce in such an arrangement if he should strongly object to it. It
appears however to Her Majesty's Government, that such doubts have no
sufficient foundation. It can hardly be supposed that so shrewd and
sagacious a man as Mehemet Ali, so accustomed to calculate chances, to
weigh relative means, and to avoid needless risks, could seriously persuade
himself that he was able to cope single-handed with the Five Powers and
the Porte united; or that he would prefer the inevitable ruin which a
struggle against such odds would bring upon him, rather than enjoy the
certain advantages which the arrangements of the Five Powers would
secure to him. It is therefore hardly to be supposed that the moral force
of the union of the Five Great Powers would not be adequate to bring
about peaceably a full execution of the intended arrangement ; but, if
Mehemet Ali should resist, a little reflection will suffice to show what
ample means of coercion the Five Powers possess. The fleet of Mehemet
Ali, his communication with Syria, his commercial marine, his capital,
are all at the mercy of the combined squadron; his fleet might be taken
and given over to the Sultan ; all communication by sea between Egypt
and Syria might be cut off; and though it is no doubt physically possible
for him, with time and expence, to send supplies to Syria by land across
the Desert, yet there would be no great difficulty on the part of the Allies
in cutting off that communication also, by occupying some position on the
coast in the line of march.
There are some hundreds of merchantmen under the Egyptian flag
sailing in the Mediterranean ; these are almost all loaded with the
personal property of the Pasha, for he is the great monopolizer of the
produce and of the commerce of Egypt ; all these would either be shut
up in Alexandria, or be captured by the Allies ; nor would any difficulty
arise as to blockading Alexandria, and preventing the ingress and egress
even of neutrals, because, although the Five Powers could not well declare
war against Mehemet Ali, who is only the subject of a Sovereign, and
although, therefore, the Five Powers could not exercise against the Pasha
the right of blockade, which is a belligerent right, yet it would be easy
for the Sultan to declare a blockade of the coast of Egypt and Syria,
which, as Sovereign, he would have a right to declare in rebellion and to
blockade ; and the Turkish fleet would be fully able to make such a
blockade effective against neutrals, while the Egyptian fleet was pre
vented by the allied squadrons from undertaking any offensive operation.
Moreover, if the blockade should not accomplish the intended purpose,
it must be recollected that, while Ibrahim's Army is in Syria, Egypt is
comparatively defenceless ; that the defeat of the Turkish Army at Nezib
has by no means annihilated all the military means of the Sultan ; that a
considerable part of the army of Hafiz made good its retreat ; that there
was a large body in the rear which was not in the battle ; and that the
Sultan had, at Constantinople and elsewhere, reserves to a large amount.
From these resources, it would be easy to collect a respectable body of
Turkish troops for a landing at Alexandria under the protection of the
2 G

220
combined squadron ; and the troops so landed, if directed, as in that case
it might be insisted upon that they should be, by European officers, would
be able to overcome all local resistance, and to make themselves masters
of Alexandria. That Mehemet Ali, by pertinaciously clinging to Syria,
might find himself dispossessed of Egypt; and if once such a blow was
struck at the very heart of his power, his Syrian Army would melt away,
and his Syrian authority would cease to exist.
But Mehemet Ali would be just as able to foresee these operations,
as the Five Powers would be to plan them; and whatever show of resis
tance he might make, and however high the language which at first he
might hold, it is in the greatest degree improbable that he would ensure
the entire ruin of himself and his family by an infatuated resistance to
the force of an overwhelming necessity. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 175.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 1, 1839.
THE various despatches of which I send your Excdlency copies in
my despatch, of this day, will fully explain to you tne view which
Her Majesty's Government have taken of the present state of affairs
in Turkey and in the Levant, and the course which they think it will be
most expedient for the Five Powers to pursue with regard to those
matters. The communications from other Governments, of which copies are
likewise sent to you in the same despatch, will also show that there
exists on these great and important affairs an almost entire identity of
opinion between the Five Cabinets ; and it is therefore to be presumed
that some specific measures will speedily be agreed upon between them
with reference to these affairs.
The first step to be taken in consequence of an agreement between
the Five Powers will probably be to make soma communication to the
Porte. Any decision of this kind which may be come to, will be finally
concluded at Vienna, and in order to save time will be communicated
from thence to the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople.
I have, therefore, to instruct your Excellency to carry into execution any
measure which you may be informed by Lord Beauvale has been agreed
to by him on behalf of the British Government, and has also been con
curred in by the Austrian Government, and by the Representatives of
the other Three Powers at Vienna.
It will be of great importance that in any step to be thus taken at
Constantinople, or in any communication which is to be made by the
Representatives of the Five Powers, those Representatives should act
not only simultaneously in point of time, but identically in point of
manner ; in order that there should not be any appearance of divergence
in the execution of a measure in the arrangement of which there has
been entire unanimity. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

3_tf
No. 176.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 2.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 10, 1839.
I HAVE recdved officially from the Sublime Porte, copy of a letter
from the Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali, and have the honour to forward
it to your Lordship. I have, &.C.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 176.
The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali Pasha. — July 5, 1839.
(Traduction.) IL y a deja quelques jours que j'ai eerit a votre Excellence pour lui
annoncer 1 avenement au Trone Imperial du tres-majestueux, tres-mag-
nifique et tres-puissant Sultan, Abdoul Medjid Khan, notre Seigneur
et Maitre, par suite de la mort de celui qu'il a plu a la Providence
d'appeler a meilleure vie.
Sa Hautesse, douee de droiture et de sagacite, qualites dont le del
Fa favorisee, a dit aussitot qu'elle fut montee au trone :
" Le Pacha d'Egypte, Mehemet Ali Pacha, s'etant permis certains
precedes offmsans envers feu mon glorieux pere, il s'est passe jusqu'a
present beaucoup de choses ; et dernierement encore, on a entrepris des
preparatifs. Mais je ne veux pas que la tranquillite de mes sujets soit
troublee, et que le sang Musulman soit verse. J'oublie done le pass6 ; et
pourvu que Mehemet Ali Pacha remplisse exactement les devoirs de la
sujetion et du vassalage, je lui accorde mon pardon Souverain, je lui
destine une decoration magnifiqiie et semblable a celle de mes autres
illustres Vizirs, et j 'accorde la succession hereditaire de ses fils au Gou
vernement de FEgypte."
Telles sont les paroles gracieuses que Sa Hautesse a proferees ; et
comme j'ai ete nomme Grand Vizir, honneur que je ne merite pas, et que
votre Excellence est une de mes anciennes connaissances, la volonte que
Sa Hautesse vient d'exprimer n'a pu, vu l'amitie sincere que je vous
porte, que me causer une vive satisfaction.
Des ordres ont ete sur le champ expedies au Seraskier de l'Orient,
son Excellence Hafiz Pacha, de faire faire halte a son armee ; et la Flotte
Imperiale qui etait sur le point d'appareiller des Dardanelles, a ete
retenue. Conformement aux ordres de Sa Hautesse, on prepare la deco
ration qui vous est destinee, et le firman de votre investiture, et nous vous
les enverrons plus tard.
En attendant, le tres-distingue Akiff Effendi, Secretaire du Conseil de
la Porte, est expedie aupres de votre Excellence, pour vous annoncer ces
joyeuses nouvelles, et vous faire connaitre en detail les sentimens que Sa
Hautesse a bien voulu exprimer a votre egard.
Nous esp6rons en Dieu que sous les auspices du tres-majestueux
Sultan regnant, notre Seigneur et Maitre, qui est etabli par le ciel, les
populations de toutes les parties de l'empire jouiront de la plus grande
tranquillite. Mais il est clair que la realisation de cet espoir depend de
Funion parmi les Musulmans. C'est pourquoi il faut, d'apres la prudence
et la sagesse qui vous caract6risent, et conformement aux ordres de Sa
Hautesse, que le pass£ soit enseveli dans Foubli, et que votre Excellence
retire ses armees et mette desormais ses soins k maintenir cette union; et
c'est dans cet espoir que je vous ecris cette depeche.

2 G 2

228

(Translation.)
The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali Pasha. — July 5, 1839.
IT is already some days since I wrote to your Excellency to an
nounce to you the accession to the Imperial Throne of the most ma
jestic, most magnificent, and most powerful Sultan, Abdul Medjid Khan,
our Lord and Master, in consequence of the death of him whom it
has pleased Providence to call to a better life.
His Highness, endowed with uprightness and with wisdom, qualities
with which Heaven has favoured him, said as soon as he ascended the
throne :
" The Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali Pasha, having been guilty of
certain offensive proceedings against my late glorious father, many things
up to the present time have taken place ; and latterly also, he has made
preparations. But I do not wish that the tranquillity of my subjects should
be disturbed, and that Mussulman blood should be spilt. I forget, then,
the past ; and provided that Mehemet Ali Pasha shall exactly fulfil the
duties of submission and of vassalage, I grant him my Sovereign pardon,
I design for him a magnificent decoration, and similar to that of my
other illustrious Viziers, and I grant the hereditary succession of his sons
to the Government of Egypt."
Such are the gracious words which His Highness has spoken ; and as
I have been appointed Grand Vizier, an honour which I do not deserve,
and as your Excellency is one of my old acquaintances, the wish which
His Highness has just expressed cannot fail, considering the sincere
friendship which I entertain for you, to cause me a lively satisfaction.
Orders have been forthwith sent to the Seraskier of the East, his
Excellency Hafiz Pasha, to halt his army ; and the Imperial fleet, which
was on the point of sailing from the Dardanelles, has been detained. Ac
cording to the orders of His Highness, the decoration which is intended
for you is being prepared, and the firman of your investiture, and we
will send them to you hereafter.
In the meanwhile the most distinguished Akiff Effendi, Secretary to
the Council of the Porte, is sent to your Excellency to announce to you
this joyful news, and to inform you in detail of the sentiments which His
Highness has been pleased to express as regards you.
We trust in God that, under the auspices of the most magnificent
reigning Sultan, our Lord and Master, who is established by Heaven, the
people of all parts of the Empire will enjoy the greatest tranquillity.
But it is evident, that the realization of this hope depends on the union
among the Mussulmans. On this account it is necessary, according to
the prudence and wisdom which characterise you, and agreeably to the
orders of His Highness, that the past be buried in oblivion, and that your
Excellency withdraw your armies and give heed to maintain this union ;
and it is in this hope that I have addressed you this despatch.

No. 177.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 2.)
MY Lord> Therapia, July 10, 1839.
I HAVE heard no more news respecting the Army of Hafiz Pasha,
and nothing of the movements of Ibrahim Pasha.
There are no news yet come from the Ottoman fleet, but I hear the
Sublime Porte has sent a Hatti Scheriff by some agent to be read to the
officers and crews of the vessels, ordering them to return to Constan
tinople. Public tranquillity continues undisturbed.

229
The messenger who was the bearer of your Lordship's despatches to
the 17th of June, arrived late last night, and will be kept here till I can
state, with some precision, the state of affairs. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 178.
Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston.
My Lord, Hertford House, le ler Aoht, 1839.
PAR sa depeche d'avant-hier, le Maredial Soult me charge de vous
donner lecture de la lettre qu'il adresse a notre Consul-General a Alex
andrie, sous la date du 27 Juillet. Pour ne pas vous importuner, je vous
en envoie copie, et je le fais avec d'autant plus d'empressement, que
vous trouverez la pensee de ces instructions parfaitement conforme a
la declaration du Maredial a Lord Granville. Agreez, &c,
(Signe) BOURQUENEY.
(Translation.)
Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston.
My Lord, Hertford House, August 1, 1839.
MARSHAL SOULT, by his despatch of the day before yesterday,
instructs me to read to you the letter which he has addressed to our
Consul-General at Alexandria, dated the 27th of July. In order not to
importune you, I send you a copy of this letter, and I do this with the
more satisfaction, since you will find the spirit of these instructions in
perfect conformity with the declaration of the Marshal to Lord Granville.
Receive, &c,
(Signed) BOURQUENEY.

Inclosure I in No. 178.

Marshal Soult to the Consul-General of France at Alexandria. — (Communicated
by Baron de Bourqueney.)
Monsieur, Paris, le 27 Juillet, 1839-
J'AI regu les depeches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'ecrire
jusqu'au No. 115 inclusivement. Celles deM. de Lurde me sont egalement
parvenues. Le Gouvernement du Roi voit avec peine, que les avantages obtenus
par Mehemet Ali, loin de lui inspirer la moderation qui conviendrait si
bien a la position forte et glorieuse dans laquelle il se trouve place, sem-
blent avoir eveilie dans son esprit et des esperances et des projets dont
rien dans ces derniers tems n'avait indique l'existence.
Le langage qu'il a tenu a M. de Lurde est certainement en accord
avec l'intention si r6cemment exprimee par lui dans les instructions
envoyees a Ibrahim Pacha, de s'en remettre pour la conclusion de sa
querelle avec la Porte, aux negociations qu'allaient entamer les Puissances
Europeennes. Ces instructions par cela meme qu'elles nous avaient ete
officiellement communiquees, et qu'un de mes officiers d'ordonnance en
avait ete rendu porteur, constituent a notre egard un engagement qui n'a
pu etre rompu par des faits auxquels nous sommes compietement
etrangers. Le Gouvernement du Roi veut croire que le Vice-Roi, promptement
remis de Fexaltation qu'ont pu lui causer des succes aussi rapides que

230
complets, reviendra a des dispositions plus dignes de sa sagesse et de son
experience ; qu'il ne voudra pas poursuivre par la force, le but de son
ambition, et qu'il comprendra que les conditions meme que la violence
pourrait arracher a la detresse et aux terreurs de la Porte, n'auraient en
realite aucun caractere definitif, et ne donneraient a la Puissance qu'il a
fondee, que des bases bien insuffisantes, si elles n'etaient sanctionnees par
l'approbation des Puissances Europeennes.
La necessite de cette approbation ne resulte pas, Monsieur, d'une
protection arbitraire de ces Puissances. S'il ne leur est pas possible de
laisser les affaires de l'Orient se regler sans leur concours, c'est que leurs
interets essentiels et directs sont trop fortement engages ; c'est qu'elles
ne pourraient tolerer aucune combinaison qui, dans une forme ou sous un
fwetexte quelconque, porterait atteinte a Findependance, a Fintegrite, de
'Empire Ottoman, ou aux droits de la dynastie regnante. Cet Empire,
dans Fetat de faiblesse auquel il se trouve reduit, n'a pourtant pas cessi
d'etre un des eiemens essentiels de Fequilibre politique, une des garanties
de la paix generale, et a ce titre il a un droit absolu a notre protection.
Pour vous prouver a quel point les vues des Puissances sont arretees
a ce sujet, je vous envoie la copie de deux declarations qui viennent d'etre
dchangees entre les Cours de Londres et de Paris. Celle qui porte ma
signature a ete envoyee aussi a Vienne, a Berlin, a St.-Petersbourg, et je
puis d'autant moins douter de la cohesion du Cabinet Autrichien que c'est
lui qui le premier a eu Fidee de cette espece d'engagement reciproque.
Veuillez, Monsieur, faire part a Mehemet Ali du contenu de cette
depeche. Appellez toute son attention sur les considerations si graves
qui y sont developpees. Dites-lui bien que quelle que soit la severite de
notre langage, elle est encore fort au-dessousdu degre de mecontentement
que sa persistance dans des pretentions incompatibles avec Finteret
general inspirerait aux autres Cabinets, deja trop portes a se defier de
ses intentions. Dites-lui, que si en cette occasion comme en beaucoup
d'autres, la France est la premiers a lui faire entendre des conseils que
peut-etre dans le premier moment il trouvera rigotireux, c'est precisement
parceque la bienveillance dont nous sommes animes a son egard nous fait
voir avec un vif regret les voies dangereuses ou il commence a entrer, et
parceque nous voudrions qu'il ne s'y engageit pas au point de com-
promettre ses grandes et belles destinees.
II me tarde de connaitre Faccueil qu'il aura fait aux propositions
d'accommodement contenues dans la lettre que lui a ecrite le nouveau
Grand Vizir. Je n'hesite pas a dire qu'elles me paraissent parfaitement
propres a devenir tout au moins la base d'une negociation serieuse. Je
ne doute pas que M. F Amiral Roussin ne vous ait envoye le texte de la
lettre vizirielle. Je le desire d'autant plus que celle qu'il vous a ecrite
lui-meme, pour vous annoncer la demarche de la Porte, aurait pu, par la
maniere dont elle etait redigee, vous faire supposer qu'il s'agissait
simplement de confier a Mehemet Ali l'investiture viagere de FEgypte.
P.S. 28 Juillet. — Je vous envoie ci-joint, Monsieur, copie des in
structions que M. le Ministre de la Marine adresse aujourd'hui meme a
FAmiral Lalande. Elles sont relatives a la defection du Capitan Pacha;
vous n'avez point a en donner communication actuelle au Vice-Roi, mais
la connaissance que vous y puiserez de nos intentions, vous servira de re*°le
pour reckoner fortement aupres de Son Altesse contre tout acte ou toute
disposition qui, de sa part, tendrait a mettre obstacle au retour de la
flotte Turque a Constantinople, et la soutiendrait dans sa desobeissance
aux ordres de sa Cour. (Translation.)
Marshal Soult to the Consul-General of France at Alexandria.— (Com'
municated by Baron de Bourqueney.)
Sir, Paris, July 27, 1839.
I HAVE received the despatches which you have done me the
honour to write to me, to No. 115 indusive: M. de Lurde's despatches
have also reached me.

231
The King's Government sees with pain, that the advantages obtained
by Mehemet Ali, far from inspiring him with that moderation which
would so well become his strong and glorious position, seem to have
awakened in his mind hopes and projects, of which there had been
nothing latterly to indicate the existence.
The language which he has held to M. de Lurde is certainly in
accordance with the intention so recently expressed by him in the instruc
tions sent to Ibrahim Pasha, to rely for the termination of his quarrel
with the Porte upon the negotiations about to be entered upon by the
European Powers, The fact that those instructions were officially com
municated to us, and that one of my Staff Officers was made the bearer
of them, created an engagement with regard to us which cannot be
broken by the occurrence of events to which we are entirely strangers.
The King's Government is willing to believe, that the Viceroy,
quickly recovering from the excitement which his successes, as rapid as
they were complete, may have caused him, will return to sentiments more
worthy of his wisdom and of his experience ; that he will not endeavour
to attain the object of his ambition by force ; and that he will perceive
that even the conditions which violence might extort from the reverses
and fears of the Porte would not in reality have a definitive character,
and would form but a very insecure foundation for that power which he
has created, unless they were sanctioned by the approbation of the
European Powers.
The necessity for that approbation does not result, Sir, from the
arbitrary protection of those Powers. If it is not possible for them to
leave the affairs of the East to settle themselves without their concur
rence, it is because their essential and direct interests are too deeply
involved ; it is because they could not tolerate any combination, which in
any way, or under any pretext whatsoever, should assail the independence
and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, or the rights of the reigning dynasty.
That Empire, even in the state of weakness to which it is reduced, has
nevertheless not ceased to be one of the essential elements of the balance
of power, — one of the guarantees of general peace ; and for these reasons
has an absolute right to our protection.
In order to prove to you the extent to which the views of the Powers
on this subject are settled, I send you copies of two declarations which
have been exchanged between the Courts of London and Paris. The one
that bears my signature has also been sent to Vienna, Berlin, and St.
Petersburgh ; and I have the less reason to doubt of the concurrence of
the Austrian Cabinet, since it was that Cabinet which first broached the
idea of this sort of reciprocal engagement.
I have to request you to make Mehemet Ali acquainted with the
contents of this despatch. Call his entire attention to the important
considerations detailed therein. Tell him that, severe as our language
may be, it yet falls far short of the dissatisfaction with which he will, by
his perseverance in pretensions incompatible with the general interest,
inspire the other Cabinets, who are already but too much disposed to mis
trust his intentions. Tell him, that if on this occasion, as on many
others, France is the first to make him hear counsels, which he may
at first deem harsh, it is precisely because the goodwill which we feel
towards him causes us to view with deep regret the dangerous courses
upon which he is about to enter ; and because we are desirous that
he should not so far commit himself as to compromise his great and high
prospects. I shall be anxious to learn in what manner he receives the proposi
tions for accommodation which were contained in the letter addressed to
him by the new Grand Vizier. I have no hesitation in saying, that those
propositions appear to me perfectly adapted for forming, at any rate, the
basis of a serious negotiation. Admiral Roussin will no doubt have
furnished you with a copy of the Vizier's letter. I desire this the more,
because the letter which he himself addressed to you, announcing the
proceeding adopted by the Porte, might, by the manner in which it was
drawn up, have led you to suppose that there was merely question of
conferring on Mehemet Ali the Pashalik of Egypt for life.

232
P.S. — July 28. I send you herewith, Sir, copy of the instructions,
dated this day, addressed by the Minister of Marine to Admiral Lalande ;
they relate actually to the defection of the Capudan Pasha ; you need
not communicate these instructions to the Viceroy ; but the knowledge
of our intentions which you will derive therefrom will serve for your
guidance in protesting strongly to His Highness against any act or
measure on his part which would throw difficulties in the way of the
return of the Turkish fleet to Constantinople, and would support it in
its disobedience to the orders of its Court.

Inclosure 2 in No. 178.
The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

(Traduction.) AINSI que le portait la lettre qui a ete adressee a Votre Excellence
il y a quelques jours, Sa Hautesse le tres-magnifique, tres-formidable, et
tres-puissant Sultan Abdoul Medjid Khan, etant monte sur le Trone
Imperial, que la predestination divine avait laisse vacant, la sagesse dont
elle est naturellement douee lui a dicte, au moment meme de son
avenement, le langage qui suit : " Le Gouverneur de FEgypte, Mehemet
Ali Pacha, avait commis quelques actes de nature a indisposer mon
glorieux pere; divers evenemens sont survenus, et des preparatifs ont ete
faits. Cependant, pour preserver de toute atteinte le bien-6tre des
populations que m'a confines la Providence, et dans Funique but
depargner le sang Musulman, j'oublierai tout le passe, j'accorderai a ce
Gouverneur son pardon, je lui enverrai une decoration semblable a celles
de mes autres Vizirs, et je lui concederai la Province d'Egypte comme
devant passer par Fheritage a ses enfans, sous la condition de remplir
entierement les devoirs de la soumission et de Fobeissance."

(Translation.)
The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.
AS was signified in the letter which was addressed to your Excellency
some days ago, His Highness, the most magnificent, the most formidable,
and most powerful Sultan Abdul Medjid Khan, having mounted the
Imperial throne, which divine predestination had left vacant, that wisdom
with which His Highness is naturally endowed, at the very moment of
his accession, dictated to him the following language : — " The Governor of
Egypt, Mehemet Ali Pasha, had committed several acts of a nature to render
my illustrious father ill-disposed towards him ; various events took place,
and preparations have been made. Nevertheless, in order to preserve
from any attack the welfare of those populations which Providence has
entrusted to my care, and with the sole object of sparing Mussulman
blood, I will forget the past ; I will grant that Governor his pardon ; I
will send him a decoration similar to those of my other Viziers ; and I will
grant to him the Province of Egypt, to pass as an heritage to his
children, upon condition of his fulfilling entirely the duties of submission
and obedience."

233
No. 179.
Viscount Palmerston to the Baron de Bourqueney .
Foreign Office, August 3, 1839.
LORD PALMERSTON presents his compliments to the Baron de Bour
queney, and has the honour to indose drafts of the proposed instructions to the
Admirals in the Levant, in order that M. de Bourqueney may forward them to
Paris to-night.

Inclosure 1 in No. 179.

Sketch of the proposed Instructions to the two Admirals in the Mediterranean.
Foreign Office, August 3, 1839.
TO go immediately to Alexandria, and to take up a position off the port,
so as to prevent the Egyptian fleet from entering, if they should be outside the
harbour, or from coming out, if they should be within.
The Admirals should then state to Mehemet Ali that their respective
Governments, who are the Allies of the Sultan, and who are determined to
uphold the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, have ordered
them to demand from him the immediate restitution of the Turkish fleet, in order
that it may be sent back without delay to Constantinople.
The Admirals should say, that no Turkish officer or man who may think
that his personal safety would be endangered on his return to Constantinople,
should be required to go back thither, but that all such persons might remain in
Egypt ; and if without some such persons there should not be hands enough to
work the ships, the Admirals should require that a sufficient number of hands
should be put on board to work the fleet as far as Rhodes or any other port of
deposit, giving their formal guarantee, that all Turkish officers and men who
might wish to return £o Egypt should be sent back thither from Rhodes.
If the Pasha should refuse to comply with this demand, the Admirals should
have recourse to any measures of compulsion which they may think within their
power, and advisable for the purpose of inducing the Pasha to yield.
In such case, the Admirals should begin with the mildest methods of coercion,
and should progressively increase the severity of the pressure, as circumstances
may require ; and they should, in the last resort, take possession of the Egyptian
fleet if they should be unable to obtain the acquiescence of the Pasha without such
a measure. If this should be done, they should send the ships to Constantinople ;
the ships to be kept by the Sultan.
Such part of tbe crews as would not be wanted to navigate the ships to
Constantinople to be landed immediately in Egypt, in exchange for so many of
the crews of the Turkish ships as might be willing to go back to Turkey; and the
rest of the Egyptians, if they should not choose to enter into the Turkish service,
to be sent back to Egypt when no longer wanted to navigate the ships.
The capture of the Egyptian fleet ought not however to induce the Admirals
to desist from exacting from the Pasha the surrender of the Turkish ships ; and
they should continue to use measures of coercion to produce that result, and
would be authorized to detain all merchant ships sailing under the Egyptian flag.
But the Admirals should recollect that England and France not being
'belligerents, the combined squadron is not to interrupt the commerce of neutrals.
The Admirals should be left a discretionary power to depart from the letter
of these instructions, adhering always to their spirit ; and they should abstain from
employing force, if it is possible to accomplish their objects without it.

2 H

234
Inclosure 2 in No. 179.
Supplementary Instruction to the Admirals.
Foreign Office, August 3, 1839.
IF, when the Admirals receive these instructions, circumstances should have
arisen to render the presence of the combined fleet immediately necessary at the
Dardanelles, in the Sea of Marmora, or in the Bosphorus, the Admirals will of
course postpone acting upon the other instruction of this day, until after the more
pressing service shall have been accomplished ; and if while they are carrying the
other instruction of this date into execution, they should find that the occupation
of Constantinople by a Russian force, or any other circumstances, would render
it inexpedient to send to Constantinople the Egyptian or the Turkish ships which
they may obtain possession of at Alexandria, the Admirals in such case should be
authorized to send such ships to be held in safe deposit in any other Turkish port.

No. 180.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 3.)
My Lord, Paris, August 1, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship copy of a despatch from
the French Consul-General at Alexandria to Marshal Soult, which has been
communicated to his Excellency by the Marseilles telegraph. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 180.
Telegraphic despatch from Marseilles, August 1, 1839.
Le Consul- General a M. le President du Conseil des Ministres.
Alexandrie, 16 Juillet.
LA flotte Turque est venue le 14, sous le commandement du Capitan
Pacha, se mettre a la disposition de Mehemet Ali. Le Vice-Roi a dit qu'il ne
la rendrait a la Porte que lorsque le Grand Vizir Hosreff Pacha serait eloignd
des affaires, et qu'on lui aurait accorde l'heredite des pays qu'il gouverne.
L'Armee Egyptienne a recu I'ordre de se retirer derriere l'Euphrate.
(Translation.)
The Consul General to the President of the Council of Ministers.
Alexandria, July 16.
THE Turkish fleet, under the command of the Capudan Pasha,
arrived on the 14th, in order to place itself at the disposal of Mehemet
Ali. The Viceroy has said that he would not restore it to the Porte,
until the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha should be removed from office, and
the hereditary Government of the countries which he rules should be
conferred on himself.
The Egyptian Army has received orders to retire behind the
Euphrates.

235

No. 181.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 5.)
My Lord, Paris, August 2, 1839.
I THIS morning stated to Marshal Soult, that Her Majesty's Government
had learnt with great satisfaction, by the report of my conversation with his
Excellency on Friday last, that the French Government coincided with that of
Her Majesty, in the opinion that the late events should not alter the course
which the European Powers had previously intended to pursue, in regard to the
affairs of the East ; but I would not conceal from him, that your Lordship had
observed, that the despatch addressed to M. de Bourqueney on the same subject, and
communicated by him to you, was not quite consonant with the sentiments he
had expressed in conversation to me. I had not finished my sentence when the
Marshal interrupted me by saying he retracted no opinion he had given to me ;
he thought now, as he did then, that the Powers of Europe should continue to
act according to their previous intention, should consider what, under the
circumstances, was best to be done for the maintenance of the integrity and
independence of the Turkish Empire, regarding as non avenu any arrangement
which the Sultan may have acceded to, under the influence of the consternation
caused at Constantinople by the late disastrous events. The object of his
despatch to M. de Bourqueney was, he said, to elicit an opinion (provoquer une
opinion) from you, as to the measures to be taken under the actual state of
affairs. A change had certainly been made in the position of Mehemet Ali, which
would render much more difficult the obtaining from him his renunciation of
possessions which the English and French Governments may think it desirable
should be given up to the Sultan.
The Marshal then adverted to the different proposals which had been
suggested at Berlin, and at Vienna, as a basis of an arrangement between Turkey
and Egypt. He himself was disposed to think, that the ground upon which we
should propose to negotiate with Mehemet Ali should be, his obtaining the
hereditary right to his family of governing Egypt, on condition of his abandoning
the other Pashalics, now under his dominion ; but that some latitude must be
given to our Representatives at Vienna, to accede to terms more favourable to
Mehemet Ali ; a maximum, however, of concession to the Pasha being laid
down, which they must not exceed.
I asked the Marshal whether, since intelligence had arrived of the actual
surrender of the Turkish fleet into the hands of Mehemet Ali, the French
Government had taken into consideration, whether it might not be expedient
that the French and English Governments should send new instructions to the
Admirals of their fleets, in reference to that event. Admiral Duperre, the
Minister of Marine, happening to be at that moment at the Foreign Office,
Marshal Soult invited him to join us ; and a conversation ensued, as to the
power and means of the combined fleet to compel Mehemet Ali to restore the
Turkish fleet to the Sultan, and the objections that might occur to the blockading
Alexandria. Admiral Duperre, though by no means disinclined to the adoption
of the measure of blockade, doubted the prudence, unless assured that the
Russian fleet from the Black Sea would not enter the Bosphorus, of the French
and English fleet occupying a position so distant from the Dardanelles. He was
decidedly of opinion, that precautions should be taken by the Admirals to
prevent the Egyptian fleet, or the Turkish fleet under the Capudan Pasha, from
entering the Straits of the Dardanelles, with intentions hostile to the Sultan's
Government at Constantinople.
This question, I collected from the conversation of the two Ministers, had
already been mooted in the Cabinet Council, and was to be resumed at a Council
of the Ministers this evening. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

2 H2

236
No. 182.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 5.)
My Lord, Berlin, July 31, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's'
despatches to the 22nd of July, together with their inclosures.
Count Bresson has shown me a note which he has been ordered by the Duke
of Dalmatia to address to the Prussian Government on the present state of the
affairs of the East, exactly similar to that which M. de Bourqueney had trans
mitted to your Lordship on the 19th instant, and of which you have furnished
me with a copy.
Although not instructed by your Lordship to make any similar formal
communication to the Prussian Government on the present state of affairs in the
East, I thought it my duty to suggest to Baron Werther, the advantages that
would be gained by an early declaration of the intended policy of Prussia, and that
instructions should be forwarded to her Representative at Vienna, with as little
delay as possible, in the spirit of your Lordship's note of the 22nd instant, in
answer to that of M. de Bourqueney.
Baron Werther informed me, that he approved highly of your Lordship's
views, coinciding with those of the French Government, for the maintenance of
the balance of Power in Europe ; and he stated that he should inform the King at
Toplitz, of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government; and for this purpose he
requested that I would allow him to take a copy of your Lordship's note to M.
de Bourqueney, with which request I thought it right to comply.
No answer has yet been received by the French Minister to his official
Note, and I suppose he will not receive any until sufficient time has elapsed to
enable this Government to communicate with the Austrian Cabinet.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 183.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 5.)
(Extract.) Berlin, July 31, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the Russian Minister
called upon me this afternoon, and read to me some despatches he had received
this morning from Count Nesselrode, and copies of those he had written to M.
de Kisseleff, in answer to your Lordship's despatch to Lord Clanricarde, of the
9th instant; as also a report from M. de Bouteneff, of the communications
made to the Ambassadors of the Five Powers at the Porte, by Nouri Effendi.
As your Lordship will be already in possession of the information the
despatches contain, I need not further allude to them ; but Baron Meyendorff
read me a letter from Count Nesselrode, dated the 25th instant, in which
he said that the defeat of Hafiz Pasha, and the defection of Achmet Pasha, would
make no change whatever in the intentions and disposition of the Emperor,
taken before the news of those later events had come to his knowledge ; that His
Imperial Majesty considered that the fleets of England and France were quite
sufficient to insist upon the Turkish fleet repassing the Dardanelles without his
assistance; and that he had no wish whatever to propose that his squadron should
join ours in the Mediterranean. Count Nesselrode said, that the Emperor was
of opinion that the death of the Sultan, and the indication of moderation and
conciliation shown by his successor, would, in the end, have the happiest effects,
and that he was without alarm as to the termination of the affairs of the East ;
and that he thought the mind of Mehemet Ali . would be favourably acted'
upon by the early step taken by Abdul Medjid, of offering to make the Pashalic of
Egypt hereditary in his family, and would render him more easy to be treated
with hereafter.
His Excellency then said, " We understand that the English and French
Governments intend to propose that the Five Powers shall make a declaration of

237
their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman
Empire, under the present dynasty, and that none of them would seek to profit
by the present state of things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of
territory. As far as the independence of the Turkish Empire is concerned, and
the latter proposition, that Russia, among the rest, should not seek to profit by
the present state of things, the Emperor would instantly sign any instrument
which would record such a determination on his part ; but guaranteeing the
integrity of the empire was another thing ; that it perhaps might fall upon Russia
at a moment most inconvenient to herself to be called upon, as the nearest
neighbour, to bring back a rebellious vassal under the dominion of the Sultan,
and the Emperor might be exposed to numerous inconveniences by entering into
such a compact.''
I remarked to Baron Meyendorff, that the Emperor was already bound
somewhat in this manner by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi ; but he said, " We
are at liberty by that Treaty to judge of the casus foederis; for instance, if the
Porte was to make an unjust aggression, we are not bound to protect it from
the effects of it, as the inconveniences to which such a position might give rise
were foreseen when the Treaty was made."
The conversation then ended, and I informed Baron Meyendorff, that I
should report his observations to your Lordship, and he told me that I was
perfectly at liberty to do so.

No. 184.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received August 5.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1839.
ABOUT two hours after I had despatched messenger Webster on the 20th
instant, Count Nesselrode communicated to me the information he had that
morning received, that Nouri Effendi had called together the Envoys of the
Five Great Powers at Constantinople, and had submitted to them, upon the part of
the Turkish Government, as a plan for the settlement of the differences between
the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, the same proposition as your Lordship had
instructed Lord Beauvale to suggest at Vienna. The news appeared to give
his Excellency much pleasure; and he blamed the Ambassadors, to whom the
proposal was communicated, for having simply stated that they would report it to
their respective Governments, and not having expressed at once their satisfaction
at the proposition of the Divan.
Count Nesselrode discussed with me the probability that France would
desire better terms than those offered, for the Pasha of Egypt, and particularly
his retention of St. John d'Acre. But he said the precise terms of the final
conditions to be imposed upon the parties would virtually depend upon Her
Majesty's Government.
Count Fiquelmont, who left St. Petersburgh yesterday for Vienna, on his
road to Italy, has had a long conversation with the Emperor, chiefly, I under
stand, upon the Turco-Egyptian Question, and he appeared well satisfied with
what had passed upon the occasion.

No. 185.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 5.)
My Lord, St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1839.
COUNT NESSELRODE communicated to me this morning the latest
information he has received from Constantinople and the Levant ; giving an
account of the defeat and flight to Malatia of the Turkish Army, and of the
insubordinate, if not traitorous, conduct of Achmet Pasha, commanding the
fleet of the Sultan. I have not seen Count Nesselrode ; but I conversed on
these occurrences with Count Matuszevic, who brought for my perusal a copy of
the despatch which is to be sent this evening to M. Kisseleff, and to be commu- ,

238
nicated to your Lordship. The chief object of it appears to be, to change the
place of conference of the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers from Vienna
to Constantinople. The Russian Government seem still very confident that a
settlement of the disputes between Mehemet Ali and the Porte may, and will, be
easily effected, notwithstanding the late success of the Pasha's arms. Russia
would not refuse her assent to the Pashalic of Syria being conferred for his
life upon Ibrahim Pasha, if the Sultan should consent to such a demand.
I have, &c,
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 186.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, August 5, 1839.
I HAVE to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that an
instruction, to the following effect, be forthwith addressed to Admiral Sir
Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the
Mediterranean. Sir Robert Stopford will go immediately to Alexandria, and take up a
position off the port, so as to prevent the Egyptian fleet from entering, if they
should be outside the harbour, or from coming out, if they should be within.
Sir Robert Stopford will then state to Mehemet Ali, that the British
Government, which is the Ally of the Sultan, and which is determined to uphold
the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, has ordered him to
demand from Mehemet Ali the restitution of the Turkish fleet, in order that it
may be sent back without delay to Constantinople.
Sir Robert Stopford will say, that no Turkish officer or man who may think
that, in consequence of the part he may have taken in carrying the fleet to
Alexandria, his personal safety would be endangered on his return to Constanti
nople, should be required to go back thither ; but that all such persons might
remain in Egypt. If, however, the assistance of some such persons should be
necessary, in order to work the ships, Sir Robert Stopford will require that a
sufficient number of hands should be put on board to work the fleet as far as
Rhodes, or any other Turkish port of deposit, giving his formal guarantee, that
all such Turkish officers and men, who might wish to return to Egypt, should be
sent back thither when the ships should have reached their destination.
If Mehemet Ali should refuse to comply with this demand, Sir Robert
Stopford should have recourse to any measures of compulsion which he may think
within the extent of his power, and advisable, for the purpose of inducing the
Pasha to yield.
In such case, Sir Robert Stopford should begin with the mildest methods
of coercion, and should progressively increase the severity of the pressure, as
circumstances may require; and he should, in the last resort, take posses
sion of the Egyptian fleet, if he should be unable to obtain the acquiescence
of the Pasha without such a measure. If this should be done, Sir Robert
Stopford should send the ships so taken to Constantinople, to be kept by the
Sultan ; such parts of the crews as would not be wanted to navigate the ships to
Constantinople, should be landed immediately in Egypt, in exchange for such
portion of the crews of the Turkish ships as might be willing to go back to
Turkey : and the rest of the Egyptians, if they should not choose to enter into
the Turkish service, should be sent back to Egypt, when no longer wanted to
navigate the ships.
The capture of the Egyptian fleet ought not, however, to induce Sir Robert
Stopford to desist from exacting from Mehemet Ali the surrender of the Turkish
ships; and Sir Robert Stopford should continue to use measures of coercion to
produce that result : for which purpose he would be authorized to detain all
merchant ships sailing under the Egyptian flag. But Sir Robert Stopford
should recollect that Great Britain, not being a belligerent, he is not entitled to
interrupt the commerce of neutrals.
Sir Robert Stopford should have a discretionary power left him, to depart
from the letter of these instructions, provided he adheres to their spirit ; and he

239
should abstain from employing force as long as he may think it possible to
accomplish without it the object which he is to attain.
Similar instructions will be given to the French Admiral, with whom Sir
Robert Stopford should concert and co-operate. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 187.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, August 5, 1839-
I HAVE to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands that, in
addition to the instructions contained in my other letter of this day's date, a
further instruction should be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, stating,
that if, when he receives the above-mentioned instructions, circumstances should
have arisen to render the presence of the combined British and French fleets
immediately necessary at the Dardanelles, in the Sea of Marmora, or in the
Bosphorus, Sir Robert Stopford will, of course, postpone acting upon the other
instructions contained in my letter to your Lordships of this date, until after
the more pressing service shall have been accomplished ; and if, while Sir Robert
Stopford is carrying the other instruction of this date into execution, he should
find that either the occupation of Constantinople by a Russian force, or any other
circumstance, would render it inexpedient to send to Constantinople the Egyp
tian or the Turkish ships which he may obtain possession of at Alexandria, Sir
Robert Stopford, in such case, should be authorized to send such ships to be held
in safe deposit in any other Turkish port.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 188.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, August 5, 1839.
THE instructions for Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, contained in my other
letter of this day's date, have been framed in conjunction with the French
Charge d'Affaires ; but Baron de Bourqueney could not take upon himself the
responsibility of agreeing to them on behalf of his Government. Baron de
Bourqueney sent copies of them to Paris on Saturday evening, for the conside
ration of the French Government.
But I have settled with Baron Bourqueney that these instructions should be
sent by a messenger immediately to Earl Granville, with instructions to Earl
Granville to send on the messenger and the instructions to Malta, if the French
Government should agree to what is proposed, so that by such means several
days might be gained in the arrival of the instructions. If the French Govern
ment should object to any part of the instructions, and should wish for altera
tions, the messenger will in that case wait at Paris till the two Governments
shall have come to an understanding.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

240
No. 189.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord Foreign Office, August 5, 1839.
I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, copies of two letters which I
have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, containing instruc
tions for the guidance of the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron in
the Mediterranean, in the present state of the affairs in the Levant.
These instructions have been prepared by me, in concert with M. de
Bourqueney ; but M. de Bourqueney could not take upon himself the responsi
bility of agreeing to them on behalf of his Government. He sent copies of them,
however, *to Paris on Saturday evening, for the consideration of his Government;
and I have settled with him that these instructions should be sent immediately to
your Excellency, in order that you may send on the messenger and the instruc
tions, if the French Government should agree to what is proposed ; by which
means several days may be gained in the arrival of the instructions.
If the French Government should object to any part, and should wish for
alterations, then the messenger will wait at Paris till the two Governments shall
have come to an understanding.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 190.
Viscount Palmerston to Sir George Hamilton.
Sir, Foreign Office, August 6, 1839.
I HAVE received your despatch of July 24, reporting the substance of your
conversations with Baron Werther, upon the present state of affairs in the Levant ;
and I have to instruct you to express to that Minister the sincere gratification
which is felt by Her Majesty's Government in finding that the views and opinions
of the Cabinets of London and of Berlin upon the Affairs of the Levant are so
entirely the same ; and that the course of policy which it appears in the present
crisis to be so important for the Five Powers to pursue, will be supported by the
weight and authority of Prussia. Baron Werther will, no doubt, have already been
informed that the French Government is of opinion that the defeat of the Turkish
Army, the defection of the fleet, and the timidity of the Divan, ought to make no
alteration in the course which the Five Powers had intended to pursue before
those events were known : and you will state to Baron Werther, that in that
opinion Her Majesty's Government entirely concur.
Those unfortunate events cannot in any degree diminish the great interest
which Europe has in maintaining the Ottoman Empire in its integrity and inde
pendence as an essential element of the balance of power ; nor can those events
diminish in any sensible degree the means which the Five Powers, if united, must
necessarily have, of carrying into effect any arrangement which they may unani
mously agree upon as necessary for the accomplishment of the great objects which
they have in view. But those events, by rendering more apparent the dangers
to which the Ottoman Empire would be exposed, if left to itself, and by showing
more clearly the imminence of those dangers, afford additional proofs of the
necessity of union, vigour and promptness on the part of the Five Powers.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

241
No. 191.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 6.)
My Lord, Alexandria, July 17, 1839.
INCLOSED I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of two
despatches received by me from his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, together with
copy of my reply thereto, and which has been sent this day to Constantinople by
the same steamer which brought Viscount Ponsonby's despatch.
I have endeavoured to be as explanatory as possible in my despatch to Her
Majesty's Ambassador, and which consequently obviates the necessity of any
further observations on my part to your Lordship. I have &c.
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 191.
Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, Therapia, July 5, 1839.
ON the 3rd instant, the Representatives of the Five Great Powers were
invited to meet the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his house on the
Bosphorus. When they were assembled, his Excellency Nouri Effendi stated,
that the Sultan had commanded him to assure the Ministers, in his Highness's
name, of his esteem and friendship for the Sovereigns they represented, and his
warm desire to cultivate by every means the good understanding that existed
between the Ottoman Porte and their Governments.
His Excellency proceeded to say, he was commanded to make known to the
Ministers of his Allies and friends, that the Sultan being animated by the wish
to put an end to the calamities which press heavily upon his people, in conse
quence of the conduct of the Pasha of Egypt, and the anger it had excited in the
bosom of the late Sultan Mahmoud, had determined to send one of the eminent men
of his Court to offer the Egyptian Pasha pardon for the past, and assurance of favour
for the future (of which the Sultan sent a decoration as the mark and evidence),
and to promise that his Highness would confer upon the Pasha and his family
the hereditary Government of Egypt, to be held by the Pasha and his descen
dants as vassals, on the condition that Syria, &c, &c, should be immediately
restored to the Sultan.
Nouri Effendi asked the opinion of the Representatives, who replied, that
they would rejoice in the restoration of peace, and were warmly desirous of the
prosperity of his Highness ; that being uninstructed by their Governments, they
could not give any opiniqn as to the terms which the Sublime Porte was about
to propose to the Pasha, but they would not fail to report to their Governments
the communication they had received.
Questions were asked to ascertain precisely the nature of the proposal
intended to be made to the Pasha ; and it was distinctly understood, that the
Sultan would grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary Government of Egypt,
within the boundaries that were formerly the limits of that country ; that is, as
I understand it, the limit that used to circumscribe the country as a
Pashalic. It was asked if it was intended to leave Mehemet Ali in possession of
Syria, or of Mecca, or Medina, or of St. John d'Acre, and the reply was in the
negative. The Representatives thought it right to confine themselves to
inquiries directed solely to the perfect elucidation of what was stated to
them, and not to enter at all into the discussion of the merits of the
proposition. Nouri Effendi desired the Ministers to write to the Consuls of their
respective Governments, and the Ministers agreed to notify the facts, and what
had taken place, to the Consuls.
2 I

242

There were questions asked as to the state of the armies in Syria, and
Nouri Effendi said, that orders had been sent which would be received by
Hafiz Pasha in about ten days, peremptorily commanding him to refrain from
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

hostilities.

Indosure 2 in No. 191.
Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.
gjr Therapia, July 7, 1839.
I INCLOSE a letter which will inform you of what, has taken place. The
statement comes from Admiral Lalande, who was visited by the second in
command of the Ottoman fleet, Osman Bey, bearer of a message from Ahmed
Pasha. It seems Ahmed asserts that the Sultan was murdered by Hosrew, now
Grand Vizier, and Halil Pasha. That those persons intend to give up this
country to Russia ; that it is necessary to oblige the Sultan to appoint another
Ministry. The Capudan Pasha proposed to go to Candia, but as Admiral Lalande
pointed out to the messenger, Osman Bey, that Candia belonged to Mehemet
Ali, and to carry the Ottoman fleet there would be to deliver it up to that Pasha,
Osman seemed struck with the remark, and said the Capudan Pasha would go to
Rhodes. Admiral Lalande said he had no orders to interfere by force with the
movements of the Ottoman fleet. He has ordered a French brig of war to
observe the motions of that fleet.
The French Ambassador communicated the facts to the Sublime Porte, and
has assured the Sultan of the devotion of the French Government to the cause of
the Sultan, &c, &c. He has advised the Porte to send couriers in all haste to
Hafiz Pasha, and I believe he has advised that orders should be given for the
recall of the army back to this country. I shall give advice that the army be left
where it is, because that part of the Empire ought not to be exposed to become
the prey of Mehemet Ali.
The Ambassador has desired the French Consul-General to place befoue
Mehemet Ali the expediency of his remaining quiet, and to show him that
all the Great Powers must interfere in this crisis, and his part is to be
acquiescent. I have to beg of you to say, that the Pasha will do well to reflect
upon the inadequacy of his own means to resist the force of the United
Sovereigns, and that his wisdom will direct him to avoid the consequences that
may attend imprudence.
I have assured the Porte of the firm support of the British Government.
I have only the shortest time for writing, therefore I confine myself to the
principal facts. It is not easy to believe Ahmed Pasha has taken this step
(unless he be mad) without having some support somewhere, but as yet there
are no signs here of any disposition to make a disturbance ; I think the end may
be, that Ahmed Pasha will offer the fleet to Mehemet Ali. It is to be seen
whether or not he will be able to give it to him. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 191.
Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.
[See Inclosure 1 in No. 148.]

243
Inclosure 4 in No. 191.
Colonel Campbell to Viscomt Ponsonby i.
My Lord, Alexandria, July 16, 1839*
ON the morning of the 14th instant, I had the honour to receive your
Excellency's despatches of the 5th and 7th instant, which were sent to me by
M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General.
I soon after called on M. Cochelet, who I found had received. despatches, of
the same nature from Admiral Roussin, who had also sent a letter from Baron
Stiirmer to M. de Laurin ; but not any letter had come for Count Medem.
I then proposed to M. Cochelet, that as his instructions and mine, and
probably those of M. de Lau.rin, were similar, and as also the object and views of
Count Medem were identical, we should go collectively to wait on the Pasha to
give effect to our instructions; and the more so, as our Amhassadors had
collectively conferred with Nouri Effendi.
M. Cochelet thought it would be better for us to act separately, and wished
to go alone.
About 4 p.m. on the same day, a fleet of nineteen vessels of war came iu
wew, and as this could be no other than the fleet of the Capudan Pasha, I again
called on M. Cochelet to urge that we should wait on the Pasha, and should
have a communication with him before he could see the Capudan Pasha, who
could not possibly enter the port before the next morning (the 15th).
M. Cochelet was unwell and could not leave his house, but he was desirous
that 1 should call on the Pasha with my Colleagues of Austria and Russia, and
fix an audience for us and M. Cochelet together on the next morning.
I immediately called on M. de Laurin and Count Medem, and we proceeded
together to the palace, where we had a long conversation with Mehemet Ali, and
the substance of which is detailed in the Resume inclosed.
On the following, morning (15th), I went early to the palace, and found the
Pasha looking at the Turkish fleet* which was about six or seven miles off; whilst
his own fleet of eleven sail of the line, two large frigates, and a brig, which was
nearer shore and- to the westward, was standing towards the Turkish fleet.
The " Nile'' steamer was at the same time seen nearer shore, standing for
the port, with the Capudan Pasha's flag at the main, and the boat of the Capudan
Pasha, with his flags towing astern by the steamer.
The Pasha then asked me if I had any objection to defer my conference
and that of my Colleagues with him till the evening, as he must receive the
Capudan Pasha, and on my reply in the affirmative, he sent off a similar request
to my Colleagues. M. Cochelet, however, arrived, as the messenger was leaving
the room. I told my dragoman, whom I found at the palace, to remain, to report to
me the ceremony of the reception of the Capudan Pasha; and I have now the
honour to inclose his report thereof.
On the evening of yesterday (15th), my three Colleagues and myself waited
on Mehemet Ali (Boghos Bey and Artin Bey were present), and we remained
with him an hour and a quarter.
The whole of this conversation is given so fully in the Resume, that it leaves
me nothing to add, bufcto express my hopes that your Excellency will perceive
that I have endeavoured to carry into effect the desires expressed to me in your
despatches of the 5th and 7th instant.
It u clear that the enmity between Mehemet Ali and Hosrew Pasha is too
bitter to admit of any reconciliation ; and that Mehemet appears to feel that there
cannot be any security for him, or any good understanding between the Sultan
and him, so long as Hosrew Pasha is in power.
Whether the Pasha has had any understanding or previous concert with the
Capudan Pasha to induce him to the traitorous step which he has taken, I have
not been able to ascertain, but I think it very far from improbable; at any rate,
he was known to have been in correspondence with him, when it was sup
posed that he, Achmet Mushir Pasha, was coming here with proposals from the
2 12

244
late Sultan to Mehemet Pasha ; and besides, Achmet Pasha was known to be
hostile to Hosrew Pasha. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.
P. S. — The Captain of the Sultan's steamer which conveyed Akiff Effendi
from Constantinople, waited this morning upon the Capudan Pasha to ask his
orders, as he was to leave this day on his return. The Capudan Pasha replied, —
"' I have no orders to give you myself; you are only to follow those already
given to you. I did not come here as a rebel, but seeing that the true way to
save the empire was to come here, I have done so, as all the nation feels that the
counsels of Mehemet Ali, and not those of Hosrew Pasha, can restore the
Ottoman Empire."

Inclosure 5 in No. 191.

Resume succinct de deux entretiens qui ont eu lieu entre le Pacha d'Egypte et les
Consuls- Gener aux des Quatre Grandes Cours.
LE 14 JuiJlet, vers les 5 heures du soir, la flotte Turque avec le Capitan
Pacha a son bord, parut en vue d'Alexandrie. Sur cette nouvelle, les Consuls-
Generaux d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, et de Russie, se rendirent chez le Vice-Roi,
a. Feffet de Fexhorter a ne point se laisser aller a quelque mesure irreflechie, et
d'obtenir de la part de Son Altesse des promesses tranquillisantes sur sa conduite
future. M. le Consul-General de France ayant ete retenu chez lui par suite
d'une indisposition, avait charge ses Coliegues de porter egalement la parole en
son nom. Cette seance, au reste, ne devait etre que le prelude de la reunion
generale fixee au lendemain suivant.
Nous commencames par representer au Vice-Roi, combien les accusations
portees par Achmet Pacha contre Hosreff et Halil Pacha, dans le but de colorer et
justifier sa defection, et notamment les bruits repandus sur l'empoisonnement du
Sultan Mahmoud, etaient denues de fondement, et peu conformes avec les depo
sitions des medecins Europeens qui avaient traite Sa Hautesse durant le cours de
sa maladie. Passant en outre a, la situation actuelle des affaires, nous lui dimes que les
Representans des Grandes Puissances, dans le but d'eviter jusqu'au dernier
moment une intervention armee, et desirant la solution pacifique de la Question
Orientale, Fengageaient serieusement a s'arranger a l'amiable avec le Sultan ; que
deja Sa Hautesse venait de lui donner un temoignage eclatant de sa magnanimite,
en lui concedant l'heredite de FEgypte ; que c'etait maintenant au Pacha a faire
preuve de bonne volonte et de soumission envers son Souverain, et de hater le
denouement paisible de cette lutte. Qu'a cet effet le renvoi immediat de la
flotte serait le gage le plus palpable de sa loyaute.
Mehemet Ali nous repondit: — " Je ne pretends point disculper Achmet
Pacha ; ses allegations peuvent bien ne pas etre fondees, et je presume, en effet,
que tout ce qu'il m'avait eerit doit etre attribue plutot a la haine que lui inspire
Hosreff Pacha. Quant a la concession faite par le Sultan, je ne la considere
point comme un trait de generosite de sa part, mais comme un acte de necessite.
Tant que Hosreff Pacha sera a la tete des affaires, je dois me metier de toutes
ses assertions, et je ne puis compter sur une reconciliation franche. Je dois viser
en consequence au positif, et ne point me contenter de promesses et de sermens;
comment pourrais-je me tier a Hosreff qui est mon ennemi mortel ?"
Nous representames a Son Altesse qu'elle etait trop experimentee dans les
affaires pour se laisser duper ; que les promesses ecrites de son Souverain le
mettaient a l'abri de tous les artifices du Grand Vizir; qu'il etait de son intent
de ne point provoquer des desordres a Constantinople, qui pourraient naitre
facilement par la nouvelle de la perte de l'Armee Turque, de la defection de la
flotte, et de l'incertitude dans laquelle Fon se trouvait sur Fattitude du Vice-Roi.
Que le meilleur moyen de retablir la securite de la capitale, serait de restituer la
flotte a Sa Hautesse, et d'envoyer sans delai une personne a Constantinople
chargee de faire, en son nom, acte de soumission envers le Grand Seigneur, et
lui exprimer les vceux que Son Altesse pourrait nourrir. Qu' Achmet Pacha ayant

245
quitte les Dardanelles apres avoir recu I'ordre de se rendre avec sa flotte a Con
stantinople, avait commis un acte de haute trahison, et qu'il repugnait aux
Representans des Grandes Cours de croire, qu'en acceptant l'escadre des mains du
Capitan Pacha, il voulut se rendre son complice.
Ici le Pacha se l^cria vivement contre un pareil argument, alleguant qu'en
tems de guerre il etait bien permis de recevoir les deserteurs. Nous lui repon-
dhnes que la defection d'Achmet Pacha avait eu lieu apres I'expedition de la lettre
clu Grand Vizir qui annoncait Foubli du passe au nom du Sultan Abdoul Medjid,
l'envoi du Firman, et la concession de l'heredite pour FEgypte; que d'ailleurs le'
Vice-Roi avait envisage lui-meme la paix comme retablie, puisqu'il avait donne
ordre a son fils Ibrahim Pacha, des la reception de la lettre du Grand Vizir, de se
retirer avec ses troupes en-deca de l'Euphrate.
" Oui," repondit Mehemet Ali, " je ne suis plus en hostility avec le Sultan,
qui est, comme je vous Fai deja dit, innocent et pur comme un diamant ; mais je
suis en guerre avec ses Ministres, qui n'ont point ete nommes par la volonte de
la nation, et ont usurpe par des intrigues les premieres places du pays, et prd-
tendent maintenant dieter la loi."
A ces raisonnemens du Pacha, nous repliquames que selon la connaissance
que nous avions des hommes a Constantinople, Hosreff Pacha nous paraissait la
seule personne capable de dinger les affaires dans un moment aussi critique que
l'etait toujours le changement d'un regne en Turquie; que les vosux de la nation
n'y etaient pour rien ; qu'elle n'avait jamais ete consultee, et qu'en consequence,
il etait difficile de connaitre son opinion ; qu'il s'agissait avant tout d'imposer au
peuple dans un moment de crise, et qu'en general l'histoire de l'Empire Ottoman
nous offrait Fexemple que l'avenement au trone d'un Sultan ne s'etait jamais
opere sans secousse, sans effusion de sang, et sans un changement de Ministres.
La conversation roula encore assez longtems sur le caractere et les capacites
des differens hauts dignitaires de la Turquie, et sur les reviremens qui, selon
I'avis du Pacha, seraient favorables pour consolider le Gouvernement actuel.
Puis, ayant fait quelque tour dans la chambre, le Vice-Roi reprit : — "Mon inten
tion n'est point d'envoyer pour le moment un fonctionnaire a Constantinople
pour complimenter le Sultan sur son avenement au trone, mais je vous prie de
transmettre aux Representans des Quatre Grandes Puissances pres la Porte
Ottomane, la declaration suivante, savoir :
" Que dans deux jours, Akiff Effendi repartira pour Constantinople. II
sera porteur d'une lettre de felicitation et de soumission de ma part au nouveau
Sultan Abdoul Medjid. J'ecrirai egalement une lettre a Hosreff Pacha dans la
quelle je lui representerai : — 1°. Que feu le Sultan Mahmoud m'avait fait dans
le tems, par Fentremise de Sarim Effendi, des propositions bien plus avantageuses
que celles que Sa Hautesse m'u adressees aujourd'hui, puisqu'il m'avait propose
alors l'heredite de FEgypte de meme que celle de l'Eyalet de Seyda et du Sandjack
de Tripoli. 2°. Que dans les circonstances actuelles, je sollicite l'heredite de
FEgypte avec celle de la Syrie et de Candie, c'est-a-dire, de tout ce que je possede
maintenant, comme je l'avais annonce precedemment. 3°. Qu'a cette condition,
et si Fon veut agir de bonne foi envers moi, je serai le plus fideie des serviteurs
et des vassaux de Sa Hautesse, et je la defendrai quand et contre qui elle
voudra. " C'est dans ce sens que je me propose d'ecrire a, Constantinople. Je ne
ferai point mention dans ma lettre au Grand Vizir, de la flotte, par bienseance,
mais je vous prie de vouloir bien assurer, Messieurs les Ambassadeurs et Ministres,
que je n'ai jamais eu l'intention de la garder ou de m'en servir dans un but
hostile contre le Sultan; je m'engage au contraire, formellement a la restituer des
que mes propositions auront ete acceptees. Dans ce cas, tous les batimens com-
posant I'Escadre de Sa Hautesse jusqu'au dernier, seront renvoyes a Constanti
nople. Quant aux amiraux Ottomans, ceux qui craindraient de retourner en
Turquie, pourront rester en Egypte qui fait partie de la meme monarchic. Une
foisque le Sultan aura consenti amapriere, et que Hosreff Pacha aura ete eioigne
de la direction des affaires, je n'hesiterai pas sur la premiere invitation de Sa
Hautesse a me rendre a Constantinople, et ce ne sera pas avec I'Escadre que je
m'y transporterai, mais seul sur un bateau a vapeur, et dans le but unique de pre
senter en personne mes hommages a mon Souverain et lui offrir mes services.
" Enfin je vous declare, que si Fon n'agree pas mes propositions, je ne
ferai point la guerre, mais je me maintiendrai dans ma position actuelle, et
j'attendrai."

246
Ainsi se termina notre premiere conversation avec Mehemet Ali.
Notre seconde reunion, fixee d'abord au lendemain matin, fut remise ensuite.
a Fapres-midi, a cause du debarquement d' Achmet Pacha, qui fut; regu lememe
jour par le Vice-Roi. Deux heures avant le coucher du soleil, les quatre Consuls?
Generaux d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de France, et de Russie, se rendirent simul-
tanement chez le Pacha. Dans cet entretien, des tentatives furent renouvelees,
pour engager Mehemet Ali a se desister des a present de la flotte, et a la rendre:
a son legitime proprietaire ; mais cette fois encore nos representations furent: 'en;
pure perte.11 protesta de ses intentions conservatrices ; recapkula de nouveau la deck*
ration qu'il nous avait faite la veille ; y apporta quelque modification dans less
expressions, et s'efforca surtout a nous convaincre de la necessite de la chute de;
Hosreff Pacha.
II disait a. ce sujet : — " Aussi longtems que le Grand Vizir restera.en places,
il n'y aura pas de veritable raccommodement entre le Sultan et moi. Que.Sa,
Hautesse nomme Grand Vizir qui elle voudra, et je serai le premier a cooperer a.
la consolidation de son trone. Je ne brigue point pour moi ce poste, car je lea
refuserai si on me l'offrait, mais je desire ardemment l'eloignement d'un homme
qui est deteste par la nation entiere, et auquel tous les moyens sontbons pour"
arriver a son but, meme le fer et le poison. Tant que les Representans desi
Quatre Grands Cabinets soutiendront Hosreff Pacha, il pourra rester en place,,
mais le jour ou il ne jouira plus de leur protection, il tombera. Aujourd'hui, si:
la. tranquillite n'est point menacee a Constantinople, c'est graces a. Fappui des,
Grandes Puissances; que Hosreff se retire, et la tranquillite se maintiendra dans.
la. capitale sans leur cooperation. Je viens d'ecrire au Grand Vizir une lettre
particuliere, par laquelle je lui donne le conseil de quitter les affaires et de
demander sa demission. Cette lettre sera remise a Akiff Effendi, que j'expedie
demain pour Constantinople. Par le prochain bateau a vapeur Francais j'ecrirai
dans le meme sens a la sceur du Sultan Mahmoud, et la Valide Sultane, car en
leur envoyant mes lettres par Akiff Effendi, Hosreff Pacha serait homme a lea
soustraire." Avant. de quitter le Vice-Roi, il nous engagea de profiter du departi
pyroscaphe Ottoman pour Constantinople, afin de transmettre nos Rapports knos:
Ministres respectifs.

(Translation.)
Brief Summary of two Interviews which took place between the Pasha of Egypt*
and the Consuls- General of the Four Great Courts.
ON the 14th of July, towards 5 o'clock in the evening, the Turkish
fleet, with the Capudan Pasha on board, appeared in- sight of Alexandria.
Upon this being known, the Consuls-General of Austria, England, and
Rnssia repaired to the Viceroy, in order to exhort him not to allow
himself to adopt any inconsiderate measure, and to obtain from His
Highness some tranquillizing promises with respect to his future conduct.
The Consul-General of France, being kept at home by indisposition, had
requested his Colleagues to speak in his name. This meeting, moreover,
was only to be a prelude to the general meeting fixed for the ensuing
day. We began by representing to the Viceroy how groundless were the
accusations which, with the view of giving a colour to and justifying his
defection, Achmet Pasha had brought against Hosrew and Halil Pasha,
particularly the reports spread abroad respecting the poisoning of Sultan
Mahmoud, so little in conformity with the depositions of the European.
doctors who had attended His Highness during the course of his illness.
Passing then to the present position of affairs, we told him that the
Representatives of the Great Powers, with the view of avoiding armed
intervention to the last moment, and desiring the peaceable solution of the
Eastern Question, seriously entreated him to come tb an amicable
arrangement with the Sultan ; that His Highness had already given him
a' striking proof of his magnanimity by granting him the hereditary

247
Government of Egypt ; that it was now the Pasha's turn to give a proof
of goodwill and submission towards his Sovereign, and to accelerate the
peaceful solution of this struggle. That for this purpose the immediate
restitution of the fleet would be the most evident pledge of his good
faith. Mehemet Ali replied to us : "I do -not pretend to exculpate Achmet
Pasha ; his assertions may indeed not be well founded ; and I dare say
that all that he has written to me ought rather to be attributed to the
hatred with which Hosrew Pasha inspires him. As to the concession
made by the Sultan, I do not consider it as a mark of generosity on his
part, but as an act of necessity. As long as Hosrew Pasha shall be at the
head of affairs I must mistrust all his assertions, and I cannot reckon upon
a sincere reconciliation. I must therefore aim at something positive, and
not content myself with promises and oaths. How could I put faith in
Hosrew who is my mortal foe ?
We represented to His Highness, that he was too experienced in
business to allow himself to be duped ; that the written promises of the
Sultan sheltered him from the artifices of the Grand Vizier; that it was
his interest not to excite disorders at Constantinople, which might easily
spring up upon the news of the loss of the Turkish Army, of the defection
of the fleet, and of the uncertainty which was felt respecting the attitude
iff the Viceroy. That the best method of re-establishing the security of
the capital would be to restore the fleet to His Highness, to send to
Constantinople without delay some person, charged to make in his name
his submission to the Grand Signor, and to lay before him the wishes of
His Highness. That Achmet Pasha, having quitted the Dardanelles,
after having received the order to proceed with the fleet to Constantinople,
had committed an act of high treason ; and that the Representatives of
the Great Courts felt repugnance to believe that he was willing to make
himself an accomplice of the Capudan Pasha by accepting the fleet at his
hands. Here the Pasha loudly protested against such an argument, alleging
that, in time of war, it was permitted to receive deserters. We replied to
him, that the defection of Achmet Pasha had taken place after the
sending of the Grand Vizier's letter, which announced, in the name of the
Sultan Abdul Medjid, the oblivion of the past, the forwarding of the
firman, and the grant of the inheritance of Egypt ; that, moreover, the
Viceroy had himself looked upon peace as re-established, since he had
given orders to his son Ibrahim Pasha, upon the receipt of the Grand
Vizier's letter, to retire with his troops on this side of the Euphrates.
" Yes," answered Mehemet Ali, '' I am no longer in hostility with
the Sultan, who, as I have already told you, is innocent and pure as a
diamond; but I am at war with his Ministers, who have not been named
by the voice of the nation, and who by means of intrigues have usurped
the chief posts of the country, and now pretend to dictate the law."
To this reasoning of the Pasha, we replied, that according to the
Tcnowledge which we possessed of persons at Constantinople, Hosrew
Pasha appeared to us to be the only man capable of directing affairs at
such a critical moment as a change of reign in Turkey always was ;
that the wishes of the nation went for nothing in this ; that it had never been
consulted, and that therefore it was difficult to know its opinion ; that above
all things it was important to overawe the people at a critical moment ;
and that the history of the Ottoman Empire in general, afforded us an
example, that the accession of a Sultan to the throne had never taken
place without a shock, without shedding of blood, and without a change
of Ministry. The conversation turned for some time longer upon the character
and the capacity of the different great dignitaries of Turkey, and upon
the changes which, according to the Pasha, would be favourable to the
consolidation of the present Government. Then having taken a few
turns up and down the room, the Viceroy proceeded:— "It is not my
intention for the present to send an officer to Constantinople to compli
ment the Sultan on his accession to the throne, but I beg you to transmit

248
to the Representatives of the Four Great Powers at the Ottoman Porte,
the following declaration, namely: —
" That in two days Akiff Effendi will set out again for Constan
tinople. He will be the bearer of a letter of congratulation and of sub
mission from me, to the new Sultan Abdul Medjid. I shall also write a
letter to Hosrew Pasha, in which I shall represent to him: — 1st. That
the late Sultan Mahmoud made to me at one time, through the medium
of Sarim Effendi, much more advantageous proposals than those which
His Highness has now addressed to me, since he then proposed to me
the hereditary Government of Egypt, as well as that of the district of
Seyda, and of the Sandjack of Tripoli. 2ndly. That, under present cir
cumstances, I ask for the hereditary Government of Egypt, with that of
Syria and of Candia, that is to say, of all that I now possess, as I had
previously announced. 3rdly. That on this condition, if I am treated
with good faith, I will be the most faithful of the servants and vassals of
His Highness, and I will defend him whenever and against whomsoever
he may wish.
" It is in this sense that I propose to write to Constantinople. I
shall not mention the fleet in my letter to the Grand Vizier, from a feeling
of propriety, but I beg you to have the goodness to assure the Ambassadors
and Ministers, that I have never had the intention of keeping it, or of
making use of it for a hostile purpose against the Sultan ; on the con
trary, I formally engage to restore it, the moment my proposals shall
have been accepted. In this case, all the vessels composing the squadron
of His Highness, to the very last, shall be sent back to Constantinople.
As for the Ottoman Admirals, those who may fear to return to Turkey,
may remain in Egypt, which forms a part of the same monarchy. If
once the Sultan agrees to my prayer, and Hosrew Pasha shall have been
removed from the direction of affairs, I shall not hesitate to proceed to
Constantinople on the first invitation of His Highness, and it will not be
with the squadron that I shall go thither, but alone in a steamer, and
with the sole object of presenting my homage in person to my Sovereign
and offering him my services.
" Finally I declare to you, that if my proposals are not accepted, I
will not make war, but I will maintain myself in my present position, and
I will wait."
Thus ended our first conversation with Mehemet Ali.
Our second meeting, fixed in the first instance for the ensuing
morning, was afterwards put off to the afternoon, on account of the
landing of Achmet Pasha, who was received the same day by the Viceroy.
Two hours before sunset, the Four Consuls-General of Austria, England,
France, and Russia, proceeded simultaneously to the Pasha. In this
interview renewed endeavours were made to induce Mehemet Ali to
give up the fleet forthwith, and to restore it to its lawful owner; but
here, again, our representations were entirely thrown away.
He declared his conservative intentions ; recapitulated afresh the
declaration which he had made to us the evening before; modified in
some degree the expressions contained in it, and endeavoured above
all to convince us of the necessity for the fall of Hosrew Pasha.
On this subject he said, " As long as the Grand Vizier remains in
office, there will be no real reconciliation between the Sultan and me.
Let His Highness name whom he will Grand Vizier, and I will be the first
to co-operate for the consolidation of his throne. I do not aspire to that post
myself, for I should refuse it if it were offered to me ; but I ardently wish
for the removal of a man who is detested by the whole nation, and who
avails himself of any means, even the sword and poison, to attain his end.
So long as the Representatives of the Four Great Cabinets support
Hosrew Pasha, he may remain in office, but the day that he ceases to
enjoy their protection he will fall. If, at this moment, tranquillity is not
threatened at Constantinople, it is owing to the support of the Great
Powers. Let Hosrew retire, and tranquillity will be preserved in the
capital without their co-operation. I have just written a private letter to
the Grand Vizier, in which I advise him to retire from affairs, and to ten-

249
der his resignation. This letter will be given to Akiff Effendi, whom I
despatch to Constantinople to-morrow. By the next French steamer I
shall write to the same effect to the sister of Sultan Mahmoud, and the
Valide Sultana ; for, if I send them my letters by Akiff Effendi, Hosrew
Pasha is capable of withholding them.
Before leaving the Viceroy, he requested us to take advantage of the
departure of the Turkish steamer for Constantinople, to send our reports
to our respective Ministers.

Inclosure 6 in No. 191.
Detail of First Interview of the Capudan Pasha with Mehemet Ali.
(Translation.) ON the 14th of July, at 4 o'clock p.m., appeared the Sultan's fleet off
Alexandria, in number of nineteen sail.
On the 15th, at 9 o'clock a.m., the Egyptian steamer the "Nile"
entered the western harbour, having on board Mushir Achmet Pasha, the
Admiral of the said fleet. Immediately, Mehemet Ali's first Secretary, named
Houssein Pasha, was sent from the palace in the Pasha's own boat, to meet and
bring him on shore. When the " Nile" steamer anchored, Mushir Achmet
went into the boat, and immediately a salute of nineteen guns was fired by the
" Nile," which salute was repeated by the forts the moment he landed, when
he was received by the Pasha's civil officers of rank, and he rode upon the
Pasha's own horse ; and thus preceded by the said officers, cawasses, and
chiaushes, went to the Pasha's palace between two files of the troops that were
placed all the way. As soon as he entered the palace gate, Mehemet Ali walked
out of his room to meet him, when the Admiral seeing him, unbuckled his sword,
gave it to one of the officers behind him, and walked respectfully towards the
Viceroy, and bowed to the ground as if meaning to kiss his dress, while the
Viceroy embraced and kissed him, saying " Welcome, brother." After this,
they walked arm in arm into the Viceroy's room, all the officers following them.
They sat near each other on the middle of the sofa. The Capudan Pasha
then told his Highness that, for a long time past, it was his wish to have the
honour of seeing him. After coffee and pipes, the Viceroy dismissed all the
bystanders, and this was at half-past 9 o'clock ; when Sherif Aga, the
Capudan's Pasha's Kiaja, who was still within, walked up to the Viceroy, and,
kissing his feet, told him, " Now you are both together, with your leave I
retire," meaning that he had accomplished his object, and fulfilled his duty so
far. His Highness and the Capudan Pasha remained by themselves in the room
till half-past 10 o'clock, after which the Capudan Pasha walked out of the room
bare-footed, his own servant not being there to give him his shoes, and was
obliged to walk about twenty paces without shoes, until his servant brought
them, as well as his sword, upon which he went to the Mussappi Serai (the
palace for guests), accompanied in the same way as he had arrived. When he
entered the palace assigned to him, all the civil officers, as well as Houssein
Pasha, kissed his foot, and he asked them to take seats and gave them coffee,
telling them, " Thank God, my wishes to meet the Viceroy are accomplished,
and you may know that I have obtained his Highness's permission for the landing
of the Vice and the Rear Admirals."
With the Capudan Pasha ten officers landed, two of whom are Beys
(Colonels), and one is the brother of Osman Pasha, the Ex-Egyptian Admiral
who deserted to Constantinople more than five years ago.

2 K

250
No. 192:
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmenton.r— (Received August 6.)
My Lord, Alexandria, July 17, 1839.'
THE fleets of the Capudan Pasha and of Mehemet Ali are stiff cruizing*?
together in sight of Alexandria.
Yesterday morning, about sixty of the principal officers of the Sultan's
fleet came on shore, and were presented to Mehemet Ali by the Capudan
Pasha. Mehemet Ali addressed them and said, " My sons, from henceforward all
differences between Constantinople and Egypt must be removed from your hearts,
and we must consider ourselves as one entire body: Our Sovereign is a young
and pure jewel, and we must support him and aid our nation with all our hearts,
and all fidelity."
The officers expressed much satisfaction, and requested permission to adopt
the uniform worn by the Egyptian Navy, instead of their own (which is in the
Russian form), to which the Pasha replied, that they might do in that as appeared.
best to themselves. (Signed) 'PATRICK CAMPBELL.
No. 193.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount. Palmerston. — (Received August 6.)
My Lord,. Alexandria, July 17, 1839.
CAPTAIN CAILLIER, the Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, reached
Ibrahim Pasha on the 1st of July, near Aintab, and delivered to him the order
from Mehemet Ali to suspend the advance of his army.
Ibrahim Pasha then represented, that his actual position was not at all a
military one, and moreover, that he could not there procure forage for his
horses, on which Captain Caillier consented to his taking a position at
Marash. I have the honour to inclose translation of a letter from Ibrahim Pasha to
Mehemet Ali ; but since then Ibrahim Pasha has received the order to evacuate
the country to the east of the Euphrates, and he has in consequence withdrawn,
all his troops from Orfa and Bir, and has not now a single soldier beyond the
Euphrates. The late victory has been more complete than was at first supposed, and,
in fact, the Turkish Army of Hafiz Pasha no longer exists.
It is most certain that if Hafiz Pasha had gained the battle, the Turks in
Aleppo, in Damascus, and in the principal towns in Syria, had made their
arrangements to massacre all the Europeans and native Christians in Syria.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 193.
Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet AU.

Cara Bunar, le 19 Rebi-el-akhir, 1255.
(Traduction.) (ler Juillet, 1839.)
J'AI pris connaissance de la depeche que Votre Altesse m'a adressee le 5
Rebi-el-akhir, 1255 (17 Juin, 1839), par M. Caillier, Aide-de-camp de Son
Excellence le Maredial Soult, President du Conseil, et Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres de France.
Hafiz Pacha ayant envoye contre Antab Solyman Pacha de Marache, et

251
s'etant empare/de cette place, en y fesant bloquer notre garnison, j'ai attaque" le
12 Rebi-el-akhir (24 Juin), le gros de< l'Aimee Turque, et mes precedens
rappnrts x>nfr< rendu compte de cette affaire dont les r&sultats sont aujourd'hui
connus «le Votre Altesse.
. Elle mfordonne par sa depeche preeitee, de m'ari'&ter la on je me trouverais,
et dene pointavancer. Cependant les observations que je vais lui soumettre la
convaincront de la i necessite absolue ou je me suis vu de quitter mes positions et
de me dirigensur Marache.
1°. Le lieu ou je me trouvais etant a cinq ou six heures au-dela d'Antab,
et une autre portion de mon armee etant campee a Ouront pres de Nezib, en
gardant nos positions, nous aurions peri infailliblement par le manque de vivres.
Ainsi la nuit que M. FAide-de-camp s'est trouve aupres de moi, c'est avec mille
peines que Fon a pu fournir a chaque cavalier la demi ration pour sa monture ; et
si nous etions demeures jusqu'au lendemain, nos chevaux seraient restes a jeune.
Sur nos derrieres, Alep est la seule ville un peu voisine d'ou Fon pourrait tirer
des vivres, et elle est encore a une distance de quatre jours. Pour faire trans
porter des vivres d'Alep, il aurait fallu attendre dix jours : quatre pour Faller,
quatre pour le retour, un pour le chargement a Alep, et un pour le dechargement
au camp. Je n'avais d'ailleurs a ma disposition ni charrois ni betes de somme,
et il en eut fallu pour la subsistance de mon armee 7,000 a 8,000, qu'il m'etait
impossible de me procurer.
2°. Ainsi que Votre Altesse a pu le voir par les lettres re^es d'Adana, qui
lui ont ete transmises par le dernier courrier^ l'ennemi fesait des dispositions
pour marcher aussi par Koulek: on ignore encore s'il a opere ce mouvement ou
non; mais s'il vient a. Foperer, de la position ou je me trouvais il m'etait
impossible de Fatteindre ni a pied ni a cheval.
3°. Enfin, en retournant a Alep, j'aurais Fair (ce qui serait inoui) de reculer
apres la victoire, mes cotes resteraient decouvertes, et l'ennemi pourrait encore
nous inquieter, en repassant la frontiere avec un reste de troupes plus ou moins
dispose a revenir.
Marache et Ourfa etant bien fournis de vivres, il devenait indispensable pour
moi de les occuper, afin de faire ; subsister mon armee, sans compter que des que
•l'ennemi attaquera (Koulek, j'aurai de la l'avantage de pouvoir l'atteindre.
Tels sont les motifs qui m'ont absolument force d'occuper Marache et Ourfa.
J'ai fait part de toutes ces explications a M. FAide-de-camp, qui a pu juger par
lui-meme de Fetat des choses. J'ai l'honneur, &c,
(Signe') IBRAHIM. PACHA .

(Translation.)
Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet All
Cara-Bunar, 19th Rebi-.el-akhir, 1255.
(July 1, 1839.)
I HAVE -taken cognizance of the despatch which your Highness
addressed to me on the 5th of Rebi-el-akhir, 1255, (June 17, 1839,) by
M. Caillier, Aide-de-Camp of his Excellency Marshal Soult, President of
the Council, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
Hafiz Pasha having sent Solyman Pasha of Marash against Aintab,
and having made himself master of that place, by blockading our
garrison there, I attacked the main body of the Turkish Army on the
12th of Rebi-el-akhir (June 24), and my previous reports have given an
account of that affair, the results of which are at this time known to
your Highness.
Your Highness enjoins me, by your above-cited despatch, to halt
wherever I might be, and not to advance. The observations, however,
which I am about to lay before you, will convince you of the absolute
necessity in which I have found myself of leaving my positions, and
moving upon Marash.
1st. The place where I was, being five or six hours beyond Aintab,
and another part of my army being encamped at Ouront near Nezib, if
2 K2

252
we had retained our positions, we should have infallibly perished for
want of provisions. Thus the very night the Aide-de-Camp was with
me, it was with the greatest difficulty that each horseman could be
furnished with half a ration for his horse ; and if we had remained
until the following day, our horses would have fasted. In our rear,
Aleppo is the only town somewhat in the vicinity from whence provisions
could be drawn, and even that is four days distant. In order to trans
port provisions from Aleppo, we must have waited ten days ; four for
going, four for returning, one for loading at Aleppo, and one for unloading
in the camp. Moreover, I had neither cars nor beasts of burden at my
disposal, and for the subsistence of my army, from 7,000 to 8,000 of them
would have been required, which it was impossible for me to procure.
2dly. As your Excellency may have seen by the letters received from
Adana, which were forwarded to you by the last courier, the enemy made
preparations for marching also by Koulek : it is not yet known whether
or no he has executed that movement ; but if he should do so, it was
impossible for me, from the position in which I was, to reach him either
on foot or on horseback.
3rdly. Lastly, by returning to Aleppo, I should have the appearance
of retreating after a victory (which would be a thing never heard of),
my flanks would remain exposed, and the enemy might again disquiet us,
by repassing the frontier with a remnant of an army more or less inclined
to return. Marash and Orfa being well furnished with provisions, it became
indispensable for me to occupy them, in order to subsist my army,
not to mention, that so soon as the enemy shall attack Koulek, I
shall from thence have the advantage of being able to come up with him.
These are the reasons which have absolutely forced me to occupy
Marash and Orfa. I have communicated all these explanations to the
Aide-de-Camp, Avho has been able to judge for himself of the state of
affairs. I have, &c,
(Signed) IBRAHIM PASHA.

No. 194.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 6.)
My Lord, Alexandria, July 17, 1839.
WITH my official letters of 5th and 7th July, from Viscount Ponsonby, I
had also the honour to receive a letter, and as the matter of it is official,
and important at this moment, I have thought it my duty to send to your
Lordship a copy of that letter, as well as of my reply thereto.
The Pasha will not come to any terms so long as Hosrew Pasha remains in
power ; and he has written to him to demand his retirement from office ; and I
really cannot but think that this concession on the part of Hosrew Pasha is now
called for by circumstances.
The only army now in the Turkish Empire is that of Mehemet Ali, and the
Porte is also without a fleet. It is true that the want of those could easily be
remedied by the Great Powers; but it must be borne in mind as a certain fact,
that such is the influence of Mehemet Ali in the Turkish Empire, he could raise
up in his favour not only Constantinople, but every part of Turkey; and, if he
desired it, he could, by those means, overthrow Hosrew Pasha at his will.
These facts, and the actual crisis, are so important, that I have deemed it
proper, even at the risk of being thought presumptuous, to submit my opinions
to your Lordship, trusting to your goodness to excuse the liberty which I have
taken. I have &c.
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

253
Inclosure 1 in No. 194.
Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell
(Extract.) Therapia, July 5, 1839.
I THANK you for the intelligence contained in your last communication.
You will have been prepared by what I wrote to you, for the fatal termination of
the Sultan's illness. It is evident that the disease had existed many months, and
it is doubtful if a remedy could have been successfully applied later than in the
last Autumn. His life might have been prolonged had he been more taken care
of lately, but the mortal blow had been struck long ago. He was not aware,
himself, of his situation, and those about him were also ignorant of it, so that he
continued to do everything calculated to hasten a catastrophe. He went off at
last rapidly. It is astonishing how much and how generally he is lamented.
It is not when a man is dead, and no longer the dispenser of rewards
and punishments, that the voice of flattery is raised. It, therefore, is
reasonable to believe, that a man so lamented, was really esteemed when alive.
It is certainly the greatest loss the Rayahs could suffer. He always protected
them, and even at the expence of offending his own people. He had great
qualities derived from nature. He had great views for the country he governed,
but he stood alone, and could not find instruments to do the work well he
desired to have performed. No man was ever placed in more difficult circum
stances ; but I am entirely convinced he would have ultimately been successful
over all his enemies had he lived, and I do not except Mehemet Ali, although
there are reports here that Ibrahim has gained a victory, and Hafiz Pasha been
defeated, and I think such an event very probable.
There is most perfect tranquillity here, and a willing obedience given as yet
to the new Government, which is in fact entirely in the hands of Hosrew
Pasha, appointed Grand Vizier, with all the authority that formerly belonged to
that post. I send an official letter containing the report of what took place
at a meeting called by the Sublime Porte of the Representatives of the Five Great
Powers with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I left out one thing which I now
mention, namely, that if Mehemet Ali or his son choose to come here, the
Sultan will receive him with honour and courtesy.
I never believed that Mehemet Ali would act otherwise than he has done.
He must advance or he must fall. The European Powers will betray their own
interests if they suffer him to advance. The conclusion seems to me clear.
His power is a house of cards, and any of the Governments can destroy it with a
breath. He has been raised to importance by the want of knowledge of these
countries, and the erroneous system of policy that was its consequence. People
are grown wiser.

Inclosure 2 in No. 194.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) Alexandria, July 16, 1839.
MY official despatches will inform your Lordship of all that has been
arranged with the Pasha on the subject of your Lordship's despatches of 5th
and 7 th instant.
I fully concur in the opinion expressed in your Lordship's private commu
nication of the 5th, that the late Sultan was far before the age in which he lived;
and had his energies been better directed, he might have contributed more suc
cessfully towards the reconstruction of the Turkish Empire. But the feeling of
revenge towards Mehemet Ali that predominated in all his actions, has, I fear,
inflicted more evils on that Empire than many years of wise government can
remedy. It was scarcely to be expected that a man of strong feelings like Sultan
Mahmoud, could be brought to forget the humiliation to which he had been
exposed in his former contest with the Pasha of Egypt. The intense hold which

254
that sentiment had of his mind, can best be judged of by the declaration he had
made, that he would sooner become a vassal of Russia than relinquish the hope
of revenge. With such impressions, all attempts at reconciliation became fruit
less. But when your Lordship is in possession of the details of the battle of the
24th ultimo, and of what has taken place since, I think you will be of opinion
that the war had much more the character of a personal than a national quarrel.
And now that the hand of Providence has removed one of the causes, by which
so disastrous a struggle has been so long maintained, it would be the greatest
calamity that could befall the Turkish Empire, were the same rancorous spirit to
be transmitted, through Hosrew Pasha, to the new Sultan.
I will not venture to set up my own opinion against that of your Lordship,
as to the ultimate success of Sultan Mahmoud against Mehemet Ali; but
whatever might have been the result, one thing appears certain, that at the
present moment, the power of Mehemet Ali seems more than ever consolidated
by all the efforts that have been made to overthrow it.
Now, however, that all motives for jealousy have ceased at Constantinople,
(except, perhaps, in the breast of Hosrew Pasha, and a very few of his imme
diate adherents,) I trust your Lordship will pardon me for indulging a hope, that
you may be induced to bring the weight of your influence to the noble task of
accomplishing a reconciliation with Mehemet Ali, which, in my humble opinion,
is almost all that is required for the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire.
Mehemet Ali gave the first impulse to reform in Turkey. Under his adminis
tration, rapid progress has been made in civilization, in education, and in the
formation of an efficient army and navy. The recovery of the Holy Cities from
the Wahabees, and the heavy expence he has incurred to keep Arabia in subjec
tion, all these circumstances, which have rendered his name conspicuous among
Mahomedans, contribute a claim to some consideration for himself and family,
which he cannot be expected to forego in his present position. Indeed, it
may be said, that his ambition has always been to restore his nation to its
former power, and to place it in a situation to resist encroachments ; and
had Sultan Mahmoud taken advantage of that sentiment of amour-propre so
prominent in Mehemet Ali's character, and confided implicitly in his patriotic
views, he might have secured the cordial co-operation of the latter in every
national undertaking. Previous to the late contest, and ever since, .Mehemet
Ali has evinced so much deference for the will of the European Powers, that
there does not exist any good ground for suspecting him of views of agoxan-
dizement, beyond what he has already declared that he considers , his family
entitled to, for the services rendered by him to his nation; and if he ever enter
tained any such designs, be is fully aware that the Powers of Europe, who are
interested in maintaining the integrity of Turkey, would never support him in
them. The concessions expected by Mehemet Ali once secured to him, and a
Ministry appointed at Constantinople possessing the entire confidence of the
nation, there can be no doubt that the most beneficial results might be obtained
from his energy and enlightened views, in supporting the Government of Abdul
Medjid ; whilst by fomenting the spirit of animosity that has so long prevailed
in the counsels of the Porte, incalculable mischief may ensue, and the remaining
strength of Turkey may be wasted in civil war.
On the whole, my Lord, I trust that late events have placed the British
Government in a situation to give an immense impulse to the regeneration of
the Turkish Empire, and that your Lordship will have the merit of layino- the
foundation of this grand work.

No. 195.
Colonel Campbell to discount Palmerston. — (Received August 6.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, July 17, 1839.
COUNT LURDE, Secretary to the French Embassy at Constantinople,
and who arrived here from Paris a few days ago, called on the Pasha last njo-ht
to take leave, before going to Constantinople in the French steamer this day.
In the course of conversation, Count Lurde used strong expressions in

255
regard to the Capudan Pasha, whom he called a traitor; and Mehemet Ali replied
with considerable warmth, " That he would have been a traitor if he had given
up his fleet to Russia; but that it was to avoid that, that he had come to Alex
andria, as a faithful subject of the Sultan, and to unite with him for the service
of the Sultan, and forthe good of the Ottoman Empire."
Captain Walker, of the British Navy* who is serving on board the Capudan
Pasha's ship, has just called upon me, and told me, that when the fleet was out
of the Dardanelles, the Capudan Pasha received his commission by a steamer, and
orders to proceed to the Island of Rhodes, where he would receive ulterior
orders. The Capudan Pasha learnt from the Captain of the steamer, that Tahir Pasha
was at Rhodes with a commission to supersede him, and to return the fleet to
Cbnstantinople ; on which the Capudan Pasha assembled his officers; and told
them, that he was convinced that Hosrew Pasha and Halil Pasha wanted to give
up the fleet to Russia ; and that it would be better to remain outside, where
they could have the aid of the British and French fleets, and join Mehemet Ali ;
and Captam Walker says;, the whole of the officers of the fleet were of the
Capudan Pasha's opinion.

No. 19S..
Viscount Ptilmerstom to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Louds, Foreign Office, August 7, 1839.
I AM to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that a further
instruction be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, with reference and in
addition to the instructions last sent to him, in conformity with my letters to your
Lordships of the 5th instant.
Sir Robert Stopford is to be informed, that by accounts received from the
Mediterranean, subsequent to those upon which those last instructions were
founded, it appears that the Turkish fleet had not gone into the harbour of
Alexandria, as had been reported, but was at anchor outside, in conjunction with
the Egyptian squadron ; and consequently, that the Turkish fleet was still in the
power of its own officers, and not in the power of Mehemet Ali.
It appears further, that the Turkish officers had been ledtogo to Alexandria
by a mistaken notion which had been instilled into them by the Capudan Pasha,
that if the fleet returned to Constantinople, it would be given up to the Russians.
Sir Robert Stopford will, therefore, not only call upon Mehemet Ali to
deliver up the Turkish fleet, if it should be in any way under his controul, but
he will also enter into communication with the officers of the Turkish ships ; he
will explain to them the falseness of the pretence under which they have been
persuaded to fail in their duty towards their Sovereign ; and he will use every
argument to prevail upon them to return to their allegiance. He will point out
to them that the course which they have pursued is calculated to weaken and degrade
theTurkish Empire. He will represent to them that England and France have no
other object in these matters than to uphold the Sultan's authority, and to maintain
the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He will call upon the
Turkish officers to separate their ships from the Egyptian fleet, and to unite with
the British and French squadron in defence and support of the Sultan's authority ;
and he will make them understand, that any act of hostility against the Sultan,
on the part of the Egyptian or Turkish squadrons, either singly or united, would
be resisted to the utmost by the squadrons of the Allies.
Sir Robert Stopford will avoid any engagement with the Turkish and Egyp
tian fleets unless in self-defence ; because the object of the British Government
is to preserve the Ottoman Fleet, and not to destroy it ; and, therefore, Sir
Robert Stopford will not use force, unless he is so superior in strength as to put
resistance out of the question.
It would, however, be desirable that Sir Robert Stopford should, if he can
do it with safety to his ships, take up a position, pending the negotiations, so as
to cut off the communication between the port of Alexandria and the Turco-
Egyptian Fleet.
The great object of Her Majesty's Government being to persuade the

256
Turkish fleet to return to its allegiance, Sir Robert Stopford will not lightly give
up that object as unattainable, even if his first efforts to accomplish it by nego
tiation should be ineffectual ; and he will not hesitate to send a small vessel to
Constantinople, if he should think that any communication to be had with the
Turkish Government could lead to an amicable arrangement. But, pending the
negotiation, he will keep close to the Turkish fleet, and follow it wherever it may
go ; and he will endeavour to remain master of its movements. There could be
no objection to its going to any Turkish port outside the Dardanelles, even before
it should have made its submission to the Sultan, provided it were accompanied
into such port by the allied squadron.
Sir Robert Stopford, understanding from these instructions that the wish
of Her Majesty's Government is to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan, but
not to employ force towards that fleet, unless it should proceed to acts of hostility
against its sovereign, will use his discretion, according to circumstances, in
carrying the views of Her Majesty's Government into effect.
Sir Robert Stopford will observe, that the previous instructions of the 5th of
August were founded upon the supposition, that on his arrival at Alexandria he
would find the Turkish fleet within the power, and dependent on the will of
Mehemet Ali ; and therefore Sir Robert Stopford was ordered, in a certain con
tingency, to take possession of the Egyptian Fleet as a means of compelling
Mehemet Ali to surrender the Turkish ships. But if Sir Robert Stopford
should, upon arriving at Alexandria, find the Turkish ships outside the harbour,
and at the disposal of their own officers, and not dependent upon the will of
Mehemet Ali, then and in such case there would be no valid reason why Sir
Robert Stopford should commit any act of hostility against the Egyptian ships ;
and he will in such case consider as cancelled that part of his former instruction
which enjoins him in a particular contingency to take possession of the Egyptian
ships.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 197.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, , Foreign Office, August 7- 1839.
WITH reference to my despatch, of the 5th instant, I herewith trans
mit to your Excellency, a copy of a further letter which I have addressed to
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, containing additional instructions for
the guidance of the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron in the
Mediterranean. Your Excellency will communicate these instructions to the French
Government, and if they concur in them, you will send on the original instruc
tions, transmitted to you herewith, to the Mediterranean, together with the
former ones forwarded to you with my despatch of the 5th instant.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 198.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 7.)
My Lord, Paris, August 5, 1839.
MARSHAL SOULT read to me this morning despatches received
yesterday from Alexandria, containing a detailed report of two conferences
between the Pasha of Egypt and the Consuls of Austria, of France, of Great
Britain, and of Russia, relating chiefly to the restitution of the Ottoman fleet
to the Sultan.
"lour Lordship will have learnt from the paper of which Count Medem
allowed me to take a copy, and which I transmitted yesterday, that the efforts of

257
the Consuls to persuade Mehemet Ali to send back the Turkish fleet immedi
ately and unconditionally to Constantinople, were not successful ; and as you will
have received from Colonel Campbell his statement of what passed in the con
ferences, it is unnecessary for me to write what I may remember of the account
given of them by M. Cochelet. I must not, however, omit to mention, that the
French Consul is strongly impressed with the commanding position to which late
events have raised Mehemet Ali ; and is persuaded that the Viceroy, conscious of the
power he possesses, will not be induced to recede in any essential point from the
conditions of a reconciliation with his Sovereign, put forward in the communica
tion which he requested the Consuls at. Alexandria to address to the Represen
tatives of their respective Governments at Constantinople.
M. Cochelet states, that the Pasha has at this moment not less than sixty
vessels of war at his command, of which more than a third are ships of the line,
and that his army amounts to 200,000 men.
The Marshal read to me a letter from his Aide-de-camp, Captain Caillier,
reporting his conversations with Ibrahim Pasha, relative to the execution of the
orders, of which he was the bearer, from Mehemet Ali, to arrest the march of the
Egyptian Army wherever it might be, when those orders reached him. It appears
from this letter, that Ibrahim Pasha had determined, after his victory over Hafiz
Pasha, to send a part of his army as far as Koniah, and that he had directed Solyman
Bey to proceed with another corps to Malatia; the difficulty of finding provisions and
forage for his army in the Aleppo country, rendered Ibrahim Pasha very reluctant
to conform to his father's orders ; but Captain Caillier's representations induced
him to order the corps which was to have inarched upon Koniah, not to go
beyond the district of Marash, and to recall Solyman Bey, leaving only a small
force in Orfa and in Hir.
Admiral Roussin's last despatches from Constantinople contain little more,
Marshal Soult told me, than a relation of the ceremonies which took place at the
girding the Sultan with the sword of Osman.
Marshal Soult then asked me, if I had heard from your Lordship this
morning ; and upon my replying negatively to this question, he said, that
probably before the evening a courier would arrive with despatches, transmitting
to me copies of instructions which Her Majesty's Government proposed should be
given to the Admirals commanding the British and French fleets in the Levant ;
that he had just received a despatch from M. de Bourqueney informing him,
that, in a conference with your Lordship, at which Lord Minto assisted, you had
given him a copy of an instruction with a supplement, proposed to be sent to
Admiral Stopford, directing the measures to be taken by the combined fleet with
reference to the Ottoman fleet, which the Capudan Pasha had given up to
Mehemet Ali.
The Marshal then put this copy into my hands, observing to me, that the
question was one of most grave importance, inasmuch as the consequence of its
adoption might be the lighting up a general conflagration in the East. After
reading the proposed instructions, I said, that without doubt the measures pro
posed were of a vigorous character, but that timely vigour often tended to avert
danger and difficulties which a more timid policy might create.
He said, that he should immediately send off M. de Bourqueney's despatch
to the King at St. Cloud, and that its contents would afterwards be submitted
to the consideration of the Cabinet Council.
It was, however, evident from the tone of Marshal Soult's conversation, that
his first impression is not in favour of the adoption of the proposed instructions.
I have &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 199.
Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff. — (Communicated by M. de Kisseleff,
August 8.)
Monsieur, St.-Petersbourg, le^- Juillet, 1839.
PAR mon courier du 8 de ce mois, je vous ai communique la depeche de
Lord Palmerston, dont le Marquis de Clanricarde a ete charge de me remettre
copie, en retour de nos dernieres ouvertures relatives aux affaires d'Egypte.
2 L

258
Je vous ai prevenu, Monsieur, que je ne tarderai point a vons transmettre la
reponse que l'Empereur m'ordonnerait de faire a cette communication.
En m'acquittant aujourd'hui de ce devoir, je vous invite avant tout a exprimef
a Lord Palmerston combien l'Empereur se plait ii apprecier Faccueil amical que
le Ministere Anglais a fait k nos propositions du 3 Juin dernier, destinees a assurer
la paix du Levant, en renfermant Faction du Pacba d'Egypte dans un cercle qu'il
ne lui serait point permis de franchir sans se mettre en etat d'hostilite avec
l'Europe entiere.
Nous nous felicitons sincerement de voir que nos idees sur cette iinportante
question se soient entierement rencontres avec celles du Cabinet Anglais.
En effet, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Britannique a ete penetre comme
nous de 1'indispensable necessite d'aller d'abord au plus presse en maitrisant les
faits, c'est a -dire, en empechant que la lutte entre le Sultan et le Pacha d'Egypte
ne devint menacante pour la securite de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est a conjurer ce
danger qu'ont e'te diriges et nos efforts et les demarches decisives que FAngleterre
et la France ont jug6 necessaires de faire a Alexandrie.
Les remontrances que les Representans des Cabinets Allies ont ete appeles a
adresser k Mehemet Ali, ont pleinement repondu fi notre attente. Ibrahim Pacha
a recu I'ordre d'arr^ter la marche de ses troupes. Les hostilites ont ete sus-
pendues, graces a I'unanimite des efforts que les Cabinets de l'Europe out faits
pour les reprimer.
Ce premier resultat une fois obtenu, il restait aux Grandes Puissances une
tache non moins importante a remplir : celle de consolider desormais le repos de
l'Orient au moyen d'un arrangement pacirique entre la Porte ec le Pacha.
Nous partageons compietement I'opinion que Lord Palmerston a enoncee sur
la necessite d'un pareil accommodement. Vous savez deja, Monsieur, que notre
auguste Maitre s'est empresse de donner son assentiment aux bases de cette pacifi
cation, telles qu'elles avaient ete proposees d'abord par le Cabinet de Vienne. Elles
ne different pas essentiellement de celles projetees par le Ministere Anglais.
D'apres le plan du Prince Metternich, la Porte reprendrait possession de la
Syrie, soit du vivant de Mehemet Ali, soit apres sa mort. Selon I'opinion de
Lord Palmerston, la retrocession immediate de la Syrie serait consideree comme
la condition absolue de tout accommodement durable entre la Porte et FEgypte.
Pour notre part, nous n'hesiterons pas, Monsieur, a adherer a l'une ou a
l'autre de ces combinaisons, pourvu qu'elle ait ete librement adoptee par la Porte
elle-meme. Cette condition constitue a nos yeux la base de tout arrangement
auquel notre auguste Maitre serait appeie a. prendre part. C'est ici le seul point
ou nos opinions semblent differer de celles qui se trouvent exposees dans la
depeche de Lord Palmerston du 9 Juillet. D'apres la maniere de voir du
Ministere Anglais, " ce serait aux Cinq Puissances a. echanger d'abord leurs idees
sur Parrangement definitif a conolure entre la Turquie et FEgypte ; et ce serait a
la suite d'un pareil echange d'iXes, qu'on annoncerait aux deux parties I'opinion
des Cinq Cours par leurs Representans a Constantinople et a Alexandrie ; et Fon
finirait ainsi par vaincre la repugnance que l'une ou l'autre des deux parties
aurait pu manifester des Forigine, a. 1 'egard de Parrangement qui leur aurait ete"
propose." Ce plan d'action, qui etablirait une entiere parite entre le Sultan et le
Pacha, ne serait pas sans inconvenient a nos yeux, car il admettrait comme une
eventualite possible, que nous eussions a combattre et a vaincre une resistance qui
nous serait opposee de la part du Sultan, tandis que c'est uniquement en sa fiiveur
et de son aveu que pourrait legitimement s'exercer une intervention Europeenne,
destiuee a, raffennir Pexistence de FEmpire Ottoman.
Par consequent, pour rester entierement fideies au principe de conservation
qui fait la base de la politique des Cinq Grandes Puissances ;\ 1 'egard des affaires
de l'Orient, et pour ne point courir le risque de se trouver en contradiction avec
les vues du Gouvernement Ottoman, il nous, semblerait preferable de commencer
d'abord par nous assurer si le plan de pacification projete par les Cabinets Allies
est reel lenient de nature a obtenir F assentiment du Sultan. Ce n'est qu'a pres
avoir acquis la certitude d'une adhesion complete et spontauee de ce Souverain,
que les Cabinets de l'Europe pourraient proceder a s'entendre ulterieurement sur
les metres a adopter en commun,afiu d'imposerau Pacha d'Egypte les conditions
d'accoimnodement librement adopte par la Forte.
Telles sont les reflexions que nous a'.lions, commilniquer a Lord Palmerston,
en reponse a sa depeche du9 Juillet, lorsqu'une expedition de Constantinople, eu

259
date du ^~i' (dont je vous ai transmis le resume par mon dernier conrrier), est
venue nous annoncer les determinations que le Divan a juge necessaire de prendre
pour amener 1 'affaire d'Egypte a une solution prompte et decisive.
Ces determinations, dictees par un veritable esprit de conciliation et de
gagesse, simplifient de beaucoup la question que les Cabinets Allies avaient a
cceur de resoudre. Guidee par une juste appreciation de ses vrais intents, la
Porte est allee au-devant des propositions que les Cinq Puissances etaient a la
veille de lui faire. Elle a pris l'initiative des demarches qu'il s'agissait de faire
a Alexandrie. Elle a rdsolu d'offrir a Mehemet Ali l'heredite de FEgypte en
retour de la retrocession de la Syrie. Enfin, elle a reuni en conference les
Representans des Cabinets Allies, pour leur annoncer ces resolutions, et pour
reclamer leur appui moral en faveur des offres d'accommodement qu'elle vient
de faire au Pacha.
De cette maniere, la base de la negociation a ete posee par la Porte elle-
meme. C'est elle qui a spontanement ouvert la deliberation, et qui de fait en a
fixe le si^ge a Constantinople, la ou il convenait seul de mettre en discussion les
interets qui concernent directement le sort a venir de FEmpire Ottoman.
Aujourd'hui ou cette grave deliberation vient de s'ouvrir sous les plus
favorables auspices, de Faveu de la Porte, et avec le concours unanime des Repre
sentans des Cabinets Allies, nous devons attendre avec calme les reponses que
le Pacha fera aux propositions qu'il vient de recevoir de la part de la
Porte. Ici trois eventualites se presentent a notre esprit :
1°. Mehemet Ali peut acceder purement et simplement aux offres qui
lui ont ete faites; — en ce cas, toutes les difficultes s'applanissent d'elles-
memes. 2°. Mehemet Ali, sans rejeter absolument les termes de Parrangement
projete, peut essayer d'obtenir de la Porte des conditions plus favorables. En ce
cas, une negociation s'etablira a Constantinople entre les deux parties ; et ce
sera alors aux Representans des Cabinets Allies a interposer leurs bons offices,
toutes les fois que le Divan en reconnaitra Fopportunite ; enfin,
3°. Mehemet Ali peut se refuser obstinement a toute reconciliation avec la
Porte. Si, contre notre attente, cette derniere supposition venait a se realiser,
le Divan croirait devoir recourir a Fassistance des Representans Allies pour
reclamer leur appui, afin de vaincre la resistance du Pacha ; en ce cas. nous
reconnaitrions comme juste et comme necessaire que les Grandes Puissances
unissent leurs efforts pour contraindre le Pacha d'Egypte a souscrire a un
arrangement equitable, qui aura obtenu en meme tems et Faveu de la Porte et
le suffrage de toutes les Puissances de l'Europe.
Voila, Monsieur, la marche qui nous semble a la fois la plus simple et la
plus sure pour conduire a une conclusion satisfaisante le differend regrettable
qui depuis longtems met en danger la securite de l'Empire Ottoman, et tient en
suspens la paix de l'Europe.
L'Empereur vous charge, Monsieur, de porter a la connaissance du
Ministere Anglais Pensemble des considerations contenues dans la presente
dep^he. Vous voudrez bien en remettre copie a Lord Palmerston, en lui
expnmant l'espoir que les opinions de notre Cabinet, qu'enonce cette depeche,
seront accueillies par le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Britannique, avec la meme
satisfaction avec laquelle notre Auguste Maitre a daigne recevoir la communis
cation dont M. le Marquis de Clanricarde vient d'etre Forgane.
Recevez, &c,
(Signe) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)
Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff. — (Communicated by M. Kisseleff, Aug. 8.)
Sir, St. Petersburg, July -|f, 1839.
BY my messenger of the 8th of this month, I communicated to you
the despatch from Lord Palmerston, with a copy of which the Marquess of
Clanricarde was directed to furnish me, in reply to our late overtures on
the Affairs of Egypt. 2 L 2

260
I informed you, Sir, that I' should not delay to transmit to you the
reply which the Emperor might direct me to make to this communication.
In fulfilling this duty to-day, I have to request you in the first place
to express to Lord Palmerston how glad the Emperor is to acknowledge
the friendly reception given by the British Government to our propositions
of the 3d of June last, the object of which was to secure the peace of the
Levant, by confining the action of the Pasha of Egypt to limits which
he would not be allowed to pass without placing himself in a state of
hostility with all Europe.
We congratulate ourselves sincerely that our ideas on this important
question should have so completely coincided with those of the English
Cabinet. The Government of Her Britannic Majesty has in fact, as well as we
ourselves, been convinced of the indispensable necessity of applying
ourselves in the first instance to what was most urgent, by bringing
matters within our controul, that is to say, preventing the struggle
between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, from becoming dangerous to
the security of the Ottoman Empire. It is to avert this danger that
our efforts, as well as the decisive steps which England and France
have considered it necessary to take at Alexandria, have been directed.
The remonstrances which the Representatives of the Allied Cabinets
have been called upon to make to Mehemet Ali, have completely answered
our expectations. Ibrahim Pasha has received orders to stop the march
of his troops. Hostilities, thanks to the unanimity of the efforts made
by the Cabinets of Europe for their repression, have been suspended.
This primary object once attained, the Great Powers have still a task
of not less importance to perform : that of henceforth consolidating the
repose of the East by means of a pacific arrangement between the Porte
and the Pasha.
We entirely coincide in the opinion which Lord Palmerston has
pronounced as to the necessity of such an arrangement. You are
already aware, Sir, that our August Master hastened to give his assent to
the bases of this pacification as proposed in the first instance by the Court
of Vienna. They do not essentially differ from those contemplated by the
English Government. According to Prince Metternich's plan, the Porte
would resume possession of Syria, either during Mehemet Ali's life-time
or after his death. According to Lord Palmerston's opinion, the im
mediate giving up of Syria should be considered as the absolute condition
of any lasting arrangement between the Porte and Egypt.
As far as we are concerned, we shall not hesitate, Sir, to accede to
either one or the other of these combinations, provided it shall have been
freely adopted by the Porte itself. This condition forms in our opinion
the basis of any arrangement in which our August Master should be called
upon to take a part. This is the only point in which our opinions appear
to differ from those expressed in Lord Palmerston's despatch of the 9th
of July. According to the view taken of this matter by the British
Minister, " it would be for the Five Powers in the first instance to commu
nicate to each other their opinions with respect to the definitive arrange
ment to be concluded between Turkey and Egypt ; and it would be as a
consequence of such communication of ideas that the opinion of the Five
Powers would have to be announced to the two parties, by means of
their Representatives at Constantinople and at Alexandria ; and thus the
repugnance which either one or the other of the two parties might from
the commencement have evinced with regard to the arrangement which
might have been proposed to them, would finally be overcome."
This plan of action, which would establish an entire parity between
the Sultan and the Pasha, would not, according to our opinion, be without
inconveniences, inasmuch as it would admit as a possible contingency
that we should have to combat and conquer a resistance opposed to us
by the Sultan, whereas it is solely in his favour and with his consent;
that a European intervention, having for its object to strengthen the
existence of the Ottoman Empire, can legitimately take place.
In order, consequently, to remain true to the principle of conservation
which forms the basis of the policy of the Five Courts as regards the

261
Affairs of the East, and not to run the risk of finding ourselves opposed
to the views of the Ottoman Government, it would appear to us preferable
to commence, in the first place, by ascertaining whether the plan of pad-,
fication projected by the Allied Cabinets is really of a nature to obtain the
assent of the Sultan. It is not till after the Cabinets of Europe shall have
acquired the certainty of a complete and willing accession on the part of
that Sovereign, that they will be able to come to an ulterior understanding
as to the measures to be adopted in common, in order to impose upon the
Pasha of Egypt the conditions of arrangement freely agreed to by the Porte.
Such are the reflections which we were on the point of communicating
to Lord Palmerston in reply to his despatch of the 9th of July, when
despatches from Constantinople dated s4;',,^' (of which I sent you the
abstract by my last courier,) made us acquainted with the determination
which the Divan has thought it necessary to take in order to bring the
Egyptian affair to a speedy and decisive solution.
These determinations, dictated by a genuine spirit of conciliation
and wisdom, simplify greatly the question, the solution of which the
Allied Cabinets have at heart. The Porte, induced by a just appreciation
of its true interests, has anticipated the propositions which the Five
Powers were on the point of making to it. It has taken the lead in regard
to the steps which it was proposed to take at Alexandria. It has resolved to
offer to Mehemet Ali the inheritance of Egypt in return for the cession of
Syria. Finally it has called together in conference the Representatives of
the Allied Cabinets, for the purpose of announcing these resolutions to
them, and of requesting their moral support to the offers of arrangement
which it had made to the Pasha.
The basis of negotiation has thus been laid down by the Porte itself.
It has of its own accord opened the deliberation, and has virtually fixed
its locality at Constantinople, the only place where it was fitting that in
terests, having direct reference to the future fate of the Ottoman Empire,
should be discussed.
It is our duty, now that this important deliberation has been opened
nnder the most favourable auspices with the sanction of the Porte, and
with the unanimous consent of the Representatives of the Allied Powers,
calmly to await the replies which the Pasha shall make to the pro
positions which he has received on the part of the Porte.
Three possible contingencies here occur to us : —
1. Mehemet Ali may wholly and simply accede to the offers that have
been made to him : in that case all difficulties will of themselves be
removed. 2. Mehemet Ali may, without absolutely rejecting the terms of the
proposed arrangement, endeavour to obtain more favourable conditions
from the Porte. In this case, a negotiation between the two parties will
be opened at Constantinople ; and it will then be for the Representatives
of the Allied Cabinets to lend their good offices whenever the Divan
shall see occasion for them. Lastly —
3. Mehemet Ali may obstinately refuse all reconciliation with the
Porte. If, contrary to our expectation, this latter supposition should turn
out true, the Divan may consider itself justified in having recourse to the
Allied Representatives for support in order to overcome the resistance of
the Pasha ; in such case we should think it right and necessary that the
Great Powers should unite th; ir efforts to compel the Pasha of Egypt to
agree to an equitable arrangement, which shall have obtained at once
the sanction of the Porte as well as the concurrence of all the Powers
of Europe. This, Sir, is the course which to us appears to be the most simple and
the most certain to lead to a satisfactory termination of the unfortunate
difference which has for a long time placed the security of the Ottoman
Empire in danger, and has kept'the peace of Europe in suspense.
The Emperor directs you, Sir, to bring the whole of the considerations
embodied in this despatch to the knowledge of the English Government.
You will furnish' Lord Palmerston with a copy of the same, and you will
express a hope, that the opinions of our Cabinet contained in this despatch,
will be received by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty with the

262
same satisfaction with which our August Master has been pleased to
receive the communication of which the Marquess of Clanricarde was the
channel. Receive, &c,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 200.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 9.)
(Extract.) Vienna, July 30, 1839.
PRINCE METTERNICH'S last intelligence from Constantinople is of
the 17th instant. Nothing positive was then known there about the fleet. It
was in the neighbourhood of Rhodes, and a merchantman had brought the
report of its having been seen in company with the Egyptian fleet. This was
not credited, but much anxiety was felt upon the subject by the Turkish
Ministers. M. de Bouteneff had received a fresh instruction for transmission to Count
Medem, directing him to address himself again to Mehemet Ali, and renew to
him, in the Emperor's name, the menace, that if he overstepped the districts of
Orfa and Diarbekir, a Russian Army would enter Asia Minor to oppose him.

No. 201.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 9.)
My Lord, Vienna, July 30, 1839.
A LETTER of the 17th instant from Lord Ponsonby, informs me that
Nouri Effendi and his colleagues say, that it is fit the Porte should settle the
affairs of their country like Mussulmans, amongst each other, and avoid the
interference of the Europeans, for which reason, terms of a more agreeable
nature should be offered to Mehemet Ali. Your Lordship will have seen that
this distrust of the Christian Powers had been divined by Prince Metternich,
and that in the communication enjoined to the Internuncio, he has done his best
to counteract it. With a view to second his efforts, I have sent to Lord Pon
sonby copies of my declaration of the 27th of July, and of Prince Metternich's
answer, requesting his Lordship not to use them otherwise than confidentially,
and to give no copies until the step I have taken shall have been sanctioned by
Her Majesty's Government. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 202.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 9.)
(Extract.) Vienna, July 30, 1839.
ON the 27th, I sent my declaration to Prince Metternich, and on the
following day received his answer. Copies are inclosed.
There is but one word in my declaration which is not authorized by your
Lordship's despatch : it is that of reciprocity of declarations between all the
Powers. Being in the French note, and highly valuable in itself, I did not
hesitate to adopt it. The more nearly the steps taken by France and England
can coincide, the better.
P.S. — I annex copy of Count St. Aulaire's note and its inclosure.

263
Indosure 1 in No. 202.
Lord Beauvale to Prince Metternich. Vienna, July 27, 1839.
THE Austrian Ambassador in London having communicated to Her
Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a despatch from his Highness
the Chancellor of Court and State, wherein the principles which direct the
counsels and determine the conduct of Austria in the affairs of Turkey, are
laid down, the British Government feels itself called upon to notify its perfect
adhesion to the views and intentions therein enounced.
The Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, has, in
consequence, been empowered to declare, and does declare in the name of his
Court, that it is determined to maintain the integrity and independence of the
Turkish Empire under the present dynasty ; and as a necessary consequence of
such determination, that it will not seek to profit by the present state of
things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory or any exclusive
influence. The British Government confidently anticipates, that this declaration will
be reciprocated by the other European Courts, its friends and allies, which have
already given proofs of the wisdom and disinterestedness of their views on the
present occasion, and in the first instance, by that of His Imperial and Royal
Apostolic Majesty, to which the honour of having originated this proposition

belongs.

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 202.
Prince Metternich to Lord Beauvale.

Vienne, ce 28 Juillet, 1839.
LE Soussigne a l'honneur d'accuser a son Excellence my Lord Beauvale,
la reception de l'office qu'il lui a adresse en date d'hier.
L'Empereur, dans les instructions qu'il a fait adresser le S de ce mois a son
Ambassadeur pres Sa Majeste Britannique, a developpe avec une entiere franchise
les principcs qui ont invariablement guide sa politique a Fegard de la Porte
Ottomane, et qui continueront a lui servir de rigle. En donnant si explicite-
ment son plein assentiment a ces principes, le Gouvernement Britannique repond
non seulement aux vceux, mais egalement a 1'attente de Sa Majeste Imperiale.
Convaincu que Fheureuse identite de vues dont ont fait preuve, dans la presente
crise, les Puissances qui, par une saine politique, sont le plus directement
appelees a influer sur les destin6es de l'Empire Ottoman, offre le moyen le plus
efficace d'en assurer la conservation, le Cabinet Imperial a accueilli avec une bien
vive satisfaction, l'assurance, qu'a Fegard de cette question, l'une des plus graves
du jour, il existe une parfaite uniformite de principes entre lui et le Cabinet
Britannique. I$^§& >
Le Soussigne a l'honneur d'inviter son Excellence my Lord Beauvale "a
vouloir bien porter cette assurance a la connaissance de sa Cour, et il le prie en
meme tems, d'agieer pour lui celle de sa haute consideration.
(Signe) METTERNICH.

(Translation.)
Prince Metternich to Lord Beauvale. 'X
Vienna, July 28, 1839.
THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge to his Excellency, Lord
Beauvale, the receipt of the Note which he yesterday addre sed to him.
The Emperor has explained with the matt perfect frankness, in the instruc-

264
tions which he addressed on the 3rd instant to his Ambassador at the Court of
Her Britannic Majesty, the principles which have invariably guided his policy
with regard to the Ottoman Porte, and which will continue to regulate his
conduct. The British Government, in so explicitly giving its full assent to these
principles, has not only responded to the wishes, but likewise to the expectations
of His Imperial Majesty. Convinced that the fortunate identity of views,
manifested at the present crisis by the Powers who, in accordance with sound
policy, are chiefly called upon to exerciee an influence on the destinies of the
Ottoman Empire, offers the most effectual means for ensuring its pre
servation, the Imperial Cabinet has received with very lively satisfaction the
assurance that, with regard to this question, one of the most important questions
of the day, a perfect uniformity of principle exists between themselves and the
British Cabinet.
The Undersigned has the honour to request Lord Beauvale, to have the
goodness to bring this assurance to the knowledge of his Court, and he, at the
same time, requests him to accept the assurance of his high consideration.
(Signed) METTERNICH-

Inclosure 3 in No. 202.
Count St. Aulaire to Prince Metternich.

Vienne, le 23 Juillet, 1 839.
L'AMBASSADEUR du Roi des Francais a recu I'ordre de communiquer
a Son Altesse Monsieur le Chancelier de Cour et d'Etat, la depeche dont
ci-joint copie.
En declarant qu'il veut Fintegrite et Findependance de l'Empire Ottoman
sous la dynastie actuellement regnante, et qu'il est dispose a faire usage de ses
moyens d'action et d'influence pour assurer le maintien de cet element si neces
saire de l'equilibre politique, le Gouvernement du Roi ne fait qu'adherer aux
sentimens exprimes si souvent, et recemment encore dans des termes egalement
precis, au nom de Sa Majeste Imperiale et Royale.
Mais il a juge que les circonstances actuelles donneraient de Futilite a. la
manifestation ecrite et reciproque de ces sentimens de toutes les Puissances, et il
a voulu, pour sa part, s'acquitter de ce devoir sans perdre un jour.
(Signe) ST. AULAIRE.

(Translation.)
Count St, Aulaire to Prince Metternich. Vienna, July 23, 1839.
THE Ambassador of the King of the French has received instructions to
communicate to His Highness the Chancellor of Court and State, the despatch
of which a copy is hereunto annexed.
The Government of the King, in declaring that it wishes the integrity and
independence of the Ottoman Empire under the actually reigning dynasty, and
that it is ready to use its means of action and influence, for the purpose of
ensuring the maintenance of this indispensable element of the political balance,
only announces its adherence to the principles so often already expressed, and
again recently expressed in terms equally precise, in the name of His Imperial
and Royal Majesty.
But the Government of the King has thought, that the actually existing
circumstances would render useful a written and reciprocal manifestation of this
sentiment, on the part of all the Powers, and it was anxious on its part to fulfil
this duty without losing a day. (Signed) ST. AULAIRE.

265
Inclosure 4 in No. 202.
The Due de Dalmatie to Count St. Aulaire.
Monsieur le Comte, Paris, le 17 Juillet, 1839.
DANS la crise si grave ou. la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, survenant au
milieu des evenemens qui ont marque les derniers mois de son regne, vient de
jeter l'Empire Ottoman, Funion des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe pouvait
seule offrir une garantie suffisante pour rassurer les amis de la paix. Des commu
nications ediangees depuis quelques semaines, ont heureusement prouv<5 que cette
union est aussi complete qu'il etait possible de le desirer. Tous les Cabinets
veulent Fintegrite et Findependance de la monarchic Ottomane sous la dynastie
actuellement regnante ; tous sont disposes a faire usage de leurs moyens d'action
et d'influence pour assurer le maintien de cet element si essentiel de l'equilibre
politique; et ils n'hesiteraient pas a se declarer contre une combinaison quel-
conque qui y porterait atteinte. Un pareil accord de sentimens et de resolutions
devant suffire, lorsque personne ne pourra plus en douter, non seulement pour
prevenir toute tentative contraire a ce grand interet, mais meme pour dissiper
des inquietudes dont la seule existence constitue un danger veritable, par suite
de Fagitation qu'elles jettent dans les esprits, le Gouvernement du Roi croit que
les Cabinets feraient quelque chose d'important pour l'affermissement de la paix,
en constatant dans des documens ecrits qu'ils se communiqueraient reciproque-
ment, et qui necessairement ne tarderaient pas a avoir une publicite plus ou moins
complete, I'expose des intentions que je viens de rappeler. En ce qui nous
concerne, Monsieur le Comte, je declare formellement que ce sont, que ce seront,
invariablement les notres, et je vous autorise a laisser a Monsieur de Metternich
une copie de la presente depeche, api^s lui en avoir donne lecture. Je ne doute
pas que le Gouvernement Autrichien, dans la reponse qu'il croira sans doute
devoir faire a la lettre par laquelle vous lui transmettrez cette depeche, n'adhere
de son cote, de la maniere la plus formelle, a. cette profession de foi, si parfaite-
ment conforme a l'expression souvent reproduite de sa politique. Si, comme
j'ai lieu d'esperer, les Cabinets de Londres, de Petersbourg, et de Berlin, repon-
. dent de meme aux communications semblables que je vais leur faire parvenir, le
but que se propose le Gouvernement du Roi se trouvera atteint.
Sa Majeste voulant donner un temoignage non equivoque des dispositions
dont elle est animee a l^gard de la Porte, m'a ordonne d'envoyer a Monsieur
PAmiral Roussin, sans attendre I'avis officiel, ni meme la confirmation directe
de la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, les lettres de creance qui l'accreditent aupres
du nouvel Empereur. Agreez, &c,
(Signe) DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)
The Due de Dalmatie to Count St. Aulaire.
Monsieur le Baron, Paris, July 17, 1839.
IN the very serious crisis into which the death of the Sultan Mahmoud,
occurring in the midst of the events which have characterized the last months
of his reign, has thrown the Ottoman Empire, the union of the Great Powers
of Europe could alone offer a guarantee sufficient to reassure the friends of
peace. The communications, which during a few weeks have been interchanged,
have happily proved that this union is as complete as it is possible to desire it.
AU the Cabinets wish for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman
Monarchy under the dynasty now reigning; all are disposed to employ their
means of action and of influence to ensure the maintenance of this essential
element of the political equilibrium ; and they would not hesitate to declare
themselves against any combination whatever which might impair it.
As such an agreement of sentiments and determinations must be sufficient,
when there can be no longer any doubt of it, not only to prevent any attempt
2M

266
being made at variance with this great interest, but even to dispel the uneasiness
of which the mere existence produces a real danger, by reason of the disquiet
•which it occasions in the public mind, His Majesty's Government considers that
the Cabinets would effect something important towards the settlement of peace,
by recording, in written documents, to be reciprocally communicated to each
other, and which necessarily would not be long before they acquired a publidty
more or less complete, the declaration of the intentions which I have just men
tioned. So far as we are concerned, M. le Baron, I formally declare, that such
are, and such will invariably be our intentions, and I authorize you to leave
with Prince Metternich a copy of this despatch after having read it to him. I
entertain no doubt that the Austrian Government, in the answer which it will
assuredly think it fitting to return to the letter, by which you will transmit to it
this despatch, will on its part adhere in the most formal manner to this profes
sion of faith, which is in such perfect conformity with its often repeated enun
ciation of its policy. If, as I have reason to hope, the Cabinets of London,
Petersburgh, and Berlin, reply in the same manner to the communications of a
like nature which I am about to forward to them, the object which His
Majesty's Government proposes to itself will be accomplished.
His Majesty being desirous of giving an unequivocal proof of the feelings
with which he is animated with respect to the Porte, has ordered me to send to
Admiral Roussin, without waiting for official intelligence, nor even for the direct
confirmation of the death of Sultan Mahmoud, the letters of credence accre
diting him to the new Emperor. Receive, &c,
(Signed) DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 203.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 9.)
My Lord, Vienna, July 30, 1839.
COUNT ST. AULAIRE informs me, that Prince Metternich has declined
to make common cause with France under certain circumstances in her demand
for the passage of the Dardanelles ; saying, that it would destroy his position
of the^'ws^e milieu, and consequently his means of usefulness. Count St. Aulaire
is apprehensive, that this will create much irritation in the French Government.
It will be desirable to calm this as much as possible. The demand, if not made
in concert with England, ought not to have been made at all ; but they committed
the additional error of announcing that I should be instructed to concur in it ;
they obtained a sort of promise under this expectation, and when it was falsified,
it of course turned against themselves.
I have reason to apprehend, that in consequence of this incident, the orders
to the Austrian squadron to place itself under the command of Sir Robert Stop
ford will be modified, and that it will preserve an independent position, leaning
in doubtful cases more to the British Admiral than the French one.
I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 204.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 9.)
(Extract.) Vienna, August 1, 1839.
I INCLOSE a series of queries which M. de St. Aulaire has sent to his
Court.

267

Inclosure in No. 204.
Queries addressed by Count St. Aulaire to his Government.
Egypte.
TOUTES les Puissances paraissent d'accord de laisser hereditairement
FEgypte a Mehemet Ali et a sa descendance. Candie.
LTle de Candie suivra-t-elle le sort de FEgypte?
Syrie.
1°. La Syrie suivra-t-elle le sort de FEgypte?
2°. La Syrie laissee viagerement a Mehemet, conform6ment a, Parrangement
de Kutahia, retournera-t-elle a la Porte, a la mort du possesseur actuel?
3°. Opererait-on un partage, provisoire ou definitif, de la Syrie entre le
Sultan et le Vice-Roi?
4°. Pourrait-on proposer, pour assurer ce partage, Poccupation temporaire
de quelque point de la cote par des troupes Franc aises et Anglaises?
Arabie.
Ibrahim conservera-t-il les Pachalics de la Mecque et de Medine? Memes
questions que pour la Syrie. Tribut.
Mehemet Ali et ses Successeurs restant vassaux de la Porte, on devra deter
miner la quotite du Tribut qu'il aura a, payer pour ses diverses possessions.
SoUVERAINETE DU SuLTAN.
Quels seront les droits de Souverainete que conservera le Sultan, soit dans
l'administration interieure, soit sur les forces de terre et de mer de son Vassal?
Mehemet Ali aura-t-il un Pavilion, le droit d'alliance, le droit de paix et de
guerre, le, droit de battre monnaie ? &c.
Possibilite d'assimilation aux Souverains des Regences barbaresques, tant
pour les questions ci-dessus que pour les questions relatives a, la suprematie reli-
gieuse du Sultan.
Necessite de regler la succession de Mehemet dans sa famille par un acte
qui serait de son vivant, du Viee-Roi, ratifie par la Porte.
Redigera-t-on en instrument authentique, les declarations des Puissances
sur leur volonte de maintenir Fintegrite et Findependance de l'Empire Ottoman?
Pour la garantie a donner par les Puissances a. la Convention conclue ou a
conclure entre le Sultan et Mehemet Ali, quelles formes devra-t-on adopter de
preference? La reconnaissance de la neutralite perpdtuelle et de l'inviolabilite de
l'Empire Ottoman, par rapport aux Puissances Europeennes, et vice-versd, ne
pourrait-elle pas suffire comme garantie, avec cet avantage qu'elle ne lierait pas
d'une maniere trop-genante vis-a-vis de la Porte?
Necessite que les Representans des Quatre Cours a Vienne, recoivent des in
structions assez detailiees, et des pleins-pouvoirs assez etendus, pour se pro-
noncer definitivement sur les points de la Question d'Oiient, et donner les
directions convenables a Constantinople et a Alexandrie.
Possibilite de maintenir virtuellement a Vienne la reunion diplomatique,
pendant le delai necessaire pour Fentier applanissement des difficultds actuelles,
et de celles qui naitraient de l'application des resolutions Europdennes.
2 M2

268
(Translation.)
Queries addressed by Count St. Aulaire to his Government.
Egypt.
ALL the Powers appear agreed to leave Egypt hereditarily to Mehemet
Ali and his descendants. Canoia.
Is the island of Candia to follow the fate of Egypt ?
Syria.
1 . Is Syria to follow the fate of Egypt ?
2. Is Syria, left for life to Mehemet in accordance with the arrangement
of Kutaya, to revert to the Porte on the death of its actual possessor ?
3. A division of Syria, either provisional or definitive, be made between
the Sultan and the Viceroy?
4. Might it be proposed, with a view to secure this partition, that some
point of the coast should be temporarily occupied by French and English troops?
Arabia.
Is Ibrahim to retain the Pashalics of Mecca and of Medina ? Same ques
tions as with respect to Syria. Tribute.
As Mehemet Ali and his successors are to remain vassals of the Porte, the
amount of the Tribute which he will have to pay for his various possessions
ought to be fixed. Sovereignty of the Sultan.
What are to be the rights of sovereignty which the Sultan is to retain, as
well with respect to the internal administration, as with respect to the military
and naval forces of his vassal ?
Is Mehemet Ali to have a flag, the right of forming alliances, the right of
peace and war, the right of coining ? &c.
The possibility of assimilating him to the rulers of the barbaresque Regen
cies, as well with respect to the above points, as to questions relative to the
religious supremacy of the Sultan.
Necessity of settling the succession of Mehemet Ali in his family by an Act,
which shall, during his, the Viceroy's life, be ratified by the Porte.
Are the declarations of the Powers, with respect to their intention to
maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, to be recorded
in an authentic document ?
What forms ought to be chosen for the guarantee to be given by the Powers
to tbe Convention concluded, or to be concluded, between the Sultan and
Mehemet Ali ?
Would not the acknowledgment of the perpetual neutrality and inviola
bility of the Ottoman Empire, as far as regards the European Powers, and vice
versd, be a sufficient guarantee, with this additional advantage, that it would
not bind the parties to the Porte in a too inconvenient manner ?
Necessity of furnishing the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna
with sufficiently detailed instructions, and with sufficiently extended powers, to
enable them to decide definitively on all points of the Oriental Question, and to
give suitable directions at Constantinople and Alexandria.
Possibility of virtually keeping assembled at Vienna the diplomatic meeting,

269
during the time which may be necessary for the entire removal of existing
difficulties, and of such difficulties as may arise from the carrying into effect of
the European resolutions.

No. 205.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 9.)
(Extract.) Vienna, August 1, 1839.
PRINCE METTERNICH'S latest accounts from Constantinople, assure
him that the Divan have determined to close with Mehemet Ali, and to make no
notification to the Representatives of the Christian Powers until peace is
concluded. From this the ambition of Mehemet Ali may save us. He now looks to
nothing less than being Sultan. The object of the Divan in this determination
was, to avoid the interference of the Christian Powers. In the same spirit, all
the Turkish Ambassadors at their Courts are to be recalled, and the Charges
d'Affaires re-established as before. Prince Metternich is well satisfied with Lord
Ponsonby and Admiral Roussin, who have recommended a reference to the
Christian Powers. He has sent a strict injunction to Baron Stunner to conform
to this course.
There are many rumours announcing revolt in other provinces of the
Turkish Empire. The Capudan Pasha is understood still to nourish the project
of returning to Constantinople, in order, in conjunction with other Pashas, to
change the Government. The position where his fleet was last seen, is supposed
to indicate an intention of going over to Mehemet Ali.
No. 206.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 9.)
My Lord, Vienna, August 1, 1839-
I HAVE now the honour to transmit copy of Prince Metternich's answer to
Count St. Aulaire's note of the 23rd ultimo. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 206.
Prince Metternich to Count St. Aulaire.

Vienne, le 24 Juillet, 1839.
LE Soussignd, &c, &c, a l'honneur d'accuser k son Excellence M. l'Ambas
sadeur de France, &c, la reception vde l'office qu'il lui a fait celui de lui adresser
hier, et il s'empresse d'y faire la reponse suivante :
L'Empereur ayant a cceur de s'expliquer en toute occasion avec une entiere
franchise sur ce qu'il croit pouvoir etre utile au maintien de la paix generale, et
ayant considere I'evenement du deces du Sultan Mahmoud comme pouvant faire
naitre des chances de perturbations graves dans l'Empire Ottoman, dont la
reaction ne tarderait pas a, se faire sentir bien au-dela des frontieres de cet Empire,
n'a point hesite a charger le Soussigne, au moment meme ou Sa Majeste Imperiale
a eu lieu de se convaincre que la vie de Sa Hautesse etait dans un danger immi
nent, de faire connaitre aux Cours de France, de Grande Bretagne, de Russie, et
de Prusse, sa ferme determination de suivre la ligne politique clairement definie
dans les points suivans :
1°. Sa Majeste Imperiale a declare qu'elle etait decidee a ne pas s'ecarter
de la resolution qu'elle avait prise, de vouer tous ses soins et ses efforts a, la con
servation intacte de l'Empire Ottoman sous la dynastie actuellement regnante, et
a vouer a ce but tous les moyens d'influence et d'action dont elle pourra disposei.

270

l'aUtOrite SOUVeiaillC UU ounan, cl a i iuivgn»v- «~ ^v,.. hiinpu w.
3°. Que l'Empereur desirait que les autres Puissances prissent une deter
mination semblable a celle qu'il venait d'enoncer, et qua cet effet, Sa Majeste"
Imperiale sera constamment prete a s'entendre avec elles, afin de s'assurer par
la franchise de leur concours, les moyens d'atteindre le but qu'elle se propose.
Rien ne saurait etre plus satisfaisant pour l'Empereur que Fentier assenti
ment du Cabinet Francais aux principes qui, dans une circonstance aussi riche
dans ses consequences possibles, servirait de regie a la conduite du Cabinet
Imperial. Le Soussigne prie M. l'Ambassadeur de vouloir bien transmettre cette
assurance a son Gouvernement, et il saisit, Sec. (Signd) METTERNICH.
(Translation.)
Prince Metternich to Count St. Aulaire. Vienna, July 24, 1839.
THE Undersigned, &c, &c, has the honour to acknowledge, to his
Excellency the Ambassador of France, &c, the receipt of the note which his
Excellency did him the honour to address to him yesterday, and he hastens to
return to it the following reply : —
The Emperor being anxious on all occasions to explain himself with the
most perfect frankness with respect to what he thinks may contribute towards
the maintenance of general peace, and considering the event of the death of the
Sultan Mahmoud, as calculated to give rise to the possibility of serious disturb
ances in the Ottoman Empire, the reaction of which would not fail to cause itself
to be felt far beyond the frontiers of that Empire, hesitated not to desire
the Undersigned, at the very moment when His Imperial Majesty had reason to
convince himself that the life of His Highness was in imminent peril, to make
the Courts of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia acquainted with his
firm resolve to follow the political course clearly laid down in the following
points : —
1st. His Imperial Majesty declared, that he was determined not to depart
from the resolution he had taken, of devoting all his care and efforts to preserve
the Ottoman Empire under the actually reigning dynasty inviolate, and to
devote to this object all the means of influence and action at his disposal.
2ndly. That it followed from this determination, that His Imperial Majesty
would declare himself against every combination which should endanger the
independence of the Sovereign authority of the Sultan, and the integrity of
his Empire. 3rdly. That the Emperor wished, that the other Powers should take a
determination similar to the one which he had announced, and that His Majesty
will be ever ready to come to an understanding with them on this matter, in
order to secure, by the sincerity of their co-operation, the means of attaining the
object he has in view. Nothing could be more satisfactory to the Emperor
than the entire assent of the French Cabinet to the principles which, on an
occasion so fruitful in possible consequences, would constitute a rule of conduct
for the Imperial Cabinet.
The Undersigned requests the Ambassador to have the goodness to transmit
this assurance to his Government, and he avails himself, &c,
(Signed) METTERNICH.

No. 207.
Lord Beauvale to discount Palmerston. — (Received August 9.)
(Extract.) Vienna, August 1, 1839.
I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich the substance of your Lord
ship's letter of 23rd July, and am happy to announce to you that he concurs in
the whole of your Lordship's views, and in the deductions to be drawn from

271
them. At the same time he is waiting for despatches, which he expects from
Russia, and therefore preached great prudence of conduct in the mean time.
I replied, that for two months we had been behindhand with events ; that, in
tending the integrity of the Turkish Empire, we were doing nothing to sup
port it ; that it would be much more difficult to restore it after it should
have been broken into, than to arrest events at the point where they now
stand; that the disposition of the Turkish Ministers to get rid of our assist
ance, and the tendency to revolt among the Pashas, required that we should show
ourselves in a more imposing attitude than we had hitherto taken ; that as an
application of these reasonings, I had reduced to writing the results which
naturally flow from the premises we had adopted in common ; and I put into his
hands the paper of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. As he read it he
agreed with every word, but said he could not sign it without Russia ; for that if
a collective step were taken at Constantinople to which M. de Bouteneff should
not be a party, the Turks would remark his absence, and it would do more harm
than good. He therefore proposed that the paper should be sent separately by
himself to M. de Stiirmer, and by M. de St. Aulaire and me to our colleagues
at Constantinople, in order that they might act upon it individually. I repre
sented the inadequacy of this course and its uncertainty; but perceiving a
doubt in his mind whether M. de St. Aulaire would concur in the step I had
proposed, I asked him whether I should carry from him an invitation to that
Ambassador to speak with him upon the subject in the morning. To this he
assented. I found M. de St. Aulaire a warm advocate of the plan, which he
considered himself as fully authorized to concur in by his instructions. What
I would suggest to my Government would be, that full powers and instructions
should be sent to M. de St. Aulaire and myself to sit down and treat either
five together, or four, or three. In these views M. de St. Aulaire concurs with
me, and will send the same recommendation to his Government.

Inclosure 1 in No. 207.
Project of a Declaration between the Powers, as proposed by
Lord Beauvale.
THE Powers, regarding the integrity of the Turkish Empire
as a necessary element in the balance of power in Europe, and considering any
attempt against that integrity as endangering the state of peace which they are
determined to maintain, will regard any Pasha who shall raise the standard of
revolt against his Sovereign, as committing an act of hostility against
themselves. As a consequence of this basis, and considering the negotiations between the
Porte and Mehemet Ali as having been imposed upon the former by a necessity
which it could not controul, the Powers have determined to take the
results of that negotiation (be they what they may) into consideration, with
reference to the principles established above, and will assign to them no value
whatever, except in as far as they shall be found conducive to the objects which
the Powers have in view, and which they will employ their utmost efforts to
attain.

Inclosure 2 in No. 207.
Project, as altered by M. de St. Aulaire.

THE Powers, regarding the integrity of the Turkish Empire as
a necessary element in the balance of power in Europe, and as a condition of the
state of peace which they are determined to maintain, will regard any attempt
against this integrity as an act of hostility against themselves.
As a consequence of this basis, and considering the negotiation between the
Porte and Mehemet Ali, as having been imposed upon the former by a necessity
¦which it could not controul, the Powers have determined to take the

272
results of that negotiation (be they what they may) into consideration, with
reference to the principles established above, and will assign to them no value
whatever, except in as far as they shall be found conducive to the objects which
the Powers have in view, and which they will employ their utmost efforts to
attain.

No. 208.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 9.)
(Extract.) Vienna, August 2, 1839.
PRINCE METTERNICH has just communicated to me a despatch from
Baron Werther, adhering entirely to the views of Austria, and assenting to the
negotiation here, provided it is agreed to by the other Powers.
M. de Bresson had made a declaration similar to those made at London
and here, inviting at the same time a reply from the Prussian Government.
Baron Werther, however, before acceding to this request, had referred it to
Vienna, to know what had been done here, intending to conform thereto.

No. 209.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 10.)
My Lord, Paris, August 8, 1839.
THE messenger Aspain arrived here at 1 o'clock yesterday, and
delivered to me your Lordship's despatches, of the 5th instant, with their
inclosures. Immediately on the receipt of them, I went to the Foreign Office and
communicated to Marshal Soult your despatch which directed me to
send on the messenger, provided the French Government agreed to the
proposal of Her Majesty's Government.
His Excellency had received on Monday last from M. de Bourqueney, copies
of the inclosures in that despatch ; and your Lordship will have learnt by the
report I made that day of the tenour of Marshal Soult's conversation, that the
French Government would, in all probability, object to giving to Admiral
Lalande, instructions similar to those which Her Majesty's Government propose
to send to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, for his guidance in the present state of
affairs in the Levant.
The objections, the Marshal told me, were fully stated in a despatch
addressed to M. de Bourqueney, which he read to me, and which had been sent
off on the previous evening to London, to be communicated to your Lordship.
His Excellency said, that he had written this despatch after the Council of
Ministers had maturely deliberated upon the subject to which it related ; and he
could not but believe, he added, that the accounts from Alexandria, which
reached London subsequently to the drawing up of the proposed instructions to
Sir Robert Stopford, would occasion some change in the view taken of this matter
by Her Majesty's Government. From those accounts, he said, it appeared that
hostilities had ceased between the Sultan and the Pasha, although the conditions
of peace had not been settled; and that Mehemet Ali had given orders to
Ibrahim Pasha to withdraw the Egyptian troops from the left side of the
Euphrates, and had declared, that even if the proposals made by him to the
Divan were not accepted, he would abstain from all aggressive movements, and
only maintain the possession of those countries which his troops now occupied.
The Marshal thought, that during this suspension of hostilities, it would be rash
and dangerous to have recourse to the extreme measure of firing upon the
Egyptian fleet to obtain the immediate restoration of the Turkish fleet.
The danger to be apprehended was, that Mehemet Ali, after the capture or
destruction of his fleet, after we had exhausted on an incidental point, our
means of pressure upon him, would not be restrained from pushing further his

273
victories by land, and exciting insurrection in Asia Minor, as well as in the
European dominions of the Sultan.
This, my Lord, is the substance of the grounds on which Marshal Soult
objected to adopt the instructions Her Majesty's Government proposed to give to
the Admirals in the Levant ; but there is no doubt that the decision of the
French Government on this question has been much strengthened by the well-
founded apprehension, that the destruction of the Egyptian fleet by France
would raise a clamour in this country, fatal to the existence of a Ministry under
whose orders it had been effected. I have Sec.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 210.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 12.)
My Lord, Paris, August 9, 1839.
THE messenger Cookes arrived here this morning soon after 10 o'clock,
and delivered to me your despatch of the 7th instant inclosing a copy of a letter
addressed by your Lordship to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,
containing instructions in addition to those of which I received a copy on
Wednesday last, for the guidance of the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's
squadron in the Mediterranean.
I lost not a moment in reading in translation to Marshal Soult, these
additional instructions, observing to him, that they were conformable to the
despatch which he had written to M. de Bourqueney, in reply to the communi
cation of the instructions which Her Majesty's Government proposed to send to
Sir Robert Stopford, upon first hearing that the Turkish fleet was in the power
of Mehemet Ali. The Marshal expressed his concurrence in my observation,
and appeared much pleased with the prospect of the French and British Admirals
acting under similar instructions. His Excellency said, that the Ministers were
to meet in Council at 2 o'clock ; and he requested me to leave with him a
copy of the instructions, in order that he might submit them to their considera
tion, and that he would call upon me after the Council, to inform me of the
result of their deliberations.
I have since received from the Marshal a copy of a telegraphic despatch
from IV] . de Bourqueney, stating that the English Cabinet withdraws its first
project of instructions, and will concert with the French Government fresh
instructions to be drawn up within the limits traced in Marshal Soult's despatch
to M. de Bourqueney, and also a note from his Excellency, deferring until 10
o'clock this evening his interview with me.
Marshal Soult, upon my proposing to him to delay by a telegraphic order
the departure of the steam-boat from Marseilles, said it was too late, but that
he would at the Council make arrangements with the Minister of Marine, for a
steam -vessel to be ready at Toulon for the conveyance of the despatches to the
British and French Admirals in the Levant. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.
P. S. — Marshal Soult called here this evening, and informed me that the
Cabinet Council had heard with much satisfaction the contents of your
Lordship's letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, but had deter
mined to wait M. de Bourqueney's report of his communication with your
Lordship on the subject, (which they expected to receive to-morrow,) before they
prepared their instructions for Admiral Lalande. G.

2 N

274

No. 211.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 14.)
My Lord, Paris, August 12, 1839.
I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches to the 9th of
August. Marshal Soult received this morning two short despatches from Admiral
Roussin, dated the 22nd of July, for the conveyance of which, the French
Ambassador writes that he had availed himself of the services of an English
courier. It is to be presumed, therefore, that your Lordship is already in
possession of the information they contain, which, in fact, amounts to little more
than that at that date, Constantinople was in a state of tranquillity; and that
Akiff Effendi had returned from Alexandria with Mehemet Ali's answer to the
proposition of peace made by the Sultan. The Ambassador states that in this
answer the Pasha professes perfect subini.ssion to the Sultan, and that he had had
coin stamped with the image of his Sovereign ; but he requires not only that the
hereditary government of Egypt, which had been offered to him, should be
conceded, but also the hereditary government of all ihe other Pashalics in his
possession. Admiral Roussin makes no mention of the further demand by
Mehemet Ali, that Hosrew Pasha should be dismissed from office, nor does he
give any account of the impression created in the Divan, by the Pasha's counter-
project of peace.
A telegraphic despatch was also received this morning from Marseilles, stating
the arrival of a steam-boat from the Levant, giving intelligence of the British
and French fleets being united near to Tenedos, and of the Turkish fleet having
entered the port of Alexandria.
Marshal Soult read to me a draft of instructions to Admiral Lalande, which
had been prepared, and which he purposed to submit to the consideration of the
Cabinet this evening. They are drawn up in the spirit of the additional
instruction to Sir Robert Stopford, contained in your letter of the 7th of August
to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
The Marshal also read to me M. de Bourqueney's report of a conversation
with your Lordship, in which you alluded to the disposition of the French
Government to acquiesce in conditions of an arrangement between Mehemet Ali
and the Sultan, more favourable to the Pasha than Her Majesty's Government
thought it expedient to concede.
His Excellency took this occasion of again assuring me, that the French
Government had really no desire to aggrandize the power of Mehemet Ali •
"but," said he, ' ' we cannot be blind to the necessite des faits. We acknowledge the
right of the Sultan, and we wish the restoration to him of all to which he is
entitled by that right; but if we insist upon the restitution of more than
Mehemet Ali will concede, we risk accelerating the crisis which we apprehend,
and producing that conflagration and general war among the Powers of Europe,
which they are all desirous to avert." T have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 212.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 12.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, August 3, 1839.
ON Wednesday last the French Ambassador called upon Count Nesselrode
to communicate a despatch from the Due de Dalmatie on the affairs of Turkey
similar to that of which your Lordship received a copy from M. de Bourqueney.
M. de Barante had a long conversation with the Vice-Chancellor upon the
subject of the despatch ; but he did not gather any intimation of what would be
the formal reply of the Russian Government to the communication which he
had made, and I do not believe that the answer has yet been drawn up, or de-
tei mined upon.

275
M. de Barante did not conceal from the Russian Minister, that his Govern
ment had instructed the French Ambassador at Constantinople to make a demand
for leave to pass the Dardanelles, and an offer of the services of the French
sqiuadron, to the Sultan, in case his Highness should require the assistance of any
European Power.

No. 213.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 12.)
(Extract.) Therapia, July 20, 1839.
I COMMUNICATED to the Grand Vizier the account of Achmet Pasha's
proceedings, as I received it in a letter from Captain Wakefield to Mr. Consul
Lander, which I inclose in copy. 1 took this opportunity to inform the Grand
Vizier, that some of the Ottoman Ministers had expressed an opinion that the
Porte ought to negotiate with Mehemet Ali directly, in order to avoid the
interference of the Great Powers. I asserted the impolicy of the opinion,
adding, that it could not be carried into effect with success by the Porte, because
the Great Powers were too directly interested in the arrangements to be made
between the Sublime Porte and Mehemet Ali, to permit them to be executed,
unless they were in unison with the general good. I said, that happily the
general good imperiously demanded from the Great Powers, that the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire should be maintained, and that the independence of the
Ottoman Government should be established upon solid bases. I inclose herewith
the Grand Vizier's answer.

Inclosure 1 in No. 213.
Captain Wakefield to Mr. Consul Lander.
"Rhadamanthus," Besika Bay,
Dear Sir, Tuesday, July 16, 1839.
I FORWARD the despatches by Mr. Ward.
We left the Turkish fleet 100 miles to the southward of Rhodes, steering
south, in company with the " Nile" Egyptian war-steamer. Sherif Aga had
been to Alexandria from the Capudan Pasha, and was sent back in the " Nile,"
as it was supposed in consequence of the Viceroy's having agreed to the terms
of the communication which had been offered by the Capudan Pasha. The
small Turkish steamer entered Alexandria as we came out.
The Capudan Pasha had twenty-two sail with him, eight of the line.
I IlclVC &c
(Signed) ARTHUR WAKEFIELD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 213.
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extrait.) Pe'ra, ce 19 Juillet, 1839-
J'AI l'honneur de rendre compte a votre Excellence de Fentrevue que je
viens d'avoir avec le Grand Vizir, et clans laquelle je lui ai dit exactement tout
ce que votre Excellence m'avait ordonne de lui faire savoir.
Son Altesse a appris avec le plus grand interet les nouvelles de la Flotte
Turque du 13 courant ; die est indignee de la conduite du Capitan Ahmed
Pacha. Le Grand Vizir, apres avoir longuement parie de la falalite qui a preside a
2 N 2

276
la nomination d'Ahmed Pacha comme Grand- Amiral, et de Hafiz Pacha comme
Generalissime, a tenu le langage suivant : —
"Son Excellence Lord Ponsonby nous assure que FAngleterre pren-
dra des mesures pour faire rendre la flotte au Sultan. J'espere en effet,
pour l'honneur des Gouvernemens justes et eclair£s, qu'ils ne souffriront
jamais le scandale qu'Ahmed Pacha vient de donner au monde, et que
FAngleterre surtout, contribuera puissamment a la restitution, a son maitre
legitime, d'une flotte dont Findigne chef croit pouvoir en disposer. Com
ment M. l'Ambassadeur peut-il croire qu'il ait passe par la tete a quelques
membres du Ministere Ottoman de faire un arrangement avec Mehemet Ali,
sans se concerter avec les Grandes Puissances ? — et que peuvent faire les Ministres
sans moi ? Vous savez, qu'a peine le Sultan Abdoul Medjid eut-il pris les renes
du Gouvernement, qu'il a exprime a Fegard de Mehemet Ali des sentimens
pleins de bienveillance que nous nous sommes empresses de porter a la connais
sance de MM. les Representans des Grandes Puissances.
" Api^s les mauvaises nouvelles arrivees de Farmee, j'ai donne a M.
l'Ambassadeur les assurances les plus positives, que quand mfime Ibrahim Pacha
serait venu a Scutari, nous ne donnerions pas a Mehemet Ali un pouce de
terrain, sans avoir consulte les Grandes Puissances. Je luiidtere mes assurances
a cet egard.
" Les detroits de la Mer Noire et des Dardanelles sont tres-rigoureusement
ferm^s a tons les batimens de guerre etrangers ; et les commandans des forts
de Fun et l'autre detroits ont ordre de tirer sur les batimens de guerre, de
quelque nation que ce soit, qui, plus de deux ou trois ensemble, voudraient forcer
le passage. Pour a present nous restons dans Pinaction, ce qui se combine avec
les conseils de Lord Ponsonby, jusqu'a ce que nous pourrons voir plus clair dans
cette question ; alors nous reflechirons serieusement sur la convenance de
demander, si cela devenait ndcessaire, la mediation des Grandes Puissances. En
attendant, je dirige tous mes efforts vers deux buts, savoir, de maintenir la tran
quillite publique, qui, grace a Dieu, ne laisse rien a desirer, et de rassembler
autant de forces qu'il est possible.
"Je vous prie, M Pisani, de faire savoir tout cela a M. l'Ambassadeur, avec
bien des complimens de ma part."

(Translation.)
M. Frederic Pisani io Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Pern, July 19, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to give an account to your Excellency of the interview
which I have just had with the Grand Vizier, and in which 1 told him exactly
everything which your Excellency had desired me to make known to him.
His Highness has learnt with the greatest interest the news respecting the
Turkish fleet of the 13th instant; he is indignant at the conduct of the
Capudan Ahmed Pasha.
The Grand Vizier, after having spoken at length of the fatality which had
presided over the nomination of Ahmed Pasha as High Admiral and of Hafiz
Pasha as Generalissimo, held the following language : —
" His Excellency Lord Ponsonby assures us, that England will take
measures to restore the fleet to the Sultan. I hope, in fact, for the honour of
the just and enlightened Governments, that they will never suffer the scandal
which Ahmed Pasha has just exhibited to the world, and that England above
all, will contribute powerfully to the restitution to its lawful owner, of a
fleet which the unworthy Commander thinks that he can dispose of.
How can the Ambassador believe that a design has entered into the head of
some of the Members of the Ottoman Ministry to make an arrangement with
Mehemet Ali without concerting with the Great Powers ? And what can the
Ministers do without me? You know, that the Sultan Abdul Medjid had
scarcely assumed the reins of government, when he expressed, with respect to
Mehemet Ali, sentiments full of benevolence, which we hastened to commu
nicate to the Representatives of the Great Powers.
After the arrival of the bad news from the army, I gave the Ambassador

277
the most positive assurances, that even if Ibrahim Pasha should come to
Scutari, we would not give to Mehemet Ali an inch of land, without having
consulted the Great Powers. I repeat to him my assurances in this respect.
" The straits of the Black Sea and of the Dardanelles are very rigorously
closed to all foreign ships of war ; and the Commandants of the forts of both
straits have orders to fire upon the ships of war, of whatever nation they may
be, who, being more than two or three together, should wish to force a passage.
For the present we remain inaotive, which agrees with the counsels of Lord
Ponsonby, until we shall be able to see more clearly in this question ; then we
shall reflect seriously on the expediency of asking, if that should become neces
sary, the mediation of the Great Powers. In the meanwhile, I direct all my
efforts towards two points, namely, to maintain public tranquillity, which, thank
God, leaves nothing to desire, and to collect as large a body of forces as
possible. " I beg you, M. Pisani, to make all this known to the Ambassador, with
many compliments on my part."

No. 214.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmeiston. — (Received August 12.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 20, 1839.
[ INCLOSE, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of a
despatch to me from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and my reply to it, based
upon the instructions Her Majesty's Government gave to the Admiral, and which
your Lordship communicated to me. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSON i

Inclosure 1 in No. 214.
Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.
" Princess Charlotte,'' off the South end of Cyprus,
My Lord, My 11, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with my arrival here
with the squadron under my command, in pursuance of a private intimation from
Lord Minto, signifying his desire for the. squadron to assemble in this neighbour
hood, and to await further orders.
As the accounts of the Sultan's death, and the defeat of his army, which
reached me this morning from Candia, and have been confirmed by the "Rhada
manthus," from Alexandria, may render it necessary for the squadron to take
up another position, I have to request your Excellency will be pleased to favour
me with such information for my further guidance, as you may judge fiF'to give
me under those altered circumstances. I have &c
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD,
Admiral.

Inclosure 2 in No. 214.
Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.
Sir, Therapia, July 19, 1839.
I HAD yesterday evening the honour to receive your despatch dated the
11th of July, 1839, to which I hasten to reply, that Her Majesty's instructions
to you appear to have provided for the case of the loss of a battle by the Sultan's
forces in Syria ; that they also provide for anything attempted to be done by

278
the Pasha of Egypt tending to prolong and aggravate hostilities ; and I do not see
anvthing (of which I have knowledge) that would induce alteration in the views
of "Government ; but there is one new event of which you no doubt will have
cognizance,— the union of Achmet Pasha with the Pasha of Egypt, — which, it is
to "be presumed from the report of Lieutenant Wakefield, has been settled.
1 think the spirit and the end of your instructions indicate that it would be
proper to consider the Ottoman fleet, thus removed from the authority of its
legitimate Sovereign by the rebellious act of the Capudan Pasha, as being thereby
subjected to the vigorous exertion of your power; and I think it would be right
to take all safe and proper means to prevent that fleet being delivered up to the
Pasha of Egypt, if there should be fortunately still time left for so doing; and I
am of opinion it will be equally advantageous and just to restore it to the Sultan.
I have stated my opinion in consequence of your desire, and I have only to
add that there is perfect tranquillity here. J have, &c.«
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 215.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 12.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 21, 1839.
COLONEL CAMPBELL will have reported to your Lordship, that the
Ottoman fleet is anchored with the Egyptian fleet off Alexandria, and that AkifF
Effendi, the bearer of the proposals made by the Sublime Porte to the Pasha of
Egypt, had left Egypt on his return to Constantinople ; I have to acquaint you
that he arrived here this day. I cannot tell you what answer he brought, but I
hope to do so by the Vienna post.
Your Lordship will have learnt from Colonel Campbell the professions of
loyalty made by Mehemet Ali, and I need not advert to the subject. I will
mention a possible occurrence, that the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets united may
come here ; I am satisfied they could not be opposed at the Dardanelles, with any
degree of vigour ; if they were to come, I think they might be submitted to here,
and the Sultan might be advised to disgrace his Ministers, and throw the admi
nistration of the Government into the hands of Achmet Pasha and the dependents
of Mehemet Ali.
Your Lordship will judge of the effect of such an event. 1 have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.
P. S. July 22. — I have received no intelligence from Colonel Campbell.

No. 216.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 12.)
(Extract.) Therapia, July 22, 1839.
I FORWARD reports I have this moment received from the Dragoman.

Inclosure 1 in No. 216.
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, Per a, ce 22 Juillet, 1839.
J'AI l'honneur de rendre compte a Votre Excellence de ce que je viens
d'apprendre des Mousteshars, Nouri Effendi et Sarim Effendi, apres le retour
d'Akiff Effendi, arrive hier d'Alexandrie.
Mehemet Ali versa des larmes lorsqu'Akiff Effendi lui parla de la mort du
Sultan Mahmoud. 11 fit faire ensuite, pendant trois jours, des rejouissances

279
pubFques pour ceiebrer Pavenement au trone du Sultan Abdoul Medjid; il fit
substituer le nom du nouveau Sultan a. celui du Sultan Mahmoud dans la Priere
solemnelle du Vendredi dans les Mosquees; il promit de faire battre monnaie
au coin d'Abdoul Medjid ; et il protesta de sa soumission au Sultan comme un de
ses fideles Vizirs, et de son devouement a la Porte, a laquelle il promet de rendre
par la suite de grands services. Mais Son Altesse demande en meme tems un
Berat qui eonfiere le gouvernement hereditaire dans sa famille, de toute FEgypte
et de toute la Syrie, enfin de tous les pays soumis aujourd'hui a son autorite.
Mehemet Ali a envoye a son fils Ibrahim Pacha I'ordre de se retirer sur le
terrain compris dans ses confins de la Syrie, et demande que la Porte retire
son armee en la faisant revenir sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate. Son Altesse
parle de venir a Constantinople pour faire ses hommages au Sultan, mais il y met
la condition sin'e qud non du Herat qu'il demande prealablement.
Akiff Effendi ayant dit a Mehemet Ali Pacha qu'il allait ecrire a son
Gouvernement pour lui eommuniquer les demandes de Son Altesse, le Pacha
lui conseillade venir a Constantinople pour en informer la Sublime Porte de
vive voix, et de retourner a. Alexandrie avec les instructions qu'elle lui aura
donnees. Mehemet Ali intercede en faveur du Capitan Achmet Pacha, et prie la
Porte de lui pardonner la demarche qu'il vient de faire en cedant a des craintes
imaginaires qu'il s'etait mises dans la tete.
La Porte va deliberer sur cette grande question de l'Orient.
9 a suis &c
(Signe) FREDERIC PISANI.

(Translation.)
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Pera, July 22, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency what I have just heard
. from the Moustechars, Nouri Effendi and Sarim Effendi, since the return of
Akiff Effendi, who arrived yesterday from Alexandria.
Mehemet Ali shed tears when Akiff Effendi spoke to him of the death of
Sultan Mahmoud. Subsequently he caused public rejoicings to be made during
three days, to celebrate the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne ; he
caused the name of the new Sultan to be substituted for that of Sultan
Mahmoud in the solemn prayer of the Friday in the Mosques ; he promised to
coin money with the die of Abdul Medjid ; and he made protestations of his
submission to the Sultan as one of his faithful Viziers, and of his devotion to the
Porte, to which he promises hereafter to render great services. But His
Highness, at the same time, demands a Berat, conferring upon his family the
hereditary Government of the whole of Egypt, and of the whole of Syria, in
short, of all the countries now subject to his authority.
Mehemet Ali has sent orders to his son Ibrahim Pasha to retire upon the
territory inc'uded within his limits of Syria, and he demands that the Porte
shall withdraw its army, by causing it to return upon the right bank of the
Euphrates. His Highness talks of coming to Constantinople to pay his homage
to the Sultan, but he attaches to his so doing the indispensable condition of the
Berat, which he demands in the first instance.
Akiff Effendi, having told Mehemet Ali Pasha, that he was ?hout to write
to his Government to communicate to it His Highness' demands, the Pasha
recommended him to come to Constantinople, in order to acquaint the Sublime
Porte therewith by word of mouth, and to return to Alexandria with the instruc
tions with which the Porte shall have furnished him.
Mehemet Ali makes intercession in favour of the Capudan Achmet Pasha,
and requests the Porte to pardon him the step he has taken in giving way to
imaginary apprehensions which he had got into his head.
The Porte is about to deliberate upon this Great Question of the East.
I am, &c,
(Signed) F. PISANI.

280
Inclosure 2 in No. 216.
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Ttra, ce 22 Juillet, 1839.
LA Porte est assez disposee a traiter avec Mehemet Ali sur les bases
suivantes, proposees, dit-elle, par le Prince de Metternich, et approuvees par le
Cabinet de St. James.
1°. Le Gouvernement de FEgypte donne hereditairement a Mehemet Ali.
2°. Le Gouvernement de toute la Syrie donne a Ibrahim Pacha.
3°. A la mort de Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pacha aura le G&uvernement de
FEgypte, et la Syrie rentrera de nouveau sous I'autorite immediate de la Porte,
comme cela etait autrefois. J'ai l'honneur, &c,
(Signe) FREDERIC PISANI.
(Translation.)
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Pera, July 22, 1839.
THE Porte is disposed to treat with Mehemet Ali on the following bases,
proposed, as it says, by Prince Metternich, and approved by the Cabinet of St.
James' : —
1st. The Government of Egypt given hereditarily to Mehemet Ali.
2ndly. The Government of the whole of Syria given to Ibrahim Pasha.
3rdly. At the death of Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pasha shall have the Govern
ment of Egypt, and Syria shall again come under the immediate authority of the
Porte, as was the case in former times. I have, &c,
(Signed) F. PISANI.

No. 217.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 12.)
My Lord, Alexandria, July 18, 1839.
I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch, of 25th June.
In reference to Earl Granville's despatch, of 15th June, your Lordship
will have known how unfounded are the reports of the occupation either of
Orfa, or of Bassora, by any Egyptian troops.
In regard to the expulsion from Mecca of two dignitaries appointed by the
Sultan to reside in the Sacred City, the facts are as explained in the inclosed paper
given to me by the Pasha.
Your Lordship will see by that paper, that the two dignitaries, Osman
Pasha and Sheriff, were sent by the Porte to Medina, in place of eunuchs, as had
ever been the custom, and that they have been busy in intrigues against Mehemet
Ali, and for which purpose, there is reason to suppose, they were sent by the
Porte. Those dignitaries are, however, still in their situations at Medina, from
which they have never been removed.
As to the seventeen persons who were brought from Medina to Cairo, they
were residents there, and not persons sent there in tbe employ of the Porte;
and they were dealt with, as would have been any turbulent subjects in other
parts of Mehemet Ali's Governments.
In regard to Viscount Ponsonby's despatch of May 22, it appears, either that
Nouri Effendi has been most grossly deceived, in regard to what was passing in
different districts of the Turkish Empire, or that he has desired to impose on Her

281
Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. And my despatches will have evinced
to your Lordship the groundlessness of many of the complaints urged by the
Porte, against Mehemet Ali. I have &c.
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 217.
Report of Mehemet Ali relative to Dignitaries of the Porte at Medina.
LES Arabes de Judeide ont tue le gendral, et voie les provisions de
bouche expediees de Medine au Nedj. Pendant qu'on travaillait a contenir et
a faire rentrer dans le devoir ces pillards, les differentes tribus qui habitent aux
environs de Medine se sont soulevees, et sont venues cerner la Ville Sainte. La
nuit qui suivit cette aggression, le Cheik-el-Harem, Osman Pacha, se trouvait
hors de Medine dans un jardin. Le Gouverneur de la ville s'empressa de le
faire prevenir de ce qui se passait et de Pengager a rentrer ; Osman Pacha refusa
de le faire. Le jour suivant, ce meme Osman Pacha voyant que, contrairement
a ses previsions, Medine allait resister, se rendit a la ville et dit au Gouverneur
qu'il n'etait pas besoin de preparer la defense et de faire faire des sorties aux
troupes ; que les Cheiks des tribus insurgees Fetaient venus voir la veille au soir;
qu'il se chargeait d'etre mediateur, et d'arranger les differends. Cette circon
stance fit bien comprendre qu' Osman Pacha etait d'intelligence avec les
revokes. En second lieu, Feyssol-ebn-el-Turki avait fait porter par son frere a,
Kourchid Pacha, General-en-Chef de l'Armee du Nedj, une lettre du Pacha de
Bagdad, qui Pexhortait a tenir bon contre le General Egyptien, et Fassurait
qu'il irait a son secours. Osman Pacha et l'Administrateur du Tombeau,
Cherif Bey, ayant eu connaissance de cette demarche de Feyssol, envoyerent
dire a Feyssol, dans le but d'entraver les operations de Kourchid Pacha, qu'il se
gardat bien de faire sa soumission, et que la Sublime Porte ne manquerait pas
de lui venir en aide dans sa resistance. Feyssol, seduit par cette promesse,
reussit a faire echapper d'aupres de Kourchid Pacha son frfere, porteur de la
lettre dont j'ai parle, et persista dans la voie des hostilites: on sait quelle grande
perte d'hommes il en est resulte.
Cherif Bey distribuait de l'argent, donnait des honoraires a. dix-sept
habitans de Medine qui n'avaient aucune espece de charge. II fesait aussi des
presens en montres, en pelisses d'honneur, en argent meme, aux Cheiks de
Gebel-Chemis, et a ceux des tribus environnantes, de telle sorte qu'il n'y avait
plus a douter que les mouvemens et les revoltes de ces tribus etaient le resultat
des manoeuvres d'Osman Pacha et de Cherif Bey. Je jugeai des-lors que, pour
mettre fin a un pareil etat de choses, il devenait necessaire que ces deux Envoyds
de la Porte fussent eioignes des lieux Saints. J'envoyai en consequence le
General d'Artillerie Selim Pacha, avec deux regimens d'Infanterie et un corps de
troupes irregulieres; 1°. Pour apaiserla revoke; 2°. Pour inviter les deux agens
de Constantinople a donner leur demission, et a demander a la Porte qu'on les
remplace par des eunuques, comme les choses se fesaient auparavant. Selim
Pacha avait ordre de ne pas obliger les deux fonctionnaires susdits a se retirer
avant l'arrivee des ordres de la Porte a ce sujet. Je me trouvais au Soudan
lorsque les lettres de demission venues de Medine parvinrent au Caire ; j'en fus
informe ; a mon retour au Caire, j 'appris que les troubles des environs de la Cite
Sainte etaient apaises. Les circonstances dans lesquelles nous -nous trouvions
ne me permettant guere d'expedier ces lettres a Constantinople, je les retins.
Les deux Envoyes resterent a leur poste, vaquant a leurs offices comme aupara
vant ; je leur ai mfime fait parvenir un a compte de mille bourses, conformement
a l'intention de la Porte, ainsi qu'elle me Pavait fait connaitre.
Je n'etais pas dupe des menees de la Porte dans cette partie de mon
Gouvernement ; j'avais devine ses projets, lorsqu'elle envoya, au lieu d'eunuques
comme par le passe, Osman Pacha et Cherif Bey aux Lieux Saints. Si je
ne m'opposai pas a l'admission de ces deux agens, c'est que je voulais voir ou
cela irait ; et les faits ont pleinement justifie mes previsions.
Lorsque j'entretiens a si grands frais des forces aussi considerables pour
assurer respect et inviolation aux Saints Lieux, et tranquillite dans les pays
2 0

282
environnans, dans Pinteret du peuple Musulman, il n'est pas convenable que la
Porte fasse des intrigues pour y semer le trouble et la profanation. Dieu et les
hommes condamnent une pareille conduite.
Je demande que Osman Pacha et Cherif Bey soient rappeles, et que
dorenavant il soit envoye, comme par la passe, des eunuques a leur place.
Les dix-sept personnes qui servaient a Medine les menees des deux envoyes,
ont ete mandees au Caire ou elles restent en liberte, entretenues par mon tresor.
Osman Pacha et Cherif Bey continuent d'exercer sans entraves leurs fonctions
aux Lieux baints.

(Translation.)
Report of Mehemet Ali relative to Dignitaries of the Porte at Medina.
THE Arabs of Judeida have killed the General and plundered the pro
visions sent from Medina to the Nedj. While efforts were making to cause
these robbers to return to their duty, the different tribes which dwell in the
neighbourhood of Medina rose and came and blockaded the Holy City. The
night after this aggression the Sheik-el-Harem, Osman Pasha, was at a garden
outside of Medina. The Governor of the city hastened to acquaint him with what
was passing, and to urge him to return ; Osman Pasha refused to do so. The
following day, this same Osman Pasha, seeing that, contrary to his anticipation,
Medina was going to offer resistance, repaired to the city and told the Governor
that it was not necessary to make preparations for defence, and to cause the
troops to move out ; that the Sheiks of the insurgent tribes had been to visit
him the evening before ; that he undertook to be mediator, and to arrange the
differences. This circumstance showed clearly that Osman Pasha had an under
standing with the insurgents.
In the second place, Feyssol-ebn-el-Turki had caused his brother to carry
to Kourshid Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Nedj, a letter
from the Pasha of Bagdad, which exhorted him to hold out against the Egyptian
General, and assured him that he would go to his assistance. Osman Pasha,
and the Guardian of the Tomb, Cherif Bey, having become acquainted with
this proceeding of Feyssol, sent word to Feyssol, with the view of impeding the
operations of Kourshid Pasha, that he should by no means make his submission,
and that the Sublime Porte would not fail to come to his aid in his resistance.
Feyssol, seduced by this promise, succeeded in procuring the escape from
Kourshid Pasha, of his brother, the bearer of the letter of which I have spoken,
and persisted in his hostilities : it is known how great a loss of fife was the
result of this.
Cherif Bey distributed money, gave rewards to seventeen inhabitants of
Medina, who had no kind of office. He also made presents of watches, dresses
of honour, and even of money to the Sheiks of Gebel-Chemis, and to those of
the surrounding tribes, so that there no longer remained any doubt that the
movements and revolt of these tribes were the result of the manoeuvres of
Osman Pasha and of Cherif Bey. I then judged it necessary, in order to put
an end to such a state of things, that these two Envoys of the Porte should be
removed from the Holy Cities. I consequently sent the General of Artillery
Selim Pasha, with two regiments of Infantry and a body of irregular troops : —
1st. To put down the revolt ; 2ndly. To invite the two Agents from Constan
tinople to give in their resignation, and to request the Porte to replace them by
Eunuchs, as was formerly the case. Selim Pasha had orders not to oblige the
two functionaries abovementioned to retire, before the arrival of directions from
the Porte on this subject. I was in the Soudan, when the letters of resignation
coming from Medina, arrived at Cairo ; I was informed of it ; on my return to
Cairo I learnt that the troubles in the neighbourhood of the Holy City were
appeased. The circumstances in which we were placed scarcely allowing me to
forward these letters to Constantinople, I kept them. The two Envoys remained
at their post, attending to their duties as heretofore. I even furnished them
with a credit of 1,000 purses agreeably to the intention of the Porte as it had
made it known to me.
I was not the dupe of the dealings of the Porte in this part of my Govern-

283
ment ; I had guessed its projects, when it sent Osman Pasha and Cherif Bey to
the Holy Cities, instead of sending Eunuchs as heretofore. If I did not oppose
the admittance of those two Agents, it was because I wished to see how far
things would go ; and the facts have fully justified my anticipations.
While I am maintaining such large forces at so great an expence, to ensure
the respect and the inviolability of the Holy Cities, and the tranquillity of the
neighbouring country in the interest of the Mussulman people, it is not fitting
that the Porte should carry on intrigues for the purpose of promoting troubles
and profanation therdn. God and mankind condemn such conduct.
I demand the recall of Osman Pasha and Cherif Bey, and that henceforward
Eunuchs be sent in their place, as was the case heretofore.
The seventeen persons who promoted the intrigues of the two Envoys at
Medina, have been sent for to Cairo, where they remain at liberty, maintained by
my treasury. Osman Pasha and Cherif Bey continue to exercise their functions without
impediment at the Holy Cities.

No. 218.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 12.)
My Lord, Alexandria, July 18, 1839.
IN reference to your Lordship's despatch, of June 25 and its inclo
sures, I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that Admiral Sir Robert
Stopford writes to me, off Cyprus, July 12, that the subject of his despatches
being no longer valid in consequence of the late important events, and the Pasha
of Egypt having declared his intention of stopping further hostilities in conse
quence of the Sultan's death, he (the Admiral) proposes returning with the
squadron off the Dardanelles, in pursuance of Admiralty orders.
I suppose that the Admiral was not aware of the arrival here of the fleet
of the Capudan Pasha.
(Signed) ' PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 219.
The Due de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney. — (Communicated by the
Baron de Bourqueney.)
Monsieur, Paris, le 6 Aodt, 1839.
J'AI recu hier la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser avec
le projet d'instructions aux Amiraux qui vous a ete remis par Lord Palmerston,
pour etre presente a, Papprobation du Gouvernement du Roi. Le Conseil qui
vient d'en deliberer, n'a pas juge qu'il fut possible d'adherer completement a ce
projet. Je crains que le Cabinet Britannique, sous la premiere impression des
facheuses nouvelles arrivees d'Alexandrie, ne se soit pas suffisamment rendu
compte de Fensemble de la situation. Les hostilites sont evidemment terminees
en Orient. Ni par terre, ni par mer, personne n'annonce en ce moment
l'intention de les continuer, ou plutot de les reprendre. D'un c6td, on n'en a
plus les moyens, a supposer, ce qui est douteux, qu'on en eut la volonte. De
l'autre, on n'y a aucun intent, et Fon sait assez qu'on ne pourrait le faire sans
s'exposer a de tres-graves consequences, sans compromettre gratuitement une
fort belle position. Dans cet etat de choses, la defection de la Flotte Ottomane
a certainement de facheux et tres-regrettables inconveniens auxquels nous
devons essayer de remedier; mais elle ne constitue pas un de ces dangers
imminens propres a justifier des mesures aussi extremes que celles qu'on nous
propose. Cette flotte dans les mains de Mehemet Ali, n'est aujourd'hui qu'un
depot, un gage a Paide duquel il se promet d'obtenir a la fois l'investiture
heretlitaire de tout ce qu'il possede. La France et FAngleterre, tout en insistant
fortement sur Finvitation que nous avons deja fait parvenir a, Mehemet Ali par
2 0 2

284
nos Consuls, de restituer les vaisseaux Turcs, doivent sans doute prendre der
mesures pour que, dans le cas peu probable ou il recommencerait la guerre, il ne
peut s 'en faire un instrument d'attaque contre la Porte ; et le meilleur moyen
peut-etre de lui en oter I'envie, c'est de lui declarer formellement, que desormais
les Escadres Francaise et Anglaise agiront uniquement dans le but de proteger
le Sultan contre ses agressions ou d'envahissemens qudconques. Toute
demarche, toute demonstration faite dans le sens que je viens d'indiquer,
aurait notre approbation entiere, parceque nous y voyons une utilite reelle et
de grandes chances d'efficacite. Mais la mesure d'hostilite contre Mehemet
Ali ne faciliterait pas le plan que FAngleterre et la France se sont propose de
concert. En detruisant I'Escadre Egyptienne, non seulement, nous n'en
donnerions plus de force a la Porte, mais nous n'amenerions pas le Vice-Roi a
se desister de la moindre de ses pretentions. La puissance materielle et morale
qu'il exerce aujourd'hui sur terre, rend son action bien moins dependante qu'on
ne le suppose de ses forces maritimes. L'attaquer lorsqu'il n'attaque pas, ce
serait risquer de le pousser a. quelque parti extreme. Certain, lorsqu'on lui
aurait enleve ses vaisseaux, de n'avoir plus rien a craindre de l'Europe qui, en
effet, aurait epuise contre lui, dans un but comparativement bien secondaire, tous
ses moyens de coaction, il en conclurait naturellement qu'il n'a plus rien a menager
envers Elle ; et en supposant qu'il ne se ddcidat pas a faire marcher Ibrahim sur
Constantinople meme, il lui suffirait, pour susciter une diversion terrible, de
provoquer dans PAsie Mineure, en Macedoine, en Albanie, quelque souievement
de nature a ramener la question de Pintervention Russe. On sait malheureuse-
ment que les instrumens ne lui manqueraient pas a cet effet, et qu'il n'aurait peut-
etre pas besoin, pour y parvenir, de remuer un seul de ses soldats. De telles
eventualites valent certainement la peine qu'on les pese murement avant de se
decider a les braver. J'ajouterai, Monsieur, qu'a Londres on semble trop se
preoccuper de Fagrandissement de Mehemet Ali, parce qu'on veut toujours
considerer ce cote de la question sous Faspect qu'il aurait s'il s'agissait d'un Etat
Europeen. Sans doute entre les mains d'un homme tel que le Pacha d'Egypte,
la possession de territoires trop considerables peut avoir des dangers qui expli-
quent et justifient les efforts des Puissances pour mettre un terme a, ses
empietemens. La France est la premiere a le reconnaitre, et Elle n'a cesse de
travailler a contenir les projets, a moderer les pretentions de ce Pacha ; mais il
ne faut pas s'exagerer le mal ; l'Empire Ottoman meme, divise administrative-
ment par des stipulations auxquelles la clause de l'heredite, quelque expresse
qu'elle fut, pourrait bien d'ailleurs ne pas donner un caractere de permanence
definitive; FEmpire Ottoman, uni, malgi-e le partage plus ou moins durable, par
le lien puissant des moeurs et de la religion, n'en continuera pas moins a former
en face des Puissances Europeennes, ce grand corps dont l'existence a toujours
ete juge indispensable au maintien de l'equilibre politique. Les forces qu'il
possede, dans l'une et l'autre de ses divisions actuelles, concourent egalement a
ce but; et je ne crains pas de dire, qu'en ruinant le Pacha d'Egypte, on travaillerait
efficacement a la destruction de l'Empire Ottoman. Notre politique aujourd'hui,
comme des le commencement de cette crise, doit veiller avant tout a ce que
Constantinople ne regoive de protection exterieure qu'avec notre commun
concours. Telles sont, Monsieur, les objections qu'a suggere au Gouvernement du Roi
la proposition du Cabinet de Londres, et qui ne lui ont pas permis d'y adherer
entierement. Veuillez les faire connaitre a Lord Palmerston, en lui indiquant
la marche qui nous parait preferable. Elle consiste, vous le voyez, a reclamer
de nouveau la restitution de la Flotte Ottomane, et dans le cas ou Mehemet Ali
s'y ref'userait, a lui declarer qu'il doit dorenavant considerer les Escadres
Alliees comme uniquement et specialement chargees de repousser toute
tentative dirigee contre le territoire ou I'autorite de la Porte. Le Cabinet
Anglais en y reflect] issant, reconnaitra, je n'en doute pas, qu'une telle attitude
suffit aux besoins du moment, que sans rien compromettre, elle atteindra,
suivant toute apparence, le but que la France et FAngleterre ont en vue, et que,
places a. notre grand regret dans l'impossibilite d'acceder sans reserve, au projet
du Gouvernement Britannique, nous ne pouvions mieux lui prouver notre confiance
absolue et Fintime accord de notre politique avec la sienne.
XYGC6VP7 &C
(Signe) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

285

(Translation.)
The Duke de Dalmatia to the Baron de Bourqueney. — (Communicated by the
Baron de Bourqueney.)
Sir, Paris, August 6, 1839.
I RECEIVED yesterday the letter which you did me the honour to address
to me, with the project of instructions to the Admirals, which has been put into
your hands by Lord Palmerston, to be submitted for the approval of the King's
Government. The Council which has been in deliberation thereupon, has
deemed that it was not possible to adhere entirely to this project. I fear that
the British Cabinet, under the first impression made by the unhappy news
received from Alexandria, has not sufficiently taken into account the whole
position of affairs. Hostilities are evidently at an end in the East. Neither by
land, nor by sea, does any one at present announce an intention of continuing
them, or rather of recommencing them. On the one hand, the means no
longer exist, supposing, which is not probable, that there were the inclination
to do so. On the other hand, they have no interest in it, and it is well
known that it could not be done without the risk of very serious consequences,
nor without gratuitously compromising a very good position. In this state of"
things, the defection of" the Ottoman fleet certainly does entail unhappy and
very deplorable consequences, which we ought to try to remedy ; but it does
not constitute one of those imminent dangers which could justify such extreme
measures as those proposed to us. That fleet in the hands of Mehemet Ali is
now but a security, a pledge by means of which he proposes to himself to obtain
at once the hereditary investiture of all that he holds. France and England,
while strongly pressing the invitation which we have already made to Mehemet
Ali through our Consuls, to deliver up the Turkish ships, ought undoubtedly to
adopt such measures as that, in the improbable event of his recommencing war,
he may not be able to use them as an instrument of attack against the Porte ;
and the best means perhaps of depriving him of the wish to do so, would be to
declare to him formally, that henceforth the French and English squadrons will
act solely with the view of protecting the Sultan against his aggressions, or
from any invasions whatsoever. Every step, every demonstration made in
the spirit of what I have pointed out, would have our entire approbation, because
we see therein real utility, and great chance of success. But to commence
hostility against Mehemet Ali would not tend to facilitate the attainment of the
object which England and France have conjointly proposed to themselves. By des
troying the Egyptian squadron, not only should we add no strength to the Porte,
but we should not induce the Viceroy to relinquish the least of his pretensions.
The physical and moral power which he now exercises by land, renders him in
his operations much less dependent on his maritime force than is supposed. To
attack him when he does not attack, would be to risk the urging him to some
extreme course. Certain as he would be, when deprived of his ships, of having
nothing further to fear from Europe, when, in fact, she had exhausted against
him, for an object comparatively of very secondary importance, all her combined
means of operation, he would naturally conclude, that he had no further occa
sion to pay any regard to her ; and supposing that he should not decide on
making Ibrahim march on Constantinople itself, he need only, for the pur
pose of making a serious diversion, excite in Asia Minor, in Macedonia, in
Albania, some revolt of a nature to bring on again the question of Russian
intervention. We know, unfortunately, that the instruments for this purpose
would not be wanting to him, and that he would not perhaps have occasion, for
the attainment of it, to employ a single soldier of his own. Such contingencies
are certainly well worthy of being weighed maturely before we decide on
risking them. I will add, Sir, that in London too much stress seems to be laid on
the aggrandisement of Mehemet Ali, in consequence of always choosing to view
that side of the question in the light in which it would be if a European State
were concerned. No doubt, in tbe hands of such a man as the Pasha of Egypt,
the possession of too considerable an extent of territory may involve dangers
to account for and to justify the efforts of the Powers, to put a stop to his
aggressions. France is the first to acknowledge it ; him, and she has unremittingly
laboured to restrain the designs, and to moderate the pretensions, of this Pasha :

286
but we must not exaggerate the evil; the Ottoman Empire itself, divided
administratively by stipulations to which the question of succession, however
precise it might be, cannot, indeed, give a character of real permanence ; the
Ottoman Empire, united, notwithstanding the more or less durable distribution*
by the powerful tie of manners and religion, will continue nevertheless to form,
with regard to the European Powers, that great body the existence of which has
always been deemed indispensable to the maintenance of the balance of power.,;
The forces which it possesses, throughout its actual divisions, combine alike to
this end ; and I do not hesitate to say, that overthrowing the Pasha of Egypt.
would effectually work the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Our policy
at the present time, as from the commencement of this crisis, should take care
above all things, that Constantinople receives no foreign protection but with our
common concurrence.
Such, Sir, are the objections to the proposition of the Cabinet of London
which have occurred to the King's Government, and which have prevented it
from entirely concurring therein. Be so good as to communicate them to Lord
Palmerston, pointing out to him at the same time the course which we prefer to
adopt. It consists, you will see, in requiring afresh the restitution of the
Ottoman fleet, and in case Mehemet Ali should refuse, in declaring to him that
he must thenceforth consider the allied squadrons as solely and specially charged
to repel every attempt made against the territory or the authority of the Porte.
The English Cabinet, will, T have no doubt, perceive on reflection, that such an
attitude is all that is required for the present emergency ; that without compro
mising anything, it will attain, according to all appearance, the object which
France and England have in view, and that, being, to our deep regret, unable
to accede without reserve to the project of the British Government, we
could not give any better proof of our entire confidence and of the intimate con
nection between our policy and its own.
Accept &c .
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 220.
The Due de Dalmatie to Baron Roussin. — (Communicated by the Baron de
Bourqueney.)
M. le Baron, Paris, le 7 AoUt, 1839.
DEPUIS la dernifere expedition que je vous ai adressee, nous avons appris
Pentree de la flotte Turque dans le port d'Alexandrie, le refus fait par Mehemet
Ali d'acedder aux propositions de la Porte, et les conditions exorbitantes qu'il
met aujourd'hui a un arrangement. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que ni la
France ni les autres Puissances ne peuvent approuver de telles exigences. Nous
nous concertons en ce moment avec le Cabinet de Londres, sur les dispositions
qu'elles peuvent rendre ndcessaires de notre part ; et j'ai charge M. Cochelet de
declarer au Vice-Roi, dans les termes les plus formels, qu'alors meme qu'il
arracherait a la detresse de la Porte des conditions incompatibles avec la dignite
du Sultan, on propres a compromettre Favenir de l'Empire, elles n'obtiendraient
pas l'assentiment des Puissances Europeennes, si nlcessaire cependant pour
donner quelque valeur et quelque solidite a un tel arrangement.
C'est assez vous dire, M. le Baron, que le Gouvernement du Roi persiste
dans les vues que vous y avez trouvees ; — que la Porte ne se hate pas de conclure
avec Mehemet Ali ; qu'elle ne fasse rien surtout sans le concours de ses Allies :
tels sont les conseils que vous ne devez pas cesser de lui faire entendre, les seuls
qui se concilient avec ses interets evidens ; et il lui sera d'autant plus facile de
les suivre, que le Vice-Roi, au milieu de toutes ses exigences, annonce pourtant
l'intention de ne pas les appuyer par la force des armes. Rien n'oblige done les
Ministres du Sultan a se hater.
Je vous ai transmis par le dernier paquebot, la reponse de FAngleterre a
notre declaration en faveur de Findependance et de l'integrite de l'Empire
Ottoman. Celle de PAutriche m'est parvenue depuis: elle est egalement
sat-sfaisante. Les Trois Cours sont unanimes a. proclamer la necessite d'un concert

287
JSuropeen pour regler les affaires de l'Orient. La Russie seule, qui avait d'abord
paru admettre la convenance de ce concert, cherche maintenant a eiuder, sous
des pretextes plus ou moins specieux, les consequences du principe qu'elle n'ose
pas contester directement. Un statu quo depourvu de sanction, expose par
consequent a de nouvelles et promptes vicissitudes, c'est incontestablement ce
qui lui convient le mieux dans l'Orient. II se pourrait done qu'un arrangement
direct entre la Porte et Mehemet Ali entrat dans ses vues ; que loin de le
contrarier, elle y donnat secretement la main ; et s'il etait vrai, comme quelques
indices donnent lieu de le supposer, que Nouri Effendi se fut rallid a la politique
du Cabinet de St.-Petersbourg, il y aurait lieu de concevoir des inquietudes dans
ce sens. Je ne doute pas que vous n'y veilliez avec soin.
Veuillez aussi ne pas perdre un moment de vue l'attitude militaire et
navale de la Russie, du cote de la Mer Noire. Dans le cas ou les mouvemens
que vous remarqueriez vous paraitraient indiquer un projet de se porter sur
Constantinople, vous en donneriez sur le champ avis a M. PAmiral Lalande qui
viendrait aussi prendre position a Tenedos avec son eseadre, pour etre pret a
franchir le detroit des Dardanelles, si les Russes arrivaient dans le Bosphore.
Vienne etant en ce moment le point central des negociations auxquelle?
donne lieu la Question d'Orient, comme aussi le lieu ou Fon est le plus prompte-
ment informe de Fensemble des circonstances qui peuvent en modifier la
marche, le Cabinet Britannique a autorise" d'une part Lord Beauvale a donner a
Lord Ponsonby les informations et les avis propres a le diriger utileinent, et de
Pautre, a present a ce dernier Ambassadeur de se conformer aux directions
qu'il recevra de son Collegue. Vous voudrez bien, M. le Baron, avoir egard
egalement aux communications de M. le Comte St. Aulaire, qui a ordre de suivre
avec vous une correspondance reguliere. Veuillez agreer, &c,
(Signe) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)
The Due de Dalmatie to Baron Roussin. — (Communicated by the Baron de
Bourqueney.)
Monsieur le Baron, Paris, August 7, 1839.
SINCE the last despatch which I addressed to you, we have received intel
ligence of the entry of the Turkish Fleet into the Port of Alexandria, of the
refusal of Mehemet Ali to agree to the propositions of the Porte, and of the
exorbitant conditions he now proposes for an arrangement. I need not inform you
that neither France nor the other Powers can approve of such exactions. We are
at this present moment concerting with the Cabinet of London on the measures
that these proceedings will render it necessary for us to take ; and I have in
structed M. Cochelet to declare to the Viceroy in the most formal manner, that
even if he were to extort from the exigencies of the Porte, conditions incompatible
with the dignity of the Sultan, or that would compromise the future existence
of the Empire, yet those conditions would never receive the sancton of the
European Powers, which is so requisite for giving weight and solidity to any
such arrangement.
It is sufficient to say, M. le Baron, that the King's Government continue to
entertain the views which you have found set forth in that despatch. Let the Porte
be in no hurry to conclude an arrangement with Mehemet Ali ; above all, let it do
nothing without the concurrence of the Allies. Such are the counsels you ought
not to cease to press upon the Porte, the only counsels reconcileable with its
true interests; and it will be the easier for it to follow them, since the Viceroy,
amidst all his exactions, announces nevertheless his intention not to support
them by force of arms. There is therefore no necessity for haste on the part of
the Sultan's Ministers.
I transmitted to you by the last packet, the answer of Great Britain to our
declaration in favour of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
The answer of Austria has since reached me, it is equally satisfactory.
The Three Courts are unanimous in proclaiming the necessity of a European
Concert for settling the affairs of the East. Russia alone, who had at first

288
appeared to admit the expediency of such a concert, now endeavours, upon
pretexts more or less specious, to elude the consequences of a principle she dare
not openly contest. A status quo, destitute of sanction, and on that account
exposed to fresh and sudden vicissitude, is incontestably that which best suits the
purposes of Russia in the Levant. It might therefore so happen, that a direct
arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali would be in conformity with
her views ; that so far from interposing to prevent it, she might secretly promote
it ; and if it were true, as some indications would lead one to suppose, that
Nouri Effendi has come round to the policy of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh,
there would be some grounds for apprehension on this score. I have no doubt
that you will carefully direct your attention to this subject.
Also, do not for a moment lose sight of the military and naval attitude of
Russia in the Black Sea. In case of any movements on their part, appearing
to you as indicating an intention to advance upon Constantinople, you will in
stantly communicate the intelligence to Admiral Lalande, who will take up
a position with his squadron at Tenedos, to be ready to pass through the Straits
of the Dardanelles, should the Russians enter the Bosphorus.
Vienna being at this moment the central point of the negotiations arising
out of the Eastern Question, and being also the place where the first intelli
gence will be received of all the circumstances which may modify the course
of these negotiations, the British Cabinet has on the one hand authorized
Lord Beauvale to give to Lord Ponsonby all the information and intelligence
that may be useful for his guidance ; and, on the other, has enjoined this latter
Ambassador to conform to the instructions he may receive from his Colleague.
You will have the goodness, M. le Baron, to pay equal attention to the com
munications of the Count St. Aulaire, who is instructed to maintain a regular
correspondence with you. Accept, &c,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 221.
The Due de Dalmatie to Amiral Duperri. — (Communicated by the Baron de
Bourqueney.)
Monsieur FAmiral et cher Collegue, Paris, le 13 Aoilt, 1839.
LES evenemens qui ont mis la flotte Turque au pouvoir du Vice-Roi
d'Egypte ayant determine Je Gouvernement du Roi et celui de Sa Majeste
Britannique a se concerter sur les mesures a prendre pour prevenir les graves et
facheuses consequences qui pourraient en resulter, je dois vous donner con
naissance des determinations auxquelles ils se sont arretes, afin que vous puissiez
en informer M. FAmiral Lalande, et le mettre en mesure de concourir, en ce qui
le concerne, a I'execution du plan convenu entre les deux Cours.
Les Consuls- Generaux de France et d'Angleterre demanderont, de nouveau,
formellement a Mehemet Ali, la restitution ou le renvoi des batimens appartenant
a la Porte. Dans le cas oft il s'y refuserait, ils lui annonceront que desormais les
escadres combinees ont pour mission spedale de proteger la portion de FEmpire
Ottoman qui releve directement de Sa Hautesse contre toute agression patente
ou deguisee dont elle serait Fobjet de la part des forces navales Egyptiennes.
Pour appuyer la demande des Consuls-Generaux et prendre eventuellement
Pattitude que rendrait necessaire le refus du Vice-Roi, les Amiraux se con-
certeront entre eux soit pour se rendre eux-memes devant Alexandrie avec le
nombre de batimens qui leur paraitra convenable, soit pour y envoyer seulement
une force suffisante, suivant ce qui passera a Constantinople, et qu'ils jugeront la
presence de tous les deux, ou de Pun d'eux, necessaire aux Dardanelles. En tout
cas, ils prendront, selon les circonstances, les dispositions necessaires dans le but
de surveiller la flotte Egyptienne, de suivre et au besoin de contenir tous ses
mouvemens, de Fisoler de la flotte Ottomane, et aussi, autant que possible, de
couper toute communication entre le port d' Alexandrie et les vaisseaux Turcs,
en evitant toutefois de faire naitre Foccasion d'un conflit que ni les uns ni les
autres ne rechercheront certainement.
Les Amiraux se mettrontde plus en rapport avec les Capitaines des batimens

289
Turcs. Comme il parait qu'un des motifs qui ont decide ces derniers a se placer
sous la protection du Vice-Roi, c'est I'opinion erronee repandue parmi eux, que le
Ministere du nouveau Sultan se proposait de livrer la flotte a la Russie, les Amiraux
leurexpliqueront la faussetedece bruit; ils emploieront tous les argu mens possibles
pour les faire rentrer sous I'autorite de leur Souverain ; ils leur feront remarquer
que la France et FAngleterre, qui leur donnent ce conseil, sont, de toutes les
Puissances, les plus interessees al'integriteet Findependance del'Empire Ottoman;
et ils ne leur cacheront pas que les escadres alli^es s'opposeraient par la force a
toute entreprise dirig^e contre I'autorite du Sultan ; ils leur offriront enfin de
s'interposer pour leur faire obtenir du Gouvernement de la Porte toutes les
garanties qu'ils croiraient devoir exiger pour leur surete personnelle avant de
rentrer dans Fobeissance.
A cet effet et en general, s'il y avait lieu de croire que quelque communication
directe avec le Gouvernement Ture put faciliter un arrangement a l'amiable, les
Amiraux n'hesiteraient pas a envoyer a Constantinople un, ou successivement
plusieurs batimens legers ; mais pendant le cours de la negociation, ils se tiendront
auprls de la flotte Ottomane et la suivront partout ou elle pourra se diriger, de
manilre a rester maitres de ses mouvemens. Si meme, avant d'avoir fait sa
soumission au Sultan, elle voulait se rendre dans un port Ture quelconque en
dehors des Dardanelles, soit a Rhodes, soit a Marmorice, il n'y aurait pas de
raison pour s'y opposer. Le principe que les Amiraux ne devront jamais perdre
de vue, c'est que le but des Gouvernemens allies etant de rendre au Sultan la
flotte Ottomane, et non de la detruire, le seul cas oil il y aurait lieu d'employer
la force contre elle ou contre la flotte Egyptienne, ce serait que l'une ou Pautre
de ces deux flottes en vint a. des hostilites positives contre son Souverain le
Sultan, ou contre les territoires qui relevent directement de Sa Hautesse.
Si la flotte Ottomane etait entree dans le port d' Alexandrie, et que Mehemet
Ali serefusat a la rendre a son Souverain ou a la laisser sortir pour la destination
indiquee, les Amiraux se borneraient a laisser des batimens pour l'observer, en
tel nombre qu'ils jugeront convenable.
Je vous disais tout-a-1'heure, Monsieur FAmiral et cher Collegia que les
Commandans de I'Escadre devaient se faire suivre sur la cote d'Egypte par les
forces necessaires au succes de leur mission. II me semble d'ailleurs evident que
tout en reunissant sur ce point un nombre de vaisseaux propre a suffire trbs
largement a. toutes les eventualites, ils peuvent laisser sur la cote del'Asie Mineure
assez de batimens pour surveiller aussi, avec toute l'efficacite desirable, ce qui se
passera de ce cdte, et obtenir dans les cas prevus, c'est-a-dire si les Russes se
presentaient a Constantinople, ou si les escadres alliees etaient appelees par le
Sultan, la Fibre entree de la Mer de Marmara. II ne faut pas oublier qu'apres
tout, c'est la la question principale, et par consequent que de ce cote l'observation
doit etre incessante.
Soyez assez bon, Monsieur FAmiral, pour me communiquer les instructions
que vous croirez devoir adresser a. M. FAmiral Lalande par suite des resolutions
dont je viens de vous faire part. Agreez, &c,
(Signe') MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)
The Due de Dalmatie to Admiral Duperre'. — (Communicated by the Baron de
Bourqueney.)
Monsieur FAmiral and Dear Colleague, Paris, August 13, 1839.
THE events which have placed the Turkish fleet in the power of the
Viceroy of Egypt, having determined the Government of the King and that of
Her Britannic Majesty to concert upon the measures to be taken, with a view to
prevent the serious and untoward consequences which might result from them,
I have to inform you of the determinations at which they have arrived, in order
that you may communicate them to Admiral Lalande, and enable him to assist,
as far as concerns him, in the execution of the plan agreed upon between the
two Courts. 2 P

290
The Consuls-General of France and England will again formally demand
of Mehemet Ali, the restitution or the return of the vessels belonging to the
Porte. In the case of his refusal, they will announce to him, that thence
forward the combined squadrons are specifically appointed to protect that por
tion of the Ottoman Empire which depends immediately upon the Sultan;
against every aggression, whether overt or concealed, which may be the object of
the Egyptian naval forces.
In order to support the demand of the Consuls-General, and eventually to
assume the attitude which the refusal of the Viceroy may render necessary, the
Admirals will concert between them, as to whether they should themselves
repair to Alexandria wTith the number of vessels which may appear to them to
be necessary, or whether they should only send there a suffident force ; according
to what shall occur at Constantinople, and according as they shall judge the
presence of both or of one of them to be required at the Dardanelles. , In any
case, they will make, according to circumstances, the necessary arrangements,
with a view to watch the Egyptian fleet, to follow, and, if necessary, to controul
all its movements, to separate it from the Ottoman fleet, and also, as much as
possible, to cut off all communication between the Port of Alexandria and the
Turkish vessels, avoiding nevertheless to give any opportunity for a conflict,
which certainly neither the one party nor the other will seek for.
The Admirals, moreover, will place themselves in communication with the
Captains of the Turkish vessels. As it appears that one of the motives which
have decided the latter to place themselves under the protection of the Viceroy,
is an erroneous opinion current amongst them, that the Ministry of the new
Sultan intended to deliver up the fleet to Russia, the Admirals will explain to
them the falsity of this report : they will employ all the arguments possible to
bring them again under the authority of their Sovereign : they will point out to -
them that France and England, who give them this advice, are, of all the Powers,
those most interested in the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire;
and they will not conceal from them, that the Allied squadrons will oppose by
force every enterprise directed against the authority of the Sultan ; and, finally,
they will make them the offer of their interposition, to obtain for them, from the
Government of the Porte, all the guarantees which they may think proper to
require for their personal security, before returning to their obedience.
For this purpose, and as a general rule, if there should be reason to think
that any direct communication with the Turkish Government would facilitate an
amicable arrangement, the Admirals will not hesitate to despatch one vessel, or
several light vessels in succession, to Constantinople ; but, during the course of
the negotiation, they will keep near the Ottoman fleet, and will follow it whither
soever it may proceed, so as to remain masters of its movements. If, even before
having made its submission to the Sultan, it should wish to proceed to any
Turkish port whatever without the Dardanelles, either to Rhodes or to Marmo-
rice, there would be no reason for opposing it. The principle which the Admi
rals should never lose sight of is, that the object of the Allied Governments
being to restore the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan, and not to destroy it, the only
case in which force should be employed against it, or against the Egyptian fleet,
would be that, wherein either one or the other of these two fleets should com
mit actual hostilities against their Sovereign the Sultan, or against the territories
which depend directly upon His Highness.
If the Ottoman fleet should have entered the port of Alexandria and Mehe
met Ali should refuse to restore it to his Sovereign, or to allow it to go out for
the destination already mentioned, the Admirals should confine themselves to
leaving some vessels, in such number as they may think fit, to observe it.
I have already stated to you, M. FAmiral and dear Colleague, that the
Commanders of the squadron should cause sufficient forces, for the successful exe
cution of the service, to follow them to the coast of Egypt. It appears to me, in
deed, evident, that while they unitein this point a number of vessels amply sufficient
to provide for every contingency, they will be able to leave a sufficient number
of vessels on the coast of Asia Minor to observe with proper efficiency what may
pass on that coast, and to obtain, in the case anticipated, that is to say, if the
Russians should appear at Constantinople, or if the Allied squadrons should be
summoned by the Sultan, the free entrance into the Sea of Marmora. It must
not be forgotten that this, after all, is the principal question, and. that, conse
quently, watchfulness on this point should be incessant.

291
Be good enough, Monsieur FAmiral, to communicate to me the instructions
which you may think necessary to address to Admiral Lalande, in consequence of
the resotaiiionsLof which I have just informed you.
Receive, &c,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE;

No. 222.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 15, 1839.
WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch, of the 30th of July,
inclosing a copy of the declaration which your Excellency had addressed on the
27th to the Austrian Government, upon the subject of the policy of Great
Britain with respect to the affairs of the Levant, I have to acquaint your
Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of that declaration.
Her Majesty's Government likewise approve of your having sent copies of
this dedaration, and of Prince Metternich's answer, to Lord Ponsonby, as
reported in your despatch, of the 30th ultimo. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 223.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 16, 1839.
I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to draw the attention of the French
Government to the fact, that the confidential communications which have recently
been going on between the British and French Cabinets, upon the subject of the
orders- to be given to the two squadrons in the Mediterranean, in consequence of
the defection of the Turkish fleet and its reception by Mehemet Ali, have, by
some means or other, been made known to the French newspapers : that this has
happened while the matter in question was still undetermined between the two
Governments ; and that the communication made to the French papers has by
the parties to whom it was made, been converted into a handle for misrepre
sentation, and for hostile and unfounded attacks against Great Britain.
Her Majesty's Government think it only necessary to observe, that serious
inconveniences must arise from such breaches of official confidence, and that such
premature disclosures of negotiations between the two Governments, must tend
to render difficult any combined and concerted action between them.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 224.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 17.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 27, 1839.
THE Minister of Justice, Hadji Saib Effendi, is on the point of being sent
to the Pasha of Egypt with instructions, which are to be decided upon,
to-morrow, at a Great Council. Saib Effendi is to sail in a Turkish steam-boat
the day after to-morrow, at the latest. The Porte has promised me a copy of
these instructions. I have been assured that their nature has not yet been
determined upon ; but the Porte may only wish to conceal it from me until they
are actually off.
2 P 2

292
Ibrahim Pasha is advancing on Asia Minor. Maggiun Aga; one of the
officers who command the Egyptian van-guard, has written to the Governor of
Sverick, a letter (which the latter transmitted to the Porte, and which the Chief
Dragoman has seen) which says :—" His Highness the Generalissimo Ibrahim,
having confided to me the Government of Orfa, Diarbekir, and Harpout, I am
repairing thither with a considerable body of troops. On the receipt of this
letter you will lose no time in finding and sending to me 600 camel-loads of
barley, &c." I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 225.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 17.)
(Extract.) Therapia, July 26, 1839.
I EXPECT that, long before this arrives in London, the settlement be
tween Mehemet Ali and the Porte willhave been made. The answer to be given
to-morrow to the demands of the Pasha of Egypt may not be satisfactory to him :
but I think that either the Pasha will insist upon his demands, and the Porte
will yield to them ; or the Pasha will take what is offered, and defer exacting
the full measure until after he shall have completely established his authority
in Constantinople, which he will do with very little delay. Perhaps this latter
mode of acting may be the best for him ; because the proceeding can be so
managed that the grant will have the air and the form of an act springing
spontaneously from the Porte ; and as such it will be less subject to the criticism
of foreign Governments. 1 consider the Ottoman Empire to be delivered over
to Mehemet Ali.
In the absence of instructions to direct my conduct, I remain passive, after
having taken those steps (reported in my late despatches) which were intended
to delay any settlement that should not be in concurrence with the interests
and counsels of England and France.
Her Majesty's Government has learned from Colonel Campbell the demands
made by Mehemet Ali. I am informed, and I think correctly in substance, that
the answer to be given by the Porte is, " The hereditary government of Egypt
to be granted to Mehemet Ali, and the government of Syria to be granted to
Ibrahim Pasha till the death of Mehemet Ali, when the government of Syria is
to be again at the disposal of the Porte."
This answer given by the Porte would be inconsistent with the promises made
to me by the Grand Vizier.

No. 226.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 17.)
(Extract.) Therapia, July 29, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of a Collective Note signed by the Representatives of
Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, and myself, on the 27th instant.
The Note was yesterday presented by the Dragomans of the Five Powers to
the Sublime Porte, and cheerfully and gratefully received by the Grand Vizier,
on the 28th. I inclose Dragoman Pisani's report to me of what took place on
that occasion. Baron Stiirmer received Prince Metternich's instructions on the mornin°- of
the 27th, and the Note, signed, was ready in the evening. 1 beg leave to express
with all humility my approbation of the activity and promptitude with which
the Baron acted ; and I consider the measure to be the most salutary step that
could have been taken. It was also most fortunately well-timed, for the Ottoman

293
Ministers had actually resolved upon concessions to the Egyptian Pasha, which
would have been at this moment on their way to Alexandria, and which wrould have
mischievously complicated the affairs of this country. This measure has given force
and courage to the Grand Vizier to resist the Pasha, and to maintain the rights and
interests of the Sultan. It will also, I think, insure the tranquillity of the
Capital, and the security, therefore, of the foreign and Christian populations
and inhabitants. It opens the road for all that may be considered right
to be done by Her Majesty's Government. It has placed Her Majesty's Govern
ment in a position that enables it to secure the future integrity and independence
of Turkey. I fear the state of Asia Minor is very unsatisfactory, but it is natural that
it should be so after the late events. It is not to be imagined that Mehemet
Ali will neglect any means in his power to augment disorder everywhere, but he
is himself the source of all the dangers and difficulties, and if he he forced to
desist from pursuit of his ambitious plans, order will be easily restored. If
Her Majesty's Government will secure Constantinople against all attack, there
will be no just cause for alarm from anything that can he done to disturb the
peace, or alter the balance of power in Europe; but if that main object be neg
lected, there must be, eventually, a complete failure of all that is attempted
to preserve the common interests, and to escape a war at some future, and pro
bably not distant, period.
P. S. — I inclose a translated copy of the Pasha of Egypt's letter to the
Grand Vizier.

Inclosure 1 in No. 226.
Collective Note of the Five Powers.

Constantinople, ce 27 Juillet, 1839.
LES Soussignes ont recu ce matin de leurs Gouvernemens respectifs des
instructions, en vertu desquelles ils ont l'honneur d'informer la Sublime Porte,
que Paccord sur la Question d'Orient est assure entre les Cinq Grandes
Puissances, et de Fengager a suspendre toute determination definitive sans ieur
concours, en attendant Feffet de Pinte^t qu'elles lui portent.
(Signe) PONSONBY, Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.
BARON DE STURMER,
Internonce d'Autriche.
COMTE KONIGSMARCK,
Ministre de Prusse.
BARON ROUSSIN,
Ambassadeur de France.
A. BOUTENEFF,
Ministre de Russie.

(Translation.)
Collective Note of the Five Powers. Constantinople, July 27, 1839.
THE Undersigned have received, this morning, from their respective
Governments instructions, in virtue whereof they have the honour to inform the
Sublime Porte, that agreement among the Five Great Powers on the Question of

294
the East is secured, and to invite it to suspend any definitive resolution without
their concurrence, waiting for the effect of the interest which those Powers feel
(Signed) PONSONBY, Ambassador of England.
BARON DE STCJRMER,
Internuncio' of Austria.
COUNT KONIGSMARCK,
Minister of Prussia.
BARON ROUSSIN,
Ambassador of France.
A. BOUTENEFF.
Minister of Russia:

Inclosure 2 in No. 226.
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Pfra, ce 28 Juillet, 1839.
JE m'empresse de rendre compte a Votre Excellence du resultat de la
mission dont mes Collegues les Premiers Drogmans de France, d'Autriche, de
Prusse, et de Russie, et moi, avons ete charges aupres de Son Excellence le
Moustechar Nouri Effendi, resultat, comme Votre Excellence va voir, extreme-
ment satisfaisant.
Nous avons remis la Note Collective signee hier par leurs Excellences les
Representans des Grandes Puissances, et relative a la Question d'Orient, au
Moustechar, a, qui nous avons, en meme tems, presente une traduction Turque
de la susdite Note. Le Moustechar ayant lu la Note, a fait quelques obser
vations qui d6notaient qu'il en etait tres-satisfait, et il est alle la faire voir au
Grand Vizir, qui n'a pas tarde a nous faire chercher.
Nous avons trouve Son Altesse avec les Moustechars Nouri Effendi et Sarim
Effendi. Son Altesse a parie dans les termes les plus obligeans des: offres
bienveillantes des Grandes Puissances, et de leurs excellentes dispositions envers
la Porte. Nous avons assure les Ministres que les Grandes Puissances, extreme-
ment interessees a la Question d'Orient, sont resolues de la terminer, tout en
consultant la dignite de la Sublime Porte et Fintegrite de l'Empire Ottoman.
Les Ministres ont ete on ne peut plus satisfaits de ce que nous venions de leur
dire, et le Grand Vizir, surtout, en a exprime toute sa reconnaissance, en disant :
" Voila, en effet, comment des Gouvernemens doivent en agir envers les autres
Gouvernemens." Aprls quoi, Son Altesse nous a dit que la notification que
nous venions de faire a la Sublime Porte par une Note Officielle revetue des
signatures des Representans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, ne laissait plus aucun
lieu a envoyer Saib Effendi a Alexandrie; mais qu'attendu qu'il faut une re-
plique a la reponse de Mehemet Ali, envoyee par le canal d'Akiff Effendi,
elle va lui ecrire, qu'aussitot apres Parrivee d'Akiff Effendi a Constantinople, la
Sublime Porte s'est occupee de cette affaire, et qu'elle etait a la veille de prendre
une determination, mais que MM. les Interpretes des Cinq Grandes Puissances
se sont presentes a la Porte avec une Note Officielle, pour Fengager, au nom de
MM. les Representans de ces Puissances, de ne prendre aucune determination
sans leur concours, ce a quoi Elle a du adherer pour ne pas manquer aux egards
qu'exige d'Elle la sollicitude temoignee ainsi par les Grandes Puissances.
Le Grand Vizir nous a charges, my Lord, de prier nos Ministres respectifs
d' ecrire des lettres analogues aux Consuls a Alexandrie; et nous avons assure
Son Altesse que MM. les Representans s'empresseront d'ecrire dans le meme
sens a MM. les Consuls.
Le Grand Vizir et les deux Moustechars ont decide, comme mesure tr^s-
convenable, que la lettre de Son Altesse sera portee a. Mehemet Ali par le Capi
Kiaja, c'est-a-dire FAgent de ce Pacha pres la Porte, qui fera le voyage dans un
bateau a vapeur de la Marine Ottomane, lequel devra partir apre,s-demain ; et
Son Altesse a exprime le desir que, de la meme maniere que le Capi Kiaia doit
remettre la lettre Viziriale a Mehemet Ali, une personne au choix de MM. les

295
Representans soit destinee a se rendre a, Alexandrie par la meme occasion, chargee
des depeches de leurs Excellences pour les Consuls.
Nous avons promis au Grand Vizir de porter fideiement a la connaissance
de nos Ministres respectifs tout ce que Son Altesse venait de nous dire, et nous
nous sommes retires. Je suis, &c,
(Signe) FREDERIC PISANI.

(Translation.)
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Pera, July 28, 1839.
I HASTEN to give your Excellency an account of the mission to his
Excellency the Moustechar Nouri Effendi, with which my Colleagues, the
Dragomans of France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and myself were entrusted,
— a result, as your Excellency will see, extremely satisfactory.
We delivered to the Moustechar the Collective Note relative to the Eastern
Question, signed yesterday by their Excellencies the Representatives of the
Great Powers ; presenting him, at the same time, with a Turkish translation of
the said Note. The Moustechar having read the Note, made some observations
which showed that he was very well satisfied with it, and he went to show it to
the Grand Vizier, who presently sent for us.
We found His Highness with the Moustechars Nouri Effendi and Sarim
Effendi. His Highness spoke in the most obliging terms of the kind offers of the
Great Powers, and of their excellent dispositions towards the Porte. We assured the
Ministers that the Great Powers, being deeply interested in the Eastern Question,,
are resolved to bring it to a conclusion, having respect, at the same time, for the
dignity of the Sublime Porte, and for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It
was impossible for the Ministers to be better satisfied than they were with what
we had said to them, and the Grand Vizier especially expressed all his gratitude,
saying, " See, in truth, how Governments ought to act towards other Govern
ments." Afterwards His Highness said to us that the notification which we had
just made to the Sublime Porte by an Official Note, signed by the Representatives
of the Five Great Powers, rendered it no longer necessary to send Said Effendi
to Alexandria ; but that as it was necessary to make some reply to the answer of
Mehemet Ali, sent by Akiff Effendi, he would write to him, that immediately
after the arrival of Akiff Effendi at Constantinople, the Sublime Porte had
occupied itself with this affair, and was on the eve of taking a decision thereupon ;
but that the Interpreters of the Five Great Powers presented themselves to the
Porte with an Official Note, inviting it, in the name of the Representatives of those
Powers, not to take any resolution without their concurrence, to which the Porte
could not but assent, in order not to be wanting in the consideration which the
solicitude thus evinced by the Great Powers requires of it.
The Grand Vizier commissioned us, my Lord, to request our respective
Ministers to write corresponding letters to the Consuls at Alexandria; and we
assured His Highness, that the Representatives would readily write to the same
effect to the Consuls.
The Grand Vizier and the two Moustechars have decided, as a very proper
course, that Flis Highness' letter should be conveyed to Mehemet Ali by the
Capi Kiaja ; that is to say, the Agent of that Pasha at the Porte, who will make
the voyage in a steam-vessel of the Ottoman Navy, which will start the day after
to-morrow ; and His Highness expressed a desire, that in the same way as the
Capi Kiaja is to deliver the Vizirial letter to Mehemet Ali, so a person selected
by the Representatives should be appointed to proceed to Alexandria by the
same opportunity, with their Excellencies' despatches to the Consuls.
We promised the Grand Vizier faithfully to make known to our respective
Ministers everything that His Highness had said to us, and we withdrew.
I am, &c,
(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI.

296
Inclosure 3 in No. 226.
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.
(Traduction.) J'AI recu la lettre que Votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'ecrire pour
me faire savoir que par suite de la mort dont, par I'ordre du destin, une t£te
auguste vient d'etre frappee, Sultan Abdoul Medjid, notre Seigneur et Maitre, a
succede au Trone Imperial ; qu'en meme tems que Sa Hautesse a bien voulu
m'offrir mon pardon, Elle m'a aussi destine une decoration semblable a. celles
des autres illustres Vizirs ; que FEgypte m'est donnee pour etre gouvernee par
ma famille et pour droit d'heredite ; que Votre Altesse a envoye a Son Excellence
Hafiz Pacha, Generalissime de l'Orient, de faire faire hake a l'Armee Imperiale ;
qu'attendu la position delicate dans laquelle la Sublime Porte se trouve, il est
devenu ndcessaire que la Nation Musulmane soit unie par tous les liens possibles,
et que Pon fasse disparaitre cette desunion qui Pafflige ; et que le Secretaire
du Conseil de la Porte, Son Excellence Akiff Effendi, a ete expedie ici pour
entrer dans les details sur la maniere d'etablir la surete reciproque qui depend de
Funion entre les deux parties.
Que le del daigne conserver notre Padishah et bienfaiteur sur le trone, et
lui accorder ses faveurs divines : tels sont les vceux que je ne cesse de faire.
Apres la bataille qui s'est livree, comme on sait, dans les plaines de Nezib,
avec le Generalissime de l'Orient, j'ai eerit a mon fils Ibrahim Pacha, que s'il
a deja passe sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate, il eut a repasser ce fleuve sans
deiai. Votre Altesse sait sans doute, comme tout le monde le sait aussi, que quant
a moi rien ne saurait m'etre plus agreable que de voir se realiser un moment plus
tot cette union et cette bonne intelligence dont Votre Altesse parle, afin que,
suivant mon ancien usage, je recommence a rendre des services a la Sublime
Porte et a lui donner de nouveaux temoignages de mon devouement. Mais
lorsque sous le regne du Sultan defunt, Sarim Effendi, alors Beylikgi de la
Chancellerie Imperiale, vint ici charge d'une mission, il m'annonca que Sa
Hautesse allait me conferer a perpetuite le gouvernement de toute FEgypte, et
ceux de la province de Seyda et du Sandjack de Tripoli de Syrie. Votre
Altesse n'ignore pas que considerant mes services passes, je n'ai pas accepte les
offres qui m 'etaient faites, et que j'ai prie que toutes les provinces et tous les
Sandjacks qui se trouvaient deja soumis a mon Gouvernement me fussent donnes
a perpetuite a moi, et apres moi, a mes fils et petits-fils.
Sans parler ici de nos anciennes liaisons d'amitie, et de nos relations, qui ne
cesseront jamais, j'aime a croire que reflechissant, d'apres l'intelligence des
affaires et la perspicacite que vous caracterisent. sur la position delicate de la
Sublime Porte, sur la sincerite de mes sentimens, et sur les avantages d'assurer
la tranquillite de la Nation Musulmane, Votre Altesse agira envers moi d'une
maniere analogue aux circonstances actuelles, amenees par les decrets du
Ciel. La lettre que Votre Altesse m'a ecrite parle seulement de FEgypte : elle
ne fait aucune allusion aux autres choses, et je vois clairement par les discours
d'Akiff Effendi, qu'il n'a aucune mission, aucune autorisation relativement a
ma demande, savoir, que toutes les Provinces et tous les Sandjacks me soient
donnes a perpetuite. Ainsi il a ete juge qu'il etait inutile pour lui de reste r ici,
et que plutot que d'entrer en correspondance avec la Sublime Porte, il valait
mieux qu'il s'en retournat pour faire connaitre a Votre Altesse, de vive voix,
mes sentimens ; et c'est ce qui j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir par cette
lettre. Le 5 Djemazi-ul-evel, 1255.— (16 Juillet, 1839.)

(Translation.)
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.
I HAVE received the letter which Your Highness has done me the honour
to write to me, to communicate to me that, in consequence of the death by which,
agreeably to destiny, an August personage has been stricken, Sultan Abdul

297
Medjid, our Lord and Master, has succeeded to the Imperial Throne ; that at
the same time that His Highness has been pleased to offer me pardon, he has also
designed for me a decoration similar to that of the other illustrious Viziers;
that Egypt is given me to be governed by my family, and by hereditary right ;
that Your Highness has sent to his Excellancy Hafiz Pasha, Generalissimo of the
East, to cause him to halt the Imperial Army; that considering the delicate
situation in which the Sublime Porte is placed, it has become necessary that the
Mussulman nation should be united by all possible ties ; and that the disunion
by which it is afflicted, should be made to disappear ; and that the Secretary of
the Council of the Porte, his Excellency Akiff Effendi, has been sent hither to
enter into details upon the manner of establishing that reciprocal security which
depends upon the two parties being united.
May Heaven preserve our Emperor and benefactor on the throne, and grant
him its Divine favours : such are the vows which I cease not to make.
After the battle, which, as it is known, took place in the Plains of Nezib,
with the Generalissimo of the East, I wrote to my son Ibrahim Pasha, that if he
had already passed over to the right bank of the Euphrates, he should recross
the river without delay.
Your Excellency is doubtless aware, as all the world is, that as far as I am
concerned, nothing could be more agreeable to me than to behold that union
and good understanding of which your Excellency speaks, realized as soon as
possible, in order that, agreeably to my ancient habit, I may begin again to
render services to the Sublime Porte, and to give it fresh proofs of my devotion.
But when, during the reign of the late Sultan, Sarim Effendi, at that time the
Beylikgi of the Imperial Chancery, came here on a mission, he announced to me
that His Highness was about to confer on me in perpetuity the government of all
Egypt, and those of the Province of Seyda, and of the Sandjak of Tripoli of
Syria. Your Excellency is not ignorant that, in consideration of my past
services, I did not accept the offers made to me, and that I requested that all the
Provinces and Sandjaks which were already governed by me, should be given
to me in perpetuity, and, after me, to my sons and grandsons.
Without speaking in this place of our ancient connections of friendship, and
of our relations, which will never cease, I flatter myself that Your Highness,
reflecting, with the knowledge of affairs, and the penetration by which you are
characterised, upon the delicate position of the Sublime Porte, upon the sincerity
of my sentiments, and upon the advantage of securing the tranquillity of the
Mussulman nation, will act towards me in a manner consistent with existing cir
cumstances, which have been brought on by the decrees of Heaven.
The letter which Your Highness has written to me, speaks only of Egypt ;
it makes no allusion to other matters, and I clearly perceive by the language of
Akiff Effendi, that he has no commission, nor authority with reference to my
demand, namely, that all the Provinces and all the Sandjaks should be given to
me in perpetuity. Therefore it has been considered useless for him to remain
here ; and that, rather than that he should enter into a correspondence with the
Sublime Porte, it was better that he should return to communicate my sentiments
verbally to Your Highness ; and that is what I have the honour to impart to you
by this letter.
The 5th Djemazi-ul-evel, 1255. — July 16, 1839.

No. 227.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 17.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 29, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of my letter to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General
at Alexandria, transmitting a copy of the Collective Note of the 27th instant.
The French Ambassador had written to the French Consul-General a letter,
and Baron Stiirmer had expressed his own notion, and that of the Ministers of
Prussia and Russia, that some efforts should be made by us all to obtain the
restoration of the Ottoman Fleet. I wrote to Baron Stiirmer a note, of which
I inclose copy, and stated to Admiral Roussin my opinion, that the Collective Note
Iiaving been agreed to by the Porte, it was not competent to us to make any
2 Q

298
arrangements without further instructions from our Governments, in whose hands
the affair was now entirely placed ; that therefore 1 could not approve of any
proposition being made to Mehemet Ali, and had confined myself to the simple
notification of the fact of the Collective Note, and the adhesion of the Porte to the
proposal therein contained.
I think there might arise inconveniences from any step we might take in
present circumstances.
In my despatch to Admiral Stopford, of which a copy is also annexed, one
possible inconvenience is mentioned.
The French Ambassador admitted my view, but has acted upon his own.
It was not proposed that we should write a collective nor an identic letter to the
Consuls at Alexandria; and I thought myself at liberty, therefore, to act as I
have done, and Her Majesty's Government thereby is wholly uncommitted.
The French Ambassador was apparently anxious to send his aide-de-camp
with the despatches, to which I, for one, readily consented. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 227.
Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, Therapia, July 29, 18S9.
I INCLOSE copy of a Collective Note signed by the Representatives of the
Five Great Powers.
It was yesterday delivered to the Sublime Porte, and the Porte, without
delay, gave its formal adhesion to the proposition therein contained.
You will acquaint the Pasha of Egypt with this fact. The Representatives
of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, have directed the Consuls-General of
their respective Governments to communicate the above fact to the Pasha ; and it
is desired by all that the Consuls-General should act conjointly in performing
what is desired of them. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 227.
Viscount Ponsonby to the Baron de Stiirmer.
My dear Baron, July 29, 1839.
I SEND back Admiral Roussin's letter, and I send you the letter I have
written to the British Consul-General.
I think it better to avoid saying one word that is not absolutely necessary for
making known the fact. I have no authority from my Government to take any
measures for effecting any arrangement between the Porte and the Pasha ; and
our act of the 27th instant has placed the arrangement entirely in the hands of
the Great Powers themselves, and our Governments are alone competent to act
now. The Porte has acceded to what we proposed. I think it proper to avoid
committing my Government ; and therefore I say nothing about the restitution
of the fleet. I do not like to reduce my Government, in communication with
Mehemet Ali, to a level with the Pasha. I cannot treat him as I should treat
the Sultan ; and it seems to me sufficient to cause the fact of our proceedings
here to be notified to him. I offer him no advice. I am not Ambassador near
the Pasha of Egypt. You will perceive that I have not the least fault to find
with Admiral Roussin's letter. It is not a collective act we have to perform,

299
excepting in so far as the sending officially the copy of our Collective Note to the
Porte, and notifying the acceptance by the Sublime Porte of the proposition
contained therein. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 227.
Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.
Sir, Therapia, July 29, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, a copy of a Collective
Official Note, signed by the Ministers of the Five Great Powers, which was
yesterday presented to the Sublime Porte, and received by the Ottoman Ministers
with the highest satisfaction.
It appears to me that, in accordance with your instructions, the paramount
object of Her Majesty's Government is to prevent a collision between the Porte
and the Pasha of Egypt ; and I presume that the act done by the Great Powers, as
now reported to you, is to be considered as an additional reason for the adoption
of every measure that may tend to prevent any attack being made by the
Egyptians upon the Sultan.
It would be rash to assume that Mehemet Ali may not be induced, by what
has now been done, to make attempts to overthrow the Government of this
country; and it is possible that he may have recourse to some means that may be
furnished him by the Ottoman fleet: for instance, he might at once send back
that fleet, having secured for himself the attachment of the officers commanding it,
which it is certain he has attempted to do, if not succeeded in effecting; and the
fleet, in that case, might be employed at Constantinople to overawe the Sultan, and
change the Government, so as to establish in authority men devoted to the party
and the views of Mehemet Ali. I should think it may be a question as to the
expediency of allowing the Ottoman fleet to come up to Constantinople, before
the Grand Vizier shall have had knowledge of the situation of things in it, and
time to take such measures as he may think proper. I will communicate with
the Grand Vizier on this point, and report to you upon it.
There is another contingency worthy of consideration, namely, the possibility,
some say the probability, that Ibrahim Pasha may advance with his army to menace
the capital. If that were to happen, it might be considered proper for Her
Majesty's servants to offer and give all the protection and support possible to the
Sultan and his Government ; and I think it would be easily in the power of Her
Majesty's servants to secure the capital against all attack from without, and from
almost every chance of domestic tumult, and the efforts of the partizans of
Mehemet Ali to produce revolution. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 228.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 19.)
My Lord, St. Petersburgh, August 10, 1839.
THE departure of the steam-boat allows me barely time to inform your
Lordship of a conversation which I have just had with Count Nesselrode. His
Excellency sent for me to let me know the intelligence he had just received from
Constantinople and Alexandria. And as it appeared to us possible that this
despatch might reach your Lordship as soon as any news of the same date from
Egypt, his Excellency permitted me to take the copies of reports of two
interviews between the Pasha of Egypt and the Consuls-General of the Four
Powers at Alexandria, and between the Pasha and the Consul-General of
Austria, which I have the honour to inclose.
Count Nesselrode told me that his accounts from Constantinople up to the
2 Q2

300
30th of July, stated that that capital enjoyed perfect quiet, and the rumours we
Jhad heard of revolts in the Turkish provinces had not been confirmed.
His Excellency expressed his surprise and 1 egret that Achmet Pasha should
not have been met, and stopped by our Admiral before he reached Alexandria,
and that the French Admiral Lalande had allowed him to pass with the Turkish
fleet unopposed.
Count Nesselrode asked me if I supposed my Government would persist
in maintaining the conditions we had proposed, of a definitive settlement of the
differences between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, in the altered condition of their
affairs, and of the tone of the Pasha.
I replied, that Her Majesty's Government did not see that the recent
events that had occurred necessitated any other change in the views and conduct
of the Five Great Powers, than an increase of vigour and promptitude in their
interposition to uphold the Turkish Empire.
Count Nesselrode assured me of his readiness to concur in that view •
but his Excellency added, that it remained to consider by what steps it should
be supported, provided, as appeared probable, our diplomatic exertions at Alex
andria proved fruitless.
Count Nesselrode expressed his regret that the French and English com
bined fleet had repaired to Tenedos instead of remaining off Alexandria.
His Excellency showed me a copy of his reply to the communication
addressed by the French Government to each of the Four Powers, and proceeded
to speak of the demand made by the French Ambassador at Constantinople to
pass the Dardanelles. He showed me the despatch he had written to Count
Medem thereupon ; and he said he had no doubt that the whole of the Turkish
affairs would be settled quietly and satisfactorily, provided the French fleet was
kept out of the Dardanelles. He said the demand was ill-timed and ill-advised,
and that he was sorry it had been made.
I reminded his Excellency that it was made only conditional upon one
contingent, which appeared very unlikely to arise ; and that upon the general
wisdom of the policy, — as regarded Turkey or the rest of Europe, — by which
the Dardanelles were to be kept closed, I knew the British Government agreed
with what he said upon it, however necessary an exceptional case of infringing
that rule might be.
On the whole, Count Nesselrode repeated the same assurances I had pre
viously received and reported to your Lordship, and in which I believe ; namely,
that the Russian Government are most desirous of avoiding any military demon
stration, or any necessity for carrying into execution the main clause of the Treaty
of Unkiar Skelessi.
I have to apologise to your Lordship for the hurry which is evident in this
despatch. I have &c.
(Signed) ' CLANRICARDE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 228.
[See Inclosure 5 in No. 191. J

Inclosure 2 in No. 228.
The Consul-General of Austria in Egypt, to the Internuncio at Constantinople.
(Extrait.) Alexandrie, le f9 Juillet, 1839.
DANS un entretien que j'ai eu hier le -&, avec Mehemet Ali, je lui ai pose
les deux questions suivantes :
1°. Quel serait le parti qu'il prendrait, si la Porte ne consent pas a
eloigner des affaires Hosreff Pacha, ni a accorder a Mehemet Ali l'heredite de
toutes ses possessions ?
2°. Quelle serait sa conduite, si la Porte accddait a l'une et a Pautre de ces
demandes ?

301
Reponse ad lm. " Dans le cas de refus de la Porte, je resterai tel que je suis,
c'est-a-dire, je garderai toutes les provinces que je possede en occupant encore
en sus Ourfa et Diarbekir ; je garderai aussi la flotte Ottomane, persuade que
les Grandes Puissances n'emploicront contre moi que des mesures negatives;
mais si elles voulaient recourir a des mesures coercitives, je suis resolu a me
defendre a outrance.
Ad 2m. " Si la Porte adhere a. mes demandes, je laisse la Syrie et les autres
provinces a mes enfans pour les gouverner k leur guise, et je me rendrai a
Constantinople, pour mettre mon zele et mes services aux pieds de mon
Souverain ; je n'accepterai pas le poste de Grand Vizir, ni aucun autre emploi
actif, je ne veux etre que son premier Conseiller, pour Paider a gouverner son
Empire, pour introduire des reformes utiles, remedier aux abus inveteres en
Turquie, et y faire regner la justice, la securite, et l'abondance."
En conclusion, Mehemet Ali a prie M. Laurin de porter fidelement cet en
tretien a la connaissance de l'lnternonce."

(Translation/
The Consul-General of Austria in Egypt to the Internuncio at Constantinople.
(Extract.) Alexandria, July xg-, 1839.
IN a conversation which I had yesterday the i%th with Mehemet Ali, I put
to him the two following questions : —
1°. What course would he adopt if the Porte should not consent to dismiss
Hosrew Pasha from office, or to grant to Mehemet Ali hereditary succession of
all his possessions ?
2°. What line of conduct would he pursue if the Porte should accede to
both of these demands ?
Answer to 1st. " In the event of the refusal of the Porte, I will remain as
I am, that is to say, I will keep all the provinces I possess, occupying besides
Orfa and Diarbekir ; I will keep also the Ottoman fleet, being certain that the
Great Powers will only take negative measures against me : but if they choose to
have recourse to coercive measures, I am resolved to defend myself to the utmost."
Answer to the 2d. " If the Porte accedes to my demands I will leave
Syria and the other Provinces to my children to govern as they like, and will go
to Constantinople to place my zeal and my services at the feet of my Sovereign.
I will not accept the post of Grand Vizier nor any other active employment ; I
only wish to be his chief Counsellor, to assist him in governing his Empire, to
introduce useful reforms, to apply remedies to inveterate abuses in Turkey, and
to cause justice, security, and plenty to reign in that country."
In conclusion, Mehemet Ali requested M. Laurin to give a faithful account
of this conversation to the Internuncio.

No. 229.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 18.)
My Lord, Paris, August 16, 1839,
I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to the
13th of August.
I had an interview with Marshal Soult this morning ; his Excellency
received despatches yesterday from Admiral Roussin and from M. Cochelet, the
French Consul-General at Alexandria. The former, he said, contained scarcely
any intelligence that had not previously reached Paris. The French Ambassador,
it seems, had not been made acquainted with the answer which the Porte had
given to Mehemet Ali's propositions for peace.
M. Cochelet writes, that the Turkish fleet had entered the port of
Alexandria, and that a great number of the officers belonging to it, and who
were walking about the streets, had adopted the dress of the Egyptian officers
of marine.

302
Count Medem, the Russian Consul-General in Egypt, states in a letter to
his brother at Paris, that the Egyptian fleet is also gradually retiring into port,
in consequence of the apprehension felt by Mehemet Ali of its being attacked
by the English and French fleets, if it remained at sea. #
This intelligence, Marshal Soult said, made him feel indifferent in regard
to sending the instructions to Admiral Lalande which had been prepared.
I asked the Marshal whether he meant that no further representations
should be made to the Pasha respecting the restoration of the Turkish fleet to
the Sultan. He said, far from it; indeed, he had thought of despatching
another of his aides-de-camp to Mehemet Ali to remonstrate against the course
in which he was proceeding, particularly with reference to his demand of the
dismissal of the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha, and to the letters which he had
written to seventeen different Pashas to join with him in insisting on a compliance
with that demand. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 230.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 19.)
(Extract.) Berlin, August 14, 1839.
I COMMUNICATED to Baron Werther the contents of your despatch of the
6th of August; and his Excellency entirely agreed with your Lordship's opinion,
that the present unfortunate state of affairs in the East ought to make no alteration
in the course which the Five Powers had intended to pursue. He stated that Prussia
would follow the line of conduct pointed out to her by Great Britain and Austria;
and that he had entire confidence in the measures which those Governments
should decide upon adopting. He stated that he was convinced, that Russia
was acting honourably and without arriere-pensee at this conjuncture.
It appears that M. de Tatistcheff has left Petersburgh for Vienna ; Baron
Werther therefore is of opinion, that he will have received the Emperor's orders
to concert with Lord Beauvale and Prince Metternich ; and he said that the
Emperor had lately talked without reserve to Count Fiquelmont, and much to
that Minister's satisfaction, on the Turkish Question.
I feel, however, that I should, on the occasion of this despatch, be wanting
in my duty, were I to conceal from your Lordship that I find much apprehension
exists here among those who take an interest in the affairs of the East, and who
are acquainted with their present state, as to the consequences that may ensue,
dangerous to the peace of Europe, should Mehemet Ali be driven to desperation
bv the adoption of coercive measures against him, before all means of conciliation
bad been resorted to. It is considered that, as long as he is on amicable term?
with the Five Powers, he is comparatively harmless, and unable to light the flames
of war ; but, if reduced to extremity, he has it instantly in his power, by advanc
ing his troops on Constantinople, to create a complication of evils throughout
Europe, either by still further destroying the power of the Sultan and exciting a
revolution at Constantinople, or by bringing down the intervention of a Russian'
armed force.
Such are the opinions that I have heard expressed, and I am sure I need
not apologize to your Lordship for reporting them.
No. 231.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 20.)
My Lord, Paris, August 18, 1839:
THE inclosed paper* is a copy of a note which, on the 28th ultimo, was
presented to the Sublime Porte, signed by the Representatives of the Great
European Powers at Constantinople. * See Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

303
Marshal Soult received a copy of it this morning in a despatch from Admiral
Rnussin, and obligingly lost no time in communicating it to me.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 232.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 21.)
My Lord, Pan's, August 19, 1839.
MARSHAL SOULT read to me this morning a despatch from M. de
Bourqueney, by which I learnt that your Lordship had received despatches from
Constantinople of the 29th ultimo, and had been made acquainted with the
Collective Note of the Representatives of the Great European Powers to the
Sublime Porte, relative to the suspension of the negotiations with Mehemet Ali,
before intelligence of it had reached the French Government.
In the same despatch, M. de Bourqueney mentions the proposition made by
your Lordship, that, in the event of Mehemet Ali's refusal to restore the Turkish
fleet to the Sultan, the British and French Consuls should withdraw from Alex
andria. To this proposition Marshal Soult decidedly objected ; he said, that
the departure of the French and British Consuls, while those of Austria and of
Russia remained, could not fail to inspire in the mind of Mehemet Ali the hope
that Russia and Austria no longer acted in concert with Great Britain and
France, and might encourage the Pasha to persevere in insisting upon conditions
of peace with his Sovereign, which the appearance of a continued union between
the Great Powers of Europe might induce him to give up. 1 observed, that your
Lordship seemed to look to arrangements being made at Vienna for the simulta
neous withdrawal of the Consuls of the other Great Powers. His Excellency then
said, that we should be exhausting, to obtain the restoration of the Turkish fleet,
those means of intimidation which might be more advantageously employed in
obtaining acceptable terms of peace ; hut he seemed not disinclined to acquiesce
in any decision that might be taken in regard to the Consuls at Alexandria, to
which the Austrian Government was a party.
Count Medem put this morning into the hands of the Due de Dalmatie a
copy of a despatch from Count Nesselrode, in which the Russian Minister ad
verts to the communication made to him by M. de Barante, with respect to the
entrance of the combined French and English Fleet into the Sea of Marmora;
he answers that communication as if the Ambassador had announced as positive
the intention of the combined Fleet to pass the Dardanelles, and not as contin
gent upon the Russian Fleet entering the Bosphorus; and proceeding upon this
hypothesis, Count Nesselrode dwells upon the necessity of the Russian
Government adopting measures for the independence of Turkey, and on the
danger arising therefrom to the peace of Europe.
The Marshal requested Count Medem to point out to his Government, that
it was only in the case of a Russian armament passing into the Bosphorus that
the French fleet would proceed to the Sea of Marmora, and that he was perfectly
willing that both ends of the canal of Constantinople should be closed against
the entrance of foreign ships of war. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 233.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 21.)
My Lord, Paris, August 19, 1839.
WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of August 16, by which I am
directed to draw the attention of the French Government to the fact that the
confidential communications between the two Governments respecting the orders
to be given to the English and French Admirals in the Levant, have by some

304
means or other been made known to the French newspapers, I have to state, that
this morning, before 1 made any allusion to this subject, Marshal Soult reverted
to it, and assured me, that it had given him more pain and vexation than could
have been felt by your Lordship on the occasion. I said to him, that after he had
expressed himself so strongly upon this matter, it was unnecessary for me to execute
an instruction I had received from you, to represent the serious inconvenience which
might arise from confidential communications between the two Governments being
prematurely made public, and becoming matter of discussion in the newspapers.
>¦ tinvc &c.
(Signed) ' GRANVILLE.

No. 234.
Count Nesselrode to Count Medem. — (Communicated by M. de Kisseleff,
August 19, 1839.)
M. le Comte, St. Pe'tersbourg, le %3^ , 1839.
AU milieu des evenemens qui semblent de jour en jour aggraver davantage
Petat des affaires du Levant, l'Empereur a juge necessaire, que ses Representans
fussent exactement instruits et du jugement qu'il porte sur la situation actuelle
de l'Empire Ottoman, et des determinations qu'il a prises pour prevenir les
dangers qui menacent aujourd'hui de compromettre le repos de l'Orient.
C'est d'ordre expres de notre Auguste Maitre, que je me fais un devoir,
M. le Comte, de vous faire connaitre ses pensees et ses determinations, de la
maniere la plus positive.
L'Empereur a la conscience d'avoir fait tout ce qui etait en son pouvoir
pour empecher un conflit entre la Turquie et FEgypte. II a adresse au Sultan
Mahmoud les representations les plus serieuses pour le detourner de I 'idee de
s'engager dans une lutte dont notre Auguste Maitre prevoyait les consequences
deplorables. L'evenement n'a que trop realise nos previsions et justifie nos remontrances.
La journee du -Jf Juin a detruit Farmee Turque. La trahison du Capitan
Pacha a mis le comble aux malheurs qui ont marque le terme du regne du
Sultan Mahmoud.
Malgre tant de desastres, son fils Abdoul Medjid est monte sur le tr6ne, sans
que son avenement ait ete accompagne de scenes de desordre et de troubles
dont l'histoire de Turquie nous offre de si frequens exemples. Loin de la, les
derniers rapports de notre Ministre a Constantinople attestent, que la solemnite
du couronnement a ete ceiebree par des temoignages unanimes de respect et de
fidelite, au milieu de cette immense population de la capitale de FEmpire
Ottoman, dont la securite n'a pas ete troublee un seul instant.
Dans cet etat de choses, l'Empereur ne desespere nullement da salut de la
Porte, pourvu que les Puissances de l'Europe sachent respecter son repos, et que
par une agitation intempestive, elles ne finissent par Pebranler, tout en voulant la
raffermir. Peu de mots suffiront, M. le Comte, pour vous exposer a cet egard notre
pensee toute entiere.
La situation oil la Porte se trouve aujourd'hui, quelque difficile qu'elle soit,
n'est pas ueuve pour elle. Durant une longue serie d'annees elle a toujours
commis les memes fautes, eprouve les memes desastres. Mais guidee par un
secret instinct de sa propre conservation, elle a toujours su eviter le moment
fatal qui devait amener sa chute.
Aujourd'hui, dirigee par la meme pensee de conservation, elle est a la veille
de transiger encore une fois avec Mehemet Ali. Deja, die lui a fait parvenir a
cet effet des offres de conciliation, dont elle s'est empressee de faire part aux
Representans des Cinq Grandes Puissances. De plus, elle leur a demande leur
appui a Alexandrie, pour determiner le Pacha a accepter les propositions qu'elle
vient de lui adresser.
De cette maniere, la tache que les Cabinets de l'Europe sont appeies a.
remplir, leur a ete clairement indiquee par la Porte elle-meme. lis doivent
appuyer ses demarches a Alexandrie; decider Mehemet Ali a les accepter; ne

305
point permettre qu'il impose au Sultan des conditions plus ondreuses ; en un
mot, placer le Pacha dans la necessite d'adopter les bases d'un arrangement
definitif que l'Europe est autorisee a considerer comme solide, parcequ'il est
equitable. Voila, M. le Comte, la tache que les Cabinets de l'Europe auront a remplir.
Pour atteindre ce but, il faut que tous leurs efforts soient concentres a.
Alexandrie. Tourner leur action vers Constantinople, ce serait diriger leurs
forces du c6te d'ou le danger ne vient pas. La, il ne faut ni agitation diplo
matique, ni deployement de forces militaires : il ne faut que du repos.
Cette conviction a dicte les determinations de l'Empereur. Au milieu
de Fagitation generale que la crise du Levant a fait naitre, il n'a eprouvd ni
inquietude, ni impatience d'agir. II n'a fait aucune demonstration. II n'a
envoye a Constantinople ni un vaisseau, ni un soldat, dans la ferme persuasion,
que son calme ferait a la Porte plus de bien que ne lui en aurait fait son armee
et sa flotte.
Telle est Fattitude que l'Empereur a prise.
Or, si la Russie, dont les intents les plus directs se trouvent engages dans
la crise actuelle, et dont les frontieres touchent immediatement a celles de la
Turquie, ne se montre aujourd'hui ni inquiete, ni impatiente de paraitre sur le
theatre des evenemens, il nous semble qu'a plus forte raison les Puissances dont
la securite n'est nullement compromise, et que de grandes distances separent de
l'Empire Ottoman, peuvent, sans le moindre inconvenient, adopter la meme
attitude, et moderer leur action.
Dans cette attente, notre Auguste Maitre se plait a, croire que le Gouvernement
Francais, guide par la politique pleine de prevoyance qu'il a suivie jusqu'a ce
jour, ne cherchera point a compliquer la situation de l'Empire Ottoman par un
deployement de forces navales, qui, au lieu d'imposer la paix a Alexandrie,
viendrait la troubler a. Constantinople.
Si malheureusement Fespoir que l'Empereur est en droit de fonder sur la
moderation du Gouvernement Frangais ne se realisait pas ; si Fapparition d'une
Eseadre etrangere dans la Mer de Marmora venait aggraver l'etat des choses a
Constantinople ; la marche que la Russie aurait a suivre ne serait pas douteuse.
En presence d'une flotte etrangere, le Ministre de l'Empereur protesterait
formellement contre la violation flagrante de la fermeture des Dardanelles :
principe que la Porte a considere de tout tems comme une regie fondamentale de
sa politique, et qu'elle s'est engagee envers nous a maintenir invariablement ; il
declarerait qu'il regardait cette violation comme contraire a Findependance de la
Porte, suspendrait immediatement ses fonctions, et quitterait Constantinople.
Alors, il ne resterait plus a l'Empereur qu'a, prendre les mesures qu'il jugerait
necessaires pour retablir la Porte dans son entiere independance, et la mettre a
meme de remplir ses engagemens envers nous, libre de toute contrainte etrangere.
Telles seraient, M. le Comte, les consequences inevitables de Fapparition
d'une Eseadre Frangaise dans la Mer de Marmora.
Comme il importe plus que jamais que les Cabinets de l'Europe se rendent
compte a, eux-memes de leur position relative, et qu'ils fassent preuve a cet egard
de la plus grande sincerite les uns envers les autres, notre Cabinet a pense qu'il
devait au Gouvernement Frangais un expose clair et positif des determinations
que nous serions forces de prendre, si Feventualite dont je viens de faire mention,
venait jamais a se realiser. En ce cas, le parti que nous aurions a prendre, ne
dependrait pas de notre libre choix ; il nous serait impose par les necessites de
notre politique aussi bien que par les interets les plus directs de notre empire.
Un coup-d'ceil jete sur la carte expliquera la difference qui existe a cet egard
entre la position geographique de la Russie et celle des Puissances de FOccident.
En effet, lorsqu'en 1833 une Eseadre Russe vint jeter Fancre dans le
Bosphore, sa presence ne pouvait etre consideree ni comme une menace dirigde
contre la Marine Francaise, ni comme une atteinte portee a la prosperite
commerciale de Marseille. Mais si aujourd'hui une Eseadre Frangaise paraissait a
Constantinople, sa presence reagirait directement sur Odessa et sur Sevastopol.
Le Ministere Frangais est trop dclaire et trop equitable pour ne pas
reconnaitre la difference de position que je viens de signaler. En 1833, nous
avons protege la Porte sans braver les Puissances de FOccident. En 1839, les
escadres etrangeres, sans proteger la Porte, viendraient insulter la Russie.
II nous suffit d'avoir clairement etabli cette distinction, qui nous dispense
2 R

306
d'entrer a ce sujet dans de plus amples devdoppemens. D'ailleurs, notre intention
n'est point ici de provoquer une discussion quelconque sur une eventualite qui,
nous Fesperons, ne se realisera pas ; notre unique desir est simplement de mettre
le Cabinet Frangais a meme de se pe'ne'trer des intentions et des interets qui
servent de regie k la politique de la Russie. Eclaircir mutuellement te position
des Cabinets, c'est incontestablement le moyen le plus sur de maintenir le parfait
accord si heureusement etabli entre eux: union desirable, parcequ elle
renferme en elle, ainsi que M. le Due de Dalmatie dans une de ses communi
cations recentes Fa si bien observe, la garantie la plus solide pour rassurer les
amis de la paix. „
C'est dans cet esprit de conciliation et de parfait accord, que vous etes
charge de vous acquitter aupres de M. le President du Conseil, de la commu
nication contenue dans la presente depeche dont vous voudrez bien lui donner
lecture et remettre copie. Recevez, &c,
(Signee) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)
Count Nesselrode to Count Medem. (Communicated by M. de Kisseleff,
August 19, 1839.)
M. le Comte, St. Petersburgh, £^ 1839.
IN the midst of the events which seem from day to day to aggravate more
seriously the state of affairs of the Levant, the Emperor has considered it neces
sary that his Representatives should be exactly apprized, both of the opinion which
he has formed of the present situation of the Ottoman Empire, and of the reso
lutions which he has taken to counteract the dangers which threaten at the
present time to compromise the peace of the East.
It is by the express order of our August Master, that I make it my duty,
M. le Comte, to acquaint you, in the most positive manner, with his thoughts
and determinations. The Emperor feels conscious of having done all in his power to prevent a
conflict between Turkey and Egypt. He addressed to Sultan Mahmoud the
most serious representations, in order to deter him from the idea of engaging in
a struggle of which our August Master foresaw the deplorable consequences.
The event has but too far realised our anticipations and justified our remon
strances. The action of the -g-f of June, has destroyed the Turkish Army. The
treason of the Capudan Pasha has filled up the measure of the misfortunes which
have marked the close of Sultan Mahmoud's reign.
Notwithstanding so many disasters, his son Abdul Medjid has ascended the
throne, without his accession being accompanied with those scenes of disorder and
of trouble, of which the history of Turkey offers us such frequent examples.
Far from this being the case, the latest reports from our Minister at Constanti
nople attest, that the solemnity of the coronation has been accompanied by
unanimous demonstrations of respect and of fidelity in the midst of that immense
population of the capital of the Ottoman Empire, the tranquillity of which has
not been troubled for a single moment.
In this state of affairs, the Emperor in no wise despairs of the safety of the
Porte, provided that the Powers of Europe know how to respect its tranquillity,
and that they do not by inopportune agitation end by unsettling, at the same
time that they wish to consolidate, it.
Few words will suffice, M. le Comte, to place before you our whole opinion
in this respect.
The situation in which the Porte finds itself at present, however difficult it
may be, is not novel. During a long course of years, it has always com
mitted the same faults, and experienced the same disasters. But, guided by
a secret instinct for its own preservation, it has always known how to avoid the
fatal moment which would bring on its fall.
At the present day, actuated by the same idea of preservation, it is on the

307
eve of once more entering into an arrangement with Mehemet Ali. It has
already caused to be made to him for this purpose offers of conciliation, which
it has hastened to communicate to the Representatives of the Five Great
Powers. Further, it has asked for their support at Alexandria, in order to
persuade the Pasha to accept the proposals which it has just made to him.
In this manner, the work which the Cabinets of Europe are called upon to
perform, has been clearly pointed out to them by the Porte itself. They have
to support its overtures at Alexandria ; to prevail upon Mehemet Ali to accept
them ; not to allow him to impose more onerous conditions on the Sultan ; in one
word, to place the Pasha under the necessity of adopting the bases of a defini
tive arrangement which Europe is authorized to consider as stable, because it is
an equitable one.
This, M. le Comte, is the work which the Cabinets of Europe will have to
perform. To attain this end, it is necessary that all their efforts should be concen
trated at Alexandria. To direct their action towards Constantinople, would be
to direct their efforts to the side from which the danger does not come. There,
neither diplomatic agitation is necessary, nor the display of military force ; tran
quillity alone is wanting.
This conviction has dictated the resolutions of the Emperor. In the midst
of the general agitation which the crisis in the Levant has produced, he has
experienced neither uneasiness nor impatience to act. He has made no demon
stration ; he has not sent to Constantinople a single ship, or a single soldier, in
the firm persuasion that his inaction would do the Porte more good than his
army or his fleet could have done.
Such is the attitude which the Emperor has taken.
Wherefore, if Russia, whose most direct interests are engaged in the present
crisis, and whose frontiers are immediately adjacent to those of Turkey, appears
at the present time to be neither uneasy, nor impatient to appear on the theatre
of events, it seems to us, that much more can the Powers, whose safety is in
no way compromised, and who are separated by great distances from the Ottoman
Empire, adopt, without the least inconvenience, the same attitude, and mode
rate their action.
In this expectation, our August Master flatters himself that the French
Government, guided by the policy full of foresight which it has pursued up to
this day, will not endeavour to complicate the situation of the Ottoman Empire
by a display of naval force, which, instead of preserving peace at Alexandria,
would unsettle peace at Constantinople.
If, unfortunately, the hope which the Emperor has reason to found upon
the moderation of the French Government, should not be realized ; if the
appearance of a foreign fleet in the Sea of Marmora should come to aggravate
the state of affairs at Constantinople ; the course which Russia would have to
pursue would not be doubtful. In the presence of a foreign fleet, the Emperor's
Minister would formally protest against the flagrant violation of the principle of
the closing the Dardanelles ; a principle which the Porte has at all times con
sidered as a fundamental rule of its policy, and which it has engaged itself to
us invariably to maintain ; he would declare that he regarded this violation as
contrary to the independence of the Porte ; he would immediately suspend his
functions, and quit Constantinople. Then it would only remain for the Emperor
to take such measures as he might consider necessary to re-establish the Porte
in its entire independence, and to enable it to fulfil its engagements towards
us, free from all foreign constraint.
Such, M. le Comte, would be the inevitable consequences of the appearance
of a French squadron in the Sea of Marmora.
As it is more than ever necessary that the Cabinets of Europe should give
an account to themselves of their relative positions, and that they should give
proofs in this respect of the greatest sincerity towards one another, our Cabinet
has thought that it was its duty to give to the French Government a clear and
positive explanation of the steps which we should be obliged to take, in the
event of the case of which I have just made mention ever being realized. In
this case, the part which we should have to take, would not depend on our own
free choice ; it would be imposed on us by the exigencies of our policy, as well
as by the most direct interests of our Empire. A glance thrown upon the map
2 R 2

308
will explain the difference which exists in this respect between the geographical
position of Russia, and that of the Western Powers.
In fact, when a Russian squadron anchored in the Bosphorus in 1833, its
presence could neither be considered as a threat directed against the French
Navy, nor as a blow struck at the commercial prosperity of Marseilles. But if,
at the present moment, a French squadron should make its appearance at Con
stantinople, its presence would react directly upon Odessa and Sevastopol.
The French Ministry is too enlightened and too just not to acknowledge
the difference of position which I have just pointed out. In 1833 we protected
the Porte without offering any affront to the Western Powers. In 1839,
the foreign squadrons, without protecting the Porte, would come to insult Russia.
It is sufficient for us to have clearly established this distinction, which
dispenses us from entering upon this subject in fuller particulars. Besides, our
intention now is not to provoke any discussion whatever with respect to a
contingency, which we hope will not be realised ; our desire is simply to enable
the French Cabinet to comprehend fully the intentions and the interests which
serve as a rule for the policy of Russia. Mutually to clear up the position of
the Cabinets, is incontestably the surest means of maintaining the perfect agree
ment so happily established among them ; a union desirable, because it contains
in itself, as the Duke of Dalmatia in one of his recent communications has so
well observed, the most solid guarantee for reassuring the friends of peace.
It is in this spirit of conciliation and of perfect concord, that you are
authorized to make to the President of the Council the communication contained
in the present despatch, which you will have the goodness to read to him, and
of which you will give him a copy. Receive, &c,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 235.
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 20, 1839.
M. DE KISSELEFF communicated to me yesterday a copy of the
despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Medem, of the f^~, which,
it appears from your despatch of August 10, Count Nesselrode himself has
shown to your Excellency.
With reference to that part of the despatch which relates to the passage
of the Dardanelles by a French squadron, I read to M. de Kisseleff the three
instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, of which I
inclose copies*, in order to show to M. de Kisseleff that the Russian Govern
ment had misconceived the nature of the demand which the British and
French Ambassadors at Constantinople were instructed to make, — that in
certain contingencies the fleets of their respective nations might be 'permitted
to pass the Dardanelles. I pointed out to M. de Kisseleff that such demand
was not made with any view of hostility against Sevastopol or Odessa, but
solely for the protection of Constantinople, and not upon the principle of
separate action on the part of England and of France, but for the purpose of
maintaining a joint action on the part of the Five Powers. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

See Nos. 90, 117, and 120.

309
No. 236.
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.
Sir, Foreign Office, August 20, 1839.
I HAVE to instruct you to state to the French Government, with reference
to the communications which have passed between the two Governments, about
the measures to be taken for restoring to the Sultan the Turkish fleet, that in
the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Collective Note presented to the
Porte, on the 28th ultimo, by the Representatives of the Five Powers, affords a
strong reason to Great Britain and France for pursuing a different course on this
important matter from that which they had before contemplated.
The Governments of England and France are friends and allies of the
Sultan, and have spontaneously and formally declared their determination to
uphold the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire under its present
dynasty, and to oppose themselves to any combination which might be calculated
to trench upon that integrity and independence. But it is manifest that
Mehemet Ali, by retaining the Turkish fleet, avowedly as a means of extorting
from the Sultan the concession of certain demands, does openly attack the
independent political action of the Sultan, and does, by a combination with the
traitorous Commander of the Turkish fleet, endeavour to possess himself of the
means of destroying the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Her Majesty's
Government is therefore of opinion, that the Governments of France and Eng- ,
land are bound, no less by a regard for their recent declarations, and a respect
for their own honour, than by considerations of sound policy, to compel Mehemet
Ali to give back to his own lawful Sovereign the ships of that Sovereign, which he
now, in violation of every principle of duty and good faith, persists in retaining
for purposes hostile to that Sovereign. But as the Five Powers have now, by
the Note of the 27th ultimo, placed themselves collectively in the situation of
mediators between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, it is the opinion of Her
Majesty's Government, that all further steps in this matter ought to be taken, if
possible, collectively by the Five; and that the decision as to such steps should
emanate from Vienna, which is the central point of the negotiation, instead of
from London or Paris.
Her Majesty's Government, therefore, are about to send immediately
instructions to Lord Beauvale, to propose to the Representatives of the other
Four Powers the steps which, under all circumstances, appear to Her Majesty's
Government the fittest to be taken with respect to the Turkish fleet ; and to state
to the Representatives of those Powers, that it is the opinion of Her Majesty's
Government, that the restoration of that fleet by Mehemet Ali should be insisted
upon as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation whatever upon any
other point.
The course which Her Majesty's Government would propose for the attain
ment of this object is, that the Consular Agents of the Five Powers at Alex
andria should be instructed by the Ambassadors and Ministers at Vienna,
formally, and in a Collective Note, to demand from Mehemet Ali the immediate
restitution of the Turkish ships, together with such of the officers and men as
may be willing to return to their allegiance ; that if this demand be complied
with, the Turkish ships should be placed under the care and custody of the
combined English, French, and Austrian squadron ; the Admirals of which
would take care not to permit any of those Turkish ships to go up to Constan
tinople, without being first certain by communications with the Turkish Govern
ment, that the fidelity of the officers and men could be relied upon, and that there
would be no danger of their again revolting against the Porte, in the event of
their being sent back to Constantinople.
If any doubt should be entertained on this point, the ships should be kept
at Rhodes or elsewhere outside of the Dardanelles, or they should be accom
panied to Constantinople by some ships of the combined fleet ; or else they
should be sent back with merely officers and men enough to navigate them, and
perhaps a guard belonging to the Allies on board each ship.
The Consular Agents should have no power to negotiate as to the surrender
of the Turkish ships, nor to allow Mehemet Ali more than a stated period, —

310
twenty-four or forty-eight hours, to give a decisive answer. They should make
him aware that, if that answer should be negative, they would be obliged imme
diately to leave Alexandria ; and if he should refuse to comply with the demand
made, they ought at once, and altogether, to embark on board the fleet, and to
go to Smyrna, or to any other place, from whence they might be able to return
to Alexandria, if their departure should have the effect of obtaining compliance
with their demands.
But it is possible that Mehemet Ali might still persist in retaining the
Turkish ships, trusting that the Allied Powers would not follow up the recall
of their Consular Agents by any ulterior measures ; and in such case it is the
opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the honour of the Five Powers, a
regard to good faith on their part towards the Sultan, and considerations of the
highest importance connected with the great interests of Europe, require that
further measures should be adopted. The measures which might, in the first
instance, be resorted to, are : —
First, To prevent any vessel under Egyptian flag from entering into, or
coming out of, the port of Alexandria ; and to enforce a similar measure with
respect to the ports of Syria.
Secondly, To seize, detain, and hold in deposit, all merchant ships found
anywhere under the Egyptian flag, either at sea or in any of the ports of Syria
where they could be captured without any material difficulty.
Thirdly, To take possession of the Island of Candia, in the name of the
Sultan, and to re-establish the Sultan's direct authority in that Island.
Fourthly, To declare to Mehemet Ali, that the combined squadron will
defend the Turkish Empire against any attack on his part, as effectually as if it
were a Turkish fleet.
Her Majesty's Government will give instructions to Sir Robert Stopford to
take any, or all, of these steps, if he shall be directed so to do by Her Majesty's
Ambassador at Vienna, as far as the force under his command may enable him
to do so, either with, or without, the co-operation of any one of the other
squadrons, if the result of the communications which may take place between
Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna and his Colleagues, should lead that
Ambassador to consider it expedient to do so ; and you are instructed to invite
the French Government to send similar instructions and authority to their
Ambassador at Vienna, and to their Admiral in the Mediterranean.
The French Government will perceive that the measures above proposed
apply to the case of the Turkish ships being inside the harbour of Alexandria,
and within the power of Mehemet Ali. If, on the contrary, the Turkish ships
should be outside of the harbour and within the power of their own officers, then
Her Majesty's Government would propose, that the course to be pursued should
be such as has already been agreed upon for that contingency by the French and
English Governments : — that is to say, the combined fleet should interpose, if
possible, between the Turkish squadron and the port of Alexandria, so as to
prevent them from entering. The Admirals should endeavour, by personal
communication, to persuade the Turkish officers to return to their allegiance ;
they should employ all possible means of negotiation for this purpose, and should,
if necessary, send small vessels to Constantinople, with any communications
which might appear likely to contribute to an arrangement. They should abstain
from any attack on the Turkish ships, unless necessary in order to prevent those
ships from committing hostilities against the Turkish territory ; but they should
follow the Turkish ships with a sufficient force wherever they might go, in order
to watch their movements, and to remain masters of those movements. There
could be no objection to allow those ships to go to any Turkish port outside of
the Dardanelles, even before they had made their submission to the Sultan,
provided a sufficient part of the allied squadron were to accompany them thither.
But Her Majesty's Government are of opinion, that the instructions for this case,
like those for the case first supposed, ought to emanate from Vienna ; and Her
Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna will, therefore, be desired to communicate also
upon this part of the case, with his Colleagues at Vienna.
You will give a copy of this despatch to the Due de Dalmatie.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

311
No. 237.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 21, 1839.
I HAVE the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's
Government highly approve of the Note which your Excellency, in conjunction
with the Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, addressed to
the Porte on the 27th of July, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch
of the 29th of July. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.
No. 238.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 23.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 30, 1839.
BY invitation from the Mousteshar Nouri Effendi, the Representatives of
the Five Great Powers met his Excellency at his Kiosk this day.
The Mousteshar asked them where it was intended to hold the meeting for
the arrangement of the affairs of this country ; whether it was to be at Constan
tinople, or Vienna, or elsewhere; and whether an Ottoman Minister was invited?
To this it was answered, that the Representatives had not yet received any
information on the subject.
The Mousteshar then said, — " The Porte is without armies, the Ottoman
fleet has deserted, what can the Porte do if Mehemet Ali should attack? Will
the Great Powers defend the Porte?''
It was replied, that the Great Powers had determined to prevent a collision
between the belligerents, and therefore the Great Powers could not permit the
Pasha to attack the Porte. The French Ambassador, in answering the above
question, did not distinctly enough express himself to satisfy the Mousteshar,
and I felt it necessary to say, that the instructions given to the English and
French Admirals, did, in my opinion, impose upon them the obligation to defend
this country against any attack that the Pasha might venture to make, and in
this view I was fully supported by the Austrian, and Russian, and Prussian
Ministers, and by the French Ambassador. M. de Bouteneff fully and freely
concurred in a position stated by the Internuncio, that the Sublime Porte having
consented to the proposition made in the Collective Note of July 27, was under
an obligation to the Five Great Powers, not to attempt to have any secret
understanding with Mehemet Ali ; but to communicate fairly with them and act
in concurrence. The Mousteshar admitted the obligation.
There was a good deal said, of which the above is the substance.
The questions of the Mousteshar were just and natural, and I hope the
answers have been satisfactory, and that the last reply removed the apprehension
apparently entertained in some degree, that the Porte might be left unprotected

against the Pasha.

I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 239.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 23.)
My Lord, Therapia, July 30, 1839.
I INCLOSE an account given by Dr. Ainsworth and his companions, of
the disposition of the Egyptian soldiers under Ibrahim Pasha, which is founded
upon the report of deserters from Ibrahim's army, who came to Hafiz Pasha's

312

camp, where the Doctor was, up to the fatal battle. I think the disposition of
the soldiers is of importance when the adoption of measures that may be taken
in Syria are in consideration. I. beg to recall the fact I stated, from the best
authority, long ago, that the Egyptian soldiers desired above all things to escape
by any means from the military service of Mehemet Ali. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 239.
Captain Conolly to Viscount Ponsonby.
.My Lord, Therapia, July 29, 1839.
DR. AINSWORTH and his friends, Messrs. Russell and Rassam, say, that
the least exhibition of military skill on the part of Hafiz Pasha, the least chance
in the extraordinary melee, that ended in his defeat, might have caused the
complete defeat of Ibrahim Pasha, as deserters from his camp a day or two
before agreed in declaring that their Egyptian comrades, so far from wishing to
oppose the Sultan, only desired a fair opportunity of laying down their arms ;
and if from want of support by these cold soldiers, or through any other
accident, Ibrahim had been beaten, he would have been without an
open road of retreat. As it is, they represent the rout of Hafiz to be
complete. The last they saw of this Commander-in-chief, was when he was
cutting down some of his own recruits, who were trying to leave the field.
Even at this desperate moment, Dr. Ainsworth says, he might have recovered
the day, if he would have attended to the advice of the Prussian officers, to
make a good charge with another column of his unbroken men.
The road was covered with fugitives from his army, and retirers from the
corps of Izzet Pasha. Many of the latter were comfortably riding on hired
horses, doubtless paying the costs with their shares of Izzet Pasha's military
chest. The Kourds, these gentlemen say, fired upon them and on the Turkish
fugitives, and may be considered in a state of complete revolt.
I have, &c,
(Signed) A. CONOLLY.

No. 240.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 23, 1839.
I HAVE received this morning, and have laid before the Queen, your
Excellency's despatches to the 30th July.
With reference to the first of those despatches, I have the satisfaction to
acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the
answers which, in conjunction with the Representatives of the other Great
Powers, your Excellency returned to the questions put to you by the Turkish
Minister, in the conference which you had with him on the 30th of July.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 241.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords> Foreign Office, August 23, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships, that the Five Powers
having agreed to concert together upon the affairs of the Levant, and Vienna
being the place where the communications and negotiations on these affairs will

313
centre, it may become important with a view to the saving of time, that the
Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean, should
be instructed to execute any measures which he may be informed that Her
Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna has consented to on the part of Great Britain,
as arising out of the concert between the Allied Powers. I have therefore to
signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that instructions be given to
Sir Robert Stopford that, until further orders, he should carry into effect any
instructions which he may receive on the above-mentioned affairs from Lord
Beauvale. I have to request that your Lordships will send me a duplicate of the
instructions which you may give to Sir Robert Stopford in consequence of this
letter, in order that I may send that duplicate to Lord Beauvale to be
forwarded by him to Sir Robert Stopford, together with any communication
which Lord Beauvale may have occasion to make to the Admiral upon the
matters in question. 1 am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 242.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, • Foreign Office, August 23, 1839.
WITH reference to my other letter of this day's date, I have the honour
to acquaint your Lordships, that the instructions issued to Sir Robert Stopford
in pursuance of my two letters of the 5th of August, and of my further letter
of the 7th of August, have been suspended at Paris, and are now to be
considered as cancelled ; and that Her Majesty's Minister at Paris has been
instructed to return the packets addressed to Sir John Louis, in which your
Lordships' letters to Sir Robert Stopford were inclosed. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 243.
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell
Sir, Foreign Office, August 23, 1839"
THE Five Powers having agreed to concert together upon the affairs of the
Levant, and Vienna being the place where the communications and negotiations
on these affairs will centre, I have to instruct you to carry into effect any
instructions which you may receive on the above-mentioned affairs from Lord
Beauvale. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 244.
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.
Sir, Foreign Office, August 23, 1839.
THE instructions to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford contained in the packets
addressed to Sir John Louis, which were sent to Paris on the 5th and 7th of
August, being cancelled in consequence of my letter to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty, of which a copy is inclosed, I have to instruct you to return
to me those packets by the first messenger.
You will at the same time return to me the two packets addressed to Lord
Ponsonby, and sent to Paris on the days above-mentioned, and numbered on the
2 o

314
outside, Nos. 110 and 113; and the two packets addressed to Sir Robert
Stopford, and stated in the memoranda sent to Paris to contain copies of the
instructions to the Admiralty.
You will retain the remaining packets addressed to Lord Ponsonby, and
those addressed to Sir Robert Stopford, and stated to contain despatches for
Colonel Campbell, until further orders. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 245.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, August 24, 1839.
WITH reference to my letter of yesterday, conveying to your Lordships the
Queen's commands, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be directed to
carry into effect any instructions which he may receive on the affairs of the
Levant from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, I am to acquaint your Lord
ships, that it is Her Majesty's pleasure that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should
not be precluded from executing any instructions given to him by Lord Beauvale,
and arising out of the negotiations at Vienna, provided the measures to be taken
shall be such as Sir Robert Stopford may think himself to have adequate means
to execute, even though the French Admiral should not receive corresponding
instructions from his own Government, or from the French Ambassador at
Vienna. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.
P. S. — I have to request that your Lordships will send me a duplicate of the
instructions which you may give to Sir Robert Stopford in consequence of this letter.

No. 246.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 26.)
(Extract.) Berlin, August 21, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch
of August 13th, together with its inclosures.
Baron Werther has informed me, that he has sent to the Prussian
Charge d'Affaires in London, a copy of the official answer of the Prussian
Government to the note addressed to him by the French Minister, on the
attitude to be taken by the Five Powers in the Turco-Egyptian Question, with
orders to communicate it to your Lordship. The contents of this note cannot
fail to be highly satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

No. 247.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 25.)
My Lord, paris, August 23, 1 839.
I HAD the honour of giving Marshal Soult, this morning, a copy of the
despatch which your Lordship addressed to me on the 20th of August, with the
instruction that it should be communicated to the Marshal.
I at the same time made him verbally acquainted with its contents.
He agreed entirely in considering that the Note delivered by the Represen
tatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople, had made a great change in the
state of the Eastern Question ; that it would be most desirable to endeavour to
preserve the same joint system of action between the Five Powers ; and that

315
Vienna would be the best place for arriving at common conclusions, and con
certing common operations.
I then said, that 1 considered the Note of the more importance, inasmuch as
that it at once bound the Five Powers in alliance with the Sultan for preserving
his rights, and maintaining the integrity of his Empire ; and that therefore it
left no doubt either as to the general spirit with which Mehemet Ali should be
met, or as to the paramount necessity of the immediate restoration of the Ottoman
Fleet, by the retention of which the rights of the Sultan were so evidently violated,
and the integrity of his Empire endangered.
In this observation also he generally agreed, as well as in the propriety of
the five Consuls at Alexandria jointly demanding the Ottoman Fleet's restitution.
But he seemed to hesitate as to the propriety of their departure in case of a
refusal, though the one step seems almost necessarily the consequence of the
other. The Marshal concluded, however, by saying, that, after he had duly read
and considered your Lordship's communication, he would then fully state and
explain his sentiments on the subject. I have, &c,
(Signed) HENRY LYTTON BULWER.

No. 248.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 25, 1839*
THE important Note which was presented to the Porte on the 28th
ultimo, by the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople, forms
an epoch in the affairs of the Levant, and seems to fix definitively the mode of
proceeding which the Five Powers should adopt, in conducting their negotia
tions, and in planning their measures about these affairs.
The Note abovementioned proclaims the union of the Five Powers, and
their determination to act together and in concert, with a view to effect a final
arrangement of tbe differences between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali ; and that
Note originated out of communications, of which Vienna was the centre.
It appears, therefore, to Her Majesty's Government, that it is on every
account most desirable that the Five Powers should continue to act together,
and that Vienna should continue to be the point at which the negotiation should
be carried on.
Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, proposed to the Government
of France, that instead of sending, as the Two Governments had intended to
do, from London and from Paris, instructions to the British and French
Admirals in the Mediterranean, and to the British and French Consuls-General
at Alexandria, for the purpose of demanding from Mehemet Ali the restitution
of the Turkish fleet, or for the purpose of endeavouring to prevail upon the
officers of that fleet to return to their duty, a different course should be pur
sued; and that the measures to be taken for the purpose of obtaining from
Mehemet Ali restitution of the Turkish fleet, should be concerted by the
Representatives of the Five Powers at Vienna, and should, if possible, be
taken by the Five conjointly.
I send accordingly to your Excellency, copies of those proposed instruc
tions, and of the correspondence which passed thereupon, in order to put you
fully in possession of the views and sentiments of Her Majesty's Government
on this matter, and of those of the Government of France, as far as they have
been made known to that of Her Majesty : and your Excellency will see that
all these proposed instructions have been withdrawn, in order that a new
course may be taken at Vienna.
Your Excellency will, therefore, immediately place yourself in commu
nication on this matter with the Austrian Government, and with your other
colleagues. You will state, that it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government,
that the Five Powers are bound by honour and good faith towards the Sultan,
to recover for him his fleet before any further negotiation takes place with
Mehemet Ali for a final arrangement, because the possession of the Turkish
2 S 2

316
fleet gives to Mehemet Ali an advantage in any such negotiation which he
ought not to be permitted to retain.
The Five Powers have formally pledged themselves to each other to
uphold the independence of the Ottoman Empire under its present dynasty ;
but how can the Sultan be considered as retaining even the semblance of
independent authority, if one of his subjects is to be allowed to keep forcible
possession of the whole naval force of the Turkish Empire, for the avowed
purpose of using that naval force, either morally or physically, as a means of
extorting from his Sovereign concessions which the Sovereign, if he were not
thus stripped of the means of self-defence, would not be disposed to grant?
It seems to Her Majesty's Government that all the professions which the
Five Powers have made of regard for the Sultan, and of a determination to
protect and support him, would be deservedly considered as empty mockery,
if those Powers were not to use all the means at their command to give back
to the Sultan his fleet ; and Her Majesty's Government is also of opinion, that
the Five Powers are bound by a regard to what is due to themselves, to make
the restitution of that fleet an indispensable preliminary to any other arrange
ment whatever.
The course which Her Majesty's Government would wish to suggest to
the other Four Powers for this purpose is, that the allied squadrons should
be ordered to repair to Alexandria, leaving at the entrance of the Dardanelles
such a force as might be sufficient, if invited up for that purpose by the Sultan,
to bar the passage of the Bosphorus to the troops of Ibrahim, should that
general advance through Asia Minor, and threaten an attack upon Constanti
nople. That the fleet, upon arriving at Alexandria, should take up, if possible,
such a position as to command the entrance into the harbour, so as to
be able to prevent any ships of war from going in or coming out, which would
be the more easy, because it is understood that no line-of-battle ship can go
into or come out of the harbour without taking out her lower-deck guns.
The combined fleet, upon arriving at Alexandria, would find the Turkish
fleet either in the harbour and within the power of Mehemet Ali, or out of
the harbour and within the power of its own officers.
If the Turkish ships should be out of the harbour, and in the power of their
own officers, then Her Majesty's Government would recommend that the
Admirals should pursue the course which is suggested for that case in the
supplementary instructions prepared for Sir Robert Stopford, and in the letter
from Marshal Soult to the French Minister of Marine.
But if the Turkish ships should be in the harbour, and therefore within
the power of Mehemet Ali, Her Majesty's Government would suggest, that the
Consuls-General of the Five Powers should, by a Collective Note, demand
from Mehemet Ali the immediate surrender of the Turkish ships, fixing a
definite period of time within which a decided answer should be given.
If the ships should be surrendered, such of their officers and men as
chose to return to their duty, should be allowed to come out with them ; but
it would be imprudent in the Admirals to allow the ships to go at once to
Constantinople, because Mehemet Ali might have gained the officers and
crews over to his side, and the ships, when off Constantinople, might turn
against the Sultan, and might declare for Mehemet Ali. It would, therefore,
be safer to keep the Turkish ships to cruize for some time in company with
tbe combined squadron, or to send them to Rhodes, or to some other Turkish
port, in company with part of the allied force, which should remain with
them to watch and controul their movements.
If, however, Mehemet Ali should refuse to surrender the ships, Her
Majesty's Government propose that the Consuls-General of the Five Powers
should immediately leave Alexandria and embark, as a demonstration of the
serious displeasure of the Allies ; and a private intimation might be given
beforehand to Mehemet Ali, that such a step would be the necessary conse
quence of the refusal.
The inferior consular agents might remain, for a time, for purposes of
commercial routine.
If this measure should have no effectin producing compliance on the part
of Mehemet Ali, various other methods of coercion might be employed,
without any positive attack upon the Egyptian ships.
In the first place, all communication might be cut off between Egypt and

317
Syria ; and all ships and vessels under the Egyptian flag might be pre vented
from entering or leaving any Egyptian or Syrian port.
In the next place, all merchant ships under the Egyptian flag, might be
seized and detained, to be held in deposit until compliance were obtained.
Thirdly, a detachment from the allied fleet might proceed to Candia, and
establish there the direct authority of the Sultan, engaging, on the part of
the Five Powers, to obtain for the population of Candia the same privileges
and immunities which were granted by the late Sultan to the people of Samos.
Any one, or all, of these measures might be ordered at the discretion
of the Representatives of the Five Powers at Vienna ; and your Excellency
is authorized to give to Sir Robert Stopford any instructions to this effect
which you may deem expedient.
Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to proceed in this matter in
concert with the other Four Powers, and are ready to make some sacrifices of
opinion in order to arrive at unanimous action. But if your Excellency should
find it impossible to obtain an unanimous assent of your colleagues to any
course of proceeding on this matter which would be consistent with the prin
ciples upon which the British Government is acting, or which could be likely
to attain the objects in view, your Excellency is authorized to act in concert
with a less number than the Four, if you shall find that any reasonable and
effectual course of proceeding is assented to by such a proportion of the Five
as may give to that course adequate moral weight and sufficient physical
means. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 249.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.*
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 25, 1839.
NOTHING has hitherto happened to alter the opinion of Her Majesty's
Government as to the nature of the final settlement which it would be desirable
for the Five Powers to effect between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, nor to
change the belief of Her Majesty's Government, that if the Five shall agree to
press any given arrangement upon Mehemet Ali, the union of the Five will
carry with it amoral weight sufficient to obtain from Mehemet Ali acquiescence
in their decision.
The British Government is still of opinion, that there can be no security
for the peace of Europe, as far as that peace depends upon the affairs of the
Levant, until Syria shall have been restored to the direct rule of the Sultan ;
because, till then, the Porte cannot be safe from those aggressions on the part
of the Pasha, which would lead to the direct interference of Russia in Turkey,
and to consequent differences and collisions between the Powers of Europe ;
and the British Government is therefore of opinion, that the Pasha ought to be
compelled to evacuate Syria, in exchange for the hereditary government of
Egypt ; and that the Five Powers have means of inducing compliance on his
part, without occasioning events that would, as some persons seem to appre
hend, bring on the very evil which all parties wish to avert.
And first, with respect to the arrangement itself; if Mehemet Ali is not
to give up Syria, what are the alternatives ? Why, first, that matters should
be left exactly as they now are and lately have been ; that is to say, that
Mehemet Ali should continue in his present position as established by the
arrangement of Kutaya, holding the Pashalics of Egypt and Syria at the annual
will and pleasure of the Sultan, not by the formal tenure of annual appoint
ment, but by the real tenure of the power of the sword. But to continue this
state of things would be to do nothing, except to leave in still greater force
all the dangers which have caused of late so much disquietude to the Powers
* Similar despatches were addressed, on the 27th of August, to Lord Clanricarde, Sir George
Hamilton, and Mr. Bulwer.

318
of Europe. I say in greater force, Because the Pasha being now stronger
as against the Porte than he was last year, he would be more able, and there
fore more likely, to execute the intention which he then proclaimed of declaring
himself independent; and thus the Five Powers would have taken great pains
to establish among themselves perfect unanimity and entire concert about the
affairs of the Levant, for the mere purpose of doing absolutely nothing; — a
result which might just as well have been the consequence of disagreement as
of union, and which would justly expose them not only to the derision, but to
the censure, of all the world.
The other alternative would be, that the Sultan should give to Mehemet
Ali now, the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt, upon condition
that Ibrahim should promise, that on the death of Mehemet he will evacuate
Syria and Candia, and the Holy Cities. But would any man attach the
slightest value to such a promise; and would not the grant of the hereditary
government of Egypt be justly looked upon as a gratuitous and unrequited
concession made by the Sultan to his subject, at the recommendation of the
Five Powers, who set out by professing a chivalrous and disinterested deter
mination to protect the Sultan against all encroachment?
Such an arrangement, moreover, would virtually and practically be to
grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of all that he now occupies;
for if the Five Powers permit Mehemet to retain Candia, and Syria, and
Arabia, because the Five are not strong enough to force him to evacuate those
countries now, can it be supposed that the Sultan alone will be strong enough
five or six years hence, at the death of Mehemet Ali, to do that which the
Five Powers united cannot undertake at present ? Or is it probable that the
Five Powers will be more disposed then to help the Sultan in this matter than
they now are? seeing that in the interval Mehemet and Ibrahim will of
course have very much strengthened their position in the countries which they
are then to be required to evacuate, and that even if the Five Powers should
then be as unanimous as they now are, the difficulty to be overcome wouldhave
much increased during the interval.
Such an arrangement, therefore, would be practically an unconditional
submission to all Mehemet Ali's demands ; and if the Five Powers are prepared
to advise the Sultan so to comply, it is difficult to see what is to be gained
in point of honour by any of the parties to such a proceeding, by attempting
to disguise the submission under the flimsy pretence that a part of the conces
sion is only temporary, and limited to the life of Mehemet Ali. In such a case,
Mehemet Ali would again urge the plea which he set up last year, and would
say that he could not leave his family exposed after his death to the caprices
of the Porte ; and he would declare himself independent, as the only way to
secure his family from future contingencies.
In fact, the natural and necessary consequence of any arrangement which
should leave Mehemet Ali in possession of' what he now occupies, must
evidently be his casting off his nominal allegiance to the Sultan, and his
declaring himself an independent sovereign. His desire for independence
cannot be diminished by continuing him in his present extended state of occu
pation, but his means of asserting that independence will be greatly increased
thereby; and thus the Five Powers, having set out in their negotiations on
these matters by loudly proclaiming their steadfast determination to maintain
the integrity of the Turkish Empire, will have effected as a first carrying out
of that declaration the dismemberment of a vast and important portion of that
empire. If it be absolutely necessary that the Sultan should submit to such terms,
he must, of course, bow to stern necessity ; but far better would it be that he
should do so from his own weakness, than from the advice and intervention of
friends, who, professing to help, would interfere only to despoil.
But far preferable to such a dismemberment of the Turkish Empire would
be a change in its dynasty, by the substitution of the family of Mehemet for
that of the Sultan ; and it would be wiser for the Powers of Europe to allow '
Mehemet Ali to march with his army and sail with his fleet to Constantinople,
and to depose the Sultan, and to set himself up in his stead, than it would be
for those Powers to pursue the course to which 1 am now adverting. For in
such a case, though the dynasty were changed, ihe Turkish Empire would
remain, with its territory undiminished and its resources unbroken ; it would

319
still be a substantive Power, capable of defending itself, and competent to
maintain its place in the political community of States.
But such a course is impossible, for many reasons which it is needless to
detail ; and it appears to Her Majesty's Government that, consistently with
the declarations of the Five Powers, and with a due regard for the great
European objects which those Powers have in view, there is no other course
open for them to pursue, but to carry into execution the arrangement which,
giving to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, would restore to
the direct authority of the Sultan all the other portions of the Turkish Empire
now held and occupied by the Pasha.
Mehemet Ali would, of course, in the first place object to such an arrange
ment ; he would threaten all kinds of violent proceedings, and would declare
that he would fight to the death in order to resist what was demanded.
But he is far too shrewd and sagacious a man not to be able to measure
the great disparity between his own force and that of the Five Powers acting
in union with the Sultan, and carrying with them Christian strength and
Mahomedan feeling.
The Allies would begin by the mildest means of coercion, and would
avoid as long as possible any measures which would place the Pasha upon
anything like a footing of equality with the instruments of pressure which
they might use ; but it is surely impossible seriously to contend that, if the
Five Powers were united and determined, they would not succeed after a
certain time, and probably without any very violent means, in obtaining the
full submission of the Pasha to the arrangement which they were resolved to
execute. The fact is, that any one or two of the Five Powers, if acting cordially
with Turkey, would be fully able, in no great length of time, and without
any very great exertion, to compel the Pasha to acquiescence ; but that which
could not so be accomplished without the employment of a considerable
military force, might, probably, if the Five Powers were united, be brought
about by little more than the action of moral influence alone.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 250.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, August 25, 1839.
I TRANSMIT herewith to your Excellency, for your information, a copy
of two letters which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty, signifying the Queen's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford
should be ordered to execute any measures which he may be directed by
your Excellency to carry into effect.
I likewise indose two duplicates of the Letters of Instruction which the
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will have in consequence issued to Sir
Robert Stopford, and which your Excellency will send on to that officer with
tbe first orders which you may find it necessary to give to him.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 251.
Baron Werther to Count Bresson. — (Communicated by Baron Werther, August 26,

¦\

Monsieur le Comte, Berlin, le 16 Aodt, 1839.
JE me suis empresse de placer sous les yeux du Roi, mon auguste
Maitre, la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser a la date du
24 Juillet, ainsi que la depeche de M. le Due de Dalmatie du 17, qui s'y
trouvait jointe en copie.
Sa Majeste a daigne me charger de vous exprimer, M. le Comte, qu'EUe

320
a vu avec une veritable satisfaction dans cette communication un nouveau
gage de la sollicitude desinteressee que les Grandes Puissances Europeennes
vouent a la conservation de la Monarchic Ottomane sous la dynast.e actuelle-
ment regnante. Comme le Roi, mon auguste Maitre, est persuade" que
FEmpire Ottoman forme Fun des demens les plus essentiels de 1 equilibre
politique de l'Europe, la Prusse usera de toute FinflUence dont elle dispose,
pour contribuer a preserver de toute atteinte Fintegrite" et Findependance de
cet Empire et I'autorite' souveraine du Sultan. La Prusse ayant de tout tems
suivi cette ligne a Fegard de la Turquie, ne s'en de'partira pas dans les graves
conionctures du moment actuel; elle n'hesitera done pas a accorder son
appui moral aux efforts que feront les Cabinets qui exercent une action
directe sur l'Orient, pour atteindre le but sur lequel d'ailleurs, d'apres 1 intime
conviction du Roi, mon auguste Maitre, toutes les Grandes Puissances sont
parfaitement d'accord. . . „
Je saisis, &c.,
(Signe) WERTHER.

(Translation.)
Baron Werther to Count Bresson. — (Communicated by Baron Werther, August 26.)
Monsieur le Comte, Berlin, August 16, 1839.
I HASTENED to lay before the King, my august Master, the letter which
you did me the honour to address to me, dated the 24th July, together with the
despatch from the Due de Dalmatie, of the 17th, a copy of which accompanied
your letter.
His Majesty has deigned to instruct me to inform you, M. le Comte, that
he has seen, with real satisfaction, in that communication a new pledge of the
disinterested solicitude which the Great European Powers entertain for the
preservation of the Ottoman Monarchy under the reigning dynasty. As the
King, my august Master, is convinced that the Ottoman Empire is one of the
most essential elements of the balance of power in Europe, Prussia will exert all
the influence at her disposal in order to contribute to defend from every attack
the integrity and independence of that Empire and the sovereign authority of the
Sultan. Prussia, having always followed that course with regard to Turkey, will
not depart from it during the present serious juncture ; she will not, therefore,
hesitate to lend her moral support to the efforts which the Cabinets that exercise
a direct influence in the East will make, to attain the object on which moreover
the King, my august Master, is firmly convinced that all the Great Powers are
perfectly agreed. I take, &c,
(Signed) WERTHER.

No. 252.
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.
Sir, Foreign Office, August 27, 1839.
I INCLOSE to you, for your information, a copy* of an Instruction which
I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, respecting the
mode of proceeding to be adopted by the Five Powers, in conducting their
negotiations, and planning their measures about the affairs of the Levant;
and I have to instruct you to communicate the substance of this instruction
to Marshal Soult. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

* See No. 248, p. 315.

321
No. 253.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
My Lord, Paris, August 26, 1839.
FROM a conversation I had this morning with Marshal Soult, I am
induced to apprehend, that the French Government will now throw obstacles
in the way of the selection of Vienna as the place for settling and agreeing
upon the affairs of the East ; nor will it allow its Ambassador the power to
give instructions to the French Admiral in the Mediterranean. The cause
of this is to be sought in the difference which really exists in the views of
the French Government as to the manner of dealing with Mehemet Ali, and
those which are entertained by the other Powers ; and I think it probable that
the Marshal, seeing this, will endeavour to escape from the necessity of
either opposing, or consenting to, any resolution to which those Powers, if
negotiating together, might come conjointly.
It appears, indeed, possible, that the Cabinet of France may create a
question out of the Note lately presented by Count Medem, and thus
endeavour to direct attention from Alexandria to St. Petersburgh.
At all events, 1 fear that no decided measures of a coercive character
will be employed by France for limiting the ambition of the Viceroy, or for
restoring the fleet of the Sultan. I have, &c,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.
No. 254.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
My Lord, Alexandria, July 26, 1839.
I WAITED yesterday, in company with the Austrian Consul-General,
on Mehemet Ali, whom I found in his Divan with the Capudan Pasha and
M. Cochelet. The conversation was at first general, and the Capudan Pasha, who has
now put aside his former dress and adopted one similar to that worn by
Mehemet Ali, remarked that he could not be blamed at Constantinople for
his change of dress, as there also they had resumed their ancient costumes*
Soon after the Capudan Pasha retired, and Mehemet Ali then entered
upon the subject of his relations with the Porte, and of his desires and
opinions with respect to Hosrew Pasha.
He told my two Colleagues and myself, that if the Sultan were to send
to him the grand decoration, and at the same time to concede to him the
succession in his family (l'heredite) of all his present Governments (he does
not, I believe, demand the Pashalic of Mecca and Medina, which in fact is
vested in Ibrahim Pasha, and not in Mehemet Ali), he would accept the
decoration as a mark of respect and homage to his Sovereign, but he would
not accept the succession of his Governments, so long as Hosrew Pasha was
retained in power or place ; and that he would remain in his present position;
but if Hosrew Pasha were removed, he would then immediately send back
the fleet of the Capudan Pasha to Constantinople; would recall Ibrahim
Pasha to Egypt; and would, without any hesitation, proceed, himself, in his
steamer to Constantinople, to pay his homage to his Sovereign, and to give
his best aid and counsels in what would add to the glory of the Sultan, and to
the power and welfare of his Empire.
Mehemet Ali has written to the different Pashas of Pashalics (sixteen,
I believe, in number), to urge them to be faithful to their young Sultan, and
to give their best services for the good of the Empire; but calling on them,
at the same time, to assist in promoting the removal from power of Hosrew
Pasha, as no security for any good can be held out, or can take place, so long
as that Seraskier remains at the head of affairs.
2T

322
From this may be seen the strong enmity existing between Mehemet
Ali and Hosrew, and which is of very long standing; and on this point he is
as may be expected, fully seconded by the Capudan Pasha, who most
probably will have written to all his friends and partisans, to the same effect
and purport. I learn that Ibrahim Pasha is at Marash with the head-quarters of his
army, and that the corps which he had sent to Orfa, before the arrival of
Captain Caillier, will be withdrawn to the west of the Euphrates, as soouas
possible. The greater part of the Capudan Pasha's fleet are anchored in this port,
and the remainder will also be brought in, as will also be the fleet of
Mehemet Ali.
Hosrew Pasha has written to the Capudan Pasha to say, that if he will
return with his fleet to Constantinople, no notice will be taken of his late
defection, and that a full pardon and oblivion of the past will be accorded.
The Capudan Pasha has replied, that he has not been, nor does he
intend to be, disloyal to his Sovereign; that what he has done has been for
the interest of the Sultan and of the Turkish Empire, and to remove the fleet
out of the power of the intrigues of Hosrew Pasha; and that he will not return
so long as the latter remains in power.
It has been remarked, that in the letter of Hosrew Pasha to the Capudan
Pasha, he addresses him as " Etfendem Sultanem," and only addresses
Mehemet Ali as " Sultanem;" and those who understand the Turkish
language say, that the address to the Capudan Pasha, of " Effendem
Sultanem," is of a higher style than the address to Mehemet Ali.
Perhaps this may have been done expressly, in order to flatter the
Capudan Pasha; but I cannot but think from what I know of Mehemet Ali,
that he will have been much annoyed by this mark of distinction made
between him and the Capudan Pasha, and the more so, in the actual state of
affairs, and the present position of all the parties. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 255.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
My Lord, Alexandria, July 23, 1839.
M. COCHELET, the Consul-General of France, received by the French
steamer from Constantinople, on the 25th instant, a letter from Admiral
Roussin, transmitting four letters to the respective addresses of Mustapha
Pasha, the next in command to the Capudan Pasha, of the Patrona Bey, of
the Capitana Bey, and of the Reala Bey.
. Admiral Roussin wrote to M. Cochelet, that Hosrew Pasha had given
those letters to him, in order that they might be sent to the Consul-General
for their sure delivery by him.
M. Cochelet gave them to Mehemet Ali, who, after seeing the Capudan
Pasha, sent for the four Admirals to whom the letters were addressed, and
gave them to them. These letters, which were from Hosrew Pasha, 'were
torn up by those with apparent indignation.
1 shall not remark on the conduct of Admiral Roussin, in wishin°- to
impose on M. Cochelet such a task, nor on the conduct of M. Cochelet, in giv^
ing the letters to Mehemet Ali.
I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship, the translation of
a letter from Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha, in consequence of his sending
the letters to the four Admirals, and by which your Lordship will be made
fully aware of the substance of them.
I further transmit the translation of a letter sent by Mehemet Ali to the
principal Pashas of the Porte, and amongst others to the Pasha of Tripoli, in
which Mehemet Ali calls on them to make common cause against Hosrew
Pasha. A corvette of the Viceroy has been sent to Salonica, with five of Mehemet

323
Ali's confidential officers, who are charged with those letters for the Pashas
of Salonica, Roumelia, SilUstria, Albania, Monastir, and other places.
Your Lordship will perceive, that Mehemet Ali must be well aware of
the co-operation of those Pashas in his views and feelings, when he openly
sends a corvette and confidential officers to them.
Mehemet Ali told me three days ago, that he was having made a trans
lation of parts of the "Code Civil" of France, to be ready when the
dismissal or retirement from affairs of Hosrew Pasha should enable him to
go to Constantinople ; and that he would then propose to the Sultan some
analogous changes, but above all, the most perfect security for property and
persons of every class and religion, and also a pure, impartial, and speedy
administration of justice ; and that he hoped still to see Turkey sufficiently
strong to support itself against any efforts of Russia.
The Pasha appears resolved not to recede from his demand for the
removal of Hosrew Pasha, nor will he accept of less than the hereditary
succession in his family, of Egypt, all Syria, and Candia, for which he would
pay tribute, and be a faithful vassal to the Sultan ; and he evidently hopes to
be able to arrange all this with the Sultan in an amicable manner, provided
that his great enemy Hosrew Pasha be removed.
In regard to the hereditary succession to Syria, it is possible that the
Porte may refuse it; but I am fully convinced, that if the Porte were now to
obtain possession of Syria, on the same footing as before its occupation by
Mehemet Ali, that country would for many years be the scene of the direst
anarchy and misery, and all European commerce would be destroyed and
rendered impossible.
I am aware, my Lord, that such is not the opinion at Constantinople,
nor, indeed, of all Her Majesty's Consular Servants in Syria; but it is the
deliberate opinion which I have formed from what I have seen, and from
facts which I have heard, and to the accuracy of this opinion I would readily
pledge mysdf.
Ibrahim Pasha has received invitations from all the leading people in
Asia Minor, to send troops to protect them from the brigandage which most
unfortunately reigns in that country ; but he will not send a soldier across
the Euphrates. The whole of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets are now in this port, and
some of the large Turkish ships have had part of the guns and stores taken
out, as otherwise they could not have entered.
The Pasha has ordered two palaces to be prepared for some personages
of distinction, who are expected in a steamer from Constantinople, with a
mission to the Viceroy. It is reported that Halil Pasha, the brother-in-law
of the young Sultan, is one of those, and that the others are two principal
Ulemas. Mehemet Ali is so fully and so well informed of what passes at Constan
tinople, and in every part of Turkey, that I have never yet known him to he
mistaken in the intelligence which he has communicated to myself and
colleagues ; and thus he always anticipates, and is prepared for every event
and circumstance. In fact, there is not a secret for him in the Divan at
Constantinople. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 255.
Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.
(Suivent les titres.)

(Traduction.) VOUS m'avez adresse, par Akif Effendi, une lettre on vous me dites que
les circonstances etant changees, les griefs qui nous tenaient s£pares doivent
&re mis en oubli comme s'ils n'avaient jamais existed et que nous fassions
cause commune.
2 T 2

324
La connaissance que j'ai depuis longtems de votre nature ne me permet-
tant pas d'avoir confiance en ces paroles, je vous ai repondu que vous voulus-
siez bien ou changer de sentimens et de conduite, ou offrir votre demission.
Dans le meme tems que je vous ecrivais cela, je me disais: " Cet homine-la.
ne pourra pas s'empecher de manifester son caractere par quelque acte qui
prouvera qu'il n'est pas change*." Et voila que I'evenement vient justifier ma
prevision! En effet, a peine avez-vous eu connaissance de l'arrivee de la Flotte
Imperiale dans les eaux d'Alexandrie, que vous vous etes empresse d'expddier
au General Mustafa et aux trois autres officiers superieurs, des lettres ou vous
representez le Capitan Pacha comme traitre, et, tout en blamant leur conduite,
vous les exhortez a se saisir de lui et a retourner a Constantinople avec la
Flotte. Ce fait seul ne doit-il pas me convaincre que je ne me suis pas
trompe dans le jugement que j'ai porte de vous? Si vous pensez que Mehemet
Ali ne vous connait pas, ou qu'on le trompe sur votre compte, vous etes dans
Perreur: II ne vous connait que trop!
La demarche que vous reprochez au Capitan Pacha ne lui appartient pas
en propre. Le General et les trois officiers superieurs dont il a ete parle, tous
enfin, ont agi d'un commun accord, apres en avoir ddibere en conseil.
Ces memes officiers superieurs, et peut-etre d'autres encore, ont temoigne*
par eerit, de leur libre participation a cet acte.
Les quatre lettres envoyees par Votre Altesse ont ete fiddement remises
a leurs adresses.
Ces officiers ne sont pas passes a Fetranger pour meriter que vous les
traitiez comme vous le faites.
II etait plus convenable et plus conforme a votre dignite que vous leur
disiez : " Qu'informe de l'eloignement de la Flotte, vous aviez appris avec
plaisir qu'elle etait venue mouiller a Alexandrie qui est un port de FEmpire;
qu'entre nous tous desormais il ne saurait y avoir separation ; que dans les
conjonctures presenies, nous devions nous unir et agir de concert en toutes
choses; que vous aviez informe Sa Hautesse de leur arrivee sur les c6tes
d'Egypte, et qu'Elle s'en etait montree contente; enfin, qu'en se dirigeant
vers ce point, ils etaient entierement dans nos idees d'union."
Un pareil langage les aurait rassures, flattes, et aurait confirme' ce que vous
avancez dans la lettre que vous m'avez adressee par Akif Effendi; mais, c'est
inutile; votre naturel ne vous permet pas d'avoir de la fixite dans les idees,
et je suis toujours plus fortifie dans n on opinion sur vous.
L'action du Capitan Pacha et des autres personnes sous ses ordres,
n'est pas (ce qu'a Dieu ne plaise) un crime de felonie envers Sa Hautesse.
Chacun d'eux avait pene*tre, comme moi, votre caractere, et aucun n'avait
confiance en vous. Vous voyez done bien que ce n'est pas seulement Mehemet
Ali qui se mefie de vous, mais je pourrais dire la nation entiere. Mais
sachant cela, j'ai voulu preserver le pays de troubles et de dangers en vous
engageant a vous demettre du Vizirat et de rentrer dans la vie privee. Cette
resolution serait honorable pour vous et avantageuse pour tous. En souvenir
de nos anciens rapports, j'ai voulu vous re* peter ce conseil.
C'est maintenant a, vous de reflechir sur ce que vous avez a. faire. En
vous retirant des affaires, consentez a delivrer les grands, et la nation en
general, d'une penible mefiance.

(Translation.)
Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.
(Titles.)
YOU have addressed me, through Akif Effendi, a letter in which you tell
me, that circumstances being changed, the grievances which held us separate
ought to be buried in oblivion, as if they had never existed, and that we should
make common cause.
The knowledge which I have long since had of your nature not permitting
me to have confidence in these words,.! answered you, that you should be so o-ood
as either to change your sentiments and your conduct, or to offer your resignation.

325
At the same time that I thus wrote to you, I said to myself, — " That man will not
be able to forbear showing his character by some act which will prove that he is
not changed:" and behold the result has justified my anticipation ! In fact,
scarcely bad you knowledge of the arrival of the Imperial fleet in the waters of
Alexandria, than you hastened to send to General Mustafa, and to the three other
superior officers, letters in which )ou represented the Capudan Pasha as a traitor,
and, at the same time that you blamed their conduct, you exhorted them to arrest
him, and to return to Constantinople with the fleet. Ought not this act alone
to convince me, that I am not deceived in the judgment which I have held of
you ? If you think that Mehemet Ali does not know you, or that he is deceived
about you, you are mistaken : he knows you but too well.
The proceeding with which you reproach the Capudan Pasha does not
belong to him peculiarly. The General and the three superior officers of whom
it has been spoken, all, in fact, have acted by common agreement, after having
considered it in council.
These same superior officers, and perhaps others besides, have expressed, in
writing, their free participation in this act.
The four letters sent by Your Highness have been faithfully delivered accord
ing to their addresses.
These officers have not passed over to a foreign country so as to deserve that
you should treat them as you do.
It was more suitable and more conformable to your dignity that you should
say to them, — " That, informed of the removal of the fleet, you had learnt with
pleasure that it was moored at Alexandria, which is a port of the Empire ; that
between us all there could henceforth be no separation ; that in the present
juncture we ought to unite ourselves and to act in concert in everything ; that you
had informed His Highness of their arrival on the coast of Egypt, and t hat he
had shown himself content with it ; in short, that in proceeding hither they were
acting entirely in conformity with our ideas of union."
Such language would have reassured and flattered them, and would have
confirmed what you set forth in the letter which you addressed to me through Akif
Effendi : but it is useless ; your nature does not allow you to have firmness in
your ideas, and I am always more confirmed in my opinion of you.
The deed of the Capudan Pasha, and of the other persons under his orders,
is not (God forbid) a crime of felony against His Highness. Each of them divined,
like myself, your character, and none had confidence in you. You see well, then,
that it is not Mehemet Ali only who mistrusts you, but I may say the whole
nation. But knowing this, I have wished to save the country from troubles and
from dangers, in begging you to resign the office of Vizier and retire into private
life. This resolution would be honourable for you and advantageous for all. In
Temembrance of our former relations, 1 have wished to repeat to you this advice.
It is now for you to reflect on what you have to do. By retiring from office,
consent to free the higher classes, and the nation in general, from a painful state
of mistrust.

Inclosure 2 in No. 255.
Circular addressed by Mehemet Ali to the Chief Pashas of the Porte
(Suivent les titres.)
(Traduction.) 13 Djemmad-Evel, 1255.
SANS doute qu'a cette heure votre Excellence est informee que Sultan
Abdoul-el-Medjid Khan, notre tout-puissant Seigneur, s'est assis sur le trone
de son vdiere pere, passe k meilleure vie. Que sa memoire vive longtems
parmi les hommes! Cette nouvelle me fut apportee par Akif Effendi,
Secretaire du Haut Conseil de la Sublime Porte, envoye* aupres de moi en
.mission. Aussitot apres que ce glorieux avenement me fut notifie, tous les
forts d'Alexandrie et les batimens en rade l'annoncerent a la population,
par des salves d'artillerie qui continuerent trois jours consecutifs, se repetant
trois fois entre le lever et le coucher du soleil. II en a ete de meme au
Caire et dans tous les chef-lieux des pays que je gouverne. J'ecrivis en

326
m£me tems a mon fils bien-aime Ibrahim Pacha, et aux Gouverneurs des
provinces, qu'ils eussent a faire faire dans toutes les mosquees, grandes ct
petites, les prieres usitees en pareille occasion pour notre nouveau Seigneur,
tres-haut et tres-pur.
Le Se'raskier d'Orient, Hafiz Pacha, k la tete d'un corps d'armee consi

Afin d'epargner le sang Musulman, je mis tout en ceuvre pour ne pas donner
lieu, le premier, aux hostilites, et j'e*crivis plusieurs fois dans ce sens a moa
fils. Cependant, lorsque Solyman Pacha de Marache fut venu occuper
Antab, et que j'eus des motifs de croire que les mouvemens siditieux
pouvaient, a force d'intrigues, se propager dans l'interieur du pays, si je
continuais a rester dans la meme inaction, et qu'ainsi seraient compromis et
peut-dre perdus tous les heureux fruits que mon zde et mes efforts de tant
d'annees avaient fait eclore et prosperer sous le soleil bienfaisant de notre
Auguste Seigneur, je me decidai, dans cette extremite, de chaudes larmes
aux yeux, et un glaive aigu au cceur, de donner I'ordre a mon courageux fils
Ibrahim Pacha, de ne plus hesiter a. combattre, ajoutant que, si la victoire
nous restait fidele, il passat l'Euphrate, reunit les troupes d'Adana au grand
corps d'armee, qu'il le divisat ensuite en deux colonnes, dont l'une mareherait
sur Marache et pousserait en avant, et dont l'autre s'avancerait vers Ourfa
et Diarbekir. Mais a peine ai-je eu connaissance de l'avenement au trone
de notre jeune Souverain Abdoul Medjid, que, sans en attendre la notification
officielle, je me dis: "Que tout ce qui est passe soit passe;" et je
m'empressai de transmettre contr'ordre a mon fils, en lui enjoignant de ne
pas poursuivre les resultats de la victoire de Nezib, et de ramener Farmee en
decade l'Euphrate, si deja elle l'avait franchie. Je demandai ensuite a Dieu
qu'il protegeat notre honors Seigneur, qu'il le fit vivre des jours sans fin, ei
que, sous son ombre tutelaire, tous ses serviteurs fiddes, grands et petits,
eussent les biens de la vie en abonclance, et jouissent d'une fdicite sans
bornes. Mais un homme s'est montre, Hosreff Pacha, le seul artisan de tous les
maux dans lesquels l'Empire est plonge depuis trop longtems, qui, faisant
tourner les difficultes du moment au profit de ses coupables projets, s'est
comme arrog6, de son autorite privee, le titre eminent de Grand Vizir, et j'ai
lu dans FOrdonnance Imperiale, qu'il en remplira les fonctions avec de
pleins-pouvoirs. Ce fameux personnage, depuis son entree aux affaires
jusqu'k aujourd'hui, non seulement n'a rien fait d'utile pour le Trone
Imperial, ni pour la nation, mais meme toute sa carriere presente une suite
d'actions fatales a l'Etat, aux peuples, et a moi. Tout le monde sait quels
services important et nombreux je me suis toujours empresse de rendre
au tres-majestueux Sultan que Dieu nous avait donne; tout le monde sait
aussi de quelle maniere j'en ai ete recompense. Lorsque Hosreff Pacha, en
1240, vint a Alexandrie, quel accueil ne lui fis-je pas, dans Fespoir que sa
vieille haine contre moi cederait il mes precedes genereux, et qu'il me serait
plus facile d'appeler sur moi, par son entremise amie, la bienveillance de
notre honore Seigneur. Combien je me trompais! A peine de retour a
Constantinople, cet illustre Pacha remua toute la somme de fiel accumule*
depuis longtems contre moi, et en ne portant aux pieds du Souverain que
des mensonges et d'odieuses calomnies, il rdissit a mettre la desunion entre
Sa Hautesse et un homme qui disposait de forces imposantes de terre et de
mer : et vous savez combien de sang Musulman ses perfidies ont fait verser.
A cela ne s'est point borne son genie malfaisant: il a cause la ruine d'un
nombre immense de families puissantes et deVouees, et il a converti leurs
maisons en demeures de bibous. II a fait plus encore: par Feffet de ses

penchans peu conformes a la dignite Imperiale. Sans tenir
eompte aes circonstances, sans necessite, Hosreff Pacha a sugo-ere et nourri
Fidee de faire des guerres imprudentes, sans autre but que cle preparer la
dissolution de l'Empire et de semer la discorde entre les Grands. Tous
ces mifaits sont resles impunis.
Cette fois-ci encore ii s'est mis en avant, et il a dit : " Moi seul et pas un

327
autre.'* Or, comme notre gracieux Souverain est encore dans un age fort
tendre, Hosreff Pacha, n'obeissant plus qu'a son caprice, va lacher la bride
a ses passions haineuses, et les manifester, sans retenue, par des actes qui
doivent conduire la nation Musulmane a sa perte. Telle est sa coupable
pensee. Quand on etudie avec reflexion la conduite qu'il a tenue jusqu'a ce
jour, il est facile de pressentir celle qu'il tiendra al'avenir. L'Amiral Achmet
Pacha a ete le premier a prejuger de.ses actes futurs par ses actes passes.
** Hosreff Pacha," s'est-il dit, "est un etre dangereux et gonfle* de venin. La
flotte que Sa Hautesse a formee avec tant de peine, irai-je, dans les circon
stances critiques oh nous nous trouvons, la mettre entre les mains d'un homme
qui bient6t aura detruit tout ce qui a ete si peniblement opere ? Non ! je ne
le ferai pas. Je me rendrai a Alexandrie ; les deux flottes de FEmpire
s'uniront : c'est le moyen de servir utilement le Souverain et la nation." Les
officiers de I'Escadre Ottomane partageaient les sentimens de leur chef, et
toutes choses ayant ete concertees en commun, le signal du depart fut donne ;
et huit jours avant la date de cette lettre, nos yeux ont vu vingt-cinq voiles
Imperiales embellir la rade d'Alexandrie. Les deux escadres, aujourd'hui
re*unies et confondues, croisentdevant les passes du port. Elles appartiennent
toutes les deux a Sa Hautesse. Son Excellence le Capitan Pacha, comme
vous ne devez pas en douter, a e*te recu ici avec la distinction due a son haut
rang, et il continue d'etre traite* avec les mSmes e*gards. Quant a moi, ancien
et fidde serviteur de l'Empire, je ne pouvais plus me resigner a voir un
homme tel que Hosreff Pacha agir dorenavant de la meme maniere qu'il Fa
fait par le passe. En consequence, mon devoir m'a cornmande de lui ecrire
pour Fengager a. offrir sa demisiosn, et avec cette reponse j'ai fait repartir
PEnvoye Akif Effendi. J'ai adresse en mfime tems des lettres a 1'illustre Tante
et a. la glorieuse Merede notre bien-aime Seigneur, au Cheik-el-lslam, Fincor-
ruptible defenseur des lois, ainsi qu'au noble Halil Pacha, les conjurant de
prendre en consideration le malheureux etat de la nation, et d'agir pour Eloigner
Hosreff Pacha des affaires, et lui donner un remplaqaivt. A cause de Fainitid
<jue j'ai toujours portee aux Pachas devours aux interets de la nation Musul
mane, j'ai voulu leur faire part des demarches que j'ai faites ; et comme
Votre Excellence compte au nombre des plus grands et des plus fiddes, je
ftii envoie la presente lettre par un de mes Agas. Lorsque, par la grace de
Dieu, die lui sera parvenue heureusement, Votre Excellence jugera conve-
nablet je Fespere, de concourir &Feloignement de Hosreff Pacha des affaires,
et par la, die aidera a atteindre le but que doivent se proposer les vrais
Osmanlis, — la tranquillite du pays et la prosperite* de l'Empire.

(Translation.)
Circular addressed by Mehemet Ali to the chief Pashas of the Porte.
(Titles.) ]Sth Djemmad-Evel, 1255.
WITHOUT doubt, by this time your Excellency is informed that Sultan
Abdul-el-Medjid Khan, our all-powerful Lord, is seated on the throne of his
revered father, who has passed to a better life. May his memory long live
among men ! This news was brought me by Akif Fffendi, Secretary of the
High Counrif of the Sublime Porte, sent to me on this m'ssion. As soon as this
glorious event was notified to me, all the forts of Alexandria and the ships in the
roadstead announced it to the population by salutes of artillery, which continued
three days consecutively, being repeated three times between the rising and
setting of the sun. It has been the same at Cairo, and in all the chief places
of the countries which I govern. I wrote at the same time to my much loved
son, Ibrahim Pasha, and to the Governors of the Provinces, that they were to
cause to be made in all the mosques, great and small, the prayers usual on a like
occasion for our new Lord, most high and most pure.
The Seraskier of the East, Hafiz Pasha, at the head of a considerable army,
had been excited by the intrigues of Hosrew Pasha to pass the Euphrates ; and
according to the instructions which he received, this General has fomented
tumults, and aided revolts at Pyass, at Giaour-daghi, and in the district of

328
Aintab. In order to spare Mussulman blood, I used all my exertions in order
not to be the first to give occasion for hostilities, and I wrote many times to
this effect to my son. Nevertheless, when Solyman Pasha of Marash had come-
to occupy Aintab, and that I had reason to believe that seditious movements
might, by means of intrigues, be propagated in the interior of the country, if I
continued to remain still inactive, and that thus all the happy fruits which my
zeal and my efforts for so many years had made to bud and prosper under the
beneficent sun of our August Lord, might be endangered, and perhaps destroyed,
I decided, in this extremity, with warm tears in my eyes, and with, as it were, a
sharp sword in my heart, to give the order to my courageous son, Ibrahim Pasha,
to refrain no longer from fighting ; adding, that if victory should continue faithful
to us, he should pass the Euphrates, unite the troops from Adana with the main
army, which he should then divide into two columns, one of which should march
upon Marash, and push onwards, and the other should advance against Orfa
and Diarbekir. But hardly had I knowledge of the accession to the throne of
our young Sovereign Abdul Medjid, than, without waiting for the official notifi
cation of that event, I said to myself, " Let all that has passed be passed ;" and
I hastened to send counter orders to my son, enjoining him not to follow up the
results of the victory of Nezib, and to bring back the army on this side of the
Euphrates, if it had already crossed that river. I then prayed God to protect our
honoured Lord, that he would make him live for ever, and that, under his
protecting shadow, all his faithful servants, great and small, should have the goods
of life in abundance, and enjoy happiness without bounds.
But a man, Hosrew Pasha, has appeared the sole artificer of all the evils
into which the Empire has for a long time been plunged, who, turning the
difficulties of the moment to the advancement of his own culpable designs, has
assumed, as it were, to himself, on his own authority, the eminent title of Grand
Vizier; and I have read in the Imperial Ordinance, that he will fulfil the func
tions of it with full powers. This famous personage, since his entry into affairs
until to-day, has not only never done anything useful for the Imperial throne or
for the nation, but even all his career presents a train of actions fatal to the
State, to the people, and to me. All the world knows what important and
numerous services I have aiways been eager to render to the most magnificent
Sultan whom God had given us ; all the world knows also in what manner I
have been rewarded. When Hosrew Pasha, in 1 240, came to Alexandria, what
reception did I not give him, in the hope that his ancient hatred against me
would yield to my generous proceedings, and that it might be more easy for me
to attract to myself, by his friendly intervention, the goodwill of our honoured
Lord! How was I deceived ! Scarcely had this illustrious Pasha returned to
Constantinople, when he roused up the whole mass of animosity for some time
accumulated against me, and in carrying to the feet of the Sovereign nothing but
lies and odious calumnies, he succeeded in sowing disunion between His
Highness and a man who had at his disposal imposing land and sea forces; and
you know how much Mussulman blood his perfidies have made to flow. His
mischievous spirit did not confine itself to this ; he has caused the ruin of an
immense number of powerful and devoted families, and he has converted their
houses into dwellings for owls. He has done more; by the effect of his
hateful ifltrigues and of his fatal suggestions, the good qualities which nature
had bestowed upon our Master, of long memory, changed into inclinations little
consistent with the Imperial dignity. Without regard to the circumstances,
without necessity, Hosrew Pasha has suggested and nourished the idea of making
imprudent wars, for no other purpose than to prepare the dissolution of the
Empire, and to sow discord among the great. All these misdeeds have remained
unpunished. This time, again, he has put himself in front, and he has said, " I only, and
no other." Now, as our gracious Sovereign is still in a very tender age,
Hosrew Pasha, obeying only his caprice, will give rein to his odious passions,
and will manifest them, without restraint, by acts which must conduct the Mus
sulman nation to its destruction. Such is his wicked design. When one studies
with reflection the conduct which he has pursued up to thisday.it is easy to
anticipate that which he will pursue in future. The Admiral, Achmet Pasha,
has been the first to conjecture his future acts from his former acts. " Hosrew
Pasha," said he, " is one likely to be dangerous and swollen with venom. The
fleet which His Highness had formed with so much trouble shall I, in the

329
critical circumstances in which we are, go and place it in the hands of a man
who will soon have destroyed all that which has been so laboriously effected ?
No! I will not do it. I will proceed to Alexandria; the two fleets of the
Empire shall unite ; this is the way of usefully serving the Sovereign of the
nation." The officers of the Ottoman squadron partook of the sentiments of
their Chief, and everything having been agreed in common, the signal for depar
ture was given ; and, eight days before the date of this letter, our eyes saw
twenty-five Imperial ships embellishing the roadstead of Alexandria. The two
squadrons now united and mingled together, cruize before the mouth of the
port. They both belong to His Highness. His Excellency the Capudan Pasha,
as you cannot doubt, has been received here with the distinction due to his high
rank, and continues to be treated with the same respect. As for me, an ancient
and faithful servant of the Empire, I could no longer reconcile myself to
seeing such a man as Hosrew Pasha act henceforth in the same manner
which he has done formerly. In consequence, my duty has enjoined me to write
to him, to request him to offer his resignation, and I have made the Envoy,
Akif Effendi, return with this answer. I have addresed, at the same time,
letters to the illustrious Aunt and glorious Mother of our much loved Lord, to
the Sheik-el-Islam, the incorruptible defender of the laws ; also to the noble
Halil Pasha : conjuring them to take into consideration the wretched state of the
nation, and to act so as to displace Hosrew Pasha from office, and to give him a
successor. On account of the friendship which I have always borne towards the
Pashas devoted to the interests of the Mussulman nation, I have wished to com
municate to them the proceedings which 1 have adopted ; and as your Excellency
counts among the number of the greatest and most faithful, I send you the
present letter by one of my Agas. When, by the grace of God, it shall
have happily arrived, your Excellency will judge it advisable, I hope, to concur
in the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha from office, and by that means you will assist
in attaining the object which the true Osmanlis ought to propose to themselves,
—the tranquillity of the country and the prosperity of the Empire.

No. 256.
Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received Aug. 29.)
My Lord, Aleppo, July 30, 1839.
I DO myself the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's
information, copies of my despatches of the 15th and 23rd instant, to
Viscount Ponsonby, together with copies of their several inclosures, in a
letter I received from Captain Davies, of Her Majesty's ship " Dido," under
date of the 5th instant; my answer to him of the 15th instant; a letter
addressed to Captain Davies by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays of the 3rd
instant ; and a letter I addressed to his Excellency Solyman Pasha, re
lating to Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell ; as also extract of a letter I
wrote to Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, on the 10th instant ; all of which will,
I hope, meet with your Lordship's approval.
Since closing the above despatches to his Excellency the Ambassador,
I have to inform your Lordship, that M. Caillier, Marshal Soult's Aide-de
camp, who has been with his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, at
Marash, reached this from thence on the 28th instant. He left his Excel
lency the Seraskier at Marash, on the 25th instant, at which time the
Egyptian forces continued on the frontiers, stationed as I had the honour
of mentioning in my despatch of the 15th instant to his Excellency the
Ambassador. M. Caillier, I hear, states that a great portion of the forces are
suffering very much from fever, occasioned by the late great exposure,
the want of water, and the very great heats of this year, which are
unprecedented. I am told that M. Caillier remains here until he receives an answer
from his Government to despatches he has written ; the reason of his
leaving his Excellency at Marash, is attributed to his being unwell, caused
by his late exposure to the great heats of the summer.
2 U

330
I beg leave further to inform your Lordship, that his Excellency
Solyman Pasha, (Colonel Seves,) who had obtained leave from his Excel
lency the Seraskier to come to Aleppo and recruit his health after his late
fatigues, of which his Excellency was feeling the bad effects at Aintab,
had left that place for this ; but half way his Excellency changed his
course, and proceeded to Nezib and Birejick ; some say that it was in
consequence of a post that reached him from the Seraskier, with orders to
repair in that direction ; others assert that this change of route of his
Excellency was voluntary, wishing to again see Nezib and the field of
battle, in order to take some notes which he required.
It is further reported, that his Excellency the Seraskier intended to
leave Marash soon, and go to Aintab, but his arrival there is not yet
positively known.
His Excellency the Seraskier is very much vexed against the inha
bitants of Aintab for the late rebellious spirit they showed to his Govern
ment, and has in consequence, for a punishment, ordered the Ferdeh Tax
in that town to be taken three times over.
I am happy to acquaint your Lordship, that his Excellency lsmael
Bey, Governor of this town, who has undertaken operations against the
malcontents of Richa and Jessir Soghr, on the Latakia road, has suc
cessfully terminated the affair, and that district is again perfectly quiet.
His Excellency has proceeded to Hamah and Homs, and from thence
returns here.
So that the whole of this consular district is now much quieter than
it has been of late, although in the Alexandretta district irregularities
continue to be practised from time to time by those mountaineers. t
There are no correct advices at present as to where his Excellency
Hafiz Pasha is, though it is generally believed that he is in the direction
of Malatia with the remains of his army.
I am also informed by a respectable country merchant of this place,
who has dealings on the other side of Orfa, that letters have been received
here from the direction of Diarbekir, from the villages of Siverik and
Chermook, which state that the Koords and Turcomans in that neigh
bourhood are all up in arms, and that it is impossible for any person to
go from thence either to Diarbekir or Malatia.
I have also to acquaint your Lordship, that Maggiun Bey, who was
sent by his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha to Orfa, continues to be there, and
has, I am told, been joined by his Excellency Selim Pasha, who commanded
the forces in the Adana district, and has been replaced for the time by his
Excellency Achmet Menekly Pasha, late Minister of War.
This Government has, within the last two or three weeks, sent a very
large force of Irregulars in the direction of Orfa ; but I do not hear, for the
moment, of the regular force being increased. I have, &c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.
P.S. — I am this moment informed, just as I am closing my packet,
that his Excellency Solyman Pasha has reached this, which I hasten to
submit to your Lordship.

Inclosure 1 in No. 256.
Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Aleppo, July 15, 1839.
I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship under the 1st instant,
transmitting copy of a dictated narration made to me by a M. Petit, in
the Sultan's Seraskier's service, and who was present at the engagement
which took place under the 24 th ultimo, between the Turkish and Egyp
tian forces, which details I hope, ere now, will have reached your Lord
ship's hands.
Captain Davies, of Her Majesty's ship " Dido," having informed me,

331
under date of the 5th instant, — copy of which, with my answer thereto, un
der this day's date, I beg to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information,
— that he would, on his return from a cruize on the coast, take any commu
nication I might have for your Excellency relating to the movements
of the Egyptian army, I avail of it to lay before your Lordship the further
movements of the Egyptian forces under the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha,
since the engagement between the two armies under the 24th ultimo,
which I have elicited from a good channel, and one that has the appear
ance of being correct.
His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, after having taken pos
session of all the provisions, ammunition, and military stores, &c, found
in the Turkish camp at Nezib, proceeded with a small force to the
banks of the Euphrates, opposite Birejick, where the Osmanli army had
another depot, which the Seraskier took possession of; and then sent
across the river a Musselim to Bir, to take charge of that town ; and, it is
said, ordered another one to proceed to Orfa for the same purpose.
His Excellency then directed Mahomed Bey, Colonel of the Annadis,
to cross the Euphrates with his troops, and put under his charge four
regiments of regulars and some artillery, with orders to leave part at
Bir for the service, and advance himself with the rest to Orfa, and there
wait for orders.
This has now been confirmed, by the arrival of several persons who
reached this on the 13th instant, with a caravan from Orfa, and who state
that, when they left that place, the colonel of the Bedouin Cavalry, with
two Infantry regiments, one of Cavalry, and a few pieces of artillery, had
reached there, and were very well received : that on passing through Bir,
they observed that the force there was composed of about a regiment of
Infantry, with some few artillery. They add, that when they left Orfa,
the Egyptian forces had not advanced any further in that direction.
His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, with all the army, left Nezib on the
28th ultimo, and proceeded to Aintab, which place he reached without
any opposition ; Solyman Pasha, of Marash, flying when he heard of the
approach of the Egyptian arms. His Excellency the Seraskier from thence
advanced with some of the Cavalry and Light Artillery on Marash, which
place he also reached, and was very well received.
I beg leave to inform your Lordship, that M. Caillier, Marshal Soult's
aide-de-camp, who is on a mission to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, and
who reached this, on the 26th ultimo, left again on the 28th for Nezib,
hoping to find there his Excellency ; but on his arrival, he found that the
Seraskier had left that place; consequently, M. Caillier, I hear, proceeded
after his Excellency the Seraskier, and did not come up with him,
until he reached Marash. No authentic advices have been received here
by any person from M. Caillier, as to the issue of his mission ; but it is
generally reported, that on M. Caillier's reaching and presenting to
his Excellency the letter he was bearer of from his Highness the Viceroy
Mehemet Ali, his Excellency immediately acquiesced in its contents, which
were, that he was not to advance any further after receipt of his High
ness's letter.
The last advices from Marash, state that his Excellency the Seraskier
continued there, and would not, from all appearances, march any further
forward, in consequence, it is said, of the letter he received from the Viceroy
by the French Envoy.
I learn that the French Consul here has received a letter from Solyman
Pasha (Colonel Seves), who says, that his Excellency the Seraskier is at
Marash with some Cavalry, and that he is at Aintab with four regiments
of Infantry ; the remainder of the forces, with the exception of four regi
ments that are at Bir and Orfa, are echelonnees from Aintab along the
northern frontiers, as far as Adana, and again from Aintab to Nezib.
The roads of this district are still very unquiet : a few days back some
discontent had manifested itself in the direction of Richa and Jessir
Soghr, on the road from hence to Latakia, at which latter place the
inhabitants rose and killed the Musselim with some of his attendants.
In consequence of this reaching the Seraskier's ears, the governor of
this town received orders from his Excellency to proceed immediately to

332
that district with some Irregular Cavalry, and quell the disturbance s in
that neighbourhood.
I was informed yesterday by the Government here, that his Excel
lency lsmael Bey had reached Richa, and had destroyed 120 of the
malcontents of that place, sending here a great many others prisoners,
and several loads of arms that were seized : and further, that his Excel
lency had gone from thence to Jessir Soghr, in search of those who
killed the Musselim of that place, whom he is determined to punish, and
purposes to destroy that village and its inhabitants, for, I hear, they have
at all times shown symptoms of discontent. The 18th Regiment of
Infantry reached this yesterday from the main army ; they have received
four months' pay, and were marched out this morning for Jessir Soghr,
where they are to co-operate with the Irregulars under his Excellency
lsmael Bey, against the malcontents of that district.
By Mr. Vice-Consul Catziflis's last advices under the 10th instant
from Tripoli, he advises that his district had reassumed its tranquillity,
and that the Mutualis fled on the approach of the Egyptian troops that
were sent down to act against them.
The Alexandretta district, by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays' advices of the 3rd
instant, had assumed a more tranquil appearance. Mustook Bey had
fled from Byass, though the mountaineers continued still, from time
to time, to commit irregularities. I inclose copy of a letter addressed by
Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to Captain Davies, of Her Majesty's ship " Dido,"
and which will fully inform your Lordship as to the state of the moun
taineers in that district.
The town of Aleppo is perfectly quiet.
In consequence of the intercepted state of the roads in the direction
of Adana, there are no late advices from thence, with regard to the move
ments of the Egyptian arms on that northern frontier and the defile of the
Taurus. The Government say, that they have received of late no advices
from that quarter ; but it is currently reported in the town that, at the
time the engagement took place between the two armies at Nezib, the
body in the defile of the Taurus advanced also under his Excellency
Selim Pasha, and a collision took place between them and the Osmanli
column on the Koniah line, under Hadji Halil Pasha, in which some say,
that the Egyptians met with a reverse and were obliged to retreat back
to the defile ; others again advance that the Osmanli troops were also
defeated on that line ; but now that the roads from hence to Adana are
again beginning to be open, I hope the first arrivals from thence will
bring us some news. I shall not fail to transmit immediately to your
Lordship, whatever advices I may receive thereon from Mr. Vice-Consul
Jones of that district.
The general and prevalent opinion here among the public is, that the
Sultan's Seraskier, his Excellency Hafiz Pasha, after the defeat of his
troops at Nezib, directed his course, with several Pashas and Viziers, on
Malatia, where it is said, he found Izzet Pasha, who was advancing on
that line with 30,000 men.
There have been no arrivals from that quarter since the battle ; but I
hear, that several persons are soon expected, from whom I shall not fail to
obtain every information on that point.
I have not yet received an answer to the letter I addressed his
Excellency Solyman Pasha, copy of which I beg to inclose for your Lord
ship's information, respecting the fate of Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell,
who, according to M. Petit, as I had the honour of informing your
Lordship, under the 29th ultimo, were in the Turkish camp the day of the
engagement. I have, &,c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

333
Inclosure 2 in No. 256.
Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Aleppo, July 23, 1839.
I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship under the 15th
instant, which despatch I sent to Alexandretta, to be forwarded to your
Lordship by Her Majesty's ship " Dido," together with copy of my letter,
under that day's date, to Captain Davies in command of that vessel.
I have to acquaint your Lordship, that I learn from M. Guys, the
French Consul here, that he has received a letter from M. Caillier, who
tells him, that he is still at Marash with his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha,
and where he will remain, until he receives an answer from Paris to
despatches he has written to the Government vid Egypt.
The French Consul further adds, that from what he has elicited,
Ibrahim Pasha is likely to continue at Marash, and keep his forces sta
tioned on the frontier for some time longer, in consequence of advices,
that there are still several bodies of the Sultan's troops moving about
Asia Minor, whose direction his Excellency wishes to ascertain previous
to retiring his troops, and is occupied in vigilantly watching their move
ments ; thus the Egyptian forces who fought at Nezib, having made a
junction with the column at Adana and on the defile line, are stationed
on the frontiers, so as to form a cordon, extending from Adana along
the whole range of the Taurus to Marash, and from that line to the
Euphrates, besides four regiments of regulars, who have crossed the river
and have advanced, under Mahomed Bey, as far as Orfa. Some persons
of the country say, that a Mussellim under this Government is in autho
rity, even beyond Orfa, at a place called Samsat. But I am assured, that
his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, after the interview he had with M. Caillier,
sent immediately orders to the officer in command of the forces which
had advanced to Orfa, to march no further forward on that line.
The last two or three days this Government has received orders from
his Excellency the Seraskier, to send all the Irregular Cavalry at present
here to Orfa : so that detachments of these troops have been leaving this
daily since then.
I also learn from the Government here, that his Excellency Solyman
Pasha, who has been at Aintab since the engagement, will be here in the
course of a day or two. With regard to the movements on the Sultan's
territory, it is currently reported and believed, that his Excellency the
Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, after the battle which took place at Nezib,
retreated with all his Pashas and the remains of his army, not amounting
to 4,000 men, to Malatia, and where, it is asserted, he continues,
having been joined by Izzet Pasha with about 30,000 men ; and that
Hadji Halil Pasha who had advanced on the Koniah line towards the
defile, had also retreated back to Koniah. And, I am assured by a
person of credit, that no collision ever took place on that line between the
Turkish and Egyptian forces.
Yesterday a letter was received by the Government from his
Excellency Ibrahim Pasha at Marash, inclosing a firman, received from
his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, stating that the Sultan Mahmoud
had been succeeded by Sultan Abdul Medjid, who had ascended the
throne ; and ordering that prayers should be read at the different mosq'ues
on the occasion ; and a salute of twenty-one guns was fired three times
during the day, on Sultan Medjid's ascending the throne.
I am happy to be able to inform your Lordship, that the irregularities
that have been lately committed in the Richa and Jessir Soghr districts,
on the Latakia road, have entirely subsided. This Government having
received advice from his Excellency lsmael Bey, Governor of this town,
who went with a force to act against these malcontents, and clear those
passes, that he had entirely dispersed the discontented spirits of that
district, and that those roads were again tranquil and perfectly secure ;
that the inhabitants of both these places had given in their submission,
and had come forward for pardon, with a promise of remaining quiet and

334
faithful to the Government. Thus the whole of this Consular district is
now pretty tranquil to what it has been, although some irregularities
have been lately committed by the inhabitants of two towns.

Inclosure 3 in No. 256.
Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Captain Davies.
(Extract.) Aleppo, July 15, 1839.
I BEG leave to inform you, that from intelligence I obtained from
the Major-General of the forces, his Excellency Solyman Pasha, while
here, the total amount of forces under his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha,
that assisted at the battle of Nezib, are 43,000 men, 39,000 of which are
regulars, and 3,000 to 3,500 irregulars, with 156 pieces of artillery.
At Adana, and in the defile of the Taurus, there are about 15,000
men, 10,000 of which are regulars, and the remainder irregulars.
There are also on the mountains of Tripoli, called Akkar, two
regiments of Infantry, and one of Cavalry, acting against the Mutualis
inhabiting those mountains, and who have lately evinced discontent.
At Byass there is also a regiment of Infantry.

Inclosure 4 in No. 256.
Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to Captain Davies.
(Extract.) Alexandretta, July 3, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to grant receipt of your letter under date, Her
Majesty's ship " Dido," Alexandretta, July 2, informing me of your
having received official information from Mr. Acting-Consul Werry at
Aleppo, of the defeat of the Turkish Army by his Highness Ibrahim
Pasha, and requesting me to inform you, whether, after that event and
the flight of Mustook Bey, and the desertion of his followers, which I had
the honour to communicate to you verbally, I consider the property of
Her Majesty's subjects likely to be in danger for the present at Alex
andretta. I beg to state, that I do not think the British property at Alexan
dretta to be in danger for the present, as I consider that the defeat of
the Turkish Army and the flight of Mustook Bey, will deter the moun
taineers and other disaffected persons in this district from venturing into
the plains, although the events of the last two days prove, I am sorry to
state, their still unsettled condition.
These events have been the murder of three persons near Serisekili,
about half-way between this place and Byass, on the 30th ultimo ; and
yesterday, about the same place, an attack of the Government post,
under an escort of two mounted police (Buluk Bashis force), in which one
of the police was killed, and the other badly wounded, with also two balls
in his horse ; the fate of the post has not yet been ascertained, the
wounded man having been able only to escape back to Alexandretta.
Accounts received from Byass on the 28th ultimo, state that Mustook
Bey, on receipt of news of the defeat of the Turkish Army, was deserted
by all his followers, and with difficulty made his escape across the
frontiers. I am unable to state particularly the number of land forces under
the command of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha ; but from the best informa
tion I have been able to obtain, the estimated number before the com
mencement of hostilities was about 65,000 regulars and 15,000 irregulars,
which, it appears, have been increased, since the defeat of the Turkish
Army, by the enrolment of deserters from that camp into the Egyptian
Irregular Cavalry.
With regard to the information you require, whether I am aware of
any ships of war building or about to be built within the province of

335
Syria, I beg to inform you, that there is no establishment for the building
of ships of war within the province of Syria ; but I understand from
Mahomed Bey, the head builder at Alexandretta, who was here last
month, for the purpose of examining the timber of these mountains,
and selecting the best adapted for ship-building purposes, that orders
were issued for laying down twelve ships of the line and frigates, with
the least possible delay, at Alexandretta.
I shall feel obliged by information of your probable movements, that
I may transmit such to Mr. Acting-Consul Werry, at Aleppo, for his
guidance.

Inclosure 5 in No. 256.
Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Solyman Pasha.
General, Alep, le 3 Juillet, 1839.
M. PETIT, Francais, Instructeur attache' a l'Armee Turque de Hafiz
Pacha, et qui a ete fait prisonnier, se trouvant maintenant a Alep, il m'a
dit qu'il avait vu au camp des Osmanlis deux Anglais nommes Mr. Ains
worth et Mr. Russell, qui, en voyageant pour lever des plans de geographie,
se sont trouves au milieu du camp Ture, apparemment en venant du cote'
de Biredjick, car, m'a-t-il dit, que depuis quelque tems ces deux Anglais
voyageaient dans FAsie Mineure pour compte de la Societe Geographique
de Londres; il m'a ajoute ensuite, qu' apres la bataille, lui (M. Petit) se
trouvant chez vous, on vous porta dans ce moment la, des papiers Merits en
Anglais (apparemment appartenants aux susdits Messieurs), et que vous
eutes la bonte' de dire, en les voyant, " Eh bien, je les transmettrai au
Consul Anglais d'Alep;" en consequence de ce, je prends la liberte,
General, non seulement de vous prier de me faire passer ces papiers par
la premiere sure occasion, mais de vouloir bien m'obliger de prendre
toutes les informations possibles sur le compte de ces Messieurs, pour
m'en donner des nouvelles, c'est-a-dire savoir ce qu'ils sont devenus.
II m'a ete dit que M. Molinari vient d'acheter une selle a F Anglaise d'un
de vos soldats (Hanadis), et cette circonstance me donne de fortes inquie
tudes sur le sort des dits Anglais.
J'ose attendre de votre bont6 accoutumee, que vous pourrez me
donner quelques nouvelles positives des susdits Messieurs, dont je connais
Fun tres-particulierement. Dans l'attente d'etre honore1 d'une reponse
agreable, agreez-en d'avance, General, mes remercimens les plus sinceres,
ainsi que mes excuses de la peine que je vous donne, et je vous prie de me
croire avec les sentimens de la plus haute consideration, &c.
(Signe) F. H. S. WERRY.

(Translation.)
Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Solyman Pasha.
General, Aleppo, July 3, 1839.
MONSIEUR PETIT, a Frenchman, an instructor attached to the
Turkish Army of Hafiz Pasha, and who was taken prisoner, being now at
Aleppo, has told me that he saw in the camp of the Osmanlis two En
glishmen, Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell, who, travelling for the purpose
of taking geographical surveys, arrived in the midst of the Turkish
camp, apparently coming from the direction of Biredjick, for he told me
that for some time past these two Englishmen have been travelling in Asia
Minor in behalf of the Geographical Society of London ; he then added,
that after the battle, while he(M. Petit) was with you, some papers written
in English (apparently belonging to the above-mentioned gentlemen) were

336
brought to you, and that you had the goodness to say, on seeing them,
" Well, I will transmit them to the English Consul at Aleppo ;" in conse
quence of this, I take the liberty, General, not only to request you to
send me these papers by the first safe opportunity, but also to oblige me
by obtaining all possible information respecting these gentlemen, in order
to give me some intelligence with regard to them, that is to say, to let me
know what has become of them. I have been told that M. Molinari has
just bought an English saddle from one of your soldiers (Hanadis), and
this circumstance gives me great uneasiness as to the fate of these
Englishmen. I venture to expect from your accustomed kindness, that you will be
able to give me some positive intelligence respecting the above-mentioned
gentlemen, one of whom I know very intimately. In the expectation of
being honoured with a favourable answer, receive in anticipation, General,
my most sincere thanks, as well as my apologies for the trouble which I
am giving you ; and I beg you to believe me, with sentiments of the
highest consideration, &c, (Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

No. 257.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, July 30, 1839.
HAVING seen it asserted in the speeches of some French Deputies,
that Ibrahim Pasha was only the adopted son of Mehemet Ali, I men
tioned it to him, and asked him if Ibrahim Pasha was his own son, or if
he was the son of his wife by a former husband.
The Pasha replied, that his wife never had any other husband but
himself, and that she bore to him five children, all born at Cavalla in
Roumelia, the native town of himself and of his wife. That the eldest
child, a female, who has been dead for some years, was the wife of
Moharem Bey (now here). Ibrahim Pasha was the second, and the others
were Toussoon Pasha and lsmael Pasha (both dead), and Nayli Hanim,
the widow of the late Defteretan.
The Pasha added, that all his other children were the offspring of
separate and different mothers.

No. 258.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
My Lord, Damascus, August 2, 1839.
IT appears that Bir and Orfa were taken possession of by the Egyp
tian troops, previous to Ibrahim Pasha having reoccupied Aintab and
having himself advanced to Marash. The Egyptian Government con
tinues to be actively employed in making preparations on the Aleppo
frontier, by sending to the different points occupied by the forces,
considerable supplies of ammunition and military stores, I presume with
the intention to be in an attitude more effectually to bring to a conclusion
the pending Question between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, which the
recent composition of the Sultan Medjid's Ministry would not indicate as
likely to be easily accomplished favourably to Mehemet Ali.
I make no doubt your Lordship will be particularly informed on the
advantages the present positions occupied by the Egyptian forces offer
to Mehemet Ali, either for immediate offensive, or future aggressive, ope
rations. The former, viewed distinctly from any connexion .with the
latter, would appear necessary, not only for the defence of the north of
Syria, but absolutely requisite to govern and control the whole of that

337
border. The malcontents of the lower ranges of the Taurus, extending
from and above Marash to Byass and northward along the Adana pro
vince, as well as south to Beylan and Alexandretta, never can be kept in
check without Marash is placed in the hands of whatever Power is called
on to govern the Aleppo Pashalic: and unless this post is put in the
hands of the Egyptian Government, a warfare will always exist
on those mountains. Bir and Orfa, considered in the same sense, are
essential, though not to a parallel extent as the occupation of Marash is,
to control the mountaineers, to constrain, control, and govern the Arab
tribes east of the Euphrates, and prevent them from passing that
river on the line to Dair ; the occupation of the two former places by
the Sultan's troops rendered the southern desert frontier of the Aleppo
Pashalic a continual field for the incursions and depredations of the
Arab tribes, and prevented the Egyptian Government, with all the irre
gular Bedouin Cavalry force employed on that service, from protecting
it effectually. The district of Orfa is also one of great agricultural
resource, on which at all times the Pashalic of Aleppo, conjointly with
its own, relied for its supplies of grain ; and notwithstanding the exten
sion of agriculture in Syria, Orfa would derive considerable advantage
by the sale of its harvests at Aleppo, of which the late occupation of that
district by the Sultan's authorities have deprived the population on both
sides. The occupation of Marash, Bir, and Orfa, by the Egyptians, consi
dered as giving aggressive power to that Government, differs in its rela
tive advantage. Marash does not offer, more than Aintab, means to the
Egyptians to prosecute offensive operations ; both lie on the direct road
to Malatia, or to Kaisserieh to Koniah. Marash is consequently immedi
ately requisite to the Egyptian Government for the proper governing and
protection of the lower ranges of the Taurus ; while allowed to remain in
the hands of the Sultan, it offers the means of immediate aggression on the
Egyptian territory, both in a military and insurrectionary point pf view,
as the late operations of Hafiz Pasha on that line fully establish.
With respect to the aggressive advantage the possession of Bir and
Orfa offers to the Egyptians, either to the north of Mesopotamia and
Anatolia, or to the south of the former to Babylonia, it is self-evident ;
and it may only remain for your Lordship to decide whether it is politic
or expedient that Mehemet Ali should establish his depots to the east
of the Euphrates, having the free passage of that river, to enable him
to carry his operations in either direction ; if to the south, which will at
once bring him in connexion with Koordistan, and eventually with Persia,
should he not pursue aggressive measures towards Babylonia, will enable
him to exercise considerable influence throughout that line of country;
and if to the north of Mesopotamia and Anatolia, will equally awaken the
jealousy of Russia and the Sultan, or enable the former to be in intelli
gence with Mehemet Ali ; while placed within his old limits in Syria on
this side of the Euphrates, unconnected with any views north or south in
Mesopotamia, he will be in a position distinct and separate from all
other Powers, and more within the control and under the influence of
Great Britain. This is supposing Mehemet Ali is, or may be, destined to
be an instrument in the hands of the Governments of Western Europe, or
such others as by a defensive pacific policy may form a balance in oppo
sition to the views of Russia in the Levant and the East.
With a view to diminish the burdens levied on the population of
Syria, also to prevent both the Sultan and Mehemet Ali endangering the
pacific policy of the European Powers, by the presence of imposing armies
on the northern frontier, it might be advisable for both Powers to main
tain such forces only between Malatia and Diarbekir on one side, and
Aleppo on the other, as are sufficient to hold and govern the intermediate
countries in a pacific sense; and that, with the exception of the force at
Aintab and Marash, but weak garrisons should be kept at Bir and Orfa,
leaving the space between the Euphrates and Aleppo, as it was before,
without any. Though it should not be considered that these countries
can be held or governed without the presence of a regular military force,
which will always necessitate the Egyptians to have a strong force at
2 X

338
Aleppo ; and the Sultan, for the same reason, will require similar forces
at Diarbekir and Moussul, otherwise the line to Bagdad will soon be inter
rupted by the Koords, Sinjars, and other population. The distinction
and difference would be in keeping up in these countries a force sufficient
to govern and control, and not one to undertake aggressive operations
between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali ; and in this pacific sense, if both the
Sultan and Mehemet Ali could be brought to consider that it would be
productive of the establishment and the prolongation of amicable rela
tions between them, neither Mesopotamia or Syria need be overburdened
with the maintenance of excessive large armies.
Mr. Pro-Consul at Aleppo will, I presume, inform your Lordship of
the measures taken by the Egyptian Government to extinguish the insur
rectionary movements at Richa and Jessir Soghr. I hear this has been
accomplished ; and the force of 12,000 men, regulars and irregulars,
employed on that service, is on its march hither, first to act against the
Mutualis on the Balbec line, which have been now some time in insurrec
tion. The Emir Gewad Harfoush fled from hence, after having made his
submission to the Government ; and it is said he has been killed in a recent
rencontre between him and the Egyptian irregulars. This force, com
manded by his Excellency lsmael Bey of Aleppo, will afterwards, passing
through Damascus, proceed to the Haouran, where a portion of the inha
bitants of the Agloun district refuse to pay taxes or listen to the Govern
ment ; and also against a body of Druses who are now in arms at the
Ledgea, in consequence of the Emir Guionblate having been recently
seized and decapitated here with seven others, for having been found in
arms infesting the roads. This Emir was cousin to the one of that family
who is at Constantinople, and who has been a long time in intelligence
with the malcontent Druses in these parts. Government will experience
some further delay and difficulty in completely extinguishing these insur
rections : the population generally disbelieving the death of the Sultan and
the accession of Abdul Medjid ; and still less will they listen to the defeat
of Hafiz Pasha ; in other respects, Damascus, and indeed the surrounding
country, is tolerably quiet. I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

No. 259.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
My Lord, Beyrout, August 3, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that his Excellency
Said Bey, the son of the Viceroy of Egypt, commanding the corvette
" Damenhoor," arrived at this place on the 30th ultimo. His Excellency
intends to visit Tripoli, and may probably cruize off this coast for a month
or two. On the 23rd ultimo, Mahmoud Bey, the Governor of Beyrout, notified
publicly the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne of Constan
tinople, and salutes were fired on the occasion during three successive
days. In this immediate neighbourhood all is tranquil ; but on the Acre
and Caiffa roads assassinations and robberies have been frequent of late.
The Mutualis are also in arms in detached bodies, and have committed
disorders in various directions. I fear it may be some time ere perfect
tranquillity is restored in Syria.
By our latest advices, Ibrahim Pasha was at Marash.
Her Majesty's ship " Dido," Captain Davies, touched at this place on
the 27th ultimo in search of Admiral Stopford. I informed Captain Davies
that he would in all probability find the Admiral at Tenedos ; he accord
ingly sailed for that destination. I have, &c,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

339

No. 260.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
My Lord, Alexandria, August 7, 1839.
A STEAMER of the Porte arrived here from Constantinople on the
5th instant, conveying Mujed Bey, the Capi Kiaja (Charge d'Affaires) of
Mehemet Ali to the Porte, and also Captain Anselme, attache* to the
French Embassy at Constantinople.
The latter brought to me communications from his Excellency
Viscount Ponsonby, as also similar communications from the Ambas
sadors of the Great Powers to their Consuls-General here.
I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of the
despatch of Viscount Ponsonby to me, togetherwith its inclosures Nos.
1 and 2.
I replied to Viscount Ponsonby by the French steamer which left at
daylight this morning, and have the honour to transmit copy of my
despatch to his Excellency, No. 3, together with copies of the inclosures
sent to his Excellency, inclosures Nos. 4, 5, and 6.
Inclosure No. 4 is the Procds-Verbal of the interview of my colleagues
and myself with the Pasha yesterday morning, and inclosures 5 and 6
are the documents alluded to in the Proc£s-Verbal.
I request to call your Lordship's attention to inclosure No. 6, by
which you will perceive that the Porte was ready to accede to Mehemet
Ali's demands in respect to the hereditary succession in his family of
Syria, &c, when the collective communication from the Ambassadors of
the Great Powers induced the Porte to leave the entire decision of the
Oriental Question in the hands of the Great Powers.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 260.
Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.
Sir, Therapia, July 29, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of a Collective Note signed by the Representatives
of the Five Great Powers.
This Note was yesterday delivered to the Sublime Porte, and the
Porte, without delay, gave its formal adhesion to the proposition contained
therein. You will acquaint the Pasha of Egypt with this fact. The Repre
sentatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, have directed the
Consuls-General of their respective Governments to communicate the
above fact to the Pasha, and it is desired by all that the Consuls-General
should act conjointly in performing what is desired of them.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 260.
Collective Note of the Five Powers.
[See Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

2X2

340
Inclosure 3 in No. 260.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Alexandria, August 6, 1839.
I HAD the honour to receive yesterday, by the steamer of the Sultan,
your Excellency's despatch of 29th July, together with the Collective Note
signed by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.
The proces-verbal which I have now the honour to transmit,
together with its two inclosures, will put your Excellency in possession of
the proceedings of my colleagues and of myself on this occasion.
M. Cochelet was of opinion, that we should address a Collective Note
to the Pasha; but this was overruled by my colleagues of Austria, and
Russia, and myself, and we therefore limited ourselves to the letter of
your Lordship's despatch which was, " to acquaint the Pasha with the
fact;" as we thought, that if we gave a note to the Pasha we might fall
into the fault of either saying too much or too little. I have, &c,
(Signed) P. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 4 in No. 260.
Proces- Verbal of Interview of the Consuls-General with Mehemet Ali.
LE 6 Aout, a 9 heures du matin, Messieurs les Consuls-Generaux
d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de France, et de Russie, se rendirent chez le
Pacha d'Egypte, a Feffet de lui notifier, a l'invitation qui leur avait ete;
adress6e a ce sujet par les Representans de leurs Gouvernemens respectifs
a, Constantinople, la Note Collective adress£e a la Sublime Porte le 27
Juillet, de la part de leurs Excellences, et dont ils venaient d'etre munis
simultanement par leurs Ministres respectifs.
Cette Note portait que la Porte Ottomane, d'apr&s l'idee qui lui avait
et6 annoncee par les Ambassadeurs et Ministres des dites Grandes
Puissances, avait donne une adhesion formelle a la proposition de suspen-
dre toute determination definitive sans leur concours dans la Question
Orientale et d'attendre Feffet de Finteret que les Grands Cabinets lui
portent. Le Gerant du Consulat-General de Prusse se trouvant retenu chez lui
par suite d'une indisposition, avait charge le Consul-General de Russie
de faire connaitre au Vice-Roi la participation de sa Cour a cette
demarche. A peine arrives au palais et en presence de Son Altesse, les quatre
Consuls-Gdneraux s'acquitterent simultanement de la tache qui leur etait
envoyee. Apres avoir ecoute la lecture de la Note Collective susmen-
tionnee, Mehemet Ali leur annon§a qu'il avait deja eu connaissance de
cette piece par les informations qui lui avaient ete adressees directement
de Constantinople, et observa que la copie qu'il en avait recue par Hosreff
Pacha contenait quelque variete ; savoir, au lieu de la " Question Orien
tale," on y avait mis la "Question Egyptienne ;" et au mot " d'interet" on y
avait substitue ceux de '' dispositions bienveillantes." Cette piece, redig£e
en langue Turque, nous fut remise en traduction et en copie par le Vice-Roi
et se trouve jointe k ce Proces- Verbal. En ediange, Son Altesse demanda
une copie de la Note Collective telle qu'elle nous avait ete adressee, ce qui
lui fut accorde.
Les Consuls-Generaux engagerent ensuite le Vice-Roi a prendre note
de cette derniere note, et lui annoncerent que les Grandes Puissances
feraient connaitre par la suite a leurs Representans, les resolutions
qu'elles adopteraient dans leur haute sagesse et d'un commun accord, pour
r6gler definitivement la Question Orientale d'apres des principes d'equite\
de convenance, et de stabilite pour Favenir. Qu'en attendant la reception
destructions directes et precises de leurs Cabinets, Son Altesse apprd-
cierait sans doute les sentimens qui avaient dicte cette demarche de la

341
part des Cours Europeennes, motivee sur le desir uni de retablir et de
conserver la tranquillite de l'Orient.
" Oui," repondit Mehemet Ali, "j'aime a croire que les Puissances
d'Europe me jugeront avecequite, et en ce cas elles ne trouveront aucune
difficulte de ma part a me soumettre a leur decision ; d'ailleurs, je n'ai que
deux mots a articuler, ils vous sont connus : c'est l'heredite de la Syrie et
Peioignement de Hosreff Pacha ; quant au premier point, il m'avait deja
6t6 accorde, et Saib Effendi etait au moment d'etre expedie a Alexandrie
avec cette nouvelle, lorsque la mediation des Grandes Cours fit arreter
son depart. C'est Hosreff Pacha lui-meme qui m'en donne I'avis, et Moufid
Bey en a recu Fassurance verbale de Sa Hautesse elle-meme."
Sur la demande des Consuls-Generaux, la copie de la lettre du Grand
Vizir constatant le fait precite, leur fut remise, et elle se trouve egalement
jointe en traduction a ce Proces- Verbal.
Cet entretien n'avait dure gu£re au-dela d'une demi heure ; le Vice-
Roi semblait fortement preoccupe, et sa contenance trahissait Finquietude
que lui fesait eprouver Fingerence des Grandes Puissances dans les
Affaires d'Orient. (Translation.)
Minute qf Interview of the Consuls-General with Mehemet Ali.
ON the 6th of August, at 9 a. m., the Consuls-General of Austria,
England, France, and Russia, waited upon the Pasha of Egypt, for the
purpose of notifying to him, in conformity with instructions which had
been addressed to them upon this subject by the Representatives of their
respective Governments at Constantinople, the Collective Note addressed
to the Sublime Porte on the 27th July by their Excellencies, and with
which they had been simultaneously furnished by the Ministers of their
respective Governments.
This Note set forth that the Ottoman Porte, in consequence of the
intention which had been communicated to it by the Ambassadors and
Ministers of the above-mentioned Great Powers, had given its formal
adhesion to the proposition to suspend taking any final decision respecting
the Oriental Question without their concurrence, and to await the result
of the interest which the Great Cabinets feel for it.
The Acting Consul-General of Prussia being confined to his house
in consequence of indisposition, had charged the Consul-General of
Russia to make known to the Viceroy the participation of his Court in
this measure. Immediately upon their arrival at the palace, and in the presence of
His Highness, the four Consuls-General simultaneously fulfilled their
mission. After having heard the above-mentioned Collective Note read to
him, Mehemet Ali informed them that he had already been made aware of
this document by communications direct from Constantinople, and
observed, that the copy of it which he had received through Hosrew Pasha
differed in some degree ; viz : — in lieu of " the Oriental Question " was
put " Egyptian Question ;" and for the word " interest," the words " be
nevolent dispositions " had been substituted. This document was drawn
out in the Turkish language, and a copy thereof, as also a translation,
were given to us by the Viceroy. They will be found appended to this
Proces- Verbal. His Highness, in exchange, desired to have a copy of
the Collective Note, such as it had been sent to us. This was complied
with. The Consuls-General then requested the Viceroy to take into consi
deration this last-mentioned document, and announced to him, that the
Great Powers would hereafter make known to their Representatives the
resolutions which, in their high wisdom and with a common accord, they
should adopt, to settle finally the Eastern Question upon principles of
equity, propriety, and future stability. And that, awaiting the reception
of direct and precise instructions from their Cabinets, His Highness
would, doubtless, appreciate the feelings which had prompted this
measure on the part of the European Courts, founded, as it was, upon their

342
united desire to re-establish and to maintain the tranquillity of the
East. " Yes," replied Mehemet Ali, " I am inclined to believe that the
Powers of Europe will judge me with equity ; and in that case they will
not find any difficulty on my part to submit myself to their decision*
Moreover, I have but two words to say, and they are already known to
you, — the hereditary Government of Syria, and the removal of Hosrew
Pasha. With respect to the first, it had already been granted to me ;
and Saib Effendi was on the point of being sent to Alexandria with this
news, when the mediation of the Great Powers caused his departure to
be stopped. It is Hosrew Pasha himself who gives me this intelligence,
and Moufid Bey has received a verbal assurance of it from His Highness
hi person. At the request of the Consuls-General, a copy of the letter from the
Grand Vizier, stating the above-mentioned fact, was given to them, and a
translation thereof is likewise appended .to this Proces-Verbal.
This interview lasted little more than half an hour. The Viceroy
appeared to be much pre-occupied, and his appearance betrayed the
uneasiness which the interference of the Great Powers in the affairs of
the East caused him to experience.

Inclosure 5 in No. 260.

Translation from the Turkish, of the Note sent by the Porte to Mehemet
Ali, as that received by it from the Representatives of the Great
Powers.LES Cinq Ambassadeurs des Puissances, Soussignes, conformement
aux instructions qu'ils ont regues hier de leurs Cours respectives, se feii-
citent d'avoir a annoncer aux Ministres de la Sublime Porte que Faccord
des Cinq Grandes Puissances touchant la Question Egyptienne est certain,
et ils prient que la Sublime Porte, en attendant le fruit de leurs disposi
tions bienveillantes, ne decide absolument rien sur la susdite question
sans leur recours. (Translation.)
Translation from the Turkish, of the Note sent by the Porte to Mehemet Ali, as that
received by it from the Representatives of the Great Powers.
THE Five Ambassadors of the Powers, Undersigned, conformably to
the instructions which they received yesterday from their respective Courts
are happy to have to announce to the Ministers of the Sublime Porte that
the accordance of the Five Great Powers respecting the Egyptian Question
is certain, and they entreat that the Sublime Porte, whilst awaiting the
result of their benevolent dispositions, should not decide anything at all
(ne decide absolument rien) with respect to the above-mentioned question
without reference to them.

(Traduction.)

Inclosure 6 in No. 260.
Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali.
(Suivent les titres.)

J'AI recu par le retour d'Akif Effendi la reponse de Votre Altesse a
la lettre que j ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser par cet Envoye et Pen ai
compns le contenu, ainsi que celui du rapport du meme Akif Effendi sur
les conferences qui ont eu lieu entre Votre Altesse et lui. J'ai depose l'une
et 1 autre aux pieds de Sa Hautesse, qui en a pris connaissance; et ie les
ai communiquees ensuite aux principaux dignitaires de la Sublime
Porte reunis en Conseil. Nous nous sommes rejouis en apprenant que

343
Votre Altesse, qui est un ancien feudataire de l'Empire, qui lui a rendu
den services plus reels que tous les autres, qui, pour cette raison, est
devenue Fun des plus grands de nos eoliegues, avait la noble pensee de
faire cause commune avec les membres les plus influens et les plus
devoues de la nation Musulmane, et nous avons prie Dieu qu'il exaucat
nos voeux communs d'union pour le bonheur de l'Empire. Dans sa
reponse, qui renferme une espece de reproche, Votre Altesse fait observer
que dans la lettre que j'eus l'honneur de lui faire remettre par Akif
Effendi, je ne parlais de la transmission par h6redite que des provinces
Egyptiennes ; mais ce n'etait la qu'une forme employee pour annoncer a
Votre Altesse son pardon. Du reste, Akif Effendi n'avait pas mission de
traiter les affaires ; il etait seulement charge de vous porter la nouvelle
la plus desirable de toutes, — de votre rentree en grace ; c'est pourquoi
j'omis de donner a Votre Altesse de plus amples explications. Quoiqu'il
en soit, tous les grands dignitaires de la Sublime Porte voulant, avec moi,
que vous ayez la securite et toutes les garanties necessaires, et etant
prets a associer leurs efforts aux votres pour la prosperite de FEmpire,
apres avoir pris les Ordres Supremes de Sa Hautesse, notre Auguste
Maitre, j'avais donne I'ordre a son Excellence Saib Effendi, Ministre de la
Justice, de se rendre aupres de Votre Altesse, a Feffet de s'entendre avec
elle sur les demandes qu'elle a presentees, sur les services qu'elle a
l'intention de rendre, et sur les mesures a prendre dans les conjonctures
actuelles. Cet Envoye allait partir sur le bateau a vapeur, lorsque les
Ambassadeurs des Cinq Grandes Puissances ont remis a la Sublime Porte
une Note signee par eux, dont la traduction se trouve dans la presente
lettre. Son contenu fait connaitre que les Cinq Grandes Puissances se
sont mises d'accord pour discuter et regler les Affaires d'Orient. Imme
diatement apres la presentation de cette Note, les hauts dignitaires de la
Sublime Porte se sont reunis de nouveau en Conseil, et ont ete d'avis que
l'ingerence des etrangers dans une affaire de suzerain a vassal est une
chose assez peu convenable ; mais considerant que les Cinq Grandes
Puissances s'en etant deja occup6es de concert, le refus de leur mediation,
contraire aux usages Europeens, serait offensant pour elles, et pourrait
attirer des embarras et du trouble a la nation Musulmane, vu Fetat
general des choses; reflediissant, de plus, qu'a la suite de Fobtention de
votre grace et des projets d'union qui s'effectuent, les garanties d'un
concours exterieur deviennent superflues, et que, des-lors Fintervention ou
la non-intervention des Puissances dans Farrangement des affaires n'est
d'aucune importance, les Grands assembles, tout en faisant des voeux pour
que nous n'ayons jamais a recourir aux etrangers, n'ont pas juge k propos
dans les circonstances actuelles, de repousser la demande imprevue des
Cinq Ambassadeurs, et y ont donne leur adhesion. Nous avons desire, et
la volonte de Sa Hautesse est, que vous soyez informe avant tout de ce qui
vient d'avoir lieu. C'est pourquoi le depart de PEnvoye dont il a ete
question, se trouve suspendu. J'ai pris la liberte d'ecrire la presente
lettre a Votre Altesse, et je l'expedie par le bateau a vapeur. Apres que
Votre Altesse aura pris connaissance de son contenu, ainsi que des
communications adressees par les Ambassadeurs aux Consuls-Generaux,
je la prie de vouloir bien me faire connaitre son opinion.
Ce 20 Djemazi-el-evel, 1255.
P. S. — II a ete convenu que votre Charge d'Affaires a Constantinople,
Moufid Bey, se chargerait de porter lui-meme cette lettre a Votre Altesse,
pour lui en developper de vive-voix le contenu. Votre Altesse connaitra
ainsi plus facilement les choses. (Translation.)
Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali.
(Titles.)
I HAVE received, by Akif Effendi on his return, Your Highness'
answer to the letter which I had the honour of addressing to you by that
Envoy, and I have understood its contents, as also those of the report by

344
the same Akif Effendi of the Conferences which took place between Your
Highness and him.
I have laid both at the feet of His Highness, who took cognizance
of them, and I communicated them, afterwards, to the Principal Dignataries
of the Sublime Porte assembled in Council. We were highly pleased at
learning that Your Highness, who is an ancient Feudatory of the Empire,
who has rendered to it more real services than all the other Feudatories,
and who, for this reason, has become one of the greatest of our colleagues,
had the noble idea to act in common with the most influential and most
devoted members of the Mussulman Nation, and we prayed God to fulfil our
united vows for the prosperity of the Empire. Your Highness, in your
answer, which contains a kind of reproach, observes, that in the letter which
I had the honour of transmitting to you by Akif Effendi, I only mentioned
the hereditary transmission of the Egyptian Provinces ; but this was only a
formula made use of to announce to Your Highness your pardon. More
over, the mission of Akif Effendi was not to treat of affairs ; he was only
charged to convey to you the most desirable news of all, — your being
readmitted into favour ; it was on this account that I omitted giving to
Your Highness any fuller explanation. However, all the High Digni
taries of the Sublime Porte desiring, with me, that you should have all
necessary security and guarantee, and being ready to join their efforts to
yours for the prosperity of the Empire, after having taken the supreme
commands of His Highness, our August Master, I had given orders to His
Excellency Saib Effendi, Minister of Justice, to wait upon Your Highness,
for the purpose of coming to an understanding with you on the demands
presented by Your Highness, on the services which you intend to render,
and on the measures to be taken under present circumstances. That Envoy
was on the point of departing with the steam -boat, when the Ambassadors
of the Five Great Powers presented to the Sublime Porte a Note signed
by them, of which a translation is inclosed in this letter. Its contents show
that the Five Great Powers have come to an understanding to discuss and
regulate the Affairs of the East. Immediately after the presentation of this
Note, the High Dignitaries of the Sublime Porte met again in Council, and
were of opinion that the interference of strangers in matters between a
Sovereign and his vassal is far from being right ; but, taking into con
sideration that the Five Great Powers have already been conjointly
occupied with this subject, and that the refusal of their mediation, con
trary to the usages of Europe, would offend them and might be the
cause of inconvenience and trouble to the Mussulman Nation, considering
the general state of things ; bearing in mind also, that after your
pardon and the projects of union which are about to be carried into
effect, the guarantees of a foreign co-operation become superfluous, and
consequently the intervention or non-intervention of the Powers in the
arrangement of affairs is a matter of no importance ; — the High Digna
taries assembled, whilst anxiously hoping that we never need have recourse
to strangers, have not deemed it expedient, under the present circum
stances, to reject this unexpected demand of the Five Ambassadors, and
have agreed to it. We have desired, and it is the pleasure of His High
ness, that you should immediately be informed of what has taken place.
On this account the departure of the Envoy abovementioned has been sus
pended. 1 have taken the liberty of writing the present letter to Your
Highness, and I send it by the steam-boat. When Your Highness shall
have become acquainted with its contents, and with the communications of
the Ambassadors to the Consuls- General, I request you will let me know
your opinion.
This 20th Djemazi-el-evel, 1255.
P.S. — It has been agreed that your Charge d'Affaires at Constantino
ple, Moufid Bey, should take this letter himself to Your Highness, to explain
vivd voce its contents. Your Highness will then learn the state of things
with greater facility.

345
No, 261.  <
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
My Lord, Alexandria, August 7, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a
letter written by me to Viscount Ponsonby, in reply to two notes from his
Excellency, and which may be considered as semi-official.
Your Lordship will perceive that it was reported at Constantinople,
that Ibrahim Pasha was advancing to Diarbekir, Harpoot, &,c, but I can
assure your Lordship that Ibrahim Pasha, according to the reports from
Captain Caillier, and to every information received by my colleagues and
myself from Syria, remains in the positions in which he was at the arrival
of Captain Caillier at his head-quarters ; and Mehemet Ali has assured
me, that Ibrahim Pasha will not send a single soldier in advance ; and I
have already had the honour to inform your Lordship, that Ibrahim
Pasha has refused to attend to the invitations sent to him by different
authorities in Asia Minor, to send troops to their different districts.
I have more than once taken the liberty to intrude upon your
Lordship my opinion relative to the hereditary succession of Syria to
Mehemet Ali, which, I think, would be most advantageous to the Porte
itself, and would tend to strengthen rather than to weaken it. But the
chief reason for my opinion is, the misery which would ensue to the
Christian and Jewish population in Syria, if that country were to be
constituted as before : and I feel convinced, that not only would Syria
then become a scene of anarchy and bloodshed, but European commerce
also would be entirely destroyed.
This, my Lord, is not my own opinion alone, but it is also that of all
my colleagues, and of the best-informed European merchants. Were
Syria to be yielded in hereditary succession to Mehemet Ali, the case
would be very different from that of Wallachia, Moldavia, &c, as not
only do the Princes of those provinces profess the Greek religion, but
they are also, from their geographical position, exposed to the powerful
and immediate action of Russia; whereas, on the contrary, Syria is in
quite a different position in those respects ; and I cannot but take the
liberty of expressing my intimate conviction to your Lordship, that the
cession of Syria, in succession to Mehemet Ali, would not only be much
to the advantage of Syria and of European commerce, but would also
tend to strengthen the Ottoman Empire itself.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 261.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Alexandria, August 6, 1839.
I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's two notes of
the 26th and 27th of July.
Your Lordship informs me (and M. de Bouteneff writes the same to
Count Medem), that Ibrahim Pasha is advancing to Diarbekir, Harpoot,
&c, &c. I think I can positively assert that Ibrahim Pasha is not advan
cing, although such a report has been widely spread at Constantinople,
where the reports regarding the Pasha are not usually correct, and are
often too much exaggerated.
Ibrahim Pasha had, before the arrival of M. Caillier at his head
quarters, sent a corps to Orfa, but this corps will be brought (if not
already so) to this side of the Euphrates ; but he has not sent, nor will he
send, any troops to Diarbekir, Harpoot, &c, &c.
It is not improbable (as your Lordship states), that the late successes
of Mehemet Ali may hasten the destruction of the Turkish Empire, if the
Government be not sufficiently wise to adopt the only course now likely
to ward off such a catastrophe. I mean, by availing itself of the counsels
and effective assistance which he has it in his power to afford.
2Y

346
The state of disorganization represented by the late accounts from
Smyrna and Constantinople, to exist among the remains of the army in
Asia Minor, though partly brought about by the defeat of the main body
of the army, must have had its original cause in the precipitate measures
resorted to by Sultan Mahmoud for bringing into the field a force greatly
exceeding the resources of the country, destitute of officers, and without
the elements of military discipline, which can alone keep an army together
under difficult circumstances.
The interference of the European Powers in the ultimate settlement
of Eastern Affairs, which the Pasha was the first to invoke, will now
furnish a satisfactory guarantee against any views of aggrandizement he
may have been supposed to entertain ; and the army he possesses is in
such a state of efficiency as to supply a sufficient force for the immediate
protection of the Empire, and ample materials for the reorganization of
the Turkish Army on a more improved system.
But unless Hosrew Pasha be removed, it will be in vain to look for
any improvement in the management of affairs at Constantinople. He
has inherited all the inveterate enmity of Sultan Mahmoud against
Mehemet Ali, without any of his virtues, and would not hesitate to plunge
the country into all the horrors of civil war, in order to gratify his ambi
tion and revenge. On the other hand, Mehemet Ali and his son Ibrahim
Pasha are now looked up to by the nation as the only individuals pos
sessing the means of regenerating the Ottoman Empire. Mehemet Ali
has expressed his readiness to support any administration not under the
influence of Hosrew Pasha, and the confidence reposed in him by all
parties would give a strong impulse to the work of reform.
The Pasha considers the union of the Turkish and Egyptian
fleets as the most vital blow that could be struck against the designs of
Russia, and it is viewed in that light by all the Sultan's officers here ; as
two or three more years of training under European instruction would
render them quite a match for the Russian Navy, if they are not so
already.

No. 262.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
My Lord, Alexandria, August 8, 1839.
WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday, I have now the honour to
transmit to your Lordship the translation of a letter from Mehemet Ali to
Hosrew Pasha, in reply to the letter which forms inclosure No. 6 in my
despatch. This letter appears to me to be of great importance, inasmuch as it proves
that the Sultan had already accorded to Mehemet Ali all his demands,, when
the mediation of the Great Powers put a stop to any further proceedings.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 262.

Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha. — (August 6, 1839.)
(Traduction.) (Suivent les titres.)
J'AI recu la lettre que Votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser par
mon Charge d'Affaires Moufid Bey.
Votre Altesse m'informe qu'elle a pris connaissance du contenu de la
depeche que je lui adressai par Akif Effendi, et du rapport du meme Envoye;
que les hauts dignitaires de la Sublime Porte reunis en Conseil, apres avoir
recu communication de ma depeche et du rapport d'Akif Effendi, etaient con-
venus, pour donner suite a ma demande, pour mettre a. jour la nature des services
que je pouvais rendre a FEmpire, et determiner les mesures a, prendre dans les
circonstances actuelles, d'envoyer aupres de moi le Ministre Saib Effendi par le
bateau a vapeur, lorsque sur ces entrefaites, les Ambassadeurs des Cinq Grandes

347
Puissances ont presente a Votre Altesse une note, dont vous me dites mettre
la traduction dans votre depeche, ajoutant que les Consuls-Generaux des Cinq
Grandes Puissances residant a Alexandrie me feraient des communications
analogues, et que les rapports verbaux de mon Charge d'Affaires me feraient
mieux comprendre tout ce dont il s'agit.
Messieurs les Consuls-Generaux, qui ont recu des depeches de la part de
leurs Ambassadeurs respectifs, m'ont communique leurs instructions, et mon
Charge d'Affaires m'a aussi fait part de ce qu'il devait me dire.
Mon seul but, mon unique desir, sont de faire ma soumission, et de rendre
des services a notre magnanime et tout-puissant Seigneur et Maitre. Mais j'ai
tres-humblement supplil Sa Hautesse qu'en consideration de ma qualit6 d'ancien
serviteur de l'Empire, et de mes services passes, sa generosite voulut bien
remplir deux voeux que j'osai lui adresser. Je prie Dieu qu'il conserve l'auguste
personne de notre Souverain sur le trone aussi longtems que le monde durera !
Lorsque mon Charge d'Affaires a recti I'ordre de se rendre aupres de moi,
il a obtenu la faveur d'etre admis a baiser les pieds de Sa Hautesse notre mag
nanime Seigneur, qui lui a dit: ''Moufid Bey, fais mes complimens au Pacha;
la priere qu'il a adressee au tr6ne d'obtenir l'heredite pour l'Egypte avec ses
dependances, je la lui accorde, et j'ai donne I'ordre qu'on reglat cette affaire."
Ces paroles bienveillantes de Sa Hautesse ont rejoui mon cceur, en ce
qu'elles remplissent mon vceu le plus cher, Fobtention de l'heredite, et me
glorifient ainsi entre les Grands de FEmpire.
Ensuite, lorsque les dignitaires de la Sublime Porte etaient reunis en
Conseil, ils ont repete a Moufid Bey : " Notre Seigneur et Maitre vient d'accorder
tout ce que Mehemet Ali Pacha avait sollicite aux pieds du trone, l'heredite de
FEgypte avec toutes ses dependances, et voila que les Ambassadeurs des Cinq
Grandes Puissances viennent de presenter cette note, dont il est necessaire que
Mehemet Ali prenne connaissance."
. En suite de ce qui a ete dit et fait, je me rejouis de ce que Fun de mes deux
voeux est exauce, et je vois que pour le second, on a eu Fair de le negliger pour
le moment ; nonobstant, j'espere qu'il me sera egalement accorde par la haute
bienveillance de Sa Hautesse. Dans ce cas, je ne pense pas que Fon ait besoin
de recourir a la mediation des Cinq Grandes Puissances.
Votre Altesse connaitra encore mon opinion parce que lui diront Messieurs
les Ambassadeurs, d'apres les depeches qu'ils recevront de Messieurs les Consuls-
Generaux residant a. Alexandrie. C'est pour dire ces choses a Votre Altesse
que j'ai l'honneur de lui faire presenter cette humble depeche par mon Charge
d'Affaires Moufid Bey, &c, &c. (Translation.)
Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha. — (August 6, 1839.)
(Titles.)
I HAVE received the letter which Your Highness did me the honour to
address to me by my Charg6 d'Affaires Moufid Bey.
Your Highness informs me, that you have taken cognizance of the contents
of the despatch which I addressed to you by Akif Effendi, and of the Report of
that Envoy ; that the High Dignitaries of the Sublime Porte in Council assem
bled, after my despatch and the report of Akif Effendi had been communicated
to them, had resolved to send to me by the steamer the Minister Saib Effendi,
in order to give effect to my demand, to bring to light the nature of the services
which I could render to the Empire, and to decide upon the measures to be
taken under present circumstances ; when in the meanwhile the Ambassadors of
the Five Great Powers presented a Note to Your Highness, of which you tell me
you send me a translation in your despatch, adding, that the Consuls-General of
the Five Great Powers residing at Alexandria, would make an analogous
communication to me, and that the verbal reports of my Charge d'Affaires would
better enable me to understand all that was going on.
The Consuls-General who have received despatches from their respective
Ambassadors, have communicated their instructions to me, and my Charg6
d'Affaires has also told me what he had to report to me.
My only object, my sole desire, is to make my submission, and to do service
toXmr magnanimous and all powerful Lord and Master. But I entreated His
2 Y 2

348
Highness very humbly, that in consideration of my character of an old servant of
the Empire, and of my former services, he would of his generosity grant two
prayers which I ventured to address to him. I pray God to preserve the August
person of our Sovereign upon the throne as long as the world shall last !
When my Charge d'Affaires received directions to join me, he obtained the
favour of being admitted to kiss the feet of His Highness our Magnanimous
Lord, who said to him ; " Moufid Bey, make my compliments to the Pasha ; I
grant the prayer which he has addressed to the throne, that he may obtain the
inheritance of Egypt with its dependencies, and I have given orders that this
affair may be arranged."
These benevolent words of His Highness have rejoiced my heart, inasmuch
as they fulfil my most cherished wish, the acquisition of the hereditary Power,
and thus exalt me among the grandees of the Empire.
Afterwards, when the Dignitaries of the Sublime Porte were assembled in
Council, they repeated to Moufid Bey, " Our Lord and Master has granted all
that Mehemet Ali had solicited at the foot of the throne, — the inheritance of
Egypt with all its dependencies ; and now the Ambassadors of the Five Powers
have presented tnis Note, of which it is necessary that Mehemet Ali should take
cognizance." From what has been said and done, I rejoice that one of my two wishes is
granted, and I see that, with respect to the second, it appears to have been forthe
moment neglected ; I hope, notwithstanding, that it will also be granted to me
through the great benevolence of His Highness. In that case I do not think that
it will be necessary to have recourse to the mediation of the Five Great Powers.
Your Highness will again learn my opinion by what the Ambassadors will
tell you according to the despatches which they will receive from the Consuls-
General residing at Alexandria. It is in order to say these things to your High
ness, that I have the honour to present this humble despatch to you by my Charge
d'Affaires, Moufid Bey.

No. 263.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 30.
My Lord, Therapia, August 6, 1839.
I INCLOSE translated copy of a letter from the Grand Vizier to Mehemet
Ali, transmitting the Collective Note of July 27.
I also inclose herewith, translated copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the
Grand Vizier, in reply to the letter sent by Akiff Effendi immediately after the
accession of Abdul Medjid.
The insolence of this letter is remarkable, and the writer shows the con
tempt he entertains for our understandings, by the absurdity of his assertions
and doctrines. To say that Achmet Pasha is not guilty of treason in having
carried off the Sultan's fleet, because he brought it to Alexandria, which is a
port belonging to the Ottoman Empire, is an assertion that will hardly pass
current even in Europe. To dictate the dismissal of the Grand Vizier is no
great evidence of his submission to the Sultan, particularly in the man who has
repeatedly applied to foreign Powers to recognize his independence, and who
now demands the hereditary possession of a third of the Ottoman Empire. It
would seem that Mehemet Ali has so long duped and deceived people, that he
has no apprehension of their discovering the grossest fallacies. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 263.
The Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali. — July 31, 1839.
[See Inclosure 6 in No. 260.]

349
Inclosure 2 in No. 263.
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha.
[See Inclosure 1 in No. 255.]

No. 264.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
My Lord, Therapia, August 7> 1839-
WITH reference to your instructions of July 13, 1 have to acquaint your
Lordship, that the French Ambassador is of opinion that it is not expedient to
make the communication to the Sublime Porte at this moment, because the
Ministers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, may not think right to concur in it ;
and the Ambassador, therefore, would defer the measure until an emergency
shall call for it. I have suggested that he and I should make separately a
verbal communication to the Grand Vizier, stating that we have authority
from our Governments to give the protection of the fleet to the Sublime Porte, if
it be demanded ; and I offered as my reasons the fact, that Ibrahim Pasha can
reach Scutari in twenty days ; that Mehemet Ali has now received notice of the
Collective Note ; that he may direct Ibrahim to march, in order, by the operation
of fear, to induce the Sublime Porte to make an arrangement with him ; and
because I think it necessary to give the Grand Vizier sure ground for relying
upon the support of England and France, without which he may yield to intimi
dation. I have no doubt that in spite of appearances and overt acts, there may be
exertions made by some parties to bring about an arrangement between the Porte
and the Pasha. I feel confident that the Grand Vizier ought to have our support,
to give him the power to repress the action of Mehemet Ali's partisans in this
country, and that with our support there is nothing to fear for domestic tran
quillity. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 265.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)
My Lord, Therapia, August 7, 1839.
HAFIZ PASHA has been removed from the command of the army, and is
now at his Pashalic of Sivas. Seidullah Pasha, a younger man, commands, and
has with him about 8,000 Regular Infantry and 4,000 Cavalry. The position he
occupies will not enable him to prevent Ibrahim advancing by Koniah.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 266.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 31.)
My Lord, Therapia, August 7, 1839.
I AM happy to state, that the Prussian officers have arrived here safe two
days ago. Count Konigsmarck told me that he had learned from those officers a fact
which I think is of great importance with a view to future proceedings; it is, that
5,000 of Ibrahim Pasha's troops joined Hafiz Pasha after the battle of Nezib,
many of them enlisting in the Sultan's Guards, and others elsewhere. This is a

350
striking proof of the feelings prevalent in the Pasha's army. It is also stated
that, generally speaking, those subjects of the Sultan who had gone over to the
Egyptians, have returned as fast as possible to their proper allegiance.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.
No. 267.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 31.)
(Extract.) Therapia, August 7, 1839.
ON the 31st of July, I received a report from the Dragoman, stating that
Nouri Effendi and Sarim Effendi had told him that Ibrahim Pasha was within
five days' march of the Bosphorus, &c, &c. I received almost at the same time
a note from the Internuncio, stating that he had heard the same thing, and also
I heard from the French Ambassador a similar account. I replied to M. de
Stiirmer, that I saw no remedy except the bringing up the fleets to defend the
passage of the Bosphorus, and maintain the authority of the Porte in the city.
I called on the French Ambassador, and stated the same opinion to him.
He objected to it, in consequence of his being without authority to direct the
French Admiral to take that step, and because he had been assured by Mehemet
Ali, that his troops should not advance, and therefore he did not credit the state
ment made by the Ottoman Ministers. I replied, that his Excellency and myself
were instructed to prevent a collision between the parties, and that assuredly a
march upon Constantinople was a collision, and came strictly within the letter of
our instructions. We had a long discussion, at the close of which it was settled
that we should see Baron de Stiirmer. I accordingly called upon him, and he
agreed that it was necessary to save the capital and Government, and that the
fleets presented the only means. I said that, under that conviction, I was
determined to call on the British Admiral to come up ; that I hoped the French
Ambassador would concur in the measure ; that I begged he (the Internuncio)
would inform M. de Bouteneff of what I had said ; and that it was to be hoped
he would take a similar step ; that this measure was to be executed with the
concurrence of the Sublime Porte.
I do not think it necessary to trouble your Lordship with the arguments I
used, for it is obvious that if the capital and Government were not saved from the
power of Mehemet Ali, all the measures already taken, and all the policy adopted
by Her Majesty's Government and by the other Governments, would be
abortive. The French Ambassador saw Baron de Stiirmer in the evening, and on his
return told me he would co-operate with me if necessary, but wished to have
previously a meeting of the Five Representatives; and the meeting was fixed
accordingly for the next day.
I received at night a note from the Internuncio, saying that M. de Bouteneff
had made inquiries, and found that there was no truth in the report of Ibrahim's
advance. (I inclose a note from the Dragoman, in which the affair is stated.)
The Internuncio still desired the meeting, and it took place, and what had before
been said was repeated ; and I renewed my declaration that in case the capital
should be threatened by the advance of Ibrahim, I would take upon
myself to apply to the British Admiral, and would throw upon him the respon
sibility of refusing to come up, which I, however, felt certain he would not
hesitate to do. The French Ambassador and the Internuncio both agreed in
the necessity for protecting the Porte, &c, &c. M. de Bouteneff said, that it
would not have been in his power to co-operate in the measure I had proposed,
because he had no authority to act, and must have referred to his Government,
and could not receive an answer in less than a month.
The motives which directed my conduct were these : I did not give credit
to the entire accuracy of the statement of the Ottoman Ministers but I
did suppose that they had intelligence showing that Ibrahim Pasha would
move down this way ; I thought it would be inexcusable to leave for a moment
unapplied the only means that can secure us against the multiplied evils of
Ibrahim's presence. 1 was glad also to have an opportunity to manifest my
determination to bring up the fleet in case of necessity.

351
Inclosure 1 in No. 267.
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Peru, ce 31 Juillet, 1839.
J'AI parle hier a Nouri Effendi sur la sage mesure a prendre, savoir, que
les Flottes Anglaise et Frangaise viennent dans le Bosphore dont elles sont fort
peu eloignees, pour empecher, si le cas se presentait, les troupes Egyptiennes de
passer en Europe. J'ai eu occasion de voir ce matin, a. la Porte, Nouri Effendi
et Sarim Effendi, qui etaient ensemble. Ils trouvent cette mesure tout-a-fait
inutile, en meme tems qu'elle serait extremement nuisible, car elle ne ferait
qu'accroitre la confusion dans la ville. Mais void des nouvelles interessantes
recues ce matin. Six regimens Egyptiens sont deja a Conia ; il ne faudrait
que cinq ou six jours, disent les Ministres, pour que l'Armee Egyptienne arrive a
Constantinople. La Porte est tranquille du cote de la mer, vu que les Flottes
Anglaise et Frangaise doivent empecher la Flotte Egyptienne d'entrer dans le
Bosphore ; mais le langage des Representans des Cinq Puissances est bien loin
de rassurer la Porte sur ses craintes de l'Armee d'Ibrahim. Dans I'opinion de la
Porte, aussitot que les lettres qu'il s'agit d'expedier a Alexandrie y seront arrivees,
et que Mehemet Ali aura vu la reponse du Grand Vizir, le Pacha enverra
immanquablement a Ibrahim I'ordre de marcher sur Constantinople pour porter
un grand coup. La Porte est convaincue que des lettres et des paroles, et meme
des menaces, ne sont capables d'ai-reter le projet de Mehemet Ali. Cela etant,
la Porte pense qu'il faut differer le depart du bateau a vapeur, car elle est, dit-elle,
sure que Mehemet Ali, fort irrite de la reponse qu'il s'agit de lui donner, ferait
marcher son armee de terre contre Constantinople, mesure incalculable dans ses
resultats. Nouri et Sarim ont prie Monsieur Lapierre d'attendre l'issuedu conseil qui
se tient chez le Moufti, pour voir si le bateau a vapeur part ou non ; ce qui fait
voir que le conseil a pour objet F Affaire Egyptienne, malgre les assurances donnees
hier, qu'il s'agissait d'une autre affaire. Je suis, &c,
(Signe) F. PISANI.
(Translation.)
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Pera, July 31, 1839.
I SPOKE yesterday to Nouri Effendi respecting the prudent measure to be
taken, that is, that the English and French fleets should enter the Bosphorus,
from whence they are not far distant, to hinder, if the case should arise, the
Egyptian troops from crossing over into Europe. I have had the opportunity
this morning, of seeing at the Porte Nouri Effendi and Sarim Effendi, who
were together. They consider this measure as perfectly useless, and at the same
time extremely injurious, as it would only increase the confusion in the city.
But the following interesting news has been received this morning : six
Egyptian regiments are already at Koniah; it only requires five or six days,
say the Ministers, for the Egyptian Army to arrive at Constantinople. The
Porte is at ease with respect to the sea, as the English and French fleets will
prevent the Egyptian fleet from entering the Bosphorus ; but the language
of the Representatives of the Five Powers is very far from relieving the Porte
from its fears of the Army of Ibrahim. It is the opinion of the Porte, that as
soon as the letters which it intends to send to Alexandria shall have arrived
there, and Mehemet Ali shall have seen the answer of the Grand Vizier, he will
infallibly send orders to Ibrahim to march upon Constantinople to strike a great
blow. The Porte is convinced that neither letters, nor language, nor even
menaces are capable of arresting the intention of Mehemet Ali. That being the
case, the Porte thinks proper to delay the departure of the steam-boat ; for it is
certain, it says, that Mehemet Ali, greatly enraged at the answer which it is
proposed to give to him, would march his land forces against Constantinople, a
measure of which the results are incalculable.

352

Nouri and Sarim have requested M. Lapierre to await the issue of the
Council held at the Mufti's house, to see whether the steam-boat goes or not which
makes it evident that the object the Council has in view is the Egyptian affair, in
spite of the assurances given yesterday that it related to other business
r I am, &c,
(Signed) PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 267.
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
De la maison de Sarim Effendi,
Mv Lord ® She'ilan Akindissi, Jeudi, ler Aout.
LE paquebot Ture est parti hier a 6 heures du soir.
C'est Sarim Effendi, en pr6sence de Nouri Effendi, qui nous a donne a M
Lapierre et a moi, les nouvelles de Conia.
Je viens de voir Sarim Effendi, qui dit aujourd'hui que nous avons mal com-
pris. II pretend avoir dit que les troupes Egyptiennes sont a Adana, ou Menekli
Ahmed Pacha est nomme Gouverneur, ayant sous ses ordres six regimens avec
de I'artillerie. Adana est a dix-huit heures de Conia. Ali Pacha de Conia est
avec un corps d'armee a peu de distance des gorges du Mont Taurus, Koulek
Boghaz. .
Nouri Effendi est a sa ferme aux " Eaux Douces.' Le Grand Vizir
vient d'envoyer un homme aux "Eaux Douces," pour l'inviter a se rendre chez
son Altesse a. Constantinople, ainsi que Sarim Effendi. Je suis, &c,
(Signe') F. PISANI.

(Translation.)
M Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
Sarim Effendi's House, at Sheilan Akindissi,
My Lord Thursday, August 1 .
THE Turkish packet sailed at six o'clock in the evening.
It was Sarim Effendi who gave to M. Lapierre and me the news from Koniah,
injthe presence of Nouri Eff'endL
I have just seen Sarim Effendi, who says to-day that we have misunderstood
him. He asserts that he said that the Egyptians are at Adana, where Menekli
Ahmed Pasha is appointed Governor, having under his orders six regiments with
Artillery. Adana is eighteen hours from Koniah. Ali Pasha of Koniah, with a
division of the Army, is at a short distance from the passes of the Taurus, Kulek
Boghaz. Nouri Effendi is at his farm at " the Sweet Waters." The Grand Vizier
has just sent a man to " the Sweet Waters," to invite him to come to His High
ness at Constantinople, together with Sarim Effendi. I am, Sec,
(Signed) PISANI.

No. 268.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 31.)
My Lord, Therapia, August 8, 1839.
THE Representatives of the Five Powers were invited to meet his Excellency
Nouri Effendi this day at Kalender, where we all attended in consequence.
The business was to communicate to the Representatives a letter from Mehemet
Ali to the Grand Vizier, in which the Pasha of Egypt calls for the retreat of
that high functionary from the post he occupies.

353
It was asked by the Representatives (the French Ambassador), if it was
intended to bring forward this matter as a personal question between the Grand
Vizier and the Pasha, or one of a public nature? The Mousteshar replied, that it
was purely public, being a question of an attempt made by Mehemet Ali to dic
tate to the Porte the choice of a Grand Vizier; that if the dictation were
submitted to now, it would be again exercised as interest or caprice might surest;
that it was an insolent and intolerable pretension of Mehemet Ali to supersede,
by his own will, the sovereign rights of the Sultan.
The Representatives all expressed the same opinion, strongly condemnatory
of the proceedings of the Egyptian Pasha. They all expressed the hope that the
Sultan would treat the demand with contempt ; they all spoke of the Grand
Vizier as the man the best fitted, by his experience and his qualities, to be at this
particular moment the chief of the Ottoman Ministry; and said, that if it should
become necessary to give stronger evidence of their opinion, they would not be
backward to give it. They desired the Mousteshar to make known these things
to the Sultan.
In the course of conversation, the Mousteshar stated his wish, that the
Representatives should write to the Consuls at Alexandria to have the sentiments
of the Representatives made known to Mehemet Ali ; but it was thought by the
Representatives, that it was not proper for them to take any step in the matter
beyond that already taken ; and that it was not consistent with the dignity of the
Representatives to enter into correspondence upon such a subject with the Pasha
of Egypt. The Representatives were warm in their expression of disapprobation of
Mehemet Ali's conduct. There, was a, good deal of comment upon the doctrine
brought forward by Mehemet Ali, in his letter, to rebut the charge of treason
made against the Capudan Pasha by the Grand Vizier. Every one treated it as
a contemptible absurdity in point of argument. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 269.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 31.)
My Lord, Therapia, August 10, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of a despatch, dated 7th instant, which I sent on
that day to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, in reply to one from him, desiring
information. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 269.
Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.
(Extract.) Therapia, August 7, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, copies of two
despatches* from Lord Palmerston to me, and copies of one from me to his
Lordship.t I have not yet had an answer from the French Ambassador to the
suggestion of making a verbal communication to the Grand Vizier, but
I hope I may have one before Lieutenant Stopford leaves this to-morrow.
The service the fleet is likely to be called upon to perform seems to be to prevent
the passage of the channel between Asia and Europe by the troops of Ibrahim
Pasha; and to give such evidences of the cordial and powerful support by
England of the Sultan's Government, as should check and prevent the action
and success of Mehemet Ali's party in Constantinople.
• See Nos. 90, and 117. t See No. 264.
2 Z

354
Ibrahim Pasha can be at Scutari with his army in twenty days' march from
Koniah . It may be the policy of Mehemet Ali to order that movement when he
receives the communication of the Collective Note. He may think it better for
his interest to endeavour to frighten the Porte into an arrangement with him
without the concurrence of the Great Powers; and I think a movement by
Ibrahim will have that effect, unless the Porte should be supported and ensured
against the danger. Mehemet Ali may, on the other hand, wait till he learns
what terms the Great Powers are likely to agree to give him, and direct his
efforts to the creation of differences between them, and of a rupture of the plan
of universal co-operation. If Mehemet can force the Porte to treat with him
alone (by the effect of fear), he will place the Great Powers in embarrassments
more difficult, perhaps, to remedy, than it would be to deal with a difference
amongst them as to terms.
I will take the best means in my power to inform you of Ibrahim's motions.
I fear he will have the advantage if he acts with promptitude, and that the time
will be spent in discussion here which, if employed in acting, would make his
attempts wholly useless.

No. 270.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 2.)
(Extract.) Paris, August 30, 1839.
I HAD the honour, in my despatch of August 26, to express to your
Lordship my apprehensions that the French Government might not assent to
the idea of settling the affairs of the East, through the mediation of the Ambas
sadors of the Five Powers at Vienna ; that that Government might possibly
raise a question in respect to the Dardanelles, which would prevent the concentra
tion of the European efforts at Alexandria; and that finally, I could not hold out
any hopes that Marshal Soult would adopt any vigorous measures of coercion,
whether for restraining the ambition of the Viceroy of Egypt, or for restoring
to the Sultan his fleet.
I shall now cake the liberty of giving to your Lordship my reasons for
forming an opinion which may require apparent qualifications, but which I still
fear that your Lordship will find substantially correct.
And I am the more inclined to do this from considering, on the one hand,
that it is of importance that your Lordship should know as clearly and distinctly
as possible, the real feelings and intentions of this Government ; and believing
on the other, that these feelings and intentions will not be stated to your Lord
ship so clearly or so distinctly as would be desirable at the present crisis.
In order to give your Lordship the views which I entertain, and which I
venture to submit to your attention, I should begin by doing justice to Marshal
Soult, and stating, that I believe he most sincerely entertains an attachment to
British connexion, «nd is most desirous to maintain, in all circumstances, the
friendly relations which subsist between the two countries. So that the form in
which any objections to your Lordship's suggestions are raised, will always
rather disguise than lay open the real extent of ihe differences in respect to
them, which, when the moment of action or decision on any practical point
may arise, will be found to exist.
For instance, in respect to the plan which your Lordship proposed
for obtaining possession of the Ottoman fleet, the French Government may
say, " nothing could be more desirable than the rescue of that fleet from
Mehemet Ali, but the means proposed for effecting such an excellent result are
objectionable," (nor will it be difficult to give reasons for this, since nothing can
be suggested to which objections also will not occur).
If pressed to give an answer, as to whether they will agree to any plan for
coercing the Viceroy, the French Cabinet may first observe, "that that must
depend upon what the plan is ;" but, if still further pressed, the question of the
Dardanelles, to which I alluded, may be resorted to, and the following line of
argument may be taken.
"The condition of Mehemet Ali is merely a part of the general Oriental
Question, which, in fact, concentrates itself at Constantinople, and is forced on us

35&
by considerations of Russian interference with the aft'airs of the Porte. We do-
not say, then, that we will not adopt means towards compelling Mehemet Ali
to restore the fleet, or to accept reasonable conditions from the Sultan ; but in
looking to this part of the question, we must not forget the principal and vital
one, viz., that of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.
" While we are pressing Mehemet at Alexandria, Ibrahim may march tp
Constantinople; what then is to occur? The Russian note lately received
forces this upon us. Until the Five Powers are agreed upon this point, it is
impossible to come to any determination on the other."
It will be useless, I fear, to say what I firmly believe, from some knowledge
of the man [Ibrahim], and some experience of the general character of Oriental
politicians ;
"The march to Constantinople, which you apprehend, will never occur;
the Viceroy will talk high, but will be found submissive, if he but see the Great
Powers united."
I fear it will be useless to urge this argument, so ably stated in your
Lordship's despatch of August 27, and which I have already lost no opportunity of
urging, because the opposition to it is rather taken as the means of putting
off a disagreeable step, than as the reason for opposing one from which danger
is really apprehended. And now, in respect to the Conference at Vienna, I
should very probably be wrong if I stated that the French Government will
decidedly object to such a conference, though 1 believe the Marshal is himself
unfriendly to it, and that a party in the Cabinet is likewise so. Bun if the French
Government does not oppose the Conference, it will, I feel confident, endeavour
so to limit its object, as to strip it of all dignity, and render it of small effect.
" Our Ambassador," the French Ministry will say, " shall have the power
of considering in conjunction with your Representative and the Representatives
of the other Great Powers, what steps may be peaceably taken for obtaining the
Sultan's fleet, and also on what conditions the Viceroyalty of Egypt, &c , should
be established, but we cannot give him the power to decide on any measures to
be. adopted for obtaining or enforcing such conditions: we cannot, therefore, give
him any power over our fleet in the Mediterranean ; and though we ourselves do
not say that we will not ia the end adopt coercive measures, we do not pledge
ourselves to do so, nor indeed can we do so, until the whole question, — that
portion of it relative to the Dardanelles and Russia, as well as that portion which
relates to Egypt and Mehemet Ali, — is decided."
By such a course, I think your Lordship will perceive that the proceedings
at Vienna, as far as France is concerned, would, as I have ventured to observe,
lose the greatest part of their importance and consideration; and the object of
such proceedings may be regarded as eluded, if not opposed. The French
Government imagine also that Prince Metternich himself will approve of their
limitations, and not deem it necessary or expedient to concert in common the
means of carrying out the arrangement which the Powers may undertake in
common to frame and to propose. I state this, because 1 believe it to be the
impression here, but it does not seem to me to be true.
Because, if it be even possible to conceive that the Great Powers might
have considered the affairs of the East as a Turkish Question to be settled by the
Turks themselves, and thus left things to their fate, it is hardly possible to
suppose that these Powers, after having adopted the state of the East as a
European Question, interfered in the arrangements which the Porte was about to
conclude, and engaged them to consider and to recommend other arrangements
of a more fitting character, would there stop, and say, " Here is our recom
mendation — these are the terms, and the only terms you should accord ; but if
you ask us how you are to obtain these terms, we can only reply that, stripped of
your fleet, and deprived of your army, you are to obtain them as you can."
This is the difficulty of the position in which the French Government
places itself, — a difficulty which it seeks to avoid, b , proposing or consenting to
measures of procrastination, during which it may hope that a part of
tlie question at all events, if not the whole of it, will arrive by itself at some
termination. In stating, however, thus positively my conviction that the French Govern
ment will find means of avoiding the adoption of any measures for coercing the
Viceroy, which may be proposed, 1 should improperly convey my meaning if I
left it to be imagined that there is so powerful a disposition in the French
2 Z 2

356
Cabinet to take part with Mehemet Ali, that nothing would be attempted to
obtain, even by peaceable means, the restitution of the Sultan's vessels, and the
abandonment of a portion of the Viceroy's demands, more especially that portion
which relates to Hosrew Pasha's dismissal. On the contrary, I believe that
such concessions, as a means of arranging the remaining question of Syria, would
be willingly obtained, and will be seriously and sincerely tried for by the French
Cabinet, through representations to Mehemet Ali ; but through representations
only. I have thus endeavoured, my Lord, to put you as much as possible in
possession of what I believe may be really expected from this Government on
the question which now occupies so much of your Lordship's attention ; and at
the hazard of being prolix, I have entered into what I fear may appear
lengthy explanations.
It only remains for me to say, that I shall neither lose any opportunity,
nor neglect any means, of enforcing the views of Her Majesty's Government,
and the representations relating thereto, with which I may be honoured by
your Lordship.

No. 271.
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 3.)
My Lord, Berlin, August 28, 1839.
I HAVE just seen Baron Werther, who has received despatches from
Alexandria of the 6th instant. The Consuls had presented the Note of the
Five Powers, signed at Constantinople on the 27th ultimo, and had been received
by Mehemet Ali with assurances of good will and moderation. He said,
however, that two things must be secured to him: — the inheritance of Syria to
his family, and the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha.
I asked Baron Werther if he thought it would be wise to sacrifice Hosrew
Pasha. He thought not; first, because he was the only man in Turkey capable
of directing public affairs ; secondly, because it would ill-become the Five
Powers to allow themselves to be dictated to by Mehemet Ali.
Baron Werther asked me why the British fleet remained off the Dardanelles,
instead of being off Alexandria to support the negotiations of the Five Powers?
The Prussian officers who were at the battle of Nezib have returned to
Constantinople. They state that Hafiz Pasha would not have been defeated had
he known how to command his troops ; that the Turkish Army was superior to
the Egyptian ; and that 5,000 Egyptian troops deserted to the Turks after the
battle. I have &c.
(Signed) ' WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 272.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, September 4, 1839.
I HAVE received your despatch of A ugust 7, by which it appears, that in con-
sequenceof the intelligence which the Turkish Ministers communicated to you on
the 31st of July, of the near approach of Ibrahim Pasha to Constantinople, you
had proposed to your Colleagues to bring up the British and French fleets for
the defence of the passage of the Bosphorus ; and I have to acquaint your
Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your conduct in that
matter. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

357
No. 273.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, September 4, 1 839.
WITH reference to your despatch of August 8, I have to acquaint your
Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which your
Excellency and your Colleagues held to the Turkish Minister on the 8th of
August, respecting the demand made by Mehemet Ali that the Grand Vizier
should be dismissed from his office. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 274.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 5.)
My Lord, Therapia, August 13, 1839-
LAST night I had a message from the Grand Vizier by a confidential
person, desiring me to request the British Admiral to free Salonica from a brig
of war sent there by Mehemet Ali, and from which five or six emissaries had
been disembarked, sent by the Pasha of Egypt to excite the people to revolt
against the Ottoman Government.
The Grand Vizier said that this occurrence had been officially reported by
Izzet Pasha, the Governor of Salonica. I sent the Grand Vizier word that I
would consider the matter and let him know my opinion ; that it was necessary
I should act in concurrence with my colleagues, &c, &c. This day, whilst the
Baron de Stiirmer was with me, I received another statement of the affair of the
brig of war, which I showed to the Baron, who said he had similar information.
I asked his Excellency if he did not think that the Five Powers were under
obligation to protect the Sublime Porte against the Pasha of Egypt, now that
the Great Powers had, as it were, prohibited the Porte from making peace with
Mehemet Ali or carrying on hostilities, and thereby had left the Sublime Porte
exposed defenceless to the attempts of that Pasha ? The Internuncio replied in
the affirmative, and agreed with my proposition to recommend to the Com
manders of the British and French Naval Forces to free Salonica from the
presence of the Egyptian ship of war.
I immediately sent to the French Ambassador the account I had received of
the affair ; I told him my view of the subject, and that the Internuncio concurred
in it. The Ambassador answered that he approved of it and would write to
Admiral Lalande. I wrote instantly a letter to the Commander of Her
Majesty's squadron, of which I inclose copy, and sent it by the speediest con
veyance to the Austrian steamer; but that vessel had just left the harbour
before my letter arrived, and it was to be sent by the first sailing vessel to Besika
Bay. Baron Stiirmer went from me to the French Ambassador, and his Excellency
had the goodness to promise me, that on his return to Buyukdere, he would
acquaint M. de Bouteneff with what had been done.
I received this evening a note from the French Ambassador which I inclose
in original. In my letter to the Grand Vizier, I recommended that he should seize and
confine the emissaries of Mehemet Ali at Salonica, hut that he should not take
any severer measures.
The two inclosed letters contain his Highness the Vizier's answer to my
communication. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.
P.S., August 14. — I inclose a report just arrived from Her Majesty's Consul
at Salonica. I will write to him to put Mustapha Nouri Pasha on his guard
against the intrigues of Mehemet Ali. Mustapha is one of the best and most

358
enlightened of the Turks. I have taken pains to make the Grand Vizier sen
sible of the good services Mustapha has done in quieting Albania, and preventing
a rebellion there, which I believe was on the point of breaking out, in conse
quence of the misconduct of Mustapha's predecessor. XT •

Inclosure 1 in No. 274.

Viscount Ponsonby to the Senior Officer commanding Her Majesty's Squadron at
Besika Bay.
Sir, Therapia, August 13, 1839.
I LEARN from authority, that a brig of war belonging to the Pasha of
Egypt is in the neighbourhood of Salonica, and has landed emissaries in the
country, for the purpose of exciting the population to insurrection. I bring this
matter before you, and take the liberty to say, that it is my opinion, that in
consequence of the arrangements made between Her Majesty's Government, in
common with the Great Powers, and the Sublime Porte, it is incumbent upon us
to take possession of that brig, and thereby prevent the prosecution of designs
exactly in contradiction to the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government.
I have communicated the fact herein mentioned to his Excellency the
French Ambassador, who has the same opinion I have expressed. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 274.
Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord et cher Collegue, Therapia, le 13 Aout, 1839.
JE viens de recevoir de Salonique le m£me avis que votre Excellence et
M. l'lnternonce. J'avais deja expedie ma lettre a M. le Contre-Amiral Lalande
pour qu'il agisse exactement comme FAmiral Stopford, pour detourner le bati-
ment Egyptien de sa mission en Albanie.
Ce fait me rappelle ce que nous limes, FAngleterre et nous, en Mars, 1833.
Nous fimes amener nos pavilions a Smyrne a la premiere nouvelle de I'arrivee
des agens de Mehemet Ali dans cette ville. Les circonstances sont les m&mes et
notre conduite aussi. A°Tcez &c
(Signd) BARON ROUSSIN.

(Translation.)
Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Therapia, August 13, 1839.
I HAVE just received from Salonica the same intelligence as your Excel
lency and the Internuncio. I had already sent my letter to Rear-Admiral
Lalande, that he may act exactly like Admiral Stopford, in order to turnback
the Egyptian vessel from its mission to Albania.
This circumstance reminds me of what we. England and France, did in
March 1833. We caused our flags to repair to Smyrna, at the first news of the
arrival of the Agents of Mehemet Ali in that city. The circumstances are the
same, and so is our conduct. Accept, &c,
(Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.

359
Inclosure 3 in No. 274.
Mr. Redhouse to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, August 14, 1839.
UPON communicating the contents of your Lordship's letter to his High
ness the Grand Vizier, his Highness instructed ine to return to your Lordship
his thanks for the zealous promptitude with which your Lordship had attended to
liis Highness's reclamation. His Highness further declared, that any greater
severity than seizure of their pjrsoiij, against the emissaries, should not be
permitted by him, as it was not oal/ contrary to prudence, but also to his well-
known disposition. I have, &c,
(Signed) W. REDHOUSE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 274.
M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby,
My L?rd, Pe'ra, ce 14 Aotit, 1839.
LE Grand Vizir apres avoir pris connaissance du contenu de la lettre que
j'ai remise a Mr. Redhouse, m'a fait prier de passer chez lui pour me charger de
dire a votre Excellence que la teneur de cette lettre lui a fait le plus grand
plaisir; que maintenant il est convaincu plus que jamais des veritables sentimens
et de FinterSt que prend l'Angleterre aux affaires de la Turquie ; et qu'il est on
ne pent plus recoanaissant dj l'interet pardculier que votre Excellence porte a, sa
personne. Je suis, &c,
(Signe) ETIENNE PISANI.

"{Translation.)
M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby,
My Lord, Pera, August 14, 1839.
THE Grand Vizier, after having taken cognizance of the contents of the
letter which I delivered to Mr. Redhouse, begged me to call upon him to desire
me to tell your Excellency, that the tenor of this letter has given him the greatest
pleasure ; that he is now more than ever convinced of the true feelings of England,
and of the interest which she takes in the affairs of Turkey; and that he
cannot be too grateful for the interest which your Excellency feels for him.
I am, &c,
(Signed) ETIENNE PISANI.

Inclosure 5 in No. 274.
Mr. Consul Blunt to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, Salonica, August 9, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Excdlency, that a Turkish transport
arrived here on the 7th instant, from the Dardanelles, with letters from the Pasha
of that place for the Kaimakam of Salonica. The transport immediately
commenced loading rice and arobes.
Yesterday, a brig-of-war, to all app3arance Turkish, entered the gulf, and
grounded on the flats. The boats of the transport immediately went to her
assistance, and she was got off", and entered the port in the evening. On coming

360
to anchor she saluted the castles, and the salute was returned. This morning
every one was surprised to learn that the brig-of-war was Egyptian, and sent by
Mehemet Ali. She is nineteen days from Alexandria, and has been put in
quarantine. It is reported, my Lord, that there is a person of distinction on board, sent
purposely to communicate with Mustapha Pasha. I regret that I have not been
able to learn any more certain particulars relating to the mission of this brig-of-
war, to communicate to your Lordship. I have, &c,
(Signed) C. BLUNT.
P. S. — I have just been informed, that the brig from Egypt has on board
persons from Mehemet Ali, for Mustapha Pasha, the Roumeli Valisi, Adrianople,
Scodra, and other places.

No. 275.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 5.)
My Lord, Therapia, August 14, 1839.
I HAVE heard from the Grand Vizier, that Ibrahim Pasha is obliged to
send his despatches from Marash to Scanderoon under the guard of an escort of
some hundred men. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 276.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston — (Received September 6.)
My Lord, Alexandria, August 15, 1839.
HAVING waited yesterday on the Pasha with Captain Wakefield, of Her
Majesty's steamer " Rhadamanthus," 1 found M. Cochelet, the French Consul-
General, with Mehemet Ali.
Captain Wakefield having told the Pasha that he meant to proceed on the
following day to join the Admiral, M. Cochelet observed, that it was mentioned
in his private letters received that morning from Paris, that official instructions
were to be sent to the British and French Admirals in the Mediterranean, to
proceed with their squadrons to Alexandria, to demand that the Turkish fleet be
sent back to Constantinople.
Mehemet Ali replied, that the moment that the two squadrons should appear
in sight of this place, he would send immediate orders to his son Ibrahim Pasha
to move forward with his army, and he requested M. Cochelet to write that such
was his determination ; and the Pasha, then addressing himself to Captain
Wakefield, requested him to say the same thing to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.
The Pasha then added, that if Hosrew Pasha was dismissed, he would
immediately send the Turkish fleet to Constantinople, and that he would send
his son Said Bey in his corvette along with the fleet.
. ^e Pasha repeated what he had already said, and requested us to consider it
as his positive determination.
M. Cochelet has written this intelligence to Admiral Lalande by Captain
Wakefield, and will communicate it to his Government by the French steamer
which will leave this on the 17th instant. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

361
No. 277.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 6.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, August 16, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's
despatch, of the 15th of July, transmitting for my information copies of
three despatches addressed by your Lordship to Her Majesty's Ambassadors
at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, and to Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin,
explaining the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the affairs of
the Levant. It is probable that the death of Sultan Mahmoud, and the other important
events that immediately preceded or followed that occurrence, may have pro
duced some change in the views of Her Majesty's Government, respecting the
measures to be adopted for establishing the future relations between the Sublime
Porte and Mehemet Ali. I nevertheless feel it my duty to submit to your
Lordship's consideration, with all deference, some observations on the immediate
subject of those despatches.
The intention expressed by Mehemet Ali to occupy Ona and Diarbekir as a se
curity against future aggression on the part of the Sultan, was communicated to the
Consuls-General of all the Four Great Powers, and is referred to in my despatch
dated 14th June last ;. but your Lordship will have learnt from my subsequent
reports, that after the death of Sultan Mahmoud, Mehemet Ali no longer looked
upon the occupation of Orfa and Diarbekir as a necessary guarantee, and had
instructed Ibrahim Pasha not to send any troops in that direction. That dispo
sition may be considered as a confirmation of what I have previously stated to
your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali did not entertain any design against Bagdad.
With respect to the event contemplated in your Lordship's despatch of the
9th of July, to Lord William Russell, of a coalition between Russia and
Mehemet Ali against the Sultan, in which case a Russian force from Gumri
might unite with the troops of Mehemet Ali at Diarbekir, and invade Asia
Minor, I feel myself justified in assuring your Lordship, from the knowledge I
have acquired of Mehemet Ali's character and views, that such a combination
could never be anticipated with any degree of satisfaction or tranquillity by a
man whose constant ambition has been to relieve his country from the yoke of
Russia, and who has too much experience of the friendship of that Power, not
to feel that, by having the Russians, instead of the Turks, for neighbours, he
would have no security for the possession of Syria or even of Egypt.
Her Majesty's Government appears desirous to place the relative territorial
position of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali on such a footing as to guard against
future encroachments on either side ; and with that intention it is proposed that
the Egyptian forces should evacuate Syria, and thus place the Desert between
them and the Turkish territory.
Mehemet Ali thinks that the deference he has shown for the opinion of the
Great Powers of Europe, in avoiding a conflict with Sultan Mahmoud, as long as
his personal safety would allow him to do so, and the moderation he has evinced
in not taking advantage of the successes he has lately obtained, or of the general
expression of public opinion in his favour throughout the Empire, are sufficient
pledges that he will not hereafter act in opposition to the pacific views of the
Great Powers, and that bis conduct would entitle him to their favourable con
sideration. His expectations on this point have been considerably strengthened
by the opinion recently expressed in the Council of State, as to the propriety of
granting to his family the hereditary succession to the government of the terri
tories he now occupies ; and I am fully persuaded that no arguments will induce
him to recede from the assertion of those claims, which he is assured would have
been acceded to under any other administration than that of Hosrew Pasha,
and would have been forced even upon the latter, had it not been for the
interposition of the Great Powers at Constantinople,
In my despatch " Separate," of the 7th of August, as well as in previous
despatches, I have already taken the liberty to submit to your Lordship some
reasons in favour of allowing Syria to remain under the permanent authority of
Mehemet Ali and his family, and nothing has occurred to weaken the opinion I
then ventured to offer to your Lordship's consideration. By granting those
3 A

362
concessions to Mehemet Ali, he may become the means of re-organizing the
Turkish Empire ; whilst, by a contrary policy, his interests must remain opposed
to so desirable a consummation.

No. 278.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 6.)
My Lord, Alexandria, August 16, 1839.
INCLOSED Ihave the honour to transmit to your Lordship, a translation
of the instructions sent by the Porte to Hafiz Pasha, for his guidance in the
operations intended against Mehemet Ali during the late campaign.
1 have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 278.
Instructions given by the Sultan to Hafiz Pasha, found at the Turkish
Head-Quarters after the battle of Nezib.

Plan de la marche de VArm&e du Sultan contre V Egypte, en neuf Articles.

PUISQUE le Gouvernement Egyptien ne se soumettra jamais a son Sou
verain, Fete prochain il est bien probable qu'il se declare et obtienne d'etre inde-
pendant. Comme tous mes efforts et tous mes calculs ne m'ont porte aucune
utilite, il n'y aura que la guerre qui me rendra maitre de cette province et qui
Punira a FEmpire des Osmanlis, et pour son execution et son succes il faut
prendre de bonnes dispositions. ARTICLE I.
Pour le bon succes de cette entreprise il faut etablir des lois rigoureuses ;
dans le reglement il sera promis des grades de Seraskier a tous les Ferik Pachas,
s'ils ne trahissent et n'intriguent pas ; mais s'ils manquent a. leurs devoirs ils seront
immediatement renvoyes du service.

ARTICLE II.
D'apres ce plan, Farmee doit etre composee de 60,000 a, 70,000 hommes,
avec 120 pieces de canons, ainsi qu'il suit: 40,000 Infanterie, 15,000 Cavalerie,
5,000 Artillerie et corps du Genie ; et pour le reste 10,000 de troupes
irregulieres. ARTICLE III.
Partout ou l'ennemi sera rencontre, il devra etrebattu par FArtillerie ; il est
necessaire que le Generalissime exerce journellement FArtillerie en ligne de
bataille. ARTICLE IV.
Pour empecher les Egyptiens de faire un coup de main sur Marache, il est
necessaire que cette ville soit fortifiee et gardee par beaucoup de troupes ; apres
avoir pris ces mesures, le Generalissime marchera droit sur Alep et de la a
Damas, et ensuite a Acre, pour prendre possession de cette forteresse et ne pas
perdre de tems pour s'emparer de toutes les dites villes. Apres la prise d'Acre, il
faut laisser dans cette place un grand nombre de soldats et marcher en droite

363
ligne sur FEgypte. La prise d'Acre sera consideree la premiere conquete de
cette guerre ; cette entreprise pourra avoir son succes peut-etre avant quatre a
cinq mois; et si le Gouvernement Egyptien ne rentre pas sous la domination de
FEmpire, que le Generalissime sache que la guerre sera indefinie, et il faut qu'il
prenne des mesures en consequence ; car la prise de FEgypte etant la seconde
conquete, il faut au moins quatre a, cinq mois pour le succes de cette seconde
entreprise ; a ce compte, l'importante possession de la Syrie et de FEgypte
employera en tout onze mois ou un an.

ARTICLE V.
Selon les notions que nous avons, Solyman Pacha n'est pas content de sa
position. Un homme si important doit etre eioigne du camp. II faut done
envoyer aupres de lui un officier pour tacher par tous les moyens, de le faire venir
dans notre quartier. Solyman Pacha etant Europeen, il faut envoyer aupres de
lui un de nos officiers Francais pour tacher de le faire passer chez nous.

ARTICLE VI.
^ehemet Ali jusqu'a present n'a donne de grades aux Arabes que jusqu'a
celui de capitaine, tandis qu'aux Chretiens il donne ceux de Colonel, General, et
Pacha ; dans notre camp il y a des Arabes qui ont le grade de Pacha, par
consequent, celui qui deserte vers nous avec trente soldats, il faut lui donner le
grade de Lieutenant, et celui qui desertera avec trente a cent soldats, le faire
Capitaine ; et si un Commandant deserte avec son bataillou, le nommer Colonel ;
et ceux qui intrigueront dans l'Armee Egyptienne pour revolter les soldats, soit
officier, soit Colonel, obtiendraient chez nous de hauts grades. Afin que ce
projet ait son execution, il est necessaire d'ecrire des proclamations et de les faire
parvenir au camp Egyptien par des espions.

ARTICLE VII.
Les Druses, les Mutoualis, qui se trouvent dans l'Armee Egyptienne, les
chefs des peuplades et le peuple qui sont sous la domination de Mehemet Ali,
doivent etre encourages par des promesses pour embrasser notre parti. II faut
done seconder leurs intentions et leur accorder tout ce qu'ils desirent ; et pour
mieux reussir dans cette entreprise, il est necessaire que Hafiz Pacha porte avec
lui 7,000 a, 8,000 bourses pour distribuer de Fargent la ou il le jugera
convenable et utile. ARTICLE VIII.
Dans I'armee de Mehemet Ali Pacha il y a beaucoup d'employes Europeens
par le moyen desquels on pourra connaitre tous ses plans et ses projets. II est
necessaire pour etre bien informe, d'envoyer aupres d'eux des espions, afin que le
succes de la guerre qui va s'ouvrir Fete prochain ne laisse aucun doute.
ARTICLE IX.
Pour faire un debarquement de 10,000 a. 12,000 hommes a Tripoli, il faut
que I'Escadre se mette en mouvement, et aussitdt que le corps d'armee marchera
de Marache, il est necessaire d'entrer en intelligence avec les Druses, les Mutoualis,
et autres Cabailes. Pour le succes de cette entreprise, il faut preparer trente
a. quarante pieces de canons de campagne, 10,000 a 15,000 fusils, avec les muni
tions et materiel, pour etre expedies par mer a la premiere demande. Les
personnes chargees de cette entreprise doivent employer tous leurs soins afin que
ces affaires puissent se terminer le plus tdt possible.
3 A 2

364

(Translation.)

Instructions given by the Sultan to Hafiz Pasha, found at the Turkish Head-
Quarters after the battle of Nezib.

Plan of march of the Army of the Sultan against Egypt, in nine Articles.
SEEING that the Egyptian Government will never submit to its Sovereign,
it is very probable that in the approaching summer it may declare and obtain its
independence. As all my efforts and all my calculations have been useless, there
is nothing but war which will render me master of that Province, and which will
unite it to the Empire of the Osmanlis, and for its execution and success good
dispositions must be taken. ARTICLE I.
For the success of this enterprise, rigorous laws must be established ; in the
Public Orders the grade of Seraskier shall be promised to all the Ferik Pashas,
if they do not betray their trust or intrigue ; but if they fail in their duties,
they shall be immediately turned out of the service.
ARTICLE II.
According to this plan, the Army ought to consist of from 60,000 to 70,000
men, with 120 pieces of cannon, as follows: 40,000 Infantry, 15,000 Cavalry,
5,000 Artillery and Engineers, and the remaining 10,000 irregular troops.
ARTICLE III.
Wherever the enemy shall be met, he should be attacked by the Artillery ;
it is necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should exercise the Artillery daily
in line of battle. ARTICLE IV.
To prevent the Egyptians from making a sudden attack upon Marash, it
is necessary that this town be fortified and guarded by a strong body of troops ;
after having taken these measures, the Commander-in-Chief will march upon
Aleppo, and from thence to Damascus, and then to Acre, to take possession of
that fortress, and not to lose time in obtaining possession of all the said towns.
After the capture of Acre, he must leave a strong body of troops in that place,
and march direct upon Egypt. The taking of Acre shall be considered the first
conquest of this war ; this enterprise may, perhaps, be accomplished within four
or five months ; and if the Egyptian Government does not return under the
dominion of the Empire, let the Commander-in-Chief know that the war will
be indefinite, and he must take measures in consequence ; for the conquest of
Egypt being the second achievement, four or five months will be necessary for the
success of this second enterprise ; according to this calculation, the important
possession of Syria and Egypt will require eleven months or a year to accomplish.
ARTICLE V.
According to the information we have, Solyman Pasha is not content with
his position. A man of so much importance should be got rid of. An officer
should be sent to him to endeavour by all means to gain him over to our side.
Solyman Pasha being a European, one of our French officers must be sent to
him to endeavour to gain him over to us.

£>'

ARTICLE VI.
Mehemet Ali, up to the present time, has given no higher grade to Arabs than
that of Captain, whilst to Christians he gives the rank of Colonel, General, and

365
Pasha ; in our camp, there are Arabs who have the rank of Pasha ; such being
the case, he who deserts to us with thirty soldiers, shall receive the rank of
Lieutenant ; and he who deserts with from thirty to one hundred soldiers, the
rank of Captain ; and if a Commandant deserts with his battalion, the rank of
Colonel ; and those who intrigue in the Egyptian Army to make the soldiers
revolt, whether he be an Officer or Colonel, shall obtain high grades with us.
In order to put this project into execution, it is necessary to write proclamations
and to scatter them in the Egyptian camp by means of spies.
ARTICLE VII.
The Druses, the Mutualis, who are in tbe Egyptian Army, the Chiefs of
tribes, and the people who are under the dominion of Mehemet Ali, should be
encouraged by promises to embrace our party. Accordingly their intentions
should be seconded, and they should be granted all they desire ; and the better
to succeed in this enterprise, it is necessary that Hafiz Pasha should have with
him 7,000 or 8,000 purses, to distribute money where he judges it convenient
and useful. ARTICLE VIII.
In the army of Mehemet Ali Pasha, there are a great many European
Employes, by means of whom all his plans and projects may be known. It is
necessary, in order to be well informed, to send spies among them, in order that
the success of the war, which is about to open in the approaching summer, may
be ensured. ARTICLE IX.
In order to disembark 10,000 or 12,000 men at Tripoli, the squadron must
be put in movement, and as soon as the corps d'armee shall march from Marash,
it is necessary to enter into communication with the Druses, the Mutualis, and
other Cabailes. For the success of this enterprise, thirty or forty pieces of
field artillery, from 10,000 to 15,000 muskets, with ammunition and materiel,
must be prepared to be sent by sea on the first demand. The persons charged
with this enterprise should employ all their diligence in order that these affairs
may terminate as soon as possible.

No. 279.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 9.)
My Lord, Paris, September 6, 1839.
YOUR Lordship will probably have been informed of the communication
which Count Appony recently made to Marshal Soult, expressive of the regret
of the Cabinet of Vienna, at Admiral Roussin's having suggested the arrival of a
combined squadron at Constantinople, and strongly deprecating such a measure.
The Count was at the same time instructed to state, that Prince Metternich
would see with great pleasure the withdrawal of the French and English Fleets
from the entry of the Dardanelles ; and that the Austrian Commander, at all
events, would have orders to retire to Rhodes.
Marshal Soult, I understand, replied by observing, that he was not at this
moment disposed to change the present position of the French fleet, which
occupied that position with the view of bringing France as near Constantinople
as Russia was at Sevastopol ; the intentions of the French Government being
those which he had frankly stated at St. Petersburgh, viz., to enter the Sea of
Marmora on the one side, if the Russians entered the Bosphorus on the other.
" Before, however, giving you any decided answer on this subject," (said the
Marshal,) " which relates to one portion of the Eastern Question, let me ask
you, Count, what your Government would do in two cases, bearing upon the
same question ?

366
" 1st. If the Russians, our fleets being withdrawn as you desire, arrive at
Constantinople ; or if Mehemet Ali, advancing, threatens that capital, how will
your Cabinet view these things, and what course would it take respecting them?
" 2ndly. If we enter into coercive measures, as you seem to desire, (Count
Appony had said something on this subject,) against the Viceroy of Egypt, will the
Government of Austria join and bear a proportionate part in such measures?"
Count Appony saying that he was unable to answer these questions, the Marshal
begged him to apply to his Government respecting them ; and said, that until
they were answered, the Count must see that the Cabinet of France could not
make any explicit or decisive explanations as to its own policy.
Such, I believe, is the substance of the conversation which passed between
the Count and the Marshal. I have, &c,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.
No. 280.
The Hon. W. Fox Strangways to Sir John Barrow.
Sir, Foreign Office, September 9, 1839.
I AM directed by Viscount Palmerston to transmit to you the accompany
ing copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Alex
andria, stating that Mehemet Ali had declared that the moment the British and
French squadrons should appear in sight of Alexandria,, he (Mehemet Ali)
would send immediate orders to his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to move forward with
his army. In laying this despatch before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,
Lord Palmerston directs me to request that you will point out to their Lordships
that it will be desirable that Admiral Sir R. Stopford should leave at, or near,
the Dardanelles, a small detachment of his squadron, to be ready to go up to
Constantinople, if called for by the Turkish Government, in order to protect
Constantinople against any threatened attack of Ibrahim Pasha.
I am to add, that Lord Palmerston will send a copy of Colonel Campbell's
despatch herewith inclosed, and of this letter, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at
Vienna, by a messenger who will be despatched from hence to-morrow.
I have, &c,
(Signed) W. FOX STRANGWAYS.

No. 281.
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.
Sir, Foreign Office, September 10, 1839.
I HAVE to acquaint you that, on the 4th instant, I had a long conver
sation with Count Sebastiani upon the Affairs of the Levant.
I read to him my two despatches to Lord Beauvale of the 25th ultimo,
saying that those two despatches would explain to him the views and opinions of
Her Majesty's Government upon Turkish Affairs, and the course which Her
Majesty's Government is prepared to pursue on those matters.
As Count Sebastiani and I have always spoken and acted towards each
other with unreserved confidence, we did not attempt to disguise, in this con
versation, that the feelings of the British and French Governments, with regard
to the course to be pursued towards Mehemet Ali, are somewhat different, and
that the French Government leans much more towards the Pasha than the
British Government does; but Count Sebastiani did not seem to be prepared for
the statement made in the last passage ofmy despatch to Lord Beauvale, of August
25, that Her Majesty's Government, although most anxious to continue to act in
these matters in concert with the other Four Powers, is yet ready, if such unani
mity cannot be obtained, to act in concert with a less number than the four, if any
reasonable and effectual course of proceeding should be assented to by such a
pioportion of the Five as may give to that course adequate moral weigiht, and
sufficient physical means.

367
Count Sebastiani observed that this was a very important decision, and
implied a separation from France, and a dissolution of the alliance of the Five
Powers. I said that it did not appear to me to go to that extent : that the Five
Powers might continue agreed as to their general policy and ultimate views, but
might not all be equally willing to take an active part in each of the particular
and successive measures by which the result was to be arrived at : that instances
of this kind had happened upon other occasions ; as, for example, in the course of
the Belgian Negotiation, England and France were of opinion, in 1832, that
active measures ought to be taken to obtain the evacuation of Antwerp by the
Dutch, while Austria, Prussia, and Russia, did not approve of such a course ;
England and France, however, took the active measures which they thought
necessary, although Austria, Prussia, and Russia, declined to be parties thereto ;
but that circumstance did not dissolve the Alliance, nor prevent the Five Powers
afterwards from taking up the negotiation again, and bringing it to a satisfactory
end. So, on the present occasion, England might agree with Austria, Prussia,
and Russia, in thinking it necessary to employ against Mehemet Ali active
measures to which France, for reasons of her own, might be unwilling to become
a party ; but the unwillingness of France ought not to prevent the other Powers
from moving on towards the attainment of an object deeply important to the
general interests of Europe; and I said, that although England is most anxious
to continue to act in concert with France, yet England is by no means bound to
stand still in concert with France, if France should decline to move forward,
while other Powers are willing to advance.
We then proceeded to discuss the objects which the Five Powers have in
view, and the measures by which those objects might be attained. Those
objects I stated to be, as explained in the two despatches to Lord Beauvale, the
restitution of the Turkish fleet, and the limitation of the authority of Mehemet
Ali to the hereditary government of Egypt.
Count Sebastiani said, that the French Government entirely concur in
thinking these two objects desirable, and are of opinion, that the Turkish fleet
ought to be restored to the Sultan, and that the smallest possible amount of
concession, in the way of permanent arrangement, ought to be made to Mehemet
Ali ; but with respect to the fleet, the French Government does not think that
its restitution ought to be made the object of a separate demand, or a preliminary
to the negotiation for a general settlement ; but that Government would prefer
suspending the demand for the fleet, and leaving that fleet in the hands of
Mehemet Ali, until the Five Powers should have come to an agreement, both as
to the nature of the final arrangement to be proposed to Mehemet Ali, and as to
the means of obtaining his assent to that arrangement ; and the French Govern
ment thinks that then would be the time to demand the restoration of the fleet.
The reasons assigned by Count Sebastiani for proposing this delay were, that the
Turkish fleet would only be a burden to Mehemet Ali, who would soon be tired
of paying and feeding its officers and men ; that if it returned now to Con
stantinople it might again become treacherous, and declare for Mehemet Ali at a
place where its treason might be much more dangerous; and lastly, because we
could only employ the same means of coercion to compel the restitution of the
fleet, which could be employed to enforce the general arrangement ; and it
would not be wise to exhaust our means upon the smaller object.
With respect to the final arrangement, Count Sebastiani said, that the
French Government would be for the smallest extent of concession with which
Mehemet Ali would be contented; but he seemed to imply, that France is
disinclined to be a party to any active measures of coercion against Mehemet
Ali ; and he seemed to doubt that any measures which the Five Powers could
resort to would be effectual.
I stated that we differ with the French Government as to the time at which
the restitution of the Turkish fleet ought to be demanded, and are of opinion,
that the Five Powers are bound in honour not to delay, and to omit no effort to
restore that fleet to the Sultan : that so long as Mehemet is allowed to retain
that fleet, the Sultan never can believe that the Five Powers are sincere in their
professions of friendship and protection ; and Mehemet Ali never will think that
those Powers are in earnest in their declarations of a determination to maintain
the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire : that on the one hand,
therefore, the Porte will not place its full confidence in the Allies ; and on the
other hand, Mehemet Ali, who, though he has suspended open war against the

368
Sultan, is actively carrying on secret war against him, and intriguing with all
the provincial Pashas to excite them to rebellion, will have an unanswerable
argument to urge to those Pashas in support of his instigations ; for he will say,
with apparent reason, that the Five Powers would never allow him to continue
to retain the Turkish fleet, if they were not secretly on his side ; he will con
sequently represent to those Pashas, that they would only be anticipating the
real wishes of the Allies by following the example of the Capudan Pasha, and
revolting against the Sultan.
I said, that as to the idea that the Turkish fleet would be a burden to
Mehemet Ali, it is plain that if he thought so, and if he did not, on the contrary,
think that the possession of that fleet was an advantage to him, he would make
a merit of sending it back of his own accord, and would thus lay in a claim to
favour from the Sultan, and to consideration from the Allies. But it is manifest,
from the pains he has taken to secure that fleet by taking it into harbour, and by
even landing part of its furniture and equipments, that he looks upon the pos^-
session of it as a powerful instrument of negotiation, if not of war.
I admitted that if the fleet were restored, there would be prudence in not
sending it at once to Constantinople ; but I said, that all we require are the
ships and their equipments, and that we do not want the men ; and that it would
be easy for the comhined squadrons to find sailors enough to navigate the ships
back to Constantinople, or to Rhodes, or to some other place where they might
be placed in safe-keeping. With regard to the means of coercion which could be
employed to obtain restitution of the fleet, I said it is true that we could only
employ for that purpose the same means which we might have to employ after
wards for enforcing a final arrangement; but that did not strike me as consti
tuting an objection ; for, in the first place, there is a greater likelihood of our
being unanimous in the employment of those means for the recovery of the
fleet, because even if there should exist different opinions as to the expediency
of compelling Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria, I presumed that no impartial or
disinterested man anywhere could deny, that it would be perfectly proper to
compel Mehemet Ali to surrender a fleet, which belongs not to him hut to his
Sovereign; which he has obtained not by victory in battle, but by treason; which
he accepted upon a pretext which he knew to be false, namely, that unless he
received it, it would be given up to the Russians; and which, if now delivered up
by him to tbe English and French Admirals, would certainly be in safe-keeping-,
and would not be handed over to any authority but that of the Sultan.
Thus, then, tbe necessary means of coercion could be more easily employed
for a purpose which all are agreed about, than for one about which some of us
may differ ; and so far from there being any danger that our means of coercion
would thus be exhausted on a minor point, and would no longer be available for
the larger one, it is apparent, on the contrary, that if our means of pressure, or
the fear of them, should have succeeded in compelling Mehemet Ali to yield
about the fleet, we should have gained a great moral advantage over him ; and he
would be much more likely to be compliant afterwards upon other points.
I said to Count Sebastiani, that he himself, when he was assuring me of the
sincerity and earnestness of the French Government in this matter, had reminded
me that France had declared that she would consider any hostile act of Mehemet
Ali against the Sultan as an act of hostility against France herself; but what,
I asked, was the forcible retention of the Turkish ships, but an act of hostility
against the Sultan ? What, for instance, would France say, if the French Fleet
were to mutiny and go to Malta : and if the British Government were not merely
to refuse to deliver up the crews for punishment, which of course could not be
expected, but were to insist upon keeping possession of the ships and all their
equipments? Would not the French nation indignantly declare such a pro
ceeding to be an act not only grossly insulting, but eminently hostile to
France ?
I said, that Her Majesty's Government are for all these reasons of opinion,
that the Five Powers ought to demand the restoration of the fleet in the first:
instance, and without further delay, and not to postpone that demand till the
Five shall have come to an agreement as to the nature of the final arrangement.
But then, in what way is the demand to be made, and how is compliance to be
enforced, if in the first instance it is withheld ? I said, that the manner and
means had been already pointed out by Her Majesty's Government. We think
that the demand should be made by the Consuls-General of the Five Powers at

369
Alexandria, and by a Collective Note, in order that there may not be the slightest
shade of difference between the expressions to be used by each of the Five.
That if the demand shall not be fully and unconditionally complied with in
twenty-four or forty-eight hours, we think the Five Consuls-General ought
immediately to leave Alexandria, and to embark on board the Fleet; and that a
certain time, perhaps four or five days, ought then to be given to the Pasha, to
enable him to meditate upon the full import of this first demonstration of the
displeasure of the Five Powers.
That if after a proper time this step should fail to produce compliance, then
the allied squadron should prevent any vessel under Egyptian flag, either of
war or of commerce, from entering or leaving any Egyptian or Syrian port ; the
squadron taking care not to meddle with any other flag but the Egyptian, in
order that no complaints should be made by neutrals ; this measure, I observed,
would have a double effect : — first, it would cripple Mehemet Ali's pecuniary
resources, which depend very much upon his trade ; in the next place it would
cut off at the root all military supplies for the army of Ibrahim in Syria.
If it was thought necessary to render the pressure of this measure more
stringent, the allied squadron might seize and detain all merchant-ships under
the Egyptian flag, of which a good many are to be found in the Levant ; and such
vessels might be sent to Rhodes, to be there held in safe-keeping.
If after a certain time, perhaps a month or six weeks, this pressure should
prove inadequate, the next step of coercion might be the occupation of the Island
of Candia by a Turkish force, protected by the allied squadron ; a clear under
standing being previously had with the Porte, that at the moment of occupation,
there should he granted to the inhabitants of Candia, both Turks and Greeks,
the same institutions which have been given to the people of Samos.
I said, that if all these measures were to fail, the Five Powers would then
have to consider what further steps they should take, but that there would be
ample time for such consideration ; and that it did not appear at all necessary to
plan beforehand, anything more than the above-mentioned measures.
Count Sebastiani did not seem to think that his Government would alto
gether like to join in such a course ; and he treated the measures as being some
of them insufficient, and others as likely to overshoot their mark. He thought
the withdrawal of the Consuls-General might indeed be resorted to, if the step
were taken by the Five Powers jointly ; but he doubted its producing any effect.
He thought the blockade would be ineffectual, because he did not believe that
Mehemet Ali had many merchant-vessels under the Egyptian flag ; and because,
even if communication with Syria by sea were cut off, Ibrahim might advance
and find resources in the country he might occupy ; and, moreover, supplies
might be sent him by land.
But Count Sebastiani said, he thought his Government would feel the most
serious objections to an attempt upon Candia, because any endeavour to over
throw the Pasha's authority there, and to establish that of the Sultan, would lead
to an outbreak among the Greek population of the island, for the purpose of
uniting themselves to the Kingdom of Greece. For, he said, the Greeks form a
majority in Candia, and the Turkish minority are all for Mehemet Ali, so that
nobody would be for the Sultan.
I said, that I could not think that the withdrawal of the Consuls-General
would be regarded by Mehemet Ali as a trifling measure ; that we knew he had
exhibited marks of great uneasiness when he received the copy of the Collective
Note presented to the Porte on the 28th July, by the Representatives of the
Five Powers at Constantinople ; and that it is probable that the withdrawal of the
Consuls-General would induce him to surrender the Turkish fleet. But that
the naval measures, if resorted to, would be severely felt by him ; that his
finances are already much embarrassed, as is proved by the long arrears due to
many of his troops; and that those finances would greatly suffer from such a
measure; that it is well-known that, though an irregular army got together in
the Oriental fashion, may subsist itself as it goes along, an army disciplined and
organised in the European manner, as that of Ibrahim is, cannot move or act
without constant supplies of various kinds, and without having a secure line of
communication in its rear for the conveyance of those supplies. The army of
Ibrahim in Syria has hitherto received its supplies from Egypt by sea, a short
and easy, and cheap line of communication ; but if the sea line were cut off, all
the supplies would have to be sent bv land, first across the Desert, and then
3 B

370
through a long tract of country infested by marauders and insurgent tribes,
through which it would require' immense means of transport to convey military
stores ; and where the convoys would be liable to be plundered at every step,
unless escorted by large bodies of troops.
It must be obvious how such a difficulty would cripple the operations of
Ibrahim's army; and instead of a naval blockade leading to his advance to
Constantinople, it would much more probably compel him, after a time, to fall
back. But even supposing, that Ibrahim should make a dash at Constantinople,
and march at once and rapidly by Koniah upon Broussa, a small detachment of
the allied squadron placed in the Bosphorus, would make it impossible for him
to cross over, and would probably, by its presence, maintain tranquillity in Con
stantinople ; and then if Ibrahim, foiled in his attempt, were obliged to retreat,
his army would suffer greatly from all those causes which expose to harassment
an army retreating through a long line of unfriendly country.
I stated, that the periodical returns which we receive from our Consuls in the
Levant, show that there are a good many merchant ships sailing under the
Egyptian flag ; and the seizure and detention of them would be a serious incon
venience to the Pasha.
With regard to the occupation of Candia, and the restoration of that island
to the direct authority of the Sultan, I said that I did not see how that operation
could tend to separate that island from the Turkish Empire, and to transfer it to
the Kingdom of Greece : that it is well-known that Mehemet has at present a
very small garrison in that island, and that there seems to be no reason why the
Turkish and Greek population should prefer the authority of Mehemet with very
imperfect local institutions, or rather with none at all, to the authority of the
Sultan with local institutions like those of Samos, which, for all practical pur
poses of security of person and property, are almost tantamount to absolute
independence. I said, however, that this last measure would certainly require to be well
considered before it was resolved upon, and that it should not be undertaken
unless we could arrange proper and adequate means of execution, in which,
undoubtedly, I did not see any difficulty ; but if the Five Powers should deter
mine to demand the Turkish fleet, and upon a refusal on the part of Mehemet
Ali, they should resolve first to withdraw their Consuls-General, next to shut up
the ports of Egypt and Syria, and then to seize and detain all Egyptian merchant
men, they might very well postpone the consideration of any further measures
till the result of those first steps should be ascertained.
Count Sebastiani said he would report to his Government the substance of
our conversation. You will show this despatch to Marshal Soult.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 282.
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell.
Sir, Foreign Office, September 13, 1839.
I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 16th
of August. With reference to your despatch, of the 15th of August, I have to
instruct you to state to Mehemet Ali, in writing, that Her Majesty's Government
is well satisfied that he is so sagacious and so well able to calculate consequences,
that he will carefully abstain from taking the steps which he is reported in that
despatch to have announced his intention to take, in the event of the appearance
of the combined squadron off Alexandria.
For the Pasha must be well aware, that he is not in a position, which, either
geographically or politically, or with reference either to military or to naval
considerations, can enable him with impunity to set at defiance the Governments
of Europe, and more especially the Maritime Powers.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

371
No. 283.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston* — (Received September 13.)
My Lord, Therapia, August 18, 1839.
ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD came up to Constantinople in
the "Confiance" steamer, on the 15th, and intends to return to the fleet in a few
days. Yesterday he had an interview with the Grand Vizier. I have &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.
No. 284.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13.)
(Extract.) Therapia, August 19, 1839*
ON the 17th, in the morning, M. de Bouteneff read to me, by order of his
Government, your Lordship's instructions to Lord Clanricarde, exposing the
views of Her Majesty's Government for the final settlement of affairs between
the Sublime Porte and Mehemet Ali ; and also Count Nesselrode's reply, sent
through M. de Kisseleff at London. To the first condition upon which the
Emperor of Russia gives his concurrence, namely, " that the consent and appro
bation of the Porte be given," I observed, that the measure stated by your
Lordship is almost identically that which was offered spontaneously by the Porte
to Mehemet Ali, a few days after the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid ; and
therefore there is an unequivocal proof that it is approved of by the Porte.
No. 285.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13.)
(Extract.) Therapia, August 20. 1839.
I HAVE just received from the Sublime Porte, and inclose to your
Lordship, copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.
The Porte declares that the assertion made by the Pasha is false, and that
the truth is, that the Sultan yielded nothing to him but Egypt alone.
It appears from what I learn, that Mehemet Ali is inclined to adjourn his
demand for the deposition of Hosrew.
It will appear in this letter that there is a strong desire to settle the question
without the intervention of the Great Powers.

Inclosure in No. 285.
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.
[See Inclosure in No. 262, p. 347.

No. 286.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13.)
(Extract.) Therapia, August 21, 1839.
I HAVE just learnt, that in a Council at which some of the Ulema
assisted, with other members of the Porte, it was finally resolved to limit the
offers to Mehemet Ali to the concession of Egypt as an hereditary government ;
and that this decision was so agreeable to the Sultan that he desired to know the
names of those who had voted in support of it. I believe this result may be
attributed to the firmness of the Powers in the support of the Sultan ; and in
part also to the fact, that the Pashas who received the letters from Mehemet
3 B 2

372;
Ali have sent those letters to the Grand Vizier, with strong declarations of
their loyalty and devotion to the Sultan.
It appears to me the moment is not yet come for the partisans of Mehemet
Ali to advance further : prudence requires that the Grand Vizier should be first
got rid of by them in some way or other.
I have had a most satisfactory conversation with Baron de Stiirmer, and beg
to offer my humble tribute of applause to his zeal and ability.
I inclose two official Notes I sent in to the Porte this day. The situation of
affairs made it necessary, in my opinion, to adopt this formal mode of communi
cation.

Inclosure 1 in No. 286.

Viscount Ponsonby to Nouri Effendi. Therapia, August 21, 1839.,
THE Undersigned, &c, having received from the British Ambassador at
Vienna the inclosed copy of a declaration made by his Excellency in the name
of his Court, thinks it expedient to communicate officially that document to
the Sublime Porte.
The Sublime Porte will perceive that this declaration engages the British
Government to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire
under the present dynasty, and not to seek to profit by the present state of
things for the purpose of gainiug any acquisition of territory, or any exclusive
influence. The Undersigned has to state, that his Excellency the French Ambassador
at Vienna has made a similar declaration, and that the Chancellor of Court and
State, Prince Metternich, has officially approved of and adopted the obligations
contracted by those declarations.
The Sublime Porte will receive with satisfaction this indisputable manifesta
tion of the sincerity with which the Three Courts are resolved to support all the
rights and interests of Sultan Abdul Medjid and his Empire.
The Undersigned, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 286.
Viscount Ponsonby to Nouri Effendi. Therapia, August 21, 1839.
THE Undersigned, &c, has the honour to represent to his Excellency
Nouri Effendi, for the information of the Sublime Porte, that he has heard
rumours, which he thinks are well founded, that efforts have been made to
induce the Sublime Porte to enter into negotiations with the Pasha of Egypt,
for the purpose of making arrangements with that Pasha for the settlement, as
pretended, of the political differences between the Sublime Porte and the said
Pasha ; and further, it is rumoured, that the Sublime Porte may have listened to
counsel recommending that mode of proceeding.
The Undersigned considers it his duty to remind the Sublime Porte, that
the Sublime Porte is bound by positive engagement to the Five Great Powers,
not to enter into negotiation, nor to make any arrangement with the Pasha
Mehemet Ali, without the knowledge and consent of the Great Powers.
The Undersigned, &c, has to call to the attention of the Sublime Porte
the important fact, that the arrangement to be made between the Sublime Porte
and the Pasha is not a matter involving only the interests of the Sublime Porte
and its subjects, but is a matter that concerns and touches most nearly the
interests of the Five Powers : and therefore, that the Five Powers, it is to be
presumed, cannot see with indifference their rights and interests disposed of by
the Sublime Porte, without their special knowledge and concurrence in what
shall be done.
The Undersigned, &c, (Signed) PONSONBY.

373

No. 287.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13.)
(Extract.) Therapia, August 22, 1839.
I COMMUNICATED to his Excellency the French Ambassador, my
Official Notes to the Sublime Porte, of yesterday's date, and of which copies
were inclosed in my preceding despatch.
His Excellency said, that he intended to make a communication to the Porte
similar to mine on the subject of the declaration made at Vienna by the Ambas
sadors ; that with respect to the arrangement of the differences between
Mehemet Ali and the Porte, without the consent of the Five Powers, he
thought it unnecessary at this moment to repeat what had already been signified
to the Porte by the Collective Note, but he did not object to the step I had taken.

No. 288.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13.)
(Extract.) Therapia, August 22, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose a Note, addressed by the Sublime Porte to
the Representatives of the Five Powers, which I have just received.

Inclosure in No. 288.

Official Note addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the
Five Great Powers.
(Traduction.) TOUT le monde sait qu'aussitot apres l'avenement du Sultan au Tr6ne
Ottoman, Sa Hautesse a proclame le pardon de Mehemet Ali, et qu'Elle a
accorde l'heredite de FEgypte dans la famille de ce Pacha.
Unpersonnage etait deja destine k allerentamer les negociations necessaires,
lorsque les Representans des Cinq Grandes Puissances a Constantinople ont
donne a la Sublime Porte une Note Collective, par laquelle ils Finformaient
que les Cinq Puissances sont d'accord entre elles d'arranger la Question
Egyptienne a I'unanimite.
En consequence, la Sublime Porte a fait savoir a Mehemet Ah cet etat de
choses, et elle attendait les communications qui allaient lui etre faites par les
Cinq Puissances. ,
Mais sur ces entrefaites, Mehemet Ali a demande l'heredite de tous les pays
qu'il a en son pouvoir, il retient la Flotte Imperiale jusqu'a ce qu'il ait obtenu
ce qu'il desire, il a demande et il persiste a demander des nominations et des
changemens qui ne dependent que de la seule volonte du Souverain, et il a eerit
et envoye des lettres aux Vizirs dans FAnatolie et la Roumelie, pour les exciter
a la revoke. Telles sont les propositions dures et les process violens qu'il s'est
permis : maniere d'agir contraire a la soumission et a Fobeissance.
Cela etant, il appartient toujours aux Cinq Puissances d'arranger cette
affaire, et la Sublime Porte demande qu'il soit pris des mesures pour faire con
sents Mehemet Ali a ce qui suit : a rendre la Flotte Imperiale ; a se desister de
la pretention de l'heredite de la Syrie; a revenir a de meilleurs sentimens
relativement au changement du Viziriat— changement qui depend de la volonte
de Sa Hautesse ; a cesser de chercher a susciter des desordres ; a ce que cette
affaire soit negociee et arrangee ici par Fentremise des Cinq Puissances ; et a
attendre les actes de faveur qui emaneront du Trone Imperial. La Porte demande
aussi que MM. les Representans communiquent tout ce qui a ete dit plus haut
a leurs Cours respectives, sans le moindre delai, et qu'ils demandent les
instructions necessaires. . .
Tout cela ayant ete porte a la connaissance des Legations d Autnche, de

374
Russie, de Prusse, et de France, nous en informons aussi Son Excellence l'Am
bassadeur de la Cour de la Grande Bretagne, et c'est ce que nous faisons en lui
presentant cette Note officielle.
Le 13 Djemazi-ulakhir, 1255 (22 Aout, 1839).
(Translation.)
Official Note addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five
Great Powers.
ALL theworld knows that immediately after the Sultan's accession to the
Ottoman throne, His Highness proclaimed the pardon of Mehemet Ali, and
bestowed the inheritance of Egypt in the family of the Pasha.
A person was already fixed upon to proceed and open the necessary
negotiations, when the Representatives of the Five Great Powers at Constanti
nople gave in a Collective Note to the Sublime Porte, by which they informed it,
that the Five Powers had unanimously agreed among themselves to settle
the Egyptian Question.
In consequence, the Sublime Porte made Mehemet Ali acquainted with
this state of things, and awaited the communications which were about to be
made to it by the Five Powers.
But in the meanwhile Mehemet Ali has demanded the inheritance of all
the countries which are in his power ; he keeps possession of the Imperial fleet
until he obtains what he desires ; and he has required, and he persists in
requiring, certain appointments and changes which depend solely upon the will
of the Sovereign ; and he has written and sent letters to the Viziers of Anatolia
and Roumelia to excite them to revolt. Such are the harsh propositions and
the violent proceedings which he has allowed himself to adopt ; a manner of
acting at variance with submission and obedience.
This being the case, it still belongs to the Five Powers to arrange this
affair, and the Sublime Porte asks that measures may be taken to make
Mehemet Ali consent to what follows: to restore the Imperial fleet ; to renounce
his pretensions to the hereditary government of Syria ; to adopt more reasonable
views with regard to the change of the vizirial office, — a change which depends
entirely upon the will of His Highness ; to cease endeavouring to stir up dis
orders ; to agree that this affair should be negotiated and arranged here, through
the medium of the Five Powers ; and to wait for the acts of grace which will
emanate from the Imperial Throne. The Porte further requests the Representa
tives to communicate without delay all that is said above to their respective
Courts, and to ask for the necessary instructions.
All this having been communicated to the Missions of Austria, Russia,
Prussia, and France, we also inform his Excellency the English Ambassador
thereof, as we hereby do in this official Note.
13th Djemazi-ul akhir, 1255 (August 22, 1839).

No. 289.
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13.)
(Extract.) Berlin, September 4, 1839.
I COMMUNICATED to Baron Werther, and have since sent to him a
copy of your Lordship's despatch, of the 27th ultimo, to Sir George Hamilton.
His Excellency said, the principles and opinions set forth in that despatch had
his entire approbation ; but he contemplated with considerable fear the difficulty
and danger of putting them into execution. He said, your Lordship had better
information on the latter point than he could have, and he consequently relied
on success. 1 have not yet been able to procure a copy of the report of the battle of
Nezib, made by the Prussian officers, but the following is the substance : — They
state, that if Hafiz Pasha had remained in his entrenched camp, he was se
cure ; but the late Sultan and the Mollahs forced him to expose himself in the

375
plain, and even then he was certain of victory, had he known how to handle his
troops : but the soldiers had no confidence in their Chief, and the Chief no
power over his soldiers ; and their mutual distrust led to weakness and defeat.
The Prussian officers further state, that there was the same confusion amongst
the troops of Ibrahim Pasha, and that the Syrian regiments attempted to pass
over to the Ottoman Army during the battle. This prevented the Egyptians
from following up their victory.

No. 290.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, August 22, 1839.
COUNT NESSELRODE told me yesterday, that he had that morning
received a courier from London ; that the English Government took the same
view of the affairs of Turkey as that of Russia ; that the French Government, in
reply to a proposition made by your Lordship, had refused to be a party to
coerce Mehemet Ali, who had become more and more insolent, and positive in
his demands upon the Sultan.
Count Nesselrode says, there is nothing to impede Ibrahim Pasha's vic
torious career, and no reason why Mehemet Ali might not be, at this moment,
master of Constantinople.
The language I have continued to hold is, that Mehemet Ali must be
treated only as a refractory vassal, whose ambition it is necessary to check by
direct and active interference ; that the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and
the rule and independence of the reigning Sultan, must be maintained, in order
to preserve the peace of Europe.
Your Lordship may rest assured, that the Russian Government cordially
agree in this view, and will act upon it sincerely and honestly.

No. 291.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, August 27, 1839.
AT Count Nesselrode's desire, I called upon his Excellency this morning,
when he informed me that the Emperor, having reason to believe that the British
Government was better disposed towards Russia, and entertained a more favour
able and just opinion of his views and policy than heretofore, was desirous of
improving this disposition to the utmost, and of strengthening the good under
standing, which so happily existed ; and, therefore, as the Russian Ambassador
was absent from London, His Imperial Majesty had directed Baron Brunnow
to visit London, previously to repairing to his post at Stutgardt, to communi
cate fully with your Lordship, and to offer the most unreserved explanations of
the views and policy of this country upon any point upon which your Lordship
might wish to have them, or which you might desire to discuss.
Count Nesselrode said, that unless he were himself to proceed to London,
it would not be possible for the Emperor to send thither any person more
thoroughly acquainted with the foreign affairs and policy of Russia than Baron
Brunnow. He will set out on Thursday upon his journey, which he will perform by land,
as far as Rotterdam, and will probably arrive in England immediately after this
despatch. I did not hesitate to assure Count Nesselrode and Baron Brunnow, of the
satisfaction Her Majesty's Government would feel at the sentiments expressed on
the part of the Emperor, and of the sincere pleasure with which, I was convinced
your Lordship would welcome Baron Brunnow in England.

376
No. 292.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, August 28, 1839
COUNT NESSELRODE entered, yesterday, into a long conversation
with me upon the state of affairs in Turkey ; and his Excellency showed me
the last despatches he had received from Constantinople, from Paris, and
from London.
Count Medem's despatch detailed the conversation to which it refer
red with great apparent accuracy; and the language of the French Mi-
niter was clear and positive. He said, the French Government would
on no account join in coercing by force of arms the Pasha of Egypt ;
and deemed it better, that the Sultan should accede to Mehemet Ali's
demands (which the Marshal recapitulated), than that an armed interference
should be effected to prevent the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire.
Count Nesselrode showed me a copy of Mehemet Ali's reply to Hosrew
Pasha, and a report of his sending emissaries to excite other Pashas against
that Minister, and characterised the whole of his conduct as the height o
arrogance; and his Excellency added, that these affairs were getting daily
into a more critical state.
I said, that although the question appeared, from the intelligence he had
communicated, to assume a more grave and difficult aspect, it became, how
ever, more simple, and was reduced to this,— what Powers are prepared to
act against Mehemet Ali? and what is the safest and most judicious mode
of action? We were committed in hostility against the Pasha (by the seizure
of a brig, which his Excellency had just reported to me), and in such hostility,
at present, we appeared to stand alone; but I was sure, that even if we
were to be alone in such a course, Her Majesty's Government would sup
port the just rights and interests of the Sultan. Count Nesselrode said,
in a manner that showed it was a decision which had been maturely formed,
" You may be sure that we shall not desert you in such a case." This
was only what I expected.
Count Nesselrode showed me M. de Kissel eff's report of your Lord
ship's assent to changing from Vienna the seat of communications and nego
tiations that the Turkish affairs may require.
On the whole, I found Count Nesselrode yesterday more at his ease
upon the state of the Turco-Egyptian Question, than he had been, because,
although it appeared more difficult than ever to settle without some act or
demonstration of armed intervention, there appeared a chance of Russia and
England acting in concert.
P.S. — Since writing this despatch, I have obtained an extract of Count
Medem's report of his conversation with Marshal Soult, to which I have
alluded. And I send it to your Lordship, because Marshal Soult is stated to
have announced, on the part of the French Government, two principles of
action, which I take to differ, toto ccelo, from those adopted by Her Majesty's
Government: — the one, that it were better to concede his own terms to
Mehemet Ali, than to coerce him by force; the other, that the battle of
Nezib, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, justify the Pasha in demanding,
and the Five Powers in acquiescing in, terms different from those approved of
before the occurrence of these events.

Inclosure in No. 292.

Extract of a despatch from the Count P. Medem to Count Nesselrode, reporting
a conversation with Marshal Soult.
M. LE MARECHAL me fit part du sens des instructions qu'il venait
d'expedier au Consul-Ge'neral de France a Alexandrie. II doit commencer
par declarer a Mehemet Ali, que sa demande concernant le renvoi de Hosreff

377
ne saurait aucunement etre prise en consideration, et que la France lui donnait
le conseil d'abandonner des pretentions de ce genre, ainsi que de restituer la
flotte Ottomane, ce qui serait la meilleure maniere de se recommander a son
Souverain, et en meme tems a la bienveillance des Puissances qui y reconnai-
traient un gage de ses dispositions conciliantes et du prix qu'il mettait a leur
approbation. Sur mon observation que je ne voyais dans ces instructions que des con-
seils auxquels le Pacha restait libre d'avoir dgard ou non, le Ministre me
demanda ce qu'il y aurait eu a y ajouter.
Je lui repondis qu'il me semblait que M. Cochelet aurait pu etre autorise,
le cas echeant, a tenir au Pacha un langage plus peremptoire, en lui
donnant a entendre que la France avait a sa disposition les moyens d'appuyer
des conseils bien intentionnes s'il se refusait a les suivre.
Soult. — Et si le Vice-Roi persistait a s'y refuser?
Moi. — Dans ce cas extreme, on aurait recours a Femploi de mesures
coercitives, pour le forcer a accepter les conditions de paix qu'on aurait
jugees seules propres a etablir d'une maniere stable et satisfaisante les relations
entre le Souverain et le Pacha.
Soult. — Et qui se chargera d'appliquer ces mesures?
Moi. — Necessairement ce role serait devolu aux deux Puissances mari
time* qui ont dans les mers du Levant des forces navales suffisantes pour
arriver a leurs fins, soit en etablissant un blocus, soit en se portant a. des
hostilites contre Mehemet Ali.
Soult. — Je n'hesite pas a vous declarer, que nous ne nous porterons
jamais a un pareil acte d'agression, deja par la raison que nous ne voulons pas
courir le risque d'irriter le Vice-Roi au point de le pousser peut-etre a
reprendre l'offensive contre la Turquie, ce qui amenerait des complications
trop serieuses pour ne pas nous engager a eviter tout ce qui serait de nature a
les provoquer. D'ailleurs, un blocus ne servirait a rien et serait tout entier au
desavantage de notre commerce. Pour enlever la Syrie au Vice-Roi il faudrait
y envoyer une armee considerable, ce qui n'est ni dans notre intention, ni dans
notre pouvoir. La Russie serait seule en position de se charger d'une sem
blable entreprise, mais nous la crayons trop sage pour la supposer disposee a
se jeter dans une expedition aussi lointaine et aussi hasardeuse. Notre avis.
est done d'employer par la voie diplomatique tons les argumensde persuasion,
afin de rendre Mehemet Ali plus traitable ; mais a l'emploi de la force, nous
n'y consentirons point. Et qui oserait prendre stir soi la responsabilite d'avoir
tire le premier coup de cation ? Lorsque M. le Comte de Nesselrode signa les
depeches dont vous venez de me donner communication, et dontje m'em-
presserai de porter le contenu a la connaissance du Roi, il ignorait encore les
resultats de la bataille de Nezib, la destruction de I'armee Ottomane, et la
defection de la flotte. Nul doute que depuis il n'ait modifie ses opinions sur
la limite des concessions a accorder au Vice-Roi d'Egypte, vainqueur de son
adversaire sur terre et sur mer, et bien decide a s'assuier les meilleures condi
tions possibles. II en resulte que s'il persevere dans sa pretention de con-
server a titre hereditaire tout ce qu'il possede actuellement, nous pensons
qu'il sera d'une politique prudente de le lui conceder, etd'arriver ainsi au plus,
tot a cette transaction qui doit regler definitivement les rapports entre le suze
rain et le vassal.

(Translation.)
Extract of a Despatch from the Count P. Medem to Count Nesselrode, reporting
a conversation with Marshal Soult.
THE MARSHAL communicated to me the purport of the instructions
which he had just forwarded to the Consul-General of France at Alexandria.
He is to begin by declaring to Mehemet Ali, that his demand respecting the
dismissal of Hosrew can in no wise be taken into consideration, and that France
advised him to abandon pretensions of this sort, as well as to restore the Ottoman
Fleet, which would be the best means of recommending himself to his Sovereign,
and at the same time to the goodwill of the Powers, who would tec therein a
3 C

378
pledge of his conciliatory disposition, and of the value which he attached to their
approbation,. On my observing that I only saw in these instructions advice which the
Pasha was free to follow or not, the Minister asked me what there could have
been added to them,.
I replied to him, that it seemed to me that M. Cochelet might have been
authorized, in the event of such a case occurring, to hold more peremptory
language to the Pasha, by giving him to understand that France had the
means at her disposal to enforce well-meant advice, if he refused to follow it.
Soult. — And if the Viceroy should persist in his refusal?
I.— In that extreme case recourse would be had to the employment of
measures of coercion, to force him to accept conditions of peace which had been
considered to be the only fitting ones to establish the relations between the
Sovereign and the Pasha in a secure and satisfactory manner.
Soult. — And who will undertake to carry these measures into execution ?
I. — Necessarily this part will devolve on the two Maritime Powers who
have a sufficient Naval Force in the Levant to attain their end, either by esta^-
blishing a blockade, or by proceeding to hostilities against Mehemet Ali.
Soult. — I do not hesitate to declare to you, that we will never lend ourselves
to such an act of aggression, for this reason that we are unwilling to run the risk
of irritating the Viceroy to the degree, perhaps, of driving him to renew offensive
operations against Turkey, which would bring on complications too serious for
us not to wish to avoid every thing of a nature to bring them about. Moreover,
a blockade would be of no use, and would be entirely to the disadvantage of our
commerce. In order to wrest Syria from the Viceroy, it would be necessary to
send a considerable army thither, which it is neither our intention nor in our
power to do. Russia alone would be in a situation to undertake such an enter*,
prise ; but we believe her to be too wise to imagine that she is disposed to enter
upon so distant and so hazardous an expedition. Our advice is, therefore, to
employ every argument of persuasion in the way of diplomacy, in order to make
Mehemet Ali more tractable ; but as for the employment of force, we will never
qonsent to it. And who would take upon himself the responsibility of having
fired the first shot? At the time when Count Nesselrode signed the despatches
which you have just communicated to me, and the contents of which I shall
hasten to bring to the knowledge of the king, he was still ignorant of the result
of the battle of Nezib, of the destruction of the Ottoman Army, and of the
defection of the Fleet. No doubt he has since modified his opinions as to the
extent of the concessions to ba made to the Viceroy of Egypt, the conqueror of
his adversary by sea and by land, antt fully determined to obtain the most
favourable conditions. It follows, that if he perseveres in the pretension of re
taining hereditarily all that he now possesses, we think that it will be prudent
policy to grant it to him, and thus to arrive as quickly as possible at that arrange
ment which is definitively to regulate the relations between the Sovereign and the
Vassal.

No. 293.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13:)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, August 31, 1839.
BARON BRUNNOW called yesterday to take leave of me.
He is the bearer of a letter from His Imperial Majesty to the Queen.
Asregards the Turco-Egyptiari Question, I believe your Lordship will
be perfectly satisfied with Baron Biunnow's language.: and your Lordship may
rely upon his words, as those of one possessing the entire confidence of his
Government. I do not fear to repeat my conviction, that the Russian Government
will act in the affairs of Turkey, on the present occasion, in entire accor
dance with the policy Great Britain has declared, and sincerely for tag
maintenance of the Sultan's Empire.:

3W

No. 294.
Lord Beauwale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 13.)
(Extract.) Vienna, September 3, 1839.
ALTHOUGH it is not probable that the final settlement of the affairs
of Turkey and Egypt will come tinder discussion at an early period, I yet
think it desirable to lose no time in calling your Lordship's attention to the
difference between the terms demanded by the Porte in its official Note of
the 22nd of August, and those dwelt upon in your Lordship's, despatch
of the 25th of August.
The Official Note makes no objection to granting Syria for life to
Mehemet Ali, provided it is not given hereditarily. If the Five Powers were
agreed upon obtaining its immediate restitution, this would create nd
difficulty; but such not being the case, those who wish to secure it to
Mehemet Ali, either permanently or for life', will not fail to take advantage
of this demand made by the Porte, to argue that we are not authorized to
insist upon better terms for the Sultan, than those which he requires for
himself. The answer to this is to be found in various of your Lordship's despatches.
The Powers do not interfere only for the benefit of the Sultan, but. to secure
peace and a durable state of possession in the East; still the limited demand
made by the Porte will not fail to stand in the way of obtaining more*
The state of the affair does not warrant me in asking for a further instruc
tion in consequence ; but I think it probable that the first step in any joint
negotiation which may be brought to bear at Vienna, would be to apply tci
the Porte to learn the conditions which the Sultan is willing to accord to,
Mehemet Ali.

No. 295.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, September 14, 1839i.
YOUR Excellency's despatches to the 22d of August, have been
received and laid before the Queen.
I have to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government
approve of your Excellency having addressed to Nouri Effendi the Notes, of
which copies are inclosed in your Excellency's despatch of the 21st of
August. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 296.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 15.)
My Lord, Pan's, September 13, 1839.
I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch of
the 10th of September.
With regard to what your Lordship observes in respect to General
Sebastiani seeming unprepared for the statement made in the last passage of
your Lordship's despatch of August 25, to Lord Beauvale, I have to remark,
that the contents of that despatch were duly, according to your Lordship's
desire, communicated to Marshal Soult ; and 1 have on more than one occasion
pointed out the importance of that particular passage to the Marshal, an4
likewise to M. Desages. I shall now, in conformity with your Lordship's
3 C 2 " 'r'"

380
orders, show to Marshal Soult the despatch which I have just received,
and which contains the substance of your Lordship's conversation with
General Sebastiani. I have, &c,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 297.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 15.)
(Extract.) Paris, September 13, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that it is the intention of
the French Government to recall Admiral Roussin from Constantinople. M.
de Pontois, a gentleman who has occupied for some time the situation of
Minister at the United States, is to replace Admiral Roussin, but with merely
the title of Envoy Extraordinary.

No. 298.
Mr. Bulwer to discount Palmerston. — (Received September 15.)
(Extract.) Paris, September 13, 1839,,
M. DE LANGSDORFF, a relative of M. de St. Aulaire, and Secretary
of Embassy at Vienna, being about to return to his post with particular
instructions to M. de St. Aulaire, called on me Wednesday morning last.
The Baron said, the views of France and England being identic with
respect to Constantinople, the only subject of difference that could exist
was, the conduct to be pursued between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan;
"and I think," said M. de Langsdoiff, "that your Government considers
this part, which is the minor part of the question, too strongly." I
replied, that my Government were anxious to provide, not merely for a
temporary exigency, but for the permanent position of the Ottoman
Empire; and that, considering the present position of the Pasha of Egypt,
in relation with that general object, the limits to be set to his power, and
the course to be adopted in respect to him, was a question of the first
importance; besides, the Collective Note lately delivered, placed the
Governments who were parties to it, in a decided position, and bound them
to pursue prompt and energetic measures. But that this was not all, for that
which I especially regretted, looking as he (the Baron) did, at the union of
the two Powers of France and England as most desirable in this and all
other matters, was the impossibility I had as yet found of arriving at any
clear notions of what course the French Government really did deem it
advisable to pursue; that the views of Her Majesty's Government were
distinct and positive, and had been fully explained.
They considered that by the Note which the Great Powers had
delivered to the Porte, those Powers had bound themselves in alliance with the
Sultan, and were engaged to procure him such terms as friends and Allies
ought to procure for a State to which they volunteered assistance ; and that
with this object Her Majesty's Government had, in the first place, proposed
plans for restoring to the Sultan his fleet; had in the next stated, that the
hereditary viceroyalty of Mehemet Ali should be confined to Egypt, and
agreed to consider all these questions, and the means of effecting them, at
Vienna. But as yet, while France knew distinctly what our Government
would do, 1 frankly confessed, that I only knew what the French Govern
ment would not do; which rendered it the more difficult to endeavour to
comhine the united efforts of the two Governments into any common course*
The Baron admitted that something must be done to vindicate the honour
of the Governments of Europe after their common Note; but could not
state to me anything that his Government had determined to do with this
object.

381
r I have thought it right to communicate this conversation, although
necessarily it was not of an official character, to your Lordship, as well on
account of Baron Langsdorff's position at Vienna, as on account of his being
sent there sooner than he had intended to return, in order to carry to M. de
St. Aulaire the most recent and complete information in respect to the views
of the French Government ; while he had requested to see and to talk with
me previous to his departure.
From scattered observations, and the general tone of Baron Langsdorff's
Conversation, I should conclude, that the French Government were most
desirous to come to some arrangement with us in respect to the position of
the Viceroy of Egypt, to which that personage might be prevailed upon,
through a representation that it was for his own interests, to consent ; but
I still remain persuaded that the French Government do not, and are not
likely to feel disposed to aid us in enforcing any conditions upon Mehemet
Ali, which he might reject as unfavourable.
I should also think that the Baron imagined that Austria might agree
with France in respect to some general plan of pacification less favourable to
the Porte than your Lordship would desire.
Upon the whole, the impression which I retained from the conversation
alters none of my previous opinions.
The possibility of getting France into some vigorous system of action
will entirely depend upon our getting the other Powers to consent to such a
system. Even in that case, the French Ministry would wish to stand aloof.

No. 299.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 16.)
(Extract.) Vienna, September 8, 1839v
THE delay in Count Fiquelmont's arrival, and that which has been
necessary in order to transfer affairs into his hands, have rendered it impos
sible to answer your Lordship's despatches of the 25th August at an earlier
period. Upon the arrival of those despatches, my first care was to inform Prince
Metternich, through his Secretary, of their contents, and by this channel I
learnt that he persisted in the opinion that the first measure ought to be a
demand for the restitution of the fleet.
My next step was to communicate with the French Ambassador, who
had at that time received no fresh instructions, but was anxious to co-operate
with me as fir as those already in his hands would permit. Two days
afterwards his instructions arrived, and I then learnt from him that they had
restricted rather than extended his powers; that, if he joined in a demand
for the restitution of the fleet, he could not follow it up by any measure of
coercion; that he was not authorized even to withdraw the Consul ; and that
all propositions of the sort must be referred to Paris. Upon this ground he
urged me strongly to enter upon the general question, instead of making that
of the fleet a preliminary.
Upon inquiry, I found that he was as little authorized to resort to action
upon the general question as upon the special one ; it was equally evident
that our views upon it were entirely different, and I therefore declined
acceding to his proposal.
I told the Ambassdor that if he could not go along with me in demanding
the restitution of the fleet, — a step which would have the concurrence of the
whole world, — it would be idle to set out with him upon another road, on
which he would be sure to abandon me before we reached the first stage.
Having occasion the same day to write to him, I took advantage of the
opportunity to tell him the truth of the situation in plainer terms than your
Lordship's position would allow you to employ. I expressed my conviction
that this question would resolve Europe into its elements; and as he had
assumed England to be passionately hostile to Mehemet Ali, I told him thai
¦this was an error accredited by the French Press; that the public is indifferent;
while the Ministry is pronounced for the unity of the Ottoman Empire;

382
tjuoting your Lordship's own words, that that unity, if it could be attained
Under Mehemet Ali, would be accepted; but that this being impossible, we
should persist in supporting it under the Sultan; and I added that, if our
two countries liad been united in their views, they would not have had a
difficulty to encounter, whereas, if they remained disunited, they would fail in
everything: Some days passed after .this before I could see Count Fiquelmont, He
believes that anything reasonable which is agreed to here by the Three
Powers, or even by England and Austria, will, at Constantinople, receive the
accession of Russia; and he thinks this would apply to the order to the
Consuls at Alexandria to withdraw, if their demand for the fleet was rejected,
One great difficulty of engaging Russia to make common cause with usr
arises, in his opinion, from the aspect of menace towards her assumed by
England and- France; and he went into long reasonings to show the expe
diency of removing the fleets from the mouth of the Dardanelles.
The difficulties I opposed to him were purely of a material nature.
Whither, I asked, would you have them go? They must not show themselves,
off Alexandria without orders to act. In all cases, a naval force must be left
hear at hand to defend the passage into Europe against Ibrahim.
The English fleet is destined to execute the resolves of the Conference
here; where then can it so well be placed for communication as in the
neighbourhood of the Ambassador at Constantinople?
He was unprepared with an answer to these statements, and requested,:
that at least the attitude of the fleet might be divested of the character of
suspicion and menace towards Russia which it had at first borne.
I assured him that this was already done, and quoted your Lordship's
despatch to Lord Clanricarde of August 20. and various instructions, in which
the passage of the Dardanelles is made to depend upon the call of the Sultan.
Count Fiquelmont's request would, in my opinion, under any circumstances, be
Reasonable. We agreed that it would be unwise to do anything without having
made a further effort to gain the accession of France ; and I proposed that the
Austrian Ambassador at Paris should concert with our Minister there^ the
language most likely to produce au effect; and that each should employ it
separately. I further stated, that in my opinion it behoved us to represent that
we did not look upon the instruments which had been exchanged, as mere
waste paper; that we considered ourselves bound by the Collective Note to
the Porte, and were determined, as far as our power went, to redeem our
pledge; and that we called upon those Powers who had contracted equal
obligations with ourselves, to assist us in fulfilling them. He concurred in
these propositions, and said, that as scon as he had seen the French, Ambas
sador, he would send orders to Count Appony to act upon them. I then
observed to him, that if this attempt should fail, it would be necessary for
England and Austria to resolve what course to pursue. He concurred in this;
and it was agreed between us, that I should submit the question to my Govern
ment, and that it should be taken into consideration in the mean time by that
of Austria. I therefore beg to call the attention of Her Majesty's Government
to this subject, and shall await your Lordship's instructions upon it.

No. 300.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 16.)
(Extract.) Vienna, September 8, 1839.
IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I have given copy of your
despatch of August 25, to Count Fiquelmont. The reasonings of that despatch
are unanswerable; but how far they will influence the conduct of the Courts
with whom we are acting, seems doubtful. The first plan traced by
Austria did not contemplate the immediate restitution of Syria to the Sultan.
She has since adopted our view of the eligibility of such a course, without,
however, pronouncing herself as -to its practicability, #r as to the means of

383
attaining it. The official reports from Paris, slate the French Government to have
.pronounced its determination never to fire a shot against Mehemet Ali; and
to have canvassed the Representatives of other Powers with the view of
influencing their Courts to join in the same resolution. The French Govern
ment has further stated its opinion to be, that all which Mehemet Ali asks,
— Syria, Arabia, and Candia, — should be granted hereditarily to his family.
Russia, though assenting to the propriety of your Lordship's proposition, has
done so with a doubt as to the possibility of carrying it into effect. Instead,
therefore, of being able to present it to Mehemet Ali with the joint weight
of the Five, it seems more probable that only Four can be induced to concur
in it; and of those Four two partly from motives of complaisance. Under these
.circumstances, I have to request your Lordship to inform me how far I am to
consider your despatch as containing a final instruction ; and whether under
,any circumstances and to what extent it may be deviated from. All depends
upon France. If her cordial concurrence and perseverance in the demand
could be counted upon, there would be no doubt of its ultimate success. Is
this possible in the present temper of France?
lam too deeply impressed with the conflicting difficulties and complica
tions with which this whole question is surrounded, to form any very positive
opinion upon it; but I think it my duty to submit it to your Lordship under
all the aspects in which it presents itself.

No. 301.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 16.)
(Extract.) ; Vienna, September 8, 1839.
THE details given in a preceding despatch will have acquainted your
Lordship with the circumstances which have prevented my acting upon the
instructions conveyed in your other despatch of August 25. The conse
quent delay being unavoidable, I profit by it for the purpose of further refer
ence to your Lordship.
Your despatch proceeds upon the idea that the Five Powers are
acting together. Now this is so far from being the case, that it can only be
said of England and Austria. Your Lordship's despatch partly provides for
this situation, authorizing me to act, under prescribed conditions, with a less
number. If this smaller number should consist of Austria and France, I should
feel no difficulty ; but if it were to consist, as is not impossible, of Austria
and Russia, how am I then to understand your order ?
- If neither France nor Russia can be brought to concur with England and
Austria in a common course of action, the two latter Powers will then be
called upon to decide for themselves what line they are to take. The period
which has already elapsed since the Collective Note was presented, will not
allow this to be much longer deferred ; and if the return of the present mes-
'senger should bring no means of uniting a sufficient number of, the Powers to
proceed to act, I would submit to your Lordship the propriety of furnishing
me with instructions as to the course which you may think fit to direct me to
propose to Austria to pursue in common with ourselves. It has been .sug
gested by some that an intimation to Mehemet Ali, that no arrangements' niade
'in his favour by the Porte without the assent of the European Powers would
fie recognized, might decide his conduct. I, doubt it, even if made by the
Jive; from two or three of them he would value it little. Another course
' might be, to advise the Porte to withhold even the grant of hereditary right
, in Egypti remaining rather as she is than submitting to ruinous ,^o$,eessions.
This would involve the burthen of the permanent defence of Constantinople,
and would leave a wide door open for internal mischances in the Turkish
Empire, and for disunion among the Christian Powers. In short, I can see
tio good solution to the question; and yet the case is, I fear, the one most
likely to occur, and for which it behoves the Two Powers toprovide.
The best chance, perhaps, of.putting it .off would be to limit our proposi
tion to France, in the first instance, to a demand for her concurrence in calling
for the restitution of the fleet, and. in withdrawing the Consuls jf it should be

384
refused. She can scarcely deny this ; and if she grants it, the Five Powers
will be enabled to present themselves again to Mehemet Ali, acting in
unison. Whether this is worth while, whether each further advance,
if it is to lead to ultimate disunion and disappointment, is calculated to
be other than an aggravation of the exposure to shame and ridicule to which
they are already liable, is a question which I would submit to your Lordship's
serious consideration. Should you decide to adopt the course I have suggested,
the position of Russia would yet be anomalous. The Four would come to an
agreement here, and she would have to be invited at Constantinople.. But
if a case were to occur in which Austria and England were to resolve upoa
acting without France, provided Russia would join them, how could they
decide upon measures here in uncertainty as to the answer she might give at
Constantinople'.' I place these difficulties before your Lordship, because it is
possible that your representations at St. Petersburgh, if you should think fit
to make any. might have weight in causing their removal.
Your Lordship's despatch further points out the measures of compulsion
which might be eventually resorted to by the fleet.
It appears certain that the case which would present itself would be, that
of the Turkish and Egyptian fltets being both within the harbour of Alexandria.
In this case, the measure indicated is, the cutting off of all «ommunication
under the Egyptian flag between Egypt and Syria, and preventing vessels
under that flag from leaving any Egyptian or Syrian port. It will, therefore,
be proper that, in transmitting such an order to Sir Robert Stopford, I
should be directed to acquaint him with the manner in which Her Majesty's
Government proposes that it should be carried into effect.

No. 302.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 16.)
My Lord, Vienna, September 9, 1839.
I LAST night received an invitation from Count Fiquelmont, to wait
upon him this morning to receive communication of despatches just arrived
from St. Petersburgh. Being prevented by indisposition from going myself, I
sent Mr. Crampton, to whose report 1 beg to refer your Lordship.
According to this document, the conditions on which Russia offers her
assent are three : —
1. The Five Powers must agree.
2. The conditions must be fixed by the Porte itself.
3. If they are such as would require coercion towards Mehemet Ali, the
means of exerting it must be undeniable.
This at once brings us to the requests enounced by the Porte in her
official Note. The demands therein enumerated come clearly within the scope
of the instruction to M. de Bouteneff. While it is a question of withholding
assent to the demands of Mehemet Ali, the Porte is strong. If we are to
call upon him to recede from what he possesses, then the difficulty begins.
From these premises, I would venture to submit to your Lordship, a plan of
conduct to which the assent of the Five Powers could hardly be refused.
The first step in it would be the demand for the restitution of the fleet,
to be followed immediately by the departure of the Consuls, and the suspen
sion of diplomatic intercourse with the Pasha, if it were refused. In this
case, the Porte would withhold the grant of hereditary succession in Egypt,
and the Powers would provide for the defence of Constantinople ; but to do
this effectually, and without danger of disunion among themselves, it would
be necessary to regulate with Russia the means to be employed.
If the Pasha, finding his position uneasy, should recommence hostilities
against the Porte, then would be the moment to put the fleets in activity by
blockading Alexandria, and interrupting the communication between itand
Syria. I propose to reserve this operation for the case specified: — 1st. In
order to obtain the adhesion of Fiance; 2ndly. Because there are many-
things which have more weight in expectation than in action.
I do not believe that if Mehemet Ali refuses the fleet to the Consuls

385
under the alternative of their departure, he would surrender it to a blockade ;
and if your Lordship should adopt this opinion, it will be well to seud the
order to the Consuls by a single ship, rather than by the fleet.
These measures would complete the first act of the affair. Either the
Pasha would give way about the fleet, receiving thereby a heavy blow, or he
would find himself placed singly in face of all Europe united with the Sultan
against him.
There will be time enough to submit the further conduct of the affair
to your Lordship, when that of its commencement shall have been determined
upon. I have &c.
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 302.
Report of communication made by Count Fiquelmont to Mr. Crampton.
(Extract.) Vienna, September 9, 1839.
HAVING . waited upon Count Fiquelmont, his Excellency placed in my
hands the copy of an instruction addressed by the Russian Government to
M. de Bouteneff, dated St. Petersburgh, August -g-f, and which had been
communicated to Count Fiquelmont by Count Tatistcheff.
The following is, as nearly as I can recollect, its substance : —
M. de Bouteneff is instructed to state generally the Emperor's full
concurrence in the desire of the Five Powers to settle the differences between
the Porte and Mehemet Ali, and his readiness to enforce any measures on
which the Five Powers may agree for this purpose.
M. de Bouteneff is, however, directed, in the first place, not to adhere
on the part of Russia, to any measures to which the Porte itself shall not
have consented ; more than this, — that he is to consider the Porte itself as
the best judge of what its own safety requires, and not to concur in any plan
which would oblige it either to ask for more, or to accept of less, than it
itself thinks requisite.
In the second place, M. de Bouteneff is instructed not to consent to any
measures for the execution of which it would be necessary to coerce Mehemet
Ali, unless such coercion shall appear to him to be practicable, and that the
means and instruments of it shall have been previously provided and agreed
upon by the Five Powers, and that the Russian Government shall judge
these means to be sufficient to effect the common object*. The instruction
does not allude to any particular mode of coercion except that of the blockade
of Alexandria by the French and English fleets, to which measure M. de
Bouteneff is directed to signify the Emperor's consent.
His Imperial Majesty again alludes to the Belgian Question, as illustrative
of the bad effects of the Great Powers of Europe combining to summon a
Party to execute measures when they are not agreed among themselves as to
the means of enforcing them in case of refusal.
The Emperor expresses his warm assent to the firm language held
on this subject by Lord Palmerston, and informs M. de Bouteneff, that he has
given orders to Baron Brunnow to repair to London, in order to express his
satisfaction with, and to confirm so desirable an unity of opinion between the
Two Cabinets on this important principle.
When I had read this document, Count Fiquelmont said, by way of
summing up its contents, " Vous voyez que la Russie veut se mettre non pas
devant la Porte mais derriere elle ; l'Empereur, dont on connait le caractere,
e veut pas de demi-mesures.'f

* It is not expressly stated that a reference to St. Petersburgh upon this subject would be
required ; but the general tenour of the instruction would seem to indicate such a necessity.
t You perceive that Russia wishes to place herself not before, but .behind, the Porte ; the
Emperor, whose character is known, has no wish for half measures.
3 D

386
No. 303.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, September 18, 1839.
WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, of the 3rd instant, I
have to inform your Excellency, that the Note from the Porte therein
referred to, makes no difference in the views of Her Majesty's Government.
That Note is important as an official request of the Porte for the aid and
support of the Five Powers ; but considering the present circumstances of
Turkey, and the feebleness and timidity of the Divan, that Note ought not to
prevent the Five Powers from endeavouring to obtain an arrangement more
favourable to the Sultan, than that described in the Note. The reasons given
by your Excellency in your despatch, why the Five Powers should so act
without being restrained by the Note, are considered unanswerable by Her
Majesty's Government; and your Excellency is instructed to recommend and
urge such a course to the Representatives of the other Four Powers, for the
conclusive reasons which you yourself assign. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 304.
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 18.)
(Extract.) Berlin, September 11, 1839.
THE language held to the Prussian Government by M. de Brunnow,
during his passage through Berlin, made a very favourable impression, inas
much as it led them to believe that he carried with him instructions from the
Emperor of Russia that would give satisfaction to Her Majesty's Govern
ment, and enable the British and Russian Governments to act on the Eastern
Question with perfect identity.
Your Lordship may easily imagine how gratifying this information was
to the Prussian Government. In all the conversations I have had with
Baron Werther, he has given me to understand that he highly approves the
view your Lordship has taken of this question, and is anxious to further its
execution by every means in his power.
M. de Brunnow spoke to me with great frankness ; and it struck me that
the views of the Emperor of Russia would coincide with those of Her
Majesty's Government.

No. 305.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 19.)
MY Lord> Paris, September 16, 1839.
I DO myself the honour to inclose to your Lordship, copies of the
despatch addressed to Count Medem, and of that containing instructions to
M. de Bouteneff, which Count Medem was instructed to communicate to
Marshal Soult.
The Marshal, I understand, received the communication made to him
as one which would receive his attentive consideration. I have, &c,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.'

387
[ Inclosure 1 in No. 305.
Count Nesselrode to Count Medem.
Monsieur le Comte, St. Petersbourg, le 16 Ao4t, 1839.
LE Prince Gagarin m'a exactement remis l'expedition que vous m'avez
adressee sous la date du ^"i," ; M. le Baron de Barante a bien voulu me
communiquer* de son cote les instructions que le Cabinet des Tuileries a
re*cemment transmises a ses Representans a Vienne, Constantinople, et
Alexandrie. Veuillez, M. le Comte, exprimer a, M. le President du Conseil, le juste
inte*ret que nous attachons aux communications que M. l'Ambassadeur de
France a ete charge de nous faire. Elles viennent entierement a l'appui des
explications que M. le Due de Dalmatie a bien voulu vous offrir verbalement.
D'une part, elles attestent le vif desir que le Gouvernement Francais eprouve
de voir la crise du Levant promptement termine*e par un arrangement
pacifique et durable; de l'autre, elles nous font acquerir la certitude que le
Cabinet des Tuileries, loin d'accorder aux interets du Pacha d'Egypte une
injuste preference, n'hesite point a se prononcer formellement en faveur de
la cause du Sultan.
L' accord qui subsiste ainsi entre les intentions de la France et celles des
autres Cabinets de l'Europe; nous autorise a croire que les efforts reunis de
tous reussiront encore une fois a doigner les dangers dont l'existence de
l'Empire Ottoman semble menacee.
Quelle que soit la gravite de ces dangers, nous ne de*sespe*rons nullement
du salut de la Turquie, pourvu que les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe
persistent unanimement dans la ferme resolution de soutenir la cause du
Sultan, et qu'elles impriment a cet effet aux demarches de leurs Representans
a, Alexandrie un caractere d'energie, qui peut seul reussir a vaincre la resis
tance du Pacha d'Egypte.
S'il en etait autrement, les remontrances des Cabinets de l'Europe ne
• produiraient aucune impression sur l'esprit de Mehemet Ali. II ne se
preterait a aucune concession equitable. II resterait en possession, et de la
flotte Ottomane, et du territoire qu'il a occupe meme au-dela des limites
posees par l'arrangement de Kutahia. En un mot, il ne tiendrait aucun
compte des offres de conciliation dont les Representans Allies viennent de se
rendre l'organe. Leur intervention en faveur de la Porte, demeurerait ainsi
impuissante et sterile; de sorte que l'Europe verrait avec surprise et avec
regret, que les Cabinets reunis de Paris, de Londres, de Vienne, et de St.
Petersbourg se reconnaissent dans l'impossibilite de vaincre la resistance
d'un Pacha d'Egypte isolement opposee a la volonte unanime de toutes les
Grandes Puissances.
Nous abandonnons au Cabinet des Tuileries de juger de l'impression
qu'un pareil fait devrait produire sur I'opinion de tous les pays, ainsi que des
consequences regrettables qui en resulteraient pour l'autorite* morale de tous les
Gouvernemens. Cette consideration est si grave, elle interesse de si pres la dignite" des
Cours de l'Europe, qu'il nous suffit de l'avoir signalee ici, pour etre persuades
qu'elle ne saurait manquer de fixer l'attention serieuse du Cabinet des
Tuileries. Nous ne meconnaissons pas, il est vrai, les motifs que M. le Due de
Dalmatie vous a exposes, M. le Comte, et qui inspirent au Gouvernement
Francais un eloignement reel pour l'adoption de mesures coercitives contre
l'Egypte. Mais une fois que les Representans Allies ont spontan^ment offert
leur intervention k la Porte, et que celle-ci l'a accepts, il serait impossible
de disconvenir que les Cabinets de l'Europe ont contracte envers le Sultan
l'engagement moral d'assurer a ce Souverain des conditions plus avantageuses
que celles qu'il aurait pu obtenir, s'il avait conclu un arrangement direct
avec le Pacha, ainsi que le Divan en avait eu d'abord la pensee, deter
mination que la Porte aurait deja mise a execution depuis longtems, si les
Representans Allied ne Ten avaient empeche, en lui offrant leur intervention.
II en requite necessairement que le Sultan, pour avoir renonce* a l'avan-
3D2

388
tage d'une transaction immediate, pour avoir consenti a. rester sous le poids
d'une incertitude de jour en jour plus accablante et plus dangereuse ; en un
mot, pour avoir place sa confiance dans les promesses des Cabinets Allies, se
trouve au'ourd'hui pleinement en droit d'attend re que ces promesses ne restent
pas sans effet.
Or, comment les Grandes Puissances repondront-elles a cette juste attente
du Sultan, si elles ne se determinent point a adopter envers l'Egypte une
attitude plus prononcee et plus decisive ?
Nous nous bornerons, M. le Comte, a livrer cette question a l'examen
consciencieux du Cabinet Francais.
De notre cote, nous ne saurions mieux lui faire connaitre les principes et
les vues qui dirigent la politique de notre Auguste Maitre, qu'en vous auto-
risant a communiquer a M. le Due de Dalmatie les directions dont Sa Majeste*
a cru devoir munir son Repre*sentant a Constantinople.
Vous trouverez ci-joint le resume des instructions que je viens de
transmettre a ce Ministre. Elles lui laissent une entiere latitude pour con-
courir, de concert avec ses collegues, & faciliter un arrangement definitif entre
la Turquie et l'Egypte; mais elles lui prescrivent aussi les bornes, au-dela
desquelles il lui serait impossible de porter ses demarches, a moins d'avoir
acquis la certitude, que ses collegues ont recu de leurs Cours les pouvoirs
necessaires, afin d'appuyer leurs remontrances a Alexandrie, par des mesures
propres k faire respecter la mediation des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.
M. de Bouteneff ne tardera pas a faire connaitre a l'Amiral Roussin,
comme a ses autres collegues, l'esprit dans lequel il lui est prescrit d'agir.
L'intention qui a preside a la redaction des instructions qu'il vient de recevoir,
ne saurait etre meconnue. Elle n'a qu'un seul but : celui d'imprimer a l'inter-
vention de l'Europe dans les affaires d'Egypte un caractere d'energie qui soit
denature a, vaincre la resistance de Mehemet Ali; a faire respecter les resolutions
urianimes des Cabinets; enfin, a consolider le repos du Levant, au moyen
d'un accommodement prdmptet equitable.
Ce but etant d'accord avec les voeux de toutes les Puissances, nous
esperons que leurs Representans a Constantinople recevront des directions
qui les mettront en mesure d'agir dans le meme sens que notre Ministre ; et
que la reunion de leurs efforts, diriges vers le meme but d'une maniere
conforme a la dignite des Grandes Puissances, ne tardera point a amener la
crise actuelle a une solution satisfaisante pour l'Egypte, equitable pour la
Porte, et honorable pour l'Europe.
Tels sont les vceux que notre Cabinet n'hesite pas a emettre, dans la
ferme persuasion qu'ils s'accordent avec l'interet bien entendu de toutes les
Puissances amies de la paix.
Veuillez, M. le Comte, enoncer cette pensee envers M. le Due de
Dalmatie, en lui donnant lecture de la presente depeche, ainsi que du resume
des instructions a M. de Bouteneff, qui s'y trouve annexe. Recevez, &c,
(Signe*) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)
Count Nesselrode to Count Medem.
Monsieur le Comte, St. Petersburgh, August 16, 1839.
PRINCE GAGARIN" has duly delivered to me the despatches which
you addressed to me, under date of the ^^-t. The Baron de Barante
has, on his part, been good enough to communicate to me the instructions which
the Cabinet of the Tuileries has recently transmitted to its Representatives at
Vienna, Constantinople, and Alexandria.
You will be so good, M. le Comte, as to express to the President of the
Council, the just interest which we attach to the communications which the
Ambassador of France has been directed to make to us. They entirely corrobo
rate the explanations which the Duke de Dalmatie has been good enough to give
you verbally. On the one hand they prove the anxious desire felt by the French
Government, to see the crisis in the Levant speedily settled by a pacific and

389
durable arrangement; on the other hand, they furnish us with the certainty that
the Cabinet of the Tuileries, far from giving to the interests of the Pasha of
Egypt an undue preference, does not hesitate formally to declare itself in favour
of the cause of the Sultan.
The agreement which thus subsists between the intentions of France and
those of the other Cabinets of Europe, justifies us in believing, that the combined
efforts of all will once more succeed in warding off the dangers with which the
existence of the Ottoman Empire appears to be menaced.
However great may be these dangers, we in no wise despair of the safety of
Turkey, provided that the Great Powers of Europe unanimously persist in the
firm resolve to support the cause of the Sultan ; and provided they, with this
view, give to the steps to be taken by their Representatives at Alexandria a
character of energy which alone can overcome the resistance of the Pasha of Egypt.
If this is not done, the remonstrances of the European Cabinets would
produce no impression on the mind of Mehemet Ali. He would not consent to
any equitable concession. He would remain in possession of the Ottoman fleet, as
well as of the territory which he has occupied, even beyond the limits laid down
by the arrangements of Kutayah. In one word, he would not even take into
consideration the .offers of conciliation, of which the Allied Representatives
have been the organ. Their intervention in favour of the Porte would thus
remain ineffective and without result ; so that Europe would see with surprise
and regret, that the united Cabinets of Paris, London, Vienna, and St. Peters
burgh acknowledge themselves unable to conquer the resistance of a Pasha of
Egypt singly opposed to the unanimous will of all the Great Powers.
The Cabinet of the Tuileries may judge what impression such a fact must
produce on the opinion of all countries, and how much to be regretted will be
the consequences which will thence result to the moral authority of all Govern
ments. This consideration is of such importance, it so closely affects the dignity of
the Courts of Europe, that we consider it sufficient to have noticed it here, in
order to feel convinced that it will not fail to attract the serious attention of the
Cabinet of the Tuileries.
We do not, it is true, undervalue the motives which the Due de Dalmatie
has stated to you, and which cause the French Government to feel a real
disinclination for the adoption of coercive measures against Egypt. But the
Allied Representatives having once spontaneously offered their intervention to the
Porte, and the latter having once accepted it, it would be impossible to deny, that
the Cabinets of Europe have morally bound themselves to the Sultan, to insure to
that Sovereign more advantageous conditions than he would have been able to
obtain, if he had concluded a direct arrangement with the Pasha, as was first
contemplated by the Divan ; a course which the Porte would long ago have
already carried into execution, had not the Allied Representatives, in offering
their intervention, prevented it.
It thence necessarily follows that the Sultan, having renounced the advan
tages of a direct arrangement, having consented to remain under the weight of a
daily more overwhelming and dangerous uncertainty ; in a word, having placed
his confidence in the promises of the Allies, is now fully justified in expecting
that those promises shall not remain without effect.
But how are the Great Powers to meet that just expectation of the Sultan,
if they will not resolve to assume a more marked and decisive attitude towards
Egypt? We shall confine ourselves, M. le Comte, to leaving this question to the
conscientious examination of the French Cabinet.
As far as we are concerned, we cannot make that Cabinet more thoroughly
acquainted with the principles and views which direct the policy of our august
Master, than by authorizing you to communicate to the Due de Dalmatie the
instructions with which His Majesty has thought it fitting to furnish His Repre
sentative at Constantinople.
You will find hereunto annexed a summary of the instructions which I have
addressed to that Minister. They give to him perfect liberty to assist, in concert
with his Colleagues, in facilitating a definitive arrangement between Turkey and
Egypt ; but they likewise prescribe to him the limits beyond which it would be
impossible for him to extend his endeavours, unless he should have acquired the
certainty that his Colleagues have received from their Courts the necessary

390
powers for supportiflg their remonstrances at Alexandria by measures calculated
to cause the mediation of the Great Powers of Europe to be respected.
M. de Bouteneff will not delay to make Admiral Roussin, as well as his other
Colleagues, acquainted with the sense in which he is directed to act. The object
in view in framing the instructions which he has just received, cannot be
misunderstood. That object is solely to give to the intervention of Europe in
the affairs of Egypt a character of energy, which may be calculated to overcome
the resistance of Mehemet Ali ; to cause the unanimous resolution of the Cabinets
to be respected ; finally, to consolidate the tranquillity of the Levant, by means
of a speedy and equitable arrangement.
This object being in conformity with the wishes of all the Powers, we hope
that their Representatives at Constantinople will receive directions which will
enable them to act in the same sense as our Minister ; and that the union of
their endeavours directed towards the same object in a manner conformable to
the dignity of the Great Powers, will ere long bring the present crisis to a satis
factory end as regards Egypt, to an equitable one as regards the Porte, and
to an honourable one as regards Europe.
Such are the wishes which our Cabinet does not hesitate to entertain, in the
firm persuasion that they are in accordance with the well-understood interest of
all the Powers friendly to peace.
You will have the goodness, M. le Comte, to communicate this opinion to
the Due de Dalmatie, by reading to him the present despatch, as well as the
summary of the instructions to M. de Bouteneff, which are thereunto annexed.
Receive, &c,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 305.
Count Nesselrode to Monsieur de Bouteneff.
L'EMPEREUR, pour repondre au desir que vousm'avez temoigned etre
muni d'une instruction precise, au milieu de la crise du moment, m'a donn6
I'ordre de vous adresser la presente depeche.
Elle a pour objet de vous recommander iterativement, Monsieur, d'em-
ployer tous vos soins a accderer autant que possible, la conclusion d'un
arrangement definitif entre la Porte et l'Egypte. Notre Auguste Maitre
desire que cette transaction ait lieu aux conditions les moins defavorables
possibles pour le Sultan, car ce sont les interets de ce Souverain que nous
devons soutenir de tous nos efforts.
Mais c'est a lui seul qu'appartient aussi le droit de determiner en dernier
ressort, l'etendue des sacrifices qu'il lui convient de faire ou de ne pas faire,
pour assurer la tranquillite interieure de ses Etats.
Nous ne devons et nous ne pouvons pas nous eriger en arbitres de ce qui
concerne de si pres Pinteret vital de la Porte elle-meme ; c'est elle seule
qui doit en etre juge. Dans cette persuasion, l'Empereur croit devoir vous
reserver toute la latitude necessaire pour concourir, de concert avec vos
collegues, a faciliter un arrangement pacifique entre la Porte et l'Egypte, et
pourvu que les conditions de cette reconciliation aient obtenu la libre adhesion
du Sultan; car s'il en etait autrement, vous risqueriez de faire renaitre pour
nous, les memes difficultes contre lesquelles nous avons eu k lutter dans
l'Affaire Beige, et vous rentreriez vous-meme dans le cercle vicieux dans
lequel la Conference de Londres s'est placee des l'instant ou elle s'est decidee
a imposer au Roi des Pays Bas les conditions d'un accommodement auquel
ce Souverain refusait sa sanction.
L'Empereur vous recommande specialement, Monsieur, d'eviter 1'ecueil
que je viens de vous signaler, afin de ne point retomber dans les memes
embarras ou nous avons ete places dans le cours des longues et penibles
deliberations relatives a la Question Beige.
L'experience que nous avons acquise durant cette negociation doit vous
conseiller aussi d'6viter un autre inconvenient, celui de contracter envers la
Porte, l'engagement premature d'imposer peremptoirement a Mehemet Ali
les conditions d'un arrangement definitif, k moins d'avoir acquis d'avance, la

certitude que les "Reprdsentans des autres Cours ont la ferme volonte' et le
pouvoir de combiner ensemble avec vous les mesures d'execution necessaares
pour obliger le Pacha d'Egypte a souscrire aux termes d'une pacification que
vos collegues et vous, d'accord avec la Porte, auraient unanimement reconnu
comme juste et comme irrevocable.
En effet, ce serait compromettre gravement la dignite* des Puissances
Europeennes, que de reculer devant la resistance que Mehemet Ali tenterait
d'opposer aux resolutions des Representans Allies, malgre la publicite que
leurs demarches aurait acquise a la face de l'Europe entiere. Si vos collegues
se trouvaient en mesure de faire aupres du Pacha d'Egypte, de nouvelles de
marches auxquellesla presence des Escadres Anglaise et Franchise devant Alex-
tmdire pre*terait un caractere decisif et peremptoire, l'Empereur vous autoriserait
pleinement a y donner votre adhesion la plus franche et la plus cordiale, au
nom de la Russie.

(Translation.)
Count Nesselrode to M. de Bouteneff,
IN order to comply with the desire which you have expressed to me, to be
furnished in the present crisis with a precise instruction, the Emperor has
directed me to address to you the present despatch.
The object of this despatch is once more to recommend to you, Sir, to use
all your efforts to accelerate, as much as possible, the conclusion of a definitive
arrangement between the Porte and Egypt. Our August Master wishes this
arrangement to be effected on conditions as little as possible unfavourable to the
Sultan, for it is the interests of that Sovereign which we are bound to support
with all our power.
But it likewise belongs to him alone, finally to determine what may be the
extent of sacrifices which he may or may not be able to make, in order to ensure
the internal tranquillity of his States.
We may not, and we cannot, constitute ourselves judges of that which so
dosely concerns the vital interests of the Porte itself; of that it must be itself the
judge. Under this conviction, the Emperor thinks it right to allow you all
latitude to act in concert with your colleagues in facilitating a pacific arrange
ment between the Porte and Egypt, provided that the conditions of this recon
ciliation shall have obtained the unfettered sanction of the Sultan ; for otherwise
you would run the chance of drawing upon us similar difficulties to those which
we had to contend with in the Belgian affair ; and you would yourself re-enter
the false position in which the Conference of London placed itself, from the
moment at which it decided to impose upon the King of the Netherlands the
conditions of an arrangement to which that Sovereign refused his consent.
The Emperor specially enjoins you, Sir, to avoid the danger I have pointed
out to you, in order not to be again placed in the same embarrassments in which
we found ourselves during the long and painful deliberations relative to the
Belgian Question.
The experience which we have acquired during the course of that nego
tiation, ought also to teach you to avoid another danger ; namely, that of con
tracting towards the Porte a premature engagement peremptorily to impose on
Mehemet Ali the conditions of a definitive arrangement, unless you should
previously have acquired the certainty that the Representatives of the other
Courts are really willing, and possess the power of concerting together with you,
the measures of execution requisite, in order to oblige the Pasha of Egypt to agree
to the terms of a pacification, such as your colleagues and you, in conjunction
with the Porte,, shall have unanimously considered as just and as irrevocable.
It would, indeed, seriously compromise the dignity of the European Powers,
to retrace their steps in consequence of the resistance which Mehemet Ali might
endeavour to offer to their resolutions, notwithstanding the publicity which the
steps taken by the Allied Representatives might have acquired in the face of all
Europe. If your colleagues should be in a position to take some fresh steps with
respect to the Pasha of Egypt, to which the presence at Alexandria of the English

392

and French squadrons should give a decisive and peremptory character, the
Emperor fully authorizes you to give, in the name of Russia, your most frank
anr\ rnriWa] aanotinn tbprpfrn

and cordial sanction thereto.

No. 306.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 19.)
My Lord, Paris, September 16, 1839.
IN a conversation I had with Marshal Soult, in respect to the position
of affairs in the East, and when I was pressing upon him the necessity of
acting with promptitude and vigour for their settlement, he said that he should
shortly be able to communicate, in a precise form, the views of the French
Government thereupon; and he confessed that the Pasha of Egypt
should neither be allowed to retain the districts of Adana and Marash, nor
the Island of Candia. " But," said the Marshal, " to obtain Syria from him is,
I believe, out of the question." I asked the Marshal, whether he would
consider himself bound to provide for the execution of any arrangement for
which the French Government did declare itself, and which the Porte
accepted ? But although his Excellency did not absolutely say, that should
Mehemet Ali refuse to accept the conditions of which France approved, force
should not be employed to compel him to do so, neither would he say, that
force should be employed for such an object; and I still think that Her Majesty's
Government can hardly hope that the French Cabinet will, under any
circumstances, be persuaded to employ measures of coercion against the
Viceroy. I have, &c,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

No. 307.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 19.) >
My Lord, Therapia, August 26, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a duplicate translation
of the Official Note addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Five Great Powers,
on the 22nd instant, as well as a copy of my reply. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 307. ,
[See Inclosure in No. 288.J
Inclosure 2 in No. 307.
Official Note from Viscount Ponsonby to the Sublime Porte.
Therapia, August 23, 1839«
THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's* Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary, has had the honour to receive from his Excellency the
Mousteshar Nouri Effendi, a Note from the Sublime Porte, under date of the
22d August, which the Undersigned, in accordance with the desire of the
Sublime Porte, has this day transmitted to his Court.
The Undersigned is confident that the British Government will receive
with the greatest satisfaction, this evidence of the confidence reposed by the

393
Sublime Porte in the Five Great Powers ; and that the result of this wise
measure adopted by the Sublime Porte will be in every respect advantageous
to its rights and interests.
The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 308.
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.
My Lord, Foreign Office, September 19, 1839.
I RECEIVED, on the 13th instant, your Excellency's despatches from
the 22nd to the 31st of August, and I have the satisfaction to acquaint your
Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held
by your Excellency as reported in those despatches. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 309.
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde .
My Lord, Foreign Office, September 19, 1839.
WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 27th August, stating
that the Emperor of Russia has determined to send Baron Brunnow to London,
I have to instruct your Excellency to assureCount Nesselrode, that HerMajesty's
Government have learnt, with much gratification, the motives which have led
His Imperial Majesty to send Baron Brunnow to this country at the present
moment ; and your Excellency will state, that Baron Brunnow will be received
with the greatest cordiality, not only from the high character which he bears,
but from the knowledge which Her Majesty's Government possesses that the
Baron enjoys the full confidence of Count Nesselrode. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 310.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 21.)
My Lord, Alexandria, September 2, 1839.
NO changes have taken place here since my last despatches of the 16th
August to your Lordship, and all is perfectly tranquil; but the Pasha holds
the same language as before with respect to Hosrew Pasha and to the Turkish
fleet. Ever since the communication was made to the Pasha, that the Great
Powers had undertaken the settlement of the Eastern Question, I have
abstained as much as possible from entering with the Pasha into any of the
points connected with it.
The Pasha has, however, told my colleagues, that Ibrahim Pasha had
written to him to say, that his present position was a bad one during the
winter, and that he must either advance or retire before that season ; and he
asks his father's orders on the subject, and his father has directed him not to
move for the present; but I am assured that Ibrahim Pasha has collected
supplies, and made every preparation which could be required for a forward
movement by his army.
I saw the Pasha four days ago, when he told me that if in the course of
a month or six weeks he should not learn that the arrangement between the
3E

394
Porte and himself was in a train of settlement, Ibrahim Pasha must advance
with his army. That Ibrahim had written to say that his army could not, in
its present position, receive supplies to pass the winter, and that he must
either advance or retire. I asked why the army could not then return to its
late positions of Aleppo, Aintab, &c, to which the Pasha replied that it could
more easily get supplies in Asia Minor.
I mentioned that the Pasha had stated to myself and colleagues, that the
army would remain in the positions which it occupied at the period when
Captain Caillier should arrive at Ibrahim Pasha's head-quarters, to which he
replied, that the army had halted there, and would, for a reasonable time,
await the decision of the Congress at Vienna.
I then asked the Pasha how far Ibrahim Pasha would advance in the event
of such a movement, to which he replied, that as he himself was not
acquainted with that country, or with its resources, he must leave that entirely
to Ibrahim Pasha's own discretion and judgment.
Mehemet Ali added that many deputations, and amongst them some
Ulemas, had come to Ibrahim Pasha to urge him to advance, and had told him
that if the Russians moved on to oppose him, the whole population, men,
women, and boys, of Asia Minor would take up arms against the Russians; and
the Pasha said that if Circassia, with only half a million of souls, could resist
Russia, he felt sure that Ibrahim Pasha, aided by all the population of Asia
Minor, could prevent their progress.
The Pasha does not appear at all uneasy as to the results for him of the
present state of affairs ; and I believe that he keeps up constant communica
tion with the leading persons in Asia Minor and in Turkey in Europe, who
all appear disposed to attend to all his suggestions, and to conform implicitly
to his directions; and I believe firmly that the whole Mussulman population
of Turkey looks up to him with awe and respect, and that even in Constanti
nople itself, the influence of his name is very great, and carries much weight
with it. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 311.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 21.)
My Lord, Alexandria, September 5, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Captain Caillier, who
was sent by Marshal Soult to Ibrahim Pasha, returned to this place on the
2nd instant, on his way to Paris, and says that Ibrahim Pasha occupied his
former position at Marash, and has also a corps at Orfa.
Ibrahim Pasha mentioned to Captain Caillier the necessity of changing
his position for the facility of supplies, and mentioned that if his father con
sented, he would propose occupying Diarbekir, but not to move further north
than was absolutely necessary.
Captain Caillier has told me, that Ibrahim Pasha professes the strongest
allegiance and obedience to the Sultan, and that he will defend the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire, and of the Sultan's supremacy, even against Mehemet
Ali himself, but at the same time, that he will not forego the hereditary
succession to Syria, even if Mehemet Ali himself should do so.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL

395

No. 312.
Lord - William Russell to. Viscount Palmerston.* — (Received September 23.)
(Extract.) Berlin, September 18, 1839.
BARON WERTHER haying: frequently asked me, with apparent
mortification, why the British fleet appeared more disposed to enter the
Dardanelles than to assist in coercing Mehemet Ali to comply with the
wishes of the Five Powers, I was glad to be able to furnish an answer, by
being put in possession of Colonel Campbell's despatch to your Lordship,
dated August 15, in which he stated that Mehemet Ali would direct
Ibrahim Pasha to march on Constantinople the instant the English
and French squadrons appeared in sight of Alexandria. Baron Werther
said, that if we were deterred from acting against Mehemet Ali by that
threat, he had triumphantly set at defiance the Five Powers. I told his
Excellency that we should commit a serious fault if we proceeded to act
before we had ascertained that the French Government positively declined
to act with us. The Baron replied, that he was certain the French
Government would not act with us. In that case, I said, we must act
with the Powers which agree with us ; and we have the means of forcing
Mehemet Ali to accede to our terms. " Undoubtedly we have," he replied,
" if you will cease to be so very distrustful of Russia ; but as long as that
distrust exists, we have no means of preventing Ibrahim Pasha from
marching on Constantinople, and creating anarchy by the intrigues and
money of Mehemet Ali." I told him your Lordship had no distrust of
Russia, and I was convinced that you would accept the assurances M. de
Brunnow was charged to give you with the confidence and loyalty they
merited. I begged of Baron Werther to instruct the Prussian Minister at Paris
to make known to the French Cabinet the King of Prussia's approval of
the policy of the British Cabinet towards the East, and His Majesty's
desire that France should not separate from the Five Powers. His
Excellency said he had already so done, and would repeat his instructions.

No. 313.
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.
Sir, Foreign Office, September 23, 1839.
IN a conversation which I had with Count Sebastiani a week ago,
Count Sebastiani endeavoured to persuade me to consent, on the
part of Her Majesty's Government, to propose to the Sultan and
Mehemet Ali an arrangement, by which Mehemet Ali should become
hereditary Governor of Egypt and of Southern Syria, as far north
as a line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout, leaving, as I understood
him, the former city to the Sultan, and giving the latter place to the
Pasha ; while, on the other hand, Mehemet should evacuate all the other
territories now held by him ; and the Count stated that France would be
willing to concur in coercive measures to enforce the execution of such
an arrangement. To this I replied, that such an arrangement would have the great
disadvantage of containing within itself the seeds of future contention ;
that the line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout would be a mere arbitrary
line, and would establish no definite frontier between the TwoParties ;
that it would give Mehemet Ali a tSte de pont, as it were, in Syria, which
would both tempt and assist him to future encroachments ; that the pro
bable differences between him and the Arab tribes would furnish him with
a constant pretext for keeping up an army in Syria : and that all the
objections which apply to the present state of things, as established by
3 E 2

396.
the arrangement of Kutaya, would apply in a proportionate degree to the
arrangement thus suggested by Count Sebastiani. I said, that if the
Five Powers are to take this matter in hand, and to employ force, or the
threat of force, to compel acquiescence on the part of Mehemet Ali, it is
on every account most desirable that the arrangement which they may
determine to carry into effect should be one calculated to accomplish the
great object which they have in view, and to secure the peace of Europe
against the dangers by which it would be threatened, if future conflict
were to arise in Syria between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt ; but
that it would reflect little honour upon the alliance, if the Five Powers
were to make a great effort to accomplish an evidently imperfect result.
I said, that moreover I did not understand upon what principle
France could be ready to co-operate in coercive measures for the purpose
of enforcing this incomplete settlement, and should decline so to co-operate
for the purpose of enforcing a settlement which she herself admits to be
far better, and which, because it is far better, she would prefer, if Mehemet
Ali could be persuaded willingly to accede to it.
I said, that the main objection put forward by France to coercive
measures for the purpose of compelling Mehemet Ali to content himself
with Egypt, is, that if such measures were to be employed for such a pur
pose, Mehemet would immediately order Ibrahim to advance upon Con
stantinople, and then would follow all the difficulties and embarrassments
which such a step on his part would necessarily produce ; but, I said, the
only reason we have for thinking that Mehemet Ali would take such a
step is, that he has said he would ; but if we are to go by what he has
said, it is equally certain that he would order Ibrahim to march for the
purpose of resisting the modified arrangement proposed by France ;
because what Mehemet Ali has really said is, that he will not abandon
the smallest part of what he now occupies ; and that he will resist by all
means in his power any attempt to deprive him of any portion of it.
Either, therefore, we are to go by what Mehemet Ali says, or by what we
think it is likely he will do. In the former case, the incomplete settlement
would be just as difficult of enforcement as the more complete one; in the
latter case, we may reasonably expect that, if the Five Powers are united,
the complete arrangement will be as easy of attainment as the incomplete
one could possibly be.
Count Sebastiani admitted that Mehemet Ali might resist the
arrangement he had suggested, and disclaimed, on the part of the French
Government, any peculiar knowledge of the intentions of Mehemet Ali, or
any authority to negotiate on behalf of the Pasha with the other Powers :
but, he said, the decision of the French Government turned very much
upon domestic considerations : and that his Government might be able
to justify, towards the Chambers and the public, the employment of
coercive measures against the Pasha, if it could be shown that the Pasha
had not been driven absolutely to despair, and that France had made for
him the best arrangement which could be obtained.
I said, that considering what Mehemet Ali is, and from what con
dition he sprung, I certainly thought that the hereditary Pashalic of
Egypt would at least be a "beau desespoir;" but that, from what the
Count had then said, it would appear that the first object of France was
the Pasha, and not the Sultan ; and that although the French Government
had made a spontaneous declaration that its leading aim was, " to main
tain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under its pre
sent dynasty ; and that France would employ all its influence and means
of action, in order to maintain the security of this essential element of the
balance of power ; and that they would not hesitate to oppose any combi
nation which should be hostile to that independence and integrity,"
nevertheless, it would seem that the object of France was to uphold
Mehemet Ali rather than the Turkish Empire ; and I observed, that this
tallied with a remark which had been made very early at Vienna, that the
views of England and France differed in this respect: that England
wished to make the best bargain for the Sultan, and France the best
bargain for Mehemet Ali.
Count Sebastiani assured me, that I was quite mistaken if I enter-

397
tained such a supposition, and that the objects aimed at by France were
nothing more or less than those which she had stated in her declaration.
He then pressed me to come to some practical conclusion which he
might be able to communicate to his Government.
I said it was impossible for me to give him any such answer as he
wished, because, in the first place, I could not take upon me to do so
without consulting my colleagues and ascertaining their decision ; and,
secondly, because matters were not yet in such a state as to enable the
Cabinet to come to a decision. I said, that I thought it likely that we
should in the first place ascertain whether the other Three Powers agree
with us, or with France ; and, in the former case, whether they would be
willing to co-operate with us for the practical execution of our common
views ; and if we found they were willing to do so, we might possibly
accept their co-operation and go on.
But if they do not agree with you, said Count Sebastiani, or will not
co-operate with you, will you then unite with France to carry into effect
the arrangements which I have suggested ?
I said it would be time enough for the Government to determine
that question when the case arose, and it was impossible to decide it
beforehand. He asked what, then, should be the communication he should make
to his Government? I said he had better report exactly what had passed
between us ; and that it would be for his Government to consider what
course would suit them best. That if the other Three Powers should
agree with us, which I thought probable, it would surely be better for
France to face all the internal difficulties which keep back its Govern
ment, and to join frankly and freely the other Four Powers ; but if, for
reasons of which the French Government alone can judge, such a course
would be impossible, France might stand aloof while the other Four were
carrying into execution an arrangement which even France herself has
approved of, and she might then join the Allies again in the other arrange
ments which might require to be made when the territorial settlement
had been effected. I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 314.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 23.)
My Lord, Paris, September 20, 1839.
COUNT MEDEM informed me this morning, that yesterday, in an
interview with Marshal Soult, (who was about to send a courier to St.
Petersburgh,) he pressed the Marshal strongly to make some statement
of the views of the French Government in regard to an arrangement
between the Porte and the Viceroy of Egypt, and that Marshal Soult said
that he was employed on such a document. " Then," said Count Medem,
" your Excellency must have fixed the basis of it ; may I request to be in
formed thereupon ?" At last, he learnt that the views of the French Govern
ment, in respect to such a settlement, were those of which I spoke in my
despatch of September 16; viz., the abandonment of all pretensions over
Hosrew Pasha's employment; the restoration oftheOttoman fleet; the resig
nation of Adana, Marash, and the Island of Candia, on the part of the Vice
roy, together with some arrangement in respect to Syria, which would divide
that country into Pashalics, of which the sons of Mehemet should have
the separate Governments entailed upon their male offspring respectively,
with the condition, that these Pashalics, on failure of direct male issue,
should fall back, as each such case should occur, to the Porte. I asked
Count Medem whether the Marshal had said what he would do, supposing
Mehemet Ali should refuse to subscribe to such conditions. He said, that

398
he had put this question to the Marshal, but could obtain from him no
more direct answer than that if Mehemet AM positively refused to accept
such an arrangement as that he spoke of, then the French Govern
ment would feel less objection to the employment of coercive measures.
Count Medem has communicated the result of this conversation to his
Government. I have &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 315.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 23 J
My Lord, Paris, September 20, 1839.
COUNT MEDEM received a communication from his brother this
morning, which he was kind enough to show me.
By Count Alexander Medem's letter, it would appear that Mehemet
Ali had first declared to the other Consuls, (the Consul-General of Russia
not being present,) that unless there seemed some probability of an
arrangement within a months time, he should order his son, at the expira
tion of that period, to march on to Constantinople ; that in consequence
of this communication, Count Alexander Medem had had an interview
with the Viceroy, and requested him to state distinctly his intentions; and
that Mehemet Ali had replied, by observing, that if within a month's time
some arrangement under the intervention of the Five Powers had not
commenced, he could have no doubt that the conclusion of such an
arrangement would be a work of much time, and that, unable to maintain
his troops where they were, he should then advance them to Orfa and
Diarbekir ; but that under no circumstances should he pass the Taurus,
unless measures of coercion were adopted against him.
I have, &c,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 316.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 26.)
My Lord, Paris, September 23, 1839.
AS I had understood from the French Government, that it had been
their intention to leave Captain Caillier in Egypt until the settlement of
affairs, and as I learnt he was returning, I asked M. Desages what was
the occasion of this change. M. Desages told me, that Captain Caillier
seeing that the Viceroy had stopped his army, and had proclaimed the new
Sultan, considered his mission terminated, and being unwell, resolved to
come back to France. " And though on other reasons," said M. Desages,
" we might regret this, yet, if Mehemet Ali should take any desperate
course, it is quite as well that M. Caillier should not be with him."
I have, &c,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 317.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 29.)
(Extract.) Pan's, September 27, 1839.
I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatches to the
24th of September.
With respect to the language which General Sebastiani held to your
Lordship about a week ago, I have to inform your Lordship, that Marshal

399
Soult has generally stated to me, that Mehemet Ali might make, and ought
to make, great concessions; has lately declared, that he should propose a
plan in which such concessions would be comprehended ; and has never
declared that force should not be employed, though he would never affirm
that it should be so; making this question depend upon the satisfactory
resolution of two others, viz., the common accord of the Great Powers as
to the conditions that should be imposed upon the Pasha, and an amicable
understanding between the said Powers as to the part they should take in
the possible contingency of Ibrahim's march on Constantinople. But as the
Marshal knew that an amicable understanding on this point seemed unlikely :
its being made the necessary preliminary to any discussion of the measures for
executing an arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, did, in
fact, indefinitely adjourn the consideration of such measures, and in this
manner indefinitely adjourn the whole question.
As I could never understand the Marshal to express himself more decidedly
on this matter, I may confess that I was rather surprised to find that " General
Sebastiani had endeavoured to persuade your Lordship to propose to the
Sultan and Mehemet Ali an arrangement by which Mehemet Ali should
become hereditary Governor of Egypt and of Southern Syria, as far north as
a line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout, stating that France would be willing
to concur in coercive measures to enforce the execution of such an arrange
ment." I cannot help saying that I am almost inclined to believe, that General
JSebastiani, although he pressed your Lordship for an answer which he might
give to his Government, did not speak according to any positive instructions
from his Government, — a conjecture which I hazard with the more confidence
since the despatch containing the views of the French Government on the
affairs of the East, was not sent to London earlier than last Monday, while that
despatch merely expresses the views of which I had the honour to acquaint
your Lordship in my despatch of September 16, with, however, this important
exception, that Marshal Soult having told me that the Island of Candia ought
to be immediately surrendered to the Sultan, now says in his official commu
nications to the different Cabinets, that Candia should be surrendered to the
Porte after Mehemet's death. There is nothing said, however, in this recent
declaration of the opinions of the French Government, as to any willingness
to employ measures of coercion, should such become necessary, to carry even
their own project into execution, — a fact which would be of no importance,
since the one case would seem implied in the other, had not the French Govern
ment always placed, as 1 have had the honour of observing to your Lordship,
so many conditions in the way of the ultimate employment of force, as to
render the chance of resorting to it almost an impossibility ; thereby weaken
ing and almost destroying the effect of any simple declaration against the
Viceroy's pretensions.
As your Lordship will, I understand, have transmitted to you a copy of
the Note sent to the French Ambassadors in London and Vienna, you will be
able to compare the contents of that Note with General Sebastiani's prior
observations. And now, my Lord, passing by the incident, and arriving at the general
question in its present position, I should state, that in an interview I had this
morning with Marshal Soult, we entered into the subject of M. de Brunnow's
mission, and the conversation which had in consequence taken place between
your Lordship and General Sebastiani. I asked Marshal Soult to inform me
of the substance of that conversation, as it had been reported by General
Sebastiani. The Marshal said, you will see by reading this despatch, which is
an answer to it. I accordingly did read a despatch which General Sebastiani
has orders to communicate to your Lordship, and which, turning entirely
•upon the part which Russia would take to herself, in sending, in case of need,
a force for the protection of Constantinople, declares, as the Marshal did
himself personally declare to me, that France never would consent to this
measure. "I stand," said the Marshal, "by my old declaration, that if a
Russian fleet appear in the Bosphorus, a French fleet shall arrive there also.
This declaration," continued the Marshal, "has been likewise the decla
ration of England, and by it I abide."

400
I observed to the Marshal, that I considered, and thought that Her
Majesty's Government might consider, that there was a good deal of difference
between what Russia might do by herself and for herself, and what she might
do with the consent and as the agent of the other Great Powers ; and that, in
fact, by accepting any such mission, she took no exclusive part in Eastern
Affairs. The Marshal did not concur in these observations ; but considered, on
the contrary, that though the form under which Russia would obtain her object
might in this new convention be changed, that the attainment of that object
would still be its result ; that she would thus acquire the position to which
she aspired, of appearing as alone capable of protecting Constantinople ; that
consequently, the Porte would sink into that state of dependence upon the
Russian Empire from which it had been the object of France to deliver her :
while he, the Marshal, had always considered the Question of the East as one
which was to be settled, and considered rather with the view of limiting the
power of Russia than that of the Pasha of Egypt ; the second seeming to him
an inferior object to the first. I observed, that as the Marshal, agreeing with
us as to the principle of protecting the Sultan against Mehemet Ali,
seemed to differ from us as to the means of doing so, so we, agreeing
with him as to the necessity of keeping the power of Russia within
reasonable bounds, might also differ from him as to what would be the
wisest course for attaining that object. But this I begged the Marshal
particularly to observe, that whereas the presence of Russia at Constan
tinople, if the result of a convention between that Empire and other
Powers, would, as I had already remarked, be in many other respects
different from her entering into the Bosphorus in merely her own right, so
more especially would it be different by making the other Powers with
which this convention was entered into, parties to the proceedings. So that
France, by opposing Russia in such a case, would be opposing her Allies :
a course which I could not persuade myself that the French Government
would willingly adopt.
The Marshal did not answer directly to this remark ; and I thought it
better to let the conversation drop for the moment, since the more the French
Government themselves consider the position in which France would be
placed by standing alone and aloof amidst the general settlement of a question
in which she began by assuming so forward and important a part, the more
likely is it that all parties will endeavour to associate this country with the
other Great Powers of Europe in any course of which those Powers may
generally approve ; and it may be better, therefore, not to take the first word
of this Government, on the new position which affairs have taken, as the last.
The communication of M. de Brunnow, and the manner in which the
French Government seem to think it will be considered by Her Majesty's
Government, have, indeed, created such a sensation here, and seem so to have
confounded all previous speculations, that it is difficult at this first moment to
say what will definitively be the result. On the one hand, the feeling in this
country is very strong against Russia ; at the same time the opinion of the press,
and of the men who conduct the public journals and general literature of France,
is decidedly, as I have already had the honour of informing your Lordship,
favourable to Mehemet Ali, who is considered, I can hardly say why, as the
natural ally of France in the East.
Judging from these circumstances, then, I should be inclined to say at
once, that if Her Majesty's Government, agreeing with the propositions which I
understand M. de Brunnow to have made, should enter into a convention with
the Governments of Russia and Austria for limiting Mehemet Ali's power to
Egypt, and for compelling him to withdraw his forces within such limits, and
if such a convention were to assign to Russia, as her part in the means of execu
tion, the protection of Constantinople, France would not be a party to such con
vention, and that she would protest against the appearance of a Russian force
in the Bosphorus, should the case arise of any such force appearing there; in
every other respect maintaining the position of a neutral. This I take the liberty
of saying might, I think, be naturally expected from France.

401
No. 318.
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell.
Sir, Foreign Office, September 26, 1839".
YOUR despatches to the 5th of September, have beep received and
laid before the Queen.
With reference to your despatch of the 2nd of September, I have to
instruct you to state to Mehemet Ali, that Her Majesty's Government feels
persuaded that he is so well able to calculate consequences, that he will
not expose himself to those which would follow from any further acts of
hostility on his part against the Sultan.
I have further to state to you, that the opinion which, it appears from
your despatches, you have formed of the power and influence of Mehemet
Ali in Turkey, and which opinion is probably founded upon statements
made to you by Mehemet Ali himself, is believed by Her Majesty's Govern
ment to be incorrect and exaggerated. I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 319.
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, September 27, 1839.
I HAVE the satisfaction to acquaint you, that the Queen has been
graciously pleased to appoint you to be Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-
General in Egypt, in the place of Colonel Campbell, who retires from the
service on account of his health.
It is essential for the public service, thaty ous hould proceed to
Egypt with as little delay as possible; I have, therefore, to desire that you
will make your preparations for that purpose, and that you will commence
your journey to Alexandria without loss of time.
Your Commission and Instructions will be forwarded to Alexandria ;
and on your arrival, you will receive from Colonel Campbell, the whole
of the official correspondence of the Consulate; and I have to desire that
you will consider the instructions therein contained as addressed to
yourself, and will make them the guide of your conduct.
Previously to your departure from Vienna, you will wait upon Her
Majesty's Ambassador, and receive from his Excellency, such instructions
as he may think it right to give to you for the guidance of your conduct
in Egypt.

No. 320.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, September 27, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency, that the Queen has
been graciously pleased to appoint Colonel Hodges, now Her Majesty's
Consul-General in Servia, to be Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General
in Egypt, in the place of Colonel Campbell.
I transmit to your Excellency, a copy of a despatch which I have
addressed to Colonel Hodges, directing him to proceed to Egypt without
delay; and I have to desire that your Excellency will give to Colonel
3 F

402
Hodges such instructions as you may judge proper, for the guidance of
his conduct in Egypt, and that you will place him fully in possession of
the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the
the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, as explained in the various commu
nications which have been addressed to you.
Colonel Hodges will leave in your Excellency's possession, the origi
nals of the official correspondence of the Consulship in Servia.
I am, &.c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON,

No. 321.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received September 27.)
My Lord, Therapia, September 5 1839.
I INCLOSE a Report which Captain Walker has made of the occur
rences during the progress of the Ottoman fleet from the Dardanelles to
Alexandria. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 321.
Captain Walker to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Therapia, August 4, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to state for your information, all the particulars
relative to the late extraordinary conduct of the Capudan Pasha, as well
as the movements of the Turkish fleet, from the time of its departure from
the Dardanelles until its arrival at Alexandria.
On the morning of the 4th of July, the Capudan Pasha received the
official notification of the death of Sultan Mahmoud, and the accession of
his son, upon which occasion, all the ships dressed with flags and fired a
royal salute; and in the afternoon of that day, the fleet, consisting of
eight ships of the line, twelve frigates, one corvette, four brigs, two
schooners, three fire-ships, and one steam-vessel, weighed and stood out
of the Dardanelles. As we had been for a long time under orders for the
coast of Syria, all supposed that to be our destination ; nor was I aware
that such was not the case, until our arrival in Besika Bay, when the
Capudan Pasha informed me, that the Sultan had been poisoned, and
four of the principal officers of his household beheaded; that this had been
done by the Russian party, who had assumed the Government ; and that
to avoid the fleet falling into the hands of Russia, he intended to cruise
outside the Dardanelles, so as to be ready to act with England and France.
On the following morning, the 5th, he weighed, and when off Tenedos, fell
in with Admiral Lalande, whose force consisted of two ships of the line,
and a brig; after the usual salutes had been exchanged, the French
Admiral, accompanied by the Prince de Joinville, came on board to visit
the Capudan Pasha. I was afterwards informed by him, that he had
communicated all to the French Admiral, who highly approved of his
plans, and that the Capudan Pasha intended to proceed to Rhodes. I then
requested him to allow me to send letters on board the " Vanguard," which
was in sight, so as your Excellency, as well as Admiral Sir Robert
Stopford, might be made acquainted with his intentions; but his reply
was, that the French Admiral had promised to communicate all parti
culars to your Lordship, as well as to the English Admiral ; and that he
was anxious that the " Vanguard" should remain with the fleet, as well as
the French brig which Admiral Lalande had ordered to accompany him.
Nothing of consequence occurred during our run down to Rhodes,
which we passed on the night of the 7th, except the departure of the Kiaja

403
Bey, on the 6th, in a corvette, who, I was informed, was sent to commu
nicate with Hafiz Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army.
On the 11th, when off Castel Nosso, we were joined by the French
steamer of war " Papin," having on board the Mousteshar of the fleet, who
was the bearer of the Capudan Pasha's commission under the new
Government, which was immediately read, in the presence of the Admirals
and crew of the flag-ship, upon which occasion all the Turkish ships
saluted, as well as the French brig of war ; soon after which both French
vessels parted company.
On the morning of the 12th, the Egyptian steamer of war, " Nile,"
joined us, having on board the Kiaja Bey, who, I have since ascertained,
was sent to Mehemet Ali, and not to Hafiz Pasha, as I had been informed.
He communicated with the Capudan Pasha, and in the afternoon, the fleet
made sail to the southward, accompanied by the Egyptian steamer; the
" Vanguard" having hoisted a Turkish flag, I was sent to her in a brig,
when Sir Thomas Fellowes informed me of his intention of joining Admiral
Sir Robert Stopford, who was off Cyprus. On the morning of the 13th,
the "Vanguard" parted company to the eastward, after having commu
nicated with the " Rhadamanthus," which was passing through the
Turkish fleet. So anxious was the Capudan Pasha to get to the south
ward, that he carried such a press of sail, as obliged him to leave behind
a line-of-battle ship and frigate, which were bad sailers; and the " Nile"
steamer, being sent to those ships, to order them to rendezvous off Alex
andria, was the first intimation I received as to the Capudan Pasha's
intention of proceeding there. When I spoke to him on the subject, he
told me that he had received by the Kiaja Bey, a letter from Mehemet
Ali, who offered to put the Egyptian fleet under his command ; but before
doing so he wished to consult with him as to the best steps to be taken
for the good of the Turkish Empire, and that he (the Capudan Pasha)
meant to proceed off Alexandria for that purpose. On the following day,
the 14th, we fell in with the Egyptian fleet, consisting of eleven ships of
the line, three frigates, and two brigs, which were cruising about ten
miles off Alexandria, and so ignorant were the Admirals and Captains of
the change in the Capudan Pasha's plans, that many of the ships cleared
for action; and my firm belief is, that not more than four officers belonging
to the fleet, were aware of his intention of joining Mehemet Ali. No
salutes were exchanged, but on the morning of the 15th, when the
Capudan Pasha landed at Alexandria, from the steamer " Nile," all the
forts saluted, which was returned by the Turkish flag-ship, after which
both fleets stood off for the night.
On the 16th, the Turkish fleet anchored off the western entrance of
Alexandria, about six miles from the town, when all the Admirals and
Captains went on shore to wait upon Mehemet Ali. I also landed, and did
not again return to the fleet; and on the 17th, when the Capudan Pasha
proposed to me to cruise with the united fleets, I declined, stating as a
reason, that I was not authorized, by the British Government, to serve
under Mehemet Ali ; to this he replied, that it was still the Sultan's fleet,
but united with the Egyptian for the good of the Turkish Empire.
On the 18th, when the "Confiance" arrived, I informed the Capudan
Pasha of my intention of proceeding to Constantinople. He then asked
me if it were not possible to remain, and on my replying that I could not,
he appeared much hurt.
I have now, my Lord, stated, to the best of my recollection, all the
particulars respecting this extraordinary affair ; and have only to add,
that I left Alexandria on the 20th, in the "Confiance," and arrived here
on the 2nd of August. Ihave, &c.,
(Signed) B. W. WALKER, R.N.

3 F 2

404

No. 322.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received September 27.)
(Extract.) Therapia, September 6, 1839.
THE party of Mehemet Ali spread abroad the notion, that the Mus
sulman interest would be sacrificed by the Great Powers, and therefore
that an arrangement should be made without their intervention between
the Sultan and the Pasha. Lord Beauvale's declaration at Vienna, of
July 27th, offered the best refutation of the assertions of the party. I
resolved, therefore, to make the declaration public ; and, I am happy to
say, that, so far as I can judge of the matter, the effect has been very
good.

No. 323.
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.
Sir, Foreign Office, September 28, 1839.
I HAD yesterday another conversation with Count Sebastiani on Turkish
Affairs. The Count showed me, by order of his Government, the copy of a
despatch which has recently been addressed by the French Government to
Count St. Aulaire.
This despatch states, that the French Government has at last settled its
opinion on the Turkish Question, and has determined the plan of arrangement
between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which it wishes to suggest for the con
sideration of the Allies. This plan, however, it proposes as a thing to be
discussed, and subject to modification.
The plan is, that Mehemet Ali should evacuate the small district of
Adana, making his frontiers the mountain range called Amanus ; and that
Candia should be held by Mehemet for his life only ; but that the Sultan
should give him an hereditary tenure in all the other territories which he. now
occupies. With respect to Candia, the French Government suggests that at
the death of Mehemet Ali, one of his younger sons might be made hereditary
Pasha of that island.
The arguments by which this scheme is supported are, that Mehemet is
becoming very strong, and that might is entitled to respect, as well as right;
that immediate peace in the Levant is absolutely necessary, and that the only
way of obtaining it is to give to Mehemet all, or nearly all, he asks. That
this arrangement would greatly strengthen the Sultan, because Mehemet Ali,
if he were satisfied with his condition, would always be ready to defend the
Sultan against foreign attack. That this scheme would leave the Sultan all
that is really essential to him, that is to say, nominal sovereignty and acknow
ledged rights.
That, moreover, no power founded upon the life of a man so old as
Mehemet, and who has not in his favour the religious veneration which binds
the Mussulmans to the Sultan, could be very lasting; and that at some time
or other the Sultan might do in Syria and Egypt that which the late Sultan
did recently at Tripoli, namely, send an expedition and resume possession of
the country. When I had read the despatch, I said to Count Sebastiani that as we
have always spoken to each other without reserve, I could not refrain from
observing, that the course taken of late upon this Turkish Question by the
French Government, is to me perfectly incomprehensible; that it is at variance
with the true interests of Fiance, and full of inconsistencies.
Perhaps, I said, he would tell me, that the French Government is as
good a judge as I can be, of what are the true interests of France, and upon
that point, therefore, I would say no more. But I reminded him that France
having started by a spontaneous declaration that she was determined to employ
all her means of action to maintain the integrity and independence of the
Turkish Empire, she now proposes to dismember that Empire, and by cutting

405
off a large portion of it, thus necessarily to throw the Sovereign, who is to rule
the remainder, into the arms of foreign Powers for support and protection.
Count Sebastiani denied that the proposed arrangement would be a dismem
berment, because the rights of sovereignty would be reserved for the Sultan ;
and he said, that, as a security against Mehemet Ali's throwing off his alle
giance, it might be stipulated by treaty, that the Five Powers should prevent
Mehemet and his successors from ever declaring themselves independent. I
said, that I called that arrangement a dismemberment of an Empire which
divides its resources, military and pecuniary, into two parts, to be swayed
and applied by two different and separate authorities and wills, of which one
will and authority might choose to apply its portionof those resources hostiiely
against the other: and that as to the stipulation which he suggested, I could
not imagine, that either the Sultan could trust to it, or that Mehemet Ali
would be restrained by it ; because neither of them could think it likely that
the Five Powers would be disposed to interfere by force of arms, some
years hence, to prevent Mehemet from casting off his nominal subjection, if
those Powers should pronounce the employment of force against Mehemet
Ali to be impossible now.
I observed, that the effect of such an arrangement would be to establish
in the' heart of the Turkish Empire a power which would not have advanced
so far if it had not been ambitious, and which being ambitious would neces
sarily wish to advance further; for I could not acquiesce in the doctrine of the
French despatch, that the best means of restraining ambition is to yield all to
its demands ; on the contrary, the demands of ambition increase in proportion
as they are gratified. But the result would of course be, that the Sultan
would be swayed by two passions: the fear of further attack, and the desire
to get back what he had lost; and he would cling to that Power which was
most likely. to afford him protection against future dangers, or assistance to
recover his legitimate authority. That this Power would be Russia; and that
thus France, which professes to be actuated by the strongest wish to rescue
the Sultan from the exclusive influence of Russia, is, in fact, proposing an
arrangement by which that influence would be permanently riveted.
But I said that what is remarkable in this scheme is, that emanating
from a Cabinet which has recently professed its determination to uphold the
Ottoman Empire under its present dynasty, the scheme is all in favour of
Mehemet Ali, and all against the Sultan. For, in fact, the proposal substan
tially is, that the Sultan shall give to Mehemet an hereditary tenure in Egypt,
Syria, and Arabia, and in all that Mehemet either now has, or means here
after to acquire, upon the single condition that Mehemet shall now evacuate
the little district of Adana, which might be covered by a pocket-handkerchief;
and that some contingent arrangement, to take place at Mehemet's death,
should be made about Candia. But what earthly motive could the Sultan
have for agreeing to such an arrangement ? and would it not be infinitely better
for the Sultan that things should remain as they have been since the arrange
ment of Kutaya, and that the Porte should take the chance of future events ?
I said that, if I was the adviser of the Sultan/ I should certainly recommend
him to decline such an arrangement as this.
Count Sebastiani said, that this plan was by no means one upon which
France insists ; and that he thought his Government would be equally well
content with the plan which he had mentioned to me on a former occasion,
and by which the hereditary Government of Mehemet would be bounded to
the north by a line drawn across Syria between Damascus and Beyrout.
To that I restated the objections which I had mentioned to him before,
namely, that it would be an imperfect arrangement ; that it would place the
two parties in contact without any natural frontiers interposed between them ;
and that it would leave Mehemet in possession of the Holy Cities, which the
French Government had specially mentioned as places which ought to be
restored to the direct rule of the Sultan ; and that if coercion is to be em
ployed, it is better to employ it to effect a complete, instead of an incomplete,
settlement. We then discussed at length the proposals made by Baron Brunnow, and
the course which it would be expedient for England and Fiance to take there
upon, and Count Sebastiani dwelt upon the circumstance that the convention
which Baron Brunnow had proposed, would be limited to the present occasion,

ox

406 v
and would therefore afford no security for the future. To this I replied, that
my notion was, that upon that convention should be grafted stipulations by
which the Five Powers should engage for a limited period, say ten years to
come, to concur in upholding and protecting the Turkish Empire.
The Count caught eagerly at that suggestion ; said that such a plan
would be entirely in conformity with his views; that he should wish such a
convention to be for twenty years ; that he would immediately write to bis
Government to suggest the idea to them, and that he thought that it might
make the whole difference in their view of the matter. He said that he had
written to Paris the week preceding, to report the substance of Baron Brunnovv's
communications, and that he expected an unfavourable answer; but that we
must not be discouraged by that, but must wait to hear the reply to the com
munication which he would now make to his Government in consequence of
the conversation we had had together. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 324.
Count Sebastiani to Viscount Palmerston.
Mon cher Vicomte, Londres, le 28 Septembre, 1839.
VOUS trouverez ci-jointe une depeche que je viens de recevoir, et que
j'ai ordre de vous communiquer: c'est la reponse a celle que j'avais ecrite
pour donner a mon Gouvernement connaissance des propositions de la Russie.
Elle est positive dans la resolution que la France a prise de ne pas y acceder.
Je voudrais partager l'espoir qu'elle exprime encore de voir TAngleterre
revenir a son premier et veritable Allie. Tout a vous,
(Signe) SEBASTIANI.
(Translation.)
Count Se'bastiani to Viscount Palmerston.
My dear Viscount, London, September 28, 1839.
YOU will find annexed a despatch which I have just received, and which I
am directed to communicate to you: it is the answer to that which I wrote to
make known to my Government the propositions of Russia. It is positive
as to the resolution which France has taken not to agree to those propositions.
I would fain participate in the hope therein expressed of again seeing England
return to her first and true Ally. Ever yours,
(Signed) SEBASTIANI.

Inclosure in No. 324.
The Due de Dalmatie to Count Se'bastiani.
Monsieur le Comte, Paris, le 26 Septembre, 1839.
J'AI recu les depeches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'ecrire. Les
craintes que nous avions concues sur le succes de la tactique employee par
le Cabinet de St. Petersbourg pour separer TAngleterre et la France, et
conquerir ainsi dans la Question d'Orient des auxiliaires bien inattendus,
semblent sur le point d'etre justifiees par I'evenement. Ce n'est pas sans un
etonnement douloureux que nous voyons un homme aussi eclaire que Lord
Palmerston, accueillir avec tant de complaisance un projet tel que celui qui lui
a ete presente par M. de Brunnoff: un projet qui, au prix d'une vaine et
illusoire concession de principe annuliee immediatement en fait par Facte

407
meme qui est cense la consacrer, tend a donner une sanction Europeenne 1
la position exceptionnelle que la Russie s'arroge depuis trop longtems a
Constantinople. Accepter, consigner clans une convention formelle la
promesse de ne pas renouvelor le Traite d'Unkiar Skelessi, contre lequel la
France et PAngleterre ont proteste si expressement il y a six ans, ce serait
en quelque sorte annuller cette protestation, et reconnaitre la validite de
Facte contre lequel elle etait diiigee. Proclamer dans cette meme convention
le principe de la cloture des deux detroits, si solemnellement consacre par le
tems, par le consentement unanime des nations, et merne par les engage-
mens ecrils, ce ne serait pas lui donner une force nouvelle, ce serait bien
plutot l'affaiblir, en la classant au nombre de ces stipulations accidentelles
que les circonstances amenent et qu'elles peuvent emporter. Ce qu'il faut
ace principe, incessamment menace par l'ambition d'une grande Puissance,
ce sont des garanties qui en assurent Pinviolabilite, ou du moins qui assuient
que lors qu'il sera absolument necessaire d'y deroger, cette derogation ne
pourra compromettre les grands inteiets qu'il etait destine a. proteger. Nous
n'avons cesse de le repeter : de telles garanties ne peuvent resulter que de
l'admission simultanee des forces de toutes les Cours Alliees dans les eaux
de Constantinople. C'est la le but auquel nous nous etions efforces d'arriver,
et auquel, un moment, PAngleterre et l'Autriche avaient paru tendre avec
nous. Au lieu de cela, que nous propose-t-on ? Precisement ce que nous
repoussions tous d'abord, ce que la France continue a repousser comme ie
triomphe complet de la politique du Cabinet de St. Petersbourg qui n'a
jamais demande autre chose: on veut que les forces Russes seules penetrent
dans le Bosphore, tandisque celles de la France et de PAngleterre s'eioigne-
raient des Dardanelles pour aller menacer le Pacha d'Egypte; et ce qui est
plus etrange, on pretend nous faire croire que Pexclusion dont nous serions
ainsi Pobjets cesserait d'avoir pour nous un caractere off'ensant par cela seul
que nous y aurions donne notre consentement. Certes, en exigeant cette
exclusion, la Russie revele sa pensee; si elle n'avait d'autre desir que
de mettre fin aux embarras du moment, si, satisfaite de Pinfluence
naturelle que sa situation lui donuera toujours dans l'Empire Ottoman, die
n'aspirait pas a s'y creer peu-a-peu des droits particuliers au detriment de
toutes les autres Puissances, il est impossible de concevoir d'ou pourrait
naitre la repugnance a voir Hotter les pavilions des Cours Alliees k cote du
sien sous les murs de Constantinople. Le Traite meme d'Unkiar Skelessi
n'y mettrait pas d'obstacle. Qu'elle y consente, et la Question d'Orient sera
degagee de sa plus serieuse difficulte. Mais telle n'est pas sa pensee. Elle
veut, je l'ai deja dit, au moyen d'un precedent etabli d'un consentement
commun, amener l'Europe a sanctiouner la position exceptionnelle qu'elle a
d'abord essaye de se creer sans la participation des autres Cours. Ce qu'on
lui concederait aujourd'hui en fait, elle le reclamerait plus tard comme un
droit, et nous serions certainement bien plus mal places pour lui refuser, dans
des conjonctures analogues, Pespece de privilege dont nous aurions une fois
reconnu en sa faveur la convenance et la necessite. II y a plus: ce refus
deviendrait presque impossible, parceque apres un tel precedent, il prendrait
le caractere d'un caprice mal veil lant. Nous ne pouvons done, M. le
Comte, donner notre assentiment aux propositions de M. de Brunnoff.
Jamais, de notre aveu, une eseadre de guerre etrangere ne paraitra devant
Constantinople, sans que la notre ne s'y montre aussi. C'est a cette seule
condition que nous pouvons autoriser l'infraction du principe de la cloture des
detroits, et toute autre combinaison rencontrerait, dans I'opinion energique et
unanime de la France, des obstacles qui ne permettraient pas au Gouverne
ment du Roi de s'y associer, lors-meme qu'il ne partagerait pas, comme il
la partage, en effet, cette repugnance nationale si vive et si profonde.
Veuillez, M.'. le Comte, donner lecture de cette depeche a Lord
Palmerston. Le Cabinet de Londres n'ayant pas encore pris de resolution
definitive sur la grave question qui y est traitee, nous aimons a croire
que de plus mures reflexions lui feront repousser les propositions de la
Russie. En tout cas, la determination du Gouvernement du Roi est
irrevocable. Quelles que soient les consequences d'un deplorable dissenti-
ment, diit-il avoir pour effet Paccomplissement du projet favori de la Russie,
celui de nous isuler de nos Allies, ce n'est pas nous qui en aurons encouru

408
la responsabilite. Nous resterons sur notre terrain. Ce ne sera pas notre
faute si nous n'y retrouvons plus ceux qui s'y etaient d'abord places a cdte de
nous. Le dernier paquebot de l'Orient ne nous a apporte aucune information
nouvelle de quelque gravite, mais celles qui me sont parvenues confirment de
plus en plus I'opinion que j'ai depuis longtems exprimee sur la ferme volonte
de Mehemet Ali, de repousser par tous les moyens les conditions trop
rigoureuses qu'on voudrait lui imposer. Ce qui n'est pas moins certain, c'est
le nombre et la puissance des adherens qu'il compte dans toutes les parties
de l'Empire Ottoman. II ne faut peut-etre qu'un moment pour l'embraser
tout entier et pour precipiter l'Europe elle-meme dans de terribles ebranle-
mens. C'est la le danger, Pimmense danger que nous redoutons, et dont
la prevision dirige toutes nos demarches. Puissent les autres Gouvernemens
Papercevoir enfin comme nous. Agreez, &c,
(Signe) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.
(Translation.)
The Due de Dalmatie to Count Sebastiani.
Monseiur le Comte, Paris, September 26, 1839.
I HAVE received the despatches you have done me honour to write to me.
The fears we entertained of the success of the tactics employed by the Cabinet of
St. Petersburgh for separating England and France, and thus acquiring unex
pected auxiliaries upon the Eastern Question, seem upon the point of being
justified by the event. It is not without feelings of painful astonishment that
we perceive a man of such enlightened judgment as Lord Palmerston entertain
with so much complacency a project like the one proposed to him by M. de
Brunnow; a project which, at the price of an idle and illusory concession of
principle to be in fact immediately annulled by the very act which is supposed to
establish it, tends to give an European sanction to the distinctive position which
Russia has for too long a period arrogated to herself at Constantinople. To
accept, and to record in a formal Convention, the promise not to renew the
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, against which Treaty France and England, six years
ago, so strongly protested, would be in some measure to annul that protest, and to
recognize the validity of the Act against which it was directed. To proclaim in
that same Convention the principle of closing the two straits, a principle so
solemnly sanctioned by time, by the unanimous consent of nations, and even by
written engagements, would not be to add new force to it, but rather to weaken
it, by bringing it within that class of accidental stipulations which circum
stances produce, and which circumstances may destroy. What this principle
requires, threatened as it continually is by the ambition of one great Power, is,
that guarantees should be given which will ensure its inviolability, or which
will, at any rate, provide that, whenever it shall become absolutely necessary to
deviate from that principle, such deviation shall not compromise the great
interests which the principle was designed to protect. We have never ceased to
repeat the fact: such guarantees can only result from the simultaneous admission
of the Forces of all the Allied Courts into the waters of Constantinople. That
is the end at which we have used all our endeavours to arrive, and to which, at
one time, England and Austria appeared to be going along with us. Instead of
that, what do they propose to us? Precisely what we all rejected at first ; what
France continues to reject as being the complete triumph of the policy of the
Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, which has never sought for anything else : it is
desired that the Russian forces should alone penetrate into the Bosphorus, whilst
those of France and England should remove from the Dardanelles to go and
menace the Pasha of Egypt ; and what is still more strange, they wish to make
us believe, that the exclusion of which we should thus be the objects, would cease
to bear the character of being offensive to us, merely because we should have
given our consent to it. Certainly, in requiring such an exclusion, Russia reveals
ber intentions: if she had no other desire than that of putting an end to the
present difficulties ; if, satisfied with the natural influence which her situation

409
will always give her in the Ottoman Empire, she did not aspire to create for
herself there, by degrees, exclusive rights to the detriment of all the other
Powers, ii is impossible to conceive whence could arise the repugnance to seeing
the flags of the Allied Courts floating side by side with her own under the walls
of Constantinople. Even the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would present no obstacle
to that. Let her consent to that, and the Eastern Question will be disembar
rassed of its most serious difficulty. But such is not her wish. She wishes, as
I have already observed, by means of a precedent established by common consent,
to bring Europe to sanction the distinctive position which she has from the first
tried to create for herself without the participation of the other Courts. What
at the present time would be conceded to her in fact, she would afterwards de
mand as a right ; and we should certainly be in a much worse situation, for
refusing to her, in analogous circumstances, a description of privilege, the expe
diency and necessity for which we had once admitted in her favour. Nay, more ;
that refusal would become almost impossible, because, after such a precedent, it
would assume the character of malevolent caprice. We cannot, then, M. le
Comte, give our assent to the propositions of M. de Brunnow. Never, with our
consent, shall a foreign squadron of war appear before Constantinople, unless
ours appears there also. It is on this condition alone that we can authorize
the infringement of the principle of the closing of the Straits ; and every other
arrangement would meet with obstacles in the powerful and unanimous opinion
of France, which would not allow the King's Government to lend itself thereto,
even if it did not partake, as in fact it does, of that national repugnance which
is so strong and so deep.
Be so good, M. le Comte, as to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston.
The Cabinet of London having not yet come to any final determination on the
important question which is treated herein, we are inclined to think that more
mature reflection will cause it to reject the propositions of Russia. At all events,
the determination of the King's Government is irrevocable. Whatever may be
the consequences of a deplorable difference of opinion, should it effect the
accomplishment of the favourite project of Russia, that of separating us from
our Allies, we shall not have incurred the responsibility of it. We will keep
our ground. It will not be our fault if we no longer find there those who at
first placed themselves side by side with us.
The last packet from the East has brought us no new intelligence of any
importance ; but that which has reached me, confirms more and more the opinion
which 1 have long expressed, of the firm determination of Mehemet Ali, to
repel by all possible means the too rigoious conditions which it might be wished
to impose upon him. What is no less certain, is the number and strength of the
adherents whom he reckons in all parts of the Ottoman Empire. A moment per
haps may suffice to set the whole of it in a blaze, and to precipitate Europe itself
into dreadful commotions. There is the danger, the immense danger, which we
dread, and the anticipation of which directs all our movements. Would that the
other Governments may at length view it as we do.
Accept, &c,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 325.
Count Medem to Count Nesselrode. — (Communicated by Baron Brunnow.)
M. le Comte, Alexandrie, le -|-f AoUt, 1839.
LA situation des affaires n'a subi aucune modification depuis Pexpedilion
de mon dernier rapport. Le Pacha continue a observer la meme attitude,
a tenir le meme langage, et a persister, comme par le passe, dans ses preten
tions hors de mesure.
J'ai cm devoir, vu la face nouvelle que la Question Orientale vient de
prendre, par le fait de Pingerence des Cinq Grandes Puissances, m'ab-
stenir autant que possible, d'entrer dans de nouvelles discussions politiques
avec le Pacha. II me semble d'autant plus utile, M. le Comte,
3G

410
d'attendre les resolutions des Cabinets d'Europe avant de poursuivre nos
pourparlers avec Mehemet Ali, que I'etat de malaise et d'lrritabilite dans
lequel il se trouve, rendrait aujourd'hui toute argumentation aussi gratuite
qu'inefficace. Les dernieres nouvelles parvenues de Syrie sont toutes a la guerre.
Ibrahim Pacha y fait, dit-on, des preparatifs immenses, et s'approvisionne
comme s'il s'agissait tres-prochainement d'une expedition lointaine. II vient
d'ecrire a son pere pour lui demander l'autorisation eventuelle d'avancer avec
son armee, alldguant que l'approche de la saison rigoureuse ne lui permettait
pas de conserver sa position actuelle, et le mettait clans Pobligation, ou de
reculer, ou de se porter en avant. Mehemet Ali n'a point consenti a la
demande de son fils, mais il a dit hier a mon Collegue d'Autriche, " qu'il
attendrait encore un mois, et que si d'ici la les Grandes Cours n'auraient point
adhere a ses dernieres propositions, il ferait marcher son armee sur Konia."
Les emissaires que Mehemet Ali avait charge de missions secretes pour
les Pachas de Macedoine et deRoumeiie, n'ayant point obtenu la permission de
debarquer a Salonique, ont du renoncer a se rendre k leur destination, et sont
retournes depuis quelques jours a Alexandrie, avec le meme brick Egyptien
sur lequel ils s'etaient embarques.
Depuis quelque tems, des symptomes de mecontentement se sont
declares parmi les troupes de tene et la marine Turque stationnes dans cette
ville; la nostalgie, les diverses maladies auxquelies elles sont assujetties
depuis leur arrivee en Egypte, et plus encore la mauvaise qualite des alimens,
comme Pabsence d'un bon traitement medical, paraissent avoir contribue a
exasperer la soldatesque Ottomane. Je suis, &c,
(Signe) MEDEM.

(Translation.)
Count Medem to Count Nesselrode. — (Communicated by Baron Brunnow.)
M. le Comte, Alexandria, August -|-f, 1839.
THE situation of affairs has not undergone any change since I sent off my
last despatch. The Pasha continues to maintain the same attitude, to hold the
same language, and to persist, as hitherto, in his inordinate pretensions.
Considering the new aspect that the Eastern Question has assumed in conse
quence of the interference of the Five Great Powers, I have thought it my duty
to abstain, as much as possible, from entering into fresh political discussions with
the Pasha. It appears to me the more advantageous, M. le Comte, to wait for
the determination of the Cabinets of Europe before we continue our interviews
with Mehemet Ali, because the state of indisposition and irritability in which he
is, would at present render all discussion as gratuitous as it would be ineffectual.
The last news from Syria are all warlike. They say that Ibrahim Pasha is
making immense preparations there, and is laying in provisions, as if tliere was a
question of a distant expedition very soon. He has recently written to his father
to ask him to authorize him eventually to advance with his Army, alleging that
the approach of severe weather did not allow him to continue in his present
position, and obliged him either to retreat or to advance. Mehemet Ali has not
aseented to the demand of his son ; but he said yesterday to my Austrian Col
league, — "That he would wait another month; and that if within that time
the Great Courts should not have acceded to his last proposals, he would cause
his Army to march upon Koniah."
The emissaries whom Mehemet Ali had charged with secret missions for the
Pashas of Macedonia and Roumelia not having obtained permission to disembark
at Salonica, have been obliged to give up proceeding to their destination, and
came back a faw days ago to Alexandria on board the same Egyptian brig in
which they sailed.
Symptoms of discontent have for some time shown themselves amongst the
Turkish soldiers and sailors stationed in the town ; nostalgia, the different

411
diseases to which they have been subject since their arrival in Egypt, and what is
worse, the bad quality of their provisions, as well as the want of good medical
treatment, appear to have contributed to exasperate the Ottoman soldiery.
I am, &c,
(Signed) MEDEM.

No. 326.
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.
Sir, Foreign Office, October 3, 1839.
IN addition to Her Majesty's Commission and to the consular instruc
tions with which you are furnished, I inclose to you a letter which, by Her
Majesty's commands, I have addressed to the Viceroy of Egypt, announcing
your appointment.
You will deliver this letter to the Viceroy in your first audience.
I also inclose for your information a copy of the letter.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 327.
Viscount Palmerston to His Highness the Vizier Mehemet Ali Pasha,
Viceroy of Egypt.
Sir, Foreign Office, October 3, 1839.
THE Queen, my Sovereign, having thought fit to recall Colonel Campbell
from the situation which he has for some time held as Her Majesty's Agent
and Consul-General in Egypt; and Her Majesty being desirous to convince
your Highness of the personal respect and regard with which she is animated
towards your Highness, as well as of her desire to cement and strengthen the
friendship and good understanding which have so long subsisted between
Great Britain and the Ottoman Porte, and to cultivate and promote the rela
tions between this country and the territories of which the government has
been confided to your Highness, Her Majesty has commanded me to acquaint
your Highness, that she has selected Colonel Hodges, lately Her Majesty's
Consul-General in Servia, to be Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in
Colonel Hodges, who will deliver this letter to your Highness, is in every
way qualified, by his former services, to do justice to Her Majesty's choice,
by keeping up and improving the friendship which so happily subsists between
Great Britain and the Ottoman dominions ; and Her Majesty trusts that your
Highness will give your countenance and protection to Colonel Hodges, and
that you will afford to him every attention and assistance, to enable him to
execute the duties which Her Majesty has confided to him.
I entreat your Highness to be assured of the anxious desire which I feel
for the welfare and prosperity of your Highness; and I have the honour
t»0 DG 0£C (Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 328.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston, — (Received October 4.)
(Extract.) Therapia, September 10, 1839.
I PAID a visit to Rechid Pasha this morning, to congratulate him on
his return, and we had a long conversation. He told me, that Marshal Soult
had expressed to him his desire to co-operate in all things for the good of the
Sultan, and he seemed to think, that the support apparently given to
3 G 2

412
Mehemet Ali springs from the newspapers and the dissatisfied parties, and
not from the Ministers. He spoke strongly against leaving Syria in the
power of Mehemet Ali, or of Ibrahim, upon any terms, or under any modifica
tion of title, saying, that it would amount to a partition of the Empire and
bring on the destruction of the reigning dynasty. He approved of what
we have done here, and of the Sublime Porte remaining entirely passive
until the questions in doubt should be cleared up by the Great Powers.
He expressed his entire confidence in the goodwill and friendship of
England, and was anxious to learn if I had any intelligence respecting the
measures determined upon by the British and French Governments. He
asked if the fleets were to go before Alexandria, and what they were to do;
and if it were not true, that the British Government had proposed to force
Mehemet Ali to surrender the Ottoman fleet. I replied, that I had not
received information on these points, but expected it immediately. He
said, he wanted the British Government to do some act that would confirm
what he had stated to be, "the kind intentions of that Government;" for
many persons endeavoured to persuade the Porte and the world, that England
would do nothing, whatever England might say ; and also to establish the
belief, that France and England disagreed. He said, that we had done
right to support the Grand Vizier; that to have permitted Mehemet Ali to
remove him from his post would have been to abandon the rights of the
Sultan, and establish a system of Government wholly dependent on Mehemet
Ali. He- said, there were no appearances of any disposition in the capital
that were at all alarming, but that there was no want of distribution of
money by Mehemet Ali, to procure creatures and their service.

No. 329.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 7.)
(Extract.) Paris, October 4, 1839.
1 HAD the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatches to the 1st
of October. With respect to your Lordship's interview with General
Sebastiani, I can only say, with great regret, that he neither holds the
language nor speaks in the tone of the Government here.
General Sebastiani fiist proposes to your Lordship, that the boundary
line of the Egyptian Power should be drawn from Beyrout to Damascus,
and declares, that the French Government will aid by force, if necessary, to
compel the Viceroy to submit to these terms; a week afterwards he proposes
in the name of his Government, that Mehemet Ali's sway should extend as
far as the Amanus (that part of the ridge of Mount Taurus which runs from the
Bay of Issus to the Euphrates), making no mention of the employment of
means of coercion to enforce even the small concessions to which Mehemet
Ali would thus be obliged to submit. Finally, he says, that his Government
would as soon agree to one plan as the other, while the difference between
the two plans is so great, that if that Government has any opinion at all, it
must be in favour of one plan or the other, and cannot be equally in favour
of both. Indeed, I am sure that at this moment it would not consent to
General Sebastiani's original proposition.
I venture to observe, therefore, that he seems either to be uninformed of
the views of his Government, or not quite accurately to represent them, or to
have instructions to hold a sort of language which, making everything uncer
tain and contradictory, keeps the whole question in a state of indecision and
suspense, which the French Cabinet, embarrassed by contending difficulties,
may possibly feel disposed to prolong. At the same time, the General is per
fectly right in staling that, though the French Government has expressed an
opinion, that opinion is not to be considered peremptory or conclusive ; indeed
the time has not yet arrived at which any opinion expressed by the French
Cabinet can be so considered. For my own part, I mentioned to your Lordship
in my despatch of September 27, that Marshal Soult having first stated to
Count Medem and myself that he was in favour of the immediate restoration of

413
Candia to the Sultan, did, but a few days afterwards, (in his recent declara
tion,) propose that the surrender of this valuable island should not take place
till the period of Mehemet's death.
I have no doubt that the French Government is inclined to join in anv
proposition which it thinks Mehemet Ali will consent to, and to take part in
none to which it believes it will be necessary to force the Pasha's compliance.
Thus, the point of view in which the French Government will regard
any conditions to be proposed to Mehemet Ali, is evident and unchangeable,
while its opinion in regard to those conditions is as yet doubtful and liable
to alteration. For Mehemet Ali, under some circumstances, would consent
to what, under others he would refuse; and there is, consequently, in the
French Counsels a mixture of positiveness and of vagueness ; positiveness
as to what will not be done, vagueness as to what may, which your Lordship
will easily understand.
No decision, therefore, is to be expected from this Government as the
result of its own opinions; those opinions depending on the effect of a
variety of external causes by which they are to be determined. It is
principally by the course which the other Governments pursue, by the
concert between themselves which they may establish, that the policy of
France will be guided ; and it is only when there are decision and certainty
elsewhere, that anything like certainty or decision is to be expected
here. Should it be possible for the other Governments to come to any clear
understanding, confining the pretensions of Mehemet Ali, and providing the
means for carrying such understanding into effect, then the French Govern
ment, disliking the isolated state in which by its refusal to join in any general
arrangement it would be placed, and considering also that measures of coercion
would not be necessary, if Mehemet Ali saw the impossibility of resisting such
measures, might consider the question differently from at present.
At all events, 1 feel, my Lord, that I cannot too distinctly state that the
other Cabinets must form their decision in order to obtain a decision from the
French Cabinet, and that they must not wait for a decision from the French
Cabinet in order to form their own.
In this conviction, I feel sure, rests the solution of the present diffi
culties, and the chance of bringing them to a favourable termination.
The project proposed by M. de Brunnow of assigning to Russia, in any
system of warlike co-operation, the protection of Constantinople, was certain
at first to be discountenanced. But notwithstanding that the language
still held on this subject is most adverse to admitting the Russians under
any circumstances into the Bosphorus, I do not consider that the repug
nance expressed in this matter is insurmountable. Here again, the con
duct of the French Government will ultimately be guided by its opinion
as to whether Mehemet will, or will not, resist the conditions proposed to
him. If he do not resist such conditions, the presence of the Russian fleet
will not be necessary at Constantinople, and the French Government will
then find it easy to justify its sanction of an improbable occurrence for the
sake of establishing an important principle, such as no doubt would be
established by the expiration of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the under
standing that Russia would act in the affairs of the East in concert with the
other Great Powers of Europe.
In short, the more I consider the subject, the more readily I venture,
my Lord, to repeat my conviction, that the acquiescence of France in any
course which your Lordship would approve, must be sought for in the union
of the other Cabinets, and in the power thus obtained of acting upon the
fears of Mehemet Ali, and thereby removing the fears of France, which
shrinks, and will continue to shrink, from being brought into any active
measures of hostility against the Viceroy.
Were it advisable, when the other Governments were agreed upon their
course, to state to this Government what that course would be, and to observe,
that if France stood aloof, such course would be rigorously pursued; but that
if the French Government joined in the proceedings of the other Powers, some
definite concessions might be made with respect to the, opinions it had
expressed as to the limits to be assigned to the Viceroyalty of Egypt; this,
I think, by placing the French Government in a favourable position for

414
replying to those who would attack it for joining a confederation against the
Pasha, would be the most certain mode of obtaining its frank and prompt
accession to the common policy adopted; nor do I think, in such case, that the
concessions to be made need be great. As to the policy of making them at all,
however, I do not of course venture to express an opinion, and have only been
led to make the foregoing remark by the desire that your Lordship should be
as fully acquainted as possible with all the means which my situation suggests
to me, for preventing this Government from separating itself from the other
Powers of Europe, as well as with all the difficulties which lie in the way of
this object. I should now observe, that, when recently at Fontainebleau, with
Count Medem and Count Appony, the general result of our observations was,
that the French Government was mortified by the conduct of Russia, and
annoyed by that of England; that it had come to no positive resolution, but
that its present disposition, should Russia, Austria, and England, agree to
act according to the propositions of M. de Brunnow against Mehemet Ali.
was towards withdrawing its fleet from the Dardanelles, adopting a neutral
position, and trusting to accidents for the opportunity of interfering again
in such a manner as would be popular in France, and in that sense effec
tive. We none of us, however, considered the mind of the French Govern
ment wholly made up; and my own opinion is, that it imagines that Austria,
while favourable to the assistance proposed by Russia, will not be so positive
in restricting Mehemet Ali to Egypt as ourselves; that in this manner new
combinations and propositions may arise, or that things may even be left in
their present position. While such is the state of things, it is not France
which by any decided resolution, will give them a more positive aspect.
Marshal Soult spoke to me, on the morning of my departure, of the conversa
tion which your Lordship had had with General Sebastiani, respecting which
I had not, at that time, received any information. And his Excellency seemed
to consider, that your Lordship had made some proposition to General Sebas-
tiania for guaranteeing the existence of the Ottoman Empire for ten or twenty
years. To this the Marshal objected in the strongest terms, as seeming to
imply, that at the end of that period, the existence of the said Empire might
be called in question, thereby weakening, instead of strengthening, a Slate
which we have hitherto treated as permanently necessary to the balance of
power in Europe. On receiving your Lordship's despatch this morning, I
lost no time in calling on M. Desages, the Marshal being still at Fontainebleau,
and explaining to him what I conceive to be clearly your Lordship's meaning,
corresponding, as it does, with the views which the French Government have
at various former times expressed; namely, that it might be advisable to enter
into a general alliance for the maintenance and protection of the Porte during
that crisis of its reforms and regeneration, through which it has for the next
few years to struggle; thereby removing it from the sole protection of one
Power, and at the same time aiding the tranquil development of those resources
which only require to be properly cultivated and directed, in order once more
to form a strong and independent Empire.
M. Desages, looking at your Lordship's suggestion in this light, seemed
to consider it was one which the French Government would view with satis
faction, but could not express any decided opinion during the absence of
the Marshal. I should observe to your Lordship, that I have had, this evening, a con
versation with Count Appony, who seems generally to concur in the opinions
expressed in this despatch.

No. 330.
Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 7.)
My Lord, Jerusalem, August 19, 1839.
I THINK it is my duty to report to your Lordship, that this district
remains in a very disturbed state. The Sheik Abdrachman Aamar has made
so formidable an appearance in the neighbourhood of Hebron, that the

415
Governor and Sheik ofthat place 'have left, and are now in this city. Hebron
is therefore left without any magisterial authority, and all intercourse between
this and Hebron has for the past ten days been cut off.
I am assured that the above-named Sheik has at his command between
three and four thousand armed men, and that he had been endeavouring to
raise the Tahyr and Tarabin tribes (from the neighbourhood of Gaza) to'join
him, but had not been successful ; he has, however succeeded in disturbing
the south and more eastern districts.
Three men of his party, with their arms, were taken on the 15th instant,
and brought into town. And yesterday, one from a village two hours distant,
where there has been a disturbance, and an attempt to kill the Sheik. They
succeeded in killing one of his relatives, and then they all fled to the moun
tains to join Abdrachman Aamar, except the one who has been brought in.
The intercourse between one part of the country and another is much
impeded by the insecurity of the roads, which are everywhere infested by
the disaffected. Such, my Lord, is the feeling against the Egyptian Government in this
district, — chiefly owing to the conscriptions that have been made for the
army, — that it is difficult to conceive how the people are ever to be pacified
or governed under the present order of things.
The Syrians are a very different race of people from the Egyptians, and
the natural face of their country favours the determined spirit of opposition
which they evince towards the present Government, as they find shelter in,
the mountains, which are not easy of access to regular troops ; and as a last
resource, many fall back upon the Desert, rather than submit, depending on
a future day for a favourable opportunity to return.
A continuance of this state of things must soon depopulate the country
of its Mussulman inhabitants; and unless the Government establish some
system of colonization, or unless they afford encouragement either to Chris
tians or Jews, the laud will literally be left without inhabitants to cul
tivate il.
Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Jaffa informs me, that a French gun-brig,
came to an anchor off the town on the 10th instant at sunset. The French
Vice-Consul communicated with her commander, by going off in a boat. She
got under weigh at sunrise the following morning, and is reported to lave
come from Beyrout, and to have returned there, calling in at Caiffa.
I have, &c.
(Signed) WM, I. YOUNG.

No. 331.
Mr. Consult Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 7.)
My Lord, Damascus, August 30, 1839.
THE last despatch I had the honour of addressing your Lordship was
under the 2nd instant.
Since then the measures taken by his PTighness Ibrahim Pasha have
tended to reduce the insurgents infesting the country north of this city.
lsmael Bey, Governor of Aleppo, and the Caftan Bey arrived here, through
that line of country, with a force of about 6,000 troops. The Emir Gevvad,
the Mutuali insurgent, was constrained to place himself in the hands of the
Emir Bechir, who delivered him up to the local Government here, and he
was decapitated with seven other of his adherents.
Ali Agha Hazneh Kealibi, an influential personage of this city and a
favourite of Ibrahim Pasha, was put en his trial, convicted of conspiring
against the Government here, and was publicly beheaded.
His Excellency lsmael Bey and the Caftan Bey have continued their
march to the Haouran and Agloun districts. I hear the former is for the
present tolerably quiet; but the inhabitants of the latter, comprising 200
villages, have taken arms, and refuse to pay any kind of taxes, furnish slip-

416

plies, or acknowledge the Government. lsmael Bey, with his forces, have
consequently proceeded there to reduce them to order.
In the other parts of the Damascus district 1 hear that the state of the;
country is perfectly tranquil. (Signed) N. W. WERRY..

No. 332.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 7.)
My Lord, Aleppo, August 24, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's
information, copy of a despatch I addressed Viscount Ponsonby, under the
13th instant, and by which your Lordship will perceive, that nothing whatever
of any interest had transpired up to that period.
Since the date of the above despatch, I am unable to lay before your
Lordship anything further of any interest.
His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha and the Egyptian forces
continue on the frontiers as heretofore. Everything remains in statu quo, and
without any change or movement whatever on any point.
I am happy to be able to state to your Lordship, that this district is now
quite tranquil, and the roads are again beginning to become free from the
late malcontents that had infested them. I have, &c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure in No. 332.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Aleppo, August 13, 1839.
I HAD last the honour of addressing your Lordship on the 23rd ultimo,
and have now to inform you, that on the 28th of the same month, M. Caillier,
Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, returned from Marash, and starts to-morrow
for Latakia, for the purpose of proceeding by the Austrian steamer to
Smyrna. I learn that M. Caillier's mission to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha has
succeeded, his Highness having immediately issued orders for the army not
to advance beyond Marash, at which place he still remains, although prepara
tions have been made here for his reception.
The army continues to occupy the frontiers between Aintab and Marash,
and the force sent to take possession of Orfa has not advanced beyond that
point. His Excellency Solyman Pasha arrived here a short time ago from Aintab
and Nezib, for change of air, and will remain until further orders from his
Highness Ibrahim Pasha.
I am sorry it is still out of my power to give your Lordship any satisfactory
account of the two Englishmen, Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell, who, I hope
and trust, may have retreated with Hafiz Pasha after the battle.
M. Perier, Aide-de-camp of Solyman Pasha, has delivered into my
charge several papers found in the camp belonging to those gentlemen, which
I have deposited in the Cancelleria until claimed.
According to Mr. Vice-Consul Hays' last reports, his district, as well as
the mountains of Giaour-Dagh and those extending to the Defile of the Taurus,
are for the moment apparently tranquil.
I can also report the Aleppo district in the same state, since the departure
of his Excellency lsmael Bey, the Governor of this place, for the purpose of

417
chastising the rebels who had committed many robberies and murders in
different parts between Aleppo and Damascus. He is now disarming the
population in that route ; and the road to Latakia, which a short time since
was very dangerous, is now perfectly safe. I have, &c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

No. 333.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston — (Received October 10.)
(Extract.) Paris, October 7, 1839.
UNDERSTANDING that General Sebastiani had informed his Govern
ment that the propositions of M. de Brunnow were declined by Her Majesty's
Government, I called on Marshal Soult this morning, who informed me in
fact, that he had received a despatch from London, in which his Excellency
General Sebastiani stated, that Her Majesty's Government had informed M.
de Brunnow, that the propositions of which he had been the bearer, having
been considered inadmissible by the French Government, Her Majesty's
Government, in consideration of the relations subsisting between the two
countries, had not been able to accept them, but had made counter-propo
sitions to the Russian Government, which M. de Brunnow had accepted ad
referendum. I do not think that General Sebastiani had entered into any detailed
explanation as to what these propositions were; but I could gather from
Marshal Soult, that, as far as he understood them, there were points therein
from which he disagreed.
I need not say, that being myself as yet uninformed of what had taken
place, I only listened on this subject to Marshal Soult's observations.
The Marshal then informed me, that your Lordship had also, in the
conversation which General Sebastiani was reporting, alluded to the territorial
division between the Viceroy and the Sultan, and had admitted that Her
Majesty's Government might consent to the Pachalic of St. Jean d'Acre
being annexed to the hereditary government of Egypt, the fortress of St.
Jean d'Acre being excepted therefrom, and consigned to the guardianship of
the Porte. 1 said to the Marshal, that if such had been the conduct of Her Majesty's
Government, I trusted that the French Government seeing how desirous Her
Majesty's Government were of maintaining the alliance and good under
standing which had so long prevailed between the two countries, would
itself act in a similar spirit, and meet your Lordship by concessions similar
to those which you had made.
The Marshal said, that undoubtedly he was sensible to your Lordship's
conciliatory conduct, and that he should be most desirous to imitate it: hut
that with regard to St. Jean d'Acre, there was no power capable of taking
it from Mehemet Ali ; that, if even in the hands of a simple Pasha, it might
resist any army in Europe for three years; and that, therefore, he could not,
as he should explain to General Sebastiani, agree with your Lordship in this
particular. I then asked the Marshal if there were any other concessions different
from those opinions which the French Government had lately expressed, which
he might now be disposed to make ; and how he felt as to the proposition
which I understood had been suggested by General Sebastiani, for cutting
Syria into two divisions, and giving the lower division, which would be
formed by a line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout, to Mehemet Ali ?
He said, that he had never heard from General Sebastiani of such propo
sitions, and that he did not think Mehemet Ali would accede to them ; that
for his own part, he laid a great stress upon Adana; that Adana was most
important, as connected with the passes of the Taurus, &c. I then said, that
Adana had been previously mentioned, but that I now hoped that the French
Government, considering what your Lordship was reported to have said
with respect to the Pashalic of St. Jean d'Acre, departing thereby from
3 H

418
your original idea, would also, and of its own part, make some similar
concession. To this the Marshal only replied by saying, that he had sent his propo
sitions to Vienna, and that he must await the answer they would receive from
that Court. In continuing the conversation, the Marshal observed, that as to mea
sures of coercion, if the Cabinets were once agreed as to the extent of
territory to be allotted to the Viceroy, they would be agreed as to the mode
of enforcing their opinion, and that the Cabinet of France would go with the
other Cabinets in this part of the question: but that all considerations as to
measures of coercion must follow after a territorial arrangement. This
language arrives at the same result as before, since, if such a territo
rial arrangement as Mehemet Ali will agree to, be decided upon, all
measures of coercion fall to the ground; and nothing as yet has hap
pened to make me change my constant conviction, that France will not
agree to any territorial arrangement that Mehemet Ali is not likely to
accept. Here is the essence of the whole question. The Government, as a
Government, are not perhaps deeply concerned as to whether the Pasha of
Egypt would be content with little or much, and will not urge him to contend
for the latter rather than the former; but the nation having a decided
predilection for this personage, the Government will hardly dare to force his
acceptance of the little, if he persist in struggling for the much. But
Mehemet Ali, in what he contends for, will be guided by a consideration of
the means for depriving him of it; every thing that intimidates him, and
inclines him to yield, will incline the French Government towards imposing
upon him concessions which it would not begin by consenting to, or engaging
for. The Union of England with the other Powers, or with a portion of the
other Powers, will intimidate Mehemet Ali; and in the same proportion
encourage France, which waits for emitting any decided opinion until one of
the most important elements, out of which such opinion is to be formed, is
brought in a clear shape before it. Up to such time, this Government will
probably contend for conceding nearly all to Mehemet Ali, because it does not
know that Mehemet Ali will yield anything. And this is remarkable, that while
France has declared herself the partizan of Turkey, that basis of an arrange
ment which she has proposed, known of course to the papers, — as all things
here are known, — has been at once considered by them all, as favourable to the
very party against which the French began by entering the field. I send
your Lordship, on this ground, the " Courrier " of this morning, which is notless
worthy of notice, since it shows the editor knew of the decision of the
English Cabinet when his article was written. This casual information may
also be useful to your Lordship, as affording no light argument against the
propositions which, put forward to support the Ottoman Empire against the
Pasha, are taken up by all the Pasha's party, as favourable to him, and
unfavourable to the Ottoman Empire.
If I have made myself clear about the Question of Egypt, I shall have
explained to your Lordship my notion, that it is a question which, involving
the dislike of the French Government to being engaged in hostile measures
against Mehemet Ali, is to be dealt with by removing that apprehension.
Every thing which tends to awe the one party to submission, will tend to
strengthen the other as to the terms which it will join in exacting.
The interference of Russia, or rather her protection of the Porte, entered
so much into the Affairs of Egypt, that it always afforded an excuse for not
acting at Alexandria, by bringing forward the position of Constantino
ple. Independently of this, however, it was chiefly a question of amour-
propre. The French Government do not so much fear what would
really happen from a Russian force entering the Bosphorus, as what
would be said of it : And if I may venture to write upon this subject, I would
say that, were it desirable to frame any plan for engaging the co-operation
of Russia in a manner compatible with the co-operation of France, the chief
object to consider, would be the satisfaction of this Government as to the
form of the proceeding ; for as to the substance, they would be much less
difficult. Marshal Soult spoke to me again as to the idea of guaranteeing or pro
tecting the existence and independence of the Porte for a certain time

419
which he seemed to object to, as being less than the general guarantee or
protection we had already entered into. I stated to his Excellency the
manner in which I viewed his proposition as contained in my last despatch ;
but I did not insist upon the subject, as I concluded that an arrangement of
this kind would form part of the general propositions to which the Marshal
alluded, and which I should better understand when I saw them together.
The decision of Her Majesty's Government not to accept M.de Brunnow's
propositions, will have a favourable effect on the public opinion here, as to
the general relations between the countries ; but the effect it will have on the
Oriental Question itself remains to be seen, and will much depend on the
line which Austria takes in the present state of affairs.

No. 334.
Lord Beauvale io Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 12.)
My Lord, Vienna, September 21, 1839.
COUNT FIQUELMONT communicated to me a report from the
Austrian Consul at Alexandria, by which it appears, that Mehemet Ali has
given orders to Ibrahim Pasha to recommence hostilities, and occupy as much
of the Sultan's territories as his means will permit, unless peace should be
concluded within a given time. The Count proposed to me to join in
declaring to Mehemet Ali, that no advantages obtained by these means
would alter his situation, as they would not receive the sanction of the
Powers. I had no difficulty in agreeing to this, and requested him to give me a
copy of his instruction to the Internuncio, in order that there might be no
difference in our language. This document I transmitted to Lord Ponsonby,
with the request, that, after concert with his Colleagues, he would send the
necessary orders to Her Majesty's Consul at Alexandria. Of this paper
I inclose a copy. I have not failed upon this occasion to urge the adoption of
stronger measures, but find nobody to act with. The French Ambassador has
no powers, and is interdicted from doing anything against Mehemet Ali.
The Russian Ambassador will not even discuss the affair, his Court referring
everything to Constantinople. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 334.
Count Fiquelmont to Baron de Stiirmer.
M. le Baron, Vienne, le Septembre, 1839.
UN de vos rapports du 5 Septembre nous a donne des nouvelles
d'Alexandrie en date du 26 Aout, qui sont, comme vous le dites, M. le Baron,
d'une nature alarmante ; le rapport de M. Laurin annexe au votre, nous a
fait connaitre la resolution que paraissait vouloir prendre Mehemet Ali, de
faire occuper par son Armee de Syrie autant de terrain en Asie Mineure
qu'Ibrahim Pacha croirait pouvoir le faire. Le premier mobile de cette reso
lution a ete la representation que fit Ibrahim k son pere combien il lui serait
difficile, quand la mauvaise saison arriverait, de maintenir son armee con-
centree a Marache et dans les environs ; qu'il demandait done Pautorisa-
tion de s'etendre et de profiter de la disposition favorable de beaucoup de popu
lations qui lui envoyaient des deputations pour demander d'etre occupees par
des troupes Egyptiennes ; ce qui ne serait peut-etre veritablement qu'un
mouvement motive par la necessite de vivre, peut-etre employe par Mehemet
Ali comme un moyen d'en imposer a la Porte et de la forcer de souscrire a
Parrangement qu'il veut dieter. Ce calcul est naturel, nous pouvons done
Padmettre comme une chance qui va se presenter et que nous devons prendre
en consideration. 3H2

420
Si nous avions a disposer des forces Europeennes qui sont dans le Levant,
notre parti serait bientot pris ; nous assignerions les positions a prendre dans
un ordre naturel ; les roles alors seraient bien vite. changes. Mehemet Ali se
trouverait heureux d'accepter les conditions qu'on voudrait lui faire, car ce ne
sont pas les forces qui manquent pour Py forcer: mais les choses ne sont pas
aussi simplement placees ; et il n'y a pas unit6 de but pour toutes les Puis
sances, il n'y a done pas le concert qui serait necessaire pour atteindre celui
qui leur est commun. Ce n'est pas a vous, a qui cette absence de concert rend
la position si difficile, qu'il faut en dire les causes ; vous etes a la fois place
pres des causes et des effets ; le desir que nous avons c'est de venir au secours
des embarras de votre position, car ce serait aussi venir au secours de la
Porte. La plus grande des difficultes de la situation est celle que les embarras
qui se montrent a Constantinople ne peuvent disparaitre que par le concert
entre des points tres-eioignes les uns des autres ; il y faut done du tems, et la
Porte est presseed'en finir ; voila le danger, et le seul danger, car nos corres-
pondances nous donnent deja la certitude que l'initiative d'une sage et noble
moderation fera cesser des jalousies que des imprudences pourraient si facile-
ment rendre dangereuses pour tout le monde. II ne nous reste done plus
qu'un tems frfes-court a traverser, pour voir s'etablir un changement de
position decisif en faveur de la Porte. Dans une pareille situation, nous devons
desirer de voir eviter toutes les mesures qui, ne prouvant pas le concert le plus
intime, exciteraient Mehemet Ali, sans le contenir. II nous parait peu im
portant que I'armee d'Ibrahim occupe un district de plus ou de moins en Asie
Mineure ; cela ne changera ni ne deddera la question. Le seul danger serait
celui de le voir s'approcher assez pres de Constantinople pour y susciter des
troubles et pour y faire prendre aux forces Europeennes des positions qui, pour
defendre cette capitale, ameneraient par leur defaut de concert, des dangers
d'une autre nature. Nous le regretterions d'autant plus que, nous le repetons
a Votre Excellence, nous avons la certitude qu'une autre situation des choses
va resulter des communications qui ont lieu entre les Cabinets. Mais avant
que les instructions qu'ont recues les Representans des Puissances pres de la
Porte ne soient modifiees, et que des sentimens de confiance aient remplace
celui de la defiance, nous ne pouvons qu'en appeler a leur sagesse et les
conjurer d'eviter toutes les mesures extremes; c'est ce que nous vous prions
de faire si les evenemens devaient Pexiger. Nous persistons a croire qu'il
serait sage de ceder au vceu de la Porte elle-meme et de faire prendre aux
deux escadres une autre position que celle de rester en observation a Pentree
des Dardanelles. Nous croyons avec MM. les Amiraux, que faire paraitre les
escadres reunies devant Alexandrie sans que cette demonstration soit suivie
d'aucun effet, serait compromettant ; mais entre les deux positions, il en est
une troisieme intermediate qui donnerait aux escadres la possibilite d'agir
selon tous les evenemens qui pourraient arriver, ce serait les parages de Pile
de Rhodes, plus rapproches des c6tes de Syrie. Cette position agirait bien
plus sur Pesprit de Mehemet Ali, car tout ce qui peut menacer les communi
cations de l'Egypte avec son armee en Asie Mineure lui montrerait tousles
dangers de cette position trop avancee, et ferait bien plus d'effet que fappari
tion devant Alexandrie, qui,n'etant suivie d'aucun resultat, serait un triomphe
pour lui.
Mais ceci, M. le Baron, est une opinion et rien de plus, puisqu'elle reste
isolee. Nous devons done chercher une mesure qui pourrait obtenir Passenti-
ment et la co-operation de nos Allies. Les entretiens que nous avons eus
ici avec MM. les Ambassadeurs nous ont montre la seule chose que nous
puissions faire en attendant que de nouvelles instructions des Cours impriment
a notre marche un caractere plus decide.
Mehemet Ali est un homme qui a fait preuve de plus de sagacite qu'on
n'en trouve ordinairement en Orient; on peut done s'adresser a son intelligence
avec la certitude d'etre compris. Je vous prie done, M. le Baron, de vouloir
bien charger M. Laurin de lui parler de la maniere suivante de sa situation.
Les f'autes de la Porte et Phabilete qu'il a su mettre a en profiter, lui ont
donne des forces superieures ; il peut en abuser ; il peut dans le moment
actuel enlever encore a la Porte de plus grands territoires ; personne n'est la
pour s'y opposer : il peut garder la flotte Ottomane ; les Allies du Sultan

421
n'emploieront pas la force pour la reprendre, car sa destruction serait la suite
probable du conflit.
Mehemet Ali peut done s'il le veut se complaire dans la conviction etdans
l'abus de la puissance materielle ; les Puissances ne feront rien pour la com-
battre. L'Europe possede une arme plus forte contre Mehemet Ali, c'est,
comme nous Pavons dit ailleurs, celle de son avenir. Que veut-il en effet? il
ne cesse de repeter, que tout ce qu'il fait n'a d'autre but que celui de fonder
l'avenir de sa famille. Croit-il peut-etre que la haine personnelle qui l'anime
contre Hosreff Pacha soit une bonne base a donner a l'etablissement de sa
famille ? A-t-il jamais vu un sentiment de cette nature fonder quelque chose
de durable? Plus il a fait d'efforts pour rapprocher l'Egypte de l'Europe, par
son administration, par les arts et par le commerce ; plus il a du apprendre,
et mieux il comprendra, que la sanction de l'Europe est necessaire a Pexistence
reguliere et a la duree d'une position politique quelconque ; qu'il ne se trompe
done pas sur la nature de la superiorite de ses forces, elles ne suffisent pas
pour lui donner l'avenir qu'il veut fonder. Si m6me le Sultan lui accordait
toutes les concessions qu'il demande, elles ne suffiraient pas pour consolider
sa position, car l'Europe ne la sanctionnerait pas. II y a un siecle que
Mehemet Ali, Chef de Musulmans revokes, aurait pu fonder un nouvel Empire;
il aurait existe dans cet etat de separation et d'isolement qui rendait alors
l'Europe pen attentive a des evenemens de cette nature ; Mehemet Ali lui-
meme a voue sa vie a l'etablissement d'un autre ordre de choses ; il a besoin,
sous peine de passer comme un meteore, de la sanction de l'Europe, et
l'Europe ne sanctionnera que cequi laissera intact le principe de laSouverainete
du Sultan. Si Mehemet Ali fonde Pespoir du succes de sa resistance sur la
conviction qu'il parait avoir de la difficulte qu'auront les Puissances d'adopter
de concert des mesures actives contre lui, il doit sen tir qu'elles se mettraient
facilement d'accord pour refuser leur sanction a un ordre de choses qu'elles
trouveraient trop onereux pour la Porte: une mesure negative n'est jamais
difficile a prendre.
C'est a rendre cette position intelligible a Mehemet Ali que M. Laurin
doit mettre tous ses soins ; nous ne doutons pas que les Agens des Puissances
a Alexandrie ne soient autorises a lui tenir le meme langage.
Le but des Puissances apres des evenemens aussi desastreux que ceux qui
ont suivi L; mort du Sultan Mahmoud, a ete d'empecher la Porte de souscrire,
dans ce premier moment si difficile, a des conditions trop dangereuses pour
son avenir, et de lui donner le tems de reprendre confiance et courage. La
moindre des obligations morales que nous avons contractee envers le Sultan,
est done celle que Parrangement que fera la Porte ne soit au moins pas plus
desavantageux que celui dont nous avons empeche la conclusion ; et si la Porte
se croyait forcee par sa position interieure a souscrire a. celui que nous avons
deja repousse, ou a en accepter un plus mauvais encore, vous pouvez, M. le
Baron, Pinstruire de la declaration que nous faisons faire a Mehemet Ali, qu'un
tel arrangement n'obtiendra jamais la sanction de l'Europe. Les Puissances
abandonneront cette position a toutes les incertitudes toujours inseparables
de ce qui n'a pour base, ni la necessite, ni le droit, ni la justice ; nous disons
la necessite, parce que nous ne tenons pas une ambition qui serait sans
mesure, pour une necessite.
L'avenement au trone du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, si paisible et si regulier
au milieu de tous les desastres du moment, est une preuve qu'il existe encore
pour son Empire un principe de vie bien superieur a tout ce qui existe dans les
camps Egyptiens. Mehemet Ali n'a done pas pour lui ce principe de necessite
que son esprit Oriental aime quelquefois invoquer sous le nom de fatalisme.
Vous voudrez bien, en donnant connaissance de cette depeche a MM. vos
Collegues, vous entendre avec eux pour lui donner execution ; si, contre notre
attente, vous ne trouviez pas un concert unanime, vous n'en prescrirez pas
moins a M. Laurin le langage que nous avons indique, et vous en instruiriez la
Porte. Nous devons vous prevenir que M. le Ministre de Prusse a ete oblige
de s'absenter pour deux semaines pour une affaire de famille pressante ; nous
ne doutons pas que M. le Comte de Konigsmarck trouvera dans I'unanimite
des Representans des Puissances ici un motif suffisant pour se reunir a la
demarche a laquelle vous voudrez bien Pinviter. Recevez, &c,
(Signe) FIQUELMONT.

422
(Translation.)
Count Fiquelmont to Baron de Stiirmer.
Monsieur le Baron, Vienna, September , 1839.
ONE of your reports of the 5th of September has brought us intelligence
from Alexandria of the 26th of August, which is, as you say, M. le Baron, of an
alarmino- nature ; the report of M. Laurin which is annexed to yours, has made
us acquainted with the resolution which Mehemet Ali appeared disposed to
take to cause his Syrian Army to occupy as much territory in Asia Minor as
Ibrahim Pasha might think practicable. The primary cause of this resolution
was the representation made by Ibrahim to his father, showing how difficult it
would be for him, when the bad season should arrive, to maintain his army
concentrated at Marash, and in its neighbourhood ; and demanding for that
reason permission to extend his line, and to profit by the favourable disposition
of the population of various districts who had sent deputations asking to be oc
cupied by the Egyptian troops; which perhaps would be in reality nothing
more than a movement occasioned by the necessity of finding provisions,
possibly made use of by Mehemet Ali as a means of influencing the Porte, and
of obliging it to accept the arrangement which it is his desire to dictate. This
calculation is natural, and we may therefore consider it as a chance which is
about to occur, and which we must take into our consideration.
If we had at our disposal the European forces which are in the Levant, our
line would soon be taken ; we should assign the positions to be taken in their
natural order ; the parts would then be very soon changed. Mehemet Ali would
be happy to accept the conditions which might be offered to him, for there is no
want of force to compel him ; but matters are not in so simple a position ; and
there is no unity of purpose among all the Powers, and consequently not the
concert necessary for the attainment of the object common to all. It is not
necessary to explain to you, who are thereby placed in so difficult a position, the
causes of this want of concert ; you are placed at once near to the causes of it
and to its effects ; what we desire is, to aid you in your embarrassment, for that
would be equally to aid the Porte.
The principal difficulty of the position is, that the embarrassments which
have occurred at Constantinople cannot be removed except by concert between
points very far distant from one another ; time is therefore required, and the
Porte is anxiom; to finish ; this is the danger, the only danger, for our accounts
already afford us the certainty that the very adoption of a wise and noble mode
ration will cause the jealousies to cease, which want of prudence might so easily
render dangerous for all the world. Very little time accordingly remains to be
passed, before we shall see a decisive change of position take place in favour of
the Porte. In such a situation we must desire to see all measures avoided, which,
not being indicative of the most thorough concert, might excite Mehemet Ali
without controuling him. It appears to us of little importance whether the army
of Ibrahim occupies a district more or less in Asia Minor; this will neither change
nor decide the question. The only danger would be, that of seeing him approach
near enough to Constantinople to excite disturbance there, and to cause the Eu
ropean forces to take up positions for the purpose of defending the Capital, which
might, in consequence of their want of concert, produce dangers of another kind.
We should regret this the more, inasmuch as, I repeat it to your Excellency, we
are certain that another position of affairs will result from the communications now
taking place between the Cabinets. But until the instructions received by the
Representatives of the Powers at the Porte shall have been modified, and sen
timents of confidence shall have replaced sentiments of distrust, we can only
appeal to their prudence, and conjure them to avoid all extreme measures ; it is
this we request you to do, should events require it. We continue to believe, that
it would be wise to accede to the wish of the Porte itself, and to cause the two fleets
to occupy a different position from that of observation at the entrance of the Darda
nelles. We agree with the Admirals, that the appearance of the united squadrons
before Alexandria without such demonstration being attended by any result
would be discreditable ; but between the two positions there is a third, halfway
which would afford the squadrons the means of acting according to the events
which might occur: this would be the vicinity of the island of Rhodes, more con-

423
tiguous to the coasts of Syria. This position would exercise a much greater influ
ence on the mind of Mehemet Ali, inasmuch as everything likely to endanger
the communications of Egypt with his army in Asia Minor, would show him all
the dangers of a too advanced position, and would have a much greater effect
than the appearance off Alexandria, which, being followed by no result, would
be a triumph for him.
This, however, M. le Baron, is merely an opinion, and nothing more, because
it stands alone. We must therefore seek for a measure which might obtain
the assent and the co-operation of our Allies. The conversations which we have
here had with the Ambassadors, have shown us all that we can do until new
instructions from the Courts shall have given to our proceeding a more decided
character. Mehemet Ali is a man who has proved himself to possess more sagacity than
is usually found in the East ; it is, therefore, possible to appeal to his under
standing with the certainty of being understood. I therefore request you, M. le
Baron, to have the goodness to instruct M. Laurin to speak to him in the follow
ing manner of his position.
The faults committed by the Porte, and the cleverness with which he has
availed himself of them, have given him a superiority of strength ; he may abuse
it ; he may at this moment deprive the Porte of still greater territories ; no one
is present to prevent it ; he may keep the Ottoman fleet ; the Allies of the Sultan
will not employ force to recover it, for its destruction would be the probable
consequence of the conflict.
Mehemet Ali may, therefore, if he should see fit, plume himself in the con
sciousness and in the abuse of material force ; the Powers will do nothing to
oppose that force. Europe possesses a more powerful arm against Mehemet Ali,
and that is, as we have elsewhere said, his future position. What, in fact, is his
object ? He ceases not to repeat, that everything he does has no other object
but to secure the future position of his family. Does he, peradventure, imagine
that the personal enmity which he feels towards Hosrew Pasha, is a good foundation
on which to establish his family ? Has he ever seen a sentiment of this nature
establish anything durable ? The greater have been his efforts to assimilate Egypt
to Europe by his administration, by the arts, and by commerce, the more must
he have learnt, and the better will he understand, that the sanction of Europe
is necessary for the regular existence, and for the permanency of every political
position ; let him therefore not deceive himself with respect to the nature of the
superiority of his forces ; they will not suffice to bestow on him the future
position which he desires to found. Even if the Sultan were to agree to all the
concessions he demands, they would not suffice to consolidate his position, for
Europe would not sanction it. A century ago Mehemet Ali, Chief of the
revolted Mussulmans, might have founded a new Empire. It would have
existed in that state of separation and isolation which at that time rendered
Europe little attentive to events of that nature ; Mehemet Ali has himself
devoted his life to the creation of a different order of things : he requires,
unless he is to pass away like a meteor, the sanction of Europe, and Europe will
only sanction that which leaves the principle of the Sovereignty of the Sultan
untouched. If Mehemet Ali grounds his hope of the success of his resistance
on the conviction which he appears to entertain of the difficulty which the
Powers will find in adopting, by common consent, active measures against him,
he must be aware that they would easily agree in refusing their sanction to a
state of things, which they should find too burdensome for the Porte ; there is
never any difficulty in adopting a negative measure.
M. Laurin should use his best endeavours to render this position intelligible
to Mehemet Ali ; we do not doubt, that the Agents of the Powers at Alexandria
will be authorized to hold the same language to him.
The object of the Powers, after events so disastrous as those which followed
the death of Sultan Mahmoud, was to prevent the Porte from agreeing, in the first
moment of such difficulty, to conditions too dangerous to its future position, and
to give it time to resume confidence and courage. The least, therefore, of the
moral obligations which we have contracted towards the Sultan is, that the
arrangement to be made by the Porte shall, at all events, not be more disad
vantageous than the one, the conclusion of which we prevented ; and if the Porte
should think itself obliged, by its internal position, to subscribe to the one
already rejected by us, or to accept one still worse, you may, M. le Baron, make
it acquainted with the declaration which we are causing to be made to Mehemet

424
Ali, that such an arrangement will never obtain the sanction of Europe. The
Powers will abandon such a position to all the uncertainties which are inseparable
from that which is grounded, neither on necessity, nor on right, nor on justice;
we say necessity, because we do not hold unmeasured ambition to be a necessity.
The accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne in so peaceable and
orderly a manner in the midst of all the disasters of the moment, proves, that a
principle of vitality is still inherent in his Empire, greatly superior to anything
that exists in the Egyptian camps. Mehemet Ali has not therefore in his favour
that principle of necessity which his Oriental spirit is fain at times to invoke
under the name of fatalism.
You will have the goodness, in communicating this despatch to your Col
leagues, to come to an understanding with them, in order to carry it into effect;
if contrary to our expectation you should not find unanimous concurrence, you
will, notwithstanding, prescribe to M. Laurin the language which I have pointed
out to you, and you will inform the Porte thereof. I must acquaint you, that
the Prussian Minister has been obliged to absent himself for a fortnight, owing
to some family business of importance ; we do not doubt that Count Konigsmarck
will find, in the unanimity of the Representatives of the Powers in this capital,
a sufficient reason for joining in the measure to which you will have the goodness
to invite him. Receive, &c,
(Signed) FIQUELMONT.
No. 335.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 12.)
My Lord, Vienna, October 3, 1839.
THE French Government have made to that of Austria the same propo
sition for the settlement of the affairs of the East which they have made to
Her Majesty's Government.
Count Fiquelmont considers the immediate restitution of Adana and
the defiles of the Taurus as a great object to the Porte. He also considers
the division of Syria into Pashalics to be conferred at -Mehemet Ali's death
upon his younger children, as ensuring the reversion of that country to the
Sultan ; but he thinks that Candia ought to be immediately given up by
Mehemet Ali, and that France may probably be induced to extend her pro
posal to that amount.
The answer of Austria will consist, 1st, Of an inquiry whether France
is prepared to enforce her demands, in case Mehemet Ali should decline
agreeing to them; and if this is answered satisfactorily, she will then renew
the declaration of her concurrence in the smallest amount of concessions by
the Porte upon which the Two Powers shall agree.
The instructions, however, to Count Appony and to Prince Esterhazy,
will be to favour the conclusion of the agreement traced above. 'Austria
inclines to this course from several reasons. She thinks that it is a great
object to finish quickly. She conceives that under this arrangement the
Sultan will ultimately inherit the whole possessions of Mehemet Ali, and that
in the mean time the Ottoman Empire will be saved from danger.
I should add, that Count Fiquelmont holds that it would give strength
and vitality to that Empire, if tbe intelligence of Mehemet Ali and the
Mahommedan feeling still existing in Egypt could be rallied to it, and
combined in its defence. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 336.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, Foreign Office, October 16, 1839.
WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, of the 3rd of October,
I have to state, that it would, no doubt, be a great source of strength to
the Turkish Empire, if Mehemet Ali would, in the character of a faithful

425
subject, exert all his energies, and apply all his means, for the purpose of
supporting the power and authority of the Sultan; but it is manifest that
Mehemet Ali's object is, and long has been, not to support the power and
authority of the Sultan, but to extend his own power and authority to the
detriment of the Sultan ; and no real support can rationally be expected for
the Sultan's throne, from a person placed in the situation in which Mehemet
Ali stands, and actuated by the motives by which he is inspired.
It is further a great mistake to suppose that there is more Mahommedan
feeling in Egypt, than in those parts of the Turkish Empire which are under
the direct authority of the Sultan. For, on the contrary, Mehemet Ali has in
many ways gone further to break down Mahommedan ascendancy than the late
Sultan did ; and, as an instance, there are many more Christians employed in
offices of emolument and command under Mehemet Ali than in the other parts
of the Turkish Empire. It is indeed remarkable how contradictory are the
assertions which the partizans of Mehemet Ali are driven to have recourse to ;
for while at one time and for one purpose they represent him as the great
champion of Mahommedan feeling, at another time, and for another purpose,
they extol him as the subduer of Mahommedan prejudice, and as a man who
has had energy enough to coerce that religious fanaticism which rendered the
Mahommedans so overbearing and intolerable to the Christians in all the trans
actions and intercourse of life.
It is difficult, moreover, to see by what process of reasoning it is pos
sible to arrive at the conclusion, that if the whole of Syria is now
left in the possession of Mehemet Ali, upon the condition that at his death it
is to be divided into Pashalics for the benefit of his younger children, such an
arrangement would secure the reversion of all Syria to the direct authority of
the Sultan. For Ibrahim, at the death of Mehemet, would stand precisely in
the same situation in which Mehemet now stands ; and it is not apparent why
Ibrahim should then be more willing than Mehemet now is, to relinquish
Syria. But as he would then have the entire command of the resources,
military and financial, of all the countries which Mehemet now governs, he
would be as strong then as he is now, and just as able to refuse to evacuate
Syria. Nothing, then, would be more easy than for Ibrahim, on the death
of Mehemet, to persuade the younger children to agree to some other arrange
ment, to accept some different provision, and to renounce their claim to the
Syrian Pashalics; and thus the proposed arrangement would probably have
just the opposite effect to that which is supposed. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 337.
Viscount Ponsonby io Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 18.)
(Extract.) Therapia, September 22, 1839.
ADMIRAL STOPFORD wished that the Porte should be informed,
that a violent wind from the south might force the British squadron to anchor
under the White Cliffs, and that if it so happened, it must not be considered
as an unfriendly act.

Inclosure 1 in No. 337.
Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.
"Princess Charlotte," Besika Bay,
My Lord, September 11, 1839.
AS the season is fast approaching, in which this anchorage at Besika
Bay will be no longer safe for so many large ships, I beg leave to acquaint
your Excellency, that in the event of any bad weather coming on which may
endanger the squadron under my command, itis my intention to run up the
31

426
Dardanelles off the place known by the name of "the White Cliffs," where
I understand the ships may anchor in safety.
But if political circumstances do not require the presence of the
squadron at Besika Bay, I should recommend its removal to Vourla before
the second week in October. It is, moreover, to be taken into consideration,
that owing to the extensive marshy grounds bordering upon the sea coast,
this anchorage is proverbially unhealthy after the rains begin.
In the course of a month the ships will require a supply of provisions, for
the conveyance of which I must send two ships of the line to Malta.
I am, &c,
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 337.
Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.
(Extract.) Therapia, September 19, 1839.
YOU are already acquainted with the arrangement that the Eastern
Affairs should be settled at Vienna, and that Lord Beauvale is directed to
correspond with you.
I sent to Vienna your letter, in which you speak of bringing the fleet
to the " White Cliffs'." I think it inconvenient to speak of that movement
to the Porte, without having the authorization of Her Majesty's Government,
or that of Lord Beauvale from Vienna.

No. 338.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 21.)
My Lord, St. Petersburgh, October 12, 1839.
A COURIER has arrived here from Paris, and I am informed that he
has brought instructions to the Baron de Barante, to propose this arrange
ment of the Turco-Egyptian Question : that the Viceroy of Egypt shall
continue to hold Syria, with the exception of the district of Adana and the
defiles of the Taurus, which are to be restored to the Porte, together with
Candia. After the death of Mehemet Ali, the Pashalic of Egypt to revert to one
of his sons, and that of Syria to another.
As Count Nesselrode has gone to the Emperor at Czarskoe-Celo, I am
unable to inform your Lordship how he received this proposition; but I
cannot think it possible that the Imperial Cabinet will accede to it.
Baron Brunnow's report of his communications with your Lordship have
given great satisfaction. Count Nesselrode showed me a long despatch from
that Minister, in which he expressed regret only at the British Cabinet's
not having yet decided upon a course of action to be immediately
adopted. I have, &c,
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 339.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 21.)
My Lord, Paris, October 18, 1839.
COUNT MEDEM showed me to-day the communications he had
received from M. de Brunnow, and which contained, first, M. de Brunnow's
general account of his mission, with reasons why it had been especially
;*\cleu to Great Britain, which Count Medem read to Marshal. Soult.

427
Secondly, M. de Brunnow's account of his conversation with your
Lordship. Thirdly, The plan, which he, Count Brunnow, had proposed as the means
of imposing suitable conditions on the Viceroy.
In both of the two former communications, M. de Brunnow spoke in a fair
and sensible manner of the spirit of friendliness with which his propositions
to the British Government had been received, as well as the difficulties which
attended the entire acceptance of them. Count Medem, at the same time,
informed me that he had heard from his brother at Alexandria, that M.
Cochelet had officially informed Mehemet Ali, on the part of the French
Government, that that Government would never join in employing coercive
measures against him. I think, however, that Count Medem was misinformed
as to any official communication of this kind having been made to the
Pasha. I should observe, that in the communications which I have had with the
Marshal, I have remarked the adoption of a more conciliatory and less posi
tive tone than heretofore ; but I have never heard anything inducing me to
believe that the French Government will depart from its fixed resolution
(however differently that resolution may be expressed) of not joining in
any plan of arrangement which it thought Mehemet Ali would resist,
and which, consequently, it might be called upon to enforce.
As far as this general resolution is concerned, I still think no alteration
likely to take place ; but as to the arrangement itself, I believe no positive
decision is come to, because a variety of causes on which the strength of
Mehemet's resistance depends are still undetermined. The opinion of
Austria on these matters is, I believe, the circumstance now especially
expected; and on that opinion, which the French Government thinks will be
in favour of its own notions, though without any reason of which I am ac
quainted for such anticipations, the bias of the French Cabinet will depend.
I have, &c,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 340.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 21.)
My Lord, Paris, October 18, 1839.
IN a conversation I had a day or two since with Marshal Soult on the
state of affairs at Alexandria, he informed me that he learnt from M. Cochelet,
that Mehemet Ali was more determined than ever on other matters, but that
with regard to Hosrew's dismissal he would probably abandon his original
pretensions. I bring this more especially to your Lordship's attention, having just
heard from Count Medem, that the Viceroy had recently stated to Count
Alexander Medem, that he entertained great hopes of arriving at a favourable
termination of existing difficulties, through an amicable arrangement between
himself and the Porte. [ have &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 341.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 22.)
My Lord, Vienna, October 14, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from Lord Ponsonby.
I have, &c,
-(Signed) BEAUVALE.

3 12

428
Inclosure in No. 341.
Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Therapia, September 30, 1839.
I RECEIVED this day your Excellency's despatch dated Vienna,
September 19, 1839, and inclosing copy of Count Fiquelmont's despatch to
Baron de Stiirmer. I have seen the Baron, and agreed to do whatever be thinks
proper to be done on the points to which your Lordship refers ; and I will,
when a decision is taken, apply in your name to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford,
to forward the orders to the British Consul-General at Alexandria.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 342.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 1 7.)
(Extract.) Therapia, September 21, 1839.
MR. THURBURN, lately Her Majesty's Consul at Alexandria, called
upon me this day. His object was to learn my opinions respecting Egypt,
and I thought it right to state them very strongly, because he is one of
the most vehement of the supporters of Mehemet Ali in his preten
sions. I thought it not unadvisable to show him that I was not misled by
the fallacies upon which it has been, and is attempted to establish a belief in
the power of the Pasha of Egypt, and in the necessity for giving him Syria,
&c, &c, in order to obtain security for Turkey against Russian dominion. He
was obliged to admit that the settlement he desired should be made, is the
partition of the Turkish Empire, and to argue in support of the good effects
of that measure.

No. 343.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 22.)
My Lord, Therapia, September 30, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of unofficial Note I this night received from the Sublime
Porte. It will relieve any doubts or difficulties at Vienna, arising from uncer
tainty as to the desires of the Sublime Porte. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 343.
Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.
(Traduction.) DANS la Note que la Sublime Porte a eu l'honneur d'adresser a Messieurs
lesRepresentansde Cinq Puissances, le 13 Djemadi-ul-akhir (22 Aout) dernier,
elle a exprime le desir que, puisque les Grandes Puissances s'etaient chargees
de Parrangement de la Question Egyptienne, elles voulussent bien aviser aux
moyens de faire rentrer Mehemet Ali dans ses devoirs, en le decidant a restituer
la Flotte Imperiale, a renoncer k ses pretentions exagerees, et a attendre
Peff'et des dispositions qui seraient coneertees sous la mediation des Cinq
Cabinets et sanctionnees par Sa Hautesse.
Depuis lors la Sublime Porte a constamment reyu des preuves des
dispositions bienveillantes des Cinq Cours a son egard; aussi est-elle pr£te

429
a rendre pleine justice k leur bonne volonte, tout comme elle est loin de
meconnaitre les difficultes de plus d'un genre qu'elles peuvent avoir reu-
contrees dans I'execution de leurs genereux desseins.
Neanmoins, plus d'un mois s'est ecoule depuis la remise de la dite Note,
sans que Paccord qui, graces a la Divine Providence, s'est etabli entre les
Cinq Cours, se soit maniteste par aucun acte positif propre a remplir le but
qu'elles se sont propose. Les Hautes Puissances Mediat ices sont trop
connues par leur sagesse et leur equite pour qu'elles ne sentissent pas a quel
point il est desirable pour le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse de voir cesser au
plus t6t un etat de choses pernicieux pour l'Empire Ottoman, et qui, en y
jetant tous les jours de nouveaux germes de trouble et de desordre, menace
de compromettre la paix du monde.
L'avenement au Trone du Sultan Abdoul Medjid a ete signale par un
grand acte de clemence qui accordait a Mehemet Ali le pardon de ses fautes
passees, ainsi que l'heredite de ses enfans pour l'Egypte. Le Pacha a paye
ce bienfait avec la plus noire ingratitude. Tout le monde sait qu'il a non
seulement refuse de restituer la Flotte Imperiale, qui lui a ete livree par la
plus lache des trahisons, mais qu'il cherche a revolutionner les pays soumis
au Sultan, et qu'il agit en general d'une maniere hostile envers la Sublime
Porte. Toutefois, Sa Hautesse, perseverant dans ses intentions genereuses,
est encore prete a accorder a Mehemet Ali l'heredite a ses enfans pour
l'Egypte, ainsi que le pardon pour tout ce qu'il a commis jusqu'a ce jour
d'inconvenant et de criminel. C'est a ces conditions que le Gouvernement
de Sa Hautesse sera toujours dispose a souscrire a un arrangement avec ce
vassal. La conduite de celui-ci apres la conclusion d'un pareil arrangement
decidera a quel point il est digne de faveurs ulterieures, lesquelles cependant
ne sauraient etre que l'effet spontane de la clemence souveraine.
En communiquant tout ceci a Monsieur l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, la
Sublime Porte le prie de vouloir bien exprimer a son Gouvernement Pespoir
qu'elle nourrit de voir les Hautes Puissances Mediatrices prendre au plus t6t
les moyens que, dans Jeur equite, elles jugeront propres a amener PAffaire
Egyptienne a une solution satisfaisante. (Signe) RECHID.
Constantinople, le 19 Redjeb, 1255.
(28 Septembre, 1839.) (Translation.)
Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.
IN the Note which the Sublime Porte had the honour to address to the
Representatives of the Five Powers, on the 13th Djeinadi-ul-akhir (22nd August
last), it expressed a desire that, since the Great Powers had taken upon them
selves the settlement of the Egyptian Question, they would be pleased to devise
means for making Mehemet Ali return to his duty, by inducing him to restore
the Imperial fleet, to abandon his exaggerated pretensions, and to await the result
of the arrangements which might be concerted under the mediation of the Five
Cabinets, and sanctioned by His Highness.
Since that time the Sublime Porte has constantly received proofs of the kind
feelings of the Five Courts towards it; it is therefore ready to do full justice to
their good will, while it is far from being unmindful of the difficulties of more
than one description which they may have encountered in the execution of their
generous intentions.
Nevertheless, more than a month has elapsed since the delivery of the
abovementioned Note, without the concord which, thanks to Divine Providence,
has been established between the Five Courts, having been made manifest by any
positive act calculated to accomplish the object which they have had in view.
The High Mediating Powers are too well known for their wisdom and equity not
to feel how desirable it is for His Highness' Government that the earliest possible
termination should be put to a state of things which is injurious to the Ottoman
Empire, and which, by constantly sowing fresh seeds of confusion and disorder,
threatens to endanger the peace of the world.
The accession of the Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne was distinguished

430
by a gveat act of clemency which granted to Mehemet Ali pardon for his past
faults, as well as hereditary succession for his children in Egypt. The Pasha has
repaid this kindness with the blackest ingratitude. All the world knows that he
has not only refused to restore the Imperial fleet, which was given up to him
through the basest treachery, but that he seeks to revolutionize the countries
subject to the Sultan, and that he acts generally in a hostile manner towards the
Sublime Porte However, His Highness, persevering in his generous intentions, •
is .still ready to grant to Mehemet Ali hereditary succession for his children in
Egypt, as well as pardon for all the improper and criminal acts which he has
hitherto committed. Upon these conditions His Highness' Government will
always be disposed to consent to an arrangement with this vassal. The conduct
of the latter, after the conclusion of such an arrangement, will determine to what
extent he may be worthy of further favours, which favours, however, can only be
thespontaneous result of the sovereign clemency.
In communicating, the above to the English Ambassador, the Sublime Porte
requests him to have the goodness to express to his Government the hope which
it-cherishes, that the High Mediating Powers will take, as soon as possible, the
stepsiwhich, in their justice, they shall consider calculated to bring the Egyptian
affair to a satisfactory solution. (Signed) RECHID.
Gemstantinople, Redjeb 19, 1255 (September 28, 1839).

No. 344.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 22.)
My Lord, Therapia, September 30, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose a Report of an Official Message I have
just received from his Excellency Rechid Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
I will report my reply alter having communicated with the French
Ambassador. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 344.
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extrait.) Pe'ra, ce 29 Septembre, 1839.
J'AIPhonneur de porter a la connaissance de Votre Excellence, le
message officiel dont Rechid Pacha vient de me charger pour elle. Le Pacha
m'a parle dans les termes suivans:
" Nous entendons dire que les flottes combinees qui se trouvent a present
a Besika Baie, se disposent a se rapprocher des Dardanelles pour etre a Pabri
des vents. Le Pacha d'Egypte s'obstine a garder notre flotte que la plus
ladie des trabisons lui a livree ; il fait mine de rejeter les propositions qui
lui seront faites par les Puissances amies. Pour ces raisons, la Sublime
Porte pense que les flottes combinees serviraient mieux sa cause en se
porlant sur Alexandrie ; mais la Porte ne veut pas non plus que les flottes
combinees s'eioignent trop de ses eaux, et elle voudrait que les flottes eussent
a. choisir pour leur station, soit le port de Smyrne, soit celui de Vourla, ou
enfin quelque rade sur la c6te, pres de Tchesrhe."
(Translation.)
M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.
% Lortl. Peru, September 29, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to communicate to your Excellency the official
message which Rechid Pasha has charged me to delivtr to you. The Pasha
spoke to me in theTjllowing terms : —

431
" We understand that the combined fleets,, which are at present at Besika
Bay, are preparing to approach the Dardanelles for shelter. The Pasha of
Egypt persists in keeping our fleet, which has been given up to him through
the basest treachery ; he threatens to reject the proposals which shall be made
to him by the friendly Powers. For these reasons, the Sublime Porte thinks
that the combined fleets would serve its cause better by going towards Alex
andria; but the Porte does not wish that they should remove too far from the
Turkish waters, and it would be glad that the fleets should choose for their
station, either the port of Smyrna, or that of Vourla, or, in short, any roadstead
on the coast, near to Tchesme.''

Inclosure 2 in No. 344.
Viscount Ponsonby to M. Frederic Pisani.
Sir, Therapia. September 30, I839t
I BEG you will inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that having this
day received his Excellency's official message of the 29th instant, 1 will
immediately forward it to my Government.
His Excellency is acquainted with the fact that the British squadron has
been stationed where it is by the order of the British Government, for the
sole purpose of securing the Sublime Porte against the occurrence of any
danger ; and his Excellency may also know, that by a recent arrangement
made for ensuring unity of action amongst the Great Powers, the Admiral is
to receive his orders from the British Ambassador at Vienna. This being the
case, his Excellency will see that I have not authority to direct the Admiral,
but that I have forthwith adopted the only means within my power to demon
strate my desire to perform whatever his Excellency demands of me.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 345.
Viscoimt Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 22.)
(Extract.) Therapia, September 30, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.
It arrived here by the French steamer on the 24th, and is said to have been
written about the 15th of the month.
The inclosed letter marks that Mehemet Ali had begun to feel his own
fault in attacking Hosrew in the way he did, and that he may not be disin
clined to maintain him in his post.

Enclosure in No. 345.

MeJwmet Ali, to the. Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha: — (Received1 ai Constantinople,
September 24, 1839.)*
(Traduction.) JAI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre responsive de votre Altesse, dans
laquelle, en me disant qu'elle n'a d'autre but que le bien du service, elle
m'exhorte a reunir nos efforts, ct a tacher d'arriver au bonheur tant dans
cette vie que dans Pautre. Dans cette meme lettre, votre Altesse m'annonce
qu'elle n'a pas encore pu arranger les affaires du moment conformement au
dicton suivant: "On aime pourtant toujours a servir les intdrets de ses
compatriotes." Tres-illustre Seigneur ! j'ai ete tres-etonne de voir qu'apres
avoir amene Paffaire k ce point (comme vous le savez par la correspondance
qui a eu lieu jusqu'ici), vous veuillez tout-^-coup servir les interets de vo
compatriotf-s

432
Lorsque feu le Sultan Mahmoud, de glorieuse memoire, a daign£ pro-
mettre de m'accorder a perpetuite, l'Egypte ainsi que la Province de Sa'ida
et Tripoli, j'ai humblement et respectueusement decline cette proposition,
en le suppliant de m'accorder a perpetuite, la totalite des provinces et
districts places sous mon administration. Votre Altesse savait parfaitemefit
tout ceci, et cependant, des son avenement au poste de Grand Vizir, elle
s'est bornee a m'offrir seulement l'Egypte. En outre, votre Altesse, qui avait
ete Gouverneur d'Egypte durant dix-huit mois, connaissait tres-bien a quel
point on respecte parmi les Arabes le principe d'intercession. Neanmoins;
lorsque son Excellence le Grand-Amiral Ahmed Pacha est venu ici, vous
n'avez pas juge a propos d'agir avec douceur, et de dire: " Un de mes
Collegues s'est fache contre moi, et s'est rendu aupres d'un autre Collegue.
Prenons celui-ci pour mediateur, et cherchons a apaiser celui-la et a retablir
Punion entre nous." Au contraire, vous m'avez eerit de saisir FAmiral et de
vous Penvoyer, et avez, en meme temps, adresse aux officiers de la Flotte
Imperiale des lettres auxquelles on ne se serait pas attendu. Ces procedes
de votre Altesse, qui denotent un manque total d'egard pour une amitie de
quarante ans, ainsi que pour la position eievee a laquelle je suis parvenu sous
les auspices de la Sublime Porte, m'ont, je Pavoue, blesse au supreme degre,
et c'est pour user de represailles que je vous ai invite a donner votre
demission. Mais, sans trop m'appesantir sur ces circonstances, je me
bornerai a dire, qu'apres le retour d'Akif Effendi, votre Altesse a place"
Paffaire en question sur un tout autre terrain, en m'ecrivant qu'au moment ou
Said Effendi, devait etre expedie vers moi, les Representans des Cinq
Puissances avaient remis a la Porte telle et telle Note. Le fait est que
depuis quelques annees ces Puissances ont toujours engage la Porte a
arranger elle-meme. ses affaires. Dans la lettre que je viens de recevoir de
votre Altesse, il est dit qu'on ne peut accomplir la volonte de notre Prophete
qu'en travaillant pieusement pour le bien de notre Auguste Souverain, Vicaire^
du Prophete, et pour celui de notre nation. Je ne revoque pas en doute que
ces paroles ne soient extiemement convenables et marquees au coin de la
verite. Dieu sait que cette croyanee est aussi la mienne ! Mais les procedes
sus-indiques de votre Altesse ne sont pas en harmonie avec ses paroles. II
devrait nous suffire, ce me semble, d'avoir ete pour cette affaire la fable de
tous les journaux. Toutefois, puisque vous declarez que votre cceur ne recele
pas meme une ombre d'animosite, ni d'esprit de vengeance, je dois vous
assurer, et le Trfes-Haut m'en est temoin, que moi aussi je n'ai d'autre desir
que celui de signaler ma soumission k la Sublime Porte, et de temoigner de
Pamour et de Pattachement a des Ministres qui, comme vous, sont etrangers
a toute haine et a tout sentiment vindicatif. D'apres ceci, nos intentions se
trouveraient etre ies memes et il n'y aurait de divergence que dans la maniere
dont elles se manifestent.
Pour decider done notre difference et prononcer la-dessus conformement
a la loi religieusc et politique, comme aussi pour delivrer la nation Musulmane
d'un pareil scandale, il nous faut un juge habile, verse dans les lois, perietr6
de sentimens religieux, et connu pour sa droiture et son impartiality. Voila'
done que je vous fais aussi cette proposition, mu comme je le suis par mon
zele pour la religion, et par ma sincere amitie a votre egard. S'il plait k
Dieu, il eclorra dans votre cceur des sentimens conformes a vos paroles; et en
accomplissant l'ceuvre salutaire de delivrer les Musulmans de ces embarras
et de rendre a tous une securite parfaite, vous serez beni par tout le monde,
et votre nom, inscrit dans les annales de Phistoire, sera repele avec eloge
jusqu'au jour du dernier jugement.
Si votre Altesse est disposee a acceder a cette proposition, elle voudra
bien avoir la bonte d'envoyer ici un ou deux Oulemas et Ministres de la
Sublime Porte, qui, joignant Pexperience a Pamour du bien, n'aient des
egards personnels ni pour vous ni pour moi, et qui^ mettant de c6te les
considerations politiques, soient exclusivement inspires par leur devouement
a la Sublime Porte et leur attachement pour la nation Musulmane.
Une pareille mesure serait en tout cas utile a la marche de Paffaire et
repondrait en meme temps a l'intention de votre Altesse, de rendre dans les
circonstances actuelles un service salutaire a notre Religion et a notre
Gouvernement.

433

(Translation.)
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha. — (Received at Constantinople,
September 24, 1839.)
I HAVE had the honour to receive Your Highness's reply, in which,
in informing me that you have no other object but the good of the service,
you exhort me to unite our efforts and endeavour to attain happiness as well
in this life as in the next. In the same letter Your Highness informs me,
that you have not been able as yet to arrange the affairs of the moment
conformably with the following saying, — " However, one always wishes to serve
the interests of one's fellow-countrymen." Most illustrious Lord ! I was greatly
surprised to perceive that after having brought the matter to this point (as you
are aware from the correspondence which has hitherto taken place), you should
desire on a sudden to serve the interests of your fellow-countrymen.
When the late Sultan Mahmoud, of glorious memory, deigned to promise
to grant to me in perpetuity Egypt as well as the Province of Saida and Tripoli,
I humbly and respectfully declined that proposal, praying him to grant to me in
perpetuity the whole of the Provinces and districts placed under my administra
tion. Your Highness knew all this perfectly well ; and yet, since your accession
to the post of Grand Vizier, you have confined yourself to offering me Egypt
alone. Besides, Your Highness, who has been Governor of Egypt for eighteen
months, knows very well how much the Arabs respect the principle of intercession.
Nevertheless, when his Excellency the Grand Admiral Ahmed Pasha arrived
here, you did not think proper to act with mildness, and to say, " One of my
Colleagues is angry with me, and has gone to another of my Colleagues ; let us
take the latter for a mediator, and endeavour to pacify the former, and re-esta
blish friendship between us." On the contrary, you have written to me to
seize the Admiral, and to send him to you, and you have at the same time
addressed to the officers of the Imperial fleet letters which could not have been
anticipated. These proceedings of Your Highness, which denote a total want of
regard for a friendship of forty years, as well as for the exalted station to which
I have arrived, under the auspices of the Sublime Porte, have, I confess, hurt
me in the highest degree, and it is by way of retaliation that I have called upon
you to give in your resignation. But without laying too great stress on these
drcumstances, I shall confine myself to saying, that after the return of Akif
Effendi, Your Highness put the matter in question on quite another ground, by
writing to me, that at the moment when Said Effendi was about to be sent to me,
the Representatives of the Five Powers had delivered to the Porte such and such
a Note. The fact is, that for some years back these Powers have always advised
the Porte to arrange its affairs itself. In the letter which I have just received
from Your Highness, it is said, that we can only accomplish the will of our
Prophet by labouring piously for the good of our August Sovereign, Vicar of the
Prophet, and for that of our nation. I do not question but that these expres
sions are extremely proper, and bear the stamp of truth. God knows that that
belief is mine also ! But the above-mentioned proceedings of Your Highness
are not in unison with your words. It ought to be sufficient for us, as it appears
to me, to have been with respect to this matter the theme of all the newspapers.
However, since you declare that your heart does not conceal even a shadow of
animosity or revengeful feeling, I must assure you, and the Most High is my
witness, that I, on my part, have no other desire than that of marking my sub
mission to the Sublime Porte, and of testifying affection and attachment to
Ministers who, like yourself, are strangers to all hatred and to all revengeful
feeling. According to this, our intentions should be the same, and there would
be no difference, save in the manner in which they are shown.
To decide, therefore, our difference, and to pronounce thereupon in con
formity with the religious and political law, as well as to relieve the Mussulman
nation from such a scandal, we require a skilful judge, well acquainted with the
laws, impressed with religious sentiments, and known for his justice and his
impartiality. Here, then, is the proposal which I also make to you, moved
thereto by my zeal for religion, and my sincere friendship towards yourself. If
it please God, he will cause to spring up in your heart sentiments in accordance
3 K

434
with your words, and by accomplishing the salutary work of relieving the Mus
sulmans from these embarrassments, and by restoring perfect security to all, you
will be blessed by all the world, and your name, inscribed in the annals of
history, will be spoken of in terms of praise till the day of judgment.
If Your Highness is disposed to accede to this proposal, you will have the
goodness to send here one or two Ulemas and Ministers of the Sublime Porte, who
uniting experience with a love of goodness, may have no personal attachment to
you or to me, and who, setting aside political considerations, may be exclusively in
spired with devotion for the Sublime Porte and with attachment to the Mussul
man nation.Such a measure would be under all circumstances useful for the progress of
the affair, and would at the same time be in accordance with the intention of
Your Highness to render, in the present state of affairs, beneficial service to our
religion and to our Government.

No. 346.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 22.)
My Lord, Therapia, September 30, 1839.
THE French Ambassador has acquainted me with his being recalled, and
that a frigate would be sent for him without delay. I heard this fact with
regret. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.
No. 347.
Viscount Ponsonby i to Viscount Palmerston^ — (Received October 22.)
(Extract.) Therapia, October 1, 1839.
I HAVE heard this day from a well-informed person, that there is a
great disposition to make an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, and that it
will probably be made if he shall show any signs of concession, such as
consenting to restore the fleet.

No. 348.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 22.)
My Lord, Alexandria, September 26, 1839.
ON the 14th instant the French Consul-General received a despatch from
his Government to inform him, that it had been resolved on by the British and
French Governments, to direct very strong remonstrances to be made by myself
and M. Cochelet to Mehemet Ali, respecting the detention of the Turkish fleet,
and to insist upon the Pasha sending it back to Constantinople.
M. Cochelet told me that Marshal Soult had written to him, to say, that I
was to receive similar instructions, and that our demands were to be made
simultaneously. I told M. Cochelet that I should not fail to inform him of any
instructions which I might receive to that effect.
M. de Laurin also informed me, that he had received a despatch from his
Court to the effect that such instructions would be sent ; and he was directed to
support the demands made by the British and French Agents.
The French Consul-General here, as also those French merchants and
employes who have access to Mehemet Ali, appear to make it a study to impress
him with the strong sympathy of the French Government and nation in his
favour, and that it is France alone which supports him, and every article in the
French journals to this purport is read to the Pasha.
The Pasha appears to have relinquished his intentions to press for the

435
removal of Hosrew Pasha from his post of Grand Vizier, but he seems resolved
not to accept less than the hereditary succession of the provinces which were
placed under his government and that of Ibrahim Pasha, at the Peace of Kutaya
in the year 1833.
The Pasha left this yesterday for an excursion on the Nile for the benefit of
his health, and will return on the 2nd or 3rd of October.
Captain Caillier, who returns to-morrow by the French steamer to France,
told me that the Pasha had yesterday said to him, that if he would remain eight
days longer in Egypt, he might carry the intelligence to France of an amicable
arrangement having been concluded between the Porte and himself, as he
expected almost daily to receive the final settlement of the affair from Constanti
nople. The state of the country is tranquil, and the rise of the Nile being the best
which has taken place for many years, affords the certainty of a most abundant
harvest of every sort. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 349.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 22.)
My Lord, Alexandria, October 6, 1839.
WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 13th of September,
relative to the declaration of the Pasha's intentions, in the event of the
appearance of the combined squadrons off Alexandria, I have the honour to
transmit to your Lordship the copy,of a note which I have written in obedience
to your Lordship's instructions.
Boghos Bey informs me, that he has sent a translation of it to the Pasha,
who is at present in the Delta, and that he will communicate the reply to me so
soon a3 he shall receive it ; but as Her Majesty's steamer leaves to-morrow for
Malta, I shall not be able to communicate the reply by that opportunity.
T ' n rvp &C
(Signed) ' PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 349.
Colonel Campbell to Boghos Bey.

Alexandrie, le 20 Octobre, 1839.
LE Soussigne, Agent et Consul-General de Sa Majeste Britannique, a
communique au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste la declaration faite par Son
Altesse le Vice-Roi, le 14 d'Aout dernier, portant que, "si les Escadres Anglaise
et Francaise paraissaient devant Alexandrie, il ordonnerait a Ibrahim Pacha
d'avancer avec son armee."
Le Soussignd a ete par consequent charge par Son Excellence le Vicomte
Palmerston, Principal Secretaire d'Etat de Sa Majeste Britannique pour les
Affaires Etrangeres, de faire savoir a Mehemet Ali par eerit, que le Gouverne
ment de Sa Majeste est bien convaincu qu'il est si sagace et clairvoyant, et si
bien capable de calculer des consequences, qu'il s'abstiendra soigneusement de
prendre les mesures qu'il est dit dans la dite deplche d'avoir annonce*es que e'etait
son intention de prendre, en cas que les escadres combinees apparussent devant
Alexandrie. Car le Pacha doit bien savoir qu'il n'est pas dans une position la
quelle, soit par sa situation tant politique que geographique, ou soit sous le
rapport des considerations militaires ou navales, peut le mettre en etat de defier
impunement les Gouvernemens d'Europe, et plus particulierement les Puissances
Maritimes.
3K 2

436
Le Soussigne prie Son Excellence Boghos Joussouff Bey de vouloir bien
communiquer cette Note a Son Altesse le Pacha et d'en accuser la reception par
eerit. .
Le Soussigne profite de cette occasion, &c,
i^eooussigi F (g.^ PATRICK CAMPBELL.

(Translation.)
Colonel Campbell to Boghos Bey.
Alexandria, October 20, 1839.
THE Undersigned, Agent and Consul-General of Her Britannic Majesty,
has communicated to the Government of Her Majesty the declaration made
by His Highness the Viceroy, the 14th of August last, to the effect that "if the
English and French squadrons should appear before Alexandria, he would
order Ibrahim Pasha to advance with his Army."
The Undersigned has been, in consequence, instructed by His Excellency
Viscount Palmerston, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, to state to Mehemet Ali, in writing, that Her Majesty's Go
vernment is well satisfied that he is so sagacious and clear-sighted, and so well
able to calculate consequences, that he will carefully abstain from taking the
steps which he is reported in that despatch to have announced his intention
to take in the event of the appearance of the combined squadron off Alex
andria ; for the Pasha must be well aware that he is not in a position which,
either geographically or politically, or with reference either to military or
naval considerations, can enable him with impunity to set at defiance the
Governments of Europe, and more especially the Maritime Powers.
The Undersigned requests his Excellency Boghos Joussouff Bey to have
the goodness to communicate this Note to His Highness the Pasha, and to
acknowledge in writing its receipt.
The Undersigned avails himself of this opportunity, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 350.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, October 23, 1839.
WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of October 1, stating that
you have been informed, that there exists a great disposition to make a
private arrangement with Mehemet Ali, I have to instruct your Excellency strongly
to urge the Turkish Government to abstain from taking any such step, and to
place confidence in the friendly intentions and promised support of the Powers
of Europe. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 351.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 24.)
My Lord, Paris, October 21, 1839.
I ARRIVED at Paris yesterday, and I this morning called at the Foreign
Office to apprise Marshal Soult of my return.
His Excellency received me with great personal cordiality ; but upon our
entering on political questions, I found with regret, that the language of the
Marshal manifested a less anxious desire to act in union and concert with Her
Majesty's Government, than appeared in his communications with me on his first
undertaking the duties of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

437
On speaking of the Turco-Egyptian Question, he expressed his regret that
the propositions, of which the Baron Brunnow was the bearer from the Court of
St. Petersburgh, had been so favourably listened to by Her Majesty's Govern
ment ; and considering the jealousy which was felt in England of the views and
policy of Russia, he was surprised, he said, at your Lordship's having been willing
to acquiesce in the occupation, under any circumstances, of Asia Minor by a
Russian army. I observed to his Excellency, that the occupation by Russian
troops of a province of the Turkish Empire for its protection, under a Conven
tion between the Five Great Powers of Europe, stipulating that those troops
should retire from it whenever the other Powers, parties to the Convention,
should call upon them to withdraw, was, in fact, a renunciation of the principle
of the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty, and of any pretension by the Russian Govern
ment, to the exclusive protection of the Turkish Empire. The Marshal would
not allow that any reliance could be placed in such a Treaty ; " but," added
he, " I consider this to be more a question affecting English interests than those
of France ; but the French Government will certainly never be party to any such
Convention." His Excellency then adverted to the conditions of peace between the Sultan
and Mehemet Ali, saying, that he had no objection, if more favourable terms for
the Sultan could be obtained, than those which the French Government pro
posed to be adopted as the basis of an arrangement, to agree to them. I asked
his Excellency whether the terms he alluded to, as proposed by France, were the
concession by the Porte to Mehemet Ali, of the whole of Syria, the Arabian
Pashalics, the Pashalic of Candia as well as Egypt ? He answered affirmatively;
and on my observing that this arrangement would leave the vassal far more
powerful than the empire to which he acknowledged allegiance, he said, " We must
be guided in these matters, not by what might moralement be best, but by facts.
You have on one side, Mehemet Ali, with an army 150,000 strong, and twenty
sail of the line ; on the other you have the Sultan, not able to bring together
15,000 men, and having nothing for him but prestige, souvenir, and abstraction."
His Excellency assured me, that the Courts of Berlin and Vienna were
disposed to concur in the opinions of the French Government regarding the
conditions of peace. I then put to him the question, whether, if Mehemet Ali
should be so unreasonable as not to abate of his present pretension to retain
Marash, Adana, and the territory to the east of the Euphrates, the French
Government would join in measures of coercion to force upon the Pasha the
acceptance of its own proposed conditions of peace ? To this question the
Marshal replied, " I shall be ready to enter with the other Powers into the con
sideration of the means of enforcing them ; but it is useless, he said, to enter into
that consideration until the Powers had agreed upon the conditions to be imposed."
I need not remark to your Lordship, that no other interpretation can be given
to this language, than that the French Government will not, under any circum
stances, be induced to commit hostilities against the Pasha of Egypt. This
determination of the Government arises not, I believe, from any wish to aggran
dize Mehemet, but from the fear of becoming engaged in a war which would be
unpopular in France, and which might very probably provoke the censure, by
the Chamber of Deputies, of the Ministers who advised it.
I have forgotten to mention that, in the course of the conversation with the
Marshal on this subject, he alluded to your Lordship having said to General
Sebastiani, that you would concede to Mehemet Ali a part of Syria up to the
walls of St. Jean d'Acre, but not the fortress itself; and he added, " I have no
objection to St. Jean d'Acre being taken from the Pasha, but how is the capture
to be effected ? " England, he imagined, would not spare troops for such an
expedition, France will not send any troops, nor will a single soldier be afforded
by the Austrian Government for this service. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

438
No. 352.
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde,
My Lord, Foreign Office, October 25, 1839.
YOUR Excellency has been aJready informed, through the Russian
Government, of the particulars of the communications which Baron Brunnow
was sent hither to make, and of the nature of the answer which Her Majesty's
Government gave to those communications ; but in order that the details of
the negotiation carried on between the Baron and Her Majesty's Government
may be upon record, I think it right to recapitulate them in this despatch.
Baron Brunnow arrived in London on the 15th September, and left England
on the 12th of October; and during the interval between those two dates, he
had several long conversations with myself, and with other members of Her
Majesty's Government, upon various matters connected with the relations
between Great Britain and Russia.
The substance of all his communications on these different matters, was
extremely satisfactory; and nothing could be more conciliatory than his manner
upon every occasion. He was frank and unreserved in his conversations;
and his mission, whatever may be its result, as to the main point upon which
it bore, cannot fail to produce beneficial effects upon the relations between
the two Governments.
Baron Brunnow, on his arrival, stated that the principal purpose for which
he was sent hither, was to explain frankly and without reserve, to Her Majesty's
Government, the views and opinions of the Russian Cabinet upon the affairs
now pending in the Levant ; and to ask for an equally candid explanation of the
views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government.
He said, that the Russian Government had been gratified at finding that
the sentiments of the two Cabinets on these matters, as far as they had been
mutually explained, appeared to be so nearly alike; and he said, that the
Russian Government had witnessed, of late, with great satisfaction, evidences,
as they conceived, of greater confidence on the part of the British Government,
in the sincerity and good faith of Russia with regard to the affairs of Turkey;
that the Emperor felt, that he deserved that confidence, and was anxious to
confirm it by the fullest explanations, and thus to draw closer the ties between
Great Britain and Russia.
The Baron said, that the Emperor could take but one view of the relative
positions of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; that he looked upon the Sultan as a
Sovereign who was his Ally, and intitled to his support ; and that he considered
Mehemet Ali, as a revolted subject: That he saw that the quarrel between
these two, might lead to events which might occasion serious differences between
the Powers of Europe, and endanger the general peace; and that he was there
fore most anxious that some permanent arrangement should be made between
the two parties, which would ensure future tranquillity. That His Imperial
Majesty was convinced, that if England and Russia could come to a clear and
full understanding on the matters, the arrangement which they might determine
to support, would ultimately be carried into effect: That the Russian Govern
ment understood that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion, that the
arrangement best calculated to prevent future collisions between Mehemet Ali
and the Sultan, would be, that, which, conferring upon Mehemet Ali the here
ditary Pashalic of Egypt, would restore immediately to the direct authority
of the Sultan, all the other portions of the Ottoman Empire now occupied by
the forces, and administered by the authorities, of Mehemet Ali. That the
Russian Cabinet entirely concurs in preferring this arrangement, and is perfectly
ready to co-operate in carrying it into effect ; but that compulsion of some kind
might become necessary to induce Mehemet Ali to consent to this plan ; and
that the Emperor not choosing to embark in a plan without seeing his way
to the execution of it, and not being willing to begin an undertaking with
other parties, without being certain that they had made their minds up to go
through with it, in conjunction with him, His Imperial Majesty was desirous,
before this arrangement should be proposed to the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, to
know what Powers were prepared to concur in the measures which mhdit'be
necessary in order to carry it into effect.

439
Baron Brunnow then proceeded to discuss those measures, and to consider
what they might be. He stated, that the Russian Government very much
approved of the series of coercive measures which had been proposed by Her
Majesty's Government, namely, the interception of all communication by sea,
between Egypt and Syria ; the blockade of the ports of those two provinces ;
the seizure and detention of all ships under the Egyptian flag ; and the occu
pation of Candia, and its restoration to the direct authority of the Sultan. And
he said, that if these measures were taken by a powerful alliance, acting in
Support of the Sultan's rights, or even if such parties were to intimate to>
Mehemet Ali their determination to take such measures, should they become-
necessary, little doubt could be entertained that Mehemet Ali would yield to>
superior force, and would submit to inevitable necessity. But the Baron said
there was a contingency connected with these measures, which could not safely
be overlooked. Mehemet Ali had declared, that if coercion were attempted
against him, he would immediately order Ibrahim to advance to the shores of
the Bosphorus, and to threaten Constantinople. This might be an empty
menace, which perhaps never would or could be put into execution ; but, on the
Other hand, Mehemet Ali might, in a moment of desperation, make such an
attempt ; and it might be the more likely that he should do so, if he thought
that such a movement would take the Powers of Europe unprepared, and would
create dissensions among them. Consequently, Baron Brunnow said it was of
the greatest importance, that England and Russia should settle beforehand what
should be done in such an event.
That it was clear that the Sultan was not at present in a state to defend::
himself against such an attack: his army having been defeated and dispersed,.
and his fleet having been delivered up to Mehemet Ali. But the Sultan could not
be abandoned, and left to be a prey to Ibrahim. That some of the Allies must
come to his aid, and that the Emperor thought, that from local position, Russia.
was the Power which could most easily afford assistance. That Ibrahim would
take about twenty days to march from his present positions to the Bosphorus ;,
and that there would be time enough during that period, for a Russian naval
force to occupy the Bosphorus, and for a Russian land force, if necessary, to
take post on the Asiatic side of the Strait.
Baron Brunnow said, that the Russian Government was well aware of the
feeling which exists in this country, about the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which,
whatever may have passed about it, the Emperor nevertheless considers a binding
obligation ; but in the present case, the Russian Government proposed that the
aid to be given, if necessary, by Russia to the Sultan, should he given, not in
virtue of the separate engagements taken by the Emperor, but in virtue of the
engagements about to be entered into between the Powers of Europe and the
Sultan: That this succour, therefore, would be an act of the Alliance, and not
of Russia alone ; that the Russian force would arrive as the force of the Alli
ance, and would retire as the force of the Alliance, whenever the purpose for
which it came should have been fully accomplished. He said that the Emperor
was perfectly willing that all these matters should be settled by a previous con
vention between the parties concerned ; that this convention should define the
objects to be attained ; should determine the means to be employed ; and should
assign to each of the co-operating Powers its appropriate share in the execution ;
and that the arrangement which, on this matter, he, Baron Brunnow, had to
propose, was, that all the operations which might become necessary in Egypt
and Syria, should be undertaken by England, and Austria, and France; and
that whatever might be requisite within the Straits, and in Asia Minor, should
be executed by Russia.
He said, that with respect to the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles,
he understood that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion, that as a per
manent principle and standing rule, the best arrangement would be, that while
Turkey is at peace, both of those Straits should be shut against ships of war of
all Powers ; and he could assure me, that the Emperor would be perfectly
ready to agree to such an arrangement, and to consider the Bosphorus as being
as much closed against Russian ships of war, as the Dardanelles against the
ships of war of other Powers ; and the Emperor would willingly agree, that an
Article to this effect should be inserted in the proposed convention.
Baron Brunnow further said, that if England and Russia should happily
come to an understanding on these matters ; and if such a Convention as he

440
had described, were to be signed, he was authorized to say, that in such case the
Emperor would not renew the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.
The Baron further said, in reply to a question which I put, that the Russian
Government did not make the accession of France to these arrangements, a
sine qud non; and that although the co-operation of France would undoubtedly
render the execution more easy, Russia would be perfectly ready to act without
France, if France could not be persuaded to concur, and if England was
willing to go on without her. #
As soon as it was possible to assemble the Cabinet, a meeting of Her
Majesty's confidential servants was held, to consider what answer it would be
proper to give to these overtures from the Russian Government ; and the com
munication which thereupon it became my duty to make to Baron Brunnow, was
to the following effect: —
I stated, that Her Majesty's Government highly appreciate the friendly
sentiments towards England, which prompted His Imperial Majesty to send
Baron Brunnow with the communication with which the Baron had been charged;
and that Her Majesty's Government derives the highest satisfaction from
finding that the views and opinions of the two Governments upon the important
matters in question, were so entirely in accordance.
That the Russian Government had justly interpreted the feelings of that
of Great Britain, when it supposed that the British Cabinet repose full confi
dence in the sincerity and good faith with which Russia is acting in these
affairs ; and that Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to give proofs of
that confidence. That Her Majesty's Government are ready to adopt the
whole arrangement proposed by Baron Brunnow, with the exception of one single
point, upon which I had to propose a modification, which, without essentially
altering the plan, would remove a difficulty which Her Majesty's Government
would otherwise find insurmountable.
I said that Her Majesty's Government continue to think, that the only
way of preventing future collisions between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali,
which might seriously endanger the peace of Europe, was to bring back within
the confines of Egypt, the state of occupation of Mehemet Ali ; the Sultan at
the time granting to the Pasha, as a compensation for the sacrifice which he
would thus make, an hereditary tenure in the Pashalic of Egypt. I said that
we continue to be of opinion, that if the Five Powers were to agree to assist
the Sultan in imposing this arrangement upon Mehemet Ali, the latter would,
however reluctant to do so, yield to the force of a confederation which he would
know himself unable to oppose, rather than expose himself to the risk of for
feiting by resistance, those advantages which the proposed arrangement, would
afford him. That even if the French Government were induced, by domestic
considerations, to decline being a party to the proposed Convention, yet if
such a Convention were signed by the other Four Powers, and were made
known to Mehemet Ali, there seems good reason to think, that it would induce
him to acquiesce ; but that at all events, the means of the Four Powers to
enforce the arrangement would be amply sufficient ; and that Great Britain
was prepared to become a party to such an agreement, and to take a share in the
execution. I said, that with respect to the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles,
Baron Brunnow had rightly understood the opinion of Her Majesty's Govern
ment ; and that this opinion rests upon a general and fundamental principle of
the Law of Nations. Every State is considered as having territorial jurisdic
tion over the sea which washes its shores, as far as three miles from low water
mark ; and, consequently, any Strait which is bounded on both sides by the
territory of the same sovereign, and which is not more than six miles wide, lies
within the territorial jurisdiction of that sovereign. But the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles are bounded on both sides by the territory of the Sultan ; and are
in most parts less than six miles wide ; and consequently the territorial juris
diction of the Sultan extends over both of those Straits; and the Sultan has a
right to exclude all foreign ships of war from those Straits, if he should think
proper to do so. Now, by the Treaty of 1809, Great Britain acknowledged
this right on the part of the Sultan, and promised to acquiesce in the enforce
ment of it ; and it is but just that Russia should take the same engagement ;
and Her Majesty's Government are of opinion, that the exclusion of all foreign
ships of war from the two Straits, would be more conducive to the maintenance

441
of peace, than an understanding that the Straits in question should be a general
thoroughfare, open at all times to ships of war of all countries.
But, I said, Her Majesty's Government being willing to acknowledge by
Treaty, as a general principle, and as a standing rule, that the two Straits
should be closed for all foreign ships of war, are of opinion, that if for a par
ticular emergency, one of these Straits should be opened for one party, the
Other ought, at the same time, to be opened also for other parties ; in order that
there should be the same parity between the condition of the two Straits, when
open and when shut ; and, therefore, Her Majesty's Government would expect,
that in that part of the proposed Convention, which would allot to each Power
its appropriate share of the measures of execution, it should be stipulated, that
if it should become necessary for a Russian force to enter the Bosphorus, a
British force should at the same time enter the Dardanelles. I said, that this was
no proof of any want of confidence in Russia; for, in truth, the very fact of
the Emperor becoming party to the proposed Convention, would make it impos
sible for any one to breathe a doubt as to His Imperial Majesty's good faith ; and
that, as the bulk of the British squadron would probably be required off the
¦coasts of Egypt or Syria, the smallness of the number of ships that could be
spared for going up the Dardanelles, would of itself show that their presence
was intended to record a principle and to manifest union, and not to proclaim
distrust or to exercise controul.
Baron Brunnow expressed great regret at this decision of Her Majesty's
Government, which, must necessarily suspend for a time the progress of the
negotiation ; because his instructions did not provide for this case ; and he should
therefore be obliged to refer the question for the decision of his Government ;
and much valuable time would thereby be lost, which ought to be employed in
'action. But he pressed me much to consider whether this question might not
be put aside, and he reserved for future consideration, without preventing the
two Governments from proceeding to act upon other points, with respect to
which they were agreed; and he expressed a strong desire that the Allied
Powers should make an immediate demand for the restoration of the Turkish
fleet, or for the contemplated territorial arrangement ; or for any other thing
upon which they might be agreed ; and that if their demand should be refused,
they should begin by putting in force those measures of coercion in which they
might all concur; leaving the question about the Dardanelles to be settled, if,
and when, it should arise.
I said, that Her Majesty's Government had indeed proposed that the
demand for the restoration of the fleet should precede the demand for the ter
ritorial arrangement, and should be made immediately ; because it appeared to
us, that whatever differences of opinion might exist as to the territorial
arrangement, there could be no difference as to the propriety and justice of
demanding and compelling the restitution of the fleet. But Austria and France
were against such a course ; and both recommended that the question about the
fleet should be allowed to merge in the larger question as to the final arrange
ment; and Her Majesty's Government had yielded to the wish of those
two Powers. But certainly, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, being agreed as
to the arrangement which ought to be enforced upon Mehemet Ali, might at
once, and without France, if France should be unwilling to join them, call upon
Mehemet Ali to submit ; and they might begin to execute the progressive
measures of coercion, if he should refuse. But in that case, Mehemet Ali
might order Ibrahim to march to the Bosphorus ; and then would come upon us,
in the most inconvenient manner, and without our being prepared for it by any
previous agreement, the very difficulty which we were at present unable to solve ;
and I said, that unless we should come to a satisfactory understanding as to what
was to be done in such a contingency, it would not be wise to take steps which
might directly tend to make that contingency happen.
The Baron, however, still pressed upon me the great anxiety of his
Government, that something should be done ; and the strong conviction of that
Government, that some act or other would become necessary, on the part of
some of the Powers of Europe, within a very short period of time ; and from
himself, but not by any instruction from his Government, he pressed me to
submit to the Cabinet, that Great Britain might, by herself, take some prelimi-
- 3 L

442
nary measures, which, either as demonstrations, or as a commencement of coercion,
could not fail to have a decisive influence on Mehemet Ali.
I said that I knew that, in the present state of things, Her Majesty's
Government would not begin to act alone in these matters. That we attach
very great importance to the attainment of an European concert upon these
questions ; and that we by no means as yet despair of arriving at such a result ;
that if it should be found impossible to unite the Five Powers, or a sufficient
portion of them, in a common course of action, it would be necessary for the
British Government then to consider what it might be fitting for Great Britain
to do; but that till the present negotiations should have come to some conclu
sion, it would be premature for Her Majesty's Government to take into con
sideration a contingency which has not yet happened.
It was then agreed between Baron Brunnow and myself, that we should each
draw up a report of what had passed between us ; he. for the information of
his Government; I, for the information of your Excellency. I was, however,
prevented by a heavy and continued pressure of business, from preparing my
despatch ; and Baron Brunnow's Report, of which he gave me, confidentially, a
copy, and of which I herewith inclose a copy, contains so full and so faithful a
report of the conversations to which it relates, that I felt it unnecessary, at the
time, to add anything thereto ; and my reason for writing this despatch is, that
I am desirous of furnishing your Excellency with a statement which, though less
full in detail, embraces a greater range of time.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 353.
Baron Brunnow to Count Nesselrode. — (Communicated confidentially by
Baron Brunnow.)
(Extrait.) Londres, ce ?<ff£f , 1839.
LE jour meme ou le Conseil du Cabinet se reunissait a Windsor pour
prendre en deliberation PAffaire d'Egypte, j'ai rec u la depeche du 9 Septembre
par laquelle votre Excellence m'a recommande de lui faire connaitre un moment
plus tot les determinations que le Cabinet Britannique allait arreter relativement a
cette grave question.
Je me suis empresse aussitot de demander une entrevue a Lord Palmerston.
Le billet que je lui ai eerit a ce sujet s'est croise avec Pinvitation qu'il m'a
adressee de son c6te, de me rendre chez lui en ville, ou il allait arriver le lende
main, 2 Octobre.
Je me fais un devoir de soumettre a votre Excellence le resume de cet
entretien, que nous avons repris le jour suivant, 3 Octobre, et dont l'ensemble
vous mettra a meme, M. le Comte, de vous former une opinion exacte de la
nature des vues que le Principal Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangeres a
bien voulu me communiquer avec une sincerite a laquelle je ne saurais assez
rendre justice.
II a commence par me dire que le Conseil avait pris en mure consideration
les ouvertures dont j'avais ete charge.
Qu'il n'avait pas hesite a reconnaitre et a apprecier vivement laloyaute des
intentions qui les avait dictees.
Que sous ce rapport, I'opinion de tous les Membres du Cabinet s'etait pro-
nonce unanimement, de maniere a rendre Phommage qui est du a la droiture des
intentions de notre Auguste Maitre.
Que le desir manifesto par Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'en venir a une entente
amicale avec PAngleterre relativement aux Affaires d'Orient, repondait entiere
ment aux voeux du Cabinet Britannique. Mais que celui-ci se voit oblige de ne
point perdre de vue bien des considerations qui lui recommandent d'user d'une
grande circonspection dans sa marche, afin de ne point heurter de front des opinions
qu'il lui importe de menager.
Lord Palmerston est entre a. cet egard dans des explications tres-detaillees

443
que je chercherai, M. le Comte, a reproduire ici, en vous rapportant aussi fidele-
ment que possible les propres paroles dont ce Ministre s'est servi.
" L'opinion demes Collegues," m'a-t-il dit, " s^st prononcee hautement en
faveur des memes principes que vous avez exposes au nom de votre Cabinet pour
le maintien de Findependance et la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman. Nous
desirons comme vous d'agir dans ce but de concert avec vous et d'y consacrer
une action commune. Nous serions decides a agir dans ce sens avec tous les
Cabinets qui voudraient concourir avec nous au meme but. Nous serions pre
pares a marcher dans cette voie avec la France et meme sans elle, si elle refusait
de s'y associer. Nous persistons a croire que nos efforts devraient tendre a faire
rentrer le Sultan en possession de la Syrie. Nous ne nous dissimulons pas que
ce resultat ne saurait etre obtenu sans un deployement de forces destinees a
vaincre la resistance du Pacha.
" Cependant nous ne saurions meconnaitre non plus, que l'emploi de ces
mesures pourrait porter Mehemet Ali a adopter un parti extreme en fesant
marcher son armee sur Constantinople.
" Si cette eventualite venait a se realiser, nous sommes les premiers a
admettre la necessite de voir la Russie interposer ses forces materielles pour
garantir la securite de la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman. Mais dans ce cas, mes
Collegues ont ete d'avis qu'il serait desirable et necessaire, que l'intervention mili
taire de la Russie dans le Bosphore n'eut point l'apparence d'exclure notre
concours. "D'apres I'opinion unanime du Conseil, l'intervention militaire de la
Russie, si elle devenait necessaire pour la protection et la defense de Constan
tinople, devrait avoir lieu de telle sorte a pouvoir etre combinee avec une certaine
co-operation et assistance des forces navales d'Angleterre.
"Ce concours pourrait etre determine de maniere a ne point confondre et
a ne point mettre en contact les forces d'une Puissance avec celles de l'autre.
Cette distinction resulterait meme d'un principe sur lequel nous sommes deja
d'accord. Nous considerons en these generale les deux detroits de Constanti
nople comme fermes au pavilion de guerre des nations etrangeres. Or, si par
exception a cette regie et dans Pinteret commun de la defense de l'Empire
Ottoman, Pun de ces detroits s'ouvre a vos forces navales, il serait juste et naturel
qu'en vertu de la meme exception, l'autre de ees detroits admit egalement les
notres. Elles n'y paraitraient nullement dans l'intention de gener ni de con-
troler votre action. Chacun des deux detroits serait place sous la sauve-garde
des Puissances respectives dont les forces resteraient ainsi separees, et ne se trou-
veraient pas mises en presence. Vous d'un cote, nous de Pautre, nous serions la
pour empecher que l'Armee Egyptienne ne vint a franchir le canal de Constanti
nople. Pkceea a distance les unes des autres, les forces respectives ne risque-
raient point de se trouver en contact. D'ailleurs, la disproportion numerique qui
existerait entre elles, demontrerait evidemment que notre co-operation n'aurait
rien d'hostile pour vous ; car la presence de trois ou quatre vaisseaux que nous y
enverrions, ne serait assurement pas faite pour entrer en concurrence avec vos
forces de terre et de mer concentrees dans le Bosphore. Tout ce qu'il nous
faudrait, serait de constater a la face de la nation, que nous n'avons pas consenti
a nous laisser exclure d'une action commune destinee a. sauver la capitale de
l'Empire Ottoman ; que nous n'avons point souserit formellement a un principe
en vertu duquel la Russie serait investi du pouvoir d'exercer seule ce protectorat.
" Ce n'est done ni par mefiance pour les intentions de l'Empereur, que nous
respectons, ni par jalousie pour la Russie, avec laquelle nous desirons sincerement
de marcher d'accord, mais c'est uniquement par les considerations susmen-
tionnes qu'il nous est impossible d'adherer a un arrangement par lequel nous pro-
damerions nous-memes Pexclusion absolue de notre pavilion la ou nous etablirions
en principe la presence isolee du v6tre."
C'est dans ces termes que Lord Palmerston m'a fait connaitre la decision
du Conseil. II me Pa communiquee de maniere a me prouver qu'il n'entrait en
ce moment dans les vues du Cabinet Britannique aucune mefiance contre les
intentions de notre Auguste Maitre a Fegard de la Turquie. Mais qu'en emet-
tant I'opinion ci-dessus exposee, ce Cabinet n'avait fait autre chose que de se
premunir contre les attaques qu'il lui est facile de prevoir, s'il se prfetait a des
concessions qu'on pourrait representer comme une atteinte port oe a l'honneur
de la nation Anglaise.
Apres avoir eeoute avec une attention serieuse la communication dont ie
F 3L2 J

444
vietts de rendre compte, j'ai repondu aussit6t a Lord Palmerston, que dans un de
nos precedens entretiens je lui avais deja fait connaitre les ordres formels dont
j'etais muni relativement a la question des pavilions etrangers dans la Mer de
Marmora. Que mes instructions a cet egard etaient trop precises pour qu'il me fut
permis de m'en eloigner.
Qu'il ne m'appartenait assurement pas de m'eriger en juge des considerations
sur lesquelles se fondait I'avis des Membres du Conseil.
Que si leur determination a ce sujet etait prise, la mienne devait Petre
egalement. Que la volonte de l'Empereur etant pour moi la seule regie de ma conduite,
je devais m'arreter au point ou nous etions parvenus ; rapporter fidelement a. ma
Cour les reflexions qu'il venait de me communiquer ; et reserver entierement a.
l'Empereur de porter sur elles un jugement qui n'appartient qu'a lui seul.
Que pour ma part, j'etais persuade que dans aucun cas, et lors-meme que les
vues des deux Cabinets ne pouvaient pas s'accorder, notre auguste Maitre ne
regretterait jamais d'avoir donne a PAngleterre dans cette circonstance grave une
preuve spontanee d'amitie et de confiance.
Que je croyais avoir suffisamment rempli ses intentions, si j'etais parvenu a.
convaincre le Cabinet Britannique de la sincerite des intentions de Sa Majeste
Imperiale, ainsi que des dispositions amicales qu'elle a constamment vouees a la
Grande Bretagne.
Que si ces dispositions etaient reconnues ici comme elles meritent de Petre,
je me feliciterais de n'avoir pas inutilemcnt employe mes soins et mes efforts.
Mais que je croyais avoir atteint maintenant les dernieres limites de la tache
qui m'avait ete imposee, et que si la decision du Conseil telle qu'il venait de me
la faire connaitre, etait definitivement arretee, il ne me restait qu'a suspendre le
cours de nos deliberations et a, en referer a l'Empereur, en lui soumettant la
difficulte que venait d'opposer a mes demarches un obstacle qu'il ne dependaitpas
de moi de faire disparaitre, a moins de devier du sens strict de mes instructions,
ce que je ne me permettrais de faire dans aucun cas, sans la volonte expresse de
l'Empereur. Lord Palmerston a parfaitement reconnu la valeur et la justesse des motifs
qui m'empediaient de passer outre. 11 m'a annonce qu'il informerait incessam-
ment le Marquis de Clanricarde de tout ce qui venait de se passer entre nous,
ainsi que des difficulties qui ne nous avaient point permis d'en venir a. un arrange
ment definitif sur la Question d'Egypte. De mon cote, je Pai prevenu que je
soumettrai a. ma Cour un recit fidde de notre entretien. Et pour m'assurer
davantage de Pexactitude avec laquelle j'aurai saisi ses idees, je lui ai annonce
que je placerai sous ses yeux, avant de Pexpedier, le rapport que j'allais adresser
a votre Excellence. II m'a promis a son tour qu'il me communiquerait d'avance
les depeches qu'il allait adresser a Lord Clanricarde.
Apres vous avoir indique, M. le Comte, le point d'arret qui a mis obstacle a
la poursuite de ma negociation, je m'abstiendrai d'entrer ici dans de plus amples
developpemens sur les explications que nous avons echangees sur la question
theorique et pratique d'une co-operation navale.
Les observations faites de part et d'autre sur cette combinaison n'ont
presente d'ailleurs rien de nouveau. A mes yeux, cette question est totalement
epuisee. Chacun est reste de son avis sans convaincre et sans faire ceder Pautre.
II n'a certainement pas dependu de moi de resoudre cette difficulte a la satis
faction mutuelle des deux Cabinets. Tout ce que j'ai pu faire c'est d'empecher
qu'elle ne devint entre eux un sujet de controverse, et d'eviter par la que ma
mission, concue dans un esprit de sincere bienveillance de la part de notre
Auguste Maitre, ne finit par provoquer une discussion f&cheuse entre la Russie et
la Grande Bretagne.
Cet ecueil je crois heureusement Pavoir evite : je dirai plus; j'ai tout lieu
d'esperer que ma mission a produit le bon effet qu'elle etait destinee a atteindre
et qu'elle a contribue utilement a. convaincre le Cabinet Britannique des senti
mens eleves qui animent notre Auguste Maitre, ainsi que de ses dispositions
amicales envers le Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne.
J'aime a. penser que cette impression continuera a reagir favorablement sur
les communications ulterieures entre les deux Cours.
Pour le moment, ce qui m'a semble de la plus grande urgence, c'est de faire
en sorte que la suspension de Parrangement definitif entre PAngleterre et notre

445
Cabinet relativement aux affaires de l'Orient, ne devint une cause d'ajournement
pour retarder et pour entraver les mesures de salut que reclame imperieusement la
situation precaire de l'Empire Ottoman.
Sous ce rapport, j'ai tire un grand parti des reflexions que Sa Majeste
l'Empereur a adressees personnellement au Marquis de Clanricarde, ainsi que de
celles dont votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part en m'adressant sa depeche
du 9 Septembre.
Les informations qu'elle m'a communiquees sur I'etat d'incertitude et de
disorganisation morale ouse trouve la Porte, m'ont mis a meme d'insister aupres
de Lord Palmerston sur la necessite de prendre enfin quelques mesures energiques
pour reprimer les projets audacieux du Pacha d'Egypte, et pour le disposer a.
souscrire a une transaction basee sur des conditions equitables.
L'urgence qu'il y a d'adopter a cet effet une attitude plus prononcee est
suffisamment reconnue par le Ministere Anglais lui-meme. Mais s'il hesite a
arreter a. cet egard une determination energique, c'est qu'il a a lutter en realite
contre une double difficulte.
La premiere est, qu'il ne voudrait pas courir la chance de pousser M#hemet
Ali a marcher sur Constantinople tant que PAngleterre n'est point parvenue a
s'entendre prealablement avec nous, sur le mode d'une action commune destinee
a mettre Constantinople a Pabri d'une invasion ennemie.
La seconde est, qu'il prefererait que la France ne restat point en dehors des
mesures qui seraient dirigees contre Mehemet Ali, tandis que cette Puissance
resiste depuis deux mois a toutes les propositions qu'on lui a faites d'ici pour
l'engager a se porter contre le Vice-Roi a l'emploi de la menace et de la force.
Ainsi place dans la double incertitude, d'une part de ne pouvoir pas compter
sur une entente avec nous lorsqu'elle n'existe pas encore, de Pautre sur une
co-operation du Gouvernement Francais lorsqu'elle a ete obstinement refusee
jusqu'ici, le Cabinet Britannique eprouve une hesitation qui neutralise les mesures
qu'il voudrait prendre pour appuyer et defendre les interets de la Porte.
Les motifs de cette hesitation, M. le Comte, expliquent pourquoi PAngle
terre s'est abstenue jusqu'a ce jour d'adopter une attitude decisive a Fegard de
l'Egypte. Cependant il m'a semble que le moment etait venu ou cette hesitation
devrait ceder a des considerations plus graves. En effet, dans un moment ou
chaque jour de perdu en discussions steriles contribue a aggraver la situation de
FEmpire Ottoman et peut la conduire vers sa chute, j'ai pense qu'il etait de
mon devoir de faire un appel direct a la sagesse du Gouvernement Anglais pour
le decider a ne point differer plus longtems d'interposer les moyens d'action en
son pouvoir, afin de briser la resistance de Mehemet Ali.
C'est sur cette necessite que j'ai appele Pattention du Principal Secretaire
d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangeres dans un second entretien que j'ai eu avec lui
dans la journee du 3 Octobre.
Je lui ai fait sentir que le tems qui s'ecoulerait pour ecrire d'ici a Lord
Clanricarde et pour en recevoir des reponses a la suite de notre entretien de la
veille, pourrait devenir mortel pour la Porte ; que dans I'etat ou elle se trouve,
chaque heure semble la rapprocher de sa ruine ; et qu'il n'y a qu'une action
prompte et energique de la part de PAngleterre qui puisse la preserver d'une •
catastrophe imminente.
A l'appui de cette verite, j'ai place sous les yeux de Lord Palmerston une
carte de l'Asie Mineure, et lui indiquant les deux points de Tenedos et
d'AIexandrie, je lui ai dit, "Voila oil votre eseadre se trouve aujourd'hui, et voila
ou elle devrait etre pour sauver FEmpire Ottoman."
Pour preciser davantage les reflexions que j'avais a coeur de soumettre dans
cette grave conjoncture a l'examen approfondi de Lord Palmerston, je lui ai
demande la permission de lui donner lecture d'un apercu rapide que j'avais trace
dans le but de rendre clairement compte au Ministere Anglais lui-meme de la
situation actuelle des choses en Orient, et des mesures qu'il me semblait urgent
de prendre pour abattre Paudace de Mehemet Ali.
Cet apercu, entierement degage de toute consideration liee a notre propre
politique, est redige avec une parfaite impartialite, comme s'il avait ete concu
dans Pinteret seul de l'honneur et de la dignite de la Grande Bretagne.
En tracant ce travail, je n'ai pas hesite un seul instant a. croire que notre
Auguste Maitre daignerait approuver les intentions dans lesquelles je Fai redige,

446
persuade comme je le suis, que je serai assez heureux de meriter toujours son
approbation, lorsque, mettant de c6te toute consideration personnelle d*interet et
d'amour-propre, je consacrerai mes efforts a la cause commune du maintien de la
paix generate, et de la bonne intelligence entre la Russie et FAngleterre. C'est
dans cette persuasion que j'ose soumettre a votre Excellence le travail ci-joint,
tel que je Pai communique a Lord Palmerston.
Ce Ministre, sans me dissimuler Pimpossibilite ou se trouverait PAngleterre
de se charger a elle seule d'une action decisive a Fegard de l'Egypte, est convenu
pourtant envers moi, qu'il ne serait guere possible non plus de rester dans une
inaction absolue, et qu'il fallait faire quelque chose pour venir au secours de la
Porte, afin de ne pas exposer les Cours Europeennes au blame d'avoir piomis au
Sultan une assistance qu'elles n'ont pas le moyen delui preter, — aveu de faiblesse
et d'im puissance qui serait aux yeux du monde une veritable atteinte portee a la
dignite des Grandes Cours.
Quel que soit le resultat que puisse produire cet essai, il aura du moins
Favantage d'avoir constate positivement aux yeux du Ministere Anglais, d'abord",
que nous desirons sincerement une action destinee a sauver FEmpire Ottoman ;
en second lieu, que nous ne serions nullement jaloux du role que FAngleterre
jbuerait pour exercer une influence salutaire sur la Question d'Egypte; de plus, que
ce n'est point la Russie qui tient a s'attribuer dans cette crise une part prepon-
derante; enfin, que ce n'est pas notre Cabinet non plus qui veut gener ni
embarrasser I'e moins du monde la position du Gouvernement Britannique; et
que si ce dernier peut decider la France a se joindre aux mesures coercitives qu'il
prendrait contre Mehemet Ali, une pareille action collective, sans etre pour nous
un motif de jalousie et de mefiance, rencontrerait au contraire notre entier assen
timent, de meme qu'elle a obtenu Padhesion la plus franche de notre Auguste
Maitre, a. 1'epoque ou Sa Majeste a daigne se prononcer a ce meme sujet, il y a
Un an, lors de son sejour a Tceplitz.
Je dirai plus, si PAngleterre peut reussir a ecarter Popposition que la France
a elevee jusqu' ici contre 1'emploi des mesures coercitives envers l'Egypte,
en ce cas, l'Empereur verrait avec satisfaction que la mission dont il m'a
charge ait pu concourir a influcr moralement sur les determinations du
Gouvernment Francais, et k vaincre la resistance opiniatre qu'il avait opposee jus
qu'ici aux demarches concues a Londres dans Pinteret Europeen de la pacification
du Levant. Au moment de terminer ce rapport, il m'est permis d'esperer encore, que
le resultat que je viens de signaler ici pourra etre obtenu, et que le Ministere
Anglais parviendra a surmonter les difficultes que la France n'a cesse de faire
naitre depuis si longtems, de maniere a compliquer tous les jours davantage
la Question d'Egypte.
Si je pouvais quitter Londres avec la certitude que ces difficultes ont ete
heureusement vaincues, et que le Cabinet Britannique a reussi d'a nener la
France a se joindre a une action efficace dirigee contre Mehemet Ali, je me feli-
citerais de pouvoir annoncer a votre Excellence un resultat qui repondrait si
utilement a la sollicitude que notre Auguste Maitre ne cesse de vouer a l'afler-
missement du repos de l'Orient.

(Translation.)
Baron Brunnow to Count Nesselrode. — (Communicated confidentially by
Baron Brunnow.)
(Extract.) London, s<-*™»" « i«39
THE very day that the Cabinet Council assembled at Windsor to
deliberate upon the affair of Egypt, I received the despatch of the 9th of
September, in which your Excellency enjoined me to make you, as soon as
possible, acquainted with the decision which the British Government was
about to take with respect to that important question.
I immediately requested an interview of Lord Palmerston. The Note
which I wrote to him on this point crossed the invitation which he on his

447
part addressed to me, to call upon him in town, where he would arrive the
following day, the 2nd of October.
I will endeavour to lay before your Excellency a summary of this con
versation, which we resumed the following day, the 3rd of October; and
which, taken together, will enable you, M. le Comte, to form for yourself an
exact opinion of the nature of the views which the Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs was pleased to communicate to me with a degree of
sincerity to which I cannot sufficiently render justice.
He began by telling me, that the Council had taken into serious con
sideration the overtures with which I had been entrusted.
That it had not hesitated to admit and strongly to appreciate the sin
cerity of the intention by which those overtures had been dictated.
That on this point the opinion of all the Members of the Cabinet was
unanimous, so as to pay the tribute which is due to the rectitude of the
intentions of our august Master.
That the desire manifested by the Emperor to come to an amicable
understanding with England, with respect to the Affairs of the East, was in
entire conformity with the wishes of the British Cabinet; but that the latter
is under the necessity of not losing sight of many considerations which make it
expedient for it to observe great caution in its proceedings, in order not to
run directly counter to opinions which it is important to it that it should
have regard for.
Lord Palmerston, on this point, entered into very detailed explanations,
which I will endeavour, M. le Comte, to repeat in this place, while I report
to you, as faithfully as possible, the very words employed by this Minister.
"The opinion of my Colleagues," said he, "is loudly expressed 'in
favour of the same principles as those which you have set forth on the part of
your Cabinet, for the maintenance of the independence and the preservation of
the Ottoman Empire. Like you, we desire to act for this purpose in concert with
you, and to dedicate thereto a common action. We should be determined to
act in this manner with all the Cabinets who might be willing to concur with us
for the attainment of this object. We should be ready to proceed in this
course with France, and even vdthout her, if she refused to join therein. We
persist in thinking that our efforts should be directed to reinstate the Sultan
in the possession of Syria. We do not conceal from ourselves that this result
cannot be obtained without a display of force designed to overcome the
resistance of the Pasha.
"Still, neither can we overlook that the employment of these measures
might lead Mehemet Ali to adopt an extreme resolution, and to march his
Army on Constantinople.
" If this contingency should occur, we are the first to admit the neces
sity of seeing Russia interpose her material force to ensure the safety of the
capital of the Ottoman Empire. But in that case, my Colleagues are of
opinion that it would be desirable and necessary that the military intervention
of Russia in the Bosphorus, should not have the appearance of excluding our
co-operation. "According to the unanimous opinion of the Council, the military
intervention of Russia, if it should become necessary for the protection and
defence of Constantinople, ought to take place in such a manner as that it
might be combined wiih a certain degree of co-operation and assistance on the
part of the naval forces of England.
"This co-operation might be settled so as not to blend and not to bring
in contact the forces of one Power with those of the other. This distinction
would even be the result of a principle on which we are already agreed. As
a general proposition, we look upon the two Straits of Constantinople as
closed to the flag of war of foreign nations. Consequently, if as an excep
tion to this rule, and for the common interests of the defence of the Ottoman
Empire, one of those Straits should be opened to youi naval forces, it would
be just and natural, that in pursuance of the same exception, the other of
tho^e Straits should equally admit our naval forces. They would appear there
by no means with the intention of confining or controuling your action. Each of
the two Straits would be placed under the protection of die respective Powers,

448
whose forces would in this manner remain separated, and would not find
themselves in presence of each other. You on one side, we on the other,
would be there to prevent the Egyptian Army from crossing the canal of
Constantinople. Placed at a distance from each other, the respective forces
would run no risk of coming in contact. Besides, the numerical disproportion
which would exist between them, would evidently show that our co
operation could have no hostile tendency with respect to you ; for the
presence of three or four ships of the line which we should send there,
would assuredly not be calculated to compete with your land and
sea forces concentrated in the Bosphorus. All that would be neces
sary for us, would be to prove to the nation, that we have not consented
to allow ourselves to be excluded from a common operation, having for
its object to preserve the Capital of the Ottoman Empire ; that we have not
formally agreed to a principle by which Russia would be empowered to
exercise that protectorate alone.
" It is not therefore from mistrust as to the intentions of the Emperor,
whom we respect, nor from jealousy of Russia, with whom we are sincerely
desirous of proceeding together, but only from the considerations above-men
tioned that it is impossible for us to accede to an arrangement by which we
should ourselves pronounce the absolute exclusion of our flag from a quarter
where we should in principle establish the isolated presence of yours."
It is in these terms that Lord Palmerston communicated to me the
decision of the Council. He did so in a manner which proved to me that the
British Cabinet at the present time entertained no mistrust as to the in
tentions of our August Master with regard to Turkey. But that in expressing
the opinion above set forth, it had merely guarded itself against the attacks
which it is easy for it to anticipate, in the event of its lending itself to con
cessions which might be represented as an injury done to the honour of the
British Nation.
After having listened with serious attention to the communication of which
I have just given an account, I immediately replied to Lord Palmerston, that
in one of our previous conversations, I had already acquainted him with the
formal orders which I was furnished with relative to the question of foreign
flags in the Sea of Marmora.
That my instructions in this respect were too precise to admit of my
deviating from them.
That it certainly was no business of mine to make myself a judge of the
considerations on which the opinion of the Members of the Council rested.
That if their determination was taken on this matter, mine must be so
likewise. That the will of the Emperor being for me the sole rule of my conduct, I
must stop at the point at which we had arrived; faithfully report to my
Court the observations which he had just imparted to me ; and wholly reserve
to the Emperor to pronounce upon them a decision which rested with himself
alone. That for my part, I was satisfied that our August Master would never,
in any case, and even if the views of the two Cabinets could not be reconr
died, regret that he had given to England in this serious matter a spon
taneous proof of friendship and of confidence.
That I considered that I had sufficiently fulfilled his intentions, if I had
succeeded in convincing the British Cabinet of the sincerity of the intentions
of His Imperial Majesty, as well as of the friendly dispositions which he has
constantly entertained towards Great Britain.
That if those dispositions were appreciated here as they deserve to be,
I should consider myself happy in not having unprofitably employed my care
and my efforts.
But that I conceived, that I had now reached the extreme limits of the
duty which had been assigned to me, and that if the decision of the Council,
such as he had just announced it to me, was definitively taken, it only re^-
mained for me to suspend our discussions, and to refer the matter to the
Emperor, explaining to him the difficulty which had opposed to my proceed
ings an obstacle which it did not rest with me to remove, unless I deviated

449
from the strict sense of my instruction, which I could in no case allow myself
to do without the express sanction of the Emperor.
Lord Palmerston fully admitted the weight and justice of the motives
which hindered me from going further. He stated to me, that he would
immediately acquaint the Marquess of Clanricarde with what had passed
between us, and also with the difficulties which, had not permitted us to
come to a definitive arrangement on the question of Egypt. On my part,T
informed him, that I will submit to my Court a faithful narrative of our con
versation. And to assure myself the more of the exactness with which I shall
have caught his ideas, I told him that I shall place before him the report
which I was about to address to your Excellency, before sending it off. He
promised me on his part that he would beforehand communicate to me the
despatches he was about to address to Lord Clanricarde.
After having explained to you, M. le Comte, the obstacle which has
prevented the continuance of my negotiation, I will abstain from entering
here into more ample details respecting the explanations which passed be
tween us on the theoretical and practical question of a naval co-operation.
Moreover, the observations on either side upon this combination offered
no novelty. In my view of the case, this question is altogether exhausted.
Each party remained of his own opinion, without convincing, and without
inducing the other to give way. It certainly did not depend upon me to solve
this difficulty to the mutual satisfaction of the two Cabinets. All that I could
do was, to prevent it from becoming a subject of controversy between them,
and thereby to secure my mission, which was planned by our August Master
in a spirit of sincere goodwill, fron ending in provoking a disagreeable
discussion between Russia and Great Britain.
This rock I conceive I have fortunately avoided : I will say more ; I have
every reason to hope that my mission has produced the good effect which it
was designed to accomplish, and that it has advantageously contributed
to satisfy the British Cabinet of the exalted sentiments by which our August
Master is animated, as well as of his friendly dispositions towards the Govern
ment of Great Britain.
I would fain think, that this impression will continue to operate favoura
bly upon the further communications between the two Courts.
For the moment, that which appears to me most important is, to contrive
that the suspension of the definitive arrangement between England and our
Cabinet, with respect to the affairs of the East, should not be the occasion of
delay, so as to retard and to impede the measures of salvation which the
precarious situation of the Ottoman Empire imperatively calls for.
On this point, I have derived great advantage from the observations
which His Majesty the Emperor addressed personally to the Marquess of
Clanricarde, as well as from those which your Excellency was so good as to
impart to me in your despatch of the 9th of September.
The particulars which you communicated to me, as to the state of uncer
tainty and of moral disorganisation in which the Porte is situated, enabled
me to urge upon Lord Palmerston the necessity of taking at length some
energetic measures to repress the daring projects of the Pasha of Egypt, and
to dispose him to submit to an arrangement based upon equitable conditions.
The urgency which exists for adopting, for this purpose, a more decided
attitude is sufficiently admitted by the English Ministry itself. But if it
hesitates to take an energetic determination in this respect, it is because it
has to struggle against a twofold difficulty.
The first is, that it would not wish to run the risk of driving Mehemet
Ali into marching upon Constantinople, so long as England has not come to
a previous understanding with us as to the mode of a common action, having
for its object to place Constantinople in security against an hostile attack.
The second is, that it would prefer that France should not remain aloof
from the measures which might be employed against Mehemet Ali, whilst
that Power resists for the last two months all the proposals which have been
made to it from hence to induce it to lend itself to the employment of
menace and of force against the Viceroy.
Placed thus in the twofold uncertainty of being unable to reckon, on the
one hand, upon an understanding with us, since it does not yet exist ; on the
3M

450
other, upon a co-operation with the French Government, since it has
hitherto been obstinately refused, the British Cabinet feels a degree of hesi
tation which neutralises the measures which it would desire to take, to sup
port and defend the interests of the Porte.
The reasons of this hesitation explain, M. le Comte, why England has
abstained, up to this time, from adopting a decisive attitude with regard to
Egypt. Nevertheless, it has appeared to me, as if the moment had arrived when
this hesitation must give way to more weighty considerations. In fact, at a
time when every day lost in unprofitable discussions contributes to aggravate
the situation of the Turkish Empire, and may bring it to destruction, I have
considered it my duty to make a direct appeal to the wisdom of the English
Government, to induce it no longer to delay the interposition of the means of
action at its disposal, in order to crush the resistance of Mehemet Ali.
It is to this necessity that I called the attention of the Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, in a second interview which I had with him on
the 3rd of October.
1 impressed upon him, that the time which must elapse in writing from
hence to Lord Clanricarde, and in receiving his reply, in consequence of our
conversation of the preceding day, might be fatal to the Porte ; that in its
present state, every hour seemed to bring it nearer to its destruction ; and
that nothing but a prompt and energetic action, on the part of England, could
preserve it from an imminent catastrophe.
In support of this truth, I placed before Lord Palmerston a map of Asia
Minor; and, pointing out to him the two spots of Tenedos and Alexandria, I
said to him, " See where your squadron now is, and see where it ought to be
to preserve the Ottoman Empire."
To explain more precisely the considerations which I was desirous at
this momentous crisis to submit to the serious examination of Lord Palmerston,
I requested his permission to read to him a hasty minute which I had sketched
out, in order clearly to explain to the English Ministry itself the actual state
of affairs in the East, and the measures which it appeared to me to be urgent
to adopt, with a view to humble the audacity of Mehemet Ali.
This minute, wholly divested of every consideration connected with our
own policy, is drawn up with perfect impartiality, just as if it were composed
with a view only to promote the honour and dignity of Great Britain.
In sketching out this paper, I have not hesitated a single moment to
suppose, that our August Master wnuld be pleased to approve the intentions
with which I have drawn it up, being sure, that I shall be happy enough
always to merit his approbation, when, laying aside every personal conside
ration of interest and self-love, I shall employ my efforts for the common cause
of the maintenance of the general peace, and of the good understanding
between Russia and England. It is under this persuasion, that I venture to
lay before your Excelleney the annexed document such as I communicated
it to Lord Palmerston.
That Minister, without concealing from me the impossibility of England
undertaking alone to act decidedly with respect to Egypt, nevertheless agreed
with methatitstill was scarcely possible to remain in a state of absolute inaction,
and that something must be done to succour the Porte, in order not expose
the Courts of Europe to the reproach of having promised to the Sultan assist
ance which they have not the means of affording, — an admission of feeble
ness and weakness, which in the eyes of the world would be a real affront to
the dignity of the Great Courts.
Whatever result may be produced by this attempt, it will at least have
the advantage of having positively proved to the English Ministry, first, that
we sincerely desire a course of action, having for its object to preserve the Otto
man Empire ; secondly, that we should be in nowise jealous of the part which
England might play in order to exercise a salutary influence on the question
of Egypt ; further, that it is not Russia wdio clings to assigning to herself a
preponderating part in the present crisis ; lastly, that neither is it our Cabinet
which would in the least constrain or embarrass the position of the British Go
vernment ; and that if the latter can induce France to join in the coercive
measures which it might have recourse to against Mehemet Ali, such conjoint

451
action, instead of being to us a motive for jealousy and distrust, would on the
contrary meet with our entire concurrence, in the same manner as it received
the most frank adhesion of our August Master, at the time when His Majesty
was pleased to declare himself on this same matter, a year ago, when he was
staying at Toplitz.
I will say further, that if England can succeed in setting aside the oppo
sition which, up to this time, France has offered to the employment of measures
of coercion against Egypt, in that case, the Emperor would see with satis
faction that the mission which he entrusted me with, may have contributed
to produce a moral influence on the determination of the French Govern
ment, and to overcome the obstinate resistance which up to this time it had
offered to the measures devised in London for the advancement of the Euro
pean interest of the pacification of the Levant.
While closing this report, I have still reason to hope, that the result which
I have just indicated, will be obtained, and that the English Ministry will sur
mount the difficulties which France for so long a time has not ceased to originate,
so as to render the Question of Egypt every day more complicated.
If I could leave London with the certainty that these difficulties have
happily been surmounted, and that the British Cabinet has succeeded in in
ducing France to unite in an effective system of action against Mehemet Ali, I
should congratulate myself on being able to announce to your Excellency a
result which would so advantageously respond to the solicitude which cur
August Master does not cease to devote to the establishment of the repose of
the East.

Inclosure in No. 353.
Baron Brunnow's Memorandum on Eastern Affairs.
(Extrait.) Octobre, 1839.
DANS la crise actuelle de l'Orient, il est un fait qui enhardit Mehemet
Ali et decourage la Porte : c'est Finaction de PAngleterre. Car ce fait prouve
d'une part, qu'il y a disaccord entre les Grandes Puissances ; de l'autre, inde
cision de la part de PAngleterre elle-meme.
Le jour ou celle-ci se decidera a agir, la Porte reprendra courage et les
esperances de Mehemet Ali s'evanouiront.
Tout le secret de resoudre la crise du moment d'une maniere prompte et
pacifique, consistera done a. faire croire aux Musulmans que Paccord entre les
Puissances Europeennes existe.
Pour cela il ne faut pas un grand deployement de forces ; il faut seulement
une resolution prompte et energique, calculee de maniere a produire une forte
sensation sur la Turquie aussi bien que sur l'Egypte.
C'est sur cette conviction que se fonde le plan d'operation expose ci- apres.
II a pour but : —
1°. De rassurer la Porte et d'empecher au sein de la capitale de cet Empire
cette disorganisation politique et morale qui y fait tous les jours de plus alarmans
progres.ss. 2°. D'empecher Ibrahim de mettre a execution la menace qu'il a faite de se
porter en avant, si dans un certain espace de tems donne le Sultan ne souscrivait
point aux termes de Parrangement propose par le Pacha d'Egypte.
3°. D'influer fortement sur les determinations de ce dernier, pour le porter
a moderer ses pretentions et a transiger avec la Turquie a des conditions
equitables. Le plan qu'il s'agirait d'adopter, serait done destine a. agir simultanement
sur Constantinople, sur la Syrie, et sur Alexandrie.
Selon le plus ou moins de vigueur que Pon voudra employer a I'execution de
ce plan, on peut y proceder de trois manieres differentes.
3 M2

452
Maximum du Plan d' Operation.
Constantinople.
Declarer a la Porte qu'elle peut compter sur la ferme resolution du
Gouvernement Britannique d'appuyer efficaceraeut ses vrais interets ; qu'elle ne
doit ni se livrer a un fatal decouragement, ni se pr£ter a des concessions humi-
liantes pour le Sultan ; mais attendre avec confiance le resultat des efforts que
FAndeterre fera dans un parfait accord avec ses Allies ; lui annoncer que dans
ce but, FAmiral Stopford vient de recevoir des ordres positifs qui attesteront
hautement a la face de l'Europe Pattitude que le Gouvernement Britannique est
resolu de prendre pour reprimer les projets ambitieux de Mehemet Ali.

Syrie.
Donner a FAmiral Stopford I'ordre : — 1°. De se porter avec son eseadre sur
les cotes de la Syrie, en etablissant sa station selon que la saison et les circonstances
locales le lui conseilleront, dans la baie de Iskenderoon, ou sur tel autre point
qui lui presentera le plus de securite.
2°. De detacher un nombre de vaisseaux qu'il jugera suffisant pour aller
occuper, soit par surprise, soit de vive force, les ports sur la cote qui servent
de principaux depots militaires et de communication entre l'Egypte et I'armee
d'Ibrahim ; a cet effet, la situation de Lattakie et de Bayrouth semblerait d'autant
plus importante que leur voisinage des villes d'Alep et de Damas est fait pour
agir sur les populations de ces villes, ainsi que sur les tribus Druzes, ou regne le
plus de mecontentement contre Padministration oppressive du Vice-Roi.
3°. D'envoyer un officier superieur au quartier-general d'Ibrahim, pour lui
declarer, que s'il fait un seul pas en avant, au mepris des promesses formelles que
Mehemet Ali a donnees aux Puissances Europeennes, FAngleterre se verra
obligee de regarder le Pacha d'Egypte comme traitre a sa parole et comme dechu de
son pouvoir ; que des-lors elle armera au nom de la Porte les populations de
la Syrie toute entiere, et frappera Mehemet Ali de toute la rigueur que reclamera
Finfraction qu'il aurait faite aux engagemens qu'il avait pris de respecter le repos
de l'Orient, que toutes les Grandes Puissance ont egalement a cceur de maintenir
et de defendre.
4°. De capturer tous les vaisseaux sous pavilion Egyptien qui auront a bord
des munitions de guerre destinees a l'Armee d'Egypte.

Egypte.
Envoyer simultanement un officier superieur a. Alexandrie pour faire exacte
ment la meme declaration a Mehemet Ali, en y ajoutant de plus, que si Ibrahim
marche, PAngleterre, sans jalousie et sans mefiance aucune, sera la premiere a
appeler la Russie au secours de la Porte.
Ces mesures si elles sont promptement executees, permettent de croire avec
une entiere certitude: d'abord, qu'Ibrahim, menace devoir couper ses com
munications avec l'Egypte, n'osera point s'avancer au centre de PAsie Mineure ;
en second lieu, que Pcventualite d'une intervention militaire Russe dans le
Bosphore cessera par consequent de se realiser ; troisiemement, que la position
prise par FAngleterre sur les cotes de la Syrie, ebranlera fortement dans cette
contree I'autorite de Mehemet Ali et y amenera peut-6tre un etat de choses qui*
sans coup ferir, pourra faire rentrer cette province sous la domination de la Porte, si
les populations desirent reellement un pareil retour ; enfin, que dans tout etat
de cause, la Porte negociera une transaction definitive avec l'Egypte, sous des
auspices bien plus favorables, lorsque FAmiral Stopford aura pris pied sur les
cotes de la Syrie, que lorsqu'il est a Fancre devant Tenedos.

453

Medium du Plan d* Operation.
Declaration rassurante a Constantinople concue dans les memes termes
ci-dessus indiques ; — Ordre a FAmiral Stopford de se porter sur les cotes de la
Syrie pour intercepter les communications entre ce pays et l'Egypte ; — capturer
les vaisseaux sous pavilion Egyptien ; — envoyer un officier a Ibrahim charge d'un
message comminatoire dans le meme esprit que nous avons ci-dessus indique ; — •
faire une declaration analogue a, Mehemet Ali.
Minimum.
Declaration rassurante a Constantinople ; — Ordre a FAmiral Stopford
d'etablir sa station a File de Rhodes ou a celle de Chypre ; — d'envoyer un
detachement pour croiser sur les cotes de la Syrie et renvoyer les batimens qui
portent des munitions de guerre a l'Armee d'Egypte; — expddier un officier a
Ibrahim pour lui declarer que s'il avance, PAngleterre rendra Mqhemet Ali et
toute sa famille responsable des consequences que pourra entrainer la reprise des
hostilites. Meme declaration a Alexandrie.
Observations generates.
1°. Executer toutes ces mesures avec la plus grande promptitude et le plus
grand secret. Promptitude, — parceque c'est Je seul moyen d'en assurer le succes;
secret, parcequ'il faut frapper d'abord le coup avant de l'annoncer.
2°. En declarant a Mehemet Ali que si Ibrahim marche, FAngleterre sera
la premiere a inviter la Russie a venir au secours de la Porte, le Gouvernement
Britannique produit Peffet qu'il importe essentiellement d'obtenir, car il fait
voir a Mehemet Ali que Paccord entre PAngleterre et la Russie existe.
3°. Si le Gouvernement Britannique le j uge indispensable, FAmiral Stopford
pourra laisser un detachement de 3 a 4 vaisseaux a Tenedos, bien qu'il soit
preferable qu'il ait a sa disposition toutes ses forces reunies, que de les diviser.
4°. En ce qui concerne la France, PAngleterre en adoptant la marche
ci-dessus indiquee, n'empecherait en rien que le Cabinet des Tuileries vint s'y
associer, s'il le jugeait a propos. Le Gouvernement Britannique commencerait
seulement par agir d'abord sans se laisser retenir davantage par la resistance
que le Ministere Francais a opposee depuis trois mois a toutes les propositions
qui lui ont ete successivement adressees par le Cabinet de Londres. La France
serait libre de suivre le mouvement de PAngleterre, mais celle-ci serait assure-
ment dans son plein droit en usant de la liberte qu'elle a a son tour de marcher
en avant sans se laisser paralyser par une opposition qui, en derniere analyse,
finirait par assurer, sous la protection de la France, le triomphe de FEgypte et
la ruine de la Porte. Conclusion.
D'apres un mur examen, le plan tel qu'il vient d'etre expose ci-dessus,
semblerait reunir de grands avantages sans presenter le moindre inconvenient.
L'Angleterre en Padoptant agirait avec la dignite et Penergie qui appartient a
une Grande Puissance ; elle employerait le seul moyen qui reste, selon tous les
calculs de la prudence humaine, pour preserver l'Empire Ottoman d'une
catastrophe qui deviendra inevitable, si les Cabinets de l'Europe continuent
encore a discuter comme ils Pont fait jusqu'ici, sans probabilite aucune d'en venir
a une conclusion positive ; et s'ils hesitent encore plus longtems a prendre une
attitude forte pour imposer un frein aux projets ambitieux du Pacha d'Egypte.
, En, derniere analyse, PAngleterre, si elle se decide a agir, a une grande
chance de sauver l'Empire Ottoman; tandisque si elle n'agit point, elle a la
certitude que cet Empire croulera, ou du moins que le Sultan pour retarder cette
chute, sera contraint de subir toutes les conditions que Mehemet Ali voudra
Jui imposer ;— transaction desastreuse pour la Porte et humiliante pour tous les
Cabinets qui, apres avoir promis leur assistance et leur mediation a, la Turquie,
auront fini par Pabandonner sans defense.

454
(Translation.)
Baa-on Brunnow's Memorandum on Eastern Affairs. October, 1839.
IN the existing crisis of affairs in the East, there is one circumstance which
encourages Mehemet Ali, and discourages the Porte; this is, the inaction of
England. For this circumstance proves, on the one hand, that there is disunion
among the Great Powers ; on the other, the existence of indecision on the part of
England herself.
The day that England shall determine to act, the Porte will recover courage,
and the hopes of Mehemet Ali will vanish away.
The whole secret for bringing the present crisis to a solution, in a prompt and
peaceable manner, will consist therefore in inspiring the Mussulmans with the
belief that the European Powers are united.
For this purpose no great display of force is requisite : a prompt and ener
getic resolution, so devised as to produce a strong sensation in Turkey as well
as in Egypt, is all that is required.
It is on this persuasion that the plan of operations hereafter explained rests.
Its object is :
1st. To reassure the Porte, and to put a stop in the very capital of that
Empire to that political and moral disorganization which is there daily making
the most alarming progress.
2ndly. To prevent Ibrahim from carrying into execution the threat which he
has uttered of advancing, if within a given space of time the Sultan should not
consent to the terms of the arrangement proposed by the Pasha.
3rdly. To exert a strong influence over the determinations of the latter, in
order to induce him to moderate his pretensions, and to come to a settlement
with Turkey on equitable conditions.
The plan to be adopted then should be designed to operate at the same time
upon Constantinople, upon Syria, and upon Alexandria.
Three different courses may be adopted, according as it may be desired to
employ more or less vigour in the execution of this plan.
Maximum of the Plan of Operations.
Constantinople.
To declare to the Porte that it can rely upon the firm resolution of the
British Government effectually to support its real interests: that it must not give
way to fatal despondency, nor lend itself to concessions humiliating to the
Sultan ; but wait with confidence the result of the effort which England will
make in perfect concert with her Allies ; to announce to it that, for this end,
Admiral Stopford has received positive orders which will plainly manifest, in the
face of Europe, the attitude which the British Government is determined to
take, in order to repress the ambitious projects of Mehemet Ali.
Syria.
To order Admiral Stopford: 1st. To proceed with his squadron to the
Coast of Syria, and there station himself according as the season and local
circumstances shall render advisable, in the Bay of Scanderoon, or at such other
point as shall offer the greatest security.
2ndly. To detach what he may consider a sufficient number of ships, to
occupy, either by surprise or by force, the ports on the coasts which serve as the
principal military depots, and as points of communication between Egypt and the
Army of Ibrahim ; for this purpose the situation of Latakia and of Beyrout would
appear so much the more important, as their vicinity to the cities of Aleppo and
of Damascus is calculated to produce an influence on the people of those cities, as,
well as upon the Druse tribes, among whom the greatest discontent against the
oppressive administration of the Viceroy is prevalent.

455
3rdly. To send a superior officer to Ibrahim's head-quarters, to declare to
him, that if he advances a single step in disregard of the formal promises given
by Mehemet Ali to the European Powers, England will feel under the necessity
of considering the Pasha as a traitor to his word, and as having forfeited his
power ; that thereupon she will arm, in the name of the Porte, the people of the
whole of Syria, and will strike Mehemet Ali with all the force which shall be
called for by his infringement of the engagements taken by him to respect the
repose of the East, which all the Great Powers have equally at heart to maintain)
and to defend.
4thly. To capture all the vessels under the Egyptian flag which shall have on
board munitions of war destined for the Army of Egypt.
Egypt.
To send at the same time a superior officer to Alexandria, to make precisely
the same declaration to Mehemet Ali ; adding, moreover, that if Ibrahim should
march, England, without any jealousy and distrust, will be the first to summon
Russia to the assistance of the Porte.
These measures, if executed with promptitude, warrant us in believing
with certainty, — first, that Ibrahim, menaced with having his communica'tions
with Egypt cut off, will not dare to advance into the centre of Asia Minor ;
secondly, that the contingency of a military intervention of Russia in the
Bosphorus, will, consequently, not be realized ; thirdly, that the position assumed
by England on the coasts of Syria will greatly shake in that country the autho
rity of Mehemet Ali, and will, perhaps, bring on there a state of things which,
without a blow, will cause that province to return under the sway of the Porte,
if the people really desire so to return ; lastly, that in every state of the case,
the Porte will negotiate a definitive arrangement with Egypt under much more
favourable circumstances, when Admiral Stopford shall have taken up a position
on the coasts of Syria, than when he is at anchor before Tenedos.
Medium of the Plan of Operation.
An encouraging declaration at Constantinople, couched in the terms indi
cated above ; orders to Admiral Stopford to proceed to the coasts of Syria for the
purpose of cutting off the communications between that country and Egypt ; to
capture vessels under the Egyptian flag ; to send an officer to Ibrahim to convey
to him a threatening message in the same sense as that which we have suggested
above; to make a corresponding declaration to Mehemet Ali.
Minimum.
An encouraging declaration at Constantinople ; orders to Admiral Stopford
to take up a position at Rhodes or at Cyprus ; to send a detachment to cruize
on the coasts of Syria, and to turn away the vessels which may convey war
like stores to the army of Egypt; to despatch an officer to Ibrahim to declare
to him, that if he advances, England will make Mehemet Ali and all his family
responsible for the consequences which the resumption of hostilities may bring
on. The same declaration to be made at Alexandria.
General Observations.
1st. To execute all these measures with the greatest promptitude and with
the greatest secrecy. Promptitude, — because it is the only means of ensuring*
their success ; secrecy,-— because the blow must first be struck before it is
announced. 2ndly. By declaring to Mehemet Ali, that if Ibrahim marches, England1
will be the first to invite Russia to come to the assistance of the Prte, the
British Government produces the effect which it is of essential importance to
obtain, for it lets Mehemet Ali see, that union exists between England and-
Russia. 3rdly. If the British Government considers it indispensable, Admiral

456
Stopford can leave at Tenedos a detachment of three or four sail of the line,
although it were better that he should have at his disposal his whole forces
united, than that he should divide them.
4thly. As for France, England by adopting the course above pointed out,
would in no wise prevent the Cabinet of the Tuileries co-operating in it, if it
thought fit to do so. The British Government would merely commence by
acting in the first instance, without allowing itself to be any longer restrained by
the resistance which the French Ministry for the last three months has offered to
all the proposals which have successively been made to it by the Cabinet of
London. France would be free to follow the motions of England, but the latter
would surely be fully entitled to make use of the liberty which on her part she
possesses, of proceeding without suffering herself to be paralyzed by opposition,
which, in the last instance, would end by ensuring, under the protection of
France, the triumph of Egypt and the ruin of the Porte.
Conclusion.
After an attentive examination, the plan above sketched out would appear
to unite great advantages without offering the slightest inconvenience. England,
by adopting it, would act with the dignity and with the energy appertaining to a
Great Power; she would employ the only means which remain, according to all
calculations of human wisdom, for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire
from a catastrophe which will be inevitable, if the Cabinets of Europe still
continue to discuss, as they have hitherto done, without any probability of
arriving at a positive conclusion ; and if they still hesitate any longer to assume
a strong attitude in order to controul the ambitious projects of the Pasha of Egypt.
Finally, England, if she decides upon acting, has a great chance of saving
the Ottoman Empire ; whereas, if she does not act, she has the certainty that
that Empire will crumble to pieces, or, at least, that the Sultan, to delay its fall,
will be compelled to submit to all the conditions which Mehemet Ali shall
be willing to impose upon him ; an occurrence disastrous for the Porte, and
humiliating for all the Cabinets, which, after having promised their assistance**md
their mediation to Turkey, will have ended by abandoning her without defence.

No. 354.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 28.)
(Extract.) Paris, October 25, 1839.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 22nd of October.
Marshal Soult this morning read to me despatches dated the 7th, which he had
just received from Alexandria and from Constantinople. They first mention
rumours of Ibrahim Pasha having withdrawn his head-quarters from Marash to
Aleppo, and of insurrections having broken out in parts of Syria, but add, that
the truth of these rumours was very doubtful. Mehemet Ali had removed to
Cairo, as he says, for the benefit of his health by the change of air, and as said
by others, to be out of the way of further discussions with the European
Consuls. The French Ambassador in one of his despatches transmits a copy of a letter
addressed by Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha, written with the intention of
inducing the latter to enter into negotiations for peace without the intervention
of the European Powers ; and the Ambassador also reports the substance of a
despatch received by the Internuncio from Count Fiquelmont, recommending
that a peace should be concluded upon the basis of the Sultan conceding to
Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, and the government of
Syria, and of Candia, during the life of Mehemet Ali, holding out the hope,
that at his death these Pashalics may be divided among his children.
A courier arrived this morning at the Austrian Embassy from Prince
Metternich ; he is also charged with despatches to Prince Esterhazy, and will
proceed immediately to London. Count Appony read to me a despatch from
Prince Metternich, in which his Highness writes, that although his wishes are
always for the least possible concession being made by the Sultan to the demands

457

of Mehemet Ali, yet that the Austrian Government can now only wait until the
French and English Governments arrive at an agreement as to the conditions of
peace which the Great Powers shall propose to the respective parties.

No. 355.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 28.)
(Extract.) Paris, October 25, 1839.
THE French Government states, that if it were supposed that it has any
desire to aggrandize the Pasha of Egypt, such supposition is utterly groundless.
It would be well content not only to accede to an arrangement which should
deprive the Pasha of all the dominions he governed, excepting Egypt, but also to
one which should restore to the Sultan the possession of Egypt itself. The
question, however, is not what is desirable, but what is feasible; and it sees
not the means of driving Mehemet Ali out of Syria by force, or of so embar
rassing him by naval operations as to induce him to make the sacrifice of such
extensive and important dominions. France, whatever might be the intention
of its Government, could not furnish a military force for this purpose. England
is not prepared to send an army to Syria, nor are the Austrian and Prussian
Governments willing to employ their troops in such an enterprise. The execution
of it, therefore, could only be undertaken by Russia ; and considering the
difficulties which a Russian army would have to encounter, and the force which
Ibrahim Pasha could bring into the field, there may be doubts of the success of
its operations, but none as to the remeuy being worse than the disease.
The moral power of the Sultan would be far more seriously impaired by
having his empire and his capital protected by the arms of Russia, than by the
undue aggrandizement of his vassal; and the French Government never had
been more surprised than at the favourable consideration your Lordship had
given to the Baron Brunnow's proposition, that the troops of the Emperor
Nicholas should occupy Asia Minor, and the defence of Constantinople be
confided to a Russian force.
I have not failed to point out, that the proposal made by Baron Brunnow
implied the virtual abandonment of the principle hitherto asserted and acted
upon by the Russian Government, of not considering the affairs of Turkey an
European Question, and of excluding from all discussion with other Powers the
relations of the Ottoman Empire with Russia ; and that it was only under a Con
vention specially binding the Russian Government to withdraw its troops from
the territories of the Sultan when called upon to do so by the other Great Euro
pean Powers, that the protection of the Sultan from the Egyptian army would
have been confided to Russia.
The reply has been, that whatever confidence the English Government
may be disposed to place in the proposed Convention, such Convention would
not be an abrogation of the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty, but a sanction given by the
other Powers to the carrying that Treaty into execution, against which both
England and France had protested. In the present state of things, the French
Government says, it has only to wait the progress of events. It has com
municated to the other Powers its views in regard to bringing about a
peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. The conditions proposed are such
as the Pasha may be expected to accept, and which the Sultan might concede
with far less danger to the Turkish Empire than might result to it from an
attempt to enforce greater sacrifices from Mehemet Ali.

No. 356.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, October 29, 1839.
AS it appears that Ibrahim Pasha has retired from Marash, and as he does
not seem to indicate any intention of advancing upon Constantinople, Her
Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be expedient that Admiral
3 N

438
Sir Robert Stopford should be directed to proceed, with the squadron under his
command, to Smyrna, or to any other convenient anchorage on the coast of Asia
Minor, if the weather should compel him to leave Besika Bay.
This course would be better than that he should proceed to the White
Cliffs, unless some reason with which Her Majesty's Government is at present
unacquainted, should render it preferable for the squadron to go to the White
Cliffs. I have, therefore, to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that
instructions to the above effect may be given to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.
If, however, when those instructions reach Sir Robert Stopford, the squadron
should' already have anchored at the White Cliffs, and should find itself safe in
that anchorao-e, it may remain tliere until further instructions, or until Sir Robert
Stopford, with a view to his own arrangements, may find it more convenient to
go to Smyrna.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 357.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 29.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, October 18, 1839.
THE proposition of the French Cabinet, to which I referred in my last
despatch, is the same that has been made through M. de St. Aulaire to the
Austrian Government, and has been communicated to your Lordship.
M. de Barante tells me, that no answer has been given to it by Count
Nesselrode. I cannot learn that there is any truth in the reports lately circulated in
English and French newpapers, that the army in the south of Russia and on
the Turkish frontier has been augmented. But I am informed, that the number
of troops usually withdrawn during the winter months from the neighbourhood
of Odessa and Sevastopol, will be continued in their present station during the
winter : so that there will always be 20,000 men ready for embarkation at a
short notice.

No. 358.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, 'October 29, 1839.
YOUR Excellency will find in my despatches to Mr. Bulwer, an account of
the communications which have passed between Count Sebastiani and myself, upon
Turkish affairs up to a certain point of the negotiation. Subsequently to the
period to which those despatches relate, I had a conversation with Count
Sebastiani, in which I stated that Her Majesty's Government regretted extremely
that it was quite impossible for them to concur in the final arrangement between
the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which the Government of France recommended,
and which was to consist in granting to Mehemet Ali an hereditary tenure in
the government of all the territories and places which he now occupies, except
the small district of Adana, which the French Government proposed should be
immediately restored to the direct authority of the Sultan, and except also the
Island of Candia, which the French Government thought might, at the death of
Mehemet Ali, be given to one of his younger sons.
I said that such an arrangement would be a virtual dismemberment of the
Turkish Empire, the integrity of which France had spontaneously declared her
full determination to maintain; for such an arrangement would give to Mehemet
Ali independence in all but the name; it would leave him strnno-er than the
Sultan, and in the uncontrolled possession of the resources, financial and military,
of the best part of the Sultan's dominions. Mehemet Ali, therefore, would
require nothing in order to make himself independent, but the will to do so ; for

459
the Sultan would be entirely unable to prevent him from so doing. But
Mehemet Ali announced to the Powers of Europe very fi?aakly last year, that hig
object was independent sovereignty; that he would never give up his deter
mination to attain that object ; and that he was firmly resolved to accomplish it* .
If, therefore, the Five Powers were to help him half way on his road, by advising
the Sultan to grant him hereditary tenure of what he now occupies, they could
have no just reason to be surprised if, in the course of a very short period after
wards, he were to withhold his tribute, alter his title, call himself King of the
Arabs instead of Pasha of Egypt, and thus dismember the Ottoman Empire in
word as well as in fact.
I said that Her Majesty's Government, therefore, could not concur with the
Government of France, in pursuing a course which must demonstrably lead to
results so diametrically opposite to those which both Governments have pledged
themselves to obtain, and which are necessary for the best interests of Europe.
But I said that, as the French Government seem so anxious to procure
better terms for Mehemet All, we would endeavour to see if it were not possible
to render the proposed arrangement somewhat more favourable to him, without
injury to- the fundamental principle upon which the arrangement ought to
rest. I then pointed out upon the map a line which would extend the hereditary
Pashalic of Mehemet Ali without any material danger to the Sultan ; and I sug
gested, that instead of placing the eastern limit of the Pasha's Government at Et
Arish, which is the proper boundary of Egypt, his Pashalic might be made to
continue along the sea-coast, as far north as the cape formed by Mount Carmel ;
that the boundary might from thence run in a straight line to the southern
extremity of the Lake Tiberias ; thence down the River Jordan to the Dead Sea j.
thence along the whole of the western shore of the Dead Sea to its southern
extremity ; and from thence to the head of the Gulf of Akaba, and along the
western coast of that gulf to Cape Ras Mahommed ; and so round by the eastern.
shore of the Gulf of Suez to Suez. Thus excluding from the hereditary Pashalic
the Fortress oi' St. John of Acre and the caravan road from Damascus to the
Holy Cities. The Fortress of Acre, I observed, is the key of Syria, and on that
account ought to be held by the Sultan : and the possession of the Holy Cities,
as was very justly pointed out by the French Government in the early part of
the negotiation, is essential for the Sultan ; and therefore it is necessary that the
authority of Mehemet Ali should not extend over the road which leads to those
cities. I said that the arrangement which I had thus suggested would certainly be
objectionable, because it would bring the territory administered by the Pasha too
closely in contact with that administered by tbe direct authority of the Sultan,
and because it would not interpose any adequate barrier between those territories;
but, nevertheless, it might be recommended to the Sultan, if all the Five Powers
were prepared to employ whatever means might in any case be necessary to carry
it into execution.
1 said that if such a modification of our original plan would obtain for Her
Majesty's Government the concurrence and co-operation of the Government of
France, we should be willing to agree to it ; but I begged Count Sebastiani to
understand that this was the utmost extent of modification to which Her
Majesty's Government could be a party; and that it appeared to me that it would
be far better for the Sultan to let things remain as they are, and to take the
chance of future events, than to consent to grant to Mehemet Ali an hereditary
tenure in the government of any greater extent of the territory of the Ottoman
Empire. I observed, that Her Majesty's Government had afforded repeated proofs of
its willingness to modify its own opinions for the purpose of obtaining the
co-operation of France.
First, Her Majesty's Government had given up one part of the instructions
which it had proposed should be sent to the admirals, for obtaining the restoration
of the Turkish fleet; next, Her Majesty's Government had waved the proposal
which it had made, that the restoration of the Turkish fleet should be demanded
and enforced, without waiting for a general agreement among the Five Powers
as to the final arrangement to be made between the Sultan and the Pasha; and
now Her Majesty's Government is willing, if, by so doing, it can obtain the
co-operation of France, considerably to enlarge the boundary which we had pro-
3 N 2

460

posed for the hereditary Pashalic of Mehewefc-AJi. I expressed a hope that the
spirit of conciliation thus shown by Her Majesty's Government would be duly
appreciated, and that the French Government would accede to the suggestion
made, and would consent to join with the other Powers in such measures as

now

mi°-ht be necessary for carrying the arrangement, so modified, into effect.
b Count Sebastiani said he would report to his Government what I had pro
posed, and the statements I had made; and that he would let me know as soon
as he should have received a reply. . , « r ¦,-, •
After the proper time had elapsed for the arrival of an answer from Pans,
Count Sebastiani came to me and showed me a despatch from Marshal Soult,
which stated that the French Government could not agree to the suggestion
which Her Majesty's Government had made, but still adhered to its own pro
posal,— namely, that Mehemet Ali should have hereditary tenure in the govern
ment' of everything which he now occupies, except Candia and the district of
Adana ; Candia to&be retained by him during his life, with reversion to one of his
younger sons ; Adana to be immediately evacuated by him and to be restored to
the Sultan. Such an arrangement the French Government thought would
probably be agreed to by Mehemet Ali ; but as the despatch did not distinctly
say that France would be a party to coercive measures to enforce even this
arrangement if it were rejected by Mehemet Ali, and as, on the contrary, the
French Government appeared to labour under the greatest dread of employing
in any case coercion against the Pasha, the natural inference to be drawn was,
that even these conditions, inadmissible as they were, were not to be proposed to
Mehemet Ali as an ultimatum, but were to be considered liable to extension if
he should not consent to accept them. In fact, the despatch seemed very
plainly to imply, that France would not be a party to any arrangement to which
Mehemet Ali should not spontaneously and without coercion agree.
As this reply rendered all further negotiation or discussion useless, I con
tented myself with expressing to Count Sebastiani the regret which Her Majesty's
Government must feel at thus losing all prospect of arriving at a common under
standing with France upon these urgent and important matters; and 1 said that
as the last proposal of Her Majesty's Government had been declined by France,
that proposal must be considered as withdrawn, and as not having been made;
and Her Majesty's Government must again take its stand upon the plan which it
originally proposed, and which goes to limit the hereditary Pashalic of Mehemet
Ali to Egypt, ending to the eastward at El Arish.
It is needless for me in writing to your Excellency, to dwell upon the regret
with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt the present views and opi
nions of the French Government upon these matters; because your Excellency
has, by your personal communications with Her Majesty's Government during
your late visit to England, become fully acquainted with its sentiments upon all
these affairs. But as your Excellency is hereby instructed to give to Marshal
Soult a copy of this despatch as the least formal way of conveying to the French
Government in an official manner, and of thus placing on record the sentiments
of the British Government, I cannot refrain from stating, that the views and
intentions expressed by the French Government in the outset of these negotia
tions were not calculated to prepare Her Majesty's Government for the course
which the French Cabinet has subsequently adopted and seems to intend ,to
pursue. A short recital of facts will suffice to show how natural the disappoint
ment is which Her Majesty's Government feel upon this occasion.
When first it became certain that hostilities were going to break out between
Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, the French Government came forward generously
and spontaneously, as the champion and protector of the Sultan. It not only
concurred with the British Government in giving instructions to the com
bined squadrons in the Mediterranean to use coercive measures to compel
Mehemet Ali to stop his army and to cease hostilities, but it made of its own
accord a formal declaration to the other Four Powers, announcing its determina
tion to maintain " the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under
its present dynasty, and to employ all its influence and means of action in order
to maintain the security of this essential element of the balance of power," and
" to oppose any combination which should be hostile to that independence and
integrity ;" and it invited the other Powers to make to it similar declarations in
reply. Great Britain complied with this invitation, and immediately responded in
similar terms.

461
The French Government theiFpToposed, that the measures to be taken with
respect to Turkish affairs should be decided by a conference of the Five Powers
at Vienna. This proposition was entirely in accordance with the spirit of the
preceding declaration, and, when coupled with that declaration, it naturally led
Her Majesty's Government to suppose that the object intended to be attained by
the deliberations of such a conference, was to be, to secure for the future, upon a
firm and stable foundation, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman
Empire. But, in order that the assembled Plenipotentiaries should be able to accom
plish that end, it was obviously necessary that they should all come with full
powers to concur in any measures of execution which might be found requisite
for that purpose ; and therefore it is evident that the French Government could
not at that time have considered unconditional submission to the Pasha, as the
only course that could be recommended to the Sultan.
Nor was this all, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, acting in
accordance with what he must have supposed to be the intentions of his Govern
ment, signed a Collective Note, by which the Five Powers requested the Porte
not to make any terms with the Pasha by a separate negotiation, but to be guided
in its arrangements with Mehemet Ali by the advice of the Five Powers, — a
recommendation which would have been unsuitable towards an Ally in distress,
unless the parties who gave it were determined to obtain for the Sultan, by their
interference, better terms than in his present state he was likely to get by direct
negotiation with the Pasha; for it is evident that if they intended merely to
advise the Sultan to submit to whatever terms the Pasha might be willing to
impose, the Collective Note was only calculated to excite in the mind of the
Sultan delusive expectations of support.
These acts of the French Government and of its Agent certainly led Her
Majesty's Government to think, that France was resolved to afford her steady
co-operation in effecting such a final arrangement between Mehemet Ali and his
Sovereign as might, by relieving the Sultan from future danger on the part of
the Pasha, tend to secure the " independence and integrity of the Ottoman
Empire under its present dynasty;" and it has been with deep regret that Her
Majesty's Government have observed the appearance of a sudden change in the
feelings and policy of the French Government on these matters. For the
Cabinet of Paris soon declined to be a party to any effectual measures, in order
to compel Mehemet Ali to restore to the Sultan that fleet, the possession of
which, as a means of naval defence for Constantinople, is obviously necessary in
order to enable him to maintain the shadow of that independence which Her
Majesty's Government had been led to believe the Government of France was
resolved to uphold. The Collective Note which, not having been disavowed,
still constitutes an undeniable pledge of support from France to the Sultan, has
lost, nevertheless, some part of its moral weight, by the subsequent recall of the
Ambassador who signed it ; and the effect of the assurance that France would
employ all her influence and means of action, in order to maintain the Ottoman
Empire under its present dynasty, has been unfortunately neutralized by the
intimations since given by the French Government, that it had no influence or
means of action which it could usefully or successfully employ, in order to reduce
the pretensions of the Pasha within any limits which Her Majesty's Government
can think compatible with the integrity and independence of Turkey.
The British Government proposed to the other Four Powers a plan of
arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which, in principle, was
approved by all, not excepting even France herself; but the French Govern
ment, after admitting that the arrangement so proposed would, if carried into
effect, best tend to secure the future peace of the Levant, and to consolidate the
resources of the Turkish Empire, declined to be a party to any measures for
carrying that arrangement into execution, and proposed a plan of its own which
amounts virtually to an immediate dismemberment of that empire.
So obvious, indeed, is the tendency of that plan, that the partisans of
Mehemet Ali, upon becoming acquainted with that scheme, hailed it as a
declaration of the French Government in favour of the Pasha, and loudly pro
claimed it as a proof that France would not join in any measures of coercion
against him.
Her Majesty's Government need scarcely say, that they attach no weight or
value to the interpretations of the policy of the French Government thus made

462
by the partisans of Mehemet Ali, except inasmuch as they show to what an
extent circumstances have combined to deprive the Sultan of the benefit of that
influence which the original declaration of the French Government must have
led hrin to count upon.
It appears, then, from the foregoing recital, that the French Government,
which began by declaring itself the protector of the Sultan, has now become in
appearance, and for practical purposes in the negotiation, the protector of the
Pasha; and Her Majesty's Government finding at the present time a state of
things so different from that which existed when these negotiations commenced,
cannot refrain from expressing its very sincere and deep regret, that the opinions
and views of the two Cabinets should appear to be so widely different upon a
matter of such great European importance, and upon which it would have been
so desirable that Great Britain and France could have acted in concert.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 359,
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 2.)
My Lord, Therapia, October 8, 18.99.
I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of an instruction addressed by his
Excellency the Internuncio to the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria, and
also copy of a letter from myself to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in
Egypt. I n&vc &c.
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 359.
Baron Stiirmer to M. de Laurin.

Monsieur, Constantinople, le 5 Octobre, 1839.
S. A. LE GRAND VIZIR m'a fait communiquer la derniere lettre que
lui a adressee le Pacha d'Egypte. Le ton qu'y regne est a la verite un peu plus
msodere que celui qu'il avait pris jusqu'ici dans ses ouvertures envers le Divan
de Sa Hautesse. Mais ce que m'y a frappe, c'est que Mehemet Ali parait se
flatter toujours d'amener la Porte aun arrangement auquel les Grandes Puissances
de l'Europe, sous. Pegide desquelles die se trouve placee, resteraient etrangeres.
Est-il possible qu'un homme qui dans sa longue carriere a fait preuve d'une
sagacite peu ordinaire, puisse s'aveugler a ce point, lorsqu'il s'agit de ses propres
interets? Je ne doute pas, Monsieur, qu'en en appelant & cette meme sagacite,
vousi ne parveniez a lui faire comprendre Perreur ou il se trouve, et a Peclairer
sur sa veritable situation. Void les reflexions qui vous aurez a lui remettre.
Les malheurs de la Porte et Pabilite qu'il a su mettre a en profiter, lui ont
donne des forces, superieures. II peut en abuser : il peut dans le moment actuel
enlever encore a la Porte des plus grands territoires ; personne n'est la pour s'y
opposer. II peut garder la flotte Ottomane ; les Allies du Sultan n'emploieront
pas la force pour la reprendre, car sa destruction serait la suite probable du
conflit. Mehemet Ali peut done, s'il le veut, se complaire dans la conviction et
dans Pabus de sa puissance materielle. Mais oil tout cela le menera-t-il si
l'Europe lui est hostile ? En supposant meme qu'elle ne fit rien pour le com-
battre, die possede contre lui une arme redoutable : c'est celle de son avenir.

base a donner a l'etablissement de sa famille? A-t-il jamais vu un sentiment
de cette nature fonder quelque chose de durable? Plus il a fait d'efforts
pour rapprocher l'Egypte de l'Europe par son administration, par les arts et par
le commerce, plus il a du apprendre et mieux il comprendra que la sanction de

463
l'Europe est necessaire a. Fexistence reguliere et a la duree d'une position poli
tique quelconque. Qu'il ne se trompe done pas sur la nature de la superiorite
de ses forces : elles ne suffisent pas pour lui donner l'avenir qu'il veut fonder.
Si meme le Sultan lui accordait toutes les concessions qu'il demande, elles ne
^uffiraient pas pour consolider sa position, car l'Europe ne les sanctionnerait pas.
Voila ce dont il doit se penetrer surtout, et ce que je vous autorise. Monsieur, a
lui dire au nom de la Cour Imperiale.
II y aua siecle que Mehemet Ali, Chef des Musulmans revolt es, aurait
pu fonder un nouvel Empire : il aurait existe dans cet etat de separation et
d'isolement qui rendait alors l'Europe peu attentive a des evenemens de cette
nature. Mais Mehemet Ali a lui-meme voue sa vie a l'etablissement d'un autre
ordre de choses : il a besoin, sous peine de passer comme un meteore, de la sanc
tion de l'Europe, et l'Europe ne sauctionnera que ce qui laissera intact le principe
de la souverainete du Sultan.
Si Mehemet Ali fonde Pespoir du succes de sa resistance sur la conviction
qu'il parait avoir de la difficulte qu'auraient les Puissances d'adopter en concert
des mesures actives contre lui, il doit sentir qu'elles se mettraient facileinent
d'accord pour refuser leur sanction a un ordre de choses qu'elles trouveraient trop
onereux pour la Porte: une mesure negative n'est jamais difficile a prendre.
En mettant tous vos soins, Monsieur, a rendre cette position intelligible a
Mehemet Ali, vous servirez ses interets aussi bien que ceux de la Porte. Je
vais donner connaissance de cette depeche aux Ambassadeurs de France et d'An
gleterre, ainsi qu'aux Envoyes de Russie et de Prusse, et je ne doute pas que
MM. vos Cdlegues ne recoivent I'ordre de tenir au Pacha le meme langage.
Recevez, &c,
(Signe) STURMER.

(Translation.)
Baron Stiirmer to M. de Laurin.
JSir,, Constantinople, October 5, 1839.
HIS Highness the Grand Vizier has caused the last letter which the Pasha
of Egypt has addressed to Mm to be communicated to me. The tone which
pervades it is in truth a little more moderate than that whicli he had hitherto
assumed in his overtures to the Divan of His Highness. But that which
struck me in it is, that Mehemet appears to continue to flatter himself that he
will bring the Porte to an arrangement, to which the Great Powers of Europe,
under whose aegis the Porte is placed, shall be strangers. Is it possible that a man
who has given proof during his long career of no common sagacity, can be so blind
when his own interests are concerned ? I do not doubt, Sir, that by appealing
to that sagacity you will be enabled to make him understand his error, and to
enlighten him as to his real position. These are the reflections which you should
lay before him.
The misfortunes of the Porte, and the skill which he has shown in taking ad
vantage of them, have given him a superiority of force. He can abuse it;
he can wrest still larger territories from the Porte at the present moment ;
nobody is there to oppose him. He may keep the Ottoman fleet ; the Allies of
the Sultan will not employ force to retake it, for its destruction would probably
be the result of a combat. Mehemet Ali may then, if he chooses, revel in the
conviction and in the abuse of his material power. But where would this lead
him, if Europe is hostile to him ? Even supposing she were to do nothing to
combat him, she possesses a formidable weapon against him, that of his future
position. In fact, what does he want ? He ceases not to repeat that all that he has
done has no other object than that of founding the future position of his family.
Does he imagine, for example, that the personal hatred by which he has hitherto
been animated against Hosrew Pasha is a good basis for the establishment of his
iamily ? Did he ever see a feeling of this nature serve as a foundation for
anything lasting ? The more efforts he has made to approximate Egypt to
Europe by his administration, by commerce and the arts, the more he must have
learnt and the better he will understand, that the sanction of Europe is neces
sary to the regular existence and to the continuance of every political position.

464
Let him not therefore deceive himself as to the superiority of his forces. They
are not sufficient to give him the future position which he wishes to found.
Even if the Sultan were to make all the concessions which he asks for, they
would not suffice to consolidate his position, for Europe would not give its
sanction to them. He should be convinced of this above all things, and this is
what I authorize you, Sir, to tell him in the name of the Imperial Court.
A century back Mehemet Ali, chief of the revolted Mussulmans, might
have founded a new empire : it would have existed in that state of separation
and isolation which at that period rendered Europe but little attentive to events
of this kind. But Mehemet has himself devoted his life to the establishment of
a new order of things ; he requires the sanction of Europe, at the risk of passing
away like a meteor, and Europe will only sanction that which leaves the prin
ciple of the sovereignty of the Sultan untouched.
If Mehemet Ali rests the hope of his successful resistance upon the convic
tion which he appears to entertain of the difficulty which the Powers would have
in adopting in concert active measures against him, he must feel that they would
easily come to an agreement to refuse their sanction to a state of things which
they should find too burdensome for the Porte ; it is never difficult to take a
negative step.
You will promote the interests of Mehemet Ali, as well as those of the
Porte, by using all your endeavours to make him understand this position.
I shaU communicate this despatch to the Ambassadors of France and
England, as well as to the Envoys of Russia and Prussia, and I have no doubt
that your Colleagues will be directed to hold similar language to the Pasha.
Accept, &c,
(Signed) STURMER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 359.
Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, Therapia, October 5, 1839.
YOUR Colleague, the Austrian Consul-General, will have received an
instruction from his Excellency the Internuncio, dated Constantinople, 5th of
October, 1839, which he is desired to communicate to you, and to request your
co-operation with him in his efforts to expose to the Pasha of Egypt the impo
licy and the inutility of all the attempts the Pasha may make to resist measures
which it shall be the interest and the duty of some of the Great Powers, and
perhaps of Europe as a whole, to carry into execution ; and I have to beg that
you will do what is proper for that end, making use of such arguments as Her
Majesty's Government would use, founded upon the opinions they entertain of
the comparative resources and power of the Pasha, and upon their views of
political exigencies and interests, of which you are well-apprised. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 360.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — {Received November 2.)
My Lord, Therapia, October 8, 1839-
HIS Excellency the Internuncio has been so good as to give me a copy of
the information he received by the last French steamer, on the 4th instant, from
Alexandria, and which he sent in to Rechid Pasha for the Porte. I have not
received any communication by this last, nor by the preceding steamer, from
Her Majesty's Consul-General at Alexandria, and it is from other sources I have
learned the malady of Mehemet Ali, and such other matters as ought to be
known by the Ambassador here.
I yesterday received from Mr. Consul Werry, at Damascus, a despatch of
September 25, and one from Mr. Vice-Consul Werry, at Aleppo, of September 20,
and a private letter from Mr. Consul Moore, at Beyrout, dated 28th September;

465
and I gathered from these reports very important information, tending to show
the correctness of the accounts given by the Austrian Consul-General to the
Internuncio (inclosed), of the impediments that prevent Ibrahim Pasha from
marching this way.
I gather from the examination of the reports of these Consuls, that it will
not be possible for Ibrahim to arrive in this neighbourhood before the end of
December, and that probably it will not be in his power to come then ; and that
were he to come, he could not well have a larger force than about 15,000 men.
If this be correct, it will be apparent, that what I have so much insisted
upon, is true; namely, that the real force of Mehemet Ali is insignificant,
instead of being of a magnitude before which the Great Powers of Europe are
obliged by prudence to bow down with submission. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 360.
Extract of Reports from Alexandria, of September 26, 1839.
MEHEMET ALI va mieux, mais des qu'il se met a parler d'affaires,
son pouls bat avec violence et devient fievreux.
On lui a conseille de changer d'air, ce qui Pa determine a s'absenter
pendant une huitaine de jours pour faire un voyage sur le Nil.
Les troubles en Syrie continuent, surtout dans le Haouran.
A Adana, ou est le gros de l'Armee du Taurus, on manquait de vivres, de
fourrages, &c, et des fievres malignes faisaient de grands ravages parmi les
troupes. Nonobstant, Ibrahim Pacha s'occupait a deplacer la moitie de cette
armee, et a lui faire reprendre les cantonnemens d'Antioche et de Killis.
Mehemet Ali a envoyd 120,000 ardebs de ble aux trois quartiers-generaux
de Damas, de Alep, et de Marache, pour prevenir la famine dont ils sont menaces.
Ces dispositions pourraient bien faire penser qu'il veut se preparer aux evenemens
que l'avenir pourrait amener; mais elles prouvent en meme temps qu'il n'est
plus question, comme on Pavait annonce avec emphase, de marcher en avant, si,
au bout d'un mois, la Sublime Porte ne se prete a un arrangement. Partout
les soldats demandent leur solde arrieree, et partout les caisses sont vides.
Quant a la flotte Ottomane, le Pacha dit toujours qu'il veut la garder jusqu'a
la paix. Mais tout faisait croire qu'il pourrait modifier incessamment son
lanorage. Achmet Pacha ne le voit plus si souvent. II a quitte sa maison de
campagne pour s'installer sur son Vaisseau Amiral ; Mehemet Ali commence a
le traiter avec froideur.
Mehemet Ali, interpelie sur les projets de faire avancer son armee, et de
marcher sur Constantinople, dit bien qu'il n'a pas abandonne celui d'envahir
1'Asie Mineure ; mais qu'il n'a jamais songe a vouloir occuper Constantinople.
La verite est qu'il avait effectivement ordonne a Ibrahim de se porter en avant,
mais que celui-ci lui a represente que I'armee manque de vetemens et de vivres ;
que les maladies en ont enleve une partie considerable; que les Vizirs de
FAnatolie, auxquels il s'etait adresse, avaient tout d'un coup manifeste des
intentions peu amicales envers les Egyptiens ; que des troubles avaient eclate*
en meme temps sur plusieurs points de la Syrie qui ne pouvaient etre reprimes
avec succes par des troupes irregulieres; enfin, qu'il se yoyait oblige d'operer une
dislocation de Farmee, et meme d'evacuer les endroits situes autour de Marache.
(Translation.)
Extract of Reports from Alexandria of September 26, 1839.
MEHEMET ALI is better, but the moment he begins to talk upon
business, his pulse beats with violence, and becomes feverish.
A change of air has been recommended to him, which has determined
him to absent himself for a week to make a voyage on the Nile.
The troubles in Syria continue, particularly in the Haouran.
A want of provisions and forage was felt at Adana, where the main body
30

466
of the Army of the Taurus is, and malignant fevers were making great havoc
among the troops. Notwithstanding this, Ibrahim Pasha was busy in re
moving one half of this army, and making it re-occupy the cantonments of
Antioch and Killis.
Mehemet Ali has sent 120,000 ardebs of wheat to the three head
quarters of Damascus, Aleppo, and Marash, to provide against the famine
which threatens them. These proceedings would seem to indicate, that he
wishes to prepare for the events which the future may produce. But they
also prove that there is no longer an idea of advancing, as had been empha
tically given out, if at the end of a month the Sublime Porte does not come
into an arrangement. The soldiers every where demand their arrears, and
the military chests are empty everywhere.
As to the Ottoman Fleet, the Pasha always says that he will keep it
until peace is established. But everything gave reason to imagine that he
might shortly alter his language. Achmet Pasha does not see him so fre
quently as formerly. He has left his country house, to establish himself on
board his flag-ship ; Mehemet Ali begins to treat him with coolness.
Mehemet Ali, when interrogated respecting his plans of making his army
advance and march on Constantinople, says, that he has not abandoned the
plan of invading Asia Minor ; but that he never dreamt of occupying Constan
tinople. The truth is, that he had in fact ordered Ibrahim to move forward,
but that the latter represented to him that the army was in want of clothing and
provisions ; that sickness had carried off a considerable number ; that the
Viziers of Anatolia, to whom he had addressed himself, had all of a sudden
evinced intentions but little friendly to the Egyptians ; that disorders had.
broken out at the same time in different parts of Syria, which could not be
successfully put down by irregular troops. Finally, that he found himself
obliged to change the quarters of the army, and even to evacuate the places
situated around Marash.

No. 361.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 2.)
(Extract.) , Therapia, October 8, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of an Official Note sent in this day to the Sublime Porte,
as a reply to the Note of the 28th of September, from the Porte to the Repre
sentatives of the Five Powers. I had previously answered in the usual way
through the Dragoman ; and I have taken this additional step, because it seemed
necessary to come forward in support of the policy we have pursued here, and
of the policy of the Porte.
I inclose copy of a Note, dated October 2, 1839, from the French Ambas
sador to the Porte.

Inclosure 1 in No. 361.
Note from Viscount Ponsonby to the Sublime Porte.
Ttierapia, October 8, 1839.
THE Undersigned directed the Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy
to express to his Excellency Rechid Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs the
great satisfaction with which the Undersigned received the Note, dated 28th
September, which his Excellency, by order of the Sublime Porte, had addressed
to the Ministers of the Five Powers ; and further, to assure his Excellency that
the Note should be forwarded without delay to Her Britannic Majesty's
Government. The Undersigned is of opinion, that in treating an affair of such hi"ff
importance, it is right to make a more formal official reply, particularly on
account of the increased interest that events attach to the transaction ; and
therefore, the Undersigned has the honour to assure his Excellency, in this
official form, that the Undersigned is confident Her Majesty's Government will

467
nave learnt, with the highest satisfaction, the wise and generous views and
sentiments of the Sublime Porte, as described in that Note, in exact conformity
with the early declarations of the Ottoman Ministers to the Representatives of
the Great Powers, and received with entire satisfaction.
The Undersigned must be permitted to add, that late and present events
increase in a very high degree the respect due for the magnanimity of the
Sublime Porte, exemplified in the continued adherence to the resolution to
extend to thePasha of Egypt the same indulgence and favour as was then offered
to him, notwithstanding the multiplied acts of aggression and offence that have
been committed or countenanced by that Pasha since the communication was
made to him of the beneficent intentions of his August Sovereign and Master,
Sultan Abdul Medjid. The Undersigned cannot have a doubt of the complete
triumph of a policy so wise, and just, and benevolent, if it shall be persevered
in by the Sublime Porte without alteration, because its base is the maintenance
of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and resistance to the
attempts that are made to partition it, under the disguise and cloak of a desire to
re-establish peace. Enlightened men know, that by granting to the Pasha of
Egypt the demands he continues to make, the Sublime Porte would give a fatal
blow to the sacred royal prerogatives and power of the Sultan ; and they cannot
fail to applaud the wisdom and courage exerted to uphold the national welfare
and unity. The Undersigned avails himself, &c, (Signed^ PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 361.
Note from Baron Roussin to the Sublime Porte.
Therapia, le 2 Octobre, 1839.
LE Soussigne, Ambassadeur de France pres la Sublime Porte, a recu la
Note que Son Excellence Rechid Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, lui
a fait l'honneur de lui adresser le 28 Septembre, a Pappui de la Note en date du
22 Aout dernier, qui avait ete egalement adressee aux Representans des Grandes
Cours par le Ministere de Sa Hautesse.
Ces deux communications sont une preuve trop manifeste des justes senti-
ihens de confiance dont s'est montre animee la Sublime Porte envers le Gouverne
ment du Roi et ceux de ses augustes Allies, pour quele Soussigne ne s'empresse
pas de les transmettre a Paris. II n'ajoutera rien aux considerations qui y sont
tleveloppees avec autant de prudence que de verite, et il croirait meme inutile de
rappeler que les dispositions de la France a Pegard de l'Empire Ottoman sont
toujours aussi amicales, s'il n'etait heureux lui-meme d'en renouveler aussi
souvent que possible, les assurances. Le Soussigne ne doute pas que d'apres
la nouvelle demarche de la Sublime Porte, le Gouvernement du Roi ne cherche,
d'accord avec ses Allies, a regler les affaires d'Orient de maniere a affermir
l'Empire Ottoman en consolidant la paix du monde, et il s'empressera de trans-
taettre a la Sublime Porte, aussitot qu'il les aura rec ues de sa Cour, les decisions
qu'elle aura prises a cet egard.
Son Excellence Rechid Pacha, en adressant aux Representans des Grandes
Cours sa Note du 28 Septembre, avait egalement charge les Premiers Drogmans
• des Ambassades de France et d'Angleterre, de representer a ces Ambassadeurs,
que la presence de leurs flottes au mouillage qu'elles occupent maintenant,
pouvait faire naitre des complications que la Sublime Porte a interet a eviter;
que les mauvais tems qui vont regner pendant plusieurs mois ne permettraient
que ti-es-difficilement aces flottes de conserver leur mouillage actuel, et pourraient,
par necessite, les obliger a entrer dans les Dardanelles.
Le Soussigne reconnait combien ces reflexions sont fondees, et que la Porte
est parfaitement dans son droit en adressant aux Representans des Cours amies,
cette demande officiense d'explication que des susceptibilites etrangeres ont pu,
d-ailleurs, lui rendre necessaire. Mais le Soussigne doit, de son cote, rappeler
a la Sublime Porte, que les deux Gouvernemens, en faisant rapprocher leurs
escadres jusque dans la Baie de Tenedos, ont voulu donner au Gouvernement
de Sa Hautesse, au milieu des circonstances de la plus haute gravite, un appui
3 0 2

468
moral qui paraissait necessaire pour eviter les plus facheuses complications, que la
sagesse de la Sublime Porte a su, du reste, empecher. Le Soussigne ajoutera,.
qu'il appartient seulement aux Gouvernemens qui ont decide cette mesure, de
reconnaitre si elle est encore maintenant utile, et qu'eux seuls pourront prescrire
aux Amiraux de s'eloigner lorsqu'ils jugeront que cette determination ne serait
plus a regretter pour personne, et surtout pour la Sublime Porte.
En transmettant au Gouvernement du Roi les reflexions inspirees a la
Sublime Porte par la presence des Escadres Francaise et Anglaise, le Soussigne
ne doute pas qu'apres les avoir examinees avec tout Pinteret qu'il accorde aux
Affaires d'Oiient, il ne s'empresse de prendre la determination la plus prudente,
et, en meme tems, la plus utile a l'affermissement de l'Empire Ottoman.
Le Soussigne saisit, &c,
(Signe) BARON ROUSSIN.

(Translation.)
Note from Baron Roussin to the Sublime Porte.
Therapia, October 2, 1839.
THE Undersigned, Ambassador of France at the Sublime Porte, has
received the Note which his Excellency Rechid Pasha, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, did him the honour to address to him on the 28th of September, in
support of the Note dated 22nd of August last, which had also been addressed
by the Ministers of His Highness to the Representatives of the Great Courts.
These two communications are too evident a proof of the just feelings of
confidence by which the Sublime Porte has shown itself to be animated towards
the Government of the King, and those of its august Allies, for the Undersigned
not to hasten to forward them to Paris. He will add nothing to the consi
derations which are developed therein, with as much prudence as truth, and he
should think it useless to recal to mind that the disposition of France towards
the Ottoman Empire is as friendly as ever, if he himself did not take pleasure
in renewing this assurance as often as possible. The Undersigned does not
doubt that, after the fresh step taken by the Porte, the Government of the King
will seek, in concert with its Allies, to settle the affairs of the East in such a
manner as to strengthen the Ottoman Empire by consolidating the peace of the
world, and he will hasten to lay before the Sublime Porte the decision which his
Court may come to on this matter, as soon as he shall have received it.
His Excellency Rechid Pasha, in addressing the Note of the 28th of Sep
tember to the Representatives of the Great Courts, had also desired the First
Dragomans of the French and English Embassies to represent to those Ambas
sadors, that the presence of their fleets, at the anchorage which they now occupy,
might give rise to complications which it is for the interest of the Porte to avoid;
that the bad weather which was about to set in for some months would with
difficulty allow of the fleets remaining at their present anchorage, and might
perforce oompel them to enter the Dardanelles.
The Undersigned acknowledges that there is ground for these reflections,
and that the Porte is perfectly justified in addressing this informal demand for
explanation to the Representatives of the friendly Powers, which moreover the
susceptibility of others may have rendered necessary. But the Undersigned, on
his side, must recall to the recollection of the Sublime Porte, that the two
Governments, in causing their squadrons to approach even as near as the Bay of
Tenedos, wished to afford to His Highness's Government, under circumstances
of the greatest moment, a moral support that seemed necessary to avoid the
most disastrous complications, which, however, the wisdom of the Sublime
Porte has been able to avert. The Undersigned will add, that it is for those
Governments alone who decided upon this measure to judge whether it is still
useful, and that they alone can order the Admirals to depart whenever they
shall be of opinion that this determination will not be a source of regret to
anybody, and particularly to the Sublime Porte.
In transmitting to the Government of the King, the observations which the
presence of the French and English squadrons have suggested to the Porte,
The Undersigned does not doubt that, after examining them with all the

469
interest which it feels in the affairs of the East, it will lose no time in taking the
most prudent determination, and at the same time the one most useful to the sup
port of the Ottoman Empire.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.

No. 362.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, November 3, 1839.
HER Majesty's Government are of opinion, that it is expedient that Admi
ral Sir Robert Stopford should be authorized to attend to any requisition which
he may receive from the Porte, through Her Majesty's Ambassador, for the
presence of the British squadron at Constantinople, in order to support the
Sultan's Government against an insurrection : and I am accordingly to signify
to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that an instruction to the above
effect should forthwith be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

No. 363.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 4.)
My Lord, Therapia, October 13, 1839.
I HAVE this morning received from the Sublime Porte the inclosed
communication. I believe Ibrahim Pasha is driven by the necessities of his army, to
commit the aggressions mentioned, and that those necessities will multiply
greatly every day. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 363.

Substance of Despatches received by the Sublime Porte. — (Communicated to the
Representatives of the Five Powers, October 12, 1839.)
TOPGI OGLOU, commandant un corps de troupes Egyptiennes qui'
fait partie des troupes cantonnees a Ourfa, se porta, il y a peu de temps,'
dans le voisinage de Souirik; s'empara des provisions de bouche qui s'y
trouvaient; prit possession des districts de Tzermik et de Erghana, et apres
y avoir sejourne quelque tems, il en sortit, emmenant avec lui quelques
families de ces districts, et retourna a Ourfa.
On avisait aux moyens d'etablir des autorites, au nom de Sa Hautesse,
dans les deux districts ci-dessus mentionnes, pour assurer par la la tran
quillite des habitans et des pauvres; mais Shukri Bey, General de division
dans l'Armee Egyptienne, se presenta tout recemment dans les environs, a
la tete de trois regimens d'Infanterie, d'un regiment de Cavalerie, et d'un
corps de troupes irregulieres compose de mille hommes; il somma le Gou
verneur de Souirik, Omer Bey, d'en sortir, et fit ses dispositions pour se
rendre maitre, en employant la force, et de ce district, et de celui de
Tzermik. Omer Bey, considdrant qu'il n'etait pas autorise par la Sublime Porte
a opposer de la resistance, sortit de la place, bon gr6 mal gre, et se porta a
Malatia. Ces mouvemens des troupes Egyptiennes non seulement troublent la
tranquillite de ces pays la et feront cesser les travaux aux Mines Imperiales,
mais peu apres ils agiront dans une sphere plus grande: ils feront que les

470
tribus Curdes s'attacheront a leur parti, et ils feront naitre une foule d'autres
itoconveniens. Voulant retablir la surete du pays et des routes, et proteger les habitans
et les pauvres, on expedia a Erghana, Rustem Bey, Colonel de la Garde
Imperiale, et Fon ecrivit en consequence au Caimacam de Diarbekir.
LTnspecteur des Mines Imperiales, Son Excellence Saadem Pacha,
vient d'adresser deux depeches a la Sublime Porte, pour qu'on lui fasse savoir
sans deiai comment il faut agir dans ces circonstances, et dans le cas que cet
etat de choses empirait.
Le Pacha a envoye en meme temps a la Porte une lettre de Shukri Bey,
accompagnee de plusieurs pieces.
Ibrahim Pacha, etabli aujourd'hui a Marache, seme le trouble et la
division dans les environs. 11 a meme expedie un corps de plus de 500
hommes contre Solyman Pacha, Ex-Mouhassil de Marache, sous le com
mandement de Cara Mursal Oglou, Ahmed Bey, et Durzi Bey Chebib, et
Cara Bairactar, Hassan Jazige. Solyman Pacha evitant de combattre avec
les siens, se retira a Caissar.
Depuis le jour de son entree a Marache, Ibrahim Pacha livre a ses
soldats tous les produits des fermes et des terres, &c, que Solyman Pacha
possede, soit dans la ville, soit dans les villages de Marache, ce qui cause
a ce dernier beaucoup de prejudice.

(Translation.)
Substance of Despatches received from the Sublime Porte. — ( Communicated to the
Representatives of the Five Powers, October 12, 1839.
TOPGI OGLOU, commanding a corps of Egyptian troops, which forms
part of the troops stationed at Orfa, went a short time ago to the neighbour
hood of Souirik; made himself master of the provisions which were there;
took possession of the districts of Tzermik and of Erghana, and having stayed
there some time, went away, carrying with him some families of those
districts, and returned to Orfa.
Measures were under consideration for establishing, in the two districts
above-mentioned, authorities in the name of the Sultan, in order thereby to
secure the tranquillity of the inhabitants and of the poor. But Shukri Bey,
General of Division in the Egyptian Army, appeared very recently in the
neighbourhood at the head of three regiments of infantry, one of cavalry,
and one of irregular troops consisting of 1000 men ; he summoned the
Governor of Souirik, Omer Bey, to go out of it, and made his arrangements
to render himself master by force, as well of that district as of the district
of Tzermik. Omer Bey, considering that he was not authorized by the Sublime Porte
to offer resistance, left the place whether or no, and proceeded to Malatia.
These movements of the Egyptian troops not only disturb the tranquillity
of those countries, and will put a stop to the working of the Imperial Mines,
but will shortly have a more extensive action : they will cause the Koords to
attach themselves to their party, and will give rise to a multitude of
other inconveniences.
As it was desired to restore security in the country and on the roads,
and to protect the inhabitants and the poor, Rustem Bey, Colonel of the
Imperial Guards, was despatched to Erghana, and the Caimacam of Diar
bekir was written to accordingly.
The Inspector of the Imperial Mines, his Excellency Saadem Pasha, has
just addressed two despatches to the Sublime Porte for immediate information
how he is to act under these circumstances, and in case the state of affairs
should become worse.
The Pasha sent at the same time to the Porte a letter from Shukri Bey,
accompanied by many documents.
Ibrahim Pasha, at present stationed at Marash, disseminates trouble and
disturbance in that neighbourhood. He has even sent a corps of more than
500 men against Solyman Pasha, Ex-Mouhassil of Marash, under the

471
-orders of Cara Mursal Oglou, Ahmed Bey, and Durzi Bey Chebib, and Cara
Bairactar, Hassan Jazige. Solyman Pasha, avoiding to engage with the force
under him, retired to Caissar.
Since the day of his entry into Marash, Ibrahim Pasha makes over to his
soldiers all the produce of the farms and lands, &c, the property of Solyman
Pasha, either in the city or in the villages of Marash, which occasions much
injury to the latter.

No. 364.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 4.)
(Extract.) Therapia, October 14, 1839.
IN reply to Admiral Stopford's communication to me, that he thought
of going to Vourla, I said, that I thought Ibrahim Pasha in too greait difficulties
to make an attempt at present upon this1 place; but that I thought it would
be highly imprudent to leave unexecuted any measures calculated to defeat
an attempt, if made by him.

No, 365.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 4.)
My Lord, Therapia, October 14, 1839.
I AM assured by Rechid Pasha, that the copy * of the instructions to Hafiz
Pasha transmitted to me in your Lordship's despatch of September 9, and
which I communicated to his Excellency for the purpose of ascertaining their
authenticity, is very incorrect. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 366..
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, November 4, 1839.
I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of an instruc
tion f which I have been commanded by the Queen, to address to the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty.

No. 367.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, November A, 1839.
I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government
approve the instruction which it appears by your despatch of October 8, you
addressed to Colonel Campbell, on the 5th of October, directing him to co-operate

* See Inelosure in No. 305. t See N'°- 3S3-

472

with the Austrian Consul-General in pointing out to Mehemet Ali the impolicy and
inutility of any attempts on his part to resist the measures which the Great
Powers may determine to adopt. I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 368.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, November 4, 1839.
I HAVE received and laid before the Queen, your Excellency's des
patches to the 8th of October.
Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the Note, of which a copy
is inclosed in your despatch of the 8th of October, and which your Excel
lency addressed to the Porte on that day, in reply to the Note communicated by
the Porte, on the 28th of September, to the Representatives of the Five
Powers.

No. 369.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 5.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, October 25, 1839.
COUNT NESSELRODE communicated to me a long despatch from
Baron Brunnow, in which the Baron minutely detailed the substance of his
communications with your Lordship.
Count Nesselrode informed me of the suggestion made by your Lordship
to Baron Brunnow, and by him referred to his Government, that if it were
found expedient for a Russian force to defend the Bosphorus, a British force
should appear simultaneously within the Dardanelles.
Copies of the reply of the Imperial Cabinet to the last proposition of
the French Government are sent to London by this messenger, and will be
communicated to your Lordship by M. de Kisseleff.

No. 370.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 7.)
My Lord, Paris, November 4, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, by yesterday's
messenger, of your despatches of the 1st of November.
I this day communicated to Marshal Soult the instructions sent by
Her Majesty's Government to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, relative to the
anchoring the fleet under his command near Smyrna. The Marshal
expressed his obligation to me for the communication ; he told, me that
similar instructions had been given by the French Government to Admiral
Lalande, of which he would send me a copy. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

473

No. 371.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 8.J
(Extract.) Therapia, October 16, 1839.
I HAD yesterday the honour of presenting Her Majesty's letter to the
Sultan, and my credentials also.
His Imperial Majesty expressed his great satisfaction with Her Majesty's
letter, and the high value he attaches to Her Majesty's friendship.
His Imperial Majesty was pleased to honour me with a very gracious
reception. I presented the Secretary of Her Majesty's Embassy, and the other mem
bers of it, to His Majesty.
The Grand Vizier and the Seraskier. and the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, received me on my arrival within the Palace, (the old Seraglio,)
where Sultan Abdul Medjid resides. All the usual forms demonstrative of
respect to Her Majesty's Ambassador were observed.
I had a conversation with the Grand Vizier and the Secretary of State.
The Grand Vizier said, that were the army of Ibrahim on the opposite coast,
the Porte would not yield ; that the Porte relied upon the friendship of Eng
land. I replied, that the Porte might depend upon the friendship of England.
The conversation was of some length. I afterwards conversed with Rechid
Pasha. He said that they were convinced that ruin would follow submission to
the Pasha of Egypt's demands. The Grand Vizier rejoined us, and the sub
ject was continued. I said, that resistance at present to the demands of the
Pasha produced no evil to the Sultan ; that the Porte was able to reduce its
expences, whilst Mehemet Ali must continue to incur greater than he had
any means to support ; that the information from Syria showed the bad and
disordered state of the army and country under Ibrahim ; that on the side
of the Porte there did not appear any danger from an open attack from the
Pasha ; and that if it were attempted, it would be resisted by all the Powers,
if reliance could be placed upon their formal and reiterated declarations;
that therefore the Porte should remain in the position it had taken, until the
views and opinions of its friends should be known ; that if at last those
friends should not do what the Porte thought consistent with its interest, it
would then be time enough to make to Mehemet Ali those concessions
which necessity might demand to be made, instead of now laying the Govern
ment of the country at that Pasha's feet, and risking, if not giving up, the best
interests of the Sultan, without necessity.
The Grand Vizier concurred.
The reports from the Consuls in Syria, which go home, and other infor
mation f have received, all show how little solid power the Egyptians have ;
and a report from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Inter
nuncio, which I have read, and which I believe will be shown to Lord Beau
vale, gives an account from Alexandria of a similar state of things.

No. 372.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 1 1 .)
(Extract.) Pans, November 8, 1839.
COUNT MEDEM has called upon me this morning, and made me
acquainted with the contents of a despatch from Count Nesselrode, which he
has communicated to Marshal Soult, and which is in answer to the proposition
made by the French Government, with respect to an arrangement between
the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

3 P

474

No. 373.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received November 15.)
My Lord, Tlterapia, October 22, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of a Note from the Sublime Porte, dated 21st instant.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 373.
Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Mve Powers.
Constantinople, le 13 Chaban, 1259.
(Traduction.) (21 Octobre, 1839.)
ON sait qu'aussitot apres Favenementau tr6ne du Sultan Abdoul Medjid,
le pardon que Sa Hautesse daignait accorder a Mehemet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte,
a condition que les hostilites cesseraient par terre et par mer, fut piiblie, et
annonce a tous les hauts fonctionnaires de l'Empire; et que, bient6t apres,
les Cinq Puissances Alliees se chargfcrent de Parrangement et de la conclusion
de la Question Egyptienne.
On sait aussi qu'en attendant la decision des Cinq Puissances, et pour
laisser les choses dans I'etat ou elles etaient, la Sublime Porte fit savoir a ses
generaux, dans leurs campemens respectifs, qu'il fallait eviter absolument, la
circonstance arrivant, tout conflit avec les troupes Egyptiennes, et qu'elle ne
cesse encore de faire les memes recommandations.
II etait done necessaire. qu'en attendant Pheureuse issue de la mediation
des Puissances, Mehemet Ali Pacha s'abstint aussi de tout mouvement hostile.
On voit cependant par les depeches successives communiquees aux Repre
sentans des Cinq Puissances, que les troupes du Pacha, sous pretexte, tantot
de prendre des quartiers d'hiver, tantdtde poursuivre leurs deserteurs, se sont
peu k peu portees en avant des lieux qu'elles occupaient et se sont etablies
dans diverses villes, bourgs et villages. Les commandans de l'Armee Otto
mane, se conformant aux instructions de la Sublime Porte, ne se sont pas
opposes a ces envahissemens de territoire ; ils se sont contentes d'en informer
le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, et de demander a cet egard Pexpression de
la volonte Imperiale.
Or, il serait contraire aia declaration officielle de la Sublime Porte qu'elle
autorisat ses sujets a repousser par la force I'agression Egvptienne. D'un
autre cote, il est impossible d'envoyer aux habitans des lieux dont les
Egyptiens veulent s'emparer des instructions pour qu'ils les y reijoivent.
En consequence, outre la difficulte qui resulte pour la Sublime Porte de
ce fait en lui-meme, il ne lui parait pas convenable, apres Pacceptation de
l'intervention des Cinq Puissances, de pourvoir, sans les consulter, aux
mesures qu'exige une affaire aussi delicate.
La Sublime Porte se regarde done comme obligee par la nature de Paffaire
aussi b;en que par celle de ses rapports d'amitie avec les Cinq Puissances,
d'en faire part a leurs Representans et de s'en referer a eux quant a la marche
qu'elle doit adopter.
La presente Note est adressee a M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, de m6me
qu'elle Pest a M. Plnternr.nce d'Autriche. a MM. les Ministres de Russie
et de Prusse, et. a M. ie Charge d'Affaires de France, et c'est pour nous une
occasion de lui renouveler Passurance de notre haute consideration. (Signe*) RECHID.

475
(Translation.)
Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.
Constantinople, 13th Chaban, 1259.
(October 9], 1839.)
IT is known that immediately after the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid
to the throne, the pardon which His Highness was pleased to grant to Me
hemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, on condition that hostilities should cease by land
and by sea, was published and notified to all the high functionaries of the
Empire ; and that presently afterwards the Five Allied Powers undertook to
settle and conclude the Egyptian Question.
It is also known, that while waiting for the decision of the Five Powers,
and in order to leave matters in the state in which they were, the Sublime
Porte acquainted its Generals in their several positions, that it was absolutely
necessary to avoid, the case occurring, any conflict with the Egyptian troops,
and that the Porte does not even now cease to issue the same injunctions.
It was necessary, therefore, that while waiting for the happy issue of the
mediation of the Powers, Mehemet Ali should also abstain from all hostile
movements. It appears, however, by the successive despatches communis
cated to the Representatives of the Five Powers, that the troops of the Pasha,
under pretext, at one time of taking up winter quarters, at another of follow
ing deserters, have by degrees advanced from the positions which they occu
pied, and have established themselves in different cities, towns, and villages.
Tbe Commanders of the Ottoman Army, in obedience to the instructions
of the Sublime Porte, have not opposed these encoachments ; they have
confined themselves to reporting them to the Government of His Highness,
and to demanding the enunciation of the Imperial pleasure in respect to this
matter. Now, it would be at variance with the official declaration of the Sublime
Porte, if it were to authorize its subjects to repel by force the Egyptian
aggression. On the other hand it is impossible to direct the inhabitants' of the
places which the Egyptians wish to make themselves masters of, to receive
them. Consequently, besides the difficulty which the Sublime Porte experiences
from this circumstance alone, it does not consider it proper, after having
accepted the intervention of the Five Powers, to have recourse, without con
sulting them, to the measures which so delicate an affair requires.
The Sublime Porte then considers itself obliged by the nature of the
affair, as well as by the nature cf its friendly relations with the Five Powers,
to communicate thereupon with the Representatives, and to refer to them
as to the course which it should adopt.
The present note is addressed to the Ambassador of England, in the
same manner as it is addressed to the Internuncio of Austria, the Ministers of
Russia and of Prussia, and the Charge d'Affaires of France ; and the doino- so
affords me an opportunity of repeating to him the assurance of our high con
sideration. (Signed) RECHID.

No. 374.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.— -(Received November 16.)
(Extract.) Aleppo, September 23, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy
of my despatch of the 20th instant, to Viscount Ponsonby, which I hope will
meet with your Lordship's approbation.
Since the date of my inclosed despatch to his Excellency the Ambas
sador, nothing of any interest has transpired on this frontier, or within the
jurisdiction of this Consulate, which merits your Lordship's attention.

3 P 2

476
Inclosure in No. 374.
Mr. Pro- Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Aleppo, September 20, 1839.
I II AVE further to inform your Lordship, that during my stay at Biregick,
J had occasion to see a very respectable Christian, from whom I elicited that
the whole country round is perfectly quiet, and that the only Egyptian trOops
that had crossed the river were two regiments of Infantry under Selim Pasha,
who continue to remain at Orfa, as also some Bedouin Cavalry and Turkish
Irregulars (Bachi-Bozuks) under Colonel Maggiun Bey. He added, that this
latter, with the Bedouins and Turkish Irregulars, had only just returned to
Orfa, for he had heard they had gone on a reconnoitring tour along the
Desert, in which they had advanced to a place called Ambra, the object of
which, he says, is not known, though generally rumoured and believed to
find Souffbok Bey and that tribe of Arabs.
1 have the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that the Egyptian forces
continue to occupy on the frontiers between Aintab and Marash, the same po
sition as when I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship, with the
exception of several regiments, which have been ordered as here under.
Towards the south, for Hamah, Homs, and Damascus, two regiments
of Infantry, two idem of Cavalry, and one of Artillery.
To Antioch, two regiments of Infantry; and there are at present forming
the garrison of Aleppo, two regiments of Infantry, and one idem of Cavalry,
the Dragoons. His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to occupy Marash,
and has with him about five regiments, four of which are Infantry, and. one
Cavalry, with a few batteries of Artillery.
At Aintab there are four regiments of Infantry, and two of Artillery.
I have not received lately any advices from the Adana district, butT am
assured that Achmet Menekli Pasha continues to be there with a corps of
Cavalry. From the latest advices I have from the Alexandretta district, I am
able to inform your Lordship, that the whole of those mountains and of
Byass along that range to Adana, are now perfectly quiet and secure; and I
may add, that at present, the whole of this Consular district enjoys the
greatest tranquillity. , .
I have further to inform your Lordship, that on my way back to Aleppo,
I passed through Aintab, and I there learnt that his Excellency the Seras
kier had ordered the Cuirassier Regiment to proceed forthwith to Albistan,
said to be about eighteen hours from Marash ; and upon my enquiring for
what reason, I was told that one of those mountains, called "Giugik Dagh,"
had risen, and was completely revolted, in consequence, they added, of his
Excellency having demanded their arms and conscripts.
I was further informed, that the inhabitants of this mountain were the
same who had some short time back advanced on the Giaour Dagh mountains,
and who committed the late many depredations on the caravans, &c , towards
Byass, and all that neighbourhood, and who had also, some time back, taken
the Government oxen employed in the mountains for the timber cutting in the
same direction.
I was also told by many, whilst at Aintab, that the Seraskier Ibrahim
Pasha had still the intention of bringing the River Sedjour to Aleppo, and
that he had sent for all the colonels of the regiments there, to combine mea
sures for this undertaking. Since my arrival liere I learn that the Government
has sent a large quantity of baskets, spades, &c, to Aintab, by order of his
Excellency the Seraskier, said to be for the purpose of working the canal
which is to conduct the River Sedjour to this place.
In consequence of there having been no arrivals from Malatia and that
direction, I possess no correct information to lay before your Lordship with
regard to the movements of the Sultan's Seraskier Sadullah Pasha, who I am
assured is at Malatia.
It has been reported, to me that Sadullah Pasha has collected in the

477
direction of Malatia, Diarbekir, &c, a force of 20,000 Regulars, and {hat
10,000 have reached Malatia from Constantinople, which, together with
Solyman Pasha's force of Irregulars, form a body of 35,000 to 40,000 men.
But this report requires further confirmation, as it does not appear to be at
all authentic, nor is it mentioned from any other quarter.
His Excellency Solyman Pasha (Colonel Seves) is still here, though
hourly expecting, he says, to obtain leave from his Excellency the Seraskier
to repair to Sidon.
His Excellency lsmael Bey, our Governor, is still in the Damascus district,
and is employed with his Excellency Sheriff Pasha in the settlement of the
Haouran affair.

No. 375.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 16.)
My Lord, Damascus, September 28, 1839.
I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship on the 30th ultimo.
The insurrection in the Agloun district has been pacified by his Excel
lency lsmael Bey and the forces under his command, not however without
first destroying two villages. The tribe of Saffer Arabs who, it was appre
hended, would have made common cause with the Agloun population, were
previously defeated by lsmael Bey's forces; one Chief Sheik, and twenty-
five Arabs, were taken and decapitated ; they lost also, it is said, 25,000
sheep and 2,000 camels, which became booty to the Egyptian soldiers.
lsmael Bey and the Caftan Bey, with their forces, have since proceeded to the
Haouran district, the Fellah population of which have hitherto refused to pay
taxes, furnish supplies, and recognize the Government. 1 hear the chief
Sheiks of Haouran, with the major part of the population, carrying with them
their effects, provisions, &c, have fled to Boussre, and have once more entered
the Ledgea. His Excellency Sheriff Pasha left Damascus on the 15th
instant, with his suite, taking with him one battery of field-pieces, a regiment
of light regular cavalry, and 500 irregular foot, which arrived here the day
previous from Aleppo, and is to be joined with 500 foot from the Emir
Bechir's, under his son, the Emir Halil, at the Ledgea, to form a junction with
lsmael Bey's forces. Nine redoubts, to cover the springs, are to be erected,
in order to render the position of the Ledgea untenable to the insurgents.
All the masons, builders, and carpenters have been put into requisition for
this undertaking, and sent off to the Ledgea. Not only the subjugation of
the Haouran population may be a protracted affair, but the chief object of
rendering the Ledgea a refuge and bulwark for the disaffected and insurgents
of the south of Syria, may be of doubtful issue ; still it is the only plan which
promises success to the Egyptian Government.
Your Lordship will receive from the Aleppo Pro-Consul, advices on the
measures taking by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, either to advance, or to
maintain his forces in the positions he occupies, until the solution of the
pending question between the Sultan and the Viceroy. But from general
advices, there is not an appearance that the Egyptian forces are intended to
return immediately to their old cantonments. The only indications which I
have observed from hence to maintain the Egyptian forces in the north, are
the sums of money which have been sent to Aleppo ; and the medical men
which have arrived from hence, have received orders to rejoin the forces,
even at Orfa. Ibrahim Pasha has also sent orders, that the depot of clothing
at Acre should furnish the supplies to the army on the northern frontier.
These, with the operations going on at the Ledgea, denote that the Govern
ment is intent on keeping the army on that frontier, and, at the same time, is
taking measures here to prevent, in case of an advance of his Highness
Ibrahim Pasha, a reaction in the south of Syria.
In the Palestine jurisdiction, I hear there has been, in the neighbourhood
, of Jerusalem, great uneasiness at the disaffection of a Sheik, having at his
command a large population who can find arms. In other parts of Syria
tranquillity exists, but the commercial interests are in a languid state.

478
The Government here is taking measures to keep down and regulate ithe
incessant rise and variation of specie, which is a grievance of long standing,
which seems likely still to frustrate the intentions of Government. 1 have, &c.,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

No. 376.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 16.)
My Lord, Alexandria, October 20, 1839*
ON the 13th instant I received a despatch, (inclosure No. 1,) from Her
Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, informing me, that the Internuncio
had sent instructions to the Austrian Consul-General here, to make a
communication to the Pasha, and which I was directed to support.
As the Pasha was still absent, I merely informed Viscount Ponsonby of
the receipt of his despatch (inclosure No. 2).
M. de Laurin gave to me a copy of the communication received by him
from the Internuncio, and which forms the inclosure No. 3; and he, at the
same time, received a Turkish translation of it, which he was instructed to
give to Mehemet Ali.
The Pasha arrived here on the evening of the 16th, and on the following
morning, M. de Laurin saw him, and gave to him the paper, in Turkish,
alluded to.
On the morning of the 18th, I waited on the Pasha, and my despatch to
Viscount Ponsonby, (inclosure No. 4,) will inform your Lordship of the details
of my interview.
Inclosure No. 5 is copy of a letter from Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali,
and inclosure No. 6 is the reply thereto.
Your Lordship will see by those two documents, that Hosrew Pasha did
not, as Mehemet Ali says, offer to negotiate directly with him without tbe
knowledge or sanction of the Great Powers, but that the proposition to that
effect proceeded from Mehemet Ali ; and that Hosrew Pasha, so far from
listening to it, immediately addressed to the Representatives of the Great
Powers at Constantinople a Note, dated September 28, translation of which
forms inclosure No. 7.
I have further the honour to inclose copy of a Note (No. 8) from Baron
Stiirmer to M. de Laurin, transmitting another Note (inclosure No. 9) from
the Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers, and which M. de Laurin
was authorized to communicate confidentially to the Pasha.
1 have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 376.
Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbetl
[See Inclosure 2 in No. 359.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 376.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.
<My»Lord, Alexandria, October 16, 1833.
I HAD the honour to receive, on the 13th instant, your Excellency^
despatch of 5th instant, directing mc to co-operate with the Austrian Consul-
General, in the representation to the Pasha, which he is instructed • by the
Internuncio to make.
M. de Laurin has fully communicated to me the instructions which he

470
has received, and I have assured him of my most zealous and cordial
co-operation in such manner or form as he may deem best calculated to
obtain the desired end.
As the Pasha is still absent, although daily expected here, no steps have
yet been able to be taken in the affair. I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELIL

Inclosure 3 in No. 376.
Baron Stiirmer to M. de Laurin.
[See Inclosure I in No. 359.]
Inclosure 4 in No. 376.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.
My. Lord,, Alexandria, October 19, 1.839.
IN my despatch of the 16th instant, T had the honour to acknow
ledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of 5th instant, and to inform your
Excellency that I should conform to the contents of it, on the return of the
Pasha to this place.
The Pasha returned on the evening of the 16th instant, and on the
morning of yesterday I waited on him, and found him alone.
I mentioned to the Pasha, that I w*s charged by your Excellency to
support the demands which the Internuncio had directed M. de Laurin to
state to him, and which that Consul-General had mentioned to me having
already submitted to him on the previous day. And I said, that I hoped and
expected that his Highness would conform to them, not only as being the
wish of the Great Powers, but also that it was only just, and also of his own
interest to make to his Sovereign the concessions required.
The Pasha said that he could not consent to give up Adana, which was
" the door to his house;" but that he was ready to pay for Adana any extra
tribute beyond what he already paid.
I replied, that such a transaction could merely be considered as a bargain
and not as any concession to his Sovereign, and which he was bound to
make; and, moreover, that he ought to consider that he had been informed in
the note given to him by M. de Laurin, that the Great Powers would not
regard as valid, any agreement made between the Porte and Mehemet Ali
without their sanction.
He again said, that he could not give up Adana, but that he would not
object to give up Candia to the Porte, but nothing more.
I then entered on the subject cf his sending back the Turkish fleet, to
which he replied, that it was well known that it was not his intention to
keep it, and that he always considered it as the property of the Sultan, and
that he would restore it so soon as the question between the Porte and
himself should be settled, but that if he gave it up now, it would only be a
motive for demands for further concessions. And I could not bring him to
change his opinion either on this point, or upon that of further concessions to
the Porte. He mentioned, however, that he did not longer desire the removal of
Hosrew Pasha; but in regard to the Note of 28th of September, sent by the
Divan to the Ambassadors of the Great Powers at the Porte, to desire that no
arrangement might be permitted except by the medium of the Great Powers;
the Pasha expressed some surprise, as he had, he said, a letter from Hosrew
Pasha, of the 3rd of September, implying, that a direct amicable arrangement <
might be made between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, without the intervention
of the Great Powers, and to which letter Mehemet Ali replied on the 15th'
of September.

480
The Pasha promised me copies of those letters, which I have now the
honour to transmit to your Excellency (inclosures No. I and 2), by which you •
Excellency will be able to judge how far Hosrew Pasha's letter bears" the >
interpretation of a desire to treat directly with Mehemet Ali, without the
knowledge or interference of the Great Powers; but it appears to me that the
letter of Hosrew Pasha does not admit of the interpretation which Mehemet
Ali pretends to give to it.
Copies of those letters have also been given to M. de Laurin and to
Count Medem.
I learn from those two gentlemen, that the substance of their interviews
with the Pasha was to the same effect as my interview ; and in regard to the
Consul-General of France, he has not interfered in this affair.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 5 in No. 376.
Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali.

(Traduction.) 3 Septembre, 1839.
J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la depeche de votre Altesse et d'en com-
prendre le contenu. Elle est remplie de reproches, et Votre Altesse nous
invite de nous eloigner des affaires et a lui donner avis de cela. J'ecris la
presente a. votre Altesse pour lui temoigner que notre amitie est sincere envers
elle, et de cela Dieu en est temoin, et que nous ne nourrissons aucun senti
ment d'animosite envers elle. L'opinion qu'elle a de moi n'est pas juste, et
malgre que les reproches et les plaintes de votre Altesse contre moi ayent
rempli la terre entiere, moi je ne me suis pas fache contre elle et cela regarde
plutot a l'Empereur. Toutes ces paroles ont cause entre les Musulmans et
les Sages d'Europe du tort an nom de Mehemet Ali Pacha, et puisque " chaque
individu doit se devouer a la cause des siens," cela m'a beaucoup surpris en
votre Altesse, et m'a meme fache. Parce que le Capitan Pacha est coupable,
vouloir retenir la flotte n'est pas une chose raisonnable, et nous ne le croyions
pas. Vous avez ecoute les paroles du Capitan Pacha, et si vous auriez
envoye la Flotte Imperiale, cela aurait ete une chose convenable et douce.
Ce qui peut regarder mon eloignement des affaires, Votre Altesse le sait, que
depuis plusieurs annees j'ai reste retire dans ma maison. La Providence,
malgre mon desir contraire, a voulu que je devins Grand Vizir, et cela est
Feffet de la Grace Divine, et s'opposer, aurait ete s'opposer a la volonte de
Dieu: je craignais, et j'acceptais le Viziratavec la persuasion que Dieu m'aidera.
Maintenant, Monseigneur, je vous prie beaucoup de vouloir me pardonner
cette faute du Grand Vizirat, puisque cela pour moi etait un destin de Dieu,
par la raison meme que je me trouvais un des premiers dans ITslam ; et je
remercie le Tout-Puissant qu'au dernier soupir je me trouve dans la grace du
Prophete et au service de notre bienfaiteur, l'Empereur, que je servirai avec
zele. Votre Altesse connait tout cela minutieusement, et en le rdpetant elle
pourrait se facher. Que Dieu donne a chacun de nous selon son cceur; en
attendant, tachons avec zfele et devouement a remplir nos devoirs.
(Translation.)
Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali. September 3, 1839.
I HAVE had the honour to receive the despatch from Your Highness, and
to understand its contents. It is full of reproaches, and Your Highness calls
upon me to give up office, and to inform you of my doing so. I write this letter
to Your Highness to prove to you that my friendship for you is sincere, and of
that God is witness, and that l" entertain no sentiments of animosity against you.
The opinion which you have of me is not just, and notwithstanding that the
reproaches and complaints of Your Highness against me have filled the whole

481
earth, I myself am not angry with you, and that matter rather concerns the
Emperor. All these words have injured the name of Mehemet Ali Pasha
among the Mussulmans and the wise men of Europe, and since " each person
ought to devote himself to the cause of his countrymen," your Highness has
much surprised me, and has even vexed me. Because the Capudan Pasha is
blameable, it is not reasonable that you should wish to retain the fleet, and I did
not believe that you would. You have heard the words of the Capudan Pasha,
and if you had sent the Imperial fleet, it would have been right and proper. As
regards my retirement from office, your Highness knows, that for some years
past I have remained secluded in my house. Providence, notwithstanding my
desire to the contrary, would that I should become Grand Vizier, and that is
the effect of the Divine favour, and to resist, would have been to resist
the will of God ; I feared to do so, and I accepted the office of Vizier with the
persuasion that God will aid me. Now, my Lord, I entreat you to be so good
as to pardon me this fault of being Grand Vizier, since that in my case was
agreeable to the destiny of God, because I was one of the first men in Islam ;
and I thank the Almighty that up to my last breath I am in the favour of the
Prophet, and in the service of our benefactor, the Emperor, whom I will serve
with zeal. Your Highness knows all this minutely, and in consequence of my
repeating it you may be angry. May God give to each after his heart ; in the
meanwhile, let us endeavour with zeal and with devotion to fulfil our duties.

Inclosure 6 in No. 376.
Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.
[See Inclosure in No. 345.]
Inclosure 7 in No. 376.
Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.
[See Inclosure in No. 343.J

Inclosure 8 in No. 376.
Baron Stiirmer to M. de Laurin.

Monsieur, Bouyoukdere, le 7 Octobre, 1839.
VOUS recevez ci-incluse une copie de la derniere Note de la Porte aux
Representans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, que faute de tems je n'ai pas
pu joindre a ma lettre d'avant-hier expediee par PArchiduc Lodovico. Vous
pouvez la communiquer au Pacha, si vous le jugez convenable, mais ce ne
devrait etre que d'une maniere confidentielle. (Signe) STURMER.
(Translation.)
Baron Stiirmer to M. de Laurin.
Sir, Buyuhde're, October 7, 1839.
YOU receive inclosed herein a copy of the last Note of the Porte to the
Representatives of the Five Great Powers, which, from want of time, I was
unable to add to my letter of the day before yesterday, sent by the " Archiduc
Lodovico." You may communicate it to the Pasha if you think fit ; but you
should only do so confidentially. (Signed) STURMER.

3 Q

482
Inclosure 9 in No. 376.
Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.
[See Inclosure in No. 343.]

No. 377.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received November 17.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1839.
COUNT NESSELRODE called upon me yesterday. He is very
anxious to receive from your Lordship the definitive opinion of Her Majesty's
Government, as to the best settlement to be effected between Mehemet Ali
and the Porte, and as to the measures to be adopted to effect that settlement.
But his Excellency is reconciled to the longer delay than he had anticipated
in the arrival of such a communication, by the hope that your Lordship will
have ascertained the views of the French Cabinet, and obtained, if possible, its
assent to the line of conduct which Her Majesty's Government may desire
to adopt. Count Nesselrode has always shown himself sensible of the advantages
which would be gained by securing the assent of France to the settlement
desired by the other Powers. His Excellency repeated, what he had frequently
remarked to me before, that the French journals were entirely wrong in asserting
that M. de Brunnow's mission was intended to exclude France from acting in
concert with Russia and England upon this subject, and he seems sincerely to
hope that your Lordship will succeed in conciliating the spirit of the French
Government towards the policy of the British Cabinet. He laid much stress
upon the opinion, that Candia was the portion of Mehemet Ali's possessions
which it was most desirable for the Sultan to regain, with a view to his
own security. His Excellency expressed a decided opinion, that if a fleet
should intercept the communications between Syria and Egypt, and act
offensively against Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pasha would not dare to attempt a
march upon Constantinople, and that he would even have great difficulties
in maintaining his army in its present position ; because a hostile army can
make no progress, and can have no security in Syria, without support and
communications from without by sea. But this last reflection did not lessen
Count Nesselrode's desire that the French Government should prove, at least,
not hostile to the arrangement which the other Powers may desire to effect.

No. 378.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.' — (Received November 18.)
(Extract.) Berlin, November 13, 1839.
I READ to Baron tVerther the copy of your Lordship's despatch,
dated the 25th of October, to the Marquess of Clanricarde, relative
to the mission of Baron Brunnow in England, and his Excellency expressed
his entire approbation of it, more particularly of the view taken by Her
Majesty's Government with respect to the Straits of the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles; and that the best arrangement would be, that while Turkey
is at peace, both of those straits should be shut against ships of war of all
Powers ; and he considered that this arrangement would be more conducive
to the maintenance of peace, than an understanding that the Straits in
question should be open at all times to the ships of war of all countries.
"With regard to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that if for
a particular emergency, one of those Straits should be opened for one party,
the other ought at the same time to be opened for other parties, and for
instance, if it should become necessary that a Russian force should enter the

483
^Bosphorus, a British force should at the same time enter the Dardanelles'
(and for which case it appears that M. de Brunnow's instructions did not
] provide,) his Excellency observed, that however right and necessary it would
, be at a future period to come to some distinct understanding on this point,
he regretted that any time should at present be lost in the negotia
tion of this question, as he considered that no such emergency as that
contemplated by the advance of Ibrahim Pasha on Constantinople could
.possibly arise ; that all the accounts he had received from Asia Minor,
confirmed him in the opinion of the impossibility of Ibrahim's advance,
from the present state of Syria and of his own army ; but that Her
Majesty's Government must be even better informed on this head than he
could be. Convinced, however, as he was, of the impossibility of Ibrahim's
advance, he begged me to convey to your Lordship his opinion, that it would
be more advantageous to leave the question of the Straits of the Bosphorus
and Dardanelles for a matter of future negotiation ; (more particularly as
irappily at this moment, the British and Russian Governments seemed to
.have abandoned all distrust of each other on Turkish Affairs ;) and that all
the energies of Her Majesty's Government should be turned to the settle
ment of the Syrian Question.

No. 379.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November IS.)
My Lord, Paris, November 15, 1839.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 12th of November.
I have communicated to Marshal Soult your Lordship's despatch of Octo
ber 29, in which are recapitulated the proceedings which have taken place
between the two Governments on the Affairs of the East, and in obedience
to your instructions, I left a copy of it in his hands.
His Excellency this morning informed me that the French Consul at
Alexandria writes, that the language of Mehemet Ali is pacific; and although
the Pasha said, that in the case of his giving up Adana, it ought to be held
by one of his sons under the Porte, still he believed that the Viceroy would
conclude a treaty of peace with the Sultan on the conditions stated in the
project of the French Government. On my asking the Marshal whether he
bad any reason to suppose that the Turkish Government weie disposed to
accede to those conditions, his Excellency replied, that the despatches of
M. Pontois merely announced his arrival at Therapia, and at the time of their
date, M. Pontois had not had any conversation with the Turkish Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
The Marshal, at the same time that he expressed his hope, that a peace
would be concluded between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, seemed desirous
that I should not imagine that the French Government felt any anxiety on
the subject. He told me, that the reports he had received from the French
Consuls at Beyrout, at Damascus, and at Aleppo, contradicted the rumours
of any insurrections being apprehended in Syria, of a nature to give uneasi
ness to Ibrahim Pasha. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 380.
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.
My Lord, Foreign Office, November 19, 1839.
I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's
despatches to the 5th of November.
With reference to your conversation with Count Nesselrode on Turkish
Affairs, reported in your despatch of that day, I have to state to vour
3 Q 2

484

Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government are waiting for a reply from the
Russian Government to the proposition made by them to that Government,
through Baron Brunnow, and explained in my despatch to your Excellency,
of the 25th ultimo; and Her Majesty's Government anxiously hope, that so
reasonable an arrangement will meet with the concurrence of the Imperial
Cabinet. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 381.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 21.)
(Extract.) Therapia, October 26, 1839.
BY the last post I forwarded copy of an Official Note from the Porte,
dated October 21st. I now inclose copy of my answer.

Inclosure in No. 381.
Note from Viscount Ponsonby to Rechid Pasha.
THE Note, dated the 21st of October, addressed by his Excellency
Rechid Pasha to the Undersigned, affords a new proof of the fidelity with
which the Sublime Porte adheres to engagements. The High Allies and
friends of the Porte must find in such conduct, additional incitement to devote
their uninterrupted attention to the early and stable settlement of the great
affairs they have taken upon themselves to arrange; and the result will prove
that the delicacy with which the Ottoman Government has acted, is in intimate
accordance with prudence. The interest of the Pasha is to provoke the
Porte or its Generals to act, so as to enable him to strike some blow that
will give him advantages in the final arrangement ; and his is a position in
which it is politic to risk. His strength is not solid, but rests upon ephe
meral bases; and his army is not good, is not numerous, is not paid, is not
well affected. The domination of the Egyptians in Syria is opposed by all
who dare act, and is detested by the whole population of the country. The
Pasha has the greatest need of some success against the Ottoman troops,
that may give his partizans occasion to make, anew, pompous reports of his
power, to deceive the uninformed world, and to give force to his extravagant
claims, which amount to the partition of the empire under the disguise of
vassalage. Time has already operated beneficially for the State, for it has
proved the fidelity of the subjects of all ranks to their Sovereign, and belied
the assertions of the Pasha of Egypt, that the Pashas and the people were
the supporters of his pretensions. Time has shown that the authority of the
Sublime Porte is obeyed throughout the empire, and that the enemies of the
Porte have spoken falsehood when they asserted that anarchy prevailed
everywhere, and that there remained no empire to be the object of the
friendly solicitude of the Allies of the Sultan.
It is easy to point out many more advantages that have been produced
by the operation of time in making truth known ; and the Sublime Porte will
not fail to see the wisdom of the counsel given in the Collective Note of the
28th of July, by the Representatives of the Great Powers, which prevented a
hasty submission on the part of the Porte to the imperious demands of a rebel
subject, and saved the empire from partition, and the most sacred prerogatives
of the Sultan from the danger to which they must be exposed, by leaving the
government of the Holy Cities in the possession of a man raised to a power
much too great to be controuled by the Porte. It would be wrong, therefore,
if the Sublime Porte were impatient; it would be a great error to act under the
influence of such a feeling, for its only consequence would be to make the Sul
tan abandon a third part of his empire to the family of Mehemet Ali, and to
raise up rivals to dispute the most sacred of His Imperial Majesty's rights.

485
The Sublime Porte cannot have anything to apprehend, if it will continue
to act with the prudence and firmness that have hitherto distinguished its
conduct.
<¦' The Allies of the Porte are interested in maintaining the integrity
and independence of the Ottoman Empire ; and it is not to be imagined
that they want the power to do so against a petty Chief, if it should
be necessary for them to exert their strength. The Ottoman Ministers
are too well acquainted with facts to be deceived by the vain boasts
of the Pasha of Egypt, and the absurd exaggerations of his partizans; but
there are ignorant men in this country who entertain the most foolish ideas,
and think, that to grant Mehemet Ali all he demands, would be to unite the
whole Mussulman force, and to create the means of preserving the country
from all danger. It requires little penetration, however, to see, that if what
Mehemet Ali demands were granted, the effect would not be to unite
Mussulmans, but to disunite them; for it is impossible that a Sultan could be
safe on his throne, when such possessions as Syria, Arabia, Egypt, &c, were
placed irrevocably in the hands of a Pasha; and it is equally impossible for a
Pasha, holding such possessions, to be safe in the enjoyment of them, as long
as there is a Sultan on the throne interested to wrest them from him; and
the consequence must be, that jealousy, fear, and hate, must predominate in
the bosoms of the Sultan and Pasha, and that union (even for an hour) cannot
exist between them : and thus it is manifest that the ideas above-mentioned;
of strengthening the Mussulman power by granting the demands of Mehemet
Ali, are false, and that the measure is ridiculous, if proposed as a security for
the empire, because it is in fact the partition of it, creating a necessity for
one portion of it to be always in opposition to the other, — a strange way of
making the whole strong against external enemies.
The difficulty stated as arising from the alternative, that the Sublime
Porte may be obliged either to disregard its acceptance of the intervention
of the Five Powers, and order the Ottoman Generals to resist the advances
of Ibrahim Pasha, or to instruct the inhabitants of those parts into which
that Pasha may enter, to receive him, is one that, on all accounts, requires
attention, but it must be resolved by the consideration of what is best for the
interest of all, including those inhabitants in question.
If the Generals and Armies of the Sublime Porte were sure of making a
successful resistance to the advances of the Pasha, there might be no doubt
of the propriety of making it ; and the Five Powers might not interpret the
act to be an infringement of the engagement of the Sublime Porte, and the
inhabitants would thereby be protected; but if there be danger that the Otto
man forces should be found not sufficiently prepared nor numerous enough to
insure success for their efforts, it must be the duty of the Porte not to throw
away that power in the defence of a small portion of the country which, if
kept unbroken, may suffice to restore the whole monarchy to peace and
order, and amply compensate the inhabitants of those districts for any
temporary evils they may sustain by submission to the temporary power of
an invader. It is not necessary that the Porte should give any instructions
to the inhabitants upon the subject, and prudence requires that nothing
should be said upon the matter to them, and, whenever it is in its power,
the Porte will apply the remedy to the evils they are exposed to.
The Undersigned, &c, (Signed) PONSONBY.
Therapia, October 25, 1839.

No. 382.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 21.)
My Lord, Therapia, October 27, 1839.
I INCLOSE copy of a report from the Austrian Consul-General at
Alexandria to the Internuncio. It contains interesting information upon
several subjects, illustrative of the means possessed by the Egyptians." I

486
have since heard that Ibrahim has made some arrangement with his adver
saries in the Ledgea, by which he grants them large privileges. I believe
this arrangement, if it be made, will prove to be of the nature of more than
one or two previously made between the same parties. A mere expedient to
gain time. I have, Sec.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 382.
M. de Laurin to Baron Stiirmer.

(Traduction.) (Extrait.) Alexandrie, le 15 Octobre, 1839.
DEPUIS mes rapports du 24 du mois passe et du 6 du courant, les affaires
de la Syrie semblent avoir considerablement empire.
Dans la nuit du 25 au 26 Septembre, les insurges du Haouran attaquereift
les troupes de Cherif Pacha et les repousserent jusqu'au-dela des Puits de
Barack sur la route de Damas. Le chef des troupes irregulieres, Hassan
Agha-el-Yazdji, fut porte blesse a Damas, et Pon decida dans un Conseil des
autorites militaires de cette ville, de renforcer sur le champ les troupes du
Haouran et de leur envoyer des munitions de bouche et de guerre.
Ce succes des insurges, quelque petit qu'il fut, parait cependant inquieter
beaucoup Mehemet Ali. II apprehende que les mecontens ne l'exagerent et
ne soulevent par la d'autres peuplades. Cette apprehension du Pacha est
parfaitement fondee. La defaite de Hassan Agha fait le sujet de toutes les
Conversations, et depuis lors plusieurs districts de la montagne ont refuse
Pimpdt, et se trouvent actuellement en revoke ouverte contre le Gouvernement.
Pour ce qui regarde la dislocation des troupes d'Ibrahim Pacha, elle a
eu lieu avant que Kiamil Bey eut apporte au Seraskier les contre-ordres dont
fait mention mon rapport du 6 de ce mois. Ibrahim Pacha se trouve main-
tenant avec peu de troupes a Marache, et neanmoins (d'apres un rapport
d'Alep du 19 Septembre) il doit avoir l'intention d'occuper Besana et
Diarbekir. Mehemet Ali semble a present approuver la premiere de ces mesures de
son fils, mais il nie d'avoir donne I'ordre d'occuper Besana et Diarbekir. Les
travaux des fortifications de St. Jean d'Acre et aux passes d'Alexandrie se
continuent avec assiduite.
La flotte Ottomane a recu une grande quantite de biscuit et d'autres
munitions de bouche. On en infere qu'elle pourra bientot partir d'ici. Les
equipages le desirent si ardemment, qu'il faudra a la fin adherer a leur
demande pour ne pas les pousser a la revoke. Meme le paiement de la solde
arrieree qui eut lieu il y a quatre jours, n'a pu apaiser cette demande enoncee
d'une maniere presqu'impetueuse.
P.S. — 16 Octobre, 1839. J'expedie ce rapport par le pyroscaphe de
guerre Anglais "Rhadamanthus."
Le Pacha est attendu d'une heure a Pautre. Mr. Campbell et le
Comte Medem se sont declares prets a appuyer de leur mieux le Message
que je dois faire au Pacha d'apres la depeche de votre Excellence du 5 de ce
mois. M. Cochelet n'a recu, a ce sujet, aucune instruction positive.
(Translation.)
M. de Laurin to Baron Stiirmer. Alexandria, October 15, 1839.
SINCE my reports of the 24th ultimo, and 6th instant, affairs in Syria
appear to have grown much worse.
In the night between the 25th and 26th of September, the insurgents of

487
the Haouran attacked the troops of Cherif Pasha and drove them back beyond
the wells of Barack on the road to Damascus. The Commander of the irre
gular troops, Hassan Agha el Yazdji, was carried wounded to Damascus, and it
was decided in a council of the military authorities of that city, forthwith to rein
force the troops of the Haouran, and to send them provisions and military stores.
This success of the insurgents, trifling as it has been, appears, nevertheless,
to disturb Mehemet Ali much. He is apprehensive lest the malcontents should
exaggerate it, and thereby raise up other tribes. This apprehension on the part
of the Pasha is perfectly well founded. The defeat of Hassan Agha is the
subject of every conversation, and subsequently several districts of the moun
tain have refused to pay taxes, and are actually in open revolt against the
Government. As regards the breaking up of the troops of Ibrahim Pasha, it took place
before Kiamil Bey had brought to the Seraskier the counter-orders mentioned in
my report of the 6th instant. Ibrahim Pasha is now with a few troops at
Marash, and nevertheless, (according to a report from Aleppo of the 19th of
September,) he intends to occupy Besana and Diarbekir.
Mehemet Ali appears at present to approve of the first of these measures of
his son, but he denies having given orders for the occupation of Besana and
Diarbekir. The works on the fortifications of St. Jean d'Acre, and at the
passages of Alexandria, continue with activity.
The Turkish fleet has embarked a great quantity of biscuit and other
provisions. It is inferred from thence, that it will possibly soon depart from
this. The crews long for it so intensely, that it will he necessary at last to yield
to their demand, in order not to drive them to revolt. Even the payment of
their arrears, which took place four days ago, has not had the effect of pacifying
this demand, which has been expressed almost with impetuosity.
P. S. — October 16, 1839. I send this report by the British steamer of war
" Rhadamanthus." The Pasha is hourly expected. Colonel Campbell and Count Medem have
declared themselves ready to support to the best of their ability the message
which I am to deliver to the Pasha according to your Excellency's despatch of
the 5th of this month. M. Cochelet has not received any positive instruction
on this point.

No. 383.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 21.)
My Lord, Therapia, October 28, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of Baron Stiirmer's
reply to the official Note of the Porte, dated October 21, which was forwarded
to your Lordship in my despatch of October 22. I have, &c,
(Signed); PONSONBY.
P.S. — The reply of the French Charge d'Affaires, Count de Lurde, was
mueh to the same purport. P.

Inclosure in No. 383.
Note from Baron Stiirmer to the Sublime Porte. 24 Octobre, 1839.
LE Soussigne a pris connaissance de la Note que son Excellence M. le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser, en date
du 21 de ce mois.

488
II regrette plus vivement que personne les penibles embarras que sustii-
tent a la Sublime Porte les envahissemens des troupes Egyptiennes dans
FAsie Mineure ; mais il croirait superflu de faire observer au Divan, que ces
embarras sont inherens a la situation du moment, et que, les circonstances ne
permettant point d'y remedier promptement, il est d'une sage politique de
s'appliquer du moins a ne pas les aggraver.
Laisser fraterniser les troupes Ottomanes avec celles d'Ibrahim Pacha
entrainerait, sans contredit, de graves inconveniens ; de l'autre cdte, une lutte
entre ces deux forces armees pourrait amener les complications les plus
facheuses, car on ne saurait se dissimuler que tout nouveau succfes des
Egyptiens produirait en leur faveur un effet moral incalculable, et pourrait
soulever des peuplades dont leurs emissaires n'ont pas reussi jusqu'ici a
ebranler Pattachement k leur souverain legitime.
Le Soussigne est done sur de remplir les intentions de son Auguste Cour
en conseillant a la Sublime Porte d'en joindre iterativement a ses Generaux e.t
Commandans dans PAsie Mineure, d'eviter soigneusement tout contact avec
les troupes Egyptiennes, et de se retirer chaque fois que celles-ci feraient mine
de vouloir se rapprocher des positions qu'ils occupent. En agissant ainsi, la
Sublime Porte prendra Pattitude la plus propre a manifester. la confiance
qu'elle place dans Pappui des Cinq Puissances coalisees. Le moment d'ail
leurs n'est pas loin, j'espere, ou elle sentira toute la valeur de cet appui, et le
Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse n'aura pas a regretter de Favoir attend u avec
patience. La Sublime Porte n'ignore pas que le gros de l'Armee Egyptienne n'est
nullement en mesure de se porter en avant ; mais quand meme il le pourrait,
Mehemet Ali est trop bien avise pour ordonner un mouvement qui deviendrait
pour les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe le signal de leur reunion instantanee
contre lui.
La perte temporaire de quelques portions de terrain dans PAnatolie n'a
pas assez d'importance dans la conjoncture actuelle pour balancer les grands
interets qui sont en jeu, et faire devier le Ministere Ottoman du systeme de
temporisation et de calme qu'il a suivi jusqu'ici avec tant de sagesse. Le
Soussigne est d'avis que les empietemens memes des Egyptiens peuvent
tourner au profit de la Sublime Porte en achevant d'irriter I'opinion publique
contre Mehemet Ali, et en accelerant les effets de Funion qui existe entre les
Cinq Puissances.
En soumettant ces reflexions au jugement eclaire du Divan de Sa Hau
tesse, le Soussigne saisit cette occasion de renouveler a son Excellence M. le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres lassurance de sa haute consideration.
(Signe) STURMER.
(Translation.)
Note from Baron Stiirmer to the Sublime Porte. October 24, 1839.
THE Undersigned has taken cognizance of the Note which his Excellency
the Minister for Foreign Affairs did him the honour to address to him on the
21st instant. He regrets more deeply than any one the painful embarrassments which the
encroachments of the Egyptian troops in Asia Minor occasion to the Sublime
Forte ; but he would consider it superfluous to state to the Divan, that these
embarrassments necessarily attach to the present state of affairs ; and that as
circumstances do not admit of a remedy being speedily applied, it is a prudent
policy to endeavour at least not to aggravate them.
To allow the Ottoman troops to fraternize with those of Ibrahim Pasha,
would unquestionably give occasion to serious inconvenience : on the other hand,
a conflict between these two armed forces might bring on the most lamentable
complications ; for it is impossible to conceal, that every fresh success on the part
ot the Egyptians would produce an incalculable moral effect in their favour and
might stir up the tribes whose attachment to their lawful Sovereign the Egyptian
emissaries have not yet succeeded in shaking. ' ¦¦
The Undersigned, therefore, feels certain that he shall fulfil the intentions

489
of his august Court, by counselling the Sublime Porte again to enjoin its
Generals and Commanders in Asia Minor, carefully to avoid coming in contact
with the Egyptian troops, and to retire on all occasions when the latter should
evince an intention to approach the positions occupied by them. By actiug thus,
the Porte will assume the attitude best calculated to manifest the reliance which
it places on the support of the Five United Powers. The moment besides, is
not, I trust, far distant, when it will experience the whole value of this support,
and the Government of His Highness will not have occasion to regret having
waited for it with patience.
The Sublime Porte is not ignorant that the main body of the Egyptian
Army is by no means in a state to advance ; but even if it could do so, Mehemet
Ali is too prudent to order a movement which would be the signal for the imme
diate coalition of the Great Powers of Europe against him.
The temporary loss of some portions of territory in Anatolia is not of
sufficient importance in the present state of affairs, to weigh against the great
interests which are at stake, and to cause the Ottoman Ministry to deviate from
the temporizing and passive system which up to this time it has so prudently
observed. The Undersigned is of opinion that even the encroachments of the
Egyptians may turn to the advantage of the Sublime Porte, by eventually irri
tating the public mind against Mehemet Ali, and by hastening the effects of the
union existing between the Five Powers.
In submitting these considerations to the enlightened judgment of the
Divan of His Highness, the Undersigned takes this opportunity to repeat to his
Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs the assurance of his high consi
deration. (Signed) STURMER.

No. 384.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, November 22, 1839.
I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches
to the 28th of October.
I have to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government
entirely approve the Note which you addressed to the Porte on the 25th of
October, of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of October 26, in reply to
the official Note of the Porte, of October 21, respecting the continued
encroachments of the Egyptian Army upon the Turkish territory.
I am, &e,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 385.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston — (Received November 21.)
(Extract.) Paris, November 18, 1839.
THE French Government felt hurt at having been taxed in yourLordship's
despatch, (which I had communicated on Friday last to Marshal Soult,) with
having, at the commencement of the communications between the two Govern
ments, professed a determination to preserve the independence and integrity of
the Turkish Empire, and with having subsequently, and on a sudden, changed
its policy, and become, to all practical purposes, the protector of Mehemet
Ali. It avers, that it is as desirous as ever to maintain the independence of the
Turkish Empire, and8 makes the following statement of its conduct: When
accounts arrived here of hostilities being imminent between the Sultan and
Mehemet Ali, the French Government, being strongly impressed with the great
danger which might result to the independence of Turkey from the breakino-
out of war, was anxious to concert with the British Government, the best means
of preventing a collision of the Turkish and Egyptian Armies, or, if hostilities
3 R

490
bad actually commenced, of concluding an armistice between them. As long as
both parties were in the field, and as long as no decisive advantage had been
gained by either army, when the Turkishand Egyptian fleets were nearly of equal
force, and when the slightest naval assistance given to one might ensure
victory over the other, it was not unreasonable to expect, that the warning
voice of the British and French Governments would be listened to, and that
their intervention might be effectual ; but after the total rout and dispersion
of the Turkish Army, and after the treacherous surrender by the Capudan
Pasha, of the fleet under his command, into the hands of Mehemet Ali, the
position of affairs' was entirely changed, and we had to consider what it was
possible to do, as well as what arrangement it was desirable to effect. The French
Government is not disposed to deny, that the arrangement proposed by the
British Government, if it could be carried into effect, affords a better security
to the Turkish Empire than the arrangement proposed by France ; but we
have not the means of compelling Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria, and we
must not vouloir I'impossible. A naval blockade could not effect that object.
They have had enough of blockades, and of their inefficacy at Vera Cruz, and
at Buenos Ayres, and how could the two Governments undertake a blockade,
which, if the information received from Admiral Lalande be correct, those who
would have to execute it, the officers of the two fleets, agree, could not be
maintained upon the coast of Egypt and of Syria without great risk, and
which would not turn out to be effectual ? If these naval means are in
adequate to compel Mehemet Ali to accept the limits traced out in the
Plan of the British Government, where is to be found the military force
to drive the Egyptians out of Syria ? It cannot, or will not, be furnished by
England, by France, or by Austria ; there remains then only Russia ; and if
that task be assigned to Russian troops, the French Government has no hesita
tion in asserting, that a far more irrecoverable blow would be inflicted upon the
independence of the Sultan and of the Turkish Empire, by the Russian occu
pation of Constantinople and of Asia Minor, than by the conceding to the
administration of Mehemet Ali even all the territory which the Egyptians
now occupy.
This, my Lord, is, I think, the substance of the grounds on which the
French Government defends itself from the imputation of inconsistency of
conduct in the Eastern Question.

No. 386.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, November 22, 1839.
WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 18th instant,
I have to observe to your Excellency, that the upshot of the statement of the
French Government appears to be, that in proportion as the course of events
has rendered the active assistance of the Powers of Europe necessary for
maintaining the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, exactly
in that proportion, and precisely for that reason, the French Government has
become unwilling to afford to the Sultan any assistance at all.
With respect to the notion, that the Five Powers acting in union with the
Sultan, have not the means of compelling the Pasha of Egypt to evacuate
Syria, that opinion is one which it can scarcely be worth while seriously to
argue ; the disparity of forces between the two parties in such a contest
being so infinitely great, that resistance on the part of the Pasha must
necessarily be vain.
The French Government, however, seems to be of opinion, that the
Sultan would be more seriously injured in his independence by receiving
assistance from Russia, than by having his Empire practically dismem
bered, and by being deprived permanently of the resources of a large portion
of his own territories. In this opinion Her Majesty's Government cannot
concur. It is undoubtedly a misfortune for a Sovereign to be under the
necessity of receiving military or naval aid from another Sovereign to defend
him against hostile attack. The receiving of such aid is a public and

491
undeniable proof of great weakness on the part of him who receives it ;
and real independence is not compatible with great weakness. Such aid
also, if given by the single act of the Sovereign who affords it, entitles that
Sovereign to ask in return favours and influence which must trench upon the
future independence of the Sovereign who has been protected. But if
Ttussia were to give assistance to the Sultan, not as acting upon her own
single decision, but as acting in pursuance of a concert between the Five
Allied Powers, such assistance would of course not bring after it any favours
¦or concessions from Turkey to Russia that would be injurious to the inde
pendence of Turkey; and then the only question would be, whether
the independence of the Turkish Empire would, permanently and for the
future, be most affected by the temporary occupation of some part of the
Turkish territory by a friendly Russian force, which would come in to restore
that territory to the Sultan, and which would go out again when that
purpose was accomplished, or by the permanent occupation of such territory
by a hostile Egyptian force, which, having come in to conquer, would stay
in to retain ; and would by retaining, practically sever such territory from
the Turkish Empire. Surely there can be no doubt how that question
must be answered . I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 387.
Baron Werther to Viscount Palmerston. 3, Lower Berkeley Street,
My Lord, ce 22 Novembre, 1839.
JE viens de recevoir la copie d'un rapport de notre Legation a
Constantinople. Comme les donnees qu'il renferme vous offriront peut-etre
quelque interet, je m'empresse de vous transmettre cette copie. Ce rapport
du Comte Kcenigsmarck confirme ce que vous avez eu la bonte de me
communiquer hier, que Mehemet Ali ne veut pas meme se contenter des
territoires que le Cabinet Francais propose de lui abandonner hereditairement,
et que le Vice-Roi insiste a, obtenir le district d'Adana et les defilds du
Taurus. Veuillez agreer, &c,
(Signe) WERTHER.

(Translation.)
Baron Werther to Viscount Palmerston. 3, Lower Berkeley Street,
My Lord, November 22, 1839.
I HAVE just received the copy of a report from our Mission at Constanti
nople. As the particulars which it contains will perhaps be of interest to you,
I hasten to send you this copy. This report from Count Konigsmarck confirms
what you had the goodness to communicate to me yesterday, that Mehemet AH
is not disposed even to be satisfied with the territories which the French Cabinet
proposes to abandon to him hereditarily, and that the Viceroy insists upon
obtaining the district of Adana and the defiles of the Taurus. Receive, &c,
(Signed) WERTHER.

3 R 2

492
Inclosure in No. 387.
Count Kcenigsmarck to His Majesty the King of Prussia.
Sire, Bouyoukdere, ce 30 Octobre, 1839.
PAR mon tres-humble rapport, No. 65, j'ai eu l'honneur de rendre
compte k votre Majeste de la demarche que M. l'lnternonce d'Autriche,
d'ordre de sa Cour, avait prescrite, en date du 5 de ce mois, a M. de Laurin,
pour declarer au Pacha d'Egypte qu'il ne parviendrait pas d'amener la Porte
a un arrangement auquel les Grandes Puissances, sous Pegide desqudles
elle s'etait placee, resteraient etrangeres, et pour faire comprendre a Mehemet
Ali, qu'une superiorite de forces materielles ne suffirait pas pour lui donner
l'avenir qu'il veut fonder dans Pinteret de sa famille, puisque, quand meme le
Sultan accorderait toutes les concessions qu'il demande, elles ne consolide-
raient pas sa position, si l'Europe ne les sanctionnait pas. Je me suis permis
de joindre au dit tres-humble rapport Poffice que j'avais adresse a M. le
Comte de Medem, charge, durant Pabsence de M. Roquerbe, de la gestion du
Consulat de Prusse a Alexandrie, pour Pinviter a appuyer, au nom de mon
Auguste Cour, le langage de M. le Consul-General d'Autriche, et a eclairer le
Vice-Roi sur sa veritable position.
M. le Comte de Medem vient de m'informer de la maniere dont il s'est
acquitte de cette commission, et comment le Pacha Pa recue, par un rapport
qu'il m'a adresse en date du 20 du courant, et que j'ai l'honneur d'annexer
ici en copie. Votre Majeste daignera voir entre autre par cette piece, que
Mehemet Ali a declare aux Consuls-Generaux, qu'il n'avait jamais cherche k
etablir des negociations avec la Porte dans le but de terminer ses differends
avec elle, sans le concours des Grandes Puissances; qu'il avait pris ample
connaissance de la depeche de M. le Baron de Stiirmer, et qu'il appreciait
beaucoup les considerations qu'elle renfermait, mais qu'il n'avait rien a y
repondre, sinon qu'il se tenait a sa derniere declaration, et que ce ne serait
que lorsqu'il connaitrait les resolutions definitives des Grandes Cours sur la
Question Orientale, qu'il pourrait emettre une replique positive, Pissue de la
question reposant sur des faits et non sur des raisonnemens.
II resulte en outre de ce rapport, que M. le Consul-General de France,
au lieu de s'associer a cette demarche, est alle jusqu'a faire sentir au Pacha,
que si dans la depeche de M. l'lnternonce d'Autriche il n'etait pas question de
moyens repressifs, ce changement de langage etait du a Pinfluence de la
France seule, qui s'etait opposee a toute mesure coercitive ; qu'a la suite de
cette communication, M. le Consul-General de Russie avait cru devoir faire
part au Vice-Roi du projet d'accommodement presente par le Cabinet
des Tuileries, en lui observant qu'il devait etre prepare plutot a obtenir
moins que plus ; que Pidee des mesures comminatoires n'etait nulle-
ment abandonnee, et que ses pretentions relativement a la destitu
tion de Hosreff Pacha avaient ete jugees compietement inadmissibles ;
observations auxquelles Mehemet Ali a repondu, que la Question Orientale
ayant change de face par le fait de l'intervention des Grandes Puissances, il
renoncait a la demande du renvoi de Hosreff Pacha ; que quant a Pile de
Candie, il se dedderait aussi a s'en desister, mais que, pour Adana, il ne
consentirait jamais a la restituer a la Porte, les defiles du Mont Taurus (Koulek
Boghas) fermant la porte de sa maison et le mettant a l'abri d'un coup demain
de la part des Turcs.
Le rapport que M. de Laurin a adresse k M. le Baron de Stiirmer sur ce
sujet, renferme a peu pres les memes details, mais le rapport ci-jointdu Comte
de Medem etant plus precis, M. l'lnternonce en a fait un extrait pour sa
Cour. Je n'ai pas encore appris ce que M. le Colonel Campbell a eerit a
Lord Ponsonby, ni lu ce que M. le Consul-General de Russie a mande a
M. de Bouteneff sur leurs entretiens avec Mehemet Ali a Poccasron de la
demarche Autrichienne ; mais d'apres ce que MM. de Medem et de Laurin
en rap'portent a M. de Stiirmer et a moi, on ne saurait cependant douter
qu'elle n'ait fourni une nouvelle preuve que le Pacha d'Egypte, aussi longtems
qu'il se croira soutenu par la France et a l'abri de moyens coercitifs, ne se
desistera pas de ses pretentions. Je suis, &c,
(Signe) KCENIGSMARCK.

493

(Translation.)
Count Konigsmarck to His Majesty the King of Prussia.
Sire, Buyukde're, October 30, 1839.
BY my most humble report, No. 65, I had the honour to give Your
Majesty an account of the step which the Internuncio of Austria, by orders
from his Court, had, on the 5th instant, enjoined M. de Laurin to take, in'
order to declare to the Pasha of Egypt that he would not succeed in bringing
the Porte to an arrangement with which the Great Powers, under whose
protection it had placed itself, should have nothing to do, and to make Mehe
met Ali understand, that a superiority of material forces would not suffice to
confer upon him that future position of which, for the interest of his family, he
is desirous of laying the foundation, since, even if the Sultan should grant all
the concessions which he demands, they would not consolidate his position,
if Europe did not sanction it. I ventured to annex to the above-mentioned
most humble report the despatch which I had addressed to Count Medem,
who, during the absence of M. Roquerbe, has the management of the
Prussian Consulate at Alexandria, to request him to support, in the name of
my August Court, the language of the Consul-General of Austria, and to
enlighten the Viceroy on his real position.
Count Medem has just acquainted me with the manner in which he
executed this commission, and how the Pasha received it, by a despatch
which he has written to me, dated the 20th instant, and of which I have the
honour to inclose a copy. Your Majesty will be pleased to observe among
other things by this document, that Mehemet Ali has declared to the Consuls-
General, that he had never sought to enter into negotiations with the Porte
with the view of bringing his differences with it to an end, without the con
currence of the Great Powers; that he had made himself fully acquainted
with the despatch of Baron de Stiirmer, and that he greatly appreciated the
considerations which it contained ; but that he had no answer to make to it,
except that he abided by his last declaration ; and that it was only after he
should be aware of the definitive resolutions of the Great Courts on the
Eastern Question, that he could give a positive answer, as the solution of the
Question depended on facts and not on reasonings.
It further appears from this report, that the Consul-General of France,
instead of joining in this proceeding, went so far as to give the Pasha to
understand, that if in the despatch of the Internuncio of Austria there was
no mention of measures of coercion, this alteration of language was owing to
the influence of France alone, who had opposed all such measures ; that in
consequence of this communication the Consul-General of Russia had thought
it right to communicate to the Viceroy the plan of arrangement proposed by
the Cabinet of the Tuileries, remarking, that he should be prepared rather to
obtain less than more ; that the notion of threatening measures was by no
means abandoned; and that his pretension, relative to the dismissal of Hosrew
Pasha, had been considered altogether inadmissible, to which observations
Mehemet Ali replied, that the Eastern Question having changed its aspect
from the circumstance of the intervention of the Great Powers, he abandoned
his demand for the removal of Hosrew Pasha ; that, as for the Island of
Candia, he would decide upon giving that up also; but that as to Adana he
would never consent to restore it to the Porte, as the defiles of Mount Taurus
(Kulek Boghas) closed the door of his house, and secured it from a sudden
attack on the part of the Turks.
The report which M. Laurin has addressed to the Baron de Stiirmer
contains pretty nearly the same details ; but the annexed report of Count
Medem being more precise, the Internuncio has made an extract of it for his
Court. I have not yet learnt, what Colonel Campbell has written to Lord
Ponsonby, nor read what the Consul-General of Russia has detailed to M. de
Bouteneff respecting their interviews with Mehemet Ali on the subject of the

494

Austrian proceedings; but, according to what MM. Medem and Laurin
report to M. de Stiirmer and myself respecting it, it is altogether impossible to
doubt, that it has furnished a fresh proof, that the Pasha of Egypt, so long as
he shall imagine himself supported by France, and secure from coercive
measures, will not desist from his pretensions. I am, &C',
(Signed) KCENIGSMARCK.

No. 388.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 25.)
(Extract.) Vienna, November 11, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that his Excellency
Lord Beauvale informed me on the evening of the 9th instant, that Prince
Metternich would see me on the ^following morning at 12 o'clock. I
called on the Prince at the hour appointed, and his Highness immediately
entered on the subject of the Eastern Question ; he assured me emphatically,
that the opinions of Austria were completely identified with those of
England, whatever might be the difficulties that obstructed the realization
of their joint views. He stated it as his confident opinion, that Russia and
Prussia were in perfect unanimity with England and Austria in their deter
mination to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and that the
professions of France were of the same tenour, although a disposition to give
countenance to the pretensions of Mehemet Ali was manifestly evinced.
"It would probably," said Prince Metternich, "be of some advantage to you
to tell Mehemet Ali that I have, vivd voce, acquainted you with the views of
Austria, and that you can bear your own personal testimony to their complete
accordance with those of your own Government. Endeavour to point out to
the Pasha the magnitude of the risk he is incurring, and that at his advanced
period of life, it would be the height of impolicy to sacrifice the prospects of
the future to the assumed exigencies of the present. That no unreasonable
conditions, such as the surrender of Egypt, will be imposed on him ; that if
he professes himself to be the faithful and obedient subject of the Sultan,
deeds and not words must prove his sincerity ; and that he would undoubtedly
consult his own interests in supporting the Ottoman Empire, as any further
encroachment would be contrary to the resolution of the Great Powers of
Europe, and could have no other result than the aggravation of his
embarrassments." Prince Metternich then passed to the consideration of those difficulties
which would seriously engage the attention of the Great Powers. Although
fully alive to, and by no means undervaluing questions of territorial
boundary, he gave the pre-eminence to those which involved the final settle
ment of rights and duties.
The Prince then read to me the despatch most recently received from
the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria, the purport of which was the
continued obstinacy of the Pasha in his territorial pretensions, as well as the
detail of a conversation held with him on the subject of the surrender of
the Turkish fleet.
I forward this despatch to your Lordship under flying seal, through his
Excellency Lord Beauvale.

495
No. 389.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 21.)
My Lord, Vienna, November 10, 1839.
BEING uncertain whether a copy of Lord Ponsonby's despatch to me
of the 28th ultimo has been sent to your Lordship. I have the honour to
transmit one with its inclosure. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 389.
Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, Therapia, October 28, 1839.
I INCLOSE a despatch I received this day from Colonel Campbell. It
reports a conversation between the Pasha and him. I do not understand
what is said about Adana. I know of no propositions having been made to
the Pasha ; there was a demand made that he should give up the fleet.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 389.
Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.
[See Inclosure 4 in No. 376.]

No. 390.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 25.)
My Lord, Vienna, November 16, 1839.
IN reference to my despatch, of the 10th instant, I have the honour to
transmit to your Lordship the copy of a despatch which I have received
from Viscount Ponsonby, together with its inclosures. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 390.
Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, Therapia, October 30, 1839.
WITH reference to the despatch of October 19, from Colonel Campbell,
which I had the honour to transmit to your Excellency on the 28 th instant, I now
inclose translations of the two letters which form the annexes to that
despatch. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

496
Inclosure 2 in No. 390.
Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha.
[See Inclosure 5 in No. 376. J
Inclosure 3 in No. 390.
Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.
[See Inclosure in No. 345.J

No. 391.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 25.)
(Extract.) Therapia, October 30, 1839.
RECHID PASHA has acquainted me with what passed between him and
M. de Pontois yesterday, as follows : — " After some preliminary discourse,
I said to the Envoy, ' I am much mortified by seeing, as I do, in the French
journals, that France shows partiality for Mehemet Ali, which contradicts
the assurances I have given to my Government, and to His Highness, of the
friendly feelings of the French Government for the Sublime Porte, and of its
will to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman dominions.' "
The Envoy replied : " There is no attention to be given to what the journals
say. The Government has at heart the interests of the Sublime Porte, and is
strongly disposed to do what may be useful to it.
The Pasha. — The interests of the Sublime Porte demand that nothing
should be granted to Mehemet Ali, except the hereditary government of Egypt
alone ; but France has proposed to the Great Powers an arrangement by which
Adana should be given up now to the Porte, and Candia restored to it after the
death of Mehemet Ali, and Syria be divided amongst his children at the same
period, and that the hereditary government of Egypt should be given to him.
To give Syria to the children of Mehemet Ali as an hereditary possession after
the death of that Pasha, is the same thing as to cede the hereditary possession of
it to him now.
The Envoy. — The French Government is of opinion that the Sublime Porte
should grant to Mehemet Ali, independently of the hereditary government of
Egypt, some other favours for life. France disagrees with England only on one
point, namely, as to the means to be employed. France, in communicating her
ideas to the other Governments, has not given them as her ultimatum ; it is only
a project. The employment of force against Mehemet Ali is considered by the
Government of France as the signal for his march to Constantinople, and there
fore of the march of the Russians, which might bring on an European war. If
the combined fleets go to Alexandria to burn the Egyptian fleet, the Ottoman
fleet will be burnt also.
The Pasha. — The combined fleets by going to Egypt might do other things
than burn the fleet.
The Envoy. — The season is too far advanced for the fleets to go to Egypt.
We have not the advantages that Russia has ; the Russians are at the door of
Constantinople, they have the winds for them and the currents, and our fleets
are at a distance from Constantinople, and they might find many obstacles in
approaching it.
The Pasha. — The two fleets together consist of a large number of ships,
and one-half would suflice for Egypt, and the other half for these parts
(parages). The Egyptian Army is not in a state to march forward, for money

497
is wanting, and there are troubles to be quieted in different parts of Syria ;
besides, if the season is bad for the English and French ships to act on the
coast, it is too far advanced also for the Egyptian Army to march forward ; but,
to conclude, I wish to know if you are already informed of the resolutions of the
French Government ?
The Envoy. — The Baron Brunnow, sent by the Emperor of Russia to
London, was the bearer of propositions that have been rejected by England ; it
is therefore very probable that after that having happened, and particularly as
Prince Metternich is on the point of returning to Vienna, the Governments
will not long delay coming to an understanding and sending me and my
colleagues instructions on the Egyptian Question, and the Russians will fail in
all their efforts to disunite France and England.
I had a long conversation with M. de Pontois two days before his visit to
Rechid Pasha, when he said to me nearly what he said to the Pasha as reported
above. He was anxious to disclaim all partiality for Mehemet Ali and all
jealousy of England, and to attribute the wishes of the French Government, as
expressed in its propositions, to the opinion entertained that Mehemet Ali would
bring on a war, &c. I discussed with him, one by one, the reasons assigned for
that opinion.

No. 392.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 25.)
My Lord, Vienna, November 16, 1839*
COLONEL HODGES has left this town for Alexandria. During his
stay here I communicated to him, according to your Lordship's orders, the
correspondence upon Turkish and Egyptian affairs, and before his departure I
addressed to him an instruction of which I have the honour to inclose a copy.
It has been communicated to Prince Metternich, who fully concurs in its contents.
I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 392.
Instructions from Lord Beauvale to Colonel Hodges.
Sir, YOUR arrival at Alexandria from Vienna, — the supposed centre of the
negotiation upon the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, — will probably excite expec
tation of a result, the want of which may lead to a doubt as to the existence of
understanding between the Powers.
You have seen by the correspondence which has been placed in your hands,
that for some time past the affairs in question have been treated in London, and
you will not conceal the fact.
From Vienna, therefore, nothing is at present to be expected upon them ;
but it is to be remarked, that upon all the leading points — upon the preservation
of the integrity of the Turkish Empire under the reigning dynasty ; upon the
defence of Constantinople; upon the conditions ou which the right of hereditary
succession may be recognized in the family of the Pasha ; the Five Powers are
already agreed. Nothing remains to be established between them but the line
of demarcation and some other points of detail, upon which there is every
prospect of their coming to a sufficient agreement.
If, therefore, Mehemet Ali were to build upon your arrival without definitive
instructions, a hope of security to himself from dissensions among the Powers,
he would be deceived. A rash step taken by him would at once lead to conse
quences which would make him sensible of his error.
It is probable that England will have been represented to the Pasha as his
enemy, as exciting and leading the opposition to him, and as aiming at his
destruction. If these opinions have gained credit with him, he will be little accessible
3 S

498
to the truth, nor will it be desirable to attempt to force it upon him ; but as
occasion may offer, it will be well that you should state, that the British Govern
ment has no feeling of enmity or hostility towards him ; that the order and
security which he has established in Egypt are more valuable to England, by
opening a short communication with India, than to any other nation ; that the
commercial prosperity of Egypt reacts upon us ; and that for these reasons the
continuance of the system which Mehemet Ali has created in that country, is of
high value and importance to us.
In Africa we are friendly to his power, and to its permanence : if we
are less so in Asia, it proceeds not from any hostility to his. person, but
because in Asia his presence acts as a solvent to the empire of the Sultan, —
an empire which his conquests in that quarter of the globe can neither support
nor replace ; which they can only weaken and destroy ; and which we are deter
mined to sustain.
If the object of Mehemet AH be really the establishment of his family,
it is only in Africa that that establishment can be fixed. There he will have
Europe friendly to him ; and, reconciled to the Porte, he may pursue the
consolidation of the structure he has raised, with every facility for success,
and with the certainty of transmitting it to his descendants.
In Asia, on the contrary, there can never exist between him and the Sultan
but an armed truce. He must either overthrow or he overthrown. But the
chances are not equal : the loss of a battle expels Mehemet Ali from Asia, the
gain of one opens at most to him the road to Constantinople, which is too
strongly guarded, for him to make an impression upon it. Full and final success
is therefore impossible to him; the utmost he can gain in Asia is the temporary
occupation of some addilional districts ; the utmost he can lose may be read in the
history of all conquerors when checked in their career. And let him not deceive
himself* by supposing that the defence of Constantinople is but temporary, that
the Powers will slacken in their efforts, or separate in their views. He will not
find it so : their defence of it results from no personal feelings, from no transient
motives. It is founded on their interests. Aiming at the preservation of peace,
they cannot risk that so great a spoil should become an object of contention, and
to avoid this, they unite their efforts to secure it to its present possessor.
Mehemet Ali can never occupy it, and his power can take no root in Asia unless
he does occupy it. If, then, he is willing to pass away, as he has seen Buona
parte pass before him, let him continue his present career.
If he aims at bequeathing his power and station to his family, let him accept
what has been offered. In Africa these objects can be secured to him, while in
Asia his reign is but for a day.
By all accounts of Mehemet Ali, he will be but little accessible to these or
similar reasonings ; nor is the time yet come when they can with propriety be
made to him, unless he should of himself give occasion for it.
You will, therefore, abstain from all official communications whatever upon
these subjects, awaiting the orders of our Government: but from the ascendancy
which Mehemet Ali appears to exercise upon all who approach him. it is possible
that these truths may as yet have been unheard, and even uncontemplated, in
Egypt; and it is for this reason that I explain them to you, leaving it to your
tact and discretion to make use of them, in case opportunities of doing
so with advantage should present themselves, without however pledging your
Government to any particular measures or course of conduct, beyond the engage
ments which it has already taken. These are public; but the mode of rendering
them available, must be left to the Government itself. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 393.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 25.)
(Extract.) Vienna, November 16, 1839.
I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich your Lordship's despatch,
of October 2t), to Earl Granville, in which his Highness expressed his entire concur-

499
reuce, requesting me to assure you, that there is no difference between England
and Austria upon this question.
Prince Metternich expects that the difficulty about the joint defence of
Constantinople will be got over, and that England, Austria, and Russia, will
thereby be enabled to act together.
He will accede to the plan of settlement, be it what it may, which shall be
agreed upon between England and Russia. The more favourable it is to the
Porte, the more he will be pleased with it. He considers the delay which has
taken place to have been favourable to the Porte. He is in no hurry to ter
minate it, and looks to ultimately uniting the Five Powers upon one line, and
to carrying through their common determinations, without a blow being struck.
I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 394.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 26.)
(Extract.) Berlin, November 20, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch
of November 12, inclosing despatches under flying seal to the Marquess of
Clanricarde. Baron Werther read to me yesterday a despatch he had received from Count
Konigsmarck, dated Constantinople, October 30th ; and as 1 considered* that
some of its contents might be interesting to your lordship, I requested his
Excellency to .give me a short abstract; a copy of which I have the honour
herewith to inclose.

Inclosure in No. 394.
Abstract of Despatch from Count Konigsmarck to Baron Werther.
Constantinople, le 30 Octobre, 1839.
LE Consul-General de France a Alexandrie a fait sentir a Mehemet Ali
que, si dans la depeche de l'Iniernonce d'Autriche, il n'etait pas question de
moyens repressifs, ce changement de langage etait du a. Pinfluence de la France
iqpti .s'etait opposee a toute mesure repressive.
Mehemet Ali a dit aux Consuls, qu'il consentirait a. la cession de Candie,
mais que pour Adana et les defiles du Taurus, il ue consentirait jamais a les
restituer au Grand Seigneur. (Translation.)
Abstract of Despatch from Count Konigsmarck to Baron Werther.
Constantinople, October 30, 1839.
THE Consul-General of France at Alexandria has given Mehemet Ali
to understand that, if in the despatch of the Austrian Internuncio there was
no question of coercive measures, this change of language was owing to the
influence of France, who had opposed herself to all such measures.
Mehemet Ali has told the Consuls, that he would consent to give up
Candia, but that as for Adana and the defiles of the Taurus, he would never
consent to restore them to the Grand Siguor.

3 S 2

500

No. 395.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 27.)
My Lord, Paris, November 25, 1839.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 22d of November.
In reference to your despatch of that day, in which your Lordship incloses, for
my information, and for communication to the French Government, a copy of Vis
count Ponsonby's reply to an Official Note addressed by the Porte, on the 21st of
October, to the Representatives of the Five Powers, on the subject of the con
tinued encroachments of the Egyptian Army upon the Turkish territory, I have
to state that, upon my mentioning Lord Ponsonby's Note to Marshal Soult, this
morning, his Excellency said, that a copy of it, which he had just read, was at
that moment on his table; and he was sorry to observe that the language of
Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was calculated to excite hopes in
the Divan, which the real state of things could scarcely justify. I replied, that
the statements made by Lord Ponsonby in his Note, of the advantages which the
Porte had derived from its compliance with the request of the Representatives
of the Five Powers, not hastily to submit to the conditions of peace imperiously
prescribed by Mehemet Ali, appeared to be well founded. The discontent
existing in Syria is stated by the Austrian Consul at Alexandria to give con
siderable uneasiness to the Pasha of Egypt, and the report seems to be true, that
Ibrahim Pasha has represented to Mehemet Ali, that in consequence of that
discontent, it would be imprudent to march his army into Asia Minor. The
Marshal answered, that from the last accounts received by him of the state of
Syria, it appeared that the country was perfectly tranquil. Captain Caillier, his
Aide-de-camp, who had traversed a great part of it, and the French Consuls at
Beyrout and Damascus, all testify to its tranquillity, as well as private letters of
a very late date from those countries. But with respect to the Eastern Question,
he hoped to transmit in a day or two to Count Sebastiani, a despatch which he
had addressed to him, and which would to-morrow be submitted to the Cabinet
Council, containing observations on your Lordship's despatch to me upon the
same subject, as well as full explanations of the opinions of the French Govern
ment on the present state of affairs in the East.
The Marshal said he was in momentary expectation of the despatches which
were brought to Marseilles by the steam-boat, of which the arrival had been
notified by telegraph ; and his Excellency seemed very desirous to receive the
confirmation of the report which prevailed on board the packet, that the Turkish
fleet had been restored to the Sultan, considering it as a prelude to the conclusion
of peace ; but I observed to him, that the dissatisfaction which had manifested
itself among the officers and crews of the Turkish ships, and the difficulty the
Pasha had in satisfying their demands for pay, might account for his restoration
of the fleet, even though no progress had been made towards a peace with the
Porte. [ IlclVG ScC*
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 396.
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, November 28, 1839.
I HAVE received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, a copy of the
the instructions which he gave to you on your departure from Vienna, for the
guidance of your language and conduct at Alexandria. Her Majesty's Govern
ment approve the tenour of those instructions.

501
No. 397.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, November 28, 1839.
WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 16th instant,
transmitting a copy of the instructions which you have addressed to Colonel
Hodges, I have to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government ap
prove of the tenour of those instructions. No. 398.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, December 2, 1839.
I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to continue to urge the Turkish
Government to remain firm ; to make no concession to Mehemet Ali ; but to
trust to the support of its Allies. The British Government has taken its line;
and the course of the negotiation during the last few months ought to inspire
the Turkish Government with confidence in Great Britain.
No. 399.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 2.)
My Lord, Paris, November 29, 1839.
MARSHAL SOULT this morning read to me his despatch to Count
Sebastiani, in reply to that which your Lordship addressed to me on the 29th
of October, respecting the conduct of the French Government on the Turco-
Egyptian Question.
As your Lordship must by this time have received from the French Ambas
sador a copy of Marshal Soult's despatch, it is unnecessary for me to report its
contents. The despatch appeared to me to contain little that has not been
before adduced and already answered, and I did not feel myself called upon to
enter into any extensive argument upon the subject. I contented myself with
pointing out several inaccurate statements that occur in the course of the
despatch ; and in regard to the insinuation that Her Majesty's Government in
their anxiety to restore to the Sultan the territories now in possession of
Mehemet Ali, had lost sight of the more important European Question, I
observed, that the putting an end to the exclusive Protectorate of Turkey
by the Russian Government, which must be the European Question refer
red to, would be best accomplished by the course which England had pro
posed ; and that a combined operation concerted by all the Five Powers
for the defence of the Turkish Empire, would be, in fact, to annul the
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Marshal Soult, after he had finished reading his
despatch, entered into the question of the conditions of peace, to which Mehemet
Ali might be brought to accede. The Pasha, he said, was willing to give up
Adana which he had possessed ever since the arrangement of Kutaya; he was
willing also to withdraw from Diarbekir and Orfa, in short, from the eastern
side of the Euphrates ; he was ready to accept only a life interest in the occu
pation of Candia, and perhaps might be induced to cede it at the present time.
With regard to the Holy Cities, the possession of which by Mehemet Ali, your
Lordship seemed to think would destroy the prestige of the Sultan's sovereignty,
he observed that those cities had been occupied by Mehemet Ali's troops for
twenty-five years, at the express request of the Sultan himself, the Turkish
Government not having the means of defending them against the Wahabites ;
and that these Holy Cities would be again exposed to the same danger, if the
Egyptian troops were to be withdrawn from them. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

502

No. 400.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston — (Received December 5.
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, November 18, 1839.
IN consequence of a delay in the arrival of the post at Berlin, the messenger
Fenessy was detained nearly four days in that capital, and only brought me your
Lordship's despatches of the 25th and the 29th of October, on Wednesday night,
the 13th instant.
Count Nesselrode promised me to despatch a messenger, at the end of this
week, with the formal answer of the Imperial Government, which I presume will
be contained in a despatch to M. de Kisseleff.
Count Nesselrode says, the reports he has received from Constantinople,
convince him that the Sultan will not come to a settlement of his differences with
Mehemet Ali without the advice or interference of his Allies. The Russian
Consul at Alexandria, however, "has written, that the Pasha would give up
Candia, if the Sultan would accede to his other demands.
P.S. — I have omitted to state above, that the Pasha of Egypt declared
positively to Count Medem, that he would on no account give up Adana and the
passages of the Taurus ; — a declaration that shows the justice of the objection
made by your Lordship to the proposition of the French Government, without
any offer of carrying it into effect by force, if necessary, when agreed to by the
Allied Powers. I now inclose a copy of an extract of the despatch of the Russian
Consul-General in Egypt, which Count Nesselrode has given me.

Inclosure in No. 400.
Count Medem to Count Nesselrode.

(JExtrait.) Alexandrie, le -^ Octobre, 1839.
J'AI dit au Pacha : " il n'entre dans la pensee d'aucune des Grandes Cours
de vous ecraser, toutes veulent au contraire vous assurer un avenir. Elles ont toutes
lemeraedesiretlememe intent — unepacificationhonorable,equitablepour l'Egypte
et sans etre desavautageuse pour la Porte ; en d'autres termes, une solution com
patible avec la securite future et Pintegrite de l'Empire Ottoman. Aucune
d'elles n'a considere vos pretentions relatives a la destitution de Hosreff Pacha
admissibles ; ce serait vous accorder une ingerence dans les affaires interieures
du pays efintervertir les roles de Souverain et de vassal."
Mehemet AH me repondit : — "Si j'ai insiste dans le tems sur le renvoi de
Hosreff, c'est lui qui m'y a contraint par ses intrigues et sa duplicite ; e'etait la
le seul moyen pour moi d'en venir a un arrangement definitif et stable. Depuis
que les Grandes Cours d'Europe se sont chargees du role de Mediatrices, les
affaires ont change de face, et cette question est aujourd'hui pour moi d'un
interet secondaire. Ce n'est plus snr le renvoi de Hosreff que j'insisterai. et je
renonce entierement a cette pretention. Pour ce qui est de Pile de Candie,
j'y souscrirai encore, si elle peut suffire pour amener la paix desiree ; cette
possession, quoique importante pour moi comme position maritime, loin de m'avorr
rap porte le moindre revenu, m'a toujours suscite des depenses ; mais quant a
la restitution d'Adana, qui forme la porte de ma maison, qu'on ne me la
demande pas, car je n'y adhererai point. En m'6tant les defiles du Mont Taurus
(Goulek Boghas), que j'ai fait fortifier a si grands frais, ce serait vouloir me
mettre aia merci d'une attaque de la part de la" Turquie."
Moi. — Ce district, ayant ete donne a ferme a Ibrahim et non concede a vous,
vous ne pouvez le reclamer comme propriete. Si vous y avez fait des fortifica
tions et depense des sommes immenses, personne ne vous y obligeait ; c'est a
vous-meme qu'il faut vous en prendre et non a la Porte, et cette consideration ne
saurait influencer les decisions des Grandes Cours.
. Mehemet Ali.—Je ne me deciderai jamais a remettre la clef de ma maison ; que
laPdrte augmente son tribut, j'y consentirai, mais on ne me persuadera point de
restituer Adana.

503
(Translation.)
Count Medem to Count Nesselrode.
(Extract.) Alexadria, October -2%, 1839.
I SAID to the Pasha, "None of the Great Courts think of crushing
you; they all, on the contrary, vvish to secure you a future position. They
have all the same desire for, and the same interest in, an honourable peace, —
fai:- towards Egypt, without being disadvantageous to the Porte; in other
terms, a settlement compatible with the future security and integrity of the
Ottoman Empire. None of them have considered your pretensions relative
to the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha as admissible ; that would be to grant to
you a right of interference in the internal affairs of the country, and invert the
positions of Sovereign and vassal."
Mehemet Ali replied to me. " If I insisted at the time upon the dismissal
of Hosrew, it was he that forced me to do so by his intrigues and duplicity;
it was the only way by which I could arrive at a definitive and durable
arrangement. Since the Great European Courts have taken upon themselves
the character of Mediators, the appearance of affairs has changed, and I con
sider that question at present as one of secondary interest. I will no longer
insist upon the dismissal of Hosrew, and I abandon that pretension altogether.
As to what is desired respecting the island of Candia, I will also consent to
it, if that would suffice to bring about the wished-for peace ; that possession,
although of importance to me as a maritime station, so far from producing me
any revenue, has always been a source of expence; but with regard to the
restitution of Adana, which is the gate of my house, do not ask me for it ; for I
will never consent to it. To deprive me of the passes of Mount Taurus (Kulek
Boghas) which I have caused to be fortified at so great an expence, would be
to wish to p ace me at the mercy of an attack on the part of Turkey."
Myself. — That district having been given to Ibrahim to farm, and not
given up to you, you cannot claim it as your property. If you have con
structed fortifications and expended large sums of money there, no one forced
you to do so; itis yourself and not the Porte whom you should blame, and that
consideration can have no influence on the decisions of the Great Courts.
Mehemet All — I will never consent to give up the key of my house. Let
the Porte increase the tribute, I will consent to it ; but they will never
persuade me to restore Adana.

No. 401.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 5.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, November 22, 1839.
I HAVE the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that, by the messenger
who bears this despatch, Count Nesselrode sends to M de Kisseleff a commu
nication which will convey to your Lordship the consent of the Imperial Cabinet
to the modifications of Baron Brunnow's propositions, desired by Her Majesty's
Government. Baron Brunnow will be directed to repair immediately to London, to con
tinue the negotiations he so sucessfully opened with your Lordship.

504

No. 402.
Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff. — (Communicated by M. de Kisseleff,
December 5.)
Monsieur, St. Petersbourg, ce %% Novembre, 1839.
LE Marquis de Clanricarde vient de me remettre la copie d'une depeche
dans laquelle le Principal Secretaire d'Etat a consigne un expose circonstancie
des entretiens qu'il a eus avec le Baron de Brunnow, expose qui est entierement
d'accord avec les informations que ce Ministre nous avait transmises au moment
de quitter Londres.
II r£sulte des communications que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre etait charge
de nous faire, que le Cabinet Britannique est dispose a adopter Pensemble de nos
propositions, a I'exception d'un seul point a Pegard duquel il croyait devoir
demander une modification qui, si elle etait acceptee par notre Cour, amenerait
une entente immediate entre la Russie et PAngleterre sur les affaires de la Turquie.
Le Baron de Brunnow nous avait dejafait connaitreles considerations majeures
qui obligeaient le Ministere Anglais a insister sur cette modification : la franchise
et la confiance avec lesquelles Lord Palmerston s'etait enonce a cet egard vis-a-vis
de lui, ont ete vivement appreciees par l'Empereur. Sa Majeste Imperiale ne
saurait ne pas reconnaitre la gravite des difficultes contre lesquelles le Ministere
Anglais aurait a lutter pour faire reussir une pareille combinaison ; et si par une
preuve de deference, notre Auguste Maitre peut contribuer a les lui eviter,
il eprouvera une sincere satisfaction de repondre a Pappel que le Gouvernement
de la Reine vient de faire a son amitie.
D'ailleurs, les ouvertures spontanees que l'Empereur avait fait adresser par
le Baron de Brunnow au Cabinet de Londres, etqui ont ete accueillies avec ce sen
timent de confiance qu'un expose aussi sincere des intentions pacifiques de la
Russie etait fait pour inspirer, ont suffisamment indique le but que Sa Majeste
Imperiale n'a cesse de poursuivre des Porigine des facheuses complications qui ont
surgi en Orient. De son c6te, le Cabinet de Londres y a repondu avec la meme
franchise et avec un egal desir de faciliter entre toutes les Puissances une entente
qui mettrait un tenne a ces complications, et assurerait ainsi le salut et Fintegrite"
de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est la en effet la seule pensee qui a servi constamment
de base a la politique de l'Empereur, et c'est la encore la regie invariable qui
determinera sa conduite a l'avenir ; guide par ces principes, etrangers a toute vue
d'influence ou de preponderance exclusive, desireux de faire cesser un conflit
qui pourrait entrainer la chute du trone du Sultan, notre Auguste Maitre
n'hesitera jamais a mettre de cote toute consideration d'amour-propre, pour
atteindre le but elev-e que les Puissances ont en vue, et pour ecarter, autant qu'il
pourra dependre de lui, les obstacles qui seuls semblent aujourd'hui s'opposer a
la solution de la Question d'Orient.
Je me feiicite en consequence de pouvoir vous annoncer, Monsieur, que l'Em
pereur, appreciant toute la gravite des considerations que Lord Palmerston a fait
valoir, dans la vue de nous demontrer la necessite ou etait PAngleterre d'insister sur
la co-operation d'une partie de ses forces navales, dans le cas ou un peril imminent
forcerait la Porte Ottomane a avoir recours a l'intervention militaire de la Russie,
Sa Majeste Imperiale est disposee a adherer sous ce rapport au vceu que le
Cabinet de Londres lui a fait manifester, et a admettre, si Phypothese dont nous
avons fait mention, venait a se realiser, que le pavilion de chacune des Puissances
qui voudront participer k Paction commune, soit represente par Penvoide quelques
batimens, afin de constater par la, qu'elles ont toutes concouru a la defense et
a la protection de la Capitale de l'Empire Ottoman. Un arrangement special
devra fixer le nombre de ces vaisseaux, et indiquerles parages ou ilsdevront croiser
dans la Mer de Marmora pres du Detroit des Dardanelles, de maniere a preVenir
tout contact avec les forces Russes destinees a mettre Constantinople a l'abri de
toute attaque du cote du Bosphore.
L'Empereur, en adoptant cette resolution, a pense que personne n'etait plus a
meme de regler les details de Parrangement dont il s'agira de convenir, et
d'assurer par la le succes de la negociation generale, que celui qui Pa conduite
des son origine k Pentiere satisfaction de notre Auguste Maitre. Je viens par
consequent d'inviter le Baron de Brunnow a retourner sans delai a Londres pour
mettre la derniere main a un arrangement dont les points les plus essentiels se

505
trouvent deja arrltds, et qui, en determinant les moyens d'action que les Puis
sances Contractantes seraient appeiees a employer pour faire adopter leur plan a
Mehemet Ali, contribuerait a assurer sur des bases solides la pacification du Levant.
Vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, annoncer sans retard a Lord Palmerston les
determinations que l'Empereur vient de prendre, dont je crois de mon devoir de
vous prevenir par le courrier que je vous expedie aujourd'hui.
La maniere distinguee avec laquelle le Baron de Brunnow s'est acquitte de
la mission que l'Empereur avait daigne lui confier, Paccueil bienveillant dont
Sa Majeste la Reine Pa honore, et la justice edatante que le Principal Secretaire
d'Etat s'est plu a rendre a Pesprit de conciliation et au sentiment de moderation
dont il a ete constamment anime, nous sont garans que le choix de ce Pienipo-
tentiaire ne pourra qu'etre agreable au Cabinet de Londres.
Veuillez donner lecture de la presente depeche a Lord Palmerston et lui en
aisser copie, s'il vous en temoignait le desir. Recevez, &c,
(Signd) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)
Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff. — (Communicated by M. de Kisseleff,
December 5.)
Sir, St. Petersburgh, November -^f, 1839.
THE Marquess of Clanricarde has just transmitted to me a copy of a des
patch, in which the Principal Secretary of State has set forth a detailed state
ment of the conversations which he had held with Baron de Brunnow, a state
ment entirely in accordance with the intelligence which that Minister trans
mitted to us on leaving London.
It appears, from the communications which the English Ambassador was
instructed to make to us, that the British Cabinet is disposed to adopt all our
proposals, with the exception of one single point upon which they thought
proper to request a modification, which, if accepted by our Court, would bring
about an immediate understanding between Russia and England on the
affairs of Turkey.
Baron de Brunnow had already brought to our knowledge the more
important considerations which obliged the English Ministry to insist on that
modification : the frankness and confidence with which Lord Palmerston
expressed himself to him on this matter, have been highly appreciated by the
Emperor. His Imperial Majesty cannot but acknowledge the serious nature
of the difficulties against which the English Ministry would have to contend,
in order to render such a combination successful ; and if, by a proof of
deference, our August Master could contribute to relieve them therefrom, he
would feel sincere satisfaction in responding to the appeal which the Govern
ment of the Queen has just made to his friendship.
Moreover, the spontaneous overtures which the Emperor has caused
Baron de Brunnow to address to the Cabinet of London, and which have been
received with the feeling of confidence which so sincere a declaration of the
pacific intentions of Russia was calculated to inspire, have sufficiently indi
cated the object which His Imperial Majesty has never ceased to pursue,
since the commencement of the grievous complications which have arisen in
the East. The Cabinet of London on its side has responded to them with
the same frankness, and with an equal desire to facilitate an understanding
among all the Powers, which would put an end to these complications, and
would thus secure the safety and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. That is,
in fact, the only feeling which has constantly been the basis of the Emperor's
policy, and it is the invariable rule which will decide his conduct for the
future : guided by these principles, free from every desire for influence or
exclusive preponderance, anxious to put an end to a conflict which might
bring about the fall of the Sultan's throne, our August Master will never hesi
tate to put aside every selfish consideration, in order to attain the high
object which the Powers have in view, and to remove, as far as is in his
power, the obstacles which alone at present seem to prevent a solution of the
Eastern Question. 3 T

506
I congratulate myself, consequently, on having to state to you, Sir, that
the Emperor, fully appreciating the importance of the considerations set forth
by Lord Palmerston, with the view of explaining the necessity under which
England found herself of insisting, that a part of her naval force should
co-operate, in the event of imminent danger obliging the Ottoman Porte to
have recourse to the military intervention of Russia, His ImperiaL Majesty is
disposed in this respect to accede to the wish which the Cabinet of London
has manifested, and to consent, if the contingency above mentioned should
arise, that the flag of each of the Powers who may wish to participate in the
common operation, should be represented by sending some vessels, in order1
to prove thereby that they have all united for the defence and protection of
the capital of the Ottoman Empire. A special arrangement should fix the
number of these vessels, and the spaces within which they should cruize in the
Sea of Marmora, near the Straits of the Dardanelles, in order to avoid any
contact with the Russian forces destined to place Constantinople in security
against any attack from the side of the Bosphorus.
The Emperor, in adopting this resolution, has judged that no one was
better able to regulate the details of the desired arrangement, and to insure
thereby the success of the general negotiation, than he who has conducted
that negotiation from its commencment to the entire satisfaction of our
August Master. I have, therefore, requested Baron Brunnow to return to
London without delay to complete an arrangement, the principal points of
which are already settled, and which, by defining the means of action which
the Contracting Powers should be called upon to employ in order to force
Mehemet Ali to adopt their plan, would contribute to establish the pacifi
cation of the Levant on a solid basis.
You will have the goodness, Sir, to state without delay to Lord Pal
merston the determination which the Emperor has just taken, of which I
think it right to inform you by the messenger whom I despatch this day.
The able manner in which Baron de Brunnow has discharged the mission
which the Emperor deigned to entrust to him, the favourable reception^
with which Her Majesty the Queen honoured him, and the eminent justice
which the Principal Secretary of State has rendered to the spirit of con
ciliation, and to the feeling of moderation with which he has been always
animated, assure us, that the choice of that Plenipotentiary cannot but be
agreeable to the Cabinet of London.
Be so good as to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston, and to give him
a copy of it if he desires to have one. Receive, &c,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 403.
Count Se'bastiani to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 6.)
Londres, ce 4 De'cembre, 1839.
LE Comte Sebastiani a l'honneur d'adresser ci-jointe a. son Excellence
M. le Vicomte Palmerston, Ministre Secretaire d'Etat au Departement des
Affaires Etrangeres de Sa Majeste Britannique, la depeche dont le Gouvernement.
du Roi lui a donne I'ordre de transmettre copie a son Excellence, et de lui.
renvoyer, en meme temps, avec tous ses remercimens,, la minute de lettre
ecrite a. Lord Granville, qu'elle avait bien voulu lui confier.
Le Comte Sebastiani saisit, &c. (Translation.)
Count Sebastiani to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 6.)
London, December 4, 1839.
COUNT SEBASTIANI has the honour to communicate to his Ex
cellency Viscount Palmerston, Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, the annexed! despatch of which the Government of the

507
King has directed bun to transmit a copy to his Excellency; and at the
same time to return to him, with his best thanks, the draft of letter written
to Lord Granville, which he had been so good as to communicate to him.
The Count Sebastiani avails himself, &c.

Inclosure in No. 403.
The Due de Dalmatie to Count Sebastiani.
Monsieur le Comte, Paris, le 25 Novembre, 1839.
AINSI que vous me Pavez annonce, Lord Granville m'a communique une
longne depeche de Lord Palmerston, relative a la Question d'Orient, dont Fobjet
est de justifier 3a resolution qu'a prise le Gouvernement de Londres de rejeter le
plan d'accommodement propose par la France. Sans reprendre,, un a un, des
details bien souvent reproduits dans ma correspondance, je crois devoir repousser
les accusations elevees dans cette depeche contre la marche suivie par le
Gouvernement du Roi, et repondre a. quelques assertions erronees qu'elle me
parait contenir.
Je commence par protester, de la maniere la plus formelle, contre Pidee qui
y est exprimee, que la France s'est constitute la protectrice de Mehemet Ali.
Cette idee a ete trop souvent mise en avant pour qu'il me soit possible de la
passer sous silence. Non, la France n'eprouve pour Mehemet Ali aucune pre
dilection pa/rtielle. L'unique but qu'elle poursuit est Parrangement des affaires
d*Orient sur des bases solides et durables. Quant aux conditions de cet arrange
ment, les plus avantageuses qu'il soit possible de menager a la Porte sans exposer
la paix generale a de funestes perturbations, sont celles que nous preferons ; mais
convaincus, comme nous Pavons toujours ete, que le plan de PAngleterre ne
serait pas accepte par le Vice-Roi, et que pour le lui imposer il faudrait recourir
a des mesures extremes, impraticables peut-etre, et en tous cas bien dangereuses,
nous n'avons pu Paccepter, et nous avons dit hautement quel etait celui qui nous
paraissait le phis propre a assurer tout a la fois Pintegrite de PEmpiKe Ottoman
et le maintien de la paix.
Lord Palmerston pretend, il est vrai, que nous avions commence par approuver
les propositions du Cabinet de Londres. J'ignore absolument sur quoi peut
reposer tme pareille affirmation, qui se produit pour la premiere fois, et que je ne
puis rattacher a aucune des communications echangees sur la question entre les
deux Gouvernemens. Je desire que vous me fassiez savoir d'ou peut provenir
un pareil malentendu.
Ce n'est pas d'ailleurs sur ce seul incident que Lord Palmerston appuie le
reproche de contradiction qu'il adresse a notre politique. Rappelant Pempresse-
ment avec lequel, au commencement de la crise actuelle, nous avons pris
Finitiative de Pappui a. accorder a la Porte, il pretend demontrer que notre
attitude a completement change, et qu'en proclamantle principe de Pintegrite de
l'Empire Ottoman, en engageant les autres Puissances a le proclamer avec nous,
nous avions d'avance condamne les bases que maintenant nous voulons donner a
la -reconciliation de la Porte avec son vassal.
II m'est impossible, M. le Comte, d'admettre cette maniere de poser la
question. II est parfaitement vrai, et le Gouvernement du Roi ne peut que se
phnre ale voir rappeler, qu'il a le premier invite les Puissances a se concerter pour
sauver la Porte de Forage qu'elle avait imprudemment provoque. II est egale
ment certain que tandisque tous les autres Cabinets deliberaient encore sur la
position qu'ils prendraient, le Gouvernement du Roi etait deja parvenu a arreter
la marche d'Ibrahim Pacha victorieux, et que par ses representations energiques
et incessantes, trop faiblementappuyeespar ses Allies, il avait indique a Pambition
de Mehemet Ali les limites au-dela desquelles il rencontrerait Popposition
unanime des Puissances. L'invitation faite a la Porte par l'Ambassadeur de
France, de concert avec ses Collegues, de ne conclure rien avec le Vice-Roi sans
avoir consutte les Cours Europeennes, Pengagement echange, sur notre demande,
entre les Cours de Londres, de Vienne, de Berlin, et de Paris, pour la protection
de Findependance et de Pintegrite de l'Empire Ottoman, sont des faits egalement
eonstans et que je n'entends certes ni desavouer ni revoquer en doute ; mais
pour que Fon fut autorise a en tirer les consequences que veut en tirer Lord
3T2

508
Palmerston, il faudrait commencer par etablir que les stipulations de notre projet
sont contraires a cette integrite, a cette independance; et c'est ce que nous
n'admettons en aucune facon.
Sans doute, c'est une situation facheuse pour un souverain que la necessite
d'accorder a un sujet trop puissant l'investiture hereditaire des territoires qu'il
gouverne; mais cette necessite, dont on ne pretendra pas apparemment nous
rendre responsables, Lord Palmerston la reconnait lui-meme, puisqu'il propose
aussi en faveur de Mehemet Ali, cette investiture hereditaire, appliquee seulement
dans de moindres proportions. Le differend existant entre la France et PAngle
terre ne roule done pas, cela est evident, sur une question de principes, mais bien
sur le mode d'application, sur des appreciations de detail. Lord Palmerston admet
que l'Empire Ottoman ne serait pas demembre si la seule Egypte etait concedee,
comme Pachalic hereditaire, a Mehemet Ali et a sa posterite. Nous croyons
que le demembrement n'aurait pas lieu davantage si a FEgypte on ajoutait la
Syrie, en consacrant d'ailleurs la souverainete de la Porte et la vassalite du
Vice-Roi par la stipulation formelle du tribut en argent et des secours en hommes
et en vaisseaux qu'il serait tenu de lui fournir. Encore un coup, il y a la, entre
les deux Cabinets, non pas diversite de principes, mais dissentiment sur leur
application ; et aucun des deux n'est autorise a puiser dans ce dissentiment le
droit d'accuser l'autre d 'inconsequence et de contradiction.
Lord Palmerston dit, il est vrai, que pour en arriver a accorder a Mehemet
Ali la totalite de ses demandes il n'etait pas necessaire d'annoncer d'abord
l'intention de donner secours a la Porte contre ses exigences. Pour repondre
a cette objection, il suffit d'etablir quelles etaient d'abord ces exigences, et a
quel point nous sommes parvenus a les reduire. Mehemet Ali, dans le principe,
non seulement repoussait avec emportement Pidee d'acheter l'heredite par les
moindres concessions territoriales, mais declarait qu'il entendait garder aussi les
districts nouveaux occupes par son fils aprfes la bataille de Nezib. II reclamait
de plus, comme condition absolue d'une pacification, le renvoi du Grand Vizir.
Aujourd'hui, non seulement il renonce a ces deux clauses exorbitantes, mais il
consent, sauf des restrictions qui ne sont probablement pas son dernier mot, a
abandonner Pile de Candie, le district d'Adana, et il offre encore d'elever la
somme du tribut qu'il paie a la Porte. Pourrait-on soutenir que des modifications
de cette importance ne meritent pas d'etre prises en consideration?
Une autre objection elevee par le Cabinet de Londres c'est que nous aurions
rendu nos propositions plus inacceptables encore en repoussant opiniatrement,
et de la facon la plus peremptoire, la pensee d'en venir jamais a les appuyer
par des moyens coercitifs dans le cas ou elles ne seraient pas accueillies par le
Vice-Roi. En fait, cette objection n'a plus de portee aujourd'hui que Mehemet
Ali a adhere a notre plan, mais je dois ajouter qu'elle est fondee sur une allega
tion inexacte. La France n'a pas ecarte, d'une maniere absolue, la prevision
des mesures coercitives; elle n'a pas refuse d'en deliberer avec les autres Cours;
seulement elle a demande qu'avant de s'occuper des moyens d'execution, on
commencat par se mettre d'accord sur le but k atteindre, et aussi, ce qui etait
bien autrement urgent, ce qui touchait a des questions bien autrement delicates
et ditficiles, sur le mode d'action par lequel les Puissances concourraient a la
defense de Constantinople dans le cas ou Ibrahim Pacha poursuivrait sa course
victorieuse. Les motifs qui nous faisaient preferer une semblable marche sont
evidens. D'une part, Pinteret vraiment important pour l'Europe est celui de la
defense de Constantinople, et on peut meme dire que tous les autres interets,
sous le point de vue Europeen, sont subordonnes a celui-la. D'un autre cote,
tant qu'on n'etait pas certain de s'accorder sur les conditions a presenter a
Mehemet Ali, il eut ete plus qu'inutile de se livrer prematurement a la discussion
des voies de contrainte auxquelles il pourrait devenir necessaire de recourir pour
forcer son consentement. Nous avions, d'ailleurs, la conviction que cette penible
necessite ne se presenterait pas si les conditions proposees etaient raisonnables, et
I'evenement a justifie notre maniere de voir.
Lord Palmerston, parmi les argumens qu'il emploie pour demontrer Pimpos-
sibilite pretendue d'acceder a notre projet, fait valoir une consideration dont il
pretend que le Gouvernement Francais a reconnu la force au commencement de
la negociation actuelle. C'est que la possession des Villes Saintes de PArabie
est necessaire au Sultan. Si, par la possession, il entend le droit de souverainete,
il a parfaitement raison de soutenir que le Sultan, depouilie de ces sanctuaires
de PIslamisme, perdrait une portion du prestige religieux sur lequel s'appuie en

509
partie sa puissance. Nous en sommes convaincus, et nous mettons un si grand
prix a la conservation de tous les elemens de cette puissance, que lorsqu'il y a
quelques mois on repandit le bruit que les agens entretenus par le Sultan en
qualite de chef de la religion, a la Mecque et a Medine, avaient ete expulses
par le Vice-Roi, je chargeai le Consul-General de France de lui faire a ce sujet
de vives representations ; c'est probablement le fait auquel Lord Palmerston veut
faire allusion. Je remarquerai en passant, que ce bruit, aussi bien que tant
d'autres repandus a Constantinople contre Mehemet Ali, etait compietement faux.
Quoiqu'il en soit, aujourd'hui comme alors, je reconnais que la Porte doit garder
son droit de souverainete sur les Villes Saintes et sur PArabie tout comme sur la
totalite des autres territoires gouvernes par le Vice-Roi et sa famille, mais je ne
vois pas et je n'ai jamais dit qu'aucun interest moral ou materiel fut compromis
par ce que PArabie continuerait a etre placee sous Padministration du Vice-Roi ; et
j'ajouterai, que Pidee de changer cet etat de choses etabli sans contestation depuis
vingt ans, se presente a moi comme une combinaison toute nouvelle qui ne
pourrait que compliquer au detriment meme de la Porte, une question si difficile
deja. Le fait est que jusqu'ici cette idee n'avait pas ete mise en avant, et que
l'Arabie etait universellement consideree comme une dependance de l'Egypte,
comme li^e au sort de ce dernier pays.
J'ai parcouru en quelque sorte le cercle des objections elevees par Lord
Palmerston contre notre politique. Je crois avoir prouve qu'elles reposent en
general sur des malentendus ou des erreurs de fait. II en est encore une dont
j'hesite presque a parler. Dans I'opinion du Cabinet Britannique, le rappel de
M. PAmiral Roussin a eu pour effet d'attenuer la force morale de Facte qu'il
avait signe pour promettre a la Porte Pappui de la France. Je ne comprends
pas, je Pavoue, comment le changement d'un agent diplomatique pourrait amener
ce resultat en presence de la declaration sans cesse renouvelee par le Gouverne
ment du Roi qu'il persiste dans sa politique bienveillante pour le Sultan. Je n'en
dirai pas davantage, et le Cabinet de Londres comprendra que je n'entre pas dans
des explications qui prendraient un caractere personnel.
Lord Palmerston, dans la depeche a, laquelle je reponds, exprime le regret
qu'il eprouve du desaccord survenu entre la France et PAngleterre. II enumere
tout ce que son Gouvernement a fait pour le prevenir. Au nombre des temoign-
ages de condescendance qu'il nous a donnes, il compte Pabandon des mesures de
rigueur auxquelles il avait propose de recourir pour forcer Mehemet Ali a
restituer prealablement la flotte Ottomane. Peut-etre, M. le Comte, peut-etre
serais-je en droit de remarquer que ces mesures n'ont pas ete seulement repoussees
par la France ; que toutes les autres Cours les ont jugees dangereuses, imprati-
cables, et d'un succes a-peu-prfes impossible ; et que, suivant toute apparence, le
Gouvernement Britannique meme, livre a sa seule impulsion, les eut ecartees
apres y avoir mieux refledii. Au reste, il est loin de ma pensee de contester les
sentimens concilians que le Cabinet de Londres a portes dans cette grande affaire.
Ils ne se sont arretes, j'en suis bien convaincu, que devant une conviction erronee a
mon avis, mais sincere et profonde. Une conviction non moins energique, quoique
contraire, a du egalement surmonter, dans notre esprit, Pimpulsion de sentimens
tout aussi bienveillans pour nos Allies; elle nous a reduits a la necessite de
persister dans un facheux dissentiment ; mais on nous rendra cette justice que
nou3 avons fait aussi longtems que possible, tout ce qu'a dependu de nous pour
Pattenuer, pour le dissimuler aux yeux des autres Cours.
Je me suis souvent demande, M. le Comte, comment il se faisait que les
deux Cabinets en fussent venus a ne pas s'entendre sur la question qui semblait
la mieux faite pour les mettre d'accord. Je vais vous dire toute ma pensee.
Cela tient surtout a ce que la France a principalement eu en vue le cote
Europeen de la Question, tandis que PAngleterre s'est trop preoccupee des
considerations relatives a la position respective de la Porte et du Vice-Roi.
Nous nous sommes propose, avant tout, de faire sortir de la crise actuelle
l'annulation du protectorat exclusif et dominant que la Russie commencait a
faire peser sur la Porte, ou, du moins, d'empecher que ce protectorat n'y trouvat
une nouvelle occasion de s'exercer et de se legitimer en quelque sorte, sans
negliger le soin de preserver, en Egypte et en Syrie, Pintegrite de l'Empire
Ottoman ; nous avons eu constamment present a Pesprit qu'il n'etait pas moins
important de sauver a Constantinople Findependance de cet empire, cette inde
pendance sans laquelle Pintegrite n'est plus qu'un vain mot. L'Angleterre avait
paru d'abord se diriger vers le meme but que nous, et obeir & la meme pensee.

510
Ne l'a-t-elle pas, depuis, un peu perdu de vue ? Je serais tente de le croire,
lorsque je remarque dans la depeche. a 'laquelle je reponds, il ne se trouve pas uft
mot dont on puisse induire que le Cabinet de Londres voie autre chose dans la
solution a donner a la Question d'Orient qu'un reglement territorial plus ou
moins a la convenance du Sultan et du Vice-Roi.
Veuillez, M. le Comte., donner lecture de la presente depeche a Lord
Palmerston et lui en laisser copie. Agreez, &c,
¦(Signe) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)
The Due de Dalmatie to Count Sebastiani.
Monsieur le Comte, Paris., November 25, 1839,
IN accordance with what you announced to me, Lord Granville has
communicated to me a long despatch from Lord Palmerston, relative to
the Eastern Question, the object of which is to justify the resolution which
the British Government has taken to reject the plan of arrangement pro
posed by France. Without reverting, point by point, to the details so often
reproduced in my correspondence, I think it right to repel the accusations
brought forward in that despatch, against the course pursued by the Govern
ment of the King, and to reply to some erroneous statements which it appears
to me to contain.
I begin by protesting in the most formal manner against the idea ex
pressed therein, that France has constituted herself the protectress of Me
hemet Ali. This idea has been too often brought forward, to make it
possible for -me to pass it over in silence. No, France entertains no partial
predilection for Mehemet Ali. The only end which she pursues is the
arrangement of the Affairs of the East, upon solid and durable bases. With
respect to the conditions of this arrangement, the most advantageous which it
may be possible to secure to the Porte without exposing the general peace to
disastrous derangements, are those which we prefer ; but convinced, as
we have always been, that the plan of England would not be accepted
by the Viceroy, and that in order to impose it upon him, it would be
necessary to have recourse to measures, extreme, perhaps impracticable, and
in any case very dangerous, we have not been able to accede to it, and we
have distinctly stated the one which appeared to us the most proper for
securing at the same time the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the
maintenance of peace.
Lord Palmerston, it is true, asserts that we had set out by approving the
propositions of the Cabinet of London. I am totally ignorant upon what
ground such an assertion can rest, which is produced for the first time, and
which I cannot connect with any of the communications which have passed
upon this question between the two Governments. I wish that you will let
me know whence such a misunderstanding can have arisen.
But it is not upon this circumstance alone, that Lord Palmerston founds
the reproach of inconsistency which he ascribes to our policy. Calling to
mind the eagerness with which, at the commencement of the present crisis,
we took the initiative in the support to be afforded to the Porte, he endea
vours to demonstrate that our attitude is completely changed, and that by
proclaiming the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and by
engaging the other Powers to proclaim it with us, we had by anticipation
condemned the bases upon which we now seek to found the reconciliation of
the Porte with its Vassal.
Tt is impossible for me, M. le Comte, to admit this mode of putting the
question. It is quite true, and the Government of the King cannot be other
wise than pleased to see it recalled to mind, that it was the first to invite the
Powers to concert together in order to save the Porte from the storm which it
had imprudently raised. It is equally certain, that while all the other
Cabinets were still deliberating upon the position in which they should place
themselves, the Government of the King had already succeeded in arresting

511
the victorious progress of Ibrahim Pasha, and that by its energetical and '
incessant representations, too feebly supported by its Allies, it had indicated
to Mehemet Ali the limits beyond which his ambitious views would en
counter the unanimous opposition of the Powers. The advice given to the
Porte by the Ambassador of France in concert with his colleagues, to
conclude nothing with the Viceroy without having consulted the European1
Cburts; the engagements interchanged at our request between the Courts of
London, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, for the protection of the independence and
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, are facts equally certain, and which 1 1
do not mean to deny or to call in question ; but to be justified in drawing the
conclusions which Lord Palmerston wishes to deduce from them, it would be
necessary to begin by establishing, that the stipulations of our plan are op
posed to this integrity and to this independence, and this is what we do not
in any manner admit.
No doubt, it is a distressing situation for a Sovereign to be placed under
the necessity of yielding to a too powerful subject the hereditary investiture of
the territories which he governs; but this necessity, for which apparently it will ''
not be pretended that we are to be made responsible, has been acknowledged
by Lord Palmerston himself, since he also proposes this hereditary investi
ture in favour of Mehemet Ali, but applied within more confined limits. The
difference existing between France and England does not therefore turn, as it
is evident, upon a question of prindple, but rather upon the mode of applica
tion, upon considerations of detail. Lord Palmerston admits, that the
Ottoman Empire would not be dismembered if Egypt alone were granted as
an hereditary Pashalic to Mehemet Ali and his posterity. We think,,
that the dismemberment would not any more take place if Syria were added to
Egypt, provided the sovereignty of the Porte and the vassalage of the Viceroy
were recorded by a formal stipulation for tribute in money, and continr
gents of men and of vessels which he would be considered liable to furnish.
Furthermore, there is between the two Cabinets not a diversity of principles,
but a difference of opinion as to their application ; and neither of the two is
justified in deducing from this difference of opinion a right to accuse the
other of inconsistency and of contradiction.
Lord Palmerston, it is true, says that, in ordter to decide upon granting
to Mehemet Ali the whole of his demands, it was unnecessary to announce
beforehand the intention of giving assistance to the Pbrte against
them. In order to answer this objection, it will be sufficient to establish'
what were in fact his demands, and to what point we have succeeded in
reducing them. Mehemet Ali at the outset not only repelled with warmth
the idea of purchasing the hereditary tenure, by the smallest territorial
concessions, but declared that he intended to keep also the districts newly
occupied by his son after the battle of Nezib. He required, furthermore, as a
necessary condition to a pacification, the dismissal of the Grand Vizier. At
the present time, he not only renounces these two exorbitant conditions,
but he consents, under restrictions which are probably not his ultimatum, to
give up the Island of Candia and the district of Adana, and he offers, further,
to raise the amount of tribute which he pays to the Porte. Can it be maintained^
that modifications of this importance do not deserve to be taken into consi
deration ?
Another objection brought forward by the Cabinet of London is, that we
have rendered our propositions still more unacceptable by obstinately and
in the most peremptory manner repelling the idea of ever enforcing those
propositions by coercive measures, in case they should not be accepted by the
Viceroy". This objection, in point of fact, has no longer any application,
since Mehemet Ali has acceded to our plan ; but I must add that it is founded
upon an incorrect statement. France has not absolutely rejected the con
templation of coercive measures; she has not refused to deliberate upon them
with the other Courts ; she has only demanded that, before considering the
means of execution, an agreement should be previously come to with respect tb.
the object to be attained, and also as regarded a much more urgent affair, and'
one which related to questions much more delicate and difficult,— -with respect
to the modie of action by which the Powers should join in the defence of
Constantinople in case Ibrahim Pasha should continue his victorious progress.
The motives which induced us to prefer sucb a course are evident.* On the

512
one hand, the really important interest of Europe is that involved in the
defence of Constantinople ; and it may even be said, that every other interest
in an European point of view is subordinate to that one. On the other hand,
as long as there was no certainty of an agreement upon the conditions to be
offered to Mehemet Ali, it would have been worse than useless prematurely
to discuss the means of pressure to which it might be necessary to recur in
order to extort his consent. We felt besides a conviction, that this painful
necessity would not occur if the conditions proposed were reasonable ; and the
event has justified our view of the matter.
Lord Palmerston, among the arguments which he employs to demon
strate the alleged impossibility of agreeing to our demands, adduces a con
sideration of wdiich he asserts the French Government acknowledged the force
at the commencement of the present negotiation. This is, that the possession
of the Holy Cities of Arabia is necessary to the Sultan. If, by possession, he
means the right of Sovereignty, he is quite right in maintaining that the Sul
tan, deprived of these sanctuaries of Mahomedanism, would lose a portion
of the religious veneration upon which his power in some measure is
founded. We are convinced of this, and we regard so highly the preservation
of all the elements of this power, that when, some months since, a report was
spread, that the agents maintained by the Sultan at Mecca and Medina in his
capacity of Chief of the religion, had been expelled by the Viceroy, I directed
the Consul-General of France to make to him strong representations
upon this subject ; it is probably to this circumstance that Lord Palmerston
alludes. I will observe, by the way, that this report, as well as so many
others current at Constantinople against Mehemet Ali, was entirely false.
Whatever the case may be, now, as formerly, I acknowledge that the Porte
should retain its right of Sovereignty over the Holy Cities and over Arabia, as
well as over the whole of the other territories governed by the Viceroy and by
his family ; but I do not see, and I have never said, that any interest, either
moral or physical, would be compromised by Arabia continuing to be placed
under the administration of the Viceroy ; and I will add, that the idea of
changing this state of things, established without question for twenty years,
appears to me as quite a new arrangement which can only tend to complicate,
to the injury of the Porte, a question already so difficult. The fact is, that
until now, this idea had never been brought forward, and that Arabia was
universally considered as a dependency of Egypt, and as linked to the destiny
of the latter country.
I have in some measure gone the round of the objections raised by Lord
Palmerston to our policy. I think I have proved that they are founded in
general upon misunderstandings or upon errors of fact. There is still one upon
which I almost hesitate to speak. In the opinion of the British Cabinet, the
recall of Admiral Roussin has had the effect of weakening the moral weight
of the Act which he had signed, promising to the Porte the support of
France. I do not comprehend, I confess, how the change of a diplomatic agent
could produce this result in the face of the declaration continually renewed by
the government of the King, that it persisted in its friendly policy towards the
Sultan. I will say no more on this subject, and the Cabinet of London will
perceive that I do not enter into explanations which might assume a personal
character. Lord Palmerston, in the despatch to which I am replying, expresses the
regret which he feels at the disagreement which has arisen between France
and England. He specifies all that his Government has done to prevent it.
He reckons in the list of proofs of deference which he has given to us, the
abandonment of the rigorous measures to which he had proposed to have
recourse, in order to force Mehemet Ali to restore, in the first instance, the
Ottoman fleet. Perhaps, M. le Comte, 1 might be justified in observing, that
these measures were not repudiated by France alone; that all the other
Courts considered them dangerous, impracticable, and almost impossible of
success; and that, according to all appearances, the British Government
itself, left to its own impulse, would have rejected them upon more mature
reflection. However, it is far from my intention to call in question the conci
liatory sentiments with which the Cabinet of London has been actuated in this
important affair. These, I am well convinced, have been checked only by a
conviction, erroneous, in my opinion, but sincere and deep. A conviction

513
not less forcible, although of a contrary nature, could not but overpower in like
manner in our minds the impulse of sentiments no less friendly towards our
Allies ; it has reduced us to the necessity of persisting in an unfortunate
difference of opinion ; but this justice will be rendered to us, that we have, as
long as possible, done everything in our power to lessen it, and to conceal it
from the observation of other Courts.
I have often asked myself the question, M. le Comte, how it has hap
pened that the two Cabinets should not have come to an understanding upon a
question, which appeared the best adapted to bring them to an agreement.
I will frankly state to you my opinion. It arises from the circumstance, that
France has principally had in view the European side of the question, while
England has been too much engrossed with considerations relative to the
respective positions of the Porte and of the Viceroy. Without neglecting the
care of preserving in Egypt and in Syria the integrity of the Ottoman Empire,
we have proposed to ourselves above all to make the present crisis terminate in
the abolition of the exclusive and predominant protectorship which Russia
was beginning to impose upon the Porte, or at least to prevent this protectorship
from finding in this crisis a new occasion for its exercise, and in some measure
for its legalisation ; we have borne constantly in mind, that it was not less
important to preserve at Constantinople the independence of this Empire; that
independence without which integrity is but an idle word. England ap
peared at first to pursue the same object, and to act upon the same intention
as ourselves. Has she not since somewhat lost sight of these views ? I am
almost induced to think so, when I observe that there is not, in the despatch
to which I am now replying, a single word from which it can be inferred, that
the Cabinet of London sees anything else, in the solution of the Eastern
Question, but a territorial arrangement, more or less favourable to the Sultan
and to the Viceroy.
Have the goodness, M. le Comte, to read this despatch to Lord Palmer
ston, and to give him a copy of it.
Receive &c
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 404.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 6.)
(Extract.) Therapia, November 13, 1839.
I HAVE heard that the French Minister stated to an acquaintance of mine,
that the French Government disagreed with the English upon the question of
Mehemet Ali, because the time was not propitious for settling the great question
with Russia ; and was of opinion that the Porte ought to patch up (pldtrer) affairs
with Mehemet Ali ; that there should be then established a protectorship for the
security of Constantinople by the Great Powers.
I told Rechid Pasha, that I doubted M. de Pontois acted under instructions
from his Government, when he advised the direct arrangement should be made with
Mehemet Ali ; because I doubt if the French Government would give such instruc
tions at the present time, without the concurrence of the British Government ; and
I had no knowledge that any such concurrence had been given by the latter. I said
the Sublime Porte could not suffer any loss by delaying to act, until after the Porte
should have correct information of what the Governments of England and
Austria have decided to do. That, were it the fact that the Egyptian had the
power necessary to attack the Porte, he could not exert it at this season of the
year. That it would always be time enough for the Porte to consent to the
partition of the Empire ; and that no present danger existed to hurry on the
adoption of such a measure.

3U

514
No, 405.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, December 6, 1839.
I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government
entirely approve the language which you held to Rechid Pasha, as reported in
your despatch of November 13, with reference to the advice which M. de Pontois is
stated to have given to the Turkish Government, to come to a direct arrange
ment with Mehemet Ali. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.
No. 406.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 9.)
(Extract.) Paris, December 6, 1839.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 3rd of December;
Marshal Soult, this morning, told me that he had received despatches yesterday
from Constantinople and from Alexandria, but that they contained no very
interesting information ; nothing, in short, which could lead him to form any
opinion whether peace was likely to be soon concluded between the Sultan and
Mehemet Ali by a direct negotiation between the two parties.
The French Consul at Alexandria writes, that the attempt at insurrection
in the Haouran has been entirely put down ; that the whole of Syria is in a state
of tranquillity, and that Ibrahim Pasha is employed in collecting tribute from the
country ; that the Egyptian Army had been paid a considerable portion of the
arrears which were due to it, and that the officers and crews of the Ottoman
fleet had received a month's pay from Mehemet Ali.
No. 407.
Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 10.)
My Lord, Jerusalem, October 16, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to apprize your Lordship that active steps are being
taken by the Egyptian Government to place Acre in a state of defence. Three
vessels, loaded with guns and other warlike stores, have been discharged there,
and all the artisans that could be found here have been sent down to work
there. I have, &c,
(Signed) W. T. YOUNG.

No. 408.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 10.)
(Extract.) Damascus, October 25, 1839.
IT is stated by the Government here, that the insurgents in the Ledgea have
made their submission and returned to their avocations in the Haouran. Only
four redoubts, in lieu of nine, have been erected by the Egyptians, on the
border of the Ledgea, said to be a condition stipulated with the insurgents ;
but I have heard that the chief cause of the pacification are orders from his
H-ghness Ibrahim Pasha, to settle this affair as speedily and in the best manner
possible. Neither his Excellency Sheriff Pasha nor lsmael Bey have yet
returned here with their forces ; I am informed that the former will proceed to

.'M5
the (southern Druse Haouran mountains, to organize affairs there, and regulate
the agricultural preparations ibr the season, which have met with interruption ;
:and: his ^Excellency will afterwards join lsmael Bey with the forces who are to
proceed to the Agloun tdistrict; "which was suddenly, and but partially, pacified
when the Haouran insurrection was renewed, to regulate affairs there and
forward the agricultural preparations, which have been, in a great measure,
iabandoned. The Caftan Bey has been recently employed with his irregular Annadi
Cavalry to defeat the Arab tribe Zein of the Desert, bordering the Ledgea and
Haouran district, from whom very considerable captures of flocks and animals
have taken place, which cannot fail to tend, with the former captures, to
diminish the supplies of this city.
The Mutuali Chief, Sheik Hussein Shebib, in the neighbourhood of Soor,
who is at the head of 500 horsemen, which numbers have collected from the
remnant of the late Emir Gewad,' continues to interrupt the roads and disturb
that part of the country.
Such is the state of this part of Syria ; what is going on further south I am
not perfectly informed on ; and the measures of the Government and the com
plexion of affairs generally, confirm the observations I had the honour of making
to your Lordship in my last despatch, that his Highness Ibrahim Pasha is
anxious to put the south of Syria in a state to enable him to be at liberty to act
with his army on the northern frontier, as circumstances may require.

No. 409.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 10.)
(Extract.) Aleppo, October 31, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information,
copies of two despatches I addressed to Viscount Ponsonby, on the 11th and
29th of this month.

Inclosure 1 in No. 409.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Alep, le 11 Octobre, 1839.
ME trouvant indispose a ne pouvoir pas ecrire moi-meme pour le moment,
je dicte en Francais ces lignes au Pro-Chancelier de ce Consulat, afin de ne pas
laisser partir le steamer pour chez vous, sans donner a votre Excellence
connaissance de ce qui s'est passe dans nos contrees depuis la derniere depeche
que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser en date du 20 Septembre passe.
J'ai l'honneur maintenant de vous soumettre, que les forces Egyptiennes
sont toujours dans les memes positions a vous marquees precedemment, a I'ex
ception qu'a cause des grandes maladies qui ont regne parmi les troupes qui
etaient a Adana, I'ordre a ete donne de disperser ce corps dans les environs
d'Antioche, et Fon dit que Achmet Menekli Pacha a regu I'ordre de Sa Hautesse
le Seraskier de se rendre ici.
Nous avons appris aussi depuis quelques jours, que le Seraskier Ibrahim
Pacha reunit a Marache un nombre considerable d'ouvriers en maconnerie et
menuiserie, et la voix court que c'est pour y construire des redoutes et d'autres
fortifications ; cependant il y a des personnes qui assurent que ce n'est que pour
y batir des h6pitaux et des casernes ; dans peu de jours nous pourrons savoir au
juste ce qui en est. J'ai appris par une bonne source, que Son Altesse le
Seraskier compte faire son quartier d'hiver a Marache avec le corps de
troupes qu'il a avec lui.
L'esprit de sedition qui s'etait manifeste dans une des montagnes d' Albestan
dont j'ai eu l'honneur de vous parler par ma derniere depeche, se trouve, a ce
que Pon dit, presque calmee, a cause des forces que Son Altesse le Seraskier
a dirigees contre les habitans de cette montagne.
3 U2

516
Aussi une espece de revoke s'est manifestee de nouveau dans les montagnes
de Payass, pres d'Alexandrette, mais d'apres les derniers avis que j'ai recus de la
dite echelle, des forces suffisantes ont ete mises en marche contre les rebelles, et
tout fait croire que cela n'aura aucune suite : de meme dans les montagnes
de Lattaquie il s'etait declare un esprit de revoke parmi les Ensaris ; mais par les
mesures immediates et energiques qui ont ete egalement prises par le Gouverne
ment, le peuple est rentre dans l'obeissance et commence a payer les imp6ts
qu'on leur demandait. A I'exception de ces petits evenemens, tout le reste
du district de ce Consulat est assez tranquille.
J'ai aussi l'honneur de vous dire, que depuis que les mesures de guerre ont
cesse dans nos contrees, le commerce a repris un peu de faveur, et si cela dure,
je pense que les interets de nos nationaux iront de mieux en mieux.
Son Excellence Solyman Pacha se trouve encore ici, mais ayant demande
a Sa Hautesse un conge pour aller voir sa famille, cette permission lui a ete
accordee sous la condition de retourner ici sous peu de jours.
J'ai l'honneur, &c,
(Signe) F. H. S. WERRY.

(Translation.)
Mr. Pro- Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Aleppo, October 11, 1839.
BEING too unwell at this moment to write myself, I dictate these lines in
French to the Pro- Chancellor of this Consulate, in order not to let the steamer
depart without acquainting your Excellency with what has passed in our district
since my last despatch to you of the 20th of September last.
I have now. the honour to acquaint you that the Egyptian troops continue
in the positions already stated to you, with the exception that, in consequence of
the severe illness which has prevailed among the troops at Adana, orders have
been given to distribute that corps in the neighbourhood of Antioch, and it is
said that Achmet Menekli Pasha has been ordered by His Highness to repair
hither. We have also learnt during the last few days that the Seraskier Ibrahim
Pasha is assembling a considerable number of masons and carpenters at Marash,
and it is reported that this is with the view of constructing redoubts and other
fortifications ; however, there are some persons who say, that it is only to build
hospitals and barracks; in a few days we shall known the truth. I learn from
good authority, that His Highness the Seraskier intends to take up his winter
quarters at Marash, with the corps of troops which he has with him.
The seditious feeling which had shown itself in one of the mountains of
Albestan, which I had the honour to mention to you in my last despatch, is said
to be nearly quelled, in consequence of the force which His Highness the
Seraskier directed to be sent against the inhabitants of that mountain.
A kind of revolt has also broken out afresh, in the mountains of Payass
near Alexandretta, but according to my last advices from thence, a sufficient
force had been marched against the rebels, and there is every reason to believe
that nothing will result from it ; a spirit of rebellion had in like manner
manifested itself among tke Ensaris, in the mountains of Latakia ; but in con
sequence of the energetic measures taken by the Government, the people had
returned to their obedience, and were beginning to pay the taxes required of
them. With the exception of these slight events, the remainder of the district
of this Consulate is tolerably quiet.
I have also the honour to state to you, that since warlike operations have
ceased in our district, commerce has somewhat revived, and if this lasts, I think
that the interests of our countrymen will go on improving.
His Excellency Solyman Pasha is still here, but having asked His Highness
for leave of absence to go and see his family, permission has been given him on
condition of returning hither in a few days. I have, &c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

517
Inclosure 2 in No. 409.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Aleppo, October 29, 1839.
I HAD the honour to address your Lordship under the 11th instant,
which communication, in consequence of indisposition, I was obliged to dictate
in French, to the Pro-Cancellier of this Consulate.
I now do myself the honour of transmitting to your Excellency the little
that has further taken place since that period, on events in this district meriting
your Lordship's attention.
His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to occupy Marash
with the same force ; and the Egyptian troops on that northern frontier, and
within this district, continue to hold with little or no change the same posi
tions as I had the honour of noting to your Lordship in my last communication.
But it is generally supposed that his Excellency the Seraskier will, on the
approaching severe winter months, make Aleppo his head-quarters, leaving,
however, the troops in the same positions they now hold.
His Excellency has caused a second "Salyan" to be taken from the
inhabitants of Marash.
I had the honour of stating to your Lordship, in my last communication,
that his Excellency the Seraskier had ordered to Marash all the principal
masons, carpenters, and workmen, supposed to be either for the erection of
fortifications, or for that of barracks and hospitals for the forces.
About five days ago the chief Government architect of this Pashalic, M.
Vincent Germain, received an order from his Excellency to repair immediately
in that direction, for which district he has left.
I learn from persons coming from that frontier, that some redoubts and
other fortifications have already been erected at Marash, and that the chief
architect's presence in that quarter has for its object to superintend the erection
of barracks and hospitals at Aintab ; and it is said, that probably the same
buildings will be required at Marash, as the forces there are to hold, during the
winter months, that position, which contains at present no suitable quarters for
that season; from which it appears that his Excellency the Seraskier has the in
tention of keeping during the winter season, the whole of the forces concentrated
in the same positions they now hold, all along the northern frontier of Syria.
I beg also to observe to your Lordship, that the Government here and
throughout this district have laid, and continue to lay in depot, a considerable
quantity of grain of all sorts, as also of ammunition, much greater than
has ever been practised in former years by this Government, and ever since its
occupation of this country.
The Egyptian force at Orfa has not been increased in any way ; but it is
reported in town, and it appears correct and authentic, that the inhabi
tants of Mardin, in consequence of the demand on that part of the coun
try by the Sultan's authority, to furnish conscripts for the army, rose and
destroyed the Governor of the town, Cadi, and other officers of the place, and
then sent a deputation to the Egyptian commanding officer at Orfa, inviting him
to advance with a force, and that on their approach, they, the malcontents,
would deliver up that place and the surrounding country to the Egyptian
authority. I have made very strict inquiry respecting this circumstance, and find it
confirmed through other channels. The Dragoman has also had some conver
sation with a Christian who has just arrived here from Diarbekir, of the Gadban
family, whose account of the affair corroborates with the above report which I
have had the honour of noting to your Lordship ; and further adds, that he met
Colonel Maggiun Bey, with some Bedouin Cavalry, Turk Irregular Cavalry
(Bashi Bozuks), and about a regiment of regulars, at Chermook, which place they
had just reached from Orfa, and that it was reported they were on their way to
Mardin. Chermook, as your Lordship is aware, has, ever since the occupation of
Orfa by the Egyptian forces, a Mussellim named there under that Government,
and is distant about three days from Mardin, and two from Diarbekir.

518
The information that I have been able to elicit from this person, who has
reached from Diarbekir, respecting the movements of the Sultan's troops and
officers is, that the force at Malatia, under Sadullah Pasha, said to be of about
10,000 men, has been withdrawn from thatplace, and marched to Carpoot.
I have no late advices from the Adana district, but I believe everything
there remains without any further change since the last time I addressed your
Lorddiip. I informed your Lordship, in my last, that resistance to the Government
had taken place in the mountains near Byass, on the continuity of the range of
the Taurus, refusing to pay the taxes, and that a force had been directed against
the malcontents. I have no fresh advices from the Alexandretta district
respecting the issue of that undertaking; but I learn from different good
sources here, that the malcontents of those mountains had begun to giveinthdr
submission, and to pay the taxes in the same manner as the Ensaries in
the Latakia district, who had also some time back evinced symptoms of
discontent, in consequenee of the demand made for the taxes, but who, I learn
from our agent there, have returned to their duty ; and altogether, I may say
that the whole of this consular district is at present pretty tranquil.
Although the malcontents in Syria against the Egyptian Government are
general among the population, it may be said that the whole of the population of
this country is inimical to this Government; arising from the forcible con
scription, and at present from the heavy taxation everywhere exercised and
exacted with such great rigour, and a train of circumstances growing out of the
wants of a too grasping Government inconsistent with the means of the people.
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

No. 410.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 10.)
My Lord, Beyrout, November 7, 1839.
THE information I have the honour to transmit by this month's packet,
via Alexandria, is but limited.
During the last fifteen or twenty days, the communication between Tyre and
Acre has been interrupted by a party of insurgent Mutualis (an heretical sect of
Mahommedans) to the number of about 400. These lay in wait for travellers
whom they rob and murder, as well as plunder the caravans which pass that
way. They lately seized upon a Christian, and, after robbing him, spared his
life on condition of his conveying a message, on their part, to the Governor of
Tyre, demanding 50,000 piastres, and a supply of ammunition and provisions
from that town. In the event of a refusal, they threatened an incursion into
the town. The inhabitants of Tyre are without the means of defence, and
have applied in great alarm to the Mudir of Acre for protection. It is doubted,
however, whether he has a sufficient force at his disposal to keep the Mutualis
in check ; meanwhile our communication with the south is interrupted.
Trade is almost entirely suspended at this place, which may he principally
attributed to the anxiety and suspense which exist generally in respect to the
present state of the relations betwixt Mehemet Ali and the Porte.
Accounts have reached Beyrout, that Ibrahim Pasha has directed troops to
march towards Malatia, Diarbekir, and Mardin.
Solyman Pasha arrived at Sidon from Aleppo on the 24th ultimo, and has
since visited Acre, at which place considerable military stores have lately arrived
from Egypt.
On the 22nd instant, Mahmoud Bey, the Governor, communicated to the
European Consuls here an order from his Excellency Sheriff Pasha, prohi
biting the introduction of arms into Syria as an article of commerce.
On the 31st ultimo, an Egyptian brig-of-war touched here, bearing treasure
for the payment of the troops in Syria; and on the 1st instant, a steamer,
supposed to be the Egyptian frigate " Nile," passed within sight of this port
Steering northward. I have, &c,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

519
No. 411.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 10.)
My Lord, Berlin, December 4, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's
despatches to the 26th of November together with their inclosures.
The French Charge d'Affaires at this Court has read to me part of a
despatch addressed to him by Marshal Soult, in which was inclosed a copy of
your Lordship's despatch to Lord Granville of the 29th of October.
The Marshal began by stating, that although the language held by your
Lordship to the French Ambassador in London had become less strong (moins
tranchant) than formerly on the Turkish and Egyptian Question, yet the
views taken by Her Majesty's Government of the state of affairs in the East,
and of the means to be employed for bringing about an arrangement between
the Porte and Mehemet Ali, were still too exaggerated and too inadmissible to
cdncide with those of the French Government.
The Marshal commented in rather severe terms on some of the passages-
in your Lordship's despatch to Lord Granville, saying, that some of the sentk
ments were exaggerated and others unfounded, and that he was preparing to
answer them in the most peremptory terms (dans les termes les plus peremp-
toires). I merely observed to M. Humann, that a considerable time had
elapsed since the despatch in question had been received and no answer had as
yet been returned.
M. Humann then read to me extracts of a despatch from Marshal Soult to
the French Consul-General at Alexandria.
I was much struck with the language of this despatch, for whilst it repri
manded in gentle terms the conduct of the Consul-General in having gone too
far at different times, in his conversations with the Pasha of Egypt, in his assur
ances of the protection of France, and of the interest she took in Mehemet Ali's
welfare, thereby perhaps contributing to the Pasha's obstinacy in making him
believe that France was more disposed to the aggrandizement of Egypt than to
the maintenance of the Porte, yet this slight expression of disapprobation at
his conduct was much interwoven with flattery for the Pasha personally, and
with assurances to the Pasha of the admiration with which his " genius and
glory " inspired the French nation. The despatch however terminated with
orders to M. Cochelet to state to Mehemet Ali, that if the French Govern
ment had to choose between the preservation of the integrity of the Turkish
Empire and the aggrandizement of' the Pasha, their choice must inevitably be
the former ; and that the Pasha would best insure the continued protection of
France by the moderation of his demands.
Although evidence was not before wanting to prove that the complaints
which had been received at Vienna and Constantinople of M. Cochelet's lan
guage at Alexandria were well founded, yet the existence of the despatch I have
had the honour of quoting to your Lordship, proves that the French Govern
ment have even.thought it necessary to take notice of it.
Baron Werther informed me yesterday, that he had received news direct
from Alexandria, containing renewed complaints of M. Cochelet's language.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 412.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 10.)
(Extract.) Berlin, December 4, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the Russian Minister
has this moment informed me that a Russian Cabinet messenger has arrived at
Berlin on his way to Stutgardt, bearing instructions to Baron Brunnow to pro
ceed to London without delay, to negotiate with Her Majesty's Government
the final arrangements consequent upon the acceptation by Russia of the propo-

520
sitions lately made by your Lordship, for the entry of the English and French
fleets into the Straits of the Dardanelles, in the event of a Russian force being
required for the protection of the Porte.
The messenger has not been detained a moment, but has been desired to
proceed to Stutgardt without delay.

No. 413.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, December 10, 1839.
IN a conversation which I had with Count Sebastiani on Thursday last,
I took occasion to remark, but in a friendly manner, upon the considerable
naval preparations which the French Government is making at Toulon. I
observed, that there is now in the Levant a French squadron of nine sail of
the line, all heavy and powerful ships, and that we learn that an additional
squadron of eight sail of the line is fitting out at Toulon, which, when
complete, will give France a fleet of seventeen sail of the line in the Mediter
ranean. I said that this great armament cannot fail to attract attention and
to produce remarks in this country ; that it will inevitably become the
subject of discussion ; and that people will naturally ask whom is it that so
large a force is intended to act against?
It will be said, that such a fleet is not wanted against the Russians, who
have only twelve sail of the line shut up in the Black Sea; that it
cannot be meant against the Turks, because they have no fleet left; that it is
obviously not directed against Mehemet Ali, because France not only
declares that she will not coerce him, but of late has in her negotiations
openly protected him ; that, consequently, there remains only England and
the English fleet, against which these great preparations can be made. I said
also, that persons who wish to embroil the two Governments may allege that
the tone and language of the French press is calculated to countenance the
notion, that in France, at least, these naval preparations are believed to be
destined to support some system of policy adverse to Great Britain ; and I
instanced an article which appeared lately in the " Journal de Paris," and
which openly boasted, not only that England would be forced by France to
submit to, and even to sign and guarantee the independence of Mehemet Ali,
but that Gibraltar was to be wrested from us, and to be transferred to the
Spaniards. I said, that I myself attached no importance whatever to such
newspaper articles, but they were at least indications serving to show which
way public opinion and public feeling in France are travelling.
Count Sebastiani seeming to entertain some doubts of the accuracy of the
report which had reached Her Majesty's Government as to the naval prepa
rations at Toulon, I gave him the details, and stated that the French force
now in the Levant consists of —
The Montebello 120 Guns.
Hercule 100 „
Jena 90 „
Jupiter 86 ,,
Santi Petri 86 ,,
that the squadron which is equipping at Toulon is to consist of — ¦

The Diademe

86 Guns.

Genereux

80 „

Triton

80 „

— Trident

80 „

9

The Souverain

100 Guns.

Alger

80

» j

Marengo

80

yy

Scipion

80

M

Ville de Marseille

80

,, recently brought from Brest

Neptune

86

„ ditto.

Ocean

120

,, expected from Brest.

— Suffren
8

90

„ ditto.

521
I said that we are going to put three line-of-battle ships into commission,
in order to relieve three others now in the Mediterranean, and whose time of
service is out ; but that if the French should make so large a naval armament,
it is obvious, that we may be obliged to convert this relief into a reinforce
ment, and perhaps even to make a still further addition to our ships in
commission. Count Sebastiani said he would certainly report to his Government what
I had said to him, and would not fail to mention the friendly spirit in which
my remarks had been made; but he assured me, in the most positive manner,
that the main wish and guiding principle of his Government, in regard to its
foreign relations, was to maintain unimpaired its alliance with England, and
to render that alliance as close and intimate as possible; and that, consequently,
he could undertake at once to declare, that not a shadow of hostile feeling
towards England could by possibility have entered into the motives which
may have induced his Government to order the equipment of this squadron of
reserve. I think it will be desirable that your Excellency should take an
opportunity of adverting to this matter, in conversation with Marshal Soult,
in the same manner in which I touched upon it in my interview with Count
Sebastiani. For, notwithstanding the friendly professions and declarations of
the French Government, it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government, not
to apprehend that the Cabinet of the Tuileries bears in mind, with respect to
Mediterranean affairs, the views and policy which have in past periods
actuated the Monarchical, the Republican, and the Imperial Governments of
France. The desire of possessing Egypt is not a recent ambition on the part of
France; and the French Government seems to be labouring to establish
an Independent State, consisting of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, to be placed
under the protection, and to be subject to the influence, of France.
Undoubtedly, the full execution of such a plan would be attended
with difficulties hardly to be surmounted; and when once its nature and
extent came to be generally seen and understood in England, any British
Government would be compelled by public opinion, to resist the further
progress of such a scheme. But in matters of this kind, prevention is better
than remedy, and the earliest steps are always the wisest and the most
effectual ; and therefore it is, that Her Majesty's Government have deemed
it expedient to lose no time in noticing this apparently uncalled-for aug
mentation of the French fleet.
Her Majesty's Government do not believe that the Cabinet of the
Tuileries can seriously contemplate a rupture with England, for the purpose
of supporting the aggressive pretensions of Mehemet Ali ; but that Cabinet
probably thinks, that if the French naval force in the Mediterranean were
very much superior to that of Great Britain, such a circumstance would
tend to give great weight to the opinions and wishes of France in favour of
Mehemet Ali ; and that France would be able to negotiate in favour of the
Pasha with much better effect, if, while England had only twelve sail of the
line in the Mediterranean, France were to have seventeen, besides the whole
of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets, which now, by a train of circumstances of
which the history yet remains to be fully explained, are in the possession of
Mehemet Ali.

No. 414.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 12.)
My Lord, Paris, December 9, 1839.
I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult, and was imme
diately, on my entrance into his room, greeted with a congratulation upon the
communication he received yesterday from General Sebastiani, of the Russian
Government having notified to your Lordship its acquiescence in the proposal
3 X

522
of Her Majesty's Government, and expressed its willingness that if a Russian
force should enter the Bosphorus, ships of war of all the other co-operating
Powers shall enter the Dardanelles. Nothing, said the Marshal, could be more
satisfactory than this communication ; he considered it as the removal of the
great obstacle to the satisfactory conclusion of the Eastern Question ; and when
I observed that Mehemet Ali, being aware that the forces of all the Great Powers
would be united in defence of Constantinople, could no longer indulge the
hope of sowing dissension among them by the advance of the Egyptian Army
towards the capital of Turkey, and would be therefore disposed to accede to more
reasonable conditions of peace than those on which he now insisted, his Excel
lency fully concurred in the justice of this observation ; the Marshal told me he
should write by a courier this day to Count Sebastiani, instructing him to
express the satisfaction with which the King and the French Government had
received this communication.
His Excellency mentioned to me, that the French Minister at Stutgardt had
written to him, that the Baron de Brunnow had received, on the 6th of this
month, instructions to proceed directly to London, and that on the 8th he pur
posed setting off for that destination. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 415.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 12.)
^Extract.) Paris, December 9, 1839.
THE Marshal Soult told me this morning, that in the same despatch in
which General Sebastiani had apprized him of the communication received by
Her Majesty's Government from that of Russia, relative to the union of the
forces of all the Allies of the Porte in the Bosphorus and the Dardanekes, his
Excellency had stated, that your Lordship had mentioned to him the accounts
which had been received in England of the equipment of a reserve squadron at
Toulon, to be commanded by Admiral Rosamel. The Marshal said, that he
thought he had, at the time of the appointment of Admiral Rosamel to this
command, explained to me the circumstances of that appointment, but upon my
assuring him that he had never in his conversations with me alluded to the
subject, he expressed his regret at the omission ; he purposed replying to this
part of General Sebastiani's despatch, in a way that he had no doubt would
be perfectly satisfactory to your Lordship ; he then entered into an explanation
of the reasons which necessitated the French Government to have reserve ships
in commission at home, in order to supply the place of others on a foreign
station, which, from the discharge of the sailors after a certain period of service,
and from other causes, might be obliged to return to France.

No. 416.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, December 12, 1839.
WITH reference to your despatch, of the 9th instant, I have to ac
quaint your Excellency, that Count Sebastiani read to me yesterday a despatch
from Marshal Souk, in which the Marshal expressed the great satisfaction with
which the French Government had learnt that the Russian Cabinet was disposed
to agree to the arrangement proposed by Her Majesty's Government on the
subject of the Dardanelles, and that Baron Brunnow was expected to return to
London for the purpose of resuming the negotiation ; and the Marshal stated,
that if, when Baron Brunnow arrived, it should appear that the Russian pro
posals were such as have been announced, and were not accompanied by any

523
conditions or reserves tending to counteract their ostensible effect^ the
French Government would, in such an altered state of things, be prepared to
reconsider the whole of the Turco-Egyptian Question, not even excepting those
points upon which different Governments have hitherto taken views so different
as to render further negotiation upon them apparently useless. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 417.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville,
My Lord, Foreign Office, December 13, 1839.
IN your despatch, of the 9th instant, your Excellency reports, that Mar
shal Soult had stated to you on the morning of that day, that, in the same des
patch in which General Sebastiani had apprized him of the communication which
has been received by Her Majesty's Government from that of Russia, about the
return of Baron Brunnow to London, Count Sebastiani had stated that I had
mentioned to him the accounts which had been received in England of the in
tended equipment of a reserve squadron at Toulon, to be commanded by Admiral
Rosamel; and your Excellency further reports the explanations given to you by
Marshal Soult, respecting the appointment of that Admiral.
I have to state to your Excellency in reply, that in the despatch relative
to the Affairs of the Levant, which Count Sebastiani showed me a few days ago,
and which I mentioned in my despatch of the 1 2th instant, there was a passage
relating to what I had said to Count Sebastiani the other day upon the subject
of the intended equipment of a fleet of reserve at Toulon, and that passage con
tained very nearly the same statement which Marshal Soult made verbally
to your Excekency as above referred to.
But this explanation leaves the matter much as it was before, and entirely
evades the real point. Your Excellency should, therefore, ascertain from
Marshal Soult, whether it is, or is not, the intention of the French Government
to equip a squadron of reserve of eight sail of the line at Toulon, in addition to
the nine sail of the line already in the Levant ; for it is the equipment of such a
squadron, and not the appointment of any particular Admiral to command it,
to which the observation of Her Majesty's Government has been directed; and
if it should be the intention of the French Government to carry its active naval
force in the Mediterranean to the amount supposed, Her Majesty's Government
would be glad to know that fact.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 418.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.' — (Received December 16.)
My Lord, Paris, December 13, 1839.
IN obedience to the instructions contained in your despatch of the 10th
instant, I adverted in an interview I had this morning with Marshal Soult to
the report which had reached Her Majesty's Government of the fitting out of a
squadron of eight sail of the line, at Toulon, in addition to the nine sail of the
line now stationed in the Levant under the command of Admiral Lalande. I
expressed my hopes that the report which I had made to your Lordship of my
conversation with his Excellency on Monday last, and more especially the
despatch which he told me he had written to Count Sebastiani upon this subject,
had already satisfied Her Majesty's Government that the account of the force of
this squadron of reserve had been exaggerated, and that the equipment of it had
3X2

524
been ordered with no view the least unfriendly to England ; butT could not omit
however to mention to him, that I had received yesterday a despatch containing
observations similar to those addressed by your Lordship to the French Ambas
sador, relative to the report of the naval preparations which had been made at
Toulon ; and which you thought it desirable that I should take an opportunity
of adverting to in my conversation with his Excekency. This instruction
showed, I said, how very anxious Her Majesty's Ministers are, to be enabled to
answer satisfactorily any remarks or questions which might be put to them on
the subject of this armament in either House, when Parkament meets. Marshal
Soult replied, that he had no doubt of your Lordship having been satisfied with
the answers he had given to Count Sebastiani upon this matter, and he added,
that the number of French ships of the fine fit to go to sea, did not amount to
more, he believed, than thirteen, and that two of them were employed to trans
port troops to Algiers. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 419.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 17.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, November 30, 1839.
COUNT NESSELRODE assures me, that he feels confident that the Sultan
•will rely upon the efforts of his Allies, and will not settle his disputes with
the Pasha without their intervention : and his Excellency considers that, after
all that has passed, it will be infinitely better that the fina larrangement should
be determined by the Great Powers : as thereby the d^nity of the parties
who signed the Collective Note presented to the Sultan, and whose conduct
has been consistent with that Note, will be maintained ; the Ottoman Em
pire will gain better terms ; and the settlement will be more probably per
manent.

No. 420.
M. Wagner, Prussian Consul at Alexandria, to Count Koenigsmarck.
(Extrait.) Alexandrie, le 26 Novembre, N. S., 1839.
C'EST un fait digne d'attention, que la premiere nouvelle des demarches
collectives que les Representans des Cinq Grandes Puissances a Constantinople
ont faites pour assurer la Porte de Pinteret de leurs Cours et pour Pengager
a renoncer a tout arrangement direct, a produit sur Mehemet Ali la plus grande
impression : il en fut consterne et parut sentir Pinutilite et les dangers d'une
resistance a la volonte unanime des Cinq Puissances.
Autant que les ouvertures faites isolement et qui ne reposent point sur une
base solide, restent steriles, autant d'effet peut-on se promettre d'une demarche
collective que les Consuls-Generaux pourraient etre appeles a faire auprfes de
Mehemet Ali pour lui intimer, comme une decision definitive et irrevocable, la
resolution de leurs Cours a Pegard de ses differends avec la Porte ; et je partage
I'opinion de plusieurs de mes Collegues, que Mehemet Ali se soumettrait a cette
decision, fsit-elle meme beaucoup moins avantageuse pour lui que les conditions
qu'il pourrait attendre d'un arrangement direct avec la Porte.
Mehemet Ali sent tous les jours davantage les difficultes de sa position; il
s'est aliene Pesprit des Cabinets qui sont intervenus dans ses differends avec la
Porte, en se refusant a accepter leur mediation et en fesant par ses ouvertures
directes a la Porte des tentatives de s'y soustraire. L'essai d'exciter a la revoke

525
les populations des provinces restees fideies a Sa Hautesse, a compietement
echoue ; Farmee d'Ibrahim Pacha se trouve paralysee par les rigueurs d'un
dimat auquel elle n'est point accoutumee, ainsi que par le manque de vivres et
la difficulte de ses communications avec la Syrie. La presence de la flotte
Turque a Alexandrie, qui avait ete regardee au premier moment comme un
incident heureux pour Mehemet Ali, ne manque pas d'offrir de grands incon-
veniens; le Pacha s'est vu oblige, pour calmer le mecontentement toujours
croissant des equipages, a leur faire payer un mois de solde, ce qui augmente ses
embarras pecuniaires.
Tandis que la position de Mehemet Ali devient de jour en jour plus difficile,
celle de la Porte parait s'ameliorer; et la marche sage et correcte qu'elle a suivie
en acceptant l'intervention des Grandes Puissances, ne manquera pas de lui en
feire eprouver les effets salutaires.
Nous voyons les provinces rester tranquilles ; le jeune Sultan qui, des son
avenement au trone, avait en sa faveur les sympathies des Cinq Puissances,
gagne de jour en jour de popularite, et le Hatti Cherif, publie dernierement,
exercera probablement une influence salutaire sur I'opinion publique en Turquie
et en Europe. Mais un incident imprevu, la manifestation d'un mecontente
ment populaire a Constantinople, un souievement dans les provinces, un change
ment du Ministere Ture, une incendie ou une disette, pourraient facilement
changer cet etat de choses et amener d'un jour a l'autre de graves complications.
Mehemet Ali insisterait alors avec plus d'opiniatrete que jamais sur ses preten
tions outrees, et le Sultan, pour sortir d'embarras, se verrait oblige de souscrire
a un arrangement direct moins favorable que les conditions que lui aurait pro-
curees une prompte intervention des Cinq Puissances, — intervention qui aujourd'hui
aurait probablement pu se borner a faire simplement connaitre leur decision
unanime et irrevocable au Pacha d'Egypte.

(Translation.)
Mr. Wagner, Prussian Consul at Alexandria, to Count Konigsmarck.
(Extract.) Alexandria, November 26, N.S., 1839.
IT is a fact worthy of attention, that the first news of the collective steps
which the Representatives of the Five Great Powers at Constantinople have
taken to assure the Porte of the interest of their Courts, and to prevail upon it
to give up any direct arrangement, has produced the greatest impression on
Mehemet Ali : he was thrown into consternation by it, and appeared to feel the
uselessness and the dangers of resisting the unanimous will of the Five Powers.
In proportion as the overtures made singly and without any basis to rest
upon are fruitless, so much the more effect may be anticipated from a collective
step which the Consuls-General might be called upon to take, to intimate to
Mehemet Ali, as a final and irrevocable decision, the determination of their
Courts with regard to his differences with the Porte ; and I agree in opinion
with several of my colleagues, that Mehemet Ali would submit to this decision,
even if it were much less advantageous for him than the conditions which he
might expect from a direct arrangement with the Porte.
Mehemet Ali feels more and more every day the difficulties of his position ;
he has alienated from himself the good-will of the Cabinets which interposed in
his differences with the Porte, by refusing their mediation, and by endeavouring
to escape from it by making direct overtures to the Porte. The attempt to
excite to revolt the population of the Provinces, which remained faithful to His
Highness, has completely failed ; the Army of Ibrahim Pasha is paralyzed by the
rigour of a climate to which it is unaccustomed, as well as by the want of pro
visions, and by the difficulty of its communications with Syria. The presence of
the Turkish fleet at Alexandria, which at the first moment was looked upon as a
fortunate event for Mehemet Ali, does not fail to produce much inconvenience.
The Pasha has been compelled, in order to appease the increasing discontent of
the crews, to furnish them with a month's pay, which augments his pecuniary
difficulties. While the position of Mehemet Ali becomes daily more difficult, that of the
Porte seems to improve ; and the wise and prudent line which it has adopted in

526
accepting the intervention of the Great Powers cannot fail to make it feel the
salutary effects thereof.
We see the other provinces remain quiet ; the young Sultan, who had the
sympathy of the Five Powers in his favour, from the time of his accession to the
throne, gains popularity daily ; and the recently published Hatti Sheriff will
probably exercise a salutary influence over public opinion in Turkey and in
Europe. But one unforeseen accident, the manifestation of popular discontent
at Constantinople, a rising in the provinces, a change of the Turkish Ministry,
a fire, or a famine, might easily alter this state of things, and produce at any
moment serious complications. Mehemet Ali would in that case insist, with
more obstinacy than ever, upon his exaggerated pretensions, and the Sultan, to
escape from embarrassment, would find himself obliged to consent to a direct
arrangement less favourable than the conditions which a prompt intervention
of the Five Powers would have procured for him, — an intervention which now
might probably have been confined to simply making known to the Pasha of
Egypt their unanimous and irrevocable decision.

No. 421.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 22.)
(Extract.) Therapia, November 24, 1839.
THIS country seems to be in its usual state. The Government is obeyed,
and the revenue collected as heretofore. I am told, that the Hatti Sheriff
published at the Gulhane, on the 3rd of November last, is universally approved
of, and that Ottoman and Rayah subjects desire, with equal anxiety, to see it
carried into execution.
The accounts received by the Internuncio and others from Alexandria,
speak of the state of Syria as being very embarrassing to Ibrahim Pasha, and
say, that country is with difficulty kept in subjection by the military force.

No. 422.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 22.)
(Extract.) Therapia, November 27, 1839.
THE Internuncio has been so good as to communicate to me the latest
intelligence he has received from Alexandria, which I inclose for your Lord-
skip. I have seen a very intelligent gentleman, lately arrived from that place ;
and he says, the Ottoman sailors are in utter despondency; that they had received
only one month's pay ; that Ahmed Pasha is held in contempt ; that the Egyptian
troops have seventeen months' pay due to them ; that Mehemet Ali is detested
by all, but is feared ; that Ibrahim is extremely feared ; that in his opinion, any
disaster befalling the Pasha would produce his certain fall at once ; that Mehe
met Ali is extremely alarmed at his position, — and this last fact he has gathered
from authority that cannot be doubted. He thinks the Pasha will offer to send
the fleet back. It is said the French have recommended that step.

Inclosure in No. 422.
M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.

(Extrait.) Alexandrie, le 17 Novembre, 1839.
MEHEMET ALI se resigne de plus en plus. II ne gatera rien aux affaires
pour Pile de Candie, soit qu'on veuille la lui prendre avant ou apres sa mort.
La Flotte Ottomane lui est a charge et demande a haute voix a etre renvoyee.
Depuis le premier Ramazan eke est payee du Tresor Egyptien.

527
Ahmed Pacha a appris que Mehemet Ali desire se concilier avec Hosreff
Pacha. Dans ce cas, il resterait ici ou bien il se retirerait a la Mecque. Mehemet
Ak continue a lui jurer amitie, mais il le voit plus rarement que par le passd ; il
ne lui communique plus ni des nouvelles importantes, ni des plans, &c. &c, de
sorte qu'il s'adresse souvent aux Consulats etrangers pour avoir les nouvelles de
Constantinople et d'Europe.
Le pyroscaphe " Peiki Chewket," a apporte ici, cinq exemplaires du Hatti
Cherif du 3 de ce mois. R fit une impression difficile a decrire. Malgre la
defense la plus severe, des officiers de tout grade se pressent autour du bateau
pour en prendre les details, et sont doublement impatiens de leur captivite.

(Translation.)
M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.
(Extract.) Alexandria, November 17, 1839.
MEHEMET ALI becomes more and more resigned ; he will not mar
matters on account of the Island of Candia, whether it is intended to take it
from him before or after his death. The Ottoman fleet is a burthen to him,
and demands loudly to be sent back. Since the first of Ramazan it has
been paid out of the Egyptian treasury.
Ahmed Pasha has learnt that Mehemet Ali wishes to become reconciled
with Hosrew Pasha. In that case, he would remain here, or rather, he
would retire to Mecca. Mehemet Ali continues to swear friendship to him,
but he sees him less frequently than formerly; he no longer communicates to
him important news, or plans, &c, &c. ; so that he often applies to the
foreign consulates for news from Constantinople and Europe.
The steamer, " Peiki Chewket," has brought here five copies of the
Hatti Sheriff of the 3rd of this month. It made an impression difficult to
be described. In spite of the strictest prohibition, officers of every rank
crowded round the boat in order to get the details of it, and are doubly
impatient of their captivity.

No. 423.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.-— (Received December 25.)
(Extract.) Berlin, December 18, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's
despatches to the 10th of December, together with their inclosures. *¦ .-*«$[
I have had frequent conversations with Baron Werther on the affairs of the
East; and he informed me yesterday, that he was happy to hear from Paris that
when the French Government heard of Baron Brunnow's renewed mission to
London, it received the intelligence with satisfaction, and expressed its hopes that
it might lead to a termination of the Eastern Question.

No. 424.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 25.)
My Lord, Paris, December 23, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of the speech
which His Majesty the King of the French dekvered this day upon opening the
Session of the Chambers. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

528

Inclosure in No. 424.
Speech of His Majesty the King of the French at the opening of the Chambers, .
December 23, 1839.
(Extrait.) MES rapports avec les Puissances etrangeres ont conserve ce caractere
pacifique et bienveillant que prescrit Pinteret commun de l'Europe. Notre
pavikon, de concert avec celui de la Grande Bretagne, et fideie a Pesprit de
cette union, toujours si avantageuse aux interets des deux pays, a veille sur
Findependance et la surete immediate de l'Empire Ottoman. Notre politique
est toujours d'assurer la conservation et Pintegrite de cet Empire, dont l'existence
est si essentieke au maintien de la paix generate. Nos efforts ont au moins
reussi a arreter dans l'Orient le cours des hostilites que nous avions voulu
prevenir ; et, quekes que soient les complications qui resultent de la diversite
des interets, j'ai l'esperance que Paccord des Grandes Puissances amenera bientot
une solution equitable et pacifique. (Translation.)
Speech of His Majesty the King of the French, at the opening of the Chambers,
December 23, 1839.
(Extract.) MY relations with Foreign Powers have preserved that pacific and friendly
character prescribed by the common interests of Europe. Our flag, in con
cert with that of Great Britain, and faithful to the spirit of that union, always
so advantageous to the interests of the two countries, has watched over the
independence and the immediate safety of the Ottoman Empire. Our policy
is ever to assure the preservation and the integrity of that Empire, the exist
ence of which is so essential to the maintenance of the general peace. Our
efforts have at least succeeded in arresting in the East the course of those
hostilities which we had desired to prevent; and, whatever may be the
complications which result from diversity of interests, I have the hope that
the agreement of the Great Powers will soon bring about an equitable and
pacific solution.

No. 425.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 26.)
My Lord, Paris, December 23, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose an extract from the " Eclaireur de la
Mediterranee," which confirms the answer I received from Marshal Soult,
in reply to the question I put to him, by your Lordship's directions, re
specting the number of French ships of the line in commission in the
Mediterranean. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 425.
Extract from the " Eclaireur de la Mediterranee."
L'ESCADRE de FAmiral Lalande ne se composera plus que de six vaisseaux.
Le trois ponts " le Montebello," etait du nombre de ceux qui devaient operer leur
etour en France; mais on apprend aujourd'hui meme que ce vaisseau reste
rans le Levant. Au moment ou le Gouvernement Anglais augmente son eseadre

529
de trois vaisseauxde plus, et donne ordre k FAmiral Stopford de se maintenir en
Orient, nous faisons rentrer une partie des notres.
M. le Vice-Amiral Ducampe de Rosamel, Commandant superieur de l'es
cadre de reserve, n'est attendu a Toulon que dans la premiere quinzaine de
Janvier prochain. A cette epoque, huit vaisseaux doivent etre reunis au port,
savoir: les trois vaisseaux attendus du Levant, les deux de Brest, ensuite "le
Neptune," "FAlger" et " le Marengo," plus les deux negates " la Beke-Poule"
et " FAmazone."

(Translation.)
Extract from the " Eclaireur de la Mediterrane'e."
THE squadron of Admiral Lalande will no longer consist of more than
six ships of the line. The three-decker " Montebello" was one of those
which was to return to France ; but we learn this very day that this ship
remains in the Levant. At the time when the English Government increases
its squadron by three more ships of the line, and orders Admiral Stopford to
remain in the East, we bring home part of ours.
Vice-Admiral Ducampe de Rosamel, Commander-in-Chief of the
Squadron of Reserve, is not expected at Toulon before the first fortnight of
next January. At that time eight ships of the line are to be assembled in
port, namely, the three ships of the line expected from the Levant ; the two
from Brest; and then the "Neptune," "Alger," and "Marengo;" besides
the two frigates the " Belle Poule," and the "Amazon."

No. 426.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December 26.)
My Lord, Therapia, November 30, 1839.
I HEARD, yesterday, from Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles, of
the arrival of three British line-of-battle ships in Besika Bay, where they cast
anchor. The news had reached town early, and inquiries were made by some of
my colleagues. I replied, that orders had been given some time ago, that
measures of precaution should be taken against the threatened attack by
Ibrahim Pasha, and any possible attempt that might be made from that quarter
against the Porte. I said the same thing to Rechid Pasha. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 427.
Measures suggested by Baron Brunnow for the Settlement of the Turco-Egyptian
Question. January, 1840.
1°. DE declarer que les Cabinets Allies, considerant que la situation
actuelle des affaires entre la Sublime Porte Ottomane et Mehemet Ali, Pacha
d'Egypte, menace de troubler la paix de l'Orient, et peut finir par faire naitre des
dvenemens qui entraineraient de graves complications pour l'Europe entiere ; et
considerant en outre qu'ils ont formellemenl promis a la Porte Ottomane une
assistance que celle-ci a acceptee; ont resolu d 'arreter entre eux les bases d'une
pacification par laquelle cette assistance serait efficacement pretee et Pindepen-
dance ainsi que la securite de l'Empire Ottoman completement mises a couvert
du danger d'une agression a laquelle le Pacha d'Egypte pourrait se livrer de
nouveau. 2°. Etablir que les Cabinets Allies, en se fondant sur les determinations et
lesvues ddja spontanement manifestees de la part du Sultan, dans le but de faire
cesser a l'avenir tout sujet de dissension et de mesintekigence, admettent en
3 Y

530
principe que la Sublime Porte accorde a Mehemet Ak Pacha la possession de
l'Egypte toute entiere, avec le droit de transmettre a ses descendans Fadminis-'
tration de cette province; dont la Sublime Porte donnera Finvestiture a ses succes-
seurs en maintenant ainsi dans sa famille les titres et les prerogatives dont il a
joui jusqu'ici en qualite de Pacha d'Egypte, vassal de la Porte.
3°. Les limites du Pachalic d'Egypte seront determinees.
4°. Mehemet Ali et ses successeurs continueront a reconnaitre la
Souverainete du Sultan et a lui payer le tribut que la Porte percevait jusqu'ici du
Pachalic d'Egypte.
5°. Les Pachalics de la Syrie, Damas, Alep, et autres, ainsi que le district
d'Adana, de meme que Pile de Candie, seront evacues par les troupes Egypti
ennes, et immediatement restitues a la Porte, qui continuera a les posseder en
toute propriete comme de tout tems.
6°. La flotte Ottomane, actuekement dans le port d'Alexandrie, sera
immediatement replacee sous I'autorite des preposes Turcs que le Sultan
ckargera de la recevoir et de la ramener a Constantinople avec ses equipages et
tout le materiel y appartenant.
7°. Les dispositions ci-dessus, apres avoir ete prealablement communiquees
a la Porte comme resultat de Pappui qui lui a ete formellement promis par les
Representans des Cinq Cours, et apres avoir obtenu P adhesion du Sultan, seront
mises a execution par les Cabinets Allies, lesquels se chargeront de notifier ces
conditions a Mehemet Ali Pacha, en le sommant d'y souscrire.
8°. Si contre toute attente, Mehemet Ali refusait d'accepter les termes de
cet arrangement, et annoncait l'intention de soutenir des pretentions plus
etendues, les Cours Alliees sont resolues de proceder a une serie de mesures
coercitives graduellement destinees a vaincre Popposition du Pacha d'Egypte et
a lui imposer Parrangement pacifique qui aura obtenu la sanction prealable du
Sultan et que toutes les Puissances de l'Europe auront reconnu comme juste et
comme irrevocable.
9°. En consequence, les Cabinets Allies procederaient a Pemploi des
mesures ci-apres: (ici suivrait Pindication des moyens d'action dont le Ministere
Britannique a ete le premier a nous suggerer le plan). En adoptant ces
mesures on mettrait d'abord a execution celles qui generaient le moins le
commerce, tout en agissant moralement sur les determinations de Mehemet Ak
en deteriorant sa position sous le rapport politique et militaire.
A cet effet, on commencerait par diriger les Escadres Anglaise et Francaise
dans la Baie d'Iskenderoon pour y prendre une position et une attitude qui
menaceraient Ibrahim Pacha dans son flanc, intercepteraient toutes ses commu
nications par mer, et Pexposeraient au danger de voir edater des troubles
serieux parmi les populations mecontentes qu'il retient a peine dans l'obeissance
aujourd' hui, etqui se soustrairaient a son pouvoir des qu'elles auraient une chance
de le faire impunement en se fondant sur Pappui des forces militaires de
FAlliance. Si cette premiere demonstration etait insuffisante, on procederait a retablir
I'autorite du Sultan dans Pile de Candie, mesure qui ne manquerait point de
reagir sur toutes les provinces soumises a Mehemet Ah et y ebranlerait fortement
son pouvoir. Dans le cas ou cette mesure ne parviendrait pas encore k vaincre la
resistance de Mehemet Ali, il faudrait en venir au blocus des cotes de la Syrie et
de l'Egypte, — demonstration qui imposerait assurement au commerce Europeen
une certaine gene, mais ne serait aussi que momentanee, parceque le Pacha
d'Egypte ne resisterait pas longtems a Pemploi de moyens coercitifs qui paraly-
seraient toutes ses ressources financieres.
Je m'abstiens de ranger ici le rappel des Consuls au nombre des mesures
dont je me permettrais de suggerer Padoption, d'une part, parceque Pabsence
de nos agens diminuerait les moyens d'action morale quejnous avons sur Mehe
met Ali ; de l'autre, parceque les esperances de ce dernier pourraient se fortifier
de nouveau si les Consuls de toutes les Puissances Europeennes ne se trouve-
raient pas rappeles simultanement de leurs postes.
10°. Apres avoir precise dans leur ordre graduel les mesures coe'rcitives_
qu'ils ont resolu de prendre, les Cabinets Allies etabliraient comme une eventualite
possible la chance que Mehemet Ali, venant de rejeter le plan de pacificatioa
ci-dessus, recommencat les hostilites contre l'Empire Ottoman, en faisant
marcher ses troupes par FAsie Mineure pour menacer Constantinople.

531
Dans ce cas, la Cour Imperiale de Russie, invariablement resolue comme
elle Pest d'aller au secours de son voisin et de ne point permettre que le tr6ne
du Sultan fut mis en peril par son vassal, s'engagerait a agir dans un but de
conservation et au nom de l'Alliance Europeenne, en consentant a la demande
du Sultan, a envoyer sa flotte de la Mer Noire avec des troupes de debarque-
ment pour defendre la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman contre I'agression de
I'armee d'Egypte, pendant que de l'autre cdte les flottes combinees des autres
Puissances opereraient sur les cdtes d'Egypte et de Syrie, afin de forcer Mehemet
Ali d'arrSter la marche de ses troupes. De plus, afin de mieux constater aux
yeux de l'Europe entiere Pintime et franche union qui s'est etablie entre les
Cours Alliees dans la poursuite du plan salutaire qu'elles ont adopte, il serait
expressement entendu, que pendant que la flotte et les troupes Russes seraient
appelees dans le Bosphore, afin de pourvoir a la defense de Constantinople,
rAutriche, la Grande Bretagne, et la France, sur Pinvitation qui leur en serait
egalement adressee par la Porte, feraient entrer de leur cote chacune deux ou
trois batimens de guerre dans la Mer de Marmora, oii ces vaisseaux etabkraient
une croisiere entre Galkpoli et le Golfe de Moudania pour empecher toute
entreprise des troupes Egyptiennes de ce c6te-la.
1 1°. II serait convenu que la presence des forces Russes dans le Bosphore,
de m^me que celle des vaisseaux de guerre des autres Puissances dans la Mer
de Marmora, cesserait aussit6t que le but de surete qu'ils avaient momentane-
iment ete appeles a atteindre, auraient ete obtenu, et que le danger dont Con
stantinople aurait ete menace n'existerait plus.
12°. II serait expressement entendu en outre, que Padmission des pavilions
etrangers dans le Bosphore ainsi que dans la Mer de Marmora ne serait consi
deree que comme une mesure exceptionnelle, adoptee a la demande seule de la
Porte elle-meme et uniquement dans le but de sa defense ; mais que cette
mesure ne porterait pas la moindre atteinte au principe existant, en vertu du-
quel la Sublime Porte a toujours considere le detroit des Dardanelles et celui du
Bosphore comme devant rester fermes en tems de paix comme en tems de
guerre aux vaisseaux de guerre de toutes les Puissances etrangeres. Ce prin-
dpe ayant invariablement servi de regie a l'Empire Ottoman de tout tems
comme un droit inherent k la souverainete du Sultan, comme maitre et gardien
des deux detroits, les Cours Alliees, pour manifester le respect qu'elles portent
unanimement a Findependance et au repos de l'Empire Ottoman, s'accorderaient
a reconnaitre aujourd'hui formellement la fermeture des detroits des Dardanelles
et du Bosphore, et s'engageraient a considerer desormais la Mer de Marmora et
la Mer Noire comme mers closes, en consacrant a jamais ce principe comme
faisant partie du droit public Europ6en.

(Translation.)
Measures suggested by Baron Brunnow for the Settlement of the Turco -Egyptian
Question, January 1840.
1. TO declare that the Allied Cabinets considering that the actual state
of affairs between the Sublime Ottoman Porte and Mehemet Ali, Pasha of
Egypt, threatens to disturb the peace of the East, and may end by producing
events which would lead to serious complications for the whole of Europe ;
and considering moreover that they have formally promised the Ottoman
Porte assistance, which the latter has accepted ; they have determined to
settle among themselves the basis of a pacification, by means of which that
assistance may be effectually afforded, and the independence as well as the
security of the Ottoman Empire entirely protected from the danger of an
aggression which the Pasha of Egypt might again attempt.
2. To lay down that the Allied Cabinets, acting upon the determinations
and the views already spontaneously evinced on the part of the Sultan, with
the view of causing every subject of dissension and misunderstanding to cease
for the future, admit as a principle that the Sublime Porte should grant to
Mehemet Ali Pasha the possession of the whole of Egypt, with the rio-ht of
transmitting to his descendants the administration of that province • the
3 Y 2

532
investiture of which the Sublime Porte shall grant to his successors, thu
maintaining in his family the titles and prerogatives which he has hitherto
enjoyed in his capacity of Pasha of Egypt, vassal of the Porte.
3. The limits of the Pashalic of Egypt shall be fixed. .
4. Mehemet Ali and his successors shall continue to recognize the
Sovereignty of the Sultan, and to pay to him the tribute which the Porte
hitherto received from the Pashalic of Egypt.
5. The Pashalics of Syria, Damascus, Aleppo, and others, as well as the
District of Adana, and also the Island of Candia, shall be evacuated by the
Egyptian troops, and immediately restored to the Porte, who shall continue
at all times to hold them in full possession.
6. The Ottoman Fleet, at present in the Port of Alexandria, shall im
mediately be replaced under the authority of the Turkish officers whom the
Sultan shall direct to receive it, and to bring it back to Constantinople with
its crews and all the furniture thereunto belonging.
7. The above arrangements, after having been in the first instance com
municated to the Porte as the result of the support which has been formally
promised to it by the Representatives of the two Courts, and after having
obtained the concurrence of the Sultan, shall be carried into execution by the
Allied Cabinets, who will undertake to notify these conditions to Mehemet
Ali Pasha, and to call upon him to acquiesce in them.
8. If, contrary to all expectation, Mehemet Ali should refuse to accept
the terms of this arrangement, and should announce his intention to support
more extensive pretensions, the Allied Courts are resolved to proceed to a
series of coercive measures destined by degrees to overcome the opposition of
the Pasha of Egypt, and to impose upon him the pacific arrangement which
will have received the previous sanction of the Sultan, and which all the
Powers of Europe will have considered just and irrevocable.
9. In consequence, the Allied Cabinets would proceed to the following
measures ; (here would follow an explanation of the means of action of which
the British Ministry has been the first to suggest to us the plan.) In adopt
ing these measures, those would be first carried into execution which would
least annoy commerce, at the same time that they would have a moral action
upon the determinations of Mehemet Ali by rendering his position worse,
politically and militarily.
For this purpose the Allied Cabinets would commence by despatching
the English and French Squadrons to the Bay of Scanderoon, in order to take
up a position and an attitude which should menace Ibrahim Pasha on his
flank, should cut off all his communications by sea, and should expose him
to the danger of seeing serious troubles break out among the discontented
populations, whom he scarcely keeps under obedience at the present time,
and who would withdraw themselves from his sway, as soon as they should
have a chance of doing so with impunity, relying upon the support of the
military forces of the Alliance.
If this first demonstration should be insufficient, the Allied Cabinets
would proceed to re-establish the authority of the Sultan in the Island of
Candia, a measure which would not fail to react upon all the provinces
subject to Mehemet Ali, and strongly to shake his power therein.
In case this measure should not yet have the effect of overcoming the
resistance of Mehemet Ali, it would be necessary to proceed to the blockade
of the coasts of Syria and of Egypt, —a demonstration which certainly would
expose European commerce to some degree of annoyance, but which would
also be only of short duration, since the Pasha of Egypt would not long resist
the employment of coercive measures which would paralyse all his financial
resources. I abstain from including the recall of the Consuls among the number of
the measures of which I would allow myself to suggest the adoption, on the
one hand, because the absence of our agents would diminish the means of
moral action on Mehemet Ali which we possess; on the other, because the
hopes of the latter might be again strengthened if the Consuls of all the
European Powers should not be simultaneously recalled from their posts.
10. After enumerating in their order the coercive measures which they
have determined to adopt, the Allied Cabinets would lay down as a possible
contingency the chance that Mehemet Ali, rejecting the above plan of pacifi-

533
cation, should recommence hostilities against the Ottoman Empire, by
marching his troops through Asia Minor in order to menace Constantinople.
In this case, the Imperial Court of Russia, invariably determined as it is
to assist its neighbour, and not to allow the throne of the Sultan to be put in
peril by his vassal, would pledge himself to act for its preservation and in
the name of the European Alliance, by consenting, on the demand of the
Sultan, to send its Black Sea fleet with a body of troops to be disembarked
for the defence of the capital of the Ottoman Empire against the aggression of
the Egyptian Army ; whilst, on the other hand, the combined fleets of the
other Powers should act on the coasts of Egypt and Syria, in order to compel
Mehemet Ali to stop the advance of his troops. Moreover, in order better to
prove to the whole of Europe the intimate and frank union which exists
among the Allied Powers in pursuit of the salutary plan which they have
adopted, it would be expressly understood that, while the Russian fleet and
troops should be called into the Bosphorus in order to provide for the defence
of Constantinople, Austria, Great Britain, and France, on the invitation
which would be addressed to them by the Porte in the same manner, would
on their part each of them cause two or three vessels of war to enter into the
sea of Marmora, where those vessels would cruize between Gallipoli and the
Gulf of Moudania in order to prevent any attempt of the Egyptian troops in
that direction. 11. It should be agreed that the presence of the Russian forces in the
Bosphorus, as also that of the vessels of war of the other Powers in the Sea
of Marmora, should cease as soon as the object of security which they
had for a time been called upon to effect, should have been attained, and the
danger with which Constantinople should have been menaced should no
longer exist.
12. It should, moreover, be expressly understood that the admission of
foreign flags into the Bosphorus, as well as into the Sea of Marmora, should
be considered only as a measure of exception, adopted at the sole demand of
the Porte itself, and merely with a view to its defence ; but that this measure
should not at all prejudice the existing principle, in virtue whereof the Sublime
Porte has always considered the Strait of the Dardanelles and that of the
Bosphorus as necessarily closed in time of peace, as well as in time of war, to
the vessels of war of all foreign Powers. This principle having invariably
been the rule of the Ottoman Empire from all time, as a right inherent in the
Sovereignty of the Sultan as the master and guardian of the two Straits, the
Allied Courts, in order to manifest the respect which they unanimously enter
tain for the independence and for the repose of the Ottoman Empire, should
agree formally to recognise at the present time the closing of the Straits of the
Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and should undertake to consider hence
forward the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea, as closed seas, by recording
for ever this principle, as forming part of the public law, of Europe.

No. 428.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, January 3, 1840.
IN reply to your despatch, of the 23rd December, 1839, inclosing an
extract from the newspaper the " Eclaireur de la Mediterranee," relative to
the amount of the French naval force in the Mediterranean, I have to observe
to your Excellency, that the statement contained in that extract is vague, and
can scarcely be taken as a contradiction to the enumeration of ships which I
sent to you in my despatch, of the 10th ultimo.
If the ships named in the list which I sent to your Excellency are not all
to be commissioned, it would be very easy for the French Government to
specify which of them are to continue to be laid up in ordinary.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

534

No. 429.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston — (Received January 5, 1840.)
(Extract.) Therapia, December 11, 1839.
I HAVE this day received a report from the Dragoman, which is as
follows : —
" His Excellency Rechid Pasha has charged me to thank your Lordship
for the instructions of the 8th instant ; and he has desired to have a translation
of them. The Pasha also charges me to assure you, that the Sublime Porte is
firm in tke system it has adopted, and that there is no question of an ac
commodation with Mehemet Ali, direct or indirect, under the auspices of
any Power.

No. 430.
Viscount Palmerston to Count Sebastiani.
Mon cher Comte, Holland House, le 5 Janvier, 1840.
EN reflediissant sur notre conversation d'hier, je pense que je n'ai vrai-
ment pas le droit de donner au Gouvernement Francais copies ou extraits de
depeches ecrites par un Ministre d'une autre Puissance a un de ses Collegues,
et qui ne m'ont ete communiquees que confidentiellement. Mais puisque ce
que vous desirez est d'etre a meme de faire connaitre a votre Gouvernement le
but de la seconde mission du Baron de Brunnow a Londres, je crois que je
pourrai en peu de mots vous donner les renseignemens que vous me demandez,
et je crois meme que de cette maniere je vous fournirai les moyens d'expliquer
Paffaire a votre Gouvernement mieux et plus clakement qu'en vous envoyant
les extraits dont il a ete question hier.
En effet, la chose est de la plus grande simplicite: vous savez parfaitement
deja tout ce qui s'est passe entre le Gouvernement Anglais et le Baron de Brunnow
au mois d'Octobre passe. Vous savez que PAngleterre et la Russie se sont
trouvees d'accord sur toutes les questions qui ont ete discutees par rapport a
FAff'aire Turco-Egyptienne, excepte seulement la distribution de roles entre les
Puissances Alliees pour la defense de Constantinople, dans le cas ou Ibrahim
Pacha pourrait marcher sur Broussa pour menacer Constantinople.
Le Baron de Brunnow nous a propose un certain arrangement pour ce cas,
nous lui en avons propose un autre ; ses instructions n'avaient pas prevu notre
proposition, et il ne s'est pas cru autorise a y acceder sans en referer a sa Cour.
II ecrivit par consequent a Petersbourg, et par suite d 'instructions qu'il a
recues de sa Cour, il est maintenant revenu a Londres pour nous annoncer
l'adhesion de l'Empereur a Parrangement que nous lui avions propose; et le
Baron est aussi charge de negocier dans le but d'amener une solution definitive
et permanente de la Question Turco-Egyptienne, afin d'assurer Findependance
et Pintegrite de l'Empire Ottoman, et de mettre un terme aux dangers dont
I'etat existant des relations entre le Sultan et le Pacha, et la position militaire
de ce dernier, menacent la paix de l'Europe.
Je n'ai pas pu encore communiquer au Cabinet la reponse du Cabinet de
St. Petersbourg; mais le Conseil se reunira demain et je leur ferai cette com
munication. Le Baron de Neumann est arrive de Vienne, charge, comme sans
doute il vous Paura dit, denous annoncer que PAutriche est entierement d'accord
avec PAngleterre et la Russie sur ces questions importantes; et je crois pouvoir
affirmer que la Prusse envisage ces affaires sous le meme point de vue. II ne
nous reste done maintenant que le concours de la France pour etablir un accord
Europeen sur une affaire qui est sans contredit la plus grave et la plus
importante de toutes celles que nous avons eu a traiter pendant ces dernieres
annees; nous esperons vivement que ce concours ne nous sera pas refuse, et que
les Cinq Puissances, marchant d'accord et sur une meme ligne vers un but d'un
interet commun et general, parviendront par leur fermete, leur vigueur, leur

535
unanimite, et leur desinteYessement, a dcarter pour bien des annees les dangers
graves doat Petat actuel des choses dans le Levant menacent sans cesse la paix
et le repos de l'Europe. Agreez, &c,
(Signd) PALMERSTON.
(Translation.)
Viscount Palmerston to Count Se'bastiani.
My dear Count, Holland House, January 5, 1840.
UPON reflecting on our conversation of yesterday, it occurs to me that
I have, in fact, no right to give to the French Government copies or extracts
of despatches written by a Minister of another Power to one of his Colleagues,
and which have been communicated to me confidentially only. But since
what you desire is to be enabled to inform your Government of the object of the
second mission of the Baron de Brunnow to London, I think I can, in a few
words, give you the information you require ; and I think, moreover, that by
this mode I shall furnish you with the means of explaining the affair to your
Government better and more clearly than I should were I to send you the
extracts referred to yesterday.
The thing is, in fact, extremely simple; you already know perfectly
well what passed between the English Government and the Baron de Brun
now in the month of October last. You know that England and Russia were
agreed upon all the questions which came under discussion with respect to
the Turco-Egyptian Affair, excepting only as to the parts to be assigned to
each of the Allied Powers for the defence of Constantinople, in case Ibrahim
Pasha should march on Brussa for the purpose of menacing Constantinople.
The Baron de Brunnow proposed to us a certain arrangement for this
contingency; we proposed to him another. His instructions did not provide
fur our proposition, and he did not consider himself authorized to accede to
it without referring it to his Court.
He wrote consequently to Petersburgh, and in consequence of instruc
tions which he has received from his Court, he has now returned to London,
to announce to us the Emperor's acquiescence in the arrangement which we
had proposed to him ; and the Baron is also instructed to negotiate with the
view of bringing about a definitive and permanent solution of the Turco-
Egyptian Question, in order to secure the independence and integrity of the
Ottoman Empire, and to put an end to the dangers with which the existing
state of relations between the Sultan and the Pasha, and the military position
of the latter, threaten the peace of Europe.
I have not yet had an opportunity of communicating to the Cabinet the
answer of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh ; but the Council will meet to-mor
row, and I will then make the communication to them. The Baron de
Neumann has arrived from Vienna, having instructions, as no doubt he will
have informed you, to announce to us that Austria entirely agrees with
England and Russia on these important questions; and I think I can under
take to say that Prussia takes the same view of these affairs. Nothing more,
then, is now wanting to us but the concurrence of France to come to an
European agreement respecting an affair which is undeniably the most serious
and important of any which we have had to treat upon of late years ; we ardently
hope that that concurrence will not be withheld from us, and that the Five
Powers, advancing together on the same line towards an object of common
and general interest, will, by their firmness, their vigour, their unanimity,
and their disinterestedness, succeed in removing, for many years to come, the
serious dangers with which the actual state of affairs in the Levant continually
threatens the peace and repose of Europe. Accept, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

536

No. 431.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 6, 1840.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, December 16, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's
dupkcate despatches, with inclosures, of the 3rd and the 14th of October.
Having left Trieste on the 1st of this month, I reached here on the evening
of the 14th instant in the French steamer "Mentor." I landed in the barge of
the Egyptian Admiral, which Her Majesty's Consul had procured for that pur
pose, and immediately proceeded to the residence of Colonel Campbell, who
received me with great kindness and cordiality. Colonel Campbell immediately
reported my arrival to his Excellency Boghos Bey, as well as to the Agents and
Consuls-General of the different Foreign Powers resident at Alexandria ; and I
have been this day informed through Boghos Bey, that his Highness Mehemet
Ali has fixed Saturday next, the 21st instant, as the day for my official
reception. I yesterday afternoon had the honour of waiting upon Boghos Bey, and
experienced from him a warm and courteous reception. He assured me of
Mehemet Ali's anxious desire to maintain the best understanding and the most
friendly relations with Her Majesty's Government, and at the same time
expressed his own readiness to be of any utility in furthering this end. In reply,
I assured Boghos Bey, that nothing should be wanting on my part to promote
so desirable an object, and that it was the sincere desire of Her Majesty's
Government to bring to a favourable and equitable termination those differ
ences that have unhappily existed between Mehemet Ali and kis Sovereign the
Sultan.

No. 432.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 9, 1840.)
My Lord, Aleppo, November 20, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information,
copy of my despatch of this day's date to Viscount Ponsonby, together with
extract of a letter from Mr. French Consul Giket of Tarsous, under date
October 21, as also extract of Mr. Vice-Consul Elias's journal of Latakia,
October 31, the whole of which will put your Lordship in full possession of
every thing of interest that has transpired within this Consular district up to this
period, and meriting your Lordship's notice. I have, &c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure I in No. 432.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Aleppo, November 20, 1839.
I HAD the honour of addressing your Excekency under the 29th ultimo,
per Austrian steamer, vid Beyrout.
I now avail myself of tke same channel to do myself the honour of commu
nicating to your Lordship the little information since circulating within the
jurisdiction of this Consulate, and worthy of your Lordship's notice.
M. Vincent Germain, the chief government architect of this Pashalic,
who, I stated to your Lordship, had received orders from his Excellency the
Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha to proceed to Aintab, for which place he immediately
left, andgenerally supposed to be for the purpose of superintending the erection
of barracks and a hospital, both of which that place does not contain, has, since
my last communication to your Lordship, returned back here. I have seen

537
M. Germain, who assures me that the sole object of his visit to Aintab and that
district, was to superintend, from the knowledge he has of the locakties
of that part of the country, the work his Excellency the Seraskier has under
taken of turning some six or seven small sources of the River Sedjour into the
Aleppo River, which he tells me kas been successfully accomplished, and which
in a few days wik be very visible in the Aleppo River, which will in consequence
rise considerably. This statement as to the object of M. Germain's visit to
Aintab, I hear confirmed through other channels, and from persons coming from
that direction.
The Egyptian forces within this district, and stationed on the northern
frontier of Syria, have undergone but little change since my last communication
to your Lordship.
The two Infantry Regiments that have been in garrison here, the 11th and
17th of the Line, left this on the 11th instant, said to be for Orfa, to change
quarters with the 9th and 14th stationed there ; the cause given for this move
ment is, that as the two regiments of this place have their depots here, and con
sequently their clothing for the winter suited for the severe season of Orfa,
which the regiments there have not, their depot being at a distance, at Taffa,
which place they left in the summer season. Consequently, to avoid expence,
and also loss of time, the Orfa regiments will, it is said, come here to perform
garrison duty, where they may easier receive their clothing.
This sudden change of garrison of these troops has, however, given rise to
a great many conjectures with the public, and various reports are afloat respect
ing tke same. Some say tkat tkey proceed to Orfa, and from tkence are to be
sent forward to Diarbekir, where, it is said, Maggiun Bey, commanding officer
at Orfa, has orders to advance to ; others have the idea that these troops are
sent to reinforce the force at Orfa, it being the intention of the Egyptian autho
rity on that fine to advance in the direction of Bagdad.
I shall watch ak these movements and see if any of these reports get con
firmed, and immediately report to your Lordship accordingly.
The Egyptian force at Orfa is composed of two regiments of Infantry, one of
Cavalry, and a few batteries of Artillery, wkich wik, with the two regiments that
left this on the 11th instant, make five in all, besides Bashi Bozuks and
Annadis. From what I can learn, the Egyptian authority on that line does not, for
the present, and up to the last departures from thence, extend beyond Swerik
and Chermook ; at both of which places there are irregular troops exacting
taxes from the inhabitants of those places.
His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to remain at Marash
with about the same force as I have before noted to your Lordship.
Although his Excellency does not himself advance in any way, still, I learn
that he has sent the Cuirassier Regiment to Albestan, which is sixteen miles
beyond Marash, north.
A native merchant, who has reached this from Malatia, states, that at Bisneh,
although the authority is a Mussekim appointed by the Sultan's Seraskier, still
the Egyptian irregulars, Bashi Bozuks and Annadis, frequently advance to that
place, and obtain from the inhabitants what they require. Bisneh is two days
beyond Marash, situated east.
This merchant further states, that while he was at Bisneh, he heard
that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha had ordered the Cuirassier Regiment to
advance from Albestan to a place called Smantia, about twenty-four hours
from Roustant, and attacked a tribe of Turcomans, say of 4,000 tents, whom
they compelled to pay a Salyanof 200,000 piastres. I am told tkat tkese same
Turcomans reside in the winter in the Adana district, and in the summer gene-
raky occupy the place above mentioned. The forces concentrated at Aintab
are, without material change, composed of four regiments of Infantry and two
of Artillery. The French Consul, M. Gillet, has, been kind enough, under the 21st of
October, to give me some advices on the position of the Egyptian troops in the
Tarsus district ; extract of which I have the honour to inclose herewith for
your Lordship's information.
The last advices I have received from Alexandretta are under the 16th
instant, at which period everything was stated to be quiet there and throughout
that district.
3 Z

538
The Governor of that place, Rashouan Effendi, had received orders
from his Excellency the Seraskier, to get brought down immediately from the
mountains, the following quantity of timber, 1,700 trees, part of which had
already arrived on the beach, and had begun to be shipped, to be conveyed
from thence to Acre, for the Artillery service tkere.
The disaffected in the direction of Byass had not of late, and since the
force sent against them, evinced any further symptoms against the Government,
which was rigorously exacting from all classes of tke population the taxes ; and
I am told in many instances, particularly the lower order, taken in two-fold.
This measure, my Lord, is being in a similar manner exercised both here,
at Aleppo, and throughout this district generally ; which, in consequence of the
rigorous steps pursued, and in many instances with force, has of late caused
general discontent among all the population ; among the lower classes of the
inhabitants this measure is greatly felt, and causes great oppression. Many
are said not to be able to stand against it.
I beg to inclose, for your Lordship's information, extract of Mr. Vice-
Consul Elias's journal, under dale Latakia, 31st October, which will fully
acquaint your Lordship with tbe measures pursued by this Government, in
exacting the taxes, and the consequences arising therefrom.
I am sorry I have no correct or interesting advices to offer to your Lord
ship respecting the Sultan's Seraskier Sadullah Pasha's movements, beyond
that his Excellency was a short time back at Malatia, with about 20,000 men
and sixty pieces of Artillery ; but by advices received here in town, I learn he
had marched with that force to Karpoot.
From a late arrival from Koniah, I also learn that Hadji Ak Pasha of that
place was still there, but expected soon to be replaced by a person whose name
was not known. It was reported that the new Pasha of that district was to
bring with him a force of about 20,000 to 22,000 men, to be composed of four
regiments of Infantry, two of Cavalry, and about thirty pieces of Artikery.

Inclosure 2 in No. 432.
Mr. French Consul Gillet to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.
(Extrait.) Tarsous, le 21 Octobre, 1839.
C'EST avec bien de plaisir, Monsieur, que je viens satisfaire a votre
demande pour avoir des nouvelles poktiques sur cette province ; mais elles sont
bien insignifiantes.II y a deux mois que le corps d'armee qui etait dans cette province pouvait
s'elever en totalite k 30,000 hommes de toute arme ; a present il n'est que de
20,000 ; plusieurs regimens formant cette difference ont ete envoyes a Antioche,
Alep, Homs, et Latakie, parceque cette province ne pouvait redlement pas
nourri r autant de monde, ni pres de 10,000 chevaux de cavalerie qui s'y
trouvaient. Maintenant void I'enumeration des regimens qui s'y trouvent sous les
ordres directs d' Achmet Meneckli Pacha.
Trois regimens d'Infanterie avec un General' de Brigade, quatre regimens
de Cavalerie avec deux Generaux de Brigade, un regiment d'Artillerie a cheval
avec son Colonel, et deux batteries d'Artillerie a pied.
Toutes ces troupes sont encore campees aux environs de Adana, a I'excep
tion d'un regiment de Cavalerie qui est ici.
En outre, il y a aussi 1,500 Artikeurs reguliers aux batteries be Kouluk
Bogkaz, et 700 a 800 d'Ingenieurs.
Un bataillon de Baltagi dans ce meme lieu et aussi des troupes de Genie,
et enfin des troupes irresjulieres, Cavalerie et Infanterie, reparties sur toutes les
provinces, qui, avec les troupes ci-dessus, forment le total general de 20,000
hommes. II n'y a nul doute que tout ce corps d'armee ne passe son quartier d'hiver
dans la province.

539
(Translation.)
Mr. French Consul Gillet to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.
(Extract.) Tarsus, October 21, 1839.
IT is with much pleasure, Sir, that I proceed to comply with your request
to be furnished with the political news of this Province ; but they are very
unimportant. Two months ago the corps d'arme'e which was in this Province might
have amounted in all to 30,000 men of all arms ; it now only amounts to
20,000 ; several regiments constituting the difference between these amounts
have been sent to Antioch, Aleppo, Homs, and Latakia, because this province
could in fact, neither maintain so many people, nor nearly 10,000 cavalry
horses which were here.
Now the following is an enumeration of the regiments at present under
the direct command of Achmet Meneckli Pasha.
Three regiments of infantry, with a Brigadier-General, four regiments of
cavalry, with two Brigadier-Generals, a regiment of Horse Artillery, with its
Colonel, and two batteries of Foot Artillery.
All these troops are still encamped in the neighbourhood of Adana, with
the exception of a regiment of cavalry, which is here.
Moreover, there are also 1,500 regular artillerymen in the batteries of
Kulek Boghaz, and from 700 to 800 engineers, a battalion of Baltagi in the
same place, and also engineers ; and finally irregular troops, cavalry and in
fantry, divided among all the provinces, which, with the above troops, form a
sum total of 20,000 men.
There is no doubt that the whole of this corps d'armee* will be quartered
for the winter in the province.

Inclosure 3 in No. 432.
Extract of Mr. Vice-Consul Elias' s Journal, dated Latakia, October 31, 1839.
L'ORDINE e Pistesso per la riscuozione dei danari del territorio di Latakia,
e continuase a fare tutti i sforsi; e di piu, il Generate Sehm Bey ebbe l'ordine
d'andare in persona con Poccorente delle trupe del regimento, e mandare degk
Uffiziak per altri luoghi, e cosi sono sparsi in tutti i cantoni.
II Campo del Mudir 6 sempre trasportato d'una provincia alPaltra, facendo
pagare tutto a forza di bastone ; ma gli abitanti sono gia scarsi di moneta e non
possono soddisfare i loro debiti, avendo venduto i loro grani, orzo, bovi,
mortoni, butirro, &c. &c, a vii prezzo ; ed anche s'imprestano sempre deka
moneta a 4. 5. p. c. al mese; ed altri hanno preso a 35. 40. p. c. per otto mesi,
o sia alia racolta del tabacco, per prendere questo genere al prezzo che sara
fissato dai negozianti; e non si vede altro che gente girare in citta, cercando che
gli da moneta col cambio, e molti del paese hanno guadagnato bene in
questa circostanza. (Translation.)
Extract of Mr. Vice-Consul Elias' s Journal, dated Latakia, October 31, 1839.
THE same order for the collection of money from the territory of
Latakia continues to be put in execution with every effort ; and moreover,
the General, Selim Bey, was commanded to go in person with the troops of
the regiment which were at hand, and to send officers to the other places, so
that they are dispersed throughout the whole country.
The Mudir's camp has been constantly moved from one Province to
another, making every one pay under pain of the bastinado ; the inhabitants,
however, are already in want of money, and cannot pay their debts, having
3 Z 2

540
sold their grain, barley, oxen, sheep, butter, &c, under their value; money
also is borrowed at 4 and 5 per cent, for one month ; some have taken it up
at from 35 to 40 per cent, for eight months, or till the tobacco crop is got in,
in order to take it in kind at a price to be fixed by the merchants ; nothing
is seen but persons traversing the town, endeavouring to obtain money at
interest, and many of the natives have been considerable gainers under these
circumstances. >

No. 433.
Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 9, 1840.)
My Lord, Jerusalem, November 25, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that the state of this
part of the country is daily becoming more unsettled. The Fellah are
assuming a very determined position against the Government, and their
attitude towards the authorities is materially changed. The severe measures
that have lately been pursued to obtain money, have caused whole villages to
be abandoned : and many of the Sheiks have sent word to the Governors in
my district, that they consider themselves no longer responsible to the
Pasha. Unless some steps are taken by the Government, the whole of this
part of the country will be in a state of open revolt. Hebron has formally
declared itself independent ; and a messenger sent last week by the Governor
of Jerusalem on some business there, was ordered to return without delivering
his message. Sheik Abdrachman Aamar continues to increase the number of his
followers. I have, &c,
(Signed) W. T. YOUNG.

No. 434.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 9, 1840.)
(Extract.) Damascus, November 28, 1839.
THE affairs in the Haouran and Agloun districts have been settled since
the date of my last despatch. His Excellency^ Sheriff Pasha and lsmael Bey
are returned here, with the regular forces employed on that service.
All the taxes and imposts due in those districts have been rigorously
collected, and the same is being carried into execution throughout the
Damascus district, and I hear also in every part of Syria. His Highness
Ibrahim Pasha's orders to his Excellency Sheriff Pasha and to lsmael Bey, are
said to be very severe, menacing that, in case the taxes are not collected by
the end of Ramadan, in their respective districts, they will be charged with
the deficiency, and have to pay it up from their private purses. It is stated
that these funds are destined chiefly for the payment of the army. There is at
present about 6,000 purses in the treasury here ; but I believe a great part of
the total amount being collected in Syria, will be required for Egypt, as I
understand the income collected along the coast is chiefly sent to the seat of
the Government in that country, though the wants for the expenditure in
Syria, are not of a less important and urgent nature ; and it may be also, that
these funds will not be employed, until the Egyptian Government decides
whether, or not, they may be required to forward offensive operations on the
northern frontier. The 18th Regiment Infantry has been paid within these
three days ; it is said the irregulars are also to he paid in a few days. 2,000
purses have been sent the last week to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha. 1,000
purses are reserved for the Pilgrim Mecca Caravan. Orders have been issued
to collect the Haratch due three months hence, in Moharem, for the year
«256. Many of the Chiefs in the different quarters of this city, appointed and
charged by the Government to collect the Ferdeh tax, fail and become
bankrupts ; the deficit is again charged to and collected from the inhabitants

541
to the Christians, it amounts to an additional charge of thirty per cent. It
seems to be the object of the Government that, whatever may be decided on,
as regards the future possession of this country, or any other eventual circum
stance occurring, no taxes shall remain to be collected.
I hear that the French Solyman Pasha, who has been on an inspection at
Acre, is expected here on his way to Aleppo. Part of a regiment, Cavalry,
employed on the Ledgea service, has been sent to Acre. The Infantry and
Artillery employed on the same service, remain here for the present. But, as
yet, nothing denotes that the army on the northern frontier at Marash and
Orfa, will fall back. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, by recent advices from
him to Sheriff Pasha, was still at Marash. I hear that the same rigours prac
tised in this district and in Syria, have been employed also to collect taxes on
the newly occupied frontier, including Albistan and Antemarah, also from
Orfa, Swerik and Chermook, taking in a large radius of country on the ranges
of mountains on the former country in a north-westerly direction, exacting
taxes as due several years, on the plea that they have never been subject to or
paid taxes to the Sultan's Government.
The Einir Bechir has sent one of his grandsons, the Emir Meggid, with a
force to reduce the Mutuali Chief, Sheik Shebib, who, with about 500
horsemen, continues to infest the roads between Acre, Soor, Tyre and Sidon.
This Sheik has been joined with other Mutualis from the remains of the force
of the late Emir Gewad, some of which have shown themselves on the Balbec
line, against which a force has also been sent by the Emir Bechir; but I believe
the whole of that affair will very soon terminate in the pacification, or in the
destruction, of these brigands.
The new French Consul, the Count de Rattimenton, is arrived at his post
here. I find he visited Solyman Pasha at Sidon, he says, to ascertain from
Solyman Pasha the position in which the French relations are. His visit also to
the Emir Bechir, denotes the desire of theFrench Government, that their Damas
cus Consul should be on the most advantageous footing with the quasi Independ
ent Prince of Lebanon. The Count de Rattimenton was previously employed
at Tiflis. I also hear that the Prince de Joinville is expected to visit Damascus,
and that the French Consul-General at Alexandria may make a tour of Syria
next spring.

No. 435.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 9, 1840.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, December 19, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali
intimated to me his desire that my public audience should take place on the
18th instant, at 11 o'clock, a.m.
At an early hour of the day appointed, a detachment of Infantry com
manded by a field-officer with a military band, accompanied by a numerous
body of the Viceroy's Janissaries, and a number of horses for the use of those
British residents who had intimated their intention of escorting me to the
Viceroy's Palace, made their appearance at the residence of Colonel Campbell.
The cortege was numerous and respectable ; and having been received at
the grand entrance with the ceremony usual on such occasions, I was ushered
into the Hall of Audience at the hour appointed, and presented to the
Viceroy by Colonel Campbell. I then addressed the Pasha in the following
terms: —
" The letter which I have the honour to present to your Highness from
Her Majesty's Government, accrediting me as Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-
General in Egypt, will make known to your Highness the earnest desire of the
Government of Great Britain, to consolidate and maintain the interest of that
part of the Ottoman Empire which has been entrusted to the government of
your Highness. Nothing shall be wanting on my part to maintain a continu
ance of that good understanding and those friendly relations, which it is the
desire of my Government to see mutually established and upheld. I shall use
my best efforts to follow the judicious example that has been set me by my

542
predecessor Colonel Campbell, and the best and only reward I shall seek on
the termination of my labours, will be my Sovereign's approbation of my
political conduct in carrying with me the good will and approval of your
Highness." Mutual assurances of regard were then presented, and I ventured to
compliment the Pasha on the magnificent new edifices and improvements of
Alexandria, to which he replied, that " he was doing his best to regenerate his
country and merit the esteem of Europe." I then assured his Highness that
his labours in this respect were fully appreciated by Europeans, which Artin
Bey, the Pasha's Dragoman, interpreted, raising his voice, "My Lord's power is
well known in Europe." The Pasha replied emphatically, " I know not whe
ther it has been appreciated hitherto, but please God it shall be so hence
forward." Leave was shortly after taken.
Having returned to the house of Colonel Campbell, I read to the British
merchants Her Majesty's Commission as Agent and Consul-General for Egypt.
" I assured them of my anxious desire to merit their confidence and esteem ;
that I should be thankful for their counsel and assistance in all matters con
nected with British interests, and indulged in the expectation, that on their
part, I should experience sympathy and good will in enabling me to carry into
effect the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government, as I could never
conceive the possibility of a body of British merchants drawing a line of
separation between their local interests as private individuals, and the policy of
that Government which directed the affairs of our common country." I have
the satisfaction of assuring your Lordship, that I received from this highly
respectable assemblage of British merchants the most cordial assurances of
their support, and I hope and trust that nothing shall be wanting on my part
to merit a continuance of their confidence and regard.

No. 436.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 9, 1840.)
My Lord, Alexandria, December 20, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that Kiamil Pasha, late
Envoy to the Court of Berlin, who arrived here on the morning of the 18th
instant, in a Turkish Government steamer with the Hatti Sheriff lately pub
lished at Constantinople, and the Firman for its execution in Egypt, is to
leave to-morrow for Cairo, accompanied by Habib Effendi, who was the
bearer of Mehemet Ali's presents to the late Sultan Mahmoud, on the occasion
of the marriage of his eldest daughter with Halil Pasha. The object of this
journey to Cairo is to publish the Hatti Sheriff and Firman, and to cause their
registration in the Mehkemeh of that Capital.

No. 437.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 9, 1840.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, December 21, 1839-
I FIAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I yesterday paid a
visit of ceremony to Hussein Pasha, one of the Viceroy's Officers and Directors
of Finance, and on taking leave, was pressed by Artin Bey to wait upon Mehemet
Ali, who happened to be in an adjoining room. I yielded to his solicitation,
and on going to his Highness, found him surrounded by several individuals,
including two of the Resident Consuls, but a significant glance from the Pasha
soon induced them to withdraw; and from this circumstance, coupled with
Artin Bey's desiring me to remain, I was led to conclude that the interview was
preconcerted.

543
The conversation soon turned to the Oriental Question, which gave the
Pasha an opportunity of complaining of the treatment he had experi
enced from the Porte during the whole of his career, of which he gave a brief
relation. He touched cursorily on the events of the Greek war, and the
humble position which the Porte assumed towards him in the affair of Mus
tapha Pasha of Scutari, as well as its treachery in that of Abdullah Pasha of
Acre; and then characterised in most unequivocal terms, the policy of England,
as highly pernicious to her own interests not less than those of Egypt.
In answer to this, I expressed my confidence of being able to convince
his Highness in our future interviews, of the friendly intentions of that Govern
ment towards Egypt, always, however, with a due regard to the interests of
the Ottoman Porte. His Highness then emphatically exclaimed, " I am the
pillar and support of Turkey ; if they wish to support her, let it be done
through me. I have been mistrusted by the English on the groundless suppo
sition of being capable of uniting with the enemies of my country against my
country. But should a war break out with Russia, as I am a Mussulman, I
would make up my differences with the Porte, and prove to the world that I am
the staunchest friend of the Ottoman Empire. I appeal to Colonel Campbell
(who was seated on the left of the Pasha) for his opinion on my devotion to
Turkey, and what I have done for her resources ; ask Mr. Briggs and other
British merchants for their candid opinion of me and my measures."
In reply to this, I said I had no doubt whatever of tbe genius and force
of his Highness' character having acquired for him the admiration of the
individuals alluded to, but that his Highness was too generous not to admit
that the late Sultan Mahmoud was also possessed of numerous attractive
qualities, which had ensured to him the profound respect and esteem, not only
of the British Ambassador, but of every British resident within the precincts
of Constantinople. The Pasha, during the whole of this interview, flitted from topic to topic,
evidently with the view of drawing me out, but while replying directly to what
could not be passed over, I allowed his Highness to perceive that I had no
desire to enter on any premature discussion, desiring him to repose confidently
on the assurance of the just and friendly intentions of Great Britain, whose
policy was as equitable as it was decided ; his Highness ended the conversation
by repeating with great energy, " I am a soldier, but love peace ; I am firm,
but God is my last refuge ; if they pull me I will not come ; if they push me
I will not go, no, not a step ; I will wait events."

No. 438.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 9, 1840.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, December 21, 1839.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that two frigates, two
corvettes, and one transport, are in readiness to sail from this port for St. Jean
d'Acre, for the purpose of bringing from thence from 3,000 to 4,000 irregular
troop's, as a reinforcement of the garrison of Alexandria. The two corvettes
have left the port, and are now cruising outside, and it is expected that the
frigates will leave to-morrow forenoon.
Three transports laden with corn have also sailed; two for the port of
Alexandretta, and one for the Island of Candia. December 23.
p. S. — I have this moment been acquainted by M. de Laurin, that the
transports and frigates dispatched by Mehemet Ali, as within alluded to, are sent
for the purpose of bringing invalids from Ibrahim Pasha's Army, and a rein
forcement of no more than from 600 to 800 regular troops.

544
No. 439.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 9.)
My Lord, Paris, January 6, 1840.
I INCLOSE the " Moniteur Parisien" of this evening, which contains the
address of the King, proposed by the Commissiorr of the Chamber of Peers,
and which was this day read to the Chamber. Your Lordship will observe,
that in the paragraph relative to the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, the
phraseology of the King's speech has not been followed. The word integrite
of the Ottoman Empire is omitted, and the word independance substituted in
lieu of it. I heard some days ago that an opinion prevailed in the Com
mission, and indeed generally in the Chamber of Peers, that the expression in
His Majesty's speech conveyed a meaning too unfavourable to the pretensions
of the Pasha of Egypt, and that they wished to mark that opinion by making
the alteration to which I have drawn your Lordship's attention.
The debate on the address, I was told this evening, was remarkable only
for the attack made by the Legitimist Peers, the Due de Noailles and the
Marquis de Dreux Breze, upon the French Alliance with England, and upon
the general policy of the English Government. M. Villemain, the Minis
ter of Instruction, spoke in defence of both. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVHXE.
No. 440.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 9.)
My Lord, Paris, January 6, 1840.
MARSHAL SOULT informed me last night, that he had yesterday received
despatches from M. de Pontois, but that the steam-boat which conveyed them
had not brought any despatches to him from Alexandria. The intelligence
from Constantinople, he said, was uninteresting ; but he had learnt, by an
indirect channel, that Mehemet Ali had held a conversation with M. Cochelet,
in which the Pasha had declared that it was not his wish to occupy the Holy
Cities ; that the maintaining a considerable body of troops for the defence of
them was a great burden on his finances ; but that whether the Holy Cities
were occupied or not by Egyptian troops, he had always considered every
appointment in them connected with religion to be under the controul of the
Sultan, as Caliph, or successor of Mahomet.
The Marshal said he waited with impatience for the confirmation of the
account, in the expected official despatches from the French Consul, because
he thought it most important with reference to the restoration of peace between
the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. L have Sec.
(Signed) ' GRANVILLE.
No. 441.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 12, 1840.)
(Extract.) Therapia, December 13, 1839.
THERE has been a good deal said here of the mission of a person of dis
tinction to Alexandria, and erroneous reports may reach England. The fact is,
that the Ottoman Ministers have thought it expedient to send Kiamil Pasha to
deliver to Mehemet Ali a Firman issued by the Porte in furtherance of the
Hatti Sheriff of the 3rd of November last, promulgated at the Gulhane..

545
No. 442.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 12, 1840.)
My Lord, Therapia, December 17, 1839.
THE Berat for Colonel Hodges has been received at the Embassy, and
forwarded to Alexandria. I have, &c,
(Signed^ PONSONBY.
No. 443.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received January 14.)
My Lord, Vienna, January 5, 1840.
PRINCE METTERNICH has written to Berlin, to urge the Prussian
Government to take part in the arrangement about to be concluded in London,
for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question. I need give your Lord
ship no account of the contents of tbe Prince's despatches, as they are sent to
London to be communicated. I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.
No. 444.
Viscount Palmerston to Sir George Hamilton.
Sir, Foreign Office, January 14, 1840.
I HAVE to instruct you to invite the Prussian Government to give full
powers to Baron Werther, the Prussian Charge d'Affaires, to negotiate with
the Representatives of the British, Austrian, Russian, and French Governments
at London, or with the Representatives of such of those Governments as may
be willing to negotiate, and to conclude a Convention between the negotiating
Powers, or between them and the Porte, for the purpose of arriving at a final
and satisfactory settlement of the affairs of the Levant. Her Majesty's Govern
ment intend to prepare a Draft of a Convention for this purpose, to be sub
mitted for the consideration of the other Four Powers.
I inclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have received
this morning from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, stating that Prince
Metternich has urged the Prussian Government to take part in the proposed
negotiation. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 445.
Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow. — (Communicated by Baron Brunnow.)
Monsieur le Baron, St. Petersbourg, le V£™?"'\Z\
NOUS venons d'avoir indirectement connaissance de la depeche adressee
par le Maredial Soult, le 25 Novembre, au Comte Sebastiani, et dans laquelle
le Cabinet des Tuileries justifie Pattitude qu'il a prise en opposition au point
de vue adoptd par PAngleterre dans les discussions qui ont eu lieu entre les
deux Gouvernemens, au sujet du plan de pacification a effectuer entre la
Porte et le Pacha d'Egypte.
Comme ce n'est point a nous, M. le Baron, que cette depeche a ete
adressee, et que nous n'en avons eu connaissance que par une voie indirecte, nous
4 A

54©
ne nous sentirions point appeles a nous expliquer sur des divergences d'opinions
qui concernent plus particukerement les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres, si
le Gouvernement Francais n'avait juge a,propos de nous meter dans la discus
sion, en ajoutant a sa reponse un passage dont la tendance est evidemment dirigee
contre nous.
11 ne nous appartient done pas de nous prononcer ici sur la maniere dont
la France entend concilier ses vues concernant Pintegrite de l'Empire Ottoman,
avec celles de PAngleterre. Nous ne nous arreterons pas non plus sur la
pretention qu'elle met en avant, d'avoir pris Pinitiative de Pappui offert a la
Porte Ottomane. Si elle croit avoir contribue plus qu'aucun autre des Cabinets
Allies a appeler sur le Sultan la sollicitude de l'Europe, et par ses represen
tations energiques, indique la premiere a Mdhemet Ali, les limites au-dela
desqudles il rencontrerait Popposition des Puissances, nous ne sommes nulle-
ment disposes a lui contester cette satisfaction. II nous suffit que le bien ait
ete opere, les hostilites suspendues, le Pacha contenu jusqu'ici dans les bornes
qu'il ne devait pas franchir. Nous nous feiicitons de ce resultat, sans demander
qui des autres ou de nous s'est presente pour Fobtenir en premiere ligne.
Mais ce qui nous a surpris, ce qui devait en effet nous surprendre, c'est le
doute jete sur nos intentions a Fegard de Findependance du Sultan ; c'est
l'accusation portee contre nous de faire, suivant l'expression du Cabinet
Francais, peser sur la Porte Ottomane un protectorat exclusif et dominant.
Est-il besoin de rappeler que loin de vouloir proteger exclusivement le Sultan,
loin de nous prevaloir de notre Traite d'Alkance avec la Porte, nous avons au
contraire ete les premiers a en prevenir Papplication, et a reclamer pour elle
Fassistance des Cours Maritimes, en les engageant, a plusieurs reprises, et de
la maniere la plus pressante, a faire usage de tous leurs moyens d'action
aupres du Pacha rebelle ? Si des Porigine des compkeations, nos avertisse-
mens avaient ete suivis, si Pon avait agi a Alexandrie sans tourner les yeux a
Constantinople, si Pon s'etait preoccupe un peu moins exclusivement de ce
que la France appelle le cote Europeen de ,1a question, des longtems la paix eut
€te retablie en Orient, et nous n'aurions pas a chercher si laborieusement le
denouement de la crise actuelle. Mais toutes recriminations sont aussi loin de
notre pensee qu'elles seraient presentement inutiles.
Pour repondre victorieusement aux allegations du Gouvernement Frangais,
il nous suffira d'un seul fait, et ce fait, M. le Baron, c'est celui de votre
presence a Londres. Quant au Cabinet Britannique, nous aimons a lui rendre
la justice, qu'il n'avait pas attendu votre second envoi en Angleterre, pour
apprecier et reconnaitre la loyaute de la politique de l'Empereur. Nous
n'avons done pas un seul instant admis la pensee que les insinuations de la
France aient pu faire sur lui la moindre impression. Nous devons neanmoins
lui faire remarquer, que dans les circonstances du moment un langage pareil a
celui de la France pouvait entrainer des consequences infiniment regrettables.
Avec un Cabinet moins conciliant que le notre, et plus susceptible de ceder a
un premier mouvement, la negociation qui va s'entamer pouvait en souffrir
gravement. Que Lord Palmerston veuille bien y faire attention. Avouer
aussi hautement que vient de le faire le Maredial Soult, que dans la pacification
du Levant, son but principal a ete moins cette pacification elle-meme que
1'annulation de notre pretendue preponderance en Orient ; declarer en termes si
peu couverts, qu'a ses yeux il est encore plus important de proteger contre
nous Findependance de la Porte, que d'assurer son integrite de la part du Pacha ;
insinuer enfin que dans I'opinion de la France, la cause du dissentiment qui s'est
recemment manifeste entre elle et la Grande Bretagne, vient surtout de ce que
celle-ci a cesse de suivre te meme but, d'obdr a la meme pensee, c'est-a-dire aux
memes defiances ; est-ce la, nous le demandons au Principal Secretaire d'Etat, un
moyen bien efficace de nous rattacher a Pceuvre commune ? Ne serions-nous pas
quelque peu fondes a nous prevaloir de pareilles dispositions pour nous refuser
d'associer la France aun arrangement qui, pour etre mene a bonne fin, a besoin de
reposer sur une coincidence de vues, et sur une confiance redproque ? Telle
n'est pourtant point, M. le Baron, l'intention de l'Empereur. La politique de
notre Auguste Maitre est trop eievee, trop au-dessus des susceptibilites et des
petitesses de Famour-propre, pout* qu'il soit tente de leur sacrifier Pinterfit
majeur du moment, et pour qu'il n'apporte pas a ses determinations, le degre
de mesure qu'il sait toujours mettre dans ses paroles. Ce n'est pas dans
1'instant meme, ou par les concessions qu'il a faites au maintien de la paix

547
Europeenne, il vient de donner au inonde la preiive la plus eclatante de son
abnegation, qu'il se laissera detourner par un semblable incident du noble but
qu'il se propose. Sa Majeste fait d'aikeurs la part des circonstances dans
lesquelles a ete ecrite la depeche du Gouvernement Frangais. Sous les
impressions erronees auxqueltes votre mission en Angleterre avait donne
-naissance, il est concevable a la rigueur, que le Cabinet des Tuileries ait era
pouvoir adopter a notre egard un langage si peu conforme a nos intentions
veritables. H ignorait d'ailleurs encore les modifications que nous avons
consenti a apporter a la teneur de nos premieres propositions.
Aujourd'hui qu'il en est instruit, il nous parait impossible d'admettre qu'il
se refuse plus longtems a reconnaitre combien dans la Question d'Orient les vues
de notre Cabinet sont pures. Nous avons des-lors tout lieu d^espdrer qu'il
apportera d'autres dispositions a la conclusion d'un arrangement dont nous ne
pretendons pas plus l'ecarter en ce moment, que nous n'avons voulu le faire lors
de votre premier voyage a Londres. Veuillez done, M. le Baron, en communi-
quant la presente depeche au Principal Secretaire d'Etat, Passurer de notre part,
que le langage du Cabinet Francais ne change rien a notre attitude. En rele
vant les allegations si gratuitement articulees par ce Cabinet, nous n'avons fait
qu'obeir a la necessite ou il nous avait lui-meme places de ne point les passer
sous silence. Recevez &c,
(Signe') NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)
Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow. — (Communicated by Baron Brunnow.)
Monsieur le Baron, St. Petersburgh, ^ZlV^'
WE have just been made acquainted, in an indirect manner, with the
despatch addressed by Marshal Soult, on the 25th of November, to Count
Sebastiani, and in which the Cabinet of the Tuileries justifies the attitude which
it has assumed in opposition .to the view taken by England in the discussions
which have taken place between the two Governments, upon the subject of the
plan of pacification to be carried into effect between the Porte and the Pasha of
Egypt. As this despatch has not been addressed to us, M. le Baron, and as we have
only been made acquainted with it through an indirect channel, we should not
feel ourselves called upon to enter into the divergences of opinion which concern
more particularly the Cabinets of Paris and of London, if the French Govern
ment had not thought fit to mix us up in the discussion, by introducing into its
answer a passage, the tendency of which is evidently directed against us.
It is not our business, then, to give our opinion here on the manner in which
France pretends to reconcile her views respecting the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire with those of England. Neither shall we dwell upon the pretension
which she has advanced, that she took the initiative in offering assistance to the
Ottoman Porte. If she thinks that she has contributed more than any other of
the Allied Cabinets to call forth the anxiety of Europe with respect to the
Sultan, and that she has been the first, by her energetic representations, to
point out to Mehemet Ali the bounds in passing which he would meet with the
opposition of the Powers, we are by no means disposed to deny her this gratifi
cation. It is sufficient for us that good has been effected, hostilities suspended,
and the Pasha kept within the bounds which he ought not to pass. We congra
tulate ourselves upon this result, without inquiring which of us was the first to
come forward to produce it. But we were surprised, and we really had reason
to be surprised, at the doubt thrown upon our intentions with regard to the
independence of the Sultan ; and at the charge brought against us, of having,
according to the expression used by the French Cabinet, imposed upon the
Ottoman Porte an exclusive and predominant protectorship. Is it necessary to
call to mind that, so far from wishing exclusively to protect the Sultan, so far
from taking advantage of our Treaty of Alliance with the Porte, we were on the
contrary the first to guard against its application, and to claim for the Porte the
assistance of the Maritime Courts, by calling upon them repeatedly, and in the
4 A 2

548
most urgent manner, to make use of all their means of action against the
rebellious Pasha ? If, from the commencement of the difficulties, our warnings
had been attended to ; if, without turning to Constantinople, measures had been
taken at Alexandria ; if what France calls the European side of the question,
had been less exclusively attended to ; peace would long ago have been re-esta
blished in the East, and we should not have had so much trouble in finding a
solution of the present crisis. But all recrimination is as far from our intention,
as it would now be useless.
In order to give a triumphant answer to the allegations of the French Govern
ment, one circumstance is sufficient, and that circumstance is, M. le Baron, your
presence in London. As to the British Cabinet, we are glad to do it the justice
to say, that it did not wait for your second mission to England to appreciate and
acknowledge the good faith of the Emperor's policy. We have not, therefore,
for one moment, entertained the idea that the insinuations of France could have
. made the least impression upon it. We must, however, observe to it, that under
f existing circumstances, language similar to that held by France, might lead to
. very lamentable consequences. With a Cabinet less conciliatory than ours, and
more disposed to yield to a first impulse, the negotiation which is about to
commence might suffer seriously therefrom. Let Lord Palmerston well consider
this. To avow so openly as Marshal Soult has just done, that, in the pacification
of the Levant, his principal object has been not so much the pacification itself,
as the annihilation of our alleged preponderance in the East; to declare in
terms so little reserved, that according to his view it is still more important
to protect the independence of the Porte against us, than to secure the main
tenance of its integrity as regards the Pasha ; finally, to insinuate that, in the
opinion of France, the disagreement which has recently arisen between herself
and Great Britain, has been caused by the circumstance, that the latter has
ceased to pursue the same object, and to entertain the same opinion, that is to
say, the same suspicions ; is this, we ask the principal Secretary of State, an
effectual way of attaching us to the common work ? Should we not be some
what justified in taking advantage of such a disposition, to refuse our consent to
the association of France in an arrangement, which, in order to be brought to a
satisfactory conclusion, must be based upon a coincidence of views, and upon
mutual confidence? Such, however, M. le Baron, is not at all the intention of
the Emperor. The policy of our August Master is too exalted, and too far
above the susceptibility and meanness of selfishness, to allow him to sacrifice
thereto the more important interests of the moment, and to prevent his exer
cising, in his decision, that degree of moderation which he always employs in
his language. It is not at the very moment, when, by the concessions which he
has made in order to maintain peace in Europe, he has given to the world the
most brilliant proof of his self-denial, that he will allow himself to be diverted
by such an incident from the noble object which he has in view. Moreover, His
Majesty makes allowances for the circumstances under which the despatch of the
French Government was written. Under the erroneous impressions to which
your mission to England had given rise, it may just be imagined, that the
Cabinet of the Tuileries might have thought itself entitled to use, with respect
to us, language so little in accordance with our real intentions. It was, besides,
still in ignorance of the modifications which we have consented to make in the
tenour of our original proposals.
Now that it is aware thereof, it appears to us to be impossible that it can
refuse any longer to acknowledge how pure the intentions of our Cabinet are
upon the Eastern Question. We have, henceforth, every reason to hope that it
will proceed with a different disposition to the conclusion of an arrangement,
from which we are as far from intending now to separate it, as we were at the time
of your first journey to London. Have the goodness, then, M. le Baron, in com
municating the present despatch to the principal Secretary of State, to assure
him, from us, that the language of the French Cabinet makes no change in our
position. In answering the allegations so gratuitously made by that Cabinet,
we have only yielded to the necessity under which we were placed of not passing
them over in silence. Accept, &c.,
(Signed; NESSELRODE.

549
No. 446.
Count Nesselrode to Count Medem at Paris— (Communicated by Baron Brunnow.)
M. le Comte, St. Petersbourg, le 26 Decembre, 1839.
J'AI recu la depeche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser, pour
m'accuser la reception de mon expedition du 22 Novembre, et dans laquelle
vous rendez compte au Ministere Imperial des plaintes que vous avait faites le
Chef du Cabinet Francais, relativement a la nature incomplete et tardive de nos
dernieres communications au sujet du retour de M. te Baron de Brunnow en,
Angleterre. Bien qu'il ne nous soit pas absolument demontre qu'en cette occa
sion, nos communications aux Cours de Vienne et de Berlin aient ete plus.
detailtees, puisqu'il ne s'agissait que de leur annoncer un seul fait, Padoption
de la modification demandee par PAngleterre a nos premieres ouvertures ; bien
qu'egalement, le retard de peu de jours qu'a subi la depeche qui vous etait
adressee, tienne purement a des combinaisons insignifiantes dans Parrangement
du depart de nos courriers ; neanmoins, M. le Comte, nous admettrons la recla
mation comme fondee, et nous allons y repondre avec une entiere franchise.
Nous conviendrons done que dans les derniers tems nos explications avec
la France ont ete empreintes d'une certaine reserve, et que celles que nous avons
donnees a nos autres Allies, portaient, peut-etre, un caractere plus marque
d'empressement et d'abandon. Cette reserve avait ses motifs, et nous ne pre-
tendons point les dissimuler. C'est que depuis longtems, M. le Comte, nous
avions cru nous apercevoir que la France apportait dans ses jugemens sur notre
politique en Orient, des dispositions moins favorables que les autres Puissances I
c'est que celles-ci nous temoignaient plus de confiance et d'equite ; qu'a Fegard
de l'Egypte, leurs vues s'identifiaient davantage avec les notres ; et que, comme
nous, elles pensaient trouver dans la conduite du Gouvernement Francais, plus
de penchant pour te vassal que pour te souverain legitime. C'est que dans la
question du differend a regler entre le Sultan et Mehemet Ali, la France ne
semblait voir qu'une question purement secondaire. Elle mettait a la representer
comme Europeenne avant tout, — une affectation dont le but nous etait palpable.
C'est qu'en unmot le langage qu'elle adressait a nos Allies, et celui que tenaient
les feuilles plus particukerement destines a soutenir a Pinterieur la popularite
de son Ministere, portaient ouvertement Pempreinte d'un sentiment peu juste,
peuamical, envers la Russie.
Ce qui n'etait qu'une presomption, vient de se convertir en fait, par la
depeche que te Marechal Soult a recemment adressee au Gouvernement Anglais,
pour defendre contre les objections de celui-ci, son opinion sur le plan de pacifi
cation a effectuer entre l'Egypte et la Porte. Dans cette piece, qui se rapporte
exclusivement aux divergences qui se sont-manifestees entre les deux Cabinets,.
celui des Tuileries a cru devoir gratuitement nous faire entrer dans Parene de la.
discussion, en appelant sur nous particukerement la vigilance et l'attention.
de PAngleterre. 11 y avoue explicitement que Findependance de l'Empire
Ottoman le preoccupe pour le moins autant que son integrite meme ; et qu'a.
ses yeux il est peut-etre plus important de proteger l'une contre nous, que
d'assurer l'autre contre l'Egypte. II y reprocbe a PAngleterre deperdre de vue
ce qu'il appelle le cote Europeen de la question, pour ne s'occuper que de la
partie Egyptienne ; il y insinue enfin, que s'il existe aujourd'hui entre la Grande
Bretagne et la France un dissentiment facheux, ce dissentiment vient unique
ment de ce que, dans la pacification du Levant, la Grande Bretagne ne voit
autre chose qu'un arrangement territorial, plus ou moins avantageux, a obtenir
en faveur du Sultan, tandis qu'au contraire la France s'est constamment pro-
posee d'en faire avant tout sortir Vannulation du protectorat exclusif et dominant
que nous faisons, suivant son expression, peser sur la Porte Ottomane !
Voila, certes, des aveux nettement articutes ; et si nous pouvons reprocher
au Cabinet Francais de meconnaitre nos vraies intentions, il ne nous accusera
surement pas de nous meprendre sur les siennes.
Comme la depeche qui renferme les allegations que je viens de citer, ne
nous est point adressee, nous ne nous sentirions point autorises a y repondre
directement. Mais puisque, d'un autre cote, te Marechal Soult a pris vis-a-vis

550
de vous Pinitiative des reclamations, il ne nous sera pas defendu de lui faire
entendre les n6tres.
Le protectorat exclusif de la Russie ! Nous Pavouons, apres toutes les
preuves de desinteressement qu'a donnees l'Empereur dans ces derniers temps,
nous avons ete' surpris de voir se reproduire un pareil fant6me. Le Gouverne
ment Francais perdrait-il de vue, qu'au moment ou nous parlons, l'Empereur n'a
mis encore en mouvement ni un soldat, ni un vaisseau, tandisque les batimens
Francais sikonnent les eaux de la Mediterranee, et ancraient encore, il y a peu,
dans le voisinage des Dardanelles ? Etait-ce done ce protectorat exclusif que
nous ckerchions lorsqu'en 1833, avant que le desespoir du Sultan Peiit porte a
appeler notre assistance, nous avons adjure les Puissances Maritimes de le
secourir contre le Packa ? Etait-ce celui que nous voukons conserver, lorsque
dfes le commencement de la crise actuelk, nous avons ete les premiers a eveiller
sur la situation de l'Orient la commune sollicitude de ces memes Puissances ; a
les engager a contenir Mehemet Ali dans des limites infranchissables ; k les
presser, et la France en particulier, d'employer au besoin contre lui des mesures
coercitives ? Si comme on Pa tant de fois soutenu, le Traite d'Unkiar Skelessi
avait eu pour but de nous assurer cette protection exclusive, aurions-nous,
comme nous Pavons fait, employe nos conseils et nos efforts a prevenir Papplica-
tion de ses clauses ? La France ne sait-eke pas, que loin de nous prevaloir de
cet acte, nous nous sommes spontanement declares prets a en faire Fabandon,
si nous obtenions en echange la reconnaissance d'un principe de droit public
Europeen, qui, a la verite, fermerait bien aux pavilions etrangers Faeces de Fun
des deux detroits de Constantinople, mais qui, k nos propres batimens, interdirait
Fentree de l'autre? Faut-il enfin rappeler au Gouvernement Francais que
meme anterieurement aux dernieres concessions que nous venons de faire, nous
avions, spontanement encore, propose, que s'il devenait necessaire de faire
avancer notre flotte et nos troupes au secours de la capitale du Sultan, cette
mesure serait depouikee de tout caractere isole, qu'eke ne serait point Russe
exclusivement, mais proclamee solennekement comme une mesure Europeenne ?
Ces faits devant etre pour la France aussi patens qu'ils le sont pour les
autres Cabinets, on serait presque tente de se demander, M. le Comte, si c'est
bien serieusement qu'eke a pu elever contre nous des allegations pareilles a celles
que renferme la depeche du Marechal Soult, ou si eke a voulu les employer en
faveur de son plan de pacification, comme un moyen de negociation dans ses
discussions avec PAngleterre, en reveikant sur notre compte d'anciennes appre
hensions que nous avons si heureusement reussi a effacer?
Si (ce que nous sommes assurement loin de penser) telle avait ete effective-
ment l'intention du Cabinet des Tuileries, sa conduite en cette occasion presen-
terait avec la notre un contraste bien remarquable. Lorsque se sont manifestes
les premiers symptdmes d'un dissentiment entre les deux Puissances Maritimes
sur les moyens de conciker la securite du Sultan avec les pretentions du Pacha
d'Egypte, qu'aurions-nous fait, nous le demandons a la France, si, comme eke
le suppose si gratuitement, notre intention avait ete de l'isoler en la separant de
PAngleterre? Evidemment, nous aurions cherche a envenimer ce dissentiment,
a l'exploiter, a le convertir, s'il eut ete possible, en mesintelligence. Nous nous
serions efforces d'exagerer encore aux yeux du Cabinet Anglais la partialite qu'il
reproche a la France en faveur du Pacha d'Egypte.
Nous eussions abonde avec empressement dans le sens de ses idees, et
soutenu energiquement son plan de pacification contre celui mis en avant par
la France. Bien loin de la, nous avons parte aux deux Puissances le langage
de la conciliation. Quoique k la verite le Plan de Lord Palmerston nous
semblat plus favorable que celui du Gouvernement Francais, a la securite future
de la Porte Ottomane, bien qu'il fut certainement aussi plus conforme a la
dignite des Cinq Cours intervenantes, apres les offres de mediation, qu'ekes
avaient, de leur propre mouvement, adressees au Grand Seigneur, nous nous
sommes bornes k engager les deux Cabinets a chercher a rapprocher leurs idees.
Nous leur avons declare, que si elles parvenaient par des concessions reciproques
a se rencontrer a mi-ckemin, et a convenir d'un moyen-terme, nous etions prets
a adopter le plan dont ils pourraient tomber d'accord, pourvu seulement que ce
plan fut accepte par la Porte, et precede d'une entente commune sur ses moyens
d'execution .
Ce n'est pas plus pour isoler la France, et pour nous passer de son
concours, qu'a l'epoque des propositions dont nous avons charge le Baron de

551
Brunnow, nous nous sommes en premier lieu adresses a FAngleterre. C'est
parceque comme nous Favons dit et le repetons au Gouvernement Francais,
FAngleterre nous avait temoigne des dispositions plus confiantes; c'est
parceque les vues de cette Puissance a Fegard du Vice-Roi d'Egypte coinci-
daient davantage avec les notres, et qu'au besoin, elle etait d'avance determi*-
ninee a les appuyer pas des moyens d'action.
Mais de ce que nous avons pris vis-a-vis d'elle Pinitiative d'ouvertures
prealables sur un arrangement a discuter plus tard avec les autres Cabinets,
s'ensuit-il done necessairement que notre dessein fut d'en exclure la France?
Si une pareille initiative devait impliquer cette exclusion, pourquoi FAutrieke,.
pourquoi la Prusse, ne Pont-ekes pas ainsi interpretde pour elles-memes? D'oil
vient qu'aucune de ces deux Puissances n'avait songd a s'en formakser? Leur
amour-propre est-il moins exigeant, ou nous ont-elles rendu plus de justice?
II est tems, M. te Comte, que les mefiances et les recriminations fassent
place enfin a une plus saine appreciation de nos vues poktiques. L'Empereur
a fait assez de sacrifices d'amour-propre au desir de Punion et de la paix, pour
avoir droit d'en obtenir quelques uns en dchange. Sa Majeste ne s'est pas
bornee a de purs sacrifices d'opinion, eke a offert au bien commun des conces
sions de fait, autrement importantes. C'est bien le moins que Fon renonce
d'un autre cote, a des preventions qui n'ont plus de fondement. Si malgre'
tant de preuves de desinteressement et d'abnegation, l'Empereur continuait
avoir ses intentions meconnues ; si, tout en acceptant ses concessions on essayait
de les exploiter dans un but de popularite, en les representant comme derivant
d'une autre source que de sa spontaneite libre et entiere ; si dans Parrangement
qu'k s'agit de conclure, on s'efforcait de compliquer la negociation par de
nouvekes exigences, en agitant des questions, en soulevant des eventuaktes.
etrangeres a la crise actuelle; si, enfin, sous pretexte de faire entrer la Turquie
dans te systeme Europeen, on tentait de nous enlever, non cette preponderance
exclusive, a laquelle nous n'avons jamais pretendu, mais cette part legitime
d'influence a laqueke la Russie ne renoncera point; alors, M. le Comte, ayant
€puise la mesure de la moderation et de la condescendance, notre Auguste
Maitre pourrait se voir force de se replacer sur le terrain qu'il occupait avant
ses premieres propositions, et il ne resterait plus k Sa Majeste qu'a attendre
avec calme les evenemens, ne prenant conseil, pour les regler, que du soin de sa
dignite et des interets de son Empke.
Tel ne sera point le cas, nous aimons a l'espdrer. Quand te Cabinet
Francais s'exprimait comme il a fait dans la depeche precitee, il etait encore
dans Pignorance de Pimportante modification que nous avons consenti a apporter
a la teneur originelte de nos ouvertures. II pouvait done a la rigueur lui rester
un doute sur nos intentions definitives. Mais apres le gage dclatant que
l'Empereur vient de donner de sa loyaute, Sa Majeste n'admet pas la poss-
bikte qu'il en puisse exister encore. Que la France apporte done a la negocia
tion qui va s'ouvrir des dispositions conformes a cet acte de conciliation, et nous
nous feliciterons sincerement de la voir y prendre la part que son r61e et sa
position lui assignent. L'Empereur vous a deja charge, et il vous charge iterative-
ment, d'assurer le Cabinet des Tuileries de tout te prix qu'il attache a une
co-operation qui, aux yeux de la majorite, ne peut que contribuer a asseoir la
pacification du Levant sur des fondemena plus solides.
Veuillez, M. le Comte, exprimer cet espoir et cette opinion au ckef du
Cabinet Frangais, en lui donnant communication et copie de la presente
depeche. Recevez, &c,
(Signe) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)
Count Nesselrode to Count Medem at Paris. — (Commmicated by Baron Brunnow,)
M.Ie Comte.. St. Petersburgh, December 26, 1839.
I HAVE received the despatch which you have done me the honour to
address to me, acknowledging the receipt of my despatch of the 22nd of

552
November, and in which you give an account to the Imperial Ministry of the
complaints which the Chief of the French Cabinet had made to you, relative to
the incomplete and tardy nature of our last communication on the subject of
the return of Baron Brunnow to England. Notwithstanding it has not been
absolutely demonstrated to us, that on this occasion our communications to the
Courts of Vienna and of Berlin have been more detailed, since all that was to be
done was to announce to them a single fact — the adoption of the modification
required by England in our first overtures ; although, besides, the delay of a
few days, which has been the case with the despatch addressed to you, originated
solely in the trifling matters relating to the arrangement for the departure of our
messengers; nevertheless, M. le Comte, we will admit the remonstrance to have
some foundation, and proceed to answer it with entire candour.
We will admit, then, that our explanations with France have latterly been
characterised with a degree of reserve, and that those which we have given to
our other Allies have borne, perhaps, a character of greater cordiality and frank
ness. This reserve had its motives, and we do not pretend to disguise them. It
is, M. le Comte, because we have for some time considered that France, in her
opinion of our policy in the East, was less favourably disposed than the other
Powers ; it is because the latter evinced towards us a greater degree of confi
dence and equity ; because, with respect to Egypt, their views were more
identified with our own ; and because, like us, they thought they found in the
French Government more inclination for the Vassal than for the lawful Sovereign.
It is because France appeared to consider the Question of difference to be
settled between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali as purely secondary. She set
herself about representing the matter as essentially an European question
— an insinuation, the object of which was evident to us. In a word, it is
because the language which she addressed to our Allies, and that held by the
papers more peculiarly designed to uphold in the interior the popularity of" her
Ministry, manifestly bore the character of sentiments little just, kttle friendly
to Russia. That which was merely a presumption has now been changed into a fact, by
the despatch which Marshal Soult kas recently addressed to the Englisk Govern
ment, in order to defend, against tke objections offered by the latter, his opinion
upon the plan of pacification to be effected between Egypt and the Porte. In
this document, which relates exclusively to the differences which have manifested
themselves between the two Cabinets, that of the Tukeries has thought fit to
bring us gratuitously into the discussion, by especially directing against us the
vigilance and the attention of England. It plainly avows therein, that the
independence of tbe Ottoman Empire interests it, at least as much as even the
integrity of it ; and that in its estimation it is, perhaps, more important to
protect the one against us than to secure the other against Egypt. It reproaches
England for losing sight of what it calls the European side of the Question, in
order to busy herself with the Egyptian portion of it alone. Lastly, it insinu
ates that if, at the present time, an unpleasant difference of opinions exists
between Great Britain and France, that difference is solely occasioned by
Great Britain looking to nothing in the pacification of the Levant, beyond
obtaining for the Sultan a territorial arrangement more or less advantageous ;
whereas, on the other hand, France has always proposed to herself above every
thing to extract from that pacification, the annihilation of the exclusive and
domineering protectorate which we, according to his expression, cause to weigh
upon the Ottoman Porte.
Thus, we have in truth two avowals clearly expressed; and if we can
reproach the French Cabinet with mistaking our real intentions, it wik surely
not charge us with being under any misapprehension with respect to its own.
As the despatch in which the allegations which I have cited, is con
tained, is not addressed to us, we should not feel ourselves warranted in
replying to it directly. But since, on the other hand, Marshal Soult has been
the first to address to you demands for explanations, we will not be restrained
from causing him to hear our own.
The exclusive protectorate of Russia ! We confess, after all the proofs of
disinterestedness which the Emperor in these last times has offered, we have
been astonished to see such a bugbear reappear. Could the French Govern
ment forget, that, at the moment I am speaking, the Emperor has not yet
moved either a single soldier or a single vessel, while the ships of France plough

553
the waters of the Mediterranean, and, moreover, cast anchor a short time ago
in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles ? Was it, then, this exclusive pro
tectorate at which we aimed when, in 1833, before the despair of the Sultan
had led him to invoke our assistance, we implored the Maritime Powers to
succour him against the Pasha ? Was it what we desired to retain when, at the
very beginning of the existing crisis, we were the first to rouse up, with reference
to the state of the East, the common solicitude of these same Powers ; to urge
them to restrain Mehemet Ali witkin bounds which he could not pass ; to press
them, and especially France, to employ, if necessary, measures of coercion
against him? If, as has so often heen maintained, the Treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi had had for its object to secure to us this exclusive protection, would
we have employed, as we have done, our advice and efforts to prevent the
application of its stipulations ? Is not France aware, that, far from taking
advantage of that instrument, we have spontaneously declared ourselves
ready to forego it, if we could obtain in exchange for it the recognition of a
principle of public European law, which, in truth, would indeed close to
foreign flags the entrance into one of the two Straits of Constantinople, but
which would prohibit to our own vessels the entrance into the other ? Finally,
must we remind tke Frenck Government tkat, even before the last concessions
which we have made, we had still spontaneously proposed, that, if it should
become necessary to advance our fleet and our troops to the succour of the
Sultan's capital, that measure should be deprived of all appearance of isolation,
that it should not be exclusively Russian, but solemnly announced as an
European measure?
As these facts must be as notorious to France as they are to the other
Cabinets, one would almost be tempted to ask, M. le Comte, if she has really
seriously been able to advance against us such allegations as those contained in
Marshal Souk's despatch, as a means of negotiation in her discussions with
England, reviving with respect to us apprehensions of old date, which we have
so happily succeeded in effacing ?
If (what we are assuredly far from supposing) such had really been the
intention of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, its conduct on this occasion would
offer a very remarkable contrast with ours. When the first symptoms of a
difference of opinion between the two Maritime Powers as to the means of
reconciling the security of the Sultan witk the pretensions of the Pasha of
Egypt manifested themselves, what should we have done, we ask France, if,
as she so gratuitously supposes, our intention had been to isolate her by sepa
rating her from England ? Clearly we should have sought to exasperate this
difference, to increase it, and to convert it, if it were possible, into a misunder
standing. We should have exerted ourselves to exaggerate still more, in the
view of the British Cabinet, the partiality which it reproaches France with
entertaining in favour of the Pasha of Egypt.
We should have eagerly coincided with its notions, and energetically
supported its plan of pacification against tkat put forward by France. Very
far from that, we have held to the Two Powers the language of conciliation.
Although in truth Lord Palmerston's plan appeared to us more favourable than
that of the French Government to the future security of the Ottoman Porte,
although it was certainly also more conformable to the dignity of the Five
intervening Powers, after the offers of mediation which they had, of their own
accord, addressed to the Grand Signor, we confined ourselves to exhorting
the two Cabinets to endeavour to make their notions coincide. We declared to
them that if by reciprocal concessions they contrived to meet each other half
way, and to agree to a middle term, we were ready to adopt the plan on which
they might agree, provided only that that plan was accepted by the Porte, and
preceded by a common understanding as to the means of carrying it into execution.
It was no more in order to isolate France, and to dispense with her co
operation, that at the time of making the proposals which we had entrusted to
Baron Brunnow, we in the first instance addressed ourselves to England. It is
because, as we have said and repeat to the French Government, England had
evinced towards us dispositions of greater confidence ; it is because the views of
that Power, with regard to the Viceroy of Egypt, coincided more with our own,
and that, in case of need, it was determined beforehand to support them by
action. But does it necessarily follow because we have made to England in the
4 B

554
first instance preliminary overtures as to an arrangement to befiereafter discussed
with the other Cabinets, that we designed to exclude France ? If such a course
necessarily implied an exclusion of this kind, why has not Austria, why has not
Prussia, so interpreted it for themselves ? Whence comes it that neither of
these Two Powers thought of taking exception to it ? Is their self-esteem less
exacting, or have they rendered us more justice ?
It is time, M. le Comte, that this distrust and these recriminations should
give place at length to a sounder appreciatiation of our political views. The
Emperor has made sufficient sacrifices of personal feeling to the desire for union
and peace, to be entitled to obtain some in return. His Majesty has not con
fined himself to mere sacrifices of opinion ; he has made for the common
advantage actual concessions, far more important. It is the least that can be
done in other quarters, to give up prejudices which have no longer any founda
tion. If, notwithstanding so many proofs of disinterestedness and self-denial,
the Emperor should continue to see his intentions misunderstood; if, at the
same time that his concessions are accepted, endeavours are made to turn them
to account with the view of acquiring popularity, by representing them as
proceeding from another source than his free and entire volition ; if, in the
arrangement which is to be concluded, endeavours are made to complicate the
negotiations by new demands, by discussing questions, by raising contingencies
unconnected with the existing crisis ; if, in short, under the pretext of bringing
Turkey into the European system, attempts should be made to deprive us, not
of that exclusive preponderance to which we have never pretended, but that
fair share of influence which Russia will not forego ; then, M. le Comte, having
exhausted the measure of moderation and compliance, our August Master
might see himself compelled to replace himself in the position which he occu
pied before he made his first propositions, and nothing would remain for His
Majesty but calmly to wait for events, taking no counsel, for the ordering of
them, hut of attention to his own dignity and to the interests of his Empire.
We flatter ourselves that such will not be the case. When the French
Cabinet expressed itself as it has done in the despatch above-mentioned, it was
still ignorant of the important modification which we have consented to admit
in the original purport of our overtures. It might therefore in strictness still
retain a doubt as to our definitive intentions. But after the striking pledge
which the Emperor has just given of his sincerity, His Majesty does not admit
the possibility of such a doubt still existing. Let then France bring to the
negotiation about to be entered upon, dispositions consistent with this act of
conciliation, and we shall sincerely congratulate ourselves on seeing her resume
in it the station which her part and her character assign to her. The Emperor
has already instructed you, and he instructs you again, to assure the Cabinet of
the Tuileries of the great value which he attaches to a co-operation which, in
the opinion of the greater part, cannot but contribute to settle the pacification
of the East on the most solid foundations.
Have the goodness, M. te Comte, to express this hope and this opinion to
the Chief of the French Cabinet, on communicating to him the present despatch,
and giving him a copy of it. Receive, &c,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 447.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 16.)
(Extract.) Paris, January 13, 1840.
MARSHAL SOULT told me this morning, that he had heard I had
expressed the hope, that the French Government would communicate to that of
Her Majesty the exact number of the French ships of the line now in commis
sion, in order that Her Majesty's Ministers may be enabled to reply with con
fidence and certainty to any questions which might be put to them regarding the
reports of considerable naval armaments being prepared in the ports of
France. The Marshal said, that he had also received from Count Sebastiani the

555
copy of a letter addressed to him by your Lordship, inclosing a list of French
ships, which it had been reported to your Lordship were now in commission,
and which were to constitute tke Fleet of France in the Mediterranean.
The Marshal read to me your Lordship's letter, and then went over with
me the inclosed list of skips. His Excellency said that, by a courier of this
evening, he puoposed answering Count Sebastiani's despatch ; and that the
French Ambassador would be furnished with such information as would
enable him to answer satisfactorily your Lordship's inquiries, and show
that the French Naval Force in the Mediterranean did not exceed the number
of ships* (namely, fifteen,) which, at the time that the communication took
place hetween the two Governments relative to the junction of their fleets iu
tbe Levant, it had professed its intention to equip ; and that, independent of
the two British ships of the line now in the Tagus, which might be considered
as part of the British Mediterranean fleet, that fleet was now superior to that of
France. His Excellency spoke of the ship of the line at Rochefort having been
launched, because the ship was ready for launching, and not as intended for im
mediate service.
This is' the substance of Marshal Souk's conversation with me relative to
the subject of your Lordship's letter to Count Sebastiani ; but the answer to
your inquiries will be given, I hope, more explicitly and in detail by the French
Ambassador.

No. 448.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 16.)
(Extract) Paris, January 13, 1840.
MARSHAL SOULT this morning, after questioning me relative to the
progress made in the negotiation between your Lordship and Baron Brunnow,
informed me that he had received from the French Ambassador a report of a
conversation he had had with your Lordship ; from which it appeared that you
were preparing propositions (in consequence of Baron Brunnow's communica
tions respecting the Turco-Egyptian Affairs) for the consideration of the other
Powers interested in the settlement of that question.
The proposals of the Russian Government, he understood, were to the
effect that two or three British, and two or three French ships of the line,
sfeoukl enter the Dardanelles, but not proceed beyond Gallipoli ; that the Russian
fleet, having troops on board, and unlimited in number, were to be stationed in
tbe Bosphorus, and opposite to Constantinople.
The Marshal gave no positive opinion as to the acceptance by France of
the arrangement proposed by Russia for the defence of the Straits of Constan
tinople ; but from the manner in which he spoke of the superiority in numbers
as well as in position, assigned to Russia in Baron Brunnow's propositions,
I am led to conclude that the French Government will not be a party to that
arrangement.

No. 449.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 17, 1840.)
My Lord, Therapia, December 24, 1839.
RECHID PASHA, after expressing the pleasure the communication of
your Lordship's Instructions of December 2, gave him, says, that it has aug
mented the confidence of the Sublime Porte in the goodwill of Great Bri
tain; and that the Sublime Porte will remain firm, and will not make any
concession to Mehemet Ali without the concurrence of its Allies.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

4 B 2

556
No. 450.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received January 20.)
My Lord, Pan's, January 17, 1840.
I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult. His Excellency
had received, yesterday, despatches from the French Consul at Alexandria,
stating that Mehemet Ali manifested no impatience regarding the delay that has
taken place in concluding a peace with the Sultan, — a delay which the Pasha
asserted was more detrimental to the Porte, than to himself, — that Mehemet Ali
had lately issued pay to his army, and to the Turkish as well as to the
Egyptian fleet.
Marshal Soult mentioned tkat Albania was in a disturbed state.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 451.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 21, 1840.)
(Extract.) Therapia, December 28, 1839.
I FORWARD copy of the letter from the Grand Vizier to the Pasha of
Egypt, which was carried to Alexandria by Kiamil Pasha, of whose mission I
advised your Lordship.
The sovereignty of the Sultan is asserted and exercised in the firman of
which Kiamil Pasha is the bearer. This may bring on the discussion of the
question, what are to be the prerogatives of the Sultan wken the Pasha is made
hereditary Governor of Egypt ?

Inclosure in No. 451.
The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

AINSI qu'il est connu a votre Altesse, on ne peut jamais etablir une bonne
administration dans un Etat, ni assurer la tranquillite des peuples que par un
regime stable et sage, et sous le regne des lois equitables.
Mais on n'a pu s'occuper d'institutions en Turquie, malgre te besoin
extreme qu'elle en a, a cause d'une foule d'affaires embarrassantes dont elle a
ete depuis quelque tems successivement accablee.
Sa Majeste Imperiale, animee de sentimens pleins de clemence et d'inten-
tions les plus salutaires, veut faire prosperer l'Empire et la nation, et assurer le
repos et le bien-etre de ses sujets; et un Hatti Cheriff ayant ete emanee
dernierement de Sa Hautesse a cet egard, des firmans analogues ont ete publies
dans toutes les parties de l'Empire. II est par consequent devenu necessaire
que la Sublime Porte adresse aussi des firmans de la meme teneur a votre
Altesse, ainsi qu'a votre fils, son Excellence Ibrahim Pacha ; et voila pourquoi
deux firmans ornes en haut d'un Hatti Cheriff vous sont envoyes avec le tres-
ikustre Kiamil Pacha, General de Brigade dans l'Armee Imperiale.
Votre Altesse verra par la teneur de ces firmans, queke est la volonte
souveraine ; et comme les lois dont on s'occupe, et qu'on va etablir, devront
donner une nouvelle vie k la religion, au Gouvernement, a l'Empire, et a la
nation, et que cela est precisement ce que votre Altesse a toujours desire,
d'apre's la sagesse et le zeie qui la distinguent, et a quoi elle a constamment
applique ses soins, tout le monde a la conviction qu'elle agira conformement
aux ordres souverains.
J'espere done que votre Altesse s'empressera de pubker les firmans qui vous
sont envoyes dans les lieux qui se trouvent dans votre Gouvernement, et dans
celui de votre fils sus-mentionne, et qu'elle mettra en pratique les principes
salutaires qu'ils renferment.
7 Chewal, 1255 (13 Decembre, 1839.)

557
(Translation.)
The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.
AS Your Highness is aware, a good administration can never be esta
blished in a State, nor can the tranquillity of the people be assured, except
by a firm and wise rule, and by the exercise of equitable laws.
But it has not been possible in Turkey to take such institutions under
consideration, notwithstanding the extreme want of them, on account of the
number of embarrassing affairs with which she has been for some time con
tinually overwhelmed.
His Imperial Majesty, animated by feelings full of clemency, and by the
most salutary intentions, desires to make the Empire and the nation prosper,
and to ensure the repose and the welfare of his subjects ; and a Hatti Sheriff
having lately been issued by His Highness for this purpose, firmans of a similar
kind have been published in all parts of the Empire. It has therefore become
necessary that the Sublime Porte should address firmans to the same effect to
Your Highness, as well as to your son, his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha ; and
this is the reason that two firmans, adorned at the top with a Hatti Sheriff, are
sent to you by the hands of the illustrious Kiamil Pasha, a Brigadier-General
in the Imperial Army.
Your Highness will perceive, from these firmans, what the Sovereign
will is ; and as the laws under consideration, and which are about to be
established, are intended to give new life to religion, to the Government, to
the Empire, and to the nation, and as this is precisely what Your Highness has
always desired, in conformity with the wisdom and zeal which distinguish
you, and to which your care has constantly been devoted, every one is con
vinced that you will act in accordance with the Sovereign orders.
I hope, therefore, that Your Highness will hasten to publish the firmans
sent to you in the places under your government, and in that of your son
abovementioned, and that you will put the wholesome principles which they
contain, into practice.
Chewal 7, 1255 (December 13, 1839).

No. 452.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 21, 1840.)
My Lord, Therapia, December 29, 1 839.
I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a report from M. de Laurin to the
Internuncio, which his Excellency has had the goodness to communicate to me.
Rechid Pasha was made acquainted with the contents of that report, and I took
occasion to recommend to him the perfection of the means most proper for defence
against any enterprise that might be attempted by Mehemet Ali. Mekemet Ali
is as likely as any man to mistake the nature of his own position ; and he may risk
attempts that cannot have success against the power opposed to them, and
which failing, will, at last, put in danger those advantages he can secure by a
prudent submission. He may march his troops towards the capital, and make
a great effort to raise confusion there, and give rise to serious inconvenience,
though his ultimate defeat be inevitable. I have long believed that a British
maritime force, acting in conjunction with the Sultan's flag on the coast of
Syria, cutting off the communication with Alexandria, and closing that port,
would paralyze the whole body of Mehemet Ali's power. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

558
Inclosure in No. 452.
M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.
(Traduction.)
M. le Baron, Alexandrie, le 16 De'cembre, 1839.
LES nouvelles sur les menees des mecontens dans FAsie Mineure, que j'ai
eu l'honneur de mander a votre Excellence en date du 6 de ee mois, ont ete com-
muniquees le lendemain a mes Collegues par Mehemet Ak. II a declare a mes
Collegues et a moi, qu'aucun de ses commandans de troupes ne s'etait approche
des insurges, et qu'il avait meme fait dire a ceux de Diarbekir d'etre tranquilks,
vu qu'il ne voulait et ne pouvait rien faire pour eux. Mais sous main on ne
neglige rien pour entretenir la fermentation et meme pour preparer une revoke
qui viend rait a eclater par la suite dans un moment favorable.
Mehemet Ali m'a dit dernierement qu'il n'etait pas inactif, qu'il travaillait
journellement et se preparait a toutes les eventualites. En effet, on remarque
une activite extraordinaire dans le Divan des Muavin. Mercredi dernier on
expedia a Ibrahim Pacha des ordres relatifs a la concentration de Farmee. Ces
mouvemens doivent commencer au mois de Fevrier et etre executes avant la
Lune de Safer.
Les confidens du Pacha pretendent savoir qu'il a le projet d'occuper
Diarbekir, d'organiser les masses', et ainsi renforce, de s'emparer du reste de
FAsie Mineure. D'autres, au contraire, pensent qu'il ne s'agit que de faire
prendre a Ibrahim une forte position defensive a Marache, afin de mettre a
couvert Tarsous et Adana. D'autres encore, partisans du Pacha, et Francais
pour la plupart, le poussent a prendre l'offensive et garantissent le succes te
plus brillant pour le cas ou il attaquerait Constantinople par mer et par terre.
Les masses, disent-ils, sont contre le Sultan et te Grand Vizir, et sympatkisent
tekement avec Mehemet Ali, qu'elles sont pretes a Paccueillir comme le plus
fort et le plus keureux. Une fois Constantinople prise, les Puissances
Europeennes cesseront aussi de defendre un trdne qui n'a aucun soutien dans
les sentimens de la nation.
Mehemet Ali loue beaucoup ce langage, qui convient parfaitement a ses
plans et a ceux de son fils. Tous deux seraient disposes a commencer la lutte
des a present.
Le parti modere pense que le Pacha causera a la Porte un dommage plus
sensible en se tenant sur la defensive qu'en se portant a Pattaque. C'est pour
quoi ce parti cherche a le dissuader d'avancer. II dit au Pacha qu'il se trouve
maintenant dans une position inattaquable, et que pourvu qu'il puisse s'y main
tenir durant Phiver, il ne rencontrera plus aucun obstacle a devenir le maitre de
la Turquie Asiatique.
Par le dernier bateau a vapeur on lui eerit de Constantinople de se tenir
tranquille et d'attendre les evenemens, bien persuade que les Puissances
n'oseront pas Pattaquer s'il ne fait point d'invasion en Europe.
On ignore encore quel parti prendra le Pacha. Mais dans tous les cas il est
positif qu'il s'occupe tres-serieusement a faire de grands preparatifs de guerre.
II" menace d'armer au pis alter les corps de metier et les ouvriers des fabriques
(17,000 hommes), et deles reunir a I'armee de Syrie.
Mr. Hodges vient d'arriver ici. II m'a remis aussitot une lettre de Son
Akesse le Prince de Metternich, et m'a dit avoir I'ordre d'agir dans Faccord le
plus intime avec moi et de donner toute son attention a mes conseils.
Agreez, &e,
(Signe) LAURIN.
(Translation.)
M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.
M. le Baron, Alexandria, December 16, 1839.
THE intelligence respecting the proceedings of the malcontents in Asia
Minor, which I had the honour to report to your Excellency in my letter of the 6th
nstant, was communicated to my Colleagues on the following day by Mehemet

559
Ali. He declared to my Colleagues and to me that none of the Commanders oi
his troops had gone near the insurgents, and that he had even sent word to those
of Diarbekir to be quiet, as he neither would nor could do anything for them.
But nothing is neglected in secret to keep up the ferment, and even to prepare
a revolt which should break out afterwards at a favourable moment.
Mehemet Ali told me lately that he was not idle, that he worked daily, and
prepared for all chances. In fact, an extraordinay activity is observed irt the
.Divan of the Muavin. Orders were sent off on Wednesday last to Ibrahim Pasha,
relative to the concentration of the Army. These movements are to commence
in the month of February, and to be completed before the moon of Safer.
Those in the confidence of the Pasha pretend to know that he has the
plan of occupying Diarbekir, of organizing the population, and thus reinforced,
of taking possession of the rest of Asia Minor. Others think, on the contrary,
that it is only intended that Ibrahim should take up a strong defensive position
at Marash, in order to cover Tarsus and Adana. Others, again, partisans of
the Pasha, and chiefly Frenchmen, urge him to act on the offensive, and pro
mise the most brilliant success in the event of his attacking Constantinople by
sea and by land. The population, say they, are opposed to the Sultan and tke
Grand Vizier, and sympatkize so strongly with Mehemet Ali, tkat they are
ready to welcome him as the strongest and the most fortunate. Constantinople
once taken, the Powers of Europe will also cease to defend a throne which has
no support in the feelings of the nation.
Mehemet Ali praises this language very much, which tallies perfectly witk
bis own and bis son's plans. Both are disposed to begin the struggle imme
diately. The moderate party are of opinion that the Pasha will do more hurt to the
Porte by keeping on the defensive than by making an attack. Therefore it is
that this party seek to dissuade him from advancing. They tell the Pasha that
be is now in a position that cannot be attacked, and that if he can only maintain
himself in it during the winter, he will meet no further obstacle to bis
becoming master of Turkev in Asia.
The last steamer from Constantinople brings him advice to remain quiet
and wait for events, fully persuaded that the Powers will not attack him if he
makes no invasion into Europe.
It is still unknown wkat line tke Paska will take ; but at all events, it is
certain tkat ke is very seriously occupied in making great preparations for war.
He threatens, if the worst comes to the worst, to arm the corps of artizans, and
the workmen of the manufactories (17,000 men), and to unite them to the
Army of Syria.
Mr. Hodges is just arrived here ; he immediately delivered to me a letter
from His Highness Prince Metternich, and told me that he had orders to act in
the most perfect concert with me, and to pay every attention to my counsels.
Accept, &c,
(Signed) LAURIN.

No. 453.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 21.)
My Lord, Vienna, January 12, 1840.
I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich the inclosure in Lord Ponson
by's despatch of December 29, and he has requested me to delay the messenger,
so as to give him time to write his sentiments upon its contents to Baron Neu
mann, for communication to your Lordship. In the mean time I can state, that
bis ideas revert to his proposition of November last, and that he considers it ad
visable that no time should be lost in declaring to the Porte and to Mehemet
Ali, that an attack made by the latter would encounter the opposition of the
Powers. If no arrangement has yet been signed in London, the necessity of

560
this is, in the Prince's opinion, self-evident ; if one has been signed, still there
will be delay in obtaining the accession of the Porte ; whereas the proposed
notification should be made without the loss of a moment, whereby no prejudice
will be caused to the plans for the final settlement of the question.
I asked the Prince, if he was prepared to make the declaration in the name
of the Four Powers only without France, to wdiich he answered, that if France
did not accede to this proposition, neither would she do so to the more extended
one ; and that the real question therefore was, whether, in case she should
refuse to go along with us, we should proceed without her. This, he said, is a
matter for the consideration of the Four Powers, and Austria is for doing so.
I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 454.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, January 24, 1840.
WITH reference to the observations in your Excellency's despatch of the 28th
December, on the relative positions of the Sultan and Mehemet Ak, when thelatter
should be made hereditary Governor of Egypt, I have to state to your Excellency,
that it never has been contemplated by Her Majesty's Government that Mehemet
Ali should have, as hereditary Pasha of Egypt, any other, or different, powers
and authorities than those which he now possesses. All that has been proposed
is, that the Sultan shall engage to appoint Mehemet Ali's lineal descendants as
successors to Mehemet Ali, in the post of Pasha of Egypt ; but that Egypt
should remain, as it now is, an integral part of the Ottoman Empire ; that all
treaties and laws made by the Sultan, skould apply to Egypt as much as to any
other province ; and that the troops and ships of the Pasha of Egypt should be
as much at the disposal of the Sultan, for attack or defence in time of war, as
those kept by any other Pasha of the Ottoman Empire.
Your Excellency will find a statement to this effect in my despatch to the
Marquess of Clanricarde, of the 9th of July, 1839, of which a copy was trans
mitted to your Excellency in my despatch, of the 13th of that month.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.
No. 455.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, January 25, 1840.
I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that the negotiations on Turco-
Egyptian Affairs, in which I have for some time been engaged with the Plenipor
tentiaries of Austria and Russia, are making such progress as to give reason to
expect that they may end in an agreement between the Powers of Europe to
assist the Sultan in confining tke autkority of Mehemet Ali to Egypt. Tke
Austrian and Russian Plenipotentiaries kave received full powers to sign a Con
vention for tkat purpose, and tke Plenipotentiary of Prussia expects shortly to
receive the like authority from his Government. I cannot speak with equal
certainty as to the course which the French Government may pursue in this
matter ; but in any case, the presence of a Turkish Plenipotentiary will be
required, and I have therefore to instruct your Excellency to urge Rechid Pasha
to send off immediately to Nouri Effendi, the Ambassador of the Porte at Paris,
powers and authority to sign in London any Convention that may be proposed
to him by the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers, or by those of Four out of
the Five, provided it be a Convention securing advantages to the Sultan in the
shape of support and assistance from the Powers of Europe. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

561
No. 456.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 23.)
(Extract.) Paris, January 20, 1840.
COUNT MEDEM this morning gave to Marshal Soult a copy of a
despatch he received yesterday from Count Nesselrode relative to the Oriental
Question, and the negotiation upon that subject with which Baron Brunnow
has been charged by the Russian Government.
The Marshal read to me this despatch, commenting upon parts of it as he
read them. The despatch does not state what are the propositions of which the
Russian Envoy to London is the bearer, and Count Nesselrode accounts for his
communications with the British Government being more unreserved than those
with France, on the ground that the Court of St. Petersburgh, in respect to the
conditions of a pacific arrangement between Turkey and Mehemet Ali, and the
means of enforcing them, coincides more with the Court of St. James than with
the Court of the Tuileries. No. 457.
The Due de Dalmatie to the Baron de Barante — (Communicated by Count
Se'bastiani.)
M. le Baron, Paris, le 24 Janvier, 1840.
J'AI l'honneur de vous envoyer te texte d'une * depfeche ecrite par
M. de Nessekode a M. de Medem, qui, ainsi qu'il en avait I'ordre, m'en a remis
copie, apres m'en avoir donne lecture. La forme et te fond de cette depeche
m'ont, je dois vous le dire, egalement surpris. Dans les observations que je
vais vous presenter a ce sujet je ne tiendrai compte que du fond.
La marche suivie par le Cabinet de St. Petersbourg dans Pincident de la
Mission de M. de Brunnow, n'avait pas cause une telle surprise au Gouverne
ment du Roi, que j'eusse cru devoir en faire l'objet d'une reclamation. Aussi
n'etait-ee nullement a titre de plainte que j'en avais parte a M. de Medem.
J'avais voulu seulement bien etablir que ce qu'il y avait dans cette marche de
peu conforme aux protestations generates d'intentions conciliantes et de desir
d'arriver a un accord Europeen ne m'avait pas echappe. Dois-je supposer que
M. de Medem avait mal compris ma pensee, et, en la transmettant a son
Gouvernement, en avait assez exagere la portee pour qu'on ait juge necessaire
d'y repondre d'une maniere aussi solennelle? Ou bien dois-je croire que le
Cabinet de St. Petersbourg, sans s'abuser lui-meme sur le veritable sens de
mes paroles, a saisi te premier pretexte qui s'est offert a lui de nous faire
parvenir, sous forme de recrimination, Pexpression d'un mecontentement
d'ailleurs bien peu fonde ? Je serais porte a admettre plutot cette derniere
supposition, en voyant combien peu cette pretendue reponse se refere a ce
qu'elle semble avoir pour but de refuter.
Quoiqu'il en soit, sans entrer dans une polemique dont le moindre incon
venient serait de ne pouvoir conduire a aucun resultat, je vais m'expliquer en
peu de mots sur quelques uns des points principaux traites dans la depeche de
M. de Nesselrode.
Le Gouvernement du Roi n'a jamais songe a enlever a la Russie sa part
legitime d'influence dans les affaires de l'Orient ; il sait qu'elle doit etre grande
pour etre en accord avec la nature des choses ; ce que nous avons voulu, ce que
nous voulons encore, c'est que les autres Puissances ne soient pas desheritees de
celle qui leur appartient egalement, c'est qu'elles en trouvent la garantie non
pas uniquement dans la moderation personnelle du Souverain de la Russie,
mais bien dans un ensemble de mesures poktiques combinees pour la protection
efficace de tous les droits et de tous les interets.
Demander que ces droits et ces interets ne soient pas a la merci d'anc

* See No. 446.
4 C

562
Puissance a laquelle il ne manquerait pour abuser de sa preponderance que la
volonte de te faire, exiger d'autres suretes que la generosite et la sagesse d'une
des parties, ce n'est certes pas, quoiqu'on en dise, lui temoigner une injurieuse
defiance, c'est tout simplement faire acte de prudence et de dignite. Je ne puis
done reconnaitre que dans la surveillance attentive, inquiete si Pon veut, que
nous portons sur la situation de Constantinople, il y ait rien dont le Cabinet de
St. Petersbourg ait le droit de s'offenser.
Le Gouvernement du Roi serait bien autrement fonde a reclamer contre
les assertions sans cesse renouvelees, qui le presentent comme se preoccupant
exclusivement, dans la Question d'Orient, des interets du Pacha d'Egypte, et y
sacrifiant ceux de la Porte. Apres les delegations appuyees d'argumens si
convaincans, qu'il a tant de fois opposees a ces imputations malveillantes, il
devait peu s'attendre, peut-etre, a les voir reproduites dans la depeche de M. de
Nesselrode. Ce n'est pas d'ailleurs sans une satisfaction reelle qu'il y trouve
Fassurance que M. de Brunnow a la mission de travailler a faire cesser sur le
point delicat du reglement territorial de la Question d'Orient, les dissentimens
partiels de PAngleterre et de la France, — dissentimens qui ne sauraient etre que
temporaires entre deux Cabinets unis par des liens si etroits. Les informations
que j'avais recueillies au sujet des instructions donnees a cet Envoye m'avaient
fait craindre au contraire que la Russie, en adherant purement et simplement
au plan le plus defavorable au Vice-Roi, ne tendit a rendre plus difficile un
rapprochement entre les idees des Cabinets de Londres et de Paris. Nous en
avions ete d'autant plus surpris, que le Gouvernement Imperial, en manifestant
a plusieurs reprises son regret de ce qu'on n'avait pas laisse au mois de Juiket
dernier la Porte et le Pacha s'arranger directement, avait autorise a penser qu'il
eut adhere sans peine meme a des conditions beaucoup plus avantageuses pour
le Pacha que celles que nous proposons aujourd'hui. Certes, un changement
aussi complet dans sa maniere de voir n'eut pas trouve a beaucoup pres, une
justification suffisante dans le simple fait de la mediation offerte le 27 Juiket a
la Porte, puisque cette offre n'impliquait en aucune facon, de la part , des
Puissances, la promesse d'une intervention materieke dkigee dans le but de fake
obtenir au Sultan des stipulations determinees.
Voila, M. le Baron, ce que j'avais a vous dire sur la lettre de M. de
Nesselrode. Vous voudrez bien lire a ce Ministre la presente depecke et lui
en laisser copie. Asreez &c.
(Signe) ' MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)
The Due de Dalmatie to the Baron de Barante. — (Communicated by Count
Sebastiani.)
Monsieur le Baron, Paris, January 24, 1840,
I HAVE the honour to send to you the copy of a despatch written by
M. de Nesselrode to M. de Medem, who, agreeably to his instructions, delivered
to me a copy, after having read it to me. The form and the substance of this
despatch have both, I must confess to you, equally surprised me. In the obser
vations which I am about to make to you on the subject of this despatch, I shall
touch merely upon the substance.
The course pursued by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in the case of the
Mission of M. de Brunnow, did not create such surprise in the King's Govern
ment, as to make it appear to me to call for remonstrance. Neither was it by
any means in the style of complaint that I spoke of it to M. de Medem. I merely
wished clearly to establish, that the inconsistency of this step with the general
protestations of conciliatory intentions, and of a desire to produce harmony
throughout Europe, had not escaped me. Am I to suppose that M. de Medem
had misunderstood my meaning, and that, in communicating it to his Govern
ment, he had so exaggerated its tendency, as to cause it to be deemed
necessary to answer it in so formal a manner ? Or rather, am I to think that
the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, without mistaking the true sense of my words,
has seized on the first pretext which presented itself for conveying to us, in the

563
form of recrimination, the expression of dissatisfaction for which, moreover,
there is very little ground? I am rather inclined to admit this latter supposition,
on observing how little this pretended answer bears upon what it appears designed
to refute. Be that as it may, without entering into a discussion, the least inconvenience
of which is that it does not tend to any result, I will in a few words explain
myself upon some of the principal points treated in the despatch of M. de
Nesselrode. The King's Government has never thought of depriving Russia of her
legitimate share of influence in the affairs of the East, — it knows that that influ
ence must be great according to the nature of things: what we have wished,
what we still wish, is that the other Powers should not be excluded from that to
which they are all equally entitled ; that they should have it ensured to them
not only by the personal moderation of the Sovereign of Russia, but also by a
system of combined political measures for the effectual protection of all rights
and interests. To require that those rights and interests should not be at the mercy of a
Power which would need, for the purpose of abusing its own preponderance, only
the will to do so, — to exact other securities than the generosity and wisdom of
one of the parties, — is assuredly not, whatever may be said of it, to evince an
offensive distrust; it is merely to act the part of prudence and of dignity. I
cannot, then, admit, that there is anything in the attentive vigilance, restless if
you will, which we exercise over the situation of Constantinople, at which the
Cabinet of St. Petersburgh can have any right to take offence.
The King's Government would be much more entitled to remonstrate
against the constantly repeated assertions, which represent it as employing itself
exclusively, in the Eastern Question, with the interests of the Pasha of Egypt,
and sacrificing to them those of the Porte. After positive denials supported by
such convincing arguments, which it has so repeatedly made to those malevolent
imputations, it had, it might have been supposed, little reason to expect to see
them again brought forward in the despatch of M. de Nesselrode. It is not,
however, without real satisfaction that it finds therein, the assurance that M. de
Brunnow is commissioned to endeavour to bring to an end, with respect to the
delicate point of the territorial settlement of the Eastern Question, the partial
differences which exist between England and France, — differences which cannot
but be temporary between two Cabinets united by such close ties. The infor
mation which I had obtained on the subject of the instructions given to that
Envoy had, on the contrary, made me fear that Russia, in adhering wholely and
simply to the proposition the most unfavourable to the Viceroy, might tend to
increase the difficulty of an approximation between the views of the Cabinets of
London and of Paris. We were the more surprized at this, because the
Imperial Government, while repeatedly manifesting its regret that the Porte and
the Pasha had not been left to settle their differences directly in the month of
July last, had given reason for thinking that it would, without hesitation, have
consented to conditions much more advantageous to the Pasha than those which
we now propose. Assuredly, so complete a change in its manner of viewing the
question would have been far from obtaining a sufficient justification in the
simple fact of the offer of mediation made on the 27th of July to the Porte,
since that offer did not by any means imply, on the part of the Powers, the
promise of an active intervention, having for its object to obtain for the Sultan
any given stipulations.
Such, M. le Baron, are the observations which I had to make to you on the
letter of M. de Nesselrode. You will be pleased to read this despatch to that
Minister and to give him a copy of it.
Accept, &c,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

4 C 2

564
No. 458.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 27.)
(Extract.) Paris, January 24, 1840.
I THIS day, at an interview I had with Marshal Soult at the Foreign Office, '
inquired from him what was the view taken by the French Government of the
communication received from the French Ambassador in London.
The Marshal immediately sent for Count Sebastiani's despatch, which
begins by saying that the communication made to the Ambassador by your
Lordship was merely a sketch (une ebauche) of a project of Convention, on which
you were desirous to have the opinion of the French Ambassador before you
submitted it, in a more finished shape, to the consideration of the Cabinet.
Count Sebastiani then states the propositions made by your Lordship in this
sketch, for bringing about the settlement of tbe Turco-Egyptian Question.
I did not enter into any discussion with the Marshal regarding these pro
positions, but I observed to his Excellency, that the mode of proceeding adopted
by your Lordship afforded a strong demonstration of your wish not to act
separately from France upon the Affairs of the East, and that I had no doubt
this early and frank communication of your Lordship's present views of this
question, under the alteration of circumstances caused by the Court of St.
Petersburgh's admission of the principle of the defence of the Straits of Con
stantinople being confided to other Allies of the Porte as well as to Russia,
would be duly appreciated by the French Government.
The Marshal unhesitatingly expressed his obligation to your Lordship for
this mark of confidence, but he appeared to be in expectation of receiving an
official communication from the English Government to the same effect. I
observed to him that your Lordship must naturally look for a confidential reply
to your confidential communication, before you proceeded to make any propo
sition officially to the French Government, and that I was surprised none had
been sent. His Excellency then told me that the Council were to assemble at
the Tuileries this evening to deliberate upon the contents of Count Sebastiani's
despatch. The Marshal did not specify any particular objection to any one of the
Articles of the proposed sketch of Convention ; he approved of the plan of the
Five Powers concluding, in the first instance, the Convention with the Porte,
but doubted much the acquiescence of Russia in that plan, inasmuch as
it would annul the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and make Turkey a component
part of the European system, from which it had hitherto been the policy and
endeavour of the Russian Cabinet to exclude it.
His Excellency did not believe that the interception of supplies by sea
from Egypt into Syria, would occasion any serious embarrassment to the
Egyptian Army under Ibrahim Pasha, and he considered that the result of the
proposed arrangement would be only to prolong the actual relative position of"
the two parties. No. 459.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 30.)
My Lord, Paris, January 27, 1840.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 24th of January.
Marshal Soult informed me this morning, that a despatch would be sent by a
courier this evening to Count Sebastiani, in reply to your Lordship's commu
nication to the French Ambassador. The Marshal said to me, that by the
acquiescence of Russia in a Treaty between the Five Powers and the Porte,
a point of great importance would be gained, but he had no expectation of the
Emperor authorizing his Plenipotentiary to enter into such a Convention.
His Excellency did not communicate to me what answer his despatch
would contain relative to the other points of your Lordship's Proposition.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

565

No. 460.
The Due de Dalmatie to Count Sebastiani. — (Communicated by Count SSbastiani,
February 4.)
Monsieur le Comte, Paris, le 26 Janvier, 1840.
J'AI recu la depeche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'ecrire sous le
No. 9. L'importance des informations qu'elle contient a fixe la plus serieuse
attention du Gouvernement du Roi. Vous comprendrez que je ne m'explique
pas encore d'une maniere complete sur la communication de Lord Palmerston.
Le caractere tout confidentiel de cette communication, dont les bases memes et
a plus forte raison la redaction n'etaient pas encore definitivement arretees par
te Cabinet Britannique, appelle d'autant moins de notre part une reponse imme
diate et officielle que, dans une pareille niatiere, le fond ne peut gu£re etre
apprecie independamment de la forme. Quoiqu'il en soit, et sans m'arreter a
des points de detail qui pourraient demander des eclaircissemens, je n'hesite pas
a dire qu'en ce qui concerne le mode de la protection a accorder a la Porte
contre un mouvement eventuel d'Ibrahim Pacha sur Constantinople, les modi
fications proposees par Lord Palmerston au plan du Cabinet de St. Petersbourg,
me paraissent constituer une amelioration considerable. L'idee de faire inter-
venk la Porte dans le traite qui reglerait ce mode de protection, est surtout une
conception tres-heureuse et d'une grande portee.
Je regrette de ne pouvoir approuver egalement dans le projet de Lord
Palmerston, ce qui se rapporte aux arrangemens territoriaux a conclure entre le
Sultan et te Vice-Roi. Nous persistans a croire que ce Ministre ne tient pas
suffisamment compte des ressources de Mehemet Ali, de Penergie de son
caractere, et de Pimpossibilite morale qu'un homme de cette trempe accepte,
sans resistance, des conditions qui lui oteraient avec une si grande partie de sa
puissance materielle, toute la force d'opinion dans laquelle reside son principal
appui. Plut6t que de les subir, je suis convaincu qu'il s'exposerait aux plus
grandes extremites, et que, tout en s'abstenant peut-etre de marcher sur Con
stantinople, il n'hesiterait pas a envahir la Mesopotamie, a enlever a la Porte
des provinces dont les ressources lui permettraient d'opposer aux resolutions des
Puissances la resistance la plus energique.
Contre de telles entreprises que pourraient les moyens de coaction indiques
par le nouveau projet Anglais ? Que pourraient meme l'intervention Russe
dans les limites ou il tend a la contenir ? n'est-il pas evident qu'une fois entrees
dans cette voie, les Puissances n 'auraient d'autre alternative que de reculer
devant Paudacieuse attitude de Mehemet Ali ou de recourir au seul moyen reel
de proteger la Porte en autorisant l'intervention Russe dans le sens le plus
etendu ? A moins d'abandonner le Sultan a sa faiblesse, ne serai ent-elles pas
forcees de souffrir qu'une armee Imperiale traversat PAsie Mineure et la Syrie,
pour refouler jusqu'en Egypte les soldats du Vice-Roi ? Je ne pense pas que
cette extremite put convenir a PAngleterre, plus qu'elle ne nous conviendrait a
nous-memes. En vous signalant Pinsuffisance des voies coercitives proposees par le Cabinet
de Londres, j'ai voulu surtout vous faire remarquer ce qu'il y a de contradictoire
entre la grandeur des concessions demandees a Mehemet Ali et la faiblesse des
moyens par lesquels on se propose de les lui arracher. Sans doute le Cabinet
de Londres se persuade que ce Pacha cedera a la premiere demonstration des
Puissances, et que hors d'etat de suffire longtems aux charges d'un statu quo
rendu plus genant et plus onereux pour lui par Pespece de blocus qu'on etabli-
rait sur la cote de Syrie, il s'empressera de s'y soustraire en acceptant Parrange
ment qui lui sera offert. Je crois fermement que c'est une erreur, et que meme
en admettant, ce qui n'est guere probable, que Mehemet Ali ne se fit pas un
jeu de jeter l'Europe dans les complications les plus effrayantes plutdt que de se
soumettre aux injonctions des Puissances, la prolongation du statu quo actuel
avec ses incertitudes et ses dangers, serait tout au moins la consequence de sa
resistance passive. II faudrait etrangement meconnaitre la situation respective
des deux parties pour croire que cette prolongation fut plus desavantageuse au
Vice-Roi qu'au Sultan.

566
Dans Petat ou la Porte est aujourd'hui reduite, elle a particukerement
besoin pour se remettre, pour reprendre le degre de consistance et de solidite exige
par Pinteret general, de repos, de securite, d'un sentiment de confiance dans l'avenir.
De tels avantages sont bien autrement importans pour elle que celui de recouvrer
immediatement la possession de quelques provinces qu'eke serait peut-etre fort
embarrassee d'avoir a gouverner, et dont, en tout cas, la souverainete lui serait
conservee. Mais la Porte ne peut recueilkr ces avantages que par une prompte
reconciliation avec Mehemet Ali ; et pour que cette reconciliation ait quelque
chance de dure'e, il faut qu'elle repose sur des bases qui soient dans une juste
proportion avec la force et la puissance des Parties Contractantes.
Telles sont, M. le Comte, les raisons qui nous font considerer comme
dangereuse et impraticable la tentative d'imposer k Mehemet Ali les conditions
enoncees dans la communication de Lord Palmerston. II n'y a de notre part ni
obstination, ni predilection aveugle, ni engagement d'aucune sorte. Nos motifs
sont tous puises dans Pinteret general, dans la force des choses, et dans des
convictions profondes. Que Lord Palmerston les considere surtout comme
inspires par le plus vif desk de nous entendre, et d'etablir entre nos deux
Gouvernemens cette identite de vues et de tendances qui serait la meilleure
garantie de la paix du monde comme des interets des deux pays.
Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que le Gouvernement du Roi s'en rapporte
entierement a vous quant au choix du moment et de la forme qui vous parai-
tront les plus propres a produire avec avantage les argumens que je viens de

vous suggerer.

AsTeez &c.
(Signe) ' MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

Tlw Due de Dalmatie to Count Se'bastiani. — (Communicated by Count Se'bastiani,
February 4.)
Monsieur le Comte, Paris, January 26, 1840.
I HAVE received the despatch marked No. 9, which you have done me
the honour to write to me. The importance of the information which it
contains has fixed the most serious attention of the Government of the King.
You will understand, that I do not as yet explain myself fuky upon the subject
of Lord Palmerston's communication. The strictly confidential character of
this communication, of which even the bases, and still less therefore the form,
had not yet been definitively arranged by the British Cabinet, requires so much
the less an immediate and official answer on our part, as in such a matter the
substance can hardly be taken into consideration independently of the form.
Be that as it may, and without stopping at points of detail which might
require explanations, I do not hesitate to say, that in what relates to the mode
of protection to be afforded to the Porte against any eventual movement of
Ibrahim Pasha upon Constantinople, the modifications proposed by Lord
Palmerston to the plan of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, appear to me to con
stitute a considerable improvement. The idea of bringing in the Porte as a
party to the treaty for regulating this mode of protection, is above all a happy
conception and one of great scope.
I regret that I cannot equally approve of that part of the project of Lord
Palmerston, which refers to the territorial arrangements to be concluded
between the Sultan and the Viceroy. We persist in thinking that this Minister
does not sufficiently take into account the resources of Mehemet Ali, the energy
of his character, and the moral impossibility that a man of that stamp should
accept without resistance, conditions which would deprive him, with so large a
portion of his physical power, of all the force of opimon in which his principal
strength consists. Rather than submit to them, I am convinced that he would
expose himself to the greatest extremities, and that, although perhaps refraining
from marching upon Constantinople, he would not hesitate to invade Mesopo
tamia, and deprive the Porte of provinces the resources of which would enable
him to oppose the most energetic resistance to the resolutions of the Powers,

567
Against such enterprises, what could the means of coercion indicated in the
new English plan avail ? What could even the Russian intervention avail, in
the limits within which that plan professes to restrict it? Is it not evident,
that having once entered upon this course, the Powers would have no other
alternative but either to retire before the bold attitude of Mehemet Ali, or to
have recourse to tke only real means of protecting the Porte, by authorising
a Russian intervention in its most extended sense ? Unless they abandon the
Sultan to kis weakness, would tkey not be obliged to allow an Imperial army to
traverse Asia Minor and Syria, in order to drive back the soldiers of the Viceroy
into Egypt ? I do not think that this extreme measure would suit England
any more than it wrould suit us.
In pointing out to you the insufficiency of the coercive measures proposed
by the Cabinet of London, I have been especiaky desirous of directing, your at
tention to the disproportion between the magnitude of the concessions demanded
of Mehemet Ali, and the weakness of the means by which it is proposed to extort
them from him. No doubt the Cabinet of London persuades itself that the
Pasha will yield to the first demonstration of the Powers, and that, incapable of
sustaining for any time the charges of a status quo, rendered more galling and
onerous to him by the sort of blockade which would be established on the coast
of Syria, he would hasten to extricate himself from them by accepting the ar
rangement which would be offered to him. I firmly believe that this is an error,
and that even admitting, which is scarcely probable, that Mehemet Ali would
not play tke game of involving Europe in the most alarming complications rather
than submit to the injunctions of the Powers, the prolongation of the present
status quo, with its uncertainties and its dangers, would at the least be the conse
quence of his passive resistance. It would be a strange misconception of the
respective position of the two parties, to think that this prolongation would be
more disadvantageous to the Viceroy than to the Sultan.
The Porte, in the state to which it is now reduced, especially requires for
its recovery, for its restoration to the degree of strength and solidity demanded
by the general interest, repose, and security, and a feeling of confidence in the
future. Such advantages are of much more importance to the Porte than that
of immediately recovering the possession of some provinces which it would per
haps be very much embarrassed to have to govern, and the sovereignty of which
would in any case be preserved to it. But the Porte can only obtain these
advantages by a prompt reconciliation with Mehemet Ali ; and in order that
this reconciliation may have any chance of duration, it should be founded upon
bases which are in due proportion to the force and to the power of the Contracting
Parties. Such, M. le Comte, are the reasons which lead us to consider as dangerous
and impracticable, the attempt to impose upon Mehemet Ali the conditions
announced in the communication from Lord Palmerston. There is on our part
neither obstinacy nor blind predilection, nor engagement of any kind. Our
motives kave all tkeir source in tke general interests, in tke force of circum
stances, and in deep convictions. Let Lord Palmerston consider tkem, above
all, as inspired by the most earnest desire to come to an understanding, and to
establish between the two Governments that identity of views andmotives, which
will be the best guarantee for the peace of the world as well as for the interests
of the two countries.
I need not say to you, that the Government of the King leaves entirely to
your discretion the choice of the moment and the mode which may appear to you
most proper to bring forward with advantage the arguments which- I have just
suggested to you. _AcC6T)t &C *
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

568

No. 461.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 30.)
(Extract.) Berlin, January 20, 1840.
THE French Charge d'Affaires at this Court has communicated to Baron
Werther, the Russian Minister, and myself, part of a despatch which he received
on the 18th instant, from Marshal Soult, informing him that Her Majesty's
Government had rejected M. de Brunnow's propositions, as they were found to
be inadmissible both in form and substance ; and that your Lordship was about
to bring forward counter-propositions. This information astonished both Baron
Werther and myself, more particularly as his letters from London made no
mention of such a fact.
I am informed that it was likewise stated in Marskal Souk's despatck, that
the territorial arrangements proposed by M. de Brunnow did not meet with the
approbation of Her Majesty's Government, as they were more favourable to
Mehemet Ak than those contemplated by your Lordship.

No. 462.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 31.)
My Lord, Therapia, January 8, 1840.
I INCLOSE reports from Alexandria, for which I am indebted to the
Internuncio. They may be interesting to your Lordship as confirmatory of other
information. I have, &c. ,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 462.
M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.

(Extrait.) Alexandrie, le 23 Decembre, 1839.
LE bateau a vapeur du Grand Seigneur, le " Peiki Chewket," arriva ici
dans la matinee du 18 Decembre. II nous amena Kiamk Pacha, ci-devant
Ministre a Berlin. La curiosite que Fapparition de ce dignitake excita a Alex
andrie etait telle qu'on sut le motif de sa mission avant qu'k n'eut mis pied a
terre. Tandis que le bateau jetait Pancre, Kiamil Pacha fut questionne par les
amis de Mehemet Ali s'il etait porteur de la nouvelle de la destitution de
Hosrew Packa, ou bien de celle de sa mort, et d'un arrangement definitif de
PAffaire Egyptienne.
Aussi des bruits dans ce sens coururent incessamment en ville. Mais des
que Kiamil Pacha eut declare franchement qu'il n'avait rien de semblable a man
der par rapport a Hosrew Pacha, etquesa mission n'avait pas trait a la Question
Egyptienne, l'emotion causee d'abord par son arrivee se calma, d'autant plus
qu'il se repandit bientot la nouvelle qu'il n'apportait que le Hatti Cherif de
Goulhane, et qu'il se rendrait, apr£s Pavoir transmis au Vice-Roi, au Caire, pour
y faire proclamer solemnekement le contenu de ce document.
Le President du Conseil des Muavin, Houssein Pacha, eut I'ordre d'aller
au-devant de Kiamil jusqu'en bas de Pescaker du Palais, et de Pintroduire a
Mehemet Ali. La ceremonie se passa tout simplement. Le Vice-Roi re?ut le
Hatti Cherif de la main de Kiamk Pacha, le porta a son front et a sa bouche,
et apres un entretien confidentiel d'une demie-heure dans lequel k fut arrete que
Kiamil Pacha partkait le 21 Decembre pour le Caire, accompagne de Habib
Effendi, ancien Chiaja de cette vike, que le Hatti Cherif y serait proclame,
registre et communique en copie a toutes les autorites provinciates, le Ministre

569
de la Porte se rendit dans la maison du Divan Effendi ou on lui avait prepare"
des appartemens. Mehemet Ak ne parut ni se rejouir ni s'embarrasser de la mission de Kiamil
Pacha. II fit accrediter I'opinion parmi le peuple, que ce Hatti Cherif n'etait
autre chose que l'lbka ordinaire par lequel on le confirmait dans sa dignite.
Le depart de Kiamil Pacha et de Habib Effendi pour le Caire eut effective-
ment lieu le 21 Decembre a 9 heures.

(Translation.)
M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.
Alexandria, December 23, 1 839.
THE Grand Signor's steam-boat, " Peiki Chewket," arrived here on the
morning of the 18th of December. It brought us Kiamil Pasha, formerly
Minister at Berlin. The curiosity excited at Alexandria by the appearance of
this dignitary was so great, tkat the motive of his mission was known before
he landed. While the steamer was casting anchor, Kiamil Pasha was questioned by the
friends of Mehemet Ali, wkether he was the bearer of the news of the dismissal
of Hosrew Pasha, or of that of his death and of a definitive settlement of the
Egyptian Question.
Rumours of this nature spread immediately through the town ; but the
moment that Kiamk Pasha declared frankly that he had nothing of that nature
to communicate respecting Hosrew Pasha, and that his mission did not relate to
the Egyptian Question, the emotion caused by his arrival subsided, more especidly
when he soon after announced that he was merely the bearer of the Hatti Sheriff
of Gulhane, and that he was proceeding, after having delivered it to tke Viceroy,
to Cairo, in order to cause the contents of tke document to be solemnly pro
claimed there.
The President of the Council of the Muavin, Houssein Pasha, was ordered
to go and meet Kiamil at the foot of the staircase of the palace, and to intro
duce him to Mehemet Ak. The ceremony was of the ordinary kind. The
Viceroy received the Hatti Sheriff from the hands of Kiamil Pasha, carried it
to his forehead and to his mouth, and after a confidential interview of half an
hour, during which it was settled that Kiamil Pasha should set out on the 21st
of December for Cairo, accompanied by Habib Effendi, formerly Chiaja of that
city, and that the Hatti Sheriff should there be proclaimed, registered, and copies
communicated to all tke provincial Authorities, the Minister of the Porte repaired
to the house of the Divan Effendi, where apartments had been prepared for hiih.
Mehemet Ali did not seem either to rejoice at, or to be embarrassed by, the
mission of Kiamil Pasha. He caused the opinion to be spread among the
people that this Hatti Sheriff was nothing more than the customary Ibka, by
which he was confirmed in his dignity.
The departure of Kiamil Pasha and Habib Effendi for Cairo did, in fact,
take place at 9 o'clock, on the 21st of December.

Inclosure 2 in No. 462.
M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.

M. le Baron, Alexandrie, le 28 Decembre, 1839.
LE changement d'uniforme de la Marine de Sa Hautesse est en rapport
avec une autre disposition que Mehemet Ali vient de faire. Ce changement n'a
rien moins pour but que la fusion de tous les equipages du Sultan avec ceux de
Mekemet Ak. L'autre prescrit que, pour le moment, la moitie des officiers et
ckarges subalternes de la Flotte Egyptienne doit passer a bord des vaisseaux
Ottomans, et vice versd. Mais il est a prevoir que cette mesure, qu'on met
deja a execution, sera suivie d'une fusion generate des equipages des que les
habillemens commandes seront prets. 4D

570
Le but avoue de cette disposition est d'apporter plus d'unite dans les
manoeuvres et dans Paction. Cette mesure doit avoir ete provoquee par Ahmed
Fevzi Pacha, qui pense, dit-on, que la flotte du Sultan gagnera beaucoup sur
le rapport de Pinstruction et du service materiel, en observant attentivement les
Arabes, qui sont plus adroits et plus agiles.
Mais ce n'est pas ce but que s'est propose Mehemet Ali. II parait avoir
remarque que la flotte Ottomane n'est pas aniiitee a son egard des sentimens
les plus purs. II sait meme qu'il y aurait probablement une emeute dans le cas
ou le paiement de la solde eprouverait les delais qui ne sont ici que trop d'usage.
C'est pourquoi il cherche a prevenir, a temps, un semblable evenement, et il se
voit d'autant plus sur a ce sujet que, par toute sorte d'artifices, il a fait accroke
aux equipages que sa cause est identique avec celle du Sultan. Pour mieux
encore remplir ce but, il a severement ordonne qu'a bord les deux flottes on ne
parlera du Sultan qu'avec la soumission et le respect qui lui sont dus en sa
qualite de Pere commun de la Patrie et de Chef de PEtat.
Aujourd'hui, Ahmed Fevzi Pacha donne a diner a Mehemet Ali et aux
Etat-Majors des Flottes Turque et Egyptienne. Les officiers et les matelots y
prendront part, de sorte qu'il y aura en tout 1000 couverts. Ce diner aura
lieu a bord du vaisseau "Mahmoudie," de 130 pieces de canon. L'effet que ces
nouvelles ont produit sur les Francs et les Turcs de cette ville est que Mehemet
Ak a enfin leve le masque et s'est formellement approprie la flotte du Grand
Seigneur. Agreez, &c,
(Signe) LAURIN.
(Translation.)
M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.
Sir, Alexandria, December 28, 1839.
THE change in the uniform of His Highness's Navy is connected with
another proceeding of Mehemet Ali. This change has no less an object in view
than the amalgamation of the crews of the Sultan with those of Mehemet Ali.
The other directs that for the present one-half of the officers and subalterns of
the Egyptian fleet shall remove on board the Turkish ships, and vice versd.
But it is to be anticipated that this measure, which is already being carried
into execution, will be followed by a general amalgamation of the crews, the
moment that the clothes, which have been ordered, shall be ready.
The avowed object of this proceeding is, to produce a greater unity of
action in the manoeuvres. This measure would seem to have been brought
about by Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, who, it is said, thinks that the Sultan's fleet wik
gain a great deal of instruction in practical service, by observing with attention
the Arabs, who are more active and expert.
But this is not the object of Mehemet Ak. He appears to kave remarked,
that the Ottoman fleet is not animated by the purest feelings towards kimself.
He is even aware that there would probably be a disturbance in case any delays,
such as are only too common here, were to take place in furnishing the pay. It
is with this view that he seeks to guard against such an event in time ; and he
thinks himself the more secure on this head, because he has used all kinds of
artifice to make the crews believe that his cause is identical with that of the
Sultan. In order the better to attain this end, he has strictly enjoined that no
one on board the two fleets shall speak of the Sultan without the submission and
the respect due to him, in his capacity of common Father of the Country and
Chief of the State. P*^
To-day Ahmed Fevzi Pasha gives a dinner to Mehemet Ak and to the Staff
of the Turkish and Egyptian Fleets. The officers and the sailors are to take
part, so that there will he 1000 guests in all. This dinner will take place on
hoard the "Mahmoudie," of 130 guns. The effect produced by these tidings
upon the Franks and Turks of the City is, that Mehemet Ali kas at length
thrown off the mask, and formally appropriated to himself the Fleet of the
Grand Signor. Accept, &c,
(Signed) LAURIN.

571
No. 463.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 31.)
My Lord, Paris, January 29, 1840.
MARSHAL SOULT last night informed me that the Baron de Bour
queney would be despatched this day to London, for the purpose of apprizing
Count Sebastiani that the King had determined to relieve his Excellency from
tke duties witk which he was now charged at the Court of Her Majesty, and
that it was the King's intention to mark his sense of the services of Count
Sebastiani, by advancing him to the dignity of Marshal of France.
Marshal Soult at the same time told me that M. Guizot would be named
Ambassador to England.
In reply to this communication, I said that Her Majesty's Government
would much regret the departure of Count Sebastiani, who has been animated
with the most sincere desire to maintain the best understanding between France
and England, during the whole period that he has occupied the important post
from which he was about to be relieved, and had by his honourable and straight
forward conduct conciliated the good opinion and respect of those with whom he
bad to do ; but that they would learn with pleasure His Majesty's gracious
intention to confer the high dignity of Marshal of France upon Count
Sebastiani. That with respect to the appointment of M. Guizot to the vacant Embassy,
his high reputation could not fail to secure to him a most favourable reception
by Her Majesty and by Her Majesty's Government.
M. Guizot has just caked upon me, and said he was glad to have the
opportunity of assuring me that Count Sebastiani could not have been more
anxious than he wik he, to maintain the most intimate alliance between tke
British and French Governments. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 464.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, January 31, 1840.
WITH reference to your Excekency's despatch, of the 24th instant,
reporting a conversation wkich your Excekency had held with Marshal Soult on
the subject of a confidential despatch which the Marshal had received from
Count Sebastiani, relative to the negotiations now carrying on in London upon
the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, I have to state to your Excellency, that I
showed Count Sebastiani, confidentiaky, on paper, a sketch of the plan which
had suggested itself to me, as one to which ak the Five Powers might
agree. But I have not as yet been able to mature that plan sufficiently to be
able to submit it for tke consideration of the Cabinet ; and of course, therefore,
I have not yet made any formal proposition to any of the Plenipotentiaries of the
Four Powers. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 465.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 31, 1840.)
My Lord, Alexandria, December 27, 1839.
IT has been for some time known at this place, that great discontent exists
amongst the crews of the ships belonging to the Turkish squadron, and that this
circumstance has caused considerable anxiety to Mehemet Ali, and led him to
4 D2

572
the determination of amalgamating the crews of the Turkish and Egyptian
squadrons. M. de Laurin, the Austrian Consul-General, caked upon me this day, and
confirmed what I have stated to your Lordship, adding that Mehemet Ali had
ordered 15,000 Egyptian uniforms to be made for the Turkish sakors, who are all
wek disposed to exchange their present Frank costume for that of the Ottomans.
M. de Laurin further informed me that Mehemet Ali is assigning an equal
number of Egyptian and Turkisk officers on board tke Sultan's squadron,
expecting thereby to avert the dangers that are already impending.
The Viceroy gives this day a dinner on board the " Mahmoudie," the
Capudan Pasha's flag-ship, to the officers of all ranks of the combined Turkish
and. Egyptian fleets. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 466.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received January 31, 1840.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, December 27, 1839.
I HAVE just learnt that a considerable military movement has taken
place in Syria. The garrison of Marash, which is now 9,000 strong, is to be
increased to 12,000, and the works of St. Jean d'Acre, which are already formi
dable, are to be put into a perfect state of defence.

No. 467.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 1.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, January 14, 1840.
THE Russian Government are anxiously awaiting the determination of Her
Majesty's Government, as to tke course of action to be adopted independently of
France, if France should refuse to concur in the settlement which may be
determined upon by the other Powers of Europe. I expressed to Count
Nesselrode my personal conviction, that Her Majesty's Government would
proceed with the vigour and consistency with which they had hitherto acted,
and which the conduct of the Emperor was so well calculated to inspire, and
deserved to meet with. No. 468.
Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, February 3, 1840.
HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excekency
held to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatch of January 14, respecting
the course which Her Majesty's Government would pursue in the Turco-Egyp
tian Question. No. 469.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 3, 1840.)
My Lord, Damascus, December 23, 1839.
I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship, my last despatch,
on the 28th ultimo, per Beyrout sailing packet.
His Excellency lsmael Bey proceeded from hence on the 17th instant, to

573
the Naplouse district, with rather a considerable irregular force of foot and
cavaky, ostensibly to collect taxes due to tke Government.
A regiment of Cavaky and one of Horse Artillery kave arrived here from
the north, and remain in garrison. One regiment of Infantry is also arrived at
Hamah. The 18th Infantry has marched from hence to Acre; the Govern
ment here says it is to garrison that fortress, but I am told it is destined for
Egypt. The cause stated for these troops having been marched from the north,
principaky from Antioch, is that, having suffered from sickness, their re
moval from thence became indispensable, and that they are merely to winter
in the Damascus district and the south ; whether the stations they now occupy
may have been decided on from any political motive connected wTith the future
state of this country, your Lordship can best judge. Nothing at present
denotes that the troops on the Marash frontier and at Orfa will fall back, or that
those in the environs of Aleppo will retire to tke south.
I hear that the Emir Bechir has succeeded in re-establishing order on the
roads between Acre, Tyre, and this place, infested by the Mutuaks under Sheik
Hussein Shebib, but he witk kis partizans, now reduced to about twenty
persons, kave not been apprehended; the Government has threatened to
destroy the houses of ak tkose wko are found absent, or suspected of being
so, to join this Chief, which strong measure has produced, for the present,
the effect of reducing these insurgents.
The country, in otker respects, is quiet, and as winter is setting in, it may
be hoped that it wik remain so, as the country is not adapted for marauding or
insurrectionary movements during the inclement season.
The Pkgrim Mecca Caravan is on its departure. The number of Turks
is very smak, not above 600. The Persians are about 800. A combination of
ckcumstances seems to tend to deter yearly the Islams from undertaking this
religious journey.
Commerce of ak kinds is in a very languid and depressed state, arising
chiefly from the kmited extent of operations with Bagdad, whose markets are in
fluenced by the state of Persia, and the great influx of goods to them. The un
certain political position of this country materially increases tke paralysis wkick
pervades the whole system in Syria ; and the late rigorous exaction of taxes, by
the Government, on the agricultural classes, kas tended to prevent, in many parts,
the cultivation of lands. I have, &c,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

No. 470.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 3.)
(Extract.) Paris, January 31, 1840.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 28th instant.
Marshal Soult this morning read to me a despatch received yesterday from
Count Sebastiani, stating that your Lordship had submitted to the Cabinet
Counck the proposition that the Turco-Egyptian Question should be settled by
a Convention to be concluded between the Sultan and the Five Great Powers,
and not, as had been intended, by a Convention to which the Sultan was not
previously invited to be a Contracting Party, and tkat Her Majesty's Council
had unanimously approved of this proposal.
The Marshal said, that his own opinion entirely coincided upon this point
witk that of Her Majesty's Government, and that this communication from the
French Ambassador gave him great satisfaction. He doubted, however, very
much, that the Court of St. Petersburgh would agree to this proposition.
The Marshal calculated the time that must necessarily elapse before a
Plenipotentiary from Turkey could arrive in London from Constantinople, and
seemed to rejoice that during the next two months the French Government
would not be under the necessity of refusing or assenting to be a party to a
Convention of the Five Powers regarding the Affairs of the East.
I sounded Nouri Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, whether he
would go to England and sign a Convention, in case he should be invited so to

574
do, for the purpose of expediting an arrangement which must otherwise be
delayed for a length of time. His Excekency said that he had no orders from
his Government which would justify his taking such a step, and he could not
quit his post, and enter into a negotiation in London upon his own respon-
sibkity.

No. 471.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received February 11.)
My Lord, Alexandria, December 30, 1 839-
IN reference to my despatch of the 27th instant, I have been given to
understand, both by M. de Laurin and others, that nothing of any particular
importance took place on the occasion of the dinner given by Mehemet Ali on
the 27th, on board the " Mahmoudie." Mehemet Ali made great professions of
loyalty and devotion to the Sultan before the Turkish officers, saying, that it
would afford him great satisfaction to renew similar occasions of cementing
those sentiments which were happky now in common amongst them all for tke
good of thek country.
The Austrian and Russian Consuls-General called upon the Pasha yester
day : the former questioned him as to his object in placing an equal number
of Egyptian and Turkish officers on board the Turkish squadron. Mehemet
Ali replied, " that he had done so at the request of Ahmed Capudan Pasha
and the two other Admirals, who seeing the superiority in the discipline and
manoeuvring of the Egyptian squadron, thought it advisable to adopt this
system for placing the crews of both the fleets on an equal footing of effi
ciency." The Austrian Consul-General inquired his object in ckanging tke
uniforms of the Turkish sakors. " This measure I have also resorted to at the
suggestion of the Capudan Pasha," repked Mehemet Ali, " and I know it wik be
popular among tke sakors themselves, who are anxious and willing to change
the Muscovite costume for that of the Turkish." " But ak this," repked M.
de Laurin, "coincides badly witk your assurances that you only detdned the
Turkish squadron for a time, without considering them at ak as forming part of
your own forces." " What I am doing," repked Mekemet Ak, " is but natural
and just : I shall give up the Turkish squadron as soon as the differences
between the Porte and myself are arranged; and if, in the interim, I am
attacked by any Foreign Power, I will use it as a means of defence ; wkick my
present position would fully justify." Count Medem informs me that kis con
versation witk tke Pasha was of a similar nature. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 472.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 11.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, January 4, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I waited upon His
Highness Mehemet Ali yesterday, at 10 o'clock, a.m., and presented to him
my exequatur from the Porte. I found with his Highness, Ahmed Capudan
Pasha, Boghos Bey, and the first Dragoman, Artin Bey. The Pasha said,
that he had always received with pleasure the firmans of the late Sultan
announcing the appointment of British Agents, and that the circumstance of his
present youthful Sovereign being a particular friend of the British Government
enhanced it greatly on this occasion. The Capudan Pasha then retired ;
although I had met him at Constantinople on two occasions, I as pointedly as
I could avoided recognizing him.
The Pasha opened the conversation by saying, in reply to a desire which I
expressed of seizing the opportunity of accompanying him to see Cairo, that
that depended not on him, but upon the Englisk Government, in wkose hands

575
now rested the option of good or evk in the settlement of his question with the
Porte. I begged to assure his Highness of the friendly intentions of Her
Majesty's Government ; and assured him, that whatever his own opinions might
be, no Power could be more interested in his prosperity ; but at the same time
announced to him the positive determination of Her Majesty's Government to
adhere to the line of policy wkich it had definitively adopted on this subject, and
of which an additional proof was afforded to his Highness, by the nomination of a
new Agent to enforce it. His Highness might rely upon my faithfully expressing
the intention of Her Majesty's Government, unbiassed and uncontrolled by
any consideration. I then proceeded to acquaint His Highness impressively,
that it was England's firm determination to maintain the integrity of Turkey
under its present dynasty ; and that any opposition offered by His Highness
could only entail upon him the most ruinous consequences ; for that Her
Majesty's Government were determined to carry out their policy by measures
which could leave no doubt as to the spirit of it, even if they acted
alone. The Pasha was evidently much agitated, and I awaited his reply,
when Boghos Bey, who stood by him, requested him to be composed, and
to akow me to proceed. Finding that his Highness was not disposed to con
tinue the subject, I remarked that Prince Metternich, with whom I had a short
time ago an opportunity of conversing upon the Oriental Question at Vienna,
had authorized me to state to his Highness, that the Austrian Government
were determined to back the policy of England to its fullest extent ; and that
be bekeved tke other Powers were equally agreed upon the subject ; and for the
correctness of which statement I referred his Highness to M. de Laurin, the
Austrian Consul-General. Mehemet Ali here burst forth violently, that " much
words were useless. I don't deny the power of England, nor can I tie her
hands; but if they pretend to confine me within the limits," meaning, I pre
sume, of Egypt, "I swear that I wkl do anything before I submit to be thus
sacrificed ; as for supporting the Turkish dynasty, who can be more zealous
than I am 1 the very people about me would rise against me, were I to attempt
its overthrow." I said, that the occupation of the Turkish provinces in Asia
Minor was incompatible with such an assertion ; to which the Vizier replied,
that before the battle of Nezib it was not concealed at Constantinople that unless
he had a predominant share in the administration of the Empire, it could never
be restored to any degree of quiet or order, owing to the obstinacy of Hosrew
Pasha ; even the affections of that man (the Capudan Pasha, who had retired,)
were akenated. " I now hold firm possession of those provinoes, and still tkey
are not submissive. I am an old man, upwards of seventy-one, but I will never
consent to the cession of them during my life-time." The Pasha confirmed
this determination with a solemn oath, and evinced a desire to cease the con
versation. He had much reliance on tke justice and humanity of England, and
was sure she would hesitate ere she caused the effusion of blood which might
spring from her present policy. "Write," said he, " and I will answer all."
I remarked in conclusion to his Highness, that the nature of my communication
to him was perfectly confidential, and by no means official, and actuated by the
best motives ; and that I should feel very happy to renew the theme whenever
he felt disposed to do so.
Although my personal knowledge of the Pasha is of a very short duration,
it was evident to me, from his manner and gesture, that he was labouring under
great anxiety of mind, and incertitude of action ; and I believe that I may, even
after so short a residence in this country, assure your Lordship that Mehemet
Ak wik submit, as soon as he sees a force able to compel him to do so at hand,
but not until then.

No. 473.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received February 1 1 .)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 4, 1840.
AFTER my interview with Mehemet Ali yesterday, a Council was sum
moned at an unusual hour, where the withdrawal of the troops from the Hedjaz,
for the reinforcement of the garrison of Alexandria, was taken into considera-

576
tion. This force, I am told, does not exceed 4,000 men ; and it has been
decided to hold them in readiness to march upon this point. Instructions have
been given to the squadrons and telegraphs, to bring into use and famikarize
tkemselves with the French Code of Signals.
These circumstances may be deemed worthy of notice, and I therefore beg
leave to report them for your Lordship's information. I have, &e,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 474.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 11.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 6, 1840
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that a few hours after the
arrival here of the French steamer from Marseikes, M. Cochelet, Consul-General
for France, waited upon the Pasha, and made to him the following communica
tion : — " That Russia had made many concessions to the other Powers, and was
about to identify her policy witk that of England and Austria by uniting her
force to theirs for the termination of the Egyptian Question ; that to such an
union France could not object, and that it was even one to which she herself
might possibly become a party ; that it was necessary for the Pasha to be
convinced, that the arrangement of the Egyptian Question, upon the basis
proposed by France, was no longer attainable. M. Cochelet went on to warn
the Pasha of the dangers to which he would expose himself by a perseverance
in his present course. To this the Pasha replied, tkat having exercised mode
ration in preventing his army from advancing upon Constantinople after the
battle of Nezib, he relied upon the Great Powers taking this circumstance into
consideration ; that even the oppressed were entitled to justice ; that he would
await events, and place his confidence in Divine Providence.
Count Medem, Russian Consul-General, called upon tke Paska soon after,
and made a similar declaration on the part of his Government; adding, "If
you should attempt to move on Constantinople, you may expect to have a
Russian force opposed to you." The Pasha answered, " I have no thoughts of
moving upon Constantinople, for I am not able to contend with one Power,
much less with ak."
I have since learnt, from a source on which I can place reliance, tkat tke
Pasha has declared to the people about him, that he will surrender his just
rights only with his life ; using the words, " They must first trample on my
body." In addition, I have only to state that, from everything I can hear and learn,
Mehemet Ak wik only submit when he sees the danger near at hand.
I have &c.
(Signed) G.' LLOYD HODGES.

No. 475.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 11.)
My Lord, Berlin, February 5, 1840.
I HAVE learnt from an authority upon which full reliance may be placed,
that a letter has within a few days been received at Berlin from a Prussian
Artillery officer at Constantinople, in the service of the Porte, who was present
at the battle of Nezib, in which the writer states his opinion, that notwithstand
ing the completion of the fortifications at the passes of Boghas Kulek,
near Koniah, the Turkish Army in Syria would not be able to prevent the
advance of Ibrahim Pasha on Constantinople, of which fears were entertained.
This officer, however, adds his impression, that Ibrahim would not have it
in his power to muster on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus, a larger force than

577
15,000 men, and that the Turkish garrison of Constantinople, together with
2,000 Artikerymen withdrawn from the Dardanelles, would be sufficiently
strong to resist the passage of the Bosphorus, and an attack upon Constantinople
by the Pasha, whose failure in the object of his attempt would, probably, lead
to the total destruction of his army. Ihave, &c,
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 476.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 11.)
My Lord, Therapia, January 15, 1840.
I INCLOSE a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 476.
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

(Traduction.) J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir des mains de Kiamil Pacha, General de
Brigade dans l'Armee Imperiale reguliere, deux nobles firmans ornes d'un Hatti
Cheriff, et adresses Fun k votre serviteur, et l'autre a, mon fils, son Excekence
Ibrahim Pacha, dont la substance est : que Sa Majeste Imperiale, animde de la
pensee du bien public, a exprime dans un Hatti Cheriff qui vient d'etre publie*,
sa volonte souveraine d'etablir de nouvekes institutions tendant a Pamdioration
de I'etat des provinces, et du sort des peuples ; que les bases fondamentales du
Hatti Cheriff, dont les consequences necessaires ont 6t6 developpees, sont : — la
garantie de la vie et de l'honneur ; le mode d'asseoir les imp6ts ; et la regie a,
observer dans la levee des soldats et dans la duree de leur service ; qu'attendu
la difficulte qu'k y a a exeputer tout de suite les mesures relatives a la percep
tion des impots et a la duree du service militaire, on doit continuer de percevoir
les imp6ts et d'employer les soldats comme a Pordinaire, jusqu'a ce que des
dispositions calculees a faciliter ces deux objets aient ete arretees dans les
Conseils ; et que quant aux autres points dejk developpes, on doit commencer a.
les mettre a execution des-a-present.
J'ai recu les firmans avec tous les konneurs qui leur etaient dus, en les
portant sur mes levres et sur mon front, et afin de remplir a cette occasion
toutes les formaktes requises, j'ai envoye au Caire avec Kiamil Pacha celui qui
m'dait adresse, pour y convoquer une grande assemblee et Py faire lire ; j'en ai
expedie des copies dans les ckefs-keux des provinces et des sandjacks de la
Syrie, et j'ai expedie a mon fils, Ibrahim Pacha, le firman qui etait a son adresse,
pour qu'il eut a le faire Ike publiquement a Adana, et qu'il en envoyat une copie
a Djidda. Effectivement, une assembtee a ete tenue au Divan du Caire, alaqueke ont
assiste le Cadi, les Mouftis des quatre Rits Orthodoxes, tous les Outemas,
Imaums, Hatibs, les principaux des habitans, tous les servkeurs de Sa Hautesse,
les Vice-Consuls des Puissances Amies, et les Patriarckes et les notables des
autres Nations Chretiennes. La le Firman a ete ouvert et lu avec toutes les
demonstrations de la veneration et du respect, et aussitdt la lecture terminee,
tous les assistans ont beni le Sultan et fait des voeux pour la conservation de ses
jours precieux et pour la prosperite de son Empire.
Dieu soit loue! C'est dans le tems du tres-grand, tres-puissant, et tres-
Auguste Sultan regnant que vont revivre les Lois Divines et la Legislation qui, a
cause des circonstances, se trouvent depuis nombre d'annees tombees dans
Finobservation. Cette sollicitude Souveraine fait voi* que la Providence Divine
veike sur la conservation de FEmpire, et sur le bonheur et la prosperite de Sa
Hautesse. Mais tant. que les reg.emens de justice dont il s'agit n'auront pas
4 E

578
ete* etablis, c'est en vain que les Ministres de la Subkme Porte, hommes done s
de loyaute, de devouement, de zele, et de piete, s'efforceront et prendront mille
peines pour faire le bien, chacun dans la partie qui te concerne, durant Pexercice
de ses fonctions ; car il est clair que la ou un bon principe n'existe pas, il n'y a
aucun bon effet a attendre.
Le pays ou je me trouve est a l'extremite de l'Empire, et c'est avec de grands
efforts que j'ai reussi, il y a deja plusieurs annees, a y etablir la garantie de la
vie, de l'honneur et de la fortune. Ici nul n'est mis a mort qu'il n'y ait etd
legalement condamne. Les puissans ne mokstent en aucune maniere les faibles,
ni dans leur honneur ni dans leurs biens. La confiscation, la condamnation a
Famende, et les payemens a faire aux Moubashirs (officiers charges du recou-
vrement des monnaies) ont ete supprimes et remplaces de tems a autre par
d'autres reglemens. Nul n'est condamne a subir par la loi du talion une peine
encourue par un autre. On fait toucher exactement aux heritiers, queke que soit
la nation a laquelle ils appartiennent, la part qui leur est ediue, et Pon a de
tems en tems, et lorsque Poccasion se presentait, redige des Codes de peu
d'etendue et a la portee de chacun, qui sont, sous les auspices du Sultan, main-
tenus en vigueur.
II existe surtout des codes militaires pour I'armee et la marine lesquels ont
ete sanctionnes par la signature des Oulemas, et doivent, ainsi que la resolution
en a ete prise, avoir toujours force de loi.
Tels sont les reglemens qui ont ete etablis et dont on ne s'est jusqu'ici
jamais ecarte. Apres cela, on avait fixe a cinq ans, a compter du jour de
Fenrolement, le terme du service militaire. Mais plus tard, en consideration
de Pexigence des tems, et par des raisons locales, le service a ete fixe a quinze
ans. D'autres excelkntes dispositions de ce genre ont aussi ete faites avec
succes. Mais attendu la difficulte qu'il y a a faire ces sortes de reglemens,
aucune branche de ces institutions n'a pu etre portee a sa perfection.
Que Dieu daigne conserver la prosperite de l'Empire de Sa Hautesse jusqu'a
la consommation des siecles. Fort de la volonte que Sa Majeste Imperiale vient
de manifester, je mettrai desormais tous mes soins a executer, avec Fassistance
divine, toutes les dispositions que renferme le susdit noble firman ; et sous les
auspices de Sa Majeste Imperiale, toutes auront sous peu de tems ete mises a
execution. Et c'est pour exprimer toute ma reconnaissance ainsi que pour renouveler
mes hommages, que j'ecris a votre Altesse la presente lettre, que je lui envoie
par Kiamil Pacha qui s'en retourne a Constantinople.

(Translation.)
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.
I HAVE had the honour to receive from the hands of Kiamil Pasha,
General of Brigade in the regular Imperial Army, two noble firmans adorned
with a Hatti Sheriff, and addressed, one to your servant, and the other to my son
his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, the substance of which is, that His Imperial
Majesty, animated with a desire for the public welfare, has signified, in a Haiti
Sheriff just published, his sovereign will to establish new institutions tending
to ameliorate the state of the Provinces and the condition of the people : that
the principal bases of the Hatti Sheriff, the necessary consequences of which have
been explained, are : security of life and honour ; the manner of assessing the
taxes ; the regulations to be observed in the conscription of soldiers and in the
duration of their service ; but inasmuch as it is difficult to put into immediate
execution the measures relating to the collection of the taxes and to the duration
of military service, the taxes are to be collected, and the soldiers to be employed
in the usual manner, until arrangements calculated to facilitate these two objects
have been determined upon in the Councils ; and with regard to the other points
already mentioned, they are to be carried into execution from the present time.
7. have received the firmans with all due honours, raising them to my lips
and to my forehead, and in order to discharge on this occasion all the necessary for
malities, I have sent the one addressed to myself to Cairo, by Kiamil Pasha to con
voke a great assembly, and cause it to be read therein ; I have sent copies of it to
the chief places of the Provinces and Sandjacks of Syria, and I have sent to my son

579
Ibrahim Pasha the firman which was addressed to him, that he may cause it to
be read publicly at Adana, and send a copy of it to Djidda.
In effect, an Assembly has been held at the Divan of Cairo, at which were
present the Cadi, the Muftis of the four orthodox rites, all the Ulemas, Imaums,
Hatibs, the principal inhabitants, all the servants of His Highness, the Vice-
Consuls of the friendly Powers, and the patriarchs and chief men of the other
Christian nations. There the firman was opened and read with every demon
stration of veneration and respect, and at the conclusion, all present blessed the
Sultan, and prayed for the preservation of his precious life, and for the prosperity
of his Empire.
God he praised! It is in the time of the most great, most powerful, and
most august reigning Sultan, that the divine laws and legislation which, from
circumstances have for a number of years past fallen into neglect, are about to
revive^ This sovereign care shows that Divine Providence watches over the
preservation of the Empire and over the happiness and prosperity of His High
ness. But so long as the rules of justice in question are not established, it is in
vain that the Ministers of the Sublime Porte, men endowed with loyalty, devo
tion, zeal, and piety, labour and take a thousand pains to do good, each in the
matter which concerns him, during the exercise of his functions ; for it is
evident that where no good prindple exists, no good result can be attained.
The country where I am, is at the extremity of the Empire, and it is now
some years since I succeeded in establishing in it security for life, honour, and
property. Here no person is put to death who has not been legally condemned.
The powerful de not, in any manner, injure the weak, either in their honour or
iu their property ; confiscation, condemnation to fines, and payments made to
the Moubashirs (officers employed in the recovery of money), have been sup
pressed, and other regulations substituted for them from time to time. No
person is made answerable for a crime committed by another. Heirs, to
whatever nation they may belong, are put duly in possession of the inheritance
to which they may succeed, and from time to time, and as opportunites presented
themselves, codes of moderate length and within the capacity of every one,
have been drawn up, and are maintained in vigour under the auspices of the
Sultan. There are also military codes for the army and navy, which have been
sanctioned by the signature of the Ulemas, and which are always to have, as was
determined, the force of law.
Such are the regulations which have been established and which have
hitherto, never been departed from. After that, the term of military service
was fixed at five years, to date from the day of enlistment. But, latterly, in
consequence of the exigencies of the times, and for local reasons, the term, of
service has been fixed at fifteen years. Other excellent arrangements of this
sort have been made with success. But the difficulty of making these regula
tions, has prevented any branch of these institutions from being brought to its
perfection. May God deign to preserve the prosperity of His Highness's Empire to the
end of time. Strong in the pleasure which His Imperial Majesty has manifested,
I shall heneeforth employ all my diligence to execute, with the divine assistance,
all the regulations which the before said noble Firman contains; and under the
auspices of His Imperial Majesty they shall all be put in execution in a short time,
And it is to assure you of all my acknowledgments, and to renew my
compliments, that I write to Your Highness the present letter, which I send by
Kiamil Pasha, who is about to return to Constantinople.

No. 477.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 11.)
(Extract.) Therapia, January 15, 1840.
I INCLOSE two reports from Syria.
4 E 2

580
Inclosure 1 in No. 477.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Aleppo, December 24, 1839.
HIS Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to occupy Marash,
and, from all appearances, has not the intention for the present of abandoning
that point, or retiring the force he has with him from that position.
The forces at Orfa remain without any further change than that noted in
my last despatch to your Lordship, that the 11th and 17th Regiments of the Line
in garrison here left this for Orfa ; and since then the 9th and 14th Regiments
of the same, who were at Orfa, have replaced them here, where they continue to
remain. The 13th Regiment of Cavalry stationed kere kas also received orders to
proceed soutk to Acre, for which place it has left ; and the 2nd Regiment of
Artillery kas returned to its post here, from Aintab.
It is rumoured, that some of the other regiments that are at present at Aintab
are soon to come to this place to winter ; and the Government here, I under- ,
stand, has already prepared and emptied several khans for their reception.
I learn from several quarters, that some of the regiments from the Adana
district, and some of those that have occupied the north-eastern frontier, have
also been sent to the south, to their respective garrisons. This measure, and '
the disposition of tke forces returning soutk, is generally supposed to be for the
purpose of placing all tke troops into quarters suited for tke severe months of
the winter season which has approached.
By the latest advices from the Alexandretta district, I learn from Mr. Vice-
Consul Hays, that for the present everything continues quiet ; and that the inha
bitants of the neighbouring mountains have not evinced any further symptoms of
discontent against the Government, which continues to exact the taxes.

Inclosure 2 in No. 477.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, Damascus, December 28, 1839.
I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship, per Austrian steamer,
on the 4th instant.
The 1 6th Regiment of Infantry, which arrived here from the north, has pro
ceeded to Acre. A regiment of Horse Artillery, and one of Cavalry, has been
stationed here ; and one regiment of Infantry has arrived at Hamah.
I hear the Mutuali Sheik, Hussein Shebib, who infested the environs of
Tyre, has, with a few followers, entered the Ledgea. The Government here
expects that the Snutt Arab, Sheik Antash, will cause them to be seized and
delivered up to this Government. Twenty-two Mutudis have been brought
here and delivered to the Government, by the Emir Bechir's grandson, forming
part of Hussein Shebib's followers. Two of tkem killed a Catholic Greek priest
at Korsheya, and have committed various depredations and robberies. They
are to suffer death, and the rest are to be sent to Acre. In other respects the
country is for the present quiet.
I hear that the Egyptians are as active as they were previously represented
to be, in Arabia.
I do not observe any fresh measure of Government which is indicative of
its future policy. Affairs remain in the same state which I had the honour of
noticing to your Lordship in my last despatch.
Your Lordship will be informed by the Aleppo Pro-Consul of the expected
arrival of troops there, from the northern frontier. Ibrahim Pasha was stik at
Marash. The troops are said to be expected at Aleppo from that point, and no
mention is made of those at Orfa retiring, though, I hear, quarters are preparing
at Aleppo for ten regiments. Whether this retrogade movement is owing to the
bad quarters to the frontiers, ill adapted to winter, to tke sickly state of the

581
troops, or is a prelude to the settlement of the question between the Sultan and
Mehemet Ak, your Lordship can best determine. .
The Pilgrim Mecca Caravan has left this city. The number of pilgrims is
very smak, being about 800 Persians and 600 Turks. The fervour of the Mahom-
medans seems to diminish annually for this pious journey. I have, &e,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.
P.S. — lsmael Bey has proceeded with a considerable force of Irregular
Cavaky and of Foot, to cokect Miri due in the Naplouse district.

No. 478.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 12.)
My Lord, Paris, February 10, 1840.
I RECEIVED, yesterday, your Lordship's despatch of the 7th instant,
with its inclosures.
The appointment of M. Guizot to be Ambassador at the Court of London is
notified in the " Moniteur" of this day.
I, yesterday, stated to M. Guizot, as wek as to Marshal Soult, tkat your
Lordship thought it essential in the present state of things, when the negotiation
of an arrangement with the Three Powers about the affairs of Turkey was in
progress, that a French Ambassador should be on the spot witk wkom you migkt
communicate on that subject ; and I learnt from them that, twenty-four hours
after the arrival of Count Sebastiani, with whom M. Guizot was desirous of
having some conversation, he would be prepared to leave Paris. Count Sebas
tiani is expected here on Saturday ; M. Guizot wik, tkerefore, set off probably

for London the beginning of next week.

I have, &e,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 479.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 12.)
My Lord, Paris, February 10, 1840.
THE despatches lately received from M. Cochelet state, that since the last
interview which took place between Colonel Hodges and Mehemet Ali, tke
Pasha has expressed his determination to decline ak verbal communications with
the Consuls of the Great European Powers, and that he is occupied in preparing
naval and miktary means of defence. To a certain degree, tkis account is con
firmed by letters wkick have been received here from the Russian Consul at
Alexandria, who, however, subsequently to the audience of Colonel Hodges, had
a conversation with Mehemet Ali, in which the Pasha observed to him, that if
the Egyptian garrison quitted Candia, the island would not fak under the
dominion of the Turks, but be under the government of the native Greeks ; and
that with regard to the Holy Cities in Arabia, if they should be evacuated by
the Egyptians, they wkl fak an easy prey to tke tribes of the Wahabites.
Count Medem, the Russian Consul, is of opinion that the arming of the
workmen at Alexandria and in the adjacent cities, wik not give to Mehemet Ali
an efficient miktary force ; but he agrees in opinion with the French Consul, that the
Pasha will not be induced, by any fear of the hostility of the European Powers,
to abandon the possession of Syria ; and that from the crops in Egypt having
been last year abundant, he has stkl considerable pecuniary resources.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

582

No. 480.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscov/nt Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Therapia, January 18, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an abstract of Kiamil Pasha's
report of his mission to Egypt, which has been communicated to me by the
Porte ; and also a copy of a tetter from Mehemet Ali to the Consul-General of
France, relative to his Arabian possessions. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.
P.S. — It is striking that Mehemet Ali, in kis letter to M. Cochelet, relating
to his affairs in Arabia, treats this matter as if ak his exertions were to be
considered to have been made by an independent Sovereign, and not by a subject
and officer of the Sultan, and as if tke means, military and civk, employed,
belonged to Mekemet Ali by right, and not to the Porte.

Inclosure 1 in No. 480.
Report of Kiamil Pasha.

(Traduction.) KIAMIL PACHA a ete charge de porter a Mehemet Ak et a son fils
Ibrakim Pacha, les Firmans lmperiaux qui leur avaient ete adresses relativement
aux institutions salutaires qu'on est maintenant occupe a etabhr et. a executes
dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte.
A son arrivee a Alexandrie, lui-meme ainsi que le Firman dont k etait
porteur ont ete parfaitement bien accueikis par le Gouverneur qui leur rendit
tous les honneurs d'usage. Ensuite Mehemet Ali envoya le dit Pacha au Cake,
ok k fit lire pubkquement le Firman en presence des Oulemas, des principaux
habitans et des Vice-Consuls des Puissances amies. Cette declaration du Sultan,
si marquee au coin de la justice, a ete pour tous les habitans de l'Egypte le sujet
de la joie la plus vive et la plus parfaite. Le Firman adresse k Ibrahim Pacha
lui a ete expedie par son pere, qui a annonce qu'il en enverrait aussi des copies
dans les divers districts de la Syrie.
Void, en substance, ce qu'a dit Mehemet Ak dans les entretiens qui ont
eu naturellement lieu sur la question du jour. Parlant de ce qu'on avait laisse
les Puissances Europeennes se meier de Parrangement de Paffaire, il indiqua, par
voie d'akusion, qu'elles ne pouvaient pas, sans raison, s'imposer tant de depenses
et d'embarras ; qu'ekes devaient avoir des vues particukeres et agir en cela selon
leurs interets poktiques *. Cela Famena a entamer de nouveau la question d'un
arrangement direct. II dit que pourvu qu'on lui laissat l'Egypte et la Syrie, ses
interets a lui ne seraient pas compromis si on donnait a un autre les contrees
situees plus en arriere, ainsi que le Hedjadj ; que, par consequent, il consentait
a ce qu'on disposat de la province de Djidda en faveur d'un autre, mais qu'il ne
se desisterait pas de la Syrie. Mais Kiamil Pacha n'ayant point de mission
relative a des objets poktiques, n'est entre dans aucune espece d'expkcations qui
auraient eu Pair d'une reponse.
Le ci-devant Grand- Amiral Ahmed Pacha que Kiamil Pacha eut mission
de voir, aff'ecta de ne temoigner aucun repentk de sa conduite, qu'k voulait
expliquer par quelques interpretations futiles. Neanmoins le seul aspect
d'Ahmed Pacha trahit les reniords qui lui dechirent le cceur. Les generaux et
officiers de la Flotte Imperiale deplorent unanimement d'avoir ete trompes, et ils
cherchent par leurs instances a hater le moment de leur retour a Constantinople.
Void ce que contient le Rapport de Kiamil Pacha.
* Mehemet Ali said, " Russia seeks to obtain Constantinople, and England Egypt.'"

583
(Translation.)
Report of Kiamil Pasha.
KIAMIL PASHA was instructed to convey to Mehemet Ali and to his
son Ibrahim Pasha, the Imperial firmans which were addressed to them
respecting the salutary institutions which are about to be established and
carried out in the dominions of the Sublime Porte.
On his arrival at Alexandria, he, as well as the firman of which he was
the bearer, were perfectly well received by the Governor, who paid them all the
usual honours. Afterwards Mehemet Ali sent the Pasha in question to Cairo,
where he caused the firman to be publicly read in the presence of the Ulemas,
of the principal inhabitants, and of the Vice-Consuls of the friendly Powers.
This declaration of the Sultan, so marked witk the stamp of justice, has formed
the subject of the most lively and most sincere joy to ak the inhabitants of
Egypt. The firman addressed to Ibrahim Pasha was despatched to him by his
father, who announced that he would also send copies of it to the different
districts of Syria.
The following is tke substance of wkat Mekemet Ak said in tke interviews
which have naturally taken place upon the question of the day. Speaking of
the circumstance that the European Powers had been allowed to interfere in
the arrangement of the matter, he remarked, incidentally, tkat tkey could not,
¦without a motive, take upon tkemselves so much expence and embarrassment ;
that they must have some particular objects 'and act thereupon according to
their political interests*. This led to his entering afresh upon the question
of a direct arrangement. He said tkat, provided they would kave him Egypt
and Syria, his own interests would not suffer if the countries situated further in
their rear, as well as tke Hedjaz, were given to anotker ; tkat, consequently,
he consented that the province of Djidda should be placed at the disposal of
another, but that he would not give up Syria. But Kiamil Pasha having no
commission with regard to political objects, he entered into no sort of explana
tion which could have the appearance of an answer.
The late Grand Admiral, Ahmed Pasha, whom Kiamil Pasha was instructed
to see, pretended to show no feekng of repentance for kis condud, which he
tried to account for by some futile explanations. Nevertheless, the counte
nance alone of Ahmed Pasha betrays the feekngs of remorse which agitate kis
mind. Tke generals and officers of tke Imperial fleet unanimously lament
having been deceived, and they seek by their importunity to hasten the moment
of their return to Constantinople.
The above are the contents of the Report of Kiamil Pasha.

Inclosure 2 in No. 480.
Mehemet Ali to M. Cochelet.

(Traduction.) CHACUN sait que la Porte sous les trois derniers regnes se voyant dans la
necessite de chasser du Hedjadj les Wehabites qui Pavaient envahi, avait chargd
les Gouverneurs de Bagdad, de Damas, et d'Egypte, de cette entreprise. Mais
le dernier surtout avait ete plus particukerement encourage par les faveurs les
plus flatteuses. Sorti des rangs de Farmee, jaloux d'etre compte parmi les
defenseurs de PEtat, je me chargeai seul de la conduite de l'expedition. A force
de peines et de sacrifices je delivrai les lieux saints de la presence de l'ennemi.
C'etait servir a la fois la religion Musulmane et l'Empire Ottoman. Aussi rien
ne fut-il epargne pour la defense des pays reconquis. ISfE
Cependant la garde des lieux saints coutant beaucoup et exigeant une
armee considerable, je pensai que le moyen de diminuer la depense et d'assurer
a l'avenir la tranquillite, serait d'aller subjuguer chez eux-memes les habitans de
I'Assir des Wehabites'), lorsque j 'appris que ceux-ci, suivant l'exemple de leurs
* Mehemet Ali said, " Russia seeks to obtain Constantinople, and England Egypt."

584
ayeux, voulaient, dans des vues hostkes, s'emparer de divers points sur la cote
du Yemen. Persuade que s'ks n'etaient prevenus, ils recommenceraient a
troubler la paix de l'Empire, je songeai a prendre les mesures necessaires pour
amener leur soumission complete. C'est pour parvenir a les chasser du
Yemen qu'il fallait y envoyer une armee et y ordonner des dispositions ca-
pables de les soumettre. L'eioignement de FAssir, sa situation dans un desert,
necessitated; de vastes moyens de transport pour une armee avec ses munitions
et ses bagages. Le Nedjid pouvant seul fournir les chameaux dont on avait
besoin, il fallait encore envoyer des troupes dans cette province pour se les
procurer. Le Nedjid n'a ete evidemment occupe que pour parvenir a la sou-
mission de FAssir et pour garantir par ce moyen la religion et PEtat des dangers
qui les menacaient. Je te repfete, mes guerres dans FHedjadj, toutes les
depenses que j'ai faites, n'ont eu absolument d'autre but que de servir ma nation
et mon souverain.
A la fin du dernier regne, Edhem Effendi, Dignitaire de la Porte, etant
venu en mission en Egypte, la conversation vint a router sur le rebelle Turktcke-
bilmez. A quoi pensiez-vous, lui di-je, en le nommant Gouverneur de
Djidda ? C'etait agir plut6t dans mon interet que dans le votre. La Porte
en se chargeant de gouverner eke-meme PArabie, m'epargnerait une depense
annuelle de 135,000 a 140,000 bourses qui pourront servir a me fortifier de ce
cote-ci. Ce n'est par la, repondit-il, Funique erreur que nous ayons commis.
En definitive, si par suite de mon devouement a ma nation et k mon Souve
rain, PArabie m'est accordee temporairement, je continuerai k faire mes efforts
pour la defendre ; mais j'aime trop mon pays et mon Gouvernement pour
proposer d'abandonner de moi-meme cette province. Seulement si Pon desire
qu'eke soit gouvernee par la Porte, que Fordre me vienne de me retirer, et je
rappekerai aussitot mes troupes sans faire la moindre difficulte pour Pevacuer.

(Translation.)
Mehemet Ali to M. Cochelet.
EVERYBODY knows tkat tke Porte, under the three last reigns, finding
itself under the necessity of driving out of the Hedjaz the Wahabees, who had
invaded that territory, charged the Governors of Bagdad, Damascus, and Egypt
with this undertaking. But the last of these was, above all, more particularly
encouraged by the most flattering marks of favour. Sprung from the ranks of
the Army, eager to be reckoned among the defenders of the State, I under
took alone the conduct of the expedition. By dint of labour and of sacrifices,
I delivered tke Holy Places from tke presence of tke enemy. Service was tkus
rendered at once to the Mahomedan religion and to tke Ottoman Empire.
Moreover, nothing was spared for the defence of the reconquered countries.
However, the keeping of the Holy Places costing a great deal and requiring
a considerable Army, I thought that the way to diminish the expence and to
secure tranquillity for the future, would be to proceed to subdue in their own
country the inhabitants of Assir (the Wahabees) , when I learnt that, following
tke example of their ancestors, they wished, with hostile intentions, to seize
upon different points on tke coast of the Yemen. Being persuaded that if
they were not prevented, they would begin again to disturb the peace of the
Empire, I determined to take the measures necessary for bringing about their
complete submission. In order to succeed in driving them out of the Yemen,
it was necessary to send thither an Army, and to make such arrangements there
as would be likely to bring them under subjection. The distance of Assir, and
its situation in a desert, required great means of conveyance for an Army with
its ammunition and baggage. The Nedjid being alone able to furnish the camels
which were required, it was also necessary to send troops into that province to
procure them. The Nedjid was evidently only occupied in order to bring about
the subjection of Assir, and to secure by that means the Religion and the State
from the dangers which threatened them. I repeat, that my campaigns in the
Hedjaz, and all the expence which I have incurred, have positively had alone for
their object the service of my nation and my Sovereign.
At the end of the last reign, Edhem Effendi, a dignitary of the Porte,
having come upon a mission to Egypt, the conversation turned upon the rebel-

585
lious Turktche-bilmez. What were you thinking of, I said to him, when you
appointed him Governor of Djidda ? You were thus consulting my interests
more tkan your own. Tke Porte, by undertaking itself to govern Arabia, would
save me an annual expence of from 135,000 to 140,000 purses, which will serve
to strengthen me on this side. That, he answered, is not the only mistake
which we have committed.
Finally, if in consequence of my devotion to my nation and to my Sove
reign, Arabia is temporarily granted to me, I will continue to endeavour to defend -
it ; but I love my country and my Government too much to propose of my own
accord to abandon that province. But if it is desired that it should be governed
by the Porte, let me receive orders to withdraw, and I will recall my troops
without making the least difficulty as to evacuating it.

No. 481.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 12, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that the two frigates and
two corvettes which I mentioned in my despatch, of the 21st December,
having sailed from this port for St. Jean d'Acre, returned here yesterday, and
have brought with them 1,930 irregular troops. It is reported that 2,000 more
are expected here from the same quarter, and that 3,000 Irregular Cavalry had
left Syria by land for Cako, where it is said Mehemet Ali is now about concen
trating a formidable force. The above 1,930 men kave already left Alexandria
for Cairo, to join the garrison of that place. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 482.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 12, 1840.
I HAVE just been informed, that on Mehemet Ali's taking leave of Kiamil
Pasha, on his return to Constantinople on the 3rd instant, he requested the
latter to tell Halil Pasha, that it was his intention to accompany the Turkish
fleet to the Bosphorus early in the spring, in order to have the satisfaction of
showing to his youthful Sovereign, the alterations he had made in the discipline
of the squadron; and the consequent superior precision they had attained in
their evolutions.
This intention on the part of the Viceroy is here considered as unlikely to
be realized, but I am not disposed to treat it as undeserving of notice, when I
take into account his fertility in expedients, and the serious dilemma to which
he is verging. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 483.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 13, 1840.
MEHEMET ALI has ordered the immediate formation of two regiments .
of National Guards, to be formed from the inhabitants of Alexandria, to consist
of 4,000 men. Ahmed El Garbi, an influential and. popular Chieftain, has this
day been raised to the rank of Bey, and is entrusted with the command of thisA
force. 4 F

586
A National Guard is also to be formed of the inhabitants of Cairo, Damietta,
and Rosetta, and it is, I believe, decided to carry into execution this system
throughout all parts of the Ottoman Empire over which Mehemet Ali holds
controul. I kave Sec
Signed) G.' LLOYD HODGES.

No. 484.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 14, 1840.
INTELLIGENCE kas come to me from a source on which I can rely, that
Mehemet Ali has been for the last week addressing the crews and officers of the
Turkish squadron, teking them their faith and liberties were menaced, be kaving
reason to apprehend an attack from the Akied Powers of Europe. That Great
Britain was foremost in the measures towards him, but that he warned ak true
Mussulmans not to be bknded by professions of support from Powers who only
sought their own aggrandisement. That as for the Sultan ke was in tke
hands of designing men ; but, that as God was great, he, Mehemet Ak, would
try to rescue him from his danger, and maintain him upon his throne ; that he
would await the Allies patiently and repel tkem in case of attack ; that should
he be successful in his repulse of the enemy, he would unite both fleets and give
battle to the invading squadrons, and if he were victorious, would carry war into
the very heart of those countries that had tried to disturb the peace of Egypt :
that he looked for the union of all true Mussulmans, and as his cause was just,
he had no doubt of success.
In fact, my Lord, Mehemet Ali has been very successful in demoralizing
the crews of the Turkish squadron, and he has, no doubt, become much more
popular than before, with both officers and men. The whole of the Turkish
officers now appear in the Egyptian uniforms, and the crews wik be dressed in
the same costume in a few days ; they are regularly driked with muskets once
or twice a-week, and the Pasha is careful to make a display of this force by
marching it through the crowded streets of Alexandria from the Arsend to the
exercising ground outside the walls.
I waited on the Pasha this morning, and he was not long in expressing kis
determination to maintain his rights at all risks and kazards ; on which I told
him of the regret I felt at the tone he had assumed in his harangues to the
officers and crews of the Sultan's squadron, and pointed out how much it was
at variance with his former professions, not only to the Sublime Porte, but to
the Agents of the Great Powers here. To this the Pasha repked, " I have not
as yet held the language you impute to me, but if I am driven to it, I shall hold
such language, and resort to any means for my defence ; for I tell you, if I am
attacked, I will resist, and cause muck blood to be shed." I then said I was
glad he denied using such language, and that as for ak his preparations of
defence, he was master of his actions, and might do what he thought proper ;
but that he must well know such preparations would have no effect whatever in
thwarting the views of Great Britain and her Akies, or of turmng them from
their unalterable determination of supporting the Sublime Porte, and restricting
him within his due limits. I told kirn that England had in no way changed her
old habits of never coming to a rash decision, but the decision once made, of
striking boldly, and with such a force as must command success. I entreated
Mehemet Ali to be assured that England would only resort to such a measure
when he had proved to us that all means of persuasion were unavailing, and
recaked to kis memory a circumstance of no remote date, which unhappky
might bear a strong analogy to his own case, should he persist in his present
course, which was, that Napoleon Buonaparte refused the offer of the Akied
Sovereigns that he should be the ruler of France, with the Alps and the Rhine
as a boundary, but at a latter period, having sent Caulaincourt to treat with the
Allied Powers, his tardy offers of acceptance were rejected.
The Pasha, with some impatience of manner, replied, " There is no use in

587
all this talking. I am determined ; you may write to your Government and
tell them so."
Notwithstanding all this threat of resistance, I still continue to believe
that the Pasha will give in as soon as he sees at hand a force capable of compel
ling him to submit. I imvc ' &c.
(Signed) G.' LLOYD HODGES.

No. 485.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 16, 1840.
MEHEMET ALI has loosely spoken of his intention to send to Leeza,
under the orders of Deli Mustapha, Vice-Admiral of the Turkish squadron, a
regiment of the regular troops of the line on board the Turkish squadron,
amounting to 3,000 men, and to augment this force by a corps of 2,000 men,
chiefly gunners, belonging to that squadron. This circumstance is as yet only
talked of, but I have reason to believe that the Pasha is determined to carry it
into execution, which has induced me to call upon the Austrian Consul-General,
to consult witk him on the measures he proposed to adopt on the occasion. M.
de Laurin not appearing to come to a decision, I requested him in his character
of Senior of the Foreign Agents, to ascertain from our Colleagues, what their
line of conduct would be under the circumstances, stating, at tke same time, my
fixed determination of officially protesting against suck a measure on the part
of the Pasha, even alone, should my Colleagues refuse to co-operate with me ;
M. de Laurin approved of my suggestion, and decided upon consulting with my
Colleagues on the subject.
I trust your Lordship will approve of the decision I have come to.
I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.
No. 486.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 16, 1840.
MEHEMET ALI has addressed a letter of the 3rd instant to Abbas Pasha,
Governor of Cairo, desiring him to consult with the Minister of War on the
immediate organization of ten regiments, to consist of 3,200 men each, six of
which are to be armed and equipped as the regular Turkish regiments of the
kne, and four as the Bedouin Arabs. These are destined to replace the army of
the Hedjaz under Ahmed Pasha. Two regiments of that army, and several
squadrons of Cavaky, are ordered to defend the Egyptian frontier from El- Arisb
to Alexandria. The reasons given by the Viceroy for this movement are, that
the Franks pretend to have a right to demand of him the provinces he now pos
sesses, and he has decided upon defending himself at all kazards, and has no
doubt that the Franks wkl pause well ere they dare to attack him.
I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 487.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 17; 1840.
THIS morning I had interviews with Count Medem and M. Wagner, the
Agents of Russia and Prussia. Count Medem informed me that he had seen the
Pasha the day before yesterday, and asked him his reasons for the extensive
4 F 2

588
warlike preparations now going on in Alexandria ; to which Mehemet Ali replied,
tkat kaving been informed by me that it was the intention of Her Majesty's
Government to restrict his territorial possessions to Egypt alone, he was deter
mined to resist ; and with the exception of Candia, which he could not well
defend, he would never cede one inch of the country he now held in his posses
sion. Count Medem replied, that he had better pause and think well on the
effect that all this arming might produce on the Great Powers, the majority of
which, he was convinced, would never require Mehemet Ali to make unjust
sacrifices. M. Wagner kas informed me that, having on a recent occasion had an
interview with the Pasha, he expressed himself in the same terms, but with
redoubled wrath and anger against Great Britain, which Power he declared to be
menacing him for her own selfish ends. That she had been before driven from
Egypt, and that if she ventured to trouble the repose of this country again, he
would repel her, pursue her squadrons, and carry war into her own islands.
Your Lordship will perceive that the Pasha states to Count Medem that I
had told him that he must content himself with Egypt alone, whereas the whole
substance and tendency of my communications resolve themselves into two dis
tinct propositions, — that Great Britain entertains the most friendly feelings to
Mehemet Ali, and that " no Power could be more interested in his prosperity,"
— but that if this question could not be settled consistently with the vital inte
rests of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain was unalterably determined, witk or
without her Allies, to strike witk such a force as must command success. But
your Lordship will perceive, on reference to my correspondence, that 1 gave no
positive or geographical interpretation of what I expressed as the Pasha's " due
limits." Your Lordship will clearly see that words make no impression whatever on
the Pasha, and that nothing short of an actual array of military or naval strengtk
will bring him to terms. He may even go the length of akowing himsek to be
attacked, under the impression that, should he be worsted, the least that the
Allied PowTers wrould offer him would be Egypt alone. However, the more dili
gently and accurately he informs himself of the strength of the squadrons of
England, the greater will be his , apprehensions for himself, and the greater his
readiness to treat with us, if even at the eleventh hour.
Among other symptoms of things taking the turn I have alluded to, I
cannot omit mentioning the partial failure of some of his plans of defence ; for
instance, of the imposing array of National Guards, the formation of which has
been so loudly trumpeted, only 300 had been up to yesterday enrolled ; nor can
he place such implicit reliance upon the Turkish fleet as he would fain have
believed. Deli Mustapha Pasha has declared that he wik never give up alive
that ship which was entrusted to him by the Sultan. In spite of this, my Lord,
1 believe nothing will bring the Pasha to reason but the appearance of an
imposing force off this city to demand and enforce compliance with the terms
that may be offered to him. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 488.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 21, 1840.
I AM not aware that your Lordship has been made acquainted that, about
a month previous to my arrival in this country, the Consul-General for France
was instructed by his Government to demand of Mehemet Ali an explanation in
writing as to the intentions regarding the occupation of the Hedjaz.
I have herewith the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of the reply *
sent by the Viceroy to M. Cochelet. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

* See Inclosure 2 in No. 480.

589

No. 489.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 23, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali has
received serious interruption in the progress of his warlike preparations. The
levee en masse that he had attempted to raise under the name of a National
Guard, has dwindled into a force hardly worth naming ; he is evidently much
depressed and disappointed, and has assumed a tone very different from that
which he held a few days ago. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 490.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 13.)
My Lord, Alexandria, January 24, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that Omer Bey, Rear-
Admiral of the Turkish fleet, has refused to accept or wear the new uniform
which Mehemet Ak has desired to be prepared for tke officers and men of the
Turkish squadron.
I this morning had a conversation with M. d'Anastasy, the Swedish
Consul-Generd, who is one of the Pasha's confidential friends and advisers,
and on remonstrating on the recent acts and intentions of the Pasha, as regards
the officers and men of the Turkish fleet, M. d'Anastasy replied, " Why, what
will you have the Viceroy do, when he fears that discontent may manifest itself
amongst them ?"
I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali has been forced
to abandon his plans for a general armament, finding the impossibility of carry
ing them into effect. The excuse he gives is, that he is just now reluctant to
disturb the Fellahs in their agricultural occupations, and that he defers his project
to a more favourable moment.
Mehemet Ali persists, kowever, in obtaining as many men as he can at
Alexandria. He was led to expect that a force would he raised of 12,000,
whereas he has been able to embody, up to this date, only 1,600 men.
I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 491.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 1 5.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, January 29, 1840.
YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 6th instant, were delivered to me on
the 20th instant.
The Imperial Cabinet are highly pleased by the reports Baron Brunnow
has sent home of his reception in London, and of the commencement of his
negotiations with your Lordship.
The extent of the powers granted to Baron Neumann have been made
known to this Court, and the Russian Government rely confidently upon the
firmness and wisdom of the British Cabinet, to bring the Question of Syria
to a satisfactory settlement : there does not exist here any apprehension of war,
although the recent debates in the French Chambers have put an end to any
expectation that France will unite kerself in this matter to the other Great
Powers. • The French Ambassador received, two days since, a letter from Marshal
Soult, in the postscript of which the President of the Council says, that he had

590
just received from Count Sebastiani, information that Her Majesty's Ministers
had determined upon the rejection of Baron Brunnow's overtures, or proposi
tions.

No. 492.
Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 17.)
My Lord, Berlin, February 12, 1840.
THE Prussian Government have lately made a communication to the
Cabinet of the Tuileries, on the subject of the negotiations going on in London
on the Oriental Question, which has not met with much success.
Baron Arnim had been instructed to present a Note to the French
Government, strongly advising France not to separate herself from the rest of
Europe, as the union of the Four Powers was too compact to be resisted, and
that it would be for the interest of France to join with them with as little delay
as possible. Baron Arnim writes to his Government, that the French Cabinet
received the communication with great coldness, and have not yet returned
any answer to it. I I13.VG SzC ,
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 493.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, February 18, 1840.
COLONEL HODGES informs me, in his despatch, of the 4th of Janu
ary, that instructions have been given to the Egyptian squadrons and tele
graphs, to bring into use and to familiarize themselves with the French Code
of Signals, from whence it might be inferred that the Pasha expected that his
ships would have to act in concert with the French squadron. The packet
from Marseilles to Alexandria of the 21st of December, if it kept its time,
would have arrived at Alexandria early in the morning of the 3rd of January.
Colonel Hodges' despatches do not afford means of judging when the packet
in question actually arrived at Alexandria; but in his despatch of the 6th
of January he mentions that a few hours after :the arrival of the packet,
M. Cochelet saw Mehemet Ali , and that Count Medem saw the Pasha soon
after. Some time, therefore, must have elapsed between the arrivd of the
packet and the date of Colonel Hodges' despatch of the 6th of January.
In the " Times " newspaper of the 13th instant, accounts are quoted from
Toulon of the 6th of this month, stating that a telegraphic despatch had been
received on the preceding day, directing the Maritime Prefect to hold a steamer
in readiness to sail with pressing orders for M. de Pontois and Admiral Lalande;
and that Admiral Rosamel had also been directed to send off three ships of the
line to the Archipelago, with various articles indispensable for the fleet, which
articles were to be embarked on board the " Neptune," " Suffren," and "Alger."
Your Excellency will see that up to the 4th of February, no extraordinary
movement had taken place at Toulon, of the nature referred to in the
newspaper which I have quoted. The letters from Alexandria of the 16th
of January, appear to have reached London on the morning of the 7th of
February, being quoted in the newspapers of that day ; and therefore the French
Government must have received their despatches from Alexandria of the 16th
of January, at the latest, on the morning of the 5th of February.
I mention these coincidences to your Excellency, in order tkat you may
endeavour to ascertain wkether the order for the reinforcement to be sent to
the French squadron in the Levant has originated in any intelkgence received
from Egypt. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

591

No. 494.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 23.)
(Extract.) Therapia, January 26, 1840.
MEHEMET ALI, as your Lordship knows, has threatened resistance.
He has been busy in endeavouring to seduce the Ottoman officrs and sailors.
He might risk an expedition against Constantinople with his fleets. He perhaps
might hribe the garrison at the Dardanelles, and kis presence at the head of a
large naval force at Constantinople, would produce more mischief than any
other event that can well be supposed possible under existing circumstances..
The British fleet alone can give security against the execution of such a project,
I presume Her Majesty's Government would not suffer it to be executed.
Mehemet Ak has had time to take his measures to strike such a blow as
a desperate man might risk. I would not say that he will not do it, but I am
sure it can be prevented witk ease. I believe Mehemet Ali knows his own
intrinsic feebleness, yet his pride and ambition may be strong enough to make
him refuse the possession of Egypt as the price of his submission to the loss of
Syria, &c, which it is necessary for the preservation of the European peace.
should be taken from him.

No. 495.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston,.— -(Received February 23.)
My Lord, Therapia, January 28, 1840.
IN consequence of the renewal of Mehemet Ali's threats, I have renewed my
endeavours to engage the Sublime Porte to take measures for resisting any attack
by sea or land that might be made ; and I requested Captain Walker to speak,
in my name, to the Capudan Pasha upon the subject, and to suggest such means
for his adoption, as appeared calculated to prevent the passage of the Bosphorus
or the Dardanekes by Ibrahim's Army, should he ever reach the coast.
(Signed) ' PONSONBY.
No. 496.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 23.)
(Extract.) Therapia, January 28, 1840.
I HAVE heard from bis Excellency Rechid Pasha very strong expressions
of the impatience the Ottoman Ministers feel for the termination of affairs.
He adds, the Porte has- entirely confided in the Great Powers, and it will
never bekeve they wik abandon the interests of the Sultan.

No. 497.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 23.)
(Extract.) Therapia, January 29, 1840.
I LEARN that M. de Pontois has powers to call the French Admkal to
tbe assistance of the Porte, if Mehemet Ali skould make an attack.

592

No. 498.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 23.)
(Extract.) Paris, February 21, 1840.
WITH reference to your directions given me on the 1 8th instant, to take an
opportunity of endeavouring to ascertain whether the order for the reinforcement
to be sent to the French squadron in the Levant has originated in any intelligence
received from Egypt, I have to state, that Marshal Soult, in reply to an observa
tion I made this morning upon the " Alger " and the " Suffren " ships of the line
having sailed from Toulon for that destination, said, that these two ships
had orders to go, in the first instance, off the coast of Greece near Athens, and
would afterwards proceed to join Admiral Lalande, whose squadron had, by the
return to Toulon of vessels wanting repair, been reduced to only four ships of
the kne.

No. 499.
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.
Sir, Foreign Office, February 25, 1840.
I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 24th of
January. You state in your despatch of the 14th of January, that Mehemet Ak,
in a conversation which you had with him on that day, expressed to you
his determination to maintain his rights at ak risks and hazards.
I have to instruct you, on the next occasion on which Mehemet Ali shall
speak to you of his rights, to say to his Highness, that you are instructed by
your Government to remind him that he has no rights except such as the Sultan
has conferred upon him ; that the only legitimate authority wThich he possesses
is the authority which has been delegated to him by the Sultan, over a portion
of the Sultan's dominions, and which has been entrusted to him for the sole
purpose of being used for the interest of, and in obedience to the orders of the
Sultan ; that the Sultan is entitled to take away that which he has given ; that
the Sultan may probably do so, if his own safety should require it ; and that if,
in such case, the Sultan should not have the means of self-defence, the Sultan has
Allies who may possibly lend him those means.
You should also take an occasion of suggesting to the mind of Mehemet
Ali, that if it should become necessary to use force in order to coerce him, and
if that force should be successful, he might possibly not obtain from the Sultan
the terms which had been first proposed to him ; that to a garrison which
capitulates in time, honourable conditions are granted ; but that a garrison
which insists upon being stormed, must take the chance of war.
I have further to instruct you to take every proper opportunity and means
of endeavouring to explain to the officers of the Turkish fleet, that it is the
intention and determination of Great Britain, and of the other Powers in
alliance with Turkey, to maintain the integrity and independence of the
Ottoman Empire under its present Dynasty, and not to infringe in any way
upon the dignity of the Sultan, nor to trenck upon the territory of the Ottoman
Empire. That, consequently, those officers have been led into error in imagining
that they were serving the interests of the Sultan, or of their country and faith,
by going with their ships to Alexandria ; and that on the contrary/ they have
thereby done a serious injury to the very cause which they wished to support ;
and that the best course which, as good Mussulmans and faithful subjects of the
Porte, they could pursue, would be to avail themselves of the first opportunity
to return with their ships to Constantinople in order to rally round their Sultan
and Caliph, and to defend his person and throne.
I have to. add, that you wik act in this matter openly, and, wik make no

593
secret either towards Mehemet Ali or towards your Colleagues, as to the nature
of the instructions which you have received with regard to the officers of the
Turkish fleet. 1 am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 500.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 27.)
(Extract.) Damascus, January 18, 1840.
I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch, under
the 23rd ultimo.
The Mutuali chief insurgent, Sheik Hussein Shebib, who with his
partisans took refuge- in the Ledgea, were not suffered to remain there by the
Snutt Arabs of that district, headed by Sheik Antash, and on their quitting
that stronghold, he with his followers were seized by the Druses of Haouran,
and dekvered up to tke Government here. Hussein Shebib and another
Mutuali have been beheaded, and nine sent to Acre ; a body of other
Mutualis have been also seized by the Emir .Bechk's troops, and sent here. The
Mutuali insurrection, or ratker disorders, may be considered terminated.
The Firman emanated to Mehemet Ak, in consequence of tke Sultan's
Hatti Skeriff of Gulhane was promulgated kere on the 6th instant ; it has
produced considerable sensation among the population, though very imperfectly
understood, as this document was published in Turkish instead of Arabic. I
hear a translation is being made in Arabic. The chief authorities of the city
were invited, and were present at this ceremony, but the European Consuls
received no intimation or information thereon. The impression made on the
minds of the majority of the population is, that it is a prelude to the Sultan
resuming the Government of Syria, the abolition of Ferdeh, Conscription, Sta
tute labour and requisitions, and the restoration of the old order of Government,
ak which is congenial to the desire and feelings of the people.
The country is generaky in a tranquil state, but dulness and inaction per
vade the whole system,. and no alteration has taken place in this respect since I
had tbe honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch.
Mehemet Ak is reported to be daily pushing his influence in the Persian
Gulf, and Kourschid Pasha is fortifying himself on the Arabian Coast, but ak is
quiet for the moment. He will not move until events in the north authorize
such a step, as the consokdation of his authority is his primary object. He is
reported to be master of a line from the Red Sea to the Gulf ; it is presumed ke
wkl strengthen himself in both seas, and then will kave little left to fight for, if
let alone. I hear from Bagdad, that Ibrahim Pasha's irregular troops have been from
Orfa, and attacked and plundered the Arabs under the Sultan's jurisdiction at
Khaboor, and induced some to join them, while the Egyptians are still encamped
on that river. It is also reported that the Pasha has been tampering with the
Chiefs and citizens of Merdin. I hear that these Chiefs sent an invitation to
Ibrahim Pasha to occupy that city, of which Inger Mehemet Pasha of Moussoul
got information, and proceeded there and decapitated a great many of the Chiefs
and a Cathokc bishop.

No. 501.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 28.)
My Lord, , Aleppo, January 20, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information,
copy of my despatch* of the 24th December of last year, which I addressed
to Viscount Ponsonby, and which I hope will meet your Lordship's approval.

* See Inclosure 1 in No. 477.
4G

594
I have nothing fresh or interesting to offer to your Lordship's notice on the
state of affairs, coming within the cognizance of this consular district, since the
date of the above despatch.
His Flighness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, who still continues to remain
at Marash, has, I learn, been of late a little indisposed, but witk nothing serious.
All the Egyptian forces are now cantoned into winter quarters throughout
this district, many of them along the north and north-eastern frontier ; and
others have gone southward for the same purpose.
The whole of this consular district enjoys tranquillity for the present.
I have, &c,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

No. 501.
Mr. Consul Werry to John Bidwell, Esq.
(Extract.) Damascus, January 23, 1840.
I INCLOSE you a list of the distribution of the Egyptian regular forces in
Syria. At Acre very great preparations are making to repair, and put in a state
of defence, that important fortress, by rebuilding part of the walls, parti
cularly that towards the sea, and erecting towers and redoubts on the land
side. I hear 500 pieces of artillery kave arrived tkere from Egypt, of which
250 are already placed in battery. Every measure is being taken in every part
of Syria to resist either effective operations to dislodge the Egyptians, or
demonstrations made against them ; and however much Mehemet Ak may
feign to come into the views of the Sultan's Government, either for internal
ameliorations of Government, or for a cession of territory, be assured he is
taking every measure to secure at least what he holds, if not to occupy tbe
Pashalic of Bagdad, from both the routes from Bassorah to Bagdad, and from
the north by way of Merdin and Moussoul. He stik hopes to establish
an Arab Empire, to execute which, he must count on the disunion of the Great
Powers, and be tacitly understood with one or more of them, as it is not
reasonable to suppose he would attempt the execution of this project, unless
some European Power countenanced his measures. My advices, both
from Bagdad and Moghill, near Bassorah, confirm the Pasha's intentions of
occupying the Bagdad Pashalic, which the operations of Kourschid Pasha, hold
ing a line from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf, and Ibrahim Pasha's troops,
from Orfa to the Kaboor, fully indicate, if not to be immediately performed,
will kenceforward be done without muck figkting, if left alone.

Inclosure in No. 502.
Note of the Distribution of the Egyptian Forces.
Aleppo. Orfa.
9th Infantry. 1 1 th Infantry.
10th ditto. 17th ditto.
14th ditto- 22nd ditto.
31st ditto.

Killis.

Marash.

2nd Infantry (Guard).
6 th Infantry. 3rd ditto diUo>
34th ditto; 4th Infantry>
llthCavairy. 2nd Cuirassiers (Guard).

Aintab.

Adana.

1 st Infantry (Guard).
1st Artillery ditto. 5th Infantry.
2nd ditto, (Foot).
2nd Infantry. Tarsus.
12th ditto. 7th Cavaky.

595
Mmm. Gaza.
8th Cavalry. 2nd Cavalry.
HamaA- Jerusalem.
30th Infantry. 25th Infantry.
1st Artikery (Horse).

Latakia.

Antioch.

Damascus.
2nd Horse Artillery (Guards).

2nd Horse Artillery (Guards). 2^ Cavalr*7'
Tripoli.
2 Battalions Sappers.
Idlip.
1st Battalion, Sappers. Homs.
Acre 1st Horse Artillery (Guards).
10th Cavaky.
18th Infantry.
Taken from the Board of Health at Aleppo, this 6th January, 1840.
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

No. 503.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 28.)
My Lord, Beyrout, January 29, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the Hatti Sheriff of
Gulhane was pUbkcly read at tke Serai at this place, by the Moufti, on the 20th
instant, previous notice having been given the same morning in the bazaars of
the dty. No notification on the subject was made to Her Majesty's Consulate, nor
to any other European authority here. The feekng produced in tke country
generaky, by the pubkcation of tke Hatti Sheriff, is one of sincere and undis-
sembled satisfaction.
Such cannot be said to be the case in respect to information which reached
this place two days ago from Egypt, relative to the organization in that country
by the Viceroy, of a Militia or National Guard. A feeling amounting to con
sternation has been caused here amongst both Christians and Mahommedans, by
this intekigence, and akeady numbers of persons have concealed themselves,
and others contemplate emigrating, from a fear lest a similar regulation skould
be extended to Syria. If such be the case, it will be received with the utmost
dissatisfaction ; but I am not prepared to say at present whether any open
resistance would or could be offered by the natives.
In other respects, the pubke tranquikity is undisturbed ; but all classes are
in a state of deep anxiety as respects the future, with reference to the existing
position of affairs between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, and botk commerce and
public confidence are greatly affected thereby. I have, &c,
(Signed) N. MOORE.
p.S. — The effect produced by the information received from Egypt, alluded
to, has produced so great and general alarm amongst all classes, that with a view
of ' ascertaining whether there were any positive grounds for supposing tke
measure would be extended to Syria, I made inquiry last night of Mahmoud
Bey, the Governor, on the subject. His Excellency replied, that he was without
anv information from Egypt relative thereto.
J N. M.
4 G2

596
I have just learnt that the Governor has issued orders prohibiting the
departure from this place of ak persons under kis jurisdiction, without previous
examination into the motives of such departure. N. M.

No. 504.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 27.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, February 6, 1840.
I HAVE not been able to discover any intention on the part of Mehemet
Ali to cause his army, under the orders of Ibrahim Pasha, to advance or move
from their present position. No. 505.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received February 27.)
My Lord, Therapia, February 6, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation, which I have only just
received, of an article that appeared in the " Moniteur Ottoman." I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 505.
Article from the " Moniteur Ottoman" of February, 1840.
(Traduction.) PAR suite du changement du Capitan Pacha, annonce dans le precedent
numero de cette gazette, la Flotte Imperiale, qui se trouve a Alexandrie, etant
restee sans chef, il etait devenu necessaire de charger quelqu'un parmi les
employes du Gouvernement, pour qu'il prit soin de la flotte, et qu'il maintintune
bonne administration parmi les officiers et les equipages.
Or, Moustapha Pacha etant un homme capable et intelligent, et ayant de
grandes connaissances dans toutes les parties du service de la flotte, il a plu.a
Sa Hautesse de le nommer Caimacam, pour qu'en cette qualite il ait a expedier
les affaires qui regardent la flotte, et avoir soin des batimens qui la composent.
En consequence, le Firman qui confere a Moustapha Pacha le poste de
Cai'macam, lui a ete expedie, et Son Altesse le Grand Vizir a eerit a Son Altesse
Mehemet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte, pour Pinviter a faire lire publiquement le Firman
ci-dessus mentionn6, afin de porter par-la son contenu a la connaissance des
officiers et des equipages de la flotte, et a mettre a execution la volonte de Sa
Hautesse. (Translation.)
Article from the "Moniteur Ottoman" of February, 1840.
IN consequence of the change of the Capudan Pasha, announced in the
preceding number of this paper, the Imperial fleet which is at Alexandria being
without a chief, it became necessary to employ some one among the servants of
the Government to take care of the fleet, and to maintain good government
among the officers and crews.
Now, Mustapha Pasha being a man of capacity and intelligence, and
having great knowledge in all that relates to the service of the fleet, His Highness
has been pleased to appoint him Caimacam, in order that, in that quality, he may
despatch the business which concerns the fleet, and may take care of the vessels
which compose it.

597
In consequence, the firman which confers the post of Caimacam Upon
Mustapha Pasha has been transmitted to him, and His Highness the Grand
Vizier has written to His Highness Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, to request
him to cause the above-mentioned firman to be read publicly, in order thereby to
make it known to the officers and crews of the fleet, and to carry the will of
•His Highness into execution.

No." 506. '
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 3.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, February 1 1, 1840.
COUNT NESSELRODE sent me, a few days ago, a copy of the sketch
of a Convention which Baron Brunnow submitted to your Lordship, and I had a
conversation upon it with his Excellency tkis morning.
No. 507.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, March 5, 1840.
WITH reference to my former instructions to your Excellency, of the 10th
and 13th of December of last year, and of the 3rd of January last, upon the sub
ject of the naval armaments now making in the ports of France, I have to state
to your Excellency, tkat Her Majesty's Government have been informed that, in
addition to the seventeen sail of the line, of which I sent your Excellency a kst
in my despatck of the 10th of December and which are either already equipped, or
in progress of equipment, for service in the Mediterranean, the " Inflexible," of
ninety guns, is getting ready for sea at Rochefort ; and that thus the French
will soon have eighteen sail of the line, and most of tkem keavy ships, afloat in
the Mediterranean. If this information be true, this is a matter which must necessarily engage
the serious attention of the British Government, and the more especially, because
the explanations hitherto given upon this subject by the French Government
have been anything but satisfactory.
Her Majesty's Government are not aware that any Naval Power meditates
an attack upon France ; and Her Majesty's Government do not know of any
operations which France can be called upon to undertake in conjunction with
other Powers, for which so large a force can be necessary.
But if the French naval force afloat shall be raised to so large an
amount it wik be impossible for Her Majesty's Government not to make
a corresponding augmentation of the British fleet in commission ; because
neither public opinion in England, nor a due sense of official responsibility,
would permit any Administration in this country to leave the British fleet in
commission inferior to the fleet of France, so as to give to France the command
of the sea ; and Her Majesty's Government is persuaded, that whatever exer
tions may at any time be required on the part of the nation to maintain the
position of Great Britain as a Naval Power, those exertions will be cheerfully,
promptly, and effectuaky made.
But it cannot escape the sagacity of the French Government, that such
armaments and counter- armanents on the part of France and England, origi
nating in no political necessity, cannot take place without producing effects
extremely unfavourable to the maintenance of friendly relations between the two
countries. It is possible, indeed, that some of the ships now ready, or getting ready,
at Toulon, may be intended to take the place of some of those now in the Levant,
and which, in consequence of the term of service of their crews being over, are
to come home, and to be laid up again in ordinary ; but though this was inti-

598
mated by Count Sebastiani, it has never yet been distinctly stated by the French
Government. Your Excellency is instructed to take an opportunity of communicating
these remarks to M. Thiers, as I shak do to M. Guizot. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 508.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 9.)
My Lord, Paris, March 6, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches to
the 3rd instant.
I tkis morning went to the Foreign Office, intending to communicate with
M. Thiers upon several points which I had delayed bringing under the con
sideration of the French Government, in consequence of the Ministerial inter
regnum. Our interview was, however, interrupted by the arrival of the
Members of the Conseil d'Etat, who came to pay a visit of ceremony to the
new President of the Council.
In the short conversation, however, that passed between us, M. Thiers
said, that he had read over all the correspondence in his office that had any
bearing upon the Turco-Egyptian Question, but that he must consult witk his
Colleagues upon a question so important as tkat of the East, before he could
explain to me his views, or give instructions to the King's Ambassador in
England upon the subject. He considered, however, that until a Turkish
Plenipotentiary arrived in London, the question was suspended, and that there
fore no inconvenience would arise from this short delay. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 509.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 11.)
My Lord, Paris, March 9, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's despatches to the
6th instant. I had this morning a conversation with M. Thiers, upon the subject of the
naval armaments in the ports of France^ I told him that I had yesterday
received a despatch from you, stating that the information which had reached
your Lordship regarding the amount of the French naval force actually afloat
in the Mediterranean, or getting ready for sea, was such as must necessarily
engage the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government; that from this
information it appeared, that in addition to a kst of seventeen sail of the kne
which your Lordship had communicated some time ago to Count Sebastiani
as being already equipped, or in progress of equipment, the " Inflexible," of
ninety guns, was preparing for sea at Rochefort, and that France would,
therefore, soon have eighteen sail of the line, and most of them heavy ships,
afloat in the Mediterranean ; and I observed, that if this information were true,
Her Majesty's Government would be compelled to augment proportionally
tke British fleet, for that neither public opinion in England, nor a due sense of
official responsibility, would allow the Ministry to leave to any other nation the
command of the sea. I also represented that such armaments and counter-arma
ments were calculated to have an unfavourable effect upon the friendly relations
between the two countries, which it was the acknowledged interest of both to main
tain, and which I knew M. Thiers was desirous to cultivate. M. Thiers assured me
that the information on which was founded my representation, was erroneous ;
that the French Government neither had equipped, nor purposed to equip, more
than fifteen sail of the line, of which it was intended that nine should be

599
stationed in the Levant, and that six should remain at Toulon. I answered, that
fifteen sail of the line appeared a larger force than was necessary for any
operations which France could be called upon to undertake in the Mediter-.
ranean. To this, the French Minister replied, that for the service of trans
porting troops to Algiers, and between Algiers and other points on the coast,
these large ships were very serviceable ; and that, besides, a state of things
might occur in the Dardanelles, in wkick it would not be prudent tkat the
naval force of France and England united, should be less than thirty sail of
the line. M. Thiers then proceeded to say, that whatever turn affairs might take in
the East, there was no danger of firing of cannon between our fleets ; he hoped
that the two Governments might arrive at a concordance of opinion in the
Turco-Egyptian Question, but even should they not agree upon the measures to
be pursued, such disagreement would not affect the friendly relations between
the two countries. I then observed to M. Thiers, that although Count Sebas
tiani had intimated to your Lordship, that some of the ships mentioned in the
fist you had shown to his Excellency were to be replaced by others in the list
and laid up in ordinary, no distinct statement on tkis subject had been given by
the French Government, and that it would be satisfactory to receive such a
document. His Excellency answered, that he kad no objection to giving suck
a statement, but that in these matters there ought to be reciprocity, and that
a corresponding statement of the British naval force ought to be offered to the
French Government.
Our conversation on this subject ended by M. Thiers saying, that the
French Government did not seek to maintain a naval force as large as that of
England, but it desired that its Navy should be upon a footing to make it
respected, and that its vessels individually skould be able to cope with those
of America and England. r l"»3"\7'p iK,r*
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 510.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 11.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, February 24, 1840.
COUNT NESSELRODE observed to me in conversation, that it would be
very difficult to insist upon the restitution of the Fort of Acre to the Sultan; and I
said, my personal opinion was, that your Lordship might be induced to
concede it to Mehemet Ali, if thereby the cordial co-operation of France could
be secured. The Russian Ministers seem confident that no foreign force wik be
required for the defence of Constantinople, and this is their sincere desire.
No. 511.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 11.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, February 24, 1840.
YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 4th instant, were delivered to me
on tke 17th inst.
Since writing my preceding despatch, a messenger has arrived from London
to Count Nesselrode.
His Excellency says, that he did not anticipate this long delay in negotiating
the Convention for the settlement of Syria, which he fears may produce bad
consequences, and which he says cannot produce any good result.
Count Nesselrode assured me, that no one could desire more sincerely than
did the Russian Government, that France should accede to the proposed
Convention ; but he said, that he saw no probability, and barely the possibility
of such an event; because the basis on which the French Government had

600
desired to open a negotiation, differed so widely from that upon which your
Lordship and Baron Brunnow were agreed, that the Cabinet of Paris would have
to abandon all the propositions and opinions they had pubksked : besides, the
French Government had evinced a determination not to coerce, by hostilities,
the Viceroy of Egypt ; but coercive measures must undoubtedly now be resorted
to. I repeated to his Excellency my hope, that the delay, and the presence of
M. Guizot in London, and of Count Sebastiani in Paris, might lead to a,result
different from that which he anticipated ; but that I should not fail to commu
nicate to my Government, the views entertained by the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 512.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, March 12, 1840.
I HAVE to inform your Excellency, that owing to the changes which have-
lately taken place in the French Ministry, and in consequence of its being
uncertain whether the Ministry which has been formed at Paris will be able to
maintain itself, no further progress has lately been made in the Turco-Egyptian
Negotiation. Baron Brunnow and M. de Neumann are naturally very anxious
tkat some definitive determination skould be taken by Her Majesty's Govern
ment; but it is obviously impossible for Her Majesty's Government to know
wkat to propose to tke Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, until Her
Majesty's Government shall have been able to ascertain what France may be
inclined to accede to, and wkat ske would decline, so tkat we migkt know,
wkether it will be possible for the Five Powers to keep together, or whether the
Four will be obliged to conduct tkese matters to a settlement without the
co-operation of France. This, however, cannot be ascertained until M. Guizot
shall have received his definitive instructions from the new French Ministry.
Her Majesty's Government do not at present despair of finding that the opinions
of the present French Ministers may approximate more nearly than those of
their predecessors, to the views of the Four Powers.
Although M. Guizot has not yet been furnished with instructions
calculated to give to what passes between him and me, an official character, or
to enable us to arrive at any practical result, yet I kave kad some conversation
with his Excellency, in order to ascertain from him his own views and, as far as
he may know them, the views of his Government, and in order also to put him in
possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government. The substance of what
passed between us is as follows : —
In tke opinion of M. Guizot, the Government of France intirely agrees with
the Government of Great Britain, in wishing to maintain the independence and
integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and coincides with us in opinion, that the best
arrangement of the pending dispute would be to confine Mehemet Ali to Egypt.
But the Government of France, according to M. Guizot, feels convinced that
Mehemet Ali would not consent to suck an arrangement without compulsion ;
and the French Government thinks that the means of compulsion which have
been suggested by Great Britain would be insufficient. M. Guizot said, that to
cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria would have no
decisive effect upon Ibrahim's military position in Syria; it would only compel
Mehemet Ali to send by land the supplies which his Syrian Army would
require, and those suppkes would, by means of camels, arrive by land as surely
as by sea, though at a greater expence of time and money ; that a commercial
blockade of Alexandria would annoy France and England more than Mehemet
Ali ; that any attempt to restore Candia to the Sultan by force, would create a
new Greek revolution in that island ; and thus, he said, nothing in the opinion
of France would be effectual for the accomplishment of the object in view, but
the entrance of a Russian Army into Asia Minor. And such a step would,
according to M. Guizot, more seriously shake the independence of the Ottoman
Empire than anything which could result from the present state of things.
In support of these opinions, M. Guizot argued that the restoration of Syria
would not give any real increase of strength to the Sultan ; that the Sultan

601
would be unable to govern it with advantage, and that he would not draw from
it a revenue larger than the tribute which the Pasha now pays to him for it.
He said that it is good organization and not extent of territory that gives strength
to States, and that the Sultan would be stronger if he were to govern well and
efficiently tke territory which is now subject to his direct authority, than if he
were to regain what Mehemet Ali actually occupies, and to administer it ill. '
M. Guizot further argued, that if Mehemet Ali were contented, he would
become the best friend and firmest defender of the Porte, while, on the other
hand, if his pretensions were overruled he would continue to be the most
dangerous enemy of the Ottoman Empire.
Everything like an event in the Levant, according to M. Guizot, must turn
to the profit of Russia, who is on the spot and ready to take advantage of
whatever happens. It is, therefore, the interest of the other Powers to prevent
the occurrence of events, and this, M. Guizot thinks, would be best accom-
plisked by letting the two parties make peace on their own terms. M. Guizot
positively denies that France is actuated in these matters by any selfish views of
influence or aggrandizement. He did not indeed deny, that some very extra
vagant schemes and notions upon these affairs have been broached by some
parties and by some newspapers in France ; but he assured me that those
views were by no means shared by the ten or twelve leading men from among
whom any possible French Cabinet must necessarily be chosen ; and he said,
that the Government of Great Britain ought not to give more credit to such
imputations upon the policy of France, tkan the Government of France gives to
the assertions made in the French papers, that the course pursued by Great
Britain is dictated by a desire to obtain possession of Egypt.
In reply to M. Guizot's arguments I stated it to be the opinion of Her
Majesty's Government, that the means of coercion which have been proposed,
are sufficient to induce Mehemet to comply witk the arrangement which has
been proposed to him ; but that, even supposing this not to be the case, and
that the advance of a Russian force into Asia Minor should become necessary, I
could not see how such an advance, sanctioned, as it would be, by a Treaty
between the Five Powers and the Ottoman Porte, in which should be recorded
the objects of the advance of that force, the duration of its stay, and the time of
its retirement, could materially affect the independence of the Porte, except as it
would be a public proof of tke present weakness of the Sultan, and of kis
inability to defend himself without external aid. But this fact, I remarked to
M. Guizot, is unfortunately too well known, and would not be made more real
by tke entrance of Russian troops into Turkey ; wkile, on otker hand, if the
advance of those troops were to place the Sultan in possession of the resources
of Syria, and to take those resources away from his enemy, Mehemet Ak, such
an entrance of Russian troops would in the end strengthen the independence of
the Sultan, by increasing his financial and military means. But very different,
I observed, would be the result, if tke Russian forces were to enter Turkey by
the single wkl of the Russian Government, and were to act, when in Turkey, as
the single and uncontrouled discretion of that Government might suggest ; to
stay as long as that Government pleased ; and to make their departure depend
on such conditions as that Government might choose to impose. That would
indeed shake the independence, if it did not even impair the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire; and yet this, I told M. Guizot, would infallibly be the conse
quence of acting as France wishes to do, that is, of allowing things to remain as
they are, or of granting to Mehemet Ali all tke conditions ke demands. For in
eitker case new collisions must infallibly arise between tke Sultan and the
Pasha, by the aggressions either of the one or of the other; and such collisions
would certainly lead to events wkick would bring the Russians into Turkey,
unfettered by any engagement with the other Powers. I pointed out to M.
Guizot, that in such case neither England nor France could prevent the
Russians from entering, as neither of those Powers would be on the spot. France
and England might, in such case, indeed, make war upon Russia, to punish that
Power for what it had done ; but is it the object of the Powers of Europe to lay
the ground for a future war, or are we not striving to make arrangements by
which a future war may be prevented ?
I further observed to M. Guizot, that even if the naval means of the
Allies should fail to coerce Mehemet Ali, there is a plan much better than the
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602
advance of a Russian force into Asia Minor; and that is an expedition to
Alexandria, to strike at the heart of Mehemet Ali's power.
This suggestion appeared new to M. Guizot, and it seemed to make a con
siderable impression upon him ; but he represented it as difficult of accomplish
ment, from the great amount of force which Mehemet Ali could concentrate to
oppose it.
I reminded him, that about 13,000 Englisk had made good their landing in
Egypt in face of a good Army of between 20,000 and 30,000 men; and I
said, that a combined Austrian and Turkish expedition of sufficient amount
would drive like dust before the wind, the artizans of the dockyard of Alex
andria, and the wretched conscripts whom Mehemet Ali kas assembled in Egypt;
and that, if Mehemet Ali were to bring back Ibrahim Pasha's Army from Syria
for the defence of Egypt, we should then only have to change the direction of
the expedition, and to send it to take possession of Syria, thus left defenceless.
I observed., that if, as M. Guizot contended, extent of territory does not
give power, mankind kacl from the earliest ages been in a considerable error ;
and that this error had been equally shared by those who sought to obtain
power themselves, and by those who have striven to prevent others from becom
ing dangerously powerful. But that it is obvious that extent of territory does
give to the party possessing it, men, money, and miktary positions ; and these
are the elements which constitute the strength of States.
With respect to organization, I remarked that the Porte has been making
rapid advances to a system of organization and of rational government, infi
nitely better than anything which exists under the tyrannical and grinding sway
of Mehemet Ali; and that there is no reason, moral or pkysical, why tke
Sultan skould not be able to govern Syria, as well as the remoter province of
Bagdad ; and that neither of the two are so far from Constantinople as many
provinces of other States are from the seat of government, or as some
portions of the territory which Mehemet Ak has invaded in Africa and
Arabia, are from Alexandria. That as to the advantage which the Sultan
would derive from regaining possession of Syria, I had to observe, that the
Sultan would in that case not only have at his disposal the amount of tribute
now paid for Syria by Mehemet Ali, but the additional revenue drawn from that
province by Mehemet Ali for his own purposes, and which is employed by him
to make war against the Sultan.
I admitted that the occurrence of any great events in the Levant ought, if
possible, to be prevented; but I said that the only way of averting events of
a very disastrous nature, would be to reduce Mehemet Ali to a state of occu
pation compatible with his condition of a subject; that as to contenting
Mehemet Ali, I had yet to learn how it is possible to content ambition ; and
tkat I was convinced that neither Mehemet Ali nor his successor could, as
things now stood, be a real friend or defender of the Porte; because their
interest and that of the Sultan must be in opposition, as long as there should be
anything left for the one to acquire or for the other to lose.
With respect to the views and intentions attributed to France, I observed,
that those intentions had been openly avowed by many of the French papers
which are the organs of that party to whose opinion and influence the French
Government say tkey are obliged to defer: that those papers plainly state, that
the Mediterranean ought to be a French lake ; that Mehemet Ali should be
made the Sovereign of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, and should become the pro
tected Ally of France ; and that thus, witk Algiers, Egypt, and Syria, and witk
Tunis and Tripoli, which would of course be swallowed up by France and her
Egyptian Ally, France would virtually command tke whole shore of the Medi
terranean, from Tangier to Adana ; and that the ports and ships of Egypt
would be at the disposal and at the service of France.
I said that I did not certainly believe that any reflecting French statesman
could seriously think of schemes, the accomplishment of which he must see
would be impossible. That in the first place, if, for the time present, the
French Government were disposed, as their newspapers are, to count up the
amount of their own maritime force, and to add to that force, the Egyptian and
Turkish fleets now in the harbour of Alexandria, the French Government must
still feel conscious that the naval forces which Great Britain would be able to
muster, added to the naval forces of those Allies wkom the course pursued by

603
JFrance must give to Great Britain, would infallibly turn the balance against
France. It would, however, be much better, I observed, that neither party should
begin this kind of arithmetic ; that as to the above-mentioned scheme for the
future, it was needless for me to say, that Great Britain would endeavour, by
every means at her disposal, to prevent its accomplishment, because such a
scheme would be greatly against the interests of Great Britain. France would,
therefore, not be able to reakse suck a plan without a war, of which the result
might not be success.
With respect to the notion inculcated by some of the French papers, that
the policy of Great Britain, with regard to the affairs of the East, is grounded
on a wish to obtdn possession of Egypt, I observed to M. Guizot, that Great
Britain would not accept the possession of Egypt, even if it were offered to
her, because that possession would be a burthen and not an advantage ; and I
remarked, that it is not very apparent how Great Britain is likely to secure
Egypt for kerself, by endeavouring, as ske does, to make it continue to be a
province of tke Ottoman Empire.
M. Guizot promised to report all that passed between us to his Govern
ment. In the mean time, that Government cannot furnish M. Guizot with
instructions with respect to this question, until it has ascertained whether it
wik be able to stand.
Her Majesty's Government do not, however, despair of inducing France to
agree to the generd principles ldd down by the other Four Powers, provided
those other Four Powers remain firm and steady to their purpose.

No. 513. j
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. —(Received March 13.)
My Lord, Therapia, February 18, 1840.
M. DE BOUTENEFF communicated to me this evening a despatch from
Count Nessekode, dated January -|-f, 1840, containing dkections to M. de
Bout6neff, " de s'associer a toutes les demarches que Lord Ponsonby croirait
necessake de fake pour inspirer au Divan une juste confiance dans les intentions
des Cabinets."^— [To co-operate in all tke steps which Lord Ponsonby might deem
it necessary to take in order to inspire the Divan with just confidence in the in
tentions of the Cabinets.] I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 514.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 1 6.)
My Lord, Paris, March 13, 1840.
M. THIERS this morning began a conversation with me on the Turco-
Egyptian Question, by assuring me of his most anxious desire to cultivate and
maintain an intimate Union and Alkance between France and England ; and
that he very much regretted that upon a question so important as that which
now occupied the attention of all the Great European Powers, the French and
British Governments, having the same objects in view, should differ as to the
means best calculated to arrive at a satisfactory result. His Excellency said it
was from no partiakty to Mehemet Ali, that the French Government refused to
be a party to coercive measures against the Pasha, to compel him to abandon
the possession of Syria ; that it was to the French Government a matter of
indifference whether the Pasha retained or did not retain it ; but that he was
persuaded, that the measures which it was proposed to adopt would fail of
success, and that the attempt would entail evils of far greater magnitude than
any that could be apprehended from the Egyptian occupation of Syria.
M. Thiers then went into a detail of the naval and military means of
4 H 2

604
Mehemet Ak, and thought it very doubtful whether the operations of any
army that Russia could bring into Asia Minor, would be successful in the defiles
of the Taurus against the Egyptian Army in its present efficient state, and
commanded by Generals as able as Ibrahim Pasha and Solyman Bey. The
Russians, he said, have had some experience of wars of this nature, in their
battles witk the Caucasians ; we have had the same experience in the Algerine
Territory with Abdel Kader ; and the Egyptians are more formidable enemies
than Caucasians or Arabs ; but, added M. Thiers, wall even the success of the
Russians in Syria, be favourable to the independence of the Sultan ? Is
a Russian Army to remain stationary in Syria, to keep in subjection the
Turkish population of those Pashalics, or is it to be left to be the theatre of
civil war between feeble detachments of Turkish troops and the Druses, and
other warlike tribes of those countries, and the Porte thus rendered more
unequal to the defence of its European dominions than if it were in the posses
sion of Mehemet Ali ?
I said to M. Thiers, that I would not now discuss with him whether the
accounts he had received of the military resources of Mehemet Ali were
exaggerated, or whether the Pasha was in a condition to refuse acceding to any
arrangement proposed to him by the European Powers ; but I would ask him
(not however speaking in the name of my Government, for I had received no
instructions to make any communication to the French Government on this
subject, since the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs had been placed in his hands),
whether he had any proposition other than what had been made by his prede
cessor in office, for settling the difference between the Porte and Mehemet Ak.
M. Thiers answered, that any proposition from Her Majesty's Government
would be considered by him and by his Colleagues with the most earnest desire
to come to an understanding with it upon this question. I said, supposing
(but I had not the slightest reason for imagining that such a proposition would
he made), that it was proposed to the French Government to join with the other
Powers in calkng upon Mehemet Ali to give up a certain part of Syria, leaving
to kim the remainder, would the French Government agree to that proposition,
and what would be the position taken up by France, if refused by the Pasha?
To this question, M. Thiers replied, that no hope could be entertained that
Mehemet Ali would give up Syria ; that he had found by the correspondence in
his office, that the French Government had pressed with, the utmost earnest
ness some concession from the Pasha on this point, but that the Pasha's
language on this head had been invariable and most decided ; that he might
be induced to give up Adana besides Candia, and the Arabian Pashalic. M.
Thiers then said, that I must be as well aware as he was of the impossibility of
any Ministry in France, however composed, acting hostkely against Egypt for
the purpose of restoring to the Porte the Pashalic of Egypt. There was but
one opinion in the country upon that question.
M. Thiers terminated our conversation by saying, that it would be his
most earnest desire that a difference of opinion upon this question should not
affect the good understanding between the two Governments ; but that he could
not be blind to the possible effects of the mutual recriminations of the press of
the two countries, arising on this divergence in the policy of tkeir respective
Governments, upon tke feeling of botk nations. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 515.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, March 17, 1840.
WITH reference to the assertion which Marshal Soult recently made,
tkat in July last he told your Excellency that the French would have fifteen sail
of the line in the Mediterranean, I must observe to your Excellency, that no
mention of such an intention is made in any of your despatches of that period.
But in your despatck of June 17, of last year, your Excellency reported, that
Marshal Soult stated to your Excellency, tkat the French fleet on the Levant

605
station would consist of ten sail of the line, besides frigates and sloops of war;
and tkat thus if the British squadron should be augmented to an equal amount,
the combined force would consist of twenty sail of the line. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 516.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 20.)
My Lord, Therapia, February 26, 1840.
IN obedience to your Lordship's directions, I requested that full powers
migkt be sent to Nouri Effendi to concur in a Treaty to be negotiated at London,
&c, &c. I had the honour, by last post, to acquaint you, that the Porte had
consented and had desired that I should forward the full powers by a messenger.
The full powers have not yet been sent to be forwarded. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 517.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 20.)
My Lord, Therapia, February 26, 1840.
M. DE BOUTENEFF communicated to me a despatch he had received
from Count Nesselrode, stating tkat your Lordship had desired that M. de
Bouteneff and I should act together for persuading the Sublime Porte to abstain
from committing itself witk tke Pasha of Egypt, &c.
In reply, I assured M. de Bouteneff of my readiness to take any steps he
should think proper, adding, that at the present moment I was not aware that
any were necessary. His Excellency was of tke same opinion upon this head, as
So much had been lately done, and with entire success, to obtain the desired end.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 518.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.— -(Received March 20.)
My Lord, Therapia, February 26, 1840.
COUNT KCENIGSMARCK read to me a despatch from Baron Werther
to the Prussian Charge d'Affaires in London, giving full powers to that Minister
to concur in the arrangement of the Egyptian Affair upon the basis of Prince
Metternich's Note, &c, &c. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 519,
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received March 22.)
My Lord, Paris, March 20, 1840.
IN my interview witk M. Thiers this morning, he again reverted to the
Turco-Egyptian Question. His Excellency re-stated the opinions and the argu
ments on this subject which I had heard from him a week ago, and which,
»-¦«¦

606
having been detailed in a despatck addressed by him to M. Guizot, and read to
your Lordship by the French Ambassador, I need not report.
His Excellency expressed great regret tkat tke discussions wkick had taken
place had not ted to an approximation in the line of conduct of the two Govern
ments on this question. He said that the accounts which he had received from
the French Consuls and Agents since our last conversation, strongly confirmed
his impression, that neither menace nor force would wrest from Mehemet Ak the
possession of Syria. He said that if any reasonable proposition were made to
tke Paska, the French Government would use its best efforts with him to induce
him to accept it. I asked him whether he considered every proposition short
of leaving to Mehemet Ali the possession of all Syria as unreasonable; ke
answered tkat perhaps there might be modifications in regard to the hereditary
tenure of the wrhole, or part of it. He stated, that the restoration of
Adana to the Porte was an important object, and that the French Government
" pesera de tout son poids" to obtain it. I asked whether by the menace of the
hostility of France against the Pasha, if he refused to make this concession ? To
this he repked by an allusion to tke acknowledged public feeling of France
against a war witk the Pasha of Egypt ; but again repeated the words " il pesera
de tout son poids." I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 520.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 22.)
My Lord, Paris, March 20, 1840.
I THIS morning called upon my Turkisk Colleague, and learnt from him
that he had as yet received no instructions to proceed to England. He had heard
from Constantinople that such instructions would be sent to him, but no official
communication had been made to him to that effect. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.
No. 521.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 23.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, February 12, 1840.
THE next subject touched upon was the attack upon the tribe inhabiting
the banks of the river Khaboor (under the jurisdiction of the Sultan) by Ibrahim
Pasha's irregular Cavalry from Orfa, wkich tke Viceroy attempted to explain by
Saying, that Ibrahim Pasha had been compelled to use compulsory measures by
tke refusal of tkat tribe to furnish recruits. Mehemet Ali was evidently
embarrassed on this subject, and declined answering further, unless I addressed
him officially in writing.
I then mentioned a report of his Highness having been tampering with the
chiefs and citizens of Merdin, and that they had sent an invitation to Ibrahim
Pasha to occupy that city, and that a Catholic bishop and some of the opposing
chiefs had been decapitated. Mehemet Ali explained tkis by saying, that it was
only a deputation from Maggiun Bey to his son, and that he knew nothing of
the murder of the Catholic bishop. .
W< | Noticing the recent destitution of Ahmed Pasha, Mehemet Ali ckaracterized
it as a direct insult towards him on the part of the Sublime Porte, who having
sought, six months after his defection, to arrange matters amicably with the
Pasha, now testified its disappointment by that insulting measure. He added,
that were he not sure of the sentiments of Mustapha Pasha, he would not have
allowed him to accept the appointment. From this I entirely dissented, by
declaring, that I considered that the Sublime Porte was perfectly entitled to
dismiss at pleasure an officer who had proved himself unfaithful.

607

No. 522.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston — (Received March 23.)
My Lord, Alexandria, February 21, 1840.
VARIOUS rumours have been afloat here for the last fifteen days. The
Austrian Consul-General received a communication from the Internuncio,
dated the 7th instant, stating tkat the preliminaries of a Treaty had been
agreed upon between England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, for the settle-'
ment of the Eastern Question, and that he was in hourly expectation of receiving
the announcement of its conclusion.
This intelligence, coupled with the news that Mehemet Ali kad received
from his agents at Paris and Constantinople, fiked him with alarm, and he
awaited with muck anxiety the arrival of Her Majesty's steamer from Malta,
which took place on the 20th instant. This vessel, however, brought no con
firmation of the above circumstance ; notwithstanding which, I bdieve that the
French Consul-General has made sueh representations to the Pasha, that he
sees a crisis at hand, and no longer to be averted.
M. Cochdet seems much perplexed and disappointed, and the numerous
Frenck residents of this place evince their alarm in various ways.
Ak those circumstances have roused the Pasha's energies, and he is now
making efforts to plaee himself in a formidable posture of defence. He
has just given the most pressing orders regarding the three foUowing extra
ordinary measures: — •
1 st. To disarm the two squadrons in the Port of Alexandria, and form six
regiments from the ships' crews and marines, to defend the coast from Rosetta
to Alexandria, and thence to the Arab's Tower. To bring on shore ak the
guns of the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons, and place them in battery to
strengthen the positions of Aboukir, the Catacombs, Marabout, and the entrance
of the Port of Alexandria. To dispose the ships in kne at such a distance, that
in case of fire, one could easily be removed without endangering the others.
2nd. To form a camp of 36,000 men at Damanhour, chief town of Behere,
thirty-four mkes from this city. This corps will be composed of two regiments
formed from the crews of the Egyptian squadron, two regiments of regular
Infantry, eight squadrons of regular Cavaky, and 25,000 Bedouins, wko, tke
Pasha says, have been engaged for a considerable time back.
3rd. To arm forthwith the National Guards of Alexandria, Cairo, and
other towns of Egypt, in the manner described to your Lordship in my former
despatches. Thus the fusion of the two squadrons which the Pasha contemplated, and
hastened or suspended according to circumstances, is now definitively decided
upon. The Egyptian squadron furnishing three regiments, and that of the
Sultan tke same.
The selection of Damanhour as the place of encampment, is judicious, being
central, and commanding a ready communication with most of the points on
the coast open to attack.
Boghos Bey has assured me, that Kourschid Pasha has retired from the
Hedjaz, and Ibrahim Pasha from Yemen, and that both are on their march for
this country. This circumstance Boghos Bey wished to impress upon me as a
proof of the Pasha's wikingness to surrender these provinces ; but it is mani
festly the intention of the Pasha to concentrate the whole of his disposable
troops in Egypt.
Advices from Cairo represent all civil and military departments of tke
Government to be in full activity. A considerable quantity of bombs, powder,
and other military stores were sent to Alexandria on the 19th instant. A
regiment of Guards stationed at the Citadel has received orders to march,
together with the Artillery of Toura, and a portion of the invakds with which
the town is garrisoned ; 260 decorations were sent down for the National
Guard of Alexandria. The foundery of Boulac is in full activity casting cannon
skot. It is positively stated that the Minister of War has orders to pay seven

608
months arrears ; and that, in addition to the money which the war department
has lately received, 500 purses are to be furnished by the Divan Iradat .
I have been informed that Ibrahim Pasha has written for Artikery, and tkat
elm wood has been sent for to Alexandria to construct the carriages. The
number of cannon required is estimated at 120. The gates of Cairo have been
repaired; the palace of Ibrahim Pasha at Quasr-el-Ain is in readiness for
Ahmed, late Capudan Pasha.
Acre is in all the bustle of being fortified and provisioned, so as to with
stand a siege, and its garrison is to be considerably augmented.
The Viceroy is in a state of great agitation, and treats as an act of insanity
the declaration made by the officers of the Sultan's squadron, on the 14th
instant, when paying their respects to him on the occasion of the Bairam, " that
they were ready to make common cause with him against the Infidels, but that
they would never take arms against their Sultan."
He illtreats and dismisses the Mudirs and Mamurs who tell kim tkat tke
Fekaks would leave tkeir lands en masse to escape the military conscription.
All tke Mudirs of Lower Egypt kave received orders to exact exorbitant sums ;
but even with the bastonade it will be impossible to raise the sums demanded.
The National Guard of Alexandria is now drilled for four kours twice a
week, hut of the number contemplated, the Government is obkged to content
itself witk 3,700, of whom 1,100 are picked out, the greater part of the rest
being boys incapable of bearing arms.
The financial resources of the country have been nearly exhausted, and the
maintenance of the troops now embodied is a matter of wonder to the mercantile
community here. But it is evident that vast as are the natural resources of
Egypt, they are unequal to any continuance of the pressure which is now upon
them. Alarm is spreading among the foreign merchants, who are reluctantly
closing their purse strings, determined rather to sacrifice previous advances,
than incur the risk of total ruin, and this despite the ascendancy that the
Pasha has acquired over tkeir minds, by tke manner in which he has sought
to identify their interests with his own.
I have reason, in some degree, to alter my opinions as to Mehemet Ali's
intention of resisting to the last extremity, should his territorial possessions be
restricted to Egypt alone. In such a case his self-love might possibly lead him
to risk a struggle. He counts much on his chances of successfully exciting
insurrections not only in Asia Minor, but also in Constantinople and Turkey in
Europe ; and I perceive a certain method and arrangement in preparing his
means of resistance, which I had not expected. I still, however, rather inckne
to tke opinion tkat kis good sense will prevent kim from risking a colksion witk
tke Powers of Europe. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 523.
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.
Sir, Foreign Office, March 25, 1840.
I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 22nd
of February. I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the lan
guage which you held to Mehemet Ali, as reported in your despatck of the 12th
of February, in reply to his observations on the dismissal of Achmet Pasha by the
Sultan, from his office of Capudan Pasha. It seems, indeed, to be a most extra
ordinary perversion of language on the part of Mehemet Ali, to assert tkat the
Sultan, by dismissing a traitorous Admiral from his post, has offered an insult to
Mehemet Ali. It may, indeed, be natural that a Pasha who has turned against the
Sultan, the power and tke arms which the Sultan kad entrusted to kim for very
different purposes, should dislike to see the Sultan dismiss from his service, an
Admiral who has likewise betrayed his trust; but if there has been any insult

609
offered in this case, it may justly be affirmed, that the Pasha is offering an
insult to the Sultan by continuing forcibly to retain the Sultan's fleet in the
harbour of Alexandria.
You are at liberty to show this despatch to Boghos Bey.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 524.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 25.)
(Extract.) Paris, March 23, 1840.
COUNT APPONY this day called upon the Ambassador of the Porte, for
the purpose of inquiring from him whether he had received instructions from his
Government to proceed to England to take a part in the negotiations on the
Affairs of the East, and found that no orders to that effect had as yet reached him.
No. 525.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 26.)
My Lord, Therapia, February 27, 1840.
I HAVE received from his Excellency Rechid Pasha, a packet containing
fdl powers for Nouri Effendi, and instructions for that Ambassador, which, at
tbe request of the Sublime Porte, I send by a messenger to Vienna, to be
forwarded to Earl Granville at Paris. I kave, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 526.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 26.)
(Extract.) Therapia, March 3, 1840.
I INCLOSE a despatck from Mr. Consul Moore, dated 21st of February,
because I am not sure that your Lordship has received the intelligence it
contains, and to part of which I wish to draw your attention for reasons that
will appear when your Lordship receives a despatch that will be forwarded by
the first messenger. . .
Mr. Moore says, " Secret meetings amongst the Christians and some
Sheiks of the Druses have been held in Mount Lebanon, and a resolution
adopted to resist ak attempts either to disarm them or to levy conscripts." This
is a strong symptom of the state of Syria.
The late accounts from Alexandria show the efforts making by Mehemet
Ali to increase his force, and Colonel Hodges seems to think it possible he may
risk some desperate measure. I have ventured in a former communication, to
state an opinion that he will not make an attempt which is easy to be foiled,
and which, if foiled, must be the cause of his total ruin; but still it may be
made early in April, and in twenty or a few more days, the sea might be reached
by the army of Ibrahim, who would then be able to raise by means of money,
disturbances that would produce the worst consequences. This danger may be
completely guarded against by the naval means at hand : a few frigates and stea
mers are enough to prevent the possibility of the attempt to pass the water
and also to prevent all sedition, and to give confidence and power to the Sul
tan's Government.

4 I

610
Inclosure in No. 526.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Beyrout, February 21, 1840.
SINCE I had the honour to address your Excellency under date of the 1st
— 3rd instant, all tke masons and builders at Beyrout have been called for by
the Governor, and sent to Acre to be employed in the fortifications at that place ;
the bakers have likewise received orders to prepare a supply of biscuit for that
fortress : similar orders have been given at Sidon.
Two battalions of Infantry have passed through this place for the same
destination, and others are to follow.
The trenches are to be deepened and enlarged at Acre, whither a large
quantity of lime for making mortar kas also been transported. A mound on
the east, raised by the Egyptian army when that place was besieged and taken,
is to be levelled ; and permission has been granted to such persons as may be
desirous of quitting the city, to depart, and several have already availed of the
permission, and are arrived at Sidon.
The present force at Acre consists of a regiment of Cavalry and one of
Infantry, and about 600 artillerymen, but this force is to be increased.
Secret meetings amongst the Christians and some Sheiks of the Druses
have been held in Mount Lebanon, and a resolution adopted by them to resist
all attempts either to disarm them, or to levy conscripts.
Solyman Pasha has left Beyrout for Sidon and Acre.
In this neighbourhood public tranquillity is maintained. I kave, &c,
(Signed) N. MOORE

No. 527.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 26.)
My Lord, Paris, March 24, 1840.
I TRANSMITTED to Nouri Effendi a despatch from his Government
which was forwarded to me by Lord Ponsonby, containing official instructions
to his Excekency to proceed to England to take part in tke conferences at
London on the Affairs of the East.
I have this evening received a note from Nouri Effendi, apprizing me of
his intention to quit Paris in two days to proceed to his destination.
(Signed) ' GRANVILLE.

No. 528.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, March 28, 1840.
I HAVE to inform your Excellency, that a very bad effect has been
produced upon the pending negotiations upon the Turkish Question, by an
opinion which has gone forth, that Austria would not choose, in any case, to take
any active part in any measures which the Allies migkt find themselves obliged
to resort to in support of the Sultan's rights.
This opinion passes current at Paris, and is entertained by many persons
in London. Her Majesty's Government know very well that this opinion is
entirely unfounded, and that Austria would be perfectly ready and willing to
take any part which might properly belong to her in any measures which
midit become necessary; but it would be desirable that your Excellency should
pom out to Prince Metternich, how much the successful issue of the pending

611
aegntiations may be prevented, and how much the political weight, which
properly belongs to Austria, is diminished, by the prevdenl misconception which
has arisen upon this matter. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 529.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received March 29.)
(Extract ) paris, March 27, 1840.
NOURI EFFENDI took leave of me yesterday, stating it to be his
intention to quit Paris this day for London. No. 530.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 3.)
(Extract.) Therapia, March 7, 1840.
I INCLOSE a translated copy of a letter written by Mehemet Ali to
the Grand Vizier, which was sent in original from Rechid Pasha, and
translated by M. Frederic Pisani. Inclosure in No. 530.
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.
(Traduction.) J'AI l'honneur de representer ce qui suit: ainsi qu'il est connu k
votre Altesse, tous mes efforts, des le debut de ma carriere, n'ont eu
qu'une seule tendance, — celle de rendre a la religion, a la Sublime Porte,
k FEmpire, et a la Nation Musulmane, des services importans.
Si, par la grace de Dieu, et sous les auspices de la Sublime Porte, j'ai
pu parvenir a la position dans laquelle je me trouve aujourd'hui, votre
Altesse n'ignore pas que les decrets de la Providence avaient permis qu'il
fut tenu a mon egard, sous le regne precedent, des procedes qui, etant
tout-a-fait opposes a mes veritables sentimens, ne pouvaient manquer de
m'affliger profondement.
Sensiblement peine de ce que les temps passes n'ont pas ete juste-
ment apprectes, songeant aux maux et aux dangers imminens de toutes
especes dont le tems present est gros ; et persuade qu'un homme aussi
eclaire que votre Altesse pensait aux consequences d'un pareil etat de
choses, si Fon manquait d'y remedier a temps, j'ai cru de mon devoir, —
devoir que m'imposaient et la religion et mon devouement sincere, —
de vous donner quelques explications sur certains points ; et c'est ce que
j'avais fait dans une lettre que j'ai envoyee a ma fille, Zuhra Khanum,
afin qu'elle la remit a votre Altesse. J'attendais, a la verite, de la part
d'un homme anime de tant de zeie, d'un homme d'une si grande expe
rience dans les affaires, une reponse conciliante. Mais, quelque temps
apres, votre Altesse envoy a a ma fille un billet qui renfermait vos ordres,
et qu'elle me fit parvenir.
\m J'ai plusieurs fois medite sur le billet en question, et Fayant trouve*
con£u, contre mon attente, dans un style plein d'allusions et d'altegories,
les decrets du ciel Fordonnent ainsi, me suis-je dit, en mordant mes
doigts, tant j'etais stupefait.
Ne voulant plus rien dire ni rien ecrire, j'ai demeure quelque temps
comme hors de moi-meme. Mais, a la fin, sachant ce qui se passe actu-
ellement, et considerant la position dans laquelle je me trouve sous les
4 12

612
auspices de la Sublime Porte, garder le silence parceque je suis fache,
m'a paru un grand crime, une chose capable de m'attirer les plus
mauvaises consequences et dans cette vie et dans l'autre. Et comme,
d'ailleurs, je connais votre Altesse pour Fhomme le plus sage de notre
siecle, pour un homme qui veut le bien de la religion et de I'etat, j'ai ete
induit, par les impulsions de la saine raison et de mon zele, a vous ecrire
encore une fois, sans aucune etiquette, pour vous exposer la verite toute
nue. Votre Altesse parle dans le billet qui renferme ses ordres, de la
necessite pour moi que je donne des temoignages evidens, utiles, &c,
Bien que cela ne soit pas clair, je crois, cependant, en avoir saisi Fallu-
sion. Si je ne me trompe, votre Altesse veut parler de la restitution de
la flotte Imperiale. S'il en est ainsi, je lui ferai observer, que la flotte
Imperiale a toujours ete la propriete hereditaire du Sultan notre Sei
gneur et Maitre ; qu'elle est venue tout naturellement a Alexandrie ; et
que Sa Hautesse sait fort bien qu'un aussi humble serviteur que Mehemet
Ali ne vise pas a la lui ravir.
Au reste, il y a deja longtems que j'aurais renvoye la flotte a
Constantinople ; mais puisqu'on n'insiste que sur la restitution de cette
flotte, tandis que Fon rejette l'offre que j'ai tant de fois faite, non seule
ment de rendre la flotte, mais de reunir toutes les forces de terre et de
mer de l'Egypte a celles de la Sublime Porte, n'ai-je pas raison de croire
que, continuant d'avoir de moi I'opinion qu'on en avait sous le regne
precedent, on veut faire une scission ? Or, tandisque la meme opinion a
mon egard existe, si j'avais renvoye la flotte, quelques uns de mes col
legues se livreraient a des illusions ; et en disant, — voici que nous avons
pris la flotte, ils mettraient obstacle a Famitie de la nation ; et a la longue,
le peuple Mahometan ne tomberait-il pas dans un plus grand abime ?
Voila, Monseigneur, que je vous ai expose tels qu'ils sont redlement
eten apparence et au fond, les motifs quimeguident a Fegard de la flotte.
Expliquons maintenant les motifs que j'ai pour persister a demander la
Syrie j usque et compris Adana et les gorges du Mont Taurus avec leurs
confins. J'ai deja passe ma soixante-dixieme amtee; il ne faut point d'autres
preuves que je ne travaille pas pour moi-meme. Mais il y a tant d'annees
que je sers ; j'ai cree une famille, et mon desir le plus ardent est que ma
famille, toujours sous les auspices de Sa Hautesse, ne soit pas dispersee
apres moi, et que fils, petit-fils, et arriere-petit-fils, sincerement devoues
a la Sublime Porte, et ayant dans PArabie des forces imposantes, et
toujours pretes a agir au besoin, ils puissent ainsi rendre des services a
la religion et au Gouvernement, et faire que ma memoire soit pour long-
temps benie dans Fhistoire. Or, on persiste obstinement a me refuser
Adana et les gorges du Mont Taurus, d'ou je conclus qu'on veut me
frustrer de Pobjet que je desire obtenir, et qu'on a peut-etre meme
d'autres intentions encore ; et de la naquit la necessite pour moi de
persister dans mes demandes resolument.
L'idee de ne pas s'arreter au refus, et de vouloir commettre la faute
si prejudiciable de recourir, a la fin, a quelques Grandes Puissances,
confirme de plus en plus mon premier soup^on.
J'ai rejete tout net les propositions qui m'avaient ete faites de
concert par les Grandes Puissances, en leur faisant une reponse tout-a-
fait negative, et en voici les raisons:
Rien de plus favorable a la politique des Grandes Puissances que le
recours a, elles : en effet, leur politique exige que la Sublime Porte soit
toujours en proie a des malheurs, afin qu'affaiblie par la, sa faiblesse
facilite I'execution du projet qui, depuis nombre d'annees, fait Pobjet de
leurs meditations, — le partage de la Turquie, lorsque le temps en sera
venu. Les Puissances se sont coalisees pour detruire les sources d'ou la
Sublime Porte peut tirer des forces. Elles disent, l'Egypte fait la prin-
cipale force de la Sublime Porte ; diminuons done la puissance de
l'Egypte ; car, comme apres cela la discorde et les dissentions entre les
deux parties ne cesseront jamais, k la longue les deux parties s'affaibli-
ront egalement, et nos voeux seront accomplis. Cela etant, il vaut mille

613
fois mieux perir a present d'une maniere digne de l'Islamisme, et en
montrant une vive foi, que perir avec deshonneur dans cinq ans d'ici.
Quoiqu'il en soit, votre Altesse saura qu'on a commence ici a faire
des preparatifs de guerre qui ne sont interrompus ni de jour ni de nuit.
Pour Pamour de Dieu, que votre Altesse ne permette pas que le peuple
Mahometan soit plonge dans les malheurs dont il est menace; qu'elle
daigne m'accorder la faveur que je desire si ardemment obtenir, la faveur
d'etre admis comme un serviteur fideie et devoue. Non, un homme aussi
judicieux, aussi edaire que votre Altesse ne saurait ignorer qu'en me
traitant avec cette clemence que j 'implore, il verra ses voeux accomplis
dans Pun et l'autre monde ; et c'est ce qui m'encourage a prendre la
liberte de vous faire de nouvelles representations ; ce que je fais, comme je
l'ai dit plus haut, d'une maniere denu6e de toute etiquette.
Je prends Dieu a temoin que ces representations sont Tranches et
sinceres. Plein de confiance dans la sagacite, dans Pesprit de religion et
de moderation qui vous anime, et dans votre qualite de mon ancien
Maitre et Protecteur, je vous ai ouvert tout mon cceur. J'espere en Dieu,
que daignant preter une oreille favorable a mes prieres, votre Altesse
voudra bien mettre toute sa sollicitude a faire prendre un nouvel essor a.
la nation Musulmane, et renouveler votre ancienne protection a mon
egard. Moi, de mon cote, qui ai recours a la clemence de votre Altesse,
je me montrerai pour le reste de ma vie assidument et constamment
occupe a servir, avec Passistance divine, et avec un devouement sans
bornes, la religion et notre Gouvernement; et j'assurerai ainsi ma feiicite
dans cette vie et dans l'autre. Mais si votre Altesse fait a mes represen
tations, qui portent le sceau de la franchise et de la verite, une reponse
semblable a celles qui Pont precedee, et cherche a gagner du tems, moi
aussi, mettant en chaque circonstance toute ma confiance dans Passistance
et la faveur divines, je ne changerai pas de resolution ; et votre Altesse,
informee de cela, donnera les ordres qu'il lui appartient de donner.
19 Zilhadge, 1255. (23 Fevrier, 1840.) (L.S.) MEHEMET ALI.

(Translation.)
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.
I HAVE the honour to represent as follows : — As Your Highness is aware,
ak my efforts from tke commencement of my career have only had one object, —
that of doing important service to religion, to the Sublime Porte, to the Empire,
and to the Mussulman nation.
If I have been enabled by the grace of God, and under the auspices of the
Porte, to attain the position which I now hold, Your Highness is not ignorant
that in the preceding reign the decrees of Providence permitted measures to be
adopted with regard to me, which, being perfectly opposed to my true feelings,
could not fail deeply to afflict me.
Sensibly grieved that past times have not been justly appreciated, contem
plating the evils and imminent dangers of all kinds with which the present time
is pregnant, and persuaded that so enlightened a man as Your Highness would
think of the consequences of such a state of things, if a remedy was not produced
in time, I have thought it my duty — a duty imposed upon me by religion and my
sincere devotion — to make some explanations to you upon certain points; and this
is what I did in a letter which I sent to my daughter, Zuhra Khanum, to be dek-
vered by her to Your Highness. I certainly expected a conciliatory reply from
a man actuated by so much zeal, and from one so well versed in affairs. But,
some time afterwards, Your Highness sent a Note to my daughter, containing
your orders, which she caused to be delivered to me.
I have repeatedly meditated over the Note in question, and having, against
my expectation, found it couched in a style full of akusions and allegories, I
said to myself, — biting my fingers, so much was I astounded, — Heaven has
thus decreed it.
Not being willing to say or to write anything more, I remained for a time

614
as if beside myself. But at last, knowing what is now going on, and considering
the position in which I am placed under the auspices of the Sublime Porte., I
thought that to keep silence because I am angry, was a great crime, a thing
capable of drawing down the worst consequences upon me both in this and in
the other world. And since, moreover, I know Your Highness to be the wisest
man of our age, — a man who desires the good of religion and of the State, — I
have been induced, under the impulse of sound reason and of my zeal, to write
to you once more without any ceremony, to lay the naked truth before you.
In the Note which contains your orders, Your Highness speaks of the
necessity of my giving evident and useful proofs, &c. Although that is not
clear, I believe, nevertheless, I have found out to what it alludes. Unless I am
deceived, Your Highness would speak of the restitution of the Imperial fleet. If
this be so, I will observe to you, that the Imperial fleet has always been the
hereditary property of the Sultan, our Lord and Master ; that it came quite
naturaky to Alexandria; and that His Highness wek knows that so humble a
servant as Mehemet Ak does not aim at wresting it from him.
Moreover, it is now some time since I would have sent back the fleet to
Constantinople ; but since the restitution of this fleet is alone insisted upon,
whilst the offer which I have so often made, not only to restore the fleet, but to
unite all the land and sea forces of Egypt to those of the Sublime Porte, is
rejected, have I not reason to believe that, in continuing to have the same
opinion of me, as was the case under the preceding reign, it is wished to effect a
schism? Now, as long as the same opinion exists with respect to me, if I had
sent back the fleet, some of my Colleagues would have given themselves up to
ikusions ; and saying, Now we have taken the fleet, — they would place obstacles
in the way of the friendship of the nation ; and in the long run, would not the
Mahomedan people fall into a greater abyss ?
Ihave now, my Lord, laid before you the motives which guide me with
respect to the fleet, such as they really are in appearance and in substance. Let
us now explain the motives which I have in persisting to demand Syria, as far
as, and including, Adana, and the passes of Mount Taurus and their borders.
I have already passed my seventieth year; no other proofs are required that
1 do not labour for myself. But I have served for so many years ; I have
created a family, and my most ardent desire is, that my family, always under
the auspices of His Highness, may not be dispersed after my death, and that
sons, grandsons, and great grandsons, sincerely devoted to the Sublime Porte,
and possessing an imposing force in Arabia, and always ready to act in case of
need, may also render services to religion and to the government, and cause my
memory to be long revered in history. Now, the refusal to give me Adana and
the passes of the Taurus, is obstinately persisted in, whence I conclude that it
is desired to frustrate the object 1 have in view, and that perhaps something
further is intended ; and hence the necessity which I feel for resolutely persist
ing in my demands.
The notion of not being content with a refusal, and of being willing to commit
so prejudicial an error, as "o have recourse at last to some great Powers, more
and more confirms my first suspicion.
I have at once rejected the proposals which had been made to me in con
cert by the Great Powers, by making a reply to them quite in the negative, and
these are my reasons.
Nothing is more favourable to the policy of the Great Powers, than that
recourse should be had to them : in fact, their policy requires that the Sublime
Porte should always be a prey to misfortunes, in order that, weakened thereby, its
weakness may facilitate the execution of the plan which for a number of years has
formed the object of their meditations — the partition of Turkey, when the time
shall have arrived. The Powers have coalesced to destroy the sources from whence
the Sublime Porte can derive its forces. They say, Egypt constitutes the prin
cipal power of the Sublime Porte ; let us diminish then the power of Egypt ; for,
since after that, the discord and dissensions between the two parties will never
cease, the two parties will be equally reduced in the long run, and our wishes
will be accomplished. This being the case, it is much better to perish at once
in a manner worthy of Islamism, and by showing a lively faith, than to perish
five years hence with dishonour.
However this may be, Your Highness will be aware that warlike prepara
tions, which cease neither day nor night, have been begun here. For the love of

615
God, Your Highness, do not allow the Mahometan people to be plunged into the
misery which threatens them. Grant me the favour which I so ardently desire,
that of being admitted as a faithful and devoted servant. No, so enlightened^
so judicious a man as Your Highness is, cannot be ignorant that you will see
yomr desires accomplished in this world and in the next, by treating me with
the clemency which I implore ; and this it is which encourages me to take the
liberty of making fresh representations to you ; which, as I have said above, I
da without any ceremony.
I call God to witness, that these representations are frank and sincere.
Full oi' confidence in the wisdom, in the spirit of religion and of moderation
which animates you, and in your quality of my old master and protector, I have
opened my whole heart to you. I trust in God that, vouchsafing a favourable
ear to my prayers, your Highness will use all your care to give a fresh impulse
to the Mussulman Nation, and renew your former protection with regard to me.
I, for my part, who have always had recourse to the clemency of your Highness,
I shall, by divine assistance, show myself assiduously and constantly occupied
for the rest of my life in serving religion and our Government, with a boundless
devotion ; and I shall thus ensure my happiness in this world and in the next.
But if your Highness answers my representations which bear the stamp of
frankness and truth, in a like manner as before, and seeks to gain time, I shall
not alter my resolution, putting my entire confidence, under every circumstance,
in divine favour and assistance; and your Highness being "informed of this, will
give the orders which it is your duty to give.
19th Zilhadge, 1255. (February 23, 1840). (LS.) MEHEMET ALI.

No. 531.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 3.)
(Extract.) Therapia, March 11, 1840.
I INCLOSE a communication I have just received from the Sublime
Porte, being the substance of despatches from Bagdad, Diarbekir, and
Moussoul.

Inclosure in No. 531.
Substance of despatches from Moussoul, Bagdad, and Diarbekir.
(Traduction.) LE Gouverneur de Bagdad, Ali Pacha, eerit sous la date du 19
Fevrier dernier, " le General Egyptien Kourchid Pacha qui etait il y a
quelque tems dans le Yemen, vient d'arriver maintenant a un endroit
distant de trente heures de Bassora. II y leve des troupes, et fait des
approvisionnemens. 11 fait aussi venir du Yemen sur des batimens, de
I'artillerie, des munitions de guerre et autre materiel necessaire, voulant,
sans doute, mettre a execution quelque projet qu'il medite."
Une d6peche de Mehemed Pacha de Moussoul, porte en substance ce
qui suit : " PEgyptien connu sous la denomination de Maadjoun Agassi,
est venu ces jours-ci avec un corps de Cavalerie considerable a un endroit
appete Sabour vers Moussoul, ou il a commis des exces en pillant
quelques tribus. De la il s'est dirig6 vers Bassora, et par ses marches et
contre-marches dans ces environs la, il trouble la tranquillite des
habitans. A juger de sa maniere d'agir, son intention est de frapper
un coup quelque part. En cas done, que ce Maadjoun Agassi ne se
retire pas avec ses cavaliers du cote d'Ourfa, et de la vers l'Egypte, son
pays, des troubles edateront dans la province de Moussoul ainsi que
dans les environs de Bagdad, et sur la grande route qui y mene."
Le Moushir de Diarbekir, Saadoullah Pacha, eerit : " le General de
Brigade, Ferhad Bey, qui est a Antab, exige, en employ ant meme
quelques moyens coercitifs, du bl6 et de Forge du district de Hazahzour.

616
Un Colonel Egyptien est venu d'Ourfa sous pretexte d'acheter des mulets,
et un Major s'est rendu par la grande route de Balou a Erzroum : ils y
font des approvisionnemens de vivres, et s'y procurent d'autres objets, et
ils veulent faire la m6me chose en avancant plus encore dans le pays."
Les Pachas susmentionnes ajoutent : " independamment de ces pro-
cedes de la part des Egyptiens, qui font jouer des ressorts patens et
caches, on voit bien qu'ils ont beaucoup d'autres objets en vue, et une
pareille conduite est tout-a-fait opposee a la politique suivie aujourd'hui."
Agissant, disent-ils, avec prudence, ils, cherchent toujours a eviter de
provoquer les Egyptiens en la moindre chose ; mais ils demandent des
instructions de la Sublime Porte, pour savoir ce qu'ils doivent faire en
cas que les Egyptiens vinssent a commettre de nouveaux actes
d'agression.

(Translation.)
Substance of despatches from Moussoul, Bagdad, and Diarbekir.
THE Governor of Bagdad, Ali Pasha, writes under date of the 19th
of February last, "The Egyptian General Kourchid Pasha, who some time since
was in Yemen, has arrived at a place about thirty hours from Bassora. He is
there levying troops and laying in provisions. He is likewise bringing artillery,
warlike stores, and other necessary stores from Yemen by boats, intending
without doubt to put into execution some plan which he meditates.
A despatch from Mehemet Pasha of Moussoul, contains in substance what
follows: — "The Egyptian known under the name of Maadjoun Agassi, arrived
within the last few days with a considerable body of cavalry at a place near
Moussoul, called Sabour, where he ccmmitted excesses in pillaging several tribes.
From thence he went to Bassora, and by his marches and counter-marches in
that vicinity, he disturbed the tranquillity of the inhabitants. To judge of his
movements, his intention appears to be to strike a blow somewhere. If this
Maadjoun Agassi does not retire with his horsemen towards Orfa, and from
thence to his country, Egypt, disturbances will take place in the province of
Moussoul, as well as in the environs of Bagdad, aud on the high road leading
thither." The Moushie of Diarbekir, Saadoullah Pasha, writes: — "The General of
Brigade, Ferhade Bey, who is at Aintab, has made requisitions of corn and
barley in the district of Hazahzour, to enforce which he even employs coercive
measures. An Egyptian Colonel has arrived from Orfa on the pretext of buying
mules, and a Major has proceeded to Erzeroum by the great road of Balou ;
they are there collecting provisions, and other matters, and they intend doing
the same while proceeding further up the country."
The above-named Pashas add : — " Independently of these measures on the
part of the Egyptians who are intriguing openly and secretly, it is clearly to be
seen, that they have many other objects in view, and such conduct is entirely
opposed to the policy at present followed." They say, that acting always with
prudence, they seek to avoid provoking the Egyptians in the least matter ; but
they ask instructions from the Sublime Porte, in order to know what they are to
do in case the Egyptians should commit fresh acts of aggression.

No. 532.
Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 6.)
(Extract.) Berlin, April 1, 1840.
I HAVE had a general conversation with Baron Werther since I
arrived here, from which I infer that the policy of Prussia remains
unchanged; that is, that the same desire prevails to act as much as
possible in concert with Austria and Russia, the results of which should
be the continuance of peace. At the same time there is a very friendly
feeling in this Cabinet towards England and France.

617
Baron Werther has given such instructions on the Eastern Question
to Baron Biilow, as he thinks will be satisfactory to your Lordship, but
he fears that a speedy settlement of that question is not to be expected.
At the same time, the status quo gives him no apprehension of war. He
rejoiced at Baron Brunnow's appointment to London, as he thought him
more able than any one to explain all pending questions ; his long ser
vice in the Foreign Office of St. Petersburgh, making him master of
every subject, and his views being conciliatory.

No. 533.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 6.)
My Lord, Paris, April 3, 1840.
I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches to the 31st
of March, and I have to thank your Lordship for transmitting to me a
copy of your despatch of the 12th of March to Lord Beauvale, containing
an account of a long and interesting conversation you held with M. Guizot
upon the Turco-Egyptian Question.
The arguments adduced by the French Ambassador in support of
the views of the present Ministers and of their predecessors in this
matter, are those which I have heard from the mouth of Marshal Soult,
and of M. Thiers, and which I reported in various despatches to your
Lordship ; I am glad to be put in possession of the statement made
by your Lordship in reply to those arguments, and shall avail myself of it
in any future discussion that may arise upon this question with the
French Minister ; but I should deceive your Lordship, if I led you to
expect that any change in the views or conduct of the French Govern
ment could thereby be effected, or that Her Majesty's Government need
not despair of inducing the French Government to agree to the general
principles laid down by the other Four Powers, provided those Four
Powers remain firm and steady in their purpose.
I am every day more and more convinced (a conviction, I believe,
shared by every one of my Diplomatic Colleagues), that France will not
join in hostile measures to compel the evacuation of Syria by the
Egyptians, whatever may be the party who form the Government.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 534.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 7.)
(Extract.) Damascus, February 20, 1840.
UNDER the 18th ultimo, per Austrian steamer from Beyrout, I had
the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch.
The environs of this city and the Damascus district are in a
quiescent state. I have only heard that, on an order being sent by the
Government here to the Mussellim of Balbec, to seize one of the Mutuali
Emirs implicated in the late insurrection, that Emir proceeded to the
house of the brother of the Governor of Balbec, residing in one of the
adjacent villages, and killed him ; but it appears the affair terminated
there, and has produced no further consequences for the present.
I hear that a spirit of resistance has manifested itself to the measures
supposed to be contemplated by the Egyptian Government in the Emir
Bechir's jurisdiction in Mount Lebanon. It is stated that the Emir
required those who had been furnished with arms by order of Ibrahim
Pasha, subsequently to the quelling of the Druse insurrection, in which
the Emir Bechir's Christian population was employed, — when 16,000
stand of arms were distributed to them, — to deliver their arms up
4 K

618
to the Emir Bechir. It appears they have refused to accede to this demand,
and have declared that the population are, with the Druses, determined
that they shall retain their arms, which were placed in their hands, under
a promise from the Egyptian Government, that they should be for the
defence of themselves and their children ; that this determination has
arisen chiefly from the apprehension of the population, that it is the
intention of the Egyptian Government to exact from them conscripts for
the Egyptian army, or to raise a militia to serve beyond the limits of the
Emir Bechir's jurisdiction.
I hear that orders have been received here from the Government in
Egypt, to send the six Chiefs commanding the Irregular Syrian Cavalry
with their force to Egypt ; this force may amount to about 1,200 men,
but is ordered to be completed to 2,000. Some difficulty has presented
itself in executing the orders of the Egyptian Government in the imme
diate marching of these troops ; they state that they were recruited for
the Syrian service, and have no means either for themselves or their
families, which must remain in Syria, to extend their service to a distant
part of the territories of this Government. The Chiefs have required a
delay of sixty days to combine arrangements on this subject. It would
appear that it is the object of the Government to remove them from.
Syria, as both the chiefs and men are the most turbulent spirits in the
country, whom the Government cannot trust, while they can be employed
in Egypt or Arabia, with a better chance of success.
My freshest advices from Aleppo, state the destination of two
regiments of Infantry from thence for the South, and I hear some Artillery-
is to augment that force for the same object ; here, it is stated, that this
force is for the district of Acre. No change had taken place in retiring
any part of the force either from Marash or Orfa, and Ibrahim Pasha was
still at the former place.

No. 535.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, April 7, 1840.
I AM commanded by the Queen to signify to your Lordships Her Majes
ty's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, or the officer commanding
Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles,
should be instructed, on receiving an application from the Porte for the
presence of the British Squadron in the Bosphorus to protect Con
stantinople against any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha, to repair to
the Bosphorus with his squadron, or with such portion thereof as he
may think sufficient, and there to adopt, in concert with Her Majesty's
Ambassador, and with the Turkish Government, the most effectual
measures for the protection of the Turkish capital against an attack by
the Egyptian forces.

No. 536.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, April 7, 1840.
IN order to guard against the possibility of any misunderstanding, a
precise instruction will now be given to the British Admiral in the terms
of my letter to the Admiralty of this day, of which I inclose a copy, and
by which the Admiral will be directed, on receiving through your Excel
lency an application from the Porte for the presence of the British squa
dron in the Bosphorus to protect Constantinople against any attack on
the part of Ibrahim Pasha, to repair to the Bosphorus with his squadron,
or with such portion thereof as he may think sufficient, and there to adopt,

619
in concert with your Excellency and with the Turkish Government, the
most effectual measures for the protection of the Turkish capital against
an attack by the Egyptian forces.

No. 537.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 10.)
My Lord, Therapia, March 18, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to forward translated copies of a letter from
the Grand Vizier to the Pasha of Egypt, and of the latter's reply, on the
subject of the new appointment of a Capudan Pasha, both of which
documents were communicated to me this day by his Excellency Rechid
Pasha. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 537.
The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

January 19, 1840.
CONFORMEMENT aux ordres emanes de Sa Hautesse, le poste de
Capitan Pacha vient d'etre confere au Ministre du Commerce, son
Excellence Said Pacha.
Quoique le predecesseur de Said Pacha doive conserver sa decoration
personnelle, il faut cependant d'apres notre systeme, que la decoration
affectee a la dignite de Capitan Pacha, soit donnee a son successeur.
Par suite de ce changement, il a fallu, suivant les regies de la
marine, nommer un personnage convenable Commandant Superieur de la
flotte Imperiale. Le General de Division, Moustapha Pacha, etant un ser-
viteur actif et intelligent de la Sublime Porte, et se trouvant la, Sa Majeste
Imperiale a daigne le nommer Ca'imakam de la flotte, pour qu'il ait, en
cette qualite, a soigner toutes les affaires qui regardent les batimens, et
avoir Finspection sur les equipages ; et j 'expedie a Votre Altesse le
firman contenant la double commission de Moustapha Pacha a qui Said
Pacha 6crit lui-meme.
Je vous ecris done cette lettre pour vous recommander de mettre a
execution la volonte de Sa Majeste Imperiale, en faisant lire publique-
ment le Firman susdit, afin que la commission de Moustapha Pacha soit
connue des officiers et des matelots de la flotte ; Votre Altesse prendra
aussi la decoration affectee au poste deUapitan Pacha et elle Fenverra ici.
(Translation.)
The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali. January 19, 1840.
IN obedience to the orders of His Highness the post of Capudan Pasha
has been conferred on the Minister of Commerce, his Excellency Said Pasha.
Although the predecessor of Said Pasha is allowed to retain his personal
decoration, the decoration attached to the dignity of Capudan Pasha must,
according to our system, be given to his successor.
In consequence of this change it has become necessary, according to the
regulations of the Navy, to name a proper person superior Commandant of the
Imperial fleet. The General of Division, Mustapha Pasha, being an active and
intelligent servant of the Sublime Porte, and being on tke spot, His Imperial
Majesty kas been pleased to name kim Caimacam of tke fleet, in order tkat ke
may in tkat capacity kave a care of ak things relating to the vessels, and have
1 4 K2

620
the superintendence over the crews : and I forward to your Highness the
firman containing the twofold commission of Mustapha Pasha, to whom Said
Pasha writes himself.
I write this letter therefore to enjoin you to execute the wkl of His Imperial
Majesty by causing the said firman to be publicly read, in order that the
commission of Mustapha Pasha may be known to the officers and the sakors
of the fleet. Your Highness will likewise take the decoration attached to the
post of Capudan Pasha, and forward the same to this place.

Inclosure 2 in No. 537.
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

February 29, 1840.
J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir le Firman qui annonce, qu'en vertu des
ordres emanes du Trdne, la dignite de Capitan Pacha a ete conferee k
son Excellence Said Pacha, et que, comme par suite de ce changement il
a fallu, d'apres la regie suivie dans la marine, nommer un personnage
convenable Commandant Superieur de la flotte Imperiale, Sa Hautesse
a daigne nommer son Excellence Moustapha Pacha, qui se trouve ici,
Caimakam de la flotte Imperiale. J'ai aussi regu la lettre par laquelle
Votre Altesse me recommande de mettre a execution la volonte de Sa
Hautesse, en faisant lire le Firman susdit en presence des officiers de la
flotte. Comme il est de mon devoir d'executer la volonte de Sa Majest6
Imperiale, j'ai fait remettre le Firman susdit a Moustapha Pacha par le
Capitaine qui en avait ete le porteur, et je Fai fait lire ensuite publique-
ment k bord du vaisseau le " Mahmoudie," en presence de tous les officiers
et capitaines qui s'y etaient reunis.
J'ai aussi donne les ordres necessaires a Moustapha Pacha de remplir
avec soin les devoirs de sa charge.
Je voulais vous faire savoir que nous ne cessons tous de former des
voeux pour la conservation des jours predeux et de la prosperite de Sa
Majeste Imperiale, lorsque le Capitaine dont j'ai parle plus haut, ayant
exprime le desir de retourner a Constantinople, j'ai profit6 de cette
occasion d'ecrire a Votre Altesse. (Translation.)
Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier. February 29, 1840.
I HAVE had the lionour to receive the firman announcing that in
obedience to the orders of the throne, the dignity of Capudan Paska has been
conferred on his Excellency Said Pasha, and that, as in consequence of this
change it had become necessary, according to the rule followed in the maritime
service, to name a proper person superior Commandant of the Imperid fleet,
His Highness had been pleased to name his Excekency Mustapha Pasha, who
is here, Caimacam of the Imperial fleet. I have likewise received tke letter by
which your Highness enjoins me to carry the will of His Higkness into execu
tion, by causing the abovenamed firman to be read in presence of the officers of
the fleet. As it is my duty to execute the will of His Imperial Majesty, I kave
caused tke said firman to be delivered to Mustapka Paska by tke Captain wko
brought it, and I have subsequently caused it to be publicly read on board the
ship of the line, the " Mahmoudie," in presence of all tke officers and captdns
who had there assembled.
I have likewise given the necessary directions to Mustapha Pasha to
execute with care the duties of his situation.
I wished to inform you that we do not cease to pray for the preservation of
Ihe precious days, and for the prosperity, of His Imperial Majesty, when the
captain, of whom I have spoken above, having expressed a wish to return to
Constantinople, I availed myself of this opportunity to write to your Highness.

621
No. 538.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston — (Received April 10.)
My Lord, Alexandria, February 26, 1840.
BY accounts I have this day received from Kaiffa, I am informed
that the fortification of St. Jean d'Aere is carried on with the greatest
activity, and Ibrahim Pasha, it is said, has allowed the Governor only
thirty days to render it effective. Workmen are brought from all quarters,
consisting of condemned criminals, soldiers, &c, to the amount of about
6,000. The 30th Regiment of Infantry is on its way from Damascus to
reinforce the place. Solyman Pasha is expected from Saida, and 100
pieces of Artillery are to be brought from Alexandria. The extensive
stores of the hospital have been filled with powder; and provisions suffi
cient to maintain 16,000 men, for six months, are said to be in store. Ten
thousand baskets have been ordered for the object, it is said, of levelling
a mound near Acre.
The inhabitants of Acre are in the greatest alarm about an expected
blockade of that place.
The Mudir returned to Acre to-day, after an absence of three months,
spent in collecting the contribution. His instructions were most per-
emptory ; and it is said that he has succeeded in settling accounts with
the peasants, as well as obtaining payment of the sums advanced them
by Ibrahim Pasha, at an interest of 25 per cent. But this has occasioned
extreme misery and desolation among the country people, many of whom
were obliged to sell their oxen to escape the threatened puniskment;
others to abandon their homes with their families.
It is said, that the Government despairing of payment from some of
the villages, has applied to the merchants who traffic r with them.
The Local Government does not pay the least attention to the claims
of British merchants trading with this country, a subject on which I
shall do myself the honour of reporting to your Lordship shortly.
Mehemet Ali talks openly of dismantling and sinking the ships of
both squadrons, arming the shores from Marabout to Rosetta, with the
guns from the ships, and employing the crews and officers in defending
this line of coast.
I 11 ri Vf* tV.O
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 539.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 7.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, March 6, 1840.
THE reports I receive from Mr. Consuls Werry, Moore, and others,
represent Syria as in a great state of excitement, caused by Mehemet Ali's
recent arbitrary measures for the increase of his military forces; Mr.
Werry writes to me to say, that he has addressed your Lordship on this
subject, as well as his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby.
From what I learn from other sources of information, I am led to
believe, that the Pasha's fears have been seriously excited in consequence
of those circumstances; and that he has decided upon sending two
influential and confidential individuals of his suite to the head-quarters of
Ibrahim Pasha, for the purpose of arranging with him such measures
as may prove most likely to allay the alarms that have now risen to such
a height. Large reinforcements of troops, of all arms, have arrived at
Alexandria since I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship. A
number of cannon of different calibres, with a large supply of shot and
shell, have also been sent down here, from the arsenal of Cairo, which
has been in full activity for some time past.

622
Your Lordship is, doubtless, informed of what even the public prints
make known, that important military preparations have lately been made
at St. Jean d'Acre ; and that Solyman Pasha has been to that place, in
order to superintend and accelerate these works of defence.
Mehemet Ali assumes a tranquil and determined demeanour ; and
continues to declare that he will resist to the last. He is certainly most
indefatigable and methodical in his efforts for defence; but I perceive
nothing to lead me to change my opinion, that he will submit to the deci
sion of the Great European Powers, so soon as he sees them united in
their purpose, and a sufficient force at hand to carry their intentions into
effect. Mehemet Ali left Alexandria this afternoon for Cairo, and I have
conceived it my duty to follow him. I, therefore, propose proceeding to
Cairo to-morrow morning. I purpose returning to Alexandria before the
English packet shall depart on the 19th instant.
We have had several deaths here lately, said to proceed from plaguei
They average daily from three or four to seven. But I have been credibly
informed, that no such disease actually has existed here since my arrival;
and that such a report is propagated for the sole purpose of gaining time
for defensive preparations, by working on the fears of Great Britain in
particular, or indeed any other European Power that may prove disposed
to attack the possessions of the Pasha.

No. 540.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 7i)
(Extract.) Alexandria, March 20, 1840;
IN reference to my despatch of the 6th instant, I have the
honour to inform your Lordship, that I returned to Alexandria yesterday,
having left Cairo on the morning of the 15th instant, the Viceroy
preceding me by a few hours:
From all I could learn and perceive, the object of Mehemet Ali's visit
to Cairo was to expedite the works now going on in the arsenal ; to
ascertain the precise numbers of men and horses that the Cavalry esta
blishment at Ghizeh could furnish ; and to inspire confidence in the minds
of the people of the neighbourhood, whose fears have been excited to an
extraordinary degree by the late levies, and other arbitrary acts of the
Pasha: Mehemet Ali does not appear to have been by any means satisfied
with the condition of the public mind in Cairo. He warmly reproved
Abbas Pasha, Governor of that place, for not having repressed certain
manifestations of popular feeling.
The arsenal in general is well furnished, and the greatest activity
prevailing in some departments ; as, for example, in the manufactory
of muskets, which is directed by an artisan from Birmingham. , Within a
few weeks the Pasha will possess a supply of arms fully sufficient to equip
any force he can possibly assemble.
Extraordinary exertions are making in the manufactory of powder,
where steam-engines are employed, and where men, women, and children
are at work, day and night. On the 14th instant, 200 camel loads of
gunpowder were sent off to Alexandria. The Pasha besides is amply pro
vided with shot and shell.
Great efforts are making to furnish a large number of gun-carriages
and extra wheels, as well as in making tumbrils, and repairing old ones.
I was particularly struck, in examining these pieces, by the perfection of
the iron work ; but the wood-work appeared to me to be so rudely
fashioned and imperfect, that I should greatly question its durability.
The manufactory of swords and small arms, of which there is a
large supply, is by no means inferior to the workmanship of France

623
Considerable quantities of boots and shoes, of European make, are
in store ; as well as much cloth and linen stuff for summer clothing.
The cavalry establishment, at Ghizeh, is under the superintendence
of a French officer of considerable experience. Most of the horses were
at grass. The appearance and bearing of the soldiers evinced an economy and
discipline which would be highly creditable to any European troops.
With the exception of the Fez, and the full Egyptian breeches, with
which, however, the Cavalry wear boots and spurs, there is not much
difference from the usual costume and equipments of a French dragoon.
The garrison of Cairo is composed at present of the following force :
— two regiments of Regular Infantry, each of about 4,000 men ; one
regiment of Baltagi, or Invalids ; and in the neighbourhood of the city
there are stationed, — one regiment of Regular Cavalry, about 4,800
Arnaouts and Turks, and about 2,000 Cavalry from Syria.
In Toura, there are also from 1,500 to 1,800 of the 35th Regiment of
Infantry. In Upper Egypt, there are three regiments of Cavalry; one at
Benisouef, one at Minieh, and one at Manfalut.
On the 16th instant, about 800 Cavalry arrived at Cairo, from Syria;
reporting that the whole number expected from that quarter amount
to 5,000. The 32nd Regiment of Infantry, from Essiout, which was to have
proceeded to Alexandria, has received counter orders.
I hear that some Artillery has been expedited to Cosseir and Suez ;
but I have not as yet been able to ascertain the numbers.
Amongst the other defensive preparations of the Pasha, a consider
able force of Artillery has been brought to this point. A regiment of
that arm is at present encamped outside the town. It consists of 10
batteries, 60 brass field-pieces, and 3,200 men ; the remaining 800 who
complete its complement of 4,000, being now, for the most part, with the
horses, which are at grass. Yesterday the Pasha reviewed this regiment :
.it did not perform any evolutions, but the guns were placed in position.
Of these, four batteries executed target practice with round shot, and
acquitted themselves in a manner highly creditable. The other six bat
teries opened and sustained for some time a rolling fire, and tke guns
were served actively and witk efficiency. Tke men afterwards went
through the sword exercise Two additional batteries of the same regi
ment are daily expected to arrive from Cairo.
Having said thus much of the force, arms, and materiel possessed by
Mehemet Ali, your Lordship will perhaps permit me to add, that the
wealth and resources of Egypt cannot be unknown to you ; they are
such as enable Mehemet Ali to form, in various parts of the country,
ample depots of corn, rice, and pulse, — the usual food of the inhabitants.
Some of my Colleagues talk much of the resources at the disposal
of Mehemet Ali, and the means he still has in reserve for procuring
money. His credit with the capitalists of Europe can be better esti
mated by your Lordship than by myself; and I therefore shall only
review his financial position in this country. He has no doubt at present
produce in his stores to the value of half a million sterling; but this
being set off against his debts, would leave a very small balance in
his favour. Upon the breaking out of a war with any of the European
Powers, the chief outlets being closed, the produce of Egypt would be no
longer available as a source of wealth ; commerce would, consequently,
be paralyzed; and it is obvious that Mehemet Ali must support hostilities
by means of his credit alone.
It is my duty to remark to your Lordship, that the bearing of
Mehemet Ali is full of defiance. In his public conversations respecting
both his own legitimate Sovereign, the Sultan, and the Allied Powers, be
expresses himself in the haughtiest terms.

624
No. 541.
Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmerston. Londres, le 7 Avril, 1840.
LE Soussigne, Ambassadeur Ptenipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte,
ayant ete specialement charge par son Auguste Maitre le Sultan, de se
rendre a Londres pour y reclamer Feffet de Pinteret manifeste a Sa
Hautesse par la Note Collective que les Representans des Cours de la
Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, accr£-
dites aupres du Grand Seigneur, ont presentee au Divan, le 27 Juillet,
1839, s'adresse en toute confiance a MM. les Representans des dites
Cours reunis a Londres, pour concerter avec eux les moyens d'effectuer la
pacification de l'Empire Ottoman dont le repos a ete trouble par les
projets ambitieux de Mehemet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte.
II est generalement connu, que depuis Fannee 1827, FEmpire Ottoman
a eprouve une serie de malheurs et de desastres par terre et par mer, a la
suite desquels ses moyens defensifs ont eprouve pour le moment un grand
affaiblissement. Mehemet Ali, au lieu d'aider son Souverain a se relever
de ces pertes, a, au contraire, profite de I'etat d'affaiblissement ou se
trouvait l'Empire Ottoman, pour donner suite aux desseins ambitieux et
hostiles que depuis longtemps il meditait contre son Souverain. En
effet, il ne craignit pas de Fattaquer en 1832 : et il lui enleva une partie
de ses plus belles provinces. Les sacrifices que fit alors le Sultan, devaient
lui faire esperer que la paix ne serait plus troubtee dans ses Etats, et que
le Pacha d'Egypte, en reconnaissance de la generosite avec laquelle Sa
Hautesse lui avait confere le gouvernement de tant de belles provinces, les
administrerait dans Pinteret de son maitre. Mais, au contraire, Fepuise-
ment ou se trouvait l'Empire Ottoman a la suite de tant de malheurs, et
I'affaiblissement momentane dans lequel il languissait, furent pour
Mehemet Ali un motif de donner un nouvel essor a son ambition. C'est
ainsi qu'il essaya, il y a deux ans, de se declarer independant et d'obtenir
a cet effet le consentement des Puissances etrangeres. Mais celles-ci,
faisant preuve de loyaute et de bonne foi envers la Porte, repousserent
spontanement une pretention si incompatible avec les droits de souve
rainete du Sultan. Mais cette injuste pretention ne fit que changer de
forme : et bientot apres, Mehemet Ali demanda avec hauteur pour lui et
ses enfans, l'heredite de toutes les provinces qu'il administrait au nom de
Sa Hautesse. II appuya sa demande de preparatifs hostiles, indiquant
suffisamment son dessein d'imposer par la force a son Souverain.
Feu le Sultan Mahmoud se vit en consequence oblige de se mettre en
garde contre les nouveaux projets de son ambitieux vassal. II reunit une
armee pour sa defense. Cependant les deux armees une fois en presence,
en vinrent aux prises ; il en resulta pour l'Empire Ottoman de nouveaux
desastres qui briserent le cceur du Sultan Mahmoud, et contribuerent a
acceterer sa fin.
Malgre tant de malheurs qui vinrent fondre a la fois sur la Porte, un
des premiers actes du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, a son avenement au trone,
fut d'offrir a son vassal rebelle Foubli du passe et l'heredite de l'Egypte
pour lui et ses enfans, a condition que le Pacha restituerait la flotte
Imperiale et toutes les provinces ne faisant pas partie du Pachalic
d'Egypte. Au lieu de reconnaitre la magnanimite de son Souverain, Me
hemet Ali y repondit par des pretentions dures et hautaines. Neanmoins,
le Sultan allait envoyer un fonctionnaire k Alexandrie pour y faire un
nouvel effort afin de regler un arrangement avec son vassal, lorsque les
Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de
Russie, voyant la position desastreuse dans laquelle se trouvait le Grand
Seigneur, et mdes par des sentimens d'amitie, de bienveillance, et de
generosite, qu'il ne saurait assez reconnaitre, firent signifier par le moyen
de leurs Representans accredites aupres de la Sublime Porte, que " Paccord
sur la Question d'Orient etait assure entre les Cinq Grandes Puissances,
en engageant le Sultan a suspendre toute determination definitive sans
leur concours, en attendant Feffet de Pinteret qu'elles lui portaient."

625
Le Soussigne prend la liberte de reproduire ci-jointe la copie de cette
Note Collective.
Sa Hautesse a attendu jusqu'a present avec confiance Feffet del'int6r&t
si gen6reusement exprime par cette meme Note. Mais place sous le
fardeau des charges extraordinaires qui pesent sur FEmpire Ottoman, et
oblige de se premunir contre Pattitude hostile et les preparatifs de guerre
toujours continues de Mehemet Ali, le Sultan se voit empeche de donner
tous ses soins a la reforme des abus dans Fadministration de son empire ;
tandisque les ressources de tout genre, qui devraient contribuer k operer
cette reforme, s'epuisent tous les jours de plus en plus, et font desirer
ardemment de voir bient6t un resultat aux intentions bienveillantes des
Cinq Cours Alliees de la Porte.
Le Soussigne est en consequence charge d'appeler laserieuse attention
de MM. les Representans des Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche,
de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, sur un etat de choses aussi penible
que dangereux pour l'existence politique de l'Empire Ottoman, dont elles
ont declare vouloir maintenir Pintegrite et l'independance, et de reclamer
leur co-operation et leur sollicitude pour faire cesser au plus tot des maux
d'une nature aussi grave.
Pour mieux atteindre a ce but, le Soussigne Ptenipotentiaire est
charge par ordre du Sultan son Auguste Maitre, d'annoncer qu'il est muni
de Fautorisation necessaire pour conclure et signer une Convention avec
MM. les Representans des dites Cours, laquelle aurait pour but d'aider
le Sultan a faire executer Parrangement d'apres lequel Sa Hautesse
avait annonc6 l'intention de conferer a Mehemet Ali et a ses enfans,
l'heredite du Gouvernement de l'Egypte, a condition que le Pacha resti-
tuerait la flotte Ottomane et toutes les autres provinces ou gouvernemens
situes en-dehors du Pachalic d'Egypte.
Le Soussigne, en vertu de Pinteret que les dites Puissances ont mani-
feste au Sultan, et vu la position critique ou se trouve aujourd'hui place'
l'Empire Ottoman, a l'honneur d'inviter, au nom de Sa Hautesse, MM.
les Representans de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse,
et de Russie, a vouloir bien se joindre a lui pour conclure une Convention
dans le but ci-dessus enonce, et pour convenir en meme temps des moyens
necessaires pour y donner effet.
Le Soussigne se flatte que MM. les Representans des dites Cours
voudraient bien lui preter leur assistance pour accomplir un oeuvre qui
devrait essentiellement contribuer a rendre la paix au Levant, et servir en
meme temps a prevenir les complications facheuses qui, sans cela, pour
raient en resulter pour l'Europe entiere.
Le Soussigne, Ptenipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte, prie MM. les
Representans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, d'agreer Passurance de sa plus
haute consideration. (Signe) NOURI.
(Translation.)
Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmertson. London, April 7, 1840.
THE Undersigned, Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Porte,
having been especially instructed by his august Master the Sultan, to proceed
to London, tkere to solicit tke effect of the interest manifested to His Highness
by the Collective Note which the Representatives of the Courts of Great Britain,
Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, accredited to the Grand Signor, presented
to the Divan on the 27th of July, 1839, addresses himself with full confidence
to the Representatives of the said Courts assembled in London, in order to
concert with them the means of effecting the pacification of the Ottoman
Empire, the repose of which has been disturbed by the ambitious projects of
Mehemet Ali, Paska of Egypt. .
It is generally known tkat since the year 1827, the Ottoman Empire has
experienced a series of misfortunes and disasters by land and by sea, in conse
quence whereof its defensive means have for the time been much weakened.
Mehemet Ali, instead of assisting his Sovereign to recover himself from these
losses has, on the contrary, availed himself of the state of weakness in which
4L

626
the Ottoman Empire was placed, to pursue the ambitious and hostile designs
which for a long while he meditated against his Sovereign. Infact, he did not
fear to attack him in 1832 ; and he deprived him of a portion of his fairest pro
vinces. The sacrifices which the Sultan at that time made, entitled him to expect
that peace would be no further disturbed in his dominions, and that the Pasha of
Egypt, out of gratitude for the generosity with which His Highness had conferred
upon him the Government of so many fair provinces, would administer them for
the interest of his Master. But, on the contrary, the state of exhaustion in which
the Ottoman Empire was placed in consequence of so many misfortunes, and
the temporary weakness under which it languished, induced Mehemet Ali to
give a fresk impulse to his ambition. Thus he attempted two years ago to
declare himself independent, and to obtain for that object the assent of foreign
Powers. But these proving their sincerity and good faith towards the Porte,
spontaneously repelled a pretension so incompatible with the Sultan's rights of
sovereignty. But this unjust pretension only changed its shape ; and soon
afterwards Mehemet Ali haughtily demanded for himself and his children, the
inheritance of all the provinces which he administered in the name of the Sultan.
He supported his demand by hostile preparations, indicating sufficiently his
design of imposing by force upon his Sovereign.
The late Sultan Mahmoud accordingly found himself obliged to guard
against the new projects of his ambitious vassal. He collected an army for his
defence. However, the two armies, once in presence, came to an engagement ;
the result whereof was new calamities to the Ottoman Empire, which broke
the heart of Sultan Mahmoud5 and contributed to hasten his end.
Notwithstanding so many calamities which befell tke Porte at one time, one
of the first acts of the Sultan Abdul Medjid, on his accession to the throne, was
to offer to his rebellious vassal oblivion of tke past, and tke inheritance of
Egypt for himself and his children, on condition that the Pasha restored the
Imperial fleet, and all the provinces which do not form a part of the Pashakc of
Egypt. Instead of acknowledging tke magnanimity of kis Sovereign, Mekemet
Ali replied to it by harsh and haughty pretensions. Nevertheless, the Sultan
was about to send a functionary to Alexandria, to make there a fresh attempt to
settle an arrangement with his vassal, when the Courts of Great Britain, Austria,
France, Prussia, and Russia, seeing tke disastrous situation in which the Grand
Signor was placed, and influenced by sentiments of friendship, goodwill, and
generosity, which cannot be sufficiently acknowledged, signified through their
Representatives, accredited to the Sublime Porte, " that the agreement on the
Eastern Question was ensured among the Five Great Powers ; whereupon the
Sultan was invited to suspend any definitive determination without their con
currence, and to wait for the effect of the interest which they felt for him."
The Undersigned takes the liberty to inclose a copy of this Collective Note.
His Higkness has waited up to the present time with confidence for the
effect of the interest so generously expressed in this same note. But placed
beneath the burthen of the extraordinary charges which weigh down upon the
Ottoman Empire, and obliged to take measures of precaution against the hostile
attitude and the incessant warlike preparations of Mehemet Ak, the Sultan finds
himself prevented from devoting all his care to the reform of abuses in the
administration of his Empire ; while the resources of all kinds wkick shodd
contribute to effect that reform, are day by day exhausted more and more, and
occasion a vehement desire of witnessing speedily the result of the friendly
intentions of the Five Courts, Allies of the Porte.
The Undersigned is in consequence directed to call tke serious attention of
the Representatives of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia,
and Russia, to a state of things as painful as it is dangerous to the political
existence of the Ottoman Empire, the integrity and independence of which they
have declared their desire to maintain ; and to claim their co-operation and tkeir
solicitude in order to put a stop, at the earliest possible period, to evils of so
serious a nature.
In order better to attain that object, the Undersigned Plenipotentiary is
directed, by order of the Sultan his August Master, to announce that he is pro
vided with the necessary authority for concluding and signing a Convention
with the Representatives of the sdd Courts, which should have for its object,
to aid the Sultan in carrying into effect the arrangement according to which
His Highness had announced his intention of conferring upon Mehemet Ali and
his children the inheritance of the Government of Egypt, on condition that

627
the Pasha should restore the Ottoman Fleet, and all tke other Provinces and
Governments situated without the Pashalic of Egypt.
The Undersigned, in virtue of the interest which the said Powers have
manifested towards the Sultan, and considering tke critical situation in which
the Ottoman Empire is at present placed, has the honour to invite, in the name
of His Highness, the Representatives of Great Britain, Austria, France,
Prussia, and Russia, to be pleased to unite with him in the conclusion of a Con
vention with the object above-mentioned, and to come to an agreement at the
same time as to the means necessary for carrying it into effect.
The Undersigned flatters himself, that the Representatives of the said
Courts would be good enough to lend him their assistance for the accomplish
ment of a work which must essentially contribute to restore peace to the
Levant, and tend at the same time to prevent the grievous complications, which
otherwise might result for tke wkole of Europe.
Tke Undersigned, Plenipotentiary of tke Sublime Porte, requests the Re
presentatives of the Five Great Powers to accept the assurance of his highest
consideration. (.Signed) NOURI.

No 542.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, April 10, 1840.
I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of an official
Note which I have received from Nouri Effendi, announcing that he is
authorized to conclude and sign with the Plenipotentiaries of Great
Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, a Convention, having for
its object to assist the Sultan to carry into effect an arrangement with
Mehemet Ali, which shall confer upon that Pasha and upon his children
the hereditary government of Egypt, in return for the restoration by him
to the Sultan of the Turkish fleet, and of all the provinces and govern
ments lying beyond the limits of the Pashalic of Egypt.
Nouri Effendi further requests, that the Representatives of the Five
Powers will conclude with him such a Convention, and will at the same
time agree with him as to the means necessary for carrying the same
into effect. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 543.
Viscount Palmerston to Nouri Effendi.
Foreign Office, April 11, 1840.
THE Undersigned, &c, has had the honour to receive the Note of
the 7th instant, by which his Excellency Nouri Effendi, &c, has announced
that he is provided with the necessary powers and instructions to con
clude with the Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Austria, France, Great
Britain, Prussia, and Russia, a Convention for the purpose of giving effect
to the Collective Note which was presented to the Porte on the 27th of
July, 1839, by the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople.
In reply to this communication, the Undersigned has the honour to
nform his Excellency Nouri Effendi, that the Undersigned is ready, on
the part of Her Majesty's Government, to concert immediately with his
Excellency, together with the Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia,
and Russia, the best means of realizing the friendly intentions which the
Representatives of the Five Powers manifested in the name of their
respective Courts towards the Porte by the above-mentioned Collective
Note of the 27th July, 1839.
The Undersigned, &c, (Signed) PALMERSTON.
4 L 2

628
No. 544.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, April 11, 1840.
I INCLOSE to your Excellency a copy of a note which I have
addressed to Nouri Effendi in reply to His Excellency's note of the 7th
instant, of which a copy was inclosed in my despatch of yesterday's
date, and I have to instruct your Excellency to show this reply to
M. Thiers. I am, &c;,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.
No. 545.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 16.)
(Extract.) Paw, April 13,1840.
IN obedience to your instructions of the 11th instant, which I
received by the post this day, I have shown to M. Thiers the copy of the
Note addressed by your Lordship to Nouri Effendi, in reply to his Excel
lency's Note of the 7th.
M. Thiers made scarcely any observation upon the Note, but requested
me to allow him to keep it for twenty-four hours. I asked him whether
any, or what answer had been given to Nouri Effendi's Note by the
French Ambassador in London ? M. Thiers said, none, except the
acknowledgment of its receipt, and that with respect to the matter it
contained, he preferred entering into the discussion of it with your Lord
ship rather than with Nouri Effendi. No. 546.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 17.)
My Lord, Paris, April 15, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the "Moniteur"
of this day, containing a speech delivered yesterday by the President of
the Council in the Chamber of Peers. I was present at the debate, and
the general approbation manifested of the sentiments of M. Thiers on the
Question of Egypt, confirmed the opinion I have always entertained and
expressed in my despatches to your Lordship, that no Ministry which
could be formed in this country, would agree to the adoption by France
of measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.
No. 547.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 20.)
My Lord, Paris, April 17, 1840.
IN my interview this morning with M. Thiers, I asked him whether
he had instructed the French Ambassador in London, to give any reply
to the Note which Nouri Effendi had addressed to the Representatives in
London, other than the mere acknowledgment of its receipt. M. Thiers
said, that the French Government having no expectation that the settle
ment of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, would be advanced
by any communication with Nouri Effendi regarding the contents of his
Note, had not instructed M. Guizot to answer it. With respect to the
question itself, he was seady and desirous to discuss with your LordshiD

629
the means of effecting a reconciliation between the Porte and the Pasha
of Egypt ; but he had his doubts as to the policy of establishing a con
ference of the Five Powers for the attainment of that object, being of
opinion that if four of the Five Powers decided upon having recourse to
coercive measures to compel the restoration of Syria to the Turkish
Government, the refusal of France to join in those measures, after having
been a party in the conference, would be a more marked separation from
the other Powers than if no such conference had taken place.
I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 548.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston; — (Received April 20.)*
(Extract.) Aleppo, February 20, 1840..
I NOW do myself the honour to wait on your Lordship with a copy
of another despatch I addressed to Viscount Ponsonby under the- 21st of
last month. Since the date of the above communication, nothing whatever of any
interest has transpired in this district, and in any way meriting your
Lordship's notice.
His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to be at
Marash, and all the Egyptian forces within this district, and on the north
and north-east frontiers, remain without any further change, but are all
cantoned on various points in suitable quarters, to meet the severe
weather of the season.

Inclosure in No. 548.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Aleppo, January 21, 1840:
HIS Highness Ibrahim Pasha continues to remain at Marash, and
where, from all appearances, he will most likely pass the winter.
All the Egyptian forces are now cantoned into winter quarters;
some along the north and north-east frontier, others in some of the prin
cipal towns, besides many of the regiments that have gone southwards
for the same object.
The Egyptian force at Orfa remains, from all accounts, without any
further change ; nor have I been able to learn that their authority on that
line has advanced further, but continues to occupy the points I have
already noted to your Lordship.
The Alexandretta district and the neighbouring mountains of the
Giaour Dagh, who had several months back evinced symptoms of discontent
against this Government, are, by the latest advices from our authority in that
district, perfectly quiet ; and, I may add, that not only that, but also the
Latakia, Tripoli, and indeed every part of this Consular district, enjoys
for the present every quietness.

No. 549.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, April 21, 1840.
I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to endeavour at the proper
time to persuade the Porte to give to the Druses such privileges and
exemptions as may satisfy their reasonable desires; I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

630
No. 550.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 22.)
My Lord, Paris, April 20, 1840.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 17th instant.
M. Thiers told me to-day, that although the French Government
would not consent to their Ambassador in London being member of a
Conference of the Five Powers, solemnly assembled to deliberate upon the
propositions contained in the Note of Nouri Effendi, M; Guizot was autho
rized to discuss with your Lordship, and also with the Representatives of
the other Powers, the means of effecting peace between the Sultan and
Mehemet Ali ; and that the French Government were ready to urge upon
the Pasha of Egypt, and to use their utmost influence to obtain, his
acquiescence in any arrangement which, considering his position and
means of resistance, there is the least chance of his accepting.
M; Thiers said, that he had written a long despatch to M. Cochelet
to be read to Mehemet Ali, cautioning him not to be led by the speeches
made in the Tribunes of the Chambers of France, to indulge in exagge
rated expectations in regard to the conditions of peace between him and
the Sultan. I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE:

No. 551.
Mr. Consul Werry to J. Bidwell, Esq. — (Received April 21.)
(Extract.) Damascus, February 20, 1840.
ALL the measures and operations of the Egyptian Government seem at
present intended to protect Egypt and Syria from the Western Powers,
though Ibrahim with his chief forces remain at Marash, and are extended
into Orfa Swerik, and Chermook, north and south, to the Khaboor river ;
in fact, ready to proceed further in either direction, according to circum
stances, next spring. No. 552.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 20.)
My Lord, Beyrout, February 27, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to state, for your Lordship's information, that
Solyman Pasha visited Beyrout on the 31st ultimo. His Excellency has since
left for Sidon. His appearance at this place added greatly to the alarm which
previously existed amongst both Christians and Mahommedans, lest it should
have for its object the enrolment in Syria of a Militia, as in Egypt. Solyman
Pasha assured me that for the present no such intention existed ; and he has
since left this place for Sidon and Acre.
At the latter place, the most extensive preparations are making for
defence ; the trenches are to be enlarged and deepened ; a mound to the
east of that fortress, raised by the Egyptian army on its investment, is to be
levelled ; large supplies of biscuit and other provisions have been ordered ;
a stock of lime, for making mortar, has also been transported there ; and the
works are pushed on with such vigour, that the labour is carried on by torch
light. It is reckoned that, betwixt labourers and troops, not fewer than 13,000
men are employed at Acre. All the builders and artizans from this and the
neighbouring places, have been sent to that place.

631
Several families have also quitted the city, it is said by permission, and
are arrived at Sidon.
The military force at Acre, according to last accounts, consists of three
regiments, — one of Cavalry and two of Infantry, with about 600 Artillery
men. About 300 guns on the batteries were counted about two years ago by
an individual through whom I have received this information, but it is said,
that since then they have been increased, though I have not, been able to
ascertain the precise number.
Secret meetings have been held in Mount Lebanon amongst the Chris
tians and Sheiks of the Druses, and a resolution taken by them to resist all
attempts either to enrol or disarm them.
The Government is everywhere collecting its outstanding revenue, and
much rigour is used to compel payment. The usual advances made by
Government to cultivators has this year been discontinued ; the land must
therefore, in many cases, lie fallow for want of the means of sowing it.
Though public tranquillity is maintained, much anxiety is felt by all
classes as to the future. I have, &c,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

No. 553.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 26.)
My Lord, Therapia, April 1, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to inclose a translated copy of the Grand Vizier's
reply to the Pasha of Egypt's last communication, of which a copy was
transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch of the 7th of March.
I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 553.
The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

(Traduction.) L'EXPERIENCE du passe semble, d'apres Sa Hautesse, notre Auguste
Maitre et Bienfaiteur, et la Sublime Porte, rendre, pour ainsi dire, necessaire
de ne pas revenir sur ce qui a ete dit touchant la position dans laquelle
Votre Altesse s'est mise de son propre gre, tout ce qui a ete dit n'ayant
jusqu'ici produit aucun effet.
Dans le seul but, cependant, de nous premunir contre toutes les insinu
ations qui pourraient, ce qui est a plumer, etre faites plus tard, savoir, que
nous n'avons fait aucun cas de la confiance que Votre Altesse vient de
montrer, ni des ouvertures qu'elle vient de faire pour un accommodement, je
vous parlerai succintement, conformement a la resolution qui en a ete prise,
des principaux points de la lettre confidentielle que vous venez de m'adresser,
en vous faisant connaitre avec franchise mes sentimens la-dessus.
Personne n'est plus vivement affecte que moi des differends qui existent
depuis de longues annees entre la Sublime Porte et Votre Altesse, des maux
de toutes especes qui en resultent pour notre Patrie, et de la commotion que
produisent dans tous les esprits cette desunion et cette scission qui regnent
parmi les Musulmans. Sans la reserve que je me suis imposee en fait
d'imputations qui sont aussi desagreables pour celui qui les fait que pour
celui a qui il les fait, il me serait certes extremement facile de demontrer
que les torts ne sont pas de notre cote. Mais ces choses la etant laissees au
tribunal du Tres-Haut, nous esperons en Dieu que ceux qui en sont la cause
n'ediapperont point a la cotere celeste.
Quoiqu'il en soit, j'ai jug6 a propos, jetant un voile sur le passe, et
gardant le silence sur l'avenir, fixer toute mon attention sur le present. Je

632
dis done, d'abord, au sujet de notre derniere correspondance qui fait le fond
de nos presentes discussions, que vous vous plaignez. que j'ai employe
certaines expressions fortes; c'est-a-dire, que je me suis servi d'un langage
faisant voir la necessite que vous prouviez votre fideiite et votre devouement
a la Sublime Porte, par des faits et a la face de tout le monde ; et vous
ajoutez, que mes expressions renferment indubitablement une allusion a la
restitution de la flotte Imperiale. Tandis qu'il fallait, en effet, que Votre.
Altesse commencat par rendre la flotte, ce qui serait tout-a-fait dans I'ordre
des choses, vous en faites a present une affaire secondaire ; et il est devenu
clair et evident, que les desks de la Sublime Porte ne seront pas accomplis
meme a cet egard, si la question administrative n'est pas simultanement
resolue d'une maniere satisfaisante.
Vous dites qu'il a fallu retenir la flotte parcequ'elle etait allee k
Alexandrie spontanement. Je crois devoir repondre que votre justification
n'est pas solidement etablie. L'arrivee de la flotte a Alexandrie n'a pas et6
la consequence d'une victoire, mais Feffet d'une trahison qui a He reprouvee
par I'opinion publique de tous les Pays, et qui a couvert le nom de son auteur
d'une eternelle infamie. La detention de la flotte, parcequ'elle est altee a
Alexandrie, est done, comme tout le monde sait, aussi inconvenante qu'elle
est injuste. Vous avouez vous-meme, que la flotte est un bien hereditaire de
Sa Majeste Imperiale, et vous dites que vous n'avez jamais eu la pensee de
vous en emparer. II est pourtant clair et evident que, retenir la flotte contre
la volonte de Sa Hautesse, sans etre aucunement arrete par la consideration
de ce qu'en dira la Nation Musulmane entiere, qui regardera cet acte tout
simplement comme un ntepris pour elle, c'est la meme chose que s'en
emparer. Dans un tems, le feu Sultan se plaignait aussi; mais n'en parlons pas a
present, car ce serait une longue histoire a raconter. Je dirai seulement que
lors de Pavenement au trone de Sa Majeste Imperiale, dont toutes les pensees
sont tournees vers le pardon du passe et le retablissement de la paix et de la
Concorde parmi tous ses sujets, et qui n'emploie tous ses momens qu'a assurer
leur prosperite et a leur faire jouir des bienfaits d'une administration equi
table et paternelle, et des avantages de la civilisation, Sa Hautesse a mani-
feste a, votre egard des sentimens que vous ne devez pas oublier.
Si vous dites : comme le Sultan ne fait que commencer a regner, il ne
s'opposera pas a ce que ses Ministres lui proposeront, je vous ferai observer
que vous etes dans une erreUr complete. Les excellentes intentions qui
animent le Sultan, comme on Fa vu plus haut, sont tellement enracinees dans
son cceur plein de bonte, que si quelqu'un de ses serviteurs osait tenir une
conduite opposee a. ses sentimens souverains, il encourrait sur le champ sa
cotere et sa disgrace; ce qu'a Dieu ne plaise! Vous pouvez juger de la aussi
combien Sa Hautesse doit etre peinee de voir un de ses plus illustres Vizirs,
un personnage tel que Votre Altesse, correspondre d'une maniere si inconve
nante aux bontes et a la faveur dont elle Pa combtee des le debut de son
regne. La lettre de Votre Altesse nous apprend, que non seulement vous 6tes
dispose a rendre la flotte Imperiale, mais que vous avez meme montrd
plusieurs fois des dispositions a reunir toutes les forces de terre et de mer de
l'Egypte a I'armee et a la flotte de la Sublime Porte, qui les a refuses ; ce qui
vous a fait cle la peine. Eh, quoi ! voulez-vous dire que Sa Hautesse doit
abandonner la moitie de son empire a un de ses sujets, seule condition k
laquelle le sujet promet toutes les forces dont il peut disposer? qu'en-
tendez-vous dire ? J'avoue que je n'ai pas pu comprendre votre idee. On
voit qu'en parlant des pays qui ne font point partie de l'Egypte, vous vous
croyez oblige d'insister dans vos pretentions que Adana et les gorges du
Mont Taurus vous soient abandonnes, parceque vous les considerez comme
necessaires pour assurer l'avenir de votre famille ; et que vous pensez que
tant que ces positions seront soumises a votre autorite, vous etes a l'abri de
toute attaque de la part de la Sublime Porte.
Les motifs de Votre Altesse pour donner tant d'importance a Poccupation
de ces lieux, ne doivent-ils pas aussi engager la Sublime Porte a ne les aban
donner ni les ceder jamais? et ces positions etant les clefs des pays situes
au-dela de l'Asie Mineure, ne sont-ils pas considerees comme les fortifications
naturelles de l'Anatolie? est-il possible que nous en venions a un accom-

633
modement tant que Votre Altesse persiste dans de pareilles pretentions? Je
ne doute pas que Votre Altesse ne m'attribue, a moi, cette fermete et cette
Constance dans les principes qui nous guident. Mais supposons pour un
moment, que Votre Altesse soit a ma place ; je vous demande: oseriez-vous
essayer de persuader Sa Majeste Imperiale de faire des concessions telles que
celles dont il s'agit; concessions de nature a detruire de fond en comble son
influence et sa puissance, a blesser la dignite souveraine, et a froisser si con-
siderablement les interets de ses sujets ? Je vous prie d'une maniere toute
particuliere de me repondre franchement.
Mais que Votre Altesse sache aussi, que suppose meme, par impossible,
que preferant notre ancienne amitie a la fideiite et au devouement que je
dois au Padishah, notre Bienfaiteur et Maitre, je veuille favoriser vos demandes
bien connues, est-il a presumer qu'un Souverain si sage et doue de tant de
sagacite (Dieu veuille nous le conserver !) condescende au sacrifice de ses
droits sacres? Est-il d'ailleurs possible que tous les Ministres, tous les fideies
et devoues serviteurs de la Sublime Porte, et meme les particuliers, donnent
leur consentement a un etat de choses si nuisible?
II est possible que quelques hommes, mus uniquement par leurs propres
interets, vous aient flatte dans les lettres qu'ils vous ont ecrites, en vous
disant que le Sultan a de bonnes dispositions, ou que vous avez beaucoup de
partisans, et qu'ils aient voulu vous induire ainsi en erreur. Mais si ces
choses etaient vraies, l'opposition d'un Ministre et meme de plusieurs
Ministres, pourrait-elle les empecher?
Plus encore, n'est-il pas bien connu que dans la Note Collective qu'ils
ont presentee a la Sublime Porte, en date du 27 Juillet dernier, les Repre
sentans des Grandes Puissances ont formellement et categoriquement declare
leur ferme resolution est de s'opposer a tout arrangement qui ne serait pas
conforme aux interets de tout le monde?
Votre Altesse a voulu nous faire concevoir des soupcons sur les inten
tions des Puissances. Mais quel est done leur but? Leur but est aujourd'hui
ce qu'il etait au commencement dela question; c'est-a-dire, que comme elles
considerent la force de cet empire comme etant necessaire a la conservation
de la balance politique de l'Europe, elles veulent que les arrangemens a
faire soient conformes a ce principe. Or, le partage de l'Empire Ottoman en
deux parties egales soumises a deux differens Gouvernemens, serait un
obstacle a Pobtention de la fin qu'elles se proposent, et voila pourquoi les
Puissances ne veulent pas que Pon y consente. Si dans cet etat de choses,
oubliant les devoirs que nous imposent et la fideiite que nous devons a notre
Souverain, et la place que nous occupons, nous aurions ose supplier Sa
Majeste Imperiale d'accorder les demandes de Votre Altesse, nous nous
mettrions en opposition, non avec quelques Puissances seulement, mais avec
l'Europe entiere, et c'est ce que Pon ne saurait nier. Tandis done que la
raison etait de notre cote, et que telles etaient les intentions que les Puissan
ces de l'Europe ne cessaient de nous manifester d'une maniere positive, nous
etait-il possible de suivre une autre ligne de conduite que celle que nous
avons adoptee jusqu'ici? Voila encore une chose que je vous prie de prendre
en consideration. Si les Puissances de l'Europe n'ont pas pu jusqu'a present faire naitre
un resultat conforme a nos vceux, nous ne devons pas pour cela prendre
soupcon de leurs intentions; et bien que certaines circonstances aient retarde
le resultat espere, leurs sentimens k notre egard n'ont pas subi par la la
moindre alteration: et nous avons la certitude que les exigences imperieuses
de leur politique se combineront a la fin, d'une maniere favorable a nos droits
clairs et patens. Tel etant le pied sur lequel nous sommes avec les Grandes
Puissances, nous attendons les evenemens avec la plus grande securite.
Vous annoncez des preparatifs de guerre, sur le ton de la menace; ce
qui ne s'accorde guere avec votre pretendue fideiite et votre devouement a
Sa Hautesse, qui en est surprise. Quant a Sa Hautesse, forte de ses droits,
qui sont assis sur des bases solides, et de la protection du Ciel, die agira en
consequence, et fera ce qu'exigent ses relations avec les Grandes Puissances.
En un mot, vous voudrez bien me faire savoir categoriquement si vous
avez, ou non, l'intention d'accepter les concessions etles faveurs que le Sultan
notre Auguste Maitre, en montant sur le tr6ne, a daigne vous offrir. Comme
vous connaitrez les principes et les intentions de la Sublime Porte par les
4 M

634
reponses qu'elle fera par eerit a vos demandes, et que vous faites profession
de fideiite et de devouement, si, independamment de ces demandes, vous avez
quelques idees et quelques observations a nous communiquer, vous voudrez
bien le faire d'une maniere claire et tres-detaillee.
Je prends, en attendant, la liberte de vous donner, ainsi que notre
ancienne amitie l'exige, quelques conseils analogues a notre sujet. Apres le
rang eieve auquel votre Altesse est parvenue, il ne lui reste plus rien a desirer;
et elle-meme avoue que le principal objet de ses vceux a present est d'assurer
un avenir a ses fils et petit-fils. Or, pour y parvenir, il ne faut employer
que les moyens sages qui seuls y conduisent. Pour combler done vos vceux,
il faut profiter du moment actuel, car il n'est pas improbable qu'un peu
plus tard vous ayez perdu Poccasion de le faire. Que votre Altesse ne prete
pas Poreille dans des affaires semblables, a des insinuations perfides d'un
tas d'adulateurs; mais qu'elle ecoute plutot les representations bienveillantes
d'un ami sincere qui se fait un devoir, a son age avance et avec la grande
experience qu'il a acquise, de dire la verite.

(Translation.)
The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.
IN tke opinion of His Highness Our August Master and Benefactor, and
of the Sublime Porte, the experience of the past appears, as it were, to make it
necessary not to revert to what has been said relative to the position in which
Your Highness has voluntarily placed yourself, since everything which has been
said has hitherto produced no effect.
Nevertheless, with the sole object of securing ourselves against ak the in
sinuations which might, as it is to be presumed, be made at a later period,
namely, that we have had no regard for the confidence which Your Highness
has shown towards us, nor for the overtures which you have made for an accom
modation, I will address you briefly, in conformity witk tke resolution which has
been taken on that matter, witk respect to the principal topics of the confidential
letter which you have just written to me, and communicate to you with sincerity
my opinion thereupon.
No one is more deeply affected than myself by the differences which for
many years existed between the Sublime Porte and Your Higbness, by the evils
of all kinds which have resulted to our country from tkose differences, and from
tke troubles which this disunion and schism among Mussulmans produce in the
minds of all people. Witkout the reserve which I have imposed upon myself
with respect to imputations which are as disagreeable for him who makes them,
as for him against whom they are made, it would assuredly be extremely easy to
demonstrate that the wrongs are not on our side. But those matters being left
to the tribunal of the Most High, we trust in God, that those persons who are
the cause of them, will not escape tke anger of heaven.
Be that as it may, I have thought fit, throwing a veil over the past, and
preserving silence as to the future, to fix my entire attention on tke present. I
say tken, in the first place, on the subject of our recent correspondence which is
the matter of our present discussions, that you complain that I have made use
of certain strong expressions, that is to say, that I have employed language
proving the necessity of your evincing your fidelity and devotion to the Sublime
Porte, by acts and in tke face of tke world; and you add, tkat my expressions
indubitably contain an illusion to the restoration of the Imperial Fleet. Whereas,
in fact, Your Excellency ought to begin by restoring the fleet, which would be
altogetker in the order of things you now treat that matter as an affair of secon
dary importance ; and it has become clear and evident, that the desires of the
Sublime Porte will not be accomplished even in this respect, if the administra
tive question is not at the same time settled in a satisfactory manner.
You say that it was necessary to retain tke fleet, because it went to Alex
andria spontaneously. I deem it my duty to reply, tkat your justification rests on
no solid foundation. The arrival of the fleet at Alexandria was not the conse
quence of a victory, but of a treason which has been reprobated by the public
opinion of all countries, and wkick has covered the name of its autkor with
eternal infamy. The detention of the fleet, because it went to Alexandria, is

635
then, as all the world knows, as improper as it is unjust. You admit yourself,
that the fleet is an hereditary property of His Imperial Majesty, and you say
that you have never had any idea of making yourself master of it. It is, how
ever, clear and evident that to retain tke fleet against the will of His Highness,
without being at all deterred by tke consideration of what the whole Mussulman
mation will say of the transaction, who will regard tkat act simply as a contempt
for His Higkness, is the same thing as to make yourself master of it.
At one time the late Sultan also complained ; but let us talk no more
about it now, for it would be a long story to tell. I will merely say, that at the
time of His Imperial Majesty's accession to the throne, — all whose thoughts are
turned towards the pardon of the past, and the re-establiskment of peace and of
concord among all his subjects, and who employs all kis time merely to ensure
tkeir prosperity, and to make them enjoy the benefits of an equitable and pater-
nd admimstration, and the advantages of civilization, — His Highness manifested,
witk respect to you, sentiments which you ought not to forget.
If you say, As the Sultan has only just begun his reign, he will not oppose
wkat kis Ministers skall suggest to him, — I will observe to you tkat you are alto
gether mistaken. The excellent intentions by which the Sultan is animated, as
has been seen above, are so deeply rooted in his heart full of goodness, tkat if
any one of his servants should dare to act contrary to his Sovereign sentiments,
he would forthwith incur his anger and his disgrace, which God forbid ! You
can judge from thence dso how much His Highness must be grieved at seeing
one of his most illustrious Viziers, suck a personage as Your Highness, make so
unseemly a return to the goodness and to the favour which he has heaped upon
him from the very commencement of his reign.
Your Highness's letter informs us that not only are you disposed to
restore the Imperid fleet, but that you have also at various times manifested
your disposition to join the sea and land forces of Egypt to the army and fleet
of the Subkme Porte, wkick kas refused them — a circumstance wrhich has occa
sioned you sorrow. What ! would you say that His Highness should abandon
the moiety of his Empire to one of his subjects, the only condition on wkick
tkat subject promises all tke forces of which he can dispose ? What do you
mean to say ? I confess that I have been unable to comprehend your meamng.
It is evident that when you speak of the countries which do not form part of
Egypt, you think yourself obkged to insist upon your pretensions that Adana and
the passes of Mount Taurus should be made over to you, because you consider
them necessary to secure the future condition of your family; and think, that so
long as these positions shall be subject to your authority, you are safe from all
attack on the part of the Sublime Porte.
The motives which induce Your Highness to attach so much importance
to the occupation of these places, must not they also influence the Sublime
Porte not to abandon them, or ever to yield to them ? and these positions being
the keys of the countries situated beyond Asia Minor, are they not considered
as the natural fortifications of Anatolia ? Is it possible that we should come to
an agreement so long as Your Highness persists in such pretensions ? I have
no doubt that Your Highness attributes to me, firmness and constancy in
the principles by which we are guided. But let us suppose for a moment
that Your Highness was in my place : I ask you, Would you venture to endea
vour to persuade His Imperial Majesty to make such concessions as those
under consideration — concessions calculated to destroy altogether his influence
and his power, to wound his sovereign dignity, and to prejudice so considerably
the interests of his subjests ? I request you most earnestly to answer me
frankly. But Your Highness should also consider, that even supposing — what is
impossible — that, preferring our ancient friendship to the fidelity and devotion
which I owe to the Padishah, our benefactor and master, I should be willing to
favour your well-known demands, is it to be presumed that a Sovereign so wise,
and endowed with so much sagacity (may God please to preserve him to us !)
would consent to sacrifice his sacred rights ? Is it besides possible that all the
Ministers, all tke faithful and devoted servants of the Sublime Porte, and even
private persons, should consent to such a hurtful state of things ?
It is possible that some persons, influenced solely by their own interest,
may have flattered you in the letters which they have written to you, saying
that the Sultan is well disposed, or that you have many partisans, and may have
4M2

636
thus wished to deceive you. But if these things were true, could the opposition
of a single Minister, or even of many Ministers, prevent them?
Moreover, is it not well known that in the Collective Note which the
Representatives of the Great Powers presented to the Porte on the 27th of July
last, they formally and categorically declared tkat their fixed resolution is to
oppose every arrangement which should not be consistent with the general
interest ?
Your Highness has desired to inspire us witk suspicions as to the in
tentions of the Powers. But what then is their object ? Their object is now
what it was at the commencement of the question ; that is to say, that as they
consider the force of this Empire to be necessary for the preservation of the
political balance of Europe, they desire that the arrangements which are to be
made should be in conformity with that principle. Now, the division of the
Ottoman Empire into two equal portions, subject to two different Govern
ments, would be an obstacle to the attainment of the end which they propose
to themselves ; and that is why the Powers are unwilling tkat we should agree
to it. If in tkis state of things, forgetful of the duties imposed upon us by the
fidelity wkick we owe to our Sovereign, and to tke place which we hold, we
should have ventured to beseech His Imperial Majesty to grant the demands of
Your Highness, we should place ourselves in opposition, not only to some
Powers, but to the whole of Europe ; and that is what cannot be denied.
Whilst, then, reason was on our side, and such were the intentions which the
Powers of Europe did not cease to manifest to us in a positive manner, was it
possible for us to follow any other line of conduct than that which we have
adopted up to this time. This is also a point which I request you to take into
consideration. If the Powers of Europe have not hitherto been able to bring about a resdt
in conformity with our wishes, we ought not therefore to entertain any suspicion of
their intentions ; and altkough certain circumstances may have retarded the looked-
for result, their sentiments with respect to us have not therefore undergone the
sligktest alteration ; and we possess the certainty that the imperious necessities
of their policy will at last effect a combination in a manner favourable to our
clear and manifest rights. Such being the footing on which we stand with the
Great Powers, we wait for events with the greatest security.
You announce warlike preparations in a menacing tone, which is scarcely
consistent with your pretended fidelity and devotion to His Highness, who is
surprised at it. As for His Highness, strong in his rights, which rest on solid
foundations, and in tke protection of Heaven, he wik act accordingly, and will
do what is required by his relations with the Great Powers.
In a word, you will have the goodness to let me know categorically
wkether you intend or not to accept the concessions and the favours which the
Sultan, our August Master, on ascending the throne, was pleased to offer to you.
As you will learn tke principles and intentions of the Sublime Porte by the
answers which it will return in writing to your demands, and as you profess
fidelity and devotion, if, independently of those demands, you have certain
notions and observations to communicate to us, you will have the goodness to
do so in a clear and very explicit manner.
Meanwhile, I take the liberty of giving you, as is required by an ancient
friendship, some advice corresponding with the subject of which we are treating.
After the exalted rank at which Your Highness has arrived, nothing further
remains for you to desire ; and you yourself admit that the principal object of
your wishes at present is to ensure a future position to your children and grand
children. Therefore, to attain to this, you should only make use of the means
which alone can enable you to do so. To effect, then, your wishes, you must
take advantage of the present moment ; for it is not improbable that somewhat
later you may have lost the opportunity of doing so. Let not Your Highness,
in matters of this kind, tend an ear to the perfidious suggestions of a multitude
of flatterers ; but listen rather to the benevolent representations of a sincere
friend, who makes it his duty, at his advanced age, and with the experience
which he has acquired, to tell the truth.

637
No. 554.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 1.)
My Lord, Alexandria, March 27, 1840.
COUNT MEDEM acquaints me of the details of an interview he had
with Mehemet Ali a day or two since. In allusion to his present position,
the Pasha inquired, with some appearance of irritation, " When will this
business end?" and he continued by saying, " There is now more disunion
than ever amongst you; and though a change has taken place in the
French Ministry, there is as little probability as before of any alteration
in the policy of that country, as far as regards my interests." Count
Medem replied, "Your Highness is mistaken ; for I believe that the question
must now be brought to a final conclusion. England seems determined
to act." The Pasha rejoined, "Let England act; if she is alone, I am not
afraid, and may even contend with her. I am invulnerable in Egypt.""
Count Medem then said, " Hear me, Pasha : your Highness is vulnerable
everywhere. Do not depreciate in your own mind the means of England.
The thing most easy for her to effect, would be precisely the measure
most dangerous to you. She would blockade your coasts. You know
what would then be your lot in Syria. The blockade would be your ruin :
you would be destroyed little by little. It would be a thousand times
better for you to die in the field. The foreign merchants resident in
Egypt would quit the country, your commerce would be paralyzed, and
your end would be wretched." [ have &c.
(Signed) G.' LLOYD HODGES..
No. 555.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 1.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, March 31, 1840-
1 HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that, accompanied!
by Mr. Alison, I waited upon Mehemet Ali yesterday.
I informed Mehemet Ali of the capture*, near Corfu, of the Greek
merchant brig, "Achille," and an Ionian trabacolo, employed for
recruiting and transporting Albanian troops for the service of his High
ness. At first, the Pasha denied all knowledge of this affair, but upon
my insisting, and showing him the charter of the brig, he said, that the
fact as I stated it was very possible, — as ever since his possessing the
supreme authority in Egypt, he had always recruited his Albanian
corps from their native country. As to the vessels, he said that the
English might do with them whatever they pleased, but that he expected
numbers of Albanians would yet reach him.
' I replied, that whatever his practice may have been formerly, it but ill.
accorded with his actual political relations/and his professions of devotion
to the Sultan, and desire for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, to
now seduce and enrol Turkish subjects, for the purpose of acting against
their legitimate Sovereign ; I added, that it was perfectly known to me who-
were the agents of his Highness in this business. The Pasha rejoined, that
he had taken no measure for seducing the subjects of the Porte, he only
wanted recruits for his army ; and starting up, he exclaimed with great
warmth, " 1 could, if I would, make the whole nation revolt against the
Sultan, and possibly I may do so, if driven to extremities."
I next entered upon the topic of my instructions contained in your

* See page 639.

638
Lordship's despatch of the 25th ultimo, and had not proceeded
far in my communication, the matter of which I had some time since
conveyed to him in a private conversation, when the Pasha manifested
much impatience, and exclaimed abruptly, " You speak as if you were a
novice in this question. I am weary of these representations. Let us
drop the subject. These matters have been repeated to me over and over
again. It is useless again to refer to them." Here, Boghos Bey, seeing
the Pasha much excited, and fearing that he might commit himself,
requested me to write to his Highness, to which I only replied, that. my
communications with the Pasha must be personal, but that if I had
occasion to apply to the Minister, it would be in writing ; and I added,
that I expected of his Highness a patient hearing. I said that I
regretted extremely, that my communication was not of a more agree
able character, but that I really thought the blame to rest, rather with
his Highness than with my Government; and that he might rest satisfied,
that any representations it might become my duty to make, would
always be couched in terms of due respect to the Pasha.
Resuming then the conversation, I asked Mehemet Ali, " Pray, what
does your Highness purpose doing with the Turkish fleet ;" to which he
replied, " I shall keep it as a weapon taken from the hand of my enemies,
until my differences are settled with the Porte, and then I shall send it
back to the Sultan." To this I rejoined, " If the officers of the Turkish
fleet knew their duty to their religion and to the Sultan, they would
return with their ships to Constantinople ; and I do not conceal from
your Highness, that I am instructed by my Government to advise their
adoption of such a course." On this, the Pasha, in a state of the greatest
excitement, jumped up from his Divan, and cried, "Now you place me in
a state of war. I warn you, that the first defection I perceive, I will
shoot the offender." I contented myself with answering, " Your Highness
may rely on it, that threats will not prevent the performance of my duty.
I view with regret, the measures your Highness is adopting, and the
preparations you are making ; they cannot avail, and only prove the
eagerness with which your Highness is rushing towards certain
destruction." I begged Mehemet Ali to inform me, whether he had not recently
written to Hosrew Pasha, respecting some arrangement of his differences
with the Sublime Porte. He replied, that he had written such a letter
about a month since, to which he expected a reply by the next steamer:
and that he believed that Hosrew Pasha had communicated it to the
Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople. I said that I had
been informed, that a copy had been, by his orders, furnished to M.
Cochelet ; and I expressed a hope, that his Highness would have suffi
cient confidence in me to intrust me with the same document. To this the
Pasha made no objection, but ordered Boghos Bey to furnish me with a
transcript, which, however, I have not as yet received.
It is proper that I should inform your Lordship, that the demeanour
and tone of Mehemet Ali, during the whole of the political portion of this
interview, manifested defiance and haughtiness.
I observed towards him a calm, respectful, but firm, deportment:
It is not possible to believe that Mehemet Ali, confiding in his own
feeble resources, could assume such a bearing, or use such language, to
the Agent of a Power like Great Britain.
As respects that portion of your Lordship's instructions relating to
the officers of the Turkish fleet, the performance would be so replete with
danger for those individuals, that it is my intention to take no active
measures as regards it until I receive your Lordship's further orders.
Should I, however, find that there is peril to the lives of any persons who
may have been compromised through a confidence in the sympathy and
assistance of Her Majesty's Government, I shall certainly receive such
persons into my house, or furnish them with an asylum on board one or
other of the two vessels of war stationed here.
Under the circumstances before set forth, I cannot but be of opinion,
that further intercourse between myself and the Pasha's Government
should be avoided at present as much as possible. It is useless, and

639
worse than useless. It can only expose me gratuitously to much that
is painful. Threats I cannot employ, until I am certain that menaces
will be immediately followed by effects : I, therefore, have determined to
remain for the present entirely passive, until the resolutions of Her1
Majesty's Government are made known to me.
I shall await with anxiety the reception of your Lordship's next
despatches ; and I trust the mode in which I have executed your Lord
ship's late commands may merit your approval.

Papers relating to the case of the Greek Merchant Brig "Achille,"
and an Ionian Trabaeolo, referred to in the preceding
Despatch. James Stephen, Esq. to John Backhouse, Esq.
(Extract.) Downing Street, April 10, 1840.
I AM directed by Lord John Russell to transmit to you, for the
information of Viscount Palmerston, copies of a despatch, and of its two
inclosures, which have been received from Her Majesty's Lord High
Commissioner to the Ionian States, reporting the measures which he has
taken for defeating the scheme of an agent of Mehemet Ali, to convey a
party of Albanian recruits to Candia. Inclosure.
Sir Howard Douglas to Lord John Russell.
(Extract.) Corfu, March 12, 1840.
FOR some time past, this island, and Paxo, have been kept in
constant alarm by hordes of Albanians being assembled, who, it was
apprehended, meditated a descent upon one or both of these Islands ;
and on the 2d instant, it was stated to me that an Egyptian Agent,
named Ibrahim Muzzo, a Colonel in the service of Mehemet Ali, had
arrived here and had taken up a Greek Brig and an Ionian trabaeolo,
for the purpose of embarking as many Albanian recruits as they could
contain out of those which had been engaged, and to convey them to
Candia. Having ascertained that Ibrahim Muzzo was an agent so employed,
and having become possessed of an authentic copy of the Charter Party
under which those vessels had been taken up, I determined to take the
strongest measures, at the proper time, to defeat the present attempt,
and effectually to prevent all attempts of this kind for the future. Tke
Turkisk Consul, wko suspected what was going on, wished me to
prevent the enterprise before it was undertaken ; but I thought it much
better to let the agent proceed to such an extent as might make the case
strong, evident, and ripe.
I accordingly requested Captain Codrington, of Her Majesty's Ship
" Talbot," to keep a look out upon the vessels thus engaged, to follow
them to any point of Albania, and watching them there, to endeavour to
catch them in the act of embarking men, and to bring them both into
this port. This service, Captain Codrington executed to my perfect
satisfaction, and I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the copy of his
report herewith put up.
I have not failed to communicate also these details to Her Majesty's
Minister at Vienna, in reference to his despatch of the 30th August last
I have likewise reported the circumstances to Lord Ponsonby.

640
Sub-Inclosure 1.
Charter Party.
(Traduzione.) PER mezzo del presente privata carta, la quale avra la stessa forza
come se fosse anche pubblica, di comune consenso, cioe, dalP una il Capitan
Demetrio Polemi del brigantino mercantile Greco "Achille" di ton 147,
attrovantosi in questo porto di Corfu, e dalP altra Imbraim Bey Ottomano
da Belichi, Colonello di Maemet Ali, ritrovantosi in questi recenti di con-
tumacia, si convennero come segue :
1. II suddetto Capitano Demetrio noleggia all' Imbraim Bey il suo na-
viglio, ed Imbraim Bey accettandolo, si obbliga di caricarlo con per-
sone per Candia nel seguente accordo.
2. II veniente Mercardi 21 corrente, Stylo Vecchio, tempo permettendo,
si obliga il detto Capitano di ricevere nel suo naviglio il Imbraim
Bey, e di recarsi nell' opposto Continente nel porto Tre Scoglietti
pertinenza di Butrinto, ove le persone deggiono imbarcarsi.
3. Arrivando quello, nel periodo di cinque giorni si obbliga P Imbraim
Bey d' imbarcare li detti Ottomani Albanesi tanti quanti il naviglio
del suddetto Capitano Demetrio potra contenere.
4. II Capitan Demetrio tosto che saranno imbarcate le persone si obbliga,
con primo buon vento, di partire per Candia, portando seco lui anche
l'Imbraim Bey, il quali si obbliga di andarvi.
5. Arrivando in Candia nel porto di Canea o Suda, nel periodo di cinque
giorni dovra P Imbraim Bey sbarcare le persone suddette senza diffi-
colta o pretesti, si da pero F autorita al detto Capitano Demetrio
di non sbarcarli se prima non riceve dal suo noleggiatore Imbraim
Bey il nolo di detto viaggio, consistente in tailed colonati 900, come si
obbliga di contarli, senza verun ostacolo, come si convennero ambe le
parte per quante persone s' imbarcheranno.
6. II suddetto Capitano Demetrio si obbliga di aver la cura per la giorna-
liera sussistenza delle suddette persone, e giornalmente consegnare al
suo noleggiatore per distribuirle a loro a suo piacere ; tutte le spese,
pero, che incontrerebbe il Capitan Demetrio, saranno pagatedall' Im
braim Bey come lo sara di ogni altra spesa che potrebbe seguire
per esse.
Tanto si convennero ambo le parti, e si obbligano di tenerlo firme, si-
curo, ed irrevocabile, ed in riscontro si fanno due simili firmate da en-
trambe per tenere una per caduno per riciproca loro cautela.
(Firmato) DEMETRIO POLEMI.
IMBRAIM BEY.
Corfu, li 19 Febraio, 1840. (Translation.)
BY this private writing, which shall have the same effect and force as
if it were published with mutual consnet, that is to say between Captain
Demetrio Polemi of the Greek merchant-brig "Achille," of 147 tons, in the
port of Corfu, on the one part, and Ibraim Bey, an Ottoman of Belichi, a
Colonel of Mehemet Ali, and now in quarantine here, on the other, it is
agreed as follows :
1. The above Captain Demetrio charters to Ibraim Bey his said vessel,
obliging himself to convey people to Candia under the following
agreement.
2. On Wednesday next the 21st inst., weather permitting, the said
Captain Demetrio obliges himself to receive on board his vessel
Ibraim Bey, and to proceed to the port of Tre Scoglietti, belonging
to Butrinto on the opposite coast, where these persons are to be
embarked.
3; Three days after her arrival, Ibraim Bey obliges himself to embark
as many of the said Albanian Ottomans as the vessel can take.

641
4. Captain Demetrio, as soon as these persons are embarked, obliges him
self to proceed to Candia with the first fair wind, taking with him
also the said Ibraim Bey, who obliges himself to accompany him.
5. On arrival in Candia in the port of Canea or Suda, Ibraim Bey shall
disembark in the period of five days the above-mentioned persons with
out any hindrance or pretext. Authority, however, is given to the
said Captain Demetrio not to disembark them till he first receives
from Ibraim Bey the freight for the voyage, being 900 dollars, which
he obliges himself to pay without any obstacle, according to the
agreement made by both parties for such persons as shall be em
barked.
6. The said Captain Demetrio obliges himself to take care of the daily
subsistence of these persons and to deliver it daily to the freighter,
to be distributed to them at his pleasure. All the expences, however,
to which the said Demetrio may be exposed, shall be paid by Ibraim
Bey, as well as any other expence that may occur.
It is so agreed between the Contracting Parties, who oblige them
selves to hold it secure and irrevocable, in proof of which they subscribe
two similar instruments, one to be retained by each for mutual security.
(Signed) DEMETRIO POLEMI.
IBRAIM BEY.
Corfu, February 19, 1840. Sub-Inclosure 2.
Captain Codrington to Major Fraser.
Her Majesty's Ship " Talbot,"
Sir, Corfu, March 9, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his
Excellency, the Lord High Commissioner, that on the 7th I proceeded
with the " Talbot " and " Weazle" in search of the Greek merchant brig
" Achilles," and the Ionian trabaeolo, mentioned in your letter of the 4th
instant, as going to Tre Scoglietti, with the intention of embarking
Albanian recruits for the service of the Pasha of Egypt.
On anchoring at Butrinto, for the purpose of making enquiries, and
reconnoitering the neighbouring anchorage of Tre Scoglietti, to see what
progress the brig had made in the embarkation, I found, that after stay
ing there only a few hours, she had sailed to the north, with a fair wind,
early on that very morning. On making further enquiries from the
Turkish trabacolos then lying at Tre Scoglietti, I was informed, that the
brig had only taken in a little ballast, but had not embarked any men
there, since the Albanians, who had been assembled to the number of four
hundred, and had been waiting there for her for some time past, had been
obliged, for want of provisions, to disperse themselves, in consequence of
the brig not having arrived at the time appointed. Whether this were
true or not, it seemed probable that the brig, after calling to receive
recruits at one or two places on the Albanian coast, more to the north,
would stand out to sea, and proceed to Alexandria, along the western
side of Corfu. The " Weazle" was therefore detached for a few days, to
the southward, to endeavour to cut her off to the west of Cape Bianco,
while the " Talbot " continued the examination of the Albanian coast to
the north. _ . . . .. .
No vessel was lying at Santa Quaranta, nor could any be distin
guished that evening to the southward of Cape Kephali. On the next
day the 8th, at Port Palermo, I was informed that in that neighbour
hood there had also been collected about four hundred men, ostensibly
for Greece, or for Candia, but in reality as recruits for the Pasha of
These men having been reduced, by the delay, to great distress for
provisions, had also dispersed themselves in the neighbouring villages,
but could be again collected in twenty-four hours, or a little more, for
embarkation. 4 N

642
Nothing having been seen on board of the brig on this part of the
coast, I returned close along shore to the southward, intending to seek
information at Santa Quaranta, but on rounding Cape Kephali, the same
afternoon, I observed the brig and Ionian trabaeolo at anchor together,
in a small bay to the south of the Cape, — a place where there is no house,
nor Dogana, nor any Turkish authority in the neighbourhood, to interfere
with them.
The captain and crew of the brig made no mystery of their business
there, avowing at once that it was to convey recruits for the Pasha of
Egypt; adding, that the Agent whom they had brought, was then up the
country, for the purpose of collecting them for embarkation. The crew
of the trabaeolo added to this, that they had accompanied the brig,
for the purpose of showing them the anchorage. Both vessels were
ordered at once to return to Corfu, in company with tkis ship, and on
being assured that the command would be enforced, they obeyed, though
with reluctance. A strong attempt at escape from on board the
trabaeolo was made by a person in a Turkish dress, who, I under
stand, is a brother of the Agent. Finding himself pursued by our boat,
he plunged overboard, out of his, and swam for the shore, but was cap
tured, and sent on board the trabaeolo again.
All further attempts at escape during the night, while on the passage
from thence to Corfu, were prevented by the precautions taken, and the
strict look out kept on them ; and I had the satisfaction of delivering them
into the charge of the captain of the port in this anchorage, at three this
morning. (Signed) H. E. CODRINGTON.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 10.)
My Lord, Vienna, August 30, 1839.
LORD PONSONBY, with reference to the arrival of an Egyptian
brig at Salonica, having on board emissaries from Mehemet Ali, expressed
to me his opinion that it would be desirable that the Austrian Agents
should be instructed to hold a language to the Pashas near whom they
reside, calculated to confirm them in their allegiance to the Sultan. I
transmitted this suggestion to Prince Metternich, coupled with another
for having the coast of Albania watched by the Austrian naval force
in the Adriatic, to prevent the landing of Agents from Egyptian ships
of war. Both suggestions have been complied with, and in return Prince
Metternich has requested me to make a similar application to the Officer
commanding Her Majesty's naval forces in the Adriatic.
As I am not aware whether any naval force is stationed there, I have
written upon the matter to Sir Howard Douglas, and have the honour to
inclose copy of my letter I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.
Inclosure.
Lord Beauvale to Sir Howard Douglas.
Sir, Vienna, August 30, 1839.
IT is not improbable that attempts may be made by the Pasha of
Egypt to excite revolt in Albania: Should any Egyptian vessel appear
upon the coast having Agents on board charged with such a commission,
it would be highly desirable, and no more than consistent with the rela
tions existing between Her Majesty's Government and the Great Powers
and the Porte, that such vessel should be taken possession of.
The Austrian Government have sent orders to that effect to their
naval force in the Adriatic, and have requested me to apply in the same
sense to the Officer commanding Her Majesty's vessels in that sea.

643

As I am doubtful whether we have a naval force there, I beg to put
the affair into your hands, requesting you, if such a force exists in
the Adriatic, to transmit this application to the Officer commanding it.
I have, &c,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 24.)
My Lord, Therapia, March 31, 1840.
I ACQUAINTED the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the informa
tion of the Sublime Porte, with the friendly conduct of Sir Howard
Douglas, with respect to the emissaries sent by the Pasha of Egypt into
Albania, &c. &c, which has been reported by his Excellency the Lord
High Commissioner to Her Majesty's Government; and I have this day
received from his Excellency Rechid Pasha a message, saying that my
communication had been heard by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan with
the greatest pleasure and satisfaction. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

James Stephen, Esq., to John Backhouse, Esq.
Sir, Downing Street, May 7, 1840.
REFERRING to my letter of the 10th instant, I am directed by
Lord John Russell to transmit to you, for the information of Viscount
Palmerston, a copy of a despatch which has been received from Her
Majesty's Lord High Commissioner at Corfu, covering a translation of a
communication from the Vizier Nouri Pasha, in which His Highness
expresses his gratitude for the measures recently taken by the Lord
High Commissioner to defeat the scheme of an Agent of Mehemet Ali
to carry off a party of Albanian recruits. I have, &c,
(Signed) JAMES STEPHEN.
*
Inclosure.
Sir Howard Douglas to Lord John Russell.
(Extract.) Corfu, March 25, 1840.
IN reference to my despatch of the 12th instant, I have the
honour to transmit to your Lordship translated copy of a communication
addressed to me by His Highness the Vizier Nouri Pasha, Governor of
the adjoining Ottoman Provinces, expressive of his gratitude for the
measures which, under your Lordship's instructions, I took to prevent
the transport of troops from the ports of Albania to join the Pasha of
Egypt. The Agent of the Viceroy of Egypt taken by Her Majesty's ship
" Talbot" and brought hither, I shall detain under surveillance until I
hear from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.
Sub-Inclosure.
The Vizier Mustafa Nouri Pasha to Sir Howard Douglas.
(Translation.)
Excellency, OUR Consul in" the Ionian Islands has informed us that a certain
Albanian named Ibraim Muzoz, who came from Alexandria to Corfu,
manifested an intent to disturb the tranquillity of these countries by
4 N 2

644
levying soldiers, hiring ships, and preparing to transport Albanian troops
to other countries.
On this becoming known to your Excellency, our said Consul was
duly informed of the same, and your Excellency on this, as well as on a
former occasion, made manifest your wish to scrupulously maintain that
ancient and sincere friendship and harmony which exist between the
Ottoman Porte and Great Britain.
Last year, when we received manifest proofs of this true friendship
from your Excellency, who incurred both danger and trouble in driving
away the suspected vessel which arrived from Egypt, we expressed our
sentiments of profound gratitude for the conduct pursued by a friendly
and neighbouring Power, under the circumstances of the case.
These we now again express to your Excellency in consequence of
the information communicated to us relative to the measures taken by
your Excellency to impede the departure of the vessels engaged for the
transport of troops levied with a view to disturb the tranquillity of these
countries. Your Excellency has foreseen every possible disturbance.
These acts on the part of your Excellency we cannot but consider as
proofs of the cordial feeling which exists between Great Britain and the
Ottoman Porte, and the conduct of the English calls forth the expression
of our gratitude. We trust that in reply to this we may receive such
manifestations of a friendly disposition as may tend to strengthen the
feelings which now unite us, and to prevent those disorders which attempts
similar to those that have lately occurred, might occasion. We also
avail ourselves of this opportunity to express the profound esteem and
consideration with which, &c,
(Signed) VIZIER MUSTAFA NOURI PASHA.
Yanina, March 11, 1840.

No. 556.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 4.)
(Extract.) Paris, May I, 1840.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 28th of April.
M. Thiers, yesterday, read to me extracts of a despatch addressed
by him to M. Cochelet, for the purpose of showing that the Pasha of
Egypt was not encouraged by the French Government to refuse his
acquiescence in reasonable conditions of peace with the Sultan. In one
of the extracts which he read to me, M. Thiers enjoins the French Consul
to make it clearly understood by Mehemet Ali, that France will not
sacrifice its alliance with England to the interests of the Pasha.

No. 557.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, May 5, 1840.
A FEW days before the adjournment of the House of Commons fqr
the Easter recess, I requested M. Guizot again to draw the attention of
his Government to the question of the Naval Armaments of France, with
respect to which, so many communications have taken place between the
two Governments since December last.
I said, that when the Navy Estimates were discussed in the
House of Commons, some members remarked, that the number of ships

645
which we then had in commission would require, in order to man
them, a larger number of seamen than that which we had proposed to
Parliament, as the permanent establishment for the service of the year ;
and the Government was asked how it reconciled the number of ships in
commission, and the crews which those ships must necessarily contain,
with the number of men proposed to be voted : I said, that in reply it
had been stated, that we hoped to be able to lay up in ordinary some of
the ships of the line then in commission, and thus to reduce the num
ber of seamen employed, so as to bring it down to the number proposed
to be voted ; and that if circumstances should arise to prevent this re
duction, and if the state of affairs should require the continuance of the
same amount of naval force which was then employed, the Government
would come down to Parliament later in the session, would state that
fact, and would apply for a supplementary vote. I said, that the Chancel
lor of the Exchequer would be obliged after Easter to make his financial
statement of the income and expenditure of the country, for the year end
ing April, 1841 ; and that the Government must, before that statement is
made, determine finally what amount of naval force we may be obliged to
keep up : that our decision on this point must mainly depend upon the course
pursued by France. That if France should reduce her naval force, England
would do the same ; but that if France should resolve to maintain her
present large amount of ships in commission, England could not reduce
hers ; and the Government would be obliged to apply to Parliament for
a supplementary vote: that, in applying for this vote, we might be com-,
pelted to state the reasons which rendered it necessary, and that, if it
should be occasioned by the extensive armament of France, a statement
of that fact in Parliament would not produce a good effect upon the
public mind of Europe, or upon the mutual relations of the two countries.
I showed M. Guizot the list, of which I inclose a copy, by which it appears,
that the French have in the Mediterranean seventeen sail of the line now
afloat, and equipped or equipping for service, and another ship of the
line at Rochefort ; while we have in the Mediterranean ten, at Lisbon
two, at home two preparing for the Mediterranean, two getting ready for
general service, and the three guardships : that thus, the French have
eighteen sail of the line afloat, while we have, exclusive of the guard-
ships, which have not their full complement of men, and which cannot
leave their respective ports, and exclusive of the three line-of-battle ships
in the East Indies, which cannot be reckoned in this comparison, only
sixteen. I said, that it is impossible for England to remain inferior to
France in naval means, either permanently, and upon a comparison of
the whole number of ships belonging to each country, or for a time, and
upon a comparison of the number of ships which each country may have in
commission: that it appeared however to Her Majesty's Government, that
it would be much better to restore the balance by mutual reduction than
by rivalship in augmentation ; and that, accordingly, I had, on the part
of Her Majesty's Government, to propose through him to the French
Government, that if France would reduce the number of her line-of-
battle ships in commission to twelve, England would fix her Mediter
ranean fleet at the same amount, and would, in addition to that fleet, keep
in commission in the seas of Europe only the two sail of the line at
Lisbon, and the three guardships ; the latter of which are rather head
quarter stations for the Port Admirals than an available naval force,
and the former of which are a necessary reserve for a country which, like
England, has numerous and widely scattered Colonial possessions, and
many distant interests to guard. I, at the same time, showed M. Guizot
your Excellency's despatch of the 17th of June of last year, in which
you report, that Marshal Soult had talked not of fifteen sail of the
line, but of' ten, as the French naval force; saying, that France had then
seven in the Levant; that the French Government intended to send
thither three more, which were getting ready at Toulon, and that they
would then have ten in the Levant ; and that if the English Government
would augment the British squadron in the Mediterranean to the same
amount, there would then be a combined force of twenty sail of the line
ready to act for the protection of the Turkish Empire.

646
M. Guizot promised to report to his Government what I had said,
and to let me know as soon as possible their decision on this proposi
tion. Accordingly, a few days ago, M. Guizot read to me a part of a
letter which he had received from M. Thiers, conveying the French
answer to the above-mentioned proposal of Her Majesty's Government.
M. Thiers said in that letter, that the French Government has now nine
sail of the line in the Levant, and six at Toulon ; not, however, it is to be
observed, noticing in this enumeration the two others which are under
repair at Toulon, and the " Inflexible," which is getting ready for sea at
Rochefort. He said, that in order to obviate any jealousy on the part of
England, he was willing to agree that under present circumstances, the
French force should be distributed in the following manner : that ten sail
of the line should be stationed to the eastward of Malta, and between that
Island and the Dardanelles and Alexandria; and that six should be
stationed to the westward of Toulon, and between that port and Algiers
and Cadiz; the French naval force in commission being thus maintained
at seventeen ; namely, sixteen in the Mediterranean and one at Rochefort.
But M. Thiers added, that whenever France should acquire the certainty
that she would not be left alone (isolee) on the Turco-Egyptian Question,
the French Government would immediately lay up in ordinary five out of
these seventeen sail, and turn over their crews to frigates and smaller
vessels, and send them to Buenos Ayres.
Your Excellency will see that there was nothing in this communi
cation which could lead Her Majesty's Government to think, that it
would be expedient or proper to abstain from proposing to Parliament a
fresh grant for the purpose of keeping up the present amount of our
naval force ; because the proposal that the existing naval force of France
should be divided into two portions, of which, one should be stationed to
the east of Malta, and the other to the west of Toulon, could hardly
be dealt with by any serious observation ; and the measure which was
announced as intended to. be adopted whenever such an arrangement of
the Turco-Egyptian Question as would be satisfactory to France shall
be arrived at, would produce no diminution in the effective and active
naval force of France, (because the real naval force of a country must be
measured by the number of seamen employed,) but would only be a
transfer of a part of that force from one description of ships to another,
and its application to a purpose which would not be by any means calcu
lated to allay national jealousy in this country. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON

Inclosure in No. 557.
List of French Ships in the Mediterranean, April 1840.

In Toulon Roads fit for Sea,
Ocean 120 Hercule 100 Genereux 80
Triton 80 Marengo 80

In Toulon fitting for Sea.
Souverain 110 Ville de Marseilles 80 Scipion 80
Friedland . . 120; launched at Cherburgh.
Jemappe . . 100, launched at L'Orient.
Inflexible . . 90, fitting at Rochefort

647

Nine in the Levant, of which two are coming to Toulon for Repair.
Montebello 120 Jena 90 Jupiter 86
Santi Petri 86 Diademe 86 Trident 80
Neptune 86 Alger 80 Suffrein 90

No. 558.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 8.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, April 6, 1840.
THE morning after my interview with his Highness the Viceroy, on
the 31st ultimo, he nominated Ahmed Pasha to the command of the
Turkish and Egyptian squadrons, and restored to him the insignia of
rank as Capudan Pasha, of which he had been, only a few weeks since,
deprived by the Sultan.
This step on the part of Mehemet Ali, has created much surprise
in the minds of my Colleagues ; and I confess that it strikes me as
one of the most important and significant indications of his deter
mination to resist, should force be resorted to against him by the Allied
Powers ; nay, more, that he is now determined, by some overt act, to
bring the question to a crisis.
I am informed by M. Cochelet, that when he remonstrated with him
on the late nomination, he answered, " What would you have me do ? I
sent lately to Constantinople, proposals for an arrangement with the
Porte : these were confided to my daughter-in-law. Twice she went with
them to Hosrew Pasha, who found some excuse for not receiving
her. I am laughed at by the Court of Constantinople. I will show
these people that they cannot insult me with impunity. As to
Ahmed Pasha, he shall always have asylum in Egypt ; and the Turkish
fleet will be sent home as soon as my differences with the Sultan are
terminated. If Mustapha Pasha deems his staying in this country incon
sistent with his honour, he may go to his friend Colonel Hodges, who will
probably send him to Constantinople ; but if he does not, I will."
Indeed, my Lord, it would in no way astonish me, were Mehemet Ali,
on being driven to extremities, to order the advance of Ibrahim Pasha's
Army on Constantinople. Such an act would be only in keeping with the
tone and manner he has lately assumed, especially towards the Austrian
Consul-General and myself. The Pasha's deportment towards M. de
Laurin, in an interview he had with him on the 4th instant, was both
insulting and defying. I may here remark to your Lordship, that M.
Cochelet assures me, that on some points, such for instance as the restoring
liberty to the officers of the Turkish squadron, he backed my representa
tions made to the Pasha.

No. 559.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 8.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, AprU 8, 1840.
A LETTER has been received from Sheriff Pasha on the subject of
the quarantine in Syria, which it was stated had increased the popular
ferment. Sheriff Pasha referred to the opinion which had been already
expressed, that if the power and jurisdiction of his Highness in Syria were
not speedily confirmed and consolidated, the public feeling, exasperated by

648
the present and other measures, might evince itself in a manner highly
dangerous to the existing authority.
What I can communicate as more positive, since the facts, after
coming to my knowledge, were confirmed by M. Cochelet himself, is, that
this gentleman, on the evening of the 4th instant, had an audience of
Mehemet Ali, in the course of which he informed the Pasha that he had
received despatches from M. Thiers, from which he gathered that France
was inclining in her foreign policy towards a Northern Power.
Count Medem tells me, that on remonstrating with the Pasha on
his late nomination of Ahmed Pasha to the command of both fleets,
Mehemet Ali replied, " that he had been urged to that course by the
insulting conduct of the Porte; and that, independent of such a cause, he
had long wished to grant repose to the declining years of his old servant,
Mustapha Pasha, recently Admiral of the Egyptian squadron, for which
purpose he had named Ahmed Pasha Inspector-General of both fleets."
Your Lordship will, no doubt, observe the discrepancy contained in the
titles given by the Pasha to his new Admiral, in his two conversations with
M. Cochelet and Count Medem.

No. 560.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 8.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, April 18, 1840.
SINCE I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship, in my
despatch of the 8th instant, the affairs of this country have not
assumed any novel or remarkable character.
The warlike preparations of the Pasha continue, on all sides, with
extreme activity ; and his air of perfect confidence in the fortunate
results of his policy, seems undiminished. Every day confirms and aug
ments my former suspicions, that Mehemet Ali is backed by the secret
support and assurances of a first-rate European Power ; and that he is
fully prepared and resolved for any contingency.
At Alexandria, there has not recently occurred anything more
worthy of note than the collection of forces at Damanhour, and the
diligent drilling of the troops belonging to the fleets and the city ; both
circumstances to which I have adverted in former despatches.
About a fortnight back, 105,000 round-shot and shell arrived from
Cairo. A frigate, called the " Cafarshir," is loading with military stores,
amongst which, are 1,100 shell ; and three or four transports are also
taking in munitions. These, it is thought, are destined for St. Jean
d'Acre. The fine corvette commanded by Said Bey, son of the Pasha, is
preparing for sea.
On the 16th instant, Her Majesty's steam-ship " Gorgon," and the
" Daphne" corvette, sailed from this port, in consequence of orders from
Admiral Sir John Louis, and proceeded to Malta.
The 26th and 35th Regiments of Infantry have left Cairo, and, I
believe, have descended to the coast. Fifteen or twenty new field-pieces
had also been despatched in the same direction. Several influential
Sheiks, for the purpose of elevating the public spirit, have assumed the
Nizam costume ; but the late forcible conscriptions have spread terror and
dissatisfaction throughout Egypt.
The information I receive from Syria, represents that country as
being in a very agitated and unsettled condition. Discontent prevails to
the highest extent. It is said, that the Emir Bechir, Prince of Mount
Lebanon, has refused to furnish 20,000 men demanded of him by the
Egyptian Government. All accounts concur in declaring that the

649
Syrians look with confidence and hope to being speedily liberated by an
European army.
The fortification and victualling of St. Jean d'Acre, continue without
intermission. The garrison of Acre, on the 9th ultimo, was as follows: 
1 Regiment (18th) Infantry.
1 Regiment (30th) Infantry, formed of invalids.
600 Sappers and Miners. (Baltadgi.)
300 Regular Artillery.
1,000 Irregular Artillery.
Another regiment of Infantry is expected to arrive from Damascus.
No. 561.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 8.)
My Lord, Alexandria, April 20, 1840.
SINCE I had the honour of writing to your Lordship in my despatch
of the 18th instant, I have ascertained that the Pasha is about to under
take a short tour up the Delta.
I am informed by a letter received this day from our Consular Agent
at Atfe, on the Mahmoudie Canal, that four regiments of Regular
Infantry, recently arrived from Cairo, are now encamped at Damanhour,
at which place there are also 800 men of Irregular Cavalry. In addition,
several regiments from Upper Egypt and from the Hedjaz, are expected
there. It is believed that two regiments will be quartered in the village
of Darout-a-Halgh-el Ghiamal, about an hour distant from Atfe.
The recruiting of the National Guard continues everywhere with
the utmost activity. At Cairo, Osman Bey Sennari, late Ulema of the
Mosque Ashar, has undertaken to raise four regiments ; and Mehemet
Ali has promised, that should he succeed, he will make him Pashax of two
tails. Ibrahim Aref Bey, late a merchant in Cairo, is named Brigadier-
General, and has engaged to raise two regiments. Mahomed Bey, late
Ulema, is to assemble other two regiments, and to be decorated with the
same rank. These eight regiments are to be recruited in the city of Cairo.
Hussein Bey Surur is to be made Colonel, and is to recruit one
regiment in Old Cairo.
Ali Djezzar will have the same rank, and is to form another regiment
in the neighbouring suburb of Boulac.
My correspondence from Syria of the 31st ultimo, represents Ibrahim
Pasha as still at Marash. It is worthy of remark, that something more
than two months back, he had distributed various regiments in Hamah,
Homs, Damascus, Acre, &c. ; but that the whole of these troops, with
reinforcements, have been recalled and concentrated about Marash.
Three regiments of Infantry are also on the point of leaving Aleppo with
the same destination.
It is reported in Aleppo, that the Egyptian Infantry is to be divided
into two columns of operation : one to be stationed near Acre, and the
other at Marash.
The entire force of Cavalry is concentrating in and about Killis.
In the vicinity of Aleppo, all the beasts of burden have been put in
requisition to transport the materiel of the army deposited there in the
magazines. The utmost activity prevails in perfecting the fortifications of Acre.
Workmen of all kinds are impressed for this service from the adjacent
cities. Requisitions for provisions and other stores, are also exacted
over great part of the country, for the supply both of Acre and Alexandria.
The Government is exerting itself to disarm the mountaineers. An
inconsiderable revolt had taken place. The misery of the masses is
extreme. The disaffection of the Syrians is universal.
I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.
40

650
No. 562.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, May 8, 1840.
WITH reference to my letter to your Lordships of the 7th of April,
conveying to your Lordships the Queen's pleasure as to the instructions
to be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, with reference to the
contingency of an application being made by the Porte, for the presence
of the British squadron in the Bosphorus to protect Constantinople
against any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha ; I am commanded by
the Queen to acquaint your Lordships, that accounts recently received
show, that it is not improbable that Ibrahim Pasha may suddenly
march on Constantinople ; and I am to signify to your Lordships Her
Majesty's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be instructed
to station two or three sail of the line in the neighbourhood of the
Dardanelles, to be ready to pass up to Constantinople, if invited by the
Turkish Government to do so. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.
No. 563.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, May 8, 1840.
I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a letter
which, I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,
conveying to their Lordships the Queen's pleasure that Admiral Sir
Robert Stopford should be instructed to station two or three sail of the
line in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, to be ready to pass up to
Constantinople, if invited by the Turkish Government to do so.
I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.
No. 564.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, May 12, 1840.
I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of an instruction
which, by Her Majesty's commands, I have addressed to the Lords Com
missioners of the Admiralty, to provide for the possible contingency of
Admiral Sir Robert Stopford being invited by the Turkish Government to
pass up to Constantinople. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.
No. 565.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 14.)
My Lord, Paris, May 12, 1840.
THE Turkish Ambassador, Chekib Effendi, accredited to Her Majesty,
is arrived in Paris. He purposes to remain in Paris about a week, and
will then proceed to London. I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

651

No. 566.
Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 18.)
My Lord, Jerusalem, February 17, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to apprise your Lordship that I have received a
letter from the Consular- Agent at Acre, advising me that the greatest
possible activity is displayed there in repairing and strengthening the for
tifications. Here there is another seizure of all the artisans : they are treated in
every respect like convicts. It is reported that they are taken to the
north. I have, &c,
(Signed) W. G. YOUNG.
No. 567.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.-~-(Received May 17.)
(Extract.) Aleppo, March 19, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's informa
tion, copy of a despatch I addressed, under the 12th instant, to Viscount
Ponsonby.

Inclosure in No. 567.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Aleppo, March 12, 1840.
HIS Highness the Seraskier Pasha continues to remain at Marash
with the same force. The Cuirassier Regiment still occupies Albestan ;
and I learn that a detachment of Egyptian Irregular Cavalry (Bachi
Bozuks) have advanced in the direction of Kaisserieh, it is said to about
four to five hours' distance on this side of that town, and are busily occu
pied in exacting and collecting the Salyan Tax from all the inhabitants
throughout the line of country from Marash to that point, besides an
immense quantity of plunder and spoil, which, I am told, they have and
continue to take from all classes.
I have not heard of any change or movement in the disposition of the
Egyptian forces throughout this district
I beg leave further to inform your Lordship, that his Excellency
Maggiun Bey, with the Annadis and some Irregular Cavalry (Bachi
Bozuks), have lately been advancing on the Orfa line towards Bagdad. I
am told that the principal object of Maggiun Bey in these incursions
into the country, which he often makes, is to exact the Salyan Tax, and
to seize as much plunder as possible from the inhabitants. The last
advices from Orfa state that Maggiun Bey had just reached that place
from an expedition he had made, first against the Arabs, along the River
Khaboor, from whom he obtained large sums of money and a great
quantity of pillage, consisting of grain and cattle of all sorts, which had
reached Orfa ; and that he afterwards had advanced in a similar manner
towards the Sindjar, from whence he came. From inquiry I have made
I learn that Maggiun Bey has under him at Orfa about 1,000 Annadis ;
the remainder are with the Caftan Agha, in the direction of Hamah;
and the total Bachi Bozuks that are between Aintab, Marash, and those
in the direction of Orfa, amount to about 1700 men.
The regular force at Orfa remains without any change ; but on that
line towards Diarbekir, the Egyptian authority extends at present even
4 02

652
beyond Swerik and Chermook, and within ten hours from Diarbekir;
there are at present at Diarbekir about 700 of the Sultan's regular troops,
with two Viziers ; and if Maggiun Bey chose, he might, with 500 men,
take possession of that town. His Excellency the Sultan's Seraskier
Sadullah Pasha had gone to Karpoot, according to report, in order to
superintend and raise animals, which are sent to convey the ammunition
and military stores that are being landed by the Turkish Government on
the coast of the Black Sea, at Trebizond and Samsoon.
By the last advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays at Alexandretta,
and from our different agents on the coast, every thing appears to be tran
quil within their respective districts ; and the whole of this consular dis
trict is tranquil, and enjoys perfect health. I have no recent advices from
the Adana district ; there does not appear to be any movement of any
interest, except that the works and fortifications in the defile of the Taurus
have, I understand, all been entirely finished. About a fortnight ago, 120
pieces of Artillery of those taken at Nezib were sent to Alexandretta, and
then shipped on board vessels of war to be conveyed to Acre.

No. 568.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 1 7.)
(Extract.) Damascus, March 23, 1840.
I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship, on the 20th ultimo.
I therein mentioned an aggressive act, indicative of the beginning of an
insurrectionary feeling of some of the Mutualis in the Balbec district. I
have since learnt that from 150 to 200 horsemen infest the roads from
Balbec, Hosneh, to Homs. The Government is employed in taking mea
sures to repress them, but the absence of sufficient numbers of irregular
Syrian Cavalry, renders the entire success thereof problematical. In
the present juncture of affairs, it is not impossible that the Emir
Bechir looks on the Mutualis, extending on the whole line of country
from Soor to Balbec, Hosneh, and Homs, as strong outposts, if not
auxiliaries, in case any sudden change should take place of a warlike
contest between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, for the possession of Syria ;
in which case, the Emir Bechir might look to them as a relief from being
brought into immediate collision with either of the contending Powers on
the eastern desert line of his territories, and thereby permitting him to
maintain a neutral position.
The measures and preparations taking for the victualling and
defence of Acre continue, throughout this district, to be pursued with
great activity ; this fortress seems to exclusively occupy the attention and
energies of the Government in the south ; the country, extending from
the coast, north and south, and the east, will be guarded by two regiments
of regular Cavalry, and a regiment of Horse Artillery ; and a hill, com
manding part of the fortifications, is being reduced by the troops now in
garrison there.
My last advices from Aleppo state, that the Egyptian regular forces,
in lieu of retiring, still occupied the country to the north, as far as Albes
tan, and that the Irregular Cavalry were even making incursions within
a short distance of Kaisserieh, and that the forces from Orfa to the river
Khaboor, south, extending Egyptian influence to the Sindjar and Merdin ;
and northerly, assuming an influence, if not an absolute jurisdiction and
authority, beyond Swerik and Chermook, to within a few hours of Diarbe
kir ; that in every direction the Egyptian irregular forces were occupied
in obtaining spoil and pillage, and reducing the country to the Egyptian
rule. Your Lordship will observe that these measures have a tendency to
render the advance of any force from the north, either Ottoman or
European, of a difficult nature, while the Egyptians command
ing the Sindjar and the Arab tribes on the desert line south, bring their
authority in immediate contact with the Koords from the mountains of

653
Koordistan, independent of the same fierce tribes, widely and numerously
scattered on all the mountains along the ranges of the Taurus, extending
from Marash in a north-east direction.

No. 569.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 18.)
(Extract.) Beyrout, March 27, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that since my despatch
of the 27th February, 135 pieces ^of cannon, taken at the battle of
Nezib, have been transported to Acre, and 15,000 trees, for palisades,
have been ordered for the same place.
Two days ago, the Governor visited the castles which defend Beyrout,
with a view, I presume, of impressing the people with the intention of
Mehemet Ali of offering resistance at every point, if necessary. They
are not of a nature to be strongly defended under any circumstances.
Although the public tranquillity is undisturbed in this neighbourhood,
complaints are loud from all parts of Syria of the rigour used to enforce
the payment of taxes and imposts, and there exists a feeling of strong
discontent in consequence.
Accounts have to-day reached this place from Damascus, that the
plague is rapidly spreading in that city ; it has infected the garrison.
I regret to add, that it has likewise declared itself in the lazaretto here.
No. 570.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 17.)
(Extract.) Therapia, April 25, 1840.
IF Ibrahim advances, it will be easy to raise all the Syrians
against his government. I might answer for the inhabitants of
Lebanon, the Emir Bechir, and all, provided England will act, and
will support them ; and I think the mere appearance of a British squad
ron (no matter how small), being accompanied by an Ottoman frigate
carrying the Sultan's flag, will suffice for raising all those countries.
The Sultan will send the frigate, and give every aid in his power.
No. 571.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 17.)
(Extract. Therapia, April 26, 1840.
IN a former despatch, I acquainted your Lordship with the intention
of the Porte to collect a military force to guard against any attack from
the Egyptian Army, having for its end to menace the capital, &c.
It appears that about 23,000 men can be employed for the above
mentioned purpose. The Porte has appointed Riza Pasha to be General in
Asia, so as to have under his command Scutari and the country above Mon-
dania, where it is proposed to establish a camp for protection against an
attempt by Ibrahim, a measure which, I believe, will fully and completely
' answer that purpose.

No. 572.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 17.)
(Extract.) Therapia April 26, 1840.
I INCLOSE copy of a report from the Austrian Consul-General at
Alexandria to the Internuncio, which his Excellency was so good as to
give me.

654
Inclosure in No. 572.
M . de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.
Monsieur le Baron, Alexandrie, le 16 Avril, 1840.
LA reponse a la lettre de Mehemet Ali Pacha, du 23 Fevrier dernier,
dont fait mention la depeche de votre Excellence du 28 Mars dernier,
vient d'etre remise au Pacha.
L'ayant vu cet apres-diner, il me dit que ce n'est pas une re
ponse a sa lettre: que tout y est vague; que le Sadrazam fait connaitre son
embarras ; qu'il sent sa faiblesse et Fimpuissance de la Sublime Porte,
quoique soutenue par les Puissances ; que c'est absurde de dire que tout
depend du Sultan, puisque Hosrew Pacha a destitue dernierement
plusieurs grands dignitaires sans et meme contre bx volonte de Sa
Hautesse ; que le style de la lettre n'est pas bon ; que la redaction en est
Franque ; qu'on ne sait plus ecrire a Constantinople ; qu'au lieu de refuter
ses propositions, on met en avant d'autres qui n'ont pas le sens commun ;
que puisqu'on ne veut pas ecouter la voix de la raison, il est juste de se
mefier du Divan et de continuer les armemens ; que cependant il lui ecrira
dans deux ou trois semaines sur le mgme ton que precedemment.
La conclusion de la lettre, disait Mehemet Ali, est la chose la plus
curieuse qu'on lui ait jamais ecrite. "On me presse," disait-il, "d'en finir,
de ne pas perdre cette bonne occasion parcequ'elle ne se presentera pas
de sitot, une fois perdue ; mais finir quoi et comment ? rendre tout hors
l'Egypte ? Cela ne peut pas etre ; je garderai malgre ces Messieurs la ce
qui m'appartient ; s'ils veulent, qu'ils viennent m'attaquer ; l'Egypte est
gardee par la mer et par les deserts, et j'aurai bientot 80,000 hommes
reunis a Alexandrie pour repousser une attaque. Je payerai en btes les
traitemens, si Fargent viendra a me manquer. J'en ai parte aux officiers
des deux escadres, il y a soixante jours ; ils ont accueilli avec transport
cette proposition, et je compte sur eux." Agreez, &c,
(Signe) LAURfN

(Translation.)
M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stiirmer.
Monsieur le Baron, Alexandria, April 16, 1840
THE answer to Mehemet Ali Pasha's letter of the 23rd of February last,
mentioned in your Excellency's despatch of the 28th of March last, has just been
delivered to the Pasha.
Having seen him this afternoon, he told me that it was no answer
to his letter ; that everything in it was vague ; that the Sadrazam evinces
his embarrassment ; that he is conscious of his weakness, and of the want of
power of the Sublime Porte, although supported by the Powers ; that it is
absurd to say that everything depends on the Sultan, seeing that Hosrew Pasha
has lately displaced several great dignitaries without, and indeed against, the
consent of His Highness ; that the style of the letter is not good ; that its
composition is Frank ; that at Constantinople no one can any longer write ; that
instead of refuting his propositions, others have been advanced devoid of common
sense ; that as the voice of reason is not listened to, he is justified in distrusting
the Divan, and in continuing to arm ; but that, nevertheless, he should write
to him in two or three weeks in the same sense as before.
The conclusion of tbe letter, said Mehemet Ali, is the most curious thing that
has ever been written to him. " 1 am urged," said he, " to finish ; not to lose this
favourable opportunity, because once lost, it will not so soon recur : but, what am
I to finish, and how? To give up everything except Egypt? That cannot be ;
I shall retain, in spite of these gentlemen, that which belongs to me ; if they
wish it, let them come and attack me : Egypt is defended by the sea and by the
desert, and I shall soon have 80,000 men assembled at Alexandria to repel an

655
attack. I shall issue their pay in corn, if money should grow scarce. I have
spoken to the officers of the two squadrons of this, sixty days ago : they were
delighted with the proposition, and I rely upon them. Receive, &c,
(Signed) LAURIN.

No. 573.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston, — (Received May 18.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, May 4, 1840.
COUNT NESSELRODE appears to think it possible that your Lord
ship's observations to M. Guizot on the engagement contracted by
France by the Collective Note to the Porte of last July, may produce a
good effect ; and his Excellency is confident that if France joins the other
Great Powers, Mehemet Ali will at once give way.
No. 574.
Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.
My Lord, Londres, le 18 Mai, 1840.
PAR la reponse en date du II Avril que votre Excellence a daigne
faire a la Note du 7 du meme mois que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser,
elle a annonce qu'elle etait prfete a concerter immediatement avec les
Ptenipotentiaires des Quatre Grandes Puissances et avec moi, les moyens
les plus propres a realiser les intentions bienveillantes que les Represen
tans des Cinq Cours ont manifestees a la Porte Ottomane par la Note
Collective du 27 Juillet, 1839.
Permettez-moi, My Lord, de vous rappeler qu'il y a deja cinq
semaines passees, et PAffaire de l'Orient reste enGore dans Petat ou elle
C*tait. Ce deiai non seulement rend ma resposnsabilite grave vis-a-vis de mon
Souverain, mais aussi contribue a alimenter et propager de plus en plus
en Turquie Pinquietude qui y regne. Les dernieres nouvelles que je viens
de recevoir de Constantinople, me mandent qu'il y a eu des troubles k
Sophia, a Adrianople, et sur quelques autres points en Roumelie. Mon
Gouvernement a des raisons de soupgonner Mehemet All d'etre Pinstiga-
teur de ces troubles, et je laisse k imaginer Feffet de ces troubles, si le
Pacha, encourage par l'inaction des Cinq Puissances, se permet de
susciter a la Porte de nouveaux embarras bien plus graves encore.
II est done de Pinteret des Cinq Puissances Mediatrices de prevenir
les malheurs qui menacent la Turquie, comme il est de leur dignite de
remplir au plus tot Pengagement qu'elles ont contracte envers le Sultan
mon Maitre.
J'ai deja eu l'honneur de prevenir votre Excellence par ma Note du 7
Avril dernier, que je suis munide Fautorisation necessaire pour conclure avec
les Ptenipotentiaires d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de
Russie, une Convention de nature a terminer definitivement PAffaire de
l'Orient; et pour arriver a ce but, j'ai prte MM. les Representans des
dites Cours de me preter leur assistance ; et comme je vois que Paccom-
plissement de cette ceuvre depend essentiellement des bons offices du
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Britannique, je viens les reclamer instam-
ment, et prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien donner effet le plus tot possi
ble aux bonnes intentions d'une entente immediate qu'elle a manifestees par
la Note responsive du 11 Avril de cette annee.
Cela seul pourrait tirer la Porte de la position critique ou elle se
trouve, et fera cesser un etat de choses si prejudiciable k ses interets aussi
bien qu'a ceux de l'Europe entiere. J'ai l'honneur, &c,
(Signe) ' NOURI.

656
(Translation.)
Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.
My Lord, London, May 18, 1840.
IN the reply dated 11th of April, which your Excellency was pleased to
make to the Note which I had the honour to address to you on the 7th of the
same month, you stated that you were ready immediately to concert together
with the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Great Powers, and with me, as to the
most suitable means for realizing the kind intentions which the Representatives
of the Five Courts have manifested to the Ottoman Porte by the Collective
Note of the 27th of July, 1839.
Allow me, my Lord, to remind you that five weeks have now elapsed, and
the Eastern Question remains in the state that it was.
This delay not only makes my responsibility to my Sovereign very serious,
but it also contributes to keep up and excite the restlessness which becomes
more and more prevalent in Turkey. The last accounts which I have received
from Constantinople, bring me intelligence of troubles at Sophia, Adrianople,
and some other places in Roumelia. My Government has reason to suspect
Mehemet Ali to be the instigator of these disorders, and I leave the effect of
these troubles to be imagined, if the Pasha, encouraged by the inactivity of the
Five Powers, allows himself to cause still more serious embarrassment to the
Porte. It is, therefore, for the interest of the Five Mediating Powers to ward off
the misfortunes which threaten Turkey, as it is also for their dignity to fulfil the
engagements which they have contracted with the Sultan my Master, as soon as
possible. I have already had the honour to acquaint your Excellency in my Note of
the 7th of April last, that I am provided with the necessary authority to con
clude a Convention with the Plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, France,
Prussia, and Russia, of a nature to settle definitively the Eastern Question ; and
in order to attain this end, I have requested the Representatives of the above-
mentioned Courts to afford me their assistance ; and as I perceive that the
accomplishment of this work depends essentially upon the good offices of the
Government of His Britannic Majesty, I now earnestly solicit them, and I beg
your Excellency to give effect as soon as possible to the good intentions of
coming to an immediate understanding, which you manifested in your Note of
the 11th April of this year.
This alone could extricate the Porte from the critical position in which it
is placed, and would put an end to a state of things so hurtful to its interests,
as well as to those of the whole of Europe. I have, &c,
(Signed) NOURI.

No. 575.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, May 20, 1840.
WITH reference to the plan which has been suggested for se
parating the Pashalics of Syria from that of Egypt, I have to observe to
your Excellency, that such a separation would in reality be merely nomi
nal and illusory, because the whole would, according to that plan, remain
in "the power of Mehemet Ali till his death, and at his death, the whole
would fall into the hands of Ibrahim Pasha ; and it would be the merest
delusion to fancy, that, at that time, the powerless younger brothers of
Ibrahim would have any possible means of compelling Ibrahim to give
them up their Pashalics, or that they would have any chance of obtaining
those Pashalics.
Such a prospective arrangement never would or could be carried into
effect.

657
No. 576.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord, Foreign Office, May 20, 1840.
I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of April 26, reporting that
you had advised the Turkish Government to exert itself, and to adopt
such measures as are within its power for the defence of Constantinople ;
and I have to acquaint you, that Her Majesty's Government approve the
course which you have pursued in this respect.
I have also to instruct your Excellency to omit no opportunity of
impressing upon the Ottoman Ministers, that one great difficulty which
has hitherto prevented Her Majesty's Government from carrying fully into
effect their anxious desire to assist the Sultan, is the general opinion,
exaggerated no doubt, but nevertheless too prevalent, that the Sultan has
by the events of last year been entirely stripped of all means of self-
defence ; and that the whole task of protecting him, or of enforcing his
rights, must fall upon His Highness' Allies. In proportion, however, as
the Sultan shows that he has been successful in reorganizing means of
self-defence, in the same proportion will it become less difficult for Her
Majesty's Government to give effect to their good wishes in the Sultan's
favour. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 577.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 20.)
(Extract.) Paris, May 18, 1840.
CHEKIB EFFENDI, the Turkish Ambassador accredited to Her
Majesty, arrived here about a week ago.
He purposes leaving Paris towards the end of the week.

No. 578.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 29.)
My Lord, Therapia, May 5, 1840.
NOT being certain that your Lordship will receive from Her Majesty's
Acting-Consul at Aleppo a despatch dated April 13, 1840, I have the
honour to inclose it for your perusal.
It indicates a design on the part of Ibrahim to move ; and what is
stated respecting the establishment of a mortar-battery to command the
town, may be the means intended to enable the Egyptians to leave that
place under the guard of a feeble garrison, without abandoning it to the
inhabitants, who are extremely averse to the Egyptian Government. I
have brought the matter before the Ottoman Ministers with the view of
hastening their defensive measures. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

4P

658
Inclosure in No. 578.
Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Aleppo, April 13, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that this Government
has, within these two or three days, received orders from his Highness
the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha at Marash, to get ready to start, at the first
orders, the six batteries of artillery that are stationed here ; which orders,
I am told, are being executed with haste and great activity, but its
destination is not yet known.
At the barracks of Sheik Yabrak, the Government is hastily erect
ing a platform in the centre of that building, upon which mortars are to
be placed, so as to bear upon and command this town.
The 12th Regiment of the line that was here, has left this for Hamah,
to replace the one there which has been ordered to Acre : and, I am told
that the 2nd of the line (Guards), which is here, is also to leave for the
south, to Damascus. With this exception, I have not heard of any further
movement among any of the different corps of the Egyptian Army, who,
I have every reason to believe, occupy the same positions as I have pre
viously had the honour of noting to your Lordship.
The expedition of Maggiun Bey from Orfa, in the direction of the
river Khaboor, has, I hear, been successful; for it is stated, that his
Excellency repulsed an attack made on him by Suffook, of the Gherba
Arab tribes, and that several Chiefs of the Annazee tribe have given in
their submission to Maggiun Bey and to the Egyptian authority : but I
hear from another quarter, that, on the contrary, Maggiun Bey, in an attack
he made against the Gherba Arabs, got repulsed, and was obliged to
retire. The first letters from Orfa will, however, bring us some authentic
account with regard to this affair, which I will not fail to immediately
communicate to your Lordship. No. 579.
Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.
My Lord, Londres, le 31 Mai, 1840.
LA responsabilite qui pese sur moi des mon debut a Londres,
m'impose le devoir d'adresser une Note Officielle aux Representans des
Cinq Grandes Cours qui ont pris a cceur les interets du Sultan mon
Auguste Maitre, afin de les prier de ne pas tarder a prendre avec moi en
consideration PAffaire Orientale, dont la solution est attendue avec une
vive impatience par Sa Hautesse le Sultan.
Les Representans des Grandes Puissances, par un mouvement gene
reux et spontane, ont arrete le Sultan dans la voie des sacrifices que le
malheureux etat des affaires de l'Orient, a son avenement au trone, allait
lui imposer. Quelque penible qu'eut 6t6 Parrangement qu'il ait fait alors
avec Mehemet Ali, il le serait cependant encore davantage aujourd'hui, si
les intentions bienveillantes des Puissances sollennellement manifestees par
la Note Collective du 27 Juillet, 1839, restaient sans effet.
L'interet constant que votre Excellence a temoigne au Sultan, doit me
faire esperer qu'elle voudra bien prendre en consideration cet etat de
choses, et s'occuper sans deiai d'une affaire qui, par les retards qu'elle
eprouve, donne tout Pavantage a Mehemet Ali, tandis qu'il affaiblit de
plus en plus FEmpire Ottoman.
C'est avec une anxieuse impatience que j'attendrai une reponse
satisfaisante a ma Note de ce jour, et je repete ici ce que j'y ai consigne,
savoir que, de mon cote, j'apporterai toutes les facilites qui dependraient
de moi pour aider a lever les obstacles qui, jusqu'a present, ont arrete la
conclusion d'un arrangement entre le Sultan et son ambitieux vassal
sous les auspices des Cinq Grandes Puissances. J'ai l'honneur, &c,
(Signe) CHEKIB.

659
(Translation.)
Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.
My Lord, London, May 31, 1840.
THE responsibility which devolves upon me on my arrival in
London, imposes upon me the duty of addressing an official Note to the
Representatives of the Five Great Courts, who have taken up the
interests of the Sultan, my August Master, in order to entreat them no
longer to delay to take into consideration with me the Eastern Question,
the solution of which His Highness the Sultan awaits with great impa
tience. The Representatives of the Great Powers, by a generous and spon
taneous movement, arrested the Sultan in the sacrifices which the unhappy
state of affairs in the East. was about to impose upon him, at his accession
to the throne. However painful the arrangement would have been which
he then would have made with Mehemet Ali, it would be still more
painful now, if the benevolent intentions of the Powers solemnly
manifested by the Collective Note of July 27, 1839, remained without
effect. The constant interest which your Excellency has shown for the
Sultan, causes me to hope, that you will be pleased to take this state of
things into consideration, and occupy yourself forthwith with an affair
which, in consequence of the delays which it has experienced, gives all
the advantage to Mehemet Ali, while it enfeebles the Ottoman Empire
more and more.
It is with anxious impatience that I shall await a satisfactory
answer to my Note of this day, and I here repeat what I have therein
stated ; namely, that I, on my part, will afford all the facilities which
depend upon me in assisting to remove the obstacles w hich have hitherto
impeded the conclusion of an arrangement, under the auspices of the
Five Great Powers, between the Sultan and his ambitious vassal.
I have, &c,
(Signed) CHEKIB.

No. 580.
Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston. Londres, le 31 Mai, 1840'
LE Soussigne, l'Ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte pres Sa Majeste'
Britannique, avait espere, a la suite de la Note presentee le 7 Avril de
cette amtee par son predecesseur, Nouri Effendi, aux Representans des
Cours d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, et
de leurs reponses a la dite Note, trouver, en arrivant a Londres, PAffaire
Turco-Egyptienne terminee, ou a la veille de Petre.
C'est done avec le plus vif regret qu'il a appris que les soins que les
Representans avaient promis de vouer k un objet aussi important pour le
repos de l'Orient, etaient jusqu'a present restes infructueux.
Le Soussigne, depuis son depart de Constantinople, a recu de
nouveaux ordres qui lui enjoignent de presser la solution de cette affaire.
Si, par consequent, les deiais apport6s dans I'execution des intentions
bienveillantes de leurs Excellences, provenaient de difficultes qu'il serait
dans les facultes du Soussigne d'applanir, il a l'honneur de les prevenir que,
de son cote, il apportera toutes les facilites qui dependront de lui, pour
aider k lever ces difficultes, et qu'a cet effet il est muni, comme l'Ambas
sadeur Nouri Effendi, son predecesseur, des pouvoirs les plus amples pour
concerter avec leurs Excellences les moyens de parvenir a conclure un

660
les Cinq Grandes Puissances relativement aux interets du Sultan, et la
continuation de leur union a cet egard, suffiront pour ecarter toutes les
difficultes, si effectivement il en existe.
En attendant, le Soussigne croit de son devoir de faire observer a
leurs Excellences, que l'Empire Ottoman se trouve dans une position fort
critique ; que Pincertitude a Fegard des resultats des deliberations de
Londres, y propage une inquietude qui prend un caractere tellement grave
et alarmant, que rien ne saurait justifier un plus long deiai de l'ajustement
d'une question soumise depuis dix mois aux jugemens et a la sagesse des
Cinq Grandes Puissances ; enfin, que la necessite de sa solution devient de
jour en jour plus urgente.
En consequence, le Soussigne prie instamment Monsieur le Ptenipo
tentiaire de Sa Majeste Britannique, de vouloir bien, de concert avec les
Representans des Cours d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie,
redoubler ses genereux efforts pour mettre fin a un mal toujours croissant,
et menacant la paix de l'Orient.
Le Soussigne reitere avec une vive instance la demande faite par son
predecesseur, de vouloir bien donner suite au plus tot possible a Pinteret
manifeste d'une maniere si amicale et bienveillante au Sultan par la Note
Collective des Representans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, en date de
Constantinople, le 27 Juillet, 1839, et les Representans a Londres des
dites Puissances, par leur Note responsive a celle du 7 Avril de son
Excellence Nouri Effendi, avaient annonce vouloir prendre immediatement
en consideration. Le Soussigne, l'Ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte pres Sa Majeste
Britannique, prie M. le Ptenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste Britannique de
vouer de concert avec les Representans des autres Grandes Cours, une
attention serieuse a Pobjet de la presente Note, et profite de cette
occasion, &c. (Signe) CHEKIB.
(Translation.)
Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston. London, May 31, 1840.
THE Undersigned, Ambassador from the Sublime Porte to Her
Britannic Majesty, had hoped, on his arrival in London, from the Note
presented by his predecessor, Nouri Effendi, on the 7th of April of this
year, to the Representatives of the Courts of England, Austria, France,
Prussia, and Russia, and from their answers to the said Note, to find the
Turco-Egyptian Question settled, or on the eve of being so.
It is, therefore, with the deepest regret that he has learnt, that the
care which the Representatives had promised to devote to an object so
important to the tranquillity of the East, had, up to this moment, proved
fruitless. The Undersigned, since his departure from Constantinople, has
received fresh instructions which enjoin him to accelerate the solution of
this affair. Consequently, if the delays which have taken place in the
execution of the benevolent intentions of their Excellencies, proceeded
from difficulties which it may be in the power of the Undersigned to
smooth away, he has the honour to inform them, that he will offer every
facility which depends upon him to assist in removing those difficulties,
and that, for this purpose, he is furnished, like his predecessor the
Ambassador Nouri Effendi, with the most ample powers to concert with
their Excellencies as to the means of arriving at the conclusion of an
arrangement, which may be based upon equitable principles, and may
contain guarantees for a lasting peace to the Ottoman Empire. How
ever the Undersigned is convinced, that the agreement which has sub
sisted from the commencement between the Five Great Powers, relative
to the interests of the Sultan, and the continuance of their union in this
respect, will suffice to remove all difficulties, if indeed any exist.
In the meantime, the Undersigned feels it his duty to submit to their

661
Excellencies, that the Ottoman Empire is in a very critical position ; that
the uncertainty, with respect to the result of the deliberations in London,
occasions therein an uneasiness which assumes so serious and alarming a
character, that nothing would justify a further delay in the settlement of
a. Question which during ten months has been submitted to the judgment
and wisdom of the Five Great Powers ; finally, that the necessity of its
solution becomes daily more urgent.
The Undersigned, consequently, earnestly entreats the Plenipoten
tiary of Her Britannic Majesty, in concert with the Representatives of the
Courts of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, to redouble their generous
endeavours to put an end to an evil which is continually increasing, and
which threatens the peace of the East.
The Undersigned most earnestly repeats the demand made by his
Predecessor, that no time may be lost in giving effect to the interest ma
nifested in so friendly and benevolent a manner to the Sultan by the
Collective Note of the Representatives of the Five Great Powers, dated
Constantinople, July 27, 1839, and which the Representatives of the said
Powers in London by their Note, in answer to that of his Excellency
Nouri Effendi of the 7th of April, announced their intention of taking im
mediately into consideration.
The Undersigned, Ambassador from the Sublime Porte to Her Bri
tannic Majesty, entreats the Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty to
give his serious attention, in concert with the Representatives of the other
Great Courts, to the subject of this Note, and he avails himself of this
(Signed) CHEKIB.

opportunity, &c, &c.

No. 581.
The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received
June 1.)
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, May 23, 1840.
IN conversing upon the limit for Syria, lately proposed, by Beyrout
and Damascus, and upon the present state of the negotiations in London,
I remarked to Count Nesselrode, that there appeared no reason, at this
moment, to hurry them to a close, and asked if his Excellency did not
think so. His Excellency replied, that it was always better to bring such
a question as the one in hand, to a close as speedily as possible. But
that, if we could be sure that Mehemet Ali would not move forward, delay
in the negotiations was not of consequence.

No. 582.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 5.)
(Extract.) Therapia, May 7, 1840.
THE Report from Aleppo, dated April 13th, transmitted in my pre
ceding despatch, shows that preparations are making to enable Ibrahim
to move; it is, however, certain, that if he moves his army to threaten the
capital, Syria will be raised against him, and that he will put everything
upon the issue of his enterprise.

No. 583.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 5.)
My Lord, Therapia, May 13, 1840.
I HOPE 18,000 troops will march for a position selected be
tween Isnick and Scutari, upon the only road by which Ibrahim could
pass, were he to attempt an attack; the position is in itself very strong,

662
and it will be strengthened by some field works, and the road may be
also commanded by guns from the vessels in the Sea of Marmora.
About 6,000 of the troops have been inspected near Pera ; and they
are admitted by some French military men, to be as fine troops as need
be. One of the regiments is said to be as good as any French regiment,
I do not know how Ibrahim well can bring a larger number to attack,
and I am sure his troops are not better than those he will have to assail,
who, being in position, will have an advantage.
The spirit amongst the soldiery is good. I think Ibrahim will not
venture an attack ; it would be the extreme of rashness to do so, when
such preparations are made to resist him, for a defeat or a repulse would
be his ruin. The expence of these preparations will not be great to the
Porte ; nothing can be lost by the measures, though everything may be
gained; for should the troops be beaten, the result could not be worse
than that which would attend the unresisted march of Ibrahim to the sea
side, where he must be resisted by the Allies, or allowed to be master of
Constantinople. The resistance there, however, even at the worst, would
be easy enough, if the Allies choose to exert their maritime force, or if Eng
land alone exerts her own which is at hand. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 584.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 10.)
(Extract.) Damascus, April 24, 1840.
NOTHING has further transpired respecting the insurgent Mutualis
in the Balbec district ; it would appear that they are dispersed and quiet
for the present, overawed by the Irregular Cavalry force brought against
them from the Adana district.
The Damascus district remains in a tranquil state, and nothing
whatever of interest has taken place worthy of your Lordship's notice.
preparations, however, continue making for the fortress of Acre : some
hundred camels have been purchased here for the service of transporting
provisions, tents, &c, to the garrison. The Government is very hard-
pushed for funds ; the Treasury is completely drained — so much so, that
the only resource it has is to levy the Kharatch: and measures are taken
to obtain the Ferdeh Tax in advance.
My advices from Aleppo, under the 8th instant, state Ibrahim Pasha
to be always at Marash ; and no movement of the regular forces had
taken place, either from that position northwards, or from Orfa south
wards, or of the irregulars, further than I had the honour of stating to
your Lordship in my last despatch.
I learn from Aleppo, under the 15th instant, that warlike prepa
rations are making there for the north of Syria ; the artillery is being
placed in an efficient state for immediate service. Works are being
erected for overawing Aleppo, in case the chief military force is otherwise
employed ; a large quantity of ammunition has been sent to the coast,
and a depot is said to be forming at Byass. Two more regiments have
been marched to the south — one destined for Hamah, and one for
Damascus. These measures do not indicate the immediate advance of the
Egyptian regular forces under Ibrahim Pasha, either from Marash north
wards, or from Orfa southwards, but demonstrate the intention of a
determined resistance for the retention of Syria, and at the same time
holding all the disposable forces ready on the northern frontier for any
emergency, either to advance, or to act on the defensive, which a change
in the political position Mehemet Ali may be placed in, shall create.

663
No. 585.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 10.)

My Lord, Alexandria, May 15, 1840.
YOUR Lordship was pleased, in your despatch of the 25th of
March, to express certain opinions on the late actions and language of
his Highness the Pasha, granting me, at the same time, liberty to show
that communication to his Excellency Boghos Bey.
It appeared to me, that when the above despatch was written, your
Lordship could hardly have been fully apprized of the resolved and uncom
promising course on which the Pasha seems fully decided.
I felt that the relations of Great Britain with this Government are
already sufficiently delicate, and that until the means of coercion are
really at hand, it may be more injurious than useful to assume a hostile
tone, and thus to widen our estrangement, and create premature diffi
culties. I have therefore availed myself of the discretionary power confided
to me by your Lordship, and have refrained from acting on the above-
cited despatch, without ulterior instructions.
In conclusion, I may add, that with the Pasha himself, and every
member of his Court, my personal intercourse, although somewhat
reserved, continues to be perfectly satisfactory, and is marked by every
proper form and courtesy. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 586.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 10.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, May 21, 1840.
THE past month has not been very productive of events in Egypt.
The warlike preparations in this country are continued.
The large frigate " Cafarshir," having on board seven cannon, and
considerable military stores, sailed from this port on the 26th of April,
accompanied by two schooners, and speedily followed by two transports.
On the 10th of May, news reached Alexandria, that the frigate, which it is
said was bound to St. Jean d'Acre, had been wrecked on her outward
voyage. On the 15th of May arrived here the former Sovereign of Dongola
Ouroo, or King Thumball. He comes to complain of the tyranny of the
Pasha's Governor in his late States.
In Syria there are appearances of increased activity. The fortifi
cations of Acre are nearly completed ; the coast is being placed in a state
of defence : regiments, arms, ammunition, and stores, are being distributed.
through its ports. On the last days of April, 800 camels left Aleppo with
gunpowder, each bearing about two cwt. The Local Government, at
the same time, made a requisition for 150 additional camels, for the same
purpose. From Aleppo 12,000 muskets were simultaneously despatched ;
biseuit and cartridges are being prepared in different places. Whether
Ibrahim Pasha contemplates offensive, as well as defensive, warfare, is not
so certain. He has caused the whole of his Artillery to be inspected, and
carefully put into a condition for service. The garrison of Aleppo, with
twelve batteries of Artillery now in that city, have orders to be ready to
march at the shortest notice.
Maggiun Bey had returned in the beginning of April to Orfa, from
his expedition towards the Sindjar; he had subjected all the tribes along

664
the river Khaboor, and had joined the conquered territory to the Pashalic
of Orfa, although it previously depended on that of Moussoul.

No. 587.
Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.
Sir, Foreign Office, June 11, 1840.
I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the
26th of May.
In reply to your despatch of May 15, I have to acquaint you that I
approve the course which you have adopted with reference to my
instruction of the 25th of March. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 588.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 14.)
(Extract.) Therapia, May 15, 1840.
THE deposition of the Seraskier (Halil) and the Festival of Mahomed's
birth, have occasioned delay in the departure of the troops for the
position between Isnick and Scutari, but I hope it will take place
immediately. I attach great importance to the execution of this plan; I think
it will have the effect of —
1st. Making it almost an act of madness in Ibrahim to attempt an
attack against the capital, because 18,000 men, posted as the Turks will
be, would require a large force of good troops for their expulsion ; and,
on the most favourable calculation for Ibrahim, he cannot bring above
20,000, and that of an indifferent quality; and if he should not succeed,
his whole power, which is founded upon the belief in his force, would be
destroyed, and he would be attacked in the rear.
2nd. Because the assemblage of a large compact Ottoman force in
such a position would dissipate the errors of those who imagine the Porte
has no army ; and it would put it out of the power of malcontents,
animated by Mehemet Ali's agents, to excite in Constantinople acts of
insubordination, they being evidently exposed to being attacked and put
down, and punished by those troops. The same effect will be produced
on the inhabitants of a large extent of country in every direction from the
capital. 3rd. It will tend to improve the army itself, and it cannot cost any
great additional outlay beyond that which must at any rate be expended
upon the army.
4th. These effects above stated will obviate the necessity for the
employment of foreign means for the defence of Constantinople, and
thereby prevent inconveniences that might attend the arrangements for
affording protection by foreigners. Russian forces need not be called in ;
— the French fleet need not be called up. The pretences upon which France
rests the defence of her inimical policy will be taken away ; and if M.
Thiers should really wish to concur with Her Majesty's Government, they
will give him a good ground to state to his country for so doing, as it
will enable him to show that the power of Mehemet Ali is not what it has
been stated to be, and that conclusions drawn from false premises are not
true. I have talked over these topics with Count Pisani, who is well
acquainted with them, and your Lordship will have the goodness to
examine him upon them. I have given this despatch into his charge, and he
will be at your commands in London.

665

No. 589.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 15.)
(Extract.) Beyrout, April 25, 1840.
THE only information I have the honour to communicate on the
present occasion, relates to the measures which continue to be taken for
the defence of Acre.
On the 21st instant a regiment of Guards passed through Beyrout for
that place.
The greater part of the inhabitants of Acre have retired outside the
walls. The approaches to it are said to have been undermined; and
besides the works to the east, others have been completed on the western
side. Military stores continue to arrive from Egypt for the same destina
tion. Solyman Pasha is for the present at Sidon.

No. 590.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 15.)
My Lord, Paris, June 12, 1840.
I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 9th of June.
I had some conversation yesterday with M. Thiers, on the Oriental
Question. It began by his saying to me, that the dismissal of Hosrew
Pasha from the councils of the Sultan had caused a very favourable change
in the disposition of Mehemet Ali towards his Sovereign ; that the Pasha
had talked of sending back the Turkish fleet to Constantinople, and on
board of it his son, to pay his homage to the Sultan. 1 asked M.
Thiers what were the conditions of peace, which, under this favourable
change in the disposition of Mehemet Ali, he indulged the hope of obtaining
from him. He replied, that the language of the Pasha was less positive in
regard to the retention of Adana ; that he talked of that district being held
as a Pashalic by one of his sons ; and M. Thiers believed that he might be
induced to consent to the restoration of it to the Sultan. When I spoke
of the cession of a part of Syria as one of the conditions of peace which
had been thought essential for the security of the Porte, M. Thiers gave
me no encouragement to hope that the declared resolution of Mehemet All
to keep possession of the whole of it was at all changed ; but he held out
the expectation that the Pasha might be induced to pay a tribute for it
far o-reater in amount than had ever hitherto been paid, and which would
welf compensate the Turkish Government for the loss of territory.
r I have, &c,
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 591.
Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received June 15.)
,„,,•> St. Petersburgh, June 6, 1840.
(Extract.) _ s '
I SAW Count Nesselrode this morning. His Excellency said that he
had no late news from Constantinople, but according to the last accounts,
matters were going on much as usual. He did not seem apprehensive of
4 Q

666
any advance by Mehemet Ali towards Constantinople ; nor did he appear
to have received any intelligence of expected revolutionary movements at
Smyrna. Count Nesselrode was evidently disappointed not to have a more
favourable report of the reception by M. Thiers, of your Lordship's late
proposals to the French Government on the Eastern Question. His
Excellency observed to me, that M. Thiers had not, it is true, positively
refused to accede to the proposed measures, but had given an answer
which would allow him time for communicating with Alexandria.

No. 592.
Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 16.)
(Extract.) Vienna, June 9, 184ft.
PRINCE METTERNICH will forward to Baron Neumann, for com
munication to your Lordship, despatches from the Internuncio, representing
the sense entertained by the Divan of the urgency of an early settlement
of their differences with Mehemet Ali. So pressingly is this felt at Con
stantinople, that full powers have been sent to the Turkish Plenipoten
tiary in London, to sign any agreement which the Four Powers shall
concur in recommending.
Prince Metternich will readily place two frigates at the disposition
of the Four Powers, for any service they may concur in recommending.

No. 593.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 16.)
(Extract.) Therapia, May 29, 1840.
THE removal of Hosrew from his post of Grand Vizier is to take place
directly. Fethi Ahmed Pasha declined the post, and it is to be given to
Raouff Pasha, the late Grand Vizier, a man of no party, and- much
esteemed for integrity and his knowledge of business.

No. 594.
Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.
My Lord, Foreign Office, June 26, 1840.
WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, of the 12th in
stant, reporting the substance of a conversation which you held with
M. Thiers on the preceding day, relative to the question pending between
the Porte and Mehemet Ali, I have to observe to your Excellency, that
the French Government has, for some time past, talked of the evacuation
of the district of Adana, as one of the concessions which France knew
that Mehemet Ali was willing to make ; but now M. Thiers says, that if
the report of the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha should prove true, Mehemet
Ali may be prevailed upon, not indeed to evacuate Adana, but to erect it
into a nominally separate Pashalic, to be held by one of Mehemet Ali's
sons. M. Thiers, however, seems not to be aware that the district of
Adana is at this moment a separate Pashalic, and is heldy not by Mehemet

667
Ali, but by Ibrahim; and, therefore, the arrangement which M. Thiers
holds out, as a possible consequence of the favourable change which the
dismissal of Hosrew Pasha may produce in the mind of Mehemet Ali,
is the very arrangement which has actually been in existence for the last
six years. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 595.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 28.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 7, 1840.
I HAVE been furnished with the inclosed return of the forces of
Mehemet Ali.
I have only to observe, that the population which supports this force
is supposed to be about three millions of souls ; and the country inhabited
by that population is known to be wasted by the unceasing exactions of
the Pasha's government. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 595.
Return of the Forces of Mehemet Ali Pasha.

Men.

In Cairo (1,940 of which are Turks), four regiments 12,800
In Syria, twenty-five regiments - - 87,000
In the Hedjaz, the Nedjid, and Soudan - 57,000
InRosetta ----- 3,200
In Damietta ----- 3,200
In and about Alexandria, land and sea forces, gun
ners, and men employed in the arsenal - 32,800

Or, 155,000 Regulars,
And 41,000 Irregulars.
196,000
Return of Militia in the course of Organization.

196,000

Men.

Seyd Ahmed Garbee has engaged to raise in Alex
andria two regiments - - 6,200
The Commandant of Rosetta, one regiment 3,200
,, Damietta and neighbourhood,
two regiments ... 6,200
Tbe Manaours in the four districts of Lower Egypt,
four regiments ... 12,800

4 Q2

668

In Cairo and Environs.

Men.

Osman Bey, of Senaar, Aaleem of the College of
Azhar, has engaged to raise four regiments
with the rank of Mirmiran - - 12,800
The Mirleeva Ibrahim Aarif Bey, two regiments 6,400
The Mirleeva, the Aaleem Mehmed Bey, two
regiments .... 6,400
El Djezzar Abee Bey, from Boulac, the port of
Cairo, one regiment ... 3,200
Hassan Bey, from Old Cairo, one regiment - 3,200
„ from the Environs, one regiment 3,200
Twenty Regiments, 63,600
Return of the Efficient Troops in Alexandria. Men.
In the Arsenal ----- 4,000
On board Mehemet Ali's fleet - - 15,000
the Sultan's fleet - - - 14,000
Troops of the line within Alexandria - 4,800
Invalid pioneers - 800
Turkish gunners .... 800
One regiment of Egyptian Artillery - - 4,000
One regiment of the line (at Marabout) - 3,200

46,600

The armies of the Hedjaz and the Nedjid are daily expected under
Kourschid and Ibrahim Pashas.

No. 596.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received June 28.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 9, 1840.
I RECEIVED yesterday a letter from Colonel Hodges, dated
Alexandria, May 29, in which he speaks of the facility with which, in his
opinion, Mehemet Ali could be brought to agree to such terms as your
Lordship proposed should be offered, by the employment of Her Majesty's
squadron in the Levant alone.
Colonel Hodges had received reports similar to those I also have
received from Syria, and other parts, stating the great and increasing
discontents. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

669

No. 597.
Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 2.)
(Extract.) Paris, June 29, 1840.
THE French Government thinks, that during the suspense of an
arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, the power and
authority of the Turkish Government in Asia Minor, as well as in the
provinces of European Turkey, are daily becoming weaker, and that
the Powers of Europe have not available means for the coercion of
Mehemet Ali.

No. 598.
Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Paris, July 3, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to transmit the " Constitutionnel " of yesterday's
date, in which it is stated, according to the Substance of a telegraphic
despatch which M. Thiers has received, that Mehemet Ali, upon learning
the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha, had determined to restore the Turkish
fleet to the Sultan. (Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 599.
Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received July 5.)
(Extract.) Damascus, May 22, 1840.
THE Government here continues to be very straightened in its
finances. Severe measures have been resorted to, to oblige the
Christian community to pay up the arrears and balance owing on the
Kharatch tax. The Ferdeh is also begun to be collected, though not due
for three months hence. In this city great uneasiness exists. It is re
ported from good source, that the population of Haouran and the Ledgea
Arabs are determined to resist the payment of the Ferdeh tax ; that the
Druses of the Emir Bechir's mountains, conjointly with his Christian
subjects, are firmly agreed on all points to stand by each other ; that it
is thought they will resist at least the anticipated payment of this tax,
the enforcement of which may lead to very considerable embarrassment to
the Government in all its measures, situated, as those territories are,
contiguous to Acre, and the absence of a sufficient military force m the
Damascus district, to carry into execution its plans.
I am informed that orders were received by the Government here
from Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, to raise a militia in this city and
environs, of, it is stated, two regiments of Infantry, about 7,000 men; but
Sheriff Pasha and Bachri Bey have made representations to the above
Chiefs that, under the actual circumstances of the absence of both regular
and irregular forces in this city and its environs, the ill-feeling of the
population generally towards the Egyptian Government, and the difficulty

67©
there is in restraining them and keeping them in subjection, even
disarmed as they are, it would be impolitic to put arms in their hands,
which might be the cause, in conjunction with the distaste which generally
exists to military discipline, of insurrections breaking out at different
points of this district ; to these representations the Government here is
awaiting fresh instructions; but I may remark that this tallies with
the feeling of the population in the Emir Bechir's territories against the
projected creation of a militia in the mountains, on which I have already
informed your Lordship.
The advices from Aleppo to the 6th and 13th instant, state Ibrahim
Pasha to be.always at Marash. The arms, ammunition, &c, transporting
to the coast, being chiefly those taken at the battle of Nezib,seem destined
for Acre, whether to be in depdt there for arming the projected militia in
the south, or far Egypt, does not appear yet clear. Troops continue t®
be directed along the coast from the north to the south. Solyman Pasha
was, by last accounts, at Sidon.
I do not hear that anything indicates the advance of Ibrahim Pasha's
regular forces, at least for the present. There is a report in town very
generally credited, of which no mention is made in the advices from
Aleppo, that Ibrahim Pasha has experienced some losses in rencontres
with the Koords of the lower ranges of the Taurus ; his irregular Druse
Cavalry has suffered the most ; and it is said an order has been received
here to send a Chief, with 500 horsemen, from the Acre district to his
Highness ; also, that a regiment of Horse Artillery stationed here, the
animals of which are now at grass, has received marching orders to join
Ibrahim Pasha at Marash.

No. 600.
Mr. Consul Moore io Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Beyrout, May 29, 1840.
I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that measures
continue to be taken for the defence of the whole coast of Syria, and that
Solyman Pasha is about to visit this and the neighbouring places on a
tour of inspection.
But the most important information I have to communicate to your
Lordship by this opportunity is, the refusal of the Christians of Lebanon
to give up their arms at the demand of this Government. They reply to
tbe requisition, that the Viceroy, by a firman, had granted these arms in
perpetuity., in lieu of those formerly taken from them; that they had faith
fully used them against his Highness's enemies, the Mutualis and Druses ;
had suffered much in the service, bearing the expences of their campaigns
at .their own cost ; and finally declare their intention of retaining -their
arms. The Christians have allied themselves with the Druses, and they are
mutually pledged to resistance.
The determination has already been proved, by their wresting from
some people of the Emir Bechir who had attempted to begin the disarma
ment, thirty muskets, which were delivered to Druses, heretofore their
enemies, but henceforward to be their allies.
In consequence of an apprehended attack by the mountaineers upon
Sidon, where there exists a depot of arms, a brig of war has to-day been
despatched to apprize Ibrahim Pasha. The Government Post betwixt
this place and Sidon has been intercepted, and all we hear, indicates -the
commencement of a revolt.
The sentinels at the cordon established in this neighbourhood 'by
the Health Department, hastily returned into the town last night, in
consequence of an apprehended attack by the insurgents. They have

671
been ordered back to their posts this morning, but I shall not be surprised
to hear a°;ain of their retreat.
Such is the general feeling at present in Lebanon, that it will require
equal caution on the part of this Government, either to proeeed in their
intention of disarmament, or to abandon it; and everything indicates a
rekindling of the latent spirit of hostility in Syria to the Egyptian yoke.
Each hour now brings information of the spirit of disaffection among
the population of Lebanon. The position of the Emir Bechir seems a
very critical one, situated as he is with the Viceroy, with a population
under his jurisdiction now all but in a state of declared revolt.
I have; &c,
(Signed) N. MOORM,
P.S. — The- French Consul here to-day privately chartered a small
Greek brig for Smyrna, and hurried her off with the greatest secrecy. I
have ascertained that she bore despatches.
It is rumoured that two of the Emir Bechir's sons are favourable to
the insurrection. We are every hour receiving accounts of the capture of arms from
straggling parties of sddiers. The Cordon at Sidon has been forced, and
the arms carried, off. A strong guard is placed, at each of the gates of this
place, and the gunners are at their posts, on the forts. N. M.

No. 601.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received1 July 10.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, June 6, 184£h
I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that yesterday his
Highness the Viceroy quitted Alexandria for Cairo. The recent incen
diary attempts in the capital seem to have been the motive of this visit;
but it is- not supposed that the Pasha will be long absent from hence.
The fires appear to have been numerous, but it is not proved that
they arose out of political causes. Some of them were certainly acci
dental, and others are supposed to have been the work of those lawless
characters who abound in all large cities, and who convert a public
calamity into an opportunity for depredation. Recent accounts deny that
any fire had taken place in the citadel.
Public opinion in Egypt is unsettled and feverish, without
being precisely hostile to Mehemet Ali. This is caused by the dubious
and uncertain appearances of the Egyptian Question, as well as by the
power of the Pasha wanting that aspect of rooted stability which inspires
confidence in the masses.
It is certain that the spirit of the National Guard throughout Egypt,
is eminently unsatisfactory ; and the Viceroy seems to fear that a secret
understanding amongst the Chiefs of the new force, extends its ramifica
tions over the whole country.
I have been informed by very high authority, that immediately after
the arrival' of the French steam-vessel of the 24th ultimo; the French
Consul-General visited the Viceroy, and in the conversation, M. Coche
let asked Mehemet Ali whether he found himself in a financial con-
condition to hold out another year in his present policy. The answer of
the Pasha was, that he could do so very easily ; that he could now sell
produce which would clear off his debts to the merchants, and defray six
months of the arrears of those in his service, after which he said that he
would be very well able to proceed on credit for another year. The

672
Pasha added, that his crops of the present season, promised to be unusually
productive. In connexion with what I have stated of this conversation, I may
notice that the Viceroy has recently been effecting very extensive sales of
produce. About the middle of May he sold 150,000 cantars of cotton, at
thirteen dollars per cantar, which is three dollars per can tar cheaper than
last year. About the same time, the Government disposed of 40,000
ardebs of corn, at forty-five piasters per ardeb, making 90,000 dollars.
Thus the Viceroy would have recently realized 1,950,000 dollars, but
that the Government usually sells more produce than it possesses, and
probably will not be able to produce the complete quantities above
enumerated. This morning, the British packet " Emetje," arrived with the mails
from Syria, and the information I have received is very important.
Already, in my despatches of the 18th and 20th of April, I had
apprized your Lordship that the utmost discontent and ferment existed
in Syria, and that there had been even some partial symptoms of
resistance. In the middle of last month my sources of information
instructed me, that the population of Naplouse, one of the most war
like in Syria, had evinced a disposition to refuse payment of the new
Miri tax, and that several armed bodies from various points, had retired
to the mountains. About the same time I received news that the insur
gents under Halil, had beaten two battalions of the 25th Regiment of
Egyptian Infantry quartered in Jerusalem.
The correspondence of this day proves that these indications of an
unsettled spirit have not been without corresponding results, and that the
condition of Syria has become most critical.
It appears that the Egyptian authorities had given orders to disarm
the Christians of Mount Lebanon, but that they have refused to comply,
under the pretext that the arms put in their hands had been given to them
by the Pasha only to replace those of which they had formerly been deprived.
It is to be remarked, that this people had formerly aided the Pasha
in his wars ; but that they have now joined cause with their former
enemies, the Druses, and that both, in conjunction with the inhabitants of
the Haouran district and other Syrian populations, appear to be fully
decided on an open and formidable insurrection.
The post between Beyrout and Saida was stopped and delayed two
hours by the insurgents. The horses and harness were taken ; but the
conductor of the mails and the correspondence were not detained or at all
injured. It seems that the Sanatory Cordon of Saida had been forced, and the
arms there in depot carried off to the mountains. News was constantly
reaching Beyrout, on the 29th ultimo, of straggling parties of Egyptian
troops having been surprised and disarmed by the Syrians. The above
town was in a state of great agitation ; all egress was prevented ; strong
guards were stationed at the gates, and the gunners were at their posts
on the forts.
The above events do not come to my knowledge only by the reports
of Consular officers attached to this Mission, but are confirmed to me by
other sources of intelligence.
The utmost diligence prevails in perfecting the fortifications of St.
Jean d'Acre, and in rendering it an immense depdt of all warlike stores.
My advices of the middle of May inform me, that a very able European
engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Schultz, had recently arrived there, and
had taken the direction of the works, some of which he disapproved and
had demolished, in order to have them reconstructed on more scientific
principles. Enormous quantities of munitions were continually arriving in Acre.
The powder magazine being completely filled ; about 800 additional bar
rels of that material had been deposited in the extensive stores of the
hospital.

673
The garrison of Acre, at the date already mentioned, was as follows
Men.
18th Regiment Infantry (incomplete) . . . . 2,000
30th do. do. (invalids) . . . . 2^500
2nd do. do. . . .... 2,500
1 Battalion of 25th Regiment Infantry . „ . . 600
1 do. of Sappers . . .... 600
1 do. of Invalids . . . . . . 600
1 Company of Engineers . . .... 100
10th Regiment of Cavalry . . .... 1,000
Regular Artillery . . . «, 200
Irregular do. . . . . 600

Total 10,700
Masons and stone-cutters . . 1,500
The nearest military force to Acre was then at Saida, where the 6th
Regiment of Infantry was quartered, and where a barrack was being
constructed for the accommodation of a garrison of two regiments.
In the middle of May, Ibrahim Pasha was still at Marash, with a
division of about 10,000 men. It was said that he had ordered five
absent regiments to join him.
Solyman Pasha was about to leave Saida on a tour of inspection
throughout the troops stationed in Syria, and was to establish a compe
tent force at every point of the coast where a disembarkation might be
possible. By information of the 20th May, I learn that his Excellency Mag
giun Bey continued then at Orfa. His force consisted of —
3 Regiments of Infantry. . 2 Batteries of Heavy Artillery.
3 do. of Cavalry. 2 do. of Light do.
and about forty cannon.
He had, besides, about 1,500 Bedouin or Annadi Cavalry, and a
corps of 700 irregular troops. The Gherba Arabs, dwelling on the river
Khaboor, and recently subjugated by the Bey, were perfectly quiet.
The district of Orfa was also tranquil ; and it appears that the inhabitants
are highly satisfied with the wise and temperate government of Maggiun
Bey. My despatches from Candia allude to some appearances of an
intention to put that island in a posture of defence. The carriages of
the guns in the various forts were being changed.
I do not know that I have more to add to the foregoing information,
except it be the fact that the Pasha has lately declared, that should he
be coerced by one or more European Powers, he is in a condition and
fully determined to revolutionize the Turkish Empire.
I had neglected in the proper place to inform your Lordship, that the
French steam-packet which arrived in this port on the 4th instant, is
reported to have brought from Marseilles 300,000 dollars. This money
was addressed to two gentlemen who are frequently employed in the
affairs of the Pasha, and as they have never been known to receive
remittance of anything like so large an amount, it is confidently asserted
that the above sum was really destined for the treasury of the Viceroy.

No. 602.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.— (Received July 7.)
Mv Lord, Alexandria, June 16, 1840.
BY the British monthly steam-packet, I shall have the honour to
furnish to your Lordship an ample narrative of late events in Syria.
I shall now briefly notice the latest information from that quarter.
The Emir Bechir has declared openly for the Pasha's Government, and
4 R

674
a large proportion of the mountaineers have returned to their homes and
usual occupations. Still the insurgents are in force about Tripoli and
Latakia; but his Highness the Pasha has taken prompt and energetic
steps to crush the revolt. He even declares that the Druses have offered
to march against the refractory, an assistance which he has declined.
Within the last three days I have had two long interviews with the
Viceroy. He conversed on the affairs of Syria frankly, openly, and
without any show whatever of doubt, fear, or hesitation. I am convinced
that he has no dread of quelling the disturbances; but he seems to
suspect that the Sublime Porte or her Allies may be tempted, by his
present difficulties, to make some attempt on his Syrian possessions.
The Pasha has consequently despatched, or has nearly completed, for
the protection of the coast of Syria, two naval divisions, consisting
together, of — 3 Ships of the Line. 3 Corvettes.
12 Frigates. 1 Brig.
Of these, fully nine are Turkish vessels. Their Captains and superior
officers are Egyptian, and the crews composed in equal numbers of Arabs
and Turks. Eleven of these ships, expected to sail this day, will also
bear, 2 Regiments of Turkish Marines . 6,400
2 Regiments of Egyptian Infantry . 6,400
12,800
who are to be embarked in equal proportions. This force, I presume, is
destined to strengthen those points of the Syrian coast where a descent
of an invading army might be practicable.
Yesterday I received information which made it desirable, that I
should hear the facts from the Viceroy's own lips. Accompanied,
therefore, by M. de Laurin, Consul-General for Austria, I waited on
his Highness at 5 o'clock p. m. I was welcomed in his name, and
treated by his household and himself with marked distinction and cor
diality i He informed me that he had resolved to despatch to Constan
tinople, his former secretary and confidential servant, Sami Bey, who
would leave next morning (16th June). That his Envoy would be
charged with the congratulations of kis Highness to the Sultan on the
birth of his daughter, and a complimentary present, on that happy event,
of 2,000 purses (10,000/.). Sami Bey would also declare to the Sultan
that, all along, Hosrew Pasha had been the only barrier to a friendly
arrangement ; and that since that personage had been removed, the Pasha
was prepared to fulfil his former promises, and would restore the Turkish
fleet so soon as His Imperial Majesty should please to indicate whether
he desired it to return under the orders of the Viceroy's son, Said Bey,
or of his Admiral, Mutish Pasha.
I have also heard that the Sultana Mother has written to the deser
ter Ahmed Fevzi, late Turkish Capudan Pasha, informing him, that in
consequence of recent events, he may expect his speedy restoration
to favour and power.
Yesterday morning, M. Cochelet, Consul-General of France, was in
conference with his Highness the Pasha as early as 7 o'clock.
I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 603.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Alexandria, June 17,. 1840.
YESTERDAY I had the honour to inform your Lordship, in a brief
despatch forwarded by the French steam-packet, of the recent impor
tant circumstances connected with the Egyptian Question.

675
To avoid the confusion arising from a lengthened statement of
numerous facts and considerations appertaining to late occurrences, I
propose to divide into several despatches the matter on which it is my
duty to address your Lordship.
His Highness Mehemet Ali, having returned from Cairo to Alexandria
early on the morning of the 14th instant, I hastened to pay my respects
to his Highness at 5 o'clock in the same afternoon.
I was received very cordially. The Pasha appeared to be in high
spirits, probably caused by the news he had recently received, of the
dismissal of Hosrew Pasha, late Grand Vizier. In speaking of that
event, his Highness said that the downfall of Rechid Pasha must soon
follow, and that the disgrace of that Minister would not give him much
sorrow. He remarked, that the Commercial Treaties concluded by Rechid
Pasha, as well as his hasty and premature reforms, would never be
forgiven by the Turks, meaning, perhaps, by the nation, no more than
those Pashas and High Functionaries whose rapacity his administrative
acts had been the means of restraining.
The Pasha declared the condition of Turkey to be very precarious,
and said that public feeling there is much excited. He told me, that he
was about to despatch to Constantinople one of his most confidential
servants, who possesses considerable influence in the Turkish capital.
This is Sami Bey, late Secretary to his Highness, and high in his Councils.
Sami Bey is a Turk of the Morea, educated in Constantinople, versed in
many Oriental as well as European languages, and represented as a man
of very considerable talents.
Mehemet Ali spoke calmly, freely, and with confidence, of the affairs
of Syria. He assured me that the present revolt was occasioned by a
mistake of his orders. He said, that wanting to equip his National
Guards at Cairo, and knowing that there were disposable depdts of arms
in the citadel of St. Jean d'Acre, he had written to his son Ibrahim Pasha
to supply him ; but that, either the order was not understood, or the
Generalissimo felt unwilling to deprive his fortress of part of its
stores ; consequently, he had sought to make good the requisition by
demanding of the Syrian mountaineers the restitution of those arms with
which they had been formerly entrusted ; a measure which the Pasha said
he had never contemplated.
The Viceroy informed me, that he received news of the insurrection
when about halfway on his voyage to Cairo, and that, at first, he had
ordered off the " Nile " steam-vessel with despatches to the Emir Bechir,
directing him to obey no one in the mean time, as he had resolved to
proceed to Syria, and would take the supreme command in person. His
Highness added, that subsequent intelligence had been of so tranquil
lizing a nature as to induce him to change his original purpose, and that
he should now send, in his stead, his grandson Abbas Pasha, with proper
instructions for reducing the disturbed provinces to subjection.
I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 604.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, June 17, 1840.
ON the 5th of June, the Pasha quitted this city for Cairo, where he
arrived about 10 o'clock, a. m., of the 7th. During his voyage an express
reached him with the news of the late insurrection in Syria. A body of
2,800 Arnaouts and Turks, quartered near the city, was ordered to march
to the revolted country; but they were countermanded shortly after, the
Pasha having received satisfactory advices from Syria.
In the mean time, the " Nile " steam-vessel was despatched, on the
7th instant, to Beyrout, with letters and orders from the Viceroy.
At 10 o'clock, a.m., of the same day, the Viceroy reached Cairo,
4 R 2

676
It was also on the 7th of June the French corvette of war, the
" Vigilante," which had been in this port since last March, was sent to
visit the Syrian coast from St. Jean d'Acre to Latakia, after which she
will probably return to this place. Pfg$l$
About the same time, a naval division was ordered to be ready for
sea by the 9th instant, and to sail to the coast of Syria. It was to be
commanded by Mustapha Bey, and to be thus composed : —
Frigates . . Menufich, Corvettes . . Tantah,
Rechid, Genna-Bahari.
Behere, Brig . . Temsah.
Sergehad,
Damietta.
I believe that the whole or greater portion of these ships have since sailed.
The Viceroy left Cairo on the morning of the 12th instant, and
reached Alexandria at 8 o'clock, a. m., of the 14th.
The "Nile" steam-vessel had returned from Beyrout, the night pre
vious to the Pasha's arrival. At the same time, news reached Alexandria
of the birth of the Sultan's daughter, and of the dismissal of the Grand
Vizier Hosrew Pasha, which had been previously expected, and its date
pretty correctly predicted by Mehemet Ali.
The intelligence from Syria, which reached the various Represen
tatives in Alexandria of Foreign Powers, was by no means distinct or
conclusive : still it tended to the inference, that the revolt was less com
pact and formidable than at first imagined.
From the commencement, it was fully believed that the fate of Syria
depended on the part which might be taken by the Emir Bechir, Prince
of Mount Lebanon. He now appears to have declared wholly for the
Pasha ; and to insure his fidelity, I am assured that on some plausible
pretext, the Emir has been surrounded by a guard of 800 Egyptians
devoted to Ibrahim Pasha. These are with him in his palace of Bet-el-
Dyn, near Deir-el-Ghamar. It appears, however, that the old Emir, with
his son Emir Emin, who is a General of Division in the Viceroy's service,
have been active in assembling those who still remain faithful to Mehemet
Ali, and that they will exert their efforts in quelling the rising insur
rection. News has reached me that, on the outbreak of the present disturb
ances, the French Consul at Damascus wrote to the Emir Bechir,
proposing to him that M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General at Alex
andria, should be named to mediate between the Viceroy and the insur
gents. The Emir commenced his reply by some compliments, and then
went on nearly as follows : — " You greatly mistake the character of the
disturbances which have taken place. They are originated by some
abandoned characters of Deir-el-Ghamar, who have been joined by all
sorts of vagabonds, who act without justice, without object, and without
orders. My desire for peace accords entirely with the interest of the
Egyptian Government. In conjunction with that Government, and by
the aid of God, I hope soon to force the disorderly into subjection and to
restore good order. I have advised all the honest population of the
mountains not to meddle with these wicked people. I am grateful for
your offer and thank you for it, as I find in it a proof of your friendship."
It is true that two of the sons of the Emir Bechir, the Emirs Casim
and Halil, are understood to be hostile to the Egyptian authority; and
it is said that the Emir Mahmoud, one of his grandsons, had even sent a
message to the old Emir, to the effect, that should he dare to interfere
with the present insurrection, he would slay him with his own hand.
If Mehemet Ali may be credited, who has asserted the facts to myself
and to others of my Colleagues, the mountaineers have returned to their
homes and occupations, and only a portion of rebels are in arms between
Tripoli and Latakia.
But, probably, the safest documents from which conjectures may be
derived of the more recent phases of the revolt are, first, the very politic
letter already cited from the Emir Bechir to the French Consul in
Damascus ; and, secondly, a despatch of the 10th instant, from M. Gherk-

677
man, Austrian Consul at Beyrout, and obligingly communicated to me by
M. de Laurin.
It would appear from this despatch, that his Excellency Solyman
Pasha had marched from Saida against the inhabitants of Lebanon ; but
that the Emir Bechir had earnestly entreated him to forbear from pushing
his troops into the mountains, and that the General had consented, with
the proviso, that the insurgents should return to their villages and give
up their arms.
The Emir Bechir is reported to have also addressed his Highness
Ibrahim Pasha on the same subject, and the answer of the Generalissimo
is quoted as follows : — " If your Excellency can become guarantee of
tranquillity, I agree to your request, and a plenary pardon shall be
granted. The peasants must disband. If they cannot, at present, pay
their taxes, let them say when they will be in a condition to do so. They
may keep their arms, if your Excellency thinks that they will not abuse
the concession. " If what I have proposed is sufficient to quell the revolt, you may
, tell Solyman Pasha to send back the troops to Acre ; but if otherwise, let
them march on Deir-el-Ghamar."
M.Gherkman adds, that it was hoped that these concessions would
calm the Maronites for the moment ; but that the Druses and Mutualis
were still full of dissatisfaction.
It is at least certain, that the most prompt and energetic measures
have been taken by the Egyptian Authorities to crush the present rising.
What troops have been sent against the rebels I do not yet know precisely,
further than that two regiments had left Acre for that purpose. Solyman
Pasha seems to command the repressing, division. It is certain that the
Egyptians have such a military force in Syria, that they can, with the
utmost facility, sweep any number of insurgents from the champaign
countries. Whether they can advantageously push into the mountains
is another question ; but they can blockade those mountains, and starve
their crowded population into submission. Lebanon produces little or
no corn, and imports nearly all it consumes. The above measure of
coercion was instantly adopted by Solyman Pasha, as your Lordship will
perceive by his inclosed orders to the Governor of Beyrout, who, on
the 1st instant, communicated them to the Foreign Consuls now in
that town.
I remark that many persons who have travelled in Syria, and some
consular officers residing there, express their suspicion that the actual
revolt will have no other results or termination than those which
attended previous attempts of the same nature. This, I presume, is also
the opinion of the Viceroy, for he manifests neither irresolution, uncer
tainty, or anxiety.
My letters from our Consul at Damascus, assure me that the Catholic
Greek patriarch, with his Bishops and Clergy, have been active in
fomenting the revolt and promoting its objects.
I have given information of recent events to Admiral Sir John Louis,
and I have suggested the possible expediency of sending one of Her
Majesty's ships of war to the coast of Syria, for the protection of
British subjects and property. On the latter subject, Mr. Consul Moore
has also addressed the Admiral, from Beyrout.

Inclosure in No. 604.
Solyman Pasha to the Governor of Beyrout.
(Traduzione.) GIACCHE gli abitanti della montagna dei Druzi generalmente, si
sono sollevati in ribellione, vale adunque che alia ricezione diquesta mia
notificazione, che pubblicherete avvertito a chi spetta, afin d'impedire
l'esportazione per mare, alle scale di Giunte, Gibul e Battrun, ed egual-
mente per qualunque via per terra, al monte Libano generalmente,
specialmente Fimbarco di granaglie ed altre provviste alle dette scale.

678
Se per trasgressione al presente Ordine si trovasse dei bastimenti,
&c, diretti per quelli porti, e necessario immediatamente romperli e
farli andar a fondo, senza il minimo esito. Che Favviso vi serva.
Circular from the Governor of Beyrout to the Representatives of the
European Powers, communicating the preceding Order.
1 Rebi-akhir, 1256. (1 Giugno, 1840.)
HO ricevuto il presente Ordine di sua Eccellencia il Maggior Generate
Solyman Pascia, di cui avete copia accioche prendiate la dovuta conos-
cenza, ed in conseguenza vi compiacera d'avvertire, da parte vostra, i
negozianti e capitani sotto la vostra giurisdizione per Feffetto.
(Firmato) MAHMUD BEY,
Governatore.

(Translation;)
Solyman Pasha to the Governor of Beyrout.
NOW that the inhabitants of the Mountain of the Druses generally
are in rebellion, it is meet that on the receipt of this my letter, you should
make a notification to those whom it may concern, to prohibit them from.
exporting by sea to the ports of Djounie, Gebel, and Batruon, as well as
by land to Mount Lebanon ; more particularly grain and other provisions
to the same ports.
If, in violation of this order, any vessels shall be discovered bound to
those ports, you should immediately sink them without hesitation. Let
this be your warrant.
Circular from the Governor of Beyrout to the Representatives of the European
Powers, communicating the preceding Order.
1st Rebi-akhir, 1256. (June 1, 1840.)
I HAVE received the present order of his Excellency Major-General
Solyman Pasha, of which a copy is inclosed for your information, and in
order that you may make the necessary communication to merchants and
captains under your jurisdiction. (Signed) MAHMOUD BEY,
Governor.

No. 605.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Alexandria, June 17, 1840.
I OBTAINED information on the 15th instant that a second naval
division had received orders to victual for three months, and to make
ready, with the utmost expedition, to proceed to the coast of Syria. It
will be composed as follows : — Guns. Men.
Ship of the Line, No. 8, Beillan  80  1,000
( Nasratie  74  750
666
450 547562500629
425491

Frigates  <

Nusmatie  60
Kaid Zafar. ... 50
Surie  50
Mirat Zafar. ..44
Naoun Bahari . 50
Hafiz Bahman . 64
Nezim Zafar . . 52
VShehab Bahary 44
Corvette  Misiri Ferah . . 26

275

679
It is remarkable that all the above ships, except the first, belong to
the Turkish squadron. The captains and superior officers will, however,
be Egyptians, and the crews will be composed in equal numbers of Arabs
and Turks. The Turkish ships will be under the orders of Osman Bey, formerly
fifth admiral (Riala Bey), and now promoted to the rank of fourth
admiral (Patrona Bey). He is son of the second in command of the
Turkish squadron, and, with his father and one other officer, is known
to have induced the Capudan Pasha, Ahmed Fevzi, to betray his trust
into the power of Mehemet Ali.
It is reported that the whole maritime force on the coast of Syria
will consist of — 1 Ship of the Line,
15 Frigates,
3 Schooners,
1 Brig.
It has also been determined to place on board the ships now
preparing, and probably for the defence of various points on the Syrian
coast, — 2 Regiments of Turkish Marines  6,400 men.
2 Regiments of Egyptian Regular Infantry 6,400 „

12,800

These troops will be thus distributed for transport. The Turks will sail
in the " Beillan," as well as in three Egyptian frigates of the first division,
which had not yet taken their departure ; and the Egyptians will proceed
on board the Turkish ships. The Turkish Marines will be under the
orders of Hassan Bey, formerly a Colonel in the Sultan's fleet, and now
raised to the rank of Brigadier-General.
His Highness Abbas Pasha, grandson of the Viceroy, is expected t°
arrive from Cairo to-morrow, and will embark in the " Beillan " on his
way to Syria, where he is to occupy a high command. The character
ascribed to Abbas Pasha is that of cruelty and unrelenting severity.
These accounts of the armament differ in some minute particulars
from those indicated in my despatch of yesterday ; but I presume that this
discrepancy results from some alterations in the original dispositions.
The large naval force which the Pasha is despatching to Syria natu
rally excites attention, and awakens conjectures as to its objects.
It is obvious that ships can avail little in a war with mountaineers
fighting from their fastnesses ; and it is known that three Egyptian cor
vettes and three schooners of the fleet were already stationed at Beyrout.
I do not either perceive that the Viceroy entertains any serious fears or
doubts of being able to cope with the insurgents; but I am inclined to
think that two motives may have induced the measures under my conside
ration, and presented them to the Pasha as necessary precautions.
1st. Possibly the information which the Viceroy has received, may
have inspired in his mind a suspicion, that either the Sublime Porte or
some of her Allies may seek to take advantage of his existing difficulties
for attempting a descent on the Syrian coast.
2nd. Mehemet Ali is perhaps of opinion that his present warlike
attitude and his display of force, as well as the show of being at all points
prepared for defence, may be useful supports to the negotiations for an
arrangement of the Egyptian Question which now occupy the thoughts of
his Highness, and which constitute the main object of the recent mission
of Sami Bey to Constantinople. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

680

No. 606.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
(Extract.) Alexandria, June 17, 1840.
HAVING yesterday morning received some information which led
me to believe that Sami Bey, to whom and to whose intended voyage to
Constantinople I alluded in my despatch, of the 17th instant, was about
to be charged by his Highness the Viceroy with a most important mission
to the Sublime Porte, I thought it expedient to verify what I had heard
from the lips of Mehemet Ali himself.
Accompanied by M. de Laurin, Consul-General for Austria, I waited
on the Pasha in the evening. I was welcomed in the name of his High
ness, and received with marked distinction and cordiality.
The Viceroy informed me, that Sami Bey would next morning pro
ceed to Constantinople by an express steam-packet ; that he had charged
his envoy with his congratulations to the Sultan on the birth of a
daughter, and, in consequence of the same happy event, Sami Bey would
be bearer of a complimentary present to His Imperial Majesty of 2,000
purses (£10,000).
Mehemet Ali added, that Sami Bey was besides charged to inform
the Sultan, that the former Grand Vizier, Hosrew Pasha, having been
dismissed from office, his Highness the Pasha was now prepared to abide
by his former promises, and to restore the Turkish squadron, so soon as
His Imperial Majesty should please to express his pleasure whether his
fleet should be sent to him under command of the Viceroy's own son, Said
Bey, or of the Pasha's Admiral, Mutish Pasha.
The French Consul-General had an audience of the Viceroy as early
as 7 o'clock, a.m., of the 16th instant ; but I have every reason to conclude
that he had no participation whatever in the recent resolutions.
It is not for me to speculate on the above important declarations of
his Highness Mehemet Ali ; but I ought, perhaps, to state, that neither
the opinion of those longest acquainted with him, nor my own observa
tions of his character, induce in me a belief tkat the restitution of the
Turkish fleet is likely to be entirely unconditional, or will be effected
without something like a certainty of corresponding advantages. His
Highness has probably already prepared the way for an arrangement
with the Sublime Porte. No doubt Sami Bey, and the partisans of
Mehemet Ali, will employ with skill the powerful engines of influence
with which both the Pasha and his agents are thoroughly acquainted.
In the mean time, the Turkish fleet is not given up ; and your Lord
ship will not fail to remark, by my other despatch of this day, the use
to which his Highness is converting the ships and crews of that squadron.

No. 607.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
(Extraet.) Alexandria, June 19, 1840.
THE Egyptian steam-vessel, "Nile," returned to this port from
Beyrout yesterday morning, and in the evening I again had the honour of
waiting on the Viceroy.
His Highness informed me that his steamer had brought him news
that the insurrection in Syria continued precisely in the same condition as
when the former advices had left that country. He said that none
remained in arms except the Maronites, and that he would very soon find
means for bringing them to reason. He repeated again an assertion,
that the Druses had offered to march against the rebels; but that, not
feeling much confidence in such auxiliaries, he had declined their proposal.
I observed to Mehemet Ali, that the large naval armament he was

681
sending to the coast of Syria must necessarily create astonishment in
Europe, and possibly alarm ; that ships could not avail much in a war of
the mountains ; and that I trusted he would see the expediency of inform
ing me of his objects, since this measure was likely to be misinterpreted.
The Pasha answered, that troops, whose presence was required in Syria,
Were about to be sent there, and that the naval force was merely destined
for their transport. His Highness pledged his word, most solemnly, that
so soon as the Syrian revolt should be quelled, the vessels sent to that
coast should return to Alexandria.
The Viceroy continued, " Intriguers have been active in Syria. You
and I shall have to speak of that hereafter. As to my business with the
Porte, it will end quietly. All is on the eve of being settled."
I assured his Highness, that nothing would give me higher satisfaction
than to see such a just and amicable arrangement made with the Porte,
as might be consonant with the wishes and policy of the Great European
Powers. At the same time, I remarked, that on this question I had not
received any new instructions from Her Majesty's Government.
Mehemet Ali said, " It is neither from your Government nor from
European Powers that I derive any assurance that my differences with
the Porte are near their termination ; it is from Constantinople.
"Abdul Medjid has expressed his desire to put an end to our
dissensions ; and as I seek nothing but justice, these dissensions will be
settled with equity to me, and with benefit to the Sultan."

No. 608.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
My Lord, Alexandria, June 19, 1840.
THE Russian Consul-General, Count Medem, has just related to me
"the circumstances of an interview he had this morning with his Highness
Mehemet Ali, and they appear to me of sufficient interest to merit the
attention of your Lordship.
In conversing on the mission of Sami Bey to Constantinople, Count
Medem inquired whether that Envoy had full powers to conclude an
arrangement with the Sublime Porte, without ulterior reference to his
Highness. The Viceroy answered, that he had not ; but that Sami Bey
would report to him the fate of his propositions, and would await new
instructions at Constantinople, unless the Sublime Porte skould judge
it expedient to send, itself, a Plenipotentiary to Alexandria.
Count Medem next put to the Viceroy the closest and most pressing
queries, with the object of ascertaining whether his Highness purposed to
restore the fleet unconditionally ; and the Count even asked him, hypo-
thetically, whether he would still maintain that intention in the event of
Sami Bey failing in his negotiations ?
The Pasha seemed piqued at these doubts, and said that, " on the
word of Mehemet Ali," the Turkish fleet should be rendered to the Porte,
whether Sami Bey succeeded in his mission or the reverse. He told
Count Medem, that myself and others had put to him the same questions,
though not so roughly, and that he had given all the same reply ; that
Hosrew Pasha having been removed from power, he (Mehemet Ali)
was now prepared to abide by his former promises of giving up the
Turkish squadron, provided the event alluded to should take place.
In talking of a settlement of the Egyptian Question, which the
Pasha seemed to consider certain, he spoke of Egypt and Syria as one
State indissolubly linked together under his dominion and that of his
family. Adana, he thought, would probably be yielded to him for life,
and so too Candia. But as regarded the latter, the Viceroy observed that
it would not be the wish of either England or Turkey to take it from his
hands He declared that the Sublime Porte, in particular, well knows
4 S

682
that such an event would soon be followed by the island acquiring an
independence like that of Samos, or by its placing' itself under the sceptre
of Greece. As for Arabia, continued Mehemet Ali, they may do with it
whatever they please. The Porte cannot govern it. It will be as before;
Turkey will be perpetually soliciting my assistance and interference in
that country, which of necessity must fall as much as ever under my
authority. I have, &c,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES,

No. 609.
Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 5.)
Alexandria, June 20, 1840,
My Lord, 12 o'clock, p.m.
BEFORE the closing of the mails, I have only a few moments in
which to report briefly to your Lordship the latest information.
The ships of the naval force mentioned in my late despatches left
this port during yesterday morning.
A letter of the 17th instant from Cairo, mentions the departure for
the coast of 2,000 irregular Albanian troops, called down by a telegraphic
order. My latest Syrian news is from Jaffa, and is dated the 12th instant.
It was then reported in that place, that the force under Solyman Pasha
had returned to Saida, unable to approach the mountains. An export of
grain from Jaffa was prohibited. The insurgents had seized the corn-
mills near Saida and Beyrout, and had attacked the quarantine of the
latter port.
The latest accounts from Arabia assert that the evacuation of that
country by the troops of Mehemet Ali, had been countermanded by the
Egyptian Government; that Kourschid Pasha was at Djidda, and Ahmed
Pasha still between Mecca and Medina.
Inclosed is a species of manifesto widely circulated in St. Jean d'Acre,
and other towns in that vicinity. It is understood that it proceeds from
the Viceroy, although it is not invested with any official form. It seems
well enough calculated for the limited intelligence of an uneducated
population. [ have &c.
(Signed) G, LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 609.
Translation of a Manifesto or Proclamation circulated largely in
St. Jean d'Acre and other cities of Syria. It has no signature, but
is believed to be published by order of his Highness the Viceroy
°f Esypt- 
The following are the preparations of Mehemet Ali for war.
THE fleets of the Sublime Porte and that of his Highness the Pasha,
being united, amount to twenty-one line-of-battle ships, and nine large
frigates. This being the Viceroy's force by sea may be compared with
that of England, which consists of twelve or fourteen ships, unless indeed
they shall hereafter add to that number. We shall also see what steps
the French, in the meantime, will take.

683
Mehemet Ali states that he has no fear of being attacked at St. Jean
d'Acre, while his fleet exists ; for that no troops could force a landing on
the coast so long as they shall not have a superior force in ships to
protect their disembarkation. Necessity alone will decide between him
and the above-mentioned Power.
This current report the Pasha circulates to the population. He adds,
that he has no fear of the British forces, further stating that he respects
the character of the English for their justice, but that they have no
respect for him. Still he hopes that the world will make them respect
him. Ibrahim Pasha has troops enough to meet the Russians on the banks
of the Euphrates. He possesses 50,000 men, besides having the addition
of 25,000 men from the neighbourhood of the above river. Thus, if the
Russians do meet him with an equal force, they cannot beat him. Even
should they exceed that amount, he hopes to send them the same journey
as he did formerly the Turkish troops.
In addition to all this, Mehemet Ali fully assures himself of the
assistance of France, and he believes, that when Ibrahim Pasha and
Solyman Pasha fight in company, they must always conquer.
In the mean time, he makes known to the population, that all the
Mahommedan people will fight en masse for their religion. This has
already been clearly known to the English, Russian, and Austrian
Powers. Even supposing that the French will not assist the Pasha, he
will also let them know that he is to be respected.
The Viceroy and his sons are determined to die as soldiers. They
separate political from religious principles. The Pasha has already
offered restitution to the Sublime Porte, proposing to return the Holy
Cities and some parts of Syria. These terms were refused on the ground
that all Syria would not be yielded.

No. 610.
Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
My Lords, Foreign Office, July 7, 1840.
WITH reference to the letter from your Lordships' Secretary of the
5th of July, inclosing a copy of a despatch from Admiral Sir Robert
Stopford, dated the 26th of June, and stating the measures which he had
adopted in consequence of the accounts which he had received of an
insurrection having broken out in parts of Syria against the Egyptian
authorities ; I am to suggest to your Lordships, that Admiral Sir Robert
Stopford should be cautioned so to shape the measures he may take for
protecting British interests, as not thereby to give support to Mehemet
Ali. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 611.
Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston. Le 7 Juillet, 1840.
LE Soussigne, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Ptenipotentiaire de la
Sublime Porte, vient d'apprendre que Mehemet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte, a
annonce l'intention de renvoyer a Constantinople la flotte de Sa Hautesse,
dans te but d'ouvrir par cette offre la voie k des negociations directes
avec le Divan.
Le Soussigne se fait en consequence un devoir de communiquer a son
Excellence Lord Palmerston le jugement qu'il porte sur cet incident.
4 S 2

684
II a la ferme persuasion que Sa Hautesse le Sultan ayant reclame et
obtenu la promesse d'un appui efficace de la part des Grandes Puissances*
persistera dans sa resolution d'attendre Feffet de Fassistance amicale des
Cabinets amis, et n'entrera point en negociation directe avec le Pacha
d'Egypte, tant que Pamitie des Grandes Puissances lui fait esperer une
solution satisfaisante de la crise actuelle. II est convaincu de plus, que les
offres de Mehemet Ali, sans promettre aucun resultat positif, n'ont d'autre
but que de compliquer la negociation, de trainer Paffaire en longueur, et de
provoquer des retards qu'il se flatte de pouvoir tourner a son profit et au
detriment de la Sublime Porte.
Dans cette persuasion, le Soussigne se fait un devoir d'adresser a Son
Excellence Lord Palmerston la prtere de ne differer d'aucune maniere les
deliberations actuellement ouvertes a Londres, et de n'attendre aucun
resultat des propositions directement faites par Mehemet Ali. Loin de la,
le Soussigne invite, avec une nouvelle instance, le Cabinet de Sa Majeste
Britannique de hater autant que possible les determinations qui devront
etre prises afin d'en venir a un arrangement conforme a la securite de la
Porte, comme a la dignite des Grandes Puissances qui ont promis leur
appui a Sa Hautesse le Sultan.
Le moment actuel semble etre dedsif pour en venir k un arrange
ment satisfaisant. Mehemet Ali, sentant les embarras de sa position,
cherche a en sortir de maniere k transiger directement avec la Porte et k
^carter par la l'intervention des Grandes Puissances. Celles-ci, etant
sincerement amies du Sultan, ne sauraient se laisser induire en erreur
par cette politique perfide de Mehemet Ali. Au lieu de perdre un tems
predeux en deliberations trop prolongees, elles doivent au contraire en
venir promptement a une decision ; convenir entre elles de concert avec le
Representant de Sa Hautesse, des conditions a imposer a Mehemet Ali ; et
concerter d'avance les moyens necessaires pour obliger celui-ci a se
soumettre a cet arrangement que les Puissances Amies auront reconnu
comme juste et comme irrevocable.
Telle est la marche que le Soussigne se fait un devoir de signaler a
la bienveillante attention du Cabinet de Sa Majeste Britannique comme
la seule qui puisse conduire a un resultat prompt et utile. Chaque heure
de retard menace la Sublime Porte d'un danger irreparable.
C'est dans cet etat de choses que le Soussigne croit devoir faire un
nouvel appel k Pamitie et a la sagesse du Cabinet de Sa Majeste Britan^
nique, pour le conjurer de mettre immediatement un terme a Pincertitude
qui pese sur FEmpire Ottoman, et dont il ne saurait plus longtems
supporter le poids.
Le Cabinet de Sa Majeste Britannique, de concert avec les autres
Puissances, a promis son appui et son assistance a Sa Hautesse le Sultan.
C'est Paccomplissement de cette promesse que le Soussigne vient reclamer
aujourd'hui avec une pleine confiance dans la loyaute et dans la prevoy-
ance du Gouvernement Anglais, qui ne permettra point que Mehemet Ali,
par des faux-fuyants et par de perfides efforts, parvienne a differer
aujourd'hui la conclusion d'une affaire a laquelle tient le sort de l'Empire
Ottoman. Mehemet Ali, lorsqu'il saura que les Puissances, de concert avec la
Porte, ont arrete un plan de pacification, dans la ferme resolution de le
mettre a execution, ne tardera point a s'y soumettre, et Paffaire se termi-
nera sans provoquer la moindre secousse. Mais tant que Mehemet Ali
verra les Puissances irresolues; il prolongera sa resistance, negociera
dans l'intention de ne point conclure, et cherchera ainsi par ses sourdes
menees, a ebranler l'Empire Ottoman d'une maniere plus dangereuse
encore que par la force des armes.
C'est sur ce perfide systeme de Mehemet Ali que le Soussigne se fait
un devoir d'appeler Pattention la plus serieuse du Cabinet de Sa Majeste
Britannique, en reclamant instamment une decision immediate et
definitive. Le Soussigite a l'honneur, &c,
(Sigite) CHEKIB.

685
(Translation.)
Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston. July 7, 1840.
THE Undersigned, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the Sublime Porte, has just learnt that Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt,
has announced his intention to send back His Highness's fleet to Con
stantinople, with the view of opening the way by this step to direct
negotiations with the Divan.
The Undersigned, consequently, considers it his duty to communicate
to his Excellency Lord Palmerston, his opinion upon this event.
He is firmly persuaded that His Highness the Sultan having claimed
and obtained the promise of efficient support from the Great Powers,
will persist in his determination to await the result of the friendly aid of
the Allied Cabinets, and will not enter into direct negotiation witk the
Pasha of Egypt, as long as the friendship of the Great Powers gives
him the hope of a satisfactory solution of the present crisis. He is
moreover convinced, that the overtures of Mehemet Ali, without giving
hopes of any positive result, will only tend to complicate the negotiation,
to protract the question, and to occasion delays which he flatters himself
he can turn to his advantage and to the detriment of the Sublime Porte.
With this conviction, the Undersigned considers it his duty to
request his Excellency Lord Palmerston, not to delay in any way the
deliberations now entered upon in London, and not to expect any result
from the proposals made direct by Mehemet Ali. Far from that,
the Undersigned, with renewed earnestness, requests Her Britannic
Majesty's Government to hasten as much as possible the resolutions
which must be taken in order to come to an arrangement in accordance
with the safety of the Porte, as well as with the dignity of the Great
Powers who have promised their support to His Highness the Sultan.
The present moment appears to be the decisive one for coming to a
satisfactory arrangement. Mehemet Ali, feeling the embarrassment of his
position, seeks to relieve himself from it by treating directly with the Porte,
and thereby averting the intervention of the Great Powers. These last,
being sincere friends of the Sultan, cannot allow themselves to be led
into error by this perfidious policy of Mehemet Ali. Instead of wasting
precious time in too lengthened deliberations, they ought, on the contrary,
to come quickly to a decision; to agree amongst themselves, in concert
with the Representative of His Highness, upon the conditions to be im
posed upon Mehemet Ali ; and to settle beforehand the measures neces
sary for obliging the latter to submit to that arrangement which the
Friendly Powers shall consider just and irrevocable.
Such is the course which the Undersigned thinks it his duty to point
out to the kind attention of Her Britannic Majesty's Cabinet as the only
one which can lead to a prompt and useful result. Every hour's delay
threatens the Porte with irreparable danger.
In this state of things the Undersigned thinks it right to make a
fresh appeal to the friendship and wisdom of Her Britannic Majesty's
Cabinet, in order to entreat it immediately to put an end to the uncer
tainty which weighs upon the Ottoman Empire, and of which that
Empire can no longer support the burthen.
Her Britannic Majesty's Cabinet, in concert with the other Powers,
has promised its support and assistance to His Highness the Sultan.
It is the fulfilment of this promise which the Undersigned now claims
with full confidence in the good faith and foresight of the English
Government, which will not permit Mehemet Ali, by subterfuge and
treachery, to succeed in now delaying the conclusion of a question upon
which the fate of the Ottoman Empire depends.
Mehemet Ali, when he shall know that the Powers, in concert with the
Porte have arranged a plan of pacification, with a firm determination to
carry'it into execution, will not delay to submit to it, and the question
will be brought to a termination without causing the slightest shock.

686
But as long as Mehemet Ali shall perceive that the Powers are irresolute,
he will prolong his resistance, will negotiate with the intention of coming to
no conclusion, and will thus seek, by his underhand dealing, to shake the
Ottoman Empire in a manner still more dangerous than by force of arms*
It is to this perfidious system of Mehemet Ali that the Undersigned
considers it his duty to call the most serious attention of Her Britannic
Majesty's Cabinet, while he earnestly entreats an immediate and
definitive decision. The Undersigned has the honour, &c,
(Signed) CHEKIB.
No. 612.
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 10, 1840.
I TRANSMIT herewith for your information, a copy of a Note which
I have received from Chekib Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador at this
Court, relative to the differences between the Porte and Mehemet Ali.
I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 613.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 12.)
(Extract.) Therapia, June 23, 1840.
ALTHOUGH I presume you will have received Mr. Consul Moore's
reports, I think it right to inclose one from him to me.

Inclosure in No. 613.
Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby.
(Extract.) Beyrout, June 10, 1840J
YESTERDAY a numerous meeting of Christians and Druses, at which
several Sheiks attended, met near this town, and solemnly pledged them
selves by oath to continue in arms until they had driven the Egyptians
out of Syria. I had this information from a gentleman who was present.
This morning we have information of the arrival of the "Nile"
Egyptian steamer at Sidon, bearing despatches for the Emir Bechir. The
orders from Egypt are by all means to put a stop to the insurrection
by concession and conciliation. It remains to be seen whether the
insurgents will rest satisfied with any promises from the Viceroy, unless
they are guaranteed by an European Power ; and I think they will not.
They have too often been deceived.
The ink of the Firman guaranteeing to the Christians of Lebanon
their arms, was hardly dry, before*they were called upon to deliver them
up, and to furnish conscripts.
We have not above 1,000 troops in this town, and they dare not
venture out. The insurgents have again attacked the Lazaretto, with a
view of getting the arms which are there ; and they meditate an assault
on Beyrout also. They are full of ardour, and desire of all things the
troops to come out. They are now about 5,000 strong in this neighbour
hood. The Franks who ride out in the environs are constantly importuned
by them for powder and arms, which is their greatest want. Their hope
is, that succour will be afforded them from Europe, or at least by the
Porte.

687
June 11. — Last night the Emir Emin, the son of the Emir Bechir,
attended a great council held at a church about an hour from Beyrout,
at which many leading Emirs and Sheiks were present. His object was to
submit to them the proposals of the Viceroy, brought by the " Nile " — a
general pardon, retention of their arms, and exemption from the conscrip
tion — threatening them with extermination if they refused compliance.
The Emir Emin was hardly allowed to proceed in his address, which
was received with the utmost disapprobation by the assembly ; and. the
insurgents insisted on a guarantee on the part of England and France for,
their own conditions, as set forth in a memorial to the Emir Bechir. I
have been able to obtain a copy of this document, which I have had
hastily translated, and beg leave to inclose, together with another of a
proclamation. A French corvette is this moment arrived whilst I am writing.
I consider Egyptian influence at an end in Syria ; and if arms and
ammunition are supplied, the Pasha's troops will be driven out to a man
or massacred. There are, 11,000 stand of arms at Pleddin, the residence of the Emir
Bechir, who is now in the most critical position. He has attempted to
arm a party in favour of the Viceroy, but without success; and the
insurgents menace an attack to get possession of these arms.
The Aleppo post, arrived to-day, was stopped by the insurgents ; and
we hear that the same spirit of revolt exists to the north generally. I do
not see how Ibrahim Pasha' can move his troops in this direction. The
whole district of Damascus too, where much uneasiness prevails, is
inadequately supplied with regulars and irregulars.
The insurgents are close to the town, and I hear their musketry.

No. 614.
Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — {Received July 12.)
My Lord, Therapia, June 23, 1840.
I INCLOSE for your Lordship a communication from a person at Alex
andria, who is well acquainted with Mehemet Ak, and who writes what the
Pasha wishes to have written. I have, &c,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 614.
Communication from Alexandria.

Alexandrie, le 16 Juin, 1840.
AUSSITOT que Son Altesse a su la destitution de Hosrew Pacha, seul
personnage de qui elle avait a se metier, elle a nolise le bateau k vapeur Toscan,
pour l'expedier ad hoc a Constantinople avec un Envoye qui est Sami Bey, son
Secretaire intime, pour complimenter Sa Hautesse sur la naissance de sa fille
et Pentree du nouveau Ministre, et lui offrir ses hommages de soumission et de
fiddite, ce que le Pacha n'a jamais cesse de faire, si des malveillans n'avaient
mal interprete ses intentions loyales. Nos diplomates d'ici augurent bien de
cette mission qui a aussi pour but de tenir tout ce qui appartient a la puissance
Egyptienne au service du Sultan, Souverain legitime du Pacha, — de mettre a sa
disposition les escadres, Farmee, les finances, ses enfans, et jusqu'a la personne
meme du Vice-Roi. II est k esperer maintenant que la diplomatic de Con
stantinople agira de maniere a conduke les affaires vers une prompte solution,
en profitant de la volonte spontanee du Vice-Roi, et des bonnes dispositions
des nouveaux Ministres Ottomans qui veulent en fiair.

688
(Translation.)
Communication from Alexandria. Alexandria, June 16, 1840.
AS soon as His Highness learnt the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha, the
only person whom he had reason to distrust, he freighted the " Tuscan"
steam-vessel to send her expressly to Constantinople with an Envoy, who
is Sami Bey, his private Secretary, in order to compliment His High
ness on the birth of his daughter, and the appointment of the new
Minister, and to offer him his homage of submission and fidelity, which
the Pasha has never ceased doing, if evil-disposed persons had not
wrongly interpreted his sincere intentions. Our diplomatists here augur
well of this mission, which has also for its object to place at the service
of the Sultan, the lawful Sovereign of the Pasha, everything that apper
tains to the Egyptian Power, — to place at his disposal the squadron, the
Army, the treasure, the children, and even the very person of the Viceroy.
It is now to be hoped that the diplomacy of Constantinople will act so as
to bring matters to a speedy solution, taking advantage of" the spontaneous
desire of the Viceroy, and of the good dispositions of the new Turkish
Ministers who wish to have done with them.

689

No. 615.

CONVENTION

Conclue entre les Cours de la Grande Bretagne, dAutriche, de Prusse, et de
Russie, d'une part, et la Sublime Porte Ottomane, de V autre, pour la Paci
fication du Levant; signe'e a Londres, le 15 Juillet, 1840.

Au nom de Dieu Tres Misiricordieux.
SA Hautesse le Sultan ayant eu recours a Leurs Majestes La Reine
du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur
d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Boheme, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur
de toutes les Russies, pour redamer leur appui et leur assistance au
milieu des difficultes dans lesquelles il se trouve place par suite de la con
duite hostile de Mehemet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte, — difficultes qui menacent
de porter atteinte a Pintegrite de FEmpire Ottoman et k Findependance
du Trone du Sultan ; Leurs dites Majestes mues par le sentiment d'amitte
sincere qui subsiste entr'Elles et le Sultan ; animees du desir de veiller
au maintien de Pintegrite et de Findependance de l'Empire Ottoman, dans
Pinteret de Faffermissement de la Paix de l'Europe ; fideies k Fengage-
ment qu'Elles ont contracte par la Note Collective remise k la Porte par
Leurs Representans k Constantinople, le 27 Juillet, 1839 ; et desirant de
plus prevenir I'effusion de sang qu'occasionnerait la continuation des
hostilites qui ont recemment edate en Syrie entre les Autorites du Pacha
d'Egypte et les sujets de Sa Hautesse ;
Leurs dites Majestes et Sa Hautesse le Sultan ont resolu, dans le but
susdit, de conclure entr'Elles une Convention ; et ont nomme a cet effet
pour Leurs Ptenipotentiaires, savoir :
Sa Majeste la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et
d'Irlande, le Tres Honorable Henri Jean, Vicomte Palmerston, Baron
Temple, Pair d'Irlande, ConseiUer de Sa Majeste Britannique en Son
Conseil Prive, Chevalier Grand Croix du Tr6s Honorable Ordre du Bain,
Membre du Parlement, et Son Principal Secretaire d'Etat ayant le De-
partement des Affaires Etrangeres ;
Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Boheme, le
Sieur Philippe, Baron de Neumann, Commandeur de POrdre de Leopold
d'Autriche, decore de la Croix pour le Merite Civil, Commandeur des
Ordres de la Tour et de PEpee du Portugal, de la Croix du Sud du Bresil,
Chevalier Grand Croix de POrdre de St. Stanislas de seconde classe
de Russie, Son ConseiUer Aulique, et Ptenipotentiaire pres Sa Majeste
Britannique ;
Sa Majeste le Roi de Prusse, le Sieur Henri Guillaume, Baron de
Bulow, Chevalier de POrdre de I'Aigle Rouge de premiere classe de
Prusse, Grand Croix des Ordres de Leopold d'Autriche et des Guelphes
de Hanovre, Chevalier Grand Croix de POrdre de St. Stanislas de seconde
classe, et de St. Wladimir, de quatrieme classe, de Russie, Commandeur
de POrdre du Faucon de Saxe-Weimar, son Chambellan, ConseiUer intime
actuel, Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Ptenipotentiaire pres Sa
Majeste Britannique ;
Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, le Sieur Philippe,
Baron de Brunnow, Chevalier de POrdre de Ste. Anne de premiere classe,
de St. Stanislas de premiere classe, de St. Wladimir de troisieme, Com
mandeur de POrdre de St. Etienne de Hongrie, Chevalier de POrdre de
I'Aigle Rouge, et de St. Jean de Jerusalem, son ConseiUer Prive, Envoy6
Extraordinaire et Ministre Ptenipotentiaire pres Sa Majeste Britannique ;
Et Sa Majeste le Tres Majestueux, Tres Puissant et Tres Magnifique
Sultan, Abdul Medjid, Empereur des Ottomans, Chekib Effendi, decore
4 T

690
du Nichan Iftihar de premiere classe, Beylikdgi du Divan Imperial, Con
seiUer honoraire du Itepartement des Affaires Etrangeres, son Ambas
sadeur Extraordinaire pres Sa Majeste Britannique :
Lesquels, s'etant reciproquement communique leurs Pleins-pouvoirs,
trouves en bonne et due forme, ont arrete et signe les Articles suivans : —
ARTICLE I.
Sa Hautesse le Sultan s'etant entendu avec Leurs Majestes la Reine
du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Au
triche, Roi de Hongrie et de Boheme, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de
toutes les Russies, sur les conditions de Parrangement qu'il est de
l'intention de Sa Hautesse d'accorder a Mehemet Ali, — conditions lesquelles
se trouvent spedfiees dans PActe Separe ci-annexe, — Leur Majestes s'en
gagent a agir dans un parfait accord, et d'unir leurs efforts pour deter
miner Mehemet Ali a se conformer a cet arrangement ; chacune des
Hautes Parties Contractantes se reservant de co-operer a ce but selon les
moyens d'action dont chacune d'elles peut disposer.
ARTICLE II.
Si le Pacha d'Egypte refusait d'adlterer au susdit arrangement qui
lui sera communique par le Sultan avec le concours de leurs dites Ma
jestes, celles-ci s'engagent a prendre, a la requisition du Sultan, des
mesures concertees et arretees entr'Elles, afin de mettre cet arrangement
a execution. Dans Fintervalle, le Sultan ayant invite Ses Alltes a se
joindre a lui pour I'aider a interrompre la communication par mer entre
l'Egypte et la Syrie, et a empecher l'expedition de troupes, chevaux,
armes, munitions, et approvisionnemens de guerre de tout genre d'une de
ces provinces a l'autre ; Leurs Majestes la Reine du Royaume Uni de la
Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie
et de Boheme, s'engagent a donner immediatement a cet effet les ordres
necessaires aux commandans de leurs forces navales dans la Mediter-
ranee ; Leurs dites Majestes promettent en outre, que les commandans de
leurs Escadres, selon les moyens dont ils disposent, donneront au nom de
FAlliance tout Pappui et toute Fassistance en leur pouvoir a ceux des
sujets du Sultan qui manifesteront leur fideiite et obeissance a leur
Souverain. ARTICLE III.
Si Mehemet Ali, apres s'etre refuse de se soumettre aux conditions de
Parrangement mentionne ci-dessus, dirigeait ses forces de terre ou de mer
vers Constantinople, les Hautes Parties Contractantes, sur la requisition
expresse qui en serait faite par le Sultan a Leurs Representans a Con
stantinople, sont convenues, le cas edieant, de se rendre a Pinvitation de
ce Souverain, et de pourvoir a la defense de son trone, au moyen d'une
co-operation concertee en commun, dans le but de mettre les deux
detroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, ainsi que la capitale de l'Empire
Ottoman, a l'abri de toute agression.
II est en outre convenu, que les forces qui, en vertu d'une pareille
entente, recevront la destination' indiquee ci-dessus, yresteront employees
aussi longtems que leur presence sera requise par le Sultan, et lorsque Sa
Hautesse jugera que leur presence aura cesse d'etre necessaire, les dites
forces se retireront simultanement, et rentreront respectivement dans la
Mer Noire et la Mediterran^e.

ARTICLE IV.
II est toutefois expressement entendu, que la co-operation mentiomtee
dans l'Article precedent, et destinee a placer temporairement les detroits
des Dardanelles et du Bosphore et la Capitale Ottomane sous la sauve-

691
garde des Hautes Parties Contractantes, contre toute agression de
Mehemet Ali, ne sera consideree que comme une mesure exceptionnelle,
adoptee a la demande expresse du Sultan, et uniquement pour sa defense
dans le cas seul indique ci-dessus. Mais il est convenu que cette mesure
ne derogera en rien k Fancienne regie de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de
laquelle il a ete de tout tems dlfendu aux batimens de guerre des
Puissances Etrangeres d'entrer dans les detroits des Dardanelles et du
Bosphore. Et te Sultan, d'une part, declare par le present Acte, qu'a
^exception de Feventualite ci-dessus mentionnee, il a la ferme resolution
de maintenir a. l'avenir ce principe invariablement etabli comme ancienne
r&gle de Son Empire, et tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, de n'admettre
aucun b&timent de guerre etranger dans les detroits du Bosphore et des
Dardanelles; d'autre part, Leurs Majestes la Reine du Royaume Uni de
la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie
et de Boheme, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies,
s'engagent a respecter cette determination du Sultan, et a se conformer
au principe ci-dessus cnonce. ARTICLE V.
La presente Convention sera ratifiee, et les ratifications en seront
6changees a Londres dans Pespace de deux mois, ou plus tot si faire se
peut. En foi de quoi, les Ptenipotentiaires respectifs Font signee, et y ont
appose les sceaux de leurs armes.
Fait a Londres, le quinze Juillet, Fan de grace mil huit cent quarante.
(L.S.) PALMERSTON. (L.S.) CHEKIB.
(L.S.) NEUMANN.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

(Translation.)
CONVENTION
Concluded between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Rtissia
on the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte on the other, for the Pacifi
cation of the Levant, signed at London, July 15, 1840.

In the Name of the Most Merciful God.
HIS Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to thek Majesties
the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the
Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia,
and the Emperor of all the Russias, to ask their support and assistance in
the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reason of the hostile
proceedings of Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, — difficulties which threaten
with danger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence
of the Sultan's throne, — Their said Majesties, moved by the sincere
friendship which subsists between them and the Sultan ; animated by the
desire Of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman
Empire as a security for the peace of Europe ; faithful to the engagement
which they contracted by the Collective Note presented to the Porte by
their Representatives at Constantinople, on the 27th of July, 1839 ; and
desirous, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which would be occa
sioned by a continuance of the hostilities which have recently broken out
in Syria between the authorities of the Pasha of Egypt and the subjects
of the Sultan; Their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have
resolved, for the aforesaid purposes, to conclude together a Convention,
and they have therefore named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
4 T 2

692
Ireland, the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount Palmerston, Baron
Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of Her Britannick Majesty's Most
Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable
Order of the Bath, a Member of Parliament, and Her Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs ;
His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia,
the Sieur Philip, Baron de Neumann, Commander of the Order of Leopold
of Austria, decorated with the Cross for Civil Merit, Commander of the
Orders of the Tower and Sword of Portugal, of the Southern Cross of
Brazil, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stanislaus of the Second
Class of Russia, His Aulick Councillor, and His Plenipotentiary to Her
Britannick Majesty ;
His Majesty the King of Prussia, the Sieur Henry William, Baron
de Bulow, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of the First Class of
Prussia, Grand Cross of the Orders of Leopold of Austria, and of the
Guelphs of Hanover, Knight Grand Cross of the Orders of St. Stanislaus
of the Second Class, and of St, Wladimir of the Fourth Class of Russia,
Commander of the Order of the Falcon of Saxe-Weimar, His Chamber
lain, actual Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni
potentiary to Her Britannick Majesty ;
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Sieur Philip, Baron
de Brunnow, Knight of the Order of St. Anne of the First Class, of St.
Stanislaus of the First Class, of St. Wladimir of the Third, Commander
of the Order of St. Stephen of Hungary, Knight of the Order of the Red
Eagle, and of St. John of Jerusalem, His Privy Councillor, Envoy Extra
ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannick Majesty
And His Majesty the Most Noble, Most Powerful, and Most Magnifi
cent Sultan Abdul Medjid, Emperor of the Ottomans, Chekib Effendi,
decorated with the Nichan Iftihar of the First Class, Beylikdgi of the
Imperial Divan, Honorary Councillor of the Department for Foreign
Affairs, His Ambassador Extraordinary to Her Britannick Majesty ;
Who, having reciprocally communicated to each other their full
powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed
the following Articles : — ARTICLE 1.
His Highness the Sultan having come to an agreement with their
Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire
land, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King
of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, as to the conditions of
the arrangement which it is the intention of His Highness to grant to
Mehemet Ali, conditions which are specified in the Separate Act hereunto
annexed ; Their Majesties engage to act in perfect accord, and to unite
their efforts in order to determine Mehemet Ali to conform to that
arrangement ; each of the High Contracting Parties reserving to itself
to co-operate for that purpose, according to the means of action which
each may have at its disposal. ARTICLE II.
If the Pasha of Egypt should refuse to accept the above-mentioned
arrangement, which will be communicated to him by the Sultan, with the
concurrence of Their aforesaid Majesties; Their Majesties engage to take,
at the request of the Sultan, measures concerted and settled between
Them, in order to carry that arrangement into effect. In the meanwhile,
the Sultan having requested his said Allies to unite with him in order to
assist him to cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria,
and to prevent the transport of troops, horses, arms, and warlike stores
of all kinds, from the one province to the other; Their Majesties the
Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the
Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give
immediately to that effect, the necessary orders to their naval Commanders

693
in the Mediterranean. Their said Majesties further engage, that the
naval Commanders of their squdrons shall, according to the means at
their command, afford, in the name of the Alliance, all the support and
assistance in their power to those subjects of the Sultan who may manifest
their fidelity and allegiance to their Sovereign.
ARTICLE III.
If Mehemet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions of
the arrangement above-mentioned, should direct his land or sea forces
against Constantinople, the High Contracting Parties, upon the express
demand of the Sultan, addressed to their Representatives at Constanti
nople, agree, in such case, to comply with the request of that Sovereign,
and to provide for the defence of his throne by means of a co-operation
agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two Straits
of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the Capital of the OttoiVatii
Empire, in security against all aggression.
It is further agreed, that the forces which, in virtue of such con<_^
may be sent as aforesaid, shall there remain so employed as long as tneii
presence shall be required by the Sultan ; and when His Highness shall
deem their presence no longer necessary, the said forces shall simul
taneously withdraw, and shall return to the Black Sea and to the Medi
terranean, respectively. ARTICLE IV.
It is, however, expressly understood, that the co-operation mentioned
in the preceding Article, and destined to place the Straits of the Dar
danelles and of the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman Capital, under the
temporary safeguard of the High Contracting Parties against all ag
gression of Mehemet Ali, shall be considered only as a measure of ex
ception adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his
defence in the single case above-mentioned ; but it is agreed, that such
measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the
Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited
for ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles
and of the Bosphorus. And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby declares
that, excepting the contingency above-mentioned, it is his firm resolution
to maintain in future this principle invariably established as the ancient
rule of his empire ; and as long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no
foreign ship of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dar
danelles ; on the other hand, their Majesties the Queen of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of
Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the
Russias, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, arid to
conform to the above-mentioned principle.
ARTICLE V:
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof
shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of two months, or sooner
if possible. . . .
In witness whereof the' respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the
same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.
Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord
one thousand eight hundred and forty.
(L. S.) PALMERSTON. (L. S.) CHEKIB.
(L. S.) NEUMANN.
(L. S.) BULOW.
(L. S.) BRUNNOW.

No. 616.
ACTE SEPARE
Annexe .a la Convention conclue a Londres, le 15 Juillet, 1840, entre les Cours de
la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, d'une part, et la
Sublime Porte Ottomane, de l'autre.
SA Hautesse le Sultan a l'intention d'accorder et de faire notifier k
Mehemet Ali les conditions de Parrangement ci-dessous : —
$ 1.
Sa Hautesse promet d'accorder a Mehemet Ali, pour lui et pour ses
descendans en ligne directe, Padministration du Pachalic de l'Egypte ; et
Sa Hautesse promet en outre d'accorder a Mehemet Ali, sa vie durant,
avec le titre de Pacha d'Acre, et avec le commandement de la Forteresse
de St. Jean d'Acre, Padministration de la partie meridionale de la Syrie,
dont les limites seront determinees par la ligne de demarcation suivante :
Cette ligne, partant du Cap Ras-el-Nakhora sur les cotes de la
Mediterranee, s'etendra de la directement jusqu'a Pembouchure de la
riviere Seisaban, extremite septentrionale du Lac Tiberias; longera la
cote occidentale du dit Lac ; suivra la rive droite du fleuve Jourdain, et
la cote occidentale de la Mer Morte; se prolongera de la en droiture
jusqu'a la Mer Rouge, en aboutissant a la pointe septentrionale du Golfe
d'Akaba ; el suivra de la la cote occidentale du Golfe d'Akaba et la cote
orientale du Golfe de Suez jusqu'a Suez.
Toutefois, le Sultan, en fesant ces offres, y attache la condition que
Mehemet Ali les accepte dans Fespace de dix jours apres que la comma.
jnication lui en aura ete faite a Alexandrie par un Agent de Sa Hautesse ;
et qu'en meme tems Mehemet Ali depose entre les mains de cet Agent
les instructions necessaires aux Commandans de ses forces de terre et de
mer, de se retirer immediatement de PArabie etde toutes les Villes Saintes
qui s'y trouvent situees ; de File de Candie ; du district d'Adana ; et de
toutes les autres parties de l'Empire Ottoman qui ne sont pas comprises
dans les limites de l'Egypte et dans celles du Pachalic d'Acre, tel qu'il a
£t£ designe ci-dessus. §2.
Si dans le delai de dix jours fixe ci-dessus, Mehemet Ali n'acceptait
point le susdit arrangement, le Sultan retirera alors l'offre de Padminis
tration viagere du Pachalic d'Acre ; mais Sa Hautesse consentira encore
a accorder a Mehemet Ali, pour lui et pour ses descendans en ligne
directe, Padministration du Pachalic d'Egypte, pourvu que cette offre
soit accept6e dans Fespace de dix jours suivans, c'est-a-dire, dans un
delai de vingt jours, a compter du jour ou la communication lui aura et6
faite, et pourvu qu'il depose egalement entre les mains de FA gent du
Sultan les instructions necessaires pour ses Commandans de terre et de
mer de se retirer immediatement en dedans des limites, et dans les ports,
du Pachalic de FEgypte.

Le tribut annuel a payer au Sultan par Mehemet Ali, sera propor
tionne au plus ou moins de territoire dont ce dernier obtiendra Padminis
tration, selon qu'il accepte la premiere ou la seconde alternative.

695

§4.
11 est expressement entendu de plus, que dans la premiere comme
dans la seconde alternative, Mehemet Ali (avant Pexpiration du terme
fixe de dix ou de vingt jours) sera tenu de remettre la flotte Turque,. avec
tons ses equipages et armemens, entre les mains du Prepose Ture qui
sera charge de la recevoir. Les Commandans des Escadres Alliees
assisteront a cette remise.
11 est entendu que dans aucun cas Mehemet Ali ne pourra porter en
compte* ni decmire du Tribut a payer au Sultan, les depenses qu'il a
faites pour I'entretien de la flotte Ottomane pendant tout le tems qu'elle
sera restee dans les ports d'Egypte. § 5.
Tous les Traites, et toutes les lois de l'Empire Ottoman s'appliqueront
k FEgypte et au Pachalic d'Acre, tel qu'il a ete designe ci-dessus, comme
a toute autre partie de l'Empire Ottoman. Mais le Sultan consent, qu'a,
condition du payement regulier du tribut susmentionne, Mehemet Ali et
ses descendans pergoivent au nom du Sultan, et comme delegue de Sa
Hautesse, dans les provinces dont Padministration leur sera confiee, les
taxes et impots tegalement etablis. II est entendu en outre* que moyen-
nant la perception des taxes et impots susdits, Mehemet Ali et ses
descendans pourvoieront a toutes les depenses de Padministration civile
et militaire des dites Provinces.

§6.
Les forces de terre et de mer que pourra entretenir le Pacha d'Egypte
et d'Acre, fesant partie des forces de l'Empire Ottoman, seront toujours
consider6es comme enfcretenues pour le service de PEtat.

§7-
Si a Pexpiration du terme de vingt jours apres la communication qui
lui aura ete faite, (ainsi qu'il a ets dit plus haut, §2,) M6hemet Ali
n'adhere point a {'arrangement propose, et n'accepte- pas l'heredite du
Pachalic de l'Egypte, le Sultan se considerera comme libre de retirer cette
offre, et de suivre, en consequence, telle marche ulterieure que ses propres
interets et les conseils de ses Allies pourront lui suggerer.
§8.
Le present Acte Separe aura la mdme force et valeur que s' il etait
insere mot k mot dans la Convention de ce jour. II sera ratifte et les
ratifications en seront echangees a Londres en meme tems que celles de
la dite Convention.
En foi de quoi, les Ptenipotentiaires respectifs Pont signe, et y ont
appose les sceaux de leurs armes.
Fait a Loudres, le quinze Juillet, Fan de grace mil huit cent quarante,
(L.S.) NEUMANN. (L.S.) CKEKIB.
(L.S.) PALMERSTON.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(LJ3.) BRUNNOW.

696
(Translation.)
SEPARATE ACT
Annexed to the Convention concluded at London on the 15th of July, 1840,
between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia,
on the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, on the other.
HIS Highness the Sultan intends to grant, and to cause to be
notified to Mehemet Ali, the conditions of the arrangement hereinafter
detailed : — § 1.
His Highness promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for
his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of
Egypt ; and His Highness promises, moreover, to grant to Mehemet Ali,
for his life, with the title of Pasha of Acre, and with the command of the
Fortress of St. John of Acre, the administration of the southern part of
Syria, the limits of which shall be determined by the following line of
demarkation : —
This line, beginning at Cape Ras-el-Nakhora, on the coast of the
Mediterranean, shall extend direct from thence as far as the mouth of
the river Seisaban, at the northern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias ; it
shall pass along the Western shore of that Lake, it shall follow the right
bank of the river Jordan, and the western shore of the Dead Sea ; from
thence it shall extend straight to the Red Sea, which it shall strike at the
northern point of the Gulf of Akaba, and from thence it shall follow the
western shore of the Gulf of Akaba, and the eastern shore of the Gulf of
Suez, as far as Suez.
The Sultan, however, in making these offers, attaches thereto the
condition, that Mehemet Ali shall accept them within the space of ten
days after communication thereof shall have been made to him at Alex
andria, by an agent of His Highness ; and that Mehemet Ali shall, at the
same time, place in the hands of that agent the necessary instructions to
the Commanders of his sea and land forces, to withdraw immediately from
Arabia, and from all the Holy Cities which are therein situated ; from
the Island of Candia ; from the district of Adana ; and from all other
parts of the Ottoman Empire which are not comprised within the limits
of Egypt, and within those of the Pashalic of Acre, as above defined.
§2-
If within the space of ten days, fixed as above, Mehemet Ali should
not accept the above-mentioned arrangement, the Sultan will then with
draw the offer of the life administration of the Pashalic of Acre ; but His
Highness will still consent to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and
for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic
of Egypt, provided such offer be accepted within the space of the ten days
next following ; that is to say, within a period of twenty days, to be
reckoned from the day on which the communication shall have been made
to him; and provided that in this case also, he places in the hands of the
agent of the Sultan, the necessary instructions to his military and naval
Commanders, to withdraw immediately within the limits, and into the
ports of the Pashalic of Egypt. §3.
The annual tribute to be paid to the Sultan by Mehemet Ali, shall be
proportioned to the greater or less amount of territory of which the latter
may obtain the administration, according as he accepts the first or the
second alternative.

697

§4.
It is, moreover, expressly understood, that, in the first as in the
second alternative, Mehemet Ali (before the expiration of the specified
period of ten or of twenty days), shall be bound to deliver up the Turkish
Fleet, with the whole of its crews and equipments, into the hands of the
Turkish Agent who shall be charged to receive the same. The Com
manders of the Allied Squadrons shall be present at such delivery.
It is understood, that in no case can Mehemet Ali carry to account,
or deduct from the tribute to be paid to the Sultan, the expences which
he has incurred in the maintenance of the Ottoman Fleet, during any
part of the time it shall have remained in the ports of Egypt.

§5.
All the Treaties, and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire, shall be
applicable to Egypt, and to the Pashalic of Acre, such as it has been
above defined, in the same manner as to every other part of the Ottoman
Empire. But the Sultan consents, that on condition of the regular pay
ment of the tribute above-mentioned, Mehemet Ali and his descendants
shall collect, in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegate of His High
ness, within the provinces the administration of which shall be confided
to them, the taxes and imposts legally established. It is moreover
understood, that in consideration of the receipt of the aforesaid taxes
and imposts, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall defray all the
expences of the civil and military administration of the said provinces.
§ 6.
The military and naval forces which may be maintained by the
Pasha of Egypt and Acre, forming part of the forces of the Ottoman
Empire, shall always be considered as maintained for the service of the
State. §?•
If, at the expiration of the period of twenty days after the commu
nication shall have been made to him (according to the stipulation of
§ 2) , Mehemet Ali shall not accede to the proposed arrangement, and
shall not accept the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt, tke Sultan will consider
himself at liberty to withdraw that offer, and to follow, in consequence,
such ulterior course as his own interests, and the counsels of his Allies
may suggest to him. § 8.
The present Separate Act shall have the same force and validity, as
if it were inserted, word for word, in the Convention of this date. It
shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at
London at the same time as those of the said Convention.
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the
same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.
Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord
one thousand eight hundred and forty.
(L.S.) NEUMANN.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.
(L.S.) PALMERSTON. (L.S.) CHEKIB.

4U

698

No. 617.
PROTOCOLE signe d, Londres, le 15 Juillet, 1840,
par les Plinipotentiaires d'Autriche; de la Grande Bretagne;
de Prusse;
de Russie; et
de la Porte Ottomane.

EN apposant sa signature a la Convention de ce jour, le Ptenipo
tentiaire de la Sublime Porte Ottomane a declare :
Qu'en constatant par l'Article IV. de la dite Convention, Fancienne
regie de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de laquelle il a ete defendu de tout
tems aux batimens de guerre etrangers d'entrer dans les detroits des
Dardanelles et du Bosphore, la Sublime Porte se reserve comme par le
passe de delivrer des Firmans de passage aux batimens tegers sous
pavilion de guerre, lesquels sont employes, selon I'usage, au service de la
correspondance des Legations des Puissances amies.
Les Ptenipotentiaires des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne,
de Prusse, et de Russie, ont pris acte de la presente Declaration pour la
porter a la connaissance de leurs Cours. (Signe) NEUMANN. PALMERSTON.BULOW.BRUNNOW.CKEKIB.

(Translation.)
PROTOCOL signed at London, on the 15th of July, 1840, by the
Plenipotentiaries of
Great Britain ;
Austria ;
Prussia ;
Russia; and
Turkey.
IN affixing his signature to the Convention of this date, the Plenipo
tentiary of the Sublime Ottoman Porte declared :
That in recording by Article IV. of the said Convention the ancient
rule of the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of which, it has been at all times
forbidden to Foreign Vessels of War to enter within the Straits of the Dar
danelles and of the Bosphorus, the Sublime Porte reserves to itself, as
heretofore, to deliver passes to light vessels under Flag of War, which
may be employed according to custom, for the service of the correspond
ence of the Legations of Friendly Powers.
The Plenipotentiaries of the "Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia,
and Russia, took note of the above Declaration, for the purpose of com
municating it to their respective Courts. (Signed) PALMERSTON.NEUMANN.
BULOW.BRUNNOW. CHEKIB.

699

No. 618.
PROTOCOLE reserve, signe ct Londres, le 15 Juillet, 1840,
par les Ptenipotentiaires d'Autriche;de la Grande Bretagne;
de Prusse;
de Russie; et
de la Porte Ottomane.

LES Ptenipotentiaires des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne,
de Prusse, de Russie, et de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, ayant, en vertu
<le leurs Pleins-pouvoirs, conclu et signe en ce jour une Convention entre
leurs Souverains respectifs pour la pacification du Levant ;
Considerant que, vu la distance qui separe les Capitales de leurs
Cours respectifs, un certain espace de tems devra s'ecouler necessaire-
ment avant que Fediange des Ratifications de la dite Convention puisse
s'effectuer, et que les ordres fondes sur cet Acte puissent etre mis k
execution ;
Et les dits Ptenipotentiaires etant profondement penetres de la con
viction, que vu I'etat actuel des choses en Syrie, des interets d'humanite'
aussi bien que les graves considerations de politique Europeenne qui
constituent Pobjet de la sollicitude commune des Puissances signataires
-de la Convention de ce jour, redament imperieusement d'eviter, autant
que possible, tout retard dans Faccomplissement de la pacification que la
dite transaction est destinee a atteindre ;
Les dits Ptenipotentiaires, en vertu de leurs Pleins-pouvoirs, sont
convenus entr'eux que les mesures preiiminaires mentionnees a F Article
II. de la dite Convention, seront mises a execution tout de suite, sans
attendre Fechange des ratifications ; les Ptenipotentiaires respectifs con-
statent formellement par le present Acte Passentiment de leurs Cours k
l'ex6cution immediate de ces mesures.
II est convenu, en outre, entre les dits Ptenipotentiaires, que Sa
Hautesse le Sultan procedera de suite a adresser a Mehemet Ali la com
munication et les offres spedftees dans PActe Separe, annexe a la Conven
tion de ce jour.
II est convenu de plus, que les Agens Consulaires de FAutriche, de la
Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, a Alexandrie, se mettront en
rapport avec FAgent que Sa Hautesse le Sultan y enverra, pour adresser
a Mehemet Ali la communication et les offres susmentiomtees ; que les
dits Consuls preteront a cet Agent toute Fassistance et tout Pappui en
leur pouvoir ; et qu'ils employeront tous leurs moyens d'influence aupres
de Mehemet Ali, a Feffet de le determiner k accepter Parrangement qui
lui sera propose d'ordre de Sa Hautesse le Sultan.
Les Amiraux des Escadres respectives dans la Mediterranee, recev-
ront les instructions necessaires pour se mettre en communication a ce
suiet avec les dits Consuls.
J (Signe) NEUMANN.
PALMERSTON. BULOW.
BRUNNOW.CHEKIB.

4 U 2

700

(Translation.)
RESERVED PROTOCOL signed at London on the 15th of July, 1840,
by the Plenipotentiaries of
Great Britain ;
Austria ;
Prussia ;
Russia ; and
Turkey.
THE Plenipotentaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria,
Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, having, in virtue, of their full powers, con
cluded and signed this day a Convention between their respective Sove
reigns, for the pacification of the Levant ;
Considering that, in consequence of the distances which separate the
Capitals of their respective Courts, a certain space of time must neces
sarily elapse before the ratifications of the said Convention can be ex
changed, and before orders founded thereupon can be carried into exe
cution ;
And the said Plenipotentiaries being deeply impressed with the con
viction, that by reason of the present state of things in Syria, the inte
rests of humanity, as well as the grave considerations of European policy
wkich constitute the object of the common solicitude of the Contracting
Parties to the Convention of this day, imperiously require that, as far as
possible, all delay should be avoided in the accomplishment of the pacifi
cation which the said Convention is intended to effect ;
The said Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, have agreed,
that the preliminary measures mentioned in Article II. of the s aid
Convention, shall be carried into execution at once, without waiting
for the exchange of the ratifications ; the respective Plenipotentiaries
recording formally, by the present Instrument, the consent of their Courts
to the immediate execution of these measures.
It is moreover agreed between the said Plenipotentiaries, that His
Highness the Sultan will proceed immediately to address to Mehemet Ali,
the communication and offers specified in the Separate Act annexed to
the Convention of this day.
It is further agreed, that the Consular Agents of Great Britain,
Austria, Prussia, and Russia, at Alexandria, shall place themselves in
communication with the Agent whom His Highness may send thither to
communicate to Mehemet Ali the above-mentioned offers ; that the said
Consuls shall afford to that Agent all the assistance and support in their
power ; and shall use all their means of influence wilh Mehemet Ali, in
order to persuade him to accept the arrangement which will be proposed
to him by order of His Highness the Sultan.
The Admirals of the respective squadrons in the Mediterrnean shall
be instructed to place themselves in communication with the said Consuls
on this subject. (Signed) PALMERSTON.NEUMANN. BULOW.
BRUNNOW, CHEKIB.

701
No. 619.
Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.
My Lord» Foreign Office, July 15, 1840.
I TRANSMIT to your Excellency copies of a Convention for the
Pacification of the Levant, and of a Separate Act thereunto annexed, and of
two Protocols, which have been this day signed by the Plenipotentiaries of
Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte ; and I have to instruct
your Excellency, immediately to communicate tkese documents to the Ministers
of the Porte.
Your Excellency will further urge the Turkish Ministers to cause to be
prepared and sent to London, with the least possible delay, the Sultan's
ratification of the Convention and of the Separate Act.
I have likewise to instruct your Excellency, when the Sultan sends to
Alexandria tke Envoy mentioned in tke first paragrapk of the Separate Act, to
send with that Envoy some person belonging to your Embassy, to convey to
Colonel Hodges any communication or information which your Excellency may
think useful to send to him, witk reference to the proposals to be made to
Mehemet Ak. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 620.
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 15, 1840.
I TRANSMIT to your Excellency copies of a Convention for tke
Pacification of tke Levant, and of a Separate Act tkereunto annexed, and of
two Protocols, which have been this day signed by the Plenipotentiaries of
Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte ; and I have to instruct
your Excekency immediately to communicate tkese documents to the Austrian
Government. Your Excekency will furtker urge tke Austrian Government to cause to be
prepared and sent to London, witk the least possible delay, the Emperor's
ratification of the Convention and Separate Act.
I have likewise to inform your Excellency, that instructions have been sent
to Viscount Ponsonby, to despatch, with the person who may be sent by the Sultan
to Alexandria, some gentleman belonging to his Lordship's Embassy, in order
to convey to Colonel Hodges any communication or information which Lord
Ponsonby may think useful to send to him with reference to the proposals to
be made to Mehemet Ali. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 621.
Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.
My Lord, Londres, le -j^- Juillet, 1840.
L'ARTICLE III. de la Convention que nous venons de signer prevoit une
eventualite, et annonce, le cas echeant, une co-operation concertee en commun
entre nos Cours.
Pour reakser cette intention de maniere a eviter les retards que la distance
des lieux pourrait faire naitre, j'ai l'honneur de vous inviter, my Lord, a vouloir
bien me mettre k mime d'informer te Cabinet Imperial de Fetendue des secours
que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Britannique serait dans le cas de placer a

702
la disposition de Sa Hautesse le Sultan pour accomplk Pobjet que les Cours
Signataires de la Convention de ce jour ont en vue d'attdndre, dans Pinteret
commun de la conservation de FEmpire Ottoman. Veuillez agreer, &c,
(Signe) BRUNNOW.

(Translation.)
Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.
My Lord, London, July ¦&, 1840.
THE Third Article of the Convention which we have just signed,
anticipates a contingency, and announces, in that case, a co-operation
concerted in common between our Courts.
To carry this intention into effect, in such a manner as to avoid the
delays which distance from the spot might occasion, I have the honour to
request you, my Lord, to have the goodness to enable me to apprize the
Imperial Cabinet of the extent of the succour which Her Britannic
Majesty's Government would have it in its power to place at the disposal
of His Highness the Sultan, for the accomplishment of the object which
the Courts, who have signed the Convention of this day, aim at obtaining,
in the common interest of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire.
Receive, &c,
(Signed) BRUNNOW.

No. 622.
Viscount Palmerston to Baron Brunnow.
M. le Baron, Foreign Office, July 1 5, 1840.
I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, and
entirely agree with you that, in the present state of things, and considering the
distances which separate our respective Courts from the places where the
measures mentioned in Article III. of the Convention of this day would be
carried into effect, it is desirable that we should at once come to an under
standing as to the co-operation stipulated for in that Article.
Recent events in Syria have indeed rendered it less likely tkan ever that
Ibrahim should venture to march upon Constantinople, but, nevertheless, we
ought to be prepared for such a contingency.
There can be no doubt that if such a case were to arise, the Russian
Government would be able, from its disposable means in the Black Sea, to send
to the Straits of the Bosphorus a sufficient succour either of land or of naval
forces, according to the nature of the case, for the defence of the Sultan ; and
it is not therefore for the purpose of completing a force which would otherwise
be deficient, that the Britisk contingent would be sent.
But it has been wisely judged by all the parties to the Convention which
we have this day signed, that we should best promote the great objects of
European policy which we all kave in view, by so arranging the execution of
every part of our measures, that we should in every step of our progress give
manifest and indisputable proofs of our union and mutual confidence ; and in
this view of the matter it becomes of great importance, that a British force
should co-operate with the Russian force in the contingency provided for by the
Third Article of the Convention.
But the amount of naval force which we could spare for such a purpose,
must necessarily be limited by a consideration of the aggregate amount of our
squadron in the Mediterranean, and of the other services which that squadron
will have to perform ; and I had occasion to make known to your Court, by a
despatch which I addressed to Lord Clanricarde in October last, that, in such a
case, we should be able to send but a smak number of ships to the Dardanekes
and Sea of Marmora.

703
I have now communicated upon this matter with Lord Minto, and I have
to state, that our Mediterranean squadron consists of the ships mentioned in the
accompanying list ; and considering the various duties which that squadron will
have to perform, according to the arrangements agreed upon between the Four
Powers and the Sultan, we could not conveniently undertake to detach more
than three or four ships of the line, witk a proportion of frigates and steamers,
to co-operate with the Russian ships, in the event of the Sultan requiring the
aid of the naval forces of the Two Powers for the defence of his Capital.
But the Admiral commanding our squadron in the Mediterranean wik be
ordered to hold the above-mentioned force ready to sail to the Dardanelles,
under some steady and competent officer, tke moment tke Admiral shall receive
from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, an intimation that the
Sultan has applied for such assistance. I am, &c,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 622.

Inst of Ships composing the Mediterranean Squadron.

Princess Charlotte
Asia Ganges -
Powerful -
Thunderer
Bellerophon Implacable Hastings
Benbow -
EdinburghBelleisle -
Revenge -
Castor -
Dido -
Carysfort
Talbot -
Tyne -
Dapkne -
Magicienne Hazard -
WaspJaseur -
Zebra -
Scorpion
Weazle -

Gorgon -
Cyclops -
Rhadamanthus Hydra -
Phcenix -
Confiance

104 guns, Captain Fanshawe.
84 ,, Captain Fisher.
84 ,, Captain Reynolds.
84 ,, Captain Napier.
84 ,, Captain Berkeley.
80 ,, Captain Austin.
74 ,, Captain Harvey.
72 ,, Captain Laurence.
72 ,, Captain Stewart.
72 ,, Captain Henderson.
72 ,, Captain Nicolas.
72 „ Capt. Hon. W. Waldegrave.
36 ,, Captain Collier.
18 „ Captain Davies.
26 ,, Captain Martin.
26 ,, Captain Codrington.
26 ,, Captain Townshend.
26 „ Captain Dalling.
24 „ Captain Mickell.
18 „ Commander Wilkinson.
16 ,, Commander Mansel.
16 ,, Commander Boultbee.
16 „ Commander Stopford.
10 „ Lieutenant Gayton.
10 „ Lieutenant Simpson.
Steam-Vessels.6 guns, Captain Henderson.
6 ,, Captain H. T. Austin.
4 „ Commander Wakefield.
4 „ Commander Robinson.
4 „ Commander F. Stopford.
2 „ Lieutenant E. Stopford.

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