JQQb-

PRO FIDE
A TEXT-BOOK OF APOLOGETICS

PRO FIDE
A DEFENCE OF NATURAL
AND REVEALED RELIGION
BY CHARLES HARRIS, B.D.,
LECTURER IN THEOLOGY AND PAROCHIALIA, ST.
DAVID'S COLLEGE, LAMPETER ; EXAMINING CHAPLAIN
TO THE BISHOP OF LLANDAFF

" Reason is the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning
anything, even Revelation itself " (Butler, Analogy, part ii. 3).
" As it was my intention to convince ... by reason, so it has been
my endeavour strictly to observe the most rigid laws of reaso ning.
And, to an impartial reader, I hope it will be manifest that the
sublime notion of a God, and the comfortable expectation of Immor
tality, do naturally arise from a close and methodical application of
thought " (Behkeley, Preface to the Three Dialogued).

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1905

PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VIMEY, LD.„
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.

pi 54-

Hz^

TO
MY WIFE

PREFACE

The present Text-book of Apologetics is intended
to meet the needs of three classes of readers :
(i) students at the Universities and elsewhere, pre
paring for theological examinations; (2) ministers
of religion, who have to deal practically with
modern unbelief; and (3) that large and increasing
section of the reading public which takes an in
telligent interest in modern religious problems and
difficulties. By avoiding the use of too many
technical terms, by relegating the more difficult
subjects to appendices, and by marking the more
metaphysical sections for optional omission, the
writer hopes that the book has been made available
for the general reader, as well as for the theological
student. On reviewing his . work, the author is painfully
conscious of its defects. Two or three of the
chapters he would, had it been possible, have
entirely re-written. The first chapter in particular
(" The Argument for a First Cause ") seems to him
obscure and inadequate. Its complete recasting
being now impossible, he has contented himself

Vlll

PREFACE

with adding, at the end of the book, a supple
mentary section on the Argument for a First
Cause. In spite of its manifold imperfections, the writer
ventures to hope that the present work, being
complete and modern in tone, will be found
useful.1 It has at any rate the merit of actuality.
Many of its most characteristic arguments were
originally hammered out in the course of debates
with Secularists in East London, and on the
platform of the National Secular Society in Hyde
Park. In its present form it represents lectures
on practical Apologetics delivered during the last
five years to ordination candidates at St. David's
College, Lampeter.
The book assumes the results of modern science
and historical criticism to their full extent.2 How
little the full acceptance of them prejudices the
Christian Faith will be seen in the sequel. The
1 At present no Anglican text-book, and, with the excep
tion of Dr. Fisher's Grounds of Theistic and Christian
Belief (revised edition, 1903), no English text-book of any kind
covers the whole apologetical field. The omissions of Dr.
Bruce's Apologetics are well known. Of translations, the
treatise of Ebrard is antiquated, that of Kaftan narrowly
Ritschlian, and that of Schanz, while containing valuable matter,
is too ultra-conservative and ultramontane to be generally
useful. * For lack of space Old Testament problems have been only
slightly touched upon. The reader who desires fuller informa
tion will find it in Dr. Wade's Old Testament History, in Canon
Ottley's slighter and briefer Short History of the Hebrews,
in Dr. Driver's Sermons on Subjects connected with the Old
Testament, and in other books mentioned at the close of c. xviii.

PREFACE ix
case for Christianity has been based mainly on those
documents which Rationalists as well as Christians
accept as authentic and generally trustworthy.
Personally, the writer believes firmly in the authen
ticity of the fourth Gospel ; * but since many good
critics, especially in Germany, still resist the
strong and continually accumulating evidence in
its favour, he has refrained from using it, except
occasionally to illustrate or corroborate facts other
wise well attested.
The writer has conscientiously endeavoured to
grapple with the immense literature of his subject,
and to give some account, however meagre, of
all the chief arguments which have been urged
both for and against Religion. To Philosophy
— especially contemporary Philosophy — his obliga
tions have been even greater than to Theology.
He wishes to acknowledge an especial debt of grati
tude, among English works, to Prof. Wm. James's
Principles of Psychology, and The Will to Believe, and
Varieties of Religious Experience; Prof. J. Ward's
Naturalism and Agnosticism ; Mr. H. Sturt's (and
others') Personal Idealism ; Mr. F. C. S. Schiller's
Riddles of the Sphinx ; Dr. Romanes' Mind and
Matter and Monism ; Prof. Maher's Psychology ; and
Prof. Case's article " Metaphysics " (in Encycl.
Brit. vol. xxx.) : also, among foreign works, to
1 See pp. 307-21. The writer would refer all who doubt the
genuineness of St. John's Gospel to Dr. J. Drummond's
(Unitarian) An Inquiry into the Character and Authorship
of the Fourth Gospel (1903).

x PREFACE
M. Fonsegrive's Essai sur le Libre Arbitre ; MM.
Renouvier and Prat's La Nouvelle Monadologie ;
M. Boutroux's De la Contingence des Lois de la
Nature ; and, to a less extent, to Dr. Lotze's
Metaphysics (tr.) and Microcosmus (tr.); and to
Prof. W. Wundt's Ethics (tr.), and other works.
The writer's own sympathies are with the now
dominant school of " Personal Idealism," which,
in reaction from the Pantheism or semi-Pantheism
of Hegel, the Agnosticism of Kant, and the
materialistic tendency of so much recent Meta
physics and Psychology, has gone back to
Berkeley, to learn from him that not matter but
Personality is the ultimate fact in the universe, and
that Spirit cannot be interpreted in terms of
physical law. According to all probable indica
tions, the Philosophy of the twentieth century
will be the Philosophy of Personality, and from
such a Philosophy Religion has everything to hope
and nothing to fear.
The writer's warm thanks are due to his
colleagues Dr. Wade and Mr. G. E. P. Broderick,
B.Sc, for many kind criticisms and suggestions. C. H.
St. David's College.
February, 1905.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
PAGE
THE ARGUMENT FOR A FIRST CAUSE ... I
Appendix : The Ontological Argument for God's
Existence ....... &

CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF THE FIRST CAUSE . . .II
Appendix : Is God Finite or Infinite ? . . .21
CHAPTER III
THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE AND
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD  23
CHAPTER IV
DESIGN IN NATURE  34
Appendix : The Argument from the Intelligibility of the
Universe ....... 46

PAGE

xii CONTENTS CHAPTER V
OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT FOR DESIGN . 48
Appendix I. : Theories of Evolution . . -7°
Appendix II. : Evolution and Holy Scripture . . 72
Appendix III. : Agnostic Testimony to the Argument
for Design ....... 74
CHAPTER VI
BERKELEY'S ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE . JJ
Appendix : Agnostic Testimony to the General Sound
ness of Berkeley's Position . . . .88
CHAPTER VII
THE ARGUMENT FROM RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE .. 90
CHAPTER VIII
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE CONSENT OF MAN
KIND  105
Appendix I. : Theories ofthe Origin of Religion . 118
Appendix II. : The Moral and Spiritual Value of Savage
Religions . .  120
CHAPTER IX
THE UTILITY OF RELIGION CONSIDERED AS EVI
DENCE OF ITS TRUTH  1 23

CHAPTER X
AGNOSTICISM AND FAITH

I3S

CONTENTS xiii
CHAPTER XI
PAGE
CREATION IN TIME  147
CHAPTER XII
THE HUMAN SOUL  158
CHAPTER XIII
FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM . . . . 1 78
CHAPTER XIV
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL  20O
Appendix I. : Evolution and the Fall . . . 224
Appendix II. : Weismannism and the Transmission of
Sin  228
CHAPTER XV
HUMAN IMMORTALITY  23 1
CHAPTER XVI
MIRACLES AND ANSWERS TO PRAYER . . .253
Appendix I. : Miracles and the Freedom of the Will . 271
Appendix II.: Miracles and the Rationality of the
Universe ....... 272
CHAPTER XVII
THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION .... 274
Appendix I. : Buddhism and Christianity . . . 288
Appendix 1 1 : Christianity, Judaism, and Mahometanism 291

XIV

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XVIII
PAGE
THE CHRISTIAN DOCUMENTS  293
Appendix I. : Inspiration and Criticism . . • 323
Appendix II : Old Testament Difficulties . . .324
CHAPTER XIX
THE TEACHING OF JESUS  327
Appendix I. : Testimony of Freethinkers and Agnostics
to the Excellence of Christ's Character and
Teaching .  359
APPENDIX II. : Objections to the Moral Teaching of
Jesus  36d
Appendix III. : The Mythical Theory of the Origin of
Christianity  368
CHAPTER XX
THE PERSON OF JESUS  37°
CHAPTER XXI
THE MIRACLES OF JESUS  417
Appendix I. : Jesus and Demoniacal Possession . . 455
Appendix II. . The Miracles ofthe Old Testament . 457
Appendix III. : The Argument from Prophecy . . 458

CHAPTER XXII
THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS
Appendix I. : List of the Resurrection Appearances
Appendix II. : Rationalistic Theories of the Resur
rection .......
Appendix III. : The Resurrection ofthe Body .
Appendix IV. : The Ascension ....
Appendix V. : Our Lord's Birth of a Virgin

463 496497499 501502

CONTENTS

xv

CHAPTER XXIII
THE INFLUENCE OF JESUS UPON THE WORLD
Appendix I. : Reason and Religious Authority

Appendix II.:
Appendix III.
Appendix IV.
Appendix V. .
Appendix VI.

Hell
: The Atonement
The Holy Trinity
History of Apologetics
Useful Books .

5IO 536540 544 546 5.8
556

SUPPLEMENT
THE ARGUMENT FOR A FIRST CAUSE,
INDEX 

559563

ERRATUM
Page 53, line 29. For " consciousness transcends life, and life
consciousness," read "consciousness transcends life, and reason
consciousness.''

PRO FIDE

CHAPTER I
THE ARGUMENT FOR A FIRST CAUSE
Summary. — There must be a sufficient reason why every existing
thing exists, and why it is just such as it is. Even if the
universe exists from eternity, there must be a sufficient reason
why it exists from eternity, and why it is such as it is. In
other words, it must have an Eternal Cause. Also this
Eternal Cause must be uncaused, otherwise it would not
be a real cause, but an effect. There must be somewhere
in the universe a real cause which is uncaused, otherwise
the universe would consist entirely of effects without any
cause, which is absurd. Efficient causation can be discerned
with certainty only in the operations of the human mind.
In external nature it cannot be directly perceived, but
may be legitimately inferred. Hume's denial of this is
unreasonable.
Of the various kinds of causes enumerated by
philosophers the most important are — (i) efficient
causes, i.e. causes in the popular sense ; and (2) final
causes, i.e. ends or purposes of action. The present
chapter deals mainly with efficient causes. Final
causes will be dealt with at length in the chapters
on Design (iv., v.). 1

2 THE ARGUMENT FOR A FIRST CAUSE
That nothing which is not absolutely self-existent
can exist without an adequate cause, is the conviction
of all thinking men. How this conviction is reached
is a matter of dispute. Some think that it is the
result of experience, others that it is a necessary law
of thought, so obviously true, that, like the axioms
of Euclid, it neither needs nor is capable of proof.
However this may be, it is as a practical principle
the common postulate of Theology, Philosophy, and
Science, and may here be assumed without formal
proof. There are, however, certain objections to
the absolute universality of the law of causation
which it is necessary to consider in this place,
because, if they were valid, the proof of a First
Cause of all things would be impossible.
(i) It is argued by John Stuart Mill that it is not
necessary to seek a cause for every fact, but only
for every change. According to him, the permanent
elements in the world — e.g. the primary qualities of
matter — are uncaused and require no explanation,
and only the changeable elements in the world
require to be explained by causes.
The reply to this is that if certain features of the
world remain permanent while others change, there
must be some reason why this is the case. There
is no reason in the nature of things why the
primary qualities of matter should be permanent.
It is as easy to think of them as continually
changing, as to think of them as permanent. But
since they do not change but remain permanent,

AN ETERNAL FIRST CAUSE 3
there must be some cause for their permanence.
If their permanence has no cause, there is no need
to assign a cause to anything.
(2) A more subtle argument against the univer
sality of causation is presented in the following
syllogism :
Only those things which begin to exist have a
cause.; But the universe exists from eternity :
Therefore the universe has no cause.
This argument, which is largely employed by
modern materialists, is invalid, even if it is granted,
as it ought not to be, that the universe is eternal.
For if the universe exists from eternity, there
must be some cause, and that an eternal cause,
why it exists from eternity. For since its origin
in time is quite as conceivable as its existence
from eternity, there must be some adequate cause
why it exists from eternity rather than from
time. Again, a reason is required why the universe
exists at all. Its existence is not a necessity of
thought. Its eternal non-existence is as readily
conceivable as its eternal existence. But since,
by hypothesis, it eternally exists rather than non-
exists, there must be some adequate cause for its
existence. Again, the matter of which the universe is com
posed has certain definite qualities, and, on the
hypothesis which we are considering, has had them
from eternity. But those qualities might conceivably

4 THE ARGUMENT FOR A FIRST CAUSE
have been quite different from what they are.
Matter, for example, instead of attracting other
matter, might have repelled it, or might have
attracted it according to a different law from that
which actually prevails. It is, in fact, possible to
conceive of an indefinite number of different com
binations of qualities which the original matter
might have had, from each of which a different kind
of universe would have resulted. But matter was
in fact endowed with the particular qualities which
it had, and with no others, and for this there
must have been a cause.
Lastly, the existing state of the world is due not
only to the actual properties of matter, but also
to its collocations, or distribution in space. For
example, the climate of the earth is due not only
to the heat of the sun, but also to its distance.
Now, the present distribution of matter in space is
due to previous distributions, and those to yet
earlier ones, until the earliest of all is reached,
which was the cause of all. But this original dis
tribution of matter, which by hypothesis reaches
back to the eternal past, is only one out of an
indefinite number of distributions which the
original matter might have had. Unless, therefore,
the origin of the world is due to chance, there must
have been some eternal cause which determined the
original distribution.
We conclude, therefore, with confidence, that
whether the universe is eternal or not, a First Cause
of it must exist. We say a cause rather than

OBJECTIONS TO A FIRST CAUSE 5
causes, because one cause being sufficient, it is
unphilosophic to postulate more.1
This chapter may fitly close with a consideration
of certain objections to the idea of a First Cause.
(1) It is objected that since everything is assumed
to have a cause, therefore the First Cause must
have a cause, and that again another cause, and
so on to infinity.
But what is really meant is that everything which
is not absolutely self-existent must have a cause.
The causality of everything except the First Cause
is derived, and more or less imperfect. " Second,"
or physical causes, being wholly determined by
other causes, are really effects,2 and it is reasonable
1 This principle ofthe parsimony of causes is called " Occam's
Razor." William of Occam (died 1349) expressed it thus : " Entia
non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem." Other scholastic
statements of it are, " Principia non sunt cumulanda,'' and
" Frustra sit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora." Sir
William Hamilton stated it as follows: "Neither more, nor
more onerous causes are to be assumed, than are necessary
to account for the phenomena."
Besides the above proof of the unity of God from the prin
ciple of "parsimony," there is the proof a posteriori hom the
unity of nature, and the proof a priori from the metaphysical
impossibility of there being two or more infinites or absolutes ;
but since no one now seriously questions the divine unity,
detailed discussion of the subject is unnecessary.
' The case of man is somewhat different. The human will
is believed to be, within certain limits, self-determining or free.
Now in so far as the will chooses freely between alternatives,
its action is uncaused even by God, and thus it is a true cause
and in no sense an effect. But inasmuch as the will owes its
existence to God, and exercises its freedom by divine per
mission, it is, from another point of view, an effect and not
a cause (see ch. xiii.).

6 THE ARGUMENT FOR A FIRST CAUSE
to seek the cause of causes which are really effects.
But to seek the cause of a cause that is genuinely
such is an absurdity.
It may be added that an infinite regress of causes,
without any First Cause, even if it were possible,
would afford no explanation of the universe. For
such a supposed chain of causes, all dependent
upon one another, would really be a chain of effects,
and the universe would consist entirely of effects
without any cause. To attempt to account for the
universe without assuming a First Cause is like
trying to make a clock without a spring, or to
hang a chain in the air.
(2) Another objection to the proof of a First Cause
is based upon the theory of causation first advanced
by Hume. According to Hume and his modern
representatives, no such thing as efficient causation
can be detected in nature. It can be established,
they say, by observation, that certain events in
variably precede other events, but not that they
effectively cause them. They conclude from this
that the argument for a First Cause advanced by
Theists is invalid.
The reply to this is twofold.
(a) Although efficient causation cannot be directly
observed in nature, it can be legitimately inferred.
Hume and Mill are quite right in saying that all
that we actually see in nature is the regular sequence
of events. But this regular sequence must have
a cause. What the cause is may be doubtful, but
that it exists is certain.

HUME, MILL, AND KANT ON CAUSATION 7
(_>) Although efficient causation cannot be observed
in nature, it can be observed in the human mind.
When a man resolves to think of something and
thinks of it, or to do something and does it, it is
impossible to persuade him by any subtlety of
argument that he is not the efficient cause of his
own thought and action. Reid indeed maintained,
" For anything I know to the contrary, some other
Being may move my hand as often as I will to
move it," but ingenious speculations of this kind do
not set aside the plain verdict of common sense.
Efficient causation, therefore, exists ; and if Mill
and Hume cannot find a place for it in their
philosophies, the inference is that their philosophies
are seriously defective.
(3) Kant's objection to the argument for a First
Cause is slightly different from Hume's. He admits
that we are bound by the constitution of our thinking
faculty to assume that everything has a cause, but
denies that this proves that it is so. He regards
causation as a way we have of looking at things, a
law of the working of our own minds, and not at all
a law of the external world. Things are not really
causes; we only think they are. And since there
are no causes, there cannot be a First Cause.
The reply is that such a position logically leads
to universal scepticism. If we cannot trust our
reason, we can trust nothing. All science is
ultimately based on the postulate that our rational
faculties, when rightly used, are able to lead us
to truth. This may be called an act of faith in

8 THE ARGUMENT FOR A FIRST CAUSE
the trustworthiness of reason. A man may refuse
to make it, but if he does, he renders all knowledge
impossible. If a man can doubt the evidence of
his reason that everything has a cause, he can
equally doubt the truth of the axioms of mathe
matics, or the evidence of his senses. So contrary
to common sense is Kant's position, that he is
unable to hold it consistently. In the end he admits
that external things are causes, and that they cause
sensations in us.
Prof. Karl Pearson holds a similar doctrine. Ac
cording to him the idea of causation is purely sub
jective. We know only our own sensations, and not
external things or their relations. "We find," he
says, "that the mind is entirely limited to one
source, sense-impression, for its contents." ..." We
are cribbed and confined in this world of sense-
impressions, . . . and not a step beyond can we
get."1 Yet Prof. Pearson, like Kant, holds that
there is a real external world, on the ground that
our sense-impressions must have causes. So, after
all, causation does exist in some form or other as
a reality outside the mind.

APPENDIX
THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE
The ontological argument is an attempt to prove the
existence of God from the mere idea of God. As stated
by St. Anselm, it is as follows : We have in our minds the
1 Grammar of Science, pp. 62, 108, etc.

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 9
idea of a perfect being ; but an actually existing being is more
perfect than a being that exists in the mind alone : therefore a
perfect being really exists.
Gaunilo, a contemporary of St. Anselm, retorted with the
following parallel argument : It is possible to conceive of a
perfect island, far superior to any existing island ; but a really
existing island is more perfect than an island that exists in
the mind alone : therefore the perfect island that we imagined
really exists.
The saint replied that the perfection of an island is only
relative and partial, whereas the perfection of God is absolute,
so that the arguments are not really parallel. In this he
was right ; but it cannot be denied that the argument, as
originally stated, was open to Gaunilo's criticism.
Anselm's argument, rejected by the schoolmen, was revived
in a modified form by Descartes and Leibnitz.
A more satisfactory way of stating the argument is as
follows : There exist in the human mind ideals, e.g. the ideal
of absolute perfection ; but such an ideal cannot be derived
from the mind itself, for the mind is imperfect ; nor can it
be derived from external nature, for nothing perfect exists
in nature. It remains that it must be derived from some
Being superior to nature, who is absolutely perfect.
It should be noticed that this form of the argument does
not, like Anselm's, infer the existence of God from the mere
idea of perfection, but from the need of assigning a cause
to this idea.

LITERATURE (a) THEISTIC
Flint, Theism, lect. iv. ; J. Martineau, A Study of Religion,
bk. ii. c. 1; Descartes, Metaphysical Meditations (tr.), iii.;
Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 32 ff. ; Fraser, Philosophy of
Theism, vol. i. lect. 8, vol. ii. lect. 2 ; Romanes, Thoughts on
Religion, pp. 116-28; J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism,

io THE ARGUMENT FOR A FIRST CAUSE
lect. xix. ; Pearson, On the Creed, art. i. c. 2 ; W. S. Jevons,
Principles of Science, c. xxxi. ; F. C. S. Schiller, Riddles ofthe
Sphinx, c. x. ; Knight, Aspects of Theism, c. vii.
[b) Agnostic
Hume, Human Understanding, sect. vii. ; J. S. Mill, Three
Essays on Religion, p. 142 ff.; Spencer, First Principles, pt. i. ;
K. Pearson, Grammar of Science, p. 113 ff. ; Kant, Critique of
Pure Reason (tr. Meiklejohn), pp. 359-410.
(_) Atheistic
"Physicus,"1 Candid Examination of Theism, pp. 6-8, 189-97 >
Haeckel, Riddle of the Universe, especially c. xii.
(_?) The Ontological Argument
Knight, o.c, c. iv. ; Flint, o.c, p. 278 ff.
A translation of St. Anselm's Proslogium and Monologium,
together with Gaunilo's objection and St. Anselm's reply, is
issued by the Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago.
1 I.e. the distinguished naturalist G. J. Romanes. The author
afterwards retracted his opinions and died in the communion
of the Church. His unfinished Thoughts on Religion is a
refutation of his earlier work.

CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF THE FIRST CAUSE
Summary. — It is proved against Pantheism that the First Cause
is not identical with the universe. If it were, it could not
be the cause of the universe. Also it would have con
tradictory and impossible attributes. The personality ofthe
First Cause is demonstrated (a) from the fact that perfect
causality can only be affirmed of a free personal intelligence,
(b) from the fact that infinity in the strict sense can only be
affirmed of perfect mind, and (c) from the existence of human
personality. If the First Cause is not personal, it is inferior
to its creature, man. Personality, being a pure perfection,
implies no limitation or imperfection of the nature of the
First Cause.
It was demonstrated in the last chapter that a First
Cause of the universe exists. The object of the
present chapter is to investigate its nature.
I. — The Transcendence of the First Cause
The first question that requires discussion is
whether the First Cause is distinct from the uni
verse, or identical with it. According to Pantheism,
God and Nature are identical. Nothing exists
except God, and therefore the universe is its own
First Cause.
The pantheistic view has already been incidentally
refuted in proving the existence of a First Cause.
In the first chapter it was shown that the existing

12 THE NATURE OF THE FIRST CAUSE
universe is not the only universe conceivable, and
that therefore there must be some cause why this
particular universe out of the infinite number of
possible universes actually exists. But such a
cause cannot be the universe itself, nor can it be a
limited being greater than the universe. It must
be a cause capable of producing all possible uni
verses : in other words, it must be transcendental,
infinite, and absolute. It must be infinite not only
in certain limited respects (as in the opinion of
some the present universe is infinite in time and
extension), but infinite in all possible respects, and
the absolute cause of all inferior infinities.
The error of Pantheism may also be shown by a
consideration of its consequences.
(i) If the First Cause is identical with the uni
verse, then the First Cause is liable to change. The
universe, if not as a whole, at least in its parts, is
subject to evolution or development. The First
Cause, therefore, must evolve or develop, and be
sometimes more perfect and sometimes less perfect.
This is fully admitted by many Pantheists. Hegel,
for example, teaches that the First Cause begins by
being unconscious and destitute of all qualities, that
it gradually perfects itself as the world develops,
and finally attains self-consciousness in man.
Analogous statements are made by ScheUing, Fichte,
Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and Spinoza.
But the First Cause must, as has been already
shown, be absolutely complete and perfect in all
respects. If it changes, it must thereby become

PANTHEISM 13
either more complete or less complete. If more
complete, it was not complete before it changed ;
if less complete, it ceases, after the change, to be
the First Cause. Therefore it cannot change at all.
(2) If God is identical with the universe, contradic
tions and absurdities must be affirmed of Him. He
must be conscious and unconscious, rational and
irrational, material and immaterial, hot and cold,
round and square, moving and at rest. He must
be identical with the Theist who believes in a God
distinct from the world, with the Pantheist who
believes that the universe is God, and with the
Atheist who denies that there is a God at all.
Moreover, since the universe consists of parts and
is extended, God must consist of parts and be
extended. (3) But this is not the worst. If God is identical
with the actual world, moral distinctions disappear
altogether. Since evil exists as well as good, God
must be sinful as well as holy, cruel as well as
merciful, unjust as well as just. He must be the
coward as well as the hero, the murderer as well as
his victim, the criminal as well as his judge. The
more thorough-going Pantheists admit this. Hegel,
for example, says : " What kind of an absolute being
is that which does not contain in itself all that is
actual, even evil included?" And an Indian
Pantheist only develops the moral consequences
of his creed when he says: "Though the soul
plunge itself in sin, like a sword in water, it shall
in no wise cling to it."

14 THE NATURE OF THE FIRST CAUSE
But a creed which denies the distinction between
right and wrong, a distinction grounded on the
direct testimony of consciousness, must be false.1
II. — The Personality of the First Cause
(i) It has been shown that God is a perfect cause.
But the conception of perfect cause involves the
idea of perfect personality. Cause is a conception
derived, not from observation of external nature,
but from observation of the operations of the mind
itself. The mind is able to choose freely certain
ends, and to bring them about, either by willing
them directly or by willing their appropriate means.
A being, therefore, which is a cause in the full sense
of the word, must possess intelligence and volition.
It is true that inanimate objects and forces are
sometimes spoken of as causes, but always in a
lower and inferior sense. A cause, strictly so
called, must be a person, and a perfect and infinite
cause must be a perfect and infinite person.
(2) The personality of God may also be proved
from His infinity. It has been shown that God
is infinite in the sense that He contains within
Himself the equivalent of all possible things. But
possible as distinguished from actual things can
exist only for a mind. Matter is entirely actual.
It is precisely what it is, and cannot contain
within itself what is not, as a mind can when it
conceives the possible. God therefore, as contain
ing within Himself all possibility, is infinite mind.
1 See chap. iii.

GOD'S PERSONALITY 15
But impersonal mind is an absurdity. Therefore
God must be an infinite person.
(3) The personality of God may also be proved
from the existence of human personality, as follows.
No effect can transcend its cause. Now, personality,
as it exists in man, is the highest known fact in
the universe : therefore God is at least personal.
This argument is based on the self-evident truth.
confirmed also by experience, that the cause of an
effect must always be adequate, that is, it must contain
within itself a power and excellence at least equal
to the effect to be produced. Within the sphere of
human activity (which is the only form of efficient
causality directly known to us) this law invariably
holds. For instance, a great picture can only be
produced by a great painter, and a great poem by a
great poet. Never under any circumstances is this
prii 'iple violated. An inferior artist never pro
duces a great work of art ; an idiot never accom
plishes a task which would naturally require an
intelligent man to accomplish it.
Nevertheless, plausible objections have been
made to the principle of adequate cause considered
as of universal applicability. John Stuart Mill,
for example, says: "The notion seems to be that
no causes can give rise to products of a more
precious or elevated kind than themselves. But
this is at variance with the known analogies of
Nature. How vastly nobler and more precious,
for instance, are the higher vegetables and animals
than the soil and manure out of which and by

16 THE NATURE OF THE FIRST CAUSE
the properties of which they are raised up ! The
tendency of all recent speculation is toward the
opinion that the development of inferior orders of
existence into superior, the substitution of greater
elaboration and higher organization for lower, is
the general rule of Nature. Whether it is so or
not, there are at least in Nature a multitude of
facts bearing that character, and that is sufficient
for the argument." 1
Mill here confuses succession "with efficient causality.
He argues that because a less excellent state of
things precedes a more excellent state of things,
therefore it causes it. This is the old fallacy of
post hoc ergo propter hoc. It is perfectly true that
for the purposes of natural science, which does
not profess to deal with efficient causation, the idea
of cause as "invariable antecedent" may suffice,
but it does not suffice for philosophy. Philosophy
asks not only what things follow what things,
but why they do so, and by no means assumes
that, because one thing follows another, it causes it.
In the order of nature, matter precedes life, and
life precedes mind; but it would be rash indeed
to conclude from this that matter causes life and
life causes mind. It may be that all three are
effects of some other cause, or that if they cause
one another, the order of causation may be precisely
the reverse of what is assumed. It is perfectly
conceivable, and indeed is held by good authorities,
that the order of causation is the reverse of the
1 Three Essays, p. 152.

MILL ON EFFICIENT CAUSE 17
order of time, and that what appears later in order
of evolution is really the cause of what appears
earlier. In this case, instead of matter being the
cause of mind, mind is the cause of matter; and
instead of Darwin's arboreal animal being the
cause of man, man is the cause of the arboreal
animal ; and instead of the original nebula being
the cause of the universe, the universe is the
cause of the original nebula. Either of these
suppositions is preferable to the absurdity of
supposing that a cause can produce anything
superior to itself.
It may be added that Mill's examples of effects
transcending their causes are singularly ill chosen.
The " higher vegetables and animals " of which he
speaks, are certainly never produced entirely from
soil and manure, but always from other vegetables
and animals of the same kind.
There is nothing, therefore, in the facts of natural
science to hinder the argument from the personality
of man to the personality of God. Moral person
ality, as we know it in man, is the highest fact in
Nature, and therefore the Author of Nature must
be at least moral or personal, otherwise He would
be inferior to His own creatures. Theists admit
that " moral " and " personal " are inadequate terms
to apply to God ; but they represent the highest
qualities that we can conceive, and are therefore
the nearest to the truth. If any one prefers to
speak of God as hyper-personal, no Theist who
understands his position will object.

i8 THE NATURE OF THE FIRST CAUSE
III. — Objections
It is now necessary to consider certain difficulties
and objections which are frequently urged against
the ascription of personality to the First Cause.
First Objection. — It is said that if it is logical to
argue that because man is personal, God is so, it
must be logical to argue that because man has a
brain, God has a brain, and that because man is
imperfect, therefore God is imperfect; in fact, on
the principle that whatever is true of the effect,
is true of the cause, it is necessary to argue that
God, being the cause of the material world, must
Himself be material, extended, heavy, and so
forth.1 The reply is that it is not true, and is not assumed
by the argument, that whatever is true of the effect
is true of the cause. In a certain sense, of course,
the effect is contained in the cause, but only in
the sense that the cause is able to produce it. Thus
a painter is the cause of the picture he produces,
but he is not the picture, nor does he possess the
attributes of the picture. For instance, he is not
rectangular, nor made of paint and canvas.
Yet, although the cause need not actually possess
any of the attributes of the effect, it is possible, by
examining the effect, to obtain important information
about it. For instance, by examining a picture, it
is possible to infer that it was produced by a
1 This is argued by Mr. G. J. Holyoake, Prof. Clifford, Prof.
Du Bois-Reymond, and others.

OBJECTIONS TO GOD'S PERSONALITY 19
painter, and if it is a good picture, that the painter
possessed considerable artistic skill. Similarly, it
is possible from an examination of Nature to infer
an Author of Nature, and to conclude, not indeed
that He is material, or extended, or anything of
the kind, but that He possesses great skill and
wisdom. Now it has been already proved that He
possesses infinite power, and it will be proved
more fully in the next chapter that He possesses
infinite moral perfection. God, therefore, is pure
perfection without any admixture of limitation or
imperfection. But to possess a brain, or to be
material, or to be extended, are qualities denoting
limitation and imperfection ; therefore they cannot
in any sense be affirmed of God. But personality,
provided that it can be shown to express a pure
perfection, is predicable of Him.
Second Objection. — It is objected that personality
implies some measure of limitation or imperfection,
and that therefore it cannot be predicated of the
infinite and absolute God.
In order to examine this objection, it is necessary
to analyse the idea of personality. Whenever God
is affirmed to be personal, it is meant among other
things less important: (1) that He is intelligent;
(2) that He is self-conscious ; (3) that He possesses
will. (1) That intelligence is the name of a perfection
is clear. Even the limited intelligence of man is a
noble attribute, exalting him to be the king and
high-priest of nature. Moreover, intelligence is not

2o THE NATURE OF THE FIRST CAUSE
an attribute implying in itself limitation or imper
fection. It is as easy to conceive a perfect intel
ligence, knowing all actual and possible things,
as to conceive a limited intelligence like man's.
Intelligence, therefore, in a perfect and infinite
degree, can be legitimately predicated of God.
(2) Self-consciousness, again, is implied in perfect
intelligence. For if a perfectly intelligent Being
did not know Himself, His intelligence would be
limited. (3) Will, in like manner, is a real perfection. With
out an active will, man, in spite of the gift of intel
ligence, would never have attained the mastery of
the world. Even God, if He were pure intelligence
without will, could neither create nor govern the
world. If therefore God is really perfect, He must
possess will. Will implies, of itself, no limitation
or imperfection of nature. It is as easy to conceive
of a will absolutely free and infinitely powerful,
as to conceive of a Jimited will like man's. God
therefore possesses a will adequate to His intel
ligence — that is to say, He is able to achieve all
that is possible.
Third Objection. — It is objected by certain philo
sophers of the " absolute " school, that God cannot
be personal, because that would contradict His
being "absolute." By "absolute" is meant not
related in any way to anything. But if God, they
argue, is personal and conscious, and knows Him
self and other things, He must be related to
Himself, and therefore imperfect, and not absolute.

GOD A RATIONAL ABSOLUTE 21
We reply : Not every relation implies imperfec
tion or limitation. Certainly the relation of an
Infinite Being to Himself does not. Such a relation
must from the nature of the case be an infinite
and perfect one. Similarly, the relation of a perfect
cause to its effect implies no imperfection in the
cause, though it may in the effect. We may go
further, and say that if God were really absolute
in the sense of being unable to enter into relations
with anything, He would be unable to create or
rule the world, which is absurd.
Another objection of a similar kind is that if God
is " absolute," He must have absolutely all attributes.
Thus He must not only be absolutely personal,
but also absolutely impersonal ; not only absolutely
holy, but absolutely sinful, and so forth. But this
is absurd. One and the same being cannot have
at the same time a number of contradictory attri
butes. God is a rational, not an irrational absolute.
He possesses every possible perfection in an abso
lute degree, but no contradictory attributes or
imperfections of any kind.

APPENDIX
IS GOD FINITE OR INFINITE?
There has been much discussion in recent Philosophy as to
whether God is finite or infinite. God is certainly not finite
in the sense of Mr. J. S. Mill and Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, who
argue that the world being finite, its cause is finite, and that

22 THE NATURE OF THE FIRST CAUSE
God accordingly is only a kind of Primus inter pares — a Being
greater than other beings, but of the same order.
All actual existence is finite, and ifa cause for actual existence
alone had to be sought, God, perhaps, might be regarded as
finite. But we have to seek a cause for all possible and con
ceivable existence, and since the categories of the possible and
the conceivable are, to our faculties at least, infinite, God
must, by creatures like us, be regarded as infinite.
It is, however, possible that, from the point of view of perfect
intelligence, the number of possibilities and conceivabilities
is finite, and that therefore God appears to Himself as a
finite, complete, and perfect whole. Thus God is finite to
Himself, but infinite to us, and to all creatures. This,
perhaps, is the true solution of the difficulty. Many good
metaphysicians hold that absolute infinity is an irrational and
impossible conception, and that therefore absolute infinity
cannot be predicated of God.

LITERATURE (a) Theistic
Flint, Anti-theistic Theories, lect. ix., x.; Illingworth, Person
ality, Human and Divine, and Divine Immanence ; Momerie,
Personality, and Belief in God; Boedder, Natural Theology,
p. 46 ff. ; Martineau, A Study of Religion ; Luthardt, Funda
mental Truths, lect. iii. ; Sturt, Personal Idealism, viii. ;
Fisher, Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, c. i. ;
Knight, Aspects of Theism, c. xi.
(.) Pantheistic and Agnostic
Spinoza, Ethics, pt. i. ; M. Arnold, God and the Bible^
H. Spencer, First Principles, pt. i.

CHAPTER III
THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE AND
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD
Summary. — Only the general goodness, and not the moral
perfection, of the Deity can be proved by arguments taken
from external nature. But the inward voice of conscience
testifies that a perfect standard of righteousness exists
independent of the human mind. Whatever, therefore, may
be the explanation of moral evil, God is good, and hates
evil. The evidence of conscience is vindicated against the
misrepresentations of Hedonism and Utilitarianism ; also
against certain illegitimate deductions from the theory of
Evolution.
It is impossible to prove by observation of the
world alone the moral perfection of the First
Cause. Neither the justice, nor the benevolence,
nor even the veracity of the Deity are so plainly
manifested in the present order of things that doubt
concerning them is impossible. Upon the whole, no
doubt, nature gives us the impression that God is
good. His justice is daily vindicated in the general
prosperity of virtue and the general misery of vice.
His benevolence is shown in the delight which all
creatures feel in the mere exercise of their bodily
and mental functions. His veracity may be in
ferred from the fact that He gives His creatures
faculties for the attainment of truth, and therefore
23

24 THE MORAL ARGUMENT
presumably loves truth. But, on the other hand,
the existence of so much unrewarded virtue and
unpunished wrong, of so much seeming cruelty, and
above all of so much sin and error in the world,
seems to cast a doubt upon the absolute perfection
of His moral character. So much are these diffi
culties felt even by thoroughly religious men, that
some have supposed that there exists besides the
good God an eternal principle of evil, which He is
unable, with all His efforts, entirely to control.
Others have supposed that the moral character of
God is, like that of men, partly good and partly evil.
It is necessary, therefore, to turn to an argument
of a more decisive character, and this is to be
found in what is known as the Moral Argument.
Man is a moral being. No nation of men is
known who have not some idea of the distinction
between right and wrong. As to the particular
actions which are right or wrong, there is some
diversity of opinion, though less than is often re
presented; but as to the reality of moral dis
tinctions, and the duty of men to do the right so
far as they understand it, there is complete agree
ment. Since, however, the existence of moral distinctions
is, as will be shown, one of the strongest proofs of
the existence of a moral Creator, many attempts
have been made by philosophers of sceptical
tendencies to show that these distinctions are
illusory, and that right conduct is, at bottom,
nothing but enlightened self-interest.

HEDONISM 25
Hedonism. — According to one form of this teach
ing, known as Hedonism, the chief end of life is
Pleasure. That form of conduct which yields to
the individual the maximum of pleasure or the
minimum of pain is right, and other standard of
right there is none.
The reply to Hedonism is threefold. In the first
place, conscience testifies that duty and pleasure,
even when they coincide, as they sometimes do, are
not the same thing ; and experience further testifies
that they often collide. The Hedonist answers that
the collision is only apparent, for if what is called
duty ever summons a man to sacrifice a present
pleasure, it is always in order to secure a greater
pleasure in the future. But the plain man remains
convinced, all the same, that there are some cases of
virtuous self-sacrifice in which there is no adequate
return in terms of pleasure. Especially is this the
case when a man at the call of duty sacrifices his
life for his country, or for some noble cause. In
this case, there being, on sceptical principles, no
future life, a future compensation is impossible.
In the second place, Hedonism fails to account
for the feeling of moral obligation as distinguished
from prudence. It is doubtless prudent to follow
the course of conduct which yields an overplus of
pleasure, but it can never be a duty to do so, in the
sense that to act otherwise would be a sin. But
the sense of duty and the sense of sin are inexpugn
able facts in human nature. It is simply playing
with the subject to assert that the sense of duty is

26 THE MORAL ARGUMENT
only a conviction that a certain course of conduct
will be pleasurable, or that remorse, say, for a
mean or cowardly action, is only a conviction
that a more pleasurable course of conduct might
have been chosen. Hedonism, therefore, failing
to account for the sense of duty, or for shame,
or repentance, or remorse, or for any of the
strictly moral feelings, is an inadequate theory
of morals.
In the third place, Hedonism affords no secure
basis for social morality. Its basis is the greatest
pleasure of the individual, and it is impossible to
show that this always coincides with the interests
of society. The best authorities say that it does
not ; and even if it does, the proof is so doubtful,
that it would never be able to hold in check the
narrow self-interest which the general adoption
of Hedonistic principles would inevitably foster.
To take a concrete example, it is impossible to
show by conclusive arguments that the pleasure
of having children is not outweighed by the great
pain, self-denial, and anxiety which the bearing
and nurture of children entails ; and therefore it is
probable that if Hedonistic opinions ever prevailed
universally, men and women would refuse to rear
children, and the human race would dwindle or
come to an end.
Utilitarianism. — The general inadequacy and
moral repulsiveness of pure Hedonism have led
to its restatement in the modified form of
Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism differs from simple

UTILITARIANISM 27
Hedonism in having regard to the happiness
of others as well as of self. According to its
teaching, right conduct is that which conduces
to the greatest happiness or greatest pleasure of
the greatest number. Every one, in acting, is to
consider not only his own pleasure, but the plea
sure of all other persons whom his action will
affect, according to the principle, " Every one
to count for one, and nobody for more than one."
In the system of Utilitarianism expounded by
John Stuart Mill there is a further element.
Account is taken not only of the intensity or
quantity of pleasures, but also of their quality.
A distinction is drawn between pleasures that are
noble and elevated, and pleasures that are ignoble
and base. This distinction, true and important as
it is, is an illegitimate addition to the theory in
question. No pleasure, considered simply as
pleasure, can differ from another pleasure otherwise
than in quantity or intensity. If it differs in any
other way, it must be from the presence in it of
something which is not pleasure. Every course
of conduct or action has various qualities or aspects.
It may, for example, be pleasurable, and dignified,
and unusual, and beautiful, and noble, and vir
tuous, and many other things. But its pleasure-
ableness is not its dignity, or its unusualness, or
its beauty, or its nobleness, or its virtuousness.
All these qualities, though conjoined in the same
course of action, are distinct. Mill therefore, in
recognizing grades of ,nobility in- pleasures, has

28 THE MORAL ARGUMENT
passed beyond mere pleasure, and introduced
aesthetic and moral distinctions for which his
theory has no place.
In general criticism of Utilitarianism it may be
remarked that it is as incapable as Hedonism of
finding room for, or of explaining, the fundamental
moral facts. It does not explain the sense of duty —
the sense, that is, that a course of conduct is not
only prudent as conducing to pleasure, but binding
on the conscience in a far higher sense. Nor can
it either justify or logically urge real self-sacrifice.
When the interests of society require that an
individual should sacrifice his interests or his life
for its sake, what argument can the Utilitarian
bring to bear on him ? He can say, " You should
consider the interests of others more than your
own." But the man can retort, " Why should I ? "
and to this there is, on Utilitarian principles, no
answer. Utilitarianism, then, is simply a very
illogical form of Hedonism. As Dr. Martineau
epigrammatically expresses it, " From ' Each for
himself to 'Each for all' — no road."
Evolutionary Ethics. — The last sceptical theory
of morality which it is necessary to examine is
that of the existing school of Evolutionary Ethics.
Following a hint of Darwin in his Descent of
Man, Mr. Herbert Spencer, Mr. Leslie Stephen,
Prof. Clifford, and others, have sought to ex
plain conscience as an inherited faculty derived,
partly from the "tribal conscience" — i.e. the gre
garious instincts of primitive man — and partly

SPENCER'S EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS 29
from the accumulated experiences of the race
that certain actions conduce on the whole to
pleasure, and others to pain. As Mr. Spencer
expresses it, " Experiences of utility, organized and
consolidated during all past generations of the
human race, have been producing nervous modifica
tions, which, by continued transmission and accu
mulation, have become in us certain faculties of
moral intuition, certain emotions responding to
right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent
basis in the individual experience of utility."
Mr. Spencer's theory is, in its main features,
credible enough. It is credible, though it is not
demonstrated, that ancestral experiences as to
what things are beneficial and noxious, may be
transmitted to posterity as instincts to seek and
avoid those things. It is also clear that tribes of
unselfish men would, owing to their unusual
powers of co-operation, have a great advantage in
warfare and in other respects over tribes of selfish
men, and so would tend to survive and to propagate
unselfishness. Nor need it be denied that con
science has been evolved — perhaps, even, evolved out
of non-moral elements. What must, in the interests
of truth, be denied, is the illegitimate assumption
that because conscience has been evolved out of
non-moral elements, therefore it is still identical
with those non-moral elements. Such an assump
tion is contrary to experience. A chicken is
evolved out of an egg, but there is more in a
chicken than there is in an egg. Man has been

30 THE MORAL ARGUMENT
evolved, according to Darwin, out of an ape, but
there is more in man than there is in an ape. The
perception of colour has been evolved out of the
perception of light, but the perception of colour is
more than the perception of light. The fact is that
the history of Evolution is the history of real
additions to the knowledge and capacities of crea
tures. It is not the mere reshuffling of old elements,
but the gradual appearance of entirely new ones.
It is nothing to the point, therefore, to prove that
the ideas of right and wrong have been evolved out
of the ideas of pleasure and pain, or out of tribal
instincts. What is necessary is to prove that they
contain no new element, and this the evolutionist
moralists have not seriously attempted to do.
There is nothing, therefore, in the theory of
evolution, to lead us to distrust the validity of
our moral intuitions, or to require us to resolve
them, contrary to the plain testimony of conscious
ness, into non-moral elements such as pleasure
and pain. Conscience, then, is trustworthy, and
hence, to account for conscience, there must be a
God, and a God with moral attributes, as will
now be shown.
The Argument from Conscience. — (i) The moral
law is felt to be not a mere human convention,
but objectively true. Deceit, cowardice, selfish
ness, cruelty, injustice, envy, ingratitude, and the
like are felt to be in themselves, and apart from
all consequences, morally base and vile; while
truthfulness, courage, unselfishness, benevolence,

ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIENCE 31
justice, generosity, and gratitude are felt to be in
themselves morally excellent. It is as certain that
they are so, as that feathers are light, and lead
heavy. But these moral distinctions must have an
efficient cause. The cause cannot be man himself,
because moral distinctions are discerned to be
objectively true, and to be independent of human
will and legislation. The cause cannot be anything
non-moral or physical, otherwise the effect would
transcend the cause; besides, moral distinctions
can only exist for a moral and personal being.
It follows, therefore, that the cause must lie in
some transcendent Personal Being to whom moral
distinctions are real, and who is altogether holy.
(2) The same result is reached from a considera
tion of the sense of duty, or moral obligation.
Whenever one course of conduct is discerned to be
morally right, and the alternative courses of conduct
morally wrong, there arises in the mind a sense
of moral obligation. This is a feeling altogether
peculiar in its nature. It is not a sense of compul
sion : the person under a sense of moral obligation
is perfectly free to resist it. Nor is it a feeling that
it would be imprudent to refuse to perform the act.
It is more like an earnest command or exhortation,
founded on such just and evident reasons, that it
cannot be neglected without a sense of shame and
sin. Now this exhortation, or command, or
" categorical imperative," as Kant called it, clearly
comes from outside ourselves. Being moral in
its nature, it cannot come from the non-moral or

32 THE MORAL ARGUMENT
physical universe. It must come, therefore, from
some personal Being superior to man, who since
He commands always what is right, and sets
before man a standard of sinless perfection, must
be morally perfect. This argument was never
better expressed than by Cicero, who says : 1 "It
has always been the persuasion of all truly wise
men that the moral law was not devised by men
or introduced by nations, but is an eternal law to
which the whole world must conform. Its ultimate
basis is God, who commands and forbids. And
this law is as old as the mind of God Himself.
Hence the law upon which all moral obligation is
founded is truly and pre-eminently the mind of the
Supreme Divinity."
Difficulties undoubtedly occur, when an attempt
is made to account for the existence of evil in a
world ruled by a perfect Being; but since the
Author of the universe reveals Himself in con
science as irreconcilably opposed to evil, He cannot
possibly be its cause. But this subject will be
more fully discussed later.

LITERATURE
(a) The Moral Argument
Flint, Theism, lect. vii. ; Fraser, Philosophy of Theism,
vol. ii. lect. i ; Martineau, A Study of Religion, ii. p. 39 ff. ;
Ebrard, Apologetics (tr.), vol. i. pp. 17-24, 208-55 i Boedder,
Natural Theology, p. 62 ff. ; Newman, Grammar of Assent,
c. v. ; Knight, Aspects of Theism, c. xii. ; F. P. Cobbe, A
Faithless World; Butler, Sermons.
1 De Legibus, ii. 4.

ETHICS OF EVOLUTION 33
(b) Hedonism and Evolutionary Ethics
J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism ; J. Martineau, Types of Ethical
Theory, vol. ii. pp. 304-422 ; Huxley, Evolution and Ethics,
pp. 1-146; Clifford, Lectures, vol. ii. p. 74 ff. ; K. Pearson, Ethic
of Freethought; Wundt, Ethical Systems (tr.), p. 142-59;
C. M. Williams, Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of
Evolution ; F. P. Cobbe, Darwinism in Morals.

CHAPTER IV

Summary. — The general harmony of Nature is attributed by
philosophers either (i) to unknown or unknowable causes,
or (2) to the natural properties of matter and energy, or
(3) to a Designing Mind. But as against (1), it is illegitimate
to postulate unknown or unknowable causes, when known
ones suffice, and as against (2), it is impossible to explain
from the known properties of matter and energy either the
origin of these properties, or the reason why matter was
originally arranged as it was, or the origin of consciousness
and intelligence. There remains, therefore, the third hypo
thesis, a Designing Mind, which is proved to be the true
and adequate cause both of the order of physical nature
and of consciousness and intelligence.
Most serious thinkers admit that the universe is
neither a fortuitous concourse of atoms nor an
incoherent medley of partial uniformities, but a
unity of the most thoroughgoing kind. All the
forces of Nature, even those which are most diverse,
co-operate for common ends, and result in har
monious combinations which cannot possibly be
accidental. For instance, the body of a living
animal is a most wonderful and complex harmony
of diverse forces, mechanical, chemical, vital, and
1 The argument of this chapter is popularly called " The
Argument from Design." Strictly speaking it should be called
" The Argument./*?.- Design." 34

SPENCER'S UNKNOWABLE 3S
psychical, all supplementing one another, and
tending jointly to promote the proper good of
the animal. Moreover, organisms in general are
adjusted to the environment, and the environment
to organisms in such way as to make it evident to
all observing minds that a principle of harmony
and order runs through the whole of Nature.
Attempts to explain this harmony may be divided
into three classes. Some philosophers attribute it
to unknown or unknowable causes, others to the
natural properties of matter and energy, and others
to design. Besides these three suppositions there
are no others.
(i) Theories of the Unknowable. — With regard to
the first supposition, that the harmony of Nature
is due to unknown or unknowable causes, it might
suffice to say that it is illegitimate to appeal to
unknown or unknowable causes, until it has been
plainly proved that known causes are inadequate
to account for things. It is, nevertheless, advis
able to consider what these alleged causes are,
and what they are worth.
(a) Mr. Spencer attributes the origin of things
to "the Unknowable." But this hypothesis is
objectionable because there is no evidence that
anything unknowable exists. Unknown things
exist in plenty, but there is no evidence that any
of them are unknowable. The First Cause may,
of course, be unknowable, but there is at any rate
no proof that it is. There are two alternatives —
one that it is knowable, and the other that it is

36 DESIGN IN NATURE
unknowable. Which of these alternatives is true
can only be decided by a person who has attained
to actual knowledge of the First Cause. Mr.
Spencer, therefore, who knows that the First
Cause is unknowable, must have attained to con
siderable actual knowledge of the very cause which
he professes not to know. It has, indeed, been
wittily remarked that there are few things in the
whole realm of human knowledge with which Mr.
Spencer displays from time to time such an intimate
acquaintance as the " Unknowable." Thus he fre
quently asserts, (i) that it exists, (2) that it is the
cause of all things, (3) that it always preserves in
the universe the same amount of actual and potential
energy, (4) that it is impersonal, and (5) that it is
a stupendous and immeasurable force. But if all
this can be known about the "Unknowable," Mr.
Spencer can have no objection on principle to
theologians knowing a few more things about it —
as, for example, that it is Infinite Mind, and the
Moral Governor of the universe. In reality Mr.
Spencer's " Unknowable " is only a form of im
personal energy, and the inadequacy of impersonal
causes to explain the universe has already been
demonstrated in Chapters II. and III.
(b) Thoroughgoing Hegelians explain the world
as a manifestation ofthe "Absolute." The futilities
of the Hegelian Absolute have already been ex
hibited in Chapter II. It may be added here, that
even if such a mass of logical contradictions as the
Hegelian Absolute could possibly manage to exist,

UNCONSCIOUS WILL AND MIND-STUFF 37
it could never give existence to a world which is
rational and logical.
(c) Schopenhauer attributed the origin of things
to " unconscious will." But since will is the
deliberate choice by rational and conscious beings
of some particular course of action, the phrase
unconscious will is a contradiction in terms. The
same may be said of such phrases as " unconscious
mind," " unconscious design," and the like, which
are occasionally used by thinkers who reject the
idea of a personal God, and yet recoil from the
alternative of naked Materialism. In reality there
is no logical halting-place between thoroughgoing
Theism and thoroughgoing Materialism. A cosmic
mind which does not think and is not conscious,
is no mind at all, and might just as well be called
matter at once.
(d) The late Prof. Clifford accounted for things
by his theory of " mind-stuff." " The universe,"
he says, "consists entirely of mind-stuff." By
"mind-stuff" he means indefinite numbers of
separate sensations or feelings existing apart by
themselves scattered through space, without any
mind to feel them. These atoms of "mind-stuff,"
by combining together, gradually form themselves
into matter, and mind, and all the phenomena of
the universe. " A feeling," says Clifford, " can
exist by itself without forming part of a conscious
ness. It does not depend for its existence on the
consciousness of which it may form a part. Hence
a feeling is a thing-in-itself, an absolute whose

38 DESIGN IN NATURE
existence is not relative to anything else " {Lectures,
vol. ii. pp. 52-73)- It is sufficient to say of this theory
that there is no evidence that "mind-stuff" either
does or can exist. Indeed, there is the strongest
reason for supposing that it cannot, for to imagine
that sensations or feelings exist as it were " in
the air," without any mind to feel them, is like
imagining that the attributes of bodies, such as
heaviness, hardness, colour, and the like, exist
apart from the bodies to which they belong, and
apart from the minds which perceive them.
(.) Equally unsatisfactory are those theories
which seek the origin of things in such unverifiable
abstractions as " prothyle," " prodynamis," and
" ethers " of various kinds, which by gyrating, or
vibrating, or condensing, or expanding in various
ways, give rise to the universe and all its marvellous
uniformities and harmonies. As scientific specula
tions concerning the internal structure of matter
they are legitimate enough ; but when they are put
forward as ultimate explanations of the universe,
they become mere varieties of Materialism, the
theory which has next to be considered.
(2) Materialism. — Materialists affirm that the order
and harmony of the world are due to the primary
qualities of matter and energy, from which they
result by natural necessity. "All and every law,"
says Physicus, "follows as a necessary conse
quence from the persistence of force, and the
primary qualities of matter " {Candid Examination
of Theism, p. 52).

MATERIALISM 39
But, as has been already shown, the order of
the world is the result not only of the properties
of matter and energy, but also of the original
distribution of matter in space. With a different
distribution of matter, a different universe would
have resulted, even if the properties of matter and
energy had been the same. Now this original
distribution of matter and energy must have had
a cause, and since its cause was nothing connected
with matter and energy, and it is illegitimate to
postulate unknown or unknowable causes, its cause
must have been the only remaining alternative — a
Designing Mind.
Again, the primary qualities of matter and energy
are such, that, when a proper distribution of matter
has been made, they produce a harmonious universe.
But those qualities might conceivably have been so
ill-assorted and incongruous, that they would not
have produced an orderly universe. What then
is the cause why these qualities are so well ordered
and harmonious ? It cannot be the qualities them
selves, and it is illegitimate to introduce unknown
or unknowable causes. The only alternative is that
the cause is an Intelligent, Designing Mind.
Again, the properties of matter and energy are
manifestly inadequate to account for the origin of
consciousness and reason. This is sometimes ad
mitted even by Materialists. Physicus, for example,
says, " How such a thing as conscious intelligence
is possible is a wholly unanswerable question."
Haeckel says, " I have entitled consciousness ' the

40 DESIGN IN NATURE
central mystery of Psychology': it is the strong
citadel of all mystic and dualistic errors, before
whose ramparts the best equipped efforts of
reason [i.e. of Materialism] threaten to miscarry."
Semi-materialists like Tyndall, Huxley, and Bain
are still more explicit. Tyndall, in his Belfast
address (1874), after a brilliant exposition of
the arguments for Materialism, proceeds : " But
now comes my difficulty. Your atoms are in
dividually without sensation ; much more are they
without intelligence. May I ask you then to try
your hand on this problem ? Take your dead
hydrogen atoms, your dead carbon atoms, your
dead phosphorus atoms, and all the other atoms,
dead as grains of shot, of which the brain is formed.
Imagine them separate and sensationless ; observe
them running together and forming all imaginable
combinations. This, as a purely mechanical process
is seeable by the mind. But can you see, or dream,
or in any way imagine, how out of that mechanical
act, and from these individually dead atoms, sensa
tion, thought, and emotion are to rise? What
baffles and bewilders me is the notion that from
those physical tremors, things so utterly incon
gruous with them as sensation, thought, and
emotion can be derived. You may say or think
that this issue of consciousness from the clash of
atoms is not more incongruous than the flash of
light from the union of oxygen and hydrogen.1 But
I beg to say that it is. The flash is an affair of
1 This had been urged by the German Materialist, L. Buchner.

HUXLEY ON MATERIALISM 41
consciousness, the objective counterpart of which
is a vibration. It is a flash only by your inter
pretation. You are the cause of the apparent in
congruity; andyou are the thing that puzzles me."
Huxley expressed himself similarly. " I cannot
conceive," says he, " how the phenomena of con
sciousness as such, and apart from the physical
process by which they are called into existence, are
to be brought within the bounds of physical science.
Take the simplest possible example, the feeling of
redness. Physical science tells us that it commonly
arises as a consequence of molecular changes pro
pagated from the eye to a certain part of the sub
stance of the brain. Let us suppose the process of
physical analysis pushed so far that one could view
the last link of this chain of molecules, watch their
movements as if they were billiard balls, weigh
them, measure them, and know all that is physically
knowable about them. Well, even in that case we
should be just as far from being able to include the
resulting phenomenon of consciousness, the feeling
of redness, within the bounds of physical science, as
we are at present. It would remain as unlike the
phenomena we know under the names of matter
and motion, as it is now. It seems to me pretty
plain that [besides matter and force] there is a third
thing in the universe, to wit consciousness, which,
in the hardness of my heart or head, I cannot see
to be matter or force or any conceivable modifica
tion of either" {Evolution and Ethics, p. 117 ff.).
In view of the admitted impossibility of deriving

42 DESIGN IN NATURE
conscious intelligence from unconscious matter,
some Materialists have supposed that matter itself
is conscious. This theory is called Hylozoism.
Hylozoists believe that the ultimate atoms of matter
possess rudimentary mind and intelligence. The
amount of mind which a single atom, or even a
single molecule, possesses is infinitesimally small;
but when countless multitudes of molecules are
associated together to form brains and nervous
systems, the result is minds of a higher order,
which are conscious and intelligent in the full sense
of those terms.
Ingenious as this view is, the objections to it are
fatal, (i) There is no evidence whatever that ordin
ary matter is conscious. (2) A number of separate
and distinct consciousnesses like those supposed
could not produce a single indivisible consciousness
such as that of man. (3) A number of inferior
minds grouped together would not constitute a
higher type of mind.1 (4) The amount or degree of
mind which Hylozoists suppose to be sufficient to
account for the universe is ridiculously small. If
mind is necessary at all to account for the universe
(and Hylozoists admit that it is), then a stupendous
Mind, such as Theists postulate, is necessary, and
not a collection of barely conscious and quite un
intelligent atoms.
(3) The Hypothesis of a Designing Mind. — Mate-
1 For a conclusive refutation of the theory that mental facts
can be compounded, the reader may consult Prof. James's
Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 158 ff.

A SUPREME DESIGNING MIND 43
rialism having failed to give a rational account of
the universe, there remains only the hypothesis
of a Designing Mind. We propose to show {a)
that this hypothesis is legitimate, {b) that it is
adequate. It is legitimate, because it postulates
more clearly even than Materialism a known and
intelligible cause. We are far more certain that
we possess intelligent and designing minds, than
that what is called " matter " exists. In the opinion
of many excellent authorities, and those by no
means inclined to paradox or scepticism, matter is
simply a modification of mind. On the other
hand, the reality of mind, at least as a fact of ex
perience, has never been doubted. It is true that
mind, as we know it, is invariably associated with
matter in the form of a brain and nervous system ;
but mind can be equally well thought of as dis
embodied, and reasons have already been given
for thinking that the Supreme Mind is so. This,
however, is quite a subordinate question. The
real point at issue is whether the universe is the
work of a Designing Mind ; not whether that Mind
is embodied or disembodied.
The hypothesis of design, as advanced by
Theists, is adequate, because it postulates the kind
of cause required, and also the degree required.
The mind of man, as we know it, is orderly and
rational, and operates by reducing both the external
and the internal world to harmony and order.
Examples of its operations are government by law,
treatises on various branches of knowledge, works

44 DESIGN IN NATURE
of art, mechanical inventions, and above all moral
virtue, which is the perfect harmony of the inner
forces of the soul. But Nature also is orderly and
rational, as is shown by the fact that men of science
are able to discover and understand her laws.
True, the complexity of Nature surpasses what the
human mind can grasp, but still nothing has ever
yet been discovered in Nature which is fundament
ally irrational, or beyond the possible comprehension
of an intellect analogous to man's. The supposition
therefore of a stupendous Designing Mind as the
cause of the world's harmony is adequate, and being
alone adequate, is alone true.
The conclusion which has been reached from a
consideration of the general harmony of Nature
may be confirmed by a consideration of some
particular cases of harmonious adaptation. The
most striking of these are found in the bodies of
animals. For example, the structure of the eye is
so exquisitely adjusted to the sense of sight, and is
so closely analogous to the microscopes and tele
scopes made by man, that most minds find the
inference irresistible that the eye was specially
designed to see with. Something similar may be
said of the organs of hearing, smell, taste, and
feeling. But perhaps the most striking case of all is
the organs of sex. These organs are remarkable not
only for their obvious adaptation to one another
and for their being shared between two distinct
individuals, but also for their subserving a purpose
which is yet future. It is characteristic of true

MAN'S DESIGNING MIND 45
design, not only that it produces harmonious
adaptations in things, but that it provides for future
events. Now, the organs of the two sexes display
in the most unequivocal manner both these charac
teristics, for they are not only mutually adapted
to one another, but they provide for future events —
viz. the continuation of the race. Of course design
cannot be actually seen in Nature — it is impossible
from its nature that it ever could be — but it is
difficult to see how the circumstantial evidence for
design could possibly be stronger than it is in cases
such as these.
There remains to be noticed one great advantage
which the hypothesis of design possesses over all
others. It gives a natural and sufficient account
of the origin of the human mind. Design may
or may not exist in Nature — it is there a matter
of inference at best — but it certainly exists in the
human mind. Now, the most probable cause that
can be assigned for the existence of the designing
mind of man, is the existence of a Designing Mind
greater than man's. The human mind cannot have
its origin in something lower than itself, e.g. a
physical force, nor can it have its origin in any
thing higher than mind, for nothing higher than
mind can be conceived or proved to exist. The
inevitable conclusion, therefore, is, that the origin
of the human mind is due to a Designing Mind
analogous to, but infinitely transcending it.

46 DESIGN IN NATURE

APPENDIX
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF THE
UNIVERSE
To many minds the mere fact that the universe is intelligible
and science possible is the strongest of all proofs that there
is a Designing Creator. " If we read a book," says Professor
Baden Powell,1 " which it requires much thought and exercise
of reason to understand, but which we find discloses more
and more truth and reason as we proceed in the study, and
contains clearly more than we can at present comprehend,
then undeniably we properly say that thought and reason
exist in that book irrespectively of our minds, and equally so
of any question as to its author or origin. Such a book con
fessedly exists, and is ever open to us in the natural world.
Or, to put the case under a slightly different form : When
the astronomer, the physicist, the geologist, or the naturalist
notes down a series of observed facts or measured dates, he
is not an author expressing his own ideas — he is a mere
amanuensis taking down from the dictations of Nature : his
observation book is the record of the thoughts of another mind;
he has but set down literally what he himself does not under
stand, or only very imperfectly. . . . That which requires
thought and reason to understand must be itself thought and
reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express
must be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained
is but partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than
the mind and reason of the student. If the more it be studied
the more vast and complex is the necessary connection in
reason disclosed, then the more evident is the vast extent and
compass of the intelligence thus partially manifested, and its
reality, as existing in the immutably connected order of objects
1 Savilian, Professor of Geometry at Oxford, and a contributor
to Essays and Reviews.

PHYSICUS ON THE ORDER OF NATURE 47
examined, independently of the mind of the investigator "
{Order of Nature, p. 238 ff.).
Physicus, who quotes this passage in his Candid Examina
tion of Theism, replies that the correspondence between the
human mind and the world is sufficiently accounted for by
the common origin of both; but the point is that one of the
factors in this correspondence is a rational mind, and that
therefore, presumably, the other factor is so also.

LITERATURE
See the close of the next chapter.

CHAPTER V
OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT FOR DESIGN
Summary. — Evolution disproves the doctrine of " special
creation," but not the argument for a Designing Creator.
It rather strengthens it, for if the evolution of individual
organisms from a formless egg proves the existence of a
Designing Creator, as it is held to do, still more does the
evolution of countless species of plants and animals from
a minute speck of protoplasm prove it. Again, the theory
of Natural Selection, supposed true, leaves the Argument
for Design where it was before. Natural Selection must
have a cause, and since Natural Selection tends to produce
rational harmony in nature and gives birth to intelligent
beings like men, its cause must be intelligent — in other
words, a Designing Mind.
I. — Objections drawn from the Fact of
Evolution
Prior to Darwin it was generally1 believed that
the existing species of animals were instantaneously
created in substantially their present forms, and
that they are incapable of any fundamental change.
These views are known as the theories of " Special
Creation " and of the " Immutability of Species."
Darwin revived, with many improvements and a
vast array of added proofs, the transformist teach-
1 Not universally, for St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas
believed in some kind of evolution, and Lamarck advocated
Transformism. 48

EVOLUTION AND SPECIAL CREATION 49
ing of Lamarck, who held that there are no absolute
barriers between species, but that under certain
circumstances one species may develop into a
different one. According to Darwin, species were
not created separately, but originated gradually
by development or evolution from one or a few
extremely small and simple organisms. The direct
evidence for Darwin's theory is slight, but the
indirect evidence is strong, and although differ
ences of opinion still exist as to the causes of
organic evolution, the fact itself is no longer
seriously in dispute.
What, then, are the religious consequences of
the doctrine of Evolution? Materialists generally
affirm that Evolution in any form is fatal to the
argument for design. The Design Argument, they
say, is bound up with the doctrine of Special
Creation, and falls with it. If living creatures
have been gradually evolved by the operation of
natural laws, they cannot have been created by
a Designing Mind.
Now, it is quite true that Paley and all the older
apologists assumed without question the doctrine
of Special Creation, and they were quite right to
do so, considering that this was the accepted
scientific doctrine in their day. But it is quite un
true that their argument in any way depended upon
that doctrine. The Design Argument simply infers
from the admitted order and harmony of Nature
an adequate cause for it, and goes on to prove that
the only adequate cause is a Designing Mind. It
4

So PALEY ON DESIGN
makes no difference to the argument whether the
order that exists came into existence suddenly by
instantaneous acts of creation, or gradually by a
process of evolution or development. To take
a particular instance, the body of a living dog
shows manifold marks of design. For example,
its eyes are apparently made to see with, and its
legs to walk with. Now, these marks of design
exist, and require to have a cause assigned to them,
whether the dog (or the race of dogs) was created
suddenly six thousand years ago, or was evolved
gradually in the course of millions of ages from a
protozoOn. The question of time and of method
does not enter into the argument at all. In Paley's
classical work a traveller across a desolate heath
finds a watch, and argues, from the indications of
intelligent purpose which it presents, that it was
made by an intelligent designer. It makes no
difference to the argument whether the watch was
made by hand or by machinery, whether it took a
day to make, or forty years. Similarly, if any
particular organ, say an eye, shows signs of being
specially designed to perform its particular function,
it is no reply to this to say that the eye took a
hundred million years to evolve, and that it passed
through many stages before it reached its present
form. It is often forgotten that Evolution is not
a new fact first discovered by Darwin. Darwin
only affirmed of races what had long been known
of individuals. An individual man, for example, is
evolved from an almost microscopic germ of very

EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUALS 51
simple character. It is only very gradually that
this germ or embryo acquires a distinctively human
form and human intelligence. Now, this process
of generation, which is essentially a process of
evolution, so far from being supposed to contradict
the supposition of a Designing Creator, is always
alleged as a proof of it. If, therefore, the evolution
of individuals is consistent with the existence of
a Designing Creator, and even a proof of it, then
the evolution of races must also be consistent with
His existence and a proof of it. This was not
perceived by Darwin himself, but it was perceived
by many other naturalists and biologists of hardly
less celebrity — by A. R. Wallace, for example, the
co-discoverer of the principle of Natural Selection,
and by Asa Gray, who popularized the Darwinian
system in America. Even Huxley, the militant
champion of Agnosticism, says, " There is a good
deal of talk, and not a little lamentation, about the
so-called religious difficulties which physical science
has created. In theological science, as a matter of
fact, it has created none. Not a solitary problem
presents itself to the philosophical Theist at the
present day which has not existed from the time
that philosophers began to think out the logical
grounds and the logical consequences of Theism. . . .
In respect of the great problems of Philosophy, the
post-Darwinian generation is, in one sense, exactly
where the pre-Darwinian generations were. . . .
The doctrine of Evolution is neither anti-theistic
nor theistic. It simply has no more to do with

52 SPONTANEOUS GENERATION OF LIFE
Theism than the first book of Euclid has " (Darwin's
Life and Letters, vol. ii. p. 303). Darwin himself
thought otherwise, but even he said, " The theory
of Evolution is quite compatible with the belief
in a God " (vol. i. p. 307).
Darwin did not put forward his theory as an
explanation of the universe, or even of the origin of
life. He derived all species of plants and animals
from certain very rudimentary forms of living
protoplasm, but of the origin of living protoplasm
itself he offered no explanation. Other speculators
have been bolder. They suppose that living
protoplasm was evolved by some unascertained,
but quite natural process from inorganic matter;
and having thus bridged the gulf between dead
and living matter, they are enabled to postulate
an unbroken chain of development from the
nebula to man.
It is open to the apologist to reply that several
links of this chain are weak, or rather do not exist.
For instance, all recent biologists agree that " no
shred of trustworthy experimental testimony"
exists that dead matter ever becomes living, and it
is not even pretended that known natural causes
are adequate to account for the origin of conscious
ness and intelligence.
But even if it be granted, for the sake of argument,
that the chain of natural causation from the nebula
to man is unbroken, the design argument is not in
the least degree weakened. If formless inorganic
matter, such as existed in the nebula, possessed

UPWARD TENDENCY OF EVOLUTION 53
the power of evolving out of itself the whole
order of Nature, including life, consciousness, and
reason, its properties must have been much more
wonderful than has been hitherto supposed. The
problem, then, is simply transferred to the nebula,
or to its ultimate constituents; and the question
arises, How came the nebula to possess these
remarkable characteristics ? And the only satis
factory answer to this question is, as has been
shown, that it was formed by a Designing
Creator. The fact is that even a complete proof that the
whole order and harmony of Nature is due to what
is called natural causation, would not in the slightest
degree diminish the philosophical proof that there
is a God. That proof depends, not on the fact that
so many phenomena of Nature are mysterious and
cannot be assigned to natural causes, but on the
fact that natural causes themselves require to be
explained. Another argument for the existence of a De
signing Creator may be drawn from the general
upward character of evolution. It is generally
admitted that effects cannot transcend their causes —
i.e. their true efficient causes. But in the process
of evolution effects are continually transcending
their phenomenal causes. Thus life transcends the
dead matter from which it apparently originated,
consciousness transcends life, and life conscious
ness. We are obliged therefore to postulate over
and above the known properties of matter the

54 DARWIN'S DIFFICULTY
continuous action of a Designing Mind, guiding
the evolutionary process.
There is one objection to the Argument for Design
which, had it not seemed serious to so great a man,
would hardly deserve notice. Darwin himself was
by no means blind to the strength of the Argument
for Design — indeed, in some moods he felt it to be
irresistible ; but he always fell back on the objection
that the human mind, owing to its animal origin, is
untrustworthy when it draws any " grand con
clusions." " When reflecting," he says, " [on the
Argument for Design], I feel compelled to admit a
First Cause, having an intelligent mind in some
degree analogous to that of man. . . . But then
arises the doubt, Can the mind of man, which has,
as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as
low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be
trusted when it draws such grand conclusions ? . . .
[I often have an] inward conviction that the uni
verse is not the result of chance. But then with me
the horrid doubt always arises, whether the convic
tions of man's mind, which has been developed
from the mind of the lower animals, are of any
value, or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust
in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are
any convictions in such a mind ? " {Life and Letters,
vol. i. pp. 312, 316).
It ought not to need pointing out that the origin
of a faculty has nothing to do with its trustworthi
ness. For instance, the faculty of consciousness
was evolved out of a previous state of unconscious-

HUXLEY ON DARWIN'S DIFFICULTY 55
ness, but it is not therefore fallacious. The faculty
of sight was only gradually acquired, but ex
perience proves it to be trustworthy. And human
reason, though it has been evolved out of the in
telligence of the lower animals, is certainly adequate
to draw very " grand conclusions." It is not
necessary to prove this by elaborate arguments,
because it is proved by experience every time an
astronomer successfully predicts an eclipse, or a
navigator determines the position of his ship at
sea, or a calculator successfully solves a difficult
problem. As Prof. Huxley well says, " We are told
that the belief in the unity of origin of man and
brutes involves the brutalization and degradation
of the former. But is this really so ? Could not a
sensible child refute by obvious arguments the
shallow rhetoricians 1 who would force this conclu
sion upon us ? Is it indeed true that the Poet or
the Philosopher, or the Artist, whose genius is the
glory of the age, is degraded from his high estate
by the undoubted historical probability, not to say
certainty, that he is the direct descendant of some
naked and bestial savage, whose intelligence was
just sufficient to make him a little more cunning
than the fox, and by so much more dangerous than
the tiger ? Or is he bound to howl and grovel on
all fours because of the wholly unquestionable fact
that he was once an egg, which no ordinary power
of discrimination could distinguish from that of a
1 Prof. Huxley seems to have forgotten that Darwin was one
of them.

56 NATURAL SELECTION
dog? No one is more strongly convinced than I
am of the vastness of the gulf between civilized
man and the brutes ; or is more certain that whether
from them or not, he is assuredly not of them "
{Man's Place in Nature, p. 153).

II. — Objections drawn from the Theory of
Natural Selection
- It has now been proved that the fact of Evolu
tion considered in itself is quite compatible with
creation by design, and that the circumstance that
Evolution is progressive is even a proof of it.
But it may still be objected that the special
Darwinian doctrine of Natural Selection is fatal
to the Design Argument, at least as usually pre
sented. Darwin himself inclined to this opinion.
In his Autobiography, written in 1876, he says':
" The old argument from design in Nature, as given
by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so con
clusive, fails now that the law of Natural Selection
has been discovered. We can no longer argue
that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve
must have been made by an intelligent being, like
the hinge of a door by man. There seems to be
no more design in the variability of organic beings,
and in the action of natural selection, than in the
course which the wind blows" {Life and Letters,
vol. i. p. 309).
It is important, therefore, to understand accu
rately what Natural Selection is. This famous

MALTHUS, LAMARCK, AND DARWIN 57
theory, the adequacy of which is still in dispute,
was first suggested to Darwin by the Essay on
Population of Malthus, published originally in 1798.
Malthus's main point was that there is a constant
tendency in all animated life to increase beyond
the nourishment provided for it, and that conse
quently there arises a competition for food, or
" struggle for existence." Darwin combined with
the Malthusian doctrine of the struggle for exist
ence a new theory of variation and inheritance.
It had long been known that there is a tendency
in offspring to vary slightly, and sometimes con
siderably, from the parental type, but all except
Lamarck had believed that this variability was
confined within narrow limits. It was thought,
for example, that the influence of variability might
be adequate to produce a new variety of dogs or
pigeons, but not to change a dog or a pigeon into
a different species of animal altogether. Darwin
removed these limits, and supposed that, given
sufficient time, the tendency to variability would
suffice to change one species into another com
pletely different. He regarded variability as
following no fixed law, but as producing changes
at random in all directions. Some of these changes
or variations would be unimportant, and exercise
no influence on the organism ; but others would
be beneficial or injurious — that is, they would help
or hinder the organism in the struggle for existence.
In the former case the organism would have an
exceptionally good chance of surviving; in the

58 NATURAL SELECTION AND DESIGN
latter case it would probably be destroyed. Organ
isms, therefore, with favourable variations, would
rapidly multiply, and by the law of heredity
hand on their advantages to their descendants,
while less favoured organisms would become
extinct. The same processes would be repeated
indefinitely, until at last an immensely superior
type of creature would be produced. In this way
Darwin supposed that the origin even of man
might be accounted for without postulating an
intelligent Author of Nature.
There is one point about the Darwinian theory
which must be summarily rejected as unphilo-
sophical, and that is the theory that any facts in
the universe are due to chance ; 1 but in other re
spects it is an able and legitimate attempt to solve
a difficult problem. Whether it is a successful
attempt, regarded scientifically, must be left to
naturalists and biologists to decide. Biologists of
the school of Weismann maintain that it is ; but
many, perhaps the majority of the best authorities,
are of a different opinion. Even Darwin did not
1 A distinction must be drawn between (a) absolute chance,
and (b) relative chance. By absolute chance is meant the occur
rence of an event without any cause at all. Relative chance
is the accidental production by an unintelligent cause of an
effect which would naturally require intelligence to produce it.
Thus if the letters of the alphabet, drawn from a bag at
random, happened to produce an intelligible sentence, the
event would be said to be due to relative chance. Darwin,
who was no philosopher, seems really to have believed in ab
solute chance. His followers, for the most part, attribute the
appearances of design in Nature to relative chance.

NATURAL SELECTION AND DESIGN 59
regard it as the sole factor in Evolution, but only
as the most important one. All we have here to
consider is the effect of the theory of Natural
Selection upon the Argument for Design, assuming
for the moment that it is a true and adequate
account of the process of Evolution.
The Argument for Design as applied to living
organisms is that the actual existence of finite
designing minds in the world, and the apparent
adaptation of means to ends in the structure of
organic bodies, afford strong evidence that the
whole of organic Nature is ultimately due to the will
of a supreme Designing Mind. We say ultimately,
because the Argument for Design does not deny
the existence of second causes. The Designing
Mind may, for anything we know to the contrary,
work entirely through natural causes without em
ploying anything of the nature of a miracle or a
" supernatural " event. This, perhaps, has actually
been the case. It may be that Natural Selection
has been the sole and sufficient natural cause of
the appearance of design in organic Nature. But
even so, Natural Selection must have a cause.
There must be some reason why organisms multi
ply in excess of the food supply, and so have to
struggle for existence. Nature might conceivably
have been so ordered that organisms never multi
plied in this way, in which case there would have
been no struggle for existence and no organic
evolution. Again, there must be some reason why
animals tend to vary. There might conceivably

60 NATURAL SELECTION AND DESIGN
have been a law of Nature that offspring should
strictly resemble their parents. Further, in order to
produce the truly admirable contrivances which we
find in the bodies of the higher animals, the varia
tions assumed must be of a particular kind. Mere
indefinite variations in shape, like those of stones,
or waves, or of currents of air, would not suffice
for the production of definite organs fulfilling
definite purposes. The variations must be definite,
they must be sufficient in number, and they must
be predominantly in an upward direction, for if they
were not, progressive evolution would be impos
sible. Again, the variations must be psychical as
well as physical ; mind must first be produced as
the result of some favourable variation, and then
it must be improved by the appearance of succes
sively higher types of mind. This cannot be
accidental. Moreover, in order that evolution may
be continuous and progressive, these variations,
both physical and psychical, must be inherited — a
fact which might conceivably have been otherwise.
It is thus evident that none of the so-called
Darwinian " causes " is ultimate. Each of them,
considered separately, requires accounting for, and
it is also necessary to account for their harmonious
co-operation to produce a common result iri the
evolutionary process. If these facts are attentively
considered, it will be seen that the Argument for
Design stands precisely where it did, and is neither
strengthened nor weakened by the adoption of
the Darwinian hypothesis. The same may be

WASTE IN NATURE 61
said of any other scientific theory of Evolution
that can be propounded. However far the explana
tion may be carried back, it is always competent
to the inquirer to ask : Why do these particular
ultimate laws, rather than others, prevail in the
universe ? And the only logical answer to this
question is, as has been already shown, that a
Designing Creator has so willed it.
III. — Miscellaneous Objections
Objection I. — The amount of waste in Nature dis
proves design. It is pointed out that probably not
one in a million of the germs of plants and animals
ever attains maturity. " The destruction of living
germs," says Lange, in his History of Materialism,
"the failure of what has begun, is the rule;
complete development is a special case among
thousands. It is the exception, and this exception
is made by that Nature which the purblind
teleologist admires for its self-preservation brought
about by adapting means to ends."
Reply. — This objection assumes that the only
conceivable useful function of germs is to grow
to maturity. But this is contrary to experience.
Seeds and fruits form exceedingly nourishing food
for men and animals. The seed of wheat is man's
staff of life. Animal germs in the shape of eggs
are a valuable article of diet. Teleologists
admit, of course, that seeds are adapted to
develop under certain circumstances to maturity.

62 DESIGN NOT EVERYWHERE APPARENT
But they deny that this is their only use, or that
it is necessary to suppose that every seed was
intended actually to fulfil this purpose.
Objection II. — That since the variations of organ
isms take place, on Darwin's theory, at random,
they offer no evidence of design, but rather the
contrary. Reply. — The idea that variations take place at
random is the weakest part of the Darwinian
theory, and has already been disproved. But even
were it true, there would still be abundant
evidence of design in the action of natural selec
tion. Nature is so constructed as to select all
thbse variations which are useful, and tend to the
perfection of the animal, and to reject and destroy
all those which are useless, and there must be
some adequate cause of a rational character why
this is so.
Objection III. — That the argument from particular
cases of apparent design is not valid, because it
ignores the much greater number of cases in which
there is no appearance of design.
Reply. — Teleologists admit that the argument
from particular cases is not so strong as the
argument from the general harmony of Nature;
nevertheless it is not without force. If only a
single object in the universe existed showing marks
of design, it would still be legitimate to infer a
Designer, if the marks were only evident enough.
If, for example, only a single man existed in an
absolutely chaotic universe, he would have a perfect

VESTIGIAL ORGANS 63
right to infer that he had been formed by a
Designing Creator, though he would have no right
to infer such an origin for the rest of the universe.
But the actual state of the case is far more favour
able to the Argument for Design than this. Men
with designing minds exist in millions, and through
out the vegetable and animal kingdoms marks of
design are numerous and strong, while apparent
exceptions are rare. It is necessary, therefore, to
postulate a Designing Mind as the cause of, at any
rate, all living organisms.
Objection IV. — That the existence of useless rudi
mentary organs, such as the dew-claws in dogs,
the splint-bones of a horse's foot, the rudimentary
hind-legs of certain whales and serpents, and the
appendix in man, disproves design.
Reply. — A few apparent exceptions cannot dis
prove an induction founded on a large number
of genuine instances. The tendency of Nature
undoubtedly is to eliminate organs which have
become useless. But this is not done at once,
perhaps because their too sudden removal would
disturb the physiological balance of the organism.1
Most of the organs mentioned are presumably in
the process of elimination, and if so, they rather
illustrate than disprove design. Again, it does
not follow that because an organ is useless to its
1 Prof. Huxley argues that rudimentary organs are still use
ful, otherwise they would long ago have disappeared. " The
recent discovery," he says, "of the important part played by
the thyroid gland [once supposed to be useless] should be a
warning to all speculators about useless organs."

64 VESTIGIAL ORGANS
possessor, it is useless altogether. Rudimentary
organs are useful to men of science. " Rudimentary
organs," says Darwin, " may be compared to the
letters in a word, still retained in the spelling,
but become useless in the pronunciation, but which
serve as a clue in seeking for its derivation."1
Prof, le Conte says, "They are among the most
obvious and convincing proofs of the origin of
organic forms by derivation." 2 The same may
be said of some of the anomalous features of em
bryology. "It is probable," says Darwin, "from
what we know of the embryos of mammals, birds,
fishes, and reptiles, that all the members in these
four great classes are the modified descendants of
some one ancient progenitor, which was furnished
in its adult state with branchiae, had a swim-
bladder, four simple limbs, and a long tail fitted
for aquatic life." Now, on the hypothesis that
there is a God, it is reasonable to suppose that
He intends natural science to be successfully
cultivated. And this He has secured by ordaining
that there shall be in nature certain clues to its
meaning, of which these rudimentary organs and
the anomalous facts of emb^ology are among the
chief.3
' Origin of Species, c. xiii.
2 Evolution, c. vii.
3 The older school of Evolutionists supposed that the develop
ment of the embryo was a clue to the whole development of
the race. " Ontogenesis," says Haeckel, " is a brief and rapid
recapitulation of phylogenesis." This statement would now
have to be modified. "The most striking general [recent]
change," says Prof. Mitchell, "has been against seeing in the

SPECIAL DESIGN 65
Objection V. — That it is impossible to believe the
doctrine of "Special Design" — the doctrine, that
is, that each particular thing was specially pre
ordained to achieve the exact result that it actually
accomplishes. This objection is due to Darwin. " Do you
consider," he says, " that the successive variations
in the size of the crop of the pouter pigeon, which
man has accumulated to please his caprice, have
been due to the ' creative and sustaining powers
of Brahma [God] ' ? . . . It seems preposterous that
the Maker of a Universe should care about the crop
of a pigeon solely to please man's silly fancy. . . .
Do you believe that when a swallow snaps up
a gnat, God designed that that particular swallow
should snap up that particular gnat at that particular
instant ? "
Reply. — The doctrine of Special Design does not
mean that each particular thing was designed
separately, without reference to other things. The
Divine Intellect saw from eternity in one compre
hensive view the whole possible and actual operation
of natural laws, and ordained each particular event,
such as the death of a gnat, or the shape of a
pigeon's crop, as part of a complete order of Nature.
It would perhaps be unworthy of God to ordain
facts of ontogeny any direct evidence as to phylogeny. The
general proposition as to a parallelism between individual and
ancestral development is no doubt indisputable, but extended
knowledge has led us ... to a reluctance to attach detailed
importance to the embryological argument for Evolution "
{Encycl. Brit., vol. xxviii. p. 342). 5

66 THEORY OF A FINITE DESIGNER
details merely as details (though of this we must
not speak too decidedly), but to ordain them as
part of a great and glorious system is not unworthy'
of Him. Attention to details, when those details
are part of a great scheme, is a mark not of im
perfection, but of perfection.
Objection VI. — That the Design Argument only
proves the existence of a finite designer of the
world, not of an infinite and omnipotent Creator.
Reply. — This is fully admitted. The design argu
ment proves from appearances of design in the
universe that the universe has a Designer; but
since the whole universe probably, and the known
universe certainly, is finite, there is no reason,
so far, to suppose the designer infinite. Nor need
he be the Supreme Creator. He may be some
inferior being or demiurge, who has formed the
world out of pre-existing materials, as the ancient
Gnostics supposed. But now the design argument
is supplemented by the argument for a First Cause.
The latter argument proves that the demiurge, and
the materials out of which He constructed the
world, were created (supposing them to exist at
all) by an infinite and omnipotent God. But the
demiurge, being now no longer necessary to account
for the world, may be eliminated, unless there is
some positive reason for supposing that he exists.
The only strong reason for supposing this is the
evil and imperfection of the present world. This
subject will be fully discussed later (c. xiv.)
Objection VII. — That it is unworthy of an omni-

MILL ON OMNIPOTENCE 67
potent Creator to make use of means to gain His
ends. This objection is ancient, but it has been recently
revived by Mill. " Every indication of design in
the Kosmos," says he, " is so much evidence against
the omnipotence of the Designer. For what is
meant by design ? Contrivance : the adaptation of
means to an end. But the necessity for contrivance
— the need of employing means — is a consequence
of the limitation of power. Who would have
recourse to means, if to attain his end his mere
word were sufficient ? A man does not use
machinery to move his arms. If he did, it would
only be when paralysis had deprived him of the
power of moving them by volition " {Three Essays,
p. 176).
Reply. — Omnipotence is not, as Mill imagines,
the power to do anything whatsoever, but the
power to do whatever is not intrinsically irrational.
Even Omnipotence cannot annihilate the past, or
make a thing true and false at the same time, or
make the sum of two and two equal five. From
similar considerations it follows that Omnipotence
cannot in all cases dispense with means. Not even
God can make a being morally responsible without
giving him free will, or educate him in the virtues
of faith and hope without placing him in a state
of probation in which there is scope for the exercise
of those virtues. Again, many of the means em
ployed by the Creator to carry out His designs
have an intrinsic excellence of their own, and serve

68 APPARENTLY MALEVOLENT DESIGN
to display His glory in a high degree. It is reason
able, therefore, to suppose that He chooses them
not simply as means, but partly also as ends. God
could, if He so willed, create adult men, without
causing them to pass through any process of
development ; but it may be that it is His will to
display in infancy and childhood some excellence
of the Divine Nature which is less apparent in
adult men. If there were no children, human life
would certainly be poorer; and if all so-called
" means " were eliminated from the universe, it
would be a far less interesting place than it is.
Objection VIII. — Are we to believe that the poison-
fangs of serpents, the beaks of birds of prey, and
the teeth and claws of ravenous beasts are specially
designed to wound and kill ?
Reply. — Certainly. But this raises the problem of
evil, which requires separate discussion (see c. xiv.).
Objection IX. — That the clumsiness of many of
Nature's contrivances shows want of skill and
intelligence in the Designer.
Even the structure of the eye is criticised.
"Sturmius, says Paley, held that the examination
of the eye was a cure for Atheism ; yet Helmholtz,
who knew incomparably more about the eye than
half a dozen Sturms, described it as an instrument
which a scientific optician would be ashamed to
make " (J. Ward, Gifford Lectures, vol. i. p. 6).
Reply.— It is true that Helmholtz, in his Popular
Scientific Lectures, uses rash and inconsiderate
language upon this subject. He says, for example,

HELMHOLTZ ON THE EYE 69
" the eye has every possible defect that can be
found in an optical instrument, and even some
which are peculiar to itself," and that if an optician
had sent him home an instrument so carelessly
made, he would have thought himself justified in
returning it. But Helmholtz is here only speaking
of the eye theoretically, from " the narrow but
legitimate point of view of an optician." As a
practical instrument he regards the eye as un
surpassed. Its defects, he says, " are all so
counteracted, that the inexactness of the images
very little exceeds the limits which are set to the
delicacy of sensation by the dimensions of the
retinal cones. The adaptation of the eye to its
functions is therefore most complete, and is seen
in the very limits set to its defects. The result,
which may have been reached by innumerable
generations under the Darwinian law of inheritance,
coincides with what the wisest wisdom may have
devised beforehand." This agrees very well
with Darwin's opinion expressed in the Origin
(c. vi.), where he speaks of the eye as "a living
optical instrument as superior to one of glass as
the works of the Creator are to those of man,"
and draws attention to " all its inimitable con
trivances for adjusting the focus to different dis
tances, for admitting different amounts of light,
and for the correction of spherical and chromatic
aberration." But even if the imperfections of the structure
of the eye were ever so great, it would still be

70 THEORIES OF EVOLUTION
impossible to infer want of wisdom or skill in
the Designer, considering that He has created a
Helmholtz with sufficient wisdom to detect the
defects, and sufficient skill to devise a better
instrument.

APPENDIX I
THEORIES OF EVOLUTION

Although the more rigid Darwinians regard Natural Selection
as the only, or almost the only, factor in Organic Evolution,
a strong body of scientific opinion dissents. It is pointed
out with perfect justice that the struggle for existence does
not of itself account for the production of superior organisms,
but simply operates by killing off those which are weakly or
unsuitably constructed. In itself it is rather a hindrance than
a help to development. A gardener who wishes to obtain
the finest possible cabbages eliminates the struggle for
existence altogether. He plants the young seedlings too far
apart to interfere with one another, removes the weeds that
might choke them, and supplies them with abundance of
water and manure. A farmer who wishes to obtain a good
stock of cattle does not turn twenty oxen into a pasture
which contains only food enough for ten. No doubt hard
work and healthy exercise develop the faculties of animals
and men, but not a painful " struggle for existence." The
real efficient cause of evolution is thus clearly the favourable
variations, the origin of which Darwinism assigns to chance
— that is, to no cause at all. Again, the question of the
origin of species has become much more complicated since
Darwin's day. It was believed then that the ultimate
cells of which living organisms are composed were similar
in all species, and that the only problem was to account

FACTORS OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION 71
for the building up of these cells into differently shaped
organisms. It is now known that the cells in each species are
fundamentally different in structure, and it seems absolutely
impossible to explain the origin of this difference on the
principles of Natural Selection. (For full details see E. B.
Wilson, The Cell in Development?) Other supposed causes
of evolution are: (1) the Lamarckian factors, i.e. the direct
effect of the environment on the organism, and the effect
on organs of use and disuse, which Darwin admitted to be
to some extent operative, and on which the American Neo-
Lamarckians lay great stress ; J (2) Sexual Selection, or the
struggle among the males for the possession of the female,
which operates among animals by the law of battle, and
among birds by the law of attractiveness ; (3) Romanes' theory
of Physiological Selection, which is an attempt to show
why incipient varieties, destined to become distinct species,
are not swamped by cross-breeding with the parent form ; and
(4) the theory of Bathmism, which postulates the existence
of an inherent growth-force in organisms, which would lead
to divergent evolution even in a neutral environment. In
its extreme form Bathmism postulates that just as the whole
future development of an individual organism is implicitly
contained in the embryo, so the whole future of organic
evolution was implicitly contained in the first germ of life from
which all the species of plants and animals are ultimately
descended, and therefore that all the other factors in evolution,
except the original growth-force, are secondary.
At present biological theory is extremely unsettled, and
theologians who are well advised will beware of identifying
themselves with any particular views of development. The
words of Romanes spoken in 1886 remain true to-day : "At
1 There is an important controversy between the followers
of Weismann, who deny that the modifications produced by the
"Lamarckian factors " are inherited, and the Neo-Lamarckians
and Spencerians, who affirm it. (See further c. xiv., appendices
1, 2).

72 EVOLUTION AND HOLY SCRIPTURE
present it would be impossible to find any working naturalist
who supposes that survival of the fittest is competent to
explain all the phenomena of species-formation." This pre
cisely accords with the recent utterance of Prof. Vines
in his presidential address to the Linnsean Society: "(i) It
is established that Natural Selection, though it may have
perpetuated species, cannot have originated any. (2) It is
still a mystery why Evolution should tend from the lower
to the higher, from simple to complex organisms. (3) The
facts seem to admit of no other interpretation than that
variation is not (as Darwin supposed) indeterminate, but that
there is in living matter an inherent determination in favour
of variation in the higher direction." (For further testimony
to the insufficiency of Darwinism, see the interesting recent
book of the Rev. J. Gerard, S.J., F.L.S., The Old Riddle
and the Newest Answer, from which the two previous quota
tions are derived.)

APPENDIX II
EVOLUTION AND HOLY SCRIPTURE
It is often supposed that Evolution, though consistent with
Theism, is not consistent with the authority of Holy Scripture,
which is assumed to teach that the world was created six
thousand years ago, in six days, by a process known as
" special creation." One way of meeting this difficulty is by
showing that the differences between Genesis and modern
science do not exist, or have been exaggerated. One clear
difference must be admitted. In Gen. i. 11, grass, herbs,
and trees are said to have been produced before the sun,
which is incredible. At the same time, the writer lays very
little stress on the precise order of events, and gives a quite
different order in chapter ii.
By denying that Genesis fixes a date for creation, by
regarding the six days as symbolizing long geological ages,

EVOLUTION AND HOLY SCRIPTURE 73
and by laying stress on the general though not precise
agreement between the Mosaic order of creation and the
order of production of organisms assumed by modern
Evolutionists, the differences between Genesis and science
may be reduced to a minimum. Followers of St. Augustine
and St. Thomas Aquinas may even find the doctrine of
Evolution covertly alluded to in Gen. ii. 4, 5 (A.V.).
But from an apologetic point of view these harmonistic
expedients are unnecessary. No one except an extreme
upholder of verbal inspiration believes that the Bible contains
any revelation upon scientific subjects. The Biblical writers,
like modern theologians, assume the secular knowledge of
their time to be true, and express themselves accordingly.
They all, for example, regard the earth as fixed in the centre of
the universe and flat, and they speak of man's heart and reins
as the seats of his intellect and emotions. The Bible is
full of scientific errors, expressed or implied, but these are
no hindrance to believing that it contains a religious revelation.
Creation is one of these subjects in which Theology and Science
come into close contact, yet even here their provinces are
quite distinct. Theology deals with the ultimate explanation
of things and the nature of the First Cause ; Science deals
with the method of creation, and with that alone. When,
therefore, the writer of Genesis affirms that the world was
made by an intelligent Creator whose goodness is manifested
in all His works, he is dealing with a theological question,
upon which he has a right to pronounce an authoritative
opinion ; but when, or rather if, he affirms that the world was
made at such a date, or in such a period, or in such an order,
or by such a method, he is dealing with strictly scientific
questions, his solution of which can be freely rejected without
calling in question his authority as a religious teacher. The
Church as a whole has never believed that the Bible contains
any scientific revelation. Those who think otherwise fall into
the error of Paul V. and Urban VIII. when they condemned
Galileo. It is interesting to notice that Galileo expressed

74 AGNOSTICS ON DESIGN
precisely those views upon Biblical inspiration which are
stated in this appendix, and which are held by all modern
theologians, at least of the Anglican Church.

APPENDIX III
AGNOSTIC TESTIMONY TO THE ARGUMENT FOR DESIGN
{a) Kant.— Since the principles of Kant's Philosophy for
bade him to admit the validity of the Design Argument, his
forced testimony to its irresistible persuasiveness is the more
striking. " This proof," he says, " will always deserve to be
treated with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the
most in conformity with human reason. It gives life to the
study of Nature, deriving its own existence from it, and thus
constantly acquiring new vigour. It reveals aims and in
tentions, where our own observation would not by itself have
discovered them, and enlarges our knowledge of Nature by
leading us towards that peculiar unity, the principle of which
exists outside nature. This knowledge reacts on its cause,
namely, the transcendental idea, and thus increases the belief
in a Supreme Author to an irresistible conviction. It would,
therefore, not only be extremely sad, but utterly vain to
attempt to diminish the authority of this proof. Reason,
constantly strengthened by the powerful arguments that come
to hand of themselves, though they are no doubt empirical
only, cannot be discouraged by any doubts of subtle and
abstract speculation. Roused from all curious speculation
and mental suspense as from a dream by one glance at the
wonders of Nature and the majesty of the cosmos, reason
soars from height to height till it reaches the highest, from
the conditioned to conditions, till it reaches the supreme and
unconditioned Author of all " {Critique of Pure Reason [tr.
M. Mulier], vol. ii. p. 535).
(/. ) J. S. Mill. — " It must be allowed that in the present
state of our knowledge the adaptations in Nature afford a large

AGNOSTICS ON DESIGN 75
balance of probability in favour of creation by intelligence "
{Three Essays, p. 174).
(c) Darwin. — Although in his later years predominantly
Agnostic, Darwin often found the design argument irresistible.
He says, " I cannot be contented to view this wonderful uni
verse, and especially the nature of man, and to conclude that
everything is the result of brute force. I am inclined to look
at everything as resulting from designed laws, and the details,
whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we call
chance. Not that this notion at all satisfies me " {Life and
Letters, vol. ii. p. 311).
(d) Huxley. — " The teleological and the mechanical views
of Nature are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the
contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the
more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrange
ment of which all the phenomena of the universe are the
consequences, and the more completely is he at the mercy
of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that
this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to
evolve the phenomena of the universe" (Darwin's Life and
Letters, vol. ii. p. 201).
(.) Haeckel. — Although in his History of Creation Haeckel
writes, " I maintain with regard to the much-talked-of purpose
in Nature, that it has no existence but for those persons who
observe phenomena in animals and plants in the most super
ficial manner," yet he says {Riddle of the Universe, c. xiv.),
" The idea of design has a very great significance and applica
tion in the organic world. We do undeniably perceive a
purpose in the structure and in the life of an organism. The
plant and the animal seem to be controlled by a definite
design in the combination of their several parts, just as
clearly as we see in the machines which man invents and
constructs; as long as life continues, the functions of the
several organs are directed to definite ends, just as is the
operation of the various parts of a machine."

76 DESIGN AND EVOLUTION
LITERATURE
{a) The Design Argument
Paley, Natural Theology (S.P.C.K. edition, edited by Prof.
F. le Gros Clark, F.R.S.) ; Janet, Final Causes (tr.) ; J. S. Mill,
Three Essays, p. 167 ff; J. Martineau, A Study of Religion;
G. G. Stokes, Natural Theology; Fraser, Philosophy of
Theism, ii. p. 65 ff; Flint, Theism, lect. v. vi. ; G. P. Fisher,
Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, c. ii.
(b) Evolution and Darwinism
Darwin, Origin of Species ; Descent of Man ; Romanes,
Darwin and after Darwin ; H. Spencer, First Principles ;
Principles of Biology ; Principles of Psychology, etc. ; J.
Croll, Philosophical Basis of Evolution ; A. Moore, Science
and the Faith, and Essays ; J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnos
ticism (Gifford Lectures) ; Haeckel, Riddle of the Universe ;
K. Pearson, Grammar of Science ; Le Conte, Evolution and
its Relation to Religious Thought; H. Drummond, Ascent
of Man; Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals; Mental
Evolution in Man ; Thoughts on Religion ; A. R. Wallace,
Darwinism ; Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx ; Gerard, The
Old Riddle and the Newest Answer; A. Weismann, Essays
upon Heredity ; Romanes, Examination of Weismannism ;
Huxley, Evolution and Ethics ; Iverach, Evolution and
Christianity ; Waggett, Religion and Science.

CHAPTER VI
Berkeley's argument for god's existence 1
Summary. — All the so-called properties of matter are thoughts
and ideas of the human mind. But these thoughts and ideas
exist also outside the human mind. There must, therefore,
be some Universal Mind of which they are thoughts and
ideas — that is, there must be a God.
The plain man and those philosophers styled
Realists believe that the world consists of two
entirely different kinds of substances — viz. material
substances, which occupy space, resist pressure,
can be moved, etc., and thinking substances — or
minds. The plain man thinks not only that
material substances exist, but that they are capable
of existing independently of any mind whatsoever.
In this particular of belief — viz. the independency
and self-sufficiency of matter — he agrees with the
eighteenth-century Deists and Materialists whom
Berkeley attacked, and with their modern repre
sentatives, the champions of materialistic theories
of Evolution. The Deists believed that the material
world had originally been created by an omnipotent
God, but- had then been left to itself to work
1 The reader who dislikes Metaphysics will do well to omit
this chapter. 77

78 MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM
out its own destiny, independently of the Deity,
by the operation of certain mechanical laws and
properties, originally impressed upon it. The
Materialist believed then, as now, that matter can
exist independently of any mind, finite or infinite,
that it is self-existing and self-sufficing, that it
existed millions of ages before any minds at all
were evolved in the universe, and will continue
to exist millions of ages after the last mind has
ceased to be. The plain man does not believe these
materialistic theories to be in fact true, but he sees
no absurdity in them, and is willing to regard them
as at least possible hypotheses. The Berkeleian
idealist, on the other hand, regards them as palpable
absurdities, destitute of any assignable meaning,
and illegitimate from the start.
I. — Berkeley's Theory and Argument
We will present Berkeley's argument, in our own
words, in the form of a criticism upon Locke, who
represents the position of the plain man and the
Materialist, that matter is an independent substance.
Berkeley himself used precisely the same arguments,
but expressed them in a more abstract and technical
way. Locke divided the qualities or properties of matter
into two classes — the primary and the secondary.
The former he believed really to be in bodies,
the latter only in the mind. That the secondary
qualities of matter, such as colour, sound, smell,
taste, hardness, beauty, etc., exist only for the mind,

LOCKE ON MATTER 79
is generally admitted by all schools of philosophers.
The sky, for example, can only be blue to a being
possessed of sight. To suppose that a mere sensa
tion, such as blue, can exist apart from a mind
is a palpable absurdity, as even the plain man
will, upon reflection, admit. Physicists have, it is
true, maintained that there is something in the
external world — viz. vibrations — which corresponds
to the sensation of blue existing in the mind, but
these vibrations are not the sensation of blue, or
anything like it. Similar arguments serve to show
the purely mental character of all the secondary
qualities of matter. A bell, for example, is struck,
and a sound is heard. Now a sound, as heard,
is a sensation existing in the mind. It may be
caused, perhaps, by something outside the mind
— "material vibrations," for example — but such
vibrations are not the sensation of sound or
anything like it. It is strictly demonstrable,
therefore, that all the secondary qualities of
matter are modifications of mind, and can exist
for mind only.
The second point of the argument is to prove that
the same holds good of the primary qualities of
matter, such as extension, capacity for motion, and
inertia. This was denied by Locke. " Solidity,
extension, figure, motion, and rest," he maintained,
" would be really in the world as they are, whether
there were any sensible being to perceive them or
not" {Human Understanding, bk. ii. c. xxi. sect. 2).
On this point, however, Berkeley undoubtedly

80 BERKELEY ON MATTER
proved Locke to be wrong, even on the principles
of " experience " to which he appealed. Solidity,
extension, figure, motion, rest, etc., can all be re
duced to definite experiences and inferences of a
conscious mind. They do not possess a single
element that is not mental. The solidity of a body,
for example, is nothing more than the fact that
when we press it, we experience certain sensations
of hardness. The extension or figure of a body
is simply a group of sensations, tactual or visual,
arranged by the mind in a particular way. The
figure called a cube, for example, may be recognized
either by feeling it and allowing the mind to
interpret the feelings, or by looking at it and allow
ing the mind to interpret the resulting optical
impressions. In either case the cubical extension
or figure of the body is nothing but a group of
sensations and inferences of the mind.
Motion, again, resolves itself ultimately into certain
muscular and ocular sensations. When we say
that our bodies are in motion, we mean, if we
are moving ourselves, that we experience certain
muscular feelings of contraction, pressure, etc.,
joined with certain optical sensations which may
be described as changes in the field of vision.
These muscular feelings and changes in the field
of vision exhaust all that any motion does or can
mean to us. It is evident, therefore, that the
primary qualities of matter, no less than the
secondary, are purely mental, and exist only for
the mind. That this is so can also be shown in

BERKELEY ON MATTER 81
another way. A person with a vivid imagination
can form with closed eyes a perfect mental
picture of external material objects, with all their
properties, both primary and secondary, complete,
the only difference being that the one picture
is real and the other ideal. The meaning of
this difference will be considered presently ; for
the moment, it is sufficient to observe that the
whole of the so-called properties of matter can
be ideally reproduced in the mind, and thus
shown by actual experiment to be mental in
character. But the plain man will now probably object that
we have not yet done full justice to the facts. We
have proved, it is true, that the so-called properties
of matter are nothing but mental phenomena, but
we have not explained the very real distinction
which does in fact exist between a real external
object and a mental picture of it.
An oak-tree, for instance, if only thought of, can
be dismissed from the mind or made to undergo
any number of changes at will; but a real oak-
tree persists in consciousness unaffected by any
efforts of the will to dismiss it or to change it.
Again, a real oak-tree is visible to others as
well, which is not the case with the mere idea
of an oak-tree. There must, therefore, be some
invisible reality external to the mind to which the
visible appearances or qualities of the oak-tree
belong; there must, in other words, be such a
thing as material substance. 6

82 BERKELEY ON GOD'S EXISTENCE
In the greater part of this argument the plain
man is undoubtedly right. " Material " objects do
undoubtedly exist independently of our minds, and
since they consist of qualities, and qualities cannot
exist alone, there must be some substance or reality,
independent of our minds, to which the qualities
of " material " bodies belong. But we demur alto
gether to the assumption that this substance must
of necessity be a material or unthinking substance.
We have just proved that the qualities of bodies
are, without exception, sensations, ideas, or thoughts.
But sensations, ideas, and thoughts can exist only
in and for a mind. The substance, therefore, which
underlies the material world must be a Universal
Mind, and the properties of " matter " must be ideas
in that Mind.
The same point may also be proved in another
way. It is admitted that we must postulate the
existence of some substance which is independent
of our minds, and that the choice lies between a
thinking substance and an unthinking substance.
Now, a thinking substance is a known reality, familiar
to every man from his own experience, because he
himself is a thinking substance. But an unthinking
substance is an unknown abstraction, and perhaps
not a reality at all. Mind we know, and the ideas
of mind we know, but what an unthinking substance
is, or whether it exists or can exist, we have no
notion. If therefore we are obliged to choose between
the hypotheses of a thinking and an unthinking
substance, there can be no hesitation as to the

OBJECTIONS TO BERKELEY 83
choice. Science forbids the postulation of unknown
causes when known causes suffice, and since
in this case a known cause suffices, the unknown
cause must be rejected. The ultimate reality,
therefore, which underlies matter is a thinking
substance, or mind — in other words, a personal
God. It may be added that even if the hypothesis of
an unthinking substance were legitimate, it would
not explain the facts. The facts are the sensible
properties of matter, and these are, as has been
already explained, thoughts and ideas. But an
unthinking substance can possess neither thoughts
nor ideas, and therefore cannot account for the
known properties of matter.
II. — Objections to Berkeley's Theory
To discuss all the objections that may be raised
to Berkeley's brilliant and ingenious argument, of
which only the outlines are given above, would
require a treatise on Metaphysics. Space can
only here be found for the consideration of a few,
mostly theological
Objection I. — Berkeley's argument denies the
reality of matter, and thus contravenes the tradition
of the Church that matter is real.
Reply. — A theory which in fact denied the reality
of matter, would undoubtedly be theologically ille
gitimate, as throwing doubt upon the evidence of
the senses, and impeaching the veracity of God.

84 ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS
But Berkeley's theory does not do this. It supposes
that the senses are entirely trustworthy, and that
matter really is what it appears to the senses to be
— viz. really extended, really heavy, really coloured,
really beautiful, etc. There is, in fact, no theory
which makes matter so real and the senses so
trustworthy as Berkeley's. It is true that the
current teaching of the Church for many ages
before Berkeley was expressed in terms of Realism.
But this was due not to any statements in Holy
Scripture, or to any authentic apostolic tradition,
but to the authority of Aristotle and the Schoolmen.
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas were great men,
but even they were not infallible, and cannot be
allowed to bar the progress of Philosophy for ever.
Berkeley's theory has now been tested by nearly
two hundred years of use, and although capable
of abuse, has not been found on the whole dangerous
to faith.1 It is held by an increasing number of
Theists, and is probably at the present moment
the predominant theory, at least in the Anglican
branch of the Church.
Objection II. — Berkeley's theory is inconsistent
with the Resurrection of the Body.
Reply. — The Church's doctrine of the Resurrection
of the Body is a practical, not a metaphysical one.
Starting from the fact that, whatever the meta
physics of the subject may be, there is a real
1 It has occasionally been abused by Agnostics to prove that
the soul itself is not a substance, but only a series of sensations;
but this does not follow logically from the theory.

BERKELEY AND THE RESURRECTION 85
distinction between soul and body, and that matter
is in some way essential to the soul's full realization,
the Church affrms that even in the world to come
the soul will possess a " material " body, and
perhaps a " material " environment of some kind.
The Church thus asserts a real distinction between
soul and body, but does not define what that dis
tinction is. Now Berkeleianism makes the dis
tinction between body and soul as real as Realism.
It affirms, for example, that the body is visible,
tangible, extended, capable of motion, etc., and
that the soul is invisible, intangible, unextended,
incapable of motion, etc., and that these qualities
are real. On the theoretical side it establishes a
distinction between soul and body by demonstrat
ing that the former is a thinking substance, distinct
from, and, in a sense, existing independently of
God, and that the latter is a thought in God's
mind, standing in a close relation to, but quite
independent of, the human soul. A Berkeleian,
therefore, can believe the Resurrection of the Body,
even its "material" resurrection, as fully and un
feignedly as the Realist.
Objection III. — If external objects were mere
thoughts, they could not act as causes, and produce
dynamical effects.
Reply. — Mere thoughts, even human thoughts,
act as causes, and produce striking dynamic results.
Very striking results, for example, were produced
by the ideas of Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality
at the French Revolution, and are now being

86 BERKELEY ON CREATION
produced by the ideas of Arbitration and Imperialism.
But if human thoughts have such power, how much
more Divine thoughts !
Objection IV. — Man has the power of influencing
by his will and altering the course of external
Nature. But if external Nature is, as Berkeley
affirms, a thought in God's mind, man must have
the power of influencing and altering God's thoughts
— a theory which borders on irreverence.
Reply. — To believe that, within certain limits
and in a certain sense, man can influence the
thoughts of God, is not irreverent, and is even
scriptural. For example, God allows man to in
fluence His will by prayer, and to provoke Him
to anger by sin ; much more therefore may God
allow man to " influence His thoughts " by moving
material bodies, and otherwise acting upon physical
nature. Objection V. — Berkeley's theory is inconsistent
with the Scripture doctrine of Creation. If matter
is a mere thought in God's mind, it must have
existed eternally, and not have been created in
time. Reply. — Creation in time is as possible and in
telligible on Berkeley's theory as on the theory
of Realism. Matter existed first of all as an idea
in the mind of God which He intended in due
time to manifest to finite intelligences, such as
those of angels and men. When the idea of
matter was actually so manifested, the material
world became visible to creatures, or, in the

BERKELEY ON CREATION 87
language of Scripture, was created. On this point
Berkeley may, perhaps, be allowed to speak for
himself :
"Hylas. — The Scripture account of the Creation
is what appears to me utterly irreconcilable with
your notions.
" Philonous. — There is no sense [of Scripture] you
may not as well conceive, believing as I do. I
imagine that if I had been present at the Creation,
I should have seen things produced into being —
that is, become perceptible — in the order prescribed
by the sacred historian. I ever before believed
the Mosaic account of the Creation, and now find
no alteration in my manner of believing it. When
things are said to begin or end their existence, we
do not mean this with regard to God, but His
creatures. All objects are eternally known by
God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal
existence in His mind ; but when things, before
imperceptible to creatures, are by a decree of God
perceptible to them, then are they said to begin
a relative existence with respect to created minds.
Upon reading, therefore, the Mosaic account of
the Creation, I understand that the several parts
of the world became gradually perceptible to finite
spirits, endowed with proper faculties ; so that
whoever such were then present, they were in
truth perceived by them. This is the literal
obvious sense suggested to me by the words of
Holy Scripture, in which is included no mention
or no thought, either of substratum, instrument,

88 BERKELEY AND AGNOSTICISM
occasion, or absolute existence. And upon inquiry,
I doubt not it will be found that most plain, honest
men, who believe Creation, never think of these
things any more than I."

APPENDIX
AGNOSTIC TESTIMONY TO THE GENERAL SOUNDNESS OF
BERKELEY'S POSITION
J. S. Mill. — " Matter, then, may be defined, a Permanent
Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked whether I believe in
matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of
it. If he does, I believe in matter ; and so do all Berkeleians.
In any other sense than this, I do not. But I affirm with
confidence, that this conception of Matter includes the whole
meaning attached to it by the common world, apart from
philosophical and sometimes from theological theories. The
reliance of mankind on the real existence of visible and
tangible objects means reliance on the reality and permanence
of possibilities of visual and tactual sensations, when no such
sensations are actually experienced" {On Hamilton, . 6th ed.
P- 233)-
Prof. Huxley. — " The arguments used by Descartes and
Berkeley to show that our certain knowledge does not extend
beyond our states of consciousness, appear to me to be as
irrefragable now as they did when I first became acquainted
with them some half-century ago. All the materialistic writers
I know of who have tried to bite that file have simply broken
their teeth " {Evolution and Ethics, p. 130).
Prof. K. Pearson. — " Matter as the unknowable cause of
sense-impression is a metaphysical entity meaningless for
science" {Grammar of Science, p. 251).

BERKELEY ON HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 89
LITERATURE
(a) Berkeleian
Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,
" the design of which is plainly to demonstrate the reality and
perfection of human knowledge, the incorporeal nature of the
soul, and the immediate providence of a Deity : in opposition
to Sceptics and Atheists " ; Principles of Human Knowledge ;
Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher ; H. Rashdall, The
Ultimate Basis of 'Theism (in Contentio Veritatis) ; Personality ,
Human and Divine (in Personal Idealism, ed. H. Sturt) ;
J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism (lects. xviii. to xx.,
especially lect. xx.) ; Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysics (semi-
Berkeleian). (b) Anti-Berkeleian
Rickaby, First Principles (c. ii., especially pp. 294-6).

CHAPTER VII
THE ARGUMENT FROM RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
Summary'.— Ontologists maintain that the human soul has a
certain immediate consciousness of God, independent of
logical argument. This opinion at least contains truth.
The contemplation of natural beauty often leads to a
mystical state of "cosmic consciousness," in which the
existence of a Spiritual Reality in or behind Nature is more
or less clearly felt. Some persons even attain to a direct
mystical consciousness of the presence of a Personal God.
Even ordinary religious persons are generally conscious
that they are in vital union with some actual Spiritual Being,
from whom they draw supernatural strength, and in whom
they find joy and peace unspeakable. Man possesses a
whole group of religious faculties, and it is contrary to the
analogy of Nature for these to exist unless there also exists
an environment suitable for their exercise and use. But the
only environment suitable to man's religious faculties is a
Personal God.
There are certain philosophers who maintain that
all rational beings possess a certain immediate
rudimentary knowledge of God, which forms the
basis, or at least an element, of all thought. This
opinion is called Ontologism, and its defenders
Ontologists.1 Descartes, Malebranche, Rosmini,
1 Ontologism, or the doctine that the human mind possesses
a direct knowledge of God, must be carefully distinguished from
the Ontological Argument referred to in c. i., with which it
has nothing to do. 90

ONTOLOGISM 91
and other Ontologists, point out that all human
minds possess, at least in germ, certain transcen
dental ideas, such as that of infinity, and those
of moral and .esthetic perfection ; and they argue
that since these ideas cannot have been gained by
the contemplation of finite and imperfect things,
they must have been gained by the contemplation
of the Deity, in whom alone they are found.
At first sight it might be supposed that Ontologism
is sufficiently refuted by the mere existence of
Atheists and Agnostics ; but the matter is not so
simple. Ontologists do not suppose that the appre
hension of God by ordinary men is other than
rudimentary and partial, and they admit, and even
insist, that preoccupation with other affairs, pre
judice, and sin, may prevent the human mind from
attending to the knowledge which it implicitly has.
They show, moreover, that many who call themselves
Atheists or Agnostics, nevertheless retain strong
traces of transcendental notions. For example, they
believe in ideals of various kinds, in a real distinc
tion between virtue and vice, and in the binding
character of the duties of benevolence, justice, and
self-sacrifice — beliefs which indicate some know
ledge, however vague, of a higher world and a
Moral Ruler of the universe, and are irreconcilable
with Atheism or Agnosticism.
It is impossible in the limited space available to
discuss Ontologism as a philosophical system : it
must suffice in this chapter to draw attention to
certain elements of truth which it undoubtedly

92 ARGUMENT FROM NATURAL BEAUTY
possesses, and to develop one or two of its less
metaphysical arguments.
I. — The Argument from the Beauty of Natural
Things, and from "Cosmic Consciousness"
The contemplation of Nature produces upon the
human soul a twofold effect. In the first place, it
stimulates and satisfies the desire of scientific
knowledge ; and in the second place, it produces an
aesthetic — sometimes even a religious or spiritual-
effect. These two effects are entirely distinct and
different in kind. From the scientific point of view
the most beautiful landscape is nothing but so
many atoms of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon,
silicon, calcium, etc., variously arranged and vibrating
in various ways. From the artistic point of view
it is beautiful, glorious, sublime. The beauty of
Nature is not an imaginary thing, invented by
metaphysical theologians in want of an argument,
but a solid fact of experience. It has even a market
value, as house agents and estate agents are well
aware. Moreover, it exists not only in the mind,
but in Nature. It is as certain, for instance, that a
cypress-tree is objectively beautiful, as that it is
solid or combustible. To deny that beauty exists,
because some inartistic persons cannot see it, or
because artistic authorities are not agreed on all
points of taste, is like denying the existence of
colour because some persons are colour-blind, or of
sound because some persons are deaf. It follows,
therefore, that the First Cause of the world cannot

COSMIC CONSCIOUSNESS 93
be simply a mechanical force, but must be a being
to whom beauty is a reality — in other words, an
Intelligent Artistic Mind.
But it is not as a mere argument for God's
existence that the beauty of nature exercises its
chief religious influence upon the mind. In certain
moods the sight of natural beauty brings the soul
into direct communion with a Being who, if not
always distinctly apprehended as personal, is yet
felt to be spiritual, unutterably lovely, sympathetic,
and infinite. The poets of all ages testify to this
feeling — not only religious poets like Wordsworth
or Tennyson, but even Agnostic poets like Shelley,
Byron, and Goethe. For example, Byron, de
scribing his feelings in the presence of Nature,
says : Then stirs the feeling infinite, so felt
In solitude, where we are least alone ;
A truth, which through our being then doth melt,
And purifies from self: it is a tone,
The soul and source of music, which makes known
Eternal harmony.1
This peculiar and exalted state of consciousness
and feeling is fully acknowledged by recent
psychologists to be unique in character, and of
great scientific interest. Prof. Wm. James, the
famous American psychologist, speaks very
decidedly upon this point. " Even the least mystical
of you," he says, " must by this time be convinced
of the existence of mystical moments as states of
1 Childe Harold, iii. 90.

94 COSMIC CONSCIOUSNESS
consciousness of an entirely specific quality, and
of the deep impression which they make on those
that have them." He proceeds to quote the
Canadian psychiatrist Dr. R. M. Bucke as follows :
" The prime characteristic of cosmic consciousness x
is a consciousness ... of the life and order of
the universe. . . . There occurs an intellectual
enlightenment which alone would place the in
dividual on a new plane of existence — would make
him almost a member of a new species. To this
is added a state of moral exaltation, an indescrib
able feeling of elevation, elation, and joyousness,
and a quickening of the moral sense, which is fully
as striking, and more important, than is the
enhanced intellectual power. With these come
what may be called a sense of immortality, a
consciousness of eternal life — not a conviction that
he shall have this, but the consciousness that he
has it already." 2
Even the unimaginative mind of Charles Darwin
was not altogether closed to such impressions.
" Whilst standing," he says, " in the midst of the
grandeur of a Brazilian forest, it is not possible
to give an adequate idea of the higher feelings
of wonder, admiration, and devotion which fill and
elevate the mind. I well remember my conviction
1 " Cosmic consciousness " is a better description of this
mystical state than Prof. Sidgwick's phrase, " cosmic emotion."
" Cosmic emotion " is not wholly emotional, for the emotion is
based on a distinct perception of some external Spiritual Reality
with which the soul feels itself in contact.
8 Gifford Lectures, p. 398.

COSMIC CONSCIOUSNESS 95
that there is more in man than the mere breath
of his body."1
A recent writer, after quoting numerous typical
passages illustrating this " cosmic consciousness,"
ranging from the Egyptian Book of the Dead to
Wordsworth's famous lines on Tintern, sums up
thus : " It will be noticed that the above quotations
range through the whole of recorded history ;
they might have been indefinitely multiplied ; and
every one of them expresses, not the experience
of an individual, but of endless generations of men ;
psalmists, poets, and even philosophers only be
coming popular as they utter the innermost
feelings of humanity at large. Here, then, we
have evidence that Nature — the material world with
its sights and sounds — has exerted, throughout all
ages, a profound religious influence on the thoughts
and affections of men. . . . The influence in
question is independent of any particular theo
logical interpretation ; coexisting alike with Mono
theism, Polytheism, Pantheism — a mystic emotion
more fundamental than the varieties of creed — a
primary, permanent, world-wide agent in the
education of the human soul."2
We may agree, then, with Prof. James : " The
existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows
the pretension of non-mystical states to be the
sole and ultimate dictators of what we may
believe. ... It must always remain an open question
1 Life and Letters, vol. i. p. 312.
8 Rev. J. R. Illingworth, Divine Immanence, p. 47.

96 GOD'S PRESENCE FELT
whether mystical states may not possibly be
superior points of view, windows through which the
mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive
world." That they are so, is the contention of Ontologists.
II. — Direct Mystical Consciousness of a
Personal God
The indefinite aesthetic and cosmic consciousness
just described exists in some degree in most men.
The higher states of mystical consciousness in
which the Being with whom communion is held
is distinctly apprehended as a Personal, All-holy
God are more rare, but nevertheless constitute a
well-established and important class of psycho
logical phenomena. A number of excellent cases
have been collected and discussed with scientific
precision by Prof. James in his important Gifford
Lectures before alluded to. A few typical examples
may be quoted to illustrate what is meant.
A Swiss writes : " All at once I experienced a
feeling of being raised above myself, I felt the
presence of God — I tell of the thing just as I was
conscious of it — as if His goodness and His power
were penetrating me altogether. The throb of
emotion was so violent that I could barely tell
the boys to pass on and not wait for me. I then
sat down on a stone, unable to stand any longer,
and my eyes overflowed with tears. I thanked
God that in the course of my life He had taught
me to know Him, that He sustained my life and

GOD'S PRESENCE FELT 97
took pity both on the insignificant creature and
on the sinner that I was. I begged Him ardently
that my life might be consecrated to the doing
of His will. I felt His reply. . . . Then slowly
the ecstasy left my heart ; that is, I felt that God
had withdrawn the communion He had granted,
and I was able to walk on, but very slowly, so
strongly was I still possessed by the interior
emotion. . . . My impression had been so profound
that I asked myself if it were possible that Moses
on Sinai could have had a more intimate communi
cation with God. I think it well to add that in
this ecstasy of mine God had neither form, colour,
odour, nor taste ; moreover, that the feeling of His
presence was accompanied with no determinate
localization. It was rather as if my personality
had been transformed by the presence of a spiritual
spirit. But the more I seek words to express this
intimate intercourse, the more I feel the impossi
bility of describing the thing by any of our usual
images. At bottom the expression most apt to
render what I felt is this : God was present, though
invisible; He fell under none of my senses, yet
my consciousness perceived Him."
More normal experiences are described in the
following passages :
" God is more real to me than any thought or
thing or person. I feel His presence positively, and
more as I live in closer harmony with His laws
as written in my body and mind. I feel Him in
the sunshine or rain; and awe mingled with a
7

98 GOD'S PRESENCE FELT
delicious restfulness most nearly describes my
feelings." "God is quite real to me. I talk to Him, and
often get answers."
"God surrounds me like a physical atmosphere.
He is closer to me than my own breath. There
are times when I seem to stand in His very presence,
to talk to Him. ... I have the sense of a Presence,
strong and at the same time soothing, which hovers
over me. Sometimes it seems to enwrap me with
sustaining arms." 1
It is said of Brother Lawrence, whose sense of
God's presence was habitual, and who found in
it unbounded delight : " His very countenance was
edifying ; such a sweet and calm devotion appearing
in it, as could not but affect the beholders. And
it was observed that in the greatest hurry of
business in the kitchen he still preserved his re
collection and heavenly mindedness. He was never
hasty nor loitering, but did each thing in its
season, with an even, uninterrupted composure and
tranquillity of spirit. ' The time of business,' said
he, ' does not with me differ from the time of
prayer ; and in the noise and clutter of my kitchen,
while several persons are at the same time calling
for different things, I possess God in as great
tranquillity as if I were upon my knees at the
Blessed Sacrament' " 2
1 W. James, Gifford Lectures, pp. 67-72.
8 Brother Lawrence, Practice of the Presence of God (Fourth
Conversation).

THE HEBREW PROPHETS 99
A still more remarkable case of direct conscious
ness of God is that of the Hebrew prophets. The
sincerity of their belief that God directly revealed
Himself to them, and put words in their mouths
to speak, is beyond question. As Prof. Sanday
says, " With one consent they would say that the
thoughts which arose in their hearts and the words
which arose to their lips were put there by
God. ... It is remarkable what a clear and firm
distinction they draw between what comes from
God and what comes from themselves. There
are in their minds two trains of thought running
parallel to each other, and they never seem to
have the slightest hesitation as to which facts shall
be referred to the one and which to the other. It
is the characteristic of the false prophets to confuse
the deceits of their own heart with the words of
the Lord. The true prophet is never in any doubt.
He may have to wait some time before a revelation
comes to him — Jeremiah on one occasion waits
ten days — but he does not anticipate the desired
moment. The prophets always know and very
frequently set down the precise time when the
word of the Lord 'came to them.' ... A proof
that the prophets were not the victims of hallucina
tion is supplied by the extraordinary consistency of
their language in regard to themselves and their
mission. If one prophet here and another there
had supposed themselves to be sent by God, and
to have words put in their mouths by Him,
it would not have been so surprising. But as it

too ORDINARY RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
is, we find the whole line of prophets, stretching
over a succession of centuries, from Amos, from
Nathan, from Samuel, from Moses, from Malachi,
all make the same assumption. The formulae
which they use are the same : ' Thus saith the
Lord,' ' The word of the Lord came,' ' Hear ye the
word of the Lord.' Such an identity of language
implies an identity of psychological fact behind it ;
but, if an individual may be subject to delusions,
it is another thing to say that a class so long
extended could be subject to them — and to delusions
with so much method about them."1
Upon the whole, then, there can be no doubt
that a large number of sane and truthful persons
have professed in all ages to enjoy an immediate
and distinct consciousness of the existence of a
personal God. Such evidence, though not in itself
conclusive, is strong.
III. — The Religious Experience of Ordinary
Men
What keeps religion alive among the masses of
mankind more than anything else, is the sense of
its vital power. Real religion completely transforms
the character, raising it to a higher plane altogether,
and making its happy possessor capable of actions
of heroism and exalted virtue, which, without it, he
could not possibly perform. It fills the soul with
a blissful serenity and peace, which pass all under
standing, and which not even the fiercest storms of
1 Inspiration, pp. 145-55.

ORDINARY RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 101
life can seriously disturb. A man who is religious
has surrendered himself to a Great Another, upon
whom he rests, and from whom he draws ever new
supplies of spiritual and moral power. " There
is a state of mind," says Prof. James, "known to
religious men, but to no others, in which the will
to assert ourselves and hold our own has been
displaced by a willingness to close our mouths
and be as nothing in the floods and waterspouts
of God. In this state of mind, what we most
dreaded has become the habitation of our safety,
and the hour of our moral death has turned into
our spiritual birthday. The time for tension in
the soul is over, and that of happy relaxation, of
calm, deep breathing, of an eternal present, with
no discordant future to be anxious about, has
arrived. . . . [Religion] adds to life an enchantment
which is not rationally or logically deducible from
anything else. . . . Religious feeling is thus an
absolute addition to the subject's range of life. It
gives him a new sphere of power. When the out
ward battle is lost, and the outej world disowns
him, it redeems and vivifies an interior world which
otherwise would be an empty waste. . . . Religion
ought to mean nothing short of this new reach of
freedom for us, with the struggle over, the keynote
of the universe sounding in our ears, and ever
lasting possession spread before our eyes. This
sort of happiness in the absolute and everlasting
is what we find nowhere but in religion."1
1 Gifford Lectures, pp. 47, 48.

102 ORDINARY RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
It is open, of course, to the objector to say that
this power of religion is only a particular example
of the power of ideas to influence human
conduct — no more remarkable, for instance, than
the power of ambition, or of the love of wealth,
to develop a man's latent faculties, and to goad
him to energetic action. The really religious man,
however, who after all in this matter is the man
who knows, refuses to see the question in this
light. He is certain that there is a very real
difference between being dominated by an ordinary
idea and living by religion. Religion is felt by
all who have personal experience of it, to be actual
communion with a Power outside ourselves, which
lifts us, as it were, on eagles' wings, far above our
natural level, and places us in a position of security
and peace. Religion is not simply thinking about
God, but feeling Him, and knowing Him, and
resting in Him, and surrendering one's all to Him,
and experiencing the delicious sense of pardon,
and of being sustained in His everlasting arms,
and folded to His fatherly heart. Religion has its
secret, which is known to none but the religious,1
and this is its sufficient justification. This is not
the kind of argument which will satisfy the Agnostic,
but it is the argument which has convinced the
world. The inward blissful experiences of those
1 Cf. Rev. ii. 17, He that hath an ear, let him hear what the
Spirit saith unto the churches; To him that overcometh will I
give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white
stone, and in the stone a new name written, which no man
knoweth saving he that receiveth it."

PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION 103
who live by religion are an evidence of its truth
far deeper and more cogent than all the arguments
of the speculative reason ; and if, for any cause,
this evidence ever ceased to be available to the
generality of mankind, religion would become extinct
in a generation, except among philosophers.
IV. — The Psychological Aspect of Religious
Experience
A few words may be added on the psychological
aspect of religious experience. Regarded psycho
logically, the religious phenomena of the mind
form a distinct and important group. The pheno
mena of cosmic consciousness, repentance, the
sense of pardon, religious awe, conscience, religious
exaltation, conversion, etc., are facts. They are
as fundamentally human as love, hatred, "jealousy,
fear, or anger. Now, it is an accepted law of Nature
that mental faculties are related in every case to
something objectively real. The sense of sight, for
instance, is related to real illuminated objects, the
sense of hearing to real sounds, the sense of touch
to real surfaces, the emotion of fear to real dangers,
the emotion of love to real lovable objects, and
so on. Even the self-regarding affections, such
as self-love, are no exceptions, for the self itself
is real.
A strong presumption, therefore, arises that the
religious faculties also correspond to something
real. Nature does not produce organs and faculties
at random. She does not give earthworms eyes,

104 PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION
or fishes wings. Therefore, since she has evolved
a religious faculty, or rather a group of religious
faculties, we may rest assured that the higher
spiritual environment, to which they are obviously
intended to correspond, exists. If there really is
a personal, holy God, the evolution of religious
faculties in the higher orders of creatures is only
what we should expect ; but if no God, or no such
God, exists, their appearance is an unexplainable
anomaly.

LITERATURE
(a) Ontologism as a Philosophy
Descartes, Metaphysical Meditations (tr.) ; Malebranche, De
la recherche de la verite, and Meditations chretiennes et
mitaphysiques ; Rosmini-Serbati, Theodicy, and New Essay
on the Origin of Ideas (tr.). For an attempted refutation, see
Boedder, Natural Theology, p. i2ff.
(_¦) The Psychology of Religious Experience
W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience (Gifford
Lectures, 1901-2) ; Illingworth, Divine Immanence; Luthardt,
Fundamental Truths of Christianity, lect. vi.
(c) The Philosophy of Mysticism
Inge, Christian Mysticism; Granger, The Soul of a
Christian,

CHAPTER VIII
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE CONSENT OF MANKIND
Summary. — All nations agree that there is a Power or Powers
supreme over Nature and man, which takes an interest
in human affairs, and can be influenced by human prayer
and conduct. This belief has persisted, in spite of severe
adverse criticism. It is, therefore, probably true. This
conclusion is unaffected by any theories which may be held
as to the origin or evolution of religion.
The universality of religion has been observed
from very ancient times, and has generally been
considered a strong confirmation of its truth. " If I
were a nightingale," says Epictetus, " I would by
singing fulfil the vocation of a nightingale. If I
were a swan, by singing, the vocation of a swan.
But since I am a reasonable being, it is mine to
praise God. This is my calling : I will fulfil it." 1
" If you go round the world," says Plutarch, " you
may find cities without walls, or literature, or
kings, or houses, or wealth, or money, without
gymnasia or theatres. But no one ever saw a
city without temples and gods, one which does
not have recourse to prayers or oaths or oracles,
1 Discourses, i. c. 6.
i°5

106 RELIGION UNIVERSAL
which does not offer sacrifice to obtain blessings,
or celebrate rites to avert evil." x " There is no
people," says Cicero, " so wild and savage as not
to have believed in a God, even if they have been
unacquainted with His nature. ... It is necessary
to believe that there are gods, because we have
an implanted or rather innate knowledge of them.
Now, a thing concerning which the nature of all
men agrees, must of necessity be true." 2
In modern times the universality of religion has
occasionally been called in question, notably by
Lord Avebury, who in his Prehistoric Times makes
an elaborate attempt to prove that numerous tribes
in North and South America, Polynesia, and
Australia, and some in India and Africa, are with
out a religion. His arguments, however, have
failed to convince even those who would most
gladly believe them to be true, and Prof. Tylor
only expresses the general sentiment of competent
Anthropologists when he says, "The assertion
that rude, non-religious tribes have been known
in actual existence, though in theory possible, and
perhaps in fact true, does not at present rest on
that sufficient proof which, for an exceptional state
of things, we are entitled to demand. ... So far
as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible
evidence, we have to admit that the belief in
spiritual beings appears among all low races with
whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate
1 Adversus Cole ten.
8 De legibus, i. 8 ; De natura deorum, i. 17.

BUDDHISM A RELIGION 107
acquaintance ; whereas the assertion of absence of
such belief must apply either to ancient tribes or
to more or less imperfectly described modern ones '
{Primitive Culture, 4th ed., 1903, pp. 418, 425).1
A more serious attempt to impugn the univer
sality of religion is that of M. Barthelemy de Saint-
Hilaire, who maintains that Buddhism, the religion
of nearly a third of the human race, is really
Atheism. Now, it is highly probable that the principles
of Buddhism, if developed to their logical con
sequences, would result in Atheism, but that is an
entirely different thing from saying that Buddhism
is Atheism. Buddhism always has been, and is
now, a religion, recognizing gods and heavens
and hells innumerable. The founder himself, as
Prof. Flint points out, has been deified. It is
believed that in the course of his numerous in
carnations or transformations he four times became
Mahu-Brahma, the supreme god of the Hindus, and
that afterwards he became Buddha, and acquired
omnipotence, omniscience, and other attributes of
Supreme Divinity. All Buddhist literature, ancient
and modern, contains frequent allusions to the
gods. " The Lalitavistara," says Prof. Flint, " in
troduces us to Buddha before his incarnation. The
1 Prof. Gustav Roskoff, after a minute examination of Lord
Avebury's instances, comes to the same conclusion. " Hitherto,"
he says, " no tribe has been found without a trace of religion "
(Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvolker, p. 178). On
the same side are O. Peschel, F. von Hellward, P. Gloatz,
W. Schneider, and Ch. Pesch.

108 THE POSITIVIST CALENDAR
scene is laid in heaven. Surrounded and adored
by those who are adored, the future Buddha
announces that the time has come for him to
assume a mortal body, and recalls to the assembled
gods the precepts of the law. When in the
bosom of his mother Maya Devi, he receives the
homage of Brahma, of Cakra, the master of the
gods, of the four goddesses, and of a multitude
of deities. When he enters the world, the divine
child is received by Indra, the king of the gods,
and Brahma, the lord of creatures. . . . And so on,
and so on." 1
The history of Buddhism, therefore, renders it
extremely difficult to believe that the founder was
really an Atheist.2 If he was, the fact only proves
that the tendency of the human mind towards a
religion of some kind is irresistibly strong.
Another objection to the universality of religion
is that a certain number of distinguished men have
been Atheists. These exceptions, however, are
extremely few. Comte's Positivist Calendar 3 con
tains the names of the five hundred and forty-three
men and women whom he supposes to have done
the most good in the world. Of these over ninety
per cent, were convinced believers in supernatural
1 Anti-theistic Theories, p. 284.
8 Dr. Fairbairn says, " Nothing could be farther than the
soul or system of the Buddha from what we mean by Atheism " ;
and he speaks of his " thoroughly theistic consciousness "
{Philosophy of the Christian Religion, p. 242).
3 It is given in The Catechism of Positive Religion (tr.),
Appendix, table D.

RELIGIOUS UNSETTLEMENT 109
religion ; and of the rest, very few carried their
scepticism so far as seriously to doubt the exist
ence of a God. Comte himself, who stands head
and shoulders above all other Atheists,1 felt the
need of a religion so strongly that he deliber
ately invented one. He established a cult of
" Humanity," with a priesthood, public worship,
sacraments, a reformed confessional, the honour
of saints, an ideal preference for virginity — in fact,
he paid Christianity, especially Catholic Chris
tianity, the sincere compliment of imitation. He
even declared his belief in certain of the Christian
miracles, notably in our Lord's miraculous birth
of a virgin, which, according to some modern re
presentatives of " criticism," is incredible.
Another objection to the Argument from Consent
is the existence of unbelief among cultured nations
at the present time. Unbelief exists, without doubt,
but not to the extent that is often supposed. Men
are critical of traditional beliefs, and somewhat
suspicious of orthodoxy; there is also a certain
amount of anti-clerical feeling; but it would be a
great mistake to identify this with Atheism, or
even with Agnosticism of a radical type. Religious
authority must be distinguished from religion.
There is a considerable tendency to question the
former; very little to question the latter. What
1 Laplace, perhaps, might be compared with Comte ; but out
side mathematics he showed small ability, and Napoleon
declared him only capable of " solving problems of the in
finitely little."

no SCIENCE AND RELIGION
radical unbelief there is, is mostly found among
those who devote themselves exclusively to Natural
Science. But even here, it would be a gross
exaggeration to say, as Mr. Froude did some years
ago, that the foremost scientists have gone over
in a body to the materialistic camp. In recent
and contemporary science such names as Balfour
Stewart, Asa Gray, Clerk Maxwell, Joule, Tait,
Lord Kelvin, Sir Oliver Lodge, and Sir G. G. Stokes,
are sufficient in themselves to refute such a state
ment. There are, moreover, indications that the
wave of materialism and semi-materialism which
followed the publication of The Origin of Species in
1859 has spent itself. There have been important
retractations. Prof. Wundt, for example, who
in 1863 wrote his Human and Animal Psychology
from an entirely materialistic standpoint, has now
issued a new and completely revised edition, in
which he speaks of his earlier work as a sin of
his youth.1 Dr. Romanes, one of the greatest
representatives of the Darwinian tradition, before
his death completely recanted his earlier views.2
1 "As for myself, I had but little experience in the difficult
work of psychological analysis, and set about my task with
more zeal than discretion. So that for years before the appear
ance of the first edition of my Physiological Psychology, in
which I took up the same problem with more modesty and
caution, I had learned to look upon the Lectures as wild oats
of my youthful days, which I would gladly have forgotten"
(Preface to second edition, 1892).
8 "Never was any one more arrogant in his claims for pure
reason than I was — more arrogant in spirit, though not in letter,
this being due to contact with science ; without ever considering

SCIENCE AND RELIGION in
And even Prof. Huxley, in his famous Romanes
Lecture, Evolution and Ethics (1903), unsaid a great
deal. At the present moment it cannot be fairly
said that the general attitude of Natural Science
is hostile to faith. Even if it were, it would be
wrong to attach too much importance to the fact.
Natural Science is only one out of many fields of
human activity and knowledge, and it has many
limitations.1 The religious opinions of men of
science should, of course, be treated with respect,
but not with more respect than the opinions of
historians, philosophers, poets, statesmen, or any
other men of learning and cultivation. The study
of Natural Science does not confer any special
aptitude for the treatment of theological questions.
These come more within the province of Philosophy,
and, as is well known, almost all philosophers,
including all the greatest, have been believers in
religion.
how opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of
my earlier argument as to God Himself, as if His existence were
a merely physical problem to be solved by man's reason alone,
without reference to his other and higher faculties " {Thoughts
on Religion, p. 101).
1 Darwin says, " It is an accursed evil to a man to become
so absorbed in any subject as I am in mine. ... I cannot
endure to read a line of poetry: I have tried lately to read
Shakespeare, and found it so intolerably dull that it nauseated
me. I have also almost lost my taste for pictures or music. . . .
My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding
general laws out of large collections of facts ; but why this
should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone
on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive " {Life
and Letters, vol. i. pp. 101, 102 ; vol. ii. p. 139).

112 VALUE OF CONSENT
There still remains to be considered what amount
of evidential value ought to be attached to this
general — almost universal — agreement as to the
truth of religion. Some value it certainly has,
but it is not easy to say how much. The cogency
of the Argument from Consent varies very much
according to the subject-matter about which there
is consent. If the subject is a technical one, such
as the distance of the fixed stars, or the habits of
microbes, the judgment of a single expert is worth
more than the judgment of all the rest of mankind ;
but if the subject is one which men in general are
able to understand, and which affects human life
at many points, then the general consent of mankind
becomes an argument of great importance. That
this is so is universally recognized. Every one,
for example, admits that the consent of mankind
that government is better than anarchy, marriage
better than free love, and private property better
than communism, is an argument of a most solid
character. Very few, again, will seriously question
the verdict of mankind that Shakespeare is a great
dramatist, Dante a great poet, Victor Hugo a
great novelist, Michel Angelo a great artist, and
King Alfred a great statesman. Now, religion
is above all a human and practical thing. It
appeals, like literature, oratory, statesmanship,
poetry, and art, to man as man. It touches
ordinary life at every point. The arguments for it
are simple, practical, and obvious, and are taken
from every branch of knowledge and experience.

PERSISTENCY OF RELIGION 113
Religion is, as has been finely said, " the total
reaction of man upon the universe." But if so, it
is just one of those subjects with regard to which
the Argument from Consent is valid and weighty.
It is weighty, whether the knowledge of God in
the soul is strictly innate, as some think, or
gradually acquired by reasoning, which is the
more usual opinion. Whichever of these views is
true, it is certain that the facts of the universe
combine to produce in the mind of the ordinary
man an almost overwhelming conviction that there
is a God, and this is sufficient for the argument.
Another point of great importance is that the
belief of mankind in religion is persistent. Religion
survives, not because it has never been criticised,
but because it has triumphed over criticism. There
have been periods when the hostile critics seemed
to have so effectually made out their case that the
speedy downfall of religion was confidently ex
pected. The last age of the Roman republic was
such a period ; but with the accession of Augustus
a reaction set in, and religion regained greater
prestige and influence than ever. The eighteenth
century in England was another such period. " It
has come," says Butler, "to be taken for granted
by many persons, that Christianity is not so much
as a subject for inquiry; but that it is, now at
length, discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly
they treat it as if, in the present age, this were an
agreed point among all people of discernment ; and
nothing remained but to set it up as a principal 8

ii4 PERSISTENCY OF RELIGION
subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of
reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the
pleasures of the world." x It is even said that in
1747 Butler refused the primacy because " it was
too late for him to try to support a falling
Church." In France the Revolution gave Atheism
a short-lived triumph. On August 10th, 1793,
a great festival was held to celebrate the final
overthrow of religion, and the substitution of
Nature and Reason for God. Yet within a year
Robespierre obtained a decree recognizing a
Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul,
and soon afterwards the reaction went further
and brought back Christianity.
The fall of religion has been confidently expected
so often, that wise men have given over expecting it.
Comte and his followers expected it in 185 1, when
they boldly came forward " to claim as their due the
general direction of this world, in order to con
struct at length the true Providence, moral, in
tellectual, and material ; excluding once for all from
political supremacy all the different servants of
God — Catholic, Protestant, or Deist — as at once
1 Advertisement to the Analogy. It is amusing to observe
how some. people, who ought to know better, still indulge in talk
of this description. For example, Prof. K. Pearson says, " I
set out from the standpoint that the mission of Freethought is
no longer to batter down old faiths ; that has been long ago
effectively accomplished, and I, for one, am willing to put a
fence round the ruins, that they may be preserved from desecra
tion, and serve as a landmark. ... I start from the axiom that
the Christian ' verities ' are quite outside the field of profitable
discussion " {Ethic of Freethought, Preface to first edition).

PERSISTENCY OF RELIGION 115
belated and a source of trouble."1 Many eager
Darwinians expected it in 1859, when the famous
Origin was published, and since then the rise of the
" Higher Criticism " has inspired high hopes in the
minds of many Secularists. But all these hopes
have been disappointed. Positivism failed to
appeal either to the multitude or to the educated.
Darwinism was found consistent with orthodoxy.
The higher criticism, as expounded by its saner
representatives, has been found useful and even
edifying. And thus after two hundred years of
almost continuous criticism, supernatural faith, in
spite of a certain amount of unsettlement on par
ticular points of doctrine, remains practically un
shaken. In many ways religion seems to be
showing greater vitality than ever. Foreign mis
sions, for instance, have progressed during the last
thirty years in a manner previously unexampled.2
Religion, then, being persistent, is probably true.
False beliefs, however widely held, tend to dis
appear before criticism. Thus the once universal
beliefs in the immobility of the earth, in judicial
astrology, in witchcraft, in alchemy, and in sym
pathetic magic, collapsed as soon as they were
seriously questioned. Moreover, false religious
beliefs, such as animal-worship, fetichism, demon-
1 These were the words with which Comte closed his third
course of Philosophical Lectures on the General History of
Humanity. 8 In 1875 the Christian population of the world was estimated
at 394 millions. Now it exceeds 500 millions. {Encyc. Brit.
xxvii. p. 54).

116 RELIGIOUS DIVERGENCIES
worship, and polytheism, have met with a similar
fate. Monotheism, however, has resisted all
attempts to refute it, and has proved itself fit to
survive, by surviving.
It will be convenient to conclude this chapter
with a consideration of a few objections to the
Argument from Consent not previously noticed.
Objection I. — The consent of mankind to the truth
of religion is of no value, because the various
systems of Theology are extremely divergent.
This was Darwin's difficulty. " This argument,"
he says, " would be a valid one if all men of all races
had the same inward conviction of the existence of
a God ; but we know that this is very far from being
the case. Therefore I cannot see that such inward
convictions and feelings are of any weight as
evidence of what really exists" {Life and Letters,
vol. i. p. 310).
Reply. — The fact that men differ on certain points
is no reason for distrusting their general agreement.
Biologists differ greatly in their theories of Evolu
tion, nations in their forms of government, historians
in their views of certain facts of history, yet it
would be unreasonable to doubt that Evolution is a
fact, that government is a good thing, and that
history in general is trustworthy. When a number
of witnesses contradict one another on certain
points, a jury does not therefore infer that the
statements on which they agree are false. It is
true that religions differ greatly in details, but there

ORIGIN OF RELIGION 117
is a very general agreement on at least the following
points :
(1) That there is a Power or Powers supreme
over nature and man ; (2) that this Power is in
telligent and personal ; (3) that it takes an interest
in human affairs, and can -be influenced by human
prayer and conduct.
Cultivated nations go further and maintain that
this Power is one and holy, a friend of righteous
ness, and an enemy of vice. Surely, then, we have
a right to maintain, on principles of common sense,
that such religious doctrines as these, which have
behind them universal consent, or the consent of
the most advanced races, have at least a consider
able degree of probability.
Objection II. — Religion owes its origin to scientific
and philosophical theories, now admitted to be false,
and this invalidates the testimony of mankind to its
truth. Reply. — As to the origin of religion, nothing
whatever is known. Religion is as old as human
history, and all attempts to trace it back further
than this are pure speculation. It is sometimes
thought that the religion of savages furnishes a
clue to the prehistoric development of religion.
But in the first place, we do not know whether
the religion of savages fairly represents that of
prehistoric man ; and in the second place, savage
religions are of a very varied character. Some
savages are polytheists, others monotheists,
others devil-worshippers, and there is no way of

u8 ORIGIN OF RELIGION
discovering which of these cults is the oldest. It
is often assumed that ethical monotheism, being
the most perfect form of religion, must have been
last evolved ; but this seems negatived by the fact
that some of the lowest races in the world, such
as the Australians, the Andamanese, and the
natives of Tierra del Fuego, profess an ethical
monotheism of a fairly advanced type. Mr. Herbert
Spencer derives gods from ghosts, and Prof. Tylor
from a supposed primitive animism ; but all such
theories are pure conjecture. Even if Mr. Spencer
or Prof. Tylor were right, the argument from the
consent of mankind would still retain its force.
It is not the arguments which first suggested the
idea of religion to men which are important, but
those which secured its universality and its
survival in spite of attacks. Now, those arguments
have nothing to do with ghosts or animism, but
are in the main the very arguments that Theists
appeal to now.

APPENDIX I
THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION
Theories of the origin of religion have very little bearing
upon the question of its truth, but it may be advisable, for
the sake of completeness, to say a few words about the more
important of them.
(i) Mr. Herbert Spencer derives religion from a belief in
ghosts, which, he thinks, originated in dreams about dead
people. But if religion is, as has been shown, a reaction of

ORIGIN OF RELIGION 119
the human mind upon the universe as a whole, such a special
origin for it must be inadequate. Mr. Spencer's theory may
perhaps account for some forms of ghost-propitiation, but not
for religion in general.
(2) Professor Tylor's theory that religion arose from the
belief that inanimate things, such as trees and stones, possess
life and intelligence, may perhaps account for some of the
grosser aspects of fetichism, but not for the higher aspects even
of this, much less for polytheism and monotheism.
(3) Bayle's theory that religion was invented by priests and
rulers in their own interests is refuted by the fact that religion
prevails among peoples like the Australians, who have neither
priests nor rulers.
(4) The theory that fear of the destructive forces of nature
(lightning, earthquakes, tempests, etc.) gave birth to religion
is not even plausible. A savage who saw a flash of lightning
kill a man would doubtless acquire a well-grounded fear of
lightning ; but this fear would not of itself produce a conviction
that an intelligent being directed the lightning. A belief of
this kind must have had its origin, not in fear, but in reasoning.
(-5) The theory that religion is due to ignorance of natural
causes is refuted by facts. If it were true, religion
would decline in proportion as knowledge of natural
causes advances. But this is not the case. Religion has
always hitherto held its own in the most progressive com
munities, and is nowhere stronger at this moment than in
that typically progressive community, the United States of
America. The prestige of religion would not be in any way
impaired, even if science advanced so far as to find natural
causes for everything. Religion is not based on the gaps in
our scientific knowledge, but on the fact that natural causation
itself requires to be explained.
(6) The theory that religion is a -special form of sexual
emotion does not deserve refutation. Phallic and priapic
rites are mere excrescences on religion. True religion is
inseparably connected with chastity.

150 SAVAGE RELIGIONS
APPENDIX II
THE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUE OF SAVAGE RELIGIONS
There is a tendency among anthropologists to lay undue
stress upon the crudities and imperfections of savage religions,
and to fail to do justice to their higher and ennobling' elements.
The one-sided statements of Prof. Tylor, and especially of
Mr. Spencer, have led many to suppose that religion in its
lowest forms is destitute of a moral or spiritual element
altogether. How false this view is, is well shown by Dr.
Andrew Lang in his valuable book, The Making of Religion,
from which the following facts are taken.
The Australians, the lowest of all races, worship a Supreme
Being, generally called Darumulun, who imposes on men
a moral law, punishes wrong-doing, and reads the secrets of
the heart. Among^the precepts of Darumulun are to honour
and obey the old, to be unselfish and share what one has
with one's friends, to live peaceably with one's neighbours,
not to commit fornication, adultery, or sodomy, and to obey
the food-restrictions of the tribe. At the religious mysteries
these and similar ethical precepts are taught to the young
men under circumstances of the deepest solemnity. Each
lad is given, " by one of the elders, advice so kindly, fatherly,
and impressive, as often to soften the heart, and to draw
tears from the youth." The stomachs of the neophytes are
kneaded to expel selfishness and greed. The future life
(apparently) is illustrated by the burial of a living elder,
who rises from a grove. This may, however, symbolize the
new life of holiness to which the initiated are called. The
Supreme Being is called " Our Father," just like the Christian
God. Unselfishness is regarded as of the essence of religion,
and a selfish man is spoken of as " uninitiated."
The Andamanese, another low race, once believed to be
Atheists, have a god named Puluga, who is "like fire," but

SAVAGE RELIGIONS __._
invisible. He was never born, and is immortal. By him
were all things created, except the powers of evil. He knows
even the thoughts of the heart. He is angered by yubda =
sin, or wrong-doing — that is, falsehood, theft, grave assault,
murder, adultery, bad carving of meat, and (as a crime of
witchcraft) by burning wax. To those in pain or distress
he is pitiful, and sometimes deigns to afford relief. He is
Judge of Souls, and the dread of future punishment to some
extent is said to affect their course of action in the present
life. This account is given by an educated Englishman,
who knows their language, and lived among them for eleven
years. The Fuegians, a race almost as low as the Australians, have
a deity who reads the heart, punishes sin, and is particularly
angry at murder. " Very bad to kill man," said a Fuegian ;
" Big Man in woods no like it — he very angry." Capt. Fitzroy
says of them : " A great black man is supposed to be always
wandering about the woods and mountains, who is certain of
knowing every word and every action, who cannot be
escaped, and who influences the weather according to men's
conduct." Many other interesting facts bearing on the ethical side
of savage religion, together with references to original
authorities, are given in Dr. Lang's book.

LITERATURE
(a) The Argument from Consent
Lactantius, Divine Institutes, bk. i. cc. 2, 5, etc. ; Clement
of Alexandria, Miscellanies, bk. v. cc. 13, 14; Cicero, De
natura deorum, i. 17, etc.; Flint, Theism, p. 348; Boedder,
Natural Theology, pp. 62-76; Mill, Three Essays, p. 155 ff.

122 ANTHROPOLOGY • AND RELIGION

(.) Anthropological Theories of the Origin of
Religion
H. Spencer, Data of Sociology, and Principles of Sociology,
c. xxiii. ; Tylor, Primitive Culture, c. xi. ; F. B. Jevons,
Introduction to the History of Religion ; A. Lang, The Making
of Religion ; Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion ; G.
Allen, Evolution of the Idea of God ; Frazer, The Golden Bough ;
Roskoff, Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvblker ; Ch. Pesch,
Der Gottesbegriff in den heidnischen Religionen (~aj des
A Iterthums, fbj der Neuzeit.

CHAPTER IX
THE UTILITY OF RELIGION CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE
OF ITS TRUTH
Summary.— Religion is more useful to the state and to the
individual than Agnosticism. It is a stronger social bond ;
it encourages virtue and discourages vice more efficiently ;
it is a better instrument of progress ; and it promotes human
happiness in a much higher degree. On the supposition,
therefore, that this is a rational universe, it follows that
Religion is truer than Agnosticism. Certain objections to
the utility of religion are considered and refuted.
I. — The Utility of Religion to Society
The favour with which practical statesmen have
generally regarded religion is mainly due to the
following causes :
{a) Religion acts as a powerful cement, holding
the social fabric together. It performs this function
best when the members of a community are of
one religion; but even when they are not, inas
much as almost all religions inculcate the leading
social and civic duties, the unifying effect is
considerable. {b) Religion encourages moral virtue, which
legislation cannot do except to a very limited
extent. 123

124 UTILITY OF RELIGION
(c) Religion is a powerful check upon vice, acting
inwardly upon the conscience, thus supplementing
law, which acts only by external penalties, which
moreover are easily evaded.
{d) Religion is a progressive moral and social
force. It holds up a moral and social ideal, far
in advance of anything that can be immediately
embodied in legislation, and so prepares the way
for future social and political progress.
II.— The Utility of Religion to the Individual
Religion immensely increases human happiness,
chiefly in the following ways :
{a) Personal religion — i.e. communion with God —
is sweet in itself, apart from all other advantages.
As Prof. Wm. James says, " Religion includes
a new zest, which adds itself like a gift to life,
and takes the form either of lyrical enchantment,
or of appeal to earnestness and heroism ; [also] an
assurance of safety, and a temper of peace, and
in relation to others a preponderance of loving
affections " {Varieties, p. 485).
(_>) Religion is a great support in the sorrows
of life. If a good man is misjudged by the world,
he knows that there is One that judgeth uprightly.
If his life is seemingly a failure, and he is unde
servedly wretched, he knows that there is an
eternal reward.
(c) Religion removes the sting of death. Only
religion can do this. Religion alone offers the
hope that those who have been loved on earth

UTILITY OF RELIGION 125
will be seen again, and that beyond the gates of
death is a blessed hereafter.
It appears, then, that religion is in a high degree
useful to the state and beneficial to the individual.
But if so, a presumption at once arises that religion
is true. The principle is generally recognized
that social and political theories are true in propor
tion as their practical application tends to promote
order, progress, and general happiness. But the
practice of religion conduces, as has been shown,
to order and progress in the state, and to the
individual happiness of all virtuous citizens. It
must, therefore, according to the common way of
judging theories, be true, or true in the main. Such
reasoning is, of course, not demonstrative. It is
quite conceivable that the universe is constructed
upon such irrational principles, that the more true
a theory is, the worse it works in practice ; but
reason refuses to entertain such a supposition,
unless it is obliged. And it is not obliged.
III. — Objections to the Argument from Utility
Objection I. — The moral ideals of Agnostics are
as high as those of Theists, and therefore the
world would make as much moral progress under
Agnosticism as under Theism.
Reply. — The moral standard of M. Comte, Mr.
Matthew Arnold, and ofthe best educated Agnostics,
is borrowed from Theism, especially from Chris
tianity, and cannot be expected to continue
indefinitely, when Theism itself has disappeared.

126 MORAL STANDARD OF AGNOSTICISM
The higher morality is based on belief in a per
sonal God, and if that belief is not true, has no
sufficient justification in reason. The establish
ment of Agnosticism, therefore, would bring about
a gradual deterioration of the moral standard.1
Social progress would gradually cease, and after
a time deterioration would set in.
But even if Agnosticism could succeed in main
taining the full ethical standard of Theism, it would
still be inferior to Theism as an instrument of
moral progress. The ethical standard of Agnos
ticism exists in the Agnostic's mind alone. The
ethical standard of Theism is embodied in an
actually existing, morally perfect Being. Theism,
therefore, which acknowledges an actually existing
Deity, the friend and rewarder of virtue, must
always be a more effectual stimulus to virtue than
Agnosticism, which denies or doubts the existence
of such a Being. Mr. Mill, in his later years, admitted
this. "It cannot be questioned," he says, "that
the undoubting belief of the real existence of a
Being who realizes our own best ideas of perfection,
and of our being in the hands of that Being as
the ruler of the universe, gives an increase of
force to those feelings beyond what they can
receive from reference to a merely ideal concep
tion " {Three Essays, p. 252).
1 The moral standard of popular Agnosticism is much lower
than that of educated Agnosticism. There is no such difference
between the moral standards of philosophic and popular
Christianity.

RELIGION A BOND OF SOCIETY 127
Objection II. — Religion is not the only possible
bond of society. Unselfish motives are as natural
as selfish ones, and suffice for the maintenance
of society among the social animals. Hence among
men also natural motives would suffice as a bond
of society.
Reply. — The question at issue is not whether
Agnosticism can supply a social bond at all, but
whether it can supply as strong a bond as Theism.
If it cannot, then Theism is a better social theory.
That unselfish or altruistic feelings are natural
to man, is not denied. Often altruistic actions
are performed out of pure benevolence, without
reference to religion, or to self. But the Agnostic
has no monopoly of such unselfish impulses. They
come to all men irrespective of creed. But the
Theist has this advantage over the Agnostic, that
besides the natural motives to altruism which he
shares with the Agnostic, he also has faith in a
just God who encourages altruism, and severely
punishes all breaches of social duties. Theism,
therefore, is a more powerful social bond than
Agnosticism, and therefore more useful to society,
and therefore more likely to be true.
Objection III. — The supposed utility of religion
is more than counterbalanced by the inconveniences
to which it has given rise. Chief among these
are, {a) religious wars and persecutions; {b) per
sistent opposition to education and to the advance
ment of science ; (c) hostility to popular liberties ;
{d) the rise of an order of men, claiming super-

128 THE SINS OF THE CHURCH
natural powers, and incurably opposed to the
best interests of mankind.1
Reply. — All the inconveniences mentioned are
due not to the principles of religion, but to
ignorance or neglect of them. Thus :
{a) Religious wars and persecutions are contrary
to the precept of religion, which commands men
to love one another, even their enemies.
(_>) To oppose education and the advancement
of science is contrary to religion, because religion
teaches that the physical universe is a revelation of
the Divine Nature, and therefore to be studied, not
only for secular, but even for religious reasons.
Moreover, in most ages religion has been the pioneer
of education and science. Almost all the older
universities and schools of Europe are religious
foundations, and the education of the poor was
the business of the Church centuries before the
State awoke to its responsibilities in the matter.
(c) The Church has in certain countries and in
certain ages allied itself with despotic power, but in
general its influence has been favourable to liberty
and just government. It was the influence of the
Church which gradually abolished slavery and
serfdom in Europe. In England, in 121 5, the in
fluence of Archbishop Langton secured Magna
Charta, and in 1688 the stand of the Seven Bishops
greatly assisted the cause of popular liberty. It
1 Cf. Prof. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, vol. ii. p. 237 :
" The priest is at all times and in all places the enemy of all
men — sacerdos semper, ubique, et omnibus inimicus."

UTILITY OF PRIESTHOODS 129
may be added that the government of the Church
has contained from the first a popular element.
The bishops and clergy of a diocese were elected in
early times by the whole of the clergy and people,
and the affairs of the Church at large were regu
lated by representative councils, oecumenical, patri
archal, and provincial, which formed a model for
the representative forms of government of modern
states. {d) The supposed opposition of priesthoods to the
best interests of mankind is not supported by facts.
Priesthoods have abused their powers just as
other men have, but not more; and inasmuch as
many of their functions are philanthropic and
ethical, the existence of priesthoods may be justified
even on secular principles. Moreover, if religion
is true, priesthoods are necessary also on religious
grounds, for persons will always be needed to teach
the truths of religion and to celebrate its rites.
Even Mr. Spencer, whose anti-clerical orthodoxy
is beyond dispute, says, " Though ecclesiastical
institutions hold less important places in higher
societies than in lower societies, we must not
infer that they will hereafter wholly disappear.
If in times to come there remain functions to be
fulfilled in any way analogous to their present
functions, we must conclude that they will survive
under some form or other. As there must ever
continue our relations to the unseen, and our
relations to one another, it appears not improbable
that there will survive certain representatives of
9

i3o HELL
those who in the past were occupied with ob
servances and teachings concerning those two
relations ; however unlike their sacerdotal proto
types such representatives may become" {Principles
of Sociology, vol. iii. c. 15). M. Comte also
assigns to the priesthood most important functions
in his ideal atheistical State.
Objection IV. — The happiness said to be produced
by religion is exaggerated, and more than counter
balanced by the misery it causes. Christianity in
particular teaches that the majority of mankind
will perish everlastingly — a doctrine which, if
sincerely believed, leads logically to pessimism.
Reply. — Christianity does not profess to make
men in general happy, but only good men. A
man knows whether he is sincerely trying to do
his duty or not. If he is, Christianity will make
him happy ; if he is not, its teachings will fill him
with just alarm, and seriously dispose him to
repentance. This just severity of Christianity is
not a thing to be regretted. If its teaching were
different— if, for example, it offered happiness to the
evil and the good alike — it would be a demoralizing
system, deserving to be suppressed.
The subject of eternal punishment will be dis
cussed more fully later, but it may be remarked
here that Christianity does not affirm that the
majority of mankind will be lost, or make any
numerical statements at all upon the subject. It
states, indeed, in solemn warning, that those who
remain finally and obstinately impenitent will be

RELIGION PRODUCES HAPPINESS 131
excluded for ever from the presence of God, and
from the society of the just, but it declares nothing
as to the nature of their punishment. One thing is
certain, that it will be in accordance with the divine
mercy and compassion, as well as with the divine
justice. Exclusion from heaven may even, as many
theologians teach, be quite consistent in some cases
with the attainment of a certain relative happiness.1
Upon the whole, it is certain that religious belief
tends to human happiness in a far higher degree
than Agnosticism. To prove this at further length
is unnecessary, because it is largely admitted by
the Agnostics themselves. Prof. Clifford says :
" It cannot be doubted that theistic belief is a
comfort and solace to those who hold it, and that
the loss of it is a very painful loss. . . . We have
seen the spring sun shine out of an empty heaven,
to light up a soulless earth ; we have felt with
utter loneliness that the Great Companion is
dead." 2 Mr. Cotter Morison says : " Men will
believe, in spite of science and the laws of their
consciousness, in a good God, who loves them
and cares for them and their little wants and trials,
and will, if they only please Him, take them at
last to His bosom, and wipe the tears for ever
from their eyes." 3 "Physicus" says: "And foras
much as I am far from being able to agree with
those who affirm that the twilight doctrine of the
1 See c. xxiii., appendix on Hell.
8 Lectures and Essays, ii. 250.
3 The Service of Man, c. iii.

132 MISERY OF AGNOSTICISM
' new faith ' is a desirable substitute for the waning
splendour of the old, I am not ashamed to confess
that with this virtual negation of God, the universe
to me has lost its soul of loveliness ; and although
from henceforth the precept to 'work while it is
day' will doubtless but gain an intensified force
from the terribly intensified meaning of the words
that 'the night cometh when no man can work,'
yet when at times I think, as think at times I
must, ofthe appalling contrast between the hallowed
glory of that creed that once was mine, and the
lonely mystery of existence as now I find it, — at
such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid
the sharpest pang of which my nature is suscep
tible." J And again : " But now, how changed !
Never in the history of man has so terrific a
calamity befallen the race as that which all who
look may now behold advancing as a deluge, black
with destruction, resistless in might, uprooting our
most cherished hopes, engulfing our most precious
creed, and burying our highest life in mindless
desolation" (p. 51). Viscount Amberley says: "I
must to a certain extent admit the reality of the loss
which the adoption of this faith [viz. of Agnos
ticism] entails. There is consolation no doubt in
the thought of a heavenly Father who loves us ;
there is strength in the idea that He sees and helps
us in our continual combat against evil; there is
happiness in the hope that He will assign us in
another life an infinite reward for all the endurances
1 A Candid Examination of Theism, p. 114.

MISERY OF AGNOSTICISM 133
of this. Above all, there is comfort in the reflection
that when we are parted by death, we are not
parted for ever ; that our love for those whom we
have cherished on earth is no temporary bond,
to be broken ere long in bitterness and despair,
but a possession never to be lost again — a union
of souls, interrupted for a little while by the
separation of the body, only to be again renewed
in far greater perfection, and carried on into far
higher joys than can be even imagined here. All
this is beautiful and full of fascination — why should
we deny it ? Candour compels us to admit that
in giving it up, with the other illusions of our
younger days, we are resigning a balm for the
wounded spirit, for which it would be hard to
find an equivalent in all the repertories of science
and in all the treasuries of philosophy." Mr.
Mill says : " The beneficial effect of such a hope
{i.e. in God, and human immortality) is far from
trifling. It makes life and human nature a far
greater thing to the feelings, and gives greater
strength as well as greater solemnity to all the
sentiments which are awakened in us by our fellow
creatures and by mankind at large. It allays the
sense of that irony of Nature which is so painfully
felt when we see the exertions and sacrifices of a
life culminating in the formation of a wise and
noble mind, only to disappear from the world
when the time has just arrived at which the world
seems about to begin reaping the benefit of it.
The truth that life is short and art long is from of

134 MISERY OF AGNOSTICISM
old one of the most discouraging parts of our
condition; this hope admits the possibility that the
art employed in improving and beautifying the soul
itself may avail for good in some other life, even
when seemingly useless for this." 1
Objection V. — Religion diminishes the sum of
human happiness by concentrating the thoughts
upon another world, and thus hindering the per
formance of the practical social duties of this.
Reply. — Whether this criticism is true of any
religion is doubtful. It certainly does not apply to
Christianity, which makes the active service of man
the best passport to heaven. (Matt. xxv. 31-46;
Jas. i. 27 ; 1 John iii. 17; etc.).

LITERATURE
B. Kidd, Social Evolution; C. L. Brace, Gesta Christi;
J. Bentham, Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion
upon the Temporal Happiness of Mankind; J. S. Mill,
Three Essays (No. ii., Utility of Religion) ; Flint, Theism,
p. 329-35 ; Clifford, Ethics of Religion (in Lectures, vol. ii.) ;
Seeley, Natural Religion, c. v.
1 Three Essays, p. 249.

CHAPTER X
AGNOSTICISM AND FAITH
SUMMARY. — Agnosticism is suspension of judgment as to the
truth of religion, on the ground of the insufficiency of the
evidence. Agnosticism would be a possible position, if
religion were a matter of pure speculation ; but it is not.
Religion involves action, and whenever it is necessary to
act, it is necessary to decide the speculative questions upon
which action depends. Life must be lived upon some prin
ciples, either those of religion or others. The Agnostic,
though professing neutrality, neglects to regulate his life
by the principles of religion : he therefore rejects religion
as decidedly as the Atheist, and loses all the advantages
which belong to religion if it is true. The Agnostic ob
jection to religion, that its first principles cannot be logically
demonstrated, is invalid, because this is the case with the
first principles of all the sciences.
The most popular type of Agnosticism at the
present day is that which neither affirms nor
denies the truth of religion. It is argued that
since neither Theists can conclusively prove nor
Atheists disprove God's existence, the only rational
attitude for a thinking mind is suspension of
judgment. This argument is plausible, but it proceeds upon
the assumption that a man's attitude towards a
matter of practice ought to be the same as his
135

1 36 RELIGION A PRACTICAL MATTER
attitude towards a matter of pure speculation.
This is a grave error. In matters of pure
speculation, such as the cause of gravity, or the
origin of nebulae, or the ultimate constitution of
matter or of ether, suspension of judgment is not
only allowable, but is a duty, until the evidence
for one particular view becomes overwhelmingly
strong. In matters of practice, however, it is necessary
to act. And whenever it is necessary to act, it
is necessary to decide at once the speculative
question upon which action depends. A doctor,
called in to treat a man seriously ill, has to decide
at once what his patient is suffering from, and what
remedies are to be employed, however obscure
and conflicting the symptoms may be. An artizan
out of work, and offered two posts, must decide
at once which he will take, although he may be
uncertain which of the two is the more advanta
geous. A statesman who has received an ultimatum
from a foreign power must decide, within a few
hours, between peace and war, often with a very
insufficient knowledge of the relative advantages
of the two policies.
Now, religion, being, as has been already shown,
a matter of practice, offers to every man born into
the world what is called a forced option. Life has
to be lived, and since it has to be lived, it must
be lived upon some principles or other. It may
either be lived upon the principles of Religion,
in which case a particular type of character will

A VIA MEDIA IMPOSSIBLE 137
be developed, or upon the principles of Atheism,
in which case a quite different type of character
will be developed. Between these two alternatives
there is no via media, such as Agnosticism claims
to be. Either there is a God, or there is not. If
there is, then to live every moment to His glory,
and to make this life a preparation for the next,
is the whole duty of man. If there is not, then
to live for purely secular ends is the only alter
native. The Agnostic professes not to decide
between these alternatives, but in reality he does
decide. He refuses to regulate his life as he would
regulate it if he believed in a God and a hereafter,
and therefore to all intents and purposes he denies
those beliefs. If religion were a mere matter of
speculation, without influence upon life or conduct,
the Agnostic's position would be logical ; but since
religion is practical, affecting every part of life
and building up a special type of character, Agnos
ticism is mere trifling. If religion is true, it offers
great advantages to its adherents both in this world
and in the world to come. But these advantages
are dependent upon faith, and the Agnostic forfeits
them equally with the Atheist, unless he makes
the great venture of faith upon which they are
conditional. The Agnostic may object that if the
Deity wishes to be universally acknowledged, He
ought to make the evidence for His existence
more plain than it is ; but it may be that it is
the will of the Deity to be worshipped not by
those who seek purely logical demonstrations of

138 PROF. WM. JAMES ON AGNOSTICISM
His existence, but by those who are satisfied with
evidence mainly moral. True believers are agreed
that the existence of God is not so much a matter
to be argued out, as to be spiritually discerned,
and perhaps the reason why the purely logical
evidence for religion is not made strictly demon
strative, is that the faculty of spiritual discernment
may be forced into exercise. This, at any rate,
is the Christian view of the matter. (John ii. 20,
xx. 29 ; 1 Cor. ii. 14 ; 1 John ii. 20, etc.)
Prof. Wm. James thoroughly endorses this argu
ment. " We see," he says, " first, that religion offers
itself as a momentous option. We are supposed to
gain even now by our belief, and to lose by our
non-belief a certain vital good. Secondly, re
ligion is a forced option so far as that good
goes. We cannot escape the issue by remaining
sceptical and waiting for more light, because,
although we do avoid error in that way, if re
ligion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true,
just as certainly as if we positively chose to
disbelieve. . . . Scepticism, then, is not avoidance
of option ; it is option of a certain particular kind
of risk. Better risk loss of truth than chance of error
— that is your faith-vetoer's exact position. To
preach scepticism to us as a duty until 'sufficient
evidence' for religion be found is tantamount to
telling us, when in presence of the religious hypo
thesis, that to yield to our fear of its being in error,
is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it
may be true. ... I simply refuse obedience to the

AGNOSTICISM ILLOGICAL 139
scientist's command to imitate his kind of option in
a case where my own stake is important enough to
give me the right to choose my own form of risk.
I do not wish to forfeit my sole chance in life of
getting upon the winning side. . . . We feel, too, as
if the appeal of religion to us were made to our own
active good-will, as if evidence might be for ever
withheld from us, unless we met the hypothesis
half-way. To take a trivial illustration : just as a
man who in a company of gentlemen made no
advances, asked a warrant for every concession,
and believed no one's word without proof, would
cut himself off by such churlishness from all the
social rewards that a more trusting spirit would
earn, — so here, one who should shut himself up in
snarling logicality and try to make the gods extort
his recognition willy-nilly, or not get it at all, might
cut himself off for ever from his only opportunity of
making the gods' acquaintance. ... I for one cannot
see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for
truth-seeking, or wilfully agree to keep my willing
nature out of the game " {The Will to Believe, pp.
26-8, abridged).
We are now in a position to consider the
only other plausible objection to Religion that
Agnosticism can offer. Agnostics are fond of
contrasting Religion with Science, very much
to the disadvantage of the former. Science,
they say, walks by knowledge, whereas Religion
walks by faith. Science proves its principles by
experience, or by logical reasoning from experience,

Ho SCIENCE BUILT UPON FAITH
whereas Religion assumes its principles without
proof.1 Now, to this statement so often made by Agnostics,
and so often accepted by incautious apologists, we
offer an unqualified denial. Science is as much
built upon faith as Religion, and can dispense with
it as little. Before Science can proceed to investi
gate a single question, she must make a number of
pure acts of faith. She must make, for example,
(i) An act of faith in the trustworthiness of human
reason — i.e. in its ability to lead the inquirer to true
conclusions ;
(2) An act of faith in the trustworthiness of
human memory, for unless memory is trustworthy,
it is impossible either to amass facts or to construct
a chain of arguments ;
(3) An act of faith in the trustworthiness of the
senses, for unless the senses can be trusted, know
ledge of the external world is impossible ;
(4) An act of faith in a number of unprovable
1 E.g. Prof. Huxley says : " Scientific men have a way of
looking upon belief which is not based upon evidence, not only
as illogical, but as immoral." . . . " If we set out in life with
pretending to know that which we do not know, we are assuredly
doing our best to deserve the character [of lying like the devil] "
{Science and Christian Tradition, pp. 65 and 54). " Scepticism
is the highest of duties ; blind faith the one unpardonable sin "
{Method and Results, p. 40). Prof. Clifford says : " It is wrong
always, everywhere, and for every one to believe anything upon
insufficient evidence. . . . The life of the man [who believes
on insufficient evidence] is one long sin against mankind. . . .
Our duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a
pestilence which may shortly master our own body, and then
spread to the rest of the town."

HUXLEY'S GREAT ACT OF FAITH 141
principles, generally summed up in the phrase
" the uniformity of Nature."
All these propositions are assented to by acts
of faith of the most absolute kind. They are
not only not proved by science, but they never
can be proved. Even so decided an Agnostic as
Prof. Huxley says : " The ground of every one
of our actions, and the validity of all our reason
ings, rest upon the great act of faith 1 which leads
us to take the experience of the past as a safe
guide in our dealings with the present and the
future. From the nature of ratiocination [reason
ing], it is obvious that the axioms on which it is
based cannot be proved by ratiocination." And
again : " [The laws of Universal Causation and
of the Uniformity of Nature] are neither self-
evident, nor are they, strictly speaking, demon
strable. ... If there is anything in this world
which I do firmly believe in, it is the universal
validity of the law of causation ; but that univer
sality cannot be proved by any amount of evidence,
let alone that which comes to us through the
senses" {Evolution and Ethics, p. 121).
The idea that faith in things incapable of proof
is as necessary to Science as to Religion, although
a commonplace of Philosophy, is so unfamiliar to
the general reader, and even to the non-philo
sophical man of Science, that it is desirable to
explain the matter at some length.
1 The italics are ours.

142 AXIOMS OF MATHEMATICS
All the Sciences, then, including Mathematics,
are based upon certain first principles, called
axioms or postulates, which, being incapable of
proof, are taken for granted. Sometimes these
principles are formally stated, more often they
are tacitly assumed. It is, for example, a tacit
assumption of Geometry that the properties which
are proved to be true of the ideal figures existing
in the mind of the geometer, or symbolically re
presented in diagrams or formulae, are also true
of actual external bodies existing in space ; so that,
for instance, whatever is proved true of an ideal
geometrical sphere is also true of the sphere of
Jupiter, or of Mars, or of the earth. But it will
be more useful to devote attention to the ultimate
postulate which underlies the whole of Physical
Science, the Uniformity of Nature. This principle
is not self-evident, for to the uninformed mind
Nature appears far from uniform, and even in
telligent minds can easily conceive of Nature as not
uniform. Nor can it be proved by evidence,
because the facts of Nature are infinite in number
and variety, and only an infinitesimally small
number of them can be examined and proved to be
uniform. Moreover, even if Science could actually
prove that Nature is uniform at this moment, this
would not be proof that Nature will be uniform in
future or has been uniform in the past. Even sup
posing that Nature has been experimentally proved
by Science to have been strictly uniform for the last
hundred years — a quite unwarrantable supposition —

UNIFORMITY OF NATURE 143
this would not afford the slightest guarantee for
the permanence of the routine. If Nature has been
uniform for the last hundred years, then the mathe
matical probability1 that it will be uniform next
year is considerably less than certainty — viz. 101
to 2 ; the probability that it will be uniform for the
next ten years is 101 to 10 ; the probability that
it will be uniform for the next century is 10 1 to
100; while the probability that it will be uniform
for the next thousand years is adverse — viz. 1,100
to 101 (practically 10 to 1) against it. As Prof.
De Morgan, one of the highest authorities on
the mathematical theory of probability, says,
" No finite experience whatsoever can justify us
in saying that the future shall coincide with the
past in all time to come, or that there is any
probability for such a conclusion." 2
Only one serious attempt has been made to evade
this reasoning. Mr. Herbert Spencer maintains
that although the experience of living men, or even
the combined experience of the human race during
the historical period, is insufficient to prove the
uniformity of Nature, yet if to this be added the
experience of man's human and pre-human ancestors,
extending over countless ages, such proof is possible.
1 Adopting Laplace's formula for calculating the recurrence
of events which have never been known to fail, viz

m + n + 1
where m = the number of times the event has been observed
to happen without fail, and n the number of unobserved cases
for which the chances of recurrence are to be calculated.
8 Essay on Probabilities.

144 SPENCER ON INNATE IDEAS
Mr. Spencer supposes that every experience of the
uniformity of Nature in the past has been stored
up in the brain, and transmitted as a heritage to
posterity ; so that our present " innate " conviction
of the uniformity of Nature is in reality the experi
ence of our ancestors for millions of years that this
has been always so. " The human brain," says Mr.
Spencer, "is an organized register of infinitely
numerous experiences received during the evolution
of life, or rather, during the evolution of that series
of organisms through which the human organism
has been reached. The effect of the most uniform
and frequent of these experiences has been suc
cessively bequeathed, principal and interest ; and
has slowly mounted to that high intelligence
which lies latent in the mind of the infant, and
which, with minute additions, it bequeaths to
future generations " {Principles of Psychology, § 208).
In reply to this theory it is sufficient to say
that if primitive man's impressions of the uniformity
of Nature were stored up in his brain, so also
were his impressions of its want of uniformity.
To the unscientific mind Nature appears far from
uniform ; to the savage it appears inexpressibly
capricious and wayward. If, therefore, our innate
convictions about the general course of Nature
arose in the way suggested by Mr. Spencer, we
should have an innate belief not in the uniformity
of Nature, but in its capricious variability. To
common observation, Nature is partly variable and
partly invariable, and its variability preponderates.

VERIFICATION OF AXIOMS 145
Mr. Spencer's theory is fully discussed in Prof.
Wm. James's Principles of Psychology, who sums
up as follows : " I must reaffirm my conviction
that the so-called Experience-philosophy has failed
to prove its point. No more, if we take ancestral
experiences into account, than if we limit ourselves
to those of the individual after birth, can we believe
that the couplings of terms within the mind are
simply copies of corresponding couplings impressed
upon it by the environment. This indeed is true
of a small part of our cognitions. But so far as
logical, and mathematical, ethical, aesthetical, and
metaphysical propositions go, it is not only untrue,
but altogether unintelligible. ... It is hard to
understand how such shallow and vague accounts
of them as Mill's and Spencer's could ever have
been given by thinking men " (vol. ii. p. 688).
We state therefore, not as a hypothesis, but as
fact, that the first principles of Science are as in
capable of demonstration as those of Religion, and
that consequently they must be accepted, if at all,
upon Faith. But this means that the chief Agnostic
and pseudo-scientific objection to Religion has
disappeared. It is true that Theology cannot
logically demonstrate its own first principles, but
then every science is in the same predicament.
The sciences can, however, verify their first
principles. They do so by showing that the first
principles which they assume explain the whole
or the bulk of the facts, and that no other suggested
first principles explain them as well. But such
10

146 VERIFICATION OF AXIOMS
verification is equally possible for Theology. Theo
logians can and do show that the actual facts of
the world and of human nature are fully explained
by the hypothesis of the existence of a Personal
God ; and that the facts are not so well explained
— rather, are not explained at all — by any rival
hypothesis. The method and procedure, therefore,
of Natural Theology is entirely legitimate, and
is as little open to rational objection as that of
any other science.

LITERATURE

Huxley, Science and Christian Tradition (essays vii. viii. ix.) ;
Flint, Agnosticism ; W. James, The Will to Believe (essay i.),
and Principles of Psychology, c. xxviii. (Necessary Truths, and
the Effects of Experience) ; W. S. Jevons, The Principles of Science,
especially c. x. (Theory of Probability), c. xi. (Philosophy of In
ductive Inference), and c. xii. (Inductive Application of the
Theory of Probability) ; F. B. Jevons, Evolution, cc. vii.-xi. ; W.
K. Clifford, Philosophy of the Pure Sciences (Lectures, vol. i.) ;
K. Pearson, Grammar of Science, cc. iii.-v. ; Mill, Logic, bk.
iii., especially c. xxi. ; Personal Idealism (essay ii., Axioms
as Postulates) ; Bradley, Logic, especially bk. ii. c. 3 ; Kant,
Critique of Pure Reason.

CHAPTER XI
CREATION IN TIME1
Summary. — Eternal creation is conceivable, but strong philo
sophic and scientific, as well as theological, arguments render
creation in time more probable.
I. — The Philosophic and Scientific Aspect of the
Doctrine of Creation
Creation is popularly defined as the production
of something out of nothing. More precisely it
is a method of production which operates not by
changing or modifying anything already existing,
but by calling an entirely new substance into being.
Creation is distinguished from Divine Generation
and from pantheistic development by the circum
stance that what is produced is distinct from and
inferior in nature to the Creator, and depends
not only for its first production but also for its
continuance from moment to moment simply upon
His will.2
1 The possibility of creation is involved in the idea that God
is the First Cause. Full proof of this has already been given.
(See c. i.)
8 The definition of St. Thomas Aquinas is as good aiS any :
" Creation is the production of a thing according to its whole
substance, no basis, either uncreated or created, being pre
supposed " {Summa, i. 65, 3). 147

148 ETERNAL CREATION
Some theologians have held that the creation of
the universe is an eternal act, and to this in the
abstract no objection can be raised. There are,
however, reasons, not only theological, but also
philosophic and scientific, for thinking that a
universe such as the present could not have
existed from eternity.
(i) From the point of view of Philosophy there
are serious difficulties in believing that an object
liable to any kind of change or motion can be
eternal. Eternity differs fundamentally from time.
Both imply duration, but the duration of eternity
is changeless, while the duration of time is successive.
In time there is a before and after ; but eternity
is a changeless "now," with nothing corresponding
to past or present, before or after. Clearly, then,
only things absolutely changeless can be eternal,
and the world, being subject to change, must be
subject to time.1
It may be argued, however, that though the world
is not eternal, it may have existed from infinite
1 The philosophical distinction between time and eternity is
admirably expressed by St. Augustine. " Eternal life," he says,
" surpasses temporal life by its very vivacity ; nor can I perceive
what eternity is, except by the eye of my mind. For by that I
exclude from eternity all change, and in eternity I perceive no
portions of time, because these are made up of past and future
movement. But in eternity nothing is past or future, because
what is past has ceased to be, and what is future has not yet
begun ; whereas eternity only is,— not was, as though it were
not still, not will be, as though it were not yet. Wherefore It
alone can quite truly say of Itself, I am who am ; and of It
alone can it be said, He who is sent me to you' {De Vera
Rei. c. xlix.).

TIME IS FINITE 149
time. Infinite time, however, is probably im
possible. Time, unlike eternity, is capable of
division. It is formed by the addition of moment
to moment. In every actual space of time, how
ever long, there is an actual number of moments.
But an actual number is necessarily finite. It is
formed by the addition, one by one, of finite units.
The number of units which it contains is strictly
definite. The addition of another unit would make
it one more, the subtraction of a unit would make
it one less. But that which is made more or less
by the addition or subtraction of a finite number,
must itself be finite. Every actual number, there
fore, is finite ; and since every actual period of
time consists of an actual number of finite moments,
its duration must be finite — in other words, it must
have had a beginning and an end.1
(2) The evidence of physical science tends also,
upon the whole, in the same direction. At first
sight it might be supposed that modern science,
in demonstrating the Conservation of Energy,2 had
demonstrated the eternity of matter and of the
laws of the universe. According to the law of
the Conservation of Energy, energy is absolutely
indestructible. It may change its form, as when
a certain amount of electricity is changed into a
1 By a similar argument it may be shown that the quantity
of matter in the universe is probably finite.
2 This law was first fully formulated by the late Sir William
Grove in his Correlation of Physical Forces, published in
1846. The term "Conservation of Energy" is preferable to
Mr. Herbert Spencer's " Persistence of Force."

ISO DEGRADATION OF ENERGY
certain amount of light, or heat, or chemical action,
but it cannot change its amount. The total quantity
of actual and potential energy1 in the universe
remains, according to this theory, always the same,
and therefore it would seem that the universe
must always have been, upon the whole, such as
it is now.
But not less important than the principle of the
Conservation of Energy is that of the Degradation
of Energy. According to this principle, the amount of
energy available for the actual work of the universe
continually diminishes. The tendency of the work
ing forces of nature is to pass into heat, and much
of this heat is diffused into space and absolutely
lost, so far as capacity for doing work is concerned.
The effective forces of nature, therefore, are being
continually wasted, so that within a long but finite
period they will have disappeared altogether. Then
the laws of the universe, as we know them, will
have ceased to operate, and matter will either have
been annihilated, or reduced to a state indistin
guishable by our senses from annihilation. The
properties of matter — probably all, certainly most
of them — depend upon the rapidity and amplitude
of certain molecular motions, and when, owing to
the dissipation of effective energy in diffused heat,
this motion is reduced to a minimum, matter will
1 Energy is best defined as matter (or ether) in actual or
potential motion. Potential energy is variously defined as
" energy of position," or " energy of stress." There is potential
energy in a bent bow, in a compressed spring, in a stored
accumulator, or in a stone supported by the hand.

DEGRADATION OF ENERGY 151
become imperceptible to the senses — i.e. practically
annihilated. Upon this important point the leading scientific
authorities are agreed. " Heat," say the authors
of The Unseen Universe,1 " is par excellence the com
munist of our universe, and it will no doubt
ultimately bring the present system to an end.
So far as we yet know, the final state of the
present universe must be an aggregation (into one
mass) of all the matter it contains — i.e. the potential
energy gone — and a practically useless state of
kinetic energy—.... uniform temperature through
out that mass" (pp. 126, 127). Prof. Mach says,
" A tendency exists towards a diminution of the
mechanical energy and towards an increase of the
thermal energy of the world." 2 Prof. Balfour
Stewart says, " The energy of the universe is in
process of deterioration. Universally diffused heat
forms what we may call the great waste-heap of
the universe, and this is growing larger every
year." 3 Lord Kelvin has also frequently expressed
himself in the same sense.
From this it follows that the visible universe
came into existence at a definite date in the past,
which may perhaps, when physical science is more
advanced, be even approximately fixed. It is clear
that it cannot have existed from the infinite past,
for in that case the whole of its mechanical energy
1 Profs. B. Stewart and P. G. Tait.
' Popular Scientific Lectures (tr.), p. 175.
3 Conservation of Energy, § 209.

1S2 THE WORLD NOT ETERNAL
would have been already dissipated.1 It remains,
then, that it had its origin in time — or, to speak
more accurately, at the beginning of time, for time
itself did not exist until the universe came into
being. The world may thus be regarded as a
lamp which has been lighted, and is gradually
burning out. " Looked at in this light," says Prof.
Balfour Stewart, "the universe is a system that
had a beginning and must come to an end ; for
a process of degradation cannot be eternal. If we
could view the universe as a candle not lit, then
it is perhaps conceivable to regard it as having been
always in existence ; but if we regard it rather as
a candle that has been lit, we become absolutely
certain that it cannot have been burning from
eternity, and that a time will come when it will
cease to burn."
Certain attempts have from time to time been
made to escape this unwelcome conclusion and to
devise means by which the lost mechanical energy
of the universe may be restored to it. It has been
supposed, for example, that when the diffused heat
reaches the limits of the ether, it is reflected back
1 Unless, of course, the stock of mechanical energy is infinite
in amount. But the amount of mechanical energy in any given
part of the universe, say in the solar system, is certainly finite,
and even if the universe is infinite in extent, this would not
make the amount of energy in any given part of it other than
finite. There are, too, the strongest philosophical reasons for
believing that any actual and concrete universe, such as ours,
must be finite in extent. Even space (i.e. actual, as distin
guished from ideal, space) is probably finite. See above,
sect. (i).

SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 153
into the interior of the universe, where it forms
intensely heated foci, and that when extinct suns
pass through these foci they are instantly rekindled.
Sir William Crookes has given his support to a
modification of this theory.1 But all such theories
are, as their authors admit, pure conjectures based
on no evidence. So far as the scientific evidence
goes, the visible universe must have originated in
time, and must end in time.
At this point the interest of Theology in creation
ceases. Whether the world was created in any
thing like its present form ; whether matter was
created directly, or formed out of something
simpler ; 2 whether life was a new creation, or de
veloped from the ordinary forces of matter; whether
the species of plants and animals appeared suddenly
and separately, or were evolved gradually out of
simpler forms ; whether man has a separate origin,
or is descended from some animal ancestor, are
purely scientific questions, and the answers to
them have no appreciable bearing upon religion.
Attempts to "reconcile" Geology with Genesis, or
1 His views are expressed in his Address to the Chemical
Section ofthe British Association in 1886, and in his Presidential
Address to the Chemical Society in 1888.
2 There is no direct evidence that matter is composed of
simpler elements, for though, since the discovery of radium,
it is clear that the atom can be split, the fragments appear
still to be matter. Many physicists, however, assume that
matter is built up out of ether, prothyle, mindstuff, pyknatoms,
or other hypothetical entities. These supposed substances,
though non-matter from the point of view of Physics, are
matter from the point of view of Philosophy and Theology.

154 SPENCER ON CREATION
Genesis with Geology, once so common, are as
unnecessary as they are probably futile. The
Bible contains the record of a religious, not of a
scientific, revelation, and ingenious endeavours to
find the Darwinian Doctrine or the Nebular Hypo
thesis foreshadowed in the Mosaic Cosmogony tend
generally to bad exegesis, and are in any case a
doubtful service to Theology.1
II. — Objections and Difficulties
Objection I. — The process of Creation is incon
ceivable, and therefore impossible. Mr. Spencer
says : " The commonly received or theistic hypo
thesis, creation by external agency, the assumption
not only of theologians, but of most philosophers,
turns out, when critically examined, to be literally
unthinkable. It is not a question of probability,
or credibility, but of conceivability. Experiment
proves that the elements of this hypothesis cannot
even be put together in consciousness " {First
Principles, pp. 27-9, slightly adapted).
Reply. — We can imagine the disappearance of
the present universe, and the appearance of a new
one. We can also imagine a Being possessed of
the power to make the present universe disappear,
and a new one come in its place. We can con
ceive, therefore, both creation and annihilation.
On this point both Mr. Mill and Prof. Huxley are
against Mr. Spencer, and on the side of the
1 On this point see further chap. v.

HUXLEY ON CREATION 155
theologians. " What is intended," says Prof. Huxley,
" by made out of nothing, appears to be caused to come
into existence, with the implication that nothing of
the same kind previously existed. This is perfectly
conceivable, and therefore no one can deny that
it may have happened. It appears to me that the
scientific investigator is wholly incompetent to
say anything at all about the first origin of the
material universe " {Science and Hebrew Tradition,
p. 186 ff).
Objection II. — If the universe is good in itself, and
it befits God to bring into existence what is good
in itself, He must have created the universe from
eternity. Reply. — All that is good in itself exists eternally,
in the most absolute and perfect way, within the
Divine Nature. God has no occasion, therefore, to
create, in order to realize and enjoy in perfection all
that is good. If He does create, it is an absolutely
free and spontaneous act, in no way necessary to His
perfection and blessedness, and therefore not
necessarily eternal. The decree to create, no doubt,
is eternal : this follows from the Divine omniscience.
But it does not, therefore, follow that the effect of
the decree is eternal. The idea of an eternal decree
to create in time involves no contradiction.
Objection III. — Creation implies change in God, and
is therefore inconsistent with the Divine Perfection.
Reply.— Creation does not imply essential change
in God. No power or perfection has appeared in
created things which did not already exist in a

156 IS CREATION PERFECT?
far more unqualified and perfect manner in God
from eternity. The relation of God to created
things may be compared to the relation of an
absolute monarch to his ministers. The monarch
gives his ministers certain of his powers to exercise,
but this arrangement does not increase or diminish
his regal authority. The authority delegated to his
ministers is all his, and is exercised in dependence
upon him, and he himself continues to possess the
same regal power as absolutely as before. Similarly,
when God creates, the powers manifested in created
things are not added to or taken from God : they
are only partial externalizations of an already exist
ing, unchangeable, infinite Power and Perfection.
Objection IV. — Since God is perfect, the world
which He has created ought to be the most perfect
conceivable. But this is not the case.
Reply. — It belongs to no created thing to be abso
lutely perfect. However excellent a creature may
be, it is always possible to imagine one more
excellent. Hence there can be no such thing as
a best possible creature or best possible world.
A thing so perfect that nothing more perfect could
be conceived, would not be a creature at all, but
God. Since, then, there can be no such thing as a best
possible world, it rests with God Himself, in the
exercise of His unlimited freedom, to decide what
degree of His own infinite perfection He shall
manifest in the actual universe. A universe created
by a good God must, of course, be good, but it

CREATION BY A DEMIURGE 157
cannot be decided a priori by philosophy how
good it must be. Proof that the universe is good
is given in c. xiv.
Objection V. — There is no proof that the universe
was created immediately by God. It may have
been created by some inferior being or demiurge.
Reply. — It is perhaps impossible to demonstrate
strictly that the power of creation cannot be
delegated to a creature ; but the production of
substances from nothing is a work of such prodi
gious causal efficiency, and is so clearly the primary
act upon which all things else depend, that it
seems natural to restrict it to the Deity Himself.
The hypothesis of creation by a demiurge is
unnecessary, introduces serious complications into
Theology, and, though it has been regarded with a
certain amount of favour by a few modern writers,1
may be safely consigned to the limbo of forgotten
beliefs.

LITERATURE
Janet, Final Causes (tr.), p. 3872. ; Stokes, Natural Theology,
ii. p. 144 ff.; Aquinas, Summa, i. q. 45, and Contra Gentes,
ii. iff.; J. Martineau, Study of Religion, i. pp. 374-92 ; Bruce,
Apologetics, pp. 65-7, 83-6 ; Boedder, Natural Theology,
c. iv. ; Flint, Theism, pp. 390-4; "A Troglodyte,'' Riddles of
the Sphinx, bk. iii.

1 See, for instance, Prof. James's Varieties of Religious
Experiences, p. 525.

CHAPTER XII1
THE HUMAN SOUL
Summary. — Consciousness testifies that the soul is a really
existing spiritual substance, distinct from the body and
from its own thoughts ; further, that it is indivisible, and
persists in unchanging self-identity through life. It follows
from this that the soul is neither developed from matter
nor formed from the souls of parents, but created. Hume's
objections to the substantiality and unity of the soul are
considered, together with certain difficulties arising from
the phenomena of alternating personality, hypnotism, and
automatic writing.
I. — Proof that the Soul is a Substance
The object of this chapter is to consider the
arguments of those modern speculators who deny
the existence of the soul as a distinct substance.
The great majority of philosophers have always
held that the soul is a really existing entity or
substance, uncompounded, indivisible, self-identical
through life, and distinct both from the body and
from its own changing thoughts and feelings.
This was the view of Plato and Aristotle, of all
early and mediaeval Christian thinkers, of Descartes,
Leibnitz, Hobbes, Reid, Berkeley, and Hamilton,
and even of such philosophical sceptics as Locke
1 This chapter (except the first two sections) may be omitted
at a first reading. '58

THE SOUL A REALITY 159
and Kant, and the Deists of the eighteenth century.
Even Thomas Paine himself believed in a sub
stantial soul.
The reasons for this belief lie upon the surface,
and may be briefly summarized thus.
(1) We know that the soul really exists by direct
experience. Whenever a man thinks, or is in any
way conscious, he is always more or less conscious
of his Self, Ego, or Soul, and of its distinction
from other things. Thus a man distinguishes
between {a) himself and other persons, (_¦) between
himself and the material world, (.) between him
self and his body, and {d) between himself and
his own thoughts, sensations, emotions, and feelings.
If, therefore, the testimony of consciousness is
to be trusted — and it must be trusted, otherwise
all knowledge becomes impossible — the Self {i.e.
the soul, or ego) is a real thing, distinct from matter,
and from its own variable thoughts and feelings.
(2) The soul is not only a "thing" or phenomenon
in general, but is that particular kind of a thing
known as a substance. A substance in philosophy
is a thing that exists per se or of itself, and is thus
distinguished from an attribute or a thought, which
exists in dependence upon some substance. Thus
solidity, heaviness, motion, etc., which are attributes,
cannot exist apart by themselves, but only as attri
butes of some actually existing material substance,1
1 We do not here raise the question discussed in ch. v.,
whether material substance is not ultimately a thought in
God's mind.

i6o PERSONAL IDENTITY
which is solid, heavy, moves, etc. Similarly,
thoughts, emotions, or feelings, such as love,
hatred, knowledge, etc., must belong to some soul
or mind. There cannot be love without a mind
that loves, or hatred without a mind that hates,
or knowledge without a mind that knows. The
mind or soul, therefore, is a substance existing
per se ; but its thoughts and feelings exist not per se,
but in and for the mind to which they belong.
(3) Memory testifies that I am the same person that
I was yesterday, or a year ago, or thirty years ago.
This means that the soul is persistent, and remains
always the same identical substance through life.
(4) The nature of thought proves the existence
of the soul. Thinking consists very largely in
comparing ideas together, and observing their
similarities and differences. Now, that which com
pares ideas together, and discovers new ideas and
new facts from the comparison, must be something
distinct from the ideas compared.
(5) The unity, simplicity, and indivisibility of the
soul are indicated by the unity of consciousness.
We feel ourselves to be one person and no more.
This unity ofthe Ego, or soul, is so absolute, that its
division into parts is not even conceivable. The
thoughts, perceptions, and emotions of the Ego
are many and variable ; but the Ego itself which
experiences them, remains ever a single, simple,
indivisible, self-identical unit.
(6) The spirituality of the soul is a necessary
inference from the spirituality of its effects, which

THE SOUL IMMATERIAL 161
are the facts of consciousness. All the thoughts
and feelings of the soul are immaterial. They
neither exist in space, nor possess any of the
properties of matter. To affirm that a pain, for
example, is square, or pink, or five feet long, or that
a thought weighs a hundredweight, or describes an
elliptical orbit, is not only not true, but nonsense.
Now, that which produces immaterial effects cannot
be material : if it could, an effect would transcend
its cause, which is absurd. It follows, then, that
the soul is an immaterial or spiritual substance,
not bound by the laws and limitations of matter,
but transcending them in various ways.1
(7) The existence of the soul may also be proved
by dynamical considerations. It is a matter of
common observation that the human mind produces
physical changes in the world which would not take
place without it. Thus, except under the guidance
of mind, matter would never spontaneously form
itself into clothes, or houses, or reaping machines,
or telescopes, or printing presses. Mind, therefore,
produces actual dynamical effects which, apart
from mind, would be impossible. Now, that which
produces real effects, must itself be real. It is
idle to say that these effects are produced by the
mere material particles of the brain. What produces
them is not the brain, but the immaterial intelligence
1 The spirituality of the soul may also be proved from the
existence of general ideas. These cannot be derived from the
material world, because all material objects are strictly in
dividual. They must therefore be derived from some spiritual
principle transcending matter altogether. II

1 62 ORIGIN OF THE SOUL
of which the brain is the organ. Mind as mind
is the causal agent here, and therefore mind as
mind is a substance.
II. — Theological Inferences
(i) The human soul, <being a spiritual substance,
cannot have been originally developed from matter,
nor is it now derived from the bodies of parents.
(2) Being an indivisible substance, it cannot give
rise to new souls by subdivision. The souls of
offspring, therefore, are not derived from the souls
of parents.
(3) It follows that all ordinary forms of Tradu-
cianism (the doctrine which derives the soul from
the souls or bodies of parents) are unsatisfactory,
and must be rejected. Traducianism rightly lays
stress on the fact of heredity, but it fails to take
account of other important elements in the
problem. (4) Creationism, therefore (the doctrine that each
soul is a new creation infused by God into the
embryo at conception),1 is the most satisfactory
theory ; but to account for heredity, it must be
further supposed that there is a real influence of the
souls of the parents, and in them of the souls of
ancestors, upon the soul of the child.
III. — Objections
To this account of the nature of the soul philo-
1 Some Creationists hold that the rational soul is not created
and infused, until the embryo assumes a distinctively human
form. Lotze affirms the gradual creation of the soul.

HUME ON THE SOUL 163
sophers of the Empirical School of Hume offer the
following objections.
Objection I. — The existence of the soul is not a
direct deliverance of consciousness, but an inference.
All that we are directly conscious of is our feelings
and thoughts from moment to moment. Apart
from these we have no knowledge of any self
or soul at all.
Reply. — When a feeling comes into our minds,
we are conscious not only of the feeling, but of
ourselves as feeling it. When a thought comes
into our minds, we are conscious not only of the
thought, but of ourselves as thinking it. Without
any process of argument at all, we are directly
conscious that we ourselves — i.e. our souls, or Egos —
are distinct from the feelings and thoughts that
we have now, and have ever had. We not only
know things, but know that we know them, and
that we who know them are distinct from the
things themselves. The thinker is always dis
tinguished from his thought, the feeler from his
feeling, and the wilier from the thing willed.
Objection II. — To assume an indivisible substantial
soul is unnecessary. The so-called soul can be
readily and successfully analysed into a mere
succession of ideas, thoughts, or mental states,
following one another in certain regular ways, it
is true, but without any substantial link between
them. " The soul," says Hume, " is nothing but
a bundle or collection of different perceptions,
which succeed each other with an inconceivable

164 HUME CRITICIZED
rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.
Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without
varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more
variable than our sight ; and all our other senses
and faculties contribute to this change ; nor is there
any single power of the soul which remains un
alterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The
mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions
successively make their appearance, pass, repass,
glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of
postures and situations. There is properly no
simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different,
whatever natural propension we may have to
imagine that simplicity and identity. The com
parison of the theatre must not mislead us. They
are the successive perceptions only that constitute
the mind; nor have we the most distant notion
of the place where these scenes are represented,
nor of the material of which it is composed "
{Treatise of Human Nature, pt. iv. par. 6).
Reply. — (i) It is impossible to realize in thought
what is meant by sensations or ideas existing by
themselves independent of the mind which is con
scious of them. All thoughts imply a thinker, and
feelings a feeler.
(2) A series of mere sensations would not know
themselves to be a series. A sensation is just
what it is and no more. It cannot, while remaining
a mere sensation, get beyond itself and know other
things. The sensations of sweetness and toothache,
for instance, are just sweetness and toothache, and

HUME CRITICIZED 165
do not contain within themselves a knowledge
either of one another, or of other things. Sweetness
does not know what toothache is, nor toothache
what sweetness is. If, then, a sensation of sweet
ness be followed by a sensation of toothache, neither
the toothache nor the sweetness can know that
this is the case. But somehow or other, when
this sequence takes place, it is. known ; and since
the sensations cannot know it, it must be known
by something else, viz. by the soul, which thus
is proved to exist as an independent reality. As
Prof. Knight well says, " A succession of states
of mind has no meaning except in relation to the
substrate of self that underlies the succession,
giving it coherence, identity, and intelligibility"
{Hume, p. 177).
This argument was used against Hume in his
lifetime, and neither he nor any of his numerous
followers 1 have been able to answer it. Hume, in
fact, admitted the inadequacy of his theory, and
stated in an appendix to the First Book of his
1 Among Hume's more prominent followers are James Mill,
J. S. Mill, Bain, Ribot, Taine, Binet, and Sully. They have all
built upon him, without doing anything to strengthen his weak
metaphysical foundations. Clifford's mind-stuff theory repre
sents a recent extreme development of Humism. Physiological
psychologists, being, as a rule, not philosophers, generally show a
tendency towards Hume's superficial views, and cognate theories
of Psychical Atomism. Representative of this tendency is Ziehen,
who in his recent Physiological Psychology accepts Hume's doc
trine as axiomatic. Miinsterberg assumes the same theory, with
only a very thin disguise, disclaiming " all kinds of compromise
with Philosophy and Ethics " {Psychology and Life, p. 4).

1 66 ADMISSIONS OF MILL
Treatise that the actual continuity of consciousness
was, on his theory, " a difficulty too hard for my
understanding." John Stuart Mill, a faithful disciple
of Hume, made even more serious admissions.
" The theory [of Hume]," he says, " has intrinsic
difficulties which we have not set forth, and which
it appears to me beyond the power of metaphysical
analysis to remove. . . .
" " The thread of consciousness which composes the
mind's phenomenal life consists not only of present
sensations, but likewise, in part, of. memories and
expectations. Now what are these? In them
selves they are present feelings, states of present
consciousness, and in that respect not distinguished
from sensations. They all, moreover, resemble
some given sensations or feelings, of which we
have previously had experience. But they are
attended with this peculiarity, that each of them
involves a belief in more than its own present
existence. A sensation involves only this ; but a
remembrance of a sensation, even if not referred to
any particular date, involves the suggestion and
belief that a sensation, of which it is a copy or
representation, actually existed in the past; and
an expectation involves the belief, more or less
positive, that a sensation or other feeling to which
it directly refers will exist in the future. Nor can
the phenomena involved in these two states of
consciousness be adequately expressed without
saying that the belief they include is, that I myself
formerly had, or that I myself, and no other, shall

THEORY OF WILLIAM JAMES 167
hereafter have, the sensations remembered or ex
pected. The fact believed is that the sensations
did actually form, or will hereafter form, part of
the self-same series of states, or thread of con
sciousness, of which the remembrance or expecta
tion of those sensations is the part now present.
If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of
feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement
by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of
itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the
alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is some
thing different from any series of feelings or possibilities
of them, or of accepting the paradox that something
which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be
aware of itself as a series" {Hamilton, pp. 247, 248).
It is unnecessary to criticise further a theory
which, by the admission of its most capable sup
porters, is bankrupt, and incapable of explaining
such fundamental psychical facts as memory, antici
pation, and the sense of personal identity.
Objection III. — It is possible to regard the soul as
a series of successive mental states, each of which,
as it occurs, has the power of knowing the states
that went before, and of thus giving rise to memory
and the sense of personal identity.
This is the theory of Prof. William James, who
states it as follows : " The consciousness of self
involves a stream of thought, each part of which as
' I ' can (1) remember those that went before, and
know the things they knew; and (2) emphasize
and care paramountly for certain ones among them

168 CRITICISM OF JAMES'S THEORY
as me, and appropriate to these the rest. The /
which knows is a thought, at each moment different
from that of the last moment, but appropriative of
the latter, together with all that the latter called its
own. All the experiential facts find their place in
this description, unencumbered with any hypothesis
save that of the existence of passing thoughts or
states of mind. Thought itself is the thinker, and
Psychology need not look beyond " {Principles of
Psychology, vol. i. p. 401, abridged).
Reply. — This theory is more satisfactory than
Hume's, because it recognizes the need of some real
connection between successive mental states, and
attempts to provide one. It is unsatisfactory, how
ever, for several reasons.
(1) Prof. James says: "Thought is itself the
thinker." But this is contrary to experience. Con
sciousness testifies that it is not thought that thinks,
but the thinker. Whenever thought takes place,
there is always a felt distinction between (i.) that
which thinks (viz. the mind, ego, or soul), and (ii.)
that which is thought. The thinker and his thought
are two realities, not one, and any attempt to reduce
them to one is bad psychology. As Prof. Ward cor
rectly says, " However much assailed or disowned,
the conception of a mind or conscious subject is to
be found implicitly or explicitly in all psychological
writers whatever, — not more in Berkeley, who
accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who accepts it as
a fiction. This being so, we are far more likely to
reach the truth eventually if we openly acknow-

CRITICISM OF JAMES'S THEORY 169
ledge this unexpugnable assumption, if such it
prove, instead of resorting to all sorts of devious
periphrases to hide it. . . . Common sense is right
in positing, wherever experience is inferred, (i.) a
factor answering to what we know as self, and
(ii.) another factor answering to what each of us
knows " {Encycl. Brit., " Psychology," vols, xx.,
xxxii.). (2) Prof. James's theory postulates a changing self.
" The / which knows," he says, " is different from
that of the last moment." But this again con
tradicts experience. Experience assures us that the
/ which knew something a moment ago, or last
week, or last year, is identically the same / which
knows something now. If Prof. James's theory
were correct, we ought to remember that we were
somebody else a moment ago, and still other persons
last week, and last year.
(3) Prof. James's theory accounts for memory by
supposing that each momentary mental state, or
"section of the stream of thought," knows the
previous one, and the previous one the one before,
and so on, each mental state handing down to the
next a knowledge not only of itself, but of all the
previous states.
This hypothesis, ingenious as it is, must be
pronounced contrary to experience, and inherently
impossible. We are not always remembering the
past. Often, when engaged upon some absorbing
work, we do not think of the past for hours. Now,
a state of consciousness cannot contain more than

i7o CRITICISM OF JAMES'S THEORY
it does contain, and since present consciousness
often contains no consciousness of past things at
all, and never a consciousness of all past things, it
is impossible that it can transmit a memory of
things in the way supposed.
Again, the stream of consciousness is not un
broken, as Prof. James's theory requires, but inter
rupted often for hours at a time by periods of
unconsciousness — as, for instance, when a person is
sound asleep or chloroformed. Now, to pass over
the strange and, as most will think, absurd result
of Prof. James's theory, that a man's soul is annihi
lated every time he goes to sleep, it may be
pertinently asked, How, when a man wakes from
a night's rest, does his first waking thought become
aware of his last thought the night before? Of
course, if the man has a soul, which continues to
exist while he is asleep, there is no difficulty ; but
if he has none, there is a chasm of eight hours
between one thought and the next, and nothing to
bridge it.1 We affirm, therefore, that Prof. James's
ingenious and elaborate theory fits the facts no
better than Hume's and Mill's, and hence we are
not surprised to find that he is not very enthusiastic
about it himself, and at times expresses a decided
hankering after the old-fashioned substantial soul
of metaphysics and theology. " [I feel] strongly,"
he says, " the logical respectability of the argu
ments for that well-known spiritual agent in which
1 It cannot be bridged by the continuity of the brain, because
memory is a. psychical and not a merely cerebral function.

KANT ON SUBSTANCE 171
scholastic psychology and common-sense have
always believed. The fact is that one cannot afford
to despise any of these great traditional objects of
belief. Whether we realize it or not, there is
always a great drift of reasons, positive and
negative, towing us in their direction. I confess,
therefore, that to posit a soul influenced in some
mysterious way by the brain-states, and responding
to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to
me the line of least logical resistance, so far as we
have yet attained" {Psychology, vol. i. p. 181,
abridged). Objection IV. — A "substance" is a metaphysical
fiction — an unknown and unknowable substratum,
supposed, without evidence, to underlie the appear
ances of things, and to cause them to be what they
are. It cannot be proved that there is such a thing
as a substance, and therefore it cannot be proved
that the soul is a substance.
Reply. — The definition of substance given above
is the sceptical one of Kant, and of certain mediaeval
writers, and is not the true one. A substance,
according to its true definition, is not something
unknowable, but simply a thing that exists of
itself, as distinguished from an attribute or a
thought, which can only exist as an inherent in
something else. By the " substance " of the mind
or soul is simply meant the Self, or Ego, as distin
guished from its thoughts and feelings. The sub
stantial self is not unknowable, but known : — better
known, in fact, than any other thing.

172 THE SOUL DURING SLEEP
Objection V. — It is not possible to define what
is meant by the soul, or to form a distinct idea
of it.
Reply. — Definition, strictly speaking, is an enumer
ation of the parts of which a thing consists, and
when a thing, such as the soul, does not consist of
parts, it cannot be strictly defined. The soul can,
however, be defined according to its activities, as that
which feels, thinks, wills, etc. As to forming a dis
tinct idea of the soul, if by that is meant a sensuous
mental picture, it is of course impossible, the soul
being spiritual. But there is such a thing as a
spiritual apprehension of a purely spiritual object.
Objection VI. — There is no evidence of the con
tinuity of the soul during sleep and unconsciousness.
Reply. — There is no evidence of the continuity
even of material objects when no one is looking at
them, but it may be justly inferred. Similarly, the
continued existence of the soul during sleep may be
justly inferred from the persistence of memory, and
from the sense of continued identity. If the soul
does not persist during sleep, two daily miracles
must be assumed — one of annihilation at night, and
another of re-creation in the morning.
Objection VII. — The facts of alternating personality
prove that the soul is not simple, but divisible.
Cases are known in which a person falls into a
trance, and upon waking has no memory of his
former state, but appears a new person, not only
from lapse of memory, but from a distinct alteration
of disposition. Generally speaking, after a few

ALTERNATING PERSONALITY 173
weeks or months another trance occurs, and when
the subject awakes, he resumes his original person
ality, recovering full memory of his earlier life,
but forgetting all about his secondary state. In
some cases these alternations of personality continue
through the whole of life.
Reply. — The evidence of such morbid cases is of
small weight compared with that of normal ones;
but such as it is, it rather favours the theory of
a substantial soul. For :
(1) In all these cases each ofthe alternating states
of consciousness shows all the characteristics of
true personality. There is (within the limits of the
state) the sense of personal identity, also memory
and expectation. The Ego distinguishes itself from
its body and from its thoughts ; there is the exercise
of will and imagination : in fact, the hypothesis of
a substantial soul is as much required to account
for the phenomena of these abnormal states as for
those of normal ones. The thoughts in these
abnormal states are not disconnected, as, on
Hume's hypothesis, they ought to be, but are
linked together by memory, and by the conscious
ness that they are all experiences of one and the
same person.
(2) These phases of personality are not simultane
ous, but successive, and therefore afford no evidence
that the Ego can be split in two. Rather is their
successiveness evidence that the Ego persists, and
that the periodical discontinuity is due, mainly at
least, to some obstruction of the memory.

174 ALTERNATING PERSONALITY
(3) The discontinuity between the states is
seldom, perhaps never, absolute. In the well-
known case of Felida X., first described by Dr.
Azam, of Bordeaux, two different states, which we
will call A and B, alternated through life. Felida
A knew nothing whatever about Felida B ; but
Felida B knew everything about Felida A, and this
is clear proof of continuity. Mary Reynolds, of
Pennsylvania, had two alternating states, neither of
which had the least knowledge of the other. Yet
even here there was a certain amount of continuity.
The first time her second state occurred, she re
membered a few words which she had learnt in her
first state, and later in life, when she had per
manently settled into her second state, " she said
she did sometimes seem to have a dim, dreamy
idea of a shadowy past, which she could not fully
grasp." It is also said that towards the end of her
life her character became more harmonious, and
embraced the characteristics of both states com
bined. Thus even this case, which is perhaps the
strongest that can be urged for the theory that
personality is divisible, really affords evidence to
the contrary.
(4) Even if there were undeniable proof that
distinct personalities do occasionally exist in the
same organism, this would not be proof that
the soul is divisible. It would only prove that,
just as there are physical monsters born with two
heads or two bodies, so there are psychical monsters
born with two or more souls.

UNCONSCIOUS CEREBRATION 174
(5) The differences of character which distinguish
the alternating personalities are not absolute. As
a rule, one state is comparatively normal, and the
other a weakened and perverted form of it. The
difference is like that between the healthy state of
a person who is naturally cheerful, amiable, and
industrious, and a morbid state of the same person
rendered melancholy, savage, and lethargic, by a
liver attack. There is nothing, then, in the
phenomena of alternating personality which is
inconsistent with the unity and substantiality of
the soul, or which cannot be reasonably explained
as due to imperfect functioning of the brain.
Objection VIII. — The phenomena of automatic
writing, unconscious cerebration, and hypnotism,
prove that many trains of thought go on in the
mind, of which the Ego is unconscious. These can
only be split-off portions of the thinking Ego, which
is thus proved to be divisible.
Reply. — These phenomena can be explained in
several ways without resorting to the violent ex
pedient of dividing the substance of the Ego. For
example, (1) There may be subordinate centres of con
sciousness, closely associated with, but not strictly
identical with, the central Ego, and capable of
performing a certain limited amount of independent
thinking. If this is so, the structure of the mind
is analogous to the structure of the nervous system,
in which the lower nervous centres are capable
of functioning independently to a certain extent,

176 UNCONSCIOUS CEREBRATION
but are nevertheless controlled in the main by the
unifying brain.1 Such a theory would be in sub
stantial harmony with the traditional view that the
human soul is formed by the superposition of a
unifying rational soul upon the lower psychical
activities which man shares with plants and
animals. (2) It is possible that the Ego, without division
of substance, is able to carry on several sub
ordinate trains of thought concurrently with the
main one, but that its consciousness of them is
generally so faint, that they cannot be described
or remembered.
Either of these explanations is better than the
theory of a composite Ego, which contradicts the
plain testimony of consciousness.

LITERATURE
{a) Maintaining the Substantiality of the Soul
Plato, Phcedo ; Locke, Human Understanding, bk. ii. c. 23 ;
Berkeley, Three Dialogues ; Descartes, Meditations ; Leibnitz,
Monadology ; Kant, Critique of the Practical Reason ; Lotze,
Metaphysics, bk. iii. c. 1, and Microcosmus; Maher, Psycho
logy ; Ladd, Physiological Psychology ; Renouvier, La Nouvelle
Monadologie ; T. Case, Metaphysics {Encycl. Brit., vol. xxx.).

1 "We conclude," says Mr. Syme, "that each psychical
centre has a consciousness of its own, and that this conscious
ness is related to the supreme consciousness (the Ego) as the
subordinate nerve centres are related to the supreme nerve
centre (the cerebral hemispheres) " {The Soul, p. 73).

LITERATURE 177
(.) Denying the Substantiality of the Soul
Hume, Treatise; J. Mill, Analysis; J. S. Mill, Hamilton;
Bain, Emotions and Will, etc. ; Sully, Psychology, etc. ; Binet,
Double Consciousness ; Ribot, Diseases of Personality ; Ziehen,
Physiological Psychology.
(.) Mediating
Wundt, Outlines and Human and Animal Psychology, etc. ;
James, Principles of Psychology ; Syme, The Soul.

12

CHAPTER XIII1
free-will and determinism 2
Summary. — The actual moral faculties which man possesses
can only be rationally accounted for on the hypothesis that
he possesses free-will. Moreover, direct consciousness testi
fies to freedom, and this testimony cannot be set aside. The
opposing theories of Automatism and Materialistic Monism
are refuted, and certain scientific, philosophical, and theo
logical objections to the free-will doctrine are considered.
If the truth of a belief is to be measured by its
persistency in face of opposition, no belief has a
better claim to be regarded as true than that of the
Freedom of the Will. After two thousand years
of criticism it still remains the belief of the bulk
of mankind, and if there is a disposition among a
certain class of students of natural science to discard
it on account of its alleged discrepancy with certain
mechanical views of the universe, contemporary
1 This chapter, with the exception of section i., jnay be omitted
at a first reading.
8 Modern deniers of Free-will object to be called Necessarians
or Fatalists, and prefer the title Determinists. They agree,
however, with Necessarians and Fatalists in denying the existence
of real options. They affirm, of every action that takes place,
that it is the only action that is possible, and that we delude
ourselves by imagining that any other action could have occurred
in its place. Libertarians, on the other hand, maintain that
options are real. i78

THE CASE FOR FREE-WILL 179
philosophers have made ample amends by a series
of brilliant vindications of the reality of moral
freedom. To mention only a few, in France and
Belgium, MM. Fonsegrive, Renouvier, Couailhac,
Noel, Boutroux, and Piat ; in Germany, Dr. Lotze
and Dr. Gutberlet ; in England, Profs. W. R. B.
Gibson, Poynting, and J. Ward, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller,
and Dr. Martineau ; in America, Prof. Ladd,
Prof. Wm. James, and Mr. Hazard, have declared
themselves on the Libertarian side ; and a large
number of others, who do not go the whole way
with these, follow Prof. W. Wundt in repudiating
the materialistic Determinism which has charac
terised so much recent Psychology.1
I. — The Case for Moral Freedom
(1) The argument from the primary ethical emotions.
Moral feelings, such as self-approbation, shame,
repentance, and remorse, also moral judgments,
such as the distinction between justice and injustice,
are natural : they arise instinctively in quite
young children and uneducated persons, and are
unconnected with any particular philosophical or
theological views. They are so ingrained in human
nature that even Fatalists, who regard them as
absurd, cannot help entertaining them to some
extent. Now, all these instinctive feelings and judgments
presuppose the reality of moral freedom. Take,
1 E.G. Dr. Stout and Mr. Bradley advocate psychical as
distinguished from materialistic Determinism.

180 THE CASE FOR FREE-WILL
for example, the feeling of remorse. When a man
has done a dastardly deed — basely injured a bene
factor, for instance, or betrayed a friend — he ex
periences, on reflection, acute remorse. This re
morse is unquestionably based on the belief that he
could have acted otherwise than he did. If he believed
that no other act was possible than the one he did,
he would not blame himself for it, and would not
feel remorse. Common sense always draws a strong
distinction between actions which are avoidable
and those which are unavoidable. A man may kill
his own father ; but if the act be pure misadventure,
he feels no remorse. A man may fail in business,
and bring his wife and children to destitution ; but
if the failure be due not to his own fault, but
to unavoidable circumstances, he does not blame
himself, but simply bewails his bad fortune. All
moral judgments about an action turn upon the
question whether it was, or was not, the only action
possible to the agent. If it was the only action
possible, the agent is neither praised nor blamed.
Thus no one is grateful to another for doing him
a benefit, if he knows that the other could not
help doing it. No one admires the useful diligence
of convicts in making roads and harbours, because
he well knows that they are compelled to make
them. Similarly, no one blames a maniac for
massacring a whole family of helpless children,
because it is well known that his act was necessitated
by the nature of his mental disease. As Prof.
Sidgwick, himself a Determinist, admits, " The

THE CASE FOR FREE-WILL

181

conception of freedom is, so to say, the hidden
pivot upon which our moral sentiments naturally
play" {Methods of Ethics, bk. i. c. 5).
Moral Freedom, then, is postulated by, and
forms a rational justification of, the ordinary
unsophisticated moral sentiments of mankind.
Determinism, on the other hand, is in flagrant
contradiction to every one of them. Determinism
teaches that no action is ever possible except the
one that actually takes place. The desperado cuts
a throat, and the hero sacrifices his life, by a law
as inevitable as that by which an unsupported
stone falls to the ground. Such a doctrine, if
really accepted, renders every moral judgment
irrational. Thus it is irrational to be grateful for
a kindness, because, on this theory, the doer could
not help doing it ; it is irrational to be angry with
a man who beats in his wife's head with a poker,
because the unfortunate man had no alternative ;
it is irrational to attribute merit to a child who
has resisted a temptation, because he could not
help resisting it ; and it is irrational to praise a
saint, because he can no more help being a saint
than a thief can help picking pockets. As Prof.
Sidgwick says, " On the Determinist theory, ' ought,'
' responsibility,' ' desert,' and similar terms, have
to be used, if at all, in new significations." Or as
Mr. Cotter Morison graphically expresses it : —
" Nothing is more certain than that no one makes
his own character. That is done for him by his
parents and ancestors. The hero was born with

182 ADMISSIONS OF DETERMINISTS
his noble and fearless heart; the saint came into
the world with his spontaneous aptitude for good
works and lofty feeling; and the moral monster,
the cowardly, selfish, unscrupulous criminal, was
born with his evil passions inherited from pro
genitors near or remote. No merit or demerit
attaches to the saint or the sinner in the meta
physical and mysterious sense of the word. Their
good or evil qualities were none of their making.
A man inherits his brain as much as he inherits his
estate. ... It will perhaps be said that this view
does away with moral responsibility, and that those
who hold it cannot consistently blame any crime
or resent any injury ; that we should not on this
hypothesis reproach a garotter who half murders
us — he is a machine, not a man with free-will. It
is no more rational to blame him, than it would
be to blame a runaway engine which knocks you
down, and mangles or kills you. To which the
answer is, that the sooner the idea of moral responsi
bility is got rid of, the better it will be for society and
moral education. What do we gain by this fine lan
guage as to moral responsibility ? " 1
Determinism, then, by the confession of its
advocates, can only hope to establish itself by
completely abolishing the present moral instincts
of mankind. But this is tantamount to a confession
of defeat, for the majority of men will always prefer
a theory which is in harmony with and explains
the facts, to one which, finding the facts against it,
1 Service of Man, c. ix. The italics are ours.

KANT ON FREE-WILL 183
says, So much the worse for the facts. The moral
sentiments are instinctive, and therefore only to
a very limited extent alterable by education or
philosophic training. The prospect, therefore, that
the moral sentiments of the human race will,
within any calculable time, be brought into ap
proximation to the Determinist scheme, is extremely
remote. Naturam expellasfurca, tamen usque recurret.
(2) The argument from the sense of obligation.
Kant argued : " I ought, therefore I can " ; in
other words, I must be able to do what it is my
duty to do, otherwise the universe is irrational.
(3) The argument from consciousness.
Whenever we perform a deliberate act, we are
conscious before, and after, and during the
action, that we are able to act otherwise. If, for
example, we are about to choose a profession for
a son, we are convinced, before we begin de
liberating at all, that we have a real power of
choice between alternative professions. All the
time we are deliberating — a process that may last
for months — we remain under the same conviction.
We never think that the result is a foregone con
clusion, but rather that there is a real option
between (say) the Army, the Navy, and the Church.
If any one were to suggest that the option is only
apparent, and that in reality only one choice is
possible, we should regard him as talking nonsense.
Again, in the act of choosing, we are fully conscious
that the choice is free, and that we could choose
otherwise ; and finally, when we look back on our

1 84 THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF FREE-WILL
conduct, we are convinced that we have exercised
a real choice between real alternatives, all of which
remained possible down to the very moment of
decision. The same irresistible conviction of real
freedom accompanies all deliberate actions. In
actions in which right and wrong are directly
involved, the consciousness of freedom and re
sponsibility is particularly strong, both before and
afterwards. When a man has deliberately done a
mean or dishonourable action, he never thinks of
excusing himself on the plea that he could not
help it, but takes the full blame for it as an action
which he deliberately and freely did, and which
he ought not and need not have done. Professor
James does not exaggerate our inward conviction of
freedom when he says, " The whole feeling of reality,
the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life,
depends on our sense that in it things are really
being decided from one moment to another, and
that it. is not the dull rattling off of a chain that
was forged innumerable ages ago."1
(4) The argument from utility.
Belief in free-will encourages men to greater
exertions to attain virtue and happiness, than the
opposite doctrine. It makes for optimism and
progress, while determinism makes for pessimism.
This is often admitted even by determinists.
For example, Mr. Mill says : " The free-will
doctrine, by keeping in view precisely that
portion of the truth which the word 'necessity'
1 Psychology, vol. i. p. 453.

MILL'S ADMISSIONS 185
puts out of sight, namely the power of the
mind to co-operate in the formation of its own
character,1 has given to its adherents a practical
feeling much nearer to the truth than has generally,
I believe, existed in the minds of Necessarians.
The free-will doctrine has, I believe, fostered,
especially in the younger of its supporters, a much
stronger spirit of self-culture. Necessarians do
really in some instances (I speak from personal
experience) suffer those depressing consequences,
which their opponents erroneously impute to the
doctrine of Necessity itself" {Logic, bk. vi. c. 2).
II. — Objections and Difficulties
Objection I. — The sciences of Physiological Pys-
chology and Brain-physics have demonstrated that
all the activities of the mind, and consequently of
the will, are strictly determined by the mechanical
vibrations of the molecules of the brain.
This is the well-known Automaton theory of
Tyndall, Huxley, and Clifford.2 Huxley states it as
1 Mill is here decidedly illogical. If Determinism is true, the
mind has no power to form its own character. See the more
consistent statement of the case by Mr. Morison above.
8 The only philosopher, as distinguished from scientist, who
has espoused Automatism, is Dr. Shadworth Hodgson. Both
in his Theory of Practice and in his Metaphysic of Experience
he denies that thoughts or feelings, however intense, can have
the least influence upon action. Mind is to him a mere epi-
phenomenon of matter. " Consciousness," he says, " is initiated
by, and depends on, nerve-motion, and not vice versa." He
even says, " There is no real action and reaction of states of
consciousness upon each other."

t86 THEORY OF AUTOMATISM
follows : " Consciousness would appear to be related
to the mechanism of the body simply as a collateral
product of its working, and to be as completely
without any power of modifying that working as
the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of
a locomotive engine is without influence on its
machinery. Volition is an emotion indicative of
physical changes, not a cause of such changes. The
soul stands related to the body as the bell of a
clock to the works. Our mental conditions are
simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes
which take place automatically in the organism.
The feeling we call volition is not the cause of a
voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the
brain which is the immediate cause of that act.
We are conscious automata."
Clifford says : " We are to regard the body as
a physical machine which goes by itself according
to a physical law. We go by ourselves when we
have had food. If anybody says that the will
influences matter, the statement is not untrue, it
is nonsense." 1 Tyndall says : " The logic seems
of iron strength which claims for the brain an
automatic action uninfluenced by states of con
sciousness." 2
Reply. — (i) It is not true that Physiological Psycho
logy or Brain-physics has discovered facts inconsis
tent with free-will, much less proved the theory of
1 Lectures, vol. ii. p. 33.
8 Apology for the Belfast Address. Tyndall, however, was
not so confident in his Automatism as Huxley and Clifford.

LADD AND JAMES ON AUTOMATISM 187
Automatism. Prof. Ladd says : " Nothing of
scientific value which Physiological Psychology has
to offer, throws any clear light on the problem of
the ' freedom of the will.' Physiology neither
disproves nor verifies the postulate of free-will;
accordingly this postulate must be raised and
discussed on other grounds " {Physiological Psy
chology, p. 544). Professor James speaks of "the
strange arrogance with which the wildest material
istic speculations persist in calling themselves
' science,' " and adds : " The last word of Psychology
here is ignorance. . . . The consciousness doesn't
count, these reasoners say ; it doesn't exist for
science, it is nil ; you mustn't think about it at all.
The intensely reckless character of all this needs
no comment. It is making the mechanical theory
true per fas aut nefas. My conclusion is that to
urge the automaton theory upon us, as it is now
urged, on purely a priori and quasi-metaphysical
grounds, is an unwarrantable impertinence in the
present state of Psychology" {Psychology, vol. i.
pp. 138, 454).
(2) If conscious intelligence had not been in some
way useful to the creatures that possessed it, it
would never have been evolved and perfected, as it
has been, in the course of the struggle for existence.
" Up to a certain point," says Dr. Romanes,
" mechanism is able to perform all the compensations
or adjustments which are performed by the animal
body ; but we also find that beyond this level such
compensations are never performed without the

188 ROMANES ON AUTOMATISM
intervention of consciousness. Surely this large
and general fact points with irresistible force to the
conclusion that in the performance of these more
complex adjustments, consciousness — or the power
of feeling and the power of willing — are of some
use. All the organs and functions of animals are
of use to animals ; we never meet, on any large or
general scale, with organs and functions which are
wholly adventitious. Is it to be supposed that the
highest functions of the highest organs of the
highest animals stand out of analogy with all other
functions in being themselves functionless ? To
this question I, for one, can only answer, and
answer unequivocally, No. As a rational being,
I am forced to conclude that, apart from the
activity of mind, this planet could never have held
the wonderful being who, in multiplying, has
replenished the earth and subdued it — holding
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the
fowl of the air, and over every living thing that
moveth " {Mind and Motion and Monism, p. 23).
(3) Experience testifies that the mind, by willing,
can move the body, and through it other things,
and that therefore the will is capable of producing
physical or mechanical effects.
(4) If human consciousness has no influence upon
human action, it follows logically that if man had
been created without a mind, the same outward actions
as are now performed, would still have been performed
by him. That is to say, that blind painters would
have painted pictures, and exhibited them in public

ABSURDITIES OF AUTOMATISM 189
galleries to blind spectators ; that deaf composers
would have composed elaborate symphonies, and
have caused them to be played by deaf musicians to
deaf audiences ; and that two automata, elsewhere
precisely resembling Shakespere and Newton in
every outward respect, but possessing not the faintest
degree of consciousness or intelligence, would
have mechanically produced, the one the tragedy of
Hamlet, the other the Principia. These and other
unspeakable absurdities are necessarily involved
in Automatism, and yet Materialists have the
audacity to call believers credulous.
Objection II. — Free-will is inconsistent with the
law of the Conservation of Energy. This law
asserts that the amount of energy in the universe
remains always the same. But if the human will
has the power to produce physical effects, it must
have the power of creating new energy, which is a
manifest violation of the principle of the Conserva
tion of Energy.
Reply.— The law of the Conservation of Energy,
as stated by Profs. Stewart and Tait, is as follows :
" In any system of bodies whatever, to which no
energy is communicated by external bodies, and
which parts with no energy to external bodies, the
sum of the various potential and kinetic energies
remains for ever unaltered"1 {Unseen Universe,
p. 114).
1 The words for ever have no right in the definition. Science
knows nothing about eternity. It should be noticed also that
the law of Conservation only applies to closed systems of bodies,
and not to the whole universe. "It is plainly impossible," says

igo THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY
It is evident, then —
(i) That the law in question is a purely physical
one, having reference only to inorganic bodies.
There is no proof that it holds true of animated
bodies of any kind, much less that it holds true of man.
The materialist may urge that the general analogy
of nature requires us to believe that a law which
holds good of matter must also hold good of mind ;
but this we entirely deny. The argument is purely
analogical, and the force of such an argument
varies, as Bishop Butler correctly pointed out,
according to the degree of resemblance of the things
compared. When the things compared are very
much alike, then the presumption that a given law
which holds good of one will hold good of the
others, is very strong; but if the resemblance of
the things is slight, the presumption also is slight.
Now, mind and matter differ more markedly in their
general properties than any other things whatso
ever. As Prof. Bain, himself a semi-materialist,
confesses : " We are in this fix : mental states and
bodily states are utterly contrasted ; they cannot
be compared ; they have nothing in common except
the most general of all attributes — degree, and
order in time ; when engaged with one we must
be oblivious of all that distinguishes the other.
Extension is but the first of a long series of
Prof. J. Ward, " to prove that the phenomenal energy in the
universe is fixed in amount. The physicists themselves are
beginning to see this more and more clearly, and frankly to
admit it " {Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. ii. p. 76).

THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY 191
properties, all present in matter, all absent in mind "
{Mind and Body, pp. 125, 135). The inference
therefore is not that it is probable that the law of
the Conservation of Energy applies to mind, but
that it is in the highest degree improbable.
(2) The law in question only affirms that the
quantity of energy in a system of bodies remains
unaltered, provided that it is not acted upon from
without. Now mind, as we have already proved,
has the power of producing physical effects {e.g.
tools and machines), which physical agents, of
themselves, could never produce. This implies that
mind can add energy to matter;1 but this is no
breach of the law of the Conservation of Energy,
because the energy is added from without. " It is
better," says Prof. Poynting, " to face the situation
boldly and claim for our mental experience as great
certainty as that which the physicist claims for his
experience in the outside world. If our mental
experience convinces us that we have freedom of
choice, we are obliged to believe that in the mind
there is territory that the physicist can never
annex. . . . Undoubtedly will results in physical
motion" {Hibbert Journal, July, 1903).
Objection III. — Neither mind determines the activi
ties of matter, nor matter the activities of mind; but
both mind and matter are attributes of a single
1 Some speculators, however, suppose that the will, by acting on
the moving molecules of the brain, always at right angles to the
direction in which they are moving, directs the motions of
the body without adding energy to matter. This view seems
to the writer unnecessary and over-subtle.

192 MATERIALISTIC MONISM
substance, which determines the activities of
both. Reply, — This is the theory of Semi-materialistic
Monism, advocated by Prof. Bain and certain other
modern Psychologists. It is held in two forms.
(i) It is said that mind and matter are both
attributes of some unknown tertium quid, which
causes the activities of both. But there is abso
lutely no evidence that any such tertium quid exists.
Mind is known, and matter is known, but nothing
whatever is known about this hypothetical third
thing. All the existing facts can be explained by
the ordinary theory that mind influences matter,
and matter mind. Exactly how this interaction
takes place is a mystery, but the actual fact of it
is demonstrated by constant experience. Besides,
the mystery is not removed by assuming an un
known tertium quid. For, in the first place, this
tertium quid is another mystery ; and, in the second
place, it being ex hypothesi neither mind nor matter,
it is a mystery how it can act upon either. Thus
this theory substitutes several mysteries for one.
(2) It is said that mind and matter together make
up a single reality, and constitute " a double-faced
entity." This, however, contradicts consciousness.
Consciousness (which, after all, is the only possible
guide) draws an absolute distinction between the
mind and the brain. To affirm, in opposition to
consciousness, that these two things are the same
because they happen to be connected, is arbitrary
in the extreme.

MATERIALISTIC MONISM 193
(3) It may be urged, both against this hypothesis
and that of Automatism, that the mind is conscious
of being itself a real cause, a real originator of effects,
and not a mere effect of something else. If Monism
or Automatism were true, the mind would never
imagine itself to be a primary and efficient cause.
That we do imagine ourselves to be causes is certain.
" We are more certain," says Prof. Poynting, " of our
power of choice and of responsibility, than of any
other fact, physical or psychical. We are certain,
all of us, in every-day life, that this power of choice
exists, whatever conclusion we may come to in
the quiet of our studies. The freedom of choice is
unlike anything else in Nature — it is a simple fact.
Holding this view, I am bound to repudiate the
physical account of Nature, when it claims to be
a complete account."
Objection IV. — If free-will were a fact, the pre
diction of future acts would be impossible.
Reply. — Rational freedom is not inconsistent with
rational uniformity of action. If it is good and
rational to act according to general rules, then
it may be confidently expected that rational beings
will, upon the whole, elect to do so. God Himself,
who is the freest of all beings, acts, both in Nature
and Grace, in a highly uniform manner. Of course,
if free-will is a fact, we cannot expect to predict
all actions, but we may expect to forecast a great
many, at least with a high degree of probability.
Beyond this we cannot fairly expect to go, and
experience shows that this is all that is, in fact,
13

194 FREE-WILL AND CHARACTER
possible. It is only physical events, such as
eclipses, that can be predicted with certainty.
Human actions admit of probable prediction only.
Objection V. — If free-will is a fact, men's actions
do not flow from their characters, but are arbitrary
excrescences upon them.
Reply. — A character embraces not one only, but
a great variety of different possible motives. In
any given circumstances, a man's character supplies
him, through its various motives, with a number of
different possibilities of action, and it lies with him
to decide which of these possibilities shall become
actual. No action can be performed which does
not lie within the capacities of the character ; but
these capacities are indefinite in number and often
sharply contrasted. Some thoroughly mean men,
for example, are capable at times of acts of sur
prising generosity ; and some of the worst of man
kind have occasional fits of goodness. Every action,
therefore, being chosen out of a number of alter
native actions which the character renders possible,
is both free and a true outcome of character.
Objection VI. — The regularity of voluntary actions,
as disclosed by statistics, disproves free-will. For
example, the statistics of marriages and suicides
are approximately regular.
Reply. — (i) It has already been remarked that
regularity of conduct is fully consistent with
moral freedom.
(2) Statistics give an entirely fallacious appear
ance of uniformity to phenomena which are highly

FREE-WILL AND STATISTICS 195
variable. Facts have, in fact, to be averaged, just
because, individually considered, they cannot be
predicted. Facts, when averaged, cease, strictly
speaking, to be facts. The " average Englishman,"
for example, who marries at a certain average age,
is a pure statistical fiction, and to know when he
marries affords no information as to when a par
ticular Englishman will marry, or whether he will
marry at all. Similarly the statistics of suicide do
not inform us when or whether a particular person
will commit suicide, or anything about the matter.
It is hard, therefore, to see how statistics, which deal
with averages, throw any light at all upon freedom
of choice which is possessed, if at all, by individuals.
Dr. Venn, in his Logic of Chance, has conclusively
shown that statistics give no information as to the
causes from which the events tabulated arise, and
that even if an element of pure chance were at
work, it would not necessarily affect the final
average. As Dr. Martineau well says, " The per
centage decides nothing about the necessary or free
disposal of the working energy detailed through
men and things. . . . The average on which we rely
is the joint product of a necessary and a contingen
factor; the latter being qualified for partnership
in a constant result, by the limits of its variation,
and the equality of its possibilities. The steadiness
of the total is saved, while the freedom of the in
dividual is reserved " {Study of Religion, ii. 253 ff).
Objection VII. — Free volition is motiveless volition,
and therefore irrational.

196 THE STRONGEST MOTIVE
Reply. — Free-will is not action without a motive,
but rational and deliberate choice between motives.
Objection VIII. — The will is always determined
by the strongest motive.
Reply. — This is contrary to experience. When
resisting a strong temptation, we know that we are
reinforcing by an act of will the weaker motive,
and that, apart from our will, the right would have
no chance of prevailing. As Prof. James says,
"We feel in all cases of hard volition as if the
line taken, when the rarer and more ideal motives
prevail, were the line of greater resistance, and as
if the line of coarser motivation were the more
pervious and easy one, even at the very moment
when we refuse to follow it. The sensualist never
says of his behaviour that it results from a victory
over his ideals, but the moralist always speaks of
his as a victory over his propensities. If a brief
definition of ideal or moral action were required,
none could be given which would better fit the
appearances than this — It is action in the line of
greatest resistance" {Psychology, ii. p. 548).
Objection IX. — Mr. H. Spencer says : " Physical
changes either conform to law, or they do not. If
they do not, this work, in common with all works
on the subject, is sheer nonsense : no science of
Psychology is possible " {Psychology, i. p. 503).
Reply. — (1) A great group of facts cannot be
excluded from the realm of science because they
contain a small, or even a large, incalculable
element. The incalculable element in history is

THE DIVINE FORE-KNOWLEDGE 197
extremely large, and yet there is a science of
history. (2) It does not follow that because human volitions
do not conform to the mechanical laws to which Mr.
Spencer and other materialistic philosophers labour
to subject them, they do not conform to laws at
all. There may be, and are, psychical and spiritual
laws to which even volitions conform. But these
are laws of freedom, not of mechanical necessity.
Objection X. — Free-will is inconsistent with the
Divine Omnipotence.
Reply. — (1) It is not inconsistent with an omni
potence which is moral and benevolent, to limit
itself voluntarily for the benefit of its creatures.
(2) It is a greater exhibition of omnipotence to
create a free, moral personality such as man's, than
to create a conscious automaton of the kind postu
lated by Determinism.
Objection XI. — Free-will is inconsistent with the
Divine Foreknowledge.
Reply. — The two principles may be reconciled in
either of the two following ways :
(1) It may be supposed that the Deity does not
foresee contingent actions, but only those final ends
to which He is guiding particular creatures and
creation at large. On this theory the Deity foresees
all the human volitions which are possible, and also
all the measures which He can take to counteract
wrong volitions. In this way, although ignorant of
the actual outcome of future volitions, He can guide
the world unerringly to its predetermined goal.

iq8 THE DIVINE FORE-KNOWLEDGE
This view, however, is based on a superficial view
of the Divine Perfections, and is less probable than
the following.
(2) It may be supposed that the duration of time
is contained in the duration of eternity, and that
therefore God, who sees events sub specie cetemitatis,
sees the events of time as part of an eternal present.
He thus foresees even human volitions, and ordains
His own corresponding actions from eternity in
accordance with this absolute fore-knowledge.
This species of knowledge transcends, not only
in degree, but also in kind, all human know
ledge, and is called by theologians Scientia
Media.

LITERATURE1
(a) Libertarian

Butler, Analogy, pt. i. c. 6 ; Kant, Critique, etc. ; Fonsegrive,
Essai sur le libre arbitre ; Renouvier, Les dilemmes de la
mitaphysique pure, c. iv., etc. ; Boutroux, La contingence des
lois de la nature; Noel, La conscience du libre arbitre
W. J. Ward, Philosophy of Theism, essays vi.-xi. ; W. James
The Will to Believe (vi.), and Psychology, ii. p. 486
Momerie, Personality (iii.); Sturt, Personal Idealism (iii.)
Hazard, Freedom of the Mind in Willing; Martineau
Study of Religion, bk. iii. c. 2 ; Maher, Psychology, c. xix
Ladd, Physiological Psychology, pp. 524-44 ; Romanes, Mind
and Motion and Monism, cc. v. vi. ; Lotze, Microcosmus, i.
p. 144 ff.; Temple, Bampton Lectures, iii.; A. Moore,
Essays, vii.

1 The most important modern literature of free-will is French.

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM 199
(.) Determinist
Mill, Hamilton, c. xxvi., Logic, bk. vi. c. 2 ; J. Edwards,
Freedomof the Will; Spinoza, Ethics, props, xxvi.-xxxvi. ; Bain,
Emotions; L. Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 278-92; H.
Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, bk. i. c. 5.
{c) Mediating
W. Wundt, Principles of Morality (tr.), c. i., etc.

CHAPTER XIV
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Summary. — Evil arises from the abuse of free-will by finite
minds. Moral evil is not caused by God, but overruled
by Him for good. The transmission of a tendency to sin is
not unjust, because a remedy for it has been provided, and
there are important compensations. Physical evil is shown
to subserve important moral purposes in the case of man,
and in the case of animals to be more than compensated
for by physical good.
I. — Moral Evil 1
To the Polytheist, who believes in numerous gods,
some of whom are good and others evil, and to
the Dualist, who acknowledges two eternal principles,
the one good and the other evil, the problem of
evil presents no particular difficulty; but to the
1 Theologians and Philosophers distinguish between (i) Moral
Evil and (2) Physical Evil. Moral evil proper is the deliberate
choice by a rational being of 'what he knows to be wrong.
Cognate with it is Original Sin, which is a transmitted tendency
to moral evil. Physical evil consists mainly of pain, sorrow,
disease, and death. Ignorance, as far as it is deliberate and
sinful, is moral evil. Indeliberate ignorance is physical evil.
Leibnitz adds a category of "metaphysical evil" — i.e. the
natural imperfection which belongs to every created thing.
Mere imperfection, however, is not properly evil.

HUME AND MILL ON EVIL 201
Theist, who attributes the origin of the universe
to a single Being, whom he regards as not only
good, but also infinitely wise and powerful, the
problem is much more serious. Some have regarded
it as altogether insoluble. Hume, for example, says
{Human Understanding, sect, viii.) : " It is not
possible to explain distinctly how the Deity can be
the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without
being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These
are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted
human reason is very unfit to handle ; and whatever
system she embraces, she finds herself involved
in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions,
at every step which she takes with regard to such
subjects. To reconcile the indifference and con
tingency of human actions with prescience ; or to
defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity
from being the author of sin, has been found
hitherto to exceed all the power of Philosophy.
Happy if she be thus sensible of her temerity, when
she pries into these. sublime mysteries!" Others,
less cautious or less modest than Hume, have said
roundly, that either the goodness or the omnipotence
of the Deity, or both, must be given, up. Mr. J. S.
Mill, for example, says {Three Essays, p. 186):
"We have not to attempt the impossible problem
of reconciling infinite benevolence and justice with
infinite power in the Creator of such a world as
this. The attempt to do so not only involves
absolute contradiction in an intellectual point of
view, but exhibits to excess the revolting spectacle

202 EVIL AND MORAL FREEDOM
of a Jesuitical defence of moral enormities." In
a similar spirit Mr. St. George Stock writes
{Hibbert Journal, July, 1904) : " The problem and the
mystery are entirely made for us by our theology,
which postulates that the cause of all things is
the will of a single almighty, all-wise, all-loving
Being. . . . This doctrine, I venture to say, will
have to be given up, if Theology is to be brought
into touch with the times. The mystery of this
unfathomable universe is one that the plummet
of our thought will never sound. But at least we
can avoid, and as an intellectual duty we are
bound to avoid, plain and palpable self-contradictions.
We cannot assert in the same breath the reality
of evil, and the fact of creation by an omnipotent,
omniscient, and benevolent Being. . . . Let us
therefore make up our minds what God it is we
worship. Is it the God of Nature revealed to us by
science, or the God whom our hearts reveal to us ?
We must take our choice, and desist from the vain
endeavour to fuse the two into one."
These objections, however, are based on the
assumption that the theory of Necessity or
Determinism, in some form or other, is true. If
it is true, then, of course, all the evil in the world
must be attributed directly to the Deity, who is
thereby proved to be either weak or wicked. But
on the opposite supposition of Moral Freedom, which
has already been proved to be true, moral evil is
not to be attributed directly to the Deity, but to
those finite spirits, human and superhuman, who

EVIL AND MORAL FREEDOM 203
abuse the gift of free-will entrusted to them. This
is not, as is sometimes alleged, a mere evasion
of the difficulty. On the free-will hypothesis, the
causality entrusted to free finite spirits is real.
God is not even ultimately the cause of the free
choice which a rational creature makes, and therefore
a man is, within the limits assigned to him by
God, the first and ultimate cause of his own
volitions, and the chain of causation, when traced
back to him, ends.
It may, nevertheless, be objected, that the Deity,
having perfect foreknowledge that moral evil would
arise unless prevented, ought to have prevented it.
He might have prevented it in three ways : (1) He
might have refrained from creating beings liable
to sin ; (2) He might have created such beings,
and secluded them from temptation ; (3) He might
have allowed them to be tempted, but have forcibly
prevented them from falling.1
Now, we maintain decidedly that each of these
alternatives is less worthy of God, and would have
resulted in a worse universe, than the alternative
which He actually adopted. For —
(1) If He had created beings incapable of sin,
those same beings would have been incapable of
virtue. Not even Omnipotence can create a being
capable of virtue, without making it at the same
time capable of sin. Virtue is impossible without
1 This treatment of the subject is suggested by Dr. Momerie's
Origin of Evil.

204 EVIL AND MORAL FREEDOM
moral freedom, and moral freedom is impossible
without freedom of choice, and freedom of choice
is power to choose wrong as well as right. No
doubt if God had made us what Mr. Huxley says
we are, conscious automata, we should have been
incapable of sin ; but it is better to be men, with all
the glorious possibilities of freedom and virtue,
than to be machines, however excellent. The
crowning dignity of man, and the chief part of
the image of God in which he was created, is moral
freedom, and to wish it away is to be untrue to
the best ideals of the race.
(2) God might, it is said, have created free moral
beings, and have saved them from sin by secluding
them from temptation. This could not have been
done entirely, without depriving them of passions
or propensions altogether, but it might have been
done to a very considerable extent.
It might have been done ; but if it had been,
mankind would never have advanced, as they have,
from innocence to virtue. Between innocence and
virtue there is a great distinction. Innocence is
that negative goodness which results from ignorance
of vice or absence of temptation. Virtue is that
state of stable moral excellence which is attained
by him who has again and again wrestled with
evil in its most seductive forms, and by continual
conquests over self has formed habits which secure
him against all likelihood of falling. If, therefore,
it was the design of the Creator (as in fact it
was) that His creatures should attain to virtue as

EVIL AND MORAL FREEDOM 205
distinguished from innocence, it was impossible
for Him to seclude them from temptations in the
way suggested. A boy brought up at home by
an over-careful mother and artificially guarded
from temptation may be innocent, but certainly
is neither virtuous nor manly, and when he is
actually forced to take his part in the battle of
life, is in much greater danger of irretrievably
falling than a lad who has already learnt what evil
is, and has begun to struggle with it in earnest.
Whatever the explanation of it may be, finite
creatures like man cannot become perfect at once,
but require to be perfected through much tempta
tion and suffering. Even the Son of Man Himself
was " in all points tempted like as we are " ; " offered
up prayers and supplications with strong crying
and tears unto Him that was able to save Him
from death " ; " learnt obedience by the things
that He suffered " ; and that He might encourage
us to face the same conflict boldly, wae " perfected
through sufferings " (Heb. iv. 15 ; v. 7; ii. 10).
(3) God might, it is said, have allowed His
creatures to be tempted, but have forcibly pre
vented them from falling.
To have done this, however, would have been
to deprive them of all real moral freedom. A
man who can only exercise his free-will in one
way, is only one degree above an automaton with
no free-will at all. It is better, upon the whole,
that sinners, by actually falling, should taste
the bitter fruit of sin, and, becoming conscious

206 ORIGINAL SIN
of their own weakness, should seek more earnestly
for strength where it may be found. Often a
fall, shattering, as it does, a man's pride and self-
confidence, is the beginning of higher things.
This was the case with St. Peter, who, through
his fall and subsequent repentance, attained a new
stability of faith, and justified the prophetic name
which his Master gave him. Better, no doubt, it
would be never to fall ; but better to fall, and fall
often, than to be irresistibly prevented from falling.
II. — Original Sin
The question, however, is seriously complicated
by the existence of original or transmitted sin.
Original sin may be defined as a bias towards
evil which renders the choice of the virtuous
alternative more difficult than it ought to be. Thus
stated, the doctrine of Original Sin constitutes a real
moral difficulty. It seems as if the individual who
inherits, through no fault of his own, original sin,
has a fair ground of complaint against the Deity.
The game of life which he has to play is not a
fair one. The dice are loaded against him, and
he has no real chance of winning. His character
is warped, before ever he receives it, by the vicious
choices of innumerable ancestors, for whose mis
takes he is obliged to suffer. He seems to suffer
at the hands of a God who claims to be just, a
monstrous injustice
It is, however, fortunately possible to vindicate
completely the justice of God's dealings in this

ORIGINAL SIN 207
matter. The principle of heredity,1 of which original
sin is a particular example, cuts both ways. The
individual inherits not only the vicious tendencies
of his ancestors, but their virtuous tendencies also.
The character of the saint descends to posterity,
as well as the character of the criminal. If the
individual is discouraged by the thought that so
many of his ancestors have been wicked, he may
comfort himself with the reflection that probably
more of them were good, and many of them far
better than himself. It is wrong to exaggerate
the amount of evil in the world. In spite of original
sin, the world contains a great deal of good, and
the amount of good is steadily increasing. No
serious student of history denies the reality of
moral progress ; and though the progress would
have been much more rapid and thorough if sin
had never been, this consideration must not blind
us to the good which now is, and always has been,
in the world, and which is as much transmitted to
posterity as the evil. The evil which the individual
inherits is doubtless a disadvantage to him, but it
is more than counterbalanced by the good which
he receives with it. If every individual started
where Adam started, the world would make no
progress. It is better to accept cheerfully the evil
with the good, recognizing that much good comes
out of evil, than to indulge in pessimistic com
plaints against the Creator, who is steadily guiding
the world to greater and greater perfection.
1 On the nature of heredity, see appendix ii.

208 ORIGINAL SIN
This is the place to deal with another objection
which is often brought against the doctrine of
Original Sin. It is alleged that God acts unjustly
to the individual in imputing to him as guilt the
original sin which he innocently inherits. This,
however, is precisely what God does not do.
Calvinism indeed affirms it, but the Church has
always protested against so monstrous a calumny
upon a just and merciful Creator. There is a
Christian doctrine of Original Sin, but none of
Original Guilt. Although, as the ninth Anglican
Article expresses it, " the corruption of the nature
of every man," considered in itself, "deserveth
God's wrath and damnation," yet the man himself,
who innocently inherits it, is an object, not of wrath,
but of Divine pity and compassion. The good and
merciful Creator, having complete knowledge of
the difficulties against which fallen man has to
struggle, makes full allowance for his inevitably
imperfect conduct. Knowing the secrets of the
heart, He often condescends to see victory and
merit where human eyes see nothing but failure
and sin. Knowing, then, what we do of God's
infinite moral perfection, we are sure that each
individual case will receive absolute justice at His
hands, and that justice will be tempered with mercy.
It is, however, through the sublime doctrine of
human redemption through Christ that God's
justice and mercy are most convincingly demon
strated. If, when the race had fallen, God had left
it to itself, His justice might, perhaps, have been

PHYSICAL EVIL 209
successfully impugned ; but He did not. He pro
vided a perfect remedy both for actual and original
sin, and made it available for all mankind. Thus the
effects of the Fall were reversed, and the possibility
of sinless perfection was again freely offered to
man. But this doctrine is best considered in con
nection with Christianity. III. — Physical Evil
The existence of physical evil, by which is chiefly
meant pain, sorrow, disease, and death, has been
held by many to constitute a strong argument
against the benevolence of the Deity. " In sober
truth," says Mr. J. S. Mill, "nearly all the things
which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to
one another, are Nature's every-day performances.
Killing, the most criminal act recognized by human
laws, Nature does once to every being that lives ;
and in a large proportion of cases, after protracted
tortures, such as only the greatest monsters whom
we read of ever purposely inflicted on their living
fellow-creatures. Nature impales men, breaks them
as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by
wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with
stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them
with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them
by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and
has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve,
such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a
Domitian never surpassed. All this Nature does
with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy
14

210 PHYSICAL EVIL AND MAN
and of justice, emptying her shafts upon the best
and noblest indifferently with the meanest and
worst. She mows down those on whose existence
hangs the well-being of a whole people, perhaps the
prospects of the human race for generations to
come. Everything, in short, which the worst men
commit, either against life or property, is perpetrated
on a larger scale by natural agents. . . . The wor
shipper [of the God revealed in Nature] must learn
to think blind partiality, atrocious cruelty, and
reckless injustice, not blemishes in an object of
worship, since all these abound to excess in the
commonest phenomena of Nature " {Three Essays,
pp. 28, 112).
It will be convenient to consider the subject of
physical evil, firstly in its relation to man, and
secondly in its relation to the animal creation.
(i) Physical evil in its relation to man. — Mr. Mill's
arguments are a singular mixture of weakness and
strength. It is difficult to treat seriously the con
tention that because it is wrong for men to destroy
the lives or goods of their fellows, therefore it is
wrong for God. If there is a God at all, He is the
maker and absolute owner of man, and of all that is
his. Everything that man is or has, is a loan
from a Lender, whose title to reclaim it when He
wills cannot possibly be questioned.
The other arguments adduced by Mr. Mill are
more worthy of attention. Although God has a
right to take life, He has no right, as Mr. Mill
justly implies, to take it with cruelty, and it is

EVIL AND A FUTURE LIFE 211
equally true that if He allows men to exist at all,
He is morally bound to treat them with justice.
There certainly axe prima facie some facts in Nature
which are hard to reconcile with the divine benevo
lence and impartiality.
It is important, however, to bear in mind two
considerations : (1) that man is a moral being,
requiring for his advance in holiness moral discipline ;
and (2) that he possesses an immortal soul. As will
be shown more at length in the next chapter, belief
in the being of God is for all logical minds insepar
able from belief in a future life. If the arguments
for religion are adequate to prove the existence of
a personal God, they are adequate to prove human
immortality, and therefore all attempts to justify
the ways of God to man must be logically based on
the assumption of human immortality. If human
immortality is denied, the existence of God must
also be denied, and there is no need for a theodicy
at all.
Now, on the assumption that man is immortal, and
is at present in a state of probation, the utility of
pain and sorrow is at once evident. Their function
clearly is to detach the soul from the world. Had
this life been made a state of unalloyed pleasure,
the tendency of men, even of good men, would
have been to live for this life alone, and to forget
that they are "strangers and pilgrims on the
earth " (Heb. xi. 13). Even as it is, the attraction of
earthly pleasures is so great, that many live for
these alone, neglectful of their higher destiny. God,

212 EVIL AS A MORAL DISCIPLINE
therefore, in His great goodness, sends sorrow,
pain, disease, and especially death, to detach men's
affections from the things of the earth, and to
incline them to things above. He sends these
physical evils to all men, because all men require
to be taught by them, but most often to the wicked,
because the wicked require this teaching most.
Physical evil, then, subserves a moral purpose. It
withdraws the soul from the pursuit of vanities, and
leads it to find rest in Him who alone can give it
lasting happiness.
Again, were it not for the existence of physical
evil, few of the higher human virtues would be
developed at all. In the absence of danger, there
would be no courage ; in the absence of uncertainty,
no faith; in the absence of calamity, no fortitude;
in the absence of pain, no patience ; in the absence
of misfortune in others, no compassion. Not the
hour of pleasure, but the hour of stress and trial
brings out the best that is in a man. No battle no
victory, no cross no crown, is the teaching, not only
of Jesus Christ, but of the best moralists of all
faiths, and, duly considered, it contains a full
justification of most of the physical evil that affects
humanity. It is desirable, nevertheless, to consider with
some attention certain particular points of difficulty
emphasized by Mr. Mill.
(i) He alleges a complete want of justice in the
Author of Nature. " There is no evidence what
ever," he says, "in Nature for divine justice,

EVIL AND GOD'S JUSTICE 213
whatever standard of justice our ethical opinions
may lead us to recognize. There is no shadow of
justice in the general arrangements of Nature"
{o.c, p. 194).
This surely is a great exaggeration, for —
{a) We are assured, even by Agnostic moralists,
that the virtuous are as a rule much more happy
than the vicious. Now this surely means, on the
assumption that there is an Author of Nature, that
He makes a practice, not perhaps an invariable
practice, but still a practice, of rewarding virtue
with happiness. If He were indifferent to justice, as
Mr. Mill generally represents Him, He would make
no difference at all between the virtuous and the
vicious in His distribution of happiness. If He
were positively unjust, as Mr. Mill sometimes says
that He is, He would ordinarily render the vicious
happy and the virtuous miserable. But, as a
matter of fact, He does the very opposite of this.
{b) Mr. Mill says that Nature never discriminates
between virtue and vice.
This again is an exaggeration. Certain of her
gifts, such as sunshine and rain, Nature bestows
indiscriminately on all. Other gifts, however, are
reserved for the righteous above. Health and long
life, for example, belong predominantly to the
temperate and the chaste. Plentiful harvests are
reaped only by diligent husbandmen. Success in
life is rarely attained without some degree of
honesty, diligence, and prudence. Again, Nature
places a great premium upon knowledge, and a

214 BUTLER ON HUMAN JUSTICE
heavy penalty upon ignorance, and, as is well
known, the possession of knowledge and the lack
of it are important indications of moral character.
Indeed, it would almost seem that moral dis
crimination on the part of Nature is the general
rule, and non-discrimination the exception.
(c) If the facts of social life are included among
the phenomena of Nature, as in all reason they
ought to be, then it is still more evident that
Nature discriminates between virtue and vice. For
it is unquestionably true that all human societies
discriminate in a most marked manner between
virtuous and vicious men, assigning honours and
conveniences to the former, and dishonour and
inconveniences to the latter. As Bishop Butler well
remarks, " From the natural course of things,
vicious actions are, to a great degree, actually
punished as mischievous to society : and besides
punishment actually inflicted upon this account,
there is also the fear and apprehension of it in
those persons, whose crimes have rendered them
obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery ; this state of
fear being itself often a considerable punishment.
The natural fear and apprehension of it too, which
restrains from such crimes, is a declaration of
Nature against them. It is necessary to the very
being of society, that vices destructive of it should
be punished as being so ; the vices of falsehood,
injustice, cruelty : which punishment therefore is as
natural as society ; and so is an instance of a kind
of moral government, naturally established and

BUTLER ON HUMAN JUSTICE 215
actually taking place. And since the certain
natural course of things is the conduct of Providence
or the government of God, though carried on by the
instrumentality of men ; the observation here made
amounts to this, that mankind find themselves
placed by Him in such circumstances, as that they
are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour,
and are often punished and sometimes rewarded
under His government, in the view of their being
mischievous or eminently beneficial to society. . . .
The Author of Nature has as truly directed that
vicious actions, considered as mischievous to
society, should be punished, and put mankind under
a necessity of thus punishing them ; as He has
directed and necessitated us to preserve our lives
by food " {Analogy, pt. i. c. 3).
Mr. Mill's reply is that man establishes these
moral distinctions in defiance of Nature {o.c, p. 194).
A more unphilosophical position than this can hardly
be conceived. Whether upon Christian or upon
Agnostic principles, man is part of Nature, and the
instinct which leads him to punish vice and reward
virtue is as much part of the cosmic order as the
law of gravitation.1 The result, then, is that there
is evidence that the Author of Nature distinguishes
between virtue and vice. He distinguishes even
through physical nature, which is by no means
indifferent to moral distinctions. He distinguishes
1 This curious and unphilosophical severance between Nature
and Man is also found in the otherwise excellent Romanes
Lecture of Prof. Huxley, delivered in 1893.

216 EVIL AND THE ANIMAL KINGDOM
much more decidedly through human nature and
human society; and since these are the highest
products of Nature, they must be supposed to
represent Nature's true meaning and aim. Christians
admit that the justice of the Deity as manifested
in Nature and in human society is not yet perfect,
but it is real, and is sufficiently evident to form
a real corroboration of the secret presentiment of
the soul that one day the Divine Justice will be
perfectly revealed.
(ii) Physical evil in its relation to animals. — The
amount of physical pain in the world was some
times underestimated by the old Apologists. Paley's
great chapter on the Goodness of the Deity {Natural
Theology, c. xxvi.) perhaps errs on the side of optim
ism, but it is far nearer the truth than Tennyson's
well known representation, or misrepresentation, of
" Nature red in tooth and claw with ravine,"
shrieking against the creed that God is love. The
judicious Paley may in this instance have slightly
overshot the mark, but the soundness of his general
conclusions no responsible naturalist has ever dis
puted. He laid down and proved by solid evidence
two main propositions : (i) " That in a vast plurality
of instances in which contrivance is perceived, the
design of the contrivance is beneficial"; (2) "That
the Deity has superadded pleasure to animal sensa
tions, beyond what was necessary for any other
purpose, or when the purpose, so far as it was
necessary, might have been effected by the operation
of pain."

HAPPINESS OF ANIMALS 217
Both these positions are unhesitatingly endorsed
by modern authorities. Darwin, whose tendencies
were decidedly pessimistic, and who regarded the
amount of suffering in the world as a great
hindrance to faith, yet wrote : " According to my
judgment, happiness decidedly prevails. . . . All
sentient beings have been formed so as to enjoy, as
a general rule, happiness " {Life and Letters, vol. i.
p. 310). " Natural selection will never produce in
a being anything injurious to itself, for natural
selection acts solely by and for the good of each.
No organ will be formed, as Paley has remarked,
for the purpose of causing pain or for doing an
injury to its possessor. If a fair balance be struck
between the good and evil caused by each part,
each will be found, on the whole, advantageous."
" When we reflect on this struggle [for existence],
we may console ourselves with the full belief, that
the war of Nature is not incessant, that no fear
is felt, that death is generally prompt, and that
the vigorous, the healthy, and the happy, survive
and multiply" {Origin, cc. iii. vi.). Dr. A. R.
Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of the
principle of Natural Selection, says : " On the
whole, we conclude that the popular idea of the
struggle for existence entailing misery and pain in
the animal world is the very reverse of the truth.
What it really brings about is the maximum of
life and of the enjoyment of life, with the minimum
of suffering and pain. Given the necessity of death
and reproduction— and without these there could

218 USEFULNESS OF PAIN
have been no progressive development of the
organic world — and it is difficult even to imagine a
system by which a greater balance of happiness could
have been secured. . . . Violent deaths are painless
and easy. Illness, and what answers to poverty
in animals — continued hunger — are quickly followed
by unanticipated and almost painless extinction. . . .
Thus the poet's picture of ' Nature red in tooth
and claw with ravine ' is a picture the evil of which
is read into it by our imaginations,, the reality being
made up of full and happy lives, usually terminated
by the quickest and least painful of deaths"
{Darwinism, c. ii.). Even Mr. Mill concedes that,
"granting the existence of design, there is a pre
ponderance of evidence that the Creator desired
the pleasure of His creatures. There is a certain
amount of justification for inferring, on grounds
of Natural Theology alone, that benevolence
is one of the attributes of the Creator" {o.c,
p. 191).
It may be added that pain in many, perhaps
in the majority of cases, can be shown to be
directly useful. Thus noxious and deadly things,
such as poison and fire, are clearly rendered painful
by God, in order that they may be avoided. The
pain of disease is intended to force the patient
to rest, and so to afford him a better chance of
recovery. In the case of man, the pain of disease
is also useful in diagnosis. The painful emotion
of fear is clearly intended to prompt the more
defenceless animals to escape with all speed from

THE LAW OF PREY 219
their foes. In all these cases pain is a proof at least
of the relative benevolence of the Deity. Again, the
fierce ravages of destructive animals, about which
Agnostic controversialists say so much, are not such
serious evils as they seem. If animals did not prey
upon one another, they would multiply with such
rapidity, that they would starve one another to
death — a far worse calamity than being eaten.
Being eaten is certainly a less painful death than
starvation, which, we must remember, is the fate of
all animals that live to be old. All authorities
agree that creatures devoured by birds or beasts
of prey have, as a rule, an easy death. The case
of a cat playing with a mouse, which was such
a difficulty to Darwin, is clearly exceptional, and
even in this case, the mouse is probably too
stupefied to feel its situation acutely. Livingstone,
we know, under the claws of a lion felt no pain
whatever. The fangs of serpents, again, and the
stings of scorpions, another well-known difficulty,
are at any rate evidence of benevolent design
towards the animals that possess them. Their
main function is protective, not aggressive, and
rarely do such creatures go out of their way to
attack anything but their natural prey. With
reasonable care, the danger from venomous beasts
may be generally avoided, even in those countries
which they most infest.1
1 Europeans in India are seldom bitten by serpents. On the
other hand, the careless natives, who walk through the jungle
barefoot, perish by thousands every year.

220 SATANIC AGENCY
IV. — The Hypothesis of a Personal Devil
All this and much more may be said in extenua
tion of the physical evil which exists in the world,
but it does not amount to a proof that no evil
exists. Evil — real, undeniable, irreducible evil —
exists in abundance. Speaking for myself, I am
unable to believe that hideous and excruciating
diseases, such as cancer, which affect both men
and animals, and which cannot, in the case of
animals at least, be explained as a means of moral
discipline, are the work of a good and benevolent
God. I endorse absolutely the words of Dr. E. A.
Abbott. " I cannot think," he says, " of disease
and pain, and the conflict in the animal world for
life and death, as being, so to speak, part of God's
first intention. Stoics, and Christians who imitate
Stoics, may call these things ' indifferent.' I cannot.
And even if I could, what of the ferocity, and
cruelty, and exultation in destruction, which are
apparent in the animal world ? ' Death,' say the
Stoics, ' is the mere exit from life.' Is it ? I was
once present at a theatre at Rouen where the hero
took a full quarter of an hour to die of poison,
and the young Normans who sat round me ex
pressed their strenuous disapprobation : ' C'est trop
long,' they murmured. I have made the same
remonstrance in my heart of hearts ever since I
was a boy, and saw a cat play with a mouse, and
a patient stoat hunt down and catch at last a
tired-out rabbit : ' It is too long,' ' It is too cruel.'

THE ZOROASTRIAN DEVIL 221
' Did God ordain this ? ' — I asked : and I answered
unhesitatingly, ' No.' These are but small
phenomena in Nature's chamber of horrors ; but
for me they have always been, and will always
remain, horrible. I believe that God intends us
to regard them with horror, and perhaps to see
in them some faint reflection of the wantonly
destructive and torturing instinct in man" {The
Kernel and the Husk, pp. 87, 88).
What, then, is the cause of this commingling
of evil with good in the texture of the universe ?
There are two possible explanations. One is that
God is the cause of the evil as well as of the
good, and is therefore a morally imperfect being.
But a morally imperfect being would not require
from man a standard of absolute moral perfection
(see ch. iii.). The other explanation is that the
universe is — partially, at least — under the control
of a hostile and evil power, which seeks con
tinually to frustrate the benevolent intentions of
the Creator. Two forms of this theory may be dis
tinguished : (1) the Zoroastrian, which regards the
hostile power as eternal and uncreated ; and (2) the
Theistic, which regards it as created and subordinate.
The Zoroastrian view must be rejected, (1) be
cause it postulates two first principles, which
is a plain metaphysical impossibility (see ch. i.) ; (2)
because conscience testifies that the moral law is
ultimately supreme ; and (3) because the theory
issues ultimately in a pessimism, and is therefore
pbjectionable from the practical point of view.

222 THE DEVIL OF THEISM
The Theistic view is open to mone of these
objections. It supposes that a large share of the
government of the material universe was committed
at the creation to a. personal spirit, of great, but not
unlimited, power and intelligence, who, having been
originally created good, subsequently fell, and
introduced evil and disorder into the world. In
Scripture this powerful being is alluded to as the
"prince of this world" (John xii. 31; xiv. 30;
xvi. 11); "the prince of the power of the air"
(Eph. ii. 2); "the prince of the devils" (Matt. ix.
34); "the evil one " (Matt. vi. 13, R.V.); "Satan"
(Matt. iv. 10) ; " the devil " (Matt. iv. 1) ; " Beelzebub "
(Matt. x. 25); " Apollyon" (Rev. ix. 11); "that old
serpent " (Rev. xii. 9) ; and his inferior ministers
are called " the principalities," " the powers," " the
world-rulers of this darkness," and "the spiritual
hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places " (Eph.
vi. 12). The New Testament represents his power
as so great, that " all the kingdoms of the world
and the glory of them " are his to bestow (Matt. iv.
8). St. John declares that the whole world "lieth
in the evil one " (6 koo-/im>. 6'Xos iv raj trov-qprn Kehat),
and that the Son of God is manifested to destroy
his works (1 John v. 19; iii. 8). Not only moral
evil, but also physical evil of all kinds, such as
death, disease, sorrow, and pain, are attributed
to him (Heb. ii. 14 ; Acts x. 38 ; etc.), and the
apostles are thus enabled without doing violence
to the facts, to attribute perfect goodness and
benevolence to the Author of Nature (Matt. v. 48).

THE PERMISSION OF EVIL 223
This hypothesis of a personal devil has
many advantages. It explains the whole of the
facts ; it avoids the postulation of two first
causes ; it vindicates the moral perfection of the
Deity ; and it allows the optimistic hope to be
entertained that in the end good will triumph
over evil.
It involves, however, one not inconsiderable
difficulty. If God is really omnipotent, how comes
it, it may be asked, that He permits the activity of
the devil to continue ?
Some help towards a solution may be gained
from a consideration of what God permits in the
case of man. God has entrusted the human race
with a power over Nature analogous to that which
Satan exercises over the universe, and He permits
the abuse of that power. When, for instance, a cruel
child pulls off the legs of a fly, or a brutal driver
maltreats a horse, God does not directly interfere.
Why He does not, we cannot tell : we can only
surmise. Perhaps He respects the native dignity
of the free moral beings which He has created,
and for this reason is unwilling to deprive them
of their power, :until they have shown themselves
finally and completely unworthy of it. Perhaps
some important educational purpose is served by
this permission to sin. However this may be, it
is plain that the permission accorded to the devil
to do evil, presents no greater difficulty than the
same permission accorded to man. Both are ex
tremely perplexing, and both admit the same

224 EVOLUTION AND THE FALL
kind of solution. This is most obviously the case,
if it be supposed that the devil, like man, is in
a state of probation, and that repentance is still
open to him until the end of the world. On this
hypothesis, which has much to recommend it, the
case of the devil and the case of man are so closely
analogous that the problem of non-human evil
receives a complete analogical, though not, of course,
a complete philosophical, solution. With our present
faculties, and with our present information, a
complete solution of the question is probably im
possible, but this need not prevent us from
maintaining that by far the most satisfactory
solution of the origin of evil yet advanced, is the
traditional one, that it arose from the abuse of free
will by angels and men.

APPENDIX I
evolution and the fall

There is a general impression that the doctrine of the Fall
has been " hard hit," as Romanes expressed it, " by the
scientific proof of Evolution."1 A little reflection, however,
will show that Evolution is as consistent with the doctrine of
the Fall as it is with the doctrine of Creation. The doctrine
of the Fall itself needs no modification. All that is needed is
to translate it from one terminology into another.
On the assumption that Evolution is true, man must be
regarded as "created" when that "arboreal animal," from
1 Thoughts on Religion, p. 176.

EVOLUTION AND THE FALL 225
which he is supposed to be descended, first became conscious
of right and wrong, and of duty to a Higher Power. It is
not necessary to suppose that man's moral faculty appeared
suddenly, although it may have done so, for Nature operates
sometimes per saltum. More probably, the moral and religious
faculties appeared at first, as the author of Genesis himself
seems to suggest, in a rudimentary and inchoate form. Man's
moral sense was probably active at first only in certain
directions, and with relation to certain definite subject-matter.
Yet man was a responsible being before God from the very
first moment that conscience awoke in him, and forthwith he
owed it to his Maker to do the right so far as he knew it.
Man's condition was not one of perfection, as is sometimes
affirmed, but of innocence, as the Greek theologians rightly
apprehended. " By nature," says St. Clement of Alexandria,
" we are adapted for virtue ; not so as to be possessed of it
from our birth, but so as to be adapted for acquiring it.
And by this consideration is solved the question propounded
to us by the heretics — viz. 'Was Adam created perfect or
imperfect ? If imperfect, how could the work of a perfect God,
and, above all, how could man, be imperfect ? If perfect, how
did man transgress God's commandments ? ' For they shall
hear from us that he was not perfect at his creation, but
adapted to the reception of virtue. For it is of great import
ance in regard to virtue to be made fit for its attainment.
For it is intended that we should be saved by means of
ourselves" {Miscellanies, bk. vi. ch. 11, 12).
A still earlier writer, Theophilus of Antioch, compares un
fallen man to an infant. "Adam," he says, "being yet an
infant in age, was on this account as yet unable to receive
knowledge worthily. For now also, when a child is born, it
is not at once able to eat bread, but is nourished first with
milk, and then with the increment of years it advances to
solid food. Thus, too, would it have been with Adam ; for
not in any grudging spirit, as some suppose, did God com
mand him not to eat of knowledge. But He wished also to
IS

226 EVOLUTION AND THE FALL
make proof of him, whether he was submissive to His
commandment. And at the same time He wished man,
infant as he was, to remain for some time longer simple and
sincere. For this is holy, not only with God, but also with
men, that in simplicity and guilelessness subjection be yielded
to parents. But if it is right that children be subject to
parents, how much more to the God and Father of all things ?
Besides, it is unseemly that children in infancy be wise beyond
their years ; for as in stature one increases in an orderly pro
gress, so also in wisdom. . . . God, then, created and blessed
man, and transferred him to Paradise, giving him means of
progress and development, in order that maturing, and becoming
perfect, and being exalted even to become a god, he might ascend
into Heaven in possession of immortality " {Ad Autolycum,
bk. ii. ch. 1 8-2 7 J.1
It is sometimes stated that man cannot have been created
sinless, because he must have received from his bestial
ancestors an inheritance of selfish, lustful, and irrational
ferocity, which it was beyond the power of his will to control.

' Although unfallen man was rude and naked, and destitute
of the arts of civilization, he must not be compared with any
existing savages. In the first place, he was innocent and sinless ;
and in the second place, he contained within himself the promise
of all future moral and material progress. Savages are Nature's
failures. They are those races which have deteriorated, or
which have failed to progress as they ought.
As to the form of religion of primitive man, it is unwise to
dogmatize. If, however, we may be allowed to speculate, it was
probably a naive, childlike monotheism. For (i) theologically,
it is natural to suppose that, in the absence of sin, the soul would
rightly apprehend the object of worship ; and (2) scientifically,
nearly all peoples, savage and civilized, preserve traces of true
ethical monotheism, however much overlaid and incrusted with
polytheism and superstition. In spite of confident statements
to the contrary, there is no evidence that monotheism is of later
origin that polytheism or animism. On this point see A. Lang,
The Making of Religion, and cf. ch. viii.

EVOLUTION AND THE FALL 227
For such an assumption we can see no justification either from
the point of view of Theology or of Natural Science. For (1)
from the point of view of Theology, it behoved God to give
man a fair start, and endow him with a nature suitable to his
new dignity, and therefore capable of rational control ; and
(2) from the point of view of Natural Science, the faculties
and powers of every creature are, as a rule, perfectly adapted
to its way of life. The passions of animals are no more in
excess of their requirements than the organs of their bodies.
In birds and beasts which are solitary by nature and live by
prey, the passions of ferocity predominate : but in gregarious
animals there is, as a rule, a distinct preponderance of social
and altruistic instincts. In man, descended, as he probably was,
from gregarious and monogamous ancestors, there need not
have been, and ought not to have been, an overplus of selfish
ness and ferocity, but rather of altruism and domesticity.1
It belongs to Science rather than to Theology to decide the
interesting question whether the human race is descended
from a single pair.2 From the theological point of view the
question is indifferent. The principle of Parsimony favours
descent from a single pair, and as there is at present no
scientific evidence either way, this hypothesis is preferable.
If, however, it should ever be proved that mankind is de
scended from a plurality of original pairs, the familiar Adam
and Eve of the Genesis story would be interpreted to mean
the first male and first female ancestors of man, irrespective
of their number. There is nothing new about such an inter
pretation. Indeed, even upon grounds of pure exegesis, it
may be fairly maintained that Adam and Eve in Genesis are
only personifications of the human race. Adam in Hebrew
is not really a proper name, but a collective noun, meaning
the human race.

1 For proof that man is naturally monogamous, see Wester-
marck's History of Human Marriage.
8 For a discussion of this point, see Lotze, Microcosmus,
bk. vii. ch. 4.

228 TRANSMISSION OF SIN
APPENDIX II
weismannism and the transmission of sin
Prof. A. Weismann, in his Essays upon Heredity and in
his Germ-plasm, A Theory of Heredity, maintained that the
transmission of acquired characteristics by heredity is a
biological impossibility. Mr. Tennant, an adherent of this
school, has recently maintained, in his Hulsean Lectures
(1901-2), that since sinful tendencies, upon the hypothesis
of a fall from innocence, are acquired characteristics, they
cannot have been transmitted to posterity by physical heredity,
as the Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin assumes.
This is a true and important observation, but it must be
remembered that there are other theories of the transmission
of Original Sin besides that of St. Augustine. The Augustinian
theory postulates the transmission of a tendency to sin by
means of physical procreation. There is, however, the alterna
tive that it is transmitted by what may be called social heredity.
Social heredity is moral influence, good and evil, transmitted
from generation to generation by such means as parental and
pedagogic training, social intercourse, public opinion, literature,
and good or bad institutions. So far as the formation of moral
character is concerned, social heredity is a far more potent
force than physical heredity. Contrary to what is popularly
supposed, the really important thing for the acquisition of
virtue is not to have virtuous ancestors, but to have virtuous
training. The thousands of waifs and strays which are rescued
every year from the worst surroundings by the various bene
volent societies and orphanages, as a general rule turn out
well. Although most of them are the children of vicious,
vagabond, drunken, and even criminal parents, and have
behind them a long evil ancestry, it is claimed that ninety
per cent, of them become virtuous and useful citizens. There
is, perhaps, a little natural and pardonable exaggeration in
these claims, but the percentage of successes is certainly

TRANSMISSION OF SIN 229
large. The adoption of Weismannism, therefore, does not
necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of Original Sin,
but only the adoption of a new theory of the manner of its
propagation and transmission — a theory, too, which is by no
means unfamiliar to Theology.
Personally, we are inclined to accept Weismannism, on the
authority of the best-informed scientific experts at the present
moment. At the same time, it is only right to confess candidly
that the question is far from settled. The opponents of
Weismannism are numerous and important. Among them
may be mentioned Hertwig, Romanes, Spencer, Cope, Eimer,
Haeckel, E. B. Wilson, and the bulk of American Naturalists,
most of whom are Neo-Lamarckians, and hold strongly the
inheritance of the effects of use and disuse. Weismannism
is also contrary to popular opinion, which, in such a question,
is worth something, though perhaps not very much ; also
to the opinion of the medical profession as a whole (though
probably not to the best-informed opinion) ; and above all
to the opinion of practical breeders. That acquired vices,
such as habitual drunkenness, tend to be inherited, is based
at least upon strong prima facie evidence,1 and in this case
the vice must be acquired, for alcohol is an artificial product.
If Weismannism should in the end be found untenable, the
1 Most medical men regard the transmission by heredity
of acquired evil habits as beyond dispute. "There is no
doubt," say Drs. Fagge and Pye-Smith, "that proclivity to
intemperance is capable of hereditary transmission. The ten
dency is by some writers regarded as itself a neurosis, to which
they give the name suggested by Roesch, ' Oinomania,' more
correctly ' Oenomania ' " {Principles and Practice of Medicine,
1891, vol. i. p. 798). Dr. Mann says : " The habit of drinking to
excess is but too easily acquired by those who have no special
proclivity to it, but there are undoubtedly cases in which it is
directly due to hereditary transmission. In addition to the
immediate effects of alcohol on the mind, a further and de
basing change is produced in the moral character" {Forensic
Medicine, 3rd edit. 1902).

230 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Augustinian doctrine of the propagation of Original Sin would
probably have to be accepted as correct ; but it is a somewhat
gloomy and discouraging doctrine, and Theology would .have
little regret in parting with it. Augustinianism is, however,
when properly explained, quite reconcilable with the Divine
justice and benevolence.

LITERATURE
St. Athanasius, Contra Gentes ; St. Augustine, Anti-Pelagian
Treatises, etc. ; Origen, De Principiis (especially bk. i .ch. 5, 6) ;
J. Mulier, Christian Doctrine of Sin (tr.) ; Momerie, Origin
of Evil; Naville, The Problem of Evil {tt.); Butler, Analogy ;
Le Conte, Evolution, c. ix. ; Fairbairn, Philosophy of the
Christian Religion, bk. i. ch. 3, 4 ; Tennant, Origin and
Propagation of Sin, and The Fall and Original Sin ; Bull,
State of Man before the Fall ; Paley, Natural Theology, c. xxvi. ;
A. Moore, Science and the Faith, and Essays, i., iii., and
Oxford House Papers, vol. ii. ; " Sin " and " Fall " in Hastings'
Bible Dictionary ; Dixie, Necessity of Pain (in Oxford House
Papers) ; E. A. Abbott, The Kernel and the Husk, ch. ix.
(Satan and Evolution) ; S. Laing, A Modern Zoroastrian.

CHAPTER XV
human immortality
Summary. — The immortality of the soul, which is a truth of
natural as well as of revealed religion, is proved from the
following facts, (i) The natural powers of the soul are greatly
in excess of the needs of a short earthly life. (2) The soul
naturally desires perfect happiness and perfect holiness,
which are unattainable on earth. (3) Virtue is often
oppressed and vice triumphant in this world, and there
fore, if there is a just God, there must be a future life in
which all wrongs are righted. (4) The soul is a simple
substance, and therefore incapable of dissolution. (5) It
has also a natural excellence, which makes it worthy of pre
servation at the hands of a good and benevolent Deity.
Certain objections to the soul's immortality, chiefly pan
theistic and materialistic, are considered.
The belief in a future life is based for Christians
mainly on the testimony of their great Founder,
who made this doctrine a cardinal point of His
teaching, and finally proved it in the most practical
of all ways, by dying and rising from the dead.
It is, however, important to remember that belief
in some kind of future life is also a truth of Natural
Religion, and is almost as widely accepted as belief
in a Higher Power. Cicero testifies to this when
he says, "As it is by nature that we believe in
the existence of the gods, and by reason that we
apprehend their nature, so it is by the unanimous
231

232 THE POWERS OF THE SOUL
opinion of all nations that we hold the doctrine that
the souls of men continue permanently to exist "
{Tusculan Disputations, i. 16, 36). We propose in
this chapter to show that the immortality of the
soul is probable on grounds of pure reason, with
out assuming the truth of any revelation.
I. — The Argument from the Natural Powers
of the Soul
By a universal law of Nature every creature is
adapted to its environment. In animals every
organ and every instinct is precisely adapted to
supply some actual need of the organism. Even
vestigial or nascent organs either have been or
will be of some actual use. Nowhere do we find
either organs or faculties in excess of the creature's
actual needs. Thus Nature provides faculties for
catching and assimilating food, for avoiding enemies
and other dangers, and for reproducing the kind,
but not for purposes extending beyond the life-
history of the animal or the needs of the race.
Man, on the other hand, is endowed with faculties
which are ridiculously superfluous, if he is only a
superior animal, destined to live some seventy
years, and then to perish for ever. Nature has
given him an intellect which passes beyond the
immediate pressing needs of life to take in all
space, all time, and all existence. He investigates
the past history of mankind and the geological
history of the earth. He speculates about the
process by which the world came to be what it

THE POWERS OF THE SOUL 233
is, and about its probable destiny. His researches
are not confined to this planet. By means of the
telescope, the spectroscope, and the resources of
mathematical analysis, he solves recondite problems
of astronomy, calculating the orbits of the other
planets, weighing them, determining their specific
gravity, and speculating on their physical condition.
He has even succeeded in calculating the all but
infinite distances of some of the fixed stars, and
by the spectroscope has determined their chemical
composition. Nor is his insatiable curiosity bounded
by the limits of purely physical science. He essays
the solution ofthe ultimate mysteries ofthe universe,
the nature of appearance and reality, of substance
and accident, of mind and matter, of cause and
effect, of time and space, of freedom and necessity,
of possibility and actuality, of good and evil, of
immortality, and of that stupendous Origin of
all things, the Mind of the Omnipotent Himself.
Particularly noticeable is the fact that his mind
takes in not only the actual but the possible, not
only particular things but general notions, not
only concrete facts but ideals. The soul of a beast
is almost entirely "immersed in matter." It pos
sesses some slight powers of memory and anticipa
tion, but, so far as we know, its ideas are entirely
derived from sense-impression, and are never of
an abstract or general kind. On the other hand,
the soul of man transcends the actual universe
altogether. He inquires not only what is, but
what might be, and what ought to be. The true

234 THE POWERS OF THE SOUL
home of his soul is among the ideals, the immen
sities, and the eternities of the universe— perfect
beauty, perfect happiness, perfect knowledge, and
perfect goodness, things which do not exist at all
in the visible world, but belong entirely to the
supernatural order. If Nature intends man simply
to eat, and drink, and die to-morrow, then assuredly
she has provided him with a mental outfit out of
all proportion to his needs. If, on the other hand,
she intends him for a state of existence in which
he will be in closer touch with the ideals and
ultimate realities of things, then (and only then)
the wide range of his intellect is intelligible. As
M. Piat truly says, " Our thought is not enclosed,
like that of the brutes, within a limited portion of
time and space ; its natural reach carries it far
further : in whatever way it employs its powers,
in whatever direction it turns, there is always
something eternal which it has in view. Now
surely there must be something deeply significant
in this excellence of our spirit. In comparison with
eternity, time counts as nothing. However long
we may have lived, our whole existence has been
a failure when we come to die, if we die for good
and all. When we depart from this life, the adapta
tion of our thought to its natural environment has
not commenced; there remains a radical dispro
portion between our ideal and us. It is necessary,
therefore, if the sense of finality is to be satisfied,
that our existence be prolonged indefinitely"
{Destinee de I' Homme, p. 159).

THE DESIRES OF THE SOUL 235
II. — The Argument from the Natural Desires
of the Soul
The desires, like the capacities, of creatures are
adapted to their way of life, and correspond to
actually attainable objects. Thus thirst corre
sponds to real water, hunger to real food, and
love to real beings capable of receiving and return
ing love. Except in plainly exceptional and, as it
were, monstrous cases, Nature never implants
desires which have no prospect whatever of being
gratified. Every desire of every animal can, as a
rule, be fully satisfied through the natural exercise
of the faculties which Nature gives.
It is otherwise with man. He is the one dis
contented creature in the universe. His desires
are out of all proportion to his means of gratifying
them. He desires perfect knowledge ; but his most
advanced science is only a superficial film of
hypothesis floating on an ocean of nescience.
He desires perfect happiness; but those who
have tasted this world's pleasures to the full, pro
nounce them vanity.1 He desires perfect holiness,
1 " I the Preacher was king over Israel in Jerusalem. . . . And
I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and
folly : I perceived that this alsoi is vexation of spirit. For in
much wisdom is much grief : and he that increaseth knowledge
increaseth sorrow. I said in mine heart, Go to now, I will prove
thee with mirth, therefore enjoy pleasure : and, behold, this also
is vanity. I said of laughter, It is mad : and of mirth, What
doeth it ? ... I made me great works. . . . Then I looked on
all the works that my hands had wrought: . . . and, behold,
all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit
under the sun " (Eccles. i. ii.).

236 THE DESIRES OF THE SOUL
but the utmost efforts of the greatest saints only
avail to make them a little less vile in their own
esteem. Not a single one of man's characteristic
natural desires can be fully gratified in his present
state of existence. No possible advance along the
lines of purely natural knowledge and goodness
can give him what his soul craves for.
Now, on the assumption that this universe of
ours is a rational one — and this assumption both
Science and Religion are bound to make — it is
incredible that Nature should ordain that all the
lowest desires of men and animals should be
completely gratified, but that man's highest and
most godlike desires should be for ever empty
and vain. It is necessary, therefore, in the interests
of rational thinking, to suppose that man really
has a future life such as religion claims for him.
It is possible, of course, to reject this hypothesis;
but let not him who does so claim that he does
so in obedience to reason. Reason imperatively
demands a future life, and to disbelieve it is the
suicide of reason, and the triumph of intellectual
anarchy and pessimism. This argument for immor
tality is as old as Plato, and it is as strong now as
when he advanced it. It has probably never been
better stated than by St. Thomas Aquinas. " Every
creature," he says, " naturally desires in accordance
with its nature. Now, desire, in creatures capable
of apprehension, follows apprehension. Sense-
perception apprehends things only under the
limitations of here and now; but intellect appre-

FUTURE RETRIBUTION 237
hends existence absolutely and in relation to all
time. Accordingly, every creature possessed of
intelligence naturally desires to exist for ever.
Now, a desire implanted by Nature cannot be
in vain, and therefore it follows that every intel
lectual substance [i.e. every reasonable soul] is
incorruptible " {Summa, i. 75, 6).
III. — Ethical and Religious Arguments
(1) First Ethical Argument. — Hitherto we have
been arguing for human immortality from purely
scientific considerations. For the rest of this
chapter we assume the theological results already
attained, the chief of which are, for our present
purpose, the substantiality of the soul and the
existence of a just and omnipotent God.
We argue, then, that since God is omnipotent
and just, He will perfectly recompense all mankind
for their good and evil conduct ; and that since He
does not do it in this life, He will certainly do it
in another.
To this argument, however, certain objections
are offered.
Objection I. — It is selfish and immoral to look
for a reward for virtue and a punishment for
vice. Virtue should be sought for its own sake.
Reply. — It is not selfishness, but a desire to
vindicate the Divine Justice, that makes men
desirous that virtue should be perfectly rewarded,
and vice perfectly punished. It is quite true that
it behoves men to seek virtue for its own sake ;

238 FUTURE RETRIBUTION
but, on the other hand, it behoves God, in the
exercise of His perfect justice, to reward virtue
with happiness and vice with misery. That the
desire for retributive justice is not selfish is
shown by the fact that we desire it equally when
we are not directly concerned in the matter.
Thus, if it were proved that in the planet
Mars virtue is frequently oppressed, and vice
triumphant, we should feel the need of a future
life and future, retribution for Martians quite
as much as we feel it for the inhabitants of the
earth. Objection II. — Virtue and vice are sufficiently
recompensed by public opinion.
Reply. — If by public opinion is meant the ad
ministration of justice, this is ridiculously false.
Some of the most heinous sins, such as ingratitude,
selfishness, and pride, are not legal offences at
all. Besides, an immense number of criminals
escape justice altogether, and a not inconsiderable
number of persons are wrongfully convicted and
even put to death for crimes they have never
committed. If by public opinion is meant the
praise and blame of society, these again are often
capriciously and unjustly awarded. Even when
society is really anxious to do impartial justice,
it is unable to do so, because it is unable to read
the heart and discern a man's real motives.
Generally speaking, society has no such just in
tentions. Society has an instinctive dislike for
virtue or capacity above the ordinary standard.

FUTURE RETRIBUTION 239
Its way is to neglect or crucify its benefactors,
and then after a few centuries to discover its
mistake, and build them splendid monuments.
Moreover, the social penalties against vice are
ridiculously inadequate. No penalties are imposed
at all on vices that happen to be fashionable ; and
when a man is expelled from society for some
unfashionable fault, he quickly finds refuge in a
fast or disreputable set, among whom he is more
at his ease than he was in respectable society.
Upon the whole, society enforces neither virtue
nor justice, but its own social code, which is often
very far removed from both.
Objection III. — A good conscience is the sufficient
reward of virtue, and a bad conscience the sufficient
punishment of vice.
Reply. — The conscience of virtuous men is, as
a rule, far more sensitive than that of vicious men,
and gives them far more uneasiness. The good
have so high a standard of goodness, that the
least defect in their character is a serious trouble
to them. Charles Simeon, one of the greatest
saints of the eighteenth century, wrote, after many
years of devoted work for God, that he was so
corrupt in heart that he constantly wondered that
he was so mercifully kept out of hell. It is not
the virtuous, but the vain, the hypocritical, and
the spiritually blind, who find the greatest satis
faction in the approval of their consciences.
Thoroughly vicious men generally feel the re
proaches of conscience but little. At the beginning

240 FUTURE RETRIBUTION
of their downward career, and especially after
their first serious sin, they feel, no doubt, both
shame and remorse ; but gradually, as conscience
is more and more often violated, it ceases to protest,
and at last, when a state of hardened guilt is
reached, conscience is commonly torpid or dead.
Dr. Martineau puts the case well when he says :
" It is not true that the conscience, in its retro
spective action, adequately administers its own
law : were that the only justice, the greatest
criminal would have the completest impunity.
The function which it really performs in our nature
corresponds, not to the judge's sentence on the
past, but to his prospective warnings addressed
to the young offender for whom he would yet
save a ' place of repentance ' ; — warnings grave and
earnest at first, but fainter at each repetition, and
at last relinquished as a mere waste and mockery
of right. So it is with our natural contrition;
it startles us with a fearful vision of what we are
and may become. Treat it as a premonition, and it
comes to us with its full intensity at the moment
of happiest promise for its full effect; but treat
it as a punishment, and where it is most wanted,
it entirely fails" {Study of Religion, ii. 366).
Objection IV. — The ethical argument does not prove
that the future life is everlasting. It would be
possible for God to reward virtue and punish vice
adequately within a finite period.
Reply. — This is true; but it is not claimed that
the argument proves more than the actual existence

IMMORTALITY AND ETHICS 241
of a future life. How long the life lasts is to be
gathered from other arguments.
(2) Second Ethical Argument. — If there is no future
life, it is not reasonable always to do one's duty ;
but if there is a future life, then right conduct is
always reasonable.
All the best authorities, or nearly all, are agreed
that the interests of self do not always coincide
with the interests of others, and that in many
instances the performance of social duties involves
a real sacrifice of self, for which there is not, in
this life at least, any adequate return. To live
for others may be a very noble and glorious thing,
but it cannot, from a merely worldly standpoint,
be shown to be either wise or prudent, except
to a very limited extent. In particular, it can never,
under any circumstances whatsoever, be reasonable
to sacrifice the only life one has for others. To
die for one's country, to man the lifeboat in a
tempest, to visit the sick in time of plague, are
sublime actions, and under some circumstances
are imperative duties ; but if this life ends all, they
are simply irrational folly. No posthumous reward
given by a grateful country to heroes who have shed
their blood for it, can in the least degree reward them
for what they have done. If there is no hereafter,
then the noblest of all human acts lack all justification
in reason. The force of this argument is admitted
even by so cautious a thinker as Prof. Sidgwick.
" It seems then," he says, " that we must conclude
that the inseparable connection between Utilitarian 16

242 IMMORTALITY AND ETHICS
duty and the greatest happiness of the individual
who conforms to it, cannot be satisfactorily de
monstrated. The utmost development of sympathy
would not cause a perfect coincidence between
Utilitarian duty and self-interest. . . . Therefore
it is, one may say, a matter of life and death to
the Practical Reason that this premiss [viz. that it
is always to the interest of the individual to do
his duty] be somehow attained. In proportion as
man has lived in the exercise of the Practical Reason
— as he believed — and feels as an actual force the
desire to do what is right and reasonable as such,
his demand for the removal of conflict from the
intuitions of his reason will be intense and imperious.
Thus we are not surprised to find Socrates — the
type for all ages of the man in whom this desire
is predominant — declaring, with simple conviction,
that 'if the Rulers of the Universe do not prefer
the just man to the unjust, it is better to die than
to live.' . . . We have, then, to regard [belief in a
future life] as an hypothesis logically necessary
to avoid a fundamental contradiction in one chief
department of our thought " {Methods of Ethics,
concluding chapter, slightly adapted).
(3) Third Ethical Argument. — Religion is a real
and vital union between the soul and God, and
since God is the fountain of eternal life, every soul
that is really and vitally united to Him must
be everlasting.
This argument, it will be observed, only avails
to prove the immortality of religious men.

THE SOUL INCORRUPTIBLE 243
IV. — Metaphysical Argument
The metaphysical argument is not so conclusive
as some of the other arguments, but it is not
without a persuasiveness of its own, and is
especially useful in combating the presumption,
arising from Physiological Psychology, that the
soul, being in some sense dependent on the body,
necessarily perishes with it. The metaphysical
argument is very ancient, being used by Socrates
in the Phcedo to refute the materialistic assumption
that the soul is a " harmony " of the body, and there
fore mortal. Briefly stated, it is as follows : —
(1) It follows from the principle already
established that the human soul is a really exist
ing spiritual substance, distinct from the body
(ch. xii.), that the destruction of the body cannot,
of itself, involve the destruction of the soul. If
the soul perishes at all, it must be from some
cause distinct from the physical death of the
body. (2) It follows from the fact that the soul is an
indivisible unit (see ch. xii.) that it cannot be
destroyed even by internal dissolution. Dis
solution is the separation of an aggregate into
its component parts ; and since the soul possesses
no parts, it cannot be dissolved.
(3) There remains the possibility that it may
be destroyed by gradual or sudden annihilation.
This supposition, though possible in the abstract,
cannot be pronounced probable on grounds of

244 SOUL WORTHY OF PRESERVATION
reason. The continuance of creatures in existence
depends upon the will of the Creator. As long
as He wills them to exist, they exist; but as soon
as He ceases thus to will, they are annihilated.
Now, what the will of the Creator is in this respect
may be ascertained from the analogy of Nature.
The law ofthe indestructibility of matter and energy,
as ascertained by modern science, proves unquestion
ably that it is His will to sustain material substance
in existence, if not eternally, at least for an in
definitely long time. Again, inasmuch as the
Deity acts not capriciously, but in accordance
with the highest reason, we must suppose that
material substance possesses an intrinsic excellence
sufficient to justify its continual preservation.
But spiritual substances, or souls, possess an in
trinsic excellence infinitely transcending that of
matter,— so far transcending it, in fact, that a single
soul is of greater worth than the whole material
universe. If, therefore, the intrinsic worth of
matter moves God to allot to it a term of existence
indefinitely long, the intrinsic worth of the human
soul must move Him to allot to it a term of life
practically infinite.1
1 It has often been pointed out that this argument tends to
prove the immortality of all souls, even of plant-souls and
animal-souls. This is true ; but it does not prove their personal
immortality, which is the only kind of immortality which we
are discussing. Only personal souls can enjoy this. Personal
souls are distinct from and transcend the material organism
with which they are placed in a manner in which sub-human
souls do not. The evidence, therefore, for the immortality of
personal souls is much stronger than for that of inferior souls.

MATERIALISTIC OBJECTIONS 245
V. — Objections
Objection I. — Thought is simply a function of the
brain, and therefore perishes with the brain. " Not
only consciousness," says Herr E. Duhring, " but
every stirring of life depends on functions that
go out like a flame when nourishment is cut off.
The destruction of any piece of apparatus involves
the loss of some one or other of the vital opera
tions ; and the consequence is that as far as life
extends, we have before us only an organic
function, not a separate thing {thing-in-itselj), or
an expression of that imaginary entity the soul.
This fundamental proposition carries with it the
denial of the immortality of the soul, since, where
no soul exists, its mortality or immortality cannot
be raised as a question", (quoted in W. James's
Human Immortality, pp. 93, 94).
Reply. — This objection depends on the supposi
tion that the soul is not an independent substance,
but a mere function of matter. A full refutation
of this theory, and a proof that it leads to con
sequences that are palpably absurd, are given in
chapters xii. and xiii.
To discuss the immortality of sub-human souls belongs rather to
Metaphysics than to Theology. It may, however, be remarked
that there are strong metaphysical reasons for thinking that
just as there is a law of physical conservation affecting matter
and energy, so there is a law of psychical conservation affecting
souls of every grade. A conception of this kind gives Evolution
a deeper meaning. {Cf. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx,
bk. iii., and Welldon, Hope of Immortality.)

246 SEMI-MATERIALISTIC OBJECTIONS
Objection II. — Even if the soul is a distinct
substance, it is dependent on the body in the most
absolute manner, and can neither feel nor think
without it. Thus the whole of the ideas of the
soul come to it through the bodily senses. Even
its higher functions, such as memory, imagination,
and reasoning, cannot be performed without the
assistance of a normal and healthy brain. When,
therefore, the brain is destroyed, the soul (even
supposing it to exist) must of necessity become
inactive and unconscious — i.e. be practically annihi
lated. Reply. — Not all the ideas of the soul are derived
through the medium of the bodily senses. For
example, general or abstract notions, and ideals,
cannot be derived from this source ; nor can such
conceptions as possibility, necessity, contingency,
freedom, substance, cause, and effect. Thus the
human soul, in its most characteristic ideas and con
ceptions, transcends matter and sense-impression
altogether. It is, however, true, that all its
feeling and thinking, even the highest, is carried
on through the instrumentality of the brain, and
that when the brain is seriously deranged, thought
is carried on with great difficulty, or not at all.
It does not, however, follow from this, that when
the brain is destroyed, consciousness must per
manently cease. It has been already shown in
this chapter that one chief reason why we believe
that the soul will continue to exist after death,
is that it possesses an intrinsic excellence sufficient

SEMI-MATERIALISTIC OBJECTIONS 247
to justify its preservation at the hands of a good
and benevolent Deity. But if this is so, it will
exist to exercise those powers on which its ex
cellence depends. An unconscious and unthinking
soul would possess none of those qualities that
make it worthy, in God's sight, of preservation.
It is evident, therefore, on grounds of reason,
that God will either give the soul the power of
feeling and thinking without the aid of a body
(a supposition which, if we regard death as a
metamorphosis from a lower to a higher state
of existence, is perfectly legitimate), or else will
assign to it a body endowed with new and higher
powers. The latter supposition is that which
Christianity adopts. The grounds for it are given
in chap. xx.
Objection III. — The powers of the soul decay
with the decay of the body ; therefore it is probable
that when the body perishes, the powers of the
soul will be entirely destroyed.
Reply. — The best workman cannot do good
work with a worn-out tool. Similarly, the soul
cannot do good work with a worn-out brain.
If the brain is, as physiological psychology
teaches, the organ of mind, it is clear that its
decay is sufficient to account for the impaired
memory, etc., of old age, without assuming any
decay of the soul itself, or of its inherent
powers. Objection IV. — The metaphysical argument does
not prove the immortality of the wicked ; for their

248 IMMORTALITY OF THE WICKED
souls possess no excellence that can move the
Creator to will their continuance.1
Reply. — The souls of the wicked are, as to their
essence, not evil, but good. They possess by nature
the same fundamental excellences as the souls of
the righteous ; they differ from them, however,
" accidentally," as theologians say, by the existence
within them of moral evil. If, now, it can be
shown that the moral evil of such souls can and
will be separated from them, their immortality is
proved. Moral evil may be separated from sinful souls
in two conceivable ways — either by their voluntary
repentance, or by the act of God annihilating their
free-will and compelling them to act rightly for
the future. In the case of the finally impenitent,
the first alternative is excluded; there remains
therefore the second, which is, that when the souls of
the wicked have been adequately punished for their
sins, and found incorrigible, God will forcibly
deprive them of the Divine image, destroy their
free-will, and degrade them to the rank of necessary
agents. Such souls, deprived of free-will, but not
of intelligence, would still possess a natural ex
cellence sufficient to justify their eternal preserva
tion. It is a truth of revealed, and probably of
natural religion, that the material universe will be
preserved to share in the glory that shall be revealed
1 Some theologians admit this objection to be valid, and main
tain that the immortality of the wicked cannot be proved by
reason alone.

PANTHEISTIC OBJECTIONS 249
{cf. Rom. viii. 18 ff). If so, it is highly probable that
rational souls, even though lacking the crowning
perfection of freedom, will also be preserved for
ever, and given some useful work to perform in the
economy of the universe. Such a view is preferable
to the usual one which makes moral evil absolutely
eternal. It is difficult to believe that a holy and
omnipotent God will allow finite beings to defy His
will for ever. (See further chap, xxiii., appendix 2.)
Objection V. — The soul is immortal in its essence ;
but when it passes from the body, it is merged in
the Universal Mind, and loses all personal identity.
This view is characteristic of Pantheism.
Reply. — Although this theory of immortality has
already been virtually refuted by the previous
disproof of Pantheism, it is advisable to say a
few words about it here.
(1) It has already been demonstrated that each
individual soul is a really existing substance,
distinct from other souls, and from the universe,
and from the Author of the universe. It has also
been shown that souls do not admit of fusion
with other souls. The supposed absorption, there
fore, of the human soul by the Infinite Mind is
a metaphysical impossibility.
(2) The most complete conceivable union of the
individual soul with other souls and with God need
not imply loss of personality. It is not of the
essence of personality to be limited to itself. Ethical
personality perfects itself by going beyond itself, and
making itself one with the universe, and with other

250 PANTHEISTIC OBJECTIONS
souls, and with God, by means of knowledge,
sympathy, and love. In the Godhead, where
personality exists in its most perfect form, the
three mystical Persons completely interpenetrate
and mutually contain one another.1 Hence the
most complete union between the finite soul and
God — even that " deification " of the soul which
results from the enjoyment of the beatific vision —
will not result in the destruction, but in the
enhancement of personality.
(3) Personal immortality is the only immortality
that can satisfy the craving of the human heart
or vindicate the justice of God. If all men, good
and bad, receive from the Infinite the same reward —
namely, absorption, which is only another name
for annihilation — then Infinite Injustice is seated on
the throne of the universe, and, as Socrates long
ago said, " it is better to die than to live." Schleier
macher, an advocate of this doctrine of Pantheistic
Absorption, once tried to comfort with it a young
widow who had just lost a dearly loved husband.
This is what she replied : " Schleier, shall I not
find him again ? O my God ! I implore you,
Schleier, by all that is dear to God and sacred,
give me, if you can, the certain assurance of finding
and knowing him again. Tell me your inmost faith
on this, dear Schleier. Oh ! if it fails, I am undone.
It is for this that I live, for this that I submissively
and quietly endure ; this is the one only outlook that
1 This interpenetration is called by the Greeks _.pix<ty.,m>
and by the Latins circumin.. essio, or circumincessio.

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH 251
sheds a light on my dark life — to find him again,
to live for him again, to bless him again. O God,
it cannot be destroyed. Speak to my poor heart ;
tell me what you believe. . . . Do you know
when it is that I feel the grasp of the sorrow too
bitterly ? It is when I think, ' In that future the
old things will go for nothing ' ; and when I think,
' His soul is resolved back — quite melted away in
the great All. The old is quite gone by ; it will
never come to recognition again.' Oh, Schleier!
this I cannot bear ; oh ! speak to me, dear " (quoted
in Martineau's Study of Religion, vol. ii. p. 337 ff).
VI. — The Evidence of Psychical Research
The recently founded (1882) Psychical Research
Society numbers among its objects the scientific
proof (or disproof) of a future life. Some of its
members, trained in scientific methods, and inclined
rather to scepticism than to credulity, assert that
there are certain imperfectly investigated facts,
which afford at least prima facie evidence that the
soul survives death. The subject is important, and,
in a book entirely devoted to the problem of human
immortality, would require to be dealt with at
length. Here it must suffice to refer the reader
to the great posthumous work of Mr. F. W. H.
Myers, Human Personality, and its Survival of
Bodily Death, and to the smaller book recently
translated from the French, M. Gabriel Delanne's
Evidence for a Future Life (LAme est Immortelle).

2S2 HUMAN IMMORTALITY

LITERATURE
Plato, Phcedo ; Salmond, Christian Doctrine of Immor
tality ; Alger, Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future
Life ; Welldon, Hope of Immortality ; Caillard, Individual
Immortality ; F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality and its
Survival of Bodily Death, also his earlier book, Science and a
Future Life ; W. James, Human Immortality ; Martineau,
Study of Religion, bk. iv ; Mill, Three Essays, p. 197 ff. ; Maher,
Psychology, c. xxiv. ; Piat, Destinie de V Homme ; Fiske, Man's
Destiny.

CHAPTER XVI
miracles and answers to prayer
Summary. — Miracles are possible {a) because the process of
evolution cannot be accounted for without assuming the
continuous action upon the world of a guiding supernatural
cause ; (_¦) because the origin of life, consciousness, and
reason must have been miraculous ; {c) because the mere
fact that there exists a personal God distinct from, and in
finitely transcending Nature, proves the possibility of the in
trusion of supernatural phenomena into the existing universe.
Certain objections to miracles from the deistic, pantheistic,
and sceptical standpoints are considered, and some account
is given of the rationale of prayer.
I. — Modern Science and Miracles
It is commonly supposed, not only by Agnostics,
but even by well-informed Christians, that the
discoveries of modern science, and in particular
the fact of Evolution, have in some way rendered
miracles more difficult to believe. Thus, in a recent
book which professes to be a philosophical defence
of the Christian Faith {Contentio Veritatis, 1902),
it is said : " To admit in practice the possibility of
such an event [as a miracle] is to destroy the
canons upon which not only our ordinary reasoning
about matters of science, but in particular our
253

254 THE ORIGINAL NEBULA
ordinary canons of historical criticism, are based "
(p. 53). And again: "The miraculous element in
the Gospels is a very serious crux " (p. 87). x We
maintain, on the other hand, that the order of
Nature, as revealed by modern science, is steeped
in the supernatural, and that it is necessary to
assume, in the present state of our scientific
knowledge, that miracles have actually taken
place. (1) It has already been pointed out that the
evolutionary process has been mainly in an upward
direction. In the nebula was no life, nor sensation,
nor intelligence, but only heated matter. Yet out
of the absolutely lifeless nebula arose in process
of time first vegetative organisms, then sensitive
organisms, and finally intelligent organisms. Now,
since reason refuses to entertain the supposition
that effects can transcend their true efficient causes,
it is clear that this process of evolution, in which
effects have continuously transcended their ante
cedent conditions, cannot be regarded as one of
purely natural causation. Evolution being a pro
cess of development from inferior to superior orders
of being, it is plain that what goes before in evolu
tion is only partially the cause of what comes after.
The nebula is not the whole, but only a part of
the cause of the present order of Nature. It
accounts for the formation of the heavenly bodies
and for their movements ; it also accounts for the
1 After mature consideration of this book, we feel bound
to say of it : Non tali auxilio, nee defensoribus istis.

LAPLACE'S PERFECT CALCULATOR 255
dynamic phenomena investigated by physical
science ; but it does not in the least degree account
for the origin of life, or for organic evolution, or
for the facts of psychology, or of any of the higher
or philosophical sciences. The supposition of
Laplace, that a perfect mathematician, who had had
an opportunity of examining the original nebula,
would have been able to calculate unerringly the
whole of the subsequent history of the world, is,
on the face of it, ridiculously false. Not only
would such a calculator have been unable to predict
the appearance of life, consciousness, and reason,
but inasmuch as mind influences the motion of
matter in various ways, he would have been unable
to calculate correctly even physical events. He
could not, for instance, have predicted the
appearance on the earth of tools, or houses, or
machinery, which, though physical events, are
dependent upon mind for their production. Evolu
tion, then, can only be accounted for by supposing
the continuous action upon the world of a super
natural cause, leading created things towards a
perfection which they are' not naturally capable
of attaining, and guiding and directing the blind
forces of Nature towards a predetermined; and
rational end.
Materialists seek to avoid this conclusion by
saying that although life and consciousness and
reason were not actually in the nebula, they were
there potentially. This, however, is only an obscure
and mystifying way of saying that though they

256 ARISTOTLE ON CAUSATION
were not there at first, they came to be there after
wards. The mysterious word " potentially," as
used by materialists, is a kind of philosophical red
herring drawn across the track of the argument
to prevent the unwary from perceiving the un
deniable fact that life and consciousness were not
there. But if they were not there originally, but
came to be there afterwards, there must have
been some cause why they came to be there. And
since things which do not yet exist cannot cause
their own existence, and since purely blind and
physical forces cannot of themselves give rise to
the infinitely higher phenomena of consciousness
and reason, it follows that a Supernatural Cause
co-operated with the physical forces of Nature in
producing them.1
The wise words of Aristotle on this subject
are worth remembering : " Those philosophers
who, like the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, adopt
the supposition that what is best and fairest in
the universe is not to be found in the principle
of things [because plants and animals are deve
loped from potential germs], do not form their
opinions correctly. For seed arises from other
natures that are antecedent and perfect, and the
perfect organism comes first, not the seed"
{Metaphysics, xi. 7).
1 It requires an intelligent cause to make the potential actual.
This Manual of Apologetics is potential in the compositor's box
of type, but it requires the intelligence of the writer and of the
compositor to make it actual.

THE SEVEN WORLD-ENIGMAS 257
(2) The chain of causation in the evolutionary
process is not continuous, but broken at various
points, so that there arise from time to time certain
" new beginnings," which cannot be accounted for
as effects of what went before, and which therefore
must be assumed to have had a miraculous origin.
Prof. Emil du Bois-Reymond's famous Ignorabimus
speech, delivered in 1880, is the locus classicus on
this point. The Berlin professor enumerated no
fewer than seven " world-enigmas " impossible or
extremely difficult of solution. They were :
(i.) The nature of matter and force ;
(ii.) The origin of motion ;
(iii.) The origin of life ;
(iv.) The apparently pre-ordained orderly arrange
ment of Nature ;
(v.) The origin of simple sensation and con
sciousness ;
(vi.) The origin of rational thought, and of the
cognate faculty of speech ;
(vii.) The freedom of the will.
Of these he regarded the first, the second, and
the fifth to be for ever insoluble. The third, the
fourth, and the sixth he regarded as possibly
capable of solution, though extremely difficult. As
to the last, he expressed himself undecided. On
all these points he declared that the deliberate
verdict of science was : Ignoramus, ignorabimus.
No advance has been made by science towards
solving these enigmas since 1880. Indeed, one of
them, the origin of life, which some of the more
17

258 ORIGIN OF LIFE
hopeful spirits in 1880 regarded as soluble, is now
involved in greater obscurity than ever. Dr. E. B.
Wilson, the eminent American biologist, in a
recent technical work on cell-development, writes
as follows : " The study of the cell has, on the
whole, seemed to widen rather than to narrow
the enormous gap that separates even the lowest
forms of life from the inorganic world. ... I am
well aware that to many such a conclusion may
appear reactionary or even to involve a renuncia
tion of what has been regarded as the ultimate
aim of biology. In reply to such a criticism, I can
only express my conviction that the magnitude
ofthe problem of development, whether ontogenetic 1
or phylogenetic,2 has been underestimated ; and that
the progress of science is retarded rather than
advanced by a premature attack upon its ultimate
problems ' {The Cell in Development and In
heritance, 1900, p. 434).'
It is necessary, then, to admit that in the present
state of our scientific knowledge it is impossible
1 Ontogenetic = of individual organisms.
8 Phylogenetic = of species.
3 The speculation of Lord Kelvin and von Helmholtz that
life was introduced into this planet by a meteorite which
contained in some crevice a living organism, is almost uni
versally regarded as impossible. Prof. K. Pearson says :
" Our experience of meteorites— especially the intense cold they
are subjected to in space, and the intense heat they undergo in
passing through our atmosphere, together with the probability
that they are fragments of azoic, rather than of zoic bodies —
does not allow of much significance being attributed to this
pleasant conceit " {Grammar of Science, pp. 347-8).

LORD KELVIN ON CREATIVE POWER 259
to explain the existing facts of the world, without
having recourse to the hypothesis of miracles.
It may be, and is, unwise to build too much on
the existing gaps in our knowledge, but it is
equally unwise to ignore them ; and since some
of them, according to the best authorities, never
can be filled, it would be wrong not to draw such
provisional conclusions as the facts suggest.
Setting aside, then, the two questions of creation
and of the appearances of design in Nature, science
in its present condition is obliged to postulate
unadulterated miracles to account for (i.) the origin
of motion, (ii.) the origin of life, (iii.) the origin of
consciousness, (iv.) the origin of reason, and (v.)
the origin of moral freedom. Even if it be assumed,
against the weight of authority, that motion is
eternal, that life is mechanical motion, and that
moral freedom is an illusion, there still remain (i.)
consciousness and (ii.) reason to be accounted for.
And since few persons are now sanguine enough
to suppose that a natural origin will ever be found
for these, science will probably always have to
assume that two miraculous events at least have
really occurred. We are not surprised, therefore,
to find one of the most eminent of contemporary
scientific men declaring, " I cannot say that with
regard to the origin of life Science neither affirms
nor denies creative power. Science positively
affirms creating and directive power, which she
compels us to accept as an article of belief" (Lord
Kelvin, in the Nineteenth Century, June, 1903).

260 PHILOSOPHY AND MIRACLES
II. — Philosophy and Miracles
After a proof from natural science that miracles
have actually taken place, it seems superfluous to
prove that they are possible. Since, however, their
possibility has been denied on philosophical grounds,
a brief consideration of the question is desirable.
The whole problem of the possibility of miracles
turns upon the view that is taken of the nature of
God, and of His relation to the universe. If He
is a Being distinct from the universe and morally
free, as Theists maintain that He is, the possibility
of miracles cannot for a moment be denied. If, on
the other hand, He is identical with Nature, as the
Pantheists affirm, or if, having created the world,
He left it to work out its own destiny under the
operation of general laws, as the eighteenth-century
Deists imagined, then miracles are impossible.
Much has already been said in disproof of Pan
theism and Deism, but it is still desirable to consider
them in a little more detail in connection with the
problem of miracles.
(i) Deism. — From the Deistic point of view, M.
Renan states the argument against miracles in the
following form. " Miracles," he says, " are special
interpositions like those of a watchmaker, who,
although he has made a very fine watch, yet is com
pelled to regulate it from time to time in order to
compensate for the insufficiency of the mechanism."
We reply —
{a) That the relation of God to the world is not

DEISM AND MIRACLES 261
in the least like that of a watchmaker to a watch.
God is immanent in the world, sustaining it in
existence every moment by His almighty will, and
concurring in all its operations. He is, as Scripture
says, the Life of the world, upholding all things
by the Word of His Power. The religious proof
of this is the fact that the human soul holds actual
dynamic communion with God through Nature and
through conscience (see ch. vii.). Science also demands
an immanent First Cause. Prof. Le Conte says
{Evolution, p. 300) : " [Science demands] the frank
return to the old idea of direct divine agency, but
in a new, more rational, less anthropomorphic form, —
the belief in a God not far away beyond our reach,
but a God immanent, a God resident in Nature, at
all times and in all places directing every event,
and determining every phenomenon — a God in
whom in the most literal sense not only we, but
all things have their being, in whom all things
consist, through whom all things exist, and without
whom there would be and could be nothing."
{b) The doctrine of Evolution, unknown to the
earlier Deists, shows that it is God's will that the
universe should not be perfect at the first, but
should gradually advance towards perfection. But
the process of Evolution implies, as has been already
proved, a continuous divine action upon the world
of a supernatural and miraculous character.
(c) There has been an interruption of the divine
plans brought about by human and superhuman sin.
Disorder has been introduced into the universe,

262 SPINOZA ON MIRACLES
and thus it has become necessary for God to
work redemptive miracles to restore the violated
order of Nature.
(2) Pantheism. — The system of Pantheism has
closer affinities with modern thought than Deism,
and some of the strongest objections to miracles
are based upon it. The classical statement of the
Pantheistic argument against miracles is the sixth
chapter of Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise,
published in 1670. He there argues —
(a) That Nature is a full manifestation of the
divine knowledge and will ; that God wills all that
He knows and all that He is capable of willing;
and that consequently Nature exhausts all that
there is in God, and actually is God. "The laws
of Nature," he says, " embrace everything conceived
by the divine intellect. . . . The power and efficiency
of Nature are in themselves the divine power and
efficiency." (_>) From this he concludes : " Any event happen
ing in Nature which contravened Nature's universal
laws would necessarily also contravene the divine
decree, nature, and understanding; or if any one
asserted that God acts in contravention of the laws
of Nature, he ipso facto would be compelled to
assert that God acted against His own nature — a
manifest absurdity."
The reply is that God is not identical with Nature,
and does not will all that He knows, and all that
He is capable of willing. We have shown that His
immeasurable Being transcends the world to an

HUME ON MIRACLES 263
infinite extent; and that His will is adequate to
the production and government not only of this
present world, but of all conceivable or possible
worlds. There is therefore an infinite reserve of
power in God, which makes miracles for ever
possible. This reserve has actually been drawn
upon, from time to time, for the production of
new creatures, which, as we have shown, could
never have come into existence through the opera
tion of the already existing forces of Nature. (See
above, sect, i., and cf. ch. ii.)
(3) Scepticism. — The sceptical argument of Hume,
which is regarded by many modern Agnostics as a
decisive disproof of the possibility of miracles, is
stated by its author, with his usual lucidity of style,
in the tenth section of his Enquiry concerning Human
Understanding. " A miracle," he says, " is a violation
of the laws of Nature ; and as a firm and unalterable
experience has established these laws, the proof
against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact,
is as entire as any argument from experience can
possibly be imagined."
Hume himself regarded his argument as invulner
able. "I flatter myself," he says, "that I have
discovered an argument which, if just, will, with
the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to
all kinds of superstitious delusion, and, consequently,
will be useful as long as the world endures."
His argument is, however, vulnerable at several
points. (i.) Miracles are not correctly described as

264 HUME ON MIRACLES
" violations of the laws of Nature." They are not
even suspensions of those laws. Their method
of operation is analogous to that of human volition.
When the human will acts upon the external world,
and produces a sensible effect, it does not thereby
violate any law of Nature. When, for instance,
a man raises a stone weighing a hundredweight,
and holds it in his hands, he does not in so doing
violate or suspend the law of gravitation. That
law continues in full force, as is proved by the
continuance of the sensation of weight ; but the
effect of the law is counteracted by the operation
of the greater force of the human muscles, directed
by the human will. Similarly, when God works
a miracle, it is not supposed by theologians that
any of the laws of Nature are suspended, but that
God counteracts or modifies some of the effects
which those laws would ordinarily produce, by
a process analogous to that by which the human
will acts upon and influences physical Nature.
This is admitted by John Mill, who says, "The
interference of human will with the course of
Nature is not an exception to law ; and by the
same rule interference by the divine will would not
be an exception either" {Three Essays, p. 227).
(ii.) Hume says that a firm and unalterable
experience has established the strict invariability
of the laws of Nature.
To this we reply :
(a) That the strict invariability of the laws of
nature is a truth not ot experience, but of faith.

HUME ON MIRACLES 265
It not only has not yet been proved by experience,
but never can be proved. (See ch. x.)
(_¦) Science has shown that certain miracles,
such as the origin of life, of consciousness, and
of reason, have actually taken place. (See sect. i.
of this chapter.)
(c) No one even so much as pretends that the
most important of all the phenomena of Nature —
namely, those of human conduct — have up to the
present time been proved to be uniform. When
biographies of great men and histories of nations
are correctly written in advance, it will be time
to discuss the question whether the strict uni
formity of Nature has been proved by any " firm
and unalterable experience." At the present
moment even the weather cannot be confidently
predicted twenty-four hours beforehand.
{d) There is much evidence, some of it extremely
circumstantial and strong, that phenomena not
readily to be explained by natural causes have
actually occurred and still occur. Hume himself
mentions the then recent miracles wrought in
France at the tomb of Abbe Paris, the famous
Jansenist, which were so undeniable that even the
Jesuits, who were bitterly hostile to Jansenist
opinions, and had the support of the civil
magistrate, were unable to challenge their truth.
"Many of the miracles," says Hume, "were im
mediately proved upon the spot, before judges of
unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of
credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the

266 HUME ON MIRACLES
most eminent theatre that is now in the world.
The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf,
and sight to the blind, were everywhere talked of
as the usual effects of this holy sepulchre." He
also alludes to a marvellous Spanish miracle
attested by such irreproachable evidence, that even
the sceptical Cardinal de Retz was unable to detect
a flaw in it ; and to two miracles of the Emperor
Vespasian at Alexandria, attested by no less an
authority than the sceptical and philosophic
historian Tacitus. Indeed, Hume himself admits —
" So long as the world endures, I presume, will
the accounts of sacred miracles and prodigies be
found in all history, sacred and profane."
But if there is all this profusion of strong
evidence in favour of miracles, what becomes of the
assertion that " a firm and . unalterable experience "
has established the unvarying uniformity of Nature,
and that " the proof against a miracle is as entire
as any argument from experience can possibly be
imagined"? Even Mill admits that at this point
Hume has blundered. "[Hume's] argument," he
says, " has the appearance of assuming that the testi
mony of experience against miracles is undeviating
and indubitable, as it would be, if the whole question
was about the probability of future miracles, none
having taken place in the past ; whereas the very
thing asserted on the other side is that there have
been miracles, and that the testimony of experience
is not wholly on the negative side. All the
evidence alleged in favour of any miracle ought

HUME ON MIRACLES 267
to be reckoned as counter-evidence in refutation
of the ground on which it is asserted that miracles
ought to be disbelieved. The question can only
be stated fairly as depending on a balance of
evidence : a certain amount of positive evidence
in favour of miracles, and a negative presumption
from the general course of human experience
against them."
Mill also correctly observes that all the evidence
against miracles is negative evidence, and that such
evidence is much weaker than positive. It is
proverbially difficult to prove a negative, and to
prove such sweeping negatives as those of Hume,
is, in the actual state of the evidence, impossible.
Hume is quite right in drawing attention to the
fact that many miracles are false and fraudulent ;
but when he proceeds to argue from this that all
are false or fraudulent, he is manifestly guilty
of special pleading.1 Different miracles differ
greatly in the character of their attestation. Some
are evidently false ; others weakly attested ; others
are attested by evidence so cogent, that, unless one
has made up one's mind beforehand that miracles
never happen, it is extremely hard to disbelieve
them. Hume has another argument against the credibility
of miracles, which he admits is somewhat subtle.
1 To argue that because some miracles are false, all are so,
is as unreasonable as to argue that because Herodotus makes
many false statements in his History, nothing in it is to be
believed.

268 HUME ON MIRACLES
He says that the alleged miracles of different
forms of faith mutually cancel one another. Thus
Mahometan and Pagan miracles cancel Christian
miracles ; Roman Catholic miracles cancel Jansenist
and Protestant miracles, etc.
But inasmuch as all the chief religions contain
much that is good, it is perfectly credible that God
allows supernatural powers to be exercised by
men of very different religious persuasions. As
to miracles alleged to be wrought in aid of false
hood and wickedness, these, if genuine, must be
regarded as diabolical miracles.1
Upon the whole, then, seeing that in all ages and
countries miracles are alleged to happen, and that
there exists in this country an Incorporated Royal
Society for the scientific investigation of alleged
supernatural phenomena, it cannot be said, upon
the evidence, that there is any effective presumption
against the occasional occurrence of miracles.
{d) But the chief defect of Hume's argument is
its neglect to take into account the question of
1 The possibility of diabolical miracles must always be a
serious one to those who believe in superhuman intelligences.
There is a tendency in these days to regard belief in angels
and devils as intrinsically absurd. In reality it is a thoroughly
philosophical belief. "At present," says Sir Oliver Lodge, "in
the cosmic scheme we strangely draw the line at man. We
know of every grade of life from the amoeba upwards — but the
series terminates with man. From man the scale of existence
is supposed to step to God. Is it not somewhat sudden ? The
step in the other direction from man to the amoeba is as nothing
to it. Why this sudden jump from the altitude of man into
infinity? Are there no intermediate states of existence?"
{Hibbert Journal, Jan., 1903),

HUME ON MIRACLES 269
the existence of a personal God. If there is no
God, then, of course, miracles are impossible; but
if there is a God, then no philosophy can prove
them impossible. As Mill well says, " [Hume's
argument] is far from being equally [conclusive]
when the existence of a Being who created the
present order of Nature, and therefore may well
be thought to have the power to modify it, is
accepted as a fact, or even as a probability
resting on independent evidence. Once admit a
God, and the production by His direct volition of
an effect which, in any case, owed its origin to His
creative will, is no longer an arbitrary hypothesis
to account for the fact, but must be reckoned with
as a serious possibility."
The objection advanced by Mill seems to have
occurred to Hume himself, for towards the end
of his famous chapter he remarks that the fact
that a miracle is alleged to have the Almighty
for its Author, does not make it a whit more
probable, because, says he, " it is impossible for
us to know the attributes or actions of such a
Being, otherwise than from the experience which
we have of His productions in the usual course
of Nature." To this we reply that it is not
through external nature, but through conscience,
that the most valuable part of our knowledge of
God's attributes comes to us, and that therefore
we have independent knowledge as to how, under
exceptional moral and spiritual circumstances,
He may be expected to behave. The evidence

270 ANSWERS TO PRAYER
for miracles is, in fact, as much spiritual as
historical. III. — Answers to Prayer
On the principle that the greater includes the
less, the proof of the possibility of miracles proper
is also a proof of the possibility of answers to
prayer. A few words may be added on the theory
of the subject. Assuming prayers to be really
answered — and all religions make this assumption —
two theories of the method are possible. One is
that God, knowing from eternity what prayers
would be offered, and which of them He would
answer, so fixed the order of Nature at the creation,
that answers to prayers are given by the opera
tion of the natural laws. The other theory is that
God answers prayer at the time that it is made
by a direct supernatural influence upon the forces
of Nature, or upon human souls, analogous to the
influence which the human will exerts upon Nature
and upon other souls. The second theory seems
more worthy of God, and more in accordance with
that direct personal dealing between God and the
individual soul which constitutes vital religion.
Some persons have supposed that God does not
or cannot answer prayers for temporal benefits,
and that therefore it is illegitimate to pray for
rain, or fair weather, or bountiful harvests. This
supposition cannot be justified either from the
philosophical or from the scientific point of view.
Physical nature is not a cast-iron system, incapable

PRAYER FOR RAIN 271
of modification by the action of intelligent will.
Even the human will can act upon Nature, with
out any breach of natural laws, and therefore
a fortiori the divine will can do so. " Prayer for
rain," says Sir Oliver Lodge, "need involve no
greater interference with the order of Nature than
is implied in a request to a gardener to water the
garden" {Hibbert Journal, Oct., 1902).1

APPENDIX I
miracles and the freedom of the will
There is a very close connection between the philosophical
doctrine that the human will is free and the theological
doctrine that miracles are possible. If liberty is a fact, the
human will is not subject to those laws of mechanical

1 There is a strong philosophical reaction at present against
the crude mechanical view of the universe which renders prayer
useless and miracles impossible. M. Fonsegrive says {Essai
sur le Libre Arbitre, p. 360), " Since the publication of the
first edition of this essay in 1887, the movement in favour of
the theory of the contingency of events, begun or revived by
MM. Renouvier and Boutroux, has become accentuated. Deter
ministic Necessitarianism has lost some of its influence over
men's minds, as they have gradually come to see how extremely
narrow are the limits of positive science." MM. Ch. Renouvier
and L. Prat, in their La Nouvelle Monadologie, speak still more
decidedly. (See particularly p. 133 ff.) In America there action
has gone so far that Mr. C. S. Pierce advocates the existence
of chance in the universe, and calls himself a Tychist. (See
the Monist, April, 1892.) Even Prof. Wm. James regards the
theory of chance as preferable to that of mechanical determinism
{The Will to Believe, p. 145 ff.). The metaphysics of the
subject are well discussed in De la Contingence des Lois de la
Nature, by M. Boutroux.

272 MIRACLES AND FREE-WILL
uniformity which prevail in the material world, but belongs
to a higher order of being altogether. Its action, therefore,
upon physical nature, regarded from the standpoint of physical
science, is the intrusion of a higher and incalculable power —
in other words, a miracle. This explains the extreme reluc
tance of opponents of religion to admit the fact of free-will.
If they admit it, they admit a perpetual miracle, and, there
fore, cannot easily deny the possibility of other miracles.
APPENDIX II
miracles and the rationality of the universe
It is sometimes said that belief in miracles introduces
intellectual chaos into philosophy, and renders natural science
and the science of history impossible.
We reply :
(i) That miracles are too rare to render the order of nature
doubtful, and therefore do not interfere with natural science.
(2) That the incalculable action of the human will does not
render the science of history impossible, and therefore the
incalculable action of miracle does not either.
(3) That though miracles cannot be predicted, they can
be seen to have a rational purpose. The Resurrection of
Jesus, for example, was intended to reveal the fact of a
future life. Now belief in a future life is, as we have shown,
necessary to a thoroughly rational view of the universe. It
follows, therefore, that the miracle of the Resurrection, which
establishes that belief, establishes also the rationality of the
universe.

LITERATURE
{a) Pro-miraculous
Mozley, On Miracles ; Paley, Evidences ; Illingworth, Divine
Immanence; Butler, Analogy, pt. ii. ; Temple, Bampton
Lectures ; Newman, Two Essays on Miracles ; Christlieb,
Modern Doubt (lect. v.) ; A. T. Lyttelton, Place of Miracles

MIRACLES AND ANSWERS TO PRAYER 273
in Religion; Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law; Pascal, Pensees;
Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 412 ff.; G. P. Fisher, Grounds,
p. 421 ff.; Aquinas, Summa, i. no; S. Cox, Miracles;
Sabatier, Philosophy of Religion, bk. i. ch. 3.
{b) Anti-miraculous
Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-politicus , ch. vi. ; Hume,
Human Understanding, x. ; J. S. Mill, Three Essays, p. 212 ff. ;
Supernatural Religion, ch. i.-vi. ; S. Laing, Modern Science
and Modern Thought, pt. ii. ch. 8 ; E. A. Abbott, Philomythus.
{c) The Efficacy of Prayer
Jellett, Efficacy of Prayer ; Romanes, Christian Prayer and
General Laws ; Gore, Prayer and the Reign of Law {Oxford
House Papers, vol. ii.) ; Life of George Mulier (of Bristol) ;
S. I. Prince, The Power of Prayer; W. W. Patton, Prayer and
Remarkable Answers.

)_

CHAPTER XVII
THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION
Summary. — The imperfections of Natural Religion render a
Supernatural Revelation antecedently credible. A Super
natural Revelation requires confirmation by miracles.
Christianity possesses the characteristics of a perfect
religion, and therefore the evidences of its truth are
worthy of serious examination.
1 — The Credibility of a Supernatural Revelation
" It is natural," says Mr. Illingworth, " that in
proportion to our belief in a Personal God, we
should expect that He would reveal Himself to
man ; not merely to a favoured few, but to the
human race as such. For the desire of self-com
munication is, as we have seen, an essential
function of our own personality ; it is part of what
we mean by the word ; and we cannot conceive
a person freely creating persons, except with a
view to hold intercourse with them when created."
Some sort of a revelation, or manifestation of God
to His creatures, is therefore antecedently probable,
and as a matter of fact, all nations, or nearly all,
have believed that real revelations have been
vouchsafedto them. 274

WEAKNESS OF NATURAL RELIGION 275
It may be objected, however, that God has
sufficiently revealed Himself in Nature, and that
therefore a supernatural or supplementary revela
tion is not to be looked for.
We have no desire to disparage the religion of
Nature, for we are convinced that it furnishes the
only solid foundation upon which the fabric of
revealed religion can be reared. We admit that
those who have the time and the inclination for
abstract thought, and who are able to divest them
selves of all prejudice, and follow reason wherever
it guides them, are able to attain a reasonable
assurance that there is a good God who loves
His creatures, and that the soul is immortal, and
that after death there are rewards for the righteous
and punishments for the wicked. It may be that
in the absence of all sin and prejudice these facts
would be so luminous and plain to every human
being, that they could no more be denied than
the laws of thought or the axioms of Euclid. But
in the existing state of the world there is so much
sin and prejudice, that it is difficult for men to
attain strict truth upon any subject whatsoever
outside pure mathematics. Admitting, then, to the
full, that in an unfallen world reason would in
fallibly attain to a true knowledge of God, we
still contend that in a world like this, in which
the most deadly errors — religious, moral, and
political — everywhere prevail and are most diffi
cult to refute successfully, a republication of the
principles of Natural Religion in a supernatural

276 WEAKNESS OF NATURAL RELIGION
and impressive manner by the Author of Nature
Himself is most desirable, and therefore entirely
credible. Natural Religion rests upon strong and solid
arguments, but even its most ardent friends do not
venture to maintain that it has ever yet on its own
merits established itself as the creed of any nation.
A philosopher here and there, a Socrates, or an
Aristotle, or a Cicero, has perceived its truth, but
not one of them succeeded in making its cult popular.
The attempt of the English and French Deists in
the eighteenth century to establish a religion of
Nature proved a complete failure. The modern
Unitarians have set themselves the same task, but,
so far as we can see, without any real prospect
of success. Unitarianism, however the fact may
be explained, does not commend itself to religiously
minded, men. It seems to be an unstable halting-
place for those who are making the journey from
Faith to Agnosticism, or from Agnosticism to
Faith. Its tone is not devotional. It inspires no
enthusiasm, sends out few missionaries, and seems
likely to be crushed out of existence between the
two real competitors for the allegiance of the
modern world, Christianity and Unbelief. The
only seemingly successful attempt to found a
philosophic religion is that of the Neo-Platonists
in the third and fourth centuries a.d. But this
is no real exception to the rule, for the Neo-
Platonists, in order to make their system a success,
incorporated into it bodily the whole supernatural

WEAKNESS OF NATURAL RELIGION 277
machinery of Paganism. For reasons which it is
difficult to explain fully, but which must lie deep
in human nature, Natural Religion has never
succeeded in propagating itself apart from Revealed
Religion. Its principles are of the highest value,
and fortunately are now professed by more than
half the human race; but men have learnt them,
not through Philosophy, but through the great
monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam, all of which are based upon faith in a
revelation. Nor is there any reason for supposing
that Natural Religion is any more able to stand
alone now than it ever was. So far as we can
see, it still needs the support of revelation to give
it stability. Those who at the present day lose
belief in revelation, generally become, not Deists
or Unitarians, but Agnostics or Pantheists. In
theory, the personality of God and the immortality
of the soul are truths of reason ; but in practice
those who reject revelation find it hard to attain
them, and still harder to hold them with sufficient
firmness to make them real motives of action.
The human mind is so constituted that it shrinks
from trusting too absolutely to abstract reasoning.
A man may be convinced by the most cogent
philosophical arguments that there is a personal
God and that the soul is immortal ; He may be
unable to detect any flaw in these proofs, and may
in addition be able to answer all the Agnostic
objections against them. Nevertheless, his mind
craves for independent verification. He wishes

278 NEED OF A REVELATION
for a supernatural message from the Author of
Nature Himself to convince him that his reason
has not erred. No one with any real knowledge of
human nature will deny this.
II. — The Miraculous Attestation of Revelation
Without going so far as to say that physical
miracles are indispensably ' necessary to attest a
revelation, we nevertheless maintain that they are
in the highest degree desirable. As there is a
tendency in some quarters to deny this, we desire
to lay particular stress upon it.
The great danger to which Theism is always
exposed, is that of degeneration into Pantheism.
The Monotheism of Cicero and of Plutarch lapsed
in the second and third Christian centuries into
Neo-Platonism, which degraded the living, personal
God into an abstract and impersonal First Cause.
The religions of India, originally polytheistic and
personal, have for many ages been fundamentally
pantheistic. Nor is this tendency confined to
ancient times or to the East. The recent Hegelian
movement is a form of philosophic Pantheism, and
Mr. Spencer's doctrine of " the Unknowable " is a
scientific Pantheism. The progress of physical
science, which is continually reducing seeming
disorder to order, and extending the reign of law
to phenomena which were once regarded as lawless
and incalculable, is making it difficult for many
minds to retain their belief in the personal God
of Theology and of the human heart, Who cherishes

HARSHNESS OF NATURAL LAW 279
a tender individual love for every human soul.
The earthquake, the tornado, and the pestilence
overwhelm in a common destruction the saint and
the sinner. Nature seems an adamantine system
of blind, resistless forces, which roll on for ever,
careless of human needs and human tears or
groans. The student of physical Nature moves
amid the complications of an apparently soulless
machine, and the conclusion seems forced upon
him that if there is a God at all, He is bound and
fettered by His own laws, and incapable of any
independent action upon Nature. It is true that
this way of arguing is illogical, and that men ought
to form their ideas of God from man and not from
Nature ; but the fact remains that the seeming in-
exorableness of physical Nature, and its comparative
failure 1 to draw moral distinctions, are difficulties
that all men feel acutely at times, and which in
a scientific age like the present are particularly
insistent and paralyzing. What therefore is
imperatively required in a revelation designed
to satisfy human needs and to supply the defects
of purely natural religion, is such a supernatural
interference with the mechanical uniformity of
Nature as shall make it clear that Nature is ruled
by a personal Being friendly to the human race,
and attentive to the needs of individual men. The
presumption against the personality (or the benevo
lence) of the Author of Nature, created by cyclones
1 Nature does draw moral distinctions to some extent. See
ch. xiv.

280 THE QUESTION OF IMMORTALITY
and devastating eruptions, requires to be rebutted
by the contrary evidence of miracles of mercy such
as those recorded in the Gospels.1
The other pressing problem of religion — a
problem never more pressing than at the present
time — is the question of human immortality. The
philosophical arguments in favour of it are strong,
and the scientific arguments against it can be
shown to be without weight; nevertheless every
cautious reasoner feels the urgent need of some
corroborative evidence to clinch the matter. The
actual resurrection of a corpse, or at least the return
of a spirit, is wanted to show that the world beyond
1 How strongly this need of a miraculous interference with the
monotony of natural law is felt, may be illustrated by the
following powerful passage from Mr. Blatchford's little book
God and my Neighbour : " Christ was not justified in claiming
that God is a better Father to man, than man is to his own
children. 'Who among you, if his child asks bread, will give
him a stone ? ' None among us. But in the great famines, as
in India and Russia, God allows millions to die of starvation.
These His children pray to Him for bread. He leaves them to
die. Is it not so ? He has for millions of years looked down on
the ignorance, the misery, the crimes of man. For thousands of
years — perhaps for millions of years — the generations of men
prayed to God for help, for comfort, for guidance. God was deaf,
and dumb, and blind. A tidal wave rolls landward, and twenty
thousand human beings are drowned or crushed to death. A
volcano bursts suddenly into eruption, and a beautiful city is a
heap of ruins, and its inhabitants are charred or mangled corpses.
And the heavenly Father who is love, has power to save, and
makes no sign. Is it not so ? Blindness, epilepsy, leprosy,
madness, fall like a dreadful blight upon a myriad of God's
children, and the Heavenly Father gives neither guidance nor
consolation. Only man helps man. Only man pities ; only man
tries to save."

MIRACLES ATTEST REVELATION 281
the grave, to which Philosophy points, really exists.
It is not, therefore, an argument against Christianity,
but rather a strong one in its favour, that it claims
to demonstrate the reality of a future life by the
miraculous resurrection of its Founder. Miracles of
resurrection are those which are most wanted, and
are therefore those which are most likely to happen
in a genuine revelation intended to meet human
needs. There are some who maintain that Chris
tianity must get rid of its miracles, if it wishes to be
universally accepted. We maintain, on the con
trary, that its miracles are its strength, and that
it is credible just because it offers that miraculous
attestation of religion which reason shows to be
necessary. A revelation which did not offer
miraculous attestation of such fundamental truths
as the personality of God, of His sympathy with
the individual soul, and of a future life, would
lie under the gravest suspicion of not being a
revelation at all, but a mere human invention.
III. — The Characteristics of a Perfect Religion
In order to ascertain what form a true revelation
may be expected to take, it is necessary to consider
what would be the characteristics of the most perfect
conceivable religion.
An absolutely perfect religion — perfect, that is
to say, from the point of view of human needs —
would —
(1) Reveal truly the nature of God, so far as it is
necessary for man to know it ;

282 A PERFECT RELIGION
(2) Bring about a perfect reconciliation between
the sinner and his God ;
(3) Render sinless perfection possible for fallen
man; (4) Achieve the supreme end of religion, the most
perfect and intimate union conceivable between the
worshipper and the object of worship ;
(5) Unite mankind in social bonds of love and
brotherhood. These, be it observed, are the ideals not only
of Christianity, but of all religions, and they there
fore form a reliable criterion for judging the merits
of a supposed revelation. A revelation is not
necessarily true because it satisfies them — the
historical claims of the revelation to acceptance
would still require to be considered — but never
theless any revelation which satisfies them fully,
or even in large measure, merits a full and impartial
inquiry into its evidences. On the other hand, a
religion which does not satisfy them at all, or
only to a very slight extent, is obviously false, and
does not require serious consideration.
The case for Christianity is that it satisfies these
ideals far more perfectly than any other religion,
and therefore has the best claim to be considered
true. Whether it actually is true or not, is a matter
for further investigation.
IV. — Christianity as the Ideal or Perfect
Religion
We proceed now to take the points which

CHRISTIANITY REVEALS GOD'S LOVE 283
characterize a perfect religion in order, and to
inquire how far Christianity appears to satisfy
them. (1) As to the nature of the Deity, Christianity
reveals that He is personal, and is most adequately
described not by metaphysical terms, such as the
First Cause, the Infinite, and the Absolute, but as
the Father of spirits. Not God's power or immensity,
but His spiritual affinity to man, His moral
personality, His holiness, His tender sympathy, and
His unutterable redemptive love, are the main themes
ofthe Gospel. If Christianity does not satisfy all
the demands of the speculative intellect, it satisfies
in the fullest manner the demands of the human
heart. The personality of God is the life of
religion. Science and Philosophy may perhaps
content themselves with an abstract First Cause,
but the only God that can satisfy the soul is one who
cherishes with tender love every soul that He has
made. The main message, then, of Christianity to
the world is the true and proper personality of the
Creator, and His love to man, as revealed in the
Incarnation. It would have been possible for God
to have made this revelation by means of prophecy.
But when the fulness of time was come, a far more
satisfying method was adopted. "God, who at
sundry times and in divers manners spake in time
past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these
last days spoken unto us by His Son " (Heb. i. 1).
The Incarnation of the Son of God, as it actually
occurred, does not strike the mind at first as being

284 THE INCARNATION
worthy of Omnipotence. It seems derogatory to
the Divine Nature to take upon itself human limita
tions, to be born, to be tempted, to suffer, and to
die. But regarded from the point of view of man's
needs, the Incarnation is the most satisfactory kind
of revelation conceivable. The following points
may be briefly noticed. Some of them will be dealt
with more fully hereafter.
(a) The Incarnation made God intelligible. It
brought Him down from the abstract into the
concrete, and made plain men and women, unskilled
in abstract thought, able to understand more of
the Divine Nature than the profoundest philosophers
had understood before. " No man hath seen God
at any time; the only begotten Son, which is
in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared
Him" (John i. 18).
(_¦) By becoming incarnate as an individual man,
and not as an influence in the whole human race,
the Son of God revealed in the clearest manner
the Divine Personality. If He had become in
carnate in the race, the Divine Personality would
have been obscured, and encouragement would
have been given to pantheistic conceptions of the
Divine Nature.
(c) By becoming incarnate as an individual man,
the Son of God revealed the importance of human
personality, and the infinite value of the individual
human soul.
{d) By being conceived and born, the Son of
God sanctified human life from its first beginnings.

THE ATONEMENT 285
In the ancient world, which did not regard in
fanticide as a crime, this teaching was particularly
needed. {e) By becoming subject to human limitations,
to temptation, and even to pain, sorrow, and death,
the Son of God revealed in the most practical
possible manner the infinite compassion of God,
and His sympathy with human suffering.
(/) By becoming poor, He taught men that riches
and honours are not the highest goods, and that
the very poorest can be virtuous, religious, and
happy. By becoming poor He also taught the
rich to respect the poor, and to treat them kindly.
(_f) By living an actual human life, He set a
perfect example for men to follow. Precepts are
good, but example is better.
(2) The Incarnation made possible a complete
reconciliation between God and man.
Superficial thinkers have affirmed that no recon
ciliation is necessary, or that if it is, it can be
effected by human penitence. There is truth
in this, but only a half-truth. It is quite true
that penitence is the natural and fitting atone
ment for sin. Thus when one human being sins
against another, penitence is accepted as an adequate
atonement. Even in the case of a sin against
God, a really adequate repentance would be an
adequate atonement. But the awakened conscience
of man knows that this is impossible. His penitence
for sin, like all his other virtuous acts, is weak and
ineffectual, and he needs some transforming power

286 VICTORY OVER SIN
that will make his penitence perfect. The Incar
nation provides for this. The incarnate Son of
God, as the head of the human race, and as respon
sible for it, renders to God adequate sorrow for
the sins of the world, and gives individual men
grace to attain deeper and deeper penitence, until
in the end their penitenee will become perfect, and
God will accept it as adequate.
(3) The Incarnation makes sinless perfection
possible, not at once, but in due course. It effects
this not simply by the inspiring effect of Christ's
perfect example, but by means of constant supplies of
supernatural grace given to those who are really
walking by faith. According to the Christian theory,
Christ, by virtue of His Holy Incarnation, becomes
the new ancestor of the human race. As by our
natural birth and training we inherit the evil nature
and sinful tendencies of our ancestors, so by our
new and spiritual birth we are made partakers of
Christ's holy and sinless human nature, and in its
strength are enabled to obtain complete victory
over sin. This sounds mystical, and to some minds
fanciful, but it represents the central and vital
religious experience of Christians. All who have
advanced far in the religious life testify that through
Christ they have been brought into vital union with
God, and have received a new strength against
the powers of evil.
(4) The supreme end of religion is complete union
between the worshipper and the object of worship.
This is brought about in the most perfect conceiv-

UNION WITH GOD 287
able manner by the Incarnation. In Christ human
nature is personally united to God, and since in
dividual believers are related to Christ as members
to the head, or as branches to the vine, they are
thereby brought into a supernatural union with the
life of God. In this world the full fruition of this
divine life is not attained ; but in the world to come,
when human nature has been perfected through
suffering, and cleansed from all stain of sin, every
true believer will see God as He is, and will be
united to Him perfectly by knowledge and love,
and will so fully partake of His nature as to be
in a manner " deified."
Some forms of religion, such as Buddhism, profess
to offer a closer union with God even than this.
They teach that the soul is destined at the last
to be absorbed altogether into the Divine Nature.
This, however, is not really a doctrine of union at
all, but of annihilation, and is therefore immeasur
ably inferior to the Christian doctrine of the Beatific
Vision. (5) A perfect religion must inculcate universal
benevolence, and the active and unselfish service
of man. Moreover, since man is naturally a social
animal, a perfect religion must be social. Now,
Christianity possesses both these characteristics in
a marked degree. It inculcates mutual benevolence
and helpfulness more completely and successfully
even than Buddhism. It also meets the social or
gregarious instinct of man by presenting itself in
the form of a visible, organized Church. Some

288 UNIVERSAL BENEVOLENCE
modern forms of Christianity have discarded the
Church idea, but Christ's own purpose was certainly
to found a visible, authoritative Church, and all the
historic Churches of Christendom confess this.
We conclude, then, that Christianity perfectly
fulfils the ideal requisites of a universal religion,1
and that therefore its historic claims to be a genuine
revelation deserve candid and careful investigation.

APPENDIX I
BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY

It is sometimes claimed for Buddhism that it inculcates a
moral standard as exalted as that of Christianity, and it is
certainly true that some of the founder's sayings are worthy
of a place in the New Testament. For example, Gautama
was once asked, What is the highest happiness of man ? and
he replied, "To serve wise men and not to serve fools; to
give honour to whom honour is due ; to have right desires
for oneself; to succour father and mother ; to cherish wife
and child ; 2 to follow a peaceful calling ; to give alms and live

1 It should be particularly noted that Christianity is the only
religion capable of accommodating itself to all races and all
civilizations. It is this because it is less a religion of institu
tions than of principles. Its only positive social institution is
monogamy, which is natural to the whole human race. Its only
religious institutions are the Apostolic Ministry and the Holy
Sacraments. Judaism and Mahometanism, on the other hand,
are religions of institutions, and thus lack elasticity and
adaptability. 8 Gautama is speaking of ordinary adherents of his doctrines
living in the world. His more earnest followers are celibates
and mendicants,

BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY 289
righteously ; to help one's relatives and do blameless deeds ;
to cease and abstain from sin ; to eschew strong drink ; not
to be weary in well doing ; reverence and lowliness, content
ment and gratitude, the regular hearing of the law ; to be
long-suffering and meek; to associate with members of the
Sangha ; 1 religious talk at due seasons ; temperance and
chastity ; a conviction of the Four Great Truths ; the hope of
Nirvana ; a mind unshaken by the things of the world, with
out anguish or passion, and secure, — this is the greatest
blessing. They that act like this are invincible on every
side, on every side they walk in safety, and theirs is the
greatest blessing."
We fully admit that many of these sentiments are not
unworthy of Christ Himself. When, however, it is seriously
maintained that the religion of Buddha is equal or superior
to that of Christ, it is necessary to enter an emphatic protest.
In the first place, it is a system of unmitigated Pessimism.
The Four Great Truths of the Buddhist religion are these :
(1) That misery always accompanies existence;
(2) That existence results from passion or desire ;
(3) That there is no escape from existence except by destruc
tion of desire ;
(4) That the destruction of desire may be accomplished by
following the fourfold way to Nirvana.
The pessimism of Gautama is as radical as that of those
Western pessimists who counsel universal suicide. Gautama
and his disciples only refrain from suicide because they
regard suicide as insufficient of itself to end existence. Death
is followed, except for those who have attained Buddhistic
perfection, by an endless series of transmigrations into other
bodies, in which the sins committed in previous states of
existence are mercilessly chastised. The only way to attain
annihilation is to practise the strictest asceticism, and to
extinguish the very desire to live. When all desire has been

1 The monks or mendicants of Buddhism. 19

290 BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY
extinguished, and not till then, the soul at death enters into
Nirvana — that is, is absolutely annihilated.
Christianity, on the other hand, is an optimism. It believes
that life is worth living, that the evils of the world are
capable of remedy, and that for the righteous there is reserved,
after death, an exceeding great reward.
Buddhism, in spite of its precept of universal benevolence,
is upon the whole a reactionary, paralyzing, and unethical
creed. It is unethical, because its whole system of transmigra
tions is vitiated by a fundamental injustice. Europeans
generally imagine that the personal, individual soul is by
Buddhists supposed to pass from body to body, and to be
punished with retributive justice for sins committed in a
previous state of existence. This would, of course, be strictly
just, but it is not the doctrine of Gautama. According to
him, the individual soul perishes at death, and that what
passes on to the next incarnation is not the soul, but its
Karma. This Karma is the sum of the merits and demerits
of the previous soul, which its successor is forced to inherit.
Buddhism therefore teaches that men are rewarded and
punished for the sins of other persons who lived ages before
they were born — a doctrine which is monstrously unjust.
Buddhism is reactionary, because if its principles were fully
carried out, the human race would be reduced first to
mendicancy and then to extinction. The mere fact that it
discourages marriage is sufficient to condemn it in the eyes
of all practical men.
It is hardly possible to treat seriously the suggestion of
Mr. A. Lillie, M. Burnouf, and some other writers, that
Christianity has borrowed its principles from Buddhism. It
is not possible to conceive two systems more widely
divergent. There are, no doubt, interesting parallels between
Christianity and Buddhism, but very few of them occur in
those Buddhist writings which are known to be early. The
most famous parallel of all, the miraculous birth of Buddha,
is not really a close one, for it is expressly affirmed in the

JUDAISM AND MAHOMETANISM 291
Buddhist narratives that his mother was not a virgin. Prof.
Hopkins, one of the most recent authorities, says : " Where
the parallels make borrowing seem probable, as in the case
of miracles and legends not found in other religions, and
striking enough to suggest a loan, the historical evidence is
strongly in favour of Christianity having been, not the copyist,
but the originator."

APPENDIX II
CHRISTIANITY, JUDAISM, AND MAHOMETANISM
Neither Judaism nor Mahometanism can be regarded as
serious competitors of Christianity for world-wide supremacy.
Judaism is the religion of a race, and still retains its original
racial exclusiveness. It has, moreover, in its canonical docu
ments, no clear revelation to offer on the all-important question
of a future life. Mahometanism, again, is, to a large extent,
though less than Judaism, a racial religion. It has propagated
itself in many lands, largely by the sword ; but its institutions
are too closely bound up with the conditions of Eastern society
to allow it to become the religion of the Western races. It
possesses the great merit of affirming clearly the doctrine of
immortality, but its eschatology is in general sensual, unedify-
ing, and unjust. " The doom of the infidels," says Gibbon,
" is common : the eternal mansions of the Christians, the
Jews, the Sabians, the Magians, and the idolaters, are sunk
below each other in the abyss ; and the lowest hell is reserved
for the faithless hypocrites who have assumed the mask of
religion. After the greater part of mankind has been con
demned for their opinions, the true believers only will be
judged by their actions. . . . Instead of inspiring the blessed
inhabitants [of heaven] with a liberal taste for harmony and
science, conversation and friendship, he [Mahomet] idly cele
brates the pearls and diamonds, the robes of silk, palaces of
marble, dishes of gold, rich wines, artificial dainties, numerous

292 MAHOMETANISM
attendants, and the whole train of selfish and costly luxury,
which becomes insipid to the owner even in the short period
of this mortal life. Seventy-two Houris, or black-eyed girls,
of resplendent beauty, blooming youth, virgin purity, and
exquisite sensibility, will be created for the use of the meanest
believer; a moment of pleasure will be prolonged to a
thousand years, and his faculties will be increased a hundred
fold, to render him worthy of his felicity."
The Mahometan religion is a good one, but not good
enough to make it worthy of serious consideration as a final
and perfect revelation.

LITERATURE
{a) Revelation

Butler, A nalogy, pt. ii. ; Paley, Evidences, Prefatory Con
siderations ; Stanton, The Place of Authority in Religious
Belief; Sanday, Inspiration; Gore, Essay in Lux Mundi;
A. Balfour, Foundations of Belief '; Sabatier, Outlines of a
Philosophy of Religion, bk. i. ch. 2 ; Bruce, Chief End of
Revelation, and Apologetics, p. 298 ff. ; Luthardt, Fundamental
Truths, lect. xvii. ; Caillard, Reason in Revelation ; Christlieb,
Modern Doubt, lect. ii.
On the negative side the following are useful : Mill, Three
Essays, p. 212 ff. ; Martineau, Seat of Authority in Religion ;
Cassel, Supernatural Religion ; S. Laing, Modern Science and
Modern Thought, pt. ii.
(.) Christianity and Other Religions
Hardwick, Christ and other Masters; Non-Christian
Religious Systems (Various writers, S.P.C.K., 7 vols. 2s. 6d.
each) ; J. Wordsworth, The One Religion ; Maurice, The
Religions of the World; Fairbairn, The Philosophy of the
Christian Religion ; Fisher, Grounds, ch. xv.

CHAPTER XVIII
the christian documents
Summary. — The genuineness of those New Testament docu
ments, which were unquestioned in the ancient Church, is
vindicated. Some account is given of the present state of
Old Testament criticism.
It is sometimes supposed that the principles of
criticism were first discovered in the nineteenth
century, and that until Baur and the Tubingen
school arose, the Christian records were never
subjected to any really adequate examination. In
reality, the profusion of spurious and heretical
works which were produced even in the second
century forced Christian scholars to adopt early
an extremely critical attitude towards all writings
professing to emanate from Apostles. The most
rigid tests of genuineness were applied, and great
hesitation was shown in admitting new works into
the sacred canon. The result has been that, so
far as the New Testament is concerned, the judg
ment of modern critics largely endorses that of
antiquity. It is universally recognized that the
Gospels, Acts, and Epistles which are contained
in the New Testament are immensely superior
293

294 THE OLD TESTAMENT
to those which the ancient Church rejected, and
that, if any apostolic works are genuine, these are.
The Old Testament stands upon a somewhat
different footing. The Jewish canon was taken
over bodily by the Christian Church, without in
dependent investigation, and the result has been
that in this case received views have had to
undergo a more extensive revision. Nothing,
however, has been discovered which tends to throw
doubt upon the main features of the history of
Israel. The most disturbing result of criticism
has been the establishment of the legendary
character of the first eleven chapters of Genesis.1
This, however, is not such a serious matter as it
seems. The history of most nations begins with a
legendary period, and if this is found to be the case
with Israel also, it is no indication that the sub
sequent history is untrustworthy. From the call of
Abraham onward there can be little doubt that
the narrative is, in the main, historical. To discuss
the problems of Old Testament criticism with any
thing like fulness, however, would be out of place
in a work like this. Judaism prepared the way for
Christianity ; but Christianity is not, to the extent
which some suppose, dependent upon Judaism.
The acceptance of the most extreme results of Old
Testament criticism is perfectly compatible with
Christian orthodoxy, so long as the moral and
1 The fact that the narratives contained in these chapters
are not strictly historical, does not prevent their having a real
spiritual and even theological value,

BAUR ON THE PAULINE EPISTLES 295
spiritual value of the Old Testament revelation is
recognized. I. — The Pauline Epistles
The earliest Christian documents of which the
dates can be certainly fixed are the Pauline Epistles.
They are divided into four groups : —
(1) 1 and 2 Thessalonians — a.d. 51.
(2) 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians,1 Romans —
a.d. 55, 56.
(3) Philippians, Colossians, Ephesians, Philemon —
a.d. 59-61.
(4) Titus, 1 and 2 Timothy — a.d. 61-64, or 66, 6y.
It will be seen that the first two groups were
written less than thirty years after the Ascension,
at a time when the great bulk of the original
disciples of Jesus were still alive. Their evidence,
therefore, is of great importance.
The authenticity of the four Epistles of the
second group (1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, and
Romans) was admitted as unquestionable by the
founder of modern negative criticism, Ferdinand
Christian von Baur (1 792-1 860), and since his time
the general tendency of his school has been to
accept almost the whole of the Pauline Epistles.
For example, Harnack, Jtllicher, and Renan, whose
negative orthodoxy is beyond dispute, accept
the whole of St. Paul's Epistles, except those to
1 Personally, I am inclined to date Galatians considerably
earlier, even before 1 Thessalonians.

296 VAN MANEN'S VIEWS
Timothy and Titus.1 Since, however, a small
group of irreconcilables, represented by van Manen,
Steck, and Volter, reject every Pauline Epistle,
and their quite impossible views are represented
in the Encyclopcedia Biblica as being those of
" criticism," it may be worth while to state briefly
the evidence for the Pauline authorship of the
chief epistles attributed to St. Paul.
The thirteen epistles mentioned above were
recognized in the second century as unquestionably
genuine. Even the heretic Marcion rejected only
the Pastoral Epistles, and that, in all probability,
because his doctrines are so strongly condemned
in them.2 From the middle of the second century
onwards, when Christian literature first begins to
be abundant, they are quoted copiously, and with
out the least indication of doubt. Traces of them
are also found in the very earliest Christian writings
outside the canon. The Epistle of St. Polycarp
to the Philippians, which was written about a.d. iio,
and is certainly genuine, contains abundant evidence
that the Epistles of St. Paul were even then re
garded as Scripture. " Neither I," says Polycarp,
"nor any such one, can come up to the wisdom
of the blessed and glorious Paul. . . . When absent
from you, he wrote you a letter, which, if you
1 Renan expresses doubts about the Ephesians, but Jiilicher
decidedly defends it. Harnack thinks that even the Pastoral
Epistles contain genuine Pauline matter, and are not mere
forgeries. 8 Some think that he rejected them because they were private
letters, and therefore unsuitable for reading in church.

THE PAULINE EPISTLES 297
carefully study, you will find to be the means of
building you up in that faith which has been given
you. . . . Do we not know that the saints shall
judge the world ? as Paul teaches. ... It is
declared in these passages of Scripture, Be ye
angry and sin not, and Let not the sun go down
upon your wrath."1 Polycarp quotes or alludes to
the following Epistles : 1 Thessalonians, twice ;
2 Thessalonians, twice; 1 Corinthians, four times;
2 Corinthians, three times ; Galatians, four times ;
Romans, three times ; Philippians, five times ;
Ephesians, four times ; 1 Timothy, five times ;
2 Timothy, twice. Thus Polycarp, in his short
Epistle of fourteen chapters, quotes or uses no
fewer than ten of the thirteen Pauline Epistles,
the only three unused being Colossians, Philemon,
and Titus.
St. Ignatius, who wrote about the same time,
* • and whose seven Greek Epistles have generally
been accepted as genuine since the publication of
Lightfoot's great edition of Ignatius in 1885,2 gives
similar testimony. There are fewer allusions to
Scripture in Ignatius than in Polycarp, but he quotes
or uses at least seven Pauline Epistles — viz.
1 Thessalonians, once ; 1 Corinthians, seven times ;
Galatians, once ; Romans, once ; Ephesians, twice ;
1 Timothy, once ; Titus, twice.
1 Quoted from Eph. iv. 26.
8 Lightfoot's arguments were accepted as decisive by Harnack,
the leader of advanced criticism in Germany, so that the genuine
ness of these seven letters may now be regarded as certain.

298 RATIONALISTIC PREJUDICE
The oldest Christian writing outside the New
Testament, the Epistle of Clement of Rome to the
Corinthians, which was written about a.d. 95, con
tains fairly close correspondences with seven
Pauline Epistles — viz. one with 1 Thessalonians,
seven with 1 Corinthians, one with 2 Corinthians,
one with Romans, two with Ephesians, one with
1 Timothy, and two with Titus.
Weightier evidence than this it would be difficult
to produce for any ancient work. If the Pauline
Epistles were secular productions, and St. Paul a
classical writer, no one would think of resisting
it. It is only because St. Paul is a Christian
writer, and his writings are appealed to as
evidences of the truth of Christianity, that their
authenticity is denied. Rationalistic critics are
fond of demanding that the books of the New
Testament should be treated precisely like any
other ancient books. This is precisely what
Christian critics desire, and precisely what
rationalistic critics refuse to concede. Classical
scholars, in investigating the genuineness of
classical writings, regard it as an axiom that the
traditional opinion as to their authorship is to be
accepted, unless it can be disproved by really
cogent arguments. Rationalistic critics, on the
contrary, regard it as an axiom that all the books
of the New Testament are spurious, unless their
genuineness can be proved by absolutely irresistible
evidence. This is the attitude, not of criticism, but
of prejudice,

i PETER 299
II. — The Epistles of Peter and John
Besides the Pauline Epistles, two other un
questioned apostolic Epistles have been transmitted
to us — viz. 1 Peter and 1 John. These Epistles,
being written by the two most eminent disciples
of Jesus, are of even greater evidential value than
the Pauline Epistles, which were not written by
an actual disciple.
1 Peter is one of the best attested works in ancient
literature. Eusebius says of it {Ecclesiastical History,
bk. iii. ch. 3), " One Epistle of Peter, that known
as the First, is fully acknowledged. It has been
frequently cited by the ancient Fathers also in their
own writings, as unquestionably genuine." Origen
(a.d. 240) says : " Peter has left one acknowledged
Epistle." It is quoted frequently, and in express
terms ascribed to the Apostle by Clement of
Alexandria, and Tertullian of Carthage (a.d. 200),
also by Irenaeus (a.d. 180) and by other good
authorities. The earliest evidence is also completely
satisfactory. It was quoted, as Eusebius assures
us, by Papias of Hierapolis (a.d. 130). Polycarp,
writing about a.d. no, quotes it again and again.1
The still earlier Epistle of Clement of Rome (a.d. 95)
1 Polycarp's short epistle contains no less than fourteen quota
tions or close coincidences. The following are typical examples :
" In whom, though now ye see Him not, ye believe, and believing
rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory " (ch. i. = i Pet. i.8).
" Believed in Him who raised up our Lord Jesus Christ from the
dead and gave Him glory" (ch. ii. = i Pet. i. 21) ; " Not rendering
evil for evil or railing for railing" (ch. ii, = i Pet. iii. 9).

300 i JOHN
also contains six coincidences with i Peter, three
of which are so close as to be convincing.
Against this decisive evidence only two objections
of any weight are offered. One is that i Peter
represents the Roman State as persecuting the
Christians for the sake of their religion, whereas
the Pauline Epistles and the Acts agree in repre
senting the Roman magistrates as protecting the
Christians against the malice of their enemies. If,
however, i Peter was written shortly after the
Neronian persecution in a.d. 64, which is the usual
supposition, this objection falls to the ground.
The other objection is that this Epistle is not
mentioned in the Muratorian list of canonical books
drawn up towards the end of the second century.
The reply is that the Muratorian list has come down
to us in a fragmentary state, and has been copied
by an exceptionally careless and ignorant scribe.
There can be little doubt that in its original and
complete form it mentioned 1 Peter.
The attestation of 1 John is not less satisfactory.
Eusebius mentions it several times among the un
disputed books. " Besides the Gospel of John,"
he says, " his First Epistle is acknowledged without
dispute, both by those of the present day and
by the ancients" {Eccl. Hist. iii. 24; see also
iii. 25, v. 8, vi. 25). It is quoted as St. John's by
Dionysius of Alexandria, and by Cyprian of
Carthage (a.d. 250), by Origen (a.d. 240), and by
Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria (a.d. 200),
also by the Muratorian fragment (a.d. 180). Ireneeus

DISPUTED BOOKS 301
(a.d. 180), who, as a hearer of one of John's disciples,
is a specially valuable authority, ascribes it without
hesitation to St. John. " For this reason he [John]
has thus testified to us in his Epistle, Little children,
it is the last time, and as ye have heard that
Antichrist doth come, now have many Antichrists
appeared, whereby we know that it is the last
time. . . ." {Against Heresies, iii. 16, cf. 1 John ii. 18).
The earlier evidence is also thoroughly satisfactory.
The Epistle was quoted, as Eusebius informs us,
by Papias (a.d. 130), and also by Polycarp (a.d. no).
Polycarp's knowledge of the Epistle is quite un
questionable, " For whoever does not confess that
Jesus Christ has come in the flesh, is Antichrist "
(Polycarp, Epist. ch. vii. = 1 John iv. 3). It was
also in all probability known to the writer of the
Didache {c a.d. 100).
We may have every confidence, therefore, in
ascribing it to the Apostle John.
III. — The Disputed Epistles and the Apocalypse
The rest of the Epistles ascribed to Apostles —
viz. Hebrews,1 James, 2 Peter, 2 John, 3 John,
and Jude — were of disputed authority in the ancient
Church, and therefore, although they are probably
genuine, cannot be fairly used in controversy.
The same may be said of the Apocalypse, or
Revelation of St. John, which was rejected by
many ancient Churches.
1 Hebrews was not written by St. Paul, and its real author is
unknown. It is, however, a genuine work of the apostolic
age, as its use by Clement of Rome sufficiently indicates.

302 ACTS GENUINE
IV. — The Acts of the Apostles
The Acts, in spite of its ignominious rejection
by the Tubingen school, must be pronounced, on
the evidence, certainly genuine. It was received
by all ancient authorities as the unquestioned
work of Luke, the companion of Paul. Tertullian,
Clement of Alexandria, and the Muratorian fragment
all ascribe it to St. Luke. Irenaeus transcribes
long passages from it into his work Against
Heresies. It is quoted in the Epistle of the Churches
of Gaul, a.d. 177. Polycarp (a.d. no) quotes Acts
ii. 24, " Whom God raised up, having loosed the
pains of death " (c. i.). Ignatius says that after the
resurrection Jesus ate and drank with His disciples
{avvefayev Kai ffvvetnev — Ad Smyrn. iii. ; cf.
a-vve<t>dyo/jLev Kai avveirlofiev — Acts X. 41). Clement of
Rome praises the Corinthians for being fonder of
giving than of receiving, which is apparently a
reference to Acts xx. 35. Moreover, the internal
evidence proves conclusively that the author was a
companion of St. Paul.1
Two main objections are offered to the authenticity
of Acts. One is that it represents St. Peter and
St. Paul as friends, and as in essential agreement
on points of principle, whereas it is alleged that
they were really irreconcilable opponents.
1 The we-sections (Acts xvi. 10-17 ; xx. 5-15 ; xxi. 1-18 ; xxvii. ;
xxviii. 1-16) are accepted as genuine, even by Schmiedel and
van Manen. But the rest of Acts is in precisely the same style,
therefore the whole of it is genuine.

OBJECTIONS TO ACTS 303
The view that Peter and Paul were enemies,
which for fifty years maintained itself among
negative critics, is based solely on the late and
untrustworthy evidence of the Clementine Homilies
and Recognitions,1 which cannot be placed earlier
than a.d. 160, and which many scholars assign to
the third, or even to the fourth century. All the
really ancient evidence points to the fact that St.
Peter and St. Paul were friends, and held identical
views on all important points. This is evident
even in the Epistle to the Galatians, written in
the very heat of the controversy about circumcision.2
St. Peter is represented in that Epistle as in entire
agreement .with St. Paul, but as weakly allowing
himself on a particular occasion to act inconsistently
with his real opinions. Clement of Rome, writing
about a.d. 95, speaks of the two Apostles with
equal respect, and nowhere hints at any difference
between them. " Let us take," he says, " the noble
examples furnished in our own generation. Let
us set before our eyes the good Apostles. Peter
through unrighteous envy endured not one or
two, but numerous labours ; and when he had at
last suffered martyrdom, departed to the place
of glory due to him. Owing to envy Paul also
obtained the reward of patient endurance, after
1 The Clementine Homilies and Recognitions are Gnostic, not
orthodox, productions, and their doctrine is a mere caricature of
Christianity. 8 In the opinion of the writer, Galatians was written before
the Council of Jerusalem, not afterwards.

304 BLASS ON ACTS
being seven times thrown into captivity, compelled
to flee, and stoned. . . . These men spent their lives
in the practice of holiness " (ch. v. vi.).
The other objection is that the Acts records
miracles, and that books written by eye-witnesses
never contain miracles. Professor Blass, himself
a disbeliever in miracles, replies to this as follows :
" The miraculous element in Acts presents no
difficulty. The most portentous miracles which
Luke, has narrated he did not witness ; if in his
account of things he actually witnessed there are a
few errors or deviations from the truth, they can
be readily condoned. What right have we to blame
Luke, unless we also find fault with Paul himself?
Luke narrates miracles about Paul, but Paul
boasts of his own miracles, both to the Romans
(xv. 19) and to the Corinthians (2 xii. 12), writing
that signs and wonders and mighty works have
been performed by him. Let critics cease to dream
about a primitive age, pure and uncontaminated
by miracles, and to wish to date writings accord
ing to their antecedent notions about miracles"
{Prolegomena to Acts)}
V. — The Synoptic Gospels2
The four canonical Gospels have been transmitted
1 There is a further objection that Acts quotes Josephus,
but the evidence for this is so slight that it is not worth
discussing. 8 The first three Gospels are called " synoptic '' because
they narrate our Lord's ministry from the same general point of
view, and have much matter in common.

ST. MATTHEW'S GOSPEL 305
to us as the unquestioned productions of the
authors whose names they bear. Eusebius begins
his catalogue of the undisputed books of the New
Testament thus : " And here among the first must
be placed the holy quaternion of the Gospels "
{Eccl. Hist. iii. 25). Since, however, certain special
difficulties are raised against the authenticity of
the fourth Gospel, it will be well to begin by
considering the case of the Synoptic Gospels.
(1) St. Matthew's Gospel is extremely well
attested. Not to mention later authorities, Irenaeus
says : " Matthew also issued a written Gospel
among the Hebrews, while Peter and Paul were
preaching at Rome, and laying the foundation of
the Church." St. Matthew's Gospel is included
in Tatian's Diatessaron, or Harmony (a.d. 160), is
frequently quoted by Justin (a.d. 150), and is
cited as Scripture by Barnabas (a.d. 120): "As
it is written, Many are called, but few are chosen "
(Barnabas, ch. iv. = Matt. xx. 16). Clear traces of
its use are also found in Polycarp, Ignatius,
Clement of Rome, and the Didache.
This evidence proves that it is an authoritative
work of the apostolic age, but there are three argu
ments of considerable strength against its direct
ascription to the Apostle Matthew. The first is
the statement made by Papias (a.d. 130), and after
wards repeated by many authorities, that St.
Matthew wrote in Hebrew. Papias's words are :
" Matthew therefore compiled the oracles {rd \6yta)
in the Hebrew tongue, and each one interpreted 20

306 ST. MARK'S GOSPEL
them as he was able " (Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. iii. 39).
The most natural view to take of Papias's language
is that he is alluding not to the present Greek
Gospel, but to an earlier work in Hebrew. If
so, the existing Gospel is probably not by St.
Matthew. The second difficulty is the acknowledged fact
that St. Matthew used St. Mark's Gospel. This is
certainly not what one would expect an eye-witness,
and above all an Apostle, to do.
The third difficulty is that those touches which
mark an eye-witness are absent from the first
Gospel. This, however, may be due to the fact
that the author deliberately preferred to adopt
an impersonal style.
It is best, perhaps, to leave the question more
or less open. Direct Matthaean authorship is
defensible ; but, upon the whole, the weight of the
evidence seems to incline, not strongly, but still
perceptibly, against it. A Gospel written by a
disciple upon the basis of Matthew's Hebrew work
would still be a Gospel according to Matthew.
(2) St. Mark's Gospel is now universally re
cognized- as genuine. Papias (a.d. 130) gives the
following account of its origin : " This also the
presbyter [or elder] used to say. Mark having
become Peter's interpreter [or translator], wrote
accurately but not in order whatsoever things
[Peter] remembered — namely, the things which had
been said or done by Christ. For [Mark] neither
heard the Lord, nor followed Him. But afterwards,

ST. LUKE'S GOSPEL 307
as I said, he followed Peter, who used to frame
his instructions to meet his [immediate] needs,
and did not, as it were, attempt to frame an orderly
account of the Lord's words. So that Mark made
no mistake, when he thus wrote certain things as
[Peter] remembered them. For he made one thing
his care, not to omit to record anything that he
had heard, or to set down anything false among
them " (Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. iii. 29).
(3) The evidence that the third Gospel is the
work of Luke, the companion of St. Paul, is quite
conclusive. It is admittedly by the same author
as Acts, and, as has been explained, the "we-
sections" of Acts prove incontestably that the
writer of this work accompanied St. Paul on his
missionary journeys.
The date assigned to the third Gospel depends
on the date assigned to Acts. Acts, according to
many authorities, was written during the first
Roman imprisonment of St. Paul — i.e. about a.d.
61. This would throw the Gospel back to a.d.
59 or 60. Others date both books after the de
struction of Jerusalem (a.d. 70).
It is probable that St. Luke gathered many of
the materials for his Gospel during St. Paul's
imprisonment at Caesarea (Acts xxiv. 27).
VI. — The Fourth Gospel
External Evidence. — The fact that since 1820, when
Bretschneider published his Probabilia, there has
been a continual controversy as to the authorship

308 ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL
of the fourth Gospel, must not blind us to the cir
cumstance that it has been handed down to us from
the earliest times as an absolutely unquestioned
work. It is, in fact, attested by a greater amount
of evidence, internal and external, than any other
Gospel, and than almost any other New Testament
writing. Eusebius classed it without hesitation
among the undisputed writings. Clement of
Alexandria (a.d. 200) says of it : " But John last of
all perceiving that the bodily things had been made
clear in the [earlier] Gospels, encouraged by his
familiar friends, and inspired by the Spirit, composed
a spiritual Gospel" (Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. vi. 14).
The learned Origen, Clement's successor as the head
of the Catechetical School of Alexandria, says :
" I have learnt by tradition concerning the four
Gospels, which alone are uncontroverted in the
Church of God spread under heaven, that that
according to Matthew . . . was written first, . . . that
according to Mark second, . . . that according to
Luke third, . . . that according to John last of all "
(Eusebius, o.c. vi. 25). And again : " Why need I
speak about him who reclined upon the breast of
Jesus, John who has left behind a single Gospel,
though he confesses that he could make so many
as not even the world could contain ? " Tertullian
(a.d. 200), another well-informed witness, expressly
states that the present four Gospels have been
acknowledged ever since the Apostolic period. " I
affirm," he says, " that not only among the Churches
founded by Apostles, but among all the Churches

IREN.EUS ON ST. JOHN 369
that are united to them in Christian fellowship,
that Gospel of Luke, which we earnestly defend,
has been maintained from its first publication. . . .
The same authority of the Apostolic Churches will
uphold the other Gospels which we have in due
succession through them and according to their
usage, I mean those of Matthew and John " {Against
Marcion, iv. 5).
These three learned witnesses, Clement, Origen,
and Tertullian, who had access to earlier autho
rities now lost, and who affirm positively that
all their predecessors from the Apostolic age
onwards acknowledged the fourth Gospel as St.
John's, are really sufficient ; but since their evidence
is questioned, it is desirable to produce still earlier
witnesses. The Muratorian Fragment (a.d. 180) affirms that
" the author of the fourth Gospel is John, one of
the disciples." Irenaeus, about the same date,
says : " It is not possible that the Gospels can be
either more or fewer in number than they are. . . .
The Word, the artificer of all, He that sitteth upon
the cherubim, has given us the Gospel under
four aspects, but bound together by one spirit. . . .
The Gospel according to John relates His original,
effectual, and glorious generation from the Father,
thus declaring : ' In the beginning was the Word,
and the Word was with God, and the Word was
God.' Also, 'All things were made by Him, and
without Him was nothing made.' " Irenaeus also
testifies that St. John's Gospel was as much

3io IREN_£US ON ST. JOHN
recognized by the Gnostics as by the Church.
"Those who follow Valentinus," he says, "making
copious use of the Gospel according to John, shall
be proved to be totally in error by means of this
very Gospel. For since our opponents bear testi
mony to us, and make use of these documents,
our proof derived from them is firm and true"
{Against Heresies, bk. iii. ch. u, 12). Irenaeus
is a particularly valuable witness, because his own
teacher, Polycarp, had been a hearer of John. This
can be proved from Irenaeus' own writings. In
an epistle to his friend Florinus he says : " While
I was yet a boy, I saw thee in Lower Asia with
Polycarp, endeavouring to gain his approbation.
For I have a more vivid recollection of what
occurred at that time than of recent events, so
that I can even describe the place where the
blessed Polycarp used to sit and discourse — his
going out, too, and his coming in — his general
mode of life and personal appearance, together
with the discourses which he delivered to the
people ; also how he would speak of his familiar
intercourse with John, and with the rest of those
who had seen the Lord ; and how he would call
their words to remembrance. . . . These things,
through God's mercy which was upon me, I then
listened to attentively, and treasured them up, not
on paper, but in my heart ; and I am continually,
by God's grace, revolving these things accurately
in my mind" (quoted by Eusebius, o.c. bk. v.
ch. 20).

TATIAN AND JUSTIN 311
It is clearly impossible that Irenaeus, with such
exceptional opportunities of knowing the truth,
could be deceived with regard to the authorship of
the fourth Gospel.
Ascending now to an earlier generation, Tatian,
about a.d. 160, compiled a harmony of the four
Gospels called the Diatessaron, which, after being
long lost, has recently been recovered. It was
long denied by advanced critics that the Diates
saron made use of St. John's Gospel; but the
publication of a newly discovered Arabic version
of it by Ciasca in 1888 set the matter at rest.
The Diatessaron uses the present four Gospels,
and no others, and therefore it is evident that
already at that early date the canon of the four
Gospels was complete.1
Tatian's teacher, Justin Martyr, also knew and
used the fourth Gospel. This has been denied,
but is not really doubtful. Among other close
coincidences with St. John is the following. In the
sixty-first chapter of his first Apology, Justin de
scribes the rites of Christian Baptism as follows :
"As many as are persuaded and believe that what
we teach and say is true, and undertake to live
accordingly, are brought by us where there is
water, and are regenerated in the same manner
in which we were ourselves regenerated. For in
the Name of God the Father and Lord of the
1 A document cannot attain canonical rank at once, and
therefore St. John's Gospel must have existed much earlier
than a.d. 160.

312 THE GOSPEL OF PETER
universe, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and
of the Holy Spirit, they then receive the washing
with water. For Christ also said, ' Except ye be
born again, ye shall not enter into the kingdom
of heaven.' Now, that it is impossible for those
who have been once born to enter into their
mothers' wombs is manifest to all." The reader
who compares this passage with John iii. 4, 5,
and notices how awkwardly the statement about
a man entering into his mother's womb is intro
duced by Justin, and how naturally by St. John,
will have no difficulty in deciding on which side
the obligation lies.
It is sometimes maintained by advanced critics
that though Justin knew the fourth Gospel, he
valued it little ; but inasmuch as he makes it the
basis of his whole Christology, and continually
speaks of Jesus as the Word made flesh, it is clear
that he valued it highly.
The remains of Christian literature earlier than
Justin are scanty, but they yield distinct traces
of St. John's Gospel. The Gospel of Peter, a
Docetic work, discovered in 1885, and published
in 1892, is assigned by a preponderance of critical
opinion to the former half of the second century.1
Its use of the present canonical Gospels, including
that of St. John, is sufficiently evident. Dr.
Armitage Robinson says : " The unmistakable
1 Harnack, who thinks that Justin used it, dates it near the
beginning of the century. Dr. Sanday assigns it to A.D. 125,
Zahn to 130, Dr. Swete to 150.

BASILIDES AND VALENTINUS 313
acquaintance of the author with our four Evangel
ists deserves a special comment. He uses and
misuses each in turn. To him they all stand on
an equal footing. He lends no support to the
attempt which has been made to place a gulf of
separation between the fourth Gospel and the
rest, as regards the period or area of their accept
ance as canonical. Nor, again, does he countenance
the theory of the continued circulation in the
second century of an Urevangelium, or such a
prae-canonical Gospel as we feel must lie behind
our synoptists. He uses our Greek Gospels, and
there is no proof . . . that he knew of any other
Gospel record than these."
The two great Gnostic heretics, Basilides and
Valentinus, who flourished early in the second
century, undoubtedly recognized the authority of
the fourth Gospel. This is sufficiently evidenced
by the quotations from their writings given by
Hippolytus in his Refutation of all Heresies. In
the thirtieth chapter of the sixth book of this
work he quotes Valentinus as saying, " All that
have come before me are thieves and robbers " —
a clear reference to St. John x. 8. In his seventh
book he introduces the following passages from
Basilides: "And this is what is meant in the
Gospels, There was the true light which lighteth every
man coming into the world" ; and, " That everything
has its own proper seasons is sufficiently proved
by the words of the Saviour, Mine hour is not yet
come." The former passage contains a quotation

314 PAPIAS AND ARlSTlDES
from John i. 9, the latter passage from John ii. 4.
Valentinus flourished about a.d. 140, and Basilides
as early as 120, so that the origin of the fourth
Gospel is thrown back by this evidence to a.d. 100
at least. Hippolytus also tells us that the fourth
Gospel was freely used by the still earlier sects
of the Naassenes and Peratae, so that its date
must be placed well within the first century.
The orthodox evidence of this period is in exact
accordance with the heretical. Papias (a.d. 130),
whose works are unfortunately lost, almost certainly
knew the fourth Gospel. Eusebius tells us that
he quotes the First Epistle of John ; and since the
Gospel is admittedly by the same author, he probably
knew the Gospel also. There is, in fact, direct evi
dence to this effect. An ancient preface to St. John's
Gospel x says : " The Gospel of John was published
and given to the Churches by John; while he was
still in the body, as one named Papias, of Hierapolis,
a dear disciple of John, has related in his Exoterica,
i.e. at the conclusion of his five books [of Exposition
of the Oracles of the Lord]." Irenaeus also quotes
a comment of certain presbyters upon John xiv. 2,
" In my Father's house are many mansions," ap
parently from the work of Papias, as Lightfoot
and Harnack agree.
The Apology of Aristides, discovered in 1889,
describes the Incarnation in terms peculiar to the
fourth Gospel. " It is acknowledged," writes
1 This preface is published in the Wordsworth- White edition
of the Vulgate.

IGNATIUS AND ST. JOHN 315
Aristides, " that Jesus is the Son of the Most High
God, and that by the Holy Ghost He came down
from heaven for the salvation of men. And that
having been conceived of a holy virgin without
seed and incorruptibly, He took upon Him flesh,
and was manifested to men." Only St. John uses
the expression " came down from heaven " 1 in
connection with the Incarnation, and speaks of our
Lord's perfect human nature as " flesh." Eusebius
states that this Apology was presented to the
Emperor Hadrian, so that its date lies between
a.d. 117 and 128.2
The evidence of the still earlier writer Ignatius
(a.d. no) is more definite and copious. In one
place he reproduces John iii. 8 almost verbatim —
" He knoweth whence he cometh and whither he
goeth." He speaks of the Eucharist not, after the
manner of the Synoptists, as Christ's Body and
Blood, but as his Flesh and Blood. " I desire," he
says, "the bread of God which is the Flesh of Jesus
Christ, and I desire as drink His Blood, which is
love incorruptible" {cf John vi. 33, 51, 55). He
speaks of Jesus as the Logos (Word) of God, as
the Door of the Father, and as the Living Water.
He also calls the devil " the prince of this world."
All these phrases are peculiar to St. John.
1 Cf St. John iii. 13 ; vi. 33, 38, 41, 42, 50, 51, 58.
8 Dr. Rendel Harris thinks that Eusebius has made a mistake,
and that the Apology was really presented to Hadrian's
successor Antoninus Pius. I agree with Dr. Armitage Robinson
that this is not probable.

316 INTERNAL EVIDENCE
Upon the whole, the use of the fourth Gospel by
Ignatius must be regarded as established.
Ignatius's contemporary, Polycarp, does not
quote St. John's Gospel, but he quotes his First
Epistle, and this, as we have seen, is equivalent.
Internal Evidence. — The internal evidence agrees
with the external. The Gospel professes to be
written by an eye-witness (i. 14, cf. 1 John i. 1 ;
xix. 35; xxi. 24); it shows a remarkably accurate
knowledge of the topography of Palestine, of
Jewish opinions and customs, and of Jerusalem
and the temple as they were before the great
catastrophe of a.d. 70. It would have been exceed
ingly difficult for a writer of the second century
to have acquired the information which the fourth
Evangelist possesses. If the writer was not St.
John, he must have been an extremely able forger.
That he was a forger, few readers of the Gospel
will consent to believe.
Objections. — The objections brought against the
authenticity of the fourth Gospel are numerous,
but only a few are of decisive importance.
(1) It is said to be incredible that one who had
enjoyed familiar intercourse with Jesus on earth
could ever have come to regard Him as divine,
as the fourth Evangelist does (See xx. 28, ff).
This argument assumes that the original Apostles
regarded Jesus as a mere man, and that it was
St. Paul, who never saw our Lord, who first taught
that He was equal to God. But we have no right
to assume this. Our business as critics is to

OBJECTIONS TO ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL 317
ascertain what documents, on the actual evidence,
are to be regarded as apostolic, and from these
to ascertain what the Apostles believed about our
Lord. To make up our minds first of all that
the Apostles held Unitarian views, and then to
reject all the documents which contradict this
supposition, is not criticism. Of course, if Jesus
worked no miracles and never rose from the dead,
it is obvious that the original Apostles would never
have come to believe in His divinity. But if, as
not only the fourth Gospel, but the whole New
Testament, affirms, He actually did these things,
and in addition ascended into heaven, a belief in
His divinity might naturally arise, even among
the Apostles themselves. St. Matthew's Gospel
affirms that after the Resurrection He claimed all
power in heaven and earth, and directed all man
kind to be baptized in the Name of the Father, and
of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (Matt, xxviii.
18, 19). This is as clear an affirmation of our
Lord's divinity as anything in the fourth Gospel.1
(2) It is said that the theology, and especially the
Christology, of St. John's Gospel is more developed
than that of the Synoptic Gospels.
This, if true, is only what is to be expected in
a work written twenty or thirty years later. But
the Christology of St. John is not really much in
advance of that of St. Paul and St. Peter. It is
only somewhat more fully expressed. The idea
that Jesus is a pre-existent divine Being who
' This subject will be further considered in a later chapter.

318 THE SPEECHES IN ST. JOHN
became incarnate for the salvation of the world,
is found as certainly in Romans and Colossians,
and even in i Peter, as in the fourth Gospel.
If St. Paul in a.d. 56 could speak of Jesus as " He
that is over all God blessed for ever " (Rom. ix. 5),1
St. John could write in a.d. 90, " And the Word
was God." There is hardly a statement in St. John,
either about the Person of Christ or about the
Holy Spirit, which cannot be paralleled in the
Pauline Epistles.
(3) It is said that the speeches of Jesus are
in the style of the Evangelist, and therefore pre
sumably untrustworthy.
But this is also true of the speeches in St. Mark's
Gospel, and even of those in St. Matthew's. The
fact that St. John is translating from the Aramaic,
and is presenting, not ordinary discourses, but
carefully selected sayings bearing upon our Lord's
superhuman claims,2 is sufficient to explain most of
the facts. If the fourth Evangelist was really the
son of Zebedee, there is every reason to suppose
that his report of our Lord's sayings is at least
true in substance.
(4) Another difficulty is that St. John seems to
contradict the Synoptic Gospels in several important
particulars. He represents our Lord's ministry
1 For a demonstration that this is the true sense of the
passage, see Sanday and Headlam's Commentary, in loc.
8 The Evangelist expressly states that he writes with the
purpose of producing faith in our Lord's Divine Sonship. This
purpose regulates the choice both of sayings and incidents
(see John xx. 26-31).

ST. JOHN AND THE SYNOPTISTS 319
as lasting three years instead of one. He records
a number of visits to Judaea, which are entirely
unnoticed by the Synoptists. He represents the
Crucifixion as taking place before, instead of after,
the Passover.
In reply, it may be said that the Synoptists
nowhere state how long the ministry lasted. As
to the Judaean ministry, although they do not relate
it, they imply it. See, for example, Luke xiii. 34,
" O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, . . . how often would
I have gathered thy children together, even as
a hen gathereth her own brood under her wings,
and ye would not ! " The reason why the Synoptists
do not record the visits to Jerusalem, is probably
that St. John alone accompanied our Lord on
these occasions, the other Apostles being left
behind in Galilee to carry on the work. St. John
apparently possessed a house at Jerusalem, and so
was able to entertain Jesus suitably.
The solution of the difficulty about the Passover
is probably this. The proper time for eating the
Passover was Friday night, as St. John states,
but Jesus, knowing that He would be put to death
before this, ate the Passover on Thursday night
with His disciples, as the Synoptists record.
Conclusion. — We conclude, therefore, that the
evidence for the genuineness of the fourth Gospel,
both external and internal, is entirely satisfactory,
and that the objections raised by negative critics
are unimportant. This is not only the judgment
of orthodox critics, who may be supposed to be

320 DRUMMOND ON THE GENUINENESS
biassed in favour of the Gospel, but also of many
Unitarians, to whom the doctrines it contains are
particularly distasteful. Dr. J. Drummond, for
instance, a pupil of Dr. J. J. Tayler and Dr.
Martineau, both strong opponents of the genuine
ness, has recently issued a learned and able
defence of the Johannine authorship. He writes :
" In the last quarter of the second century, and
subsequently, if we except the shadowy Alogi, the
Gospel was universally, and without hesitation,
received as the work of the Apostle John, who
composed it at Ephesus in his old age, after the
publication of the other Gospels. This, then, is
the view, which, following a well-established rule
in literary questions, we are to accept, unless
adequate reason can be shown for not doing so. . . .
Of course, I do not say that this is conclusive,
for there may be an explanation which it is no
longer possible to discover; but I do say that
the argument is a real and strong one, and that
those who can see nothing in it, simply show
that they are uncritical, and unable to estimate
the force of evidence." He concludes as follows :
"We have now gone carefully through the
arguments against the reputed authorship of the
Gospel, and on the whole have found them
wanting. . . . The external evidence (be it said
with all due respect to the Alogi is all on one
side, and for my part I cannot readily repel its
force. A considerable mass of internal evidence
is in harmony with the external. A number of

THE OLD TESTAMENT 321
difficulties which have been pressed against the
conclusion thus indicated, melt away on nearer
examination, and those which remain are not
sufficient to weigh down the balance. In literary
questions we cannot look for demonstration, and
where opinion is so much divided, we must feel
some uncertainty in our conclusions ; but on weigh
ing the arguments for and against to the best of
my power, I must give my own judgment in favour
of the Johannine authorship."1
VII. — The Old Testament
Old Testament criticism is still so immature
that it is impossible to speak very positively about
its results. There seems, however, to be a fairly
general consensus of opinion upon the following
points. The prophetical books are in the main the work
of the prophets to whom they are traditionally
assigned. The second part of Isaiah, however (cc.
xl.-lxvi.), was written in the time of the Captivity.
Of the minor prophets, Joel is probably post-exilic,
and Jonah is an allegory rather than a prophecy.
Daniel, which is not by the Jews reckoned among
the prophets, is probably an Apocalypse of the
second century b.c.
1 Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel, p. 79 ff.,
p. 514. Another learned Unitarian defence of the Gospel is Dr.
Ezra Abbot's External Evidence of the Fourth Gospel. The
present writer began the investigation with a decided prejudice
against the authenticity, but found the evidence too strong to be
resisted. 21

322 THE OLD TESTAMENT
The Pentateuch, traditionally ascribed to Moses,
is only partly his. The Ten Commandments and
the Laws associated with it (Exodus xx. — xxiii.), and
certain other parts of the Pentateuch, are probably
Mosaic, but the work as a whole is a compilation
of documents of different dates, brought into its
present form during the Captivity or later. Joshua
probably formed originally part of the Pentateuch.
The historical books, Judges, Samuel, Kings,
Ezra, and Nehemiah, are valuable historical authori
ties, based to a large extent on contemporary
documents, but often defective in arrangement
and chronology. Less valuable as history is the
work of the Chronicler, who is too much inclined
to idealize the past. Still less valuable is Esther.
The criticism of the Psalter has led to few
decisive results, the indications of date being ex
tremely scanty. There is, however, a tendency
to ascribe fewer Psalms to David than formerly.
Job is a dramatic poem of the period of the
Captivity. Proverbs probably contains genuine Solomonic
sayings, but is, as a compilation, of much later
date. Ecclesiastes is to be placed in the Persian,
possibly even in the Greek, period.
. The Song of Songs is not by Solomon, but is
of early date. Whatever may have been its
original meaning, it was as an allegory that it was
admitted into the Canon of Scripture.

INSPIRATION AND CRITICISM 323

APPENDIX I
INSPIRATION AND CRITICISM
In this book a frankly critical attitude is adopted towards
the Christian Scriptures. It is not assumed that they are
inspired or free from error, or in any special degree trust
worthy. They are regarded simply as ancient records, and
are subjected to the same critical examination as other ancient
records. At the same time it is important for the reader to under
stand clearly, that the doctrine of Biblical Inspiration, rightly
understood, is no obstacle to the free criticism of the Bible.
Inspiration admits of degrees. The New Testament is on
a higher level of inspiration than the Old, and even in the
same Testament there are great differences of spiritual level.
Isaiah is more fully inspired than Judges or Esther, and St.
John's Gospel than St. Mark's.
Again, belief in inspiration is quite consistent with the
admission of a large human element in the sacred books.
The prophet or inspired writer is not a passive instrument in
the hand of God, like a harp in the hand of a player. Nor is
he a mere scribe, writing by dictation at the mouth of an angel
or of God Himself. God's message is generally mediated
through the spiritual experience and character of the prophet,
and bears the impress of his personality. Inspiration acts not
by superseding the prophet's natural spiritual insight, but by
heightening it.
It follows from this view of inspiration that criticism of
the sacred records is not only permissible, but is 'even a
duty. Nor must criticism, as some maintain, be confined to
the historical and literary features of revelation. The sub
stance of the revelation must itself be freely criticised from the
spiritual and religious standpoint. The personal equation
must be allowed for. The eternal truth must be disentangled

324 OLD TESTAMENT DIFFICULTIES
from the historical setting in which it occurs. The imper
fections which necessarily characterize the earlier stages of an
historical revelation, must be recognized as such, and dis
carded. If the religious, criticism of revelation is not allowed,
the imprecatory Psalms must logically be regarded as on a
level with the Sermon on the Mount, and the ferocious
exploits of an Ehud or a Jehu as worthy of the imitation of
Christian people.1 There is in man a faculty of spiritual
insight which is given for the very purpose of discerning
between the spiritually true, and the spiritually imperfect or
false. "Beloved," says St. John, "believe not every spirit,
but try the spirits whether they are of God." 2 " Moses," says
our Lord, " because of the hardness of your hearts suffered
you to put away your wives : but from the beginning it was
not so." 3 St. Paul says : " If any man think himself to be
a prophet, or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things
that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord " ;
" He that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is
judged of no man." 4

APPENDIX II
OLD TESTAMENT DIFFICULTIES
The moral difficulties of the Old Testament were felt as
early as the second century, when the Gnostics, especially
Marcion, maintained that the Old Testament is too imperfect
to be the work of the Supreme God, and must therefore be
a revelation from an inferior being, or Demiurge. The Deists
of the eighteenth century held that no revelation which con-

1 One of the capital errors of Puritanism was its over-estimation
of the spiritual value of the Old Testament.
1 i John iv. i.
3 Matt. xix. 8.
4 i Cor. xiv. 37 ; ii. 15.

OLD TESTAMENT DIFFICULTIES 325
tained any imperfection could be real, and they therefore
rejected the Old Testament with great unanimity. The
Deistic point of view is not entirely unrepresented even now.
Mr. Blatchford, for example, says : " I cannot believe that the
Bible is the word of God. For the word of God would be
above criticism, and beyond disproof, and the Bible is not
above criticism nor beyond disproof. I cannot believe that
any religion has been revealed to man by God. Because a
revealed religion would be perfect, but no known religion is
perfect" {God and my Neighbour, p. 9).
In this matter, however, the doctrine of Evolution has been
of great assistance to orthodox apologists. It has familiarized
men's minds with the idea that in Nature perfection is gained
not at once, but by slow degrees, and has thus rendered it
credible and even probable that God, if He revealed Himself
at all, would reveal Himself gradually. This is precisely what,
according to the Christian view of the matter, He has done.
Christianity accepts the Old Testament, but only as an
inferior and preliminary dispensation. The Old Testament is
essentially a progressive revelation. It advances gradually
from more imperfect to less imperfect religious and ethical
ideas. It also frankly recognizes its own imperfections, and
points forward to a time when it will be superseded by a
perfect and eternal covenant (Isa. Iv. 3 ; Jer. xxxi. 31, xxxii. 40 ;
Ezek. xxxvii. 26, xi. 19). It is not fair, therefore, to judge the
Old Testament by a standard of abstract perfection to which
it makes no claim. Its true justification is the fact that it
contained the germ of higher things, and was destined in due
course to develop into the religion of Christ. If Christianity
can be justified, then the seed from which it sprang is ipso
facto justified. To find fault with the Old Testament for its
imperfection is like finding fault with an embryo because it
is not yet a perfect animal.

326 THE CHRISTIAN DOCUMENTS

LITERATURE
{a) INSPIRATION OF SCRIPTURE
Sanday, Inspiration, and Oracles of God; Gore, essay in
Lux Mundi; W. Lee, Inspiration of Holy Scripture.
(_) Old and New Testament
Bennett and Adeney, Biblical Introduction.
(.) Old Testament
Driver, Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament;
Ryle, Canon of the Old Testament ; Buhl, Canon and Text of
the Old Testament; Kirkpatrick, Divine Library ofthe Old
Testament; Ottley, Aspects of the Old Testament.
{d) New Testament
Salmon, Introduction to New Testament; Westcott, Canon
of New Testament ; also Introductions to New Testament by
Weiss, Godet, Jiilicher, Zahn.
(_) Popular Works
The Cambridge Companion to the Bible ; Peters, The Old
Testament and the New Scholarship; Mackay, The Church
man's Introduction to the Old Testament; P. Smith, How we
got our Bible, and How God inspired the Bible; A. F. W.
Ingram, Old Testament Difficulties, and New Testament
Difficulties (S.P.C.K) ; J. M. Wilson, Evolution and the Holy
Scriptures (S.P.C.K).

CHAPTER XIX
THE TEACHING OF JESUS1
Summary. — The religious teaching of Jesus is shown to be in
full accordance with Natural Religion, and His ethical
teaching to be ideally perfect. It is argued that He must
be regarded as at least a prophet, with a unique mission
from God.
It was stated in c. xvii. that the teaching of
Jesus appears prima facie to be in accordance
with the principles of Natural Religion, and that
its moral precepts are of the highest excellence.
In this chapter these positions are established by
a detailed examination of Christ's teaching.
I. — Christianity a Religion, not an Ethical
System
Christianity is distinctively a religion, not an
ethical system like Confucianism and Taouism.
This must be carefully borne in mind in attempting
to estimate the value of its ethical creed. Its
ethical precepts are, no doubt, ethically beautiful,
but they rest upon a supernatural basis which
1 The quotations in this chapter are from the A.V., revised by
the help of the R.V. and other modern authorities.
327

328 CHRIST'S ETHICS BASED ON RELIGION
alone gives them their true meaning and justifica
tion. Christian ethics starts with the assumption
that man is an immortal being, placed in this world
to qualify himself by the practice of piety and
virtue for a higher state of existence. Its precepts,
therefore, differ considerably in substance, and
still more in spirit, from those of teachers who
regard this present life as the only one.
II. — Christianity a Supernatural Revelation,
not a Philosophy
Christianity is not a product of philosophical
speculation, but claims to be a direct and final
revelation from the Supreme Being. From a
certain point of view it is, no doubt, as the Deists
insisted, " a republication of natural religion," but
it is a republication of it by authority, and with
many improvements. Without raising the question
— which will be discussed in the next chapter —
whether Jesus claimed in any sense to be a Divine
Being, it may be stated as beyond controversy that
He claimed to be a prophet, and the greatest of
prophets. He recognized the inspiration of other
prophets, including His contemporary John, but
He placed Himself in a higher category altogether.
Those who build upon His sayings, build (He
says) upon an unshakable rock (Matt. vii. 24).
To receive His words is to receive the words of
God (Matt. x. 40). Those who wilfully reject His
teaching will be severely condemned at the judg
ment (Matt, xi. 20). Accordingly, we find Him

TEACHING ABOUT GOD 329
handling freely, and subjecting to drastic revision,
the precepts of the Old Testament, even those
attributed to God Himself (Matt. v. -vii.), and
promulgating His new teaching with all the
authority of an ambassador sent from heaven
with plenary powers (Matt. ix. 2, etc.).
III. — Christ's Teaching about God
The character of every religion is mainly de
termined by its teaching about God, and it is
accordingly to this that we first turn in order to
estimate the religious worth of Christianity.
Christianity endorses all that Reason and Philo
sophy teach about the transcendence and omni
potence of the Deity, but it lays the chief stress
upon His personality and His love. In Christ's
teaching God is not predominantly Lord and King,
but " Our Father which art in heaven " (Matt. vi. 9).
He loves all men, even the wicked. "He maketh
His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and
sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust " (Matt.
v. 45). " He is kind unto the unthankful and to
the evil " (Luke vi. 35). He is ever ready to for
give men their sins, on condition that they forgive
one another (Matt. vi. 14). When the sinner goes
astray, God seeks him as a shepherd does a lost
sheep (Matt, xviii. 12). He earnestly desires all
men to be saved. " It is not the will of your Father
which is in heaven, that one of these little ones
should perish " (Matt, xviii. 14). " There is joy in the
presence of the angels of God over one sinner that

330 GOD'S COMPASSIONATE LOVE
repenteth " (Luke xv. io). Christ's characteristic
teaching about our Father in heaven is focussed
in the exquisite parable of the Prodigal Son. The
Prodigal leaves his home, and deeply grieves his
kind Father. Yet his Father does not cast him off.
No sooner does the Prodigal begin to return, than
his Father is filled with tender compassion. While
he is yet a great way off, his Father sees him, has
compassion on him, runs to him, falls on his neck,
and kisses him. The Prodigal, , who is deeply
penitent, asks to be no longer treated as a son,
but as a hired servant ; 1 but his Father bids the
attendants bring forth quickly the best robe, and
put it on him, and put a ring on his hand, and
shoes on his feet, and kill the fatted calf, and make
merry, " for this my son was dead, and is alive
again ; he was lost, and is found " (Luke xv. 1 1 ff).
Christ brings out wonderfully God's individual
izing love for each single soul. Judaism had
emphasized mainly God's love for the holy nation,
but Christ taught that God's providence extends
to the smallest details of daily life. " Are not two
sparrows sold for a farthing ? and one of them
shall not fall on the ground without your Father.
But as for you, the very hairs of your head are
all numbered " (Matt. x. 29, 30). " If God so clothe
the grass of the field, . . . shall He not much more
clothe you, O ye of little faith ? " (Matt. vi. 30).
" Your Father knoweth what things ye have need
of before ye ask Him " (Matt. vi. 8).
1 See the text of Westcott and Hort.

GOD LOVES THE MEEK AND LOWLY 331
God's willingness to give both temporal and
spiritual blessings to those who ask is often insisted
on. "What man is there of you, whom if his son
ask a loaf, will he give him a stone ? Or if he
ask a fish, will he give him a serpent ? If ye then,
being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your
children, how much more shall your Father which
is in heaven give good things to them that ask
Him?" (Matt. vii. 9-1 1) — or, as St. Luke records
the saying, " How much more shall your heavenly
Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask
Him?" (Luke xi. 13).
Christ showed particular anxiety to bring re
ligion within the reach of the humble, the unedu
cated, the poor, and the young. The Rabbis and
legalists of Israel seemed to imagine that God
cared particularly for the learned, and for those
who kept the Law with pedantic accuracy. Christ's
teaching was the very opposite of all this. "I
thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth,
because Thou hast hid these things from the wise
and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.
Yea, Father : for so it seemed good in Thy sight "
(Matt. xi. 25). " Have ye never read, Out of the
mouth of babes and sucklings Thou hast perfected
praise?" (Matt. xxi. 16). " Whosoever shall humble
himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the
kingdom of heaven " (Matt, xviii. 4). " Take heed that
ye despise not one of these little ones ; for I say unto
you, That in heaven their angels do always behold
the face of My Father which is in heaven " (xviii. 10).

332 GOD'S JUSTICE PROVES HIS LOVE
" Blessed are ye poor : for yours is the kingdom
of God " (Luke vi. 20). " Blessed are the poor in
spirit : for theirs is the kingdom of heaven "
(Matt. v. 3). " The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me,
because He hath anointed Me to preach the Gospel
to the poor" (Luke iv. 18). "Go and shew John:
. . . the poor have the Gospel preached to them "
(Matt. xi. 4-5). The essence of Christ's teaching
on this subject is nowhere better expressed than
in the glorious Magnificat of His holy mother —
"He hath scattered them that are proud in the
imaginations of their heart. He hath put down
princes from their thrones, and exalted them of
low degree. The hungry He hath filled with good
things ; and the rich He hath sent empty away "
(Lukei. 51-3).
Christ did not, however, emphasize exclusively
the mercy and benevolence of God. If God is a
loving Father, He is also a just Judge, distributing
to every man according to his works. It is to be
observed, however, that the anger of God is chiefly
directed against those who sin against the Law
of Love. In the striking parable of the Unmerciful
Servant, God is represented as saying, " O thou
wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt, because
thou desiredst me : shouldest not thou also have had
compassion on thy fellowservant, even as I had
pity on thee ? " And our Lord adds : " And his
lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tor
mentors, till he should pay all that was due unto
him. So likewise shall My Heavenly Father do

RELIGION AND WORSHIP 333
also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not
every one his brother their trespasses " (Matt xviii.
32-5). Severity of this kind emphasizes rather than
obscures the truth that God is Love. God is so
fully Love, and so desirous that Love should
everywhere prevail, that He regards uncharitable
conduct as the worst of sins, and punishes it
accordingly. IV. — Religion and Worship
Jesus insisted strongly on the absolute and
undivided homage that the human soul owes to
its Creator, and many of His most striking sayings
deal with this fundamental truth. " No man can
serve two masters : for either he will hate the
one, and love the other ; or else he will hold to one,
and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and
mammon " (Matt. vi. 24). " Seek ye first the
kingdom of God, and His righteousness ; and all
these things shall be added to you " (Matt. vi. 33).
" If any man come to Me, and hate not his father,
and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren,
and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be
My disciple " (Luke xiv. 26). It was not, however,
a slavish fear of God that Jesus encouraged, but
filial love. " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with
all thy mind. This is the first and great command
ment " (Matt. xxii. 37-8).
Jesus protested earnestly against the idea that
religion consists mainly of the scrupulous per-

334 EMPTY CEREMONIALISM CONDEMNED
formance of external ceremonies. The pedantic
and unspiritual glorification of the letter of the
Law and the insistence upon trivial traditions,
which characterized contemporary Rabbinism, were
criticized by him with great severity. " Except
your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness
of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case
enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. v. 20).
" The sabbath was made for man, and not man
for the sabbath" (Mark ii. 27). "It is lawful to
do well on the sabbath day" (Matt. xii. 12). "Ye
have made the word of God of no effect for the
sake of your tradition. . . . Not that which goeth
into the mouth defileth a man; but that which
cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man. . . .
Evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications,
thefts, false witness, railings : these are the things
which defile a man : but to eat with unwashen hands
defileth not a man " (Matt. xv. 6 ff. ). " Now do ye
Pharisees make clean the outside of the cup and the
platter ; but your inward part is full of ravening
and wickedness. . . . Woe unto you, Pharisees ! for
ye tithe mint and rue and all manner of herbs,
and pass over judgment and the love of God :
these ought ye to have done, and not to leave
the other undone " (Luke xi. 39 ff). " God is
one ; and there is none other but He : and
to love Him with all the heart, and with all the
understanding, and with all the strength, and to
love his neighbour as himself, is much more than
all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices" (Mark. xii.

PERSONAL RELIGION 335
32).1 " The true worshippers shall worship the
Father in spirit and in truth : for the Father seeketh
such to worship Him. God is a Spirit : and they
that worship Him must worship Him in spirit
and in truth " (John iv. 23-4).
The religion that Jesus approved was personal
religion, not the religion of mere rites and cere
monies. According to Him, the kingdom of God
or of heaven, which He came to found, was, in
its fundamental aspect, the reign of God in the
believer's soul. This personal, living relation of
the soul to God was represented by Jesus as the
believer's most cherished possession. It is the
pearl of great price, to buy which a man must
sell all that he has. It is the treasure hidden in
a field, " which when a man hath found, he hideth,
and for joy thereof goeth and selleth all that he
hath, and buyeth that field" (Matt. xiii. 44). It
is the white stone, with a new name written therein,
"which no man knoweth saving he that receiveth
it" (Rev. ii. 17). According to many authorities,
this is the true meaning of the saying, " Behold,
the kingdom of God is within you " (Luke xvii. 21).2
In accordance with the practical character of
His religion, Jesus repeatedly declared that the
Service of God necessarily involved the Service
of Man. The first commandment was to love God,
1 Jesus did not utter, but He highly approved, this sentiment.
8 So Godet, McClellan, Field, R.V. The context, however,
favours the rendering, "The kingdom of God is among you,"
and this is adopted, among others, by Plummer, Meyer, Weiss,
Alford, and Bengel.

336 GOOD WORKS
but the second was to love man. " The second
commandment," said Jesus, " is like unto it, Thou
shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two
commandments hang all the Law and the prophets "
(Matt. xxii. 39-40). Great stress was laid by Him
upon good works. " Not every one that saith unto
Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of
heaven ; but he that doeth the will of My Father
which is in heaven. . . . Wherefore by their fruits
ye shall know them " (Matt. vii. 20 ff). The future
judgment is declared, both in the parables and in
plain dogmatic statements, to be according to works
(Matt. xvi. 27). Works of mercy are frequently re
presented as the best title to eternal happiness.
" Come, ye blessed of My Father, inherit the
kingdom prepared for you from the foundation
of the world : for I was an hungred, and ye gave
Me meat : I was thirsty, and ye gave Me drink : I
was a stranger, and ye took Me in : naked, and
ye clothed Me : I was sick, and ye visited Me : I
was in prison, and ye came unto Me. . . . Verily I
say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto
one of the least of these My brethren, ye have done
it unto Me" (Matt. xxv. 34 ff).
Jesus endorsed the Jewish opinion, generally
current since the Captivity, that among the most
notable duties of religion are (1) Prayer, (2) Fasting,
and (3) Almsgiving.
Prayer. According to Jesus, the great requisite
of successful prayer is Faith ; the great hindrance
to it, want of Faith. "Ask, and it shall be given

PRAYER 337
you ; seek, and ye shall find ; knock, and it shall
be opened unto you : for every one that asketh re
ceiveth ; and he 'that seeketh findeth ; and to him
that knocketh it shall be opened " (Matt. vii. 7-8).
" If ye have faith, and doubt not, ye shall not only
do this which is done to the fig tree, but also if ye
shall say to this mountain, Be thou removed, and
be thou cast into the sea ; it shall be done. And all
things, whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing,
ye shall receive" (Matt. xxi. 21-2). "Verily, verily, I
say unto you, If ye shall ask anything of the Father,
He will give it you in My Name. Hitherto have
ye asked nothing in My Name : ask, and ye shall
receive, that your joy may be fulfilled " (John xvi.
23-4). These sayings must of course be understood
with the limitations which are elsewhere expressed
or implied. For example, the thing asked for must
be good (Matt. vii. 11), and in accordance with
God's will (vi. 10); „also the asker must be in a
right relation to God (John ix. 31 ; 1 John iii. 22).
In opposition to the Pharisees, who for pretence
made long and public prayers, Jesus recommended
short and private petitions. " When ye pray, ye
shall not be as the hypocrites are : for they love to
pray and stand in the synagogues and in the corners
of the streets, that they may be seen of men. Verily
I say unto you, They have received their reward,
But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thine inner
chamber, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray
to thy Father which is in secret ; and thy Father
which seeth in secret shall reward thee. But when
22

338 THE LORD'S PRAYER
ye pray, use not vain repetitions, as the Gentiles do :
for they think that they shall be heard for their
much speaking" (Matt. vi. 5-7).
Our Lord's precepts about prayer mainly have
reference to unpremeditated, extempore prayer ; but
it is clear from the fact that He taught His
followers the Pater Noster, that he did not reject
the use of precomposed forms. Some have denied
this, arguing from Matt. vi. 9 (" After this manner
therefore pray ye ") that the Lord's Prayer is a
moflel, not a form. But the words of Jesus in
St. Luke's Gospel are quite express : " When ye pray,
say, Father, hallowed be Thy Name " (xi. 2). The
teaching of the Lord's Prayer is important. From
its first words we learn that God loves us, and
that we ought to love one another in Him. By
the use of our for my, and of us for me, we are
taught to pray for others as often as we pray for
ourselves. We are further instructed that God's
glory and the advancement of His kingdom should
be the chief aim of our lives ; that we should
strive to do God's will on earth as perfectly as
the angels do it in heaven ; that we should pray
for nothing but what we may fairly suppose to be
in accordance with God's will ; that, consequently,
we should pray mainly for spiritual benefits, and
when we pray for things temporal, should do so
with reserve, asking for necessaries, not for luxuries ;
that we are sinners depending upon God's mercy
for forgiveness, and that we can only obtain it on
condition that we forgive others ; that we are weak,

FASTING 339
and therefore should avoid temptation, but that
when temptation comes upon us without our seeking
it, God will save us, if we ask Him, from our
ghostly enemy.
There are Jewish parallels to some clauses of
the Lord's Prayer ; but as a composition it is of
undoubted originality, and condenses in a striking
way some of the most fundamental of the ideas of
Jesus. Fasting. — Jesus laid less stress upon fasting than
a reader of the Authorized Version would suppose.
The allusions to it in Matt. xvii. 21, Mark ix. 29,
disappear from the Revised Version. At the same
time, it is undeniable that He intended His followers
to make a moderate and rational use of this aid
to devotion. He speaks of public fasts in Mark ii.
20: "The days will come, when the bridegroom
shall be taken away from them, and then will they
fast in that day." Private fasts are alluded to in
the Sermon on the Mount : " When ye fast, be not,
as the hypocrites, of a sad countenance : for they
disfigure their faces, that they may be seen of men
to fast. . . . But thou, when thou fastest, anoint
thy head, and wash thy face ; that thou be not
seen of men to fast, but of thy Father which is
in secret" (Matt. vi. 16-8).
Almsgiving. — Almsgiving naturally takes a pro
minent place in a religion of universal benevolence.
The following are the most striking sayings :
" When thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know
what thy right hand doeth " (Matt. vi. 3), " Give

34o ALMSGIVING
alms of your meat and drink,1 and, lo, all things are
clean unto you " (Luke xi. 41). " Sell that ye have,
and give alms ; provide yourselves bags which wax
not old, a treasure in the heavens that faileth not,
where no thief approacheth, neither moth corrupteth"
(Luke xii. 33). " Give to him that asketh thee, and
from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou
away " (Matt. v. 42). " When thou makest a feast,
call the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind :
and thou shalt be blessed ; for they cannot recom
pense thee : for thoii shalt be recompensed at the
resurrection of the just" (Luke xiv. 13-4).
Besides these three recognized religious duties
there was another upon which Jesus laid great
stress, viz. —
Repentance. — The duty of repentance and confes
sion of sin is clearly recognized in the Old Testament,
especially in the writings of the exilic and post-
exilic period. Rabbinic theology also recognized
its importance in theory, but nullified it in practice,
by associating with it an arrogant doctrine of
human merit. Jesus insisted that repentance should
be really humble and sincere. His most charac
teristic teaching on the subject is contained in
the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican.
In this parable the Pharisee, who represents
the Rabbinic point of view, confesses not his
sins, but his merits — " God, I thank thee, that I am
1 This somewhat free rendering brings out the meaning of
a difficult expression. §ee the Revised Version and the
commentators,

REPENTANCE 341
not as other men are, extortioners, unjust, adul
terers, or even as this publican. I fast twice in the
week, I give tithes of all my income." The publican,
on the other hand, standing afar off, does not lift
up so much as his eyes to heaven, but smites upon
his breast, saying, " God be merciful to me, the
sinner." Christ's comment is, " I tell you, this man
went down to his house justified rather than the
other : for every one that exalteth himself shall be
abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be
exalted " (Luke xviii. 10 ff).
It is important to observe that Jesus required
repentance and confession of sin, not only from the
unconverted, but also from practising Christians.
A striking saying to this effect is given by St. Luke
(xvii. 10): "When ye shall have done all those
things which are commanded you, say, We are un
profitable servants : we have done that which was
our duty to do." Again, the Lord's Prayer, which
is meant to be used by Christians alone, contains
a prayer for the pardon of daily sins. There
are Christians in our day who profess to be
absolutely sinless and to need no repentance ;
but it is to be feared that such are self-deceived.
Perfectionists of this type would probably be
classed by Jesus with the Pharisee, rather than
with the publican.
Ceremonial Worship. — Although Jesus warned His
followers against unreal ceremonialism, and laid
stress on the spiritual and practical aspects of
religion, He did not undervalue formal public

342 CEREMONIAL WORSHIP
worship and edifying ritual.1 He was zealous for
the sanctity of the temple (Matt. xxi. 13), and
constantly attended its worship. He frequented
the liturgical services ofthe synagogues (Matt. iv. 23,
etc.). He founded a visible Church (Matt xvi. 1 8), with
social worship (Matt xviii. 20), centring in a social
sacrament (1 Cor. xi. 25). Even the kingdom of God,
which from one point of view is the reign of God in
the individual soul, is from another point of view
the visible Church which exists to establish God's
reign. The identity of the kingdom of God with
the Church is implied in the parables of the Tares
and of the Net, and is expressly taught in Matt.
xvi. 18. V. — The Universality of Christianity
Some critics maintain that Jesus never intended
to found a universal religion, and that this idea
first occurred to the Apostle St. Paul. Appeal
is made to two classes of passages — one class in
which He speaks of the perpetual obligation of the
Law (Matt. v. 18; vii. 12; Luke xvi. 17); and
another class in which He restricts His own and
the Apostles' mission to Israel (Matt. x. 5 ; xv. 24).
(a) It is certain, nevertheless, that Jesus regarded
the authority of the Law as lapsing with His advent.
"The Law and the prophets," he says, "were
1 See the really admirable treatment of this subject by Cranmer
in the Preface Of Ceremonies, prefixed to the Book of Common
Prayer.

JESUS (NOT PAUL) THE FOUNDER 343
until John : since that time the kingdom of God
is preached, and every man presseth into it " (Luke
xvi. 16). It is true that He adds, " But it is easier
for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of
the Law to fail " ; but this does not mean that the
Law continues in force, but that it is " fulfilled "
in the Gospel. It was a favourite idea of Jesus
that His teaching was not new, but rooted in the
past ; not a reversal of old teaching, but a develop
ment of it; not5 an entirely fresh Law, but the old
transformed. The eternal Law of which He speaks,
is not the old Law as Moses left it, but the same
Law as perfected by Himself. That this is the
true sense of His words is proved by a number
of quite unambiguous passages. Thus He says of
the greatest prophet of the Old Dispensation :
" Notwithstanding, he that is least in the kingdom
of heaven is greater than he" (Matt. xi. 11). The
incompatibility of the Law and the Gospel is
strikingly taught in Matt. ix. 16-7 : " No man
putteth a piece of undressed cloth unto an old
garment; for that which is put in to fill it up
taketh from the garment, and a worse rent is
made. Neither do men put new wine into old
wine-skins : else the wine-skins break, and the
wine runneth out, and the wine-skins perish :
but they put new wine into fresh wine-skins, and
both are preserved." It appears to have been
the intention of Jesus that the Law should continue
to be observed by the Jews until the destruction
of the Temple, but that with this event the Old

344 CHRIST'S RELIGION UNIVERSAL
Dispensation should finally close (Matt. xxiv. 2;
Luke xxi. 5; John iv. 21).
(A) It is also certain that Jesus intended to
found a universal religion. The apparent state
ments to the contrary refer only to our Lord's own
ministry, and to that of the Apostles during His
lifetime. Many striking sayings of Jesus deal with
the world-wide extension of His Church. "This
Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all
the world for a witness unto all nations ; and then
shall the end come " (Matt. xxiv. 14). " Many shall
come from the east and west, and shall sit down with
Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of
heaven. But the children of the kingdom shall be
cast into the outer darkness " (Matt. viii. 1 1-2). " He
that soweth the good seed is the Son of Man ; the
field is the world" (Matt. xiii. 37-8). "The kingdom
of God shall be taken from you, and given to a
nation bringing forth the fruits thereof" (Matt. xxi.
43). " He shall sit upon the throne of His glory : and
before Him shall be gathered all nations " (Matt. xxv.
31-2). " Go ye, and teach all nations" (Matt, xxviii.
19). " It behoved the Christ to suffer, and to rise from
the dead the third day : and that repentance and
remission of sins should be preached in His Name
among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem " (Luke
xxiv. 46-7).1 It will be observed that the sayings
spoken before the Resurrection are as decisive as
those spoken afterwards.
1 Christ Himself ministered in Samaria (John iv.), and among
the heathen (Matt. xv. 21-39 i _/• Jonn x"- 20 ff.).

THE FUTURE LIFE 34.
VI. — The Future Life
In no respect are the Old and the New Testaments
more sharply contrasted than in their attitude
towards a future life. The Old Testament appeals
to motives which are earthly and transitory.
Children are to honour their parents that their
days may be long in the land which the Lord
their God gives them. The patience of Job is
rewarded by a fresh family, a double number of
sheep, camels, oxen, and asses, and by a prolonga
tion of his life by a hundred and forty years.
Jesus, on the contrary, taught His followers to
look for their reward in the world to come. The
sanctions of the beatitudes, except the third, refer
to eternity — " Theirs is the kingdom of heaven . . .
they shall be comforted . . . they shall be filled . . .
they shall obtain mercy . . . they shall see God."
And our Lord concludes : " Blessed are ye, when
men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall
say all manner of evil against you falsely, for My
sake. Rejoice, and be exceeding glad : for great is
your reward in heaven : for so persecuted they the
prophets which were before you" (Matt. v. 3-12).
Many of the sayings of Christ upon this subject are
of wonderful beauty. "Then shall the righteous
shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their
Father " (Matt. xiii. 43). " Fear not, little flock ; for
it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the
kingdom " (Luke xii. 32). " Lay up for yourselves
treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust

346 THE JUDGMENT
doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break
through nor steal : for where your treasure is,
there will your heart be also" (Matt. vi. 20-1). " In
My Father's house are many mansions ; if it were
not so, I would have told you ; for I go to prepare
a place for you " (John xiv. 2).
Jesus opposed the materialistic and sensuous
notions about the future life which prevailed uni
versally in His time. When the Sadducees asked
Him whose wife a woman, who had been seven
times married, would be in the world to come, He
replied : " Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures,
nor the power of God. For in the Resurrection
they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but
are as angels in heaven " (Matt. xxii. 29-30).1
VII. — The Judgment
According to the teaching of Jesus, the soul at
death passes into an intermediate state of joy or
misery (Luke xvi. 19 ff; xxiii. 43). This implies
that at death there is an individual judgment
which decides the destiny of the soul, certainly for
the intermediate period, and probably for eternity.
It would appear that the punishments of the inter
mediate state are remedial, and that many who
suffer them will be finally saved. This, at any rate,
1 Jewish ideas of the Resurrection were grossly materialistic.
Some account of them is given by Edersheim in his Life and
Times of Jesus the Messiah, vol. ii. p. 396 ff. A fuller state
ment, with quotations from original authorities, is given in
Wetstein's valuable commentary. Some of the later Rabbis
adopted Christ's doctrine of a spiritual resurrection.

CHRIST'S MORAL TEACHING 347
was St. Peter's view, and upon such a matter he is
likely to have been well informed (1 Pet. iii. 18 ff).
At the end of the world, the date of which is not
disclosed, there will be a general resurrection, and a
judgment of all men according to their works. The
object of this final judgment will be the complete
justification of God's dealing with all His creatures.
Then time will come to an end, and angels and
men will enjoy their eternal recompense (Matt. xvi.
27; xxv. 31 ff.).1
VIII. — Characteristics of Christian Morality
Universality. — Christian morality consists of prin
ciples rather than of positive precepts, and to this
fact it owes its wonderful adaptability to every
race and every civilization. Thought is required
before the principles of Christ can be reduced to
practice, and thus His teaching is morally and
intellectually stimulating.2
High Standard. — Christ did not, like Mahomet,
lower His moral standard to suit the average man,
but required from every one of His followers
a serious attempt to reach moral perfection.
Christians are to take God Himself as their standard
1 The joy of heaven is uniformly represented in the New
Testament as spiritual in character (Matt. v. 8 ; 1 Cor. xiii. 12 ;
1 John iii. 2, etc.). The teaching of Jesus as to the future
punishment of the wicked is dealt with elsewhere (xxiii. cp. 2).
' To protect His teaching against being taken too literally,
He expressed much of it in the form of paradoxes, which must
be understood in the spirit rather than in the letter.

348 INWARDNESS
of perfection. " Be ye therefore perfect, even as
your Father which is in heaven is perfect"
(Matt. v. 48).
Holiness. — Ancient moralists aimed at virtue.
Christianity raises virtue to the higher plane of
holiness. Holiness or saintliness is a new type of
character, unknown to the ancient world, and
hardly known even now outside Christianity.
" Among all the men of the ancient heathen world,"
says Professor Seeley, " there were scarcely one
or two to whom we might venture to apply the
epithet holy. In other words, there were not more
than one or two, if any, who, besides being virtuous
in their actions, were possessed with an unaffected
enthusiasm of goodness, and besides abstaining
from vice, regarded even a vicious thought with
horror. Probably no one will deny that in Christian
countries this higher-toned goodness which we call
holiness has existed. Few will maintain that it
has been exceedingly rare."
Inwardness. — Christianity goes to the root of
morality in requiring purity of motive. It forbids
not only murder and assault, but anger and hatred ;
not only adultery and fornication, but lustful
thoughts and looks. It demands also that virtue be
sought for its own sake, and not for the reputation
which it brings.
Christ's Attitude towards Conscience. — There is
profound insight in the teaching of Jesus about con
science. He recognized that conscience is a God-
given faculty, intended to guide us to discern the path

UNIVERSAL BENEVOLENCE 349
of virtue, but He often insisted that by unfaithful
use conscience may become so perverted as to lead
us into error. It is therefore our duty to enlighten
and instruct our consciences by every means in
our power. " The lamp of the body is the eye : if
therefore thine eye be sound, thy whole body shall
be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole
body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the
light that is in thee be darkness, how great is the
darkness ! " (Matt. vi. 22-3). " First cast out the
beam out of thine own eye, and then shalt
thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy
brother's eye" (Matt. vii. 5).
Benevolence. — Christianity is the only religion
which makes universal benevolence the primary
duty of man. It does so to a greater extent even
than Buddhism, for the ultimate aim of the latter
is not benevolence, as we understand it, but the
extinction of human existence.
The originality of Christ's teaching upon this
subject appears mainly in the following particulars.
(a) Benevolence is to be shown not only to
equals, but to inferiors. The poor, the despised,
and the outcast, who cannot recompense their
benefactors except by their prayers, are to be the
special object of Christian bounty (Luke xiv. 14,
etc.) (_•) Benevolence is to be extended to men of
other races and other religions. Jesus taught this
in the parable of the Good Samaritan, and enforced
it by healing numerous Gentiles, and feeding four

350 LOVE OF ENEMIES
thousand of them in the wilderness (Matt. xv.
21-39)- (c) Benevolence is to be shown even towards
enemies. "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou
shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thy enemy :
but I say unto you, Love your enemies, and pray
for them which persecute you ; that you may be
sons of your Father which is in heaven " (Matt. v.
43-5). " Love your enemies, do good to them which
hate you, bless them which curse you, and pray for
them which despitefully use you. And unto him
that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer also the
other. . . . For if ye love them that love you,
what thank have ye ? for sinners also do even the
same. . . . But love your enemies and do good,
. . . and ye shall be children of the Highest : for
He is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil. Be
ye merciful, as your Father also is merciful "
(Luke vi. 27 ff).
{d) Self-denial and self-sacrifice are required of
Christians. " If any man would come after Me,
let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and
follow Me. For whosoever would save his life
shall lose it : and whosoever shall lose his life for
My sake shall find it " (Matt. xvi. 24-5).
{e) Benevolence is to be shown not only by con
ferring, temporal benefits, but by attempting to
bring others into the way of salvation. This is
to be done partly by preaching and teaching, and
partly by setting a good example. "Let your
light so shine before men, that they may see your

HUMILITY 351
good works, and glorify your Father which is in
heaven" (Matt. v. 16).1
(/) Benevolence is translated into social duty in
the Golden Rule : "All things whatsoever ye would
that men should do to you, do ye even so to them :
for this is the Law and the Prophets " (Matt. vii. 12).
Truthfulness is regarded by Christ as so much
a matter of course among His followers, that (ideally
at least) oaths will be no longer necessary in a
Christian community, and a plain Yea and Nay
will suffice for all purposes (Matt. v. 37).
Humility. — In no respect does Christianity pre
sent a greater contrast to pagan morality than
in its teaching about humility. The Greeks and
the Romans admired the ambitious and self-asser
tive type of character, and despised humility as
weakness and poverty of spirit. Christ, on the
other hand, took every opportunity of checking
ambition and encouraging meekness among His
followers. " Be not ye called Rabbi. . . . Neither
be ye called masters  But he that is greatest
among you shall be your servant. And who
soever shall exalt himself shall be humbled ; and
whosoever shall humble himself shall be exalted "
(Matt, xxiii. 8 ff). " The kings of the Gentiles exer
cise lordship over them; and they that exercise
authority upon them are called benefactors. But ye
shall not be so : but he that is greatest among you,
let him be as the younger ; and he that is chief,
1 Christ condemns with great severity those who set a bad
example, especially to the young (Matt, xviii. 6).

352 USE AND ABUSE OF WEALTH
as he that doth serve" (Luke xxii. 25-6). "Ye call
Me Master and Lord : and ye say well ; for so
I am. If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed
your feet ; ye also ought to wash one another's
feet. For I have given you an example, that ye
should do as I have done to you" (John xiii. 13-5).
Wealth. — There can be no doubt that Jesus re
garded wealth, and the worldly honours and
advantages which it brings, as serious spiritual
dangers. " The care of the world, and the deceitful
ness of riches, choke the word, and [the man] be
cometh unfruitful " (Matt. xiii. 22). " It is easier for
a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for
a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God "
(Matt. xix. 24). He seems to have regarded volun
tary communism as the ideal state of society. " If
thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and
give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in
heaven : and come and follow Me " (Matt. xix. 21; cf.
also Luke xii. 33). In practice, however, Jesus re
cognized the lawfulness of private property, asserted
that rich men could be saved, and only required His
immediate followers, who intended to devote their
whole lives to the spread of the Gospel, to abandon
their wealth. Christians are frequently exhorted
to be free from covetousness, to be contented with
small means, and not to be over-anxious for the
future (Luke xii. 15; Matt. v. 3; vi. 25; etc.).
In the parable of the Unjust Steward Jesus
exhorts His followers to make friends of the angels
by means of a judicious use of their wealth, in

MARRIAGE 353
order that when they die, the angels may receive
them into the eternal habitations. And He adds :
" He that is faithful in that which is least is
faithful also in much : and he that is unjust in the
least is unjust also in much. If therefore ye have
not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon,1 who
will commit to your trust the true riches ? " (Luke
xvi. 9ff).
Marriage. — The tenderness of Christ towards
children (Mark x. 13-6, etc.) shows a high esteem
for family life, and for the spiritual advantages
of marriage. His teaching in this respect accords
with that of the Old Testament, and is in sharp
contrast to that of Gautama and other pessimists.
Marriage is so clearly the fundamental relation
of human society, that Jesus, departing from His
general practice, laid down definite regulations
with regard to it. He declared — (1) that monogamy
is the only natural and lawful form of marriage ;
(2) that husband and wife become one flesh, and
are bound to love one another more than any
one else; (3) that the marriage tie can only be
dissolved by death.
Whether He permitted divorce in the single case
of adultery is a point upon which the Eastern and
Western Churches differ, and upon which modern
critics are also divided. The exception is only
mentioned in St. Matthew, and some think that it
1 Mammon, or wealth, is called "unrighteous" because of
the unrighteousness which is frequently associated with it.
Compare the expression "filthy lucre." 23

354 ASCETICISM
is a later insertion, or refers to pre-nuptial fornica
tion.1 All the other accounts represent Christ as
forbidding divorce absolutely. In any case, it would
appear that He forbade remarriage after divorce
(Matt. v. 31; xix. 3; Mark x. 11 ; 1 Cor. vii. 10).
Asceticism. — Christianity is not in its primary
aspect an ascetic religion. It is intended mainly
for men and women living in the world, marrying
and giving in marriage, and performing the ordinary
duties of society. The Founder Himself was no
ascetic. He attended the marriage festivities at
Cana. He shared in the social life of all classes.
He expressly contrasts His own manner of life
with that of John. " For John came neither eating
nor drinking, and they say, He hath a devil. The
Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they
say, Behold a man gluttonous, and a winebibber,
a friend of publicans and sinners. And yet
wisdom is justified of her works" (Matt. xi. 18-9).
Jesus only recommended asceticism to a limited
extent, as when He counselled moderation in the
use of worldly pleasures, the weaning of the heart
from worldly objects of ambition, liberal alms
giving, and occasional secret fasting. The kind of
fasting which Jesus approved is well expressed in
one of the recently discovered Oxyrhyncus logia:
" Except ye fast from the world, ye shall in no
wise see the kingdom of God."
Jesus recognized, however, that there would be
some who under the new Dispensation would feel
1 The word used is nopveia, fornication, not /joiya'a, adultery.

CITIZENSHIP 355
themselves called to devote their whole lives to
God in an especial manner. To these He gave two
" counsels of perfection " — viz. (i) celibacy (Matt.
xix. 12), and (2) voluntary poverty (xix. 21). To
these the monastic communities added later the
precept of "obedience."
Prudence. — Maxims of selfish prudence find no
place in our Lord's teaching, but there are several
sayings which deal with the need of prudence in
carrying on the work of evangelization. " Behold,
I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves :
be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as
doves. . . . When they persecute you in this city, flee
ye into another. . . . Give not that which is holy
unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before
swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and
turn again and rend you" (Matt. x. 16, 23; vii. 6).
Citizenship. — It is not correct to say that the
teaching of Jesus has no bearing upon politics.
His frequent exhortations to be faithful in the
exercise of delegated authority, and His threats of
Divine vengeance upon those who abuse their
privileges, contain teaching of the most practical
kind for rulers and magistrates, whether of
monarchical or democratic communities. Jesus also
expressly endorsed the principle of civil obedience
both by example and precept.
As to the theory of Church and State, He held
that the two are essentially distinct. There is a
distinct sphere that belongs to Csesar, and a dis
tinct sphere that belongs to God (Matt. xxii. 21).

356 PROPHECIES OF CHRIST
It follows that the magistrate has no right to
persecute, or to enforce uniformity of religion.
It also follows that such forms of Church establish
ment as practically identify Church and State, and
deprive the Church of its inalienable right to
spiritual freedom, are contrary to the Divine will.
IX. — The Prophecies of Christ
A prophet is much more a forth-teller than a
yor.-teller, yet there can be no doubt that Jesus,
in common with other prophets, claimed to have
the power of foretelling events. Some of His
prophecies have received so remarkable a fulfilment,
that they have contributed not a little to the
success of His religion.
(i) He prophesied repeatedly that His religion
would extend itself among all nations, and become
the universal religion of mankind (Matt. xxiv. 14;
xxv. 32 ; xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 15; Luke xxiv. 47;
Acts i. 8 ; John xii. 32 ; etc.). His followers now
number over a third of the human race, including
all the most advanced peoples ; and if the progress of
Christianity during the present century is as rapid
as it was during the last thirty years of the nine
teenth, by the beginning of the twenty-first century
nearly all the world will be Christian.
(2) He prophesied the fall of Jerusalem, and the
complete destruction of the Temple, during the
lifetime of persons then living (Matt. xxiv. 2 ; Luke
xix. 41 ff. ; etc.), which came to pass.
(3) He prophesied His own death and resurrec-

PROPHECIES OF CHRIST 357
tion (Matt. xvii. 9; xvi. 21; Mark viii. 31; Matt.
xxvi. 32 ; etc.).
(4) He prophesied Peter's denial (Matt. xxvi. 34)
and the treachery of Judas (Matt. xxvi. 25, etc.).
Objection. — Jesus prophesied that His second
coming to judgment would take place immediately
after the destruction of Jerusalem (Matt. xxiv. 29),
which did not happen.
Reply. — It is absolutely certain from Mark xiii. 32
that Jesus did not disclose the time of His second
coming, and Luke xxi. 24 shows conclusively that
He did not expect that it would happen immediately
upon the fall of Jerusalem. It is probably merely
a defect of arrangement in the great eschatological
discourse, which makes the Second Advent and
the fall of Jerusalem appear to synchronize. It
must be remembered that those who reported the
discourse expected that Jesus would return in their
own lifetime, and would naturally arrange His
words in such a manner as to be not inconsistent
with this view.
X. — Reasons for accepting Christ's Teaching
as Inspired
We accept Christ's teaching as inspired for the
following reasons : —
(1) Because it is antecedently credible that the
imperfections of Natural Religion would be supplied
by a fuller Supernatural Revelation, and because
the only serious claimant to be such a Revelation
is the religion of Christ.

358 CHRIST AN INSPIRED TEACHER
(2) Because Christ's teaching is, as has been shown,
in full accordance with the teaching of Natural
Religion, and even when it passes beyond it, as
in its teaching that God is Love, it does so, not by
contradicting Natural Religion, but by developing
its principles further.
(3) Because Christ's teaching deals explicitly and
fully with the most vital and also most doubtful
points of Natural Religion — namely, the true person
ality of God, His providential care for the in
dividual soul, the efficacy of prayer, the possibility
of forgiveness, the possibility of perfect holiness,
human immortality, and future retribution.
(4) Because the moral teaching of Christ appeals
to the conscience as ideally perfect.
(5) Because Christianity has superseded all other
religions and philosophies among the most advanced
races, and, in spite of severe criticism, still maintains
its position.
(6) Because the teaching of Christ is upon one
level of excellence, and does not, like other religions
and philosophies, mingle truth with error, piety
with superstition, and lofty morality with puerilities
and ineptitudes.
(7) Because Christ's teaching is an optimism, and
thus conduces in the highest degree to progress and
happiness. (8) Because the Christian type of character is
higher than any other, and the Christian Church
produces more saints, and better ones, than any
other.

AGNOSTIC TESTIMONIES 359
(9) Because Christ, whose character, as delineated
in the Gospels, is as beautiful as His teaching,
claims to be a teacher sent from God, and it is
impossible to disbelieve Him.
(10) Because it is impossible that an uneducated
Galilean carpenter, brought up in an atmosphere of
narrow Jewish particularism, could, without super
natural assistance, have discovered and founded the
Universal Religion of Mankind.

APPENDIX I
testimony of freethinkers and agnostics to the
excellence of christ's character and teaching1
Matthew Arnold (1822 — 1888). — "Jesus Christ's new and
different way of putting things was the secret of His succeed
ing where the prophets failed. And this new way He had
of putting things is what is indicated by the expression
epieikeia — an expression best rendered by the phrase, ' sweet
reasonableness.' "
" Now, never were there utterances concerning conduct and
righteousness which so carried with them an air of consum
mate truth and likelihood as Jesus Christ's did ; and never
therefore were any utterances so irresistibly prepossessing.
He put things in such a way that His hearer was led to take
each fact or rule of conduct by its inward side, its effect
on the heart and character; then the reason of the thing,
the meaning of what had been mere matter of blind rule,
flashed upon him. . . . Jesus made His followers first look

1 Several of the following quotations are taken from Luthard's
Moral Truths, and from Mr. Ballard's The Miracles of
Unbelief.

360 AGNOSTIC TESTIMONIES
within and examine themselves ; He made them feel that they
had a best and real self as opposed to their ordinary and
apparent one, and that their happiness depended on saving
this best self from being overborne. . . . Self-examination,
self-renouncement, and mildness, were, therefore, the great
means by which Jesus Christ renewed righteousness and
religion. . . . Jesus over the heads of all His reporters t — this
idea is for us a constant guide in reading the Gospels. . . .
The victory of Jesus is won and sure. Conscience and self-
renouncement, the method and the secret of Jesus, are set
up as a leaven in the world, nevermore to cease working
until the world is leavened " {Literature and Dogma ; God
and the Bible).
Dr. Lecky. — " It was reserved for Christianity to present to
the world an ideal character which through all the changes
of eighteen centuries has filled the hearts of men with an
impassioned love, and has shown itself capable of acting on
all ages, nations, temperaments, and conditions ; has not
only been the highest pattern of virtue, but the highest in
centive to its practice, and has exerted so deep an influence
that it may be truly said that the simple record of three short
years of active life has done more to regenerate and soften
mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers, and than
all the exhortations of moralists. This has indeed been the
well-spring of whatever has been best and purest in the
Christian life. Amid all the sins and failings, amid all the
priestcraft, the persecution, and fanaticism, which have dis
graced the Church, it has preserved, in the character and
example of its Founder, an enduring principle of regenera
tion " {History of European Morals, vol. ii. p. 88).
J. J. Rousseau (1712 — 1778). — "I do not know why men
will insist on ascribing the excellent morality of our books
to the progress of Philosophy. This morality, which is
derived from the Gospel, was Christian before it was
philosophical. . . . Can the Person whose history the Gospels
relate be Himself a man ? What sweetness, what purity in

AGNOSTIC TESTIMONIES 361
His manners ! What affecting goodness in His instructions !
What sublimity in His maxims ! What profound wisdom
in His discourses ! What presence of mind, what ingenuity
of justice in His replies ! Yes, if the life and death of Socrates
are those of a philosopher, the life and death of Jesus Christ
are those of a God " {Troisihne Lettre de la Montaigne ;
Emile). S. Laing (181 1 — 1897). — "The Sermon on the Mount,
and St. Paul's description of Christian charity, carry their
own proof with them, and such parables as that of the
Good Samaritan require no support, either from historical
evidence or from supernatural signs, to come home to every
heart whether in the first or in the nineteenth century. The
fact that the son of a Jewish mechanic, born in a small town
of an obscure province, without any special aid from position,
education, or other outward circumstance, succeeded, by the
sheer force of the purity and loveliness of His life and
teaching, in captivating all hearts and founding a religion
which for nineteen centuries has been the main civilizing
influence of the world, and the faith of its noblest men and
races — this fact, I say, is of itself so admirable and wonderful,
as not to require the aid of vulgar miracles and metaphysical
puzzles in order to be recognized as worthy of the highest
reverence. And when such a life was crowned by a death
which remains the highest type of what is noblest in man,
self-sacrifice in the cause of truth and for the good of others,
we may well call it divine, and not quarrel with any language
or any forms of worship which tend to keep it in view and
hold it up to the world as an inducement to a higher life. . . .
The highest and most consoling beliefs of the human mind
are to a great extent bound up with the Christian religion.
If we frankly ask ourselves how much, apart from this religion,
would remain of faith in a God and in a future state of
existence, the answer must be, Very little. . . . After all, we
must fall back on Christianity for any grounds upon which
to trust, more or less faintly, in the ' larger hope.' The

362 AGNOSTIC TESTIMONIES
Christian religion, apart from any question of miracles, is
an existing fact. It is a fact which for nineteen centuries
has proved, on the whole, in accordance with other facts and
with the deepest feelings and highest aspirations of the
noblest men and women of the foremost races in the pro
gressive march of civilization. ... It requires no train of
reasoning and laboured reflection to make us feel that ' right
is right,' and that it is better for ourselves and others to
act on such precepts as those of ' loving our neighbours as
ourselves,' and ' doing as we would be done by,' rather than
to reverse these rules and obey the selfish promptings of
our animal nature.
" Of the same order, though less clear and cogent, are the
teachings of the Gospel respecting God and immortality.
They are less clear and cogent, because the only evidence
by which they could be demonstrated from without, that
of miracles, has broken down and failed us;1 and because
we cannot verify them experimentally by an appeal to facts,
as we can in regard to the working of moral laws and precepts.
But it still remains that they are ideas which have arisen
inevitably in the course of the evolution of the human mind ;
and that they fit in with and satisfy, in a way which no
other ideas can do, many of the best and deepest feelings
which have equally been developed in that mind, in the
course of its progressive ascent from lower to higher things.
It remains also true that science, while it can add nothing
to this proof, takes nothing from it " {Modern Science and
Modern Thought, c. ix., published by the Rationalist Press
Association). Renan (1823 — 1892). — "Jesus is in every respect unique,
and nothing can be compared with Him. Be the unlooked-
for phenomena of the future what they may, Jesus will not

1 Mr. Laing here concedes the point we have so often insisted
upon, that no revelation can be really satisfactory which is not
supported by miracles.

AGNOSTIC TESTIMONIES 363
be surpassed. Noble Initiator, repose now in Thy glory !
Thy work is finished, Thy divinity established. A thousand
times more living, a thousand times more loved since Thy
death than during the days of Thy course here below, Thou
shalt become the corner-stone of humanity, insomuch that
to tear Thy name from this world would be to shake it
from its very foundations. No more shall men distinguish
between Thee and God."
Prof. Seeley (1834— 1895).— "The story of His [Christ's]
life will always remain the one record in which the moral
perfection of man stands revealed in its root and its unity,
the hidden spring made palpably manifest by which the whole
machine is moved. And as, in the will of God, this unique
Man was elected to a unique sorrow, and holds as undisputed
a sovereignty in suffering as in self-devotion, all lesser ex
amples and lives will for ever hold a subordinate place,
and serve chiefly to reflect light on the central and
original Example. In His wounds all human sorrows will
hide themselves, and all human self-denials support them
selves against His cross. . . . The achievement of Christ
in founding by His single will and power a structure so
durable and so universal [as the Christian Church] is
like no other achievement which history records. When
we speak of it, the commonplaces of admiration fail us
altogether. If a high and complete morality often exists
outside the Church, it does not often exist independent
of it. The atmosphere of Europe has been saturated for
some fifteen centuries with Christian principles, and however
far the rebellion against the Church may have spread, it
may still be called the Moral University of the world — not
merely the greatest, but the only great School of Virtue
existing. While this is so, it is idle for any virtue that
springs up in its neighbourhood to claim to be independent
of it" {Ecce Homo, pp. 360-9, xx., Eversley edition).
Viscount Bolingbroke (1678 — 1751). — "No religion ever
appeared in the world whose natural tendency was so much

364 AGNOSTIC TESTIMONIES
directed to promote the peace and happiness of mankind as
Christianity. The system of religion which Christ published,
and His evangelists recorded, is a complete system for the
purposes of religion, natural and revealed. Christianity as it
stands in the Gospels is not only a complete but a very plain
system of religion. The Gospel is, in all cases, one continued
lesson of the strictest morality, of justice, of benevolence, and
of universal charity."
Schopenhauer (1788 — 1860). — "The purely ethical portion
[of Christianity] is unassailable."
Goethe (1749 — 1832). — " The greatest praise is due to the
Christian religion, which has at all times proved the purity
of its origin, inasmuch as it has ever re-emerged in its pristine
and admirable peculiarity as a mission, a brotherhood, a
family friend for the supply of men's wants, from those great
errors in which man had in his blindness involved it unawares.
Let mental culture go on advancing, let the natural sciences
progress in ever greater extent and depth, and the human
mind widen itself as much as it desires, beyond the elevation
and moral culture of Christianity as it shines forth in the
Gospels, it will not go."
D. F. Strauss (1808— 1874). — "Among the personages to
whom mankind is indebted for the perfecting of its moral con
sciousness, Jesus occupies at any rate the highest place. . . .
With reference to all that bears upon the love of God and of
our neighbour, upon purity of heart and upon the individual
life, nothing can be added to the moral intuition which Jesus
Christ has left us."
Thomas Paine (1736 — 1809). — "Jesus Christ was a virtuous
and amiable man. The morality which He preached was of
the most benevolent kind — it has not been exceeded by
any." /. S. Mill {1806— 1873).— "The most valuable part of the
effect on the character which Christianity has produced by
holding up in a Divine Person a standard of excellence and
a model of imitation is available even to the absolute un-

AGNOSTIC TESTIMONIES 365
believer, and can never more be lost to humanity. For it is
Christ rather than God whom Christianity has held up to
believers as the pattern of perfection for humanity. It is the
God incarnate, who being idealized has taken so great and
salutary a hold on the modern mind. And whatever else may
be taken away from us by rational criticism, Christ is still left ;
a unique figure, not more unlike all His precursors than all
His followers, even those who had the direct benefit of His
personal teaching. . . . About the life and sayings of Jesus there
is a stamp of personal originality combined with profundity of
insight which . . . must place the Prophet of Nazareth, even in
the estimation of those who have no belief in His inspiration,
in the very first rank of the men of sublime genius of whom
our species can boast. When this pre-eminent genius is
combined with the qualities of probably the greatest moral
reformer, and martyr to that mission, who ever existed upon
earth, religion cannot be said to have made a bad choice in
pitching on this man as the ideal representative and guide of
humanity ; nor even now would it be easy even for an un
believer to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from
the abstract into the concrete than to endeavour so to live
that Christ would approve our life. ... To this we add that to
the conception of the rational sceptic it remains a possibility
that Christ actually was what he supposed Himself to be, . . .
a man charged with a special, express, and unique commission
from God to lead mankind to truth and virtue " {Three
Essays, pp. 253 ff.).
Carlyle (1795 — 1881). — " Look on our divinest Symbol — on
Jesus of Nazareth and His life and His biography and what
followed therefrom. Higher has the human thought not yet
reached : this is Christianity and Christendom, a symbol of
quite perennial infinite character, whose significance will ever
demand to be anew inquired into and anew made manifest."
Prof. P. Gardner. — " The true differentia of Christian
teaching seems to me to have been rightly set forth by
Matthew Arnold in the word inwardness. The Founder of

366 OBJECTIONS TO CHRIST'S TEACHING
Christianity stands above all other religious teachers, because
alike in life and in words . . . He taught that purity of heart
leads a man to the vision of God ; that evil proceeding out
of the heart defiles and corrupts his whole being; that sin
consists not in deed, but in intention ; that righteousness
consists not in the keeping of outward rules, but in a right
attitude of spirit. . . . The divine obedience of Jesus is the
fountain among remote hills whence has flowed down in a
never-interrupted stream that loyalty of heart to the divine,
which is the living principle of Christian faith. . . . The whole
merit of the religion is that it is one which is not bound to
formulae and rules — that it has a spring of vitality, and can
adapt itself to the hopes and the needs of successive genera
tions. . . . The teaching is very general : it is adapted not
merely to the times or to the Jewish race, but to mankind "
{Historic View of the New Testament, lect. iii.).

APPENDIX II
OBJECTIONS TO THE MORAL TEACHING OF JESUS
As the unsurpassed excellence of the moral teaching of
Jesus is generally recognized by Rationalists, the objections to
it may be briefly dealt with.
Objection I. — The moral teaching of Jesus is lacking in
originality. Most, if not all, of His utterances can be paralleled.
Reply. — (i) A system which concentrates and puts into a
practical form the best wisdom of all the moralists of the world,
must be pronounced original. Originality is not claimed for
precepts in detail, though many of them really are original,
but for the system as a whole.
(2) No system except Christianity teaches the highest
morality without admixture of baser elements.
(3) No system except Christianity makes universal love its
primary and fundamental principle.

OBJECTIONS TO CHRIST'S TEACHING 367
Objection II. — Christianity contains no teaching about
political duties.
Reply. — See sect. viii. of this chapter {Citizenship). Detailed
instructions on political duties could not be expected, because
these duties differ greatly in different countries and different
ages. The law of love as taught by Christ contains all that
is necessary. Objection III. — Christianity is essentially effeminate and
unmanly. It tends to make men cowardly and lacking in
spirit. Reply. — A religion which teaches men to protest against
evil, and to suffer persecution and even death for the truth's
sake, cannot be an unmanly one. The number of martyrs
which Christianity has produced is enough to vindicate it
against such a charge. The precept to turn the other cheek
to the smiter has been often stigmatized as mean-spirited, but
in reality it requires more courage to do this than to retaliate.
Objection IV. — Christian morality is selfish ; it teaches men
to do good for the sake of an eternal reward.
Reply. — On the contrary, Christianity teaches men to do
good out of pure love to God and their fellow-men. An
action which is not done from this motive is not, according
to Christian teaching, a good action at all.
Objection V. — Christianity teaches indiscriminate almsgiving,
and experience shows that this is injurious to society.
Reply. — It has been already explained that such precepts as
Give to him that asketh thee must be understood in the spirit
and not in the letter. The law of love requires that we
should give wisely, and in such a way as to benefit and not
injure the recipient. This implies that alms must sometimes
be refused, and that indiscriminate almsgiving is wrong.
Christians are not forbidden to revise their practical rules
about almsgiving in the light of the teachings of Political
Economy, or to meet changes in social conditions (see further
ch. xxiii., sect, i, Promotion of Philanthropy).

368 IS CHRIST A MYTH?
APPENDIX III
THE MYTHICAL THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY
It is impossible to treat seriously the theory first advanced
in Holland by Loman (1882), and Pierson and Naber (1886),
that Jesus never existed ; yet since Mr. J. M. Robertson x and
Mr. Blatchford 2 in widely read books adopt the theory, and
Mr. Grant Allen 3 regards it as credible, it may be desirable
to say a few words on the subject.
We reply, then —
(1) No Biblical scholar of repute holds the mythical theory.
(2) The Biblical writings, some of which at any rate are
genuine, speak of Jesus as a person only recently dead, and
of His personal disciples as still living (1 Cor. xv. 6; Gal. i.
17-9; etc.)
(3) The Pagan historian Tacitus entirely corroborates the
statements of the Gospels.*
(4) Jesus is too great a character to have been invented by
myth-makers. He is one of the colossal figures of history,

1 " It is not even certain that the earliest Jesuism took shape
round the memory of an actual man " (Short History of
Christianity, p. 15).
3 " I cannot believe in the existence of Jesus Christ, nor
Buddha, nor Moses. I believe that these are ideal characters
constructed from still more ancient legends and traditions "
{God and my Neighbour, p. 9).
3 " We may well be excused for gravely doubting whethei
Jesus] is not rather to be numbered among the wholly
mythical and imaginary figures of legend and religion "
(Evolution of the Idea of God, c. xviii.).
4 Tacitus says : " The founder of that name was Christ, who
suffered death in the reign of Tiberius, under his procurator,
Pontius Pilate. This pernicious superstition, thus checked for a
while, broke out again ; and spread not only over Judaea, where
the evil originated, but through Rome also" (Annals, bk. xv.
44). Tacitus was born about A.D. 53.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS 369
and only a colossal genius could have invented Him. The
inquirer who will take the trouble to read some real myths,
like those of Jupiter, Perseus, or Hercules, in a classical
dictionary, will at once perceive the difference between the
Gospels and mere mythical legends.

LITERATURE
G. B. Stevens, Theology of the New Testament, pts. i., ii. ;
Wendt, The Teaching of Jesus (tr.) ; J. Moorhouse, The
Teaching of Jesus ; Seeley, Ecce Homo; Bruce, The Kingdom
of God; R. F. Horton, The Teaching of Jesus ; B. Weiss, Biblical
Theology ofthe New Testament (tr.) ; W. Beyschlag, New Testa
ment Theology ; Stier, Words of the Lord Jesus (commentary) ;
Sanday, article " Jesus Christ " in Hastings's Bible Dictionary ;
Gore, Sermon on the Mount (popular).

24

CHAPTER XX
THE PERSON OF JESUS
Summary. — It is shown that Jesus taught and the Apostles
believed that He was " the Son of God " — that is, a
pre-existent Divine Being who became incarnate for the
salvation of the world.
That Jesus was the noblest and purest character
that ever appeared upon earth, is the verdict of
Rationalism as well as of Christianity, and not a
few Rationalists are willing to admit that the
excellence of the teaching of Jesus entitles Him
to be considered in some sense a prophet, and the
greatest of prophets. Assuming, then, these points
to be provisionally proved, we proceed in the
present and following chapters to consider whether
the present faith of the Church that Jesus was not
only a prophet, but a Divine Person, can be reason
ably sustained. The inquiry involves two distinct
questions :
(i) Did Jesus Himself claim to be divine, or
was the claim afterwards made for Him by the
Church ?
{2) Is the claim, supposing that Jesus really made
it, credible ?' 37°

WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY 371
I. — What is Christianity?
There can be no doubt that the essence of
Christianity, as understood by believers, consists
in a unique and quite unlimited devotion to Christ
Himself. Christ is trusted, loved, and adored, with
absolute self-surrender, as the Incarnate Son of
God, the Divine Propitiation for sin, the Gate of
access to the Father, the Giver of Eternal Life,
the Dispenser of the gifts of the Spirit, the Divine
Indweller in the soul, the Light and Life of the
world, the Refuge in the storms of life, the Rescuer
in temptation, the sympathizing Friend, the Reader
of the heart, and the Almighty Judge. That
Christianity means this now, and has meant it in
the past to every true believer, cannot possibly be
denied. Christianity means the worship of the
Founder as a divine Mediator and Redeemer.1
Wherever this faith is sincerely held, Christianity
is a vital power. Wherever it is abandoned, as
in modern Unitarianism, Christianity becomes cold
and lifeless, and ceases to produce its characteristic
effects. It is a fact of experience, not denied by
Unitarians, that in warmth of devotion, in Christian
heroism, in missionary zeal, and in the power of
producing the highest types of Christian character,
"orthodox" Christianity stands unrivalled; and so
conscious are the orthodox that devotion to Christ
1 No other religion assigns to its founder the place which
Christianity assigns to Christ. Moses, Mahomet, and Buddha.
claim deyotjon to their teaching, not tQ their persons,

372 ST. PAUL ON CHRIST'S PERSON
as a Divine Person is the motive power of Christi
anity, that they do not recognize as genuine
Christians any who take a lower view of their
Founder's nature.
We have now to inquire whether the " orthodox "
view of Christ's Person is original.
II. — What the First Christians believed about
Christ
{a) The doctrine of St. Paul.
In the Pauline epistles, the chief of which were
written less than thirty years after the Ascension,
the doctrine of Christ's divinity is already fully
developed. Thus St. Paul teaches :
(i) That Jesus existed in heaven before His
Incarnation as a personal Being equal to the Father
in glory and majesty (Col. i. 17; Phil. ii. 6;
1 Cor. xv. 47; 1 Cor. x. 4; cf. 1 Tim. iii. 16;
Gal. iv. 4).
(2) That He created angels and men, and the
whole universe, as the agent of the eternal Father
(Col. i. 16-7 ; 1 Cor. viii. 6).
(3) That He sustains Creation in existence, and
is the cause of its rational order (Col. i. 17).
(4) That His assumption of human nature was
voluntary, and had a redemptive purpose (Phil. ii. 7).
(5) That His death was of cosmical efficacy,
reconciling the whole creation to God (Col. i. 20 ;
cf. Eph. i. 10).
(6) That He truly rose from the dead (1 Cor,
xv., etc,).

ST. PAUL ON CHRIST'S PERSON 373
(7) That He ascended to the right hand of God,
where He now rules the universe, and is worshipped
by all creation, with the full approbation of the
Supreme Father (Phil. ii. 9, etc.).
(8) That He is the future Judge of the world
(2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Thess. i. 7, etc.).
(9) He is so completely divine, that His name
is joined with the Father's on terms of equality,
as the giver of the highest spiritual gifts to men
(2 Cor. xiii. 14 ; Gal. i. 1 ; Eph. v. 5 ; 1 Thess. iii. 1 1).
His name is invoked in prayer — in fact, prayer
to Christ is the distinguishing mark of a Christian
(Rom. x. 1 3 ; 2 Cor. xii. 8). Believers are mystic
ally united to Him as their Head, and He dwells
in their hearts (2 Cor. xiii. 5 ; Gal. ii. 20, iii. 27 ;
etc.). Faith in Him is equivalent to faith in God
{passim) ; and He is actually called God in express
terms in Rom. ix. 5, " Who is over all, God blessed
for ever"; cf. Titus ii. 13, "Our great God and
Saviour Jesus Christ " (R.V.).
It is perfectly true that as Son of God Jesus is
inferior to Him who begets Him, and that He owes
Him filial subjection (see especially 1 Cor. xv. 28) ;
but it is impossible to deny, in the face of such
passages as Phil ii. 6, 2 Cor. xiii. 14, that He shares
the Father's divine nature, and that His Sonship
is, as the Athanasian theology expresses it,
" essential " or " consubstantial."
Two points should be particularly noticed with
regard to this teaching : (1) that it is not proved
controversially against objectors, but alluded to

374 ST. PAUL AND THE TWELVE
incidentally as the unquestioned faith of all who
profess and call themselves Christians ; and (2)
that St. Paul assumes that it is equally the faith
of the other Apostles. The second point is made
clear by Galatians ii., where St. Paul says that on
a certain famous occasion he went up to Jerusalem,
and communicated to them that Gospel which he
preached among the Gentiles, and that they added
nothing to him, but that contrariwise James, Cephas,
and John, who seemed to be pillars, gave to him and
Barnabas the right hands of fellowship.
Now, if the original Apostles had held Jesus
to be a mere human Messiah, it is certain that
the great controversy of the apostolic age would
have turned not upon circumcision, but upon the
Person of Christ. There would have been a
Unitarian party, led by St. Peter, maintaining that
Jesus was a mere man, and a Catholic party, led
by St. Paul, maintaining that He was very God ;
and between parties so divided no peace or com
promise would have been possible. This considera
tion, joined with the fact that not only in Galatians,
but elsewhere, St. Paul represents St. Peter's
doctrine as fundamentally the same as his own,
renders it critically certain that the original
apostolic doctrine of Christ's Person was a very
exalted one.
(_>) The doctrine of St. Peter and the Twelve.
1 Peter. — This conclusion is fully confirmed by
the first Epistle of St. Peter, which has been
already proved to be unquestionably genuine.

ST. PETER'S CHRISTOLOGY 375
St. Peter shows himself not less impressed than
St. Paul with the divine majesty of Christ. Accord
ing to him, Christ existed before His Incarnation,
as is shown by the fact that He sent His Spirit
to inspire the Old Testament prophets (i. 11).
He was manifested in the flesh for the salvation
of men — " manifestation " implying previous exist
ence (i. 20). He is everywhere represented as
the centre of Christian love and devotion (i. 8,
etc.). His mystical union with His people, where
by He gives them spiritual life, is often alluded
to : " Sanctify in your hearts Christ as Lord "
(iii. 15); "Life in Christ" (iii. 16); "Eternal glory
in Christ" (v. 10); "All that are in Christ" (v. 14).
Great stress is laid upon His absolute sinlessness :
" Without blemish and without spot " (i. 19) ; " Who
did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth "
(ii. 22) ; " Christ suffered for sins once, the righteous
for the unrighteous, that He might bring us to
God" (iii. 18). Salvation is declared to be through
Christ, and through faith in Him (i. 9 ; v. 10).
His death was of supernatural efficacy, atoning
for sin, and bringing mankind into a new relation
to God : " Unto sprinkling of the blood of Jesus "
(i. 2) ; " Redeemed with precious blood, as of a lamb
without blemish and without spot, even the blood
of Christ" (i. 18); "Who His own self bare our
sins in His body upon the tree, ... by whose
stripes ye were healed " (ii. 24) ; " Christ suffered
for sins once" (iii. 18) ; " Suffered on your behalf"
(ii. 21). Christ now exercises almighty power

376 CHRISTOLOGY OF i JOHN
over the universe : " Who is at the right hand
of God, having gone into heaven ; angels and
authorities and powers being made subject unto
Him" (iii. 22). Christ's revelation, or second
coming in glory, is earnestly expected (i. 7, 1 3 ;
iv. 12; v. 3), when He will be the judge of quick
and dead (iv. 5). He is the one and only Mediator
through whom cometh salvation, and through
whom alone acceptable prayer and worship can be
offered to the Supreme Father (ii. 5 ; iv. 11; etc.).
If the doxology in iv. 11 refers to Christ, as
grammatical considerations render probable, divine
worship is paid to Christ in express terms.
The impression that the Epistle of Peter makes
upon the candid reader is that it was written by
one who had a firm belief in Christ's essential
Deity. Neither in doctrine nor in devotional
attitude towards Christ's Person does the author
in any way fall short of St. Paul. Apart from the
style, which is quite different, the epistle might
pass as Pauline.
1 John. — The unquestioned Epistle of St. John
teaches similar doctrine. Briefly stated, St. John's
account of Jesus is as follows. He existed with
the Father before His Incarnation, as His Logos,
or Word, and shared His eternal divine life (i. 1-2).
He was manifested in the flesh to destroy the
works of the devil, to take away sin, and to give
eternal life to men (i. 2 ; iii. 5 ; iv. 2 ; iii. 8). His
death is a propitiation for the sins of the whole
world, and His blood cleanses the soul from sin

CHRISTOLOGY OF HEBREWS 377
(i. 7 ; ii. 2 ; etc.). Faith in Him is the same as faith
in the Father, the Father and the Son being in
separably united (ii. 23-5, etc.). How completely
the author associates the Son with the Father, and
assigns to Him the essential attributes of divinity,
may be seen from the following typical passages :
" The witness is this, that God gave unto us eternal
life, and this life is in His Son. He that hath the
Son hath the life ; and he that hath not the Son, hath
not the life " (v. 11, 12) ; " This is the Antichrist, even
he that denieth the Father and the Son. Whosoever
denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father:
he that confesseth the Son hath the Father also "
(ii. 22) ; " We have beheld and bear witness that
the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour
of the world. Whosoever shall confess that Jesus
is the Son of God, God abideth in him, and he
in God " (iv. 14-5).
Hebrews. — The same type of doctrine is re
presented by the Epistle to the Hebrews, which,
though not by an Apostle, belongs certainly to the
apostolic age. In it Jesus is represented as eternal
(i. 12 ; xiii. 8) ; as the agent in creation (i. 2 ; i. 10);
and as the sustainer of the universe (i. 3). He is
the effulgence of the Father's glory, and the very
image of His substance (i. 3). He is superior to
all the angels, and is worshipped by them (i. 4-6).
He is probably called God in i. 8 : " Thy throne,
O God, is for ever and ever " (where, however,
Westcott's note should be consulted). The fact that
this epistle lays such great stress upon our Lord's

378 DID THE APOSTLES DEIFY JESUS?
subjection to human conditions (v. 15 ; v. 7-10; etc.),
make its testimony to His Divinity all the more
striking. (c) Probable source of the Apostles' Christology.
The fact that belief in Christ's Divinity was
common to all the Apostles, renders it highly
probable that this doctrine was taught by Christ
Himself. Had the Apostles been Gentiles, this
inference would have been doubtful. Gentiles in
general had no adequate idea of the infinite gulf
which divides the Creator from the creature.
Gentile gods were little more than magnified men.
They were born like men, they had passions like
men, they were subject to the decrees of fate and to
changes of fortune. So narrow was the line that
divided mortal men from the immortal gods, that
intermarriages were common, and heroes at death
were often deified. Popular imagination exalted to
divine rank in heaven a Romulus, an _Esculapius,
or a Hercules. A Roman emperor was worshipped
by the provinces while he lived, and by the Senate
and Roman people when he died. Had Peter and
Paul been Greeks or Romans, they might spontane
ously have deified their Teacher after His death,
"just as the Roman Senate, not many years before,
had deified Augustus. But Peter and Paul were
Jews, and therein lay a world of difference. The
absorbing passion of the Jew was zeal for the
exclusive worship of the one true God. The God
of the Jews was a jealous God : " I am Jehovah :
this is My name : and My glory will I not give to

DID THE APOSTLES DEIFY JESUS? 379
another, neither My praise unto graven images "
(Isa. xlii. 8). Even Moses and Elijah, great as
was the place they filled in the imagination of
the Jews, were never deified. To suppose, then,
that typical Jews like St. Peter and St. Paul
deified Christ without express warrant from Him,
is quite inadmissible. Even if no Gospels existed,
we should know for certain from the apostolic
epistles that Jesus taught a very high view of His
own person.
We have now to examine the evidence of the
Gospels ; but before doing so, it is desirable to
consider certain objections which are offered to the
conclusions already reached.
Objection I. — The documents alleged to emanate
from Apostles are spurious.
Reply. — This objection has been sufficiently met
in c. xviii. sects, i, 2.
Objection II. — St. Paul's deification of Jesus is
readily explained. The real or apparent vision
which he experienced at Damascus convinced
him that Jesus was a supernatural Being, dwelling
in heaven, and possessed of enormous power. He
became so possessed with this thought, that the
figure of the real historical Jesus faded from his
mind, and was replaced by the ideal figure of a
superhuman, divine Christ. As St. Paul was not
an original disciple, and had never seen our Lord
in the flesh, there was nothing to check this
idealizing process, which culminated at length
in the full doctrine of Christ's Divinity.

3_o DID THE APOSTLES DEIFY JESUS?
Reply. — (i) St. Paul, a strict Pharisaic Jew
brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, would have
been as unlikely as St. Peter to deify, of his
own accord, one whom he knew certainly to be
a man. (2) St. Paul expressly states that his doctrine
was not his own, but was communicated to him
in a supernatural manner by Christ Himself (Gal.
i. 20). That Christ instructed St. Paul not by
mere spiritual influences, but by spoken words,
is clear from 1 Cor. xi. 23, where St. Paul states
that the account which he there gives of the in
stitution of the Eucharist was communicated to
him by Christ.
(3) Even if the above hypothesis could explain
how St. Paul came by his doctrine of Christ's
Divinity, it cannot explain how the same doctrine
came to be held by St. Peter and the Twelve.
Objection III. — The Epistle of St. James and
St. Peter's speeches in Acts take a much lower
view of Christ's person than 1 Peter. They do
not imply more than that Jesus was the Messiah
of the Jews, and the last and greatest of Jewish
prophets. Reply. — (1) The evidence of the disputed Epistle
of James, which is not ascribed to him until the
time of Origen (a.d. 230), and of which Eusebius
says, " It is held to be spurious : at least, not many
of the ancients have made mention of it," is not
to be received against that of the certainly genuine
Epistle of Peter. Similarly, the speeches of St.

CHRISTOLOGY OF ST. JAMES 381
Peter recorded in Acts by a person who never
heard them, and whose sources of information
are doubtful, are less valuable evidence of what
St. Peter really believed than his own epistle.
(2) Assuming the Epistle of James and the
speeches in Acts to be authentic, it may be
replied :
{a) The Epistle of James is an untheological
production. It is chiefly concerned with morality,
and contains hardly any allusions to doctrine.
Yet when Jesus is mentioned, it is with the highest
reverence, and in language which expresses a
high view of His person. Thus in the first verse
St. James co-ordinates Christ with God quite
in the manner of St. Peter and St. Paul, by
describing himself as the slave of God and of
the Lord Jesus Christ. In ii. 1 he describes
Jesus as " the Lord of glory," a title suggesting
superhuman dignity and power. He also looks
for Christ's second coming to judgment : " Be ye
also patient ; stablish your hearts : for the coming
of the Lord is at hand. Murmur not, brethren,
one against another, that ye be not judged :
behold, the judge standeth before the doors " (v.
8-9). In ii. 7 he speaks of " the honourable name "
of Jesus, and in iv. 15 he alludes to His power
to heal the sick and to forgive sin. Upon the
whole, considering the untheological character of
St. James's Epistle, its language about our Lord's
person cannot be pronounced unsatisfactory from
the point of view of orthodoxy,

382 THE SPEECHES IN ACTS
{b) The speeches in Acts belong to that extremely
early period, immediately following the Ascension,
when the Christian doctrine of our Lord's Person
was not yet distinctly formulated. It was not
until after the Resurrection that faith in Christ's
Divinity was definitely reached, and it took time
to grasp its meaning fully, to determine its relation
to other truths, such as the unity of God and the
supremacy of the Father, and to find the best
method of expressing and teaching it. What,
therefore, the Apostles preached first and foremost
were facts, especially those to which they could
give their personal testimony, such as the Resur
rection and Ascension of their Master. The facts
they taught explicitly, the doctrine which lay behind
the facts they taught implicitly.
It is necessary, moreover, to remember that the
speeches in Acts were addressed to persons outside
the Church, and must not be taken to represent
the full faith of the Christian Society. They were
intended to prepare the way for deeper teaching.
The Apostles themselves had been led to faith in
Christ's Divinity through faith in His Messiahship,
and they wisely aimed at leading their converts
along the same road. In their public preaching,
therefore, they strove to prove that Jesus was the
long-expected Messiah of the Jews, that He had
truly risen from the dead, and had been exalted
to the throne of the universe, whence He dispensed
the Holy Spirit and every kind of gift and blessing
to men. The Apostles rightly considered that

THE SPEECHES IN ACTS 383
persons who believed this already virtually
believed Christ's Divinity, and that nothing but
reflection was required to make the belief explicit.
Turning now to the actual teaching of the book
of Acts, we assert that it implies the highest view
of Christ's person. Thus, for example, —
(1) Prayer to Jesus is represented as universal.
Christians are described as those "who call upon
the name" of Jesus (Acts ix. 14). The dying
Stephen prays, " Lord Jesus, receive my spirit,"
and adds, " Lord, lay not this sin to their charge "
(Acts vii. 59). The nature of Stephen's prayer should
be particularly noticed. He does not say, "Jesus,
pray for me," which would be the form of invoking
a saintly intercessor, but, " Lord Jesus, receive my
spirit," as if Jesus were equal to God, and able
Himself to confer life and immortality. The more
this point is pondered, the more evident it becomes
that the first Christians regarded Christ as divine.1
(2) Omnipotence is ascribed to Jesus both in
express terms and by implication. Thus He is
" Lord of all " — i.e. of the whole universe (x. 36).
It is He who sends down the Holy Spirit (ii. 32).
He is the Prince or Author of life (iii. 15). He is
1 The earliest Christians neither invoked nor prayed to saints.
The invocation of saints first began to be practised in the second
half of the fourth century, and was not introduced into the
services of the Church until several centuries later. Direct
prayer to saints is a still more modern development (Bingham,
Antiquities, xiii. 3 ; Mason, Purgatory ; Luckock, After death,
p. 174 ff.). On the whole subject see Liddon, Divinity of our
Lord, vii.

384 THE SPEECHES IN ACTS
at God's right hand — " Behold, I see the heavens
opened, and the Son of Man standing on the right
hand of God " (vii. 56 ) ; " Him did God exalt to
[or with] His right hand to be a Prince and a
Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel, and re
mission of sins" (v. 31); "God hath made Him
both Lord and Christ" (ii. 36).
(3) He is the sole Mediator between God and
man, and the only giver of salvation : " In none
other is there salvation : for neither is there any
other name under heaven, that is given among men,
wherein we must be saved" (iv. 12).
(4) He is sinless : " The Righteous One " (vii. 52) ;
" The Holy and Righteous One " (iii. 14).
(5) The " name " of Jesus is used where we should
expect to find the name of God. The converts are
baptized in the " name " of Jesus Christ for the
remission of sins (ii. 38). In the " name " of Jesus
the lame man walks (iii. 6). Signs and wonders
are done through the "name" of God's Holy
Servant (or Son)1 Jesus (iv. 30). Through His
"name" every one that believeth on Him shall
receive remission of sins (x. 43).
(6) His second coming to judge the world is
declared : " He charged us to preach unto the
people, and to testify that this is He which is
1 The word ndis, as applied to Jesus in Acts iii. 13, 26, iv.
25, 27, 30, is translated "Servant" in the R.V. ; but Dalman
argues strongly for the rendering " Son " ( Words of Jesus, tr.,
pp. 276-80). The same title occurs (apparently in the sense
of Son) in the Didache and in Clement of Rome.

JUDAIC TENDENCY TO EBIONISM 385
ordained of God to be the Judge of quick and
dead" (x. 42).
These declarations do not amount to a formal
statement of the Deity of Christ, but it is impossible
for one who sincerely accepts them to avoid
arriving at that conclusion. In the same way the
Apostles' Creed 1 does not expressly state Christ's
Deity, though its statements imply it.
Objection IV. — 1 Peter makes use of the Epistle
to the Romans, and probably of the Epistle to the
Ephesians. It is therefore likely that the author
has borrowed his high view of Christ's person from
St Paul.
Reply. — It is most unlikely that St. Peter, the
leader of the original Apostles, would have funda
mentally altered His doctrine to suit that of St.
Paul, who had never been a disciple. Moreover,
there is evidence that St. Peter and St. Paul were
in doctrinal agreement long before 1 Peter or even
the Pauline epistles were written (Gal. i. ii.).
Objection V. — The tendency of Jewish Christianity
to degenerate into Ebionism or Unitarianism is
an indication that the original Apostles taught a
low view of Christ's person.
Reply. — The tendency referred to was natural
enough. Y or Jews the doctrine ofthe Divine Unity
was all-absorbing, and it was difficult to assimilate
with it the doctrine of Christ's Divinity. To
believe in Christ's Divinity seemed to many Jews
1 A consensus of recent authorities dates the original Apostles'
Creed not later than about A.D. ioo. Ignatius (no) uses it.
25

386 ebionite views not apostolic
equivalent to believing in two Gods. Moreover, the
observance of the Law obscured the true view of
Christ's person and work. Jewish Christians who
kept the law of Moses naturally gravitated towards
the view that they were saved by the Law as well
as by the Gospel, and tended to take a low view of
Christ's Person and work.
This tendency, however, is not evidence that the
original Apostles taught a low view of Christ's
Person. The evidence points, as we have seen, in
quite a different direction.
Objection VI. — The original Christian view of
Christ's person was that Jesus, up to the time of His
Baptism, was an ordinary man, but that, on the
occasion of His Baptism in Jordan, the Spirit of God
descended upon Him, and He became from that
moment the Son of God and the Messiah.
In favour of this view it is urged —
(i) That at the Baptism of Jesus the true words
spoken by the Father were not, "Thou art My
beloved Son in whom I am well pleased," but,
" Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee."
This version of the utterance is found in certain
MSS. of St. Luke (iii. 22), and also in St. Justin's
account of our Lord's Baptism {Dialogue with
Trypho, lxxxviii. ; ciii.).
In reply it may be said —
(a) That this reading in St. Luke is certainly not
the original one, as all textual critics are agreed.
(_¦) That St. Mark's Gospel, from which St. Luke
derived his account, and also St. Matthew's, have

EBIONITE VIEWS NOT APOSTOLIC 387
the ordinary form of the words, which is thus
plainly original.
(.) That the reading this day have I begotten Thee
is easily explained as an assimilation of the Gospel
text to that of Psalm vii. 5, which was regarded
in early times as a prophecy of Christ's Baptism.
Thus St. Justin says, "There came at the same
instant from the heavens a voice, which was also
uttered by David when he spoke, personating
Christ, what the Father would say to Him, ' Thou
art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee ' "
{Dialogue, ch. lxxxviii.).
(2) It is also urged in favour of this view, that
certain early heretics, such as the Cerinthians, the
Ebionites, and the Carpocratians, believed that
Jesus was a mere man, the son of Joseph and Mary
by natural generation, and that there descended
upon Him at His Baptism the Logos, or the Holy
Spirit, or a heavenly Aeon called Christ (Irenaeus,
Against Heresies, bk. i. 25, 26).
Reply. — Such views are repugnant, as we have
shown, to the authentic Epistles, not only of St.
Paul, but also of St. Peter and St. John, and
therefore cannot be regarded as original. Their
advocacy by Cerinthus was so repugnant to St.
John, that, on one occasion, recognizing Cerinthus
among the bathers in the public baths, he rushed
away without bathing, exclaiming, " Let us flee,
lest even the bath-house fall down, because
Cerinthus, the enemy of truth, is within " (Irenaeus,
Against Heresies, bk. iii. 3).

388 HERMAS NOT AN ADOPTIANIST
Objection VII. — Two types of Christology were
current in the Apostolic Church : (i) the Pauline
view, that Christ was a pre-existent heavenly Being,
or Spirit, who became incarnate ; and (2) the Judaic
view, that Jesus was a mere man, who, on account
of His extraordinary goodness, was adopted by God
to be His Son. The former type of Christology
is called by Prof. Harnack Pneumatic, the latter
Adoptianist. Reply. — There is no evidence either in the New
Testament or in the Fathers that Adoptianist views
were ever held in the Church. Even Hermas,
upon whom Harnack especially relies as favouring
Adoptianism, distinctly teaches Christ's pre-exist
ence. The following passage is quite explicit :
" Listen and understand, O ignorant man. The
Son of God is older than all His creatures, so
that He was a fellow-counsellor with the Father
in His work of creation : for this reason He is
old" (Hermas, Similitudes, ix. ch. 12).
That Adoptianist views prevailed among the
Ebionites and other heretical sects, is admitted;
but that is another matter altogether.
III. — What Jesus believed about Himself
Any confidence which we have or may have
about Christ's testimony to Himself must be based
upon confidence in His moral character. If He
can be shown to have been in no ordinary degree
a good and sincere man, then we shall be inclined
to give His claims at least a serious and candid

MORAL CHARACTER OF JESUS 389
consideration. If, on the other hand, He appears
to have been in any way insincere or deficient in
goodness, we shall be justified in summarily rejecting
His claims as preposterous. In the last chapter
we have already given reasons for believing that
Jesus was one of the noblest characters in human
history, and have quoted agnostic testimony to
that effect. Nevertheless it is desirable, considering
the greatness of the issues involved, to treat the
subject here more fully.
(1) The goodness of Jesus is shown by ."the
excellence of His moral and religious teaching,
which is not derived from other teachers, but is
stamped with the impress of His own beautiful
personality. The best rationalist opinion agrees
with this. Keim, for instance, says : " The first
great fact in the personal existence of Jesus is that
His whole being was constantly full of the idea of
God in the sunny expansion of God into the Father ;
and the second great fact is the complete domina
tion of the idea of moral good, which is indissolubly
connected with the former as explanation and
expression. It is usual to call the former His
unbroken fellowship with God, and the latter His
unsullied sinlessness. . . . The lofty religion which
He preached assumed flesh and blood first in His
own person, and that in a unique manner, because
imperfection reigns in others. The Church lives
upon this belief; and this belief seems to be
established, without need of further proof, by the
fact that Jesus' religious preaching originated

390 MORAL CHARACTER OF JESUS
essentially in His personal religion, and his wonder
fully lofty and spotlessly pure religion is therefore
the outcome of the personal perfection of religious
experience and moral practice " {Jesus of Nazara,
tr., vol. vi. p. 403). Similarly Strauss says : " This
intuition of a God good to all [as expressed in the
Sermon on the Mount] Jesus could only have
drawn out of His own being ; it could only have
emanated out of that universal benevolence which
was the fundamental characteristic of His own
nature, and by which He felt Himself in perfect
harmony with God. To be able, like God Himself,
to stand firm against the irritation which is
produced by wickedness, to conquer an enemy
only by conferring benefits upon him, and to
overcome evil only with good — these were the
principles of conduct which He derived from the
disposition of His own heart. . . . The dominant
feature of His character was the love which embraces
all creatures, and He makes of that the fundamental
characteristic of the Divine Essence." J
(2) The goodness of Jesus is affirmed in the
strongest language by those who have the best
right to pronounce upon it — those, namely, who
for nearly three years were brought into the
closest daily contact with Him.
Thus St. Peter represents Him as absolutely
sinless : " A lamb without blemish and without
spot" (1 Pet. i. 19); "Who did no sin, neither
1 Life of Jesus (1864), quoted by Godet, Defence of the
Christian Faith (tr.), p. 202,

MORAL CHARACTER OF JESUS 391
was guile found in His mouth : who, when He was
reviled, reviled not again " (1 Pet. ii. 22-3) ; " Christ
also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the
unrighteous, that He might bring us to God "
(1 Pet. iii. 18). In the Gospel narrative St. Peter
is represented as testifying on behalf of all the
Apostles : " We have believed and know that Thou
art the Holy One of God" (John vi. 69, R.V.).
Similarly in Acts, St. Peter, speaking of Jesus,
says : " Ye denied the Holy and Righteous One "
(Acts iii. 14), with which may be compared St.
Stephen's description of Jesus as " the Just One "
(Acts vii. 52).
St. John, the bosom friend of Jesus, who knew
Him even more intimately than St. Peter, speaks
of Him as sinless: "Jesus Christ the Righteous"
(1 John ii. 1) ; " If ye know that He is righteous, ye
know that every one also that doeth righteousness
is begotten of Him " (1 John ii. 29) ; " We know that
He was manifested to take away sins ; and in Him
is no sin" (1 John iii. 5).
Even the traitor Judas recognized the goodness
of Jesus. St. Matthew records that Judas, "when
he saw that Jesus was condemned, repented
himself, and brought again the thirty pieces of
silver to the chief priests and elders, saying, I
have sinned in that I have betrayed the innocent
blood " (Matt, xxvii. 3-4).1
1 The evidence of the Baptist is also worthy of attention.
When Jesus came to be baptized, "John forbad Him, saying, I
have need to be baptized of Thee, and comest Thou to me ?"
(Matt, iii, 14; cf. iii. u, and John i. 27, 29),

392 MORAL CHARACTER OF JESUS
(3) The goodness of Jesus is also affirmed by
those who were in no sense connected with Him :
by Pilate (" I am innocent of the blood of this
just person : see ye to it," Matt, xxvii. 24 ; " Why,
what evil hath He done ? " Mark xv. 14 ; "I find
no fault in this man," Luke xxiii. 4, 14, 22 ; "I find
in Him no fault," John xviii. 38 ; xix. 4, 6, 12) ;
by Pilate's wife (" Have thou nothing to do with
that just man," Matt, xxvii. 19); by one of the
thieves ("This man hath done nothing amiss,"
Luke xxiii. 41) ; by the centurion (" Certainly this
man was righteous," Luke xxiii. 47).
(4) The unquestionable verdict of history is that
Jesus was one of the best men that ever lived.
This view of Him is taken not only by Christians,
but by those who regard Him as a man like other
men, and not altogether faultless. Thus Dr.
Martineau says : " Jesus of Nazareth, in virtue of
the characteristics of His spirit, holds the place of
Prince of Saints, and perfects the conditions of the
pure religious life " {Seat of Authority, p. 652).
Dr. Keim says : " The life of Jesus, both in public
and private, was in an eminent degree holy and
pure, and allows us as such to infer a previous
unsullied youth striving towards the noble and
the exalted. The small defects which have been
detected are no sins ; they are sometimes an
extravagance of idealism and energy, and some
times a remnant of human force in the crushing
conflict of the elements, and vanish like a drop in
the ocean of brilliant superhuman achievement. , , ,

MORAL CHARACTER OF JESUS 393
We are still able to retain the strong and joyful
conviction that it was Virtue herself that trod the
earth in Him, and that the dolorous confession
made by antiquity ofthe impossibility of sinlessness,
and of the non-existence of the ideal of virtue and
wisdom, found in Him its refutation and its end.
In detail, a plenitude of virtues — zeal for God and
love of man, self-respect and humility, bravery and
self-denial ; every virtue so full, the zeal so fervent,
the love so melting, the heroism so ardent, the
self-denial so unbounded, .that out of each atom a
great man must grow " {Jesus of Nazara, vol. vi. pp.
416, 417).
Having now established that Jesus was one of
the purest and most beautiful spirits that ever
laboured for the good of mankind, we proceed to
inquire what He taught about Himself, and what
position in the universe He claimed to occupy.
We shall use the testimony of all four Gospels ;
but inasmuch as it is generally supposed that there
is a larger subjective element in the discourses of
the fourth Gospel than in those of the Synoptics,
we shall use the fourth Gospel mainly to confirm
and illustrate what is independently attested by
the other three. This is not, perhaps, a logical
course to adopt, for the fourth Gospel, being
the direct production of the most intimate friend
of Jesus, ought probably to be regarded as the
best guide to the interpretation of His teaching.
Expediency, however, may be pleaded in favour of
our procedure. The authenticity of the discourses

-394 THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS
and sayings in Matthew and Luke is admitted by
almost all,1 but the authenticity of those in St. John
is seriously disputed. Under such circumstances
it is better to rest the case upon the undisputed
testimony. (i) There is good evidence that Jesus taught His
own sinlessness. This in itself is a remarkable
fact. The general opinion of mankind has pro
nounced sinlessness impossible. Thus Demos
thenes assigned the attribute of acting rightly at
all times to the gods alone {De Corona, p. 322).
Cicero declared that he had never found a perfectly
wise man. Xenophon said, " I see that no one
1 For example, Renan says : " Matthew evidently merits an
unlimited confidence as to the discourses ; they are the Logia,
the identical notes taken from a clear and lively remembrance
of the teachings of Jesus. A kind of splendour, at once mild
and terrible — a divine strength, if we may so speak — emphasizes
these words, detaches them from the context, and renders them
easily distinguishable" (Life of Jesus, Introduction).
The fourth Gospel is also regarded by Renan as to a large
extent trustworthy. " Upon the whole," he says, " I admit as
authentic the four Canonical Gospels. All, in my opinion, date
from the first century ; and the authors are, generally speaking,
those to whom they are attributed. . . . Every one who sets him
self to write the life of Jesus without any predetermined theory
as to the relative value of the Gospels . . . will be led, in numer
ous instances, to prefer the narration of John to that of the
Synoptics. The last months of the life of Jesus especially are
explained by John alone ; a number of the features of the
Passion, unintelligible in the Synoptics, resume both probability
and possibility in the narrative of the fourth Gospel." Even of
the Johannine discourses Renan says: "There are in the dis
courses of John some admirable gleams, some traits which truly
come from Jesus." Renan's view is endorsed (in the main) by
Harnack and Matthew Arnold,

THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS 395
of mankind is free from failings." Epictetus raised
the question, " Is it possible for a man to be fault
less?" and answered, "It is impossible. What
is possible is to be continually striving to be
faultless." Mahomet expressly disclaimed sinless
ness, and recorded in the Koran God's command
to him : " Pray for the forgiveness of thy sins."
Gautama, the founder of Buddhism, is not repre
sented as having been sinless from the first, but
as gradually attaining sinlessness. It is related
that Socrates on one occasion, seeing his disciples
deriding a physiognomist, who professed to have
discovered in the philosopher's face indications of
all the vices, openly declared that he had in his heart
the germs of all the sins which the physiognomist
professed to have detected.1 Moses was plainly
guilty of serious sin (Exod. ii. 12). Isaiah was "a
man of unclean lips " (Isa. vi. 5). Elijah confessed,
" I am not better than my fathers " (1 Kings xix. 4).
St. Peter, conscious of his unworthiness in the
presence of Christ, exclaimed, " Depart from me, for
I am a sinful man, O Lord " (Luke v. 8). St. Paul
confessed himself the chief of sinners, and some
times feared, lest, when he had preached to others,
he might himself be a castaway (1 Tim. i. 15;
Rom. v. 8 ; vii. 23 ; 1 Cor. ix. 27). St. John, the
purest and most beautiful of all New Testament
1 Socrates himself never claimed sinlessness. Even his en
thusiastic admirer and biographer, Xenophon, does not venture
to claim for him more than freedom from impiety ; "No one
of mankind ever saw or heard Socrates doing or saying anything
irreligious or impious" (Memorabilia, i. 1, 11).

396 THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS
characters, says decidedly : " If we say that we have
no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in
us. If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just
to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from
all unrighteousness. If we say that we have
not sinned, we make Him a liar, and His word
is not in us " (i John i. 8). The fact is that the
more holy a man is, the more strictly he judges
himself, and the less inclined he is to claim that
he is free from sin. Strauss himself, in his well-
known Life of Jesus, recognizes this. " In pro
portion," he says, " as man makes progress towards
moral perfection, the instinctive sense by which
he detects in himself the slightest deviations
from such perfection becomes more and more
acute." Jesus, on the other hand, never recognized in
Himself the least moral blemish.1 The most explicit
statements of His sinlessness are found in the
fourth Gospel : " Which of you convinceth Me
1 The only apparent exception is Mark x. 17 ff., where Jesus,
having been accosted by a young man as " Good Master,"
replies, " Why callest thou Me good ? there is none good but
one, that is, God." That Jesus seriously meant to deny that He
was good, is, in view of the other claims which He made (see
below), quite impossible. Dr. Gore is clearly right when he
says (Bampton Lectures, i.) : " Christ was systematically training
[the Apostles] to trust Him with that sort of trust which can
legitimately be given to God only. This becomes all the more
conspicuous when we find Him repudiating from one who came
with the vague language of casual respect, even the familiar
title, ' Good Master.' Such ordinary and casual deference, the
language of mere compliment commonly addressed to con
temporary Rabbis, He would not accept ; but language far

THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS 397
of sin " (viii. 46) ; " The prince of this world cometh,
and hath nothing in Me (xiv. 30) ; " I do always
those things that please Him " (viii. 29) ; " I am the
Good Shepherd" (x. 11); "I glorified Thee on
the earth, by finishing the work which Thou hast
given Me to do " (xvii. 4). The synoptic evidence,
however, is really as strong. The claim to be the
personified Moral Law of the human race, and in
particular to be the Judge of the world, which He
continually made, implies sinlessness. So does His
claim that His death is a propitiatory sacrifice .for
the sins of the world (Mark x. 45). Quite decisive
also is the passage (Matt. xi. 28) where, after
declaring that " no man knoweth the Father, save
the Son," He says, " Come unto Me, all ye that
labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you
rest. Take My yoke upon you, and learn of Me ;
for I am meek and lowly in heart : and ye shall
find rest unto your souls. For My yoke is easy,
higher, devotion of far intenser meaning He was deliberately
encouraging in the disciples who did know Him, and had
reasons for what they said and felt." Another explanation of
the passage, first suggested by Origen, is accepted by UUmann,
Godet, Meyer, and some other modern critics. UUmann says
(Sinlessness of Jesus, p. 150) : " He undoubtedly did intend
to reject the attribution to Himself of goodness in that absolute,
that purely divine sense of which we have spoken. And not
without reason. . . . His goodness [as man] was not, like the
divine goodness, absolutely unexposed to temptation, and
raised above all change, but a goodness capable of development,
and to be perfected by temptations, conflicts, and sufferings."
Meyer says : " This declaration is no evidence against the
sinlessness of Jesus." B. Weiss, in loc, takes the same
view.

398 THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS
and My burden is light." An invitation like this
could never have been addressed, without extreme
arrogance and impiety, by a sinner to fellow-
sinners. Not to dwell further upon a claim which is
implied in every other claim that Jesus made,
we subjoin the words of the author of the most
learned and critical of the rationalistic Lives of
Jesus. " Any one," says Keim,1 " who has given
himself to the contemplation of the words and
acts of our Lord receives from it irresistibly this
impression — here we have before us a conscience
which has never felt the sting of the sense of
guilt. And this is not a case of a moralist of a
low or easy standard of morality. Oh no ! it
is He who branded with the character of sin a
bare look, an idle word, and, behind the veil of
the outward actions, all impurity of heart and
motives. He sternly rebuked His age ; He
made His disciples blush for their weaknesses ;
He made them pray for the forgiveness of their
sins. But He, the man of the most absorbing
vocation, of the vastest mission, . . . never prayed
for pardon for Himself, not even at Gethsemane
or Golgotha. He walks with perfect constancy
in the sunshine of the paternal love of God ; He
compels other men to believe in His perfect good
ness ; He pronounces forgiveness upon sinners in
the name of God; He dies for them, and ascends
1 Keim rejects the fourth Gospel altogether, and uses the
testimony even of the Synoptists with the utmost caution.

THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS 399
to heaven to take His place upon the judgment-
seat of the all-holy God." 1
1 Of particular alleged blemishes in our Lord's character, the
following are the chief:
(1) He showed wilfulness and disobedience to His parents
(Luke ii. 43).
Reply. — (a) It is clear that He was not lodging with His parents
at the time, and did not know that they had started home.
(b) It must be remembered that the relation of Jesus to His
parents was not precisely that of other children.
(2) The Baptism of Jesus involved on His part a confession of
sin (cf. Matt. iii. 2, 6).
Reply. — Any presumption of this kind is removed : (a) by
the voice of the Father, which declared His sinless perfection
(Matt. iii. 17) ; (b) by the express words of John and of Jesus
Himself (Matt. iii. 14, 15 ; cf. 11, and John i. 29).
(3) He wilfully destroyed the property of the Gadarene swine-
owners (Mark v. 13).
Reply. — (a) Whatever may have been the case with the
other actions of Jesus, His miracles must have been worked
in full dependence upon God and in obedience to God. It is
certain, therefore, that since the miracle was sanctioned by
God Himself, it cannot have involved any injustice to any one.
(b) Probably the owners of the swine were Jews, and had no
right to keep swine.
(4) He called Judas a devil (John vi. 70).
Reply. — (a) Judas deserved the title, and Jesus, who could
read the heart, had the right to apply it to Him. (b) The
term may mean a false accuser, a slanderer.
(5) Jesus spoke too severely of the Scribes and Pharisees
(Matt, xxiii.).
Reply. — (a) Religious hypocrisy is the vilest of sins, and
is more culpable than open immorality, (b) Jesus could read
the hearts of men, and knew the truth better than we do.
(c) Jesus had in view the Church in all ages, and in the
persons of the Scribes assailed religious hypocrisy in all its
forms. (6) Jesus showed undue violence in cleansing the temple
(John ii. 15).
Reply.— (a) The scourge was used by Him to drive out the
oxen, not to strike their owners, (b) Jesus acted in the matter

4oo JESUS TEACHES WITH AUTHORITY
The consciousness that Jesus possessed of being
sinless is not of itself evidence that His personality
was more than human. Nevertheless, it is a fact
that challenges attention. It marks Jesus off from
all the great men who have ever lived, and demands
investigation and, if possible, explanation.
(2) Jesus claimed an authority far higher than
that of a prophet. The prophets spoke in the
name of the Lord. Jesus did not hesitate, even
upon the most solemn occasions, to speak in His
own name. Thus in the Sermon on the Mount
He revised on His own authority the words
spoken by God Himself on Sinai : " Ye have
heard that it was said to them of old time [viz.
by God], Thou shalt not kill : . . . but / say unto
you, ... Ye have heard that it was said, Thou
shalt not commit adultery : . . . but / say unto
as a prophet, and His zeal was not blameworthy, but altogether
commendable. (7) In cursing the fig-tree Jesus showed unreasonable anger
(Matt. xxi. 19).
Reply. — The miracle was an acted parable indicating the
judgment of religious hypocrites.
(8) Jesus showed want of resignation upon the Cross — "My
God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" (Matt, xxvii.
46). Reply. — (a) There is no complaint against God in these words.
Jesus only asks the cause of His being thus forsaken. (.)
The words have reference to the mystery of the Atonement, in
which " He bare our sins in His own body on the tree."
(9) He spoke disrespectfully to His mother (John ii. 3).
Reply. — The words are quite respectful, woman, or lady,
being a title of respectful address. Jesus does no more than
warn His mother that now that His ministry has begun, not
even she must presume tp dictate pr suggest what He is to do.

DEVOTION TO CHRIST'S PERSON 401
you," etc. (Matt. v. 21 ff). We are not surprised,
therefore, to find that what impressed the people
about this sermon was not so much its contents
as the tone of authority which pervaded it : " The
people were astonished at His doctrine : for He
taught them as one having authority, and not as
the scribes " (Matt. vii. 28-9). Similarly He worked
miracles in almost every case in His own name :
" I will ; be thou cleansed " ; " Young man, I say
unto thee, Arise" ; " Lazarus, come forth." He also
vindicted His power to forgive sins, braving the
accusation of blasphemy to which it exposed Him
(Mark ii. 5 ff).
(3) All other great religious teachers have de
manded faith in God alone, and have spoken of
themselves in the spirit of St. Paul when he said :
" Who then is Paul, and who is Apollos, but
ministers by whom ye believed ? " Jesus, how
ever, demanded unlimited faith in His own Person
— a faith so intense, and a devotion so consuming,
that none but God can rightly claim it. That He
did so, lies on the surface of the Gospel narratives,
and is as clear in the Synoptists as in St. John,
as clear in St. Mark as in St. Matthew arid St. Luke :
" If any man come to Me, and hate not his father,
and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren
and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be
My disciple " (Luke xiv. 26) ; " Whosoever shall
confess Me before men, him will I confess also be
fore My Father which is in heaven. But whosoever
shall deny Me before men, him will I also deny
26

402 DEVOTION TO CHRIST'S PERSON
before My Father which is in heaven " (Matt. x.
32-3) ; " He that loveth father or mother more than
Me is not worthy of Me : and he that loveth son
or daughter more than Me is not worthy of Me "
(Matt. x. 37) ; " He that receiveth Me receiveth Him
that sent Me " (Matt. x. 40) ; " Come unto Me, all ye
that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you
rest " (Matt. xi. 28) ; " Whosoever shall not receive
you, nor hear your words, when ye depart out of
that house or city, shake off the dust of your feet.
Verily I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable
for the land of Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of
judgment, than for that city" (Matt. x. 14-5);
"[Jesus] said to another, Follow Me. But he said,
Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father.
Jesus said unto him, Let the dead bury their
dead : but go thou and preach the kingdom of God "
(Lukeix. 59-60); "I am the Way, the Truth, and the
Life : no man cometh unto the Father, but through
Me" (John xiv. 6); "He that honoureth not the
Son honoureth not the Father which hath sent him"
(John v. 23).
Jesus continually encouraged men to put faith
in Him and in His supernatural powers to an
unlimited extent. He received as a matter of
right, and without the least sign of displeasure,
the most extreme marks of subjection and reverence.
He carefully prepared the way for and led up
to the great act of faith by which the disciples
declared their conviction that He was the Messiah
and the Son of God, and openly expressed His

CHRIST'S OFFICE AS JUDGE 403
joy at the result : " Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-
jona : for flesh and blood hath not revealed it
unto thee, but My Father which is in heaven"
(Matt. xvi. 17 ; see also Matt. viii. 2 ; xiv. 33 ; xv. 25 ;
xx. 20; xxviii. g, 17; John ix. 38; xx. 28; John
vi. 67).
(4) Jesus taught that at the Last Judgment He
would not be a subject of judgment like other men,
but the Judge. All the Gospels, and apparently
all the original sources of the Gospels, testify to
this. This claim to be the Judge of the world
appears even in the Sermon on the Mount, which
is sometimes stated to be a purely ethical dis
course : " Many will say to Me in that day [i.e.
in the Judgment Day], Lord, Lord, did we not
prophesy by Thy name ; and by Thy name cast
out devils, and by Thy name do many mighty
works ? And then I will profess unto them, I
never knew you : depart from Me, ye that work
iniquity " (Matt. vii. 22-3). The same claim is made
again and again in the course of the ministry :
"The Son of Man shall come in the glory of His
Father with His angels ; and then shall He reward
every man according to his works " (Matt. xvi. 27) ;
" Whosoever shall be ashamed of Me and of My
words in this adulterous and sinful generation
of him also shall the Son of Man be ashamed, when
He cometh in the glory of His Father with the
holy angels " (Mark viii. 38) ; " In an hour that ye
think not the Son of Man cometh " (Luke xii. 40) ;
" Then shall they see the Son of Man coming in

404 CHRIST'S OFFICE AS JUDGE
the clouds with great power and glory. And then
shall He send His angels, and shall gather together
His elect from the four winds, from the uttermost
part of the earth to the uttermost part of heaven "
(Mark xiii. 26-7) ; " Whosoever shall confess Me
before men, him shall the Son of Man also confess
before the angels of God " (Luke xii. 8) ; " When
the Son of Man shall come in His glory, and all
the angels with Him, then shall He sit upon the
throne of His glory : and before Him shall be
gathered all nations : and He shall separate them
one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep
from the goats : and He shall set the sheep on
His right hand, but the goats on the left. Then
shall the King say unto them on His right hand,
Come, ye blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom
prepared for you from the foundation of the
world. . . . Then shalt He say also unto them on
the left hand, Depart from Me, ye cursed, into
everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his
angels. . . . And these shall go away into eternal
punishment : but the righteous into eternal life "
(Matt. xxv. 3 1 ff).
The same claim to the office of Judge appears also
in the parables, the most characteristic of the utter
ances of Jesus, and the least capable of alteration
or perversion. It is found in the parable of the
Tares : " Let both grow together until the harvest :
and in the time of harvest / will say to the reapers,
Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in
bundles to burn them : but gather the wheat into

CHRIST'S OFFICE AS JUDGE 405
my barn. ... So shall it be in the end of the
world. The Son of Man shall send forth His
angels, and they shall gather out of His kingdom
all things that cause stumbling, and them that
do iniquity, and shall cast them into the furnace
of fire : there shall be the weeping and gnashing
of teeth " (Matt. xiii. 30, 40-2). It is found again
in the parable of the Ten Virgins, where it is
undoubtedly Christ Himself who pronounces the
sentence of exclusion (Matt. xxv. 12); and in the
parable which follows it, where Christ is represented
as going into a far country, and then returning and
recompensing His servants according to their be
haviour during His absence (Matt. xxv. 14 ff; cf.
Luke xix. 12 ff).
The testimony of the fourth Gospel is precisely
similar : " The Father judgeth no man, but hath
committed all judgment unto the Son. . . . The
Father hath given Him authority to execute judg
ment also because He is the Son of Man. Marvel
not at this : for the hour is coming, in the which
all that are in the graves shall hear His voice,
and shall come forth ; they that have done good,
unto the resurrection of life; and they that have
done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment " (John
v. 22 ff.).
(5) Jesus taught that His death was not simply
a martyrdom, but a supernatural event of moment
ous importance, changing for the better the re
lations between God and man, and initiating a
new and everlasting covenant. This teaching is

406 CHRIST'S ATONING DEATH
less prominent than that concerning His office as
Judge, but it is found in all the Gospels, and is
enshrined in that sacred rite which is celebrated
by Christians in remembrance of Him, and there
fore it must be regarded as critically established.
All the accounts of the institution of the Holy
Communion show that Jesus regarded His death
as an Atonement for sin : " This is My blood of
the covenant, which is shed on behalf of many
unto remission of sins " (Matt.) ; " This is My
blood of the covenant, which is shed on behalf
of many " (Mark) ; " This cup is the New Covenant
in [i.e. by means of] My blood, even that which
is poured out on your behalf" (Luke);1 "This cup
is the New Testament in My blood " (i Cor.
xi. 25).
Similar doctrine is found in the striking passage
Matt. xx. 28 = Mark x. 45 : " The Son of Man came
not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and
to give His life a ransom for [or, instead of] many "
(Xvt/oo. SlvtI iroXkcov). It also occurs several times
in St. John's Gospel : " I lay down My life for
the sheep" (x. 15); "The bread which I will give
is My flesh, [which I will give] for the life of the
world" (vi. 51); "He that eateth My flesh, and
drinketh My blood hath eternal life" (vi. 54).
(6) Jesus claimed to be " the Son of God " in a
sense far in advance of that in which the title is
1 There is some doubt as to what is the true text of Luke
xx. 19-20. The reader should consult the R.V. margin, Hastings's
Bible Diet. vol. ii. p. 636, and Plummer's Commentary, in loc.

THE TITLE SON OF GOD 407
used in the Old Testament of the Davidic king
(2 Sam. vii. 14) and of the Messiah (Psalm ii-
7). By "the Son of God" Jesus meant a super
natural being, exalted far above angels and men,
and second only to God the Father in rank and
dignity. Some critics deny this,1 but the evidence
is too strong to be resisted. Three passages from
the Synoptic Gospels are quite conclusive. The
first is Mark xiii. 32 = Matt. xxiv. 36: "But of
that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the
angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father."
The Son— notice the absolute use of the term, as
in the fourth Gospel — is here certainly ranked
above the angels,2 even while it is admitted that
His knowledge is limited.3 The second passage
is Matt. xi. 27 = Luke x. 22 : " All things have
been delivered unto Me of My Father : and no
one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither
doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he
to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him."
The point of greatest significance in this passage
is neither the omnipotence granted to the Son,
nor the fact that He alone knows the Father, but
the remarkable statement that the nature of the Son
is so transcendent that it is apprehended by the
1 Those critics who deny this meaning in the Synoptic Gospels
generally admit it in the fourth Gospel.
2 The superiority of the Son to the angels appears also in
Matt. xvi. 27 ("His angels"), and xiii. 41 ("Shall send forth
His angels").
3 The limitation of the Son's knowledge is also recognized in
the true text of Matt. xxiv. 36. See the R.V.

4o8 THE TITLE SON OF GOD
Father alone. Harnack's rationalistic exposition of
the passage in his What is Christianity ? is entirely
vitiated by neglect of this important point. A
really impartial criticism must candidly admit that
a Being so exalted that He shares the Father's
omnipotence, and is incapable of being understood
by any but Him, is no creature, but is the Father's
alter ego, His consubstantial Son, and the sharer
of His throne and attributes.
This conclusion is confirmed by the third and
last synoptic passage which we have to consider,
Matt. xxvi. 63 = Mark xiv. 61 = Luke xxii. 66 ff, in
which an account is given of the trial of Jesus
before the Sanhedrim. That Jesus was not con
demned merely for claiming to be the Messiah
is clear both from St. Matthew and St. Mark. To
lay claim to the office of Messiah was not in itself
an offence. Barchochebas, in the reign of Hadrian,
appeared in this character, and his claim was
accepted by the Jewish population of Palestine
(Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. iv. 6). Jesus, however, claimed
to be more than this. He asserted that He was
not only the Messiah, but also the Son of God.
This comes out quite clearly at the trial. " I adjure
Thee," said the high-priest, " by the living God,
that Thou tell us whether Thou be the Christ, the
Son of God " [the Son of the Blessed, Mark]. Now,
if Jesus had regarded Himself as simply a human
being, He would have at once explained that His
words had been misunderstood, and that He
abhorred the impiety of such a claim as much as

OMNIPOTENCE AND OMNIPRESENCE 409
His accusers. Instead of this, He answered :
" Thou hast said : nevertheless I say unto you,
Henceforth ye shall see the Son of Man sitting
at the right hand of power, and coming on the
clouds of heaven." It is no wonder, therefore, that
the high-priest rent his garments, and said, " He
hath spoken blasphemy : what further need have
we of witnesses ? behold, now ye have heard the
blasphemy." The synoptic account ofthe matter is
fully confirmed by the fourth Gospel : " The Jews
answered Pilate, We have a law, and by that law
He ought to die, because He made Himself the
Son of God" (John xix. 7).1
(7) Jesus claimed the essentially divine attributes
of omnipotence : " All things have been delivered
unto Me of My Father" (Matt. xi. 27); "All
authority hath been given unto Me in heaven and
on earth" (Matt, xxviii. 18); and omnipresence:
" Where two or three are gathered together in My
name, there am I in the midst of them " (Matt, xviii.
20) ; " Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end
of the world " (Matt, xxviii. 20).
(8) Jesus claimed Divinity in precise and un
ambiguous language. This is evident not only
from the fourth Gospel—" Before Abraham was,
I AM" (viii. 58); "My Lord and my God"
(xx. 28) — but also from the Synoptics : " Baptizing
1 Other important passages bearing upon the higher sense
of the title Son of God are Matt. iii. 17 (the Baptism); Matt.
xvii. 5 (the Transfiguration) ; Matt. xxii. 45 ; Matt. xxi. 33
(Parable of the Vineyard); and Matt, xxviii. 19 (Baptismal
formula).

410 THE BAPTISMAL FORMULA
them in the name of the Father, and of the Son,
and of the Holy Ghost" (Matt, xxviii. 19). The
last passage plainly teaches that the Son and the
Holy Spirit are Divine Persons sharing the ineffable
" name " or nature of the Supreme Father, and that
therefore Jesus is, in the language of the Nicene
Creed, "God of God, Light of Light, very God
of very God, . . . of one substance with the Father."
It has been suggested by some critics that this
passage is of later origin. It is maintained, not
without a certain superficial appearance of plausi
bility, that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity was
of gradual growth in the Church, and that therefore
the present passage, which asserts it in precise and
dogmatic language, must be far later than the
apostolic age. If, however, we are willing to be
guided by the evidence rather than by our pre
conceived notions of what is likely, we shall have
to admit that the present passage is undoubtedly
apostolic. There is, in fact, hardly a single text in
the New Testament which is supported by evidence
so ancient and so weighty. Not only is it contained
in every manuscript of St. Matthew's Gospel, but
it is clearly presupposed in the Trinitarian ex
pressions used by Clement of Rome, a.d. 96:
" Have we not one God, and one Christ, and one
Spirit of grace which was poured out on us ? "
(c. 46), "As God lives, and the Lord Jesus Christ
lives, and the Holy Ghost, the faith and the hope
of the elect " (c. 58) ; also by the Didacke, a.d. 100 :
" Baptize ye in the name of the Father, and of the

THE BAPTISMAL FORMULA 411
Son, and of the Holy Ghost in living water " ; and
by Justin Martyr, a.d. 150: "For in the name of
God the Father and Lord of the universe, and
of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Ghost,
they then receive the washing with water"
(1 Apol. 61). The Baptismal formula is also pre
supposed in the Apostles' Creed, which is an
expansion of it, and which, in its earliest form, dates
back at least to the year 100 a.d.
Against this weighty evidence only one positive
argument is produced. It is alleged that Baptism
was not originally administered in the name of
the Trinity, but in the name of the Lord Jesus
(Acts ii. 38, x. 48, etc).1 The obvious answer is
that these passages do not specify the form used,
but only indicate that the Baptism was Christian.
That this is the true explanation is shown by
the Didache. This document, like Acts, speaks of
Christian Baptism as in the name of Jesus — " Let
none eat or drink of your Eucharist but those who
have been baptized in the name of the Lord " ; but
when it describes the manner of Baptism, it gives
only the Trinitarian formula, which it mentions
twice, and emphasizes by requiring triple immersion.
IV. — Difficulties
There are a few passages in the Gospels which
at first sight seem inconsistent with our Lord's true
Deity. 1 This difficulty is alluded to by Cyprian, Ep. 73, who suggests
that the Apostles baptized Jews in the name of Jesus, and
Gentiles in the name of the Trinity.

4i2 THE KENOSIS
(i) St. Mark vi. 5, 6, speaks of His inability
to do any mighty works at Nazareth, because of
their unbelief. Clearly, however, it is moral
inability of which the Evangelist speaks. At other
times Jesus, for sufficient reason, worked miracles
without requiring faith as a condition (Matt. viii.
23 ff; Johnv. 13).
(2) St. Luke says that the child Jesus " advanced
in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God
and man" (ii. 52). This, however, only proves that
His humanity was real. Jesus would not have
been a child at all, except in appearance, unless He
had acquired knowledge and spiritual graces and
virtues gradually like other children.
(3) In Mark xiii. 32 Jesus speaks of His ignorance
of the time of the Day of Judgment. But He does
not regard this ignorance as inconsistent with His
Divinity, for even while He speaks of it, He places
Himself higher in rank than the angels. The
ignorance belonged to His human nature.1 As God,
He knew all things ; but as man, His knowledge,
though great, was limited. Its greatness is
sufficiently shown by the special mention of this
one limitation. If it be asked why He did not
on this occasion draw upon the resources of His
divine knowledge in order to answer the Apostles'
1 This was the view of St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius,
and St. Gregory of Nazianzus. The view of certain modern
Kenoticists is that the Divine Nature of Christ was subject
to ignorance during the time of His earthly humiliation. There
is no real Scriptural support for this opinion, and it does not
explain the difficulty better than the usual view.

THE GREAT DILEMMA 413
question, the answer probably is that such know
ledge would have been injurious to them, and to
the Church {cf. Acts i. 7).
The reason why the time of the Day of Judgment
lay beyond the sphere of Christ's human knowledge
probably is that it is a contingent event {cf 2 Pet.
iii., R.V. margin). Knowledge of contingent events
differs in kind as well as degree from human
knowledge, and is possible only to a being who
surveys time from the standpoint of absolute
eternity (see p. 198).
V. — The Resulting Dilemma
Critical investigation has led us step by step to
the conclusion that the Founder of Christianity, who
is revered not only by Christians but by most Free
thinkers as the best of men, and the greatest of
religious and moral reformers, claimed to be divine.
This conclusion is supported by such varied and
convergent evidence, that all real doubt upon the
subject is precluded. We are therefore brought
face to face with a very serious dilemma : either
the Author of Christianity was divine, or He
was not good {aut Deus aut homo non bonus). Of
attempts to evade this dilemma the following are
the chief:
(1) Mr. G. W. Foote advocates the theory that
Jesus was insane.
To this we reply that it is strictly impossible
that a system of religion and morality which has
commended itself to the intellect and conscience of

414 THE GREAT DILEMMA
the highest races of the earth can have been
originated by a madman.
(2) It is maintained that Jesus during the greater
part of His life was sane, but that during the last
few weeks of His ministry His mind became un
hinged, and that He was in an abnormal mental
state when He uttered His apocalyptic discourse
(Matt, xxiv.), and claimed to be the Son of God at
His trial (Matt. xxiv. 64).
It is a sufficient reply to this to point out that
the same claims were made by Him throughout
His ministry. They are found even in the Sermon
on the Mount and in the Parables, and are by no
means confined to the final episode of His career.
Moreover, Jesus never appeared so truly great
as at the end of His ministry. The sublime scene
at Calvary is itself a sufficient proof that Jesus
was not mad, or in any way deranged.
(3) It is maintained that Jesus believed Himself
to be divine, not because He had any internal
knowledge of the fact, but because He interpreted
the Old Testament prophecies, especially Daniel,
as indicating that the Messiah would be a Divine
Person. We reply that no mere man who interpreted the
prophecies in this way, could (unless he were insane)
possibly imagine himself to be the Messiah.
(4) It is maintained that the character of Jesus
deteriorated towards the end of His ministry, and
that He finally became a deceiver and impostor.
This is, in the main, the view of Renan, who

THE GREAT DILEMMA 415
considers that the raising of Lazarus, which
immediately preceded the triumphal entry into
Jerusalem, was a deliberate fraud arranged before
hand by Lazarus and his sisters, with the connivance
of Jesus {Life of Jesus, R.P.A. ed., pp. 124, 125).
We reply that a view like this, which makes
Jesus and some of His chief followers impostors,
is absolutely incredible. The high moral standard
set by Christ Himself in the Gospels, the unselfish
heroism of the Apostles, and the austere virtues
of the early Christian Church, render such a view
of His character once for all inconceivable.
The dilemma, therefore, to which our inquiry
has conducted us, cannot be evaded. Either Christ
was divine, as He continually claimed to be, or He
was an impostor of the worst type. An impostor
He cannot have been, because He founded the
purest system of religion and morals that has ever
been presented to the world. He must, therefore,
have been divine, as the Apostles themselves, and
the Church ever since their day, have believed.
The matter, however, cannot be finally decided
here. If Jesus was really divine, we have a right to
expect :
(1) That His Divinity should be made evident
by remarkable miracles; and—
(2) That His influence upon the world should be
shown to be exceedingly great.
Accordingly we proceed in the three following
chapters to investigate whether this has been the
case.

416 THE PERSON OF JESUS
LITERATURE
(a) Trinitarian
Liddon, Bampton Lectures ; Gore, Bampton Lectures * ;
Sanday, art. " Jesus Christ " in Hastings' Bible Diet. ; Godet,
Defence of the Christian Faith, vi.; Ballard, Miracles of
Unbelief, viii. ; Luthardt, Fundamental Truths, x. ; Oxford
House Papers, vol. i. p. 68 ; Illingworth, Personality, Human
and Divine, viii. (b) Theistic
Seeley, Ecce Homo ; Harnack, What is Christianity ?
Martineau, Seat of Authority, bk. iv.
(c) The Sinlessness of Christ
UUmann, The Sinlessness of Jesus an Evidence for Christi
anity (tr.).
(d) The:Kenosis, and Christ's Human Knowledge
Dorner, Person of Christ, div. ii. vol. iii. p. 249 ff. ; Ottley,
Doctrine of the Incarnation, vol. ii. p. 285 ff. ; Gore, Disserta
tions ; Hall, Kenotic Theory ; Gifford, The Incarnation; Mason,
Conditions of our Lord's Life on Earth, Swayne, Our Lord's
Knowledge as Man ; Powell, Principle of the Incarnation.
* Also the same shortened for popular use (Why we Christians
believe in Christ?)

CHAPTER XXI

THE MIRACLES OF JESUS

Summary.— It is shown that the miracles attributed to Jesus
in the oldest Gospel sources cannot be explained as myths
or legends, but must be accepted as authentic history.
I. — The Importance of the Evidence of Miracles
So far we have been presenting only the moral
evidence for Christianity. But moral evidence,
though indispensable, is inadequate to sustain the
whole burden of proof. If faith is to be secure,
the moral evidence must be supplemented by
appropriate miraculous evidence. Even if the
Christian Revelation professed to be nothing but
a republication, by authority, of the truths of
Natural Religion, miracles would still be necessary,
or at least highly desirable, to testify to its authori
tative character. But since Christianity is more
than this — since, that is, it professes to reveal
truths which, though not contrary to, are above
reason — it is under a special obligation to produce
miraculous evidence of the truth of its claims.
The Founder of Christianity, wiser than some of
417 27

4i 8 IMPORTANCE OF MIRACLES
His modern followers,1 clearly recognized this
obligation. He did not disparage moral and
spiritual evidence — He regarded it, in fact, as the
most important evidence of all {cf. John xx. 29);
nevertheless, He considered it to be part of His
mission to confirm His words by " mighty works "
and "signs following." Accordingly, while He
refused to perform mere marvels at the demand of
bigoted and prejudiced opponents (Mark viii. 12,
Matt. xvi. 1), and reproved the popular appetite for
" signs and wonders " (John iv. 48), He continually
appealed to His miraculous " works " as signs that
He was really sent from God. This is the case
not only in the fourth Gospel (" The witness
which I have is greater than that of John : for
the works which the Father hath given Me to
accomplish, the very works that I do, bear witness
of Me, that the Father hath sent Me," v. 36; "The
works that I do in My Father's name, these bear
witness of Me," x. 25 ; " If I had not done among
them the works which none other did, they had
not had sin," xv. 24), but also in the Synoptists.
Thus, when John the Baptist sent to inquire
1 See, for instance, Contentio Veritatis, p. 144 : " The time
is past when Christianity could be presented as a revelation
attested by miracles, depending on these for the main evidence
of its truth"; also p. 88: "[Miracles] are unmeaning. We
should not now expect, a priori, that the Incarnate Logos
would be born without a human father, that He would suspend
His own laws during His sojourn on earth, or that He would
resuscitate His earthy body, and remove it into the sky, nor
do we see that those events, however well proved, are of any
value as evidence for His divinity."

IMPORTANCE OF MIRACLES 419
whether He was really the Expected One or not,
Jesus appealed to the evidence, not only of His
preaching, but also of His miracles wrought upon
the blind, the lame, the lepers, the deaf, and the
dead (Matt. xi. 4 = Luke vii. 22). In reply to the
Pharisees, who attributed His miracles to Beel
zebub, He declared that they were worked by
the finger {or Spirit) of God, and were a sign
that " the kingdom of God is come upon you "
(Matt. xii. 28 = Luke xi. 20). He severely reproved
the inhabitants of Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Caper
naum for their obstinate rejection of the testimony
ofthe " mighty works" which He performed among
them (Matt. xi. 2off = Luke x. 13 ff). In particular,
He offered His Resurrection as a convincing sign
of the truth of His teaching : " For as Jonas was
three days and three nights in the whale's belly;
so shall the Son of Man be three days and three
nights in the heart of the earth" (Matt. xii. 40).1
The Apostles also regarded it as an essential
part of their office to bear witness to the miracle
of the Resurrection (Acts i. 22, etc.). When it is
remembered, further, that Christ regarded Himself
as not only the bearer of a revelation to mankind,
but also^ as a supernatural Person, the Son of
God manifested in the flesh, the need, or at least
1 It is possible that these words, being wanting in the parallel
passage in St. Luke (xi. 30), are not in place here ; but they
imply, as J. Lightfoot has shown, an Aramaic original, and
therefore probably formed part of the original Matthaean Logia.
Their omission by St. Luke is probably due to the difficulty
about the Son pf Man remaining three nights in the grave.

420 ST. PAUL'S MIRACLES
the great propriety, of miracles to support His
claims becomes still more apparent. A natural
Christ may, perhaps, afford to dispense with
miracles. A supernatural Christ cannot. From a
supernatural Christ supernatural works are impera
tively and rightly demanded, and if they are not
forthcoming, sober reason will conclude that the
" supernatural " Christ is not supernatural.1
II. — The Evidence of the Pauline Epistles
The great Pauline epistles, which even the de
structive criticism of Tubingen spared, testify to
two important facts : (i) that St. Paul worked
numerous miracles in proof of his apostolic
authority ; and (2) that the other Apostles did the
same. Thus in Romans xv. 19 St. Paul speaks
1 There is much sober sense in these words of Mozley. "If,
then, a person of evident integrity and loftiness of character
rose into notice in a particular country, who made these com
munications about himself— that he had existed before his
natural birth, from all eternity, and before the world was, in
a state of glory with God, that the world itself had been made
by him, that he had, however, come down from heaven and
assumed the form and nature of man for a particular purpose,
. . . and lastly, that he should descend again at the end of
the world to judge the human race — if this person made these
assertions about himself, and all that was done was to make
the assertions, what would be the inevitable conclusion of sober
reason respecting that person ? The necessary conclusion of
sober reason respecting that person would be that he was dis
ordered in his understanding. ... By no rational being could
a just and benevolent life be accepted as a proof of such
astonishing announcements. . . . Thus miracles and the super
natural contents of Christianity must stand or fall together"
(On Miracles, lect. i.).

MIRACLES OF THE APOSTLES 421
of " the signs and wonders " {arrj/ieuuv km Tepdrtov)
wrought by him in the power of the Holy Ghost
from Jerusalem to Illyricum " for the obedience
of the Gentiles." Again, in 2 Corinthians xii. 11, 12,
he says : " In nothing was I behind the very
chiefest Apostles, though I am nothing. Truly the
signs of an Apostle were wrought among you in all
patience, by signs and wonders and mighty works "
(o^/mio.? re Kai rkpacn Kai Svvd/ieo-i). Similarly in the
Epistle to the Galatians (iii. 5) he speaks of himself as
" working miracles " {ivepy&v Sw a/xei?) among them.
That the Apostles worked miracles in confirma
tion of their teaching, is also asserted by the
contemporary writer of Hebrews, a learned and
competent witness.1 In ii. 3 he speaks ofthe "great
salvation, which having at the first been spoken
through the Lord [Jesus], was confirmed unto us
by them that heard ; God also bearing witness with
them, both by signs and wonders, and by manifold
powers " {<rr)/j,eloi<; re Kai repaa-t, koI ir ot/oXat? Svvdfieai).
The statements, therefore, in Acts about the
miracles wrought by St. Paul and the other
Apostles, and about the evidential value which they
attached to them (Acts xv. 12; iv. 10, 30; v. 12-3;
viii. 6 ; xiv. 3 ; xix. 1 1 ; etc.), are entirely credible.
Upon the whole, then, it seems impossible to re
sist the conclusion (1) that the Apostles performed
"mighty works," which, whether strictly miraculous
or not, were at least contrary to all ordinary
1 Hebrews was certainly written in the Apostolic age, for it is
quoted by Clement of Rome, a.d. 95.

422 THE OLDEST GOSPEL SOURCES
experience, and (2) that they regarded them as
important credentials of their authority.1 If first
hand evidence to this effect were wanting, we
might be inclined to hesitate ; but in face of the
definite and emphatic statements of St. Paul in
his unquestioned epistles, doubt is impossible.
III. — The Evidence of the Oldest Gospel Sources
As it has been alleged that the existing Gospels
contain late and legendary matter, and as in the
case of St. Matthew, which has perhaps been
subjected to a process of subsequent editing, this
possibility must be seriously recognized,2 it is
desirable to go back at once to the oldest Gospel
sources now recoverable.
Critics of all schools (Sanday, Salmon, Zahn,
Weiss, Jiilicher, Holtzmann, Reuss, Schmiedel,
Wernle, Weizsacker, Beyschlag, etc.) agree that
the two oldest sources of the Synoptic Gospels
are (1) the Hebrew or Aramaic Logia of St. Matthew,
and (2) The Reminiscences of St. Peter, recorded
by his convert and " interpreter," St. Mark. The
former is the older source, having been written
at a very early period for the use of the Hebrew-
1 Cf Wernle, Beginnings of Christianity, vol. i. p. 119:
"Jesus' miraculous powers likewise continued effective in the
Apostles. It came to be universally accepted that an Apostle
could prove himself such by signs and wonders."
8 We by no means wish to intimate that this is the case, but
it is desirable, in an inquiry of this kind, to be as cautious as
possible in admitting evidence, and to exclude, in the first
Instance at least, everything that is doubtful.

ST. PETER'S MEMOIRS 423
speaking Church of Jerusalem. Zahn believes that
this Logia was a complete Hebrew Gospel, but the
majority of recent critics assume that it consisted
chiefly, though not entirely, of discourses. It is
possible that the whole of the discourses in St.
Matthew's Gospel are taken from this source ; x but,
in order to be on the safe side, we shall regard
as Logia sayings only those which are common to
St. Matthew and St. Luke.
The Reminiscences of St. Peter were prob
ably identical with the present canonical Mark.2
If they were not, they resembled it so closely that
the difference is unimportant.3 All critics agree
that St. Mark reproduces St. Peter's narrative
with great fidelity. Dr. Swete speaks of " the
peculiar freshness and realism of the second
Gospel, the vividness of its descriptions, its liveli
ness even in dialogue, its precision and circum
stantiality in its notices of time, place, custom,
situation, and the like, and the simple objectivity
of its narrative," and says that it is due "directly
or indirectly to an eye-witness." Renan says :
" The Gospel of Mark is the one of three Synoptists
' This is Renan's view.
8 St. Justin (a.d. 150) clearly understood by The Remini
scences of St. Peter the present canonical Mark. He found
in the Reminiscences the fact that Jesus called the sons of
Zebedee Boanerges. This is mentioned by St. Mark only
(Dialogue with Trypho, evi. ; cf. Mark iii. 17).
3 The theory that the present Mark is based on an older
Urmarkus, or "original Mark," advocated by Baur, is now
generally abandoned. Dr. Swete says: "There is no trace in
ancient literature of this supposed Urmarkus,"

424 ST. PETER'S MEMOIRS
which has remained the most primitive, the most
original, the one to which the fewest after-elements
have been added. In Mark the facts are related
with a clearness for which we seek in vain among
the other evangelists. He likes to report certain
words of Jesus in Syro-Chaldean. He is full of
minute observations coming doubtless from an eye
witness. There is nothing to prevent our agreeing
with Papias in regarding this eye-witness, who
evidently had followed Jesus, who had loved Him,
and observed Him very closely, and who had
preserved a lively image of Him, as the Apostle
Peter himself" {Life of Jesus, Introd.)
Now this primitive Gospel, which proceeds from
St. Peter, is completely steeped in miracle, it is,
in fact; in proportion to its length, more miraculous
than any other Gospel. Several times it draws
attention to the immense number of miracles which
Jesus performed : " They brought unto Him all
that were sick, and them that were possessed with
devils. And all the city was gathered together at
the door. And He healed many that were sick
with divers diseases, and cast out many devils "
(i. 32-4). " He had healed many ; insomuch that as
many as had plagues pressed upon Him that they
might touch Him " (iii. 10). " And wheresoever He
entered, into villages, or into cities, or into the
country, they laid the sick in the marketplaces : . . .
and as many as touched Him were made whole"
(vi. 56).
Of particular miracles this primitive Gospel

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MIRACLES 425
records a large number, which may be classified
as follows :
Visions, Voices, etc. — The Baptism and Temptation
(i. 10 ff), the Transfiguration (ix. 2).
Miracles of Healing. — Insanity and demonic posses
sion (i. 24, v. 1, vii. 29, ix. 25), fever (i. 31), leprosy
(i. 40), paralysis (ii. 1 1), withered hand (iii. 5), issue
of blood (v. 25), deaf-mutism (vii. 35), blindness
(viii. 22, x. 52).
Raising the Dead. — The daughter of Jairus (v. 22).
Physical Miracles. — Rebuking the storm (iv. 39),
feeding the five thousand (vi. 35), walking on the
sea (vi. 52), feeding the four thousand (viii. 1),
cursing the fig-tree (xi. 14, 20).
To these may be added two portents — the super
natural darkness at the Crucifixion (xv. 33), and
the rending of the veil of the temple (xv. 38).
It is not possible, therefore, to eliminate miracle
from the life of Jesus by going back to the earliest
evidence. The Gospel of St. Mark, which repre
sents the earliest tradition, that of St. Peter himself,
records over twenty particular miracles, and alludes,
besides, to an immense number of others.
The Testimony of the Apostles to Christ's Miracles. —
The Apostles, therefore, believed that Jesus worked
miracles, and it is difficult to suppose that they were
mistaken. They were with Him continually, and
had ample opportunities for careful observation. It
is true that they were not trained in the methods
of [exact science, and therefore would be liable
at times to make mistakes, but the striking and

426 TESTIMONY OF THE APOSTLES
undeniable character of most of Christ's miracles and
their immense number furnish a sufficient guarantee
against extensive error. If the Apostles were
mistaken in some, or even in many cases — and this,
we admit, is possible — they were assuredly not
mistaken in all. So numerous and so notorious
were the miracles of Jesus, that even His enemies
did not dispute them. This was not from want of
will (John ix. 18, cf. Acts iv. 14-6), but from want
of power. The Pharisees put forward the theory
that He worked them by the aid of the Evil One
(Mark iii. 22). Others, more favourably disposed,
advocated less objectionable theories (Mark vi. 14).
But all these explanations concede that our Lord's
miracles were facts.
The Testimony of Jesus Himself to His Miracles. —
But there is testimony to the reality of our Lord's
miracles more important than that of the Apostles
or of the Pharisees. There was One who must
have known for certain whether His miracles were
genuine or not, and to His testimony we naturally
turn. The attitude of Jesus towards His miracles
has already been briefly adverted to in the first
section of this chapter, but its great importance
necessitates a somewrhat fuller treatment in this
place. Jesus, then, on the testimony both of St.
Mark and of the Logia, unquestionably believed in
His power to work miracles of all kinds — not
merely in His power to mitigate slight nervous
disorders, as is sometimes alleged, but in His
power to cure instantaneously the most obstinate

TESTIMONY OF JESUS HIMSELF 427
and inveterate maladies, such as leprosy, to work
physical miracles, such as stilling the storm, and
even to perform that miracle of miracles, the raising
of the dead. The evidence for these statements is
not simply one or two disputed sayings of obscure
import, but our Lord's whole behaviour at almost
every recorded miracle. Thus Jesus believed that
he could instantaneously cure blindness (" What wilt
thou that I should do unto thee?" Mark x. 51); a
withered hand (" Stretch forth thy hand," Mark iii. 5) ;
chronic paralysis (" Arise, take up thy bed," Mark
ii. 11); the worst form of leprosy ("I will; be thou
clean," Mark i. 41) ; and in every one of these cases
the cure was immediate.1 He also believed in His
power to work physical miracles, and to control the
powers of inorganic nature. Thus during a tempest
on the Sea of Galilee, He rebuked the wind, and said
unto the sea, Peace, be still. And the wind ceased, and
there was a great calm (Mark iv. 39).2 The force of this
incident cannot be evaded by saying that the cessa
tion of the storm was a fortunate coincidence, or
that Jesus, being less alarmed than the Apostles,
saw signs of a change of weather which were in
visible to them. If this had been so, He would
have said to them, " Fear not, there are signs that
the storm will shortly cease." Instead of that He
1 Nearly all our Lord's miracles were worked instantaneously.
In the rare exceptions (Mark viii. 22 ff.) the process lasted only
a few minutes.
3 The peculiarity of the words used by Jesus, Snima, we<fiifia><ro
(literally, Peace, be muzzled), is of itself an indication of
genuineness,

428 THE MIRACLES OF FEEDING
said, " Peace, be still," words which show that He
regarded Himself as a Being able to impose His
will upon physical nature. This was the impression
which the incident made upon the Apostles, and
Jesus made no attempt to remove it. "Who
then," said they, " is this, that even the wind and
the sea obey Him?" (Mark iv. 41, Matt. viii. 27,
Luke viii. 25).
The two miracles of feeding the multitudes are
particularly well attested. That of feeding the five
thousand is attested by all the Evangelists, and that
of feeding the four thousand by St. Matthew and
St. Mark. Both of them are also attested by Jesus
Himself in a conversation reported by the same
two Evangelists. " Why reason ye," said Jesus to
the Apostles, " because ye have no bread ? do ye
not yet perceive, neither understand ? have ye
your heart hardened ? Having eyes, see ye not ?
and having ears, hear ye not ? and do ye not re
member? When I brake the five loaves among
the five thousand, how many baskets (/_o</>_v ov?) full
of broken pieces took ye up ? They say unto Him,
Twelve. And when the seven among the four
thousand, how many basketfuls {airvpihmv) of broken
pieces took ye up ? And they say unto Him,
Seven. And He said unto them, Do ye not yet
understand?" (Mark viii. 14 ff = Matt. xvi. 5 ff).1
The historical truth of the miracles of feeding has
1 This passage proves conclusively that the two miracles of
feeding are distinct events, and not, as some critics contend,
varying reports of the same event,

THE MIRACLES OF FEEDING 429
been vigorously assailed. The view of Paulus,
recently revived among others by Weiss x and
Beyschlag, is that the generosity of Jesus in sharing
with others His little meal of loaves and fishes
induced others to produce hidden stores of food,
and to distribute them among their neighbours.
Paulus's theory might be accepted if this were the
only physical miracle recorded in the Gospels, and
if the details about it were less precise. But under
the actual circumstances, it cannot be regarded as
credible. The incident is narrated in detail by two
actual eye-witnesses, St. Peter and St. John, and
these, since they assisted in distributing the food,
must have known where it came from. It is also
attested by Jesus Himself (see above), and by the
multitudes fed, who clearly regarded it as a miracle,
for they desired on account of it to take Jesus by
force and make Him king (John vi. 14, 1 5).2
Another great physical miracle is the walking on
the sea (Mark vi. 45 ff., Matt. xiv. 22, John vi. 16).
It is difficult to dismiss it as a legend, for it is
attested by St. Mark (that is, by St. Peter), and
by another eye-witness, St. John.3 According to

1 It is fair to say that Weiss regards his view as highly
speculative (Life of Christ, vol. ii. p. 385).
* It is clear from the Synoptists that the Apostles shared in
the Messianic enthusiasm of the people. Jesus was obliged to
force them (^.dyxao-e) to enter the ship and depart (Mark vi. 45).
3 Even if the attempt of St. Peter to walk on the water, a
detail added, perhaps, by the editor of St. Matthew, be dismissed
as a legend, the main incidents of the event stand firm on the
testimony of St. Peter and St. John.

430 WALKING ON THE SEA
the Synoptic account, the ship which contained the
Apostles was in the middle of the lake encountering
bad weather, when they saw Jesus walking on the
water. They were in great fear, supposing that
what they saw was an apparition ; but Jesus said,
" Be of good cheer : it is I ; be not afraid." He then
entered into the ship, and the wind ceased and they
were " sore amazed " {Xlav iv iavroK egio-TavTo).
St. John's account substantially confirms St.
Peter's. He agrees with St. Peter that the incident
took place about the middle of the lake,1 and
though he does not actually say that Jesus entered
the ship, his account is consistent with it, and
perhaps implies it.2 All the accounts state expressly
1 Some critics have argued from St. John's words, " And
straightway the boat was at the land whither they were going,"
that the incident occurred close to land in shallow water, and
that Jesus walked into the sea to meet them. This is negatived
by the statement in John vi. 19 that the incident took place " when
they had rowed about five and twenty or thirty furlongs.'' The
lake's greatest width is fifty-six furlongs. Its average width is,
as Josephus correctly states, about forty furlongs ( Wars, bk. iii.
10). The Apostles were therefore about the middle of the lake
when Jesus appeared. The sudden cessation of the storm and
contrary winds caused the rest of the voyage to be unusually
and unexpectedly rapid, so that the ship was " straightway at
the land whither they were going."
. Critics have argued that because St. John says that the
disciples "were willing" (rj6e\ov) to take Jesus into the ship,
therefore they did not do so. This is negatived by the context,
and especially by the particle oSv. The disciples were afraid to
take Jesus into the ship at first, believing Him to be an
apparition. Then He spoke to them and said, "It is I, be
not afraid." Their fears then ceased, and therefore (oyv) they
were willing (17&X0. ) to take Him into the ship, and, as the
Synoptic account says, did so.

CURSING THE FIG-TREE 431
that Jesus walked upon the sea (eVt 7775 Bakdaa^),1
and represent the incident as a miracle of mercy,
intended to rescue the Apostles from the perils of
the storm. The words placed in the mouth of
Jesus — " Be of good cheer : it is I ; be not afraid "
(Matt., Mark) ; " It is I ; be not afraid " (John)— are
appropriate and clearly authentic. Upon the whole,
it seems impossible not to conclude that this is a
genuine miracle, similar in character to the stilling
of the storm. The two incidents mutually confirm
and support one another.
The last important physical miracle of the Petrine
memoirs is the cursing of the barren fig-tree (Mark
xi. 12 = Matt. xxi. 18). This also brings into strong
relief Christ's belief in His supernatural power over
physical nature. He deliberately cursed the fig-tree
(" No man eat fruit from thee henceforward for
ever ") ; and on the next day, when the fig-tree was
found withered away, acknowledged the miracle
(Mark xi. 23 = Matt. xxi. 21). It is objected that this
was a miracle of wrath, and therefore out of harmony
with Christ's other miracles. We reply that it was
a miracle of warning, and therefore of mercy. The
fig-tree represents the religious hypocrite who makes
great professions of godliness without correspond
ing holiness of life. The cursing of the fig-tree
represents God's judgment of such persons, and
warns the Apostles not to imitate their works. So
1 Recent critics have rightly abandoned the rationalizing view
of Paulus that en. ttjs tfaXao- otj. means on a high shore above
the sea.

432 THE DAUGHTER OF JAIRUS
understood,1 the miracle teaches an important and
salutary lesson, and cannot be pronounced destitute
of motive.2
Similar in character to the physical miracles are
those of resurrection. That Jesus believed in His
power to raise the dead admits of clear proof,
which may be thus briefly summarized.
(i) The Petrine memoirs record an event, which
prima facie appears to be a miracle of resurrection —
the raising of Jairus's daughter (Mark v. 22 ff). It
has been maintained that this incident was not a
miracle, but a fortunate coincidence. The girl was
not really dead, as those at her bedside supposed,
but only in a state of death-like syncope, from
which the arrival of Jesus happily roused her.
Even if this explanation were correct, an im
portant element of miracle would still remain.
How did Jesus know, before He came to the house, that
the maid who was reported dead was really alive
(ver. 36)? By hypothesis, He did know this, and
as He had not inspected the body, by which means
alone He could have known it naturally, He must
have known it supernaturally. The miracle, there
fore, even on this hypothesis, remains a miracle —
a miracle of knowledge.
But the whole hypothesis of seeming death is
1 This interpretation of the miracle is not suggested by the
context, but is none the less unmistakable.
' This miracle is excellently treated by Trench, Notes on the
Miracles, mir. 31, who remarks, " [Christ's] miracles of mercy
were numberless, and on men; his miracle of judgment was
but one, and on a tree."

LAZARUS, AND THE WIDOW'S SON 433
untenable. The words of Jesus, The child is not
dead, but sleepeth, do not really support it. He used
precisely similar words of Lazarus, who was un
doubtedly dead.1 All the other indications of the
narrative point to actual death. Christ's words,
"Fear not, only believe," show that He was
about to work a miracle. His urgent command
that the matter should not be made known (Mark
v. 43) implies that it was a miracle. It was related
as a miracle by the Apostles, it was believed to
be such by the parents of the child (ver. 42), and
it was as a miracle that its fame "went forth into
all that land" (Matt. ix. 26). If it had been
a natural event, Jesus would never have allowed
His Apostles to believe it a miracle.
(2) All doubt that the raising of Jairus's daughter
was a real resurrection is removed by the two
similar narratives of the raising of the widow's son
at Nain (Luke vii. 1 1 ff.) and the raising of Lazarus
(John xi).2 The former of these is recorded by a
1 " This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God,
that the Son of God may be glorified thereby. . . . Our friend
Lazarus is fallen asleep ; but I go, that I may awake him out of
sleep. . . . Then Jesus therefore said unto them plainly, Lazarus
is dead " (John xi. 4-15).
8 The arguments against the truth of this last miracle are not
strong. It is said (i) that the raising of Lazarus implies a
greater exercise of supernatural power than the raisings
recorded by the Synoptists. If, however, the daughter of Jairus
and the widow's son were really dead, the difference is unim
portant. No one has a right to say that Jesus was able to raise
a corpse on the first day of death, and not on the fourth. (2)
The omission of the raising of Lazarus from the Synoptic narrative
is somewhat surprising, but it must be remembered (a) that it
28

434 EVIDENCE OF THE LOGIA
careful and conscientious historian upon the testi
mony of " eye-witnesses and ministers of the
word " (Luke i. 2) ; the latter is minutely described
by a friend and disciple of Jesus who witnessed
it. Both these events were explained by Paulus as
cases of apparent death, but few at the present
day will regard this view seriously.
(3) There still remains the evidence of the Logia.
In an undisputed Logia passage (Matt. xi. 5 =
Luke vii. 22) our Lord refers to His mighty works
as proofs of His Messiahship, and mentions among
them His miracles of resurrection. " Go your
way," He says to the disciples of the Baptist, " and
tell John the things which ye do hear and see :
the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk,
and the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, and
the dead are raised up." {Cf also Matt. x. 8.)
The proof, therefore, of the Resurrection miracles
is complete.
We will close this section with a few other
indications, taken from the Gospels, that the
miracles of Christ were real. Among them are
His frequent injunctions not to report His mighty
works (Mark iii. 12, v. 43, vii. 36, viii. 26, etc.);
His warnings against attaching undue importance
belongs to the Judcean ministry of Jesus, which the Synoptists,
for whatever reason, do not record, and (b) that the Synoptists
do actually record two other miracles of the same class, which
confirm its credibility. (3) Lastly, it may be said that something
is required to account for the extraordinary enthusiasm with
which Jesus was received in Jerusalem (Mark xi. 1-10). The
raising of Lazarus supplies this explanation (John xii. 9, 17).

DELEGATION OF MIRACULOUS POWER 435
to them (John iv. 48 ; xiv. 1 1 ; Luke x. 20) ; and
a number of striking and obviously genuine utter
ances in which He alludes to them : " Woe unto
thee, Chorazin ! woe unto thee, Bethsaida ! for
if the mighty works had been done in Tyre and
Sidon which were done in you, they would have
repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. . . .
And thou, Capernaum, shalt thou be exalted unto
heaven ? thou shalt go down unto Hades : for if the
mighty works had been done in Sodom which
were done in thee, it would have remained until
this day. Howbeit I say unto you, that it shall
be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the
day of judgment, than for thee (Matt. xi. 21-4 =
Luke x. 13-5; cf. Luke xiii. 32, and Luke xi. 20 =
Matt. xii. 28).
But perhaps the most convincing proof of the
reality of Christ's miraculous power is the fact
that He delegated them. " He appointed twelve,"
says St. Mark, "that they might be with Him,
and that He might send them forth to preach, and
to have authority to cast out devils. . . . And He
began to send them forth by two and two ; and He
gave them authority over the unclean spirits. . . .
And they cast out many devils, and anointed with
oil many that were sick, and healed them (Mark iii.
14; vi. 7, 13). "He called unto Him His twelve
disciples," says St. Matthew, "and gave them
authority over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and
to heal all manner of disease and all manner of sick
ness. . . . And Jesus charged them, saying, Heal

436 OTHER GOSPEL MIRACLES
the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast
out devils : freely ye have received, freely give."
Matt. x. i, 8; cf. Luke x. 17; Mark xvi. 17-20;
John xiv. 12).
Seeing, then, that this delegation of miraculous
powers by Christ is attested by all the Evangelists,
and that the actual exercise of these powers by
the Apostles can be independently verified,1 the
conclusion that Christ really possessed the power
of working miracles can hardly be resisted.
IV. — The Testimony of the Other Gospel
Sources
The miracles recorded in the other Gospel
sources are, upon the whole, similar in character
to those found in the Petrine memoirs and in the
Logia, as the following table will show.
Visions, Voices, etc. — A voice from heaven (John
xii. 28).
Miracles of Healing. — The centurion's servant
(Matt. viii. 5-13; Luke vii. 1-10); two blind men
(Matt. ix. 27-31); the dumb demoniac (Matt. ix.
32-3 ; Luke xi. 14) ; one possessed with a devil,
blind, and dumb (Matt. xii. 22); a woman which
had a spirit of infirmity eighteen years and was
bowed together (Luke xiii. 10-17) ; a dropsical man
(Luke xiv. 1-6); ten lepers (Luke xvii. 12-9);
the healing of Malchus's ear (Luke xxii. \<y-^y)\
the nobleman's son (John iv. 46-54) ; the impotent
1 See sect. ii.

OTHER GOSPEL MIRACLES 437
man at Bethesda, who had been afflicted thirty-
eight years (John v. 1-16); the man born blind
(John ix.)
Raising the Dead. — The widow's son at Nain
(Luke vii. 1 1-7) ; Lazarus (John xi.) ; possibly also
the resurrection of the saints (Matt, xxvii. 52-3),
which, however, seems more of the nature of a
vision. Other Physical Miracles. — The miraculous con
ception of Jesus (Matt. i. 18-25 ', Luke i. 26-38,
iii. 23) ; the guiding star of the Magi (Matt. ii. 9) ;
the finding of the coin in the fish's mouth
(Matt. xvii. 24-7); the earthquake (Matt, xxvii. 51);
the first miraculous draught of fishes (Luke v. 7-10);
changing the water into wine (John ii. 1-11);
the second miraculous draught of fishes (John
xxi. 1-23).
These miracles do not form an entirely homo
geneous series. Those relating to our Lord's
infancy, not being supported by Apostolic testi
mony, fall into a group by themselves, and require
to be considered separately (see c. xxii. app. 2).
Certain miracles related by St. Matthew alone, or
by his editor, and differing somewhat in character
from the others (the star of the Magi, the coin in
the fish's mouth, the earthquake at the tomb,
and the resurrection of the saints),1 form another
1 There are two miracles, however, recorded by St. Matthew
alone (the two blind men, Matt. ix. 27-31, and the demoniac
who was blind and dumb, xii. 22), which conform to the Synoptic
type so closely, that they may safely be regarded as belonging to
the original Logia.

438 OBJECTIONS TO THE MIRACLES
distinct group.1 Excluding these two groups, there
remains an important series of seventeen miracles
precisely resembling,2 and therefore strongly con
firming, the series vouched for by St. Mark and
St. Peter. With this independent corroboration,
the evidence for the Marcan miracles must be pro
nounced, even from the purely historical point of
view, extremely strong.
V. — Objections to the Christian Miracles
Objection I. — Miracles are contrary to the uni
formity of nature, and are therefore impossible
and incredible.3
1 In separating the peculiarly Matthaean miracles from the
rest, we by no means wish to intimate that they are spurious,
but only that their attestation is comparatively weak, and that
controversial stress cannot be laid upon them.
' The changing of the water into wine at Cana, which is not
a miracle of mercy, and appears to lack adequate motive, may be
thought to be an exception, but if it be regarded as a symbolical
miracle or acted parable, it is the same in character as the
cursing ofthe fig-tree.
3 This position is taken up not only by such writers as Strauss
and Renan, but even by the more conciliatory school of rationalism
represented by Harnack and Wernle. Harnack says : " We
are firmly convinced that what happens in space and time is
subject to the general laws of motion, and that in this sense, as
an interruption of the order of Nature, there can be no such thing
as ¦ miracles.' " Wernle says : " If faith in the enchanted world
[of miracles] constitutes the substance of Christianity, then, of
course, the doom of our religion would be sealed." Even Dr. J.
Drummond, who maintains the genuineness of the fourth Gospel,
says ; " I must frankly add that, on general grounds affecting
the whole question of the miraculous, I am unable to believe
that such miracles as the turning of water into wine and the

A PRIORI OBJECTIONS 439
Reply. — This objection has already been dealt
with in c. xvi. We will only here add that
to start the investigation with a strong prejudice
in one direction is unworthy of criticism. The
existence of a God being admitted, miracles are
certainly possible, and their actual occurrence is a
matter of evidence. There is a certain presumption
against miracles arising from the general uniformity
of Nature, and a certain presumption in their
favour arising from the known character of God,
and the need of a revelation. These opposite
presumptions balance one another, and there the
matter is left to be determined by the evidence.
Objection II. — The miracles of Jesus were worked
in a pre-scientific age, and therefore the evidence
in favour of them cannot be trusted.
Reply. — It is necessary to distinguish between
(i) the testimony of the Apostles to the actual
facts ; and (2) their testimony to the supernatural
character of the facts.
(1) The testimony of the Apostles to the actual
facts is, after making due allowance for a reasonable
margin of error, to be received. The miracles of
Jesus were not abstruse scientific experiments,
requiring special training to appreciate them,
but miracles of healing. Persons of ordinary
common sense know perfectly well, without
scientific training, the difference between health and
raising of Lazarus were really performed" (Character and
A uthorship of the Fourth Gospel, p. 426). This initial prejudice
vitiates the whole treatment of the evidence for miracles by these
writers.

440 APOSTOLIC IGNORANCE OF SCIENCE
disease. The sick, therefore, who were healed, and
their friends, and the Apostles, were perfectly able
to form a sound judgment as to whether the cures
which Christ professed to perform were genuine or
not.1 They decided that they were genuine, and
against their decision there is no valid objection.
(2) On the other hand, the testimony of the
Apostles to the miraculous nature of the facts
which they witnessed is by no means equally
trustworthy. They knew far less about the laws
of nature than we do, and therefore it is perfectly
legitimate to attempt to explain any or all of the
apostolic " miracles " by natural causes. What,
however, is not legitimate is to manipulate the facts
in order to accommodate them to the theory advo
cated. The business of the critic is to accommodate
his theory to the facts, not the facts to his theory.
Objection III. — The presence of miracles in the
Gospels proves that they are late and legendary
compositions. Reply. — Many undoubtedly contemporary narra
tives record miracles. The Life of St. Martin of
1 Prof. Wernle says : " In the Gospels Jesus appears before
us first of all as a physician of men's bodies, as the redeemer of
the sick and suffering. However great the number of miraculous
narratives that we set on one side as exaggerations or inventions
of a later age, a nucleus of solid fact remains with which we
have to deal. Jesus possessed an healing power, strictly limited,
it is true, by unbelief, but capable of producing the very greatest
physical and psychical changes whenever He encountered faith.
This power operated especially in the case of mental diseases,
but was by no means confined to them " (Beginnings of
Christianity, vol. i. p. 97).

THE GOSPELS NOT LEGENDARY 441
Tours, by his friend Sulpitius Severus, is full of
them.1 Many are contained in the Lives of St.
Francis of Assisi by the Tres Socii, and by Thomas
of Celano.2 Prof. Harnack, in his brilliant lectures,
What is Christianity ? very properly lays stress
on this point : " But the miraculous element, all
these reports of miracles ! Not Strauss only, but
many others also have allowed themselves to be
frightened by them into roundly denying the credi
bility of the Gospels. . . . We now know that it is
not after they have been long dead, nor even after
the lapse of many years, that miracles have been re
ported of eminent persons, but at once, often the very
next day. The habit of condemning a narrative, or of
ascribing it to a later age, only because it includes
stories of miracles, is a piece of prejudice " (pp. 24, 26).
We may add that the character of the Gospel
miracles proves that they are not legends. If
they had been legends, they would have been of
the same unworthy and frivolous character which
marks the miracles attributed to Christ in the
Apocryphal Gospels.3
1 It would appear, however, from c. xxv., that Severus was not
an actual eye-witness of the bulk of the miracles which he records.
3 The text of Thomas of Celano' s Life is now conveniently
accessible in Dr. Rosedale's edition (1904).
3 We append a few specimens of miracles, which are really
legendary, and which fairly represent the tone of the Apocryphal
Gospels. When the Holy Family fled to Egypt, and approached
a city of idols, it was changed into sandhills (Arabic Gospel of
the Infancy, 23). The water in which the infant Jesus was
washed healed leprosy and other diseases (18). The infant
caused a fountain to spring forth in the desert for His mother

442 ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES
Objection IV. — The evidence for the Gospel
miracles is no stronger than that for the ecclesiastical
miracles. But the ecclesiastical miracles are admitted
to be spurious by almost all; therefore the presump
tion is that the Gospel miracles are spurious also.
Reply. — It is not true that the evidence for the
ecclesiastical miracles is as strong as that for the
Gospel miracles. In the immense majority of
cases the evidence for ecclesiastical miracles melts
away upon close examination. In the few excep
tional cases in which ecclesiastical miracles are as
well authenticated as those in the Gospels {e.g. the
vision of Constantine,1 the miraculous prevention
of the rebuilding of the Jewish temple under
Julian,2 the instantaneous healing of a blind man at
to wash His clothes in. His sweat produced balsam (24). He
changed a mule (which was really a man bewitched) into a man
again (21). He healed a demoniac, and the demons issued from
the man's mouth in the shapes of ravens and serpents (11). He
struck three of His playmates dead (Pseudo-Matthew, 26 ff.),
and on another occasion changed some of them into kids. He
made twelve clay sparrows, clapped His hands, and bade them
fly away (27). He drew out a plank, which was too short, to
the required length (37). He carried water in His cloak (33).
He was adored by lions (35). This is the kind of puerilities
which the Gospels would have contained, had they really been,
as Strauss alleges, legendary.
1 For this miracle we have the authority of Constantine himself,
confirmed by an oath to Eusebius (Eusebius, Life of Constantine,
i. 27 ff.).
3 The evidence for this event, though not that of eye-witnesses,
is strong. It is attested by St. Ambrose, St. Chrysostom, St.
Gregory of Nyssa, and by the pagan historian Ammianus
Marcellinus, all contemporaries. Ammianus relates that ex
plosive balls of fire issued from the foundations and drove back
the workmen, whenever they attempted to approach.

NON-MIRACULOUS RELIGIONS 443
Milan in the time of St. Ambrose,1 and the remark
able " stigmata " found on the hands and feet of St.
Francis of Assisi after his death), the best critics
believe that, whether the events in question were
miracles or not, they really happened.2
Objection V. — Jesus disbelieved the miracles
attributed to Him, or at least regarded them as
of insignificant importance (John iv. 48, xx. 29;
Luke x. 20 ; Matt. xii. 39 ; John xiv. 1 1).
Reply. — The passages alluded to prove no more
than that Jesus regarded moral evidence as higher
in character than miraculous. That Jesus believed
in His own miracles has already been proved
(see sect. iii.).
Objection VI. — Miracles are not necessary to
prove the truth of a revelation. The religions of
Mahomet and Buddha have been widely accepted,
notwithstanding the fact that their founders did not
appeal to the evidence of miracles.
Reply. — It is not denied that moral evidence alone
may commend a religion to the consciences of
' Gibbon says : " The truth of [this miracle] is attested by
Ambrose himself, by his secretary Paulinus, and by his proselyte
the celebrated Augustin, who, at this time, professed the art of
rhetoric in Milan. The blind man's name was Severus ; he
touched the holy garment, recovered his sight, and devoted the
rest of his life (at least twenty-five years) to the service of the
Church " (Decline and Fall, xxvii.). A full account of this
miracle is given by St. Augustine in his Confessions (bk. ix. c. 7).
' The examples given represent the best type of ecclesiastical
miracle. They are dignified and not without adequate motive.
On the other hand, a large number of ecclesiastical miracles are
undignified and trivial.

444 NON-MIRACULOUS RELIGIONS
great multitudes of men. This has been the
case with Buddhism, and to a less extent with
Mahometanism.1 But while admitting this, we still maintain that
a revelation which is attested by moral evidence
and miracles, stands upon a firmer foundation
altogether, than one which is attested by moral
evidence alone. As Prof. Mozley well says:
" The triumph of Mahometanism over human
belief, striking as it has been, cannot blind us to
the fact that the belief of the Mahometan is in its
very principle irrational, because he accepts
Mahomet's supernatural account of himself, as the
conductor of a new dispensation, upon Mahomet's
own assertion simply, joined to his success. . . .
Christianity is the only religion in the world which
professes to possess a body of direct external
evidence to its having come from God. Mahometan
ism avows the want of this ; and the pretensions
of other religions to it are mockery. One religion
alone produces a body of testimony — testimony
doubtless open to criticism, but still solid, authentic,
contemporaneous testimony — to miracles, a body
of evidence which makes a stand, and upholds with
a natural and genuine strength certain facts"
{On Miracles, i.).
Again, even if it be admitted that miracles would
be unnecessary to prove the truth of a revelation
which was simply a republication of the truths of
Natural Religion (and we do not admit this), they
1 Mahometanism has been chiefly propagated by the sword.

THE MIRACLES STH.L USEFUL 445
would still be necessary to establish the truth of
such a religion as Christianity,1 the cardinal doc
trine of which is the Incarnation. The Incarnation
is a miracle, and being a secret miracle, requires, as
Butler correctly says, open miracles to prove its
truth. Objection VII. — Miraculous evidence becomes
weaker by lapse of time, and therefore, however
useful it may be to contemporaries, it is of little or
no use to subsequent generations.
Reply. — (1) The miracles of Jesus performed the
important function of recommending the new
religion to the first generation of believers. By
starting Christianity upon its victorious career in
the world, they have proved themselves useful to
all future generations.
(2) The miracles of Jesus, having been recorded
by credible witnesses, are a standing confirmation
of the truth of Christianity. Reported testimony
is not equal in value to the testimony of the senses,
but it is of great value, and its value does not
diminish with lapse of time. It is as strong now
as it was in the second century, and will be as
strong twenty centuries hence.
Objection VIII. — Miracles are as much needed now
to convince objectors as they were in the Apostolic
age. Why, then, are they not worked?
Reply. — Objectors have before them now the
1 And, we may add, of Buddhism and Mahometanism, both of
which teach numerous truths over and above those of Natural
Religion.

446 REIMARUS, WOOLSTON, RENAN
evidence of the beneficent influence exercised by
Christianity upon the civilized world for nearly
two thousand years. This evidence, which some
consider the strongest proof of the truth of
Christianity, was not available in the Apostolic age.
It is not correct, therefore, to say that miracles are
as necessary now to convince objectors as they
were then. In the apostolic age miracles were
necessary to overcome the difficulties of founding a
new religion. They have been less necessary
since, and have, in consequence, been much more
sparingly performed.1
Objection IX. — The miracles of Jesus are capable
of natural explanation.
Reply. — It will be convenient to consider the chief
natural explanations in order.
(i) Reimarus, Woolston, and partly also Renan,
regarded the miracles as fraudulent tricks on the
part of Jesus and His disciples. As this theory is
now generally abandoned, it is hardly necessary
to refute it at length. A few remarks upon it, as
applied to the Resurrection, will be found in the
next chapter.
(2) Strauss maintained that the miracles of Jesus
are legends or myths, not history. The Messiah was
expected to work miracles. Isaiah had prophesied
1 Some would say that the miraculous powers of the Church
ceased altogether at the close of the Apostolic age. The safer
opinion is that vestiges of these miraculous powers still remain,
ready to be exercised upon proper occasions. Some remarkable
recent cases of miracles are reported from various parts of the
mission-field.

STRAUSS, PAULUS 447
that in the Messiah's days " the eyes of the blind
shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be un
stopped. Then shall the lame man leap as an hart,
and the tongue of the dumb shall sing " (Isa. xxxv.
5, 6). Hence the early Christians, believing Jesus
to be the Messiah, invented miraculous stories
about Him.
This view requires us to suppose that the Gospels
are late and unauthentic productions, a supposition
which has been already disproved.1 (See, further,
Objection IIL).
(3) Paulus, whose methods still find occasional
representatives,2 maintained that all the so-called
miracles of Jesus are authentic, but that they are
not miracles. Thus Jesus walked not on the sea,
but on the high shore above the sea. The changing
of the water into wine was an innocent wedding
joke. The healing ofthe blind was effected by " an
efficacious eye-salve." The stilling of the storm
was a " happy coincidence." Further happy coin
cidences were the raisings of Jairus's daughter, of
Lazarus, and of the widow's son, who were not
really dead, but only in a death-like stupor. The
Transfiguration was a mistake of Peter, James, and
John, who saw Jesus through the uncertain light
of a morning mist talking to two men, and thought
that they were Moses and Elijah. Upon the cross
1 Baur, like Strauss, regarded the miracles as legendary, and
the Gospels as unauthentic, but he gave a different account of
the origin of the legends.
8 See, for instance, Dr. E. A. Abbott's Kernel and the
Husk.

448 KEIM ON THE MIRACLES
Jesus did not die, but only fainted. The so-called
Resurrection, therefore, was quite a natural event.
The Ascension was the disappearance of Jesus in
a mountain cloud which came between Him and
His disciples ; etc.
To most persons the mere statement of Paulus's
theory is its sufficient refutation. Applied to one
or two miracles, it might be credible : applied to
over thirty, it becomes ridiculous.
(4) The general attitude of present-day rationalism
is represented by Keim. He regards physical
miracles as altogether incredible, and healing
miracles as only credible in so far as they can be
shown to be due to natural causes — that is, not to
be miracles.1 Thus he is willing to credit the
healing of Peter's wife's mother, because she was
perhaps not very ill, and perhaps her fever was
intermittent. The healing of the palsied man he also
accepts, but finds fault with St. Luke, and especially
St. Mark, for grossly exaggerating the symptoms
of the case. The cleansing of the leper causes Him
1 He explains the miracles which he accepts as due to the joint
action of faith on the part of the person healed, and of unique
sympathy on the part of Jesus : " Under His tender and com
passionate glance, under His elevating word, and in the believing
touch of His garment, the sick grew well, and felt themselves
relieved." He admits, however, that the series of miracles
ascribed to Jesus is unique and unparalleled. " It may be that
such healings occurred at other times also, yet they occurred in
His time in a special degree only in connection with and through
Him ; and other times have been unequal to His, in the extent
and attestation of the cures, and chiefly in the depth of the
moral-religious basis, even though it is too much to talk — with
Ewald or Holtzmann — of thousands of cases of healing."

KEIM'S METHODS ARE ARBITRARY 449
serious difficulty. It is too well attested to be
rejected outright ; on the other hand, it cannot be
naturally explained. Keim suggests, therefore, that
there was no miracle. The man had already
spontaneously recovered of his leprosy before he
came to Jesus, and Jesus simply pronounced him
clean. The healing of the withered hand Keim
accepts, with the proviso that the hand was not
withered, but only subject to slight paralysis. He
also accepts the healing of the woman with the
issue of blood, and a few other miracles which
seem to him capable of natural explanation. But
all the greater miracles, such as the healing of
the Gadarene demoniac, the stilling of the storm,
the walking on the sea, the raising of Jairus's
daughter, and the feeding of the five thousand,
he first pronounces impossible, and then by various
"critical" artifices dissolves into myths.
Keim's theory must be pronounced arbitrary for
several reasons.
{a) He decides beforehand that miracles are
impossible, and consequently does not even profess
to judge miraculous narratives by the ordinary
laws of evidence. If a narrative is miraculous, it
is a myth, and the only task that remains for
" criticism " is to invent an ingenious theory of the
origin of the myth.1
1 What is said of Keim applies with equal force to Dr.
Schmiedel. He treats miracles in precisely the manner of Keim,
with only this difference, that he does not commit himself verbally
to the principle that miracles are impossible. 29

450 THE PHYSICAL MIRACLES
{b) The Memoirs of St. Peter and the Logia of
St. Matthew, the oldest Gospel sources, attest with
equal distinctness the greater miracles which Keim
rejects, and the lesser ones which He accepts.
They also report words of Jesus, of undoubted
genuineness, in which He attests even such miracles
as the cure of leprosy and the raising of the dead.
Criticism, therefore, can draw no real distinction
between the attestation of the greater and of the
lesser miracles of Jesus.
(c) Keim does not really explain even those
miracles which he accepts as authentic. In every
case of healing he reduces materially the gravity
of the symptoms ; in other words, instead of
explaining the facts recorded by the Evangelists,
he substitutes other facts, and explains them. Con
sequently, his whole procedure amounts to a
confession that the miracles of Jesus, which he
professes to explain, are not capable of explanation.
Objection X. — The healing miracles of Jesus are
credible, but not His physical miracles.
Reply. — All miracles, considered simply as
miracles, are equally difficult to believe. Every
philosophical objection which can be brought
against a physical miracle, applies with equal force
to a healing miracle. If to some persons the heal
ing miracles of Jesus seem more credible, it is
because they think them more capable of a natural
explanation. Objection XI. — The contemporaries of Jesus attri
buted miracles at random to all great men,, and

MIRACLES AN AID TO FAITH 451
therefore the statements in the Gospels that Jesus
worked miracles are of no historical value.
Reply. — None of the great contemporaries of
Jesus are represented as working miracles. Even
John the Baptist, who was regarded as a prophet,
worked no miracles, nor were miracles ascribed to
him (John x. 41). The reason why miracles were
ascribed to Jesus and not to John, clearly is that
Jesus professed to work them, and John did not.
Objection XII. — Miracles, so far from being the
main support of Christianity, are the chief hindrance
to its universal acceptance.
Reply. — If by Christianity is meant the historical
belief of the Church that Jesus Christ is the Son of
God made man, then miracles are not a hindrance,
but an aid to faith, for it is to be expected that a
superhuman Person would perform superhuman
works. If, on the other hand, by Christianity is meant
Unitarianism, or Natural Religion, even so, miracles
are an aid to faith, for the truths of Natural
Religion are almost as much questioned, and there
fore almost as much in need of miraculous corro
boration, as those of historic Christianity. No
reflecting person can deny that the healing miracles
of Jesus, supposed true or probable, render the
Divine Benevolence more easy to believe, and that
His Resurrection, supposed an actual fact, lends
additional credibility to the doctrine of a future life.
Whichever way, therefore, we regard Christianity,
whether as a revelation of new truths inaccessible

452 MATTHEW ARNOLD ON MIRACLES
to reason, or as a republication of Natural
Religion, its well-attested miracles render it more
credible. Objection XIII. — Miracles, however authentically
proved, can confer no additional credibility upon
an alleged revelation. "Suppose," says Matthew
Arnold, " that I could change the pen with which
I write into a pen-wiper, I should not make what
I write any the truer or the more convincing."1
Reply. — The miracle supposed by Matthew Arnold
would confer no credibility upon a revelation,
because its frivolous and unethical character
would prove clearly that it did not proceed from
God. It is otherwise with the miracles of Christ. Sup
posing them to be authentic, their lofty and sublime
character, their redemptive purpose, and the depth
of Divine compassion which they reveal, stamp
them as works of God.
VI. — Provisional Conclusions
It is premature to come to a final decision
with regard to the miracles of Jesus until the
evidence for the greatest of them all, His Re
surrection, has been considered. But it will be
convenient at this point to sum up the results
which have already been attained. It has been
shown —
1 It is satisfactory to notice that Matthew Arnold erased this
unfortunate and offensive illustration from the last edition of his
Literature and Dogma.

THE ARGUMENT SUMMARIZED 453
(1) That St. Paul and the Twelve believed firmly
that they possessed miraculous powers.
(2) That these miraculous powers were delegated
to them by Jesus.
(3) That Jesus Himself professed to work
miracles, and frequently alluded to them as facts
in His discourses.
(4) That the Apostles witnessed and reported
many striking miracles of 'Jesus.
(5) That the enemies of Jesus were unable to
deny His miracles.
(6) That the oldest narrative Gospel source is, in
proportion to its length, even richer in striking
miracles than the later sources.1
(7) That the physical miracles, including those
of raising the dead, are as well attested as the
miracles of healing.
(8) That the miracles of the oldest sources cannot
be explained as legends or myths.
(9) That the Gospel miracles are unique in re
spect of their number, character, magnitude, and
varied attestation.
(10) That the numerous attempts to explain the
Gospel miracles as a whole by natural causes are
not even plausible.
(11) That though plausible efforts have been made
to explain certain of the healing miracles of Jesus
1 So uncompromisingly miraculous is the narrative of St.
Mark that Keim finds himself obliged (contrary to the weight
of the evidence) to date it later than St. Matthew and St.
Luke,

454 MODERN FAITH-HEALING
as acts of ordinary faith-healing, yet when we
consider {a) the immense number of persons healed,
{b) the absence of failures, (.) the incurable char
acter of many of the diseases, and {d) the complete
ness and instantaneousness of the cures, which
were sometimes performed at a distance, and
without the instrumentality of faith in the persons
healed, it is impossible to resist the conviction
that even the healing miracles, taken as a whole,
are incapable of natural explanation.1
We think, therefore, that whoever examines the
evidence fairly, and without an overwhelming pre
possession against the possibility of miracles,
will come to the conclusion (i) that the miracles
ascribed to Jesus by the oldest authorities are facts,
and (2) that they are. miracles.
1 In ordinary faith-healing the failures are much more
numerous than the successes, the successes' are often only partial,
and it is seldom that serious diseases are cured. This was the
case even with the famous Jansenist miracles, which Hume
compares with the miracles of the Gospels. Paley justly
remarks that the Jansenist miracles (1) were tentative. Out of
many thousand sick, infirm, and diseased persons who resorted
to the tomb, the professed history of the miracles contains only
nine cures. (2) The convulsions at the tomb are admitted. (3)
The diseases were, for the most part, of the sort which depends
upon inaction and obstruction. (4) The cures were gradual ;
some patients attending many days, some several weeks, and
some several months. (5) The cures were many of them incom
plete. (6) Others were temporary (Evidences of Christianity,
prop. ii. c. 2). The same remarks apply to the more recent
healings at Lourdes, where often, out of many thousands of
patients, there are no cures at all, and to the attempted healings
of the " Christian Scientists."

JESUS AND DEMONIC POSSESSION 455
APPENDIX I
JESUS AND DEMONIACAL POSSESSION
The Synoptic Gospels, as is well known, always represent
insanity and epilepsy, and sometimes diseases in general,
as due to demonic possession. Jesus also, in numerous
Synoptic passages, seems to countenance this belief. Several
different views are held as to the real attitude of Jesus towards
this question.
(1) According to some, Jesus rejected the belief in demonic
possession altogether. They allege that the Synoptists have
allowed their own beliefs to colour the language which they
place in the mouth of Jesus, and that His real sentiments
must be sought in the fourth Gospel, which records no cures
of demoniacs.
This theory must be rejected as inconsistent with the
attribution of any degree of credibility, however slight, to the
Synoptic Evangelists.
(2) According to another view, Jesus accommodated His
language to the delusions of the persons whom He desired
to heal, humouring them for their own good.
But He used exactly similar language in speaking to the
disciples (Matt. xii. 43, etc.).
(3) According to others, Jesus knew that the current views
about demonic possession were erroneous, but did not
regard it as part of His mission to correct them. On the
contrary, He preferred to "accommodate" His language to
the popular theology or demonology.
" Accommodation " of this kind, unless the popular belief
is, in its main features, true, must be pronounced immoral,
and therefore not credible of Jesus.
(4) According to the traditional view, demonic possession,
exactly as it was conceived of in the Apostolic age, is a fact.
Instances of it are rarer now than they used to be, but still

456 JESUS AND DEMONIC POSSESSION
they occur, and, when they do, must be regarded as, in the
strictest sense, supernatural phenomena.
There is more to be said for this view than is sometimes
imagined ; J but it seems better, especially considering that
some of the cases of possession in the New Testament present
the features of well-known diseases, to set it aside, and to
seek for some other explanation.
Probable Conclusion. — The following theory seems fairly well
to harmonize the facts. Jesus accepted the current belief
of the Jews, which has since been adopted by the Christian
Church, that God governs the world to a very considerable
extent through the instrumentality of created spirits, some
of which are good, and others (through a fall from innocence)
evil. He regarded the good spirits (or angels) as minister
ing good things to man, and the evil angels (or devils)
as ministering evil things. Being thus fully convinced
that malignant diseases, and especially mental diseases, are
due to diabolical agency, He was able to use the popular
language about possession as approximating sufficiently to
the truth for the ordinary purposes of religion.2
The advantage of this view is, that it does not conflict, as
the traditional view does, with the natural causation of disease.

1 It is defended in so recent a book as Demonic Possession in
the New Testament : its Relations, Historical, Medical, and
Theological, by W. M. Alexander, M.D. Dr. Alexander rightly
lays stress on the confession of the demons that Jesus was the
Son of God (Mark iii. n, 12, etc.), and this is undoubtedly
difficult to explain on any but the traditional view.
2 It should be noticed that Jesus does not appropriate all
the popular language upon the subject. The crudities and
extravagances which are found in Josephus, in Rabbinical
literature, and in the Apocryphal Gospels are absent from the
New Testament. In the one passage in which Jesus uses
language approaching that of the popular demonology (Matt.
xii. 43ff. = Luke xi. 24 ff.), He is speaking figuratively, or
parabolically.

MIRACLES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 457
It regards the Satanic power as operating, not miraculously,
but as part of the order of nature.
It may be objected that this view assumes the existence
of a personal devil or devils. It does so, but the assumption
is reasonable, and will continue reasonable, as long as the
universe continues to present the appearance of a conflict
between good and evil. The assumption of a non-personal
devil, or mere influence for evil, is attended with far greater
philosophical difficulties (see further pp. 220-4).

APPENDIX II
THE MIRACLES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT
The Old Testament miracles, owing to the uncertain
character of their attestation, cannot be regarded as possessing
apologetic value. They are, moreover, in the opinion of the
best recent authorities, much less numerous and important
than those of the New Testament. With the exception of the
Mosaic miracles which inaugurated the Old Dispensation, and
a few isolated "signs" to individuals (1 Kings xiii. iff.;
2 Kings xx. 1 ff. ; etc.), it is difficult to point to any well-
attested Old Testament miracles. Those of Elijah and Elisha
cannot be used controversially, because, in the opinion of not
a few authorities, they are Rabbinical haggadoth, rather than
sober history. Again, the miracles of the Captivity lose their
contemporary attestation, and therefore their apologetic im
portance, if the book which records them (Daniel) be regarded
as an Apocalypse of a far later date. Philosophically, the Old
Testament miracles must be pronounced credible, owing to
the organic connection between the New Testament and the
Old; but from the strictly evidential standpoint the verdict
must be not proven.

458 ARGUMENT FROM PROPHECY

APPENDIX III
THE ARGUMENT FROM PROPHECY
Some of the detailed correspondences between the life of
Jesus and the predictions of the prophets, upon which the
older apologists laid stress, are certainly impressive, but it is
not wise, in the present state of criticism, to lay much
controversial stress upon them.1 More important in every
way, from the apologetic point of view, is the fact that the
life of Jesus, taken as a whole, realizes and even surpasses
the highest expectations of the Old Testament prophets, and
that the religion which He founded fulfilled, and more than
fulfilled, the high hopes which they confidently cherished even
in the darkest days of the nation. Only a summary of the
leading correspondences can here be given.
(i) The prophets believed that the Old Covenant, under
which they lived, would be superseded by a new and more
spiritual covenant, which they describe in language which
exactly suits the religion founded by Christ. "Behold, the
days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant
with the house of Israel. ... I will put My law in their
inward parts, and in their heart I will write it " (Jer. xxxi.
31 ff.). " I will put a new spirit within you; and I will take
the stony heart 1. of their flesh, and will give them an
heart of flesh " (Ezek. xi. 19).
(2) The prophets declared that the Gentiles would be

1 Among the most impressive of these are Christ's birth at
Bethlehem (cf. Mic. v. 2) and His Davidic descent. Some
critics maintain that His birth at Bethlehem is a mere legend
suggested by the prophecy of Micah, but this is unlikely. The
Davidic descent of Jesus, legally through Joseph, and perhaps
also naturally through Mary, may be regarded as certain (see
Mark x. 47 ; Acts ii. 30; Rom. i, 3 ; etc,),

ARGUMENT FROM PROPHECY 459
admitted into this New Covenant, and that the religion of
Israel would thus become the religion of the whole earth.
" The earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as
the waters cover the sea" (Isa. xi. 9). "And nations shall
come to thy light, and kings to the brightness of thy rising
(Isa. Ix. 3). " And of them [the Gentiles] also will I take for
priests and for Levites, saith the Lord " (Isa. Ixvi. 21). " I will
pour out My Spirit upon all flesh" (Joel ii. 28). "Glorious
things are spoken of thee, O city of God. I will make
mention of Rahab [Egypt] and Babylon as among them that
know me : behold Philistia, and Tyre, with Ethiopia ; this
one was born there [in Zion]. Yea, of Zion it shall be said,
This one and that one was born in her ; and the Most High
shall establish her. And the Lord shall count, when He writeth
up the peoples, This one was born there " (Ps. lxxxvii. 3-6).1
(3) The prophets prophesied that this new covenant would
be established by a Davidic king, whose rule would extend
over all the earth, and last for evermore. " And there shall
come forth a shoot out of the stock of Jesse, and a branch out
of his roots shall bear fruit. . . . Unto Him shall the nations
seek, and His resting-place shall be glorious " (Isa. xi. 1, 10).
" Of the increase of His government and of peace there shall
be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon His kingdom,
to establish it, and to uphold it with judgment and with
righteousness from henceforth even forever" (Isa. ix. 7). " I
will raise unto David a righteous Branch, and He shall reign
as king and deal wisely" (Jer. xxiii. 5). "The Lord said
unto my Lord [the Messiah], Sit Thou at My right hand, until
I make Thine enemies Thy footstool" (Ps. ex. 1).
(4) The prophets often speak of the gentleness and
humanity of the Messiah's rule, of His kindness to the poor

1 This psalm describes the enrolment of all the nations of the
earth as citizens of Zion, and the conferring upon them of the
same privileges as if they had been Israelites by birth,

460 ARGUMENT FROM PROPHECY
and afflicted, and of the universal peace which the world
will then enjoy. "A bruised reed shall He not break, and
the smoking flax shall He not quench " (Isa. xlii. 3). " Then
the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the
deaf shall be unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap as an
hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall sing" (Isa. xxxv. 5, 6).
" With righteousness shall He judge the poor, and reprove
with equity for the meek of the earth. . . . And righteousness
shall be the girdle of His loins, and faithfulness the girdle
of His reins. And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and
the leopard shall lie down with the kid ; and the calf and the
young lion and the fatling together ; and a little child shall
lead them " (Isa. xi. 4 ff.). " And they shall beat their swords
into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks : nation
shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn
war any more " (Isa. ii. 4 = Mic. iv. 3).
(5) The prophets represent the spiritual blessings of the
Messianic age as absolutely unique. "And the Lord thy
God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed,
to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all
thy soul, that thou mayest live " (Deut. xxx. 6). " In that
day shall there be upon the bells of the horses, Holy unto
the Lord ; and the pots in the Lord's house shall be like
the bowls before the altar" (Zech. xiv. 20). "They shall
teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man
his brother, saying, Know the Lord : for they shall all know
Me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them"
(Jer. xxxi. 34).
(6) Although the prophets do not represent the Messiah
as actually a Divine person, yet Divine titles are applied to
Him, and He is invested with superhuman powers. " His
name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God,
Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace " (Isa. ix. 6).
(7) He is priest as well as king, and His priesthood excels
that of Aaron, and is eternal. "Thou art a priest for ever
after the order of Melchizedek " (Ps. ex. 4).

ARGUMENT FROM PROPHECY 461
(8) The great prophet of the Captivity enriches the
Messianic picture with a delineation of the Messiah's sufferings.
Only through persecution, rejection, and death, will the
Messiah attain to His glory. His death, however, will be an
atoning sacrifice for the sins of the people, and the Messiah,
triumphing over death, will witness the fruit of His labours.
" He was despised, and rejected of men ; a man of sorrows,
and acquainted with grief. . . . He was wounded for our
transgressions, He was bruised for our iniquities : the chastise
ment of our peace was upon Him ; and with His stripes we are
healed. . . . Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise Him ; He hath
put Him to grief : when thou shalt make His soul an offering
for sin, He shall see His seed, He shall prolong His days,
and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in His hand. He
shall see of the travail of His soul, and shall be satisfied "
(Isa. liii.).
The extraordinary manner in which these anticipations of
the prophets, even those which at first sight appear contra
dictory, were fulfilled in Jesus Christ, is a strong confirmation,
on the one hand, of the reality of prophecy, and on the other
hand of the truth of Christianity.

LITERATURE
(a) Christ's Miracles

To the authorities mentioned under c. xvi. add Bruce, The
Miraculous Element in the Gospels, which is thoroughly
critical ; Trench, On the Miracles, which is mainly expository ;
Salmon, Non-miraculous Christianity ; H. Bushnell, Nature
and the Supernatural (important); Fisher, Grounds, c. ix. ;
and Paley's Evidences of Christianity, which is still valuable,
and by no means superseded, as is sometimes represented.
On the rationalistic side Keim, Jesus of Nazara, vol. iii. pp.
152-249, is especially thorough and illuminating.

462 THE MIRACLES OF JESUS
(.) Demonic Possession
Nevins, Demon Possession and Allied Themes; W. M.
Alexander, Demonic Possession in the New Testament; A. D.
White, Warfare of Science with Theology, cc. xv., xvi.
(rationalistic). (c) The Argument from Prophecy
The subject is well treated from a modern standpoint in
Riehm, Messianic Prophecy ; Fisher, Grounds of Theistic and
Christian Belief (revised ed.), p. 447 ff. ; Bruce, Apologetics,
p. 245 ff. ; R. L. Ottley, Incarnation, part ii. sect. 4 ; A. B.
Davidson, " Prophecy," in Hastings' Bible, Diet. ; Stanton,
The Jewish and the Christian Messiah ; the Old Testament
Theologies of Schultz and Oehler ; cf. also W. R. Smith, The
Prophets of Israel ; Kirkpatrick, Doctrine of the Prophets ;
and C. A. Briggs, Messianic Prophecy. For other, and mainly
older points of view, see J. Davison, Discourses on Prophecy ;
Hengstenberg, Christology of the Old Testament; Payne
Smith, Prophecy a Preparation for Christ; Delitzsch,
Messianic Prophecies ; Alexander, Witness of the Psalms to
Christ; B. Maitland, The Argument from Prophecy (S.P.C.K).

CHAPTER XXII
THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS
Summary. — It is shown that a concurrence of strong historical
with exceptionally strong moral evidence justifies faith in
the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. The Resurrection authenti
cates the teaching of Jesus, and therefore His Divinity.
The unique importance of the miracle of the
Resurrection, and the prominent place which it fills
in the earliest preaching of the Apostles, entitle
it to special treatment. Yet its evidential import
ance should not be exaggerated. It is a mistake
to place it in a special class by itself, as the only
miracle capable of historical verification, and the
sole authentication of all other miracles. Those who
speak of it in this way, place upon the evidence for
the Resurrection a greater weight than it will bear.
They do not reflect how difficult it is to prove
an isolated fact of an abnormal character. If the
Resurrection, or any other miracle of Jesus, stood
alone, the evidence for it, though it were far
stronger than it is, would fail to convince. What
makes the case for the Resurrection exceptionally
strong is that it forms part of a series of extra
ordinary events, all worked by the same person,
463

464 :NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE
all remarkably well attested, and all, or nearly
all, stamped with a lofty ethical character, which
renders them not unworthy of being ascribed to
God Himself. The Resurrection, therefore, is not
an isolated event. It belongs to a class, and the
class contains hundreds certainly — thousands
probably — of closely similar events. Thus the
evidence for the Resurrection is cumulative. It
consists of the evidence for that special event,
together with the evidence for all the other miracles
that Jesus worked. To say, therefore, that the
Resurrection proves the other miracles is only half
the truth. To be accurate, it is necessary to add
that the other miracles prove the Resurrection.
I. — The Evidence of St. Paul
It is well to begin with the evidence of St. Paul,
because this is perhaps the oldest,1 and is certainly
the least disputed.
The Resurrection is the corner-stone of St. Paul's
system. It is the convincing proof that the Man
Jesus, born of the seed of David according to the
flesh, is also the eternal Son of God (Rom. i. 4).
It demonstrates that the ignominious death of Jesus
was really a victory over the powers of darkness
(Col. ii. 12-5). It is a pledge that those who
are members of Christ are raised to newness of
life, and have in prospect a blessed immortality
' The only evangelical source which is probably older is the
Hebrew Logia of St. Matthew.

ST. PAUL ON THE RESURRECTION 465
(Rom. vi. 4-1 1). In short, to use St. Paul's own
forcible words, Jesus Christ " hath abolished death,
and hath brought life and immortality to light
through the Gospel " of the Resurrection.
Unfortunately, St. Paul nowhere describes in
detail the evidence upon which the Resurrection
of Jesus was believed by the first disciples. He
has left us, however, an important passage
(1 Cor. xv. 3-1 1), written just twenty-five years after
the Resurrection, in which he mentions six appear
ances of the risen Lord (five to the original
disciples, and one to himself), but without any
indication of place, time, or circumstances. St.
Paul's words are : " For I delivered unto you first
of all that which also I received, how that Christ
died for our sins according to the Scriptures ; and
that He was buried ; and that He hath been raised
on the third day according to the Scriptures ; and
that He appeared to Cephas [Peter] ; then to the
Twelve ; then He appeared to above five hundred
brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain
until now, but some are fallen asleep ; then
He appeared to James ; then to all the Apostles ;
and last of all, as unto one born out of due
time, He appeared to me also. . . . Whether
then it be I or they, so we preach, and so ye
believed." This passage was written in or about the year
55, but it is based on considerably earlier testimony.
St. Paul was converted, according to most recent
critics, soon after the Ascension, probably within
30

466 ST. PAUL'S VISIT TO ST. PETER
a year of it.1 Three years later he went up to
Jerusalem to visit St. Peter, and saw also St.
James.3 From them, therefore, it cannot be doubted,
he received particulars of the five appearances
which he records in i Corinthians xv. This is
the verdict not only of Orthodoxy, but also of
Rationalism. Strauss, for example, says : " The
fact that the Apostle Paul heard from the mouth of
Peter, of James, and of others besides, that Jesus
had appeared to them, and that they all, with
the five hundred brethren also, were absolutely con
vinced that they had seen Jesus living after He had
died, is one which we will not call in question." 3
1 Harnack makes the date a.d. 30.
2 Gal. i. 18.
3 Similarly Dr. Schmiedel says (Encyclop. Biblica, vol. ii.
col. 1,879): "This passage must be regarded as the earliest
account of the appearances of the risen Jesus ; unquestionably
it goes back to the communications made by Peter during the
fifteen days' visit of Paul, three years after the conversion of the
latter (Gal. i. 18)." Prof. Weizsacker says : " Paul's knowledge
of these things must have come from the heads of the primitive
Church " (Apostolic Age, i. p. 5). Prof. Wernle says : "In the
very earliest time St. Paul obtained this information from St. Peter"
(Beginnings of Christianity, i. p. 115). Dr. Keim also says:
" In this epistle [1 Corinthians] Paul states what he had received
from tradition from the earliest Apostles and first Christians,
that is at and after his two weeks' visit to Peter in Jerusalem
in the year 39. What he then heard he found to be established
or elucidated in his intercourse with the Apostles and earliest
brethren. Paul wishes in pious earnestness to give the truth. . . .
It is beyond doubt that the facts were really experienced and
believed as they were faithfully related to him, and as he
has again faithfully reported them. . . . Paul's help supplies
the whole question with its fixed point, its Archimedean fulcrum "
Jesus of Nazara, vol. vi. pp. 279-81).

EVIDENCE OF SS. PETER AND JOHN 467

II. — The Testimony of St. Peter and St. John
This conclusion is corroborated by the undisputed
Epistle of St. Peter, who regards the Resurrection
as the firm basis of a Christian's life and hope.
" Blessed," says St. Peter, " be the God and Father
of our Lord Jesus Christ, who according to His
great mercy begat us again unto a living hope by
the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead,
unto an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled,
and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for
you" (1 Peter i. 3, 4 ; cf. i. 21, iii. 21).
St. John also in his undisputed epistle alludes
indirectly, but unmistakably, to the post-resurrection
appearances of Jesus (" That which . . . our hands
handled [i'tyt\kajtyr)a-av\ concerning the Word of life "
(1 John i. i).1 That the handling spoken of is the
handling of the risen body of Christ is made clear
by a comparison with the Gospel (John xx. 27 ;
cf. Luke xxiv. 39).2
It is absolutely certain, therefore, and may be
taken as the starting-point of the inquiry, that
shortly after the death of Jesus the Apostles
and other brethren saw visions of Him, which
1 The disputed Apocalypse also testifies to the Resurrection,
both implicitly, by its mention of the Lord's Day (i. 10), and
explicitly : " I was dead, and behold, I am alive for evermore,
and I have the keys of death and of Hades" (i. 18); "These
things saith the First and the Last, which was [became] dead,
and lived again " (ii. 8).
' See Westcott's Commentary in loc.

468 ST. PAUL'S EVIDENCE EXAMINED
completely convinced them that He had risen from
the dead.1
III. — Examination of St. Paul's Testimony
St. Paul's evidence, quoted above, is possibly —
we do not say probably — consistent with the view
that the manifestations of the risen Christ were
purely spiritual. St. Paul speaks of " appearances "
only {axpOrj), and says nothing of the empty tomb,
of the handling of the risen body, or of words
spoken by the risen Lord. Hence many critics2
suppose that the idea of a bodily resurrection is
a later legendary growth, and that the original
view was, that the spirit of Jesus returned and
manifested itself in a purely spiritual manner.3
This minimizing interpretation of St. Paul's
language is, we believe, incorrect ; but since it is
accepted by numerous Rationalists, and even by
1 Baur says : " For the disciples the Resurrection was as real
as any historical fact — whatever may have been the medium of
this persuasion. . . . History must hold to the assertion that to
the faith of the disciples the Resurrection of Jesus Christ was a
fact, certain and indisputable. It is in this faith only that
Christianity found a ground solid enough to erect upon it the
superstructure of its whole historic development." So also Mr.
Macan, writing from the standpoint of pure Rationalism, says :
" Two broad facts may be taken as certain — that Paul and the
other Apostles had certain visions, and that in consequence of
these visions they believed that Jesus had risen from the dead "
(The Resurrection, p. 68).
' Schenkel, Baur, Keim, Weizsacker, Harnack, Wernle, etc.
3 Some of these critics admit that Christ appeared in a
" spiritual body," but they regard this spiritual body as com
pletely different from His earthly body. The latter, they believe,
remained in the tomb.

ST. PAUL'S CONVERSION 469
some who claim to be Christian believers,1 we
will adopt it provisionally, and proceed to inquire
whether, even on this minimizing hypothesis, the
Resurrection appearances can be naturally ex
plained. St. Paul's Conversion. — The conversion of St. Paul,
regarded as an isolated event, is perhaps capable
of a natural explanation.2 St. Paul possibly was,
as Holsten suggests, a weak epileptic with shattered
nerves, which were to him a permanent "thorn
in the flesh" (2 Cor. xii. 7). He was certainly
prone to visions and ecstasies, at least after
His conversion (2 Cor. xii. 1 ff. ; Acts xxii. 17).
Although a Pharisee and a strict observer of the
Law, he was already, before his conversion, dis
satisfied with his religion, and desirous of some
thing better (Rom. vii. 7 — viii. 11). He had
heard arguments in favour of Christianity, having
been present almost certainly when St. Stephen
delivered his famous apology (Acts vii. 1-53). As
a Pharisee, the doctrine of the Resurrection would
be likely to appeal to him (Acts xxiii. 6 ff). The
spectacle of the constancy of St. Stephen and of
the other Christian martyrs would also be likely
to produce an impression upon his mind. In his
heart he was already inclining towards Christianity,
and his feverish zeal against the Church was only
1 By Canon Wilberforce, for example.
2 It may perhaps be naturally explained, if we confine ourselves
to St. Paul's own account ofthe matter. If, however, St. Luke's
account in the Acts is authentic, natural explanation is im
possible.

470 ST. PAUL'S CONVERSION
a futile attempt to stifle his conscience, and to
blind himself to the fact that the Christians, after
all, were- in the right. At last, at the close of his
journey to Damascus, the crisis, so long prepared,
arrived. He broke violently with his former faith,
and, in the intense spiritual exaltation ofthe moment,
saw a vision of the risen Christ, just as the dying
Stephen shortly before had seen " the heavens
opened, and the Son of Man standing on the
right hand of God." J
1 Visions, though unusual, are not unprecedented during
religious revivals. Two or three have already occurred in the
course of the present Welsh revival (Nov. — Dec. 1904).
There are also parallels to the overpowering light which
St. Paul saw at his conversion. Charles Finney, the American
revivalist (1792 — 1875), writes in his Autobiography (c. iii.):
" Mr. Gale was standing at the door [of the meeting-house],
and as I came up, all at once the glory of the Lord shone around
and about me, in a manner most marvellous. The day was just
beginning to dawn ; but all at once a light perfectly ineffable
shone in my soul, and almost prostrated me to the ground. In
this light it seemed as if I could see that all nature praised and
worshipped God, except man. It was too intense for the eyes.
I recollect breaking into a flood of tears, in view of the fact that
mankind did not praise God. I think I knew something then,
by actual experience, of that light that prostrated Paul on his
way to Damascus. It was surely a light such as I could not
have endured long.''
There is an extraordinary modern parallel to St. Paul's
conversion in the instantaneous conversion of Alphonse
Ratisbonne. Ratisbonne was a free-thinking Jew, who, happen
ing to enter the Church of San Andrea della Fratte in Rome, in
the year 1843, saw an overpowering celestial vision of the
Mother of Jesus, and was instantly converted to Christianity.
Ratisbonne was hostile to Christianity, and indeed to all religion,
and the influences which had prepared the way for his conversion
had been slight (W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience,
pp. 223-6).

HOLSTEN'S VIEWS 47*
The abstract possibility of this explanation is not,
in face of the modern parallels (see p. 470, note),
to be denied. At the same time it involves many
improbabilities, and a very free handling (to use
no stronger term) of St. Paul's statements.
Holsten's theory of epileptic seizures cannot be
taken very seriously. The Apostle's unexampled
and protracted labours for a period of at least
thirty years (2 Cor. xi. 23 ff), which were terminated
not by disease, but by the sword of the executioner
(Clement of Rome, c. v.),1 prove him to have
possessed a thoroughly sound constitution. There
is more plausibility about the theory that a
long and severe struggle took place in St. Paul's
mind, and ended, at Damascus, in the victory of
the new faith ; but this, at best, is only a guess,
and is contradicted by all the evidence that we
possess.2 " Such a picture," says Dr. Knowling,
"of the Apostle's mental state is drawn in direct
opposition to his own statements. Paul knows
nothing of a gradual conversion to the Gospel. In
Galatians i. 12-6, if his language has any meaning,
it certainly shows that he was inaccessible to
human influences in this matter ; all through his
life his conversion is regarded as an event which
surprised him in the midst of his fanatical zeal ;
' St. Paul probably perished at the beginning of Nero's
persecution, A. D. 64 ; but some authorities place his martyrdom
as late as 67 or 68.
2 The expression, " It is hard for thee to kick against the
pricks " (Acts xxvi. 14), does not prove the existence of an inward
struggle in St. Paul's mind (see the commentators).

472 ADMISSIONS OF STRAUSS
he represents it as being apprehended by Christ
(Phil. iii. 12) ; he has been conquered by main
force ; if he preaches the Gospel, he does so of
necessity ; he describes himself by a term which
pointedly indicates the sudden change wrought
in him (1 Cor. xv. 8). . . . There is no acknowledg
ment that in his zeal against the Christians he
was violating his conscience, or acting wilfully
against his better judgment, and if we accept
1 Timothy i. 13, he has himself anticipated and re
futed all such imputations " {Witness of the Epistles,
p. 390).1 Even Strauss admits that if St. Paul's
account of his mental condition at the time of his
conversion is strictly true, the vision cannot be
naturally explained.2
The difficulties, therefore, of a purely natural
explanation of St. Paul's conversion are extremely
great, and they are not sensibly relieved by the
supposition of Holsten and others that St. Paul
1 Cf. also H. A. W. Meyer on Acts ix. 3-9 : " The conversion
of Saul does not appear, on an accurate consideration of the
three narratives (ix., xxii., xxvi.), which agree in the main points,
to have had the way psychologically prepared for it by
scruples of conscience as to his persecuting proceedings. On
the contrary, Luke represents it in the history at our passage,
and Paul himself in his speeches (xxii. and xxvi. ; cf. also
Gal. i. 14, 15 ; Phil. iii. 12), as in direct and immediate contrast
to his vehement persecuting zeal, amidst which he was all of a
sudden internally arrested by the miraculous fact from without."
8 Strauss says: "From . . . the excitement into which the
fanatical upholder of Jewish traditions had been brought by the
threatening advances of Christianity, ... a vision of Moses or
Elias would have been far more likely to result than an image of
Christ."

Baur admits the miracle 47.
was in a trance when he saw Christ. Even visions
seen in trance are subject to the laws of psycho
logy, and therefore, unless the mind of St. Paul
was already far on the way to conviction — which
he denies — he would not have been likely to see
a vision of Christ, but rather (as Strauss admits)
one of Moses or of some other zealous upholder
of the Law. Even Baur, in one of his latest works,
gave up the attempt to explain the conversion of
St. Paul naturally, and said : " We cannot call his
conversion, his sudden transformation from the
most vehement opponent of Christianity into its
boldest preacher, anything but a miracle ; and the
miracle appears all the greater when we remember
that in this revulsion of his consciousness he
broke through the barriers of Judaism, and rose
out of the particularism of Judaism into the
universal idea of Christianity. . . . No analysis,
either psychological or dialectic, can detect the
inner secret of the act in which God revealed His
Son in him " {Church History, p. 47).1
1 This was written in 1853, seven years before his death.
Even in his earlier work, Paul the Apostle (1845), he had
admitted that a miraculous explanation of the event was at any
rate admissible: "Although the historical and critical treat
ment of the narrative of the conversion of Paul . . . does not
allow us to consider it as simply miraculous, yet if we look at it
from a psychological point of view, the supposition of a miracle,
if not necessary, may yet be allowable" (pt. ii. c. 3). Holsten
also says (on Galatians i. 13-6): "The sudden change from
being a passionate zealot for the traditions of the fathers, and
persecutor of the community of Jesus, to being as passionate a
preacher of His Gospel ... is only to be explained as a direct
interposition of God in Paul's spiritual life."

474 APPEARANCES TO THE APOSTLES
The Other Appearances mentioned by St. Paul. —
Many other difficulties in the way of a purely
natural explanation of St. Paul's conversion might
be mentioned,1 but it is better to pass at once to
the consideration of the other appearances to which
he alludes. The real question which we have
to decide is not whether St. Paul's conversion,
taken alone, can be naturally explained, but whether
the whole group of six appearances, of which it
forms a part, can be so explained. This question
must, we think, be answered in the negative, for
the following reasons :
(i) The psychology of visions is now fairly well
understood. For the production of a definite visual
hallucination in a sane and healthy person, there is
normally required {a) intense emotional excitement
and nervous exaltation, and {b) intense pre-occupa-
tion of the mind with an idea.
Neither of these conditions seems to have been
present in the case of the Apostles. Let us briefly
review the historical circumstances of the appear
ances. {a) The appearances of the risen Christ began
as early as the third day, and at that time the
4 According to St. Paul, Christ not only appeared to him at
Damascus, but also conferred upon him a special commission to
preach the Gospel to the Gentiles. This, be it remembered, was
at a time when Christianity was still a Jewish sect, and when
none of the original Apostles had realised their responsibilities
towards the Gentiles. How St. Paul, the bigoted Pharisee,
became in a moment, not only a Christian, but a Christian more
liberal than St. Peter, is a psychological problem which no
rationalistic critic has yet satisfactorily solved.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS 475
Apostles were not in a state of exaltation, but in
one of profound depression. The arrest of Jesus
on Thursday night had been a terrible blow to
their hopes ; so much so, that they all " forsook
Him and fled" (Mark xiv. 50). Subsequently
St. Peter thrice denied Him (Mark xiv. 66 ff). The
Crucifixion and Death of Jesus on the next day
must have reduced the Apostles to despair. To
Jewish minds the fatal end of Jesus could only
bear one meaning — that God had pronounced Him
a false Messiah, and, by inflicting upon Him the
shameful punishment of crucifixion, had placed
Him under a curse (Deut. xxi. 23 ; Gal. iii. 13).
"A death like His," says Baur, "made it impos
sible for the Jew, as long as he remained a
Jew, to believe in [Jesus] as his Messiah." The
anonymous author of Mark xvi. 10 is therefore
perfectly justified in representing the Apostles
as mourning and weeping on the morning of the
third day.1
{b) The Apostles had not expected the Death of
Jesus, and a fortiori did not expect His Resurrection.
Both these events had, it is true, been several
times foretold (Matt. xvi. 21 ; xx. 18; etc.), according
to St. Mark, even openly {irapp^aia, viii. 32) ;2
1 Cf The Gospel of Peter, 14 : " But we the twelve disciples of
the Lord were weeping and mourning. And each one, mourning
at what had happened, departed to his house."
8 It should be remembered that Rationalists, as a rule, reject
our Lord's prophecies of His Death and Resurrection, and there
fore are unable to use them as proofs that the Apostles expected
His Resurrection.

47<S PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS
but the predictions had failed to make any im
pression upon the Apostles (Mark ix. io), not so
much on account of their obscurity, as because
the Apostles' minds were filled with expectations
of an entirely different kind (Matt. xvi. 22-3 ;
Mark x. 37).
Psychologically, therefore, it is scarcely possible
to account for the appearances to the disciples in
a purely natural way. The manifestations were
not expected, and they began within forty-eight
hours of the Death of Jesus, when the disciples
were still prostrated with shame and grief. So
serious, on this view of the facts, do the difficulties
of a natural explanation appear to Strauss, that
he denies altogether that the appearances began
on the third day, transports the disciples to
Galilee, gives them ample time to recover their
lost faith, and then makes them see, after a con
siderable interval, the visions enumerated by St.
Paul. This desperate expedient only serves to
show the desperate character of Strauss's hypothesis.
The third day stands firm, not only on the
testimony of all the Gospels, but also on that of
St. Paul.1 It is, moreover, confirmed by the institu
tion of the Lord's Day, which dates from the
apostolic period (Rev. i. 10; Acts xx. 7). If a
fact so well attested as the Resurrection on the
1 St. Paul does not expressly say that Jesus was seen on the
third day, but only that He rose then. It is clear, however, that
it was because Jesus appeared on the third day, that He was
believed to have risen on that day.

COLLECTIVE HALLUCINATIONS 477
third day be doubted, historical criticism becomes
impossible. (2) The appearance to James x was an appearance
to an unbeliever (John vii. 5 ; cf. Mark iii. 21),
whose unbelief had, moreover, been apparently
justified by the recent catastrophe. His mind
therefore was not in a condition to generate
spontaneously an hallucination of the risen
Saviour. (3) The older apologists denied altogether the
possibility of collective hallucinations, and pointed
triumphantly to the appearances to the Twelve,
to the five hundred, and to "all the Apostles,"2
as demonstrative proof that what was seen was
real. Recent investigations, however, have shown
that "collective hallucinations" — i.e. hallucinations
affecting simultaneously more than one person — do
occasionally occur. They are, however, rare, and
when they happen, seldom affect more than two
persons. The great Census of Hallucinations, con
ducted between the years 1889 and 1892 by the
Psychical Research Society, yielded ninety-five
apparent cases, but upon close investigation most
of them were found to be indecisive, and the final
decision of the committee was expressed in very
1 An obviously fictitious account of the manifestation to James
is given in the Gospel according to the Hebrews. No authentic
details about it are known.
8 That is, the Twelve, together with such leading Christians
as James and Jude. For this wider use of the term Apostle,
see Acts xiii. 2, 3 ; xiv. 4, 14 ; Rom. xvi. 7 ; 1 Thess. ii. 6 ; and
consult Lightfoot, Galatians, pp. 92-101.

478 COLLECTIVE HALLUCINATIONS
cautious language.1 In none of the ninety-five
alleged cases was the apparition seen by more than
two persons, and there was " no case in which two
percipients both saw an apparition, and at the
same time heard a voice."2 No cases were dis
covered parallel to the series of appearances
mentioned by St. Paul.
It is urged, however, that in times of religious
excitement visions become infectious, and that the
result is an epidemic of hallucinations. It is sug
gested, therefore, that St. Peter first saw a vision
of Jesus, and then worked upon the imaginations
of the other Apostles and brethren, until they
began to see visions of Him also.3
It is not to be denied that under the influence
of religious excitement an epidemic of hallucina
tions may arise. Thus in the summer of 1889 a
large number of peasants in the Department of
the Dordogne saw visions of the Virgin Mary.
It appears, however, from the careful investi-

1 "If the case for collective hallucinations rested on the
Census alone, it would perhaps be rash to regard it as con
clusively proved that hallucinations may be shared." Then,
after quoting other evidence, they conclude : "We do not think
it can be reasonably doubted that collective hallucinations occur,
though unmistakable ones are somewhat rare " (Proceedings,
vol. x. pp. 319, 320).
8 The best-attested cases of collective hallucinations are those
which coincide with the death of the persons seen ; but since
such appearances (if authentic) are probably caused telepathi-
cally by the dying man himself, they cannot be regarded as
mere hallucinations.
3 Renan assigns this rdle to Mary Magdalene.

EPIDEMICS OF HALLUCINATIONS 479
gations of M. Leon Marillier,1 that all who saw
the Virgin were in a state of intense religious
faith and expectancy. The original percipient, a
little girl of eleven, placed her head in a dark
hole in a ruined wall, and imagined that she saw
the Virgin at the end of it. She then made
a number of other persons do the same, telling
them what they were expected to see. The result
was that in many cases the force of imagination
was sufficient to produce a vision. It was not till
considerably later, when the excitement became
intense, that the Virgin was seen walking in the
fields or along the roads by several people at once.
But even when all saw her, "she did not appear
to all of them under the same aspect. Some saw
her in white, and others in black. For some she
was wrapped in veils ; for others her face was
bare. ... A sort of education or gathered enthu
siasm was necessary in order that they might see
the apparition with full clearness. . . . The prin
cipal elements of the visions were furnished by
the mind of each person. . . . The apparitions on
the heath, in the fields, or on the roads are ex
ceptional. They were hardly ever experienced
but by those who had already seen the Virgin
in the wall." It will be seen that the conditions
at Dordogne were entirely different from those
at Jerusalem on the third day from the Crucifixion,
1 A translation of his report, revised by himself, is printed
in the Transactions of the Society for Psychical Research,
vol. vii. pp. 100-10.

480 OBJECTIVITY OF THE VISIONS
and that the character of the manifestations was
different also.
Upon the whole, then, while admitting that col
lective hallucinations do sometimes occur, especially
under the influence of religious excitement,1 we
are unable to admit that any real parallel to the
Pauline appearances, considered in all their cir
cumstances, has yet been produced. Until, then,
such a parallel is forthcoming, it will be more
reasonable to regard the appearances in question
as real manifestations of the spirit of Jesus2 than
as hallucinations. In this judgment a great
number of Rationalists (Baur, Schenkel, Holtzmann,
Weisse, Keim, Weizsacker, Harnack, and Wernle)
concur with more conservative theologians.:
IV. — The Evidence of the Gospels and of
the Acts
This doctrine of a purely " spiritual " resurrection,
which many Rationalists are willing to accept, is,
in a sense, sufficient for faith. If the soul of
Jesus really manifested itself to the disciples after
death, or if, as Keim suggests, God sent a " telegram
from heaven " to assure the disciples that all was
well with Jesus, then human immortality is a fact,
and Jesus is really the Son of God.
But this view, though held by so many Rational-
1 Hallucinations are rare even at revivals. The present Welsh
revival has produced only a few, and none of these were collective.
8 This view is generally referred to as the theory of "a
spiritual resurrection," or of "objective visions."

THEORY OF OBJECTIVE VISIONS 48i
ists, is not really consistent with Rationalism. It
makes the Resurrection of Jesus a miracle. It is as
much a breach of the order of nature, and therefore
as much a miracle, for a disembodied spirit to return,
or for God to send a "telegram from heaven," as
for a corpse to rise. It is a mistake to think that
the philosophic objections to miracles apply ex
clusively, or even with especial force, to physical
miracles. They apply equally to all miracles. It
is more difficult, of course, to determine the limits
of natural possibility in the case of mind than in
the case of matter ; but when those limits are plainly
transcended, as they are when the facts require the
hypotheses of spirit-return and of telegrams from
heaven to be entertained,1 the philosophic objections
against alleged psychical miracles are as strong as
those against alleged physical miracles.2 The half
hearted Rationalism, therefore, which accepts a
spiritual, while denying a corporeal, resurrection,
is as incapable as orthodoxy of removing the
great stumbling-block of miracle, and is under the
additional disadvantage of being forced to deal
with the evidence in a thoroughly arbitrary way.
It is obliged to interpret St. Paul as negativing
a physical resurrection, which is difficult, and to
reject summarily all the evidence but his.
Now, it is not maintained by candid apologists
1 We assume, with the best authorities, that the theory of
spirit-return, advocated by modern Spiritualists, is not proved.
8 On this point we are in complete agreement with Schmiedel,
Encyclop. Biblica, vol. iv. col. 4,077. 31

482 LUKE ON PAUL'S CONVERSION
that all the Gospel evidence for the Resurrection is
as weighty or as credible as that of St. Paul. The
conclusion of St. Matthew, for example, has probably
been retouched by the editor, and the appearance to
the women (xxviii. 9), peculiar to the first Gospel,
is perhaps entirely due to him. The conclusion of
St. Mark also (xvi. 9-20), though canonical, is plainly
of secondary authority.1 St. Luke, however, and
St. John are witnesses of the first importance,2
and can be used with confidence.
St. Luke on St. Paul's Conversion. — The admission
of the evidence of St. Luke at once throws fresh
light upon the conversion of St. Paul. It appears
from the Acts (1) that the risen Lord spoke at con
siderable length to St. Paul, and commanded him
to preach to the Gentiles (see especially xxvi. 12 ff);
(2) that St. Paul became blind for three days;
and (3) that Ananias received a revelation, inform
ing him of St. Paul's conversion, and commissioning
him to go and heal him. If these details are to
be accepted — and coming, as they do, from an
actual companion of the Apostle, it is impossible
to doubt them — a natural explanation of the
conversion becomes impossible. The conversion
alone might be naturally explained, but the vision
1 It seems in part dependent on canonical sources, which it
epitomizes. 8 The internal evidence that the " we-sections " of Acts were
written by a companion of St. Paul has convinced even van
Manen ; and since the rest of the Acts and the Gospel of St.
Luke are written in precisely the same style, the Lucan author
ship of these books must be pronounced certain. See c. xviii.

THE RISEN LORD SPOKE 483
of Ananias, which coincided with it, can only be
regarded as a miracle.
St. Luke and St. John on the Resurrection
Appearances. — St. Paul simply mentions the appear
ances of Jesus to the original disciples. St. Luke
and St. John describe them in detail. Their
evidence may be thus summarised :
(1) Jesus spoke at every manifestation, sometimes
at considerable length. Numerous critics deny the
credibility of this, on the ground that it contradicts
St. Paul.1 But Jesus spoke when He appeared to
St. Paul, and this furnishes a presumption that
He spoke when He appeared to others.2
(2) The grave was found empty 3 on the third
day. This fact, which even Schenkel regarded
1 Schmiedel says : " There is to be drawn from the various
accounts one deduction which goes very deep : no words were
heard from the risen Jesus " (Encycl. Biblica, iv. 4,063). So
also Keim : " Paul, in mentioning the Resurrection appearances
of Jesus, has determinedly excluded the speaking of Jesus"
(Jesus of Nazara, vi. p. 290).
Considering that St. Paul gives no details of any of the
appearances, the statements of Schmiedel and Keim must be
pronounced misleading in the highest degree.
2 It has now been proved by an induction extending over
thousands of instances, that apparitions hardly ever speak, and,
when they do, never more than two or three words. The con
versations of the risen Jesus are therefore proof positive that He
was not an apparition.
3 The empty grave testifies to a real corporeal resurrection.
That the disciples did not remove the body, is evident. If they
had done so, they would not have believed the Resurrection.
It is equally evident that the Jewish authorities did not do so ;
for in that case they would have testified to the fact, and
perhaps have produced the body, when the Apostles began to
preach the Resurrection.

484 THE EMPTY TOMB
as incontrovertible, has been denied by Strauss,
Keim, Weizsacker, and Schmiedel. But it is
attested not only by Luke, but also by Mark (that
is, by Peter), by Matthew, by John, by the Jews
(Matt, xviii. 13), and apparently by Paul also, for
that is the most natural conclusion to draw from
the fact that he mentions the burial in close
connection with the Resurrection (1 Cor. xv. 4).
To deny a fact so amply attested is mere prejudice.
(3) The risen Jesus sought to dispel the idea
which the Apostles at first entertained, that He
was a disembodied spirit :
{a) By offering Himself to be handled, and by
showing the wounds in His hands, feet, and side :
" They were terrified and affrighted, and supposed
that they beheld a spirit. And He said unto
them, . . . See My hands and My feet, that it is
I myself :_ handle Me, and see; for a spirit hath
not flesh and bones, as ye behold Me having"
(Luke xxiv. 37 ff.) 1 ; " He shewed unto them His
hands and His side " (John xx. 20) ; " Reach hither
thy finger, and see My hands ; and reach hither
thy hand, and put it into My side : and be not
faithless, but believing " (John xx. 27).
(_¦) By eating before or with the Apostles : " They
gave Him a piece of a broiled fish. And He took
it, and did eat before them " (Luke xxiv. 42) ; " We
1 Cf. the testimony of St. Ignatius, a disciple of St. John :
" When He came to those who were with Peter, He said to them,
'Lay hold, handle Me, and see that I am not an incorporeal
demon ' " (To the Smyrcenans, iii.).

THE HANDLING AND THE EATING 485
did eat and drink with Him after He rose from the
dead " (Acts x. 41, cf. i. 4, R.V. marg. ; Mark xvi. 14).1
These statements have been questioned by critics
on two grounds : (1) that they contradict St. Paul,
and (2) that they imply the return of Jesus to a
purely natural life. But they neither contradict St.
Paul, who says nothing whatever about the character
of the appearances, nor do they imply that Jesus
returned to a purely natural life, for He ate, not as
needing food, but to prove that His body was real.
Seeing, then, that these statements are made by
one who himself handled the risen Lord, and saw
Him handed (1 John i. 1, cf. Westcott's note), and
by a conscientious historian whose information
was derived from eye-witnesses (Luke i. 1-4), the
handling and eating must be regarded as critically
established. (4) The body of the risen Lord was a spiritual
body, no longer subject to the limitations of
ordinary matter.2 This was shown :
{a) By its suddenly appearing, suddenly vanish
ing, manifesting itself within a closed space, and
ascending into heaven.3
1 Cf Ignatius : "And after His Resurrection He did eat and
drink with them, as being possessed of flesh, although spiritually
He was united to the Father" (o.c. iii.).
8 If the Gospel narratives had been fictitious, they would have
represented Jesus as rising with a purely natural body, for that
was the Jewish expectation (Mark vi. 14 ; xii. 23).
3 "A<pavros e'yevero, Luke xxiv. 31 ; eo-rr) iv pe'cra, Luke xxiv. 36, cf.
John xx. 19, 26, where it is added that the doors were closed;
biecrn) air' airav, Luke xxiv. S1 > *nyp@V> Acts i. 9, cf. avetpepero
th top oipavdv, Luke xxiv. 51, R.V. text, not margin.

486 THE RISEN BODY SPIRITUAL
(_>) By express statements that Jesus was glori
fied at His Resurrection : " All authority was given
Me [ih607j] in heaven and on earth " (Matt, xxviii. 18),
the reference being to the Resurrection ; " Ought
not the Christ to have suffered these things, and
to have entered into His glory ? " {ovxl e'Se. iraOeiv koI
ela-eXOetv,1 Luke xxiv. 26).
(c) Moreover, Jesus conferred the Holy Spirit
on Easter evening (John xx. 23), which was not
possible before He had been glorified (John vii. 39).
(5) Nevertheless the risen body was the same
body which was crucified, as was shown by the
empty tomb, and by the wound-prints which it
still exhibited.
(6) It is evident, therefore, that the Evangelists
believed that, at the Resurrection, the body of Jesus
was transformed into a spiritual body, that the
post-resurrection manifestations were made out of
a state of heavenly glory already attained, and that
their visible and tangible character was an accom
modation to the needs of the disciples.
(7) It is implied by St. Luke and St. John that
the Resurrection appearances were {a) numerous
and {b) convincing. St. Luke speaks of " many
proofs" (Acts i. 3), and St. John knows of "many
other signs" which the risen Lord did in the
presence of the disciples (John xx. 30).2
1 The iradeiv being past, the eio-Xtfet. els rf/v 8o|a. avrov is
presumably past also.
8 Baur is undoubtedly right in understanding these signs as
signs worked by the risen Lord. The context plainly requires
this meaning.

NUMBER OF APPEARANCES 487
Some critics object that the appearances cannot
have been more than five, because only five are
mentioned in 1 Cor. xv. 3 ff1 But this objection is
capricious in the highest degree. All that can fairly
be gathered from 1 Cor. xv. 3ff. is that the five
appearances there mentioned are typical ones about
which St. Paul and the Twelve were in the habit of
giving information to their converts. There is not
a word to indicate that they were the only mani
festations. St. Paul's list is clearly an official one.
There is an appearance to Peter, the leading
Apostle ; then an official appearance to the Twelve ;
then an appearance to the five hundred — that is, to
the Church at large ; then an appearance to James,
the Bishop of Jerusalem and leader of the Jewish
Christians ; then an appearance to " all the Apostles "
— that is, to the chief officers of the Church ; and
lastly an appearance to St. Paul, the Apostle of the
Gentiles. Clearly St. Paul is giving a carefully
selected, not an exhaustive, list.
(8) The Gospels represent the appearances as
taking place first at Jerusalem, then in Galilee,
and then again at Jerusalem. There is nothing
incredible in this representation. The fact that
the first appearances were seen on the third day
1 So Schmiedel, Encycl. Biblica, iv. 4,057. Similarly Keim :
" The appearances were five, neither more nor less. It is above
all evident that Paul supplies the complete list" (Jesus of
Nazara, vi. p. 292). Weizsacker also speaks of " the various
Christophanies, arranged by Paul in so definite an order, and
with such an evident intention of securing absolute complete
ness " (Apostolic Age, vol. i. p. 12),

488 LOCALITY OF APPEARANCES
almost necessitates thelocation of them in Jerusalem.1
The subsequent transference of the manifestations
to Galilee was appropriate, in view of the fact that
most of our Lord's followers lived there. The re
turn of the Apostles to Jerusalem for the final
appearances was also suitable, seeing that they
were to begin their work at Jerusalem. Notwith
standing this, numerous critics state dogmatically
that St. Paul locates all the appearances in Galilee,
and that therefore the Judsean appearances re
corded in the Gospels are fictitious.2 They argue
that because the appearance to the five hundred,
which St. Paul records, must presumably have
taken place in Galilee, therefore all the appearances
must have taken place in Galilee. It is not easy to
conceive a more illogical argument.
Internal Evidence of Trustworthiness. — There are
numerous features in the Gospel accounts of the
post-resurrection period which bear the stamp of
authenticity. Thus :
(i) The disciples were afraid when they first saw
1 Galilee was a three days' journey from Jerusalem.
8 So Strauss, Schenkel, Zeller, Keim, Weisse, Weizsacker,
Wernle, Schmiedel. Schmiedel says : " Galilee and Jerusalem
were at first mutually exclusive.'' Keim says : " These appear
ances of Jesus took place, according to the plainest evidences,
in Galilee, and not in Jerusalem." Wernle says : " The first
[appearances] must have taken place, according to the oldest
accounts, in Galilee." Weizsacker says : " Now these two
representations [of appearances in Jerusalem and appearances
in Galilee] are irreconcilable." On the other hand, Renan,
Holsten, and Hilgenfeld, among Rationalists, support the
Judagan appearances.

THE GOSPELS TRUSTWORTHY 489
Jesus, and thought that He was an apparition
(Luke xxiv. 37).1
(2) Jesus was not always recognized at once
(Luke xxiv. 16, 31; John xx. 14-6; xxi. 4-7; cf.
Mark xvi. 12).2
(3) Again, the great depression of the disciples
(Mark xvi. 10, cf. Luke xxiv. 21), the difficulty
with which they were induced to believe (Luke
xxiv. 11; Mark xvi. 11, 13, 14), and the obstinate
doubts of some of them (Matt, xxviii. 17;
John xx. 25, 27), being facts which a later genera
tion would have regarded as discreditable, and
therefore would not have invented, are decided
indications of truthfulness.
(4) The fourth Gospel is particularly full of un
obtrusive, but unmistakable, autoptic touches. How
true to life, for instance, is the visit of the two
Apostles to the tomb (John xx. 3-10), when John,
the younger man, outruns Peter, but the latter,
true to his energetic and impetuous nature, is the
first to enter in ! How well, too, the reflective
character of John is brought out by making him
the first to recognize the meaning of the empty
grave-clothes ; and what intimate knowledge of the
state of belief among the Apostles is shown by the
1 Their fear was natural under the circumstances, and har
monizes well with the similar fear expressed, Matthew xiv. 26.
8 This fact, which is most unlikely to have been invented,
shows that the disciples were not expecting to see Jesus when
He appeared. The appearances, therefore, were not the effects
of "expectant attention," as the apparitions in the Dordojpe
were,

490 THE DISCREPANCIES
ninth verse : " For as yet they knew not the
Scripture, that He must rise again from the
dead " !
The Discrepancies. — It is true that some of the
Gospel statements are difficult to harmonize, and
that there are several apparent, and perhaps one or
two real, discrepancies. St. Luke and St. John, for
example, mention two angels : St. Matthew and St.
Mark only one. According to the Synoptic Evan
gelists, the angels were seen by the women :
according to St. John, by Mary Magdalene only.
According to St. Luke and St. Matthew, news was
brought by the women that the tomb was empty,
and that Jesus had risen : according to St. Mark,
" they said nothing to any one ; for they were
afraid " : x according to St. John, news of the empty
tomb (but not of the Resurrection) was brought by
Mary Magdalene only.2 The words of the angel
announcing a Galilean appearance are given with
substantial agreement by St. Matthew and St.
Mark ; but in St. Luke an important change is
made. The word Galilee is retained, but the
reference to a Galilean appearance is obliterated.3
1 The conclusion of St. Mark being lost, we are unable to
be sure that this is a real discrepancy. It is possible that after
a time the women (or one of them) summoned sufficient courage
to go and tell the disciples what they had seen and heard.
8 There is, however, a hint contained in the use of the plural
(olb'ap.ev, John xx. 2) that other women had been with Mary to
the tomb.
3 The explanation of this change probably is that St. Luke
(for whatever reason) does not intend to narrate any Galilean
appearances.

THE DISCREPANCIES 491
There is a further difficulty as to whether
Jesus appeared first to Mary Magdalene alone
(John xx. 1 1-7, cf. Mark xvi. 9), or to Mary
Magdalene in company with " the other Mary "
(Matt, xxviii. 9).1
These are all the discrepancies of any moment
which can be plausibly alleged against the Gospel
narratives.2 They relate almost entirely to the
proceedings of the women on the morning of the
Resurrection, and are easily explained by the fact
that the women were so much startled by the
appearance of the angel (Matt, xxviii. 8 ; Mark xvi.
8 ; Luke xxiv. 5), that they were unable to give
an entirely consistent account of their experiences
{cf. Luke xxiv. n).3
1 This appearance to the two women (Matt, xxviii. 9) is,
critically speaking, by far the most doubtful of the appearances.
It is extremely difficult to harmonize with the representation in
St. John xx. 11 ff., where Mary Magdalene, at her second visit
to the tomb, has not yet seen Jesus (ver. 13). It is also most
difficult to harmonize with the other Gospels, which speak of
angelic appearances only as having been seen by the women. We
are not prepared, therefore, to affirm positively that this appear
ance is authentic, and we are disposed to assign it, not to the
original Matthew, but to the later editor.
8 A much more formidable list of discrepancies is given by
Mr. Macan, The Resurrection, p. 38 ff., and by Dr. Schmiedel,
Encyclop. Biblica, iv. 4,041, who enumerates no less than
twenty. If the harmonists have erred in finding too few dis
crepancies, Mr. Macan and Dr. Schmiedel have certainly erred
in finding too many.
3 Confused as the history undoubtedly is at this point, there
is complete agreement as to the two important facts that the
tomb was empty, and that an angel (or angels) appeared,
announcing the Resurrection,

492 DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS
We claim, therefore, that since the discrepancies
between the Gospels are not fundamental, and are
less important than the points of agreement, they
are insufficient to discredit the Gospel narratives
taken as a whole.1
V. — Difficulties and Objections
Many objections to the Resurrection narratives
have already been discussed, but a few still remain
for consideration.
Objection I. — Christ's Resurrection is a type of
ours (i Cor. xv. 12-23, etc.), but since our resurrec
tion is not the raising of the old body, but
the clothing of the soul with a new and spiritual
one (1 Cor. xv. 35-58), we are forbidden to think
of Christ's Resurrection as an actual resuscitation
of His natural body.
Reply. — The Resurrection of Christ was intended
to serve two purposes :
(1) To furnish a type of the future resurrection
of the righteous ; (2) to furnish an unmistakable
miraculous proof of the truth of Christianity.
The first purpose might have been fully attained
by a purely spiritual Resurrection, the second
not so fully. What was urgently needed to restore
confidence in Christ and His teaching after His
1 Dr. G. P. Fisher, in his Grounds of Theistic and Christian
Belief, gives some interesting illustrations of the extraordinary
contradictions which are found in independent accounts of the
same event by different persons, and even by the same person
at different times (Revised Edition, pp. 413-20).

DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 493
ignominious death, was a palpable and undeni
able miracle. Such a miracle was the physical
Resurrection.1
Objection II. — St. Paul says (1 Cor. xv. 50) that
"flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of
God." He cannot therefore have believed in
the corporeal Resurrection and Ascension of
Jesus. Reply. — St. Paul means that flesh and blood in
their natural and unglorified condition cannot inherit
the kingdom of God (see verses 51-4). But the
body of Jesus was changed at the moment of
resurrection into a spiritual and glorious body (see
sect. iv. 4-6),2 so that no contradiction arises.
VI. — Summary of the Historical Evidence
It has now been shown —
(1) That the death of Jesus was followed, on the
third and subsequent days, by striking appearances,
which convinced the Apostles that He had risen
from the dead.
1 A " spiritual resurrection," or mere manifestation of Christ's
spirit to the disciples, would, not have had the same evidential
value as have the empty tomb, the handling, and the eating,
which cannot possibly be explained except as miracles.
8 That the body of Jesus was glorified at the Resurrection
and not at the Ascension is the ancient traditional view (St.
Augustine, St. Leo, St. Gregory, Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas
Aquinas), as well as that of modern criticism. There is no
scriptural or patristic authority for the view common in the
Presbyterian Churches that Jesus rose for forty days to a purely
natural life, or for the popular Anglican theory that the forty
days were a period of progressive glorification.

494 THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
(2) That the Apostles were not asleep, or in
trance, but awake, when they saw Jesus.1
(3) That the visions cannot be satisfactorily ex
plained as generated by ideas or expectations
present in the minds of the Apostles.
(4) That on this account, and also on account
of their numerous, persistent, and collective char
acter, they cannot be regarded as mere subjective
visions or hallucinations.
(5) That the lowest view that can plausibly
be taken of them is that they were real mani
festations of the glorified spirit of Jesus to the
disciples. (6) That the facts, taken as a whole, point to
more than this. The empty tomb, the handling
of the risen body, and the eating with the dis
ciples — all facts well attested — cannot possibly
be explained on any other theory than the
traditional one of a physical resurrection. This
theory, therefore, which explains the whole of
the facts, must be preferred to the other, which
does not.
1 St. Paul draws a clear line (2 Cor. xii. 1-10) between ecstasy
or trance, and the waking state. That the vision at Damascus
was seen in the waking state is shown by the fact that he con
tinually described it (Acts xxii. 5, xxvi. 12; Gal. i. n ff.) ;
whereas he never described the "visions and revelations"
vouchsafed to him in trance (2 Cor. xii. 4) ; also by his use of
the unambiguous word tdpana (1 Cor. ix. 1) in addition to &<p6i)
(1 Cor. xv. 8), and oipdvtoc cmraaria (Acts xxvi. 19), which, taken
alone, might be consistent with a trance vision.
The waking character of the visions seen by the other Apostles
is, of course, beyond question.

THE MORAL EVIDENCE 495
VII. — The Moral Evidence
The historical evidence for the Resurrection is
strong, but the moral evidence is still stronger.
The Resurrection, if it is true, solves the question
which affects the whole human race more than
any other. The problem of immortality is one
which in our day clamours for solution. It was
shown in cc. xiv. and xv. that unless there is
a future life, there is no rational basis for any
morality higher than pure Hedonism, or for any
religion which regards the Deity as morally perfect.
And yet this very question of a future life is en
compassed with difficulties which modern philo
sophy and science have done nothing to remove,
and have, perhaps, even increased. If, therefore,
the miraculous intervention of God in the affairs
of the world is credible at all — and we have shown
that it is — His miraculous intervention to solve this
particular problem is more credible than His inter
vention for any other purpose. The moral evidence,
therefore, for the Resurrection is not only stronger
than that for any other miracle,1 but is the strongest
that we can conceive. Upon this combination,
therefore, of strong historical and strong moral
evidence, we accept the Resurrection as a fact.
' It is stronger than the moral evidence for the raising of
Lazarus, of the widow's son, and of Jairus's daughter, because
these were raised to a purely natural life, and died again,
whereas Jesus was raised to an immortal life — " Christ being
raised from the dead dieth no more ; death hath no more
dominion over Him " (Rom. vi. 9).

496 JESUS THE SON OF GOD
VIII. — The Resurrection and the Person
of Christ
The Resurrection does not directly prove that
Jesus is the Son of God, for He might, though a
mere man, have been raised to life again; but it
proves it indirectly, because it sets the stamp of
Divine approval upon His teaching, part of which
was His own Divine Sonship. St. Paul, therefore,
is perfectly justified in saying that Jesus was
" declared to be the Son of God with power, accord
ing to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection
of the dead " (Rom. i. 4).1

APPENDIX I
list of the resurrection appearances
(a) In Judcea.
(1) To St. Mary Magdalene alone (Mark xvi. 9; John
xx. 16).
(2) To St. Mary Magdalene and the other Mary (Matt.
xxviii. 9).
(3) To Cleopas and another, journeying to Emmaus (Luke
xxiv. 13).
(4) To St. Peter (Luke xxiv. 34 ; 1 Cor. xv. 5).

1 Mr. Macan admits the cogency of this reasoning. " If
the Resurrection," he says, "be an historical event, it must
apparently affect essentially our conception of the historical
person of Christ. ' In His death He assured us of His humanity,
by His Resurrection He demonstrated His divinity.' None of the
other events or miracles of His life raised Him so conspicuously
above the level of mortality, and the analogy of what had been
granted to men before " (The Resurrection^ p. 7).

LIST OF APPEARANCES 497
(5) To the Apostles without St. Thomas (John xx. 19;
Luke xxiv. 36 ; probably also 1 Cor. xv. 5).
(6) To the Apostles with St. Thomas (John xx. 26).
(b) In Galilee.
(7) To SS. Peter, Thomas, Bartholomew (Nathanael),
James, John, and two others, at the Lake of Galilee (John
xxi.). (8) On a mountain in Galilee to the eleven disciples
(Matt, xxviii. 16) ; with which is possibly to be identified.
(9) The appearance to above five hundred brethren at once
(1 Cor. xv. 6).
(10) The appearance to St. James (1 Cor. xv. 7).
(c) In fudcea again.
(n) The appearance to the Apostles on the occasion of the
Ascension (Acts i. 4-12; Mark xvi. 19; probably also Luke
xxiv. 50 j1 and 1 Cor. xv. 7).
{d) Near Damascus.
(12) The appearance to St. Paul (Acts ix. 3 ; xxii. 6 ; xxvi.
12 ; 1 Cor. xv. 8; Gal. i. 15).
APPENDIX II
rationalistic theories of the resurrection
The most important of these theories have been already
discussed. We add here a complete list.
(1) The Theory of Fraud. — The disciples stole the body, and
pretended that Jesus had risen (Matt, xxviii. 13-5 ; St. Justin,
Apology, cviii. ; Tertullian, Apologeticus, xxi., cf. Origen,
Against Celsus, ii. 56 ; the heathen Acts of Pilate ; the
mediaeval Jewish Toledoth Jeshua ; Reimarus, 1694-1767).
In our day even Rationalists reject this theory as " repellent
and disgraceful" (Keim). It is acknowledged on all hands

1 It is not certain that this passage describes the Ascension.
See ver. 51, R.V. marg. 32

498 RATIONALISTIC THEORIES
that so pure an ethical movement as Christianity cannot have
originated in fraud.
(2) The Theory of the Natural Disappearance ofthe Body. —
The body is supposed to have been removed by some person
or persons unknown {e.g. the gardener, unknown Galilean
disciples, Mary Magdalene, the Sanhedrim, Pilate, etc).
But these unknown persons would either have produced the
body, or at least have explained that they had removed it,
as soon as the Apostles began to proclaim the Resurrection
(see above, sect iv.).
(3) The Theory of Apparent Death. — Jesus did not die upon
the cross, but fainted, and afterwards revived (Bahrdt, Paulus,
Venturini, Schleiermacher, Bunsen, Hase, and many others).
This theory is nearly, if not quite, obsolete. Strauss (1864)
said of it: "A man half-dead, dragging Himself in languor
and exhaustion out of His tomb, with wounds requiring
careful and continuous medical treatment — could He, in such
a state, have produced upon the minds of the disciples the
impression that He was victor over death and the grave, the
Prince of Life — an impression which nevertheless was the
source and spring of all their,. subsequent activity ? "
(4) The Reflection Hypothesis. — After the death of Jesus, His
disciples studied the Scriptures, and becoming convinced
that His resurrection was foretold by the prophets, began to
see visions of Him. This view, originally suggested by
Strauss, was afterwards abandoned by him, and is now
recognized on all hands as inadequate. " Visions," says Dr.
Schmiedel, " do not arise by processes so gradual or so
placid." (5) The Hypothesis of Subjective Visions or Hallucinations. —
(First in Celsus [a.d. 170]: "Who beheld the risen Jesus?
A half-frantic woman, as you state, and some other person,
perhaps, of those who were engaged in the same system of
delusion, who had either dreamed so, owing to a peculiar
state of mind, or, under the influence of a wandering imagina
tion, had formed to himself an appearance according to his

RESURRECTION OF THE BODY 499
own wishes, which has been the case with numberless
individuals," Origen, Against Celsus, ii. 55. Cf. Renan, Life
offesus, xxvi. : " The strong imagination of Mary Magdalene
played an important part in this circumstance. Divine power
of love ! Sacred moments in which the passion of one
possessed gave to the world a resuscitated God ! ")
This theory has already been sufficiently discussed.
(6) The Theory of Objective Visions, or of a Spiritual
Resurrection. — After death, the immortal and glorified spirit
of Jesus was allowed to manifest itself to the disciples.
This theory bas already been considered at length, and
shewn to be inadequate.
(7) The Mythical Theory.— The Resurrection appearances
recorded by the Evangelists and by St. Paul are all fictitious,
and therefore there are no facts to explain (Martineau,
Seat of Authority, p. 363 ff.). This view can only be con
sistently adopted by those who reject not merely the Gospels,
but even the Pauline Epistles. It is altogether preposterous.
APPENDIX III
the resurrection of the body1
The doctrine of the resurrection of the body, upon which
the historical Church has always laid much stress, encountered
in early times great opposition 2 from those Greek philosophers

1 The reader is reminded that "matter" is probably not a
distinct substance, but a thought or idea in the Divine Mind
(see c. vi.).
8 The opposition of the philosophers was partly due to the
unphilosophical form in which the doctrine of the resurrection
of the body was sometimes presented. It was not infrequently
asserted that the very particles of matter which were laid in the
grave would rise again. This, of course, is contrary to the New
Testament. St. Paul teaches that at the Resurrection the soul
will be clothed with a new and glorious body, suited to its new
environment.

5oo RESURRECTION OF THE BODY
who adopted from Plato the Oriental belief (or prejudice)
that matter is essentially evil, and that the body is the prison-
house of the soul. The Platonic view is not entirely obsolete
even now, and therefore it may be advisable to state briefly
some of the philosophical reasons for preferring the Christian
doctrine of the resurrection of the body to the Platonic one
of the immortality of the soul alone.
(i) Matter is not evil, as Plato asserted, but destitute of
moral character. It is an instrument, and, as such, can be
used for good or evil ends, with equal facility. The same
knife which a physician uses to excise a tumour may be
used by an assassin to commit a murder.
(2) Matter possesses an intrinsic excellence of its own.
It has- reached its present perfection as the result of many
ages of cosmical development, and therefore it is probable,
on the hypothesis that there is a final goal to which the
whole creation moves, that matter as well as spirit will be
ultimately perfected and glorified {cf. Rom. viii. 18-25 >
2 Pet. iii. 13 ; Rev. xxi. 1).
(3) Matter (in the form of a brain and nervous system)
is necessary to the soul for the exercise of its powers. Without
the brain, not a single function of the soul can be performed.
But if a body is thus indispensably necessary to the soul in
this present life, there is an obvious presumption — not, of
course, a strong one, but still a presumption— that a body
of some kind will also be necessary in the world to come.1
(4) In other respects, also, matter ministers to the needs
of the soul. Thinking, for example, is carried on entirely by
means of material symbols. Language, the most important
of these, consists of material vibrations. Writing, another
important aid to thought, consists of particles of matter
arranged in particular ways. Even the most abstract branches
1 The kind of body that will be required is, as St. Paul says,
a spiritual one — i.e. a perfect organ and visible expression of
a glorified and perfected spirit.

THE ASCENSION 501
of mathematics require the use of written formulas. Again,
the arts of painting, sculpture, architecture, and music, which
aim at satisfying the soul's aspirations for the beautiful and
the true, are forced to embody their ideals in material forms.
So completely " material " are all our categories of thought,
that we cannot even think of God, whom we know to be
immaterial, except as a majestic human figure seated on a
throne. This, then, being the constitution of the human
mind, it is more natural to suppose that in the future life
we shall possess bodies, and be surrounded by a " material "
environment of some kind, than that we shall not. Unless
hereafter we possess bodies, it is difficult to understand how
we shall even recognize one another ; and unless there are
beautiful objects, it is difficult to understand how the soul will
enjoy, as Plato says it will, the contemplation of perfect beauty
for ever. APPENDIX IV
THE ascension
Doubts have been expressed as to the historic truth of the
Ascension, owing to the fact that there is no certain allusion
to it in the Synoptic Gospels,1 and that the Epistles nowhere
speak of it as an event distinct from the Resurrection.
The scantiness of allusions to the Ascension as a distinct
event is admitted, but a satisfactory explanation can be offered.
The Ascension brought about no change in the condition of Jesus.
Jesus was glorified at the Resurrection, not at the Ascension,
and the event on the fortieth day, which we call the Ascension,
was His final farewell to the Apostles, not His entry for the first
time into glory., The Apostles seldom separated in thought
our Lord's Ascension from His Resurrection. They believed

1 The allusion in St. Mark is no part of the original Gospel,
and the apparent allusion in Luke xxiv. 51 is absent from the
Western text, and is regarded by Westcott and Hort as
untrustworthy.

502 THE VIRGIN BIRTH
that immediately after His Resurrection He ascended into
heaven, and there remained during the whole of the forty
days, descending to earth for occasional interviews with the
Apostles, and ascending to heaven immediately afterwards.
On the fortieth day He bade the Apostles farewell, and on
this occasion ascended visibly, that He might give them
a sensible proof of His exaltation to the right hand of
God.1

APPENDIX V
our lord's birth of a virgin
To those who disbelieve the other Gospel miracles, the
miracle of Christ's conception (Matt. i. ; Luke i., ii.) is of
course incredible. To those, however, who believe them,
it presents, or ought to present, no special difficulty. We
will consider first of all the appropriateness of the miracle, and
secondly the evidence for it.
The Appropriateness of the Miracle
(i) Natural conception produces natural personality. But
the personality of Jesus was not natural. Jesus was, on the
assumption that Christianity is true, both God and man.
Since, then, His incarnate personality was supernatural, it was

1 This view of the Ascension, which fully explains the paucity
of references to it in the New Testament, was advocated, among
older writers, by Whitby and Whiston, and has been defended
in more recent times by Baur, Kinkel, Rothe, Milligan, Westcott,
Harnack, and Schmiedel. Milligan says : " The glorification
of Jesus began at His Resurrection, not at His Ascension. . . .
He revealed Himself out of a hidden glory into which He had
passed; and this glory could only be the glory of His eternal
state, not waiting to be begun, but begun already." For
the other view, see Denney, " Ascension " (in Hastings' Bible
Dictionary).

THE VIRGIN BIRTH 503
fitting that it should be brought into existence by a super
natural act. So closely does the idea of His supernatural
conception cohere with that of His supernatural Personality,
that few in our day who abandon belief in the former are
able to retain faith in the latter.
(2) Natural conception produces in all cases a nature which
is sinful and imperfect. It was appropriate, therefore, that a
sinless and perfect nature should be originated by a super
natural conception.
(3) According to the sentiment of most nations, conception
by a virgin mother is altogether a more reverent manner
of effecting the Incarnation than the intercourse of husband
and wife.1 The Evidence for the Miracle
(1) The most important evidence for the Virgin Birth is
the Gospel according to St. Luke. St. Luke had visited
Palestine at a time when authentic details were still procurable
(Acts xxiii. 33, xxiv. 27); and, being a historian in the
full sense of the term, made full use of his opportunities
(Luke i. 3).
(2) St. Luke's narrative contains every indication that it
proceeds — perhaps directly— from the Virgin herself. This
is evident, not only from the intimate and private nature of
the details described, but also from the words of the
Evangelist in ii. 19, 51 : "Mary kept all these sayings [or
things], pondering them in her heart. . . . His mother kept
all these sayings [or things] in her heart.''
(3) St. Luke's narrative makes a decidedly favourable im
pression upon the reader, partly on account of its commend
able delicacy and reticence, and still more on account of the
absence from it of tasteless and unnecessary miracles. The
inquirer who doubts its truth should read the birth-stories in

1 See a striking passage in Lecky's History of European
Morals, vol. i. pp. 103-9.

$o4 THE VIRGIN BIRTH
the apocryphal Gospels. These are really legendary, and,
being so, are full of coarse details and senseless marvels.1
(4) Since we do not know the exact origin of St. Matthew's
account, we cannot regard it as equal in authority to that of
St. Luke, nevertheless it is an important secondary authority.
It is ancient, clearly Jewish in origin, and comparatively free
from features which can be reasonably regarded as legendary
embellishments. (5) St. Matthew's account, since it regards the Nativity
exclusively from Joseph's point of view, must (if authentic)
be ultimately based on Joseph's testimony, but it is probable
that Joseph's narrative had passed through several hands
before it reached the Evangelist.
(6) The two narratives are quite independent, and contain
several apparent discrepancies ; but they entirely confirm one
another upon the two most important facts — viz. (1) that Jesus
was born at Bethlehem, and (2) that He was supernaturally
conceived. Objections to the Miracle
Objection I. — The miracle of the Virgin Birth was not

1 For example, in the Protevangelium of James, one of the
most respectable of the apocryphal Gospels, Joseph is selected
as the husband of Mary by the miracle of a dove flying out of
his rod, and alighting upon his head (9). Mary proves her
chastity publicly by undergoing "the trial of jealousy"
(Num. v. 11) unharmed. When Jesus is born, a luminous
cloud overshadows the cave of the Nativity, the heavens cease
to revolve, flying birds remain suspended in the air, and the
motion of every living creature is arrested (18). The child is
born clauso utero, salvd integritate corporis virginalis.
Obstetrix, quce supervenit post partum, non prius credit
virginem fieperisse, quam virginitatis indicia integra tactu
probaverit. The hand of the unbelieving midwife falls off, but
is restored as she touches the Holy Child (19, 20). According
to Pseudo-Matthew, 23, the ox and the ass incessantly adored
the new-born Saviour, etc.

THE VIRGIN BIRTH 505
contained in the original preaching of the Apostles. Two
of the Gospels, and all the Epistles, are silent about it.
Reply. — It is probable that, out of regard to the reputation
of the mother of Jesus, the facts about His birth were not
made public until some time after her death. It is also
possible that for a considerable period after the Ascension
the true origin of Jesus was unknown even to the Apostles.
Joseph being dead, Mary was the only living witness to the
facts, and she would naturally be loth to disclose them, until
there was a real necessity to do so. This necessity would
only arise when theological speculation about the Person of
Jesus had become active, and when Christians began to
inquire how He who had left this world in so wonderful a
way had originally entered it. Silence could then no longer
be kept without imperilling the Christian faith.1
The absence of the miracle from the earliest apostolic
preaching — and therefore from St. Mark's Gospel — is easily
explained. The Apostles preached mainly what they had
themselves heard and seen — that is, the events from Christ's
Baptism to His Ascension. Its absence from St. Paul's epistles
needs no explanation,2 as the Apostle mentions very few of
the events of our Lord's life.
Objection II. — The supernatural conception is plainly a
legend of Pagan origin, and may be compared with the alleged
intercourse of the Greek and Roman gods with mortal women.
Reply. — Both forms of the birth story originated in Jewish
circles, and therefore this explanation is impossible.
Objection III. — There are still closer heathen analogies in
the supernatural birth of Perseus, and of Buddha.

1 It is important to observe that as soon as the fact of the
Virgin Birth became known, it was regarded as of fundamental
importance. It was contained in the oldest form of the Apostles'
Creed, which cannot be dated later than about a.d. ioo. This
is clear from Ignatius, To the Smyrnceans, i., ii. (a.d. no) ; and
also from Aristides, Apology (A.D. 131).
8 Possibly he alludes to it in Galatians iv. 4.

5o6 THE VIRGIN BIRTH
Reply. — It is uncritical to compare a mere legend like that
of Perseus with a well-attested narrative like that of St. Luke.
As to the birth of Buddha, the analogy is not close, for though
his conception is said to have been miraculous, his mother
was not a virgin.
Objection IV. — The story of the Virgin Birth was invented
as a fulfilment of Isaiah vii. 14 (LXX.), where 'almah, young
woman, is wrongly translated TrapOivos, virgin.
Reply. — (1) The story originated in Jewish circles, where
such a misinterpretation would have been unlikely.
(2) In St. Luke there is no allusion to the fulfilment of
prophecy, and even in St. Matthew, where the prophecy
is quoted, the stress is laid not on the word napOo/os, virgin,
but on the word Emmanuel, God with us, which is regarded
as a prophetic anticipation of the Holy Name of Jesus.
Objection V. — The genealogies, which are traced through
Joseph both in St. Matthew and in St. Luke, show that Joseph
was originally regarded as the true father of Jesus.
Reply. — It is possible that this is the case, and that these
genealogies were compiled before the Virgin Birth became
known, but it is not necessary to suppose this, for —
(1) Joseph was at any rate the legal father of Jesus, and
an official genealogy would necessarily trace the ancestry of
Jesus through him.1
(2) Owing to the fact that the Jews paid no regard to
descent through the female line, it was only through foseph
that the claim of Jesus to the throne of David could be
made out.

1 Belief in the inspiration of the Gospels does not necessitate
belief in the trustworthiness of the genealogies. These are
bond fide attempts by Jewish genealogists to trace the acknow
ledged Davidic ancestry of Jesus ; but to claim more for them
than this, is not wise. The apologist, as such, is not interested
in the various attempts that have been made to harmonize the
two genealogies.

THE VIRGIN BIRTH 507
(3) The Jews regarded marriage exclusively from the
husband's point of view, and therefore it is probable that
Joseph was considered by them (even when the truth about
the Virgin Birth was known) as the real as well as the legal
father of Jesus. He was considered the real father, because
it was for his sake, and as a special mark of divine favour
to him, that his wife bore him a son in this remarkable way.
Objection VI. — It is stated in the Sinai-Syriac text of
Matt. i. 16 (published in 1894) that Joseph begat Jesus, and
this reading is confirmed by the Dialogue of Timothy and
Aquila (published by Mr. F. C. Conybeare in 1898). Joseph,
therefore, was the true father of Jesus.1
Reply. — Even if the Sinai-Syriac reading were correct, it
would only prove that the genealogy quoted by St. Matthew
regarded Joseph as the true father of Jesus. This would
simply shew that the genealogy was compiled before the fact
of the Virgin Birth was generally known.2
But the Sinai-Syriac reading is certainly not correct. The
ordinary reading, supported, as it is, by every known manu
script, and by practically every known version, must be pro
nounced, if the matter is to be decided by evidence, un
questionably original. The only problem is, how the peculiar
Sinai-Syriac reading is to be accounted for.
Probably it is a case of heretical corruption of the text.
The Ebionites and certain other early heretics (Cerinthus,
Carpocrates, Symmachus, etc.) believed that Jesus was a mere
man, and in consequence denied His miraculous conception
(see Justin, Dialogue, xlviii. ; Epiphanius, Panarion, xxx. 14 ;

1 The Sinai-Syriac reads : " Jacob begat Joseph. Joseph, to
whom was espoused the Virgin Mary, begat Jesus who is called
Christ." The Dialogue reads: "Jacob begat Joseph the husband of
Mary, of whom was born («'£ r\s iyewtiBrj) Jesus who is called
Christ. And Joseph begat Jesus who is called Christ."
' It is clear from vv. 18, 25, that the evangelist did not regard
Joseph as the father of Jesus.

So8 THE VIRGIN BIRTH
Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. vi. 17). They, therefore, after the
usual manner of heretics (Marcion, for example), tampered
with the text of the Gospels, to bring it into accordance with
their views.
Others suppose that some careless scribe, who had already
written the formula " A begat B " thirty-nine times, wrote
mechanically " Joseph begat Jesus," without observing his
mistake. Such mechanical errors are common in manuscripts.
Objection VII. — Joseph's suspicion of his wife's chastity
(Matt. i. 19) was fully justified. Jesus was the natural son
of Mary and some other man.1
Reply. — This theory is a baseless Jewish slander (see
below), the credulous acceptance of which by Professor
Haeckel (Riddle of the Universe, c. xvii.) and other modern
Rationalists evinces a complete absence of the critical faculty.
The best rationalist opinion (Keim, Schmiedel, Usener, etc.)
decidedly rejects it. Keim says : " No moral taint can have
attached to the house. No calumny was ever forged against
Jesus from this side. . . . There is not the shade of a suspicion
that the house came short in any way in respect of civil
virtues, or an Israelite's religious reputation " (Jesus of Nazara,
ii. 31).
Dr. Rendel Harris has recently shown that the name of
the Virgin's supposed paramour (variously written Panthera,

1 This calumny is first found in Celsus (A.D. 170), who places
it in the mouth of a Jew. " When Mary was pregnant, she was
turned out of doors by the carpenter to whom she had been
betrothed, as having been guilty of adultery, and she bore a
child to a certain soldier named Panthera" (Origen, Against
Celsus, i. 32). The Talmud represents Mary, the curler of
women's hair, as unfaithful to her husband Stadas. She has
an intrigue with Panderas Pappus, the son of Judas : their
offspring is Jesus. A similar story is found in the mediaeval
Jewish book Toledoth Jeshua (see Keim, Jesus of Nazara, ii.
77). Among modern supporters of this view are Venturini,
Tolstoi, and Haeckel.

THE RESURRECTION 509
Pantheras, Pandera, Panderas, Pappos, etc.) is simply an
anagram ofthe Greek word parthenos, virgin.

LITERATURE
(a) A Corporeal Resurrection
Milligan, The Resurrection, and The Ascension ; Westcott,
Gospel of the Resurrection, and Revelation ofthe Risen Lord;
Latham, The Risen Master ; Knowling, Witness of the Epistles,
c. vii. ; Bruce, Apologetics, pp. 383 ff. ; Godet, Defence of the
Christian Faith, i. ii. ; J. Kennedy, The Resurrection of Jesus
Christ (R.T.S.) ; Ballard, Miracles of Unbelief, 135 ff.
(b) A Spiritual Resurrection
Keim, Jesus of Nazara, vi. pp. 274-365 ; Weizsacker,
Apostolic Age, c. i. ; E. A. Abbott, The Kernel and the Husk. "
(c) Purely Negative
Macan, The Resurrection ; Zeller, Acts of the Apostles, i.
pp. 284 ft ; Pfleiderer, Paulinism, Introd. ; Schmiedel,
" Resurrection and Ascension Narratives" (in Encyclop. Biblica) ;
Martineau, Seat of Authority , pp. 363 ff.
(d) The Virgin Birth
Knowling, Our Lord's Virgin Birth and the Criticism of
To-day (S.P.C.K.); Gore, Dissertations, i. ; Ramsay, Was
Christ born at Bethlehem ? c. iv. ; Sanday, in Hastings'
Bible Diet. ii. 643. For the negative view, see articles " Nativity "
and "Mary " in the Encyclop. Biblica.

CHAPTER XXIII
the influence OF JESUS upon the world
Summary. — The unparalleled influence of Jesus upon men of all
races for the last two thousand years constitutes a strong
evidence of the truth of His teaching, and of the Divinity
of His Person.
The last question that we have to consider is
.whether the influence of Jesus upon the history
of the world, and especially upon its moral develop
ment, has been such as to countenance the idea
that He was a supernatural Person, and the author
of a genuinely supernatural Religion.
I. — Moral Progress under Christianity
Abolition of Slavery. — When Christianity first
appeared in the world, the majority ofthe population
of Europe were slaves. Not only domestic and
agricultural work, but trade and commerce, manu
factures, and even the learned professions, were
mainly carried on by slaves for the benefit of their
masters. "The youths of a promising genius,"
says Gibbon, "were instructed in the arts and
sciences, and their price was ascertained by the
degree of their skill and talents. Almost every
profession, either liberal or mechanical, might be
510

SLAVERY 511
found in the household of an opulent senator. A
learned slave sold for many hundred pounds
sterling. Atticus always bred and taught them
himself. Many of the Roman physicians were
slaves." A few persons, such as the kind-hearted Plutarch,
and some Stoic philosophers, extended to slaves
a certain degree of humane consideration, but the
prevailing sentiment was widely different. Juvenal
speaks of Roman matrons crucifying their slaves
out of pure caprice, and causing them to be flogged
almost to death in their very presence {Sat. vi.
218 ff, 479 ff). Suetonius alludes to the practice
of exposing sick or useless slaves on an island in
the Tiber to perish {Claudius, xv.). A young slave
of Vedius Pollio accidentally broke a crystal vase
at a banquet, and his master " commanded him to be
carried away and punished with no common death ;
for he ordered him to be thrown to his lampreys,
which he kept, of great size, in a fishpond." Augustus,
however, who was present, interceded successfully
for the slave (Seneca, De Ira, iii. 40). When
Pedanius Secundus, prefect of Rome, was killed by
a slave, the senate commanded the whole of the
household slaves, six hundred in number, to be
promiscuously slaughtered, without distinction of
age, sex, or innocence (Tacitus, Annals, xiv. 42-5).
Slave door-porters were chained to the door
(Suetonius, Rhet. iii.). Slaves were frequently
branded upon the face and otherwise brutally
maltreated (Plutarch, Nicias, ad fin., etc.). So

512 SLAVERY
universally did the institution of slavery prevail
that it was regarded as part of the law of nature.
The humane and enlightened Aristotle said : " It
is clear, then, that some men are free by nature,
and that others are slaves, and that in the case
of the latter the condition of slavery is both
advantageous and just" {Politics, i. 5). Similarly
Gaius, the Roman jurist, says : " Slaves are in the
power of their masters, a power recognized by the
law of nations, for all nations present the spectacle
of masters invested with the power of life and
death over slaves ; and by the Roman law the
owner is entitled to everything acquired by the
slave" {Institutes, i. 52).
Almost the whole credit of undermining and of
finally overthrowing this inhuman institution
belongs to Christianity.1 Three stages of the pro
cess may be distinguished. In the first the Church
contented itself with enforcing the duty of mutual
love between masters and slaves. "Let the master
love his servant, though he be his superior : let
him consider wherein they are equal, even as he
is a man. . . . Let a master who has a believing
servant love him as a son or a brother " {Apostolic
Constitutions, bk. iv. 12).2 "The Bishop ought to
1 The Stoic emperors introduced a few reforms, but they were
not enforced, and produced little effect. As a matter of fact,
many leading Stoics (Cato the elder, Cassius who advocated the
execution of the slaves of Pedanius Secundus, and Vedius Pollio)
were exceptionally inhuman to slaves. The Stoic Ulpian speaks
of " a slave, or any other animal."
8 The bulk of the Apostolic Constitutions dates from the third
century.

CONSTANTINE'S LEGISLATION 513
know whose oblations he ought to receive, and
whose he ought not. He is to avoid . . . those
that oppress the widow and overreach the orphan,
and fill prisons with the innocent, and abuse their
own servants wickedly, I mean with stripes, and
hunger, and hard service. Do thou, O Bishop,
avoid such as these, and their odious oblations " (iv.
6). " Let the faithful person, whether man or
woman, treat servants kindly " (viii. 32). " Let
the slaves work five days ; but on the Sabbath
day [Saturday], and the Lord's day, let them have
leisure to go to Church for instruction in piety.
Let slaves rest from their work all Holy week
and Easter week," and at the other holy seasons
(viii. 33).1
The second stage, that of emancipation, began
with the conversion and triumph of Constantine
(a.d. 312). " In a.d. 312 a law was passed declaring
the poisoning of a slave, or the tearing his body
with the nails of a wild beast, or branding him,
1 As early as the time of Ignatius (a.d. no), slaves were
ransomed with the alms of the Church, though this could not
be demanded as a right (Ignatius, To Polycarp, iv.).' Aristides
(c. a.d. 131) says : " Slaves, male and female, are instructed so
that they become Christians, on account of the love felt.for them
by their masters, and when this takes place, they call them
brethren without any distinction " (Apology, xv.). Lactantius
(c. A.D. 310) says : " Slaves are not slaves to us. We deem and
term them brothers after the spirit " (Institutes, v. 16). Several
saints and martyrs (Felicitas, Blandina, etc.) were slaves.
Pius I. (a.d. 143 — 157), and Calixtus I. (a.d. 219 — 223), bishops
of Rome, were either slaves or freedmen. According to de Rossi,
the title " slave " never occurs on a Christian monument. (See
further. Harnack, Expansion of Christianity, i. 207 ff.). 33

514 SLAVERY ABOLISHED
to be homicide. In 314 liberty was declared a right
which could not be taken away : sixty years of
captivity could not take from the free-born the
right of demanding liberty. In 316 Constantine
writes to an archbishop : ' It has pleased me for
a long time to establish that in the Christian Church
masters can give liberty to their slaves, provided
that they do it in presence of all the assembled
people, and with the assistance of the Christian
priests.' " 1 Subsequent Christian emperors followed
Constantine's noble example. Theodosius (379 —
395) forbade the division of families. " Who can
bear," said he, " to see children separated from
their parents, brothers from sisters, wives from
husbands?" Justinian (527-565) declared that it
was his will " to have our republic frequented by
freemen rather than liberated slaves."
The third stage, that of regarding slavery as
absolutely unlawful, began to be reached in the
ninth century. The first to affirm the new principle
in express language was St. Theodore of Stude :
" Thou shalt possess no slave, neither for domestic
service, nor for the work of the fields ; for man
is made in the image of God." From the ninth
century the opinion that slavery is contrary to the
divine law gradually won acceptance, and slavery
in consequence became extinct in most Christian
countries. Abolition of Cruel Customs. — It was the custom of
all classes in the ancient world to kill or expose
1 Brace, Gesta Christi, pp. 53, 54.

INFANTICIDE 515
their newborn children,1 especially girls, and the
custom was seldom reprobated. Quintilian said
bitterly that " to kill a man is often held to be
a crime, but to kill one's own children is sometimes
considered a beautiful action among the Romans."
The Church consistently opposed the practice,
which it regarded with unmitigated horror. St.
Justin says : " But as for us, we have been taught
that to expose newborn children is the part of
wicked men ; first, because we see that almost all
so exposed (not only the girls, but also the boys)
are brought up to prostitution ; and also lest some
of them be not picked up, but die, and we become
murderers " (1 Apol. c. xxvii., xxix.). Many, of
the exposed infants were rescued and brought up
by the Christians, and from the fourth century there
were foundling hospitals in most dioceses. Con
stantine, in a.d. 315 and 321, attempted to put an
end to all forms of infanticide by enacting that
parents who were too poor to support their
children might apply for assistance to the treasury.
This plan was found after a time to be unworkable ;
but Constantine and his Christian successors did
not on that account remit their exertions to save
from death as many children as possible.
Another barbarous institution was that of gladia
torial games. Combats of gladiators, first intro-
1 The practice of procuring abortion was also prevalent. It
is condemned in the earliest Christian manual for catechumens,
The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles (a.d. 100) : " Thou shalt
not kill a child by abortion, neither shalt thou slay it when
born " (ii.).

516 GLADIATORIAL COMBATS
duced at Rome in the year 262 b.c, soon became
popular, and created an almost insane thirst for
blood. Julius Caesar, in his sedileship, exhibited
320 couples of gladiators.1 Titus opened the
Colosseum 2 with a gladiatorial ; exhibition of a
hundred days. The humane and virtuous Trajan
forced ten thousand prisoners and gladiators to
fight at one time in the arena. At the triumph of
Aurelian eight hundred pairs of gladiators con
tended. Even Constantine, as late as the year
313, cast an immense multitude of captives into
the arena to be devoured by wild beasts. These
bloody spectacles were not confined to Rome, but
took place in every important town in the provinces.
iWomen and children were present at them, and
vvomen were sometimes trained as gladiators.
. , The Christian Church never wavered in its
o.pposition, j,to these enormities. It pronounced
the. profession of, a gladiator infamous, and for
bade Christians to attend the amphitheatre under
penalty of excommunication. The conversion of
Constantine opened an era of anti-gladiatorial
legislation. The first edict against gladiatorial
combats was issued in 325, but for a long period
the imperial legislation remained ineffective. It
was not till the reign of Theodosius (379 — 395)
that these spectacles ceased in the East, and in
. 1 Caesar designed to exhibit more, but the Senate restrained him.
8 At Rome the gladiatorial shows and wild beast fights were
held at the Colosseum and sometimes at the Circus Maximus.
The former held 80,000 spectators; the latter, according to
Pliny,. 2 60, 000;

SUICIDE 517
the West they continued till the reign bf his son
Honorius. " In the West," says Dr. Lecky, " the
last gladiatorial show was celebrated at Rome,
under Honorius, in a.d. 404, in honour of the
triumph of Stilicho, When an Asiatic monk, named
Telemachus, animated by the noblest heroism of
philanthropy, rushed into the amphitheatre, and
attempted to part the combatants. He perished
beneath a shower of stones flung by the angry
spectators ; but his death led to the final abolition
ofthe games " {History of European Morals, c. iv.). '
Discouragement of Suicide.— On this point Dr.
Lecky remarks : " Direct and deliberate suicide,
which occupies, so prominent a place in the moral
history of antiquity, almost absolutely disappeared
within the Church."
The Promotion of Humane Legislation.— Christi
anity modified the rigorous harshness of. the patria
potestas of the Romans ; 1 removed the-chief civil dis
abilities of women ; 2 secured equal justice for the
widow, the orphan, and the poor; 3 introduced a more
11 ¦
1 A Roman father possessed the, power of life and death over
his children, and had a right to the whole of their - property,
however old they might be. These despotic .powers were
curtailed by a long series of enactments of the Christian emperors
from Constantine to Justinian.
' The legislation of Justinian abolished the "tutelage" of
women, and placed the wife, in almost every respect, on an
equality with her husband. , " It is worthy of the chastity of
our times," he says, " to give this new position to women ;
tutelage of women must be done away with."
' Constantine made the bishops the legal protectors of all
oppressed persons, reformed the legal tribunals, and promulgated
special legislation in favour of widows and orphans.

518 CHRISTIAN PHILANTHROPY
humane treatment of criminals and accused persons;1
discouraged war ; 2 and relieved the hard lot of the
labouring classes by securing them rest on Sundays
and holy days.3
Promotion of Philanthropy. — The active philan
thropy of the Christians, which was freely extended
to the pagans, contributed greatly to the propagation
of the Christian faith. The emperor Julian con
fessed with shame that the despised Galileans were
the main benefactors of the poor of the empire.
During the frequent pestilences, the Christians
were unremitting in their attendance upon the
sick, and tenderly nursed those who were aban
doned by their pagan nurses and physicians.4 At
1 Constantine abolished crucifixion and branding on the face.
The sexes were to be confined in different cells. The cells were
to have air and light. Accused persons under arrest were to
be humanely treated, and their trial was not to be delayed. It
was forbidden to allow legal technicalities to stand in the way
of justice. Prisoners were to be acquainted with the charges
made against them, that they might be able to prepare their
defence. 8 Cf. St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation, lii. . "When the
barbarians become disciples of Christ, immediately, instead of
wars, they turn to husbandry ; and instead of arming their hands
with swords, they stretch them forth in prayer." Some of the
ancient Christians regarded war as altogether unlawful.
3 The observance of Sunday was ordered by Constantine in
A.D. 321.
4 Eusebius, speaking of the plague at Alexandria (A.D. 259),
says : " Most of our brethren . . . visited the sick without fear,
ministered to them assiduously, and served them for the sake of
Christ. Right gladly did they perish with them. . . . Quite the
reverse was it with the heathen. They abandoned those who
began to sicken, fled from their dearest friends, threw out the
sick when half-dead into the streets, and let the dead lie

CHRISTIAN PHILANTHROPY 519
Alexandria, in the fifth century, the parabolani, or
sick-visitors, numbered between five and six hun
dred.1 The stranger, the widow, the orphan, the
foundling, and the poor, were regarded as under
the special protection of the Church. St. Basil
founded at Csesarea, in Cappadocia, about the year
a.d. 370, a great hospital, which formed the model
for similar institutions all over the world. In
almost every diocese there arose guest-houses for
the entertainment of strangers {xenodocheia), alms
houses for the impotent and aged poor {ptocheia),
orphanages for orphans and wards {orphanotropheia),
foundling-hospitals for exposed children (brepho-
tropheia), and hospitals for the sick. The cities
were divided into districts for charitable relief.
In Rome there were seven regions, each under
the charge of a deacon, and each with a special
building {diaconia) at which the relief was dis
tributed. When St. Chrysostom was at Antioch,
the alms of the Church were daily distributed to
three thousand poor, and when he was made
unburied" (Ecclesiastical Hist. vii. 22). The same historian,
speaking of a later plague, says : " The Christians were the only
people who, amid such terrible ills, showed their fellow-feeling
and humanity by their actions. Day by day some would busy
themselves with attending to the dead and burying them (for
there were numbers to whom no one else paid any heed) ; others
gathered in one spot all who were afflicted by hunger throughout
the whole city, and gave bread to them all. When this became
known, people glorified the Christians' God, and, convinced by
the very facts, confessed that the Christians alone were truly
pious and religious" (o.c. ix. 8).
1 Bingham, Antiquities, iii. 9.

520 CHARITY NOT INDISCRIMINATE
Archbishop of Constantinople, he maintained no
less than seven thousand.
The practice of charity was not entirely unknown
among the pagans. The great Stoic emperors,
Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Pius Antoninus, and
Marcus Aurelius, are mentioned as having founded
and endowed orphanages and similar charities ;
but the sum of pagan charity was infinitesimal
compared with the Christian, and it is not unfair
to claim that charity is a distinctively Christian
virtue.1 Encouragement of Chastity. — Chastity among men
was scarcely regarded as a virtue, certainly not as
a duty, by average pagan opinion in the time of
Christ. The most austere moralists did not go
1 It is not claimed that Christian charity, in the days before
the rise of the science of Political Economy, was always wisely
administered. It is a mistake, however, to think that the charity
of the early Church was usually indiscriminate. " Let the
bishop," say the Apostolic Constitutions, "know who is the
most worthy of his assistance. For if there be a widow who
is able to support herself, and another woman who is not a
widow, but is needy by reason of sickness, or the bringing
up of many children, or infirmity of her hands, let him stretch
out his hand in charity rather to this latter. But if any one be
in want by gluttony, drunkenness, or idleness, he does not
deserve any assistance " (bk. ii. 3, 4). The Didache says : " If
a wayfarer wishes to settle among you, having a trade, let him
work and eat. If he has no trade, exercise your discretion in
arranging for him to live among you as a Christian, but not in
idleness. If he will not do this, he is trafficking with Christ.
Beware of men like that" (xii.). The pseudo-Clement writes:
" Provide for those who are without a trade the means of
necessary support through employment, giving work to the
artificer, and alms to those incapable of work " (Ep. to James,
viii., in the Clementine Homilies).

PAGAN VIEWS ABOUT CHASTITY 521
further than to recommend it as a counsel of per
fection. Cicero, a remarkably good man for his
age, said : " If there be any one who thinks that
young men should be altogether restrained from
the love of courtesans, he is indeed very severe.
I am not prepared to deny his position ; but he
differs riot only from the licence of our age, but
also from the customs and allowances of our an
cestors. When, indeed, was this not done ? When
was it blamed ? When was it not allowed ? When
was that which is now lawful not lawful?"1 A
certain number of writers (Seneca, Plutarch,
Ulpian, etc.), chiefly Stoics, teach that chastity
is a duty of married men; but this was a purely
speculative opinion, repudiated by almost the whole
ancient world.2
The importance attached to female chastity was
greater. In the earliest and purest ages of Rome,
marriage was held in the highest honour, divorce
was unknown, and, if the historians can be. believed,
the Roman matrons were models of chastity and
virtue. But the domestic virtues of the Romans
did not long survive the extension of their do
minions and the increase of their wealth. The
last age of the Republic and the first age of
the Empire were marked by a declension of
female virtue which shocked even the laxest pagan
1 Quoted by Lecky, History of European Morals, c. v., who
gives other interesting illustrations of pagan sentiment.
8 The small regard which was paid to the marriage-tie may be
gathered from the fact that friends sometimes exchanged wives.

.522 UNNATURAL VICE
sentiment. Divorces became frightfully common.
Martial wrote an epigram upon a woman who
married ten husbands within a month.1 Juvenal
mentions a woman who married eight husbands
in five years {Sat. vi. 2278".). The shamelessness
of women was the continual theme of the moralist
and of the satirist. " Does any woman," says
Seneca, " now blush on account of a divorce, since
the time when certain distinguished women of
noble families reckon their years not by the number
of the consuls, but of their husbands ? . . . Where
can you find any woman so miserable, so squalid,
that one pair of adulterers is enough for her ? "
{De Benef. iii. 16). Some women of noble birth
were not satisfied even with unlimited freedom of
divorce, and Tacitus informs us that their incredible
licence "was restrained by severe decrees of the
Senate, and it was provided that no woman should
make merchandise of her body, whose grandfather,
father, or husband had been a Roman knight"
{Annals, ii. 85).
Unnatural vice prevailed extensively, and was
practised without shame. Originally condemned
by Roman law and sentiment, this peculiarly Greek
vice2 was transported to Rome in the later years
of the Republic, and under the Empire was in
dulged in not only by sensualists like Tiberius,
1 Bk. vi. 7. The poet justly remarks : " Quae nubit toties, non
nubit : adultera lege est. Offendor mcecha simpliciore minus."
2 It was the vice of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and of
Sophocles. Cicero says : " Apud Graecos, opprobrium fuit
adoJe?centibus, si amatores non haberent,"

PAGAN SENSUALITY 523
but even by philosophers like Hadrian. Pagan
writers allude to it frequently, either without dis
approval, or with disapproval so slight as to amount
almost to encouragement.1
Not only unchastity, but every other sensual vice
prevailed to an unparalleled degree in the early
Empire,2 and the poet Juvenal declared, " Nothing
will remain for after-times to add to our corruption ;
posterity will but ape our acts and our desires;
all vice has settled at its zenith : poet, hoist sail,
shake out every stitch of canvas " {Satires, i. 147-50,
tr. Mayor).
The change of sentiment with regard to the duty
of chastity,3 which Christianity introduced, is very
distinctly marked in the enactments of the Christian
emperors. Constantine greatly curtailed the liberty
1 Plutarch praises the heroic virtue of Agesilaus, who refrained
from it.
• Sallust, writing of the close of the Republic, says: "But
the lust of licentiousness, of low debauchery, and of every sort
of luxury, did not the less spread abroad : men let themselves
be used as women, women publicly offered their chastity for sale;
for the sake of filling themselves with food they sought all things,
by land and sea ; they slept before any desire of sleep had come ;
they waited neither for hunger, thirst, desire of coolness, nor for
weariness, but anticipated all in their luxurious indulgence "
(Catiline, xiii.). The incredible gluttony of Vitellius is described
by Suetonius, who remarks that it was only rendered possible
vomitandi consuetudine ( Vitellius, xiii.).
3 Those who would appreciate the immense difference between
the Christian and even the best pagan sentiment on this subject,
should compare the account of the visit of Socrates and his
disciples to the courtesan Theodota, given in Xenophon,
Memorabilia, iii. n, with the Gospel account of our Lord's
relations with fallen women (Luke vii. 37).

524 CHRISTIAN CHASTITY
of divorce. A wife might divorce her husband
only for three causes — murder, sorcery, and the
violation of tombs. A husband might divorce his
wife only for adultery, and certain other serious
sins. Adultery was made a criminal — even a capital
— offence. The same connubial fidelity was re
quired from husbands as from wives. Married men
were forbidden to keep a concubine. Breaches
of chastity were punished with great — even with
inhuman — severity. Unnatural vice, which is stig
matized with startling energy of language, is ordered
to be suppressed summo supplicio, et exquisitis pcenis.
Licentious theatrical exhibitions were forbidden,
as also was the practice of the promiscuous
bathing of the sexes, which had been ineffectively
reprobated by Hadrian and Alexander Severus.
The profession of a procurer was pronounced un
lawful. The violation even of a slave was punished
with death. Every effort was made to reclaim
fallen women. The virtue of chastity was declared,
in the codes of Theodosius and of Justinian,
pleasing to God and beneficial to the state. " No
thing in human affairs," said Justinian, "is so
deserving of reverence as marriage. . . . We enact
that all persons, to the best of their power, should
preserve chastity, which alone is able to present
the souls of men with confidence before God."
The Church did not, of course, succeed in sup
pressing sexual vice completely, but it certainly
succeeded in making it rarer and more disreputable.
The Mediaeval and Modern Period. — Among the

MODERN CHRISTIAN PHILANTHROPY 525
triumphs of Christianity in more modern times
must be reckoned the abolition of private war,1
and of duels ; 2 the abolition of serfdom, and of
African slavery ; 3 the fostering of chivalrous ideas
towards women ; the mitigation of the horrors of
war;4 the encouragement of arbitration;6 prison
reform ; 6 the abolition of torture ; 7 organized
charity; the temperance movement; constitutional
government ; 8 the encouragement of education ; s
factory and other labour legislation ; and " Christian
social" work, such as that of the Christian Social
Union, ofthe Church Army, ofthe Salvation Army,
1 The Church struggled earnestly from the tenth to the fifteenth
century to put an end to this abuse. It is said to have been
condemned by thirty Councils.
8 From the fifteenth century the Church refused Christian
burial to duellists. Duels were forbidden in the British Army
in 1844,
3 The slave-trade is now piracy by the consent of all Christian
nations. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 called it "a traffic
reproved by the laws of religion and nature." In 1833 the
British Parliament abolished slavery in the Plantations, and
voted ^20,000,000 compensation to the planters.
* The Geneva Cross indicates the origin of this humane
movement. * The recent establishment of The Hague tribunal illustrates
this tendency.
6 John Howard, the father of modern prison reform, was an
earnest Christian.
7 The French freethinkers of the eighteenth century assisted to
bring about this reform. Torture has lately been abolished in
Japan. 8 The Councils (diocesan and provincial) of the Church formed
the model for parliaments.
* All the older universities and schools are religious founda
tions. The. education of the poor was the work mainly of the
Church in most countries until quite recently.

526 THE SINS OF THE CHURCH
and of the various University and Public School
missions.
The Sins of the Church. — There is, of course,
another side to the picture, which it ill becomes a
lover of truth to conceal. The enthusiasm for
monastic celibacy, which prevailed from the close
of the fourth century, though admirable in many
ways, led too often to a depreciation of marriage,
and a disparagement of the domestic virtues.1
The laudable zeal of the early Christians for the
salvation of souls led them, when they became
possessed of power, to abandon gradually those
enlightened principles of toleration which they
had formerly professed,2 and to adopt the persecut
ing principles of their pagan adversaries. The
change did not take place at once, or without
energetic protests from some of the greatest saints ; 3
but gradually the persecuting spirit mastered the
1 The fanatical aim of St. Jerome was " to cut down by the
axe of Virginity the wood of Marriage." On this subject, see
Lecky, European Morals, c. v.
8 " The theory of persecution was established by Theodosius,
whose justice and piety have been applauded by the saints, but
the practice of it, in the fullest extent, was (a.d. 385) reserved
for his rival and colleague Maximus, the first, among the
Christian princes, who, shed the blood of his Christian subjects
on account of their religious opinions" (Gibbon, c. xxvii.).
3 The persecution of the P'riscillianists by Maximus was
reprobated by St. Martin of Tours and St. Ambrose of Milan,
"who," says Gibbon, " on this occasion-, asserted the cause of
toleration. They pitied the unhappy men who had been
executed at Treves ; they refused to hold communion with their
episcopal murderers ; and if Martin deviated from that generous
resolution, his motives were laudable, and his repentance was
exemplary."

THE SINS OF THE CHURCH 527
Church, and the final result was the Spanish
Inquisition, which perpetrated, in the name of
Christ, atrocities worthy of a Nero or a Domitian.1
Facts like these constitute — who can deny it ? —
a serious blot upon the record of the historical
Church, but they cannot fairly be alleged as an
argument against Christianity itself, to the spirit
of which they are entirely opposed. They only
prove how unfaithful Christians can be, in ignorant
and barbarous ages, to the spirit and teaching of
their Master.
The scandal of these un-Christian abuses has
now to a large extent ceased. The Reformation
has redressed the balance in favour of marriage —
somewhat, perhaps, except in the Anglican Church,
to the undue depreciation of religious celibacy —
and has gradually introduced, first the practice,
and afterwards the theory of toleration. The prin
ciple of toleration is now fully accepted by all the
Reformed Churches, and is not without influential
advocates even in the Roman Communion.
II. — The Spread of Christianity
(1) In mere number of adherents, Christianity
with its five hundred millions of believers2 does
1 The Spanish Inquisition was founded in 1480, • and was
suppressed by Napoleon in 1808. In Spain alone it burnt 31,912
heretics, and imprisoned 291,450. The Count of Alva 1 boasted,
m 1573, that during the previous six years he had executed
18,000 persons in the Netherlands, chiefly for heresy.
8 The Christian population of the globe was estimated in 1896
at five hundred millions. It now considerably exceeds this figure
(Art. "Christian Church," Encycl. Brit., vol. xxvii.).

528 SPREADjOF CHRISTIANITY
not so greatly exceed Buddhism with its {alleged)
four hundred millions, and Mahometanism with
its one hundred and seventy-five millions. It is,
however, spreading so much more rapidly than any
other religion, that it is not too much to anticipate
that within the present century it will become the
religion pf the great majority of the human race.1
(2) The converts to Christianity belong chiefly
to the most cultivated races. All those nations
which excel in literature, art, science, philosophy,
invention, industry, and political and social or
ganization, are Christian.
(3) The Christian races are the dominant races
of the earth. They govern directly two-thirds of
the world's population, and four-fifths of its area ;
they also control financially, through their great
preponderance in wealth, a considerable part of
the remainder.
(4) Christianity, though historically the religion
of civilization, is equally adapted to the lower races.
Some of its greatest triumphs have been won
among the barbarous tribes of Central Africa.2 It
has completely transformed whole tribes of the
degraded inhabitants of Australia and New Guinea.
1 The total population of the world is about fifteen hundred
millions, so that the Christian Church claims already more than
a third.
8 In Uganda, in 1884, there was only a handful of converts.
The Anglican Church of Uganda now numbers 30,000 baptized
Christians, 2,000 native teachers, 27 native clergymen, 800
churches, all supported by the converts themselves. The Roman
Church in the same district reckons 8,000 baptized Christians,
and 16,000 catechumens.

DARWIN ON CHRISTIAN MISSIONS 529
The extraordinary moral and material changes
brought about by Christian missions are attested
not only by missionaries, but also by independent,
and sometimes by hostile, observers. Charles
Darwin, for instance, writing of the South Seas,
says: "[The opponents of missions] forget, or will
not remember, that human sacrifices and the power
of an idolatrous priesthood — a system of profligacy
unparalleled in any other part of the world — in
fanticide a consequence of that system — bloody
wars where the conquerors spared neither women
nor children — that all these have been abolished,
and that dishonesty, intemperance, and licentious
ness have been greatly reduced by the introduction
of Christianity. In a voyager to forget these things
is base ingratitude ; for should he chance to be at
the point of shipwreck on some unknown coast, he
will most devoutly pray that the lesson of the
missionary may have reached thus far. . . . The
lesson of the missionary is the enchanter's wand.
The house has been built, the windows framed,
the fields and even the trees grafted by the New
Zealander. When I looked at the whole scene
I thought it admirable. The march of improve
ment consequent on the introduction of Christianity
throughout the South Sea probably stands by itself
in the records of history." x
(5) The kind of Christianity which is spread
ing is "orthodox," or Trinitarian Christianity.
1 Journal, quoted by Ballard, Miracles of Unbelief, p. 205,
who gives other interesting testimonies. 34

530 INFLUENCE OF JESUS
Unitarianism is singularly lacking in missionary
zeal, and can hardly be said to be in evidence in
the mission field.
III. — The Personal Influence of Jesus
Jesus has been dead nearly two millenniums, and
yet He inspires, in hundreds of millions of human
hearts, the same intense love and devotion which was
felt for Him by His first disciples. His empire over
the human race grows stronger, not weaker, with
time. For such a phenomenon there is no parallel
in history. " It is needless," says Dr. Row, " to
attempt to prove that the supreme attractiveness
of the person of the Founder of Christianity has
imparted to the Church the whole of its vitality.
To this fact all history bears witness. Nor is its
testimony less certain that of all the influences that
have been exerted in this earth, that of Jesus has
been the most potent. Enumerate all the great
men who have ever existed, whether kings, con
querors, statesmen, patriots, poets, philosophers,
or men of science, and their influence for good
will be found to have been as nothing compared
withthat which has been exerted by Jesus Christ. . . .
He who was in outward form a Galilean peasant,
who died a malefactor's death, has founded a
spiritual empire which has endured for eighteen
centuries of time, and which, despite the vaticina
tions of unbelievers, shows no signs of decrepitude.
Commencing with the smallest beginnings, His
empire now embraces all the progressive races

INFLUENCE OF JESUS 531
of men. Those by whom it has not been accepted
are in a state of stagnation and decay. It is the
only one which is adapted to every state of
civilization. It differs from all other states and
communities in that it is founded neither on force
nor on self-interest, but on persuasion and the
supreme attractiveness of the character of its
Founder. . . . History affirms that Jesus has not
only been a great man among great men, or even
the greatest of them, but that He stands at an
immeasurable height above them. He is the one
only catholic man, the one ideal of humanity, for
whose presence in and action on history none
of the known forces that energize in the moral
and spiritual worlds can account. What is the
necessary inference from this? I answer, that as
those forces which have energized in man from
the day of his appearance on this earth have failed
to produce His fellow, we must be in the presence
of a moral miracle " {Bampton Lectures, pp. 94, 95).
Similar homage is rendered to Jesus by not a
few modern Rationalists — by Renan, for instance,
who speaks of " the incomparable man, to whom
the universal conscience has decreed the title of
Son of God, and that with justice, since He has
advanced religion as no other has done, or probably
ever will be able to do " ; 1 and by Dr. Lecky, who
says that " He has not only been the highest
pattern of virtue, but the highest incentive to its
practice, and has exerted so deep an influence that
1 Life of Jesus, c. i.

532 NAPOLEON ON JESUS
it may be truly said that the simple record of
three short years of active life has done more to
regenerate and to soften mankind than all the
disquisitions of philosophers, and than all the
exhortations of moralists " : 1 but since many testi
monies of this kind have already been given (see
c. xix. appendix i), we will here produce the
testimony of a man of an entirely different type.
It is stated on good authority that one day at St.
Helena, the exiled Emperor Napoleon, in the course
of a conversation with Count Montholon, asked
him, " Can you tell me who Jesus Christ was ? "
The Count declined to answer, and Napoleon
proceeded : " Well, then, I will tell you. Alexander,
Caesar, Charlemagne, and I myself have founded
great empires ; but upon what did these creations
of our genius depend? Upon force. Jesus alone
founded His empire upon love, and to this very
ay ¥ millions would die for Him. ... I think I
understand something of human nature ; and I
tell you, all these were men, and I am a man :
none else is like Him ; Jesus Christ was more than
man. ... I have inspired multitudes with such an
enthusiastic devotion that they would have died
for me ; . . . but to do this it was necessary that I
should be visibly present with the electric influence
of my looks, of my words, of my voice. When I
saw men and spoke to them, I lighted up the flame
of self-devotion in their hearts. . . . Christ alone
has succeeded in so raising the mind of man towards
1 This fine passage is given in full in c. xix. appendix I.

NAPOLEON ON JESUS 533
the Unseen, that it becomes insensible to the barriers
of time and space. Across a chasm of eighteen
hundred years Jesus Christ makes a demand which
is beyond all others difficult to satisfy ; He asks
for that which a philosopher may often seek in
vain at the hands of his friends, or a father of his
children, or a bride of her spouse, or a man of his
brother. He asks for the human heart ; He will
have it entirely to Himself. He demands it uncon
ditionally; and forthwith His demand is granted.
Wonderful ! In defiance of time and space, the
soul of man, with all its powers and faculties,
becomes an annexation to the empire of Christ.
All who sincerely believe in Him experience that
remarkable supernatural love towards Him. This
phenomenon is unaccountable; it is altogether
beyond the scope of man's creative powers. Time,
the great destroyer, is powerless to extinguish this
sacred flame ; time can neither exhaust its strength,
nor put a limit to its range. This it is which
strikes me most ; I have often thought of it. This
it is which proves to me quite convincingly the
Divinity of Jesus Christ."1
IV. — Conclusion
We will conclude by summarizing and bringing
to a focus our long argument for the truth of
Christianity. 1 Quoted by Liddon, Bampton Lectures, iii. The genuineness
of this conversation is quite sufficiently attested.

534 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
(i) After discussing Natural Religion, we shewed
that the urgent need of some new spiritual force
to regenerate the world, the weakness of Natural
Religion, and the difficulties connected with the
proof of even such fundamental articles of religious
faith as the moral perfection of the Deity, and the
immortality of man, pointed to the possibility — even
to the probability — of some further revelation than
that of Nature (c. xvii.).
(2) We proceeded, therefore, to examine the
credentials of the Christian religion, and were
favourably impressed to find {a) that it offered
itself to the world as a regenerative and re
demptive power ; {b) that it endorsed every truth
of Natural Religion ; and (c) that it offered strong
miraculous confirmation of the two most doubt
ful articles of Natural Theology — the moral
perfection of the Deity, and human immortality
(p. 278-81).
(3) We discovered, however, that Christianity
was something more than a mere republication of
Natural Religion, for the Founder claimed the
position not merely of a prophet, but of a Divine
Redeemer. The doctrine of Christ's Deity, or of the
Incarnation, having no basis in Natural Religion,
seemed at first difficult to credit, but upon mature
consideration it appeared —
(a) That the Incarnation, if true, is an act of
redemptive love, worthy of God, and suitable to
man's needs (c. xvii.).
(b) That the Person who claimed to be the Son

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 535
of God was a man of unparalleled virtue and
holiness of life (c. xx. sect. 3).
(c) That if we disbelieve His claim, we are
reduced to the absurdity of supposing that
the Founder of the religion of all civilized
men was either an impostor or a madman
(c. xx. sect. 8).
{d) That the claim of Jesus was supported by
numerous well-attested miracles, and in particular
by His resurrection from the dead (c. xxi., xxii.).
(.) That belief in Christ's Divinity is the
motive power of Christianity, and that, when
it is absent, Christianity ceases to inspire enthu
siasm, or to produce its characteristic fruits
(c. xx. sect. 1).
(/) That the beneficent influence of Jesus upon
the world for the last two thousand years, and
His present dominion over human hearts, which
have no parallels in history, strongly confirm the
other indications that He was more than man
(c. xxiii. sects. 1-3).
On these grounds, therefore, we believe that
Jesus was not merely a human teacher, or even
an inspired prophet, but the Son of God. It appears
to us that, given the premisses of Theism or Natural
Religion, faith in the Christ of the Catholic Church
naturally follows, and that the Theistic and Christian
positions are inseparable. We admit that the
difficulties of Theism and Christianity are real;
but they are a mere trifle compared with the
difficulties of «o«-Theism. The non-Theist outrages

536 THE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED
reason — no weaker term is adequate — when he
affirms —
(i) That the Cause which produces the mind of
man is impersonal and unintelligent ; and
(2) That the Cause which produces the idea
of moral perfection in the human soiil is non-
moral. To affirm these propositions — and every non-
Theist affirms them — is to affirm that the creature
is greater than its Creator, and the effect than its
cause.
Since then Theism, with all its difficulties,
offers a rational, and the only rational, view of the
world ; and since non-Theism offers one which
is fundamentally irrational ; and since, moreover,
suspension of judgment upon a question of such
vital importance is impossible (see c. x.) ; we
claim the verdict for Theism, and therewith for
Christianity.

APPENDIX I
reason and religious authority
Throughout this book we have appealed continually to reason
as the sole religious guide of mankind, and we are liable to
be met with the obvious retort that, as a matter of fact, Christi
anity appeals to authority more than to reason, and prefers
blind faith to candid inquiry. It is pointed out — and
with justice — that the principle of ecclesiastical authority is
admitted by all Christians, as much by Protestants, who

RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY 537
nominally reject it,1 as by Catholics, who more consistently
affirm it.2
Now, it is perfectly true that certain views of ecclesiastical
authority — the extreme Ultramontane, for example, which
affirms the personal infallibility of the Pope, and the extreme
Protestant, which affirms the mechanical infallibility of the
letter of Scripture — do in fact sacrifice reason to blind, irrational
faith. But this is not the case with every theory of eccle
siastical authority, least of all with the Anglican theory, which,
while insisting that the Church possesses real authority in
matters of faith, affirms no less decidedly the supremacy of
reason. The following brief and imperfect summary of the
Anglican view of authority may be useful.
(i) The Authority of Revelation. — The Christian revelation,
coming from God, is authoritative, but its authoritative
character does not interfere with the supremacy of reason,
because it is reason which determines whether the revelation

1 Nonconformists accept the same Canon of Scripture as the
Church. The Wesleyan Catechism contains the Nicene Creed.
The appeal to the Primitive Church, as well as to Scripture, was
allowed by Luther, and even by Calvin, and is admitted by the
modern Presbyterians. The standard of Trinitarian orthodoxy
fixed by the Ecumenical Councils is generally recognized by
Protestant Christendom. Even the Unitarians believe in a
revelation, and therefore in religious authority of some kind.
8 For Anglo-Catholic statements, see Article xx. : " The Church
hath . . . authority in Controversies of Faith. . . . The Church [is]
a witness and keeper of holy Writ " ; and compare the Canon of
1571 enjoining preachers to "teach nothing in their sermons
which they should require to be devoutly held or believed by the
people, except what is agreeable to the doctrine of the Old and
New Testaments, and what the ancient Fathers and Catholic
bishops have collected out of the said doctrine." For the modern
Roman Catholic view, see Concil. Vat., sess. iv. cap. 4. For
the Eastern Catholic view, see the longer Russian Catechism :
" [The Church] shall never apostatize from the faith, nor sin
against the truth of the faith, or fall into error."

538 RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY
is true or not. As Bishop Butler says, " Reason is the only
faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even
revelation itself" (Analogy, part ii. 3).
(2) Human Authority in General. — Reason teaches us to
have regard to the opinions of others as well as to our own, or,
in other words, teaches a rational submission to authority.
Authority is not, as some imagine, a principle distinct from
Reason. Authority is collective reason. Just as we believe,
upon the authority of mankind, that it is advantageous to live
under some form of government, so we believe, on the same
authority, that religion, in some form or other, is true.
(3) The Special Authority for the Truth of Christianity. — We
believe in the truth of Christianity largely upon the authority
of the civilized races of mankind, which for more than fifteen
centuries have constantly professed it, and, in spite of continual
attacks upon it, still do so.1
(4) The Natural Authority ofthe Christian Church. — Christi
anity being the religion of the civilized races, the consensus
of Christendom represents the consensus of civilized man on
the subject of religion. This is the whole basis of the authority
of the Christian Church, considered as natural?
(5) The Supernatural Authority of the Church. — The super
natural authority of the Christian Church is grounded upon
the fact that Jesus Christ, who (if the Christian revelation is
true) is God and man, declared that the gates of Hades
should not prevail against it (Matt. xvi. 18), promised to be
with it always, even unto the end of the world (Matt, xxviii.
20), and to guide it, through His Spirit, into all the truth

1 It is as reasonable to prefer the religion ot the civilized races
to the religions of other races, as it is to prefer their literature
and their science.
8 Some civilized men reject Christianity, but inasmuch as they
are few in number, and not superior in intellect or virtue to
those who accept it, their authority is of less weight than that
of the Christian majority.

AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH 539
(John xvi. 13). These statements do not amount to a promise
of unconditional infallibility, but they undoubtedly confer a
supernatural authority of some kind.
(6) Reason and the Church's Supernatural Authority. — At
first sight we seem at this point to be recognizing the exist
ence of some other guide than reason — viz. the Church's super
natural authority, and in the Roman system of religion this is,
no doubt, the case. According to Ultramontane teaching, the
Church is unconditionally infallible. It is not by the use
of reason, but in some quite different way, that the Church
attains to truth. However ignorant a Pope may be, and
however fallacious the arguments by which he supports his
opinions, those opinions, if once formally promulgated, are
infallibly true, and for ever unalterable. The Anglican view
is widely different. According to Anglican teaching, religious
truth is attained and preserved by the due use of reason. It
is essential to the proper exercise of the Church's authority
that investigation should be free,1 and that all questions should
be fully discussed by competent authorities, before a decision
is reached. The current teaching of the Church is not,
according to the Anglican view, irreformable, but is subject to
continual revision, in order to secure its complete conformity
with Scripture, Antiquity, and Reason. Anglicans do not
regard Church Authority as a principle distinct from Reason,
but as Reason assisted by Grace. Just as Divine Grace
augments, and does not supersede, the spiritual powers of
the soul, so Grace assists Reason, and does not supersede it.
(7) The Religious Authority of Particular Churches. — All
Christian bodies, in which any real fruits of the Spirit are
found, possess some degree of religious authority ; but it

1 In individual cases the result of free investigation may be
to destroy faith in the Christian Revelation altogether. Under
such circumstances the investigators are under an obligation
to leave the Church, which is an association of believers in the
Christian Revelation.

S40 THE UNDIVIDED CHURCH
is not unreasonable, in the present divided state of Christendom,
to attribute a special degree of religious authority to the
primitive undivided Church, which fixed the Canon of Scripture,
and defined in its General Councils the Catholic Faith. The
appeal to antiquity — that is, to the authority of this undivided
Church — is recognized not only by the three great communions
which are historically continuous with it — the Anglican, the
Eastern, and the Roman — but also in a quite real, though less
formal, way by the Churches ofthe Reformation. The best hope
of Christian reunion is a fuller return on the part of all Christian
bodies to the principles of this undivided Church, upon which
Christendom was once visibly, and is still, to a large extent,
spiritually united. At the same time Antiquity is not to be
blindly followed. The Spirit of God still works in the
Church, and in many important matters the modern Church
is more enlightened than the ancient.

APPENDIX II
HELL
There is much misapprehension as to what the teaching
of the Church really is upon the important subject of future
retribution. This arises partly from a false identification of
the doctrine of the Church with that of Calvinism,1 from which

1 James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, was driven into
infidelity by the Calvinistic doctrine of Hell, and his son re
garded it as the accepted Christian view. It is clearly Calvinism
which he criticises in his Three Essays. "The recognition,"
he says, " of the object of highest worship in a Being who could
make a Hell, and who could create countless generations of
human beings with the certain foreknowledge that He was
creating them for this fate, ... is a moral difficulty that
almost outweighs all the beauty and benignity and moral
greatness which so eminently distinguish the sayings and
character of Christ. Is there any moral enormity which might

ETERNAL PUNISHMENT 541
it is radically different ; partly also from the fact that preachers,
having mainly in view the awakening of sinners to a due
sense of their peril, dwell by preference upon the more austere
and terrifying aspects of the doctrine. It is desirable, there
fore, in this place to show that the familiar picture has
another side. The following brief statement of the doctrine
of future punishment, as held by strict orthodox Anglicans,
will show how baseless the usual objections to the Divine
Justice based on this doctrine really are.
(1) It is of faith that there is a Hell; i.e. that souls which,
in spite of all warnings and pleadings, remain finally and
obstinately impenitent, will at the last be rejected from God's
presence, and eternally punished with such penalties as
justice requires. This truth of Revelation is confirmed also
by Natural Religion, for if the soul is immortal and free,
as Natural Religion assumes it to be, it must be possible
for it to reject God finally, and so consign itself to some kind
of a hell. Thus Plato, in the Gorgias, says : "They who have
been guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason
of their crimes, are made examples ; for as they are incurable,
the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit
themselves. But others get good, when they behold them
for ever enduring the most terrible and painful and fearful
sufferings as the penalty of their sins." Even such Agnostics
as Diderot and Voltaire believed in a hell. Diderot, for
example, thus addressed his soul : " If you abuse your reason,
you will be unhappy not only in this life, but after death, in
hell"; and Voltaire, writing to a correspondent who had
arrived at a conviction that there is no hell, said : " Most

not be justified by imitation of such a Deity ? And is it possible
to adore such a one without a frightful distortion of the standard
of right and wrong? Any other of the outrages to the most
ordinary justice and humanity involved in the common Christian
conception of God, shrinks into insignificance beside this
dreadful idealization of wickedness" (p. 113),

542 ETERNAL PUNISHMENT
happy are you ! I am far from having arrived at it."1 In
fact, if God is really just, there must be a hell of some
kind, for natural justice is revolted at the idea of selfish
sensual criminals sharing equally with the just the rewards
of Heaven.
(2) It is not of faith that any creatures whatever, except
perhaps Judas and Satan, will be finally lost. Even in these
cases it may be held that the Divine Mercy will intervene
to make their punishment tolerable.
(3) It is a false and monstrous belief that God has pre
destined any souls to perdition, or that the majority of the
human race will be lost. On the contrary, God desires, and
labours to achieve, the salvation of every man.
(4) Good Christians outside the Church, and even good
heathens, may be saved. Dr. Pusey says (representing in
this matter all Anglican theologians) : " God the Holy
Ghost (it is a matter of faith) visits and has visited every
soul of man whom God has made, and those who heard
His voice and obeyed it as far as they knew, belonged to
Christ and were saved for His merits, whom, had they known,
they would have obeyed and loved." Even those Roman
theologians, who take the sternest view of hell which s
compatible with orthodoxy, admit this. For example, Dr.
Wilhelm and Dr. Scannell, following Suarez, teach that in the
case of the heathen " the implicit desire to believe in Christ
and the Trinity must be deemed sufficient. By ' implicit
desire' we mean the desire to receive, to believe, and to
do, whatever is needful for salvation, although what is to
be received, believed, and done, is not explicitly known "
(Manual of Catholic Theology, vol. i. p. 137).
(5) Unbaptized infants are certainly saved, for it is con
trary to natural justice to believe that the fault of others
will be allowed to affect their eternal welfare. The Prayer

1 Quoted by Pusey in What is of Faith as to Everlasting
Punishment ?

ETERNAL PUNISHMENT 543
Book rubric does not state this in express words ; but the
object of this reticence is mainly to avoid encouraging the
negligence of parents in bringing their children to Baptism.
Even those austere Roman theologians who exclude un-
baptized infants from Heaven, assign to them a degree of
natural happiness which far exceeds anything that is possible
on this earth.
(6) There is no need on grounds of equity to assume a
second probation, as some do, after death. All who in this
life have shown faith and love, however rudimentary — all
who, in short, are in any sense capable of salvation, are ac
cepted by God here and now, and at death pass immediately
into such a state of existence as is fitted to prepare them
for Heaven. Good Christians pass at once into a state of joy
and felicity, called in Scripture Paradise, or Abraham's bosom,
hardly inferior in beatitude to Heaven itself. Those persons
whose faith and love are seriously imperfect, pass into a state
of temporal punishment, the degree and quality of which are
precisely adapted to each individual case. This punishment
is not only expiatory, but remedial, and is intended to
lead the soul by the easiest road to perfect sanctification.1
Then at the last judgment all who are capable of salvation
will receive their final reward, and the finally impenitent will
be lost.
(7) Nothing is of faith as to the nature of eternal punish
ment. All that is certain is that it will be both just and
merciful, and in proportion to the degree of delinquency.
If we may be allowed to speculate on so mysterious a subject,
we think it not improbable that an essential part of it will
be the loss of free-will. Sin came into the world by

1 Anglicans and Eastern Christians reject the Roman doctrine
that the souls of good Christians suffer purgatorial punishment
after death. The practical difference between the two doctrines
is great. For the Eastern doctrine see the Larger Catechism
of the Russian Church. For the Anglican doctrine consult the
commentaries on Article xxii.

544 THE ATONEMENT
the abuse of free-will, and therefore it seems equitable that
the abuse of the faculty should be punished by its loss. On
this theory, after the last judgment evil will cease to exist.
The lost, if any, will become intelligent automata, and will do
God's will, since they refuse to do it voluntarily, by natural
necessity. Creatures in this condition would probably be
capable of a considerable degree of natural happiness, but
their joy would be tempered with regretful thoughts of the
blessedness which might have been theirs, and which they
wilfully forfeited. APPENDIX III
THE ATONEMENT
There is no need, in a work like this, to discuss fully the
doctrine of the Atonement. It is necessary, however, to
notice the chief popular objections to it, which turn mainly
on its morality.
Objection I. — The doctrine of the Atonement represents
God the Father as angry with God the Son, and punishing
Him for sins which He had never committed. Such a
doctrine is unjust and immoral.
Reply. — Doubtless it is, but it is not the doctrine of the
Bible or of the Church. It first originated in the sixteenth
century, being taught by Luther (1483 — 1546) and Calvin
(1509 — 1564) and their followers.1 It was regarded by the

1 The Augsburg Confession, 1530 (Lutheran), represented
Christ as suffering the penalty of human sin vicariously (subiit
pcenam peccati). Gerhard, 1582 — 1637 (Lutheran), said : "Christ
truly experienced the anger of God annexed to each variety
of sin. How could He have redeemed us from the curse of
the law, being made a curse for us, unless He had experienced
to the full the judgment of an incensed God [nisi judicium Dei
irati persensissef]! " Calvin interpreted Christ's descent into
hell as meaning that He suffered the torments of the damned.
"If Christ," he says, "is affirmed to have descended into hell
[ad inferos'}, it is not to be wondered at, considering that He

THE ATONEMENT 545
best-informed opinion of the time as a novel and dangerous
doctrine,1 and is now abandoned by most of those who have
a right to speak for Lutheranism 2 and Calvinism.3
Objection II. — The idea of imputation, upon which the
doctrine of the Atonement rests, is immoral. It implies a
fictitious transfer of our sins to Christ, and an equally fictitious
transfer of Christ's righteousness to us.
Reply. — This idea of " imputation " also arose in Lutheran
and Calvinistic circles, and is irreconcilable with Holy
Scripture and the traditional theology of the Church.
According to this theology, there is a real, spiritual, vital,
and moral union of the closest kind between the Incarnate
Christ and the whole human race ; and in consequence of
this union it is possible, not only in figure, but in fact, for
Christ to bear the burden of our sins, and for us to share
the righteousness of Christ. As a loving parent mourns for
the sin of a beloved child, so, but in a deeper and still
more effectual way, does Christ identify Himself with the
sins of men, sorrow for them as if they were His own, and

suffered that death which is inflicted on the wicked by an angry
God. . . . He suffered in His soul the awful tortures of con
demned and lost mankind" (Institutes, ii. 16, 10). Calvin's
school for the most part held that Christ suffered in man's stead
the penal torments of Gehenna (poena gehennalis), both in His
soul and in His body (animd principaliter, corpore secundario).
The Heidelberg Catechism (1563), which combines the views
of Luther and Calvin, declares (q. 37) that "Christ bore the
divine wrath during the whole period of His earthly life."
1 Bellarmine (1542 — 1621) calledit "anew, unheard-of heresy."
Pearson, speaking for Anglicanism, says, "It must not; it
cannot be admitted."
8 There is no mention of it in Martensen's Christian
Dogmatics, the work most representative of modern orthodox
Lutheranism. 3 Dr. McLeod Campbell's The Nature of the Atonement
(Presbyterian), which has run through many editions, expressly
repudiates it. 35

546 THE HOLY TRINITY
by thus showing His sympathizing love, invite sinners to
repentance. In virtue of this mystical but real union, Christ
is also enabled to impart His righteousness to mankind,
potentially to all men, for salvation is offered to all, but
actually to believers. Those who are united to Him by faith
and love receive from Him power to repent truly, to over
come temptation, and to advance in holiness. Ultimately
all true believers will attain to perfect sanctification, and
therefore God, knowing this, grants them pardon, and accounts
them righteous, by anticipation.
Objection III. — Repentance is of itself a sufficient atone
ment for sin.
Reply. — A perfect repentance would be a sufficient atone
ment for sin, but without supernatural aid fallen man cannot
offer to God a perfect repentance (see pp. 285, 286).
Objection IV. — God might have granted the necessary
aid to repent and to live a holy life directly, without employing
any mediator.
Reply. — He might have done so ; but seeing that it is
His will in the common course of nature to confer His
gifts through the instrumentality of others, it is not
incredible that He should confer His supernatural gifts
in an analogous way. As Butler well says, " The whole
analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against
the general notion of a Mediator between God and man.
For we find that all living creatures are brought into the
world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the instru
mentality of others : and every satisfaction of it, some way
or other, is bestowed by the like means " (Analogy, pt. ii. 5).
APPENDIX IV
THE HOLY TRINITY
The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is a truth of Revelation
rather than of Natural Religion ; nevertheless it can be
shown by purely philosophical arguments that the Trinitarian

THE HOLY TRINITY 547
view of the Godhead is more satisfying from the ethical
standpoint than the Unitarian.
(1) Since Christ taught the supremacy of love and the duty
of universal benevolence, it has gradually become the accepted
doctrine of all civilized men, that love is the most beautiful
of human virtues and the most adorable of the Divine perfec
tions. But perfect love is only possible between equals. Just
as man cannot satisfy or realize his powers of love by loving
the lower animals, so God cannot satisfy or realize His love by
loving man, or any creature. If God is truly love, in the full
sense of that term, He must have always possessed some
equal object of His love, some alter ego, or, to use the
language of Christian theology, a consubstantial, co-eternal,
and co-equal Son.
(2) An ideally perfect life is a social life. A life lived in the
exercise of friendship, social intercourse, and benevolence is
a far higher life than that of a recluse, who seeks to attain
perfection in solitude. If, therefore, the life of the Godhead
is as perfect as can be conceived, it must be a social life —
that is to say, there must exist within the Divine Unity a
plurality of Persons, between whom the most perfect fellowship
exists. This conception of the Godhead as a Perfect Society,
characteristic of Trinitarianism, is ethically more fruitful and
practically more stimulating than that of Unitarianism, which
regards God as an isolated Person, incapable of social life, or
of any real love but self-love. The Trinitarian, and the
Trinitarian alone, is able to discern perfect love realized in
his object of worship, and to recognize, in the essential
Nature of the Godhead, the perfect pattern of the Family and
of the State.
(3) It is sometimes alleged that the Trinitarian view of the
Godhead is inconsistent with the acknowledged truth of the
Divine Unity. This, however, does not appear, upon an
accurate consideration of the facts, to be the case. Trini
tarian theology guards the doctrine of the Divine Unity in
several distinct ways.

548 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS
{a) According to the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, there
is only one substance, essence, and nature in the Godhead,
and this is shared by all the Persons equally and wholly.
(i.) The Divine Persons are not mutually exclusive, as
human persons are, but mutually inclusive. The Father, the
Son, and the Holy Ghost mutually contain, include, and
interpenetrate one another.
(c) The Three Persons are not three First Principles or
Causes. The Father alone is the First Cause. It is He
who begets the Son ; and from Him, as from a First Cause,1
the Holy Ghost proceeds.
(d) There is an absolute unity of will, and an absolute
concurrence in all Divine", operations, among the Divine
Persons. APPENDIX V
HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS
Period I. — To the Suppression of Paganism
The first and most important period of the history of
Apologetics extends from the first century to the suppression of
Paganism, which took place early in the fifth century. Christian
apologists during this period had to contend with two main
adversaries — the Jews, and the Pagans.
(i) The Conflict with Judaism. — The controversy with the
Jews began at the very beginning ofthe apostolic period (Acts
viii., etc.), and was still active in the second century, and indeed
much later. It gave rise to a considerable literature — viz.
The Epistle of Barnabas (a.d. 75 ?) ; St. Justin's important
Dialogue with Trypho the few (155) ; Tertullian's Answer to
the Jews (200) ; St. Hippolytus's Expository Treatise against
the few s (220); Origen's argument against the Jew in his
1 According to Western theologians, the Holy Ghost proceeds
also from the Son, but not from the Son as from a First Cause.
There is only one Fountain of Godhead, and that is the Father.

THE JEWISH CONTROVERSY 549
Against Celsus (240) ; St. Cyprian's Three Books of Testimonies
against the Jews (250); Eusebius's Demonstration of the
Gospel, bks. i. ii. (315); St. Gregory of Nyssa's Testimonies
against the Jews (390) ; St. Chrysostom's Demonstration
against the Jews and the Heathen, and Homilies against the
Jews (400).
In arguing against the Jews the apologists laid great
stress upon the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament,
which, they insisted, were perfectly fulfilled in Christ. They
repelled the charge of Tritheism, by showing that even in the
Old Testament there are intimations of a plurality of Persons
within the Divine Unity. They proved the divinity of Jesus
by identifying Him with the mysterious " Angel of Jehovah "
who appeared to Abraham (Gen. xviii.), Moses (Exod. iii.),
Joshua (Josh. v. 13), and others ; and who, being called
Jehovah, and receiving divine worship, could only be regarded
as a Divine Being.
(2) The Conflict with Paganism. — Much more important was
the conflict with Paganism. The following list contains the
leading contributions to this controversy : The Apologies of
the philosophers Quadratus and Aristides,1 presented to
the Emperor Hadrian during his visit to Greece, a.d. 131 ;
Ambrosius (?), To the Greeks, and Epistle to Diognetus
(140?); St. Justin, First and Second Apologies, and other
works of doubtful authenticity (150) ; Tatian, Oration to
the Greeks (165); Melito, Apology addressed to Marcus
Aurelius (177); Athenagoras, Embassy for the Christians,
presented to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus (177); Theo
philus of Antioch, To Autolycus (181); St. Clement of
Alexandria, Exhortation to the Heathen (190) ; Tertullian,
Apology (200) ; St. Hippolytus, Refutation of all Heresies,
bks. i. and iv. (220); Minucius Felix, Octavius (230?);
Origen, Against Celsus (240) ; Cyprian, On the Vanity

1 Aristides' Apology has lately been recovered. That of
Quadratus is lost.

550 THE PAGAN CONTROVERSY
of Idols (250) ; Arnobius, Against the Heathen (300) ;
Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, and Demonstration of
the Gospel (315); St. Athanasius, Oration against the Heathen
and On the Incarnation of the Word (319) ; Lactantius, Divine
Institutes (320) ; Hermias, Mockery of the Pagan Philosophers
(362) ; Diodorus of Tarsus, Against Fate (380), a summary
of which has been preserved by Photius ; St. Augustine, City
of God (413 — 426); Theodoret, A Remedy for Greek Affec
tions, and On Divine Providence (435).
The main purpose of the earlier apologists was to refute
the calumnious charges of impurity, barbarity, and impiety,
under which the ^Christian body laboured, and to show that
it was possible to be at once a Christian and a good citizen.
The later apologists wrote with a more exclusively polemical
purpose against Paganism. All the apologies, however, even
the earliest, contain severe strictures on Polytheism. As
against Polytheism, the apologists demonstrate the unity
of the Godhead, partly from the unity and harmony of
Nature (Origen, Athanasius, Lactantius), and partly from
the impossibility of there being more than one perfect
and absolute First Cause (Athenagoras, Cyprian, Gregory
of Nyssa). They are, in fact, uncompromising Mono-
theists, and for this reason lay greater stress on the
Divine Unity than on the Divine Trinity, greater stress on
the supremacy (monarckia) of the Father than on the
co-equality of the Divine Persons. They seek to commend
the doctrine of the Incarnation to the Pagan world by
identifying Jesus with the Divine Reason or Logos, which
is immanent in the world, and is the cause of its rational
order. This Logos, they teach, enlightens every man that
is born into the world. It inspires all genuine prophets, not
only those of Judaism, but also those of heathenism.1 The
philosophers also, they hold, especially Socrates and Plato,
spoke under the guidance of the Logos, and were thus
1 E.g. the Cumaean Sibyl.

THE PAGAN CONTROVERSY 551
enabled to anticipate to some extent the doctrines of the
Gospel. At last the Logos, who had partially manifested
Himself at sundry times and in divers manners throughout
human history, became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth, and
through His life and teaching gave to mankind a full and
final revelation, which approves itself to the conscience as
absolutely perfect. This identification of Jesus with the Divine
Logos, the real existence of which almost every philosopher
and educated Pagan of the second century believed, was
a master-stroke of apologetic ingenuity. The Logos Christo
logy formed a golden bridge by which a constant stream
of cultured and philosophic Pagans passed over into the
Catholic Church. The attitude of the Christian apologists
towards Pagan philosophy was, generally speaking, friendly.1
Several of the Christian apologists (Quadratus, Aristides,
Justin, Athenagoras) had been Pagan philosophers, and
after their conversion naturally represented Christianity as a
more perfect philosophy. A high esteem for Philosophy is
especially characteristic of the Alexandrian Fathers (Clement
and Origen), but is not confined to them. Even for educated
Christians generally, Christianity was "our philosophy." All
the apologists were Platonists. They looked with little
approval on the cold mtellectualism of Aristotelianism, and
the moral arrogance of Stoicism, and they severely condemned
— as indeed did most earnest Pagans — the levity and impiety
of the school of Epicurus. The exclusive devotion of the
primitive Christians to Plato was fortunate for the Church.
Platonism prevailed almost exclusively from the end of the
second century to the closing of the philosophic schools by
Justinian I. (a.d. 529), and inasmuch as Platonism, in its

1 The Greek Christians were more friendly than the Latins,
who were inclined to regard Philosophy as secular and danger
ous. Tatian, Tertullian, and Hermias may be mentioned as
(upon the whole) hostile to Philosophy. Tertullian, nevertheless,
makes large use of it.

552 MEDLEVAL PERIOD
Neo-Platonic form, taught the unity of God, the existence
of inferior " daemons," the immortality of the soul, future
rewards and punishments, the reality of inspiration and
prophecy, and even a kind of Trinity, it is not surprising
that many philosophic Pagans were led through Neo-Platonism
to Christ.
The firm belief of the ancient apologists in magic, and
therefore in Pagan miracles, prevented them from laying any
great stress upon the miraculous evidence for Christianity.
When they allude to the miracles of Christ, it is generally
to call attention to their ethical and redemptive character.
Arnobius, however, employs the argument from miracles
almost in the manner of the eighteenth-century apologists.
The strongest and most convincing argument employed
by the apologists was the moral contrast between Christianity
and Paganism. The rites of Paganism were, as they often
pointed out, idolatrous, superstitious, and impure ; its moral
standard was low, and it lacked the power to generate enthu
siasm for righteousness. Christianity, on the other hand, as
the apologists rightly insisted, upheld a most exalted standard
of virtue and piety, and, what is more, gave the power to
realize it.
The leading Pagan writers against the Church were Celsus
(a.d. 170?); Porphyry (270); Hierocles (305); and Julian
the Apostate (362). Lucian satirized Christianity in his
Death of Peregrinus ; and Philostratus, senior, in his Life of
Apollonius of Tyana, attempted to depict a more perfect life
than that of Christ.
Period II. — From the Middle of the Fifth to the
Middle of the Fifteenth Century
From the downfall of Paganism to the dawn of the
Reformation the history of Apologetics is almost a blank.
Christianity found only one real opponent, Mahomet ; and
the contest between the two adversaries was fought with

REFORMATION PERIOD 553
sharper weapons than the pen. The following works, how
ever, may be described as apologetic : On the Insolence of
the fews, by Agobard of Lyons (a.d. 822); A Dialogue
between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, by Abelard
(1120); The Dagger of the Faith against Moors and Jews,
by Raymundus Martini, a Dominican friar (1278); and __
Summary of the Catholic Faith against the Heathen, by St.
Thomas Aquinas (1225 — 1274).
Period III. — From the Middle of the Fifteenth
Century to the Present Time
(1) The Renaissance and the Reformation. — The intellectual
tendency of the Renaissance, which preceded the Reformation,
is generally described as Humanism. The Humanists
actively promoted the revival of classical learning, and fell
in violent love with classical ideals. They did not actually
repudiate Christianity, but were often accused (not altogether
without reason) of preferring Cicero to the New Testament,
and the teaching of the Pagan poets to that of Christ. In
Philosophy they followed Plato, and rejected, perhaps with
undue contempt, the scholastic Aristotelianism, which, since
the time of Aquinas, had dominated the schools. The chief
works in criticism of Humanism were those of Marsilius
Ficinus, De religione Christiana et fidei pietate (a.d. 1497);
Savonarola, Triumphus crucis (1497); Steuco, De perenni
philosophia (1540); and Vives, De veritate fidei Christiana
(1543)- The Reformation, being a domestic dispute among
Christians, which did not call fundamental doctrine in question,
naturally gave rise to few apologetic works. The sub-reforma
tion period, however, produced one work of considerable
importance, the De veritate religionis Christiana of Hugo
Grotius (1627), which was written to serve as an undenomina
tional manual of Christian evidences. It achieved an im
mense popularity, and was translated into the chief European

554 DEISM AND RATIONALISM
languages, and even into Arabic, Persian, and Chinese. Fifty
years ago it was still extensively read.
(2) The Close of the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Century.
— From about the middle of the seventeenth century a type
of unbelief began to prevail, which was called in England
Deism, in France Scepticism, and in Germany Rationalism.1
The English movement is the most important. The English
school of Deists embraced Lord Herbert of Cherbury,2 the
founder (1582 — 1648); Tindal (1657 — 1733); Woolston (1669
— J733)j Toland (1670 — 1722); Shaftesbury (1671 — 1713);
Bolingbroke (1678 — 1751); Collins (1676 — 1729); Cfiubb
(1679 — 1746); and, greatest of all. Hume (1711 — 1776).
Some class Locke (1632 — 1704) as a Deist, but wrongly. His
Philosophy is undoubtedly rationalistic in tendency, but in
actual belief he was a liberal Anglican. The most notable
writings against Deism were Locke's Reasonableness of
Christianity (1695); Leslie's Short and Easy Method with
the Deists (1697); Berkeley's Three Dialogues (1713) and
Alciphron (1733); Butler's Analogy (1736); Lardner's
Credibility of the Gospel History (1727 — 1755); Paley's
Evidences of Christianity (1794) and Natural Theology (1802).
French Scepticism was an offshoot of English Deism. Its
chief representatives were Bayle (1647 — I7o6)> Rousseau (1670
— 1741), Voltaire (1694 — 1778), and Diderot (1713 — 1784).
The apologetic literature to which it gave rise is unimportant.
The founder of German Rationalism was Christian Wolff,
the philosopher (1679 — 1754), who was followed by Reimarus
(1694 — 1767). The most characteristic work of Reimarus,
the Apologie, was published after his death, as the notorious
Wolfenbuttel Fragments (1774), by Lessing (1729 — 1781), the
1 To the beginning of this period belongs also the somewhat
isolated figure of Spinoza (1632 — 1677), the greatest advocate of
pure and consistent Pantheism.
8 Herbert's famous " five articles " were : (1) There is a God,
(2) who is to be worshipped, (3) mainly by virtue and piety.
(4) Men should repent. (5) There is a future retribution.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 555
greatest of the German Rationalists of the eighteenth century
with the exception of Kant (1724 — 1804), who, perhaps, is not
fairly classed as a Rationalist. Representative of the Biblical
criticism of the period is J. G. Eichhorn (1752— 1827), whose
rationalizing methods of dealing with the Gospel miracles
are similar to those of his younger and better-known con
temporary Paulus (1761 — 1851). The main solvent of the
rather shallow Rationalism of this period was not so much
the strictly orthodox polemic, as the deeper and more
philosophical Theology of Semler (1725 — 1791), Schleiermacher
(1768 — 1834), and Neander (1789 — 1850).
(3) The Nineteenth Century. — The ample space already
accorded to the controversies of the nineteenth century
renders lengthy treatment of them in this place unnecessary.
The Rationalism of this period may be classed as {a)
philosophic, (b) scientific, (.) critical. Philosophic Rationalism
in Germany has been inspired mainly by the sceptical or
semi-sceptical Philosophy of Kant (died 1804), and by the
Pantheism or semi-Pantheism of ScheUing (1775 — 1854) and
Hegel (1770 — 1831). Hegelianism was popularized to some
extent in England and Scotland by T. H. Green (1836 — 1882),
but most British philosophers of rationalistic tendencies have
preferred to develop the empirical Scepticism of Hume (e.g.
James Mill (1773 — 1836), John Mill (1806— 1873), and Prof.
Bain). Much less important has been the naked Materialism
of Vogt, Moleschott, Biichner, and Hackel. Sir W.
Hamilton, in his Philosophy of the Unconditioned (1829), and
Mansel, in his Limits of Religious Thought (1858), made
interesting apologetic efforts to press the Agnosticism of Kant
into the service of Theism and Christianity. In France
philosophic Rationalism has been ably represented by the
Positive Philosophy oi Comte (1798 — 1857). Rationalism has
been popularized among the masses in Germany by Schenkel's
Charakterbild Jesu, Strauss's Life of Jesus for the German
People (1864), and The Old Faith and the New (1872); in
France by Renan's Life of fesus (1863); and in England by

556 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Robert Owen (1771 — 1858), G.J. Holyoake, andC. Bradlaugh,
and still more recently by the cheap publications of the
Rationalist Press Association.
Modern scientific Rationalism dates from 1859, the year
of the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species. Darwinism
has been developed into complete philosophy of Evolution
by H. Spencer in his Synthetic Philosophy (i860 — 1896),
and by Fiske in his Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy (1874).
Critical Rationalism, based on the " higher criticism " of
the Bible, dates (in its modern form) from Baur's appointment
as Professor of Historical Theology in the University of
Tubingen (1826). Of late years Baur's followers have split into
two groups — an unimportant one (Pierson, Loman, Naber,
Vblter, Steck, van Manen) which rejects every New Testament
book, and a large and influential one (Harnack, Jiilicher, etc.)
which leans strongly towards conservative views.1
Among the leading apologists of the century may be
mentioned, in Germany, UUmann, Tholuck, Luthardt,
Auberlen, Christlieb, Zockler, Ebrard, Ritschl, Kaftan,
Delitzsch, Zahn, Hettinger (R.C.), and Schanz (R.C.) ; in
England, Mansel, Liddon, Lightfoot, Salmon, Westcott,
Farrar ; in France, Guizot, Lacordaire ; in Switzerland, Naville,
Godet. English apologists were dominated down to 1869
(Mozley's Bampton Lectures on Miracles) by the traditions of
Paley, who relied mainly on the evidence of miracles. Since
that date apologists have relied chiefly on the moral and spiritual
evidence for Christianity (Row, Storrs, Brace, Kidd, etc.).
APPENDIX VI
useful books
The literature of special subjects has been very fully given ;
but the following short list of general books will be found useful.
8 Among rationalistic " higher critics " of the Old Testament
may be mentioned de Wette (1780— 1849), and, in more modern
times, Graf, Kuenen, and Wellhausen.

USEFUL BOOKS 557
(a) Popular and Semi-popular. — Oxford House Papers;
Ballard, Miracles of Unbelief; Liddon, Some Elements of
Religion * ; Paley, Natural Theology, and Evidences of Christi
anity, and Horce Paulince ; A. F. W. Ingram, Old Testament
Difficulties, and New Testament Difficulties, and Church
Difficulties (S.P.C.K.) ; A. L. Moore, Science and the Faith ;
Haw, Religious Doubts\of Democracy * ; R. E. Welsh, In Relief
of Doubt* ; J. M. Wilson, Evolution and the Holy Scriptures *'
(S.P.C.K.), and Problems of Religion and Science* ; Illing
worth, Bampton Lectures*; Gore, Bampton Lectures (also
abridged edition) ; Godet, Defence of the Christian Faith ;.
Luthardt, Fundamental Truths ; Drummond, Ascent of Man,
and Natural Law in the Spiritual World; Brace, Gesta
Christi; Gore (ed.), Lux Mundi; Staley, The Natural
Religion * ; Farrar, Life of Christ ; Row, Manual of Christian
Evidences ; Maclear, Evidential Value of the Holy Eucharist ;
Temple, Bampton Lectures ; Salmon, Non-Miraculous Christi
anity. {b) Treatises. — Berkeley, Three Essays * ; Butler, Analogy ;
Liddon, Bampton Lectures ; Row, Bampton Lectures ; Flint,
Theism, and Anti-theistic Theories, and Agnosticism ; J. Ward,
Naturalism and Agnosticism (philosophic); Salmon, Intro
duction to the New Testament; Bruce, Miraculous Element
in the Gospels ; Knowling, Witness of the Epistles ; G. P.
Fisher, Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief.

LITERATURE
(a) The Influence of Jesus

Storrs, Divine Origin of Christianity ; Brace, Gesta Christi ;
Row, Bampton Lectures ; Phillips Brooks, The Influence of
Jesus ; B. Kidd, Social Evolution ; Croslegh, Christianity
judged by its Fruits (S.P.C.K.) ; Dennis, Missions and Social
Progress; articles, "Christian Church," and "Missions," and

* These books are published in cheap editions.

558 LITERATURE
"Charity," in the Encycl. Brit.; Uhlhorn, Christian Charity
in the Ancient Church ; Harnack, Expansion of Christianity,
bk. ii. c. 3. The subject is well treated from a moderate
rationalistic standpoint by Lecky, History of European Morals
from A ugustus to Charlemagne.
(.) The Authority of the Church
Stanton, The Place of Authority in Religious Belief;
Balfour, Foundations of Belief; Gore, Roman Catholic
Claims.
(c) Eternal Punishment
Pusey, What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?
Farrar, Eternal Hope ; Plumptre, Spirits in Prison ; Mason,
Purgatory ; Luckock, After Death.
(d) The Atonement
Butler, A nalogy, pt. ii. 5 ; Moberly, A tonement and
Personality ; J. McLeod Campbell, The Nature of the Atone
ment; H. A. Lyttelton, "The Atonement" (in Lux Mundi),
and his more popular paper, "The Justice of the Atonement"
•(in Oxford House Papers',' vol. ii.). Some help may also be
obtained from Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation.
(e) The Holy Trinity
There is no good comprehensive work. The reader may
consult Illingworth, Personality, Human and Divine (iii.), and
Divine Immanence, c. vii. ; A. L. Moore, " The Christian
Doctrine of God " (in Lux Mundi) ; Christlieb, Modern Doubt
(lect. iv.). (f) History of Apologetics
Article, " Apologetik, Apologie," in the Hauck-Herzogixtea/ew-
cyklopadie; art. "Apologists," in Smith's Diet. Chr. Biog.;
A. S. Farrar, History of Free Thought ; Lecky, A History of
the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe ; L. Stephen,
History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century ;
Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science ;
A. D. White, Warfare of Science with Theology ; Allen, Con
tinuity of Christian Thought; the relevant sections in the
various histories of Philosophy and Theology.

SUPPLEMENT
the argument for a first cause
The following brief supplement to the first chapter will be
found useful.
I. — Proof from the Contingency x of the Universe
That nothing which is not absolutely self-existent can exist
without a cause is a self-evident truth (see p. 2). But the
universe is not self-existent. It is not even necessarily existent.
We can imagine the universe and all its laws changed and even
annihilated. We can also imagine the universe replaced by
an infinite series of quite different universes. Since, then, the
universe is not self-existing, or even necessarily existent, but
purely contingent, it must have a Cause.
II. — Proof from the Nature of Necessary Truth
The Laws of the Universe (or of Nature) are, as we have
shown, purely contingent.2 The Laws of Reason? on the
1 A thing which is contingent may either be or not be.
There is no logical necessity for its existing.
8 For example, the Law of Gravitation can be thought of as
different. Particles of matter, instead of attracting one another,
might conceivably repel one another, or might attract one
another according to some other law than that of inverse
squares. 3 Among the chief of them are the Law of Identity, the Law
of Contradiction, the Law of Excluded Middle, the Law of
559

56o SUPPLEMENT
other hand, are eternally and necessarily true. To take a
simple example, the law that things which are equal to the
same thing are equal to one another, which is a Law of Reason,
cannot be annihilated even in thought. We cannot even ima
gine a time or circumstances in which it would not be true. The
same the case with of all the Laws of Reason, whether Logical,
Moral, Mathematical, or even Artistic. For example, that a
thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time, that
every event must have a cause, that two straight lines cannot
enclose a space, that two and two cannot make five, that
justice is better than injustice, that benevolence is better than
cruelty, that lying is contemptible, and truthfulness praise
worthy, are propositions not only true, but necessarily
and eternally true. Time, and the vicissitudes of things,
make no difference to them. They were true a million ages
ago, and will be true a million ages hence.
Now since these Laws of Reason exist, they require to be ac
counted for, and to have a cause assigned to them. Their cause
cannot be the human mind, for they existed before it, and will
survive it. Nor can their cause be the universe, because, as we
have shown, they would survive the destruction of the universe,
and would be true, not only in this, but in any universe.
Their cause, therefore, is something distinct both from the
human mind and from the universe. Moreover, their cause
cannot be anything irrational or non-moral, for Laws of
Reason and Morality can exist only in and for a Rational and
Moral Intelligence.
The First Cause, therefore, is a Moral, Personal God.
III. — Proof from the Nature of Possibility
Over and above the finite number of actual things, there
exists an infinite number of possible things. Possibility is not
Sufficient Reason, the Law of Causation, the Axioms of Mathe
matics, and the (fundamental) Laws of Morality. The full dis
cussion of these laws belongs to Logic and Metaphysics.

SUPPLEMENT 561
a mere figment of the imagination. It has as real an objective
existence as actuality. It is as true that certain things, which
do not actually exist, are possible as distinguished from im
possible, as that certain other things do exist actually.
Possibility, therefore, exists, both as an idea and as a fact ;
and, like every other fact, must have a cause. Now, the
cause of it cannot be the human mind, for the same number
of things were possible before the human mind came into
existence, and will be possible when the human mind has
ceased to exist. Nor can the cause of it be the universe,
for if the universe were annihilated, the number of possible
things would not be diminished in the least.1
The cause of Possibility, therefore, is something distinct
from the human mind and from the universe, and since the
extent of Possibility is infinite, the Cause of Possibility is
also infinite.2

IV. — The Unity of the First Cause
(1) Proof from the Principle of Parsimony. — One First
Principle being sufficient to account for all actual and possible
things, it is unnecessary, and therefore unphilosophic, to
postulate more than one (see p. 5).
(2) Proof from the Unity of the Universe. — The Laws of
Nature, or of the Universe, form a system of uniformities so
harmonious and mutually coherent, that the mind is compelled
to assume a single First Cause of them.
(3) Proof from the Laws of Reason.— -Just as the contingent
Laws of Nature, or of the Universe, form a harmonious and

1 We may add that the actual universe is numerically one, and
that the possible universes are numerically infinite. A single
actual universe cannot be the cause of the existence of an infinite
number of possible universes.
8 Possibility is also necessary and eternal. Its Cause, there
fore, must be necessary and eternal. 36

562 SUPPLEMENT
coherent system of uniformities, so the necessary and im
mutable Laws of Reason form a still more harmonious and
coherent system of uniformities. The Eternal Mind, there
fore, in and for which they eternally exist, must, in the most
absolute sense, be one.
(4) Proof from the Nature of the Infinite. — The First Cause,
being absolute and infinite (see sect. iii. above, and cf. p. 12),
must necessarily be one, for a plurality of absolute and infinite
beings would limit one another.

INDEX

Abbott, E. A., 220
Abortion, 515
Absolute, the, 12, 13, 20, 21,
36, Supplement
Acts, the, Christology of, 380 ;
" we-sections," 482. See
Bible
Adam, 207, 227
Adoptianism. See Pneumatic
.Esthetic argument, 92
Agnosticism, 35, 74, 126, 131,
135 ff-. 137
Alexander, W. M., 456
Allen, Grant, 368
Almsgiving, 339, 519, 520
Alternating Personality, 173
Alva, Count of, 527
Amberley, Viscount, 1 32
Ambrose, St., 443, 526
Ammianus Marcellinus, 442
Angel of Jehovah, 549
Anglican Church, 527, 537 ff.,
540 ff.
Animals, and pain, 216; im
mortality of, 244
Anselm, St., 8
Anthropology, 117 ff.
Anticlericalism, 109
Apocryphal Gospels, 441, 504
Apologetics, history of, 548 ff.
Apologies, ancient, 548 ff.
Apostle, wider meaning of, 477
Apostles, the, 372 ff., 420, 425,
439. 465, 474 ff-

Apostles' Creed, 385
Apostolic Constitutions, 512,
5i3> 520
Apotheosis. See Deification
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 48, 73,
84. 147. 236
Arbitration, 525
Aristides, Apology of, 314,
..OS, Si3
Aristotle, 84, 256, 276, 512,
S5i
Arnold, Matthew, 359, 452
Articles of religion, the,.
208
Ascension, the, 501
Asceticism, 354
Athanasius, St., 518
Atheism, 108, 114
Athenagoras, 550
Atonement, the, 285, 405,
544 ff.
Augustine, St., 48, 73, 148,
228, 443
Augustus, 113
Aurelian, 516
Authority, religious, 105 ff.,
537 ff-
Automatic writing, 175
Automatism, theory of, 185
Avebury, Lord, 106
Bain, Professor, 190, 192,
555
Ballard, 529

563

564

INDEX

Baptism of Jesus, 306
Baptismal formula, 410
Baptist, the, 391, 451
Barnabas, Epistle of, 305
Basil, St., 519
Basilides, 313
Bathing, promiscuous, 524
Baur and his school, 293, 295,
302, 423, 447, 468, 473, 486,
502, 556
Bayle, 119
Beatific vision, the, 287
Beauty, argument from, 92
Bellarmine, 545
Benevolence, Christian, 287,
349 ff. See Philanthropy
Berkeley's argument, 93 ff.
Bible, the, 292 ff ; inspiration
of, 323 ; Old Testament,
321, 324, 457, 458 ; New
Testament, 294, 295 ff. ;
Synoptic Gospels, 304 ff. ;
fourth Gospel, 307 ff. ; Acts,
302 ff. (see Acts) ; Pauline
Epistles, 295 ff., 372 ff. ;
Hebrews, 301, 377, 421 ;
James, 301, 380 ; 1 Peter
and 1 John, 2ggS., 374, 376;
disputed books, 301
Bingham, 519
Birth of Jesus, 502 ff.
Bishops, 513, 517
Blass, 304
Blatchford, 280, 368
Body, resurrection of the, 468,
492, 499
Bois-Reymond, du, 18, 257
Bolingbroke, Viscount, 363
Books, useful, 556
Boutroux, 271
Brace, 514
Bradley, F. H„ 177
Brain, the, 185, 500
Buddhism, 107, 287, 288 ff.,
443, 528
Burnouf, 290

Butler, 113, 190, 445, 538,
546, 554
Byron, 93
Calixtus (Callistus) I., 513
Calvinism, 208, 540, 544
Campbell, McLeod, 545
Carlyle, 365
Carpocrates, 387
Cause, efficient, 1 ff. ; First,
1 ff., Supplement ; final, 1,
34 «.
Celibacy, 355, 526
Celsus, 498, 508, 552
Cerebration, unconscious, 175
Ceremonial worship, 341
Cerinthus, 387
Chance, 58, 62
Charity, Christian, 5193.;
pagan, 520
Chastity, 520 ff.
Christ. See Jesus
Christian Science, 454
Christianity, 274-558
Chrysostom, St., 519
Church, the, 287, 355, 510 ff.,
526, 536 ff. See Anglican,
Roman, Eastern
Cicero, 32, 106, 231, 276, 394
Citizenship, 355
Clement, St., of Alexandria,
225, 299, 308
Clement, St., of Rome, 298,
299, 302, 303, 410, 421
Clementine Homilies, 303, 520
Clifford, W. K., 8, 18, 28, 37,
131, 140, 186
Comte, 555. See Positivism
Conception of Jesus, 502 ff.
Confession of sin, 340
Confucianism, 327
Conscience, 28, 30, 348
Consciousness, origin of, 257
Consent, argumentfrom, 105 ff.
Conservation of energy, 149,
189

INDEX

565

Constantine I., 442, 513 ff.
Conte, Professor le, 64, 261
Contentio Veritatis, 253, 418
Contingency of the universe,
559
Contingent events, foreknow
ledge of, 197
Conybeare, F. C, 507
Cosmic consciousness, 93
Creatianism, 162
Creation, 48 ff., 147 ff.
Creed, Nicene, 410 ; Apostles'.
See Apostles' Creed
Criticism, the higher, 115,
293 ff., 556
Crookes, Prof., 52
Cyprian, St., 411, 550
" Daemons," 552
Dalman, 384
Darwin, 28, 52, 54, 56, 60, 64,
69,7S.94> 111,217,529,556
Death of Christ. See Atone
ment
Deification, 287, 378
Deism, 77, 260, 276, 554
Delanne, E., 251
Demiurge, 66, 157
Demons. See Devils
Demosthenes, 394
Descartes, 9, 90
Design, argument for, 34 ff.,
48 ff.
Determinism. See Freewill
Devil, the, 220 ff.
Devils, possession by, 455
Diabolical miracles, 268
Diatessaron. See Tatian
Didache, the, 301, 305, 410,
515, 520
Diderot, 541
Divergencies in religion, 116
Divorce, 521 ff., 524
Drummond, J., 320, 438
Dualism, 200, 220 ff.
Duels, 525

Duhring, E., 245
Easter, 513
Eastern Church, 537, 543
Ebionism, 3853., 507
Ecstasy, 494
Education, 127, 525
Ego, the. See Soul
Eichhorn, J. G., 555
Embryology, 64
Empirical Philosophy, 80,
163 ff-, 555
Encyclopaedia Biblica, 296
Energy, 149 ff.
Epictetus, 105, 395
Epicurus, 551
Eternal punishment, 5406.
Eternity, nature of, 148
Ether, 38
Ethics, 23 ff. ; Christian,
327 ff., 347 ff., 366
Eusebius, 299, 300, 305, 518
Evil, 23, 24, 69, 200 ff.
Evolution, 48 ff., 70, 72, 224 ff.
Example, Christ's, 285
Experience, Philosophy of.
See Empirical
Experience, religious. See
Religious experience
Eye, the, 44, 68, 69
Fairbairn, 108
Faith, 140
Fall, the, 224 ff .
Fasting, 339
Fatalism. See Free-will
Feeding, miracle of, 428
Fichte, 12
Fig-tree, cursing of the, 431
Finney, 470
First Cause. See Cause
Fisher, G. P. ,'492
Flint, Prof., 107
Florinus, 310
Fonsegrive, 271
Foote, G. W., 413

566

INDEX

Force. See Energy
Foreknowledge. See God
Francis, St., of Assisi, 441
Freethinkers, 359 ff., 525
Free-will and Determinism,
178 ff., 271
Future life. See Immortality
Gaius, 512
Galileo, 73
Gardner, P., 365
Gaunilo, 9
Gautama, 395, 505. See
Buddhism
Genealogies of Jesus, 506
Genesis and science, 72, 153
Gentiles, 344
Gerard, J., 72
Gibbon, 443, 510, 526
Gladiators, 515
God, as First Cause, 1 ff.,
559 ff. ; His transcendence,
nff.; personality, 14 ff.,
284, 559 ff. ; infinity, 12, 21,
22 ; moral character, 22 ff. ;
unchangeableness, 155;
foreknowledge, 197 ; om
nipotence, 203 ; justice,
213 ; benevolence, 216 ff.,
283 ff. ; permits evil, 223 ;
Christ's teaching about,
329 ff.
Goethe, 364
Gore, 396
Gospels. See Bible
Gray, Asa, 51
Green, T. H., 555
Grotius, 553
Grove, 149
Hadrian, 524
Haeckel, 39, 64, 75, 508
Hallucinations, 474 ff.
Hamilton, Sir William, 5, 555
Happiness caused by religion,
124, 131

Harmony of Nature, 34 ff., 560
Harnack, 295, 297, 388, 438,
44L 513, 556
Hartmann, von, 12
Heaven, 347
Hebrews (Epistle). See Bible
Hebrews, Gospel according to,
477
Hedonism, 25
Hegel, 12, 13, 20, 21, 36, 278,
555
Hell, 540 ff.
Helmholtz, 68, 258
Heredity, 206
Hermas, 388
Hermias, 551
Hierocles, 552
Hilgenfeld, 488
Hippolytus, St., 313
Hodgson, Dr. S., 185
Holiness, Christian, 348
Holsten, 471 ff., 488
Holyoake, 18, 556
Honorius, 517
Hopkins, Prof., 291
Hospitals, 519
Howard, John, 525
Humane legislation, 5176.
Humanism, 553
Hume, 6, 7, 163 ff., 201, 263,
555
Humility, 351
Huxley, 41, 51, 55, 63, 75, 88,
111, 140, 141, 155, 185, 204
Hylozoism, 42
Hypnotism, 175
Idealism, Berkeleian, 78 ff.
Ideas, power of, 85
Ignatius, St., 297, 302, 315,
484, 485, 505
Illingworth, J. R., 95, 274
Immortality, 231 ff., 345, 552
Imputation, 545
Incarnation, the, 283 ff., 445.
See Jesus Christ

INDEX

567

Indian Pantheism, 13, 278
Infanticide, 285, 515
Inquisition, the, 527
Inspiration, 72, 323
Intelligibility of the Universe,
46
Intermediate state, 346, 543
Irenaeus, St., 299, 301, 305,
309
Jairus's daughter, 432
James, Prof. William, 93, 95,
138, 145, 167, 184, 187, 196,
271
James, Protevangelium of, 504
James, St., Epistle of. See
Bible
Jansenist miracles, 265, 454
Jerome, St., 526
Jesus Christ, the teaching of,
326 ff. ; historicity of, 368 ;
divinity of, 370 ff. ; miracles
of, 417 ff. ; resurrection of,
463 ff. ; influence of, 5 10 ff.
John, St., 387, 391, 467, 483.
See Bible
Joseph, St., 506 ff.
Josephus, 430
Judaic Christianity, 385
Judaism and Christianity, 271,
548 ff.
Judgment, the last, 346, 403
Julian, the Apostate, 552
Jiilicher, 295
Julius Caesar, 516
Justin, St., 305, 311, 411, 423,
497. 515
Justinian I., 514, 517, 524, 551
Juvenal, 523
Kant, 7, 74, 183, 555
Karma, 290. See Buddhism
Keim, 389, 392, 398, 448, 453,
466, 483, 487, 497
Kelvin, Lord, 151, 258, 259
Knight, Prof., 165

Knowling, Prof., 471
Lactantius, 513
Ladd, Prof., 187
Laing, S., 361
Lamarck, 48, 57, 71
Lang, A., 226
Lange, 62
Laplace, 109, 143, 255
Lardner, 554
Law of Moses, 343
Lawrence, Brother, 9
Lazarus, raising of, 433
Lecky, 360, 517, 521, 526, 531
Leibnitz, 9
Leslie, 554
Lessing, 555
Libertarianism. See Free-will
Liberty, popular, 127
Liddon, 533
Life, future. See Immortal-
ity
Life, origin of, 52, 257, 278
Lightfoot, Bishop, 297
Lightfoot, J., 419
Lillie, A., 290
Livingstone, 219
Locke, 80, 554
Lodge, Sir O., 268, 271
Logia of St. Matthew, 305,
422, 434, 437
Logia, Oxyrhyncus, 354
Lord's Prayer, 338
Lotze, 162, 227
Lourdes, 454
Lucian, 552
Luke, St., 482, 483, 503 ff.
See Bible
Luther and Lutheranism, 544
Macan, 491, 496
Mach, Prof., 151
Mahometanism, 291, 347, 395,
443, 528, 552
Malebranche, 90
Malthus, 57

568

INDEX

Manen, van, 296, 556
Mansel, 555
Marcellinus, Ammianus, 442
Marcion, 296, 508
Marillier, 429
Mark, St., 482. See Bible and
Peter
Marriage and divorce, 358,
521 ff, 524
Martin, St., 440, 526
Martineau, J., 28, 195, 240,
392, 499, 545
Mary, St., Magdalene, 478,
498
Mary, St., the Virgin, 502 ff.
Mathematics, axioms of, 142,
559
Matter, 80 ff., 257, 499. See
Energy and Ether
Matthew, Pseudo-, 504
Matthew, St., 437, 482, 503 ff.
See Bible and Logia
Maximus, 526
Mediator, 546
Messiah. See Prophecy
Meyer, H. A. W., 397, 472
Mill, J., 540
Mill, J. S., 2, 6, 7, 15, 21, 26,
68, 74, 88, 126, 133, 154,
166, 184, 201, 209, 218,
264 ff., 364, 540
Mind. See Soul
Mind, human, argument from
the, 45
Mindstuff, 37
Miracles, 253 ff., 278, 417 ff.,
457
Missions, Christian, 528
Mitchell, Prof., 64
Momerie, 203
Monotheism and Pantheism,
278
Moral evidence for Chris
tianity, 446, 510 ff., 556
Moral evidence for the Resur
rection, 495

Moral progress under Chris
tianity, 5 10 ff.
Morals. See Ethics
Morgan, de, 143
Morison, C, 131, 181
Motion, 80
Mozley, 420, 556
Miinsterberg, 165
Muratorian list, 300, 309
Myers, F. W. H., 251
Mystical consciousness, 96.
See Cosmic consciousness
Mythical theory of Chris
tianity, 368
Napoleon, 527, 532
Natural religion, 1-273. See
Religion
Natural selection, 56 ff.
Nature, order of, 34 ff., 213 ;
laws of, Supplement
Neander, 555
Nebula, the original, 254
Necessity. See Free-will
Neo-Lamarckians, 71
Neo-Platonism, 276, 551 f.
New Testament. See Bible
New Zealand, missions in, 529
Nirvana, 289. See Buddhism
Nonconformists and religious
authority, 537
" Occam's razor," 5
Old Testament. See Bible
Omnipotence, of God, 12, 21 ;
of Jesus, 409
Ontogeny, 64, 258
Ontological argument, 8 f.
Ontologism, 90
Optimism, Christian, 290
Origen, 299, 308, 497, 550
Original sin. See Sin
Orphanages, 519
Paganism, 549 ff.
Paine, T., 364

INDEX

569

Paley, 49, 216, 454, 554
Pantheism, 11 ff., 249, 262,
278, 508
Papias, 299, 305, 306, 314
Parliaments, 525
Patria potestas, 517
Paul, St., 342,372ff., 379, 420,
464 ff., 469 ff. See Bible
Paulus, 429, 434, 447, 498, 555
Pearson, Prof. K., 8, 88, 258
Perfection, counsels of, 355
Persecution, 127, 526
Perseus, 505
Persistence of force. See
Conservation
Persistence of religion, t 1 3
Personality, alternating, 173
Personality, of God, 146.,
278 ff., 546 ff., 559; of man,
284
Pessimism, 131, 289
Peter, Gospel of, 312, 475
Peter, St., 206, 303, 374, 382,
422, 467, 590. See also
Bible
Phado of Plato, 243
Philanthropy, Christian, 5 1 8 ff .
Philosophy, Greek, 499, 5 5 1 ff .
Philostratus, 552
Phylogeny, 64, 258
" Physicus." See Romanes
Physiological Psychology, 165,
185
Piat, 234
Pilate, and Pilate's wife, 392,
498
Pilate, heathen Acts of, 497
Pius I., 513
Plato, 500, 551 ff-
Pleasure, 25 ff.
Plutarch, 105, 511, 523
Pneumatic and Adoptianist
Christology, 388
Polycarp, St., 296, 299, 301,
302, 305, 310
Polytheism, 200, 549 ff.

Porphyry, 552
Positivism, 109, 114, 130
Possession. See Devils
Potentiality, 255
Poverty, voluntary, 355
Poynting, Prof., 191, 193
Prayer, 270, 336 ff. ; the
Lord's, 338 ; to Jesus, 383
Presbyterians, 493
Priesthoods, 129
Prodynamis, 38
Prophecies of Christ, 356
Prophecy, Messianic, 458 ff.
Prophets of Old Testament,
99
Prothyle, 38, 153
Prudence, 355
Psychical research, 251, 477 ff.
Psychology, 158 ff.
Purgatory. See Intermediate
state
Pusey, 543
Quintilian, 515
Rationalism^ 298, 554 ff. See
Freethinkers, Agnosticism,
Deism, Pantheism, Material
ism, Atheism, etc.
Rationality of universe, 183,
236, 272
Realism, 77
Reason and religious author
ity, 536 ff. ; origin of, 257 ;
laws of, 559
Reformation, the, 553
Reimarus, 446, 497, 554
Religion, 105, 136; origin of ,
118. See Christianity and
Natural Religion
Religious experience, 90, 10 1
Renaissance, the, 553
Renan, 295, 362, 394, 414,
423, 446, 478, 488, 499, 531,
556
Renouvier, 271

57°

INDEX

Repentance, 340, 546
Resurrection, 84, 346 ; of
body, 499 ff. ; miracles of,
432 "ff.
Resurrection of Jesus, 463 ff.
Retz, Cardinal de, 266
Revelation, 274 ff., 537
Revivals, 470, 480
Riches. See Wealth
Robertson, J. M., 368
Robespierre, 114
Roman Church, 527, 537, 542
Romanes, 10, 38, 39, 47, no,
132, 188, 224
Rosmini, 90
Rossi, de, 513
Row, 530
Rudimentary. See Vestigial
Sabbath, 513
Sallust, 523
Sanday, Prof., 99
Savages, 106, 117, 120, 226
Scepticism, 263, 554. See
Empirical, Rationalism, etc.
ScheUing, 12, 555
Schiller, F. C. S., 21, 245
Schleiermacher, 250, 498, 555
Schmiedel, 449, 466, 481 ff.
Schoolmen, 9
Schopenhauer, 12, 38, 364
Science, no, 127, 140
Scientia Media, 198
Scripture. See Bible
Sea, Jesus walks on, 430
Seeley, 363
Semler, 555
Seneca, 511
Severus, Alexander, 524
Severus, Sulpitius, 441
Sex, 44 ff.
Sexual selection, 71
Sidgwick, Prof., 181, 241
Simeon, C., 239
Sin, original, 206 ; transmis
sion of, 227

Sinai-Syriac of Matt. i. 16, 507
Sinlessness, 286 ; of Jesus,
388 ff.
Slavery, 510 ff., 525
Social aspect of religion, 287
Social work, 525
Socrates, 242, 243, 276, 523
Son of God, the, 406, 496
Soul, the, 158 ff.
Species, 48
Spencer, H., 28 ff., 35 ff., 71,
118, 129, 143, 154, 196,278,
556
Speusippus, 256
Spinoza, 12, 262, 554
Spiritualism, 481
State, the, 355
Statistics and free-will, 195
Stephen, L., 28
Stewart, Prof. B., 151, 189
Stock, St. G., 202
Stoics, 220, 511, 515, 520, 521
Storm, Jesus stills the, 429
Stout, Dr., 179
Strauss, 364, 390, 396, 441,
446, 472, 476, 498, 555
Substance, 77, 81, 82, 158, 171
Suetonius, 511
Suicide, 517
Sunday, 513, 518
Swete, Prof., 423
Syme, 176
Synoptic Gospels. See Bible-
Tacitus, 266, 368, 511
Tait, Prof., 151, 189
Talmud, 508
Taouism, 327
Tatian's Diatessaron, 305, 311
Teaching of the Twelve. See
Didache
Telemachus, 517
Tennant, 228
Tennyson, 216
Tertullian, 299, 308, 497
Testaments. See Bible

INDEX

S7i

Theatres, 524
Theodore of Stude, 514
Theodosius I., 514, 516, 524,
526
Theophilus of Antioch, 225
Thomas of Celano, 441
Thomas, St., Aquinas. See
Aquinas
Time, 148, 149
Timothy and, Aquila (Dia
logue), 507
Titus, Emperor, 516
Toledoth Jeshua, 497, 508
Toleration, 527
Traducianism, 162
Trajan, 516
Trance, 494
Transformism, 48
Trench, 432
Trial of Jesus, 408
Trinity, the, 410, 546 ff.
Truthfulness, 351
Tubingen school, 420. See
Baur
Tylor, Professor, 106
Tyndall, 40, 186
Uganda, 528
UUmann, 397
Ultramontanism, 537, 539
Unconscious will, 37
Uniformity of Nature, 141 ff.
Unitarianism, 276, 317, 371,
385, 451, 529
Universe, the, 34 ff., 46, 559
Unknowable, the, 35 ff.
Utilitarianism, 26 ff.
Utility of religion, 1 22 ff.

Valentinus, 310, 313
Venn, Dr., 195
Vespasian, 266
Vestigial organs, 63
Vice, unnatural, 522
Vines, Prof,, 72
Visions, theory of, 468 ff.,
480 ff.
Vitellius, 523
Voltaire, 541
Wallace, A. R., 51, 217
War, 518, 525
Ward, Prof. J., 167, 190
Waste in Nature, 61
Wealth, 352
Weismann, 59, 71, 228 ff.
Weiss, B., 429
Weizsacker, 466, 487, 488
Welldon, 245
Wernle, 422, 438, 440, 466,
488
Westcott, 485, 501, 502
Westermarck, 227
Whitby, 502
Wilson, E. B., 71, 258
Wolfenbuttel fragments, 555.
Woolston, 446
Works, good, 336
Worship, 333 ff., 341
Wundt, W., no, 179
Xenophon, 394, 395, 523
Zahn, 423
Ziehen, 165
Zoroastriamsm, 221

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