YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

From the
COLLECTION OF OXFORD BOOKS
made by
FALCONER MADAN
Bodlcy's Librarian

A LETTER
TO TUB
KEY. THE YICE-OHANCELLOR
OF THE
ON THE
PRESENT STATE OF THEOLOGY
IN
THE UNIVERSITIES AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND,
AKD ON TBE CAUSES OP EXISTING
SCEPTICISM AND INFIDELITY.
BY
CLERICUS.

" SOL OBSCURABITUR ET LUNA NON DABIT LUMEN BUUM, ET STELLJE OADBNT DB C(ELO. '
3fatthew xxiv. 29.

OXFORD :
H. HAMMANS (late GEAHAM), HIGH STREET.

LONDON :
MITCHELL AND SON, PRINTERS, WARDOUB STREET, OXFORD STREET.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

It has been observed by an eminent writer of the Uni
versity, in a Letter on " Man's conception of Eternity,"
that a criticism of the laws and limits of religious thought
is a work much needed. Although the present Letter
does not profess to be a work of this kind, it is not
altogether foreign to the subject ; and whatever may be
thought of the principles it advocates, it will be abso
lutely necessary that they should be carefully considered,
before any work of the nature alluded to can be regarded
as satisfactory. This being the case, the reader, it is
hoped, wUl not fail to favor this Letter with his serious
attention, making at the same time every charitable
allowance for its many deficiencies.
As it is not my design to anticipate here any of the
remarks contained in the ensuing pages, it will be suf
ficient to observe, for the sake of the general reader,
that the occasion which has called forth the present
Letter, may be found in the following extract from a
Preface to the edition of University Sermons, published
under the sanction of the recent Vice-Chancellor : —

IV PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
" When the most un scriptural opinions have been
" published among us, ' maledictum silentium quod hie
" connivet,' as said the heroic Luther."
" And a most awful responsibility would have rested
" upon our University, if such opinions had been suffered
"to fester among us unrefuted and unreproved. 'If,
"then, the sentinels of the Gospel sleep upon their posts,
" if they do not instantly rouse to its defence, they are
" guilty of the blackest treason to their Heavenly Master.'
"Thus writes that learned and able vindicator of the
" great doctrine of the Atonement, Dr. Magee. And it
" is most remarkable that, in his admirable work on this
" vital doctrine, we find as close and exact a refutation
" of the recently-pubhshed Essay upon the Atonement,
" as if it had been called forth by it, as it was by the
"writings of Priestley, Belsham, and others. His ex-
" ample has been followed with eminent talent, learning,
" and piety by the authors of the Discourses contained
"in this Volume. And most thankful may we be to
" Almighty God for disposing his servants thus to come
"forward in an awful crisis in the history of religion in
" this University, and make a powerful stand against the
" unscriptural view which has been advanced, and the
" pride of intellect and the principles of interpretation
" leading to it."
" May the Lord grant His divine blessing upon their
" faithful and able exertions ; rendering them effectual
" in averting the infidelity, scepticism, and heresy which
" at the present crisis threaten our University and our

PRELIMINARY REMARKS. V
" country from many quarters ; and in maintaining in-
" violate the inspiration and Divine authority of the Holy
" Scriptures, together with the grand system of doctrines
" of the blessed Gospel ; especially that of the ' full, per-
" feet, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction,'
" in one word, the Atonement, ' for the sins of the whole
" world,' made by the vicarious sufferings and death of
" our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ."
The most recent Discourse, I believe, which at the
present moment has been published* upon this subject
with a view to avert infidelity, scepticism, and heresy, is
an Act Sermon, preached in the Chapel of Trinity Col
lege, Dublin, by John Cotter Mac Donnell, B.D. (for
merly Eellow of Trinity College), Vicar of Laracor in
the diocese of Meath. It is remarkable, that, while the
Sermon professes to oppose the same errors which have
called forth the Eleven University Discourses, it does
not attribute them to " pride of intellect," but rather to
the highly improper explanations which have been popu
larly given of the doctrine of the Atonement; and is
accordingly entitled, " The Doctrine of the Atonement
cleared from Popular Errors ;" it is therefore intended to
supply an important omissioii. The treatise of Dr. Magee
was directed against Priestley, Belsham, and others of that
school, who were the avowed opponents of the doctrine
above mentioned ; the Act Sermon seems to be directed
not only against its opponents, but against its professed
friends, from whom it apprehends no inconsiderable
* London: F. and J. Eivington. 1856.

VI PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
danger ; for it regards modern Scepticism as — " the na-
" tural and almost necessary reaction, in an enquiring age,
" from the careless and, as" (the writer observes) " I con-
" ceive, highly improper explanations of Christ's oftice
" that are frequently put forth in popular sermons and
" tracts, and repeated continually till men regard them
" as a necessary part of the doctrine of the Atonement
" itself. There is no greater danger that can befall the
" cause of truth, than when its advocates put forward
" untenable explanations and proofs. An opponent has
" but to expose the weakness of these defences, and the
" majority of the bystanders will imagine that the truth
" which they have been used to support, must faU with
"them. This is what I believe to be our danger at
" present with regard to the doctrine of the Atonement.
"... There is a manifest temptation, in speaking of such
" subjects, to evade the confession of our ignorance ; and
" to dazzle our hearers and ourselves by the novelty and
" symmetry of systems and explanations that are only the
" product of our own misplaced ingenuity, and which, in
" the day of trial, when touched by the ' fire ' of sceptical
" enquiry, wiU only prove the ' hay and stubble ' that
" our ignorance has heaped up."
This author considers that much of the popular error
which has prevailed upon the subject, has been occa
sioned by arguing from "figurative expressions" as if they
were logical definitions.
Having furnished these two statements of the case,
I have now only earnestly to express my wish, that, in

PRELIMINARY REMARKS, Vll
pointing out the source of the errors to which this Letter
adverts, nothing may be found inconsistent with the
spirit of that Wisdom which is from above, and which
is first pure, and then peaceable ; while, at the same
time, it is hoped that this humble effort towards leading
others in the way to the attainment of that wisdom, will
not be unaided by the Divine blessing.

November.

ERRATUM.
page 1, line 9 from the bottom, for " inasmuch as the virtue of water put into
motion is heightened," read, inasmuch as when water is jmt into motion, its virtue
is thereby heightened.

A LETTEIt,

ETC., ETC.

Reverend Sir,
Although the theological waters of the University
have of late years been remarkably troubled, yet those
who respect and honor the University, and are well
wishers to the cause of learning and religion in this
country, both hope and believe that a circumstance
seemingly so unfavorable will nevertheless tend rather to
its advantage. An angel, as we read, went down at
a certain season into a certain pool and troubled the
water ; " whosoever then first after the troubling of the
" water stepped in, was made whole of whatsoever disease
"he had." "Appropriately," says an interpreter,* "did
" the angel make use of this sign of motion ; inasmuch as
"the virtue of water put into motion is heightened
" and rendered efficacious and lively ; hence waters which
" are in a state of motion and fluency are called living
" waters, such as are those of fountains and rivers ; but
" those which are still and stagnant, are said to be dead,
" such as are those of lakes and pools."
Eor a considerable number of years previous to this
event, many had been waiting in the cloisters for the
* Cornelius a Lapide.

2 PROGRESS ? OR NO PROGRESS ?
moving of the waters; verily believing that there are
cases in which troubled waters are better than torpid
ones ; that motion is a sign of life ; and therefore that
notwithstanding the venerable rule, Ne quieta movere,
troubled waters are not necessarily an untoward sign ;
as they may on the contrary be the indication of a new
influx of life. In this case it is of course to be con
sidered that the influx is that of the Spirit of Truth;
and accordingly many are of opinion that recent discus
sions in the Church and more particularly in the Univer
sity, have led to more exalted ideas of the Humanity of
the Saviour, more correct views of the nature of Justifying
Faith and of the true principles of Scripture Interpreta
tion : consequently they have been regarded by many as
conducive to the progress of Christianity.
It must be owned, however, that in these days the
very idea oi progress has been received by some, and those
not a few, with apprehension, if not alarm. Progress
in Christian life is indeed admitted ; but progress in
Christian Truth not so readily ; even although it should
after all resolve itself into a revival of ancient princi
ples. In this case it is change of any kind that is
deprecated, as being necessarily for the worse. It would
seem, indeed, as if it were supposed by some that the
doctrines of the Church are as fixed in our ideas as the
value of numbers in arithmetic, and that any change in
any particular must as necessarily lead to error in the one
case as in the other. The consequence is the doctrines
of Christianity are placed upon the same footing as pure
mathematics ; and the same immutability of thought or
fixity of idea has thus been demanded with respect to
doctrines allowed to be mysteries, as with respect to
subjects of scientific demonstration where all is intel-

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.

ligible, plain, and palpable. The reason of this is said
to be, that in regard to Christian mysteries we have
already progressed as far as we can ; that the doctrines of
the Church being true, are necessarily " the same yester-
" day, to-day, and for ever :" that being matters purely of
Revelation, truth revealed cannot progress in like manner
as truth derived from outward observation and experi
ment ; that the only way in which it could progress would
be by means of another Dispensation, and that no further
Dispensation is to be expected.
On the other hand it is affirmed, that although Truth
in itself is unchangeable, yet we none of us have ideas
of Truth as it is in itself; that our ideas of it are inti
mately connected with our moral condition ; that if our
moral condition changes, our ideas of truth must neces
sarily be modified ; that in proportion as society advances,
existing Churches and existing doctrines will therefore be
seen to be not those immutable things which others would
suppose them to be ; and that some great though gradual
change, whether in the Church or of the Church, is the
subject in Scripture of plain and palpable prophecy.
It is certainly a matter of importance that we should
endeavor to ascertain how far any innovations which may
be introduced into the Church arise merely from indi
viduals, and how far they are the result of Time, that
greatest of innovators, that is to say, rather, of changes
gradually wrought in the minds of men, under the
direction and control of Divine Providence. Indeed,
the great problem of the Church in the present day is,
how to reconcile theological Progress with theological
Conservatism. That changes in the state of the Church,
as introduced by the Divine Head of the Church, should
be equally rejected with those which are introduced by
B 2

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.

man, no one would venture to maintain; and yet we
shall certainly be liable to mistake the one for the other
(for Providence never works but by human instruments),
unless we first endeavor to ascertain the designs of Divme
Providence with regard to the Church. In the first place
then,— Is there within the Church itself any evidence in
favor of the principle of Progress; whether derived from
Scripture, or from reason and observation. Secondly,
if any such principle of Progress be admitted, is there
any real occasion for it in the present day ? Thirdly,
does any evidence exist that, in regard to the Church,
Progress has actually commenced ? The consideration of
these questions will involve that of the present state of
Theology in the Universities and the Church of England.
First of all, then, is there any evidence in the Church
in favor of the principle of Progress as derived from
Scripture, reason, and actual observation ?
In the Roman Catholic Church it is well known that
progress has been advocated under the title of Develop
ment. "Every thing," says Moehler in his Symbolik, vol. ii.,
p. 50, "that the human mind hath received from an
" external source, and which is destined to become its
" property, wherein it must find itself perfectly at home,
" must be first reproduced by the human mind itself.
" The original doctrine, as the human mind had vari-
" ously elaborated it, exhibited itself in a much altered
" form : it remained the original, and yet it did not ;
" it was the same in substance, and yet differed as
" to form. In this process of the development of the
" Divine Word during the apostolic age, we may exalt
" as high, and extend as wide as we please, the Divine
" guidance, given to the disciples of Christ ; yet cer-

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE. 5
" tainly, without human co-operation, without the pecu-
" liar activity of man, it did not advance of itself. As
" in the good work of the Christian, freewill and grace
" pervade each other, and one and the same undivided
" deed is at once Divine and Human, so we find this to
" be the case here."
Hence it is that Dr. Wordsworth observes, " Chris-
" tianity, with many of your Divines, admits as much of
" discoveries as chemistry. Even your Bellarmine, zealous
" as he was for tradition, does not scruple to say, that
" every doctrine rests on the authority of the existing
" Church; and that the Church of latter time has not only
" power to explain and declare, but to constitute those
" things which belong to the faith."* It is however with
the Church of England that on the present occasion we
are concerned. Disowning any power of constituting the
things which belong to the faith, she resolves to abide
by the authority of the Scriptures, and, according to some,
that of Tradition. In so doing it is argued that her
foundations are sure ; and that her doctrines ever will be
like their Divine master, " the same yesterday, to-day,
" and for ever." On the contrary, it may be asked,
whether by this very principle, she does not subject
herself to change, progress, and development, even more
than the Church of Rome ; for the Church of Rome
professes to be ever one and the same Church under
one and the same Dispensation ; whereas in the Church
of England, interpreters of Scripture are at liberty to
* Letters to M. Gondon, by Dr. Wordsworth, Canon of West
minster, p. 25.
"The celebrated Salmeron declares, that God has not given all
" things to all men, and that every age should enjoy its own truths
" which were unknown to preceding generations."

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.

hold the doctrine of a future new Church under a new
Dispensation. This is advocating the doctrine of change,
progress, and development upon the largest possible
scale ; and under these circumstances, there is no a,lter-
native, in putting a stop to present or future innovations,
but in doing as the Church of Rome has done, viz.,
assuming " the power of constituting the things which
"belong to the faith;" a power which would only
revive a conflict between authority on one side, and
liberty of judgment on the other ; for to suppose it pos
sible that there should be a new Dispensation and a new
Church, and yet that the doctrines or the teachings of
the new Church, should be the same with those of the
old, would be self contradictory.
It may be that there are many who do not believe
the Prophecies to predict any such change : be it so :
but divines of the Church of England have the full
privilege of believing the contrary, on the authority of
Scripture ; and of this privilege they have largely availed
themselves. It is admitted, I believe, without dispute, that there
is di. progressive order in the Divine dispensations. "In
" no view of Revelation," says the Bishop of Norwich,*
" is the wisdom of God more conspicuous than in the
" slow and gradual development of truth — the admission
"of more and more light, nccoxAmg as mankind have been
" able to endure it, and have been capable of walking by
" it." Bishop Barrington has even employed this as an
argument for the confutation of Deism. This successive
development has according to some terminated in the
present Dispensation ; according to Bishop Barrington,
* The Three Temples, p. 1.

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE. 7
the present Dispensation is to develope itself into another,
in which shall be accomplished the restitution of all things
to their primitive state. It is upon this principle that
Bishop Lowth has interpreted the Prophecies. "We
" may probably suppose," he observes on Ezekiel xliii.
10, 11, "that the words may have a farther view, and
" import that the model of God's temple here set forth,
"is but a pattern of heavenly things, as Moses' was,
" Exodus xxv. 40, and a type of that pure Church built
"upon the foundation of apostles and prophets, Jesus
" Christ being the chief corner stone ; which we may hope
" God will in due time every where restore. And in the
" mean season, it is the duty of aU good Christians, ac-
" cording to their abilities, to inform themselves and
" others what is the pattern, form, and fashion of this true
" Church of God, in order to reform all those deviations
"which have been made from it." The Church which
he here calls Reformed, he calls a new Church in Ezekiel
xlviii. 24, 27,— where he says, "here a platform of a
" new Church and state is set forth." However, there
fore, the principle of Development and Progress in re
gard to the Church, be denied in theory, it is recognized
in practise ; i. e., in the interpretation of Scripture.
Long before the present movements in the Church,
and so far back as the year 1785, the Bampton Lecturer,
Mr. Churton, whose orthodoxy has never been impeached,
observed ; " There is perhaps a day coming, (and. Oh, that
" it may be nigh at hand,) when, together with our faith
" and love, our knowledge also shall be enlarged, and our
" views extended; when we shall see order and consistency
"spring out of apparent irregularity; when the light,
" which has hitherto lightened the Gentiles, shall hkewise
" be the glory.of the peopleof Israel ; when the will of God

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.

" shall be done on earth as it is in heaven, zealously and
" faithfully by all men, as it is universally and inces-
"santly by all the holy angels." — p. 222.
In the year 1798 a corresponding doctrine was again
taught by Dr. Hall the Bampton Lecturer of that year.
Thus, p. 17; he observes, "Through the whole order
" of creation and the whole scheme of Providence, we
"observe marks of a progressive advancement and a
"gradual discovery of truth. In all the operations of
"the human mind, in the important discoveries of art
" and the improvements of laws and government, we go
" on step by step, as leisure and opportunities offer, or
" new wants are created ; until at last we have completely
" filled up the first rude outline which necessity suggested.
" A similar progress is to be observed in the higher and
" more valuable truths of religion ; and God Almighty, in
" mercy and love to his creatures, seems always to have
" proportioned his discoveries not only to the actual wants
" of mankind, but to their capacity of receiving truth
" themselves, and their means of communicating it to
" others." A similar doctrine of Progression is unfolded and
advocated by Dr. Chandler in the Bampton Lectures for
the year 1825; where the Lecturer observes p. 288:
" In fact the temples of Paganism appear to be tottering
" on many sides. A light is also breaking in on Mahom-
" medan and Papal darkness ; and, however, the lovers of
" darkness may take counsel together, however they may
" arouse themselves for a while to activity and zeal, it is a
" light which they will find impossible to extinguish or
" eventually to exclude from their own precints."
It is also observed, by Lord Waldegrave, in the
Bampton Lectures, for the year 1854, p. 398; "What-

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE. 9
' ever view we take of the Apocalypse, the signs of the
' times are alone sufficient to lead us to this one conclu-
' sion at least, that a great crisis is near at hand. I do
' not speak of the political combinations that have been
' forming, or may yet be formed in this our world. He
' must be but a very superficial observer indeed, who
^ regards the rivalry of parties, or the antagonism of
'empires, as the great phenomenon of our age. For
' there is another antagonism at work, — an antagonism
' of spiritual principles, which bids fair soon to be felt
' in every country, in every city, in every house. It is
' an antagonism of principles, which within the last few
'years has been in many cases so remarkably, and I
' may well add so disastrously, developed in this our
' University." This kind of teaching, however, has not been confined
to the University of Oxford : it has been openly main
tained in the University of Cambridge ; as for instance
in the work entitled Christianity always Progressive,
being the Christian Advocate's Publication for the year
1829. It has been further maintained by another Chris
tian Advocate, Mr. Pearson, in his interpretation of the
Apocalypse, published in the year 1835, and entitled.
The Prophetical Character and Lnspiration of the Apoca
lypse Considered, in which he even goes so far as to say,
p. 32 (see also pp. 246, 247) that " from considering the
" peculiar character of these prophecies, we may derive
" reasonable grounds for believing that God would vouch-
" safe some future revelation of his will ; in which the
"indistinct parts of them would be more completely
" cleared up ; and those parts of them in which the de-
" tails are necessarily imperfect, would be more fully and
" more. perfectly illustrated."

10 THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.
The principle. of Progress in Christianity being so
plainly advocated, it is natural to expect that the great
religious problem of the day, is, how to reconcile Pro
gress with Conservatism ; in other words, how we can
possibly pass through the various changes of Progress,
and, at the same time, preserve the doctrines of the
Church unchanged. We know that the Church of Rome
claims to be identical with the Church of the Apostles ;
nevertheless she claims the power, as we have seen of
late, of adding to her articles, and yet remaining the
same Church. Dr. Newman maintains that the Christian
Church is only a continuation of the Jewish ; thus, that
both are essentially one and the same Church; upon
which principle the Church of Rome and even the very
Christian Dispensation itself may undergo almost any
amount of change, and yet remain one and the same
Church, oue and the same Christian Dispensation.*
However others may disapprove of this principle, it
seems to be sanctioned by those Protestant writers, who,
after admitting the immense changes which, according
to their interpretations of prophecy, are to overtake the
Church — nevertheless maintain that the Church and Dis
pensation will continue to be the same. In fine, it is a
revival of the litigated question of Personal Identity ;
only applied specifically to the Church. For while some
interpreters regard the changes as constituting a New
Church, others regard the very same changes as consti
tuting only a renovated state of the Church. This latter
interpretation, which would seem to be Conservative, is
perhaps the more hazardous of the two ; for upon this
principle, the Church of England is placed upon the same
* See also University Sermons, No. 1 0.

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE. 11
ground as the Church of Rome,* since the Church and
Dispensation remaining the same, both of them may
undergo almost any amount of change.
In this view of the case the principle of Conservatism
amounts to little, as it may accommodate itself to almost
every change ; or rather it may be passively as refor
matory as its antagonistic principle ; only it is called by
a different name : for if the Church can undergo these
changes, and yet be called the same Church, what changes
may not the doctrines of the Church undergo, and yet be
called the same doctrines ? They are indeed maintained
to be the same, if the same form of words be professed ;
and yet we know that under one and the same form may
exist all the varieties of explication which have been seve
rally denominated Arian, SabeUian, Tritheistical, and so
forth. Bishop Stillingfleet expressly says, that a wrong
explication of a doctrine is not a heresy, provided we
hold to the same form of words in which the doctrine is
originally expressed; and whether that form is to be
derived from the Creeds, or from the Scripture on
which those Creeds are said to be founded, is practically
a matter of individual opinion. Thus Dr. Hey, the Nor-
risian Professor of Divinity observes in his Divinity
Lectures, vol. ii., p. 231 : " Indeed Bishop Burnett owns
that the " Doctrine of the Trinity can only be deduced
" from the Nicene Creed as a consequence. But drawing
" a consequence in things above our reason is making a
" new doctrine : what indeed is making any doctrine, but
" drawing a consequence from some expression of Scrip-
" ture? — sometimes, in order to make a doctrine, one need
" not go so far : one need only arrange expressions."
* See above, p. 4.

12 THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.
Upon the principles of the Church of Rome, such a
statement might be considered correct ; for even if it
were a new doctrine, the Church would have power to
constitute it. According however to Bishop Stillingfleet,
a new explication is not necessarily a new doctrine : the
doctrine remains one and the same : nay, it is said to
remain one and the same, even if we regard it as wholly
unintelligible. Thus the Norrisian Professor, Dr. Hey,
observes in his Divinity Lectures, vol. 2, p. 253 ; " It
"might tend to promote moderation, and in the end
" agreement, if we were industriously on all occasions to
" represent our own doctrine as wholly unintelligible.
"... I fear that we in general pretend too much that
" our doctrine is intelligible, or we use language which
" seems to imply such pretensions : Bishop Pearson and
" Dr. Waterland would have written with greater effect,,
" if they had taken occasion from time to time to say,
"that though they exposed the misrepresentations of
" others, they did not pretend to have any clear ideas of
" their own Doctrine." Thus we see what phases a doc
trine may undergo in the minds of others, of false
explication or of unintelligibUity, and yet be put forth
in definite statements, and be called the same doctrine.
One is almost reminded of the observation made by the
learned Professor, in regard to the identity of the body
at the Resurrection, vol. ii., p. 405 : " Identity is so far
"from excluding all change, that in common questions
" concerning it, it presupposes some ; and when identity
" is destroyed, seems to depend more upon convenience
" and custom of language, than upon the quantity of
" change." Of course it were foolish to expect otherwise than
that seeds thus sown, should in due time bring forth

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE. 13
their fruit. It has accordingly become an important,
and to many an alarming question, how far the principle
of Progress can or cannot be legitimately allowed to in
fluence the commonly received explanations of Christian
doctrine : thus, for instance, in the Bampton Lectures
for the year 1851, as preached before the University, I
find the following signs of the times, p. 3 ; " And, so long
" as we do not expect a further miraculous interposition to
" cut through all difficulties, whatever the peculiar theory
" may be of each one of us, concerning the law accord-
"ing to which Christianity has heretofore varied its
" aspect under varying conditions, we cannot but antici-
"pate some further variations; considering the novel
" conditions which the existing state of the world presents
" to it. But to any who apprehend some variations in
"the aspect of Christianity, and some unsettling of its
" existing relations to the civil society, questions must
"occur as more or less imminent and of more or less
" serious import, concerning the consisting of such va-
" riation, and unsettling, with received interpretations of
" Scripture, with admitted practical rules of civil and
" ecclesiastical polity, with acknowledged principles."
Accordingly after observing that the movement of the
world into which Christianity is bom, forces us to look
for a corresponding " change in some of its functions, in
" some parts of ecclesiastical organization, in some in-
" struments of moral government, and in methods of
"religious teaching," etc., the Bampton Lecturer thus
proceeds, p. 74 : —
"And herein, as I humbly conceive, consists the
" wonderful felicity of the Church to which we belong ;
" that her dogmatic declarations being suspended upon
" Scripture, not being interpretations of Scripture, are

14 THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.
" not final, according to the sense of Scripture in any one
" year or century ; but are provisional, until men shall
" agree in the sense of Scripture. And this they will
"hereafter, more than they have as yet; at least so far as
" to understand the necessary limits of their own powers
" and of its words ; when the form of a creed will be felt
" to be unimportant in comparison of a growing consent
" concerning the Scripture itself. That either positive
"dogma, or negation of dogma, should be absolutely
"final and /or ever fixed, is inconsistent with man's con-
" dition as a progressive being; that a statement of dogma
" should be provisional, suspended upon the attainment
" of further light, or upon the improvement of our facul-
" ties pf judging, is perfectly consistent with it."
Whatever may be thought of this passage, let us
look to the state of Scripture interpretation in general.
More than doubt thrown upon the first chapter of
Genesis — the history of The Fall treated as a myth, or
received in its purely literal sense only to provoke a smile
— the history of the flood questioned — a great part of
the Pentateuch a nonentity — the Psalms not satisfactorily
explained — the interpretation of prophecy almost wholly
conjectural — 'the Apocalypse a sealed book to this very
day ; nearly all that is left to the Church as being of
practical import being the Gospels and Epistles ; not un
frequently the Epistles superseding the Gospels. Such is
the actual state of Scripture interpretation. But to pro
ceed : —
Another writer. Fellow and formerly Tutor of King's
College, Cambridge, observes, in a work entitled Rational
Godliness, p. 402, " One thing however is clear, and
" that I desire to say very seriously ; the spirit of enquiry
" is most likely to go hand in hand with reverence, if no

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE. 15
" other checks be imposed upon it than such as come of
" conscience and of truth. . . . The prospects of an attack
" must very much depend upon the conduct of the de-
" fenders. If those who have leisure, learning, and au-
" thority, encourage persons less informed, not merely in
" entertaining as opinions, but in asserting as foundations
" of the faith, things which scholars are ashamed to say ;
" there must come a crash of things perishable, in which
" also things worth preserving may suffer shipwreck.
" Whereas, if the same persons were wise to distinguish
"eternal meaning from temporal shape, it would still
" prove that though the Church is beaten by waves, yet
" she is founded on a rock."
However some may disapprove of these statements,
they are only tbe re-echo of the words of Bishop Law in
his ConMderations on the Theory of Beligion, p. 218 :
" Let us be intent on studying the Word of God ;
" and careful to interpret it in such a manner as may do
" honor to its Author ; and at all times encourage a free,
" fair, and impartial examination of it. It is now high
" time to do this, and to awake out of sleep, since our
" visitation is much nearer than when we first believed :
"and it is devoutly to be wished, that we could be
" persuaded to examine our own state before others are
" obliged to do it for us ; that we were heartily disposed
" to help and forward, rather than check the progress of
" every serious enquiry and stop any further improve-
" ments in the knowledge of that which of all things
" deserves, and wants it most, — rather than withstand a
"general Reformation in reUgion by rigorously insisting
" on, and obtruding such things for doctrine as are found
" to be but the commandments of men and very foreign

16 THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.
" to the essence of Christianity,*— instead of either enter-
"taining that Antichristian kind of spirit which calls
" down fire from heaven on all who db not immediately re-
" ceive us ; which delights in straitening the way that leads
" to life, and shutting others out from the kingdom of
" heaven ; or incurring the woe denounced against those
" hypocrites who are desirous of lading men with heavy
" burdens, — with binding upon them things which are
" too grievous to be borne, which they know or might
" know, that none need touch with one of their fingers."
The learned Prelate, however, observes, p. 299 : " I
" desire it may be observed here, once for all, that when
" I mention improvements in religion, I do not intend a
" discovery of any new points, or improving upon the
" original revelation itself, in things essential to the gene-
" ral doctrine of salvation," etc. The " general doctrine"
means the one common and simple profession of faith re-
" ferred to in p. 220, where it is said, " The next step
" toward the increase of Christ's kingdom must be a
" farther improvement of Christianity, and of those who
" receive and profess it. The Church of Rome is not the
" only Church that wants amendment. Other Christian
" societies, which have separated themselves from her and
"from her grosser defects, are departed more or less
"from the original simplicity of the Gospel, and have
" mixed some doctrines of men with the Word of God,
" and so stand in need of some improvement."
On a similar principle to the one here maintained.
Bishop Warburton teaches that Christianity is progressive
equally with Science, and that the two cases are perfectly
* A somewhat confused sentence, but the design of the Author is
plain.

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE. 17
parallel. Thus in his Sermon upon " What is truth," he
observes (Sermon i. p. 22) :
" But it is not only from what lies hid, but from what
" hath been discovered, that the enemies of our Faith can
" raise objections to jits discredit. If in these later times
"it hath been pretended that a more rational idea of
" God's Dispensations hath been proposed ; if the various
" genius, the comparative excellence, the mutual depen-
" dence, the reciprocal illustration of the several parts and
" the gradual progress of the whole toward perfection,
" have been investigated with a penetration, sohdity, and
" precision unknown to those ages which time alone hath
" taught us to esteem venerable ; if, I say, this hath been
" pretended, we are then asked, ' How it came to pass
" that Truths so sublime and useful, should have lain
" hid till now, when the light of the Spirit was sent so
" early and had illuminated the Church so long ? How
" it came to pass they were denied to the best times ;
" and, after a long course of ages, reserved as a reward
" for the very worst ?' And when they have asked this,
" to discredit old truths, they can, in order to increase
" the prejudices against them, join with bigots, how in-
" consistently soever, to decry the new."
In answer to this objection. Bishop Warburton ob
serves, in reference to the promise and. gift of the Spirit :
" Now the endowment of Grace is in this respect just
" the same with every common endowment of Nature ; of
" little advantage without our co-operation ! God hath
" given men hands and feet to procure good and to avert
" evil. But the benefit does not operate like a charm ;
" it is to our dexterous application of the members that
" we owe all the advantages arising from their use. So
" it is in the free gift of the Spirit ; it was bestowed upon
c

18 THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.
" US to enUghten the understanding, to assist the judg-
" ment, and to redress the disorders of the will. But if
" either we refuse to exert these faculties, or will direct
" them to improper objects, the use and efficacy of Grace
" must surely be defeated. These reflections will enable
"us to give a reasonable account, how it might happen
" that very important truths concerning God's moral Dis-
" pensations may have remained hid for ages, and yet be
" reserved (to the greater glory of his Gospel in its great-
" est need), for the discovery of these ivorse and latter
" times." " This supposed ordinance in the economy of Grace
"may receive credit from what is confessed to have
" happened in the economy of Nature."
"The Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of the Author of
" the system to which we belong, are so clear and evident
" from every obvious configuration of matter surrounding
" us, that it cannot escape the notice of the most inatten-
" tive, or lie concealed from the most ignorant. Hence a
" God, — the Maker, Preserver, and Governor of the
" world, — is the concurrent voice of Nature,"
"Now Creation and Government from which the
"morality of human actions is deduced, are the great
" principles of Natural Religion. So that God could not
" be said to have been wanting in the discovery of himself
" to the lowest of his reasonable creatures. Yet though
" the obvious marks of his Power, Wisdom, and Good-
" ness thus obtrude themselves upon all men ; it is certain
" that a well-directed study, in the contemplation of the
" great book of Nature, opens to us such stupendous
" wonders of his Power, such awful scenes of his Wis-
" dom, and such enchanting prospects of his Goodness, as
" exceed all conception of the unlettered and uninstructed

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE. 19
" spectator. Some faint taste of these beauties the more
" inquisitive enjoyed very early ; but their successors, by
" by too much indulging in Speculation and allowing too
"little to Experience, instead of finding a real, invented
" an infinite variety of ideal worlds ; all as dishonourable
" to the Author pf Nature as distant from his Truth. At
" length men grew wiser by the foUies of those who went
" before them ; and a different method of studying Na-
" ture was invented and pursued ; in which fancy was
"excluded, and fact only allowed for a solid ground of
" physical progression. From this time Science advanced ;
" the Veil of Nature was drawn aside ; and her sacred
"mysteries exposed to the open admiration of all men."
" This was the case in the system of Nature. The
" system of Grace seems to run exactly parallel."
Having stated that the study of the Scriptures has
passed through phases similar to those of the study of
Nature, owing to unfavorable circumstances in the Civil
and Literary world, the bias of inveterate prejudices and
other causes, the learned Prelate concludes, that, " If in
" these times* the advances in the knowledge of God's
" Will should haply prove as considerable as those in the
" discovery of his Works, it will not be beside a reasonable
" expectation ; as similar means are always likely to pro-
" duce similar effects,"
" We have placed these correspondent histories of
" the progress of the human mind in Nature and Grace
"thus near one another, that by comparing the parts
"of them together in the same view, we may see
" whether there be any objections to the truth of new
" discoveries in religious matters that do not equally hold
* A.D. 1753. c 2

20 THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.
" against the truth of new discoveries in natural ; of which
" for their newness alone, no man ever yet entertained the
" least suspicion." . . .
..." It is confessed that the Book of Nature is so
" plain and clear, that every sentence names and reveals
" its Author ; that if less obvious truths have lain a long
" time concealed, it was men's own fault in adhering to
" a perverse method of enquiry ; and that when after-
" wards a better was invented, and they began to apply
" it with more care and sobriety, knowledge opened and
" enlarged itself proportionably ; while the sudden blaze
" of Ught which followed, was so far from making Truth
" suspected, that it dissipated all those doubts which had
" before been held of its obscure and equivocal nature."
" But now, if we turn from Physical to Religious en-
" quiries, we shall find that the very contrary inference
" hath been drawn from all the same circumstances. Be-
" cause men had been long unsuccessful in the discovery
" of the higher truths of Religion, not only these so lately
"found and so difficultly comprehended, but even the
"most obvious principles early delivered and generally
" received, have been rendered doubtful and suspected."
"But there is another sort of men, the pretended
" friends indeed of Religion, who from too great reverence
" for things established, have joined with such as have
" too little, in decrying all novelties in religious matters."
"These men, abhorring the vanity to be thought
" wiser than their forefathers, have in express terms de-
" clared their displeasure at making what they caU expe-
" riments in Religion."
" Divines, it is true, have long disputed how experi-
" ments in ReUgion should be made. Some would employ
" Scripture alone ; others were for taking in Fathers and

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE. 31
' Councils ; and a thnd sort for applying raillery and
' ridicule to the process. But till of late, every man was
'for some experiment or other. For what is making
' experiments, but, as we have just shewn, illustrating
' Revelation by new arguments arising from new discove-
' ries made in the order, fitness, and harmony of the
' various Dispensations of religion amongst themselves ;
'just as philosophers (of whom the word is borrowed,)
' unfold Nature by new discoveries, made from repeated
' trials, in the contents of bodies."
"No experiments in Religion is indeed the language
' of Statesmen (for in some things bigotry and politics
' agree, as extremes run easily into one another by their
' very attempts to keep at distance) ; because, according
' to the Politician's Creed, Religion being useful to the
' State, and yet only a well-invented fiction, all experi-
' ments, that is, all enquiries into its truth, naturally
' tend not to confirm, but to unsettle this necessary sup-
' port of Civil Government."
" But for one who believes Religion to come from God,
'to be frighted with the danger of experitnents, is to
' take his friend for his enemy ; the most ridiculous of
' all panic terrors."
" One might reasonably ask such a one, how it comes
' to pass that experiments, of so sovereign use in the
'knowledge of Nature, should be calculated to make
' such havoc in Religion ? Are not both the works of
' God ? Were not both given for man's contemplation ?
' Have not both, as proceeding from the common Master
' of the Universe, their depths and obscurities ? And
' doth not the unfolding the mysteries of moral govern-
' ment tend equally with displaying the secrets of the
'natural, to the advancement of God's glory and the

22 THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.
"happiness of man? In a word, had no experiments
" been made in Nature we had still slept in the shade or
" wandered in the labyrinth of School Philosophy ; and
"had no experiments been made in ReUgion, we had
" stiU kept blundering on in the rugged and dark paths
" of School Divinity."
. . . . " What reason seems to require of us is this ;
" that if yet we know not The Truth, we should seek it of
" those who do ; and if the plain and simple principles of
" it win not serve our turn, but that we wiU needs philo-
" sophize and demand a reason for every thing, that at
" least we stay for an answer ; and stay too till we un-
" derstand it, before we venture to pronounce the Religion
" of our country to be nothing but a mere human impo-
" sition." But further : — With respect to new discoveries in re
lation to mofal and religious Truth, there is an obser
vation in the Bampton Lectures for 1836 which it is
desirable to notice, p. 88 :
"It has often been asserted, that the department
" of Moral Truth admits not of discoveries properly so
" called. The assertion is one, which, after some explana-
" tion and under some restriction, may be granted. In
" the department of religious truth the case is different -.
" here it has been perceived and is aUowed, that there
" exists not only a possibility but a previous likelihood of
" what may be strictly considered and justly termed dis-
" coveries. Such subjects as lie beyond the reach of the
" eye of the human understanding, the manner of the
"Divine existence, the course of the Divine Dispensa-
" tions, the final destiny of man — such subjects as these
" form the appropriate matters of an express Revelation.
" The disclosures made respecting them are discoveries,

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE, 23
' because these are subjects, which, without Revelation,
' must have remained for ever hidden."
"And as from these discoveries once made, new duties
' immediately result ; as moreover by means of the same
' discoveries the foundations of Moral Science are more
' broadly and more firmly laid, the force of moral mo-
' fives greatly strengthened, and a flood of light thrown
' over the whole field of Moral speculation ; it is evident
' that the assertion lately noticed, requires to be restricted
'and qualified by a reference to both these considera-
' tions ; for duties previously recognized are thus seen to
' be invested with a character that may entitle them to
' be called in some sort new ; and although of duties con-
' fessedly new it may be contended that even they flow
' from general moral principles, prior to the disclosures,
'which rather make manifest and develop than create
' their obligation : it must after all be conceded, that
' these duties in some sort partake of that character of
' discoveries which belongs to the religious truths whereon
'they depend."
Now what is making experiments in religion, says
Bishop Warburton, but illustrating Revelation by new ar
guments arising from new discoveries made in the order,
fitness, and harmony of the various Dispensations of reli-
'gion among themselves ?-— Thus one Dispensation inter
prets another; the Christian interprets the Mosaic : is there
to be another Dispensation to interpret the Christian ?
Whether another be or be not admitted,* makes little dif
ference in the argument, so long as the foregoing analogy
is allowed to exist between the Progress of Science and the
Progress of Theology : indeed progressive discovery in
regard to the interpretation of the Word of God no Com-
* See above, p. 5.

24 THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE.
raentator has yet called in question ; for as there is to be
a progressive fulfilment of prophecy, so there is to be a
progressive discovery of its fulfilment. " But thou, 0
" Daniel, close the words, and seal up the book, until the
" time of the end, when many shall have searched dili-
" gently, and knowledge shall be increased" (Dan. xii. 4).
" One cannot," says Wintle upon this passage, " help ob-
" serving here the analogy between God's Word and his
" works. Not only the operations of Nature have been
" unravelled, but every useful art and invention traced
" out and brought to perfection by the continued labor
" and successive industry of men. And the like gradual
"process must be observable with respect to the Word of
" God," etc. Hence Mayer observes on Daniel xn. 4 :
" Therefore let no man say, ' Are ye wiser than the
" ancient Fathers, ye who are but of as it were yes-
" terday ?' and therefore give little credit to any new
" interpretation brought by modern writers ; and yet let
" none upon this ground be too credulous neither, but
" see good reason first, before that any sense brought be
" received as a new light, by which too many are led in
" these days ; lest it prove but a light to lead into a pit,
" as ignis fatuus doth." It is an observation of Bishop
Lowth, that prophecies are never fully understood till
they are accomplished; and that the nearer the time*
approaches of their accomplishment, the more light will
diligent searchers have for explaining them.
Bishop Butler himself proceeds in a similar manner.
In one of his Charges, he recognizes the fact of "The
"glorious establishment of Christianity in the Last
" Days ; " indeed, Mr. Lee observes in his work on the
Lnspiration of Holy Scripture, p. 409, speaking pf the
adaptation of the interpretation of Scripture to the Pro-

THEOLOGY PROGRESSIVE. 26
gress of Science, " Nor can it for a moment be main-
" tained that such endeavours to readjust our interpreta-
" tion of the language of Holy Scripture, can derogate
"from its supreme authority. A remark of Bishop
" Butler with reference to the scheme of Scripture, holds
" equally true with reference to its interpretation, — if we
" only substitute the facts of Science for the events of His-
" tory : ' Nor is it at all incredible, that a Book which has
" been so long in the possession of mankind, should con-
" tain many truths as yet undiscovered. For all the same
" phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation
" from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge
"have been made in the present and last age, were
" equally in the possession of mankind several thousand
"years before. And possibly it might be intended that
" events, as they come to pass, should open and ascertain
" the meaning of several parts of Scripture.' "
Now among the events which occurred in the history
of Natural Science, was the appearance of an order of
philosophers who maintained that the method , of inter
preting Nature had hitherto been erroneous : they there
fore established a different method founded upon different
principles. Can we presume that any parallel event will
occur in regard to the interpretation of the Word of
God ?* In one respect, a parallel is universaUy admitted.
In Natural Science man is the fministerj servant and
interpreter of Nature (the work of God) ; in Revealed
Theology man is the minister and- interpreter of the
Word of God. As then no progress for so long a period
was made in Natural Science, because of a wrong method
of investigation, has a parallel cause been in operation to
* See Sermons on the Epistles and Gospels, by the Eev. Isaac
Williams, vol. iii., p. 275.

26 NEGLECT OF ANALOGY.
impede the progress of Theology ? This brings me to
the Second part of the present Letter, in which it is pro
posed to inquire whether the prevailing Theology be sus
ceptible of improvement -. or, in the terms before stated,
whether there be any occasion for a principle of Progress.
It wiU be granted that the basis of all sound The
ology is a right apprehension of God, and that this right
apprehension is to be derived from a study of the Scrip
tures. But if we study the Scriptures, on what principle
are they to be interpreted ?
It is admitted that the Scriptures assign human
attributes to God -. that the Fathers laid it down as a
rule that these attributes are not to be assigned to Him
in a literal sense, but in a sense worthy of his Divine
Nature, i. e. deoirpem-w^; ; for it was acknowledged that the
greatest heresies arose from the neglect of this rule, such,
for instance, as those of Eunomius, Arius, and others.
Now, the principle upon which the human attributes
were to be transferred to God was that of Analogy or
Correspondence ; which is therefore at once recognized as
the fundamental principle of all sound Theology. If this
principle be misapplied ; much more, if it be misunder
stood, or fall into disuse ; wiU there not assuredly follow
a confused, uncertain, and unsound Theology ? especially
when it is considered, that upon a right understanding
and application of this principle depends the right inter
pretation of the terms Father, Son, Spirit, Generation,
Redemption, Propitiation, Sacrifice, Purchase, Ransom,
Price, Blood, Expiation, Mediation or Lntercession, as
also the Divine Attributes of Goodness, Wisdom, Power,
and so forth. We may therefore presume, if the pre
vailing Theology be in a sound condition, that no prin
ciples in the Church have excited a more profound

NEGLECT OE ANALOGY. 27
interest, none have been more thoroughly studied, more
clearly defined, more carefully appUed, more demon
stratively stated, than that of Analogy, or as it has
been synonymously caUed, Correspondence. Let us
enquire how far this has been the case.
It is well known that in the early and succeeding
ages of the Church the principle of Correspondence
entered largely into the interpretations of Scripture;
though it appears to have been far from being fully
understood.* By some it was resorted to principally
in cases of doctrinal controversy : thus when Atha-
nasius said, " These things are expressed, indeed, after
" the manner of men and in human language ; but
" they are conceived in a godlike or heavenly manner ;"
this, as the author of Divine Analogy observes,! " was
"levelled at the Arians, who founded their heretical
"opinions, and the whole stress of their reasoning in
" defence of them, upon the strictly literal acceptation
" and meaning of the terms wherein the Mysteries of the
" Gospel are revealed : whereas we express those Myste-
" ries in words of human language, which lose their strict
"propriety when applied to things supernatural and
"Divine, and are then to be understood analogically."
Aquinas, indeed, has treated of the principle and exhi
bited its use in the interpretation of Scripture in a man
ner which few in the present day care to recognize ; and
" It may well be thought strange," says the Bishop of
Cork,t " that in the space of above four hundred and fifty
" years (after Aquinas) no further improvement should
* Conybeare's Bampton Lectures for 1834, furnish ample details
tpon this subject. The present Letter is intended to refer to more
recent times. t p. 87. X p. 96.

28 neglect of analogy.
" be made in treating of the Doctrine of Analogy ; and
" that so important a point should have been thus en-
" tu-ely overlooked, among the many useless and trifling,
"and some of them even mischievous, niceties of the
" Schools." It was thought a great achievement of the
Reformation that in the interpretation of Scripture it
discarded the principle almost entirely, and conflned it
self to the Literal and Metaphorical systems. In the
eighteenth century however, Arianism began to become
formidable in this country, and the principle of Analogy
again to shew its importance in doctrinal controversy.
Accordingly, —
" I am now come down to our own times,"* says the
author of Divine Analogy,^ " wherein Arianism hath been
" not only revived, but wrought up, together with aU the
" principles of Socinianism not inconsistent with it, into
" a new and formidable heresy ; which from hiding its
" head in clandestine darkness and recess, and sculking
" from the Laws, without ever appearing in public, but
" under cover of dissimulation and a color of Orthodoxy,
" begins now to stare the received established Orthodox
" truth in the face, not without an insulting disdain and
" triumphant pity of whatever has been said or written
" against it. The prime authors and defenders of it have,
" vrithout any provocation, and merely through a foresight
" of the impending danger which threatened their hypo-
" thesis from the Doctrine of Divine Analogy, attacked it
" vigorously at every turn ; and with so much keenness
" and virulence, that they seem to have wasted all their
" strength against it already, before this untried ground
"can be fairly laid out for the engagement. On the
"side of Orthodoxy we find no mention of Analogy, but
* A.D. 1733. f p. 98.

neglect of analogy, 29
" where men are hard pressed with absurdity in the ap-
" plication of terms in their literal propriety to things
" Divine and supernatural ; nor have they yet proceeded
" any farther than to some general expressions concerning
" it, and that often without even the name ; and some-
" times perhaps to a few remarks on it, dubiously if not
" erroneously worded ; for the most part with as much
" caution as they would use in walking upon the brink
" of a precipice, from whence they observed others, by
" making a wrong step, to have fallen down headlong."
The author seems here to be excepting his own
work in answer to Toland's Christianity not Mysterious,
and to be speaking of the Orthodox in general : there
was also in this age another remarkable exception to
the general rule, in a Discourse on Predestination by
Dr. King, Archbishop of Dublin, in which the subject of
Analogy is especially treated of, and which in his " En-
" quiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestina-
"tion," Bishop Coplestone thus notices, notes, p. 115:
" I cannot omit the opportunity thus afforded me of
"recommending that Treatise to all students who have
" been conscious to themselves of any confusion or per-
" plexity upon these subjects. It has indeed been the
"practice of the most eminent Divines to dissuade us
" from entering far into such abstruse speculations ; in-
" duced by a reasonable disgust of the manner in which
" topics of that sacred nature are too often handled ;
" and by a disapprobation of many consequences which
" seemed, plausibly enough, to be connected with each
" opinion when peremptorily maintained."
This Prelate justly reprobates the unchristian temper
in which Dr. Edwards, a contemporary of the Arch
bishop, had opposed the Discourse in question: but omits

30

neglect of analogy.

aU notice of two remarkable works published by Dr
Brown, afterwards Bishop of Cork; the first entitled.
The Procedure and Limits of the Human Understanding ;
the second. Divine Analogy; in which the author en
deavors to correct some serious errors into which the
Archbishop had fallen ; but in correcting which, he on
his own part, is considered to have fallen into errors
equally serious. These works we shall have occasion
to refer to in the sequel, as being written with a
view to supply the great desideratum in Theological
Literature. " Lord Bacon," says he, " the great genius
" of the last century, under the head of Revelation and
" the Mysteries of Revelation, observes, how God hath
" vouchsafed ta let himself down to our capacities ; so un-
" folding his mysteries as that they may be best or most
" aptly perceived by us ; and, as it were, grafting or
" inoculating his Revelations into those notions and con-
" ceptions of reason which are already in us. After which
" he reckons a Treatise of Logic calculated for this very
" purpose among his Desiderata." This Treatise was to
be a sort of divine dialectics, and to be entitled, Sophron
sive De Legitimo usu Rationis humance in Divinis. Now,
says the Bishop, in his Procedure,* " This is the very
" thing I aim at, and what I endeavor, by this first Trea-
" tise, to perform in some degree." This work passed
through about three editions ; the succeeding work upon
Divine Analogy, I believe, only one ; and both have now
fallen into almost total oblivion. f Another edition, how
ever, of the Discourse of Archbishop King on Predesti-
* Introduction, p, 33.
f Reference however has been very recently made to both these
works by A, C. Frazer, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in New
College, Edinburgh. See his Essays in Philosophy, p. 216.

NEGLECT OF ANALOGY. 31
nation, and explanatory of the principles of Analogy, has
of late years been published by the present Archbishop of
Dublin, in the Introduction to which, referring to. the
author of the Discourse, the editor observes :
"The principles he lays down are at least equally
" applicable to every other mysterious doctrine revealed
" in Scripture. So that if we admit Dr. King's notions
" to be correct, they must be the proper basis of all sound
" theology ; and the Discourse might justly have borne
" the title of a Rule for interpreting rightly the Scripture
" accounts of God, and of his dealings with mankind''
Yet what says the editor, — " Considering, indeed, not
" only that the author was a person of no mean repute
" in his day, but that this very Discourse attracted so
" much attention as to pass through, at least, six editions;*
" and, considering also that its subject is by no means
" one of temporary interest, and that it possesses the
" rare merit of being calculated for almost all descriptions
" of readers ; one is disposed to wonder at its having so
"far sunk into oblivion, that a large majority probably
" of theological students have never even heard of it."
Such, then, is the neglect of a principle which is
justly declared to be the basis of all sound theology.
Now if the basis of sound theology be neglected ; if
consequently the very " Rule for interpreting rightly the
" Scripture accounts of God, and of his dealings with
" mankind'' become either absolutely unknovm, or else
uncertain, unsettled, or a matter of dispute ; wiU not all
Scripture interpretation become itself unsettled, and
hence a matter of dispute ? For what are the dealings
of God with mankind but his dispensations ? and what
* Its opposition to Calvinism seems to have been one cause of its
circulation.

32 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
is Scripture but the Word of God to man according to
these dispensations ? and may we not here perceive the
cause of the existing state of theology — of the ever-recur
ring controversies concerning God and his attributes, the
interpretation of Scripture, and its doctrines ; hence of
"the infidelity, scepticism, and heresy, which, it is said,
" at the present crisis threaten our University ?"
If, however, the basis of all sound theology has been
so generally neglected on all sides, why must we suppose
that the dangers to the Christian faith will necessarily
arise only on one side? If, as we have seen affirmed,
the very orthodox themselves have neglected the funda
mental principle of sound theology, are we to presume
that no evUs will arise from that neglect? that aU the
dangers to the Christian faith will arise from assaUants,
and none from the defenders? Allow me, then, most
respectfully to suggest, not to the assaUants, but to the
defenders of the faith, some of those evUs which have
arisen out of the neglect of the doctrine of Analogy or
Correspondence, which still continue to exist, to impede
the progress and imperil the existence of sound theology.
The first is a practical denial, by some theologians, of
the very principle itself of Analogy or Correspondence.
Thus for instance : while it is admitted by some that
there is a similis ratio between the Finite and the In
finite, it is regarded by others as of so low a nature
and so very remote, that, says the Bishop of Cork,*
" Some learned men have run into a very dangerous ex-
" treme, and have peremptorily denied, not only that
" there can be any similitude, but even any proportion
"or correspondency between the intellectual or moral
"perfections of a Human mind and those which are
* Divine Analogy, p. 117.

DENIAL OF ANALOGY. 33
" Divine. Lnter Lnfinitum et Finitum, says one, simpli-
" cissimum et compositum, dependens et independens nulla
" similitudo. And again : Licet igitur Deum pradicemus
" Sapientem, Sanctum, Bonum, Potentem ; eademque en-
" comia Angelis et Hominibus tribuamus ; non credendum
"propterea easdem, aut similes verbis illis significari
" Perfectiones — Deum igitur Optimum, Maximum, Regem,
" .Sternum, Justum, Fortem prcedicamus, propterea quod
" istius modi titulis, eos qui magni a nobis cestimantur
" solemus cohonestare ; non vero quod in animo habeamus
"ipsum Deum vocibus illis describere ; aut aliquam in
"ipso nostris similem perfectionem designare — Lmmenso
" igitur distinguimur intervallo, quo Proportio omnis ex-
" cluditur." " It might have been said with great truth," observes
the Bishop, " that all conceivable and known similitude and
" correspondency is excluded ; for the true ground and
" degrees of that similitude which all inteUigent beings
" bear to their great Archetype, are as incomprehensible
" as the Divine nature ; but to deny that there can be any
" similitude conceivable or inconceivable, is in effect to deny
" that man is made ' Ln the likeness of God or after his own
" image :' upon that principle we can affix no inteUigible
" meaning to that text ; but we destroy it utterly by say-
" ing in short, Lnter Finitum et Lnfinitum nulla similitudo.
" That nothing finite can be of the same kind with that
" which is Infinite, is as plain as a first principle ; but to
" assert that there can be no similitude or proportion or
" correspondency in one to the other, is to overturn the
" whole foundation of all our divine knowledge, which is
"only by Analogy; insomuch that if there can be no
" similitude between finite and Infinite, there can be no
" solid ground for a parity of reason in our whole manner
D

34 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
" of thinking and speaking of things supernatural and
" Divine. But as we have not only reason, but the Word
" of God, to support the truth of that similitude ; so we
" are to depend upon his goodness and veracity in not
"suffering us to be liable to such an inevitable and
" universal delusion as we should labor under if it were
" groundless." We thus see that to reject the doctrine of Analogy
or Correspondence, when treating of the Being or Attri
butes of God, is " to overturn the whole foundation of
" all our divine knowledge," to take away all " solid
" ground for parity of reason in our whole manner of
" thinking and speaking of things supernatural and Di-
"vine," and to submit ourselves to "inevitable and uni-
" versal delusion" in all that relates to the Divine Being :
wherefore also the author says, p. 347^ " They who labor
" to take away from us this knowledge of God, and his
"attributes and operations (as obtained) by analogy;
" either ignorantly or designedly strike at the foundation
" of all religion ; and are unwarily or treacherously doing
" the work of infidels and heretics," he elsewhere adds —
of Deists and Atheists also.
The argument, then, has arrived thus far ; that the
foundation of all our knowledge of God is laid in the
doctrine of Analogy or Correspondence. This is equally
acknowledged by Archbishop King in the Discourse al
ready referred to ; and would be theoretically, at least,
maintained by the best theologians of the present day.
Analogy, then, or Correspondence, implies not an
imaginary, but a real relationship ; for if it did not,
then, inasmuch as the attributes of God are known only
by analogy, we should have no assurance of the reality
of the attributes of God, no certain knowledge of what

ANALOGY IMPLIES CORRESPONDING REALITY. 35
God is, or whether He is. In this point of view. Analogy
or Correspondence is the very foundation of all truth re
specting God, and the things of heaven. So far from
implying what is imaginary, it is the very essential prin
ciple of aU certainty respecting things Divine.
" It is," says Mr. Veysie, " only by analogical repre-
" sentations that we can form the least conception relating
"to God and the invisible world" (p. 126); "it implies
" not an imaginary resemblance, but a real correspond-
" ence" (p. 122) ; nay more, it implies such certainty in
its nature, that it is actually made use of in mathematical
demonstration. Bishop Brown affirms, p. 57, " that
"words employed in their analogical sense imply as
"much truth and reality* as when they are taken in
" their Uteral sense ;" nay, much more than this, for he
agrees with Archbishop King, who says that they express
in God the perfect archetypal reaUties, only the imperfect
copies of which are in the creature ; for in God they are
" the originals, the true real things of a nature infinitely
" superior " to what they are in us, p. 478.
Hence also he observes, p. 507, "As this Analogy is
" the only ground of aU our knowledge of things purely
" spiritual ahd supernatiiral, so it is to this we owe the
"greatest fulness and enlargement of it: it is the highest
" degree of spiritual and divine knowledge we are capable
"of in this Ufe; and they who are not contented with
" it, must reject not only all Revelation and Gospel mys-
" ieif,hixi all Natural Religi'dk'Yikevfise-, since we have
" no other way but this of coiiceiving even God and his
" attributes." Now as the very nature of Analogy implies that the
wbrd analogically used involves a double sense, the literal
* See also Warburton's Sermons, Ser. ii,, p. 41.
D 2

36 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
and the correspondential ; so they who deny this double
sense in relation to the attributes of God, and to heavenly
things, undermine aU Revelation and Gospel Mystery as
weU as Natural Religion ; the doctrine of Correspondence
being the fundamental principle of both. For if we know
nothing of God except by analogy, and if analogy implies
a corresponding reality in God, they who deny that ana
logy necessarily deny the corresponding reality of the
Divine attributes, and hence the existence of God himself.
Hence the great argument of Atheists; and, therefore,
in the case of analogy applied to the Attributes of God,
they use the very language which divines have used when
applied to the interpretation of the Word of God : they
are quite ready to say, " Of these things there is no be-
" ginning, and no end ; no certain principles, and no
" good conclusion." Such is the parallel between the
interpretation of the Attributes of God and of the Word
of God, in the case of the literal sense. Let us now
proceed to the metaphorical.
Bishop Berkeley observes, in his Minute Philosopher,
p. 64, " That a twofold analogy is distinguished by the
" schoolmen, metaphorical and proper. Of the first kind
" there are frequent instances in Holy Scripture, attri-
" buting human parts and passions to God. When he is
" represented as having a finger, an eye, or an ear ; when
" he is said to repent, to be angry or grieved, every one
" sees that analogy is merely metaphorical."
Bishop Brown, also, quotes a metaphysical author in
his Divine Analogy, p. 157, who, speaking of the terms
used in the Word of God, observes ; " Those words being
"proper to express men's natural notions, which they
" had from creatures . . , when we apply them to the
" Divine nature, they must be in some sort metaphorical or

ANALOGY SUPERSEDED BY METAPHOR. 37
" transferred thence to God" ..." They must be necessa-
" rily transferred from creatures to God, which is to be me-
" taphorical." So also Dr.Bentley, in his answer to Collins
on Freethinking, observes. Sec. 10, that, "All the words
" that the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin of old, or of any
" tongue now or hereafter can supply to denote the s-ub-
" stance of God or soul, must either be thus metaphorical ;
" or else merely negative, as incorporeal or immaterial."
Accordingly, Dr. WalUs observes, in his Fifth letter con
cerning the Sacred Trinity, p. 18, "Now two of these
" three (viz.. Divine Persons), being represented in Scrip-
" ture as Father and Son ; and this Father said to beget
" the Son, and all these in a sense metaphorical (not in
" such sense as those words do properly signify amongst
" men) ; they thought it not unfit in continuation of the
" same metaphor, to call them Persons. Because as the
" word person doth properly agree to the relations of
" Father and Son in a proper sense, so doth the word
" person in a metaphorical sense, to the Father and Son
" so taken metaphorically ; and the word beget by a like
" metaphor."* In agreement with this view of the subject, it is ob
served, in what has now become a standard work on the
study of the Holy Scriptures, vol. ii., p. 387, sixth edi-
* Of course, if the Church of England sets the example, no
wonder that Dissenters should foUow it. In a controversy, now carried
on in one of their periodicals, it is observed by one of their most in
telligent writers, "That most, if not all, the technical words of Scrip-
" ture are metaphorical, and have been adopted partly because of the
" limited nature of our faculties, and partly because of the poverty of
" human language ; and then, men love to vise figurative terms. These
" metaphorical words are not only found in the GrSek Testament, but
" in the Hebrew Bible, and are current in our own language."-^C/«m-
tian Weekly News, March 35, 1856.

38 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
lion, that " The metaphor is of indispensable necessity in
" the Scriptures ; for the sacred writers having occasion
" to impart Divine and spiritual things to man, could
" only do it by means of terms borrowed from sensible,
" and material objects ; as all our knpwledge begins at
"our senses. Hence it is, especially in the poetical and
" prophetical parts of the Old Testament, that the senti-
" ments, actions, and corporeal parts, not only of man,
" but also of inferior creatures, are ascribe4 to Gpd him-
" self; it being otherwise impossible for us to form any
" conception of his pure Essence and incommunicable Jt-
" tributes." To this application of metaphor, instead of analogy,
to the Essence and Attributes of God, the Bishop of Cork
objects, on the. ground of its undermining all t;rue know
ledge of God and interpretation of the Scriptures. Thus
he observes in his Procedure, p. 134 ; "Were we capable
" of forming no other than merely metaphorical ideas or
" conceptions of God and heavenly things, and were no
" other also made use of in a revelation of doctrines en-
" tirely new concerning them ; such merely figurative
"ideas or conceptions could never have answered the
"necessary ends either of natural or revealed religion.
" For as they would then be mere figure and allusion
"only, without conveying a notion of anything corres-
"pondent or answerable in the very intrinsic nature of
" the Divine things ; we never could have argued from
" them with justness a,nd certainty, or without perpetiial
" mistake and fatal error : all our reasonings upon them
" would be precarious and without any soUd foundation
" in the nature of the things ; and, in short, we should
" have nothing more than a merely figurative, that is, no
"real, and true, and exact knowledge of them at all."

ANALOGY SUPERSEDED BY METAPHOR. 39
Accordingly, he observes, in his Lntroduction to the
same work, p. 38, that upon this principle we have a
Figurative Saviour, a Figurative Priest, a Figurative Me
diator; his merits and satisfaction, together with the
words price, purchase, redemption, washing, and cleans
ing of his blood, are all resolved into mere empty figure ;
and, in short, they who do so, " turn our whole Chris-
" tianity into a metaphorical reUgion." Into this part of
the argument, therefore, rush in the crowd of Deists
and Freethinkers, who affirm that if all these things are
to be understood in figure and metaphor only, they have
within them nothing of reality and solid truth. " The
" progress from thence," says the author of The Proce
dure, " into speculative Atheism, is short and easy. For
"if all Revealed Religion is to be rejected as merely
"figurative and metaphorical, then all Natural Religion is
" to be Ukewise rejected ; because aU the ideas and con-
" ceptions we can have of God and his Attributes from
" the light of reason, must be equaUy figurative and me-
" taphorical ; and, therefore, we have no real true know-
" ledge at all of them, and, consequently, can never prove
" the existence of a Being whereof we have no true con-
" ception or knowledge."
One reason, probably, for this observation was the
following remark, which had then only recently been
made by Locke in his Essay on the Human Understand
ing, vol. ii., p. 269 : —
" Since wit and fancy find easier entertainment in
" the world, than dry truth and real knowledge, Figura-
" tive speeches and aUusion in language wUl hardly be
" admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess,
" in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight
" than information and improvement, such ornaments as

40 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
"are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults.
" But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we
" must allow that aU the art of Rhetoric, besides order
" and clearness, aU the artificial and Figurative appUcation
" of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else
" but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and
" thereby mislead the judgment, and so, indeed, are per-
" feet cheats : and, therefore, however laudable or aUow-
" able oratory may render them in harangues and popular
" addresses, they are certainly in aU discourses that pre-
"tend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and
" where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but
" be thought a great fault, either of the language or per-
" son that makes use of them."
Accordingly, Bishop Brown is careful to draw the
distinction between Metaphor and Analogy.
" Metaphor," says he, " expresses only an imaginary
" resemblance or correspondency : analogy conveys the
" conception of a correspondent reality or resemblance.
" Metaphor is rather an aUusion, than a real substitution
" of ideas ; analogy, a proper substitution of notions and
"conceptions. Metaphor, at best, is but the using a
" very remote and foreign idea to express something al-
" ready supposed to be more exactly known : analogy
" conveys something correspondent and answerable, which
" could be now no otherwise usefully and reaUy known
" without it. Metaphor is mostly in words, and is a
" figure of speech ; analogy, a Similis Ratio or propor-
" tion of things, and an excellent and necessary method
"of reason and knowledge. Metaphor uses ideas of
" sensation to express immaterial and heavenly objects,
" to which they can bear no real resemblance or propor-
" tion ; analogy substitutes the operations of our soul,

ANALOGY SUPERSEDED BY METAPHOR. 41
" and notions mostly formed out of them, to represent
" Divine things, to which they bear a real though un-
" known correspondency and proportion. In short, me-
" taphor has no real foundation in the nature of the
" things compared ; analogy is founded in the very nature
" of the things on both sides of the comparison ; and
"the correspondency or resemblance is certainly real,
" though we do not know the exact nature, or manner,
" or degree of it. At least we may safely presume this
"from the truth and veracity of God, who has thus
" made his revelations to mankind under the analogical
"conceptions and language of this world."*
How lamentable is it, then, that so great a mistake
should have been made at the Reformation, and should
continue to this day, as to abandon the only principle
upon which we can arrive at any true knowledge of God
and of heavenly things ; and not only to abandon, but
even to ridicule it ! For as the Bishop of Cork observes,
p. 54 ; " If there were not a sure foundation for this
" Divine Analogy in the very nature of things, we should
" be under a grand delusion in all our sentiments of na-
" tural as well as revealed religion." Alas, the grand de
lusion has come to be considered as on the other side !
The reality is now said to be with the literalist ; the
grand delusion with the advocate of Correspondence !
Let us apply the rule of Hooker for the interpretation of
the Word of God to the interpretation of the Attributes
of God: " I hold it for a most infaUible rule in the expo-
" sition of the attributes of God, that where a literal con-
" struction will stand, the farthest from the letter is com-
"moiily the worst. There is nothing more dangerous
"than this licentious and deluding art which changes the
* Frocedure, p, 141.

42 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
" meaning of words as alchemy doth, or would do, the
" substance of metals, making of anything what it pleases;
" and bringing, in the end, all truth to nothing'' Now
the alchemy is that of Correspondence or Analogy.
Let us accordingly repudiate this licentious and de
luding art in regard to the Divine Attributes, as bringing
all truth to nothing, and adopt that literal and meta
phorical system of interpretation which is said to lead
pre-eminently to a right knowledge of the Word of
God. In this case the theological student is told that
"aU languages are more or less figurative; but they
" are most so in their earUest state. Before language
" is provided with a stock of words, sufficient in their
" literal sense to express what is wanted, men are under
"the necessity of extending the use of words beyond
" the literal sense. But the appUcation, when once be-
" gun, is not to be limited by the bounds of necessity.
"The imagination, always occupied with resemblances,
" which are the foundations of figures, disposes men to
" seek for figurative terms, where they might express
" themselves in literal terms. Figurative language pre-
" sents a kind of picture to the mind, and thus deUghts
" while it instructs; whence its use, though more necessary
"when a language is poor and uncultivated, is never
" wholly laid aside, especially in the writings of orators
" and poets. The language of the Scriptures is highly
"figurative, especially in the Old Testament." We are,
accordingly, reminded of the warm and vivid imagination
of the Orientals ; how the sacred poets, therefore, abound
•w£a. figures, every where scattering flowers and adorning
their poems with metaphors. This being laid down as a
general principle upon which the prophetical books of
Scripture are written, we are then supplied with the

ANALOGY SUPERSEDED BY METAPHOR. 43
purely literal principle for the historical ; and we are in
formed that the judgment of the interpreter is exercised
principally in distinguishing the literal from the figura
tive, and \k& figurative from the literal. Such is the ad
vice which is given to the student for the critical study
and knowledge of the Holy Scriptures ; such the repu
diation of the Ucentious and deluding art, which makes
of anything what it pleases, and in the end bringeth all
truth to nothing !
Let us now look back to the age preceding that of
the French Revolution, and which, we are informed, was
distinguished by deistical and infidel writings — an age
in which the Bishop of Cork composed his treatise on
Divine Analogy .-* " Most infidels and heretics," says he,
" found their reasoning upon a supposition that the attri-
" butes of God are of the very same kind in Him that
" they are in us ; and all the terms of the Gospel which
" they cannot strain to pure metaphor, they understand
" in a Uteral and proper acceptation ; so that one way or
" the other they bring all the mysteries of Christianity to
" nothing." Again :f " AU the modern refinements upon
"Arianism and Socinianism, and upon that infidelity
" which ... is the obvious result of them, together with all
" the main arguments by which they are supported, and
" the strongest objections against the Orthodox faith in
" the mysteries of the Gospel ; proceed upon men's run-
" ning either into the literal and strictly proper accepta-
" tion of all the terms in which they are expressed ; or
" into the other extreme of that which is -^uxgIy figura-
" tive and metaphorical. By which means the whole sub-
" stance and reality of things Divine and supernatural,
" signified and intended by those terms, is explained
* p. 393. t p. 401. >i

44 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
" away and brought to -nothing. So that it is now be-
" come more necessary than ever to shew that the terms
" expressing the attributes of God and the mysteries of
" the Gospel, are to be understood neither in one extreme
" nor the other : but in the way which lies between them,
" that is, by Analogy. And unless this comes to be
" allowed, there is an end of all Natural Religion likevrise.
"For if the terms expressing those attributes of God
" which are known by the Ught of Nature, are not to be
" understood analogically, but must be turned into empty
"figure and metaphor; or taken in such a literal sense as
" to express something the same in kind both in God
" and man ; not one of them can signify anything truly,
"and really, and worthily applicable to the Divine
" Nature." The reason for which the literal and metaphorical
system, as applied to the interpretation of the attributes
of God, and the mysteries of the Gospel, gave rise to
heresy, infideUty, and even Atheism itself, was this ; that
if the terms were taken in the literal sense, this would be
literally regarding the Creator as a creature ; if they were
taken in the metaphorical sense, then, inasmuch as meta
phor was addressed to the imagination and impUed no
corresponding reality, we had only metaphorical Mys
teries, metaphorical Sacraments, metaphorical Articles of
faith, a metaphorical Gospel, metaphorical Attributes of a
metaphorical Essence, and thus also a metaphorical God :
the whole of Revealed Theology was upon this principle,
one grand metaphor, and the whole of Natural Theology'
was another grand metaphor ; and as metaphor did not'
imply any corresponding reality, both together were re
garded as one grand delusion.
May it not, then, with aU due respect and deference

CONSEQUENCES. 45
be asked, by what licentious and deluding art of sorcery,
it has come to pass, that a system of interpretation which
in Natural Theology nullifies the attributes, nay, the very
existence of God himself; which in Revealed Theology is
said to be the one great source of all kinds of infidelity,
and of heretical pravity ; should yet be accounted at this
day the Orthodox, as it certainly is the popular, method of
interpreting the Word of God ? Is the Word of God
less divine than his Attributes ; or are both equally mere
metaphorical expressions ? Or does the Word of God
not speak the thoughts of God ? Or is the Logos not
Jehovah ?
Certainly, if in any one sense it can be justly said,
that metaphor has made void the Being and the Attri
butes of God, then in the same sense it has made void the
Word of God : it cannot both nullify his Attributes and
interpret his Word. His Word is no reality, if his Being
and Attributes are only metaphorical : and, in so far as
his Word is considered metaphorical, there wUl be (as
there ever have been), those who will turn his very Being
and Attributes into a like figure of speech : the only al
ternative being to reject the Word of God altogether,
and to take refuge in Deism. But further :
It is impossible to deny that the question of Inter
pretation is immediately connected with that of Inspira
tion. The lower the principle of interpretation, the
lower will be that of inspiration ; and the higher the one,
the higher the other. Now, says the Bishop of Norwich,
" When we reflect upon the immense importance of the
" question at issue — on the place which the doctrine of
" Inspiration occupies in the Christian Religion, and the
" extent to which our whole view of Revelation must be
" affected by the notions we form on this subject — such

46 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
" a chaos of opinion under any circumstances, and at any
" time, would be a matter of serious consideration. But
" the aspect of the present times renders it pecuUarly so ;
" and forces the consequences irresistibly on the attention
" of every reflecting Christian. It is amidst this discord-
" ance of doctrine about the foundation principle of aU re-
" vealed ReUgion, that a vast and momentous moral crisis
" is rapidly approaching — the rise of Education throughdjit
" the mass of the people. Amidst pretensions to sensible
" spiritual communion on the one hand, and a careful
"avoidance of recognizing any Divine interposition on
" the other — amidst theories invented or imported, that
"would subject the Sacred Volume to the rules of mere
"ordinary criticism, opposed only in partial and personal
" controversy — a large portion of the community which
" has been hitherto uneducated, is suddenly aroused into
" free enquiry, and furnished with abiUty to perceive all
"that darkens and deforms the subject; but^t must
" be owned and lamented — not furnished with that spi-
" ritual training which alone enables the enquirer to seei
" his way through it."*
From ailteeedents in the Church such as these, what
other consequences can we expect than the foUowing ?
" I speak also of my own knowledge, when I say
"that gross Deism, instead of the more refined Theism
" which characterizes the writings of some of the Neolo-
" gians, is extending rapidly, and is propagated with
" systematic activity among the lower orders. I speak
"my sincere conviction, when I say that I believe Satan
" is demonstrating his personal hostUity to the truth asit
"is in Jesus at this moment, by gathering his forces, and
* Inquiry into the Proofs, Nature, and Extent of Inspiration.
Introduction, p. 3.

CONFUSED AND INDISTINCT IDEAS. 47
" raising his banks, and mounting all his engines against
" the city which is set upon a hiU. It does seem that
" we are entering upon a struggle more portentous than
" any which have gone before ; not against one enemy at
" a time, but against aU the united hosts of superstition,
" of heresy, of infidelity, of blasphemy."*
How can it be otherwise, when the very principle of
all our knowledge of God is denominated a licentious
and deluding art ? for if this be its intrinsic nature, we
can no more adopt it in regard to the Attributes of God,
than we can in regard to the Word of God.
We thus see how the doctrine of Analogy has been
repudiated, in regard both to the Attributes of God, and
to the Word of God ; and how in both cases it has been
superseded by the literal and metaphorical systems.
There are, however, those who admit the doctrine of
Analogy, and yet maintain that after all it leads only to
obscure, confused, and indeterminate ideas. This is the
next subject for consideration.
It is observed by Mr. Veysie, in his Bampton Lec
tures, when speaking of things purely spiritual and di
vine, that, ..." It is only by analogical representations
" that we can form the least conception of the things re-
" lating to God and the invisible world. We can have
" no direct and immediate conception of these things ;
" for they are not objects of sense, nor do they make any
" part of that which passes within our own breasts. But
" material things, and the powers and operations of our
" own mind, furnish us with analogies by which we may
" in some degree conceive the nature of that Being who
" is Infinite, and of those things which are spiritual and
" heavenly. And the conceptions which we thus form,
* University Sermons, Sermon 6, page 78.

48 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
" however imperfect and inadequate, are nevertheless, as
"far as they extend, just and true; consequently the
"language in which they are expressed, although bor-
" rowed, is not merely figurative, but is significant of
" something real in the nature of the things conceived."*
The Lecturer here speaks of imperfect and inadequate
conceptions supplied by analogy ; but the editor of the
Discourse on Predestination uses the expression, " imper-
"fectly and indistinctly as we understand these Attri-
" butes ;"t and in the Fifth Essay, J First Series, refer
ence is frequently made to the " imperfect and indistinct
" knowledge we have of the Divine Attributes ;" and again
in Essay ii.. Sec. 4, First Series, it is observed that "Our
" views, indeed, on this awful subject, must, after aU, be
"indistinct, confused, and imperfect" (p. 165). This is
the common language of divines. The author of Divine
Analogy has collected together a considerable number of
expressions of the same kind, such, indeed, as we find in
most discourses in the present day.
Locke had maintained that " ideas which by reason
" of their obscurity or otherwise are confused, cannot pro-
" duce any clear or distinct knowledge ; because as far as
" any ideas are confused, so far the mind cannot perceive
"clearly whether they agree or disagree;" and that "he
" who hath not determined ideas to the words he uses,
" cannot make propositions of them, of whose truth he
"can be certain ;"§, but as it was acknowledged that if
this principle were applied to the doctrines of Christianity
* p. 136.
t p. 468.
% Essays on some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion, p.
278. § Vol. ii., book iv., chap, ii., Essay on the Muman Understanding.

CONFUSED AND INDISTINCT IDEAS. 49
as generally received, it must end in scepticism, Bishop
StiUingfleet labored to prove, that " it is a vain thing in
"any to pretend that all our reason and certainty is
"founded on clear and distinct ideas,"* that we may
therefore "believe the doctrines of Christianity to be true,
" without our having any clear and distinct ideas of them."
Accordingly, Bishop Conybeare obseryes,f " I have before
" observed, that by mysterious doctrines, we mean such
"concerning which our ideas are either inadequate or
" indeterminate. This account supposes that of these
" mysterious doctrines we have some ideas ; we have
"ideas, though such are e\\}cLex partial or indeterminate!'
Bishop Gastrell, on the Trinity, observes, Lbid., p. 109,
that with respect to Revelation, "One and the same
" God is Three in some way or manner we are not able to
" comprehend. And if we are sure we cannot compre-
" hend what this distinction is whereby God is Three, in
" vain do we look out for terms to express something
" which we have no manner of conception of" Hence he
"adds, "AU, therefore, that we can know of the Trinity
" by reason, can amount to no more than an obscure,
" confused knowledge, which we are forced to express in
" general and abstracted terms," &c. And this language
he justifies by saying, with respect to all other kinds of
knowledge, that most of our notions differ only as more
or less confused, more or less general.
Dr. Waterland makes a similar observation with respect
to the Incarnation. "The Incarnation of the Son of
" God," says he, " is another mystery. . . . There are some
" seeming not real repugnancies ; and the ideas we have
" of it are general and confuse, not particular nor special.
* Discourse on the Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 244.
f Enchiridion Theologicum., vol. iii., p. 203 ; Scripture Mysteries.
E

50 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
" Such as our ideas are, such must our faith be ; and we
" cannot believe farther than we conceive ; for believing
"is conceiving; confusely, if ideas are confusely ; gene-
" rally, if general ; distinctly and adequately, if distinct
" and adequate." . . . . " We assent as far as our ideas
" reach, for we can do no more : we believe in part what
" is revealed in part ; our faith keeping pace with our
" ideas, and ending where they end," vol. i., p. 222.
Upon sentiments of this kind the author of Divine
Analogy observes, p. 526, . . . "If we cannot affix clear and
" distinct ideas or conceptions to the terms whereby we
" express the attributes of God and all the mysteries of
" Christianity, our faith which is consequent upon these
"must be proportionably blind, confused, implicit, and
"indeterminate. Men disposed to infidelity are here
" furnished with an invincible argument for rejecting not
" only Revealed but Natural Religion likewise; both which
" must, upon his principle, be full of confusion and of
" obscurity in the most material and fundamental points :
" nor can either of them admit of a firm and undoubting
" assent of the understanding or of a well grounded re-
" Ugious faith, which must ever be as wavering and in-
" stable as the foundation it is built upon."
Accordingly, referring to Bishop Conybeare's Dis
course on The Mysteries of Christianity, which was
intended to refute Toland's work, entitled Christianity
not Mysterious, the author, in his Divine Analogy, ob
serves, that — " If the spirit of Toland could return to
"earth, he might answer thus, p. 193; — 'If some doc-
" trines of Christian mystery are incomprehensible by us,
" they must all of them be equally so; and, consequently,
"as I have proved in my Christianity not Mysterious,
" none of them can be objects either of our knowledge

CONFUSED AND INDISTINCT IDEAS. 51
"or faith." ... To this, continues Bishop Brown, "our
" author could upon his principles make no other than
" this short inconsistent answer ; ' That those doctrines
" are not so incomprehensible to us neither, but that we
" comprehend them by partial, confused, indeterminate
" ideas.' — Upon which he might expect to hear a sound,
" as it were of human voice, uttering these words ; ' This
" is the very reason why I was one of the Christian un-
" believers in the flesh ; because divines held they could
" have but a very confused, partial, indeterminate know-
" ledge of the very fundamental doctrines of Christianity ;
" and because I could, therefore, have no other than a
" very uncertain, dubious, tottering faith built upon that
"knowledge.' "
Indeed, as the author of Divine Analogy naturally
asks, p. 189; "How could we adore even God himself
" if we had not a clear and distinct knowledge of Him ?
" but not arising from any indistinct, confused, indeter-
" minate ideas given us of anything relating to his real
" Nature and Attributes ; for then we should always be
" feeling after Him in a purblind, owl-eyed, and gloomy
" state and condition of mind ; and if we should haply
" find Him, the worship to be paid Him would be equally
" dubious and uncertain, confused and indeterminate.
" Surely of aU things we ought to have a most clear and
" determinate conception of the true object of Divine
" worship, as well as of the adoration itself which ought
" to be paid to it." Where, therefore, we have indistinct
and imperfect views of God, as taught by the doctrines
of the church, the Bishop openly denies that they are
" sufficient to the intents and purposes of reUgion ;" they
can, as he affirms, give rise only to an uncertain, dubious,
and tottering faith. — Can anything more satisfactorily
E 2

52

CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.

shew the absolute necessity of a more clear, settled, and
definite doctrine of Correspondence ? Nothing, perhaps,
except the foUowing; — " It might tend to promote mode-
" ration, and in the end agreement, if we were industri-
" ously on all occasions to represent our own doctrine as
" wholly unintelligible!'*
But, says Waterland, Dr. Whitby "is very much
" disturbed that any thing should be proposed as an ar-
" tide ai faith which is not to he understood ; and oh-
" serves that no man in his sober senses can give his as-
" sent to what he understands not ; meaning understands
" not at all. He is certainly very right, I do not say
" pertinent, in the remark ; and I may venture to add
" that no man, whether sober or otherwise, can do it.
" For, undoubtedly, where there is no idea, there can be
" no assent ; because assenting to nothing is the very same
"with not assenting" vol. i., p. 281.
Nor does it appear that the introduction into the
argument of a new element, namely, that of authority,
would alter the case. Doubtless the more occasion there
is for authority, the more absolute should be the autho
rity to answer its purpose ; the more indistinct the idea,
the more distinct should be the authority; the more
likely the stones of the Temple may be to fall to pieces,
the stronger should be the iron bond to keep them to
gether; although, perhaps, even authority itself may
seem placed in a perUous position, when we are told
that " Whatever be the subject of our faith, the autho-
" rity (whatever it is) must be absolute. For what is
" doubtful in one point, is doubtful as to all. There is
" no more authority as to any point which remains, than
" to that one which is gone." Suppose, then, a person
* Norrisian Lectures of Dr. Hey, vol. ii., p. 353.

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AS TO KIND. 53
doubted, as an eminent Hebrew scholar at the Univer
sity is said to have done, whether the original word Bara
signifies creation out of nothing ; or, as Locke, whether
the self same body is to rise again (for these two subjects
are among the instances specified), then, as to the re
ceived Christian faith, is there no more authority as to
any point which remains, than to that one which is
gone ? I do not remember, says Bishop Watson to the
celebrated Thomas Paine, any passage in the Bible where
the resurrection of the same body is so much as men
tioned. So much for the controversy respecting obscure, in
distinct, and confused ideas.
We now come, however, thirdly, to a stUl more im
portant question, which has equally with the former been
the result of a neglect of the doctrine of Analogy ; I
mean the question whether the attributes of God are the
same in kind with those of man, or whether they are
different. This question will be found to involve that of the very
Being and Attributes of God himself ; our knowledge of
which depends entirely upon a true doctrine of Analogy
rightly applied and understood. It is impossible, there
fore, to overrate its importance ; for it involves the whole
question of the relation of Humanity to Divinity, and of
Divinity to Humanity. In fii^, it is a question which
concerns not Natural Theology only, but all Revealed
Theology, the interpretation of the doctrine of the Incar
nation more especially, and of those which are connected
with it. Here, therefore, if any where, we have reason
to expect from the defenders of the Faith clear, consistent,
and definite statements : indeed, in this view of its im
portance, the editor of the Archbishop's discourse seems

54 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
to have coincided, when he entitled it, "The right method
of interpreting Scripture in what relates to the Nature
of the Deity and his Dealings with mankind."
Let us, then, enquire into this subject with a due
sense of its solemn importance, not only to the interests
but to the very existence of a Christian Church.
The case, then, is thus stated by Archbishop King,
who observes, that God's Foreknowledge and Predeter
mination are not of the same nature with ours. " I have
" already shewed," says he, " that they are not of the
" same kind, and that they are only ascribed to Him by
" way of analogy and comparison, as love and mercy,
" and other passions are ; that they are quite of another
"nature; and that we have no proper notion of them,
" any more than a man born blind has of sight and
" colors ; and, therefore, that we ought no more to pre-
" tend to determine what is consistent or not consistent
" with them, than a blind man ought to determine, from
" what he hears or feels, to what objects the sense of
" seeing reaches : for this were to reason from things
" that are only comparatively and improperly ascribed to
" God, and by way of analogy and accommodation to
" our capacities, as if they were properly and univocally
"the same in Him and in us," p. 478. Hence also the
Archbishop observes that the Divine attributes " are of a
" nature altogether different from ours," p. 470 ; " of so
" very diff&tent a nature . . . that there is no more likeness
" between them, than between our hand and God's
"power" p. 474 ; that they are not " in Him after the
" same manner or in the same sense that we find them
"in ourselves," p. 476; "that they are not of the same
" kind, . . , but quite of another nature, and that we have no
" proper notion of them any more than a blind man has

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AS TO KIND. 55
"of sight and colors," p. 478; that "His attributes are
" the originals, the true real things of a nature infinitely
" superior and different from any thing we discern in his
"creatures, or that can be conceived by finite under-
" standings," p. 478; that they are no more like those
" of man, than a map is like the country which it repre-
" sents, p. 480; that "Personality in God is as truly
" different from what we call so, as a word written is dif-
"ferent from a word spoken," p. 484 ; that " wisdom, as
" in us, is as different from what we call so in God, as
" light in our conception is different from the motion in
"the air that causes it," p. 495 ; and that it is as impos
sible that we should comprehend the manner of opera
tion of God's foreknowledge, " as that the eye should
see a " sound, or the ear hear light and colors," p. 513.
On this discourse of Archbishop King, Bishop Brown
takes the following notice in the Lntroduction to his
Treatise on the Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the
Human Understanding, p. 13.
" Though His Grace thus rightly lays down Analogy
"for the foundation of his discourse; yet for want of
"having thoroughly weighed, and digested it, and by
"wording himself incautiously, he seems entirely to de-
" stroy the nature of it; insomuch that while he rejects
" the strict propriety of our conceptions and words on
" the one hand, he appears to' his antagonists to run into
" an extreme, even below metaphor, on the other. His
" greatest mistake is, that through his discourse he sup-
" poses the members and actions of a human body,
"which we attribute to God in a pure metaphor, to be
" equally upon the same foot of analogy, with the pas-
" sions of a human soul, which are attributed to Him
"in a lower and more imperfect degree of analogy;

56 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
" and even with the operations and perfections of the pure
" mind or intellect, which are attributed to Him in a yet
"higher and more complete degree. In pursuance of
" this oversight he expressly asserts love and anger, wis-
" dom and goodness, and knowledge and foreknowledge,
"and all the other Divine attributes to be spoke of God
" as improperly as eyes or ears ; that there is no more
" likeness between these things in the Divine nature and
"in ours, than there is between our hand and God's
"power ; and that they are not to be taken in the same
" sense. That because we do not know what His facul-
" ties are in themselves, we give them the names of those
" powers that we find would be necessary to us in order
" to produce such effects (as we observe in the world),
" and call them wisdom, understanding, foreknowledge,
" &c. Because He hath aU the advantages these powers
" or faculties can give him, if he had them. That he
" acts as if He had them. That we speak of him as if
" He had the like ; as if there were some such things
" in God ; and because we must resemble Him to some-
" thing we do know and are acquainted with."
" Agreeably to this incautious and indistinct manner
" of treating a subject curious and difficult, he hath un-
"warUy dropped some such shocking expressions as these;
' ' The best Representations we can make of God are infinitely
" short of Truth ; which God forbid, in the sense his
" adversaries take it ; for then aU our reasonings concern-
" ing him would be groundless and false ; but the saying
" is evidently true in a favorable and qualified sense and
" meaning ; namely, that they are infinitely short of the
" real, true, internal nature of God as He is in himself.
" Again ; that they are emblems, indeed, and parabohcal
'' figures of the Divine attributes, which they are designed

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AS TO KIND. 57
" to signify; — as if they were signs or figures of our own,
"altogether precarious and arbitrary, and without any
" real and true foundation of analogy between them in
" the nature of either God or man ; and, accordingly, he
" unhappily describes the knowledge we have of God and
"his Attributes, by the notion we form of a strange
"country by a map, which is oxA^ paper and ink, strokes
"and lines."
Now Archbishop King having said that the Divine
attributes are infinitely different from the human, came
to the conclusion that " The best representations we can
"make of God are infinitely short of the Truth!' The
Bishop of Cork maintains that they are not infinitely
short of the truth, but that they truly express by analogy
corresponding perfections in God ; still, that the simi
litude involved in the relation, correspondence or analogy
itself, is wholly inco7iceivable. In this point of view the
practical difference between the two seems to be nomi
nal ; for it does not interfere with the same forms of ex
pression, and some of the same illustrations being used
on both sides. The Bishop agrees with the Archbishop
that the attributes of God are infinitely different from
the human, not in degree only, but in nature and kind ;
and as such that our belief in God is* a belief in Attri
butes truly and in every degree incomprehensible as they
are in themselves, and of a nature and kind infinitely
different from any that are not merely human, but an
gelic ; and as such,f that He is the incomprehensible sub
ject of Attributes absolutely incomprehensible as they are
in themselves ; and after enumerating the various methods
by which men thought they arrived at a knowledge of
God, he observes, in his Divine Analogy, p. 19: "By
* Divine Analogy, p. 399. f p. 398.

58 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
" these and other such methods, whereof we can form no
"clear and distinct conception, and expressed in dark
" phrases to which we can affix no determinate sense or
"meaning, have men gone about to account for the
" manner of our conceiving the things of another world :
" and they all proceed upon this gross mistake, that our
"manner of conceiving things imniaterial is by some
" sort of ideas of thera, as we do sensible and material
" objects. But we must lay this down for a certain truth,
" that we have no capacities for any idea of the real
"nature of them in the least degree; no more than a
" man born blind hath for any idea of the sun or light;
" Such a man, of no more than four senses, could not be
" said to have only an imperfect, glimmering, uncertain
"view of things; but ^^o view at all: light would be to
" him in this respect as thick darkness ; the sun and
"moon and stars, the firmament and all the heavenly
" bodies, would be to him as imperceptible by any idea
" of them as if they had no being ; the word light would
" be to this man a terra to which he could affix no direct
" idea or conception."
To this view of the subject (if, indeed, that can be
called view, where there are no eyes to see, and nothing
to be seen), Bishop Berkeley, Dr. Samuel Clarke, Arch
bishop TiUotson, and others, were decidedly opposed : I
shall quote, however, at present, the remarks of only two
writers ; first, of Dr. Fiddes, who in his Body of Divinity,
vol. i., p. 125, observes : —
" But how transcendent soever the Moral perfections
" of the Divine nature may be, when compared with those
"of men or any other inteUigent beings, there appears
" no evident reason why we should conclude, as a great
" Prelate has done, that the Moral attributes of God are

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AS TO KIND. 59
"of a different nature from those we observe in men.
"For we consider things as of a different nature, not
" which are different in degree, but which differ in kind.
"Now if the reasons of just, good, and fit, have the same
" foundation in the Divine that they have in a human
" mind ; or, in other words, if it be reasonable that Godj
" when he determines himself to act, should do what is
" agreeable to the general rules of goodness, justice, and
" prudence, then those reasons or rules with the proper
" acts arising from thera are the same in respect both to
" God and man in the relations, how much soever they
" may differ in the degrees of perfection."
"Again; if the Moral attributes of God be not
" founded in the same general reasons with those of men
" (and if they be so founded the nature of them is stUl
" the same), then it would be impossible for us to form
" any distinct notions of the Divine attributes, or rather
"any notions at all but what would be very irregular
"and confused. For they being no farther of a moral
"consideration than as we apprehend them reasonable in
" themselves, if we do not know what common reasons
" to resolve them into, we at once destroy the morality
" of them, and all possible methods of reasoning upon
"them; What grounds, I say, can we have upon, any
"principles of natural religion, to attribute certain per^
" fections to God whereof, we are not able to discover
" any natural reason ? which yet it is impossible for us
" to do, without knowing what they are, in some imper-
" feet manner at least, in their own nature!'
" I shall only add, since I am arguing on occasion of
" what has been advanced by a learned person in one of
"the first stations of the Church; that when God refers
"it, ourselves being judges, whether his ways are not

60 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
"equal; if we are not to judge concerning the equality
" of them, according to our common notions of what is
"just and right, the design of such an appeal would be
" altogether impracticable. Neither could we be capable,
" as both reason and his positive commands require we
" should, of imitating his perfections, did we not know
" wherein his perfections consist ; an unknown object of
" imitation evidently implying as great an inconsistency,
" as an unknown object of desire."
"These refiections, I hope, wiU not render me ob-
" noxious to any charge of being wanting in a just de-
" ference to the Archiepiscopal character ; my design in
" them is only to prevent such ill effects as a great name,
"recommended with much erudition, may have toward
" misleading us in our reasonings upon the Moral perfec-
" tions of God ; in the clear and distinct conceptions
" M'hereof, the only soUd foundation is laid both of faith
" in Him and obedience to his laws ; for want of which,
" therefore, very great errors in doctrine and corruptions
" in practice, have been too frequently occasioned."
To these observations may be added those of Bishop
Law, who says, that between things entirely or infinitely
different in nature and in kind, there can be no analogy :*
" Let the manner in which Divine knowledge exist be
" never so different from that of human knowledge, yet,
" so long as it is knowledge, or agrees in the general idea
" with what men call knowledge, it must signify some-
" thing more than if it were totally different, of quite
" another kind, and had no raore resemblance to it than
"knowledge has to potver; as seems to be the case upon
" the analogical scheme." . . . "If Divine power, wisdom,
" and goodness may be so compared to human power,
* Notes on King's Origin of Evil: pages 96, 98.

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AS TO DEGREE. 61
" wisdom, and goodness ; they are qualities of the same
" nature, kind, or sort ; which seems to be giving up the
" question. If they cannot be so compared, in what are
" they alike, or wherein does this analogy between them
" consist ? or, in short, how we shall at aU be the wiser
"by it ? For to believe the reality of that which nothing
" can give us an idea of as it is in its own nature, will be
" at last, I fear, no more than believing the reality of we
" know not what ; which can never be a good ground
" for rational devotion."
On reviewing this part of the controversy, it will be
found, that the reason for which it is affirmed that the
Divine attributes are said to be of a totally different
nature from those of man, is, that the Divine is Infinite,
the human finite ; that as such the Divine is infinitely
different from the human ; in other words, the Divine is
so Divine as not to be human ; the human so human as
not to be Divine : hence that to ascribe human attributes
to the Divine is to nullify the Divinity, and make him a
creature ; and to ascribe Divine attributes to the human,
is to nuUify the humanity and regard it as pure Divinity.
It is remarkable that both Deists, Freethinkers, and
Theologians generally agree in this view of the subject.
The consequences of this doctrine are more fully de
veloped in that part of the controversy which refers espe
cially to difference in Degrees, and which is in immediate
connection with the argument concerning difference in
Nature and in Kind.
Thus : it is observed by the author of Divine Ana
logy, p. 251 ;—
" Those who assert the Divine attributes to differ only
" in degree of perfection from ours, must yet aUow them
" to be as infinite as his essence. Now Lnfinite, in the

62 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
" very notion of it, admits of no degrees. Any thing
"finite, indeed, may be capable of different degrees,\ie-
" cause it is finite ; but whatever is Infinite, is in itself
" incapable of more or less, higher or lower, greater or
" smaller, in any respect. So that if God's natural attri-
" butes differ only in degree from ours, they are Lndefinite
" and not Infinite perfections. If they were the same in
" kind with ours, they could not be Infinite ; because the
" addition of any thing finite, ever so often repeated,
" would only make up an Lndefinite but never an Lnfinite!'
Again, p. 491 ; ..." Though there may be a difference of
" indefinite degrees between two finite things of the same
" kind, yet there is express contradiction in the words
" Lnfinite degrees or Lnfinite in degree. According to the
" only conception we have of Infinity, it is in its very
"notion and nature utterly exclusive of all degrees of
" more or less ; so that if any attribute of God be really
" Infinite, it can never be a transcendent degree of any
"kind of thing whatsoever that is finite; because nothing
"finite, ever so often added or repeated, would ever make
" up an Lnfinite. Infinity, added to the conceptions of
" our own perfections, when transferred or attributed to
" God, necessarily alters the very nature of them even in
" our way of thinking, and renders them totally differ-
" ent in kind from any thing finite and created ; much
"more then from what is purely human; and, conse-
" quently, doth as necessarily exclude all analogy between
" them founded only on degrees of the same kind!'
The Bishop of Cork, viz.. Dr. Brown, is here arguing
against the Bishop of Cloyne, namely, the eminent Dr.
Berkeley, to whom he imputes this sentiment ; " That
"the Divine knowledge is truly, and properly, and formally
" the same with the human ; and that our human know-

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AS TO DEGREE. 03
" ledge is truly, and properly, and formaUy the same with
" the Divine ;" of whom also he says, in page 384 ; " The
" very thing we justly charge upon this author and others
" of his strain, is, that according to them the attributes
" belong to God in a sense altogether absurd and unintel-
" ligible : that is, as they express perfections, the very same
" in kind with those that are either natural or acquired in
" us, only infinitely greater in degree ; which is, in plain
" words, as they express, the same with Lnfinite Human
"perfections ;" or in p. 147, with " supposing God to be
"an Lnfinite Human creature ; or p. 77, with "making
" an attribute of knowledge or wisdom Lnfinitely finite,
" which is as chimerical and gigantic an idea as an Ln-
" finite Human body!' Therefore, says the author, p. 72,
" As the ancients held the nature and essence of God to
" be thus incomprehensible and ineffable by us, so they
" were of the same opinion with respect to all his attri-
" butes in general. They not only held God to be alto-
" gether another kind of being from man, but to differ
"more in kind from every rank of all created beings
"than any one of thera does from another." Indeed,
the author expressly asserts in p. 346 and other places,
that, " If any intrinsic perfection of God were of the same
kind with any virtuous disposition in our soul, it would
be a human and not a Divine perfection;" and on this
principle he proceeds throughout his work, viz., that what
is Human cannot be Divine, and what is Divine cannot
be Human.*
Lord Bolingbroke coincides in the same view of the
subject ; and, accordingly,f insinuates that we resemble
* It is very desirable to bear these statements in mind, because they
will form the subject of some important observations in the sequel.
-f- Leland's View of the Deistical writers, vol. ii,, p, 130.

64

CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.

God no more in our souls than we do in our bodies ; and
that to say his inteUect is like ours, is as bad as the An-
thropomorphites. So that, according to him, expressions
drawn from the faculties of the soul are as improper as
those drawn from the meinbers of the body. — "Thus,
" under pretence of a profound veneration for the Deity,
" we must not speak of God at all ; as some of the ancient
" phUosophers thought it unlawful to name him, or to
" worship him, except in silence. Yea, we must not so
" ranch as think of him ; for our ideas of God no doubt
"fall infinitely short of his real majesty and glory, as
" well as our expressions."
Upon the same principle, says Leland, " Plato, in his
" Book of Laws, did not prescribe to the people the wor-
" ship of one supreme God ; because he looked upon
"him to be incomprehensible ; and that what He is, or
" how He is to be worshipped, is not to be described or
" declared," vol. ii., p. 52.
What, now, was the result of this part of the con
troversy ? That in like manner as Toland avaUed him
self of tUe theory of obscure and confused ideas to esta
blish the consequence of an obscure, confused, and
dubious faith ; so Collins availed himself of the argument
of the incomprehensibility of the Divine nature, to place
Freethinkers and Theologians upon the same level with
regard to any certain knowledge of God. " The nature
" of God," says Hobbes,* "is incomprehensible; that is to
" say, we understand nothing of what he is, but only
" that he \^; and, therefore, the attributes, we give him
" are not to tell one another what\ he is, nor to signify
" our opinion of his nature, but our desire to honor him
* Leviathan, chap, xxxiv., part iii.
f See Annotationes Corderii in Dionysium, vol. i., p. 291.

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AS TO DEGREE. 65
" with such names as we conceive raost honorable
"amongst ourselves." Now, says Dr. Cudworth, in
his Intellectual System, vol. i., p. 186, one of the
reasons for the Atheistical hypothesis is this, "That
"we have no idea of God, and therefore can have no
" evidence of him." . . . That " the attributes of God," as
Hobbes observes, "signify not true nor false, nor any
" opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion
"of our hearts; and therefore they are not sufficient
" premises to infer truth, or convince falsehood."
As the Bishop of Cork had imputed to the Bishop of
Cloyne the purely human aspect of the question ; so the
latter imputed to the former the purely Divine, and
hence all the consequences logically resulting from it :
" How," says he, " are things reconciled with the
" Divine attributes, when these attributes themselves are
" in every intelligible sense denied ; and consequently the
" very notion of God taken away, and nothing left but
"the name without any meaning annexed to it." ....
" You cannot argue from unknown attributes, or, which
"is the same thing, from attributes in an unknown
"sense." .... "Whatever objections might be made
" against the attributes of God, they are easily solved by
" denying those attributes belonged to God, in this or
" that or any known particular sense or notion ; which
"was the same thing as to deny they belonged to
" Hira at all. And thus denying the attributes of God,
" they in effect denied his Being, though perhaps they
" were not aware of it."*
On the othfer hand, the sarae consequences the author
of Divine Analogy considered to be the necessary result
of the doctrine of Bishop Berkeley, who assigned attri-
* Minute Philosopher ; Art. 17, Dial. iv. F

66 CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING ANALOGY.
butes to God in, as he says, a sense altogether absurd
and uninteUigible, i. e., the purely human. WhUe the
zeal of Dr. Edwards and others incited them to declare
that the whole principle of Analogy advanced by Arch
bishop King, was a paradox, rendering " aU the Divine
" attributes, together with the great doctrines of Chris-
" tianity, insignificant, useless, and precarious ; and that
" thereby all virtue and moral practice faU to the ground.
"That by, it His Grace hath banished Truth quite out of
" the world, and that it is all lost by his unexampled
"Theology."* One might naturally presume that any doctrines
concerning the Trinity, the Atonement, and Mediation
of Christ were premature, so long as the arguments con
cerning the attributes of God, and the right method of
interpreting Scripture, remain in this dubious and con
flicting state.
Lastly; to proceed to one more Ulustration of the con
troversies concerning Analogy ; it is observed by Bishop
Coplestone,! that when God is spoken of as angry, &c.,
" The scholastic rule is no bad one for the interpretation of
" such language, Affectus in Deo denotant effectum. When
"the effect is the same which certain passions would
" naturally lead to in men, we speak of it as proceeding
" from the same cause : but nothing would be more
" absurd, as well as impious, than because the name of a
" certain passion is employed in these cases, to pursue
" the investigation farther ; analyzing the elements, the
" motives, the objects of that passion in men, and draw-
" ing inferences from hence concerning the Divine nature
" and Dispensations."
* The Procedure, Introduction, p. 18.
f Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination, p. 97,

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AS TO EFFECT. 67
Now if anger be not in God, the question is. What
is that attribute of God from which the punishment
of evU is said to proceed ? Must we think of it as
Anger, when we know it is not ? Are we compelled to
speak of a fallacy as the truth, when we know that
it is not the truth, but a fallacy ? Or if we dismiss
the faUacy, can we think of nothing as a Divine attribute
which we can substitute in its place ? Must we be con
tent to speak of it, and think of it either as.. Anger, or
else as nothing conceivable ; and hence to us, as so far
a nonentity? This was not the sentiment of another
University author, who, when treating of the existence
and nature of God,* thus observes, p. 130 ; " I think
"some men of later times have much mistaken the
" nature of the Divine Love, in imagining that Love is to
" be attributed to God, as all other passions are, rather
"secundum effectum than Affectum: whereas St. John,
" who was well acquainted with this noble spirit of Love,
" when he defined God by it, and calls him Love, meant
" not to signify a bare nothing known by some Effects, but
" that which was infinitely such as it seems to be. And
" we might weU spare our labor, when we so industri-
" ously endeavor to find something in God that might
"produce the effects of some other passions in us, which
"look rather like the brats of hell and darkness, than
" the lovely offspring of heaven." He is here referring,
it would seem, to wrath, anger, fury, and so forth, which
are attributed to God as the causes of the punishment of
sin ; a punishment which he elsewhere imputes rather to
Divine Justice. In this observation he impugns the
position subsequently maintained by Archbishop King,
* Select Discourses of John Smith, Fellow of Queen's College, Cam
bridge, A.D. 1650.
F 2

"8 APPLICATION OF ANAlOGY
who makes no difference, in point of analogy, between
good and evU human qualities assigned to the Divine
Being, and who asserts that there can be nothing in God
which can properly be called either /owe or anger; He
being, as Divine, totally different from what is Human.
Sufficient has now been said on the important con
troversies which relate to the subject of Analogy. It
remains for me to trace their relations.
As Christianity is a Revelation of God, and from
God, it becomes an important question how far a mis
understanding and misapplication of the Doctrine of
Analogy, affecting the arguments for the very Being
and Attributes of God, affect also our ideas of the great
Doctrines of Christianity.
In answering this question, I shaU confine myself to
the doctrines of the Trinity, Atonement, and Mediation;
and follow out the argument as set before us by Arch
bishop King, and others who advocate the same principles.
It has been seen that the question concerning Analogy
is said to relate to the two extremes, the Divine and the
Human, the Infinite and the Finite, or the Incomprehensible
on one side, and the Comprehensible, i. e., the external or
sensuous, on the other. Of the Divine or Infinite as it is
in itself we can form no conception whatever ; we have
nothing therefore to do with this side of the question ;
on the other hand, we are immediately concerned with
the human or finite, literal or sensuous. Accordingly
in the doctrine of the Divine Tripersonality, we are not
concerned to know anything concerning the Three Divine
Persons as they are in themselves ; but it is of the highest
importance for us to believe in the human, finite, literal,
sensuous side of the analogy. And, what is this ? Three
literal persons, three literal men. " The Father, Son, and

TO RECEIVED DOCTRINES. 69
" Holy Ghost," says the author of the Procedure, p. 303,
" are in respect of one another distinguished, through the
" whole language of Revelation, after the same manner
" and in the same style in which we speak of three men ;
"and in respect of mankind, they are ever expressly dis-
" tinguished by such different operations and offices as
" we distinguish human persons among us ... . Whatever
"is denoted by that distinction of Father, Son, and
" Spirit, it is plain we must either flatly reject the Scrip-
" ture, or else for ever think and speak of those Tliree after
" the same manner and in the same style as we do of
" three human persons." This is the finite, or, what is
called the plain and practical side of the question.
The editor of the discourse of Archbishop King refers
us, on the subject of Analogy, to the work of Tucker on
The Light of Nature. Accordingly on the subject of The
Trinity, vol. v., p. 536, this author observes concerning
the apprehensions of the vulgar among us : " They seem
" to apprehend the Son, on coming down to earth, dis-
" united from the substance of his Father, who remained
" behind at a distance in heaven ; yet during that separa-
" tion retaining his divinity, and so being a distinct God!'
Thus it is that the side of the analogy which is the
finite, human, and comprehensible, plainly inculcates the
doctrine of three distinct Beings ; the other side of the
analogy, which inculcates the Unity, is either the Specific
Unity or else the Divine, Infinite, Transcendental, Incom
prehensible, into which it is presumptuous to enquire ;
for though Archbishop King observes that the Divine
personality is as truly different from the human as a word
written is different from a word spoken, yet after all
what 'the difference is, it is, we are told, presumptuous to
attempt to know. To us therefore it is practically as if

70 APPLICATION OF ANALOGY
it were not ; and we must concern ourselves only with
the human, literal side of the analogy ; and be contented
with the vulgar to speak and think of the Trinity as
of three distinct Beings, and of the Son as a distinct
God. Thus the argument concerning Analogy, as applied
to the Tripersonality, is only a repetition of the same
dUemmas which occurred in the case of the Divine Attri
butes. That side of the analogy which is presented in
the Athanasian Creed is the uncreated, incomprehen
sible, and eternal ; and as different from anything we
are caUed upon to believe (if we cannot believe without
ideas), as a word written is different from a word spoken,
or as power is different from a hand, or as time is dif
ferent from a line, or as a country is different from the
map which represents it. Whatever it means, it is pre
sumptuous for us to enquire into ; sublunary beings are
concerned only with speaking and thinking of the Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit, as of three different men, and hence
of the Son as a distinct God. If to avoid this dUemma
(although some do not appear to regard it as any di
lemma), we attempt to interpret the word hypostasis in
some intermediate sense, we run the risk of regarding
God as only one Divine hypostasis ; and even in this
case, nothing further is generally claimed, than the at
tainment of imperfect, obscure, and confused ideas ; and
consequently, says the Bishop of Cork, a correspondingly
dubious faith.
Thus far with respect to the Tripersonality : let us
now proceed to the doctrine of the Atonement.
Bishop Sanderson* observes : " Who can reasonably
" think that our most gracious God, who is so ready to
" take from us the guUt of our own, should yet lay upon us
* See Appendix ii. to the University Sermons, p. 33.

TO RECEIVED DOCTRINES. 71
" the guUt of other men's sins?" A very rational ques
tion ; but yet he says, there is one exception to this.
" The only exception to be made in this kind is that
" alone satisfactory punishment of our blessed Lord and
" Saviour Jesus Christ, not at all for his own sins ....
" but for ours ; he paid that which he never took : it was
" for our transgressions that he was wounded, and the
" chastisement of our peace was laid upon Hira." Ac
cording to this view of the subject, Divine Justice de
manded punishment for the sins of men, as a Satisfaction
to itself; and Christ by taking our sins upon himself,
undergoing the punishment of them in our stead, satis
fied that Justice, and thus rendered the Father propiti
ous to us.
Such is the human, literal, sensuous side of the
Analogy ? What is the other side ? — " These," we. are
told by Bishop Sherlock, p. 18, " are great mysteries :
" we cannot see that there is any proportion between
" the sufferings of one and the sins of all ; or if there
" were, we cannot see the Justice of laying the sins of
" the wicked upon the innocent head. If we could see
" the reasons upon which the Justice of God proceeds in
"this case, here would be no mystery; and therefore
" the mysteriousness of the whole proceeding arises only
" frora hence, that our finite rainds cannot coraprehend
" the reason and limits of the Divine Justice ; . . . there-
" fore we must either be saved by means that are mys-
" terious to us, or God must give us infinite wisdom to
"comprehend the reason of his Justice." This, then,
is the mysterious. Divine, Infinite, Incomprehensible
side of the Analogy. Is there no intermediate idea?
None, we are told; we must either adopt the alter
native of presumptuously claiming Infinite wisdom, or

72

APPLICATION OF ANALOGY

else be content with the literal, external side of the
Analogy. The same method is pursued in one of the University
Sermons.* There is, says one of the preachers, in God
" some high perfection (more incomprehensible to my
" finite capacity than the speculations of an astronomer
" to a peasant chUd), of which anger is the most adequate
" exponent to my mind ; and which I must be content to
" think of and speak of as anger, or else remain in total
" ignorance of it." Here, again, the alternative is be
tween the incomprehensible on the one side, and the
physical, natural, or animal, on the other : for to pre
sume that any rational view of the subject could be
taken, would be to destroy the necessity of the alterna
tive. On the other hand, we are instructed by many emi
nent writers, that as God is essential Goodness, so all
punishment is directed by that Divine attribute ; that, as
such, the object of punishment is our good, and that
punishment itself is only the employment of such means
as are necessary to our amendment : it is the discipline
requisite to purification from evil, or, if this ,cannot be
effected, to its being kept in subjugation. This we are
taught by Bishop Law in his Notes upon the Origin of
Evil; by Scott in his Christian Life ; by Dr. Cudworth
in his Lntellectual System : and by other writers. It will
suffice, however, to quote at present the words of Arch
bishop King.
" As to the punishments which God has affixed hy
" way of sanction to positive laws, we must affirm that
" they are to be esteemed as admonitions and notices of
" the mischiefs consequent upon evil elections, rather
* Sermon ix., p. 16.

TO RECEIVED DOCTRINES. 73
" than that God himself wUl immediately inflict them "
(Origin of Evil, p. 500).
" Punishments are annexed to evU elections in order
" to prevent them, and inflicted to correct and amend
" the offenders, and to deter others from the like offences.
" If, therefore, the appointment and infliction of punish-
" ments prevent greater evils than they are themselves,
" it follows that God has chosen the better part in esta-
"blishing and exacting them" (Ibid., p. 501).
" There is no necessity to attribute Eternal punish-
" ment to the Divine vengeance, nor is there properly any
" such thing in God ; but it is ascribed to him, as other
" human passions are, in condescension to our capacity.
" For since these punishments may be conceived to
" promote the good of the whole, they may arise from
"the goodness, and not the vengeance of the Deity" (p.
505). " Who can tell whether the (eternal) punishment of
" the wicked may not lead them into a kind of phrenzy and
" madness ? Thus they may, indeed, be very miserable,
" and become a sad spectacle to others : they may be sen-
"sible of. their misery also, and strive against it with all
" their power ; but while they do not observe or believe
" that it is founded in perverse election, they may hug
" themselves in the cause the effects whereof they abhor ;
" being still wise in their own opinion, and, as it were,
" pleasing themselves in their misery."
" Thus the more they labor under it, the more they
" embrace the cause of it, and thereby become their own
" hindrance from ever getting free ; and will not suffer
" themselves to be any thing but what they are. This
" we see done daUy by mad and frantic persons, and
"reckon it a part of their unhappiness. The Divine

74

APPLICATION OF ANALOGY

" Goodness, therefore, is not to be charged with cruelty
" for letting them continue in that existence, though it
" be very miserable, when they themselves will not have
"it removed: or for not altering their condition, which
" they utterly refuse to have altered. 'Tis better for
" thera, indeed, not to be than to be ; but only in the
" opinion of wise men, to which they do not assent. For
" they indulge themselves in their obstinate election ; and
" though every way surrounded and oppressed with woes,
" yet wiU they not alter what they have once embraced.
" We have frequent examples in this life resembling this
"kind of obstinacy" (Lbid., p. 506).
" 'Tis to be believed that God has provided a place
" that is suitable and proper for them (viz., the wicked),
" and to which they are as much confined by the laws of
" their nature, as fishes to the sea, or terrestrial animals
" to the earth. What sort of a place that is we know
" not, but it is reasonable to beUeve that there is such
" an one. Men in this life choose for themselves habita-
" tions and companions according to their own genius,
" temper, and disposition of mind ; and likeness begets
" love ; and who can doubt but that the same thing may
"attend the bad and good after death? The good re-
" sort, therefore, to the society of God, angels, and the
" spirits of good men ; but the wicked choose those
"ghosts which were partakers in their iniquity, and
" devUs for their companions ; and this may possibly be
" brought about by natural instinct, and mere human
" disposition. Nor is God wanting in goodness if he
" suffers them to live in their own way, and enjoy the
" life themselves have chosen. For this could not be
" prevented without doing violence to the laws of nature.
" And these punishments, which the wicked voluntarUy

TO RECEIVED DOCTRINES. 75
" bring upon themselves, tend to the benefit of the uni-
" versal system of rational beings."
Such is the view of the nature of punishment taken
by Archbishop King.
Let any one attempt to introduce this view of the
subject into the doctrine of Vicarious Punishment, as ad
vocated in the Appendices and University Sermons, and
then see whether confusion may not be the result. The
object, however, of this Letter is not to disprove the
popular explanations which have been given of any of
the doctrines here specified; but rather to point out
the precarious state of the foundation upon which they
rest. With respect to the doctrine of Satisfaction of the
Divine Justice, Dr. Hey, Norrisian Professor in the Uni
versity of Cambridge,* long since regarded it as ques
tionable : and more recently the Hulsean Lecturer for
1855.f It is declared to be a mere addition to the
pure and simple doctrine of the Atonement, in Mr.
Veysie's Bampton LecturesX for 1795. The Atonement
is regarded as mostly an unexplained mystery in the
Bampton Lecture^ for 1853. It is spoken of in a similar
manner by Bishop Butler, || and its popular explanations
have begun to be renounced by many of the clergy. In
deed, in the sermon on the Doctrine of the Atonement,
preached frora the University pulpit by Professor Hussey,
it may be seen how the doctrine of the Atonement may be
duly set forth, without any reference to that of a Satisfac
tion to Divine Justice. Notwithstanding, therefore, this
explanation is revived in the University Sermons, it is not
* Norrisian Lectures, vol. ui., p. 303.
t p. 33, and Notes. t P- 15.
§ Lecture 6. J] Analogy, part ii., chap. v.

76

APPLICATION OF ANALOGY

necessary to undertake a task here, which has been ac-
corapUshed by others. " Although," says Dr. Hey upon
this subject, "we acquire our ideas of the qualities of God
" by ascribing to him human qualities, enlarged and puri-
" fied ; yet we may sometinies be misled by words and
" sounds : we may ascribe qualities to Him without pro-
" perly enlarging them, or duly clearing them from im-
" perfections." Let us now pass on to the terms Redemption, Pur
chase, Ransom, Price, Payment, and so forth.
This part of the subject is set forth before us in the
Appendix as follows : —
" Thus his sufferings are finished ; now, together with
" them, man's salvation. Who knows not that man had
" made himself a deep debtor, a bankrupt, an outlaw to
" God ? Our sins are our debts, and by sins death. Now
" in this word and act our sins are discharged, death en-
" dured, and therefore we cleared : the debt is paid, the
" score is crossed, the creditor is satisfied, the debtors
" acquitted, and, since there is no other quarrel, saved."
This is the theory of Atonement which, it is presumed,
is justified in Sermon x., by a reference to Exodus xiu.
16. " And thou shalt take the atonement money of the
" children of Lsrael, and shall appoint it for the service
" of the tabernacle of the congregation, that it may be a
" memorial for the children of Lsrael before the Lord to
" make an atonement for your souls!'
Such is the external or pecuniary side of the Ana
logy : what now is the other side ? The incomprehen
sible again ! Must we, then, remain satisfied with this
sensuous view of the subject ? Here, as in the doctrine of
Vicarious Punishment, some divines have ventured upon
generally forbidden ground, and to ascend from the sen-

TO RECEIVED DOCTRINES. 77
suous into the rational. " As a creditor," says Mr. Pen
rose, " when satisfied by payment, remits a debt; so God,
" when we have made to Him that offering of faith and
" repentance which Christ enables us to make, remits our
" heavy offences " (p. 38). . . ." We often find Christ's
" office in heaven spoken of as in the analogy of that of
" a favorite or friend at court ; and what he has done for
" us, said to be charged or entered as the balance of our
" account in the book of God's remembrance. Language
"such as this, able and excellent as are some of the
" writers in whom it is found, can scarcely be read with-
" out pain. It has, and must have, often, if not always, the
" injurious effect of complicating with mean and trivial
" images the explanation sought for in it ; and which it is
" intended to give, of that most august of all the works
" of the Divine wisdom and mercy which has ever been
" vouchsafed to mankind;" (On the Atonement, p. 39).
It is true that this author admits that methods of
speaking, which appear to the well educated and refined
to be disparaging to the greatness and goodness of God,
may be suitable in some instances ; but then be says it
is only in the case of " persons of infantine or gross con-
" ceptions." And this state of mind appears, indeed, to
be not unfrequently the one intended, when we are told
that we must be as little children ; which too often means,
that we must not venture out of that external and sen
suous state into which little children are born.
We now proceed to the doctrine of Intercession or
Mediation. " It is a doctrine of Scripture," says the author of
Divine Analogy, p. 229, " that Christ ever liveth to make
" Intercession for us. The correspondent conception
" under which this heavenly Intercession is revealed, is

78

APPLICATION OF ANALOGY

" that of a human person's interceding with an earthly
" monarch justly offended ; so as to reconcile hira to a
" subject guilty of a capital crime." — This, now, is the
sensuous side of the Analogy.
Accordingly, the Saviour is conceived as literaUy sit
ting or standing at God's right hand. Dean Comber,
in his work on the Common Prayer, vol. i., p. 141,
speaks of Christ as interceding with the Father, and
employing " his interest in heaven " for our accept
ance; and, p. 568, ourselves as invocating him to
" employ his power, his interest, and merits, to make
" our persons and our prayers acceptable." Wintle, in
his Bampton Lectures, p. 262, speaks of him as being
in heaven " our mighty and prevaUing Intercessor, exert-
" ing his interest with the Author of all Goodness in our
"behalf." Wheatly, in his Book of Common Prayer,
treating of the prayer of St. Chrysostom, observes, that
in this prayer we " remind " the blessed Saviour of the
" gracious promise" he made to us when on earth ; . . .
and if " we can but prevail with him to hear our desires
" and petitions, we know that the power of his Interces-
" sion with God is so great, that we need not doubt but
" we shaU obtain thera." Scott, vol. i., p. 193, in his
Christian Life, speaks of the Intercession of Christ as that
" of some high favorite of God" interposing between God
and man, " having personal interest with his Father," and
pleading our cause with the " powerful oratory " of his
blood. Accordingly, in the Homilies of the Church of
England, we read that Christ is our Proctor and At
torney ; some not unfrequently describe Him as Agent,
SoUcitor, Attorney-General, and so forth.
Such, then, being the external and sensuous side of
the Analogy, what is said with respect to the other ? The

TO THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE. 79
author of Divine Analogy makes this answer, p. 230.
" But as to the other part of this mystery, namely, the
" real nature and true manner of Christ's Intercession in
"heaven, it is at present above reason, and wholly
" exempted from all enquiries ; and to demand any ac-
" count of it, is to ask for an explanation of what is now
" imperceptible and inconceivable to us."
Occasionally, some theologian, seeming to have some
misgivings as to the propriety of leaving an important
doctrine of Christianity in such a state, essays, though
timidly, to venture a little farther : " What human
" prayer," says Mr. Penrose, p. 62, " does with man, that
" and much more Christ's agency does with God ; this
" is the meaning ; we cannot, without going into error,
"mean any thing more :" — which is meaning as little as
possible : stUl, however, it lifts us up a little out of the
sensuous system, but only to land us in the region of
obscure and confused ideas.
Having now seen the application of Analogy to the
received doctrines of the Tripersonality, Atonement, and
Mediation, I next proceed to its application to the Scrip
tures ; for as to the doctrine of The Ascension, as gene
rally received, it is incapable of any analogy; it is in
fact so thoroughly materialized, as to be generally re
solved into the simple act of Locomotion.
To proceed then to the Scriptures.
We have seen that the two sides of Analogy are said
to be the Divine and Human ; that the Divine is the in
comprehensible, the Human, as contrasted with the Di
vine, the comprehensible; that although the Human
might be distinguished into the rational, and the sen
suous, yet that as mysteries are said to be generally above
reason, so reason is for the most part excluded; and.

80

APPLICATION OF ANALOGY

consequently, that we are concerned mostly with the
literal and sensuous side of the analogy, or else with
obscure and confused ideas. Accordingly, the same di
lemmas in which this principle involved the arguments
concerning the Being and Attributes of God, and the
doctrines of Christianity, recur in the interpretation of
the Word of God : it- is the same question over again
concerning the Divine and Human. For instance :
In the most recent work on The Inspiration of the
Holy Scriptures,* it is observed, p. 18 ; " The Bible pre-
" sents us, in whatever light we regard it, two distinct
"elements, — the Divine and the Human. Ou the one
" hand, God has granted a Revelation ; on the other
" Human language has been made the channel to convey,
" and men have been chosen as the agents to record it.
" From this point aU theories on the subject of Revela-
"tion take their rise; and all the varieties of opinion
" respecting it have sprung from the manner in which
" the fa,ct referred to, has been taken into account. There
" are two leading systems in this department of Theology;
" the one suggested by the prominence assigned to the
"Divine element, the other resulting from the undue
" weight attached to the Human. The former of these
" systems practically ignores the Human element of the
" Bible, and fixes its exclusive attention upon the Divine
" agency exerted in its composition." ... On the other
hand, " The characteristic of the other system to which I
" have alluded, and to which the great majority of modern
" theories of Inspiration are to be referred, is that of as-
"cribing undue prominence to the Human ^emevX of the
" Bible." * By William Lee, M.A,, Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College,
Dublin.

TO THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE, 81
Accordingly, in a still more recent work it is argued,
that the Scriptures afford abundant evidence of the
Human element in their composition, and as such cannot
be said to be properly Divine ; that " the mental horizon
" of each sacred writer was in exact accordance with the
" age wherein his lot was cast. Only, it must be added,
"that all these proofs of genuineness are also equally
"proofs of a positive limitation of the range of know-
" ledge. We cannot in one moment say these Books
" were written in such an age because they have the
" knowledge of that age, and in the next moment agree
" that they have a Divine omniscience." On which the
Reviewer remarks, " The argument now before us, strip-
" ped of aU disguise, is simply as follows : here are cer-
" tain writings presenting unequivocal traces of Human
"authorship; embodying the thoughts, speaking the lan-
" guage, of living man : a deep religious spirit undoubt-
" edly animates them; but being confessedly Human, they
" cannot be Divine!'*
The reply given to this objection we shall notice in
the sequel. Suffice it to observe for the present, that in
a preceding extract, Mr. Lee admits, what could not
be denied, that the great majority of modern theories
of Inspiration " ascribe undue prominence to the Hu-
" man element of the Bible." This, indeed, may be said
to be the prevaUing characteristic of Protestantism.
Thus, referring to the historical parts of the Bible,
"Many of the facts," says Dr. Pye Smith, "thus re-
" corded, have not a directly religious interest, but they
" were Vjaluable to the Israelites and Jews as fragments
" of national and family history ; and in our times they
* The Ecclesiastic and Theologian ; April, 1856. p.- 154.
G

82 APPLICATION OF ANALOGY
" have proved to be of great importance, in casting Ught
"upon the almost lost history of several ancient na
tions."* Those who deny the Divine Inspiration of the Scrip
tures, acknowledge that this is so far conceding all they
demand : it is adopting the purely Human element to
the exclusion of the Divine. Indeed, this view of the
subject is openly advocated by those who contend that
Christianity, as a Revelation, must be intelligible ; that if
it be not intelUgible, it is no Revelation ; that if God
speaks to man. He must make use of human ideas as
well as of human language ; that in using human lan
guage. He must employ the words in the same sense in
which those who are addressed, themselves employ them ;
in fact, the whole argument is Uttle else than one in
favor of Toland's Christianity not Mysterious. The
smallest attempt at any thing spiritual is denounced as
mysticism, and with the observation that it is introducing _
obscurity where every thing is plain ; and, says Bishop
Marsh, p. 368, "Mystical interpreters delight in oh-
" scurity : obscurity is their proper element ;" for many
divines regard the earthly as the bright side of man's
nature, and the spiritual as the night side of his nature.
They are not content with pointing out the errors of
those who have endeavored to carry out the principle of
Analogy : they would exterminate Analogy altogether ; in
much the same way as the legends of Purgatory are
swept out of existence by the Psychopannychists, or hy
those who deny the immortality of the soul. If a person
should openly reject the present Canon of Scripture,
would not an outcry be raised against his orthodoxy ? but
should he introduce a principle of Interpretation which
* Scripture Testimonies, vol. i. Notes, p. 41.

TO THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE. 83
secretly undermines the arguments for the Being and
Attributes of God, the great doctrines of Christianity, the
Inspiration of the Bible, and hence the very foundations
of the Church, he might be too generally regarded as a
safe and sound theologian nevertheless. "The Soci-
nians," says the Bishop of Cork, " do expressly and pro-
" fessedly turn all into pure metaphor, and bare allusion
" only to what was enjoined and practised under the legal
" Dispensation. So that they hold Christ to be a figu-
" rative Saviour, a figurative Priest, a figurative Mediator.
" They resolve his merits and satisfaction, with the words
"price, purchase, redemption, washing and cleansing of
" His blood, all into mere empty figure ; and, in short,
" turn our whole Christianity into a metaphorical reli-
"gion" (Procedure, Introduction, p.'38).
And is there so marked a difference between turning
Christianity into a metaphorical religion, and turning the
Bible into a metaphorical book ? " In short," says
Bishop Marsh, "the figure with which we are chiefly
" concerned is metaphor, for it is a figure which is more
" frequently employed than all other figures of Rhetoric
" put together :" and, feUcitously or infelicitously, he uses
the following iUustration, in Lecture iv., at the end, refer
ring to the Church ; " As any one who was secretly at work
" for its destruction, might be compared with a man who
" was undermining an edifice, we should say, in meta-
" phorical language, that such a person was undermining
" the Church. But if the mine should at length explode,
" and the Church should fall, the defender of that Church
" might exclaim again in metaphor, and again in truth,
" Lmpavidum ferient ruince!'
In fine, whatever were the errors into which the
Bishop of Cork feU upon the subject of Analogy, no one
g2

84

THE METAPHYSICAL VIEW 

ever more solemnly and earnestly protested against that
system of Metaphorizing, which among divines was
secretly undermining, and among Freethinkers openly
scattering into the air, the foundations of the Church,
the Divine authority of Scripture, and the arguments for
the Being of a God; the former diUgently preparing
the mine, and the latter as dUigently foUowing in the
train and applying the match. For Analogy at least im
plied some corresponding reality in heavenly things and
in God himself ; whereas Metaphor implied none : this
the Bishop of Cork, in answer to the Bishop of Cloyne,
frequently maintains.
What wonder, then, that the Divine Inspiration of
the Bible should be denied ? The course of events, in
this case, is not miraculous : it is perfectly natural ; and
only what every reflecting mind would perceive to be,
— cause and effect.
Thus far, however, the subject has been viewed only
in its Theological aspect ; we now proceed to consider it
in the Metaphysical ; under which head we shall find
statements not less remarkable, and presenting the same,
or corresponding difficulties ; for in aU the cases we have
been considering, the theological difficulty consists in the
Analogy or relation of the Human to the Divine, the
Finite to the Lnfinite, and vice versa.
It is observed by the author of Essays in Philosophy,*
p. 202, that " In modern times, Spinoza has directed a
" remorseless logic to the Theory of the Universe. The
" mind of Europe, especially of Germany, has been in-
" fluenced by simUar trains of reasoning within the last
* Alexander Campbell Frazer, M. A., Professor of Logic and Meta
physics, New College, Edinburgh ; recently elected successor to the
late Sir William Hamilton.

THE FINITE AND INFINITE. 85
" half century, in a manner which ought to satisfy the
"guides of theological belief, that the dilemma now re-
" ferred to may be a serious obstruction to the religious,
" because to the inteUectual, life of some. The condi-
" tion of mind occasioned by the discussion of Theism,
" after this fashion, has so much affected even our own
" habits of thought, that some form of the dUemma is,
" at the present day, the chief force which draws grave
"and earnest persons among us into the metaphysical
"arena. They want to escape from the contradictions
" which speculative reasoning has accumulated on their
" course of religious faith, and that not by the dishonest
"process of shutting their eyes to them, but by the
"manly and candid one of thinking more deeply."
..." We fear that devotion to theology cannot be
" affirmed of this age and country, when we witness the
"bigotted aversion of our men of letters to its very
"name, and also the meagre current literature which
" that iUustrious name now represents."*
Such are the observations which occur in an essay,
entitled. The Lnsoluble Problem : a Disquisition on our
Lgnorance of the Lnfinite ; a Disquisition which opens
in the following ominous manner, and the sentiments of
which deserve to be carefully noted. " Can God be
" known by man ? If a negative answer must be returned
"to this question, our deepest feelings are, it seems,
" founded on iUusion, and human regard should be con-
" tracted within the limits of this earthly Ufe. Religious
" belief cannot exist when its nominal object is wholly
"unknown; and all the words which express what is
" caUed theological knowledge, should be excluded from
"language as unmeaning sound. We cannot obtain
* p. 349, Ibid.

86

THE METAPHYSICAL VIEW-

"such a knowledge, either naturally or supernaturally.
" Can a Being in any sense be ' revealed ' who is abso-
" lutely incognizable ? Is not the revelation impossible,
"or at least incapable of being attested by evidence?
" But if this result is at variance with our moral aspu-a-
" tions, and even with the necessities of reason, an affk-
" mative reply seems, on the other hand, involved in in-
" extricable intellectual difficulties. How can the infinite
" God be in any way an object of our thoughts ? To
" conceive an object is in some sense to define it. Defi-
" nition impUes limitation, and an infinite object cannot
" be Umited. Moreover, unlimited Being is not only in-
" conceivable Being. His very existence does not logi-
" cally consist with the existence of any other being be-
" sides. In every act of knowledge I must distinguish
" myself frora the object known by me. Every object
" that exists must therefore be limited — by the subtrac-
" tion from it of my finite being, or, as infinite, must
" absorb me and all the universe into itself. An infinite
" Being, existing in plurality, as One among many, seems
" an express contradiction ; while the only logical solu-
"tion of the difficulty lands us in the doctrine of
" Spinoza. Atheism or Pantheism are thus the only
" alternatives, when the response to our question is logi-
" cally weighed." .... P. 251; "^¦easoning itself de-
"monstrates, that contradiction of thought must foUow
" any attempt to find the rationale of the ' revelation '
" of God, presented in Providence and Holy Scripture."
This is certainly an unhappy dUemma both for theo
logy and philosophy ! But is " the harmonious develop-
" ment of religious faith and speculative reason impos-
" sible ?" The question has been recently debated on
the Continent, more especially by Schelling and Cousin ;

THE FINITE AND INFINITE. 87
and in this country by the late Sir WilUam Hamilton in
his Discussions on Philosophy, Mr. Calderwood in his
Essay on the Philosophy of the Lnfinite, and by Pro
fessor Frazer in his Essays in Philosophy. We shall
find that the various answers given to this question, in
the present day, involve the most serious consequences
to Christianity; for both in reUgious faith and speculative
reason, the real question said to be at issue is this. How
can we attain to any knowledge of God.
With respect to Schelling, Sir WUliam observes, p.
20, that " ScheUing contends that there is a capacity of
"knowledge above consciousness, and higher than the
" understanding ; and that this knowledge is competent
" to human reason, as identical with the Absolute itself.
" In this act of knowledge, which, after Fichte, he calls
" the InteUectual Intuition, there exists no distinction of
"subject and object; no contrast of knowledge and
"existence; aU difference is lost in mere indifference,
" all plurality in simple unity. The Intuition itself, —
" Reason, — and the Absolute, are identified, The Abso-
" lute exists only as known by Reason ; and Reason knows
"only as being itself the Absolute. This act is neces-
" sarily ineffable : ' the vision and the faculty ' divine,'
" to be known, must be experienced. It cannot be con-
" ceived by the understanding, because beyond its sphere;
" it cannot be described because its essence is identity,
" and aU description supposes discrimination."*
* This alleged method of knowing God is the direct intuitus in
abyssum and absorption into Deity claimed by the Mystics. It is an
exemplification of the principles of Charron, who observes, that "Deity
" is what cannot be known, nor even perceived : between finite and
" Infinite there is no proportion, no transition ; Infinity is wholly
"inaccessible, nay, imperceptible. God is the one, true, and only

88

THE METAPHYSICAL VIEW—

Such is one aUeged method of attaining to a know
ledge of God; a knowledge founded on an asserted
identity with God through an absorption into, and a
vision either of the Absolute, or the Infinite.
This supposed absorption into the Infinite is advocated
upon the ground, that there being no ratio between the
finite and the Infinite ; for the finite to proceed toward
the Infinite is to become absorbed into the Infinite ; and,
in like manner, for the Infinite to proceed toward the
finite so as to be in any relation to it, is to cease to be
itself. This dilemma, as presented in a metaphysical form
on the subject of the Absolute, is thus stated by Sir
"Infinite. The most sublime genius and the greatest effort of the
"imagination does not approach nearer Him than the lowest and
" meanest capacity. The greatest philosopher and the most learned
" divine knows God no more or better than the most contemptible
" artificer. Where there is no avenue nor passage, there can be
" neither far nor near .... God, Deity, Eternity, Omnipotence, In-
" finity, — these are only words thrown out into the air, and nothing
" more to us : they are not things subject to the human understanding.
"... If all that we say and assert conceming God was rigorously
"examined, it would be nothing but vanity and ignorance.". . ."The
" properest course, therefore, which is possible for a man to take, who
"desires to think and conceive of the Deity, is, that the soul, .after a
" universal abstraction from all things, raising itself above all as in a
" vacuum, indeterminate, and unbounded ; with a profound and chaste
" sileijce, an astonishment fuU of awe, an admiration full of fearful
" humility, imagine a luminous abyss, without bottom, without shore,
" without banks, without height, without depth, without laying hold of
" or attaching itself to any thing that comes into the imagination, ex-
" cept to lose itself, to be drowned, and resign up itself to be aisorhed
"by this Infmity. The following old sentences of the Saints come
" very near to this : ' The true knowledge of God is a perfect ignorance
" of Him.' ' To approach God, is to know an inaccessible light, and
"to be absorbed by it.'"— Bayle's Diet., Art. Simonides.

THE FINITE AND INFINITE. 89
WUUam HamUton, p. 19. "The alternative," says he,
" is unavoidable ; either finding the Absolute, we lose
" ourselves ; or retaining self and individual conscious-
" ness, we do not reach the Absolute ;" and he seems to
agree with ScheUing so far, that " only if man be himself
" the Infinite, can the Infinite be known by him." Hence
he observes, p. 1 5 ;
" We are thus taught the salutary lesson, that the
"capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the
" measure of existence; and are warned from recognizing
" the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-exten-
" sive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonder-
" fill revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness
"of our inability to conceive ought above the relative
"and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of
" something Unconditioned, beyond the sphere of all
"reprehensible reality."
*In the following note,\ however, he regards faith and
speculative reason as thus ultimately coinciding : —
" True therefore are the declarations of a pious phi-
"losophy: — 'A God understood, would be no God at
" aU ;' — ' To think that God is as we think him to be,
"is blasphemy.' The Divinity, in a certain sense, is
"revealed; in a certain sense, is concealed: He is at once
" known and unknown. But the last and highest conse-
" oration of all true religion must be an altar — 'Ar/vm^Ta
" 0e^ — ' To the unknown and unknowable God.' In this
" consummation. Nature and Revelation, Paganism and
" Christianity, are at one : and from either source the
* He seems to have had in view the Discourse concerning the
Divine Nature and Attributes, by Dr. John Edwards, at its commence
ment. f Discussions on Philosophy and Literature.

90 THE METAPHYSICAL VIEW 
" testimonies are so numerous that I must refrain from
" quoting any. — Am I wrong in thinking that M. Cousin
" would not repudiate this doctrine ?"
This conclusion concerning the last and highest con
secration of all true religion, viz., to a God unknown
and unknowable, is said to result from the premises,
that we can have no positive knowledge of the Infinite
or Unconditioned;* that thought necessarily supposes
condition ; for that to think is to condition ; and con
ditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possi
bUity of thought. This being the case, it is obvious
that God is inconceivable. The question is then, logi
cally, how that which is inconceivable can be said
to be conceived ; or how that which is unknown or un
knowable can be said to be known ; or how the Infinite
can be said to be known by the finite ? or, what is the
relation of the one to the other ? The Scottish phUoso
pher, it is said, suggests no means for extricating us
from this state.
Every one may see that this is only the theological
difficulty we have been considering, presented in the form
of the logical ; or, as called by some, the metaphysical.
Another author, again, conceiving that all Theo
logy, natural and revealed, is endangered by the ad
mission that we can have no positive knowledge of
God, inasmuch as the Infinite is said to be " unknown
and unlmowable," writes, in order to counteract the
tendency of this method of argument, to prove that
we have a positive notion of the Infinite ; for that
as all our thoughts are conditioned in Time and
Space, and Time and Space may be proved to be infi-
* Ibid., p. 14.

THE FINITE AND INFINITE. 91
nite, so we may have a positive notion of the Infinite.
"We must think Time," says he,* "we cannot think it as
" finite ; therefore we must think it as Infinite. On the
" evidence thus presented, we maintain that in our con-
" ception of Time, we have a conception of the Lnfinite "
(pp. 87 — 91). So again with regard to Space, p. 118 ;
" Since therefore we cannot think Space as finite, and
" since we cannot think it in all its extent as infinite,
" our knowledge of it must be an indefinite knowledge
"of it as Infinite." ... P. 120;— "Fly from world to
" world existing in the wide expanse, and the stronger
" your wing, and the raore daring your fiight, the more
" grand and subUme will be your conception of Infinite
" Space." Professor Frazer does not seem to coincide altogether
with either view of the subject : " The Scottish philoso-
" pher," says he, p. 222, " seems to cut away every bridge
"by which man can have access to God." — A fearful
metaphysical enterprize certainly ! — On the other hand,
he so far agrees with Sir William as to maintain that
the problem is insoluble : p. 237 ; " The application,"
says he, " of a merely human inteUigence to solve the
" relation of finite and transcendent Being, must, as we
" have already said, end in Pantheism or Atheism. Either
"finite beings are absorbed, as modifications of the
" Infinite Being ; or else Deity is excluded, as not con-
" sistent with the reality of finite agents. We are thus
" left osciUating between an Infinite universe and a Finite-
" absolute universe. But here some may complain of
" defect in the theory of Sir WUliam Hamilton. The
" Scottish philosopher suggests no means for extricating
* The Philosophy of the Infinite, by Henry Calderwood.

92

THE METAPHYSICAL VIEW —

"us from this state." ... P. 246; — " We can no more
" infer Infinite Being from the exhibition of an indefi-
" nitely great universe, than we can rise to eternity by
" an indefinite addition of times ; or to immensity, by
" an accumulation of finite spaces. Inductive generali-
" zation cannot draw from finite data more than they con-
" tain." ... P. 240 ; — " The creation of the universe is"
(according to Mr. Calderwood) " only a finite manifesta-
" tion of power, and from that we can never infer the
" Infinite. Every such argument is incompetent, as em-
" bracing more in the conclusion than is involved in the
"premises." . . . "Induction yields an indefinitely great
" finite Being, but not the Infinite Power."
So much for the light of speculative reason : what
now says theology ? The Professor observes, p. 248 ;
" Every step in scientific Theology,— and not the first
" step merely, must be taken in that region which lies
" beyond the limits of our comprehension." ... P. 251 ; —
" Revealed theology — whether the revelation be contained
" in the evolutions of nature or in the words of a book —
" is thus a body of practical knowledge, rather than a
" science of speculative truths, concerning the absolute
" relations of man to God. The one is demanded by
" the cravings of the human heart ; the other is not in
" analogy with the human faculties. The Bible is not a
" speculative solution of the insoluble problem : phUo-
" sophy can demonstrate that a solution of that sort is
" impossible. It is a mass of practical information which
" guides our reUgious life in the necessary absence of
" any solution ; and which we must receive in the con-
" viction that it demonstrably involves insuperable logical
" difficulties. There is thus a chasm between the meta-
" physical faith which conducts us to the Transcendent

THE FINITE AND INFINITE. 93
"Being, and the religious knowledge in which alone
"that Being can be definitively manifested."
Such is the answer which is given to those " who
" want to escape from the contradictions which specula-
" tive reasoning has accumulated on their course of reli-
" gious faith — and that not by the dishonest process of
" shutting their eyes to them, but by the manly and
" candid one of thinking more deeply."
This manly and candid process, however, of thinking
more deeply, does not appear to avail them : the problem
is said to be insoluble : they meet moreover with the same
insuperable difficulties, the same impassable chasm, the
same insoluble problem, if they abandon metaphysics and
shut themselves up in Theology ; for a simUar dUemma
is set before thera as theologians. Lord Bolingbroke
having observed that a comment upon the Bible is, in
many instances, rather the word of man than of God,
remarks, with respect to the Bible, vol. viii., p. 429, that
" There are not only things mysteriously, but things
" untruly expressed in it. In one case God has so little
" regard to the weakness of our capacities, that his lan-
" guage is far above all human conception : in the other,
" it descends to that of the most Uliterate ages, and of
" the most ignorant people, among whom these Scriptures
" were writ, compUed, or published."
Thus it is that the interpreter of Scripture is said to
meet with the same chasm between the inconceivable and
the conceivable, the infinite and the finite, in the Bible
as in logic and metaphysics. Altogether both metaphy
sicians, logicians, and even theologians, concur in placing
the student of theology in a very perplexing and perilous
dilemma. But where is the help? Sir William Ha
milton indeed admits once, and once only, I beUeve,

94

THE METAPHYSICAL VIEW-

that " it is only through an analogy of the human with
" the Divine nature that we are percipient and recipient
" of the Deity :" but he nowhere shews what the ana
logy is, nor does he even refer to the subject again. The
author of The Philosophy of the Infinite is sUent upon
it ; and the author of the Essays in Philosophy refers
to it only as denying its existence. One is strongly
therefore reminded of those words of Job respecting the
Deity, chap, xxiu., " Oh that I knew where I might find
" him ; that I might come even to his seat. . . . Behold, I
" go forward, but he is not there ; and backward, but I
" cannot perceive him : on the left hand where he doth
" work, but I cannot behold him .- he hideth himself on the
" right hand, that I cannot see him!'
The author of Divine Analogy saw no hope of a
better state of things but in an improved doctrine of
Correspondence or Analogy. It was to this quarter that
he looked for the regeneration of Theology. Therefore,
speaking of the imperfect statements which had been
made respecting it, in a sermon on the Mysteries, by
Dr. Conybeare, Bishop of Bristol, the former, p. 182,
expresses a wish that he would " undertake the same
" important subject over again with more caution, upon
"that unshaken foundation of Analogy first laid down
"by himself; such as would produce those noble ef-
"fects, as weU as entitle him to that great and just
" applause, which otherwise in providence wiU be re-
" served for some such extraordinary genius of the next
"generation; when the prevailing obstinate prejudices
" of the present age against the doctrine of Analogy
"shall be worn out; and the generality of learned men
" are brought to a conviction of the great service it will
" do reUgion, when rightly and fully apprehended, and

THE FINITE AND INFINITE. 95
" duly managed ; and how hurtful and dangerous it may
" prove by being misunderstood or misappUed ; of which
"that Discourse is a glaring instance."
It does not, however, appear that the subject of Ana
logy was resumed by Bishop Conybeare, or by any other
writer of that period ; probably owing to the theological
hostUities in which many of the respective parties had
indulged toward each other : and thus it was, as already
intimated, that a doctrine of fundamental importance to
Christianity fell into neglect and oblivion.
HistoricaUy speaking, however, the next generation
did not pass away without the subject being resumed,
and that too by a very " extraordinary genius," whose
reputation is derived principally from his writings upon
this very topic. To omit the name of this author, and
all mention of his theological works, while treating upon
the subject of Analogy, as this Letter professedly does,
would be like writing a history of Ancient Metaphysics,
and leaving out the name of Aristotle or Plato.
This brings me, then, to the third and concluding
part of the present Letter, namely, the question, whether
there are any evidences in existence of a progress in
Theology actually commenced.
In answering this question, it is desirable to advert
first in order to the metaphysical view of the subject.
It has been seen that all the difficulties which have
arisen with respect to our knowledge of God, and of the
relations between God and man, have arisen from the
alleged want of a ratio between the finite and the Infi
nite, or else from our ignorance of what that ratio is :
this ratio, it is affirmed by some, is theoretically impos
sible, and hence the attainment of a true knowledge of
God and of the relations of God to man is theoretically

96

THE METAPHYSICAL VIEW-

impossible : the problem of the relation of the finite to
the Infinite therefore is said to be insoluble.
If this be the case, all further enquiry into the exist
ence or nature of Divine Analogy is useless, as it is only
part of the insoluble problem.
This problem, however, engaged the especial atten
tion of the celebrated Emanuel Swedenborg, in some of
his phUosophical, and in all his theological works.
First ; in these works* he argues that an indefinitely
great finite Being is, though indefinitely great, still
finite : the finite is that which is finited, thus not that
which creates, but which is created: that which is
finited is finited by something : that something is the
non-finited, which is the same with Infinite. We may,
therefore, according to Swedenborg, rationally infer from
the universe, an Infinite Being.
Secondly ; that if the finite be finited by the Infinite,
the finite is to the Infinite as an effect to a first cause :
so that without the Infinite the finite would not exist.
There is, thus, the relation between the two of cause
and effect.
Thirdly; that the Infinite! can respect only the Infinite:
hence that the Infinite can respect only the Infinite in the
finite, or Itself in creation : in the case of man, this
truth is exempUfied in the acknowledgment by man that
the Infinite is aU in all ; this being the final cause of his
creation ; so that the Infinite has thus, in man, a respect
* Outlines of a Philosophical Argument on the Infinite, and the
Final Cause of Creation, and on the Intercourse between the Soul and
the Body. Translated from the Latin by James John Garth Wilkinson,
Member of the Eoyal College of Surgeons of London.
t For the extracts from Swedenborg's Theological Writings.illus-
trative of these positions, see the Appendix to the present Letter.

THE FINITE AND INFINITE. 97
to the Infinite. The Infinite is thus both the First and
Final cause, or the First ahd Last, the Alpha and Omega,
the Beginning and the End of the creation of the finite,
or of man.
Fourthly; that the Infinite in itself, is not in the finite;
but the In^nite from itself, is. The Infinite from itself
is the Divine Proceeding; and is in the finite, as in
man for instance, by appearance: it is in virtue of this
appearance that man is able to appropriate to himself, as
his own, that which is not his own but is from the
Infinite. Hence, it is in virtue of this appearance also,
that man possesses life as from himself, when neverthe
less it is not frora himself, but from the Lord : that we
can say man is good, when nevertheless there is none
good but God ; or wise, when nevertheless there is none
wise but God : or that man is, when nevertheless the
Lord alone is. It is, therefore, as perfectly true to say
that the Infinite is in the finite, as that man lives, or is,
or is good, or is wise, or is a being, a person, a man, and
is accountable for his actions.
Fifthly ; that although, therefore, there is no ratio, of
the finite to the Infinite as it is in itself, there is a ratio
of the Infinite in itself to the Infinite from itself in the
finite ; there is also a ratio of the Infinite from itself to
the finite, and vice versa, by reason of the appearance
that the finite can appropriate to itself as its own, what
nevertheless is from the Infinite ; so that it may become
ax\ image and likeness of the Infinite from itself; in which
image and likeness is laid the foundation of the Doctrine
of Divine Analogy.
Sixthly ; that of the Infinite we predicate that it is,
or Esse ; but even Esse, in our conceptions, impUes Ex-
istere ; for we cannot conceive Esse without Existere, or
H

98

THE FINITE AND INFINITE.

Existere without Esse. The Infinite in itself is the Esse;
the Infinite from itself, the Existere : and it is through
the Existere that we arrive at the Esse.
Seventhly ; that Time and Space are not infinite, for
whatever is infinite is Divine ; nor are they real beings in
themselves, nor even conditions of real being : they are
simply the conditions of the phenomena of external
Nature; and as such of those thoughts in the merely
natural mind, within which may ' reside other thoughts,
which, as being spiritual, are above the conditions of
Time and Space. When, therefore, it is said that all that
is conceivable is conditioned in Time and Space, this may
be true, in a certain sense, if spoken of the merely
natural mind ; but is untrue if spoken of the spiritual.
From these remarks of Swedenborg it wUl be seen,
that we may rationally infer from the finite or the inde
finite, the Infinite ; therefore that we need not be logi
cally or metaphysically Atheists, or believers in a merely
finite God : that the Infinite is in the finite by appear
ance, therefore that we need not be logically or meta
physically Pantheists :* that there is a ratio in the sense
explained, thus an analogy, between the Infinite and the
finite, therefore that we need not logically or metaphy
sically be without a true knowledge of God ; that there
is a nexusf or communication between the two, therefore
that there is not logically or metaphysically an impass
able chasm or hiatus between them, nor any irreconcil
able opposition of genuine Metaphysics to genuine Theo-
* As wiU be further shewn when we come to treat of the Doctrine
of Degrees. f Even this nexus, he observes in his Outlines, is, in one sense,
Infinite ; nor can it be explained without a knowledge of the Doctrme
of Degrees.

ANALOGICAL SERIES. 99
logy, nor any theoretical or insuperable difficulty in the
matter. The alleged difficulty, according to Sweden
borg, who has reviewed the whole question, arises only
from the fallacies of the merely natural man, who bears
the same relation to the spiritual now as he did in the
time of the Apostle Paul.
With a view to trace downwards the analogical series
of Swedenborg to that point on which we shall have to
enlarge, we briefly observe, —
1. That to attempt to contemplate the Infinite Esse
without relation to Infinite Existere is the same kind of
thing as to attempt to contemplate essence without rela
tion to existence, or as not yet existing ; which is a vain
effort of the intellect.
2. The relation of the Infinite to the finite is not
that of the Infinite Esse, but of the Infinite Existere in
which is the Infinite Esse ; and this relation of the Infi
nite to the finite, is to — the finite as indefinite.
3. The relation of the Infinite to the indefinite is as
that of the solar fire of our system to its proximate reci
pient element ; with this difference, that the former is
the relation of Infinite to indefinite ; and the latter the
relation of indefinite to indefinite : as the latter never can
be intrinsically known, so much less the former.
4. Esse is to essence, and Existere to existence as
prior to posterior: the Divine Essence is the Divine
Love ; the Divine Existence is the Divine Wisdom ; and
as love and wisdom are human attributes, so both toge
ther are the Divine Human. Moreover as love in God
is not merely the attribute of a substance, but is itself
the attribute substantiated, thus Divine substance itself,
so the Divine Wisdom is the Divine form of that sub
stance ; this Divine form is the same with the Divine
H 2

100 THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY.
Human : and it is this Divine Human which, as wUl be
seen, stands in imraediate relation to creation. This is
the subject, then, on which we proceed to enlarge. And
first —This doctrine of the Divine Human forra leads to
most important considerations in connection with the
subject of Analogy : for the unity of this Divine Human
form is the same with the Divine Simplicity ; which does
not consist in being singly one, as is commonly sup
posed, but distinctly one ; consequently it consists with
an infinite plurality, as is the case with every individual
man, who, although a unif, is a complex unit. At this
Divine unity we arrive not by a process of abstraction,
but by a process of impletion, so to speak, hence at an
Infinite plenitude ; " the fulness of him that filleth all in
"all." A similar view is taken by Cousin in his Fifth Lec
ture, on Mysticism : —
" True Divine unity," says he, " is not abstract
" unity ; it is the precise unity of perfect Being, in which
" every thing is accomplished. At the suinmit of exist-
" ence stUl more than at its low degree, every thing is
" determinate, every thing is developed, every thing is
" distinct, every thing is one. The richness of determi-
" nations is a certain sign of the plenitude of being. Re-
" flection distinguishes these determinations from each
" other ; but it is not necessary that it should in these
" distinctions see the limits. In us, for example, does
" the diversity of our faculties and their richest develop-
"ment divide the tne, and alter the identity and the
" unity of the person ? Does each one of us believe
"himself less than himself, because he possesses sensi-
" bUity, reason, and will ? ' No, surely ! It is the same

THE DIVINE HUMAN FORM. 101
" with God. Not having employed a sufficient psycho-
"logy, Alexandrian mysticism imagined that diversity of
"attributes is incompatible with simplicity of essence;
" and through fear of corrupting simple and pure essence,
" it made of it an abstraction."
Thus far then, with a view to a true and coherent
doctrine of Correspondence, we arrive at that of a Divine
plenitude, whose unity is that of a Divine Human form,
or a Divine Man.
There are,* says Cousin, two rocks to be avoided on
this subject ; one is " abstraction, the abuse of dialectics,
" which is the vice of the schools and of metaphysics ;"
the other is the refined sentimentality of Anthropomor
phism, which " makes us institute with God an intimate
" and famUiar intercourse, in which we are somewhat too
" forgetful of the august and fearful majesty of the Divine
" Being ;" — in Ulustration of which he instances Fenelon
and Madame Guyon. What that intermediate is between
a metaphysical abstraction on the one hand and a senti
mental Anthropomorphism on the other, which is adopted
by Cousin himself, he nowhere teUs us ; nor was it essen
tial to his treatment of the subject that he should ; for
he nowhere seems to trouble himself with the doctrine
of Analogy, which would have compelled him to be very
explicit upon this point : particularly as he admits that
the God of his Theodicea is " a real and determinate
" being," — " a moral person like our own," — " a personal
" God as we ourselves are a person," possessing also
human attributes. Hence he justly observes,! that we
cannot love what we are ignorant of ; that we cannot
love substance in general, or form in general. " Real
* Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Lecture xvii.
t lbid.. Lecture v.

im

THE DIVINE HUMAN FORM.

" and determinate," says he, " are synonyms. What
" constitutes a being is its special nature, its essence. A
" being is itself only on the condition of not being an-
" other ; it cannot but have characteristic traits. AU that
" is, is such or such. Difference is an element as essen-
" tial to being as unity itself. If then reality is in deter-
" mination, it follows that God is the most determinate
" of beings.". . ." By wishing to free God from all the con-
" ditions of Unite existence, one comes to deprive Him of
" all the conditions of existence itself : one has such a
" fear that the Infinite .may have something in common
" with the finite, that he does not dare to recognize that
" being is common to both, save difference of degree ; as
" if aU that is not, were not nothingness itself.". . . .
"There are," says he, referring to Kant and others,
" phUosophers beyond the Rhine who, to appear very
" profound, are not contented with qualities and pheno-
"mena, but aspire to Pure Substance, to Being in
" itself" Whereas, " there is no being in itself." " All
" being is determinate, if it is real ; and to be determi-
"nate, is to possess certain modes of being, .transitory
" and accidental, or constant and essential. Knowledge
" of Being in itself is, then, not merely interdicted to the
" human mind : it is contrary to the nature of things.
"At the other extreme of metaphysics is a powerless
" Psychology, which through fear of a hollow Ontology,
"is condemned to voluntary ignorance. We are not
" able, say these phUosophers, Mr. Dugald Stewart for
" example, to attain Being in itself : it is permitted us to
" know only phenomena and qualities ; so that in order
" not to wander in search of the substance of the soul,
"they do not dare affirm its spirituality, and devote
" themselves to the study of its different faculties. Equal

THE DIVINE HUMANITY. 103
" error ! equal chimera ! There are no more quaUties
" without being, than being without qualities. No being
" is without its determinations, and reciprocally its deter-
" minations are not without it."
Now according to Swedenborg, the determination of
being is its form : the determinations of the Divine
Being, his Divine Human form.
The false and powerless Psychology of which Cousin
complains, is that in which the soul or spirit of man is
represented as a pure en,s rationis, a metaphysical ab
straction, upon the simplipity of which is founded the doc
trine of a Divine Simplicity. Equal error, equal chimera !
Even Bishop Brown repudiated such a notion of the
Divine Simplicity ; and confessed that the only unity we
could conceive as possessed analogically by God, is the
unity of an individual Man.
From the relation of the Infinite to the finite, we
pass on therefore to the relation of the Divine to the
human. The relation of the Infinite to the finite is the meta
physical form of expressing the relation of Analogy ; the
relation of the Divine to the human is the theological
form : in both cases the difficulties are said to be the
same ; for to attribute the human to the Divine, is said
to be the same as to attribute the finite to the Infinite ;
in which case the attributes mutually destroy each other ;
and thus to speak of the Divine Human would be, accord
ing to Bishop Brown, equaUy absurd as to speak of an
" Infinite human body," an " Infinite human creature,"
with " Infinite human perfections," of a something " In
finitely finite," or of an " Infinitely great finite," &c.
Thus the same abrupt chasm which in metaphysics
is said to exist between the Infinite and the finite^ is said

104 THE DIVINE HUMANITY.
in theology to exist also between the Divine and human ;
and as such, upon this principle, there is the same abrupt
chasm between the Divine and the human, the finite and
the Infinite, in the very person of our Saviour himself as
there is out of it.
On the other hand, it is observed by the author of
the Prolegomena Logica, with respect to the nature
and attributes of the Infinite Being, that " by removing
" the condition of limitation, we remove the only con-
" dition under which such attributes have ever been pre-
"sented to our consciousness;" p. 251. "Cousin,"
says he, " observes that on M. de Biran's theory, An-
" thropomorphism becomes the universal and necessary
" law of thought. It might be replied," continues the
author of the Prolegomena, "that in all cases where
" the presentation is given by internal consciousness only,
" Anthropomorphism is in fact the condition and the limit
"of all positive thinking " (p. 311, Appendix). If this
be the case, then, whether logically or metaphysicaUy,
this settles the question.
Indeed goodness, wisdom, power, are more truly
human even than the human body. To attribute these
to the Divinity is to attribute humanity to the Divinity ;
to admit that these attributes are Divine, is to admit the
humanity to be Divine ; to admit that in God they are
infinite, is to admit that God has an Infinite Humanity :
indeed, if the Divine be infinite, then in this case the
Deity is an Infinite Man, as well as a Divine Man. If
any one denies this, let him deny that, in relation to God,
Anthropomorphism is the condition and Umit of all posi
tive thinking. If it be repUed, This is only ascribing to
God our own form of thought ; it may be replied, Are we
not doing the same when we attribute to Him goodness,

THE DIVINE HUMANITY. 105
wisdom, and power ? We raust either think of God as a
Man, or He can be no object of thought at all ; for what
is incomprehensible, is in the strict sense inconceivable ;
and what is inconceivable is nothing to us : and as such
we not only must not, but cannot, think of Him at all ;
if we do think of Him determinately, we must think of
Him as a Man. And therefore, when Bishop Beveridge
says that in worshipping Him we must set aside aU idea
of humanity,* and regard Him only as incomprehensible,
what is this but the very error of the mystics, who aim
at a direct intuitus in abyssum ?
Swedenborg regards such a method of religious wor
ship as essentiaUy pure Naturalism ; which worships only
indeterminate Being, or pure Being, or Being in general,
or the unknown God, i. e., it knows not what. " If,"
says he, " at this day (as in the time of Moses, Exod. iii.
" 4) Jehovah was to appear in the Church as a Man, men
" would be offended, and would think that He could not
" possibly be the Creator and Lord of the universe, be-
" cause He was seen as a Man ; and moreover they would
"not have any other idea concerning Him than as of a
* The following observation by & distinguished author in the Uni
versity, would, I believe, be very generally regarded as perfectly or
thodox :¦ —
" It would be little better than idolatry to fill the mind with an
"idea of God which represented Him in fashion as a «io«. And in
" using a figure of speech, we are bound to explain to aU who are
" capable of understanding, that we speak in figure only ; and to remind
" them, that logical categories may give as false and imperfect a concep-
" tion of the Divine nature iu our own age, as graven images in the
" days of the patriarchs. However legitimate the use of them may be
"in thinking of God, we must place ourselves not below, but above
"them."  The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians,
Romans .- with Critical Notes and Dissertations. By Benjamin Jowett,
M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, vol. ii., p. 404.

106

THE DIVINE HUMANITY.

" common man. In this they believe themselves wiser
" than the ancients ; not aware that in this they are alto-
" gether remote from wisdom ; for when the idea of the
" thought is directed to a universal entity altogether in-
" comprehensible, the idea falls upon no being, and is
" totally dissipated ; and in this case there is presented in
" its place the idea of Nature, to which all things in general
" and in particular are attributed. Hence it is that the
" worship of Nature is at this day so common, especially
" in the Christian world."*
If we deny that God is Man, we have the same
reason for denying that God is good, or wise, or power
ful, which are all human attributes, and as such, accord
ing to Lord Bolingbroke, are ascribed to God as impro
perly as a human body.
It is however argued by the author of Divine Ana
logy, p. 248, " That all natural inherent attributes or
" properties flow immediately and necessarily from the
" substance or essence to which they belong ; conse-
" quently if the attributes of God are of the. same kind as
" they are in man ; the substance of God is of the same
" kind as it is in man, the difference being only that of
" degree in perfection!' This necessarily foUows, in the
sense in which it will be explained when we come to
speak of degrees; for if we regard the attributes as
human, we must regard the substance as human, and if
the attributes taken together are Divine Human, so is the
substance.! It is an interesting phenomenon in the history of
* Arcana Ccelestia, art. 6876.
! Substance and essence are not, according to Swedenborg, merely
entia rationis, conceived in order to serve as the basis of logical predi
cates ; the use of the terms is founded upon the real nature of things.

THE DIVINE HUMANITY. 107
human nature, that a doctrine which has brought down
a century of reproach upon Swedenborg, should now at
last so far begin to find favor in the University, that it
is acknowledged on the one hand as, logically, an inevi
table law of all positive thought on the subject of the
Deity ; and on the other, theologically, as the veritable
doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, and even of the fathers
themselves ; for this has been clearly admitted by Dr.
Pusey, in his sermon on The Ascension and the notes
which he has subjoined ; nor is it easy to estimate the
value which his services have rendered to the Church in
thus reviving a doctrine which had been generally re
garded, in this Protestant country, as too absurd to be
a formidable heresy.* Something, however, of this kind
of theology may be found in the sermon of Sterry!
preached before the House of Commons, and pubUshed
by order of that House in 1648 ; where it is observed,
p. 11 ; — " He that descended is the same that ascended
" far above all heavens. This ascent doth not so much
" import a change of place, as of person and proportion.
"... Our Lord ascended not so much by a local motion,
"as a spiritual mutation, and exaltation of his person.
"As earth heightened unto a flame, changeth not its
"place only, but form and figure ; so the person of our
as referring to their inmost principles. The inmost of man is the
will ; this is the human essence or substance : the ^rm of the sub
stance or existence of the essence, is the understanding ; for it is in
the understanding that the will is in its form.
* For this reason, probably, scarcely a vestige of the doctrine is
to be found throughout the whole course of the Bampton Lectures :
the only Lectures of this course in which the doctrine is patronized,
being, if I mistake not, those of Mr. Garbett.
! Peter Sterry, M.A., sometime Fellow of Emanuel College, Cam
bridge.

108

THE DIVINE HUMANITY.

" Saviour was raised to a greatness, a glory vastly dif-
" fering from, and surmounting any image, all images, of
"things visible or invisible in this creation. So 'tis
" fitly expressed, Heb. vU. 26, ' He was made higher than
" the heavens ;' He was heightened to a splendor, en-
" larged to a capacity and compass above the brightest,
" beyond the widest heavens."
Now, to be " higher than the heavens " is to be above
the condition of all created being ; i. e., it is to be Divine.
" In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth!'
The heavens and the earth constitute the original limit of
creation :* all that is not within this limit is Divine : but
that which is above the heavens is above the limit, and
therefore as such is essentially Divine. How different is
this doctrine from that which resolves the glorification
or ascension of our Lord's Humanity, into pure loco
motion. In accordance with this view of the subject, Swe
denborg observes. Arcana Ccelestia, 6849 : —
" The Divine Being himself is pure Love ; and pure
" Love is as fire, hotter than the fire of the sun of this
"world. Wherefore if the Divine Love in its purity
" flowed in into any angel, spirit, or man, he would alto-
" gether perish. Hence it is that Jehovah, or the Lord,
" in the Word is so often called a consuming flre. From
"this consideration ... it manifestly appears tbat the
" Lord's Humanity is Divine ; for unless it was Divine it
" could never be so united to the Divinity itself, which
" is called the Father, as that they may be one, according
" to the Lord's words in John, chap. xiv. 10, &c. ;! for
" what so receives the Divinity must needs be altogether
* Of course excluding Hell, which is not a work of God.
f Which union was not perfected till the Eesurrection.

THE DIVINE HUMANITY. 109
" Divine : what is not Divine would be absolutely dissi-
" pated by such a union. For, to speak comparatively,
" what can be thrown into the solar fire, and not perish,
" unless it be a similar solar principle ? In like manner,
" who can be cast into the ardency of Infinite Love, ex-
" cept he who is in the ardency of simUar love, conse-
" sequently the Lord alone ?"
Let us trace the connection between this doctrine of
a Divine Humanity, and that of Analogy or Correspond
ence ; and in so doing we shall perceive — what ? — that
the controversy upon the subject of the Divine attributes
has completely ignored the doctrine of the Incarnation !
This will appear from the following remarks.
" When the Holy Scriptures speak of God," says
Archbishop King,*- " they ascribe hands and eyes and
" feet to Him : not that it is designed that we should
" beUeve that He has any of these members according
" to the literal signification : but the meaning is that He
" has a power to exercise all those acts to the effecting of
" which these parts in us are instrumental ; that is. He
" can converse with men as well as if He had a tongue
" and mouth ; He can discern all that we do or say as
" perfectly as if He had eyes and ears ; He can reach us
" as well as if He had hands and feet ; He has as true
" and substantial a being as if He had a body, and He
" is as trlily present every where as if that body were in-
" finitely extended."
Now I understand the expression,- " as if He had a
"body," to mean that in reaUty God has no body,
whether in a Uteral or any other sense : in conformity to
the words of the first Article, in which it is said, " God
* Discourse on Predestination.

110

THE DIVINE HUMANITY.

" is without body," &c. Accordingly Bishop Burnett
treats this Article as one of natural theology : " It is
" clear," says he, " that God has no body," — " it is
" certain that God has no body :" indeed to speak of
God incarnate as without body would be self-contradic
tory. "It is true," says Bishop Burnett, "that God
" has often shewn himself in visible appearances, but
" that was only his putting a special quantity of matter
" into such motions as should give a great and astonish-
" ing idea of his nature from that appearance, which was
" both the effect of his power and the symbol of his
" presence." Accordingly Bishop Beveridge observes,
when treating of the same Article concerning God as
without body — " Of whom therefore we are not to frame
" any picture or idea in our minds ; but are stiU to ap-
" prehend Him only as a God incomprehensible ; and if,
" whilst we are meditating of Him, any bodily shape
" presents itself to our thoughts, we are to remove it
" from Him we are thinking of, and conceive of Him as
"without body." God then being without body, any
words which imply the possession of a body are not to
be interpreted analogically ; for it is expressly affirmed
that Analogy implies a corresponding reality ; but there
being, it is said, no corresponding reality in God to
answer to the term body, it is therefore affirmed that
both this term and aU that it impUes must be interpreted
metaphorically. " Thus," observes Bishop Coplestone,
" after the same manner the language of Scripture as-
" cribes hands, feet, and eyes to God ; and although in
" this case it is universally allowed that the terms are me-
" taphorical, jet the principle of the application is the
" same as in the former case."* In this view of the sub-
* Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity, ^c. Notes.

THE DIVINE HUMANITY. Ill
ject the Bishop of Cork also concurs ; insisting that al
though the attributes of God are to be interpreted ana
logically, yet when a body, eyes, hands, feet, are ascribed
to Him, they are to be interpreted metaphorically. Bishop
Coplestone indeed admits, that metaphor is a species of
analogy ; but such a species as is addressed rather to the
fancy than to the judgment.
On the other hand, the following* is an observation
of the Bishop of Cork — (we must pardon the excessive
vehemence of the style) — " But if after all this, they
" should allow the terms in which the Gospel mysteries
" are expressed, to signify not only something real in spi-
" ritual things, but also somewhat correspondent and
"proportionable to the things of this world substituted
" for thera, and yet still call this metaphor ; they are then
" grossly guilty of confounding two things totally dif-
" ferent, by perversely giving them the same name to serve
" a vUe turn ; and also make a concession which at once
" renders them shamefully inconsistent with themselves,
" and overturns all their schemes of divinity." The cause
of this effervescence on the part of this eminent writer,
was, that when the attributes of God were interpreted
metaphorically, others followed out the argument, and,
as the Bishop admits, consistently proceeded to interpret
the being of God metaphorically ; so that there was only
a metaphorical essence, a metaphorical existence, a me
taphorical God : in fact, aU natural theology was re
garded as one grand metaphor.
The same argument was applied to the lucarnation ;
and so we have, upon the same principle, a Divine Being
assuming a metaphorical body, endowed with meta
phorical eyes, hands, and feet; from which the transition
* Procedure, Sfc, of the Human Understanding, p. 146.

112

THE DIVINE HUMANITY.

is easy and natural to his working metaphorical miracles,
being metaphorically crucified, and metaphorically rising
from the dead and ascending into heaven. Not that
those Church of England theologians who thus misem
ployed the terra metaphor, meant to teach any such thing,
however logically it might flow from their premises. But
foreseeing, perhaps, the consequences which might arise
from first contemplating the Deity as incarnate, and then
that to say " God is without body " would amount to a
denial of the Incarnation, they had no resource but to
apply the expression " without body " to a period ante
cedently to it ; thus going back to the Jewish Dispensa
tion; or to mere natural theology, in which case the
Christian and the Deist stand upon an equal footing.
For incarnation is defined to be " the act of assuming
" body ;" and, as Hooker says, " we must beware that
" we exclude not the nature of God from incarnation ;"
i. e., from assuming a body. Say now that God is with
out body, and He is so far disincarnated : say again, that
" He has as true and substantial a being as if He had a
" body," and this is only to say that " He has as true
" and substantial a being as if" He were incarnate.
The consequence has been, that when treating of the
attributes of God, the whole question of Analogy has been
discussed without reference to the Incarnation ; nay, the
Incarnation has been expressly excluded, as supplying
only a series of metaphors, and furnishing no soUd
ground upon which to infer, by parity of reasoning, any
real and certain knowledge of the Deity. Thus the in
termediate between the divine and human has been left
out, and hence the hiatus between the two, as acknow
ledged by metaphysicians and theologians. In this case
of course theology stands still, as well also as meta-

THE DIVINE HUMANITY. 113
physics : it is impossible for either to progress : the
ladder of Jacob is lost, and there can be no question
that the only other way of ascent to Deity, forbidden
though it be, is the tower of Babel.
The Bishop of Cork indeed surmises occasionally, that
the Humanity of our Lord may possibly have something
to do with the subject of Analogy ; but then he thinks
it is only when we are arrived in heaven ; where the
"Divine Nature will be visible to us in and through
"Him:" his human nature is there to be the medium*
in and through which the Divine perfections are to be
revealed. But if there, why not here ? Why is his
Divine body to be a mediator in heaven, and a metaphor
upon earth ? Why are we to know God in heaven through
the medium of the " body of God," and upon earth to
contemplate God as " without body ?" I say, " the body
" of God;" for even Athanasius observes, " Though
" the flesh of Christ, considered alone by itself, were but
" a part of the creatures ; nevertheless was it made ' the
"'body of God'" — aXKa 0eS yeyove cr&fia.f — "No man
" knoweth Jhe Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever
" the Son will reveal him!' It were well, says Bishop
Coplestone, if this rule, which was continually present
to Luther's mind, were more observed than it is by
Christian divines ! Luther's admonition was, " Nemo
" igitur de Divinitate nu1)A cogitet, sed has cogitationes
"fugiat tanquam Infernum, et ipsissimas Satance tenta-
" tiones." — " Omnes doctores non secus atque Diabolum
" caveamus, qui sublimibus illis articulis de Deo docere
" incipiunt nude et sine Christo." To contemplate
God as without body, what is this but to contemplate
* Divine Analogy, p. 38.
t Cudworth's Intellectual System, vol. iii,, p. 305. I

114

THE DIVINE HUMANITY.

Him nude et sine Christo ? or, if we are to contemplate
Him in and through his Divine body, why are we to
resolve it into a mediatorial mirage ? In this respect
Swedenborg, whether rightly or wrongly, has differed
in toto from the generally received theology : he has in
terpreted the Anthropomorphism of Scripture by as
strict a rule of correspondence as the Divine attributes ;
and even the Divine attributes themselves he has regarded
as Divine only as pertaining to a Divine Humanity.
" Upon a just idea of God," says he, " is founded the
" universal heaven, and upon earth the universal {Ca-
" tholic) Church, and in general all religion ; inasmuch
" as by such idea conjunction is effected ; and by conjunc-
" tion light, wisdom, and eternal felicity."
Now the difference between the doctrine of Analogy
as it exists in natural theology, so called, and as it exists
in revealed theology, is this ; that in revealed theology
humanity is distinctly introduced, in natural theology
it is distinctly omitted. In revealed theology humanity
is' the only medium through which the Divinity reveals
itself; into natural theology no such medium is admitted.
In revealed theology, therefore, another element enters
into the analogical series : in natural theology the only
two terms of the series are divine and human; in revealed
theology, there are three terms. Divine, Divine Human,
human. The admission of the second term Divine Human
into the series furnishes the connecting link between the
two extremes, and accomplishes a revolution in the argu
ment : for the result is, first, that on the one hand, the
Divinity is not divine in such a sense as to be incompre
hensible to humanity, nor Human in such a sense as to
possess attributes incompatible with Divinity. Our own
humanity indeed has no direct knowledge of the Divinity

THE DIVINE HUMANITY. 115
as it is iu itself : the Divinity as such is utterly incom
prehensible to us ; but the humanity of the Saviour has
a direct knowledge of the Divinity as it is in itself, and
as having that knowledge, is Divine ; for to know God
as He is in Himself, is to be God. No being not divine
has a direct idea of Divinity as it is in itself, for " no
"one hath seen God at any time ;" but we are not there
fore in the dark : " the only-begotten Son who is in the
" bosom of the Father, he hath declared him!' Secondly,
this being the case, the correspondence or analogy is not
of our finite humanity with naked Divinity, but of our
finite humanity with Divine Humanity ; consequently not
of one extreme with the other, but of one extreme with
the intermediate. After all, however, it may be said that
we are only transferring the difficulty from one part of
the argument to another ; for whether we speak of the
Divinity or of the Divine Humanity, the perfections of
love and wisdom belonging to both are equally divine ;
so that the difficulty itself remains one and the sarae.
We answer, that to pure and naked Divinity we cannot
ascribe any human perfections, simply because it ever is
and ever will be unknown : and as we cannot ascribe any
such perfections to the Infinite Esse, so there is no
ground of analogy between this and our humanity : con
sequently the direct relation of our humanity to pure
Divinity has no place in any doctrine of Divine Analogy.
How then are we to raise our conceptions of good
ness, wisdom, and power, beyond those attributes which
belong to a creature, so that they shaU be intermediate
between pure Divinity and our humanity? The answer
is, the intermediate is the Mediator, and is in the Media
tor only. He Himself is the ladder which reaches from
one to the other. He ascended from finite humanity to
1 2

116 THE DIVINE HUMANITY.
pure Divinity, so as to be now the Divine Human : in
this respect we cannot foUow Him, though we may ascend
in thought from creaturely humanity to Divine Hu
manity. This process of the Lord's ascension or glori
fication is the exemplar of our regeneration. He as
cended to the Father, we ascend to Him ; and through
Him to the Father, but yet to the Father only as in
Him ;- and as one with Him.
We see then that the question concerning the cor
respondence of humanity with pure and naked Divinity
does not concern us : it has relation only to the person
of the Saviour, in whom that very correspondence existed
directly. To assert the existence of such a correspondence
between the Divinity and our own humanity, is to usurp
the prerogative of the Saviour ; or of that humanity which
alone was by conception the Son of God : no wonder
therefore that the argument upon Analogy, so conducted,
should end in midnight darkness. Finite beings are
concerned only with the correspondence between a crea
turely humanity and a Divine Humanity; and 'of that
Divine Humanity we cannot say that it is extra omne genus;
for though we might say this of pure and naked Divinity,
viz., of the Father apart from the Son, yet we cannot
say so of the Humanity as Divine ; for humanity enters
into both sides of the analogy or correspondence. Nor
indeed is it easy to reconcUe the position that God is
extra omne genus, with the language of the apostle Paul,
who adopts the sentiment of the Greek poet he is quot
ing, " Lpsius enim genus sumus," and adds, " Genus ergo
" cum simus Dei," &c. Acts xvii. 28, 29.
If we attempt indeed to trace the correspondence
between our humanity and pure and naked Divinity,
then, in this case, all that Bishop Brown, Archbishop

THE DIVINE HUMANITY, 117
King and others have said upon the subject is perfectly
true. Divinity, pure and naked, is extra omne genus, of
a " totally different nature," of an " infinitely different
kind," from that of man : we know no more of it than
a blind man knows of colors; being utterly indeter
minate, our ideas of it must be indeterminate ; and an
indeterminate idea is no idea ; and in this case God is no
God to us. To institute an analogy in such a case is
useless ; for it adds nothing to our knowledge, and leads
to nothing, except to the brink of a bottomless abyss, to
an abrupt precipitous chasm, which we have no means of
crossing. Hence it is that the doctrine of Analogy was,
and is, so generally unproductive. This is the one prin
cipal source of all indistinct, confused, and obscure ideas
with regard to God and the mysteries of Christianity ; the
one real cause of all the uncertainty and arbitrariness of
allegorical interpretations ; for, as conducted upon this
principle, or no principle, it furnishes its advocates with
no more knowledge of God than is possessed by those
who oppose their sentiments : advocate and opponent
in this respect stand upon the same level, and each is
right only as pointing out the errors of the other.
To say that in this case the controversy between
King, Berkeley, Brown and others, was a mere logoma
chy* is assuredly to mistake the question ; for what was
maintained by the opponents of Bishop Berkeley and
others, was not that the analogy between the Deity and
His creatures was far less exact and complete than it is
between one man and another, but that no such analogy
existed in any sense whatever ; and the author of Divine
Analogy, who agrees with Archbishop King upon this
* Elements of Logic. By Eichard Whately, D.D. Seventh
Editibn, p. 335. See Appendix to this Letter.

118

DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.

point, takes considerable pains to point this out as the
real state of the case ; because, in the relation of one man
to another, the analogy is between things of the same
genus (which Bishop Brown denies to be analogy in his
sense of the term) ; but in the case of the Deity and His
creatures it is said to be between genus on one side, and
no genus on the other — a something infinitely different —
in which case the question is not whether the analogy is
far less exact and complete, but, whether it exists at all ;
inasmuch as far less means infinitely less, i. e., nothing, or
next to nothing. The true Ulustration of the question at
issue seems rather to be this : — whether, in arguing from
the creature to the Creator, the analogy might not be as
indirect, remote, vague, indeterminate, or even positively
erroneous as in arguing directly from a vegetable to an
animal — frora a mineral to a vegetable — from the mineral
to the animal kingdom — from man to something more
different from humanity than anything that is known.
The doctrine of the Divine Humanity so far settles this
question, as that, in this case, the analogy is between
things of the same genus ; between the humanity of the
creature on the one side, and the humanity of the Creator
on the other. In interpreting the attributes of the
Deity, therefore, if we interpret them deoirpen-w we
need not, indeed we cannot, abandon the avOpcoiroiraQm ;
we may, and must, preserve both ; and this is the real
ground of the Theanthropic representations in Scripture.
The consequence is, that we are enabled to argue from
the attributes of man to those of God; to institute a
parity of reason from one to the other; and thus that we
need not resort to the indirect expedient of effects out of
God, instead of to attributes in Him.*
* See above, p. 66,

DOCTRINE OF DEGREES. 119
If, however, in considering the Divine attributes, the
analogy with which we are concerned is not between
pure and naked Divinity on the one side, and the crea
turely human on the other (as Archbishop King, Bishop
Brown, and others have mistakenly supposed), but be
tween Divine Human perfections or a Divine Humanity
on the one side, and human perfections on the other ; the
question stUl occurs, whether we can reason rightly frora
the one to the other directly or immediately ; and, accord
ing to Swedenborg, we cannot. If there be the series.
Divine, Divine Human, and human, there is stUl a further
series between the Divine Human and the human : this
intermediate series is a series of Degrees.
We now come to the most important part of the
subject of Analogy — one which has occasioned more dis
cussion, while it has been confessedly less understood,
than any other — I mean the Doctrine of Degrees.
We have seen how the controversy concerning the
expression, same in kind, has been reconciled by Sweden
¬borg; we proceed to shew how he treats the subject of
Degrees, and, consequently, to point out the practical
bearing of his principles on the controversy between
King, Brown, Berkeley and others. This wUl furnish a
fair criterion of their value.
Any reader acquainted with this controversy wUl see,
that both those who rejected and those who advocated
degrees, when they spoke of degree, all meant one and
the same kind of degree ; namely, degrees of quantity,
such as more or less, greater or smaller, and so forth.
Even the terms higher and lower were used in this sense ;
as when we speak of higher and lower degrees of tem
perature, which are degrees of quantity.
Thus, " according to Aquinas," says Bishop Brown,*
* Divine Analogy, p, 456.

120 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.
"The perfections of the creature are in God, Altiori
" Modo, that is, in a manner very different from what
"they are in the creature; not Altiori Gradu, as this
"author (Bishop Berkeley) would have it, but in a
" higher sense ; and in a manner so infinitely different
" from what is in the creature, that the whole entire na-
" ture or kind of those perfections is thereby altered. In
" this sense it is that he says. Whatever perfection is in
" the creature pre-existit et continetur in Deo secundum
" MoDUM excellentem, not secundumG'&kDVM excellentem!'
The Bishop of Cork denies that Aquinas attributed
perfections to God in a higher degree, that is to say, in
the sense of more or greater of human perfections
increased ad infinitum; for it was the common notion
that an infinite degree of anything was constituted of
finite portions, as of spaces and times added to them
selves indefinitely ; and that in this way only we arrive at
true ideas of immensity, omnipresence, and eternity, &c.
Hence also he observes, in his Divine Analogy,* that
proportion of degrees between anything finite and in
finite is " a downright contradiction." Indeed, he re
pudiates the doctrine of degrees altogether as then un
derstood, and maintains! that Aquinas teaches that the
Divine perfections are not in God, eminenter, in a higher
degree, in the vulgar sense of the terms ; but super-
eminenter, i. e., as he says, " quite of another kind, and
" infinitely above all form or species of created beings."
While, however, the author of Divine Analogy re
pudiated the application of degree to the Divine perfec
tions ; he complained of its being adopted by his oppo
nents in the manner above stated. The same process
which was used in arriving at the ideas of immensity and
eternity, was employed also in arriving at the idea of
* p. 451. t p. 93.

DOCTRINE OF D^iGREES. 121
other Divine perfections ;* which were conceived to be
the finite moral perfections of man added to themselves
ad infinitum. It was in relation to this view of the
subject, that the author of Divine Analogy maintained
that the expression infinite degree or infinite degrees
involved an express contradiction.! "I must tell him,"
says he, speaking of the Bishop of Cloyne, J "that the
"attributes do not belong to God in his acceptation of
" them ; or in that senseless contradictory notion wherein
" they are supposed to express an infinite degree of so
" many human perfections. What we say, is, that human
" life, for instance, or human knowledge and wisdom, or
"human goodness, are in no degree truly, or properly,
"or formally the same witji the Divine," &c. . . . "We
" say that, as the nature of God is infinitely above the
" nature of man, so is the nature or kind of his know-
" ledge infinitely above the nature or kind of knowledge
"in man; and, consequently, no proportion of degrees
" only can be signified by that term when attributed to
" God."^ Hence, when Bishop Brown observes that he
altogether repudiates Berkeley's analogy of degrees ; that
he means only degrees of more or less, is evident from
his observation — " That analogy of degrees, such as is
" supposed between more white and less white, more wise
" and less wise, more good and less good, || is a modern
"invention, and the spurious issue of some wanton
* See Divine Analogy, pp. 385, 407.
t As already observed, p. 62. % Divine Analogy, p. 385.
§ Divine Analogy, p. 478.
II In the Procedure the author speaks (p, 349) of intelligent beings
as at a kss or greater distance from the fountain of happiness. This,
of course, he would say, is meant analogically, not literally in respect
of distance of space.

122 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.
" imagination ; designed to supplant the genuine analogy
"founded on a real resemblance and correspondency
" between things different in kind."* It was upon this
ground that he rejected the idea of Infinite Human per
fections or affections in the Deity, and that conse
quently he was charged by Bishop Berkeley with advo
cating the doctrine of an unknown God.
It might be supposed by some, that, after all, the
controversy was a mere logomachy; but far different
was the conviction of the controversialists, which in
cluded some of the most eminent men of the day. They
knew and maintained that it struck at the very root of
our ideas of God and His attributes ; thus, at the very
root of all religion : to thi^ day, the controversy has
never been settled, and the principles it involves are the
unrecognized source of all the theological difficulties and
differences which exist. To maintain with one class of
opponents that the attributes of God are univocally the
same in Him as in us, was to regard God as being a
man not Divine but as one of the utmost creaturely per
fection : on the other hand, it was impossible to agree
with the other class of opponents, that " we have no idea
at all of the true nature of God."!
What light then does Swedenborg throw upon this
subject? He reminds us that degrees are of two dif
ferent kinds, namely, discrete and continuous ; that the
series of degrees between the human and Divine Human
is a series not of continuous, but of discrete degrees;
and that aU the controversy which has arisen upon the
subject, has arisen from the want of knowing and ob
serving this distinction. Continuous degrees, says he,
* Divine Analogy, p, 505. f Ibid., p. 64.

DOCTRINE OF DEGREES. 123
have relation to more or less, to great, greater, greatest :
discrete degrees, to exterior, interior, and inmost. " The
"knowledge of degrees is," he observes, "the key to
"open the causes of things, and to enter into them."
"The interior things which lie hid (in the various
"objects of creation) can by no means be discovered,
" unless degrees be understood ; for exterior things ad-
"vance to interior things, and these to inmost, by de-
" grees: not by continuous degrees, but by discrete degrees.
"Decrements or decreasings from grosser to finer, or
" from denser to rarer, like that of Ught to shade, or of
" heat to cold, are called continuous degrees. But dis-
" crete degrees are entirely different : they are in the
" relation of prior, posterior, and postreme ; or of end,
"cause, and effect. They are called discrete degrees,
" because the prior is by itself, the posterior by itself ;
"but still, taken together, they make a one.*
" AU things, both in general and in particular, which
" exist in the spiritual and natural worlds, coexist from
"discrete continuous degrees together, or from degrees
"of altitude and degrees of latitude. That dimension
" which consists of discrete degrees is called altitude, and
"that which consists of continuous degrees is called
"latitude: their situation relatively to sight does not
" change their denomination. Without a knowledge of
" these degrees nothing can be known of the difference
" between the three heavens, or of the difference between
"the love and wisdom of the angels there, or of the
" difference between the heat and Ught in which they are,
" or of the difference between the atmospheres which sur-
" round and contain them. Moreover, without a know-
* Swedenborg's Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love,
art. 184.

124 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.
" ledge of these degrees nothing can be known of the
"difference of the interior faculties of the mind in men ;
" or, therefore, of their state as to reformation and re-
" generation ; or of the difference of the exterior facul-
" ties which are of the body, as well of angels as of men ;
" and nothing at all of the difference between spiritual
" and natural, or, therefore, of Correspondence ; yea, or
" of any difference of life between men and beasts, or of
" the difference between the more perfect and the imper-
" feet beasts ; or of the differences between the forms of
"the vegetable kingdom, and between the materials
" which compose the mineral kingdom. Whence it may
" appear, that those who are ignorant of these degrees
" cannot from any judgment see causes ; they see only
" effects, and judge of causes from thera ; which is done,
"for the raost part, by an induction continuous with
" effects, when nevertheless causes do not produce effects
" by continuity, but discretely ; for a cause is one thing,
" and an effect another : there is a difference between
" them, as between prior and posterior, or as between
" the thing forming and the thing formed.*
"All perfections increase and ascend with degrees
" and according to degrees. . . . Discrete degrees are said
"to ascend or descend, for they are degrees of altitude ;
" but the continuous are said to increase or decrease, for
" they are degrees of latitude. The latter degrees differ
" so much from the former, that the two have nothing in'
"common; wherefore they ought to be perceived dis-
" tinctly, and by no means to be confounded."!
Now the perfections of love, wisdom, and power,
are themselves examples of discrete degrees ; for no con-
* Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love, art. 185.
t lbid., art. 199.

DOCTRINE OF DEGREES. 125
tinuity of love produces wisdom, no continuity of wisdom
produces power ; and as love is predicated of the will,
wisdom of the intellect, and power of these in ultimate
operation, so the very faculties of the human raind, viz.,
of wiU, understanding, and action, are themselves ac
cording to these degrees : consequently, if we attribute
these perfections to God, we must attribute the very
degrees themselves to God. Hence it is that God is not
the ens rationis, the metaphysical abstraction called by
some a Divine Simplicity ; but in Him are infinite things
which are distinctly one ; and in these infinite things
are distinctly infinites ; and in these infinitely infinite
things, degrees of both kinds ; and as these things are
in Him, and all things are created by ,Him, so things
created represent the things which are in Him, and ac
cordingly Creation itself is an image of Divine Order.
It was from the want of observing this distinction of
degrees, that the author of Divine Analogy charges Locke
with tendencies to Atheism or Pantheism : for Locke had
traced up the visible systera of Creation by degrees to the
very nature of the invisible world, taking the whole uni
verse and even the Divinity itself into an infinite cone ; ac
cording to which the whole system of creatures, from the
highest spiritual intelligence, descends in a continual
scale down to brute matter, by degrees or gradations so
insensibly blending into each other, that Creator and
creature, spirit and matter, seem to be confounded, and
aU intrinsic difference to be lost. Nor could- the case be
otherwise ; for if the human attributes of love, wisdom,
and power, ascend to God by continuous degrees, so
they descend from God to man in the same gradation,
and man is thus a part of God, though a part infinitely
small.

126 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.
Against this view of the subject Bishop Brown justly
protested ; but as he knew of no other kind of degrees,
his only alternative was to reject the Doctrine of Degrees
altogether ; for, as he justly argues, the analogy between
God and man is not an analogy of great or small, or of
more or less, thus not an analogy of continuous degrees.
What however to substitute in the place of these degrees
he knew not ; and therefore with this subject " he med-
" died not." " The true ground," says he, " and de-
" grees of that similitude which all intelligent beings
" bear to their great Archetype, are as incomprehensible
" as the Divine Nature."*—" I confine myself," says he,
" to that Divine Analogy only whereby things worldly and
" human do necessarily become images and representations
" of supernatural and Divine things, to the mind of man ;
" between which the similitude or correspondency, though
" true and real, is so far from admitting of any demon-
" stration or even illustration of its particular nature and
" degrees, that these are altogether as inconceivable and
" unknown as the true intrinsic nature of things spiritual
" and Divine." And, indeed, in his day this was perfectly
true ; for as Swedenborg himself observes, " Nothing,
" so far as I am aware, has hitherto been known of dis-
" crete degrees or degrees of altitude ; what has been
"known is only of continuous degrees or degrees of
" latitude."! Therefore as long as discrete degrees were
unknown, the true grounds of correspondency were un
known ; and as long as continuous degrees were the
only kind that was conceivable, the real nature and
degree of correspondency was inconceivable.

* Divine Analogy, p. 118, 124.
t Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love, art. 188.

THE TEMPLE. 127
That there are however other kinds of degrees be
sides the continuous, is perfectly certain, conceivable,
and cognizable.
The spirit of man is no continuous degree of the ma
terial body ; mind is no continuous degree of matter ;
ideas are no continuous degrees of external sensations ;
intonation no continuous degree of affection ; speech no
continuous degree of thought. These aU are respec
tively in correspondence with each other, and communi
cate with each other ; not by continuous but by discrete
degrees. Two Ulustrations of this subject wUl be taken from
Scripture ; one from the Temple, the other from the Vision
of Jacob's Ladder.
In the Temple, for instance, there is the Court which
was external, the Sanctuary which was interior, the Holy
of Holies, which was inmost; all three thus representing
the degrees of external, interior, and inmost ; each of
these degrees having its own continuity in the respective
dimensions of the compartments. On whatever scale of
dimension the Temple might be built, thus whatever
change might be made in the continuous degree, it would
produce no alteration in the discrete, which would re
main as before in the relation of outer, inner, and inmost.
Accordingly the way opened by our Lord through the
veU was not the way of continuous but of discrete
degrees ; and as the Fathers regarded the Temple as re
presenting equally the body of the Lord, the three Hea
vens, the Scriptures, and the human mind, so they re
garded them as in correspondence with each other ; and
this is the ground of the interior senses they assigned to
Scripture. Of course, if the Scripture be interpreted ac
cording to the merely literal sense, so wUl the attributes

128 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.
of God. The merely literal interpretation of Scripture is
only the transference of the same principle of interpreta
tion frora the attributes of God, to the Word, hence to the
doctrines of Christianity, as already iUustrated ; all belong
only to the outer Court, entirely ignoring the existence
of an inner Sanctuary, a Holy of Holies, and the yet more
inward abode of Jehovah, the Shechinah, between the
dherubim : and as the only alternative, according to the
author of Divine Analogy, is between the outermost and
the inmost ; the external natural, and naked Divinity ; so
the existence of the inner Sanctuary, the Holy of Holies,
the Divine Shechinah, is ignored altogether, nothing re
maining of the Temple of God, or of the Word of God,
but the outer Court.
Accordingly, the interpretation of the attributes of
God, on the principle adopted by Bishop Brown, was
their interpretation in the outer Court ; between which
and Jehovah there was presumed to be no Sanctuary nor
Holy of Holies, but an impassable chasm, beyond which
was the incomprehensible and inconceivable. On the
principle, again, adopted by Bishop Berkeley and others,
the interpretation of the attributes of God was effected
by converting the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies into
a part of the outer Court, which was extended into the
inmost abode of Jehovah, nothing remaining of the Temple
but one uniform level — one common undistinguished
area both for the Deity and his worshippers : for vir
tually this is what is supposed to be meant by rending
the veil ; viz., the abolition not only of the sign, but,
together with it, of the thing signified.
A similar iUustration of the doctrine of discrete
degrees may be derived from the Vision of the Ladder of
Jacob.

APPLIED TO THE WORD OF GOD. 129
Pure and naked Divinity, Infinite Esse, Jehovah, or
"God the Father cannot," says Swedenborg, "in any
" wise be approached ; neither can He come to any man,
"because He is Infinite, and in his Esse, which is Je-
"hovah; from which, if He were to come to man. He
" would consume him, as fire does wood, and reduce him
" to ashes. This is evident from the consideration of
" his saying to Moses, who was desirous to see Him,
" that no one can see Hira and live, Exod. xxxiii. 20 ;
" and the Lord saith, that no one hath seen God at any
" time, save the Son who is in the bosom of the Father,
"John i. 18 ; Matt. xi. 27 ; also that no one hath heard
"the voice of the Father nor seen his shape, John v. 37.
"It is written indeed that Moses saw Jehovah face to
" face, and spake with Him mouth to mouth ; but this
" was done by an angel, in like manner as in the case of
"Abraham and Gideon."* Now; —
Of Jacob we read, " And he dreamed, and behold a
"ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached
" to heaven : and behold the angels of God ascending
"and descending on it" {Gen. xxviii. 12). To this
vision our Saviour refers in these words {John i. 51),
" Hereafter ye shall see heaven opened, and the angels of
" God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man!'
Alluding to this vision, Swedenborg observes, that by
the angels of God ascending and descending is signified
divine communication, and thence conjunction; "also,
"that from the lowest principles there is, as it were,
" ascent, and afterwards when the order is inverted, de-
" scent, appears from the signification of angels, as- de-
" noting a somewhat divine of the Lord, which is under-
* True Christian Religion, art. 135. K

130 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.
" stood by them when they are named in the Word ; — in
" this case, as denoting divine truth ; which appears from
" this consideration that they are called angels of God ;
"for the term <7o^is applied when, in the internal sense,
" truth is treated of, but the term Jehovah when good is
" treated of."*
" By the angels of God being seen ascending and
" descending upon the Son of Man is meant, that divine
" truths are in the Lord, and also from the Lord."!
"By those truths which are of a man's infancy and
" childhood, the angels of God ascend as by a ladder
" from earth to heaven ; but afterwards by the truths
" which are of his adult age, the angels of God descend,
"as by a ladder, from heaven to earth."|
In the person of the Saviour, then, the communica
tion between Humanity and Divinity, the Finite and the
Infinite, was carried on through the medium or media
tion of truths ; the gradations of which constituted the
steps of the ladder reaching from the lowest to the
highest principles, by a perpetual ascent not of continu
ous but of discrete degrees ; and the divine good of the
Father descended into these truths according to their
several gradations. Now the ratio of these gradations
could not have been that of continuous degrees, inas
much as these are not represented by the steps of a
ladder, which are not continuous with each other, but
distinct one from the other, or discreted, and are one
above the other ; that is to say, when applied to truths,
one within the other; thus one more inward than the
other, the inmost being the highest — Jehovah himself
being " the Most Highest."
* Arcana Ccelestia, 3701. ! Apocalypse Explained, art. 130
X Arcana Ccelestia, art, 3701.

APPLIED TO THE WORD OF GOD. 131
Thus was Mediation effected, in the person of the
Lord whUe upon earth, between humanity and Divinity ;
viz., by a ladder of truths according to their several
degrees ; thus by stupendous intermediates between the
lowest and the highest ; between humanity and Divinity ;
in order that the lowest might ascend to the highest, and
the highest descend into the lowest, so that both might
become one ; thus at once Highest and Lowest, the
Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the End, the
First and the Last, comprehending all things within
Himself. In accordance with this view of truth or the Word
being Mediator, it is observed by Cousin ; that* " Be-
" tween a finite being Uke man, and God, absolute and
" infinite substance, there is the double intermediary of
"that magnificent universe open to our gaze, and of
"those marvellous truths which reason conceives, but
" has not made, any more than the eye makes the beau-
"ties it perceives. The only means that is given of
"elevating ourselves to the Being of beings, without
" being dazzled and bewUdered, is to approach Him by
" the aid of a Divine Lntermediary ; that is to say, to
" consecrate ourselves ' to the study and love of truth ;
"and, as we shall soon see, to the contemplation and
"reproduction of the beautiful, especially to the prac-
"tice of the good.". . . ."Truth is incomprehensible
"without God, as God is incomprehensible without
" truth. Truth is placed between the human intelUgence
" and the Supreme InteUigence, as a kind of mediator."
It is remarkable that in this critical part of the argu
ment. Cousin is sUent as to the Word of God. The foun-
* Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. By Victor
Cousin. Lecture v.. On Mysticism.
¦K 2

132

DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.

tain of all intermediate truths between the Infinite and
the external mind of man, is, according to him, the
magnificent universe open to our gaze, and the mar
vellous truths which reason conceives ; nor could he have
applied his observation to the Scriptures without involv
ing a theory of inspiration.
The same principle, however, which Cousin applies
to the works of God, and the phUosophic truths con
ceived by human reason, Swedenborg transfers to the
Word of God, which to him is the fountain-head of all
truth. " The Word!' says he, " is the uniting medium
" betwixt man and the Lord ; and unless such a uniting
" medium existed, it would be impossible for heaven to
" flow in with man ; for without a medium there could
" be no unition, but heaven would remove itself from
" man."* " Mediation and intercession are of the Divine Truth,
" because this is the proximate attendant on Divine
" Good, which is the Lord himself. . . . The reason why
" the Lord is called Mediator and Intercessor is, because
" by the Son is meant Divine Truth, and by the Father
" Divine Good ; and mediation is effected by Divine
" IVuth, for by it is given access to Divine Good."!
" Truth from the Divine Being is the mediating prin-
" ciple of the Divine Good with those who are of the
" Church ; that conjunction may be effected, there must
" be mediation!' X
Accordingly it is justly observed by Cousin, that
" Mysticism pretends to elevate man directly to God,
" and does not see that in depriving reason of its power,
* Arcana Ccelestia, 4317. ! Ibid., 8705.
X Ibid., 8787.

APPLIED TO THE AVORD OF GOD. 133
" it really deprives him of that which makes him know
" God and puts him in a just communication with God
"by the intermediary of eternal and infinite truth!'
Hence also the same writer observes, " Truths of dif-
" ferent orders being given, truths which have not been
" made by us, and are not sufficient for themselves, we
"have ascended from these truths to their Author, as
" one goes from the effect to the cause, from the sign to
" the thing signified, from phenomenon to being, from
" quality to subject." Apply the observations here
made to the truths of the Word of God. " As Jesus
" Christ," says Mr. Isaac WUliams, " is himself espe-
" cially the Word of God, so the written Scriptures if) are
"often dignified by -appellations which are given even to
" the Son of God himself : as if they did also in some
" sense, if we may so speak, partake of his attributes ;
" being as it were the very breath of his mouth ; so that
" it is often doubtful which is most signified in the de-
"scriptions given, — the written Word, or our Lord him-
" self From the inanimate letter they pass to the Spirit
" contained therein : from the inanimate to the animate
" and intelligent ; — nay more than this, to that which is
"divinely living and inteUigent. . . . This is no doubt
" that ladder of God on which the true Israelite shall
" behold angels ascending and descending ; and shaU
"tremble to find that God indeed is there."*
As then the written Word is often dignified by
; appellations which are given even to the Son of God
himself, as if they did in some sense partake of his
attributes, if the one be divinely human, so must be the
other. When therefore it is said, " being confessedly
* Study of the Vour Gospels, Preface, p. ix.

134 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.
" human they cannot be divine," this is perfectly true if,
for the same reason, the humanity of the Saviour cannot
be divine. Deny the Divinity of his humanity, and the
divinity of the human element of the Scripture is denied ;
and as we know that the Divinity of the Lord's hu
manity generally is denied, and declared to involve a
contradiction, so upon the same principle it must be a
contradiction to call ,the Scriptures divine. Hence the
advocacy of the merely literal sense. But as a modern
Church Periodical* justly observes,! " The mystery of
" the Holy Incarnation utterly annihUates this argument.
" The human has been divine ; the words of man have
" been the very words of God. In the Incarnate Son,
" as man, the Holy Ghost dwelt without measure ; and
" hence his every word was essentiaUy divine. . . . And
"as in the case of the Incarnate Word, the Godhead
" suffered no degradation, but the manhood a super-
" natural exaltation ; so in the case of the written Word,
" the divine revelation underwent no deterioration by its
" outward expression ; but the human vehicle, without
" ceasing to be human, became divine."J
The great evil and delusion of genuine Mysticism
therefore consists in this, that it makes no account of
the doctrine of Mediation, of the laws of divine order,
of the laws of correspondence, of the doctrine of degrees,
and hence of the faculties of the human mind, such as
* The Ecclesiastic and Theologian, April, 1856.
t See above, p. 81.
X If ever the canon of Scripture should be reconsidered, as the same
Periodical intimates may be the case at a day not far distant, it is not
mere criticism or tradition, but this principle of interpretation which
must determine the claims of the respective books, and their classifi
cation accordingly.

APPLIED TO THE WORD OP GOD. 135
reason and volition. Hence " neither reason nor love!'
as Cousin justly observes, " can attain the absolute unity
"of mysticism. In order to correspond to such an
" object, there must be in us something analogous to it ;
" there must be a mode of knowing which implies the
" abolition of consciousness. . . . This mode of pure and
" direct communication with God, which is not reason,
" which is not love, which excludes consciousness, is
" ecstasy!' . . . Hence also the sarae author justly ob
serves that " Mysticism breaks in some sort the ladder
" that elevates us to Infinite Substance : it regards this
" Substance alone independently of the truth that mani-
" fests it ; and it imagines itself to possess also the pure
" Absolute, pure Unity, Being in itself."*
The communication then between the human and
the Divine is carried on by intermediate truths, accord
ing to their several degrees, in which the very essence,
so to speak, of mediation consists ; and hence it is that
it is the Word which is Mediator ; hence also the Hu-
* It is difficult to state any propositions more opposite to this
view of Mysticism, than the foUovring by Swedenborg : — 1. " That
" man has reason and freewill, or rationality and liberty, and that these
" two faculties are from the Lord in him." 2. " That a man by these
" two faculties is reformed and regenerated by the Lord ; and that
" without them he could not be reformed and regenerated." 3. " That
" a man by these two faculties can be reformed and regenerated so fax
" as he can by them be led to acknowledge that all the truth and good
" which he thinks and does, is from the Lord and not from himself."
4. "That the conjunction of the Lord vrith a man, and the reciprocal
"conjunction of a man with the Lord, is effected by these two
"faculties." 5. "That the Lord preserves these two faculties in a
" man inviolable, and as sacred in every proceeding of his Divine Pro,.
" vidence." 6. " That therefore it is of the Divine Providence that a-
" man should act from liberty according to reason " (Angelic Wisdom
concerning Divine Providence, art. 71, &c.) That popular writers who

136 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.
manity, as fulfilUng the Word, is itself the Word and
Mediator. The truths of this Word descended into the
Humanity ; thus the Humanity received them according
to the degrees set forth by the ladder of Jacob, namely,
external, internal, and inmost. He therefore who rejects
these interior senses of Scripture, rejects the ladder of
Jacob ; the only means by which he has communication
with angels, and angels with him : he rejects the media
tion of the Word, the only means by which he has com
munication with the Lord, and the Lord with him.
Has not an ignorance, then, of the true doctrine of
correspondence led to a profanation of the doctrine of
Mediation, by leading to a denial of the internal sense of
Scripture and degrading the mediation of the Word
down to the offices of Agent, Proctor, Solicitor, and At
torney? Has not metaphor superseded the ladder of
Jacob, and cut off the Church below from all communi
cation with the Church above, and from all attempted
knowledge of the kingdom of heaven, which is accord
ingly denounced as the sin of our first parents ? Has
it not thus virtually denied the divine inspu-ation of the
Scriptures, by interpreting them according to the laws of
mere human composition ? " For inspired writers," ob
serves Mr. Isaac Williams, p. 414, " being more imme-
" diately instruments in the hand of God, cannot be ever
never care to discriminate or to investigate the truth of things, should
call Swedenborg a mystic, is not to be wondered at ; but that such a
man as Cousin should do the same, is indeed a marvel : one can ac
count for it only on the presumption that he had never read one word
of Swedenborg. Some clairvoyants indeed undertake to say what is
inside a book without opening it ; but that Cousin who writes against
this ecstatic state, should so far avail himself of its prerogatives as to
do the same thing, leads only to the conclusion that on this occasion
his usual reason and judgment were certainly laid asleep.

APPLIED TO THE WORD OF GOD. 137
" safely considered, as they too freely have been, accord-
" ing to the laws of human composition ; for such a mode
" of enquiry commences the investigation itself, by sup-
" posing them uninspired ; and so goes throughout on a
" false supposition, in order to bring them down to the
"level of human criticism" (Study of the Gospels).
Thus destroying the internal sense of the Word, or
intermediate truths, metaphor is the pioneer to mysti
cism ; exemplifying the adage that extremes meet ;
whether it be the mysticism of philosophic naturalism,
or of reUgious enthusiasm.
" He who doth not," says Swedenborg,* " procure
" to himself a perception of discrete degrees (viz., outer-
" most, inner, and inmost), ... is incapable of compre-
" bending what the internal sense of the Word is, and
" its distinction from the external sense, also the distinc-
" tion between the spiritual world and the natural world ;
" neither can he understand what and whence corre-
" spondences and representatives are, and scarcely what
" influx is. Sensuous men do not comprehend these dis-
" tinctions, for they make increase and decrease in perfec-
" tion according to these degrees, continuous : thus they
" make these degrees like the degrees of length and
" breadth, wherefore also they stand without and at a
" distance from inteUigence. These degrees are degrees
" of height ; therefore by what is high in the Word, is
" meant what is interior, and as being interior, what is
" more perfect. Hence it is that the Lord in the Word
" is caUed the Highest, because He is Perfection itself,
" InteUigence itself. Wisdom and Good itself ; and hence
" it is that heaven is said to be on high, because it is in
* Arcana Ccelestia, 10,181.

138 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES,
" perfection, inteUigence, wisdom, good and truth from
" the Lord ; and therefore hell is said to be in the deep,
" because therein are no perfection, intelUgence and wis-
" dom, and no good and truth."
It is then impossible to overestimate this Doctrine of
Degrees, because without it we can form no rational
views of the relation of the Infinite Esse to creation ;
thus of the relation of the Divine to the human, of the
Infinite to the finite ; consequently also no true system
of Analogy ; for between continuous degrees there is no
correspondence. If the attributes of man are by infinite
continuity those of God, then is man a part of God ; and
creation descending from the Creator on a scale of con
tinuity with him must be itself Divine — the finite a part
of the Infinite. Thus either Nature is God, which is
Pantheism ; or God is Nature, which is Atheism. The
same is the alternative if we reject the doctrine of dis
crete degrees applied to the inner senses of the Word of
God ; for in this case the Word of God becomes the
Word of finite man, in the same manner as the attri
butes of God become only those of a finite human being.
Thus the rejection of the inner sense of Scripture is
founded upon the very same principles, which, applied to
the natural world, are the principles of Pantheism and
Atheism. We have seen the practical application of the doc
trine of discrete degrees to the controversy concerning
the attributes of God : the inspiration and interpretation
of the Scriptures : we now proceed to its application to
the controversy concerning the Origin of Creation.
It is observed by Professor Frazer that,* " Neither
* Essays in Philosophy. By Professor Frazer. pp. 354, 353,
237.

APPLIED TO CREATION. 139
" a theory of the created universe, and of the human
" part of it in particular ; nor a theory of the inaccessible
"Being on whom aU depends, is revealed. They are
" not capable of being revealed." — " It is not possible,"
he says, " for Reason to construct, or Revelation to unfold,
" the theory of man's relations to God."^ — " The appli-
" cation of a merely human inteUigence to solve the rela-
" tion of finite and transcendent being, must, as we have
" already said, end in Pantheism or Atheism. Either
" finite beings are absorbed, as modifications of the In-
" finite Being; or else Deity is excluded, as not con-
" sistent with the reality of finite agents."
On the other hand, it is observed by Victor Cousin,
" that God creates ; He creates in virtue of His creative
" power ; and He draws the universe not from non-
" entity, but from Himself, who is absolute existence."
Sir W. Hamilton, reasoning from the process of
finite causation, observes,* " We cannot conceive, either,
"on the one hand, nothing becoming something; or,
"on the other, something becoming nothing. When
" God is said to create the universe out of nothing ; we
" think this by supposing that He evolves the universe
"out of nothing but Himself; and in like manner we
" conceive annihilation, only by conceiving the Creator to
"withdraw his creation, by withdrawing his creative
" energy from actuality into power."
" But what is our thought of Creation ? It is not a
" thought of the mere springing of nothing into some-
" thing. On the contrary. Creation is conceived, and is
" by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence
" from possibility into actuality, by "One fiat of the DeUy."
* Discussions in Philosophy, ^c. By Sir W. HamUton. pp. 35,
610, 630.

140 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.
And what is the nature of this fiat ? " The Divine^^a^
" therefore was the proximate cause of the Creation ; and
" the Deity, containing the cause, contained, potentially,
" the effect!'*
Thus we have two of the most eminent philosophers
of the present day, advocating (the latter — as a mental
necessity) the general theory of the origin of Creation as
explained by Swedenborg.
It is objected, however, that this is the Pantheistic
doctrine. " We feel mentally necessitated to think," says
Mr. Calderwood! in reference to the theories of Cousin
and Sir WilUam Hamilton, " that the material universe
" could not have previously existed as part of the Great
" Spirit." . . . We at once recognize the absurdity of the
* Speaking of an object which has phenomenally begun to be,
Sir WiUiam observes, that, we cannot suppose the elements of its ex
istence began only when the phenomenon which they constitute, came
into manifested being. " We are compeUed to believe that the object
" (that is, the certain quale and quantum of being) whose phenomenal
"rise into existence we have witnessed, did really exist, prior to this
" rise, wider other forms. But to say that a thing previously existed
" under other forms, is only to say in other words that a thing had
" causes " (Discussions in Philosophy, p. 621).
Professor PoweU, in his Essays on the Spirit of the Inductive Phi
losophy, p. 461, seems equaUy opposed to the idea attached to the
word creation as that of calling a thing into existence out of nothing,
and observes that it is whoUy destitute of any foundation in Scriptural
authority. On this point he refers the reader to the authority of
Dr. Pusey in Buckland's Bridgwater Treatises, i., 24, remarking, that
the word is only a stronger or more intensitive form of expression" of
the idea of making or fashioning ; while in other passages it has refer
ence to pre-existent matter ; as where aquatic animals are described,
not as created out of nothing, but as brought forth out of the waters ;
land animals and plants, out of the earth ; and man, out of the dust
of the ground (Gen. i. 11, 20 ; ii, 7).
f Philosophy of the Infinite, pp. 157, 159, 160,

APPLIED TO CREATION. 141
" assertion that God separated frora Himself a part of
" his essence, and so operated upon it as to produce the
" universe." ..." On this theory God is not distinct
" from the world ; the creature is a modification of the
" Creator." Had either Cousin or Sir WUliam Hamilton been
acquainted with the works of Swedenborg, they might
have effectually guarded the theory against such objec
tions. On the principle of continuous degrees, which is
the only kind which seems to have occurred to these
authors, the objection of Mr. Calderwood is well founded ;
for he too thought only of continuous degrees ; and yet
the cause, notwithstanding, does not produce the effect
by continuity. Upon the principle of discrete degrees,
on the other hand, the theory is not Pantheistic ; for, as
Swedenborg observes, discrete degrees have nothing in
common with each other ; any more than life and death,
mind and matter, body and spirit, heaven and earth :
or any more than the outer Court of the Temple was
a part of the Sanctuary, or the Sanctuary a part of
the Holy of Holies, or the Cherubim part of the She
chinah, or one step in the ladder of Jacob was part of
another. With this doctrine of discrete degrees, Mr. Calder
wood, Professor Frazer, and others, have been unac
quainted: hence the alternatives of Atheism or Pan
theism which are presented to us in the case of any
theory of Creation ; and, indeed, if any one would found
such a theory upon the principle of continuous degrees,
Swedenborg would entirely concur with them that the
only alternative in this case is between Pantheism and
Atheism. " One who knows nothing," says he, " of discrete

142 DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.
"degrees or degrees of altitude, can know nothing of
"... the influx through the heavens frora the Lord, or
" of the order in which he was created. If any one
"think of these things not from discrete degrees or
" degrees of latitude, he can see then nothing of thera
" but from effects, and not from causes ; and seeing from
" effects alone, is seeing from fallacies ; whence come
" errors one after another, which may be so multiplied
" by induction, that at length enormous falsities may be
" called truths."*
Now the enormous falsities alluded to are principally
those of Atheism and Pantheism, both of which are
founded upon an ignorance of discrete degrees ; an ig
norance which has contributed not only to vitiate the in
terpretation of the attributes of God, of the Word of
God, and the various theories respecting the origin and
scale of created being ; but to vitiate also the very pro
cesses of logical and metaphysical reasoning, in relation
to the Infinite Himself. In proving that our notions of
the Infinite are purely negative, hence nothing positive,
" Put the assertion," says a distinguished logician, " to
" the test of a mental experiment. Your aUeged Infinite
"must, by the logical law of contradiction, be either
" a whole ox not a whole. Try to realize either of these,
" i. e., either an object so large that it can be no larger,
"or an object that is Infinite. These are the only logical
" ways of reaching what is not finite."!
* Angelic Wisdom concerning Divine Love, art. 187.
! If the logician is he who views knowledge in relation to yure
thought, as contradistinguished from the metaphysician who views
knowledge in relation to existence, it may be denied that this is a
genuine logical process of thought ; and consequently that the logical
difficulties in this respect, in virtue of which God is said to be incog-

APPLIED TO CREATION. 143
Now it has already been observed that large and
larger have reference to continuous degrees : continuous
degrees never reach upwards : they are like parallel
Unes which extend laterally, not altitudinally. They
have therefore nothing whatever to do with the process
of ascending toward the Infinite, the Supreme, " the Most
Highest," the Inmost, and this without reference to con
tinuity of dimension. Doubtless on the foregoing prin
ciple, God must be a God, inaccessible in every sense of
the word, and as inconceivable as He is inaccessible.
On the other hand, the doctrine of discrete degrees
preserving the scale of created being uninterrupted from
man to God without confounding the one with the other ;
enables us not to break short the chain of analogy, but
step by step to pursue that series of intermediates by
means of which we are enabled to reason from earthly
things to heavenly, and from heavenly to divine ; so that
we can proceed with certainty (as far as our spiritual
state admits), in a knowledge both of heavenly things
and of the things of God,
For, aU inteUigent beings are only so far inteUigent
as they are in the image and likeness of God ; the whole
scale of angeUc beings reaching from the highest i. e.
inmost heavens, down to this lowest i. e. outermost
earth, is but a scale of images and likenesses of God
according to their several discrete degrees, which aU ter-
nizable and inconceivable, have any foundation. That we have a posi
tive knowledge of the Infinite, in the strict sense of the terms, is by no
means affirmed ; but this only ; that the foregoing is not a genuine
process of logical reasoning, and that if the right process be adopted,
viz., that of discrete degrees, we are not left in that state of ignorance
with regard either to the Infinite or creation which some eminent
authors maintain.

144 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
minate in the raind of man ; and by means of which a
man, who is himself an image and likeness of God, may
reason from the attributes of love, wisdom, and power
in himself upwards, through aU the scale of created being
to corresponding attributes in God, and which we may
as certainly affirm belong to God, as we may affirm they
originally proceeded from Him.
We have thus one unbroken chain of analogy : there
is no abrupt chasm : no impassable gulph. God has not
first created us, and then surrounded us with some abyss
of dark waters cutting us off from the heavenly regions or
even from Himself ; and therefore even though we apply
to angelic beings the same expressions which have been
applied to God, and call them of a totally different nature
from that of man, yet it is in the sense only in which
one discrete degree is totally different from another, and
neither one has any thing in common with the other.
Love is not wisdom, wisdom is not power, yet all are
human. The spirit is not the body : it is in one sense
of a totally different nature, and yet in another sense
they are both so far of the same kind, that both are
human ; and we may speak of the human spiiit, the
human mind, or the human body : and they correspond ;
for as there is a natural body, so there is a spiritual body ;
as the one is organized, so is the other ; as the one has
members, so has the other — the one after a natural
manner, the other after a spiritual manner.
The consequence is, that as all created things them
selves are correspondences, so is the language of Scrip
ture in regard to them not metaphorical, but corre
spondential also.
But, even in this case, if we argue from the prevaU
ing theology, it may be said. What then? For, as we

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 145
have seen admitted, there is a correspondence existing
between the attributes of man and those of God ; and
yet we do not know what it is, nor have we any the
least idea of the real true nature of God. The case is
the same in regard to heaven : the correspondence may
exist, and yet we know not what it is, nor have we any
the least idea of the real true nature of heaven ; and the
reason is the same in both cases : that as God is of a
totally different nature and kind from man, so are angels ;
so also the objects of heaven are of a totally different
nature and kind from those of earth ; whence, as God is
extra omne genus, so also is heaven. A revelation there
fore of the real true nature either of God or heaven is
equally impossible : all the language of Scripture upon
this subject can "furnish no basis of dogmatic truth :"
speculatively it has relation only to " negative ideas ;"
theologically, the language must remain uninterpreted, or
else be resolved into metaphor, even in many passages
which refer " to patterns of things in the heavens :" or
else we must understand the attributes of God in a literal
sense, i. e. as univocally the same in Him and in us, and
heaven itself as univocally the same with earth ; whence
we have respectively a creaturely God and a millenarian
heaven ; or a metaphorical God and a metaphorical heaven ;
or an unknown God and an unknown heaven : or com
pounds of aU three systems together.
Let us proceed to the metaphorical interpretation, as
the most usual ; and what do we find ? that as the doc
trine of the Incarnation has been set aside in regarding
God as without body ; so has the doctrine of correspond
ence been set aside in regarding angels as without body.
The same mode of reasoning which divests Deity of a
body, divests angels of a body. " It is certain," says the

146 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
author of Divine Analogy,* " there can neither be any
" bodily parts, or members, or appetites in beings imma-
"terial; much less in the Divine Being, who is of a
" nature infinitely above that of any created spirit ; nor
" can there be any such real similitude and resemblance
" between mere matter and pure spirit, as that the nature
" and properties of one should, of themselves, furnish our
" understanding with any just and useful conceptions of
"those belonging to the other." The reasons of this
the author elsewhere explains, as foUows : — 1. It is dis
tinctly said that man was created in the image and
likeness of God, but it is not said that earth was cre
ated in the image and likeness of heaven. Hence
when the things of earth are taken to signify the
things of heaven,! the resemblance or proportion, or
correspondence is imaginary ; " 'tis pure invention and
" mere allusion alone, and no way founded in the real
" nature of the things compared." 2. "Objects J of
" mere sense can bear no real resemblance to pure
" spiritual beings ; they cannot represent any simUar
" and correspondent reaUty in Divine things." — There
is thus a chasm between the two.
These two positions may be said to comprise the
theory of Modern Theology upon this subject, hence also
the theory of Scripture interpretation. Thus do Theo
logy and Metaphysics seem to be fuU of chasms : first,
there is the chasm between the Infinite and the finite :
this originates, secondly, " the chasm between the meta-
" physical faith which conducts us to the transcendent
* p. 41.
t Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding,
p. 137. X Divine Analogy, p. 551.

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 147
" Being, and the reUgious knowledge in which alone that
" Being can be definitely manifested :" thirdly, there is
the chasm between the Divine and human in the person
of our Lord Himself: and lastly, there is the chasm be
tween things material and immaterial, or between earth
and heaven ; and as, in the last case, there is said to be
no correspondent reality, whUe there is in one of the cases
preceding, it would seem as if the last chasm was also
one of the widest. Accordingly, the author consigns the
language of Scripture upon this subject to the province
of metaphor. Now if the things of heaven are not corresponding
realities to the things of earth, heaven itself is no cor
responding reality ; there is in this case only a metapho
rical heaven, upon the same principle that the Sacraments
must be metaphorical also ; for, inasmuch, as objects
of mere sense cannot represent any similar and corre
spondent reality in Divine things, therefore bread and
mne, which are objects of mere sense, cannot represent
correspondent realities in Divine things, but have only a
metaphorical signification. The Temple was an object
of mere sense ; as also all its appurtenances, which, upon
the foregoing principle, could only be metaphorical " pat-
" terns of things in the heavens :" the prophetic descrip
tions of the New Jerusalem — the city of God, its walls,
foundations, gates, pearls and precious stones, must all
be equally metaphorical, purely imaginary, and implying
no corresponding reality. In fine, upon this principle, the
greater part of the Word of God is a series of " Divine
"metaphors;" for that metaphor which has so desolated
all divinity of the Word of God, has come to be digni
fied with the titie of Divine ; since, " when we transfer
"merelv sensitive ideas to things spiritual and imma-
l2

148 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
"terial, which are not directly perceptible, we call it
" Divine Metaphor."* Upon this principle, the author
of the Procedure and Divine Analogy does not hesitate
to say, that not only bodies, but bodily members, are
attributable to angels only metaphorically.
Such is secretly the theory of modern Theology, in
regard to the relation of things earthly to things hea
venly ; a relation thus purely imaginary, although, upon
the foregoing principle, the only conceivable relation. As,
however, metaphor is only a figure of speech, and the
objects of creation existed before language, there could
not have been at that time any conceivable relation what
ever between heaven and earth ; and what is all this but
to deny the unity and harmony of God's creation ? To
deny all conceivable Divine Law and Order ? To deny
that creation has any other harmony than that of the chaos
out of which it was created ? If angels are images and
likenesses of God ; if men were created in the image
and likeness of God ; is there no correspondence between
men and angels; no correspondence between the two
worlds, although man himself is called a microcosm ?
Let us compare this kind of Theology with that
which is presented in the writings of Emanuel Sweden
borg : —
"That natural things represent spiritual, and that
" they correspond with each other, may be known from
" this consideration, that what is natural cannot possibly
"have existence, except from a cause prior to itself:
" this cause is of spiritual origin, and there is nothing
" natural which doth not thence {piz. from the spiritual
" world) derive the cause of its existence. Natural
* Divine Analogy, p. 310.

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 149
"forms are effects; nor can they appear as causes, stiU
" less as causes of causes, or as first principles : they
" receive their forms according to their use, in the place
" in which they are. StiU, however, the forms of effects
" represent the things appertaining to their causes ; yea,
" these latter things represent those which appertain to
" their first principles. Thus all natural things represent
" the things appertaining to the spiritual to which they
" correspond ; and spiritual things also represent the
"things appertaining to the celestial, from which they
" are derived."*
" Hence it is that all things, both in general and in
"particular, contained in the Universe, represent the
" Lord's kingdom ; insomuch that the Universe with its
" heavenly consteUations, with its atmospheres, and with
"its three kingdoms, is nothing else but a kind of
" theatre representative of the Lord's glory which is in the
"heavens. In the animal kingdom, not only man but
" also each particular animal, even the least and vilest,
"are thus representative. To instance in the case of
"worms which creep on the ground, and feed on the
" leaves of plants ; these, when the time of their nuptials
" approaches, immediatdy become chrysallises, and pre-
"sently are furnished with wings, and thereby are
¦' elevated from the ground into the atmosphere, which
"is their heaven, where they enjoy their deUghts and
" their freedom, sporting one with another, and feeding
" on the choicest parts of flowers, laying their eggs, and
" thus providing for posterity ; and on this occasion, in
" consequence of their being in the state of their heaven,
"they are also in the fulness of their beauty. That
* Arcana Ccelestia, art. 3991.

150 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
"these things are representative of the Lord' s kingdom,
" may be obvious to every one."*
" There is an influx of the Lord through heaven also
" into the subjects of the vegetable kingdom ; as into
" trees of every kind, and into their fructifications, and
" into plants of various kinds and their multiplications.
" Unless a spiritual principle from the Lord within con-
" tinually acted upon their primitive forms, which are in
" the seeds, it would be altogether impossible for them
" to vegetate and grow in so wonderful a manner and
" succession ; the forms, however, therein are such, that
" they receive nothing of Life. It is by virtue of this
" influx, that they have in them an image of what is
" Eternal and Infinite ; as is evident from this circum-
" stance, that they are in a continual conatus to propa-
" gate their genera and species, and thus to live as it
" were for ever, and also to fill the universe. This co-
" natus is in every seed ; nevertheless, all those things
" which are so wonderful man attributes to mere Nature,
" nor believes in any influx from the spiritual world, be-
" cause in heart he denies its existence ; although he might
" know that nothing can subsist except by that by which
" it exists, that is, that subsistence is perpetual exist-
" ence, or, what is the same thing, that production is
" perpetual creation. Universal Nature is thus a repre-
" sentative of the Lord's kingdom."!
" Wherefore the Universe, which is an image of God,
" and therefore full of God, could not be created but in
" God from God ; for God is Esse itself, and that which
" is must exist frora an Esse : to create what does exist,
" from nothing, which does not exist, is an absolute con-
* Arcana Ccelestia, art. 3000.
! Ibid., art. 3648, 3483.

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 151
" tradiction. Nevertheless, what is created in God from
" God, is not continuous from Himself ; for God is Esse
" in itself, and in created things there is nothing of Esse
"in itself; if in created things there were anything of
" Esse in itself, that would be continuous from God, and
"what is continuous from God is God."*
Now it has been observed by a distinguished writer,
that in any alleged analogy between two things, " It has
" to be shewn that in the two cases asserted to be analo-
" gous, the same law is really operating ; that between
" the known resemblance and the inferred one, there is
" some connection by means of causes!' \ In the case
of the resemblance or analogy between the natural and
spiritual worlds, it is founded upon the relation of cause
and effect ; the spiritual world being the world of causes,
and the natural world the world of effects ; which effects,
therefore, are relatively to themselves only a series of
antecedents and consequents, and as such of mere phe
nomena. Thus, then, does the law of Correspondence J prevail
universaUy throughout Creation ; and from this law ori-
* Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love, art. 55.
! System of Logic, By J. S. MiU. vol. u., p. 363.
X It has been remarked, that the term Analogy has been a word
very loosely employed. The term used by Swedenborg, with but com
paratively few exceptions, is Correspondence, which is the most correct
of the two. Analogy has been defined a simUitude of^ relations. " In
"popular language, we extend the word analogy to include resem-
" blances of things, as well as of relations ; simUarity of attributes, as
"weU as of things, may have the name of Analogy" (Thomson's
Outlines of the Laws of Thought, p. 339). Though the term Corre
spondence is preferable to that of Analogy, yet the latter word has been
frequently used in these pages, in consequence of its being the one
generaUy employed by the several authors which have been quoted.
No doubt it is meant to be used synonymously with Correspondence.

152 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
ginate all the order, union, and communion of the natural
and spiritual worlds. Shall, then, the law of correspond
ence prevaU in the works of God, and yet not in the
Word of God ; when, nevertheless, it is the Word which
created the works, and thus imparted to them all they
possess ?
It has been observed,* that " We cannot argue from
" this world to another, unless we have some reason pre-
" viously to expect a similarity. Who would think of
" arguing from the vegetable to the animal world, except
" in those points where we had already a common princi-
" pie ? Who would reason that animal life followed the
" laws of vegetation in those points which were peculiar
" to it ? Yet many theological arguments calculated to
" satisfy, not indeed the reason but the imagination, have
"this fundamental defect."
But is not the question here the same with that which
has already been considered in regard to God ; viz. a
question of genus ? or, whether or not heaven be extra
omne genus ; whether there be any ground for a parity
of reasoning from earth to heaven, as there is from
man to God ; from the human as finite, to the Human
as Divine ?
In answer to this question, may we not say, as
is the earth to men, so is heaven to the angels ? as the
things of earth are to men, so are the things of heaven
to the angels ? We do not, indeed, speak of the heavenly
earth, but we do of the heavenly land, the same word in
Greek standing for both ; while the expression spiritual
or heavenly world indicates that both the natural and
spiritual worlds, belong, as worlds, to the same genus ;
* Epistles of St. Paul, 8fC., with Critical Notes and Illustrations.
By Professor Jowett. vol. ii., p. 409.

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 153
hence also we speak of the heavenly country; neither
is there any inconsistency in conceiving that what the
external material world is to the material body, the
spiritual and iramaterial world is to the spiritual or im
material body. There is a natural body and there is a
spiritual body, and both correspond ; there is a natural
world and there is a spiritual world, why should not
both correspond ? The plant and the animal are hetero
geneous ; angels and men are homogeneous, both being
human; because He in whose image and likeness are
both, is the Divine Human. Thus, then, angels are no
more extra omne genus, than the Deity ; and for the
same reason, viz., that humanity is common to both,
and is the tj^e in relation to which the objects in both
worlds exist.* This doctrine of correspondence at once
dissipates all metaphorical interpretation of Scripture,
whether in regard to the attributes of God, or the things
of heaven ; for the consequence is, that those things
are not metaphors which have been considered to be
such — door, light, fire, lamb, tree, river, are no more
metaphors than the prophetical visions were visions of
metaphors ; for the prophets, when in the spirit, ex
pressly state that they saw these things, though after
a spiritual manner ; it is, therefore, the hieroglyphical
language of the spiritual world, i. e. the language of cor
respondences. "That by door','\ observes Swedenborg, "is sig-
" nified communication, appears like a metaphorical way
" of speaking, or comparison ; but in the Word no meta-
" phorical speech or comparison is used, but real corre-
* See here a recent work entitled Typical Forms and Special Ends
in Creation. f Arcana Ccelestia, art. 8989.

154 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
" spondences ; even the comparisons are there made by
" such things as correspond." Because they correspond,
and the one represents the other, we apply the same
name to both ; and in that respect both belong to the
genus or species indicated by the name, as in the case of
myrtle-trees, palm-trees, and other objects seen by the
prophets in the spiritual world, and as such, after a
spiritual manner.
This brings us to the question concerning the nature
of Intermediate Ideas.
The connection of these ideas with the doctrine of
Mediation has already been pointed out. In the person
of our Lord Himself, they were the intermediate truths
between the Humanity and pure Divinity ; in the minds
of men in general, they are the intermediate truths
between the external natural and the Divine Humanity;
and, as humanity pertains to angels as well as men, there
is, in virtue of this common measure, a correspondence
between all three. Modern Theology ignores the doc
trine of a Divine Humanity, and for the most part the
humanity of angelic beings ; the consequence is, it ig
nores the only principle upon which, according to the law
of correspondence, they are conjoined ; and hence, repu
diating all intermediate ideas, is confined only to the
external natural both in doctrine and interpretation.
That this is the case, will be further seen from the fol
lowing remark by the author of the Procedure, Extent,
and Limits of the Human Understanding, p. 456 : —
" As God is really and entirely of another kind in
" Essence or Substance from all his creatures ; so likewise
"the intellect concludes, that his manner of existence,
" together with his attributes, must therefore be not only
" different in degree of perfection, but necessarUy of

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 155
" quite another kind from those of the most glorious
" beings of the creation ; and much more from those of
" our human nature, who are perhaps in the lowest rank
"of intelligent agents."
Here, then, is the recurrence of some of the chasms
in the relation of God to his creatures, already pointed
out. Two, at least, are presented ; and in consequence,
it is impossible to ascend from the outward to the in
ward, and hence for the inward to descend into the
outward. Thus, there is not only no ascending and
descending of the angels on the ladder of Jacob, but
both the angels and ladder, i. e. both the ideas and their
degrees, are equally lost in the midnight abyss of the
inconceivable; the only alternative in approaching God
in this case, being either in the resolution of this expres
sion into metaphor, or in the mystical intuitus in abyssum.
Hence, the Theology founded upon this principle
utterly excludes all degrees of knowledge in things spi
ritual and immaterial ; of which, it is said, we have no
ideas ; and which are therefore conceived by making up
the best " complex notions " we can out of things material
and human,, to represent what is after all inconceivable.
" Nor is it possible," says the author of The Procedure,*
" for us to have any intermediate idea, or a common
" measure, between things utterly imperceptible and in-
" conceivable to us as they are in their own nature ; that
" is, in other words, for which we have no ideas." And
certainly we cannot discern the agreement or disagree
ment of ideas where there are none. The consequence
is, that, being regarded as an impossibiUty, the doctrine
oi- intermediate ideas is treated as a nonentity ; for as,
* Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding,
p. 433.

156 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
it is said, we cannot pass beyond the limits of the
merely natural ; so it is not possible for us to have any
ideas which shall serve as a common measure, between
the things of this world and the things of the other,
which are utterly imperceptible and inconceivable to us,
as they are in their own nature.
This being laid down as a first principle, it applies,
Ukewise, equaUy to all the doctrines of Christianity.
If, for instance, we take the case oi Mediation. — "How
" and after what real manner Christ intercedes for us,
" so as to prevail with God in our behalf; and how He
" pleads the virtue and merit of his sacrifice, cannot be
" said to be obscurely and indistinctly known, but totally
" and entirely unknown ; as it is not at all revealed, so it
"is no article or part of our Christian faith; but that
" He doth make a real and true Intercession for us, is
"revealed; and this is clear and distinct; and accord-
" ingly the proper object of our knowledge and assent,
" and all that we are to believe of the real nature of that
" Intercession, is, that we neither have nor can have any
" knowledge of it in this world, and therefore ought to
"acquiesce therein until we come to another."*
A similar observation applies to the Doctrine of the
Atonement, which accordingly is equally a part of the
inconceivable. It was upon this principle that Bishop
Butler declared the popular explanations of the Doctrine
of the Atonement to have no foundation : — " How, and in
" what particular way," says he, " this sacrifice of Christ
" had this efficacy, there are not wanting persons who
" have endeavoured to explain ; but I do not find that
" Scripture has explained it."!
* The Procedure, Sfc, p. 131. ! Analogy, Conclusion, part ii.

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 157
The same may be said in regard to the doctrine of
the Trinity ; beyond the mere natural idea of three per
sons as three men, all is declared to be inconceivable and
inexpUcable; for in none of these cases are there any
intermediate ideas.
It is, indeed, said, that when we take the purely
natural idea, it becomes intermediate by becoraing ana
logical ; stiU, as intermediate, it only signifies something
unknown. In this case the change that takes place is
not in the idea itself, but in its application, viz. to signify
something else that is inconceivable. This kind of inter
mediation, therefore, is merely nominal ; its very nature
is unknown : it leaves the idea unchanged, and leads to
nothing but an unknown heaven, an unknown God.
Accordingly, it is in this way that are interpreted the
words of the Apostle Paul, ' Now we see through a glass
'darkly ;' we see and know, that is, that certain things
which are seen and known, signify certain things which
are unseen and unknown ; as if the Jew might be said
to have seen through a glass darkly, if he knew that
the Temple and sacrificial rites signified something else,
though what, was inconceivable.
In this case it is obvious, that as Theology neither
suppUes us with genuine intermediate ideas, nor makes
any change in the old, nor introduces any that are new,
it leaves us just where we were, and anything new must
for that very reason be mere chimera ; all that such a
Theology can do, is to tell us that the old ideas are re
presentative, though of what, it is pride of intellect to
presume. "Therefore ought we not to wait with pa-
" tience tiU we come to heaven, the proper school where
"these things are to be learned?"* There seems, how-
* Archbishop King's Discourse on Predestination.

158 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
ever, to be a popular feeling on the other hand, that
something more than this is required of Christianity as a
revelation. But, as in this case, it is said to be impos
sible to go beyond the merely natural, so, in attempting
to explain Christianity, merely natural ideas are the only
materials at hand for the use of the theologian ; if, there
fore, he would enter into doctrinal subjects at all, his
only resource is in explications of this kind ; if he at
tempts to explain the doctrine of the Trinity, it must be
by speaking of the Three Divine Persons as three distinct
Beings ; if the doctrine of the Atonement, it must be by
the method of debtor and creditor, pacification of anger,
satisfaction of God's honour and justice ; if the doctrine
of Mediation, it must be by the office of proctor, solicitor,
and attorney ; take away from such a person the use of
sensuous images, and he has nothing left but empty ab
stractions ; no tangible materials with which to buUd up
his theological system ; and if he is required to abandon
these, he will exclaim that nothing is left for him to
teach, nothing to believe, nothing to defend either of a
Bible, or of articles of Faith. To teU such a person,
therefore, not to indulge in explanations of this nature,
is only to wound his feelings, unless we point out " the
" more excellent way ;" he will only the more insist upon
his duty to contend for the faith once delivered to the
saints, and the more faithfully warn all his opponents
against incurring the awful and inevitable doom of all
heretics, sceptics, and unbelievers.
If now we proceed to the other alternative, viz., that
of intermediate ideas, the whole nature of such a Theo
logy experiences a change ; for, in this case, there is no
abrupt chasm between the external and the internal : the
rational raind is intermediate between the two, and being.

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 159
as such, in the ratio between them, is, thus the means of
communication between both.
Accordingly, the human mind is thus stated by Tur-
retin* to be represented by the Temple.
" In man," says he, " there are three parts ; the
"external senses, which apprehend things sensible, rk
" aurQriTa, and which are in the atrium or court ; the in-
"tellect and rational mind, which takes cognizance of
"things apprehended by the intellect, to. vorira, and
" which are in the holy place ; and the heart, or the con-
" science, to, Tnara, which embraces the things of faith,
" which are in the most holy place, which eye hath not
" seen, nor ear heard."
Now it is observed by Swedenborg that,! " The
"reason why the consociation of a man with the angels
" is effected by the natural or literal sense of the Word,
"is, because in every man from creation, there are three
"degrees of life, — the celestial, the spiritual, and the
"natural. A man however is in the natural degree so
" long as he continues in this world ; and, at the same
"time, so far in the angelic spiritual degree as he is in
" genuine truths ; and so far in the angelic celestial
" degree as he is in a life (frora a state of love) according
" to those truths. Nevertheless, he is not admitted into
" the spiritual and celestial degrees themselves tiU after
" death, because they are both included and hid within
"his natural ideas; wherefore when the natural is put
" off by death, the spiritual and celestial remain, from
"whence the ideas of his thought then fiow."
Spiritual and celestial ideas are thus within the na
tural by correspondence ; thus also by discrete degrees,
* Institutio Theologice, vol. ii., p. 471.
! Universal Theology, art. 339.

160 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
not by continuous. As one degree then is within the
other, the celestial and spiritual within the natural as
long as we remain in the natural world, so also all the
perceptions of our natural reason are in this case in corre
spondence with purely spiritual and celestial perceptions ;
as such they are true : they are not purely celestial nor
purely spiritual, but celestial-natural or spiritual-natural ;
being indiscriminately called spiritual, only because the
natural is subordinated to the spiritual, and derives its
quality from itj although the quality is really derived
from the degree which is predominant.
The consequence is, that the natural reason of man,
when thus regenerated, may form just perceptions, ac
cording to its state, both of God and of heavenly things ;
and in this way it is that a man may be wise unto salva
tion, without being mystical ; intelligent without being
presumptuous ; rational without being rationalistic ;
humble without being ignorant ; believing without being
blind. In a Letter like the present, it is impossible to at
tempt raore than a very general outUne of the subject.
With a view, however, of making our observations stUl
clearer, it may be well to add a few examples Ulustrating
the difference between the two systems of Divine Ana
logy as advocated by the Bishop of Cork, and Divine
Analogy as advocated by Swedenborg.
Life:* " Thus we say, the Living God; though of
" that Life we have not the least direct idea or conception ;
" and therefore we conceive it by analogy with the Life
" of Man, whose breath is in his nostrUs ; which consists
" in the conjunction of spuit and body, in the circulation
* Divine Analogy, p. 300.

doctrine of correspondence. 161
"of the blood and animal spirits, and ends wUh the
" separation of the spirit from the body." — This, then,
is the external life of man, which stands as the sign or
representative, by analogy, of Life as it is in God, the
latter being said to be in itself utterly inconceivable or
incomprehensible : and as the nature of the correspond
ence between the two is said to be as inconceivable as
the perfection itself in God, so we have no other alter
native than that of the highest on one side, and lowest
on the other. Is there no intermediate idea ?
" What is Life"* says Swedenborg, " but the in-
"most activity of love and wisdom, which are in God,
" and which are God ; whose Life may also be called the
" very essential living force?" — Is not the intermediate
idea, in this case, that of the activities of love and wisdom
according to the degrees already pointed out ?
¦ As God, says Bishop Brown,! " is no personal term
"among men themselves; but a name appropriated by
" us to the Divine Being ; so it can admit of no analogi-
" cal word to express it." — On the other hand, both the
analogical term and the intermediate idea are thus sup
plied by Swedenborg,! on John, chap. x. 34: " L said,
Je are Gods!' &c. " When the angels are called gods,
" trutJis are signified. The reason why truths are called
"gods, is, because Truth proceeds from the Divine itself,
" and in itself is Divine ; whence they who receive it are
" called gods ; not that they are Gods, but that the truth
" which pertains to them is in its origin Divine ; hence

* Universal Theology, p. 471 ; also. Angelic Wisdom concerning
Divine Love, and Apocalypse Explained, art, 1125.
! Divine Analogy, p. 306.
X Arcana Ccelestia, art. 7368. M

162 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
" it is, that in the original tongue, God is called Elohim
"in the plural."
By Infinity, or Infinite, says Bishop Brown,*
" when appUed to God, is commonly meant that He is
" infinite in Expansion, Duration, and Perfection. Now,
" to conceive God actually Infinite in extension or ex-
" pansion, is most absurdly attributing to him our idea of
" Matter or Space, stretched out as far or farther than our
" imagination can reach ; so that in this respect, that term,
"when applied to God, can mean nothing but a nega-
" tion of his being bounded by matter or space." The
same account is given in regard to Eternal Duration; as if
Eternity was constituted of indefinite additions of hours,
days, and years ; so that the term Lnfinite implies, in this
case, only what is negative.! Thus, on the one side, we
have the inconceivable Divine Attributes of Immensity
and Eternity, represented on the other side, by conceiv
able indefinite additions of spaces and times ; so that
there is, on one side of the analogy, the inconceivable
highest, and on the other the conceivable lowest; the
lowest being said to comprise all we know on the
subject. On the other hand, according to the Treatise on
Divine Love and Wisdom by Swedenborg, spaces and
times signify states ; space, signifies state as to the will ;
time, state as to the understanding ; hence also the omni
presence of God is that of the Divine Love and Divine
Wisdom, after the same manner as the presence of the
sunt ill this world is that of its heat and Ught ; Divine

* Divine Analogy, p. 371.
f Procedure, p. 388.
X Therefore, it is untrue, that of Omnipresence we can have no

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 163
Love corresponding to the solar heat ; Divine Wisdom,
or Omniscience, to the solar light ; and Divine Power,
or Omnipotence, to these in their lUtimate operations.
Thus, again, the intermediate ideas are those of Divine
Love and Wisdom, as they are in God and from God,
according to the several degrees already mentioned.
God is a Spirit. " This," says Bishop Brown, " we
"conceive by analogy with the spirit of a man.* It is
"taken for an immaterial substance, in which sense it
" has no other notion affixed to it than a negation only
" of matter, and of aU its properties ; or it is taken in a
"positive sense, to express that complex conception, or
"notion, we are able to form of our own spirit, viz.,
"from the faculties and operations of spirit and matter
"in essential union." But we have, he says, no more a
direct idea of our own spirit than of the spirit of God.
Hence, God as a spirit is inconceivable; and we can
speak of Him as a spirit only by analogy with the spirits
of angels, or, with our own spirit as connected with
matter. We have no idea, says he, either of the real
properties or true substance of an angel or spirit. Ac
cordingly, "the language of Revelation often falls in
"with this more vulgar way of conceiving angels and
" spirits {j)iz., as a flying boy, or a winged head) ; and
" speaks figuratively of the tongue, and voice, and food,
" and mouth, and face, and hand of an angel ; and the
" very denomination itself is taken from the manner
"of one man's sending another about business, and
"originally denotes a messenger."! Hence, to repre-
notion or conception, entirely positive, from any known being of the
Creation, which we might transfer by Analogy to the Divinity.— See
Divine Analogy, p. 282.
* Divine Analogy, p. 395. ! The Procedure, p, 446.
M 2

164 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
«ent God as a spirit, is only to represent ignotum per
ignotum. Now, says Bishop Newton, the spirit of every man
is the man himself, according to that saying of Cicero,
" Animus cujusque is est quisque ;" which has also been
maintained by many other divines. To say, therefore,
that the spirit of man is not in a human form, is to say
that the man himself is not in a human form ; or else,
it being granted that the spirit of man is a real veritable
substance, must we believe that it is endowed only with
metaphorical eyes, hands, and feet ; metaphor being
used where there is no correspondent reaUty ? If
our spirit be a substance, and aU substance has a form,
what is that form, in the case of our spirit, but the
human ? Wherefore to say that God is a Spirit, is to
speak by analogy from a spiritual substance in human
form, to another but Divine Substance in a Divine
Human form. In this case, assuredly, we are supplied
with more clear and distinct conceptions of both sides
of the analogy.
So, again, with regard to the expression, " Redeemed
" by his blood!' Redemption, says Bishop Brown, means
buying or purchasing back again ; the price or ransom-
money is blood; and what a purchase or ransom is
amongst men, that the blood of Christ is in respect of
God.* Thus we have the merely natural ideas of buying
or purchasing, of material blood, and oi price or money ;
this, it is said, is all we know of the subject, for what
these signs really signify, it is affirmed, we know not ;
we use them to signify, by analogy only, what in itself is
inconceivable : thus there is no choice but between the
highest on one side, and the lowest on the other.
* Divine Analogy, p, 36,

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 165
Now even the Fathers supply us with the intermediate
idea ; for, as they teach, what blood is to tlie body that
wisdom is to the soul. To buy or purchase, thus to re
deem, is to liberate from falses and evUs ; therefore, to
be redeemed by the blood of Christ, is to be liberated from
these by the truths of Divine Wisdom. John viii. 32.
To take a more modern instance, viz., from a Ser
mon* preached and pubUshed in reference to the senti
ments of Professor Jowett : —
" It wUl not, I suppose, be disputed, that when St.
" John called Christ ' the Lamb of God! he used a figure
" of speech — a Metaphor ; that could not possibly be
" mistaken for a literal statement, any more than when
" our Lord called Himself a way, or a door, or a vine . . .
"The real question about such statements as 'Behold
" the Lamb of God,' is not whether it is figurative, but
"what is the truth it was meant to teach. According
" to writers like Mr. Jowett, it teaches nothing at aU, at
" least nothing inteUigible. Not that he says this in so
"many words; but when he sums up what the lan-
" guage of Scripture teaches, there is nothing in his
" summary which is derived from this language, nothing
"that would not be just as clear, and as well under-
" stood, if sacrificial terms had never been applied to
"Christ." According then even to this author, the expression,
"Lamb of God" is but a metaphor; indeed, . both par
ties agree upon this point : a metaphor, however, im.
plies no correspondent reality .- it appeals to the imagi
nation ; the expression " Lamb of God!' therefore, inter
preted upon this principle, is purely rhetorical; and
* Act Sermon. See Preface to this Letter.

166 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
when we find Locke maintaining, that figures of rhetoric
are only calculated to mislead, can anything be more
consistent than that the safest conclusion to which we
could arrive in such a case would be, that such a figura
tive, metaphorical expression as "Lamb of God" teaches
nothing at aU, or that it is dangerous to rest any doc
trine upon it ? The Theology of the day, indeed, " may
" not say this in so many words," but it lays down posi
tive principles from which no other conclusion can be
drawn; accordingly, neither in the Sermon, nor in the
Appendix, is the meaning of the expression — the inter
mediate idea — attempted to be given.
The Fathers, however, frequently teach, that a Lamb
signifies innocence: the Lamb of God is Divine Innocence;
but as this symbol is applied to the Humanity of the
Saviour, it signifies, says Swedenborg, the Divine Inno
cence of that Humanity. This is the intermediate idea.
It is Innocence alone which can remove guilt.
Again : to take the instance of Justice as an attri
bute of God ; it is observed by Bishop Brown,* that
" Justice is defined to be a perpetual will, or disposition
" of mind, to give to every one his due ; i. e., in respect
" of property, reward, and punishment." In respect of
property, the author says, this cannot apply in the case
of our relation to God, as nothing is our own exclu
sively of ,Him ; and as to rewards and punishments, God
does not reward and punish after the manner of men.
Therefore, says he, we take the virtue Justice as the
human virtue of giving every one his due, and employ
it analogicaUy to signify some unknown, incomprehen
sible perfection in God. Here, again, there is no inter-
* Divine Analogy, p. 336,

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 167
mediate idea between Justice as a Divine Attribute, and
the lowest form of Justice, as it exists amongst men.
On the other hand, the intermediate idea suppUed
by Swedenborg is, that of Divine Order, as effected by
Truth ; for though, he says, that the Divine Love alone
would save all, and the Divine Truth alone condemn all,
yet these attributes of Love and Truth do not exist alone
or separately in God ; they are separated only in and by
those who receive the Divine Truth alone — thus not to
gether with it Divine Good. The consequence is, they
know what is good, but do not practise it ; and in so
doing act against the truth of their conscience, which ac
cordingly condemns them. The result is, that according
to the laws of Divine Order as effected by Truth, they are
ordinated by that Truth which they have received, i. e.,
they have their place in the scale of creation, according
to their nature, which place is also the place of their
own choice. This view of the subject is in conformity
with the remarks of Archbishop King already quoted ;
and may be iUustrated by an observation of Dr. John
Norris, in his Essay on Reason and Religion.
" The Justice of God,"* says he, " is the same in
" the Moral world, as Order and Proportion are in the
"Natural. It is giving to everything its place and
" station, and disposing it according to its nature and
"condition. For as the beauty of the Natural world
"arises from Proportion, so does the beauty of the
" Moral world arise, also, from due Order and Propor-
" tion ; and as God has strictly observed this rule in the
" making of the world, having made aU things, in num-
"ber, weight, and measure; so we may be sure He
* Treatise on Reason and Religion, p. 121, By Dr. John Norris,
Fellow of AU Souls. Oxford, .\.Ti. 1689.

168 doctrine of correspondence.
" proceeds by the same standard in the government and
"conduct of it; though the exactness of this latter is
" not so obvious to our observation as that of the former ;
" nor are we so able to judge of the Moral as of the
" Natural geometry of God."
The immediate relation of Divine Justice, therefore,
as thus understood, to the Doctrine of the Atonement,
is, that of a disposition of things into order, according
to their nature and condition ; thus restoring harmony
and unity, where before were disorder and discord ; in
the words of the Apostle, as quoted in the Preface to
the University Sermons, Christ thus " reconcUing all
"things unto Himself, whether. they be things in earth
" or things in heaven ;" for heaven and earth are so inti
mately connected, that disorder upon earth exercises an
evU influence upon order in heaven, and is in the ten
dency to disturb it ; as we read in the Apocalypse, which
is the history of the restoration of order in the spiritual
world, or of the process of our Lord's reconciling all
things to Himself at the period of his Second Coming —
a reconciliation which cannot be effected without a judg
ment. A reconciliation of this kind our Saviour had
before effected when upon earth, by subduing the powers
of darkness through the medium of temptations endured
in the Humanity ; by which He both glorified the Hu
manity, and ordinated the principalities and powers of
the spiritual world. Such, in the general outUne, is the
doctrine taught by Swedenborg.
Finally, to instance the case of Anger, as popularly
employed in the explanation of the Doctrine of the
Atonement. According to Bishop Brown,* if God is altogether
* Divine Analogy, p. 318.

DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE. 169
without passions, then the terms expressive of thera
must be altogether without a solid and useful meaning ;
and, therefore, he is opposed to those who assert that
God is without passions. When a Body and Parts are
ascribed to Him, these are, he says, to be understood
metaphorically ; but when passions are ascribed to Him,
they are to be ascribed, not metaphorically, but in a
lower degree of Analogy ; for our passions, he says, have
degenerated by reason of the fall; they tended to their
proper objects originally with a most delightful serenity ;
hence, when they are set right again by reason and reli
gion, their resemblance to the incomprehensible perfec
tions of the Divinity wUl become more conspicuous and
admirable. Here, indeed, we have something like an
intermediate idea between the two extremes ; although
the notion of a serene anger is as incomprehensible as
that of a serene fury, or as the Divine Perfection it is
said to represent. Now no one denies that anger is a
passion, and if it be said strictly that God is without
passions, it can be only in the way of appearance or fal
lacy that they are attributed to God, as when it is said,
that God, who is immutable, changes. But it becomes
a very serious matter when a doctrine is founded upon
this fallacy, and that doctrine the great and important
doctrine of the Atonement, or Reconciliation ; as if God
required to be reconciled to us. " I need not remind
"you, my brethren," says an opponent* of Mr. Jowett,
"that all logical reasoning is but the expansion of
"terms; and if the terras used are not strictly appU-
" cable, every chain of reasoning based upon them must
" be faUacious." Consequently, any doctrine of Recon-
* Act Sermon. See Introduction to this Letter.

170 DOCTRINE OF CORRESPONDENCE.
ciliation founded upon the fallacy of Divine anger, is
but the expansion of the faUacy. The proper way to
lay a basis of sound argument upon this subject, is,
I would submit, first to point out the genuine truth
which the fallacy is designed to signify. Now on this
subject, Swedenborg observes, that there are apparent
truths and real truths ; just as stars have an apparent
position and a real position, an apparent magnitude and
a real magnitude ; but the fallacious appearance to the
sense is corrected by reason. So in regard to anger, as
ascribed to God : to those who remain in the fallacies
of sense, God ofttimes appears to be angry. " In the
" Word," says Swedenborg, " in many passages it is
" said of Jehovah, that he burns with anger and is wroth,
" and also that in anger he consumes and destroys ; but
"it is so expressed, because it appears to man, who
" turns himself away from the Lord, as is the case when
" he doeth evil. And whereas on such occasion he is
" not heard, and is also punished ; he believes that the
" Lord is in anger against him ; when yet the Lord is in
" no case angry, and in no case consumes from anger ;
" for He is mercy itself, and good itself. Hence it is
" evident what the quality of the Word is as to the
" letter, viz., that it is according to appearance with
"man."* When, therefore, we see theologians contending,
one that anger is in God, and as such that he requires
to be reconciled ; another, that anger is not in God,
because he is without passions, the following remark of
Swedenborg may not be irrelevant : —
"It is not sin and blasphemy to interpret the Word
* Arcana Ccelestia, art, 10,431.

STATE OF MODERN THEOLOGY. 171
"according to appearances, provided such appearances
"are not formed into the principles of a system, and
"these confirmed to the destruction of Divine Truth* in
"its genuine sense."*
Thus far I have been humbly endeavoring to trace
to their veritable source the theological difficulties of the
age — difficulties which have their origin not in the errors
of individuals, but, if our remarks be true, in the state
of theology itself. Such a course of proceeding appeared
to be more likely to be useful than any attempt to pro
vide for theological straits, by making an increased de
mand upon faith. The means are within the power of
every one to remedy the evils to which we have alluded
— evUs which have arisen from the want of a true doc
trine of Correspondence, and from the rejection of the
doctrine of the Divine Humanity — the consequences of
which have been an obscure and confused theology on
the one hand, or mere naturalism on the other.
" Definite statements," says Professor Jowett,! " ^^-
" specting the relation of Christ either to God or man,
" are but human figures transferred to a subject which is
" beyond speech and thought. There may seem to be a
" kind of feebleness in falling back on mystery, when the
"traditional language of ages is so clear and explicit.
" But mystery is the nearest approach that we can make
" to the truth ; only by indefiniteness can we avoid put-
" ting words in tlie place of things. We know nothing
" of the objective act on God's part by which He recon-
" cUed the world to himself, the very description of it as
" an act, being only a figure of speech ; and we seem to
" know that we never can know any thing."-— Why so ?
* Apocalypse Explained, art. 778.
t See the work on the Epistles of St. Paul, vol. ii., p. 482.

172 STATE OF MODERN THEOLOGY.
Because, according to Archbishop King,* " no care,
" industry, or instruction, can ever give a person born
" ahd continuing blind any notion of light ; nor can he
" ever have any conception how men who have eyes
" discern the shape of a figure at a distance, nor imagine
" what colours mean." ..." If it be asked why these
" things are not made clear to us, I answer for the
" same reason that Ught and colours are not clear to one
" that is born blind, even because in this imperfect state
" we want faculties to discern them." ..." We must
" lay this down," says the author of Divine Analogy,^
" for a certain truth, that we have no capacities for any
" idea of the real nature of them in the least degree,
" no more than a man born blind hath for any idea of
" the sun or light." | ..." We are born blind in respect
" of the true nature of things immaterial, and their real
" properties ; of God in particular, and of all the things
" in another world as they are in themselves."
There is, however, said to be this difference between
the theologian and the blind man ; that the former can
make use of natural signs which are in analogy with the
things signified, at least in relation to the things of God,
if not in relation to those of another world. In relation
to the things of God, the natural is in analogy with the
spiritual, though what the analogy is, it is said, we know
not ; in relation to the things of heaven nearly all is re
solved into metaphor : therefore, in tfiis state of being
the theologian must be satisfied with being " a man of
"four senses,"^ not merely born blind, but absolutely
without the faculty, or even any traces of an organ of
vision however vitiated. For if a person is born blind
* Discourse on Predestination. ¦\ Divine Analogy, p. 20.
X Divine Analogy, p. 22. § Ibid., p, 20,

CONCLUSION. 173
into the world, simply bUnd, we know that he possesses
nevertheless organs of vision, and that it is only their
malformation that prevents him from seeing. But in
the case of the Theologian, he does not even possess
these, so it is said : he never was designed to be en
dowed with spiritually visive organs, weU or iU formed of
any kind, and can be compared only with those lower
orders in the animal kingdom which are absolutely
without any nervous apparatus whatever instrumental
to sight.* If this be the real constitution of the human
mind in regard to theological subjects, Swedenborg is
indeed in error and progress in theology is out of the
question ; we must, indeed, stand in the old paths, and
stand still ; for if the Theologian advances, it can be
only as he is led by the hand of others who are in the
same predicament with himself: and to suppose that, in
such a case, a person ought to speak otherwise than
doubtfuUy, uncertainly, in other words, sceptically, con
cerning the truths of religion, would be to suppose him
presuming to a knowledge which it was beyond his facul
ties to attain.
No, says the author of Divine Analogy,^ this is a
very mistaken conclusion ; for " we have a very solid and
"useful knowledge nevertheless, founded in the very
" make and constitution of the raind ; and it is a know-
" ledge clear and distinct." Why so ? " Because it
" reaches no farther than those natural iraages and like-
" nesses whereof we have clear and distinct perceptions."
What, then, is the difference between the Bishop of Cork
and Professor Jowett in this respect ? Simply this — that
what one caUs knowledge, the other caUs ignorance;
* Divine Analogy, p. 331. ! Ibid., p. 420.

174 STATE OF MODERN THEOLOGY.
the latter being no more than what it was maintained to
be by Bishop Berkeley and other eminent writers. How
can the case indeed be otherwise, in the present state
of the doctrine of Analogy, when even the acutest logi
cian, the profoundest logician of the day — the Scottish
philosopher himself — " seems," it is said, " to cut away
" every bridge by which man can have access to God ;"
when the relation of the finite to the Infinite, that of
man to God, is declared to be an insoluble problera, in
volving insuperable logical or intellectual difficulties ?
To speak of knowledge in such a case, is presuraption
indeed ; for that such knowledge virtually resolves itself
into pure ignorance is so far admitted by Bishop Brown
himself, when he says,* " We cannot be said only to have
" indistinct, confused apprehensions of the true nature of
" God, and of His real attributes, but none at all in any
" degree. . . . The true meaning of the word incomprehen-
" sible, is, that we have no idea at all of the real true
" nature of God."
Now if there can be no faith where there are no
ideas, faith in God must be — alas ! who can say what it
is? We should, indeed, be in a deplorable condition
if the measure of our faith in God was to be determined
by the measure of our faith in human theories ; yet how
often is faith in man made the measure of our faith in
God!! In concluding my observations on these subjects, it
may be well to add, that particular reference has been
made to the work on Divine Analogy ; because it pro
fesses to be written upon the principles advocated by
* Essays in Philosophy. By Professor Frazer. p. 316. Divine
Analogy, p. 63.
t See above, p. 50.

CONCLUSION. 175
Archbishop King (with some occasional corrections);
and because it wiU be conceded that the Discourse of
Archbishop King, and the practical application of its
principles to theological subjects, cannot be thoroughly
understood without a study of the more enlarged Trea
tises of the Bishop of Cork. These principles have been
strongly recommended to theological students by some
of the highest authorities in the Church ; they are those
of the most learned works upon the subject which the
Church possesses, and which may be said to contain the
theory of all standard modern Theology. They fully and
satisfactorUy explain why it is that no advance has been
made in theology, and why it is that, according to them,
none can be made. It is a system which, as Bishop
Brown expressly says, furnishes no new ideas. " One
" and the same conception," says he, " stands in the
" mind for what is weU and directly known, and for
" what is utterly unknown as it is in itself ;" hence all
the newness in the case is only that of a new application
of old ideas, which he himself denominates as worldly,
natural, and external : all beyond this is the incompre
hensible, the inconceivable — the great impassable abyss ;
so that to attempt to pass from the merely external is to
attempt to conceive the inconceivable, to pry into the
secret things which belong to the Lord our God, and
to incur that sin of presumption which was the cause
of the faU.
Now, if there be no other choice than that which
this Theology gives us, the charge is perfectiy just ; for
the alternative lies only between pure naturalism on one
side, and pure Divinity on the other ; and, as such, to
attempt to pass out of the region of naturalism, musjt
be to attempt to know God as He is in himself. This

176

STATE OF MODERN THEOLOGY.

at once accounts for the meagreness of modern Theology
— for the predominance of the human element in all
theories of Divine Inspiration — for the introduction of
rhetorical figure into the interpretation of Scripture —
for the strenuous advocacy of the merely Uteral and
historical sense — for whole prophetical books being set
aside as among the secret things which God has not yet
revealed — and for so many parts of the Word of God
being now considered obsolete. It explains to us the
origin of so much mystery in Christian doctrine, and, at
the same time, of so much plainness ; as also the cause
of obscure, confused, and uncertain ideas. It exhibits
to us the real nature and quaUty of modern faith ; and
enables us to see why it is that so much is required on
the one hand, or, on the other, why so little, it being
supplanted by knowledge. It reveals to us the reason
why so little is understood of the origin and nature of
sacrificial worship — why the Church is at once so quiet
and so disturbed — and why so many in this day being
warned off from the highest side of Analogy, and not
contented only with the lowest, having nothing else to
choose — accordingly choose nothing.
This Theology I have compared with another, which
professes to supply the intermediates between the purely
human and the purely Divine, between the lowest and
the highest, between the finite on one side and the
Infinite on the other, and this without attempting to
know God as He is in Himself, or the Infinite as it is
in itself; a Theology which would conduct us to heaven,
not by the Tower of Babel, but through the doors of
the Temple ; not on the wings of Lucifer, but by the
Ladder of Jacob ; not by a mystical intuitus in abyssum,
but by the regeneration of the rational faculties. If these

CONCLUSION. 177
principles are true, they must lead to a reformation in
the study of modern Theology — a change which has
so far actually commenced, that the Interpretation of
the Apocalypse upon these principles, has now reached
to a circulation the largest of any upon record. This
alone would justify me in drawing the attention of com
petent persons to the subject ; nor do I know any place
where they are so likely to be found as our Universities,
where the subject of Analogy has already been so strongly
recommended to the notice of Theological students.
In the minutest flower, says a late Fellow of Trinity
College, we discern as strong indications of a present
Divinity as in the greatest visible objects of creation, in
the lily of the field as in all the order and harmony of
the heavenly bodies. " Nor does there seem any reason,
" why a reverent and humble study of Scripture, may
"not DISCOVER systems as great and perfect in the
"written Word and the revelations it affords us, as the
"research and pursuits of later ages have done in the
"material Universe."*
With this paralleUsm between progress in Natural
Science and progress in Revealed Theology,
I now. Rev. Sir,
Most respectfully beg leave to subscribe myself.
Your obedient and humble Servant,
In the cause of Divine Truth,
CLERICUS.

* study of the Gospels, p. 78. By the Eev. I. Williams, B.D,
N

NOTE.

The Bampton Lectures for a.d. 1855, were not published tiU a great
portion of this Pamphlet was in print; they contain an observation
entirely confirming one of the principal arguments of this Letter,
although only in brief and general terms. It is to be hoped that a
statement so important will not be aUowed to slumber in the pages of
a course of Lectures, where, probably, it may be known only to com
paratively few ; but that the principle it involves will be brought out
distinctly and boldly in its relations, on the one hand, to the doctrine
of a Divine Humanity ; and on the other, to the opposite doctrine of a
Divine ens rationis "without body."
Contrasting the God of the Old Testament with the Pantheism and
Polytheism of heathen religions, the Lecturer observes, p. 162 : —
"Altogether different is the God of the Hebrews. The Author
" and Upholder of creation, He is not one with it ; He alone is Jeho-
" vah, the self-existent, the unchangeable, while everything apart from
" Him is illusory and fleeting ; He himself orders all things in heaven
" and in earth, and delegates this function of government to no inferior.
" Hence the strong Anthropomorphism of the Old Testament, in which
" the members of the human body, and the passions of the human
" mind, are spoken of as belonging to God ; representations which
" have afforded occasion of scoffing remark to the unbeliever. But,
" let us ask. If God was to be described as a Person, and not a mere
" influence ; how could the conception be conveyed, save by ascribing
" to Him attributes associated in our minds with personality ? Our
" idea of God must consist either of a mere series of negations, or it
" must clothe itself in analogical terms (true, however, as far as they
" are applicable), drawn from om- own consciousness, or from facts
" around us. And it may be questioned, whether in their laudable
" desire to vindicate the majesty of the Divine nature, some modern
" writers have not run the risk of reducing it to an abstract entity with
" which we have no affinity, and which, therefore, can excite in us no

NOTE. 179
"emotions of love, fear, or gratitude; I allude to the speculations
" which seem to aim at establishing a difference, not merely in degree
" but in Mud, between the Divine attributes and the human virtues,
" described by the same names ; as if justice, or mercy, or faithfulness,
"are not merely inadequate, but equivocal terms, when transferred
" from man to God. But if this be so, what serious relations can God
" enter into with man ; or, which amounts to the same thing, what
" knowledge can we have of such relations ? However jealously we
" must maintain the transcendency of the Divine perfections, as com-
" pared with those of the creature, we must never forget that man was
" originaUy created in the image of God ; that the likeness is still not
" quite effaced ; and that therefore there is, and must be, a real con-
" formity of our moral ideas to the infinitely higher, but, in some
" sense, corresponding Attributes of the Most High."
The Lecturer, in a note, refers the reader to Archbishop King's
Sermon on Predestination, as containing the speculations to which he
aUudes. In opposition to these views, the Jehovah of the Old Testa
ment is revealed, it is said, as a personal Deity in the form of a Man.
A simUar view of the Anthropomorphic representations of the Deity
is taken in Mr. ManseU's Letter to Mr. Bernays on Man's Conception
of Eternity : — " It is useless," says he (p. 10), " to deny in theory what
" we are all compelled to acknowledge in practice. Pantheism and An-
" thropomorphism (using the latter term in its widest sense) are the
" two alternatives of reUgious thought ; the one representing the nega-
" tive, the other the positive side. If we aspire to comprehend the
" Infinite, we are drawn by inevitable consequence into the negations
" of Pantheism. If we represent the Deity under finite symbols, these
" must be drawn from the phenomena of human consciousness, and be
" thus based on a more or less refined Anthropomorphism. But an
"Anthropomorphism of this kind, if we accept its language and mode
" of thought as regulatively true, without attempting to determine its
" speculative significance, is so far from being either logicaUy illegiti-
"mate or theologically unsound, that it is one which meets us in
" almost every page of Holy Scripture, which is implied alike in the
" letter and in the spirit of its teaching, and which furnishes the only
" mode in which that teaching can be applied to any practical use,"
According to this account, the Jehovah of the Old Testament is a
personal God, who reveals himself in his written Word as Anthro
pomorphic ; and this view of the subject is said to be neither logically
legitimate, nor theologically unsound.
N 2

180

NOTE.

It remains to be explained, why what is not logically illegitimate
or theologically unsound, may not be also — not speculatively illegiti
mate or unsound. If God be Anthropomorphic both logically and
theologically, why not speculatively or metaphysically? or must we
hold to the scholastic principle, that what is theologicaUy true may be
philosophically false ? Whatever be the limits pertaining to man as a
finite being, they are common to him equally in a metaphysical, logical,
and theological point of view. Let us take the case of negative ideas
first, metaphysically, then theologically. We are told (p. 8) that " ne-
" gative ideas have their metaphysical as weU as their theological side ;
" for metaphysics, as well as theology, has aspired to bring the finite into
" communion with the Infinite ; and the Infinite is in no case a positive
" object of human thought. The inteUectual intuition in which subject
" and object are identified — the absolute being which is at the same
" time absolute non-being — the one universal substance which im-
" derlies aU phenomena, — these and such Uke metaphysical terms
" express only the destruction of human consciousness and the negation
" of human thought." Now, if this be the case metaphysically, is it
not equally the case theologically ? One illustration of the theological
negation of thought has already been adduced from a different author
(p. 93); another is furnished in the foUowing observation of Mr. ManseU,
p. 11 : " The Almighty does not bid us aspire to the most exalted concep-
" tion which an imperfect mind can form of a Being of infinite power,
" wisdom, and goodness. He teUs us, indeed, that He is such a Being,
"and we believe, though we do not comprehend it; but this belief,
" while it serves to warn us against certain gross and material con-
" ceptions of the Divine Nature, is neither designed nor fitted to
" influence the practical portion of our reUgion." It is satisfactory to
find it admitted, that what is incomprehensible is not fitted to influence
the practical portion of our reUgion ; at the same time, the difference
between the rest of the statement and that of Swedenborg is this:
that whUe it is admitted on both sides that the Infinite is incon
ceivable, there is nevertheless, according to Swedenborg, a gradation
or a series of degrees down from this Infinite Esse to the natural mind
of man ; so that by the opening of those degi-ees, we may arrive at
conceptions of God above the merely natural and external; thus at
those spiritual, celestial, and exalted conceptions of the Deity from
which we are entirely shut out by the theology and metaphysics of the
day ; and which are speculatively true as weU as theologically. Our
alternative does not Ue, on the one hand, between external natural

NOTE. 181
thoughts of God, whioh are conditioned in time and space ; and, on
the other, a state which is the destruction of all human consciousness,
and the negation of human thought; and, therefore, according to
Swedenborg, it would be untrue that we need not aspire to the most
exalted conceptions of the Deity, or that (p. 11) such conceptions are
" neither fitted nor designed to influence the practical portions of our
" religion."* " But," says the author (p. 10), " a finite mind can form
" no conception of an Infinite Being whioh shall be speculatively true ;
"for it must represent the Infinite under finite forms." If this be the
case, then neither can a finite mind form any conception of an Infinite
Being which shall be theologically true, for it must equally in this case
represent the Infinite under finite forms ; and so we come to a Eeve-
lation which, after all, is neither theologicaUy true nor speculatively
true — nay, is not itself even a Eevelation ; for (p. 12) " the existence of
" ideas which are speculatively negative, and furnish no basis of dog-
" matic truth, is implied in the veiy conception of Eevelation as a com-
" nmnication from an Infinite to a finite intelligence." But, assuredly,
how can that be justly caUed speculatively a Eevelation which is a
¦Eevelation of negative ideas — a Eevelation of negations of human
thought — a Eevelation of the destruction of human consciousness — a
Eevelation, which, the moment it is regarded as referring to positive
ideas, ceases to be true, while it commands us to believe that it is true
nevertheless ?
Nay; but it is replied (p, 10), "a conception which is speculatively
"untrue, maybe regulatively true ;" but if regulatively true, I presume,
therefore, theologicaUy true ; for theological truth is the same with regu
lative truth ; and thus we return to the old scholastic maxim, that what
is phUosophically untrae, may be theologically true ; or, again, that what
is theologicaUy true, may be philosophically false. AU this, I most
respectfuUy submit, arises fi-om not resolving, on the rules of analogy,
according to the doctrine of degrees, those "ideas and images which
" do not represent God as He is," into those which do ; for man, as
an image and likeness of God, may so far represent God as He is, or
he could not be said to be in that image and likeness. When that
image and likeness thinks of God, the thoughts and affections are
themselves also equaUy images and likenesses of those which are in
God; and though not the Truth as it is in itself (if there be such
* A similar observation wiU apply to some of the remarks on the subject of
the Divine Attributes in the Sermon of Mr. Meyrick, entitled God's Revelation
and Man's Moral Sense, Sfc.

182 NOTE.
a thing as irrelative truth), yet images and likenesses of the Truth as
it is in itself, and therefore so far in themselves speculatively true. If
we take up any other position than this, we must meet the Deist on
the ground that Eevealed Theology is regulatively true, speculatively
untrue; regulatively a Eevelation, speculatively no Eevelation, nay,
that it is a positive absurdity to presume that there can be one ; for
that what is absolutely inconceivable can never be said to be revealed ;
between the inconceivable and the revelation, there must be an impas
sable chasm ; hence foUow these alternatives, either knowledge of truth
wUl be superseded by faith in the incomprehensible ; and then comes
the question of distinct faith and indistinct ideas, or how far we can
have faith where we have no ideas, or a true faith where our ideas
must be false ; or else we have the alternative of a merely sensuous or
external Theology, to which the philosophic mind wiU never, never
condescend. " A true religion," it is justly observed (p. 12), " while ac-
" commodated to the faculties of the receiver, is still an accommodation
" only, and implies the existence of a higher fonn of truth in relation
" to a higher inteUigence." Many there are in the present day who
are aspiring after this higher form of truth, and do not see any reason
why they should be omitted in the scale of accommodation ; nor can
they see how revealed truth can be said to be accommodated to the
mind of man in general, if it be accommodated only to a certain
class of mind, and that the most external, beyond which all ideas
are negative.This negative state of rational thought is a state implied also in
Mysticism ; and to presume that when we pass out of the sensuous,
or external rational state, we necessarUy pass into the negative, is only
to give us the alternative between a mere external and a Mystical reli
gion; it may be between a sensuous and sceptical. Not that the dis
tinguished author means this ; but the whole theory of positive and
negative thought, so far as hitherto explained, first proceeds effectually
to close up the mind, and then, very consistently, to deny its capacity
to receive higher forms of truth — which, in such a case, is no marvel.
It is hoped, however, that enough has been said to shew, how ample scope
may be afforded to the most aspiring efforts of the mind in the regions
of Theology, without passing into a state of negative thought, or in-
cun-ing the chiirge of Mysticism or presumption ; our highest aspirations
being only to become more and more — in thfe image and likeness of
Him whom we desire more and more to know.

APPENDIX.

Page 96.
Befoke presenting the following extracts from the writings
of Swedenborg, it may be well to observe — 1. That they
will be as brief as possible ; as it is desirable that every one
should read and judge for himself, from the original works,
which are all easily accessible. 3. With respect to the ratio
between the finite and Infinite, there are two statements
made by Swedenborg, apparently at variance, but really in
harmony; one that there is no ratio of the finite to the
Infinite, another that there is. When he says there is no
ratio of the finite, he means no direct ratio ; in which case
he agrees with writers in general. On the other hand, he
affirms that there is a ratio, in so far as the finite is an
image and likeness of the Infinite, arising not from the
finite, but from the Infinite in the finite by appearance ; so
that we may ascribe to the finite what is really from the
Infinite, and thus institute a quasi proportion of the finite to
the Infinite, which is yet a true one^ on the principle stated
in the Letter.
With this explanation we proceed.
Arcana Ccelestia, art. 6333 :— " All things in the Spiritual
" World which proceed from the Infinite, such as truths and
"goods, are capable of being multiplied and of growing to
"an indefinite degree. That which cannot be defined or
" comprehended by number, is called indefinite ; nevertheless
"what is indefinite, is finite in respect to what is infinite;

184 APPENDIX.
" and so finite that there is no proportion between them.
" Truths and goods derive their capacity of growdng to what
"is indefinite, from this; that they proceed from the Lord
" who is infinite. That truths and goods have such a capa-
" city, may be evident from this consideration ; that the
" universal Heaven is in truth and good ; and yet not any one
"in truth and good altogether like that of another. This
" would also be the case, if Heaven was a thousand and a
" thousand times greater. It may be evident, also, from this
" consideration ; that the angels are perfected to eternity, that
" is, they continually grow in good and truth, and yet can in
" no case arrive at the ultimate degree of any perfection, for
" there always remains what is indefinite ; inasmuch as truths
" are indefinite in number, and each truth hath in itself what
" is indefinite, and so forth. This may be still more evident
" from the things in Nature ; although men should increase
"in number to what is indefinite, stUl no one would have
" exactly the same face vrith another, nor the same internal
" face, that is, the same mind with another, and not even the
" same tone of voice. Hence it is evident, that there is an
" indefinite variety of all things, and that one thing is in no
" case the same with another. This variety is more indefinite
" in truths and goods, which are of the Spiritual World ; in-
" asmuch as one thing in the natural world corresponds to a
" thousand and a thousand in the spiritual world ; wherefore
" as things are more interior, so much the more are they
" indefinite. The reason why all things in the Spiritual World
" and also in the natural world are such indefinites, is, be-
" cause they exist from the Infinite ; for unless they thence
" existed, they would not be indefinite ; wherefore also from
" things indefinite in each world, it is very manifest that the
" Divine Being is Infinite."
Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Providence, art. 53 :
— " The Divine in itself is in the Lord ; but the Divine from
" itself is the Divine from the Lord in things created."
Ibid., 53. — " For the better understanding of this, how-
" ever, it may be expedient to illustrate it. The Divine can-

APPENDIX. 185
"not respect or regard anything but what is Divine, and
" cannot respect what is Divine anywhere but in things created
" from itself. That such is the case, is evident from this con-
" sideration ; that no one can respect another but from some-
" thing of his own existing in himself: he who loves another,
"regards him from his own love in himself; he who is wise,
" regards another from his own wisdom in himself. He may
" see, indeed, that the other either does or does not love him,
" and that he is either wise or not wise ; but this he sees from
"love and wisdom in himself; therefore he conjoins himself
"to him in proportion as the other's love for him corresponds
" with his love for the other, or in proportion as the other is
" wise like himself; for they thus act as one. It is the same
" with the Divine in itself; for the Divine in itself cannot
" respect itself from another, as from a man, spirit, or angel ;
" for they have nothing of the all-creating Divine in itself;
" and to respect the Divine from another, in which there is
" nothing of the Divine, would be to respect the Divine from
" what is not divine, which is impossible. Hence it is, that
" the Lord is so conjoined to a man, spirit, and angel, that
" all which has relation to the Divine, is not from them but
" from the Lord. For it is a known thing, that all the good
" and all the truth which any one has, is not from himself
" but from the Lord ; and indeed that no one can even name
" the Lord, or utter his names, Jesus and Christ, but from
" Him. From this theu it follows, that Infinite and Eternal,
" which is the same with the Divine, respects all things in-
" finitely in finite subjects ; and that it conjoins itself to them
" according to the degree of the reception of wisdom and love
"in them. In a word, the Lord cannot have his mansion
" and dwell with a man and angel, but in his own, and not in
"their proprium, for that is evil; and if it were good, still
"• it is finite, which in itself, and from itself, is not capable of
"infinite. From these considerations it is evident, that it
" can never be possible for finite to respect Infinite ; but that
" it is possible for Infinite to respect what is Infinite from
" itself in firnite subjects."

186 APPENDIX.
Ibid., 54. — " It appears as if Infinite could not be conjoined
" to finite, because there is no proportion between Infinite and
" finite, and because finite is not capable of Infinite ; but
"nevertheless conjunction is given, as well because Infinite
" out of itself created all things, according to what is shewn
"in the Treatise on The Divine Love and the Divine
" Wisdom, n. 383, 383, 384, as because Infinite cannot re-
" spect anything else in finites but what is Infinite from itself,
" and that this can appear wdth fijiite beings as in them.
" Thus is established a proportion between finite and Infinite ;
" not from finite, but from Infinite in finite ; and thus also
" finite is capable of Infinite ; not finite in itself, but as if in
" itself, originating in Infinite from itself in it."
When, therefore, Swedenborg speaks of what is Infinite
and Eternal from itself, he does not mean Infinite Esse from
Infinite Esse (which he says is a contradiction), but Infinite
Esse in Infinite Existere as it is in finites ; in which sense
only it is said to he from itself; and hence is called the Divine
Proceeding or Proceeding Divine.
Ibid., 48. — " I. That what is Infinite in itself and Eternal
" in itself is the same as what is Divine, may appear from
" what is shewn in many places in the treatise on The Divine
" Love and the Divine Wisdom. That what is Infinite in
" itself and Eternal in itself is Divine, is grounded in the idea
" of the angels ; they meaning by Infinite no other than the
" Divine esse, and by Eternal the Divine existere. But that
" what is Infinite in itself and Eternal in itself is Divine, can
" be seen, and yet cannot be seen by men : it can be seen by
" those who think of Infinite not from space, and of Eternal
" not from time ; but cannot be seen by those who think of
" Infinite and Eternal from space and time : therefore it can
" be seen by those who think more elevatedly, that is, more
" interiorly in the rational mind ; but it cannot be seen by
" those whose thought is lower, that is, more exterior. Those,
" by whom it can be seen, think that infinity of space cannot
" exist, nor therefore infinity of time, which is eternity from
" which all things began ; because that which is infinite is

APPENDIX. 187
"without a first and last end, or without bounds. They
" think also, that neither can there exist Infinite from itself,
" because from itself supposes a limit and beginning, or a
"prior from which it is derived; consequently, that it is a
" vain thing to speak of Infinite and Eternal from itself, be-
" cause that would be like speaking of esse from itself, which
" is contradictory ; for Infinite from itself would be Infinite
" from Infinite, and esse from itself would be esse from esse,
" and such Infinite and esse would either be the same with
" Infinite, or it would be finite. From these and similar con-
" siderations, which can be seen interiorly in the rational
"mind, it is evident that there exist Infinite in itself, and
" Eternal in itself; and that both together are the Divine, from
" which are all things."
Ibid., 49. — " I know that many will say within themselves,
" How can any one comprehend interiorly in his rational
"mind anything without space and without time; and that
" they not only are, but also that they constitute the all — the
" very thing from which all things are derived. But think
" interiorly, whether love or any affection thereof, or wisdom
" or any perception thereof, or even whether thought, is in
" space and in time ; and you will find that they are not :
" and since the Divine is Love itself and Wisdom itself, it fol-
'^'lows that the Divine cannot be conceived in space and in
" time, therefore neither can Infinite. That this may be more
" clearly perceived, consider whether thought is in time and
" space. Suppose a progression of it during ten or twelve hours ;
" may not this space of time appear as but of one or two
" hours, and may it not also appear as of one or two days ?
"for it appears according to the state of the affection from
" which the thought is derived. If it is an afi'ection of joy,
" in which time is not regarded, the thought of ten or twelve
" hours seems scarcely of one or two ; but the reverse happens
" if the affection is of grief, in which time is attended to.
" Hence it is evident, that time is only an appearance accord-
" ing to the state of affection from which thought is derived.

188 APPENDIX.
" It is the^same with the distance of space in thought, whether
" in walking, or in going a journey."
With respect to time and space, the reader is referred to
the Index to Swedenborg's writings ; a work which will save
him a great deal of trouble in otherwise finding out particular
passages. Suffice it to mention, that times and spaces have
their origin in states, and as such signify states. Space
signifies state as to esse; hence the Divine attribute of Im
mensity;' time,''state as to existere ; hence the Divine attribute
of Eternity ; but as to the different senses in which eternity is
predicated of the creature and the Creator, see Swedenborg's
True Christian Religion, and other works.
In the spiritual world there are apparent times and spaces,
aud which, as such, are variable : in the natural world they are
fixed. The former, therefore, are not real times and spaces,
but only the latter. Into the question concerning spaces and
times as real external existences, and as internal conditions of
thought, it is not necessary here to enter.
Arcana Ccelestia, art. 1383. — " Men cannot but confound
" the Divine Infinity with the infinity of space ; and as they
" cannot conceive of the infinity of space as being other than
" a mere nothing, as it really is, they disbelieve the Divine
" Infinity. The case is similar in respect to Eternity, which
" men cannot conceive of otherwise than as eternity of time,
" it being presented to the mind under the idea of time with
" those who are in time. The real idea of the Divine Infinity
" is insinuated into the angels by this : that in an instant they
" are present under the Lord's view, without any interven-
" tion of space or time, even from the furthest extremity of
"the universe. The real idea of the Divine Eternity is in-
" sinuated into them by this : that thousands of years do not
" appear to them as time, but scarcely otherwise than as if
" they had lived only a minute. Both ideas are insinuated
" into them by this : that in their now they have together
" things past and future. Hence they have no solicitude
" about things to come, nor have they ever any idea of death.

APPENDIX. 189
" but only an idea of life : thus in all their now there is the
" Eternity and Infinity of the Lord."
Ibid., 8641. — "Between Divine good and Divine truth
" there is this distinction : that Divine good is in the Lord,
" and Divine truth from the Lord. These principles are as
" the fire of the sun, and the Ught which is thence derived.
" Fire is in the sun, and light is from the sun, in which latter
"there is not fire but heat. The Lord also, in the other life,
" is Himself a sun, and also is light. In the sun there, which
"is Himself, is Divine fire, which is the Divine good of
" Divine love ; from that sun is Divine light, which is Divine
" truth from Divine good : in this Divine truth there is also
"Divine good, but not such as it is in the sun, it being
" accommodated to reception in heaven ; for unless it was
"accommodated to reception, heaven could not exist, for no
" angel can sustain the flame proceeding frora Divine love, but
" would be consumed in a moment ; just as if the flame of the
" sun of this world should immediately scorch man. But how
" the Divine good of the Lord's Divine love is accommodated
" to reception, cannot be Icnown by any one, not even by the
" angels in heaven, because it is an accommodation of Infinite
" to finite ; and Infinite is such that it transcends all intelli-
" gence of finite ; insomuch that when intelligence of finite is
" desirous to direct its view thither, it falls as into the depth
" of the sea and perishes."
Ibid., 8760. — " The Divine in itself is Infinite ; and Infinite
" cannot be conjoined with finites, thus not with angels in
" the heavens, except by the putting on of some finite, and
" thus by accommodation to reception," &c.
Page 117,
Elements of Logic. By Bichard Whately, D.D. p. 337.
 <t rYSkas. it appears, that what Dr. King has been so vehe-
" mently censured for asserting respecting the Deity, is literaUy
" true even with respect to men themselves ; viz., that it is
" onlv by analogy that two persons can be said to possess the

190 APPENDIX.
" same virtue, or other such quality. But what he means is,
" plainly, that this analogy is far less exact and complete in
" the case of a comparison between the Deity and his crea-
" tures, than between one man and another ; which surely no
" one would venture to deny. But the doctrine against which
" the attacks have been directed is self-evident, the moment
" we consider the meaning of the term employed."

Page 159.
See here Dr. Fairbairn's Typology of Scripture, vol. ii.,
p. 339. The author justly complains (vol. i., p. 17) that, " The
" typology of Scripture has been one of the most neglected
" departments of theological science. It has never altogether
" escaped from the region of doubt and uncertainty ; and many
" still regard it as a field incapable, from its very nature, of
" being satisfactorily explored, or cultivated so as to yield any
" sure and appreciable results."
The present Letter may perhaps contribute to lay open
the latent causes of this state of things.
Page 165.
The explanation of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper is
thus given by Swedenborg : —
" Body, in the genuine sense, signifies the good which is
" of love ; because the body, or the whole man which is
" meant by the body, is a receptacle of life fr'om the Lord,
" thus the receptacle of good, which constitutes life itself in
" man ; for the vital heat which is love, is the vital heat itself;
" and unless this Adtal heat be in man, he is as somewhat
" dead. . . . The body of the Lord when glorified, i. e. when
" made Divine, is nothing else ; for what else can be supposed
" concerning the Divine, which is Infinite ? ... By giving
" bread to the disciples, is signified the communication to
" them of the Divine Good of his Love (according to the degree
" in which they are capable of receiving it) ; by giving them

APPENDIX. 191
" the cup, is signified his communication to them of corre-
" spending Divine Truth ; by eating and drinking, is signified
"appropriation; whence spiritual nourishment and conjunc-
" tion with the Lord. . . . Wheresoever, in the Word, any
" thing of meat, and of what serves for meat, is named, good
" is understood ; and wheresoever any thing of drink, and of
"what serves for drink, is named, truth is understood." —
Apocalypse Explained, 339, 340; Arcana Ccelestia, 6135,
10,033.

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