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the proposed

DEGRADATION AND DECLARATION,

CONSIDERED IN

A LETTER

ADDRESSED TO THE

REV. THE MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE.

GEORGE MOBERLY, D.C.L.,
HEAD MASTER OF WINCHESTER COLLEGE, AND FORMERLY
PELLOW AND TUTOR OP BALLIOL COLLEGE.

OXFORD,
JOHN HENRY PARKER:
LONDON, RIVINGTONS.
MDCCCXLV.

OXFORD :
PRINTED BY I. SHRIMPTON.

A LETTER,
fyc.

My Dear Sir,
I trust that I may not be considered arrogant in ven
turing to come forward, and thus publicly addressing you
on the subject of the momentous propositions about to be
submitted to the judgment of the Convocation of the Uni
versity of Oxford. These propositions are in jhemselves
so great, they involve such large general principles, and
such extreme particular penalties, that I apprehend they
will call every Member of Convocation to Oxford, who is
able to leave his home, in order to give his vote on one
side or other in so great a controversy.
This interest I share with many. But it is rather- as a
Balliol man, as one not wholly unconnected with Mr.
Ward's early Oxford life, and deeply interested in the pro
posed degradation of a brother-fellow, whom I myself ex
amined and helped to elect to his fellowship, that I am
induced to break silence on this occasion.
I am now called upon, with the rest of the University,
to strip him of these honourable characters, with which I
had thus a part in investing him.
I am also called upon to assist in altering the University
b2

law respecting subscription ; and from the juxtaposition of
the judicial with the legislative proposal, as well as from
* the nature of both, it is to be supposed that the latter is to
be regarded as in some degree the legislative consequence
of the former.
Feeling then, as I do, the most utter repugnance to the
proposed Declaration, and a strong conviction that the pro
posed Degradation is neither a just and legal, nor a wise
and necessary measure, I venture to request the attention
of yourself (as the immediate University superior, and
therefore protector, of Mr. Ward and all other members of
your College, and as a member of the Board of Heads of
Houses), and through you that of others, to a few considera
tions on these two points. I will first consider the pro
posed Degradation, and then ask your attention to a few
remarks on the Declaration.
1. The preamble of the Condemnation contains seven
passages extracted from Mr. Ward's book. Before I ob
serve further upon them, I must premise, that I object to
these passages and disapprove of them, as well as to many
others throughout the book. They are, as far as I can
judge, violent, unjust, undutiful, and mischievous. The
question, however, now before the University, is not
whether they are bad or good, to be approved or disap
proved, but whether a specific condemnation worded in
certain words shall be passed upon them by the majority of
Convocation, and whether a specific degradation shall be
inflicted thereupon.
The preamble then contains seven passages, taken from
different parts of this book. These passages are various.
The first compares the Reformation with Arianism for
badness. The second expresses a conviction that in pro
portion as the Church of England becomes better and

holier, she will be more disposed to sue for pardon and
restoration from the Church of Rome. The third alleges
that the spirit of the Articles is contradictory to the spirit
of the Prayer-book, and that the two documents are only
to be reconciled by accepting the dry wording of the Thirty-
nine Articles. The fourth attributes a dishonest purpose
to the Reformers in preserving an apparent, without any
real anti-Roman determination in them. The, fifth pro
fesses that the writer signs the twelfth Article in a non-
natural sense. The sixth expresses the writer's joy and
wonder, at finding all the Roman doctrines gradually per
vading the whole body of English Churchmen. The
seventh asserts that the writer in signing the Articles re
nounces no one Romish doctrine.
Strange enough, indeed, as I think, and melancholy, as
an exhibition of bold arrogance, and undutifulness towards
the Church of England !
But who would expect, or who can understand, that the
University should be called upon without further preface,
without allegation of particular Articles or particular oppo
sitions, to pronounce that " these passages are utterly in
consistent with the Articles?" "Inconsistent with the
Articles !" how can half a dozen expressions of sentiments,
however strange and unhappy, be inconsistent with thirty-
nine complex theological decrees ? The spirit of these pas
sages may be inconsistent with the spirit of one who has
dutifully signed the Articles : the manner of interpreting
the Articles professed in two of these passages may be in
consistent with the manner of interpreting them which the
courts of Church and State would sanction, and the Decla
ration of King Charles I., prefixed to the Articles, pre
scribes : specific dogmas may perhaps be to be found in the
book inconsistent with specific decisions of the Thirty-nine

6
Articles. Any of these things would be intelligible ; but
what is to be understood by so vague an assertion as that
these seven passages, so various, so empty of theological
assertion are utterly inconsistent with the Thirty-nine
Articles? with all of them? with which of them? How are
we to understand, and therefore how can we affirm, so loose
and indeterminate a proposition ?
Again, .these passages are not only inconsistent with the
Articles, but, "utterly" inconsistent with them. What can
this mean? Is this legal, or rhetorical language ? Is the
Convocation to grow angry and use figures of vituperative
speech? 'Utterly' means, I presume, 'to the utmost? 'so far
that it cannot be exceeded,' ' to the very outside .¦' What then?
do these unfortunate passages reach the ne plus ultra of in
consistency with the Thirty-nine Articles? what if they
had denied every dogma of the Articles seriatim ? what if
they had supported Socinianism or Sabellianism, or any of
the other heretical opinions which have been condemned
in the ancient, and unreproved in the modern Church ?
j Surely, my dear Sir, this great inexactness of language
in a condemnation followed by such extreme penalties, is
not only unworthy of the University, but also very danger
ous. Who can assure himself that he is safe from such
rhetorical and loosely worded condemnation as this? If
bad times should come upon us, and the University un
happily come under the dominion of unsound, or bold, or
timid governors, (for timidity is boldness at second-hand,)
who will be able to assure himself that this case may not
become a fatal precedent, and that the soundest teachers
may not fall under its consequences ? And this danger will
be seen to be a very real and serious one, when it is re
membered that the theological test established by the law
of Church and State, both in the Universities and the rest

of the Church, is not the Thirty-nine Articles only, but the
whole Prayer-book also : in which two multifarious docu
ments it would be easy to find apparent discrepancies, so
that a writer who should follow very exactly the guidance
of one part of the joint rule, might, without difficulty, be
represented, in a loose and rhetorical way, as teaching in
consistently with another.
2. We are next called upon to decree that these same pas
sages (equally utterly) " are inconsistent with the good faith
of him the said W. G. Ward."
It is a heavy and serious thing to pronounce, by a judi
cial decree, against a man's personal honesty. I am ready
to condemn these passages, or the book at large, upon clear,
intelligible grounds. I know enough of it to know it to
be a dangerous book ; but the University must pardon me,
I know Mr. Ward too ; and I know him to be a man of the
most thorough and upright integrity. I will not and can
not be a party to a sentence, which goes out of its way to
declare that he is not an honest man.
I appeal to you, my dear Sir, strongly as you oppose the
opinions which Mr. Ward has declared on many points, to
testify to his character. I ask you, in the face of the Uni
versity, whether he is not a man to whose hearty, thorough,
self-abandoning honesty, you can bear the fullest and most
cordial witness. I ask this, because, of the hundreds who
will flock to Oxford on the 13th of February, there are
among them few who know this gentleman ; many who are
strongly prepossessed against him. Let them at least know
upon the testimony of his very adversaries, what sort of
man he is on whose character they are called upon to pro
nounce so heavy a censure.
Nay, does not every page of this unhappy book declare
the writer's uprightness and noble elevation of moral con-

scientiousness ? What class of men in our Church may not
read in that book the most awakening lessons of personal
holiness, and Church duty ? Does he use ordinary caution
or stint in exhibiting his own strange notions of dntifulness
and propriety ? Does he not set forth, broadly and nakedly,
this very 'non-natural' theory of subscription? Does he
not challenge (ringing, as it were, with the point of his
spear his adversary's shield, like one bent on mortal com
bat,) resistance, reply, and refutation ; and if need be, de
privation and ejection ? Condemn him then, if he deserves
it, and the interests of the University imperatively demand
it : but hesitate to do what no judicial sentence ever does
except by implication, what is beside the present purpose,
and what I venture to pronounce not less unjust and un
founded than many of his own charges, — hesitate, I say, to
decree that he is personally dishonest in his subscription
to the Articles.
I can readily understand what the reply will be to these
last observations ; that it is not Mr. Ward's personal honesty
which is to be condemned, but the abstract good faith of
subscribing with such opinions. Nor can I deny that such
a distinction may save some individuals, who take and keep
it, from the guilt of injustice and calumny. But I do deny
that this is the ordinary or usual acceptation of the term,
and I feel perfectly assured that, introduced as it is without
qualification or explanation into the condemnation, the ex
pression will be commonly understood to signify, that Mr.
Ward was personally dishonourable and uncandid in his
subscriptions at the time of taking his degrees.
3. These objections would appear to lie against the word
ing of the proposed condemnation, and therefore against
the Degradation consequent upon it, even if the measure
in general were confessedly legal, just, and necessary.

But the most serious doubts may well be entertained on
all these three points.
In respect of the legality of the proposed Degradation, it
is surely incumbent on the proposers of it, to shew Members
of Convocation by what authority they are enabled to pass
such a statute.
Every corporation within a state must needs have defined
powers. The moment it attempts to travel beyond the
powers expressly granted to it by law, it usurps, pro tanto,
sovereign power, and renders itself amenable to the law of
the land. I say then, that whatever answer the University
is prepared to make to a motion in the Court of Queen's
Bench for a Mandamus to restore Mr. Ward after degrada
tion, it is bound to exhibit to Members of Convocation
before the degradation, in order to satisfy them that they
are invited to exercise powers which are really theirs. It
will not do for us to trust implicitly in such a case to others.
If the Heads of Houses are satisfied of the legality of the
proceeding by their own research, or that of a committee, or
an individual of their body, the Convocation has a clear right
to the same satisfaction. The House of Convocation, not
the Board of Heads of Houses, is the body to act; its
members are those who are invited to commit themselves
to the degradation of Mr. Ward. They must not allow
themselves to be driven, blindfold, into breaking the law.
Where then, allow me to ask, in the University statutes,
which comprise, and comprising limit, the powers of Con
vocation, is the precise power of such a degradation as is
now proposed, to be found ? I ask, for I have searched in
vain. The statute 'de Degradatione' opens thus: 'Cum nonnulla
sint delicta, quce, contra statuta hujus Universitatis admissa,
graduum privatione plectuntur ; alia vero, qua? (licet alibi

10
commissa) tamen propter infame supplicii (quo vindicantur)
genus, detrahi prius insignia academica, et delinquentes
exauctorari postulant, ne stigmata, delinquentium personis
merito inurenda, simul graduum academicorum dignitati
labeculam aspergant,' &c.
The latter part of this preamble being plainly uncon
nected altogether with the case before us, allow me to ask,
whether 'utter inconsistency with the Articles' is one of
those 'nonnulla delicta quae, contra statuta hujus Univer-
sitatis admissa, graduum privatione plectuntur ?'
The foot-note to this statute refers to Tit. ix. Sect. ii. § 3.
and Sect. vii. and Tit. xxi. § 14.a et 19. These references
are plainly altogether beside the present case. The first
refers to the case of a delinquent examiner ; the second is
as follows : ' Quod si quis post praestitum illud juramentum
(absque impetrata, dispensatione) nihilominus haud inceperit,
privetur, ipso facto, non solum gradu,' &c.
The third applies to the case of a graduate resisting or
evading a Vice-Chancellor's warrant presented by the
Bedel. The fourth refers to cases of appeal, and inflicts degrada
tion on such as appeal irregularly.
Where then is the statute which forbids such subscription
as Mr. Ward's at all; and if such is to be found, where is
the statute which inflicts degradation as the punishment
for such offence b?

" Misprinted § 17 in the Corpus Statutorum.
b It occurs to me, on further examination of the Statute ' de Deo-radatione '
that it may possibly he supposed that the words ' vel ex congruo,' in the
third paragraph of that statute, give power of degradation to the Convocation
whensoever it may seem to them ' congruent' or proper to inflict it.
This however is, I think, certainly not the true meaning of the words :
1. Because the preamble mentions only two sorts of cases of degradation of
which this is not one.

11
There is, I am aware, one other passage in the statutes in
which degradation is spoken of. The first paragraph of the
2nd Sect, of the 10th Title is as follows :
§. 1. ' Enumeratio negotiorum, qua ad Domum Convoca
tions spectant.
' Quandoquidem negotia majoris momenti cum majore
deliberatione sunt tractanda ; et quae ad universam spectant
Academiam, ab universis approbari congruum est ; statutum
est, ut in Convocatione Doctorum, Magistrorum Regentium
et non Regentium (prout de antiquo fieri consuevit) de
majoribus negotiis ac totum Universitatis corpus tangentibus,
deliberetur et determinetur.
'Veluti de legibus et statutis rogandis, vel etiam abro-
gandis, interpretandis, moderandis ; de officiariorum electi-
onibus : de Delegatis ad certa negotia nominandis ; de
Dispensationibus licitis concedendis; de Praesentationibus
ad Beneficia; de Computis sive Ratiociniis examinandis et
approbandis; de Fundissive Praediis Universitatis dim ittendis
sive elocandis ; de Literis ad Regiam Majestatem, Praelatos,
2. Because the second and third paragraphs belong, plainly, to such cases
only as are mentioned in the preamble ; ' quoties hujusmodi se tulerit occasio.'
3. Because the third paragraph belongs only to those instances of the
classes mentioned in the preamble in which the delinquent ' intra Universi-
tatem prasens non fuerit.'
4. Because the third paragraph itself, duly construed, only acknowledges
two classes of crimes punishable by degradation, ' pcenam degradationis per
statuta (aut alias ex  ) irrogandam.'
5. ' Ex decreto superioris curias, vel ex congruo,' then is the alternative
description of the second class of cases mentioned in the preamble. Some
times, in such cases, sentence may have been pronounced in a superior
court, sometimes it may not. But, either way, such a delinquent is liable
to degradation under the second rule.
The Latinity indeed of the Statute is bad enough, (so bad that I doubt
whether this third paragraph does not enact the degradation of the Vice-
Chancellor himself, the only person who appears in the nominative case in it ;)
but it is hardly so bad as to describe three cases thus, ' per statuta, aut alias,
vel ex congruo.'

12
Proceres, ac Judices sive alios quoscunque conscribendis;
de amovendis Academiae dehonestamentis, et Gradu pri-
vandis. Denique, de quibuscunque ad statum, dignitatem,
et incolumitatem Universitatis spectantibus.'
I have printed this passage of the Statutes at length, in
order to render it clear at the first sight that it is, as it pro
fesses to be, a mere 'enumeratio' of the sort of matters
{'veluti de statutis' &c.) which come before the House of
Convocation. Each of these matters is the subject of a particular statute
afterwards given. Instead therefore of eking out the powers
given in other statutes by this enumeration, or index, we
must refer to those other statutes to ascertain what the
powers of degradation are to which this enumeration refers.
The point indeed is so clear that it hardly admits of further
argument; I will only add in confirmation, that the foot-note
to the statute de Degradatione makes no reference to this
' enumeratio.' Where then, I repeat, is the statute which gives authority
to the Convocation to degrade Mr. Ward ?
If none such is to be shewn, then surely the act of degra
dation will be illegal. It will be a mere privilegium ; an
act in the nature of a judicial sentence, passed extra
judicially by a legislative body; such an act as the Court
of Queen's Bench has repeatedly decided it to be beyond
the power of the governing body of a corporation to do.
Where then is the authority of degrading Mr. Ward
given ? Will any Member of Convocation venture to vote
to degrade him before he is informed on this point ?
There may, I doubt not, be passages of the Statutes which
I have overlooked, and to which the foot-note to the statute
de Degradatione makes no reference. All I say is, if there
be, let them be exhibited.

13
Of the justice of the proposed Degradation I will say
only thus much. Justice requires equality. Is it equal
dealing to allow Members of the University, not to say
Professors and Heads of Colleges and Halls, to deny the
Christian Miracles, to maintain Sabellianism, to preach
against Baptismal Regeneration, to write against dogmatic
Theology as such, all which things have been done within
these twenty years, notoriously and repeatedly, without the
smallest whisper of Degradation in any single case ; and to
inflict this punishment upon a gentleman who holds no
University or College office, who is not occupied in teach
ing, who has notoriously refrained (except by published
books) from exercising influence over young men, and
whose errors consist not in the advocacy of heresy, destruc
tive of the essence of Christian religion, but in over incli
nation towards the doctrines of Rome, which the Church
of England still holds to be a true branch of the Church
of Christ?
Again, is it wise and necessary to resort to this extreme
and most unprecedented punishment in this case ?
If it be replied that Mr. Ward has well deserved cen
sure, that he has provoked and challenged it almost in an
insulting manner, that there have been many secessions to
Rome, and that if this book be permitted to pass uncen-
sured, and be understood to speak the minds of the Uni
versity of Oxford or any large proportion of it, there may
be many more, — I cannot deny the truth of these allega
tions. But I seriously ask, Does it follow because a man de
serves censure, and has most provokingly invited it, that
therefore the University must needs pronounce it? Has
its practice been to do so? Is the University to grow
angry, and be provoked? Will it not lose more by the

14
one-sidedness of its severity, than it will gain by a single
act of discipline ?
Again, of the many hundreds who will flock to Oxford
on the 13th of February, how many are there who approve
of Mr. Ward's book? Are there ten ? I doubt it much. For
my own part I have never heard it spoken of except in
terms of disapprobation. But if this degradation be pro
posed, and as it cannot fail to be, opposed, will it not
appear as if Mr. Ward's sentiments were more extensively
adopted and approved than they are ? I will not suppose
it possible that this effect can be designed, but I am sure it
is inevitable. And, has not the general disapprobation been very
clearly and strongly expressed? in the University, in the
country at large, in many publications, and lastly, in that
temperate, thoughtful, but as it seems to me overpowering
criticism in the last number of the Quarterly Review ?
And again, is the book itself one that calls for such ex
treme measures ? Designed, as we learn from the preface,
for a pamphlet, and running on, 'inter scribendum,' to its pre
sent unwieldy length ; — treating the most momentous- ques
tions, many of them questions of fact and history, which
plainly require the most patient research and industry,
hastily, Superficially, and violently; — throwing the whole
Roman controversy aside, and deciding against the Church
of England in it in a peremptory manner, on grounds un
known to the great combatants in the argument ; — is such
a book to throw the University out of all sober-minded
self-possession, and drive it, in a paroxysm of anger, to an
act of unprecedented severity, of more than doubtful legal
ity, and of apparent one-sidedness and partizanship ?
But I pass from this subject to one of much greater im
portance. The proposed Degradation, even if it be liable

15
to the objections which I have alleged against it, is still an
act directed against an individual, and one who has rather
courted than deprecated the displeasure of the University.
The Declaration to be proposed to Convocation on the
same day appears to be a monstrous breach of law, a dis
tinct attack upon the Church, and an infringement of the
Christian liberty of every member of the University. I
trust there is no chance of its being passed into a statute.
I am sure there would be none if it were not for the ex
citement of men's minds at this time ; — an excitement, I
must take the liberty of saying, made the most of by the
uniting of this Declaration with the condemnation of Mr.
Ward. I trust that if passed into a statute, it will, on the
first occasion of its being put in force, be overthrown in a
court of law ; but meanwhile, I cannot refrain from adding
my warning to that of others, lest members of Convocation
should inadvertently give their aid to so monstrous a pro
posal. It is proposed then to give to the Vice-Chancellor for
the time being, authority to demand from any members of
the University, graduates or undergraduates, whom he may
choose to suspect of unorthodoxy, not only subscription to
the Articles (for this he may require under the existing
statute), but a Declaration also to the following effect :
'Ego A. B. Articulis Fidei et Religionis necnon tribus
Articulis in Canone xxxvi0 comprehensis subscripturus, pro-
fiteor, fide mea data huic Universitati, me Articulis istis
omnibus et singulis eo sensu subscripturum, in quo eos ex
animo credo et primitus editos esse, et nunc mihi ab Uni-
versitate propositos tanquam opinionum mearum certum ac
indubitatum signum.'
Now, of course, the first question that must arise'_ in con
sidering this Declaration is this : Does it propose to add a

16
new sense to the Articles, or does it not? And the answer
which no doubt the proposers of it would make to this
question is, "It does not. It merely states the sense in
which they are and always have been required to be sub
scribed." Let us then consider the Declaration as not adding any
new sense.
What then does it do? and what is it meant to do? If
'any person' 'shall affix any new sense to any Article,' or
' if any Divine in the Universities shall preach or print any
thing either way, other than is already established in Con
vocation with the Royal assent,' are they not already ' lia
ble to the Royal displeasure, and the Church's censure,'
and may not ' due execution' be had on them ? ' The law
then is open, and there are deputies, let them implead one
another.' Why then, I ask, will not this legal defence of the due
subscription of the Article suffice us ? What is the purpose
and design of this proposed change ?
It is to substitute the suspector for the judge. It is to
put the private scene in the Vice-Chancellor's dining-room
before subscription, in place of the public trial in the open
Court after it. It is to hold over our Christian liberty not
the legitimate hazard of a lawful trial, but the ever-present
danger of an individual's suspicion. It is to banish indivi
duals, known to be conscientious, by the requirement of a
previous, unwelcome Declaration, rather than incur the
risk of a public accusation involving a public defence. It
is to anticipate the inconveniences of a legal trial by in
veigling men of tender conscience into pleading guilty.
These are the inconveniences which are to be foreseen
on the assumption that the proposed Declaration means
nothing ; that it adds nothing ; that honest subscribers are

17
in no respect at all differently situated, at least as regards
the sense in which they subscribe, before the passing of the
Declaration and after it
But it cannot for a moment be allowed that such is the case.
For in the first place, whatever doubt there may hitherto
have been as to the theory of Subscription, whatever variety
of opinion as to the latitude intended to be given to Sub
scribers, whatever uncertainty as to the interpretation of the
law of Subscription likely to be laid down by the Courts in
the event of a judicial decision being had upon it, this
Declaration claims to settle it all. Did any person doubt
in what extent of sense the Articles may be subscribed ?
Did any person hope that the 'literal and grammatical'
sense, ' the true usual, literal meaning' of the words was all
that was required of him ? Such doubts and such hopes
are, for the members of the University, to be now authori
tatively destroyed. They are to sign, ' eo sensu,' &c.
Now let the decision offered by this Declaration be a
right or a wrong one, the legal one or another, it is given
by a party which has no right to give it. The University
has no authority to settle these questions, which are real,
grave, and doubtful ones.
But again, the decision is plainly a wrong one : first,
because it refers us to the sense aliunde petendum of cer
tain persons, supposed to be the imposers, as our rule of
interpreting the words of the Articles, and not to the words
as the proper guide to their sense. It is an ordinary and
well-known principle of law that the intention of the legis
lature in any act is to be gathered exclusively from the
words of that act. Whatever may have passed in the
debate, whatever may have been the well-known sentiments
or intentions of the individuals who drew, moved, or sup
ported the measure, whatever things they may have said at
c

18
other times from which their sentiments or intentions may
be supposed to be gathered, is beside the purpose. They
may have changed their minds, they may have been unable
to carry what they most desired, they may have acquiesced
in something imperfectly satisfactory to them. Their
ultimate intention and meaning is to be sought for nowhere
but in their words. If their words fail to express their
meaning, it is unfortunate that they did not select them
better. This is clear of the framers of any document, of whose
intention in framing it there may appear to be some (how
ever inadequate and unsatisfactory) means of forming a
judgment. But it is still more clear of the imposers. The
government of a country is the imposer of its laws ; not the
executive government, of course, but the supreme governing
power. How then are its intentions, how is its sense to be
discovered ? Its sense is to be discovered by its words, and
by its words alone. It cannot be supposed, still less ascer
tained, to mean any thing but what it says. To interpret,
then, written laws by the sense aliunde petito of framers
or imposers, and not to interpret the sense of the imposer
(for the sense of the framer has no possible connection with
the obligation) by the words of the written law,,,is as un
reasonable as it is notoriously illegal.
Secondly, the Declaration refers us to the University
as the imposer whose sense is to be followed in subscription,
instead of the Church and State of England. The Thirty-
nine Articles were imposed upon the Clergy by the act of
the 13th of Elizabeth. They were again imposed upon the
Clergy, and upon the Heads and Governors of Colleges and
Halls, and Professors in the Universities, by the Act of Uni
formity, 14 Charles II. By these acts, the Church and
State have recognised the Articles, have adopted them, and

19
made them to be part of the theological test of orthodoxy
in the Church of England. Now however competent it
may be to the Universities to apply the test, thus adopted
by the Church and State, more frequently than these acts
direct, (as in giving Degrees, or admitting to Matriculation,)
they, in so doing, apply not a test of their own, but the
test already legally allowed. They are then not the im
posers, but only the authorized administrators. The imposer
is the perpetually present government in Church and State,
which first passed, and afterwards continues, the law under
which the Thirty-nine Articles became a legal test. The
Thirty-nine Articles (and therefore, of course, their sense)
are part and parcel of the law of the land* No authority,
but the supreme authority, can alter or modify them or
their legal sense ; and he who cannot modify, cannot legisla
tively declare. Therefore no amount of power allowed to
any individuals, or corporations, to exact subscription more
frequently, or from other persons than the law directs, can
shift away from the Church and State to such corporations
or individuals the true original imposing power. If this
argument be sound, as I have every reason to believe it is,
then the clause ' et nunc mihi ab Universitate propositos' is
irrelevant and impertinent to the matter. The University,
not being the imposer, has no business to have any 'sense'
in the case. It merely applies the legal test with its sense
already upon it.
Again, not only has the University no right to have a
'sense' in the case, but also there is no security that its
sense will be always identical with that of the real original
imposer, the Church and State. On the contrary, there is
every reason to think that these senses may possibly differ.
The fluctuating majority of the House of Convocation may
at one time be notoriously of Catholic views, at another of
c 2

20
Lutheran ; at one time it may verge towards the Thirty-
nine Articles, as the part of the joint-rule of orthodoxy
most accordant with its opinions, at another time to the
Prayer-book. Meanwhile the sense of the true imposer, to
be gathered (according to the general principles of law,
strengthened in this particular case by the authoritative
Declaration of King Charles) from the words of ' the articles
established' cannot differ or be liable to change in different ages.
And numerous are the inconveniences and absurdities
which may flow from this possible discrepancy of sense be
tween Church and State, the imposer, and the University,
the particular and permitted administrator. A man may
subscribe under the Act of Uniformity, and be unable to
subscribe under the Declaration. A man may subscribe
under the Act of Uniformity, and even be himself the per
son to exact subscription under that act from others ; but
self-convicted of a deficient belief in the identity of his sense
with that of the University, he may be obliged to abdicate
his post in the University : yes, though he be Bishop or
Archbishop, 'Praefectus Domus cujusvis, sive alius quis,' at
the suspicion of a (possibly ignorant or prejudiced) Vice-
Chancellor, he may be banished from the University and
degraded, not because he does not subscribe fairly, not be
cause the due sentence of law has pronounced his subscrip
tion insufficient, but because (citra justitiam et leges) he is
unconvinced of the identity of the undiscoverable sense of
the University with the notorious, grammatical, true and
usual sense of the Articles themselves! the Courts may
pronounce a subscription valid under the Act of Uniformity;
the House of Convocation may vote it 'utterly inconsistent'
with the Declaration.
But thirdly, the rule of interpretation given in the
Declaration is an impossible one.

21
For what is meant by primitus ? The Articles were
originally published, though with certain additions now
omitted, in the reign of King Edward VI.
Are we then to be sent to the writings of Cranmer
and Ridley to find 'the sense' in which they were pub
lished? or does primitus mean in the years 1562 and
1571, and is Bishop Jewell the authority for the sense?
or does it refer to the year 1603, and the time when
the Articles received the confirmation of the 36th Canon ?
or to the time of Charles I., whose Declaration, which
does give a rule of interpretation, is still prefixed to the
Articles ? or does it refer to the Restoration, and the Act
of Uniformity, under which subscription is now legally
required, and are we to seek for the sense from Bishop Cosin,
and the Divines of that time ? No doubt the framers of
the Declaration meant by 'primitus' the date of 1571, and
referred to the sense of the Elizabethan Divines. But are
we, for ever, to take the ' senses' of framers instead of the
meanings of words ? are the Articles to be interpreted by
what their framers meant, and is the very Declaration
establishing this rule of interpretation in need of a similar
guess at what its framers mean ?
But as if the obscurity attaching to the word 'primitus'
were not sufficient, the Declaration goes on to say ' et nunc
mihi ab Universitate propositos.'
Allow me, my dear Sir, to sum up what I have been
urging, in order to exhibit at a view the otherwise almost
inappreciable strangeness of this conclusion. The Univer
sity having the Thirty-nine Articles as part of a joint test
of orthodoxy, established by law, is not content with the
letter of this document, but travels out of the letter, in
order to discover by other criteria, the sense. In so doing
it departs from King Charles's Declaration, and from all

modes of discovering the senses of words known to the
law, in order to establish one of its own. It creates itself
the imposer, and claims respect for its own sense. It sends
us back to some unassigned time called primitus, and tells
us that we must sign in the then sense. It now binds all
these strange things together, and will not let us be mem
bers of its body, unless we are ready to protest our hearty
belief that we sign in all these senses at once ; that what
ever 'primitus' may mean, we sign in that sense, and that
whatever the University may intend, we sign in that sense
too. The words of the Articles, the usual and grammatical
sense, are no longer to be thought of; the sense of Church
and State, discoverable by the grammatical sense, is not to
be regarded. A certain compound, complex sense, made
up of two profound obscurities, involving endless ancient
researches and modern guesses, but incapable of true dis
covery or authoritative decision, is substituted for the theo
logical test under which we have hitherto lived ; and this
dark, inquisitorial, senseless rule is to be applied secretly,
on suspicion, before subscription, as a snare of conscience,
not as a vindication of right !
The Articles are annulled, the Prayer-book is annulled,
as parts of the joint test of orthodoxy in the University, for
those unhappy men whom a Vice-Chancellor may suspect.
The Declaration comes first ; and he whose conscience
shrinks from this large, vague, impossible profession, is
' ipso facto' degraded and expelled !
But how can Convocation identify these senses ? If they
be, by hypothesis, identical at this moment (but it is a wild
and baseless hypothesis), how can it enact that they shall
always be identical ?
If there be indeed two different imposers of the Articles
now (Church and State for Clergy and Heads of Houses,

23
and the University for its members), who can enact, or any
how secure that their senses shall be the same ? If again,
besides the two present imposers we are to search for an
ancient sense as well, who can understand an enactment
which identifies by law the ancient with the modern
senses ? If indeed the sense of the words is meant, then
ancient and modern sense is all one, for the words remain
unchanged. But the moment we travel out of the words,
— the moment we endeavour to interpret the words by the
senses or meanings of men, — the moment we speak of pri
mitus and nunc, — the moment, that is, we take into account
dates, and times, and people in the interpretation, that mo
ment our rule becomes lax instead of stringent, tyrannical
instead of legal, undiscoverable and uncertain, and a snare
of conscience instead of plain, sure, and equitable.
The truth is that the only possible defence of the
Declaration is that it means nothing : that it is totally and
absolutely without signification ; that subscription is in no
respect altered by it : that the Articles are to be interpreted
still, as they ever were interpreted, by themselves ,• that the
'sensus imponentis' is to be discovered from themselves,
and not elsewhere. But oh ! most lame and impotent de
fence, which defends by self-annihilation ! — The least sha
dow or glimpse of meaning in the Declaration lays it open
pro tanto to the objections taken against it. It is safe from
objection only by being confessedly null and void in in
tention and in fact: — null and void alas! in every way
except in the way of ensnaring consciences, and degrading
and expelling members of the University without trial !
But I must beg your attention to one or two more points
in this proposed Declaration. ' Tanquam opinionum mearum
certum ac indubitatum signum.'
It is surely not interpreting this clause beyond its certain

24
and necessary meaning, to understand that it intends that,
after declaration and subscription, there shall be no doubt
of a man's opinions. /
If this be its meaning, and I can conceive no other, then
it is equally clear that it seeks to bind the Articles to a
sense much more narrow than they have ever been bound
to before. If there is one point more clear than another
in the history of the Thirty-nine Articles, it is that they
were drawn in a comprehensive spirit, and that the framers
of them were most careful, as far as was practicable, to
avoid a schism. Else why was the express declaration that
was originally made against the corporal presence of Christ
in the Sacrafient omitted in 1562: else why were the
Thirty-nine Articles so unlike to the Lambeth Articles
under Whitgift? But I must not linger on a point so clear
and so universally acknowledged, as the proof that the
Articles were drawn in a comprehensive spirit. If so, then
they were not designed to be ' opinionum' alicujus ' certum
ac indubitatum signum? The man who leant towards
Lutheran, or Calvinistic or Catholic views might sign them
and did sign them alike. How then could they be, or
when were they, a certain and indubitable sign of a man's
opinions ? Is it not notorious that there have subsisted in
the Church in England, radically different Schools of doc
trine from the Reformation downwards? How then have
the Articles, which all have signed alike, been, or how
could they be, a certain and indubitable sign of a man's
opinions ?
I do not now urge (as has often been urged with
great force) that the entire rule of orthodoxy in the Church
of England, consisting of Articles, Prayer-book, and
Canons, is, if proportionately interpreted, clearlv and
strongly in favour of the Catholic interpretation of Holy

25
Scripture, and the primitive form of doctrine ; but I confine
myself to this single question, When or where has it been
required or supposed in the Church of England, that the
subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles furnished a certain
and indubitable sign of a man's opinions ? What ! on Bap
tismal Regeneration ? on the Real Presence ? on the Apo
stolical Succession? on the Power of Absolution? on the
Nature and Authority of the Church ? on the Defectibility
of Grace? on Counsels of Perfection? on Judgment
according to Works ? When, or where, I repeat, has it been
required or supposed that subscription to the Thirty-nine
Articles furnished a certain and indubitable sign of a man's
opinions, even on such momentous subjects is these ?
The 36th Canon of 1603 requires that 'for the avoiding
of all ambiguities' a person shall subscribe in this order and
form of words, — ' I, N. N, do willingly and ex animo sub
scribe to these three Articles above-mentioned' (the third of
which contains the acknowledgment of the Thirty-nine
Articles), 'and to all things that are contained in them' — not a
word here of a certain and indubitable sign of opinions. King
Charles I., in his Declaration prefixed to the Articles, 'takes
comfort' in this, that 'though some differences have been
ill raised,' yet ' all Clergymen within our realm have always
most willingly subscribed to the Articles established ; which
is an argument to us that they all agree in the true, usual,
literal meaning of the said Articles ; and that even in those
curious points in which the present differences lie, men of
all sorts take the Articles of the Church of England to be
for them ; which is an argument again, that none of them
intend any desertion of the Articles established.' — On which
Bp. Burnet comments thus, 'that an Article being conceived
in such general words, that it can admit of different literal
and grammatical senses, even when the senses given are

26
plainly contrary one to another, yet both may subscribe the
Article with a good conscience, and without any equivoca
tion.' What symptom is there in any of these passages
(two of which are authoritative) of subscription being a
certain and indubitable sign of a man's opinions ?
And if it be a new thing to require subscription to be
such a certain and indubitable sign of a man's opinions, is
it not a wonderfully bold, not to say tyrannical, thing?
And can we, Members of Convocation, venture to enact it ?
There is one more point in the proposed Declaration
which must be noticed. For, as far as I can judge, it seems
to complete the climax of feebleness, inconsistency, and
illegality of this famous piece of legislation.
Throughout the condemnation of Mr. Ward, we have
heard only of the Thirty-nine Articles. The degradation
is to be inflicted on the ground of inconsistency and want
of good faith in respect of the Thirty-nine Articles. In like
manner the new Statute, in its preamble, talks of nothing
but the Thirty-nine Articles. The need of such a Statute
is stated to be the perverse interpretations offered by certain
persons to the Thirty-nine Articles. The right interpretation
of the Thirty-nine Articles accordingly, it is to be supposed,
is intended to be vindicated by an explanatory declaration.
Who then can sufficiently wonder, who can conceive it
possible, that this very Declaration should run " Ego A. B.
Articulis Fidei et Religionis, necnon tribus articulis in
canone xxxvi0. comprehensis subscripturus, profiteor —
me articulis istis omnibus et singulis eo sensu subscrip-
turum," &c. ?
The three Articles in the 36th Canon ! Why, the second
of these three Articles lets in the entire Prayer-book!
Creeds, Services, Liturgy, are all in it declared to have
in them nothing contrary to the Word of God. How

27
destructive then of all meaning in the Declaration is this
strange addition ! Mr. Ward, himself, professes to go by
the Prayer-Book. In the third of the condemned passages
he distinctly declares so much. He says, indeed, that the
spirits of the Prayer-Book and Articles are contradictory to
one another. But does the University mean to enact that
they are identical, like its ' primitus' and ' nunc' senses ?
That were indeed an enactment worthy of an omnipotent
Convocation !
By this extraordinary clause then we are landed, after a
toilsome and hazardous voyage, precisely where we set out.
We live under a joint rule after all. We have travelled in
vain through the questions, who is the real imposer, what
is the original sense, what is the present sense of Articles ;
for after all, the acknowledgment of the Prayer-Book as in
no respect contrary to the Word of God, puts a necessary
salvo upon all interpretation of the Thirty-nine Articles,
and establishes the joint authority of a larger, more ancient,
more venerable, and holier rule0. We cannot be forced
(let the framers or imposers of the Thirty-nine Articles
c I may perhaps be pardoned for printing at length the rule as contained in
the Canons of 1571.
Imprimis vero videbunt (Concionatores) ne quid vmquam doeeant pro con
done, quod a populo religiose teneri et eredi velint, nisi quod consentaneum
sit doctrina: veteris aut novi Testamenti, quodque ex ilia ipsa doctrina catho
lic! patres, et veteres Episcopi collegerint. Et quoniam articuli illi religionis
Christians, in quos consensum est ab Episcopis in legitima et sancta synodo,
jussu et authoritate serenissimae Principis Elisabethae convocata et celebrata,
haud dubie collecti sunt ex sacris libris veteris et novi Testamenti, et cum
cselesti doctrina, quae in illis continetur, per omnia congruunt ; quoniam etiam
liber publicarum precum, et liber de inauguratione Archiepiscoporum, Preshy-
terorum et Diaconorum, nihil continent ab ilia ipsa doctrina alienum ; qui-
cnnque mittentur ad docendum populum, illorum articulorum authoritatem et
fidem, non tantum concionibus suis, sed etiam subscriptione confirmabunt.
Qui secus fecerit, et contraria doctrina populum turbaverit, excommunica-
bitur.

28
mean or have meant what they will) to interpret the 27th
Article so as to annul the Creed, Catechism, and Baptis
mal Service, or the 28th so as to annul the Holy Commu
nion Service, or the 19th so as not to believe the doctrine
of the Collect for All Saints' day, or the 11th and 12th so
as to be forbidden to hold with the Collects for the 6th, or
11th, or 13th, or 25th Sundays after Trinity, or of St.
Peter's day, and many other parts of our venerable Prayer-
Book. But does this argument, while it thus nullifies the sense,
the wisdom, and even the intelligible signification of the
Declaration, nullify also its absurdity and its danger ? By
no means.
The preamble remains, shewing that it is the Thirty-nine
Articles which are intended. The necessity of travelling to
the supposed sense of framers and imposers in order to
interpret the words of the Articles remains. The proposed
scene in the Vice- Chancellor's private room remains. The
enacted identity of the ancient and modern senses remains.
The design of making subscription a certain and indubit
able sign of a man's opinions remains, self-convicted and
self-contradicted indeed by this strange clause, but neither
justified nor rendered harmless, a certain and indubitable
sign of legislative weakness, and the necessity of very great
caution on the part of the House of Convocation !
Such, my dear Sir, are some of the principal reasons,
which appear to me to render it impossible to refrain from
giving to the proposed Degradation and Declaration the
most decided and earnest opposition. I trust that I have
not in any point overstepped the limits of legitimate and
respectful argument in stating them. I could readily have
enlarged upon them, and added many additional points for
consideration, of the same kind, but I have studiously made

29
my statement as short as I possibly could. Some things I
have intentionally avoided ; such as the obvious futility of
the proposed Declaration as against dishonest men, and its
proportionate unfairness as against honest ones. Such as
my statement is, I beg to submit it to you, hoping that you
will kindly give it such attention as it may deserve, and
that it may contribute in some small degree to ward off
from the University the danger of assenting to (what I
cannot but think) the most dangerous and even fatal pro
positions, which have, at least of late years, been made to it.
I am, my dear Sir,
Your very faithful and obedient servant,
GEORGE MOBERLY.

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