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A REVIEW or
TRINITAEIANISM;
CHIEFLY AS IT APPEARS IN THE "WRITING 3 OF
PEARSOX, BULL, WATEEIAND, SHEEIOCK, HOWE, NEWMAN,
COLERIDGE, "WALIIS, AXD WARDLAW:

WITH A BRIEF NOTICE OP SDNDET

PASSAGES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT,
Bearing on this controversy.

BY JOHN BARLING.

tf Ho XIE is of the troth."— 1 John, ii. 21.

LONDON:
JOHN CHAPMAN, 142, STEAND.
MPCCCXLV1I, 11*1

533

yfc

PREFACE.

It is a fact of some significance as shewing the
progress of religious opinion in this country, that
while the doctrines of the divinity of Christ, and
the personality of the Holy Spirit, continue to
hold their place in the affections of the popular
mind, the doctrine of the Trinity is very generally
consigned to neglect, as a dark subject, and one
on which a man may be content to have, (if the
thing be possible,) no opinion at all. A dark
subject it certainly is : but not one which on that
account a Trinitarian may safely dismiss from his
thought. The unity of God, it wiU be aUowed, is at least
as much a doctrine of the Bible, as either the
divinity of Christ, or the personality of the Holy
Spirit. " Jehovah our God — Jehovah is one." All

IV PREFACE.
Christians hold, or profess to hold this. It is the
truth which distinguishes both Judaism and Christ
ianity from Polytheism. The belief therefore of
three Gods is allowed to be a pernicious heresy;
diametrically opposed to Scripture ; and equally so
to the decisions of right reason.
Now it will— it must be granted, that the opin
ions usually entertained respecting the Son of God
and the Holy Spirit, do approach very near to
this, — fearfully near to this. What is the doctrine
of three Gods, but that of three intelligent Agents
or Beings, having distinct powers of will, thought,
and action; equal to one another in nature and
all perfections, i. e. opooiaioi,, in the "proper and
specific sense of the word ? (1) And what is the
commonly received doctrine ? The writer builds
nothing on the proper signification of the word,
person. He points to the doctrine itself, which
as commonly held is, that the Holy Spirit is an
Agent in-se, having will, understanding, and all
divine perfections ; that the Son is another such
Agent, and the Father another; together making
W Theologians say that the divine persons must be i/iooitrtoi, in
order to their unity. Whether this be so or not, it is certain they
could not be three Gods without being fytoo<5<rioi.

PREFACE. V
three Divine Agents, each having in himself will,
inteUigence, and all divine perfections. How near
does this doctrine approach to the former ! Call
the three, beings as well as agents, (as many of
orthodox name do,) and how, without taking in
the heterodox notion of composition, can the one
doctrine be distinguished from the other?
In what sense then are the divinity of Jesus
Christ, and the personality of the Holy Spirit, to
be held? and in what sense, the unity of God?
How can a Trinitarian put aside these questions?
It is the function of the doctrine of the Trinity
to solve them.
Dr. Waterland in his Tract on the Importance
of the Doctrine of the Trinity, tells us, "any plain
man may easily conceive, that Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost, are properly divine, are not one the
other, and yet are one God, by an intimate union."
" This," he says, " is enough for any plain Christian
to know or believe."'11 But what are these sub
jects, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, of whom it
is predicated, that they are ' divine,' ' not one the
other, ' and ' one God by an intimate union ? '
(" Works, vol. iii. p. 409. 2nd edit.

VI PREFACE.
Beings, the plain man takes them to be ; and what
else can he take them for ? He understands there
fore by such representations as the above, that
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three distinct beings,
are all 'divine,' and 'one by an intimate union;'
that is, as he can alone understand it, by an union
of composition, juxta-position, continuity, or some
thing of the kind, issuing in the production of a
complex Being, who is pre-eminently his God.
The writer humbles himself to confess, that time
was, when he held some such notion as this. And
yet, rejected as it is by nearly all writers of repu
tation on the Trinitarian side of the controversy,
whenever they touch directly upon it, what have
they to put in its place ? The writer professes
that after a long and painful examination, not un
attended he is sure with some sense at least of the
reverence with which such an examination should
be conducted, and not without earnest prayer to
the Father of lights for the gracious aid of his
Spirit, he has been able to find in no Trinitarian
writer any account of the Trinity, (not being Sa-
bellian, Tritheistic, or in other respects plainly
heretical,) which was not either a positive contra-

PREFACE. Vll
diction in itself, or to him absolutely unintelligible.
He therefore sees no possible mode of defending
the Divinity of Christ, but such as proceeds on
a Sabellian footing.
It is well known that Dr. Watts after publishing
on the common principle of three divine agents,
so far retracted what he had written, as to put
forth a scheme of the Trinity altogether of this
kind. This he did at the age of fifty years, and
some of the latest efforts of his pen, twenty years
after, (we speak only of those which have seen
the light,) were employed in amplifying and de
fending what was then written. See his pieces
entitled, " Questions concerning Jesus," and " the
Glory of Christ as God-man displayed." We have
never been able to understand on what principle
this eminent man disclaimed all inclination to the
Arian hypothesis, as Dr. Lardner represents him
to have done. For believing in the pre-existence
of Christ's human soul, and even carrying back
its existence to a time anterior to the creation of
Adam and the world itself, which he supposed to
have been made by its instrumentality, little re
mained to bring his views respecting the intelligent

viil PREFACE.
principle in Jesus into perfect conformity with the
lower Arian or Anomsean creed, beside the renun
ciation of a manifestly inappropriate phrase. How
can that be accounted a human soul, which is sup
posed to have existed before man was made, or
the earth his habitation? Dr. Watts's theory was
plainly a graft of Arianism on Sabellianism : and
Dr. Doddridge's appears to have been very similar.
We believe there is still in the Trinitarian Dis
senting Denominations, a leaning on the part of
some, to Sabellian views : though for the most part
unaccompanied with the doctrine of the pre-exist-
ence of Christ's human soul. But others in these
denominations, are zealous against every thing which
savours of Sabellianism, and denounce it as the
beginning of an apostacy which may end no one
knows where. For if, it is argued, the only di
vinity in Christ be that of the Father, then when
soever and in so far as he is distinguished from
the Father, he cannot be entitled to supreme
worship. He is then the Mediator only, the Agent
between us and God : and as such can only be
entitled to mediate honours. This is pure Socini-
anism. Then again, when the cautions found in

PREFACE. IX
Scripture against idolatry are considered, and the
commands to worship God only, what Socinian can
avoid trembling, lest in exalting the Minister, he
trench on the glory of his great Principal and
God — yes his GOD. Here is the stronghold of
modern Unitarianism.
The writer assents in toto to the force of this
reasoning, and would draw from it an incentive
to the exercise of charity. If from the highest
Sabellianism to the lowest Humanitarianism, the
steps are so easy, though the interval appear so
great, who shall dare to draw between these ex
tremes a line marking off on the one side Christian
truth, and on the other, foul and deadly error?
Unitarians in the pre-eminent sense of the word,
Christians within these limits at all events, ought
to acknowledge and ' love one another.'
But they whom we have now in eye would hold
such a comprehension in abhorrence. The human
itarian may be a pleasant companion. He may
be met in the public street with a hearty shake
of the hand. He may be welcomed at the same
table, may be encouraged to shake his sides at
the same joke, and, miserable fellow that he shaU

X . PREFACE.
be, to enjoy himself while he can. But there is
no place reserved for him at the festive board on
high ; and no place can be allowed him in the church
below. He is no Christian. He is not a believer,
and, (awful words, which, as commonly understood,
ought to drive away all appetite for hilarity from
every company, wherein only one may be present
over whom the frightful burden is supposed to
hang,) "he that believeth not shall be damned."
How then, according to these, should the divin
ity of Christ be held, so as to avoid on the one
hand the Sabellian error, and on the other the
Tritheistic ? Is this an unimportant question ? Cer
tainly it must be held to be important, at least in
proportion to the supposed magnitude of these
opposite errors.
In laying the following sheets before the reli
gious public, and particularly before that section of
the Dissenting interest, with which the author has
during the far greater part of his life been con
nected, and with which will always be bound up in
his mind, many — very many of his most grateful
recollections, he desires only such treatment as

PREFACE. XI
one honest man is entitled to expect from another.
Though were he disposed to put in a claim on
the special indulgence of his readers, he would
not be without the means of substantiating it ;
having on more than one or two occasions made
ineffectual efforts to discuss privately and by letter,
some of the points herein handled, with his brethren
in the ministry, and with one chiefly, from whose
great abilities and general urbanity, he had hoped
for some clear and convincing exposure of any
sophistry, which like a ' worm in the bud,' might
have been feeding, unperceived by himself, on the
products of his intellectual labour. It is not for
him to say why these applications were unsuccess
ful. He feels however a cheerful confidence that
if his meditations have led him astray, he will not
be held responsible for the confirmation in error
which has been hereby induced.

Halifax.

ERRATUM.
p. 76. note. — In last line but two, for ' candour ' read ' caution.'

CONTENTS.

CHAPTEE I.
Section 1. — Nicene Creed. Specific unity — its inconsistency with
the proper unity of God. Cudworth. Emperichoresis, or, Atha-
nasian defence of the unity. Sherlock. W. J. Howe. Bull.
Augustin's reply to the charge of making the Deity complex. pp. 1—12.
Section 2. — ' Una Res ' and Lateran council, with scholastic Trinity,
or numerical unity of essence. Watts. Owen. Stuart. Nye.
Bennett. Waterland. Whateley. South. pp. 12—21.
Section 3. — Doctrine of three substantial persons in one essence.
Stillingfleet. Locke. A particular essence belongs to each par
ticular assemblage of properties. True sense of scholastic Trinity.
pp. 21—27.

CHAPTER II.
Section 1. — Middle way. Distinction of essential and personal
properties. pp. 28 — 31.
Section 2. — Waterland. Jackson. Van Mildert. Substance of
Persons distinguished by Waterland. Substance of Persons not
. distinguished by Waterland. Proofs of both. pp. 31 — 39.

Section 3. — Dr. S. Clarke. ' Nothing like is the same.' Waterland
denies. The contradiction exposed. South. Argument from
Clarke's doctrine respecting the omnipresence. Contradiction
vital to Waterland's system. pp. 39 — 49.
Section 4. — Waterland's definition of Person. It does not go be
yond Clarke's. Further developement of contradiction. pp. 49—70.

CHAPTEE III.
Section 1. — The divine nature one in number, and yet the Persons
distinct in substance. Orthodox proofs of the latter from
Sherlock.
True sense of fyiooiVios in Catholic theology. Divine nature com
mon and yet numerically one. Sherlock's illustration of this.
Its glaring self-contradiction. pp. 71 — 86.
Section 2. — Absolute and relative substances. What is meant by
the latter ? Are they perfect substances ? Sherlock affirms.
What follows from this affirmation.
Essential perfections and essential productions. Sherlock and
Howe. pp. 86 — 98.
Section 3. — Pearson makes the divine substance one in kind and
number. Beveridge also. Like and the same. pp. 98 — 106.

CHAPTER IV.
Section 1. — Newman. God one individual — proofs. God three
individuals— proofs. Person, whether unintelligible. &\os 6ebs.
Contradiction avowed. pp. iq7  126
Section 2 — Number. Is and is not. Divine eternity and omni
presence, pp. 126—130.

CONTENTS. XV
CHAPTER V.
Section 1. — Coleridge on contradiction. pp. 131 — 135.
Section 2. — His idea of Trinity. Moral argument does not reach
beyond Sabellianism. Self-subsistents. Tetrachtys. pp. 135—157.

CHAPTER VI.
Section 1. — Recapitulation. Doctrine that the nature of Persons
is unknown. Conybeare. Wardlaw. Dwight. Stuart.
pp. 158—167.
Section 2. — This school of divines forms two classes. Wallis taken
as the type of the first. His liberality, consistency, and essential
agreement with Sabellians. Watts. Baxter. pp. 167 — 176.
Section 3. — Wardlaw and Conybeare taken as types of the second
class. Their inconsistency, and self-contradiction. Dr. P. Smith.
pp. 176—188.

CHAPTER VII.
Sections 1, 2. — Scripture Testimony. Collation of passages. Dis
tinction between person and being, a mere theory of human
invention. Principles of interpretation. pp. 189 — 194.
Section 3. — Holy Spirit. Duality of New Testament. Jews no
Trinitarians. Indwelling scheme. pp. 194 — 203.
Section 4. — Phil. ii. 6 — 11. Col. i. 15. Mark, xiii. 32. John. v.
19—47. John, i. 1. Philosophy of the Logos. pp. 203—214.
Section 5. — Form of Baptism. Conclusion. pp. 214 — 217.

APPENDIX.
A. — Difference among Trinitarians on a point of great moment.
Bull. Calvin. Faber. Stuart. p. 219.
B. — Leibnitz. Dr. E. Williams. Their refinements not supererro-
gatory. p. 221.
C. — Cyril of Jerusalem. Further proof that the divine persons are
beings in the Nicene theology. p. 223.
D. — Extract from Bull. The Logos both an attribute and a distinct
being. p. 225.
E. — Extract from Newman's Essay on the Developement of Christian
Doctrine. p, 226.
F. — Neander describes the Son as a spirit and being distinct from the
Divine First Cause. p. 228.
G. — Philosophy of the Logos. p. 230.
H. — Dialogue between a Homoousian and a Homoiousian. p. 231.
Supplement to Chap. V. on Coleridge. p. 234 — 240.

CHAPTER I.

§ 1. " We believe in one God, the Father
Almighty, Maker of all things visible and invisible :
and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God,
begotten of the Father^ only-begotten, that is, of
the substance of the Father; God of God, Light
of Light, very God of very God, begotten not
made, of one substance (opoovcriov, consubstantial)
with the Father."
Such was the confession made by the Nicene
Council in the year 325 ; and it has been accounted
the leading standard of orthodoxy ever since.
The word ojxooiktios, which is the critical word
in the creed, and understood to be comprehensive
of aU that precedes it relative to the Son, properly
signifies a specific union : that is, such an union
as exists between things " which are but similar
to each other, and are considered as one by an
abstraction of our minds." See Newman's History
of Arians, p. 203.; also Bull's Defence of the

% SPECIFIC TJNITV.
Nicene Faith, sec. ii. ch. 1. § 2. ; and Jortin's
Remarks on Ecclesiastical History, vol. ii. p. 201.,
where it is said in a note, " that 6/xoovtrtos means
' of one substance in kind,' hath been shewed by
Petavius, Curcellseus, Cudworth, Le Clerc, Clarke,
&c, and to prove it would be actum agere."
This was said by Jortin of the ecclesiastical as
well as the common sense of the word. And
though divines are far from being agreed as to its
ecclesiastical meaning, Bishop Bull, a host in himself,
is here with Jortin. For in the paragraph immedi
ately following that to which reference has just
been made, and in which the Bishop shews that
the word properly denotes that sort of unity, which
may be supposed to exist between the conscious
principle in us and in the brutes, or between
human and angelic spirits, or one star and another
star, he proceeds to say, that the word was used
by the Nicene fathers in this very sense (hoc ipso
sensu)., and that the language of the creed itself
must prove it to every impartial and peaceably-
disposed individual. See §§ 3 — 7.
The objection which lies against the specific
sense of the word is, that it involves Tritheism.
For, three objects, which are of the same substance
specifically, must be numerically three in substance :
because their unity, in so far as it is specific,
consists only, as we have seen, in close resemblance,
and can therefore be no more than ideal. But now
if the three divine persons are supposed to have

CUDWORTH AND BULL. 3
each his own particular substance and attributes,
distinct from those of the other two, they must be
accounted three distinct beings — three divine beings,
that is, three Gods: if we are able to say what
are three Gods.
Cudworth, who freely allowed that in the Nicene
theology, the persons are distinct essences or sub
stances, defended the unity on the several pleas
of — 1. subordination, 2. inseparability, 3. emperi-
choresis, and 4. (we know not how to express
it otherwise) composition. The first of these is
universally allowed to be insufficient by itself;
and the three latter, (or as much of them as is at
aU tenable,) are usually included in the third —
the emperichoresis, which is the proper and charac
teristic Athanasian defence of the unity. It teaches
that the divine persons mutually pervade and
permeate one another, by an union more close and
intimate than any which obtains among created
objects — an union indissoluble, eternal, and necessary :
whence it is concluded that they may with reason
be accounted one being — one God. It is here
that Bull laid the stress of the unity. Thus, having
allowed, in the last section of his great work, that
the subordination, even when assisted by the con-
substantiality, " haud usquequaque aptam et accom-
modatam esse ad unitatem Dei Patris et Filii
declarandum et demonstrandum" he proceeds to
affirm, that the Son and the Spirit are "propagated
from the Father by an interior and not an exterior

SPECIFIC UNITY.

production ; whence it arises, that they are not
only from the Father, but in him, and he in them,
without the possibility of separation." This union,
he afterwards says, the Greeks call Tizp\.x<i>pr\<n$, the
Latins, circumincessio, or circuminsessio : and beyond
this he does not attempt to ' go.(1)
But who can avoid perceiving, that if this
emperichoresis be supposed to leave to each of
the divine persons his own substance and attributes,
unconfounded with those of the other two, the
three must still be considered as so many divine
beings ; intimately and singularly united, it is true,
but still three Divine Beings, — that is, three Gods,
so united. " Nor can three essences be one and no
more by being connexe and conjuncte, but only three
essences joined and connected to one another."^
If again it is argued, they are not three Gods,
because the three united are alone properly God;
then it will follow, that neither of the persons,
separately taken, is properly God, but only a
constituent part of God : not " totus ex toto, "
which is Catholic doctrine.
Sherlock attempted to translate this doctrine of the
emperichoresis into modern and more philosophical
language; but in doing so, only made more con
spicuous (as it is usually thought) the Tritheism,
which in its primitive form it better serves to

") See Def. Nic. Fid., sec. iv. ch. 4. § 9. ad finem ; and sec. ii. eh
9. § 11. and § 23. — with Animad. on Gilb. Clerke, § 4.
<s> Whitby's Last Thoughts, p. 6.

SHERLOCK.

disguise. For, three minds or spirits, mutually
conscious of each other's states, must be (if the
truism will be pardoned) three minds or spirits
mutually conscious. If these spirits are divine,
they will be three divine spirits mutually conscious
— that is, three Gods mutually conscious : if a
divine spirit is a God. " Omnis mens infinite per-
fecta est Deus ; tres sunt mentes infinite perfectce ;
ergo tres sunt Dii. "Where is the fault of this syl
logism ?"W " An infinite spirit is a God ; and three
spirits, whereof each is infinite in perfection, are three
Gods — as three creatures, whereof each is a rational
animal, are three men. Both of these propositions
go upon the same ground, namely that the defi
nition and the thing defined are reciprocal and of
the same extent. Now, as we have no better defi
nition of a man, than that he is a rational animal,
so neither have we a better definition of God, than
that he is a spirit infinitely perfect. And as so
many animals rational, so many men : so likewise,
so many spirits infinitely perfect, so many Gods."w
If we define God as an inteUigent, infinitely perfect
being, essence, or substance, the argument will
equally hold.
" Possibly they will answer this by a distinction,
namely — that they are three Gods, considered sepa
rately ; but considered coHectively, they are but
one God : and seeing they cannot be really separate,
it is improper to call them three Gods. But pray
(]> Second Letter of W. J. to Wallis. <2> Ibid.

6 SPECIFIC UNITY.
why not as properly three Gods, as three infinite
spirits ? seeing these terms, — a spirit infinitely
perfect, and a God, — are terms equivalent or iden
tical. "What partiality then is it to allow one, and
not the other ! And if these infinite spirits be
inseparable, why do you grant the number three
to that name, and not to the name of God ? seeing
they are both the same thing, and equally insepa
rable. * * * It is the name, it seems, is scrupled,
rather than the thing,"(I) Wallis fully admitted
the force of this reasoning. And even Sherlock
himself, in a later work,(2^ which will be more
particularly considered hereafter, allows, that no
supposition of mutual consciousness or mutual
penetration between three complete and absolute
minds, will suffice to preserve the unity of the
divine Being.
It was under this conviction, that John Howe
proposed for consideration, in a Tract entitled, " A
calm Discourse of the Trinity, &c," and which
was followed up by several successive pieces, —
whether the principle of union subsisting between
the divine persons, (supposing them to be three
intellectual natures, minds, or spirits,) might not
be such as to constitute a spiritual being, diverse
from either of the three constituent beings, alone
God in the highest sense, and possessing a strict
and numerical unity in himself. But this is an
™ Ibid.
<2> Present state of Socinian Controversy, pp. 307. 319.

HOWE. 7
hypothesis, which, while it is fully open to the
latter of the two objections just before brought
against the proper Athanasian doctrine, is burdened
with a new objection of its own, namely — that it
changes the Trinity into a sort of Quaternity.
For, what can that Being be, whom the three
unite to constitute, but a Fourth ?
Howe himself instructs us to distinguish between
" the distinct essence of the Father, or of the Son,
or of the Holy Ghost," and "the entire essence
of the Godhead, in which these three do concur."
" Each of these," he says, " conceived by itself,
are (according to the supposition) individual es
sences;" (the grammar is not ours;) "but con
ceived together, they are the entire, individual
essence of God. For, there is but one such
essence, and no more."(1^ He often insists on
the proper numerical unity of the divine essence ;
as for instance, in his Lectures on the Principles
of the Oracles of God : in one of which (the 13th)
he translates the latter part of the disputed verse
in 1 John, thus, — "these three are one thing;"
remarking, " that is the meaning of the words,
and so they should be rendered."
It will not suffice to aUege, as the author does,
that the notion of God in the highest sense,
" imports no more of real being than is contained
in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, taken together ;
and most intimately, naturally, and vitaUy, by

!') Calm Disc. sec. xix.

8 SPECIFIC UNITY.
eternal necessity, united with one another." For,
he allows, that " there is nothing more of / real
entity in a man, than what is contained in his
body and soul united and taken together." And
yet, as he says, "the term 'man' speaks somewhat
very diverse from a human body taken alone, or
a human soul taken alone, or from both separately
taken:" (sec. xx.) just, we suppose, as the salt is
not the acid or the alkali, which unite to produce
it, or both of them together, so long as they are
uncombined. And yet it contains nothing but what
is in the acid and the alkali. Or, to take another
illustration, borrowed from the fathers, of which
Howe makes use in one of these pieces : — the root
is not the tree, neither is the stem alone, nor the
branches. The tree is that thing, (quartum quid,)
which they form together ; and which is diverse
from either, though it includes nothing but what
is found in root, trunk, and branches. So the
three persons, according to this hypothesis, are
" entia realia quae concurrunt ad compositionem
alicujus quarti."
Howe indeed denied the applicability of the
word composition to the union of the divine persons,
on the ground that, as usually employed, it signifies
the bringing together of elements that before were
asunder, and which therefore may be separated
again ; whereas the union supposed to exist among
the divine persons is necessary and eternal. See
Calm Disc. sec. xiii., and Letter to a Friend. He

HOWE. 9
moreover would not allow that the persons on his
hypothesis* are to be accounted parts of the Deity,
inasmuch as they are not partible. But these are
trifles. We ask, is the supreme divinity, on this
hypothesis, either the Father, the Son, or the
Holy Ghost ? Plainly, he is neither. Is he then
the three taken collectively, — that is, connexe et
conjuncte, as "Whitby phrases it? No: for it was
to avoid the Tritheism of this notion, even when
aided by the supposition of a mutual consciousness
between the persons, that Howe put forth his hypo
thesis ; according to which, the Deity absolute is
an individual being, numerically one — una res;
although including in his mysterious individuality
the three respective essences of Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit — his only but proper constituents. We
contend then that He must be a Fourth : and beyond
all doubt, greater than either of the constituent
persons ; who therefore (whether to be called parts
or not) must either be less than God, or He the
highest greater than God, and more than infinite.
It is deserving of remark, that Dr. P. Smith,
who strongly recommends these pieces of Howe's
to the Unitarians, pronounces on his own account
a clear condemnation of the very hypothesis these
tracts are employed in defending. Thus in App.
iv. Scripture Testimony, he lays down distinctly
this proposition, that the divine persons "are not
three different beings, natures, or essences : " —
whereas these treatises proceed altogether on the

10 SPECIFIC UNITY.
supposition that they are. Dr. Smith notifies to
us also in the same connection, that " the divine
essence being not a divisible quantity, is not par
ticipated, but is infinitely, that is, whoUy and
undividedly possessed by each of the divine persons."
But now on Howe's hypothesis, neither of the
persons can be said to possess the divine essence,
whatever may be said as to their participating in
it; any more than the body of a man can be said
to possess the entire essence of a man, or the root
of a tree to possess the entire essence of the
tree, or to be the tree.
There can be no doubt that Bishop Bull evinced
his discretion in not entering minutely into the
doctrine of the emperichoresis ; cautioning his read
ers^ that it is a mystery, which we ought rather
to adore than curiously to pry into. Vid. ubi sup.
"We would not willingly offend against the spirit
of the noble passage, with which his fourth section
closes — a passage remarkable at once for its elo
quence, and for the piety which it breathes. Still it
is certain, these appeals to our reverence must have
their limits, or there will be an end to aU inquiry
into the nature and perfections of God : an awful
subject of investigation indeed ; but when pursued
in a right spirit, the noblest on which the human
mind can be employed, and no less legitimate than
sublime. Doubtless it is a subject in which the
inquirer will quickly find depths which he cannot
fathom, — mysteries which will at once constrain and

BULL. 11
stagger his faith. But if it be our duty to believe
there is but one God, then it is our duty to
believe that there are not three. Now it is expressly
admitted by the Bishop in his Discourse (1), near
the beginning, that if the persons had been only
" separated and divided from each other," that is,
if there had not existed between them this em
perichoresis, they would have been three Gods.
How then can we do otherwise than inquire into
the nature of this union ? The only bulwark of the
Homoousian (the subordination being understood)
against the charge of making three Gods, it ought to
be solid, and proof beyond all contradiction. But
now how stands the matter? The emperichoresis,
so far as it can be understood, affords, as we have
seen, no solid answer to this objection : and beyond
the limit of its intelligibility, certainly it is no answer
at all.
Moreover, the doctrine that each of the divine
persons has his own substance and attributes, is at
variance (however united we may suppose the
persons to be) with a fundamental tenet in Trini
tarian theology; namely, that the whole Trinity
can be no greater than either one of the persons
taken singly. This was no crotchet of the schoolmen,
(as Sherlock, in his ; Vindication, was desirous of
representing it,) taken out of their favourite Au
gustine. It was a principle seriously originated,
and as seriously retailed ; having been plainly forced
upon the African, Father, by the stress of the Arian

12 NUMERICAL UNITY.
controversy. It was his refuge from the charge
of making the Deity complex/') Nor is it easy to
see how, on any other principle, it could have
been repelled, holding as he unquestionably did,
the doctrine of the Una Res. But nothing can
be plainer, than that if the divine persons are
agents and beings in se, distinct from one another
in substance and attributes, they must, taken together,
be more and greater than either one alone, and
that in the proportion of three to one.
§ 2. The doctrine of the " Una Res " was first
authoritatively laid down by the Lateran Council, in
the year 1215. It teaches, as may be gathered from
what has just been said, that God (Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost) is an entity or being (thing) in the
singular number. Peter of Lombardy, a divine of
great reputation in the foregoing century, professor
of divinity in the University of Paris, and afterwards
bishop of that city, one of the most celebrated of
the schoolmen, had strongly asserted this doctrine ;
confirming it in his usual way from the writings of
the Fathers, and declaring, that the entity, which is
God absolute, neither did beget, was begotten, nor
did proceed. This doctrine gave great offence to
Joachim, an Italian abbot ; who, clear in the notion
of the specific unity of the three divine persons,
contended, as We have done, against Howe, that to
represent three beings as united into one being or
I1) See Contra Max. Lib. ii. c. 10. § 2., and De Trin. Lib. vi. § 9.

LATERAN COUNCIL. 13
thing, having, moreover, properties different from
those of its constituents, was to make a quaternity
rather than a trinity ; namely, the three constituents,
and the entity or thing, (" quartum quid") by them
constituted. In order, therefore, himself to avoid this
notion, which he denounced as heretical and insane,
he asserted that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,
are no real thing : but that on the contrary, the
union between them is collective only ; such as ob
tains among men, when they compose one nation,
or believers constituting one church.
The Lateran council, which was summoned for the
purpose among others of composing this disagreement,
decided peremptorily in favour of Peter : affirming
with truth, that what Joachim asserted was no proper
unity ; and that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,
are, as Peter taught, " una qucedam summa Res,"
a certain thing or entity supreme ; and that neither
begetting, begotten, nor proceeding. They however
repelled the accusation of Joachim, by declaring after
the manner of Augustine, that each one of the per
sons is as much the " Summa Res" as aU of them
together. Now this is inteUigible (if it were meant
to be intelligible) only on the supposition of what is
called the numerical unity of the divine essence :
that is, the principle that the divine essence, with its
glorious attributes, is but one in number ; or in other
words, that there is but One Almighty Agent or
Being, whatever may be the mysteries belonging to his
nature, and however variously he may be presented

14 NUMERICAL UNITY.
to our contemplation. Accordingly, the Council
goes on to affirm this doctrine ; arguing that since the
divine substance or essence is simple and indivisible,
the Father, in begetting the Son, did not com
municate it in part but entire : while it is certain
the Father is not without essence, and so did not
resign his essence in communicating it. Whence it
follows inevitably, that the Father and Son have and
are the same identical substance or essence : and so
also the Holy Ghost.
This Council, although not regarded as of au
thority among Protestants, has nevertheless given
tone to the general theology both of Protestants and
Romanists, ever since. All the Protestant confessions
agree in setting forth the unity of the divine essence
as one of their first and fundamental articles. And
in the Harmony of Confessions, the following note
may be found appended to the latter Helvetic Con
fession, which had spoken somewhat questionably
of the persons being "joined together" in respect
of nature. (See sec. ii.) " Lest any man should
slander us, as though we did make the persons all
existing together, but not all of the same essence, or
else, did make a God of divers natures 'joined
together ' in one, — you must understand this 'joining
together ' so as that all the persons, (though distinct
one from the other in properties,) be yet but one and
the same whole Godhead ; or so that all and every of
the persons have the whole and absolute Godhead."
Dr. Watts, in his " Questions concerning Jesus,"

WATTS. 15
writes thus : — " The common or scholastic expli
cation of the Trinity, which has long been uni
versally received by our Protestant writers, and has
been called orthodox for these several, hundred
years, is this, viz., — that God is but one simple,
infinite, and eternal spirit : hence it foUows, that the
divine essence, powers, and essential properties of
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in the Godhead,
are numerically the very same essence, powers, and
essential properties ; that it is the same numerical
consciousness, understanding, will, and power, which
belongs to the Father, that belongs also to the Son
and to the Holy Spirit, and that the sacred three
are distinguished only by the superadded relative
properties of paternity, filiation, and proeession ;
but their thoughts, ideas, volitions, and agencies,
according to this hypothesis, must be the very same
numerical thoughts, &c. in all the sacred three. "^
In like manner, John Owen remarks, — " The
natural Godhead of God is his substance or essence,
with all the glorious divine excellencies which
naturaUy and necessarily pertain thereto. Such
are omnipotency, eternity, immensity, &c. This
one nature, essence, or substance, being the nature,
essence, or substance of God, as God, is the nature,
essence, or substance of the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Ghost, — one and the same, absolutely in
and unto each of them." Accordingly, he goes
on to say, "that a divine person is nothing but

(!) Works, vol. vi. p. 450.

16 NUMERICAL UNITY.
the divine essence, upon the account of an especial
property, subsisting in an especial manner."^ This
is sheer modalism, and it agrees with what Owen
elsewhere says, that " the will of God, the Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit, is but one. It is a natural
property, and where there is but one nature, there
is but one will."^
After the same manner, Dr. Stuart, in his letters
to Dr. Channing, having taken his opponent some
what roughly to task for the view of Trinitarianism
which he had given, lays down the formal pro
position, " that God is one — numerically one in
nature and in attributes. In other words, that the
infinitely perfect Spirit, the creator and preserver
of all things, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,
has numerically the same essence, and the same
perfections, so far as they are known to us," — and
therefore, " that the Son possesses not simply a
similar or equal essence and perfections, but numeri
cally the same as the Father, without division, and
without multiplication. "(3) This he supports by
extracts from a variety of Protestant confessions,
and says "he will never undertake to defend the
representations of those Trinitarians, who have
expressed themselves so incautiously as to be under
stood to affirm, that there are three separate beings
(persons, in the common sense of the word) in the
Godhead, with distinct powers, volitions, &c."W

(D Works, vol. x. p. 504. <2) Vol. ix. p. 125. Vin. Evan.
<3> p. 26. Eng. Ed. W pp. 27. and 43.

BENNET. 17
Stephen Nye, an opponent of Dr. S. Clarke, who
is commended by Waterland, in his First Defence,
as one who was known to have studied the Trini
tarian controversy much and long, says, " It is
certain, that from the time the writings of Augustine
were published and became generally known, there
hath been a perfect agreement and consent among
all the great writers, and all the churches, in the
article of the Trinity, they having been unanimous
in the belief and doctrine, ' that there is but one
divine Being, Spirit, or Mind, and that the three
divine Persons, so called, are no other than that
divine Spirit and Being, subsisting after three modes
or manners. "w Many who perhaps may demur to the
latter part of this statement, will assent in toto to the
former, namely, that God is one Mind or Spirit.
Thus, Dr. Bennet, another of the opponents of
Dr. Samuel Clarke, and. of more orthodox reputa
tion than Mr. Nye, allows that God is but one
Person, in the common sense of the word : and there
upon concedes altogether the first of Dr. Clarke's
propositions, namely, " that there is but one supreme
Cause and Original of things ; one simple, uncom-
pounded, undivided, intelligent Being or Person,
who is the author of all being, and the fountain
of aU power." This, Dr. Bennet says, is justly
declared by Dr. Clarke to be " the first principle
of natural religion, and everywhere supposed in
W Explication of the Articles of the Divine Unity, &c. p. 22.
C

18 NUMERICAL UNITY.
the Scripture Revelation.''^ Accordingly, even
Waterland himself, commenting on the phrase, —
"not three eternals, but one eternal," could suffer
himself to say, that "the divine persons have one
eternity, one immensity, one omnipotence, as one
substance," and that " as the three persons are one
substance and one God, so every divine perfection,
and every substantial attribute, belonging to any
one person, is common to all, and there is nothing
peculiar to any one but the divine relations."1-2)
Similarly, in his Fourth Discourse, at Lady Moyer's
Lecture, (ad. fin.) he says, " the Father and Son are
one Creator, one Saviour, one Lord, and one God,
because their operations, attributes, powers, and per
fections (and consequently, the substance of both) are
one." " I affirm," says he, " that the Son hath the
individual attributes of God the Father, as much as he
hath the individual essence."'3^ And again, w " As
subsisting in one undivided substance, they (the divine
persons) are altogether but one undivided intelligent
agent : " which agrees with what Archbishop Whate-
ley intimates, namely, that it is an error to consider
the Son and Spirit as two different agents.^
All these extracts express one and the same doc
trine ; and that undistinguishable, so far as we can
perceive, from the doctrine of South, which is, that
" the three Persons of the blessed Trinity are one
W Examination of Dr. Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, p. 231.
'*' Treatise on the Athanasian Creed. Works, vol. iii. p. 233. 2nd. edit.
t" First Defence, Query 9, near the end.
<4> Query 23. Works, vol. i. p. 478. <5> Essays, 2nd Series, p. 245.

SOUTH. 19
and the same undivided essence, nature, or Godhead,
diversified only by three distinct modes of subsistence,
which are sometimes called properties, and sometimes
relations. So that," as he says, " a divine Person is
formally and properly the divine nature, essence, or
Godhead, with and under such a distinct mode,
property, or relation.''^ He thus explains what we
are to understand by mode. " A mode, in things
spiritual and immaterial, seems to have much the
like reference to such kind of beings, that a posture
has to a body, to which it gives some difference or
distinction, without super-adding any new entity or
being to it." " Modes," he says, " can have no
existence of their own, after a separation or division
from the things or beings to which they belong;"
and thereupon shortly after remarks, conformably
to the first quotation, " as every mode essentially
includes in it the thing or being of which it is the
mode, so every Person of the blessed Trinity, by
virtue of its proper mode of subsistence, includes
in it the Godhead itself, and is properly the God
head, as subsisting with and under such a certain
mode or relation." This, he affirms, " is the current
doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools, con
cerning the Persons of the blessed Trinity, and the
constantly received account given by them of a
divine Person, so far as they pretend to explain what
a divine Person is."(!y
W Animadversions on Sherlock, p. 292. <2> pp. 241, 242.

20 NUMERICAL UNITY.
We apprehend, that so far as the School-men are
concerned, this statement is correct. But we cannot
admit the same of the Fathers. Indeed, when the
author comes to produce his authorities, he cites
but one of all the Ante -Nicenes, and him in a
Tract, (Exposit. Fid.) now admitted to be spurious.(1>
Bishop Bull's work on the Nicene Faith, is almost
one continued proof, that these men held a very
different notion. And as for the Bishop himself,
he expressly condemns the modalist doctrine as plain
Sabellianism .(2>
If we take Bull as the representative of the Nicene
theology, and South as the representative of the
scholastic, we may quickly discover the opposition
which exists between these two theologies, by ob
serving where these writers respectively place the
mystery of the Trinity. Bull places it in the emperi
choresis ; South in the nature of the Persons, as the
Schoolmen plainly did, according to the jingle quoted
by him, — " Quid sit gigni, quid processus,
Me nescire sum prqfessus." p. 245.
Bull, and with him the Nicenes, setting out with the
doctrine of the consubstantiality in the specific sense,
found his difficulty in the unity. South setting out
with the doctrine of the numerical unity, found his
difficulty in the plurality. How three should
be one, was the riddle which the Nicenes had
f'l See Kaye's Account of the Writings of Justin Martyr, p. 5.
(2) See Def. Nic. Fid. Sec. 4. c. i. §7. ; and comp. Disc. I. (prope init.)

STILLINGFLEET. 21
to solve. How one should be three, was the
puzzle of the schoolmen. Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, said one party, are three real persons,
three hypostases, three divine agents ; and we must
interpret the doctrine of the unity accordingly. No,
says the other party, God is certainly but one divine
agent ; and we must interpret the personalities
accordingly. These positions are fundamentally opposed. A
sea divides them, from the opposite shores of which,
the inhabitants fixed to- their native rocks, may make
signals of friendship, but they cannot embrace.
§ 3. It must not be supposed, however, that all
who faU in with the notion of the numerical unity
of the divine Essence, consider that it pledges them
to the doctrine of one divine Agent. Many who
confidently assert the former, would exclaim against
the latter as manifest Unitarianism. With them,
while the Essence is one and singular, the Persons
are real substantial agents, having their own par
ticular powers of thought and action.
But this is an offshoot from a decayed philosophy :
namely, that which ascribed a real objective existence
to the generalizations of our minds. Thus, Stilling-
fleet, bishop of Worcester, in his Discourse on
the Trinity, says, (Pref. p. 15.) that " the nature
or essence of man, considered in itself, is but one
and indivisible : though God gives a separate ex
istence to every individual, whereby, the common

%% NUMERICAL UNITY.
nature subsists in so many distinct substances as
there are individuals of the kind." Again : — " That
which doth constitute a distinct kind, is one and
indivisible in itself. For, the essence of man is
but one, and can be no more ; for if there were
more, the kind would be altered. So that there
can be but one common nature or essence, to all
the individuals of the kind." (p. 69. See also pp.
257 — 259.) He speaks, therefore, of " a double
consideration of the essence, — as it is in itself, (and
so it is one and indivisible,) and as it subsists in
individuals, (and so it is actually divided according
to the subjects.)" " For," he continues, " although
the essence of a man be the same in itself, in
Peter, James, and John ; yet, taking it as in the
individuals, so the particular essence of them is divi
ded from the rest. And so," he says, " Philoponus^
took hypostasis for an essence, individuated by pecu
liar properties ; and therefore asserted, that wherever
there was an hypostasis, there must be a distinct es
sence : and from thence held that the three divine
Persons have three distinct essences." (pp. 91, 92.
See also pp. 94. 76. 105.) Stillingfleet, who looked
upon this as certain Tritheism, and the same as assert
ing a merely specific unity between the persons, (p. 36.
Pref.) held, on the contrary, that the divine Essence
is not only one and indivisible in itself, (which, as
O Johannes Philoponus. He was from Alexandria — a grammarian
and philosopher, and lived in centuries 6 and 7. He was one of the
leaders of a sect which then existed, and is known in ecclesiastical
history as the sect of the Tritheists.

LOCKE.

we have seen, he held of all common essences or
natures,) but also, that it is not divided in respect
of its subjects : and therefore, that it sustains the
three perfect and distinct hypostases of Father, Son,
and Holy Ghost, in perfect and even individual unity.
This is difficult enough to conceive : and yet,
perhaps, not more so than the common Platonic
doctrine of universals ; which, as it is represented by
him, makes the same thing to be both indivisible and
divisible. Stillingfleet thought it the very palladium
of the Trinitarian cause; and Coleridge, in his States
man's Manual, (appendix E,) has endeavoured to recal
attention to the works of this writer and others of
the same school, as the best, if not the only means
of preserving the orthodox cause from destruction.
We do not, however, here concern ourselves with
the hypothesis of Stillingfleet, (which, built on the
doctrine of universal essences, can only stand while
it stands,) so much as with a style of speaking de
rived altogether from the Realist philosophy, but
which is often made use of by those who have
entirely repudiated that philosophy, and who have
in fact, no more faith in the doctrine of universal
essences than Locke, the bishop's antagonist : men
who would have no scruple to assert, with the
philosopher, against the ecclesiastic, that "there is
no such thing as one and the same common nature
in several individuals ; for, aU that is in them is
particular, and can be nothing but particular. "^
i1) Works, vol. ill. p. 175. 12th. edit.

24 NUMERICAL UNITY.
Essence, therefore, with them, is particular only.
They take it, with Locke, for " the supposed but
unknown support of those qualities which they
find existing in individual things, and which we
imagine cannot subsist ' sine re substante.' "(1) What
it is, even in this sense, they know not. That it
exists, they infer only from the properties they
discern; and infer it, because, as Stillingfleet says,
" it is a repugnancy to our first conceptions of
things, that modes or accidents, &c. should subsist
by themselves." It has been questioned whether,
even in this sense, it is any other than an abstraction
of our minds. But, without entering on this spec
ulation, it is obvious to remark that in this sense,
an essence belongs to every collection of properties ;
and to each collection its own. So that, conceiving
of each of the divine Persons as having his own
powers and properties, distinct from those of the
other two, we have just as much reason in phil
osophy to ascribe to each a particular essence of
his own, as we have to ascribe a particular essence
to any assemblage of properties whatever. Nor
can we deny an essence of his own to either,
without bringing into question the existence of
essence altogether. For we know it only through
the properties it displays. Deny an essence then,
in the case of any collection of properties, and the
ground is destroyed on which our knowledge of
essence rests ; namely, " its being repugnant to our
(») Works, vol. i. p. 285.

PARTICULAR ESSENCE. 25
first conceptions of things, that properties should
subsist of themselves."
Nor is the matter at aU improved by saying, that
an essence is not denied to the divine Persons, in
toto ; but only a particular essence to each, one
being supposed common to all the persons. For,
this is to go back to the old notion of common
essences. A particular essence, belonging to several
individuals, is a contradiction in terms. Such an
essence would not be particular. Besides, it is just
as repugnant to our first conceptions, to suppose
three distinct collections of properties, inhering in
one and the same essence, as it is to conceive of
one or more subsisting without essence — if, indeed,
the cases are not identical. Every house on its
own foundation.
Again, the essence of anything is that which is
supposed to be most innate and peculiar to it. " It
makes the real being." (Stillingfleet's Disc. p. 238.)
It is that which it cannot part with, without being
itself annihilated. It is that which it cannot com
municate without communicating itself. To say,
therefore, that the essence of this is also the essence
of that, is to say, so far as the words have any
meaning, that this is that. And further, as we
conceive that properties cannot be without essence,
so neither can we conceive of essence without
properties. Accordingly, Trinitarian divines argue,
that if the Son have the divine attributes, he
must have the divine essence ; because the essence

26 NUMERICAL UNITY.
and the attributes are inseparable. But if properties
cannot be communicated without the essence to
which they belong, because they are , inseparable
from it, then neither can essence be communicated
without the properties which cleave to it. To
say, therefore, that the essence of this is the essence
of that, is to say that the properties of this are
the properties of that; but if both the essence
and properties are the same, surely, the things
are the same.
With reason, therefore, may it be said, that the
idea of one singular and particular essence, sup
porting the properties of three particular entities,
is not only a contradiction in terms and an absurdity
in philosophy ; but that, in so far as it can be made
intelligible, it signifies what they who put it forward
do not intend; and that as a cover for Tritheism,
it is the flimsiest of the flimsy ; and withal suicidal.
When then we say the essence of God is numeri
cally one, so that the essence of the Father is
the identical essence of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit, we say, if we will understand ourselves,
that the attributes of the Father are also the at
tributes of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; so
that there is but one all-comprehensive inteUect,
one almighty will, in short, (as we have found
some of orthodox name affirming,) one divine Agent
or Person, in the ordinary sense of the word^
although diverse in his acts and manifestations.

UNITARIANISM. 27
But this is Unitarianism. At least, an Unitarian
has no occasion to contend for more. The Trin
itarian may talk, as profoundly as he please, of
distinctions — real distinctions as opposed to nom
inal; of subsistences and hypostases; of formalities,
primalities, modes, properties, relations, whether
intrinsical or extrinsical : but so long as he allows
to those of an opposite name, that there is but One
Almighty Agent,* who " worketh all things after the
counsel of his own will," without compeer, removed
infinitely beyond every other agent, " the High
and Lofty One," numericaUy one in will, in power,
in consciousness, as in being, — he grants them all
which as Unitarians they need concern themselves
to maintain.

CHAPTER II.

§ 1. Thus far two principal views of the Trinity
have been considered : the first, that which supposes
the Divine Persons to he real, substantial agents, nu
merically distinct from one another in powers and in
essence, though wonderfully and singularly united ;
the second, that which supposes there is but one
such divine agent. It has also appeared, that while
one of these schemes is essentially Tritheistic, the
other is essentially Unitarian. Indeed Trinitarians
themselves, and they of the highest name, have
not failed to observe this : and in consequence, have
laboured mind and body to discover a middle course
between these extremes ; and so, to invent a sense of
the word consubstantial, which shall involve less
than the specific and more than the numerical unity,
— a sense of the word, which shall harmonize the
Nicene and Lateran Confessions.
One of these mediatory schemes we have already
seen ; which is to deny that the Divine Persons are

MIDDLE WAY. 29
distinct in essence, while it is allowed they are
distinct in respect of powers and affections. Even
Dr. Waterland sometimes expresses himself as if he
held this notion.^ But at other times, he is clear
enough on the point, that " the operations, attributes,
powers, and perfections" of the Divine Persons, are
as much one as the substance. W
The scheme of Howe may be considered as
another, having the same object.
Of this kind also is a distinction often drawn
between essential and personal properties. But it
should always be remembered when this distinction
is made, that the personal properties can never be
those attributes of wUl and understanding, which
are always proved by Trinitarians, (or attempted to be
proved,) of the Holy Spirit, whensoever his person
ality is the subject of debate. For these are beyond
all doubt, attributes of the substance. Where would
the Essence be, if will and understanding were
abstracted from it ? What is the omnipotence of
God, but the energy of his resistless Will ? What
are his foreknowledge, his omniscience, his unerring
wisdom, but divers aspects of his Supreme Intelli
gence ? Three Divine Persons, having each his
own wul and understanding, are three Beings omni
potent and omniscient; each one of them all that
is comprehended in the word God.

(]) See also Bull's Vindication of the Church of England. Works,
vol. ii. pp. 214, 215. late edit. (s> See above, p. 18.

30 PERSOJSAL AND ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES.
The only personal properties which Trinitarian
theology can acknowledge as distinct from the essen
tial, are such as these : the property of begetting or
of being unbegotten, which along with the Essence
makes the Father ; the property of being begotten,
which with the same Essence makes the Son ; the
property of proceeding, which with the same Essence
constitutes the Holy Spirit. But these will bring
little help to the Trinitarian, in steering his doubtful
and dangerous way between the extremes just named.
They cannot raise the Trinitarian doctrine above
modalism. And beside, what conception can any one
form of these properties ? With us, indeed, every
father is also a son : and so sustains in his own
person the two opposite relations of paternity and
filiation. But the correlatives are always found in
different subjects. No man was ever his own father.
And yet we are to believe that these correlatives
exist in the same Divine subject. The Being who
begets is the Being who also is begotten. The Son
and his Father, in all that respects substance and
being, are the same. It is said, indeed, that they
are not the same Person. But what in this view is
person, as abstracted from the essence or being ?
Plainly a property or relation only. That Person
therefore whom we denominate the Father, is, with
this single exception, the Person whom we are to
call his Son.
Those who would know in what way these inanities
can be defended by a very learned and acute man,

WATERLAND. 31
and explained, so as to avoid on the one hand, the
heresy of making the Son begotten as to person
only, and not as to substance, and on the other
hand, the admitted absurdity of making the same
essence or substance to be both begotten and unbe-
gotten, should consult Petavius; and when they
have done, they will cease to wonder at the parallel
which the Romanist draws between the doctrines
of the Trinity and Transubstantiation.
§ 2. But our principal business in this chapter is
with Waterland, — a name which stands deservedly
high among Anglo-Trinitarian writers. None have
discovered greater adroitness in conducting this con
troversy : and few, if any, greater learning, or more
intimate familiarity with every part of the question.
His style indeed is most dogmatic, and offensive, not
to say insulting, to his adversaries. Yet he has the
reputation of having foiled the most able champion
whom Arianism has ever found within the pale of
the Anglican Church, — a man in most, if not in all
respects, greater than himself: while nothing can
exceed the confidence with which he holds, or seems
to hold, his way between Tritheism and Sabellian
ism ; and to withdraw his feet from the burning
plough-shares on either side.
These are reasons why particular attention should
be paid to his writings. What then was the middle
course which Waterland held ? Did he teach that
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are distinct from

32 WATERLAND.
one another in substance and attributes ? Mr.
Jackson, in his first letter, under the name of
Philalethes, affirms that he did : and there is enough
in Waterland's pieces to approve the representation.
Yet his right reverend biographer seems to resent
this account :(I) and he who should confine himself to
such passages as have been already produced from
the writings of Waterland, would assuredly condemn
it too. What then did he teach on this point ? — a
vital question, and one which if perseveringly fol
lowed out, may lead to a clearer apprehension of
the middle way at which he aimed, than will serve
either his reputation as a writer, or the cause he
espoused. Let it then be observed, our question is not
whether the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are or
are not, on his principles, three substances, as three
agents, persons, and supposita. Philalethes indeed
affirmed, that on Waterland's principles they are :
and it is against this statement that the Bishop
chiefly points his displeasure ; and not without some
show of justice. For Waterland was particularly on
his guard not to drop the word substance in the
plural form. Each of the divine persons was with him
acting substance, but not an acting substance. They
were together substance, and substance, and sub
stance ; as being, and being, and being ; but not
three substances, or three beings ; but only one
™ See Life, by Van Mildert, in Works, vol. i. pp. 75, 76. 2nd edit.

DIVINE SUBSTANCE ONE. 33
substance, one being, since they are undivided.
Thus he says in his Second Defence, under Query
23. — " that person is substance I have always al
lowed ; that substance and substance make substances
you cannot prove." And again, near the same place,
I have " never pretended that Hypostasis or Person
does not imply substance, or signify substance ; only,
in Divinis, a Person is not separate substance, nor
consequently more persons more substances." In
his First Defence also, under Query 9, he thus
writes : —
" Upon the Doctor's (Clarke's) hypothesis that God's
substance is extended every where, and that the same is
the substratum of space, we may imagine two substrata,
one pervading the sun, the other the moon, which are
both distinct and distant. Will you please to tell us
whether these two are real distinct beings or no ? * * *
I suppose the Doctor or yourself will be content to allow
that this is substance, and that substance ; and yet not
two substances, but one substance. In like manner also,
this is being, and that being ; and yet not two beings,
but one being : this eternal, and that eternal ; and yet
not two eternals, but one eternal. I might go on almost
the length of an Athanasian creed. This must be your
manner of speaking, if you come to particulars ; and that
because the substrata are supposed to have no separate
existence independent on each other, but to be united by
some common ligaments, which perhaps you will call
personal attributes. And why then should you be severe
on us, &c, &c."(1)
Let it then be conceded to Dr. Waterland and his
(») Works, vol. i. pp. 371, 372.

34 WATERLAND.
Right Reverend Defender, that he did not divide the
Divine substance, or make more Divine substances
than one. Nevertheless it must be inquired, did he
discriminate between the substance of the Father
and the substance of the Holy Spirit ? Did he
distinguish between them : so that, as Philalethes
in one place expresses it, the substance of the one
was not in his view the substance of the other,
howsoever of the same kind and united ? The true
and proper answer to this question is, that Waterland
did distinguish between the substance of the Father,
and the substance of the Son, and the substance of the
Holy Ghost ; and also that he did not : that is to say,
he held both the affirmative and the negative of the
same question ; and this was his middle way between
Tritheism and Sabellianism.
He did distinguish between the substance of the
Father and the substance of the Son. What else
can be made of his frank avowal, that the Nicene
Fathers understood the consubstantiality in the spe
cific sense ? He says indeed that the consubstantiality
so understood, did not comprise their whole belief on
the subject. But he does not deny that it did form
a part of their belief. " The word expresses their
sense, but not their whole sense." " They did not
teach a merely specific consubstantiality." Such are
his remarks/1^ . . . . What else can be made of the
numerous, not to say innumerable places in which
W See under Query 29. First Defence. Works, vol. i. p. 543. 2nd ed.

SUBSTANCE OF PERSONS DISTINGUISHED. 35
he speaks of the Son as equal™ to the Father in
nature or substance, and perfections ? Equality
always implies plurality or alterity ; and that in those
respects wherein the comparison is made. " Ordo et
comparabilitas semper est diversorum, seu inter di-
versa.'W Tucker names it as a maxim of the schools,
(as it certainly is of common sense,) that " nothing
like is the same." And so Hilary is quoted in the
Library of the Fathers/3) as saying, " non est equal-
itas in dissimilibus, nee similitudo intra unum". . . .
What shall be made of those passages too numerous
to be mentioned, in which Waterland places the unity
in union ? And surely authority is not needed for
the statement, that union is necessarily of more than
one  Indeed he goes so far as to intimate in
his Second Defence, under Query 23. (all things to
the contrary notwithstanding), that no valid objection
can be sustained against the tres substantice (three
substances) of Hilary and others, so long as no
difference in the kind of substance is intended, and
no division in the same kind/4) Accordingly, with
Bull, he professes to place the unity in the emperi
choresis. " You argue that the Son cannot be

(I) As for instance in close connection with the extracts just before
made. " The word 6fioov<ru>s expresses an equality, of nature, and
signifies that the Son is as truly equal in nature to the Father, as one
man is equal to another, or any individual equal to another individual
of the same sort or species." See also Disc. 5. Lady Moyer's Lecture.
Bull, in his work on the Nicene Faith, perpetually speaks of the
Son's consubstantiality with the Father as an equality of nature.
<» Baxter's Methodus, pp. 91, 92. <3) Vol. viii. p. 149. note.
W Works, vol. ii. p- 712.

36 WATERLAND.
God in the strict sense, without making two Gods.
We answer, that Father and Son, by a most intimate
and ineffable union of substance, will, power, pre
sence, and operation, &c. (which we call irepix^PW-s),
may be one God."W "The sum of the Catholic
doctrine is this : the same homogeneous substance "
(consubstantiality in the specific sense) " and insepa
rability. The first makes each hypostasis res divina :
the last makes all to be una substantia, una Summa
Res, one undivided, or individual, or numerical
substance ; one God."(2) This is the only sense of
the numerical unity he will allow; of which he
sometimes speaks with doubtful commendation. Thus
in his Tract on the Importance of the Doctrine of
the Trinity, he says, " It is a phrase which has long
obtained in the schools, and is capable of a good
sense : but yet essence of essence, ever since the
phrase came in, as God of God, was always Catholic
doctrine ; and numerical essence must be so ex
plained as to agree with it, and to exclude a Sabellian
sense. "(3) This agrees with what he elsewhere says : —
" Please to observe, essence of essence, substance
of substance, was Catholic doctrine all along : and
this is the full meaning of individual essence."'41
And again, — "the substance of the Son may be
called the substance of the Father, both being
« First Def. Query 21. vol. i. p. 462.
<2> First Def. Query 26. vol. i. p. 502. <»> Works, vol. iii. p. 453.
<4> Vol. ii. p. 650. 2nd Def. Query 15. See also vol. ii. p. 210.

SUBSTANCE NOT DISTINGUISHED. 37
one ; and this is all that any sober Catholic meant
by individual or numerical."1"
Waterland did not distinguish between the sub
stance of the Son and the substance of the Father.
For with him the divine substance was unquestionably
one in number, being undivided. It was also a point
with him, as with the Lateran Council, that it is not
to be conceived of as divisible or distributable into
parts. Whence it follows, since the divine persons
partake all alike of the divine substance, that (as the
Lateran divines also perceived) they must each
partake of it entire : so that, as indeed Waterland
fairly admits in his Reply to Whitby, " it is the same
numerical essence both in the Father and the Son,
only existing in a different manner."^ What Water-
land held of the substance he held also of the
attributes : as we have already seen. Observe the
passage already referred to in pp. 18. 29. And so
he says in Second Defence, Query 9: — "Dr. Clarke's
notion of undivided substance appears to be plainly
this ; that if the substance be but spiritual, and there
be no disunion, then the substance is one, one simple
substance. I approve of this notion as very just :
and since the three divine persons are supposed by
us to be all spiritual, and united as much as possible,
more closely united indeed (being omnipresent) than
you suppose the parts of the divine substance to be ;
I say, since these things are so, the three persons

M Vol. i. p. 496. 1st Def. Query 25. <2> Works, vol. ii. p. 209.

38 WATERLAND.
may be one individual substance upon the Doctor's
principles, one simple, uncompounded substance,
which is what we assert : and if the substance be
individual, we hope the attributes may be so too :
and then all is right."(1) Likewise in his First De
fence, under the same query, and after the same, his
favourite argument, he says, " we admit some common
ties or bands of union" (between the divine persons),
"which we call essential attributes."™ In like manner
he speaks of " the same essential excellency or
perfection, considered primarily in the Father, and
derivatively in the Son."ts) All of which agrees per
fectly with what he says in his Second Defence,
namely, that the main difficulty attending the doctrine
of the Trinity, lies in conceiving " the same indi
vidual attributes entirely in the whole Trinity, and
entirely in every Person of it :"(4> "the Persons," as he
says in another place, " equal in all respects ; none
of them singly part of God, but every one perfect
God."(5) Indeed it was his palmary doctrine, that
the Son is not only God — God in the same strict
and proper sense as the Father; but that he is
the same God.i6) His creed bound him to this. For
since the Father and the Son are not two Gods, they
must necessarily be one God, and the same God,
that is, the same in number. " You say the Son
« Vol. ii. p. 620. m Vol. i. p. 372.
<3> First Def. Query 17. vol.i. p. 427. <4> Query 9. vol. ii. p. 622.
<6) First Def. Query 9. vol. i. p. 373.
(6> See the simple wording of Queries 1. 2. 7. 9. 10.

CONTRADICTION. 39
is God, truly, and properly, and by nature, in the
scripture sense of the word, God. Then, say I, he
must be the same with the one supreme God, because
there is but one."m Now to say that the Son is
numerically the same God as the Father, is to say,
that he has the same numerical substance and attri
butes. And so, in an earlier part of this work, we
have heard him declaring, that " every divine per
fection and every substantial attribute, belonging to
any one Person, is common to all; and there is
nothing peculiar to any one but the divine rela
tions : " — " to the Father," he adds, " paternity and
whatever it implies or carries with it ; to the Son
filiation ; to the Holy Spirit procession." To which
he further adds : — " In this account eternity, immen
sity, omnipotence, and the like, being essential attri
butes, are common to all the three Persons; who
have therefore one eternity, one immensity, one
omnipotence, and so on, as one substance, and one
Godhead."™ § 3. These conflicting statements, taken as they
are from detached and sometimes distant parts of
Waterland's writings, are extraordinary enough.
But what will be said, when it is shewn that Water-
land himself has brought together the two terms of
the contradiction, which these extracts embody ; and
affirmed them both most dictatorially, and in a
breath ?
(>> First Def. Query 24. <s> Works, vol. ii. p. 233.

40 WATERLAND.
Dr. Clarke had said, in his Observations on the
Second Defence, that " nothing can with any sense
be said to be the same in kind with itself;" and
that " the only reason why any things or properties
whatsoever, can be said to be, or not to be the same
in kind, is because they are not the same in
number."(1) This is only saying in other words, that
" nothing like is the same : " for it has been already
seen that sameness in kind consists in close simi-
larity.(2) Now in what way does Waterland reply to this
observation of Dr. Clarke ? " I have already hinted,"
he writes, " how contradictory this pretended maxim
is to Dr. Clarke's known and avowed principle in
another cause, " — the extended substance. " To
answer now more directly, and to cut off their main
argument at once, I observe," (boastful enough) "that
though in finite things, especially things corporeal,
those that are one substance in kind, are more than
one substance in number ; yet the reason is not
because they are one in kind, but because they are
separate or separable from each other ; and so it
happens, that while they are one substance in kind,
they are not one in number. But where the substance
is neither separate nor separable, (as in the Divine
Persons,) there unity of liind and number are con
sistent, and meet in one : and thus the unity is both
<:> Works, vol. iv. p. 515.
(2> Should any thing more be desired on this point, the reader is
referred to Whateley's Elements of Logic, under the word, " Same."

CONTRADICTION. 41
specific and individual, without any the least repug
nancy, or appearance of it. ! "n) To this he adds a
note, containing a reference to his Second Defence, —
one of the passages which had elicited from Dr.
Clarke the above observation ; where may be found
the following. "To answer them more directly,
— the perfections of the Father and the Son are
equal and the same in kind ; * * * and they are
also the same in number, by reason of their insepa
rable unity and coexistence."'2' He holds the same
language in his Treatise on the Athanasian Creed.
" One omnipotence or Almightiness is common to
all three ; one in kind, as being of equal extent, and
equally reaching over all ; one also in number,
because of the inseparable union among the three."
And again, — " The Godhead or Divinity which be
longs to one, belongs to all : the same in kind
because of the equality, and the same in number
because inseparably one."(3)
What now is this but to say, that the substance
and attributes of the divine persons, are both one
and more than one ; — that the divine persons have
their own individual substance peculiar to each, and
that they have not ? For let it be observed, the
unity contended for is always of substance and
Godhead. If therefore this unity be specific, then
does it consist in close resemblance ; and resemblance

C1) Further Vindication. Works, vol. iii. p. 61.
m Works, vol. ii. p. 671. <3> Vol. iii. pp. 235, 236.

4:2 WATERLAND.
implies plurality in the very respect in which the
comparison is made. To say, therefore, that the
divine persons are specifically and numerically one
in substance, is to say that they are numerically one
and more than one in this respect. South, in one of
his pieces against Sherlock, says, " a numerical unity
is the unity of one individual nature or being and no
more, and a specific unity is the unity of several
particular individual natures or beings : and therefore
(unless the same thing can be one individual and no
more, and be several particular individuals too,) for
any one to assert the same unity to be both specific
and numerical, is a monstrous contradiction," — " as
gross an absurdity as the reason of man can well
imagine."^ What Waterland says of finite and corporeal
things which are one in kind, namely, that it is not
because they are one in kind that they are one in
number, is beside the mark. Dr. Clarke's meaning
was not, that their being one in kind made them
plural, but that they could not have been one in
kind had they not been plural ; whence it follows
indeed that specific unity ascertains plurality, but
not that it causes it. The point to which it concerned
Waterland to have spoken, is this, — that specific
unity does by its nature imply plurality in the
subjects of it. But instead of addressing himself to
disprove this, he speculates about the causes of plural-
I1) Tritheism charged, &c, pp. 56, 57.

CONTRADICTION. 43
ity ; and so draws off the reader's attention from the
point at issue. What Waterland should have done
is this. He should have shewn either, 1. that specific
union does not consist in close resemblance ; or 2.
that resemblance does not always imply plurality ; or
3. that though it may in finite and corporeal things,
it does not in things infinite and incorporeal. Could
he have made good either of these propositions, he
would have done something more than to sneer at
" the Doctor's pretended maxim." But so long as
the contrary of each of these propositions maintains
its ground, so long will that maxim maintain its
ground too, namely, that " to be the same in kind,"
is always " to be not the same in number."
He tells us, however, in another place, and with
grave confidence, that " substance in union with
substance does not necessarily make substances."*1'
This, he says, is a principle which will stand so long
as common sense stands; and that so long, the doctrine
of the Trinity will stand clear of what he considers
the most important and prevailing objection against
it : — that we are now upon. But how so ?
This piece of an ingot of gold and that piece of
the same ingot, do not make two ingots, so long as
they remain parts only of one ingot. Granted. But
the ingot is not therefore the same both in kind and
in number. Its parts are the same in kind, and not
the same in number : the ingot is one in number
<" Further Vindication. Works, vol. iii. p. 46.

44 WATERLAND.
and not one in kind ; except as compared with some
other ingot, which with the first ingot must certainly
make two ingots.
The air which is now over Britain, is of the same
kind as that which is now over the Canadas. They
are specifically one : yet the atmosphere as a whole
is numerically one. There is no riddle here. The
atmosphere as a whole can have -specific unity pre
dicated of it, only as it is compared with some other
atmosphere. The parts of which it is composed are
specifically one ; and as certainly they are numeri
cally more than one.
It is so with the divine substance, according to the
view which Waterland took of Dr. Clarke's doctrine
respecting it, and of which he made such copious
use in this controversy. For it is impossible to sepa
rate from this material notion, the idea of parts ; as
Waterland well knew.'1' That part of the divine
substance, therefore, which (to use Waterland's way
of speaking) pervades the sun, is not that part which
pervades the moon, but distinct from it. They may
therefore be conceived and spoken of as two ; and so
may have specific unity affirmed of them. But we
have here no nearer approach to a unity which is both
numerical and specific, than we have in the finite
atmosphere, or, if any one will, in the more widely-
extended ether. Viewed as a whole, each is numer
ic See Works, vol. i. pp. 371—375. Vol. ii. p. 620. Vol. iii. pp. 42, 43.

CONTEADICTION. 45
ically one. Its component parts only are specifically
one.'1' In fine, neither is one and more than one in
the same sense. But now what Waterland teaches
of the divine persons is this ; — that they are one in
a certain respect, that respect being substance, divine
attributes, or Godhead ; and it is of the Persons in
this respect, that he declares they are both specifically
and numerically one.
It is strange that so shrewd and celebrated a
writer should have failed to perceive the logical.
contradiction which is couched in this ; or, should
have fancied it could derive any countenance, or that
the maxim of Dr. Clarke could receive any damage,
from the self-evident proposition, — that the parts of
which anything is composed are plural, and therefore
capable of being compared with one another, and so
of specific unity ; while the thing as a whole remains
singular, and incomparable, except with something
else. This is in perfect harmony with Dr. Clarke's
principle. All the parts of the divine substance,
(viewed in the way spoken of,) are specifically the
same : but one is not the other. All the parts of an
ivory ball are specifically the same : but this part is
not that part. So that it may be laid down univer
sally : — If x is specifically the same as or one with y,
then x is not y ; if x is numerically the same as Y,
then x is y. If therefore the substance of the Father

(') " One in kind in regard to the distinct parts, and one in number
in regard to the union of these parts in the whole .•" — Waterland's
own words in the last of the above passages.

46 WATERLAND.
is specifically the same as the substance of the Son,
then the substance of the one is not the substance of
the other. If the substance of the Father is numer
ically the same as the substance of the Son, then the
substance of the one is the substance of the other.
So that, let the matter be turned over as any one
may choose, it will still be found that to affirm the
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be both specifically
and numerically one in substance, is to affirm that
the substance of the one is the substance of the other,
and that it is not ; or, in other words, that the divine
substance is but one in number, and more than one
in number.
The fallacy lurking in the argument of which
Waterland made such abundant use in this contro
versy, lies here: — that whereas that argument pro
ceeds entirely on the supposition of parts in the objects
to which it relates, Waterland will not allow us to
conceive of the Persons as so many parts of the
Deity. The Father is not a part of the divine
substance, but the divine substance entire; which
entire divine substance is also the substance of the
Son and of the Holy Spirit. The one therefore is
the other : and yet if they are specifically the same,
the one is not the other. Here is the contradiction :
and it pervades the writings of Waterland.
No one versed in these writings will say it is a
bye-point in his system. " A substance one in kind,
and in number too," is the very nucleus of his
system. He says as much in his further Vindication,

CONTRADICTION. 47
where he may be found thus chuckling over the use
he had made of Dr. Clarke's doctrine respecting the
divine substance, in support of this principle. " I
had observed the thing long ago, before I published
a syllable in the controversy : and that I might be
the better satisfied, discoursed it sometimes over with
friends ; which still confirmed me the more in it.
Having tried the thing every way, and being secure
of this point," ( — that there may be substance " one
in kind and number too,") " a point upon which, as
I easily foresaw, the main cause would at length turn,
I then proceeded to engage these gentlemen, &c.'"(1)
Uniformly does he express himself as dissatisfied
with the specific unity alone : and equally dissatisfied
is he with the numerical ; except (and let the ex
ception be noted) as inclusive of the specific. Every
where does he teach that the truth lies somewhere
between these, or in an amalgamation of these. "As
to the question, whether it" (the consubstantiality)
" shall be called specific or numerical, I am in no
pain about it. Neither of the names exactly suit it."
" There is a deal of difference between unius sub-
stantice, and una substantia. Two men are unius
ejusdemque substantias, not una substantia. But the
three Persons are not only unius substantias, but una
substantia. The modem sense of consubstantial takes
in both."'2' And again : " Each divine Person is an
individual intelhgent agent : but as subsisting in one
<T) Works, vol. iii. p. 44.
(2) Works, vol. i. p. 501. and p. 544. note. See also pp. 467. 497.
545. and vol. ii. pp. 210. 515.

48 WATERLAND.
undivided substance, they are altogether in that res
pect but one undivided intelligent agent."'1' This
latter statement Waterland was afterwards at some
pains to explain away. But it is in its obvious sense
a faithful exposition of his system ; which expressly
makes the Father God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost
God, all equal in power and glory, and yet not three
Gods but the same God — not parts of the one divine
substance, but each the divine substance entire, and
yet the one not the other : that is, they are " una sub
stantia," and "tres substantia);" " Una res," and
"tres res;" not 6>oovo-ioi alone, (in the proper and
specific sense,) nor \iovoovitioi, but both ; one Agent,
and at the same time three Agents.
We believe, therefore, we have been too liberal in
conceding, that Waterland only distinguished between
the substance of one Person and another, without ma
king absolutely three divine substances. For if the sub
stance of each is entire and infinite, and the substance
of one is not the substance of another, it would seem
to follow inevitably, that there are three infinite sub
stances, however close and permanent may be their
union. Waterland indeed says, that " we never give
the name of substances to anything, but where the
substance is' separate or separable."'2' Ordinarily,
perhaps, we do not; and that because our actual
experience reaches only to such conjunctions as are
dissoluble. But it has been already remarked, that
W First Def. Query 29. Vol. i. p. 544. note. <2> Vol. iii. p. 45.

CONTRADICTION. 49
union is ever of more than one. And we do not
wait for its dissolution, before we speak of the
components plurally. What then if it should never
be dissolved; as theologians assert of the union of
the divine and human natures in Christ ? And what
if it never had a beginning? Union, even though
eternal and necessary, is still union.
But however this may be, and whether the sub
stance, and substance, and substance, which Water-
land acknowledged, are or are not, properly speaking,
three substances in union ;(1) he plainly distinguished
one from another. This is implied beyond all doubt,
in the statement that they are specifically the same.
The one therefore is not the other. And yet the one
is the other ; since the divine substance is but one,
and is entire the proper substance of each Person.
§ 4. Waterland, however, would never admit that
his doctrine was contradictory. Indeed, he was
willing to allow that if it were, it must be abandoned.
Thus, towards the end of his Second Defence,
where he lays down a method by which, he says, the
controversy respecting the Trinity may easily be
brought to a short issue, he puts the question of the
possible, before the question of the true ; and de
clares that " the possibility should be presupposed in

(" The truth of the matter, we apprehend, is this, that if substance,
and substance, and substance, do not make three substances, because
of their close union; then they must be parts or portions of one
subBtance, though, it may be, indivisible portions.

50 WATERLAND.
all our disputes from Scripture and Fathers.'"1' So
in his work on the Importance of the Doctrine of the
Trinity, extolling the strength of the Scripture
evidence, he says, "Provided always that there is
nothing plainly repugnant or contradictory in the
notion."'2' Hence he was earnest in contending that
he did not make three Persons one Person; or one
God three Gods ; or one agent three agents, in the
same sense. Either of these he allowed would be
contradictory and impossible. We shall follow him
in some of his statements on these heads.
" I assert, you say, many supreme Gods in one un
divided substance. Ridiculous. They are not many
Gods, for that very reason, because their substance is
undivided. Is this saying that many Gods are not many
Gods ? No ; but they, that is, the three Persons, sup
posed by the objector to be three Gods upon our scheme,
are not three Gods, not many, but one God only."'3'
Again : —
" I allow that three stands for three, and three sub
stances for three substances, and three Gods for three
Gods. What is all this to me ? I do not assert that
three stands for more or less than three ; nor that three
substances, but that three Persons (who are not three
substances) are one substance ; nor that three Gods, but
that three Persons (who are not three Gods) are one
God."'4' And again, in close connexion with the first of
these extracts : —
W Works, vol. ii, pp. 762—764. See also p. 432.
<2> Works, vol. iii. p. 415.
<3> Vol. iii. p. 19. C«) Second Defence, Query 23. vol. ii. p. 707.

DEFINITION OF PERSON. 51
" Though the union of the three Persons (each Person
being substance) makes them one substance, yet the same
union does not make them one Person ; because union of
substance is one thing, and unity of Person another : and
there is no necessity that the same kind of union which
is sufficient for one, must be sufficient for the other also.
There is no consequence from one to the other, but upon
this supposition, that person and acting substance are
equivalent and reciprocal : which the author of the
Remarks (Jackson) had acuteness enough to see, and
therefore fixes upon me, unfairly, that very supposition.
If he pleases to turn to my definition of person, he will
find that though I suppose person to be intelligent acting
substance, yet that is not the whole of the definition, nor
do I ever suppose the terms or phrases reciprocal ; any
more than the asserting man to be an animal, is supposing
man and animal to be tantamount, or to be reciprocal
terms."'1' Let us turn to this definition. It occurs in the
Second Defence, under Query 15.
"You tell me, that I acknowledge person and in
telligent agent to.be the same.'2' I never acknowledged
any such thing ; but always denied their being reciprocal.
But because this word (person) is a matter of much
dispute, I shall here endeavour, having nothing further
worth notice under this Query, to give the best account I
am able of the true notion of person." * * *
" Our first notion of person is the notion we have of a
man, a woman, a child. By degrees we learn to abstract
from the differences of age, sex, stature, &c. And so we
form a more general idea of a human person, meaning

W Vol iii. p. 19.
(2> Jackson, in making this statement, refers to the passage already
quoted, wherein Waterland asserts that each Person is an intelligent
agent, and the three together but one intelligent agent too.

52 WATERLAND.
one of our own species : and this idea, perhaps, a rude
countryman would express, improperly, by the word
christian, in opposition to brutes, or inanimate things.
From the idea of human persons thus formed, we pro
ceed to make a more general idea, by leaving out what is
peculiar to our species ; and keeping in what we conceive
common to us with angels, suppose, or any intelligent
being. And now we take in rationality only, or in
telligence : and a person is something intelligent, in
opposition to the brutal creation. Indeed, there is some
thing analogous to person even in brutes : and so it is
common to say he or she of them, in like manner as we
speak of persons. But still the common notion of person
includes intelligence : and I think Damascen is very
singular in bringing in the horse under imtornois and
irp&aamov, signifying person. But perhaps he meant it of
mtisTatns only, and did not nicely distinguish. Thus far
we are advanced, that person is something which is the
subject of intelligence:'
Here we must interrupt the author to remark, that
this summing up is too vague. The true result of
his induction, so far as it has as yet been carried,
is that person is (as the author himself had just
before said) " an intelligent, being, or a being which
is " the subject of intelligence." " Something " is a
word of too wide a signification. It may be applied,
(as the author immediately does apply it) to things
which have no individual existence. Thus he pro
ceeds : —
" But still we are not come far enough to fix the idea
of a single person : for an army, a council, a senate, is
' something which is the subject of intelligence,' ' some
thing' which understands and acts."

DEFINITION OF PERSOX. 53
Now this is true. An army, &c, is " something
which is the subject of intelligence." But an army,
a council, or a senate, is not a person ; and is never
called so, excepting in a highly figurative sense ;
whereas the present inquiry respects not the figura
tive senses of the word person, but its proper sig
nification ; and moreover the proper signification of
the word person, and not the signification of any
.word or words, denoting a collection of persons. It
is not easy, therefore, at first sight, to see what could
have induced the author to bi'ing these nouns of
multitude into the discussion. Certainly they make
nothing against the proposition which we have stated
as the true result of his induction ; namely, that a
person, (meaning of course a single person,) is not
merely " something which is the subject of intelli
gence," but a substance or being which is " the
subject of intelligence." And this agrees perfectly
with what Archbishop Whately says, in his Work
on Logic.'1' " Person, in its ordinary use at present,
invariably implies a numerically distinct substance."
And so even our Author himself will shortly be
found stating, that " all persons but the three Divine
Persons are divided and separate from each other in
nature, substance, and existence ; * * * and therefore
are not only distinct subjects, &c, but distinct sub
stances also." Let it then be distinctly understood,
that thus far nothing whatever has appeared, to
<" Page 360, 5th edit.

54 WATERLAND.
invalidate the definition of Dr. Clarke and his
friends;'1' according to which, 'person' and 'in
telligent agent or being,' are convertible terms. The
author continues : —
" We must therefore be more particular ; and at length
we may bring it " (the definition) " to this : — a single
person is an intelligent agent, having the distinctive characters
of I, thou, he ; and not divided or distinguished into more
intelligent agents capable of the same characters."
This is the definition. It is given by the author
in Italics, as we have printed it : and was plainly
valued by him. Van Mildert also thought it deser
ving of quotation in his Review of Waterland's Life
and Writings. We shall analyze it.
" A single person is an intelligent agent, having
the distinctive characters of I, thou, he." What,
now, are the distinctive characters of I, thou, he ?
We suppose they are such characters as warrant the
use of these pronouns, when speaking of the subjects
to which the characters apply. Well : — these are
personal pronouns, — pronouns used oi persons, that
is, of objects having personal characters. " The
distinctive characters of I, thou, he," are therefore,
neither more nor less than distinctive personal cha-

(') " Intelligent agent is the proper and adequate definition of the
word person ; nor can it otherwise be understood with any distinct
sense or meaning at all." — Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, under Prop. I.
" You are pleased to say, in defence of the learned Doctor, that if
he had done no more than prbved intelligent being and person to be
the same, it must for ever remain an unanswerable difficulty, &c.
Right, if he had proved what he has not, something might be said."
—Waterland's First Def. Query 22. vol. i. pp. 464, 465.

DEFINITION OF PERSON. 55
racters. If the one phrase contain anything more
than is contained in the other, we are quite at a loss
to discover it : and therefore do our author no wilful
injustice, (we are persuaded no injustice at all,) in
substituting the one for the other. The definition
will then read thus : — " a single person is an intel
ligent agent, having distinctive personal characters,
and not divided or distinguished into more intelli
gent agents capable of the same characters : " that is,
" a single person is an intelligent agent, having the
distinctive characters of a person, and not divided
or distinguished into more intelligent agents, having
each the distinctive characters of a person :" in other
words, " a single person is a single intelligent agent,
being a single person and no more ;" or, " a single
person that is a single person, is a single intelligent
agent." Evaporate the superfluous words, and the
residuum will be just this, — " a person is an intelli
gent agent : " which is the definition of Dr. Clarke.
But granting this, the author would say, it will not
follow that every intelligent agent is a person ; any
more than that every animal is a man, because a man
is an animal. For, according to Waterland, there is
an ambiguity attaching to the words " intelligent
agent," which, as he says in one place, admits of " a
stricter and a larger sense."'1' The words indeed are
" only two adjectives," and so are " to be understood
according to the subject to which the attributes are
(') Works, vol. ii. p. 27. Pref. to his Eight Sermons.

56 WATERLAND.
applied. Put the words to substance, and then we
have intelligent agent substance, whether in person
or persons. If the substance be thus or thus circum
stantiated, 'intelligent agent substance' may be a
single person ; if otherwise, it may be more persons ;
so that ' intelligent agent ' is different in sense and
meaning, according as it may be differently applied."'1'
This, in another place, he expresses after the follow
ing manner : — " Intelligent agent is understood either
of person or being. Unus intelligens agens, or unum
intelligens agens, may be equally rendered one intel
ligent agent; the former signifying intelligent person,
the latter intelligent being. In the former sense,
every Person is an intelligent agent ; in the latter
all the three are one intelligent agent : therefore
'intelligent agent' and 'person' are not reciprocal.'"2'
This is his way of avoiding the contradiction of
making the Deity both one agent and three agents.
It will be observed, then, that when it is said of
either of the Persons, that he is an intelligent agent,
we are to understand unus intelligens agens ; that is,
such an agent as is but one person : and when we
say, God is an intelligent agent, we are to understand
unum intelligens agens ; that is, such an agent as is
one being and three persons. An intelligent agent
therefore may be either one person or three persons ;
and a person will be such an intelligent agent as
W Vol. ii. p. 707. Second Defence, Query 23.
<2) Vol. ii. p. 332. Supplement to Case of Arian Subscription.

DEFINITION OF PERSON. 57
is one person, in distinction from an intelligent agent
that is three persons.
This is the definition complete. "A single person
is a single intelligent agent who is a single person : "
which, we say, teaches us no more than that a person
is an intelligent agent. Were a school-boy, required
to give a definition of man or phoenix, to say, — a man
is an animal which is a man, or, a phoenix is a two-
legged creature which is a phoenix, — he would give
just such a definition as Waterland has given of
person ; and would in fact say no more than that
a man is an animal, or a phoenix is a two-legged
creature ; neither of which is a definition. It follows
therefore inevitably, either that Waterland has given
us no definition of person, or the identical one which
" he set himself to oppose ; and which, for the Trini
tarian, plainly involves the contradiction of making
God both one Person and three Persons. For, if
every intelligent agent is a person, (which will
follow, if person may be " properly and adequately "
defined an intelligent agent,) then God, who is
certainly an intelligent agent in the singular number,
is also a Person in the singular number, and so both
one Person and three Persons. Or, to put the argu
ment somewhat differently. Every person is an
intelligent agent, or an active intelligent being or
substance. And every active intelligent substance is
a person. But now the union which orthodoxy
asserts between the divine persons, is such as to
make them but one active intelligent substance.

58 WATERLAND.
Therefore it makes them but one Person. This is
Jackson's argument : and there is no evading it but
by calling in question the definition ; which is the
course Waterland adopts. And yet when he comes
to define for himself, he either gives us no definition
at all, or the identical one which he wished to
supersede.'1' But it will perhaps be said, what if he has failed
in giving a correct definition of the word ' person?'
Let this fault lie at his door. He may then take
the benefit of the ambiguity, which he contends for
in the phrase 'intelligent agent;' and so escape the
pitfall into which his adversaries would plunge him.
We are willing to accept this ambiguity : and
to allow, that when it is said, God is an agent in the
singular number, the word is used in a sense diffe
rent from that in which it is employed when we say,
God is three agents ; though it may be impossible to
explain wherein the difference lies. What will
follow ? Why, plainly, that the Higher Agent
which is neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the
Holy Spirit, but diverse from each, and comprehen
sive of the three, though in himself individually one,
is a Fourth, and complex : as Howe taught, to the
overthrow of the proper Deity of each of the
Persons, and of the Trinity itself; and in direct
opposition to the received Trinitarian maxim, that
i1' It is to be observed, that ' intelligent agent,' and ' active
intelligent substance,' were used interchangeably by Waterland, in
this controversy.

DEFINITION OF PERSON. 59
the whole Trinity, or God absolute, is no greater
than either Person in the Trinity. Three intelligent
agents uniting to constitute another intelligent agent,
must with that other make four intelligent agents;
instead of three, or only one.
This ambiguity therefore will not serve Waterland.
And we may wonder the less at his conduct in not
extending more freely the plea, to certain other words
used in this controversy : as for instance, the words
substance and person. For it is certain, that by
affirming the like ambiguity in these words, (for
which he would have had just as good ground out of
theology, as for the ambiguity actually urged,) he
might have asserted three divine substances and yet
but one divine substance, or three Persons and yet
but one Person, with the same immunity from con
tradiction, as three agents and yet but one agent.
Nay, by means of the same happy ambiguity, he
might have asserted three Gods that are but one
God, and yet have faced it out against all his oppo
nents that he was guilty of no contradiction. Indeed
the word God is ambiguous by his own confession ;
being sometimes taken personally, and sometimes
substantially. (1) Why then so chary of using the
phrase three Gods ? God and God and God, he
would allow the Persons to be, as agent and agent
U) " When we say one Person is God, we mean he is a divine hypos
tasis, Deitatem habens, as the schools speak ; but when we say God is
three Persons, we understand it of the divine essence or substance.
So that the word God is sometimes taken essentially and sometimes
personally." — First Defence, Query 93, vol. i. p. 477.

60 WATERLAND.
and agent ; but not three Gods as three agents, lest
he should seem to contradict the doctrine of one
God. But this is needless scrupulosity. Three minor
Gods uniting to form one greater God, is not more
contradictory or more opposed to Scripture and sound
reason, than three divine agents uniting to form
another and greater Divine Agent. Indeed we cannot
distinguish between these forms of expression, ex
cepting that one is perhaps plainer than the other.
And yet had Waterland committed himself to the
plainer of the two, he would have been regarded
both by friends and enemies as having betrayed his
cause.'1' So much does orthodoxy depend on niceties
of language. . . We return to our quotation.
" This definition or description," (he seems to have had
some doubt as to its claim to the former designation,)
" will, I think, take in all the ideas that mankind have
generally affixed to the word ' person,' when understood
of a single person. I will show this first negatively, and
then positively.
" 1. Negatively. An army, a senate, &c, is not a
single person, because divided into more. The Trinity
upon the Catholic hypothesis is not a single person,
because distinguished " (observe, not divided) " into
more intelligent agents than one."
We may here observe the reason, which led
the author to bring these objects (an army, a
council, &c.) into the discussion. They afford,
it should seem, one point of resemblance to the
(i) " Two Gods, a greater and a less, a supreme and an inferior, no
Scripture, no sound reason, no good Catholic, ever taught ; no church
would have endured." — Waterland, vol. i. p. 473,

DEFINITION OF PERSON. 61
Trinity, namely, in that being composed of several
persons, they are not one single person. But the
analogy is imperfect to the last degree. For the
Trinity is an individual being or substance, which a
council is not. And this is the true reason why a
council is not a person : because, as we have seen,
all persons, in ordinary modes of speech, are in
dividual substances ; and all individual intelligent
substances are persons. It follows therefore that
the Trinity should be a single person, by the same
rule that a council is not a single person.
" 2. Positively. A man is a single person by the
definition. " An angel is a single person by the same.
" Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, a single person by the
same. " Any separate soul, a single person also.
" The ®edv6pwiros, or God-man, a single person : because
not divided or distinguished into more intelligent agents
than one, having each of them the distinctive characters. (1)
" To clear this matter a little further, we must next
distinguish persons into several kinds: as 1. — divided
and undivided ; 2. — simple and compound : which when
explained, will, I hope, set this whole affair in a true and
full light.
<]> The reader should not suffer this last clause to pass unnoticed.
For the God-man is composed of two intelligent agents, that are
distinct beings as well as agents, namely, the Logos and a human
soul. How then are they not two persons ? Because they have not
" each the distinctive characters," that is, " the characters of I, thou,
he;" which we have seen are neither more nor less than distinctive
personal characters. These two intelligent agents therefore are but
one person, because — because they are but one person. We hear
sometimes of a woman's reason. Let us be more just to the sex,
and call this a theological reason.

62 WATERLAND.
" 1. As to the distinction of divided and undivided;
all persons but the three divine Persons, are divided and
separate from each other in nature, substance, and ex
istence. They do not mutually include and imply each
other : therefore they are not only distinct subjects,
agents, or supposita, but distinct substances also. But
the divine Persons, being undivided, and not having any
separate existence independent on each other ; they
cannot be looked upon as substances, but as one substance
distinguished into several supposita, or intelligent agents."
We omit what follows, relative to simple and
compound persons, as having chiefly to do with a
point which we are not here discussing. The author
subjoins : —
" You will perceive that intelligent acting substance is
implied in every person ; and more persons are more
intelligent substances, whensoever their substance is di
vided, but not otherwise : and two intelligent substances
are two persons, when both have existed separately, or
have been severally capable of the distinctive characters,
but not otherwise. You will also perceive that intelli
gent acting substance (that is, intelligent agent as you
call it) is not equivalent to person, neither are the phrases
reciprocal. But to intelligent agent add its not being
divided or distinguished into more intelligent agents,
having the same distinctive characters;" (that is, as we
have seen, having distinct personal characters) " and then
as I conceive you complete the notion of person, ac
cording as it has commonly passed with mankind. I
suppose not any of the divine Persons a person in a
sense different from the common meaning of the word
' person : ' they are persons in the same common sense of
person ; but persons of a different kind, and differentlv
circumstantiated from what human, angelical, or any
other kinds of persons are. Thus ' person,' like triangle,

CONTRADICTION. 63
appears to be the name for an abstract idea : and the
name is equally applicable to every kind of person, as
the name of triangle is to every kind of triangle."'1'
Now, quitting the definition, let it be observed,
that the three Persons are certainly three intelligent
agents ; though he will not allow that ' person' and
' intelligent agent' are reciprocal. " The Trinity
is not a single person, because distinguished into
more intelligent agents than one." " Fathe'r, Son, or
Holy Ghost, is a single person by the definition :" —
that is, as we have seen, either one of them is a single
person, because a single intelligent agent, that is, a
single person and no more. Again : — " intelligent
acting substance is implied in every person ;'2' and
more persons are more substances, whensoever their
substance is divided." The divine persons, therefore,
being undivided in substance, cannot indeed, ac
cording to him, be " looked upon as substances."
But still they are persons " in the common meaning
of the word," like the different members of a senate,
council, or army ; only they are not divided into as
many substances as persons. They are, in short,
" one substance, distinguished into several supposita
or intelligent agents," having distinct personal cha
racters, and they, undoubtedly, the same as belong to
all other persons. « Works, vol. ii. pp. 650—653.
I2' " I beseech you, what is person but substance ? Is it, intelligent
agent, nothing ? Person, as I take it, is intelligent acting substance;
though this is not a full definition." — Second Def. Query 3, vol. ii. p.514.

64 WATERLAND.
Such, in few words, appears to be the doctrine of
Waterland in this quotation : and we know not well
how to distinguish it from the notion combated in
the third section of our First Chapter ; to which we
might content ourselves with referring the reader.
But in addition to what is there said, we would in
this place inquire, and with especial reference to the
question of contradiction, — what is meant when it is
said that God is a substance ? What but this, — that
he exists, the Subject of certain glorious attributes,
which are conceived of as characteristic of Deity !
And what less than this is intended, when it is said,
that the three Persons are three distinct supposita,
each divine ? They exist : this at the least, is implied
in the word hypostasis, which Trinitarians are united
in applying to the several Persons. They are moreover
subjects ; and as such, must have attributes : for to
be the subject of nothing, is to be no subject. These
attributes also must be divine ; for the subjects them
selves are divine. There are then both three divine
supposita, and but one divine suppositum ; three
subjects all divine, and yet but one subject which is
divine ; — three Persons, and yet but one Person.
Waterland disowns with contempt the idea of three
Gods in one undivided substance :(1) no unfair epitome
however of the doctrine contained in these extracts.
Still he will have that it is ridiculous ; and in this,
(1) Such a notion however, he ascribes to no less a writer than
Novatian. See Works, vol. ii. p. 478.

CONTRADICTION. 65
we have with him. The divine persons, being but
one substance, can be but one God. But we add,
that for the same reason, they can be, to our ap
prehension, but one Subject ; and so but one Person.
One agent he will allow them to be, and yet three
agents : whilst we have seen that the ambiguity by
which he endeavours to cover himself from the
charge of contradiction in this, will not avail him.
Besides, attributes follow substance. This has
been often observed. If therefore there is but one
divine substance, there is but one assemblage of
divine attributes. What then will remain to dis
tinguish the different intelligent agents and supposita?
Plainly, nothing of which the mind can form any
conception ; except it be those relations, which were
adverted to in the opening of this chapter, and
which, it was remarked, cannot carry the Trinitarian
doctrine beyond modalism. To say there are three
distinct divine subjects, having each the common
attributes of persons, is to say that there are three
distinct assemblages of divine attributes, and so
three divine substances ; that is, three substances
and yet but one substance, three Gods and yet
but one God : notwithstanding that pretty play of
Waterland's, — " I do not assert that three stands for
more or less than three, or that three substances, but
that three Persons (who are not three substances) are
one substance ; or that three Gods, but that three
Persons (who are not three Gods) are one God."
But why do we stoop to this war of words ? —
E

66 WATERLAND.
What are those personal properties, which Water-
land vindicates to the several members of his Trinity ?
Let a fair answer be given to this question, and
the contradiction will be at once unveiled.
What then are these properties ? — Waterland
does not speak of them as if he thought they
were of any recondite nature. So far from it,
he tells us, as we have already observed, that he
does not suppose either of the Persons to be a
person, in a sense different from the common mean
ing of the word ; that each is active intelligent
substance ; and that the three, though not active
intelligent substances, are yet three distinct subjects.
Now a subject, as we have just seen, is that in which
properties or attributes inhere ; and an active intelli
gent subject is a subject in which the attributes of
intelligence and volition inhere. May we then take
these as the properties we are inquiring after ?
Certainly they belong to every ' intelligent agent.'
They belong also to every person, at least to every
1 real person :' and that the divine persons are such,
Waterland plainly teaches both here and elsewhere, —
sometimes most imperatively.'1' Accordingly in his
4th Serm. at Lady Moyer's Lecture, he allows that
there is an ' inconvenience ' attending the use of
(') " I certainly mean a real person, an hypostasis, no mode, attri
bute, or property." — Vol. i. p. 478. " I hope none are so weak as to
deny the Persons to exist in reality." — Vol. i. pp. 371, 372. " The
thing in question * * * two real Persons in one substance or
essence." — Vol. ii. p. 209. " Three real persons * * * one numerical
substance, one being, one God." — Vol. ii. p. 206.

CONTRADICTION. 67
personal pronouns in the singular when speaking of
God ; and that the objection to the general use of
these pronouns in the plural, is simply this, that it
may lead to the idea of divided or separate persons,
and so of three Gods.'1' Could men but have been
trusted to distinguish between divided and undi
vided persons, the style of Scripture might have
been different ; and we might have read thus : —
" We are the Lord thy God." " There is no God
but us." " We even we are Jehovah, and beside us
there is no Saviour." " There is one God, and there
is no other but they, (the Persons included in the
one God:) and to love them with all the heart, &c.'"2'
Plainly, then, the Persons are ' real,' and possess
the ordinary characters of persons, only differing
from other persons in this respect, that they are not
divided from each other in substance. And so he
says expressly in his Answer to the Exeter Queries :
" The precise difference between the idea of a divine
person, and that of a divine intelligent being, is,
that a divine person is not a separate being, inde-
m Vol. ii. p. 98.
<2> Such* passages as Gen. i. 26, and xi. 7, are of too rare occur
rence, and are too easily explicable on other grounds, to lend any
essential help to the doctrine of the tri-personality. They who
would know the judgment formed by various eminent Trinitarian
writers, of the argument drawn from these passages, and from the
plural form of the common Hebrew word for God, are referred to
Wilson's Concessions of Trinitarians, on Gen. i. 1, and i. 26. The
argument may be noticed again further on. All that we are concerned
to observe here is, that no one could lament as an ' inconvenience,'
the prevailing and all but universal use of singular pronouns in regard
to God, who did not look upon the Persons as 'real' and proper,
whatever might be the union supposed to exist between them.

68 WATERLAND.
pendent of all other things."'1' But perhaps nothing
can make this more evident, than the concluding
sentence of our principal quotation, in which we are
told, that the word 'person' represents an abstract
idea, like the word ' triangle,' which is applied to
all figures contained by three straight lines. Now
just as in all triangles, whether equi-lateral, isosceles,
or scalene, right-angled, acute-angled, or obtuse-
angled, there are certain common elements which
constitute them triangles, and without which they
would not be triangles ; so in all ' real persons '
there are certain elements without which they would
not be persons. And what are those elements, if not
the attributes of will and intelligence just named?
Point to any object that is without intelligence, and
it will be at once and universally admitted, that it is
no person ; — or to an object that is without the
faculty of will, and the same admission will be made.
Is the Father then a person ? He has understanding
and will. Is the Son a person ? He has under
standing and will : and them distinct from those of
the Father, otherwise he would not be a distinct
person. For whatever is essential to any subject, is
multiplied as the subject is multiplied. Of course
the same is to be said of the Holy Ghost.
We ask then in the second place, whether when it
is said the substance of the three Persons, that is,
the substance of God, is one, it is not meant that the
« Vol. iii. p. 278.

PERSONS DISTINCT IN SUBSTANCE. 69
will and intelligence which reside in that substance
are singular ; that is, that there is but one supreme
will, one all- comprehensive understanding ? Doubt
less this is what is meant. These are attributes of
the substance, and one as the substance is one.'1'
Here then we come at once upon contradiction, —
bald, downright contradiction. There is but one
divine will, and there are three divine wills; one
divine intellect, and three divine intellects. As the
divine substance is one, the will, the intellect of God
is one also. As that substance is distinguished into
three supposita, agents, or subjects, each having
his own will and understanding, there are three
almighty wills, three all-comprehensive understand
ings. Where is the use, where is the honesty, of
disputing about the words person, substance, suppo-
situm, hypostasis, and the like, when this plain
contradiction lurks beneath them. We spurn from
us these weapons of deceit, these instruments of
disguise, these " great swelling words of vanity,"
and ask, does the union of substance which the
Trinitarian contends for, issue in, or does it imply, a
unity of will and intelligence ? Is not the divine
will, is not the divine intelligence, as much one as
the substance is one ? We challenge the Trinitarian
world to deny it. These are essential attributes,
t1) "You go on to speak of the Son's exercising the Father's
power : right, because the Father's and his are one. You add, ' by
the Father's will :' yes, and by his own too, for both are the same,
because their substance is one." — Waterland. Works, vol ii. pp.
458, 459.

70 WATERLAND.
and, we repeat, as much one as the essence or
substance is one. There is therefore but one divine
will, one divine intellect ; and the Persons cannot
be three intelligent agents, subjects, or supposita,
having each his own will and intellect.
Waterland argues that we cannot prove the doctrine
of the Trinity contradictory, because we cannot
"fix any certain principle of individuation." This
he repeats again and again. But we may argue upon
supposition. And so long as we take our hypotheses
from our adversaries, they at least cannot justly
quarrel with the conclusions which logically flow
from them.
We are of course aware, that there are those who
disclaim all knowledge of the nature of the proper
ties which belong to and distinguish the divine
persons. These will come under our notice in a
subsequent chapter. We have here had to do with
Waterland.

CHAPTER III.

§ 1. In this chapter we propose to examine the
doctrine of Sherlock, in his Work, entitled " The
Present State of the Socinian Controversy ;" one of
those later pieces of his, in which he has been said to
have expressed himself more conformably than before,
to orthodox usage. The reader will find some
striking points of resemblance between him and
Waterland ; and, it is believed, no feeble confir
mation of an impression which must already have
begun to make itself felt, namely, that the contra
diction charged on Waterland, and shewn to be vital
to his system, is vital to the system of Trinitarian
orthodoxy in general.
Thus, in this work Sherlock so far defers to his an
tagonists as to acknowledge, that the terms " three
substances," " three minds," were better let alone :
(p. 112.) and even that they are not altogether
proper, (p. 371.) God, he says, is " a most simple,
uncompounded Being:" (p. 245.) nay, a pure, simple,

72 SHERLOCK.
indivisible monad ;" (pp. 187. 189.) " a perfect, indi
visible unit ;" (p. 350.) one, not " in notion " only,
but " in truth and reality," " actually " and " essen
tially ;" " one in number." (pp. 180. 181. 183.) He
asserts, with South, that the divine nature is not
multiplied in the Persons ; which he allows would
be to multiply Gods : (p. 215.) and therefore declares
it is a great mistake, to suppose the Fathers taught a
proper specific unity ; which he confesses again and
again, it would be impossible to vindicate from the
charge of Tritheism.
Extraordinary statements to the same effect occur
in his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, the
work in which he first broached his hypothesis : —
such as, that the essence of God is numerically one ;
(pp. 48 — 50.) that the unity of the three Persons is
that of an individual Mind ; (pp. 130 — 138.) and
that. a merely specific unity is not enough to serve
the cause of Trinitarianism. (pp. 114, 115.) In this
work however he is nevertheless positive that the
three divine persons are three infinite minds; and
therefore places their unity in their mutual conscious
ness.'1' " I plainly assert," he says, " that as the
Father is an eternal and infinite mind, so the Son
is an eternal and infinite mind, distinct from the
Father, and the Holy Ghost is an eternal and infinite
mind, distinct both from Father and Son." (p. 101.)
In like manner he affirms, in the work we are now
<" Vid. ubi supr. pp. 48—50. also pp. 68. 84. 92. 100.

PERSONS DISTINCT IN SUBSTANCE. 73
to examine, that the divine persons are distinct in
substance, and even as distinct in substance as in
person : while, nevertheless, and as elsewhere, he
professedly eschews all idea of composition in the
Deity, and condemns the hypothesis of Howe, as
one form of Sabellianism.
He reasoned thus. The plain and proper Catholic
doctrine is, that the Father is God, the Son God,
the Holy Ghost God, each perfect God : and one
not the other. That is, as he understood it, that
each one is- by himself, whatever is essentially inclu
ded in the notion of God.'1'
" But now," he says, " we can form no idea of God
without perfect life and being : for whatever else, accor
ding to our imperfect manner of conceiving, is contained
in the idea of God, is nonsense and contradiction without
it. Infinite wisdom, and infinite power, and infinite
goodness, is the idea of nothing, without eternal and
necessary being; and an infinitely perfect nothing is a
contradiction in the very notion. But infinite perfect
life and being includes all other perfections, and is the
most simple and comprehensive idea of God ; for what
ever perfectly is, is whatever is any real perfection. So
that there is no foundation nor any occasion for those
distinctions of nature, essence, substance, existence, sub
sistence in God : for his essence, nature, substance, is his
being ; and his being is his perfect existence and subsist
ence." (p. 14.) For, he supposes, " it will admit of no
dispute, whether the Father who is God, be essence,
substance, subsistence ; or whether the Son who is God,
be essence, substance, subsistence ; and so in like manner
M Page 13. See also pp. 31. 32. 54. 146. 150. 254.

74 SHERLOCK.
the Holy Ghost. For this signifies no more than to be,
in the most perfect and absolute sense of being ; which is
the first and most simple idea of God, Absolute Essence
and Being. So that if the Father is, the Son is, the
Holy Ghost is ; each of them is essence, subsistence,
substance, in the most perfect and absolute sense of these
words. For if each of them is, and each of them is God,
each of them is only in that notion of being, which is
included in the idea of God." (p. 16.)
Sherlock therefore maintained, with Augustin, that
" when we say the person of the Father, we mean
nothing else but the substance of the Father :" (p.
17.) that, " to be, and to be a person, is the same
thing in God :" (ibid.) and therefore that it is very
difficult to find a term which we may unexceptionably
use of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the
plural form ; there being no reason in the nature of
things, why we should say three persons, rather than
three essences, or three Gods.'1' He therefore lays
down the following proposition, and enters at large
into the proof of it : that " what the Fathers and the
Schools call a divine person, is the divine essence
and substance ; and nothing more." See pp. 260 —
273. Whence it clearly follows, that when it is said
of the divine persons that one is not the other, the
words are as properly applicable to the essence as
the person : so that they are as truly three essences
(') " St. Austin could give no reason why we say three Persons and
not three essences, or three Gods, but only this : that since we
acknowledge there are three, it is fitting to agree upon some common
name to denote the Trinity by, and ecclesiastical use had given this
signification to the word Person." — p. 10

PERSONS DISTINCT IN SUBSTANCE. 75
or substances as three persons ; and being intelligent,
three intelligent substances ; that is, as he had as
serted in his earlier work, three infinite minds or
spirits. Thus he says in the present treatise : —
" All the philosophy of the ancient fathers, would not
allow of any difference between the person of the Father,
and his being, essence, substance, subsistence, nature ;
or between the person of the Son, and his being, sub
sistence, nature, &c. : and therefore the Son is as distinct
from the Father in nature, being, life, substance, as in
person and subsistence." (pp. 177, 178.)
" To talk of three distinct beings, substances, minds or
spirits, may be misrepresented by perverse wits'1' to
the prejudice of the divine unity ; though the Catholic
fathers, (beside hypostasis,) did not scruple to use the
same, or other equivalent expressions, concerning the
Holy Trinity, when they disputed against the Sabellians.
Yet if we believe a Trinity, whether we will or no, we
must acknowledge three, each of which perfectly is, or is
perfect being ; and no one is the other. For if we deny
this, we must either deny that the Father is, or that the
Son is, or that the Holy Ghost is : and to deny either of
these is to deny a Trinity. If it be objected against this,
that, (according to St. Austin's notion, that to be, to live,
to understand, &c, is one and the same in God,) it is
equivalent to asserting three distinct substances, minds,
spirits, &c, in the Trinity, I cannot help it." (pp. 20, 21.)
t1) This is speaking theologice : and resembles, we suppose, the
aspersions often cast by politicians on each other ; and which they
are sometimes careful to say, are to be understood politically, and not
as intended to leave any stain on the moral character. In place
therefore of the words, "may be misrepresented by perverse wits,
&c," We may read if we please, " may appear to many upright minds
as prejudicial, &c." But it would he well, if both politicians and
theologians would pay more regard to the Scripture precept, " Speak
not evil one of another, brethren."

76 SHERLOCK.
" Now, as for these terms of three substances and three
minds, there may be good reason to let them .alone ;
though when rightly explained, no reason to condemn
them of heresy. But we must insist on three distinct,
infinite, intelligent, substantial persons ; each of which is
mind and substance ; and one is not the other. They who
disown this are downright Sabellians." (p. 112.)
" It is very difficult what three to call Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost, so as to avoid the heresies of both extremes.
For there is no example of such three in nature. They
are certainly three, for the Father is not the Son,
nor the Holy Ghost ; each of the three is perfect God,
and therefore an infinite mind, an infinite spirit, and
the most perfect essence and substance : and that sub
stance which is the person of the Son, is not that
substance which is the person of the Father, any more than
the person of the Son is the person of the Father, or
an unbegotten is a begotten nature and substance."'1'
(p. 198.)
Accordingly he truly remarks, that although \i.ia
ovo-ia, fiCa (pvais, and rpels viroarAcreis, is the ordinary
phraseology of Catholicism, yet that we sometimes
meet in undoubted Catholic writers with the direct
contrary expressions ; such as rpets ovaiai, rpeis <pv<reis,
and joua v-noo-rao-is .- (p. 261.) that in like manner
ovala and cpvo-is, are sometimes applied to the Persons
individually : (p. 264.) and that all those words
<') It will be observed that in this last extract, there occurs the
exact language which Jackson uses in representing his notion of
Waterland's doctrine : though Waterland himself was careful not to
apply the words essence and substance to either of the Persons, with
the indefinite article prefixed. But whether in this, his candour was
as conspicuous as his caution, and whether after all, his candour
gained him any more than a poor verbal advantage, are questions
which we think may be safely left to the judgment of the reader.

PERSONS DISTINCT IN SUBSTANCE. 77
which are more peculiarly appropriated to signify
the divine persons, were always used by Catholic
writers in the notion of substance, and were never
thought Catholic in any other sense, (pp. 265. 267.)
Further, he contends that the Fathers, in opposing
the Sabellians, plainly used the word person in the
sense in which the Sabellians used it. For otherwise,
he says, " they must have wrangled about words,
without truly opposing one another." (p. 126.) He
proceeds to rehearse some of the arguments by
which they opposed the Sabellian scheme, and thus
continues : —
" From these we learn not only what these writers
thought of the distinction of persons between Father and
Son, but what kind of person they believed the Son to be ;
such a person as has a personal knowledge, and will, and
power ; who is capable of being sent, of receiving and
executing commands ; and has all this as distinctly in
himself, as he is a distinct person. The Father knows
the Son, and the Son knows the Father; but each of
them knows by his own personal knowledge : the Father
wills, and the Son wills, and wills all the same with the
Father ; but each of them wills by his own personal
will : the Father works, and the Son works, and they
inseparably do the same things ; but each of them works
by his own personal power. Power, knowledge, and
will, and power of acting, are essential to the notion of
a person : therefore every distinct person must have
a distinct personal knowledge, and will, and power : and
those must acknowledge this, who prove the distinction
of Persons from distinct personal acts, as all these Fathers
did." (pp. 130, 131.) Again he says: — "The Sabellians
would have allowed a Trinity of Persons in any other

78 SHERLOCK.
notion of person, than as person signifies a real, sub
sisting, intelligent being. But the Catholic Fathers
would own no other notion of person but this : and
taught that there were three persons in the Trinity, in
the same sense in which the Sabellians denied there were
three persons ; three such persons as they affirmed there
was but one : that the Son and Holy Ghost were divine
persons in the same sense that the Sabellians owned the
Father to be a person ; that is, three such persons as
they called three Gods." (p. 135.)
In like manner, when treating of the Arians, he
affirms that the Catholics had no quarrel with them
as it respects the nature of the Son's personality: both
sides agreeing that he is a substantial person. This,
he truly says, is supposed in the very disputes,
otherwise ludicrous, which were agitated between the
Catholics and their subtle opponents, and adds : —
" Could any one in their senses dispute such matters,
unless both sides were agreed, that the Son is a real,
substantial son, as human sons are, who are begotten of
the substance of their parents ; that he has a subsistence
of his own, distinct from his Father's subsistence ; that
he has a substance of his own, eternally begotten of his
Father's substance, and therefore the same," (specifically,)
" but proper mi peculiar to his own person. * * * If he
have no substance of his own, is it not ludicrous to dispute
whether he be of the Father, that is, have his substance
of his Father's substance, or be a new created substance.
For if he have no distinct substance of his own, neither
of these can be true." (p. 169.)
He tells us therefore, as other Catholic authorities
have done also, that the word consubstantiality
answers to c-juoios Kara irdvra ; and even to ofioiovo-ios,

PERSONS DISTINCT IN SUBSTANCE. 79
when strictly interpreted, that is, when interpreted
to signify perfect likeness and equality of nature.
(pp. 160, 161.) He observes, that Dionysius of
Alexandria, accurately expresses the doctrine deno
ted by this word, (consubstantiality,) in the extract
which Athanasius gives from his letter to his name
sake of Rome; wherein Dionysius plainly makes
the relation between the Father and Son to be that of
homogeneity, (pp. 167, 168.) He avers, that the
Catholic Fathers applied the word to things which
are one by a specific unity alone : (p. 170.) — that
they vary it by other words which unquestionably
signify specific union : (p. 171.) — that the divine
essence is universally acknowledged by the Catholic
Fathers, to be a common nature ; (p. 171.) that is,
according to Basil, such a nature as has the same
notion or definition ; (p. 173.) and that if this does
not signify a specific unity, all our logics deceive us :
(p. 174.) — and lastly, that the Catholics universally
held the Son to be begotten as to substance ; whence
it must follow, that the substance of the Son is not
the substance of the Father, which is unbegotten.
(pp. 175— 179.)'1'
These things would seem decisive beyond all
question, as to the specific unity of the three Persons,
and their consequent plurality in respect of nature.
And yet, as we have seen, Sherlock in this work
teaches imperatively, that the divine nature is
<¦' See Appendix A.

80 SHERLOCK.
strictly and individually one, "so one individual,"
he says, (p. 353.) " as human nature is one in one
man." Accordingly, the section which immediately
follows those to which our last references have been
made, is devoted to prove, that " by the Homoousion
the Nicene Fathers did not understand a merely
specific, but a natural unity and sameness of substance
between Father and Son.'"1' On this head he thus
writes : —
"But yet, after all this, the Catholic Fathers did not
allow the divine nature in a strict and proper notion to
be a species ; which is only a notional and logical unity
and sameness of nature. For the divine nature which
is perfect essence, is not logically but essentially one;
though it subsists distinctly in three persons. On this
one point, he says, the whole controversy turns, concern
ing the singularity of the divine nature, or the plurality
of divine natures multiplied with the persons : and
consequently that great controversy of all, whether a
trinity of true, real, substantial persons, he essentially
one, or three Gods.
" To represent this as plainly as I possibly can, we
must consider the difference between a specific and a
natural unity : between being one in notion, and one in
nature. The first is when from that agreement which we
observe in the natures of several individuals, we form
a notion of one common nature which belongs to them
all : as the notion of humanity or human nature which
belongs to all men, and affords a common name and a
common definition to them. But this is only the work of
the mind ; for there is no such one common human nature
actually existing in all mankind : but every man is a man
0) Chap. iv. sec. 5.

CONTRADICTION. 81
by himself, and has a particular human nature, as he has
a soul and body of his own, which is not the soul and
body of any other man in the world. And thus Damascen
owns it is with all creatures of the same kind : who in
truth and reality are distinct separate beings, who subsist
apart by themselves, as Peter and Paul and all other
men do ; and are united only in a common notion,' not in
a common subsisting nature, which is one and the same
in all."
" But then he (Damascen) tells us, that it is quite
otherwise in the divine nature ; which is a common
nature, and yet but one ; not kmvo\a, but irpdy/iaTi ; not
merely in our notion and conception, but in truth and
reality ; the same one divine nature, without the least
diversity or separation, actually and distinctly subsisting
in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost : which being perfectly
the same, is but one ; and really and substantially subsist
ing in three, is a common nature, which is equally and
perfectly in them all :" (pp. 180, 181.) or as he elsewhere
says, (p. 236.) " as perfectly, wholly, indivisihly, the
same in all and in each of the divine persons, as a
specific nature is notionally and ideally one and the same,
in every individual of the same kind."
This idea he repeats in a variety of places : as
earlier in this Work, at p. 26., and again in the
Section just before named, at p. 194.
" All men who know anything of the divine nature,
know that God is the most simple, pure, uncompounded
being : and if God who has no parts, and cannot be
divided into any, begets a Son, he must communicate his
whole undivided nature to him. For to beget a Son is to
communicate his own nature to him : and if he have no
parts, he cannot communicate a part, but must communi
cate the whole ; that is, he must communicate his whole
self, and be a second self in his Son." " Now a whole,

82 SHERLOCK.
and a whole of a whole, are certainly two : but not two
natures, but one nature ; not merely specifically, but
identically one. For it is impossible, that a whole which
is communicated without division or separation, should
have the least diversity from itself; so as to become
another nature from itself. For a whole of a whole must
be perfectly and identically the same with that whole of
which it is : for a whole can be but one. This is that
TnuT&Tijs ovaias, sameness and identity of nature, which the
Fathers assert; and whereon they found the unity of
God." " The Son is truly and properly begotten, receives his
whole being and nature from his Father, is substance of
his Father's substance, whole of whole, and therefore
one and the same substance with the Father ; not that
substance which is the person of the Father, nor a new
or another separate substance, as it is in human generations,
but the nature and substance of the Father, born and
repeated in the nativity of the Son, as Hilary speaks.
The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are hut one divinity,
one infinite, eternal nature and substance : but they are
thrice this one substance ; and as perfectly and distinctly
three, in this one substance, as any other three are three
substances."'1' He calls the divine nature, therefore, " a common
subsisting nature;" and thereupon, very sensibly
asks, a little before, in the same section : —
" But what possible sense can we make of this ? — one
common subsisting nature, which is really, actually, in-
divisibly one, and yet is common — that is, does really and
distinctly subsist in more than one. To be common, and
to be one, not in notion as a species, but in the truth and
reality of nature, sounds very like a contradiction. When
t") See also pp. 29—32. 47. 48. 191. 216. 230.

CONTRADICTION. 83
we say the divine nature is common to three persons,
and subsists distinctly in them, we deny it to be one
singular solitary nature. * * * But how then can this
common nature, which is not singular,'1' but subsists
perfectly and distinctly in three, he actually and essentially
one ? For a natural unity is a numerical unity, is one in
number, which one would think should signify a singular
nature ; for so it does in all creatures. And when we
speak of the unity of the divine nature, it cannot he
one by composition, which the absolute simplicity of the
divine nature cannot admit. This is the great difficulty,
&c." (p. 183.)
He warns us again, a little further on in the same
section, that there is no such unity as this in created
nature, and therefore no name for it: but then
presently subjoins : —
" Could we conceive one individual human nature,
which originally constitutes but one person, to communi
cate itself whole and entire without division or separation,
to two other persons ; we must acknowledge three human
persons, each of whom is distinctly and by himself true
and perfect man, but not three men. For man is a name
of nature, and if persons can be multiplied without
multiplying the nature, (as we at present suppose,) there
must be three human persons in one individual human
nature ; that is, three persons and one man : but not
three men, any more than three human natures."
" Thus it is with respect to the divine nature.
Were there three individual divine natures, self-originated
and independent on each other, though perfectly the
same in their notion and definition : — three such persons
(D " Singular and common," he says, " are express contradictions."
(p. 263.) Individual and common, it appears, are not contradictory.
For the divine nature, as he tells us, is " one common individual."
(p. 216.) But we must not say it is common and singular.

84 SHERLOCK.
would be as perfectly three Gods, as three human persons
that have three individual human natures, are three men.
But whereas the Scripture teaches, and the Catholic
Church has always believed, there is but one infinite, self-
originated divine nature, originally in the Father, and
by communication in the Son and Holy Spirit, these
three divine persons are each of them true and perfect
God ; but not three Gods : because they have not three
individual divine natures, but one divine nature subsisting
distinctly, but whole and perfect in them all." (pp. 199,
200.) " And though one man, who is but one individual
human nature, cannot be subdivided into three proper
individuals : yet to conceive one individual human nature,
to be communicated whole and entire, without division
or separation, to two others, is the truest image of three
distinct persons in one individual essence ; and the only
possible explication of totus ex toto, whole of whole, which
is the true Catholic faith." (p. 202.)
Now, in these extracts, what have we but the
identical doctrine of Waterland, only more plainly
and unguardedly expressed ? For, should it be
asked, as has been done in the case of Waterland,
whether the divine persons are, according to Sher
lock's exposition, distinct from each other in nature
and perfections, the answer must certainly be, yes
and no. They are not distinct. For a whole of a
whole, which is perfectly and numerically the same
as the whole of which it is, certainly can be but one.
The divine nature, as we have already noticed, is
not multiplied in the persons : but on the contrary,
and whether considered in the Father or the Son,
it is one ; one ' in reality ' and ' truth,' and not ' in
notion' only, — 'a pure, simple, indivisible monad,'

CONTRADICTION. 85
— the same in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, — ' one
in number.' And yet, the Son has ' a substance of
his own,' and is as ' distinct ' from the Father ' in
substance as in person.' His substance is begotten ;
that of the Father is not begotten. ' Every distinct
person must have a distinct personal knowledge,
will, and power.' The divine nature is not ' singular.'
This ' whole,' this ' monad,' is ' thrice subsisting.'
So that the Father and Son are, as Sherlock ex
pressly calls them, ' two perfect sames,' (p. 230.): that
is, the one is the other, and the one is not the
other. The one is the other: for otherwise they
would not be the same. The one is not the other :
for otherwise they would not be two.
This is no seeming contradiction, — a difficulty, such
as a modest mind may be content to bear with, in a
subject of such sublimity as the nature of God. It
is the identical contradiction which we have traced
in the pages of Waterland ; and is here so clearly
shown to have its roots in the heart of the Trinitarian
system, that it ought to make every Trinitarian
pause. Let us look at it in the light of the illus
tration which the author himself employs ; and
which, stripped of ambiguity and circumlocution, is
this : — that if we can conceive of one individual
human being so communicating himself, as to con
stitute another individual human being, which yet
shall not be another, but still the same individual
human being ; or, if we can conceive of one man
becoming two other men, without being multiplied,

86 SHERLOCK.
divided, or ceasing to be himself, — then, (and who
will question it? the man who has swallowed one
camel may swallow another,) — then, we may con
ceive of the divine essence, which is the essence
of the Father, so communicating itself, as to con
stitute two other essences, which are the persons
of the Son and Holy Spirit ; but which, never
theless, are not two other essences, but still the
same original essence ; ' repeated,' (that is the word)
but not multiplied, — ' subsisting in three,' and there
fore not singularly one, yet not three because
numerically one : — that is, (if words have meaning,)
multiplied and not multiplied ; repeated and not
repeated ; numerically one, and yet numerically
three. § 2. Sherlock's efforts to extricate himself from
this dilemma were unwearied, and sufficiently attest
his secret sense of the danger which it threatened to
his cause. For like Waterland, he felt that that
cause could not stand under the weight of an ab
solute contradiction.'1'
We shall not oppose ourselves to him on all those
<!> " A contradiction is to deny and affirm the same thing in the
same sense ; as to say that a thing is and is not, at the same time ;
that there is but one God, and that there are three Gods ; that is,
that there is and that there is not but one God, for if there be three
Gods, then it is not true that there is but only one God. Things
which are so contrary as to contradict each other, can never be both
true ; for all contradictions finally resolve into this, — it is and it is
not, which is absolutely impossible." Sherlock in his Vindication, p. 2.
" I grant that all logical contradictions which are resolved into is
and is not, are impossible to be believed, because they are impossible
to be true." Present State, &c. p. 83.

RELATIVE SUBSTANCES. 87
points of his defence, wherein we think him vul
nerable. It will be enough to notice that on which
he clearly placed the highest value, and which, in
military phrase, may be called the key to his entire
position : we mean the distinction which he draws
between absolute and relative substances. Indeed,
he says expressly, towards the end of his work, that
the whole dispute about one substance or three
substances in the Godhead, is to be resolved into
this distinction, (p. 379.) ; and even that " it is the
only distinction he knows of in the Godhead."
(p. 384.) We have heard him asserting that there
is no room for the distinction of substance and
subsistence in God ; and that ' a divine person is the
divine essence or substance, and nothing else.' And
yet afterwards he finds he cannot do without some
distinction of the kind. Nay, he finds himself so
hardly pressed, that he is obliged to allow that the
Trinity cannot be maintained without it. (pp. 298.
336. 350.) But then he is careful to add, that the
words themselves, by which this distinction is com
monly expressed, give him no insight into the nature
of the distinction : (which we daresay is not far from
the truth;) and thereupon he resolves it altogether
into the distinction of absolute and relative. The
consubstantiality, the. identity of nature, the em
perichoresis, the unity of operation, — all, he tells us,
are inexplicable, except to those who have learned to
distinguish between absolute and relative substances.

88 SHERLOCK.
In short, this distinction is to him as a refuge for the
destitute, where the hardly pressed theologian .may
shelter, and rest " secure," as he says, " both from
a Sabellian singularity, and a tritheistic trinity of
absolute divinities." (p. 384.)
What then are we to understand by relative sub
stances ? Relative substances, be it observed, and
substantial or subsisting relations, are phrases which
denote the same thing. They intend relations which
are both relation and substance too.
" The easiest representation of this," Sherlock tells
us, " is the relation between the prototype and its image ;
which is not a mere relation of similitude, but of origina
tion, the image being taken from the original, which is
the foundation of the relation. Though two eggs were
never so perfectly alike, yet one is not the image of the
other, because it is not of the other nor its natural
representation, though perfectly like it. But the image
is that which results from the object, like a face in the
glass, or the impression of a seal : and the whole essence
of such an image, as an image, is relative. And it is the
same case as to a living substantial image of that life and
substance from which it proceeds. It is as perfect life
and substance itself as its original, or else it could not be
a natural image of life and substance : but yet it is relative
life and substance ; life of life ; the prototype begetting
its own image in a perfect identity and sameness of
nature ; whole of whole. And this is the notion of the
schools respecting relative substances, which is intelligible
enough." (pp. 282, 283.)
Again, " By an absolute substance, I mean one entire,
perfect, individual whole, which is complete in itself,
and subsists completely by itself, without any internal
essential union to, or necessary dependence on, any being

RELATIVE SUBSTANCES. 89
of the same kind. By relative substances, I mean such
substances as are internal, subsisting relations in the same
one, whole, individual nature. Of absolute substances
we have as many instances as there are particular crea
tures in the world. Of relative substances we have no
instance in created nature ; but some such images and
resemblances, as may help us to form an intelligible
notion of them. Now it is evident without any need to
prove it, that every complete, absolute substance, how
many soever they are, multiplies the individuals of the
same kind. Three absolute, human substances are three
men : and three absolute, divine substances would, for the
same reason, he three Gods. But it is otherwise as to
relative substances, which are subsisting, personal relations
in the same one individual nature : and it is demonstrable
that the relations of the same individual nature and sub
stance cannot multiply natures and substances ; for then
they would not be relations in the same individual sub
stance, but would be absolute not relative substances."
As an image of these relative substances, he then adduces
the faculties of memory, understanding, and will ; or,
mind, knowledge, and love : of which he says, " it is
evident they are very distinct, and never can be each
other ; yet all have a necessary and mutual relation to each
other, are in each other, and equal to each other, but are
but one mind, one life, one essence, and one substance."
Upon this he asks, " whether if instead of these distinct
powers and faculties, there were real, subsisting persons,
as essentially related to each other in the same individual
nature, they would any more divide or multiply nature,
than such distinct powers and faculties do ? " He deter
mines in the negative, and remarks that " if these divine
persons," (we see here again what virtue there is in an if)
" are as essentially related to each other in the divine
nature, as such distinct powers and faculties are in human
nature, a trinity of persons must be as essentially one in

90 SHERLOCK.
the same one individual divinity, as a trinity of powers
and faculties are in the same single human nature. * * *
This shows the difference between absolute and relative
substances. Three absolute substances are always dis
tinctly and separably three, and never can be any otherwise
than specifically one. But relative substances may be
essentially one in the same one individual nature. And
this is the account both the Fathers, and the Schools give
of a Trinity in Unity ; — three relations, or three relative
substances, or subsistences,'' (or rather " one absolute
substance and two relative substances," as we shall
shortly find him saying,) " essentially related to each other
in the unity of the same one individual essence." (pp.
287—290.) Again, " Our great difficulty concerns the unity and
distinction of the ever blessed Trinity, that they are
really and distinctly three, and essentially one : and this
is represented by one nature, essence, and substance, and
three hypostases ; and yet hypostasis signifies substance,
and every divine hypostasis is the whole divine essence
and substance. Now if we immediately contemplate this
mystery under the notion of substance, it is impossible
for us to conceive one substance and three hypostases,
that is, in some sense three substances; or which is all
one as to the difficulty of conceiving it, (though the form
of expression is more Catholic,) three, each of which is
the whole essence and substance, arid neither of them is
each other : we may turn over our minds as long as we
please, and change words and phrases, but we can find no
idea to answer these, or any other words of this nature.
But now if instead of substance and hypostasis, we put
mind and its word, we can form a very intelligible notion
of this unity and distinction. * * * For eternal, original
mind, and its living, subsisting word, are certainly two ;
and neither are nor can be each other : and yet we must
all grant that eternal mind is the most real being, essence,

RELATIVE SUBSTANCES. 91
substance, and that a living, subsisting word is life, being,
substance, and the very same life and substance that the
mind is, and all the mind is." (pp. 330, 331.) "For
though the word of God be a person, which a man's
word" (say a man's reason) " is not, yet if his true nature
and character is the word, he is the same to the eternal
mind which a man's word (reason) is to his created mind :
and therefore God and his living, subsisting Word must
be one individual essence, as a man's mind and his word
(reason) are one.'' (p. 327.)
Once more, "Substance when it stands by itself, signifies
absolutely, and so three substances are three absolute
substances ; three human substances, three humanities ;
and three divine substances three divinities ; and therefore
we must not without great caution, say three substances
in the Trinity, for fear of asserting three Gods. But yet
we must own that each Person is true and perfect sub
stance. Both the Fathers and schools own this : and
three in substance are three substances, though not
three absolute but relative substances ; three subsisting
relations in the unity of the divine essence and substance.
Though in proper speaking, we cannot say three relative
substances : for though the Father speaks a relation to
the Son and Holy Spirit, it is as he is the fountain of the
Deity, — original, absolute divinity, essence, substance, in
his own person, not a relative subsistence ; and therefore
in the blessed Trinity there is one absolute substance,
absolute divinity, and two relative substances ; as there
are two internal substantial relations in the unity of
the same substance.
" And to prevent mistakes I must here remark, that by
absolute we do not mean complete and perfect. For so
the Son is absolute substance, and the Holy Spirit abso
lute substance, complete and perfect substance, as each of
them in his own person is true and perfect God : in which
sense St. Austin tells us that persona ad se dicitur, — that

92 SHERLOCK.
person is predicated absolutely, — that every Person as
considered in himself is a person, and not merely as
related to another. But when we say there is but one
absolute substance in the Godhead, by absolute we mean
original, (as I have already explained it,) as distinguished
from relative processions ; as the original is distinguished
from the image, though the image, (if a living, subsisting
image,) is as complete and perfect nature and substance as
the original is. And this is the only difference I know
between substance, nature, essence ; and suppositum, sub
ject, &c, &c." (pp. 379, 380.)
We may then observe of these relative substances,
or, as Sherlock sometimes calls them, these substan
tial processions — the Word and Spirit, that they
are certainly real substances. For when it is said
they are not absolute, all that is meant is that they
are not original. Accordingly the Author may be
found at p. 364, asserting, that " the eternal Word
has all the perfections of an eternal mind ;" and
again, at p. 371, that though the eternal Mind with
its eternal Word and Spirit, " cannot properly be
called three infinite minds and spirits,," yet that "the
eternal, subsisting Word is an infinite mind" not
withstanding, " and so the eternal, subsisting Spirit."
His doctrine in these extracts, is in fact identical
with what may be found in his Vindication. For
there he speaks of the Son as the reflex knowledge
of the eternal mind, and the Spirit as the love which
that mind must have to itself and its image, (p. 261.)
But then he is careful to tell us, that " what are
faculties in us, are persons in God :" (p. 189.) " and

RELATIVE SUBSTANCES. 93
thus," he says, " all three divine persons are holy
minds and spirits, essentially united into one infinite
mind and spirit." (p. 259.)
Now upon this we remark : —
1. That a mind whose powers of (let us say)
reason and love, are supposed to be elevated into
distinct minds, having their own powers of reason
and love, with all that is necessary to constitute them
complete and perfect minds, would be so entirely sui
generis, that nothing could be inferred respecting its
individual unity, from the individual unity of an
ordinary mind.
2. That the notion is a contradictory one. For
it supposes certain faculties of an individual mind to
be raised into distinct minds, and yet to remain the
faculties of the parent mind.'1'
3. That a similar contradiction belongs also to the
other illustration, — that of a living, subsisting image.
It is true that a man and his image in a glass are two,
and yet not two men; because the image in the
mirror has no substantial existence. It is a reflection,
and no more. Wherefore its whole essence may be
said to be relative : if any choose this mode of

<') Sherlock indeed denied that, properly speaking, there are facul
ties in God. "Whatever is in him," he says, "is essence and substance
— a pure and simple act." — Vindication, p. 129. But however this
may be, it is plain that each Person, as an infinite mind, has in himself
what answers to these faculties in us : which is enough for our argu
ment. For here is first, the parent mind with what answers to these
faculties of reason and love in us. Then, secondly, here are these
representatives of our faculties, elevated into distinct minds, having
each its own representative faculties. Now this is to suppose them
distinct and perfect minds themselves, and yet only such partial con
ceptions of an independent mind, as our faculties are of our minds.

94 SHERLOCK.
speaking. It is wholly dependent on its original ;
and has no existence apart from its original. But it
is not so with a living, subsisting image, such as the
Son is allowed to be. He has existence in himself, —
necessary existence. His whole essence therefore is
not relative : and to suppose it so, is to suppose him
to be unsubstantial, when he is affirmed to be sub
stantial -
4. That, (returning to the former illustration,)
if the powers themselves of the original mind are
not supposed to be actually transformed into real
minds, but only to afford an example of the relation
which the derivative minds bear to the primitive, —
the thing is inconceivable : — namely, that one mind
should bear the same relation to another mind as its
own powers bear to itself. They are itself: as
Sherlock argues in one part of this Work, where he
says, that " to live, to understand, and to be, are the
same thing in God." (p. 18.) Whereas two minds
are two selfs : and Sherlock himself tells us, he
cannot see how it is possible to deny three selfs in
the unity of the Godhead, without denying a Trinity.
(p. 21.)
5. That if the hypothesis be made to speak out,
what it proposes will be found to be, a triad of
minds : all absolute in the sense of complete and
perfect ; one absolute and original, the other two
absolute and derivative. If this is not Tritfieism,
it is because it is Semi- Arianism.'1'
W Appendix B.

COMPOSITION. 95
It will not serve the author to say, that two of
these minds are supposed to belong essentially to the
individual nature of the original mind. This how
ever is his plea : and so he distinguishes between the
essential perfections or properties of the divine
nature, and what he calls its essential productions.
(p. 356.) The divine nature with the essential
perfections, or the attributes usually ascribed to
Deity, is common to all the divine persons, and
therefore 'not singular.' (Ibid.) But the divine
nature considered in its entirety, and as inclusive of
the essential processions or productions, is singular,
— ' one numerically,' — one ' as human nature in
every particular man is one.' (Ibid. See also pp. 353.
367.) This is exactly after the manner of Howe : though
a difference may be observed between the schemes of
the two men in this respect ; — that whereas, according
to Howe, the supreme and comprehending essence is
neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost,
Sherlock represents it as being the Father. Thus he
says, (p. 373.) " I take the name God always to
signify a person in whom the divine nature is : not
the divinity in the abstract." And upon this he
asks, — " But in what sense then can we say that the
Trinity is one God, or that three persons are one
God? Will we say that the Trinity or the three
persons are but one person ? No ! and yet in this
proposition, the Trinity is one God, — by one God I
understand one who is absolutely God, one absolute

96 SHERLOCK.
divinity which is the Father ; who has indeed a Son
and Spirit in the unity of his own nature and
Godhead, each of which is true and perfect God, but
not a second and third God, but the Son of God and
the Spirit of God, divine subsisting relations in the
one absolute Godhead of the Father, (p. 374.) And
again shortly after, " There is one God, because
there is one divinity, and there is one God, because
there is one Father ; which are not two different
reasons, but one and the same : whence it necessarily
follows, that this one divinity is the divinity of the
Father, and that this one God in Trinity is the
Father." Now we grant that this hypothesis is free from the
objection of making a Fourth God. But it is bur
dened with another as great, namely, that it identifies
the Trinity with the Father.
But this, the author says, is not to make three
persons, one person. Perhaps, exactly speaking, it
is not. But we ask, would the Father be himself,
without his Word and Spirit ? Plainly not. For it
is with these that he is individually one. They are
therefore a part of himself. And yet the Father is
a person, and no more than a person : and the Son
is also a person, and the Holy Spirit a person.
Here are then three persons, two of whom help
to make the third and principal person ; usually
called by way of eminence the first person. We
will grant that this is not to make three persons, one
person. It is rather to make two persons, and

COMPOSITION. 97
something that taken alone is not a person, one
person. We give the author all the benefit of this
nice distinction : and still say, that, identifying the
Trinity with the Father, he has fallen into an error,
or rather a complication of errors, no less than those
which are chargeable on Howe. For how, we pray,
can the Son and Spirit be equal with the Father,
unless they include in themselves a Trinity like the
Father ? And how, not doing so, can they be perfect
God, whole of whole, each having the one divine
nature whole and entire in himself, seeing the
Father is not more than perfect God, and is the one
divine nature ? Moreover under what pretence
can it be denied that the Deity is complex ?
Sherlock was aware of his liability to the latter
charge, and made a desperate effort to escape it.
We shall transcribe what he says, at pp. 368, 369,
and leave it for the judgment of others.
" But is not this a kind of Sabellian composition of
a God ? — a whole divinity made up of three partial and
incomplete divinities ; which St. Austin calls a Triformis
Deus ? By no means. What is compounded is made up
of parts, which make a compound nature. But perfect
hypostases, however united, can make no composition.
However you unite James and John, you can never make
a compound man of them, because each of them has a
perfect human nature ; and, as Damascen observes, we do
not say the nature or species is made up of the hypostases,
but is in the hypostases : so that each divine person
being a complete and perfect hypostasis, having the whole
divine nature in himself as being true and perfect God,"
(that is, in the lower sense of divine nature,) " their

98 PEARSON.
union in the same individual nature," (the higher sense
of divine nature,) " though it makes them one essential
divinity, yet it cannot make a compound God. For
however their persons are united, the divinity or divine
nature is not compounded ; each of them being true and
perfect God," (obs. in the lower sense,) " and not one
God by composition, but by an individual unity of nature
in three. For every divine person is not God in the
same sense that every human person is a man, as having
an absolute, individual nature of his own. For in this
sense the Father alone is God, as being absolute, original
Divinity, — an eternal, self-originated mind : and three
such persons must be acknowledged to be three Gods.
But as I have been forced often to repeat it, the Son and
Holy Spirit are divine persons, as they are eternal, living,
subsisting processions in the divine nature : which proves
them to have the very same divinity, and to be one
individual divinity, but not a compound God. For one
individual nature in three, though distinguished into
distinct, subsisting persons, makes such a natural, in
separable unity of will, energy, and power, that they are
as perfectly one almighty agent, as every single person
is one agent."
With this we take our leave of a writer, whose
vacillations and crudities we should have had but
little inclination or patience to follow, were it not
that they are exhibited in defence of a system,
around which the religious sensibilities of so many
are entwined ; but which to our apprehension is rotten
at the core, and must ultimately fall, notwithstanding
the tender support of its numerous parasites.
§ 3. But after all, Sherlock's is not a name of the
highest order in the records of Trinitarianism. We

ONE IN KIND AND NUMBER. 99
have not devoted so many pages to him, on account
of his standing ; but for the reasons given at the
commencement of this chapter. Before however we
bring it to a close, we shall glance at two other
writers ; both of episcopal dignity in the Anglican
church : one of them, second in reputation (if second
at all) to Bull and Waterland only; and both, of
unimpeached orthodoxy. We speak of Pearson and
Beveridge. The work of the former on the Apostles' Creed, is
a standard book in Trinitarian libraries. It is the
product of a ripe judgment, is written in an apostolic
spirit, is full of erudition, and evinces particularly
an intimate acquaintance with the Trinitarian contro
versy. And yet we cannnot read far in this work,
without meeting with the identical contradiction
which we have found in Waterland and Sher
lock. Thus, under the first Article, ' I believe
in God the Father Almighty,' we may read the
following, on the relation subsisting between the
first and second persons.
" A further reason of the propriety of God's paternity
appears from this, that he hath begotten a Son of the
same nature and essence with himself, not only specifically
but individually : as I shall also demonstrate in the ex
position of the second Article. For generation being the
production of the like, and that likeness being the
similitude of substance, where is the nearest identity of
nature, there must be also the most proper generation ;
and consequently he which generateth, the most proper
father. If, therefore, man, who by the benediction of
God, given to him at his first creation in these words, —

100 PEARSON.
' Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth,' (Gen.
i. 28.) begetteth a son 'in his own likeness, after his
image,' (Gen. v. 3.) that is, of the same human nature,
of the same substance with him, (which if he did not, he
should not according to the benediction multiply himself
or man at all,) with which similitude of nature many
accidental disparities may consist ; if by this act of gen
eration he obtaineth the name of father, because and in
regard of the similitude of his nature in the son, how
much more properly must that name belong unto God
himself, who hath begotten a Son of a nature and essence
so totally like, so totally the same, that no accidental
disparity can imaginably consist with that identity. "fl)
If now we turn to the Bishop's commentary on
the second Article, we shall find him pursuing the
following train. First, he shows, or attempts to
show, that Jesus Christ had an existence before his
birth of Mary. He next proceeds to assert that this
existence which Christ had, was no other than the
divine essence ; which was communicated to him by
the Father. This communication, he then argues, is
the proper generation of the Son : and under this
head, writes thus : —
" Now, that the communication of the divine essence by
the Father was the true and proper generation by which'
he hath begotten the Son, will thus appear : because the
most proper generation that we know, is nothing else
but a vital production of another in the same nature "
(specific), " with a full representation of him from whom
he is produced. Thus man begetteth a son, that is,
produceth another man of the same human nature with
himself; and this production, as a perfect generation,

(i)

pp. 49, 50. edit. Dobson.

ONE IN KIND AND NUMBER. 101
becomes the foundation of the relation of paternity in
him that produceth, and of filiation in him that is pro
duced. Thus after the prolifical benediction, ' be fruitful
and multiply,' Adam begat in his own likeness, after his
image:1 (Gen. i. 28.; v. 3.) and by the continuation of
the same blessing, the succession of human generations
hath been continued. This then is the known confession
of all men, that a son is nothing but another produced by
his father, in the same nature " (specific) " with him.
" But God the Father hath communicated to the Word
the same divine essence by which he is God ; and con
sequently he is of the same nature" (specific) "with him,
and thereby the perfect image and similitude of him, and
therefore his proper Son. In human generations we may
conceive two kinds of similitude ; one in respect of the
internal nature, the other in reference to the external
form or figure. The former similitude is essential and
necessary ; it being impossible a man should beget a son,
and that son not be by nature a man: the latter accidental ;
not only the child sometimes representing this, sometimes
the other parent, but also oftentimes neither. The simi
litude then in which the propriety of generation is pre
served, is that which consisteth in the identity of nature "
(specific) : " and this communication of the divine essence
by the Father unto the Word, is evidently a sufficient
foundation of such a similitude ; from whence Christ is
called ' the image of God,' ' the brightness of his glory,
and the express image of his person.' (2 Cos. iv. 4. ;
Heb. i. 3.) "
He proceeds to show the superiority of the divine
generation above all other, and thereupon remarks : —
" In human generations the son is of the same nature
with the father, and yet is not the same man ; because
though he hath an essence of the same kind, yet he
hath not the same essence," (that is, not the same in
number) : " the power of generation depending on the

102 PEARSON.
first prolifical benediction, ' increase and multiply,' it
must be by way of multiplication, and thus every son
becomes another man. But the divine essence being by
reason of its simplicity not subject to division, and in
respect of its infinity incapable of multiplication, is so
communicated as not to be multiplied : insomuch that he
which proceedeth by that communication, hath not only
the same nature " (specifically), " but is also the same
God. The Father God, and the Son God ; Abraham
man, and Isaac man ; but Abraham one man, Isaac
another man : not so the Father one God, and the Word
another, but the Father and the Word both the same
God."'1' Here we have the doctrine plainly asserted, that
the Father and Son are the same God in number,
and the same in kind too. Nor is it difficult to
discern the train of thought which led the learned
Bishop to this conclusion. For the existence which
he claimed for the Son before his birth of Mary, was
plainly an existence distinct from that of the Father.
To have held otherwise would have been to take
sides with Sabellius and his allies, all of whom the
Bishop was too orthodox not to brand as heretics.'2'
Now the existence which the Son had before his
birth of -Mary, was, according to the Bishop, no
other than the divine essence itself. This he asserts
again and again.'3' The Son therefore must be as
distinct from the Father in essence as in existence.
And yet the divine essence, according to Pearson, is
m pp. 208, 209. (») See pp. 240, 241, and 181, 182.
<3> See pp. 182—184. 188. 190. 191. 203. The reader will observe
tfce agreement between this and some of our extracts from Sherlock.

LIKE AND THE SAME. 103
numerically one, — singularly one,'1' alike incapable
of multiplication and of division. It is therefore
both singular and plural. The essence of the Son is
distinct from the essence of the Father, and it is not.
It is the same both in kind and in number.
Accordingly Pearson sets himself to invalidate the
principle, that ' nothing like is the same.' It is
melancholy to see so grave a personage in the forlorn
hope, which orthodoxy has gathered against this
self-evident principle. Yet such is the case.
" As for that answer of Socinus, that Christ cannot
be God because he is said to be equal with God, —
(' Tantum abest ut, ab eo quod Christus sit wqualis Deo,
sequatur ipsum esse ceternum et summum Deum, ut potius
ex hoc ipso necessario consequatur non esse ceternum et
summum Deum. Nemo enim sibi ipsi cequalis esse potest,' J
— as if there could be no predication of equality where
we find a substantial identity ; it is most certainly false,
because the. most exact speakers use such language as
this is. There can he no expressions more exact and
pertinent than those which are used by geometricians,
neither can there be any better judges of equality than
they are ; but they most frequently use that expression
in this notion, proving an equality and inferring it from
identity. As in the fifth proposition of the first Element
of Euclid, two lines are said to contain an angle equal to
the angle contained by two other lines, because they
contained the same angle, or yuviav Koivi\v and the basis of
one triangle is supposed equal to the basis of another
<" Here Pearson differed from Sherlock. The latter would not
affirm singularity of the Divine Being, although he did affirm numer
ical unity. Nelson, in his life of Bull, imitated this distinction. But
Pearson with less art, uses both expressions ; and even gives the
preference to the former. See p. 38.

104 PEARSON.
triangle, because the same line was basis to both, or
pdo-n Kotvii. In the same manner certainly may the Son
be said to be equal to the Father in essence or power,
because they both have the same essence or power, that
is, ovfflav Kai Sivafuv Kowfy. Ocell. de Universo. 'AAA' del koto;
ravrb noil wffafaws 5iare\et Kal Xffov Kal ftfiotov avrb eavrov. c. i. § 6.'1'
But is it not clear, (to take the first illustration,)
that the angle or the basis (either will do) in the
instance cited, is in reality but one ? Notionally it
may be more than one ; and so may have equality
predicated of it. But would Pearson have been
content to say, that strictly God is but one, though
notionally he may be more than one ? This is intel
ligible, and may be the truth. But it is not Trinita
rian orthodoxy. What Pearson says of equality
being inferred from identity, is we think mistaken.
All that the demonstration can be said to assume on
the subject of identity, is that what is true of equality,
is, for all the purposes of the demonstration, true
also of identity. The foregoing proposition had
asserted, that if two triangles have two sides of the
one equal to two sides of the other, and likewise the
containing angles equal, the triangles are every way
equal. The demonstration in question assumes, that
if this is true when the angles are distinct and equal,
it is also true when they are not distinct, but one and
the same : or, that if the common angle be conceived
of as two angles placed one on the other, then they must
also be conceived of as coinciding one with another,

(i)

p. 187. Note appended to his comment on Phil. ii. 6.

LIKE AND THE SAME. 105
and so equal.'1'' But this will not aid the cause of
orthodoxy. If the substance of God which is strictly
one, be conceived of as more than one, then the two
or the three which the imagination makes it, must be
conceived of as equal the one to the other. What
Unitarian will question this ? or how will this oppose
the principle that 'nothing like is the same ?' Plainly
it confirms the principle, by showing that we never
speak of a thing as being like or equal to itself,
without in thought multiplying it, or investing it with
a notional plurality.
The like may be said of the quotation from Ocellus.
The universe is itself, and so properly speaking not
like itself. But we may view it in its state at one
time, and in its state at another time ; which states
we conceive and speak of as two, and so may com
pare the one with the other. Just so the Unitarian
may speak of God, as remaining always the same,
equal to and like himself. But would he in so
speaking, compromise his cardinal principle of the
strict and personal unity of God ? All that such
language would imply is this, that the Deity never
falls short of himself. View him at any point of the
infinite duration of ages past, and he will present
the same glorious object to the intellectual vision..
He is ever himself. And this is what is meant in
saying, He is like himself: the difference between
the two forms of speech being only this, that one is
<') This is not inferring equality from identity, but from imagined
coincidence ; as in Prop. 4, from actual coincidence.

106 BEVERIDGE.
literal, the other figurative. But will the Trinitarian
allow that God is plural in a figurative sense only ?
He cannot without abandoning his cause. With
him the plurality is as real as the unity. God is as
strictly three as he is one.
There is much that we would gladly quote from
Beveridge. But we shall content ourselves with one
extract, which will close this chapter.
" The Father subsists as a Father ; the Son as a Son ;
the Holy Ghost as a Spirit : and so have distinct subsist
ences, yet have all the same numerical substance. I say
numerical or individual substance ; for otherwise they
might all have the same divine nature, and yet not be
the same God. As Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, were three
distinct persons that had all the same human nature, yet
they could not all be called one man ; because though
they had but one human nature, yet they had it specifi
cally as distinguished into several individuals ; not numer
ically so as to be the same individual man : and therefore
though they had but one specifical, they had several
numerical natures ; by which means Abraham was one man,
Isaac another, Jacob a third. And upon the very same
account it is, that among the angels Gabriel, Michael,
Raphael, though they have the same angelical nature, yet
they are not the same angel. But here the Father, Son,
and Holy Ghost have not only the same divine nature in
specie, but in numero : and so have not only one and the
same nature, but are also one and the same God."'1'
w Work on Thirty-nine Articles, p, 61. 2nd edit. 1846,

CHAPTER IV.

§ 1. We now turn to a writer of our own day, —
one who, unlike those we have been examining,
calmly avows (though not without some vacillation,
yet avows) the contradiction, which hitherto and for
the most part, we have been obliged to elicit from
reluctant pages. And this is no rash adventurer, —
no superficial neophyte, who has studied the question
long enough to perceive its discords, but not long
enough to discern its latent harmonies. We doubt if
there is one in the present day who better understands
the Trinitarian question, or who has brought to its ex
amination greater clearness of apprehension, a more
vigorous judgment, or more of that devout and earnest
spirit which marks the religious character. We refer
to Mr. Newman, late of Oxford. And lest the recent
step by which he has become pledged to a doctrine -
usually thought the most repulsive to the understand
ing of all that have been put forth under the name
of Christianity, should impair the effect of his candid

108 NEWMAN.
statements, we shall endeavour, as in the cases of
Sherlock and Pearson, to trace the workings of his
mind on the subject before us, using as far as possible
his own language.
It is true that among the reasons originally assigned
by the Oxford party, for the translations they have
put forth of the works of the Fathers, is the follow
ing : namely, " the great comfort of being able to
produce out of Christian antiquity, refutations of he
resy (such as the various shades of the Arian), thereby
avoiding the necessity of discussing ourselves profane
errors, which in so high mysteries cannot be handled
without pain, and rarely without injury to our own
minds." Many of these translations however were
from the first, accompanied with copious original
notes from the pen of Mr. Newman and others, in
which the polemic element is sufficiently predomi
nant : and they were preceded by a work from
the hand of our author on the Arians of the 4th
cent., wherein the doctrine of the church is minutely
analyzed and defended, notwithstanding the Author's
perpetual repudiation of a controversial object. To
follow him in his observations, will of course be
to incur the charge of rationalizing : though little
more may be done than to repeat and compare his
own statements. But so it has ever been. Reason
on the side of orthodoxy (so called) is reasonable.
On the side of heterodoxy it loses its character, and
from ' an angel of light,' becomes changed into an
emissary of the Prince of darkness.

NEWMAN. 109
And yet it may be remarked, this writer has done
much, very much, to abate the reverence with which
the doctrine of the Trinity is usually regarded ;
by his admissions, (perhaps more widely known than
some of those which will appear in this chapter,)
that with its kindred doctrine of the Incarnation, the
Trinity is not to be learned in the first place from
the Scriptures. If such statements, coming from one
so well read in the Trinitarian controversy, are not
to be considered as unguarded expressions, prompted
by too eager a desire to advance the claims of Christ
ian antiquity, and thereby the pretensions of a class,
— they must, they ought to dispose the minds of
Protestants, to give a more candid hearing to those
arguments, by which these doctrines have been ever
assailed. Particular doctrines professing to be derived
from the Scripture, must always be held by consistent
Protestants in subordination to their cardinal prin
ciple, — ' the Bible and the Bible only.' To affirm
therefore in a community of Protestants, that the
Bible is obscure on the subject of the Trinity ; and
that, however it may be confirmed by the Scriptures
when known and admitted, it is not primarily to be
learned from the Scriptures, and was not even fully
' developed' till centuries after the exit of our Master
from the earth ; is of necessity to impair that reve
rence which has always been found to be its greatest
safeguard. To examine more closely this object of
veneration, is therefore what we are invited to do, by
this advocajte of implicit faith. Nor need we dread

110 NEWMAN.
his anathemas, though now we may hear them rever
berated from the Vatican afar, while the priest him
self, lost in thought, may be seen at the altar, raising
the napkin, and with perplexed and dubious counte
nance gazing on the object of his adoration. Let us
approach the shrine, and catch the words which
murmur on his tremulous lips.'1'
" Much as we may wish it, we cannot restrain the
rovings of the intellect, or silence its clamorous
demands for a formal statement concerning the object
of our worship. If, e. g., Scripture bids us adore
God, and adore his Son, our reason at once asks,
whether it does not follow that there are two Gods :
and a system of doctrine becomes unavoidable ; being
framed, let it be observed, not with a view of explain
ing, but of arranging the inspired notices respecting
the Divine Being, of providing not a consistent but
a connected statement. Here the inquisitiveness of
a pious mind rests, viz. when it has pursued the
subject into the mystery which is its limit."'2'
"It is a peculiarity of revelation that it clears up all
doubts as to the existence of God as separate from and
independent of nature : and shows us that the course
of the world depends not merely on a system, but on
a Being, real, living, and individual. What we
O In the following meditation the reader is requested to observe,
that the double inverted commas alone indicate verbal quotations.
But when clauses marked by single commas are followed by a reference!
these clauses are always to be regarded as quotations in respect of the
thought expressed, though not in respect of the expression.
<2> History of Arians, p. 161.

GOD ONE INDIVIDUAL. Ill
ourselves witness evidences to us the operation of
laws physical and moral ; but it leaves uncertain
whether or not the principle of these be a mere
Anima Mundi, or an Agent powerful to make or
unmake, to change or supersede according to his
Will:"'1' — "a Being external to creation and pos
sessed of individuality.'"® " According to the system
of Valentinus, the supreme Intelligence gave exist
ence to a line of spirits or JEons; who were all more
or less partakers of his nature ; that is, of a nature
specifically the same and included in his glory,
(pleroma,) though individually separate from the true
and sovereign Deity. It is obvious that such a doc
trine as this abandons the great revealed principle of
the incommunicable character and individuality of
the divine essence : "(3) " the simple individuality of
the divine nature," ' which the Greeks expressed by
the word ovo-ia.'m
' It is one of the defects belonging to the image
contained in the word Son, (and all images are by
their nature defective,) that it seems to draw " too
marked a distinction between the Father and the
Son, tending to give a separate individuality to
each.'"5' The Eclectics fell into this error, with the
Manichees and Valentinians.''6' In like manner, "the
notion in which the Arian heresy in all its shades
consisted, was, that the Son was a distinct being
m p. 201. ejusd. <*> p. 202. <3) p. 206.
W p. 391 <5' p. 183. <6> ibid.

1 12 NEWMAN.
from the Father."'1' Thus was it " placed in the
perilous dilemma of denying Christ's divinity, or
introducing a second God. The Arians proper went
off on the former side of the alternative, the Semi-
Arians on the latter."'2' Whereas we believe that the
Son is " literally and numerically one with the
Father."'3' So that " when it is said the first person
of the Holy Trinity communicates divinity to the
second, it is meant that that one essence which is
the Father, also is the Son."'4' " Their substance is
one and the same."'6' ' With Thomassin we assert
that the union subsisting between the three blessed
Persons is such, " that the whole power, life, sub
stance, wisdom, essence of the Father, is the very
essence, substance, wisdom, life, and power of the
Son." And this, according to the same Thomassin,
is what is meant by the mutual co-inherence or
indwelling of the sacred Three.''6' " The Father is
the tottos or locus of the Son : because when we
contemplate the Son in his fullness as oAos ©eos, we
do but view the Father as that person in whom God
the Son is. Our mind abstracts his substance, which
is the Son, for the moment from him ; and regards
") Athanasius's Treatises in Library of Fathers, vol. viii. p. 144.
note. See also p. 116. note. "The characteristic of that" (old
Semi-arianism) " as of other shapes of the heresy, was the absolute
separation which it put between the Father and the Son. They
considered them as two ovaiai, '6/iouu (like) but not as 6/j.ooiffioi :
their very explanation of the word tc'Aeios was 'independent' and
' distinct.' " See also note to p. 203.
m p. 150. <3> p. 399. vol. xix. W p. 203. vol. viii
<5> P. 140. (6) p. 403.

GOD ONE INDIVIDUAL. 113
him merely as Father. * * * It is however but an
operation of the mind, and not a real emptying of
Godhead from the Father, if such words may be
used. Father and Son are both the same God,
though really and eternally distinct from each other ;
and each is full of the other, that is, their substance
is one and the same."'1' " The Father and the Son
are the numerically one God : " and " it is but
expressing this in other words, to say that the Father
is in the Son, and the Son in that Father."'2' So
that the perichoresis, which " may be called the
characteristic of Catholic Trinitarianism,"'3' and is
"the test of orthodoxy as opposed to Arianism,"'4'
does but assert the individuality of God. And the
like may be said of the Homoousion. For " the
nature of God is solitary, peculiar to himself, and
one : so that whatever is accounted to be homoousios
with him, is necessarily included in his Individual
ity.'"5' ' Indeed " the question has almost been admitted
by St. Austin, whether it is not possible to say,
that God is one Person: for He is wholly and entirely
Father, and at the same time wholly and entirely
Son, and wholly and entirely Holy Ghost.'"6' " The
Father is the One simple, entire Divine Being, and
so is the Son.'"" "The Trinity is of one and the
m pp. 399, 400. note. <2> p. 402. note.
(3> Hist. Arians, p. 190. (4) Athan. Treatises, p 399. note.
(5) Hist. Arians, p. 204. <6) Athan. Treatises, p. 412. note.
C) p. 334. note.
H

1 14 NEWMAN.
same nature and substance, not less in each than m
all, or greater in all than in each."'1' " Nothing can
be named which the Son is in himself, as distinct
from the Father.'"2'
' God then is plainly one individual. Indeed this
is the very thing the Greeks aimed to express in
applying the word ovaia to him.'3' And yet to say
He is one person, is usually accounted the error of
Sabellius : which the Church has always condemned.
The substance and being of the Son are indeed
the substance and being of the Father. Yet the
Son is not the Father, but the ' image ' of the Father
— the image of his substance, as the Semi-arians
rightly taught : — " God of God, Light of Light,
whole of whole, one of one.'"4' " Such as the Father

W This is quoted by the Author from Augustin, at p. 408. Athan.
Treatises, note.
(*> p. 452. note. <3) Hist. Arians, p. 391.
>') "It may be added that although theologians differ in their
decisions, it would appear that onr Lord is not the image of the
Father's person, but of the Father's substance ; in other words, not
of the Father considered as Father, but considered as God. (Athan.
Treatises, p. 211. note.) " He is the Father's image in all things,
except in being the Father." " The Son is the image of the Father,
not as Father, but as God." (p. 149. note, ejusd.)
The word hypostasis used in Heb. i. 3. did not, (as is well known,)
acquire its technical sense of 'person,' till long after the apostolic
era. Macknight translates thus, — ' the exact image of his substance.'
So Stuart. If the Son were the image of the person, he would
reflect the peeuliarites of the person, and so the paternity. But this
is not Catholic theology. It is the Godhead which, is reflected in the
Son, who is ' of one substance ' with the Father, not of one person.
" The offspring of the ingenerate," says Hilary, " is one from one,
true from true, living from living, perfect from perfect, &c." (Athan.
TreatiseSi p. 331. note.) " It need scarcely be said, that ' perfect from
perfect,' is a symbol on which the Catholics laid stress." (p. 108.
note, ejusd.) ' Totum ex toto, perfectum ece perfecto,' occur in the
creed ascribed to Lucian : and they are commended by Bull, as being

GOD THREE INDIVIDUALS. 115
is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost."
"The ancient Fathers considered that the divine
Sonship is the very consequence (so to speak) of the
necessity that exists, that one who is infinite perfec
tion, should subsist again, "(Sherlock's phrase,) " in
a perfect image of himself."'1' So that there is an
" iteration "(2) a " repetition,'"3' though we must not
say a " duplication," in the divine nature. ' The Son
is en &eov, as well as ev ©e&> : from God, as well as
in God.'W 'He is the Word or Wisdom of God,
without which the Father would be &Xoyos, without
intelligence.''5' ' And yet he is the Son of God also,
derived from him in nature, distinct from him,
resembling him, " a continuation of the one infinite
nature of God.'"6'
even in advance of the Nicene Creed itself. (Def. Nic. sec. 2. c. xiii.
§ 7.) ' Unvarying image of the substance, will, power, and glory of
the Father,' is another expression of the same creed. Newman says
of this symbol, that " had there been no controversies oh the subjects
contained in it, it would have been a satisfactory evidence of the
orthodoxy of its promulgations :" and he gives the above clause in con
firmation. (Hist. Arians, p. 308.) Bull regards it as altogether Catholic.
<« Athan Treat, p, 283. note. <2> p. 452. note.
<3> Hist. Arians.p . 192. M pp. 187—195.
f6> pp. 185 — 187. "It was usual to declare, that to deny the
eternity of our Lord was all one as saying that Almighty God was
once &\oyos, without intelligence : e. g. Athenagoras says that the
Son is ' the first offspring of the Father ; not as made, for God being
mind eternal had from the beginning reason (rbv \6xov) in himself,
being eternally intellectual (\oyuc6s).' " p: 186. Bishop Kaye also
translates the same clause, ' being from eternity rational.' See his
Account of the Writings of Justin Martyr, p. 166. This is more
open and manly than to pretend one knows not what mystery in
these Greek words ; but of which after all no further account can be
given, than that if God had been without his logos, he would have
been without his logos.
Norton speaks of it as customary with the Fathers, to represent
the Logos both as an attribute of the Father and as a distinct being
from him. See in his Statement of Reasons, pp. 271 — 282. This is
the idea we have seen in Sherlock. W pp. 173 — 183.

116 NEWMAN.
'The doctrine of the Patripassians "was refuted
by insisting on the essential character of the Son, as
representing and revealing the Father : by arguing
that on the face of Scripture, the Christ who is there
set before us, is certainly delineated as one absolute
and real person, complete in himself, sent by the
Father, doing his will, and mediating between him
and man : and that this being the case, his person
could not be the same with that of the Father who
sent him, by any process of reasoning which would
not prove any two individual men to have one literal
personality : i. e. if there be any analogy at all'1' be
tween the common sense of the word person, and
that in which the idea is applied in Scripture to the
Father and the Son.'"2' The doctrine of these men
"was repugnant to the plainest suggestions of scriptu-
rally-enlightened reason, which leads us to argue that
according to the obvious meaning of the inspired
text, there is doubtless some real sense in which the
Father is not the Son. The Sender and the Sent
cannot be in all respects the same, nor can the Son
be said to make himself inferior to the Father, and
condescend to become man, to come from God and
then again to return to him, if after all there is no
t1' " In the mutual heavenly relationship of the two first persons of
the Trinity, there must be some analogy to the mutual earthly rela
tionship of father and son ; or the terms Father and Son, we may be
sure, would never have been adopted : for without the actual exist
ence of some analogy; the use of the terms could only lead to mis.
take." — Faber on Apostolicity of Trinitarianism.
<J> Hist. Arians, p. 139.

tJOD THREE INDIVIDUALS. 117
"distinction beyond that of words between these
Blessed and Adorable Agents."'1'
' Yes, they are Agents in se, and not merely
distinct ' aspects' or 'manifestations' of one solitary
Agent. Nay, they have " existence in themselves."
This is Catholic doctrine : and it is what the Greeks
aimed to secure by calling them hypostases or real
ities ; — a favourite word with the Semi-arians, who
were the special antagonists of Sabellius, Marcellus,
Photinus, and other kindred heretics.''2'
' Wherein then after all lay the error of the Semi-
arians ? They taught that the Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost, are distinct beings ; and we teach that
they have " existence in themselves." Where is
the difference ? To have existence or being, is to be.
And if that which is, is a good definition of a being ;
then the converse is true also: and it will follow
inevitably, (if so plain a thing needs proof,) that the
three Persons are beings in themselves, as certainly
as they have being in themselves.
' Beside, all that we know of the substance (pvo-la)
of God is, that He exists. So Athanasius teaches :l3)
and in like manner Basil says, that " the substance is
the very being of God."'4' Since then the Son has
" existence in himself," must he not have oio-Ca in
himself too, by the same rule that we ascribe an oiio-ia
to God ? Cyril of Alexandria defines ovaia to be,
¦7rpayfj,a avOviraptcTov, jtir; deo/Mevov eTepov irpbs ttjv eavrov
m p. 133. m pp. 390, 391.
i3J Hist. Arians, p. 204. i4' Athan. Treatises, p. 38.

118 NEWMAN.
oijo-racnv, that which has existence in itself, independ
ent of any thing else to fix its reality, i. e. an indi
vidual being."'1' This might be taken as a definition
of the word vTroo-rao-ts in the Church sense of it.
Accordingly the one as well as the other, " was from
the earliest date, used to give reality and subsistence
to the Son.'"2'
' In the same spirit, Justin Martyr styles the Son
¦npofi\r\6'kv yivvr)p.a : a phrase equivalent to wpofiokri,
the word by which Valentinus denoted his -5Lons ;
which were certainly conceived of as distinct indi
viduals. And Tertullian styles him " the true pro-
bole, sent forth though not divided off."'3' Indeed
" St. Cyril seems to deny that each individual man
may be considered a separate substance, except as
(» Hist. Arians, p. 202.
<2) Ibid. See moreover Bull, sec. 2. c. ix. §11.: where also defend
ing Origen, he says, that that Father almost always used hypostasis
to signify ' either subsistence in the abstract, or a singular antl
individual thing subsisting by itself, which in things possessed of
life and intelligence is the same as person.' This may be taken
therefore as the Bishop's definition of person.
Burton also in his Testimonies to the Doctrine of the Trinity,
perpetually speaks of the distinction of persons in the Godhead as a
distinct individuality. See pp. 129. 130. 92. 93. 73. 74. et passim.
" In the age of the two Dionysii, the term " (hypostasis) " was
always used for substantial or individual existence, in other words, for
personality." " Origen speaks of the Father and Son being two in
hypostasis, which can only mean in person or individuality of exist
ence." "Praxeas was one of the precursors of Sabellius, and con
founded the persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, asserting
the second and third Persons not to be distinct beings." p. 68.
Accordingly, it is usual to find the Persons in this work spoken of as
distinct beings. See pp. 20. 48, 49. 71. 74. 76.
<3> Hist. Arians, pp. 207, 208. Tertullian illustrates his notion, by
the images of a stalk and its root, a river and its fountain, the sun
and its rays : saying that the stalk and the root are two things,
although conjoined; and that whatsoever proceeds from anything
is necessarily a second to that from which it proceeds : but not
therefore separate, as Valentinus conceived of his Mans. Accordingly

GOD THREE INDIVIDUALS. 119
the three Persons are such. And St. Gregory
Nyssen is led to say, that strictly speaking, the
abstract man which is predicated of separate indi
viduals, is still one : and this with a view of illus
trating the divine unity.'1'
' Wherein then did the Semi-arians differ from
ourselves ? Clearly, they differed but in words.
*' The Anomcean creed was hopeless, but with the
Semi-arians all that remained was an adjustment of
phrases."'2' "Athanasius treats them as tenderly as
Hilary, as soon as they break company with the
Arians.'"3' " We do not," says Athanasius, " attack
them as Ario-maniacs, nor as opponents of the
Fathers, but we discuss the matter with them as
brothers with brothers, who mean what we mean, and
only dispute about the word," — one in substance.'4'
lie describes the Father as lota substantia, and the Son as derivatio
totius et portio. See Adv. Prax. cc. 8, 9.
Justin Martyr thought the comparison taken from the sun and its
light, did not sufficiently mark the distinction between the Father and
Son. He preferred the image of two fires, the one lighted from the
other. He did not hesitate to describe the Son as irepos @ebs, erepos
&pi$fitf .¦ though Newman very justly considers Sevrepos ®ebs in Euse-
bius as a mark of his Arian affinities. In his late work On the
Developement of Christian Doctrine, he expressly calls Eusebius an
Arian : (p. 14.) and says that his arianising tone is a point on which
the world may now be said to be agreed, p. 13. note.
For Justin, see Dial. Tryph. pp. 412. 413. 267. 249. 251. 252. edit.
Thirlbyj also pp. 19, 20. where the Son is said to be honoured in the
second place after the Creator of the universe, the unchangeable and
*ternal God; and p. 413, where the Father is styled the Author of
his being. We cannot wonder that Mr. Newman in this later work
ranks Justin also among the Arianizers.
<!> Athan. Treatises, p. 219. note. <2> Athan. Treat, p. 129. note.
<3> p. 139. ejusd.
<*> Athanasius is here speaking particularly of Basil of Ancyra, who,
lie says, holding that the Son was ' of the Father's substance,' and
4 like him in substance,' held in fact the Catholic doctrine of the
consubstantiality. p. 139. See App. C.

120 NEWMAN.
' But if this be so, it is plain God is three Individ
ual Beings : and yet my former line of thought led
me to the conclusion that He is but one Individual
Being. This is more than contrariety. It is con
tradiction. ' Trinitarians sometimes endeavour to escape the
difficulties of their creed, by representing the true
conception of a divine person as unattainable. I
have said, " the mysteriousness of the doctrine lies
in our inability to conceive a sense of the word
person, such as to be more than a mere character,
and yet less than an individual intelligent being.'"1'
' But can I rest in this ? To say that in the unity
of the Godhead there are three persons, when I
know not what I mean by three persons, is to say I
' know not what.' Is this to " satisfy the thoughts
of perplexed inquirers?" Will it satisfy my own ?
' Besides, it is certain men do attach ideas to
these words. Yet if we are unable to ' conceive a
sense of the word person such as to be more than a
mere character, yet less than an individual being ;'
and if nevertheless the true notion lies between these
extremes, either one of which is heresy, then it is
past dispute, that in so far as we form any idea of the
divine persons at all, we form an heretical one. It
is alarming to trace this thought in its bearing on
devotion. " Oh ! holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity !
three Persons and one God ! " — When my mind has
<l> Hist. Arians, p. 171.

SUSPENSE. 121
gone forth to these several objects of worship in its
most intense exercises, have I not regarded them
as Beings ? — or, if I have forced myself to the re
flection that God is but one, have I not immediately
found myself entangled with the opposite conception
of three several aspects of this One ? Alas ! that
my most ardent devotion should have an heretical
basis !
' I cannot then rest in the supposition that the
proper idea of a divine person is unattainable. My
thoughts will busy themselves with the object of my
worship : and oftentimes then most, when devotion
is most alive. It is agonizing to think that that is
the time when I am most an heretic ; if heresy be
that foul and impious thing, I have represented it ;
and now much more must represent it. Great God !
most impious when I would be most devout.'
' How then shall I escape the dilemma in which
my theology places me ? I can form no idea of
personal attributes as distinct from essential, that can
at all assist me in this strait. Nor can I ascribe any
sort of composition to the pure and spiritual nature
of God, whereby either of the persons shall be
rendered less than God absolute.
' No — the Father and the Son must each be oAo?
0eos. Of this there can be no doubt. And equally
certain is it, that one is not the other ; and that each
has existence in himself. Here I have the knot in
my hand, how shall I loose it ? " The Father is all
that is God. He is the One, Eternal, Infinite Being,

122 NEWMAN.
absolutely and wholly. And his nature is most
simple, and free from parts and passions. Yet this
One God is also the Son, and He is the One God as
absolutely and wholly as the Father, yet without
being the Father. In this world we have often great
changes in the same being, so that he is one thing at
one time, and another at another ; but the Unchange
able God is Three all at once, and that Three
Persons." * * * It is a contradiction indeed, and
"not merely a verbal contradiction, but an incompat
ibility in the human ideas conveyed. We can scarcely
make a nearer approach to an exact enunciation of it,
than that of saying that one thing is two things."'1'
' This is hard to believe. And yet how can it be
avoided ? " The Second Person in the Holy Trinity
is not a quality, or attribute, or relation, but the One
Eternal Substance ; not a part of the First Person,
but whole or entire God : nor does the generation
impair the Father's substance, which is, antecedently
to it, whole and entire God. Thus there are two
Persons, in Each Other ineffably, Each being wholly
one and the same Divine Substance, yet not being
merely separate aspects of the Same, Each being
God as absolutely as if there were no other Divine
Person but Himself. Such a statement indeed is
not only a contradiction in the terms used, but in
our ideas : yet not therefore a contradiction in fact ;
unless indeed any one will say that human words can

M Athan. Treatises, p. 515.

CONTRADICTION. 128
express in one formula, or human thought embrace
in one idea, the unknown and infinite God."'1'
' In fact, all heresies are but partial views of truth,
and are wrong not so much in what they affirm as in
what they deny.'2' Whence Vigilius of Thapsus says,
that " error bears testimony to truth, and the discor
dant opinions of misbelievers blend in concordance
in the rule of orthodoxy." " Grande miraculum, ut
expugnatione sui Veritas confirmelur"i3)
' Why then should I hesitate ? Did the Sabellians
sometimes represent the word as the wisdom of God,
and always God as individually one 1 They were
right. Did our friends the Semi-arians, assert that
the logos was a real being ? — and did they thus
whenever they carried up his dignity to the height
of a perfect equality with the Father, fall into the
error of making a second God ? They were right
too. The critical point wherein both parties erred,
was that the one did not add to his own belief, the
belief of the other. Marcellus had been a good
Catholic, had he combined with his own belief that
of Basil of Ancyra. " All that was wanting " to
Basil and his friends, " was the doctrine of the
perichoresis ;"'4' that is, as has been seen, the doctrine
of the numerical or individual unity.
' For " as material parent and offspring are indi
viduals under one common species, so the eternal
0> Athan. Treatises, p. 326. note. '2> p. 219. note.
W p. 140. note, (4) p. 116. note.

124 NEWMAN.
Father and Son are persons under one common,
individual substance.'1' " Christian theology * * *
takes the word (ovo-Ca) in a sense of its own, such as
we have no example of in things created, viz. that of
a Being numerically one, subsisting in three persons ;
so that the word is a predicable or in one sense
universal, without ceasing to be individual : in which
consists the mystery of the Holy Trinity."'2'
' " Nothing is more remarkable than the confident
tone in which Athanasius accuses Arians and Sabel
lians of considering the divine nature as compound,
as if the Catholics were in no respect open to the
charge. Nor are they : though in avoiding it they
are led to enunciate the most profound and ineffable
mystery. The Father is the one simple, entire,
Divine Being ; and so is the Son : they do in no
sense share divinity between them : each is 5/Los 6eo$.
This is not ditheism or tritheism, for they are the
same God ; nor is it Sabellianism, for they are eter
nally distinct and substantive persons : but it is a
depth and height beyond our intellect, how what is
two in so full a sense, can also in so full a sense be
one ; or how the divine nature does not come under
number."'3' ' The divine nature does not come under number.
Ah! here is the mystery. "There is an indestructible
essential relation existing in the one indivisible, infi
nitely simple God : such as to constitute him on one
Wp. 144. note. <» p. 152. note. <8' p. 334. note.

CONTRADICTION. 125
side of that relation (what in human language we
call) Two, (and in like manner Three,) yet without
the notion of number really coming in.'1' And so
Basil says, " That which saveth us is faith ; but
number has been devised to indicate quantity. . . We
pronounce each of the persons once, but when we
would number them up, we do not proceed by an
unlearned numeration to the notion of a polytheism."
(Ibid.) And Chrysostom, " we will decline to speak
of ' first' and ' second ;' for the Godhead is higher
than number and succession of times." (Ibid.) Au-
gustin also, "Three what? I answer Father, and Son,
and Holy Ghost. See, he urges, you have said
Three ; but explain Three what ? Nay, do you
number ? I have said all about the Three when I
say, Father, and Son, and Holy Ghost. Not as there
are two men, so are they two Gods ; for there is here
something ineffable, which cannot be put into words,
that there should both be number in Three and not
number. (Ibid.) And Boethius, " When God is
thrice repeated, and Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is
named, three unities do not make plurality of number
in them. * * * This repetition of unities is iteration,
rather than numeration. As if I say Sun, Sun, Sun,
I have not made three Suns, but named one so many
times." (Ibid.) It is however to be observed, that
this illustration is not to be taken as if God were
simply one, as the sun is one ; and plural only in
'¦' p. 453. note. See also p. 400. note.

126 NEWMAN.
name or in thought. No. This would be Sabellian
ism, and no mystery. His plurality is as real as his
unity : and yet he has no plurality, because of his
perfect unity.
' Here is the mystery. Reason, cease thy clamours.
I seek not a ' consistent ' creed. The mystery is
attained. I were a Tritheist, were I not a Sabellian.
I were a Sabellian, were I not a Tritheist. I am
neither, because I am both. With me, as with St.
Paul, there is but one God, the Father. And with
me there is also another God, the Son : who yet is
not another, because one and one do not make two in
the inconceivable nature of God.'
§ 2. Thus in the writings of Newman, as well as
those of Waterland, Sherlock, and Pearson, we have
traced the doctrine of the Trinity to a clear and
logical contradiction. Newman, as we have seen
avows it: though he too has his subterfuge; namely,
that God is above number.
But if this be so, what are we to understand by
the Apostle's declaration, that ' with us there is but
one God ?' This is usually understood to mean that
God is one in number ; — one as opposed to many
Gods or more. But, according to Mr. Newman, to say
there is but one God in number, is to say, what if
not devoid of truth, is at all events devoid of signifi
cance. For if God be ' above number,' and inde
pendent of number, then it will be immaterial
whether we say, there is but one God, or there are
thirty, after the number of the iEons of Valentinus.

NUMBER. 127
It will be much the same as to speak of a square
emotion, or a yellow sound. The predicates have no
relation to their subjects. Wherefore it will be just
as true to say this emotion is round as this emotion is
square ; or this sound is blue as this sound is yellow.
That is, neither of these expressions is true ; neither
is significant. So if the nature of God be such as
to remove it beyond the range of number, beyond
the sphere within which alone number has place, — -
if the Deity have no relation to number, then it will
be the same thing whether we say, there is but one
God, or there are as many as the Hindoo Pantheon
itself can boast.'1'
This sophism might have been culled from Sher
lock. For in the work from which we have already
extracted so largely, he summons Boetius and Basil
to instruct us, how to distinguish between ' unity of
number' and 'unity of nature;" — between 'the
numbering number ' and ' the thing numbered : ' or,
in other words, to teach us how we may number
three, when there are not three of what is numbered.'21
Who can wonder that a doctrine which has been
supported by such arguments, should sometimes have
been opposed by raillery ?
While however Mr. Newman is adduced as con
fessing the contradictory nature of the Trinitarian
O) " Unless the terms unity and duality, be signs of the same ideas
to God which they represent to men, it would have been to no purpose
that God had so repeatedly inculcated that first commandment, that he
was the one and only God." — Treatise on Christian Doctrine, by
Milton, p. 88. <2> See pp. 243—248.

128 NEWMAN.
doctrine, it must not be overlooked, that, with an
inconsistency not to be wondered at in the advocate
of an inconsistent creed, he sometimes denies (as at
p. 439, Athan. Treatises,) that the Trinitarian doctrine
has more than " an incongruity," " a partial and
indirect antagonism of ideas." It is not, he says,
like the idea of a square circle. This may be. The
proper exponent of his doctrine is not a circle which
is a square, but a circle which is not a circle ; or,
three circles which are not three circles, but only
one circle. " We cannot," he says, " make a nearer
approach to it, than by saying one thing is two
things." And is not this a contradiction, direct
and positive ?
When divines would prove that something must
have existed- from all eternity, they argue thus: —
that for a thing to create itself is impossible, inasmuch
as in order to this, it must have existed before it was ;
that is, it must have been and not have been at the
same time ; which they justly say, involves a direct
contradiction, and therefore is impossible. But
wherein is the contradiction greater than the above 1
To say that one thing is two things, is to say that one
thing is not one thing. To say that there are three
individual Beings all divine, and that there is but
one individual Being who is divine, is to say there
are three and there are not three ; or, that two of the
three are and are not.
There are doubtless great difficulties connected with
the idea of a Being who always was. But these

DIVINE ETERNITY AND OMNIPRESENCE. 129
difficulties are not thought to be of sufficient magni
tude, to overbear the evidence arising out of the
opposite supposition, namely that of a being creating
itself. Immense difficulties also connect themselves with
our ordinary ideas of the divine omnipresence. But
it may be questioned, whether these do not mainly
arise from an inadvertent confounding of material
and immaterial notions: while, whatever may be
made of them, it is certain they exist for the immate-
rialist in his own person ; but without shaking his
confidence in the positions, that this spirit is not that
spirit, (or what becomes of identity and responsi
bility ?) — and that one spirit is not two spirits while
it remains one spirit.
It is true, as Mr. Newman and others suggest, all
our ideas of God are imperfect. We take but partial
views of truth. But if, when we have satisfied
ourselves that there is but one God, we cannot trust
ourselves to say there are not three, what in the
whole round of Theism will be left to our faith ?
When we have convinced ourselves that God is just,
or that God is good, we may remain in doubt whether
he is either. Nay, when we have affirmed his being,
we may immediately proceed to deny it. For this
would be but to say he is, and he is not. Which of
all the truths of Theism, would this miserable theol
ogy leave to our faith? To forswear our reason
in a matter so plain, is to forswear our reason alto
gether, and to surrender ourselves an unresisting

130 NEWMAN.
prey either to hopeless scepticism on the one
hand, or the most abject superstition on the other.
Mr. Newman now illustrates one of these conse
quences. Alas ! that it is to be said of one so gifted.
He worships a piece of bread. Degradation how
closely resembling that of the " devout people,
whose gods grew in their gardens."

CHAPTER V.

§ 1. We cannot dismiss the subject of contra
diction, without referring to Coleridge. He held
that there are truths commanding the entire assent of
the reason, which nevertheless cannot be expressed
in what he calls ' the forms of the understanding,'
without a contradiction. Indeed he makes it a test
and sign of a truth of the reason — an idea, as distin
guished from a conception, an abstract notion, or an
impression on the senses, " that it can come forth
from the moulds of the understanding, only in the
disguise of two contradictory conceptions, each of
which is partially true, and the conjunction of both
conceptions becomes the representative or expression
(the exponent) of a truth beyond conception and
inexpressible.'"1' Such a truth, in his judgment, was
the Trinity.
And yet there are many things in the works of
W Aids to Reflection, p. 171. edit, of 1839.

132 COLERIDGE.
Coleridge, which may be pleaded in rejection of the
proposition to which we have reduced the Trini
tarian dogma.
In a commendatory and admirable essay from the
pen of an American divine prefixed to the above
edition of the Aids to Reflection, it is distinctly
asserted, that " though we may believe what passeth
all understanding, we cannot believe what is absurd,
or contradictory to reason." (p. 16.) And again,
" we are not only unable to believe the same propo
sition to be false, which our reason sees to be true,
but we cannot believe another proposition, which by
the exercise of the same rational faculty, we see to
be incompatible with the former, or to contradict it.
We may, and probably often do, receive with a
certain kind and degree of credence, opinions which
reflection would show to be incompatible. But when
we have reflected, and discovered the inconsistency,
we cannot retain both. We cannot believe two
contradictory propositions, knowing them to be such.
It would be irrational to do so." (p. 18.)
This agrees perfectly with Coleridge's own repre
sentations, in the Friend and elsewhere. " In respect
of their reason," he says, " all men are equal. The
measure of the understanding and of all other facul
ties of man, is different in different persons : but
reason is not susceptible of degree. For since it
merely decides whether any given thought or action
is or is not in contradiction with the rest, there can be

CONTRADICTION. 133
no reason better, or more reason than another." W
Accordingly few things are more common with him
in his didactic pieces, than to confute an opinion on
the ground of its being contradictory either to itself
or to some admitted truth. Thus at p. 101, Aids to
Reflection, where he is treating of human responsi
bility in connexion with the fall, he describes some
who differ from him, as " exaggerating the diseased
weakness of the will into an absolute privation of all
freedom ; thereby making moral responsibility not a
mystery above comprehension, but a direct contra
diction, of which we do distinctly comprehend the
absurdity" Nay at p. 133, he writes thus, and with
especial reference to the doctrine of the Trinity.
" Do I then utterly exclude the speculative reason
from theology ? No ! It is its office and rightful
privilege to determine on the negative truth of
whatever we are required to believe. The doctrine
must not contradict any universal principle : for this
would be a doctrine that contradicted itself." And
so in Statesman's Manual, he says, in perfect keeping
with some of Waterland's statements, " Whatever is
previously proposed for the belief, as true, must
have been admitted by reason as possible, as involving
no contradiction to the universal forms or laws of
thought, no incompatibility in the terms of the pro
position ; and the determination on this head belongs
exclusively to the science of metaphysics. In each
M Friend, vol. i. p. 259, edit. 1837. See also p. 214.

134 COLERIDGE.
article of faith embraced on conviction, the mind
determines first intuitively on its logical possibility." <">
" No faith," says Coleridge, " can enable us to
believe that the same thing can be at once A and
notA."« Now we argue that the doctrine which has been
extracted from the pages of Newman, and those
other divines whose writings have been reviewed in
the three preceding chapters, does amount to this.
Let A stand for the term, three Gods. Then we say,
the doctrine teaches that the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit, are A and not A : that is, three Gods, and not
three Gods.'3) This, to use the piquant words of our
author, is not " a mystery above comprehension, but
a direct contradiction, of which we do distinctly
comprehend the absurdity."
Nor can we admit that the contradiction exists
only in the view of a lower intellectual faculty, by
whatever name it may be called, — a faculty which we
possess in common with brutes. There are few
things in which our superiority to these is more
conspicuous, than in our apprehension of number.
Indeed the science of number belongs to the pure
mathematics, which Coleridge expressly places within
the domain of reason, or the higher intellectual
faculty/4' Now the present is a simple question of
m App. E. p. 293, edit. 1839. See also what follows in pp. 294,295.
t2] Literary Remains, vol. iii. p. 94.
iw Not three Gods. For to say they are hut one, is to say they are
not more than one, therefore a fortiori not three.
[« See Friend, vol. i. pp. 212—214. 216, 217. and Aids, pp. 170—
172. note.

CONTRADICTION. 135
number. We conceive of God, the One, as Cole
ridge names him, in a certain way. The Father is
this Being. For as has been often repeated, He is
God entire. Now the question is whether there can
be another such, without making two such. We
know of no judgment of the mind which can claim
to be intuitive, if not that by which we decide that
this cannot be. One and another are two ; if words
have meaning, or reason carry with it any certainty.
Indeed Coleridge himself may be cited in direct
attestation of this. For in the Literary Remains he
comments in the following terms, on a passage in
Sherlock's Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity.
" Surely never did argument vertiginate more. I had
just acceded to Sherlock's exposition of the Trinity,
as the Supreme Being, his reflex act of self-conscious
ness, and his love ; all forming one supreme mind :
and now he tells me that each is the whole supreme
mind, and denies that three each per se the whole
God, are not the same as three Gods ! * * * ' Each
per se God ! ' This is the first great lie of Sherlock's
scheme. Each of the three is whole God, because
neither is or can be per se." W
§ 2. What then was Coleridge's view of the Trin
ity ? This is not easy to say. In the last quotation,
he peremptorily denies that either of the Persons is,
per se, God entire. And yet but a few pages before
in the same volume from which that extract is taken,
tn Vol- iv. p. 212.

136 COLERIDGE.
he may be found arguing against the same Sherlock
in the following manner : — " According to Sherlock's
conception, it would se,em to follow that we ought to
make a triad of triads or an ennead. Else there is
an x in the Father which is not in the Son, a y in the
Son which is not in the Father, and a z in the Holy
Ghost which is in neither ; that is, each by himself
is not total God,"^ — plainly implying that in his
view each by himself is total God. In the same
quotation also, he accedes to that exposition of the
Trinity which makes it to consist in the Supreme
Being, his reflex act of self-consciousness, and his
love, all forming one supreme mind. This agrees
with very much that may be found in his writings.
And yet he represents ' substance ' as the proper
rendering of ' hypostasis : ' and accordingly speaks
of the Persons as substantially distinct from each
other. He says they are everywhere in Scripture
spoken of as individuals ; and asks what less the
church could say of them, if it taught the doctrine
of the Trinity at all/a>
These representations are, to all appearance, very
contrary, and would almost lead one to suspect, that,
on the score of contradiction, Coleridge could not
have been far distant from the writers we have been
reviewing. But let us hear him farther ; and first in
the Aids to Reflection, where he thus writes : —
t" Vol. iv. p. 206.
ra See Lit. Rem., Vol. iii. pp. 260. 265. 352. Add also Vol. iv. pp.
45, 46., where he declares himself unable to find any essential
difference between the Councils of Nice and Ariminum.

IDEA OF TRINITY. 137
"I am clearly convinced that the Scriptural and only
true idea of God," — (he says in a note, " any idea which
does not either identify the creator with the creation, or
else represent the Supreme Being as a mere impersonal
law or ordo ordinans, differing from the law of gravita
tion only by its universality," — ) " will in its develope
ment he found to involve the idea of the Tri-unity; But
I am likewise convinced that previously to the promulga
tion of the gospel, the doctrine had no claim on the faith
of mankind : though it might have been a legitimate
contemplation for a speculative philosopher, a theorem in
metaphysics valid in the Schools.
" I form a certain notion in my mind, and say : This is
what I understand hy the term, God. From books and
conversation I find that the learned generally connect the
same notion with the same word. I then apply the rules
laid down hy the masters of logic, for the involution and
evolution of terms, and prove ((to as many as agree with
me in my premises) that the notion, God, involves the
notion, Trinity.
He then, in prosecution of the thought that the
doctrine independent of the' gospel is only a specula
tion, adverts to the case of an unlearned Jew, and
asks, —
" By what right can I require this man to receive a
notion of mine " (Trinity) " wholly alien from his habits
of thinking, because it may he logically deduced from
another notion " (that of God) " with which he was almost
as little acquainted, and not at all concerned ? Grant for
a moment that the latter as soon as it is combined with
the assurance of a corresponding reality becomes identical
with the true and effective idea of God. Grant that in
thus realizing the notion I am warranted hy revelation,
the law of conscience, and the interests and necessities of
my moral being. Yet by what authority, by what induce-

138 COLERIDGE.
ment, am I entitled to attach the same reality to a second
notion, a notion drawn from a notion ? It is evident that
if I have the same right, it must be on the same grounds.
Revelation must have assured it, my conscience required
it — or in some way or other I must have an interest in
this belief. It must concern me as a moral and responsible
being. Now these grounds were first given in the re
demption of mankind by Christ, the Saviour and Medi
ator : and by the utter incompatibility of these offices
with a mere creature. On the doctrine of redemption
depends the faith, the duty, of believing in the divinity
of our Lord. And this again is the strongest ground for
the reality of that Idea, in which alone this divinity can
be received without breach of the unity of the Godhead.
But such is the Idea of the Trinity."
He proceeds to mention a report which had become
current in certain circles, to the effect that he looked
upon the doctrine of the Trinity as a demonstrable
part of the religion of nature ; and thereupon re
marks that he did not consider even the existence of
God to be strictly demonstrable, although there were
sufficient reasons within and without, to make the
belief of it binding on the conscience. He adds : —
" On this account I do not demand of a Deist, that he
should adopt the doctrine of the Trinity. For he might
he very well justified in replying, that he rejected the
doctrine, not because it could not be demonstrated, nor yet
on the score of any incomprehensibilities and seeming
contradictions that might be objected to it, as knowing
that these might be, and in fact had been, urged with
equal force against a personal God under any form capable
of love and veneration ; but because he had not the same
theoretical necessity, the same interests and instincts of
reason for the one hypothesis as for the other. It is not

IDEA OF TRINITY. 139
enough, the Deist might justly say, that there is no
cogent reason why I should not believe the Trinity;
you must show me some cogent reason why I should.
" But the case is quite different with a Christian, who
accepts the Scriptures as the word of God, yet refuses
his assent to the plainest declarations of these Scriptures,
and explains away the most express texts into metaphor
and hyperbole, because the literal and obvious interpreta
tion is (according to his notions) absurd and contrary to
reason. He is bound to show, that it is so in any sense,
not equally applicable to the texts asserting the being,
infinity, and personality of God the Father, the Eternal
and Omnipresent One, who created the heavens and the
earth. And the more is he bound to do this, and the
greater is my right to demand it of him, because the
doctrine of Redemption from sin supplies the Christian
with motives and reasons for the divinity of the Redeemer
far more concerning and convincing subjectively, that is,
in the economy of his own soul, than are all the induce
ments that can influence the Deist objectively, that is in
the interpretation of nature." (pp. 126 — 133.)
In these extracts Coleridge is clear on two points :
1. that the idea of the Trinity is logically deducible
from the proper idea of God ; but 2. that as the idea
of God makes its approach to the conscience only
through the medium of the practical reason (Kant's
doctrine), that is, by means of the wants and instincts
of our moral nature, so the doctrine of the Trinity
makes its approach by the same avenue. Its claim
on the faith of men reposes not on any chain of
abstract reasoning, but on the interests and instincts
of their moral nature ; that is to say, on their sense
of guilt, and consequent need of a Saviour, and he

140 COLERIDGE.
a divine one. This latter is a favourite idea with
Coleridge. He repeats it at pp. 188, 189. ejusd.
" The practical inquirer hath already placed his foot on
the rock, if he have satisfied himself that whoever needs
not a Redeemer is more than human. Remove from him
the difficulties and objections that oppose or perplex his
belief in a crucified Saviour ; convince him of the reality
of sin, which is impossible without a knowledge of its
true nature and inevitable consequences ; and then satisfy
him as to the fact historically, and as to the truth spirit
ually of a redemption therefrom by Christ ; do this for
him, and there is little fear that he will permit either
logical quirks or metaphysical puzzles to contravene the
plain dictate of his common sense, that the sinless One
that redeemed mankind from sin, must have been more
than man ; and that He who brought light and immortality
into the world, could not in his own nature have been an
inheritor of death and darkness. It is morally impossible
that a man with these convictions should suffer the
objection of incomprehensibility (and that on a subject of
faith) to overbalance the manifest absurdity and contra
diction in the notion of a Mediator between God and the
human race, at the same infinite distance from God as the
race for whom he mediates."
Now we hold it for certain, that this sort of rea
soning cannot take a man beyond the ground of
Sabellianism. The ancient Patripassians defended
their peculiar tenet on the plea, that it was more
honourable to their Master than that which the
Catholics opposed to it. There is no effectual way
of opposing the Sabellian, but by an appeal to the
letter of Scripture ; which it may be argued seems
in some cases to imply, that the divine principle in

IDEA OF TRINITY. 141
Jesus is distinct from that principle which is denomi
nated the Father. But this is to remove the question
from the wants and instincts of our moral nature to
the province of Biblical criticism, — no very secure
ground for one whose views of inspiration were as
lax as Coleridge's, and who moreover held that over
all questions of probability and experience, (among
which those of Biblical criticism must unquestionably
fall,) the understanding reigns paramount ; so that
there can be no appeal to this quarter on behalf of
a doctrine rejected as contradictory and impossible
by the reason, for this in Coleridge's philosophy
would be to appeal from the higher to the lower
faculty. It remains therefore that the doctrine of the Trinity,
in so far as it is to be distinguished from Sabellianism,
must after all repose on the speculative reason : and
therefore cannot carry with it any force whereby
it may be made binding on the faith of men. As a
logical deduction from the proper idea of God, it may
be binding on all (intellectually) whose logic enables
them to make it: but its authority can reach no
further. Nor even within this limit, can it be that
notion which we have been extracting from the pages
of Mr. Newman and his allies. For this as we have
seen is contradictory and impossible in the view of
reason ; and therefore cannot be accepted as a truth
of the reason, without making reason itself a lying
faculty. It is true that, according to Coleridge, one
of the marks of a truth of the reason is, that it

142 COLERIDGE.
presents a contradictory aspect to the understanding,
— the lower intellectual faculty. But reason, he tells
us, is ' fixed ' and uniform. It is ' a direct beholding
of truth ; ' and therefore can no more pronounce the
same thing to be both false and true, than the eye
can perceive that to be black which it perceives to be
white. Nay, it is one of the special provinces of
reason, to pronounce on the congruity or incongruity
of the various conceptions which are formed in the
mind,—" whether they are, or are not, in contra
diction to each other."'1' However therefore reason
may thwart and oppose the understanding, it must be
consistent with itself. And accordingly, (nor can it
have escaped notice,) in one of the above extracts
Coleridge plainly denies, that the doctrine of the
Trinity is contradictory, any further than the eternity,
the omnipresence, and even the personality of God is
contradictory. No objections, he says, lie against the
Trinity, which may not be " urged with equal force
against a personal God, under any form capable of
love and veneration."'2' W Friend, pp. 214. 259.
(2) " It is most dangerous, and in its distant consequences, subver
sive of all Christianity, to admit that the doctrine of the Trinity is at
all against or even above human reason in any other sense than as
eternity and Deity itself are above it." — Lit. Rem. vol. iii. pp. 352,
353. See also p. 31. where, commenting on a sentence of Hooker's, he
says, — " But if it be meant that the Trinity is otherwise inconceivable
than as the divine eternity and every attribute of God is, and must be,
then neither the commonness of the language, nor the high authority
of the user, can deter me from denouncing it as untrue and dangerous.
So far is it from being true, that on the contrary, the Trinity is the
only form in which an idea of God is possible, unless indeed it be
a Spinoastic or world-God."

IDEA OF TRINITY. 143
We ask then again, what was his notion of the
Trinity ? — It is to be regretted, that in the Aids to
Reflection, Coleridge gives no explicit answer to this
question. Indeed he expressly waives the consid
eration of it. Nor does he even define the notion of
God from which it is to be derived. He tells us
indeed, that it is the idea in which the learned
usually concur ; and more, that any idea will serve,
which does not reduce the Deity to a mere anima
mundi, or an impersonal law. This he repeats in the
Literary Remains : as has been seen in one of the
extracts made in the last note. The sentiment is
indeed at variance with the decisions of some of the
most noted among Trinitarians. But this does not
move our Author.'1'
Now in Coleridge's view the main point of dis
tinction between Spinozism and Theism proper,
appears to have lain in the ascription of Will to the
Deity.'2' Spinoza attributes intelligence to his first
substance, but not will. We see no reason therefore
why we should not accept as a fair exposition of the
author's idea of God, a definition which he has
himself given in that Confession of faith which
appears in the First Volume of the Literary Remains ;
and according to which, " God is a Being in whom
W See what he says on this head, respecting Bull and Waterland
in Lit. Rem. vol. iv. pp. 221, 222. It is curious to observe the sources
from which Coleridge drew his belief of the Trinity. They were, as he
tells us in vol. iv. p. 307. the Scripture, Bishop Bull, and — Plotinus.
This will remind the student, of some of the confessions of Augustine.
O See Statesman's Manual, p. 196. edit. 1839. ; also Friend, vol.
iii. p. 205. note.

144 COLERIDGE.
supreme reason and a most holy will are one with an
infinite power." There would indeed be no ground
for hesitation on the subject, were it not that the
author in connection with one of our extracts from the
Aids to Reflection, distinguishes his idea of God, from
that formed by an unlearned Jew, whose idea he never
theless represents, as that of " an existing and self-
subsisting reality, a real and personal Being." Now
personality always implies the possession of will.
This we conceive is what is chiefly intended, when
in addition to conscious intelligence, personality is
ascribed to the Infinite Being. It is difficult to clear
the author from the imputation of having fallen into
some inconsistency here. But passing this, as a
matter of small moment, we think it may be fairly
assumed, that his idea of God was such as is given in
the above-named Confession ; and that it is from this,
the idea of the Trinity is to be evolved.
How then shall we proceed to perform this opera
tion ? We believe there are not many Unitarians who
will not cheerfully accept both his definition, and
whatever Trinity can be deduced from it.
There is a Corollary appended to the above Con
fession of Faith, where we may read thus : —
" The Trinity of persons in the unity of God would
have been a necessary idea of my speculative reason,
deduced from the necessary postulate . of an intelligent
Creator, whose ideas being anterior to the things, must be
more actual than those things, even as those things are
more actual than our images derived from them ; and who,
as intelligent, must have had co-eternally an adequate idea

IDEA OF TRINITY. 145
of himself, in and through which he created all things
both in heaven and earth."'1'
This very well agrees with what we have already
heard from the author, respecting God, his reflex act
of self-consciousness, and his love. In one part of
the Aids to Reflection, the second person is incident
ally spoken of as " the all perfect Idea, in which the
Supreme Spirit contemplateth itself and the pleni
tude of its infinity." (p. 237.)
But the difficulty is how to make of this Idea a
distinct person. Leibnitz thought that the mind in
the act of reflecting on itself, being both subject and
object, and all in each, afforded the closest illustration
of the divine unity and plurality. But this was more
than illustration with Coleridge. For in his philos
ophy, ideas are not mere affections of the mind.
They have, to use his way of speaking, both a sub
jective and an objective pole. They exist in the
mind, and they have a corresponding reality out of
the mind ; and both the internal reality and the
external reality, belong essentially to the idea. When
therefore Coleridge says that the second person is
the idea of the infinite mind, he means that it is both
a thought of that mind, and a real existence distinct
from it : and being the idea of itself, that it must be
itself, thrown as it were outward, and so made other
W He adds, " But this would have been a speculative idea, like those
of circles and other mathematical figures, to which we are not autho
rized by the practical reason to attribute reality. Solely in con
sequence of our redemption does the Trinity become a doctrine, the
belief of which as real is imposed on our consciences."

146 COLERIDGE.
than itself. Accordingly it is usual with him t6
denominate the logos the divine alterity : and more
than once he quotes with manifest approbation that
formula of the Logos, ' Deus alter et idem.'m
But now if this is to be taken literally, and we are
to understand that the Logos is strictly another
mind — another God, yet without making two minds
two Gods, we have the doctrine of Mr. Newman.
We find it however very difficult to believe that
Coleridge did intend this. He speaks indeed in one
place of the Son as the creative mind of the Father. f2>
But his critique on Sherlock, in the 4th Volume of
the Literary Remains, is a decisive proof throughout,
that he did not look upon the Persons as distinct
minds. Thus he says in one place :¦ — " Sherlock's
is doubtless a very plain and intelligible account of
three Gods in the most absolute intimacy with each
other, so that they are all as one ; but by no means
of three persons that are one God." (p. 199.) And
again : — " Have these three infinite minds, at once
self-conscious and conscious of each other's con
sciousness, always the very same thoughts ? If so,
this mutual consciousness is unmeaning, or deriva
tive ; and the three do not cease to be three because
they are three sames. If not, then there is Tritheism
evidently." (p. 196.) Once more : — " It is too
evident that Sherlock supposes the Father as Father,
O) Constitution of Church and State, and Lay Sermons, pp. 288. 90.
(J) Lit. Rem. vol. iii. p. 252.

SELF-STJBSISTENTS. 147
to possess a spirit, that is, an intellective faculty, by
which he knows the Spirit, that is, the third co-equal
Person ; and that this Spirit the Person, has a spirit,
that is, an intellective faculty, by which he knows
the Father; and the Logos, in like manner, rela
tively to both. So too, the Father has a logos, by
which he distinguishes the Logos ; and the Logos
has a logos, and so on : that is to say, there are three
several though not severed triune Gods" (p. 198.)'1'
The question then returns, what was Coleridge's
idea of the Trinity ? Did he after all mean no more
than that the divine persons are the powers or attri
butes of the one infinite mind? No, certainly. For in
this same critique, commenting on Sherlock's allusion
to Augustine's illustration of the Trinity, drawn from
our understanding, memory, and will, he sharply
says, " Are memory, understanding, and volition,
persons, — self-subsistents ? If not, what are they to
the purpose? Who doubts that Jehovah is con
sciously powerful, consciously wise, consciously good :
and that it is the same Jehovah who in being om
nipotent is good and wise ; in being wise, omnipotent,
and good ; in being good is wise and omnipotent ?
But what has all this to do with a distinction of
Persons ?" (pp. 209, 210.) And immediately after,
" Then why do we make tri-personality peculiar to
(i) " To say that they " (the divine persons) " are three minds, or
spirits, or substances, that do invicem conscire, is to say that they are
three Gods : and because every mental substance hath its own active
power, intellect, and will, it supposeth three Trinities instead of one."
— Baxter's End of Controversy, p. 17. Introd.

148 COLERIDGE.
God ? " His answer to this deserves special notice ;
for here if anywhere is to be found what we seek.
" The doctrine of the Trinity, (the foundation of
all rational theology, no less than the pre-condition
and ground of the rational possibility of the Christian
faith, that is, the incarnation and redemption,) rests
securely on the position, that in man ' omni actioni
prceit sua propria passio ; Deus autem est actus
purissimus sine ulla potentialitate: As the tune
produced between the breeze and the jEolian harp,
is not a self-subsistent, so neither memory, nor
understanding, nor even love in man : for he is a
passive as well as active being : he is a patible agent.
But in God this is not so. Whatever is necessarily
of him, (God of God, Light of Light,) is necessarily
all act ; therefore necessarily self-subsistent, though
not necessarily self-originated."'1' This moreover is
immediately followed up by an emphatic commenda
tion of one of Sherlock's statements, namely, that
love in God is a person, because it is a distinct act,
and there are no accidents or faculties in God.'2'
The statement occurs at p. 133 of the Vindication :
and altogether agrees with some, which in Chap. III.
O) pp. 210, 211. See also pp. 45, 46, where he says, speaking of
the Nicene and Ariminian creeds, — " In both there are three self-
subsistent and one self-originated : which is the substance of the idea
of the Trinity, as faithfully worded as is compatible with the necessary
inadequacy of words to the expression of ideas, that is, spiritual
truths that can only he spiritually discerned."
(a) ii This most important nay fundamental truth, so familiar to the
elder philosophy, and so strongly and distinctly enunciated by Philo
Judseus, the senior and contemporary of the Evangelists, is to our
modern divines darkness and a sound." — pp. 211, 212. See App. D.

SELF-SUBSISTENTS. 149
were quoted from the same author ; namely, that
"what are faculties in us are persons in God," — "holy
minds or spirits essentially united into one infinite
mind or spirit."'1' This notion was pronounced to
be a contradictory one : nor can we here reverse
the decision. A mind whose faculties are not facul
ties but distinct minds, is not a mind but a cluster of
minds : and why a trine, any more than a quadruple
or a quintuple cluster, we are at a loss to discover.
But Coleridge, as we have seen, certainly did not
look upon the Persons as distinct minds. His agree
ment therefore with Sherlock was rather in sound
than in sense. Both made love in God a person.
But both did not understand the same thing by
person. It is true that the word self-subsistent, which
Coleridge applies to the divine persons, was recom
mended by him as a substitute for substance when
speaking of mind ;'2' and that the definition which
South gives of substance in its large and most general
sense, may very well be taken as a definition of self-
subsistent, in the use which Coleridge makes of the
word, — " a being existing by itself, so as neither
to inhere in or be supported by another being as
a subject."'3' It is true also that a spiritual substance
and a mind, have been wont to be looked on as
identical things. Still the author must be allowed to
01 See above, p. 92. <2' Lit. Rem. vol. iv. p. 184.
i3' Tritheism charged, p. 247. See also above, p. 117. Cyril's
definition of substance.

150 COLERIDGE.
have the advantage of his own statement, namely,
that three divine minds would be three Triune Gods:
which he would by no means be understood to hold.
It would seem therefore as if what are faculties or
affections in us, Coleridge wished to be looked upon
as having in God a sort of independent existence of
their own, — as, in short, beings and individuals in se,
though not minds. This notion, (which the ennades,
agathotetes, and noes, — unities, goodnesses, and intel
ligences, of the later Platonists may assist us in
apprehending,) is not indeed open to the charge of
contradiction, like that of Sherlock. But it is open
(and whatever may be said of its philosophy) to
another objection equally grave ; namely, that it
reduces the Persons to a company of defective
entities, neither of which is God, neither of which
is a person, either in the common sense, or in any
sense that is capable of serving the Trinitarian.
What sort of person would love be without intelli
gence;'1' or mind considered apart from its reason
and love ; or reason similarly isolated ? Was
reason alone incarnate in Jesus, and not love?
t1) It is to he observed that the act of Deity in reflecting on himself,
is an act of Reason: and reason and its acts are one. The idea
therefore which the infinite mind forms of itself, is the divine reason
under a certain modification: which therefore is the true self-subsistent.
Accordingly in the Corollary from which we have just above quoted,
Coleridge names two foundations of the Logos : — one the actuality of
the ideas which the Divine Being must be supposed to have of the
universe before it was made. These ideas clearly belong to the
reason, and would make as many self-subsistents as ideas, were they
not summed up in the one reason, and identical with it, " in which,"
as the author says, " the essences of all things co-exist in all their
distinctions, yet as one and indivisible." — Friend, vol. iii. p. 206.

SELF-STJBSISTENTS. 151
Was the Comforter — the Monitor, who was promised
to guide the apostles into all truth, an unintelligent
being ? In what is called orthodox theology, the
Holy Spirit is as certainly intelligent, as the Son is
good ; and the Father as truly intelligent and good,
as either the Son or the Spirit. How otherwise can
the wants of Trinitarianism be satisfied ? How
otherwise can each be God in se? A Trinity of
imperfect beings, that is to say, of love without
reason, and reason without love, and mind without
either, would more nearly resemble that which Cole
ridge ascribes to Sir Thomas Brown, than it would
the Trinity of the Church : and that he ridicules as
a trefoil, a thing of every day occurrence ; adding
with truth, though in contradiction to himself else
where, " the mystery is that one is three, each being
the whole God."'1' If each of the Persons is intelli
gent and good, (to name no other characteristic, —
and who will deny these ?) then he is so either by an
intelligence and goodness of his own, that is, peculiar
to himself, or by an intelligence and goodness which
belong to him only in common with the other Persons.
If the truth lie in the former supposition, then how
can we distinguish the Persons from minds ? If in
the latter, we do not get beyond the bounds of
modalism. For granting that intelligence and love
are self-subsistent in God, yet if in conceiving of
either one of these self-subsistents we are not to
0) Lit. Rem. vol. ii. p. 399.

152 COLERIDGE.
isolate it from the rest, because without them it
would not be a person any more than it would be
God, then certainly the true person as the true God
is the divine mind entire, and the Trinity is but this
same mind viewed (if we may speak so figuratively)
on different sides, or in different modes of action.
We are, moreover, here also at a loss to discover
why the Persons should be only three in number.
Baxter's triad consisted of vital-active-power, in
tellect, and will. Thus far, and in connection with
the Trinity, we have heard nothing from Coleridge
respecting will, and yet will plays a conspicuous part
both in his philosophy and theology : which indeed
with him are one. Will is not in his view another
name for desire, or love. It more than anything else
constitutes the ' me,' the acting responsible self. It
is 'the principle of our personality.''1' and in an
especial and pre-eminent sense, the spiritual part of
our humanity.'2' In God it distinguishes Spinozism
from proper Theism : and is in fact placed by the
author even before mind itself, as the very root, if we
may so speak, and principle of Deity, — causa sui, the
secret of his self-existence.'3' Is love then, — is
O Aids to Reflection, p. 46.
<2) p. 97. ejusd. Constitution of Church and State, p. 133.
(3) » < i yriu or ^all be in that I will to be.' I am that only one
who is self-originant, causa sui, whose will must be contemplated as
antecedent in idea to, and deeper than his own co-eternal being."
Lit. Rem. vol iii. p. 118. " Deus est ens super ens, the ground of all
being, but therein likewise absolute being, in that he is the eternal
self-affirmant, the I am in that I am : and the key of this mystery is
given in the pure idea of the will, as the alone causa sui." p. 142.

TETRACHTYS. 153
reason a self-subsistent, and shall not will be the
same? It is a self-subsistent also. The author
avows it. But then shall we not have more than a
triad ? Mind with its reason, its love, and its will,
must be at least a tetrad. Again the author assents.
The Deity is a tetrad. It is one of his most cherished
notions.'1' Nor are we to suppose that it is a notion forced
upon him simply by the necessity of finding some
place in his Trinity for will. His conception of the
Deity as a tetrad, had another, — we suppose we
should add, a deeper source. For conceiving of
mind and its idea as thesis and antithesis, with love
as their synthesis, his philosophy required a pro-
thesis. This he found in the will. " In the Trinity,"
he says, "there is 1. Ipseity, 2. Alterity, 3. Com
munity. You may express the Formula thus : —
" God the Absolute Will or Identity = Prothesis.
" The Father = Thesis. The Son = Antithesis.
"The Spirit = Synthesis."!3'
M " In how many pages " (of Waterland) " do I not see reason to
regret, that the total idea of the 4=3=1 of the adorable Tetractys,
eternally self-manifested in the Triad, Father, Son, and Spirit, was never
in its cloudless unity present to him.'' Lit. Rem. vol. iv. pp. 221, 222.
" As excellent means of raising a presumption in the mind of the
falsehood of Arianism and Socinianism, and thus of preparing the
mind for a docile reception of the great idea itself, I admit and
value the testimonies from the writings of the early Fathers. But
alas ! the increasing dimness, ending in the final want of the idea of
this all-truths-in eluding truth of the Tetractys, eternally manifested
in the Triad ; — this, this is the ground and cause of all the main
heresies from Semi-Arianism, recalled by Dr. Samuel Clarke, to the
last setting ray of departing faith in the necessitarian psilanthropism
of Dr. Priestley." p. 257.
«) Table Talk, vol. i. p. 77.

154 COLERIDGE.
This Scheme is drawn out at length in the Literary
Remains, vol. iii. where at the opening of the volume
we may thus read : —
Formula Fidei de Sanctissima Trinitate.
1830.
The Identity.
"The absolute subjectivity, whose only attribute
is the Good ; whose only definition is, — that which
is essentially causative of all possible true being ;
the ground ; the absolute will ; the adorable Trpoirpco-
rov, which, whatever is assumed as the first, must be
presumed as its antecedent ; Qebs without the article,
and yet not as an adjective. See in John, i. 18, as
differenced from i. 1.
" But that which is essentially causative of all being
must be causative of its own, — causa sui, avToir&Tcop.™
Hence ('1 " Behmen constantly makes self-existence a positive act, and
distinguishes between ' God and the ground of God.' " p. 73. ejusd.
Many will here recur to the Bythus of Valentinus; whose titles
were proarche and propator. His first and second Tetrads were thus
composed : — f 1. By thus, aire Ftoaxche vel Propator : and 2. Sige, Bive EnnBea vel Charia.

Tetrib

Ex his ,
FRIMA.
1 3. Nous.aive tfnigenitus. Pater?
^ et F-rincipium omnium. §
and 4.
Veritas.
Ex his,
i 5. Logos.
and 6.
Zoe.
Tetras
9ECONDA.
1 1. Homo.
Ex his, and 8.
Ecclesia.
Let not the reader be surprised to find homo and ecclesia in the
pleroma. Coleridge tells us in a note to Friend, vol. ii. p. 171, that
'humanity always pre-existed in the pleroma;' and if humanity
surely ecclesity. See the N. B. in what follows of the Formula.
tetrachtys. 155
The Ipseity.
" The eternally self-affirmant, self-affirmed ; the
' I am in that I am,' or the ' I shall be that I will to
be : ' the Father ; the relatively subjective : whose
attribute is the Holy one ; whose definition is the
essential finific in the form of the infinite : dat sibi
fines. " But the absolute will, the absolute good, in the
eternal act of self-affirmation, the Good as the Holy
One, co-eternally begets The Alterity.
" The supreme being, 6 ovrats &v ; the supreme
reason ; the Jehovah ; the Son ; the Word : whose
attribute is the True ; (the truth, the light, the fiat ) ;
and whose definition is, the pleroma of being, whose
essential poles are unity and distinctity, or the es
sential infinite in the form of the finite, or lastly the
relatively objective, deltas objectiva in relation to
the I am as the deitas subjectiva, the divine ob
jectivity. " (N. B. The distinctities in the pleroma are the
eternal ideas, the subsistential truths ; each con
sidered in itself an infinite in the form of the finite,
but all considered as one with the unity, the eternal
Son, they are the energies of the finific. John,
i. 3. 16.)
" But with the relatively subjective and the rela
tively objective, the great idea needs only for its
completion a co-eternal which is both: that is,

156 COLERIDGE.
relatively objective to the subjective, relatively sub
jective to the objective. Hence
The Community.
" The eternal life, which is love ; the Spirit ;
relatively to the Father, the Spirit of holiness, the
Holy Spirit, relatively to the Son, the Spirit of
truth, whose attribute is wisdom. Sancta sophia,
the Good in the reality of the True, in the form of
actual life. " Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! IXdotfip-f jotot."
"We shall not attempt to analyze this, or to dive
further into the theology or philosophy of our
author. For one thing must be plain to all, namely,
that Coleridge was no orthodox Trinitarian. Had
his lot been cast in the second century, he would
unquestionably have been ranked among the Gnostics.
His Tetrad does not indeed agree in all respects with
that of Valentinus. But there is a sufficient family
likeness between them : while it could not have
escaped Irenseus, that if Coleridge did not educe
from his Tetrad a line of iEons, after the manner of
Valentinus from his ogdoad, yet he placed a whole
pleroma in the third member of that tetrad. But
perhaps the main objection which this ancient Chris
tian writer would have made to the scheme proposed
by Coleridge, is the position it assigns to the Father.
If anything is clear in the Ante-Nicene theology, it
is this, — that the Father is the fountain of Deity.

tetrachtys. 157
He is the ctpx?), the alrta of all things, not excluding
the Son ; himself being avapxos and ayevvriros. But
Coleridge's scheme makes both the Father and Son
yewrjToi. Coleridge refers them both to a prior
principle, — a TrpoiraTcop, and that it should seem co-
ordinately. It is true he often speaks of the Tetrad
as manifested in a Triad ; and that then the Father
combines in his own person both prothesis and
thesis.'1' But this is only catachrestically. Properly
speaking, the prothesis is no less distinct from the
thesis, than it is from the antithesis, and is equally
the root or fountain of both. This is so utterly at
variance with what is called Catholic theology, that
it must place Coleridge, notwithstanding all his
reverence for ' the Church,' without her pale.
Tetrachtarian is the name he should bear ; or
with a due regard to his 4=3=1, Tetrach-tri-uni-
tarian, Tetrachtrinitarian. Even the Quarterly Re
view has at length uttered the warning, that Coleridge
is ' neither a sound nor a safe guide.'
(i) " It cannot however be denied, that in changing the formula of
the Tetrachtys into the Trias, by merging the Prothesis in the Thesis,
the Identity in the Ipseity, the Christian Fathers subjected their
exposition to many inconveniences." Lit. Rem. vol. iv. p. 240.

CHAPTER VI.

§ 1. Thus far we think the following propositions
have been made to appear : —
1. That the doctrine of three divine persons
specifically one in nature and perfections is essentially
Tritheistic. 2. That no union, whether of penetration or of
mutual consciousness, which leaves to each of the
persons his own substance and attributes, will suffice
to wipe out this stain.
3. That to say there is but one divine essence, is
to say there is but one divine will, one divine
understanding, and so but one divine agent, or per
son in the common sense of the word: which is
Unitarianism. 4. That the doctrine of three intelligent agents,
having each its own particular powers of thought
and action, and yet inhering in one particular essence,
is a ridiculous solecism and inevitably self-destructive.
5. That the specific and numerical unities are

RECAPITULATION. 159
essentially opposed to each other : objects which are
specifically one, being always numerically more than
one ; or, to speak more precisely, specific unity
always implying numerical plurality
6. That to say God is above number and higher
than number, is to destroy the significance of the
great and fundamental principle both of Judaism
and Christianity ; namely, that " Jehovah our God,
Jehovah is one."
7. That to suppose, after the manner of Howe,
the divine persons to be so united, as to constitute
another and fourth Being, diverse from either of the
constituent persons, numerically one in himself, and
alone God in the highest sense, is to take away the
proper divinity of each of the persons, to convert
the Trinity into a Quaternity, and to make the Deity
complex. 8. That to identify this greater Being with the
Father, is to suppose a Trinity in the Father, to make
the Son and Spirit parts of the Father, and that
without avoiding in the smallest degree the charge
of making the Deity complex.
9. That to convert the powers of the infinite
mind into distinct minds, having each its own in
dividual powers, is to fall into plain contradiction :
and that to make them self-subsistent is not to make
them persons ; excepting in a sense that is altogether
arbitrary, and at the same time incapable of satisfying
the demands of Trinitarian orthodoxy.
10. That no intelligible distinction can be drawn

160 CONYBEARE.
between personal and essential attributes, or between
absolute and relative substances, which is any more
capable of satisfying those demands.
Such are the principal points which have been
argued in the foregoing chapters. We are however
well aware that individuals are not wanting who,
though ranking among the most zealous of Trini
tarians, will yet condemn the labour which has been
expended on these propositions as altogether super
fluous, and tending only to what with them is a
foregone conclusion: namely, that the mystery of
the Trinity is inexplicable. God they say is certainly
one, — one mind, one spirit, — we believe we may
add, one agent : but in what sense he is three, they
pretend not to know.
This view, which is now to be the subject of con
sideration, is sometimes put forth with no small show
of contempt for the Unitarian party, as engaged in
an absurd undertaking, to refute what cannot even
be apprehended. Thus Mr. W. D. Conybeare in
an Introductory course of Lectures delivered some
years ago at Bristol College : —
" We believe that the divine nature is indeed one, yet
so that in that unity there is a distinction ; but in what
that union or in what that distinction consists, or in what
manner they co-exist, we know not, we profess not to
know: here we confess our entire ignorance. Now is
there any one I would ask who can pretend that his in
tellectual powers are able so fully to grasp the subject of
the Divine Essence, as peremptorily to pronounce the
impossibility of any such distinction, or its absolute

WARDLAW. 161
incompatibility with the divine unity. Unless however
we feel ourselves competent to such an assertion, it must
be perfectly obvious that the vulgar objections sometimes
made against this mystery, as though it involved a
contradiction in terms, are as irrelevant as they are ir
reverent : they may be scoffs, arguments they cannot
be."'1' Dr. Wardlaw in his Discourses on the Socinian
Controversy, holds a similar strain.
" The doctrine of which I now speak is freely admitted
to be above reason. But it is of consequence to observe
that on this very account, it seems impossible to prove it
contrary to reason. * * * For unless we have some
notion of the thing itself, on what principle can we pos
sibly make out the contrariety. Were we to say, that
the Persons of the Godhead are one and three, in the
same sense, we should evidently affirm what is contrary
to reason ; because such a proposition would involve, in
the very terms of it, an irreconcileable contradiction:'2'
but so long as we do not pretend to know or to say, how
they are one, and how they are three ; to prove that we
assert what is contrary to reason when we affirm they are
both, is, from the nature of the thing, impossible. For
what is it which is to be proved contrary to reason ?
Upon the supposition made, we cannot tell : it is some
thing which we do not know : of the nature and circum
stances of which we are left in entire ignorance." <3'
Dr. D wight expresses himself in a similar way,
though apparently with a clearer perception of the
double edge which the argument carries.
i1) pp. 198, 199.
(2) Dr. Wardlaw we see is one who conceives that the doctrine of
the Trinity cannot stand, if built on a contradiction.
M pp. 22, 23. 2nd edit.
K

162 DWIGHT — STUART.
" The futility," he says, " and emptiness of this funda
mental objection of Unitarians, is susceptible of an abso^
lute and easy demonstration. It is intuitively certain, or
in other language self-evident, that no proposition can be
seen to be either true or false, unless the mind possess
the ideas out of which it is formed, so far as to discern
whether they agree or disagree. The proposition as
serted by Trinitarians, and denied by Unitarians, is, that
God is Tri-personal. The ideas intended by the word
God, here denoting the infinite existence, and tri-personal ;
are not, and cannot be, possessed by any man. Neither
Trinitarians nor Unitarians, therefore, can, by any pos
sible effort of the understanding, discern whether this
proposition be true or false : or whether the ideas de
noted by the words God and tri-personal, agree or
disagree. Until this can be done, it is perfectly nugatory,
either to assert or deny this proposition, as an object of
intellectual discernment or philosophical inquiry. Where
the mind has not ideas it cannot compare them ; where it
cannot compare them it cannot prove their agreement or
disagreement ; and of course it can form out of them no
proposition, whose truth or falsehood it can at all per
ceive. * * * What God is as one, or as three in one, is
perfectly undiscernible by us."'1'
In like manner Dr. Stuart.
" What then is that distinction in the Godhead,
which the word person is meant to designate ? I
answer, withont hesitation, that I do not know. The
fact that a distinction exists, is what we aver ; the
definition of that distinction is what I shall by no means
attempt."'2' " We say it is not a mere distinction of
attributes, of relations to us, of modes of action, or of
relation between attributes and substance or essence, so
far as they are known to us. We believe the Scriptures
O Serm. xxxix.
<2> Letters to Channing, p. 30. Edit. 1834. Aberdeen.

NATURE OF PERSONS UNKNOWN. 163
justify us in these negations. But here we leave the
subject."'1' " We say the divine essence and attributes are
numerically one, so far as they are known to us, but there
is in the Godhead a real distinction between the Father and
the Son. We abjure all attempts to define that dis
tinction — we admit it simply as a fact, on the authority
of revelation. Now how can you prove that a distinction
does not exist in the Godhead ? * * * In order to prove
that this distinction contradicts the unity, must you not
be able to tell what it is, and what the divine unity is ?
Can you do either ?"'2'
It will be observed, that all of these writers use
expressions which naturally imply that they look
upon the mystery as lying in the unity as well as in
the plurality. And yet we have heard one of them,
and that more than once, expressly asserting that the
essence of God with its attributes is numerically one.
And we believe neither of these writers would
dissent from this proposition, or from the inter
pretation we put upon it, namely, that there is but
one almighty will, one all -comprehensive under
standing, — one Divine Agent, as one Being.
But if this be so, it is manifest that the difficulty
which presses on these men as Trinitarians, lies not
in the unity, but in the plurality. So that in their
perplexities, we have in fact only a reappearance of
the old scholastic puzzle :'3' with this difference
however, that whereas the schoolmen bent every
energy to expound it, these confess that it is in
explicable. We might, therefore, were we disposed, at once
m p. 31. fz) pp. 39, 40. <3> Vid. supra, p. 20.

164 NATURE OF PERSONS UNKNOWN.
take our leave of these writers, remarking only, as in
an earlier part of this essay, that provided the unity
of the Divine Being be admitted in the sense of one
Divine Agent, one Infinite Mind or Spirit, the
Unitarian needs not concern himself greatly respec
ting any alleged distinctions in the nature of this
Being; especially such as are confessed by those
who assert them, to be altogether unknown and
inconceivable. For what practical effect can attach
to the belief of such? What holy affections can
they inspire? What motives can they supply to
virtuous action ? What doctrines can they serve to
illustrate ? The present Unitarianism of England
has been censured as a system of negations ; and the
idea of deriving from it any moral elevation has
been ridiculed by a distinguished writer, as a pro
posal to ' gather grapes from thorns,' or ' to extract
sunbeams from cucumbers.'"' But what a series of
negations is here ? There are in God certain dis
tinctions which are to be called personal : but which
distinctions are not nominal ; neither are they modal ;
neither are they such as distinguish faculties in the
human mind ; nor anything else that can be named
or thought of. What can be more thoroughly
negative and barren than this ? The Unitarian
would be absurdly prodigal of his labour, who
should endeavour to prove of such distinctions that
they are self-contradictory. Neither the falsehood
W Hall's Works, vol. v. p. 33.

NATURE OF PERSONS UNKNOWN. 165
nor the truth, as Dr. Dwight rightly argues, can be
perceived of a proposition, which conveys to the
mind no notion. Such a proposition is to the mind
what an invisible object is to the eye. It is enough
for the Unitarian to ask, ' cui bono ? ' How is my
heart to be affected, or my will to be actuated, by a
proposition of this nature ? To my intelligent fac
ulties nihil, how is it to act on my moral nature, or
how assist me in any intellectual process ? I may
repeat the words of the proposition, and may believe
on extraneous authority that they contain a truth :
but so long as it is a truth unknown, ' what doth it
profit ? ' A man might be taught to repeat it in a
strange language, and might still believe that it
meant something. But what effect could be pro
duced either on his understanding, his heart, or his
life, by a proposition enunciated in a language that
he had never learned ? " Now the Catholic faith is
this, ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in
Unitate veneremur : neque confundentes Personas,
neque substantiam separantes. Alia est enim Persona
Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti. Sed Patris,
et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, una est Divinitas, cequalis
Gloria, co-ceterna Majestas" Who would think of
imparting to an untaught man the doctrine of the
Trinity in these words ? And yet wherein would it
be more absurd than to teach him to repeat the same
sentences in an English dress, when in that dress it
is allowed they convey no idea? Latin, English,
Chinese,— all are one, whether as vehicles of thought

166 NATURE OF PERSONS UNKNOWN.
or instruments of impression, if no thought is con
veyed. We recommend to these 'blind leaders of
the blind' the words of a masculine writer, whom
they hold in no small esteem : — " In the Church, I
had rather speak five words with my understanding,
that I might teach others also, than ten thousand
words in an unknown tongue"m Surely the fun
damental principle of a religion taught by Paul, was
not a proposition, which would have been as in
telligible to the Greek in any barbarous language as
in his own. Fven Waterland may be found declaring
that " our faith and our ideas keep pace with each
other ; " and that by " mysteries " are not meant
" positions altogether unintelligible, or that carry no
idea at all with them."'2' We would admonish these
men in the words of Baxter : — " The bare use of
the name (person), by one that knoweth not what
that word signifieth, doth prove no man orthodox ;
but only that he useth orthodox words. It will save
no man to use a word which he understands not."'3'
Much is often said in this connection respecting the
difficulty which attends our conception of the modi
of various things ; such as the action of our minds
on our bodies, and of our bodies on our minds, while
yet the fact of such reciprocal action is believed
without demur. It is true. We do believe the fact
of the action, while we know not the manner of it.
But neither do we believe in the manner of it. Our

W 1 Cor. xiv. 19. <2> Works, vol. iii. pp. 405, 406.
TO End of Controversy. Introd. p. 14.

MODUS OF DIVINE PERSONALITIES. 167
belief and our knowledge here keep equal pace.
We believe the fact of the action, for we know it.
We believe not in the manner of it, for we know
nothing about it. We believe that it takes place in
some way: and this we know just as well. But in
what way we neither know nor believe.
In the case however of the Trinity, the very thing
of which it is allowed and protested that we know
nothing, and have no notion, is the thing we are
required to beheve. That in the Godhead there are
three equal persons, is what we are required to
believe : and what a person in the Godhead is, is the
thing of which we have no notion. Coleridge may
here do us service. He says, " none but the weakest
men have objected to the Tri-unity merely because
the modus is above their comprehension : for so is
the influence of thought on muscular motion; so is
life itself; so in short is every first truth of necessity;
for to comprehend a thing is to know its antecedent
and consequent. * * * When a man tells me that
his will can lift his arm, I conceive his meaning:
though I do not comprehend the fact, I understand
him. But the Socinians say, ' we do not understand
you : ' "(I) that is, we do not conceive your meaning
when you tell us there are three persons in the one
God ; and you acknowledge you have no conception
of that meaning yourselves.
§ 2. These things are apprehended clearly enough

<» Lit. Rem. vol. iv. pp. 186, 187.

168

WALLIS.

by some of the writers we are now concerned with,
and accordingly they may be observed to divide off
into two classes : the one, consistent with themselves
and liberal, but of suspected orthodoxy ; the other,
orthodox in reputation, but inconsistent.
Wallis may be taken as a fair type of the first of
these classes. He states the Trinitarian doctrine
thus : —
" That according to the word of God the sacred Trinity
of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," (not three spirits, but
one spirit, as he elsewhere says from St. Augustine,)
" are so distinguished each from other, as that the Father
is not the Son or Holy Ghost ; the Son not the Father or
Holy Ghost ; the Holy Ghost not the Father or Son ;
yet so united or intimately one, as that they are all one
God : which in the Athanasian creed is called trinity in
unity, and unity in trinity ; or in common speaking, three
persons and one God."'1'
As to the nature of the distinction thus inti
mated in the Divine Being, Dr. Wallis, like the
writers just noticed, knows nothing. He is there
fore, like them, very easy under the charge often
brought against Trinitarians, (and we have seen
how justly against many of them,) of holding an
impossible and contradictory creed.
" For what is it," he asks, " which is thus pretended
to be impossible ? It is but this, that there be three
somewhats which are but one in God ; and these some-
whats we commonly call persons. Now what incon
sistency is there in this ? That Father, Son, and Holy
t1' See the opening of Letter I.

HIS AFFINITY WITH SABELLIANS. 169
Ghost, are three, is manifest ; and are in Scripture
language distinguished. That there is but one God is
manifest also ; and all those three are this God. * * *
What kind or degree of distinction according to our
metaphysics this is, we need not be very solicitous to
inquire : * * * It is enough for us, if these three may
truly be so distinguished as that one be not the other,
and yet all but one God."'1'
He is at pains therefore to show that what in
one respect is three, may in another respect be
one. He often insists that the distinction is more
than nominal or notional. He says also, it is
more than modal ; and greater than that which
obtains among the attributes. But what it is, he is
so utterly ignorant, that he can say no more of it
positively, -than that it is that distinction by which
the divine persons are distinguished.'2'
So far, and strong as this language is, we suppose
the greater part of those who are interested in the
argument of this chapter, would go with him. But
Wallis felt that such being his creed, he could have
no great ground of quarrel either with the Sabellian
or the Modalist. Thus towards the end of his 8th
Letter, noticing a Tract entitled * A Suit for For
bearance,' the author of which had complained that
Christians, not contenting themselves with " the
latitude and simplicity " of Christ and his Apostles,
had made the terms of Christian communion too
rigid, he says, " herein I think the writer hath no
W pp. 9, 10. New edit. i2> pp. 4. 26.

170 WALLIS.
cause to blame me, nor do I see that he doth." He
then proceeds in the following strain : —
" What this writer tells us of somebody that had been
Master of the Temple, who did express himself to this
purpose, ' the substance of God with this property to be
of none, doth make the person of the Father ; the very
selfsame substance in number, with the property to be of
the Father, maketh the person of the Son ; the same
substance having added to it the property of proceeding
from the other two, maketh the person of the Holy
Ghost ; so that in every person there is implied both the
substance of God, which is one, and also that property
which causeth the same person really and truly to differ
from the other two : ' — this I say would pass with me
well enough ; and if he please so to express himself, I
should not quarrel with it. * * * Again, if I should
express it thus, that God considered as the original or
fountain of being, who himself is, and gives being to all
things else, may be called God the Father, or the God
and Father of all ; and the same God as the fountain of
wisdom or knowledge, be called God the Son, <5 Koy6s, the
Word, Wisdom, or Reason, ' the True Light which
lighteth every man that cometh into the world,' God's
wisdom resulting from his essence and being ; and the
same God as the fountain of power, might, or action, be
called God the Holy Ghost, God's power of acting,
proceeding from his essence and wisdom also ; and that
this eternal, all-wise, and almighty God is one God ;
perhaps he Would not much mislike this : or if he should
I would not quarrel with him on this account, or be
positive that it must be just so. We know that Christ
is called the Wisdom of God, the Son of God, the Son of
the Highest ; and the Holy Ghost is called the Power of
the Highest. And we know that amongst ourselves,
knowledge results from the essence of our soul, and
action proceeds from both. * * * Yet would I not be
positive, much less would I require every one to be of

HIS AFFINITY WITH SABELLIANS. 171
that opinion that the personalities of God must needs be
these. I am content to rest here, that these three,
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, whatever name you call
them by, differ in somewhat, more than what we com
monly call the divine attributes ; yet not so as to be three
Gods, or more Gods than one, but are one and the same
God."'1' The latter part of this extract (with the exception
of the last sentence) is altogether of a Sabellian hue.
There are two principal forms of Sabellianism. The
first supposes the Persons to be divers aspects or
manifestations of the One Supreme. The second
asserts a Trinity of powers or faculties. The above
passage symbohzes with the latter. It is the form of
Sabellianism which Watts espoused, and remarkable
is the agreement which sometimes appears between
him and Wallis. Thus in his Fifth Dissertation,
Dr. Watts may be found thus expressing himself.
" Though I call the Word and the Spirit two divine
powers, to comport with the analogy which Scripture
seems to have established between the idea of God and
the idea of man, yet I am far from determining precisely
what or how great is that real and divine difference
which is between them ; or what is the true and inward
distinction between the essence of God himself, who is
called the Father, and his Word, and his Spirit. It is
represented in Scripture to be something more than such
a difference as is between divine attributes, or nominal
relations ; and yet it seems to be something less than is
between three distinct conscious minds, or three different
intelligent agents in the literal sense of the words."'2'
But while Wallis thus symbolized with the Sa-
W pp. 244, 245. W Works, vol. 6. p. 333. Edit. 1812.

172 WALLIS.
bellians of the second class, his affinities with those
of the first were hardly less remarkable. Accordingly
he insists much on the classic sense of the word
Persona, in illustration of the Trinity : saying in
one place that if it be properly attended to, " it will
appear no more harsh to say the three Persons,
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are one God, than to
say God the Creator, God the Redeemer, and God
the Sanctifier, are one God. It is much the same
thing whether of the two forms we use."'1' And so
he says of one of his correspondents, who had pro
pounded a view of the Trinity altogether of this
order, that his letter was for substance much to the
same purpose with what he had himself undertaken
to maintain, and " in nothing contrary to it : " but
nevertheless, that he thought the word ' manifest
ation ' too faint ; and that the difference between the
three Persons is eternal and antecedent to all man-
festations.'2' Here in truth lay the main point of difference be
tween him and the Sabellians of this class; namely
that he looked upon the ' manifestations,' which he held
in common with them, as indicative of some inward
distinction, seated in the divine nature, though what
he knew not. It might be for ought he knew, the
very distinction on which the Sabellians of the second
class insisted. But on this point he would not
speak positively. He chose rather to keep in the
m Letters, p. 89. <2> p. 227.

PRACTICAL ELEMENT OF HIS SYSTEM. 173
darkness of a distinction unknown. Surely the
apprehension which John Howe expressed in one
of his letters to Wallis, was not without foundation ;
namely, that the Unitarians would be apt to consider
him (Wallis) as " more theirs than ours."
The practical element in Wallis's system was
plainly Sabellian. Witness the summary which he
gives at the end of his Letter VI., of the chief
points for which he had been contending. They
are these. " 1st. That what in one consideration
are three, may in another consideration be but one.
2nd. That we may safely say without absurdity,
contradiction, or inconsistence with reason, there
may in God be three somewhats, which we commonly
call persons, that are but one God. 3rd. That
these three are more than three names, but not
three Gods. 4th. That God the Creator, God the
Redeemer, God the Sanctifier, otherwise called God
the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost,
are such three."
Who does not see that the practical element in
these propositions, lies in the last of them ? What
is there in either of the former, on which the hope,
the fear, or the love of a human heart can fasten?
Nothing can be more purely speculative, or barren
of spiritual profit. Accordingly, Baxter, whose views
of the Trinity closely accorded with those of Wallis,
expressly affirms, that the practical part of the doc
trine, (the only part which he deemed necessary to
salvation,) lay in a fiducial acknowledgement of God,

174 WALLIS.
and an entire surrender of ourselves to him, as our
Father, Creator, (Lord, King, and Friend,) Re
deemer and Sanctifier.'1'
This is the proper conclusion to which these views
lead. " Religion," as Coleridge says, " has no
speculative dogmas." She has especially to do with
the heart and the life. She addresses the intellect
indeed : but it is, that through the intellect she may
reach the springs of action, and the fountains of
devotion. But these views do nothing of the kind : nor, (to
repeat a former observation,) do they aid us in conceiv
ing of any doctrine by means of which they may
indirectly affect our moral nature. Will any one
pretend that he derives any assistance in conceiving
of the incarnation, or of the value of the atonement,
from the notion that it was not so much God that
dwelt in Jesus, as a certain divine distinction of the
nature of which we know nothing : or that he gains
(i) "Firmissimd teneo doctrinam Trinitatis fcederalem ad salutem
necessariam, esse Practicam ; et qui salvus erit, ita Deum Patrem,
Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum, tres Personas in una Essentia credat,
ut simul in Deum Patrem Creatorem (Dominum, Regem, Amicum,)
Redemptorem et Sanctificaturem se totum dedat etdedieet, et fiduciam
et spem totam collocet : et hcec est salviflca in Trinitatem fides."
— Methodus Theologia. p. 122. See also End of Controversy, Introd.
p. 13. and 6. 10.
In the same spirit, he says, in his work entitled " The Reasons of
the Christian Revelation," " I would advise the reader to be none of
those that shall charge with heresy all those schoolmen, and late
divines, both Papists and Protestants, who say that the three Persons
are Deus seipsum intelligens, Deus a seipso intellectus, et Deus a seipso
amatus, though I am not one that say as they : nor yet those holy
men, Potho Prumensis, Edmundus Archiepisc. Cantuariensis et Pari-
sensis, and many others who expressly say, that potentia, sapientia, et
amor, are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." Works, vol. xxi. p. 313.

LETTER OF SCRIPTURE. 175
any clearer notion of divine influence, or any in
creased ability to cope with objections, from the
doctrine that this influence proceeds from a third
divine ' somewhat,' acting in subordination to a second
and a first ' somewhat?' To gain any assistance in
conceiving of these doctrines, we must invest Dr.
Wallis's somewhats with powers of thought and
action, — we must elevate them into agents in se. So
long as they remain distinctions unknown, they
rather embarrass than aid us in conceiving of these
doctrines. And it is altogether the same with regard to the
interpretation of Scripture. The hypothesis which
makes the nature of the divine persons to be en
tirely unknown, agrees as little with the letter of
certain passages of Scripture, as the Sabellian itself.
Indeed we know of no passage of Scripture requiring
a figurative interpretation on the Sabellian scheme,
which does not require a figurative interpretation
on this ; and that not unfrequently more harsh and
unnatural. An Unitarian would be accused of en
deavouring to burlesque the sacred volume, were he
to turn any of its passages into the proper language
of this class. Let the reader try it for himself on
such as these. John, i. 1 — 14. Phil. ii. 6 — 1L
John, xv. 26.; xvi. 28. Mr. Newman's observation
that the Trinity would never have been found in the
Scriptures had not external guides led the way to it,
is true beyond all controversy of this form of the
doctrine.

176 WARDLAW.
We presume that here is to be found the principal
reason why many who set out with Wallis, part
company with him as he proceeds. This was the
chief ground of John Howe's dissatisfaction with his
Letters : and Dr. Wardlaw and Dr. Conybeare, (to
mention no others,) forgetful of themselves, here join
hands with him. We shall take these as the types
of the second of the two classes, into which the
writers of the present school divide themselves.
§ 3. We have heard Dr. Wardlaw affirming in
terms as strong as those used by Wallis, that he was
utterly ignorant of the nature of the personal dis
tinctions in the Divine Being. Moreover he denies
in toto that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are
three distinct minds or intelligent beings : and com
mends that section of Mr. Yates' work, which is
directed to prove, that the universe issubject to one
simple and undivided Mind, one all-wise Designer.
Yet in his ninth Discourse, wherein he treats of
the Holy Spirit, he argues lavishly, that a fair inter
pretation of Scripture requires us to believe, that the
Holy Spirit is possessed of 'will,' of 'understanding,'
and ' consciousness : ' that he is ' an intelligent
agent;' (of course in se, or he asserts what no one
denies;) — 'a conscious and active subsistence;' having
every variety of personal properties and personal acts
ascribed to him in the Scriptures, with all divine
attributes. And this doubtless is the proper inference

NATURE OF PERSONS KNOWN. 177
to be deduced from the passages cited by him, if
they are to be taken literally.
But this description of the Holy Spirit is identical
with that which is given of the Deity by the school-
to which Dr. Wardlaw belongs. For with him, as
with them, there is but one infinite mind or spirit ;
and therefore, as we infer, but one almighty will,
one all-comprehensive understanding, one divine
agent. But now if the Holy Spirit be a divine
agent in se, and the Son another such agent, and the
Father another, (for it is never supposed that the
Holy Spirit is more completely a person than the
Father or the Son,) how can they be other than three
divine agents, that is, three Gods ? Here is marvel
lous inconsistency — double inconsistency : for this is
at variance not only with the author's professed
ignorance respecting the nature of the divine persons,
but, as we see, with one of the fundamental principles
of his theology.
Mr. Yates, in his Vindication, remarked on this
discrepancy between the representations of Dr.
Wardlaw, and justly drew from it the inference,
that the Doctor, (all his former protestations to the
contrary notwithstanding,) must have conceived of
the divine persons as three Divine Beings ; quoting
appositely enough the words of Sherlock : — " When
we prove the Holy Spirit to be a person against the
Socinians, we prove that all the properties of a
person belong to him, understanding, will, affections,
and actions, which shows what our notion of a person

178 WARDLAW.
is, — such a being as has understanding, and will, and
powers of action. * * * A person is an intelligent
being ; and to say there are three divine persons,
and not three distinct, infinite minds, is both heresy
and nonsense." The reader will here be reminded
of some of our quotations from Sherlock in a former
chapter. Dr. Wardlaw, in his Reply, expressed great indig
nation at being classed with Sherlock : whose lan
guage he describes as " the height of presumption,
originating in self-sufficiency, and terminating in
self-contradiction ; " and whose representation of the
Trinity, he says, Mr. Yates " perfectly well knew he
(Dr. W.) never could adopt, no nor one in a hundred,
he was bold to say, of the Trinitarian body." (p. 66.)
He complained also, that Mr Yates was guilty of
great unfairness, in not connecting his former with
his later statements, and qualifying the one by the
other. But the mischief is, that these representations are
so opposed, that they nullify instead of qualifying
one another. Are we to believe that the Holy Spirit,
and consequently each of the divine persons, is an
intelhgent agent, having in himself will, under
standing, and all moral affections, or are we not?
If not, then with what integrity or purpose are these
things affirmed of him ? If we are so to believe
respecting him, then how can it be said, we have and
can have no idea of a divine person? Plainly and in
so far as these particulars go, we have a notion of a

KNOWN AND UNKNOWN. 179
divine person : and the question, which cannot be
staved off by weak exclamations, is, under what
pretence, having gone so far, we can abstain from
affirming with Sherlock, that the three divine persons
are three intelligent beings. To act is more than to
be. If intelligent agents, much more intelligent
beings. We cannot speak of their actions or their
affections without assuming their existence. None
are more ready to perceive this than Trinitarians
themselves, when they would prove that nothing can
create itself. But if the divine persons are beings
in se, — not such entities as we have found Coleridge
asserting, but beings having each in himself will,
understanding, consciousness, and all perfections mo
ral and intellectual, — then with what face can any man
deny, or pretend to quarrel with any who affirm, that
they are three distinct, conscious minds or spirits ?
What is a mind or a spirit, but a conscious, volitive,
and intelligent being ? and what is such a being, but
a mind or spirit ?
But Dr. Wardlaw has afforded us a specimen of
the way in which he would have his representations
to be combined.
" When after defining a person to be that which pos
sesses personal properties, I proceed to show that in the
Scriptures, properties confessedly of this nature are as
cribed to the Holy Spirit, the inference certainly is
intended to be that the Holy Spirit as possessing these
properties, must be a person. But does this imply my
understanding, or pretending to understand, how the
Holy Spirit subsists in personal distinction from the

180 WARDLAW.
Father and the Son ? — in what manner personal properties
are possessed and exercised by each ; — which is the same
thing, as what the nature of the distinction is ? The
question is, are personal properties ascribed to the Father,
to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, in such a way as to
indicate a distinction in the unity of the Godhead? I
have affirmed and endeavoured to prove that they are.
But further I have not presumed to go : because the
volume of Revelation goes no further."'1'
The confusion of this passage is, we had almost said,
unutterable. First we are assured that the Holy Spirit
must be a person, because 'properties confessedly
personal' are ascribed to him in the Scriptures ; mean
ing will, understanding, consciousness, &c. Similar
properties belong also to the Father and the Son; who
therefore are said to ' subsist in personal distinction '
from each other, and from the Holy Spirit. Yet we
are told we know not the nature of the distinction
between them ; and that because we know not how
they subsist in personal distinction. That is to say, we
know the nature of the distinction. It is personal.
Yet because we do not know how this personal
distinction obtains, or how it is to be reconciled with
the unity, therefore we do not know the nature of it :
that is, we do not know that it is personal. All that
we know is that there is a distinction.
' Personal properties,' we are taught, (meaning
always will, understanding, &c.) are ascribed to the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, that is, to each indi
vidually ; and hence they are truly persons in the
(') Reply, pp. 67, 68.

KNOWN AND UNKNOWN. 181
plural number : for, as he tells us immediately before,
" the only possible proof of personality is the proof
of the possession of personal properties." And yet
we must not suppose that these properties are so
ascribed to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as to indi
cate that they are really distinguished from each
other in this way, but only that they are distinguished
in some way. So that it would seem, these personal
properties after all, and for ought we know, may be
common: in which case there will be but one Person.
For Dr. Wardlaw will not question that if the per
sonal properties are common, the personality is
common too.
Dr. Wardlaw does not pretend to know " how the
Holy Spirit subsists in personal distinction from the
Father and the Son," or, " in what manner personal
properties are possessed and exercised by each ?" It
is well. But the question which the Unitarian asks
Dr. Wardlaw is not, how the Persons possess the
properties in question, but do they possess them ? -
Dr. Wardlaw answers, they do : and we rejoin, then
the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are three intelli
gent agents, that is, three intelligent beings, — three
minds or spirits — three Gods.
And yet Dr. Wardlaw will have, that he knows
not the nature of the distinction between the divine
persons ; and that he asserts this, in asserting that he
knows not how they subsist in personal distinction.
But if to ' subsist in personal distinction ' is to have
distinct personal powers, then, (the reader will pardon

182 CONYBEARE.
the truism,) the divine persons are distinguished from
each other by these powers : which indeed, as has
been just before remarked, Dr. Wardlaw cannot
deny without making them one person. Now to say
that they are distinguished from each other by these
powers, is to declare the nature of the distinction
between them ; and to say nevertheless that we know
not the nature of the distinction between them, is to
eay, that we know the nature of the distinction, and
that we do not know it ; which is, in truth, the plain
upshot of Dr. Wardlaw's statements. He can discern
' the mote in the eye of his brother ' Sherlock, but
he himself ' perceiveth not the beam in his own eye.'
If we turn to Dr. Conybeare, we shall find in his
8th Lecture, wherein he treats of the Holy Spirit,
the same inconstancy which appears in Dr. Wardlaw.
" The only real question," he says, " which presses
on the mind with respect to the Holy Spirit, is that
which relates to his personality. That all the titles
and operations ascribed to the Spirit imply a distinct
divine agency, none have ever doubted. The in
quiry must ever be, does this distinct agency imply a
distinct agent ? " (p. 272.) This is a very fair and
perspicuous statement of the question. Dr. Cony
beare, of course, takes the affirmative ; saying of the
Father and the Son, that they are ' decidedly distinct
personal agents : ' and again, that " in all the lan
guage employed with reference to the relation of the
Son to the Father, while on the one hand we find
an intimate union implied, on the other we equally

HOLY SPIRIT. 183
observe a distinct individuality." (pp. 273, 274.)
Now it is a point of argument with him, and indeed
one of the common-places of Trinitarian theology, that
the same distinction which exists between the Father
and the Son, exists also between them and the Holy
Spirit. Thus he even says, " When the Saviour,
about to withdraw his earthly presence, promises
another comforter, we naturally infer that this other
must be a being of analogous nature and essence to
himself." (p. 271. See also p. 268.)
Still it should be observed, that in the midst of
such remarks he says, conformably to our extract from
him, at pp. 160, 161, that "to faculties like ours the real
nature of the distinction and the union, must obviously
ever remain mysterious and unknown." (p. 274.)
" Whatever terms we employ, we must frankly
confess them to denote nothing more than a mys
terious and unknown distinction." (Ibid.) Hence he
sometimes speaks of the Father and Son as simply
"distinct manifestations of Divine Power," which
" seem to imply a real individuality of being and
operation." (p. 273.) " The term personality," he
says, " is applied to the distinction of these manifes
tations, rather from an analogy (necessarily imperfect)
which the phenomena revealed to us appear to bear
to the personal distinction in human society." The
term therefore affords rather an illustration than a
definition." (Ibid.) Again, "the whole subject is
transcendental ; whether with the Latins we call it
personality ; or with the Greeks {moo-rams, which

184 CONYBEARE.
perhaps may be best explained subsistence ; sub
jective mode of being, the latent support of known
phenomena, — implying that we recognize in the
known distinction of the agencies, an analogous dis
tinction in the mysterious active principles." (p. 274.)
These statements are painfully conflicting. The
writer seems to have had some consciousness of the
dilemma in which the doctrine of three divine agents
is placed. At one time impelled by his zeal against
Sabellius and all his. followers, he asserts this doctrine.
Then alarmed at its inconsistency with the proper
doctrine of the divine unity, he avers that the nature
of the distinction between thr divine persons is
unknown. But struck with the contrariety of these
two statements, he attempts an intermediate path.
The distinction between the divine persons is ' analo-
gons ' to the personal distinction in human society.
The divine persons ' seem? to have a real individuality
of being and operations. They are ' mysterious
active principles,' supporting ' distinct agencies.'
This latter we believe to be the representation, on
which rather than on any other the Lecturer would
choose to take his stand. Were he however alone
concerned, we should excuse ourselves the labour of
endeavouring to penetrate his meaning in this ; since
however just might be the construction we should
put upon his words, it would be in his power to
disclaim it, the moment it suited his purpose to do
so, on the plea that he had ' frankly confessed' what
ever words he might employ, they would denote

SUBJECTS. 185
' nothing more ' than some distinction ' unknown.'
Still as in the passage wherein this representation
occurs, he seems to aim at something more definite
than before, — something below the distinction which
exists between individual agents or beings, and yet
above that by which the faculties of our minds are
distinguished ; and moreover, as it is supported in a
foot-note by a quotation from a respected Dissenting
authority ; we cannot refuse it our consideration.
The foot-note is the following : —
" Dr. Smith has more clearly expressed this in the
following words : ' It is our full conviction that the
Holy Scriptures, in the revelations which they furnish
concerning God, represent the essential and characteristic
properties of Deity as inherent in three subjects, vir6ffTa<reis,
which we distinguish by- the name of Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit ; and the ground of this distinction we call
personality. We utterly reject the notion that the three
divine persons are component parts of the divine nature ;
for the pure and infinite Deity is not a mensurable and
divisible thing. But we maintain that the divine nature
infinite and all-perfect, entire and indivisible, is not par
ticipated, but possessed by the three sacred persons.
That a knowledge of the manner in which the fact is,
falls not within the competency of our faculties, does not
make the shadow of an objection, &c.' "
It appears then that ' the known distinct agencies '
of which Dr. Conybeare speaks, (if we may reason
on his language,) inhere in three distinct ' subjects,'
— the word by which Dr. Smith has very happily
translated the Greek v-noo-ravis : and that this is what
Dr. Conybeare means when he says, that ' we recog-

186 SMITH.
nize in the known distinction of the agencies, an
analogous distinction in the mysterious active princi
ples.' If then we can only ascertain the character of
these ' known agencies,' we shall easily discern the
notion we are to form of the principles or subjects in
which they inhere. Now it will not be questioned
that they are agencies of the intelligent order, —
developing will, understanding, and other mental
affections ; for they are ' analogous ' at least to those
which mark personal distinction in human society,
which personal distinction is only known to exist by
such developements. Dr. Smith in a part of his
work immediately adjoining that whence the above
extract appears to have been taken, displays these
manifestations'1' at length, and even with more parade
than Dr. Wardlaw. He moreover expressly says
that the consciousness and will of the Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit, though coincident, are not identical?
The three Persons then are distinct subjects, sus
taining individually, will, understanding, and all
mental affections. Now we ask, what more is wanting
to constitute them distinct beings or minds ? What
know we of the arcane essence, by which personal
properties are supposed to be supported in ourselves?
Essence relatively to our knowledge, is, as we have
seen, nothing more or less, than the subject in which
properties are supposed to inhere. Hence, when we
conceive of God as a Being in the singular number
W Works, vol. iii. App. 3. <2> Vol. iii. p. 446. 2nd edit.

RECAPITULATION. 187
arrayed with all divine perfections, how do we, how
can we conceive of him but as a glorious subject,
(hypostasis,) so arrayed ? Even Dr. Smith so speaks.
in this very connexion.'1-1 Three such subjects then are
the same to our conceptions as three beings, three
natures, three essences. If we were to acknowledge
them to be three natures or essences, what should we
add to the notion of them which we have, as three
subjects diversified by their own individual powers
of will and intellect ?
On the whole then it may be pronounced,
that neither Wardlaw, Conybeare, nor Smith, has
been more successful than Howe, in attempting to
advance beyond the position taken up by Wallis.
The divine persons are three somewhats. Thus far
the Trinitarian can go. And he may venture with
Watts, Baxter, and others, to question whether these
unknown may not point to something in the eternal
mind, analogous to the distinctions which have been
observed in our own. But the moment he steps
beyond, and invests them with wills and affections of
their own, that moment he involves himself in con
tradiction — if not the same contradiction we have
before traced in the writings of Waterland and his
compeers, yet a contradiction equally gross.
(') "The divine essence, being not a divisible quantity, but an
infinite subject, &c."
According to Dr. Smith therefore the divine nature presents the
phenomenon of three ' intelligent and active subjects,' (for so he styles
the divine persons,) each of course divine and infinite, inhering in one
infinite subject.

188 CONCLUSION.
But we have seen also that the scheme of Wallis
can pretend to no superiority over the Sabellian,
either in the interpretation of Scripture, or in the
elucidation of scripture doctrine ¦¦:'¦ and moreover that
in the respect in which it differs, from the Sabellian,
and is supposed by some to. go beyond the Sabellian,
it is utterly barren of moral and .spiritual profit.
Our verdict therefore respecting that view of the
Trinity which has been considered in this chapter, is
that it is ' wanting,' like all the rest. It either
approaches so near to Sabellianism, that the one may
be mistaken for the other, or at least exchanged,
safely exchanged for it ; or it hides a form of doctrine
which contradicts and overthrows its own distin
guishing principles.

CHAPTER VII.

§ 1. It is the common profession of that part of
the Trinitarian body which disclaims the authority of
church tradition, that they draw their religious belief
entirely from the Scriptures. Indeed they may
sometimes be found declaring that they have no
particular predilection for the doctrine of the Trinity
considered in itself, but only assent to it in deference
to the imperative authority of Revelation. What the
doctrine really is, is a question which they would
probably answer as variously as any Trinitarian that
can be named : whence it may be inferred with no
small degree of confidence, (though it is an inference
which they would certainly resent,) that they are not
so exclusively indebted for it to Revelation, as they
may themselves suppose. The form of expression
also into which the doctrine has been cast by the
conjoint influence of usage and authority, is often
found fault with by them ; although it must be
confessed their objections usually end in adopting it,

190 SCRIPTUBE TESTIMONY.
with the acknowledgment that perhaps after all no
better exponent of what they take to be the Scrip
ture doctrine, can be devised.
The object of this, essay therefore would be but
imperfectly served, did we neglect to make inquiry
into the teaching of Revelation on this head. The
limits we have here prescribed to ourselves, will
however impose on us the necessity of great brevity.
Still it is not impracticable even in the short compass
of a single chapter, to indicate the general com
plexion of Scripture, (at least of the New Testament,)
so far as it relates to this subject, and to furnish data
by means of which a pretty correct estimate may be
made of the value of this appeal.
§ 2. It is not pretended that there is any express
and direct enunciation of the doctrine in either the Old
or New Testament. What these books teach, is,
that " the Lord our God, the Lord is one ; " and
that " there is none other but He,"'1' — (a word plain
ly denoting a person,) " He," " the blessed and only
Potentate, the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords."'2'
" With us," say the apostles, " there is but one
God, the Father.'"3' They teach also that "in the
beginning was the Word : " that " the Word was
with God, and was God : " that Christ is God : that
he and the Father are one ; the Father in him, and
« Deut. vi. 4. Mark, xii. 29. 32. m 1 Tim. vi. 15.
<3> 1 Cor. viii. 6.

THREE DIVINE BEINGS. 191
he in the Father.'1' They make repeated mention
also, but especially the New Testament, of an agent
or agency called the Holy Spirit, plainly marked
with divine characters, but neither invariably per
sonal, nor invariably impersonal. Add that among
upwards of thirty benedictions, occurring at the
beginning or end of books in the New Testament,
there are two which wear a trine form. " The grace
of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and
the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all."
" Grace be unto you, and peace from Him that is, and
that was, and that is to come ; and from the seven
spirits that are before his throne ; and from Jesus
Christ. "<2) The form of baptism occurring at the end
of the Gospel of Matthew, is also trine. In 1 Cor.
xii. 4 — 6, there is a triple denomination. So also in
Eph. ii. 18 ; and 2 Thess. iii. 5. To these may be
added, Matt. iii. 16, 17 ; John, xiv. 16. 26 ; and
xv. 28. Such are the grounds on which the doctrine
is built, that there are three divine persons and yet
but one God.
But here it is obvious to remark, that if any
recondite sense be supposed to lie in the word
person, of whatever value that sense may be to one
who holds the authority of the Church, (though we
have seen of how little value it is even to him,) yet
those with whom we are now contending are not
entitled to plead it. Because all those parts of
(» John, i. 1. Rom. ix. 5. Is. ix. 6. Heb. i. 8. John, x. 30. 38,
and xiv. 10, 11. m 2 Cor. xiii. 14. Rev. i. 4, 5.

192 SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
Scripture which are cited to prove that there are
three divine persons, prove with just the sam^
strength, if taken literally, (which is what the Trini
tarian contends for,) that there are three divine
beings— Gods, which is the plain translation of the
Hebrew Elohim, if idiom be disregarded : and those
passages which are brought to prove that there is
but one Divine Being, prove with the same force that
there is but one Divine Person. If the scripturalist
demur to this, and in order to escape the contra
diction of saying that three Divine Beings are but
one Divine Being, insist on being held responsible
only for the statement that three divine persons are
but one Divine Being, we are entitled to demand
from him what this statement means. For in so far
as he takes it to mean anything different from the
proposition, that there are three Divine Beings and
yet but one, he travels beyond the record, — he
theorizes. For this is no part of the testimony of
Scripture, that the three are distinct persons, yet not
distinct beings. This is an addition of his own — an
attempt to harmonize — a theory — for which, if the
divine authority of creeds and councils be rejected,
nothing but human authority can be pleaded. Now
of all human theories, the least that can be required,
is that they be intelligible. We ask then, what is
the proper notion of a person that is not a being ?
We claim to put this question, and demand either
that it be answered, or that the theory itself be
abandoned as a thing of nought.

THREE DIVINE BEINGS. 193
Now there are not wanting men even among the
Trinitarians themselves, who freely admit, that a
doctrine which plainly contradicts itself can not be
proved even by Revelation. The utmost has been
done in proof of the Christian Revelation, so far
as reasoning is concerned, when it has been
shown that no man can reject it without involving
himself in contradiction. How then can Revelation
authenticate a contradiction? Ernesti, in his In-
stitutio Interpretis, lays it down as a principle, that
no real contradiction can exist in the books of Scrip
ture ;(1) and he gives rules and cautions by means
of which apparent contradictions may be effaced :
such as, — that the more obscure passages are to
be interpreted by the clear,'2' the incidental by
the express,'3' the loose by the more precise ;""
that tropical language should not be mistaken for
proper,'5' or idioms for emphasis;'6' that universals
and absolutes are not always to be taken universally
and absolutely;'7' that principles necessary to be
borne in mind, in order to a right understanding of
an author, are not always expressed by him, but on
the contrary are often left to be supplied by the
reader, who is supposed to be sufficiently familiar
with them ;'8) and that therefore, as well as for other
reasons, regard should always be had in the inter-
<« Vol. i. p. 38. Biblical Cabinet. <2> pp. 178, 179.
<") Ibid. m p. 182.
("' pp. 94 — 97. See also the whole of the chapter on the proper
interpretation of tropical language.
(«) p. 165. <7» p. 132. <8> pp. 131, and 179, 180.

194 SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
pretation of Scripture to the regulafidei, the analogy
of Scripture or of doctrine, the spirit of revealed
religion, " so that," as Ernesti says, " no inter
pretation be approved of which produces a sense
contrary to that doctrine, and that in difficult passages
which appear to oppose it, the interpretation be
accommodated to it."'1' With such rules we need
not the assistance of an unintelligible proposition, to
enable us to expunge from the Scriptures the con
tradiction named.
§ 3. For first as to the Holy Spirit, it may be re
marked from Dr. Watts, that all " Trinitarians allow
there are some passages of Scripture where the Spirit
must be construed as a divine power or a divine
influence. Now since the Spirit, if he be a proper,
real, literal person, yet is confessed to be sometimes
represented as a power ; why may he not be some-
W pp. 127—131. Also pp. 118, 119. A notable instance of this
acommodation occurs in Christian antiquity. — Prov. vhi. 22. Our
version reads conformably to the Hebrew, — " the Lord possessed me
in the beginning of his ways, &c." But the Septuagint reads, — " the
Lord created me, &c." Now this Greek translation of the Hebrew
Scriptures had with the earlier fathers the authority of an original.
There was no thought therefore of correcting the passage by the
Hebrew. Nor was there any doubt among the Catholics as to its
application to the Son. Yet the Nicene conference had determined
that the Son was not created. Here was a dilemma equal to any
which might be urged against the Socinian. The English reader who
would know in what way the great Athanasius could extricate himself
from it, is referred to the translations of his Treatises in the Library
of the Fathers. See the second of his four Invectives, cc. xvi  xxi.
The gist of his argument however lies in a small compass. It is this,
— that the words could not have been intended to teach that the Son
was properly created, because it is plain that he was not properly
created.

HOLY SPIRIT. 195
times represented as a person, though in his own
nature he be a proper, real, literal power ? Things
are represented in Scripture as persons, more fre
quently than persons are represented as things "m
Add to this consideration, that there is no instance
throughout the Bible of worship or prayer being
expressly addressed to the Holy Spirit, as a distinct
person or being. The two benedictions just noticed
are not exceptions to this statement. They are
devout wishes, implying prayer no doubt; but not
necessarily defining the Object of prayer. In many
places where these aspirations occur, no Object is
named. " Grace be with thee." " Grace be with
you." " Grace be with all them that love our Lord
Jesus Christ in sincerity."'3' These more at length
would be, ' I pray God, that " Grace may be with
you ;" ' or, ' that " Grace may be with all them who
love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity." ' Why may
not the mental reference be supposed the same in
the trine benedictions ? ' I pray ' (understand God),
that "the grace of the Lord Jesus, the love of GOD,
and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit may be with
you." May " He who is, and was, and is to come,"
grant that " jjrace and peace be unto you, from the
seven spirits that are before his throne, and from Jesus
Christ." The absolute use of the word God in the
former case, and the distinction made between Him
and the other two objects named, are highly deserv-
(« Works, vol. vi. p. 346. Edit. 1812.
W 1 Tim. vi. 21. 2 Tim. iv. 22, Eph. vi. 24.

196 SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
ing of remark. The same distinction appears in the
latter formula also : where it is likewise to be noticed,
that the Holy Spirit is multiplied into seven spirits ;ll)
who are placed not on the throne, but before the
throne : while if we follow the writer of the Book in
which this benediction occurs, through a few chap
ters, we shall find the personality dropped altogether,
and the seven spirits transformed into seven lamps of
fire burning before the throne of GOD ; and quickly
after into seven eyes in the head of the Lamb :'2' after
which the Holy Spirit is almost entirely lost sight
of; every act of express worship throughout the
Book, being directed either to the Great Occupant
of the throne singly, or to Him in conjunction with
the Lamb.
A person unacquainted with theological systems,
would be more likely to infer a duality than a trinity
from the book of the Revelation. Yet not a duality
of equal persons : but rather such as is constituted
by a principal and his agent, a king and his minister.
Few things are more remarkable than the absolute
use of the word God (already noticed in 2 Cor. xiii.
14.) throughout this book to denote the former of
O) Dr. Stuart in a late work adopts the interpretation which makes
these seven spirits, seven angels : and so cuts away from under the
Trinitarian all those arguments which it is usual to urge in proof of
the absolute Deity of Christ, from his association with the Father in
what are accounted acts of religious worship. Could Bishop Bull
and others have been content to make this sacrifice, they might have
spared themselves a world of trouble in mis-understanding a very
plain and well-known passage in Justin Martyr.
<2> See cc. iv, v.

GOD AND THE LAMB. 197
these objects. " The throne of GOD and the Lamb."
" The Lamb shall feed them, &c, and GOD shall
wipe away all tears from their eyes." " The LORD
GOD Almighty and the Lamb are the light thereof."
This indeed is the common style of the New Test-
tament. The word Lamb, moreover, is in itself a media
torial designation ; considered even in orthodox
theology, as belonging to Jesus in his human nature,
and indicating particularly his sacrificial character.
Then, his position in the visions narrated in this
book, is, like that of the ' seven spirits,' subordinate :
— not ' the middle seat of the celestial throne,' (as
the hymn sings,) but standing before the throne, and
immediately within the concentric circles formed
respectively by the four living creatures, the twenty-
four elders, and the angels round about them; in
immediate contiguity, therefore, with those ' Lamps
of fire,' indicative of the divine energy and intelli
gence, which reflect in his eyes their radiance.
Hence we find him sometimes included in the
homage which is presented towards the throne by
the surrounding and exterior powers ; while at other
times he would seem to take the lead in the general
chorus, and they sing the song of Moses the servant
of God, and the song of the Lamb, saying, " Great
and marvellous are thy works, LORD GOD Al
mighty ; just and true are thy ways, thou King of
saints." As our High Priest he intercedes, why
not praise ?

198 SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
This duality, and this inequality, pervade the
New Testament. Witness the opening benediction
in every one of Paul's undisputed epistles ; " Grace,
mercy, and peace, from GOD the Father, and the
Lord Jesus Christ:" followed as it is in almost
every instance, by a devout aspiration or address
directed expressly to the former ; sometimes styled
God simply, and at other times ' the God and Father
of our Lord Jesus Christ.' Analogous to these
benedictions are the following passages. " Now
GOD himself and our Father, and the Lord Jesus
Christ, direct our way unto you." " Now our Lord
Jesus Christ himself, and GOD even our Father,
which hath loved us, and hath given us everlasting con
solation and good hope through grace, comfort your
hearts, and stablish you in every good word and work."
" Peace be to the brethren, and love with faith, from
GOD the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ."
1 Thess. iii. 11. 2 Thess. ii. 16, 17. Eph. vi. 23.
Add Eph. v. 20. and Col. iii. 17. It hardly needs
to be observed, how well all these agree with the
brief summary of the Christian faith, which Paul
has given in 1 Cor. viii. 4 — 6. " There is none
other God but one. For though there be that are
called gods, whether in heaven or in earth, (as there
be gods many and lords many,) but to us there is
but One GOD, the Father, &c, and one Lord Jesus
Christ." 1 Tim. ii. 5. Eph. iv. 5, 6. and John,
xvii. 3. are all of the same character.
So defective did the summary contained in 1 Cor.

GOD AND CHRIST. 199
viii. 4 — 6, appear to certain copyists of the middle
centuries, that they boldly added the words, " and
one Holy Ghost, in whom are all things, and we in
him." But had this clause secured for itself a
footing in the received text, as the noted passage in
the First Epistle of John, there would still have
been the same deficiency to provide against, in the
other texts just quoted. Nor is the defect an
imaginary one. For if, in the initiatory bene
dictions for instance, we are to understand by ' God
even the Father,' the first person in the Trinity ;
and by ' the Lord Jesus Christ,' the second person
in the Trinity ; then how is it possible to give a
satisfactory account of the omission of the third
person, when ' grace and peace ' are looked upon as
his peculiar gifts ? Surely the exigesis most favour
able to Trinitarian views, as it certainly is most in
harmony with the general style of Scripture, is that
which takes the first named Object to mean Deity
absolute ; and the second — the Mediator, the Christ,
the Son, celebrated in the second Psalm, then be
gotten when inaugurated into his Kingly office.
Need we observe how admirably all this accords
with those primitive monuments of the Christian
faith, which are found in the Acts of the Apostles ?
" Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of GOD among
you by miracles, and wonders, and signs, which God
did by him." "Let all the house of Israel know
assuredly, that GOD hath made that same Jesus,
whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ."

200 SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
" The God of our Fathers raised up Jesus, whom
ye slew and hanged on a tree, Him hath GOD
exalted to be a Prince and a Saviour." " GOD
anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost
and with power; who went about doing good, and
healing all that were oppressed with the devil: for
God was with him. Him GOD raised up the third
day, and showed him openly : and he commanded
us to preach unto the people, and to testify that it
is he which was ordained of GOD to be the Judge
of quick and dead." " But now GOD commandeth
all men everywhere to repent ; because he hath
appointed a day in the which HE will judge the
world in righteousness by that man whom he hath
ordained." " Testifying both to the Jews and also
to the Greeks repentance towards GOD, and faith in
our Lord Jesus Christ." ii. 22. 36. v. 30, 31. x.
38—43. xvii. 30, 31. xx. 21.
It is allowed even by so grave and skilful a theo
logian as Bishop Bull, who makes an exception only
in favour of some of the more intelligent among the
Jewish Doctors, that the Jews in the time of our Lord
were no Trinitarians.'1' Now is it possible, that the re
presentations just cited could have been looked upon
by them, as pointing to any essential change in their
notions respecting God, without exciting controversy
on this ground ? Surely the transition from the pure
and simple doctrine of the personal unity of God, to
O Judicium Ecclesia; Catholics, c. i. § 13.

GOD AND CHRIST. 201
the contradictory notion, into the scriptural evidence
of which we are now inquiring, could not have taken
place without a struggle ; — a struggle which would
have imprinted itself on every book of the New
Testament. Yet where are the evidences of this
controversy? The apostles themselves, almost to a
man, were from among the commonalty. Where are
the traces of the mental conflict through which they
must have passed ? There are none. The Christian
doctrine respecting God builds on the Jewish. The
two inosculate without any show of variance. " The
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of our
Fathers, has glorified his Son, Jesus." " Lord thou
art God, which hast made heaven and earth and the
sea and all that in them is. Who by the mouth of
thy servant David hast said, ' Why did the heathen
rage, and the people imagine vain things. The
kings of the earth stood up, and the rulers were
gathered together against the Lord and against his
Christ.' For of a truth against thy holy child (a
servant) Jesus whom thou hast anointed, both Herod
and Pontius Pilate &c. were gathered together."
" The God of our fathers hath chosen thee (Saul) that
thou shouldst know his will, and see that Just One."
" God who at sundry times and in divers manners,
spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets,
hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son."
" It is my Father who honoureth me, of whom ye
say, he is your God."'1'
W Acts, iii. 13.; iv. 24—27.; xxii. 14. Heb. i. 1, 2. John, viii. 54.

202 SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
No where do the writers of the New Testament
betray even the least consciousness of any peculiar
difficulty in their conceptions respecting God. But
how could this have happened, had their notions
involved anything so contradictory, as the doctrine
we are examining ? For its inconsistencies, unlike
those which have been urged against the divine
attributes of eternity and omnipresence, and which
require the microscopic eye of the metaphysician to
detect, must have stared them in the face, and every
one of their converts too. A second object of devout
regard they did indeed set forth — Jesus the Christ,
the Saviour, — the Lamb upon mount Sion, — our
agent and representative in the court of Heaven —
the agent and representative of God towards us, —
Son of man, Son of God, — Mediator between men
and God, and so allied to both, beautifully com
pared to the mystic ladder in Jacob's vision, its foot
in the dust, its summit lost amid the uncreated
splendours. But no where do they convey any inti
mation to their countrymen, or betray any conscious
ness whatever, that in order to the formation of sound
views respecting Jesus, it was necessary for them
to modify in any degree the Unitarian notions in
which they had been brought up. It is fair therefore,
nay it is incumbent upon us, so to interpret all those
passages, which treat either of Christ as divine or of
the Holy Spirit, in such a way as not to do violence
to these understood principles.
How much is there in the New Testament to

THE SON. 203
favour what has been called the in-dwelling scheme !
— -a scheme which ranks the honoured names of
Watts and Doddridge among its supporters ; and
which can hardly be enunciated in clearer terms than
those which Christ himself has used, — " the Father
that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works," " I can
of mine own self do nothing."'1'
§ 4. Still it must be allowed there are passages
which seem to distinguish the divine in Jesus, from
the Father. Such are Phil. ii. 6 — 11; and Col. i. 15.
But these passages are both of Arian rather than
Trinitarian complexion. " God also hath highly
exalted him," — " who was in the form of God, &c."
Surely the impression which these words naturally
convey to the mind is, that the being, the nature,
which humbled itself, is the being, the nature, which
was afterwards exalted. So plain has this appeared
to many learned and devout Trinitarians, that they
have built on it, in connexion with other texts, the
notion of the pre-existence of our Saviour's human
soul. " The image of the invisible God : " therefore not
the invisible God, of whom he is the image. But
W It is worthy of remark that no sooner had the church acquiesced
in the doctrine of the absolute Deity of the Son, than a want was felt
of some Mediator between him and us. This was found in the mother
of Jesus, the Virgin, who holds much the same place in Catholic
devotion, which we believe was assigned to Jesus in the early ages of
the church. On this head there are some remarks, curious hut well
deserving of consideration, in Newman's Essay on the Developement
of Christian Doctrine, pp. 405, 406. They may be seen in Appendix,
note E.

204 • SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
we have seen the reason there is to conclude, that, in
the benedictions at the opening of this and the other
Pauline epistles, the Being styled God and Father is
Deity absolute. But if so, it will not be doubted
that the same is intended by the ' invisible God ' in
the text before us, by any one who will be at the
pains carefully to run through the intervening verses.
Then it will follow that the Son, even in his superior
nature, is not properly the Deity, but only the image
or representative of the Deity. 16th ver. — " The
first-born of the whole creation," compared with 18th
ver. — " the first-born from the dead :" therefore one
of those of whom he is first ; if not a creature, in the
same sense as ourselves, (for the word is irpcoroTOKos
not TTpcoroKTisTos, as Dr. S. Clarke observed,) yet a
production, yivvrj/xa, as even Justin Martyr styles
him, the first offspring of the divine fecundity, like,
as far as it was possible, ojxoiovo-ios, to his great
Author. Mark, xiii. 32. " Of that day and that hour
knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are
in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father :" or as it
is given in Matt. " but my Father only." In these
words Jesus is now commonly understood to have
asserted that he was not acquainted with the time in
question, in his human nature. But this is hardly
consistent with the limiting particle found in Matt.,
which plainly confines the knowledge to the Father
alone. Beside if Jesus knew it at all — knew it in
any nature, he, the person then speaking, — it is

the son. 205
hardly possible to divest his words of an appearance
at least of equivocation.'1' Hence some of the most
learned of Trinitarian divines, among them Bishop
Bull, take the verb 'to know' in the sense of 'making
known.' According to this rendering, Jesus says :
" Of that day and that hour no man giveth informa
tion :" (as if it were a thing lying within the compass
of many a one's knowledge, but that no man would
divulge it :) — " no man giveth information, no,
(i) " Matt. xx. 23. ' To sit on my right hand and on my left, is not
mine to give, &c.' ' It is not mine,' — in my mediatorial capacity, as
it is commonly interpreted. But questionless when the ambition of
the mother and her two sons incited them to prefer this important
petition, they addressed their petition to the entire nature of Christ,
how exalted soever it might be, praying him to grant their request to
the utmost extent of his power whether as God or man : ver. 20. —
' worshipping him, and desiring a certain thing of him,' and ver. 21. —
' grant that they may sit.' Christ also answers with reference to his
whole nature — ' it is not mine to give : ' and lest for some reason they
might still fancy the gift belonged to him, he declares that it was
altogether out of his province, and the exclusive privilege of the Father.
If his reply was meant to refer solely to his mediatorial capacity, it
would have bordered on sophistry, which God forbid we should
attribute to him ; as if he were capable of evading the request of
Salome and her sons by the quibble which logicians call eacpositio
prava or cequivoca, when the respondent answers in a sense or with a
mental intention different from the meaning of the questioner. The
same must be said of other passages of the same kind, where Christ
speaks of himself: for after the hypostatical union of two natures in
one person, it follows that whatever Christ says of himself, he says not
as the possessor of either nature separately, but with reference to the
whole of his character, and in his entire person, except where he
himself makes a distinction. Those who divide this hypostatical
union at their own discretion, strip the discourses and answers of
Christ of all their sincerity ; they represent every thing as ambiguous
and uncertain, as true and false at the same time ; it is not Christ
that speaks, but some unknown substitute, sometimes one, and some
times another : so that the words of Horace may be justly applied to
such disputants :
' Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo ? ' "
—Milton's Christian Doctrine, pp. 101, 102."

206 scripture testimony.
not the angels which are in heaven;" (as if the
apostles might have expected them to be more com
municative ;) but not even they, " nor the Son "
would reveal it, " but the Father only ;" who it is to
be supposed therefore was very willing to do so.
Did ever commentary more thoroughly invert and
upset its text ? Dr. Conybeare in his Lectures
proposes with Irenseus to interpret the passage of
the derivation of the Son's knowledge from the
Father. On this supposition therefore Jesus says to
his disciples asking him when the period in question
should be, that he had no original information on the
subject. But what answer was this to men, who it is
usually allowed were not at that time enlightened on
the subject of the proper divinity of their Master ;
and who therefore could not have supposed that he
had any knowledge but what was derived from God ?
St. Ambrose was so embarrassed with the passage,
that he boldly proposed to erase it, as an interpolation
of the Arians : alleging that he did not read it in
the Greek MSS.; though it was found in the
Latin. But it has been argued on the contrary, that
if this had been the work of the Arians, we should
certainly have heard much more of it. The writers
of that time would have rung perpetual changes
upon it. Whereas the fact is, the clause is quoted
as genuine by Athanasius, Epiphanius, Augustin,
Hilary; as well as by Origen, Tertullian, and Irenseus,
before them: while it is found in all known MSS.
and Versions, with the exception of one old (not

LOGOS. 207
Greek but) Latin MSS., ascribed by Scholtz to the
5th century, the writer of which most probably took
his lesson from the blessed 'papa ' St. Ambrose.
In the discourse which Jesus held with the Jews
in reply to the charge of making himself equal with
God, John, v, 19 — 47., he makes use of lofty ex
pressions. But they are mingled with others, which,
if the title ' Son ' be taken as belonging to his supe
rior nature, are hardly consistent with any higher
notions of that nature than an Arian might form.
While the discourse itself, if Arian in its commence
ment, tapers off as it proceeds, into complete Photi-
nianism. So that it is questionable, whether the
most consistent view of the whole discourse is not
that, which takes ' the Son ' throughout in the sense
of Messiah, and the Father for Deity absolute. The
same may be said of the passage immediately before
commented upon, and also of John, iii. 34 — 36. ;
x. 25—38. ; and 1 Cor. xv. 24—28. ; all which pas
sages therefore add strength to the evidence of the
duality of the New Testament theology.
The passage which tells most forcibly in favour
both of the distinction of the Son as divine from the
Father, and his equality too, is John, i. 1, 2. But
here the same absolute use of the word God occurs,
as we have already remarked elsewhere. " In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with —
God." " The same was in the beginning with —
God." And further on in the chapter, " No man
hath seen — God at any time, the only begotten Son

208 scripture testimony.
who was in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared
him." Now the natural inference from these state
ments is, that the Word and God are distinct the
one from the other : that is, that the Word is not
GOD. Yet it is expressly said, " the Word was
God." How is this ? Are we here told, that the
Word was the Being from whom he is just before
and after distinguished ? Surely not. The absence
of the article in the Greek before the word God,
were there no other reason, should determine this :
since it proves, even according to Middleton, that
the proposition is not simply convertible, and there
fore is not particular.
That there is a change of signification in the word
God, is indisputable. Trinitarians admit that there
is ; and are compelled to do so, if they would avoid
identifying the Son with the Father. They take the
word therefore in a more comprehensive sense, — as
in fact partaking of the nature of a common term,
whereas just before and after, it has the force of a
proper name. A like ambiguity exists in the Hebrew
word dik, which is at once the proper name of the
first man, and signifies also man in the abstract. So
that a Hebrew might have said, Seth was with D its,
meaning Adam : and Seth was at«t that is, man, —
he was human or of the human race. ' The Word
was with God;' that is, he was with the Father.
' The Word was God ;' that is, he was divine. This
is intelligible enough. But the difficulty is, that if
we interpret strictly, and with the Nicenes, under-

LOGOS. 209
stand that the Word was altogether of the same
nature or substance, that is, 6/xootfo-io j with the Father,
as Seth was djuootfo-to? with Adam, it will follow
inevitably that as Seth was another man, so the Word
is another God ; and hence that there are at least
two Gods, when we know there is but one.
The, orthodox mode of getting over this difficulty
is, by distinguishing between person and being. But
we have seen that this distinction will not serve those
with whom we are now contending : since to them it
can be nothing more than a theory of human in
vention ; and therefore, being unintelligible, must be
worthless. Their only choice therefore, (if they
cannot tolerate a contradiction, and will not accept
the guidance of the Unitarian Version,) must lie
between an Arian exigesis of the passage, and Pro
sopopoeia. Kuinoel and Rosenmuller interpret on the former
principle, the Arian; both describing the Logos as
" a celestial nature nearest to God, and most resem
bling him." This is the creed which in Ecclesiastical
History is distinguished by the symbol op,oios. It
may, or it may not be below the proper Semi-Arian ;
but it cannot rise above it. Neander seems to be in the
same scheme ;(1) also Semisch. None of these appear
to entertain any doubt that the Ante-Nicenes thought
with them. Dr. S. Clarke is usually accounted the
most distinguished among those, who in this country
W See Appendix F.
M

210 scripture testimony.
have advocated the same views. To his name must
now be added that of Milton.
But there is hardly room for question, that John
in this Proem uses language borrowed from the
current philosophy of the day. On this subject,
Milman has the following remarks, in his History of
Christianity, i. 72, 73. " Wherever any approxima
tion had been made to the sublime truth of the one
great First cause, either awful religious reverence or
philosophic abstraction had removed the primal Deity
entirely beyond the sphere of human sense, and
supposed that the intercourse of Deity with man, the
moral government, and even the original creation,
had been carried on by the intermediate agency
either in Oriental language of an Emanation, or. in
Platonic of the Wisdom, Reason, (Ao'yos), or Intelli
gence of the One Supreme. This Being was more
or less distinctly impersonated, according to the
more popular or more philosophic, the more material
or more abstract notions of the age or people. This
was the doctrine from the Ganges or even the shores
of the Yellow Sea to the Ilissus : it was the funda
mental principle of the Indian religion and Indian
philosophy : it was the basis of Zoroastrianism : it
was pure Platonism, it was the Platonic Judaism of
the Alexandrian school."
Let it then be observed, that while the idea of an
intermediate Power between the Deity and his crea
tures was widely prevalent, opinions varied as to

logos. 211
the personality of this Power. It is presumed this
cannot be controverted. In fact the opinions or at
least the expressions of the same man on this head,
were not always uniform. The inconstancy of
Philo's representations have been often remarked
upon.'1' Now in this uncertainty, which could not but have
been known to John, what does he ? Does he lay
down in express terms the doctrine of the person
ality ? This he might easily have done. But he
does nothing of the kind. What he concerns himself
to affirm, is, that the Logos, (whatever it is, formally
viewed,) was in the beginning ; was with God ; was
divine ; was the source of light and life ; and had
been peculiarly manifested in Jesus. Now we hazard
nothing in saying, that all this might have been
assented to by a Christian of that day, whose views on
the subject of the Logos were as vacillatory as ever
Philo's have been declared to be ; and whose belief
respecting Jesus had not advanced beyond the doctrine
of the earliest apostolic discourses. Indeed we have
John's own authority for the fact, that his gospel was
especially written to bring men to the belief " that
Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God."
It may be questioned, whether in the interpre
tation of Scripture, sufficient use has yet been made
of this uncertainty in the prevailing opinions res-
W See Appendix G.

212 SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
pecting the Logos. That beyond the circle of those
who were immediately favoured with supernatural
light, it should have given rise to opposing views
respecting the person of Jesus, is all but inevitable.
A convert in whose conception the Logos was only
the reason, the intelligence, or energy of God, and
acquainted with the apostolic doctrine only in its
primitive form, would add little to that doctrine.
But one, whose views of the Logos took the more
popular and imaginative form, would, in the ap
plication of those views to the primitive Christian
doctrine, necessarily modify it. The indwelling of
Deity in Jesus might come to be regarded by him
simply as the incarnation of a glorious but created
spirit. Or, if his views of the Logos were too
exalted for this, he might conceive of him — (a divine
agent and being, distinct from God,) as informing,
inspiring, and sustaining the human spirit of Jesus :
or, even (if his conceptions of the divine in Jesus
were particularly vivid, and much in the style of the
later Fathers of the Church) as absorbing the human
personality into his own. One whose notions of the
Logos were unfixed, would naturally express him
self in uncertain language. The same uncertainty
would be likely to appear in one of a warm and
lively fancy, though his real notions of the Logos
had been of the more philosophic kind.
Now the writings of Paul and John do exhibit
this variation, however it is to be accounted for. In

logos. 213
one place we meet with passages answering perfectly
to the Christian doctrine in its most simple and primi
tive form ; and in another, passages, which, as some
think, more naturally convey the idea of the distinct
personality of the divine principle which dwelt in
Jesus. Now, whether is the latter class of passages,
which are found only in the writings of these apostles,
to be looked upon as a higher branch of the Christian
ywoo-ts, which they were privileged to disclose ; or,
are they to be looked upon simply as the dress
which the primitive doctrine of God in Christ took
from the philosophy, or the philosophical language,
then prevalent? It is a fact deserving the closest
attention, as shewing how loosely these speculative
notions clung to the mind, and how little in that
day they interfered with the religious affections, that,
while the Jew even in common life could hear and
speak of the Holy Spirit, and the Talmudist of the
Memra or Word of Jah, — while the Alexandrian
could discourse of the Logos, and the Cabalist of
the Sephiroth, — the set forms of prayer in common
use among them all, and preserved to the present
day, were as free from all Trinitarian colouring —
were as purely Unitarian, as the staunchest of modern
Unitarians could desire.'1'
Nor should it be lost sight of in this connexion,
<J) See the eighteen prayers in Prideaux' Connection, vol. i. p. 447.
He says no doubt is to be made, they were used in our Saviour's time,
and that he joined in them when frequenting the synagogues.

214 SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
that the earliest representatives named in Ecclesias
tical History, of the more simple form of Christian
doctrine, were Christian Jews. These, from the se
cond destruction of Jerusalem under Adrian, formed
a distinct sect ; shunned as heretical by their fellow
converts from among the Gentiles. But it is hardly
likely that any sudden and important change took
place at this time in the doctrinal views of these
men. Their failing lay in an excessive regard for
antiquity. Their brethren who, according to Hors
ley, enticed by the privileges of the jElian colony,
threw off the customs they had up to that time
appeared to respect, were the changelings. The
Ebionites were conservatives. To them therefore
it is most reasonable to look for the style of thinking
on doctrinal points, which had before existed in the
Jewish church, and had been derived from their
Christian ancestors.
Yet the Jewish Christians before this time were
not looked upon as being without the pale of the
Christian Church. This fact speaks volumes in
regard to the style of thinking on doctrinal points,
prevalent at that time among Christians generally, —
and volumes still augmented, if we may be allowed
to question the solidity of those 'foundations,' on
which Horsley attempted to rear his .ZElian church
of Jewish Christians.
§ 5. The form of baptism is the only remaining
passage which it is needful here to notice. And of this

FORM OF BAPTISM. 215
the explanation is easy. We take Rev. i. 4. as the key
to it and kindred passages. Shall the Holy Spirit,
one of the three Persons in the Trinitarian creed,
be represented plurally, — be even spoken of as seven
spirits, to denote the variety and multiplicity of his
operations ; and shall we wonder that God should
sometimes be represented plurally also ? The mind
staggers when it attempts to conceive the vastness,
the complication, the multiplicity, and diversity of
his operations. We see Him at work in nature
guiding the planets as they roll; evolving on our
earth forms of life and beauty from germ and seed
innumerable ; presiding over the elements in their
fearful play, on the due equipoise of which, our
happiness and our life every moment depend. We
see him enthroned on high as the moral Governor
of his intelligent universe, weighing the actions and
the dispositions of men, and by his awful nod as
signing their reward or punishment. Again we see
him as the compassionate Friend of our race, in
terested in our happiness and improvement, ever
at hand to alleviate our sorrows and to strengthen
our virtue. He presides over the developement
of our bodies and the developement of our minds.
He presides over life, death, and resurrection ; time
present and time to come ; earth, heaven, and the
dark world beneath. Where is he not ? Where is
not his unwearied activity manifest ? Who can
embrace in one view the vast and complicated spheres

216 SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
of his operation ? Is it any wonder that our minds
in their bewilderment and amazement, should — see
him double ; that our fancies should multiply him ?
He nevertheless, in our more sober judgment as
in truth, remaining one, one Agent, one Person,
as one Being, one v-noo-rao-is as one ovcrla, — no unity
so absolute as his. " Baptizing them in the name
of the Father, and of the Son, .and of the Holy
Ghost," — God in nature, God in Christ, and God
in the Church. Oh ! here is a Trinity in which,
as in germ, all Christianity lies enfolded. It is no
barren formula for the lips to repeat without the
concurrence of the head or the heart. Here lie
the springs of our faith, and hope, and joy, and
love. God the invisible and unknown, revealing
himself to us in Jesus Christ, and imparting himself
to us, as the Holy Ghost. Here are ' the wells of
our salvation.'
Why should we go about to draw mysterious
doctrines from words not necessarily containing them,
— to create enigmas where there are none, and so
to multiply the difficulties that lie in the way of
our faith, and widen the distance between our weak
faculties and God ? We may be sure of this, that
the prime truths of a religion designed by Heaven
for the poor, for the mass, unversed in subtleties,
and debarred by their daily occupation for bread
the leisure to explore them, — that a religion designed
for them, must be in its first truths, simple, ad-

CONCLUSION. 217
dressing at once the judgment and the heart, pow
erful to move the whole man, and awake the response
of all his faculties. But does the doctrine we have
been analyzing fulfil these conditions? Is it not,
by the confession of some of its advocates, a phantom
which eludes us whensoever we attempt to grasp it ;
or a monstrosity, from which our intellectual nature
recoils. We may be sure this is not the Trinity
of the Bible. Glory be to God Most High !

APPENDIX.

NOTE. A.— Page 79.
Bull affirms as strongly as Sherlock has done, or any one can do,
that the Son is begotten as to substance : and that this is the unques
tionable doctrine of Christian antiquity. Hence he has little patience
with those ' neotericis,' among whom he chiefly refers to Calvin, who
held that the Son is self-existent as to his nature or substance, and
begotten only in respect of person. Bull energetically denounces this
doctrine as self-contradictory, as leading inevitably to Sabellianism,
and as plainly contrary to the whole current of Christian antiquity,
which, he says, made the Son to be God of God, that is begotten in
respect of divinity, receiving his very existence from the Father. —
Def. Nic. Fid. Sec. 4. c. i. §§ 7, 8.
Mr. Faber, although an enthusiastic admirer of Bishop Bull, here
takes part with Calvin. " When we speak of the Father being the
Airddeos and the fountain of Deity, and when we say that the Son
derives his substance by generation from the Father; we must be
understood as using that language solely with reference to the mutual
relations of the persons in the Trinity. As the Son conjointly with
the Father and the Spirit, is the Supreme Numen, he is, I apprehend
under this aspect, self-existent ; whence accordingly we find him
denominated Jehovah. But as the Son is, personally, the second in
gradation : he derives, I conceive, under that aspect, his subsistence
from the Father. If we deny the Son's numenical self-existence,"
(say, his self-existence as God,) " we deny him to be Jehovah : for the
very import of that name is The Self-existent. If we deny the Son's
personal derivation from the Father, thus ascribing independent per
sonal self-existence to all the three hypostases alike : we inevitably
run into direct Tritheism." — Apostolicity of Trinitarianism, vol. ii.
pp. 233, 234, note.

220 APPENDIX.
Dr. Stuart also is of the same mind. He observes, " so far as
Christ is divine, consubstantial with the Father, he must for aught that [
can see, be necessarily regarded as self-existent, independent, and
eternal. A being to whom these attributes do not belong, can never
be regarded as God, except he be called so by a figurative use of the
word." — Letters to Channing, p. 36. This is as Calvin argued.
Alas ! where then is the orthodoxy of the Ante-Nicene church ?
Even Bishop Bull, notwithstanding all the zeal and learning which he
has displayed in proving a clean bill of health in its favour, has laid
open a plague-spot, which nothing henceforth can hide : though,
mistaken man, he took it for a beauty, and sedulously cultivated it in
his own person.
Oh ! when will Christians learn to abandon dubious points, and
not to multiply unnecessarily the essentials of faith. Here is Bull
proving against Calvin, that he held a doctrine which runs counter to
the whole stream of Christian antiquity, and which inevitably leads to
the very tenet that brought Servetus to the stake. And here are
Calvin, and Stuart, and Faber, convicting, the Bishop, and with him
the whole Ante-Nicene church, of ascribing but a figurative Deity to
the Son. Alas I have Christians nothing better to do than thus to
throw mire in each other's faces, — to fight about things in which they
will never agree, — and to make the needle's eye narrower than heaven
itself has made it? Have they no better way of honouring their
Master, than by pointing invidiously one at another, and saying ' you
are not worthy of him,' and ' you are not worthy of him,' ' you have
no business in his church,' 'your faith is not what it ought to be,'
and ' you will never get to heaven.' When will they learn that it is
the disposition which makes the Christian, — that there is a grace
which stands higher than either faith or hope, — and that he who only
is not against Christ, is on his part.
Mr. Faber's place as a Trinitarian is not however with Calvin and
Stuart. The concluding sentence of our extract from him, proves that
he looked upon the persons as distinct beings. For he says, they
want only personal in addition to substantial self-existence, to make
them three Gods. Beside, his 9th and 10th chapters in Book II. are
throughout a proof, that he accepted the consubstantiality in the
specific sense. Yet he held the unity of the divine essence ; and even
represented Trinitarians and Unitarians as agreeing in this particular.
— See Introd. p. 20. also pp. 1. 22, 45. His place is manifestly
among those who are opposed in the third section of our first chapter.

221

NOTE B.— Page 94.
It is worthy of remark that Leibnitz knew no better way of escaping
the difficulties of the Trinitarian question, than by alleging this dis
tinction between absolute and relative. Thus in his Letter on the
English Tract, Considerations on Various Explications of the Trinity,
he contends, after the manner of Sherlock, that the divine persons
cannot be three absolute substances, for that then they would certainly
be three Gods. He contends also, along with Sherlock, that the
divine persons are something more than a Trinity of modes or of
offices. We must therefore say, he tells us, that there are certain
relations in the divine nature which distinguish the persons : and that
these relations must necessarily be substantial. The divine persons
are not the same concrete under different denominations, as the same
man who is both a poet and an orator ; but " trois differens concrets
respectifs, dans un sen! concret absolue." He allowed that we know
of no such example in nature ; but thought nothing furnished so good
an illustration of it, as the reflection of the mind on itself. For we
have here, he says, an image or representation of two relative sub
stances, in one and the same absolute substance ; namely that which
knows, and that which is known. Each of these beings is substantial.
Each is an individual concrete. And they differ by certain mutual
relations. He is careful however to say, that this affords but a trace
of the divine personalities : what is modal, accidental, imperfect, and
changeable in us, being real, essential, perfect, and unchangeable
in God.
Perhaps the following quotation from Dr. E. Williams, will not here
be out of place. It occurs in a note appended to Dr. Doddridge's
Lectures on Divinity, — the 159th.
" Suppose the infinite mind as to essence, to be necessarily active,
or life itself; is there anything unreasonable in the thought of a
terminus a quo and a terminus ad quern, relative to this essential
energy and life antecedent to will. Is it impossible that these termini
should contribute relative properties, which may not improperly be
called subsistences or persons ? Is it not possible that this infinitely
active life, should be denominated, according to the collective sense of
revelation, as a relative property a quo, the Father ; and the same life
as a relative property ad quern, the Son ; while the essential energy of
this life terminating ad quern is eternal generation or begetting?
Again, is there anything absurd in the supposition that this infinitely
active life proceeding in medio u duobus terminis, should constitute
another distinctive relative property called Spirit ?

222

" In all works ad extra, the effects of power and will, no one
person acts exclusively of the other : therefore no work ad extra,
whether creation, redemption, or any other whatever, can be the
distinguishing cause of these relative properties. Is it not then a
possible and a rational notion and intelligible language, when it is
said that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are these positive, real, or
personal modes of subsistence in God, or one infinitely active life, &c. ?
" The sentiment of eternal generation, and that which represents
Father, Son, and Spirit, as terms of distinct personal relations, seems
much less exceptionable to many who have long considered both sides,
than that which holds these terms as expressive of works or offices ad
extra, while yet a Trinity of persons is acknowledged. For it may be
urged, either these divine persons have essential distinctive characters,
or they have not -, if not, with what propriety can they be called three
persons? The idea of three distinct beings is disclaimed, and yet
here are supposed three persons without any difference of distinctive
characters ; that is, a diversity without any assignable ground of
difference. But if they have essential distinctive characters, what are
they if not those held by consistent Athanasians, in some respects
corresponding with the terms begetting, begotten, and proceeding, as
before explained ? If it be said the works of redemption ; it may be
replied these are works ad extra, and therefore belong to each person.
Is any divine perfection as love, goodness, mercy, wisdom, power, or
the like, a sufficient ground of personal distinction ? Surely that
person is not divine that possesses not each alike, and in an infinite
degree." It is common with many who bear the Trinitarian name, to turn
away from all such reasonings, as the puzzles and vagaries of meta
physical brains, which have nothing to do either practically or essen
tially with the doctrine of the Trinity. But how then, we would ask,
do these objectors conceive of the three persons ? Do they conceive
of them as distinct beings ? We see that Dr. Williams disclaims this
notion. And he does so in company with a very large body of Trini
tarians, who feel that it must land them either in Arianism or Tri
theism. Do they then look upon the persons as different external
manifestations of the one great and infinite Being, or as, the powers
or faculties of the eternal Mind ? This is Sabellianism, which a good
Catholic must eschew as carefully and decidedly as he does either
Arianism or Tritheism. How then should a good Catholic conceive
of the divine persons ? This, surely, is a fair question. For, if we
may believe a thing of which we have no conception, no good reason
can be given why we may not believe a thing of which we have never

223

heard :W but this we are plainly authorized by the New Testament to
pronounce impossible. Now Dr. Williams does but endeavour to
answer this question. He does but aim to express a mean, between,
what Dr. Doddridge calls, a philosophical person and a political person,
— between an attribute and a separate being. " A philosophical per
sonality in a triune God," he says, " none plead for but Tritheists : a
political personality is a mere name, without any personal difference.
When a man sustains many political relations, offices, or characters,
whoever conceives that he has any claim to a diversity of persons in
any sense. May we not allow it possible that God possesses, and that
he can make known — a medium." — Lee. clxi. note. Again: —
" person," he says, " in the Trinitarian sense is alike remote from
a divine attribute and a separate being." If the doctrine of the
Trinity does not comprehend both of these views, — if it does not
make the Logos both an attribute and a separate being ; in a word, if
it does not consist in a shameless affirmation of each and all of the
three principal forms of belief which have been opposed to it, the
Sabellian, the Tritheistic, and the Arian, then it must lie somewhere
between them. Now all that Dr. Williams attempts is to define this
position, — to trace the intricate line which orthodoxy follows between
and among these different forms of belief with their various modifica
tions. His refinements, therefore, are not the idle play of a meta
physical intellect, unless the doctrine of the Trinity itself be such.

NOTE C— Page 119.
Cyril of Jerusalem, a Saint according to the Calendar, was a friend
of this Basil ; and co-operated with the Semi-Arians at the council of
Seleucia. In his Catechetical Lectures he always understands by the
One God, — the Father : and describes the Son as the only begotten
of this One God, 'like him in all things,' (one of the Semi-Arian
formula?,) including substance, and therefore, it would seem, numeri
cally distinct from him in substance. Accordingly he plainly styles
the Holy Spirit, " a living and intelligent being."— p. 204. vol. ii.
Lib. Fathers. Indeed it is impossible to read these Lectures without
being made sensible, that Cyril, like his Semi-Arian friends, conceived
of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as three distinct beings. Yet,

(1) Eom. jl. 14. " How shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard

224

in the Preface to these Lectures in the Library of the Fathers, signed
with the initials J. H. N., it is remarked of Cyril, that " his writings
are most exactly orthodox;" and again that "though separated from
what may be called the Athanasian school, suspicious of its adherents,
and suspected by them ; yet he, when he comes to explain himself,
expresses precisely the same doctrine, as that of Athanasius or
Gregory; while he merely abstains from the particular theological
term, in which the latter Fathers, agreeably to the Nicene council,
conveyed it." — pp. 12. 18.
The following are quotations from Cyril. " We preach not three
Gods ; let the Marcionites be mute : but we preach One God, by One
Son, with the Holy Ghost." — Lib. Fathers, vol ii. p. 204. " It is not
enough to believe in One God : we must receive with reverence this
also, that He is the Father of the only-begotten, our Lord Jesus
Christ." — p. 79. " He that bath seen the Son hath seen the Father :
for the Son is ' in all things like' to Him who begat Him, Life of Life
begotten, Light of Light, Power of Power, God of God." — p. 118.
" Perfect is He who begat, perfect is That which was begotten : He
who begat, is God ; He who was begotten, is God ; himself God of all
things, yet styling the Father, his own God." — p. 119. " One they
are in respect of the attributes which belong to Godhead, since God
hath begotten God :" (specific union plainly.) " One, from considera
tion of their kingdom : for the Father reigns not over these, and the
Son over those. * * * One they are because there is no disagreement
or division between them. * * * One because the works of Christ
are not one and the Father's another ; for the creation of all things is
one, the Father having created them through the Son."'1' pp. 117, 118.
It is observable that even the Nicene Creed opens with a profession
of faith in one God, the Father. This is the style of all the creeds
anterior to this, of which we have any record: and of many still
later. How different is the style of the Protestant Confessions ! They
profess faith in one God, it is true ; but this one God is always the
Trinity. " Trinitas est Deus." — Augustin. Let the reader ponder
this diversity. It is a speaking fact : shewing the vast though silent
change, which the theology of the church had undergone, in the
centuries intervening between St. Augustin's time and the reformation.
As to the Semi-Arians themselves, they professed at their council of
Seleucia, in opposition to their brethren of the lower school, who
were for denying altogether the Nicene formula, that " they accepted
the whole proceedings of the Nicene council, except that they com-
(1) He says nothing about unity of essence.

225

plained of the word 'consubstantial' as obscure and open to suspicion."
So Athanasius. Their objection to the word appears to have been,
that it was capable of a Sabellian sense ; and had been rejected,
(Hilary says, on this account,) by a former council— that of Antioch.
Accordingly in the Section immediately preceding the quotation in the
text, Athanasius challenges the lower Arians to repeat the anathemas
and other clauses of the Nicene symbol relative to the Son ; intima
ting as he does in other parts of his works, that this would be enough
to clear them of heresy.
Mr. Newman says of the Synodal Letter, published by the Semi-
arian party at Ancyra, in 358, a.d. that " it is a valuable document
even as a defence of orthodoxy ; its error consisting in its obstinate
rejection of the Nicene Homoousion, the sole practical bulwark," as
he styles it, " of the Catholic faith against the misrepresentations of
heresy, against a sort of Tritheism on the one hand, and a degraded
conception of the Son and Spirit on the other."!1' — His. Arians, pp.
365, 366.

NOTE D.
" The simplicity of the divine nature, if rightly considered, is so far
from excluding that it necessarily infers a distinction of hypostases in
the Godhead. For wherein does the simplicity of the Godhead
especially consist but in this, that God is a pure eternal Mind, free
from the mixture of all kind of matter whatsoever ? Now an eternal
mind must needs have in it from eternity an wvota or \6yos, a notion
or conception of itself, which the Schools term verbum mentis ; nor
can it be conceived without it. This word in God cannot be as in us,
a transient, vanishing accident, for then the divine nature would
indeed be compounded of substance and accident, which would be
repugnant to its simplicity ; but it must be a substantial, subsisting
word. The great apostolical bishop of Neocsesarea, Gregory surnamed
Thaumaturgus, in his panegyric to Origen, (by all confessed to be
genuine,) calls it, ' the most perfect, living, and animate word of the
very first mind.' This word also is manifestly (though not divided, yet)
distinct from the eternal mind from whence it proceeds. And this is
no novel subtlety of the schools, but a notion that runs through the
Fathers, even those of the first ages, as appears from the testimonies
(1) See Note H.

226

produced out of them in my Defensio Fidei Nicence, and it is also
grounded on Holy Scripture.
" Hence the excellent Athanasius, than whom no man better under
stood the sense of Scripture and the doctors of the church that were
before him in the article of the Trinity, insists upon it in his Oration
against the Sabellians. In the beginning of which having first shewn
how the Catholic church of Christ, in her notion and worship of God,
differs from the heathens and Jews, he proceeds to declare the differ
ence between the orthodox Christians and the Sabellians, and other
Unitarians of his time, who under pretence of defending the unity of
the Godhead, denied all distinction of hypostases therein. His words
are these : ' We are separated also from those who corrupt Christianity
with Judaism, who, denying the God of God, profess one God as the
Jews do, affirming him the Father to be the only God, not upon
account that he only is unbegotten, and the only fountain of the
Deity, but as if he were without a Son, and barren, and void of his
living word and true wisdom. For they conceive the word of God to
be such as proceeds from the mind of man, and his wisdom to be such
as that of ours ; and therefore affirm God with his Word to be one
person, just as we say that a man together with his word is one man ;
being in this no wiser than the Jews, who own not the Evangelist in
the beginning of his gospel, proclaiming, ' In the beginning was the
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.' For if
God hath a word in his mind not really begotten of him as God of
God, how could the Word be with God, and how could it be God ?
For the word conceived in the mind of man is not a man with another
man, seeing it neither lives nor subsists, but is only a motion or
operation of the same living, subsisting mind." — Extracted from Bull's
Discourse I. The reader is desired to connect it with the statement
of Norton's quoted in note (5) at p. 115.
' Not a man with another man.' This is a remarkable expression
as shewing the affinity subsisting between Bull and Sherlock. Indeed
the Bishop openly defends Sherlock in this Discourse.

NOTE E.— Page 203.
" There was one other subject on which the Arian controversy had
a more intimate though not an immediate influence. Its tendency to
give a new interpretation to the texts which speak of our Lord's

APPENDIX. 227
subordination, has already been noticed ; such as admitted of it were
henceforth explained more prominently of his manhood than of his
economy or his Sonship. But there were other texts which did not
admit of this interpretation, but which, without ceasing to belong to
h;m, might seem more directly applicable to a creature than to the
Creator. He indeed was really ' the wisdom in whom the Father
eternally delighted,' yet it would be but natural, if, under the circum
stances of Arian misbelief, theologians looked out for other than the
eternal Son to be the immediate object of such descriptions. And
thus the controversy opened a question which it did not settle. It
discovered a new sphere, if we may so speak, in the realms of light,
to which the Church had not yet assigned.its inhabitant. Arianism
had admitted that our Lord was both the God of the evangelical
covenant, and the actual creator of the universe ; but even this was
not enough, because it did not confess him to be the one, everlasting,
infinite, supreme Being, but to be made by him. It was not enough
with that heresy to proclaim him to be begotten ineffably before all
worlds ; not enough to place him high above all creatures as the type
of all the works of God's hands ; not enough to make him the Lord
of his saints, the Mediator between God and man, the object of wor
ship, the image of the Father j not enough, because it was not all, and
between all and anything short of all, there was an infinite interval.
The highest of creatures is levelled with the lowest in comparison of
the one Creator himself. That is, the Nicene council recognized the
eventful principle, that, while we profess and believe any being to be
a creature, such a being is really no God to us, though honoured by
us with whatever high titles and with whatever homage. Arius and
Asterius did all but confess that Christ was the Almighty : they said
much more than St. Bernard or St. Alphonso have since said of
St. Mary; yet they left him a creature and were found wanting.
Thus there was ' a wonder in heaven :' a throne was seen far above
all created powers, mediatorial, intercessory; a title archetypal; a
crown bright as the morning star ; a glory issuing from the eternal
throne ; robes pure as the heavens ; and a sceptre over all ; and who
was the predestined heir of that majesty ? Who was that wisdom,
and what was her name, ' the mother of fair love, and fear, and holy
hope,' ' exalted like a palm tree in Engaddi, and a rose-plant in
Jericho,' ' created from the beginning before the world ' in God's
counsel, and ' in Jerusalem was her power ? ' The vision is found in
the Apocalypse, ' a woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under
her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars.' The votaries
of Mary do not exceed the true faith, unless the blasphemers of her

228

Son come up to it. The church of Some is not idolatrous, unless
Arianism is orthodoxy.
" I am not stating conclusions which were drawn out in the contra-
versy, but premises which were laid broad and deep. It was then
shewn, it was then determined, that to exalt a creature was no
recognition of its divinity. Nor am I speaking of the Semi-arians,
who holding our Lord's derivation from the substance of the Father,
yet denying his consubstantiality,'1) really did lie open to the charge
of making two Gods, and present no parallel to the defenders of the
prerogatives of St. Mary. But I speak of the Arians who taught that
our Lord's substance was created : and concerning them it is true that
St. Athanasius's condemnation of their theology is a vindication of the
Mediaeval. " Yet it is not wonderful, considering how Socinians, Sabellians,
Nestorians, and the like, abound in these days, even without knowing
it themselves, if those who never rise higher in their notions of our
Lord's divinity, than to consider him a man singularly inhabited by a
divine presence, that is a Catholic saint, — if such men should recog
nize, in the honour paid by the church to St. Mary, the very honour
which, and which alone, they offer to her eternal Son." — Essay on the
Developement of Christian Doctrine, pp. 404 — 406.

NOTE F.— Page 209.
" Paul and John for the purpose of designating the indwelling
divinity of the Redeemer, employed the idea already formed among
the Jewish theologians of a mediatory divine principle of revelation,
through which the whole creation is connected with the hidden incon
ceivable essence of God. A primeval self-revelation of the hidden
God, antecedent to all created life, the Word by which that hidden
essence reveals itself, (as man reveals the secrets of his mind by
speech,) as hypostatized in a spirit in which the essence of Deity is
represented in the most perfect manner ; this constitutes a universal
revelation of the divine essence, in distinction from the partial indi
vidualized revelations of God in the variety of created beings." —
History of the First Planting of the Christian Church, vol. ii. p. 181.
Bib. Cab. No. xxxvi. (1) See note H.

APPENDIX. 229
" But the apostles Paul and John, united with the doctrine of God
revealed in Christ, the idea that was already in existence in the Jewish
theological schools, of a revealer of God elevated above the whole
creation, the perfect image of the hidden Divine Being, from whom
all the communication of life from God proceeded, the image of the in
visible God, the Word, in whom the hidden God reveals himself, the first
born before all creation — and they confirmed and established this idea
and applied it to Christ. * * * But in the conception of this doctrine
there existed already among the Jews two different views. One party
considered the divine Logos as a spirit, which existed in an inde
pendent personality, although in the most intimate union with the
Divine First Cause ; while another party rejected this notion of an
Hypostasis, as inconsistent with strict Monotheism, and they conceived
to themselves under the name of . Logos,, nothing but the Reason
which is either hidden in God and only engaged in contemplation, or
else reveals itself both after the manner of thought, which manifests
itself in human speech, and also by its efficient operation in the work
of creation, — the Reason which cannot be divided from God, and
which either concentrates in him, or beams forth from out of him.
While the former was the predominant mode of conception, (as to the
Logos) in the doctrines as exhibited by the church, the other mode of
conception made its appearance not unfrequently in opposition to the
Church doctrine ; and this opposition served again on the other hand,
to promote the systematic formation and developement of the former
view." — History of the Christian Religion and Church, vol. ii. pp.
257, 258. Tr. Rose.
" The Logos, who became man in Christ, was usually represented
as a being, different in person from God the Father and subordinate to
him."— p. 259. ejusd.
" The Church doctrine formed itself in opposition to both classes of
Monarchians, and sought to maintain the substantial (selbstandig)
personal being of the Logos. * * * The Church teachers supposed
a self-revelation of God, preceding the whole creation, and forming
the foundation of it ; which serf-revelation consisted in a being,
emanating from God with the attribute of personality, representing
the divine being of God, and realizing his first conceived ideas : this
Being was the substantial Word, in which the divine thought came
forth into created activity. They said, ' while the word of man is
only the transient expression of his thought ; on the contrary out of
the supreme and entirely perfect Being, nothing can come forth as his
self-revelation, (or the first act of the communication of life from

230 APPENDIX.
God,) which is uot substantial, real, and objective.' They conceived to
themselves this Logos as the most perfect out-pouring of the Divine
Being, and they made the doctrine of the unity of God, to consist in
supposing the divine Logos to be nothing but an out-pouring from the
Divine First-Being (Urwesen), who revealed himself through this
Logos, and works by means of him." — pp. 280, 281. ejusd.
We have long looked with impatience for the two Volumes in
continuation of this History, which Mr. Rose has led his readers to
expect. May it be permitted to one, earnestly engaged in the
pursuit of truth and desirous of making use of every help that may
lie within his reach, to express a hope, that the respected translator
will not allow any further discovery of sources of discontent whether
with his Author's views of the Trinity or his manner of treating it, to
deprive the English public of the means of reading in their own
language, the account which Neander has given of the momentous
controversies, which agitated the church in the 4th and 5th centuries.
Let him, as one convinced of the soundness of his own views, have
faith in the innate power of truth, and in the good sense of the
English people.

NOTE G.— Page 211.
This inconstancy is such as to have given rise to the idea that Philo
admitted two logoi : one the thought, wisdom, or intelligence of the
infinite Being ; the other an intelligent being distinct from him, but
nearly resembling him, his agent and minister. Dr. Pye Smith in a
note to the Section devoted to the doctrine of Philo concerning the
Logos, cites authorities for this notion from the Commentaries of
Rosenmiiller and Kuinoel. He quotes also Carpzovius, quoting on his
part ' an English clergyman, Stephen Nye.' He might have added to
these the name of Dr. Watts, who in his Dissertation IV. contends at
length, that this notion furnishes not only the best mode of reconciling
Philo with himself, but also of reconciling the Fathers with themselves.
But the proper issue of this notion is Arianism. Nor is there any
way of avoiding it, but by making the being and the attribute one :
which, as we have seen, Sherlock did ; and which, according to a
former note, Bull as well as Norton describes the Fathers in general as
doing too.

231

NOTE H.— Page 225.
Wherein then did the Homoiousian alter his faith in becoming a
Homoousian ?
He believed that the Son was so one with the Father in substance
and attributes, that the substance of the Father was numerically the
substance of the Son, as it was also of the Holy Spirit.
Right. This is Catholic doctrine. But how is it to be distinguished
from the tautoousion of Sabellius ?
" The doctrine was distinguished from the Sabellian by the particle
S/iov, together ; which implies a difference as well as unity." — Lib. of
Fathers, vol. viii. p. 203. note.
Yes, yes — a difference : but what difference ? Do the substance
and attributes of the Son, or, in other words, does the Godhead of the
Son, cease to be the very Godhead of the Father ?
No. The doctrine of the Una Res forbids this supposition.
In what then do they differ ?
In person, to be sure.
True. But what is person ? what is meant, when it is said that
although the Father and Son are identical in substance and attributes,
yet they differ in person ?
" The word ' person ' which we venture to use when we speak of
those three distinct manifestations of himself which it has pleased
Almighty God to give us, is in its philosophical sense too wide for our
meaning. Its essential signification as applied to ourselves, is that of an
individual intelligent agent, answering to the Greek utt^o-too-is or
reality. On the other hand if we restrict it to its etymological sense
of persona or character, it evidently means less than the Scripture
doctrine which we wish to ascertain by it ; denoting only certain out
ward expressions of the Supreme Being relatively to ourselves, which
are of an accidental and variable nature. The statements of Revelation
lie between this internal and external view of the divine essence ;
between Tritheism, and what is popularly called Unitarianism." —
History of Arians, pp. 389, 390.
Still, an Homoiousian might say, you answer but negatively. And
it would seem you can only answer in this way. For the same author
ity has declared, that " the mysteriousness of the doctrine evidently
lies in our inability to conceive a sense of the word person, such as to
be more than a mere character, yet less than an individual intelligent
being." — See p. 171. ejusd. I find myself then in this dilemma, when
soever I attempt to bring myself over to what you call Catholic views.

232 APPENDIX.
I clearly perceive that I must regard the Father and Son as one indi
vidual being, — their substance numerically the same. But when I
come to inquire wherein they differ, I find myself utterly at a loss. I
must say they differ in person : but what this means, I know not :
neither can any one tell me. Your theology, therefore, like that of
Sabellius, instead of exalting the Son, annihilates him. I hold that
he is a glorious being endowed by the Father with powers the most
exalted, — powers all hut equal to those of the Giver himself. You
tell me I must conceive of him as altogether equal with the Father ;
and then to shelter yourself from the charge of making two Gods, you
merge him in the Father, — you tell me that he is one and the same
with that great and ineffable Being, whom we both worship. Or, if
he remain distinct from him, you do not allow me to perceive him.
So far as my apprehension is concerned, or yours either, he is lost in
the Father.
To this our Catholic would reply after the following manner : —
that although he had avowed his inability (and perhaps in language
too strong), to explain the sense in which he used the words person
and personality, yet he had recorded an earnest expression of dissent
from the doctrine of Sabellius ; and in direct and designed opposition
to that doctrine, had professed the belief of three bnt6<rrmreis or real
ities : — that this word had been chosen purposely to denote ' the
existence of the divine persons in themselves;' and that even the
strong words nature and substance, had been and still were used by emi
nent Catholic authorities, to denote the separate personalities of the
Son and Spirit : — that certain Catholic writers had even illustrated the
union subsisting between the Father and the Son, by the specific
union which subsists between two individual men ; and without
making themselves on this account liable to any just censure : — that
the person of the Son cannot indeed be the same with that of the
Father, by any process of reasoning which would not prove any two
individual men to have one literal personality; and that he is therefore
' an absolute real person,' ' complete in himself,' an agent in se, the
divine persons being properly styled, three ' blessed and adorable
agents.' Homoiousian. It seems then after all you know very well what you
mean by a divine person. Indeed, if now I take you right, you will
not be backward to admit, that I do not myself draw any stronger line
of distinction between the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in respect
of personal properties, than you do.
Homoousian. I admit this. You do not suppose any greater
distinction between them, than exists between individual men : and I

APPENDIX. 233
hold that the person of the Son cannot be the person of the Father,
by any process of reasoning which would not make two individual men
one person. So far therefore as properties strictly personal are con
cerned, two men do not differ from one another more than the
divine persons do. Beside, unless I had some very decided notions
respecting the distinction between these agents personally viewed, I
could never have declared that your party differs from mine chiefiy if
not only in words.
Homoiousian. Very justly reasoned. Allow me then to understand
you. I believe that the Father and Son are distinct Beings, having
each his own essence and attributes. How much of this do you
believe ?
Homoousian. Oh ! nothing at all ! I believe that the essence of
the Father is the identical essence of the Son ; and by the same rule,
that the attributes of the Father are the attributes of the Son ; the
Godhead of each being numerically the same : which, as I have said,
is the doctrine of the ' Una Res.'
Homoiousian. You say, and unsay. Or, do you conceive of the
powers of action and intellect inhering in the Son or in the Father, as
something distinct from the attributes of power, knowledge, wisdom,
and so forth ?
Homoousian. No. I cannot be so unthinking.
Homoiousian. Wherein then, I beseech you, are the Father and
Son distinguished the one from the other ?
Homoousian. Truly, I must say it is difficult, if not impossible,
to tell.
Homoiousian. So then you return to the position, you had just
abandoned. You do not know wherein the Son differs from the Father.
You say he differs in person : but what you mean by this, you know
not. Your efforts to exalt the Son end in his annihilation. You hold
with Sabellius : at least you cannot assign any but a verbal distinction
between him and you : and yet you anathematize him as well as me.
In our third chapter we have, by means of Mr. Newman, traced the
doctrine of the Homoousion to contradiction. In this note we shew,
and with the same auxiliary, what is the issue of the doctrine, when
contradiction is eschewed.

N

234 APPENDIX.
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER V.
Since this chapter was in type we have fallen in with the " Biographia
Literaria," new edition, published this year by Pickering ; from which
the following is extracted : —
" The question then concerning our faith in the existence of a God,
not only as the ground of the universe by his essence, but as its maker
and judge by his wisdom and holy will, appeared to stand thus. The
sciential reason, the objects of which are purely theoretical, remains
neutral, as long as its name and semblance are not usurped by the
opponents of the doctrine. But it then becomes an effective ally
by exposing the false show of demonstration, or by evincing the
equal demonstrability of the contrary from premises equally logical.'1'
The understanding meantime suggests, the analogy of experience
facilitates, the belief. Nature excites and reveals it as by a perpetual
revelation. Our feelings almost necessitate it ; and the law of
conscience peremptorily commands it. The arguments that at all
apply to it, are in its favour ; and there is nothing against but its
own sublimity. It could not be intellectually more evident without
becoming morally less effective. * * *
" From these premises I proceeded to draw the following con
clusions. First, that having once admitted the existence of an
infinite yet self-conscious Creator, we are not allowed to ground the
irrationality of any other article of faith, on arguments which would
equally prove that to be irrational which we had allowed to be real.
Secondly, that whatever is deducible from the admission of => self-
comprehending and creative spirit, may be legitimately used in proof
of the possibility of any further mystery concerning the divine
nature. ' Possibilitatem mysteriorum (Trinitatis, Sfc.J, contra in-
sultus infidelium et hcereticorum a contradictionibus vindico;' (and we
have seen how he vindicates ;) ' hand quidem veritatem, quce revela-
tione sola stabiliri possit ;' says Leibnitz in a letter to his Duke.
He then adds the following just and important remark. ' In vain
will tradition or texts of Scripture be adduced in support of a
(1) " Wherever A = B, and A is not ^ Br are equally demonstrable, the premise in each
undeniable, the induction evident, and the conclusion legitimate — the result must be either that
contraries may be both true, (which is absurd,) or that the faculty and forms of reasoning
employed are innapplicable to the subject— i. e. that there is a transitu* in aliud genua. Thus the
attributes of space and time applied to spirit are heterogeneous ; and the proof of this is that
by admitting them explieite or implicite, contraries may be demonstrated true— that is, that the
same, taken in the same sense, is true and not true. That the world had a beginning in time
and a bound in space, and that the world had not a beginning and has no limit : that a self-
originating actj is and is not possible ;— are instances."
We should have been glad to append this as a note to our observations on the divine
omnipresence, at p. 129.

APPENDIX. 235
doctrine, donee clava impossibilitatis et contradictions e manibus
horum Herculum extortafuerit. For the heretic will still reply, that
texts, the literal sense of which is not so much above as directly
against all reason, must be understood figuratively; as Herod is a
fox, and so forth.'
" These principles I held philosophically, while in respect of
revealed religion I remained a zealous Unitarian. I considered the
idea of the Trinity a fair scholastic inference from the being of God,
as a creative intelligence ; and that it was therefore entitled to the
rank of an esoteric doctrine of natural religion. But seeing in the
same no practical or moral bearing, I confined it to the schools of
philosophy. The admission of the Logos as hypostasized, (that is,
neither a mere attribute nor a personification,) in no respect removed
my doubts concerning the Incarnation and the Redemption by the
cross ; which I could neither reconcile in reason with the impassive-
ness of the Divine Being, nor in my moral feelings with the sacred
distinction between things and persons, the vicarious payment of a
debt and the vicarious expiation of guilt. A more thorough re
volution in my philosophic principles, and a deeper insight in to my
own heart, were yet wanting. Nevertheless I cannot doubt that
the difference of my metaphysical notions from those of Unitarians
in general, contributed to my final re-conversion to the whole truth
in Christ ; even as according to his own confessions, the books of
certain Platonic philosophers commenced the rescue of St. Augustin's
faith from the same error, aggravated by the far darker accompani
ment of the Manichsean heresy." — Vol. i. pp. 207 — 210.
It would seem then that Coleridge was as much a Trinitarian
(philosophically) while a member of the Unitarian body, as he was
afterwards. What caused his secession from that body was his
discovery of a moral and practical bearing for philosophical principles
which he held as an Unitarian. By this practical bearing is doubtless to
be understood, the conviction which arose in his mind that he needed
a Redeemer, (in a sense different from that in which the Priestley
school of Unitarians, with which his connection had been formed,
usually give this name to Jesus,) and he divine. Coleridge's quarrel
with the Unitarians therefore had simply a moral ground: and he could
not with any consistency have afterwards denied the rights of Christian
brotherhood to any of his former friends who had come to sympathize
with him on this ground, even though they might have remained
opposed to him on the ground of his philosophical principles. We
have argued in our chapter on Coleridge, that his proper Trinitarian
views were speculative only. Here we have abundant confirmation

236 APPENDIX.
of this. The fact appears to be, (though we do not see that any
care has been taken either in the Lit. Rem. or Table Talk to guard
the reader against mistake on this head,) that Coleridge's hostility
was not directed against Unitarianism properly so called, that is
to say, against that system the distinguishing feature of which
consists in its uncompromising assertion of the unity of God, in
opposition to all forms of belief which invalidate or only cloud
this primal truth. His sarcasms (and the pages of the above
works are plentifully strown with them) were levelled mainly against
one particular form of Unitarianism, chiefly prevalent in this country,
of which the necessarian philosophy (not to say the materialist)
is part and parcel, and which, while professing to shape its creed by
the New Testament, resolutely denies to Jesus any higher character
than that of a prophet or moral reformer. It will hardly be ques
tioned that there has existed among the Unitarians of this country
for some time past, a growing disposition to exalt the office of
Jesus as the Mediator of our race : while it is certain that Coleridge's
views on the subject both of redemption and the fall were not
those which are usually received in Trinitarian circles. He speaks
indeed in this extract, of his ' re-conversion to the whole truth
in Christ.' But it may be doubted whether his views on the
points just named, are not more likely to find favour among Uni
tarians than Trinitarians, at least among those Trinitarians who
lay the greatest stress on these doctrines. His hostility to the
popular notions on these heads was hardly less determined than
that of Unitarians themselves. Perhaps therefore it will be allowed
us to surmise, that if Coleridge's lot had been cast among the
Unitarians of America, or if only his destiny had placed him a
generation later in English Unitarian society, he would not have
felt himself under the same obligation to renounce it.
Some of the sarcasms we have alluded to, seem applicable to
the necessarian philosophy alone. We refer to the confident and
sweeping charges which he brings against Unitarianism as leading
inevitably to Pantheism. "I hold it demonstrable," he says in
one place, "that a consistent Socinianism, following its own con
sequences, must come to Pantheism, and in ungodding the Saviour
must deify cats and dogs, fleas and frogs." - (Lit. Rem. vol. 4. p. 224.)
No doubt effusions of this sort are vastly amusing to the adver
saries of Unitarians. But some of these would do well to observe
that the same charge which Coleridge brings against Unitarianism,
(we believe he intended only the Unitarianism of Priestley,) he
brings also against the system of modern Calvinism as expounded

APPENDIX. 237
by Andrew Fuller, whose puny logic, together with that of Priestley,
more puny still in Coleridge's estimation, he pictures in ludicrous
combination with the giant stature of Spinoza. " Both systems,''
he says, here plainly meaning Priestleyan Unitarianism, with the
system of modern Calvinism, — "both systems are not Spinozism,
for no other reason than that the logic and logical consequency
of 10 Fullers -|- 10 X 10 Priestleys, piled on each other, would
not reach the calf of Spinoza's leg. Both systems of necessity
lead to Spinozism, nay to all the horrible consequences attributed
to it by Spinoza's enemies." — (Lit. Rem. vol. 4. p. 295.)
What may be the real bearing of the necessarian philosophy
on the great questions agitated between the Theist and the Pantheist,
we do not here inquire. But we do say that the followers of
Jonathan Edwards are no less responsible for the logical consequences
of this philosophy, than are the followers of Priestley. Unitarianism
as such is as little interested in these consequences as Trinitarianism.
Unitarians might be named who hold the necessarian philosophy
in no less abhorrence than Coleridge himself.
If these accusations are not to be understood in the way here
suggested, but on the contrary, (and it must be acknowledged that
in one place at least Coleridge marks Sabellians, Arians, and So-
cinians, all with the same brand,) are to be looked upon as levelled
against Unitarianism proper — against Unitarianism as contra-distin
guished from Trinitarianism, then we can only express our as
tonishment that they should have been put forward by one, who,
(to make no other exception,) so clearly apprehended the nature
and magnitude of the distinction between Theism and Pantheism,
placing it in the ascription or non-ascription of will, or of person
ality to the Deity. The glory of the Unitarian, (and who shall
stop him of this boasting ?) lies in the accordant, unalloyed testimony
which he is enabled to make to the personality of God. The
Unitarian is the special antagonist of Spinoza — the special antagonist,
and that as distinguished from the Trinitarian, whose testimony
to the personality of God is impaired by the associate confession
which with equal earnestness he makes of » tri-personality, which,
he will have, is not a tri-divinity — a tri-personality which is not
this, and not that, or anything else of which the mind can form
a conception. If such a predication is not to be treated as a mere
affair of words, it must introduce confusion into our ideas of God :
and confusion, oh ! how much worse confounded, when this tri-per
sonality is taken in its obvious sense, as teaching that there are
in God three agents having each in himself will, and being each

238 APPENDIX.
divine, while nevertheless, there is but one almighty will, as one
infinite mind, and one God. This is to say that God is both
uni-personal and tri-personal in the same sense : which to affirm
of the Deity, is to declare that he is so far removed beyond the
reach of our imperfect faculties, that we are no judges of what
is contradictory or impossible in his transcendant nature. This
is indeed to play into the hands of the Pantheist. For if God
may be both uni-personal and tri-personal, then for aught our fac-
culties can determine to the contrary, he may be both personal and
impersonal. If when, by ascribing personality to God, we have
made him a person, and one person as one God, we cannot trust
ourselves to conclude that he is not three persons, then neither
can we be sure after all that he is a person : and so the very
question between the Theist and the Pantheist, will come to be
regarded as a point lying beyond the range of our faculties.
It will be observed that Coleridge in the extract at the head of this
article speaks of the Logos, conformably to what we have before heard
from him, as hypostasized — as neither an attribute nor a personifica
tion. In an Appendix also at the end of the volume from which this
is taken, appears again what Coleridge calls ' his scheme or Tetraxy : '
(p. 321.) — the absolute will = prothesis, and the love = synthesis,
with the mem-pater = thesis, and the Idea absoluta adaiquata,
Deus Filius = antithesis, the alter Deus et idem, as he is styled
at p. 300. On a cursory perusal however of the " Biographia,"
we have noticed one passage which greatly strengthens a conjecture
which has often been in our mind while perusing the works of this
author, whether he did not ascribe to the human spirit the same
plurality that he ascribed to God. "A spirit," he says, "is that which
is its own object yet not originally an object, but an absolute subject,
for which all, itself included, may become an object. It must
therefore be an ACT : for every object is as an object, dead, fixed,
incapable in itself of any action, and necessarily finite. Again,
the spirit, (originally the identity of subject and object) must in
some sense dissolve this identity in order to he conscious of it:
fit alter et idem. But this implies an act, and it follows therefore
that intelligence or self-consciousness is impossible except by and
in a will. The self-conscious spirit therefore is a will, &c."
If the inference which may certainly be drawn from this is correct
(though we know not how to reconcile it with our quotations at
pp. 147, 148.), Coleridge must he accounted a Unitarian, in spite
even of his philosophical principles. To say that the divine spirit
is one as the human spirit is one, is confession broad enough.

239

Unitarians can object to no plurality in the divine mind, to which
a parallel may be pleaded in their own.
Perhaps therefore our concluding paragraph in Chapter V. would
have been nearer the mark, if an hypothetical clause with which
it was originally prefaced, had been suffered to remain, of the
following kind : — ' If Coleridge was not after all a Unitarian, though
disguised by his philosophy, and by the hostile mien which it was
his wont to assume towards those who are commonly so denominated,
Tetrachtarian, &c.' —
On the subject of the Trinity being inferrible on principles of
natural reason from the being of God, which Coleridge repeats
though in opposition to his own quotation from Leibnitz, the fol
lowing remarks of Beveridge wul not we trust be read without
interest. " If we proceed to reason, here also, though the unity of the
Godhead be a truth which from natural principles may be easily
demonstrated, yet the Trinity in the unity is a mystery which
by the light of nature could never be discovered: &c.
" It is true Trismegist, Plato, and others, seem by the light
of reason to have seen into this hidden mystery : but if we weigh
their words and sentences, we shall find they speak of three divine
essences, rather than of three distinct persons in the same essence.
And the glimmering light they had, is thought to be borrowed
from such as had seen or heard of the Scriptures, rather than
to have sprung from their own reasons. It is true also that reason
may offer at some dark resemblances of this great mystery ; as
the sun begets beams, and from the sun and beams together pro
ceed light and heat, but one is not before another, but only in
order and relation to one another. So in waters, there is the
fountain or well-head ; then there is the spring that boils out of
that fountain ; then there is the stream that proceeds from both
the fountain and the spring; and all these are but one and the
same water. So God the Father is the fountain of Deity; the
Son as the spring, boils up out of that fountain; and the Holy
Ghost that flows from both. But such and the like instances may
serve to illustrate this mystery to such as do believe it, but are
no demonstrations of it to such as do deny it.
" That which looks the most like a reason, is drawn from God's
understanding and knowing himself, and so in himself begetting
the lively image of himself, (as a man that looks in a glass begets
the image of his own face,) and this is the second person in the

240 APPENDIX.
Trinity, called therefore the express image of his Father's person;
and from this God's looking upon himself, and representing
himself to himself, cannot but proceed delight and rejoicing in
himself; whereby the Father and the Son delight in one another,
(as a man looking into a glass, if he smiles, his image in the
glass smiles too, and seems to do whatsoever himself doth) ; and
this mutual love to and joy in one another, is a third manner
of being or subsistence in the Godhead, called the Holy Ghost.
But these and the like are subtle speculations rather than solid
arguments, and have more of a roving fancy in them than of
convincing reason. Neither did I ever read or hear of any reason
brought from natural principles for this mystery, but what by
gainsayers might easily be evaded, &c.'' Thirty-nine Articles,
pp. 65—67.

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