Mill ar The Prescience of Gcoa YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY ; THE Prescience of GOD Well agreeing with the L i b e r t y of created Agents. BEING A full ANSWER to Mr. Fan court's Free Agency of ac countable Creatures, &c. With fome fliott STRICTURES upon his fecond Letter. In which Liberty, Possibility, Contin gency, Necessity, and many other Terms are clearlyexplain d. Known unto God are all his Works from .the Beginning of the World. Ads xv. 18. Qui a, Deo Prafcientiam tollit, Divinitatem tollit. Hieron. Sic Deusadminiflrat omnia quae creavit, ut etiam ipfa pro- prias-exercere & agere motus finat. Aug. de Civ. c2)ei, Lib. 7. Cap. 30. By CDAVI, which to me is of the greate ft mo ment; and talk'dof no lefs than Demonftration, even againfi felf-evident Truths, $Sc. &c. His chief Tiefgn now, is to prove that Prescience and Liberty are inconfiftent, and deftroy each other. And the whole of his Rr a fining to this Purpofe, amounts only to this, which I fhall give i on in his own Words, fever al of which he has repeat"d fome hundred Times over, viz. What is foreknown is future 5 what is future, for exam ple, all Actions that are fo, are certain, fixed, and vat- ceffary ; ABions that are certain, fixed, neceffary, are not, cannot be free ; yea, fire as certain, and neceflary, as Certainty it felf, and Neceffity itfelf; and yet that a neceffary Agent is a Contradiction in Terms, and con- fequently fo is a neceflary Action. This, I fay, is the Sum and Subflance of all his Arguments I But how many Contradictions are here .' The fame Agents are confdercd as Agents and no Agents $ and the fame Actions as Actions and no Actions, &c. When God promifed to bring the Children of Ifrae] out of iEgypt with a ftrong hand, l£c. their Deliverance from thence was future. If fo, it was certain, fixed, neceflary, and rot free ; God therefore was neceflitate to do what was future, and confequently became a neceffarv Agent, as their Tieliverance was now become a neceffary Action, Here then was a neceffary Agent and a neceffary Action 5 but thefe are Contradictions in Terms. Who then per formed this Promife ? Who wrought their Deliverance ? Verify The P R E F A C E. v Verily thefe are Flights indeed'. Such as will, no doubt, make thofe whom he calls the ignorant Multitude ftare^ but will 'fill the Judicious with Pity, Laughter, Indig nation, or Contempt. In my Reply I have been very free with fuch Stupi dities, nor could I well help my being fo, Amodcft En quirer after Truth, how weakfoever, ftoould be treated gently ; but when aftonijhing Ignorance, and prodigious Conceit and Affurance, will needs bear all down before them, the Lovers of Truth ought to treat the Guilty with as little Ceremony, as they do them. What lefs can be faid to palpable Nonfenfe, evident Contradictions, ma- nifeft Untruths, notorious Blundering, and fhameful Wriggling, than to call them by their proper Names ? And yt I have been fo merciful, as to fpare him an equal Half, as I pall convince him when defired. Of which I offer thefe Proofs, in two Cafes where I was obliged to bemoftfree. i. When in his Preface, p. 17. heobferved upon my Words (" It is manifeft, there can be no eternal " Foreknowledge o/Sin, but upon the Suppofition that " it will be, /*. c. that it is future, for God's Knowledge " 4>f what is only poffible, is not Foreknowledge, nor " can it with either Truth or Propriety be fo called:] " And anfwers, where' s the Impropriety of calling the§ee oejow '* Knowledge of what the future Creature will be able p_ y0.72.* " to do, Foreknowledge, &c." True, but what the fu ture Creature will be able to do, is more than poffi ble, it is evidently future alfo. " Nothing but the " Knowledge of a future ObjeB, can with any Truth " or Propriety, be called Foreknowledge." This is the very thing I am pleading. " But then J ought to " have remembred, that Powers may be future, as well " as Acts, and conftdered as future, may be equally " foreknown." Now fupfofing this, future Powers are evidently more than poffible. Is not this now a pretty way of oppofmgl The filly Thing he would be at, if he could exprefs it, is obvious enough to the fugacious ; but I wave propofwg it in plain Englifh, left his ft/per lative Ignorance foould too much appear. That the Ob]eB o/Prefcience is fomething future, is felf- evident : and, that what is only poffible and not future, is not the ObjeB of Foreknowledge, but Knowledge, is felf-evi- dent alfo. Sin then was from Eternity \ either poffi ble vi The PRE FA C E. ble only, or future. If poffible only, it could not be the ObjeB of Prefcience, becaufe Pofiibilities are always prefent: 'if future, then it was certain, fixed, neceffa ry': And therefore, according to him, either God did, not foreknow Sin, or was the Author of it: Let him chufe. 2. When I obferved fome Blunders hi his Ve- pzonflration, viz. That he called the Major of an hypo thetical Syllogifm the Antecedent, and had fallen into the Scphifm called Ignoratio Eienchi : He anfwers. See below," I'hat it was not the Major, but apart of it he called _ p." 125 to the Antecedent." Very well'. The Antecedent is, " If 1 29. " it be a Contradiction to prevent what will be." But how could it come into the Head of a rea finable Crea ture, to prcve this ? However, every Body knows, that the Propofition to be proved, is to be the Conclu- fion of tloe Syllogifm. Let us then fee how it runs, To fuppofe it to be both true, that an Event will be, and yet not true, that it will be, is a Contradiction. But to prevent what will be, fuppofes it both true that it will be, and nor true that it will be. The Concluffon, according to him, fhould have been,1 Therefore, " if it be a Contradiction, to prevent what " will be." Which a Boy learning Logick cannot read without laughing. Whereas the Concluficn he has given is, " Therefore to prevent what will Le is a Contradic tion!" Now if this is not an Ignoratio Eienchi, there- never was one in the World. I fhall therefore leave it to every intelligent Reader to fay, whether this fenfilefs "Defence of fitch a ridiculous Blunder, be, not Stupidity in the Abftradt : Andwbether, inevery one of his Apo logies, he does not the more difpldy his grofs Ignorance. I hope thefe will convince both you and him, that I have been in many Cafes too favourable ; that he ought to learn to form a Syllogifm, before he ufes any of them, much more before he pretends to Demonflration ; and that it would better become him, to go to School, than to wrangle about he knows not what. There are three Things I mufi defire of you, candid Reader, 1 . That if you would underftand this Letter, you would be fo kind as to read my two former Books, The Omnifcience of God ftated and vindicated, and All future free Actions future Contingencies ; in which 1 have demonftrated, that God from Eternity foreknew all The PREFACE vii all the ABions of all his Qreatures which ever have, or ever will be done j which he (hamelefly denies: That there arefuch things as future Contingencies, by which we mean neither more nor lefs, in this Argument, than future free Actions : And, that according to him, the Omni Orient did not foreknow, in any Cafe, what any Creature he was to make would freely do ; did not fore know one fingle free Action, of ill that have been done from the Beginning, or will be done to the End of Time, rot one ; which is not only hideous Blafphemy, but lb fhocking in it felf, that it is abfolutely impoffible for any Man who believes that God is a Being of infinite Perfections, to believe it ; with feveral other palpable Abfurdities and ContradiBions in his- Scheme. 2. That you would excufe feveral of his nonfenfical Phrafes, which tho' I have freely expofed, I have yet thought convenient to ufe, in compliance with him, perhaps to the dark'ning or weak'ning of my own Argument. 3. I dejire you to obferve, that tho' I have chofen to exprefs my felf more foftly about phyfical Predetermination, God's Decree concerning Sin, and the Manner of his forefeeing the finful ABions of Men, I do not intend to difpute with thofe, who think they may fafely carry things farther. Only this much, I conceive, may be made good, that all the Principles ofthe Reformed Churches, relating to the five Points, may be well defended, fhould we lay afide feveral fuch Metaphyfical Niceties, and unfcriptural Phrafes, &c. Which, fuppofing they might be more plaufibly defended than they are, have given more Offence,, and occafion'd a greater Odium and Outcry againft thofe Truths which are clearly re vealed, than perhaps they will be found to be all worth. I have been careful throughout, to obferve all the Con ditions' our Friend required; to lay afide or explain am biguous Terms, and be underftood of plain Chrifli^tns; have waved nothing that fecmed to make againft me, how often foever it came in my way ; and Jbdll leave the Event to God. This much only I muftfay, that the Denial of God's universal Prescience, is fo manifefily contrary to Reafon,_/d diametrically oppofite to the whole Current of Scripture, fo evidently tends to the Denial of Providence, is fo inconfiftent with the di vine Perfections, and by Confequence leads fo direBly to viii The*P R E F A C E. to therfenying the very Beingjaf God, &c. that it can never be too frequently ^w/rzealoufly oppofed: And, that the five Points, are fo interwoven with Chri- ftianity, fo effential to it, and make fo great a Part of it, that a Careleffnefs about them, and much more an open rejecting and malicious traducing them, leads mceffarily and immediately to Pelagianifm, which is one direB Road to Arianifm or Socinianifm, from which the Pajfage to Popery or Deifm, is but very port, as fad Experience every where witneffes: All which call for a more publick, active and fteddy con tending for them, ejpecially at this Day, when Popery and Deifm threaten an univerfal Inundation over the Reformed Churches, The Time will come, I verily believe, when all that are refolved Proteftants, will con- fider this, and think of returning to their firft Faith, without which it is not to be expeBed they will ever return to their firft Works, their firft Love. And this I offer for my Apology. ERRATA. Befides many Miftakes in the Pointing, and fome Words which, may have been overlookt, the Reader is defir'd to cor- reQ: thefe following. P. 33, 1. 16, who, r. which, p. 36, 1. 14, d. or fupernatural. p. 37, 1. 1 3, a new Line. p. 52, J. 23, a new Line. p. J3, d. from 1. 28 to 32, and r. aft with Choice and Deliberation, let the Reafons moving:; us to one Side be never fo ftrong, and our Inclinations to it never fo great, we have an equal phyfical Power to forbear a&ing, and by Confequence.the Aftion is free. p. 56, 1. 28, after contingent Propofitions, r. in this Senfe ofthe Word. p. 57, 1. 39, d. of. p. 93, 1. 12, were free, before, r. were fuppofea free imben. p. 94, 1. 41, they have, r. it has. p. 95, 1. 30, 1 have, r. he has. p. 97, 1. 22, this, r. his firft. p. 09, 1. 39, treat of, r. repeat, p. 164, 1. 33, we, r. he. p. 185, I. 8, and, r. at leaft. (O Full Anfwer T O Mr. Fan court's Book, CALL'D The Free Agency, &c. In a Letter to his Friend. — 'DEAR SIR, fHEN our Friend did me the Honour, to fend me, by the Prefs, a Reply to my firft Book; after two maniieUr Untruths in the very firft Page oC his Preface, he promifed, in a future Reply, " to take notice of my fecond " Preface*, and of the Remarks I " had beftowed there upon his fix Principles ;" and, to wave the reft, in the laft Page of his Appendix ftitchti up with it, he informs us, " That he had deferr'd a <• while, the Publication of the fecond Part of his Ap'. *' pendix, in Expectation of my further Thoughts * See Ailfaturt free Anions, &c. p. iii. Sc 1 12, B " upon (a) " upon the Subject of the Divine Omnifcience; that " it might be as complete and decifive an Anfwer, as " poffible, to all the Arguments that had beeji offered, "from either ofthe above Topics, viz. Reafon, or Re- " velation. There, fays he, I fhall have an Oppor- " tunity, to colleB, to ftate, and refute their moft plau- " fible Reafonings $ and particularly to, lay open the " FaJIacy of the21?» Propositions there fubjoin'd." Thefe Propofitions,Sir,being expreffed in the moft obfcurc and ambiguous Words, prober only to create endlefs wrang ling, (the common Remge of ignorant, contentious Dif- putants, and the laft, but forry Supportof a bad, wicked Caufe,) I tried to explain, and place in a clearer Light, that our Author might know what we expected of him : And come now to enquire, whether he has performed his Promifes, either or both, as becomes an honeft Man; or whether, as ufual, he has excufed himfelf of the too, too arduous Task. To take notice ofa Preface, without daring to med dle with the Book, is Mr. Fancourt's Way of anfwer- ing; into which, probably, he has been led, by fup- Rep p i P°fin8 fa!fiy> tnat I had placed my chief Strength in 'the Front, as he has done his in the Rear, wifely leaving the thing he calls a Demonflration, to his Ap pendix. As complete, and decifive an Anfwer,as pof fible, to all our Arguments, he haspromifed, you fee, in the fecond Tart of his Appendix; but whether this laft Book, be the fecond Part of the Appendix, with the Change only of tbe Title ; or whether, '* having TreeAgen" taken his leave of us all, for the prefent," he defigns cy- p- 9*»to drop, that fecond Part, and deprive the World, to their unfpeakableLofs,of as complete and decifive anAn- fwer, as is poffible for him to give ; I know not : We muft take it, as it is. In it, he has lugg'd in all his Adverfaries, that he might have the Honour of truffing them all up together-- And by taking a Scrap from one, a Slice from another, a few Words or half a Sentence from a third, without any regard to the Occafion, Con nection, or Defign ; by quoting Words as theirs which they never wrote, and forcing them to fay what they abhor, with fuch like applauded Arts ; and jumbling them all together, with many things of his own repeated alaioft a hundred times, and fome new Hints of the fame ( 3 ) fame Importance, without any Judgment or Order, hut a great deal ofthe moft candid Candour, he has produ ced this ftrange Hodge-Podge. By thefe means, however, he has render'd it hard for his Antagonists to anfwer him ; fince, it is not eafy, in feveral Places", to difcern which of them he oppofes : has fcreen'd Mmfelf, from many of their juft Refentments ; feeing he may readily reply, it was another he intended, in fuch or fuch a Paffage: and endeavoured to ftave off Conviction, and fave himfelf from being wholly con futed ; fince, if any one of them ftiould filence him forever, he might find fome.thing to oppofe to the reft. Thus, if his other Opponents can demonstrate Pre- feience without a Decree, he has ftill Liberty to attack me, who think, that neither can be without the other: And, if I can prove, that the Omniscient knew, or foreknew, from before the Foundation of the World, all the free Actions of rf// hisCreatures, both thofe which have been done from the Beginning, and thofe that will be done to theEnd of the World 5 and that this Foreknowledge is, in every Inftance, either founded upon, neceffarily preceeded by,or attended with a Decree, to excite to, caufe, or permit fuch Actions, fo that there could be no Prefcience of any of them without fome Decree, he has ftill room left to oppofe them. You'll give me leave, Sir, to ask you eight Ques tions, concerning this Management, and to expect your Judgment upon them. i. Would not a fair, honeft Difputant, have considered our feveral Opinions, Ar guments, Anfwers, and Objections, particularly and feparately, feeing our Principles, Views, and Proofs are different7, z. Would he not have taken fome fmall Notice of our c#z>/Reafonings, and ftrongeft Ar guments, and either Shewn they were weak, imperti- nent,falfe,or inconclufive, or elfe confuted them,at leaft attempted to do it? 3. Would not he have fairly quoted our own Words-, without Mutilations and Alte rations, and taken them in the fame Senfe we told him, we meantthem. 4-Would he'not, when he wrote anAn- fwer,with this Title, A Reply to Mr M's Bookjn which })C has not offered to confider any thing but the Pre face, and a few ofthe laft Pages of it, have freely ex- B 2 plain'd (4 ) plain'd himfelf, that it was not the whole Book, but a few Pages of it only he meant ? 5. Would he not have honeftly perform' 'd his Promifcs, given tbe Reafons why he did not,or frankly acknowledged hecould not,or would not ? 6. Would he not have explain'd his own ambiguous Terms, and unintelligible Phrafes, which we deSired him' to do, and have ftill ufed them, with out Confufion or Perverfenefs, in the fame Senfe ? 7. Would he have been afhamedof acknowledging his own evident Blunders, when they could neither be de nied, palliated, nor excufed; or of openly giving up bis indefenfible Noftrums, and palpable ContradiBions ? 8. Would he not have kept himfelf JlriBly, to the firft Vte-fame Conditions of Difputation, which he impofed on fac.. p. i.jjjj Antagonists, when he firft put on his Harnefs, and threw down his Gantlet, as a Challenge to the whole World ? I defire you, Sir, to fay, whether our Friend is not above all thefe, notwithstanding the Candour promifed in the Title Page. However, we mutt be content. In this Anfwer, leaving my Brethren to act their own part, which they can well do, without any help of mine; I Shall con&der chiefly what he has offered againft me, waving nothing, be it ever fo ftrong, or fo filly, where he has mentioned my Name, or pretends tore- ply to any thing I have faid. To mifquote, or mifre-r prefent an Aurhor, putting Words into his Mouth he never uttered, or wire-drawing any Expreffion not fo well guarded, to any Senfe contrary to his obvious Scope and Meaning, with other the like Methods of Contention, are Arts of which 1 was never Mafter. I Should blu/h at fuch mean, vile Shifts, which are beneath one who has a good Caufe, knows what he is faying, and has not thrown away all Shame ; and muft end, in the Wrangler's Confufion. As he has not charged any fuch odious Things upon me, which you may be fure from his low Remarks on the moft trifling things, he would have done, had there been any Ground for it 5 fo, you may be Satisfied, I Shall -not, in this Reply, follow his Example. As I appeal to you, I defire you to judge. Waving therefore, at prefent, his Title-Page, a perfect Original ! and the firft firft Dozen Lines of his Preface, which I muft obferve upon hereafter, we begin with thofe that follow. Having alledg'd it, as the Opinion of himfelf, and fome others, who have taken a nearer View of the Con- troverfy concerning God's Prefcience and Man's Free will, in its Nature and Confequences, " That it will " at laft refolve into this important Qjieftion, whether " there be any Blame in Sin at all ?" i. e. in other Words, Whether the Want of Conformity unto, or Tranfgreffion of the Law of God, the great Rule of Righteoufnefs, be blame-worthy I Whether moral evil he culpable7 Or more Shortly, Whether Sin be Sin7. Goodly Queftions all! " Or, if any, to whom ' ' this Blame fairly belongs ; whether to the Creator, " or the Creature?' i.e. Whether the Creator who forbids Sin, and threatens the Sinner, or the Creature who freely chufes, freely commits it, many times a- gainft his Confcience, be fairly to be blamed ? Whe ther an infinitely perfeB Being, can act imper fectly; tor without this,or'till he does fo, he can't pof- fibly deferve Blame i or whether the imperfeB Crea ture, who is capable of finning, and. often deviates from the Rule of Righteoufnefs, even when he isco?2- fcious to himfelf of his Freedom, i. e. that he may ab stain, or ait otherwife, Should fairly bear the Blame of his own willful, chofen Deviations from that moft perfeB, righteous Rule ? Important Queftions ! The Bleffed God could not have been infinitely perfeB, had he not, from the Beginning, known or foreknown all the Actions of his future Creatures: But his knowing them, did not change their Nature, no not in the leaft. What poffible caufal Influence, Prefcience can have, on any Action good or bad, no Man in the World can tell " All fides, it's true, are forward e- " nough to pronounce the Divine Being, innocent ; but "pronouncing and proving ate two Things." That is, if thefe Words have any Senfe, and Connection with the foregoing ; If the Omnisch-^t forefecs the finful free Actions of Men, the Blame of their Sins fairly be longs to him. A goodly Confequence ! Or if Man has indeed Free-will, the Exercife of that Power or Faculty cannot be foreknown j i e. it can't be fore known, («) known what he will freely do. A Canfequence like the former! In Short, Free-will is abfolutely deftroyed by the Prefcience of God, or yor ever deflroys it. They are inconfiftent and incompatible. This, Sir, without DiSguife, is the Defign of this wonderful Medley. "There are different Solutions, upon this Head, " which he gave us before in the Preface to his Reply " to me," — The Combatants he calls by the Names of Neceffitarians and Anti-neceffitarians. *' Of the " former fort fome are Decretalifts, fome Anti-deer e- " talifts *. The Decretalifis contend for Foreknow- " ledge and Decrees both. Their Scheme he gives " from me." To pafs the Truth of thefe Divisions, and the Propriety of thefe new-coin'd Names, we go on to the Scheme. " They hold, ift, That our ac- " countable Actions were originally free, and not ne- " ceffary, quoting a Sentence of mine, that the An- " gels that fell,and our firft Parents might really have Pref. p. ». « abstained from all Sin, &c." Anf We verily think, that all human Actions, of all Sorts, are accountable Actions, if the Phrafe be proper. I never talk'd of their being originally free, and not neceffary, nor do I understand the Meaning of thefe Words. We think all our Actions, which are properly fo called, are free. We.are confeious that we chufe what we like, _ and do what we chufe, voluntarily and freely f. And tho' marty ufe the Phrafe, that fuch ot fuch Actions are neceffary, yet they never intend any Neceffity incon fiftent with Freedom.*' 2dly, That yet our accountable "Actions were ever foreknown and decreed." Anf Thefe Words are none of mine, nor do I ufe to talk fo loofely. My Words that follow do not prove this, nor did the Scope of them lead to any fuch Surmife, as you will" fee if you confult the Paffage. It is true, many make no Scruple of fuch Words, but not at all in his Senfe. They grant that all our Actions were decreed, but plead, beyond what he can anfwer, that the Decree and * Thefe I briefly obferved upon in my laft Anfwer, All fu ture free Actions, p. 1 13, 1 14. T I defire our Friend to eonfider this. If they are not fret who are confeious of nil this, who are, who raw be free? If they are, then all may be foreknown, by One who knows what things will be pleafing to us. (7) and Necefjliy flowing from it, are fo far from tAkino away the Liberty, ot Contingency of fecond Caufest that they rather establish them *. Our Author could not but know this, and had he acted with the old Candour, he had directed his Batteries againft this ; but he thought it wifer, whenever he met with the Word Decree, to run away with it, and roar out, what is decreed is neceffary, and what is neceffary is not free, &e. when this laft is the very fhing they deny. For my own Part, I believe all the Decrees of God are eternal ; that they reach to all the Actions of Men ; that no ABionot Circumflance of Action* could ever have been paft, prefent, ot future, without fome Decree ; that ail things come to pafS, "according to the Decrees ; that there is an effeBive' and permif- Jive Decree ; that God decreed' to produce, or cauji fome Actions, to excite to and affift in others, and tn permit others ; that the ~tDecr.ee to permit is in no Senfe, upon no Account^, fine Caufe of the thing per mitted ; and that when Gold permits reafonable Crea tures to chufe and aB freely, they do moft certainty chufe and aB freely. Every one of thefe I. have pro ven at large, from Scripture 'and Reafon, in my Om- nifciencc of God ftated and vindicated ; nor has he fo much as pretended to anfwer them. To give an In stance, I believe that God foreknew, thazAdam would fin freely, if permitted; and that he decreed to permit him to fin ; But never faid that he decreed to tempt him to fin, to excite, perfuade, ot draw him to fin, to caufe him to fin, or, in any meafure, to be the Author of his Sin ; or to make either r#e ABion or the Sits neceffary ; (all thefe I renounce, deteft, abhor:) but * only to permit him to fin freely. Or in the Words of the Affembly's Confefjion, " This Sin of our firft Pa rents God was pleafed according to his wife and holy Counfel to pe rmit, having purpofed to order it to his - , , own Glory. "Tho'3dly, Whatfoevet is foreknown and on ,c "*' *' decreed they fay is neceffary. [According to the Dif- " tinction, * I called upon him to difprove this, if he can. I am fure he cannot, no, nor all the Socinians upon Earth j and lince he cannot, his Vociferations about the Decree, &c. ftiew nothing but his Weaknefs or Perverfenefs.j ( 8 ) " unction, which Bifhop Burnet fays is fo facred a- " mong us (fialviniflsf) — .it was, fays Mr. M.impoffi- «* He for him \Adam\ not \tofall, in fenfu compofitq, " taking all things together, becaufe it was impofflble " that God Should be deceived, or his Decree fruf- " trate." This I have given every Word, in his own Order, and obferve upon it, that you may fee his Can dor, i. It is imperfectly quoted j my Words are, " I have waved Metaphyfical Terms, - or explain'd them, ¦ ' ¦" ftudioufly abftain'd from many fcho- laftic DiftinSions, — —even that which Biftiop Burnet iays, is fo facred among us, when difputing of the Freedom of the Will, viz. in fenfu divifo, and in fenfu compofito. To explain this a little, let it befuppofed, that God decreed to make Adam free, having Power and Liberty to Stand or fall, as he Should chufe, and that he alfoforefaw that on fuch a future Day, he would, if he fhould fuffer^hita, eat of the forbidden Fruit, which he decreed "pq permit him to do : Upon this Supposition, fay they, it was poffible for Adam not to fall, in fenfu divifo, considering his Power and Liberty abstracted from thePrefcience andDecreejand then follow the Words quoted as above." Here, ac cording to the Suppofition^ it is evident, that Adam was free, and that he freely eat the forbidden Fruit ; and therefore, that his eating it, was not a neceffary ABion, in the proper Senfe of Neceffary ; and that the Neceffity implied in this Distinction, is no way inconfiftent withFreedom of Choice, Freedom ofAction, a Tower of forbearing, or doing the contrary. Some kind of Neceffity, they think confiftent with the highefi Freedom ; and our Friend fhould take the Words, as they ufe them, and disprove their Senfe of them, or he does nothing; for they are not to be frighted by Let ters or Sounds. There are feveral Sorts of Neceffity, as we Shall fee prefently. 2. Our Friend every where ranks me among the Decretalift's, and charges it upon me with the reft, That I make all things neceffary. Whereasindeed!leverywhereg«#riagainftrto;fddom or never ufe the Word ; exprefsly deny the Charge ; and make it felf evident , that it is not honeftly imputed to us, at leaft to me. In the very Page laft quoted , and in the very next Lines, among other things, I faid, " That ( 9 ) That the Distinction was not fo very proper, or apt to confufe plain Readers That Adam was ftill free, iiotwithltanding the Prefcience and 'Decree — - That neither of them leffen'd his Power or Liberty in the leaft Thar God knew he might do either, and which he would do freely. — - That Poffibility and Prefcience did not refpect the fame thing ; — — • Yea, it is felt-evident, that, upon this SUppofition, God would have been deceived, if Mam had not had Power to have aBed otherwife, had he pledfed." I now add* had he not been free, to ail or not, to eat or forbear eating.^ Judge then, Sir, of our kuihofs great Candour, in thefe Quotations. Inflead therefore, of this candid way of proposing our Principles, concerning thefe three Points, you'll take them, as they follow. We hold, firft, That we! are to account for all our Actions ; That they are all free, and not neceffary, in his Senfe of the Word necef fary. z. That God foreknew them all, before the Foundation of the World ; and that he did decree o con cur with his Creatures in all their Motions, to excite' to or affift in fome of their A ctions, and to permit others of them ; and that as fome Decree1 relates to, fo feveral ABs of Providence are converfant about, all our? Thoughts, Words and Deeds i That he decreed, to work in his People, both to will and to do of his good Tleafure ; to make them perfeB in every good Work to py . j ¦ do his Will, working in them that which is well-pleaf- IX\ '",.* ing in his Sight, thro' Jefus Chrift, all which he ac-\\eb. xiii tually does in time j and to permit all the Sins, thatn. ever were, or ever fioall be committed in the World. 3. That the Foreknowledge of our Actions, has no man ner of Influence at all, upon any account, or in any ineafure, either upon the Agent or Actions, the Man* ner, Time, or Circumstances of. them; but fuppofei idiem to be juft what they are : That the Decree to Caufe, excite to, ot determine any Action, does neither imply, nor infer, any Neceffity^ oppofite to or everfive of the Liberty of the Agent, or Contingency of the Action 3 hut rather eftablijhes them : And, That the Decree to permit, does plainly imply and infer, a Freedom in the Agent to aB, or not ; to chufe and do what is per* wit ted, ox let it. alone. 6 *W ( 1° ¦) Upon thefe Principles, Sir, we referve, and afcribe to the First Gause, its juft and proper Honour, and give to Second Catifes their due ; whereas, Pelagiani- %ers, either confound them, or advance Second Caufes to the piace of the Firft: We maintain the univerfal Super intendency, and ABivity of Providence, be lieving, according to the Word, That God did from Eternity decree to caufe, excite to, or permit, and to limit, direB, overrule and ordain all the Motions of his Creatures, to one great End, hjs bwk Glory ; and that in time, he executes his Decrees, in the Works of his Providence, wifely, holily, and powerfully preferving and governing all his Creatures, concurring to, caufing or fiiffering all their Actions, direBing, li miting, overruling and ordaining them all, fo as in fallibly to anfwer his dwn eternal Purpofe ; whereas^ bur Antagonifts do either obfcure, difhonour, or de- ftroy this univerfal Providence : We plead, that God is the Caufe, the Author of all Good, which Petagia- nizers wickedly deny ; and that the Creature is the fole, the total Caufe of all Sin ; whereas, Mr. Fancourt blafphemoufly contends, that God is the alone Caufe of it, roaring outj that the Omniscient could not fore* fee, which way a future innocent Creature would free ly incline, alid determine it felf, lOithout determining for Erfay, it, die. We think^and hold, that every rational Agentt p-SMi &c has a natural Freedom effential to it, which it can ne^ ver lofe, while it remains a reafonable Creature ; that every fuch Agent, is a., free Agent, having a natural Dominion over his own Actions ; that Man, even in his corrupted State, is fuch an Agent, having a Power to aB or not, and being the next and immediate Caufe, of every thing he does : But we dare not fay, that he is indifferently or equally inclined to Good and Evil, fe- jng every Man knows, arid cannot but be confeious: that he has no fuch Indifferency of inclination' ; nor that 'foe tan, of himfelf, love the.. Lord his God with ail his Heart, &c according to the Covenant of-Works; or be lieve and repent, or be£in to believe arid repent, accor- 1 ding to the Command of the Gofpel ; becaufe, both thefi are contrary to the whole Current of Scripture^ and to univerfal Bxperience, cannot confift with th6 Marine of Original Silt, ^- would' detraft frafti the *' Merits ( » ) Merits of Chrift, and enervate the Grace of God j Whereas Pelagianizers either deny Original Sin, or lefjen \t, pr cannot tell what to make of it ; and plead, either that we are .'jle to do all that God can require of an Obligation upon the Bleffed God, to help them, when they can do no mere ; i. e. They Strenuoufly con tend for the Doctrine of Merit, in the ancient Senfe of that Word, and thereby overthrow the very Notion of the Grace of Gpd. In a word, we know, that Man, even in this fallen State, is a free Agent ; but not in, every Senfe, nor to every Purpoft, to which innocent Man was free, or to which Man regenerated is, or Man glorified will be free : We dare not make him fo free, as to make him facrilegous. Thefe, Sir, are ou.r Principles, which vve Shall not be afhamed to defend. Moft of tbem, are clearly deduced, from the Conside ration pf the Divine Perfections, whence we are con vinced of their Truth : Many of tbem are evident, from the Conviction and Experience of all Men, to which we appeal : And all of them are fully, frequently, and Strongly confirmed, not by a few Texts only, but the whole Tenor- of the Word of God. There are feveral Terms, Sir, fuch as, to aB, ABiont Caufe,. Free, Neceffary, Poffible, Future, ike. which, if our Friend had defined, ufed constantly in the fame Senfe, and when he gave, or oppofed the Tenets of his Opponents, affixed the fame Ideas to them, which they do, and no others ; he could not but havefeen his own Weaknefs or Perverfenefs, in all this Pother he make? about them. This is expected of a fair Difputant, if he knows what he is faying. When this is not done, to argue is but to wrangle, and to reply to an Adverfary, is but to combate Chimara^s, the Figments of their own Srains, without Profit, and without End ; feeing, tho' the Parties may ufe the very fame Words, their Ideas., are no more tbe fame, than if one of them were talking. of Chalk, the other of Cheefe. Several of thefe I ex plained, in my Omnifcience of God ftated and vindica ted, Page z6 — 29. So that he coujid not have miftakert me, had he not wink'd hard, and refufed to under- C a ftand,j (13) fland : But to prevent, it poffible, this low Jangling, which proceeds chiefly from his con f ufed jumbling of thefe Words, you'll give me leave; once mere, to make cur Senfe of them, as clear as I can ; which will be a Short, and ready way of anfwering a// his Jfyiibbles. To act or eo, is evidently an EffeB cf Power, pre- fuppofing a principle of ' ABion. This fupp'ofes a Sub- flance or Being, having this Power or Principle of Ac tion refiding in it- As fuch a Principle, is not effenti- alto, fo neither can it be communicated to, that fort of Subftance, which is called Matter. Mere Matter then, does not, cannot, ftriftly and properly, aB. This Power ot Faculty, is only found in thofe Beings-, which we call Spirits ; and t0 all of them, it feems to he effential. All the Actions, of which we have any No tion may be reduced to Thinking and Motion. Every Man perceives in himfelf, an inherent Principle, Faculty, or Power of thinking, and of moving himfelf, pr feveral things about him. He is confeious, that he is able, at pleafure, to begin Motion, to lift up his Hand, his Finger, his Foot, i£c. When he is in health, He is fenfible, that he can rife zip or fit down, go out or in ; and fo has a Dominion or Power over feme Mem bers of his Body, to move thent or not, when he will : He knows, that he can attend to external Objects, apply his Thoughts to and fix them on any of them, or remove them to others, as he is difpofed ,• and the like. To begin Motion then, to rife, walk, &c. to attend to any Object inward or outward, ot turn from them ; is foaB: And this RiSing, Walking, and Attention, is ABion, And hethat has fuch a Principle in himfelf, and exerts it, when, and as, he has a mind, to do any fuch thing, is the Agent. The Concurrence of the Firft. Caufe y/ith the Creature, in and to all'its Motions, Endeavours apd Actions, alters not the cafe one jot. .As long as the Creature does itself confider, chufe, determine, and exert its felf-moving Principle, to do what appears to it preferable ; it remains Still a true Agent, and the total Caufe of its own AB, in its owii Sphere. Nor is the Cafe at all alter'd, when God in- fufes a new and fpiritual Principle of Action into his 'Chofen, creates a new Life in them, endowing them with thofe fupernat'ural Qualities neceffary to a Life of ^sjith' and Holinefs. THey 'ar? indeed but paffive Re cipient^ y cipients of this fpiritual Life in their Regeneration but when they are born again, and the new Creature is lormcd in them, they themfelves do afterwards aB with, and under Grace ; they exert the aBive Princi ple, as it is now renewed, in all their Motions, Endea vours, Strivings and Wreltlings, in their fpiritual Courfe. Were it not fo, thefe Motions, Conatus's, Exertions, of the new Principle, could not be faid to be theirs, as they moft certainly are. Hence they are truly faid, to work out their own Salvation, ^°'phi!. it. it is God that worketh in them The Spirt him- iz, 13. felf is faid to make Interceffton for them, with Groan- Rom. viii. ings which cannot be uttered; and yet thefe Groanings^- Gal. were really theirs. The Spirit of Chrift in their™- 6- ... Hearts, cries, Abba, Father; and yet by .him they ' ""VJj!* themfelves cry, Abba, Father. They are ftrengthensd^ l6p with Might, by the Spirit in the- inner Man ; not only perfuaded, inclined, difpofed, but aBually enabled to run, to Strive, to fight, to conquer ; and when they are Jo excited and corroborated, they put forth their own Power in running, Striving, ££?c. Whence it is plain, that the Holy Spirit, and the Believer, ate each -in their kind, the Caufe and Author of thefe ABions. He as the firft, the principal, the fuperior Agent, the Believer as the fecond, the inferior, the next and r immediate Caufe, do both concur as Workers of the fame ABs of Faith and Obedience. As every-rational Creature, aBing rationally, aBs, and cannot but aB, fotfome end, which is, ot appears, upon fome account or other, good; fo have they fome Rule of Action, fome Standard to judge of Things by, and fome Power or Faculty of applying Things or Actions to this Standard, that they may perceive them ; and determine, which to chufe op refufe, which to do ot forbear. This Faculty is called the Underftand- ii:g, which leads, and direBs the aBive Principle, in all its Motions. When any fuch Agent therefore aBs, if he behaves as a reafenable Creature, the Underftand- ing views, obferves, weighs. Things, judges- what is heft, abfolutely and in itfelf, or what is, or appears fit- teft or moft defirable, at. that- time, and in his prefent CircUmftances ; the Will chilfes that, which,( all things confideired, appears at ftetentinbfi eligible 5 and then the t *4 ) . . the Soul, the aBive Being, exerts its native Principle ef ABion, to do what is approved and preferred. That the Will always follows fime Judgment of the Under standing, is certain ; and, did Men carefully obferve, what" paffes in their own Minds, when they aB, they would find, that, in moft, and very probably, in att • Cafes, within its own Sphere, it always follows its laft #n,d. praBhal Judgment. This feems to be natural to %tt, and tftajfife from our- very Constitution. And yet, this-lafi praBical Judgment, which, fpme think, is $l?ways neceffary, is not the efficient Caufe of the fuh- fequent Action, but wholly different from it. The aBive Power refiding in the Soul, when it is put forth, is the file phyfical Efficient. If this Principle is not exerted, the Creature aBs not a?.all-K If it is, then it Is, m'anifeft, that it is the next and immediate Caufe of its own ABs. Arguments, Perfuafions? Motives, Ends, .y?bpenfi;ons, Appetites, Inflintts, have, no doubt,, a gre#t weight with the Ageat, to excite it, to put forth this, 'j^ower ; and are the Qccafidns, Grounds, Rea sons, and Incentives of Action. ; but they have not, npr foffibly- can have, any fuch Power, as to effeB or pro duce the ABion; and, therefore, are by no means the Caufe of it- Of th§ fmr Sorts of Causes, ufually mentioned by ybilofbphers, the efficient, material, formal, and final, the firft only is properly and truly a Caufi of ABi-oit- j feeing that only has any true ABivity, any Principle ef Powers in itfelf, to caufe ot produce the EffeB. The Condition without which a thing cannot he done, is much lefs the Caufe of it. When I, therefore, ufe the Word Caufi, without any Epithet, I mean always the efficient. The'effic-ieiit Caufe of Things, is either the firft os thefecond. The Eirs.t Cause is abfolutely fo, with out any Dependence upon, or Subordination to any o- thjer. Gad ia ,the only fiyft and fuprems-. principal Caufe of all things, in an abfilute- Senfe. . The Second Caufe, is that which, by its own pr&per and mtrinfic jgfficacy or Power, aBs ox produces the Effect; tho*, in acting, it be fubprdipate to, and dependant upon the fifft, needing its Influence and Concourfe. %a all' its ^etioiis, &\\ mqtzi Agej?« a*<3 Secwd Caufis, de* K i5 ) pending abfilutely upon the Greater, both in their $k'- ing and Operations -. But feeing they have in them, A Principle or Power of ABion, and exert this 'Princi ple, in all they do, they are alfo principal Efficients*, in their own Kind. Inflrumental Catifis, are eithei? Strictly and properly fuch, or metaphorically only ; of irrational and rational. Instruments ftriBly fo called* do not aB themfelves, but are aBed by him, who ufeS them ; and may be called natural Inftruments. Of this kind are the Ax, the Saw, the Hammer, in the hands ofthe Artificer. Thefe are evidently not aBive^, as we have explained this Word, but paffive ; and are, therefore, not ftriBly Efficients. Free created Agents, are, in a figurative Senfe, called Inftruments, and fome* times moral Inftruments. Thus an Ambaffador or Envoy, is the Prince's Inftrument, who gives him hi* Commilfion. Thus God ufes Men, as Inftruments of his Mercies, or Judgments, in the World. Thefe arg themfelves properly aBive, efficient Canfes, exerting their own felf motive Power \ in a Subordination to$ and by the Direction or Command, and Influence of him, who fits them to work. Thus Pharaoh's Daugh* ter, was an Inftrument in God's hand, for the Preser vation of Mo fis, and yet was herfelf a free, aBive A= gent, in all She did for him. God fent her to the Ri ver, in that critical Moment, as properly, as he fent Jofeph before his Brethren, to preferve Life. Thus the 'dm-. ilW} Affyrian was the Rod of his Anger, an Inftrument in j-. chaftifing the People of his Wratty. God declares he\£. *>?j€j would send hi/Hi and yet he was a. free Agent, purf Wing "his own Intentions, which were contrary to God's, for whkh he Was juftly threatened and deftroyed. Whence we offer thefe Conclusions. 1. The Om nisci en rforetels, and therefore, fort- knows, the freeft ABions ofthe Sons of Men, i.e. fu ture Contingencies. Thus he foretold Jofeph's Advancement, and the Invafiori of Judea by the Af- fyrians, and a thpufand other things. 2. That Neceffity, as it is nfually, but improperly called, which is eonfequent upon Prefcience, and ths Decree to excite to, and' to fucceed in fome Actions, is not inconfiftent with Liberty ; and much lefs that, which flows from the Decree to permit them. God decreed te semd thvAffpriani and yet> in this the AJyfiati ( 'O . /salted freely ; as freely and more fo, than if he had not been sent. 3. That the Almighty, mays and very often does, command; raife up, determine, and employ his Crea tures, as Inftruments to accomplifh his own righteous Purpofes, and, in the mean time, fuffer tbem to follow their own Inclinations, Views, and Interests ; fo that they Shall aB freely, and do what they intend, and in the manner they chufe, as freely, as if they had not been determined, or could have acted in all refpefls, independently. It is very ppffible, yea, very frequent, for Men, in, and by the very fame ABion, in one Senfe, to do the Will of God, both that of his Com mand, and that of his Decree ; and yet freely, -oxitfwe their own. Intentions, which are, in another Senfe, dia metrically oppofite to his Will. Jehu was commanded % Kingr, to cut off the Houfe of Ahabs which he did; fo that be- jj- 6- fore a good Man, who knew not his Heart, he could Chap. x. boaft fff jois Zealfor the Lord of Hafts ; and yet his Zeal *' was indeed for the Crown. God's Command and Pur- pofe was juft ; and his exciting, concurring with, and af- fifting Jehu, in the Execution of them, were holy ; but Jehu's Aims were wicked, for which he was juftly reproved, and threatened, and he, and his Family pu- niShed. He did what he was commanded, but from a wrong Principle, and to a wrong End. , 4. Though God may, and very frequently ahes, in a full ConSiStency with his Holinefs, and all other Per fections, make ufe of the vileft and the worft of Men, as Inftruments to fulfil his own Counfels; yet feeing, that, in all their Works, they are voluntary and free Agents, executing their own Defigns, by fuch means, and in fuch a way, as, to them, feems moft proper, it is evident that they are accountable for what they do ; and that the moft Holy, is, upon no account, and in no degree, a Partner in their Wickednefs. This the Con fidences of all Men bear witnefs to. This all that acknowledge a Providence, are forced to confefs. When God fends an Army to invade, and be a Scourge to a guilty Land, they are his Meffengers commiffioned to do his Work ; and yet none, that are in their Senfes, fay, that they are neceffary Agents, and not free, or not guilty of all the Barbarity and Cruelty they com mit. The finfttl Nation-, may acknowledge the Juftice tf ( 17) of God, in their own Destruction ; and yet may rigfo- teoufly look upon their Enemies as 'pubh'ck Robbers and Murderers : And the Judge, of all the Earth, may juftly efteem and punifh them as fuch, when, without any regard to his Will and Glory, they plunder or de stroy their Neighbours. The Guilty defervc to fuffer what they do, at the hand of God, and have no juft Charge againtt Him, who may employ what Inftruments he pleafes to inflict his righteous Judgments: But the Sufferers may, with good reafon, complain of their Deftroyers, who difcover their own Pride, Malice, En mity, Covetoufnefs, brutal Rage and Madnefs, in all they do, but no Concern for the Glory "of. God. When, the Chaldeans and Sabeans were Stirred up by Satan, to plunder job, the holy Man rightly look'd above and beyond them ; well Satisfied, that it was God that had given, and taken away. He might juftly do 2 {.• ' that it did not, in the leaft, excufe or juftify the Rob bers. Here you'll pleafe, Sir, to obferve, That the moft Holy did more than barely permit them, to take away the good Man's Oxen and Afjes : It is evident, there was a very efficacious Providence converfant a- bout all thefe things; but he gave the Plunderers no Command, he inf ufed no Wickednefs into them, did not force them, nor any how excite them againft their In clinations; and, therefore, could not be charged with their Sin. Thefe things, Sir, being of the greateftlmportance, in all the Concerns of Life and Godlinefs, I defire you would keep them Still in mind. Our Author, you know, moft tenacioufly contends, That when a Thing or Action is foreknown, it is certain, fixed, neceffary, de-, termined now, and muft be ; That the Agent muft do it, eannot but do it, yea, it is neceffary he Should do it, and fo becomes, not a free, but a neceffary Agent ; and yet, that a neceffary Agent is aContradiBionin Terms. JU thefe are his fweet, adored Maxims! Well then, was not the Affyrian free7 Was he no Agent7. Did not God, not only foretel, but decree to find him againft an hypo critical Nation ? Was it not he, who was afterwards punifhed? Was npt Peter an Agent, when he denied -his Lord 5 and Judas, when he betrayed him ? If they D were ( 18 ) were not, Who were the Agents ? If they were, were they neceffary Agents? If fo, are neceffary Agents no Agents? If they were free, then free Actions, that is, future- Contingencies, may be foreknown, may before- told. When God excites and inclines Men to Shew fa vour to his People, and do them good, as he did Cy rus, ate they not Agents? Or when he ufes them, tor Inftruments of Correction, are they not free and ac countable7. Ought we not, in all evil that befals us, to feef and jufliiy the hand of God ; and do we not, at the fame time, think, that thofe that opprefs, or in jure us, are Agents, and guilty too ? Do we not pray, Gen. xliii. that God would give us favour in the Sight of them, H- from whom we wait for any Acts of Benevolence, and that he would determine them to be Friends to us? If fo, might he not foretel all thefe Events? When God inclines and determines Perfons to act, are they not Agents, when they do aB ? If they do aB, • &te they nor, according to him, free ; fince a ne ceffary Agent is a ContradiBion in Terms7 How can we thank God, for any Good we receive from Men, if he has no Agency in the Cafe? How can we thank them, if they are neceffary, i. e. no Agents ? You fee, Sir, whither the Denial of thefe things would lead as. If the bleffed God cannot dif poft, move, p'erfuade, yea, and determine rational Creatures, to whatever he pleafes, in a full Confiftency, with their own free Ufe of all their Powers and Faculties, We muft either, on the one hand, cajbier his Provide?tce, which, perhaps, is the higheft Atheifm, that Sinners are capable ot ; render Prayers to him, to turn the Hearts of our Enemies, and the like, vain, foolifh, ridiculous; and wholly overturn the Doctrine of effica cious, viBorious Grace, and with it the whole Gofpel of Chrift : Or, on the other; make them all Stocks and Stones with a Witnefs. One or other of thefe, is evidently the neceffary Confequenee of this Proposi tion, That God cannot incline, over-rule, turn, and de termine the Wills of his Creatures to any Actions he pleafes, without defiroying their natural Liberty, or .making them neceffary , Agents, i. e. no Agents. I sail upon our Friend, with the help of all the pelagi ans ( 19) ans upon Earth, to refel it, and clear themfelves of it, if they can. But of this hereafter. Liberty or Freedom prefuppofes a Subftance or Being having Life, Reafon, Will, and Pdwer. Ir refpects fome things thofe Beings are free from, and feme things they are free to. There are, as we have ob- ferved elSewhere, feveral Sorts of Liberty. Bernard, and many Since, fpeak of the Liberty of Nature, of Grace, and of Glory, i. e. in other Words, of a Liber ty from Neceffity, from Sin, from Mifery. Others talk of a fourfold Liberty, according, to the fourfold State of Man. The Liberty of Innocence, peculiar to Adam and Eve; the Libertyvof Sinners in a State of Sin; the Liberty of Believers in a State of Graces and the Liberfy of the Saints in Glory. Others tell us of a Liberty of Independence, proper to God only; a Liberty from Obligation ; a. Liberty from Slavery 't 7. e. from SubjeBion, either to Sin, or to Mifery ; a Liberty from Force or Co-aBion; and a Liberty of Choice, i. e. a Freedom to chufe according to Pkafure, otherwife called, a Liberty from proper Neceffity. The freeft Creature is dependent upon, and under Ob ligations to the Moft High : He who willingly obeys Sin, is the Servant of Sin ; and he who is fo, is expo- fed to Mifery of all Sorts : But a Freedom from Co-ac tion, is effential to Liberty, and.confequently, So is a Freedom of Choice. It is .felf- evident, that the Will cannot be forced; for this would amount to a Contradict tion ; to a Will, and not a Will. Liberty and Co-acti on are diametrically oppofite. & phyfical Neceffity, as, that a Stone fhould fall down, or an intrinfic'Determi- nation to one thing only, is inconfiftent with Choice, and confequently with Freedom. Auguftine^ in many. Places, fpeaks of a Freedom from Sin, and a Freedom from Righteoufnefs ; that thofe who are free or freed from Sin, are Servants of Right eoufnefi, and that thofe that are free from Righteoufnefs, ate the Servants of Sin. He, from the Apoftle, thought, that thefe areRom ¥^ inconsistent, and cannot be in the fame Perfon at the, a, 20. fame time. To enlarge on thefe things, would require Volumes ; and therefore, I Shall only consider what is ' to Liberty, and what may be called acciden- D a tai (20) tap to. it; in as few Lines as I can, fo as to be under- i flood. TheEffertce of Liberty confifts, in a "Power in any Agent, of its own. Accord 'and -Motion, to chufe ot re- fufe, do'ot fcybedr any thing,, which appears to it, all things considered, preferable ; or, according to Mr. locke's Ef- Ldcke, " So far as a Man has a Power to think, or lay, B. 2. « not t0 think, to move, or not to move, according to j-A o' " the Preference and Direction of his own Mind, ^4,C(' " fo far a Man is free. " Dr. Clarke gives it as his Judgment, That the Effence of Liberty confifts, in being'. an Agent, that is, in having a continual Power of chafing, whether one. Shall aB, , or -forbear afl- iclitrWs ing. That the, whole Effence of Liberty, confifts Demonft. in' the Power of AB ing. That the. true Definition p. i or. 0f 'Liberty, is, &¦ Power, to aB. That doing. is wholly Clarke's owjng to an aBive Principle, in which is effentially included the Notion of Liberty. So. that with him P 20 a P°wer °f Agency and fre^e Choice, are.precifely p' , ' , identical Terms. If fo, there, can be no ABion with- & paffim.out free Choice, and where there is free Choice,, the Dem. ABion will follow '. He thinks, thit ABion and Free- p- ior. ^0772, are perfectly identical ¦ Ideas. . And, again, ^Cr Colleft. tion and Liberty ate identical Ideas: And the true * .tot PaPers> Definition of a Free Being, is, one that is iri- P- 4°i'' dued with a Power of aBing,<- as well as £e//,/g ^fl&tf Rem. upon. He Should have faid of a created free Be- ?• 1 />(?'• ing, feeing it is evident, and he, elfewhere, acknow ledges it, That God is impassible, is not, cannot he- aBed upon. Upon the whole, it is plain, that -his O- pinion is, That every Being, which has a Power to aB, is a free Being ; That fuch a Being never aBs, but when it chufe S to ^<52r; and, That when it ch.ufes to aB, it always tf'£?s freely. For, " ^// ABions., " even thofe of Children, and the ABions of every liv- Henk " ing Creature, are all. of them effentially free. Yea, p. 27. " every ABion, every Motion arising from the /£//- #«f. " moving Principle, is effentially free." This learn ed Author does alfo carefuilydiftinguifh, between an Indifferency as to Power, and an Indifferendy as to In clination. " Nothing, fays' he, can be more evident - »' ly abfurd, than to fuppofe, that an . Indifferency. as. u to 'Power, (that is, an eqnalphyflcal "Power, eit er " of ( at ) " of aBivg, or forbearing to aB) and an Indifferency " as to Inclination, (that is, an e^a/ Approbation or " Liking o1 one Object, or of the contrary) is one and " the fame- thing." So that it feems, Men may haveSSrfh an equal phyfical Power of aB ing ot not, arid yet have-p. ¦¥*•¦ no equal Inclination to the one, and tb the other ; fd far from it, that they may be difpofed, yeSj vehemently bent to the one, and ftrong ly avtrfe to the other. This" muft needs be thfc Cafe, when any natural InftinB or Appetite powerfully prompts us ; when, any acquired Habit, has gbt the Power of a ficond Nature over us 5 and wheh any uncommon Pleafure or Pain, Profit- ot Damage; Strongly follicites and moves us to one pf the two. VJe'-trfay- have a phyfical Power of checking k natural Appetite ;' and yer, if no Inconveniency appears to keep US from gratifying it, it is no Duty to do fo \ nor would we denyourfelves fo far: We may controul' any acquired Habit ; at leaft, it is evident, we have a phyfical Power of doing it, as. the Sot has certainly fuch a Power to forbear Tippling ; and yet, if all things re main as they Were, we may' be Satisfied he will not': And' when'afiy extraordinary Pleafure ot Profit is of- fered, and'nothing to over-balanceit appears; we have manifestly a: phyfical Power of refufing either , ot bofh,- when it is certain we fhould not, and would act very unreafonably, if .we did. From' whence we offer thefe Conclusions'.; 1. Every Man is confeious to himfelf, that he- has^ in numberlefs Inftahces, an- e'qual phyftcai Power of aBing or Mt, chufing or refufing any Obfe-cl or the coit- trd'ry ; when yet; he is fbfar from -having an eqnalln- clination to, oi liking of the tine and the other, that he is powerfully, and, "with "all ithefReafbn in the World, d'lf- p'ofid, fo chlffi-ot do the one, zndrejeB the other ¦ 2. That no Man ever perceives in himfelf} an Indif ferency as to Inclination, to do or not, chafe: this or not, this or that, i$c. unlefs the thing appears of no-, or very little Confiquence ; or he can perceive no man ner of difference betwixt the Objects propofed td". his Choice; as, if Two Shillings of the fame' Weighty Stamp, and Date, were offered to, him, to take one. So that the Indifferency of the Will, is founded upoh t he Indiffer&ncy of the- Judgment* N'oir doer the Will tiief* ( 22 ) eyer hefitate in its Choice, but when the Under/land ing is dubious, or in a Sufpenfe, which to prefer *. 3, No Man can chufe that, of which he has no Know ledge, fgneti nullacupido. The Will, therefore, natural ly- follows the Understanding, and chufesthat, which, all things considered, appears, at prefent, moft eligible^. What feems eligible, is, upon Some account or other, Gepi^Nor can a reafonable Creature chufeEvifas Evil; What appears only, wholly, and upon all accounts Evil.7 Our Constitution and Frame is fuch, that fuch a Choice feems plainly impoffible to. us. To plead, therefore, for an Indifferency, in every Cafe, to cbufi and do (for thefe go. together) that which appears leaft: eligible, fit or good ; or that which feems worft, and moft to be avoided ; or what is perceived to be wholly and filely evil: Or to refitfe and defpife what, all things confi-j dered, appears beft, moft fit and defirable ; or what is, folety and" wholly good; is the greateft Abfurdity. Such an. Indifference, is a plain ContradiBion to common, Senfe and univerfal Experience. And, therefore, to p|ace the Effence of Liberty in it, is extremely filly, no! to fay ridiculous. Should, we grant, that, in moft: pf thefe Cafes, we have, an £#««/ phyfical Power tp either, as I really think we have ;; yet- our, natural Ap probation of, and ftrong Inclination to one Side, would . render it, in the higheft Senfe, morally impoffible, to chufe or do the contrary. Nor coz/W any Man, if;; in>'his Senfes, prevail with himfelf, ftrfnuchas to hefitate about what he Should prefer., : The Love ofu Happinefii and what feems to be neceffary to it, i. e. of Good in common; and the-:Averfim t&fPain and Mir • fery, or what is infeparabls from it, j. e,c of Evil as Evi-h- is fo deeply inlaid in our Natures,, that,, in my Opinion, when any of thofe are prefented tp our^ Minds, we cannot counter-aB thofe Inclinations. Should any fay, that, in thefe., we are i&dejd.pafpve 5 we * In all fuch Instances, as that of1jiede», Video mdw,$, pro, ' tqgi detewra ¦ pernor, &c. the Struggle,' I concejVe, is not be tween the Understanding and the Willi bat the Flu&uation is in the Judgment; itfelf, being in a Sufpenfe which to prefer, the ~BBnu.yi honeflutn, or the Bonum jucundum. While this conti nued, the Will inclined fometirnes to qne fide, fo.metimcs t8 the other 5 but no Sooner was (he fixed in preferring one&f them, but the prefently a&ed, accordingly. t*3) we anfwer, Suppofing it ; yet in all our Motions ana* Endeavours, to obtain the one, and avoid the othert we are moft certainly aBive, and confequently, we are Sure, that all thefe ABions are effentially free-. 4. Should we fuppofe our natural Appetites never fo ftrong, or that acquired Habits have got the Atten dant over us, in a high Degree, or that the Pleafure or Pain, the Profit or Damage; which offer them felves, to engage us to do or refufe any thing within cur Power, were never £b great : Yet all thefe being only the Occafions, Reafins and Motives of our Acti ons, and not the proper efficient Cavfis of them ; it is evident the following Actions would be effentially free* How eagerly foever we follow any thing, we are con feious, we have a natural Power to let it alone. 5. In all fuch Instances, and the like, we Should, by thefe moral Motives or Reafons of Action, be certainly inclined to one Side ; and this might he infallibly foreknown by Him, who perfeBTy knows our Na tures, Inclinations, and Tempers; what Motives of Actions we Shall have in all Cafes, and in what Light we Shall fee them, and how powerfully they will pet- fuade and excite us, l$c. in the fulleft Confiftency with this natural Liberty, in its very utmofi Extent. But to go on, we Shall give you a few more Definitions of this Liberty. The famous Auguftine every where inculcates, that to he- free, to do any thing, is to have it itz our Power* And to have any ABion in our Power, is to be fible to do what we will. That tfoaf is not in our Power \ which does not follow ourWilh £5?o. So that Liberty* with him, is a 'Power to do what we like, have Plea fure in, or chufi. * Here then we have an Under- ftanding * Hoc riabemus in poteftate, qUotl cum vblumus foffiM&sl Prseceptum veto id nobifcum agit, ut quod jam eft in poteftate faciamus. Si autem nondum eft in poteftate, wetnus nobis ft* ieftatemdari. JuguftAib. 3. contnMnxim. cap. 14. Prsecepturft qui lubens facit, liiere facit. De Gra. Chrift. cap. 13. Unde hoc quifque in potefliHe hAbere dicitur, quod st Vult» facit, st noN vult, fooN FAcit. Lib. de Sp. & Lit. cap. 3*. Cum enim hoc fit in poteftate, quod cum i/olutnus fac'tmUs, quia in poteftate noftra non' eft, nifi quod nojiram ftqtoitttr 'voliwiaiem, &o* Retraft. lib. 1. caj>. ji, &_ ( 24 ) fpanding to perceive,. a Will to chufe, and a Power to act in Contequence of this Choice. Janfenins is of ^he fame Mind with his .Matter. He coriftantly teaches, that : a>Man that is free,, moves himfelf, exerts his own Power, to do what be is inclined to. * The moft learned Turretine. agrees with the common Opinion of the Reformed, that the Effence of Liberty confifts, ipt in an Indifferency, hut ' in a rational Liking or Choice, by which a Man can ,r/o what isplcafing to him, in Confequence of a previous Judgment ofthe Under- Standing. So that two things are jrequired to conftitute Liberty, i. That the Action proceed not from a blind Jfrapulfe or brutal InftinB, but from. Judgment .and Choice. 2. That it hefpontaneous, voluntary, and of Q/ie's own Accord. Liberty then, according to him, prefuppofes Reafin, and the Ufe of it, and 'implies a |?ow-er. to act according to ;t. \ The Affembly, @8ftfcfc.fi-An their Confejfion, declare, " That God hath endued '<¦' the Will- of Man with that natural Liberty, that is '' neither forced, nor by any abfolute Neceffity of Na- *> ture determined to do Good or £uz7. " So that the Affembly thought, that this Liberty confided in a [power of acting voluntarily, and of Choice ; and that God's foreknowing and fore-ordaining of all Events, flid no way enfringe this Freedom. You fee, Sir, that thefe Definitions of what- we call the Liberty of Nature, or that which is effential to Liberty, tho' fo different Expreffions, feem to have all ^he fame Tendency, and to be much the fame; at ifoaft, not to differ fo much as fome think; excepting, ^hat Dr. Clarke is fo very pofitive, that Agency and free Choice are perfeBly identical-Terms and Ideas ; which It was with him a Maxim, Hoc eft lvberum, quod cum qolumus fiicimm - — De lib. Arb. lib. 3. cap. j.&paflim. * Omnibus enim a natura indita eft ilia notio, qua liberum d,icitur, quod fit cum volumus, non fit quod nolumus : — ipfum iielle eft regula omnis libertatis, cui nifi mox adfit atTio cujuf- cunque potentja:, v.el cejfatio aftionis, mox etiam aSiio ilia vel non a$io, cancellos libertatis egreditur. Janf. Augujl. torn. 3. gap. 3f. ,8c pafiim, Voluntas libera ft ipfum agit & movet, &c. ¦f Cum eigo ratw formalis libertatis non pofita ii: in indif- ferentia 5 non poteft alibi quseri, quam in lubentia rationali, 'per quam homo facit quod \ubet prwio rationis judicio, Sec. Tur-, rjt. Vol. 1. Loc. i». Queft. 3. Se'<&. 10, C*5) Which Some of them feem to doubt or. deny. How ever, if this be the Cafe ; how much foever an intel ligent Agent may be depraved ; how much foever blinded, hardened, feared, given up unto vile Affec tions, or given over to a reprobate Mind ; yet whin ever he^ moves himfelf , turns his Thoughts from one Object to another, he is always free. They all agree, that Co-aBioii, and phyfical Neceffity, ate inconfiftent with Liberty of any kind ; that a free A- gent is a rational Agent ; that He acts freely, who has in himfelf a Principle of ABion and Motion, who cart move fome Members of his Body, turn his Thoughts from one Object to another, and the like, and who can exert this felf moving Principle at Pleafure ; thaf rational Agents may have an iqual natural Tower to aB or not, when yet, they may have many cogent Re a1- fons to move them to oile Side. In a Word, they foerh all to agree in this, That he who can chufe what he likes, and can do what he chufes, is free. This Liber ty all Men have, in what State foever they are, npr can they ever lofe it, or be deprived of it, while they remain intelligent, accountable Agents. But there are feveral things, which may be called accidental to Liberty, and consequently, may be fe- parate from it, without deftroying its Nature ; and therefore leaving the Agent Rill free. The Liberty of Man innocent, was not, In all Refpects, the fame with that of Man fallen ; nor is the Liberty of Man renew ed, the fame with that which he Shall have in Glory. Man, in his firft Eftate, had indeed an equal phyfical *Power to do good ot evil; but was fo far from being equally inclined to both, that he was Only inclined to that which is good, even to the Love of God, as his chief Good, and to refer all to him as his chief and ultimate End. He was perfeB in his Kind ; having afufficient Light in the Understanding ; an in nate Holinefs and Rectitude in his Will; with a fixeet Pliablenefs to follow its Dictates, without any wrong Siafs in his Affections, Difirder or Rebellion in his intellectual ot fenfitive Appetites : And fo had a fufficient Power, to chufe and do all that was required of him in a way of Duty, and to have perfifted in it for ever. Should any then ask, Whence came Sin ? How could fuch a Creature do evil ? We anfwer, A 3 E he ( 16 ) he was/wj/o was he mutable ; and, by confequence, in fuch.Circumftances, that he might abufe his Liberty, and freely chufe and do what was indeed evil ; might omit what was commanded, or do what was forbidden ; which he aBually did. But fince his Fall, the Cafe is fadly altered. By his Defection, his voluntary, cho- fen, free and total Defection from God, he loft his In nocence and Rectitude, his Knowledge and Difpofiti- Eccl. vii. on t0 Holinefs ; became afraid of, averfe to, yea, En- 29. Eph.mity againft God, and wholly and filely inclined to iv. 18. Self and the Creature. His Underftanding was Gen. iii. darkened, his Mind became vain, weak, unfettled, 10. Rom.waverjng • j0is Heart deceitful above all things, and j1"' 7- .. defperately wicked, beyond what he himfelf could Jer. xvn. £M0 obftinate, fet upon Mif- chief; his AffeBions carnal, vile, fenfual; his Paffi- ons head-Strong and unruly, often blinding or biafling his Judgmenr, impatient of Reftraint, breaking over s\l Bounds, hurrying him on to act, againft the firft Judgment of the Underftanding, even when he could not but be confeious ofthe Danger; yea, every Imagi nation ofthe Thoughts of his Heart was evil, only e- vil, continually evil. This is the Cafe with all Men, Gen. vi. r.nv Nature! There is nothing in them but Darknefs, Hardnefs, Perverfenefs, Confufion, finful Lufts, a to tal Averfion and Indifpofition to any fpiritual Good ac companying Salvation, and an univerfal Depravation of all their Faculties. They are dead to Righteoufnefs, and dead in Sin. Their chief Good, is now the Creature; their chief End, Themselves. In to this Eflate has Sin brought us ! 'Tis true, the Ef fence of the Soul remains unchanged : It is ftill a fpiri tual Subftance, having the Faculties of Underftanding and Will. The phyfical Nature of it is the fame, only its Integrity and thofe happy Qualities, with which Man was at firft created, are gone ; and its natural Faculties are ueakenedand corrupted: Whence that na tural Averfion to God, and Converfion to the Crea ture, which all Men perceive in themfelves, (and in which, fome have thought, that the very Effence of original Sin confifted) and that Indifpofition and Inabi lity to fpiritual Good, which all Men are confeious of, does fpring. However, we an ftill think and perceive, judge of and chufe Things according to our Tafte, and ( Z7 ) and follow and purfueowt Choice : We can ftill fly from what we hate, and cleave to what we love j re/a/e what we do not approve and tfta, and cteye what we prefer ; and r/wr of our own free Motion, and by afelf-moving Power refiding in ourfelves, and confequently ate free Beings. Should we therefore grant, as fome very learned and pious Men do, who have not been thought Enem.ies to the known Principles of the Reformed Churches, That there is in all Men, even in this fallen State, a phyfical, yea, an equal phyfical Power to Good and Evil ; and that the Impotency that is in us to Good, is rather mo ral than phyfical, arifing not fo much from the want of Faculties, as of Difpofitions and Inclinations ; and con- fifting in an innate, habitual, growing Ineptitude , Dif- inclination and Averfion to Good ; and not in the want of the natural Powers of Underftanding and Will, which were originally fuited to it; are yet capable of, and may, by fupematural Grace, be brought aBually to fee, chufe, and purfue it : Should we, I fay, yield this, it will not from thence follow, that we have an equal Inclination to Good and Evil, or that we are indifferent to either. It is not to be denied, that all this is, in a great meafure, true. Our Natures ate not quite deftroyed by Sin, but the Innocence, ReBi- tude and Holinefs of them. The Subftance ofthe Soul is ftill the fame, but thofe original Qualities which were concreated with Adam's, ate wholly gone. Our natural Faculties remain ; but the fpiritual Light and Wifdom in, the Underftanding, the Purity and good Difpofitions of the Will, the Holinefs ofthe AffeBions, the beautiful Order and Regularity of the whole, ate utterly loft. Hence we learn the abfolute Neceffity of being bom again, born of Water and of the Spirit, j0hn iii. renewed in the Spirit of our Minds, putting on^, ?. the new Man, which after God is created in Righ-E-ph. iv. teoufnefs and true Holinefs, &c. before we can ^o23>»nda4. any fpiritual Good accompanying Salvation. As A- dam could not have loved the Lord his God, with all his Heart, &c. without a Difpofition to it, and thofe Endowments neceffary to preferve, excite, and direct fuch a Difpofition; fuch as, Knowledge, Integri ty, a Principle or Habit of Righteoufnefs and Holinefs ; much lefs can We, who are not only fiript of all thefe, E 2 but ( ** ) hut find ourfelves utterly alienated from it, and ftrong- ly inclined to the Love of Self and the Creature. And yet in Regeneration, how truly and properly fo ever called a new Creation, there is not a new thinking Subfiance, a new or another <5b«/ created ; nor are new phyfical Faculties infufed into the Souls we have ; but our Souls ate renewed and fanBifiedh our natural Powers are changed, the Depravation of them cured, the Qualities we loft reftored, and our whole Natures repaired, tho' ftill but imperfeBly in this Life. In A- dam, 'tis true, there was no Corruption, he being made upright; but in the Regenerate, there is ftill Sin dwel- Eccl. vii. ling in them. In him there was but one Principle, na tural ReBitude ; in thefe two, the Flefh and Spirit : Rom. vii. jn fcm tri0fe fpiritual Qualities were innate ; in thefe, '7>an if-fupernatural and adventitious: In him there was no Col. iii. Diforder in, nor among his Faculties ; in thefe, there ,0- is ftijl not only a Rebellion of the inferior againft the fiiperior Powers, but a Combat in the very fame Facul- Rom. vii. ties, occafioned by the two Principles in each, which I4, — 2J-, naturally, and therefore neceffarily, oppofe and endea- Gal. v. i7-.VOUr the Destruction of each other : In him, thofe fu- ' ' '' 2.9pernatura] Graces were left wholly to his own Manage- jo n xvi. ment) f0 tjiat i^ might abufi them, and fo lofe them verfe i capable of doing; or aBing, what we could not poffibly abfiain from, it this be indeed poffible : And that it has paft for a Maxim, ever fince the days of Auguftin, a Natura eft Velle, a Gratia eft bene Velle; i. e. To Will is of Nature, to will well, or that which is good, •as we ought, and as we are commanded, is of Grace. There are many others who, tho' they grant, that our Natures are not deftroyed, and that our natural Fa culties are not extinguijhed, yet deny that we have any Tower at all, even phyfical, to thofe Duties which ac company Salvation. They reafon thus ; It is certain, that we have not only loft our original Righteoufnefs, but that our natural Powers are weakened, impaired, vitiated. We feel ourfelves funk, immerfed, depreffed in Sin, and carnal things ; and yet love to have it fo. There is not only a DefeB, Shortnefs and Narrownefs in our Understandings, but Darknefs and Blindnefs: There is not only a connate or acquired Indifpofition in out Wills to Holinefs, but Averfion, total Oppofition, yea. Enmity : There is not only a Languor and Numb- nefs of our aBive Powers, but Deadnefs, and therefore, total Impotency. The Eyes we have, are not only weak and dim, but fhut ; our Ears not only ftoftt, but deaf; and tho' we have a thinking Soul, we are r.ot fufficient % Cor. iii. ofourfelves, to think any thing as of ourfelves : And?. God only can give us Eyes to fee, Ears to hear, and Hearts to perceive. Our Understandings are apt to lofe the clear Apprehenfions of the moft acknowledged things; and to waver about, and give Judgment againft, even our common and natural Notions. Our Wills, tho' naturally framed to follow the Underftanding, are faulty in a very high degree $ fo as fometimes to hurry (30) hurry it on, and fway it to give Judgment againft Conviction j fometimes to rebel againft known Light% and hang back, till the Mind, thro' Weaknefs, prefers that which it long condemned, efpecially when excited by tumultuous Paffions, and enflamed by infatiable Lufls : And is fo very obftinate, fo averfe to Holinefs, fo dead in Sin, that no Light, how clear foever, no Considerations, Arguments, Motives, how weighty and cogent- foever, ever are or cap. be effeBual to prevail with, bow, turn and bring it to follow what is required Eph. ii. to Salvation, i. e. to receive and reft upon Chrift alone, ij>. 10. sgc. without an Aft of OMNIPOTENT POWER, Col. in. io.to rajj>e jt up -from tt,is Death, to quicken, perfuade, enable, draw and determine it to a Compliance with the Gofpel-Call. From all which, fay they, it feems that there is in us a DefeB, even of phyfical Power to Gofpel Duties. It is not enough to prove, that we have a natural Power to affent to a credible Testimony, in which the general Nature of Faith confifts; to. be forry for fome things we have done amifs, and do fo no more, which is Repentance ; and to love Objects which fuit our Fancy, Tafte and Inclinations, or which are in themfelves lovely; feeing it will not, from all this, follow, that we have a phyfical Power to obey the Commands of Chrift. To believe in him, they fay, is more than believing a Testimony ; prefuppofing and implying many things, which in this finful State are fupernatural : To repent unto Life, would infer, that many things are in us, which the Scripture teftifies are not : And tp love the Lord our God with all our Hearts, %f,c. feems to be phyfically imfioffible to thofe whofe carnal Minds are Enmity againft him. Withal, if we could, fome way or other, perform thefe material ABions ; yet, that any of them fhould accompany Sal vation, not only is the material ABion to beconfidered, but the State and Frame of the Perfon, the Principle " from which, the Manner in which, the End to which, it is done, muft come into the Account. Thefe things, alas ! are too true, by fad Experience, to be denied. I do not, after all, know if thefe Opinions differ So much, as Some may fancy. Both fides grant, that our Natures are not quite deftroyed by Sin j that tbe Sitb- ftance of our Souls is not changed, nor our natural Fa culties wholly extinguifbed* Both believe, that our Inno- C Ji ) Innocence and Rectitude are gone, and that our (jloryis demolifhed, and that our remaining Powers are weaken ed and depraved; and that this is difcovered, by our natural Aversion from God, and Conversion to self and created things. Both feem to con- fefs, That, in order to Converfion, there is not only need of a Divine Revelation, to fet the Objects before us, but a fupernatural, internal Illumination, and ef ficacious Grace to help and aflift us. And if thofe of the former Opinion mean, as many of them do, That befides the Illumination of our Minds, by his Word and Spirit, there is an abfolute Neceffity of fpecial Omni potent Grace, to quicken and raife us from the Death of Sin, to perfuade and enable us to embrace Jefus Chrift by Faith, and to firengthen and determine us to go on; they differ but very little, except in Words, from the others. But, if any of them would, by fuch Expressions, infinuate, That our Difpofitions to fpiri- tttal}things ate not wholly gone ; That we are not fo far corrupted, as to he dead in Sin; but may, ofour felves, by Striving and Watching, overcome out Aver fion to Holinefs ; begin to believe, repent, and love Godt and fo prevent his Grace, and meet him half, or more than half way : That we need no other Grace to our Conversion^ but external, or at moft, internal Illu mination : That moral Suafion, when feafonably and congruoufiy urged, is fufficienr, i. e. will or may pre vail without Almighty Power : That when the Holy Spirit has done all in us, that he does, or can dot without defiroying our very Natures, We are ftiil in different to yield or not, as we think meet $ and fo turn our selves, but are not, cannot he turned by him: That efficacious Grace is not fo called from its Nature or Manner of Operation, but filely from the Event ; and that We alone make it effica cious: That to talk of ' irrefiftible, or even of overcom ing, conquering Grace, is to deftroy our Liberty, and render us no better than Stocks and Stones. If I fay, any of thefe, and much more if moft, ot all, be couch ed under thofe fifter Expressions ; we rejeB them with our whole Hearts, as, in no fmall degree, injurious to Chrift, and everfive ofthe Grace of God: And oppofe to them, thefe following, plain and full Claffes of Texts, ( 32 ) Texts, which will forever demolish thefe Pelagian A- hominations, and convince all who truly believe them, not only ofthe Blindnefi of our Understandings, and the Faultinefs of our Wills, but of our DefeB of Tower, yea, Deadnefs and total Infufficiency for our Duty. We argue, i. From fuch Texts as declare all our very Thoughts Gen. vi. to be evil; fuch as, And God f aw, that every Ima- 5- gination ofthe Thoughts of Man's Heart was o^ly Chap. viii. Evil continually. That the Imagination of 'his at. Heart is evil from his Youth. The Heart is de- Jer. xvii. ceitful above all things, ««i desperately wicked, 9- _ &c. Sin dwells in me. Sin taking occafion (even) by Rom. vii. ffo Commandment, (which was given to difcover, check ** *•*"• and reftrain it) wrought in me all manner of Concupifcence. I am carnal, and fold Under Sin. See alfo Rom. vii. iS 25. Pfal. lviii. 3, &c. Several of thefe are the more remarkable and Strong, that they were fpoken by and of regenerate Perfons ; arid are humbling to all that confider them. We reafon, 2. From thofe which witnefs direBly and clearly, to the Darknefs and Blindnefsof our Underftandings ; the Inflexiblenefs and Steddinefs of our Wills to chufe, and love, and do what is evil ; our Deadnefs in Sin, our utter Infufficiency for, and Inability to do what is re- Eph. iv. quired. Having the Underftanding darkened——— 18. becaufeof the Blindness that is in them. The natu- 1 Cor. ii. rat Man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of H- God -—neither can he know them, becaufe they Col. i. 2i. ARE spiritually discerned. And youwere fome Rom. vm.(jme ai^enated, and Enemies in your Mind. - The carnal Mind (and there can be no other in the Unregenerate) is Enmity againft God: for it is not subject to the Law of God, neither indeed can be. Te were dead in Trefpaffes and Sins. If fo, they were wholly unable to do any thing fpiritually good. 3. From thofe which plainly and exprefsly affure us, That Men cannot believe and repent by their own John vi. Powers. No Man can come unto me, i. e. believe in 24.. me, except the Father which hath fent me draw him. Chap. xii. Therefore they could not believe, becaufe that 39, 40. Ifaias faith again, He hath blinded their Eyes A deceived ( 53 ) deceived- Hca'Yt h'ath turnedhim afule, that he cannot^. xliv.' deliver his Soul, nor fay, Is there not, a Lye in my^o. right handl And Jofhua faid untdthe People, Ib. cannot si-r've the Lord. If Men cannot, there isj°1i. xxiv. certainly a DcfeB of Power in them. l9- ¦ 4. From thofe, which, in fo many Words, teach iis, that Faith and Repentance, &c. are the Gifts, of God; By Grace are you faved, through Faith, and that not of Eph. ii. 8. yourfelves. It istheGtvi of God. To you it is given phil; i- 2.9. in the behalf of Chrift, not only to believe in him, buthei% xi- alfo to ftiffer for his fake. God granted to the Gen-^8-. ..,,. tiles Repentance unto Life. -If God will perad-2^im' "' venture give them Repentance ¦ If they are gi ven, then are they wrought in them, and not .wrought by their own Power 5. From thofe who fully and clearly deferjbe the Nature and Neceffity of Regeneration. We find it called a new Creation, a RefureBion from the Dead, a new Birtfy, &c. All which evidently prove, that we are but Recipients of this Grace,, and that it is created, in- jfifed, wrought in us by Almighty Power; There- % Cor. vi. fore, if any Man be in Chrift, he is a new Creature.,! 7. We are his Workmanfiiip, created in Chrift Jefus&ph.n. 10. unto gcod Works Awake thou that fleepe'ft,- ARisECn- v: '4~ from the Dead— — - Except a Man. be born, again J°- "'• f- — Born of Water and of the Spirit,, he cannot fee the Kingdom of God. Believers are faid to he-voRN of God. Anew Heart and new Spirit isi Jo.iii.9; promifed and given, and formed in them. Gpd gives Kzeklt:' them his own Spirit, &c. Rom. viii. 9— 17:. ln,all~x*vV • , r - i z ± rr Cn. XI. 10. theie, we are but pajfeve. 6. From thofe which declare the Neceffity • of aBu- al Grace to every good Work^ even after Regeneration, and afcribe the Works rather to the Holy Spirit, than to them; which are many. It is God that woRKETiiPhil. ii. in you, both to will and to do. — This does not'?- .. leave Believers in an- Indifferency. I live, yet not 'i^ "' 10' kilt Christ. liveth in me; Not \,but the Grace[0 of God which was with me. I will put my Spirit 'g,2,eiciej within you, and cause you, to walk in my Statutes, xxxvj. 17. and keep my Judgments, anddothem. Without me j0. x v. j. ye can do nothing. 'Tis ftrange, that thefe and the Ijke, do not put Pelagianizers for ever to the bluftv- 'F "From ( 54 ) . f. ttom thofe in which the Saints fignify their deep1 Senfe of>this,.and put up their moft ardent Prayers fo? inclining, affifting, quickening, ftrengthening, turning, drawing Grace, and the like: All which do ftrong- ly prove the Falfhood of the Opinions we are confuting j ana are more than fufficient, one would think, to put the Pelagian Indifference, which deftroys the Grace of Pf. cxix. God, for ever out of Countenance. Incline my Heart 56, 37. unto thy Tefti monies -** Turn away mine Eyes from beholding Vanity, and quicken thou me in thy way'i Pf. cxix. Quicken me after thy loving Kindnefs; fo fkall I 8*8. ' keep the Teftimony of thy Mouth. That he would grant Eph. iii. you to be strengthened with Might, by his Spi* , ftant Supplication, not only to be infiruBed, but help ed, ftrengthened, drawn, &c. If this is the Cafe with the Saints, what muft it be with the ftupid otperverfe, carelefs or hardened Sinner ? And now, Sir, I intreat you to confider the Num ber, the Clearnefs, and Strength of thefe Paflkges, Which our Author may, perhaps, once more, very Reply to fcornfully arid prophanely, call sounding Texts. fae, p. 2 1 ; They will be indeed fufficient to drown all the Vocife rations of fuch Pelagianizers as he, let them roar ne ver fo loud, till the Lord comes, who will determine in his own Caufe. Obferve the great Variety, the Em- phafis and Force of them ; that they all fpeak direBly ana fully home to the purpose, and cannot, by any means, be evaded or quibbled away : Take notice of the Occafion, the Scope, and Connection of them, as Well as the very fignificant Phrafes, which fo clearly exprefsour Minds : And tell me, Whether you think that the Telagian Impeccability, the congruous Grace of tbe Jefuits, the Arminian Indifferency, and Suffi ciency of moral Suafion> can poflibly ftand before them ? And whether they do not wholly and for ever overturn them ? Give me leave, Sir, to add, That the Tela* fian Impeccability does direBly overthrow the -whole Joipel; For^ tfneZato is not vf Faith; but, the Man that ( 35 ) that doth themfhall live in them. But if Right e Contrarittatis. ( 37 ) leaft, impoffible, that they fhould ever firmly prefer them, refilvedly chufe them, andfteddily purfuethem', without illumining, renewing, determining Grace. However, they have ftill power to chufe what they ' like, and do what they chufe, within their own Sphere*; and are, therefore, undoubtedly free in all their Ac tions. For, according to Mr. Locke, " We can fcarce " tell how to imagine any Bein% freer, than to be able " to do what he wills. *" Or Dr. Clarke, " The Ac- " tions of Children, and the ABions of every living Crea-, " ture, are all of them effentially free, f" Thus we have considered the Liberty of Man fallen, while un renewed. Should any ask, Since allMen ate fo prone to all Evil, and fo averfe to all Good, whence is it, that their Corruption does not, at all times, break over all Bounds, and that things are kept in fuch a tolerable Order ? Anfw. The Impreffions which all Men have ot the Being of a God, of his PerfeBions, the intrin- fic Difference between Good and Evil, and of a Judgt. ment to come, &c. are fo deeply engraven on their Hearts, as never to be totally erafed : The Moft High may, and often gives ftrong Propenfions to fome moral Virtues, as, Magnanimity, Generofiry, , Fidelity, E- quity, if>c. even to the irregenerate : He, by many ways, fuch as, the Motions of their own Cmtcie-n-; ces, common Grace, the Reftraints of his Providence, his Word, &c. (for which, alas ! few'are fo thankful as they fhould be) diverts, checks, and keeps Men, bach from Evil, and excites to Actions worthy and laudable ; and having all his Creatures under his Government, preferves the Order we fee in ,the World. See my Principles of the reformed Churches, p. no, 119, ut. As for the Regenerate, when God creates the new, the clean Heart, implanting in their Souls new Prin ciples, Difpofitions, Habits, and Powers, they are turned, in a great meafure; from their Sins untu God, inclined, as well as enabled, to all Good, tho* not perfectly. Their natural Power to do Evil, is not indeed . loft, nor their Inclinations to it wholly re moved, * ESTay concerning Human Understanding. Book 2. ch. 21. |e£r.. 21. . •j- Remarks upon a -Philbfbphical Enquiry concerning Hu*j inan Liberty, p. 27, &C, (38 ) moved, and confequently they have ftill Liberty to da what thoy fhould not ; but being led by the Spiriiof God* wader his Influence, and receiving daily frefh Recruits «sf his Grace, their Tower and Inclination, i.e. Fr.ee- .jseiM to, Holinefs, Shall be preferved , cherifhed, lengthened, not withstanding all their FaHures, till it ^jjows up to Perfection. The Glorified ate yet much happier. Their Under- SaaeJings are perfeB ly enlightened, their Wills perfeB ly $M3$ifiediy their Affections wholly fet on their chief (Good, andgkied, as it were, to it, and all the Remains ol Corruption and inward Diforder totally removed ; So. that they have no manner of Inclination to turn- to Sm% fent cleave- tmtOf God with the moft perfeB Liberty:. *Tis, very true, that, confidered in themfelves, they Me. within a Possibility of abufiug their Liberty ; fchey have ftill a phyfical Power of doing Evil. This, ieems to, be included in the very Idea of a created A- getf$£% which will be, even to them, a perpetual Motive, *•"* Sejf- Diffidence, Humiliation, and Dependance upoa C*od, and confiantly excite to, the higheft Admiration ,t ; and many PaiTages more directly to this purpofe might bo produced. Mr. Jackfim alfo, in his Defence of Human liberty^ £. »j> is very expreis; " It is a very great Miftake to think; « that freedom of Action confifts in the Mind's being, of itfelf m+ « Jijferitttly inclined to Virtue, «i6«» and oofr the Hearts of Men, (and the like may be faid of Angels) and, by neceflary Confequence, his Paovt« hence and Government of the World; fince it fop* pofes us to be a fort of Creatures, whom the Almighty1 can neither perfuade nor turn, and afcribes a fort of Sovereignty to us, that is wholly inconfiftent with out State and Dependance. This, This, isthe Pelagian 1- dol, on which fo many ofthe Sons of Men have doated 1 That it fhould be worpipped among the Heathen, isaa Marvel; but, that this Dagon mould be fet tip MS the Temple of God, by thofe who have the Bible, majf well be thought Strange, by all who know not the $&&• nifold Devices of Satan, and the Wickednefs of th# tieart of Man, (' 4° ) -What has been , offered' above, is more than foffici-, ent to demolilh this Idol. To expatiate farther, would lead us, to. enquire* in what Faculty of the Soul it is feated; whether it be in the Underftanding or }Vill,oi both, or 'neither-, but be, of itfelfj a diftinB Tower ; and many other things, which would turn to but a very. poor Account. We frUll only repeat thefe Conclu sions ; That the Will, considered abfilutely^ and in ttfelf, and abstracted from the things requisite to Ac tion, is indifferent to various Objects, to aB, or not, this otthat; That while the Underftanding hovers and fluctuates, fo long the Will is undetermined* and, in a fehfe, indifferent; That, in many Cafes, when we cannot deny the Preference'to any one Object, rather than another, we have ftill a phyfical Power to aB con trary to it ; Thar/in all Cafes wherein we act ofour felves, we have an equal phyfical Power to forbear that Act ; That we cannot act without ot againft our Wills, abfolutely fpeaking ; That in all Cafes wherein the Underftanding is fixed in approving any thing, and the Will refolute and determined to chufe it, upon the moft cogent Motives, we have a natural or fupernatiiral Ijtower of doing it, if within our Sphere ; but this is not properly not truly an Indifference : That what-^ ever this Power is, it is plain, that while things are fo, it is impoffible for us tq fufpend our Act, and much more do the contrary, ; That in all Cafes in which we aB for any End, (which muft needs be good, real, or apparent') and deliberately chufe it, and the Means to it; we aB freely, even tho' we have neither Inclination . npr Tower to the contrary ; That, in our fallen State,, % Cor. ii. we can neither know the things of the Spirit 14. Rom. oj 'God, nor chuse them, being carnally minded, nor, $."• 7- by confequence, have power to do them, feeing they are above bur reach. [We have, indeed, in this Con dition, natural Faculties, but impaired, depraved, and utterly unequal to fuch things; and yet we know, that we readily and freely chufe, and do what is evil, and freely indulge our, to us, unconquerable Averfion to what is goodf] That in Converfion paffive, the Hoiy Spi rit removes the Enmity that is in us, repairs our Na tures,- infufes a new Life and hew fpiritual Principles^ ^pto our Souls, makes as both ixilling and able to comply" with (41 ) with the Golpel-Call;fo that in our aBive Converfion > being thus quickened, excited and enabled, we molt deliberately, voluntarily, and freely turn ourselves to the Lord our God. Nor is jt poffible it Should be otherwife, when we are tnade able and willing. When he works in us both to will and to do, it is certain we both will and do. Should it be ask'd, Whence is it that the Regenerate, may not only chufe and do what is fpiritually good, but what is evil ; whereas the Unregenerate cannot chufe and do the firfi7. Anfw. Becaufe, in the former there are two Principles living and working; whereby they may be Inclined to either : Wfiereas, in thelattev, there is but one ; and confequently, they are only difpofed and inclined to the things which ate fuit able to it. ObjeB. In Adam there was but one Principle, and yet he could in cline to either fide ; why then cannot the Sinner dp fo likewife? Anfw. This arifes from tha State of the Perfons, and from the Nature of the things. A Poffi- bility of finning is included in the very Idea of a finite Agent, and fo was found in Adam, who was notwith standing furnifhed with Abilities fufficient fot the whole of his. Duty. But thefe Abilities the Sinner has utter ly loft ; and confequently, to the To/fibility of finning, there is in him a total Difpofition to it, with a natural Averfion tp all that is fpiritually good. Again, to ren der an Action morally evil, any DefeB is enough ; but to render it fpiritually good, all Circumstances are requi red : So thatmany moe. things are neceffary to the onet than the other. * Togive Alms, is an Actfo" materially * Malum good. Now, that this ABion be reckoned morally or ex quoliiet ffiritually good, the State and Frame of the Perfon, the'defeHu, fid Principle, Manner, and End of the Action, ate alltohebonum ori- taken in ; whereas a DefeB in anyof thefe, is fufficient*'"' ex '"'. to render it morally evil, i. e. finful. Hence we learn the te%r* ImperfeBion of the very befi of our Works ; the Necef-Cllu^' fity of Regeneration, in order to our doing any thing acceptable in the fight of God ; that tho' the Wicked may abftain from this or that Act of Sin, or indeed from any AB, which he knowingly and wilfully com mits, yet he never does it in a right manner; and that when he is inclined or affified by common Grace, to do any Work materially good, there are yet many G thing.4 U* ) things wanting in it, to conftitute it a Work accompany ing Salvation. But of thefe elfewherc. We fhall conclude this very difficult, but important Subject, with thefe nine Propositions, which contain the Subftance of all we have offered in this Controver- fy, upon this head. i. Liberty, Strictly Speaking, is peculiar to intelligent Agents. 2. He who has a Power refiding in himfelf, to aB, or to forbear aBing, according to his own Judgment and Choice, is un doubtedly free. 3. "The Neceffity, which all Agents are always under, of either aBing or forbearing to aB, is fo far from deftroying their Freedom, that the very Effence of Liberty confifts in the continual chufing which of them they plea fe. 4. The fulled Approba tion of, and the Strongest Inclination to the one or the other, is no Way inconfiftent with, nor does it, in the leaft, infringe upon the fpontaneous Motion ot rational Choice oi the free Agent; and confequently, does nei ther overturn nor leffen his Liberty, tho' it feems to me to heevcrfive of Indifference. 5. An Indiffe rence to moral Good and Evil, i. e. an equal habitual Approbation of,and Inclination to the owe and the other, whether natural or acquired, was never found in any .ZS'MwgjNFiNiTEor finite. So far from it,that, 6. Such an Indifference, in any rational Agent, at leaft for any confiderahle time continued, appears tome a palpa ble Contradiction. It would be hideous Blafphemy, to dare to affert, That the Most Holy,, who yet is the freest of all Beings, is ot can be so, or, indeed, in any S^nfe, indifferent, to moral Evil ot Sin. To prove, that he is indifferent to Sin, it is not fufficient to Shew, that he has a natural Tower to perform the material ABion ; for, fuppofing that he has, the ma terial Anion is not moral Evil, /'. e. the Materiality of the Action is not the Sinfulnefs of 'it : Nor will it help them to fay, That it is not for want of Tower that he cannot fin, but becaufe he cannot bring himfelf to will to fin ; in other Words, That he has Power to fin, if he would; for Sin is not the ObjeB of Power. And it is a plain Contradiction to fay, That One infinite in Hclinefi can fin; That a Being infinitely perfect; fhould aB unworthy of himfelf, i. e. imperfeBly. As for created Agents, they are either righteous or finful ; if upright, they cannot be s6 indifferent to Evil, becaufe (43 ) becaufe this Indifference is plainly inconfiftent with In tegrity; if finful and unholy, they cannot be so indif ferent to holy ABions, becaufe this is a Contradic tion to their fu'ppofed depraved State. Should any fay, That a middle State is poffible, even that called by the School-men, the Status puree Nature ; and in fuch a State, the Agents might equally approve of, and be e- qually inclined to the one and the other : We anfwer, The Poffibility of this State has been juftly queftioned ; but fuppofing it for once, yet it is Self-evident, This In difference could not be long continued, but would be loft, at leaft in fome meafure, by a Courfc of Holinefs, or wholly loft, by declining to Sin. y. A phyfical Power in fuch Creatures as we. (who are, by Nature, carnal, Rom. vii. and fold under Sin) to perform fome Actions material- H- ly gocd, is not truly an Indifference to Works which accompany Salvation ; becaufe more is required to fuch Works, than that they be materially good. 8. No Ef feB can poffibly be more noble than its Caufe. An evil Tree cannot bring forth good Fruit ; and there fore, an' unholy Creature can never perform a holy Action ; not becaufe it has not Facilities and Powers to perform the material Action., but becaufe they are depraved and corrupted, and without thofe Vitalities which are neceflary to render Actions holy. Healthful Streams cannever flow from a poifoned Fountain. As is the Principle, fo is the'AB. 9. From all which, it appears to me very clear, That there may be the higheft Liberty, where there is no fuch Indifference to moral Good and Evil ; and Self-evident, That the Effence of Liberty does not confift in fuch an Indifference, but in a Tower to aB, or not, according to the Preference- of the Underftanding. But it is more than full time to go on to the Explication of the other Terms. Necessity is alfo of feveral forts. 1. There is an abfolute, which is fometimes called a met afihy fical Ne ceffity, the Negation of which ^implies a Contradic tion : Thus the Exiftence of God is necessary. This Neceffity is intrinfic, by an abfolute Neceffity of Na ture, fo that it cannot poffibly be otherwife. No Crea ture is, or can be thus neceffary. 2. There is a phy fical Neceffity, as that heavy Bodies Should defcend, $$c. This alfo is intrinfic , arifing from the Nature of the things, which yet may be obftructed, by the omni- G z potent (44) potent Author of their Nature. Our prefent Contro versy leading us only to confider the Neceffity of Ac tions, properly and Strictly fo called, we obferve, That no ABion of any Creature, is or can be abfolutely neceffary : And that Actions phyftcally neceflary, for fo they have been called, are not properly Ac tions, s. There is a Neceffity upon Suppofiition, other wife called a Neceffity of Confequence. Thus number- lefs Things or Actions, in their own Nature, moft contingent, are faid to become neceffary, upon fome Condition or Supposition. This Neceffity then, is not in the Things or ABions themfelves, but is extrinfw, arifing from their Connection with fuch Conditions ; and is of feveral Sorts, inafmuch as thefe Conditions do either preceed, accompany, or follow them. Some of thefe having little or no relation to the Difpute ; we Shall only mention thofe that have, and Shew, that none of 'them is repugnant to Liberty, i. All created Agents, in all their Actions, are under a Neceffity of Dependance upon God. As they ate dependant in their Beings, fo in their Operations. Upon the Suppofition, that there are fuch Creatures, they are (i) neceffarily fubject to the Law of God, as their Rule ; for no fuch Creature is or can be without or above his Law. (2) They act neceffarily, in a Dependance upon, and under the Superintendency of his Providence ; nor can they fubfifl, move, ot do any thing without him ; or do what is, in an abfolute Senfe, againft his Will. This Neceffity is included in the very Notion of a rational ac countable Creature, but does no way deftroy its natu ral Liberty ; For, tho' His Command is a Reafon, and may be a Motive of Action, yet it is not the Efficient of it ; and as for His Providence, it does not leffen or deftroy the Agent's Towers, but preferves and excites them. 2. Upon the Suppofition, that God foresees any or all the Actions of his Creatures, there arifes a Omnifci- Neceffity of Infallibility, as the Schools fpeak, that ence, eye. thefe Actions^// be done, when, by whom, and as p. 202. they were forefeen. But this is very improperly called Neceffity ; for 'Prefcience has no manner of Influence at all, either upon the Agents, the Actions, the Man ner or Circumftances of them. But it fuppofes or im plies Certainty. True ; yet it no way caufes this Cer tainty, but is founded upon it. Creatures would act juft ( 45 ) juft as they do, fuppofing all things alike, if we fhould grant, that their Actions cannot be foreknown. Befides, 'he that foreknows thofe Actions, foreknows that they will be done freely. But God cannot be deceived. True. The Agent cannot then act otherwife. This we deny. He knows he can. What if he fhould7. Anfw. This is contrary to the Suppofition, The Omniscient knows he will not. In fine, fuppofing the Foreknowledge of a free ABion, this Foreknowledge fuppofes the free Choice of the Agent, and implies only a Certainty of Event, depending upon that free Choice ; and confe quently, the Action is really contingent, and will be done freely, and not neceffarily. 3. Seeing nothing ' can be foreknown, without a Decree, either that the thing fh all be done, ot be permitted; upon the Suppofi tion, that any, or all Things or ABions are decreed^ there flows a Neceffity of Immutability, as it is cal led, and hence our Adverfaries blufter, that what is decreed is neceffary, cannot but be, and therefore is not free. Anfw. A Decree to permit has moft evi dently no manner of Cafuality at all upon the thing permitted, any more than the aBual Permiffion of it. Permiffion, indeed, removes fome Obftacles, but leaves the Agent to chufe and do as he pleafes, and can no more be the Caufe of any -ABion permitted than an ab- ftract Idea can move a Mountain. This Decree then, is perfectly confiftent with all Sorts of Liberty. The fame may be faid ofthe effeBive Decree, that in philo- fophical Strictnefs, it is not the Caufe of any thing. If it were, the EffeB would infallibly be inftantty produ ced, which we know it is not. This is too evident to be denied. It will be objected, That the Execution of this Decree neceffarily follows the Decree itfelf ; and therefore, when He who decreed that fuch or fuch an Action fhould be done, Shall execute this Decree, the Agent cannot but do it, and therefore the ABion is not free. Anfw. It is very true, that what God decrees, He will execute in the fame manner he decreed to do it ; and thathe decreed, that the greateft part, at leaft, of the moft momentous ABions of Men, fhould be done : But he did not decree, to drag ot force any of them to aB, nor to offer any Violence to their Powers, but to order things So, that the ABions fhould be done by them, fpon- C4<5 ) fpontaneonfly, willingly, freely. And whatever are the ABs of his Providence concerning the Works of Men, He is So tar from forcing, compelling, ot drawing them as Stocks or Stones, or any how obftruBing or perver ting ^ their Powers, that he preferves, excites, aBuates them, and fuffers the Agents to follow their own Judgments and Inclinations ; and therefore, all their Actions are effentially free. So that the Decree and Trevidence of God are fo far from lessening or des troying the Contingency of Things, or the Free dom of Actions, that, on the contrary, rhey preserve tir.y. upand establish them. Were thefe Things but calmly — > "• weighed, we Should not have fo many tragical Excla- •fa£' **e. mations, fo many Fears or Horrors, real ot pretended, ,. 'v' e'- againft the Decrees of God, as if they were Chains, ^'Fetters, Cables, l£c. which pull and drag Men, whe ther they will or no ; or rather leave them no Will, but flake them down, that they cannot move or. break thro' them. I fhould have joined Providence with the De crees ; for God decreed nothing but what he brings to pafs by his Trevidence, as to Agents, Things, Sea- fons, and Circumftances ; and all the ABs of his Pro vidence were the ObjeBs of his Decrees, To this it will be objected, Wh<*n God determines us to act, we muft act. Anfw. Pafiing an Ambiguity in the Word muft, we reply, When God determines us to act, we determine ourfelves, and act accordingly. But we can not do otherwife. Anfw. In numberlefs Cafes, we know we can, if we will. But we cannot will this. Anfw. We have certainly a natural Power to will it What if we actually fhould do it ? Anfw. This is a- gainft the Suppofition. But it is Strange to imagine, that we: have a Power to act contrary to a Decree. Anfw. Our Power and Liberty confifts in being abteto chufe the one or the other, and in our aBualfree Choice Gen. xx. of what God decreed. The Cafe is different, when He 6. Chap, decrees to refrain any of his Creatures from any AB or xxxi. 7. Habit of Wickednefs ; and when by His Providence or xxxv. reftrajning Grace, he aBually keeps them back from it : xixiv "24. -*?or' t*10' ^^ ¦^"' merely by mm»v?/ Motives, pre- Afts xviii. ^ent,ng things before them in fuch a Light, or giving j0. them othet'Views of them, fo that they fhall, of their own accord, abftain. from fuch things : Yet it is plain, that His ( 47 ) His Trovidence, in fuch Cafes, is often more efficacious, and that he frequently puts forth fupernatural Tower, to divert, check, bridle, turn them. And we need not fcruple to fay, that they are not free to do what God keeps them from doing, feeing, as far as they are undei Reftraint, they are paffive, and not active: But when he reflrains or diverts them from one thing, he always excites or permits them voluntarily to chufe and do an other ; and therefore, it is ftill true, that all their Ac tions are essentially free. 4- There is the Ne ceffity of the Will's being determined by the laft Judg ment of the Underftanding ; and this being neceffary, fo muft all our Actions be. This alfo is but an hypotheti cal Neceffity, and confiftent with the higheft Freedom : For this laft Judgment is either the very Act of Voli tion, and when we will to do a thing we cannot but will to doit ; or it is only the Motive or Reafon on which we begin to act freely, in a word, this Neceffity is fo far from being defiruBive to a rational Sponta neity and Freedom, that it is the very Exercife of it, 5. There is a moral Neceffity, as that a Wife-man Should act wifely, and every Man according to his Character. This, in reality, is no Neceffity at all, but fully confiftent with the moft perfeB natural Li berty. Habits, 'tis true, work after the manner of a Second Nature, and in every Cafe, if a fair Opportu nity offers, and no Inconveniency appears, 'tis a thou- fand to one, but Men follow them. In fuch Inftances, they act with the more Will, Tleafure, and Delight ; and therefore, in my Judgment, with more Freedom. Nor do they want a natural Power to forbear. The moft hardened High- way- Man, when he has met with his Prey, and bidden him ftand, demanding, with the utmoft Liberty, "his Money, £S>c. fhould Company fuddenly furprize him, can very freely leave him, and fly for his Life. 6. The Neceffity of Event, that when a Man aBs, he cannot but aB when he does aB, is no way everfive of any poffible Liberty. I have not mentioned the Neceffity of Compulfion or Force ; becaufe he that is compelled is really fo fat paffive, and he that forces him is fo far the only Agent : Nor That Neceffity, whereby fome Agents, for fo they have been called, are neceffarily determined to one Thing ; be caufe (48 ) ea ufe here is neither Choice, npr proper Liberty, not ABion. In fine, if it be true, as Dr. Clarke affirms, " That the Agents called neceffary Agents, can nei- *{ ther chufe to act, nor to forbear acting, they being " indeed no Agents at all : " And confequently, that neceffary Actions ate not Actions, but Paffions. We agree with him, that none of the Sons of Men are n.e- Demonft. ceffary Agents, but-*REE ; and that none of their Ac- $.ioz,&c.tio?2S ate neceffary, but free : And. call upon our Ad- verfaries, to Shew, that, any of the Principles of the Reformed Churches, do fuppofe, or imply, the contrary if they can. Possibility is a TrQdueibility, or Non-Repug nance to Exiftence. It is alfo of feveral Sorts. That is abfilutely poffible, which implies no Contradiction, and therefore may be done. That is phyfically pof fible which is not repugnant to any ofthe Laws of Na^ ture. All things are possible to God, elfe He would not be Omnipotent. Whatever is in the power of any Creature to do, is poffible to it. All that any how exifts, or can exift, all Contingencies and all Actions are poffible. Nor is there any thing in the Idea of Toffibility, repugnant to Liberty of any kind ; fo far from it, that there can be no Liberty of Action without it. The contrary to this is Impossi bility, which is alfo manifold. That is abfilutely impoffible which is repugnant to Exiftence, and cannot be done. In this Senfe, Nothing is, impossible with God. Contradictions are not the Objects of Tower, are not in any Senfe Things, are not produci ble ; a Tower to work them, is a Tower to do nothing. But, God cannot sin. True ; But Sin is not the Object of Tower: It is not properly a Being, but a Trivation, a not Being ; yea, it is a plain Contradic tion to infinite Perfection. That is phyfically impof fible, which is above or contrary to the Laws and Powers of Nature, or finite Agents, tho', in itfelf, It implies no Contradiction. Such Agents have no Li berty to do fuch things. There are alfo feveral Sorts of Impoffibilities upon Suppofition, which will be eafily underftood, from what has been faid. Thus, if God decrees not to do a Thing, That Thing, tho' very pof fible beforei becomes now impofiible, and the like. Anfw. (49) Anfw. Though this way of fpeaking be very common, it is very improper. This Impoffibility is, in reality, no Impoffibility at all. The Thing which God has de creed not to do, is as poffible now as ever; nor does the Decree any how leffen its Producibility. But it is not poffible to Him. Anfw. He has juft as much Power to do it as before. But He cannot deny himself. True ; but this does not affect the Toffibility of the Thing in the leaft. And tho' litigious Difputants will wrangle, it is but acting like themfelves; yet all dif- paffionate People will perceive, That this is neither more nor lefs, than only this, God will not do what he will not do. Thus, He decreed and promifed, that there fhould be no more a Flood to def-Qen jx< troy the Earth. But will any Man in his Senfes fay, 1 1. that a fecond Deluge is not as poffible as the firft, or that God has not as much Power now as before ? The Truth is, Pcffibility and the Decree do not refpedt the fame thing. That relates to God's Power, and this to his free Determination. In like manner, upon the Suppofition, That God foreknows, ot has decreed, that we fliall do fuch or fuch Things, it is impofiible we - fhould not do them. Anfw. This is, properly, no Im poffibility, anymore than the other. If the Thing be poffible in itfelf, and poffible for us, the Decree and Prefcience of God, which do not abridge or deftroy our Power, nor crofs out free Choice, do not make it in the leaft impoffible, or any how obftruB our Liberty. All the Quirks about thefe Things proceed from the Im perfection of Language, and Ambiguity of Words, and the Confufion of our Ideas flowing from them. Thus, in common Converfation, we fay, We are not free to fuch or fuch a Thing, when no body underftands us fo mean, that we have not Power to do it, or would not, in other Circumftances, very readily do it ; but only that we are not difpofid or inclined, are in doubt about the Lawfulnefs, Expediency, or SeafonabJenefs of it, &c. We ufually fay, We must, or are under. a Necessity to do fo ot fo, when we mean only, that we have promifed or refolved to do it, it is reafonable, convenient, expected of us, or there is no reaching fuch an End without it, &c. We fay, We cannot do this or that, when all know we have Power enough H to ( 50 ) to do either, if we will; and mean only that it is againft the Grain, difhonpurable, unfeafonable, foolifh, dan gerous, difficult, &c. And fometimps we fay, fuch a Thing is impossible ; not that it is fo in itfilf, or above the Tower of foch Creatures as we, but only un common, improbable, and what could hardly have been expected, &c. In all thefe, and the like, com mon Ufe warrants the Expreflions : But fo far are we, or others, from thinking, that there is any philofophi- cal Neceffity or Impoffibility intended, or that any of thefe deftroy our natural Liberty ; That all of them would be pure Non fen fe, were we really not free, and did we not freely chufe the, one, and as freely refufi the contrary. In all fuch Cafes,* we have a phyfical Power, and in different or oppofite Circumftances, we might and would, with Reafon and Choice, do what we now fay, we are not free to, cannot do, or are bnt der a Necessity not to do. We Shall conclude our Explication of thefe two Rep. to Terms, with a Paragraph from Dr. Clarke: " Neceffity Leib. p. « (alMl ^e fame may be faid of Impoffibility) in phi- 280. cc jofophical Queftions, always Signifies abfolute Necef- " fity. Hypothetical Neceffity, and moral Neceffity, ate " only figurative ways offpeaking, and in philofophi- " cal StriBnefs of Truth, are no Neceffity at all. The " Queftion is not, Whether a Thing muft be, when it " is fuppofed that it is, or that it is to be ; (which is *' hypothetical Neceffity:) Neither is it the Queftion, " Whether it be true, that a good Being continuing to " hegood, cannot do Evil — > — (which is moral Necef- " fity-') ^ut tne true ana only Queftion in Philofophy, " concerning Liberty, is, Whether the immediate phy- 11 fical Caufe or Principle of ABion be indeed in him " whom we call the Agent ; or Whether it be fome o- " *ther Reafon fufficient, which is the real Caufe of the " Action, by operating upon the Agent, and making " him to be, not indeed an Agent, but a mere Patient. Among possible Things, Some are, others are not future". Things not future, will never exift, ot be pre fent. The free Agents who can do them, will never > do them. They are in themfelves not repugnant to" Exiftence, and the Agents have fufficient Tower tp bring them into Exiftence, but will not. The Idea of Non- (5i ) Non-Futurition then, does by no means imply that of Impoffibility : For alt Men know, that many things which never will be, are poffible, as poffible as things that certainly will be. Futurition is not properly a Being, but merely a Relation, and fignifies nothing more than this ; it is true, that fuch or fuch a thing will be* Of future Things, fome are neceffarily fo, and cannot be other- wife ; in all which, there is a Neceffity of EVent : Ci thers are contingently fo, and may be otherwife, tho' they certainly will be; in all which, there is only a Certainty of Event. Among thefe laft, we reckon the future free ABions of Men ; which, considered as fu ture, will certainly be done ; as free, will be done with a Tower of not doing them ; and by confequence, the Agents will be free, i. e. may ot may not do them, and the Actions will be contingent, i. e. may or may not be done. This Futurition implies indeed a Necef fity j but then this Neceffity is very improperly fo cal led, and is in truth not a Neceffity inconfiftent with Li' berty, in the leaft, but what amounts only to this, what will be, will be. Wranglers, 'tis true, in- fifi upon it, That what will be must be: But then, every Man in his Senfes muft know, that the Word must fignifies no more than the Word will, elfe the Proposition is manifestly falfe. For ; if more is fignified, it is felf-evident, that that which is more not being included in the other, cannot follow from it, un- lefs you can draw that out of a Thing that was never in it, which none in their Wits pretend to. And there fore, fhould they wriggle to the End ofthe World, no thing will follow from this Proposition, Such or such a Thing will be, butonlyTHAT it will be. And feeing all the Effects of Will, i. e. all the Actions Of rational Agents are free, and done freely ; the Confequence is plain, That whatever will be through all Ages, will be done freely. This, Sir, is Demonflration ; I call upon our Friend, to Shew me a Flaw in it, if he can. » Certainty is the Property of Truth, which be longs chiefly, if not only, to Tropofitions ; every one of which, is either certainly true, or certainly falfe : Fof there is not, cannot be any Medium ; whether they re- H % fpea (5*) fpeit what is paft, prefent, ot future. Every Truth is All future therefore in itfelf a certain Truth : But many Propo- A him. For which Reafon, 1 Shall be a little more free, and fhall produce feveral as filly, ridiculous Things, as any I have obferved upon, which I waved, as I faid, out of mere Thy, and for pure Shame, that one prefum- ing to reform the Reformed Churches, Should be capable of fuch Weaknefs, and' which will con vince all, that I have not been fo fevere as I Should, upon fuch Letters, written with fuch an air of Confi dence, fuch Contempt of his former Antagonists, fluffed with fuch a number ofthe moft notorious Falfhoods, and injurious Mifreprefentations of the Churches of Christ 1 fay feveral, for I fhall be ready, when ever he defires me, to fhew him, double the number. But it is more than time to proceed. In the next Paragraph, he gives us the Tenets ofthe Anti-Decretalifts, which lie out of my way, and there fore I fhall pafs them ; refolving however, enpaffant, to defend a few of them, in as far as they agree with ours, ( «*) purs, or have any thing confiderable, to fupport the common Caufe. He then, Page 5. gives us his own Trinciples, in thefe four Propositions, which I Shall here give you, in his own Words, and thoroughly anfwer and confute them, once for all. " 1. That our Actions, while " free, ate what we may prevent." And this he proves by one of his own Quotations, " The Will of a moral " Creature, fo far as it is accountable, is a free Agents " i. e. it either has or had a Power to aB, ot not to " aB ; or to aft this or that" Now, Sir, that I may pinch him with his ownNonfinfe, in feveral Things, in which I fpared him formerly; you'll obferve, 1. That he falls into the very fame Blunder, he charges uppn us, and ignorantly baffles his own poor Quibble. Thefe Actions, are here fuppofed to be our Actions ; but how free Agents may prevent their own ABions, i. e. may make them not to be their own Actions, this Tri<- fler muft tell me. I am really afhamed to * All that he means, if he could exprefs his own Mind, is this, and np more, That when free Agents, have a Freedom of Indifferency, they may aB or forbear ac ting. This no Man denies, that I know of. z. His Proof is Nonfenfe by Whole-fale. Where did he learn, that the Will of any Creature, is a free Agent ! Every free Agent, is a Being ot Terfon, haying Underftan ding, Will, and active Power ; but I never heard, that the Will of any Creature was fuch a free Agent. What need he have faid, the Will of a moral Creature, fet fat as it is accountable, &c? Are any Creatures ac countable, but moral Creatures? And are not all thefe accountable, for all their Actions, in all Cafes? What does he mean, by faying, that a free Agent either has or had a Power to aB, or not to act ; or to act this or that7 If he has fuch a Power, to be fure he has it ; and the Prescience of his doing the one, and not the other, {fince both, cannot he done, at the fame time;) Eflay, cannot, any how, deftroy or abridge it. If he has had it, P- 1 J3 - ant* ^as l°fi if' ^e pfoads " he is no longer free; yea, no* " farther accountable, than for the Lofs of it, &c." What Senfe is it then, to call him a free Agent, and account able^ * It is felf-evident, That no AcTjons can with any Truth q£ Propriety, be called our Actions, till we either do tbem, or, at leaft, till it is true, that we will do them. ( 63 ) able, who once had, but has now loft this Power, and is therefore, now neither free, not accountable7. Is not this now, a fweet Principle ! And have not the Calvi- nifts much to fear ftomjuch an Enemy, furnifhed with fuch Artillery ! " zdly, That an Action which will " be, none can prevent. For, what will be, is certain, "fixed, no longer free, but neceffary — — Yea, it muft " be, £5?c." Anfw. This, is his everlafting Quirk, and, as it were, the Centre of all the reft. Upon the Sup pofition, that ,3«y thing will be, it is true, it will be J nor do we ever doubt of it. But nothing will follow but only this, that it will be. Ay; but it is cer tain. And what is there in the Idea of Certainty, any more than this, it is a Truth, that it will be ? Well ; hut it is fixed. Right. Every Truth is certain in itfelf $ and certain to him, that perceives this Certainty ; and this Certainty is a fixed, i. e. certain Thing.* So that we are not got one' Hair' s-Breadth the farther. Ay, but it is no longetfree. Anfw. This is either pure Nonfenfe, or an evident Falfliood. If it is true, that free Agents will aB, it is as true, that the Action is free ; and if fo, it is not neceffary. Well j\ but it must be. Anfw. Upon the Suppofition, that it is true, that Agents will -aB freely, there is indeed a fort of Neceffity, that they do aB. But this, is fo far from destroying Liberty, that their fuppofed acting does evidently imply it ; and it is as neceffary, that they aB freely, as that they do aB. Befides ; His firft Propofition, is direBly contrary to this. " Our Actions, while free, are what we may " prevent" Now, if we may prevent thofe Actions, which are already fuppofed to be ours, we may cer- tainYr event thofe that will be ours. This, Sir, is indeed a fort of Jangling, proper only for ignorant, peevifh Children : But our Author can do no better ! " %dly, That what God ever decreed ot foreknew, will " he." Granted. The Proof, is fo palpably ridiculous, that nothing can be more fo. He brings us in faying, 41 God only decrees to permit, or infallibly foreknows *' the Sins of Men before all Worlds." But anfwers he, " This is a poor Apology: Since, after the Doublings " are unfolded, and the Paint wafhed off, the Idea is " the fame, and carries in it as great a Certainty, In- " falllibility, and Neceffity, that fuch finful Events " Ihould * I can makjs no other Senfe of this. ( 64 ) *' fhould hej as the moft abfolute and peremptory Der " cree whatfoever." Pray, Sir, ask him, What needed he to prove what none ever denied ! What Senfe is therein the Phrafe, ever decreed'. What is the Inten tion of thefe Words, infallibly foreknows, ckc. whe ther they mean any thing more, than foreknows7. What Doublings and Paintings ate there, in faying, that the permiffive Decree, and Trefcience of God, have no caufal Influence at all, upon the Things permitted and foreknown ! By what intermediate Ideas can he prove, that the Decree to permit, or the Prefcience of any Event, carries in them, as great a Certainty, Infalli bility, and Neceffity, as the moft abfolute and peremp tory Decree whatfoever ? No Man in his Senfes, would have talk'd fo, till he had flung away all Regard for Truth and Shame ! Such a Decree plainly infers, a Necessity of Event; which the other can never1 be brought to do, tho' all the Socinians upon Earth, Ihould wriggle about it for ever. From thefe certain fixed, determined Trinciples, he concludes with the Air of Infallibility, " ^thly, And therefore he con- " tends, that what God ever decreed ot foreknew, was " never a free ABion; ot, what was ever in our " Power to prevent. Ibid. p. 5." The Particle there* fore feems to import, That it is a Confequence from one, or all of the foregoing; but without any manner of Reafon. As for the Trefcience of God ; if He does, or can forefee a free ABion, it is Self-evident it is, and will be free ; unlets his Foreknowledge is deceived^ and he forefies an Action to be what it is not. God's Decree, is either to permit one td aB, otto further, to excite to, or to caufe any Evert. The permiffive De cree, plainly implies the Freedom, both of the Agent and ABion. What God therefore decrees, to permit one freely to do, is effentially, yea, neceffarily free. And as for the other, when God decrees that fuch an Agent fhall do fuch a Thing freely ; or, that Things fhall be fo difpofed, as to move or "determine the Agenr, w to act freely ; or, that Fie will excite him to act freely; So far is it from being true, that fuch Actions are not free ; that it is a plain Contradiction to fuppofe, that they are not fo. The Proof follows, " That an ab- " filute Decree feems to ncceffitate the Event." — — An abfilute Decree to permit any Event, does no : manner ( 65 ) manner of way neceffitate it; feeing it has no manner of eaufal Influence at all, upon it: And an abfolute ef- feBive Decree, is of feveral forts, feme of which, at leaft, do not neceffitate the Event, fo as to render it«of free. The Decree to give converting, determining Grace, when executed, is always effectual, in converting the Soul; and yet, this Grace does not leffen, but refiore and perfeB Liberty. Thy People pfai. Cx.v shall be will«Tng in the Day of thy Power. v. 3. Draw me, we will run after thee. Turn thou we, Cant. i. and IJball be turned, i$c. His People are neverv. 4. fo free, as when converting, quickening, ftrengthening]er- XX3f* Grace, is moft powerful. The Decree to send Alex-V' '**¦ under againft the Terfians, and God's actual sen ding him, left him as free, and as accountable as he would have been, without them. See p. is-1*— '18. The Truth is, our Friend and I had beft let thefe alone. ** Nay, the very Foreknowledge of an Event, (if the " Foreknowledge be abfolute and ihfallible,) muft im- " ply an equal Neceffity alfo, tho' it fhould [or does] " not caufe it." Pray, Sir, ask him, What conditional Forekowledge is ; and whether there can be any true Knowledge or Foreknowledge, which is not infallible ? How came it into his Head, that this Foreknowledge im plies an equal Neceffity with the abfolute Decree ? An abfurd begging the Queftion 1 Every Man in his Wits will own, that the Prefcience of a free Action, fuppofes and implies, that it is free, and cannot but be free, if the Trefcienceis infallible. Thus, Sir, I have propofed thefe adored Principles, and have demolijhed, unA for ever deftroy ed them. And as free as I have been, with thefe lovely Quirks, I have referved half- a-dozen, I mean twice three Remarks upon them, till another time. I might now, Sir, have done, fully fa-* tisfied, that the Foundation being removed, the Hay and Stubble built upon it, will he blown away with, every Puff" of Wind. But I muft difcufs what follows. In tbe next Paragraph, p. 6. He gives us the Confer quencesof the three Schemes, in a way of his own. " If we are in the right, then all the Wickednefs in " the World — were all certain and neceffary to be, be- " fore all Worlds." This is notorioufiy falfe. I, for my part, never thought, that Sin was neceffary; Or, that it was neceffary, that Adam Jbould fin. Nor K. do ( *<>) do any of us dream of any Neceffity in our Actions, which is -destructive of our Liberty. " .And to, have " prevented any of them, would have been to prove " Infallibility fallible, and to have made void 3. " Divine Decree." We never fuppofe,- that we will not do what we will do: We know,- we will do it ; and in miHions of Cafes, 'we know alfo, that we may not do, what we -indeed willdo. We never fillily talk of preventing what will be ; but are fure, that if we have a Power to do what will be, we have a Power to let it alone- In a Word, we know we are' free. Nor can any Man doubt of this, who knows, that he is certainly a free Agent, who does what he will. Besides ; the laft part is a manifeft Untruth. God de creed to permit, and' did permit Adam to fin ; but if he had not finned, as it is certain he might not, this Decree had not been made void. The very Suppofi tion is pure Nonfenfe. He then, {ibid!) offers us the Confequences, which, he fancies, follow, if He and his Socinian Brethren are in the right. But, few true Conclufions can be drawn, from fuch fenfilefs and contradiBory Premifes, as we have Shewn moft of his are. And yet, as far as they are true, which very little of 'his is; and Senfe, for he can hardly write any thing that is fo„ they fol low from the Principles I have laid down, and there fore w e claim them, viz. " Then Man is a moral A- " gent" I dare not abfurdly add with him, fuch a gla ring Falfliood as this, " in the nobleft Senfe; and God " hath given us an amazing Proof of his infinite Wif- " dom and Tower, in contriving and making Creatures, " that have, by their Creator's Gift," {How cohld they have it any other way ?) " and in Imitation of his own " escellent'Nature," { Low Nonfenfe !) " a Principle of " Self-Determination : Nay, and the Holinefs, Juftice,- " Goodnefs,and Veracity of God." (Still this self-con demned Man, is for letting the Divine Perfections at Variance, or throwing fome of them out of his Scheme ; whereas we, who are for reconciling, keeping, defen ding, and adoring them all, add, the Wifdom of His Counsel, the Sovereignty and Independance of his Will; the Freedom, Riches, and Efficacy of his' Love and Grace; His Ttopriety in and Dominion over (67 ) over all the Works of his Hands; His Omniscience, and the Glory and Tower of his All superinten ding and overruling Providence, i£c.) " will " appear in the higheft Degree what every good Man " believes., and muft wifh them to be." Yes; if every good Man believes, and muft wifh the Attributes of God, to be -what they are. I have jgiven you, Sir, every Syllable of this, and in his own Words as I Shall - alfo do of the next Paragraph, but wave for the prefent a few more. very juft Remarks upon them. " As for the Bufinefs of the following Letters, which " is to clear the beft of Beings from the vileft Im- " putation, by Shewing, That every Creature, confi- " dered as accountable, has a Dominion over its own " ABiGns;" None ofw, nor no reafonable Creature ever denied this. " And that the Objections urged " from an eternal Certainty of out Actions againft their " Freedom, have no Foundation but in our Ignorance, " particularly of the Divine Attributes" Rtfum tene- atis ! . If thefe Words have any Senfe, they quite denid- lijh all his own poor Quibbles. We urge no fuch Ob jections, but he himfelf. So far from it, that we plead, that if our Actions were eternally certain, by which no more is, or can he meant, but this, that it was true from Eternity, that we would do them ; it is evident, to common Senfe, that we will do them, and therefore that they are free ; finee the Will cannot be forced, and what .we will do, we will do freely/ And there fore we turn all this againft himfelf, with ' invincible Reafon ; That all hi,s. Objections, from the eternal Certainty, of our Actions againft their Freedom, have no Foundation, but in^his ownlgnorance, I need not fay of the" Diyine Attributes, but of common Senfe. " We are wont (as Dr. More obferyes of the Platonifts " and Schoolmen) to fpread out every Attribute to as " infinite Excefs as we can ;" Finely worded ! " For- " getting that one neceffary Meafure of all his Attri- " butes, That' they be no farther applied to him, than " as they imply Perfection." How they cpuld forget this, 1. can't imagine! After all, I fhould be glad tp know, the Connection and Dependance of this. '¦ Thus " the Abfurdities of ' franfubfianti a tion crept in, in ** Compliment to th,e. Divine Omnipotence ;" Than K 2 which, (68) which, a groffer Falfhood can hardly be affirmed ! He Should have faid, in Compliment to the Man of Sin, that Son of Terdition, and to the Tride, Tyranny, and Avarice of his Clergy, in a direB Contradiction tov the Word of God, the Nature of a Sacrament, the Nature of Things, and the Divine TerfeBions. " And " thus the eternal Certainty of our free Actions, (tho* " a moft palpable Contradiction) in Compliment to " the Divine Omnifcience." Anfw. i. I may call this falfe alfo. Many have thought our free ABions eter nally certain, in the Nature of Thi ngs, even tho' they could not be foreknown *. z. By the eternal Certain ty of our free Actions, nothing is meant but this, as we have often faid, That it was true from Eternity, that we would freely do thefe Actions, having a Tower to forbear doing them. Now, What Contradiction 3 What Appearance of Contradiction is there in this ! I defy him, and all his Mafters to Shew me any. The Freedom of our Actions was certain and foreknown, as well as the Actions themfelves ; nor could they be our Actions, if they were not free, nor forefeen as our Actions, without the Freedom of them. Obj. If it was true, that we would do them , we cannot do otherwife, becaufe Truth is immutable, and it is impoffible to make a true Propofition /«//) them ; that they are ftill poffible, ftill contingent, and more than thefe, that they are alfo future; not contin gent only, ot poffible only, but fo poffible, and fo contin gent, as to be alfo future. He knows, that they do not ceafe to be lefs contingent, or lefs free, upon His fore knowing them, or when they become future ; but con tinue to be juft what they were, as contingent, and as free, as if they had not been foreknown, even till we aBually do them ; if not more fo. " Foreknowledge " of contingent Events, (otherwife than that they are " contingent) is (as an ingenious Correfpondent well " obferves) fo far from being a TerfeBion in any Be- " ing, that, if the Terms are ftriBly undetfkood, there " can fcarce be a more contradictory Propofition. " Which makes him to add, I take the whole of the " Caufe to reft here ; and could never find a Medium " between this, and that of fuch a Certainty as muft •* deftroy all real Contingency." Anfw. x. This Corre fpondent feems to be indeed as ingenious as our Friend, And why Should not one ingenious Perfon praife his Brother7, z. As ingenious as they both are, it will puzzle them both to make Senfe of this, and fhew the ConneB ion a\fo,of one Sentence with the other. 3. Fore knowledge of contingent Events, quA contingent E- vents, and under no other Notion, otherwife than that they are contingent, is indeed a contradiBory Propofition; juft as the Knowledge of a white Ball, quA white Sail, and under no 'Other Notion, otherwife than that it is a white Sail, is a Contradiction: But the Foreknowledge of contingent ot free Actions, un der this Notion, as being really' contingent ot free, and yet befog alfi future, is no more a Contradiction, than the Knowledge of a white Sail, under this Notion as a white Sail, and yet being alfo either big or little, at reft or in motion, in one's Hand, or on the Ground, &c. is a Contradiction. The Ideas'of Contingency and Fu- turition, are as 'diftinct, and may as confiftently relate to the fame EventSj as the Ideas of white and large, £5?c. to the fame Ball. The Foreknowledge of a future Event, if in itfelf contingent , does no more deftroy its Contingency, than the Knowledge of a prefent contin gent Event deftroys its Nature, or makes it not contin gent. 4. What does this ingenious -Perfon mean by Vuch 'a Certainty ? Are there different forts of Cer tainty ? (70) tainty ? Is - not every- Propofition either, certainty true or certainly, falfe ? and is not this Certainty e- qual to all who equally perceive it? 5. Tho' the laft Sentence, ' as- here worded, be really Nonfenfe, yet what he, intends feems to be this, That it is a Con tradiction fotthe fame Event to be certain and yet conr tingent. Anfw. 1. Yes ; if thefe Words, refpected the fame thing, which they do not. z. By contingent here he muft mean cafual or unknown, elfe nothing is -more falfe. v What imaginable , what poffible Contradiction is there in thefe Prppofitfons, Adam will fin, i, e Eat the forbidden Fruit freely. Tharabh will not let the Teoplego, tho' he may, &c. And yet both thefe Events are.in thefe Propofitions, fuppofed to he certain, and yet contingent ; fo.future, as to be alfo free ? How can a Man in his Senfes , dream, that there is any real, or fo much as an-apparent Contradiction, in them ? Thus I have done with his principal Quibbles, which are re- peatedupon every Occafion, throughout ; and muft now go on to defend myfelf. . , I had faid, There can, he r,o eternal Foreknowledge of any thing, but upon the.Suppofition that it will be ; for Know ledge of what is only poffible, i s not Foreknow-^ ledge, nor -can with any Truth pr Propriety he fo called. Te this he anfwers, ", Where is the Impropriety of " calling the Knowledge, of what the future. Creature " Will be :,able to dp,. Foreknowledge, ;any more than " of what , it 30;// do?. Toweqs may he future, as V, well && ABs ; and cpnfidered ,as future, may.bee- ¦' qually foreknown. My wifer Brethren, (naming u- only Mr. Nefs, whofe little Book was puhlifhed, ^ with the Approbation of Dr. Qvcen, and Meffieurs "¦ Lockiex and Griffith,)- wete of this Opinion. Yea, " he wonders how I could read, and much more how " I could anfwer his third Letter, and yet overlook " this, remarkable Quotation, viz. that the -..Prefcience " of Things that may come to pafs, -goes, before the " Decree, — -——So that the DifiinBion is. neceffary, " was it only to take away the Ambiguity of our own ** Terms'." ,lbid. p. 7. Anfw. 1. I never undertook to defend every improper ot unguarded Word, of any Writer,, and much lefs fuch an obfeure one as Mt.Nefs, x. When learned , Men recommend Bqolj?, no Matt takes (71 ) takes it as an Approbation of every Phrafenn them, but of the Scope, Defign, or principal Things only. Mr. How prefaced that little Book of Mr. Clarkfon's, which Letter to our Friend quotes, and yet that very Quotation, is an Mr. Nor- exprefs Contradiction to Mr. How's whole Book con-man' terning Prefcience. Some Socinians perhaps, might?' 3i"— +1- be found willing to recommend our Friend's wonder ful Effays and Replies, for the fake of their common Caufe; but he muft be more than fiark flaring mad, who would undertake to account for, or defend, his new Rhetoric, or Logic, or manifold ContradiBions, &c. 3. The Calvinifts, the Schoolmen of all forts, and indeed all that write with any Propriety upon thefe Subjects, generally fpeak of God's Knowledge of fimple Intelligence, and of Viflon. That, has for its Objects, all Poffibilities. This, all Things that ever have been, are, 01 will be: All which, from Eternity \- were future; and therefore, the Objects of Trefcience. None of them, at leaft that ever I read, fpeak of his foreseeing Toffibilities. 4. Things that may be, i. e. Toffibilities, are always prefent, and therefore not the Objects of Trefcience. Common Senfe will demon strate this ; and as for thofe who have it not, they had beft let thefe things alone. 5. Our Author, who is wifer than all my Brethren, fo that he pretended to reform- the Reformed Churches, is himfelf of this Mind, " God's eternal Foreknowledge is (as I take " it) nothing but God's eternal Knowledge of his own " eternal Decree." Effay, p. ico. Now, (paffing aOmnif fenfelefs Blunder, which I elfe where obferved) YouP- "9^ know, Sir, that Toffibilities are not the Objects of any Decree, and therefore not of God's eternal, no nor temporal Prefcience ; but Knowledge. He always knows all that may be, and foreknows all that will be. 6. His own Words Shew, that he does not know what he is faying. I was fpeaking of Things only poffible, but what the future Creature will be able to do, is not only poffible, but evidently future alfo. The Word able, tho' in Capitals, after the Word will, proves, but the more, his own Ignorance. So that after all his wriggling, it is plain, That God's Knowledge, of what is only poffible, cannot, with any Truth or Propriety, be called Foreknowledge. In deed ( 7i ) deed there knot a Propofition in the World more felf- evident than this. For, of Things that may be, it was always true, that they may be : And to know Things that may be, is neither more nor lefs, than to know that they are possible1 : But what is al ways possible, is not the Object of Prescience, but Science. Is not our Friend now, a Writer equal to fuch a Controverfy ! 7. There is no Ambiguity in our Terms, and therefore there is no need of a Dif- tinBion, where there is no Difference. 8. Since he wonders ''how I could read, and much more anfwer him, and yet overlook this remarkable Quotation ; {A mighty thing to wonder at ! I do not even now think it worth while:) May not I wonder, in my turn, How he could read, and much more how he could pretend to an fwer me, and has not dared to meddle with many Scores A>f Quotations, from the moft noted Authors, Heathens and Chriftians, Ancients and Moderns, Tapifts and Trotcftants, Friends and Adverfaries ; has not dared to reply to any one Argument, upon which I laid the greateft Strefs, nor to remark upon ome' twentieth part of what I have directed to his Friend t Yea, has* not dared to defend, or excufe, almoft any of his own fenfelefs Abfurdities, often fet before him in the plaineft Manner. His long Quotation in the nefct Paragraph, I have more than Sufficiently baffled, Omnifcience, &c. p^ 200 — 204. £5? fiaffim. He again fums up the whole Matter thus ; " So that " the real Difpute is not, whether God foreknows Sin *' in any Senfe? But, whether he foreknows it to fe, * what it /.$ «o/," {Every Syllable falfe!) " to be an " Event that is certain, and confequently neceffary, *' while it remains uncertain and contingent j and fo " free either to be ot not to be?' More Falfhood, and Nonfenfe too! " And Mr. M. is very confeious of " this, notwithstanding his loud Clamours, as if his " Opponents denied God's Foreknowledge of Sin in "general." More Falfhood ! * Thus this Man, (who glorioufly contends, That " even the Omniscient " cannot know our Thoughts before they are oilrs, Effay, p. in") * I have given you every Word of thh, in hit own Order,' that you may know, there is nothing fo filly or falfe, which he will not affirm, without any Scruple. . ( 73 ) p. iii.) pofitiv'ely affirms, that I am confeious of what never came into my Mind. I never thought^ and much lefs faid, that either he, or his Mafters denied, that God knew that Sin was poffible, which is what he means by this Nonfenfe " of God's Foreknowledge of " Sin in general." No; whatever I think of him, I know that fome of his Mafters were not out of their Wits. I never dream'd, that God foreknew Sin to bet what it is not. I often told him this was impoffible. I never dream'd, that that is certain which is uncertain. It is indeed Strange, that one in his Senfes Should af firm fuch Things. 1 never dream'd, that any thing iri the World was neceffdry and contingent too, in the fame Senfe, and In the fame Refpect. All that any of Is plead, upon this Head, is, That Millions of Things or ABions, which are, in their own Nature, most contingent and most free, may be neceffary, upon fuch or fuch Suppositions ; and that Neceffity up on Suppofition, is no way inconfiftent with the highefl Liberty. Thus, Sir, it is plain, that the Neceffity arifing, from the Suppofition of the foreknowledge of a free Action, fuppofes that it is, and will he free: And the Neceffity arifing from the Suppofition, that God de creed, that any particular Action or Actions fhould be done freely, confirms and eftablifhes their Freedom. In a Word, the whole Controversy lies in this, Whether, the Omniscient knew, from before the Foundation of the World, that his Creatures would do, all and every one ofthe Actions, which all or any of them ever have done, are now doing, or ever wilt do ? We fay with the Scriptures of Truth, agreeably to Reafon, and with the common Suffrage of Mankind, a few atheifii* cal Philofophers with their Followers only excepted, that he dId; and by Confequence, that it was then certain, i. e. true, that they would do them. In Op position to this, our Friend pleads, i. That u God " could not know from Eternity, that Man would de- " termine wrong, without determining for him, that he '* fhould determine wrong. EST. p. 91. ' a. " That it " was. not the% true, that the Creatures would do free- " ly, what they actually have done, or hereafter will " do. Ibid- pajfim." 3. " That if it was then true, " ot as foon as it became true, that they would do therh,' L " theft (74) " thefe Actions were no longer contingent otfree, Sec. " hutfixed, neceffary, ckc. Ibid, paffim." 4. " That " if the Omniscient foreknew, that all the Sins " would be committed, which either ever have, or " ever will be committed, then He himfelf is the " Caufe and Author of them ; yea, the file, the total " Caufe of them, with a great deal more of the moft "horrid Blafphemy. Eff. p. 75, 75. 1$ paffim" Thefe, Sir, are the precious Falfhoods, and Blunders, and Blafphemies,"* neceffary to fupport the Gospel he is for. I refer it to you, whether his whole Caufe is not in thefe. By the Firft, he limits Omn-iscience ; pretends to know how many ways God may have of knowing Things, /. e. to be Omnifcient himfelf; yea, makes Him n,ore ignorant, than many of us ate, (who, in Thoufands of Cafes, can very certainly foreknow and foretel how we, or our Fellow Creatures will deter mine ourfelves freely, having a Tower to forbear fuch Determinations ;) with many other blafphemous Confe- quences. By the Second, among many other Abfur dities, he defiroys his own Quibbles. For ; if it was not then true, that they would do thefe Things, This Propofition, They will do fuch Things, was thenfa\fet and infallibly known to be fo by Him who knows all Truth ; and by Confequence, when they aBually did them, they made Infallibility fallible, Cer-- tainty uncertain, &c. to mention no more of his Nonfenfe. By the Third, among numberlefs Ab furdities, he contradicts the very Suppofition, which he ignorantly fays we do ; talks of Certainty and Ne ceffity, without any Ideas, or with falfe Ideas ; and brings Things to this pafs, That there never %vas, nor poffibly can be, a free ABion in the World: For it is rid. All felf- evident, that every Action of Creatures muft be fu- fu rure free ture, before it be prefent ; it mufl be true, that it Actions, will ee, before it be true, that it is. Thus our &*¦ V-49-doughty Difputant fot Liberty, defiroys at once, all &. paffim. Liberty of Action. By the Fourth, He, without Shame, charges the Bleffed God as thetFiRST, and Principal, yea, the only Caufe, of all the Sins of Devils and Men, purely becaufe he knew before he E3*de them, that they would fin if he fhould permit them» (75 ) them j tho' He, and they too, knew alfo, that they Might have preferved their Integrity, and.that He did nothing to encourage, entice, perfuade, compel, ot caufe them to fall, but the contrary. So that you fee, Sir, that all the Blafphemies and Abfurdities, which he ignorantly, and falfily charges upon us, as the Con- fequences of our Principles, do neceffarily, and with an irrefiftible Evidence follow from his own. And I challenge him, and all the Socinians upon Earth, if they take all his Sayings together, to clear them of this Charge, if tbey can. 1 have been fo full and plain here, •Jefigning to take no more Notice of thefe Abfurdities, but to refer to what has been already offered. His Quo tation from Dr. Cudworth, {ibid.) with his filly Com ment upon it, you'll find abundantly confuted in my Omnifci ence of God, Sic. p. 8 — 15. In the next Paragraph, p. 9. without any manner of Order ot ConneBion, he falls upon the learned Dr. Slifs, and Shews tjpw contemptibly he treats his Bet ters, when ever he fancies he has got a little Advan tage. The Doctor, it feems, was not fufprized, that the Deifts eagerly embrace our Friend's Scheme ; fince itferves their Purpofe, as it undermines a cogent, and, as fome pretend, the only Argument for Christianity, that from Prophecies. To which he replies, " What ! " the only Argument ! Nothing is more certain, " than that the Chrifiian Revelation, as well as that " by Mofes, would have Stood immoveable, upon the " Bafts of Miracles alone, joined with the Purity of " its DoBrinces, had there been never a PrediBicn " befides for its Support." This, Sir, is as filly as moft of the reft. Had there been no Types, Shadows, and Trefigurations given of Chrifiianity in the Old Tcft anient ; had there been no Trophecies relating to the Perfon, Natures, Offices, the Birth, DoBrine, Miracles, Life, Paffion, Death, and RefurreBion, &c. of our dear Redeemer ; of the Succefs of his Gofpel, the Enlargement and Duration of his Kingdom, i£c. the New Teftament Revelation would have flood im moveable, as he fays. But feeing thefe were vari- oufly typified and prefigured ; and that there are feve ral Prophecies relating to each of them, it will follow, 1. That the Gofpel Revelation is ftrongly fupported La by ( 76) by them, upon many Accounts. 2. That no poffible Confirmation, after thefe, would have been fuiiicient •snithout the Fulfilment of them. 3. That if anyone of thefe bad failed, it would have been a juft Prf'ya- Mic. v. z-dice againft the Whole. Thus, had not Chrift been bom Pfal. xxii. at Bethlehem, had npt they caft Lots for his Vefture- — < *L ' h " t'?rcedhis Hands, his Feet, and Side, had he not been l0 ' numbered with the Tranjgreffors, &c. {Ml which, Ifaiah liii. were Bearly prophefied of him, and depended upon iz. the freeft ABioifS of Men, and were therefore future If. xxxv. Contingencies,) we might have, with good Reafon, v. 6. rejeBed the Gofpel, His very Miracles, and the Purity. Deut. 0f hjs Doctrine, were predicted, and to them, he xvm. 13. ijjmfejf 0ften appealed, for the Confirmation of this jo. v. 3 -fundamental Truth, That He was the promifed Meffiah. 1 -" But it is beyond his Capacity to comprehend, what " Account the Dei/Is can find in this Hypothefis." This, for once, I charitably believe. We fee he can not comprehend the moft plain and evident Things, which even the ignorant Multitude can do with Eafe. As foon as it is true, that any of us will do any particu lar Action, /'. e. aB. freely, he cannot comprehend how it fhould be any longer a free Action ; or how it can EST pafl". be true, that we will have a Tower to forbear, &c. T^ho' a Child may eatily diftingyifh between a Power and the F.xercife of that power ;" between our Choice to do a Thing, and our Power not to do it, or to do the contrary. Every Man in his Senfes, may, yea, muft comprehend, that a forefeen Toner of doing either, is no way inconfiftent with, nor in the leaft deflroyed or leffened by, a forefeen doing of one of them ; but that this forefeen Tower, does, and muft remain, as it was forefepn, i. e. a Power of doing either. In this, Sir, I appeal to every Man that has tbe Ufe of his Reafon. But, becaufe it is beyond his Capacity to comprehend, what Account the Deifts can find in his Scheme, I'll give him my kindeft Affiftance once more, not defpairing to do what is next to abfi lutely impoffible, viz. convince him, that they may find fome Account in it, many ways. You know, Sir, that it was prediBed by Ifaiah, chap. xxxv. 5, 6. viz. that our Lord Should work Mi racles-, that he fhould open the. Eyes of the Slind-, ckc. But ( 77) But as foon as thefe wete foretold, they were no longer free, fays our Friend, but fixed, neceffary, muft be, ckc. And therefore it was not in our Saviour's Tower not to do them ; they muft be done, and he muft do them ; and fince neceffary Actions, are not ABions, and neceffary Agents not Agents, ckc. pray, what was our Lord ? A mere Cypher ! — — — Horrefco fcribens. QantheDeifts, Sir, find no Account in this! Again, that he fhould be rejeBed by -the Jews, that Ifrael^uil j"r- fhculdnot be gathered, that he fhould be beir ayed, cru-z:.l'c ,?" cified, Sic. were ell fvrctcld, and thofe Predictions* , ' v r es wete all verified hytae Event; hutasfoon as thefe Sins p'fai.xli.o. were foretold, they were no longer free, hutneceffary^o'nnxiii. t£c. and fince neceffary Agents ate no Agents, &c.i,8. Who then rejeBed, betrayed, crucified him, &c ? Who were the Sinners7. Can the Deifts, Sir, find no Ac count in this ! Dare he fay, that thefe Trophecies Wete not abfolute but conditional, as he loves fenfelefsly to Elead? Pray, Sir, what poffible Conditions of thefe can e affigned, that the Jews would rejeB Chrift, but this, if they would ; or that Judas would betray him, but this, if he would, Sic. But that they would re jeB him, and Judas betray him, ckc. is plainly fore told. Again, when he was fiandaloufly treating many Scripture Prophecies, Effay, p. 116 140. I charged him, among other Things, with going far to fhake the Credit of the New Peftament, ckc. Omnifci- ence, {$c. p. 239 245. I called upon him then, and now defy him to clear himfelf. * And can the Deifts, Sir, find no Account in this ! May not Deifts, Sir, very naturally infer, that an ignorant God may prove forgetful, and then they won't havefo much to fear. Once more, If, " from the Sim- " plicity and Omniscience of God, Men may " argue away all Counfel and Defign, all Liberty of " Choice from him,, as if he was in another Senfe " too, a fimple Being," i. e. filly and foolifti. — Horrefco * A Man that dares interpret the Prophecy. of Chrift's being fold for Thirty Pieces of Silver, thus, i. e. a certain Sum for an uncertain, or a Sum of little Value, merely to evade God's knowing the certain Sum, difcovers fo much Ignorance swift an- Aalous Trofhanity, as renders him' unworthy of an Anfwer. ( 78 ) refco fcribcns, as be fiamelefsly has it, Let. 3. p. 78, 79. Why may not Deifts conclude, that they need. not much mind him ; or that He is fuch a God, as the Logg- in the Fable was a King7. I hope, Sir, thefe will help him to comprehend this ; and I promife, to fhew him as many moe ways, when ever he defires me. Our Friend then goes on to " the Prophecies which " are referable to the Actions of moral Agents, which " he fays, are either only conditional, according to " the great Standard, laid down by God himfelf, ££?<;. " Jer. xviii. 7 — — 10. £5?c." All this I fully anfwered, in the Preface to Omnifcience of Gcd, ckc. p. 6 — 8. to which I refer. He hath pretended to anfwer it, p. 10 15. but very candidly, as ufual, Slips over that which I laid the Strefs upon, being wife enough to let it alone. I there, among other Things, replied, that this was not a Standard of Prophecies at all, but of Promifes and Threatenings; and appeal'd to the Text itfelf, £5?r. I need fay nothing more upon the Head, being well fatisfied he can never refute it. But very luckily for him, I had thefe Words, " In the " Paflage referred to, there is no Prediction of any " thing, that the Nations Spoken of would do, but on- " ly of what God would do in confequence of their " Carriage, whether good or bad." Our Friend, by way of Illustration, kindly adds, " i. e. a Prediction of what God would do;" »and then obferves my con- tradiBing myfelf, ckc. and expatiates without fo much as one Word to the Purpofe. Anfw. 1. I freely grant, that this Sentence was not guarded, and that his Ad dition is natural enough, if I had faid nothing but this. However, he may call it a Blunder, or what he will : For I fhall never, like Hereticks, be afhamed to ac knowledge a Fault. But, 2. Since in that very Page, and every where elfe, I denied that thefe were Tre- diBions, but Tromifes, or Threatenings, a very little Candour would have inclined an, indifferent Perfon, to have taken it for a Slip, or Overfight, perhaps of the Printer, in paffing over an interjin'd Word, £5c. and no Man but our Friend would have made fuch an Ufe of it. But had it not. been fot this Blunder, or what you pleafe to call it ; had the Word Declaration, or the Ijke, been added, he would have had nothing 10 ( 79 ) to fay. 3. My Definition of a Prophecy is, It is the Declaration of -feme future Event. Let them shew us what shall happen, — - declare tllings to come, Shew the things that are to comeI£ *\uzz, hereafter, that we may know THAT ye are*3- Gods. This is the Senfe all Men have of Prophecies. * Agreeably to this, I added, that if the Event is not fu ture, the TrediBion of it is a Lye, and He that fore tells it, is either no Trophet, or a falfe Trophet ; that the TrediBion of an Event, which the Prophet doth not certainly forefee, is, at beft, but a Co&jeBure, ckc. with feveral other felf-evident Truths. I every where told him, that Tromifis and Threatenings, were not properly and truly Trophecies, ike. In Anfwer to all which, he obferves upon my Remarks, in fuch a way, as to outdo even his own Qutdoings, building all he offers upon that Blunder, which he has fo candidly explained for me. How would he have bounced, had I done fo? 1. " He will have it, that thefe Tromifis " and Threatenings are Trophecies ftill. For this he *' quotes Mr. Downham," (whofe Word^ he under stands not, nor do they make any thing againft me,) *' and Mr. Henry, who fays, that there is one Line of " TrediBion, in the Book of Jonah, and that Pro- " phecy, Strictly taken, is the foretelling Things to " come. Thefe Things to come, fays our Friend, be- " ing the Reward of Virtue, or the Punijhment of " Vice, alters not the Cafe : it is Prophecy ftill." Ibid. p, 1-0, 1 1. Ay, but Nineveh was not deftroyed with in the Time ; and therefore Jonah did not foretell Things to come, within the Time limited. Either' then this was no TrediBion, or Jonah was a falfe Trophet. Let him chufe. I, for my part, plead, that Jonah's Sermon, Tet forty Days, ckc. wa$ no Trophecy, and that it was never fo called in Scripture. I offered feveral Texts from both Teftaments, to prove that it is never called by any Word ufed to Signify Trophecy. I urged, tljat the Hebrew Verb, and that ufed by the Septuagint , with the Verbal in the two E- vangelifts, import no fuch thing, &c. My next Re mark was this, 3... " If by only conditional, he means uncer- * PruMio eftnarrtoio rei futur* /implicit er. Turret. Toni, 1. p. »4i. 1$6) ttncertainf. it is felf-evidcnt, that an uncertain Tro phecy, that is, a PredtBion of an Event, which the Prophet doth not certainly forefee, isjat beft,but aConjeC- ture." To this he replies, " But what if by a Prophecy " that's only conditional, Mr. F. fhould intend a Pro- " phecy that is certain, fuppofing the Condition ; theA •' it is well ftill : For then the Prophet may certainly " forefee the ConneBion between them, tho' the abfo*- " lute Futuri tion of the Event be yet uncertain, or " rather, not true. p. ii, 12." I have -given you, Sir, every Word of this, and obferve, among others, thefe four glaring Blunders in it. : 1. The Connec tion between Virtue and its Reward, Sin and the Curfe due to it, cannot be the Matter' of a Prophecy's as is evident, but of plain Declarations, or at moft of Tromifes and Threatenings. -2. Common Senfe will tell him, that the Forefight of this, is not the Forefight of an Event. 3. I fpoke of an Event that was certain, or elfe the TrediBion of it, was, at beft, but a Giiefs ; whereas the abfolute^ Fiiturition of the Event, he fpeaks of, isyet uncertain, or rather,- not true, lnfine, 4. What can he intend by" a Prophecy that is certain, fuppofing the Condition, when yet in the next Para graph, he tells us, that this Condition is not certain, and in this, that the abfolute Fiiturition of the Event, isnot true7. It is wholly needlefs to take any more Notice, of what is fo ridiculous, I fhall only therefore give you three of his Untruths, in one Pages viz. 12. which are his beft Arguments. 1. In Line 23. he fays, " That I own, that what '* will be, muft be, and cannot but he." And then like himfelf asks, " Is not this all one as to fay, that Freedom is not Freedom7'' Anfw. I never faid, never thought fi ; fo far from it, that I every where pleaded, that nothing will follow from this Propofition, it is true that fuch a Thing will be, but only that it will be ; which is neither more nor lefs- than to fay, That the Exercife of our Freedom, confifts injur doing what we will do. May not 1 ask his own Queftion, " Is " it either Wifdom or Truth to talk at fuch a Rate." a. In Line 34 and 35, " I fometimes feem to think, " that a fatal Neceffity runs thro' the whole Scale of " Beings, from the Creature up to the Creator?1' Whet* ( Si ) Where have I faid any fuch Thing, any thing like it, or that can be wrefted to countenance fuch an Insinu ation, even with all his own Arts ? I challenge him to fhew me the Place. But had I been fo filly as to talk of Fate and the Scale of Beings, I fhould have had that Reverence for the Creator, as to have bepun with Him. 3. In the two loweft Lines, he calls my fixth Remark, my lafi ; whereas the feventh follows it immediately. I would have fcorned to have obferved this, had not my feventh Remark, and what comes after in the next Lines, been the chief; and that which alone will demolifh all thefe Quibbles, or con vince all the World, that he deferves rather to be laugh' d at, than anfwered. It runs thus : " 7. \f any " future free Action, of a free Agent, is, or can be " foretold, it is felf-evident, that the Event is ftill " contingent, the Agent is ftill free, and will aB free- " ly, if the Prophecy be true. Upon the Whole, &c." Pray, Sir, read it, and that whole general, upon which, I will venture the Caufe as far as I am concerned. That the Argument may appear plainer, to the igno rant Multitude, I muft confider what he calls abfolute PrediBions, and what conditional. By the former he means, " fuch a Prediction as fuppofes the abfolute " Fiiturition of the Thing prediBed, or the abfolute " Certainty of the Event." i. e. in plain Englifi, it fuppofes, that the Event foretold, will certainly come to pafs, when, and as, it is foretold. 7&y the latter in the fame Sentence, " fuch a Prophecy as fuppofes " a Certainty in the Connexion, or that the Connexion " between the Event and Condition is certain, but not " the Certainty of the very Condition, upon which " the Event depends." i. e. it fuppofes a Con nexion between an uncertain Condition and an uncer tain Event. A glorious Trophecy .' But fince this is hardly intelligible, you'll obferve, Sir, that we may allow htm the ufe of his Jargon, for once. 1. That in a conditional Prophecy, there are always, two Parties considered as Agents, God and the Creature ; and two Events, the Carriage of the Creature, of which, even the Omniscient is ignorant; and the Thing ftro- phefied of as the Reward of that Carriage, vim. for in- ftance, that it Shall be well with the Righteous,, and M ill (82) ill with the Wicked: But whether it Shall be well ot ill, with the Terfons to whom the Prophecy relates, God knows not, as not being certain, whether they. would prove Righteous or Wicked. What odious Non fenfe, or rather Blafphemy is this I Thus, in Jonah's Prophecy, as he calls it, all that was exprefled was, that within forty Days Nineveh fhould be defiroyed, viz. upon the tacite Condition, if the Citizens re pented not; but whether they would repent or not, was uncertain, and confequently, could not be fore told ; and therefore, whether it would be indeed de firoyed at that time, was as uncertain. Now, fup pofing thefe deteftable Falfhoods for once ; from alb this, it won't follow, that there was any proper Pro phecy here, but a peremptory Threatening only. Should our Friend fay to one of his Scholars, Child* within fix Hours you Jh all be flogg'd, fupprefling tbe Condition, If you mind not your Book. Would you, Sir, or the Child, take him for a Trophet, or this for a Trophecy ? But Should he tell him, that a certain unknown Perfon would hereafter beat or rob him; you, Sir, and the Child, and all that heard it, would pre- fently take him for a Fortune-Teller, or a 2. In an abfolute Trophecy, there is only one -Patty consi dered as aBive, and one Event. By one Party, I mean, either one Jingle Agent, ot feveral concurring to the fame Action or Actions ; and by one Event, either one particular Action, or feveral making up but one Event : In all which Cafes, the Agent or Agents ate foreknown ; and it is «w, that they willdo, what is foretold in the fame Manner and in the fame Time ; nor are there any Conditions, upon which they depend,- which are not implied in the Prediction itfelf; and much lefs uncertain Conditions. Thus, we have fe veral abfolute Prophecies of what God would do * ; and feveral, of what particular Terfons, feleB Com panies, or larger Bodies of Men would do; and that, in all the Ages ofthe Church. Thus, in Jonah's Prophecy, which he calls conditional, the two aBive Parties * Should any contend, that, in Strietnsfs, Prophecies relate on ly td the Actions of others, and that the Predictions of what God mould do, are not Prophecies, but Fromifes or Threatenings only ; He may for me. This will not alter the Cafe, as to the Pro phecies concerning human Actions, (83 ) Parties are, the Ninevites, and God himfelf, or the Inftruments he would employ in their Deftruction; and the two Events are, j . Nineveh's Obftinacy in Sin, which was the Condition, and, 2. The DeftruBion which was foretold upon that Condition : But in thefe, Judas will betray his Mafter, and Peter will deny him, Tharaoh will not let the Teople go, and the like; it is felf-evident, there is but one Agent, and one E- vent, which is fimply foretold without any Condition. In all which, the Agents are either exprefi, or clearly implied, as well as the ABions they would do. Jn Cafes like the former, if the Condition is not exprefi' d, nor known, by them who hear them ; as they found like Trophecies, fo they may poffibly be miflaken for fuch : But as foon as the Condition is known, common Senfe will teach us, that they are not Trophecies, in the ordinary Senfe of that Word among Men, but Tromifis or Threatenings only. Whereas, we no fooner hear any thing like the latter, but we are fure they are not Promifes, or Threatenings, in any Senfe, but either true and proper prophecies, or mere Con- jeBures. If they come from uninfpired Men, they are, at beft, but Gueffes; if from the Fountain of Truth, Prophecies ; or with his Epithets, certain, in fallible, abfolute, fixed, ckc. Prophecies. It is felf- evident then, that all Trophecies, which are truly and properly fo, are abfolute;- and that what he calls a conditional Prophecy, is not indeed a Prophecy. Of conditional Prophecies, as he calls them, we have but a very few ; with abfolute ones, the Bible is full from End to end. I gave you a great many of all forts of thefe, in my Omni fcience , ckc. p. 73 — 89. and can pro duce Five hundred more. To return then, to my feventh Remark, There are either fome abfolute Prophecies, as he calls them, of the future free ABions both of God and Man, and ¦especially of thefe laft, in our Bibles, or not. If there are, this will for ever demolifh all his Blunders, £J?c. yea Demonstrations. It will determine the Contro- verfy, againft all the atheiftical Oppofers of Omni science, to the End of Time. For, 1. Thefe Ac tions ate fuppofed to be both future and free ; and that it was true, that the Agents would do them freely. a. If fa, then there are, ot were, fuch Things, as fu-. M 2 tun ( H) ture Contingencies ; and therefore, a future Contin gency is not a flat Contradiction. 3. If there may be one ot wee future free Actions, there may be Millions, yea Millions of Millions ; yea, it w^jv, it »2«/? be true, that all the free Actions of Creatures, were once future free ABions. For, 4. If the Freedom or Contin gency of them, be the Caufe why they can't he future and foreknown ; and if the Truth of this Propofition, they will be done, deftroys the Freedom of them, the Cafe is the fame in all. Either therefore, all or none of them are or can be foreknown. All this, Sir, is felf-evident. He muft therefore fay, That there are no abfolute Prophecies, of the future free Actions, either of God or Man, in all the Bible; ;'. e. of what either God or Man, would hereafter freely do. But this, at firft fight, is abfurd, odious, Jhockingl No Man, can poffibly read and underftand the Bible, but muft be choak'd with it. That many Scripture abfolute Predictions, relate to the moft contingent Things, the freeft Actions of Men, is not, cannot be doubted, by any Man in his Senfes. Actions of all forts of Men, high and low, good and bad ; yea all forts of Actions, Good and Evil, Sins and Duties, ate foretold in that Holy Book; nor can any, who is in his Wits, ferioufly deny it. That Men, aBing with all the Freedom which rational Creatures have, or can have, and con feious that they had and ufed their Liberty, did aBu ally do, what, and as it was foretold they would do, is apparent to common Senfe. See my Omnifcience, £J?c. p. 73 — 8. & paffim, and All future free, ckc. p. 31 — 57. & paffim. Such were thofe relating to the Amo- rites, Jofeph, Cyrus, the Four Monarchies, the Cir- cumfiances of the Life and Death of Chrift, the Rife and Wickednefs of Antichrift, and Hundreds more. As to all which, he muft either fay, that thefe were not abfolute, but only conditional Predictions; or that thefe ABions and Sins were not free after the Predic tions, but neceffary ; both which are Shocking. For as to the former, obferve, 1. That all thefe Events did aBually come to pafs, with every PunBilio of a Circumftance, as they wete foretold, z. What poffible Condition can he affign, of this, that the Cup of the Amorites would be full, or that Cyrus would de liver the Jews, or that Teter would deny his Mafier, ( 85 ) Mafter, &c. but this, if they would; but, that they would, is the very Thing foretold. 3. If they were not abfolute, thefe Sayings of our Lord, and the E- vangelifts, Matth. xxvi. 31, and 56. John xviii. 32. chap. xix. ver. 24, 35, and 37. with many more, will be plainly ridiculous. Should he plead, That if the TrediBions ate abfolute, the Events were not free ; then, 1. All the Confequences will follow, which you had above. 2. This is a ContradiBion to the Tro phecies, which fuppofid them to be the ABs of their Wills; and therefore free. 3. The Freedom, as well as the Futurition ofthe Events, are &tf# implied, yea expreffed, in the Prediction, as is evident to common Senfe. I therefore lay down ?#e/e as Maxims ; 1. That no Prophecies are conditional, in his Senfe. 2. That the Trophecies, which he calls conditional, are not true and proper Prophecies, but Tromifis ot Threaten ings only. But it is needlefs to fetch a Candle to fee the Sun. To go on. After he had fillily taken my Words, ( " about the Actions being abfilutely deter mined now, £f?c." without daring to add what follows, which would have convinced him that I was only baf fling his Nonfenfe ;) as if I had granted what he would have ; and as fillily applying them, p. 1 3. He concludes the Whole thus, " In the mean time, this (I conceive) " is very plain, That either the Contingency of the " Event, or the Abfilutenefi of the Trophecy muft be " given up." Rifum teneatis! So far is this from being either plain, or true ; That the Abfilutenefi of the Prophecy, fuppofes, declares, proclaims, and afi fures us of the Contingency, i. e. Freedom of all thefe Events. And now, Sir, I fhall not here call upon him, to difprove all, that I have faid in this, and my former Letters and Prefaces concerning Pro phecies, which pounds all thefe ^iiibbles, as in a Mor tar ; being well affured, that He, with all the blaf- phemous Deniers of Omniscience upon Earth, will he as foon able to drink up the Ocean, or pull down the Stars, as any how to refute, or demolifh it : But fhall leave it with you, and all Men, to judge, whe ther He can fay any thing, that may deferve to be called an Anfwer to me, till he has done it. I fhall therefore, Sir, fit down very ficurely, being well fa- tisfied, that it is impossible, upon his Principles,, to be done. He ( 86) He falls next upon Dr. Blifs, " for being furprized " that he Should lay fo much Strefs upon his Hypo- " thefts, as if the Whole of Religion depended upon " it." To which our Author, to the old Tune ; " Why, can there be any Religion without Liberty ? " Anfw. No. " Or any Liberty, where only one fide *' is poffible ? which the eternal Certainty, or certain " Trefcience," (Pray, can there be any uncertain Prefcience?) " of what they call contingent Events, " plainly implies?" Anfw. This eternal Certainty, neither fuppofes, nor implies, any fuch thing, but the contrary, viz. that contingent Events are, and will be what they are, contingent Events; and that free Agents will do, what it is Truth they will do, having a Tower to forbear ; and therefore, that the other fide, to ufe his Phrafe, is certainly poffible, tho' not future. The Doctor, in the next Paragraph, had faid, " There is no Likelihood of Antinomianifm," (i. e. Calvinism,, if to our Author's Purpofe,) " gaining " Ground amongft us." Our Friend, like himfelf, " will not enquire whether it is univerfally fo ; but " fuppofing it true, gives this Reafon for it ; it is be- " caufe the Liberty of the accountable Creature, is " now better underftood and defended than in Times " paft." But where? Sure not in this Higledy, Ti- gledy, Hotch-Totch ! The Telagian Liberty was as well underftood, and defended, before this remarkable Change, as fince. We have feen, that Dr. Clarke, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Jackfon, have given it up, and fo have many others. The two former, defcribe Free dom, fo as to come nearer to us, who have had always the fame Notion of it, tho' delivered in different Words. I wifh our Friend would enquire, Whether any of the Churches, wete reformed upon Telagian, or Semipelagian Principles? Whether any of them, have gained Ground upon Topery, fince they became Armi- •nianized7. Whether Popery can poffibly fubfift, but upon Arminian or Telagian Tenets ? Whether our Telagianizers, are more refolved Proteftants, than the Reformed were, when almoft univerfally Calvinifts7. Whether Telagianizers make more ufe of their Bibles, than their Fathers ? Whether Things have put on a better ( 87 ) better Face, fince the reformed Churches have left their firft Faith ? Whether the prodigious Defection from the Faith, to Deifm, Arianifm, Socinianifm, ckc. and the Inclination of many, even in our own Country, to apoftatize to Topery, owes its Rife to Calvinifm, or Telagianifm ? If any Should malicioufly fay, to the Former ; We call upon him, to name one Perfon, who was bred a Calvinift, that ever turned to either of thefe, till he was initiated into the Abominations of Telagianifm. Thefe, Sir, and the like, are well worth his while. God grant all firious Troteftants may enquire into them, before it be too late. Ay, " but it is too great a Paradox for him, to underftand, " that our freeft Actions, were always abfilutely cer- " tain, and foreknown, ckc." I believe it very cha ritably; but it is no hard Matter to underftand, That, — if it was true from Eternity, that we would freely chufe and do fuch Actions, and if this was then fore known, that then our freeft Actions are indeed free. The Doctor goes on ; " Almoft every Chapter in the " Bible ftrongly reclaims againft Antinoiriianifin" Moft true. Againft that which is truly fo called ; but not againft the Trinciples of the reformed Churches, our Adverfaries themfelves being Judges. I remember, that the Reverend Mr. Stackhoufe, Author ofthe Body of Divinity, in particular, and moe fhall be named when you will, freely owns, that the Calvinifis have the Scripture on their fide, ckc. But if our Friend will prove, what follows, in his Senfe of it, from any Paflage of the Bible, erit mihi magnus Apollo. In the fame Paragraph he falls upon me, for faying in my firft Preface, " That the Calvinifis generally grant, that the Decree makes all Events neceffary." 1 faid fo, and fiow explain myfelf, viz. upon Suppofition ; but every where excepted myfelf: I afterward explained their Meaning alfo, of which he candidly takes no Notice. They generally fay, . that the Decree makes all Events hypothetic ally neceffary: But a Ne- ceffity upon Suppofition, is not, as we have demon strated above, a proper Neceffity, nor any how incon fiftent with the highefl Liberty i fo far from it, that it eftablijbes and confirms it. The fenfelefs Things that follow are fo like himfelf, that I muft obferve upon ( 88 ) upon them particularly. " Tho' to shew bow dex- «' terous I am, at plucking down with one Hand, " what I build up with the other," (his own princi pal Talent !) " 1 elfewhere fay, Every Man who aits " freely, knows he may aB or not ; and [that] ¦—-— *' the Confcience of every Sinner, even the moft Wic- " ked Wretch upon Earth, witneffefh, that there is •' not any Sin, which is inevitably committed by him, " but that he hath Power enough to abftain from " it." Anfw. i. I never faid, that it was my Opi nion, That the Decree makes all Events neceffary. And therefore, z. What comes after, fuppofing it mine, is no way inconfiftent with any thing I faid, as my own. And yet, 3. I defy him to prove, that thsre is any thing in hypothetical Neceffity, inconfiftent with this Propofition ; Every Man who acts freely, knows he may aB or not. 4. The laft Words of this Quota tion are Dr. Twifs's, and not mine ; and therefore I added in the Margin, " At leaft, this was Dr. Twifs's " Judgment," to intimate that I was not pofitive in this. 5. Thefe Words, do not import, that Sinners tan abftainftom Sin in common, i. e. from all and every Sin of every Sort ; but from any particular Sin what- foever, efpecially thofe commonly called Immoralities j in which I thoroughly agree with him. 6. You know, Sir, that I every where plead, that we have Tower enough, in Millions of Cafes, to abftain from what we will certainly do. That which, he fays, " I muft " grant, if I will be confiftent with myfelf, is, either " that feme Men are damned for no Sin of their own ; " or, that every Man has (or at leaft had) Power. " enough to prevent his own Damnation; which 41 is to give up to him, (what he ridiculoufly calls,) " the Toffibility of our common Salvation" But, 1. Since I have little to do with either of the Tremiffes, I have as little to do with the Conclufion. And yet, t. Our Friend fpeaking of the loft State of Man with out Gofpel Grace, tells us, Let. 1. p. 8, 9. " We have *' loft our Right to Life and Immortality." Now ; if this be fo, every Man had this Right ;, and if fo, every Man that had it, W Power enough to prevent his own Damnation. In a Word, all Men in Addm had fufficient Toixer to do this, but now, none havb it, Missing Page Missing Page Missing Page Missing Page Missing Page Missing Page Missing Page Missing Page Missing Page ( 98) Certainty ,p.48 — 5 3." Foreknowledge implies a Certainty " in Things 5" i. e. that it is true, they will be freely done ; " and Certainty implies Neceffity," i. e. this Propofition, It is true, that they will be done freely, implies, that they are hypothetically neceflary ; gran ted: That they are in a ftriB and philofophical Senfe neceffary ; denied : This is contrary to the Suppofi tion ; " and Neceffity deftroys free Agency." i. e. a Neceffity upon Suppofition deftroys the Freedom of the Agent and Action ; than which, nothing can be more ridiculous. All this, Sir, is mere chitdijh trifling, or ferverfi Wrangling. 3. Upon this head, after a great deal of Impertinence, he plays us the old Tune, " when a Thing becomes certain, the contrary be- " comes impoffible ; becaufe what will be, muft be, " and cannot but be." Anfw. It is very plain, he knows not what Certainty, and Impoffibility, ckc. are. For, if it is true, i. e. certain, that a Thing will be, it is not only certainly, but neceffarily true*, that it is free, and will be done freely $ becaufe the Will cannot be forced, and all the ABs of the Will ate free. So that if there is any Strength, in this poor Quibble, it deftroys his whole Caufe. Ay, " but in " the compafs of a Tw6-penny Pamphlet, that has un- " dergone a third Impreffion, (which, by the by, I think I can prove to be falfe,) " you have a clear and *' decifive View of the prefent Controverfy. Why " can't we recall what is paft7. But becaufe to recall " it, is to make it not paft. • Why can't we hin- " der what is? But becaufe to hinder it, is to make " that it is not ; and fo it would be true that it is, " and yet true that it is not. — For the fame Rea- " fon it is, that none can prevent what will be ; be- " caufe to prevent it, is to make that it will not be; " and fo true, and not true, that it will be." Amazing Conceit and Ignorance! For, 1. Actions that are past, or present, are no longer the Objects of Power, as future ABions moft certainly are; and therefore, the Cafe is no way alike. He might as pertinently have argued, Becaufe the Moon is not mad© of Green-Cheefe, therefore it is not the Moon. 2. Tho* free Actions that are pafl, cannot be recalled, yet it is ftill * In his Senfe of the Word Neceffary. ( 99 ) ftill true they were free Actions, and are to be confi- dered as fuch ; and therefore, future free Actions, tho' they will not be prevented, ate ftill free, and to be confidered as fuch. 3. We never dream, that what will be done freely, will be prevented; but always fay. That it will be, which neceffarily implies, that it is and will be free. 4. Suppofing I fhould abfurdly fay, That a future Action cannot he prevented, that the Agent must do it, and will not have Tower to forbear doing it, £j?c. it will not certainly follow that it is not free : It is, perhaps, enough that he will have Tower to do it, and will do it, fince all the ABs of the Will ate free. " He then puts the whole Con- " troverfy upon this, Whether whatever is now cer" '* tain, was ever certain." Confufion all over! The only Meaning, which can be put upon thefe Words, fo as to relate to the prefent Difpute, is, Whether all the Actions or Things, which are now future, were future from before the Foundation of tbe World ? The Affirmative I have fairly demonstrated, All future free ABions, p. 47— —51. and therefore claim his Promife, " That he will yield, that all our Actions were ever " certain," i. e. It was ever true, that they would be, " and certainly foreknown from Eternity." And to prove, " that they were alfo ever free ;" ccnfider, that it was ever true, that they would be free ; they wete foreknown as free ; if they fhould not he free, this Foreknowledge would be a Mistake ; we know we ate free, and could not do them, if we wete not free. Sic. 4. He is at a lofs to tell, '* How it came to be " true [of Sin, for inftance,] that it was ever certain," i. e. in intelligible Terms, How it came to be a Truth, before the Creation, that Creatures, which were to be made, would sin, " which God's Forc- " knowledge always fuppofes." This is what he means, by enquiring elfewhere, very ridiculoufly, for the Cause of this Truth. Two Anfwers he rejects, but takes no notice of mine, which I have been forced to treat of forty times, viz. God decreed to permit future Creatures to do, what he saw they would do freely, viz. Sin, if permitted. Hence Sin was future before the Creation. As to the 5th, " He Will not require us to Shew how God can fore- O % " fie ( IOO ) " fee future Things, %$c. if we can folidly prove, that " all out freeft Actions were always future*," which, I am fure, I have done many ways. To conclude ; This Proposition, It is true that Adam will fin freely, im plies indeed a Certainty of Event ; but a Neceffity of Event, is a plain, direct ContradiBion to it; fo far is it from being, any how implied in it. This will an fwer the laft Lines. — — The next Letter, from p. 9 13. is directed to Mr. Eliot, with whom he wrangles in the former Part of it, and with me in the Latter. He is angry with Mr. Eliot, " for fuppofing a future poffible Action, i3c." forgetting his own Glofs, upon Mr. Nefs's Words, may come to pafs, Pref. p. 7. * "By [may] " there, Mr. N. muft mean, what will poffibly be'' Let him diftinguifh if he can. He will have it, for indeed it is his beloved Refort, " that when one fide " is certain, the other fide is impoffible ¦" i. e. If it is once true, that a free Agent will aB, it is impoffible fot him to forbear, " unlefs a Thing may be certain " and not certain at the fame time." What Confufion of Terms is here, without any Ideas .' Why may it not be true, that Tou,ot I, will do,whatwe may not do7. Or how can a Man, in his Senfes, deny it? Well, " but it can't " be proved, that what is certain, may never be. For if " what is certain, mufl be, (as his Antagonists, and I " in particular, have yielded,) it will follow, that " what is now certain was ever neceffary, ckc." Anfw. 1. It is falfe. I never yielded this, nor any thing like it ; but always pleaded, That free ABions, which are upon Suppofition future, are not neceffary, but free. Common Senfe will bear me out in this. 2. Our Friend does not know what he means by certain, not certain, impoffible, neceffary ; for it can hardly be thought, he would talk fo abfurdly, if he, did. What Contradiction is there in thefe Propofitions, Adam will fin, tho' he may abftain ; Tharaoh will not let the People go, tho' he may; Teter will deny his Lord, tho' he may not deny him, £5?c. But to leave this boyifh Trifling, he comes to deal with me. "He * And his own Words, viz.. " The Knowledge of what the " future Creature will be able to do, eye." ibid. See above, p. 71, 72. ( ioi ) " He conceives there is a Fallacy in our Argu- " ments," and kindly offers us Affiftance. " You fup- " pofe an immediate Oppofition between what will ,c be, and what will not be ; as if all Things that come " into Exiftence were ever of one of thefe two Ranks." Anfw. i. 'Tis hard to make Senfe of this *. z. We do conceive, there is an immediate Oppofition between thefe, Adam will fall at fuch a time, he will not fall at fuch a time. John will believe on fuch a Day, he will not believe on that Day, &c. Or we may pro pound them thus, Adam will fall at fuch a time, or not. John will believe on fuch a Day, or not. 3. He has not, he cannot fhew, that there is not an imme diate Oppofition between them. 4. We believe, that it was, before the Creation, true, of all the Actions of Men which ever have been, or ever will be done, that they would be done, as, when, and by whom, they have been or will be done. Let us now obferve how he helps us out ;' — " Whereas, as it is the Pro- " perty of fuch Effects, as depend upon an eternal " Chain of neceffary Caufes, that they were ever cer- " tain, or what ever would be, ckc." What Blaf- phemy is here ! How comes he, who fo often roars out againft Fatality, ckc. to fuppofe and eflablifh the worft fort of Fatality ! Where is there ; How can there be, an eternal Chain of neceffary Caufes! The Stoicks themfelves never talk'd fo atheifticalty, no not the moft rigid of them. " So it feems to be the Pro- " perty of contingent Events, — that they were ever " poffible indeed, but no more — they may or may not " be, either thus ot fhus ; but it is not yet " true that they will be, nor that they will not be, — — " till fuch time as the Agent itfelf hath done fome- " thing to make them certain." Here are moe Blun ders than Lines. 1. Contingency, is here confounded with Toffibility. Contingent Events wete ever poffible, but no more. 2. Then they were never contingent, becaufe Contingency has fimething more in it than Toffibility. 5. If they were ever poffible and no more, how comes he to fay, they may not be ? If they may not * It is indeed pure Nonfenfe! No Man in his Wits, dreams, Thar any Things, or A&ions, either do, or will come into Exiftence, of which it is trite, that they mill not be. ( I°2 ) not be, they are more than poffible j for the Idea of Toffibility has nothing to do with may not be. 4. If it is neither jpe? true, that they will be, nor yet true, that they will not be ; What are thefe Events ? Not con tingent ; for they are poffible, but no more. 5. When the Agent hath done fcmething to make them certain, are they not ftill free ABions ? If fo ; the fame Ac tions may be certain, and yet free. If »cf? what are they? Not Taffions; fot, by the Suppofition, they are ABions. If ABions, who are the Agents ? Not they who are under a Neceffity of doing them ; for a neceffary Agent is a Contradiction in Terms*. 6. The Trophecies concerning Tharaoh, Hazael, Cyrus, Te ter, ckc. were TrediBions of Things, of which, it was *#e» #nw, that they would be ; but will a Man in his Senfes fay, that either the Agents or ABions were #0 fo^er /m. But too much of this Nonfenfe, which, one would think, Should flare him in the Face. " However, he has fufficiently expofed and confuted " this plaufible Piece of Sophiftry in his Reply to me, " p. 54, $6." Where is the Connexion? All this fine Reafoning is his own, and not ours. It is however very true, and we pity him for it, that he fufficiently expofes and confutes his awn Nonfenfe, almoft in every place where he blabs it out. His Argument follows, " Thefe two Propositions, I will write again in the u Controverfy ; J will not write' again, ckc. (fup- " pofing my writing again to be now a contingent " Action) are not contradiBory, but only contrary " Tropofitions, which may be both falfe, tho' not " both true, i. e. It is as yet neither true, that I will, " nor that I will not write again, but only true that I *' may do either." This is contrary to common Senfe. For, Thefe Things are felf-evident, that in all fuch Cafes, I may do either, cannot do both, and must do one of them. Ask any of the ignorant Multitude, Whether thefe Propofitions, It is now true, that he willtty to anfwer me; It is not now true, thathe will try ; can poffibly he both falfe ? Whether one of them, is not now true; and the other now falfel Whether, * And yet, thefe Words fuppofe, That he who does fome- thing to make tbem certain, is te be the Agent that will d» them ! &c. ( 103) Whether, upon the Suppofition, that it is now true, that he will try to anfwer me, His future Trial and Anfwer, will not be both of them free Actions ? Or, Whether notwithstanding the Truth of this Propofition, He will not have Tower, or •anil not be as free, to for bear the Trial, as he would have been, had it not been true, ckc ? I leave it to you, Sir, and to all Men to judge. " But to illustrate this, he propofes an- " other Example, viz. of Cain's murdering Abel. " And here, to be contradiBory, the Propofitions, " fhould not run thus, [it is true that] Cain will mur~ " der Abel ; or [it is true that] Cain will not murder " Abel. For fince whilft one fide is true, the other, " by my own Confeffion, is certainly falfe ; this latter " muft be impoffible to be true, and confequently is " not contingent ; unlets a Thing can be both falfe " and true, at the fame time." Heu! Quantum eft fapere ! This chitdijh Trifling, is beneath Contempt. The fantaftical placing ofthe Bracket's, as if there was fcmething myfterious in it ; the proceeding from Tro~ pofttions to Sides ; the ridiculous fuppofing, that the Futurition of a free Choice, implies that it is«o longer free, or makes the contrary impoffible; the Reafoning from a contingent ABion, to a contingent Tropofition, which is flagrant Nonfenfe, &c. ate Beauties not to be found, in any Author, before our Friend. Common Senfe will convince you, that all that follows from this Propofition, Cain will murder Abel; is neither more npr lefs than this, He will do it : And that all that follows from this, He will no.tr mur der him ; is only this, He will not do it. Suppofing this Propofition, Mr. F. will anfwer me, to be now true ; Will any Man, in his Senfes, bellow out, then it is no longer a free ABion ; then he will not have a. Tower to forbear, ckc ? Is there any feeming Contra diction, between a Will to do one Thing, and a Power to let it alone7. Pray, Sir, ask any Creature above an Idiot. Ay ; but if one Part of a contra diBory Propofition be true, the other is falfe. %' rue.. Each Part then, is immutably what it is. Right. Can any Propofition, or any Part of it, be both true- and falfe, at the fame time, and in the fame Refpect ? No. If then, it be true, That Cain will murder Abel, it is plain, He must doit, he cannot but do it, he ( i°4 ) he wi ft not have Power to abftain, it is no longer a free Action, &c. All this I deny. Tho' it is true, that he will ; it is not true that he must ; that he cannot but do it, or will not have Power ft) abftain from this Murder, ckc. So far from it, that if it he true, that he will, it is as true, that he may let it alone; i. e. if he will have a Power to corn- wit this Murder, he will have a Power to forbear. The former neceffarily fuppofes or implies the latter. But what if he fhould forbear ? Anfw.. This is con trary to the Suppofition. Let us then fee, how he puts them, " But to be contradiBory, the Propofition " Should run thus, It was ever true, that Cain would " murder Abel ; or, it was not ever true, that Cain " would murder Abel ; I fay, it was not ever true, tho' *' eventually he did murder him." Hem! Homohomini quid prteflat ! How filly is this ! Here there is but one Propofition, whereas in the former -Example he made two; here there are no Brackets to confound the ignorant Multitude, there we had two Tair of them ; Jaere the little Word ever is 'added, only to make a Ihew of a Difference where there is none, which there he wifely omitted, $$c. This Propofition, in plain Englijh, would run thus, It was ever true, that Cain would murder Abel, or, it was not ever true, i. e. it was ever falfe. He fays it was not ever true, for this wife Reafon, which is a Contradiction both to the Tropofition and to common Senfe, viz. " had it been " ever true, it would never have been in his Power to " have prevented the Murder." Whereas, it is felf-evi dent, that if it was true, that Cain would have Tower to murder his Brother, he would alfo have Tower to forbear. It was only true that he would ; not that he would not have Tower to abftain. We fay in Oppo fition to him, That it was ever true, that Cain would murder Abel, at fuch a time, and in fuch a manner ; and fupport it with thefe Reafons. i. He aBually did murder him, which fuppofes that it was true, that he wojild. z. Had this Propofition, Cain will flay his Brother, on fuch a day, and in fuch a manner, been ever not true, * i. e. falfe, this muft have, been known to * Or, had it been, in any fuppofed Infiant, either before the Creation, or after it, not true, gcc. I: muft have been then falfe, &c. ( 105 ) to the Omniscient ; and confequently, when Cain aBually did do it, he would have made Infallibility fallible, ckc. 3 . As Truth is invariable, fo is Falfliood ; if therefore, this Propofition had been falfe, it muft have been immutably fo, which is contradicted by the Event. We alfo fay, that it was ever true, thathe might not murder his Brother; and that there is not fo much as a feeming Contradiction between thefe, He will ; He may not : Or, vice verfa, He may not; He will. But too much in fo plain a Cafe. He farther illufirates the Mattter thus ; " As it is one " Thing to fay. Water is hot, or not hot : One of " them is certainly true, the other as certainty falfe. " And another Thing to fay, Water is hot, ot cold. " Thefe can't indeed be both true, but they may be •' both falfe ; for it may be neither hot, nor cold, but " lukewarm only." Mr. M. would do well to lay " his Axe to the Root, and try his Strength here." Truly fol fhould, did I fee either Tree, Shrub, otBufh, to cut down. There is nothing, but what may be blown down with a Puff: Nothing to require an Axe : Nothing which I have not demolifhed more than — As for his Propofition, Water is hot, or cold, there is nothing in all my Arguments, that is any how parallel to it ; fo that it is wholly befides his Purpofe. If one of thefe, Water is hot, or not, he cer tainly true, and tbe other certainly falfe ; Then it is felf-evident, that one of thefe, Adam will fall, or not ; The Word will be mddeFlefh, or not; ckc. was ever certainly true, and the other as certainly falfe; and it is the fame in all the like imaginable Propositions, if certainly true, then it is evident that they would be$ if certainly not true, or falfe j then it is as plain, that they would not be. This is all we plead ! So that he himfelf, as ufual, has destroyed his own Quirks. I kindly defired him, to confidet well the Nature of thefe Propositions^ which he did not feem to under stand ; and-it is now evident to Aftonifliment, that I was not miflaken; and that he Will rather fay -the medneft Things, thah nothing. In Expectation of his talking fomething, on this Point, like one who knows what he is about, I had provided a whole Sheet, upon contradiBory and contrary Tropofitions, intending to P amend ( 106 ) amend a Miflake or two of my own, and to make them plain, even to the ignorant Multitude: But every Man in his Senfes, would fay I had loft mine, Should 1 difpute any more about this, when it is plain, thathe knows not what is requifite to contradiBory Tropofi- tions, and has granted alfo all that we contend for. The Queftion following Shall be anfwered before I have done. His Conclufion alfo being fo weak, as to be beneath Contempt, I fhall only defire him, in my Turn, To lay his Axe to the Root of my four Demon strations, OmnifcienccofGod, ckc. p. 42 — 89. Of my Arguments to demonstrate, that there are such Things as future Contingencies,^. Alt future free ABions, ckc. p. 43. 58. of my Examination of his senseless Axioms, ibid. p. 55, 56. Of my Remarks, and Queftions, upon which I laid fo much Strefs, OmnifcienceofGod, ckc. p. 235, and 243. All which will ftand the Affaults of all the Socinians upon Earth, and that for ever, upon his Principles. \n feveral- of the following Letters, directed to Mr. Eliot, he has faid a great deal, from feveral Authors, very confufidly, and to little Turpofi, concerning Li berty, in which I have hardly any Concern, having faid little upon this SubjeB in my former Letters, and having largely, and, I hope, clearly, given my Judg ment of it above, from p. 12. 43. But feveral Things calling forfevere Animadverfion, I Shall offer a few curfory Remarks upon them; In the next, from p. 1 3. — — . 18. he begins with an amazing Bravado, " I have, I think, demonstrated," (tho' we have feen nothing like Demonflration, no, nor common Senfe :) " That Pur free Actions were not " always certain, but are only poffible," {i. e. that it was not true, that we would, but only might io them ; tho', how an Action can be ours, ot called ours, till we either do it, or till it is true, that we will do it, no Man can imagine :) " till we ourfelves have done " fomething to make them certain." He Should have. added, and confequently not free. This is the Point he Should have laboured. Pray, Sir, What was there in this Propofition, I am fure that Pharaoh will not let you go ; or in this, One of you will betray me, that leffened ( ro7 ) leffened Tharaoh's or Judas's Liberty, or made thefe finful ABions not free, but neceffary ? He adds, " that all his Opponents do, with one Confent, allow, " That in Reality Things are fuppofed certain," (i. e. that it is true, that they will be,) " before " they- are foreknown." I, for my Part, do not ufe to talk fo loofely ; and therefore, if the Expreffion, has any where dropt from me, I hereby retract it. Since it is improper, to talk of Priority or Tofterio- rity in Eternity, my Opinion is, That neither is there any Foreknowledge before the ObjeB of it is certain, ottrue; nor is the ObjeB of it certain or true, before the Foreknowledge of it; but that they are both fimul- taneous, in figno, tarn rationis, quam temporis, as the Schools fpeak. Trefcience indeed supposes its Ob ject, but not its Exiftence, or Truth, before it is fore known. The firft Queftion he propofes, is, " Whether an accountable Creature must be a free " Agent7." A Queftion that was never denied, by any Calvinift, that I know of: Nor did I ever hear of any ObjeBion, either from Reafon or Revelation, againft the free Agency of accountable Creatures, in my Life. Many Difputes I have read, concerning Liberty, and wherein the Effence of it does confifi ; but never any, Whether Men Are free. In his Explication of the Terms, he goes on blun dering from one to another, throughout. Upon the firft, " It is the Will that is properly the moral Agent " within us;" whereas, it is the Terfon properly that is the Agent. Upon the fecond, " An accountable " Creature is fuch as is capable of Virtue or Vice » " /. e. is in a State of Trial — >- &c." Pray, Sir, are not Devils accountable Creatures? I defire him calmly to confider this, and what I have offered in An fwer to his Appendix, p. 108. Upon the q.th, viz. *' All free Agency is oppofed to Neceffity ; &c." befides feveral obvious Weaknefles, he has faid nothing of Necessity upon Supposition, which is the prin cipal Thing, he fhould have here considered. This, Sir, you'll give me leave to call, either grofs Igno rance, or fhameful Trevarication. See what I have faid upon it above, p. 43 — ?\%. Upon the tfh, We agree, that internal Neceffity, and external Co-aBion, P 2 ate ( 108 ) are inconfiftent with Liberty ; And that there Ss no Freedom, where there is not a Tower to chufe. But when he adds, that " when foever the Will is necefla- " rily determined to any Act or Object, by any thing " within or without itfelf, it has not a Liberty of " Choice, ckc." * We anfwer, r. He can hardly make Senfe of all this. 2. If any thing fo determine the Will, as to force it, or make it paffive, or, only paffive, as he loves to fpeak, we grant, that in fuch, and the like Cafes, it has not a Liberty of Choice. But, 3. When God, by his Grace, determines the Will, fo as to excite, and caufe it, to determine itself, it has then a Liberty of Choice, and determines itfelf freely ; and the fironger, and more efficacious,^ the Determina tion is, fo much the firmer, and more perfeB, is the Liberty, f Upon the 6th, " When he diflingui/hes *' between a Liberty of Volition, (wifely telling us,) " that this is a Liberty of the Will, and a Liberty of " ABion, which, (he profoundly declares,) is rather a *' Liberty ofthe infer iour and executive Powers, £5?r." It is very plain he would fay Something, if he knew what. Upon the -jth, Among other things, he conr tradicts what he faid upon the $d. There, " an A- *' gent, is one that has a felf determining Tower, " He that has not this, can do nothing •. Troper Ac- ** tion is above his Sphere, £5?o." Here " he chufes ?' to put the Queftion, not about the Agency on- " ly, but about the free Agency, ckc." As if there could be any proper Agency, or any Agency, which concerns this Difpute, where there is no Liberty. As to the 2th, No body doubts, that we have a Power, as to chufe or refufe, fo to fix our Choice ; for, " as to the Will's having fuch a Tower," I think it hardly Senfe. His Proof to fupport this, is as ridi culous, as it is needlefs ; and his fuppofing " a contrary *' Hypothefis," which no Man, not diffracted, ever did, * I defire he would reconcile this, with his own Words quoted in the very next Page, of the Objeffs afeertaining their Choice, 8cc. f I d6 not know, but the fame may be faid, tho' in a lower Senfe, when any extraordinary Honour, Profit, or Satif- faBton, which fuits our Tafle, or raifes our Expectation, is pre sented to us, in the moft engaging Light, &c. ( 109 ) did, and telling us what would follow upon that Sup pofition, is beneath Contempt. Among feveral Truths, taken ftom fome good Authors, upon the 9th and 10th, there is only a great deal of poor Conceit and Trifling, little to the Purpofe, and the evident DefeB of what would have been indeed pertinent. Give me leave but to ask, a few Queftions, out of many, which na turally offer themfelves. 1. What does he mean by faying, " And now, that they might not be fatdlly " deceived, their kind Creator has took Care, that " fuch Reafons for their Duty, and on the fide of " their real Happinefi, Shall ever be in their Reach, " as Shall vaftly out-weigh in themfelves, any thing " they can fairly put in the oppofite Scale againft " them?" I doubt there is more of Deifm in this, than he is capable of comprehending. But, to pafs it ; if he intends any thing, in thefe Lines, contrary to the Trinciples ofthe Reformed Churches, the feven Claffes of Troofs, which I have given above, will for ever confute and demolifh it. 2. What by thefe Words; '' As the Will can do no more, than put " itfelf as it can" {Surely it can do no more than it can .') " under, the Influence of Light and Evidence, " of Motives and Encitements; fo, if there be no- " thing in the Objects thus prefented, thus perceived " and weighed, to afcertain their Choice, or to render " their Choice fixed andfteady, the Will muft remain, " after all, a fantastical, whimfical Power : And whe- " ther it chufes well or ///, can be no more virtuous or " vicious in its Choice, than the lucky or unlucky, but " cafual Concourfe of Atoms ; or than the blind De- " terminations of Chance or Fortune are fo." Rifum teneatis ! It would puzzle any Philofopher upon Earth, to (hew either the Senfe otTertinence of this. * What does he mean by afeertaining their Choice ; by a cafual Concourfe of Atoms; £S?c? How came he to talk of fuch Impoffibilities ! Suppofing thefe do not afcertain the Choice, why may not the confiquent ABs be vir tuous, ot vicious, ckc? I am really forry I have fuch Things * The Truth is, it will not be eafy to find fo much Non fenfe in fo fern Lines, any where ; nor indeed to conceive fo much ! Befides, that it is direffly contrary to bis own Word's, in the preceeding Page. ( tio ) Things to animadvert upon. 3. What by thefe, " As *' the Will has a Tower to chufe, and to fix its Choice ; " fo this fixed Choice, ufually, becomes a fixed Rule to " its oWn Conduct. *- The Will Stands bound, as it " were, by its own At? ot Choice, ckc." I fhould ne*- yer have done, to treat this as it deferves. Obferve only, 1. By afeertaining the Choice, a fixed Rule, and being bound, ckc. he muft mean, if to his Purpofe, That the Will is fo fixed and bound, that it must do fo ot fo, cannot forbear, &C- that the following Actions, are no longer free, but necessary, $3c. If fo,- z. Then are we neceffarily determined by the ObjeBs; yea, as Dr. Clarke has it above, we are hot properly aBive, but paffive. If fo, 3. Then we are not indeed free Agents ; yea, there never was a free Action, of any great Importance, in the World. To this Tafs does he bring Things ! 4. Whatever he means by thefe Words and thofe preceeding, they evidently contradict his Sayings quoted, p. 108. and thofe from another Author, quoted, p. in. with which he a- grees. In his next Letter, from p. 1 8 to 24. be offers his Rea fons why an accountable Creature muft be a free Agent. But leaft this Should be cenfured as needlefs, he quotes a Paffage of a Sermon, which I could npt get, and in which I have but very little Concern ; and brings me in alfo, as faying, or rather dreaming, what never came into my Mind. " Mr. M. (tho' his prefent Sen- " fiments feem to be fomewhat different) made it the " common Opinion pf his Brethren, that the Creature " and Creator both, are under an univerfal Neceffity, " in all their Volitions and ABions.'' Flagrant Non fenfe ! I affure you, Sir, I am of the fame Mind as to thefe Things, I ever was, fince I knew any thing of them ; only more confirmed, by the fhatnelefs Shifts,, which Telagianizers ate put to, in oppoflng them. Had I entertained any Doubt about them, our Friend's prodigious Letters and Effays, would have removed them all- I ever . believed and pleaded, that the Omnipotent is the freest of all Be ings; and that all his Decrees and Works, ate most free: That Angels and Men, in their flrfl State, were as free, as fuch Creatures could he : And that noWi ( III ) now, in out finful State, wc ate ftill free ; fo free, that we might have done Millions pf Things which we have not done, and omitted Millions of Things, we have done, &c. But what has he to fupport this hei nous Charge7 I had faid, in a private Letter to him, written as to a Friend, of only half a Sheet of Paper, DireBion and all, and which I little thought ever to have feen in Trint, * " That the Liberty or Freedom " of the Will confifts in an Indifference to this or that, " your Adverfaries abfolutely deny, and it appears to " them manifestly falfe ; fince no fuch Indifference, c< they think, is, or can be found in a rational Agent, " finite or infinite." His Explication of which is like himfelf, " Now what is this but to fay, That all " Things are abfolutely neceffary, and what were *l ever beyond the Power of the Creature, or of " the Creator, either to prevent or alter." And then from fenfelefs Premifes draws as fenfelefs a Conclufion. Anfw. i . This he produced, in his Ap pendix, to which I replied, in my Anfwer to it, p. 140. And I wonder how Mr. F. could read, and much more how he pretends fo bring up this again, and overlook the full Reply made to it. 2. I have pro duced fome of the moft learned of the prefent Age, much more biafs'd in favour of Socinianifm than Cal- vinifm, who oppofe this Notion, That the Essence of Liberty confifts in an Indifferency to this and that, i. e. to good and evil, as I explained myfelf, and as every Man, but our Author, would have taken my Meaning. 3. I have plainly and clearly eftabli- Shed this Truth above, p. 20—33. Will any Man, not flaring mad, fay, That God is indifferent to Evil, i. e. Sin, in any Senfe of the Word indiffe rent ? f Will any Man, that reads ¦ and believes the Bible, fay, that Angels or Men, good or bad, ate in different to Good and Evil, i. e. equally inclined to * When I offered to print the Letters, which paft between us, thinking- it would have been of Service ; He, aihamed of what he had written, earneftly defired, I would not j which I very generoufly complied with, as you may know hereafter. f I have not forgotten my Promife, relating to many weak and prophane Things, cdncerning this Queftion, Whether Cod is free? Eflay, p. 1 18 — -124. as he fhall know hereafter. ( "2 ) to one and the other ; for fo, I underftood the Word. 4. I did not fay, that God, or the Creatures, were not indifferent, in any Cafe ; but only, that the Ef fence of Liberty did not confift in this Indifference: Or, that a rational Freedom, may fubfift without it. 5. And therefore the Concluflon he draws, does incon ceivably outrun my Tremifes, Stretch them how you will, fo as to make Senfe of them. But our Author, like his Mafters, has got the Knack of making any Words, mean any thing: And if Chalk be in the Pre- mifes, he Shall be fure to have Cheefe in the Conclu sion.. He then falls in with a long Quotation from a late ingenious Author, " That the Scheme which de- " termines the Will always and certainly by the Un- " derftanding, and the Underftanding by the Situa- " tion and Appearance of Things, feems to take " away the true Nature and Distinction of Vice " and Virtue, £$e." Forgetting, 1. That this is an evident Contradiction to what we have obferved upon in his former Letter, " That if there be nothing in " the Object thus prefented , thus perceived and " weighed, to afcertain their Choice, ckc. the Will " muft remain, after all, a fantaftical, whimfieal " Power, &c." 2. That the Situation and Appear ance of Things, are but the Reafons and Motives of our Actions, and not the Efficients of them ; nor do they fo work upon us, as to abridge our Power, or Jeffen our Liberty, in the leaft. 3. That it is the eafleft Thing in the World, for fome Men, to quote Scraps from Authors, which they do not underftand. His Quotation from Bifhop Taylor, " That if in hu- " man Actions there be a Fate, then there is no Con- " tingency, and then all Deliberation was the greateft " Folly in the World, tfc." is, with all Refpect to that learned Man, hardly Senfe. For, upon this Sup pofition, there is a Fate, in all our Confultations and Deliberations, as well as ABions. His own Words following are fo extremely filly, that I am afhamed to tranfcribe them ; fince none of us deny, that the greateft part, at leaft, of our accountable JIBions, as he calls them, were free. I, for my part, believe they are all fo. But I muft carefully confider his Quotation ( H3 ) Quotation from Bifhop Burnet, which he thus intro duces; " And this is fo plain a Cafe, that the greateft " Affertors of our captivated State by the Fall, have " fome of them been obliged to recede at kit from " the Rigour of thtir Opinion. " Luther went on " long, fays Bifhop Burnet, as he at firft fet out, " with fo little Difguife, that whereas all. Tarties " had always pretended, that they afferted the Free- " dom of the Will, he plainly fpoke out, and faid the *' Will was not free, but enflaved. Yet before he " died, he is reported to have changed his Mind ; " for tho' he never own'd that, yet MclanBhou. who " had been of the fame Opinion, did freely retraB " it ; for which he was never blamed by Luther." Burnet's Exposition, p. 151. Here, Sir, you'll ob ferve, r. That the Bifhop fpeaks of this doubtfully, as a Report only, and that too but poorly fupported ; but our Friend roundly and mfljly affirms, that he was obliged to recede, ckc. So natural is it for him, to overfhoot himfelf, and boldly aflert what he wijhcs, without any regard to Truth or Modefty. 2. It is far from being true, that Luther was the firft who ufed the Phrafe firvum arbitrium. The learned Vcff.us, in his celebrated Hiftory of Telagianifm, Book 4. Part 1 ft, p. 430. and the famous Janfinius, in his Auguftinus, Tome 2. Book 3. ch. 5. p. 188. have given unconteftable Proofs, that the Exprefflon was often ufed by Augufline, and others after him. The former judicioufly adds, that in this, the Scripture went' before them, Whofiever committeth Sin, is the John viii. Servant of Sin. For when ye Were the Servants of 7,^. Sin, ckc. 3. It was not candid, to infinuate that Lu- Rom. vi. ther, in this departed from the common Sentiments of I<5< '7>2o, the Catholicks before, or the Troteflants about, and a long time after,, the Reformation. The Book was De servo highly valued, by all the Reformed, and juftly efteemed, Arbitrio. as the ever famous Turretine calls it, a Golden Book : Nor did he, in any thing material, differ from his Brethren. 4. It was lefs fair, to fiy thy pretended that they afferted the Freedom of the Will. The Cal- vinifts do realty aflert the Freedom of the Will ; * fuch Q_ * And fo did Augufline and his Followers, and the School men, both Supralapfarians and Sublapfarians. ( "4) a Freedom, as they find in the Bible, as was known and taught in the ancient Church, and as Believers do indeed perceive they have in themfelves; but openly deteft, and oppugn, the Pelagian Free-will, as a mere Chimera in itfelf; and an Idol fet up, to evert tho Grace of the Gofpel ; and what was utterly unknown to the ancient Church, &c. 5. We need not wonder, that he is reported to have - changed his Mind ; for what is it, that Telagianizers willnot both invent and report7. But it was without all juft Foundation. A- mong all his Works, this and another were his Favou rites, as they well deferved to be. Mr. Hickman, in his Hiftory of Arminians, p. 362. tells us, that the Duke of Saxony, and Schluffelburgh, who could hard ly be in this miflaken, folemnly declared, that Luther never retraBed this Book, and give very black Cha- raBers to the Broaehers and Spreaders of this falfe Report ; and that the Divines of Saxony, in Coll. Alden. account all of them Thieves, Robbers, and fa- criligious Perfons, who repudiate the Book de fervo arbitrio, or endeavour to alienate the Lutheran Church from it. 6. 1 much doubt, whether MelanBhon ever Spoke upon this Point, with that Opennefs, which Luther ufed ; but if he did, it does not appear he ever retraBed it. He was a cautious, timorous Man, and laboured, efpecially as he grew old, by all fafe Means, to gain the Weak, and give no Offence, declining to de clare his Sentiments fully ; and was therefore fufpected of trimming about the Article of ' Tredeftination, (tho' even in this, it was but Sufpicion,) but as to the other, he never made any Scruple, fo far as I can find, if our Friend has any thing but Hear-fay, to oppofe to this, it fhall be fufficiently confuted. 7. The Dif- courfe which the Bifhop had, as our Author tells us, with a German Divine, a hundred and forty Years af ter Luther's Death, proves nothing but this, That af ter the Deceafe of that great Man of God, many, who gloried to be called by his l$ame,forfiok his Principles, and denied and oppofed the Articles which they had subscribed ; and fo fulfilled a fort of Prophecy of their Matter, That he forefaw the DoBrines of the Gofpel would befadly corrupted, when he was gone. God grant we had no Reafon to lament, that the fame fcandalous ( H5 ) fcandalous Practice has prevailed in other Countries, as well as Germany. But there are fome other Things, in the fame Paragraph of the Bifhop's Ex- pofltion, upon which I muft remark. And, i. He fays, " That fince that time, all the Lutherans have gone " into the Semi-Pelagian Opinions fo entirely and " fo eagerly, that they will neither tolerate nor hold " Communion with any of the other Perfuafion." Anfw. i. This muft be taken with fome Grains of Allowance ; for it is well known, that this did not happen, till long after Luther's Death ; and that there were then not a few, as there have been fome ever fince, very much inclined to the well known Principles of their Matter. 2. This Animofity did not filely, no not principally arife from thefe Things, but from the Sacrament ary Controverfy. Several Conferences were held between the Parties; fometimes they parted amicably, and when they did not, their Heats were not about the Calviniftical Points, as they have been fince called, but the other. Luther's Followers foon perceiving, that their Opinions were fo far from fpreading, after his Death, that they rather loft Ground, in moft Places ofthe Empire; and that Calvinifm every where prevailed in France, Great- Britain„ Sic. and that the readieft way to preferve their Intereft was, not by defending Confubftantiation, ot fome Ceremonies, which they had retained, and for which they were extremely zealous ; but by mifrepre<- finting the Doctrine of Tredeftination, which was not fo clearly and exprsfsly defined in their Confeffion ; and by raking together all that the Telagians and Se- mi-Telagians of Old, and the Jefttits then were bel lowing out againft it, and roaring out the greateft Un truths, to make People abhor the true DoBrine, and all that profefs'd it, &c. For thefe valuable Ends, it is fufficiently known, that Pcpijh Gold was given in abundance, and proved by far the beft Argument. But too much on this melancholy Subject. 2. " Calvin " not only taught St. Auftin's Doctrine, but feemed to " go on to the Supralapfarian way, which was more " openly taught by Beza, and was generally followed " by the Reformed." Anfw\ 1. If Calvin feemed, be did but feem to go on to this Way ; for we have Q_2 made ( "«) made it evident, from his own Words, (and all Men will grant, that he knew his own Principles, and could well exprefi his own Senfe ;) that he was by no means a Supralafif avian. See Ojnnifcience of 'God, ckc. p. 144. 2. That Bczr, and not a few of his Cotemporaries, who were Men eminent in their Generation, taught this way, is not to be denied : But that it was gene-r rally followed by the Reformed, is far from being true. I cannot find, that any of the Churches, have this Hy- pothefls in their Confeffions : And therefore, it was ne ver in any Country generally received by Minifters, nor commonly taught among, or received by the Peo ple. The Bifhop grants, in the next Paragraph, That in England the firft Reformers were generally in the Sublapfarian Hypothefis ; nor would it be eafy to find one Exception of any great account : And, 1 think, I can make it appear, That in the Churches beyond Sea, not one often in that Age, and not one of thirty in the next, were in the other. Of all the Deputies from the foreign Churches, in the famous Synod of Dort, (the moft venerable the Protcftant Churches ever faw, or that has met in Chriftendom for more than a thoufand Tears ,) there was not fo much as one individual Supra- lapfarian : Of all the Dutch Profeflors, there was but Aa.Svn. one, {Gomarus,)* who openly owned this Scheme: And T bef°re we °an clearly fee fupernatural Truth. ,g '4. Tho' to come, ckc. be our Duty, yet we neither 1 Cor. ii. will, not can come, without preventing, exciting, in- 14. dining Grace. 5. When the renewed, ate inclined Jo. v. 4,0. and enabled to come, ckc. and when they do come, they Jo. vi. 44. indeed act freely, more freely than ever before; Jer. xxxi. ^ut t{jen> tfley are not left to themfelves, nor do they Pf' come of themfelves. it is not they, but Grace. Pf cxix tf- What he hereinfinuates, is, 1. But very little Short 22. of the very Dregs of Telagianifm. 2. It is fo far from Cant. i. 4. being generally received by all, except the moft rigid z Cot. iii. f.Tredeftinarians, (by which Words, he knows not 1 Cor. xv.what.he is faying,) that it never was, not ever will be IOm received, by any one Perfon, who reads and under go, xv. 5- jianfc His Bible, and believes it too ; or is acquain ted with the Tlague of his own Heart. " %dly, A " Freedom of Indifference, does not fuppofe, that our " Difpo- ( 121 ) " Difpofitions or Inclinations be in an equal Degree " of Indifference, or in a perfect Equilibrio, as to " either Side, ckc. It is enough if wc be riot abfolute- " ly flaked down to one Side ; tho' we muft fight, and " run, and endure in both, would we turn the Ba- iC lance for Holinefs, ^and a bleffid Immortality." Here are as many Falfhoods and Weaknefles almoft as Words, i. It would puzzle a much greater Man than he, to make Senfe of this. z. If we are not equally, or very near equally inclined to either Side, wc cannot with Truth, he called indifferent to ei ther: Nor is our Freedom to either, a Freedom of In differency. To fay, that a Man who has the firongefl real, or apparent Motives to one Side, and few or none to the other ; or is naturally inclined to one, and violently averfe to the other, is indiffe rent to either, is a notorious Untruth: And if this is known, a wilful Lye. 3. He does not know what he means by being abfolutely ftak'd down to one Side : Nor is any Sinner, even the vileft, and when given up of God, abfolutely ftak'd down to any one Sin, or Species of Sin. 4. His hinting, that by our fighting, running, and enduring in both, we, i. e. the Unre- generate, without preventing Grace, — of which you'll hardly find a Syllabic in all his Writings, ¦ may turn the Balance for Holinefs, is exprefsfy con trary to Scripture, inconfiftent with the Covenant of Grace, and rank Telagianifm. 5. It is very obfer- vable, that there is not a Syllable of Grace, of any fort, or in any degree, in this Paragraph. Flere then, is the very Poyson of Telagius, in its utmoft Extent. And yet, he elfewhere bo aft s of his being much for free Grace, and appeals to his Friend for the Truth of it, $$c. with the fame Judgment and Candour, that runs thro' all his Letters. True ; 'tis for a free Grace that may be had, i. e. fuch as every Sinner may with out Grace do fomething to procure, one way or an other. But this is a flaring Contradiaion ; and a- mounts to, a free Grace, that may be, and is, merited, in the ancient Senfe of that Word. It is indeed everfive of free Grace. To pafs feveral o- ther Things, give me leave to ask you, Whether it be R poffible, ( 122 ) poffible, to reconcile all this, with another Principle of his, Lett. i. p. 8, 9. " That we have loft our Difpofl- " tion to Holinefs, — — our carnal Minds ate Enmity " againft God, we have loft our Tower to recover, " without the Divine Help, this Difpofition. The " carnal Mind neither is, nor indeed can be fubjeB to " the Law of God, ckc." If all this is true, Is it pof fible for us to fight and run, ckc. while our Minds are thus carnal; Or till this Enmity is removed, and we be difpofed by overcoming Grace and Omnipotent Power ? The next Paragraph is fo extremely ridiculous, as to confute itfelf. For Example, i. " The Decree itfelf, " cannot undertake, that the Creature fhall do that, u which, after all, muft be entirely left to its own " Liberty." To wave the Nonfenfe of this, we an fwer, i. If this is underftood of the Decree to per mit, you'll fee it abundantly confuted, in my Omni- fcience, ckc. f.paffim. z. If of fuch a Decree as that, To send the Affyrian againft an ungodly Nation, we have Shewn above, p. 1 5— — 18. that neither the Decree, nor the Execution of it, abridged the Affyrian' s Li berty, or extenuated his Guilt. 3. If of the Decree to convert the EleB, or cause them to walk in his Ways, ckc. We deny that the Execution of the De cree leaves the Will indifferent : But plead, that it fweetly and effeBually inclines it to Duty, with a new and fpiritual Liberty, which no Sinner has, or can have, without viBorious Grace. 2. In Oppofi tion to a Trinciple of mine, That God may decree, that fome Events pall come to pafs, not neceffarily, but contingently ot freely ; He replies: " We'll grant " them, God may decree that an Action fhall come to " pafs, either contingently or neceffarily ; either by " the Creature's free Choice, or by his own over-bear- "¦ ing Influence : But then the Exiftence ofthe Action " is all that the Decree makes certain, not the Man- " ner of its Exiftence. It is now certain, it fijall exift, " either one way or the other ; but not that it Shall exift " by the Creatures free Choice." Eheu ! §htantum eft fapere ! I have given every Word of this Heap of Ab furdities, that all may fee the flaring ContradiBions in it, and' he himfelf he convinced of them. To pafs half a dozen leffer Blunders, Obf. j. He grants, That God (I23 ) may decree that an Action pall come to pafs, either contingently or neceffarily ; but fays, that then the Ex iftence of the Action is all that the Decree makes cer tain, not the Manner of its Exiftence. A direB Con tradiction, if any can be fo ! He grants, that God may decree that an Action pall come to pais, either by the Creature's free Choice, or the other way ; but ridiculoufly contends, that when he has' decreed, that itpall come to pafs by the Creature's free Choice, it is not then certain that it pall exift by the Creature's free Choice. Another glaring Contradiction, if any ever was! 2. If an Action comes to pafs neceffarily, it is a ¦neceffary Action ; but, with him, a neceffary Action, is no ABion. Here then is another Contradiction ; an ABion and no ABion! 3. By this over-bearing Influ ence, if he means, the Influence of Light only, as he muft mean to be confiftent with himfelf; I ask him, What is there in this, inconfiftent with free Choice ? I defy him to fhew me. Common Senfe will tell him, that the more of this Influence we are under, we chufe fo much the more readily, and with the greater Rea fon, Tleafure, and Delight ; and are therefore, the more free. 4. If God may decree that an Action pall come to pafs, either contingently or neceffarily, 1 want to know wherein he oppofes me. Do you think, Sir, that he knows what he would be at? It is very true, that p. 43. he directly contradicts all this, as ufual. " To fay that God may decree that fome Events fiiall " come to pafs, not neceffarily, but contingently or " freely ; is the fame as to fay% That God may de- " cree Contradictions, that a Thing fhall be both con- " tingent and not contingent, neceffary and not neccf- " fary. Whereas to decree that an Event Shall be " free, is neither to decree that it pall he, not fl) all " not be, but only that it Shall be left to fome future " free Agent, whether itflmllhe, or no." An fix. 1. To decree, that a Thing pall come to pafs contin gently, or, which is the fame in the prefent Cafe, freely, is to decree, that it Jhall be done by a free and accountable Agent, acting according to his own Choice, and having a Tower to let it alone. Thus He decreed fo send the Affyrian againft an ungodly Nation, ckc. a. To decree that an Event pall be both contingent, R 2 and ( I24 ) and not contingent, is no Contradiction, unlefs it be in the fame refpect, and with relation to the fame Time J which have no place here. Thus, God's sending the Affyridn, ckc. was no longer contingent,' i. e. un certain, in refpect of Him, who decreed and threa tened this; tho' his finding him was ftill a free Ac tion: But it was contingent, i.e. free, in refpect of the Affyrian, who acted fo freely, as to be puniped for his Mifcarriages. 3. Whether an Event fhall be, Ot no, is never left to any Creature ; nor can be : Nor can this be afferted without a Denial of Provit. hence. It is enough, if in all Cafes, in which we are left to our own free Choice, we may, and know we may aEf or not. But to proceed ; moft that follows is beneath Contempt, fuch as, his talking ,l of God's " bringing the Evidence and our Faculties effectb- ?' ally together, Speedful ;" (of which I formerly, defired him to make Senfe, well knowing it is beyond his Ability;) " and his fenfelefs Objection, and An- " fwer ; c3c." To reply to them by the way, I de fire you- would ask one of the ignorant Multitude, What Appearance of a Contradiction there is in fup pofing, That it is true, that They, or Ton, or I, will indeed hereafter do, what we may not do, or will not do, what we may do? Or, Whether a reafonable Creature, would infill upon it, that there is. In the next Page, he produces fome Words of mine, " which, fays he, makes the Difference between ne- " ceffary and certain to be rather verbal than real." Anfw. Such a Thought never came into my Mind : And if you will turn to the Place, you will foon per ceive both his Judgment and Candour. I defy him to make good this Confequence, from any Words I ever; wrote: But, if any loofi, or ambiguous Phrafes, look*- ir.g to this, could be produced, none but he would have tortured them, to contradict what I have fo often, and fo plainly, urged to the contrary, beyond what he can anfwer. " A -Tower that can't be exerted, without making a " ContradiBion true, ir no Tower ; or is a Power to " do Impoffibilities." J;<>r Example ; a Power in God, to -bring another univerfal Flood upon the Earth, is no Tower; or it is a Power to do ah Impoffibility. What ( I25 ) a Delirium is this ! " But a Power to prevent what's '• certain, (which we fuppofe every free Agent to " have) is a Tower to make what's certain, not cer- " £.!»«. Now for a Thing to be certain, and not cer- " tain, is a flat Contradiction, £f;c." This, Sir, be ing the very ^ninteffence of all his Quibbles, and of his Caufe, I -Shall baffle prefently. "He then refers " us to his Appendix to Mr. Norman, where he has " in Mood and Figure demonstrated, that what will be, " muft be, and therefore is not contingent." And I refer you, to my Reply, All future free ABions, ckc. p. 102 106. where I have demolifhed this fenfelefs fgiiirk, which he pamelefsly calls a Demonflration, and made it evident, that he knows not what a De monflration is. But the two next Paragraphs I muft give you every Word, in which he has, to amazement, out-blundered moft of his own Blunders, " Mt. Millar, " I know, makes himfelf merry here," (tho', if you'll turn to the Paffage, you'll fee I was moft firious,) *' and charges the Form of fome of thofe Syllogifms, " with egregious Blunders." (I have not here ufed the Word egregious) " But your better Judgment will " foon difcern, that the Miftake lies wholly at his " own Door. What he calls the Major of an hypothe- " tical Syllogifm, is but a Part of the Major, viz. " that Part which Logicians call the Antecedent, {vid. " Ars Sciendi, five Logica, p. 148.) Now, where's " the Miftake to call an Antecedent, an Antecedent ? " And, as Mr. F. affirms the Connexion between the " Antecedent and the Confequent, he, according to *' Rule, aflumes the Antecedent in the minor Propo- " fition, and proves that ; and therefore rightly con- " eludes, [to prevent what will be, is a ContradiHioni] " So that, to retort his high-flown Complement, *' Mr. F. might more juftly fay, [Mutatis mutandis"} " Fie ! Fie ! that Mr. M- fhould pretend to cenfure a ¦ f Demonftration, before he can underftand one. This " is the more unpardonable, becaufe it was not lefs " than two Tears, before he publifhed his Remarks " upon it. Strange ! that no body was fo kind, as to " bid him correct fuch Blunders, of which a Boy learn- " ing Logick (and much more one that fubferibes him- *' falf, Mailer of Arts) would have been aihamed. • ** Put ( "tf ) " But this I fubmit to the Learned, and beg the Ex- " cufe ofthe common Reader." (And why not of the ignorant Multitude ?) " A Defence of that Demon- " ftration was the more expedient here; becaufe if it *' ftands, their Caufe muft fall, who aflert the eternal " Certainty of our freeft Actions, or fuch a Trefcience " of them, as implies fuch a Certainty." Hal Hal He ! Tho' I was very ferious before, I muft laugh now. Nor can you forbear, if your Laughter is not turned into Pity, or In the Paffage laft referred to, I attack'd the Matter of this Demon ftration; and proved, that it is but a fenfelefs Quib ble, in all its Parts. Look to it, and fee. He dares not venture, to return fo much as the Shadow of a Reply. I alfo, tranfiently only, obferved upon the Form of his Syllogifms, viz. that there ate four Terms in moft of them, (and therefore, it is plain, that they are but poor Sophifms ;) and that there are feveral o- ther Blunders in fome of them, mentioning only one, ISc. But that you may fee what this Man is capable of, you fhall have his Syllogifms in order. " What can't be prevented, muft be : " But what will be, can't be prevented : " Therefore what will be, muft be. " The Major, fays he, is felf-evident :" (whereas, I have proven, that if he makes Senfe of it, and brings it home to the Matter in hand, nothing can be more manifeftly falfe.) The Minor he proves thus ; " If it be a ContradiBion, to prevent what will be, " what will he can't be prevented : " But it is a ContradiBion, to prevent what will "be; " Therefore what will be, can't be prevented." This alfo I folly expofed. ** Here again, fays he, it is only the Antecedent that " needs any Proof, which I thus demonftrate ; " To fuppofe it both true, that an Event will be, " and yet not true, that it will be, is a ContradiBion. " But to prevent what will be, fuppofes it both true " that it will he, and not true that it will he : " Therefore to prevent what will be, is a Contra- li diBion." AU this alfo I demolifhed. „ Her* • ( I27 ) Here I obferved the Blunders, faying, •« After the fe cond Syllogifm, to Shew his Skill in Logick, he calls the Major, of an hypothetical Syllegifm, the Antecedent > and when he demonstrates it, {his own Word) he falls into the Sophifm, call'd Ignoratio Eienchi ; and in- ftead of proving the Major, he proves the Minor. Adding bellow, " I'll fpare him half a dozen of thefe, £§c" That the fecond Syllogifm is a categorical, and hypothetical one, is evident to all that know the Mean ing of the Terms : But it is a known Blunder to call the Major of fuch a Syllogifm the Antecedent. He replies, " What I call the Major, is but a Tart ofthe " Major, even that which Logicians call the Antece- " dent, Sic." Anfw. i. I know very well, that that Part of an hypothetical Propofition, which contains the Condition," is called the Antecedent ; as the other, which contains the Illation, is called the Confiquent. But, 2. The Phrafe, " here again it is only the Ante- " cedent, that needs any Proof," led me to think, that he meant a whole Tropofition ; becaufe in the firft Syllogifm, there is no Antecedent and Confiquent j and I could not think, that he would call the Minor, the Antecedent. 3. The Antecedent is, " If it be a Con- " tradiBion to prevent what will be ;" which, con taining the Condition, no Difputanr, in his Senfes, would have undertaken to prove ; and therefore I could not dream, that he meant this. 4. What he only fuppofes in the Antecedent, he affirms in the Mi nor ; and therefore, had he known what he was doing, he Should have proved this, and not that. Would not this. Sir, have been better waved, or excufed as an O- verflght, (which, tho' ominous in a Demonftration, might yet have pafs'd amongft his Friends,) than defended ? 5. Where does he affirm the Connexion between the Antecedent and Confeqnent 7 6.1 faid, I'll fpare him half a dozen of fuch Blunders, even in the Form of his Syllo gifms ; and he prudently accepts of my Favour, not ca ring to be put to the Blufh for them. 7. The Words Fie ! Fie ! ckc. were his own ; and when I retorted them upon himfelf, he was filuftering of Demonftra tion ! exulting in the Number of Editions, perhaps without Reafon, $$c. fmaggering and infulting over Mr. Norman, i$c. ££c ££<;. I could not have ufed an honefi, ( "8 ) tonefi, modeft Enquirer after Truth, how weak foevef, in this Manner : But conceited are not to be convinced, no, nor fllenceJ, but by expofmg their Non fenfe and Vanity; and, if even in this they are Spared, when they come to themfelves, they will fee Caufe to acknowledge the Favour, upon a double Accounx. 8. His returning me the Complement, difcovers but a very poor Spirit. I never faw his Appendix with my Eyes, till a few Days before I fent the Remarks upon it to the Prefs. No Body could bid me correB my Blunders, till they had feen them, which no one ever did, till they were in Print : Nor have I been back ward in this Letter, both to hear, and correB them. *Twould have been more for his Honour, could he have faid the fame. 9. He has more Reafon tobeg the Excufi of the Learned, than of the common Reader, for entertaining him with fuch a mean Apology, £jfc. ££>f. £5?c. io.What means he by a Defence of his Demon ftration! Do Demonstrations need to be defended7. Or has he, in this Place, either produced, or defended, or fo much as illuftrated, any Demonftration ? 11. As I have made it evident, that his fenfelefs Quibble, is any thing rather than a Demonflration ; fo his own Words, " if it flands," give Ground to fufpect, that he him felf is convinced of it. Demonftration will stand, let the whole World do what they will: And all who know what a Demonftration is, know as much. 1 2. As I have faid nothing relating to his Syllogifms, or Shab bies, unworthy a Mafler of Arts; fol leave it to you, Sir, to judge, whether this Tage, -had we nothing more to the fame Tune, would not make it evident, almoft to a Demonftration, That He is, upon all Ac counts, one of the moft unfit Perfons, for fuch a Con troversy, that ever put Ten to Taper. The beft Apo logy I can make for him, is, in the Words immediately preceeding this long Quotation, which, from the Odd- nefs of them, feem tobe his own ; viz. He has puz zled himfelf fo long, about preventing what will be, " that he has made his Head giddy with gazing upon " the airy Thantom, or his Body lean with wondering " at it." Before I conclude, you'll give me leave once more to battle the Words above quoted, viz. " A Tower to " prevent ( I29 ) " prevent what's certain, (which they fuppofe every " free Agent to have) is a Tower to make what's ccr- " tain, not certain. Now, for a Thing to be certain " and not certain, is a flat Contradiction." Bifi/m teneatis! We never fpeak of preventing what will be, i. e. what is certain. We know, that, upon Suppo sition, that an Action will be done, it will be done, and SHALL NOT BE PREVENTED. All we plead is, That every free Agent, in every Cafe, in which he acts with a Freedom of Indifferency, has a Power to tff?, or not; chufe and ^o this, or «o? ; or, in his Words, chufe either Side: And, that the- fuppofed Truth of this, that he will chufe one and not the other ; and the infallible Knowledge, or Foreknowledge, of this Truth, doth not make, ot fuppofe, his future Choice, necessary ; or in the leaft abridge his Liberty, to chuse, or do either. He objects, As long as it is true, that a free Agent may c/jo/S and do either, it frf«V be true, that he will cfe/e and do this, and wo? that, ot vice verfa; and ^5 long as neither of thefe is true, neither can be foreknown as /n;« : For, as foon as either Side istrue, it becomes certain, fixed, necef fary, impoffible it pould not be, ckc. And as foon as the other is falfe, it is alfo certain, fixed, neceffary, and impoffible it pould be. As foon then, as it is true, that fuch ot fuch an ABion will be, it is future, fixed, muft be, cannot but be, neceffary, and no longer a free ABion, Sic. becaufe Truth is immutable. This is the Substance of all his Arguments ; and upon this hangs his whole Caufe. Anfw. We grant that Truth is immutable ; and that upon Suppofition, that any Propofition, Pharaoh, for Inftance, will not let the People go, is true ; it is immutably fo: But deny that it will follow from this, that he must not let them go, could not let them go, that it was a necessary Action not to let them go, and that the contrary was impoffible, ckc. becaufe, thefe are no way contained in, nor can be deduced from the other. Thus, tho' that it was true, That Pharaoh would not let the People go ; it was not true, that he could not ; that his not letting themgo, was a necessary Action, fjc. and therefore, as immutable as that Truth was, it was no way inconfiftent with, nor any how deftroy' d the Truth of this S Propo- ( 130 ) Propofition, Tharaoh might have let the Teople go. Suppofing, that Tharaoh had Tower this Day, to let them gp, or not ; and had done nothing, as he phrafes it, to make his future Choice not to let them go, certain ; but Should do fomething to morrow, whence this Choice might be foreknown : Will any Man, in his Senfes, affirm, that from that Moment, He became a neceffary, i. e. no Agent ; and the future Choice, a nepeffary, i. e. no Choice7" Why may it not be immutably true, That God has a Power to, or may bring another univerfal Deluge upon the Earth ; and yet as immutable a Truth, that he will not ex- ercifi that Tower, or will not bring another uni verfal Deluge upon it ? Is there any Appearance of a Contradiction, between thefe, Another Flood is pos sible ; Another Flood is not future? Why, fays he, If it is true, that God will not bring another Deluge, it is certain. Anfw. This fenfelefs Jargon fin plain Englip, amounts only to this, If it is true, that he will not, it, is true, that he will not. This it is to be meta- phy fical! Ay; but if it is certain that he will not, a Tower to bring another Deluge, is a Tower to pre vent what's certain. Anfw. This Stuff, when ex- preffed fo as the ignorant Multitude may understand it, is, If it js true, ii e. certain, that God will not bring another Deluge, a Tower to bring another, is a Tower to bring another. I defy him to make more of it. Is. not this now a fubtle Way of arguing! Well; but fuppofing it certain, i. e. true, that he will not bring another Flood, " A Tower to bring another, is a Tower *' to make what's certain, not certain. Now, for a " Thing to be certain, and not certain, is a flat Con- " tradiction." Anfw. i. Here, he reafons, like him felf, from a Tower, to the Exercife of that Tower, contrary to the Suppofition. z. It is a felf-evident Pro pofition, that where ever there is a Tower to act, in any free Agent, if it is (eft to itfelf, there is neceffarily alfo, a Tower to forbear acting: And therefore, in all fuch Cafes, let its future Choice to aB he never fo ne ceffary, or certain, its Tower to forbear acting, is as, neceffary and certain, and vice verfa. He that will doubt of this, may as modeft ly doubt, whether one and two make three. Well, but if it be true,, that he win. act, ( MI ) act, it cannot be true, that he will npt act. Anfw. This is felf-evident. He can't do both, al once: But it may be true, that he will act, and aS true, that he may forbear. This, as I have often obferved, is one of his Blunders, which he does not feem capable of comprehending, That a Man can't be free with a Freedom ot Indifferency, unlefs he can do both Parts of the Contradiction at once ; which is abfolutely impoffible, whether either of them be true, or not. When he therefore talks of a Tower to pre vent what's certain, he forgets, that a Power to do one AB, is not oppofe d to the Negation of that AB, or to a contrary AB, but that two Contraries or Contra- diBories, cannot both fubfift at once, in the fame Sub ject. * But if a future Aclion is certain, it is alfo ne ceffary ; and confequently, not free. Anfw. This we deny. If it is true, that fueh, or fuch an Action, will be done, by fuch an Agent, at fuch a Time; upon this Suppofition, it is neceffary, (for fo, even Philo- fophers have talk'd,) i. e. it is true, that it will be done, by fuch or fuch an Agent, at fuch a Time; and no more : But this is fo far, from fuppofing, that it is not, or will not be a free Action, that it neceffarily fuppofes, and implies the contrary. Thus God has decreed the fet Time, for the Judgment of the Great Day, to commence : But, Does it follow. from thence, that this will be a neceffary, and not a free Action ? He promifed to bring the Children of Ifrael our of Egypt: And, Was not his aBual bringing them but, a free Action, notwithftanding this? Chrift Was de livered by the determinate Cowifil and Foreknowledge of God, ckc. But, Was God in this, a neceffary, i. e. no Agent ! And, Was this ABion, a neceffary Action, i.e. no ABion ? Chrift came to lay down his Life, and offer himfelf up for the Sheep, and foretold, that he would do it : And, Was not He a free Agent ; Was not S 2 this, * This is what the School-men meant by Simultas Votentia, aftd Potentia Simultatis, i. e. a Power of doing either, doing or not doing ; but not of doing both at once. The Reafon of which I gave before in their own Words, Quia potentia ad iinum ac tum, non opponitur potential illius actus negationem, aut ad atiutn eontrarium; fed duo contraria, aut contraditentia, non poffunt effe fitful, in eodem Siibje&o. ( I32 ) this, a free Action? Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the People of Ifrael, were ga thered together, for to do what foever God's Hand and his Comfel determined before to- be done: And were there no free Agents here ? Were all thefe, neceffary Actions, i. e. no ABions7 ObjeB. If God has decreed to do a Thing, he cannot but do it ; and therefore, his doing it, is not a free Action. Anfw. I deny this with both Hands. His Immutability is no Bar in the way ¦of his Freedom. His ft eady Pur fiance and Execution, of a free Purpofe, is aBing freely, according to a free Decree. ObjeB- If he aBually does what he has de creed, he cannot forbear, or do the contrary. Anfw. Both can't he done, at once: But in the Fulfilment of all his free Purpofes, he has an equal Power to forbear. In one Word, if there were any thing, in thefe wretched Quirks, of which an honeft Man would not beafhamed, the Conclufion muft be this, That it is impoffible, that anyone, who has upon mature Confederation, -'refolved fixedly to do any one Thing, can, info doing, be a free Agent ; or that any deliberate Action, can be a free Action. So that this Man has, (i) in a great meafure exploded, if not all free Choice, yet all Freedom in do ing what we chufe. (2) He who bellows fo loudly* for Liberty, does ignorantly aflert the worfi Sort of Necessity. And (3) by fo doing, he confounds all Things, infilling upon it, That a neceffary Agent is no Agent; and a neceffary Action, no ABion; and con fequently, that when God, Angels, or Men, think they aB, they do not aB, but are entirely paffive, ckc. I challenge him, or any of them, to difprove any of thefe, upon his Principles, even with the Affiftance of all their Mafters. But, that I may demolifh thefe fffuirks, another way, you'll obferve, Sir, That if what is future be certain, fixed, muft be, cannot but be, is neceffary, and it is impoffible it pould not be, ckc. Then what is not future, as long as it is not future, lis alfo cer tainly and fixedly not future; and therefore can not be, is impoffible to be, ckc. This, Sir, is felf-evi dent : Nor will any Man in his Senfes doubt of it. But, What is there in Non-Futurition, inconfiftent with Possibility? Or, becaufe God will not bring another Flood of Waters, will any Man not be reft ( H3 ) reft of Reafon, fay, that God cannot bring another Flood, has not Power to bring another, or that 472- other is impossible? True; Whilft a Thing is not future, it will never be, becaufe this is the fame as, what is not future, is not future: But it is felf-evident, That Millions of Things are, and have been always possible, which will never be future. To cut off, forever, all Evafions ; you know, Sir, that he grants, with us, That a free Agent may aB, or not ; may, i. e. has a Tower to chufe either Side of the Contradiction: If fo, each is poffible; for, if each were not, the free Agent could not have an equal Power to chufe or do either. Now ; both are not, cannot poffibly be future ; and therefore, if what is not future, whilft it is not future, be not possible, it can never, in any Cafe, be true, that a free Agent, infinite ot finite, has a Tower to chufe either Part of a Contradiction. Both are not possible, becaufe both are not future ! And what is become of Liberty now. This, Sir, is ftriH Demonftration. And, to make it plain, to the ignorant Multitude, I'll give you the greateft Authority, even that of our Lord himfelf z Thinkeft thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, andhepallprefentlygiveme more than twelve Legions of Angels7. Matth.xxvi. 53. Here, our Saviour declares, that he could, or had a Power to pray to his Father for Affiftance ; when it was true, that he would not pray to him, fot this End: And that Hi* Father not only could, but would anfwer his Prayer, and fend him twelve Legions of Angels, upon Suppo fition he would offer up fuch a Prayer ; when yet His fending them, was not future. Here alfo it is evi dent, That tho' it was certain, that Chrift would not put up fuch a Trayer, he acted freely in not do ing it; And, in a Word, That, upon the Suppofition, that fome Things Jliould come to pafs, as they really may, fome other Things would follow, tho' it is certain, that none of them will ever happen. This, Sir, will fatisfy all ferious Chrifiians. This will flop the Mouths of the moft contentious Wrigglers, if they believe Chrift's own Words: But, the Gospel that our Friend is for, being contrary to the Gofpel ( r34 ) Gofpel of Chrift, may lead him to doubt of \ yea oppofe them. That I may have done with thefe Quibbles, I make him this fair Propofal, which every honeft Man would comply with ; yea, I infift upon it, that if ever he pre tends to anfwer me, or talk any more of what he fo ri diculously calls a Demonftration, That he propofe it in clear, plain, intelligible Words, without §>uirk or Am biguity. You know, Sir, that every true Demonftra tion, may be exprefled in the plaineft Words, without Gfuibble ; and that none of them need fuch poor Shifts to fupport them. You know, that when any of thofe mean Arts appear, in any thing called Demonstration,, they fufficiently difcover either the Difputant's Weak nefs, or Terverfenefs, or both ; and therefore I may juftly, and do infift upon it, that he would lay them afide. If he does, I undertake, i. To make it evi dent, that all the Propofitions in his Demonftration, ate compofed of filly Ambiguities, and equivocal Terms, which, in one Senfe, are true, but when applied to his Purpofe, are manifeftly falfe ; and confequently con vince even the ignorant Multitude, that his Demonftra tion, is but a senseless empty Quibble, or rather a Bundle of them. 2. That every one of his Syllogifms, are but poor, captious Sophifms, difcovering nothing but his Ignorance, or wrangling Humour. 3. That to reafon from a Neceffity upon Suppofition, as it is called, to a philofophical or metaphyseal Neceffity, is either egregious Weaknefs, or fiandalous Trevarication. Fot Example, to argue, That becaufe it is true, that you will do fuch or fuch a Thing, it is not now a free* but a necessary Action, which, he fays, is a Con tradiction in Terms : And indeed, the Expreffion will do, is inconfiftent with true Necessity of Action, and clearly fuppofes and implies Liberty. And, 4. That moft Of his Quibbles, when explained, are identical; and do not carry the Matter one Jot far ther. All thefe, I undertake to make evident, even to the ignorant Multitude ; yea, and even to his moft implicite Admirers : Or for ever give up the Caufe. But ; if he Should ftill talk in this wretched Manner, and refufe, as he has hitherto done, the moft righteous Requeft, to fpeak in plain Terms, as becomes an honeft ( 135 ) honeft Man ; I leave it to you, and to them, to judge, whether, i. This won't amount to an Acknowledge ment of his Defeat ? 2. Whether he will deferve a Reply? 3. Whether he ought not to be hifs'd, and his conceited Nonfenfe expo fid7 As to his ;d Queftion, " Whether the fame Action " may be certain, and yet free, at the fame " time?" i. e. in plain Englip, Whether it may be now true, that fuch or fuch an Action will be done, and done by a free Agent, or done freely ? Common Senfe will force us to anfwer, Yes. Or whether, fuppofing an Action future, the Agent will have Power to do it or not \ or will act freely. Anfw. Tes. Proper ABion fuppofes and implies Liberty ; and therefore if a proper Action is fuppofed future, it is alfo fuppofed effentially free. Every one, who is, in a philofiphical Senfe att Agent, as far as he is fo, is neceffarily free. In his next Letter to Mr. Eliot, from p. 30, to 35. He comes to the ten Particulars, mentioned in the laft Page of his Appendix, which I propofed, and consi dered, {All future free ABions, ckc. p. 131 — 1 33.) telling him, that if he would explain his Terms, ufe them always in the fame Senfe, difpute fairly without poor Quirks, and queint Phrafes, the Difpute may be foon ended. But, our Friend is above Advice, and will rather obftinately perfift in wrangling, than hear-i ken to fober Counfel. The ift is, " Since it is in " FaB true, that fuch and fuch Actions have been, " it muft have been ever true, that they not only " might be, but would be." I told him, he Should have Skid, Was ever, 1. e. from before the Foundation of the World, true, that they would be; for a very ob vious Reafon. We do not plead, that there was any eternal Neceffity, that fuch or fuch Actions pould be $ far frorn it : But only, that it was certain, i. e. true, that they would be, ever fince the Almighty chop this Series of Things. I took the Affirmative, and gave my Reafons for it, All future free ABions, ckc. which he dur-ft npt meddle with ; * but he brings in all his * The .great Philofopher Tully was thus minded, An hoc, Capiet Numantiam Scipio, falfum potuijfet ejfe, fi effet fix- centis fecnlis (I may add ab utexno) diciitm ? Et fi tum non ESSEK (136 ) his Antagonists, as agreeing with me, " and wonders " that we do not fee, that this muft unavoidably run " us upon the Abfurdity of an eternal Neceffity of what " we call contingent Events ; " producing our own Words, " to evince, that we perceive this, and feem " impatient to prove it too, at Times." The Charge upon me is, " that having fuppofed, that out free Ac- " tions were ever certain, I fay they were ever inevi- " table alfo ; and that to have acted otherwife, would " have been to have made, an immutable Truth, " falfe, ckc." This is a little more of Mr. Fancourt's Candour. My Words were, All Things, Events, Ac tions, Matters of FaB, that at any Time have been, now are, or, at any Time hereafter will be, were future from the Beginning, i. e. it wastrue, that they would be, in their proper Time, juft as they have been, are, or will be. This I fuperabundantly proved. All future free, ckc. p. 49 — 58. If this is true, it is felf-evident, That, if there have been any free ABions done in Time, it was true before Time, that they were confi- deved as free, and would be free : And the more im mutable the Truths concerning them were, the more immutable was it, that they would be, and would be free. But this made the Actions themfelves inevi table. Anfw. If, by this Word, he means, that the Actions would certainly be done freely, we grant it ; but,' if he means, that the Agents would not have Tower to forbear them, or would not be free, or that the ABions would not be contingent, we deny them, as exprefsly contrary to the Suppofition. For Example, there were three immutable Truths, concerning Adam's Fall, that were fo from before the Creation, viz. He might fall; He might not fall; He will fall freely. Thefe are all perfectly confiftent: Nor did the Truth of one of them, deftroy the Truth of either, or both of the other. The firft two, were Truths inde pendent on his Choice ; but fo was not the third, as is plain from the Terms. But the Immutability of this Truth, Adam will fall freely, did not, as is evident, make, ot fuppofe his Fall neceffary; nor leffen his esset vera hsec enunciatio, Capiet Numantiam Scipio: ne ilia quidem evetfa vera est hxc. enunciatio, Cepit Numak« TIAm Scipio. Cic. de Fato, cap. 12. ( *37 ) his Freedom in the leaft ; nor make his free Action inevitable; (an abfurd Word, never ufed by me with relation to thefe Matters) all which are contrary to the very Suppofition, yea, and the very Terms. A Tropofition concerning a future indifferent Choice, may be immutable, and yet the Choice not inevitable j for, if it were, it would not be an indifferent Choice. His Anfwer to me in the next Paragraph turns upon this, that a Tower is not a Power, if it is not exerted 5 or a Power to do what we will not do, is no Power. A fenfelefs Notion ! To fhame him out of it, confider, that he grants, that while we are free, we may chufe, or not; aB, or not ; i. e. do either: But fince both can't be done, and we must do one of them, as is evident to common Senfe ; Is the Power to chufe, or do the other, no Power7, or a Power to do Impoffibilities7. ot what is become of it? Is the Power of doing either, left in out doing one7. After all, he will have us to be in a Strange Miftake, and enquires into the Springs of it, viz. " That what is now cer- " tain, was ever certain, r. Is it, fays he, becaufe " it is now certain ? But this goes upon a falfe Trin* " ciple, viz. That every thing ever was, what it " now is, ££?c." Amazing Nonfenfe! We are not fpeaking of ThiSics, but Truths: Nor, in Strict- nefs, are Things certain, but Propositions. Wq never dream, that Things are before they are ; that paft Things ate future; ot future Things/^/?; or that Actions arc ABions, before they are done, ckc. All we plead, is in fhort, That all the Truths, concerning all the Actions and Events, that ever have been, now are, ot ever will be, were Truths from before the Creation : Or, that all the Tropofitions, true or false, that ever have, can, or may be formed, concerning any, or all the Events or Actions done in Time, were true or false, before Time; and might then have been formed, as well as fince: And, if they had, they would have been as certainly true, or falfe, as they now are, or ever iief- tions, which, it feems. he was determined not to fee, wellkiiowing they would demolifh his whole Scheme. But. he will have afar off, " to refer to Place, and not " to Time - and to Signify from Heaven." Anfw. The PCtlmift is fpeaking of a Knowledge too wonderful for him, Sic. But what Wonder was this, That He wr>P is every- ( 151 ) everywhere, vet. 7 — n. mould fie Things on Earth, as well as in Heaven7 In what Senfe can any Place he afar off, from the Omnipresent? Well; but having confulted his Concordance, " He quotes eleven Texts he thinks, to his Purpofe ;" and he might have named as many m oe to prove what a Child would not deny ; " That afar off frequently fignifies a Diftance of " Place." And yet there is not one of them, that is any how parallel to this Text, but one at moft; they all relate to Creatures, (and are fo plain, that none can miftake them,) but that one, which rather ferves our Caufe, viz. Jer. xxiii. v. 23, 24. So that he might as well have faid nothing. " But it never (as he re- " members) Signifies a Diftance of Time, ckc." And yet, had he caft his Eyes a little lower, he might have found one Paffage, Heb. xi. 13. where it mufl have this Senfe $ one, zTet. i. 9. where it can hardly have any other; and two, where it cannot have his, viz. ABs ii. 39. Eph ii. 17. I am really afhamed of this Trifling. He comes next to an Argument of ours, of great Weight, to prove, That God knew from Eter nity that Man would fin ; viz. A Saviour was from Eternity fore-ordained, fit up, anointed, who pould fave his Teopte from their Sins: But this evidently and neceffarily fuppofes, that ?&(> A'«j weee thes future. In proof of this, Mr. Norman offered Rev. xiii. 8. The Lamb flain from the Foundation of the World: And our Author, to Shew his Learning, brings feveral Texts, to prove what none denies, That the Prepofition ami fometimes fignifies after, ckc. We need not lay any Strefs upon thefe Words, which they will not neceffarily bear ; nor does our Caufe require it. Other Texts,w'a. Eph. i. 4. 1 Pet. 1. 19. 2 Tim. 1.9. Tit. i. 2. See Omnifiience of God, ckc. p. 139, 140. were produced, too plain, exprefi, and full, to yield to any ftuftid Evafion, or bold Denial. The Phrafe ^' ^to- fiihris xtx/xts, Before the Foundation of the World, can never be evaded by Quibbling and Wrig gling. The Prepofition nrp) when it refpects Time, never fignifies about, and much lefs after; but con stantly, and in every Place, before. The Expref fion y,*TK|3oA» »V«, every where fignifies the Firft Foundation, i, e. Creation of all Things. I may chal lenge (152) lehge all of them to fhew me one Exception, But *' jwV/y-of fometimes fignifies Mankind." Yes ; by a Figure : As when we fay, All the World knows, we mean, all the Men in it. " And may be fo taken " here ;" By no means, nor would it anfwer his pur pofe. " And by the Foundation of the World, may " be meant the Generation, as well as Creation, of " Mankind. Our Grand- Parents were the Founders, " of this great Family, but not till they were Parents." I. e. Before the Foundation of the World, may (he dares not fay does,) Signify, not any Inftant before the World, or before Adam and Eve were created ; but fome Moment after their Creation, and before they had any Children ! A ridiculous Surmife! to be laugh' d at, rather than anfwered ! * And why may not he fay, that black is white! The Word K/tn^it, is never ufed in any fuch Senfe, in any Author ; nor will the Etymology bear it ; nor were our Firft Parents, Founders of this Family, according to the Import of this Word, which points to the firft Lines, Dr aught i Beginning, Ground-work, or ProduBion of any Thing. And therefore if he Should fillily plead, that k'oouos here fignifies Mankind, the Phrafe muft fignifie, before the Creation of Adam. What Shall we then fay of a Man, who doats fo madly upon a Nof- trum, as to force fuch an uncouth, wild, ridiculous Interpretation, upon plain Words, a very common Expreffion, contrary to their conftant Signification, and againft all the Rules of Exposition ; merely, to conclude from them, That God is ignorant? A much Shorter, and as honeft an Evafion, might have been this, That the Holy Ghoft fpake by the Rule of Contraries, or was miflaken ; and inftead of before the Foundation of the World, did mean, or Should have faid, after it. The other Phrafe v(} Xf-"""" diav'w, Ante tempora ficularia, plainly implies, Be fore all Time, or Periods of Time, before any Calculation from Agra's, or Ages ; or, as our Translators have it, Before the World began. But, fays he, " If the Tromife was fince the Crea- " tion, nay, fince the Fall, then, before the World " began, * Should the ignorant Multitude hear one very conceitedly pra ting, that our firft Parents were the Founders of the World, &c. I am afraid, they would vote him ' ¦_ " ( 1.53 ) '4 began, cannot here Signify before the Creation, nor *' beiore the Fall, but after it, iSc." Anfw. The Tromife was originally made to the Mediator, in the Covenant of Redemption ; and to the EleB, in him, as" being then given unto him. See £//b. i. 4, 5. 2 ST/ZW- i. 9- 2. If he will fhew me any ancient Au thor, who ufed this Phrafe, in the low Senfe or Senfes here infiuuated, (for he dare, not be pofitive, in any of them!) he fhall have another Reply. In the mean time, all this is but the laft defperate Shift of one, who, tho' he has nothing to fay, will not be filent : For, while thefe Verfes ftand in tbe Bible, they will con vince all that believe it, that the Decree of EleBion, the Appointment of a Saviour, ckc. were before all Time: And confequently, That the Fall of Man was then foreseen. Obferve alfo, Sir, That he has put his Eyes, againft that long Quotation, from the Ahyoc Himfelt, Prov. vii i. 22 32. whicb will flop the Mouths of all weak, or ferverfi, Gain-fayers, who have not thrown away all Reverence for his Name ; and explode our Author's other fiandalous Shift, viz. fuppofing that Chrift was fore-ordained from Eternity,. it was only to be ready, left he fhould be needed , But whether He would, or no, even the Omniscient could not tell. An odious, Shamelefs Suggestion! £f?o. See Omnifiience of God, ckc. p. 141,142. and All future free, Sic. p. 41, 42. The Nonfenfe quoted from himfelf, p. 70. I have more than ence confuted, Omnifiience of God, ckc. p. 125- — 128. to which he has not prefum'd to reply. As I have alfo his Citations, p. 75 77. ibid. p. 239—245. The feveral other vile, and fitly Things, in this Letter, if it was not unworthy of him to write, it is beneath Mr. Norman to anfwer. The next Lettter, from p. 78 — 89. is directed to me, which I fhall now confider. He begins telling me, " That in the Concluflon of his Letter to Mr. N. " he fummed Up the Controverfy in three Particulars. " That my laft Book animadverts upon every one of " them. That he fhall clofe this Debate with a diltinct " Examination of tbem ;" (tho' we have another Poft- fcript after this!) li waving the other Parts, not only ?' becaufe the chief 'of my Arguments, fo far as they " relate to the main Difpute, have been difcuft al- " ready, in the foregoing Letters; but alfo becaufe X " the ( 154 ) " the Author ofthe AbflraB prays Mr. Bavius, to con- " jz/re us to be port, and not to fay one Word beflde " thePurpofi." And a little below, " That I under- " took to reply to his Anfwer to Mr. Norman, and to " defend this Author, &c." Anfw.'i. I never under took any fuch Reply, and much lefs to defend Mr. 2ST. who needs 720 Defender againft him. I exprefsly told you. All future free, ckc- p. 88. my Bufinefs is not to apologize for them, but to obferve upon whatever does Strengthen our Friend's Caufe, which [ had not met with before, £fo. 2. I thought I had frighted him from the Word difcufi but to affirm, that he had difcufs'd the chief of my Arguments, £J?e. when he has not dar'd to meddle with the twentieth Part of them, £5?c. was indeed like himfelf 3. The awkward, wretched AffeBation, in pretending to regard the Ab- flraBer's Prayer, after fo many tedious Impertinences, numberlefi Triflings and Fal-poods, and naufeous Re petitions of the fame filly Things, in the very fame Words, many Score times, would have put any Man but himfelf to the blufh. What a poor Pretence was this, to cover his Defeat '. The very firft Particular he has quite altered,, with great Candour. In his Letter to Mr. Nori/ian it ran thus, " You affirm, there are fome Events were eter- " nally certain, without a Decree. This I deny; $£c." And thus tar I agreed with him. But here he has put it, " li 'hether any Events were eternally certain, " without a Decree to make thei-.t fo'1" Thefe Words to make them fi, alter the Cafe fo far,, that I Should not chufe to take the negative. Many Actions might not be future, without a Decree ; which yet, might mi be made necessary by it. " He then re bukes me, for doubling whether Mr. Norman af firms, what l-,e fays, he does; as he alfo does him, for a like Reafon, p. 89. ( " Why fhould you " make a Difficulty of believing the Quotation to be " juft ; Since he not only mentions the Words, but " directs to the very Book and Page, where they il Stand?") when in theory Paffage 1 am now upon, the Quotation is not juft. In many Places of his Re ply to me,' and of thffa Letters, be has mention'd Words As mine, and directed to the very Book and Tage, where, he fays, they ftand : And yet no fuch Words ( 155 ) Words are found in thofe Places ; nor did I ever fay and much lefs write any fuch ; but the contrary. What would the ignorant Multitude have faid, if a Brother Tradefhiau, or Farmer, had ufed fuch pameful Arts in Fairs or Markets? But when People are found often tripping in fuch Matters, they lofe all Credit, even when they happen to fpeak Truth : And I'll ven ture to aflure him, That, if he pould be never fo an gry, No Man will ever take his Word, for the Opinion of an Antagonist, any more. He goes on; " As no " Events were certain before the Decree," (to which I readily affenr,) " fo no other Events became certain " upon the Decree, but what were contain'd in the " Decree." This, I faid, I could hardly make Senfe of. What does he mean by upon the Decree, and being contain'd in it, ckc? But, he undertakes to do it for me, " when I have made confiftent Senfe of my " own Words, viz. Some Events God decreed to pro- " duce, caufe, make neceffary; and fome Events he " decreed to permit." Anfw. By thefe Verbs, to which, I elfewhere added, to aflift in, further, ckc. I intended to exprefs the Decrees of God concerning his Creatures, which He executes in his Works of Crea tion and Providence, fie decreed to produce many Things, fuch as, to create the World, create clean Hearts in his People, £«?c. of all which, He himfelf is the sole Cause : He decreed to cause His Creatures to Romany Things, fuch as, to caufe Believers to walk in his Ways, keep his Statutes, ckc. of all which, they themfelves ate the next and immediate Caufes : He de creed to m a k e many Things necessary, both hypo- thetically and phyfically; thus, all that He himfelf has decreed to do, or caufe to be done, is made necef fary upon Suppofition; and, that the Sun and Stars fhould rife and fit, "and that Fire pould burn, ckc. is made phyfically neceffary: And He decreed to per mit free Agents, to do many Things, of their own Accord, and with as much Freedom, yea Indiffe rence, as rational Agents can have; or as perhaps they could have had, bad they acted independantly. Thus, Sir, I have made confiftent Senfe of my own Words, and fhall wait the Performance of ' his Promife, which we may have, when he fulfils all the reft of them. But, without ftaying for my Explication, he X 2. obferves ( isO obferves upon them, in away of his own, " As If a " Decree to permit an Event (even in the Calvihifti- " cal Senfe of Termiffion) did not make it neceffary." (which, I think, it does not.) " Whereas I myfelf have " told them, They generally grant, that the Decree " makes all Events neceffary." (And yet, I always ex- " cepted myfelf ) " Yea, fince a Decree tomake ne ceffary is the fame with me, as to caufe and pro- " duce;" (which, you fee, it is not,) " the Catvinifis " in granting that the Decree makes all Events neceffary, -' do, in effect, grant, that the Decree caufes and pro- " duces Sin, all Sin ; fot Sin with them, is one of " thofe Events." (A fhamelefs Falfhood!) «« So that ¦' I hereby jufiify the hardefi Cenfure, that was ever " pafs'd upon their Scheme, viz. That it makes the " Holy God the Author of all Sin." i. e. If they, or I, had faid, what never came into our Heads ; then, this old Telagian Rant, might he juftly charged upon xis ; as it is not. Flow many Falpoods and Blunders ate here! i. A Decree to permit phyfically, is the fame in their Senfe, as it is in other Mens, viz. A Purpofe not to hinder, what He may hinder. Thus God de creed to permit Adam to fin. 2. The Decree to per mit, terminates chiefly on the Permission of the Thing permitted, and not on the Thing itfelf: In o- ther Words, The ObjeB of the permiffive Decree, is not, at leaft, primarily and immediately the Thing permitted ; but the Termiffidn of it. And therefore, ;. The Decree to permit, has no caufal Influence at all, upon what is permitted, any more than the aBual Termiffion of it: And confequently, fince God's ac tual Permiffion of all Sin, makes him not the Author of it, and is no way inconfiftent with infinite Perfec tions; His Decree to permit it, is, upon no account, unworthy of Him. And therefore, 4. We grant, That the Decree to permit Sin, makes the ObjeB, i. e. the Termiffion of it, necessary upon Suppofition: But he mult be delirious, who will conclude from this, That tbe aBual Termiffion of it, is therefore philofo- phically neceffary, and not a free ABion ; and confe quently, according to him, no ABion ; Or, that the ABion permitted is no longer free, but philosophically ¦neceffary alfo. 5. The Decree to make neceffary, is not ( 157 ) not always, nor here, the fame with me, as te caufe ot produce. Very far from it. o". Sin is a Privation, a Not-Being or Non-Entity, a moral Imper fection, fee Omnifiience of Gcd, ckc. p. 131, 132. which cannot poffibly, be either produced ot properly caufed, h) any Decree, or any ABion, of the Infi nitely Perfect. 7. I have faid enough, about the Calvinifts granting that the Decree makes all Events neceffary; and need fay no more, to one, who cannot, or will not understand it. See Omnifiience of God, ckc. p. 121, 122, and 132— —139. and Tref. p. 11, 12. Befides ; They are not unanimous about it ; and I, fol lowing many of tbem, excufed myfelf, in this Matter. 8. INo Man, I conceive, can think, that a mere Pri vation, a Not-Being, which has nothing real in it, can be call'd, or thought, an Event: But, if any do, I defire they would except it out of the Events which the Decree makes neceffary; for I never heard of a Cal- vinift, who pleaded for a Decree to make all Sin necef fary. My own Opinion, Sir, is clear enough from all my Letters. In fine, 9. A Decree to make an ABion philosophically necessary, is, in Reality, aCon- tradiBion : And therefore.the Word necessary, is but a Tarty Bug-bear, a Telagian Scarecrow, to frighten the Ignorant, the Weak, the Unftable. And our Friend having once more met with it, ufes it accordingly ; and runs away with it, bellowing out as ufual, Neces sary! Necessary! The Decree makes all Events necessary 1 c5c. &c. And what is necessary is not free, Ifjc \ Whereas, in Truth, there are no Events so free, as not to be, in fome Senfe, neces sary : And as for that Neceffity, which deftroys Free dom, it can neither confift with proper ABion, nor A- gency. And therefore, he might, with as much Judg ment and Candour, and to as good Turpofi, have ufed the Jargon of the lower Sort of Jugglers, Abraca dabra, by the Virtue of Hocus-Pocus, ££?c. " zdly, Whether God foreknew from Eternity that " all the Sins of the Creature would certainly be, and " yet never decreed they fiiould be." To which I re plied; To pafs many Inaccuracies, we anfwer; If, by a Decree that Sin pould be, he means a Decree tq caufe the Creature to fin ; tp caufe, produce, or make Sin ( 158 ) Sin neceffary, a Decree that left not the Agent as free, as he would have been, had there been no fuch De cree ; we deny, that God decreed that Sin should be. Thefe Verbs, I heap'd together here, and in parallel Places, more Strongly to exclude all Caufality or Effi ciency, which might but feem to draw in the Most Holy, into any Approbation of, or Partnerpip in our Sin; or, any how, encroach uvon, or abridge the Li berty of the created Agent. To which he, " How, " deny a Decree to make Sin neceffary, and yet grant *' that the Decree makes all Events neceffary !" Anfw. j. What would he have faid, had it not been for this Expreffion, which he does not understand, or fhame- lefsiy quibbles about? 2. I never faid, That this was my Opinion, but the contrary: And therefore his An fwer is nothing to me; nor would any but himfelf, have fo meanly and falfely objected it to me. After all, he kindly affitts me, " But Sin, perhaps, is no " Event." He is once right ! However, left he fhould wrangle about this, and contend, That Sin is an E- vent ; I muft aSfure him, I do not believe, that any Decree of God made it neceffary. The Nonfenfe im mediately following, fhews but his own Weaknefs or Perverfenefs. No Calvinifl believes, that the Decree makes Things neceffary, in his Senfe of the Word. " A Decree to caufe, produce, and make Sin, all Sin, " neceffary, are, in my Nomenclature, all equipollent *' and fynonymous Phrafes." Anfw. 1 abhor thefe Phrafes, and what he intends by them, as much as any Man upon Earth. I never ufed them at all ; and much lefs, as fynonymous Phrafes; nor does he feem to know what a Nomenclature is. " And yet, he will " not cry out in my own uncharitable Strains. But " enough of this odious, direct Blafphemy, ££?c." Anfw. 1. If he had, it would only have the more dis covered his Candour, in forcing me to believe what I abhor, and then bellowing out againft it. 2. What I charged upon him, he dares not deny to be the ne ceffary Confequence, yea plain Meaning of one of his Noftrums; and that it is Blafphemy, I have made fo evident, that he dares not reply. I fhall further illuf- trate it, to his utter Confufion, when ever he defires me. " Will any befides myfelf affirm, that the Decree 1- which makes Sin neceffary," (tho' I never fpoke of, yea (159) yea deteft the mentioning of fuch a Decree,) " leaves fhe Agent as free, as he would have been, if there " had been no fuch Decree." Anfw. i. We ^//affirm, that in many Cafes, at leaft, the Decree which makes future ABions neceffary, yea and the Execution of it too, leaves the Agents as free, as if there had been no fuch Decree. The Decree to send, and the actual sending of the Affyrian, and the like may be faid of all fuch, left him as free, as if there had been no fuch Decree. When Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and People of Ifrael were gathered toge ther, for to do whatfoever God's Hand and his Counfel determined before to be done ; They were as free, as if there had been no fuch Counfel or Determination. The Apoftle Peter tells his Hearers, I wot that through Ignorance ye did it, as did alfo your Rulers. Acts iii. 1 7. And Paul declares, Becaufe they knew him not, nor yet the Voices of the Prophets they have fulfilled them in condemning him And when they had fulfilled all that was written of him. Acts xiii. 27, and 29. Thefe Texts plainly prove, that thofe Ac tions were free ; as free, as if they had been neither forefeen, nor decreed. 'Twas they that did it, that condemned him, that fulfilled all that was written of him, and that ignorantly. 1. This Decree is fo far from deftroying the Liberty of the Agent, or Contin gency of the Event, that it confirms and eftabliflies them. 3. When he has learned to fpeak Senfe upon thefe Points, and to talk like an honeft Man too, it will then be foon enoughto enlarge farther upon them. I added, " That God from Eternity decreed to permit the fu- " ture Creature to fin ; and in this Decree, with the " forefeen Choice of the Creature to fin, He faw in- " fallibly, that Sin would be." Upon this he asks me four Queftions, which are very eafily anfwered, 1. " Why could not God, in the Decree alone, fie in- " fallibly, that Sin would be; fince, upon my Prin- " ciples, the Decree itfelf 'makes all Events neceffary V Anfw. 1. Still he falfe/y charges that upon me, whkh I every where difclaim. 2. Sin is no Event: Mor was there any Decree, to make it neceffary; and there fore, it could not befeen in the Decree. 3. When God decrees to make Events neceffary, he does not only fee them, in the Decree, but in the Caufes, and Occafions (Fine MetaphySics, " and elegantly worded !) And fo, with refpect to thefe " Tarts of this Duration which are to come, may, in " fome fort, befaid to he future ; ckc." If thefe Words have any Senfe ; they, 1. Grant all I defire, viz. That the Contingency of the Event may continue, even when the Event is future. 2. They are directly contrary to Y 2 his ( I64 ) his whole Defign, which is to prove, that an Event lofes its Contingency, as foon as it is future. Pure Pity bids me fay no more. Being fenfible of the Weaknefs of this, he gives it another way, as ridiculous ! " Or thus; upon God's " Turpofe to create a free Agent, (for till then, the " very Contingency itfelf is not future, as I would have " it, but only poSfible ;) its Tower to act, or not act, " becomes/z////rc, before it is prefent;——— But then, " that it will have fuch a Power, is no longer a Con- " tingency. This is now as certain, as neceffary, *' as what God hath purpofed to be: All that yet re- " mains contingent, is, How it will exercife this Power, " Which he give-s us over and over again, &c." Anfw. I never dreamt, That any Creature, or any ABion, or Contingency of any Action, of any Creature, was' fu ture, without, or before God's Turpofe, to make fuch a Creature, s. As all God's Purpofes are moft free; fo a prefent Purpofe, to do any thing hereafter, in any given Moment, does no way leffen his Freedom, to do what he has purpofed, at the appointed Time ; as is evident to common Senfe. " That this future Crea- ** ture will have a Power to do this, or that, indeed,, " is now future, is now certain, and what muft be ; *' but that it will do this, and not that; ot that, and *' not this, is as yet only poffible, and therefore contin- " gent ; becaufe it is yet true, that it may dp either: *' Whereas, was it now ttuefu woulddothis,it would be " impoffible to do that ; or, was it now true, it would do " that, it would be impoffible to do this ; as impoffible as ,f it is to do both, to aB and not aB, at the fame time, " &c." Here, Sir, are Metaphyfics\fot you ! the very beft we could afford ! to which we anfwer, i. Thefe Words " now future,now certain,and what muft be," do either all ftgnrfy the fame thing ; and then, the Ideas are identical; and the Thing he calls a Demonftration, is but a String of them, very conceitedly hung together: Or, if any thing more is intended by now certain, and what muft be; it will not follow from this., An Action is now future ; and therefore, it is now certain, and what muft be. This is felf-evident. z. " But that it " will do this and not that, or vice verfa, is as yet " only poffible, ckc" is palpable Nonfenfe ; 0r jn his own Phrafe, { I05 J Phrafe, a Contradiction in Terms. 3. To fay an Event i.€ as yet only poffible, and therefore contingent; is very little better. For, if it is as yet but only poffible, it is moft certainly for that very Reafon, not contingent ; unlefs the Idea of Toffibility, be the fame with that of Contingency; which is abfurd. 4. Since the Idea of Contingency, is not the fame with, but has fomething more in it, than that of Poffibility ; I defire our Friend to tell me, what this can be, if it is not the Idea, either of a future, or of an aBual Exiftence. One of thefe it muft be. If the former, Then an Action or Thing, is contingent, which, tho' it does not now aBually exift, yet is fo contingent, as to be alfo future ; and fo, is oppofed to that which is poffible only : IftheJatter, Then a Thing is contingent, which tho' it now aBually exifts, yet it fib exifis, as that it might not exift, and fo is oppofed, to that which is philofophically neceffary. 5. " When an Agent is free, fays he, it may do ei- *' ther: Whereas, was it now true, it would do this, " it would be impoffible to do that; or vice verfa, " &c." How ! Is its Power of doing either, loft in its doing one of them! Or, is that which was poffible before, become now philofophically impoffible ! " As " impoffible as it is to do both, at the fame time." Very fine! But the Impoffibility, of doing both at the fame time, is not, cannot poffibly he inconfiftent, with the moft abfolute Liberty : Or if it could, it is felf-evi dent, that there never has, never poffibly can be any Freedom in the World. Becaufe ; both cannot pof- . fibly be done at the fame time ; Whether it is yet true, that the free Agent may do either : Or, that it is now true, that he will do one of them, and not the other. This, Sir, is Strict Demonftration. If it be poffible for him to open his Eyes, tell him, Sir, that no Creature above an Ideot, can doubt of this.—— We need not indeed wonder at any thing after fuch His next Words are, " Therefore as to what I add, " Yea, the very firft Action of the firft Man, was fu- " ture, beforeh was prefent ; and the like may be faid " of every Action, when clearly explain'd, it amounts ' to no more than this; after a Decree to make the * firft Man a free Agent, his Power of acting was fu- " ture, before it was prefent ; and not that any indi- •' vidual, ( 165 ) " vidual, determinate Acts of his free Power were " fo, ,i£>c" Anfw. i. My Words ate fo plain, and I have expreffed the fame Thoughts, in other Terms, fo very clearly, that they needed none of his clear Expli cations. 2. He has riot any how explain 'd any thing I have faid ! What he calls an Explication is a plain Tje- pial of my Words! But thus he explains Scripture Texts. How happy would it be for fome Men, if they had juft Senfe enough to perceive, that they do not know what they are faying! In the next Paragraph, he agrees with me, That Adam's Fall, was a contingent Action ; but when I added, " It was future, before it was present. " This is felf-evident. It was therefore a future Con- " tingency," Sic. He replies, " True; it was con- " tingent, but then, it was only poffible, and not fu- * " ture, till he himfelf had done fomething to make it " future; which to us is felf-evident alfo." Anfw. t. To fay it was contingent, and yet only poffible, is ma nifestly falfe and abfurd. The Idea of a contingent Action or Thing, does manifestly include, either its future, ot prefent, or pafi Exiftence. 2. I have al ready Shewn, that every free Action, muft needs he fu ture, before it is prefent; and need fay no more, fince he dares npt qbjecl any thing to it. Only for the lake ofthe ignorant Multitude, Let any rational Crea ture, try to conceive, how any voluntary, deliberate, and confequently, free Action, of any finite Agent, is, or can be prefent, before it is future, i. e. that can be aBually done, before it is true, that it will be done ; ,and he will he forced to fee the Abfurdity of it. It really amounts to a plain Contradiction, as I fhall convince you, if defired. 3. What was it, that Adam could possibly do, which made his Fall, not a free but a neceffary, i. e. no ABion7. 4. Pray, Sir, bid him Shew us, how this is felf-evident, ot any how evident ; if he can. But I fpare him I went on thus, " If he fays, it " ceafed to be contingent, as foon as it 'became fu- " ture;" i. e. it ceafed to be a free Action, as foon as it became true, that he would fall. To this he re plies, " Which, indeed, he does fay, and is ready to " venture the whole Controverfy upon it." This is the eld Song over again. Then, as foon as an A6tion is foretold, it is no longer free, but a neceffary, i. a* ( 167 ) i. e. no ABion. Then, none of the, Events prediBed in Scripture, were any longer free, ckc ! Then, when God promt fes any thing, his fulfilling it, is not a free, but a neceffary, i. e. no ABion ! ckc. ckc. — Stupidity itfelf, will not go thefe Lengths ! I added, r. Then the Action, when it was done, was not contingent. To which he. " Certainly fo ; it was no longer contiri^ " gent, ot ah Action that might or might not he, ckc." Anfw. i. My plain Meaning was, Then when Adam was about to fin, he was not a free, but neceffary Agent. 2. With his good Leave, when a contingent Action is paft, it does not become a neceffary ABion. It is ftill to be considered as contingent, only, that it is noiv past. 2. Suppofing that it became future, but fome Minutes or Hours before, " when from histhen prefent Thoughts^ God certainly faw his future Thoughts; yet thefe pre fent Thoughts were either contingent or not. He grant* they were contingent, i. e.free. Well then, even thefe were future, before they were present, and foon till he will be forced to own, either, that there never were any Contingencies, or, that they were all once future Contingencies. See All future free, ckc. p. ioo. £S? paffim. This, I fay again, is felf-evident, for the Reafons given above. To all which he anfwers, in a Jargon of his own often confuted ; not by pewing that what I afferted was falfe, but floutly affirming that it is fo, £5?c. I asked, 3. Why might not an Event be both future and contingent, in different Refpects? Future, in as much as it was true, that it would be ; contin gent, in as much as it was true, that the Agent would do it freely. To which he, " an Event ceafes to be " contingent, when once it becomes future ; or elfe *' they would be future and contingent, in the fame " Refpect too." I pafs the former two Lines for their Sillinefs; and Anfw.fiow came this wild Imagination in to his Head ? Will a Man in his Senfes fay, that Fii turition and Contingency ate the fame, or refpect the fame thing? " Yea, but when once it is true, and " known to be fo, that any Man will fin, it ceafes to " be true, that it is in his Power now to refrain from " Sin, £5c." Anfw. This is only the old Song. "Try, " Sir, and your Weaknefs will foon convince you, there " is more than a feeming Contradiction between thefe two ( t« ) " two Propositions; Mr. Millar will certainly try t '9 " anfwer me ; Mr. Millar may never try." Anfw. My Words were may forbear ! However ; What Should 1 try7. Wherein lies this fieming Contradiction? Not in the Terms : For, will and may not, are evident ly not contradiBory. Not in the Ideas ; for a free Choice to do any thing, is certainly no way inconfiftent with a Power to let it alone. This is another Proof, that he knows not what a ContradiBion is. Thefe Propofitions are moft evidently not contradiBory. I know, that about a Twelve-month ago, they were both true. " If it be now true, that you will certainly " try, tho' you think you can forbear, and may pre* " tend you know you can ; yet, fure I am, fays he, ** that you in thefe Circumftances, neither will, nor " can - forbear. Do but aBually forbear what you " certainly will not forbear, but which yet you pre- " tend you can forbear, and the Controverfy, he owns, " is at an end-"* This Gibberifh anfwers itfelf. Do what you will not! No. We never pretend, that we , can do both at once, aB and not aB- But then, the Cafe is evidently the fame, Whether I am, in his Senfe, yet free to do either, or not. Suppofing him free, let him do both, in any Cafe, if he can. Or let us fee him try. Place him on Salisbury Spite, and bid him both ftand and leap down. See All future free, ckc. p. 9. Or fuppofing it now true, that he would ftand ftill ; we do not then plead, that he would have Tower both to ftand and leap down. It is fuffi cient for us, if his Standing would be a free Action, and not a neceffary, i. e. no ABion: And that he might leap down, if he would. Surely He is free v who does what he will. And if he will not, all that follows is, he will not; therefore is he ftill free. Let every Man ask himfelf, Whether he has not, in Ten thoufand Instances, done what he might not have done, ckc. And it would be ftrange indeed^ .if ftomfime of out former Thoughts, God could not certainly fie any of thefe. From all which it is plain, that as he knows not what a ContradiBion, or Demonflration is ; fo he knows not what he would be at, when he talks of Li berty and Contingency. But too much of this pal pable Stupidity. He * A Man that is capable 'of writing fuch egregious Nonfenfe, has either flung away bis Judgment or bis Shame. ( l€o ) He then brings in Mr. Norman, and adds, " One " Word more with refpect to the Title of his Letter " to him." I had find, " he pretends, that his learned " Opponents had quite miflaken the true State of the " SOueflion, and propofes it in thefe Words, Whether " there can be any fitch Things as future or cerj- " tain Contingencies? Tho' he had judicioufly " entitled his Letter, Future Contingencies, no Contin- " geucies." To which he," And yet, if they have not " miftook it; would they not do well to difplay a little " more of theit Lear ning,in (hewing that his Complaint " is Pretence only? What is thore n the titl. of his " Letter to contradiB it ?" with a great deal more fuch Stuff. Anfw I proved from his own Words, that he did not know his own Mind — — — See All future free, ckc p. oc. — — 2. He has nor, dare not fay, that I have miflaken the true State of the Queftion. ;. I made the Remark upon his Title, by way of an Ar- gumentum ad Hominem, that he might fee his own Sil- linefi. He bellowed out againft us, a future Contin gency is a flat ContradiBion ! a neceffary Contingency, H3c! %£c ! iSc ! If fo ; future Contingencies, no Contin gencies, is a flat Contradiction ! Contingencies and no Contingencies ! ckc. — — As to " what will be mufl bet " It is not only true in itfelf, even unto a Proverb ; but " it contains alfo a true State of the chief Point in dif- " ference." Anfw. It is but a poor Quibble ! true in one Senfe, as we have fhewn, and abfolutely falfe in another. 2. Whether it be true to a Troverb, I know not, having never, I think, heard it ; but if it is, it is a very filly one. 3. I have proven above, that it does not contain the chief Point in difference with me, but a fecondary Point only. He then wrangles with Mr. Norman, and concludes thus, " What he denies, is, " That any Event is contingent, and future, at the " fame time; or known unto God as fuch." Not daring to take any notice, of the long Confutation of this fenfelefs Noftrum- All future free. ckc. p. 50—59- Ifno Events are contingent and future, at the fame time, 'tis very true, that none fuch ate known or fore known unto God: But then, it is alfo true, that what ever God has decreedto do, or whatever he forefees will be done, is not now contingent, i. e. free, but neceffary. It is neceffary, that what he decrees to do, be aBually Z 7 ( 170 ) done ; and neceffary, that he do it. But now, a necef fary Agent, he tells us, is a Contradiction in Terms; and confequently, fo is a neceffary Action. Who is it then, who executes God's Decrees ! ckc. 6kc . ckc. Who is it, who does, what he forefees will be done7. But enough of this egregious, pecking Nonfenfe. Befides ; Wifer Men than he, have thought that Millions of Things, are contingent and present, at the fame time. This may, perhaps, exceed his Capacity to comprehend ; but it is not for that, the lefs true. It is a known and common Definition, of a Thing that is contingent ; Quod est, ET POTEST NON ESSE. " This Propofition, [God foreknows contingent E- •' vents,'] is a complex one," (and fo is this, I am thinking!) " and confifts of .'wo Parts; an Incidental, *' That there are future Contingencies; and a " Principal, That God foreknows them. Nowhecon- " tends, that tbe realDifnute is only about the former, " and not the latter ; ckc." — Not to difpute this, Anf. i. Why then did he not let it alone? z. We told him before, That Mr. Norman had not fo far changed, the true State ofthe Queftion, even in our Author's way of proposing it. For ; if there are a Number of exprefi Trophecies, the fulfilling of which depended upon the Behaviour of Men acting freely; ckc. it is felf-evi dent, that there are a Number of future free ABions, and confequently, of future Contingencies ; All fore known, Sic. Ibid p 91. A Child can tell him, that he who proves, that God foreknows the free ABions of Men, /. e. future Contingencies, proves two Things, 1. That there are future Contingencies. And 2. That hefore knows them. He that proves I am writing, proves alfo, That lam. He then clofes, after wrangling with Mr. Norman, " letting him fit down a mere Tunfter for " him." To which, all I fhall fay is, if Mr. Norman he as good at punning, as our Author is at trifling, ckc. ckc. ckc he is not fi con d to any Tunfter in Great Britain. The Toftfcript not having my Name in it, nor any thing concerning me, we fhall wholly wave. He con cludes thus, " Now, Sir, I fhall (for the prefent) take " my Leave of Ton and the reft ofthe Gentlemen con- •' cerned in this Controverfy." I thought he would have done it for ever. I am fure it is more than time. But if he will not give out, I'll kindly give him my beft ( 171 ) beft Advice; That he would goto School, and learn the Senfe of Words, before he ufes them ; to underftand what a Contradiction, Demonftration, Antecedent, £$c. are, before he be dogmatical about them, l£ic. yield what cannot be proven, excufi what he can't defend, £5c. which if he does, I.am pretty certain we fhall hear no more of him. But he chufes to do this, in the Words of the Reverend Dr. Blifi to him. " 1 cannot " help faying, that as I have not only atrack'd you in " your Strongest Holds, and cncounter'd every Diffi- " culty that lay in my way, £f?o." To prove this moft fotemn Affirmation, I fhall propofe but Three Taffagcs, out of many ; {two of which are Remarks on his own Words,) which he never has attempted to anfwer, and I'm fure never will be able to encounter, and much lefs demoliflj. •'¦' 1 " The many ; clear, exprefi, and infallibleV&ov utl- ciEs,both in the Old and New Teftament, which have been moft exaBly, and to a Tittle accomplished, as to Time, Means, Instruments Agents, Effects, and all other Circumftances:. Prophecies fo many, that the facred Records ate full of them ; fo clearly and exprefsly defer i- bing Events, as to every Punctilio, that thofe who ob- ferved,could not but acknowledge what FaBs were fore told, and how furprizingly they were fulfilled ; fo plain, accurate, and particular, that they feem rather Hiftories of Things paft from Eye Witneffes, than Pre- diBions of Things to come: Prophecies, of Things which were no; to be brought about by neceffary Agents, acting neceffarily ; but by rational Creatures, aBing voluntarily and freely, following their refpective Incli nations, Views, Interefts, Maxims; purfuing their own Ends, and chufing fuch Means, as they thought moft proper to attain them ; confeiovs of their own Liberty, that they were under no more Compulsion, or proper Neceffity, than when they were doing the freeft Actions ef their Lives ; well knowing, that in many Inftances, they were as indifferent, as rational Agents could be ; that they had a Dominion over their own Acts, and were to account for them before the awful Tribunal of the most high; Yea, Prophecies of Events, in which, many Thoufands, in diftant Countries, of feveral Ages, irreconcileable Interefts, jarring Humours, op- fpflte Aims, and from contrary Principles and Coun- fJ z 2 fels, ( 172 ) fels, were to act their feveral Parts ; fo as not only not to be inconfiftent, but fi wonderfully to coincide, fo unaccountably and yet feafonably to fall in, as, very often befides, yea, contrary to their various Intentions and Purpofes, to help forward the Things foretold. See Omnifiience of God, ";c. p. 73 — 8'-. All future free, ckc. p : 1, 35." When he with, the Affiftance of all the blaf- phemous Deniers of Prescience upon Earth, Shallyo- lidiy anfwtr this and what follows in the Places cited, upon the fame Subject, he may, perhaps, be allowed to conclude a Letter with fuch, a Bravado; but, till then, a little more Modefiy would have become him better. II His five Axioms, which I examined and expofed, are thefe ; 1. " Whatever js a Duty must be pos- *' sible." This is the principal Bafis of his firft Effay, fee p. 49. I ask, then ; Was it Tharaoh's Duty, to let the Children of Ifrael go, according to God's Command7. No Man, in his Senfes, will deny it. If fo, it was poffible to Pharaoh ; if poffible to him, he might have done it, and that freely ; for, even according to our Friend, He is not an Agent, who acts not freely. 3.. " What is future, must be, is necessary, it " is impossible it should not be "Eff. p. 98. ck paff. Here than was an ABion, both poffible and impoffible, at the fame Time, and in the fame Refpect ; which ;s as evident a Contradiction as can be conceived. Tharaoh might have let the Teople go, if his firft Axiom be true ; it was impossible they pould be let go, and confequently, that he pould let them go, if the fecond. 3. "' What is really future, is not " truly contingent; nor is what is truly " contingent, really future." Eff p. 104, ck paff That Pharaoh would not let the Teople go, he acknowledges was really future ; That he might, is evident, trom bis firft, Maxim : That he did not let them go, is acknowledged: But. what he might have done, ar,d yet did not do, was truly contingent ; it w,<.s fo in itfilf. and to him, and to others. Here then, was an Event really future, andyer truly contin gent , i e. here was a future Contingency 4" A " sinful Action c,n no more be free, and " not free at the same time- than the Divine " BtingcanbeHoLYandnntHoLY,GoD and not Gon" Eff- p. 70. A profane Affertion ! and filly befides \ Tha- ( 173 ) Tharaoh's Difobedience, was, as I take it, a finful Action: It was future, lays our Author, when fore known ; and therefore not free : The contrary, fay I, was a Duty, and therefore according to him poffible ; and if poffible, it was free: So that he might freely have let the People go, hut freeh would not. Here then was a finful ABion, upon his Principles, both free and not free, at the fame Time -. Tho', I hope, God isHoly, andGo^^TiLL, 5. '" A necessary Agent *' is a Contradiction in terms" Lett. 3. p. 88. Well ; Tharaoh's Difibedience was future, when fore told ; but what is future fa;- s he, is neceffary : I ask then ; Who was the Agent ? Who was the Sinner ? All thefe may be faid of Peter's Denial of his Mafter, and All future Ju das' i betray ing him, mutatis mutandis ; and of all free, &c. fuch like." When our Author can extricate himfelf out P- 3f> 3°^ of thefe Labyrinths, we Shall allow him to boaft, but not till then. The firft Maxim puts me in mind of a Promife,in my fecond Preface {viz. " Since he has fo malicioufiy and falfly charged the Reformed 'Churches with Antinomia- nifia, we'll try to retort the Charge, and fhew that Pela- gianizers of all forts are the Ant imonians, i. e. the Men who make void the Law, and that Calvinifts are the Eflablipers of the law thro' Faith,") which I fhall here, by the by only, make good. And this Principle, Whatever is a Duty, must be possible, which all true Pelagians, as well as he, embrace as a Funda mental, will do it fufficiently. If this fweet A-ciom is true, it muft he either poffible for every Man perfeBly to filfil the whole I aw in its utmoft Extent, or not a Duty incumbent on every One. This is felf-evident. To fay, that it is poffible for pvery Man, perfeBly to fulfil the whole Law in its fpiritual Meaning and fulleft Extent, is not only to contradict the Experience of ' all the Saints, in all Ages, but tbe Perfiafion of almoft all Men good and bad ; it is to render the Confeffions, La mentations and Prayers, even of the infpired Writers, plainly vain and ridiculous ; it is diametrically op posite to many Paffages of Scripture, which clearly and fully declare the contrary ; it cannot poffibly confift with the Corruption of our Natures, nor even with the Ori ginal Taint which he allows to be in us ; in a word, it is evidently everflve of the whole Gofpel. For it an ( 174 ) Gal. 3. 1 2. an eternal Truth, That the Man that doth rn%upall & ver. 2 1, nve in them: But, ?/ there had been a Law given which 2i- could have given Life, verily Righteoufnefs fhould have been by the Law. But the Scripture hath concluded all _ under Sin, ckc. Now, if all are Sinners, it is impofi o,°2o 1% fi^le for any, perfeBly to obey the Law. Befides ; If Gal. 3. 21 Righteoufnefs come by the Law, then Chrift is dead in vain. The Impeccability of Pelagius was indeed the Dregs of his Herefy, which was odious and exploded in his own Time, and fo detefied ever fince, that very few have had the Courage to efpoufe it •. Not one who knew what he affirmed. To fay, that it is not the Duty of every Man, wholly to abftain from all Sin, of every Sort, and in every Degree ; or perfeBly and perpetually to fulfil the whole Law of God, in its fpi ritual Meaning and fulleft Extent; is either to fay, That the Law of God never required Perfect, Perpe tual and Perfonal Obedience, of every Man ; or, that it does not require this of any, now. The former, is evidently and diametrically contrary, to the Nature and SanBion of the Law, and deftroys the whole Defign of it. Lev. xi. 44. Gal. iii. 10. Mat. v. 48. Lev. xix. z. ch. xx. 7, and 2ot^ pcMbe alike good. They Should remember, That the Word of the Lord shall not return un to him void, but shall ACCOMPLISH THAT WHICH HE PLEASES, AND SHALL PROSPER IN THE THING WHEREUNTO * Or, any thing in tiny Decree of God, or his Prefcience, not withstanding, ( 181 ) whereunto he sent it : And that God is not unrigh-lf. rr. n. teous, to forget their Work, andLabour of Love, ckc. SoHeb.o.io. that, if they, he faithful, they pall not lofe their Reward. Is not this Encouragement enough for all our poor Labours7 " The Spirit that (according to fuch) hath, " after all, the real Gofpel in his own keeping, can " preach it without our Labour; and will do it, whe- " ther this outward Call be heard or no." What Fi gures! what Arguments! what Nonfenfe is here! It will be enough to reply, That the Minifters of the Gofpel have a Truft committed to them, for their Dif- charge of which, they are to be accountable : That the Spirit of God bleffes the Means, to whom, when, where, in what Meafure , and for what Ends he pleafes: That he has frequently promifed his Bleffing upon the Ufe of Means, but never to any who negleB or defpife them : That he ordinarily works with them, but, per- hap, never without them, when they may be had. For thefe Reafons fhould Minifters be diligent inTreach- ing, and the Teople fwift to hear. I have given you, Sir, every Word of this Paragraph, p. 39, 40. one of the moft plaufible for many Pages, and offer'd thefe few Thoughts on it, (for it would be as endlefs, as' it is needlefs, to difcufs it, as it deferves;) that you may wonder at the Man. " But, (fays he) if his Doc- " trine is true ; O, who would not be ambitious to " have an hand in fpreading this Gofpel. p. 40." Surely one might expect from all this, That Telagiani zers of all Men were the moft ambitious to facrifice Eafe, Honour, Intereft and Life, for the Gospel which they are for : That they were the moft affiduous and indefatigable Preachers and Hearers .- And that thefe fame Calvinifts fhould be apamed and afraid to fuffer ; and Should ridiculoufly wait for the Preaching of the Spirit, in the NegleB of all outward Means I Whereas, the direct contrary to all thefe is true ; and all Men may be convinced of thefe four Things by a careful Qbfervation. Ip That tho' Te lagianizers, are expert at Roaring and Blufiering, when there is no Danger, and cfpecially when they are ex cited by Court-Favours and Preferments ; yet when fuf- fering comes, they lofe their Courage or drop their Trinciples. Look but back to the Times Since the Reformation, ( 182 ) Reformation, and you'll find but few Telagianizers at the Stake, z. That wherever thefe Opinions prevail, Treaching and Hearing too, do foon become, in a great Tfteafuteimfapionable. Several Reafons are obvious. But- . Only this one may venture to fay, That if ever they fhould univerfally prevail, in any Protefiant Country, it would foon he feen, That there would be as little Preaching there, as in Topip Countries. 3. That the Lovers and Defenders of Free Grace, have been the Sufferers ; the patient, fteddy, perfeve- ring Witneffes and Sufferers, for the Gofpel of Chrift, Nineteen Parts, at leaft, in twenty, of all the Martyrs, fince the Reformation, have been of thefe Trinciples. The Martyrs in, and about ther Valleys of Tiedmont, the Albigenfis, Waldenfes, Wickliffifts, Lollards, Huf- fites, who witneffed for Chrift againft the Abominations' of the Babylonip Whore, who was drunken with the Rev. 17. Blood ofthe Saints, wete all, as far as appears, in thefe ?> <>• Sentiments. And as we are fare, that thefe Trinciples ate found in the Sible, fo we may take it for granted, and fhall hereafter try to prove, that they were the Trinciples ofthe Church of Chrift, long before Auguf- tMe's Days ; and therefore that the Martyrs in the ten firft Perfections, under the Heathen Emperors ; and the as cruel and bloody Perfecutions, of thofe Anti- chriftian Wretches, the ever infamous Arians, were alfo thus minded. So that the noble Army. of Martyrs, are clearly on our Side. 4. That the Cal- vinifts have always been, and now are, the moft dili gent and unwearied Preachers and Hearers, of any in the World. 'Nor is it ftrange, that it fhould be fo ; fince their Minifters preach according to the divine Command; well' knowing it is their Duty, and that woe will be to them, if they preach not the Gofpel : They are for cafl- ing the Net often, not knowing whom, when, or how many they may catch, $$c. Their Hearers attend the Ordinances, as the impotent, blind, halt, and withered, Joh. r. waited at the Tool of Bethefda, for the moving of the 2 — j-. water. They know not when the Water will be moved; but it may be moved*, when they are abfent, and.there- fore they are for lofing no Opportunity. Should it not be moved, for a long Seafin, they know it is their Duty, their Wifdom, their Inter eft, to wait. Should they fee others ( 183 ) others helped in, and not they, their Eye is not evil, be caufe God is good. * They do not proudly and fcoliply fay with Telagianizers, What fhall we get by attend ing? it may be all in vain, ckc. Becaufe they know, that thefe are the Means of Salvation ; and that thofe, who would obtain the End, muft ufe the Means ; and that they can have no Hopes of Salvation, but in this Way. They are far from thinking, that their Atten dance is laying an Obligation on the most high, nor do they wait on him, to plead their Doings and their Merit. Yea ; were they fure, that they fhould never get any faving good by their hearing, they know that God has made it their Duty, and if they will aB up to their Principles, they muft do it. But Thanks be to Him, they are fure it is otherwife : That none ever fought his Face in vain ; and that they have his Pro- mife for it, Ask, and ye pall receive ; feek, and ye pall find, ckc. I leave it to our Friend's Confidence, to compare this with what he has faid of " Bethefda's Pool, ckc. p. 37. His 5th Head is, " This Doctrine is a Friend to " two great DoBrines, the Son's SatisfaBion, and the " Spirit's Operation." Surely it is a friendly Doc trine ! " The Atonement of the Son's Blood is never *' the lefs, but the more valuable, the more there are " that are capable of receiving Benefit by it, ei?c."Lett. 2. Tho' it is hard to make Senfe of thefe Words, yet we p. 4.4. gueSs his Meaning, and anfwer, r. It is neither the lefs, nor the more valuable, for the Reafon affigned. Its Value is intrinflck, arifing from the infinite Dignity of the Terfonfatisfying; and would be the fame, if no one Soul fijould be faved, as the Arminians ate not afhamed to fay, was very poffible. 2. As far as I know the Meaning ofthe Word capable, every Man is capable of receiving faving Benefit by the Obedience of Chrift: Nor is it againft any of the Tenets of Calvin, to fay, That every Man does aBually receive fome Benefits by it. 3. The true Queftion here is, Whether all the Iniqui ties, of all, and every Man, were laid upon Chrift ; and whether it was his Intention to pur chafe Grace., and * Many, I dare fay, who came to the Pool, were never heal ed ; and many, perhaps, died waiting : And yet you '11 hardly think, or call them Fools, becaufe they attended till they died. ( 184 ) and Glory for enirks, Noftrums, Infults, Bravadoes, Baip&ods, Sofihifms,, ckc. Sic. Sic. yea,, the things which he ridiculoufly calls a Demonstration ! In a word, 1 leave it to the World to judge, whether they have not devoured tub Gospel that he is for, &c. &c. ckc. yea, his whole SchemeJMtot this Purpofe I ufed them ; and this Tur pofe they" have anfwered) as fully as I expected they would ! And now I beg leave once more to tell him, That Mr. Fancourt would do well to lay his Ax to the. Root of thofe. Trees, I have fet in his way ; and try his Strength, where 1 have defir'd him, with the afllftan^e; of all the Atheiftical Deniers of the Trefcience, and by Confequence, ofthe Tyovidence of God, he pleafes to. Sail. ( 187 ) call in. To what purpofe is it, to multiply Letters, Tffays, Appendixes and Toflfcripts. to them, Letters in the News-Papers with Continuations, and Tofifiripts, ckc. ckc. full of Queint Phrafes, New Figures of Speech, Toor Quirks and Quibbles, difcovering either his Grofi Ignorance or Shameful Prevarication, Numerous Weak nefles, Impertinences? ckc. &c. To what purpofe is it, to fill all his Writings with notorious Mifreprefintations and Falpoods; which, eventhe iguor ant Multitude may fee, if they'll but confult the places quoted, eke. &c. &c. and when he has moulded the Opinions of his Antagonists, fo as he may have fome Advantage over them, to go on boafting and fwaggering, as if he had done some migh ty thing ; never considering, that he is but " man- *' fully dreffing up Images of Straw and then cOnfound-r " ing them," ckc. See his Lett, to Mr Norman p, 18, 19. To what purpofe is it, to pick out an unguarded Ex* preffion, or afirap of a Sentence here and there, which, by eking out, curtailing, or mangling, he thinks he can anfwer, (when he dare not fo much as. meddfe with their principal Arguments, tho' often call'd to it J and then run away bellowing out, a full reply7, ckc. ckc. In fine, to what purpofe is it to pretend to anfwer, and firive to have the lafi Word, when he has nothing to offer but his Old Quibbles, which he has, with great Bravery, repeated, in the very fame words, fome hun-. dreds of times? If the attentive Reader will number them, he will find this no Hyperbole. I expect, Sir, that he will reply to all tfiefi Queftions, as I have done to his ; and when he does it, he fhall have feveral more, pf the fame Importance. I defire you alSb to bid him remember all my other moft fair and righteous Re quests. There are indeed feveral Arguments of anofhet Na ture, in which, I confefs, he has the Advantage over me, in a very high degree, viz. in his crowing over his Ad- verfaries, deMfiug, defying them, ckc,. ckc. uppn every proper Oecafion, when they have np way to defend them felves, and he may Strut without Oppofition. •^^-This way of difputing, is very well calculated for feme Pur- ppfes, and exa&lyfuitsfiwe Perfons and Caufes. But, he who knows what he is a faying, and contends only for jfrwht needs no fuch Arguments. I, for my part, Bb 2 W3« ( I8S ) was never 'Mafter of fuch Arts'. I always co-nfemnedthtm. When I challenge or defy, an Antagohift, he fhall have fair notice to make the beft Defence ; and if he is Con queror, (feeing, by the Grace of God, I am refolded ne ver to put my Eyes againft Light, or refufe ConviBiort) no Man fhall more readily acknowledge it, or in a more publick Manner. „ It would hot be a fatisfying Reply, to acquaint him, that I have not yet done with him, — - "That my Caufe is well worth defending, Since the Tcr- feBions and Trovidence of God, the great Truths of the Cevehant of Grace, the Trivileges and Duties of Believers, &c. are too much concerned in it, for me to he apamed ot weary of it, pt give it up ; and thatthere- fore, Ijb'all not give over. But fince I have no other, v^ay of arfwering all thefe, give me leave only to aSfure him, before I clofe, of thefe two Things, i. That I have fiver a I Sheets of Paper, ready to. be tranferibed forthePrefs, in which, I have extracted a pretty num- fcer, of his new 'Figure DiB'ionis, fin& Strokes, of Rhe- torick, beautiful Quibbles, yto/^/7/ijSophifms, ckc. ckc. with the greateft number of palpable ContradiBions, atid manifefi Falpoods, ckc. that you will find any where, in fuch a number of Pages; All in his own Words, ranged in the moft proper Order, which I may hereafter fend him, thathe may defpife atid defy, ckc. himself. 2. That my prefent Intention is, if the Lord fpare Life'and Health, to anfwer whatever I fee of his from the Prefs, upon any of thefe^ Heads. While he; continues in the mind he now is, nothing but. Error is to be expected from him ; and therefore, it will be of fervice to prevent the evil EffeBs of it. But, if the Lord flj all give him Repentance to' the acknowledgment of .the Truth; I Shall , rejoice -with him, and blefs God tot his Goodnefs to him : And then, if he does not learn to Talk, and Write, and Reafon as other People do, a ¦port Letter to explain his Terms, give his true Senfe, and illaftrate or confirm his Arguments, &c. may be of fome ufe, to promote the public Edification. I ani, Dear Sir, A Sincere Pleader for the PERFECTIONS of GOD, v the true Liberty pf human Actions, and your very humble Servant, D4VW MILLAR. &tmmerfinith} July id, 1734. YALE UNIVERSITY L 3 9002 08561 4189