YALE UNIVERSITV

George Washington

AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

JAMES HOSMER PENNIMAN, LiTT.D.

GEORGE WASHINGTON
AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

BY
James Hosmer Penniman, Litt. D.
(VI

COPYRIGHT
JAMES H. PENNIMAN
1917

GEORGE WASHINGTON
as COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
To no other human cause is the success of the
Americans struggling with the Mother Country in
the War of the Revolution due so largely as to the
tenacity of purpose of the extraordinary man who
led their forces, added to the remarkable fact that
he who assumed command under the Old Elm at
Cambridge in 1775, remained Commander-in-Chief
throughout the long war, and in 1781 forced Corn-
wallis to surrender at Yorktown.
Though Washington exposed himself with dash
ing courage, there is no record of his having been
wounded. Though seriously ill a number of times
before and after the war, he was always in full
possession of his faculties during the Revolution.
When we recall that the disastrous surprise at
Brooklyn has been attributed to the sickness of
General Greene, we are able to form an idea of what
a calamity it would have been if through wounds or
disease the watchful eye of the Commander-in-Chief
had grown dim and that vigorous mind had relaxed
its anxious thought.
The occupation of cities by the British was
always of minor importance; the independence of
America depended on her ability to keep an army in
the field. Through Washington's efforts for eight
years, an army was always ready and he was always
at his post. During the war he left the army on
few occasions, and then only when public business
required his presence elsewhere. Washington was
always the principal character on the stage of the

Revolutionary War, the pivot around which every
thing else revolved. He had to contend with untold
difficulties, with poverty, with cold, with hunger,
with shiftlessness, with envy, with treachery, with
hostile criticism, with jealousy, and with stupidity.
Early in the war he wrote: "I know the unhappy
predicament I stand in ; I know that much is expected
of me; I know that without men, without arms,
without ammunition, without anything fit for the
accommodation of a soldier, little is to be done;
and, what is mortifying, I know that I cannot stand
justified to the world without exposing my own
weakness, and injuring the cause, which I am
determined not to do. . . . My own situation is
so irksome to me at times, that, if I did not consult
the public good more than my own tranquillity, I
should, long ere this, have put everything on the cast
of a die."
His success was due to constant striving against
adverse circumstances; he had remarkable fore
thought, but he anticipated difficulties only to over
come them. Misfortunes and accidents retarded but
did not arrest his progress. He was always prepared
for reverses, and had a way of retreat ready. When
his army was defeated it was not routed, and was
able to attack again as soon as an opportunity pre
sented itself. Never unduly elated by success, he was
never nobler than in disaster, and at no time more
dangerous than when he seemed defeated; for no
man was more ready than he to profit by the
mistakes of his opponent, and no man was swifter to
retrieve his own errors. As was remarked of
Napoleon, "To say that he committed faults is only
to say that he made war," but Washington's military
misfortunes were usually of such a character as to
add to his renown. His bringing a beaten army of
3

raw troops to fight bravely a few days after defeat,
as he did at Germantown, aroused the admiration of
the military experts of Europe; and no commander
ever gave a grander exhibition of personal power
than did Washington when he rallied the fleeing
forces of Charles Lee and sent them back to the fight
at Monmouth. No matter how few in numbers, an
army commanded by Washington was always formi
dable, for he knew how to adapt his undertakings to
the means at his disposal. He took advantage of
every opportunity, and when an opportunity did not
present itself, he created one. His force was not
only usually weaker numerically than that of the
enemy, but also inferior in discipline and military
training; but so great was his personal influence,
and such his skill in seizing on natural advan
tages of position, in reinforcing them by all the
known devices of military art and by others hitherto
unknown which he originated, that he outmaneuvred
the British generals and often forced them to keep on
the defensive or to withdraw. His success was
largely due to his wonderful skill in putting his force
exactly where it would do most good. His experi
ence as a surveyor gave him a knowledge of topog
raphy and an ability to select the strongest position,
that was superior to that of any other man in
either army.
He did not trust to others the important work
of reconnoitering, if it was possible to do it himself.
Money spent on reconnoitering excursions forms one
of the most frequent items in his accounts ; and roads,
rivers, fords, mountain passes, and elevated positions
were always studied by him vsdth the utmost care.
That communication between the Northern and
Southern States, which was essential to the suc
cess of the American cause, was always kept open

throughout the war, was due to his study of the.
country around the Hudson, and to his occupation of
West Point and the Highland passes which controlled
that river. More than any battles that he fought, his
selection of positions like West Point, Morristown
and Valley Forge, kept the British in constant
danger; for in these places he could not be attacked
to advantage; he could easily retreat if necessary;
such supplies as the country afforded were within his
reach ; he could harass British foraging parties and
prevent intercourse with the surrounding country;
and if the enemy moved in force, he was ready to hang
on his flanks and cut his communications. He kept
informed of the intentions of the British, for his
spies were continually coming and going. Washing
ton's perception of the enemy's plans and his
ingenuity in using the means at his disposal for
overthrowing them were the result of the power
which he constantly exercised of putting himself in
the place of the opposing general, and of divining his
plans by imagining what he himself would do in sim
ilar circumstances; so that he knew what General
Howe ought to do better than Howe himself, and was
at times puzzled because Howe blindly refused to do
what was obviously to his great advantage; as, for
example, when Howe went to Philadelphia instead of
up the Hudson to the relief of Burgoyne. This
was the greatest mistake that the British made
during the war.
Most of the campaigns of the Revolution were
planned by Washington, even those in which he did
not take part. His papers describe many projects
which, though carefully devised, came to nothing
through the incompetence of subordinates, lack of
means to provide the ordinary requisites of military
operations, or through other circumstances which
5

could not be anticipated or prevented. His actions
were based upon a broad foundation of common
sense, but, as Dr. Weir Mitchell said, "If common
sense explains his life, it was common sense lifted to
the level of genius." Edward Everett thought that
the most striking trait of Washington's character
was judicial moderation. He did not make up his
mind hastily. As soon as he awoke in the morning,
he mapped out the business of the day ; and he fre
quently retired to some quiet place for periods of
prayer and meditation. He gave due weight to the
opinions of others, but had the force of character to
act on his own responsibility, and when he had done
his utmost, he was content to abide by the decision of
Providence. Avoiding side issues, his mind went
straight to the point. As soon as he was sure of his
opponent's intentions, his energies were concentrated
on the vital spot to defeat them. When his plan was
formed, he was swift to carry it out. One of his prin
ciples was, when you cannot win, make it as hard for
the enemy as you can. He fought every inch of the
way where it was possible, but no one could withdraw
quicker than he when circumstances demanded.
Nothing but his promptness in this respect saved
the army at Brooklyn and at Trenton. On each of
these occasions the British retired to rest with the
expectation of annihilating the Americans in the
morning, but during the night Washington had van
ished with his army. Though the British employed
many devices to draw him into false movements, he
refused to be entrapped by them; and on the other
hand, he was ever ready to take advantage of
mistakes on their part. Too wary to allow himself
to be surprised, he understood the power of surprise
to help a weaker force, and made use of it at Trenton,
Germantown and Stony Point. No one appreciated

better than Washington the axiom that in military
operations time is everything, for time was his most
powerful ally. While time was passing, the British
were spending vast sums on their army and fleet;
public opinion in opposition to the will of George III
was gaining strength in England; the French were
being won over ; raw recruits were being disciplined
into an army; and the thirteen colonies were being
welded into a nation. From the beginning of the
war, well-trained armies of professional soldiers were
contending with the American people; and though
the Americans were brave, and accustomed to the
use of arms from youth, they learned by sad experi
ence at Brooklyn and New York that bodies of men
do not make an army unless they are properly
disciplined. No one realized this more fully than
Washington, and he was constantly writing moni
tions like these : "Discipline is the soul of an army —
it makes small numbers formidable — procures suc
cess to the weak, and esteem to all." "Strict order is
the life of military discipline." "To make men well
acquainted with the duties of a soldier requires time ;
to bring them under proper discipline and subordina
tion not only requires time, but is a work of great
difficulty; and in this army, where there is so little
distinction between officers and soldiers, requires an
uncommon degree of attention. To expect, then, the
same service from raw and undisciplined recruits as
from veteran soldiers, is to expect what never did,
and perhaps never will happen."
To Colonel William Woodford, he wrote, Novem
ber 10, 1775, "Be strict in your discipline; that is,
require nothing unreasonable of your officers and
men, but see that whatever is required be punctually
complied with. Reward and punish every man
according to his merit, without partiality or preju-

dice; hear his complaints; if well founded, redress
them; if otherwise, discourage them, in order to
prevent frivolous ones. Discourage vice in every
shape, and impress upon the mind of every man,
from the first to the lowest, the importance of the
cause, and what it is they are contending for. For
ever keep in view the necessity of guarding against
surprises. In all your marches, at times, at least,
even when there is no possible danger, move with
front, rear and flank guards, that they may be
familiarized to the use; and be regular in your
encampments, appointing necessary guards for the
security of your camp. In short, whether you expect
an enemy or not, this should be practiced ; otherwise
your attempts will be confused and awkward when
necessary. Be plain and precise in your orders, and
keep copies of them to refer to, that no mistakes may
happen. Be easy and condescending in your deport
ment to your officers, but not too familiar, lest you
subject yourself to a want of that respect, which is
necessary to support a proper command."
Under Washington, the character of the army
was constantly improving. He patiently reconciled
the prejudices and jealousies of the men of the vari
ous colonies, and was always trying to organize an
American army. When in camp, all general and field
officers dined with him every day at three; so the
General kept in touch with his men, and they became
comrades. He began this custom as soon as he took
command at Cambridge. Wherever it was possible,
he personally saw the officers whom he entrusted
with important work. His success was largely due
to his shrewdness in dealing with men and to his
ability to select the right man for the place. He knew
mankind from lifelong and active experience, in the
House of Burgesses of Virginia, in Congress, in the
8

Army, on the farm, and in the forest! He under
stood the motives and dispositions of such various
races as Americans, British, French, Indians and
negroes. The range of his experience extended over
the whole gamut of human nature, from the selfish
ness of an Arnold or a Gates to the lofty patriotism of
a Lafayette or a Greene, whose highest ambition was
to act at all times as Washington would have done.
Experience had taught him not to expect too
much, and he wrote Philip Schuyler : "We must bear
uj) — and make the best of mankind as they are, since
we cannot have them as we wish ;" a sentiment which
reminds us of the epigrams of Montaigne, The con
fidence which existed between Washington and men
like Greene, Knox and Lafayette, was a charming
feature of the war. It is said that even thirty years
after, Washington's officers could not speak of his
farewell without tears. The devotion of his friends
and neighbors was conspicuous throughout his career.
He had the confidence of men of influence, and he
utilized their attachment to him for the good of his
country as no other man in America could have done.
Knox wrote him : "I know that the people of America
look up to you as their Father, and into your hands
they trust their all, confident of every exertion on
your part for their security and happiness ; and I do
not believe there is any man on earth for whose wel
fare there are more solicitations at the Court of
Heaven than for yours."
Washington received cruel wounds from some
who pretended to be his friends, who found it the
easier to attack him because he could not reply to
their charges of inefficiency without informing the
enemy of his lack of powder and of every other mil
itary necessity. He had a deep aversion to contro
versies, and especially tried to avoid feuds that might
9

injure the American cause. He never took up a
quarrel unless it was forced upon him; but when it
was necessary, he acted with decision, and showed
people with such different kinds of presumption as
Lord Howe, Gates and Conway that it was not safe
to take liberties with him. In spite of experiences
with traitors like Charles Lee and Arnold, he never
lost faith in humanity, and he loved to believe that
other men were as noble-natured as himself. His
reason controlled his passions, so that even his ene
mies respected him. His acts and words were those
of a gentleman, and the grand manner which he
learned in youth from Lord Fairfax he always
retained. When necessary he could be severe, but his
own inclination was always toward mercy. He never
permitted his personal feelings to stand in the
way of his duty, and his example was the most
powerful influence.
Washington was a careful observer and listener.
He was everywhere, his eye saw everything, and
there was a sternness in that eye that no man whose
work was not well done would willingly face. Though
he saw all, he said little, but, when circumstances
warranted it, he could speak such burning words that
Henry Lee said he was like the torrent of Niagara.
Yet he did not bear malice, and he wrote that he
never said anything of a man that he would not say
to him. No greater evidence of his wonderful per
sonality could be given than the way in which he
immediately won the respect, admiration and affec
tion of accomplished Frenchmen, when the whirligig
of time had made those against whom he contended
in his youth the allies of his later years. Rocham-
beau said that he never knew what true glory was,
nor a truly great man, till he met Washington.
10

It is hardly possible to give a better picture of
Washington during the Revolution than those few
words of Mr. Owen Wister, which describe him as
"hurrying somewhere on a horse with ragged soldiers
behind him." One might preach a sermon on Wash
ington with these words as a text, for every one is
big with meaning. Hurrying indicates strength,
energy and zeal. Somewhere, not anywhere, to a
place carefully chosen where he could do the utmost
for his country. On a horse — Jefferson said he was
the best horseman of his age, and history and art
alike record no nobler figure than Washington on
horseback. Ragged — ^his men were ragged because
they were giving up all to fight for the country which
did not pay them even the pittance it had agreed to.
The Americans were the most hard-working, honest
and thrifty people on earth, and were never ragged
except when serving in the Continental Army,
Behind him — ^they were backing him up to the extent
of their ability, because he had won their hearts.
For, however he might be criticized by those who
planned campaigns by the warm fireside, he had the
confidence of the freezing, starving heroes around
him. It was serious business to serve under Wash
ington. He was a leader who could make men do
things. As soon as recruits saw him, they felt that
here was a man on whom they could rely to the last
extremity, and it was this that sustained his men at
Brooklyn and Trenton. No one but him could have
kept the army together during those weary months
at Valley Forge and Morristown, As Archibald
Forbes said of Skobelev : "He radiated from him the
mysterious irresistible magnetism that inspired men
to follow him, to use the rough soldier-phrase,
'through hell and out at the farther side.' " Like
Napoleon, he kept in touch with his men, and
11

explained the situation to them and appealed to their
patriotism when great efforts were needed. Patriot
ism may generally be said to diminish in propor
tion to the distance from home, perhaps even as the
square of the distance; but the men who followed
Washington thought that it was their duty to obey
wherever they were, in hunger and cold and rags,
and to die obeying. His courage was the admiration
of his men : the only thing they had against him was
the fearless way in which he exposed himself; but,
though he risked his own life, he was careful not to
endanger theirs unless it was necessary, and his
anguish at the useless exposure of his troops at
Brooklyn is recorded by eye-witnesses.
In times of danger his mind worked more
quickly, and a fellow Virginian described him as
being as cool in action as a bishop at his prayers.
Jefferson said that he was "incapable of fear, meet
ing personal dangers with the calmest unconcern."
Washington not only had courage under fire, but he
had what is far more unusual and what was much
more valuable to the cause for which he was con
tending — he had the fortitude to endure suffering,
suspicion, want, and physical and mental weariness,
without losing faith in the cause and in mankind.
The one thing that made him lose his self-control was
cowardice on the part of his men ; and on the other
hand, his admiration of bravery was such that,
although usually a remarkable judge of character, he
overlooked Benedict Arnold's failings, and appointed
him to the most responsible position at his disposal.
This was perhaps the greatest mistake that Wash
ington made during the war, and an explanation of
it may be found in the possibility that, as sometimes
happens, Arnold's severe wounds had caused a
deterioration in his moral fibre. It is interesting to
12

note that the difference between the enduring forti
tude of a Washington and the rash gallantry of a
Benedict Arnold was observed centuries ago; for
Plato says that a mind prepared to meet danger, if
impelled by its own eagerness rather than by the
public good, deserves more the name of audacity than
of courage. Though as devoted to the occupations
of peace as any man in America, when aroused
Washington had a flaming ardor of combativity
which illuminated the darkest circumstances ; so that
it was said that "Hope shone in him like a pillar of
fire, when it had gone out in all other men." No one
understood better than he the axiom that it is not
the actual loss of men in battle which is disastrous
so much as the resulting discouragement which
deprives the remaining forces of their power to
continue the struggle. It was always necessary for
him to act in such a manner as to keep up the spirits
of the army and of the nation. This was his most
important work. Public opinion at times forced him
to attempt what was not in accordance with his own
views or with military policy. He fought the Battle
of the BrandyTvine, for instance, in the vain attempt
to keep the superior force of Lord Howe from the
occupation of Philadelphia, which proved to be of
little use to them. The short periods of enlistment
caused it to be said that he was obliged to carry on
war, "not according to military opportunities, but
according to the calendar." And he wrote, "it is
as easy to stop a torrent as the soldiers when their
time is up."
The might of Washington's sword depended, to
a much greater extent than is generally realized,
upon the power of his pen. Throughout the Revolu
tion he was busy writing instructions for his men,
letters to Congress, to Lord Howe, to Brother
13

Jonathan Trumbull, to people of influence every
where. He was the most productive of American
writers; the collection of his manuscripts in the
Library of Congress is known to be the largest of
any one man in the world. In the calendar of his
letters to the Continental Congress from 1775 to 1783
are about two thousand letters, or nearly one a day,
and he wrote about seven thousand other military
letters in the same period. He also wrote at this
time numerous letters to his wife, only one of which
has been preserved, and a very long weekly letter to
Lund Washington about the management of affairs
at Mount Vernon. In addition to these, he wrote
many other letters of business, ceremony or friend
ship during the war. The letters written by his
secretaries were revised by him, and elaborate drafts
of official letters, entirely in the handwriting of
Washington, were often prepared in moments
snatched from needed repose, and sometimes in the
midst of actual danger. Yet his high-toned manner
never forsook him, and he always wrote like a
gentleman. No military man and few men of letters
have been able to use the English language more
skillfully, and his style was singuarly concise, accu
rate and direct. Guizot said that Washington was
endowed to an extraordinary degree with the power
of influencing men by "honorable sentiments and by
truth"; but though much was due to his persuasive
charm, his words also commanded respect, because
it was felt that, to apply to him an expression of
Alphonse Daudet, he could make powder talk as well
as ink. The influence of Washington's letters in
forming public opinion throughout the war was
enormous, for such was the confidence in his relia
bility and integrity that when, for instance, Governor
Jonathan Trumbull received a letter from General
14

Washington stating that supplies were needed, every
nerve was strained to meet the demand.
Washington's tact, patience and wisdom were
nowhere more conspicuous than in his letters to
Congress; nominally its servant, he often inspired
and directed it. No other man possessed its confidence
to such a degree; so that, though Congress was
always jealous of military dominion, when there was
the greatest danger it did not hesitate to invest him
with dictatorial power. He was especially busy
during the winters in urging Congress and the
governors of the States to take the necessary steps
for raising and subsisting a suitable army, in caring
for the little band of ragged patriots hutted around
him, and in preparing for the summer campaign.
These were tasks of the utmost difficulty, for the
system of government of the colonies was dis
arranged by the outbreak of the war, and such
authority as existed was mostly in the hands of
Committees of Safety, with no legal powers, whose
duties were vaguely defined. Yet so great was the
intelligence and patriotism of the people, that there
was little crime or disorder.
Washington's ability to select important points
from masses of detail, to winnow the true from the
false, and to size up a situation, was little short of
marvellous. He always had the latest and fullest
intelligence, and it is not easy to realize the difficulty
of obtaining reliable information during the Revolu
tion. Communication was slow, and dangerous;
opportunities for observation were restricted ; news
papers were issued irregularly, and had only a lim
ited circulation. Washington took personal charge
of the Secret Service, and had gold for this depart
ment when gold was a curiosity and there was noth
ing but paper money for all other purposes. General
15

Greene voiced the opinion of his chief when he wrote:
"Spies are the eyes of an army, and without them, a
general is always groping in the dark." Many of
Washington's spies were known to him alone; they
used invisible ink, and important papers were often
concealed in the pommel of a saddle, or in buttons.
The success at Trenton is attributable to two causes :
to the accurate information which Washington's spies
brought him of the numbers, disposition and condi
tion of the Hessians; and to Washington's fore
thought in taking the unusual number of eighteen
cannon with his force of only twenty-four hundred
men. That stormy morning, muskets were mostly
wet and useless, but cannon could be employed in any
weather, and six guns pointed at two regiments of
Hessians at less than three hundred yards, decided
the contest before it began.
Washington constantly felt his lack of theoretical
training in military affairs, and late in life he wrote :
"A thorough examination of the subject will evince
that the art of war is extensive and complicated ; that
it demands much previous study; and that the pos
session of it in its most important and perfect state
is always of great moment to the security of a
nation." As a young man, he read a translation of
Csesar's Commentaries, and must have studied other
military works ; for, in 1754, William Fairfax wrote
him these memorable words: "In the Duke of
Marlborough's campaign you'll observe many wise
retreats performed that were not called fiights" —
words which were, no doubt, in Washington's mind
as he retired in that masterly way through New
Jersey late in 1776. Marlborough learned the art of
war from Turenne, Conde, and Vauban, the great
masters of his time, under whom he served for five
16

years. With the single exception of General Brad-
dock, who, it may be assumed, learned more from
Washington than Washington did from him, he never
served under any one who could give him any military
instruction whatever. The principal advantage he
derived from the campaign with Braddock was
the opportunity for observation of the British
regular, collectively and individually, observation
which doubtless formed the basis of much of his
subsequent success. He was always a thorough,
hard-working student of subjects like Agriculture,
Military Affairs, and Government, which it was his
business to know; and he spared no trouble or
expense to obtain the best books, and made careful
abstracts of them, some of which may be seen among
his manuscripts in the Library of Congress. In 1775
he recommended one of his officers to familiarize
himself with Bland's Essay on the Art of War,
Instructions for Officers, The Partisan, Young, and
others. Among the military books in his library were
Otway's Art of War, The Doctrine of Projectiles,
Daveis's Cavalry, Simm's Military Course, A Work
on Manoeuvres, Stevenson's Military Instructions for
Officers Detached in the Field, Count Saxe's Plan for
New Modeling the French Army, A New System of
Military Discipline, Prussian Evolutions in Actual
Engagements, Code of Military Standing Resolutions,
Claviac's Field Engineer, Miiller on Fortification,
Anderson's Essays on Field Artillery, A System of
Camp Discipline, Vallancey on Fortification, Picker
ing's Militia, Steuben's Regulations for the Order
and Discipline of the Troops of the United States,
Traite de Cavalerie, Webb's Treatise on the Ap
pointments of the Army, De Jeney's The Partisan,
or the Art of Making War in Detachment, The
Military Guide, The Duties of Soldiers in General.
17

Few men have ever learned the trade of the
soldier in a harder school of practical experience, and
no man ever paid a higher price in work and dis
comfort for the honors that he gained. No better
training could have been provided for the command
of the Revolutionary Armies than Washington's
apprenticeship in the Virginia forces from 1751 to
1758. He learned then how to deal with untrained
soldiers, with disciplined British troops, with French,
Indians, colonists, and with a Colonial Legislature;
and he then acquired the habit of accomplishing
results with feeble resources, which remained with
him through life. In spite of his lack of military
training on a large scale, Washington was far better
equipped than the British generals for the conduct of
the war in America; for he understood the country
and the people as did no other man, with the possible
exception of Franklin. He had in an unusual degree a
combination of opposite qualities of the utmost value
to a commander. Because of his broad common sense,
severity was tempered by clemency, audacity by
caution ; and no other general has ever been able to
take a more comprehensive view of the whole field of
affairs and at the same time to devote such concen
trated attention to details.
Much of the routine of the soldier's trade is sim
ilar to that of any other business, so that the careful
work which he performed in the management of the
large estates in Virginia was an excellent prepara
tion for the task of providing food, clothes, powder,
guns, transportation, money and men for his army;
for he had to feed, move and pay it, while contending
with the perfectly appointed forces of the richest
nation in the world ; and he did all these things under
a fire of criticism at home that was far more difficult
to endure than that of the enemies' guns. Nothing
18

with regard to his troops was too minute for his
attention, "While at the head of the army," says Sparks,
"the names and rank of the officers, the returns of the
adjutants, commissaries, and quartermasters, were
compressed by him into systematic tables, so con
trived as to fix strongly in his mind the most essential
parts, without being encumbered with details. When
the army was to march, or perform any movements
requiring combination and concert, a scheme was
first delineated; and at the beginning of an active
campaign, or in the preparation for a detached enter
prise, the line of battle was projected and sketched
on paper, each officer being assigned to his post, with
the names of the regiment and strength of the forces
he was to command." Ever the best fitted for
military command, Washington was always the last
to seek it. He never overestimated himself, and was
always ready to recognize his faults and correct them.
He said, "I do not think vanity is a trait of my char
acter." He rarely talked of what he was going to do,
and never boasted of what he had done. He was
always more interested in the present and future than
in the past. He cared for the success of the cause
rather than for his own glory, and did not hesitate
to send his best troops when they could be of use to
other generals — a service which was not returned at
times of his urgent necessity ; for instance, Washing
ton said that if, after the surrender of Burgoyne,
Gates had promptly sent back Morgan's rifleihen and
the other troops which he had despatched to his aid,
the forts on the Delaware could have been held,
Howe's army in Philadelphia starved out, and the
war shortened by several years. Washington sought
nothing for himself, and declined all payment for his
services during the struggle with Great Britain. It
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is said that the only personal request he ever made
of the Government was that he might be permitted
to retain his original commission. It is now in the
Headquarters at Morristown.
General Washington's military talents were the
development of unusual natural qualities trained by
a long series of Divinely guided experiences. The
stripling who professed himself charmed by the
whistling of bullets, in the process of time grew into
the stern yet tender-hearted warrior who at Brooklyn
was in agony at the loss of his men. At twenty-two,
Washington wrote "my inclinations are strongly bent
to arms." After the Revolution, at fifty-three, he
called war "this plague to mankind," and said "my
first wish is to see it banished from off the earth."
Yet it was always his opinion that "to be prepared
for war is the most effective means to promote
peace." His last letter, written two days before his
death, was to Alexander Hamilton, on the establish
ment of a military academy, which he described as an
object of primary importance to this country.

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