THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. BY THE SAME AUTHOR. In crown 8vo, price is. 6d., THE BIBLE AN OUTGROWTH OF THEOCRATIC LIFE. ' Will well repay perusal. It contains a great deal of learning as well as ingenuity, and the style is clear.' — Guardian. ' A more valuable and suggestive book has not recently come into our hands.' — British Quarterly Beview. ' The position developed by the author is substantially that the Scriptures are not to be viewed from the standpoint of traditional dogma, but from the historical point of view, as the product of a divinely directed develop ment of Jewish history which had for its end the achievement of a divine revelation, and the building up among men of * divine and spiritual kingdom.' — Neu> York Independent. THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. DISCUSSIONS BEARING ON THE ATONEMENT D. W. SIMON, Ph.D. (Tub.), PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE CONGREGATIONAL THEOLOGICAL HALL, EDINBURGH ; AUTHOR OF (o X. Mactation not originally a special function of the priesthood, . 429, 430 XI. Mozley on representative national sacrifices, . . . 430 4?t XII. The Talmud on the objective efficacy of sacrifices. Hindoo conception, 43 1, 432 INTRODUCTION. IF Christ was the Son of God, His death, with the circumstances by which it was preceded, accompanied, and followed, suggests three special problems : — I say, if He was the Son of God. If He were merely a man, it suggests only the problems which are suggested by the death of other men eminent for goodness and insight. And when I use the phrase, " Son of God," I do so in the sense of assigning to Christ an absolutely unique relation to God, — a relation such as never did, and never can belong, save in a purely derivative way, to any mere man ; which, in fact, so far as it ever belongs to men at all, belongs to them through Him. He is the eternal, essential Son of God. I am the more anxious to lay emphasis on this presupposition for two reasons : first, because the implicit or explicit denial of Christ's specific divine dignity logically involves and necessarily leads to the denial of His atoning work ; and secondly, because the words Son of God, Divinity, even Incarnation, are now being a good deal used by a certain School that arrogates to itself the title of "Broad," "Liberal," "Advanced," and so forth, either consciously or 2 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. unconsciously, in a very ambiguous way. A few words on the genesis of what is unquestionably a new form of Humanitarianism — Crypto- Humanitarianism one might style it — may perhaps be of service,especially as an appreciation of its genesis will to some extent explain why some whose spiritual instincts are stronger than their logic, naturally fall into it without suspecting the true nature of the step they have taken. These men do not quite know where they are. Those who do, can scarcely rebut the charge of being more or less insincere in their use of the traditional phraseology. The ambiguities referred to, whether conscious or unconscious, are explainable, at all events in part, by the new presuppositions with which the problem of the person of Christ is at present approached. For centuries the thought of the Church anent the person of Christ has been dominated by the pre supposition which determined the form of the Symbol of Chalcedon1 — a symbol which still more completely expresses the faith of Christendom than any other. It ran — "We teach and confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in deity and the same perfect in humanity ; of one substance with the Father according to His deity, and the same of one substance with us according to His humanity ; in all things like to us, but without sin; of two natures unmixed, unchanged, unseparated, so that the distinction of the natures is not abolished by the union, the specific nature of each being rather pre served, and concurring into one person and one 1 Held a.D. 45 f. See Dorner's Christology, vol. ii. 117 ff. INTRODUCTION. hypostasis ; not one Son divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, who is God the Logos and the Lord Jesus Christ."1 The presupposition in question was that Deity and Humanity are related to each other disparately, as infinite and finite, unconditioned and conditioned, absolute and relative. This presupposition, as was observed, to a large extent still dominates Christian thought and Christian language, alike scientific and practical. Now, so long as inquiries into the person of Christ started from this presupposition, ambiguities were on the whole impossible. If Christ were not the union of deity and humanity, — though there are, of course, various ways of conceiving the union, — He must have been either deity alone or humanity alone; He could not therefore be spoken of without conscious insincerity as the " Son of God," in a sense which did not separate Him toto ccelo from man. Under present circumstances, however, this has become possible. During the present century, greatly owing to the influence of German thinkers, the Church has come, or is coming, to see that deity and humanity, instead of being essentially disparate, are essentially akin. Attention has been called to that corner-stone of the edifice of Biblical truth, God made man in His own likeness ; in the image and likeness of God made He him. But if deity and humanity are essentially akin, a new turn is at once given to the problem of the person of Christ. The situation becomes in some respects less difficult than it was, whilst the old point of view was maintained ; but the faith is exposed also to new, 1 Dorner, I.e. p. 139 f. 4 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. possibly more subtle dangers. In fact, where it was once a question of orthodoxy or heterodoxy, it may very easily and even unwittingly become one of orthopisty or heteropisty — which is a very different thing. If deity and humanity are essentially akin, humanity, it would seem, must be essentially divine : humanity, that is, according to its true essential idea ; humanity as it should be. Humanity as it now exists, empirical humanity, indeed, is far from being what it should be ; there is a great gulf between its idea and the actuality. Rarely in body, still more rarely in intellect, most rarely of all in heart, is any individual man, the man he himself knows he should be, might be — certainly not humanity as a whole. But let man be brought up to the ideal, let him realize the idea of his being, and what should we have ? surely an embodiment, nay, an incarnation of God : — the essentially divine, to wit, the true nature and idea of man would be realized — realized in human form, in a human intellect and heart, in a human life. Yet he who thus manifested and embodied, who thus infleshed or incarnated, the essential idea of humanity, would be nothing but a man ; he would, in fact, be the true, the real man : in a sense, the only man. Just as one might say of a perfect oak tree or a perfect rose bush, that is the true, and therefore in a sense the only oak tree in this forest ; the true, and therefore in a sense the only rose bush in this garden ; so would it be permissible to say of Christ, He is the true man, and therefore in a sense the only real man. Yet being such — yea, as such ; because He is such — therefore is He the Son of God, divine — the incarnate INTRODUCTION. 5 One. It is consequently quite possible now for one whose doctrine or view of the person of Christ is nothing but Humanitarian, commonly but inaccurately termed " Unitarian," — Humanitarian, however, in the ideal rather than the empirical sense ; to whom Christ is essentially nothing but what we all of us ought to be, — and what by coming under his influence we are destined to become ; to avow his belief in the divinity of Christ, and in an Incarnation, without seeming to himself to be guilty of using ambiguous language. Yet the language assuredly is ambiguous. The questions which those who hold this position should face are : Is it involved in the affinity between deity and humanity that men can become as God ? A human son, as we know, may attain to the rank and level of his human father because of the affinity between the two, — can that be applied to the relation we are now considering ? Is there anything in Christ beyond the fact that He realizes the idea of His being — an idea as to essential features and allowing for individual differences, the same as the idea of any man's being — that does not or would not normally belong to every human being ? Is there anything in Christ's relation to God that there cannot be in the relation of men to God ; or is the only difference between His relation and ours, that His is what ours should be, whilst ours is not what it should be? If these last two and similar questions be answered in the negative, it is a case of Crypto-Humanitarianism, whatever may be its protests ; nay more, it involves a heteropisty. So much by the way. A view of the person of Christ such as I have been noticing 6 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. logically involves an analogous estimate of His work on behalf of men. A mere man, even if he were a true man, could only have accomplished a human, even if it were an ideally human work — not a divine- human work ; not such a work as the Scripture represents, and the Christian Church has believed Christ's work to be. The three questions which face the theological inquirer into the atonement are : First, What was the exact nature of the passion of the Christ, of His obedience unto death, even the death of the cross t Secondly, What was the immediate end designed to be accomplished by Christ's obedience unto death ? Thirdly, How was Christ's obedience unto death as means, related to the end to be accomplished — what was the modus operandi ? The answer to the second question so largely determines the answers required by the other two questions, that it has naturally been used as the chief principle of classification of theories of the atonement. If Christ's obedience unto death were designed to produce an objective as well as a subjective or " moral " 1 effect, clearly our view of the nature of His obedience, at all events of the suffering unto death which it involved, must needs be other than it would be, if it affected man alone. Still greater must be the difference in the respective modi operandi. Each of the three problems would seem to furnish a principle of classification of theories of the atone ment. This is, however, really the case only with 1 The correlate to objective should be subjective, but it is scarcely suitable. INTRODUCTION. 7 two — with one of the two partially, with only one fully, namely, with the problem as to the immediate end of the obedience of Christ unto death. 1. For first of all there is substantial agreement among all who have discussed the atonement, that Christ's intervention on our behalf effects reconciliation or salvation — whatever that may include ; as to which opinions differ. If this were remembered, disputes about the words representative, substitute, vicarious, mediator, might surely cease. He is our substitute, representative, mediator, whether we take an objective or a subjective (" moral ") view of the end to be accomplished. The conceptions of what He did as our substitute — what He effected, and of the way in which it was effected — may vary — vary widely ; but in any case, it is allowed that He undertook for us ; that He taught us ; that He lived, suffered, died for us ; not less really by Young and Bushnell, and Robertson and Martineau, than by Calvin and Luther, Owen and Gerhard, Grotius and Turrettine, and others, their followers in our own day, whatever the differences between them in other respects. Whether His sufferings were a mere accident, so to speak, of His real work, like the sufferings of martyrs ; or subordinate to His resurrection ; or necessary to the completeness of the example He left us ; or a part of the manifestation of the divine purity, truth, rectitude, holiness, love ; or appointed, either on grounds of fitness and congruity, or of legal or moral necessity, — all this does not materially concern us : did He actually speak, work, hunger, thirst ; was He buffeted, despised, humbled ; did He die on our 8 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. behalf f Then was He in a most true sense our representative, substitute, mediator, the more so, as by universal agreement He was and did what He was, and did of His own loving choice, and absolutely without ill-desert of His own. 2. Differences arise when we proceed to consider the end of Christ's work ; though here, too, there is partial agreement. The so-called orthodox theories recognise a twofold end — objective and subjective ("moral"); whereas the so-called "moral" theories eliminate or deny the objective end, and recognise only the subjective or man ward end.1 All the theories treated by Dr. Crawford, for example, as "substitutes for the Catholic doctrine of the Atonement," 2 or by Dr. C. Hodge as " antagonistic to the common Church doctrine, and purely philosophical," 3 need not be treated as either " substitutes " or " antagonistic." Their advocates may ignorantly regard them as such ; but the theologian who has learnt in the School of Paul should see and be eager to say to each of them, " Yes, you have laid hold of and are asserting a part of the truth ; here is another part ; let us try to 1 It is unfortunate that so ambiguous a word as "moral" — ambiguous in this connection— should be still employed to designate the non- objective theories of the atonement. Not to mention its implication that the others are either immoral or non-moral, it is alike unfair and illogical to adopt as a principle of classification that which belongs to all the things to be classified. All theories are "moral" theories, though they may be also something more ; that something more not excluding, but including, or certainly compatible with, the "moral" aspect. I shall generally use the term subjective as the antithesis to objective. 2 Crawford's The Atonement, Table of Contents. 3 Dr. C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. ii. p. 590. It is a pity that Dr. Hodge should have been guilty of what is both an injustice and an absurdity in applying the words "purely philosophical" to such theories as the governmental, mystical, moral. INTRODUCTION. 9 confine them into one fair and harmonious whole." In endeavouring to classify theories, I shall therefore leave out of consideration this subjective, manward, world-ward ("moral") element of the objective theories. They do not all of them include all the aspects on which the several " moral " theories have laid stress ; nor indeed has any single one of the non-objective theories ever embraced all these same aspects ; but, as was indicated before, the latter are rather supple mentary than exclusive of each other, and the same thing may be said of them relatively to objective theories.1 Considered in relation to the immediate end to be accomplished, theories of the passion of Christ fall into two great classes, namely, the objectivo-subjective and the subjective. As I shall have occasion to observe later on, a third great class may be formed of those which are purely philosophical. I. Objectivo-subjective — or as I am leaving the sub jective aspect out of consideration, objective theories. These may again be subdivided as follows : — (I.) Crypto-dualistic theories, according to which the work of Christ bore a relation to some power or authority outside of God. This power or authority is not, of course, consciously conceived, still less actually represented, as dualistic ; yet as it savours of inde pendence of God, I think the theories which employ it deserve the description crypto-dualistic. 1 I ought to say here that it is altogether beside my intention to notice every variety of theory that has been advanced. To do that would require a large volume, even if it were within my power. What follows claims to be nothing more than a rough, unfinished critical study — a sort of first sketch from nature. IO THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. i. The first of the class is that which represents Christ's death as having been in some sense or other required as a ransom by, or in order to do justice to, the devil, who had acquired a certain property in men, and a certain right to their services, in conse quence of sin. Irenceus 1 is credited with being the first to suggest this explanation of such terms as " ransom " and the like. There is not a little, too, in his references to the subject which seems to warrant the bestowal of this doubtful honour on him. He says, for example, " Nor did He truly redeem us by His own blood, if He did not really become man, restoring to His own handiwork what was said [of it] in the beginning, that man was made after the image and likeness of God ; not snatching away by stratagem the property of another, but taking possession of His own in a righteous and gracious manner. As far as concerns the apostasy (devil) indeed, He redeems us righteously from it by His own blood ; but as regards us who have been redeemed [He does this] graciously."2 In the following passage some expressions look one way, others another : " The mighty Word, also very man, redeeming us by His own blood in a manner consonant to reason, gave Himself as a redemption for those who had been led into captivity. And since the apostasy (devil) tyrannized over us unjustly, and, though we were by nature the property of the omnipotent God, alienated us contrary to nature, rendering us its own disciples, the Word of God, powerful in all things and not defective with regard to His own justice, did 2 Bk. v. ii. i (Clark's translation). INTRODUCTION. II righteously turn against that apostasy and redeem from it His own property, not by violent means as the [apostasy] had obtained dominion over us at the beginning, when it insatiably snatched away what was not its own, but by means of persuasion, as became a God of counsel, who does not use violent means to obtain what He desires ; so that neither should justice be infringed upon, nor the ancient handiwork of God go to destruction. . . . The Lord has thus redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our flesh."1 For my own part, however, I think with others,2 that a careful study of the fifth book of Irenseus' work against heresies, and a connected view of his system of thought as a whole, will awaken very serious doubts regarding the correctness of the supposition ; even if it do not fully convince of its groundlessness.3 Nor does it seem to me as certain, as is commonly assumed, that the successors of Irenseus are justly chargeable with soberly and seriously teaching the view in question. Origen is reckoned amongst those who worked it out most systematically. Still later writers often outbid him in the employment of images and similes that seem to us as offensive in taste as they are awry in their morality. And yet if we approach them, after reading the vivid, concrete, drastic characterization of Christ's relation to the devil, given by Luther, who can scarcely be supposed 1 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, Bk. v. c. i. I. 3 For example, Duncker, des heil. Irenceus Christologie, etc., Gottingen 1843 ! and Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine, vol. ii. p. 220 f. 3 See Duncker's account of the Soteriology of Irenseus in the work cited above. 12 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. to have believed that God entered into legal transac tions with him, we shall be inclined to suspect that even the Fathers of the first six centuries may rather have been giving the reins to fancy than intending to reason soberly, when they wrote the offensive passages in their works.1 If such a theory were really held, it would surely be justifiable to characterize it as crypto-dualistic ; for a position of such independence relatively to God is therein implicitly assigned to the devil, that the logical issue could be nothing short of dualistic, so far, that is, as strict dualism has ever been clearly, deliberately, and fully held at all. 2. The second crypto-dualistic theory is that which conceives of Christ's obedience unto death as rendered in conformity with the demands of an eternal law, having an objective existence independent both of God and the creature — a law to which God and the creature are alike subject ; what is often called " the eternal law of righteousness." (i.) The only writer who, to my knowledge, has explicitly expounded this theory is Dr. R. W. Dale.2 1 See Note I., Appendix, for further details both as to the Fathers and Luther. " Death " and " Hell " are sometimes spoken of as though they were objectively existing powers with which God entered into a sort of negotia tion. But this has surely been mere personification. See, however, Baur, Geschichte der Versbhnungslehre, and Dorner's Glaubenslehre. 2 In an article of the British Quarterly Review for 1867, p. 486 ff. It is only right to say, however, that in his Congl. Lecture on " The Doctrine of the Atonement," published 1875, he has completely modified the view in question — or tried to do so. He says there, " The law does not claim Him as the most illustrious of its subjects, it is supreme in His supremacy. His relation is not a relation of subjection, but of identity." I adduce the theory here, of course, as a matter of history, with no intention either in Dr. Dale's case, or indeed in the case of any one else whose views I INTRODUCTION. 1 3 Because of its uniqueness it is worth stating at some length. Footing on principles of which Ralph Cud- worth and Samuel Clarke are the best known English expounders and defenders, the writer just mentioned has maintained, or seemed to maintain,1 that Christ died in obedience to a law to which God and the intelligent creation were alike subject — the eternal law of righteousness. In answer to the questions, Why am I bound to obey God ? Is it because, as a creature, I am naturally subject to God ? he replies, " That involves the concession of an eternal obligation resting on the creature to obey the Creator. So far from the commands of God originating moral obligation, ' duty ' is inconceivable if moral obligation does not exist antecedently to the divine commands. Deny the independence and eternity of moral obligation, and Duty vanishes from the universe." He quotes with approval from J. S. Mill2 the words: "The only view of the connection between religion and morality which does not annihilate the very idea of the latter, is that which considers the Deity as not making, but recognising and sanctioning, moral obligation."3 Nor may we say with " many theologians," that " the origin of moral distinctions is to be found in the Nature of may criticize, of saddling them with what I consider the logical conse quences of their principles. Luther's personifications of law are very vivid ; but they are mere personifications. No man ever felt more keenly than he that it was with God personally we have to do— not with anything outside God. See Note II., Appendix. 1 Dr. Dale was commonly held to take the view I find expressed by his words. 2 Dissertations, vol. i. p. 125. 3 Compare the Stoical idea of universal order and Zeus as administrator, Bain's Handbook of Mental and Moral Science, p. 515. 14 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. God." "The idea of God involves," indeed, "the affirmation that in Him the Ideal Law of the Conscience assumes objective Reality." But the hypothesis that moral distinctions are derived from the divine nature is as untenable as the hypothesis which traces them to the divine will. " If the Moral Law be good and right simply because it is the expression of the attributes of an omnipotent and omniscient Being, on what ground are the attributes themselves to be called good and right ? ... If the attributes of God are the ultimate and ideal standard of moral perfections, what meaning can there be in saying that these attributes are themselves perfect ? Goodness must be in itself deserving of honour, or we cannot be required to honour any being because he is good." "It is God's glory, not that His will originated the Moral Law, but that His will has uniformly honoured and asserted its authority '." " Implicated in the acknowledgment of the eternal authority of the law of righteousness is the acknow ledgment that the violation of that law is justly followed by suffering. ... If the divine penalty which follows sin has no other end to answer than the good of the universe, if it is not a recognition, on the part of God, of the essential evil of sin, and an act of divine homage to the eternal law that the wrong doer deserves to suffer, our scheme of the Divine Government will rest on no solid foundation, and will have no place for an expiatory sacrifice." " Great confusion has arisen from confounding two very different propositions. Our moral nature is INTRODUCTION. 1 5 resolute in affirming that it is an absolute and eternal law that the sinner deserves to suffer. But our moral nature does not affirm that the Moral Governor is obliged to inflict all the suffering the sinner deserves." The fact of the atonement has been revealed as the objective reason for the remission of sin : what is its rationale ? If a solution of the problem be possible, it must be sought in the moral reasons on which penalties rest. If what has been advanced is true, the penal legislation of God is the divine recognition of the law that the sinner deserves to suffer ; it is a proof that He cannot look on with passive indifference while men violate the eternal law of righteousness. The moral value of the infliction of penalties lies here, that although God has an infinite love for His creatures, He voluntarily punishes them rather than permit the eternal law that the sinner deserves to suffer to be unrecognised and unhonoured. But as a recognition of the ill-desert of sin, and as an honour to the eternal law of righteousness, the moral value of God's act in atoning for sin, He being the moral Ruler of mankind, to whom it appertained to assert the law, far transcends the moral value of His act in punishing it. Still more, the love of the Eternal Father for the Son whom He surrendered to humilia tion and death, that the ill-desert of sin might be recognised before it was pardoned, invests the divine procedure with infinite sublimity, and makes the grandest moment in the moral history of God, This view of the atonement is summed up by its author in the following propositions : — 1 6 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. "(i.) It is an eternal and absolute law that sin deserves punishment. " (2.) It is the function of God as the Creator and moral Ruler of the universe to recognise this law. "(3.) The moral significance of punishment inflicted on the sinful lies in its being the voluntary recognition by God Himself of the ill-desert of sin. " (4.) The surrender by the Eternal Father of the ' only-begotten Son to penal suffering, that is specially, to death, and the Son's voluntary endurance of that suffering, constitute a divine recognition of the ill- desert of sin far transcending in moral sublimity the infliction of punishment on the guilty." * Though the exposition just adduced contains, as I believe, the only explicit avowal of the theory under consideration, the work of Christ has frequently been reasoned about on principles which logically involve the same legal crypto-dualism. Dr. Dale has been consistent where other writers were inconsistent. (2.) The theories which claim to be par excellence " Churchly," "Catholic," "orthodox," seem to me to oscillate between three points of view ; two of which, with modifications, would supplement each other, though regarded as antagonistic ; the third is in compatible with the rest. These three points of view are the crypto-dualistic, the " personal," and the so- called "governmental." The attitude they take up, however, towards what is termed the " personal," and which I shall further describe under the next head, is 1 There is a curious affinity between the position which " the law " gradually assumed in Protestant theology and what is said about the Thora in the Talmud. See the very interesting details about the latter given in Weber's System der Altsynagogalen Theologie, especially pp. 14-20. INTRODUCTION. 1 7 such that I am compelled to put them either in the class now under examination, or in that which their advocates constantly denounce, namely, the " govern mental," which, as I shall show, is only another word for subjective, non-objective, " moral." In order to substantiate this criticism, I must recall the chief features of the so-called "catholic" theory as set forth by two prominent theologians.1 And, first, I may adduce Turrettine, who, though belonging to the close of the seventeenth century, has done more to colour and determine the systematic theology of the Reformed Churches, especially in Britain, than almost any other writer. He puts the case in a nutshell as follows : " Agreeably to the triple nature (o^eo-is) of sin (as payment of a debt, placation of anger and expiation of guilt), and to the o"XJ=oi<; of God Himself, to whom satisfaction is due, He may be regarded either as a creditor, or as a party offended, or as a judge and ruler. The first two aspects have their own place and justification ; but here we have specially to do with the third. God is not only a creditor who has a right to remit at pleasure ; not only an offended party, who may do as He will in case of offence : but He is the Judge and Ruler of the Universe, to whom alone belongs the infliction of punishment or dispensation therefrom. A creditor has the right to claim his debt, and an offended party restitution and compensation for loss ; but a judge alone, as the constituted authority, has the power to compel or enact punishment. . . . The 1 For the views of two other representative divines, the Hodges, see Note III., Appendix. B 1 8 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. irp&rov i/reuSo? of our adversaries is the notion that sin is to be regarded here as a simple debt, and God as a mere creditor, who can at His pleasure either exact or remit penalty without satisfaction. Whereas it is certain that God here assumes the axeo-is of the Judge and Ruler of the world, who sustains the rights of majesty, and professes Himself the keeper and vindi cator of its laws." x Elsewhere also he claims it also as " the unvarying opinion of the orthodox, that Christ truly and perfectly satisfied divine justice for all our sins ; that this satisfaction was offered, not merely of congruity, but of necessity ; that justice absolutely required it : and that in no other way was forgiveness possible." He adds, too, that " hatred and anger are attributed to God anthropopathically (dv0pmwoiradm), and signify solely supreme displeasure and detesta tion at sin, conjoined with a fixed and constant will to punish it."2 I will now quote from another theologian, whose work on the atonement is probably as representative of the general British consensus as any I could select — that of the late Professor Crawford. Replying to the objection, that if we can forgive an injury without demanding full reparation, why should not God do the same ? he says, its " plausibility arises from an over sight of the very broad distinction between personal resentment und judicial condemnation. Men may pass over injuries and indignities the effects of which are limited to themselves ; but we cannot thence infer that 1 Institutio theologiae elencticae, Geneva? 1682, Loc. xiv. Quasstio x. ix. (vol. ii. 456). Cf. treatise, De Satisfactions Christi necessitate, Pars I. xxv. 2 See Dissertation, De Satisfactione, etc., Pars I. xvi.-xx. INTRODUCTION. 19 ' the Judge of all the earth ' must in like manner pass over transgressions which are committed against those laws of His universal kingdom which involve the welfare of the whole intelligent creation. The satis faction which He requires is not personal ; for He solemnly declares that He has no pleasure in the death of the sinner. It is a judicial satisfaction which He is concerned to exact, not for the gratification of any wrathful or vindictive feelings ; but for the vindication of His justice in the forgiveness of sins, and with the view of maintaining, inviolate and free from every charge of imperfection or mutability, the rectitude of His government and the authority of His statutes." 1 Elsewhere he tells us that " the attribute of justice is from its very nature a judicial 'or magisterial attribute : " 2 and that " the phrase satisfaction to divine justice indicates, not that any feelings of resentment or vindictiveness on the part of God were gratified by our Lord's sufferings, but simply that these sufferings were accepted by the supreme Lawgiver and righteous moral Governor of the universe as a ground on which He might show mercy to His sinful creatures, consis tently with the rectitude of His character and the authority of those laws which as a just God He is concerned to uphold."3 In other words, the satisfac tion is offered to God in His "judicial or magisterial capacity," and that alone. " Christ's sufferings were 1 The Atonement, p. 407 f. When Dr. Crawford says man may do this and that ; and proceeds " but, etc.," we should expect a reference to what God can or cannot do relatively to " injuries and indignities ; " instead of this he passes over— doubtless quite unwittingly— to the Judge of all the earth, to God in what he would call " another capacity." 2 Atonement, pp. 372, 403- 3 L-c- P- J76, cf. 178, 179. 20 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. penal in the sense of being judicially inflicted." 1 " If by an obstacle on the part of God to the forgiveness of sinners, there be understood anything in the shape of personal resentment, or implacable vindictiveness, or ztnwillingness to show mercy, it is perfectly true that there is no such obstacle. . . . The obstacles are His aversion to sin, His just condemnation of it, and His declared purpose as the supreme Lawgiver and righteous Judge to punish it."2 "The sufferings of Christ, although they were not the very penalty which God was entitled to demand from the transgressors of His law, have yet been appointed and accepted by Him in place of it."3 How far now is the criticism previously advanced justified ? i. It is clear that we are concerned in the atone ment or the obedience of Christ unto death with a transaction affecting God as the Judge and Ruler of the world, and the righteous administrator of its laws : it is not God in His personal capacity we have to do with — so we are assured. But here is the dilemma before which we are placed. The laws which God has to uphold are either laws independent of Him — laws which He no less than His subjects are bound to obey ; or, they are simply the modes of His own being, life, and activity,— self- prescribed indeed, but still a part of Himself; as truly a part of Himself as His honour, or His faithfulness, or His love, or His feelings. If the latter view be taken of them, it seems 1 L.c. p. 183 f. 2 L.c. p. 405 f. 3 L.c. p. 179 ; cf. quotation from Principal Hill's Theology to the same effect, which is indorsed. That Drs. C. and A. A. Hodge agree with Turrettine and Crawford in substance, will appear from the account given in Note III., Appendix. INTRODUCTION. 21 to me that to speak of God's laws demanding to be upheld, requiring penalty, compensation, honour, and so forth, is only a roundabout way of saying that God Himself requires all this. God qud Ruler or Judge is still God and God alone. We cannot separate the one from the other, save on the sup position first laid down. We can separate between a man, and the same man qud king, a man and the same man qud judge, for various reasons, but specially because, firstly, he may though a man at any time cease to occupy the post of judge or ruler ; and secondly, because the laws he administers were not enacted by him, nor the kingdom over which he rules established by him. But as this separation is impossible in the case of God, — Dr. Crawford im plicitly confesses this when he tells us that " to satisfy the justice of God [which is essentially a judicial or administrative attribute] is to satisfy a. just God, or to satisfy God in respect of His justice,"1 — then to this extent his treatment of the atonement falls into what I shall designate the personal or properly Godward class. But as he repudiates the idea of a personal satisfaction, insists on Christ's satisfaction being exclusively judicial, and strenuously repudiates every form of subjective theory, the only course left open is to place his theory in what I have called the crypto-dualistic class. He, of course, had no intention of countenancing dualism in any form whatever ; he takes the precaution, too, of using expressions which, whilst distinguishing the law or constitution of the world from God, do not separate the two : but I am concerned here with logic, not with personal intentions ; 1 Atonement, p. 179, 22 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. and I maintain that the theory expounded by Dr. Crawford, consistently carried out, involves the exist ence of a system of law dualistically independent of God, to which He as well as His creatures are bound to conform : and to which He, being perfectly right eous, as the supreme Judge does actually seek to conform His administration. This criticism applies equally to Turrettine, as indeed to all who accept what is called the " sententia orthodoxorum " or the Catholic doctrine. Some parts of Dr. Crawford's exposition are, I think, open to the further criticism, that it approaches dangerously near, if not to the governmental theory, yet to that most objectionable of all theories, the acceptilatio theory ; otherwise what is the meaning of such words as, " The sufferings of Christ, although they were not the very penalty which God was entitled to demand from the transgressors of His '¦ law, have yet been appointed and accepted by Him in place of it ; " 1 especially if he seriously approve, as he seems to do, of Dr. C. Hodge's statement, "It would be no exhibition of justice if it were not an exercise of justice ; it would not teach that the penalty of the law must be inflicted, unless it implied that the penalty of the law was inflicted " ? 2 If justice requires " the penalty," i.e. surely the very penalty ; and if another than the very penalty is appointed and accepted in its place, have we not a case of an artificial, unreal value being put upon and character 1 L.c. p. 179. 2 Quoted l.c. p. 379. As I have hinted in the criticism of the method of the two Hodges in Note III., they too approach sufficiently near to the acceptilatio view. INTRODUCTION. 23 assigned to something at the good pleasure of Him to whom it is offered ? And what is this but accepti latio ? If Christ's sufferings were the very penalty, there could be no question of their being " appointed and accepted " by God " in place of" the very penalty.. For what is this theory which goes by the name of the acceptilation theory ? 1 It signifies that God accepts the satisfaction of Christ, not because a strictly infinite value belongs to the sufferings of the God-man ; but because in His infinite benevolence He is willing to content Himself with a satisfaction that is not strictly infinite. Hence the atonement of Christ is sufficient to satisfy the claims of law, because God is willing to regard it as such, although in strict fact it is insufficient. This is justified upon the principle that any oblation is worth whatever the Deity is willing to rate it at. Its value is not intrinsic and real, but acquired and nominal.2 2. But there is another point at which all these " Catholic " theories are open to objection, — it is their treatment of the word justice. Crawford assures us that " the distinction that has been attempted to be drawn," namely, by advocates of the governmental theory whom he is confuting, " between God's ' rectoral justice 'and His 'absolute justice,' is inadmissible."3 1 The acceptilatio theory may be regarded as one of the objective theories. In the expositions of some of its advocates, expressions enough occur which savour of crypto-dualism, whatever may have been the intentions of the writers. 2 See Shedd's History of Christian Doctrine, ii. 348. This is his account of it as laid down by its originator, Duns Scotus. In the Institutes of Justinian, " acceptilatio " is defined as " solutio imaginaria." This theory was subsequently revived by Arminian theologians like Episcopius, Limborch, and Curcellaeus. 3 L.c. p. 373. 24 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. " Distributive justice," which consists in rendering unto all their dues, is displayed in the administration of His government. "In the case of human govern ments, which are fallible and defective, ' rectoral justice ' may not always be administered according to the strict principles of real or absolute justice ; but not so in the case of the perfect and unerring government of God."1 In a word, as all these writers would agree, justice is to give smtm cuique : God is absolutely just in all His relations ; therefore He will give absolutely suum cuique. God is absolutely just, and gives every one his due. To whom is justice shown or done, when Christ undergoes His sufferings ? For whose sake is the passion ? We should perhaps receive for answer, " The law," the law demands justice. But what is the law ? Is it a law independent of God ? If so, we fall into the dualism to which I previously referred. No ; by the law is really understood God Himself, who is its source, who enacts it, who prescribes it ; of whose life and action it is a mode. In that case it is God Himself, and no abstraction substituted for Him, who demands justice for Himself, who seeks to do justice to Himself through Christ. In short, the end of Christ's work was to do justice to God, to meet God's claims, God's requirements. It is useless here to say, God's claims and requirements as Judge or Ruler ; for that, as I showed already, does not affect the point. It is God, God Himself, who puts in a claim for Himself. And what is that but the "per sonal " view which was so decidedly repudiated ? 1 L.c. p. 372. INTRODUCTION. 2$ Let us further consider in a word or two what is said to be done in the name of justice ; what is offered to God as His just due; what God secures for Him self as His due. That Christ came in order to, do justice to God, I hold to be certain ; this was one great end He had in view : through Him, in other words, God sought to do justice to Himself. But how ? So far as men were sinful, they received their due when the sufferings arising out of, and necessarily connected with sin came, and were brought, upon them ; bodily sufferings for the violation of bodily laws ; intellectual sufferings for the violation of intellectual laws ; and so on, for every aspect of man's complex nature and its corresponding complex environment. If men's sin deserved eternal punishment, then they would get their due by being consigned to the place where the worm dieth not and the fire is never quenched. So far God would be just, according to the definition of justice agreed on, — just, namely, to sinful men. But does God thus get His due ? The language used, especially by the forensic theologians, implies that justice would be done to God also when men were condemned. God Himself, in other words, — unless a dualistic position be assigned to the law, — de mands for Himself so much punishment for so much sin, — infinite or eternal punishment for sin which, being committed against Him, the Infinite and Eternal One, is itself infinite ; and this punishment is repre sented as His due — His righteous due ; provided the suffering is endured, whether by those who deserve it, and whose real due, be it remembered, it is assumed to be, or by a substitute, is of no real consequence ; 26 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. hence its transference to one who, in virtue of His divine nature, was able to endure infinite suffering, — not extensive indeed, yet intensive, not in duration but in intensity.1 But this seems to me, again, the despised "personal" view of the end of Christ's passion, in a most awful and revolting form. Theo logians have concealed from themselves, uninten tionally, the true nature of the position they were taking up, by substituting abstractions like "divine justice," " the law," and so forth, for God, whenever they got directly face to face with it ; and, unwittingly, they often lapsed either into dualism or into subjec tivism. Not only so, they have themselves always repudiated, in the strongest terms, the idea that God demanded suffering, as such, for Himself; that it was infinite suffering He needed for a satisfaction. But then the question returns, What about God's own due ? Giving up the futile or fatal distinction between Himself and the law, what is His due ? Every sinner condemned to eternal death is an eternal 1 So Quenstedt, Gerhard, and others. The sufferings of Christ are regarded from three points of view — that of the jus talionis, that is, the " eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth " principle ; that of a debt; and that of vindication of honour from insult. The second point of view still colours the language used by the less educated preachers and evange lists, and by the people at large ; and there is not a little in the exposi tions of the so-called governmental theory to remind us of the third. As to the amount of suffering endured by Christ, there is a marked difference between recent divines and those of the sixteenth and seven teenth centuries. The former hold that Christ's sufferings were an " equivalent ; " the latter, more or less distinctly, that they were intensive if not extensivi, the exact penalty (as is noted above). Even Turrettine uses the language : " Qua? passioni temporali pondus addit infinittem" Loc. xiv. qu. xi. 28 ; see Note III., Appendix. Principal Cunningham speaks, too, of " the value and efficacy of what Christ did and suffered as truly infinite" (Histor. Theol. ii. 264) ; but he does not keep consis tently to the idea. INTRODUCTION. 2/ loss to God: the loss of a child created in His image, from whom He expected loving reverence, worship, service ; with whom He purposed to hold eternal and ever-growing fellowship. Can that be doing justice to God ? In point of fact, justice would not be done to God, full compensation would not be made to Him, unless every sinful soul were brought back to Him in penitence and profounder reverence and love. The truth, therefore, is that justice can be done to God only by the redemption of man ; and this is perhaps the true meaning of the expression, that in Christ mercy and truth kiss each other, righteousness and grace are one. (II.) The second class of objective theories might be termed "personal" — I prefer designating them Godward. It may be well to avoid the use of the former term, because rather of what it connotes than of what it denotes. The ideas which have found expression in, or have coloured phrases like, " it is a personal question," "personal considerations," and the like, show what I mean. I have quoted above the language of Dr. Crawford on the subject, with whom others of the same school agree. Here is what an eminent representative of the New England " Governmental " School says : " If sin be injurious to God in a private personal capacity only,1 and He be not an inexorable but a compas sionate Being, He might certainly pardon at least as many sinners as repent, without any atonement what- 1 A strange notion of God surely, that could allow of His even being spoken of "as standing in a "private personal" relationship, — unmistake- ably dualistic. 28 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. ever. But sin should not be considered in this light. It is an offence against God in a public capacity, as the supreme Governor of the universe." 1 Dr. Dale, too, says : " Personal claims, if they are exclusively personal, may be waived. If this theory of sin and its punishment were complete (i.e. the theory that ' sin is of the nature of a personal offence against the majesty of God, and that punishment is the expression of God's just resentment '), God would be free to inflict or remit punishment at His own good pleasure."2 In another place, however, he remarks : " If the punishment of sin is to be defined as a vindication and assertion of the personal rights and claims of God against those who have sinned, it must be remembered that the Divine claims which sin resists, and the Divine rights which sin refuses to acknowledge, are essentially different from the claims and rights which are in such sense personal, that they can be remitted at pleasure. They are claims and rights which it is morally necessary that God should maintain." 3 Exactly so. But surely God can never advance claims and rights which it is not morally necessary for Him to maintain. And is it not un usually gross anthropomorphism to apply to any divine claims such words as " exclusively personal" ?4 1 Caleb Burge, "Scripture Doctrine of Atonement" in The Atonefiioit. Discourses and Treatises, etc. With Introductory Essay by Edwards A. Park, Boston i860. 2 R. W. Dale, Atonement, p. 380. 3 Ibid. p. 382. * This idea of " personal," as of something having lower value and validity than the legal, is explicable, of course, by the fact that men are selfish, warped, blinded, and so forth. But considered in themselves, personal relationships are surely the most important, the highest, the most sacred that can be sustained ; and the duties, claims, rights, they INTRODUCTION. 29 The views taken of the personal or Godward end of Christ's passion can scarcely be characterized as so many different theories — they are rather mutually complementary aspects of one theory, i.e. properly considered. Indeed, one can scarcely say that the subject has been looked at enough from this point of view to allow of the genesis of the variety which elsewhere prevails. Strangely enough, theologians, as a rule, have been deterred by the fear of anthro- popathisms or anthropomorphisms from duly facing and entering into the many passages of the New Testament, not to mention the Old, where the idea of a personal change in God, or a personal action on God, is more or less distinctly suggested. Preachers, indeed, have clung to the anthropomorphic ; the people, too, have never translated the personal lan guage of Scripture into the forensic terms employed by theologians ; but these latter, with rare exceptions, have fought shy of what the common mind and heart alone appreciated. The theological custom of speaking of the justice of God having its claims might suggest the idea that this was one of the ends of Christ's work which a Godward theory might have to consider. But the justice of God is merely an abstract way of speaking of God as just, of the just God. God is just ; therefore He gives to every one his due : God is holy ; therefore He seeks to preserve and secure what is due to Himself. In involve are no less inviolable, nay, more inviolable, than any others. Specially true is this of God. Canon Westcott's discussion of the terms Ikmrfcos, I'ha.aKtada.t, in his Commentary on St. John's Epistles, is warped by this mistake. Indeed, it has done untold mischief in connection with this whole subject. 30 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. speaking of rendering justice to God, we use words of wide scope. What is due to God ? Not, as I have already remarked, the punishment of sinners : that is the due of sinners, which God, through the cosmic order, which is the expression of His mind and will, renders to them ; but the sinners themselves are His due, with all their powers of body and mind. His due is, to be loved with all the heart and mind, and soul and strength, and to be served through service rendered to our fellow-creatures, human and non- human. The limitation of , the scope of justice to penalty and the like has been a mistake fraught in the history of the Christian Church down to the present moment, with the saddest consequences alike to theology and practice, to intellect and heart. Every possible legitimate aspect of the Godward end to be served by Christ's passion may be embraced under the head of giving God His due, meeting the claims of justice, and so forth. i. One form, logically considered, of this per sonal theory I have already referred to in the course of my criticism of the juridical theory, — I refer to the notion — possible though scarcely actual — that God claimed so much suffering, no matter by whom borne, for so much sin — claimed it personally ; claimed as His due, as His compensation or satisfaction. As this view of the matter is compatible neither with a true conception of justice, nor with Scripture, nor with human feeling, I need not further dwell on it : indeed I refer to it merely because a good deal of language employed in the discussion of this subject has unintentionally given rise to the charge that INTRODUCTION. 3 1 theologians have actually held it. In what sense this had any foundation I have shown before. 2. The form that first deserves actual consideration is that which represents Christ as having come to be or make a propitiation {Zkaaixbi) for the sins of the world — that is, to propitiate (l\da-ice<70ai) the dis pleasure, anger, indignation of God ; or rather, God as displeased, angry, indignant at sin. Luther, Calvin, and the " Confessions " give great prominence to this aspect of the matter ; and most of the earlier Protestant divines refer more or less distinctly to it. Says Luther : "It was the anger of God itself that Christ bore — the eternal anger which our sins had deserved. . . . Sin and the anger of God — these were the cause of His death. . . . The inner sufferings of Jesus, His anguish — an anguish in com parison with which all human anguish and fear are but a slight matter — was the feeling of the divine anger." 1 Calvin also : " Man was estranged from God by sin, an heir of wrath. . . . Christ with His own blood expiated the sins which rendered Him hateful to God ; by this expiation satisfied and duly propitiated God the Father ; by this intercession appeased His anger ; on this basis founded peace between God and man." 2 In the Apologia Confes- sionis Augustance we read : " The anger of God cannot be stilled by our works ; Christ alone is mediator and propitiator; and for His sake alone does the Father become gracious to us." 3 The Con- fessio Wurtembergica says, too : " The Son of God 1 Kostlin, Theologie Luthers, vol. ii. 411. 2 Institutes, Bk. ii. ch. xvi., 2. 8 Art. iv. (ii.) 80. 32 THE REDEMPTION OF MAN. alone is the placator of the anger of God." * The Confessio Saxonica : " Such is the greatness of the anger of God, that the Eternal Father cannot be placated, save by the beseechings and death of His Son." 2 By degrees, however, the anger of God ceased to be mentioned, save as a kind of synonym of God's fixed purpose to punish sin ; or of the threatenings of the law ; or of the necessity that sin be punished, and so forth ; and this has continued to be the custom down to the present day.3 The "propitiatory" aspect of Christ's work has accordingly been either neglected or evacuated of its significance. The modern attitude * towards it is probably expressed by Canon Westcott when he writes : 5 " The Scrip tural conception of l\dcnce