A ( ¦ °Y^LH°WMLT^HI&SinrY- Gift of A tYlACWrUmz 1 1903 TUCKER PREDESTINATION PREDESTINATION CALMLY CONSIDERED FKOM PRINCIPLES OP REASON: CONSISTENCY WITH THE NATURE OF THINGS, AND THE Strfptiires ot Kvntiy, ANSWERS TO SEVEN QUERIES ON PREDESTINATION. By WILLIAM TUCKER. JEVom tiie Tliird ILtmiloii Edition, WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY BY L. IVES HOADLEY. BOSTON: PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM PEIRCE, NO. 9, COKNHILL. 1835. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1835, by WILLIAM PEIROE, in the Clerk's office of the District Court of Massachusetts. Mpp^s 1$ BOSTON: Webster & Southard, Printers, No. 9, Cornhill. CONTENTS, LETTER I. Error in principle, and error in practice. Predestination a revealed truth. Reason should submit to revelation. Truths above reason which depend on revelation alone . Plan of discussion in these Letters . Fixed state of all events from eternity, supposing no decree of God concerning them. Considerations showing the probability that God has decreed them. Absolute impossibility of God's not having de creed them. Proof on the firsc point : Causes and effects, and their mutual dependence. All events one continued series of causes and effects. Illustrations. The proposition, though strange to some, yet true. No such thing as chance, accident, or contingency. The foretelling of events by astronomers. How every event might be fully traced. Our ignorance of causes dees' not make them contin gent. Eclipses and the wild Africa;'. Conclusion in favor of the proposition. Objection that things riftert r, -cur to throw effects out of their natural channel, of no weight' jjTJ1 ¦ unprejudiced left without doubt. "-qp i. t ra -vf.' II. must i" Fixedness of events froflj ^vf.'Ut'ii-ity and the knowledge God has about them. All things thai.e ' \''u': or will take place future from eternity, a self evident trv.'rr"M,"'-1,ulure events as certain as past events. Non-existence des Kssf uturity. Futurity ascertains exist ence. — God omniscient, V-iJu ise, not God. God's knowledge of future things proves thei^ei isiv'.ce at the time known. State of the argument. Summary .'<"3exivt5*view. Must be arirst cause, but that can be only God. How ihs reader must examine these things. Word of God our rule. LETTER III. The principles laid down not stoicism. Matter neither deified nor made eternal. Gcd the only Ruler and Guide. Second proposition ;. ' 1 VI CONTENTS. Probability of God's choosing and fixing all things from eternity. Supernatural and extraordinary events. The deluge. Building of Babel, Destruction of Sodom, Fall of Abraham, Judgments on Egypt, Exodus of Israel, and their settlement in Canaan. State of the Jews to the present time. Daily experience in reference to the elements and all created instruments. Thunder and lightning. Winds and storm. .Inundations. Pestilence. Wars. Earthquakes.- — Prophe cies — as, concerning Christ, his church, the nations of the world. Prophecies not a mere foretelling of events by tracing effects from their causes, but positive, informing what should take place — what God would bring to pass. LETTER IV. Probability of God's choosing and fixing all things, from their de pendence on God. ^tiling created independent. Existence to-day no foundation of the same to-morrow. God unceasingly sustains all. His power always exerted. He alone independent. His will to exert his power. Cannot be supposed to exert his power contrary to his will. — Probability from the analogy of human and divine power. Understanding, or power of perception and judgment. Will, or pow er of preferring and choosing. Right of direction in the understand ing. Bias of love, hatred, &c. The choice made will be executed. The will always chooses the greatest apparent good, or what is most agreeable. Every one will do what he chooses, if he can. Every one judges and chooses. Must from the nature and powers of the soul. So in God more especially. His idea of all things perfect So his judgment. So his will. LETTER V. Third proposition: ImpossibL''ty of God's not having fixed, from eternity, whatsoever comes to p, s. Topics of argument. The per fections of God, and his worksk >rfections of God, what Not of the nature of accidents, adjuncts* alities of a subject, but as the subject itself. Not as subsisting is;^ / ;'J".ly. Ground on which op- posers deny the doctrine. Appealrf-^ posers. — Eternity as a per fection of God, — not to be judged^ '(,y'our ideas of time. Neither before nor after with God, as-etera y ,/,_ Omnipresence. Kternity and omnipresence include each other. ^ ft 8th of Proverbs and the 139th Psalm. — Consequences upon the ai session of these two attributes. All possible existences present to God's v iderstanding, and subject to his will. All uncertainty as to the nature, properties causes and con sequences of things, excluded. God's will never in suspense. Con sequence if it could be. God's will his essence. Admits of no suc cession. A case supposed showing how every thing must be eternal in the mind of God Succession belongs only to creatures. All things unalterably fixed by the divine will, as the effect of positive power or of sovereign permission. The determinations of an infinite mind not suspended. CONTENTS. LETTER VI. God incomprehensible, and man vain. Invocation of the Spirit. Recapitulation and state of the argument. Further investigation. God only can originate. Subsequent existence and operations all -depend on Him. Their existence must have been determined by Him. Consequently all according to his eternal purpose and' deter minate counsel. Otherwise, new acts of will in God. Absurdities and contradictions, if so. Destruction of God's eternity. Destruc tion of his omnipresence. Any new act of will in God impossible. Another consequence, an effect without a cause. LETTER VII. What the author once thought. His change and present state. Argument from two more attributes, omniscience and immutability. These attributes, what. What follows their admission. All things tae objects of God's decrees 1 ls Uc""T?.f his knowledge. Whether He knows them, because He l»^an- *"us'!^m. Knowledge, on what founded in God, on what in " T*£{1Ies,!JV 'ations as to the latter, from the operations of nature. rorTStZu- "emselves not the foundation of their knowledge, much e ,__{„-. --vi »J. AU resolvable into his eter nal and immutable will.^.^ ^"nation of this view from the circum stance that while God ii Jriu'iave prevented things being as they are, He has permitted them. ' LETTER VIII. Recapitulation. Object in the Letter. Attributes of eternity and immutability essentially connected. Immutability and predestination stand or fall together. Immutability in God, what. Predestination, what. The two synoymous. Consequence. Further proof. Ab surd consequences of denying God'£ -frr-e-knowledge to be founded on his will, or that his will and pur '»y'es are eternal. If founded on the will of another, that other must tie God ; if on things material and inanimate they must have operated on the divine mind before they existed. Dilemma. State of the case if so. Consequences. Answer to the objection, that though God's knowledge of things be founded on his will, yet it does not follow that his will is eternal. LETTER IX. How far the argument has been advanced. Further purpose in this Letter. Omnipotence and wisdom. Omnipotence, what. Es sential to Deity. Appears in all his works. All power in creatures, source of it in God. He the Power by which all things exist. Wis dom, what. Also essential to Deity. Evinced by creation, providence t'lii CONTENTS. and grace. Depth of wisdom in grace. Appeal to the friend ad dressed in the Letters. Additional proofs from propositions assumed as axioms. God willing to act before He acts. Forming a plan of all his works, before Heexerted himself to produce them. His works .such as might be expected from perfect wisdom. Any thing other not the will and pleasure of God. The plan and the ends aimed at in it. These no other than his glory. Comprehension of the plan as taking in the whole compass of finite being with everything any way concerned. Gonclusion. LETTER X. State of the argument. What is further proposed. Plan. Nature and operation of power and wisdom in rational and intelligent beings. Power, what. All acts, exertions of power. Power seated in the will. Case where there is constraint, not applicable to God. Wis dom, what. Three senses in wbicjpj, is understood. How human beings discover where it reside ^^..sdom- defined. Wisdom and power, how they operate. *y °^r*l^ow ^e case 's w't'1 God. 'TTF-A and j' Conclusions and arguments from ^>re?'\ses established. From power. Power centred in the will. Is -o in God. Nothing in all creation but is a display of power. Power not in or from matter. That wholly passive. Nor from created spirits. Every act of mind an effect of prior agency. Neither its own cause. The soul passive in all acts considered as effects. Illustration. Conclusion. Rela tion of cause and effect universal. Summary in regard to power. General conclusion. LETTER XH. Subject of the Letter. Axioms. No principle of operation can act contrary to its nature. Therefore wisdom cannot. Consequently folly springs from another principle. Perfect wisdom not in entire possession where is the least possible error. Therefore found only ^in God. Whether God permits anything not determined. Inferences. All wisdom in God's understanding. Also indubitable certainty The best not only hvoicn bul rli'isen. Consequence if not. His wis dom prevents the possibility ot a new volition. Consequence, that He does what he chooses. At no loss for means. Summary in re gard to wisdom. LLCTTER XIII, What must appear from things laid down in Letter XII. Subject How the case must be on, supposition any event exists without, or CONTENTS. IX contrary to, the determinate will of God. How, if He did, or did not, work after a plan. Absurdities if He did not. Consideration of the case. Illustration in the sin of our first parents. Other illustrations. Absurdities, contradictions and impossibilities necessarily consequent upon the supposition, if allowed. What is further proposed in the next Letter. Impressions of the author in view of the subject. His object in the Letters, and desire for light and guidance from God. LETTER XIV. Attributes already considered. Subject, the divine will. Its nature and properties. What the will is in rational beings. What in God. Considerations to show that it is no other than God himself, instanced in its eternity, immutability, omnipotence, severeignty, wisdom, sim plicity and oneness. Conclusion. LETTEP^V v Recurrence to the last Let'cr. .. ou ^ , of this. Inferences con firming the doctrine, from tl;e '.-ternitS^f, mutability, simplicity and oneness of the divine will^ is already VvSssed; from omnipotence; from sovereignty ; from v.-.>aom^fr, worl^the moral perfections of God. God's chief end in all his ^r. ti> the manifestation of his own attributes. How this is accompli f-;v«t. Every event contributes its share. Moral evil no exception fTJ'not accidental. Christ in rela tion to it. Its share in the everr^of our world. Moral excellencies of the divine will an impregr>!wle argument for extending the divine decrees to all things without exception. I BETTER XVI. School divines respcc \f T the divine will. How God executes his purposes. Positive 'effi uency without the aid of second causes. Things that come under this particular. Creation. Miracles. In strumentality of creatures. Nothing excepted. Moral and intelli gent chiefly in view. Positive and effectual energy in relation to such. Whatever is holy under this head. Withdrawment, by which sin is supposed to have been introduced. Two propositions premised. God infinitely holy. Sin not exist without, or contrary to, his will. How demonstrated. Grand paradox. Suppositions which limit the Holy One of Israel. End for which the author supposes moral evil was introduced. The glory which it is the mean of bringing to God. Conclusion respecting sin as the ordination of the will. LETTER XVII. Subject proposed. Sin could not be a first cause. The first cause or occasion of it free from the blame of it — could have no positive in- X CONTEXTS. fluence in producing it. God could not be the blameable cause of it. In what sense He is the cause of it. Appeal. Sin traced to its fountain. Commenced in the fallen angels. Their slate. The state from which they fell. Not deceived as Eve, by a foreign enemy. Proba ble exaltation of Satan, and how he fell. Account of the origin of sin enlaro-ed upon. Suggestions from the Scriptures proving the account probable respecting Satan. How the case must naturally have been. Inference and conclusion. LETTER XVIII. Surpassing excellency and glory of God. Hence a remoter cause of sin. God's withholding himself, and leaving the creature to the exercise of his mere natural powers. Impossibility otherwise that he should have fallen. Nothins so sweetly attractive to an intelligent rational being, as God. All that is so in his works, nothing to what is in himself^ Happv ccnditifui of the angels before they fell, favor able to their continuing obe,0 . ^ Nature of things also. Natural to choose the greatest apparent.- p---^^ natures and experience. Sug gestions of the tempterin L *, -m'jn. Oivine excellencies obscured, or she could not have fa'.!?f - s° Adafn. Cain also. So every instance of atrocity recorded/ pe Scriptures. Universal conduct of men correspondent. Instep, .[.E^ts of the fear of man. How the case would be in relati _ ^A_ *' a, vrere the blaze of his glory present. Confident conclusion U«_ «ie author. Case, as he supposes, of the elect angels. "?£ LETTER XJX. Further amplification of the idea of the\vithdrawment of an impres sive sense of the divine odory as the cause of sin, by considering the natural tendency of the intelligent powers Vf a rational mind. Un derstanding and rectitude the brio-ht ima^e\of God in the creature, and though obscure in man since the fall, v.*t admirable now. The glories of the Creator being hidden, man sets up himself. How the case is with God — how with man. Independence the principal aim when God is lost sight of. Instances, and the degree to which it would go. The case, and conclusion drawn. Giving the law another occasion of sin. Author's satisfaction with his account of the origin of sin. LETTER XX. God's glory, and man's presumption in venturing to arraign his appointments. Justification of God in leaving angels and men to sin, by withholding a sense of his presence, on the ground that He is un der no obli^Xon not to do so. Its existence no impeachment of his holiness. Display of his holiness dependent on the existence of sin. So his justice, faithfulness, mercy, grace and love. Divine wisdom CONTENTS. XI more fully displayed by it. Designed probably to show the absolute dependence of the creature on the Creator. This what Satan lost sight of. Lesson in this result to those that did not fall. Case of the redeemed through Christ among men. How every moral perfec tion shines through the occasion of sin, and how, therefore, it must have been included in the divine plan. Instances in illustration of its being made subservient to the divine glory. How God's glory is to be regarded, in answer to any who dare reply against God. Sum mary. Conclusion. LETTER XXI. The ground gone over, and what follows in vie%v of it. Subject; works of God. Creation and providence. Creation, what. How the case was. Illustrated by reference to the mechanic who builds a house or constructs a machine. Conclusion thence. God's purposes not effected, and He disappointed, if he does not direct all in all. Works of providence, what. In its largest sense. Its comprehen sion. Further to be considered. LETTER XXII. Works of providence divided into works of n&iiire, and dispensa tions of grace. The heavenly orbs ., that they are the works of' God, the most we know of them. Solar- system ; the little we know of that, except that the divine arm supports and directs it. Instance the earth and man upon it. Truth of Scripture that God worketh all things without exception. Case of the vegetable kingdom. No in herent principle of growth. The earth inert, only a repository for nourishment. Gravity and motion not independent powers. Air and water passive instruments only. Animal life. Events that arise from it, and their dependence. Life, how maintained. Intellectual and rational life. The soul. Its powers. No event or thing its own producer. Observation concluding the Letter on the union of Scrip ture and reason in ascribing all operations in heaven, air, earth and sea to God. LETTER XXIII. Dispensations of grace. Grace, what. Grace in God. Two causes. In either free. No cause of it out of God. Display of it resolved on from eternity. Its prominence in God's design. Cove nant of, formed in eternity through Christ. Consequence, if the plan formed be a perfect plan, that every partaker of the covenant of grace was included and fixed by name. How this appears from reason and the nature of the thing, and from Scripture. The Lord knowing his, how in this view grace guides and influences his dispensations to wards them. Evident from the act of his grace in the gift of his Son, also from the operation of his grace in and towards his people. In stances. Conclusion of the Letter. CONTENTS. LETTER XXIV. Grace the work of God. Every other event fixed in order to its accomplishment. Purpose of grace not to be fulfilled without it, ap parent from the effect of one thought in its progress. Sin and grace enter into all the events of our world. Provision of a remedy for sin implies sin's determinate being. Case of men supposing no act of grace in God towaids them. Effects of grace. Being and per mission of every sin determined on, otherwise not known to God, nor provided against, nor God accomplish his plan. No sin but will ultimately subserve the glory of divine grace. Division of the world between sin and grace. Effect of sin and grace on the subjects of them. Conclusion and inference. Relation of Scripture prophecies and promises to the subject confirming the whole. What the author might have done. Conclusion of the argument. Author's friend addressed. Benediction. ERRATA. Page 98, third line from the bottom, erase No. 4. Page 99, beginning of fourth line from top, insert No. 4. Page 102, Note, for luuth, read truth. Page 118, middle of the page, for nto read into. Page 158, paragraph number 2, for That if, read If. INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. The reader of these letters will find in them the plain thoughts of a plain man plainly expressed ; but on a subject the truth and sub limity and grandeur of which, made even a plain man forcible, and at times truly eloquent. It is not designed in this place to give anything like a full account of the author. This indeed would be impiacticable. The materials for it are not at hand ; nor are they, so far as is known to the writer, to be obtained in this country, if in fact they exist at present at all. It is true what is called a memoir accompanies these Letters in the English edition from which this is prepared, but it is really neither a memoir, nor a mere notice. For the latter, it is too long ; and for the former, it is quite too short and meagre, especially for such a man as it is easy to see, even from this memoir and from these letters, Mr. Tucker must have been. Besides the memoir, there is also, in the English edition, a general introduction accompanying the letters. But except a fact or two, there is nothing in it of importance to be re tained in the present edition. In place, therefore, of the memoir and the introduction, it has been tliought necessary to retain a brief sketch only of the life of the author, introducing him merely to the acquain tance of the reader. William Tucker, the author of the Letters on Predestination, was a cutler and iron-monger. He was born at Chard, Somerset County, England. March 7th, 1731. His parents were in moderate circumstances, but honest and industrious, and attentive to the morals and, as far as they were able, tothe education of their children. Wil liam, who was the eldest, gave early indications of possessing a mind B XIV INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. of no ordinary character, and during his apprenticeship was so fond of reading and contemplation, that he spent most of his pocket money in the purchase of books to gratify his inclination in this respect. Being, except his parents, his only tutor, he had not of course a regular and systematic education ; yet so ardent was his desire for improvement and cultivation, that he acquired a tolerably good knowledge of the learned languages, of philosophy and of general literature. At what time precisely he became hopefully pious, does not appear. Probably it was when he was about 20 or 21 years of age. He went about that time to London, and though the particulars cannot be as certained, it is known in general that he then and there heard the cel ebrated Whitefield preach, and through the instrumentality of his preaching, was hopefully converted. — In his profession of Christian ity he was of the Baptist denomination, and was baptized by the Rev. Isaac Ham, July 7th, 1765. After his return from London, he settled in his native place, where he continued to do business between 30 and 40 years. His habits were regular, and his application close and thorough. Besides business, he also applied himself regularly and constantly to the acqusition and communication of knowledge, particularly on the subject of religion. He had a taste, too, for poetry, in which he in dulged himself considerably. He was accustomed to rise early, and when the weather was unfa vorable to his amusing or employing himself abroad, he did it in his study. It was in these seasons he composed his Letters on Predesti nation. They were first published in 1772, in the ' Gospel Magazine,' a periodical at that time edited by the Rev. Augustus Toplady, by whom and by the Rev. John Rayland, among others, Mr. Tucker was much encouraged as a writer. The Letters were first published in a volume in 1798, under the title of Predestination calmly considered.' The reviewers are said to have borne a respectful testimony to the Work, and no opposer, for a number of years, attempted a reply or even an attack. Besides the Letters on Predestination, and some poetical pieces, Mr. Tucker furnished the Gospel and Baptist Magazines with a vari ety of articles on tho pre-existence of Christ, the moral law, and other subjects, mostly controversial ; all of which are spoken of as having been highly esteemed. He is said not to have been greatly ihty and mod esty which are highly indicative of the exct',n„ j' if his character; though, as has been stated already, there is no T^ig'> 5 importance to be retained here as aiding the better understa /'ding of the Letters, or recommending them particularly to the attc' --on of readers. It appears further from the Memoir, tha pllx. Tucker, as- a man, was naturally amiable, and, as a Christia^ilunaffectedly pious. He deeply lamented the pride of our fallen nature, which he 'considered the master-sin of the race. He set a great value on the Bible, and, what is remarkable, there was found among his manuscripts, after his death, a large part of the Bible very curiously written in a short hand of his own, under an impression, that troublesome times might come, when he should be deprived of that inestimable treasure. He died, * See Letter VII. XVI INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. as he lived, in the faith and fellowship of the gospel; and, though dead, he yet speaketh. As to the preparation of the Letters for this American edition, they were found, on examination, to be repetitious to such a degree as to lessen the interest, it was thought, with which they would other wise be read. They have therefore, in accordance with the sugges tion of a friend to whom the volume was sent for his opinion of its merits, been, in some parts, considerably abridged and condensed. A careful and scrupulous regard has been had, however, throughout the volume, to the sentiments of the author, and in no case has he been made to speak a sentiment not his own. The divisions into paragraphs, wherever the numbering of them seemed likely to pro mote a clearer understanding of the argument, have been numbered. Besides this, a running title, varying with the subject, has been in troduced ; the topics discussed in each Letter have been stated at the opening of the same, and a general table of contents has been pre fixed to the whole. The work will still be found repetitious more or less, but what of repetition remains, is, for the most part inseparable from the subject, as the author chose to discuss it. Respectii g^tee author's manner of conducting his argument, it may be well toi^bserve, generally, that the argument is sustained, first, from a colV1' pation of the nature of cause and effect, and, sec ondly, from thatvor"iie perfections of God and his works. The evi dence also -of jjtoniea . ;a introduced briefly at the close of the dis cussion, thoug^111*lsir'£ Gliient from this source is not considered as altogether pertij,^ ™t ae object of the Letters being to prove the doctrine from reason^ ^ ather than from Scripture. The Queries and N'1 swers following the Letters, are worthy in their place, but need n^- be here specified, as to method. In some places in them there is 'J ''her a repetition of what is said in some parts of the Letters, butjgs they are not very long, they have been retained almost entire. As to the subject in general, both of the Letters and of the Queries and Answers, the editor having introduced the reader to the author, and given some necessary account of the preparation of the work, as here presented, would now, before closing, bespeak the attention and candor of the reader, suggest a few things respecting the doctrine itself of predestination, and remark briefly on the state of the public religious mind at the present day, calling for a consideration of the subject. TNT'RODVUTORy; ESSAY, XV1J There is not perhaps in the whole compass of philosophy and theol ogy, a single doctrine which men are more liable to abuse than the doctrine of predestination. As a philosophical doctrine, it degene rates with mere philosophers into blind inexorable fate ; and as a doctrine of revelation, it is liable to be, with some, little better ; while others, however they may believe it as a doctrine of philosophy, reject it altogether as a doctrine of revelation, and thus wrest the truth, as is to be feared, to their own and others' destruction. It is a doctrine which should be studied, therefore, with the greatest possible eandor and impartiality of mind, and with implicit regard to the sim ple question of conclusiveness in the evidence by which it is sustained. With such a regard, it is hoped, every reader of this volume will weigh the arguments and reasonings of Mr. Tucker, and not hastily reject them, or consider them inconclusive, because the general subject is environed with difficulty. He will find himself frequently called upon by the author to consider the solemnity and seriousness, as well as the importance, of the doctrine, and nothing is more needful to a right understanding and reception of the truth. And here the editor would make a single remark- respecting Mr. Tucker's reasoning from the divine perfections. ~ft is frequently objected that reasoning of this sort is all to lHjIe purpose, inas much as we know, confessedly, so little about G("v. But it may be replied that, though we know so little about O ¦¦¦¦&, it yet is not to little purpose to reason in this way; for, limi", as we are in our knowledge and capacity, we are manifestly so '¦ instituted, (and this is an ultimate fact in relation to the human m/id and the nature of things,) that we cannot but thus reason, and -fOt to reason thus, is to launch at once into universal skepticism abc:.'t everything, even our own existence. The doctrine itself of predestination is richer peculiar. It is held in its different forms by men, in other respects, of opposite creeds, and by some of no acknowledged religious creed whatever. It is called the doctrine of predestination, but is known and recognized in substance under other names. The doctrine of necessity or of prov idence, and that of election or divine sovereignty, is but another name for nearly the same thing. And it is further peculiar, in that, while as a philosophical doctrine merely, it is wont to be considered as remote and foreign from all practical regard, it nevertheless, as a religious doctrine, comes home more elosely to the heart, and is in- *B XVIII INTRODUCTORY fiSSAi'j vested with more practical relations than almost any other. WheneeV the unsubdued and such as have not repentance and faith are more quick to contend with this than with any other doctrine : because, conscious of their guilt, they feel themselves pierced by it just in the point of their greatest vulnerableness, and that too in a way most to expose the awfulneps of their state. Therefore they cannot endure it. However it be considered, the doctrine of predestination is evi dently one of great interest to the human mind ; and unless the mind be turned entirely away from the contemplation of it, no man can, as an accountable creature and a subject of the divine government, be at rest in his feelings, or at peace with his conscience, without submis sively and confidingly receiving it as the only proper basis, next to the doctrine of the divine existence, of all true religion. As to the public mind, it is with that in relation to ieligion, as it is with the mind of an individual in relation to the same. Sometimes it is in one state, and sometimes in another. Now one doctrine or sentiment has an ascendency, and now another. But what is desira ble, is, an equal propoition of all the various doctrines of religion at the same time ; - v\d without this, the mind, whether of an individual or of the public, pliable to be disproportionate and distorted, and sub ject to irregular and extravagant action. Accordingly, in this view, one doctrine may bo more important at one time, and another, at an other. And if we *-ould seek to be useful in calling the attention of the public to needful subjects of contemplation, we must, like the pa rent or the teacher '« the education of a ehild, throw out before the mind the doctrines an^ sentiments, which are required from time to time to give it a right direction and promote its healthy action. A great variety of influences mav be employed, some more agreeable perhaps, and others less, yet all necessary in their place in order to the grand result. In this point of view, it would be very unphilosophical, as well as unwise, to complain of certain means and influences, which are hav ing great prominence in the formation still further and the direction of the religious public mind, at the present da}', especially in our own country. The evil in them must be counteracted as far as may be, and the good cherished ; but they are both perhaps the legitimate and natural offspring, of the human mind, so situated and circumstanced, and so acted upon by Heaven, as is the mind of the American people. No other people, with the same universality, and degree of intellectual INTRODUCTORY E^SAY. XlX cultivation have ever been placed in such a focus of moral light ; and none probably, as a whole, have ever had such manifestations of the awakening and converting influences of the Holy Spirit. It is to be feared the work of progressive sanctiheation has not been, in all, pro portionally carried on ; but, though this should be the case, among no people, probably, has the god of this world been more disturbed, or excited to attempt mischief on a more elevated and extensive scale than among us. His kingdom is invaded on all sides, and he is put, it may be supposed, to his utmost to retain his hold on his subjects. In such a state of things, it were to be expected that every means would be employed, promising success even the least. And so we find it. The adversary not only shows off the bold and daring front of infidelity, as if to carry all by force and superior power: but he practices also every sly and wily art of plausible error and seeming truth, to decoy, if possible, and beguile and thus to conquer. As in the or re at anti-Christ of papacy, he engrafted scions of the tree of death on the stock of the tree of life, the better to elude detection on the part of those who would eat and live ; so, in instances less prominent, and down even to the least obseivnble, his artifice still is, to engraft error on truth, wherever he can, and thus to carry on his work of death by stealth, and under the garb of an angel of light. Universal ly, his object seems to be to poison the waters of life in the very foun tain, or at least at as little distance as possible from it in the stream, that all who drink, whether here or there, though they may seem to themselves to drink pure water, may yet be fatally poisoned and final ly destroyed. What proportion of the speculations in the philosophy or the reli gion of the present day, or whether this or that particular in either, be the proportion what it may, deserves to be included as noxious in the view just taken, the writer will not attempt to decide ; nor does he, in reference to some things which may be specified as at present doubtful, feel very confident to declare what will be their ultimate effect. But it is reasonable, taking the most liberal view of things, to consider Christians of every name as called upon to be on their guard against exposure ; and in so far as books and publications are concerned, one of the signs cf ihe times indicative of exposure, may be found, it is believed, in a certain apparent eagerness on the part of ¦a great multitude of readers, (1 will not say Imw much of the fault is to be attributed, in some cases, to authors,) after something excit- XX INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. ing , something new in theory, or keen in wit, or imposing in imagery — something light and airy perhaps, or something crowded with in cident, and jet off with high coloring. The reading life of not a few readers of the present day is literally, as the Psalmist says, ' as a tale that is told,' for so they spend their life as to reading. There is, too, a willingness on the part of others who would seem to be^of a more substantial character, to be gulled into the belief that everything, whether in science, or literature or religion, is now about to be made as simple and plain as the child's first lesson in the alpha bet, under the all-discriminating, comprehensive and explicatory power of these modern improved and improving times. It is a remark re cently made by a writer with whom the public are well acquainted, that ' every doctrine (he is speaking of religion,) is surrounded with difficulty, about in proportion to its radical and fundamental impor tance.' But the times on which we are fallen are rare times in lespect to things of this sort, and facile and simplex must be inscribed on every thing; and this too, not by a 'thus saith the Lord,' and therefore it is plain and easy, but as tiaced out and fairly disposed of by the ingenuity and research of the human understanding ; so that whatev er will not bear the test in this respect by yielding and coming under subjection, must be given up, and pronounced untrue and unworthy of confidence. Thus, between what is pert and flippant, or at least, superficial and perhaps fictitious, on the one hand, and on the other what is seemingly profound, but really full of assumption, if not of vain boasting, the truth, on many subjects, is exposed to fall and become neglected. The writer is aware that these remarks may not be popular with some; but they may, nevertheless, be true, and have no less impor tance, particularly in so far as the doctrine contended for in these Letters is concerned. Whether from design or otherwise — probably it is only incidental to the state of the public mind,, considering how, to a great extent, it is wont to be fed at present, but it evidently is tho fact that the doc trines of religion, and especially the doctrine of predestination, has not been so frequently the subject of discourse, as it is believed it was formerly. Perhaps in some of its forms it was once made too promi nent, at least in the discourses of some ministers; — or they, rather,. may not have inculcated it in the best manner. Probably they erred- in both respects. INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. XXI Yet why should the doctrine be passed over in silence, or laid aside as useless, if not detrimental ? It is manifestly a great doctrine, both of revelation and of reason. Only admit that there is a God ; and, as He must necessarily have originated everything, and imparted to everything whatever power it has, the doctrine follows, of course, that nothing can be above him, or beyond his control. And admit that God is wise, and acts with a view to some end, arid predestina tion follows irresistibly, as is shown abundantly by Mr. Tucker. The only question, therefore, would seem to be this: Is the doctrine worthy, and important to be known ? and has it any practical relations to make the knowledge of it useful ? And here the answer must be obvious, and cannot be mistaken. Certainly if every doctrine of Scripture, however minute, is profitable, and none can be unimportant or without usefulness ; much more must this be true in relation to a doctrine of such vitality and radical char acter as is the doctrine of predestination. Its power with the con science has been brought to view already, showing its agency in the work of conviction and conversion. And if it should be objected, as it sometimes has been, that it discourages effort and deadens zeal ; though we may admit that this is sometimes the case where the doc trine is abused, yet it is only in such cases that it has this effect; and where it is rightly received, it is, on the contrary, the very spring and life of all effort and zeal ; as, for instance, none are so earnest and persevering in prayer and the use of means, as they who realize most strongly the truth and practical importance of this great doctrine. And we see why it is so. For this doctrine brings God continually before the mind. We see him working around us. He speaks to us in every event. Therefore this doctrine at once promotes holiness of heart and life, through reverence, and fear, and gratitude, and love ; while it excites also and animates to duty, through confidence and a well grounded hope that exertions made in obedience to God and dependence on Ilim will not be without effect. The neglect, then, of the doctrine of Predestination in the present state of the public mind, or the misuse of it, perhaps, in some cases, is a reason why, considering its importance and usefulness, it should be brought before the public, and commended especially to ministers and candidates for the ministry. It is plainly a great doctrine of religion, both natural and revealed. XXII INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. Let it, then, be investigated. Let it be proved and established by the proper evidences. And if it is liable to abuse, let it be properly guarded ; and let its right use, and in that case its powerful, salutary influence be searched out and faithfully employed. The Editor cannot but hope that the discussion of the' subject so clearly and copiously by Mr. Tucker, may be of great service to many who may read his Letters ; and though he would have been glad to have had them published in this country at an earlier period, he flat ters himself the publication of them now will still he thought timely by many. Some at least, whose judgment the community are ac customed to respect, have thought well of the republication, and wished it might go forward. For, though not exactly upon the topics which have interested so extensively the theological reading commu nity for the last few years, they yet bear, notwithstanding, in a great many points, on kindred topics. They come, too, as the testi mony of an uninterested, independent, unprejudiced witness. The surface of the water has now and then been a little ruffled ; here and there, indeed, the commotion has sometimes been considerable. May it not be hoped that these Letters will have a tendency to tranquilize and smooth any commotion that may remain ? Charlcstown, June, 1835, PREDESTINATION CALMLY CONSIDERED; IN A SERIES OF LETTERS. LETTER I. Preliminary remarks. — Plan of the discussion. — Fixedness of events from the nature and connection of cause and effect. My Dear Friend, Error in principle, will be productive of error in practice, and attended with as awfully fatal consequences. Certain it is, God has as much regard to what we think, as what wc do. If our thoughts of Him correspond not with his revealed will, it is as criminal in his sight, as any outward transgression : for to discredit what He saith, is making Him, who is truth itself, a liar; and is, consequently, a fault equally punishable with any outward breach of his holy law. Predestination is, most certainly, a revealed truth — there being scarce a chapter in the Bible without some traces of it — and did not men set their reason above revelation, no doubt would arise about it. And reason, respecting things concerning God, ought to submit to the revelation He has given of them ; because, it is impossible for creatures to •2 14 PRELIMINARY REMARKS. judge what is reasonable of God, but from what He reveals. His word is truth, and must be so, whether consistent with our notions, or not. Nor is a truth less a truth, because we cannot comprehend it, nor deduce it from principles within the compass of our minds. Nothing can be, in its own na ture, unreasonable, that God hath revealed ; but, contrari wise, must be rational in the highest degree : and the rea son why we cannot see it thus, is, not because there is any real absurdity in the thing itself; but, because of our igno rance of its true nature ; and also, because of our pride, in setting up our judgment as a rule, in things far above its sphere. There are many things in nature, which, we know- as infallible truths ; when, at the same time, we may as soon comprehend Deity, as tell how, or give a reason why, they are so. Who can describe how spirits act upon mat ter ; or how volition directs and regulates the actions of the body 1 Who can search out the real essence of a grain of sand, or a blade of grass ? And if things so near us are in comprehensible, is it any wonder that some things God has revealed in his word, are so? If the works of God are in scrutable, can we suppose God himself to be comprehensi ble ; or, that what He has made known of himself is capa ble of full investigation by our shallow understandings ? If there are mysteries in nature, can we suppose grace to be without them 1 Shall we discredit a truth and pronounce it absurd, because our depraved" and limited reason cannot explore the secret of it ? We should think it highly ridic ulous for a blind man to deny the existence of light, when he has the joint evidence of so many millions in favor of its truth ; and is it not fully as absurd to reject a truth of rev elation because our comparatively blind reason eannot com prehend it, when the witness of God is more to be depended on, than that of all created beings united ? But thus unac- PLAN OF THE DISCUSSION. 15 countably absurd do those act, who deny the truths of revel ation, because they are above the comprehension of their limited powers. If their conduct in other things were con sistent with this, they must of necessity, deny their own ex istence. But though there are some truths which are above the reach of reason, and which depend alone on revelation for their certainty ; such as the doctrine of the Trinity ; the union of the divine and human nature in Christ, with many more ; yet there are others which are fairly deducible from principles of reason : among which I include the doctrine of Predestination ; -which, therefore, I shall accordingly at tempt to demonstrate in the following Letters. The plan on which I shalLproceed, is, 1. To prove that there is, and must necessarily be, such a certain fixed state of all events from eternity, both as to time, place, mode, Tind circumstances, supposing no decree of God concerning them; as there must be on supposition, God eternally, absolutely, and unchangeably decreed them. 2. To show from a few considerations, the great probability, of God's irreversi bly determining all events from eternity ; and, 3. To show the absolute impossibility of God's not having immu tably and irreversibly willed, appointed, ordained, fixed, and determined, (either effectually or permissively,) from eternity, whatsoever comes to pass. I. I shall attempt to prove, that there is, and must ne cessarily be, such a certain fixed state of all events from eternity, both as to time, place, mode, and circumstances, supposing no decree of God concerning them; as there must be on supposition, God eternally, absolutely and un changeably decreed them. And this will appear, 1st. From the nature and connection of causes and events, and their dependence one on another.. 16 FIXEDNESS OF EVENTS. It is a self-evident truth, that all events from the beginning to the end, are one continued series of causes and effects. All things, their places, circumstances, and time, are events or effects which naturally follow their causes. There can not be an effect without a cause, nor a cause without an effect. To suppose either would be a contradiction. There is no effect but is necessarily dependent on its cause, nor any cause but is necessarily connected with its effect. Every event is the effect of something prior to itself, which is its cause, or the reason why it exists. This cause is the effect or effects of some thing or things antecedent to.it or them ; and so the relation of cause and effects holds on to the beginning of the series. Or, we may invert the order and say, causes produce effects ; these effects becomes cau ses, and produce other- effects ; these effects also become causes and produce effects in their turn : and so on to the end of the chain. The same cause, in all respects, would necesarily produce the same effect : but, as there cannot be two causes, in all respects the same ; so, there cannot be two events in every point the same : for, they must necessarily differ either in time or in place. If they agree in time, they cannot in place ; if in place, not in time. And consequent ly, there never can be two causes, nor two effects precisely the same. Two causes exactly the same except in time, will invariably produce like effects, except in time. Two causes, similar in everything but in place, will produce ef fects exactly similar, but in place. And it is, I apprehend, a certain truth, that so far as causes differ from one another, in time, place, and mode, so far will the effects produced, differ also ; and the nearer causes approach each other, the greater similarity will there be in their effects. Pour water on a declivity, and it will ever run off; the greater the de scent, the swifter it will run, invariably. Throw anything FIXEDNESS OF EVENTS. 17 in its way, it will naturally stop and take another course. Pour it directly perpendicular on a perfectly level ground, it will run in all directions alike, until it spreads equally over the surface ;"~and pour it on a thousand like planes, it will produce the same effect. This will hold good in all causes and events whatever ; and it shows that effects are invariably connected with their causes, and necessarily follow them. It never was known that water stood on a declivity without being dammed up, or that a stone ever rolled on a plain without being impelled by some foreign power, or that two like causes produced contrary effects. And therefore it must be an infallible truth, that there is an inseparable connection between every cause and its effect ; and consequently, as every cause, except the first, is an effect which necessarily follows its cause ; every event is, and must be, a fixed thing ; so that if the first link in the chain be put in motion, all the rest will follow. There will not be an event through the whole compass Of time, in the whole creation, but is the effect of some cause, which is the reason and ground of its existence. And whatever the cause which is the reason or ground of an event, may be, it also, must be an effect of a prior cause ; and so on to the first cause of all. Consequently, if the series be once begun, all must inevitably follow. Though these things at first sight may appear strange to some, yet I am persuaded, if they are attentively examined, they will be found indubitably true. Whenever a cause is fully known, we are never at a loss what effect it will pro duce. We are daily conversant with a thousand things, the effects of which we are as certain before their existence, as after. And did wc fully know the time, place, nature, and tendency "of every cause ; we should as certainly know every effect, its time, place, nature, and tendency also ; and 18 FIXEDNESS OF EVENTS. clearly see that. there is not, nor can be in reality any such thing as chance, accident, or contingency in the world : we should see all things come to pass according to a fixed inva riable rule; and our knowledge, would extend to futurity; we should as perfectly know things to come, as we know those that are past. It is known that astronomers can tell events that will happen, twenty, a hundred, or a thousand years to come; such as the positions of the heavenly bodies ; the eclipses of the sun and moon, the ebbing and flowing of tides, &c. It is evident these events can be traced backward or forward to almost any number of years. And I doubt not but all other events, whether past, present, or to come, might be as fully traced, were their causes as fully known. But if this be the case respecting what we know, why not with those things we are ignorant of? Our ignorance of causes, does not make "effects, in themselves contingent ; though it may make them appear so to us.- Perhaps noth ing in nature has more the appearance of chance, to those who are ignorant of their causes, than eclipses ; yet this ignorance in the wild Africans, does not make these eclipses contingent or casual in themselves, though they appear,. so to them; for nothing appears more regular and certain, when the cause is perfectly known. A fall from a horse, a broken bone, with numberless other things, are called ac cidents, misfortunes, and the like ; but this is owing to our ignorance ; for had we, seen the various combined circum stances that became the cause, reason, and ground of the event, we should see, also, that the event was not a casual, or accidental thing; but a certain consequence of such an tecedents. And could we trace the various circumstances, which became the cause, reason or ground of the event, we should find them also to be effects of prior causes; which FIXLDNISS OF LVtNTs. l9 causes being known, would infallibly discover those circum stances to be the necessary result of those causes; and so on to the beginning of the series. It is evident, then, that there is not any such thing in reality, as chance or contingency;, and that' it is our ignor ance of causes which makes them appear so: for when a cause is perfectly known, the event is never supposed to be accidental. From all which, I humbly apprehend it to be demonstrably evident, that all events, of every kind, are fixed and permanent — that the chain once begun, the last link is as certain-of existence, as the first — that all future events, as they depend on causes now existing, are as certain of be ing, as those already past. And consequently in this re spect, are the same to us, supposing no decree of God con cerning. them, as on the supposition that He absolutely and unchangeably decreed them. I am aware that prejudiced minds may raise many ob jections against the foregoing ; as, for instance, that many things often occur which turn effects into a different channel to what, else, they would take; that man, on the foresight of a cause having a tendency to produce a disagreeable effect, turns, by his own agency, both cause and effect out of the course in which they would otherwise run: that God by his own immediate interposition, changes the series of events from what, otherwise, ,.the.y -would be. But these, or ten thousand such objections,. J \ not the least tendency to destroy their stability, but ra,„ " ^ firm them. For, as a thousand things may combine*^ . -ii ' Ifluction of an event, the least alteration in one circu . . .will produce ,.„. „ , . 'xist. Aiu-/ the event different from what otherwise 4_^_ r**\ yea, it ¦^^^vsirir , , would make it another cause and anotb < .ffect. - But both in the one and in the other, the event will be whaF either cause has a natural tendency to bring forth. And as this circumstance or variation must be the effectof another cause, 20 Fixedness of events. it also must necessarily exist, arid consequently could not but be as it is. And this will hold good in any supposed acci dental circumstance whatever. And with regard to the im mediate agency of God, who turns and changes the course of events when He pleases ; it only proves, that He is the sole Ruler and Guider of events; and that none exist but such as are agreeable to his sovereign will and pleasure. These things, well weighed, must leave the unprejudiced mind without a doubt of the certain fixedness of events, and that they could not be otherwise than they are, without sup posing a change in the first cause. Wishing you to exam ine these things with candor, I rest youiJs. LETTER II. Fixedness of evfents from their futurity, and from the knowledge God has of them. My- Bear Friend, Having in my last shown, that the fixed and certain state of things is manifest, from the nature and connection of causes and events ; I proceed now to a farther proof, 2dly. From their futurity: It is a self-evident truth, that all things, modes, times, places, connections, relations, and every circumstance that ever did or shall exist, were future from eternity. Whatever exists to-day, was future yesterday, and from the beginning. To-morrow's events are future to day, as are all succeeding ones to the end of time. The events of all succeeding gen erations were future to Adam, and were then such as would take place in the time, and manner, they have, and do. If an event be future, it is as certain of existence, as that which is past. If it be future to such a time, in such a manner, and to such a place, it is certain of being at that time, in such a manner, and at such a place. The non-existence of things destroys their futurity : for, what will not exist, can not be future ; but, what is future, must exist. And though its futurity doth not give it being, yet, it ascertains it as much as a thing past does its once existing. Our ignorance of future events does not make them doubtful in themselves. We may not know when any of the planets are in conjunc- 22 FIXXD-VESS OF EVENTS. tion or opposition ; when an eclipse will take place in either of the luminaries, in future: yet, these events, themselves, are as certain, and will as certainly take place at the time to which they are future, as though we knew them ever so perfectly. Our existence was future from the beginning, and we have being accordingly ; consequently, our existence was a fixed thing. It is a common, but true saying, that, 'what must be, will be;' we may improve it and observe that, whatever is future must be ; if it must be, it will be ; and if it will be, its existence, is a certain and fixed event. And as all things were future from eternity, they were fixed, permanent, and certain, arid would be, are, and must be, in all respects, as their beings have made appear. But as these things are self-evident, I need not enlarge, and therefore observe, 3dly. That the fixed state of things appears, not only from the nature of causes and effects, and the futurity of events; but, also, from the knowledge God hath of, and concerning them. He that is God, must be omniscient ; and he that is om niscient, must be God. Godj and the Omniscient, are terms in all respects synonymous. Omniscience is essential to Deity ; or, rather, omniscience is God, and implies a being whose wisdom and knowledge is without bounds, and im mutably the same from eternity to eternity. The Scrip tures testify of Him that, ' his understanding is infinite,' and if so, He must eternally know all things, and the circum stances thereof, even to the falling of a sparrow or the shak ing of a leaf. Nothing, though ever so minute, could es cape his most perfect comprehension. To suppose otherwise is to suppose a possibility of increase in it, and consequent ly, to destroy his omniscience, and, in effect, deny Him to be God. Now, if God had, from eternity, a perfect knowledge FIXEDNESS OF EVENTS. of all things and the circumstances of them ; it follows that all were eternally fixed and certain : that is, they are events that would, and must infallibly have existence. Whatever is known to be, must be, or it cannot be said to be known. It is true, knowledge gives not being to the thing known : but if the knowledge of it be accurate and true, it gives an infallible certainty of its existence. We know a thousand things, which, though our knowledge does not give, yet it undoubtedly proves the certainty of their being. The knowledge of things future proves their existence at the known time, with as much certainty, as the knowledge of things past doth their having had existence. Therefore the argument stands thus : 1. Whatever is perfectly known to be, in any manner, at any time, must infallibly exist, in the manner, and at the time known : and, consequently, is fixed and certain. 2. But God from eternity knew perfectly all things, with their times, modes, and circumstances, that ever did, or will exist. Therefore, 3. All things with their time? "" ^es and circumstances, were fixed from eternity, anr] ¦ \ those, which would infallibly, without the least-^yr 'a^^have being. These things, I appreheri., , a»& ^lf-evident, and cannot be denied without giving up the omniscience of God, which would deprive Him of his essence, and be in effect atheism. On the whole then, I apprehend, it demonstrably appears, that the opposers of Predestination cannot have the least ad vantage by denying the sovereignty and eternity of -God's will or purpose, or his fixing and determining all things that ever shall come to pass. For, as causes and effects, means and ends, will have their certain accomplishment; as every future event must have existence; and as God knoweth all things, and consequently all things must exist as known ; 24 FIXEDNESS OF EVENTS. it can make no difference with regard to things themselves; nor to us, in some respects, whether they take pjacc in vir tue of God's sovereign and irresistible decree, or some other cause orcausesunknown. A cause, — a first cause there must be ; for there cannot be an effect without it, and it will be difficult, yea, impossible to prove any other but God himself. Thus I have endeavored to prove the first proposition, and ,think its truth clear and evident, even to a demonstration ; and though prejudice may raise many objections, yet, I hum bly believe that nothing can be urged sufficient, in the least, to invalidate the evidence given, or that will not admit of a fair and full confutation. I hope you will examine these things with all possible candor, and endeavor to divest your mind of partiality and prejudice ; remembering that God requires us to think of Him consistent with what He has revealed of himself in his word. If his word is not our rule, we are sure to err. This is our only guide, the only criterion of truth. And that the divine Spirit, by his word, may lead us into all truth, prays Your sincere Friend. LETTER III. Same subject continued Stoicism disclaimed. — Probability of God's choosing and fixing things, from supernatural and extraordinary events, and, from prophecies and their fulfillment. My Dear Friend, You may think, perhaps, that some of the principles already laid down, bear too near a resemblance to the fate of the stoics, who held, (some of them at least) that all things followed each other, and were connected together in one continued series, by an immutable tie from eternity. But as we do not deify matter, nor believe it eternal, we naturally suppose that the order of events had a beginning, and that God the first cause began the series. And though, certainly, there is a natural and infallible connection between cause and effect : yet, we do not believe they follow each other so as to supersede the divine agency, in the supporting, guiding, and directing all events to the noblest ends. But, on the contrary, we maintain, not only, that God is the sole Ruler and Guide of all events; but that He actually determined their existence — the time when — the manner how — and the place where, from eternity. Therefore the blind fatality of the stoics cannot, justly, be charged upon us. Having proved that there is, and must necessarily be, such a certain fixed state of all events, supposing no determina- 3 26 SUPERNATURAL EVENTS. tion of God concerning them, as there must be, on the sup position that He absolutely and irreversibly determined them ; I come now, II. To show from various considerations, the great prob ability of God's immutably choosing and fixing all of them from eternity. And, 1st. The probability of this appears from the many super natural and extraordinary events that have taken place in the world in consequence of the immediate agency of God ; by which, the then present course of events has been stopped, and others, far different in their consequences have followed ; as the bringing a flood upon the earth, and destroying all flesh, except Noah and his family ; the confusion of tongues, in the land of Shinar, at the building of Babel ; the destruc tion of Sodom, with the cities of the plain, and the turning Lot's wife into a pillar of salt ; the calling of Abraham ; multiplying his seed in the land of Goshen ; the many mira cles before Pharaoh, and judgments upon Egypt ; dividing the Red Sea, preserving Israel and destroying the Egyptians ; the many miracles in favor of, and judgments upon, Israel, while in the wilderness ; the driving out the nations before them, and placing them in Canaan ; the many interpositions on their behalf, and the judgments executed on them there ; and at last scattering them all over the earth, and keeping them to this day, though thus dispersed, a dis tinct people from all the inhabitants of the globe : all these are events brought about by the all-powerful arm of Jehovah, as the effect of his sovereign will and purpose, by which the course of events has been stopped, changed, and cavried into a different channel, times without number, as Scripture abundantly evinces. And I think it no less true, that God has thus interposed, not only with regard to this people, but also with regard to all the nations of the earth, from their SUPERNATURAL EVENTS. 27 beginning to this day. Indeed this is manifest from their histories. And not only history, sacred and profane, but daily expe rience gives ample proof of the immediate interposition of divine power, by which millions of events are prevented that would otherwise have had existence, and birth given to as many more, which, else, would never have had being. And here, all the elements, yea, all creation are his instruments. His thunders roll, and shake the heavens and the earth. The forked lightnings fly, and deal destruction all around. Trees, herbs, and fruits are blasted. Beasts are struck out of .the list of breathing existence. And man, when by the Almighty arm, the subtle fluid is directed to that end, untimely falls a victim to it. — He commands, and .the winds obey Him. Hurricanes arise, and spread devastation far and wide. The sturdy oak, the towering pine, and whole forests bend beneath its force ; and though deeply rooted in earth, and intermixed with rocks and clay, all are too weak to hold their strong and numerous fibres. One blast levels their lofty heads with the ground, and raises their roots on high ; while the weaker branches, torn and driven away by the mighty gust, lie scattered over the neighboring plain. Yesterday, we beheld the friendly harbor, where navies rode in safety, without the least apparent danger ; to-day, the tempest roars and beats on all the coast. Now, these float ing castles of the ocean, these stately vehicles of commerce and wealth, incapable of withstanding the mighty torrent, are driven on roeks and sands, and in a moment, dashed to pieces. Their unhappy tenants perish in the briny flood, and all the shore is covered with the wreck and dead. — He gives the word, vapors arise, and gather into clouds ; these thicken and darken the hemisphere, till becoming too heavy for the supporting air, they pour their contents in hasty show- 28 SUPERNATURAL EVENTS. ers upon the earth. The rivulets rise and increase the larger streams; these swell the rivers, till, bursting their bounds, they sweep the whole adjacent country, as it were with a besom of destruction : their weighty waves bear all before them, and villages, towns, and cities, man and beast, fall a prey to their fury. — He commands, the air is filled with pestilential vapors, and men suck in death with every breath. — Anon, He causes the sword to go through the land, to cut off whom and whatsoever offends Him. Or, He opens the earth, and buries in a moment, towns, and cities, with thousands of their inhabitants, within its capacious tomb. In a word, He makes the meanest of his creatures, some times, the instruments of his vengeance, and a means of turning the course of events to the fulfilling of his own pur poses. Now, none, I apprehend, will assert that these extraordi nary events take place without the direction and and agency of God. It cannot be supposed that fire, air, earth, and water, or any other creature, can thus act by its own power. God, the first cause, who gave them being, gives them motion ; directs their course ; keeps them within the bounds prescribed, and says to all, ' hitherto ye shall go and no further.' The power of God is certainly exerted in these tremendous commotions. And if so, they must be the effect of his purpose. For it is impossible for God to exert his power contrary to his will ; nor can. He act without design. But whenever He puts forth His power, He must determine so to do, and must knoio his own motive, and the end to be obtained thereby. For, doth it not appear that great and important ends are answered by these events? And we know the instrument neither had, nor could have had, these ends in view. The fire and brimstone had no intention of destroying Sodom and the cities of the plain : nor did the FULFILLMENT OF PROFHECV. 29 locusts, frogs, and lice, intend to plague the Egyptians. And though these ends were answered by them, they could be no more than passive instruments in the hand of Him ' who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will' It was He that sent the flood, to stop the flood of wicked events that else would have taken place. He confounded the language of the people, to stop and abase the towering thoughts '¦*/ those vain builders who dared to mistrust the veraciett i . >f lim who had said, ' the waters shall no more vjec* . become^ fr[^>d to destroy all flesh ; ' and, also, to fulfill his own d v-wine jfii scattering them and filling the earth with inhab /' His dealings with Israel, and with the nations of old .,j.,'i t heir account, as well as all the extraordinary interpositions of divine power from the beginning to this day, were also for like ends; that is, to bring about and accom plish his infinitely wise purposes. Therefore, as those events stood in connection with, and became causes of, succeeding ones, which must be known to Him who knoweth all things ; there is, I think, the greatest probability that He eternally determined whatsoever should come to pass. 2dly. This appears probable, also, from the prophecies of Scripture, and the fulfillment of them. I shall not attempt to enumerate these prophecies ; it will be sufficient for rny purpose to speak of them in general. The prophecies concerning the Messiah and his kingdom, with their fulfillment, are glaring proofs that God, from the beginning, determined a great part, at least, of the events that have existed since the first promise and prophecy of Him to Adam : for, some way or other, they have stood connected with this, and the subsequent prophecies of him. The whole book of God is interspersed, yea, we may say, filled with prophecies and promises relative to Christ aud his Church, numbers of which are fulfilled, while many now are, and will *3 30 FULFILLMENT OF PROPHECY. be, fulfilling to the end of time ; for not one jot or tittle shall fail till all be accomplished. The prophecies, respecting the nations of the world, are a further evidence of God's determining the greatest part of events before they exist. Perhaps there is no nation, people, or tongue, on the face of the earth, but God has afore declared their circumstances in some respect or other; it is evident to demonstration, that He has done so with respect Ml a great part, numerous instances of which might be gi^^t but, as you have an opportunity of searching the sa*ti? volume, where you have abundant testimony of these thiouJ'! shall waive it. \ires, t I would observe here, that these prophecies are fri^a. mere foretelling events by tracing effects from their causes, as astronomers foretell eclipses and the positions of the ieavenly bodies ; but, they are spoken of in a positive strain, as what should take place ; not, merely, as effects of such and such causes ; but, as that which God himself would bring to pass by his own immediate agency. Now, as the fulfillment of those prophecies stands con nected with, and depends in some measure on, millions of millions of other events, (if not on all that exist) the fail ure of which would prevent the accomplishment of those propheoies ; I humbly apprehend, there is more than a prob ability, that God determined, not only the events prophesied of, but all others. I am, yours, &c. LETTER IV. Same subject continued. — Probability of God's choosing and fixing things, from the dependence of creatures on God. Analogy of human and divine power. My dear Friend,- Having in, u.y last shown the probability of God's order ing all events, »frm his extraordinary and miraculous inter positions, and re tin the prophecies of Holy Writ ; I come, 3dly. T, siMl fc" that this appears further, from the depend ence of crea.ur?h1 on God, for their existence and continuance therein. _ uest,! Neither ^<>s,,nor any other creature, exists at anytime, in any situation1, one moment, independent of the supporting power of God. He that gave us being, upholds us therein, every instant of time we exist. Our existence in life yester day, is no foundation for our living to-day. The existence of a shadow one moment, is no ground of its existence in the next : let the sjn ceise to shine, or the intervening substance be removed, it instantly vanishes, nor leaves the smallest trace behind. So that, did not God unceasingly hold us up, though yesterday we might shine in all the bloom and vigor of life, to-day we should be breathless, and our flesh turn to corruption. ' By Him we live and move and have our being.' ' He gives to all, life and breath and all things.' There is no mornent of our existence, but his power is exerted to 32 analogy. maintain and continue it : with unremitted energy, it fills heaven and earth, grasps ,the universe, and rules, supports, directs, and guides every atom. Tell me, who exists a moment without, or independent of Him, and I will tell you who is God besides Him. God alone is independent, and there can be only one independent being ; cosequently, all but one must be dependent, and ever be supported and bound ed by Him who is independent. It follows, then, if his power is continually exerted to support his creatures, it must be his will to exert it ; and if it is his will, as He perfectly sees the effects and consequences of his exerting it, there is the greatest reason to believe that all these effects and conse quences are, also, according to his will. .For it cannot be supposed that He exerts his power to product! that which is contrary to his will. Hence, therefore, thesis, at least, a great probability that He determined every Ve s>rit before its existence. But, ^f s'~ 4thly. This further appears, from thepowSMC^nd faculties given to man, which, in God are superlati* degree, or rather without any degree. — By these powt^-Mnean those which constitute intelligent agents; and which distinguish them from all other beings. But what I have a particular respect to here, is, 1. The understanding, or power of perception and judgment; or, rather, a capacity of receiving and retaining ideas; forming propositions, by uniting and comparing them : reasoning upon and about them, to discover their agreement or disagree ment, and drawing conclusions therefrom : and, 2. The will or that faculty of the mind which prefers one thing above, or before another, according to the view the understanding has of it ; expressed by willing, nilling, choosing, and refusing. I shall not attempt a particular definition of these facul- analoov. 33 ties : but only speak of them as far as it suits my present purpose. The understanding does, or ought, at all times, to direct the will in its acts ; and it will ever do so, where the mind is entirely unbiased by prejudices. It is true, that love, hatred, anger and revenge, may so far bias the mind as to influence the will to acts contrary to the judgment of the understanding. But where these are not, I apprehend, it^is impossible for the understanding to form any judgment, or draw conclusions about anything that concerns us, without some act, or acts of the will immediately following ; which act, or acts, direct our conduct respecting that thing. For I think it manifest in every man's experience, that, whatever choice he makes, he will execute, if he have power sufficient, and time and opportunity give leavei And it is the. un doubted procedure of every man to endeavor to carry his purpose, will, and choice, into e-r ^fution. As the will ever follows that which in the mind's present view seems most agreeable and best, it cannot . \ desire and attempt its ac complishment. There is no man with regard to himself; no master of a family ; no governor if a city ; no command er of an army, or king of a nation, but would, if it were in his power, have all things done, in every station, according to his own will and choice. And, indeed, it would be right that the purposes of each should be executed, if they arose from a right judgment. But, as men, through the darkness of their understandings, so often err in judgment, and make a wrong choice, it would bring things into the utmost con fusion to attempt it. But without enlarging here, this, I think, is clearly evi dent ; that every man forms a judgment about every thing he views concerning himself, whence arise some acts of his will or choice respecting it ; and this choice he will 34 analogy. execute, if his mind remain the same long enough, and it be in his power. I apprehend it is in the very nature of the powers of the soul thus to direct and do. Therefore, as God possesses these powers without measure or degree, (for it is declared of Him, ' His understanding is infinite,') He must have eternally had the most perfect idea of all things, in all their various relations. He must have known them all, in their diversity of times, places, modes and connec tions. Every atom, in its simple or compound state, must have been ever perfectly present to his view. Their nature and properties, and the effects they would produce, under their various modifications, must have been eternally, most intimately known to Him : and He, as infinitely wise, must . have been able to judge, with the utmost precision, of the propriety of all and each to answer any end proposed. And thus judging, his will must be according to the judgment formed : for He could k * but choose that which He, as omniscient, saw fittest arid best to be chosen. In a word, as God must have absoLare^ comprehended and known, from eternity, what has, a8i§] aim will exist ; He must have judged, with the utmo.t accuracy, the fitness of things ex isting as they do. And as his power would ever prevent that which his wisdom judges improper, I think it more than probable that all things exist as the effect of his will and choice. These things would admit of a much larger discussion, and many more considerations might be added here from the perfections of God ; but as I shall particularly speak of the divine perfections, when I come to show the impossibility of God's not having eternally fixed and determined all things, I shall waive the consideration of them on this head. In the mean time, I would humbly hope, that what ANALOGY. 35 has been said, will prove in some measure convincing; and if so, I shall think my labor doubly recompensed. I am sensible, objections may arise, and things may be suggested, as consequences of what has been said, that may not wear a pleasing aspect. But I hope, ere I have done, to remove every doubt which can with any propriety be raised against the truth I contend for. And now, entreating you to consider these things, with impartiality and candor, and to pray for direction to form a right judgment of them, I rest, Yours, &c. LETTER V, The doctrine argued from a consideration of the perfections and works of God. 1. His perfections. — 2. His eternity and omnipresence. My Dear Friend, Having proved that there is, and must necessarily be, from eternity, a certain fixed state of all events, their time, place, mode and circumstances, even supposing no decree of God concerning them ; and also shown, from various con siderations, the great probability that God eternally deter mined their existence : I come now, III. To point out the absolute impossibility of God's not having immutably and irreversibly willed, appointed, fixed and determined (either effectively or permissively,) from eternity, whatsoever comes to pass. And this I shall at tempt to do, 1. From the perfections, and, 2. From the works of God. 1 st. From the perfections of God. By the perfections of God, I mean those excellencies which are essential to his nature ; which characterize and distinguish Him from all other beings : or, (in different words,) which constitute the essence of DEITY, and cannot be found in any creature. Such as infinity, eternity, omni presence, &c. Here let me premise two things : 1. That those excellencies, which are ascribed to God, ETERNITY AND OMNIPRESENCE. 37 are not to be considered as accidents, adjuncts, or qualities of a subject ; but as the subject itself. Whatever is justly predicated of God, is God ; and cannnot be separated from Him, without destroying his nature, deity, and existence. — And, 2. That notwithstanding we ascribe various perfections to God, they are not to be considered as separately subsist ing in Him. They are all one in the unity of the divine essence. And although, to assist our ideas, there is a dis tinction made, according to the various displajrs, or man ifestations of the divine, mind ; yet it is easily observed by an attentive examiner, that there is such a union and oneness in the attributes of the Deity, that each severally involves the whole ; so that if either be wanting, the whole must cease. They who oppose the doctrine of predestination, affect to deny it, on the supposition of its being contrary to the per fections of God. I hope to make it appear that this pre tence is entirely groundless. Permit me to ask you, my friend, — Did you ever calmly, attentively, and impartially, consider the divine perfections, with a view to this point? Have you ever considered them in their connection, harmo ny and dependence on each other ? If not, you build your objections on a very precarious foundation ; and, it may be,. the superstructure will resemble that built on the sand, when the day of trial comes : to prevent which, let me call your attention, for a few minutes to the serious consideration of the attributes of God : and first, his eternity and omni presence. Eternity is that perfection of Deity, which implies infinite duration ; to the utter exclusion of beginning, succession or end. We naturally judge of eternity by our ideas of time, and conceive of it as a constant succession of mo- 4 38 ETERNITY AND OMNIPRESENCE. ments, gradually accumulating to countless ages. But the eternity of God, or, God as eternal, must not thus be con sidered. For to suppose a succession in .Him, were to sup pose Him a changeable being ; for in that case, He must be, this moment, what He was not the last : namely, • — older. Besides, if this were true, He could not be omnipresent : be cause there would be moments to come, which now He pos sesses not ; yea, which would always be at an infinite dis tance from Him. This also, would go far to destroy his omniscience : for He could hardly be supposed to know that which would be infinitely removed from Him. There fore we must separate from Him, all ideas of time ; or a suc cessive quantity of days, months and years. God, the eternal, is not what we understand by duration ; but He fills it as an infinite area would fill an infinite circle ; not by extension, nor by accumulated existence ; but at once, and in such a manner, that the whole of infinite duration is always and alike, present. There is neither before, nor af ter ; but eternity past, present and to come, is ever with Him, an absolute now. ' One day with the Lord, is as a thou sand years, and a thousand years as one day.' The omnipresence of God, implies his being everywhere at once, and forever. His omnipresence includes his eter nity, and eternity his omnipresence. The one cannot exist without the other. For omnipresence supposes eternal du ration present to Him, which could not be, were He not eter nal : and eternity supposes the same ; which could not be, were He not omnipresent. Eternity supposes Him to fill a boundless duration ; omnipresence, an infinity of space. Each includes each, and both. On the whole, then, and to convey my conceptions as concisely as possible, I would observe : that God comprehends, is present with, and fills, (by his will, power and wisdom,) at once, and always, an ETERNITY AND OMNIPRESENCE. 39 infinite duration, and immensity of space. Or thus : — the whole of the divine essence is at once present with, and fills, every point of infinite duration, and unlimited space. Read attentively the 8th of Proverbs and the 139th Psalm. Now then, admitting the conceptions here given of these two attributes to be just, and that God is an intelligent and all-perfect being; it will undeniably follow, that not only eternal duration, and infinity of space ; but also, all possible existences in the eompass of both, must be invariably present to his understanding, and be entirely subject to his will. Nothing that ever did, or shall exist, but was completely present in, and to, the divine mind, eternally before its ex istence, as it can possibly be, when, or after it actually takes place; nothing being either future or past to Him, but all ever most intimately present, yea, more so than anything can ever possibly be with us. But if all (to us future) exist ences were eternally present to the divine mind, it is impos sible that they should not, in every view, depend absolutely on his will. When no created thing existed but in the mind of God, it depended entirely on his will, unto what to give being. And as the nature and the properties, the causes and the consequences of things were equally present to God, these also must exist, operate, and come to pass, by virtue of his sole determination. *For his eternity and omnipresence render it impossible that any cause or reason should arise, either of any uncertainty in, or for any change of the divine will. Even our wills are never in suspense about things of which we have a clear view ; nor do our wills change, so long as we retain the same ideas of the same things. And God having ever the most intimate, true, and perfect idea of all things, with their modes and effects, his will respecting them can never be suspended, or changed, To suppose it, 40 ETERNITY AND OMNIPRESENCE. were to suppose Him unwise ; which would destroy his De ity ; and therefore cannot be. Besides, the will of God is his essence, which (as before proved) fills eternity, and admits of no succession. Suppose, then (for example's sake,) that it is the will of God to direct and influence, or effectually to permit me to write this disqui sition on the doctrine of Predestination ; as I cannot possibly write without his actual permission and supporting power, my writing must necessarily be eternal in the mind of God ; because nothing in Him admits of past or future. Succes sion belongs only to creatures. What is now with us, was simply and eternally present to Him. And what is eternally past with respect to us, is, ever was, and ever will be, now with Him. Consequently, whatever appears to exist, either as the effect of his positive power, or of his sovereign permis sion, (for by one or the other, all things must exist ;) his will either way, must have been necessarily and unalterably fixed, from eternity. This would admit of more ample discussion ; but from these few hints, I humbly apprehend, it will undeniably appear, to any unprejudiced inquirer, that it is impossible but God must have eternally fixed and determined all things that have, do, or shall exist, from everlasting to everlasting. For what should hinder his will from determining the end from the beginning ? Or prevent his bringing to pass the things before appointed ? Can an infinite mind, with all possibilities present, suspend his own determinations, till the effects of intervening determinations exist? Impossible! Yet, into a thousand such contradictory absurdities, must the rejectors of Predestination fall, unless they deny the divine attributes altogether} as I shall endeavor, hereafter, to make appear. ETERNITY AND OMNIPRESENCE. 41 You will, I trust, seriously and impartially consider what has been said. And may the good Spirit of our God lead you deeply, and experimentally, into this truth, so glorifying to God and so comforting to the soul. I rest, Yours, &c. LETTER VI. Same subject continued.— -Eternity and Omnipresence. My dear Friend, Who can find out the Almighty to perfection ? Can man, by searching, find out God ? Can creatures of a day unravel the inscrutable mysteries of the eternal mind ; and by their scanty line measure the fathomless abyss of infinity 1 Shall folly dictate to uncreated wisdom, and tell omniscience what He ought to do ? Yes, vain man would be wise, though he is born like a wild ass's colt ! Yes, man, proud man, is prone to arraign the mighty acts of Jehovah ; and set up his depraved reason, as a standard, by which to bring his Maker to the test ! While unsinning seraphs deeply bow at .the divine footstool, and receive each sovereign mandate without a murmur, or opposing thought ; man, the dust of time, fraught with rebellion in all his powers, dares to accuse and condemn the sovereign counsels and conduct, and with an effrontery not to be paralleled, presumes to charge them with injustice and cruelty ! May that most holy Spirit of illumination, who actuated the living creatures, and guided the eye-filled wheels in the vision which the prophet saw by the river Chebar, fill your heart, lead you into all truth, and inspire you with understanding; that you may know the things that are ETERNITY AND OMNIPRESENCE. 43 freely given us of God ! Let me entreat you to look up to that Spirit, for direction and wisdom, while I further conside r the arguments in favor of that grand truth for which I contend. In my last, I considered, briefly, the attributes of eternity and -omnipresence, as absolutely demonstrative of God's having eternally predetermined whatsoever comes to pass. And I am verily persuaded, none can consistently deny that proposition without also denying those attributes, as will yet more fullly appear, if we investigate a little further what has been already hinted in brief. I have affirmed, that the eternal and omnipresent God must have had, ever, and at once, most intimately present to his understanding, all possible existences,, from the highest seraph to the meanest animalcule ; and from the most pon derous globe to the minutest atom ; together with all their natures and properties, tendencies and effects : and also, that, at first, these could have had no existence, but an ideal and intentional one, in the divine mind. For, there was in eternity no being but God, whence any other being could originate ; no other cause from which an effect could take place ; nor could any event of future existing matter or spir it, be secluded from his infallible knowledge. These things granted, it must undeniably follow, that the subsequent existence and operations, of all other beings, depended solely and entirely on Him ; and his will must direct what, of the universality of possibilities should actually exist and operate. For, as their existence depended on Him, He could not give it, without determining to give it ; his will and pleasure must direct what should be, and when, and how. Things could not give being to themselves, nor could they arise from mere nonentity ; there must have been a prior efficient cause, and this could be no other than God. It is most clear, then, to the eye of reason itself, that God created the heavens and 44 ETERNITY AND OMNIPRESENCE. the earth, and all things therein. It is alike clear that He could not give being to them contrary to his will. It is evi dent also, from the above perfections, that the -nature, prop erties, and effects of things, were eternally present to his view : nor could He give being to that, the existence of whose .nature, properties, and tendencies, were contrary to his determination, will and choice. Consequently all are, and rnust be, according to his eternal purpose, and determi nate counsel. In the very nature of things it cannot be otherwise. To suppose the contrary, would be to suppose that new acts of will continually take place in the divine mind ; which would be attended with such derogation from his perfections, and with such flagrant contradictions and absurdities, that it cannot be admitted. Some of these, give me leave to lay before you. If any new volition, or act of will, were, at any time, to arise in the mind of God ; it would destroy his eternity : for, such new volition must necessarily have a when and a date whence to originate ; that is, it must have a beginning ; and its duration would be to be counted by moments, or succeed ing lapses of time ; which supposes eternity divided, and immensity to be measurable. The supposition would destroy his omnipresence ; for this new act, and the things concerning which it is put forth, could not be eternally present or known to the divine mind. It is, I apprehend, a self-evident truth, that no intelligent be ing, whether God, angel, or man, can certainly foreknow a future act of his own will. God, indeed, knows all the fu ture volitions of his creatures : but then, they are not future to Him ; but always and ever present. With regard to crea tures, they cannot certainly know a future volition, without having that very act of will present to the mind. The acts of will are, in order of nature, prior to the knowledge of them: consequently, our knowledge of a volition cannot ETERNITY AND OMNIPRESENCE. 45 precede its existence. I cannot know my own determina tions, until I have determined. And, I think, I may affirm (though T would do it with the most awful humility,) that [in so far as man can see] God cannot know his own will, choice, or determination, until He has willed, chosen, and determined. These things are clear and evident ; because, the nature of the will is such, that it cannot be in suspense, when the mind has a clear view of trie things about which a volition is put forth. Therefore, it is impossible that any new act of will can arise, in a rational being, without a cause for that new voli tion. There must be something in the view of the mind, which was not there before, to be the occasion, ground, or reason of this new act. But this cannot be with respect to God ; because it follows, from his omnipresence, that all fu turities are, at once, and ever, most perfectly present to, and with Him ; and therefore no occasion, ground, or reason, can arise in his mind to produce any such new act. Conse quently, if any new volition be supposed to take place, it must be from no motive, reason, or ground, whatsoever, and to no end ; because, nothing new, or unknown, can come up to his view, to direct the will into a new channel. No new end can present itself to Him, nor any new plan or scheme, possibly take place in such a mind as his. Therefore, if any new volition could have existence in God, it must be without choice, design, motive, or end; which would be a contradic tion and absurdity altogether, and sink the Omniscient to a level with an idiot. Another intolerable consequence, which would arise from the above supposition, is, that there would be an effect with out a caase. Whatsoever has birth in time, must be an effect ; and owes its existence to some preceding cause. If a new act of will were to take place in God, it must be in 46 ETERNITY AND OMNIPRESENCE. time; for all before time must be eternal. Such new act, then, must be an- effect ; but it would have no cause, either in, or from, God himself, nor yet from any creature. Not from God ; because, as omniscient, all his own acts of will, power, wisdom, and justiee, must have been eternally known, and present to Him. Not from the creatures ; because, all that can possibly arise from them, was alike eternally pres ent to his view. So that this supposition carries in it this flagrant contradiction : an effect, which as such, must have a cause ; and yet cannot possibly have any cause at all. Many more things might be observed, to show the incon sistency, absurdity, and impossibility, of the above suppo sition. But as ¦ they will come of course, in treating of others of the divine perfections, I shall add no more here. Wishing you to weigh these considerations in the impartial balance of unbiased reason, I rest, Your sincere friend. LETTER VII. Same subject continued. — Doctrine argued from the considerations of omniscience and immutability. — Omniscience. My Dear Friend, I once thought it scarcely possible for a good man to be lieve (what I then called) the absurd doctrine of Predestina tion. But it was an awful error I was in ; and I desire to be eternally thankful, and to adore discriminating grace, that 1 was not left to persist in it. My conviction was not by man : but, being led to consider the divine perfections — their nature, as revealed in the word, and manifested in the works of God — I clearly saw in them, the grand truth I had formerly opposed. The more I contemplated the excel lencies of the uncreated majesty, the more certainty, and the brighter glory, I beheld in this capital and fundamental doctrine. And I am most firmly convinced, that no man can, consistently, believe a God, and deny Predestination. For, if this fall, his perfections and providence must fall with it ; as my friend, I doubt not, will also clearly see, if, with attention and impartiality, simplicity and prayer, he consid ers the real nature of the divine attributes. You will, I trust, throw aside prejudice, and carefully and candidly examine, what I have now to offer from two more of these attributes, omniscience and immutability. Omniscience is that perfection by which God is infinite 48 .OMNISCIENCE in knowledge and understanding. It includes a most per fect and absolute knowledge of himself, of his own essence, or of all his attributes in their unbounded extent. It affirms Him to know his own wisdom and power, together with all possibilities and futurities; his own purpose and will, and all the consequent effects of both. It comprises an absolute and eternal knowledge of things extra se, or out of him self; their causes, effects, time, places, modes and circum stances, in all their boundless variety. Not an atom, through the universality of things, with all its multiplicity of chan ges ; not a thought, that ever did, or will, arise in human or angelic minds, or any of its effects, but was from eternity perfectly known to Him. Tn a word, there is nothing know- able, or possible, from eternity to eternity, but He perfectly and everlastingly, knew, and knows. Immutability is that perfection, by which God is un changeable in his nature, or invariably the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, in his essence, will, power, knowledge, wisdom, goodness, justice, mercy, love, and every other at tribute. It declares Him to be of one mind, and that none can turn Him ; and that the thoughts of his heart are the same through all generations. So that it is impossible that the least alteration or even a shadow of turning, can ever take place in Him. These perfections are included in his eternity and omnipresence, and all confirm each other. Now as these attributes are truly predicated of God, it must necessarily follow, that all things are the objects of the decrees of God; and that his decrees, will, and purpose, are eternal. All things are the objects of the decrees of God, because they are the objects of his knowledge ; and because, though He knows them, and has power to prevent them, yet, He permits their being. OMNISCIENCE. 49 They are the objects of his knowledge ; for God has an eternal knowledge of all things. But the question is, wheth er He knows them in consequence of his having decreed and determined their existence and effects. This, I apprehend, will be past all doubt, if we consider, that there can be no true knowledge of anything, where the thing is not conceived, or rightly apprehended in the mind. The infallible certainty of the things known con stitutes real knowledge. God's foreknowledge (or rather absolute and ever-present knowledge) of all things, proves that they must, and shall, surely exist ; though that knowl edge is not the direct cause of their existence, for the cause must be sought elsewhere. God must be infallibly sure of the things foreknown, or He could not be said to foreknow them. But whence could this certainty arise, if not from his own immutable will ? His having determined them, must be the source, both of their certain existence, and of his own immutable knowl edge. For, as a late great master in Israel has observed, ' Certain and immutable knowledge, is founded on some cer tain and immutable cause; which can be no other than the divine will. God knows that such and such things will be : because He has determined in his will, that they shall be.' And it is self-evident, that nothing can, with absolute certainty, be foreknown, without some infallible ground for that foreknowledge. The foundation of it must be perma nent and stable, as the immutable will of God is, or the knowledge cannot be infallibly sure. If we consider knowledge as having place in intelli gent creatures, it is demonstrable, that they can have no foundation for real knowledge, but .what. arises, either from their own will, or the will of another. They cannot know 5 50 OMNISCIENCE. (for instance) their own future voluntary acts, unless those acts are their present determination ; nor can they know anything, that depends not on their own will, any further than they know it to be the will of another. But neither a man's own present will, nor the present will of any other human being, can minister infallible ground of foreknowl edge; because the will of man is mutable, and consequent ly precarious and uncertain. A thousand intervening things may influence him to a change of purpose. And if not, and the will should remain the same ; yet, innumerable un foreseen occurrences might intrude, and render abortive every effort to execute the things designed. Consequently, nothing in creatures can be any ground of infallible fore knowledge. And this will appear still more evident, if we consider, what it is that constitutes a real, permanent, and certain ground for such knowledge ; which I take to be, — a knowl edge of the will of Him, on whom the thing known de pends, — an undoubted certainty of the permanency and stability of his will, — and that his wisdom and power are equal to the execution of the things determined. There must be a knowledge of these, before any absolute certainty of future things can take place in the mind. But this ab solute certainty can nowhere be found, except in God. And, therefore, nothing can be infallibly foreknown, but as it is known to be his immutable will. To examine this a little further, let me ask, What is it, that we do or can foreknow, unless upon this foundation ? Is it the positions of the heavenly bodies, and some of their various effects, as eclipses, and change, of seasons 1 Is it the flux and reflux-of the sea, at certain periods? These are still the will of God, as manifested in the established law, or order of nature. Nature, in her operations, evi- OMNISCIENCE. 51 dences his will, as clearly as any thing revealed in his word ; and it is only the divine will manifested in this established order, that can be any ground of foreknowledge in these operations. How could we know that a body lighter than air will ascend, while the heavier descends ; that heat will melt wax, while it hardens clay ; if these effects were not the apparent laws of nature, as settled and established by the immutable will of the omnipotent Ruler? Could we be sure that the rolling planets would continue to perform their revolutions, and night and morn, and seasons again return ; were it not revealed as the sovereign will, -that day and night, summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, should continue? Could we be certain, that this ponderous globe, hung upon nothing, with others more ponderous than it, would continue to whirl, with force so rapid, through such immense tracts of space, and never vary their course ; did not we know- it to be the will of the all- wise Mover, and that his omnipotent arm is equal to the mighty work ? Or Could we have an absolute certainty of their continuing a moment longer, were we not assured, by the divine word, and unaccomplished prophecies, that the end is not yet come? These things must appear evident to the views of impar tial reason, and from these we may justly infer, that no creature can have any certain infallible foreknowledge of any thing which has not its foundation, primarily, in the sovereign and immutable will of God, either as revealed in his word, or manifested in his works. It follows also, that if creatures cannot be to themselves the foundation of infallible knowledge, much less can they be so to God ; and if they are not the ground of his foreknowledge, nothing out of himself can be. Further, as there cannot be a knowledge of the existence of things, without the 52 OMNISCIENCE. existence of the things known, and as bare knowledge cannot give, or be the cause of, existence to any thing, (for they must either have an actual, or a certainly de termined existence, before they can be known ;) we must conclude, that God must have determined all existences and events before (in order of nature) He could know them. And, as his knowledge is eternal and immutuble, his will respecting all things must be no less so. This will appear with additional evidence, by considering, That though God knows them all, and has power to prevent them, if He please ; yet, He permits their being. There is not a thing, or circumstance of a thing, through the universality of existence, but God was able, with in finite ease, to have prevented both its existence and ef fects. And no other reason can be given, why He prevents them not, than because it is not his will. For does, or can any thing come to pass, and the Lord command it not? and if it is not his will to prevent it, it must be his will (at least) to permit it : and, consequently, it has being, be cause it is his will it should. There is no man that sees an advancing event, which is contraryto his will, but he will, if in his power, prevent its existence. And can it be that He, who does according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, would permit the existence of that which He wishes should not exist? Can it be, that He whose will is omnipotent ; who speaks and it is done ; who commands and it stands fast, and whose mighty fiat, the whole creation united, cannot in the least degree resist ; I say, can it be, that He should be the dupe of his creatures; give up the reins to them, and suffer them to run their mad career beyond the bounds prescribed, and thereby endanger the overturning and rendering abortive of his own infinitely wise purposes and designs 7 Impossible! — Be- OMNISCIENCE. 53 sides : the will of God is wisdom itself. What He wills is most wise ; yea, infinitely wiser than its contrary ; it being the result of consummate wisdom ; Consequently, if He suf fers things to be, and wills, or chooses that they shall not be ; He must suffer folly to triumph over wisdom ; and be either unwise, wanting skill ; or impotent, wanting power. But as neither of these is possible, it undeniably follows, that whatever has been, is, or shall be, exists in consequence of his determinate will and choice. I remain, Yours. LETTER VIII Same subject continued Doctrine argued from the divine immuta bility God's foreknowledge founded on his will, the consequences of not admitting it, and of denying that his will and purposes are eternal. My Dear Friend, In my last, I endeavored to prove, that God's foreknowl edge of all things that ever did, or ever shall come to pass,' is founded on his will. I now proceed to show, that the decrees, will, and pur poses of God, are, and must be, eternal. This, indeed, is demonstrable, from all the divine perfections ; but, especially from his immutability; to which I shall, at present, more immediately confine myself. In such a being as God, eternity and immutability stand essentially connected ; they are two names for almost the same attributes ; nor can I conceive, with what propriety any. can allow that God is eternal, while they deny Him to be unchangeable. The absurdity of such a sentiment is so glaring, that, did not prejudice blind the understanding, and lock up the mind from all conviction ; every one that pos sesses the powers of reason and reflection, would be ashamed of it. But as some are thus inconsistent, I shall, Brief! j' consider the attribute of unchangeableness, in con nection with the doctrine of predestination ; and prove, that, they must stand or fall together ; after which 1 shall point out some of the absurd consequences which must follow, on IMMUTABILITY. 55 not admitting, that God's foreknowledge is founded on his will; and on denying, that his will and purposes are eternal. Immutability is that perfection in God, which eminently runs through, cements, and adds perpetuity ,to all the rest ; so that, if that cannot be supported, these must fall; but, if that stands, these must also. For a mutable God would be no God at all. And to say that God is immutable, and yet to suppose a. change in his will, is such a flagrant contra diction as none can rationally allow: so that if there is a God, He must be immutable ; and if immutable at all, He must be so in His will, in which lies the very essence of immutability. And what is predestination, but the eternal will, and immutable purpose of God respecting all things ? or, (in other words,) the eternal fixedness of his mind, in relation to their whole existence, agency, and duration. Predesti nation is neither less nor more than this. For if God be an infinitely perfect being, He must be eternal; or, (which is the same) immutable, in his will, purposes and designs. And God's eternal, immutable will, purposes and designs, respecting the whole of created things and events, is that which we understand bj' predestination, in. the utmost ex tent of the term. Predestination, then, and the eternal, immutable will of God, concerning all things, are perfectly synonymous. Consequently, if we deny Predestination, we must also deny God to be immutable in his will: and as immutability of will is essential to his nature, (for an infinitely perfect being can never change ;) it follows, that a denial of his immutability, is, in fact, a denial of his existence. Conse quently, if absolute predestination (or the eternity and im mutability of the divine decrees) be not true, there can be no God, and atheists are in the right. 56 IMMUTABILITY. This may be further proved, thus : — Whatever is essen tial to, Or constitutive of, the divine nature, cannot be denied of God, without denying Him to exist. But Predestination or the eternity and immutability of his will, is essential to his nature. Therefore, to deny Predestination, or the eter nity and immutability of his will, amounts to a denial of his Deity and existence. But this leads me to point out some of the absurd conse quences, inseparably connected with the denial, that God's foreknowledge is founded on his will ; or that his will and purposes are eternal. And here I would observe, that if God's foreknowledge of things bo not founded on his will, it must be founded on the will of some other being, or result from the things them selves. But, if it be founded on the will of some other being, that being must be God, no less divine than the fore- knower himself; in which case, we should be presented with a plurality of Deities. For, I have before proved, that there cannot be any infallible knowledge of futurity, but from the immutable will of Him who is both omniscient and omnipotent. Consequently, all those intelligent beings, whether angels or men, on whose will this knowledge is founded, must be so many deities. On the other hand, if we suppose the divine foreknow ledge to be founded, though but in part, on things material and inanimate; then those things must have operated as causes, by producing effects on the divine mind, eternally, before they existed ; otherwise God's knowledge of them could not have been eternal. Therefore, you must, on your principles, be reduced to this dilemma : either to deny the eternity of God's knowledge; or to affirm, that the things known gave birth to the knowledge of them, eternally prior to their existence. IMMUTABILITY. 57 On this supposition, God must be infinitely beholden to his creatures; in that they gave Him that knowledge, with out which He could not be omniscient. For He could not have this perfection, had He not, from everlasting, perfectly and infallibly foreknown all things. If, then, his know ledge be founded on the «things known, they must contri bute to the production of this attribute, and God must be de pendent on the minutest circumstance of every simple atom, for a perfection essential to his Deity. If God foreknew all things, only because they would exist, if his knowledge be founded on them; then, He could not have had any hand in their production and formation, much less, in supporting them ; and, least of all, in direct ing them to any end ; or, if He had, He must be compelled thereto by some power extrinsic of himself. For if his will were not prior to, and the foundation of his acts; nothing in himself could be. But, if his own ' »rr - hat which influenced Him thereto ; his knowledjh Q --*¦£ be founded on that ; as He could not know the . rig -vv,. ,led, unless He had first willed them. So that it } ans"-s fr°"m such an hypothesis, either that God exerts Hi;-^, ' Me wisdom and power like a mere machine, compelled to motion by a con> plication of other causes : or, that He really has little, or nothing at all to do in the matter. But these consequences, and the supposition whence they flow, must be spurned, and renounced by every rational mind. Here, should the objection arise, that, 'though God's knowledge of things be founded on his own will, yet it does not follow that his will is eternal ; ' I would say, that besides all the absurdities, pointed out in my sixth Letter, the objection must further destroy divine omniscience, or the eternity and infinity of divine knowledge ; as appears from 58 IMMUTABILITY. what was said in my last Letter ; and must deprive God of his immutability, as proved above ; for what is not eternal cannot be immutable. In a word, the supposition is des tructive of every perfection of the infinite Jehovah ; as I doubt not to evince before I conclude. I might have considered the attributes of omniscience and immutabilty in various other lights, with a view to this point ; but I hope these are sufficient. Wishing you the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, I rest, Yours. LETTER IX. Same subject continued. — Doctrine proved from the divine omnipo tence and wisdom. — Explanation of what is meant by omnipotence and by wisdom. — Several axioms or self-evident truths. My Dear Friend, Having briefly considered the divine attributes of eternity, omnipresence, omniscience, and immutability; and thence drawn a few arguments, among others that might have been educed, in favor of Predestination ; I would now beg your candid attention, while I consider two other perfections of God : his omnipotence and his wisdom. Omnipotence is that' attribute by which God is infinite in power, or by which He does whatsoever He1 pleases. Unlim^ed power is essential to Deity, and coincides with his very nature and existence. For powei belongelh unto God, even that power which is almighty. With Him all things are possible ; and to the Lord not anything is diffi cult. This manifestly appears, from all his works: for the invisible things of Him are clearly seen from the creation of the world ; being understood by the things that are made, evenhis eternal power aud Godhead. He is1 the original and source of all power; and whatever of it is in creatures, re sults from his voluntary communication of it. By Him all things subsist, and in Him we live, and move, and have our being. He is sovereign and uncontrollable in the exercise of it: for when He worketh, none can let. He acteth accord- ins to his will in Heaven and Earth ; and whod his soul 60 OMNIPOTENCE AND WISDOM. desireth, even that He doth. Every creature, both animate and inanimate, is bound and limited by Him ; for He says to all, as He does to the sea, hitherto shall ye come, and no further. His eyes behold the nations, and He rules them by his power forever ; nay, through the greatness of it, He maketh his enemies to submit thkfkselves unto Him. In a word, He is the Power, by which all things exist; by which all creatures act ; by which every atom in the uni verse is supportea and guided to its various respective ends ; and by which all shall be upheld, and carried on, until the whole of the divine purposes concerning them, shall minute ly be fulfilled. Wisdom is that perfection by which God not only knows, but also contrives, purposes, and actually conducts all things, in a complete manner, and to the best end. This attribute enters likewise into his nature and essence, for wisdom dwells with Him ; and He is the only wise God ; as his works of nature, providence, and grace, demonstrate. By wisdom He made the heavens. The firmament, with all its immense retinue of suns and worlds, shows his handy work.' By it the earth and everything thereon is founded and established. So that it is not without just reason, that the adoring psalmist exclaims, ' O Lord, how manifold are thy works ! In wisdom hast thou made them all ! ' It is also evinced by providence, in the preservation of man and beast ; in upholding all things by the word of his pow er ; in sustaining, providing for, and satisfying the desires of every living thing; and in ruling and guiding the whole, to their various ends and purposes. Grace, too, manifests the superabounding wisdom of Jeho vah, both in its plan and execution. This is the wisdom of God in a mystery, the hidden and manifold wisdom, wherein He has abounded towards his creatures ; and the OMNIPOTENCE AND WISDOM. 61 contemplation of which, made the prince of apostles cry out, with holy wonder and admiration ; ' O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God ! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out.' In a word, God's wisdom is eternal, absolute, com plete, universal, and immutable; without a shadow either of defect or of change. Nothing, can be added to, or taken from it. It is a depth unfathomable, a height immeasura ble, a breadth and length boundless, incomprehensible, and infinite. Such, my dear friend, is that almighty and all-wise Be ing, with whom we have to do ; wbosf- omniscient eye per petually and at once, pervades nave/, ''verse ; and before whom every heart, and all *ve ^f Mnereof are ever clear and open. For there is no creature that is not manifest in his sight. May the most profound awe, and holy reverence of this Divine Majesty possess your soul and mine, while I point out some of the particulars which may be offered from these attributes, as additional proofs of the grand doc trine we are considering. — I will lay down a few proposi tions, which I shall assume as axioms, or self-evident truths. 1. As God has exerted his omnipotent power in the works of nature, He must, as a perfectly intelligent being, have willed to exercise that power, prior to bis actually put ting forth those acts; for it would be altogether absurd to suppose that He first acts, and then wills to act. Neither would it be less irrational, to suppose that He knew not what acts He was going to put forth ; which however must be the case, if his will did not determine, and direct his almighty arm in its exercise. Moreover, as an infinitely wise beino-, He could not determine to put forth acts of power, and exercise his power accordingly, without a pre vious knowledge of their effects and operations, and what 6 62 OMNIPOTENCE AND WISDOM. the result would be ; for it cannot be supposed that perfect wisdom could work, without knowledge, design, or end. Consequently, 2. God must have formed a plan of all his works, and of the effects which they would produce, before He exerted any act of power towards their accomplishment ; as it will evidently appear, if we consider, that it is not a characteris tic of wisdom, but of absolute folly, to work without a plan. No wise master-builder undertakes to raise an edifice, with out a scheme, or platform, antecedently drawn. It would imply a most egregious abuse of common sense, to attempt such a thing. Nay-^it would be impossible, even for the most skilful artist, U '•« . te that of which he had no idea. If, then, that minute s\^, lQf wisdom, which is in man, would not admit of such a procedure ; can we suppose that the Supreme Architect of the universe, who is Wisdom itself, could act thus ? Can He to whose infinite under standing all possible plans are eternally and perfectly pres ent, reject them all, and work without.design, and to no de terminate end ? This would be sinking the infinitely wise Jehovah to a level with an idiot. The supposition therefore, is fraught not only with blasphemy, but impossibility. 3. The works of God are such as might be expected from perfect wisdom ; and are too numerous, important, and well ordered, to be executed without previous design. He must have had the complete idea, form, and model of the whole, and of all its parts, in his own eternal mind, antece dently to the exertion of creating power : as the admirable arrangement and disposition of things conspicuously evince : all of which are manifestly the effect of design and fore cast ; being adapted to ends and uses so wise as no finite power can improve or equal. Every part of the vast ma chinery of nature discovers infinite art and skill, in its forms OMNIPOTENCE AND WISDOM. 03 operations and ends ; so that it would be to the last degree absurd, to imagine it is not the effect of unerring counsel, forethought and design.- I conclude, then, that God formed from eternity, a plan of all his works ; or that He, from ever lasting, fixed on that scheme of things, which, by his wis dom and power, He is now accomplishing. 4. This scheme or plan must be infinitely wise, for nothing can be the will and pleasure of God, that is not so. Sooner might the grand fountain of light become the centre and source of darkness, than an unwise volition have place in the mind of God. Sooner might the torrid heat of the equator generate the intense cold of the frigid zone, than an imperfect purpose or design have birth in that Being, who is absolute intelligence itself. Consequently, his will, purposes and decrees, respecting all things whatsoever, must be wisdom in the abstract : and that plan or scheme of things formed in the divine mind, must be the very perfec tion of prudence and rectitude. 5. As the plan itself is most wise, so must be the various ends which God designs thereby. A Being of infinite un derstanding, cannot propose an end, which is not perfectly consistent with his own consummate excellencies. There fore, whatever it be that God ultimately designs by all his work, that must be the best, the wisest, and consequently a perfect plan. 6. This grand end, purpose and design, can be no other than his own glory ; or the display, manifestation, and ex hibition of his adorable perfections. For the Lord hath made all things for himself; and of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things. And as this is the highest, wisest, and best end possible, it would be beneath the dig nity of the infinitely wise Worker to propose, or purpose any thing sliort thereof. It is, moreover, demonstrably evident 64 OMNIPOTENCE AND WISDOM. from the whole tenor of Scripture, that all things in nature, providence and grace, are subservient to, really declarative of, and shall ultimately terminate in, the glory of Him- who worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will. And if this will be eventually the case, it must have been the chief and primary intention of God, in all his works. For what can be more absurd than to suppose that such a glorious and sublime event should be the effect of mere chance? or that things inanimate, things animated, intelligent beings, as angels, men and devils, with natures and princi ples so Contrary and opposite, should fortuitously co-operate, to bring about this last- and grand result of all ? Conse quently, as they do, and shall finally unite and harmonize in promoting God's manifestative glory ; it follows that God himself must design, superintend, and guide the whole. — Hence, 7. The divine plan must comprehend, or take in the whole compass of finite being in all its modifications, effects, operations and ends; with all the circumstances of time, place, relations and qualities ; whether of matter or spirit, from the beginning to the end. For if God's intentional end is his own glory, or the display of his supereminent excel lencies ; He must be the efficient agent that orders and di rects all the means thereto ; otherwise He could have no absolute certainty of the event's taking place. God, as om niscient, perfectly knows every possible way of displaying his own perfections. View Him as consummate in wisdom, and He would not but choose those means which are the wisest, the best, and the most congruous to his designs. And as omnipotent, no barrier could stand in successful opposition to the execution of his purposes. In the plan which He had eternally fixed, God also infallibly knew, not only the grand result of his intentions, his own glory ; but OMNIPOTENCE AND WISDOM. 65 all the boundless variety of subordinate ends, that should coalesce and terminate in that, and every means to these : and as his knowledge of them is founded on his will, the whole must have been absolutely and eternally determined by Him who doth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth. 8. I conclude then, that God, as omnipotent and perfect ly wise, could not exercise those perfections without a will and purpose so to do. That consequently He must have had a preconceived plan, form or model, of all his works, before He exerted his power in their production. That his plan must be infinitely wise. That the ultimate end, pri marily and immutably designed thereby, was the greatest and best possible ; which end, consequently, must be the manifestation of his own glory : and that for these reasons, the divine plan must comprehend and include the whole compass of finite being, with every attending circumstance, operation and effect ; and the whole eternally determined by Him who declares, that his counsel shall stand, and that He will do all his pleasure. These things, I apprehend, are not only demonstrable from Scripture, but also from principles of reason ; and are self-evident to every competent unprejudiced mind. You will, I trust, seriously weigh what I have here ad vanced. And may the Lord give you understanding in all things. I am, Yours. #6 LETTER X . Same subject considered more at large. — Nature and operation of power and wisdom in rational intelligences. — Consequent conclusions and arguments. My Dear Friend, In my last, I laid down some propositions, which I appre hend must appear self-evident to every one who really and firmly believes that God is omnipotent in power, and con summate in wisdom. Only allow these axioms, and the point under consideration must be granted. But as these attributes of Deity must be disputed by every consistent op- poser of Predestination, I shall endeavor to demonstrate them more largely ; and prove that if absolute Predestina tion be not true, infinite power and wisdom cannot be justly predicated of God. Let me then, 1. Briefly consider the nature and operation- of power and wisdom in rational and intelligent beings. And thence, 2. Draw such conclusions and arguments as must necessarily result from such premises ; — in view of which, the great truth now under examination will, I trust, appear to be established beyond all rational contradiction. I. I will briefly consider the nature and: operations of power and wisdom, in rational and intelligent beings. I understand power, in its first principles, to be an ability to exert all or any of the faculties of the mind at pleasure ; and to carry the mental designs and volitions into actual execution. POWER AND WISDOM IN CREATURES. 67 All acts, of what kind and nature soever, whether intel lectual in the mind, or put forth extrinsically on outward objects, are exertions of that attribute we call power. So that power in exercise, is the acting of the mind in, on, and concerning itself or others. In a still more simple view, it is but another name for the effectual efforts of the will to accomplish its own purposes. The will is the immediate antecedent and impulsive cause of all free acts of power, in intelligent agents ; so that they can put forth no act of it, with any design, or to any deter minate end, without first choosing and resolving so to do. Consequently, the source of power with regard to its exer cise, is seated and centred in the will. Power, then, if considered as productive of effects, is the will acting on things exterior to itself: or, the volitions of the mind, successfully terminating on its objects, to the ac complishment of its own wishes and designs. In rational creatures there may be a will to exercise a power, which they cannot use, being bound and limited by superior agency, and by the narrowness and circumscription of both their mental and influential sphere. They may be impelled to put forth acts, in some sense contrary to their wills; but they exert no free or unforced acts, without the will being the immediate cause. But with respect to God, nothing extraneous can bind, limit, or oblige Him to an ex ertion, or non-exertion of power; therefore its exercise is wholly directed and limited by his own free and sovereign pleasure. Indeed, if we consider power in its primary sense, as an ability to act at pleasure, there may be, and is, a ca pacity for acts that are never put forth. But considered in its exercise, what God does not will to be done, cannot be done ; and what He wills, must be done. In this sense, the will of God may justly be called omnipotent. For what is 68 POWER AND WISDOM IN CREATURES. omnipotence but absolute ability or power, in the will of God to perform all his pleasure ? Wisdom, in its primary signification, I understand to be the faculty of just perception, knowledge and judgment ; or a capacity for perceiving, knowing, judging, and ordering things aright. In asecondarj' view, it is the preferring and willing of that which is just, right, and good. In a third, or manifestative view, it is a conformity of actions to right principles ; or a conduct correspondent with truth and fitness in their being and excellence. The first we may call wis dom in its principle and essence; the second, wisdom in its effect or operation on the mind, and the third, wisdom in display, or the manifestation of it to others. The two latter are the necessary result of the former: but it is by the last only that human beings can discover where this excellence resides Wisdom, then, as to its nature, both in God and rational creatures, may be briefly defined thus : Truth in the under standing, with approbation of the will, displaying itself in corresponding actions. Or thus: Truth in the understand ing, influencing the will to just, right and good actions. Wisdom cannot be where truth and rectitude are not ; for these arc essential to it : and truth and rectitude, in being and operation, are wisdom in essence and manifestation. From what has been observed concerning the nature of these attributes, we may trace something of their operation in intelligent creatures. Wisdom, we. see in its primary source is, just ideas, or truth in perception. For, if wc do not conceive of things as they are, we can have no true knowledge; nor can wc, consequently, form any right judg ment of them. But if the soul conceives of things in their true nature, with their effects, modes, relations and connec tions, the knowledge hereby conveyed will be just and true: CONCLUSIONS AND ARGUMENTS. 69 and the understanding, thus truly illumined, judges of the things it contemplates, with precision and truth ; and dis covers the beauty and excellence of some things above oth ers, which immediately creates in the mind an approbation and preference of that which is most lovely, just and good. Here wisdom is manifested to be in the will, by its choosing what is most excellent, and rejecting the contrary. If the object of the will's choice be some good to be done, or to be enjoyed, the will then acts upon, and excites the powers of the soul, in order to find the best means of obtaining the desired end : the understanding points them out, and the will obeys its intimation, and exerts its influence for their accomplishment. The will, thus exerted, is power in ex ercise ; or, the exertion of the will is power in operation. And the will thus operating to effect just and wise designs, is wisdom in display and manifestation. From the above observations, I beg to remark, 1. That though wisdom has its residence primarily in the understanding, yet the exercise and manifestation of it, as well as of power, lie in the will ; and though the will is governed by the understanding, yet, in return, the will guides and impels, (if I may so speak,) the mind, in its searches and researches after truth ; and acts, in the con trivance of every scheme, as well as in the executioa thereof. 2. That the will always prefers and follows that which the judgment or understanding points out as most eligible; and if the mind be uncontaminatcd with evil, divested of prejudice, and unbiased by everything but the love of recti tude and truth ; wisdom will characterize both its volitions and its outward acts. 3. That as the source of active power is centred in the 70 CONCLUSIONS AND ARGUMENTS. will, it cannot (if possible) but execute its purposes: for the very idea, of willing a thing, implies a determination to effect the thing willed ; and where there is no barrier supe rior to the powers of the will, it must and will execute its own designs. These things, I apprehend, are in the very nature of the faculties of the soul, and agree with the universal experience of mankind. Let us now ascend a little higher in our views of this part of our subject. And here I think we may with propriety affirm, that as God created man after his own image, the soul, in its primi tive state, bore some analogy or resemblance to the divine mind ; and possessed somewhat of those powers, in a limited degree, which are infinite in Him. For it cannot be sup posed, that He endued man with those excellencies which did not in a supereminent degree, (or rather, without de gree,) reside in himself. God, then, as unlimited in wisdom, must have eternally perceived with infallible and infinite clearness, all things in their nature, operations and effects, that were possible to exist. The ideas, or images of them, with all their number less modifications, must have been from everlasting, com pletely present to his mind : so that He must have known in truth all things whatsoever, with every circumstance thereof. His knowledge being thus perfect, his infinite un derstanding could never be misled by false appearances, or deceptive mediums : nor was it possible for his judgment to err. Consequently such clearness of idea, such absolute perfection of knowledge, and such truth in judgment, could not but be accompanied by infallible efficacy of will. In other words, God being consummately wise in his under- CONCLUSIONS AND ARGUMENTS. 71 standing, all his volitions must be absolute certainty and reGtitude, and his determinations the very standard of wis dom. . And further, as the volitions, purposes, and determi nations of God, are thus perfectly pure and just ; every act of his power which operates as the result of his will, (or rather, which is the will itself operating,) must display and exhibit essential wisdom, rectitude and truth. But not to proceed any further here, I am, yours, &c, LETTER XI. Conclusions and arguments from the premises already established — particularly from the nature and operation of power. Summary. My Dear Friend, Having briefly surveyed the nature and operations of pow er and wisdom in intelligent beings, I come now, II. To deduce such conclusions and arguments as must necessarily result from such premises ; in view of which, the great truth now under examination, will, as I trust, ap pear to be established beyond all possible contradiction. And this I shall do, — from power and icisdom. 1st. From power. — By what has been observed of the nature and operations of power, it appears that the source of it, with regard to its exercise, is seated and centred in the will. And I would add here, that power in its first princi ple, is no other than the will itself; this faculty being es sential to its very existence : for without it there could not have been the least possibility of a powerful act, in any creature whatever. Yea, even God himself, could He be supposed to be destitute of will, would be utterly void of power ; and instead of being omnipotent, would be impotence in the abstract. This granted, it follows, that all things whatsoever, from the beginning to the end, must originate in, and be the result of, the eternal and determinate will of God ; which will appear, if we consider that every act of power must have its source in and from Him. There is nothing whatever in the whole creation, but is a display of CONCLUSIONS AND ARGUMENTS. 73 power, and must have a cause, and originate either in the agent working, or some other cause. If power can originate independent of the Uncreated Mind, it must be either from matter or spirit ; for these, as far as we know, comprehend the whole of finite being. But, 1. It cannot originate in, or from, matter. For power or motion, is no essential property of it, under any mode or form ; it being naturally quiescent and passive, and without any capability of exerting itself, with the least activity : rest is its natural position ; and so it would remain forever, were it not impelled to motion by the effort of some cause extraneous. View matter under any of its modifications i with its infinite variety of operations, by which power is displayed, we shall find all depend on some agency foreign to the subject of that display. Thus vegetable^ power, or the power of vegetation, depends on the united and effica cious agency of light, heat, air, and water ; the circulation and motion of the blood, on the action of the heart; and all mechanical operations, on the power of gravity. But I need not enlarge here, as our senses demonstrate the truth, and philosophers of all ages confirm it. I observe also, 2. That as power does not originate from matter, so neither does it originate from created spirits. We can form no idea of spirits and their agency, but from our own minds arid their operations : and here we fall vastly short of just and precise conceptions; the soul being as far above our full comprehension, as the heavens are above the earth. But this one self-evident truth is sufficient for my purpose ; that every act of the mind, of what kind and na ture soever, is the effect and consequent of prior agency; and has a real cause, which is the reason and ground of its existence, distinct and separate from itself, and without which the act could not possibly take place. No act of the mind can be its own cause ; neither can the mind, with all its 7 74 CONCLUSIONS AND ARGUMENT'. powers, be the unoriginated cause of any of its acts ; as will be evident if we consider that perception or the faculty of receiving, contemplating, and retaining ideas, or the images of things, is the first cause in the soul of all its after acts : for without perception we can have no idea, knowledge, understanding, or will ; and if no will, consequently no power ; so that if power originate at all in the soul, it must be in the faculty of perception. But perception being in itself an effect, it must have a cause ; and therefore cannot be the unoriginated cause of those after acts of- the soul, of which itself is an antecedent ground. In short, it is evident to demonstration, that not only the soul itself, but all its acts are effects; they are consequents of, and produced by, prior causes. It is likewise evident that in all acts, considered as effects, the soul is passive ; and only to be considered active in them, as they are causes and grounds of consequent effects. Like the great wheel of a mill, which is passive in the reception of the stream that turns it, but active in set ting the wheels in motion : and the stones are passive in the reception of the power of the wheel, but active in grinding the corn. Or we may reverse the order; and then the corn is passive to the action of the stones ; the stones, to the in fluence of the wheel : the. wheel, to the force of the water; the water, to the power of gravity : and what is gravity but the power of God ? On the whole, then, as the mind and all the acts thereof, are the effects and consequents of prior agency, it is impos sible that power, in any respect can originate hence: nor can it indeed from any created thing, whether matter or spirit. Consequently, nil must arise solely, and alone, from God : and this will appear with additional evidence, if we consider briefly, 3. The nature of causes and effects. SUMMARY IN REGARD TO POWER. 75 , Nothing has being throughout God's universal dominion, but is an effect of an antecedent agency. No event could possibly exist without a cause. The very nature of an event implies this ; and to suppose the contrary, is a contradiction, and destroys the nature of both case and effect. ATI causes (except the first) are effects prior to their becoming causes; and as effects, they cannot generate themselves, nor be their own cause. Neither can they exist any longer than they are influ enced by their causes ; for the present being of an event cannot be the foundation of its existence the next moment ; but the duration of it must be entirely owing to the continual influence of its cause. And it will hold true of all causes whatsoever, that if their influence be suspendend, their effects will immedi ately subside. Thus, if the power of gravity were to cease but for one minute, all mechanical operations would cease also for the like time; stop the pulsations of the heart, and the blood circulates no more ; blot out the sun, and total darkness in stantly ensues. Now as all causes (except the first) are effects before they become causes, and as no effect can exist a moment longer than it is influenced by its cause, it is evi dent to demonstration, that all causes and effects depend for their existence, through every instant of their duration on the incessant and ceaseless influence and agency of the first cause, God, who does according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among th« inhabitants of the earth. Of what has been said, this is the sum : All things and circumstances of things; all caiises, effects, relations and qualities whatsoever, found in created spirits, or matter, are displays of, and produced by the exertion of, that attribrute we call power; Power displayed, and by which all things are produced, does not originate in, or arise from, the things themselves; but from God, the first cause: therefore all power, however manifested and by whom, or whatsoever displayed, is of God. And if so, it will demonstrably follow 76 SUMMARY IN REGARD TO POWER. that all things without exception, are the objects of his de crees, will, and choice ; and that it is impossible it should be otherwise. For will and power with God, (in this re spect,) are the same ; his power exerted and displayed, is his will in act and manifestation. In a word, to will is power in God; and th- simple volition, 'Let it be,' generated the whole of matter and spirit, modified the former in all its inconceivable variety of beautiful forms, and adorned the latter with all its wonderful and astonishing faculties ; it incessantly upholds, supports and mantains the whole, and all-its parts in motion ; and directs every iota to its assigned end. ' He spake, and it was done : He commanded, and it stood fast.' And ' of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things : to whom be glory forever and ever.' On the whole then, we may safely conclude, That whatsoever is effected by, or is a manifestation of, the power of God, is the object of his determinate will. But all things, without exception, are effected by, and are manifestations of, the power of God. Therefore all things, without exception, are the objects of his determinate will and choice. I might have enlarged much more on these things ; but as I would study brevity, I forbear ; and I am, Yours. LETTER XII. Same subject continued.— Conclusions and arguments from the nature and operation of wisdom. — Axioms premised. — Inferences drawn, — Summary My Dear Friend, I proceed now to deduce some arguments, 2dly. From the nature and operation of toisdom. And here permit me to premise as axioms and indisputa ble truths, the following things: 1. That no principle of operation can act contrary to its nature. 2. That wisdom, as a principle, operating in the mind of an intelligent being, can never act contrary to its nature: that is to say, unwisely. Consequently, 3. Whatever acts of folly are discovered in rational crea tures, they must arise from another principle ; wisdom can not be the immediate source of them. Therefore, 4. In whatever being there is the least warping to .error in judgment, will, or act, perfect wisdom cannot reside, i. e. wisdom cannot possess the whole of his intellectual powers. Darkness and error must in part have the rule. For, 5. Perfect wisdom utterly and eternally excludes igno rance, darkness, error, and all evil ; both in understanding, volition, and action. But, 6. This perfection resides nowhere but ia the Infinite Mind; there it essentially dwells; yea, it is his nature and essence, and operates on all things throughout all the ex- *1 78 CONCLUSIONS AND ARGUMENTS. tent of lime and place, agreeably to its own nature, without the least shadow of defect. God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all. These things premised, let us examine whether it be com patible with infinite wisdom, to leave, suffer, or permit, any the least iota of created things, or circumstances, to take place undetermined by Him; or which He did not eternally purpose, and choose should have place, being, and existence. If it be, I give up the point ; but if not, the doctrine must stand more firm and permanent than mountains of brass, never to be moved by all the wit and wisdom of men. In a former Letter, I defined wisdom to be, ' truth in the understanding, with approbation of the will, displaying itself in correspondent actions ; ' or thus, ' truth in the understand ing, influencing the will to actions, just, right, and good.' If this definition be just, (as I think cannot be disputed,) it undoubtedly follows, 1. That God, as perfect in wisdom, must have all truth in his understanding ; or a perfect and true idea, knowledge and judgment, of all things possible, knowable, or conceiva ble. Not an idea, thought or volition of any creature ; not an act of body or mind ; not a circumstance of motion, quality, relation, time, place, effect or consequent, either of matter or spirit, under any possible mode of existence, but must from eternity, be perfect in the conception of, most in timately present with, and with absolute and perfect clear ness known to Him, whose understanding is infinite. Con sequently, 2. He must have an indubitable certainty of those things, which of all possibilities conceivable in his infinite mind, are most fit and proper, and most agreeable to his wis dom to have place, being and existence. And, 3. As infinitely wise, He must not only know, but chcose CONCLUSIONS AND ARGUMENTS. 79 what is best. To know what is infinitely good and prefer able, and not to prefer and choose that good, is contrary to the nature of wisdom.. Sooner may light coalesce with darkness, than wisdom not prefer and choose the greatest good. And this, because, 1. God, as completely wise, must possess absolute and eternal rectitude of will. Whatever choice or design warps in the the least degree from uprightness, faithfulness and truth, is incompatible with perfect wisdom ; therefore the designs, ends, choice aud determinations of God must be holy, just and good, and forever the best possible: or He cannot be infinitely wise. For, 2. His wisdom renders it impossible that ever a change can take place, or a new volition arise in his will. Nothing demon trates want of wisdom more, than fickleness and in stability : unsettled purposes always flow from ignorance, or folly. These are the root of all the mutability discovera ble, in the volitions and actions of men, for where the former is not, the latter cannot be ; because, perfect wisdom, as it implies absolute and complete knowledge, is an everlasting bar against the least shadow of a change. In such circum stances, no reason can ever arise for even a turn of thought, and it would be folly and madness to change without it. Therefore God, as infinitely wise, must be immutable in his will, choice and determination. He is of one mind, and the thoughts of his heart are the same through all genera tions. It follows, 3. That as God eternally knows and chooses what is best, so as wise, He must do all He chooses. To know, choose, and determine the wisest and nest of all possible plans, and at the same time not to accomplish it, is utterly incongruous with consummate wisdom. Therefore God so SUMMARY IN R"EGARD TO WISDOM. must either execute his purposes, or be unwise. Especially as, 4. He cannot be at a loss for the best ways and means to fulfill his designs; neither can He want power. He knows hoio ; and therefore can with infinite ease, do all his pleas ure. Uncreated wisdom cannot be deceived ; neither can his influence be diverted or rendered abortive. No wisdom can circumvent, no arm successfully oppose Him ! He worketh, and none shall or can hinder it ; and He has said, I will do all my pleasure. And his unlimited knowledge and infinite sagacity, joined with boundless power, must eternally prevent even the skaking of a leaf, the falling of a sparrow, the growth of a hair, the least possible effect, existing without his knowledge, approbation, will, deter mination. In a word, it is the perfection of wisdom that gives, or rather includes power omnipotent, (for one cannot exist without the other,) and makes all things possible and easy with God. It is the knowing how, that renders the -accomplishment of the divine purposes, effectual and cer tain. And it is wisdom's energetic influence that puts an eter nal bar to the rising of the least circumstance, unfixed or not determined by Him. These things, I humbly apprehend, are necessarily inclu ded in the idea of perfect wisdom ; of which this is the sum : God, as completely wise, must have infinite knowl edge, and therefore knows what, of all things possible or conceivable, are best to have being : these He must choose, fix and determine; because his will cannot but be perfect rectitude and truth; which could not be the case, if He did not prefer that which in his wisdom He saw best on the whole. Also, what God chooses, must be his eternal choice ; be cause no reason can ever arise for a change, and it weld SUMMARY IN REGARD TO WISDOM. 81 be folly to change without one. Further, He not only knows and chooses, but must also execute his purposes ; for it would be inconsistent with wisdom, for God to leave his wise determinations unaccomplished ; especially as He knows how, and wants neither wisdom nor power to execute them in the best manner, or to circumvent, and render abor tive, every thing that can possibly stand in opposition to them. On the whole, then, it demonstrably appears, that if God is infinite in wisdom, He must not only know, fix and de termine, but work all things (without exception) after the counsel of his own will, and that nothing can possibly exist but as the effect thereof. And this will appear with addi tional confirmation and demonstration, if we consider how opposite to the nature of wisdom, and what absurdities and impossibilities follow a contrary supposition. But these must be the subject of my next. I am, Yours. LETTER XIII. Absurdities and contradictions consequent on the supposition that God has not determined, and does not work, all things after the counsel of his own will. My dear Friend, From the things laid down in my last, as necessarily resulting from the idea of perfect wisdom, I think it must undeniably appear to every candid and impartial examiner, that God not only knew, fixed, and determined, but that He worketh all things (without exception) according to the coun sel of his own will. But to demonstrate this a little farther, I come now to consider, how opposite to the nature of uner ring wisdom a contrary supposition must be, and what absurdi'ies and contradictions would follow upon it. If any event, or events, be supposed to exist without, or contrary to, the determinate will of God; He foreknew them, or He djd not. If He did not foreknow them, He cannot be omniscient not, consequently all-wise j for per fection of wisdom includes unlimited knowledge. If He did foreknow them, they were either dependent on Him for their existence, or they were not. If they were not depend ent, there must be some being, independent of Him, from whom they must derive their being ; which would, con sequently, destroy both the independence and omnipotence ABSURDITIES OF THE CONTRARY DOCTRINE. 83 of God ; as, then it would be impossible for Him to do all his pleasure. If they were dependent on Him, He must work to bring them forth, either with, or without his will : if without his will, He must exert His power without de sign, and to no end : and like the pendulum of a clock, give motion to the wheels, but know not why. But this is so absurd, and contrary to the nature of wisdom, that the lowest degree of reason must cast it off with abhorrence. But if He is allowed to work with, or according to, his will the supposition vanishes, as darkness before the rising sun. God, in the exertion of his power to create, uphold, and preserve all things, worked, after a plan, or He did not : if He did not, wisdom could have no share in. his works ; for design, means, and end, are essential to wisdom ; but, with out a plan, there cannot be either. And confusion and deformity may as soon manifest order and beauty, as wis dom be displayed without design. To suppose the wOrks of nature, and of providence, in all their beautiful harmony and usefulness, were not the effect of a previous plan, form, or model, conceived in the divine mind, is such a mystery, that none but an atheist, with his confused jumble of atoms, would dare attempt to unravel. For, here would be the grandest designs manifested, the wisest means used, and the noblest ends attained, without aim, intention, or design at all. But this is altogether opposite to the nature of wis dom, and absurd, contradictory, and impossible. If God (as He certainly must) did work after a plan, then, on the foregoing supposition, there must be some events which exist, that are not included therein ; and his all-pen etrating eye must behold them, intruding, and mixing themselves with the works of his hands, without a thought, or will in Him, either to permit or prevent them : for, if his will were to permit them, they must be a part of his plan ; 84 ABSURDITIES OF THE CONTRARY DOCTRINE. for a will to permit, un loubtedly implies intention and design ; and previous intention and design form the very nature of a plan : therefore permission would destroj' the supposition. On the other hand, if He determined to pre vent them, they could not exist at all; for who hath resisted his will ? Consequently, if any such events are supposed to exist, God cannot have any thought, will, or concern about them; but must be (with respect to them at least) like the passive, senseless mirror, receiving the impressions, or images of the objects before it, without any other effect'. But this is so contrary to the nature of divine wisdom, that it needs no comment to make it appear more so. Allowing that God formed the noblest and wisest plan, yet, on the above supposition, it was impossible but He must fail in the execution ; for these supposed events must necessarily be so interwoven and connected with those con cerned, and purposed in the divine mind, that the order of the whole must be subverted, and the various ends proposed, rendered uncertain of accomplishment, is not entirely abor tive. Let us consider this a little. God, determining to manifest and display his matchless perfections, conceived, in his eternal mind, the best ways and means thereto : these his wisdom chooses, and deter mines to pursue and accomplish. End and means thus conceived, comprised the whole plan, form, or model of all his works; in which not an atom, a creature, or thing: not a thought, volition, or act, more or less, were included, than unerring wisdom saw necessary and conducive to answer all the ends proposed. This, I think, must be granted, if we have any rational ideas of the divine perfections. Andi if so, those supposed events, as they are not the effect of his will, cannot (as observed before) be any part of his plan : but yet, notwithstanding, they must be coeval with ABSURDITIES OF THE CONTRARY DOCTRINE. 85 involved in, and, by some inscrutable means, so jumbled and connected together with those that are, that no separation can be effected, without wholly subverting and changino- the entire series of events, as will appear if we consider an instance or two. Let us then suppose the sin of our first parents to be one of those events that did not exist in consequence of the divine will, and so was no part of his all-wise plan; suppose also this event to be separated from those fixeJ by unerring wisdom, or, (which is the same) that it never had any be ing ; can imagination paint the vast difference it would have occasioned throughout the whole scheme of things ? Would it not have produced and exhibited a change incon ceivably great? Certainly it would. Consequently, if that sin were not included in the sovereign plan, and ap pointed, fixed, and determined, as a mean to the grand end, the whole scheme of infinite wisdom must be overturned and inevitably miscarry. And, when we consider what important events arise from the smallest beginnings, perhaps the same might be justly observed of any other event. Even a single thought or volition, in its progress, affects and influences the affairs of the whole world. The thought of building a tower, that should reach to heaven, became an occasion, or the means, of separating the families of Noah and giving different language and manners to all the nations of the earth. The evil thought of Lot's daughters gave birth to the two nations of Moab and Ammon; and the determination of Xerxes- to invade Greece, terminated in the destruction of the Persian empire. And no doubt but millions of events take place, even at this day, in consequence of these things, which else had never had existence. In short, were we to trace things minutely, innumerable are the instances that 8 86 ABSURDITIES OF THE CONTRARY DOCTRINE. might be produced, where a single thought, or volition, has been a foundation, not only of effecting a change in the af fairs of a nation, but of the whole world ; and which, were they not the effect of God's sovereign purpose, (and so a part of his plan,) must necessarily overturn, and as it were, an nihilate the whole ; and so render it impossible for God to govern the world. But when perfect wisdom can err, and so act contrary to its nature ; and power omnipotent be suc cessfully opposed ; then, and not till then, can this be sup posed ; then, and not till then, can a single event have being, without the concurrence of, or in opposition to, the divine will. Upon the whole, if the foregoing suppositions be allowed, these absurdities, contradictions and impossibilities, must necessarily follow. 1. Wisdom, perfect wisdom, must work without a plan ! And the Omnipotent must exert his power without any in tention, design, aim or end. Or, 2. If He did work after a plan, or previous design ; yet millions of events must exist through the efficacy of his will and power, and at the safne time be no part of his plan or design ; and so, consequently, not the effect of his will. Or, 3. These events could not depend on Him for their being, and then they must either give it to themselves, or derive it from some agent independent of God, and so suppose a plu rality of first causes. Or, 4. God must fix a plan, and not act according to it: must contrive, appoint, and determine, the wisest of schemes, without a design to accomplish it. Or, 5. He must determine to prosecute and accomplish it ¦ and at the same time know that He either will not, or can not execute his purpose. And then, 6. He must he a passive spectator of the subversion of ABSURDITIES OF THE CONTRARY DOCTRINE. 87 his all-wise designs ; having neither thought, will or power to prevent it. And consequently, 7. Can have no more to do in the government of the world, than any individual therein. But these things, and many more that might be added, are so absurd in themselves, and so incompatible with the nature of perfect wisdom and power, that pure reason must forever reprobate and spurn them off with detestation and abhorrence ; so that, on the whole, we must not only give up those essential attributes of Deity, but our reason also, if we allow the supposition. I might have abundantly enlarged on these things; yea, enough might have been raised from the perfection of wisdom, to fill a volume in favor of the doctrine ; but I apprehend it is not necessary, and therefore leave it. I purpose in my next, for the further investigation and confirmation of the point, to treat particularly of the divine will ; its nature and proper ties; and shall attempt to show how, and in what manner, God executes his purposes : and also, in what respect, and how far his will is concerned in those things that appear contrary to his written word, and which his law forbids and condemns. But who is sufficient for these things? Here are depths and mysteries inscrutable by mortals ! yea, which angels cannot explore ; and which none but uncreated wisdom can unravel! His judgments, indeed, are unsearchable! and his ways past finding out. And such knowledge is too wonder ful for created beings : it is high, and none can attain unto it. But though we cannot find out the Almighty to perfec tion ; yet enough is revealed in his word, and manifested in his works, to lead and guide the sober inquirer ; and to con vince and to satisfy him that his counsels of old are faith fulness and truth ; and that though He worketh all things, 88 ABSURDITIES OF THE CONTRARY DOCTRINE. (without exception) after the council of his own will ; yet, that He is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works. To vindicate the divine proceedings, and to advance the glory of his perfections, 1 make this feeble attempt. May the Spirit of wisdom, which cannot err, guide and direct my thoughts herein, and at the same time enlighten you to dis tinguish truth from error, and influence you to reject the latter, and cordially embrace the former. Then will you rejoice in God, as that God, who, in doing his pleasure in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, does all things well. I rest, Yours, &c. LETTER XIV. Further confirmation of the doctrine from a consideration of the nature and properties of the divine will. My Dear Friend, Having briefly considered the eternity, immensity, immu tability, knowledge, omnipotence and wisdom of God ; and thence drawn a few of the many arguments that might be produced in favor of the truth before us ; I come now for the further investigation and confirmation of the point, to treat particularly of the divine will : in doing which, I shall consider, 1. The nature and properties of the divine will, with some inferences therefrom ; and, 2. How, and in what manner God executes his purposes; taking care to point out in what respect, and how far the divine will is concern ed in those things that appear contrary to this written word, and which his law forbids and condemns. I. I am to consider the nature and properties of the divine will. The will is that power in rational beings which is the immediate source and spring of action ; or, it is that princi ple by which preference is given to any thing or things. Volition in man, is the soul going after, or acting upon, some object or objects, in a way of election, choice or prefer ence, and is that by which all its other powers are put in 90 THE DIVINE WILL. motion, and the members of the body excited to all their free actions. So that the will is the soul itself; and volition, its simple and only primary act.* And with respect to God, his will or the divine principle of volition, is no other than God himself; it is his nature and essence ; and which is possessed of all the properties of Deity ; as will, [ apprehend, fully appear from the follow ing considerations. 1. , Eternity, as it is an essential property of Deity, so it is of the divine will: for God cannot be eternal, if his will be not so. To suppose Him to be eternal, and his will not, is to suppose God to be, for an eternity past, without a will; but God without a will can be no God. Consequentlj', the supposition carries in it this absurd contradiction : A God, from everlasting existing without a will: or no God for an eternity past. But God's will is eternal, as appears, 2. From its immutability. Immutability and eternity involve each other ; and if one be destroyed, the other must necessarily be so too. But that the will of God is immu table, is clear and evident from various Scriptures. ' He is of one mind,' and 'his thoughts are the same through all *That volition is the primary act of the soul, and puts all its other powers in motion, I think is evident; for I apprehend the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its primary ideas; like a mirror, on which the objects before it fall; or, as the eye in its perception of the images of things before it. For when, through the will's activity, they are brought to light, they cannot but be perceived; and the soul can no more avoid them, than the open eye the images of the objects it looks at. In a word, the soul or will, is the only active principle in seekin^- ideas; but in the reception of them is entirely passive. Whence I think it appears, that the will, or principle of volition, is the very es sence of the soul, whence by its operations, all those appetites and pas sions that are predicated of it, arise. Therefore the understanding, judgment, &c, are not faculties distinct from the will, but rather differ ent operations and effects of volition in and upon the mind. THE DIVINE WILL. 91 generations.' Mind and thoughts here certainly imply his will and purposes, and strongly express both his unchange" able nature and eternal duration; and that ' He is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.' If the will of God be not eter nally the same with respect to all things and circumstances of things, it cannot be immutable ; and if God be not immu table in his will, He cannot be so at all : for if it be possi ble for a change to take p',.ice in a pure, spiritual, intelligent being, it is the will that must be the subject of it. Nor can we conceive a possibility of a change in Deity, but here; and if here, it immediately destroys every perfection of his nature. But the God of Jacob changeth not : 3'ea, He is eternally without the least shadow of change. Consequent ly, his will, purpose, choice and determination are ever the same ; and therefore immutability is a predicate of the divine will; and the will, the essence and nature of Jehovah. 3. Another essential attribute of Deity, which belongs also, in a peculiar manner, and is essential 1o the divine will, is omnipotence. Omnipotence, or infinite power, is. an ability in God to do all his pleasure ; and this ability is cen tred in his will: for power without will is nonentity. If we examine things closely and clearly, we shall find that there are no displays of power in God, or the creature, but origi nate in volition. In the Mosaic account of the creation, we trace nothing but the simple act of God's will, as the ener getic worker in ths proluction of the universe. Let it be, was the effectual volition, the all-powerful voice, which gen erated and spake the heavens and the earth into being: ' Let there be light, and there was light. He spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast.' No foreign aid was called ; no instrument was employed ; but his simple word or will, built the whole frame of nature, with all its grand apparatus; and the same volition has, and will 92 THE DIVINE will. preserve it, to its appointed end. So that power, in its prin ciple and essence, is no other than the divine will ; and power displayed is this will manifested ; so that on the whole, will and power are primarily the same ; that is to say, God himself. Consequently it follows, 4. That sovereignty is also a property of the divine will. For if infinite power be a perfection of it, sovereignty must be ; and that it is, Scripture abundantly evinces: ' He doth according to his will, in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth ; He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.' And God himself declares : ' I will do all my pleasure.' Sovereignty, therefore, is in the divine will : consequently, it is God himself. 5. Infinite knowledge and wisdom, as they are essential to Deity, so also are they to the divine will. That the knowledge of God has its source in his will, I have before proved in my seventh Letter. And that his wisdom is cen tred there, is evident, in that all the displays and manifesta tions of it in nature, providence, and grace, are the emana tions, effectual exertions, and certain effects, of the good pleasure of God ; the divine will being the alone and only source, spring and cause, of those displays. Consequently, as unlimited knowledge and perfect wisdom reside there, it is God himself. 6. Simplicity is another property or attribute of the di vine will ; it being but one simple, eternal and immutable act. By which I mean that though divine volition acts on all the objects that can possibly exist ; and though these objects are infinite in number and variety, yet the act is im mutably one and the same: for ' His thoughts are the same through all generations ; ' and if He has no new thoughts, He can have no new act of will. If there be but two acts of the divine will in succession, they destroy the simplicity of THE DIVINE WILL. 93 the divine essence ; for one must be eternally before the other ; or there must be a time -when God had no will ; which is absurd and contradictory, as observed above. If volition were as distinct in the mind of God, and followed one anoth er in succession, as its objects do, with respect to their being, God would be as much the subject of time, as the objects on which He acts, or about which his will is conversant. But this would destroy his eternity and immutability. It follows, therefore, that there is not, or can be, any distinction of succession in the divine will ; but that it is eternally one and the same; ' determining- the end from the beginning, and bringing to pass the times before appointed ; ' and con sequently, no other than God himself. 7. Again let me observe, that the simplicity and oneness of the divine will and purpose, constitute, or are the founda tion of the omnipresence of God. In my seventh Let ter, I have proved that his will is the source or spring of his prescience ] for He could not have foreknown what would not be, had He not predetermined what should be: nor could all things have been ever present with Him, had not his will made them so. It is the divine will that eternally com prehends, commands, acts upon, and brings the whole series of events most immediately present. It is there He sees them all in complete and perfect existence ; and it is for this reason that He calls things that are not, as though they were; and speaks in many parts of holy writ, of things done, which, in our view, came not into being until after ages. This oneness and simplicity of the will of God, as it en tirely excludes succession of thought, so it annihilates the idea of time. - Time cannot take place where there is no succession of ideas; nor can there be any succession of ideas where there is an eternal sameness of will. So that with 94 THE DIVINE WILL. respect to God, we cannot with just propriety, say there is any time between the divine determination, and the execu tion thereof.* Things are done in this view as soon as de termined. He spake, and it was done. The absolute deter mination of the being of things, makes their being absolutely certain and complete in his view : and the immutable one ness of his will, makes a whole eternity at once and ever present : so that not any one event, though ever so distant from creatures, can be any otherwise than perfectly pres ent with Him. Consequently, omnipresence is the prop erty of the divine will ; and no other than himself. I might proceed to other perfections, but as they follow of just consequence, I shall waive it, and only further observe, in brief, that all moral perfections belong also to the divine will : for what is goodness, but the constant determination * It is absolutely impossible for created intelligence to conceive of being separate and distinct from, independent of, and unconnected with, time and space. Existence without succession and locality, is, to us, inconceivable. And yet such must be that infinite Being, who is the first cause and Creator of all things. Succession of moments, or change of place, are none of his properties : for the simplicity and oneness of the divine nature, render either of them impossible. To think of a Being to whom neither time or space has any relation ; and that the things which to us existed unnumbered years past, or will exist in countless ages to come, are as equally, fully and perfectly pres ent to Him as those existing this present moment, seems something be yond the conception of a finite capacity. But it must be so, if infinity be the attribute of Deity. Therefore, on the whole, we may safely conclude that Jehovah pervades, encircles, and grasps, at once and ever, the whole of dura tion, space, creation, and all the vast concrete of things, with their op erations and effects, in his infinitely capacious mind. Consequently, Predestination is not that horrible thing, which some would represent it to be; it being only the divine will reaching to all things — bringing them eternally and at once most intimately present, , — and guiding them by his wisdom to the fulfillment of all his purposes. THE DIVINE WILL. 95 of things, not only just, but beneficent, benevolent, and a superabounding of unmerited kindness? What is justice, but the eternal choice of that which is right, and a fixed de termination to give all their due ? What is holiness, but the invariable rectitude of the divine purposes ? What is mercy, but the eternal resolution of God to save sinners? What is divine love, but God's everlasting good-will, determining the welfare of the objects of it ? In short, we cannot separate one perfection from the will of God ; and therefore it is de monstrably evident, that it is essentially himself. On the whole, then, if the divine will is God himself, and consequently possessed of all the perfections essential to Deity; it follows, that all the arguments already drawn from these perfections, will rise in proof here, and stand firm and immovable as mountains of brass. I shall not, there fore repeat them, but attend to some others which are just consequences of what has been advanced. But I must leave this till my next, while I rest, Yours. LETTER XV- Inferences from the discussion on the divine will in the last Letter con firming the doctrine still further. My Dear Friend, Having proved that every perfection of Deity centres in the divine will ; and consequently that it is the very nature and essence of God ;* I propose now to draw a few brief in ferences from those things, as a further confirmation of the truth in view. And, 1. If eternity, immutability, simplicity, and oneness, are predicates of the divine will ; if God is really of one mind, ,and never changes the purposes of his heart, or alters the thing that goes out of his lips, it is impossible but all things, their modes and circumstances, must be according to, and the effects of, his eternal will and decrees: for could it be * I have been the larger in proving this point, because there are some who would be thought masters in Israel, that sneer at this proposition of the Calvinists : ' The will of God, is God willing.' And I cannot help observing with what gust their mistaken and fallacious reasonings are swallowed by the carnal multitude: and not only the sober Deist, So- cinian, Arian, and Arminian, but the most reprobate, openly profane, and ungodly, drink them in with the utmost greediness, and exult in having such champions for principles so agreeable to the flesh, and so pleasing to the carnal dictates of proud nature. This, I humbly appre hend, is a criterion, and ought to be a satisfying argument to the doubt ing but sincere inquirer after truth, that the works referred to, do not savor of the things that be of God. INFERENCES. 97 supposed otherwise, and that anything could exist contrary to, or independent of, his determinate will, that event must have been from an eternity, secluded from his view and knowledge, — not to be known by Him till it arose into being : for who could be his counsellor, or teach Him ? — There are none more knowing or wise, from whom He could get information; nor could the event itself produce this effect on the divine mind, prior to its existence. Consequently, the rising of such an unknown event would suip im Him into new ideas, thoughts and purposes, and influence Him to new model his plan, to bring the supposed event anil its con sequences subservient to his own ends and designs, which would make Him both the subject of time and changeable- ness, and consequently destroy his eternity, immutability, &c, and so deprive Him of Deity. 2. If omnipotence be a perfection of the divine will, it follows, that all things have been, are, and shall be, accord ing to the good pleasure of it : for what should hinder ? Not impotency ; for that would be contrary to the supposition, He being the Almighty, and able to do whatsoever pleaseth Him. Nor because He will not do it: for that, as it would be willing and nilling the same thing, would be contrary to the nature of the will, and so an absurdity in itself: therefore the supposition of an event existing contrary to his determi nate will, must imply a want of an ability to prevent it, which would destroy his omnipotence and Deity, and there fore cannot be. 3. The sovereignty of the divine will renders it impossi ble that any event should exist but as the effect of his abso lute determination. SOVEREIGNTY is the glory of De ity, and essential to his very being, that which Grace most- humbly adores and glories in ; but which the carnal mind inveterately hates and opposes : it is that -which stabs the 9 98 INFERENCES. very vitals of man's boasted free-will, and brings down the towering imaginations of our proud hearts. Pride, that first and ruling passion in the human breast, forever disputes and objects against this glorious prerogative. And however ignorant thereof, men in general may be, yet it is a certain truth, that this latent bosom evil is the foundation of all their objections. Many acknowledge indeed in words the divine sovereignty, but how few maintain it in its effects and con sequences. Many seem to allow God to be the supreme and universal Governor, but at the same time deny his having any concern with millions of events that are continually Com ing into existence. But these things cannot hang together; for divine sovereignty cannot consistently be supported, with out maintaining also, that ' He worketh all things (without exception) after the counsel of his own will.' For a sovereign without rule and government, is a contradiction; and a uni versal sovereign without universal sway and influence, is no less so. If God does not all his pleasure, He is but a nominal or partial sovereign : for He cannot rule where his will neither binds nor influences. Whatever is not subject to his will, cannot be under his.governmem. If but a single atom, or volition, or any mode, quality, or circumstance of either, be supposed to be without the control, rule and guid ance of the divine will, so far we suppose God to fall short of absolute sovereignty. And were He to leave anything to act independent of his will, and were it possible for it so to act, his government would be limited, and no longer univer sal: yea, there would be more Gods than one ; for this thing would be independent, and independence is characteristic of Deity only. 4. Therefore we must either allow that God eternally determined all events, or give up his sovereignty, and blas phemously deny Him to be the universal Governor. There INFERENCES. 99 is no alternative ; God is the absolute sovereign, determin ing, ruling, directing and guiding all things, or He can be no God. From the consummate knowledge and unlimited wisdom of the will of the adorable Jehovah, may be assuredly gathered, that the whole scheme of things, the grand plan of creation, providence, and grace, was perfectly contrived, settled, fixed and formed, complete in all its parts, and the execution ab solutely determined before one line was drawn towards the performance thereof. Infinite wisdom could not be surprised by unforeseen events into after contrivances ; for time, with all its circumstances, was open to his capacious and un- bounding view. One eternal thought comprehends the vast concrete of finite things. One eternal volition fixed, and gave being to all : and his all-pervading wisdom and will bound and limit the number, weight, and measure of the whole. So that the times, places, modes, effects, use and end of every atom in the universe, from the beginning to the consummation of all things; and also every idea, thought, and purpose, that takes place in rational spirits throughout their existence, were all fixed in his eternal plan. Nor could the least idea, more or less, ever be admitted into, or omitted from, the grand scheme of things, but that which was worthy the highest wisdom to fix, ordain and determine. For, He being wise in heart, and therefore his purposes in finitely best; and being most excellent in loorking, and therefore at no loss how to execute them, it is impossible but He must do his pleasure in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth. It is true there may be, and are, many devices in the hearts of the children of men ; yet, nevertheless, the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand. For though a man's heart deviseth his ways, yet the Lord di- recteth his steps: and by his infinitely wise and holy will 100 INFERENCES. guides the whole to their appointed ends. Heaven and earth shall pass away, before one jot or one tittle of his pur poses or decrees shall fail of accomplishment : for as He hath purposed, so shall it stand ; as He has thought, so shall it come to pass. To suppose the contrary, would be to suppose Him not wise or not powerful enough to do all his pleasure. But this would at once undeify Him, and therefore is im possible. The ubiquity of the divine will proves to demonstration, that as nothing could ever be but as most intimately present to Him ; and as nothing could be present but what his will made so, all things, without exception, must be according to his eternal will. If the least thing or circumstance of a thing could arise in the universal sysern of affairs which He had not from eternity absolutely determined, so far would it be from being intimately present, that it could not be known at all. For if the divine will is not the foundation of his prescience, nothing can be. And if we suppose any one thing about which his will has no concern, that thing must have been unknown, and, (as before observed,) eter nally secluded from his sight. For had He seen it, and it had been contrary to his will, He must, as wise and omnipo tent, have prevented its existence ; and then He must have known from his will that it could not exist. But if on the view thereof, He determined not to prevent it, its existence then must be the effect of his will, and a part of his all- wise plan. Therefore if anything exists any otherwise than as the effect of his all-comprehending will, it could not be known ; it could not be present; and then his prescience, omnipotence, and in short, every other essential perfection of Deity, must be given up, and the consequence would be, that the fool's thoughts are agreeable to truth, who says in his heart, ' There is no God.' INFERENCES. 101 5. I would further add, lastly, that as all moral perfec tions are also predicates of the divine will, it follows, that God cannot do, or suffer to be ,done, anything that shall in the least degree, depreciate, or terminate in the dishonor of those perfections. And therefore as He could have no cer tainty but such things would arise, did not He superintend and guide the whole ; it cannot in the nature of things be supposed, but that He appointed, fixed and determined the whole. God, in all these work?, proposes as the chief and ultimate end, the manifestation of his own most glorious attributes: for He made all things for Himself, and created them for his glory, nor will He give it to another. But how could He be sure of this end, if the means in all respects were not absolutely fixed ? For, first, He could not display his glo ries without beings to display them to. In vain had nature, in all her extensive and superlative beauties, shown the amazing wisdom and power of Jehovah, had there been no beholder, no one to view the wonders thereof! therefore the existence of rational creatures, must in order of nature, be first in his de crees, as means to the grand end. And, secondly, the things by which, and the manner how, this should be made known, must have been determined, as next in order in the grand scheme of things. Creation, providence, and grace, are the means by which his matchless perfections shine, and are manifested to angels and men. By these, his power, wis dom, goodness, holiness, justice, love, grace, mercy, faithful ness and truth, are displayed in their full extent of glory. And there is not, or ever will be, a single event of any kind, but shall terminate in the manifestation and glory of some or other of the divine excellencies : or, but what was design ed, fixed, and decreed in the eternal council of the Sacred Three, for that end. Even sin, that grand and irreconcila- *9 102 INFERENCES. ble enemy to God and men, and every act thereof shall so terminate. The glory of divine holiness and vindictive jus tice, will be conspicuously seen in the punishment thereof: and the glory of his love, grace, mercy, holiness, and justice will be displayed in the pardon thereof. Sin did not slip in unperceived among created beings; no! He whose single thought comprehends eternity's unbounded round, ordained its being, and fixed its limits, with the utmost precision ; nor shall a single thought, more or less than is fixed in his all-wise plan, be ever found among rational beings. Moral Evil, that seemed to threaten with destruction the whole empire of God, is made by infinite wisdom, subservient to the manifesting and glorifying of all his moral excel lencies, and must have been ordained, determined, and per mitted for that very end, as evidently appears from the everlasting covenant of Grace, in which such rich and am ple provision is made, to deliver the guilty subjects from the dire effects thereof. Christ could not have been set up from everlasting, and appointed to appear in the fullness of time, to purge away sin by the sacrifice of himself, had not the being of it then been fixed and determined. His engage ment with the divine Father in eternity, is a full and clear demonstration that sin, or moral evil, is no accidental thing, but a wise and holy ordination* of God, for the manifesta tion of his own glory, in the person of his dear Son, the adorable Redeemer from it. Indeed I humbly apprehend that Christ is the beginning and end of all God's ways; and that the manifestation of his glories, as shining forth in his perfections and work, is the grand ultimatum and final result * Let none start at this; for though it is a certain and indubitable tuuth, yet God's ordination of it is in such a way as shall be for the glory of his wisdom and holiness, while the blame alone falls on the creature, as I humbly hope to prove before I finish the subject INFERENCES. 103 of all God's works. But not to-treat of this here, and to be as brief as possible, it is evident that moral evil has the greatest share in the events of our globe : it prevails in and over the whole human race ! its baleful influence intermixes with all the affairs of men ! kingdoms and their inhabitants meet their ruin here ! and destruction marks its footsteps through out this nether world ! And can it be supposed that a thing so extensive in its operation, and of such vast concern in the system of events, could exist so many ages without the di vine determination ? His simple word or will, could in a moment stop its progress, and blot it forever out of exist ence. And can it be imagined that He would suffer its being when in its own nature, it tended so much to his dis honor, had not his wisdom ordained it as a mean for the manifestation of his glory ? Sure, reason must blush at the contrary supposition ! And if moral evil exist in conse quence of the divine will, what in the whole system of things can be supposed that does not ? especially when we consider that there is not an event among men, but by some way or other stands connected with it. In a word, the moral excellencies of the divine will, stand as an impregnable argument for extending the divine decrees to all things without exception, as I might here abundantly prove. But having already exceeded bounds, I rest, Yours. LETTER XVI. How God executes his purposes, 1. By the positive and effectual ener gy of his power, without the aid of any second cause, mean or instru ment; and, 2. By making use of second causes, or the instrumental ity of his creatures. — How far and in what respect God's will is concerned in those things that appear contrary to his word, and are forbidden in his law. My Dear Friend, From what has been advanced in my last and former let ters, I would observe here, that the many distinctions formed by School Divines, respecting the divine will, have no foun dation in truth. God's will is his will, and but one immu table act, having neither before nor after, priority or subor- dinancy. If application of those distinctions be made with any propriety at all, they can only respect the manner of God's executing his purposes, and not the purpose or will itself. God, in the accomplishment of his decrees, works various ways ; the which will admit of distinction, as will appear if we consider what was proposed further, namely, II. How, and in what manner, God executes his pur poses. In general God executes his purposes in two ways: 1. By the positive and effectual energy of his will and power, without the aid or influence of any second cause, mean, or instrument : and, 2. By making use of second causes, or the instrumentality of his creatures. HOW GOD EXECUTES HIS PURPOSES.. 105 1. God accomplishes his designs by the positive and ef fectual energy of his will and power. Thus were all thing3 at first formed. The sovereign fiat, will, or word, or the simple volition, ' Let it be,' produced the whole universe. By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them. He spake, and it was done ; He command ed, and it stood fast. Also, all those after events, which we call miraculous, took place in consequence of the all-powerful exertion of the divine will; as the confusion of tongues at Babel; turning Lot's wife into a pillar of salt; dividing the Red Sea; bringing water out of the rock; drying up Jordan; the falling of the walls of Jericho; the sun standing still; raising the dead. It .is true, there was something like means used in some instances, but they were no way natu rally adequate to the effects. What real fitness or tendency had the lifting up of the rod by Moses, to divide the sea — His striking the rock, to bring forth water — The-Priests' feet, to dry up Jordan — or the. sound of rarns' horns, to throw down the walls of Jericho? These means (if 'they may be so called) were no way answerable or suitable to these grand events: and consequently the events must have been effected by the immediate energy of the divine will and power. 2. The other way of God's executing his purposes is, by the instrumentality of his creatures This takes in nature universally, no creature or thing excepted ' All (in heaven and earth) are his servants,' and, some way or other, work, as instruments in his hand, to bring forth the end He designs. Nature's grand and stupendous machine, effects nothing but the will of its divine former : and He works by the whole his sovereign pleasure. No created arm has the least influence in its operations. It is He that gave the sun 106 HOW GOD EXECUTES HIS PURPOSES. for a light by day, and the ordinance of the moon and stars for a light by night. He walks on the wings of the wind ; holds it in his fist, and stays it at his pleasure. He covereth the earth with clouds, and prepareth the rain in its season : watering the mountains and valleys therewith ; causing the grass to grow for the cattle, and herbs for the service of man ; giving food to all flesh, and thereby satis fying the desires of every living thing. In a word, as there is nothing "in nature but is formed by Him, so all operate through his agency, and fulfill his pleasure. But what I have chiefly in view here is, the intelligent and rational part of the creation; all of which, angels, men and devils, join as instruments, and are made subser vient to fulfill the divine purposes. Angels that excel in strength and do his commandment, are made ministering spirits, and constantly obey and effect the will of their adorable Creator. Man also, though lord of this lower cre ation, is under the control and direction of Him who is Lord of all ; and is made instrumental of fulfilling his infinitely wise designs. All his mazy ways and multifarious schemes centre here : for whatever devices may be in the hearts of the children of men, yet the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand. And those evil spirits that left their first estate, and forsook their own habitations, and who are now reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, to the judgment of the great day; they, notwithstanding their cursed malevolence and daring opposition to the divine will, are continually effecting it. Their inveterate rancor, envy, and malice against the divine throne and government, are limited and -bounded by the sovereign will ; and all their effects (though secret to them) are made by infinite wisdom subservient to the accomplishment of his own purposes. In short,- all rational beings in a peculiar manner are instrumental in HOW GOD EXECUTES HIS PURPOSES. 10 7 fulfilling the good pleasure of God : for ' He doth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabi tants of the earth.' And this He does, in a twofold way. By positive and effectual energy ; and by withdrawment of influence. From the former' proceeds whatever is holy, just and good, amiable, or lovely, in any of his creatures ; and from the latter arises whatever is evil : So that I hum bly apprehend the fall of angels and men took place in consequence of a suspension of divine communication ; a withholding that to which they had no right, and leaving them to the exercise of their mere natural powers. God as much fulfills hjs will this way as He does by any positive influence. And if I might be permitted to give my thoughts on a subject so deep, I would with an eye to the divine. glo ry, humbly offer a few things to the sober consideration of my friend, and those who are puzzled about the origin of evil ; and who through the subtlety of Satan, are sometimes tempted to charge God foolishly. But here I would pre mise two self-evident propositions. 1. That God is infinitely holy, just, and good, and eternally separate from the least possible taint of sin, or moral impurity. Iniquity cannot dwell nigh Him; nor can He behold it but wittr-infinite abhorrence : Consequently, He cannot possibly be the blameable author, worker, or abettor of it. This, his perfections, word, and works of providence, and redemption, demonstrate beyond all possible contradic tion. But nevertheless, 2. Sin could not have existence without, or contrary to, the divine will : its being must be a consequent of the sov ereign purpose. This appears demonstrable, from the infi nite wisdom and unlimited power of God, by which He might, with the most perfect ease, have prevented its being ; from its increase, and the extensive spread of its dire effects, 108 HOW GOD EXECUTES HIS PURPOSES. when God could have stopped its progress in a moment, at any period of time, had it been his pleasure ; and also from the glorious provision and remedy prepared for its subduc- tion, and the delivery of millions of its guilty subjects from its baleful and ruinous effects. These things, among others, indubitably prove, that the being of moral evil was a cer tain consequent of the divine purpose. From these propositions arises this grand paradox, that, ' An infinitely holy, just, and good God, did eternally will the existence of moral evil.' And the truth of this must be evident to every one who has any just ideas of the divine perfections; but how it is, cannot be so easily investigated. To suppose that God could not, consistent with the glory of his attributes, so order things, that sin should have being in the way and manner it has, and the subjects only bear the blame ; is limiting the Holy One of Israel in his wis dom. And to suppose it crept into being without the knowledge and concurrence of the divine will, would be limiting his knowledge and power ; and supposing sin to be his superior. But here is wisdom ! This is power! To ordain this evil, and make it -subservient to the display of every moral perfection; to which it is in its own nature so" opposite and contrary ! — If we may be allowed to give a reason for the divine procedure; I humbly apprehend the ordination of moral evil was for this end ; namely, to mani fest the divine holiness, righteousness, truth, faithfulness, grace, mercy, justice, and wrath ; as also to exalt the divine person of the eternal Son; in whose stupendous work, the work of redemption, all these perfections shine with un rivaled glory. Indeed, it seems impossible to conceive, how these perfections could be fully displayed, or their glory shine with such infinite lustre, if sin had not had existence. It undoubtedly is a mean of bringing more glory to the HOW GOD EXECUTES HIS PURPOSES. 109 adorable Father, Son, and Spirit, than all the unsinnin-o' creatures in the universe could bring to eternity ; and this it does, not from its own nature, for its tendency is directly the reverse ; but from the consummate wisdom and power of Jehovah; whose omnipotent arm operates through all, . and brings the whole subservient to that grand end. That this end is attained, there can be no doubt; and he can have no just conception of divine excellence, who imagines this not to be the end designed : for to suppose God to pro duce an end without design, is an absurditj- beneath a rational being. It is certain, then, that the existence of sin was the or dination of the divine will, or it could not have been made so eminently subservient to the harmonious display of the divine glories ; and it is alike certain, that God could not be the author, worker, or abettor* of it; as that would be to the dishonor, instead of the glory of his attributes. But how God could thus ordain it, and so become the first and * Some, perhaps, may object here, that if sin be the effect of the sovereign will, lie must be the author of it : If He works all things after the counsel of his own will, He must be the worker of it ; and if He could prevent 'it, and would not, he must be the abettor of it. I will not dispute about words; for if to determine the existence of sin, and so to be the remote cause of it, is to be the author; if to order things so as it should infallibly have being, is to be the worker; and if suffering, permitting, and leaving his creatures, to the commission of it, when it was in-Ais power to prevent it, is to be the abettor of it, let it be so. Go