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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

ILargCf^^apcr Coition

AMERICAN STATESMEN

EDITED BY

JOHN T. MORSE, JR.
IN THIETT-TWO VOLUMES
VOL. XIX.

DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE TARIFF
AND SLAVERY
HENRY CLAY

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HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN a. CO.

American ^tatwmen

HENRY CLAY

CARL SCHURZ
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. L

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BOSTON AJSD NEW YOEK
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY
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MDCCOXCIX

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COPYRIGHT, 1887 AND 1899, BY CARL SCUUKZ
COPYRIGHT, 1889, BY HOUGHTON, MDTLIN ft CO.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

EDITOR'S PREFACE
A WORD should be said in explanation of the
fact that this life of Clay fills two volumes, be
cause, if unexplained, this might seem to imply an
e:!^ggerated opinion of the importance of Clay in
comparison with those other statesmen to each of
whom only one volume is allotted. It was not by
original intention that this distinction was made ;
on the contrary, it was permitted with some reluc
tance and under peculiar pressure ; nor would it
even thus have seemed permissible had there not
been a fundamental reason for it. Clay's career
in public life was not only very long, but the
historian finds it singular in one respect. Other
statesmen are allied with parties and represent
policies in such a manner that a certain unity
runs through their actions : in such cases the,
writer fulfills his duty by telling what were their
political beliefs, what measures they promoted, and
what obstruction they encountered in forwarding
these beliefs ; he gives their philosophy, and seeks
to show wherein and why it sometimes achieved
successes and sometimes met with failures. But
Clay's life cannot be thus written; for he man-

vi EDITOR'S PREFACE
aged to get upon both sides of pretty much every
great question which arose in his day, and it
would be difficult to say that he had any other or
more profound philosophy in statesmanship than
temporarily to heal dissensions. Thus it is in a
way inevitable that it should require almost twice
the usual space in order to narrate a story which
requires that the policies, politics, and views of
two parties should be presented instead of the poli
cies, politics, and views of only one party. So,
when this life of Clay was offered for editorial
consideration, if appeared, perhaps by a certain
inherent necessity rather than by design, to have
taken the shape almost of a history of the United
States during that middle term of years which
intervened between the downfall of Federalism
and the exclusive predominance of the slavery
question. Yet this seemed such a very useful
element in the series that the book was accepted
in spite of its trait of disproportion.
Clay's character and reputation present an inter
esting study. From the beginning nothing seems
to occur as, by logic, it ought to occur. A man of
fiery, impetuous, emotional temperament would be
expected to prove a strenuous partisan ; but so far
was Clay from being a partisan that, although he
ranks as a Whig, it is not easy to attribute to him
any clear and stable convictions upon any great

EDITOR'S PREFACE vii
question of political principle. He dashed into
public life with a great whirl when the difficulties
with Great Britain were leading to the war of
1812. Reckless, hot-headed, and at that time
utterly inexperienced and ignorant, he caused as
much mischief as could be caused by the blunders
of so young a politician. Yet the splendid vehe
mence of his patriotism prevented his suffering the
punishment which might have followed him had he
been an older and more trusted leader. It was his
first and last error in the direction of extremism
in politics. At Ghent, in the negotiations for
peace, he proved a poor diplomatist ; yet again
good luck saved his prestige ; for an unexpectedly
good treaty was secured, and the people did not
accurately distribute the respective contributions
of the negotiators.
Having escaped so fortunately the natural re
sults of early mistakes. Clay became for the future
a statesman of moderation. It is a curious spec
tacle that he presents in this character, which, a
priori, would be supposed so anti-pathetic for him.
Concerning the tariff, he was at once everywhere
and nowhere, so to speak ; and concerning slavery
he was much worse. He was intense and extreme
only in one matter, and that was hatred of Andrew
Jackson. In all else his panacea, his watchword,
his purpose, was always Compromise. Yet what

viii EDITOR'S PREFACE
he called compromises were in fact only temporary
makeshifts. He seemed to think that a real end
had been achieved when a congressional majority
had been secured for some biU which most of those
who voted for it disliked and intended to replace
in due time. He seemed to think that protection
ists and free-traders could be brought to perma
nent agreement, and that this agreement could be
produced by or based upon a scheme which each
regarded as bad, or at least as very imperfect.
He seemed to think that pro-slavery men and anti-
slavery men, North and South, could be kept con
tented when each section earnestly believed itself
to be sacrificing its worldly interests and moral
convictions. All this sort of thing is now clearly
seen to be the most shallow and transitory states
manship. Compromises between deep, honest, an
tagonistic faiths are absurdities. Yet the states
man who advocated these tame as well as useless
methods was a man of hot spirit and high ambi
tion and no small intellectual force. He could
advocate a compromise with a fire and brilliancy
of oratory which generally belong only to the
extreme ardor of partisan faith. He presented
the views of few persons ; he asked sacrifices of
opinion and belief, political or moral, from nearly
every thinking man among the people ; one would
not think that this would prove the road to popu-

EDITOR'S PREFACE ix
larity; yet, instead of finding only a limited and
lukewarm following, he was for a long time the
most popular man in public life. His private
morals were notoriously bad, even scandalously
so, yet a nation which plumed itself almost phari
saically on the strictness of its morality forgave
him without a moment's hesitation. Why, then,
did he never succeed in becoming president ? How
he craved that office ! Of all the men who have
fallen victims to the ruinous desire for it, no one
has had that wretched political disease longer or
more severely than did Clay. Proud as he was,
he sometimes truckled for this end ; honest as he
was in a political way, it was with difficulty that
he succeeded — though to his honor it is to be said
that he did succeed — in refraining from sacri
ficing his personal honesty to the temptations of
apparent opportunism. His candidacy was con
stantly recurring, so that he was a sort of perma
nent candidate ; and it must often have been the
case that, if the country had been polled to answer
the simple question, " Who is your personal choice
for the presidency ? " the replies would have shown
an ample majority for Clay. It was one of the
many contradictions, in which his story abounds,
that aU this long-enduring popular backing never
produced the result which seemed natural and
logical.

X EDITOR'S PREFACE
It is a very difficult thing to know how to value
Clay as a statesman. Upon the one hand, his
influence during a long series of years was very
great. Yet it was an influence which has failed
to leave any permanent trace ; it was an influence
which did not impel the people in any direction
which was long held, which did not in any appre
ciable degree lead the nation towards the destina
tion which history now shows was before it. Clay
did not train any intellects to believe in slavery
or in anti-slavery ; and though he ranks as a pro
tectionist, yet hardly more did he construct any
fundamental, consistent, and wide-reaching doc
trine of protection. He contented himself always
with steering the ship of state from day to day ;
he undertook to lay out no long voyage, no definite
course in any direction ; he was satisfied to glide
around perils, to weather storms, as those came;
achievements most necessary, without doubt, yet
hardly rounding out the full duty of such a states
man as Clay aspired to be. These volumes show,
in my opinion, a man whose motives one often
approves ; whose conscientiousness one often re
spects; whose brilliance one nearly always ad
mires ; whose patriotism, gallantry, sincerity, one
praises; and yet one fails to discern the picture
of a man who had a guiding faith in any definite
principle, or who cherished any distinct ideal in

EDITOR'S PREFACE xi
the moralities, or even in the business of the na
tional statesmanship. None the less, he has left
behind him a name and reputation which stand
high among the best in our country.
JOHN T. MORSE, JR.
September, 1898.

CONTENTS

CHIP.

PAGE

I.

TOTTTH 

1

n.

The Kentucky Lawver ....

13

in.

Beginnings en Politics

. . 27

IV.

Beginnings in Legislation

38

V.

The War op 1812 . . . .

. . 67

VI.

Ghent and London 

102

VII.

In the House op Representatives .

. 126

vni.

The Missouri Compromise

172

IX.

Candidate fob the Presidency

. . 203

X.

Peesident-Makeb 

. 236

XI.

Secretary op State ....

. 258

xn.

The Party Chiefs 

312

xm.

The Campaign of 1832 ....

. 351

ILLUSTRATIONS
Henry Clay  Frontispiece
From a, daguerreotype in the possession of the Cen
tury Company.
Autograph from a MS. in the archives of the State
Department at Washington.
The vignette of Mr. Clay's birthplace, Hanover County,
Va., is after a cut in "Homes of American Statesmen,"
published by Alfred W. Putnam, New York, N. Y. Page
Francis P. Blaib  facing 236
From a photograph by Brady in the Library of the
State Department at Washington.
Autograph from a MS. in the archives of the State
Department.
Richard Rush  facing 258
After an engraving by John Sartain.
Autograph from the Chamberlain collection, Boston
Public Library.
John M. Clayton  facing 378
From a painting by Garrett in the Clayton House,
Wilmington, Del.
Autograph from Comegys' " Life of John M. Clayton."

HENRY CLAY

CHAPTER I
YOUTH
Few public characters in American history have
been the subjects of more heated controversy than
Henry Clay. There was no measure of detraction
and obloquy to which, during his lifetime, his
opponents would not resort, and there seemed to
be no limit to the admiration and attachment of
his friends. While his enemies denounced him as
a pretender and selfish intriguer in politics and an
abandoned profligate in private life, his supporters
unhesitatingly placed him first among the sages of
the period, and, by way of defense, sometimes
even among its saints. The animosities against
him have, naturally, long ago disappeared; but
even now, more than thirty years after his death,
we may hear old men, who knew him in the days
of his strength, speak of him with an enthusiasm
and affection so warm and fresh as to convince us
that the recollection of having followed his leader
ship is among the dearest treasures of their mem-

2 HENRY CLAY
ory. The remarkable fascination he exercised
seems to have reached even beyond his living exist
ence. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that
his biographers, most of whom were his personal
friends, should have given us an abundance of
rhapsodic eulogy, instead of a clear account of
what their hero thought on matters of public in
terest, of what he did and advised others to do, of
his successes and his failures, and of the influence
he exercised in shaping the development of this
republic. This, indeed, is not an easy task, for
Henry Clay had, during the long period of his
public life, covering nearly half a century, a larger
share in national legislation than any other con
temporary statesman, — not, indeed, as an origi
nator of ideas and systems, but as an arranger of
measures, and as a leader of political forces. His
public life may therefore be said to be an impor
tant part of the national history.
Efforts have been made by enthusiastic admirers
to find for him a noble ancestry in England, but
with questionable success. We may content our
selves with saying that the greatness of his name
rests entirely upon his own merit. The family
from which he sprang emigrated from England
not long after the establishment of the colony of
Virginia, and settled on the southern side of the
James River. His biographers, some of whom
wrote under his own supervision, agree in the
statement that Henry Clay was born on April 12,
1777, in Hanover County, Virginia, in a neigh-

YOUTH 3
borhood called the "Slashes." His father, John
Clay, was a Baptist clergyman, of sterling charac
ter, of great dignity of deportment, much esteemed
by all who knew him, and "remarkable for his
fine voice and delivery." The pastor's flock con
sisted of poor people. A rock in South Anna
River has long been pointed out as a spot "from
which he used at times to address his congrega
tion." Henry Clay's mother was a daughter of
George Hudson of Hanover County. She is said
to have been a woman of exemplary qualities as a
wife and a mother, and of much patriotic spirit.
The Reverend John Clay died in 1781, when
Henry was only four years old, and there is a
tradition in the family that, while the dead body
was still lying in the house. Colonel Tarleton,
commanding a cavalry force under Lord Cornwal-
lis, passed through Hanover County on a raid,
and left a handful of gold and silver on Mrs.
Clay's table as a compensation for some property
taken or destroyed by his soldiers; but that the
spirited woman, as soon as Tarleton was gone,
swept the money into her apron and threw it into
the fireplace. It would have been in no sense
improper, and more prudent, had she kept it,
notwithstanding her patriotic indignation; for she
was left a widow with seven children, and there
was only a very small estate to support the family.
Under such circumstances Henry, the fifth of
the seven children of the widow, received no better
schooling than other poor boys of the neighbor-

4 HENRY CLAY
hood. The schoolhouse of the "Slashes" was a
small log-cabin with the hard earth for a floor,
and the schoolmaster an Englishman who passed
under the name of Peter Deacon, — a man of an
uncertain past and somewhat given to hard drink
ing, but possessing ability enough to teach the
children confided to him reading, writing, and
elementary arithmetic. When not at school Henry
had to work for the support of the family, and he
was often seen walking barefooted behind the
plough, or riding on a pony to Daricott's mill on
the Pamunkey River, usiag a rope for a bridle
and a bag filled with wheat or com or flour as a
saddle. Thus he earned the nickname of "the
mill-boy of the Slashes," which subsequently, in
his campaigns for the presidency, was thought to
be worth a good many votes.
A few years after her flrst husband's death, the
widow Clay married Captain Henry WatHns, a
resident of Richmond, who seems to have been
a worthy man and a good stepfather to his wife's
children. To start young Henry in life Captain
Watkins placed him as a " boy behind the counter "
in the retail store kept by Richard Denny in the
city of Richmond. Henry, who was then fourteen
years old, devoted himself for about a year with
laudable diligence and fidelity to the duty of draw
ing molasses and measuring tape, giving his lei
sure hours to the reading of such books as hap
pened to fall into his hands. But it occurred to
Captain Watkins that his stepson, the brightness

YOUTH 5
and activity of whose mind were noticed by him
as well as others, might be found fit for a more
promising career. He contrived through the in
fluence of his friend Colonel Tinsley, a member
of the House of Burgesses, to obtain for young
Henry a place in the office of the clerk of the
High Court of Chancery, that clerk being Mr.
Peter Tinsley, the colonel's brother. There was
really no vacancy, but the colonel's patronizing
zeal proved irresistible, and Henry was appointed
as a supernumerary.
To Roland Thomas, the senior clerk of the of
fice, who lived to see and admire Henry Clay in
his greatness, we are indebted for an account of
the impression produced by the lad as he appeared
in his new surroimdings. He was a rawboned,
lank, awkward youth, with a countenance by no
means handsome, yet not unpleasing. His gar
ments, of gray "figinny" cloth, were home-made
and ill-fitting; and his linen, which the good
mother had starched for the occasion to unusual
stiffness, made him look peculiarly strange and
uncomfortable. With great uneasiness of manner
he took his place at the desk where he was to
begin copying papers, while his new companions
could not refrain from tittering at his uncouth
appearance and his blushing confusion. But they
soon learned to respect and also to like him. It
turned out that he could talk uncommonly well
when he ventured to talk freely, and presently he
proved himself the brightest and also the most

6 HENRY CLAY
studious young man among them. He continued
to "read books" when the hours of work were
over, while most of his companions gave themselves
up to the pleasures of the town.
Then the fortunate accident arrived which is
so frequently found in the lives of young men of
uncommon quality and promise. He began to
attract the attention of persons of superior merit.
George Wythe, the chancellor of the High Court
of Chancery, who often had occasion to visit Peter
Tinsley 's office, noticed the new-comer, and se
lected him from among the employees there to act
as an amanuensis in writing out and recording the
decisions of the court. This became young Clay's
principal occupation for four years, during which
his intercourse with the learned and venerable
judge grew constantly more intimate and elevating.
As he had to write much from the chancellor's
dictation, the subject-matter of his writing, which
at first was a profound mystery to him, gradually
became a matter of intelligent interest. The chan
cellor, whose friendly feeling for the bright youth
grew warmer as their relations became more confi
dential, began to direct his reading, at first turn
ing him to grammatical studies, and then gradually
opening to him a wider range of legal and histori
cal literature. But — what was equally if not
more important — in the pauses of their work, and
in hours of leisure, the chancellor conversed with
his young secretary upon grave subjects, and thus
did much to direct his thoughts and to form his
principles.

YOUTH 7
Henry Clay could not have found a wiser and
nobler mentor. George Wythe was one of the
most honorably distinguished men of a period
abounding in great names. Born In 1726, he re
ceived his education at William and Mary Col
lege. At the age of thirty he devoted himself to
the study and practice of the law, and rose quickly
to eminence in the profession. In 1758 he repre
sented the college in the House of Burgesses. In
1764 he drew up a remonstrance against the Stamp
Act, addressed to the British Parliament. As a
member of the Congress of 1776 he was one of the
signers of the Declaration of Independence. For
ten years he taught jurisprudence at William and
Mary. He aided Jefferson in revising the laws of
Virginia. In 1777 he was appointed a judge of
the High Court of Chancery, and in 1786 became
chancellor. He was a member of the convention
which framed the federal Constitution, and one of
its warmest advocates in the Virginia Convention
which ratified it. But he achieved a more pe
culiar distinction by practically demonstrating the
sincerity of his faith in the humane philosophy of
the age. In his lifetime he emancipated aU his
slaves and made a liberal provision for their sub
sistence. There were few men in his day of larger
information and experience, and scarcely any of
higher principle. Nor was Henry Clay the only
one of his pupils who afterward won a great name,
for Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall had been
students of law in George Wythe's office.

8 HENRY CLAY
When young Clay had served four years as the
chancellor's amanuensis, his mind was made up
that he would become a lawyer. He entered the
office of Robert Brooke, the attorney-general of
Virginia, as a regular law student, spent about a
year with him, and then obtained from the judges
of the Court of Appeals a license to practice the
profession. This was quick studying, or the li
cense must have been cheap, unless we assume that
the foundations of his legal knowledge were amply
laid in his intercourse with Chancellor Wythe.
But in the mean time he had also been intro
duced in society. Richmond at that time possessed
less than 5000 inhabitants, but it was the most
important city In the State, — the political capital
as well as the social centre of Virginia. The char
acter of Virginian society had become greatly
changed during the Revolutionary war. The glo
ries of Williamsburg, the colonial capital, with its
"palace," its Raleigh Tavern, its Apollo Hall, its
gay and magnificent gatherings of the planter
magnates, were gone never to return. Many of
the "first families" had become much reduced in
their circumstances. Moreover, the system of
primogeniture and entail had been abolished by
legal enactments moved by Jefferson, and thus the
legal foundation upon which alone a permanent
landed aristocracy can maintain itself had disap
peared. Although much of the old spirit still
remained alive, yet the general current was de
cidedly democratic, and the distance between the

YOUTH 9
blooded gentry and less "well-born" people was
materially lessened. Thus the "mlU-boy of the
Slashes," having become known as a young man
of uncommon intellectual brightness, high spirits,
and good character, and being, besides, well in
troduced through his friendship with Chancellor
Wythe, found It possible to come Into friendly
contact with persons of social pretensions far above
bis own. He succeeded even In organizing a
"rhetorical society," or debating club, among
whose members there were not a few young men
who subsequently became distinguished. It was
on this field that he first achieved something like
leadership, while his quick intelligence and his
sympathetic qualities made him a favorite in a
much larger circle. According to all accounts,
Henry Clay, at that period of his life, was un
touched by vice or bad habit, and could in every
respect be esteemed as an irreproachable and very
promising yoimg man.
But he soon discovered that aU these things
would not give him a paying practice as an attor
ney In Richmond so quickly as he desired; and as
his mother and stepfather had removed to Ken
tucky in 1792, he resolved to follow them to the
Western wilds, and there to "grow up with the
country." He was in his twenty-first year when
he left Richmond, with his license to practice as
an attorney, but with little else, in his pocket.
This was the end of Henry Clay's regular school
ing. Thenceforth he did not again in his life find

10 HENRY CLAY
a period of leisure to be quietly and exclusively
devoted to study. What he had learned was little
enough. In Peter Deacon's schoolhouse he had
received nothing but the first elementary instruc
tion. The year he spent behind the counter of
Denny's store could not have added much to his
stock of knowledge. In Peter Tinsley 's office he
had cultivated a neat and regular handwriting, of
which a folio volume of Chancellor Wythe's deci
sions, once In the possession of Jefferson, now in
the library of the Supreme Court of the United
States, gives ample testimony. Under Chancellor
Wythe's guidance he had read Harris's Homer,
Tooke's Diversions of Purley, Bishop Lowth's
Grammar, Plutarch's Lives, some elementary law
books, and a few works on history. Further, the
chancellor's conversation had undoubtedly been in
a high degree instructive and morally elevating.
But aU these things did not constitute a well-or
dered education. His only more or less systematic
training he received during the short year he spent
as a law student in the office of Attorney-General
Brooke, and that can scarcely have gone far be
yond the elementary principles of law and the or
dinary routine of practice in court. On the whole,
he had depended upon the occasional gathering
of miscellaneous information. He could thus,
at best, have acquired only a slender equipment
for the tasks before him. This, however, would
have been of comparatively slight importance had
he, in learning what little he knew, cultivated

YOUTH H
thorough methods of Inquiry, and the habit of
reasoning out questions, and of not being satisfied
until the subject in hand was well understood in
all its aspects. The habit he really had cultivated
was that of rapidly skimming over the surface of
the subjects of his study, in order to gather what
knowledge was needed for Immediate employment;
and, as his oratorical genius was developed early
and well, he possessed the faculty of turning every
bit of information to such advantage as to produce
upon his hearers the impression that he possessed
rich accumulations behind the actual display.
Sometimes he may have thus satisfied and deceived
even himself. This superficiality remained one of
his weak points through life. No doubt he went
on learning, but he learned rather from experience
than from study ; and though experience is a good
school, yet it is apt to be irregular and fragmen
tary in its teachings.
Some of Henry Clay's biographers have ex
pressed the opinion that the scantiness and irregu
larity of Instruction he received, without the aid
of academy or college, were calculated to quicken
his self-reliance, and thereby to become an element
of strength in his character especially qualifying
him for political leadership. It is quite possible
that, had he In his youth acquired the inclination
and faculty for methodical inquiry and thus the
habit of examining both sides of every question
with equal interest, he would have been less quick
in forming final conclusions from first impressions,

12 HENRY CLAY
less easily persuaded of the absolute correctness of
his own opinions, less positive and commanding in
the promulgation of them, and less successful in
inspiring his followers with a ready belief in his
infallibility. But that he might have avoided
grave errors as a statesman had his early training
been such as to form his mind for more thorough
thinking, and thus to lay a larger basis for his
later development, he himself seemed now and
then to feel. It was with melancholy regret that
he sometimes spoke of his "neglected education,
improved by his own irregular efforts, without the
benefit of systematic instruction."
When he settled down in Kentucky his new
surroundings were by no means such as to remedy
this defect. Active life in a new country stimu'
lates many energies, but it is not favorable to the
development of studious habits. In this respect
Kentucky was far from forming an exception.

CHAPTER n
THE KENTUCKY LAWTEE
At the time when Henry Clay left Richmond to
seek his fortune in Kentucky, the valley of the
Ohio was the "Far West" of the country, attract
ing two distinct classes of adventurous and enter
prising spirits. Only nine years before, in 1788,
the Ohio River had floated down the flatboats
carrying the pioneers who founded the first settle
ments on the northern bank at Marietta and on
the present site of Cincinnati; but forthwith a
steady stream had poured in, which In twelve
years had swelled the population of the territory
destined to become the State of Ohio to 45,000
souls. They came mainly from New England,
New York, and Pennsylvania. Emigrants from
the slave States, too, in considerable number,
sought new homes in the southern portion of the
Northwest Territory, but they formed only a mi
nority. The settlement of Kentucky was of an
older date, and its population of a different char
acter. Daniel Boone entered the "dark and bloody
ground " in 1769, seven years before the colonies
declared themselves independent. Other hardy
and intrepid spirits soon followed him, to dispute

14 HENRY CLAY
the possession of the land with the Indians. They
were himters and pioneer farmers, not intent upon
founding large industrial communities, but fond
of the wild, adventurous, lonesome, unrestrained
life of the frontiersman. Ten years after Daniel
Boone's first settlement, Kentucky was said to
contain less than two hundred white inhabitants.
But then immigration began to flow in rapidly,
so that In 1790, when the first federal census was
taken, Kentucky had a population of 73,600, —
of whom 61,000 were white. About one half of
the whites and three fourths of the slaves had
come from Virginia, the rest mostly from North
Carolina and Maryland, with a sprinkling of
Pennsylvanians. At the period when Henry Clay
arrived in Kentucky, in 1797, the population ex
ceeded 180,000, about one fifth of whom were
slaves, — the later immigrants having come from
the same quarter as the earlier.
The original stock consisted of the hardiest race
of backwoodsmen. The forests of Kentucky were
literally wrested from the Indians by constant
fighting. The question whether the aborigines
had any right to the soil seems to have been ut
terly foreign to the pioneer's mind. He wanted
the land, and to him it was a matter of course that
the Indian must leave it. The first settlements
planted in the virgin forest were fortified with
stockades and blockhouses, which the inmates, not
seldom for months at a time, could not leave with
out danger of falling into an Indian ambush and

THE KENTUCKY LAWYER 15
being scalped. No part of the country has there
fore more stories and traditions of perilous adven
tures, bloody fights, and hairbreadth escapes. For
a generation or more the hunting-shirt, leggings,
and moccasins of deerskin more or less gaudily
ornamented, and the long rifle, powder-horn, and
hunting -knife formed the regular "outfit" of a
very large proportion of the male Kentuckians.
We are told of some of the old pioneers who, many
years after populous towns had grown up on the
sites of the old stockades, still continued the habit
of walking about in their hunter's garb, with rifle
and powder-horn, although the deer had become
scarce and the Indian had long ago disappeared
from the neighborhood. They were loath to make
up their minds to the fact that the old wild life
was over. Thus the reminiscences and the charac
teristic spirit and habits left behind by that wild
life were still fresh among the people of Kentucky
at the period of which we speak. They were an
uncommonly sturdy race of men, most of them
fully as fond of hunting, and perhaps also of fight
ing, as of farming; brave and generous, rough
and reckless, hospitable and much given to bois
terous carousals, full of a fierce love of independ
ence, and of a keen taste for the confused and
turbulent contests of frontier politics. Slavery
exercised its peculiar despotic influence there as
elsewhere, although the number of slaves in Ken
tucky was comparatively small. But among free
men a strongly democratic spirit prevailed. There

16 HENRY CLAY
was as yet little of that relation of superior and
inferior between the large planter and the small
tenant or farmer which had existed, and was still
to some extent existing, in Virginia. As to the
white population, society started on the plane of
practical equality.
Where the city of Lexington now stands, the
first blockhouse was buUt in April, 1775, by Rob
ert Patterson, "an early and meritorious adven
turer, much engaged in the defense of the country."
A settlement soon formed under its protection,
which was called Lexington, in honor of the Revo
lutionary battle then just fought in Massachusetts.
The first settlers had to maintain themselves in
many an Indian fight on that "finest garden spot
in all Kentucky," as the Blue Grass region was
justly called. In an early day it attracted "some
people of culture " from Virginia, North Carolina,
and Pennsylvania. In 1780 the first school was
built in the fort, and the same year the Virginia
legislature — for Kentucky was at that time still
a part of Virginia — chartered the Transylvania
Seminary to be established there. In 1787 Mr.
Isaac Wilson, of the Philadelphia College, opened
the "Lexington Grammar School," for the teach
ing of Latin, Greek, "and the different branches
of science." The same year saw the organization
of a "society for promoting useful knowledge,"
and the establishment of the first newspaper. A
year later. In 1788, the ambition of social refine
ment wanted and got a dancing-school, and also

THE KENTUCKY LAWYER 17
the Transylvania Seminary was fairly ready to
receive students: "Tuition five pounds a year, one
half in cash, the other in property; boarding nine
pounds a year. In property, pork, corn, tobacco,
etc." In ten years more the seminary, having
absorbed the Kentucky Academy established by
the Presbyterians, expanded Into the "Transyl
vania University," with first an academical depart
ment, and the following year adding one of medi
cine and another of law. Thus Lexington, although
still a small town, became what was then called
"the literary and intellectual centre west of the
Alleghanies," and a point of great attraction to
people of means and of social wants and preten
sions. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose
that it was a quiet and sedate college town like
those of New England. Many years later, in
1814, a young Massachusetts Yankee, Amos Ken
dall, who had drifted to Lexington in pursuit of
profitable employment, and was then a private
teacher in Henry Clay's family, wrote In his diary:
"I have, I think, learned the way to be popular
In Kentucky, but do not, as yet, put it In practice.
Drink whiskey and talk loud, with the fullest con
fidence, and you will hardly fail of being called a
clever fellow." This was not the only "way to
be popular," but was certainly one of the ways.
When the Lexington of 1797, the year of Clay's
arrival there, is spoken of as a "literary and intel
lectual centre," the meaning is that it was an out
post of civilization still surrounded, and to a great

18 HENRY CLAY
extent permeated, by the spirit of border life.
The hunter in his fringed buckskin suit, with long
rifle and powder-horn, was still a familiar figure
on the streets of the town. The boisterous hilarity
of the barroom and the excitement of the card
table accorded with the prevailing taste better than
a lecture on ancient history; and a racing horse
was to a large majority of Lexingtonians an object
of far greater interest than a professor of Greek.
But, compared with other Western towns of the
time, Lexington did possess an uncommon propor
tion of educated people; and there were circles
wherein the social life displayed, together with the
freedom of tone characteristic of a new country,
a liberal dash of culture.
This was the place where Henry Clay cast an
chor in 1797. The society he found there was
congenial to him, and he was congenial to it. A
young man of rare brightness of intellect, of fasci
nating address, without effort making the little he
knew pass for much more, of high spirits, warm
sympathies, a cheery nature, and sociable tastes,
he easily became a favorite with the educated as a
person of striking ability, and with the many as
a good companion, who, notwithstanding a certain
distinguished air, enjoyed himself as they did. It
was again as a speaker that he first made his mark.
Shortly after his arrival at Lexington, before he
had begun to practice law, he joined a debating
club, in several meetings of which he participated
only as a silent listener. One evening, when, after

THE KENTUCKY LAWYER 19
a long discussion, the vote upon the question be
fore the society was about to be taken, he whis
pered to a friend, loudly enough to be overheard,
that to him the debate did not seem to have ex
hausted the subject. Somebody remarked that
Mr. Clay desired to speak, and he was called
upon. Finding himself unexpectedly confronting
the audience, he was struck with embarrassment,
and, as he had done frequently in imaginary ap
peals in court, he began: "Gentlemen of the
jury!" A titter running through the audience
increased his confusion, and the awkward words
came out once more. But then he gathered him
self up ; his nerves became steady, and he poured
out a flow of reasoning so lucid, and at the same
time so impassioned, that his hearers were over
come with astonishment. Some of his friends who
had been present said, in later years, that they
had never heard him make a better speech. This
was, no doubt, an exaggeration of the first impres
sion, but at any rate that speech stamped him at
once as a remarkable man in the community, and
laid open before him the road to success.
He had not come to Lexington with extravagant
expectations. As an old man, looking back upon
those days, he said : " I remember how comfortable
I thought I should be if I could make one hundred
pounds a year, Virginia money, and with what
delight I received the first fifteen shiUings fee."
He approached with a certain awe the competition
with what he called " a bar uncommonly distin-

20 HENRY CLAY
guished by eminent members." But he did not
find it difficult to make his way among them. His
practice was, indeed, at first mostly in criminal
cases, and many are the stories told of the marvel
ous effects produced by his eloquence upon the
simple-minded Kentucky jurymen, and of the cul
prits saved by him from a well-merited fate. In
one of those cases, — that of a Mrs. Phelps, a
respectable farmer's wife, who in a fit of angry
passion had killed her sister-in-law with a musket,
— he used "temporary delirium" as a ground of
defense, and thus became, if not the inventor, at
least one of the earliest advocates, of that theory
of emotional insanity which has served so much to
befog people's notions about the responsibility of
criminals. But in the case of Mrs. Phelps the
jury, with characteristic confusion of judgment,
found that the accused was just insane enough not
to be hanged, but not insane enough to be let off
without a term in jail.
There is one very curious exploit on record, ex
hibiting in a strong light Clay's remarkable power,
not only as a speaker, but as an actor. A man
named WUlis was tried for a murder of peculiar
atrocity. In the very teeth of the evidence, which
seemed to be absolutely conclusive. Clay, defend
ing him, succeeded in dividing the jury as to the
nature of the crime committed. The jurors having
been unable to agi'ce, the public prosecutor moved
for a new trial, which motion Clay did not oppose.
But when, at the new trial, his turn came to ad-

THE KENTUCKY LAWYER 21
dress the jury, he argued that, whatever opinion
the jury might form from the testimony as to the
guilt of -the accused, they could not now convict
him, as he had already been once tried, and it was
the law of the land that no man should be put
twice In jeopardy of his life for the same offense.
The court, having, of course, never heard that
doctrine so applied, at once peremptorily forbade
Clay to go on with such a line of argument.
Whereupon the young attorney solemnly arose,
and with an air of Indignant astonishment declared
that, if the court would not permit him to defend,
in such manner as his duty commanded him to
adopt, a man In the awful presence of death, he
found himself forced to abandon the case. Then
he gathered up his papers, bowed grandly, and
stalked out of the room. The bench, whom Clay
had impressed with the belief that he was pro
foundly convinced of being right in the position
he had taken, and upon whom he had in such sol
emn tones thrown the responsibility for denying
his rights to a man on trial for his life, was star
tled and confused. A messenger was dispatched
to invite Clay in the name of the court to return
and continue his argument. Clay graciously came
back, and found It easy work to persuade the jury
that the result of the first trial was equivalent to
an acquittal, and that the prisoner, as under the
law he could not be put in peril of life twice for
the same offense, was clearly entitled to his dis
charge. The jury readily agreed upon a verdict
of "not guilty."

22 HENRY CLAY
It is said that no murderer defended by Henry
Clay ever was sentenced to death ; and very early
in his professional career he acquired the reputa
tion of being able to insure the life of any criminal
intrusted to his care, whatever the degree of guilt.
That his success in saving murderers from the
gallows did not benefit the tone and character of
Kentucky society. Clay himself seemed to feel.
"Ah, Willis, poor fellow," he said once to the
man whose acquittal he had obtained by so auda
cious a dramatic coup, "I fear I have saved too
many like you, who ought to be hanged."
But he was equally successful in the opposite
direction when acting as public prosecutor. He
had frequently been asked to accept the office of
attorney for the commonwealth, but had always
declined. At last he was prevailed upon to take
it temporarily, until he could obtain the appoint
ment of a friend, who, he thought, ought to have
the place. The first criminal case falling into his
hands was one of peculiar interest. A slave, who
was highly valued by his master on account of his
intelligence, industry, and self-respect, was, in
the absence of the owner, treated very unjustly
and harshly by an overseer, a white man. Once
the slave, defending himself against the blows
aimed at him, seized an axe and killed his assail
ant. Clay, as public prosecutor, argued that, had
the deed been done by a free man, considering that
it was done in self-defense, it would have been
justifiable homicide, or, at worst, manslaughter.

THE KENTUCKY LAWYER 23
But having been done by a slave, who was in duty
bound to submit to chastisement, it was murder,
and must be punished as such. It was so pun
ished. The slave was hanged; but his self-con
tained and heroic conduct in the presence of death
extorted admiration from all who witnessed it;
and this occurrence made so deep and painful an
impression upon Clay himself that he resigned his
place as soon as possible, and never failed to ex
press his sorrow at the part he had played in this
case whenever it was mentioned.
It was not long, however, that he remained con
fined to criminal cases. Soon he distinguished
himself by the management of civil suits also, es
pecially suits growing out of the peculiar land laws
of Virginia and Kentucky. In this way he rap
idly acquired a lucrative practice and a prominent
place at the bar of his State. That with all his
brilliant abilities he never worked his way into the
front rank of the great lawyers of the country was
due to his characteristic failing. He studied only
for the occasion, as far as his Immediate need
went. His studies were never wide and profound.
His time was too much occupied by other things,
— not only by his political activity, which grad
ually grew more and more exacting, but also by
pleasure. He was fond of company, and in that
period of his life not always careful in selecting
his comrades ; a passion for cards grew upon him,
so much so. Indeed, that he never completely suc
ceeded in overcoming it; and these tastes robbed

24 HENRY CLAY
him of the hours and of the temper of mind with
out which the cakn gathering of thought required
for the mastery of a science is not possible. More
over, it is not improbable that his remarkable gift
of speaking, which enabled him to make little teU
for much, and to outshine men of vastly greater
learning, deceived him as to the necessity for labo
rious study. The value of this faculty he appre
ciated well. He knew that oratory is an art, and
in this art he trained himself with judgment and
perseverance. For many years, as a young man,
he made it a rule to read, if possible every day,
in some historical or scientific book, and then to
repeat what he had read in free, offhand speech,
"sometimes in a cornfield, at others in the forest,
and not unfrequently in a distant barn with the
horse and ox for auditors." Thus he cultivated
that facility and affluence of phrase, that resonance
of language, as weU as that freedom of gesture,
which, aided by a voice of rare power and musical
beauty, gave his oratory, even to the days of de
clining old age, so peculiar a charm.
Only a year and a half after his arrival at Lex
ington, in April, 1799, he had achieved a position
sufficiently respected and secure to ask for and to
obtain the hand of Lucretia Hart, the daughter of
a man of high character and prominent standing
in the State. She was not a brilliant but a very
estimable woman, and a most devoted wife to him.
She became the mother of eleven children. His
prosperity increased rapidly ; so that soon he was

THE KENTUCKY LAWYER 25
able to purchase Ashland, an estate of some six
hundred acres, near Lexington, which afterward
became famous as Henry Clay's home.
Together with the accumulation of worldly goods
he laid up a valuable stock of popularity. Indeed,
few men ever possessed in greater abundance and
completeness those qualities which attract popular
regard and affection. A tall stature ; not a hand
some face, but a pleasing, winning expression; a
voice of which some of his contemporaries say that
it was the finest musical instrument they ever
heard; an eloquence always melodious and in turn
majestic, fierce, playful, insinuating, irresistibly
appealing to aU the feelings of human nature,
aided by a gesticulation at the same time natural,
vivid, large, and powerful; a certain magnificent
grandeur of bearing in public action, and an easy
familiarity, a never-failing natural courtesy in
private, which, even in his intercourse with the
lowliest, had nothing of haughty condescension in
it; a noble generous heart making him always
ready to volunteer his professional services to poor
widows and orphans who needed aid, to slaves
whom he thought entitled to their freedom, to free
negroes who were in danger of being illegally re
turned to bondage, and to persons who were per
secuted by the powerful and lawless, in serving
whom he sometimes endangered his own safety; a
cheery sympathetic nature, withal, of exuberant
vitality, gay, spirited, always ready to enjoy, and
always glad to see others enjoy themselves, — his

26 HENRY CLAY
very faults being those of what was considered
good fellowship in his Kentuckian surroundings;
a superior person, appearing, indeed, immensely
superior at times, but making his neighbors feel
that he was one of them, — such a man was born
to be popular. It has frequently been said that
later in life he cultivated his popularity by clever
acting, and that his universal courtesy became
somewhat artificial. If so, then he acted his own
character as it originally was. It is an important
fact that his popularity at home, among his neigh
bors, indeed in the whole State, constantly grew
stronger as he grew older, and that the people of
Kentucky clung to him with unbounded affection.

CHAPTER III
BEGINNINGS IN POLITICS
Henbt Clay's first participation in politics was
highly honorable to him. The people of Kentucky
were dissatisfied with those clauses in their Con
stitution which provided for the election of the
governor and of the state senators through the me
dium of electors. They voted that a convention
be called to revise the fundamental law. This con
vention was to meet in 1799. Some public-spirited
men thought this a favorable opportunity for an
attempt to rid the State of slavery. An amend
ment to the Constitution was prepared providing
for general emancipation, and among its advocates,
in the popular discussions which preceded the
meeting of the convention. Clay was one of the
most ardent. It was to this cause that he devoted
his first essays as a writer for the press, and his
first political speeches in popular assemblies. But
the support which that cause found among the
farmers and traders of Kentucky was discourag-
ingly slender.
The philosophical anti-slavery movement which
accompanied the American Revolution had by this
time very nearly spent its force. In fact, its prac-

28 HENRY CLAY
tical effects had been mainly confined to the North,
where slavery was of little economic consequence,
and where, moreover, the masses of the population
were more accessible to the currents of opinion and
sentiment prevailing among men of thought and
culture. There slavery was abolished. Further,
by the Ordinance of 1787, slavery was excluded
from the territory northwest of the Ohio. But
nothing was accomplished in the South except the
passage of a law by the Virginia legislature, in
1778, prohibiting the further introduction of slaves
from abroad, and the repeal, in 1782, of the old
colonial statute which forbade the emancipation
of slaves except for meritorious services. Mary
land followed the example of Virginia, but then
Virginia, ten years after the repeal, put a stop to
individual emancipation by reenacting the old co
lonial statute. The convention framing the Con
stitution of the United States did nothing but open
the way for the abolition of the slave trade at
some future time. On the whole, as soon as the
philosophical anti-slavery movement threatened to
become practical in the South, it stirred up a very
determined opposition, and the reaction began.
Indeed, the hostility to slavery on the part of some
of the Southern Revolutionary leaders was never
of a very practical kind. Very characteristic in
this respect was a confession Patrick Henry made
concerning the state of his own mind as early as
1773, in a letter to a Quaker : —

BEGINNINGS IN POLITICS 29
" Is it not amazing that, at a time when the rights of
humanity are defined and understood with precision, in
a country above all others fond of liberty, in such an
age, we find men professing a reUgion the most humane,
mild, meek, gentle, and generous, adopting a principle
as repugnant to humanity as it is inconsistent with the
Bible, and destructive of liberty ? Every thinking, hon
est man rejects it in speculation, but how few in prac
tice, from conscientious motives ! Would any one befieve
that I am a master of slaves of my own purchase? I
am drawn along by the general inconvenience of living
without them. I will not, I cannot justify it ; however
culpable my conduct, I will so far pay my devoir to vir
tue as to own the excellence and rectitude of her pre
cepts, and lament my want of conformity to them."
This merely theoretical kind of anti-slavery spirit
lost all aggressive force, as those whose pecuniary
interests and domestic habits were identified with
slavery grew more defiant and exacting. In 1785
Washington complained in a letter to Lafayette
that "petitions for the abolition of slavery, pre
sented to the Virginia legislature, could scarcely
obtain a hearing." While the prohibition of sla
very northwest of the Ohio by the Ordinance of
1787 proceeded from Southern statesmen, the
slaveholding interest kept all the land south of
the Ohio fiimly in its grasp.
At the period of the elections for the convention
called to revise the Constitution of Kentucky, the
philosophical anti-slavery spirit of the Revolution
survived in that State only in a comparatively

30 HENRY CLAY
feeble flicker among the educated men who had
come there from Virginia and Pennsylvania. It
had never touched the rough pioneers of Kentucky
with any force. The number of slaves held in the
State was, indeed, small enough to render easy
the gradual abolition of the system. But the Ken
tucky farmer could not understand why, if he had
money to buy negroes, he should not have them
to work for him in raising his crops of corn, and
hemp, and tobacco, and in watching his cattle and
swine In the forest. His opposition to emancipa
tion in any form was, therefore, vehement and
overwhelming. The cause so fervently advocated
by Clay, following his own generous impulses, as
well as the teachings of his noble mentor, Chan
cellor Wythe, and by a small band of men of the
same way of thinking, was, therefore, desperate
from the beginning. But they deserve the more
credit for their courageous fidelity to their convic
tions. Clay was then a promising young man just
attracting public attention. At the very start he
boldly took the unpopular side, thus exposing him
self to the displeasure of a power which, in the
South, was then already very strong, and threat
ened to become unforgiving and merciless. Nor
did he ever express regret at this first venture in
his public career. On the contrary, aU his life he
continued to look back upon it with pride. In a
speech he delivered at Frankfort, the political
capital of Kentucky, ia 1829, he said: —

BEGINNINGS IN POLITICS 31
" More than thirty years ago, an attempt was made,
in this commonwealth, to adopt a system of gradual
emancipation, similar to that which the illustrious Frank
lin had mainly contributed to introduce in 1780, in the
State founded by the benevolent Penn. And among the
acts of my life which I look back to with most satisfac
tion is that of my having cooperated, with other zealous
and intelligent friends, to procure the establishment of
that system in this State. We were overpowered by
numbers, but submitted to the decision of the majority
with that grace which the minority in a republic should
ever yield to that decision. I have, nevertheless, never
ceased, and shall never cease, to regret a decision, the
effects of which have been to place us in the rear of our
neighbors, who are exempt from slavery, in the state of
agriculture, the progress of manufactures, the advance
of improvements, and the general progress of society."
His early advocacy of that cause no doubt dis
pleased the people of Kentucky ; but what helped
him promptly to overcome that displeasure was the
excitement caused by another topic of great public
interest, on which he was in thorough accord with
them, — the Alien and Sedition laws, that tremen
dous blunder of the Federalists in the last days of
their power. The conduct of the French govern
ment toward the United States, and especially the
corrupt attempts of Its agents, revealed by the
famous X Y Z correspondence, had greatly weak
ened that sympathy with the French Revolution
which was one of the most efficacious means of
agitation in the hands of the American Democrats.

32 HENRY CLAY
The tide of popular sentiment turned so strongly
in favor of the Federalists that they might easily,
by prudent conduct, have attracted to themselves a
large portion of the Republican rank and file, thus
severely crippling the opposition to the adminis
tration of John Adams. But to push an advan
tage too far is one of the most dangerous errors
a political party can commit ; and this is what the
Federalists did in giving themselves the appear
ance of trying to silence their opponents by the
force of law. Nothing could have been better
calculated not only to alarm the masses, but also
to repel thinking men not blinded by party spirit,
than an attempt upon the freedom of speech and
of the press, whoUy unwarranted by any urgency
of public danger. The result was as might have
been foreseen. The leaders of the opposition, with
Jefferson at their head, were not slow In taking
advantage of this stupendous folly. Their appeals
to the democratic instincts of the people, who felt
themselves threatened in their dearest rights, could
not fail to meet with an overwhelming response.
That response was especially strong west of the
Alleghanies, where Federalism had never grown
as an indigenous plant, but existed only as an
exotic. In the young communities of Kentucky
the excitement was intense, and Clay, fresh from
the Virginia school of democracy, threw himself
into the current with aU the fiery spirit of youth.
Of the speeches he then delivered in popular gath
erings, none are preserved even In outline. But

BEGINNINGS IN POLITICS 33
it is known that his resonant declamation produced
a prodigious impression upon his hearers, and that
after one of the large field meetings held in the
neighborhood of Lexington, where he had spoken
after George Nicholas, a man noted for his elo
quence, he and Nicholas were put in a carriage
and drawn by the people through the streets of
the town amid great shouting and huzzaing.
It was not, however, until four years afterward,
in 1803, that he was elected to a seat in the legis
lature of the State, having been brought forward
as a candidate without his own solicitation. The
sessions in which he participated were not marked
by any discussions or enactments of great Impor
tance; but Clay, who had so far been only the
remarkable man of Lexington and vicinity, soon
was recognized as the remarkable man of the
State. In such debates as occurred, he measured
swords with the "big men " of the legislature who
thus far had been considered unsurpassed; and
the attention attracted by his eloquence was such
that the benches of the Senate became empty when
he spoke in the House.
At this time, too, he paid his first tribute to
what is euphoniously called the spirit of chivalry,
A Mr. Bush, a tavern-keeper at Frankfort, was
assaulted by one of the magnates of Kentucky,
Colonel Joseph Hamilton Daviess, then district
attorney of the United States. The colonel's in
fluence was so powerful that no attorney at Frank
fort would institute an action against him for Mr.

34 HENRY CLAY
Bush. Clay, seeing a man in need of help, volun
teered. In the argument on the preliminary ques
tion he expressed his opinion of Daviess's conduct
with some freedom, whereupon the redoubtable
colonel sent him a note informing him that he was
not in the habit of permitting himself to be spoken
of in that way and warning him to desist. Clay
promptly replied that he, on his part, permitted
nobody to dictate to him as to the performance of
his duty, and that he "held himself responsible,"
etc. The colonel sent him a challenge, which
Clay without delay accepted. The hostile parties
had already arrived at the place agreed upon, when
common friends Interposed and brought about an
accommodation .
He soon met Colonel Daviess again in connec
tion with an affair of greater importance. In the
latter part of 1806, Aaron Burr passed through
Kentucky on his journey to the Southwest, enlist
ing recruits and making other preparations for his
mysterious expedition, the object of which was
either to take possession of Mexico and to unite
with it the Western States of the Union, the whole
to be governed by him, or, according to other
reports, to form a large settlement on the Washita
River. A newspaper published at Frankfort, the
"Western World," denounced the scheme as a
treasonable one, and on November 3 Colonel Da
viess, as district attorney of the United States,
moved in court that Aaron Burr be compelled
to attend, in order to answer a charge of being

BEGINNINGS IN POLITICS 35
engaged in an unlawful enterprise designed to in
jure a power with which the United States were
at peace. Burr applied to Henry Clay for profes
sional aid. Colonel Daviess, the district attorney,
being a Federalist, the attempted prosecution of
Burr was at once looked upon by the people as a
stroke of partisan vindictiveness; popular sympa
thy, therefore, ran strongly on Burr's side. Clay,
no doubt, was moved by a similar feeling; he, too,
considered it something like a duty of hospitality
to aid a distinguished man arraigned on a grave
charge far away from his home, and for this reason
he never accepted the fee offered to him by his
client. Yet he had some misgivings as to Burr's
schemes, and requested from him assurances of
their lawfid character. Burr was profuse in plau
sibilities, and Clay consented to appear for him.
During the pendency of the proceedings, which
finally resulted in Burr's discharge for want of
proof. Clay was appointed to represent Kentucky
in the Senate of the United States in the place of
General Adair, who had resigned. Thereupon,
feeling a greater weight of public responsibility
upon him, he deemed it necessary to ask from
Burr a statement in writing concerning the nature
of his doings and intentions. This request did
not seem to embarrass Burr In the least. In a
letter addressed to Clay he said that he had no
design, nor had he taken any measure, to promote
the dissolution of the Union or the separation of
any State from it; that he had no intention to

36 HENRY CLAY
meddle with the government or disturb the tran
quillity of the United States ; that he had neither
Issued, nor signed, nor promised any commission
to any one for any purpose ; that he did not own
any kind of military stores, and that nobody else
did by his authority ; that his views had been fully
explained to several officers of the government and
were approved by them ; that he believed his pur
poses were well understood by the administration,
and that they were such as every man of honor
and every good citizen must approve. "Consider
ing the high station you now fill in our national
councils," the letter concluded, "I have thought
these explanations proper, as well to counteract
the chimerical tales which malevolent persons have
so industriously circulated, as to satisfy you that
you have not espoused the cause of a man in any
way unfriendly to the laws or the interests of the
country." Clay did not know the man he was dealing with.
He knew only that Burr had been vice-president
of the United States; that he was a prominent
Republican; that the Federalists hated him; that
the stories told about his schemes were almost too
adventurous to be true. Burr's letter seemed to
be straightforward, such as an innocent man would
write. If the administration, at the head of which
stood Jefferson himself, knew and approved of
Burr's plans, they could not but be honorable.
This Is what Clay believed, and so he defended
Burr faithfully and conscientiously. Nothing could

BEGINNINGS IN POLITICS 37
be more absurd than the attempt made at the time,
and repeated at a later period, to hold him in part
responsible for Burr's schemes, the true nature of
which he discovered only when he had his first
interview with President Jefferson at Washington,
Then his mortification was great. "It seems," he
wrote to Thomas Hart of Lexington, "that we
have been much mistaken in Burr, When I left
Kentucky, I believed him both an innocent and
persecuted man. In the course of my journey to
this place, stiU entertaining that opinion, I ex
pressed myself without reserve, and it seems, owing
to the freedom of my sentiments at Chillicothe,
I have exposed myseK to the strictures of some
anonymous writer at that place. They give me no
imeasiness, as I am sensible that all my friends
and acquaintances know me incapable of entering
into the views of Burr." The letter by which
Burr had deceived him, he delivered into the Pre
sident's hands. Nine years later he accidentally
met Burr again in New York, where, after aimless
wanderings abroad, the adventurer had stealthily
returned. Burr advanced to salute him, but Clay
refused his hand.

CHAPTER IV
beginnings in LEGISLATION
Clat took his seat in the Senate of the United
States on December 29, 1806. When a man at
so early an age is chosen for so high a place, a
place, in fact, reserved for the seniors In politics,
be it even to "serve out an unexpired term," it
shows that he is considered by those who send him
there a person forming an exception to ordinary
rules. But it is a more remarkable circumstance
that Clay, when he entered the Senate, was not
yet constitutionally eligible to that body, and that
this fact was not noticed at the time. According
to the biographers whose dates were verified by
him, he was born on April 12, 1777, On Decem
ber 29, 1806, when he entered the Senate, he
therefore lacked three months and seventeen days
of the age of thirty years, which the Constitution
prescribes as a condition of eligibility to the Senate
of the United States, The records of the Senate
show no trace of a question having been raised
upon this ground when Clay was sworn. It does
not seem to have occurred to any member of that
body that the man who stood before them might
not be old enough to be a senator. In all proba-

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 39
billty Clay himself did not think of it. He was
sworn in as a matter of course, and, without the
bashful hesitation generally expected of young
senators, he plunged at once into the current of
proceedings as If he had been there all his life.
On the fourth day after he had taken his seat, we
find him offering a resolution concerning the circuit
courts of the United States ; a few days later, an
other concerning an appropriation of land for the
improvement of the Ohio rapids; then another
touching Indian depredations ; and another propos
ing an amendment to the federal Constitution con
cerning the judicial power of the United States.
We find the young man on a variety of committees,
sometimes as chairman, charged with the consider
ation of important subjects, and making reports to
the Senate. We find him taking part In debate
with the utmost freedom, and on one occasion as
tonishing with a piece of very pungent sarcasm an
old senator, who was accustomed to subdue with
lofty assumptions of superior wisdom such younger
colleagues as ventured to differ from him.
In one important respect Clay's first beginnings
in national legislation were characteristic of the
natural bent of his mind and the character of his
future statesmanship. His first speech was in
advocacy of a bill providing for building a bridge
across the Potomac ; and the measure to which he
mainly devoted himself during his first short term
in the Senate was an appropriation of land "to
ward the opening of the canal proposed to be cut

40 HENRY CLAY
at the rapids of the Ohio, on the Kentucky shore."
This was in the line of the policy of "internal im
provements." Those claim too much for Henry
Clay who call him the inventor, the "father," of
that policy. It was thought of by others before
him, and all he did was to make himself, in this
as in other cases, so prominent a champion, so in
fluential and commanding a leader in the advocacy
of it, that presently the policy itself began to pass
as his own. In fact it was only his child by adop
tion, not by birth. But at the time of Clay's first
appearance in the Senate there were two things
giving that policy an especial impulse. One was
a revenue beyond the current needs of the govern
ment, and the other was the material growth of
the country.
It would be difficult to find in the history of the
United States a period of more general content
ment and cheerfulness of feeling than the first and
the early part of the second term of Jefferson's
presidency. Never before, since the establishment
of the government, had the country been so free
from harassing foreign complications. The differ
ence with Great Britain about the matter of im
pressments had not yet taken its threatening form;
and the Indians, under the influence of humane
treatment, were for a time leaving the frontier
settlements in peace. The American people, also,
for the first time became fuUy conscious of the
fact that the government really belonged to them,
and not to a limited circle of important gentlemen.

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 41
Jefferson's conciliatory policy, proclaimed in the
famous words, "We are all Republicans, we are
aU Federalists," produced the desired effect of
withdrawing from the Federalist leaders a large
portion of the rank and file, and of greatly miti
gating the acerbity of party contests, which under
the preceding administration had been immoder
ately violent. The Republican majority in Con
gress and in the country grew so large that the
struggle of the minority against it ceased to be
very exciting. On the other hand, the Federalists
had left the machinery of the government on the
whole in so good a condition that the party coming
into power, although critically disposed, found not
much to change. Those at the head of the gov
ernment professed to be intent upon carrying on
public affairs In the simplest and most economical
style. Under such circumstances the popular mind
could give itself without restraint to the develop
ment of the country in the material sense. The
disturbed state of Europe having thrown a large
proportion of the carrying trade on the ocean into
the hands of the American merchant marine, the
foreign commerce of the seaboard cities expanded
largely. Agriculture, too, was remarkably pro
sperous; cotton was rapidly becoming the great
staple of the South, and other crops in increasing
variety were greatly augmented by the breaking
of virgin soils. Manufacturing industry began to
take possession of the abundant water-powers of
the country, and to produce a constantly growing

42 HENRY CLAY
volume and variety of articles. All these fields
of activity were enlivened by a cheerful spirit of
enterprise. But beyond aU this, new perspectives of territo
rial grandeur and national power had opened them
selves to the American people, which raised their
self-esteem and stimulated their ambition. The
United States had ceased to be a mere string of
settlements along the seaboard, with a few inland
outposts. The "great West " had risen above the
horizon as a living reality. The idea of a "bound
less empire " belonging to the American people
seized upon the popular imagination, and every
thing connected with the coimtry and Its govern
ment began to assume a larger aspect. The young
democracy felt its sap, and stretched its limbs.
By the Louisiana purchase the Mississippi had
become from an outer boundary an American in
land river from source to mouth, — the ramifica
tion of the sea through American territory. The
acquisition of the whole of Florida was only a
question of time. The immense country beyond
the Mississippi was stiU a vast mystery, but steps
were taking to explore that grand national domain.
In the message sent to Congress at the opening of
the very session during which Henry Clay entered
the Senate, President Jefferson announced that
"the expedition of Messrs. Lewis and Clarke, for
exploring the river Missouri, and the best commu
nication from that to the Pacific Ocean, had had
aU the success which could have been expected,"

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 43
and that they had "traced the Missouri nearly to
its source, descended the Columbia to the Pacific
Ocean, and ascertained with accuracy the geogra
phy of that interesting communication across OuB
Continent." While only a few daring explorers and adven
turous hunters penetrated the immense wilderness
beyond the Mississippi, a steady stream of emigra
tion from the Atlantic States, reinforced by new
comers from the old world, poured into the fertile
region stretching from the Appalachian Mountains
to the great river. They found their way either
through Pennsylvania across the mountain ridges
to Pittsburgh, and then by flat or keel boat down
the Ohio, or through northern New York to the
Great Lakes, and then on by water. The build
ing of the famous Cumberland Road farther south
had then only been just begun. Great were the
difficulties and hardships of the journey. While
the swift stage-coach reached Pittsburgh in six
days from Philadelphia, the heavy carrier cart, or
the emigrant wagon, had a jolt of three weeks to
traverse the same distance. The roads were inde
scribable, and the traveler on the river found his
course impeded by snags, sand-bars, and danger
ous rapids. It was, therefore, not enough to have
the great country; it must be made accessible.
Nothing could have been more natural than that,
as the West hove in sight larger and richer, the
cry for better means of communication between the
East and the West should have grown louder and
more incessant.

44 HENRY CLAY
At the same time the commercial spirit of the
East was busy, planning improved roads and water
ways from the interior to the seaports, and from
one part of the coast to the other. Canal projects
in great variety, large and smaU, were discussed
with great ardor. While some of these, like the
New York and Erie Canal, which then as a scheme
began to assume a definite shape, were designed
to be taken in hand by single States, the general
government was looked to for aid with regard to
others. The consciousness of common interests
grew rapidly among the people of different States
and sections, and with it the feeling that the gen
eral government was the proper instrumentality
by which those common interests should be served,
and that it was its legitimate business to aid in
making the different parts of this great common
domain approachable and useful to the people.
This feeling was the source from which the pol
icy of "Internal improvements" sprang. There
was scarcely any difference of opinion among the
statesmen of the time on the question whether it
was desirable that the general government should
aid in the construction of roads and canals, and
the improvement of navigable rivers. The only
trouble in the minds of those who construed the
Constitution strictly was, that they could not find
in it any grant of power to appropriate public
funds to such objects. But the objects themselves
seemed to most of them so commendable that they
suggested the submission to the state legislatures

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 46
of an amendment to the Constitution expressly
granting this power. This was the advice of Jef
ferson. While in his private correspondence he
frequently expressed the apprehension that the
appropriation of public money to such works as
roads and canals, and the improvement of rivers,
would lead to endless jobbery and all sorts of de
moralizing practices, he found the current of popu
lar sentiment in favor of these things too strong
for his scruples. In his message of December,
1806, he therefore suggested the adoption of a
constitutional amendment to enable Congress to
apply the surplus revenue "to the great purposes
of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and
such other objects of public improvement as may
be thought proper," etc. "By these operations,"
he said, "new channels of communication will be
opened between the States; the lines of separation
will disappear; their interests wiU be identified,
and their union cemented by new and indissoluble
ties." This certainly looked to an extensive sys
tem of public works. No amendment to the Con
stitution was passed; but even Jefferson was found
willing to employ now and then some convenient
reason for doing without the expressed power;
such as. In the case of the Cumberland Road, the
consent of the States within which the work was to
be executed.
Clay took up the advocacy of this policy with
all his natural vigor. He was a Western man.
He had witnessed the toil and trouble with which

46 HENRY CLAY
the emigrant coming from the East worked his
way to the fertile Western fields. The necessity
of making the navigation of the Ohio safe and
easy came home to his neighbors and constituents.
But he did not confine his efforts to that one mea
sure. He earnestly supported the project of gov
ernment aid for the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal,
which, in the language of the report, was to serve
"as the basis of a vast scheme of interior navi
gation, connecting the waters of the Lakes with
those of the most southern States; " and if he was
not, as some of his biographers assert, the mover,
— for as such the annals of Congress name Sen
ator Worthington from Ohio, — he was at least
the zealous advocate of a resolution, "that the
secretary of the treasury be directed to prepare and
report to the Senate at their next session a plan
for the application of such means as are within
the power of Congress to the purposes of opening
roads and making canals, together with a state
ment of undertakings of that nature, which, as
objects of public improvement, may require and
deserve the aid of government," etc., a direction
to which GaUatin, then secretary of the treasury,
responded in an elaborate report. Thus Clay
marched in large company, but ahead of a part of
it ; for while Jefferson and his immediate f oUow-
ers, admitting the desirability of a large system of
public improvements, asserted the necessity of a
constitutional amendment to give the government
the appropriate power. Clay became the recognized

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 47
leader of those who insisted upon the existence of
that power under the Constitution as it was.
The senatorial term, for a fraction of which
Clay had been appointed, ended on March 4,
1807, He had enjoyed it heartily. "My recep
tion In this place," he wrote to Colonel Hart on
February 1, "has been equal, nay, superior to my
expectations. I have experienced the civility and
attention of aU I was desirous of obtaining. Those
who are disposed to flatter me say that I have ac
quitted myself with great credit in several debates
in the Senate. But after aU that I have seen,
Kentucky is stiU my favorite country. There
amidst my dear family I shaU find happiness in
a degree to be met with nowhere else," We have,
also, contemporaneous testimony, showing how
others saw him at that period. WlUiam Plumer,
a senator from New Hampshire, a Federalist,
wrote in his diary : —
« December 29, 1806, This day Henry Clay, the suc
cessor of John Adair, was qualified, and took his seat
in the Senate. He is a young lawyer. His stature is
tall and slender. I had much conversation with him,
and it afforded me much pleasure. He is intelligent
and appears frank and candid. His address is good,
and his manners easy."
And later : —
"Mr. Clay is a young lawyer of considerable emi
nence. He came here as senator for this session only.
His clients, who have suits depending in the Supreme

48 HENRY CLAY
Court, gave him a purse of three thousand dollars to
attend to their suits here. He would not be a candidate
for the next Congress, as it would materially injure his
business. On the second reading of the biU to erect a
bridge over the Potomac, Henry Clay made an eloquent
and forcible speech against the postponement. He an
imadverted with great severity on Tracy's observations.
As a speaker Clay is animated, his language bold and
flowery. He is prompt and ready at reply, but he does
not reason with the force and precision of Bayard."
And finally : —
" February 13. Henry Clay is a man of pleasure ;
fond of amusements. He is a great favorite with the
ladies ; is in all parties of pleasure ; out almost every
evening ; reads but Uttle ; indeed, he said he meant this
session should be a tour of pleasure. He is a man of
talents ; is eloquent ; but not nice or accurate in his dis
tinctions. He declaims more than he reasons. He is a
gentlemanly and pleasant companion ; a man of honor
and integrity."
The reports of Clay's speeches delivered at this
session, which have been preserved, do not bear
out Mr. Plumer's description of them. His ora
tory seldom was what might properly be called
"flowery." WhUe his appeals rose not unfre
quently to somewhat lofty flights of rhetoric, he
used figurative language sparingly. His speeches,
occasional passages excepted, consisted of argu
mentative reasoning, which, in print, appears not
seldom somewhat dry and heavy. But the dra
matic fire of delivery peculiar to him gave that

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 49
reasoning a vivacity to which the Senate, then a
very small and quiet body, was not accustomed,
and which the good Mr. Plumer probably consid
ered too dashing for the place and the occasion.
Clay had scarcely returned to Kentucky when
the citizens of his county sent him again to the
state legislature as their representative, and he
was elected speaker of the Assembly. The debates
which occurred gave him welcome opportunity for
taking position on the questions of the time. The
comfortable, calm, and joyous prosperity of the
country, which had prevailed under Jefferson's
first and at the beginning of his second adminis
tration, had meanwhile been darkly overclouded by
foreign complications. The tremendous struggle
between Napoleonic France and the rest of Europe,
led by England, was raging more furiously than
ever. The profitable neutral trade of the Ameri
can merchant marine was rudely interrupted by
arbitrary measures adopted by the beUigerents to
cripple each other, in utter disregard of neutral
rights. The impressment and blockade policy of
Great Britain struck the American mind as par
ticularly offensive. Of this more hereafter. The
old animosity against England, which had some
what cooled during the short period of repose and
general cheerfulness, was fanned again into flame.
EspeciaUy in the South and West it burst out in
angry manifestations. In the Kentucky legisla
ture its explosion was highly characteristic of the
lingering backwoods spirit. It was moved that in

50 HENRY CLAY
no court of Kentucky should any decision of a
British court, or any British elementary work on
law, be read as an authority. The proposition
was immensely popular among the members of the
Assembly, More than four fifths of them declared
their determination to vote for it. Clay was as
fiery a patriot as any of them, but he would not
permit his State to make itself ridiculous by a
puerUe and barbarous demonstration. He was
young and ambitious, but he would not seek popu
larity by joining, or even acquiescing, in a cry
which offended his good sense. Without hesita
tion he left the speaker's chair to arrest this ab
surd clamor. He began by moving as an amend
ment that the exclusion of British decisions and
opinions from the courts of Kentucky should apply
only to those which had been promulgated after
July 4, 1776, as before that date the American
colonies were a part of the British dominion, and
Americans and English were virtually one nation,
living substantiaUy under the same laws. Then
he launched into a splendid panegyric upon the
English common law, and an impassioned attack
upon the barbarous spirit which would "wantonly
make wreck of a system fraught with the inteUec-
tual wealth of centuries." His speech was not
reported, but It was described in the press of the
time as one of extraordinary power and beauty,
and it succeeded In saving for Kentucky the trea
sures of English jurisprudence.
Other demonstrations of patriotism on his part

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 51
were not wanting. In December, 1808, when the
cloud had grown darker stiU, he introduced a series
of resolutions expressing approval of the embargo,
denouncing the British Orders in Council by which
the rights of neutral ships were arbitrarily over
ruled, pledging to the general government the ac
tive aid of Kentucky in anything it might deter
mine upon to resist British exactions, and declaring
that President Jefferson was entitled to the grati
tude of the countiy "for the ability, uprightness,
and inteUIgence which he had displayed in the
management both of our foreign relations and
domestic concerns," This brought to his feet the
Federalist Humphrey Marshall, a man of ability
and standing, — he had been a senator of the
United States, — but who was also noted for the
bitterness of his animosities and the violence of
his temper. Looking down upon Clay as a young
upstart, he opposed the resolutions with extraordi
nary virulence, but commanded only his own vote
against them.
Clay then offered another resolution, recommend
ing that the members of the legislature should wear
only such clothes as were the product of domestic
manufacture. The avowed object was the encour
agement of home industry, to the end of making
the country industrially independent of a hated
foreign power. This was Henry Clay's first effort
in favor of a protective policy, evidently designed
to be a mere demonstration. Humphrey MarshaU
at once denounced the resolution as the claptrap

52 HENRY CLAY
of a demagogue. A fierce altercation foUowed,
and then came the customary chaUenge and the
"hostile encounter," in which both combatants
were slightly wounded, whereupon the seconds in
terfered to prevent more serious mischief. Henry
Clay may, therefore, be said to have fought and
bled for the cause of protection when he first
championed it, by a demonstration in favor of
home manufactures as against those of a foreign
enemy. In the winter of 1809-10 Clay was again sent
to the Senate of the United States to fiU an unex
pired term of two years, Mr. Buckner Thurston
having resigned his seat. In AprU, 1810, he
found an opportunity for expressing his opinions
on the "encouragement of home industry" in a
more tangible and elaborate form. To a biU ap
propriating money for procuring munitions of war
and for other purposes, an amendment was moved
instructing the secretary of the navy to purchase
supplies of hemp, cordage, saU-cloth, etc., and to
give preference to articles raised or manufactured
on American soU. The discussion ranged over
the general policy of encouraging home manufac
tures. Clay's line of argument was remarkable.
A large conception of industrial development as
the result of a systematic tariff policy was entirely
foreign to his mind. He looked at the whole sub
ject from the point of view of a Kentucky farmer,
who found it most economical to clothe himself
and his family in homespun, and who desired to

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 53
secure a sure and profitable market for his hemp.
Besides this, he thought it wise that the American
people should, in case of war, not be dependent
upon any foreign country for the things necessary
to their sustenance and defense. "A judicious
American farmer," said he, "in his household way
manufactures whatever Is requisite for his famUy.
He squanders but little in the gewgaws of Europe.
He presents, in epitome, what the nation ought to
be in extenso. Their manufactories should bear
the same proportion, and effect the same object in
relation to the whole community, which the part
of his household employed in domestic manufactur
ing bears to the whole family. It Is certainly de
sirable that the exports of the country should con
tinue to be the surplus production of tiUage, and
not become those of manufacturing establishments.
But it Is important to diminish our imports; to
furnish ourselves with clothing made by our own
industry; and to cease to be dependent, for the
very coats we wear, upon a foreign, and perhaps
inimical, country. The nation that imports its
clothing from abroad is but little less dependent
than if it Imported its bread."
He was especiaUy anxious not to be understood
as favoring a large development of manufacturing
industries with a numerous population of opera
tives. Referring to the indigence and wretched
ness which had been reported to prevaU among
the laboring people of Manchester and Birming
ham, he said: "Were we to become the manufac-

64 HENRY CLAY
turers of other countries, effects of the same kind
might result. But If we limit our efforts by our
own wants, the evils apprehended would be found
to be chimerical." He had no doubt "that the
domestic manufactories of the United States, fos
tered by government, and aided by household ex
ertions, were fuUy competent to supply us with at
least every necessary article of clothing." He
was, therefore, "in favor of encouraging them,
not to the extent to which they are carried in
Europe, but to such an extent as wiU redeem us
entirely from aU dependence on foreign countries."
And, aside from clothing, he did not forget to
mention that "our maritime operations ought not
to depend upon the casualties of foreign supply;"
that "with very little encouragement from govern
ment he believed we should not want a pound of
Russia hemp;" that "the Increase of the article
in Kentucky had been rapidly great," there having
been but two rope manufactories in Kentucky ten
years ago, and there being about twenty now, and
about ten or fifteen of cotton-bagging.
Thus what he had in view at that time was not
the building up of large Industries by a protective
system, but just a Uttle manufacturing to run
along with agriculture, enough to keep the people
in clothes and the navy weU supplied with hemp,
and so to relieve the country of its dependence on
foreign countries In case of war. For this home
industry he wanted encouragement. What kind
of encouragement? In his speech he briefly re-

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 55
f erred to two means of encouraging manufactures:
bounties, against which, as he was aware, it was
urged that the whole community was taxed for
the benefit of only a part of it; and protective
duties, in opposition to which it was, as he said,
"aUeged that you make the interest of one part,
the consumer, bend to the interest of the other
part, the manufacturer." He merely stated these
points, together with the "not always admitted"
answer that "the sacrifice is only temporary, being
ultimately compensated by the greater abundance
and superiority of the article produced by the
stimulus." He did not, however, commit himself
clearly in favor of either proposition. But he
thought of aU "practical forms of encouragement,"
the one under discussion, providing merely for a
preference to be given to home products In the
purchase of naval supplies, whenever it could be
done without material detriment to the service,
was certainly innocent enough and should escape
opposition. He was also in favor of making ad
vances, under proper security, to manufacturers
undertaking government contracts, beUevIng "that
this kind of assistance, bestowed with prudence,
wiU be productive of the best results."
A few days after Clay had made this speech,
Albert Gallatin, secretary of the treasury, pre
sented to Congress a report on the manufacturing
industries of the United States, In which he showed
that several of them were already "adequate to
the consumption of the country," — among them

56 HENRY CLAY
manufactures of wood, leather and manufactures
of leather, soap, and candles, etc. , — and that
others were supplying either the greater, or at
least a considerable, part of the consumption of
the country, such as iron and manufactures of
iron ; manufactures of cotton, wool, and flax ; hats,
paper, several manufactures of hemp, gunpowder,
window glass, several manufactures of lead, etc.
Home industry was, therefore, practically not far
from the point of development indicated by Clay
as the goal to be reached. In response to the
request of Congress, to suggest methods by which
the manufacturing industries might be encouraged,
GaUatin suggested that "occasional premiums
might be beneficial; " that "a general system of
bounties was more appHcable to articles exported
than to those manufactured for home consump
tion;" that prohibitory duties were "Uable to the
treble objection of destroying competition, of tax
ing the consumer, and of diverting capital and in
dustry into channels generaUy less profitable than
those which would have naturaUy been pursued by
individual interest left to itself." A moderate
increase of duties would be less dangerous, he
thought; but, if adopted, it should be continued
during a certain period to avoid the Injury to busi
ness arising from frequent change. But, he added,
" since the comparative want of capital is the prin
cipal obstacle to the introduction and advancement
of manufactures," and since the banks were not
able to give sufficient assistance, "the United

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 57
States might create a circulating stock bearing a
low rate of interest, and lend it at par to manu
facturers." It wIU strike any reader conversant with the
history of that period, that Clay's argument, if
taken as a plea for protection, was far less decided
in tone and strong In reasoning than many speeches
which had been made in Congress on that side of
the question before; and also that the methods of
encouraging manufacturing industries suggested
by him were, although less clearly stated, not
materiaUy different from those suggested by GaUa
tin, who was on principle a free trader.
This topic was, in fact, only one of a great va
riety of subjects to which he devoted his attention.
He evidently endeavored to become not only a
briUiant speaker, but a useful, working legislator.
During the same session he made a report on a
blU granting a right of preemption to settlers on
pubUc land in certain cases, which was passed
without amendment. Indian affairs, too, received
his intelligent attention. A biU supplementary to
"an act to regulate trade and intercourse with
the Indian tribes and to preserve peace on the
frontier," was introduced by him and referred to
a committee of which he was made chairman ; and
his report displayed sentiments as wise as they
were humane. More conspicuous and important
was the part he took during the session of 1810-11
in the debates on the occupation of West Florida,
and on a bill to renew the charter of the Bank of
the United States.

58 HENRY CLAY
The West Florida case gave him his first intro
duction to the field of foreign affairs, and at once
he struck the keynote of that national feeling
which carried the American people into the war
of 1812. Florida was at that time in the posses
sion of Spain. The boundaries of Louisiana, as
that territory had passed from France to the
United States in 1803, were Ul defined. Accord
ing to a plausible construction the Louisiana pur
chase included that part of Florida to the west of
the Perdido River, which was commonly caUed
West Florida. But the United States had failed
to occupy it, leaving the Spanish garrisons quietly
in possession of their posts. Negotiations for the
purchase of the whole of Florida from Spain had
meanwhile been carried on, but without success.
When Napoleon invaded Spain and that kingdom
appeared doomed to fall into his hands, insurrec
tionary movements broke out in several of the
Spanish American provinces. West Florida, too,
was violently agitated. The revolutionists there,
among whom were many persons of EngUsh and
of American birth, set up an independent govern
ment and applied for recognition by the United
States. There were rumors of British intrigues
for the object of getting West Florida into the
hands of England. The revolutionary excitement
in the territory moreover threatened seriously to
disturb the peace of the frontier. President Madi
son thought this an opportune moment to settle
the boundary question. He issued a proclamation

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 59
on October 27, 1810, asserting the claim of the
United States to West Florida, the delay in the
occupation of which "was not the result of any
distrust of their title, but was occasioned by their
concIHatory views," and announcing that "posses
sion should be taken of the said territory in the
name and behalf of the United States." A bUl
was then introduced in the Senate December 18,
1810, providing that the Territory of Orleans, one
of the two territories into which Louisiana was
divided, "shaU be deemed, and is hereby declared,
to extend to the river Perdido," and that the laws
in force in the Territory of Orleans should extend
over the district in question.
The FederaUsts, who always had a deep-seated
jealousy of the growing West, attacked the steps
taken by President Madison as acts of spoliation
perpetrated upon an unoffending and at the time
helpless power, and their spokesmen in the Senate,
Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts and Horsey
of Delaware strenuously denied that the United
States had any title to West Florida. Clay took
up the gauntlet as the champion not merely of the
administration, but of his country. For the first
time in the Senate he put forth the fuUness of his
pecuHar power. "AUow me, sir," said he, with
severe irony, "to express my admiration at the
more than Aristidean justice which, in a question
of territorial title between the United States and
a foreign nation, induces certain gentlemen to es
pouse the pretensions of the foreign nation. Doubt-

60 HENRY CLAY
less, in any future negotiations, she wiU have too
much magnanimity to avail herself of these spon
taneous concessions in her favor, made on the floor
of the Senate of the United States." He then
went into an elaborate historical examination of
the question, giving evidence of much research,
and set forth with great clearness and force of
statement. The case he made out for the Ameri
can claim was indeed plausible. Accepting his
patriotic assumptions, his defense of the Presi
dent's conduct seemed complete. The plea that
the Spanish government was sorely pressed and
helpless furnished him only an opportunity for
holding up his opponents as the sympathizers of
kings. "I shaU leave the honorable gentleman
from Delaware," he exclaimed, "to mourn over
the fortunes of the faUen Charles. I have no
commiseration for princes. My sympathies are
reserved for the great mass of mankind, and I
own that the people of Spain have them most
sincerely." But he had a stiU sharper arrow in
his quiver. Mr. Horsey had been so unfortunate
as to speak of the displeasure which the steps taken
by the President might give to Great Britain.
Clay turned upon him with an outburst which
resounded through the whole country : —
" The gentleman reminds us that Great Britain, the
ally of Spain, may be obliged, by her connection with
that country, to take part with her against us, and to
consider this measure of the President as justifying an
appeal to arms. Sir, is the time never to arrive, when

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 61
we may manage our own affairs without the fear of
insulting his Britannic majesty ? Is the rod of the
British power to be forever suspended over our heads ?
Does Congress put an embargo to shelter our rightful
commerce against the piratical depredations committed
upon it on the ocean ? We are immediately warned of
the indignation of offended England. Is a law of non-
intercourse proposed ? The whole navy of the haughty
mistress of the seas is made to thunder into our ears.
Does the President refuse to continue a correspondence
with a minister who violates the decorum belonging to
his diplomatic character, by giving and repeating a de
liberate affront to the whole nation ? We are instantly
menaced with the chastisement which English pride will
not fail to inflict. Whether we assert our rights by sea,
or attempt their maintenance by land, — whithersoever
we turn ourselves, this phantom incessantly pursues us.
Already it has too much influence on the councils of the
nation. Mr. President, I most sincerely desire peace
and amity with England ; I even prefer an adjustment
of differences with her before one with any other nation.
But if she persists in a denial of justice to us, or if she
avails herself of the occupation of West Florida to com
mence war upon us, I trust and hope that all hearts will
unite in a bold and vigorous vindication of our rights."
This was an appeal to that national pride which
he himself of aU the statesmen of his time felt most
strongly, and therefore represented most effectively.
Although he was the youngest man In the Senate,
he had already acquired a position of leadership
among the members of the RepubUcan majority.
He won It in his characteristic fashion; that is to

62 HENRY CLAY
say, he straightway seized it, and in deference to
his boldness and abUity it was conceded to him.
In the debate on the West Florida question he
was decidedly the most conspicuous and important
figure ; and when the veteran Timothy Pickering,
in a speech in reply to Clay, quoted a document
which years before had been communicated to the
Senate in confidence, it was the young Kentuckian
who promptly stepped forward as the leader of the
majority, offering a resolution to censure Pickering
for having committed a breach of the rules, and
the majority obediently foUowed.
From this debate he came forth the most strik
ing embodiment of the rising spirit of Young
America. But the manner in which he opposed
the re-charter of the Bank of the United States
was calculated to bring serious embarrassment
upon him in his subsequent career; for he fur
nished arguments to his bitterest enemy. The
first Bank of the United States was chartered by
Congress in 1791, the charter to run for twenty
years. Its establishment formed an important part
of Hamilton's scheme of national finance. It was
to aid in the coUectlon of the revenue; to secure
to the country a safe and uniform currency; to
serve as a trustworthy depository of pubUc funds;
to facilitate the transmission of money from one
part of the country to another ; to assist the gov
ernment In making loans, funding bond issues,
and other financial operations. These offices It
had on the whole so weU performed that the secre-

BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 63
tary of the treasury, GaUatin, although belonging
to the political school which had originaUy op
posed the Bank, strongly favored the renewal of
its charter. He was especiaUy anxious to preserve
the powerful working force of this financial agency
in view of necessities which the impending war
with Great Britain would inevitably bring upon
the government.
The opposition which the re-charter met In Con
gress sprang from a variety of sources. Although
for twenty years the constitutionality of the charter
had been practically recognized by every depart
ment of the government, the constitutional ques
tion was raised again. As the Bank had been
organized whUe the Federalists were in power,
and many of its officers and directors belonged to
that party, its management was accused of politi
cal partiality In the distribution of its favors and
accommodations. Some of Its stock was owned
by British subjects; hence the charge that its
operations were conducted under too strong a for
eign influence. AU these things were used to
inflame the popular mind, and the opponents of
the Bank actually succeeded in creating so strong
a current of feeling against it, that several state
legislatures passed resolves caUIng upon members
of Congress to refuse the renewal of the charter.
GaUatin, the ablest public financier of his time,
and indeed one of the few great finance ministers
in our history, ranking second only to Hamilton,
knew the importance of the Bank as a fiscal agent

64 HENRY CLAY
of the government at that time too weU not to make
every honorable effort to sustain it. Without
difficulty he refuted the charges with which it was
assailed. But his very solicitude told against the
measure he advocated. A very influential coterie,
represented in the cabinet by the secretary of the
navy. Smith, and especiaUy strong in the Senate,
entertained a deadly hostUity to the secretary of
the treasury, and sought to drive him out of the
administration by defeating everything he thought
important to his success as a public financier.
There is no reason to suspect that Clay was a
party to this political intrigue. Nevertheless, he
espoused the anti-Bank cause with the whole fervor
of his nature. One reason was that the legislature
of his State had instructed him to do so. But he
did not rest his opposition upon that ground. He
sincerely believed in many of the accusations that
had been brought against the Bank; to his imagi
nation It appeared as the embodiment of a great
money power that might become dangerous to free
institutions. But his principal objection was the
unconstitutionality of the Bank, and this he urged
with arguments drawn so deeply from his concep
tion of the nature of the federal government, and
In language so emphatic, as to make it seem im
possible for him ever to escape from the principles
then laid down.
" What is the nature of this government ? (he said.)
It is emphatically federal, vested with an aggregate of
specified powers for general purposes, conceded by ex-

¦ BEGINNINGS IN LEGISLATION 65
isting sovereignties, who have themselves retained what
is not so conceded. It is said there are cases in which
it must act on impfied powers. This is not contro
verted, but the implication must be necessary, and 06-
viously flow from the enumerated power with which it is
allied. The power to charter companies is not specified
in the grant, and I contend it is not transferable by
mere impUcation. It is one of the most exalted attri
butes of sovereignty. In the exercise of this gigantic
power we have seen an East India Company created,
which is in itself a sovereignty, which has subverted
empires and set up new dynasties, and has not only
made war, but war against its legitimate sovereign !
Under the influence of this power we have seen arise a
South Sea Company, and a Mississippi Company, that
distracted and convulsed all Europe, and menaced a
total overthrow of all credit and confidence, and uni
versal bankruptcy ! Is it to be imagined that a power
so vast would have been left by the wisdom of the
Constitution to doubtful inference ? In all cases where
incidental powers are acted upon, the principal and
incidental ought to be congenial with each other, and
partake of a common nature. The incidental power
ought to be strictly subordinate and limited to the end
proposed to be attained by the specific power. In other
words, under the name of accomplishing one object
which is specified, the power implied ought not to be
made to embrace other objects which are not specified
in the Constitution. If, then, you could establish a
bank to collect and distribute the revenue, it ought to
be expressly restricted to the purpose of such collec
tion and distribution. It is mockery worse than usur
pation to establish it for a lawful object, and then to

66 HENRY CLAY
extend it to other objects which are not lawfnL In de
ducing the power to create corporations, such as I have
described it, from the power to eoUect taxes, the relation
and condition of principal and incidental are prostrated
and destroyed. The accessory is exalted above the
principal." The strictest of strict constructionists could not
have put the matter more strongly. The reader
should remember this argument, to compare it
with the reasons given by Henry Clay a few years
later for his vote in favor of chartering a new
Bank of the United States, iUustrating the change
which was taking place not only in his, but also
in other men's minds as to the constitutional func
tions of the government.
The biU to re-charter the Bank was defeated In
the House of Representatives by a majority of
one, and In the Senate by the casting vote of the
Vice-President. It is not unfair to assume that,
had Clay cast his vote in the Senate, and also
employed his influence with his friends in the
House in favor of the biU, he would have saved it,
and that, in this sense, his opposition made him
responsible for its defeat.

CHAPTER V
the war op 1812
Upon the expiration of his term In the Senate,
Henry Clay was elected a member of the national
House of Representatives for the Lexington dis
trict, and took his seat on November 4, 1811. To
him this was a welcome change. He "preferred
the turbulence of the House to the solemn stillness
of the Senate." NaturaUy it was a more congen
ial theatre of action to the fiery young statesman.
The House was then much less under the domina
tion of its committees than it is at present. It
was not yet muzzled by rules permitting only now
and then a free exchange of opinions. It stUl
possessed the character of a debating body in the
best sense of the phrase. The House of Repre
sentatives then was what the Senate afterwards
became, — the platform to which the people looked
for the most thorough discussion of their interests,
and from which a statesman could most effectively
impress his views upon the public mind. More
over, It was in the House that the Young America
of the time gathered in force to make their strength
and spirit tell — the young Republicans who had
grown somewhat impatient at the timidity and the

68 HENRY CLAY
over anxious considerations of economy and peace
with which the old statesmen of their own party,
in their opinion, constantly hampered the national
ambition and energy. Of aU poUtical elements
this was to Clay the most congenial; he was its
natural leader, and no sooner had he appeared in
the House than he was elected speaker by a very
large majority. It was weU understood that the
duties of this position would not exclude him from
participation in debate. On almost every occa
sion of Importance he availed himself of the com
mittee of the whole to proclaim his opinions, and
for this the stirring events of the time furnished
ample opportunity. It may be said without exag
geration that it was his leadership in the House
which hastened the war of 1812.
Of the events which figured as the immediate
cause of that war only a short summary can find
room here. The profitable maritime trade which
the great struggle between France and England
had, from its beginning, thrown into the hands of
American merchants, could be preserved only so
long as the United States remained neutral and
as their neutral rights were respected. President
Jefferson earnestly endeavored to remain at peace
with both beUigerents, hoping that each would be
anxious to propitiate, or at least not to offend this
republic, from fear of driving it into an active
alliance with the other. In this he was disap
pointed. They both looked upon the United States
as a weak neutral, whose interests could be injured,

THE WAR OP 1812 69
and whose feelings could be outraged, with im
punity. England and Franco sought to destroy one an
other not only by arms, but by commercial restric
tions. In 1804 Great Britain declared the French
coast from Ostend to the Seine in a state of block
ade. In 1806 the blockade was extended from
the Elbe to Brest. It thus became in part a mere
"paper blockade," Napoleon answered by the
BerUn Decree of November 21, 1806, establishing
the "continental system," designed to stop aU
trade between Great Britain and the European
continent. Thereupon came from the British side
the "Orders in CouncU" of January 7 and No
vember 11, 1807, declaring the blockade of aU
places and ports belonging to France and her
allies, from which the British flag was excluded,
also aU their colonies; prohibiting aU trade in the
produce or manufactures of those countries and
colonies, and making subject to capture and con
demnation aU vessels trading with and from them,
and aU merchandise on board such vessels. The
return shot on the part of Napoleon was the Milan
Decree of December 17, 1807, declaring that every
ship, of whatever nation, and whatever the nature
of its cargo, sailing from the ports of England or
her colonies, or of countries occupied by English
troops, and every ship which had made any voyage
to England, or paid any tax to that government,
or submitted to search by an English ship, should
be lawful prize.

70 HENRY CLAY
Between these decrees and counter-decrees, which
were utterly unwarranted by international law,
the trade of neutrals was crushed as between two
mlUstones. Indeed, these measures were pur
posely directed by the two great belligerents as
much against neutral trade as against one another.
Great Britain would not let her maritime com
merce slip out of her grasp to build up a commer
cial rival sailing under a neutral flag. She would
therefore permit no trading at aU except on con
dition that It should go through her hands, or
"through British ports where a transit duty was
levied for the British treasury." Napoleon, on
the other hand, desired to constrain the neutrals,
especially the United States, to become his active
aUies, by forcing upon them the alternative : either
aUIes or enemies. There must be no neutrals, or
if there were, they must have no rights. Thus
American ships were taken and condemned by
both parties In great numbers, and American
maritime trade was suffering terribly. But this
was not aU. British men-of-war stopped Ameri
can vessels on the high seas, and even in American
waters, to search them for British subjects or for
men they chose to consider as such, whom they
pressed Into the British naval service. A large
number of these were Americans, not a few of
whom refused to serve under the British flag, and
horrible stories were told of the dungeons into
which they were thrown, and of the cruelties they
had to suffer.

THE WAR OF 1812 71
The steps taken by the United States to protect
their neutral rights were those of a peace-loving
power not overconfident of its own strength.
Madison, President Jefferson's secretary of state,
made an appeal to the sense of right and fairness
of the British government. That iqnocent effort
having proved fruitless, commercial restrictions
were resorted to, — first, the Non^importatlon Act
of 1806, prohibiting the importation of certain
articles of British production. At the same time
negotiation was tried, and a treaty was actually
agreed upon by the American envoys, Monroe and
Pinkney, and the British government; but as it
contained no abandonment by Great Britain of
the right of search for the purpose of impressment,
President Jefferson did not submit it to the Sen
ate. An attempt at further negotiation failed.
In June, 1807, the British man-of-war Leopard
fired Into the United States frigate Chesapeake,
and overhauled her for British deserters, some of
whom claimed to be American citizens, an outrage
which created intense excitement and indignation
all over the country. An explanation was de
manded, which it took four years to obtain. In
the autumn of 1807, Jefferson caUed an extra ses
sion of Congress, and the famous embargo was
resolved upon, forbidding the departure, unless by
special direction of the President, of any Amer
ican vessel from any port of the United States
bound to any foreign country, — a very curious
measure, intended to defend the foreign commerce

72 HENRY CLAY
of the country by killing that commerce at one
blow. The effect was not, as had been hoped, to
compel the beUigerents by commercial inconven
ience at once to respect the rights of neutrals ; but
on the other hand great dissatisfaction was created
in the shipping towns of the United States; for
most of the shipowners and merchants would
rather take what little chance of trade the restric
tive measures of the beUigerents stiU left them,
than let their ships rot at the wharves and thus
accept financial ruin from the hands of their own
government. The embargo would indeed have been proper
enough as a measure preparatory for immediate
war. But Jefferson was a man of peace by tem
perament as weU as philosophy. His favorite gun
boat policy appears like mere boyish dabbling in
warlike contrivance. His nature shrank from the
conflict of material forces. The very thought of
war, with its brutal exigencies and sudden vicissi
tudes, distressed and bewildered his mind. His
whole poHtical philosophy contemplated lasting
peace with the outside world. War, as a reign of
force, was utterly hostUe to the realization of his
political ideals. When he saw that the comfort
able repose and the general cheerfulness which
prevailed during his flrst term were overclouded
by foreign complications, and that the things he
feared most were almost sure to come, he greeted
the election of his successor, which took place in
1808, as a deliverance; and without waiting for

THE WAR OF 1812 73
Madison's inauguration, vIrtuaUy dropped the reins
of government, leaving all further responsibility
to Congress and to the next president.
In February, 1809, Congress resolved to raise
the embargo, and to substitute for it commercial
non-intercourse with England and France until
the obnoxious orders and decrees should be re
voked. A gleam of sunshine seemed to break
through the clouds when, in April, a provisional
arrangement, looking to the withdrawal of the
Orders in Council in case of the reopening of
commercial Intercourse, and to an atonement for
the Chesapeake outrage, was agreed upon by the
secretary of state and Mr. Erskine, the British
minister. President Madison at once issued a
proclamation declaring commercial intercourse with
Great Britain restored. But the ships had hardly
left their harbors, when the general rejoicing was
rudely interrupted. It turned out that Erskine,
a weU-meanIng and somewhat enthusiastic young
man, had gone beyond his instructions. He was
sternly disavowed and recaUed by the British gov
ernment. A new minister, Mr. Jackson, was sent
in his place, who, in discussing the transactions
between Erskine and the secretary of state, made
himseU so offensive that further communication
with him was decUned. The situation was darker
than ever. Non-intercourse with Great Britain
was resumed ; but a partial change of ministry in
England — the Marquis of Wellesley succeeding
Mr. Canning in the Foreign Office — seemed to

74 HENRY CLAY
open a new chance for negotiation. To aid this,
Congress on May 1, 1810, passed an act providing
that commercial non-intercourse with the beUIger-
ent powers should cease with the end of the session,
only armed ships being excluded from American
ports; and further, that, in case either of them
shoidd recall its obnoxious orders or decrees, the
President should announce the fact by proclama
tion, and if the other did not do the same within
three months, the non-intercourse act should be
revived against that one, — a measure adopted
only because Congress, in its helplessness, did not
know what else to do.
The conduct of France had meanwhile been no
less offensive than that of Great Britain. On all'
sorts of pretexts American ships were seized in the
harbors and waters controUed by French power.
A spirited remonstrance on the part of Armstrong,
the American minister, was answered by the issue
of the RambouiUet Decree in May, 1810, ordering
the sale of American ships and cargoes seized, and
directing like confiscation of aU American vessels
entering any ports under the control of France.
This decree was designed to stop the surreptitious
trade that was stiU being carried on between
England and the continent in American bottoms.
When it failed in accomplishing that end. Napo
leon instructed his minister of foreign affairs,
Champagny, to inform the Amerlcaij minister that
the Berlin and Milan Decrees were revoked, and
would cease to have effect on November 1, 1810,

THE WAR OF 1812 75
if the English would revoke their Orders in Coun
cil, and recall their new principles of blockade, or
if the United States would "cause their rights to
be respected by the English," — in the first place
restore the Non-intercourse Act as to Great Brit
ain. This declaration was made by Champagny
to the American representative on August 6. The
British government, being notifled of this by the
American minister, declared on September 29,
that Great Britain would recall the Orders in
Council when the revocation of the French decrees
should have actuaUy taken effect, and the com
merce of neutrals should have been i;estored. Thus
France would effectuaUy withdraw her decrees
when Great Britain had withdrawn her Orders in
Council; and Great Britain would withdraw her
Orders in Council when France had effectuaUy
withdrawn her decrees.
Madison, however, leaning toward France, as
was traditional with the Republican party, and
glad to grasp even at the semblance of an advan
tage, chose to regard the withdrawal of the Berlin
and Milan Decrees as actual and done in good
faith, and announced it as a matter of fact on
November 1, 1810. French armed ships were no
longer excluded from American ports. On Febru
ary 2, 1811, the Non-importation Act was revived
as to Great Britain. In May the British Court
of Admiralty delivered an opinion that no evidence
existed of the withdrawal of the Berlin and Milan
Decrees, which resulted in the condemnation of a

76 HENRY CLAY
number of American vessels and their cargoes.
Additional irritation was caused by the capture,
off Sandy Hook, of an American vessel bound to
France, by some fresh cases of search and impress
ment, and by an encounter between the American
frigate President and the British sloop Little Belt,
which fired into one another, the British vessel
suffering most.
But was American commerce safe in French
ports? By no means. The French CouncU of
Prize had continued to condemn American vessels,
as if the Berlin and Milan Decrees were in undi
minished force; outrages on American ships by
French men-of-war and privateers went on as be
fore, and Napoleon refused reparation for the
confiscations under the RambouiUet Decree. The
pretended French concession was, therefore, a mere
farce. Truly, there were American grievances enough.
Over nine hundred American ships had been seized
by the British, and more than five hundred and
fifty by the French. The number of American
citizens impressed as British seamen, or kept in
prison if they refused to serve, was reported to
exceed six thousand, and it was estimated that
there were as many more of whom no informa
tion had been obtained. The remonstrances of
the American government had been treated with
haughty disdain. By both beUigerents the United
States had been kicked and cuffed like a mere
interloper among the nations of the earth, who

THE WAR OF 1812 77
had no rights entitled to respectful consideration.
Their insolence seemed to have been increased by
the irresolution of the American government, the
distraction of counsel in Congress, and the divi
sion of sentiment among the people, resulting In a
shifting, aimless poUcy, which made the attitude
of the republic appear weak, if not cowardly, In
the eyes of the European powers.
Such was the situation of affairs when Henry
Clay entered the House of Representatives and
was made its speaker. In his annual message
Madison held fast to the fiction that France had
withdrawn the offensive decrees, while at the same
time he complained that the French government
had not shown any intention to make reparation
for the injuries inflicted, and he hinted at a re
vival of non-intercourse. But the sting of the
message was directed against Great Britain, who
had refused to withdraw the Orders In Council,
and continued to do things "not less derogatory to
the dearest of our national rights than vexatious
to our trade," virtually amounting to "war on our
lawful commerce." Madison therefore advised
that the United States be put "into an armor and
attitude demanded by the crisis, and correspond
ing with the national spirit and expectations."
This had a warlike sound, while, In fact, Madison
was an exceedingly unwarlike man. He ardently
wished, and stUl hoped, to prevent an armed con
flict. To make him adopt a war policy required
pushing.

78 HENRY CLAY
But the young Republican leaders came to the
front to interpret the "national spirit and expec
tation." They totaUy eclipsed the old chiefs by
their dash and briUiancy. Foremost among them
stood Henry Clay; then John C. Calhoun, Wil
liam Lowndes, Felix Grundy, Langdon Cheves,
and others. They believed that, if the American
republic was to maintain anything like the dignity
of an independent power, and to preserve, or rather
regain, the respect of mankind In any degree, —
ay, its self-respect, — it must cease to submit to
humiliation and contemptuous treatment; it must
fight, — fight somebody who had wronged or in
sulted it.
The Republicans, having always a tender side
for France, and the fiction of French concessions
being accepted, the theory of the war party was
that, of the two belligerents, England had more
insolently maltreated the United States. Rumors
were spread that an Indian war then going on,
and resulting in the battle of Tippecanoe on No
vember 7, 1811, was owing to English Intrigues.
Adding this to the old Revolutionary reminiscences
of British oppression, it was not unnatural that
the national wrath should generally turn against
Great Britain.
Madison was all his life, even in his youth,
somewhat like a timid old man. He did not desire
war; neither did he venture to resist the warlike
current. He was quite willing to have Congress
make a policy for him, and to foUow its lead. In

THE WAR OF 1812 79
this respect he could not have found a man more
wlUing to urge, or drive, or lead him, than Henry
Clay, who at once so composed the important
committees of the House as to put them under the
control of the war party. Then early in the ses
sion he took the floor in favor of putting at the
disposal of the President a much larger army than
the President himself had recommended. Every
word of his speech breathed war. He spoke of
war not as an uncertain event, but as something
sure to come. As to the reason for it, he pointed
out that "the real cause of British aggression was
not to distress an enemy, but to destroy a rival,"
To that end, "not content with seizing upon all
our property which faUs within her rapacious
grasp, the personal rights of our countrymen —
rights which forever must be sacred — are tram
pled upon and violated" through the "impress
ment of our seamen." Was the question asked:
"What are we to gain by war?" With ringing
emphasis he replied: "What are* we not to lose
by peace? Commerce, character, a nation's best
treasure, honor!" With such words of fire he
stirred the House and the people. The character
and result of the war, too, were predetermined in
his imagination. It was to be an aggressive war,
a war of glorious conquest. He saw the battalions
of the republic marching victoriously through
Canada and laying siege to doomed Quebec. His
dream was of a peace dictated at Halifax.
Not only the regular army was increased, but

80 HENRY CLAY
the President was authorized to accept and employ
60,000 volunteers. Then a blU was introduced
providing for the building of ten new frigates,
which gave Clay an opportunity for expressing
his views as to what the American navy should be.
A large portion of the war party. Western and
Southern men, insisted upon confining the conflict
with England to operations on land. The navy
was not popular with them. They denounced na
vies generaUy as curses to the countries which
possessed them; as very dangerous to popular
Hberty; as sources of endless expense without cor
responding benefit; as nurseries of debt, corrup
tion, demoralization, and ruin. EspeciaUy in the
war then in prospect a navy would be absolutely
useless, — a curious prediction in the light of sub
sequent events. Cheves and Lowndes spoke with
ability in favor of a maritime armament, but
Clay's speech took a wider sweep. He easily dis
posed of the assertion that a navy was as danger
ous to free Institutions as a standing army, and
then laid down his theory upon which the naval
force of the United States should be organized.
It should not be such "a force as would be capable
of contending with that which any other nation is
able to bring on the ocean, — a force that, boldly
scouring every sea, would chaUenge to combat the
fleets of other powers, however great." To build
up so extensive an establishment, he admitted, was
impossible at the time, and would probably never
be desirable. The next species of naval power,

THE WAR OF 1812 81
which, "without adventuring into distant seas,
and keeping generaUy on our coasts, would be
competent to beat off any squadron which might
be attempted to be permanently stationed in our
waters," he did deem desirable. Twelve ships of
the line and fifteen to twenty frigates, he thought,
would be sufficient ; and if the present state of the
finances forbade so large an outlay, he was at least
in favor of beginning the enlargement of the navy
with such an end in view. But what he would
absolutely insist upon was the building up of a
force "competent to punish any single ship or
smaU naval expedition" attempting to "endanger
our coasting trade, to block up our harbors, or to
lay under contribution our cities," such a force
being "entirely within the compass of our means"
at the time. "Because we cannot provide against
every danger," he asked, "shaU we provide against
none?" This was a sensible theory, in its main principles
applicable now as well as then: to keep a force
not so expensive as to embarrass the country finan-
claUy, not so large as to tempt the government
into unnecessary quarrels, but sufficient for doing
such duty of high police as might be necessary to
protect our harbors and coasts against casual at
tack and annoyance, and to "show the flag," and
serve as a sign of the national power in foreign
parts, where American citizens or American pro
perty might occasionaUy need protection. With
great adroitness Clay enlisted also the sympathies

82 HENRY CLAY
of the Western members in behalf of the navy, by
showing them the Importance of protecting the
mouth of the Mississippi, the only outlet for the
products of the Western country.
The war spirit in the country graduaUy rose,
and manifested itself noisily In public meetings,
passing resolutions, and memorializing Congress.
It was Increased in Intensity by a sensational "ex
posure," a batch of papers laid before Congress
by the President In March, 1812. They had been
sold to the government by John Henry, an Irish
adventurer, and disclosed a confidential mission to
New England, undertaken by Henry in 1809 at
the request of Sir James Craig, the governor of
Canada, to encourage a disunion movement In the
Eastern States. This was the story. Whatever
Its foundation, it was beUeved, and greatly in
creased popular excitement. Yet the administra
tion seemed to be stiU halting, and the war party
felt obliged to push it forward. Their programme
was In the first place a short embargo of thirty
days, upon which Clay, as their leader, had a
conference with the President. Madison agreed
to recommend an embargo of sixty days to Con
gress, and this he did In a confidential message
on April 1. The House passed a corresponding
bill the same day; the Senate the next day in
creased the time of the embargo to ninety days,
which the House accepted, and on April 4 the bill
became a law. The moderate Republicans and
the Federalists had procured the extension of the

THE WAR OF 1812 83
time, stiU hoping for a pacific turn of negotiation.
But Clay vehemently declared that the embargo
meant war and nothing but war. When he was
reminded of the danger of such a contest, and of
the circumstance that the conduct of France fur
nished cause of war equaUy grave, he burst out
In thundering appeals to American courage and
honor, "Weak as we are," he exclaimed, "we
could fight France too, if necessary. In a good
cause, — the cause of honor and independence."
We had complete proof, he added, "that Great
Britain would do everything to destroy us. Reso
lution and spirit were our only security. War,
after all, was not so terrible a thing. There was
no terror in it except its novelty. Such gentle
men as chose to caU these sentiments quixotic,
he pitied for their deficient sense of honor."
All over the country the embargo was under
stood as meaning an Immediate preparation for
war. In the South and the West and in Pennsyl
vania enthusiastic demonstrations expressed and
further excited the popular feeling. It was a
remarkable circumstance that the war spirit was
strongest where the people were least touched in
their immediate interests by the British Orders In
Council and the impressment of seamen, while the
population engaged In maritime commerce, who
had suffered most and who feared a total annihi
lation of their trade by the war, were in favor of
pacific measures, and under the lead of the Fed
eralists violently denounced the measures of the
government and the war party.

84 HENRY CLAY
In May, 1812, President Madison was nomi
nated for reelection by the congressional caucus.
It has been said that he was dragooned into the
war policy by Clay and his foUowers with the
threat that, unless he yielded to their views, an
other candidate for the presidency would be chosen.
This Clay denied, and there was no evidence to
discredit his denial. Madison was simply swept
Into the current by the impetuosity of Young
America. He himself declared in 1827, in a letter
to Wheaton, that "the immediate impulse" to
the declaration of war was given by a letter from
Lord Castlereagh to the British minister at Wash
ington, Forster, which was communicated to the
President, and which stated "that the Orders in
Council, to which we had declared we would not
submit, would not be repealed without the repeal
of the Internal measures of France. With this
formal notice no choice remained, but between war
and degradation."
John Randolph made a last attempt to prevent
the extreme step. Having heard that the Presi
dent was preparing a message to Congress recom
mending a declaration of war, he tried to force a
discussion in the House by offering a resolution,
"that it was inexpedient to resort to war with
Great Britain." He began to debate it on the
spot. Clay, as speaker, interrupted him, and put
to the House the question whether it would proceed
to the consideration of the resolution. The House
voted In the negative, and Randolph was sUenced.

THE WAR OF 1812 85
On June 1 the President's war message came. On
June 18 a biU in accordance with it, which had
passed both Houses, was signed by the President,
who proclaimed hostUities the next day.
Thus Yoimg America, led by Henry Clay, car
ried their point. But there was something dis
quieting in their victory. The majority they com
manded in Congress was not so large as a majority
for a declaration of war should be. In the House,
Pennsylvania and the States south and west of It
gave 62 votes for the war, and 32 against it; the
States north and east of Pennsylvania gave 17 yeas
and 32 nays, — In aU 79 for and 49 against war.
This showed a difference of sentiment according
to geographical divisions. Not even aU the Re
publicans were in favor of war. Thirteen North
ern and two Southern Republicans voted against
it. In the Senate the vote stood 19 to 13, and
among the latter were six RepubUcans. So large
a minority had an ugly look. It signified that
there would be a peace party in the United States
during the war. And indeed, those who caUed
themselves the "friends of peace, Uberty, and com
merce " did make themselves felt in obstructing
military preparations and subscriptions to the na
tional loan. In some parts of New England this
opposition assumed an almost seditious character.
Nor were the United States in any sense weU
prepared for a war with a first class power. The
republic was still comparatively weak In military
resources. The population, including slaves, had

86 HENRY CLAY
not yet reached eight miUions. Ohio, Kentucky,
and Tennessee were the westernmost States, In
diana was stUl a territory, and part of it in the
possession of Indian tribes. The battle of Tippe
canoe had been fought the year before on its soil.
The regular army had scarcely 10,000 effective
men. Volunteer and mlHtia levies had to be
mainly depended upon, and to command these the
number of experienced officers, aside from super
annuated "Revolutionary veterans," was extremely
smaU. The naval force consisted of a few old
frigates and some smaUer vessels. These were
aU the means at hand, when war was declared, to
force Great Britain, through a rapid conquest of
Canada, to respect the maritime rights of the
United States.
All this looked unpromising enough. But Clay
believed in the power of enthusiasm. His voice
resoimded through the land. His eloquence fiUed
volunteer regiments and sent them off full of fight
ing spirit and hope of victory. From place to
place he went, reassuring the doubters, arousing
the sluggards, encouraging the patriots, — in one
word, "firing the national heart." But, after aU,
his enthusiasm could not beat the enemy. His
conquest of Canada turned out to be a much more
serious affair than he had anticipated. Active
operations began. The first attempt at invasion,
made by General HuU on the western frontier,
resulted In the Ignominious surrender of that com
mander, with his whole force, to the British, at

THE WAR OF 1812 87
Detroit. Other attempts on the Niagara River
and on Lake Champlain ended but little less in-
glorlously. These failures were not only military
disasters, but were calculated to bury In ridicule
the advocates of the war with their glowing pre
dictions of the taking of Quebec and the peace
dictated at Halifax. Only the little navy did
honor to the country. The American men-of-war
gathered laurels in one encounter after another, to
the astonishment of the world. It was a revela
tion to England as weU as to the American people.
Meanwhile the situation was curiously changed
by other events. Before the declaration of war
was known in Europe, Napoleon tried to increase
the excitement of the Americans against England,
and to propitiate their feeling wdth regard to
France, by causing to be exhibited to the Amer
ican minister a decree pretending to have been
signed on AprU 28, 1810, but really manufactured
for the occasion, to the effect that the Berlin and
Milan Decrees should, as to the United States, be
considered as having been of no force since No
vember 1, 1810. On the other hand, in England
the mercantUe interest and the manufacturing
population had at last become dissatisfied with the
prohibition of the American trade. There had
been a parliamentary inquiry Into the effects of the
Orders in CouncU, and the government, pressed by
motions in Parliament for their repeal, had finaUy
yielded and withdrawn the obnoxious measures on
June 23, 1812, reserving the right to renew them.

88 HENRY CLAY
should the Americans persist in a policy hostile to
British interests. But five days before, unknown
to the British government, the United States had
declared war. The Orders In CouncU had no
doubt been considered the principal cause for that
war. Now Great Britain had shown herself ready
to remove that cause. Nothing remained but the
complaint about the impressment of American sea
men. On that ground the war went on, — with
what success at first, we have seen.
It is reported that Madison seriously contem
plated making Clay commanding general of the
forces In the field, and that GaUatin dissuaded
him, saying: "But what shall we do without Clay
in Congress? " Indeed, the next session showed
how much he was needed there.
When Congress met in the faU of 1812 the gen
eral situation was dismal in the extreme. On land
there had been nothing but defeat and humiliation.
On the sea some splendid achievements. Indeed,
in duels between ship and ship, but no prospect
of success in a struggle between navy and navy.
England had not yet begun to put forth her colos
sal power. What was to happen when she should!
With aU this, the offered withdrawal of the Orders
In Council stood as conclusive proof of the fact
that, had the United States only waited a little
longer with the declaration of war, the principal
cause of complaint might have been peaceably
removed. What an opportunity for an able op
position! Madison was indeed reelected to the

THE WAR OF 1812 89
presidency in the fall of 1812, by an electoral vote
of 128 against 89; but the opposition, especially
bitter in New England, had no reason to be dis
couraged by that proportion.
BiUs to increase the navy were swiftly passed,
almost without objection, for the Federalists them
selves, especially those from the shipping States,
desired a more efficient naval force. But on a
bill for reinforcing the army the attack came. At
first it was tame enough. The biU had already
passed by a large majority to a third reading, when
Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, the leader of the
Federalists in the House, made an assault upon the
whole war poUcy, which in brilHancy of diction
and bitterness of spirit has hardly ever been ex-
ceUed in our parliamentary history. He depicted
the attempted invasion of Canada as a buccaneer
ing expedition, an act of bloodthirsty cruelty
against unoffending neighbors. Its failure was a
disgrace, but "the disgrace of failure was terres
trial glory compared with the disgrace of the at
tempt." If an army were put Into the field strong
enough to accomplish the conquest of Canada, it
would also be strong enough to endanger the liber
ties of the American people. In view of the crim
inality of the attempt, he thanked God that the
people of New England — referring to their vote
against Madison in the preceding national election
— "had done what they could to vindicate them
selves and their children from the burden of this
sin." This was not the way to obtain an early

90 HENRY CLAY
and honorable peace. "Those must be very young
poUticians," he exclaimed, his eye fixed on the
youthful speaker of the House, — "their pin-fea
thers not yet grown, and, however they may flutter
on this floor, they are not yet fledged for any high
or distant flight, who think that threats and ap
pealing to fear are the ways of producing any dis
position to negotiate In Great Britain, or in any
other nation which understands what it owes to its
own safety and honor." The voluntary yielding
of England with regard to the Orders in Council
had shown how peace might have been secured.
But he was convinced that the administration did
not want peace. The administration party had its
origin and found Its daUy food in hatred of Great
Britain. He reviewed the whole diplomatic his
tory of the United States to show that RepubUcan
influence had always been bent upon forcing a
quarrel with England, and that during Jefferson's
and Madison's administrations there had been con
stant plotting against peace and friendship. This
review he foUowed with a scathing exposure of the
subserviency of the administration to the audacious
and insulting duplicity of Bonaparte, and the
shamefid humUiation of the government in conse
quence of it. FinaUy, he declared that, whUe he
would unite with any man for purposes of mari
time and frontier defense, he would unite with no
one nor with any body of men "for the conquest
of any country, either as a means of carrying on
this war or for any other purpose."

THE WAR OF 1812 91
This savage attack struck deeply. It was fol
lowed by several speeches on the same side, insist
ing that the quarrel between the United States and
England had, after the revocation of the Orders in
Council, been narrowed down to the impressment
question, and that the United States would never
have gone to war on that account alone.
Then Clay, the foremost of the young politicians
whose "pin-feathers were not yet grown," took up
the gauntlet. Quincy and his foUowers had made
a mistake not unusually made under such circum
stances. They had overshot the mark. The most
serious danger of an opposition in time of war is
to expose themselves to the suspicion of a lack of
patriotism. This danger they did not avoid.
The report we have of Clay's speech, delivered
on January 8 and 9, 1813, although not perfect,
Is sufficient to stamp this as one of his greatest
performances. He did not find it difficult to de
fend Jefferson and Madison — who, indeed, had
toiled enough to maintain peaceable relations with
everybody — against the charge of having wan
tonly provoked a war with England. It was, he
said, the interest, as weU as the duty, of the ad
ministration to preserve peace. Nothing was left
untried to that end. The defensive measures —
non-importation and embargo — adopted to protect
our maritime trade, were "sacrificed on the altar
of conciUation." Any "indication of a return to
the pubUc law and the path of justice on the part
of either beUigerent was seized upon with avidity

92 HENRY CLAY
by the administration;" so the friendly disposi
tion shown by Erskine. But — here the orator
skUlfuUy passed to the offensive — what was the
conduct of the opposition meanwhUe? When
peaceful experiments were undergoing a trial, the
opposition was "the champion of war, the proud,
the spirited, the sole repository of the nation's
honor, denouncing the administration as weak,
feeble, pusillanimous," and incapable of being
kicked into war : —
" When, however, foreign nations, perhaps emboldened
by the very opposition here made, refuse to listen to
amicable appeals ; when, in fact, war with one of them
has become a matter of necessity, demanded by our
independence and our sovereignty, behold the opposi
tion veering round and becoming the friends of peace
and commerce, teUing of the calamities of war, the waste
of the public treasury, the spilling of innocent blood —
' Grorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire.' Now we see
them exhibiting the terrific form of the roaring IHTig
of the forest ; now the meekness and hunulity of the
lamb. They are for war and no restrictions, when the
administration is for peace. They ard for peace and
restrictions, when the administration is for war. Yon
find them, sir, tacking with every gale, displaying the
colors of every party and of all nations, steady only in
one unalterable purpose, — to steer, if possible, into the
haven of power."
Over the charge that the administration had been
duped by France, a very sore point, he skipped
nimbly, ridiculing the idea of French influence as

THE WAR OF 1812 93
well as the tremendous denunciations of Bonaparte,
in which the opposition were fond of Indulging.
With these denunciations he dexterously coupled
an attack made by Quincy upon Jefferson; and
then, to Inflame the party spirit of wavering Re
publicans, he burst out in that famous eulogy on
Jefferson which has long figured in our school-
books : —
"Neither his retirement from public office, nor his
eminent services, nor his advanced age, can exempt this
patriot from the coarse assaults of party malevolence.
Sir, in 1801 he snatched from the rude hand of usurpar
tion the violated Constitution of his country, and that is
his crime. He preserved that instrument in form, and
substance, and spirit, a precious inheritance for genera
tions to come ; and for this he can never be forgiven.
How vain and impotent is party rage directed against
such a man ! He is not more elevated by his lofty resi
dence upon the summit of his favorite mountain than
he is lifted, by the serenity of his mind, and the con
sciousness of a weU-spent life, above the mafignant pas
sions and bitter feelings of the day."
Did the opposition speak of the danger to popu
lar Hberty arising from a large army ? They were
the same party that had tried to strangle popular
liberty with the Alien and Sedition laws. Did the
opposition, as Quincy had done, accuse the Repub
lican leaders of cabinet plots, presidential plots,
and aU manner of plots for the gratification of
personal ambition? "I wish," he replied with
stinging force, "that another plot — a plot that

94 HENRY CLAY
aims at the dismemberment of the Union — had
only the same imaginary existence." Then, with
a moderation of tone which made the arraignment
aU the more impressive, he pointed at the efforts
made to alienate the minds of the people of New
England from the Union.
On the second day of his speech he discussed the
causes of the war. "The war was declared," he
said, "because Great Britain arrogated to herself
the pretension of regulating our foreign commerce,
under the delusive name of retaUatory Orders in
Council; because she persisted in the practice of
impressing American seamen; because she had
instigated the Indians to commit hostUities against
us ; and because she refused indemnity for her past
injuries upon our commerce. The war, in fact,
was announced, on our part, to meet the war which
she was waging on her part." Why not declare
war against France, also, for the injuries she in
flicted upon American commerce, and the outrage
ous duplicity of her conduct? "I wiU concede to
gentlemen," he said, "everything they ask about
the injustice of France toward this country. I
wish to God that our abUity was equal to our dis
position to make her feel the sense that we enter
tain of that injustice." But one war at a time was
enough. Great Britain, he argued, demanded
more than the repeal of the French decrees as to
America; she demanded their repeal as to Great
Britain and her aUies, also, before giving up the
Orders in Council; and she gave them up only In

THE WAR OF 1812 95
consequence of an inquiry, reluctantly consented
to by the ministry, into the effect of our non-im
portation law, or by reason of our warlike atti
tude, or both.
But now came the ticklish question : Were the
Orders in Council the decisive cause of the war,
and should their withdrawal end it? Does it fol
low, he answered, that what in the first instance
would have prevented the war should also termi
nate it? By no means. The war of the Revolu
tion was an example, begun for one object and
prosecuted for another. He declared that he had
always considered the impressment of American
seamen as the most serious aggression, no matter
upon what principle Great Britain defended her
policy. "It is In vain," he said, "to set up the plea
of necessity, and to aUege that she cannot exist
without the impressment of lier seamen. The
naked truth is, she comes, by her press-gangs, on
board of our vessels, seizes our native as weU as
naturalized seamen, and drags them Into her ser
vice. It is wrong that we should be held to prove
the nationality of our seamen ; it Is the business of
Great Britain to Identify her subjects. The colors
that float from the masthead should be the cre
dentials of our seamen." Then he put forth his
whole melodramatic power, drawing tears from the
eyes of his listeners.
" It is impossible that this country should ever aban
don the gallant tars who have won for us such splendid
trophies. Let me suppose that the genius of Columbia

96 HENRY CLAY
should visit one of them in his oppressor's prison, and
attempt to reconcile him to his forlorn and wretched
condition. She would say to him, in the language of
gentlemen on the other side : ' Great Britain intends
you no harm ; she did not mean to impress you, but
one of her own subjects. Having taken you by mis
take, I win remonstrate and try to prevail upon her, by
peaceable means, to release you ; but I cannot, my son,
fight for you.' If he did not consider this mockery, the
poor tar would address her judgment and say : ' You
owe me, my country, protection ; I owe you, in return,
obedience. I am not a British subject ; I am a native
of Massachusetts, where fives my aged father, my wife,
my children. I have faithfully discharged my duty.
WUl yon refuse to do yours ? ' Appeafing to her pas
sions, he would continue : ' I lost this eye in fighting
under Truxton with the Insurgente ; I got this scar be
fore Tripofi ; I broke this leg on the Constitution, when
the Guerrifere struck.' If she remained still unmoved,
he would break out, in the accents of mingled distress
and despair, —
' Hard, hard is my fate ! Once I freedom enjoyed,
Was as happy, as happy could be !
Oh, how hard is my fate, how galling these chaiiis ! '
" I will not imagine the dreadful catastrophe to which
he would be driven by an abandonment of bim to his
oppressor. It will not be, it cannot be, that his country
wUl refuse bim protection ! If there be any descrip
tion of rights, which, more than any other, should unite
aU parties in aU quarters of the Union, it is unquestion
ably the rights of the person. No matter what his voca
tion, whether he seeks subsistence amid the dangers of
the sea, or draws them from the bowels of the earth, or

THE WAR OF 1812 97
from the humblest occupations of mechanic life, where-
ever the sacred rights of an American freeman are as
sailed, all hearts ought to unite and every arm be braced
to vindicate his cause."
After this, the objections to the invasion of Can
ada were easily disposed of. Canada was simply a
base of supplies and of operations for the British.
Moreover, "what does a state of war present?
The united energies of one people arrayed against
the combined energies of another; a conflict in
which each party aims to Inflict aU the injury it
can, by sea and land, upon the territories, pro
perty, and citizens of another, subject only to the
rules of mitigated war practiced by civilized na
tions." This was his flnal appeal: —
" The administration has erred in the steps to restore
peace ; but its error has not been in doing too little, but
in betraying too great a soUcitude for that event. An
honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war.
My plan would be, to call out the ample resources of the
country, give them a judicious direction, prosecute the
war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever we can reach
the enemy, at sea and on land, and negotiate the terras
of a peace at Quebec or at Halifax. We are told that
England is a proud and lofty nation, which, disdaining
to wait for danger, meets it half way. Haughty as she
is, we once triumphed over her, and, if we do not listen
to the counsels of timidity and despair, we shall again
prevail. In such a cause, with the aid of Providence,
we must come out crowned with success. But if we
fail, let us fail like men, lash ourselves to our gallant

98 HENRY CLAY
tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fight
ing for Free Trade and Seamen's Rights ! "
This speech produced a profound impression in
the House. What became known of it outside
rang like a bugle-eaU aU over the country. The
increase of the army was voted by Congress. The
war spirit rose again with renewed ardor. But
what news came from the front? In the West,
General Winchester was overpowered at French-
town on February 22. His command had to sur
render and part of it was massacred. General
Harrison found himself obUged to faU back. On
the Niagara and the St. Lawrence, an expedition
was pushed forward, which, on April 27, resulted
in the temporary capture of York (now Toronto),
but no lodgment was effected. While the navy
had struck some splendid blows, the British grad
uaUy increased their force and made the superior
ity of their power teU. They strengthened their
blockade of New York, of the Delaware, and the
Chesapeake. British ships ascended the bays and
the rivers, and landed parties to plunder and set
fire to viUages on the banks. Philadelphia, Balti
more, and Annapolis became alarmed for their
safety. In Virginia, a slave insurrection was
feared. The port of Charleston was strictly block
aded. Every day It became clearer, too, that the Madi
son administration was iU-fitted for times of great
exigency. The war and navy departments were
wretchedly managed. There was incapacity above

THE WAR OF 1812 99
and below. The Treasury was in a state of ex
haustion. By April 1, the requisitions of the war
and navy departments must have gone unsatisfied
had not Astor, Parish, and Girard, three rich for
eigners, come to the assistance of the government.
New England Federalism grew constantly more
threatening In its hostility to the war policy. In
addition to aU this, tidings of evil Import arrived
from Europe. Napoleon's disastrous retreat from
Moscow brought forth new European combinations
against him In aid of England. More and more
EngUsh ships and EngUsh veteran regiments might
then be spared from the European theatre of war,
to be hurled against the United States. The pro
spect of dictating a peace at Quebec or Halifax
grew exceedingly dim.
Just then a ray of peace flashed from an unex
pected quarter. When, late In the summer of
1812, the Emperor of Russia learned that the
United States had declared war against Great
Britain, It struck him as very inconvenient that
his aUy, England, should be embarrassed by this
outside affair while Napoleon was invading Russia,
and while a supreme effort seemed to be required
to prevent him from bringing aU Europe to his
feet. Alexander resolved to offer himself as a
mediator. His chancellor, Romanzoff, on Sep
tember 21, opened the matter to the American
minister at St. Petersburg, John Quincy Adams,
as well as to the British envoy. At the same time,
the Russian minister at Washington, Daschkoff,

100 HENRY CLAY
was instructed to communicate to President Madi
son the emperor's wish. This he did in March,
1813, a few days after Madison's second inaugu
ration. Madison received the proposition with
exceeding gladness. Without waiting to learn
whether this Russian mediation was acceptable to
England, he forthwith nominated as ministers, to
act jointly with John Quincy Adams In negotiat
ing a peace, Albert GaUatin, the secretary of the
treasury, and Senator Bayard of Delaware, a pa
triotic Federalist and a man of excellent abiUties.
They sailed for St. Petersburg early In May, and
took Instructions with them in which impressments
and iUegal blockades were designated as the chief
causes of the war. With regard to the impress
ment question, the instructions said : " If this en
croachment is not provided against, the United
States have appealed to arms In vain. If your
efforts to accomplish it should fail, aU further
negotiation wiU cease, and you wIU return home
without delay."
The envoys reached St. Petersburg in July, and
learned that Great Britain was not inclined to ac
cept any mediation. The haughty mistress of the
sea would not submit her principles of blockade
and her claim to the right of impressment and
search to the judgment of any third party. She
preferred to treat with the United States directly;
and when the Russian offer of mediation was re
newed, the British government sent a proposal of
direct negotiation to Washington, This was

THE WAR OF 1812 101
promptly accepted, and the President appointed
for that purpose a new commission, consisting of
John Quincy Adams, Bayard, Clay, Jonathan
Russell, then minister of the United States to
Sweden, and Gallatin,
Clay had again been elected speaker, in May,
1813, when the new Congress met. He had again
done aU he could to "flre the national heart," this
time by a resolution to inquire into certain acts of
barbarous brutaUty committed by the British and
their savage allies during the winter and spring.
But when the President urged upon him a place in
the peace commission, he accepted. His subse
quent conduct permits the guess that his motive
in accepting it was his anxious desire to prevent
a humUIating peace. On January 14, 1814, he
resigned the speakership of the House of Repre
sentatives, and soon afterward he set out on one
of the strangest diplomatic missions of our time.

CHAPTER VI
GHENT AND LONDON
The British government, when offering to nego
tiate directly with the United States, had desig
nated London, or Gottenburg in Sweden, as the
places where the negotiators might meet. Its pur
pose was to isolate the United States as much as
possible. It desired to be left alone In deaUng
with the Americans, and to shut out aU influences
friendly to them. To this end, London and Got
tenburg seemed to be convenient localities. Fi
naUy, however, it agreed that the peace commis
sioners should meet at Ghent, In the Netherlands.
The American envoys had aU arrived there on July
6, 1814. There were among them men so differ
ent In point of character and habits and ways of
thinking, that to make them agree among them
selves might have appeared almost as difficult as
to make a satisfactory treaty with England. The
principal clash was between Adams and Clay.
John Quincy Adams was then forty-seven years
old, with aU his peculiarities fully matured, — a
man of great abUity, various knowledge, and large
experience ; of ardent patriotism, and high princi
ples of honor and duty ; brimful of courage, and a

GHENT AND LONDON 103
pugnacious spirit of contention; precise In his
ways ; stiff and cold in manners ; tenacious of his
opinions; irritable of temper; Inclined to be sus
picious, and harsh in his judgments of others, and,
in the Puritan spirit, also severe with himself; one
of the men who keep diaries, and in them regular
accounts of their own as weU as other people's
doings. Two days after the commissioners had aU
arrived at Ghent, he wrote in his journal : —
" I dined again at the table d'hSte at one. The other
gentlemen dined together at four. They sit after din
ner, and drink bad wine and smoke cigars, which neither
suits my habits nor my health, and absorbs time which
I can fll spare. I find it impossible, even with the most
rigorous economy of time, to do half the writing that I
ought." He had been a Federalist, but his patriotic soul
had taken fire at the Injuries and insults his coun
try had suffered from Great Britain. For this
reason he had broken with his party, exposed him
self to the lU-wIU of his neighbors, and supported
Jefferson's and Madison's administrations in their
measures of resistance to British pretensions.
Clay was ten years younger than Adams, cer
tainly no less enthusiastic an American patriot,
nor less spirited. Impulsive, and hot-tempered;
having already acquired something of that im-
periousness of manner which, later in his career,
was so much noticed; quick in forming opinions,
and impatient of opposition, but warm-hearted
and genial; no Puritan at aU In his ways; rather

104 HENRY CLAY
inclined to "sit after dinner," whether the wine
was good or bad ; and, while wiUing to work, also
bent on having his full share of the enjoyments of
this world. "Just before rising," Adams wrote in
his Diary one day, "I heard Mr. Clay's company
retiring from his chamber. I had left him with
Mr. RusseU, Mr. Bentzon, and Mr. Todd, at
cards. They parted as I was about to rise."
John Quincy Adams played cards, too, but it was
that solemn whist, which he sometimes went
through with the conscientious sense of performing
a diplomatic duty. No wonder the prim New
Englander and the dashing Kentuckian, one the
representative of Eastern, the other of Western,
ways of thinking, when they had struck points of
disagreement, would drift into discussions much
more animated than was desirable for the task they
had in common. Russell, a man of ordinary abil
ity, was much under the influence of Clay, while
Bayard, although not disposed to quarrel with
anybody, showed not seldom a disposition to stick
to his opinion, when It differed from those of his
coUeagues, with polite but stubborn firmiless.
"Each of us," wrote Mr. Adams, "takes a .sepa
rate and distinct view of the subject-matter, and
each naturaUy thinks his own view of it the most
important." A commission so constituted would
hardly have been fit to acoompUsh a task of ex
traordinary deUcacy, had it not been for the con
spicuous ability, the exquisite tact, the constant
good-nature, the "playfnbess of temper," as Mr.

GHENT AND LONDON 105
Adams expressed it, and the inexhaustible patience
of Albert GaUatin, a man whose eminence among
his contemporaries has probably never been appre
ciated as it deserves. Without in the least obtrud
ing himself, he soon became the peacemaker, the
moderating and guiding mind of the commission.
The British envoys, who arrived at Ghent on
August 6, having permitted the Americans to wait
for them one fuU month, were Lord Gambler, a
vice-admiral, Henry Goulburn, secretary In the
colonial department, and Dr. WiUiam Adams, an
admiralty lawyer, men not remarkable for abiUty
or standing, but apparently somewhat inclined to
be overbearing In conduct. Indeed, the advan
tage of position was altogether on their side.
Since the time when President Madison seized
upon the Russian offer of mediation, in March,
1813, the fortunes of war had been vacillating.
The Americans had made a successful expedition
against Fort George, and the British had been
repulsed at Sackett's Harbor. But the first great
naval disaster then happened in the defeat of the
Chesapeake by the Shannon off Boston Light.
New naval successes, especiaUy Perry's splendid
victory on Lake Erie, September 10, 1813, re
lieved the gloom. General Harrison won in the
fight of the Thames, in which Tecumseh was kiUed,
on October 5. But a winter expedition led by
Hampton and Wilkinson against Montreal failed;
Fort Niagara was lost. Black Rock and Buffalo
were burned, and great quantities of provisions

106 HENRY CLAY
and stores destroyed. These disasters were scarcely
counterbalanced by General Jackson's success
against the Creeks In the Southwest; but this and
the recovery of Detroit were the only considerable
advantages gained on land In 1813. The opening
spring brought another failure of an expedition
along the shore of Lake Champlain into Canada
under Wilkinson. The blockade was constantly
growing more rigid. Not a single American man-
of-war was on the open sea. The successful fights
at Chippewa and Lundy's Lane, and then the
crowning disgrace of the capture of Washington,
were stiU to come. Meanwhile the discontent with
the war prevailing in New England, which was
destined to culminate In the Hartford Convention,
although apparently not spreading, continued to
be active and to threaten rebellious outbreaks.
But the most ominous events were the downfall of
Napoleon, the conclusion of peace in Europe, and,
in consequence, the liberation of the military,
naval, and financial resources of Great Britain for
a vigorous prosecution of the war in America.
What had already happened was only chUd's play.
The really serious business was now to come. The
outlook appeared, therefore, extremely gloomy.
While on his way to Ghent, GaUatin had spent
some time in London, and had earnestly tried
there to interest. In behalf of the United States,
the Emperor of Russia, who was on a visit to his
English aUy. That effort, too, had failed. The
United States were without an active friend.

GHENT AND LONDON 107
Most of these things had become known, not
only to the Americans, but also to the British com
missioners. These gentlemen were, therefore, nat
urally inclined to treat the United States as a de
feated enemy suing for peace. At the opening of
the negotiation the British demanded as a sine qua
non that a large territory In the United States, all
the country now occupied by the States of Michi
gan, Illinois, and Wisconsin, the larger part of
Indiana, and about one third of Ohio, should be
set apart for the Indians, to constitute a sort of
Indian sovereignty under British guaranty, not to
be purchased from the Indians by the United
States, and to serve as a "buffer," a perpetual
protection of the British possessions against
American ambition. They demanded also that the
United States should relinquish the right of keep
ing any armed vessels on the Great Lakes ; and, in
addition to aU this, they asked for the cession of
a piece of Maine In order to make a road from
HaUfax to Quebec, and for a formal renewal of
the provision of the treaty of 1783 giving English
subjects the right of navigating the Mississippi.
This meant almost a surrender of American
independence. It was the extreme of humiliation.
That such a proposition could be thought of was
a most painful shock to the American envoys.
All they could do was promptly to reject the sine
qua non, and then think of going home. This
they did. They not only thought of going home,
but they openly spoke of it. The British commis-

108 HENRY CLAY
sioners received the impression, and reported it
to their government, that the Americans were very
much in earnest, and that what they really desired
was not to make peace, but to put things In an
aspect calculated to unite their people at home in
favor of the war. Then something of decisive
importance happened behind the scenes, which,
no doubt, the Americans would have been glad to
know. The leading statesmen in England were
not at aU anxious to break off negotiations, espe
ciaUy not upon points a final rupture on which
might have "made the war popular in America."
In fact, as Lord Liverpool wrote to Lord Castle
reagh, they were apprehensive that then the war
would be a long affair; that "some of their Euro
pean aUies would not be Indisposed to favor the
Americans," meaning especiaUy the Emperor of
Russia, and that this American business would
"entail upon them prodigious expense." They
did not desire to have It said that "the property
tax was continued for the purpose of securing a
better frontier for Canada." Besides, the state
of the negotiations at the Vienna Congress was
"unsatisfactory;" the situation of the interior of
France was "alarming; " the English people were
tired of war taxes. Was It not more prudent after
aU to let the Americans off without a cession of
territory? The Duke of WeUington was consulted;
he emphaticaUy expressed himself against any
territorial or other demand which would "afford
the Americans a proper and creditable ground"

GHENT AND LONDON 109
for decUning to make peace. The British commis
sioners were instructed accordingly.
Of this the Americans were, of course, ignorant.
Only Clay felt It intuitively. According to Mr.
Adams's Diary, Clay had "an inconceivable Idea
that they wiU recede from the ground they have
taken." That is to say, he had the Instinct of the
situation. The British dropped their sine qua non;
they gave up a proposition which they made to
treat on the basis of uti possidetis, each nation to
hold what It possessed or occupied at the time of
signing the treaty; they finaUy showed themselves
wiUing to accept the American proposition of the
statiis ante helium as a basis for the final arrange
ment. But one thing they would not do: they
would not listen to anything about stipulations
touching principles of blockade, rights of neutrals,
impressment and right of search, concerning which
the Americans insisted upon submitting the draft
of an article. This they declined so peremptorily
that aU further discussion seemed useless. What,
then, became of "Free Trade and Seamen's
Rights?" What of the original instruction that
the commissioners should break off forthwith and
come home If they failed in obtaining a concession
with regard to impressment? President Madison
had in the mean time reconsidered the matter and
sent further Instructions authorizing them to treat
on the basis of the status ante helium, — substan
tiaUy, to restore things to the state In which the
war had found them. Not a proud thing to do,

110 HENRY CLAY
but better, he thought, than to go on with such a
war. When the British accepted this basis, and the
Americans gave up their contention for definite
stipulations concerning the principles of blockade
and the impressment question, the peace was vir-
tuaUy assured. Only matters of detaU had to be
agreed upon, which, if both parties sincerely de
sired peace, would not be difficult. But confused
and apparently interminable wrangles sprang up
concerning the definition of the status ante helium,
mainly with regard to the British right to the navi
gation of the Mississippi and the American right
to fish in British waters, which had been coupled
together in the first treaty of peace, In 1783, be
tween the United States and Great Britain. The
British commissioners now insisted upon the Brit
ish right to navigate the Mississippi, but proposed
to put an end to the American right to the fish
eries. It is needless to recount in detail the pro
positions and counter-propositions which passed
between the two parties upon this point, as weU
as the furious altercations in the American com
mission between Clay and Adams, taxing to the ut
most GaUatln's resources as a peacemaker; Clay
insisting that a renewal of the right of the British
to navigate the Mississippi, which had been con
ceded In the treaty of 1783, and again in Jay's
treaty of 1794, when Spain held the whole of the
, right bank of the Mississippi, with part of the left,
and the British dominions were erroneously sup-

GHENT AND LONDON 111
posed to touch on the head-waters of the great
river, would be giving them a privilege far more
important than we should secure In return, as the
fisheries were "a matter of trifling moment; " and
Adams maintaining with equal heat that the fish
eries were a thing of great value, while the privi
lege to navigate the Mississippi enjoyed by the
British under the treaty of 1783 had never led to
any trouble or inconvenience. At last, after these
long and angry discussions, after much sending of
notes and repHes, in which the American envoys
displayed great skill ia argument, and after re
peated references of the disputed points by the
British commissioners to the Foreign Office in
London and long waiting for answers, the British
government declared that It was wlUing to accept
a treaty sUent on both subjects, the fisheries as
weU as the navigation of the Mississippi. This
declaration reached the American commissioners
December 22, 1814, and with it the last obstacle
to a final agreement was removed. It appeared
that the British government had become f uUy as
anxious for peace as the American. Clay adhered
to his first impressions in this respect throughout
i the negotiation; for ten days before, on December
12, when other members of the commission stiU
suspected the British of seeking an occasion for
breaking off, Adams wrote In his Diary : " Mr. Clay
was so confident that the British government had
resolved upon peace, that he said he would give
himself as a hostage and a victim to be sacrificed

112 HENRY CLAY
if they broke off on these points." There is rea
son to believe that he would not have been sorry
if they had broken off.
The treaty was signed on December 24, 1814.
It may weU be imagined that the American com
missioners heaved a sigh of relief, aU, at least,
except Clay. For five weary months they had
been fighting from point to point a foe who seemed
to have all the advantages of strength and position,
and all the whUe they had been in constant appre
hension that any hour might bring more evil news
to destroy the fruit of their anxious labors. With
dignity but not without Impatience they had borne
the gruffness with which the English commission
ers had frequently thought proper to emphasize
the superiority of the power behind them. Like
brave men they had gone through the dinners with
their British coUeagues, the ghastly humor of which
during the fiist period of the negotiation consisted
in cheerful conversations about the impossibility
of agreeing, the short and fruitless visit of the
American commissioners to Europe, their speedy
return home, and so on. Then finaUy the alterca
tions among themselves, which grew warmer as
the negotiation proceeded, had made it appear
doubtful more than once whether they would be
able to present a united front upon all the impor
tant points. In these altercations Clay had ap
peared especially fretful, constantly dissatisfied,
and ungovernable. Adams's Diary teems with
significant remarks about Clay "waxing loud and

GHENT AND LONDON 113
warm;" about his "great heat and anger;" how
"Mr. Clay lost his temper, as he generaUy does
whenever the right of the British to navigate the
Mississippi Is discussed;" how "Mr. Clay, who
was determined to foresee no public misfortune in
our affairs, bears them with less temper, now they
have come, than any of us; he rails at commerce
and the people of Massachusetts, and tells us what
wonders the people of Kentucky would do If they
should be attacked; " how "Mr. Clay Is growing
peevish and fractious," — and, recoUecting him
self, Adams contritely adds: "I too must not for
get to keep guard on my temper." At the very
last, just before separating, Adams and Clay quar
reled about the custody of the papers, in language
bordering upon the unparliamentary. But for the
consummate tact and the authority of Gallatin the
commission would not seldom have been In danger
of breaking up In heated controversy.
The complaints about Clay's iU-tempered moods
were undoubtedly well founded. Always some
what inclined to be dictatorial and impatient of
opposition, he had on this occasion especial reason
for being Ul at ease. He, more than any one else,
had made the war. He had advised the invasion
of Canada, and predicted an easy conquest. He
had confidently spoken of dictating a peace at
Quebec or Halifax. He had, after the withdrawal
of the Orders In Council, insisted that the matter
of Impressment alone was sufficient reason for war.
He had pledged the honor of the country for the

114 HENRY CLAY
maintenance of the cause of "Free Trade and Sea
men's Rights." Now to make a peace which was
not only not dictated at Quebec or Halifax, but
looked rather like a generous concession on the
part of a victorious enemy; to make peace while
disgraceful defeats of the American arms, among
them the capture of the seat of government and
the burning of the Capitol, were stiU unavenged,
and while, after some brIUiant exploits, the Ameri
can navy was virtuaUy shut up In American har
bors by British blockading squadrons; a peace
based upon the status ante hdlum, without even
an allusion to the things that had been fought for,
— in one word, a peace, which, whatever its merits
and advantages, was certainly not a glorious peace,
— this could not but be an almost unendurable
thought to the man who, above aU things, wanted
to be proud of his country.
It Is, therefore, not surprising that, during
these five weary months of negotiation. Clay should
have been constantly tormented by the perhaps
half-unconscious desire to secure to his country
another chance to retrieve Its fortunes and restore
Its glory on the field of war, and, to that end, to
break off negotiations on some point that would
rouse and rally the American people. Thus we
find that, according to Adams, on October 31,
when complaint was made of the delays of the
British government In furnishing passports for
vessels to carry the dispatches of the American
commissioners, "Mr. Clay was for making a strong

GHENT AND LONDON 115
remonstrance on the subject, and for breaking off
the negotiation upon that point, if they did not
give us satisfaction." A passport arrived the
same day, rendering the remonstrance unnecessary.
When the negotiation had gone on for three months
and It was perfectly weU understood that the Brit
ish would not listen at aU to any proposition con
cerning Impressment, Clay, who alone had pressed
this subject, was again "so urgent to present an
article" on impressment that Mr. Adams "acqui
esced In his wishes;" the article was presented
and rejected by the British at once. Less than
two weeks before the final agreement, discussing
the question of the fisheries and the navigation of
the Mississippi in the commission. Clay broke out,
saying, "he was for a war three years longer; he
had no doubt three years more of war would make
us a warUke people, and that then we should come
out of the war with honor, — whereas at present,
even upon the best terms we could possibly obtain,
we shaU have only a half -formed army, and half
retrieve our miUtary reputation." His agony grew
as an agreement was approached, and culminated
two days before the treaty was signed, when the
British note on the fisheries and the navigation of
the Mississippi had been received, which seemed
to make the conclusion of the peace certain. "Mr.
Clay came to my chamber " (writes Mr. Adams),
"and on reading the British note manifested some
chagrin. He still talked of breaking off the nego
tiation, but he did not exactly disclose the motive

116 HENRY CLAY
of his lU-humor, which was, however, easily seen
through. In the evening we met, and Mr. Clay
continued in his discontented humor. He was for
taking time to deliberate upon the British note.
He was for meeting about it to-morrow morning.
He was sounding aU round for support in making
another stand of resistance at this stage of the
business. At last he turned to me and asked me
whether I would not join him now and break off
the negotiation. I told him, No, there was no
thing now to break off on."
Only then he gave it up, and with a heavy heart
he consented to sign the treaty of peace. The
treaty provided that hostilities should cease imme
diately upon Its ratification. It further stipulated
for a mutual restoration of territory (except some
small disputed Islands), of property, archives, etc. ;
a mutual restoration of prisoners of war; a com
mission to settle boundary questions, those ques
tions, if the commission should disagree, to be
submitted to some friendly government for arbi
tration ; cessation of Indian hostilities, each party
to restore the Indians with whom they were still
at war to aU possessions and rights they enjoyed
ia 1811; compensation for slaves abducted by
British forces; a promise by both governments to
promote the entire abolition of the slave trade;
but not a word to indicate what the British and
the Americans had been fighting about.
Thus ended the war of 1812, on paper; in real
ity, it went on until the news of the peace arrived

GHENT AND LONDON 117
in America. It stands as one of the most singular
wars in history. It was begun on account of out
rages committed upon the maritime commerce of
the United States ; but those parts of the country
which had least to do with that maritime com
merce, the South and West, were most in favor of
the war, while those whose fortunes were on the
sea most earnestly opposed it. Considering that the
conduct of Napoleon toward the United States had
been in some respects more outrageous, certainly
more perfidious and insultiag, than the conduct of
Great Britain, it might be questioned whether the
war was not waged against the wrong party. As
a matter of fact the Orders in Council furnished
the principal cause of the war. That principal
cause happened to disappear at the same time that
the war was declared. Hostilities were continued
on a secondary issue. But when peace was made,
neither the one nor the other was by so much as
a single word alluded to in the treaty. To cap
the climax, the principal battle of the war, the
battle of New Orleans, was fought after the peace
had been signed, but before it had become known
in America. It is questionable whether such a
peace would have been signed at all, had that
battle happened at an earlier period. While the
peace, as to the United States, was not one which
a victorious power would make, the closing tri
umph In America had given to the American arms
a prestige they had never possessed before.
Neither was the reception the treaty met with

118 HENRY CLAY
in accord with the fears of the American, or the
hopes of the British commissioners. WhUe the
leading statesmen of England congratulated one
another, as Lord Castlereagh, writing from Vienna,
expressed it In a letter to Lord Liverpool, upon
being "released from the miUstone of an American
war," the war party in England, who wanted to
"punish" the impudence of the United States,
were deeply mortified. They would not admit
that the peace on the British side was an "hon
orable" one, since England had failed to "force
her principles on America," and had retired from
the contest with some defeats unavenged. In the
United States, on the other hand, where some of
the American envoys, especially Clay, had feared
their work would find very little favor, the news
of peace was received with transports of joy. To
the American people It came after the victory of
New Orleans; and their national pride, relieved
of the terrible anxieties of the last two years, and
elated at the great closing triumph on the field of
battle, which seemed to wipe out aU the shame of
previous defeats, was content not to look too closely
at the articles of the treaty. Indeed, the Ameri
can commissioners received, for what they had
done, the praise of aU their feUow citizens who
were unbiased by party feeling, — praise, which,
taking into account the perplexities of their situa
tion, they weU deserved. With no decisive victo
ries on their side to boast of, with no weU-organ-
ized armies to support their pretensions, with no

GHENT AND LONDON 119
national ships on the high seas, with the capture
of Washington, the burning of the Capitol, and
the hurried flight of the President stIU a favorite
theme of jest at the dinner-tables and in the clubs
all over Europe, they had to confront the repre
sentatives of the haughtiest, and. In some respects,
the strongest power on earth. If it was true that
they had not succeeded In forcing the British for
mally to renounce the right of impressment and to
accept just principles of blockade and of neutral
rights, it was also true that the British had begun
the negotiation with extravagant, humiliating, per
emptory demands, presenting them in the most
overbearing manner as sine qua non; that they
had found themselves obliged to drop these one
after another; that in the discussion about the
fisheries and the navigation of the Mississippi, they
had been dislodged from position after position,
until finaUy they accepted a treaty which stood In
strange contrast to their original attitude. The
American commissioners had the satisfaction of
hearing the Marquis of WeUesley declare In the
House of Lords, that "In his opinion they had
shown a most astonishing superiority over the
British during the whole of the correspondence."
However reluctantly Clay had signed the peace,
his proud patriotic heart became reconciled to it
as the general effects of all that had been done
disclosed themselves. These effects were Indeed
very great, and he had reason to be satisfied with
them. The question has been much discussed.

120 HENRY CLAY
whether there was any statesmanship, any good
sense, in making the war of 1812 at all. It is
true that it was resolved upon without preparation,
and that it was wretchedly managed. But If war
is ever justified, there was ample provocation for
It. The legitimate interests of the United States
had been trampled upon by the beUigerent powers,
as if entitled to no respect. The American flag
had been treated with a contempt scarcely con
ceivable now. The question was whether the
American people should permit themselves not
only to be robbed, and maltreated, and insulted,
but also to be despised, — aU this for the privilege
of picking up the poor crumbs of trade which the
great powers of Europe would still let them have.
When a nation knowingly and wiUingly accepts
the contempt of others. It Is in danger of losing
also its respect for itself. Against this the na
tional pride of Young America rose in revolt.
When insulted too grievously. It felt an irresisti
ble impulse to strike. It struck wildly, to be sure,
and received ugly blows In return. But It proved,
after all, that this young democracy could not be
trampled upon with impunity, that it felt an insult
as keenly as older nations, and that it was capable
of risking a fight with the most formidable power
on earth In resenting it. It proved, too, that this
most formidable power might find in the young
democracy a very uncomfortable antagonist.
If the warlike impulse In this case was mere
sentiment, as has been said, it was a statesmanlike

GHENT AND LONDON 121
sentiment. For the war of 1812, with aU the
losses in blood and treasure entailed by it, and In
spite of the peace which ignored the declared
causes of the war, transformed the American re-
pubUc in the estimation of the world from a feeble
experimental curiosity into a power, — a real power,
fuU of brains, and with visible claws and teeth. It
made the American people, who had so far con
sisted of the peoples of so many little common
wealths, not seldom wondering whether they could
profitably stay long together, a consciously united
nation, with a common country, a great country,
worth fighting for; and a common national de
stiny, nobody could say how great; and a common
national pride, at that time fiUing every American
heart brimful. The war had encountered the first
practical disunion movement, and klUed it by ex
posing it to the execration of the true American
feeling; kiUed it so dead, at least on its field of
action, in New England, that a similar aspiration
has never arisen there again. The war put an
end to the last remnant of colonial feeling; for
from that time forwaird there was no longer any
French party or any English party in the United
States ; it was thenceforth aU American as against
the world. A war that had such results was not
fought in vain.
Clay might, therefore, weU say, as he did say a
year later in a debate in the House of Represent
atives : —
" I gave a vote for the declaration of war. I exerted

122 HENRY CLAY
all the fittle influence and talent I could command to
make the war. The war was made. It is terminated.
And I declare, with perfect sincerity, if it had been per
mitted to me to lift the veil of futurity, and to foresee
the precise series of events which has occurred, my vote
would have been unchanged. We had been insulted,
and outraged, and spoHated upon by almost all Europe,
— by Great Britain, by France, Spain, Denmark, Na
ples, and, to cap the climax, by the Httle contemptible
power of Algiers. We had submitted too long and too
much. We had become the scorn of foreign powers,
and the derision of our own citizens. What have we
gained by the war ? Let any man look at the degraded
condition of this country before the war, the scorn of
the universe, the contempt of ourselves ; and teU me if
we have gained nothing by the war ? What is our sit
uation now ? Respectabihty and character abroad, se
curity and confidence at home."
All this was true; but he was very far from
foreseeing such happy results at the time when he
put his name to the treaty of peace. To him it
seemed then a "damned bad treaty," and his mind
was restless with dark forebodings as to Its effect
upon the character of his coimtry and his own
standing as a pubUc man.
But the sojourn in Ghent was after aU by no
means aU gloom to his buoyant nature. He had
found things to enjoy. The American commis
sioners were most hospitably received by the au
thorities and the poUte burghers of Ghent. PubUc
and private entertainments in their honor crowded
one another, and they enjoyed them. Even Mr.

GHENT AND LONDON 123
Adams enjoyed them, he, however, not without
characteristic remorse, for thus he castigates him
self in his Diary: "There are several particulars in
my present mode of life in which there is too much
relaxation of seK-dlscipline. I have this month
frequented too much the theatre and other public
amusements; indulged too much convivIaUty, and
taken too little exercise. The consequence is that
I am growing corpulent, and that Industry becomes
irksome to me. May I be cautious not to fall into
any habit of indolence or dissipation!" Clay's
temperament, no doubt, enabled him to bear such
pleasures with more fortitude and less apprehen
sion of dire consequences. There was no twinge
of self-reproach in his mind, and later in Ufe he
often spoke of the days of Ghent with great satis
faction. He would certainly have enjoyed them
stIU more, had he at the time looked farther Into
the future.
The diplomatic business at Ghent completed,
Clay, in conjunction with Adams and GaUatin,
was instructed to go to London for the purpose of
negotiating a treaty of commerce. He did not,
however, make haste to present himself in Eng
land, for there was stiU a feeling weighing upon
his mind, as if, after the many defeats in America
and the to him unsatisfactory peace, he would not
like to be in the land of a triumphant enemy. So
he lingered In Paris. But as soon as he heard of
the battle of New Orleans, he was ready to start.
"Now," said he to the bearer of the news, "now

124 HENRY CLAY
I can go to England without mortification." While
In Paris he was Introduced to the polite society of
the French capital. A clever saying is reported
of him in a conversation with Madame de Stael:
"I have been in England," said she, "and have
been battUng for your cause there. They were so
much enraged against you that at one time they
thought seriously of sending the Duke of Welling
ton to lead their armies against you." "I am very
sorry," replied Mr. Clay, "that they did not send
the duke." "And why?" "Because if he had
beaten us, we should but have been in the condi
tion of Europe, without disgrace. But If we had
been so fortunate as to defeat him, we should have
greatly added to the renown of our arms."
He arrived in London in March and went to
work with GaUatin to open the negotiation in
trusted to them. Mr. Adams did not foUow them
until May. They met again, as British commis
sioners, Goulburn and Dr. Adams. Mr. Robin
son, afterwards Lord Goderlch and Earl Ripon,
then vice-president of the Board of Trade, were
substituted for Lord Gambler. The negotiation
lasted three months ; it was friendly in character,
but resulted In very little. The British govern
ment declined to open the questions of Impress
ment, blockade, trade with enemies' colonies in
time of war. West Indian and Canadian trade;
nothing of value was obtained save some advan
tages In the commerce with the East Indies, and
a provision abolishing discriminating duties.

GHENT AND LONDON 125
Clay arrived In the United States again In Sep
tember, 1815, and was duly received and feasted
by his friends and admirers. The people of the
Lexington district in Kentucky had In the mean
time reelected him to the national House of Repre
sentatives.

CHAPTER Vn
IN THE HOUSE OF KEPEESENTATIVE8
Before Clay left Lexington to take his seat in
Congress, he received a letter from the secretary
of state, James Monroe, offering him the mission
to Russia. He declined it. He was evidently
resolved to remain in' Congress whUe Madison was
president, for when, less than a year later, In
August, 1816, Madison invited him to a place in
his cabinet as secretary of war, his answer was
stiU a refusal.
On the first day of the session, December 4,
1815, Clay was again elected speaker. In both
Houses the RepubUcans had strong majorities; in
the Senate twenty-two against fourteen Federal
ists, and in the House of Representatives one hun
dred and seventeen against sixty-five. But the
Federalists, as a party contending for power, were
weaker even than these numbers Indicated, There
is no heavier burden for a political party to bear,
than to have appeared unpatriotic in time of
war. The Federal party went down under this
load at a period when its principles were, one after
another, unconsciously adopted by its victorious
opponents.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 127
The RepubUcanism left behind by the war of
1812 was no longer the Republicanism of frugal
economy, simple, unpretentious, narrowly circum
scribed government, and peace and friendship with
aU the world, which the famous triumvirate, Jef
ferson, Madison, and GaUatin, had set out with in
1801, and which was the political ideal of bucolic
democracy. The rough jostle with the strong
powers of the external world had made sad havoc
of the idyl. Instead of the least possible govern
ment there had been, even before the war, while
Jefferson himself was president, during that pain
ful struggle under the oppressive practices of the
European beUigerents, enormous stretches of power,
such as the laws enforcing the embargo, which
equaled, if not outstripped, anything the Federal
ists had ever done. Instead of frugal economy
and regular debt paying, there had been enormous
war expenses with new taxes and heavy loans.
Instead of unbroken peace and general friendship,
there had been a long and bloody war with the
nearest of kin. Now, with that war finished, there
was a large public debt, a frightfully disordered
currency, a heavy budget of yearly expenditures,
and a people awakened to new wants and new am
bitions, for the satisfaction of which they looked,
more than ever before, to the government. The
old triumvirate of leaders were indeed still alive;
but Jefferson was sitting in his lofty MontlceUo,
the sage of the period, giving forth oracular sounds,
many of them very wise, always respectfuUy re-

128 HENRY CLAY
ceived, but apt to be minded only when what he
said corresponded with the wishes of his listeners;
GaUatin, having witnessed and sagaciously recog
nized the breakdown of his favorite theory of gov
ernment, was serving the republic as a diplomatic
representative abroad; Madison was stiU presi
dent, but, having never been a strong leader of men
for his own purposes, he could offer but feeble
resistance to the new tendencies. A new school
of Republican leaders had pressed forward into the
places of these retired veterans, — new leaders,
who would speak with pity of a government "go
ing on in the old imbecile method, contributing
nothing by its measures to the honor and reputa
tion of the country;" who wanted a conduct of
public affairs "on an enlarged policy; " who
thought that revenues might be raised, not only
to provide for the absolute wants of the govern
ment, but, beyond that, for the advancement of
the public benefit.
Of this new RepubUcan school Clay and Cal
houn were the foremost champions. Clay boldly
put forth its programme In a speech made in com
mittee of the whole on January 29, 1816, on a biU
reported by Lowndes, to reduce the direct taxes
Imposed during the war. After having defended,
with great force, the war of 1812 as a just and
necessary war, and the peace of Ghent as an hon
orable peace, he enumerated the reasons why he
deemed no great reduction of taxes advisable.
Our relations with Spain, he said, were unsatis-

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 129
factory; there would be more wars with Great
Britain ; and the United States might have to aid
the Spanish South American colonies in their strug
gle for independence. It was necessary, therefore,
to maintain a respectable military establishment,
to augment the navy, and to provide for coast de
fenses. Furthermore he would, "as earnestly,
commence the great work, too long delayed, of
internal improvement. He desired to see a chain
of turnpike roads and canals from Passamaquoddy
Bay to New Orleans, and other similar roads in
tersecting the mountains, to facilitate intercourse
between aU parts of the country, and to bind and
connect us together." He would also "effectually
protect our manufactories, — not so much for the
manufactories themselves, as for the general inter
est. We should thus have our wants supplied,
when foreign resources are cut off; and we should
also lay the basis of a system of taxation to be
resorted to when the revenue from Imports Is
stopped by war." Provision for the contingency
of war was a prominent consideration in aU this ;
Clay's political ideas had not yet come down to
the peace footing. Calhoun foUowed him with a
vigorous speech of similar tenor. These argu
ments prevailed, and the direct tax was In part
retained. Then the tariff was taken In hand. The em
bargo, the non-intercourse, and the war, while
dealing the shipping interest a terrible blow, had,
by excluding foreign products, served as a powerful

130 HENRY CLAY
stimulus to manufacturing industry. But after
the war the country was flooded by a tremendous
importation of EngUsh goods. American indus
try, artificiaUy developed by an abnormal state of
things, was now to be artificiaUy sustained against
that competition. Tariff duties were resorted to
for that avowed purpose, and a scheme was pro
posed by DaUas, the secretary of the treasury.
He arranged the articles subject to duty in three
classes: 1. Those of which the home supply was
sufficient to satisfy the demand; they were to bear
the highest duty, thirty-five per cent, ad valorem.
2. Those of which the domestic supply was only
partiaUy sufficient to satisfy the demand, compris
ing cotton and woolen goods, as weU as iron and
most of its coarser products, dIstlUed spirits, etc. ;
these were to bear twenty per cent. And 3, those
of which the home production was smaU, or no
thing; these were to bear a simple revenue tax.
Most of the Federalists opposed this protective
poUcy, whUe the RepubUcan protectionists, iUus
trating the remarkable mutation of things, quoted
against them HamUton's famous report on manu
factures. Webster and most of the New England
men opposed it, because It would injure the ship
ping interest. John Randolph, independent of
party, opposed it, because it would benefit the
Northern States at the expense of the South.
Calhoun, Lowndes, and their Southern foUowers
supported it, not only as a means of national de
fense, but also In order to help the cotton interest.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 131
since England at that time levied a discriminating
duty on raw materials to the disadvantage of cot
ton raised in America, and since the coarser cotton
fabrics imported Into the United States were mostly
made of India cotton. The principal argument
' urged by Clay and generaUy accepted by the Re
publicans was, that certain manufacturing indus
tries must be built up and sustained for the safety
of the country In time of war. Thus the tariff of
1816 was enacted, embodying substantially the
scheme proposed by DaUas.
So far Clay had, as to definite measures of pub
lic concern, preserved a plausible consistency with
the principles and measures advocated by him be
fore the war of 1812. But he should not be spared
the ordeal brought on by direct self-contradiction.
The war had thrown the currency into great disor
der. Upon the expiration of the charter of the
United States Bank, the renewal of which Clay
had helped to defeat, the notes of that institution
were withdrawn, and the notes of state banks took
their place. These banks multiplied very rapidly.
In the years 1811, 1812, and 1813 one hundred
and twenty of them went into operation, many
with insufficient capital. The secretary of the
treasury endeavored in vain to bring the banks
Into prudent cooperation. They began to refuse
one another's blUs. In 1814 specie payments were
suspended. Reckless paper Issues produced a cor
responding inflation of prices. Under such cir
cumstances Dallas finaUy saw no other way to

132 HENRY CLAY
restore order In the currency than by the promptest
possible return to specie payments, and to this end
he proposed the establishment of a specie-paying
national bank, virtuaUy a revival of the old Bank
of the United States.
The Republican majority of 1816 was ready to
return to Hamilton's plan of a financial agency,
which the Republicans of 1811 had denounced and
rejected; and they were ready, too, to enlarge that
plan in aU the features formerly objected to. But
how could Clay support such a scheme? We shaU
see. On January 8, 1816, Calhoun reported to the
House of Representatives a bill providing that a
Bank of the United States should be chartered for
twenty years, with a capital of $35,000,000, di
vided into 350,000 shares, Congress to have the
power to authorize an increase of the capital to
$50,000,000; 70,000 shares, amounting to $7,000,-
000, to be subscribed and paid for by the United
States, and 280,000 shares to be taken by individ
uals, companies, or corporations; the government
to appoint five of the twenty -five directors; the
bank to be authorized to establish branches, to
have the deposits of the public money, subject to
the discretion of the secretary of the treasury, and
to pay to the government $1,500,000 In three in
stalments, as a bonus for its charter. This was
substantiaUy Hamilton's National Bank of 1791,
only on a larger scale. It was exactly the thing
which, five years before, Clay had found so utterly

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 133
unconstitutional, and in Its very nature so danger
ous, that he could under no circumstances consent
to a prolongation of its existence.
Again the two parties found themselves reversed
in position: the Federalists were now opposing
the bank, — some of them, like Webster, because
the capital was too large ; while the Republicans,
with some exceptions, were favoring it as a neces
sity. But how did Clay perform his somersault?
He made a speech which his contemporary friends
praised as very able. It was not reported, but he
reproduced its main propositions In an address
subsequently delivered before his constituents for
the purpose of defending himself against that charge
which has such terrors for pubUc men, — the charge
of inconsistency. This was his argument: In 1811
the legislature of his State had instructed him to
oppose the re-chartering of the bank, while now
the people of his district, as far as he had been
able to ascertain their minds by conversation with
them, were in favor of a new bank. Secondly,
the old bank had abused its powers for political
purposes, whUe the new bank would be deterred
from doing so by the fate of its predecessor. This
was making an audacious draft upon the credulity
of his audience. Thirdly, the bank had been
unconstitutional in 1811, but it was constitutional
in 1816, owing to a change of circumstances. We
remember that magnificent passage In Clay's speech
of 1811 In which he arrayed In parade the monster
corporations of history, arguing that so tremendous

134 HENRY CLAY
a power as the authority to charter such companies
could not possibly have been given to the federal
government by mere Inference and impUcation;
that, if the Constitution did not grant that power
In so many words, directly, specifically, unmistak
ably, it was not granted at aU. What did he say
now? "The Constitution contained powers delegated and
prohibitory, powers expressed and constructive. It vests
in Congress aU powers necessary to give effect to the enu
merated powers. The powers that may be so necessary
are deducible by construction. They are not defined in
the Constitution. They are in their nature undefinable.
With regard to the degree of necessity various rules
have been, at different times, laid down ; but perhaps, at
last, there is no other than a sound and honest judgment,
exercised under the control which belongs to the Consti
tution and the people. It is manifest that this necessity
may not be perceived at one time under one state of
things, while it is perceived at another time under a
different state of things. The Constitution, it is true,
never changes ; it is always the same ; but the force of
circumstances and the fights of experience may evolve,
to the fallible persons charged with its administration,
the fitness and necessity of a particular exercise of con
structive power to-day, which they did not see at a
former period."
And how did he apply this constitutional theory
to the pending case? In 1811, he said, the bank
did not seem to him necessary, because it was
supported mainly upon the ground "that it was

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 135
indispensable to the Treasury operations," which,
In his opinion, could have been sufficiently aided
by the state banks then existing. Therefore the re-
chartering of the United States Bank would have
been, in his view, at that time unconstitutional.
But now he beheld specie payments suspended.
He saw about three hundred banking Institutions
which had lost the public confidence In a greater
or less degree, and which were exercising what
had always and everywhere been considered "one
of the highest attributes of sovereignty," namely,
the "regulation of the current medium of the
country." They were no longer capable of aiding,
but were really obstructing, the operations of the
Treasury, To renew specie payments and to pre
vent further disaster and distress a national bank
now appeared to him "not only necessary, but
indispensably necessary." Under these circum
stances, therefore, he considered the chartering of
a national bank constitutional. "He preferred,"
he added, "to the suggestions of the pride of
opinion the evident interests of the community,
and determined to throw himself upon their candor
and justice. Had he in 1811 foreseen what now
existed, and no objection had laid against the re
newal of the charter other than that derived from
the Constitution, he should have voted for the
renewal." This was virtually a confession that he had seri
ously mistaken the situation of things in 1811,
when, against GaUatin 's judgment, he had helped

136 HENRY CLAY
in disarranging the fiscal machinery of the govern
ment on the eve of a war. But it was a confes
sion, too, that he had thrown overboard that con
stitutional theory according to which such things
as the power of chartering corporations, not being
among the specificaUy granted powers, could not
be an implied power. He had familiarized him
self with larger views of governmental function, as
the republic had grown In dimensions, in strength,
and In the reach of Its interests. Indeed, the rea
soning with which he justified his change of posi-
\tion in 1816 stopped but little, if at all, short of
the assertion that whatever may be considered
necessary, or even eminently desirable, to help the
j'country over a temporary embarrassment, may also
'be considered constitutional. Clay, who seldom,
if ever, reasoned out a point In aU Its logical bear
ings, would not have admitted that as a general
proposition. But he evidently inclined to the most
latitudlnarlan construction. His constitutional
principles had become prodigiously elastic accord
ing to the requirements of the occasion. In this
respect he was not peculiar. Most of our public
men have been Inclined to interpret the Constitu
tion according to their purposes. This tendency
was especially strong among the young Republi
cans of that period ; and there it was all the more
remarkable as their party had in its design and
beginning been a living protest against the strong
government theory favored by the Federalists.
There was, however, this difference left between

EST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 137
them and their old antagonists: the FederaUsts
believed that government. In order to be good, or
even tolerable, must be strong enough to restrain
the disorderly tendencies of democracy; while the
young Republicans rejected the theory of strong
government In that sense, but believed that It must
have large powers in order to do the things which
they thought it should do for the development of
a great nation.
At the next session of Congress, in February,
1817, Calboun took the lead in advocating a bill
to set apart and pledge the bonus of the national
bank and the share of the United States in its
dividends, as a permanent fund for "constructing
roads and canals and improving the navigation of
watercourses, in order to facUitate, promote, and
give security to internal commerce among the
several States, and to render more easy and less
expensive the means and provisions for the com
mon defense." In his speech Calhoun pronounced
himself strongly in favor of a latitudinarian con
struction of constitutional powers, and a liberal
exercise of them for the purpose of binding the
people of this vast country more closely together,
and of preventing "the greatest of all calamities,
next to the loss of liberty, and even that in its
consequence — disunion," Clay thanked him for
"the able and luminous view which he had sub
mitted to the committee of the whole," and vigor
ously urged the setting apart of a fund to be used
at a future time when the specific objects to be

138 HENRY CLAY
accomplished should have been more clearly ascer
tained and fixed. This contemplated the accumu
lation of funds in the Treasury with the expecta
tion that suitable objects would be found for which
to spend them, — a dangerous practice in a demo
cratic government. "Congress," he said, "could
at some future day examine Into the constitution
ality of the question, and If it had the power, it
could exercise it; If it had not, the Constitution,
there could be no doubt, would be so amended as
to confer It." At any rate, he wished to have the
fund set apart. Clay himself did not doubt that
Congress had the constitutional power to use that
fund, and possibly he thought that, if only the
money were provided to be spent. Congress would
easily come to the same conclusion.
The biU passed both houses, but old-school Re
publicanism once more stemmed the tide. Presi
dent Madison, who himself had formerly expressed
opinions favorable to internal Improvements, ve
toed it on strictly constitutional grounds, much to
the astonishment and disgust of the young Repub
lican statesmen. It was. his last act.
Clay had in the mean time, by way of episode,
gone through the experience of flagging popular
ity. It was not on account of his constitutional
doctrines, or any other great question of state, but
by reason of a matter to which he had probably
given but little thought. At the previous ses
sion he had voted for a bUl to Increase the pay
of members of Congress from a -per diem of six

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 139
doUars to a fixed salary of $1500 a year, the law to
apply to the Congress then in session. He sup
ported it on the ground that he had never been
able to make both ends meet at Washington.
"The rate of compensation," he said, "ought to
be such at least as that ruin should not attend a
long service in Congress." Such arguments pre-
vaUed, and the bUl passed both houses. But many
of Clay's constituents thought differently. To the
Kentucky farmers a yearly income of $1500 for
a few months' sitting on cushioned chairs in the
Capitol looked monstrously extravagant. They
were sure men could be found who would do the
business for less money. When the election of
members of Congress came on. Clay was fortunate
enough to force the candidate opposing him into
a "joint debate," In which, as that gentleman had
been "against the war," Clay made short work of
him. But he himself had an arduous canvass. It
was then that his meeting with the old hunter oc
curred, which furnished material for a school-book
anecdote. The old hunter, who had always voted
for Clay, was now resolved to vote against him on
account of the back-pay blU. "My friend," said
Clay, "have you a good rifle?" "Yes." "Did
it ever flash?" "Yes, but only once." "What
did you do with the rifle when it flashed, — throw
it away?" "No, I picked the flint, tried again,
and brought down the game." "Have I ever
flashed, except upon the compensation bill? "
"No." " WeU, wIU you throw me away ? " "No,

140 HENRY CLAY
Mr. Clay; I wUl pick the flint and try you again."
Clay was tried again, but only by a majority of
some six or seven hundred votes. At the next
session of Congress he voted for the repeal of the
compensation act, avowedly on the groimd of its
unpopularity; but he favored the raising of the per
diem. The pay of members of Congress was fixed
at eight doUars per day. This was the only time
that his home constituency threatened to faU him,
James Monroe was elected president in 1816
with little opposition. He received 183 electoral
votes; whUe his competitor, Rufus King, the can
didate of the Federalists, had only 34, Monroe
was inaugurated March 4, 1817, and the famous
"era of good feeling" set in, — that is to say,
with the disappearance of the Federal party as a
national organization, the great organized contests
of the old parties for power ceased, to make room
for the smaUer contests of personal ambitions.
But these infused fuUy as much bitterness into the
era of good feeling as the differences on important
questions of pubUc poUcy had infused Into great
party struggles. Until then the presidents of the
United States had been men of note in the Ameri
can Revolution, Monroe was the last of the Revo
lutionary generation and of the "Virginia dynasty,"
It was taken for granted that he would have his
two terms, and that then the competition for the
presidency would be open to a new class of men.
As Madison had been Jefferson's secretary of state
before he became president, and Monroe had been

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 141
Madison's, the secretaryship of state was looked
upon as the stepping-stone to the presidency.
Those who expected to be candidates for the high
est place in the future, therefore, coveted It with
peculiar solicitude.
One of them was Henry Clay. Among the citi
zens of the United States he could find nolle to
whom the succession to Mr. Monroe, as he believed,
belonged more rightfully than to himself. Thus
he started on the career of a candidate for the
presidency, and that career began with a disap
pointment. Monroe selected for the secretaryship!
John Quincy Adams, a most exceUent selection,
although Clay very decidedly did not think so.
Monroe also signified his appreciation of Clay's
merits by offering him the War Department, and
then the mission to England. But Clay declined
both places, on the ground, as Mr. Adams reports,
"that he was satisfied with the situation which he
held, and could render more service to the public
in It than in the other situations offered him."
This was true enough; but it is also probable that
he was then already resolved to stand as a candi
date for the presidency after Monroe's second term,
although Adams had been designated as heir-ap
parent; and, moreover, his disappointment had so
affected his personal feelings toward Monroe and
Adams as to make unsuitable his acceptance of a
place among the President's confidential advisers.
This supposition Is borne out by his subsequent
conduct.

142 HENRY CLAY
The fifteenth Congress met on December 1,
1817, and Clay was on the same day reelected
speaker of the House of Representatives by an
almost unanimous vote, — 140 to 7. An opportu
nity for an open disagreement between Clay and
the administration was not long in appearing. In
his flrst message to Congress, Monroe, referring
to the passage at the preceding session of the act
concerning a fund for Internal improvements, which
Madison vetoed, deemed it proper to make known
his sentiments on that subject beforehand, so that
there should be no uncertainty as to his prospec
tive action in case such a bUl were passed again.
He declared It to be his "settled conviction" that
Congress did not possess the right of constructing
roads and canals. "It Is not contained in any of
the specified powers granted to Congress ; nor can
I consider it Incidental to, or a necessary means,
viewed on the most liberal scale, for carrying into
effect any of the powers specificaUy granted." He
then suggested, as Jefferson and Madison had
done, the adoption of a constitutional amendment
to give to Congress the right in question.
This spontaneous declaration by the President
of what he intended to do in certain contingencies
was taken as something like a challenge, and the
challenge was promptly accepted. Calhoun, next
to Clay the foremost champion of internal improve
ments, having gone Into the cabinet as secretary
of war. Tucker of Virginia reported on December
15, from a select committee, a resolution equiva-

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 143
lent to that which Madison had vetoed. Against
it Monroe's constitutional objections were mar
shaled In debate. Clay took up the gauntlet and
made two speeches. In which he disclosed his views
of policy, as well as his constitutional principles,
more pointedly than he had ever done before. He
maintained that the Constitution did give the gen
eral government the power to construct roads and
canals, and that the consent of the States, which
had been thought necessary In the case of the
Cumberland Road, was not required at aU. He
spoke as a Western man, as a representative of
a new country and a pioneer population, needing
means of communication, channels of commerce
and Intelligence, as the breath of life. He spoke
as a citizen of the Union, looking forward to a
great destiny. Was the Constitution, he asked,
giving Congress the power to establish post-offices
and post-roads, and to regulate commerce between
the States, made for the benefit of the Atlantic
margin of the country only? Was the Constitu
tion made only for the few millions then Inhabiting
this continent? No ! "Every man," he exclaimed,
"who looks at the Constitution in the spirit to
entitle him to the character of a statesman, must
elevate his views to the height which this nation is
destined to reach in the rank of nations. We are
not legislating for this moment only, or for the
present generation, or for the present populated
limits of the United States; but our acts must
embrace a wider scope, — reaching northwestward

144 HENRY CLAY
to the Pacific, and southwardly to the river Del
Norte. Imagine this extent of territory covered
with sixty, or seventy, or an hundred miUions of
people. The powers which exist in this govern
ment now wiU exist then; and those which wUl
exist then exist now."
"What was the object of the convention," he
asked, "in framing the Constitution? The lead
ing object was Union. Union, then, peace exter
nal and internal, and commerce, but more particu
larly union and peace, the great objects of the
f ramers of the Constitution, should be kept steadUy
in view in the interpretation of any clause of it;
and where it is susceptible of various interpreta
tions, that construction should be preferred which
tends to promote the objects of the f ramers of the
Constitution, to the consolidation of the Union."
This he emphasized with stiU greater force. "I
am a friend, a true friend, to state rights, but
not in aU cases as they are asserted. We should
equaUy avoid that subtile process of argument
which dissipates into air the powers of the govern
ment, and that spirit of encroachment which would
snatch from the States powers not delegated to the
general government. We shaU then escape both
the dangers I have noticed, — that of relapsing
into the alarming weakness of the Confederation,
which was described as a mere rope of sand ; and
also that other, perhaps not the greatest, danger,
consolidation. No man deprecates more than I do
the idea of consolidation; yet between separation

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 145
and consolidation, painful as would be the alterna
tive, I should greatly prefer the latter,"
Here was the weU-sprIng from which Henry
Clay drew his political inspirations, — a grand
conception of the future destiny of the American
republic, and of a government adapted to the ful
fillment of that great destiny; an ardent love for
the Union, as the ark of liberty and national gran
deur, a Union to be maintained at any price; an
imaginative enthusiasm which infused its patriotic
glow Into his political opinions, but which was
also apt to carry him beyond the limits of existing
things and conditions, and not seldom unfitted
him for the formation of a clear and well-balanced
judgment of facts and interests. But this enthu
siastic conception of national grandeur, this lofty
Unionism constantly appearing as the inspiration
of his public conduct, gave to his policies, as they
stood forth In the glow of his eloquence, a pecul
iarly potent charm.
The result of this debate was the passage, not
of the resolution reported by Tucker, but of a
substitute declaring that "Congress has power,
under the Constitution, to appropriate money for
the construction of post-roads, mlUtary and other
roads, and of canals, and for the improvement of
watercourses," Other resolutions, asserting the
power of Congress not only to appropriate money
for such roads and canals, but to construct them,
failed by smaU majorities, so that Clay carried his
point only in part.

146 HENRY CLAY
That Clay would continue to assert the power of
Congress to construct internal improvements, Pre
sident Monroe's message notwithstanding, every
body expected. But when he Interspersed that
advocacy with keen criticism of Monroe's attitude
concerning that subject, — criticism which had a
strong flavor of bitterness in it, — the effect was
not to his advantage. The unfriendly tone of his
remarks was generaUy attributed to his disappoint
ment In the matter of the secretaryship of state.
Not many men like to see personal resentments
carried into the discussion of public interests;
and In this case, to make the matter worse, the
demonstrations of resentment were, in the shape
of oratorical flings, darted at a president who was
by no means a great man, rather a man of moder
ate parts, but who was regarded as inoffensive and
well-meaning, and as honestly busying himseK
about his presidential duties, — one of those re
spectable mediocrities in high public station, with
whom people are apt to sympathize In their trou
bles, especiaUy when unnecessarily attacked and
humiliated by persons of greatly superior ability.
But the disappointment of the aspirant for the
presidency was so little under his control that he
permitted it to appear even In another of his great
endeavors, which, in order to succeed, required
particularly prudent management. This was his
effort in behalf of the Spanish-American colonies,
which had risen against the mother country, and
were struggling to achieve their independence.

m THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 147
It has been said by Clay's opponents that his
zeal for the cause of the South American patriots
was wholly owing to his desire to annoy the Mon
roe administration. This is clearly an unjust
charge, for he had loudly proclaimed his ardent
sympathies with the South American insurgents
wbile Madison was stiU president. We remember
that in his speech on the direct taxes in January,
1816, he seriously put the question whether the
United States would not have openly "to take
part with the patriots of South America." So
on January 24, 1817, before Monroe's inaugura
tion, he had stoutly opposed a bill "more effectu
ally to preserve the neutral relations of the United
States," Intended to stop the fitting out of armed
cruisers in American ports; he had opposed the
blU on the ground that it might be advantageous
to old Spain in the South American struggle. AU
this had sprung naturally from his emotional en
thusiasm. He was therefore, although imprudent
in his propositions, yet only true to himself, when,
under Monroe's administration, he continued to
demand that the neutrality law of 1817 be re
pealed; that our neutrality be so arranged as to
be as advantageous as possible to the insurgent
colonies; and finaUy that the United States send
a minister to the "United Provinces of Rio de la
Plata," thereby formaUy recognizing that revolu
tionized colony as an Independent state. This he
proposed in March, 1818. Three commissioners
had been appointed by the President to go to

148 HENRY CLAY
South America for the purpose of looking into
the condition of things; and, to cover the neces
sary expenses, the President asked for an appro
priation. Clay strenuously opposed this on the
ground that the commissioners had been appointed
without the advice and consent of the Senate. He
moved instead an appropriation for a regular min
ister to be sent there.
The speech with which he supported this propo
sition was in his grandest style. South America
had charmed his poetic fancy. In gorgeous colors
he drew a picture of "the vast region in which we
behold the most sublime and interesting objects of
creation ; the loftiest mountains, the most majestic
rivers in the world; the richest mines of the pre
cious metals, the choicest productions of the earth;
we behold there a spectacle stiU more interesting
and sublime, — the glorious spectacle of eighteen
miUions of people struggling to burst their chains
and to be free." A burning description followed
of their degradation and sufferings, and of the
terrible cruelties inflicted upon them by their re
lentless oppressors. In his imagination they were
a people of high mental and moral qualities, not
withstanding their ignorance and their subserviency
to the Influence of the church. He was sure that,
"Spanish America being once independent, what
ever may be the form of the governments estab
lished in its several parts, these governments wiU
be animated by an American feeling, and guided
by an American poUcy." He affirmed that they

IN THE HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES 149
had established and for years maintained an Inde
pendent government on the river La Plata, and
that, as the United States always recognized de
facto governments, it was a duty to recognize this.
He demanded it In the name of a just neutrality.
As the United States had received a minister sent
by Spain, so they were "bound " to receive a min
ister of the La Plata republic if they meant to be
neutral, "If the royal beUigerent is represented
and heard at our government, the republican bel
ligerent ought also to be heard." All this, he
thought, could be done without any danger of war.
Spain herself was too much crippled in her re
sources to make war on the United States, and no
other power would do so.
It was a briUIant display of oratorical splen
dors, but the House resisted the fascination. In
the discussion which followed, much of the halo,
with which Clay's poetic fancy had surrounded the
South American people and their struggle, was
dissipated by sober statements of fact. Neither
was it difficult to show that Clay was much in
error in his views of true neutrality, and that neu
trality between two belligerents did by no means
always require equal diplomatic relations with
them. Finally, the contemptuous flings at the
President and the secretary of state, with which
Clay seasoned his speech, displeased a large part
of the House. It was weU known that Monroe
and Adams were not at all unfriendly to the insur
gent colonies; only they wanted to be sure of the

160 HENRY CLAY
fact that the new government had the necessary
element of stability to justify recognition; 'they
hoped to obtain the cooperation of England In
that recognition ; they desired to avoid the embar
rassment which a hasty recognition would cause In
the negotiations between the United States and
Spain concerning the cession of Florida; and
finaUy, they wished to be first assured that the
public opinion of the country would sustain them
in so important a step.
The motion was defeated by a vote of 115 against
45. But Monroe was terribly disturbed at Clay's
I hostile attitude, so much so indeed that, two or
' three days after Clay's great speech, Adams wrote
in his Diary : —
" The subject which seems to absorb aU the faculties
of his (Monroe's) mind is the violent systematic opposi
tion that Clay is raising against his administration. . . .
Mr. Monroe added, if Mr, Clay had taken the ground
that the executive had gone as far as he could go with
propriety towards the acknowledgment of the South
Americans, that he was well disposed to go farther,
if such were the feeling of the nation and of Congress,
and had made his motion with that view, to ascertain
the real sentiments of Congress, it might have been in
perfect harmony with the executive. But between that
and the angry, acrimonious course pursued by Mr. Clay,
there was a wide difference."
Monroe was perfectly right. Clay would have
served the cause he had at heart better had he
maintained friendly relations with the admlnlstra-

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 151
tion. But that strange disturber of impulses and
motives, of perceptions and conclusions — the as
piration to the presidency — clouded his discern
ment. In the second session of the fifteenth Congress
a debate took place which was destined to be of
far greater consequence to Clay's political for
tunes than anything that had gone before. It
was the first clash between Henry Clay and An
drew Jackson. This is the story. The Floridas
were still In the possession of Spain. They served
as a place of refuge for runaway slaves, and a
base of operations for raiding Indians. Spain was
bound by treaty to prevent hostile excursions on
the part of the savages, but too weak or too negli
gent to do so. There were frequent coUisions be
tween whites and Indians on the border, one party
being as often the aggressor as the other. General
Gaines sent soldiers against the Indians, and an
Indian war began. In December, 1817, General
Jackson took command. He received authority
to pursue the Indians, but, as the administration
understood it, he was to respect Spanish rights.
This was Jackson's famous Seminole war. He
enlisted volunteers In Tennessee by his own pro
clamation, without waiting for the President to call
upon the governor for a levy of militia in the
legal, regular way. He broke Into Florida in
March, 1818, took the Spanish fort of St. Mark's,
hanged Indian chiefs who had been captured by
stratagem, ordered a Scotchman and an English-

152 HENRY CLAY
man, Arbuthnot and Ambrlster, whom he had
found with the Indians, to be tried by court-mar
tial for having instigated the savages to hostilities;
and when, on very Insufficient evidence, they were
found guUty, he had them promptly executed,
after having changed the sentence In Ambrister's
case from mere flogging to the penalty of death by
shooting; he took Pensacola on his way home,
deposed the Spanish governor, appointed a new
one, left a garrison there, and conducted himself
throughout as a victorious general with absolute
power In a conquered country, Uke a Roman pro
consul in a subjugated province.
When the news arrived In Washington, the Pre
sident and the cabinet were astonished and per
plexed. Except Adams, who was always inclined
to take the highest ground for his country against
any foreign power, they aU agreed that General
Jackson had gone far beyond his Instructions and
done lawless things. Calhoun, the secretary of war,
thought that the general should promptly be held
to a severe account. But they shrunk from affront
ing the "hero of New Orleans." The administra
tion finally concluded to restore to the Spaniards
possession of the forts taken by General Jackson,
and to affirm that the capture of those places by
Jackson and his conduct generaUy were justified,
on the principle of self-defense, by the hostile
attitude of the Spanish governors, thus denying
that any warlike step had been taken against Spain
while at the same time making a case against her
officers.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 153
On January 16, 1819, the House of Represent
atives began the discussion of a resolution reported
by its mUitary committee, "disapproving the pro
ceedings in the trial of Arbuthnot and Ambrlster,"
to which three further resolutions were added, de
claring the seizure of Pensacola and Fort Barran
cas to have been contrary to the Constitution of
the United States, and caUing for appropriate
legislation. A debate of three weeks foUowed, in
which Clay was the most prominent flgure on the
anti-Jackson side. He had no personal feeling
against General Jackson. On the contrary, he
was sincerely and profoundly grateful to the man
who, after all the disgraceful failures of the war
of 1812, had so briUiantly restored the lustre of
the American arms, and enabled him to "go to
England without mortification." But as a friend
of constitutional government he felt that he could
not possibly approve of the general's lawless con
duct in Florida. There is no reason to attribute
the position he took to any but conscientious mo
tives. But he was an aspirant to the presidency,
and known to be such, while Jackson, too, was
beginning to be whispered about as a possible can
didate for 'that honor. Would not a frank expres
sion of his views on Jackson's conduct appear like
an attempt to injure a dreaded rival ? It dawned
upon him that his unnecessary flings at the Monroe
administration had subjected his motives to suspi
cion, and thus, while attacking, he felt himself on
the defensive. He began with an almost painful

154 HENRY CLAY
effort to retrieve the groimd which he feared that
he had lost in the confidence of the House and the
country : —
" In rising to address you, sir, I must be allowed to
say, that aU inferences, drawn from the course which it
will be mj painful duty to take in this discussion, of
unfriendliness either to the chief magistrate of the coun
try, or to the iUustrions military chieftain whose opera
tions are under investigation, will be wholly unfounded.
Toward that distinguished captain who shed so much
glory on our country, whose renown constitutes so great
a portion of its moral property, I never had, I never can
have, any other feelings than those of the most profound
respect and of the utmost kindness. I know the mo
tives which have been, and wifi again be, attributed to
me in regard to the other exalted personage aUuded to.
They have been and they wiU be unfounded. I have no
interest other than that of seeing the concerns of my
country well and happily administered. Rather than
throw obstructions in the way of the President, I would
precede bim and pick out those, if I could, which might
jostle him in his progress. I may be again reluctantly
compelled to differ from him, but I wfil with the utmost
sincerity assure the committee that I have formed no
resolution, come under no engagements, and that I never
will form any resolution, or contract any engagements,
for systematic opposition to his administration, or to
that of any other chief magistrate."
This might have been sufficient to disarm sus
picion, had he not been beUeved to have an eye
toward the presidency.
He arraigned General Jackson's conduct with

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 155
dignity and a certain degree of moderation. He
emphaticaUy acquitted him of "any Intention to
violate the laws of his country, or the obligations
of humanity." He declared himself far from wish
ing to Intimate that "General Jackson cherished
any design Inimical to the liberties of the people."
He believed the general's "intentions to be pure
and patriotic." But he denounced the hanging of
Indian chiefs without trial, "under color of retalia
tion," as utterly unjustiflable and disgraceful.
He admitted retaliation as justifiable only when
"calculated to produce an effect in the war," but
never on the motive of mere vengeance. As to
Arbuthnot and Ambrlster, whether they were in
nocent or guilty, he utterly rejected the argument
by which Jackson tried to justify their execution,
namely, "that it Is an established principle of the
law of nations, that any individual of a nation,
making war against the citizens of any other na
tion, they being at peace, forfeits his aUegiance,
and becomes an outlaw and a pirate." He main
tained that, "whatever may be the character of
individuals making private war, the principle Is
totaUy erroneous when applied to such individuals
associated with a power, whether Indian or civil
ized, capable of maintaining the relations of peace
or war." He showed that Jackson's doctrine
would make every foreign subject serving In an
American army an outlaw and a pirate ; he might
have cited Lafayette and Steuben. This was the
moral he drew : —

156 HENRY CLAY
" However guilty these men were, they should not have
been condemned or executed without the authority of
law. I will not dweU on the effect of these prece
dents in foreign countries, but I shaU not pass unnoticed
their dangerous influence in our own. Bad examples
are generaUy set in the case of bad men, and often re
mote from the central government. It was in the pro
vinces that were laid the seeds of the ambitions projects
which overturned the fiberties of Rome."
He affirmed that Jackson, going far beyond the
spirit of his Instructions, had not only assumed,
by an unauthorized construction of his own, to
determine what Spain was bound by treaty to do,
but had "also assumed the power, belonging to
Congress alone, of determining what should be the
effect and consequence of her breach of engage
ment; " that then he had seized the Spanish forts
and thus usurped the power of making war, which
the Constitution had "expressly and exclusively"
vested in Congress, "to guard our country against
precisely that species of rashness which has been
manifested in Florida." A glowing peroration
foUowed, protesting against "the alarming doc
trine of unUmited discretion In our mUitary com
manders," and pointing out how other free nations,
from antiquity down, had lost their liberties, and
how we might lose ours. "Are former services,"
he exclaimed, "however eminent, to preclude even
Inquiry Into recent conduct? Is there to be no
limit, no prudential bounds to the national grati
tude? I hope gentlemen wiU deUberately survey

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 157
the awful Isthmus on which we stand. They may
bear down all opposition ; they may even vote the
general the public thanks; they may carry him
triumphantly through this House. But if they do
so, it will be a triumph of the principle of insubor
dination, a triumph of the mUitary over the civil
authority, a triumph over the powers of this House,
a triumph over the Constitution of the land. And
I pray most devoutly to Heaven that it may not
prove. In Its ultimate effects and consequences, a
triumph over the liberties of the people."
It was a fine speech and much admired ; bril
liant In diction; statesmanlike in reasoning; fuU
of stirring appeals ; also undoubtedly right in its
general drift of argument. But it had some very
weak points. Clay had again gone a little beyond
what the occasion required; he had attacked, aside
from Jackson's conduct in Florida, certain Indian
treaties which Jackson had made, and this attack
was based upon an Imperfect knowledge of facts.
Such flaws were exposed, and thus the impression
was created that he had been rather quick In mak
ing his assault without having taken the trouble
of thoroughly studying his case. In fact, he had
not exactly measured the power which In this in
stance he had to deal with. It was the popularity
of a victorious soldier.
A military "hero " has an Immense advantage
over ordinary mortals, especially In a country
where the military hero Is a rare character. The
achievements of statesmen usually remain subject

158 HENRY CLAY
to differences of opinion. A victory on the field
of battle won for the country is a title to public
gratitude, seldom to be questioned by anybody.
It Is a matter of common pride. It lives In the
Imagination of the people. That imagination Is
apt to attribute to the hero of such a victory an
abundance of other good qualities. His failings
are judged with leniency. To many it appears
almost sacrilegious to think that a man who has
rendered his country service so valuable in the
crisis of war should ever be able to act upon any
but the most patriotic motives. It will require an
extraordinary degree of wrong-doing on his part
to make suspicion and criticism with regard to him
acceptable to the popular mind; and even then he
is apt to be easily forgiven.
General Jackson enjoyed this advantage in the
highest degree. He had given the American peo
ple a briUiant victory when it was most needed to
soothe the popular pride. Would he disgrace and
endanger the republic after having so magnificently
fought for It? To convince the people, and to
make Congress declare that he had done so, would
have required a very cabn and careful presentation
of the case, moving from point to point of the aUe-
gation, and proving every position with evidence
so conclusive as to extort a verdict of guilty from
ever so unwiUing a jury. Even then the result
would not have been certain. But any argument
not absolutely irrefutable; any arraignment having
in It the smaUest flaw; any appeal proceeding in

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 159
the slightest degree upon a mere assumption of
fact, was sure to be drowned by a cry far more
powerful than any oratorical declamation, — the
battle of New Orleans. So It was In this instance.
The hero of New Orleans could not have intended,
he could not have done, any wrong. At any rate,
he had full absolution for what he had done, per
haps also for what he might do In the future, and
the resolutions disapproving his conduct were voted
down by heavy majorities.
Thus was Henry Clay defeated In his first en
counter with Andrew Jackson. The great duel
had begun which was to embitter the best part of
Clay's life. His war of 1812 had put the military
hero Into his way, and a military hero, too, of the
most exasperating kind; a hero who would not be
conciliated by a mere recognition of his good in
tentions; who demanded absolute compliance with
his wIU, and who treated any one finding fault
with him as little better than "an outlaw and a
pirate; " a hero who not seldom made Clay almost
despair of the republic. The case was indeed not
as desperate as Clay sometimes feared. Victorious
generals begin to become really dangerous to re
publican institutions when a large portion of the
people are tired of popular liberty. It is true,
however, that their peculiarly privileged position
before the popular mind may put those institutions
at aU times to temporary strain, and facUitate the
establishment of precedents prolific of evil.
For the present General Jackson, "vindicated"

160 HENRY CLAY
by the House of Representatives, was received
wherever he went with great enthusiasm, and was
"thought of in connection with the presidency,"
not only as a hero, but as a persecuted hero. At
the same time Clay's star seemed to be somewhat
obscured. The impression that his disappointment
with regard to the secretaryship of state had led
him to make a factious opposition to the adminis
tration had lowered him in the estimation of many
men. This impression had become so general as
to make his reasons for permitting now and then
an administration measure to pass unchallenged a
matter of gossiping speculation. A striking in
stance of this Is found in ilr. Adams's Diary,
where Mr. jMiddleton of South CaroUna is intro
duced as telling the story, that Clay neglected to
oppose a certain biU because "the last fortnight
of the session Clay spent almost every night at the
card table, and one night Poindexter had won of
him eight thousand dollars. This discomposed
him to such a degree that he paid no attention to
the business of the House the remainder of the
session. Before it closed, however, he had won
back from Poindexter aU that be had lost, except
about nine hundred doUars." Whether this story
in aU its details was true or not, certain it is that
Clay at that period spent far more time at the
card table than was good for his reputation. In
deed, Nathan Sargent says In his recoUections
("PubUc Men and Events "): "When a candidate
for the presidency, Mr. Clay was denounced as a

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 161
gambler. He was no more a gambler than was
almost every Southern and Southwestern gentleman
of that day. Play was a passion with them; It
was a social enjoyment; they loved Its excitement,
and they played whenever and wherever they met ;
not for the purpose of winning money of one an
other, which Is the gambler's motive, but for the
pleasure It gave them. They bet high as a matter
of pride and to give interest to the game." But
Clay himself felt that his habits in that respect
had been unfavorably noticed. Soon afterwards,
in a speech in the House, he referred by way of
iUustration to games of chance, as "an amusement
which in early life he had sometimes Indulged In,
but which years and experience had determined
him to renounce." To a man of Clay's standing
before the country there was a keen self-humilia
tion in a remark like this, and he would hardly
have made It, had he not thought something like
a promise of better conduct urgently caUed for.
The promise referred, however, only to "games of
chance," for whist seemed to maintain an almost
irresistible charm over him, except in his own
house at Ashland, where no card playing was
aUowed. Clay's political standing was so much shaken
that about the time of the opening of the sixteenth
Congress, in December, 1819, several members of
the House went to President Monroe to consult
with him as to whether it would be advisable to
displace Clay as speaker. Adams says in his Diary

162 HENRY CLAY
that Monroe advised against it, partly because such
a movement would increase Clay's importance,
partly because Clay's course had Injured his own
Influence more than that of the administration, and
partly because, as there was no Western man in
the cabinet, it was a matter of pride with that part
of the country to have a Western man In the speak
er's chair, and there was no Western man of suffi
cient eminence to be put In competition with Clay.
"In aU this," wrote Adams, "I think the Presi
dent has acted and spoken wisely." It was Indeed
wisely spoken, for, had a contest been made. It
would after aU have appeared that most of the
members of the House, although they voted against
Clay time and again In his opposition to the ad
ministration, were proud of the lustre his briUiant
abUities shed upon the House, believed In his
patriotism, and liked the gay, spirited, dashing
Kentuckian as a man. So he was, on the flrst day
of the session, December 6, 1819, reelected speaker
virtually without opposition.
Before long he was up in arms against the ad
ministration again. After long and arduous nego
tiation, Mr. Adams had. In February, 1819, con
cluded a treaty with the Spanish minister, which
provided for the cession of the whole of Florida
to this republic, fixed the southwestern boundary
line of the United States along the Sabine River
(thus excluding Texas), expunged the claims of
Spanish subjects against the United States, and
provided that the United States, as a compensation

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 163
for the cession of Florida, should undertake to
settle the claims of American citizens against Spain
to an amount not exceeding $5,000,000. The
treaty was unanimously approved by the Senate ;
but the King of Spain, faithlessly It was thought,
withheld his ratification of it, which ratification
should have taken place within six months. This
conduct produced an Irritating effect In the United
States. Many were in favor of treating the whole
matter again as an open one. The proposition to
take forcible possession of Florida was freely dis
cussed and widely approved, and a biU to that
effect was Introduced In Congress. Then the news
arrived that the Spanish government had sent a
new minister. Under these circumstances Monroe
addressed a special message to Congress, on March
27, 1820, mentioning the friendly interest taken
in the matter by the great powers of Europe, —
England, Russia, and France; expressing the hope
that. In response to their solicitations, the King of
Spain would soon ratify the treaty, and suggesting
that Congress for the time being should postpone
action on the matter.
This brought Clay to his feet. He took the
ground that, as the King of Spain had not ratified
it within the prescribed time, the whole treaty had
faUen, and that it ought not to be renewed, mainly
because It had, by accepting the Sabine as the
southwestern boundary line, instead of insisting
upon the Rio Grande del Norte, surrendered to
Spain a large and valuable territory belonging to

164 HENRY CLAY
the United States, namely Texas, It had indeed
been a disputed question whether the limits of
Louisiana did not embrace Texas. If so, Texas
belonged by purchase to the United States; if not,
it was considered part of the Spanish American
territory. Adams, In making his treaty, had only
reluctantly given up the line of the Rio Grande
del Norte, and accepted that of the Sabine; he
might have carried his point, had not Monroe,
with the concurrence of the rest of the cabinet,
desired the Sabine as a boundary for peculiar
reasons. In a letter to General Jackson he said:
"Having long known the repugnance with which
the eastern portion of our Union have seen Its
aggrandizement to the west and south, I have been
decidedly of opinion that we ought to be content
with Florida for the present." It was, therefore,
in deference to what Monroe understood to be
northeastern sentiment that Texas was given up,
and it was the abandonment of Texas which Clay
put forward as a decisive reason for not renewing
the Spanish treaty.
He introduced two resolutions In the House:
one asserting that no treaty making a cession of
territory was valid without the concurrence of
Congress; and the other, substantiaUy, that the
cession of Florida to the United States was not an
"adequate equivalent " for the "transfer " of Texas
by the United States to Spain. In support of
these resolutions he made a fiery speech, fiercely
castigating the administration for truckling to for-

m THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 165
eign powers, and extoUing the value of Texas,
which he stoutly assumed to belong to the United
States under the Louisiana purchase, Texas was,
in his opinion, much more valuable than Florida.
Even if the treaty were not renewed, Florida
would surely drop Into our lap at last, but Texas
might escape us. Lowndes answered, as to the
first resolution, that, if the principle asserted by
Clay were admitted In Its whole breadth, the treaty-
making power under the Constitution (the Presi
dent and the Senate) would no longer have author
ity to make a treaty for a boundary rectification,
which almost always involved a cession of territory
on one side or the other; and, as to the second
resolution, that Texas had always been considered
by the United States as a debatable territory, and
It had been given up as such, not as a territory
clearly belonging to this repubUc.
Clay's resolutions faUed. The King of Spain
finaUy ratified the treaty, the Senate reaffirmed it
by aU except four votes, and it was proclaimed by
Monroe, February 22, 1821, But Clay had made
his mark as maintaining the right of the United
States to Texas. How little coidd he then foresee
what a fateful part the acquisition of Texas was to
play twenty-four years later in his public career !
The miscarriage of his opposition to the Spanish
treaty did not deter him from renewing his efforts
for the South American colonies. On May 20,
1820, he spoke to a resolution he had moved, de
claring it expedient to provide outfits and salaries

166 HENRY CLAY
for a minister or ministers to be sent to "any of
the governments in South America which have
established and are maintaining their independence
of Spain," His attacks became more virulent.
For Instance: "If Lord Castlereagh says we may
recognize, we do; if not, we do not. A single
1 expression of the British minister to the present
1 secretary of state, then our minister abroad, I am
lashamed to say, has moulded the policy of our
Wovemment toward South America." In the same
speech he furnished a picture of the character of
the South American people and their future rela
tions with the people of the United States, as his
imagination painted it. "That coimtry has now
a population of eighteen miUions. The same ac
tivity in the principle of population would exist in
that country as here. Twenty-five years hence,
it might be estimated at thirty-sis miUions ; fifty
years hence, at seventy-two. We have now a pop
ulation of ten miUions. From the character of
our population we must always take the lead in
commerce and manufactures. Imagine the vast
power of the two countries, and the value of the
intercourse between them, when we shaU have a
population of forty, and they of seventy miUions ! "
The fifty years are over, and we have had ample
opportunity to appreciate this forecast. As to
their political capabilities, too, he entertained
glowing expectations. "Some gentlemen," he
said, "had intimated that the people of the south
were unfit for freedom. In some particulars, he

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 167
ventured to say, the people of South America were
In advance of us. Grenada, Venezuela, and Buenos
Ayres had all emancipated their slaves ; — [recol
lecting himself] — he did not say that we ought to
do so, or that they ought to have done so under
different circumstances, but he rejoiced that the
circumstances were such as to permit them to do
it." His resolution passed by 80 yeas to 75 nays, but
the administration, which was then stiU occupied
with the Spanish treaty, did not stir. Clay re
turned to the charge in February, 1821, when he
moved directly an appropriation for the sending of
a minister or ministers to South America, which
was defeated by a small majority, owing probably
to the arrival at that time of the ratification of the
Spanish treaty by the king. But, nothing daunted,
he was up again shortly afterwards with a resolu
tion "that the House of Representatives partici
pates with the people of the United States In the
deep Interest which they feel for the Spanish pro
vinces of South America, which are struggling to
establish their liberty and independence, and that
It will give its constitutional support to the Presi
dent of the United States whenever he may deem
It expedient to recognize the sovereignty and Inde
pendence of any of the said provinces." This
resolution, being mainly a declaration of mere
sentiment, passed, the first clause by 134 yeas to
12 nays, and the second by 87 to 68. A commit
tee was appointed, at the bead of which was Clay

168 HENRY CLAY
himself, to present this resolution to the President.
StiU the administration would not move untU a
year later, when the ablUty of the South American
republics to maintain their independence was as
a matter of fact beyond reasonable doubt. On
March 8, 1822, Monroe sent a message to Con
gress recommending the recognition of the Inde
pendent South American governments, which was
promptly responded to.
Clay's efforts in behalf of this cause gave him
great renown In South America. Some of his
speeches were translated Into Spanish and read at
the head of the revolutionary armies. His name
J was a household word among the patriots. In the
! United States, too, his fervid appeals in behalf of
I an oppressed people fighting for their Uberty awak
ened the memories of the North American war for
; independence, and caUed forth strong emotions of
: sympathy. There Is no doubt that those appeals
were on his part not a mere manoeuvre of opposi
tion, but came straight from his generous impulses.
The idea of the whole American continent being
occupied by a great family of republics naturaUy
flattered his imagination. That imagination sup
plied the struggling brethren with aU the exceUent
qualities he desired them to possess, and his chiv
alrous nature was impatient to rush to their aid.
This tendency was reinforced by his general apt
ness to take a somewhat superficial view of things,
and, as is often the case with men of the oratorical
temperament, to persuade himself with the gor-

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 169
geous flow of his own rhetoric. That his own
thoughts appear to him originaUy in the seductive
garb of sonorous phrase is a source of serious
danger to the oratorical statesman. The influence
which his embittered feeling towards the adminis
tration had on Clay's conduct was simply to make
him more inaccessible to the prudential reasons
which the administration had for its dilatory pol
icy. There was indeed a fundamental difference
of views between them. The administration had
the Spanish treaty much at heart, and would not
permit the recognition of the Spanish American
repubUcs to compUcate that transaction. Clay
wanted his country to possess aU it could obtain,
and as he thought that Florida would some time
drop Into the lap of the United States in any
event, and as the Spanish treaty relinquished the
claim to Texas, It was from his point of view the
[ correct thing to hasten the recognition of the South
j American repubUcs and thereby to defeat the Span-
\ish treaty.
^ There was also a great difference of opinion as
to the character of the South American revolution.
Adams gives in his Diary an account of an inter
view between him and Clay in March, 1821, at
which an interesting conversation took place.
"I regretted (he wrote) the difference between his
[Clay's] views and those of the administration upon
South American affairs. That the final issue of their
present struggle would be their entire independence of
Spain I had never doubted. That it was our true poUcy

170 HENRY CLAY
and duty to take no part in the contest was equaUy
clear. The principle of neutrafity in all foreign wars
was, in my opinion, fundamental to the continuance of
our fiberties and our Union. So far as they were con
tending for independence I wished weU to their cause ;
but I had seen, and yet see, no prospect that they would
estabUsh free or fiberal institutions of government.
They are not likely to promote the spirit either of free
dom or order by their example. They have not the
first elements of free or good government. Arbitrary
power, mifitary and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon
their education, upon their habits, and upon aU their in
stitutions. Civil dissension was infused into aU their
seminal principles. War and mutual destruction was
in every member of their organization, moral, political,
and physical. I had fittle expectation of any beneficial
result to this country from any future connection with
them, pofitical or commerciaL We should derive no
improvement to our own institutions by any communion
with theirs. Nor was there any appearance of any dis
position in them to take any political lesson from us.
As to the commercial connection, there was no basis for
much traffic between us. They want none of our pro
ductions, and we could afford to purchase very few of
theirs. Of these opinions, both his and mine, time must
be the test."
This kind of reasoning appeared paiofuUy cold
by the side of Clay's glowing periods. But It
must be confessed that Adams's prognostications
have, in the main, stood the test of time far better
than Clay's. It seems that Clay then did not
command sufficient information to answer such

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 171
arguments, for we find It recorded that when Adams
had finished his lecture. Clay "did not pursue the
discussion." Neither would he, at that moment,
have believed the prediction, if anybody had made
it, that only four years later he and Adams, as
members of the same administration, would bear
a common responsibility and suffer the same re
proach for a common policy friendly to the Spanish
American republics.
At any rate, a popular vein had been struck by
his speeches in behalf of a foreign people. But
he strengthened his reputation and political stand
ing more substantially by his efforts to avert a
danger which threatened the disruption of his own
country.

CHAPTER VIII
THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE
On March 6, 1818, a petition was presented In
the House of Representatives praying that Missouri
be admitted as a State. A blU authorizing the
people of Missouri to form a state government was
taken up In the House on February 13, 1819, and
Tallmadge of New York moved as an amendment,
that the further introduction of slavery should be
prohibited, and that aU children born within the
said State should be free at the age of twenty-five
years. Thus began the struggle on the slavery
question In connection with the admission of Mis
souri, which lasted, intermittently, until March,
1821. No sooner had the debate on Tallmadge's propo
sition begun than it became clear that the philo
sophical anti-slavery sentiment of the revolutionary
period had entirely ceased to have any influence
upon current thought In the South. The abolition
of the foreign slave trade had not, as had been
hoped, prepared the way for the abolition of sla
very or weakened the slave interest In any sense.
On the contrary, slavery had been immensely
strengthened by an economic development making

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 173
it more profitable than It ever had been before.
The invention of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney
In 1793 had made the culture of cotton a very
productive source of wealth. In 1800 the ex
portation of cotton from the United States was
19,000,000 pounds, valued at $5,700,000. In
1820 the value of the cotton export was nearly
$20,000,000, abnost aU of it the product of slave
labor. The value of slaves may be said to have
at least trebled in twenty years. The breeding of
slaves became a profitable industry. Under such
circumstances the slaveholders arrived at the con
clusion that slavery was by no means so wicked
and hurtful an Institution as their Revolutionary
fathers had thought it to be. The anti-slavery
professions of the Revolutionary time became to
them an awkward reminiscence, which they would
have been glad to wipe from their own and other
people's memories.
On the other hand, in the Northern States there
was no such change of feeling. Slavery was stIU,
in the nature of things, beUeved to be a wrong
and a sore. The change of sentiment In the South
had not yet produced its reflex in the North. The
slavery question had not become a subject of dif
ference of opinion and of controversy among the
Northern people. As they had abolished slavery
in their States, so they took It for granted that it
ought to disappear, and would disappear in time,
everywhere else. Slavery had Indeed, now and
then, asserted Itself in the discussions of Congress

174 HENRY CLAY
as a distinct interest, but not In such a waj^ as
to arouse much alarm in the free States. [The
amendment to the Missouri bUl, providing for a
restriction with regard to slavery, came therefore
in a perfectly natural way from that Northern
sentiment which remained still faithful to the tra
ditions of the Revolutionary period. And It was
a great surprise to most Northern people that so
natural a proposition should be so fiercely resisted
on the part of the South. I It was the sudden reve
lation of a change of feeUng in the South which
the North had not observed in its progress. "The
discussion of this Missouri question has betrayed
the secret of their souls," wrote John Quincy
Adams. The slaveholders watched with apprehen
sion the steady growth of the free States in popu
lation, wealth, and power. In 1790 the popula
tion of the two sections had been nearly even. In
1820 there was a difference of over 600,000 in
favor of the North in a total of less than ten mil
lions. In 1790 the representation of the two sec
tions in Congress had been about evenly balanced.
In 1820 the census promised to give the North a
preponderance of more than thirty votes In the
House of Representatives. As the slaveholders
had no longer the ultimate extinction, but now the
perpetuation, of slavery in view, the question of
sectional power became one of first Importance to
them, and with it the necessity of having more
slave States for the purpose of maintaining the
political equilibrium at least in the Senate. A

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 175
struggle for more slave States was to them a strug
gle for Ufe. This was the true significance of the
Missouri question.
The debate was the prototype of all the slavery
debates which foUowed In the forty years to the
breaking out of the civil war. One side offered
the constitutional argument that any restriction as
to slavery In the admission of a new State would
nulUfy one of the most essential attributes of state
sovereignty and break the "federal compact; " the
moral argument that negro slavery was the most
beneficial condition for the colored race in this
country, and for the white race too, so long as the
two races must live together; and the economic
argument that negro slavery was necessary to the
material prosperity of the Southern States, as
white men could not work in the cotton and rice
fields. The other side offered the constitutional
argument that slavery was not directly recognized
by the Constitution Itself; that the power of the
general government to exclude slavery from the
territories had always been recognized, and that,
in admitting a new State, conditions of admission
could be imposed upon it ; the moral argument that
slavery was a great wrong In Itself, and that in its
effects it demoraUzed the whites together with the
blacks ; and the economic argument that, wherever
it went. It degraded labor, paralyzed enterprise
and progress, and greatly injured the general In
terest. No debate on slavery had ever so stirred the

176 HENRY CLAY
passions to the point of open defiance. The disso
lution of the Union, civU war, and streams of
blood were freely threatened by Southern men,
whUe some anti-slavery men declared themselves
ready to accept aU these calamities rather than
the spread of slavery over the territories yet free
from It. Neither was the excitement conflned to
the haUs of Congress. As the reports of the
speeches made there went over the land, the people
were profoundly astonished and alarmed. The
presence of a great danger, and a danger, too,
springing from an inherent antagonism in the in
stitutions of the country, suddenly flashed upon
their minds. They experienced something like a
first violent shock of earthquake, making them
feel that the ground under their very feet was at
the mercy of volcanic forces. It is true, wise men
had foretold something like this, but actual expe
rience was far more Impressive than the mere pre
diction had been. Resolutions earnestly demand
ing the exclusion of slavery from Missouri were
passed by one after another of the Northern legis
latures except those of New England, where, how
ever, the same sentiment found vigorous expression
In numerous memorials from cities and towns. Of
the slaveholding States, one, Delaware, spoke
through a unanimous resolve of Its legislature in
the same sense; and even In Baltimore a pubUc
meeting protested against the extension of slavery.
But beyond these points no anti-slavery sentiment
made Itself heard In the South. The legislatures

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 177
of Virginia and Kentucky pronounced loudly for
the admission of Missouri with slavery, and the
Maryland legislature joined them. Public senti
ment In the other slave States spoke out with equal
emphasis. Thus the country found itself divided
geographicaUy upon a question of vital importance.
On February 16, 1819, the House of Represent
atives adopted the amendment restricting slavery,
and thus passed the Missouri blU. But the Sen
ate, eleven days afterwards, struck out the anti-
slavery provision and sent the blU back to the
House. A biU was then passed organizing the
Territory of Arkansas, an amendment moved by
Taylor of New York prohibiting the further intro
duction of slavery there having been voted down.
Clay had opposed that amendment In a speech and
thrown the casting vote of the speaker adversely
to it on a motion to reconsider. Thus slavery was
virtuaUy fastened on Arkansas. But the Missouri
biU failed In the fifteenth Congress. The popular
excitement steadily increased.
The sixteenth Congress met in December, 1819.
In the Senate the admission of Missouri with sla
very was coupled with the admission of Maine, on
the balance-of -power principle that one free State
and one slave State should always be admitted at
the same time. An amendment was moved abso
lutely prohibiting slavery in Missouri, but it was
voted down. Then Mr, Thomas, a senator from
lUInois, on January 18, 1820, proposed that no
restriction as to slavery be imposed upon Missouri

178 HENRY CLAY
in framing a state constitution, but that In aU
the rest of the country ceded by France to the
United States north of 36° 30', this being the
southern boundary line of Missouri, there should
be neither slavery nor involtmtary servitude. This
was the essence of the famous Missouri Compro
mise, and after long and acrimonious debates and
several more votes in the House for restriction
and in the Senate against it, this compromise was
1 adopted. By It the slave power obtained the pre
sent tangible object it contended for; free labor
won a contingent advantage in the future. The
South was strongly bound together by a material
interest; It obeyed a common Impulse and an In
tolerant wiU, presenting a solid and determined
front. The Northern anti-slavery men were held
together, not by a weU understood common Inter
est, but by a sentiment ; and as this sentiment was
stronger or weaker in different individuals, they
would stand firm or yield to the entreaties or
threats of the Southern men. Thus the bargain
was accompUshed.
Clay has been widely credited with being the
"father " of the Missouri Compromise. As to the
main features of the measure this credit he did
not deserve. So far he had taken a prominent but
not an originating part in the transaction. His
leadership in disposing of the Missouri question
belonged to a later stage of the proceeding. But
the part he had so far taken appeared to be little
In accord with his early anti-slavery professions.

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 179
The speeches he made In the course of these de
bates, among them one of four hours, have never
been reported. But some of the things he said
we can gather from the speeches of those who re
plied to him. Thus we find that he most strenu
ously opposed the exclusion of slavery from Mis
souri, and any interference with It; we find him
asserting that Congress had no right whatever to
prescribe conditions to newly organized States In
any way restricting their "sovereign rights;" we
find him sneering at the advocates of slavery re
striction as afflicted with "negrophobia; " we find
him patheticaUy, In the name of humanity, excus
ing the extension of slavery as apt to improve the
condition of the negro, and advancing the argu
ment that the evUs of slavery might be cured by
spreading it; we find him provoking a reply like
the f oUowing from Taylor of New York : —
" It [labor] is considered low and unfit for freemen.
I cannot better iUustrate this truth than by referring to
a remark of the honorable gentleman from Kentucky
[Mr. Clay]. I have often admired the Uberality of his
sentiments. He is governed by no vulgar prejudices ;
yet with what abhorrence did he speak of the perform
ance, by your wives and daughters, of those domestic
offices which he was pleased to call servile ! What
comparison did he make of the ' black slaves ' of Ken
tucky and the ' white slaves ' of the North ; and how
instantly did he strike a balance in favor of the condition
of the former ! If such opinions and expressions, even
in the ardor of debate, can fall from that honorable

180 HENRY CLAY
gentleman, what ideas do you suppose are entertained of
laboring men by the majority of slaveholders ! "
We find him arguing that the provision of the
Constitution, " The citizens of each State shaU be
entitled to aU the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States," would be violated
by the restriction to be imposed on Missouri as to
slavery. The compromise as proposed he supported heart-
Uy, and when the bUl embodying It had passed
we find him resorting to a very sharp and question
able trick to save It from further interference.
The bill passed on March 2. On the morning of
March 3, John Randolph, having voted with the
majority, offered a motion that the vote be recon
sidered. Clay, as speaker, promptly ruled the
motion out of order "until the ordinary business
of the morning, as prescribed by the rules of the
House, should be disposed of." The House went
on receiving and referring petitions. When peti
tions were called for from the members from Vir
ginia, Randolph moved "that the House retain In
their possession the Missouri biU until the period
should arrive when, according to the rules of the
House, a motion to reconsider should be in order."
Speaker Clay "declared this motion out of order
for the reason assigned on the first appUcatlon of
Mr. Randolph on this day." When the morning
business was at last disposed of, Randolph "moved
the House now to reconsider their vote of yester
day. ' ' Then Speaker Clay — so the record runs —

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 181
"having ascertained the fact, stated to the House
that the proceedings of the House on that biU
yesterday had been communicated to the Senate
by the clerk, and that, the blU not being in posses
sion of the House, the motion to reconsider could
not be entertained." The biU had been hurried up
to the Senate while Speaker Clay was ruling Ran
dolph's motions out of order. It is certain that
a mere hint by the speaker to the clerk would have
kept the blU In the House. It is also probable.
If not certain, that the first motion by Randolph,
being heard by the clerk, would have had the same
effect, had not that official received a hint from
the speaker, that he desired the bill to be hurried
off, out of Randolph's reach. The history of the
House probably records no sharper trick.
Thus it Is clear that Clay, who at the beginning
of his public life had risked aU his political pro
spects by advocating emancipation in Kentucky,
now not only favored a compromise admitting a
new slave State, — some of the sincerest anti-sla
very men did that, — but in doing so used some
of the very arguments characteristic of those who
had worked themselves up to a belief in slavery as
a blessing, and endeavored to strengthen and per
petuate its rule.
Were these his real sentiments ? Clay's conduct
with regard to the slavery question appears singu
larly Inconsistent, It is impossible to believe that
his condemnations of the system of slavery, and
his professions of hope that It would be extinguished.

182 HENRY CLAY
were insincere. His feelings in this respect would
occasionaUy burst out in an unpremeditated, un
studied, and unguarded way, as when, at this same
period, while the Missouri struggle was going on
In all Its fury, he complimented the new South
American republics for having emancipated their
slaves. But the same man would advocate "with
great force," and "In a speech of considerable
length," a bill to facilitate the catching of "fugi
tives from justice, and persons escaping from the
service of their masters." He would in the Mis
souri struggle "go with his section " in doing what
could be done at the time to secure the foothold of
slavery in new States, and thus to facilitate the
growth of its power. It is a remarkable circum
stance at the same time that none of the speeches
he made on the pro-slavery side, although they
were mentioned In the record of the debates, were
reported, even In short outline. Did he suppress
them? Did he dislike to see such arguments in
print coupled with his name ? We do not know.
We shaU find more such puzzles in his career.
At the close of the session In May, 1820, Clay
announced to the House that he found himself
obliged to retire from public life for some time.
He had formed that resolution on account of the
embarrassed condition of his private affairs. He
had lost a large sum of money by indorsing the
obligations of a friend, and there was a rumor also,
whether true or not, that he had suffered heavily
at play. At any rate, his necessities must have

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 183
been pressing, for he strenuously urged with the
President and the secretary of state an old claim
for a "half -outfit," $4500, due him as a commis
sioner of the United States In negotiating a com
mercial convention with Great Britain in 1815.
He returned to Kentucky with the hope of repair
ing his fortunes by industrious application to his
legal practice ; and at the meeting of the sixteenth
Congress for its second session. In November, 1820,
a letter from him was read to the House, in which,
"owing to imperious circumstances," he resigned
the office of speaker, as he would not be able to
attend untU after the Christmas holidays. In
fact he did not reach Washington until January
16, 1821. Then his services were urgently in de
mand. The "Missouri question," which in the previous
session seemed to have been put to rest by the
compromise, had risen again in a new, unexpected,
and threatening form. The biU passed at the last
session had authorized the people of Missouri to
make a state constitution without any restriction
as to slavery. The formal admission of the State
was now to foUow, But the Constitution with
which Missouri presented herself to Congress not
only recognized slavery as existing there; it pro
vided also that It should be the duty of the legisla
ture to pass such laws as would be necessary to
prevent free negroes or mulattoes from coming
Into or settling In the State. This was more than
those Northern men who accepted the compromise

184 HENRY CLAY
of the last session had bargained for. Not a few
of them, at heart profoundly dissatisfied with what
had been done, and whose scruples had been re
vived and strengthened by their contact with the
popular feeling at home, were ready to seize upon
this obnoxious clause in the state Constitution, to
reopen the whole question, A good many South
ern men, too, disliked the compromise, on account
of the exclusion of slavery from the territory north
of 36° 30'. The most prudent among them were
wiUing to yield a point on the questioned constitu
tional clause, rather than put In jeopardy the
soUd advantage of the admission of Missouri as a
slave State. But the bulk of them were for insist
ing upon the reception of the State without further
condition. A few Southern extremists stUl thought
of upsetting the 36° 30' restriction. In the Sen
ate, Eaton of Tennessee offered to the resolution
admitting Missouri an amendment providing "that
nothing herein contained shall be so construed as
to give the assent of Congress to any provision of
the Constitution of Missouri, if any there be, that
contravenes the clause in the Constitution of the
United States that ' the citizens of each State shaU
be entitled to aU the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States,' " — the point being
that, as free persons of color were citizens in some
States, for example, Massachusetts, Vermont, and
New Hampshire, the proposed Constitution of Mis
souri deprived them in that State of the privileges
granted them by the federal Constitution. After

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 185
long and acrimonious debates, the resolution with
this amendment passed the Senate, on December
12, 1820, by a majority of eight.
In the House the struggle raged at the same
time. On November 23 Lowndes of South Caro
lina reported a resolution to admit Missouri, tak
ing the ground that, as Congress at the last ses
sion had authorized the people of Missouri to form
a state constitution, Missouri had thereby been
invested with aU the rights and attributes of a
State, and aU those who in good f?iith respected
the acts of the government would now vote for
the formal admission of Missouri as a matter of
course. This was vigorously combated by John
Sergeant of Pennsylvania, a stanch opponent of
slavery, and a man of fine ability and high charac
ter, whom we shaU meet again In political compan
ionship with Clay under Interesting circumstances.
He stoutly maintained that Congress, when au
thorizing the people of Missouri to form a consti
tution, had not parted with the power of looking
into that constitution to see whether It conformed
to the prescribed conditions. The debate then
ranged again over the whole slavery question, grow
ing hotter as it went on, and finaUy the resolution
admitting Missouri was, on December 13, rejected
by a majority of fourteen. The excitement which
followed was intense. When the vote was an
nounced, Lowndes rose and solemnly caUed upon
the House to take measures for the preservation
of peace In Missouri. The apprehension that the

186 HENRY CLAY
fate of the Union trembled In the balance was
again freely expressed. Six weeks later, on Jan
uary 24, a resolution offered by Eustis of Mas
sachusetts, to admit Missouri on condition that
she expunge from her Constitution the provision
discriminating against free persons of color, was
taken up for consideration. It was voted down
by 146 yeas to 6 nays. When the vote had been
announced, there was a pause In the proceedings.
The deadlock seemed complete. A feeUng of help
lessness appeared to pervade the House. It was
then that Clay, who had arrived a week before,
took the matter In hand. Breaking the silence
which prevailed, he rose and said that, if no other
gentleman made any motion on the subject, "he
should on the day after to-morrow move to go into
committee of the whole to take into consideration
the resolution from the Senate on the subject of
Missouri." He did so on January 29. He declared himself
ready to vote for the senate resolution even with
the proviso it contained, although he did not deem
that proviso necessary. The speeches he deUvered
on this occasion were again left unreported, but
their arguments appear In the replies they called
forth. Admitting that the clause in the Missouri
Constitution respecting free persons of color was
incompatible with the Constitution of the United
States, this circumstance could not, he argued, be
an objection to the admission of Missouri as a
State of the Union, because the legislators of

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 187
Missouri would be bound by their oaths to support
the federal Constitution, and would, therefore,
never make any law obnoxious to it. The weak
ness of this argfument did not escape the attention
of his audience. But, he said, If the Missouri
legislature should enact any law in pursuance of
the obnoxious clause in their Constitution, it would
be declared void by the courts of the United States.
However, he added, a limitation or restriction
upon the power of the legislature of Missouri
might be imposed by adding to the senate resolu
tion a provision, that no law should be enacted,
under the obnoxious clause of the state Constitu
tion, affecting the rights of citizens of other States.
Thus he argued on both sides of the question, try
ing to concIUate the good-wiU of all, at the same
time addressing to them the most fervid appeals
to unite in a spirit of harmony, in order to save
the country from this dangerous quarrel which
threatened the disruption of the Union. But the
peacemaker had a complicated task before him.
In order to unite, he had to convince or move men
who pursued the most different objects, ranging
from the absolute exclusion of new slave States to
the unconditional admission of them. There were
not a few also who thought of postponing the
whole subject to the meeting of the next Congress.
Several amendments to the senate resolution were
moved, but aU were voted down. Nothing was
found on which a majority could be imlted. The
perplexity and excitement increased. Then, as a

188 HENRY CLAY
last expedient, Clay moved to refer the senate
resolution to a special committee of thirteen mem
bers. This was agreed to, and Clay was put at
the head of the committee.
On February 10 he brought in a report, which
was rather an appeal than an argument, "Your
committee believe that aU must ardently unite in
wishing an amicable termination of a question,
which, if It be longer kept open, cannot fail to
produce, and possibly to perpetuate, prejudices
and animosities among a people to whom the con
servation of their moral ties should be even dearer,
if possible, than that of their political bond."
The committee then proposed a resolution to admit
Missouri Into the Union "on an equal footing with
the original States in aU respects whatever, upon
the fundamental condition that the said State shaU
never pass any law preventing any description of
persons from coming to and settling in the said
State who now are, or hereafter may become, citi
zens of any of the States of this Union," This
was to satisfy the Northern people. The resolu
tion provided further that, as soon as the Missouri
legislature should, by solemn public act, have de
clared the assent of the State to this fundamental
condition, the President should by proclamation
announce the fact, whereupon the admission of the
State should be considered complete. This was
to prevent further trouble in Congress. Finally
the resolution declared that nothing contained In
it should "be construed to take from the said State

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 189
of Missouri, when admitted Into this Union, the
exercise of any right or power which can now be
constitutlonaUy exercised by any of the original
States," This was to conciliate the extreme state-
sovereignty men. "Thus consulting the opinions
of both sides of the House," he said In opening
the debate, " In that spirit of compromise which is
occasionaUy necessary to the existence of aU socie
ties, he hoped It would receive the countenance of
the House." He concluded by "earnestly Invok
ing the spirit of harmony and kindred feeling to
preside over the deliberations of the House on the
subject." But this appeal stiU faUed. After a
heated debate the resolution was voted down In
committee of the whole by a majority of nine, in
the House by a majority of three, and upon recon
sideration by a majority of six. Among the yeas
there were but few Northern, among the nays only
four Southern votes, and these were extremists of
the John Randolph type. This was on February
13. There were not many days of the session
left. The situation became more and more critical
and threatening.
On February 14 the electoral vote was to be
counted, Monroe having in the preceding autumn
been reelected president. The people of Missouri
had chosen electors. The question occurred, should
their votes be counted? Some Southern members
hotly maintained that Missouri was of right a
State. Northern men asserted with equal warmth
that she was only a territory, having no right to

190 HENRY CLAY
take part in a presidential election. The Missouri
quarrel threatened to invade, and perhaps to break
up in disorder, the joint convention of the two
Houses sitting to count the electoral vote. The
danger was averted by skillful management. Clay
reported, from the joint committee to which the
matter had been referred, a resolution "that, if
any objection be made to the votes of Missouri,
and the counting or omitting to count which shall
not essentially change the result of the election,
— in that case they shaU be reported by the presi
dent of the Senate in the f oUowing manner : Were
the votes of Missouri to be counted, the result
would be, for A. B. for president of the United
States,  votes; if not counted, for A. B. as
president of the United States,  votes; but in
either case A. B. is elected president; and in the
same manner for vice-president." This resolution
was adopted and served its purpose. Fortunately
the three electoral votes of Missouri were of no
practical importance, Monroe having received aU
the votes but one, and Tompkins, for vice-presi
dent, a very large majority.
But as soon as Missouri was reached in the elec
toral count, objection was made by a Northern
member to the counting of her votes, on the ground
that she was not a State of the Union. The Sen
ate then withdrew, and the House having been
caUed to order, Floyd of Virginia moved a resolu
tion that Missouri was a State of the Union, and
that her vote should be counted. He thought he

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 191
had now forced the Issue, so that it could not be
avoided. "Let us know," he exclaimed in closing
his speech, "whether Missouri be a State of the
Union or not. Sir, we cannot take another step
without hurling this government Into the gulf of
destruction. For one, I say I have gone as far
as I can go in the way of compromise; and If
there is to be a compromise beyond that point, it
must be at the edge of the sword." After some
more speaking in a similar vein, mainly by John
Randolph, Clay rose to pour oil on the troubled
waters. He calmly reminded the House of the
fact that a resolution had been adopted covering
the treatment of the vote of Missouri, to bridge
over the very difficulty now presenting itself. He
therefore moved that Floyd's resolution be laid on
the table, which was done by a large majority.
The Senate then was invited to return, and the
counting of the electoral vote proceeded to the
end. When the result was to be announced, Ran
dolph and Floyd tried once more to interpose, but
were ruled out of order; the president of the Sen
ate finished his announcement, and the act of vote-
counting was happily concluded.
But after all this, the Missouri question seemed
to be no nearer its solution. As the end of the
session approached, the excitement rose and spread.
Some attempts were made in the Senate and the
House to find a basis of agreement, but without
avail. Then, as a last resort, Clay moved the
appointment of a committee, together with a simi-

192 HENRY CLAY
lar committee to be appointed by the Senate, to
consider and report "whether it be expedient or
not to make provision for the admission of Mis
souri Into the Union, and for the execution of the
laws of the United States within Missouri; and if
not, whether any other and what provision, adapted
to her condition, ought to be made by law," This
was adopted by 101 yeas to 55 nays. The com
mittee was to consist of twenty-three members,
the number of the States then in the Union. Al
though It was to be elected by baUot, Clay was
by tacit consent permitted to draw up a list to be
voted for. The Senate elected a committee of
seven to join the twenty -three of the House. On
February 28 Clay reported a resolution, the same
in effect as that which he had previously reported
from his committee of thirteen, and in introducing
it he said that the committee on the part of the
Senate was unanimously in Its favor, and that on
the part of the House nearly so. After a short
debate the resolution was adopted by 86 yeas to
82 nays. The bulk of the Northern vote went
against it; of the Southerners, only a few extreme
men under Randolph's lead. The resolution passed
the Senate likewise. Missouri promptly complied
with the fundamental condition, and thus the strug
gle which had so violently agitated Congress and
the country came to an end.
It was generaUy admitted that this final accom
modation was mainly due to Clay's zeal, persever
ance, skiU, and the moving warmth of his personal

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 193
appeals. He did not confine himself to speeches
addressed to the House, but he went from man to
man, expostulating, beseeching, persuading, in his
most winning way. Even his opponents in debate
acknowledged, involuntarily sometimes, the im
pressive sincerity of his anxious entreaties. What
helped him In gaining over the number of votes
necessary to form a majority was the growing fear
that this quarrel would break up the ruUng party,
and lead to the forming of new divisions. His
success added greatly to his reputation and gave
new strength to his influence, Adams wrote In
his journal that one of "the greatest results of
this conflict of three sessions" was "to bring into
fuU display the talents and resources and influence
of Mr, Clay." In newspapers and speeches he
was praised as "the great pacificator."
As a measure of temporary pacification the com
promise could not Indeed have been more success
ful. Only a short time before its accomplishment
the aged Jefferson, from his retreat at MontlceUo,
had sent forth a cry of alarm in a private letter,
which soon became pubUc: "The Missouri ques
tion is the most portentous one that ever threat
ened the Union. In the gloomiest moments of
the Revolutionary war I never had any apprehen
sion equal to that I feel from this source." No
sooner had the compromise passed than the excite
ment and anxiety subsided. With that singular
carelessness, that elasticity of temper, which Is
characteristic of the American, the danger, of

194 HENRY CLAY
which the shock of earthquake had warned him,
was forgotten. The pubUc mind turned at once
to things of more hopeful interest, and the Union
seemed safer than ever.
The American people have since become paln-
fuUy aware that this was a delusion; and the ques
tion has often been asked whether, in view of what
came afterwards, those who accommodated the
Missouri quarrel reaUy did a good service to their
country. It is an interesting question. The com
promise had in fact settled only two points: the
admission of Missouri as a slave State; and the
recognition of the right of slavery to go. If the
settlers there wanted it, into the territory belong
ing to the Louisiana purchase south of 36° 30'.
It was practicaUy so recognized in the newly or
ganized territory of Arkansas. So far, the com
promise directly and substantially strengthened
the slave interest. On the other hand, the slave
interest had, in order to secure these advantages,
been compeUed to acquiesce in two constitutional
doctrines : that Congress had the power to exclude
slavery from the territories of the United States,
and that the admission of new States could be made
subject to conditions. But these points, especiaUy
the first one, were yielded only for the occasion,
and might be withdrawn when the Interests of
slavery should demand that the territory north of
36° 30' be opened to its invasion, as actuaUy hap
pened some thirty -four years later in the case of
Kansas.

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 195
The compromise had another sinister feature.
The anti-slavery sentiment In the North, invoked
by the Missouri controversy, was no doubt strong
and sincere. The South threatened the dissolu
tion of the Union ; and, frightened by that threat,
a sufficient number of Northern men were found
willing to acquiesce, substantially, in the demands
of the South. Thus the slave power learned the
weak spot in the anti-slavery armor. It was Ukely
to avaU ItseK of that knowledge, to carry further
points by similar threats, and to famUIarize itself
more and more with the Idea that the dissolution
of the Union would reaUy be a royal remedy for
aU Its complaints.
Would it not have been better statesmanship,
then, to force the Missouri question to a straight
issue at any risk, rather than compromise it?
It was certain that the final struggle between
slavery and free labor would ultimately come, and
also that then, as slavery was an institution utterly
abhorrent to the spirit of modem civilization, it
would at last be overcome by that spirit and per
ish. The danger was that in its struggle for life
slavery might destroy the Union and free institu
tions in America. The question, therefore, which
the statesmanship of the time had to consider was,
which would be the safer poUcy, — to resist the
demands of the South at any risk, or to tide over
the difficulty untU it might be fought out under
more favorable circumstances ?
Had the anti-slavery men in Congress, by un-

196 HENRY CLAY
yielding firmness, prevented the admission of Mis
souri as a slave State, thus shutting out aU pro
spect of slavery extension, and had the South then
submitted, without attempting the dissolution of
the Union, the probabUity is that the slave power
would have lost hope, that emancipation move
ments would have sprung up with renewed strength,
and that slavery would have graduaUy declined
and died. But would the South in 1820 have
submitted without attempting dissolution? There
is good reason to believe that It would not. The
Union feeling had Indeed been greatly strengthened
by the war of 1812, but It had not grown strong
enough in the South to command the self-sacrifice
of an interest which at that time was elated by the
anticipation of great wealth and power. In New
England aU there was of anti-Union sentiment
had been crushed, but not so in the South. The
dissolution of the Union was not then, in the pop
ular imagination, such a monstrous thing as it
is now. The Union was stUl, in some respects,
regarded as an experiment; and when a great ma
terial interest found itself placed at a disadvan
tage In the Union, it was apt to conclude that the
experiment had faUed. To speculate upon the
advisablUty of dissolving the Union did not then
appear to the popular mind poUtlcaUy treasonable
and morally heinous.
That the dissolution of the Union was freely
discussed among the Southern members of the
sixteenth Congress Is certain. James Barbour of

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 197
Virginia, a man of very high character, was re
ported to be canvassing the free state members as
to the practicabUity of a convention of the States
to dissolve the Union, and to make arrangements
for distributing Its assets and liabilities. At one
period during the Missouri struggle, the Southern
members seriously contemplated withdrawing from
Congress in a body; and John Randolph, although
he had not been for some time on speaking terms
with Clay, one evening approached him, saying:
"Mr. Speaker, I wish you would leave the chair.
I wiU foUow you to Kentucky, or anywhere else
in the world." "That is a very serious proposi
tion," answered Clay, "which we have not now
time to discuss. But if you wiU come into the
speaker's room to-morrow morning, before the
House assembles, we wiU discuss it together."
They met. Clay strongly advised against any
thing like secession, and in favor of a compromise,
whUe Randolph was for immediate and decisive
action. The slaveholders, he said, had the right
on their side ; matters must come to an extremity,
and there ooidd be no more suitable occasion to
bring them to that issue.
The secession of the Southern delegations from
Congress did indeed not come to pass ; it was pre-,
vented by the compromise. But Clay himself,
when the excitement was at its height, gloomily
expressed his apprehension that in a few years the
Union would be divided into three confederations,
— a Southern, an Eastern, and a Western.

198 HENRY CLAY
WhUe thus the thought of dissolving the Union
occurred readUy to the Southern mind, the thought
of maintaining the government and preserving the
Union by means of force hardly occurred to any
body. It seemed to be taken for granted on all
sides that. If the Southern States insisted upon
cutting loose from the Union, nothing could be
done but to let them go. It is true there was talk
enough about swords and blood; but the wars were
expected to turn upon questions of boundary and
the Uke, after dissolution, not upon the right of
States to go out. Even such a man as John
Quincy Adams, not only an anti-slavery man but
a statesman always inclining to strong measures,
approved of the compromise as "aU that could be
effected under the present Constitution, and from
extreme im willingness to put the Union at hazard; "
and then wrote In addition : " But perhaps it would
have been a wiser as weU as a bolder course to
have persisted in the restriction upon Missouri,
tiU it should have terminated In a convention of
the States to revise and amend the Constitution.
This would have produced a new Union of thirteen
or fourteen States unpoUuted with slavery, with
a great and glorious object to effect, — namely,
that of raUying to their standard the other States
by the universal emancipation of their slaves. If
the Union must be dissolved, slavery is precisely
the question upon which it ought to break." Thus
even this patriotic statesman thought rather of
separating in order to meet again in a purer condi-

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 199
tion of existence — a remarkably fantastic plan
— than of denying the right of secession, and of
maintaining by a vigorous exertion of power the
government of which he was a leading member,
and the Union of which his father had been one
of the principal founders. It must be admitted
also that, while the North was superior to the
South in population and means at that period, yet
the disproportion was not yet large enough to
make the maintenance of the Union by force a
promising task.
An attempt by the South, or by the larger part
of it, to dissolve the Union would therefore, at
that time, have been likely to succeed. There
would probably have been no armed coUIsion about
the dissolution Itself, but a prospect of complicated
quarrels and wars afterwards about the property
formerly held in common, and perhaps about other
matters of disagreement. A reunion might possi
bly have foUowed after a sad experience of separa
tion. But that result would have had to be evolved
from long and confused conflicts, and the future
would at best have been dark and uncertain. Even
in the event of reunion, the fatal principle of se
cession at wiU, once recognized, would have passed
into the new arrangement.
In view of aU this, it seemed good statesman
ship to hold the Union together by a compromise,
and to adjourn the final and decisive struggle on
the slavery question to a time when the Union
feeUng should be strong and determined enough

200 HENRY CLAY
to maintain the integrity of the repubUc, if neces
sary, by force of arms, and when the free States
should be so superior In men and means to the
slaveholding section as to make the result certain.
That this train of reasoning was Clay's conscious
motive in doing what he did wiU not be asserted.
It Is more likely that he simply foUowed his In
stinct as a devoted friend of the Union, leaving
for the moment aU other Interests out of view.
Although he had not originated the main part of
the compromise, having exercised decisive influ
ence only at the close of the controversy, yet, by
common consent, he carried off the honors of the
occasion. As the peculiar brilliancy of the abiU
ties he possessed, his Involuntary showiness, made
him always the most conspicuous figure whenever
he appeared in a parliamentary contest, so he had
impressed himself in this Instance upon the popu
lar mind as the leading actor In the drama. He
retired, therefore, to private life with a larger
stock of popularity than he had ever possessed.
What he had lost by the appearance of captious -
ness in his opposition to Monroe's administration
was now amply retrieved by the great patriotic
service rendered In bringing a very dangerous con
troversy to what was considered a happy conclu
sion. It is interesting to hear the judgment passed
upon him at that period by another public man of
high distinction. After a visit he had received
from Clay, John Quincy Adams delivered himself
In his Diary as f oUows : —

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 201
" Clay is an eloquent man, with very popular man
ners and great political management. He is, like almost
aU the eminent men of this country, only half educated.
His school has been the world, and in that he is profi
cient. His morals, public and private, are loose, but he
has aU the virtues indispensable to a popular man. As
he is the first distinguished man that the Western coun
try has presented as a statesman to the Union, they are
profoundly proud of him. Clay's temper is impetuous
and his ambition impatient. He has long since marked
me as the principal rival in his way, and has taken no
more pains to disguise his hostility than was necessary
for decorum, and to avoid shocking the public opinion.
His future fortunes and mine are in wiser hands than
ours. I have never even defensively repeUed his
attacks. Clay has large and fiberal views of public
affairs, and that sort of generosity which attaches indi
viduals to his person. As president of the Union, his
administration would be a perpetual succession of in
trigue and management with the legislature. It would
also be sectional in its spirit, and sacrifice all interests to
those of the Western country and the slaveholders. But
his principles relative to internal improvements would
produce results honorable and useful to the nation."
This was not the judgment of a friend, but of
a man always incUned to be censorious, and, when
stung by conflicts of opinion, uncharitable. It
was the judgment, too, of a rival in the race for
the presidency, — a rival careful to admit to him
self the strong quaUtles of the adversary, while
dweUIng with some satisfaction upon his weak
points. When speaking of Clay's "loose " public

202 HENRY CLAY
morals, Adams can have meant only the appar
ently factious opposition to Monroe's administra
tion, and his resort to tricky expedients in carry
ing his points In the House. He cannot have
meant anything like the use of official power and
opportunities for private pecuniary advantage, for
in this respect Clay's character was and remained
above reproach. No species of corruption stained
his name. Neither could Clay be justly charged
with a sectional spirit. His feelings were, on the
contrary, as largely and thoroughly national as
those of any statesman of his time. Although he
had at flrst spoken the language of the slaveholder
in the Missouri debate, It could certainly not be
said that he was willing to " sacrifice aU Interests
to those of the slaveholders." He would have
stood by the Union against them at all hazards,
and his tariff and internal Improvement policy
soon became obnoxious to them. But, barring
these points, Adams's judgment was not far astray.
In the course of this narration we shaU find more
opinions of Adams on Clay, expressed at a time
when the two men had learned to understand each
other better.
When Clay left Washington, his professional
prospects were very promising. The Bank of the
United States engaged him, upon liberal terms,
as Its standing counsel in Ohio and Kentucky.
He expected his practice to retrieve his fortunes
In three or four years, and to enable him then to
return to the service of the country.

CHAPTER IX
CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCT
Clat's retirement was not of long duration.
The people of Kentucky were then passing through
the last stages of a confused excitement caused by
a popular delusion, that riches can be created and
happiness acquired by a plentiful issue of paper
money and an artificial inflation of prices. The
consequence was what it always Is. The more
plenty the paper money became, the more peo
ple ran into debt. They then sought "relief" by
legislative contrivances in favor of debtors, which
caused a poUtical division Into the "relief" and
the "anti-relief" parties. The "relief measures"
came before the highest state court, which declared
them unconstitutional; whereupon the court was
aboUshed and a new one created, and this brought
forth the "old court " and the "new court " parties
in Kentucky. The whole story is told with admir
able clearness in Professor Sumner's biography
of Andrew Jackson. In these fierce controver
sies. Clay took position as an advocate of good
sense, honesty, and sound principles of finance,
sometimes against a current of popular feeling
which seemed to be overwhelming. He made ene-

204 HENRY CLAY
mies in that way from whom he was to hear In
later years; but, on the whole, his popularity
weathered the storm. Without opposition, he was
elected to represent his faithful Lexington district
in the House of Representatives of the eighteenth
Congress, which met on the first Monday in De
cember, 1823. During his absence from the House
there had been contest enough about the speaker
ship. But as soon as he appeared again, an over
whelming majority of the members gathered around
him, and he was elected speaker by 139 to 42, the
minority voting for PhiUp P. Barbour of Virginia,
who had been speaker during the seventeenth Con
gress. This was the session preceding the presidential
election of 1824, and Clay was a confessed candi
date for the succession to Monroe. His friends in
Kentucky — or, as many would have It, the people
of Kentucky — were warm and loud in their advo
cacy of his "claims." His achievement as "the
great pacificator" had much increased his popu
larity in other States. His conduct in the House
was likely to have some effect upon his chances,
and to be observed with extraordinary interest.
The first thing he did was to take the unpopular
side of a question appeaUng in an unusual degree
to patriotic emotion and human sympathy. He
opposed a bUl granting a pension to the mother of
Commodore Perry, the hero of Lake Erie. The
death of her iUustrious son had left the old matron
in needy circumstances. The debate ran largely

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 205
upon the great services rendered to the country
by Commodore Perry In the days of great public
danger and distress ; and, by way of contrast, on
the sorrows and cares of the bereft mother. The
eloquence expended upon these points had been
formidable, threatening with the contempt of the
American people those who dared to "go back to
their constituents " to teU them "that they had
turned from their door, in the evening of a long
life, the aged and venerable mother of the gallant
Perry, and doomed her to the charity of the world."
It looked like a serious matter for any presiden
tial candidate who naturally desired to be popular
with people of tender sensibilities and patriotic
feeUngs, and who had also to look after the soldier
and sailor vote. Of this aspect of the case, how
ever. Clay did not seem to think. He calmly ar
gued that this case, however great the sympathy
it deserved, did not fall within the principles of
the pension laws, since Commodore Perry had not
died of injuries received in the service; that the
principle of the law had already been overstepped
in granting a pension to his widow and children;
that there must be a limit to gratitude at the pub
Uc expense for mUitary and naval service; that
he saw no reason why the services of the warrior
should be held in so much higher esteem than the
sometimes even more valuable services of the civil
officer of the republic, and so on. His apprehen
sion concerning the superiority in popular favor
of military glory over cIvU merit he was to find

206 HENRY CLAY
strikingly confirmed by his own experience. Evi
dently this candidate for the presidency stiU had
opinions of his own and courage to express them.
It was not by the smaU tricks of the demagogue,
but rather by a strong advocacy of the policies he
believed in, that he hoped to commend himself
to the confidence of the people. So we find him
soon engaged in a hot debate on Internal improve
ments. In May, 1822, Monroe had vetoed a blU to es
tablish toUgates on the Cumberland Road, and on
the same occasion submitted to Congress an elabo
rate statement supporting his belief that the prac
tical execution of works of internal improvement
by the general government was unwarranted by
the Constitution, admitting, however, the power
of Congress under the Constitution to grant and
appropriate money in aid of works of internal im
provement to be executed by others. In January,
1824, a biU was reported authorizing the President
to cause the necessary surveys, plans, and estimates
to be made for such a system of roads and canals
as he might deem of national importance In a
postal, commercial, or military point of view.
For this purpose the biU proposed an appropria
tion of $30,000. The debate turned mainly on
the point of constitutional power, and in his most
dashing style Clay attacked Monroe's constitu
tional doctrines, stopping but little short of ridi-
I cule, and pronounced himself again in favor of the
' I most Uberal construction of the fundamental law.

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 207
In the power "to establish" post-roads, he easily
found the power to build roads and to keep them
In repair. The power to "regulate commerce
among the several States " had to his mind little
meaning, if it did not imply "authority to foster"
interstate commerce, "to promote it, to bestow
on it faculties similar to those which had been
conceded to our foreign trade." To him, this in
volved unquestionably the power to build canals.
"AU the powers of this government," he argued,
"should be Interpreted in reference to Its first, its
best, its greatest object, the Union of these States.
And is not that Union best invigorated by an In
timate social and commercial connection between
aU the parts of the confederacy? " He described
the unsatisfied needs of the great West In stirring
terms, and then opened once more that glorious
perspective of the great ocean -bound republic which
his ardent mind was so fond of contemplating.
"Sir," he exclaimed, "it is a subject of peculiar
deUght to me to look forward to the proud and
happy period, distant as it may be, when circula
tion and association between the Atlantic and the
Pacific and the Mexican Gulf shaU be as free and
perfect as they are at this moment in England,
and in any other, the most highly improved coun
try on the globe. Sir, a new world has come into
being since the Constitution was adopted. Are
the narrow, limited necessities of the old thirteen
States, indeed of parts only of the old thirteen
States as they existed at the formation of the Con-

208 HENRY CLAY
stitutlon, forever to remain a rule of its interpre
tation? Are we to forget the wants of our coun
try? Are we to neglect and refuse the redemption
of that vast wUderness which once stretched un
broken beyond the Alleghany ? I hope for better
and nobler things! "
These were captivating appeals, but they In
volved the largest of latitudinarian doctrines, —
namely, that the powers granted by the Constitu
tion must grow with the size of the country. The
bill passed the House by a handsome majority; it
passed the Senate too, and Monroe signed It on
the ground that It provided merely for the coUec-
tion of information. It resulted in nothing beyond
the making of surveys for some roads and canals.
However, Clay had on the occasion of this debate
not only put the Internal Improvement part of his
prog;ramme once more In the strongest form before
Congress and the people, but he had also managed
to revive the memory of his opposition to the
Monroe administration.
Next came a plunge into the domain of foreign
poUtics. The rising of the Greeks against the
Turks was at that time occupying the attention of
civilized mankind. The PhllheUenIc fever, fed
partly by a genuine sympathy with a nation fight
ing for its freedom, partly by a classical interest
in the country of Leonidas, Phidias, and Plato,
swept over aU Europe and America alike. In the
United States meetings were held, speeches made,
and resolutions passed, boiling over with enthu-

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 209
siasm for the struggling Greeks. It is curious to
find even the cool-headed GaUatin, at that period
minister of the United States in Paris, proposing
in a dispatch (" as if he was serious," writes
Adams) that the government of the United States
should assist the Greeks with its naval force then
in the Mediterranean. Monroe expressed his sym
pathy with the Greeks in his message; and Daniel
Webster, In January, 1824, In the House of Re
presentatives presented a resolution to provide for
the sending of an agent or commissioner to Greece,
whenever the President should find It expedient.
This resolution he introduced by a speech not only
eulogizing the Greek cause, but also gravely and
elaborately arraigning the " Holy AUiance " as a
league of despotic governments against aU popular
aspirations towards constitutional liberty.
A nation fighting for its freedom naturaUy caUed
Clay to the front. He not only supported Web
ster's motion, but remembering that the "Holy
Alliance," while it hung like a dark cloud over
Europe, also threatened to cast its shadow upon
these shores, he flung down the gauntlet by offer
ing a resolution of his own to be caUed up at some
future time. It declared that the American peo
ple "would not see without serious inquietude
any forcible interposition of the aUied powers of
Europe in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their
former subjection those parts of America which
have proclaimed and established for themselves,
respectively, independent governments, and which

210 HENRY CLAY
have been solemnly recognized by the United
States." This was essentiaUy in the spirit of the utter
ances which had appeared at the opening of the
session in Monroe's message to Congress, and
which have since become celebrated as the Monroe
doctrine. The message had been even a little
stronger In language. Referring to the difference
existing between the political system of the "aUIed
powers " in Europe, and that of the American re
pubUcs, It declared that "we should consider any
attempt on their part to extend their system to
any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to
our peace and safety." Further, with regard to
schemes supposed to be contemplated by the aUIed
powers, for interfering with the independence of
the newly established Spanish American republics,
it said that the American people could not view
such interposition "in any other light than as the
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward
the United States." Here, then. Clay found him
self in thorough accord with the Monroe adminis
tration, whose master spirit in aU that concerned
foreign affairs was John Quincy Adams. More
over, although his resolution did not touch It,
Clay certainly agreed with the other point of the
Monroe doctrine, "that the American continents,
by the free and Independent condition which they
have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to
be considered as subjects for future colonization
by any European power,"

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 211
But when he thrust his resolution into the de
bate on the Greek question, though with no inten
tion of having it discussed immediately, there was
an evident flutter in the House, It was darkly,
shyly hinted at In several speeches as something
"extraordinary," something peculiarly calculated
to involve the United States in dangerous, compli
cations with foreign powers. The consequence
was that Clay, Irritated, broke out with a speech
fuU of zeal but rather loose in argument. He
predicted that a "tremendous storm was ready to
burst upon our happy country," meaning a design
on the part of the "Holy Alliance" to subvert
free institutions in America; he denounced as
"low and debased" those who did not "dare" to
express their sympathies with suffering Greece;
and flnaUy he defied them to go home. If they
"dared," to their constituents, to tell them that
their representatives had "shrunk from the decla
ration of their own sentiments," just as he had
been "dared" when opposing the pension to Com
modore Perry's mother.
Some members of the House resented such lan
guage, and a bitter altercation foUowed, especiaUy
undesirable in the case of a candidate for the presi
dency. Indeed, ambitious statesmen gifted with
oratorical temperaments, whose perorations are apt
to run away with their judgment, may study this
debate with profit, to observe some things which it
Is weU to avoid. Richard M. Johnson of Ken
tucky, at the time one of Clay's most ardent

212 HENRY CLAY
friends and backers for the presidency, dolefuUy
remarked after this debate that "Clay was the
most imprudent man in the world,"
The resolution on the Greek cause was never
acted upon, and Clay's resolution concerning the
Spanish American repubUcs never caUed up. We
shaU see him return to that subject as the head of
the department of foreign affairs in the govern
ment of the United States.
Clay's most important oratorical effort at this
session, and indeed one of the most important
of his life, was brought forth by a debate on
the tariff. The country had gone through trying
experiences during the last eight years. As we
remember, the tariff of 1816 had been enacted to
ward off the flood of cheap EngUsh goods which,
immediately after the close of the war of 1812,
were pouring into the country and underselling
American fabrics. That object, however, was not
accompUshed, except in the case of cheap cotton
goods, which had the advantage of a "minimum"
provision: that aU cotton fabrics invoiced at less
than twenty -flve cents should be taken to have cost
that price at the place of exportation, and should
be taxed accordingly. The tariff did not prevent
the reaction naturaUy foUowing the abnormaUy
stimulated business and the inflated values of war
times. When prices rose, people ran into debt in
the hope of a stUl greater rise. Those who made
money became accustomed to more expensive Uv-
Ing. With the return of peace, the expenditures

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 213
of the government were contracted. There was
less demand for breadstuffs. Then came currency
troubles. The return to specie payments in Eng
land, and the raising of the French indemnity,
created an unusual demand for the precious metals
in Europe, which rendered more difficult the rees-
tabllshment of specie payments in America. The
notes of the state banks outside of New England
were depreciated, and these banks resisted the
efforts of the Bank of the United States toward
general resumption. A great tightness of money
ensued. Times became pinching. Prices went
down. A crisis broke out in 1819. Many busi
ness failures foUowed. The necessity of returning
to more frugal ways of Uving was painfuUy felt.
"Cheap money " theories sprung up. The distress
was greatest where the local bank currency was
most uncertain in its value. The manufacturing
interest suffered heavily, but the difficulties under
which it labored were only a part of those troubles
always occurring when the business enterprise of
a country has, by abnormal circumstances or artifi
cial means, been overstimulated In certain direc
tions, and then has to accommodate itself to en
tirely different conditions. The process of natural
recuperation had, however, already begun, and
that too on a solid basis, after the eUmination of
the unsound elements of business. But the cry
for "reUef " was stIU kept up, and a demand for
"more protection " arose.
In 1818 the duty on iron was raised. In 1820

214 HENRY CLAY
an attempt was made, and supported by Clay in
an eloquent speech, for a general revision of the
tariff, with a view to higher rates. The biU
passed the House, but failed in the Senate. Now,
In January, 1824, the Committee on Manufactures
reported to the House a biU which, In the way of
protecting the manufacturing industries, was to
accomplish what the tariff of 1816 had so signally
failed to do. The duties proposed were: 1, on
articles the importation of which would not Inter
fere with home manufactures, such as silks, linens,
cutlery, spices, and some others, these being mere
revenue duties; and 2, on iron, hemp, glass, lead,
wool and woolen goods, cotton goods, etc., these
being high protective duties.
Clay soon assumed the championship of the blU
In committee of the whole. The debate began
with a skirmish on details; but then the friends
of the biU forced a discussion on its general prin
ciples, which lasted two months. This gave Clay
one of his great opportunities. He was now no
longer the Kentucky farmer pleading for hemp
and homespun, nor the cautious citizen anxious to
have his country make its own clothes and blankets
in time of war. He had developed Into the full
blown protectionist, intent upon using the power
of the government, so far as it would go, to mul
tiply and foster manufactures, not with commerce,
but rather In preference to commerce. His speech,
one of the most elaborate and effective he ever
made, presented in brilliant array the arguments

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 215
which were current among high tariff men then,
and which remain so still. He opened with a
harrowing description of the prevaUing distress,
and among the most significant symptoms of the
dreadful condition of things he counted "the rav
enous pursuit after pubUc situations, not for the
sake of their honors and the performance of their
public duties, but as a means of private sub
sistence." "The pulse of Incumbents," he said In
his picturesque style, "who happen to be taken
iU, Is not marked with more anxiety by the attend
ing physicians than by those who desire to succeed
them, though with very opposite feelings." (To
"make room" for one man simply by removing
another was at that time not yet readily thought
of.) The cause of the prevailing distress he found
In the dependence of this country on the foreign
market, which was at the mercy of foreign Inter
ests, and which might for an Indefinite time be
unable to absorb our surplus of agricultural pro
ducts; and in too great a dependence on foreign
sources of supply. It seemed to him necessary to
provide a home market for our products, the supe
riority of which would consist In its greater steadi
ness, in the creation of reciprocal interests, in
greater security, and in an ultimate increase of
consumption, and consequently of comfort, owing
to an increased quantity of the product, and a re
duction of prices by home competition. To this
end the development of manufacturing industries
was required, which could not be accomplished

216 HENRY CLAY
without high protective. In some cases not without
prohibitory, tariff duties. No country had ever
flourished without such a policy, and England
especiaUy was a shining example of Its wisdom.
British statesmanship had therefore strictly ad
hered to it. A member of Parliament remonstrat
ing against the passage of the corn-laws In favor
of foreign production would, he thought, make a
poor figure.
This policy Clay now christened "the American
system." The opposite policy he denounced as
"the foreign poUcy." He then reviewed elabo
rately one after another the objections urged against
the "American system," and closed with a glowing
appeal to the people of the planting States to sub
mit to the temporary loss which this policy would
bring upon them, since that loss would be small in
comparison with the distress which the rest of the
country would suffer without it.
This speech on the "American system" exhib
ited conspicuously Clay's strong as weU as his
weak points: his skiU of statement; his ingenuity
in the grouping of facts and principles ; his plau
sibility of reasoning; his briUiant imagination;
the fervor of his diction; the warm patriotic tone
of his appeals: and, on the other hand, his super
ficial research; his habit of satisfying himself with
half -knowledge; his disinclination to reason out
propositions logically in aU their consequences.
We find there statements like this : —
" The measure of the wealth of a nation is indicated

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 217
by the measure of its protection of its industry. Great
Britain most protects her industry, and the wealth of
Great Britain is consequently the greatest. France is
next in the degree of protection, and France is next in
the order of wealth. Spain most neglects the duty of
protecting the industry of her subjects, and Spain is one
of the poorest of European nations. Unfortunate Ire
land, disinherited, or rendered in her industiy subser
vient to England, is exactly in the same state of pov
erty with Spain, measured by the rule of taxation. And
the United States are still poorer than either."
And this stIU more startling remark : —
" No man pays the duty assessed on the foreign article
by compulsion, but voluntarily ; and this voluntary duty,
if paid, goes into the common exchequer, for the common
benefit of aU. Consumption has four objects of choice :
First, it may abstain from the use of the foreign article,
and thus avoid the payment of the tax ; second, it may
employ the rival American fabric ; third, it may en
gage in the business of manufacturing, which this bill is
designed to foster ; fourth, it may supply itself from the
household manufactures."
By the side of this amazing revelation of the
means by which the consumer can for himself
neutralize the effects of a high tariff, we find strik
ingly wise sayings, which, however, sometimes fit
economic theories different from his own. He ob
served, for instance, that : —
" The great desideratum in poUtical economy is the
same as in private pursuits ; that is, what is the best
appfication of the aggregate industry of a nation that

218 HENRY CLAY
can be made honestly to produce the largest sum of
national wealth ? "
Notwithstanding its weak points the speech made
a great impression. The immediate effect may be
judged from the extent to which It monopobzed
the attention of speakers on the other side. Among
these stood forth as the strongest Daniel Webster,
A remarkable contrast it was when, against the
flashing oratory of the gay, spirited Kentuckian,
there rose up the dark-browed New Englander
with his slow, weU-measured, massive utterances.
These two speeches together are as Interesting an
economic study as can be found in our parliamen
tary history. The student can scarcely f aU to be
struck with Webster's superiority in keenness of
analysis, in logical reasoning, in extent and accu
racy of knowledge, in reach of thought and mas
tery of fundamental principles. Not only the calm
precision with which Webster's speech exposed
some of Clay's reckless statements and conclusions,
but the bright flashes of light which It threw upon
a variety of important economic questions, — such
as the relation of currency to the production of
wealth, the balance of trade, the principles of ex
change, the necessary Umits of protection, — give
it a high and lasting value in our literature. It
is a remarkable fact that Webster — although four
years afterwards he became an advocate of high
tariffs on the groimd that New England had taken
protection as the settled poUcy of the country, had
therefore engaged its capital in manufactures, and

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 219
should not be left In the lurch — never could deny
or reason away the principles laid down In his
great argument of 1824. It stands to-day as his
strongest utterance upon economic subjects.
But Clay carried the day. After a long strug
gle the tariff bill passed the House by a majority
of flve, and after being slightly amended was also
passed in the Senate by a majority of four. The
vote in the House was significant In its geograph
ical distribution. It was thus classed by Niles:
The "navigating and fishing States " of New Eng
land — Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine
— gave twenty -two votes against and only three
for the bUl. Of the "manufacturing States,"
Rhode Island and Connecticut, seven votes went
for and one against it. Of the "grain -growing
States," Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Penn
sylvania, Delaware, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Il
linois, and Missouri, ninety-two votes were given
for and nine against it. The "tobacco -planting
and grain-growing State" of Maryland gave six
against and three for It. The "cotton and grain
growing State," Tennessee, gave seven against
and two for it. The "tobacco and cotton planting
States," Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro
Una, Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama, threw
fifty-four votes against and one for It. AU the
three votes of the "sugar and cotton planting
State," Louisiana, went against it. Since the
time when Calhoun had eloquently argued for the
fostering of manufacturing Industries and Internal

220 HENRY CLAY
improvements, a significant change had taken place
in the current of Southern sentiment. The plant
ing Interest, most closely identified with slavery,
began to present an almost solid front not only
against the tariff, but against everything not in
harmony with its system of labor. Massachusetts,
Maine, and New Hampshire opposed the tariff
because it would be injurious to commerce. But
they soon accommodated themselves to it. It was
a combination of the grain-growing with the manu
facturing interest, the idea of the "home market,"
that carried the day.
Clay achieved a great triumph for himself. He
had not only far outshone aU others by his cham
pionship of the successful measure, but he had
given to the protective policy a new name, the
"American system," which became inseparably
Identified with his own. This appellation was
Indeed not without Its ludicrous side, which Web
ster did not fail promptly to perceive and to ex
hibit with keen sarcasm. "If names are thought
necessary," said he, "It would be well enough,
one would think, that the name should be in some
measure descriptive of the thing: and since Mr.
Speaker denominates the policy which he recom
mends, ' a new policy in this country; ' since he
speaks of the present measure as a new era in our
legislation; since he professes to invite us to de
part from our accustomed course, to instruct our
selves by the wisdom of others, and to adopt the
poUcy of the most distinguished foreign States, —

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 221
one Is a little curious to know with what propriety
of speech this imitation of other nations is denom
inated an ' American policy, ' while, on the con
trary, a preference for our own established system,
as It now actuaUy exists and always has existed,
is caUed a ' foreign policy. ' This favorite Amer
ican policy is what America has never tried ; and
this odious foreign policy is what, as we are told,
foreign states have never pursued." But although
the "American system" had nothing peculiarly
American about it, the name was adroitly chosen
and served Its purpose. It proved a well-sounding
cry which to many minds was as good as an argu
ment. Thus Clay had put his opinions on internal im
provements, on the tariff, and on the foreign pol
icy of the country, as conspicuously as possible
before the people; his platform left nothing to
desire as to completeness and precision. He was
ready for the presidential campaign.
The "era of good feeling" under Monroe left
the country without national parties; for when
there is only one, there is practically none. The
Federal party had disappeared as a national or
ganization; It had only a local existence. There
were differences of opinion on matters of public
interest within the Republican party — about the
tariff, for instance, and about internal improve
ments, which had some effect In the campaign,
but which did not yet produce weU-defined and
lasting divisions. The violent and threatening

222 HENRY CLAY
excitement on slavery caUed forth by the Missouri
trouble had come and gone like a thunderstorm.
In the planting States the question was sometimes
quietly asked, when a public man was discussed,
whether he had been for or against "slavery re
striction;" but in the rest of the country the an
tagonists of an hour had, after the compromise
was passed, silently agreed to say no more about
It, — at least for the time being. Under these
circumstances the personal question became the
most Important one. Hitherto candidates for the
presidency had been formaUy nominated by the
party caucus of members of Congress. But in
the course of time the congressional caucus had
become odious, there being a popular impression
that it was too much subject to Intrigue. Recom
mendations of candidates had always been made
by state legislatures, or even by meetings of citi
zens, but they had been looked upon merely as
more or less respectable demonstrations of public
sentiment. These, however, as the congressional
caucus feU Into discredit, gained in importance.
National conventions of political parties had not
yet been invented. A suggestion to caU one was
made in Pennsylvania, but It remained unheeded.
In the breaking up of old political habits, the
traditional notion that the secretaryship of state
should be regarded as the stepping-stone to the
presidency, had also become very much weakened.
There opened itself, then, a free field for what
might Irreverently be caUed a "scramble."

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 223
The consequence was that no less than six can
didates for the presidency presented themselves
to the people: Crawford of Georgia, Jackson of
Tennessee, Adams of Massachusetts, Clay of Ken
tucky, Calhoun of South CaroUna, and Clinton of
New York. The two last named were soon with
drawn. All belonged to the ruUng party. Craw
ford was secretary of the treasury. He was a
man of imposing presence. He had filled several
pubUc stations of importance creditably enough,
but In none of them had he rendered services so
eminent as to entitle him to rank among the first
order of statesmen, StiU he had managed to pass
in those days as a great man. His was that tem
porary sort of greatness which appears in history
as the reputation of a reputation. He had much
of the Intriguing politician in him. He was strongly
and not unjustly suspected of manipulating the
patronage of his department for his own poUtical
benefit. It was he who in 1820 had caused the
four-years '-term law to be enacted, — that law
which has done so much to develop the "spoils
system," He insisted upon holding a "regular"
congressional caucus, having made his arrange
ments to control it. It was accordingly caUed to
meet on February 14, 1824; but of two hundred
and sixteen Republicans, only sixty-six appeared,
and two more sent their proxies. Of these sixty-
eight votes, Crawford received sixty-four. Thus
he had the "regular" nomination; but as It had
been made only by a majority of a minority, aU

224 HENRY CLAY
but his friends having refused to attend the cau
cus, it lacked authoritative weight. Moreover,
his health was seriously Impaired by a paralytic
attack, which naturaUy injured him much as a
candidate. The candidacy of General Andrew Jackson was
an Innovation in American politics. From Wash
ington down, no man had been elected to the presi
dency, nor indeed been a candidate for it, who
had not grown up to eminence In civil station.
Every president had been known as a statesman.
Now, for the first time, a candidate was presented
for the highest office whose reputation had been
won entirely on a different field. General Jack
son had indeed held civil positions. As a young
man of thirty, he had for a short time represented
Tennessee in Congress. But there he had shown
no sign of capacity as a legislator, and had at
tracted attention in debate, as Jefferson said, only
because "he could never speak on account of the
rashness of his feelings," for as often as he at
tempted It he would "choke with rage." Next he
had become a judge, but nothing was heard of his
decisions. It was only as a soldier that he won
brUliant successes, and in the field indeed achieved
great renown by his energy, his intrepid spirit,
and the natural gift of command. But whenever
the general had to exercise any function of author
ity beyond the handling of troops on the march
or in action, he distinguished himself by an im
patience of restraint, a reckless disregard of the

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 225
laws, an uncontroUable violence of temper, and a
daring assumption of power, not seldom seriously
compromising the character as weU as the peace
of the country. His private life too, while It was
that of a man of integrity and generous impulses,
abounded in tumultuous broils and bloody encoun
ters. Thus his military achievements had given
him his only prestige, while at the same time he
had shown in their strongest development those
qualities sometimes found in the successful man of
war, which render him peculiarly unfit for respon
sible position and the delicate tasks of statesman
ship in time of peace.
But his candidacy, although a complete abandon
ment of the good old tradition and made possible
only by the battle of New Orleans, was "worked
up " with consummate skiU by one of his friends
In Tennessee, Major Lewis, who thus earned a
place In the very front rank of political managers.
Some letters deprecating the spirit of partisan
proscription in fiUIng public offices, which General
Jackson had written to Monroe years before, were
brought before the public to propitiate the rem
nants of the Federal party. He was made to
write another letter, to Dr. L. H. Coleman, pro
nouncing in a vague way In favor of a protective
tariff. In order to keep a man of ability and
character, but unfriendly to him, out of the Senate
of the United States, and also to give the general
an opportunity to renew friendly relations with
public men with whom he had quarreled, Jackson

226 HENRY CLAY
himself was elected a senator from Tennessee, and
took his seat in December, 1823, The Tennessee
legislature had expressed Its preference for him as
a candidate for the presidency in 1822, A con
vention of Federalists at Harrisburg in Pennsyl
vania, a State in which the Federalists stIU main
tained an organization, likewise nominated him In
February, 1824, and a month later a Democratic
convention at the same place foUowed their exam
ple. Thus Jackson was fairly started as a "man
of the people," and presently many began to see
in him not only the greatest mUitary hero in his
tory, but also a poUtical sage.
The candidate who most completely answered
the traditional requirements was unquestionably
John Quincy Adams, the candidate of New Eng
land, He had been longest in public duty. He
had won eminence by conspicuous service. His
experience and knowledge as a statesman were
unexceUed by any American of his time. His
private life was spotless, and his public character
above reproach. Austere, cold and distant in his
manners, he lacked altogether those qualities which
"make friends." He was the embodied sense of
duty, commanding respect but not kindling affec
tion. Although fuU of ambition to be president,
he would owe his elevation solely to the recogni
tion of his merits. His election was to signify
the popular approval of his public conduct. He
would not "work" to obtain it, nor countenance
his friends in "working" for him. He would

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 227
gratefuUy and proudly take the presidency from
the hands of the people, but not be obliged to any
person for procuring It. A letter which he wrote
In reply to a suggestion that he should ask and
encourage others to promote his Interests as a can
didate, portrays his ideal of public virtue : —
" Detur digniori is the inscription upon the prize.
The principle of the Constitution in its purity is, that
the duty shaU be assigned to the most able and the most
worthy. Politicians and newspapers may bestir them
selves to point out who that is ; and the only question
between us is, whether it be consistent with the duties of
a citizen, who is supposed to desire that the choice should
fall upon himself, to assist, countenance, and encourage
those who are disposed to befriend him in the pursuit.
The law of friendship is a reciprocation of good offices.
He who asks or accepts the offer of friendly service con
tracts the obligation of meeting it with a suitable return.
If he seeks or accepts the aid of one, he must ask or
accept the aid of multitudes. Between the principle of
which much has been said in the newspapers, that a
pi'esident of the United States must remember those to
whom he owes his elevation, and the principle of accept
ing no aid on the score of friendship or personal kind
ness to him, there is no alternative. The former, as it
has been announced and urged, I deem to be essentially
and vitaUy corrupt. The latter is the only principle to
which no exception can be taken."
This principle he not only professed, but he
acted upon it. Compared with what the political
usages of our days have accustomed us to consider
admissible, such a principle may appear to be an

228 HENRY CLAY
exaggerated refinement of feeling, fitted only for
an ideal state of society. It may be said that a
statesman so conscientious wUl throw away his
chance of rising into power, and thus set narrow
limits to his own usefulness. But, after aU, a
conscientious pubUc man, in order to remain per
fectly true to his pubUc duty, wiU either have to
accept the principle insisted upon by John Quincy
Adams, or at least he must make the friends who
promote his interests clearly understand that there
may be circumstances under which he wiU consider
it a virtue to forget the obUgations of friendship,
and that, whenever the pubUc interest demands it,
he wiU always have the courage of ingratitude.
Clay was first nominated as a candidate for the
presidency by the members of the Kentucky legis
lature in November, 1822. SimUar demonstra
tions foUowed in Louisiana, Missouri, and Ohio.
Of his anxiety to be elected president he made no
secret. He conducted a large correspondence with
friends aU over the country, from whom he received
reports, and to whom he sent his suggestions in
return. One of his most active canvassers was
Thomas H. Benton, who represented the young
State of jVIissouri in the Senate. Benton traveled
through Tennessee, Ohio, and Missouri advocating
Clay's interest and reporting progress from time
to time. Before long we shaU find these two men
engaged in a very different sort of conversation.
A part of Clay's correspondence about the canvass
with General Peter B. Porter and W. B. Roches-

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 229
ter of New York, Senator J. S. Johnston of Loui
siana, and his old friend Francis Brooke of Vir
ginia, Is still preserved. It reveals a very warm
and active interest on his part in the conduct of
his campaign — sometimes quite urgent as to things
to be done. He was very much chagrined not to
see a vigorous movement in his favor in Virginia,
his native State, and he pressed his friends re
peatedly, with evident impatience, to take some
demonstrative step.
Thus he did not, as a candidate for the presi
dency, adopt the lofty standard of John Quincy
Adams's principles for the guidance of his con
duct. He did accept and encourage the aid of
friends, and was quite active in spurring and di
recting their zeal. But beyond that he did not
go. He kept rigidly clear of promises and bar
gains. As early as January 31, 1823, he wrote
to Francis Brooke : —
" On one resolution my friends may rest assured I will
firmly rely, and that is, to participate in no intrigues, to
enter into no arrangements, to make no promises or
pledges ; but that, whether I am elected or not, I wiU
have nothing to reproach myself with. If elected I wiU
go into the office with a pure conscience, to promote
with my utmost exertions the common good of our coun
try, and free to select the most able and faithful pubUc
servants. If not elected, acquiescing most cheerfuUy in
the better selection which wiU thus have been made, I
wUl at least have the satisfaction of preserving my honor
unsuUied and my heart uncorrupted.

230 HENRY CLAY
And when in the heat of the canvass a proposi
tion was made to him which looked like a bargain,
he wrote (to J. S. Johnston, June 15, 1824): —
" If the communication from Mr.  is to be consid
ered in the nature of an overture, there can be but one
answer given. I can make no promises of office of any
sort, to any one, upon any condition whatever. What
ever support shaU be given to me must be spontaneous
and unsought."
When In the course of the campaign Martin
Van Buren, then a leading manager for Crawford,
becoming alarmed at the unexpected strength of
the Jackson movement, caused Clay to be ap
proached with the suggestion of a coaUtion between
the Crawford and Clay forces to make Crawford
president and Clay vice-president. Clay repUed
that he was resolved neither to offer nor to accept
any arrangement with regard to himself or to office
for others, and that he would not decline the vice-
presidency, provided it were offered to him "by
the pubUc having the right to tender it." Neither
can it be said that Clay, in the House of Repre
sentatives or in his pubUc utterances elsewhere,
had tried, as a candidate for the presidency, to
trim his sail to the wind, to truckle to the opinions
of others, to carry water on both shoulders. In
the advocacy of his principles and policies he was
as outspoken and straightforward as he ever had
been, perhaps even more dashing and combative
than he had occasion to be. It would hardly have

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 231
been predicted then that twenty years later he
would lose the presidency by an equivocation.
In the course of the canvass it became obvious
that no one of the four candidates could obtain a
majority of the electoral vote, and that the election
would devolve upon the House of Representatives.
This, however, did not prevent the campaign from
becoming very animated. There being no marked
difference of principle or opinion between the
competitors, the effusions of stump orators and of
newspapers turned mainly on personalities. Adams
wrote in August: "The bitterness and violence of
presidential electioneering increase as the time
advances. It seems as if every liar and calumni
ator in the country was at work day and night to
destroy my character. It Is impossible to be whoUy
Insensible to this process while It Is In operation.
It distracts my attention from public business and
consumes precious time." But the other candi
dates fared no better than he. Against Crawford
charges of corruption were brought. Jackson was
denounced as a murderer; and Clay's weU known
fondness for the card-table came home to him in
giving him the name of a gambler. His adherents
In Ohio resolved at a meeting that, as "all the
gentlemen named as candidates for the presidency
were honorable and inteUigent men, and to degrade
and vUify them was discreditable to the moral
sense and sound judgment of the country," the
friends of Mr. Clay would "not indulge In the
unworthy practice of vilifying the candidates whom

232 HENRY CLAY
they did not support." This, however, did not
have the effect of improving the temper of his
opponents. As the day of election approached,
the Jackson managers started a report that Clay,
seeing no chance for himself, would withdraw from
the contest and throw his influence for Crawford;
whereupon his friends issued another proclamation,
declaring that Clay " would not be withdrawn from
the contest except by the fiat of his Maker."
There were demonstrations of enthusiasm, too, —
not, indeed, by uniformed campaign organizations
and great torchlight parades; but splendors of a
different kind were not lacking. NUes records,
for instance: " Presidential vests ! A large parcel
of sUk vestings have been received at New York,
from France, stamped with pretty good likenesses
of Washington and of the presidential candidates,
Adams, Clay, and Jackson." There was great
confusion at the beginning of the campaign as to
the vice -presidency. The Jackson men raUied on
Calhoun. The friends of Adams tried to "run"
Jackson for the second office. Indeed, such a
combination had long been in the mind of Adams
himself. Gallatin was at flrst on the Crawford
ticket, but then withdrew entirely from the con
test. The Clay men selected Sanford of New
York. The result of the election did not become fuUy
known before December. It turned out that Jack
son had won ninety-nine electoral votes, Adams
eighty-four, Crawford forty-one, and Clay thirty-

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 233
seven. No one having received a clear majority,
the election devolved upon the House of Repre
sentatives; and as, according to the Constitution,
the choice by the House was confined to the three
candidates having the highest number of votes.
Clay's chance was gone. He received the whole
electoral vote of only three States, Kentucky,
Ohio, and Missouri, and four votes from New
York. For the vice-presidency, Calhoun had a
decided majority, one hundred and eighty-two out
of two hundred and sixty-one.
Clay was deeply disappointed. He had hoped
to be at least among the three eligible by the
House of Representatives. He had counted upon
a majority of the electoral vote of lUinoIs ; he had
not despaired of Virginia, his native State. It
was said that the five votes of Louisiana had
been taken from Clay by a trick In the legislature,
and that if he had received them, which would
have put him ahead of Crawford, his personal
popularity in the House would have given him the
presidency. What "might have been " only sharp
ened the sting of the disappointment he suffered.
In his letters he spoke philosophicaUy enough:
"As It is, I shaU yield a cheerful acquiescence in
the public decision. We must not despair of the
republic. Our institutions, if they have the value
which we believe them to possess and are worth
preserving, wIU sustain themselves, and wiU yet
do weU." But Martin Van Buren wrote on De
cember 31, 1824, to a friend: "He (Clay) appears

234 HENRY CLAY
to me not to sustain his defeat with as much com
posure and fortitude as I should have expected,
and evinces a degree of despondency not caUed
for by the actual state of things." This Is not
improbable, for a man of Clay's sanguine, impul
sive temperament feels misfortune as keenly as he
enjoys success.
His greatest trial, however, was stiU to come.
But before it came, he had as speaker of the
House a ceremonial act to perform, which at the
same time was an act of friendship, and which,
by the emotions it awakened, may for a moment
have made him forget the humiUation of defeat
and the anxieties besetting him. Lafayette was
visiting the United States, and wherever he went
aU the bitter quarrels of the presidential struggle
were silenced by the transports of enthusiasm with
which he was received. He appeared among the
American people as the impersonation of their
heroic ancestry to whom they owed everything
they were proudest of. Only Washington him
self, had he risen from the grave, could have
caUed forth deeper feelings of reverence and affec
tion. As the guest of the nation, he was invited
to the Capitol, and Clay had to welcome him In
the House of Representatives. It was a solemn
and touching scene. Clay delivered an address
fuU of feeling. With delicate instinct, the orator
seized upon the poetic side of Lafayette's visit.
"The vain wish has been sometimes indulged,"
said he, "that Providence would aUow the patriot.

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY 235
after death, to return to his country, and to con
template the Intermediate changes which had taken
place, to view the forests feUed, the cities built,
the mountains leveled, the canals cut, the highways
constructed, the progress of the arts, the advance
ment of learning, and the increase of population.
General, your present visit to the United States
Is a realization of the consoling object of that wish.
You are in the midst of posterity."
The relations between Clay and Lafayette were
of the frIendUest character. They had long been
in correspondence, which continued for years after
this meeting at Washington. Lafayette's letters
to Clay, many of which have been preserved,
abound in expressions not only of regard, but of
affection. It seems that the heart of the old pa
triot was completely captured by the brilliant,
frank, and generous American, and he was re
peatedly heard to speak of Clay as the man he
wished to see made president of the United States.

CHAPTER X
PRESIDENT-MAKER
Instead of being made president. Clay found
himself invested with the dangerous power of
choosing one among his rivals for the great office.
It was generaUy admitted that his influence com
manded in the House of Representatives a suffi
cient number of votes to decide the contest between
Adams, Jackson, and Crawford. He was, there
fore, so long as his preference remained unknown,
a much-sought, much-courted man. In a letter
written on January 8 to Francis P. Blair, whom
he then coimted among his friends In Kentucky,
he humorously described the situation: "I am
sometimes touched gently on the shoulder by a
friend, for example, of General Jackson, who wiU
thus address me : ' My dear sir, aU my dependence
is upon you; don't disappoint us; you know our
partlaUty was for you next to the hero, and how
much we want a Western president. ' Immediately
after a friend of Mr. Crawford wiU accost me:
' The hopes of the Republican party are concen
trated on you; for God's sake preserve It. If you
had been returned instead of Mr. Crawford, every
man of us would have supported you to the last

PRESIDENT-MAKER 237
hour. We consider you and him as the only gen
uine Republican candidates.' Next a friend of
Mr. Adams comes with tears in his eyes [an aUu-
sion to Adams's watering eyes]: ' Sir, Mr. Adams
has always had the greatest respect for you, and
admiration of your talents. There is no station
to which you are not equal. Most undoubtedly
you are the second choice of New England, and I
pray you to consider seriously whether the public
good and your own future interests do not point
most distinctly to the choice which you ought to
make? ' How can one withstand aU this disinter
ested homage and kindness? "
General Jackson himself thought it good policy
now to be on pleasant terms with Clay. There
had been "non -intercourse " between them ever
since that memorable debate in which Clay found
fault with the general's conduct In the Florida
war. Jackson had left Clay's visit of courtesy
unreturned, and when accidentaUy meeting Clay
at a Kentucky village inn, in the summer of 1819,
he had hardly deigned to notice Clay's polite salu
tation. But now, having become an anxious can
didate for the presidency while Clay was believed
to control the decisive vote in the House of Repre
sentatives, Jackson took a less haughty view of
things. Several members of Congress from Ten
nessee approached Clay to bring about an accom
modation. They declared in General Jackson's
behalf, that when treating Clay's courtesy with
apparent contempt, he was "laboring under some

238 HENRY CLAY
indisposition," and meant no offense. Clay In
response said that In censuring General Jackson's
official conduct he had merely "expressed opinions
in respect to public acts," without any feeUng of
personal enmity. The Tennessee delegation then
arranged a dinner to which both Clay and Jackson
were invited, and at which both appeared. They
exchanged salutations and dined together. When
Clay retired from the table, Jackson and his friend
Eaton foUowed him to the door and Insisted that
he should take a seat with them in their carriage.
Clay, dismissing his own coach, rode with them
and was set down at his door. Jackson then in
vited him to dinner and he accepted. Soon after
wards Jackson with several members of Congress
dined at Clay's lodgings, and then they "fre
quently met In the course of the winter, always
respectfully addressing each other." Thus the
"non-intercourse" was laboriously raised.
But all the whUe Clay was firmly resolved to
give his vote and influence to Adams. He had
made this declaration to J. J. Crittenden before
he left Kentucky for Washington, and he Informed
Benton of his determination early In December.
The legislature of Kentucky passed a resolution
requesting the members of Congress from that
State to vote for Jackson, but even that could not
swerve Clay from his purpose. His conclusion
was, for him, the only possible one. Crawford
was a paralytic. For months he had been unable,
as secretary of the treasury, to sign his official

PRESIDENT-MAKER 239
papers with his own hand. It was extremely doubt
ful whether. If elected president, he would ever be
able to discharge the duties of the office. For this
reason, aside from other considerations, Clay could
not vote for him. Could he vote for Jackson?
We remember Clay's speech on Jackson's lawless
conduct In the Seminole war. He had not since
changed his opinion. "As a friend of liberty,
and to the permanence of our Institutions," he
wrote to Francis Brooke, "I cannot consent, in
this early stage of their existence, by contributing
to the election of a military chieftain, to give the
strongest guaranty that the republic will march
in the fatal road which has conducted every other
republic to ruin." So again he wrote to Blair:
"Mr. Adams, you know weU, I should never have
selected, if at liberty to draw from the whole mass
of our citizens, for a president. But there Is no
danger In his elevation now, or in time to come.
Not so of his competitor, of whom I cannot believe
that kiUing two thousand five hundred Englishmen
at New Orleans qualifies for the various difficult
and complicated duties of the chief magistracy."
These were his honest opinions. How could he
vote to make Jackson president?
It was indeed argued that, as Jackson had re
ceived, not a majority of the electoral votes (for
he had only ninety -nine out of two hundred and
sixty-one), but more votes than any one of his
competitors, the members of the House of Repre
sentatives were bound. In obedience to the popular

240 HENRY CLAY
wiU, to ratify that verdict. Not to do so was, as
Benton expressed It with a desperate plunge into
Greek, "a violation of the demos krateo principle."
This was equivalent to saying that a mere plurality
of the electoral vote should be sufficient to elect
a president; for if the House of Representatives
were in duty bound to ratify that plurality as if
it were a majority, then the pluraUty would prac
ticaUy elect. But the Constitution expressly pro
vides that a president shaU not be elected by a
pluraUty of the electoral votes, and that, when no
clear majority Is obtained, the House of Represent
atives shaU freely choose from those three candi
dates who shaU have received the highest numbers.
Moreover, the electors having in six States been
appointed by the legislatures, it was a mere matter
of conjecture whether General Jackson would have
had a pluraUty of the popular vote, had the elec
tors in aU the States been chosen by the people.
Finally, there was nothing to prove that Adams
would not have been the second choice of the
friends of Crawford and Clay, in a sufficient num
ber of cases to insure him a clear majority In an
election confined to him and Jackson. The pre
sumption may be said to have been in favor of
this, if, as proved to be the fact, the House of
Representatives was inclined to give him that ma
jority. There was, therefore, nothing in such an
argument to limit the freedom of Clay's choice.
Benton himself admitted that his " demos krateo
principle " was in conflict with the theory of the

PRESIDENT-MAKER 241
Constitution. Indeed, if carried to Its logical
consequences. It would have demanded that a can
didate receiving an absolute majority of the elec
toral vote, but a smaUer popular vote than another
candidate, could not legitimately be president.
Nobody could have gone this length. But In 1825
a great cry was raised because a mere plurality
was not regarded as a majority, and it had much
effect. When the friends of Jackson and of Crawford
began to suspect that Clay favored Adams, their
conduct towards him changed abruptly. As they
could not persuade him, they sought to drive and
even to frighten him. He received anonymous
letters full of abuse and menace. Some of them
contained threats of personal violence. In others
he was Informed that, unless Jackson were elected,
there would be insurrection and bloodshed, A
pecuUar kind of fanaticism seems to have been
blazing up among Jackson's friends. Their news
papers opened furiously on Clay, and denounced
his unwiUingness to vote for Jackson as a sort of
high treason. But Clay could not be moved. "I
shall risk," he said In a letter to his friend Brooke,
"I shall risk without emotion these effusions of
maUce, and remain unshaken in my purpose. What
is a public man worth if he wiU not expose himself,
on fit occasions, for the good of the country?"
At last the Jackson party resorted to a desper
ate expedient. The election in the House was to
take place on February 9. On January 28 a letter

242 HENRY CLAY
dated at Washington appeared in a Philadelphia
newspaper pointedly accusing Clay of having struck
a corrupt bargain with Adams. Clay, the writer
said, was to transfer his friends to Adams for the
purpose of making Adams president, and Adams
was then to make Clay secretary of state. "And
the friends of Mr. Clay," so the letter continued,
"gave the Information to the friends of Jackson
that, if the friends of Jackson would offer the
same price, they would close with them. But
none of the friends of Jackson would descend to
such mean barter and sale." The letter pretended
to come from a member of Congress, who, how
ever, did not give his name. A copy of the paper
was maUed to Clay. This stung him to the quick.
On February 1 he pubUshed "a card" in the
"National Intelligencer," in which he expressed
his beUef that the letter purporting to come from
a member of the House was a forgery; "but," he
added, "if It be genuine, I pronounce the mem
ber, whoever he may be, a base and infamous
calumniator, a dastard and liar; and if he dare
unveU himself and avow his name, I wiU hold him
responsible, as I here admit myself to be, to aU
the laws which govern and regulate men of honor."
Clay's hot blood had run away with his judgment. -
He himself felt It as soon as he saw his "card"
in print. But a high-spirited man, conscious of
his rectitude, should not be judged too harshly if
the first charge of corruption pubUcly brought
against him does not find him cool enough to

PRESIDENT-MAKER 243
determine whether the silence of contempt or the
angry cry of Insulted honor wiU better comport
with his dignity.
Unfortunately, the threat of a challenge, which
would have been wrong under any circumstances,
in this case turned out to be even ludicrous. Two
days afterwards another "card" appeared in the
"National Intelligencer," In which George Kremer,
a representative from Pennsylvania, avowed him
self as the author of the letter. George Kremer
was one of those men in high political station of
whom people wonder "how they ever got there;"
an insignificant, ordinarily inoffensive, simple soul,
uneducated, Ignorant, and eccentric, attracting at
tention In Washington mainly by a leopard-skin
overcoat of curious cut which he was In the habit
of wearing. This man now revealed himself as
the great Henry Clay's antagonist, declaring him
self "ready to prove, to the satisfaction of unpreju
diced minds, enough to satisfy them of the accu
racy of the statements which were contained in
that letter." The thought of a duel with George
Kremer in his leopard-skin overcoat appeared at
once so farcical that the most passionate duelist
would not have seriously entertained it. As Dan
iel Webster wrote to his exceUent brother Ezeklel,
who Uved on a farm in New Hampshire, "Mr.
Kremer is a man with whom one would think of
having a shot about as soon as with your neigh
bor, Mr. Simeon Atkinson, whom he somewhat
resembles."

244 HENRY CLAY
The rashness of Clay's fierce proclamation was
thus weU punished. He had now to retrieve the
dignity of his character. On the day of the ap
pearance of Kremer's card, Clay rose solemnly in
the House to ask for a special committee to inquire
Into the charges made by that gentleman, "in
order that if he [Clay] were guUty, here the proper
punishment might be appUed, or, if Innocent, here
his character and conduct might be vindicated."
He expressed the anxious hope that his request for
an investigation of the charges would be granted.
"Emanating from such a source," he said, "this
was the only notice he could take of them." The
chaUenge to mortal combat, Henry Clay against
George Kremer, was thus withdrawn. A motion
was made by Forsyth of Georgia that the commit
tee asked for be appointed. This unexpected turn
of affairs threw poor Kremer into a great flutter.
He foUowed Forsyth, saying that, if It should
appear that he had not sufficient reason to justify
his statements, he trusted he should receive proper
reprobation. He was wiUing to meet the inquiry
and abide the result, but he desired to have the
honorable speaker's "card" referred to the com
mittee too. He was restless and bustled about,
saying to one member that the letter in question
was not really of his own making ; to others, that
he had not intended at aU to make any charge
against Mr. Clay. Then he put a sort of dis
claimer on a piece of paper and sent it to Clay,
asking whether this would be satisfactory; but he

PRESIDENT-MAKER 245
received the answer that the matter was now In
the hands of the House. After two days' debate
the committee was elected by ballot, not one mem
ber being on It who had supported Clay for the
presidency. On February 9, the very day when the electoral
vote was to be counted and the election by the
House was to take place, the committee reported.
And what was the report ? George Kremer, who
at first had promised to "meet the inquiry and
abide the result," had reconsidered over night;
instead of giving the testimony the committee
asked of him, he sent to that tribunal a long let
ter, refusing to testify. He would not, he wrote,
appear before the committee either as an accuser
or a witness, as there was no constitutional author
ity by which the House could assume jurisdiction
over the case ; such an assumption would threaten
a dangerous invasion of the liberty of speech and
of the press; he therefore protested against the
whole proceeding, and preferred to communicate
to his constituents the proofs of his statements
with regard to the corrupt bargain charged.
This letter the committee laid before the House,
and that was aU the report they made. In the
course of time, much light has been thrown upon
this remarkable transaction. It has now become
clear that. Instead of a bargain being struck be
tween Adams and Clay, overtures were made by
Jackson's friends to Clay's friends; that George
Kremer, a simple-minded man and a fanatical

246 HENRY CLAY
adherent of Jackson, was used as a tool by the
Jackson managers, especiaUy Senator Eaton from
Tennessee; that they were the real authors of
Kremer's first letter to the PhUadelphIa newspa
per; that Clay's demand for an inquiry by the
House into the charge made by Kremer was an
unwelcome surprise to them; that Kremer, having
been told by them that the charge would be sub
stantiated, blunderingly assented to the Inquiry
when the motion was made; that they, knowing
the charge to be false, wanted to avoid an investi
gation of it by the House ; that, when the commit
tee called upon Kremer for proofs, he was taken
in hand by the Jackson managers, who wrote for
him the letter protesting against the congressional
proceeding; that, in avoiding an investigation by
the House and a report on the merits of the case,
their purpose was to keep the charge without any
authoritative refutation before the people; that
they first hoped to terrorize Clay into supporting
Jackson, or at least to separate his friends from
him, while. In the event of Jackson's defeat, the
cry of his having been defrauded of his rights by
a corrupt bargain would help in securing bis elec
tion the next time. This was the famous "bar
gain and corruption " affair, which during a long
period excited the minds of men all over the United
States. It was an infamous Intrigue against the
good name of two honorable men, designed to
promote the poUtical fortunes of a third.
The "Inside view" of the relations between

PRESIDENT-MAKER 247
Adams and Clay came, long after this period,
to pubUc knowledge through the publication of
Adams's Diary. The most unfavorable inference
which can be drawn from the revelations therein
made Is, that some of Clay's friends very urgently
desired his appointment as secretary of state ; and
that one of them, Letcher of Kentucky, a good-
natured but not very strong-headed man, had said
to Adams that Clay's friends, in supporting Adams,
would expect Clay to have an influential place in
the administration, disclaiming, however, aU au
thority from Clay, and receiving no assurance from
Adams. Those who have any experience of public
Ufe know that the adherents of a prominent public
man are almost always extremely anxious to see
him in positions of power, and very apt to go
ahead of his wishes in endeavoring to put him
there, thus not seldom compromising him without
his fault. Adams received a good many visits of
men who wished to sound bis disposition, among
them Webster, who desired to obtain a promise
that the FederaUsts would not be excluded from
office, and who himself hoped to be appointed
minister to England, though he did not express
such a wish at the time. Clay too visited Adams,
to tell him that he would have the vote of Ken
tucky, and to converse with him upon the general
situation. It would be absurd to see in these
occurrences anything to support the charge that
Clay's vote and influence were thrown for Adams
In execution of a bargain securing him a place in

248 HENRY CLAY
the cabinet; for by the testimony of Crittenden
and Benton, the fact stands conclusively proven
that, before aU these conversations with Adams
happened. Clay had already declared his firm de
termination to vote for Adams, upon the grounds
then and afterwards avowed. The "bargain and
corruption" charge remains, therefore, simply a
calumny. The effect produced at the time upon Clay's
mind by these things appears in his correspond
ence. They aroused in him the indignant pride
of one who feels himself high above the venal
crowd. Just before the appearance of Kremer's
letter he wrote to Blair: "The knaves cannot com
prehend how a man can be honest. They cannot
conceive that I should have solemnly interrogated
my conscience, and asked it to teU me seriously
what I ought to do." And to Francis Brooke on
February 4: "The object now is, on the part of
Mr. Crawford and General Jackson, to drive me
from the course which my deliberate judgment
points out. They aU have yet to learn my charac
ter if they suppose it possible to make me swerve
from my duty by any species of intimidation or
denunciation." When the election came on. Clay's
whole influence went In favor of Adams, who, on
the first baUot in the House of Representatives,
received the votes of a majority of the States, and
was declared to be elected president.
But Clay's trials were not over. When Adams
began to make up his cabinet, he actuaUy did

PRESIDENT-MAKER 249
offer to Clay the secretaryship of state. After
what had happened, should Adams have made the
offer, and should Clay have accepted It? These
questions have been discussed probably with more
interest than anything connected with a cabinet
appointment in our political history.
Under ordinary circumstances, the offer would
have been regarded as a perfectly proper and even
natural one. Clay was by far the most briUiant
leader of the ruling party. His influence was
large and his abiUty equal to his Influence. It
was desirable to have a Western man in the cabi
net. Clay towered so high above all the public
characters in that region that it would have looked
almost grotesque to pass him by, exalting some
body else. It is true that Adams had differed
from Clay on important things, and had expressed
some unfavorable opinions of him, as, indeed, he
had of almost aU other pubUc men of note. But
the subjects on which they had differed were dis
posed of; and as to personal feelings, it was one
of the remarkable features of Adams's character
that, strong as his prejudices and resentments
were, he put them resolutely aside when they stood
in the way of the fulfillment of a public duty. So,
to the end of conciliating the Crawford element,
he sufficiently overcame a feeling of strong per
sonal dislike to offer to Crawford himself, in spite
of that gentleman's physical disabilities, to con
tinue him as the head of the Treasury Department,
— an offer which Crawford promptly declined.

250 HENRY CLAY
Adams had even conceived the Idea of tendering
the War Department to General Jackson, but
learned that Jackson would take such an offer "in
ill part." In an administration thus designed to
i be constructed upon the principle that the leaders
of the ruling party should form part of it. Clay
was of course a necessary man; and to offer him
a place In the cabinet appeared not only In itself
proper, but unavoidable. Clay would therefore
undoubtedly have been Invited Into the cabinet
whether he had or had not exercised any Influence
favorable to Mr. Adams's election.
Neither would there have been any question as
to the propriety of Clay's accepting any place in
the new administration under ordinary circum
stances. But that the actual circumstances were
not of the ordinary kind. Clay himself felt. When
Adams, a few days after the election by the House,
offered him at a personal Interview the secretary
ship of state, he replied that he "would take It
Into consideration," and answer "as soon as he
should have time to consult his friends." It was an
anxious consultation. At first some of his friends
were opposed to acceptance. Would not his taking
the secretaryship of state be treated as conclu
sive evidence proving the justice of the imputations
which had been made against him? It was known
that Clay and Adams had not been on terms of
cordial friendship. They had seriously differed
on important points at Ghent. Clay had made
opposition to Monroe's administration, and espe-

PRESIDENT-MAKER 251
ciaUy had criticised Adams as secretary of state.
Less than two years before, Adams had been at
tacked by one of the Ghent commissioners, Jona
than RusseU; he had published an elaborate de
fense, in which he referred, with regard to some
points of fact, to Clay as a witness, and Clay had,
in a public and somewhat uncaUed-for letter, ques
tioned the correctness of Adams's recollections,
— an act which was generaUy looked upon as an
indication of an unfriendly spirit. Would not
this sudden reconcIUation, accompanied with an
exchange of political favors, look suspicious, and
render much more plausible the charge of a cor
rupt bargain? Besides, was not the House of
Representatives Clay's true fleld ? Would not the
administration want his support there more than
in the cabinet? Would not the Western people
rather see him there than in an executive depart
ment? These were weighty questions. On the other
hand, it was urged, whether he accepted or not,
he would be subject to animadversion. If he de
clined, It would be said that the patriotic Kremer,
by bravely exposing the corrupt bargain, had ac
tuaUy succeeded in preventing its consummation.
Conscious of his own rectitude, should he attach
such Importance to an accusation coming from so
insignificant a person ? Indeed, would not either
of the other candidates, had he been elected, have
made him the same offer? Moreover, there was
a consideration of duty. It might be diBBicult to

252 HENRY CLAY
form the administration without him. Could he
permit it to be said or suspected that, after having
contributed so much to the election of Adams as
president, he thought too IU of him to accept the
first place in his cabinet? As Adams was now
the constitutional head of the government, ought
not Clay to regard him as such, dismissing any
personal objections which he might have had to
him? These arguments, as we know from Clay's
correspondence, finaUy changed the opinions of
those of his friends who had at first been averse
to his taking office. The friends of Adams in
New England were especially urgent. Some of
Crawford's adherents too, and even some of those
of General Jackson, expressed to Clay their con-
•viction that he should accept. He had declared
that he would foUow the advice of his friends, and
so he did. To Brooke he wrote: "I have an un
affected repugnance to any executive employment,
and my rejection of the offer, if it were in conform
ity to their deUberate judgment, would have been
more compatible with my feelings than Its accept
ance." In spite of that "repugnance," it is not probable
that much persuasion was required to make him
accept. He was a high - spirited, proud man.
When George Kremer made a charge, shoidd
Henry Clay run away? Not he. He would not
appear to be afraid. This may not have been aU.
Clay's ambition for the presidency was ardent and
impatient. He would forget it for a moment when

PRESIDENT-MAKER 263
discussing public questions. But it was not likely
to be absent from his mind when considering
whether he should take the place offered him.
He had looked upon the secretaryship of state as
the stepping-stone to the presidency before; he
probably ccmtinued to do so. The presidential
fever is a merciless disease. It renders its victims
bUnd and deaf. So now Clay misjudged the situ
ation altogether. "An opposition is talked of
here," he wrote to Brooke; "but I regard that as
the ebuUitlon of the moment. There are elements
for faction, none for opposition. Opposition to
what? To measures and principles which are yet
to be developed ! " He believed the new adminis
tration would be judged on its merits. He did not
know the spirit it was to meet. When he declared
himself resolved to accept the secretaryship of
state, six days after the offer had been made, he
was very far from having counted the cost.
Immediately before the final adjournment of the
eighteenth Congress, on March 3, 1825, the House
of Representatives passed a resolution thanking
"the Honorable Henry Clay for the able. Impar
tial, and dignified manner in which he had pre
sided over its deliberations," etc. In response,
"retiring, perhaps forever," from the office of
speaker. Clay was able to say that, In the fourteen
years during which he had, with short Intervals,
occupied that difficult and responsible position,
not one of his decisions had ever been reversed by
the House. Indeed, Henry Clay stands In the

264 HENRY CLAY
traditions of the House of Representatives as the
greatest of its speakers. His perfect mastery of
parUamentary law, his quickness of decision in
applying It, his unfalUng presence of mind and
power of command in moments of excitement and
confusion, the courteous dignity of his bearing,
are remembered as unequaled by any one of those
who had preceded or who have foUowed him. The
thanks of the House were voted to him with zest.
Yet many of those who felt themselves obUged to
assent to this vote were then already his bitter
enemies. The next day John Quincy Adams was inaugu
rated as president of the United States, As soon
as the nomination of Henry Clay for the office of
secretary of state came before the Senate, the war
against him began in due form. An address by
George Kremer to his constituents, in which aU
conceivable gossip was retailed to give color to the
"bargain and corruption" cry, was freely used in
Washington to prevent Clay's nomination from
being confirmed. General Jackson himself ex
pressed his hope of its rejection. A letter written,
evidently for publication, by Jackson to his friend
Samuel Swartwout, in New York, which bristled
with insidious insinuations against Clay, was cir
culated in Washington on the eve of the day when
Clay's nomination was to be acted upon.
StiU trying to obtain an authoritative investiga
tion of his conduct. Clay asked a senator to move
a formal inquiry by a senate committee, if any

PRESIDENT-MAKER 265
charge should be made against him in that body.
But no tangible charge was brought forward; only
one senator indulged in some vague animadver
sions, presenting no ground for an inquiry. Gen
eral Jackson, then stUl a member of the Senate,
said nothing; but he, together with fourteen other
senators, among them the leading Southerners,
voted against consenting to the nomination. It
was, however, confirmed by a majority of twelve,
seven senators being absent.
On the day of the inauguration. General Jack
son had been one of the earUest of those who "took
the hand " of President Adams, congratulating
him upon his accession to power. The newspapers
highly praised the magnanimity of the defeated
candidate. But after the adjournment of the Sen
ate, when Jackson was on his way to his home in
Tennessee, his tone changed. Everywhere he was
cordiaUy received ; and to every one wiUing to hear
it, at pubUc receptions, in hotels, on steamboats,
he was ready to say that the wiU of the people
had been fraudulently defeated, and that the pre
sidential office had virtuaUy been stolen from its
rightful owner by a corrupt combination. This
foreshadowed the presidential campaign of 1828.
The cry was to be: "The rights of the people
against bargain and corruption."
Not having had the benefit of an official inquiry.
Clay now tried to put down the calumny once and
forever by an expUcIt statement of the case over
his own signature. On March 26, not many days

256 HENRY CLAY
after he had become a member of the new ad
ministration, he published an address to his old
constituents In Kentucky, in which he elaborately
reviewed the whole story, conclusively refuted the
charges brought against him, and fuUy explained
and defended his conduct. It was an exceedingly
able document, temperate in tone, complete and
lucid In the presentation of facts, and unanswer
able in argument. One of Its notable passages
may be mentioned as characteristic. Clay was
very much ashamed of having threatened to chal
lenge George Kremer. Expressing his regret there
for, he added: "I owe it to the community to say
that, whatever I may have done, or by Inevitably
circumstances might be forced to do, no man in It
holds in deeper abhorrence than I do that perni
cious practice [of dueling]. Condemned as it must
be by the judgment and the philosophy, to say
nothing of the reUgion, of every thinking man, it
is an affair of feeling, about which we cannot,
although we should, reason. Its true correction
wiU be found when aU shall unite, as all ought to
unite, in Its unqualified proscription." But until
that comes to pass, shaU we go on chaUenging and
fighting, the slaves of false notions of honor? At
any rate, we shaU soon see the Honorable Henry
Clay again with pistol in hand.
Clay may have thought that his address would
make an end of the "bargain and corruption"
charge for aU time, and so It should have done.
Indeed, he received letters from such men as Chief

PRESIDENT-MAKER 257
Justice Marshall, John Tyler, Justice Story, Dan
iel Webster, Lewis Cass, and others, congratulat
ing him upon the completeness of his vindication
and triumph. But he lived to appreciate the won
derful vitality of a weU-managed political lie.
Nobody believes that lie now. But it defeated his
dearest ambitions, and darkened the rest of his
public life. It kept him refuting and explaining,
explaining and refuting, year after year; yet still
thousands of simple-minded citizens would continue
honestly to believe that Henry Clay was a great
knave, who had defeated the wiU of the people by
bargain and corruption, and cheated the old hero
of New Orleans out of his rights.

CHAPTER XI
secretary of state
The administration of John Quincy Adams was
the last one in which the conduct of the govern
ment accorded strictly with the best traditions of
the repubUc. Nothing was farther from his mind
than to use the power of appointment and removal
for poUtical ends. At that time the notion that
the accession of a new president must necessarUy
involve a thorough reconstruction of the cabinet
was not yet invented. FoUowing the example of
most of his predecessors, he appUed the rule that
no unnecessary changes should be made, even in
the heads of the executive departments. His elec
tion to the presidency and Calhoun's to the vice-
presidency had vacated the secretaryships of state
and of war, and these vacancies he fiUed with
Henry Clay and James Barbour of Virginia. As
we have seen, he offered to continue Crawford at
the head of the Treasury Department, and only
after Crawford had declined he summoned to that
place Richard Rush of Pennsylvania. Southard
of New Jersey remained secretary of the navy, and
WiUiam Wirt of Virginia, attorney -general. The
postmaster-general, McLean, was also left in his

'L0<(.<Z^^

SECRETARY OF STATE 269
place, but that officer did not at that time occupy
a seat In the cabinet; and there was no Depart
ment of the Interior, The members of the cabinet
aU passed as Republicans, But the Federalists,
of whom there were scattered remnants here and
there, — some of them looked up to as venerable
relics, — were by no means excluded from place.
When De Witt Clinton had declined the mission
to England, Adams urged it upon Rufus King of
New York, who then stood In the politics of the
country as a fine and reverend monument of an
cient Federalism.
The new administration had hardly taken the
reins In hand, when that spirit of hostility to It
which prevailed among the following of Jackson,
Crawford, and Calhoun appeared even among per
sons in federal office; and the question whether it
would not be weU to fill the service with friends,
or at least to clear it of enemies, presented itself
in a very pointed form. Then Adams proved the
quality of his principles, as witness, by way of
example, this case : The member of the House of
Representatives from Louisiana denounced Sterret,
the naval officer at New Orleans, as a noisy and
clamorous reviler of the administration, who had
even gone so far as to get up a public demonstra
tion to insult the member of Congress for having
voted to make Mr. Adams president. The mem
ber of Congress, therefore, demanded Sterret's
removal. There seemed to be no doubt about
the facts. The Insulting demonstration had not

260 HENRY CLAY
actually come off, but Sterret had been active In
making preparations for it.
Clay agreed with the member. During the pend
ency of an election, said he, every man In the
service should feel free to "indulge his prefer
ence;" but no officer should, after election, "be
permitted to hold a conduct In open and continual
disparagement of the administration and its head,"
In the treatment of persons in the service, he
thought, the administration "should avoid, on the
one hand, political persecution, and on the other
an appearance of pusiUanimity." Adams came to
a different conclusion. He looked upon this as a
test case, and it is wholesome to remember what
a president of the United States thought upon
such a question in the year 1825. He asked Clay
In reply why he should remove this man. The
insulting demonstration, of which the member
of Congress complained, had only been intended,
but not practicaUy carried out. Would a mere
"Intention never carried into effect" justify the
removal of a man from office? "Besides," he con
tinued, "should I remove this man for this cause,
it must be upon some fixed principle, which would
apply to others as weU as to him. And where
was it possible to draw the line ? Of the custom
house officers throughout the Union four fifths, in
all probabiUty, were opposed to my election. They
were all now in my power, and I had been urged
very earnestly to sweep away my opponents and
provide, with their places, for my friends. I can

SECRETARY OF STATE 261
justify the refusal to adopt this policy only by the
steadiness and consistency of my adhesion to my
own. If I depart from this In one Instance, I
shall be caUed upon by my friends to do the same
thing In many. An insidious and inquisitorial
scrutiny into the personal dispositions of public
officers wUl creep through the whole Union, and
the most selfish and sordid passions will be kindled
Into activity to distort the conduct and misrepre
sent the feelings of men whose places may become
the prize of slander upon them." This was the
president's answer to Clay's suggestions, and, as
the Diary teUs us, "Mr. Clay did not press the
subject any farther." It would have been useless.
What moved Adams, in laying down this rule
of action, was not falnt-heartedness. He was one
of the most courageous of men; he never shrank
from a responsIbUIty. He even enjoyed a conflict
when he found one necessary to enforce his sense
of right. Here he made his stand for the princi
ples upon which the government in Its early days
had been conducted, and his decision In the Ster
ret case became the rule by which his administra
tion was governed from beginning to end. He
made only two removals during the four years,
and these were for bad official conduct. With
unbending firmness he resisted every attempt to
make him dismiss officers who intrigued against
his reelection, or openly embraced the cause of his
opponents. The reappointment of worthy officers
upon the expiration of their terms, without regard
to politics, was a matter of course.

262 HENRY CLAY
Clay continued to think, not without reason,
that the president carried his toleration to a dan
gerous extreme. He would not have permitted
men In office to make their hostility to the admin
istration conspicuous and defiant. But he was
far from favoring the use of the appointing and
removing power as a political engine. He was
opposed to arbitrary removals, as to everything
that would give the public offices the character of
spoils. WhUe these were the principles upon which the
administration was conducted, the virulent hostil
ity of Its opponents continued to crop out In a
ceaseless repetition, in speech and press, of the
assaults upon its members, which had begun with
the election. In May Clay went to Kentucky to
meet his family and to take them to Washing
ton. Wherever he passed, his friends greeted him
with enthusiastic demonstrations. PubUc dinners
crowded one another, not only ia Kentucky, but
In Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, along his
route of travel; but everywhere, in response to
expressions of affection and confidence, he felt
himself obUged to say something in explanation of
his conduct in the last presidential election. The
spectre of the "bargain and corruption" charge
seemed to pursue him wherever he went.
When he returned to Washington, in August,
he was in deep affliction, two of his daughters
having died in one month, one of them on her way
to the national capital. But as to the state of the

SECRETARY OF STATE 263
public mind he felt somewhat encouraged. He
had found many friends to welcome him with great
warmth. He had heard the president spoken of
with high respect and confidence. Daniel Web
ster, too, sent him cheering reports as to "an en
tire and not uneasy acquiescence In the events of
last winter," which he had found on his summer
excursions. Clay almost persuaded himself that
the storm had blown over. But then he was
startled again by some stirring manifestation of
the bitterness which the last presidential election
had left behind it. One day he met a general of
the regular army, with his aide-de-camp, in the
president's anteroom. The aide-de-camp being
introduced to him. Clay politely offered his hand,
which the young man, drawing back, refused to
take. It turned out that he was a connection of
General Jackson. Clay was so shocked by this
rude demonstration that he wrote the general a
complaining letter about it.
Something far more serious happened in Octo
ber. The legislature of Tennessee met, and pro
ceeded forthwith to nominate General Jackson as
a candidate for president to be elected in 1828.
On October 13, more than three years before the
period of the election. General Jackson addressed
a letter to the legislature, accepting the nomina
tion, and at the same time resigning his seat in
the Senate. In this letter he laid down his "plat
form." He gave the world to understand that
there was much corruption at Washington, and

264 HENRY CLAY
that, unless a certain remedy were applied, corrup
tion would "become the order of the day there."
The remedy was an amendment to the Constitu
tion declaring "any member of Congress Ineligible
to office under the general government during the
term for which he was elected, and for two years
thereafter, except In cases of judicial office." This
letter was generally understood. It was hardly
taken as the promise of a valuable reform to be
carried out if Jackson should become president.
Nobody attached much Importance to that; cer
tainly Jackson did not, for when he did become
president, he, as we shall see, appointed a much
larger number of members of Congress to office
than had been so appointed by any one of his
predecessors. But It was taken as a proclamation
by General Jackson that he had been defrauded
of the presidency by a corrupt bargain between a
sitting member of Congress and a presidential
candidate, the member of Congress obtaining a
cabinet office as a reward for seating the candidate
In the presidential chair. It pointed directly at
Adams and Clay. Thus — it being also under
stood that, according to custom, Adams would be
supported by his foUowers as a candidate for a
second term — the campaign of 1828 was opened,
not only constructively, but in due form, with the
cry of "bargain and corruption" sanctioned by
the standard-bearer of the opposition. It became
more lively with the opening of the nineteenth
Congress in December, 1825,

SECRETARY OF STATE 265
Under Monroe, during the "era of good feel
ing," there had been Individual opposition to this
or that measure, or to the administration gener
aUy, but there had been no opposition party.
With the accession of Adams the era of good feel
ing was weU over, and those new groupings began
to appear which, in the course of time, developed
Into new party organizations. Men were driven
apart or drawn together by different motives. Of
these, the commotion caused by the last presiden
tial election furnished tbe most potent at that
time, A great many of the adherents of the de
feated candidates, especiaUy the Jackson men,
were bound to make odious and to break down the
Adams administration by any means and at any
cost. This was a personal opposition, virulent
and remorseless. There were rumors, too, of an
opposition being systematicaUy organized by Cal
houn, who then began to identify his ambition
exclusively with the cause of slavery. In the vote
against Clay's confirmation Adams saw "the raUy
ing of the South and of Southern interests and
prejudices to the men of the South." Not a few
Southern men began to feel an instinctive dread
of the spirit represented by Adams.
But the hostUity to the administration was soon
furnished with an opportunity to raUy on a ques
tion of constitutional principle. Already in his
inaugural address. President Adams had brought
forth something vigorous on internal improvements.
But In his first message to Congress he went be-

266 HENRY CLAY
yond what had ever been uttered upon that subject
before. After having laid down the far-reaching
doctrine that "the great object of the Institution
of civil government Is the improvement of those
who are parties to the social compact," he enumer
ated a vast array of powers granted in the Consti
tution, and added that, "if these powers may be
effectually brought into action by laws promoting
the Improvement of agriculture, commerce, and
manufactures, the cultivation of the mechanic and
of the elegant arts, the advancement of literature,
and the progress of the sciences, ornamental and
profound, to refrain from exercising them for the
benefit of the people themselves would be to hide
in the earth the talent committed to our charge,
— would be treachery to the most sacred of trusts."
[ He spoke of the estabUshment of a national uni
versity, astronomical observatories, and scientific
enterprises, and suggested that, while European
nations advanced with such rapid strides. It would
be casting away the bounties of Providence if we
stood still, confessing that we were "palsied by
the wiU of our constituents." This was opening
a perspective of governmental functions much
larger than the American mind was accustomed to
contemplate. There had been some serious shak
ing of heads when this part of the message was
discussed In the cabinet, especiaUy on the part of
Barbour and Clay. This went a long way beyond
the building of roads and the digging of canals,
upon which Clay had been so fond of discoursing.

SECRETARY OF STATE 267
But Adams, who was always IncUned to express
his opinions in the most uncompromising form.
Insisted upon doing so this time. The doctrine
that the Constitution conferred by implication
upon the government powers of almost unlimited
extent, and also imposed upon it the duty of keep
ing those powers in constant activity, not only
disturbed the political thinkers of the Democratic
school, but It was especiaUy apt to alarm the slave-
holding interest, which at that period began to
see in the strictest construction, and in the main
tenance of the extremest states-rights principles.
Its citadel of safety.
The first actual coUIsIon between the adminis
tration and its opponents occurred upon another
question. The president announced in his mes
sage that the Spanish- American republics had re
solved upon a congress to meet on_the Isthmus of
Panama, m which they should aU be represented;
that they had also invited the United States to
send plenipotentiaries; that this invitation had
been accepted, and that ministers on the part of
the United States would be commissioned to "at
tend at those deliberations." This was the famous
Panama mission.
A grand council of the South and Central
American republics was planned as early as 1821,
Bolivar favoring it, and a series of treaties with
regard to it was concluded between them. In
April, 1825, Clay was approached by the Mexican
and Colombian ministers with the Inquiry whether

268 HENRY CLAY
an invitation to the United States to be represented
in the Panama Congress would be favorably con
sidered. Nothing could be more apt to strike
Clay's fancy than such an undertaking. The Holy
AlUance darkly plotting at its conferences and
congresses in Europe to reestablish the odious de
spotism of Spain over South and Central America,
and thus to gain a basis of operations for interfer
ence with the North American repubUc, had fre
quently disturbed his dreams. To form against
this league of despotism in the old world a league
of republics in the new, and thus to make this
great continent the ark of human liberty and a
higher civilization, was one of those large, gener
ous conceptions weU calculated to fascinate his
ardent mind. He succeeded even in infusing some
of his enthusiasm into Adams's colder nature.
The invitation was promptly accepted. But the
definition of the objects of the congress, filtered
through Adams's sober mind, appeared somewhat
tame by the side of the original South American
scheme, and probably of Clay's desires, too. The
South Americans had thought of a league for
resistance against a common enemy; of a combi
nation of forces, among themselves at least, to be
favored by the United States, for the liberation
of Cuba and Porto Rico from Spanish power; of
some concert of action for the general enforcement
of the principles of the American policy proclaimed
by President Monroe, and so on. It is very prob
able that Clay, although not going quite so far,

SECRETARY OF STATE 269
had In his mind some permanent concert among
American states looking to expressions of a com
mon wiU, and to united action when emergency
should require.
But the purposes of our participation in the
Panama Congress, as they appeared In the presi
dent's messages to the Senate and the House, and
later in Clay's Instructions to the American en
voys, were cautiously limited. The congress was
to be looked upon as a good opportunity for giving
to the Spanish- American brethren kindly advice,
even if It were only as to their own interests; also
for ascertaining in what direction their policy was
likely to run. Advantageous arrangements of
commercial reciprocity might be made; proper
definitions of blockade and neutral rights might
be agreed upon. The "perpetual abolition of pri
vate war on the ocean," as well as a "concert of
measures having reference to the more effectual
aboUtion of the slave trade," should be aimed at.
The congress should also be used as "a fair occa
sion for urging upon all the new nations of the
south the just and Uberal principles of religious
liberty," not by interference with their concerns,
but by claiming for citizens of the United States
sojourning in those republics the right of free
worship. The Monroe doctrine should be Inter
preted to them as meaning only that each Ameri
can nation should resist foreign interference, or
attempts to establish new colonies upon Its soU,
with its own means. The recognition of Haytl as

270 HENRY CLAY
an Independent state was to be deprecated, — this
against Clay's first Impulse, — on the ostensible
ground that Hayti, by yielding exclusive commer
cial advantages to France, had returned to a semi-
dependent condition. AU enterprises upon Cuba
and Porto Rico, such as had been planned by
Mexico and Colombia, were by all means to be
discouraged. This, by the way, was an exceedingly ticklish
subject. If Cuba and Porto Rico were to be
revolutionized, slave insurrections would foUow,
and the Insurrectionary spirit would be likely to
communicate itself to the slave population of the
Southern States. Cuba and Porto Rico would
hardly be able to maintain their independence, and
if they should faU into the hands of a great naval
power, that power would command the Mexican
Gidf and the mouth of the Mississippi. The slave-
holding influence, therefore, demanded that Cuba
and Porto Rico should not be revolutionized. The
general interests of the United States demanded
that the two Islands should not pass into the hands
of a great naval power. It was, therefore, thought
best that they should quietly remain in the posses
sion of Spain. That possession was threatened so
long as peace was not declared between Spain and
her former colonies. It seemed, therefore, espe
ciaUy desirable that the war should come to a final
close. To this end the Emperor of Russia, whom
American diplomacy had faUen into the habit of
regarding as a sort of benevolent uncle, was to be

SECRETARY OF STATE 271
pressed Into service. He was asked to persuade
Spain, In view of the utter hopelessness of further
war, to yield to necessity and recognize the Inde
pendence of her former colonies on the American
continent. Clay's Instructions to Middleton, the
American minister at St. Petersburg, setting forth
the arguments to be submitted to the emperor,
were. In this respect, a re&arkable piece of reason
ing and persuasiveness.
At the Panama Congress all was then to be
done to prevent the designs of Mexico and Colom
bia upon Cuba and Porto Rico from being executed.
On the whole, that congress was to be regarded
only as a consultative assembly, a mere diplomatic
conference, leaving the respective powers repre
sented there perfectly free to accept and act upon
the conclusions arrived at, or not, as they might
choose. There was to be no aUiance of any kind,
no entangUng engagement, on the part of the
United States. This was the character in which
the Panama mission was presented to Congress.
The first thing at which the Senate took offense
was that the President in his message had spoken
of "commissioning" ministers at his own pleasure.
A practical Issue on this point was avoided when
Adams sent to the Senate the nominations of the
ministers to be appointed. Then the policy of the
mission ItseK became the subject of most virulent
attack. The opposition was composed of two dis
tinct elements. One consisted of the slaveholding
interest, which feared every contact with the new

272 HENRY CLAY
repubUcs that had abolished slavery ; which scorned
the thought of envoys of the United States sitting
In the same assembly with the representatives of
republics that had negroes and mulattoes among
their generals and legislators; which dreaded the
possible recognition of the independence of Hayti
as a demonstration showing the negro slaves In
the Union what they might gain by rising in in
surrection and killing their masters. This element
of opposition was thoroughly in earnest. It had
an unbending logic on its side. If slavery was to
exist in the United States, it had to demand that
not only the home policy, but also the foreign
policy, of the republic must be accommodated to
the conditions of its existence.
The other element of the opposition consisted
mainly of those who were determined to break
down the administration in any event and at any
cost. Their principal argument was that, notwith
standing the assurances given by the president,
participation In the Panama Congress would lead
the United States into entangling aUiances; and
if it did not do so at first, it would do so in its
consequences. In the country, however, the Pan
ama mission was popular. A grand Amphlctyonic
council of the American repubUcs, held on the
great Isthmus of the continent, to proclaim the
glories of free government to the world, pleased
the fancy of the people. When public opinion
seemed to become Impatient at the interminable
wrangle in Congress, the Senate voted down an

SECRETARY OF STATE 273
adverse report of Its Committee on Foreign Rela
tions by twenty-four to nineteen, and confirmed
the nominations for the Panama mission. In the
House of Representatives another debate sprang
up on the blU making the necessary appropriation,
which passed by more than two to one. The spirit
of the "opposition in any event" betrayed ItseK
in unguarded utterances, such as the foUowing,
ascribed to Van Buren, the anti-administration
leader in the Senate.: "Yes, they have beaten us
by a few votes, after a hard battle; but if they
had only taken the other side and refused the
mission, we should have had them."
But that was not the end of the debate in the
Senate. The attack on the administration was
continued in the discussion on a resolution offered
by Branch of North Carolina, denying the com
petency of the President to send ministers to the
Panama Congress without the previous advice and
consent of the Senate, which competency the Pre
sident had originaUy claimed in his message to
Congress. This presented to John Randolph an
opportunity for a display of his peculiar power of
vituperation. In a long, rambling harangue he
insinuated that the invitations to the Panama
Congress addressed by the ministers of the South
ern republics to the government of the United
States had been written, or at least inspired, by
the State Department, and were therefore fraudu
lent. It was In this speech that he characterized
the administration, aUudIng to Adams and Clay,

274 HENRY CLAY
as "the coalition of BUfil and Black George, —
the combination, unheard of tlU then, of the Puri
tan with the blackleg."
When Clay heard of this, he boiled over with
rage. Only a few months before he had, in the
address to his constituents, spoken of the duel as
a reUc of barbarism, much to be discountenanced.
The same Clay now promptly sent a chaUenge to
Randolph. The explanation, which might have
averted the duel, Randolph refused to give. On
April 8 they "met," Randolph not intending to
harm Clay, but Clay in terrible earnest. They
exchanged shots, and both missed; only Randolph's
coat was touched. At the second fire Clay put
another buUet through Randolph's coat, but Ran
dolph emptied his pistol into the air, and said: "I
do not fire at you, Mr. Clay." Thereupon they
shook hands, and aU was over. Randolph's pistol
had faded to prove that Clay was a "blackleg,"
and Clay's pistol had also failed to prove that
Randolph was a calumniator; but, according to
the mysterious process of reasoning which makes
the pistol the arbiter of honor, the honor of each
was satisfied. Webster wrote to Judge Story:
"You wIU have heard of the bloodless duel, I
regret it very much, but the conduct of Mr. Ran
dolph has been such that I suppose it was thought
that it could no longer be tolerated." Benton
looked at the matter from a different point of
view. With the keen relish of a connoisseur, he
describes the whole affair down to the minutest

SECRETARY OF STATE 275
detail In his "Thirty Years' View," devoting
nearly eight of its large pages to it, and sums up :
"It was about the last high-toned duel that I have
witnessed, and among the highest toned I have
ever witnessed, and so happily conducted to a for
tunate Issue, — a result due to the noble character
of the seconds, as weU as to the generous and
heroic spirit of the principals."
The net result was that Randolph's epigram
about "the combination of the Puritan and the
blackleg " received all the more currency, and that
Clay, by his example, had given new sanction to
the practice he had denounced as barbarous. He
was by no means a professional duelist. His hand
was In fact so unused to the pistol that on this
occasion he feared he would not be able to fire it
within the time given him. He simply did not
possess that courage which is higher than the
courage to face death.
The debates on the Panama mission served as
a first general drIU of the opposition. It went on
harassing the Adams administration to its last
hour, some of the most virulent attacks being di
rected against Clay, Every measure which was
suspected of being specially favored by the ad
ministration had to meet bitter resistance. In
the Senate an amendment to the Constitution was
introduced, In accordance with Jackson's recom
mendation, to exclude members of Congress from
executive appointments; another to circumscribe
the power of the general government with regard

276 HENRY CLAY
to internal Improvements ; also a bill to limit the
executive patronage. However much good there
may have been in these propositions, it became
apparent that they were brought forward mainly
for the purpose of giving point to the opposition
and to keep its spirit hot. Not one of them led
to any practical result.
The confinement of office IKe, the anxieties of
his position, and probably a feeling of regret that
he had put himseK into a situation in which he
could only with difficulty defend himseK against
the virulent hostiUty assailing him without cessa
tion, began to teU upon Clay's health. He felt
weary and IU, so seriously sometimes that he
thought of giving up his place in the administra
tion. After the adjournment of Congress he vis
ited his home in Kentucky, Again he was cheered
and feasted on the way, as weU as by his old con
stituents at home, and again he had, at dinners and
receptions, to teU the story of the last presidential
election over and over, in order to prove that the
"bargain and corruption " charge was false. Again
he returned to Washington, encouraged by the en
thusiastic affection of his friends, and their assur
ance that there were large masses of people be
lieving In the honorable character of the President
and the secretary of state.
The elections for the twentieth Congress which
took place that summer and autumn began to show
new lines of party division. In many districts the
struggle was avowedly between those friendly and

SECRETARY OF STATE 277
those hostile to the administration. The forming
groups 'were not yet divided by clearly defined
differences of principle or policy, but the air was
full of charges, insinuations, and personal detrac
tion. General Jackson's voice, too, was heard
again In characteristic tones. He took good care
to keep his grievance before the people. Having
been Invited by some of his friends in Kentucky
to visit that State "for the purpose of counteract
ing the intrigue and management of certain promi
nent individuals against him," he wrote a long
letter declining the invitation.
" But [he added] if it be true that the administration
have gone into power contrary to the voice of the nation,
and are now expecting, by means of this power, thus
acquired, to mould the public will into an acquiescence
with their authority, then is the issue fairly made out —
shall the government or the people rule ? And it be
comes the man whom the people shaU indicate as their
rightful representative in this solemn issue, so to have
acquitted himself that, while he displaces these enemies
of liberty, there wiU be nothing in his own example to
operate against the strength and durabiUty of the gov
ernment." No candidate for the presidency had ever held
such language. Here he plainly denounced the
constitutlonaUy elected chief magistrate as a
usurper, and arraigned him and the members of
his administration as "these enemies of liberty"
who were using the power of the government to
dragoon the public wiU into acquiescence. This

278 HENRY CLAY
fierce denunciation was hurled against a president
so conscientious in the exercise of his power that,
among the public officers, his most virulent ene
mies and the most enthusiastic supporters of his
opponent were as safe in their places as were his
friends. The last session of the nineteenth Congress, which
opened In December, 1826, passed over without
any event of importance, but not without many
demonstrations of "the bitter and rancorous spirit
of the opposition," which, as Adams recorded,
"produced during the late session of Congress
four or five challenges to duels, all of which, how
ever, happily ended In smoke;" and, he added,
"at a public dinner given last week to John Ran
dolph of Roanoke, a toast was given directly In
stigating assassination." No opportunity was lost
for defaming the administration. A fierce attack
was made on Clay for having. In the exercise of
his power as secretary of state, made some changes
In the selection of newspapers for the publication
of the laws.
The clamor of the opposition grew, indeed, so
loud that people not speciaUy engaged in politics
wondered in amazement whether the republic reaUy
was on the brink of destruction. The sedate Niles,
Immediately after the adjournment of Congress,
expressed In the "Register" his fear that the com
ing presidential election, which was still a year
and a haK ahead, would "cause as much heat, if
not violence, as any other event that ever hap-

SECRETARY OF STATE 279
pened In this country; that father would be ar
rayed against son, and son against father, old
friends become enemies, and social Intercourse be
crueUy Interrupted; " and all this because "the
resolution to put up or put down individuals swal
lowed up every consideration of right and of
wrong." The frenzy to which politicians wrought them
selves up was sometimes grotesque in its manKes-
tations. In Virginia it became known that John
Tyler had written a letter to Clay approving his
conduct In the last presidential election; where
upon the "Virginia Jackson Republican," a news
paper published at Richmond, broke out in these
exclamations: "John Tyler Identified with Henry
Clay! We are aU amazement! heartsick!! chop-
faUen!! dumb!!! Mourn, Virginia, mourn!! for
you, too, have your time-serving aspirants who
press forward from round to round on the ladder
of political promotion, under the disguises of re
publican orthodoxy, while they conceal in their
bosoms the lurking dagger, with which, upon the
mature conjuncture, to plunge the Goddess of
Liberty to the heart." So John Tyler found him
seK obliged to explain, In a letter several columns
long, that he might have approved of Clay's vote
for Adams without supporting the Adams admin
istration. General Floyd, a member of Congress from
Virginia, in a speech to his constituents, spoke of
"times like these, when great political revolutions

280 HENRY CLAY
are in progress," and told his hearers that they
were "now engaged in a great war, — a war of
patronage and power against patriotism and the
people." He fiercely denounced the "coalition"
which had put Mr. Adams in power, and now
made "the upper part of Virginia the great the
atre of its intrigues; " but at the same time he
informed his friends that "the combinations for
the elevation of General Jackson were nearly com
plete." Martin Van Buren, who in the last presi
dential election had been the great leader of the
Crawford forces in New York, but now, discerning
In General Jackson the coming man, was traveUng
through the Southern States In the interest of this
candidate, wrote mysteriously to some gentlemen
at Raleigh, who had invited him to a public din
ner: "The spirit of encroachment has assumed a
new and far more seductive aspect, and can only
be resisted by the exercise of uncommon virtues."
Thus the leaders of the Jackson movement
worked busily to excite the popular mind with
spectral visions of unprecedented corruption pre
vaUing, and of terrible dangers hanging over the
country; and their newspapers, led by a central
organ which they had established at Washington,
the "Telegraph," edited by Duff Green, day after
day hurled the most reckless charges of profligacy
and abuse of power at the administration. They
also brought the organization of local committees
as electioneering machinery to a perfection never
known until then, and these committees were kept

SECRETARY OF STATE 281
constantly active in feeding the agitation. Re
peating, by the press and in speech, without cessa
tion, the cry of bargain and corruption, and usur
pation of power ; never withdrawing a charge, even
if ever so conclusively refuted, but answering only
with new accusations equaUy terrific, — they grad
uaUy succeeded In making a great many well-
meaning people believe that the administration of
John Quincy Adams, one of the purest and most
conscientious this republic has ever had, was reaUy
a sink of iniquity, and an abomination in the sight
of all just men ; and that, if such a dreadful event
as the reelection of Adams should happen, it would
Inevitably be the end of liberty and republican in
stitutions In America. Such a calamity could be
prevented only by the election of the "old hero,"
who, having once been "cheated out of the presi
dency by bargain and corruption," was now "justly
entitled to the office."
On the other hand, the friends of the adminis
tration were not entirely idle. The President did
not, indeed, give them any encouragement in the
way of opening places for them. While being
constantly accused of employing the power and
patronage of the government to corrupt public
opinion, and to dragoon the people into "acquies
cence," John Quincy Adams kept the even tenor
of his way. The public service was full of his
enemies, but he did not remove one of them.
Even when well persuaded that McLean, the post
master-general, had been intriguing against him

282 HENRY CLAY
and using the patronage of his department In the
Interest of the opposition, and Clay with other
members of the cabinet urged McLean's dismissal,
the President refused, because he thought the Post-
office Department was on the whole weU con
ducted. That he did not exclude his friends from
place was perhaps aU that could be truthfuUy
said. The administration had, however, some
well-written newspapers and able speakers on its
side. They vigorously denounced the recklessness
of the attacks made upon the government, and
spoke of General Jackson as an Uliterate "military
chieftain." But that phrase was a two-edged
weapon; for, while thinking men were moved to
the reflection that military chieftains were not the
safest chiefs of republics, the masses would see in
the military chieftain only the "old hero" who
had right gaUantly "whipped the Britishers at
New Orleans." The Jackson movement thus re
mained greatly superior in aggressive force and In
unscrupulousness of denunciation.
On one occasion, however, this was carried to
a very dangerous length by Jackson himself, and
Clay apparently scored a great advantage. It Is
a strange story. In May, 1827, there appeared in
a North Carolina newspaper a letter from Carter
Beverly of Virginia, concerning a visit made by
him to General Jackson at the Hermitage. The
general had then said, before a large company, as
the letter stated, that, before the election of Mr.
Adams, "Mr. Clay's friends made a proposition

SECRETARY OF STATE 283
to Jackson's friends that. If they would promise
on his behaK not to put Mr. Adams In the seat
of secretary of state, Mr. Clay and his friends
would In one hour make Jackson the president,"
but that General Jackson had Indignantly repeUed
the proposition. Beverly's letter created much
excitement. His veracity being chaUenged, he
fell back upon General Jackson, and the general
wrote a long reply, teUIng the story somewhat
differently. According to his account, "a respect
able member of Congress " had told him that, as
he had been Informed by Mr. Clay's friends, Mr.
Adams's friends had held out the secretaryship of
state to Mr. Clay as a price for his influence, say
ing that, if General Jackson were elected presi
dent, Adams would be continued as secretary of
state, that then "there would be no room for
Kentucky," and that, if General Jackson would
promise not to continue Mr. Adams as secretary
of state, they would put an end to the presidential
contest in one hour. Then he. General Jackson,
had contemptuously repeUed this "bargain and
corruption." When this letter of General Jackson appeared
In the newspapers. Clay thought he had at last
what he had long been looking for, — a responsi
ble sponsor for the wretched gossip. He forth
with, in an address to the pubUc, made an unquali-
fled and Indignant denial of General Jackson's
statements, and caUed for Jackson's proof. In a
very spirited speech delivered at a dinner given

284 HENRY CLAY
him by his old constituents at Lexington, he once
more went over the whole dreary story, and in the
most pointed language he defied General Jackson
to produce his "respectable member of Congress,"
or, in default thereof, to stand before the Ameri
can people as a wiUful defamer. The general
could not evade this, and named James Buchanan
of Pennsylvania as his authority. Now Buchanan
had to rise and explain. Accordingly, in a public
letter, he denied having spoken to General Jack
son on behaK of Mr. Clay or his friends; he had
said nothing that General Jackson could have so
understood; had he seen reason for suspecting
that the general had so understood him at the
time, he would have set himseK right immediately.
He even suggested that the whole story of the
attempted bargain might have been an afterthought
on the part of the general. Thus Jackson's only
witness utterly faded him. Not only that, but
Buchanan's letter, together with the correspond
ence which foUowed, left ample room for the
suspicion that, if bargaining was thought of and
attempted. It was rather in the Jackson camp than
among Clay's friends.
Clay now felt as If he had the slander under his
heel. To make its annihilation quite complete,
he caUed aU his friends upon the witness stand.
If their votes in Congress had been transferred to
Mr. Adams by a corrupt bargain, many persons
must have known of it. One after another they
came forward in public letters, declaring that.

SECRETARY OF STATE 285
while the election was pending, they had never
heard of any attempt at bargaining to control
their votes in favor of Mr. Adams, and that, had
the attempt been made, they would have refused
to be controUed. AU these things were elaborately
summed up and set forth In another address to the
people published by Clay In December,
The case appeared perfect. Clay and his friends
were jubilant. Letters of congratulation came
pouring in upon him. Webster was lavish In his
praise of Clay's dinner speech at Lexington, and
thought General Jackson would never recover from
the blow he had received. Was it possible that,
in the face of this overwhelming evidence. General
Jackson should refuse to retract his charges, or
that anybody In the United States should still be
lieve them to be true, and have the hardihood to
repeat them? It was. General Jackson did not
retract. His whole moral sense was subjugated
by the dogged belief that a man who seriously
disagreed with him must necessarily be a very bad
man, capable of any viUalny, and must be put
down. He attempted no reply to Buchanan's let
ter and Clay's addresses, but, as we shall see,
seventeen years later, at a most critical period in
Clay's public life, when Carter Beverly, in a re
gretful letter to Clay, had retracted aU aspersions
upon him, Jackson repeated the slander and re
affirmed his belief In it. Neither did General
Jackson's friends remain silent; on the contrary,
they lustily proclaimed that Buchanan's letter had

286 HENRY CLAY
proved Jackson's charge, and that now there could
be no further doubt about it. Among the masses
of the people, too, who did not read long explana
tions and sift evidence, especiaUy in Pennsylvania
and in the West and South, the bargain and cor
ruption cry remained as powerful as ever. It
became with them a sort of religious belief that,
in the year 1824, General Jackson, a guileless
soldier, the hero of New Orleans, and the savior
of his country, had been cheated out of his rights
by two rascaUy politicians. Clay and Adams, who
had corruptly usurped the highest offices of the
government, and plotted to destroy the liberties of
the American people.
The twentieth Congress, which had been elected
1 while aU this was going on, and which assembled
I in December, 1827, had a majority hostile to the
(administration in both branches, — a thing which,
as Adams dolefuUy remarked, had never occurred
during the existence of the government. More
over, that opposition was determined. If It could,
not only to harass the administration, but utterly
to destroy it In the opinion of the country. The
only important measure of general legislation passed
at this session was the famous tariff of 1828, caUed
the "tariff of abominations," on account of its
peculiarly Incongruous and monstrous ]provIsIons.
Members of Congress from New England, where,
since 1824, much capital had been turned Into
manufacturing industry, from the Middle States,
and from the West, no matter whether RepubU-

SECRETARY OF STATE 287
cans or Federalists, Jackson men or Adams men,
vied with one another in raising protective duties,
by a wild log-roUIng process, on the different arti
cles In which their constituents were respectively
Interested. It created great dissatisfaction in the
planting States, and more wIU be said of it when
we reach the nuUification movement.
The time not occupied by the tariff debate was
largely employed in defaming the administration.
In the House of Representatives, the struggle be
tween the Jackson men and the adherents of the
administration grew almost ludicrously passionate.
The opposition were agreed as to the general charge
that the administration was most damnable, but
they were somewhat embarrassed as to the specifi
cations. One drag-net Investigation after another
was ordered to help them out. These inquiries
brought forth nothing of consequence, but that
circumstance served only as a reason for repeating
the charges aU the louder. The noise of the con
flict was prodigious. It increased in volume, and
the mutual criminations and recriminations grew
In rancor and unscrupulousness as the presidential
canvass proceeded after the adjournment of Con
gress, Until then the friends of Adams and Clay had
mostly contented themselves with the defense of
the administration from the accusations which were
hurled at it with bewildering violence and profu
sion. But graduaUy they, too, warmed up to
their work, and it may be said that the campaign

288 HENRY CLAY
of 1828 became one of the most furious and dis
gusting which the American people has ever wit
nessed. The passions were excited to fever heat,
and aU the flood-gates of scurrility opened. The
detractors of John Quincy Adams not only assailed
his public acts, but they traduced this most scrupu
lously correct of men as the procurer to the Em
peror of Russia of a beautiful American girl.
With frantic energy the speakers and newspapers
of the Jackson party rang the changes upon the
" bargain and corruption " charge, and Clay,
although not himseK a candidate, was glibly re
viled as a professional gambler, a swindling bank
rupt, an abandoned profligate, and an accomplice
of Aaron Burr. On the other hand, not only the
vulnerable points of Jackson's public career were
denounced, but also his private character and even
the good name of his wife were ruthlessly dragged
in the dust. Such was the vile war of detraction
which raged tiU the closing of the poUs,
Some of Mr, Adams's friends, among them
Webster, were hopeful to the last. But Adams
himself, and with him the cooler heads on his side,
did not delude themselves with flattering expecta
tions. When the votes were counted, it turned
out that Adams had carried aU New England,
with the exception of one electoral vote In Maine;
also New Jersey, Delaware, four ninths of the
vote of New York, and six of the eleven Maryland
votes. South of the Potomac, and west of the
Alleghanies, Jackson had swept everything before

SECRETARY OF STATE 289
him. In Pennsylvania he had a popular majority
of fifty thousand. The electoral vote for Jackson
was one hundred and seventy-eight, that for Adams
eighty-three. AU the Clay States of 1824 had gone
to Jackson. Calhoun was elected vice-president.
The overwhelming defeat of John Quincy Adams
has by some been attributed to the stubborn con
sistency with which he refused to buUd up a party
for himseK by removing his enemies and distribut
ing the offices of the government among his politi
cal friends. This is a mistake. The civil service
reformer of our days would say that President
Adams did not act wisely, nor according to correct
principles, in permitting public servants to take
part in the warfare of political parties with as lit
tle restraint as if they had been private citizens;
for whenever public officers do so, their official
power and opportunities are almost always taken
advantage of for the benefit of the party, endan
gering the freedom of elections as weU as the
integrity of the service. But this is a conclusion
formed in our time, when the abuses growing out
of a partisan service have fully developed them
selves and demand a remedy, which was not then
the case. Adams simply followed the traditions
of the first administrations. Had he silenced his
enemies together with his friends In office. It would
have benefited him in the canvass very little.
Neither could the use of patronage as a weapon in
the struggle have saved him, had he been capable
of resorting to It. Patronage so used is always

290 HENRY CLAY
demoralizing, but it can have decisive effect only
In quiet times, while the popular mind is languid
and indifferent. When there are strong currents
of popular feeling and the passions are aroused, a
shrewd management of patronage, although It may
indeed control the nomination of candidates by
packing conventions, wiU not decide elections.
In 1828 there were such elementary forces to en
counter. Not only had the Jackson party the
more efficient organization and the shrewder man
agers, but they were favored by a peculiar devel
opment in the condition of the popular mind.
In the early times of the republic the masses of
the American people were, owing to their circum
stances, uneducated and ignorant, and, owing to
traditional habit, they had a reverential respect
for superiority of talent and breeding, and yielded
readily to its leadership. Their growing prosper
ity, "the material successes achieved by them in
the development of the country, strengthened their
confidence in themselves; and the result of this
widening seK-consciousness was the triumph of
the democratic theory of government in the elec
tion of Jefferson. Still the old habit of readUy
accepting the leadership of superior InteUIgence
and education remained sufficiently strong to per
mit the succession of several presidents taken from
the ranks of professional statesmen. But there
always comes a time in the IKe of a democracy —
and It is a critical period — when the masses grow
impatient of aU pretensions or admissions of supe-

SECRETARY OF STATE 291
riority; when a vague distrust of professional
statesmanship, of trained skiU ia the conduct of
the government, seizes upon them, and makes
them easily believe that those who possess such
trained skiU wiU, if constantly intrusted with the
management of public affairs, take some sort of
advantage of those less trained; that, after aU,
the business of governing is no more difficult than
other business ; and that it would be safer to put
into the highest places men more like themselves,
not skiUed statesmen, but "men of the people."
By the time the Revolutionary generation of
presidents had run out, — that is to say, with the
close of Monroe's second administration, — large
numbers of voters in the United States had reached
that state of mind. Its development was wonder-
fuUy favored by the "bargain and corruption "
cry, which, after the election of Adams In 1825,
represented "the people's candidate" as cheated
out of his right to the presidency by a conspiracy
of selfish and tricky professional politicians. As
this cry was kept resounding all over the coun
try, accompanied with stories of other dreadful
encroachments and intrigues, the masses were Im
pressed with the feeling not only that a great
wrong had been done, but that some darkly lurk
ing danger was threating their own rights and
liberties, and that nothing but the election of a
man of the people, such as "the old hero," could
surely save the republic. This was the real
strength of the Jackson movement. It is a signifi-

292 HENRY CLAY
cant fact that it was weakest where there were the
most schools, and that it gathered its greatest
momentum where the people were least accustomed
to reading and study, and therefore most apt to
be swayed by unreasoning impressions.
No patronage, no machine work, could have
stemmed this tide. No man endowed with all
the charms of personal popularity could have
turned it back. But of aU men John Quincy
Adams was the least fitted for such a task. We
can learn from him how to act upon lofty princi
ples, and also how to make their enforcement thor
oughly disagreeable. He possessed in the highest
degree that uprightness which leans backward.
He had a horror of demagogy, and, lest he should
render himseK guUty of anything akin to It, he
would but rarely condescend to those innocent
amenities by which the good-wiU of others may
be conciliated. His virtue was freezing cold of
touch, and forbidding in its looks. Not only he
did not court, but he repeUed popularity. When
convinced of being right in an opinion, he would
make its expression as uncomproiaising and ag
gressive as if he desired rather to irritate than to
persuade. His friends esteemed, and many of
them admired him, but their devotion and zeal
were measured by a cold sense of duty. To the
eye of the people he seemed so distant that they
were all the more willing to believe IU of him.
With such a standard-bearer such a contest was
lost as soon as It was begun.

SECRETARY OF STATE 293
Clay tried to bear the defeat with composure.
"The Inauspicious issue of the election," he wrote
to Niles, "has shocked me less than I feared it
would. My health and my spirits, too, have been
better since the event was known than they were
many weeks before." The hardest blow was that
even his beloved Kentucky had refused to follow
his leadership, and had joiaed the triumphal pro
cession of the military chieftain.
On the day before General Jackson's inaugura
tion Clay put his resignation into the hands of
Mr. Adams, and thus ended his career as secretary
of state. It may, on the whole, be caUed a very
creditable one, although Its failures were more
conspicuous than its successes. His greatest affair,
that of the Panama Congress, had entirely miscar
ried. This, however, was not the fault of his
management. He had desired to confide the mis
sion to the best diplomatic mind in America, Al
bert GaUatin, but Gallatin, after some considera
tion, declined. John Sergeant of Pennsylvania,
of whom we have already heard as an anti-slavery
man In the Missouri struggle, and Richard C,
Anderson of Kentucky were then selected. Owing
to the long delays in Congress, the envoys did not
start on their mission until early In the summer of
1826. Anderson died on the way. In his place
Joel R. Poinsett, American minister In Mexico,
was instructed to attend the congress. When
Sergeant arrived at Panama, the congress had
adjourned with a resolution to meet again at Tacu-

294 HENRY CLAY
baya, in Mexico. But by the time that meeting
was to be held, the attention of our southern sister
republics was already fuUy engaged by internal
discords and conflicts. The meeting, therefore,
never took place, and Sergeant returned without
ever having seen the congress. To Clay this was
a deep disappointment. His zeal In behalf of the
Spanish-American repubUcs had been generous
and ardent. He had sincerely believed that na
tional independence and the practice of free Insti
tutions would lift those populations out of their
ignorance, superstition, and sloth, and develop in
them the moral qualities of true freemen. He
had battled for their cause, and clung to his hopes
even against the light of better information. He
had infused some of his enthusiasm into Mr.
Adams himseK, although the cooler judgment of
the President, even in his warmest recommenda
tions to Congress, always kept the contingency of
failure in view. Clay had seen his gorgeous con
ception of a grand brotherhood of free peoples on
American soil almost realized, as he thought, by
the convocation of the Panama council. Then
the pleasing picture vanished. He was obliged to
admit to himseK that in the conversation of 1821,
concerning the southern republics, Adams, after
aU, had been right; that free government cannot
be established by mere revolutionary decrees ; that
written constitutions, in order to last, must em
body the ways of thinking and the character of
the people ; that the people of the thirteen North

SECRETARY OF STATE 295
American colonies (to whom revolution and na
tional independence meant not the creation of
freedom, but the maintenance of liberties already
possessed, enjoyed, and practiced, the defense of
principles which had been to them like mother's
milk) were an essentially different people from
the Spanish- Americans, who had grown up under
despotic rule, to whom liberty was a new thing
they did not know what to do with, and who lived
mostlyin__a tropical climate where tTie sustenance
of animal man requires but little^ H!S§Hli'-S'^ ^^^
exertion, and where aU the influences of nature
favor the development of indolence and of the
passions rather than the government of thrift,
reason, and law.
The disappointment was Indeed painful, and he
could not refrain from expressing his feelings on
a notable occasion. In 1827 Bolivar wrote him a
formal letter complimenting him "upon his bril
liant talents and ardent love of liberty," adding:
"AU America, Colombia, and myseK owe your
excellency our purest gratitude for the incompar
able services you have rendered to us by sustaining
our cause with a sublime enthusiasm." Clay an
swered, nearly a year later. In chiUing phrase,
that the interest of the people of the United States
In the struggles of South America had been in
spired by the hope that "along with its independ
ence would be established free institutions, insur
ing all the blessings of civil liberty," an object to
the accomplishment of which the people of the

296 HENRY CLAY
United States were stIU anxiously looking. But,
lest BoUvar might fail in making a practical ap
plication of these words, Clay added: "I should
be unworthy of the consideration with which your
exceUency honors me, K I did not on this occasion
state that ambitious designs have been attributed
by your enemies to your exceUency, which have
created in my mind great soUcitude. They have
cited late events in Colombia as proofs of these
designs. But I cannot allow myseK to believe
that your exceUency wiU abandon the bright and
glorious path which lies plainly before you, for
the bloody road on which the vulgar crowd of
tyrants and military despots have so often trodden.
I wiU not doubt that your exceUency wiU in due
time render a satisfactory explanation to Colombia
and to the world of the parts of your public con
duct which have excited any distrust," and so on.
The lecture thus administered by the American
statesman to the South American dictator was the
voice of sadly disappointed expectations. Clay
was probably aware that BoUvar 's ambitions were
by no means the greatest difficulty threatening the
Spanish-American repubUcs.
Another disappointment he suffered in the faU-
ure of an effort to remedy what he considered the
great defect in the Spanish treaty of 1819. In
March, 1827, he instructed Poinsett, the Ameri
can minister to Mexico, to propose the purchase
of Texas. But the attempt came to nothing.
In his commercial diplomacy Clay followed the

SECRETARY OF STATE 297
Ideas of reciprocity generaUy accepted at the time,
which not only awarded favor for favor, but also
set restriction against restriction. This practice
of fighting restriction with equal or greater re
striction was apt to work well enough when the
opposite party was the one less able to endure the
restriction, and therefore obliged by Its necessities
to give up the fight quickly. But when the re
strictions were long maintained, the effect was
simply that each party punished its own commerce
in seeking to retaUate upon the other. This prac
tice played a great part in the transactions taking
place In and between (rreat Britain and the United
States concerning the colonial trade. The tradi
tional policy of Great Britain was to keep the
trade with the colonies as exclusively as possible
in the hands of the mother country. The United
States, of course, desired to have the greatest pos
sible freedom of trade with the British colonies,
especiaUy those in America, including the West
India islands. Various attempts were made in
that direction, but without success. The commer
cial conventions of 1815 and 1818 between the
United States and Great Britain had concluded
nothing in this respect, leaving the matter to be
regulated by legislation on either side. The result
was a confusion of privileges, conditions, and re
strictions most perplexing and troublesome. The
desirability of a clear mutual understanding being
keenly felt, negotiations were resumed. In July,
1825, Parliament passed an act offering large

298 HENRY CLAY
privileges with regard to the colonial trade on
condition of complete reciprocity, the acceptance
of the conditional offer to be notified to the Brit
ish government within one year. Congress neg
lected to take action on the offer, MeanwhUe
GaUatin, upon whom the government was apt to
faU back for difficult diplomatic service, had been
appointed minister to England in the place of
Rufus King, whose health had failed. When
GaUatin arrived in London he was met by an
Order in CouncU issued on July 27, 1826, pro
hibiting aU commercial intercourse between the
United States and the British West Indies. At
the same time Canning, the foreign secretary,
who was fond of treating the United States cava-
Uerly, informed him that aU further negotiation
upon this subject was declined. A Uvely exchange
of notes foUowed, in which GaUatin and Clay not
only had the best of the argument, but exceUed
by pointed retorts given in exceUent temper. An
other session of Congress having passed without
action, the President, in accordance with an act
passed in 1823, issued a proclamation on March
17, 1827, declaring, on the part of the United
States, the prohibition of aU trade and Intercourse
with the ports from which the commerce of the
United States was excluded. Soon afterwards
Canning died. Lord Goderich rose to the post
of prime minister, and GaUatin succeeded in mak
ing a treaty keeping the convention of 1815 in
definitely in force, subject to one year's notice.

SECRETARY OF STATE 299
Thus, while the controversy had not been brought
to the desired conclusion, at least nothing was
lost ; the dignity of the United States was main
tained ; more dangerous complications were avoided ;
and the way was prepared for more satisfactory
arrangements in the future. But It Was, In popu
lar opinion, a failure after aU, and, the temporary
cutting off of the West India trade being severely
felt, naturaUy told against the administration. It
was with regard to this transaction that, as we
shaU see, Martin Van Buren, when General Jack
son's secretary of state, gave those famous instruc
tions which cost him the consent of the Senate to
his nomination as minister to England.
On the whole, there was evidence of a liberal,
progressive spirit In Clay's diplomatic transac
tions; and it gave him much pleasure to say that,
during the period when he was secretary of state,
"more treaties between the United States and
foreign nations had been actually signed than had
been during the thirty-six years of the existence
of the present Constitution," He concluded trea
ties of amity, commerce, and navigation with Cen
tral America, Prussia, Denmark, the Hanseatic
Republics, Sweden and Norway, and Brazil, and
a boundary treaty with Mexico, With Great
Britain he was least successful in bringing matters
in controversy to a definite and quite satisfactory
conclusion. So a treaty concerning the disputed
territory on the northwest coast, the Columbia
country, provided only for an extension of the

300 HENRY CLAY
joint occupation agreed upon in the treaty of 1818,
thus merely adjourning a difficulty, whUe by an
other treaty the northeastern boundary question
was referred to a friendly sovereign or state, to be
agreed upon, for arbitration.
The one disputed question between Great Brit
ain and the United States which he did bring to
a conclusion was one left behind by the treaty
of Ghent, — the indemnity for slaves carried off
by the British forces in the war of 1812, After
seven years of fruitless negotiation, the matter
had been referred to the Emperor Alexander of
Russia. He decided in favor of the claim. But
the British government raised new objections, and
a second negotiation foUowed. Great Britain finally
agreed to pay a lump sum for the value of the
slaves, and payment was made in 1827. Thus
the administration of John Quincy Adams achieved,
diplomatically, one of its most decided successes
in a matter in which its sympathies were least en
listed. But a kindred question turned up in another
form stUl more unsympathetic. On May 10, 1828,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution
asking the President to open negotiations with the
British government concerning the surrender of
slaves taking refuge in Canada. Clay accordingly
instructed GaUatin to propose to the British gov
ernment a stipulation, first, "for the mutual sur
render of deserters from the mUitary and naval
service and from the merchant service of the two

SECRETARY OF STATE 301
countries;" and, second, "for a mutual surrender
of aU persons held to service or labor under the
laws of one party who escape into the territories
of the other." The first proposition was evidently
to serve only as a prop to the second ; for, as the
instruction argued, while Great Britain had little
interest In the mutual surrender of fugitive slaves,
she had much interest in the mutual surrender of
mUitary or naval deserters. The British govern
ment, however, as was to be expected, replied
promptly that it "was utterly Impossible for them
to agree to a stipulation for the surrender of fugi
tive slaves."
The negotiation presents a melancholy spectacle :
a republic offering to surrender deserters from the
army or navy of a monarchical power, if that
power would agree to surrender slaves escaped
from their owners in that republic! And this
happened under the administration of John Quincy
Adams; the Instructions were signed by Henry
Clay, and the proposition was laid before the Brit
ish government by Albert Gallatin! It is true
that in Clay's dispatches on this subject we find
nothing of his accustomed strength of statement
and fervor of reasoning. Neither did there appear
anything like zeal in Gallatin's presentation of
the matter. It was a mere perfunctory "going
through the motions," as if in expectation of a
not unwelcome failure. But even as such, it is
a sorry page of history which we should gladly
miss. Slavery was a hard taskmaster to the gov
ernment of this proud American republic.

302 HENRY CLAY
It would not be just to assume that a man who
had grown up in the anti-slavery school of the
Revolutionary period, and whose first effort on the
poUtical field was made in behalf of emancipation,
would lend himseK without reluctance to such
transactions, unless his conscience had become
completely debauched or his opinions thoroughly
changed. Clay had remained essentiaUy different,
in his ways of thinking and feeUng, from the ordi
nary pro-slavery man. That nervous, sleepless,
instinctive watchfulness for the safety of the pecul
iar Institution, which characterized the orthodox
slaveholder, was entirely foreign to him. He had
to be told what the interests of slavery demanded.
In order to see and feel its needs. The original
anti-slavery spirit would again and again inspire
his impulses and break out in his utterances. We
remember how he praised the Spanish-American
republics for having aboUshed slavery. In his
great "American system " speech he had argued
for the superior claims of free labor as against
those of "servUe labor." He was scarcely seated
in the office of secretary of state, when, in April,
1825, as Mr. Adams recorded, he expressed the
opinion that "the independence of Hayti must
shortly be recognized," — an idea most horrible to
the American slaveholder. When he eagerly ac
cepted the invitation to the Panama Congress, the
association with new states that had liberated their
slaves, and counted negroes and mulattoes among
their generals and legislators, had nothing alarm-

SECRETARY OF STATE 303
ing to him. Little more than a year before he
instructed GaUatin to ask of Great Britain the
surrender of fugitive slaves from Canada, he had
made one of the most striking demonstrations of
his genuine feeling at a meeting of the African
Colonization Society, which Is worthy of special
attention. That society had been organized in 1816, with
the object of transporting free negroes to Africa
and of colonizing them there. It was in the main
composed of two elements, — pro - slavery men,
even of the extreme type of John Randolph, who
favored the removal of free negroes from this coun
try, because they considered them a dangerous
element, a "pest," In slaveholding communities;
and philanthropists, some of whom sincerely be
Ueved that the exportation of colored people on a
grand scale was possible, and would ultimately
result In the extinguishment of slavery, while
others contented themselves with a vague Impres
sion that some good might be done by it, and used
it as a convenient excuse for not doing anything
more efficacious.
Clay was one of the sincere believers in the
colonization scheme as practicable on a grand
scale, and as an aid to gradual emancipation. In
his speech before the Colonization Society in Jan
uary, 1827, he tried to prove — and he had armed
himself for the task with an arsenal of figures —
that it was "not beyond the ability of the coun
try " to export and colonize a sufficient number of

304 HENRY CLAY
negroes to effect a gradual reduction of the colored
population in this country, and thus by degrees to
eradicate slavery, or at least to neutralize its dan
gerous effects. We know now that these sanguine
calculations were entirely delusive; neither did his
prediction come true, that the free negro "pests,"
when colonized in Africa, would prove the most
effective missionaries of cIvIUzation on that conti
nent. But he beUeved in all this ; to his mind the
colonization scheme was an anti-slavery agency,
and it was characteristic of his feeUngs when he
exclaimed : —
" If I could be instrumental in eradicating this deep
est stain upon the character of our country, and remov
ing aU cause of reproach on account of it by foreign
nations ; if I could only be instrumental in ridding of
this foul blot that revered State which gave me birth, or
that not less beloved State which kindly adopted me as
her son, I would not exchange the proud satisfaction
which I should enjoy for the honor of aU the triumphs
ever decreed to the most successful conqueror."
We might almost imagine we heard the voice of
an apostle of "aboUtion " in his reply to the charge
that the Colonization Society was "doing mischief
by the agitation of this question." These were
his words, spoken In his most solemn tone : —
" What would they who thus reproach us have done ?
If they would repress aU tendency toward liberty and
ultimate emancipation, they must do more than put down
the benevolent efforts of this society. They must go
hack to the era of our Uberty and independence, and

SECRETARY OF STATE 305
muzzle the cannon which thunder its annual joyous re
turn. They must revive the slave trade with aU its
train of atrocities. They must suppress the workings of
British philanthropy, seeking to meliorate the condition
of the unfortunate West Indian slaves. They must
arrest the career of South American deUverance from
thraldom. They must blow out the moral fights around
us, and extingiush that greatest torch of aU, which
America presents to a benighted world, pointing the way
to their rights, their Uberties, and their happiness. And
when they have achieved aU these purposes, the work
wiU yet be incomplete. They must penetrate the human
soul, and eradicate the light of reason and the love of
Uberty. Then, and not till then, when universal dark
ness and despair prevail, can you perpetuate slavery,
and repress all sympathies, and all human and benevo
lent efforts among freemen, in behalf of the unhappy
portion of our race doomed to bondage."
This, no doubt, was Henry Clay the man, speak
ing the language of his heart, and he spoke it, too,
at a time when he must have known that the slave-
holding interest was growing very sensitive, and
that its distrust and disfavor might become fatal
to all his ambitions as a candidate for the presi
dency. Knowing this, he said things which might
have come from the most uncompromising and
defiant enemy of slavery. Yet this was the same
man who had helped to strengthen the law for the
recovery of fugitive slaves; who had opposed the
exclusion of slavery from new States ; who at the
beginning of the Adams administration had given
the British government to understand that further

306 HENRY CLAY
negotiations for common action for the suppression
of the slave trade would be useless, as the Senate
would not confirm such treaties ; who, after having
made that anti-slavery speech, would lend himseK
to a negotiation with a foreign government for the
mutual surrender of fugitive slaves and mUitary
and naval deserters ; who would, at a later period,
vehemently denounce the abolitionists, again op
pose the exclusion of slavery from new territories,
again strengthen the Fugitive Slave Law, while
in the intervals repeating his denunciations of
slavery, and again declaring himseK In favor of
gradual emancipation.
This contrast between expression of feeling on
the one side and action on the other was incom
prehensible to the abolitionists, who, after the
Missouri struggle, began to make themselves felt
by agitating, with constantly Increasing zeal, the
duty of Instantly overthrowing slavery on moral
grounds. It is not easily understood by our gen
eration, who look back upon slavery as a moral
abnormity in this age, and as the easily discernible
cause of great conflicts and calamities, which It
would have been best to attack and extinguish, the
earlier the better. We can only with difficulty
imagine the thoughts and emotions of men of that
period, who, whUe at heart recognizing slavery as
a wrong and a curse, yet had some of that feeling
expressed by Patrick Henry, in his remarkable
letter of 1773, — who thought that the abolition
of the great evil, whUe sure finaUy to come, would

SECRETARY OF STATE 307
stiU be impossible for a considerable period, and
that In the mean time, while slavery legally existed, I
it must be protected in its rights and Interests I
against outside Interference, and especially against
aU commotions which might disturb the peace of
the community. We can now scarcely appreciate
the dread of the consequences of sudden eman
cipation, the constitutional scruples, the nervous
anxiety about the threatened Union, and the vague
belief in the efficacy of compromises and paUia-
tives, which animated statesmen of Clay's way of
thinking and feeUng. It Is characteristic of that
period, that even a man of John Quincy Adams's
stamp, who was not under any pro-slavery influ
ence at home, and aU whose instincts and impulses
were against slavery, permitted that negotiation
with Great Britain about the surrender of fugitive
slaves to go on under his presidential responsi
bility, without mentioning it by a single word in
his journal as a matter of importance. Less sur
prising appears such conduct In Clay, who was
constantly worked upon by the interests and anx
ieties of the slaveholding community In which he
had his home, and who was a natural compromiser,
because his very nature was a compromise.
His four years' service as secretary of state
formed on the whole an unhappy period in Clay's
life. Although many of his state papers testify
by their vigor and briUIancy to the zest with which
they were worked out, — even the cool-headed
Gallatin recognized that Clay had "vastly im-

308 HENRY CLAY
proved since 1814," — yet the office labor, with its
constant confinement, grew irksome to him. Here
was a Uon in a cage. His health suffered seri
ously. He seemed to be in danger of paralysis,
and several times he himself became so alarmed
that he could only with difficulty be persuaded by
President Adams to remain in office. It was be
lieved by his friends, and it Is very probable, that
the war of vlUficatlon waged against him had
something to do with his physical ailment. There
is abundance of evidence to prove that he felt
deeply the assaults upon his character. The mere
fact that anybody wiU dare to represent him as
capable of dishonorable practices is a stinging
humiliation to a proud man. There is refuge In
contempt, but also the necessity of despising any
one is distressing to a generous nature.
Moreover, the feeling grew upon him that he
had after aU made a great mistake in accepting
the secretaryship of state in the Adams adminis
tration. He became painfuUy aware that this
acceptance had given color to the "bargain and
corruption " charge. It kept him busy year after
year. In dreary iteration, at the humiliating task
of proving that he was an honest man ; while, had
he not accepted, he might have remained In Con
gress, the most formidable power in debate, lead
ing a host of enthusiastic friends, and defying his
enemies to meet him face to face. Thus for the
secretaryship of state he felt that he had given up
his active leadership on the field where he was

SECRETARY OF STATE 309
strongest; and that secretaryship, far from being
to him a stepping-stone to the presidency, had
become the most serious stumbling-block in his
way. The most agreeable feature of Clay's official
life, aside from his uncommon popularity with the
diplomatic corps, consisted in his personal rela
tions with Mr, Adams, Their daUy intercourse
supplanted the prejudices, which formerly had
prevaUed between them, with a constantly growing
esteem and something like friendship. In 1828
Clay said of Adams, in a letter to Crawford: "I
had fears of Mr, Adams's temper and disposition,
but I must say that they have not been realized,
and I have found in him, since I have been asso
ciated with him in the executive government, as
little to censure or condemn as I could have ex
pected In any man." With chivalrous loyalty
Clay stood by his chief, and Adams gave him his
fuU confidence, Adams's Diary does not mention
a single serious difference of opinion as having
in any manner clouded his relationship with the
secretary during the four years of their official
connection. On several occasions, when Clay's IU
health seemed to make his resignation necessary,
Adams with unusual warmth of feeling expressed
the high value he put upon Clay's services, assur
ing him that it would be extremely difficult to
fiU his place, and earnestly trying to dissuade him
from his purpose. Toward the close of his presi
dential term, Adams offered Clay a place on the

310 HENRY CLAY
bench of the Supreme Court, which Clay declined.
John Quincy Adams probably never spoke with
more fervor of any public man than he spoke of
Clay shortly after the close of his administration,
in answer to an address of a committee of citizens
of New Jersey : —
" Upon him the foulest slanders have been showered.
The Department of State itself was a station which, by
its bestowal, could confer neither profit nor honor upon
him, but upon which he has shed unfading honor by the
manner in which he has discharged its duties. Preju
dice and passion have charged him with obtaining that
office by bargain and corruption. Before you, my fel
low citizens, in the presence of our country and Heaven,
I pronounce that charge totaUy unfounded. As to my
motives for tendering him the Department of State
when I did, let the man who questions them come for
ward. Let him look around among the statesmen and
legislators of the nation and of that day. Let him
then select and name the man whom, by his preeminent
talents, by his splendid services, by his ardent patriot
ism, by his all-embracing pubfic spirit, by his fervid
eloquence in behalf of the rights and Uberties of man
kind, by his long experience in the affairs of the Union,
foreign and domestic, a president of the United States,
intent only upon the honor and welfare of his country,
ought to have preferred to Henry Clay."
These warm words did honor to the man who
spoke them, but the "bargain and corruption"
cry went on nevertheless,
John Quincy Adams, after his crushing defeat.

SECRETARY OF STATE 311
took leave of the presidency with the feeling that
"the sun of his public Ufe had set In the deepest
gloom," He thought of nothing but final retire
ment, not anticipating that the most glorious part
of his career was stiU in store for him. Clay,
too, spoke of retirement. But at the same time he
asked Edward Everett of Massachusetts whether
he thought that, at the next presidential election.
In 1832, the Eastern States could be counted upon
for him, Henry Clay; he would then feel sure of
the Western. Here was the old ambition, ever
dominant and restless, bound to drive him Into
new struggles, and to bring upon him new disap
pointments.

CHAPTER XII
THE PARTY CHIEFS
Under Monroe's presidency the old Federal
party had indeed maintained a local organization
here and there, and filled a few seats in Congress,
but it had even then become extinct as a national
organization. The Republicans were in virtuaUy
undisputed possession of the government. The
"era of good feeling" abounded in personal bick
erings, jealousies of cUques, conflicts of ambition,
and also controversies on matters of pubUc inter
est, but there was no gathering of forces in oppo
site camps on a great scale. In the presidential
canvass of 1824 all the candidates were recognized
as Republicans. It was the election of John
Quincy Adams In the House of Representatives
that brought about the first lasting schism in the
Republican ranks. In Its beginning this schism
appeared to bear an essentiaUy personal character.
The friends of the defeated candidates, of Jackson
and Crawford, with the foUowing of Calhoun,
banded together against the friends of Adams and
Clay. Their original raUying cry was that Jack
son had been wronged, and that the Adams-Clay
administration must be broken down in any event.

THE PARTY CHIEFS 313
whatever policy it might follow. The division
was simply between Jackson men on one side, and
Adams and Clay men on the other.
The two prominent questions of the time, that
of the tariff and that of internal improvements,
were not then In issue between them. There were
strenuous advocates of a high tariff and of Internal
improvements on both sides. Jackson himseK had
in his Coleman letter spoken the language of a
protectionist, and he had voted for several internal
Improvement biUs while he was in the Senate. In
several States he had been voted for as a firm
friend of those two policies. Even during the
whole of Adams's administration, while a furious
opposition was carried on against it, there contin
ued to be much diversity of opinion among Its
assailants on these subjects. In fact the tariff of
1828, the "tariff of abominations," was passed by
Congress, and the strict construction principles
maintained by Madison and Monroe concerning
internal Improvements suffered one defeat after
another, while both Houses were controlled by
majorities hostile to Adams and Clay. The ques
tion of the National Bank was not touched In the
campaign of 1824, nor whUe Adams was president;
nor was there, at the time the opposition started,
any other defined principle or pubUc interest con
spicuously at Issue between him and his opponents ;
for the inaugural address, and the messages in
which Adams took such advanced positions In the
direction of paternal government, did not precede.

314 HENRY CLAY
but followed, the break destined to become a last
ing one.
But it is also true that, whUe the Jackson party,
taken as a whole, was at the beginning in a chaotic
state as to poUtical principles and aims, a large
and important Southern fraction of it graduaUy
rallied upon something like a fixed programme.
At a former period Southern men had been among
the foremost advocates of a protective tariff and
internal improvements. We have seen Calhoun
almost contesting Clay's leadership as to those
objects. The governmental power required. South
erners could at that time contemplate without
terror. But a great change of feeling came over
many of them. The struggle about the admission
of Missouri had produced no open and lasting
party divisions, but It had left in the Southern
mind a lurking sense of danger. The slavehold
ing Interest graduaUy came to understand that
the whole drift of sentiment outside of the slave-
holding commimltles was decidedly hostile to the
peculiar institution; that a waU must be buUt
around slavery for its protection; that state sover
eignty and the strictest construction of the Consti
tution concerning the functions and powers of the
general government were the bulwark of Its safety;
that any sort of Interference with the home affairs
of the slave States, even in the way of iutemal
improvement, would tend to undermine that bul
wark ; that the slave States, owing to their system
of labor, must remain purely agricultural commu-

THE PARTY CHIEFS 315
nities ; that anything enhancing the price of those
things which the agriculturists had to buy would
be injurious to the planter, and that, therefore, a
protective tariff raising the prices of manufactured
goods must be rejected as hostile to the Interests
of the South.
This was a tangible and consistent policy. The
spirit animating it early found an opportunity for
asserting Itself by a partisan demonstration in the
extreme position taken by President Adams In his
first official utterances concerning the necessary
functions of the national government. These ut
terances, which gave the Jackson men a welcome
occasion for raising against Adams the cry of
Federalism, startled many old Republicans of the
Jeffersonian school. This was especially the case
in the South, The reason was not that the North
had been less attached than the South to the cause
of local seK -government. On the contrary, home
rule in its democratic form was more perfectly
developed and more heartily cherished in New
England, with her town-meeting system, than in
the South, where not only a large part of the
population, the negroes, were absolutely excluded
from all participation in seK - government, but
where the aristocratic class of slaveholders enjoyed
Immense advantages of political Influence over the
rest of the whites. But in New England, and in
the North generally, local seK-government was
felt to be perfectly compatible with a vigorous
national authority, while at the South there was

316 HENRY CLAY
constant fear of encroachment, and the assertion
of the home rule principle was, therefore, mainly
directed against the national power. That the
national government had a natural tendency hos
tile to local seK-government was mainly a South
ern idea.
The Southern interest, knowing what it wanted,
compact, vigUant, and represented by able politi
cians, was naturaUy destined to become the lead
ing force in that aggregation of political elements
which, beginning in a mere wild opposition to the
Adams administration, hardened into a poUtical
party. An extensive electioneering machinery,
which was skiUfuUy organized, and used with
great effect in the four years' campaign, beginning
with the election of John Quincy Adams and end
ing with Jackson's election in 1828, continued to
form one of its distinguishing features.
The foUowers of Adams and Clay were, by the
necessities of their situation, driven to organize on
their side. Having been the regidar administra
tion party during Adams's presidency, they became
the regular opposition after Jackson's inaugura
tion. A majority of those who favored a liberal
construction of the constitutional powers of the
general government gathered on that side, inter
spersed, however, with not a few state-rights men.
Among them the protective tariff and the poUcy
of Internal Improvements found most of their ad
vocates. Each of these new parties claimed at first to be

THE PARTY CHIEFS 317
the genuine, orthodox Republican party, but, by
way of distinction, the Jackson men caUed them
selves Democratic Republicans, and the foUowers
of Clay and Adams National Republicans, — ap-
peUatlons which a few years later gave room to
the shorter names of Democrats and Whigs.
These two new political organizations are com
monly assumed to have been mere revivals of the
old Federal and Republican parties. This they
were, however, only in a limited sense. It cer
tainly cannot be said that the Democrats were all
old RepubUcans, and the Nationals all, or nearly
aU, old Federalists. John Quincy Adams himseK
had indeed been a FederaUst; but he had joined
the Republicans during Jefferson's presidency,
when the conflict with England was approaching.
Clay had been a Republican leader from the start,
and most of his foUowers came from the same
ranks. On the other hand, many old Federalists,
who hated Adams on accoimt of what they caUed
his desertion, joined the opposition to his adminis
tration, and then remained with the Democratic
party, in which some of them rose to high places.
As to the antecedents of their members, both new
parties were, therefore, composed of mised ele
ments. They did, indeed, represent two different po
litical tendencies, somewhat corresponding with
those which had divided their predecessors, — one
favoring a more strict, the other a more latitudi
narian, construction of constitutional powers. But

318 HENRY CLAY
this, too, must be taken with a qualification. The
old Republican party, before Jefferson's election
to the presidency, had been terribly excited at the
assumptions of power by the FederaUsts, such as
the AUen and Sedition laws. But when in pos
session of the government, they went fully as
far In that direction as the FederaUsts had done.
Their leaders admitted that they had exceeded
the warrant of the Constitution In the purchase
of Louisiana; and their embargoes, and the laws
and executive measures enforcing them, were, as
encroachments upon local self-government and
individual rights, hardly less objectionable in prin
ciple than the Alien and Sedition laws had been.
But it must be admitted that these things were not
done for the purpose of enlarging the power of the
government, and of encroaching upon home rule
and individual rights. It was therefore with a
seK-satlsfied sense of consistency that they con
tinued to preach, as a matter of doctrine, the most
careful limitation of the central power and the
largest scope of local seK-government. In this
respect the new Democratic party foUowed in their
footsteps. The old Federalists, on the other hand, had
openly declared themselves in favor of a govern
ment strong enough to curb the unruly democracy.
The National Republicans, or Whigs, having in
great part themselves been Jeffersonian RepubU
cans, mostly favored a liberal construction of con
stitutional powers, not with a view to curbing the

THE PARTY CHIEFS 319
unruly democracy, but to other objects, such as
internal improvements, a protective tariff, and a
national bank.
In practice. Indeed, the lines thus more or less
distinctly dividing the two new parties were not
as strictly observed by the members of each as
might have been inferred from the fierce fights
occasionaUy raging between them. Strict con
structionists, when in power, would sometimes
yield to the temptation of stretching the Constitu
tion freely; while latltudinarlans in opposition
would, when convenient to themselves, insist upon
the narrowest interpretation of the fundamental
law. On the whole, however, the new Democratic
party, by its advocacy of the largest local seK-
government and a strict limitation of the central
authority, secured to ItseK the prestige of the
apostolic succession to Jefferson. It placed ItseK
before the people as the true representative of the
genuine old theory of democratic government, as
the popular party, and as the legitimate possessor
of power In the nation. This position It main
tained until thirty years later, when its entangle
ment with slavery caused its downfaU.
The National Republican or Whig party was
led by men who recognized the elevated character
of John Quincy Adams's administration, and who
sustained it against partisan assaults and popular
clamor. They dreaded the rule of an ignorant
and violent military chieftain such as Jackson was
thought to be. They took a lively Interest in the

320 HENRY CLAY
Industrial developments of the times, and thought
that the government, or rather themselves In pos
session of the government, could give those devel
opments more InteUigent Impulse, aid, and direc
tion than the people would do If let alone. They
felt themselves caUed upon to take care of the
people In a larger sense, in a greater variety of
ways, than did statesmen of the Democratic creed.
Thus, while the Democratic party found its princi
pal constituency among the agricultural popula
tion, including the planters in the Southern States,
with all that depended upon them, and among the
poorer and more Ignorant people of the cities,
the National Republicans, or Whigs, recruited
themselves — of course not exclusively, but to a
conspicuous extent — among the mercantile and
industrial classes, and generaUy among the more
educated and stirring In other walks of life. The
Democratic party successfully asserting itseK as
the legitimate administrator of the national power,
the Nationals found themselves consigned, for the
larger part of the time, to the role of a critical
opposition, always striving to get into power, but
succeeding only occasionaUy as a temporary cor
rective. Whenever any members of the majority
party were driven into opposition by its fierce dis
cipline, they found a ready welcome among the
Nationals, who could offer them briUiant company
in an uncommon array of men of talent. The
Whig party was thus admirably fitted for the busi
ness of criticism, and that criticism was directed

THE PARTY CHIEFS 321
not only against the enemy, but not seldom against
itseK, at the expense of harmonious cooperation.
Its victories were mostly fruitless. In point of
drill and discipline It was greatly the Inferior of
its antagonist; nor could It under ordinary circum
stances make up for that deficiency by superior
enthusiasm. It had a tendency In the direction
of selectness, which gave it a distinguished charac
ter, chaUenging the admiration of others as weU
as exciting Its own, but also calculated to limit
its popularity.
There were, then, two political parties again,
and at the same time two party leaders whose
equals — it may be said without exaggeration —
the American people had never seen before, and
have never seen since, excepting Abraham Lin
coln, who, however, was something more than a
party leader. They were, indeed, greatly inferior
to Hamilton in creative statesmanship, and to
Jefferson In the faculty of disseminating ideas,
and of organizing, stimulating, and guiding an
agitation from the closet. But they were much
stronger than either in the power of Inspiring
great masses of followers with enthusiastic per
sonal devotion, of inflaming them for an Idea or
a public measure, of marshaling them for a con
flict, of leading them to victory, or raUying them
after defeat. But while each of them possessed
the magic of leadership in the highest degree. It
would be difficult to find two men more different
In almost aU other respects.

322 HENRY CLAY
Andrew Jackson, when he became president,
was a man of sixty-two. A life of much exposure,
hardship, and excitement, and also lU-health, had
made him appear older than he was. His great
mUitary achievement lay fifteen years back In the
past, and made him the "old hero." He was very
Ignorant. In his youth he had mastered scarcely
the rudiments of education, and he did not possess
that acquisitive inteUectuality which Impels men,
with or without preparation, to search for know
ledge and to store It up. While he had keen
intuitions, he never thoroughly understood the
merits of any question of politics or economics.
But his was in the highest degree the Instinct of
a superior wIU, the genius of command. If he
had been on board a vessel in extreme danger, he
would have thundered out his orders without know
ing anything of seamanship, and been Indignantly
surprised if captain and crew had not obeyed him.
At a fire, his voice would have made bystanders
as weU as firemen promptly do his wIU. In war,
he was of course made a general, and without any
knowledge of mUitary science he went out to meet
the enemy, made raw mUitia fight like veterans,
and won the most briUiant victory in the war of
1812. He was not only brave himseK; his mere
presence Infused bravery into others.
To his military heroship he owed that popularity
which lifted him into the presidential chair, and
he carried the spirit of the warrior into the busi
ness of the government. His party was to him

THE PARTY CHIEFS 323
his army; those who opposed him, the enemy.
He knew not how to argue, but how to command;
not how to deliberate, but how to act. He had
that Impulsive energy which always creates dra
matic conflicts, and the power of passion he put
into them made aU his conflicts look tremendous.
When he had been defeated in 1825 by the Influ
ence of Clay, he made it appear as K he were bat
tling against aU the powers of corruption which
were threatening the life of the republic. We
shall see him fight Nicholas Biddle, of the United
States Bank, as if he had to defend the American
people against the combined money power of the
world seeking to enslave them. In rising up
against nullification, and in threatening France
with war to make her pay a debt, we shaU see
him saving the Union from deadly peril, and
humiliating to the dust the insolence of the old
world. Thus he appeared like an Invincible Her
cules constantly meeting terrible monsters danger
ous to the American people, and slaying them aU
with his mighty club.
This fierce energy was his nature. It had a
wonderful fascination for the popular fancy, which
is fond of strong and bold acts. He became the
idol of a large portion of the people to a degree
never known before or since. Their belief was
that with him defeat was Impossible ; that all the
legions of darkness could not prevail against him;
and that, whatever arbitrary powers he might as
sume, and whatever way he might use them, it

324 HENRY CLAY
would always be for the good of the country, —
a belief which he sincerely shared. His ignorance
of the science of statesmanship, and the rough
manner in which he crossed Its rules, seemed to
endear him aU the more to the great mass of his
foUowers. Innumerable anecdotes about his homely
and robust sayings and doings were going from
mouth to mouth, and with delight the common
man felt that this potent ruler was "one of us."
This popularity gave him an Immense authority
over the politicians of his party. He was a warm
friend and a tremendous foe. By a faithful friend
he would stand to the last extremity. But one
who seriously differed from him on any matter
that was near his heart was In great danger of
becoming an object of his wrath. The ordinary
patriot Is apt to regard the enemies of his country
as his personal enemies. But Andrew Jackson
was always inclined, with entire sincerity, to re
gard his personal opponents as the enemies of his
country. He honestly believed them capable of
any baseness, and it was his solemn conviction
that such nuisances must be abated by any power
available for that purpose. The statesmen of his
party frequently differed from him on matters of
public importance; but they knew that they had
to choose between submission and his disfavor.
His friends would sometimes exercise much infiu-
ence upon him In starting his mind in a certain
direction; but when once started, that mind was
beyond their control. His personal integrity was

THE PARTY CHIEFS 325
above the reach of corruption. He always meant
to do right; indeed, he was always firmly con
vinced of being right. His idea of right was not
seldom obscured by Ignorance and prejudice, and
In following It he would sometimes do the most
unjust or dangerous things. But his friends, and
the statesmen of his party, knowing that, when he
had made up his mind, especiaUy on a matter that
had become a subject of conflict between him and
his "enemies," it was absolutely useless to reason
with him, accustomed themselves to obeying orders,
unless they were prepared to go to the rear or into
opposition. It was, therefore, not a mere Inven
tion of the enemy, but sober truth, that, when
Jackson's administration was attacked, sometimes
the only answer left to Its defenders, as weU as
the all-sufficient one with the Democratic masses,
was simply a "Hurrah for Jackson! "
Henry Clay was, although in retirement, the
recognized chief of the National Republicans. He
was then fifty -two years old, and In the fuU matur
ity of his powers. He had never been an arduous
student; but his uncommonly vivacious and recep
tive mind had learned much In the practical school
of affairs. He possessed that magnificent confi
dence In himseK which extorts confidence from
others. He had a full measure of the temper
necessary for leadership: the spirit of initiative;
but not always the discretion that should accom
pany it. His leadership was not of that mean
order which merely contrives to organize a per-

326 HENRY CLAY
sonal foUowing ; It was the leadership of a states
man zealously striving to promote great public
interests. Whenever he appeared In a deUbera-
tive assembly, or in the councils of his party, he
would, as a matter of course, take in his hands
what important business was pending, and deter
mine the policy to be foUowed. His friends, and
some even among his opponents, were so accus
tomed to yield to him, that nothing seemed to
them concluded without the mark of his assent;
and they involuntarUy looked to him for the deci
sive word as to what was to be done. Thus he
grew into a habit of dictation, which occasionaUy
displayed ItseK in a manner of peremptory com
mand, and an intolerance of adverse opinion apt
to provoke resentment.
It was his eloquence that had first made him
famous, and that throughout his career mainly
sustained his leadership. His speeches were not
masterpieces of literary art, nor exhaustive disser
tations. They do not offer to the student any
profound theories of government or expositions of
economic science. They wiU not be quoted as au
thorities on disputed points. Neither were they
strings of witty epigrams. They were the impas
sioned reasoning of a statesman intensely devoted
to bis country and to the cause he thought right.
There was no appearance of artifice In them.
They made every listener feel that the man who
luttered them was tremendously in earnest, and
[that the thoughts he expressed had not only passed

THE PARTY CHIEFS 327
through his brain, but also through his heart.
They were the speeches of a great debater, and,
as may be said of those of Charles James Fox,
cold print could never do them justice. To be
fuUy appreciated they had to be heard on the
theatre of action, in the hushed senate chamber,
or before the eagerly upturned faces of assembled
multitudes. To feel the fuU charm of his lucid
explanations, and his winning persuasiveness, or
the thrUl which was flashed through the nerves of
his hearers by the magnificent sunbursts of his
enthusiasm, or the fierce thunderstorms of his
anger and scorn, one had to hear that musical
voice cajoling, flattering. Inspiring, overawing,
terrifying in turn, — a voice to the cadences of
which it was a physical delight to listen; one had
to see that face, not handsome, but glowing with
the fire of inspiration ; that lofty mien, that com
manding stature constantly growing under his
words, and the grand sweep of his gesture, majes
tic in its dignity, and fuU of grace and strength,
— the whole man a superior being while he spoke.
Survivors of his time, who heard bun at his
best, teU us of the effects produced by his great
appeals In the House of Representatives or the
Senate, the gaUerles trembling with excitement,
and even the members unable to contain them
selves; or, in popular assemblies, the multitudes
breathlessly listening, and then breaking out in
unearthly shouts of enthusiasm and delight, weep
ing and laughing, and rushing up to him with

328 HENRY CLAY
overwhelming demonstrations of admiring and af
fectionate rapture.
Clay's oratory sometimes fairly paralyzed his
opponents. A story Is told that Tom MarshaU,
himseK a speaker of uncommon power, was once
selected to answer Clay at a mass meeting, but
that he was observed, while Clay was proceeding,
slowly to make his way back through the listening
crowd, apparently anxious to escape. Some of
his friends tried to hold him, saying: "Why, Mr.
MarshaU, where are you going ? You must reply
to Mr. Clay. You can easily answer aU he has
said." "Of course, I can answer every point,"
said MarshaU, "but you must excuse me, gentle
men; I cannot go up there and do it just now,
after his speech."
There was a manly, fearless frankness in the
avowal of his opinions, and a knightly spirit in
his defense of them, as weU as in his attacks on
his opponents. He was indeed, on the political
field, the preux chevalier, marshaling his hosts,
sounding his bugle blasts, and plunging first into
the fight; and with proud admiration his foUowers
caUed him "the gallant Harry of the West."
No less briUiant and attractive was he in his
social Intercourse with men; thoroughly human in
his whole being; f uU of high spirits; fond of en
joying Ufe and of seeing others happy; generous
and hearty in his sympathies; always courteous,
sometimes studiously and elaborately so, perhaps
beyond what the occasion seemed to caU for, but

THE PARTY CHIEFS 329
never wounding the most sensitive by demonstra
tive condescension, because there was a truly kind
heart behind his courtesy; possessing a natural
charm of conversation and manner so captivating
that neither scholar nor backwoodsman could with
stand Its fascination; making friends wherever he
appeared, and holding them — and surely to no
public man did friends ever cling with more affec
tionate attachment. It was not a mere political,
it was a sentimental devotion, — a devotion aban
doning even that criticism which is the duty of
friendship, and forgetting or excusing aU his weak
nesses and faults, inteUectual and moral, — more
than was good for him.
Behind him he had also the powerful support
of the industrial interests of the coimtry, which
saw In him their champion, while the perfect in
tegrity of his character forbade the suspicion that
this championship was serving his private gain.
Such were the leaders of the two parties as they
then stood before the country, — individualities so
pronounced and conspicuous, commanders so faith-
fuUy sustained by their foUowers, that, while they
were facing each other, the contests of parties
appeared almost like a protracted political duel
between two men. It was a struggle of singular
dramatic Interest.
There was no fiercer hater than Andrew Jackson,
and no man whom he hated so fiercely as he did
Henry Clay. That hatred was the passion of the
last twenty years of his IKe. He sincerely deemed

330 HENRY CLAY
Clay capable of any vUlainy, and no sooner had
he the executive power in his hands than he used
it to open hostUities. His cabinet appointments
were determined upon several days before his in
auguration as president. Five of the places were
fiUed with men who had made their mark as ene
mies of Clay. Among these were two senators
who in 1825 had voted against the nomination of
Clay for the secretaryship of state, — Branch of
North CaroUna, whom Jackson made secretary of
the navy, and Berrien, who became attorney-gen
eral. Eaton of Tennessee, whom Jackson selected
as his secretary of war, was the principal author
of the "bargain and corruption" story; and Ing
ham of Pennsylvania, the elect for the Treasury
Department, had distinguished himseK in his State
by the most zealous propagation of the slander.
Barry of Kentucky, chosen for the postmaster-
generalship, possessed the merit of having turned
against Clay in 1825, on account of the "bargain
and corruption," and of having contested Ken
tucky in 1828 as the anti-Clay candidate for gov
ernor. But the most striking exhibition of animosity
took place in the State Department, at the head
of which had stood Clay himseK so long as John
Quincy Adams was president. General Jackson
had selected Martin Van Buren for that office;
but Van Buren, being then governor of New York,
could not at once come to Washington to enter
upon his new position. Jackson was determined

THE PARTY CHIEFS 331
that the State Department should not remain In
any sense under the Clay influence for so much as
an hour after he became president. On March 4,
just before he went to the Capitol to take the oath
of office, he put into the hands of Colonel James
A. Hamilton of New York, his trusted adherent,
a letter running thus : " Sir, — You are appointed
to take charge of the Department of State, and to
perform the duties of that office until Governor
Van Buren arrives In this city. Your obedient
servant, Andrew Jackson." A strange proceed
ing! Colonel Hamilton's account of what then
took place is characteristic: "He (General Jack
son) said, ' Colonel, you don't care to see me in
augurated? ' ' Yes, general, I do; I came here
for that purpose.' 'No; go to the State House,
and as soon as you hear the gun fired, I am presi
dent and you are secretary. Go and take charge
of the department. ' I do not state the reason he
gave for this haste." Colonel HamUton did as
directed, and the moment the gun was fired, the
danger that Clay might stIU exercise any influence
in the State Department was averted from the
country. The removal of Clay's friends who
were in the public service began at once.
Three days after Jackson's inauguration Clay
addressed his friends at a dinner given in his honor
by citizens of Washington. He deplored the elec
tion to the presidency of a miUtary hero, entirely
devoid of the elements of fitness for so difficult a
civil position. He beheld in It "an awful forebod-

332 HENRY CLAY
ing of the fate which, at some future day, was to
befall this infant repubUc." He recounted the
miUtary usurpations which had recently taken place
in South and Central America, and said: "The
thimders from the surrounding forts and the accla
mations of the multitude on the Fourth, told us
what general was at the head of our affairs." And
he added, sadly: "A majority of my feUow citi
zens, it would seem, do not perceive the dangers
which I apprehend from the example." He also
mentioned the "wanton, unprovoked, and unatoned
injustice " "which General Jackson had done him.
Nevertheless, Jackson was now president, and his
acts were to be discussed with decorum, and judged
with candor.
Clay was mistaken K he thought that the weU-
used refrain about tbe miUtary chieftain raised to
the presidency without any of the statesman's
qualifications would stiU produce any effect upon
the masses of the American people. They felt, at
that period, exceedingly prosperous and hopeful.
The improved means of communication — all the
accessible inland waters being covered with steam
boats — had greatly promoted the material pro
gress of the country. Railroad buUding had just
begun, and opened a vast prospect of further de
velopment. In the pubUc mind there was Uttle
anxiety and plenty of gorgeous expectation. Un
der such circumstances the generality of people
did not feel the necessity of being taken care of
by trained statesmanship. On the contrary, the

THE PARTY CHIEFS 333
only alarm of the time — and that an artificial and
groundless one — had been that the trained states
men were in corrupt combination to curtail in
some way the people's rights, from which danger
the election of General Jackson was supposed to
have saved them. The masses saw In him a man
who thought as they thought, who talked as they
talked, who was believed to be rather fond of
treading on the toes of aristocratic pretensions,
who was a living proof of the fact that It did not
require much learning to make a famous general
or to be elected president, and whose example,
therefore, assured them that every one of them
had a chance at high distinction for himseK.
But President Jackson soon furnished a new
point of attack. For the first time in the history
of the repubUc, the accession of a new president
was foUowed by a systematic proscription for opin
ion's sake in the public service. What we under
stand by " spoils politics " had. Indeed, not been
unknown before. It had been practiced largely
and with demoralizing effect in the state politics
of New York and Pennsylvania. But by the pa
triotic statesmen who fiUed the presidential chair
from the establishment of the Constitution down/
to the close of the term of John Quincy Adams,
pubUc office had been scrupulously regarded as a
public trust. Removals by wholesale for political'
reasons, or the turning over of the public service
to the members of one party as a reward for par
tisan services rendered, or as an inducement for

334 HENRY CLAY
partisan services to be rendered, would have been
thought, during the first haK century of the repub
Uc, not only a scandal and a disgrace, but Uttle
less than a criminal attempt to overthrow free in
stitutions. Even when, after a fierce struggle,
the government passed, by the election of Jeffer
son, from the Federalists to the RepubUcans, and
the new president found the bulk of the offices In
the hands of men whom the victors considered
inimical to aU they held dear, — even at that period
of intense party feeling, Jefferson made only thirty-
nine removals in the eight years during which he
occupied the presidential chair. Some of these
were made for cause ; others he justified upon the
ground, not that the offices were patronage which
the victors could rightly claim, but that there
should be members of each party In the service, to
show that neither had, even temporarUy, a mono
poly right to them, and that, this fair distribution
being accomplished, appointments should there
after, regardless of party connection, depend ex
clusively on the candidate's integrity, business
fitness, and fidelity to the Constitution. This
sentiment was so firmly rooted in the pubUc mind
that even Jackson, at the beginning of Monroe's
administration, advised the president against ex
cluding from office members of the opposite party.
When he himseK became president he announced
) in his inaugural address that the popular wiU had
'Imposed upon him "the task of reform," which
would require "particularly the correction of those

THE PARTY CHIEFS 335
abuses that have brought the patronage of the
federal government into conflict with the freedom
of elections." Never was the word "reform" ut
tered with a more sinister meaning. An immense
multitude had assembled in Washington to see
their party chief Invested with the executive power,
and to claim their rewards for the services they
had rendered him. It was as K a victorious army
had come to take possession of a conquered coun
try, expecting their general to distribute among
them the spoil of the land. A spectacle was
enacted never before known in the capital of the
republic. Jackson had not that reason for making partisan
changes which had existed in Jefferson's days.
For when Jackson became president the civil ser
vice was teeming with his adherents, whom John
Quincy Adams's scrupulous observance of the tra
ditional principle had left undisturbed In their
places. There was, therefore, no party monopoly
in the public service to be broken up. Yet now
removals and appointments were made with the
avowed object of rewarding friends and punishing
opponents, to the end of establishing, as to the
offices of the government, a monopoly in favor
of the president's partisans. Washington, John
Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy
Adams had made in all seventy-four removals, aU
but a few for cause, during the forty years of their
aggregate presidential terms. In one year, the
first of his administration, Jackson removed four

336 HENRY CLAY
hundred and ninety -one postmasters and two hun
dred and thirty-nine other officers, and, since the
new men appointed new clerks and other subordi
nates, the sum total of changes in that year was
reckoned at more than two thousand. The first
arbitrary dismissals of meritorious men indicated
what was to come, and threw the service into the
utmost consternation. "Among the official corps
here," wrote Clay on March 12, the day before
his departure from Washington, "there is the
greatest solicitude and apprehension. The mem
bers of it feel something like the inhabitants of
Cairo when the plague breaks out : no one knows
who Is next to encounter the stroke of death, or,
which with many of them is the same thing, to be
dismissed from office. You have no conception
of the moral tyranny which prevails here over
those In employment." Bad as this appeared, it
was not the worst of it. The "spoUs system,"
fuU fledged, had taken possession of the national
government, and, as we shaU see, its most baneful
effects were soon to appear.
Clay foresaw the consequences clearly, and, at
a great public feast given to him by his neighbors
upon his arrival at his home, he promptly raised
his voice against the noxious innovation. This
principle he laid down as his starting-point : " Gov
ernment is a trust, and the officers of the govern
ment are trustees; and both the trust and the
trustees are created for the benefit of the people."
In solemn words of prophecy he painted the effects

THE PARTY CHIEFS 337
which the systematic violation of this principle,
inaugurated by Jackson, must inevitably bring
about : political contests turned into scrambles for
plunder; a "system of universal rapacity" substi
tuted for a system of responsibility; favoritism
for fitness; "Congress corrupted, the press cor
rupted, general corruption; until, the substance
of free government having disappeared, some pre-
torlan band would arise, and, with the general
concurrence of a distracted people, put an end to
useless forms." This was the protest of the good
old order of things against the new disorder.
Such warnings, however, were in vain. They
might move impartiaUy thinking men to serious
reflections. But Jackson was convinced that the
political opponents he dismissed from office were
reaUy very dangerous persons, whom It was a
patriotic duty to render harmless; and the Demo
cratic masses thought that Jackson could do no
wrong. Many of them found something peculiarly
flattering in this new conception of democratic
government, that neither high character nor special
ability, but only political opinions of the right
kind, should be required to flt an American citi
zen for the service of his country; that, while
none but a good accountant would be accepted to
keep the books of a dry-goods shop, anybody
might keep the books of the United States Trea
sury ; that, while nobody would think of taking as
manager of an Importing business a man who did
not know something of merchandise, anybody

338 HENRY CLAY
was good enough to be an appraiser in a custom
house. Indeed, the manner in which Jackson selected
his cabinet was characteristic of the ruling idea.
Colonel James A, Hamilton, one of his confiden
tial friends at that time, tells us In his "Reminis
cences:" "In this important work by President
Jackson, no thought appeared to be given as to
the fitness of the persons for their places. I am
sure I never heard one word In relation thereto,
and I certainly had repeated conversations with
him In regard to these appointments." To be a
good hater of Henry Clay was considered a greater
requisite for a cabinet place than statesmanUke
abiUty and experience. In this way Jackson col
lected in his executive chamber, with the exception
of one or two, a rare assortment of mediocrities;
and nothing could have been more characteristic
than that the matter which most distracted this
high councU of statesmen was a difference of opin
ion concerning — not some important pubUc ques
tion, but the virtue of Secretary Eaton's wife.
The principle that the fitness of a man for a place,
in point of character and acquirements, had nothing
to do with his appointment to that place, was at
once recognized and exempUfied above and below;
and thus a virus was Infused Into the politics of
the nation, destined to test to the utmost the native
robustness of the American character.
Clay was nominaUy In retirement. When, after
his return from Washington, the representative of

THE PARTY CHIEFS 339
his district in Congress offered to vacate the seat
in order that he might succeed to it, he declined.
Neither would he accept a place in the legislature
of Kentucky. For a whUe he heartily enjoyed
the quiet Ufe of the farmer. He delighted In
raising fine animals, — horses, blood cattle, mules,
pigs, and sheep. He corresponded with his friends
about a lot of "fifty full-blooded merino ewes,"
which he had bought In Pennsylvania. His dairy
was profitably managed by his exceUent wKe.
He raised good crops of hemp and corn. But,
after aU, the larger part of his correspondence
ran on congressional elections, the prospects of his
party, and the doings of President Jackson. He
thought that Jackson could not possibly hold his
foUowing together, Jackson's friends In Congress
"must decide on certain leading measures of pol
icy;" If he came out for the tariff, the South
would leave him ; if against the tariff, there would
be " such an opposition to him in the tariff States
as must prevent his reelection," — in aU which
prophesyings the prophet proved mistaken. He
also believed that the great majority at the last
election was directed rather against Mr. Adams
than against himseK, and that his own public posi
tion was improving from day to day.
After the great defeat of 1828 the plaudits of
the multitude were especiaUy sweet to him. On
his way from Washington to Lexington in March,
he had been received everywhere by crowds of
enthusiastic admirers. With profound compla-

340 HENRY CLAY
cency he wrote to a friend: "My journey has been
marked by every token of attachment and heartfelt
demonstrations. I never experienced more testi
monies of respect and confidence, nor more enthu
siasm, — dinners, suppers, baUs, etc. I have had
literaUy a free passage. Taverns, stages, toU
gates, have been generaUy thrown open to me,
free from aU charge. Monarchs might be proud
of the reception with which I have everywhere
been honored."
After a short period of rest at Ashland, he could
not withhold himseK from fresh contact with the
people. During the autumn of 1829 he visited
several places In Kentucky ; and in January, 1830,
he went to New Orleans and the principal towns
on the Mississippi, where he had one ovation after
another. In the spring he wrote to his friends
again about the delights of his rural occupations,
— how he was almost "prepared to renounce for
ever the strifes of public IKe," and how he thought
he would make "a better farmer than statesman."
But in the summer of the same year we find him
at Columbus, Cincinnati, and other places In Ohio,
being "received" and feasted, and speaking as he
went. It was "private business" that led him
there, but private business weU seasoned with
politics, and accompanied with brass bands and
thundering cannon. In an elaborate speech on
the questions of the day, which he delivered at
Cincinnati in August, 1830, he could not refrain
from describing his experiences.

THE PARTY CHIEFS 341
" Throughout my journey (he said), undertaken solely
for private purposes, there has been a constant effort on
my side to repress, and on that of my feUow citizens of
Ohio to exhibit, pubUc manifestations of their affection
and confidence. It has been marked by a succession of
civil triumphs. I have been escorted from village to
viUage, and have everywhere found myself surrounded
by large concourses of my feUow citizens, often of both
sexes, greeting and welcoming me."
No wonder that his sanguine nature was inspired
with new hope, and that he felt himseK to be the
man who could raUy the defeated hosts, and over
throw the "military chieftain" with aU his "pre-
torian bands."
He was certainly not alone in thinking so. It
began to be looked upon as a matter of course
among the National Republicans that Clay would
be their candidate against Jackson in 1832. On
May 29, 1830, Daniel Webster wrote to him:
"You are necessarUy at the head of one party,
and General Jackson wiU be, K he Is not already,
identified with the other. The question wiU be
put to the country. Let the country decide it."
But In the mean time a curious movement had
sprung up, dividing the opposition of which Clay
was the head. It was the Anti-Masonic move
ment. In 1826 one Captain WUlIam Morgan, a
bricklayer living at Batavia, in western New York,
undertook to write a book revealing the secrets of
Freemasonry. Some Freemasons of the neighbor
hood sought to persuade and then to force him, by

342 HENRY CLAY
aU sorts of chicanery, to give up his design, but
without success. He was then abducted, and, as
was widely beUeved, murdered. The crime was
charged upon some fanatical Freemasons; but the
whole order was accused of countenancing It, and
was held responsible for obstructing the course of
justice on the occasion of the investigations and
trials which foUowed. The excitement springing
from these occurrences, at first confined to one or
two counties in western New York, graduaUy
spread, and grew into a crusade against secret
societies bound together by oaths. In spite of the
efforts of leading politicians to restrain it, — for
they feared its disorganizing influence, — it soon
assumed a political character, and then some of
them vigorously turned it to their advantage. Be
ginning with a few country towns where the citi
zens organized for the exclusion of all Freemasons
from office, the "Anti-Masons" rapidly extended
their organizations over the western haK of the
State. Committees were formed, conventions were
held, and not a few men of standing and influence
took an active part in the movement. In 1828,
when Adams and Jackson were the presidential
candidates, the Anti-Masons were mostly on the
side of Adams; while the Masons generaUy raUied
under Jackson's flag, who was himseK a Mason.
The Anti-Masons, however, refusing to support
the candidate of the National Republicans for the
governorship of New York, made a nomination of
their own for that office. The result was the elec-

THE PARTY CHIEFS 343
tion of the Jackson candidate, Martin Van Buren.
But from the large vote poUed by the Anti-Masons
it appeared that In the state election the balance
of power had been In their hands. They also
elected many members of the legislature, and se
cured a representation In Congress. Thus encour
aged, the movement invaded the Western Reserve
of Ohio, and won many adherents in Vermont,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
Indiana. It had its newspaper organs and a
"Review," and presently it was prepared to con
test a presidential election as a "party."
Clay had many friends among the Anti-Masons
who would have been glad to obtain from him
some declaration of sentiment favorable to their
cause, in order to make possible a union of forces.
But he gave them no encouragement. To the
many private entreaties addressed to him he uni
formly repUed that he did not desire to make
himseK a party to that dispute; that, although he
had been initiated In the order, he had long ceased
to be a member of any lodge; that he had never
acted, either in private or in pubUc life, under
any Masonic influence, but that Masonry or Anti-
Masonry had in his opinion nothing to do with
politics. He beUeved that, if the Anti-Masons were seri
ously thinking of nominating a candidate of their
own for the presidency, they would not find a man
of weight wlUing to stand, and that the bulk of
the Anti-Masonic forces would drift over to him-

344 HENRY CLAY
seK. In this expectation he was disappointed.
The Anti-Masons held a national convention at
Baltimore in September, 1831, which nominated
for the presidency WUUam Wirt, late attorney-
general under Monroe and John Quincy Adams;
and for the vice-presidency, Amos Ellmaker of
Pennsylvania. Wirt was at heart in favor of
Clay's election, but, having once accepted the
Anti-Masonic nomination, he found it impossible
to withdraw from the field. Some of the leading
Anti-Masons indulged in the hope that Clay him
seK might be prevaUed upon to give up his can
didacy, and permit the whole opposition to the
Jackson regime to be united under Anti-Masoitic
auspices. Far from entertaining such a proposi
tion, he declared, with sharp emphasis, in a public
letter to a committee of citizens of Indiana, that
the Constitution did not give the general govern
ment the sUghtest power to interfere with the
subject of Freemasonry, and that he thought the
presidential office should be fiUed by one who was
capable, "unswayed by sectarian feelings or pas
sions, of administering its high duties ImpartiaUy
towards the whole people, however divided into
reUgious, social, benevolent, or Uterary associa
tions," He felt so strongly on this point that he wrote
to his friend Brooke: "If the alternative be be
tween Andrew Jackson and an AntI -Masonic can
didate, with his exclusive prescriptive principles,
I should be embarrassed in the choice, I am not

THE PARTY CHIEFS 345
sure that the old tyranny Is not better than the
new." It is not surprising that he, with many
others, should have underestimated the strength
of the movement. We find it now hard to believe
that men of good sense should have seriously
thought of making the question of Freemasonry
the principal Issue of a national contest upon
which the American people were to divide. But
we meet among those who were prominently en
gaged in that enterprise such names as WiUiam
H. Seward, Thurlow Weed, Francis Granger,
Thaddeus Stevens, Richard Rush, and WiUiam
Wirt, two of Clay's coUeagues in Adams's cabi
net, and even John Quincy Adams himseK. In
deed, whUe Clay would have been loath to choose
between Jackson and an Anti-Masonic candidate,
Adams gravely wrote in his Diary: "The dissolu
tion of the Masonic institution in the United
States I beUeve to be reaUy more Important to us
and our posterity than the question whether Mr.
Clay or General Jackson shaU be the president
chosen at the next election." The Anti-Masonic
movement furnished a curious example of mental
contagion. But odd as it was, it kept the opposi
tion to Jackson divided.
Many things had in the mean time occurred
which created a loud demand for Clay's personal
presence and leadership on the theatre of action at
the national capital. President Jackson, treating
the members of his cabinet more as executive
clerks than as poUtical advisers, and dispensing

346 HENRY CLAY
with regular cabinet meetings, had surrounded
himseK with the famous "kitchen cabinet," a
Uttle coterie of intimates, from whom he largely
received his political Inspirations and advice, —
a secret councU of state, withdrawn entirely from
pubUc responsIbiUty, consisting of able, crafty,
personaUy honest men, skillful politicians, cour
ageous to audacity, and thoroughly devoted to
General Jackson. The members of this secret
councU were William B. Lewis from Tennessee,
one of Jackson's warmest home friends; Isaac
HUl of New Hampshire; Amos KendaU, who was
employed in the Treasury; and Duff Green, the
editor of Jackson's first newspaper organ. He
feU from grace as being a friend of Calhoun, and
was supplanted by Francis P. Blair. KendaU
and Blair had been joumaUsts in Kentucky, and
near friends of Henry Clay, but had turned against
him mainly in consequence of the so-caUed "re
Uef" movement in that State, which, as already
mentioned, was one of those epidemic infatuations
which make people believe that they can get rid
of their debts and become rich by legislative tricks
and the issue of promises to pay. The movement
developed Intense hostility to the Bank of the
United States. There had been personal disputes,
too, between Clay and KendaU, engendering much
iU feeling. The existence and known influence
of the kitchen cabinet kept the poUtical world in
constantly strained expectation as to what would
turn up next.

THE PARTY CHIEFS 347
The "Globe" newspaper had been estabUshed,
with Francis P, Blair in the editorial chair, as
President Jackson's organ, to direct and discipline
his own party, and to castigate its opponents.
In his first message to Congress, in December,
1829, President Jackson had thrown out threaten
ing hints as to the policy of re-chartering the Bank
of the United States, the charter of which would
expire in 1836 ; and In the message of 1830 those
threats were repeated. The approaching extinc
tion of the national debt rendering a reduction of
the revenue necessary, there was much apprehen
sion as to what the fate of the protective tariff
would be. Large meetings of free-traders as well
as of protectionists were held to influence legisla
tion. President Jackson had vetoed the "MarysvIUe
Bead BiU," and thereby declared his hostUity to
the poUcy of internal improvements. With regard
to the proceedings of the State of Georgia against
the Cherokees, President Jackson had submitted
to the extreme state-sovereignty pretensions of the
State, in disregard — It might be said, In defiance
— of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
A great commotion had arisen in South Caro
lina against the tariff laws, leading to the promul
gation of the doctrine that any single State had
the power to declare a law of the United States
unconstitutional, void, and not binding, — the so-
caUed nuUification theory. Webster had thrilled

348 HENRY CLAY
the country with his celebrated plea for Liberty
and Union ia his reply to Hayne, winning a
"noble triumph," as Clay caUed it in a letter.
Jackson had, at a banquet on Jefferson's birthday,
in April, 1830, given an Indication of the spirit
aroused in him, by offering the famous toast,
"Our Federal Union: it must be preserved."
Jackson had declared hostUities against Vice-
President Calhoim in consequence of the discovery
that Calhoun, as a member of Monroe's cabinet,
had condemned Jackson's proceedings In the Sem
inole war of 1818. In June, 1831, the whole
cabinet had resigned, or rather been compelled to
resign, mainly for the purpose of eliminating from
the administration Calhoun's friends, and a new
cabinet had been appointed, in which Edward
Livingston was secretary of state; Louis McLane
of Delaware, secretary of the treasury ; Roger B.
Taney, attorney -general; and Levi Woodbury,
secretary of the navy; the Post Office Department
remaining in Barry's hands.
The kitchen cabinet had elicited demonstra
tions from the legislature of Pennsylvania, subse
quently indorsed by that of New York, caUIng
upon General Jackson to stand for a second term,
notwithstanding his previous declarations in favor
of the one-term principle, and it was generaUy un
derstood that he would do so.
All these occurrences, added to the impression
that In the President and his confidential advisers
there was to be dealt with a force yet undefined

THE PARTY CHIEFS 349
and beyond the ordinary rules of calculation, pro
duced among the opposition party a singular feel
ing of Insecurity. They looked for a strong man
to lead them; they wanted to hear Clay's voice
in Congress; and it Is characteristic that Daniel
Webster, who had just then reached the zenith of
his glory, and was by far the first man In the Sen
ate, should have given the most emphatic expres
sion to that anxiety for energetic leadership. " You
must be aware," he wrote to Clay from Boston on
October 5, 1831, "of the strong desire manifested
In many parts of the coimtry that you should come
into the Senate: the wish is entertained here as
earnestly as anywhere. We are to have an inter
esting and arduous session. Everything is to be
attacked. An array is preparing much more for
midable than has ever yet assaulted what we think
the leading and Important public interests. Not
only the tariff, but the Constitution ItseK, in its
elementary and fundamental provisions, wiU be
assaUed with talent, vigor, and union. Every
thing is to be debated as if nothing had ever been
settled. It would be an infinite gratification to
me to have your aid, or rather your lead. I know
nothing so likely to be useful. Everything valu
able in the government Is to be fought for, and
we need your arm in the fight."
Clay was reluctant to yield to these entreaties.
His instinct probably told him that for a presi
dential candidate the Senate Is not a safe place,
especiaUy whUe the canvass is going on. But he

350 HENRY CLAY
obeyed the caU of his friends, which at the same
time appeared to be the caU of the public interest.
When It became known that he would be a candi
date for the Senate of the United States before the
Kentucky legislature, the Washington "Globe,"
President Jackson's organ, opened its batteries
with characteristic fury. Commenting upon tHe
fact that Clay attended the legislature in person,
and forgetting that his competitor, Richard M.
Johnson, the Jackson candidate, did the same, the
"Globe" spoke thus: —
" If under these circumstances Mr. Clay should come
to the Senate, he wUl but consummate his ruin. He wiU
stand in that body, not as the representative of Ken
tucky, but of a few base men rendered infamous in elect
ing him. He wiU no longer represent his countrymen ;
but, like an Irish patriot, become an EngUsh pensioner,
he will represent an odious oUgarchy, and, owing his sta
tion altogether to chicane and management, he will be
stripped of the dignity of his character, and graduaUy
sink into insignificance."
Nevertheless Clay was elected, but only by a
smaU majority. Thus he entered upon his senato
rial career, more heartUy welcomed by his friends,
and more bitterly hated by his enemies, than ever
before.

CHAPTER Xin
THE CAMPAIGN OP 1832
Henry Clay appeared in Washington at the
opening of Congress in December, 1831, in the
double character of senator and candidate for the
presidency. It was at that period that the method
of putting presidential candidates in the field by
national conventions of party delegates found gen
eral adoption. The Anti-Masons had held their
national convention in September. The National
Republicans were to follow on December 12. That
Henry Clay would be their candidate for the
presidency was a foregone conclusion. Nobody
appeared as a competitor for the honor. But it
remained stiU to be determined what issues should
be put prominently forward in the canvass. On
this point the opinion of the recognized leader was
naturaUy decisive. As a matter of course, a pro
tective tariff and internal improvements, and an
emphatic condemnation of the "spoils system,"
would form important parts of his programme.
But a grave question turned up, on the treatment
of which his friends seriously differed in opinion.
It was that of the National Bank. The existing
Bank of the United States had been created, with

352 HENRY CLAY
Clay's help, in 1816. Its charter was to run for
twenty years, and would therefore expire in 1836.
In order to understand how the re-chartering of
that bank became a burning question In 1831, a
short retrospect Is necessary.
When President Jackson came into office the
country was In a prosperous condition. There was
little speculation, but business in aU directions
showed a healthy activity, and yielded good re
turns. The currency troubles, which had long
been disturbing the country, especially the South
and West, were over. The "circulating medium "
was more uniform and trustworthy, and, on the
whole, in a more satisfactory condition than It
ever had been before. The agency of the Bank
of the United States In bringing about these re
sults was generally recognized. In the first two
years after its establishment the bank had been
badly managed. But Langdon Cheves, appointed
its president in 1819, put the conduct of its busi
ness upon a solid footing, and thereafter it con
tinued steadUy to grow in the confidence of the
business community. No serious difficulty was
therefore anticipated as to the re-chartering; and
as there would be no necessity for final action on
that matter until 1836, three years after the expi
ration of General Jackson's first presidential term,
the public generally expected that any question
about it would be permitted to rest at least until
after the election of 1832.
Great was therefore the surprise when, In his

THE CAMPAIGN OP 1832 353
very first message to Congress, in December,
1829, President Jackson said that, although the
charter of the Bank of the United States would
not expire until 1836, it was time to take up that
subject for grave consideration; that "both the
constitutionality and the expediency of the law
creating the bank were weU questioned by a large
number of our f eUow citizens ; and that it must be
admitted by aU to have failed in the great end of
establishing a uniform and sound currency. " Then
he submitted to the wisdom of the legislature
whether a "national bank, founded upon the credit
of the government and its revenue, might not be
devised." What did aU this mean? People asked
themselves whether the president knew something
about the condition of the bank that the public
did not know, and the bank shares suffered at once
a serious decline at the Exchange.
The true reasons for this hostile demonstration
became known afterwards. Benton's assertion to
the contrary notwithstanding, Jackson had no in
tention to overthrow the United States Bank when
he came to Washington. His secretary of the
treasury, Ingham, complimented the bank on the
valuable services it rendered, several months after
the beginning of the administration. The origin
of the trouble was characteristic. Complaint came
from New Hampshire, through Levi Woodbury,
a senator from that State and a zealous Jackson
Democrat, and through Isaac HUl, a member of
the "kitchen cabinet," that Jeremiah Mason, a

364 HENRY CLAY
Federalist and a friend of Daniel Webster, had
been made president of the branch of the United
States Bank at Portsmouth, and that he was an
unaccommodating person very objectionable to the
people, A correspondence concerning this case
sprang up between Secretary Ingham and Nicholas
Biddle, the president of the Bank of the United
States, a man of much literary ability, who was
rather fond of an argument, and Uked to say
clever things. No impartial man can read the
letters which passed to and fro without coming to
the conclusion that influential men in the Jackson
party desired to use the bank and its branches for
political purposes ; that Biddle wished to maintain
the political independence of the institution, and
that his refusal to do the bidding of politicians
with regard to Jeremiah Mason was bitterly re
sented. It appears, also, from an abundance of
testimony, of which Ingham's confession, published
after he had ceased to be secretary of the treasury,
forms part, that the members of the "kitchen
cabinet" told Jackson aU sorts of stories about
efforts of the bank to use its power in controUing
elections in a manner hostUe to him; that he trust
ingly listened to aU the aUegatlons against it which
reached his ears, and that he at last honestly be
lieved the bank to be a power of evil, corrupt and
corrupting, dangerous to the liberties of the people
and to the existence of the republic.
The first message did not produce on Congress
the desired effect. The President's own party

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 356
failed to stand by him. In the House of Repre
sentatives the Committee of Ways and Means
made a report, affirming, what was weU known,
that the constitutionality of the bank had been
recognized by the Supreme Court, that It was a
useful Institution, and that the establishment of
a bank such as that suggested in the message
would be a dangerous experiment, A sImUar re
port was made in the Senate. In the House, reso
lutions against re-chartering the bank, and caUIng
for a comprehensive report upon its doings, were
defeated by considerable majorities. Bank stock
went up again.
In his second message. In December, 1830,
President Jackson said that nothing had occurred
"to lessen in any degree the dangers " which many
citizens apprehended from the United States Bank
as actuaUy organized. He then suggested the or
ganization of "a bank, with the necessary officers,
as a branch of the Treasury Department," Con
gress did not take action on the matter, but Benton
made his first attack in the Senate on the United
States Bank, not to produce any immediate effect
in Congress, but to stir up the people.
In his third message, in December, 1831, PresI'
dent Jackson simply said that on previous occa
sions he had performed his duty of bringing the
bank question to the attention of the people, and
that there he would "for the present" leave it.
At the same time the secretary of the treasury,
McLane, submitted in his report to Congress an

356 HENRY CLAY
elaborate argument In favor of the United States
Bank. There is much reason for beUeviag that
Jackson at that period was IncUned to accept
some accommodation or compromise concerning
the bank question, or at least not to force a fight
just then. Thurlow Weed, in his "Autobiogra
phy," gives an account of a conference between
the secretary of the treasury and the president of
the bank, in which the assent of the administration
to the re-charter was offered on condition of certain
modifications of the charter. It Is further reported
that the officers of the bank were strongly In favor
of accepting the proposition, but that, when they
consulted Clay and Webster on the matter, they
found determined resistance, to which they yielded.
The officers and the most discreet friends of the
United States Bank felt keenly that a great finan
cial institution, whose operations and interests
were closely interwoven with the general business
of the country, should not become identified with
a political party in aU the vicissitudes of fortune,
and should never permit ItseK to be made the foot
ball of poUtical ambitions. They were strongly
Inclined not to press the re-chartering of the bank
until it should be necessary, and thus to keep the
question out of the presidential campaign.
Clay thought otherwise. As to the time when
the renewal of the charter should be asked for, he
maintained that the present time was the best.
There were undoubted majorities favorable to the
bank in both Houses. If the President should

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 357
defeat the renewal with his veto, he would only ruin
himseK. He had already greatly weakened his
popularity by attacking the bank. It had many
friends in the Jackson party who would stand by
It rather than by the President. Being located in
Philadelphia, the bank wielded great power and
enjoyed great popularity in Pennsylvania, the hot
bed of Jacksonism. Losing that State, Jackson
would lose the election. Moreover, the bank had
a strong hold upon the business interests of the
country everywhere, and everywhere those Inter
ests would support the bank in a decisive strug
gle. The bank issue was therefore the strongest
which the National Republicans could put forward.
That Issue should be made as sharp as possible,
and to give it a practical shape, the renewal of
the charter should be applied for at the present
session of Congress. Such was Clay's reasoning
and advice, or rather his command; and both the
bank and the party obeyed.
On December 12, 1831, the convention of the
National Republicans was held at Baltimore. Clay
was nominated unanimously, and with the greatest
enthusiasm, for the presidency. The nomination
for the vice-presidency feU to John Sergeant of
Pennsylvania, a man of exceUent character, whom
we remember to have met, at the time of the
struggle about the admission of Missouri, as one of
the strongest advocates of the exclusion of slavery.
The convention also issued an address to the peo
ple, which eidoglzed the Bank of the United States,

358 HENRY CLAY
denounced the attack made upon It by President
Jackson in his messages, and declared that, "if
the President be reelected, it may be considered
certain that the bank wIU be abolished." Thus
the Issue was made up : Jackson must be defeated
K the Bank of the United States was to be saved.
The memorial of the bank, praying for a renewal
of its charter, was presented in the Senate early
in January, 1832, to the end of forcing Congress
and the President to act without delay. If it was
Clay's object to make the bank question the most
prominent one In the canvass, he succeeded be
yond expectation ; and if he had cast about for the
greatest blunder possible under the circumstances,
he could not have found a more brilliant one.
This we shall appreciate when, at a later period of
the session, we hear both sides speak.
The first subject which Clay took up for discus
sion in the Senate was the tariff. Two circum
stances of unusual moment had brought this topic
into the foreground : one was the excitement pro
duced by the tariff of 1828, "the tariff of abomi
nations," in the planting States, and especiaUy in
South Carolina, where It had assumed the threat
ening form of the nullification movement; and
the other was the fact that the revenue furnished
by the existing tariff largely exceeded the current
expenditures, and would, after the extinguishment
of the national debt, which was rapidly going for
ward, bring on that bane of good government in
a free country, a heavy surplus in the treasury.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 359
without legitimate employment. A reduction of
the revenue was therefore necessary, and lively
discussions were going on among the people as to
how It should be effected. In September and
October large popular conventions of free-traders
had been held. One of their principal spokesmen
was the venerable Albert GaUatin, who insisted
on lower rates of duties throughout. The protec
tionists, fearing lest the reduction of the revenue
should injure the protective system, were equaUy
vigorous in their demonstrations.
Jackson's views with regard to the tariff had
undergone progressive changes. When first a can
didate for the presidency, in 1824, he had pro
nounced himseK substantiaUy a protectionist. In
his first message to Congress, in 1829, he recom
mended duties which would place our own manu
factures "in fair competition with those of foreign
countries, while, with regard to those of prime
necessity in time of war," we might even "advance
a step beyond that point." He also advocated the
distribution of the surplus revenue among the
States "according to the ratio of representation"
In Congress, and a reduction of duties on articles
"which cannot come into competition with our
own production." This meant a protective tariff.
In his second message, December, 1830, he ex
pressed the opinion that "objects of national im
portance alone ought to be protected; of these the
productions of our soil, our mines, and our work
shops, essential to national defense, occupy the first

360 HENRY CLAY
rank." In his third message, December, 1831, he
invited attention to the fact that the public debt
would be extinguished before the expiration of his
term, and that, therefore, "a modification of the
tariff, which shall produce a reduction of the reve
nue to the wants of the government," was very
advisable. He added that, In justice to the inter
ests of the merchant as weU as the manufacturer,
the reduction should be prospective, and that the
duties should be adjusted with a view "to the
counteraction of foreign policy, so far as It may be
injurious to our national interests." This meant
a revenue tariff with incidental retaliation. He
had thus arrived at a sensible plan to avoid the
accumulation of a surplus.
Clay took the matter in hand in the Senate, or
rather In Congress, for he held a meeting of friends
of protection among senators and representatives
to bring about harmony of action in the two
houses. At that meeting he laid down the law
for his party In a manner, as John Quincy Adams
records, courteous, but "exceedingly peremptory
and dogmatical." He recognized the necessity of
reducing the revenue, but he would reduce the
revenue without reducing protective duties. The
"American system" should not suffer. It must,
therefore, not be done in the manner proposed by
Jackson. He insisted upon confining the reduc
tion to duties on articles not coming Into compe
tition with American products. He would not
make the reductions prospective, to begin after the

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 361
public debt was extinguished, but immediate, as he
was not in favor of a rapid extinguishment of the
debt. Instead of abolishing protective duties, he
would rather reduce the revenue by making some
of them prohibitory. He also insisted upon "home
valuation" — i. e. valuation at the port of entry
— of goods subject to ad valorem duties, and upon
reducing the credits aUowed for their payment.
When objection was made that this would be a
defiance of the South, of the President, and of the
whole administration party, he repUed, as Adams
reports, that "to preserve, maintain, and strengthen
the American system, he would defy the South,
the President, and the devil."
He introduced a resolution in the Senate "that
the existing duties upon articles imported from
foreign countries, and not coming into competition
with similar articles made or produced within the
United States, ought to be forthwith abolished,
except the duties upon wines and silks, and that
those ought to be reduced; and that the Commit
tee on Finance be instructed to report a bUl
accordingly." On this resolution, which led to
a general debate upon the tariff, he made two
speeches, one of which took rank among his great
est efforts. Its eloquent presentation of the weU-
known arguments in favor of protection excited
great admiration at the time, and served the pro
tectionists as a text-book for many years. He de
clared himseK strongly against the preservation of
existing duties "in order to accumulate a surplus

362 HENRY CLAY
in the treasury, for the purpose of subsequent dis
tribution among the several States." To coUect
revenue "from one portion of the people and give
it to another " he pronounced unjust. If the reve
nue were to be distributed for use by the States
in their public expenditure, he knew of no princi
ple in the Constitution "that authorized the federal
government to become such a coUector for the
States, nor of any principle of safety or propriety
which admitted of the States becoming such recip
ients of gratuity from the general government."
He thought, however, that the proceeds of the
sales of public lands should be devoted to internal
improvements. He caUed free trade the "British
colonial system " ia contradistinction to the protec
tive "American system," two names which them
selves did the duty of arguments. He contrasted
the effects of the two systems, using as an IUustra
tion the seven years of distress preceding, and the
seven years of prosperity foUowing, the enactment
of the tariff of 1824, — which drew from Southern
senators the answer that the picture of prosperity
fitted the North, but by no means the South, He
discussed the effect of the tariff on the South in
a kindUer tone than that in which he had spoken
in the meeting of his friends, but he denounced in
strong terms the threats of nullification and dis
union. He said : —
" The great principle, which Ues at the foundation of
aU free government, is that the majority must govern,
from which there can be no appeal but the sword. That

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 363
majority ought to govern wisely, equitably, moderately,
and constitutlonaUy ; but govern it must, subject only to
that terrible appeal. If ever one or several States, being
a minority, can, by menacing a dissolution of the Union,
succeed in forcing an abandonment of great measures
deemed essential to the interests and prosperity of the
whole, the Union from that moment is practicaUy gone.
It may finger on in form and name, but its vital spirit
has fled forever."
This seemed to exclude every thought of com
promise. The efforts of the free-traders to discredit the
"American system," by resolutions, addresses,
and pamphlets against the tariff, annoyed him
greatly; and nothing seems to have stung him
more than a calmly argumentative memorial from
the pen of Albert GaUatin. Only the deepest
irritation can explain the most ungenerous attack
he made upon that venerable statesman in his
great speech. This is the language he appUed to
him: —
" The gentleman to whom I am about to aUude, al
though long a resident in this country, has no feeUngs,
no attachments, no sympathies, no principles, in common
with our people. Nearly fifty years ago Pennsylvania
took him to her bosom, and warmed, and cherished, and
honored him ; and how does he manifest his gfratitude ?
By aiming a vital blow at a system endeared to her by
a thorough conviction that it is indispensable to her
prosperity. He has flUed, at home and abroad, some of
the highest offices under this government, during thirty
years, and he is stiU at heart an aUen. The authority

364 HENRY CLAY
of his name has been invoked, and the labors of his pen
in the form of a memorial to Congress, have been en
gaged, to overthrow the American system, and to substi
tute the foreign. Go home to your native Europe, and
there inculcate upon her sovereigns your Utopian doc
trines of free trade ; and when you have prevaUed upon
them to unseal their ports, and freely to admit the pro
duce of Pennsylvania and other States, come back, and
we shall be prepared to become converts and to adopt
your faith."
This assault was an astonishing performance.
GaUatin had come to America a very young man.
Under the presidency of the first Adams he had
been intellectuaUy the leader of the Republicans
in the House of Representatives. He had been
a member of that famous triumvirate, Jefferson,
Madison, GaUatin. Jefferson had made him sec
retary of the treasury; and Madison, equaUy sen
sible of his merits, had kept him in that most
important position. His services had put his name
In the first line of the great American finance
ministers. Clay had met him as one of his col
leagues at Ghent, and he would hardly have denied
that the conclusion of the treaty of peace was
owing more to GaUatln's prudence, skiU, and
good temper, than to his own efforts. As minis
ter to France under Monroe, GaUatin had added
to his distinguished services by his patriotism and
rare diplomatic ability. When Clay, as secretary
of state, needed a man of peculiar wisdom and
trustworthiness to whom to confide the interests

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 365
of this republic, he had thought first of Gallatin.
It was GaUatin whom he had selected first for the
most American of American missions, that to the
Panama Congress. It was GaUatin whom he had
sent to England after the retirement of Rufus
King, to protect American interests amid uncom
monly tangled circumstances. But now, suddenly,
the same American statesman, not present and
unable to answer, was denounced by him In the
Senate as one who had "no feeUngs, no sympa
thies, no principles, in common with our people,"
as "an aUen at heart," who should "go home to
Europe; " and aU this because Clay found It trou
blesome to answer Gallatin's arguments on the
tariff. GaUatin, during his long career, had much to
suffer on account of his foreign birth. The same
persons who had praised him as a great statesman
and a profound thinker, when he happened to
agree with their views and to serve their purposes,
had not unfrequently, so soon as he expressed
opinions they disliked, denounced him as an imper
tinent foreigner who should "go home." He was
accustomed to such treatment from smaU politi
cians. But to see one of the great men of the
repubUc, and an old friend too, descend so far,
could not fail to pain the septuagenarian deeply.
But the irony of fate furnished a biting com
mentary on Clay's conduct. Scarcely a year after
he had so fiercely denounced GaUatin as "an aUen
at heart " for having recommended a gradual re-

366 HENRY CLAY
duction of tariff duties to a level of about twenty-
five per cent.. Clay himseK, as we shaU see, pro
posed and carried a gradual reduction of duties to
a maximum of twenty per cent., aU the while feel
ing himseK to be a thorough American "at heart."
After a long debate Clay's tariff resolution was
adopted, and in June, 1832, a blU substantiaUy
In accord with it passed both Houses, known as
the tariff act of 1832. It reduced or abolished
the duties on many of the unprotected articles,
but left the protective system without material
change. As a reduction of the revenue It effected
very little. The Income of the government for the
year was about thirty miUions; its expenditures,
exclusive of the public debt, somewhat over thir
teen mUlIons; the prospective surplus, after the
payment of the debt, more than sixteen mUUons.
The reduction proposed by Clay, according to his
own estimate, was not over seven miUions; the
reduction reaUy effected by the new tariff law
scarcely exceeded three mUlions. Clay had saved
the American system at the expense of the very
object contemplated by the measure. It was ex
tremely short-sighted statesmanship. The surplus
was as threatening as ever, and the dissatisfaction
in the South grew from day to day.
One of the important incidents of the session
was the rejection by the Senate of the nomination
of Martin Van Buren as mialster to England.
Van Buren was one of Jackson's favorites. He
had stood by Jackson when other members of the

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 367
cabinet refused to take the presidential view of
Mrs. Eaton's virtue. He had greatly facilitated
that dissolution of the cabinet which Jackson had
much at heart. When he ceased to be secretary
of state, Jackson gave him the mission to England,
holding in reserve higher honors for him. In the
Senate, however, the nomination encountered strong
opposition. With many senators It was a matter
of party politics. The strongest reason avowed
was that, as secretary of state. Van Buren had In
structed the American minister to England to
abandon the claim, urged by the late administra
tion, of a right to the colonial trade, on the express
ground that those who had asserted that right had
been condemned at the last presidential election
by the popular judgment. The opponents of Van
Buren denounced his conduct as a wanton humilia
tion of this repubUc, and a violation of the princi
ple that, in Its foreign relations, the vicissitudes
of party contests should not be paraded as reasons
for a change of policy.
Clay, leading the opposition to Van Buren, found
it not difficult to show that the policy foUowed by
the administration of John Quincy Adams in this
respect was substantiaUy identical with that of
Madison and Monroe, and that, by officiaUy rep
resenting that policy as condemned by the people.
Van Buren had cast discredit upon the conduct
of this repubUc in its intercourse with a foreign
power. But he had stiU another objection to Van
Buren's appointment. He said : —

368 HENRY CLAY
" I befieve, upon circumstances which satisfy my mind,
that to this gentleman is principaUy to be ascribed the
introduction of the odious system of proscription for the
exercise of the elective franchise in the government of
the United States. I understand that it is the system
upon which the party in his own State, of which he is
the reputed head, constantly acts. It is a detestable
system, drawn from the worst periods of the Roman
RepubUc ; and if it were to be perpetuated, — if the
offices, honors, and dignities of the people were to be
put up to a scramble, and to be decided by the result of
every presidential election, — our government and in
stitutions would finaUy end in a despotism as inexorable
as that at Constantinople."
That Van Buren was a "spoUs poUtician" is
undoubtedly true. But that to him "the intro
duction of the odious system " in the general gov
ernment was "principaUy to be ascribed," is not
correct. Jackson was already vigorously at work
"rewarding his friends and punishing his enemies,"
when, a few weeks after the beginning of the ad
ministration. Van Buren arrived at Washington.
Jackson would doubtless have introduced the " spoils
system," with aU its characteristic features, had
Van Buren never been a member of his cabinet.
In the Senate, however. Van Buren's friends did
not defend him on that ground. It was in reply
to Clay's speech that Marcy, speaking for the
poUticians of New York, proclaimed that they saw
"nothing wrong in the rule that to the victors be
long the spoils of the enemy."

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 369
The rejection of Van Buren's nomination was
accomplished by the casting vote of the Vice-Presi
dent, Calhoun, who thought that after such a de
feat Van Buren would "never kick again." Clay
wrote to his friend Brooke : " The attempt to excite
public sympathy in behaK of the ' little magician '
has totaUy failed; and I sincerely wish that he
may be nominated as vice-president. That is ex
actly the point to which I wish to see matters
brought." Clay's wish was to be gratified. The
rejection of Van Buren made it one of the darling
objects of Jackson's heart to revenge him upon his
enemies. He employed his whole power to secure
Van Buren's election to the vice-presidency first,
and to the presidency four years later. Both Clay
and Calhoun had yet to learn what that power was.
The dangers to which a candidate for the presi
dency is exposed, when a member of the Senate,
were strikingly exemplified by a curious trick re
sorted to by Clay's opponents. They managed
to refer the question of reducing the price of the
public lands to the Committee on Manufactures,
of which Clay was the leading member, an ar
rangement on Its very face unnatural. Clay un
derstood at once the object of this unusual proceed
ing. "Whatever emanated from the committee,"
he said, in a speech on the subject, "was likely
to be ascribed to me. If the committee should
propose a measure of great liberality toward the
new States, the old States might complain. If
the measure should lean toward the old States,

370 HENRY CLAY
the new might be dissatisfied. And K It Inclined
to neither class, but recommended a plan accord
ing to which there would be distributed impartial
justice among aU the States, it was far from cer
tain that any would be pleased." However, he
undertook the task, and the result was his report
on the public lands, the principles of which became
for many years a part of the Whig platform.
In 1820 the price of public lands, which had
been $2.00 an acre on credit and $1.64 for cash,
was fixed at $1.25 in cash. The settlement of the
new States and territories had indeed been rapid,
but various plans were devised to accelerate it still
more. One was, that the public lands should be
given to the States; another, that they should be
sold to the States at a price merely nominal;
another, that they should be sold to settlers at
graduated prices, — those which had been in the
market a certain time without finding a purchaser
to be considered "refuse " lands, and to be sold at
greatly reduced rates. These propositions were
advanced by some In good faith for the benefit of
the settlers, but by others for speculative ends.
Benton was the principal advocate of cheap lands,
for reasons no doubt honest. Jackson had never
put forth any definite scheme of land policy; but
McLane, his secretary of the treasury, recom
mended In his report of December, 1831, that the
public lands should be turned over at fair rates to
the several States ia which they were situated,
the proceeds to be distributed among all the States.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 371
Under such circumstances, the subject was re
ferred to Clay's Committee on Manufactures. He
reported that the general government should not
give up Its control of the public lands; that it
would be unjust to the old States If the public
lands were disposed of exclusively for the benefit
of the new States; that the price should not be
reduced; and that the proceeds of the sales, ex
cepting ten per cent, set apart for the new States,
should be distributed among aU the States accord
ing to their federal representative population, to
be applied to the promotion of education, to in
ternal improvements, or to the redemption of any
debt contracted for internal improvements, or to
the colonization of free negroes, as each State
might see fit, — such distribution to take place
only in time of peace, while in time of war the
public land should again become a source of reve
nue to the general government. WhUe condemn
ing the principle of the distribution of surplus
revenue arising from taxation, he defended the
distribution of the proceeds of public land sales,
on the ground that Congress had authority to stop
revenue from taxation, but not, without the exer
cise of arbitrary power, the revenue from the pub
lic lands.
No sooner had Clay submitted his report than
It was referred to the Committee on Public Lands,
where the whole subject should have gone origi
nally. That committee, under the inspiration of
Benton, made a counter-report, setting forth that

372 HENRY CLAY
the net proceeds of the land sales could be arrived
at only by deducting from the gross proceeds
the whole cost of the administration of the land
department, inclusive of surveying; that such a
deduction would leave little to be distributed; and
that, if distribution were made of the gross pro
ceeds, it would be equivalent to taking so much
from the customs revenue to divide among the
States under the name of proceeds of land sales,
— a scheme against which Clay himseK had loudly
protested as utterly unwarranted by the Coastitu-
tion. This criticism was undoubtedly correct, and
Clay could not controvert it. The Land Commit
tee further recommended a reduction of the price
of land from $1.25 to $1.00 per acre; the offering
of lands remaining unsold for five years after
having been offered once, at fifty cents per acre;
fifteen per cent, of the proceeds of land sales to be
set apart for the benefit of the new States.
A debate foUowed, in the course of which Clay
made some predictions proving how little a mind
even so large as his, and so Intent upon grasping
the proportions of the rapid growth of this repub
lic, was able to form a just estimate of future de
velopments. He said : " Long after we shall cease
to be agitated by the tariff, ages after our manu
factures shall have acquired a stabUity and perfec
tion which will enable them successfuUy to cope
with the manufactures of any other country, the
public lands will remain a subject of deep and
enduring Interest. We may safely anticipate that

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 373
long, K not centuries, after the present day, the
representatives of our children's children may be
deliberating in the halls of Congress on laws relat
ing to the public lands." He did not foresee —
as probably nobody did at that period — that, fifty-
five years after he spoke thus, the protected indus
tries, having for twenty -flve consecutive years en
joyed an "American system" far more protective
than his, would stiU be demanding more, and
bidding fair to continue doing so for an Indefinite
time; while, on the other hand, the public lands
stiU under the control of the government would
have shrunk to a comparatively poor remnant in
quantity and quaUty, likely to be in private hands
In another generation, except perhaps some deserts,
and some forest reserves in mountainous regions.
His biU passed the Senate, but failed to be acted
upon In the House of Representatives. It did,
however, not fail, as some of those who forced the
subject upon him had foreseen, seriously to injure
the candidate for the presidency in the Western
States, as being an opponent of "cheap lands."
But the principal, and the most ominous, strug
gle of the session was stiU to come — the struggle
concerning the Bank of the United States. As
we have seen, the memorial of the bank praying
for a renewal of Its charter was presented to Con
gress in January. The committees in the two
houses, to which the memorial was referred, re
ported favorably, recommending the renewal of
the charter with some modifications. It was weU

374 HENRY CLAY
known that good majorities In both Houses were
ready to vote for the renewal.
The enemies of the bank, or rather President
Jackson's nearest friends, under Benton's leader
ship, then rushed to the attack. Several serious
charges against the Bank of the United States,
drawn up by Benton, were made In the House,
with a demand for an investigation by committee.
The majority of the committee was composed of
known opponents of the bank ; among the minority,
probably the most conscientiously impartial man
of aU, was John Quincy Adams, then in the first
year of his distinguished career as a member of
the House of Representatives. An exposition of
the charges and specifications, and of the findings
of the committee iu detail, wiU not be undertaken
here. The reader wUl find an eminently clear and
complete presentation of the case in Professor W.
G. Sumner's "Andrew Jackson." John Quincy
Adams made a separate report, which was of espe
cial value. The majority of the committee de
clared that the bank was unsound, and recom
mended that it should not be re-chartered; the
minority said that it was safe and useful, and
ought to be re-chartered; in this latter view John
Quincy Adams substantially concurred. One
member of the majority declared that he had seen
nothing in the conduct of the president and di
rectors "Inconsistent with the purest honor and
Integrity; " but, being a warm friend of General
Jackson, he consented to sign the majority report.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 375
Jackson himseK honestly believed all the charges,
whether proved or disproved. On the whole, the
result of the investigation was regarded as favor
able to the bank. The biU to renew the charter
passed the Senate June 11, 1832, by 28 to 20,
and the House July 3, by 109 to 76. It looked
like a great victory; It was only the prelude to a
crushing defeat.
If Jackson had ever been inclined to drop his
attack on the bank, that inclination vanished the
moment the National Republican Convention made
the bank question an issue In the presidential
canvass. From that hour he saw in the bank his
personal enemy — that is to say, an enemy of the
country, whose destruction was one of the duties
he had to perform. His combativeness became
aroused to its highest energy. But there was his
cabinet divided, the secretary of the treasury hav
ing In his official report made an elaborate argu
ment In favor of the bank; there was his party
divided, some of its leading men in and out of
Congress being warm friends of the bank; there
was his faithful Pennsylvania, the seat of the
bank, and more than any other State under its
influence, likely to be turned away from him by
that influence; there was Congress, with Demo
cratic majorities in both houses, yet both houses
having emphaticaUy declared for re-chartering the
bank. Could he, in the face of these facts, con
tinue the fight? He did not hesitate a moment.
The biU to renew the bank charter, as passed by

376 HENRY CLAY
both houses, was presented to him on July 4,
1832, and on July 10 came his veto.
As a legal, financial, and historical argument,
that veto presented many vulnerable points; but
as a campaign document it was a masterpiece.
No more powerful stump speech was ever deliv
ered. In ingenious variations of light and color.
It exhibited the bank before the eyes of the people
as an odious monopoly; a monopoly granted to
favored individuals without any fair equivalent;
a monopoly that exercised a despotic sway over
the business of the country; a monopoly ItseK
controlled by a few persons; a monopoly giving
dangerous advantages to foreigners as stockhold
ers ; a monopoly the renewal of which would put
mUlions Into the pockets of a few men; a mo
nopoly in its very nature unconstitutional, the
decision of the Supreme Court notwithstanding; a
monopoly mismanaging Its business to the detri
ment of the people, and using its power for cor
rupt purposes; a monopoly tending to make the
rich richer and the poor poorer.
This was In substance Jackson's veto message.
There was one bitter pill In it intended for Clay's
special enjoyment. As to the constitutionality of
the bank, Jackson simply repeated the argument
which Clay had used in 1811, when opposing the
re-chartering of the first Bank of the United States.
The Supreme Court, Jackson argued, had decided
the charter to be constitutional on the ground that
the Constitution gave Congress power "to pass

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 377
aU laws which shaU be necessary and proper for
carrying these powers [the granted powers] Into
execution." Chartering a bank might have been
necessary and proper then, but the President was
sure that It was not at aU necessary and proper
now. Just so Clay had reasoned in 1811. It was
In overruling the Supreme Court that Jackson
In the veto uttered the famous sentence: "Each
public officer who takes an oath to support the
Constitution swears that he wIU support it as
he understands it, and not as it is understood by
others." The arrival of the veto in the Senate was the
signal for a grand explosion of oratory. Webster
opened the debate with his heaviest artillery of
argument; Clay, Ewing, and Clayton spoke, thun
dering magnificently against the veto and Its au
thor. With great force it was argued that the
bank denounced by Jackson as an unconstitutional
and tyrannical monopoly was, in aU essential fea
tures, the bank established under Washington and
sanctioned by him ; that the privileges It enjoyed
were far outweighed by the services it rendered to
the country; that the holding of bank stock by
foreigners, who were excluded from taking part
in its management, was as little dangerous to the
country as the holding by foreigners of United
States bonds; that, according to the doctrine of
President Jackson, a law held to be constitutional
by the Supreme Court was not binding upon him
If he saw fit to deny Its constltutlonaUty ; that, K

378 HENRY CLAY
such a doctrine prevaUed, there was an end of aU
law and judicial authority, and the President was
an autocrat like Louis XIV. ; and finaUy, that
the overthrow of the bank would plunge aU busi
ness interests into confusion, and the whole coun
try Into disaster and distress. Clay urged with
; especial warmth a proposition, which thencefor
ward formed part of his poUtical programme, —
ithat the veto power, "though tolerated by the
! Constitution, was not expected by the convention
i to be used in ordinary cases; " that it was designed
for "instances of precipitate legislation in un
guarded moments; " that the principle upon which
it rested was "hardly reconcilable with the genius
of representative government," and, indeed, "to
tally irreconcilable with it, if it was to be fre
quently employed in respect to the expediency of
measures as weU as their constltutlonaUty."
Nothing could have been more characteristic and
significant than the manner in which Jackson's
spokesman, Benton, defended the veto and raised
the war-cry against the opposition. "The bank
Is in the field as a combatant," he said, "and a
fearful and tremendous one, in the presidential
election. If she succeeds, there is an end of
American liberty, — an end of the republic." He
described how the bank, by increasing and by
withdrawing its loans and accommodations, sought
alternately to bribe and to coerce the people to
support it. Then he whipped the Democrats into
line, exclaiming: —

^^^^-%^-^^

/e-^

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 379
" Tou may continue to be for a bank and for Jackson,
but you cannot be for this bank and for Jackson. The
bank is now the open, as it has long been the secret,
enemy of Jackson. The war is now upon Jackson, and
if he is defeated all the rest will fall an easy prey.
What individual could stand in the States against the
power of that bank, and that bank flushed with a vic
tory over the conqueror of the conquerors of Bonaparte ?
The whole government would faU into the hands of the
moneyed power. An ofigarchy would be immediately
established, and that oligarchy in a few generations
would ripen into a monarchy."
He declared that this republic deserved a more
glorious death, and he preferred that she should
end in "a great immortal battle, where heroes and
patriots could die with the liberty they scorned to
survive." After a wild wrangle between Benton and Clay
about a street fight between the Benton brothers
and Jackson, which had occurred years ago, — for
the debate degenerated into bitter personaUties, —
the vote was taken, and the biU, the President's
objections notwithstanding, received 22 against
19 votes, not the necessary two thirds. Thus the
veto was sustained.
Clay and his friends were still in good spirits.
The veto, they thought, would severely shock the
sober sense of the people, and, In effect, be Jack
son's death-warrant. Nicholas Biddle wrote to
Clay that he was "delighted with It." AntI- Jack
son newspapers found the veto message "beneath

380 HENRY CLAY
contempt," and advised that it be given the widest
possible publicity. So It was, and with a startling
result. The Democratic National Convention had been
held in May, whUe the struggle in Congress was
stiU going on. That Jackson would be a candi
date for reelection had been taken for granted
since the first year of his administration. He had
no competitor. The formality of a nomination
was therefore In his case deemed unnecessary.
The convention was caUed merely to designate a
candidate for the vice-presidency. That candi
date, too, had been selected by Jackson, — Van
Buren, endeared to him by the enmity of his own
enemies. The national convention had only to
ratKy the decree. Eaton, Jackson's first secretary
of war, was inclined, as a member of the conven
tion, to vote against Van Buren. But he received
a warning not to do so, "unless he was prepared
to quarrel with the general."
The National Republicans hoped that the veto
would disgust the many supporters of the bank
among the Democrats, and thus demoralize and
scatter Jackson's foUowing. It had the opposite
effect. The bank Democrats found that there was
a man at the head of their party whose resolution
no opposition could stagger, and who had a wiU
much stronger than theirs ; to that will they bowed.
The secretary of the treasury, who had made a
report in favor of the bank, did not resign. The
Democratic politicians, who had been at the same

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 381
time friends of the bank and friends of Jackson,
soon discovered that the cry against the great
monopoly was the popular cry and would win.
Many of them had to "turn very sharp corners,"
but they turned them with alacrity. Members of
Congress, who had voted for the renewal of the
bank charter, took part In the anti-bank meetings,
apologized for what they had done, and then lus
tily joined In the outcry against the "monster,"
Having once changed their position on a question
they had considered highly important, simply be
cause Jackson would have it so, they found no
further difficulty in surrendering their wiU com
pletely to him. The effect of the veto had there
fore been, not to scatter Jackson's following, but
actuaUy to consolidate his party, giving It more
cohesion and discipline than it had ever had be
fore, and strengthening it numerlcaUy too, for,
although there were a few defections, the war
against the bank drew crowds of recruits to its
ranks. The cholera appeared that summer in the United
States, but it checked only for a moment the ani
mation of the campaign. The Clay party remained
hopeful to the end. In May a convention of
"young men " had met at Washington, represent
ing almost every State, to ratify Clay's nomination
for the presidency. WiUiam Pitt Fessenden of
Maine was one of its vice-presidents, and there
were not a few among its members who became
distinguished men in later days. The Democrats

382 HENRY CLAY
dubbed the meeting "Clay's Infant school," but It
encouraged him in the belief that he had the
youth of the country on his side. The National
Republieans, having great strength among the
merchants, manufacturers, and professional men,
and commanding a large proportion of the talent
of the country, sought to make a campaign of
argument, and flooded the country with addresses,
pamphlets, and printed campaign matter of all
kinds. The United States Bank ItseK did its
share of the work. But this kind of effort faUed
to reach the large class of voters, then much
larger than now, who were not "reading people."
The Jackson party trusted more to speeches, meet
ings, and processions. The figure of the "old
hero," grown to greater proportions than ever
since he was engaged in his struggle against the
"monster monopoly," exercised a wonderful charm
over the popular imagination, — a charm against
which all the learned arguments about the useful
ness of the Bank of the United States and its
constltutlonaUty, and the abuse of the veto power,
avaUed nothing. Before the eyes of the masses
Jackson appeared as a St, George klUIng the
dragon, and as the invincible champion of "hard
cash," of the "yeUow boys," driving out "Old
Nick's money" and "Clay's rags." Further, the
country was made to ring with the old "bargain
and corruption " charge, revived to do new service.
At a late period of the campaign the hopes of
the Clay party were highly excited by the defec-

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 383
tion of the New York "Courier and Enquirer,"
under James Watson Webb, and of several other
newspapers which turned from Jackson to Clay.
The National Republicans became extremely san
guine of success. So much the more terrible was
their disappointment when the returns of the elec
tion came In. Of the 288 electoral votes Jackson
had won 219, Clay only 49, those of Massachu
setts, Rhode Island, Maryland, Delaware, and
Kentucky. Wirt, the candidate of the Anti-Ma
sons, had carried Vermont; South Carolina gave
her vote to John Floyd of Virginia. It was a
stunning defeat. Clay and his friends stood won
dering how it could have happened.
Clay had committed two grave blunders in states
manship, and one equaUy grave In political tactics.
The South was In a dangerous ferment against
the tariff. The impending extinguishment of the
pubUc debt made a large reduction of the revenue
necessary. Clay might, therefore, in recognition
of the necessity for reducing the revenue, have
proposed a reduction of tariff duties sufficient to
take off the edge of the Southern discontent, with
out the least appearance of yielding to Southern
threats. The measure he did propose reduced the
revenue very little, and, by maintaining the high
protective duties, exasperated the South stIU more.
This was the first blunder in statesmanship.
The other was that, instead of advising the
United States Bank to keep clear of politics and
to accede to any reasonable modiflcation of its

384 HENRY CLAY
charter that might avert the opposition of Jack
son, he forced the fight, and made the question of
the bank a party question; thus involving in the
changing fortunes of party warfare the most im
portant financial institution of the country, whose
solvency, credit, and political impartiality were of
the highest concern to the business community.
The blunder in political tactics was that he be
lieved he could excite the enthusiasm of the masses
for a great moneyed corporation In its contest
against a popular hero like Jackson, — a most
amazing infatuation; and thus he made the bank
question the leading Issue In the presidential cam
paign. Without these blunders he would, probably, not
have been victorious; but with them his defeat
became certain and overwhelming.

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS U. S. A.
ELECTROTVPED AND PRINTED BY
H. O. HOUGHTON AND CO.

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