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R E

AP

L Y

TO THE
OBSERVATIONS O F
Lieut. Gen. Sir W I L L I A ^ HOWE,
ON A PAMPHLET, ENTITLE1>
LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN.

[ Price 3 i. ]

R E

TO THE
OBSERVATIONS .
O F
tleut. Gen, Sir WILLIAM HOWE,
ON A P/^MPHLET, ENTITLED
LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN:
• I N WH I C H
His Misrepresentations are detefled, and thofe
Letters are fupported, by a Variety of New Matter
gnd Argument. TO WHICH IS ADDED,
AN APPENDIX, COHTAINING,
I. A Letter to Sir William Howe upon his Stridures
on Mr. Galloway's private Cha^after.
II. A Letter from Mr. Kirk to SirWi;,LiAM Howe, and
his Anfwer.
III. ALetter from aComYnittee, to the Prelident, of theCon-
grefsj on- the State of the Rebel Army at Valley Forge,'
found among the Papers of Henry Laurens, Efq.
By the Author of Letters to a Nobleman.
u^iii^i alteram partem*
¦¦.  —  ¦  ¦^" ¦-— ¦• — -  ' '  ¦-¦'!¦
THE SECOND EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.
LONDON:
, Printed for G, Wilkie, No. 71, St. Paul's Church-yard.
M Dec LXXXI.

%'

!+¦. »¦'

Ill i ' Ti-a-n-.i|«»«J<M4^ i;

REP L Y

T 0

Sir William Howe*s Obfervations, &^Ct

HE!n a hian, cohfcioUs of his ow^ti tnif-

w

cbiiduft, or at leaft lying under the charge
of having betrayed a public trlift, a truft of as
^reat importance as was ever committed to any fub-
jedt, finds himfelf under the neceffity of mifrepre-
fentiiig ttotorious fads, arid even of defcending to
perfonal detradion, for his own vindication, he is
truly to be pitied. This ^ppiears to be the cafe of
the late Coiiinlander in Chief of his Majefty 's Forces
in America. If the Author of the " Letters to a
Nobleman'* has contributed to the diftrefs of the
General, he has done it with reluftanqe, from a
iregard to truth and jufticej and a fenfe of duty to
B the

( 2 )
the public, and not from any impulfe of private
refentment; for he frankly declares, he never had
any caufe of perfonal enmity to Sir William Howe,
who neither had perfona)ly injured nor offended
him ; and therefore, that the motives which led^
him to publifh his ftridures on the condudt of the
American war, could no't arife from fuch a prin
ciple. He confidered him only in his public ca
pacity ; and, imagining that he could throw new
light on a fubjeft which appeared to many to be
datk and problematical, and in which the public
Avelfare was intimately concerned, he proceeded to
animadvert upon his condudt as Commander in
Chief. Nor was the examination of the management of
the American war ncedlefsly undertaken. The
unparalleled failures in that war, the unCQtpijQa
magnitude of the evils, in which they had involv^
tiie nation, with- the reludlance of Government to
make jvidicial enqiiiry into the caufes of thetp^
loudly called for it.
We had feep the General, in the Middle Colo
nies, commanding a force always^ commonly fQvir
times, and at certaia periods- ei^ttimes!, grea^q?
than that of: his enemy ; a fprce fo.powerful,. fo
adequate to the piirpplesfor which it was, iatendedi
that he could not help exppefllng hisr " utter
t« amazement" ot} the ocQafion, anti^paying to tlji?
Secretary of State of the j^mericaa dcpajrtment th?
greateft, though not more., than a juft encomium, for

(43 >
for his " uncommon' exertions." To this was
added a naval force of eighty vefTels of war, under
the command of his Noble Brother, to co-operate
with him in fubduing thd moft unnatural and un-
juftifiablfi rebellion that ever happened in any coun-
•try. We had' feen him, between" the 3d of Septem
ber and the 8th of December, driving that enemy
before him, /rom Long Ifland, over the North
. . River, and the Delawate, killing, captivating, and
¦reducing his army from iS,ocp to 3000 mert,
and taking from him the vshole province of New
Jerfey. But fuch was the reverfe of condudt (it could
not be of fortune ; for fortune, however vari
able and frolic, has never yet been found to
commit fych iaLunders), fuch was the derelidtipn of
military virtue, ^h^t he fuffered that reduced, paniq-
ftruck enemy to. fjjrprife his advanced poft, and
drive him out of Weft Jerfey, and to conquer all
Eaft Jerfey, except his three pofts on the Rariton ;
and, eftahldfhed at Moffis Town, in the neigh
bourhood of his head-qyarters, to befiege, harafs,
and 4iftrefs the whole Britifh army, from Decem-
-ber to Jane, without making, one attethpt to dijlodge
^im. We had feen hitn, having under his command
^t 'New York 30,000 men, marching out againft
this enemy, who, by his o,wd exaggerated account,
had no moseiJian 10,000, new-raifed and undif-
B ? ciplinedi

( 4 )
clplined; and, a few days after, fhamefuUy retreat
ing before him from Hillfborough to Am boy
•without taking any one proper Jiep to bring him to
an engagement.
We had feen him, after this difgraceful retreat,
embarking his army on fhip-board, at an immenfe
expence to the nation ; and, forewarned of the 'dif
ficulties and dangers he muft necefTarily encounter
on the ocean, proceeding, againft contrary winds,
700 miles, to meet the fame enemy pofted on
ftronger ground, and enabling him, by this wafte
of time, to procure near double his former num'
lers. We had feen him, contrary to the moft urgent
motives, to the plaineft didtates of military fci-
ence, and the explicit orders of his Sovereign,
lead his force ^00 miles from the place where he
was diredled to join General Burgoyne, and at the
very time whqn that jundtion was .to have been
made ; and by this abfurd cond\^& facrifice a whok
Britijh army.
We had feen him at Brandywine, by the moft
judicious and fpirited manoeuvres, perfedlly fur-
round and hem in, between the two columns of
his own force and impaffable waters, the whole
rebel army, vigoroully attack, and fuddenly defeat
iti and yet, with an indolence not to be juftified,
Jie fuffered the defeated remains to lie a' whole
jiight at Chefter, within eight miles of his camp,
fi^d on the next morning' to efcape, Unmvlefied, '¦
We

( 5 )
We had feen him at Gbfhen a few days after*
when his enemy, with his reduced force, had in-
cautiouQy and foblifhly advanced near the van of
his army,'" after one of his columns -had adtuaily
*' engaged with the rebel advanced guard *," in-
tiniidated from his intended attack by a fall of
rain-, although that circumftance was much more
¦favourable co his own regular troops than to the
undifciplined troops bf his enemy ; and although
fhat enemy had a confideraUe river in its rear.
We had feen hirn at Germantown fuffer him
felf to be furprifed, his advanced pofts defeated
and driven back upon the main body of his army,
and that army in imminent danger of a total rout
by an inferior undifciplined enemy.
We had feen him, when the rebel force lay at
White Marfh, and when he adtually had the beft
information of its pofition and ftrength, march out
pf his lines under a pretence of intending to attack
it; and yet, after lying three days within two
miles of it, return, without attempting to bring it
to adtiori, either by affault, or turning its right
flank or rear ; in either of which cafes he muft
have cut his enemy off from his magazines and
fupplies, and placed him in a lituation ffOm
whence i&i? could not have efcaped without ruin.
We had alfo feen the Gdneral, after he had
proved his force in every adtipn fuperior to that of
* See Sir William Howe's \.%Vi.ts. his

C 6 )
his enemy, fuffer his: whole army to' be beficgcd in
.Philadelphia, kom the month of November to the
mo.r*th of J,une, by a feebk, fickly, naked, -and half-'
fisrved army, of lefs than ,4000, effeSive men *.
But further.-^ We had feen the fame General,
•with a vanity and prefumption unparalleled in
hiftory, after this indolence, ^fteralhthefe wretched
blun4er5, accept, from a few of his officers, 4
triumph more magnificent than would have be
come the conqueror of America, without the con--
fcjitiof his Sovereign, or approbation of his coun
try ; .ana that at the time when the news of a war
with France had juft arrived, and in the very city,
the capital of North America, the late feat of the
Congrefs, which was in a few days to be delivered
up to that Congrefs.
Such was thjC difgraceful condudt, fuch .'the pre
fumption of the General, and fuch were the mif-
fortunes which he had brought on his country I
And yet, t^ad he pontented himfelf with the honours
he had received from this .mockery of a triumph,
he might have .pleafed himfelf with dreaming of
his triump,hai, arches, d^ecprated with the mottos
of vidtary ,aii,d the embkqis of glory, and with
his QuiJtotic , tilts, and tournaments, an!d the
" Letters tp a Nobleman" would never have ap
peared. .Byt: when the .Author faw the General
"'* See a Lettef in the A^endix, from a Committee to tl^e
Prefident of the Congrefs. and

( ,7 )
«nd his Noble Brother, fupported by a dangcFpus
fadlioaa, purfuing raeafiwes which he conceived
tended to involve his country in difgraee and ruin j-
when he faw them, in order to conceal their own
mifcondudt, attempting to perfuade the great re-
prefentative body of the nation, that America was
" tbe ftrongeft country in the world *," and im-
praidticable in war ; that the people were univer-
ifally difloyalj that the immenfe naval and mili
tary force committed to their command was in
competent to the redlidlion of the rebellion — in
order, to prevail on the nation to give up the
greateft part of its dominions ; the duties of a ci-
ihea, a difinterefted regard for the welfare of his
country, and an honeft indignation at fo flagitious
an attempt, called on him to lay before his fellow-
fiibjedts a true ftate of the matters thus attempted
to be hiifreprefented. Such were his motives, di-
vefted of every other confideration ; and he de
clares, that the Letters were wrote without the
folicitation or knowledge of any perfon whatever
in the adminiftration of Government.
Had the General, by a true ftate of fadts, and
by candid argunient, free from perfonal abiife.
convinced me that I was wrong; ever happy to
acquit injured innocence, there is no conceffion,
no adt pf juftice, which mj honour vvould not in-
diTce me to perforin ; but as 'the reverfe is the
* Siee General Grey's Evideketintht Nffrtatiwe, p..'ic7^ -
cafe,"

( ^ )
cafe, the fame motives which influenced rile td
Y^rite the Letters, oblige me to vindicate the truths
they contain. . , •
In my firft letter, " On the Strength and Prac
ticability pf the iVIiddle Colonics in refpedt to mi^.
litary Operations/' in order to refute what the
General had attempted to prove, jhat this part of
America was the " ftrongeft of all countries in the
*.' wprld," I have given a true, and candid defcrip-
tion of that country, fupported by the evidence of
General Robertfpnj who hadrefided in it many
years, and which can be fupported by many gen*
tlemen, now in England, who have lived in itj
and I had further made a cpmparifon between it
and the fcene of adlion in the laft American war,'
Ihewing that the latter was infinitely more difficult
than the former. To evade the force of thefe
truths, the General obferves.
Narrative, p. 37.] " That the two laft war s,
" with refpeSi to the fiate of the country of America.,
*' are in no degree ftmilar. In the laft war, the dif-
" Jiculties arifmg from the ftrength of the country^
« werey for the moft part, removed by the friendly ¦
" difpofuion of , the inhabitants, who all exerted them'-
*' felves to facilitate the operations of the King*s
" army, and to fupply them with fvery necejfary and
*^: accommodation."
r What thefe " neceflaries and accommodations*^'
were, which were thus furnifhed in the laft war,
and wifiich the General could not procure, is
, :l(i . 5 . not

C 9 )
not mentipnedk That the inhabitants furnifhed
General Braddock in his expedition to the Ohio,
Colonel Bouquet, in his expedition to Mufkingum,
far beyond the Ohio, and Sir JefFery Amherft in
his expedition to Montreal, with carriages and
provifions, is true — and with nothing elfe — They
wanted nothing elfe. But Sir William Howe did
not even want all thefe.— *-He tranfported carriages
with him from England, and whatever more he
wanted were procured on Lpng Ifland and Staten
Ifland, Large fleets of provifions were conftantly
fent to him j and in every part of the country,
where his army marched, he procured a fupply with
out difficulty. At Bordentown, Captain Gamble
was forming a large magazine of provifipns volun
tarily, and with every apparent mark of zeal for the
fervice, brought in by the inhabitants when Tren
ton was taken; and the whole army was fupplied,
during two months, in its march froni the Elk to
Philadelphia^ with more provifions than it could
confume : and there was nothing which the coun
try produced, either of neceffaries or delicacies,,
during the nine mpnths it remained in Philadel
phia, with which it was npt furniftied by the in
habitants. What then were the advantages which the Ge
nerals in the laft war poffefiTed, that were not to
be commanded in the prefent ? There were none,
But they had difadvantages and difficulties infi
nitely greater to encounter, which their gallantry
C eafily

f( 10 )
eafily overcaffte. The General's operations Were
carried on iri the Middle Colonies, ¦where every '
neceffary was eafily obtained •, but the expedition
of Sir Jeffisry Amherft led him to pafs from Al
bany by Lake OntaiiOi to Montreal^ near 300
miles, carrying his provifions either through a wil-
dernefs or an enemy's country, over lakes,; moun
tains, and fwamps ; and the operations of General
Forbes and Colonel Bouquet led them through a
wildertiefs inhabited only by Indians, where no
fingle article of provifions of any kind was to be
procured ; ihe firft to Fort du Quefiie, and the
other fpr beyond it, down to Mufkingum ; and
yet we ha:ve found that thefe gatlant meii, in whofe'
hearts the honour of their Sovereign and the fer-'
vice of their country were deeply itrrprefl^d, were
riot obftrudted or intimidated in the path to glory
and fuccefs by thefe difficulties.
To refute iny afiertion, that " theftrehgth and
" impradticability ofthe Middle Cploiiibs-is loft in
" idea,, when we cpmpa'rc them with the fcene of
•• adtion in the laft war," the General adduces the
teftimony pf Major-general Grey, who fays.
Page 38.] " 'Th'at' part ef America 'wh'erd Thavi
*' been, is. the firongefi country I bave ever. been in-, it
" is every where hii-ly and covered with w;ood,
*' interfe5led by ravines, and creeks,, and marlhy
*' grounds; and in every quarter of a mile is
*? apofi fitted for ambuscade.'* And in Hisanfwer to
another queftion, he adds, « That America is, of
J " all

( II )
" all -countries, the bell calculated for the defen-
*' five; every . hundred yards might he difputed y at
" leaft that part of it which I have feen,"
.This is a formidable defcription pf the Middle
Colonies,.and weH calculated to furnifh the reader
with apologies for the 5(Va,at of fuccefs in the Ame
rican war; but it is truly yifionary. What counj
tries the.iMajor-gcneral alludes to, I know not;
and yet ...to. prove that he is miftaken in his
fadts,^.]ifvrU. .be no arduous taflc. He has. feen the
plains on Long Ifland, of, thirty miles in length,
and from feven to twelve in breadth, .which
are without wood, or a fingle. obftrudtion that
can give one enemy the advantage over ano
ther. .He has ^Ifo , feen, the country between
NewrYork and Trenton, and between the head
of Elk and Philadelphia, in which there is not a
hill but what may be either afcended without dif
ficulty, or avoided by an army in its march. And
when thefe hills are com.pared with thofe of this
country, they are by no means fo high, fo fteep,
or fo difficult of accefs; but when we compare
them with the country from Albany to (Montreal,
and with, Conigocheague Ridge, Sideling Hill,
Ray's Hill, the Allegheny and Laurel ridge of
mountains, which may biCJuftly ftyled the Ameri
can Alps, they ,are little more than mole-hills ;
and yet thefe mountains, though full of ravines
gind dangerpys defiles, and althpugh covered with
C ? wpod.

( t2 3
wood, and pofTefTed by an enemy whofe talent in
war is ambufcade, did not intittiidate the bravery,
nor obftrqdt the rnarch, pf an Aniherft, a Forbes,
or a Bouquet ; they faw them with contempt, and
pafTed theni in defpite pf their oppofing enemy.
If the country which the General has feen is .
every where covered with wood, where do thofe im
menfe quantities of wheat, rye, barley, Indian
corn, pats, and buck-wheat, which furnifh the
inhabitants with food, and are exported to Eu
rope,' find room to grow? Is it poffible that a
country, fettled one hundred years, and having fo
many hundred thoufands of induftrious inhabitants
in it, can in any degree bear this defcription, and
rerriain to this day a wildernefs ? I imagine- not.
The real truth is, that the provinces of New Jer
fey and Pennfylvania, where the late operations
were carried on, are fettled, and full of planta
tion?, and at leaft two-thirds, and in many places
five-fixth parts of it cleared of wood ; and the
v?ood confifts of large trees, ftanding at confider-
able diftances, free froni underwood, and eafily
fcoured with cannon. As to the f' ravines," they
muft be in proportion to the hills which I have
defcribed. The " creeks," or rivulets, are all.
fordahfle, or may be pafTed by marching a few
miles round; and there are no ** marfhes'' dr fenny
grounds within the country. This g^round, when
cleared, is meadow, and of fix times the value of
upland,

( 13 )
upland, and therefore the firft improved. Thefe
are all fadts, well known to the people of that
country, and which can be proved by many gen
tlemen now in London. How then can it be pof
fible that this country can be, what the General has
attempted to prove in the Houfe of Commons,
*' the ftrongeft country in the world ?"
" I fhall new proceed, fays the General, with my
remarks, page by page." As I ha^e no particular
objedtion to this method, I will do myfelf the ho
nour of ftridtly attending him.
In page 3, of the L,etters, 1 have afferted, " That
*' in thjs country we have lately feen two armies,
" one meditating its conqueft, the other its d^-
*' fence. We have feen the Britifh army pene-
" trating into its heart, a circuit of near two hun-
" dred miles, from Long Ifland, by the White
*' Plains, to Trenton, and from the Elk Ferry to
" Philadelphia, in defiance of the utmofi efforts of
*' an enemy perfedtly acquainted with every ad-
'' vantageous fpot of ground ; and we h^ve feen
*' that army taking, with eafe and little lofs, every
*' ftrong poft poffefTed by tl^e enemy^ who hav?
«' fled at its approach" \
Page 39.J " This defcription," fays the Gene
ral, " is introduced to prove that the co.m(ry is not
*' VERY strong nor impracticable ; but it only
?« proves, that the Generals and officers, commanding
f fhe feveral forps, i^ere indefatigable in their duty,
'¦'and

( '4 )
" and furmounted al! the difficulties which they met
" with in thofe marches."
1 have never enquired, nor am I now enquiring
into the condudt of the officers of the army ; nor
have I ever had anyreafon to do fo. Whenever led
on to adtion, their condudt has fhewn that they were
adluated by honour, and a love of their country ;
and I therefore acknowledge, that they were indefa
tigable (that is, not fatigued) in their duty, when
ever called to it; becaufe I am confident that
many, if not all, would have furmounted difficul
ties tenfold as great as any of thofe to which they
were led, and not think it z fatigue. In the whol^
tenor of my Letters, I have only cenfured the in
dolence and mifcondudl of their Leader ; my cen-
fures could not, in juftice, extend further.
Ibid.] "The Commander in Chief, however,
« imll be fuppofed to have had fome fhare in the
«' merit of thefe fuccejfes."
He Certainly had ; I will not only fuppofe it,
but frankly confefs it. Whenever the '^ General
found himfelf either difpofed, or under a neceffity of
meditating a blow againft the enemy, he never
failed of fuccefs. At Long- Ifland and the White
Plains, in the progrefs of the army to the Dela
ware, and at the Brandywine, he fucceeded as far
as he chofe ; had he prelTed the advantages his
truly judicious manoeuvres gave him, he might
have ended tl^e rebellion. 1 jiave not cenfured the

( is r
the Getiefal for want of abilities; this is a failing'
for which he oughf^ not to be cenfured; the blame
in that cafe would juftlyfall on his employers. My
ftridtures are confined to his nOn-^exertion of thofe
military abihties which were demonftrared in his
manoeuvres on Long Iftand and the Brandywine,
atnd that Undaunted courkge which was fo appa
rent in the adtion at Bunker's Hill.
Ibid,]' *' But it is not true that the enemy alvjays
*' fled at our approach, nor that' we tffok all their
*' flrong pofts with eafe and little lofs"
Here the Gener'al takes advantage of the words
" always fled," and', to ferve the purpofe of con-
tradidting me, applies them to all the condudt of
the rebels in the general adlions. A fmSll fhare of
candour, or a little attention to the paragraph he
cites to make out this contradidtion, would have
taught him, that I did not allude to the battles of
Long Ifland, Fort Wafhington, or Brandywine.
I had in the fame paragraph declared, " that the
" Britifh army had penetrated from Long Ifland,
«' by the White Plains, to Trenton, in defiance of
** the utmofi efforts, of the enemy," including the
very ihftances he mentions; and therefore he might
have perceived, that the words 'f always fled" could
only refer to thofe formidable unfortified '* pofis,"
which are to be found " in every quarter of a mile f'
and even in " every one hundred yards," in that
country, the beft of all other countries " caku-
" lated

C 16 )
" tafed for the defenfive." And here my expref*
fion will be found ftridtly true ; for it is known
that the rebels fled at the approach of the Royal
army, at Newark, Brunfwick, Princeton, twice at
Trenton, near Newport in Newcaftle county, and
ac Goflien in Pennfylvania*; at feveral of which
places, had they been purfued by 5000 Britifh,
their army muft have been utterly ruined.
Ibid.] " Much ipight be faid upon the fiate
" of loyalty in America. Some are loyal from
'¦^principle, uasy from interefi, uahy from refent-
*' ment; and there are others zvho wifh fuccefs to
*' Great Brit(iin,from a recollellion of the hafpinefs
*' they enjoyed under her government."
While I exprefs my furprife at, I Cannot help
thanking the General for, this candid cPnfefllon
refpedling the loyalty of the people of America.
It amounts to a full acknowledgment of all I have
contended for in the Letters refpedting it. The
force of the fadts I have alledged, has, I truft, ex
torted it from him — but, I apprehend, unwarily;
otherwife he would not have taken up near four
pages to difprove the fadts adduced in fupport of
a truth he fo fully confelTes. The tafk of recon
ciling this confefllon to his attempt, in the Houfe
of .Commons, to prove that the " Americans were
" almoft univerfally diflbyal," I cheerfully leave
to thofe who will undertake it.
* See the General's Lettefs. I had

( t? )
. 1 had faid in the Letters, that fome, who Wer«
high in office in America, in order to juftify the
negleSi and inhuman treatment which, his Majefiy's
faithful fubjeSls had received, and to throw a veil
over that mifcondudt which had wafted, unnecef-
farily, many millions for the nation, facrificed its
true intereft, and loft its honour, were tlie inven-'
, tors of the report of the univerfal difloyalty of the
Americans. To this the General anfwers.
Page 39.] '¦'• t am at a lofs to know what fpe-
*' cies of negleSi and inhumanity is here meant ; /
" am contented that flriSlures fhould be made upon my
*•'¦, prof effional conduct, but I feel myfelf hurt as a man
" when I am accufed of inhumanity^' '
Ever pleafed to do the General juftice, Iwill
relieve his feelings as a man ; and 1 wifh I could
alfo relieve thofe which he muft experience as an
Officer. There is nothing in my Letters whicfi
charges him with doing perfonally a fingle adt of
inhumanity. My ftridtures were confined to his
" profeffional condudt ;*' and the fubfequent part
of my Letters explains what I mean by the inhu
man treatment which his Majefty's faithful fub-
jedts had received ; and, as he has mifunderftood
me, I will again explain it. The inhuman treat
ment alluded to, was . the indifcriniinate plunder
fufFered to be committed, by the foldiery under
his command, on Staten Ifland, Long Ifland, the
White Plains, and in the province of New Jerfey,
where friend and foe, loyalift and rebel, met with
D the

( 1« )
the farhfe fate; ^ ferieis of continued plunder. Which
was a dii^raee to an army pretending to difi:ipline^
and which, while it tended to relax fhe difciplitie
of the troops, could not fail to create ^the greateft
"averfion, even in the 'breaft of loyalty itfelf, to a
fervice Which, under the fair pretence of giving
them protedtion,* robbed them, in many'inftances,
of even thfe neceflliries of life.
In vaiYi,*'! imagine, willthe General plead, be
fore the Candour and humanity of the public, his
brders and "prOckniations forbidding plunder.-
Laws, without execution, are "but a. dead'lettisri
and his orders, and proclamations, fo bftien Re
peated, withput'punifhing the atrocipiJs offenders,
were cPhfitfe't^ed as blank paper ; and the plundeF-
ing cohtinvied as much after as before they were
iffued, until he pafl!ed into 'Pennfylvania, where,.
having madean exartxple or two of the delinquents,
the plunder in a great meafure ceafed. Had thi&
irslfchief been nipped in the tud by a few exam--
pies, which might have been eafily done in an
arrny.fb perfedtly fubmifllve to difcipline in every
other refpedt as the Britifh was, the relaxa^
tion in difcipline which loft Trenton, the im-
preffipns made on the minds pf the Loyalifts, to
thepire/udice of the King's fervice, and the difgraee
that was brought on the honour, juftice, and hu-
manil^ of Britain, could not have ta'ken place.
To vindicate himfelf againft this vifionary chargp^
.of perfonal inhumanity, he tells us, page 40, of
7 his.

( 19 ;
his- gr^at humanity and, beaevplence to the pepple
of Bofton, and that " it is upon, record (Proclama-
•' tion 'h'ith. October, lyjsJ, that their fervic.es were..
*' counted,, by reconmending a defenfivje. affociation ;
*' and thai arms were cffered Po all who would.declare
" themf elves willing to contribute their afftfiance 'in
" the prefcrvation of goqd order and governmentr
" withinthe town of Bofion."
What his behaviour was. to the people of Bof-
lon, they can beft inform the public; the tafk I
Ijave afTumed, is, only to enquire into his conc^udt
in the Middle Colonies. Why, then, not tell us
pf his wi/e and prudent condudt there ? Was
it becaufe he is confcious that it was not fa
wife' and prudent in the Middle Colonies as at
^offeon .^ If this fenfe of the matter .did- nptt prevail
with him, it was impolitic to n^entip^ this prpcla-r
mation ; becaufe it only informs us, that he knew
what ought to be done, and. did it not. To draw
alTiftance to the Britifh force, wherever he ope
rated, was moft- certainly his duty. If the. Loy
alifts in Bofton were to be trufted, Nvhen affoci-
ated-, with arms, men of the fame principles were
to be equally trusted in the provinces of New
¦york. New Jerfey^ and Pennfylvania, where they
were more numerous. Why then was there not a
like proclatnation iffued in any of thefe provinces ?
Had this been done, the falutary eifedts are obvi^
ous, from an indubitable fadl. Since his refigna-
|ion, upwards of ^,000 Loyalifts are embodied in
P 2 arms

( 20 )
arms for the defence of New York; Had this
been done, it would have enabled Sir H. Clintoii
to have led, inftead of between two and three, at
leaft 8000 men, in a diverfion in favour of the
Northern army, and faved it; for Sir Henry.
did not leave more regulars, than the number of
Loyalifts, thus embodied, for the defence of New
York, when he paflTed up the North river^ and
found himfelf too weak to proceed. Had this
been done, he might, if he did not choofe to fup
port the Northern army, have taken at leaft 5000
men more with him to Pennfylvania ; a number
equal to Wafliington's whole force, the greater
part of the time the two armies were in that pro
vince.' And had the like procla(Tiation been iffued in
New Jerfey, when the General was at Trenton,
and had driven Wafhington's enfeebled army, of
3000 men, and all the officers of the rebel State,
Put of the province ; and when the General him
felf incautioufly confeffes, " that his fuccelTes had
" intimidated the leaders of the rebellion, and
" nearly induced a general fubmifflon *," all thofe
men in New Jerfey, who were loyal •"¦ from prin-
*f ciple, from intereft, from refentment, and from
?' a recoUedtion of the happinefs they enjoyed
*' under the Britifli gPvernment," would have
iflfociated in arms, and formed a folid barrieir of
• Narrative, p. 40. defence

( 21 )
defence againft every attempt of the rebels, excepfi
that of Wafhington's army.
And had the General iffued the like proclama-.
tion, when in Philadelphia, he would have ob
tained a milida of 3500 men. Had he invited the
people in the peninfula between the Delaware and
Chefapeak, to affociate, and affift him in arms ;
and had he, as he was fequefted, landed a few
men ^° fupport them, and to furnifh them with
^rms and ammunition ; the 2000 Loyalifts, who
had afl"ociated, in lefs than three days, in three of
the thirteen counties only, would have been im
mediately in arms on the part of Great Britain ;
and no man, who is acquainted with the general
loyalty of the people of that country, can doubt^
but that their numbers would have increafed, in a
month, to 6000, if not 8000 men. Nothing could
have been wanting to have carried this nieafure
into complete effedt, and to have reduced this pe
ninfula to the peace of the Crown, but a fmall
poft at Wilmington, to cover that country ; be
caufe, while that poft remained, Wafhington could
not, with any degree of prudence, truft his army,
or any part of it, in that peninfula. This would
have been a fnare into which the Britifh General
ought to have led him, and out of which he could
not have extricated himfelf : he would in that cafe
have been between the aflTociated Loyalifts and the
poft at Wilmington, where the Bricifli army might
liave been tranfported by water in one, or have
marched

( 22 ) ,
marched by land in two days, from Philadelphia.
Allj thefe truths muft, upon a flight view of the
chart of that, country, ftrike the military eye with
inftantaneous convidtion ; a.nd yet that invitation
and encouragement which he boaft's' of having pub-
Hfhed at Bofton, was in this country fhamerully
negledted. The General acknowledges, that he found in
Philadelphia 448:z * male inhabitants capable. of
bearing arms. Of this number there were not
fifty who had taken any part againft the Britifh
goy.ernment; the reft, being about one eleventh
part of the inhabitants, had fled; lefs than looo
were Quakers : fo that, had the General parfuetf
the fame wife meafure in Philadelphia which he
did at Bofton, and which General Knyphaufen
afcerward'S purfued at New York ; had he fuffer
ed the people to have chofen their own officers,
and embodied themfelves for the defence of the .
city ; a militia of 3500 men, befides the numei
rous refugees who attended him, would have
formed an armed force, which, with a few veffels
of war, and lOoo regular troops, would hare
been a fufficient defence for that city -againft any
force of the enemy, except Wafhington's army.
Xhis woxild have enabled bim to have marched
out with his whole force againft Wafhington^
while he remained from December to the middle
* Narraiive, p. 54. of

( 23 )
bf June vi'ith his reduced, fickly, and half-fiarved
army at the Valley Forgie, where that arm.y might
have been attacked in their weak increnchments*
Qr furroUnded and befiegedi and reduced by fa
mine in one week at fartheft, and an end have
"been put to the rebellion *.
Page 41 ii employed in entertaining ihe reader
iaith the pr-ofufe liberality of the General towards
Mr. ¦Galloway, and with fome dblique general charges,
flriking at his popidarity and integrity.
What either that Gtnflemari's popiilarity or in
tegrity has to do with Sir William Howe's mili
tary condudt, the reader will bepuzzled to difcern.
i fhall rtot therefore, in this Refly, Undertake a
vindication of Mr. Galloway's perfonal charadter.
But, at the fame time, Icannot help obferving,,thit:
general charges againft either a public or privatt
charadter are little better than affaffinations in thfe
dark, againft which the Tnoft perfe'dt innocence
has no chance of guarding itfelf. The charges
againft the General in my Letters are fo parti
cular, fpecific, and defined, tha:t he might, if
he could, vindicate himfelf againft them. But his^
honbcrr, it feems, has not led him to deal t?hus ho
nourably by Mr, Galloway.
In order to prove that many of the Pennfylva-
niaHS were attached to the Britifh government,
• See a Letter from a Camftiittee to fbe Prfefident of Con-
^leis, in tbe Appendix,' I have

( 24 )
1 have aflTerted, that during our poffelfion of Phi-
ladelphiaj the people of the country, at the rifque
of their lives, had fupplied the Britifh army,
'riavy, and inhabitants, amounting to not lefs than
5O5OO0 perfons, with all kinds of provifions, while
they refufed thefe fupplies to the rebel General.
Thefe fadts Sir William Howe does not venture
to deny. I thought, and ftill think, they fully
fupport the matter I wifhed to prove. In fo great
a conteft, in the event of which the feelings, the
intereft, and happinefs of mankind were fo deeply
involved, and their paffions fo violently engaged,
neutrality of fentiment or attachment is unprece
dented — is impofTible. , Men's opinions, and wifjies
will become fixed in favour of one fide or the
other ; and I concluded, how reafonably the
Reader will determine, that thofe men who vo
luntarily fupplied Wafhington's army againft their
Sovereign, were rebels ; and that thofe who, every
mile they pafTed, rifqued their lives, and yet at that
rifque fupplied the King's troops with provifions,
from five to an hundred miles diftance, were
friends and faithful fubjedts. But it feems the
General is of a different opinion.  Hear his
arguments. Page 42.] " That the people of the country
*' brought in frefh provifions to us, and refufed fuch
•' fupplies, as much as they dared, to the rebel
•' General, is certain. But I do not admit, that
'' this conduSl proceeded from the motives afcribed

( 15 )
** by ihe Author. The people of the country had no
*' opinion of the value of Congrefs money. Thiy
" knew they fhould receive Softly hard money in
*' payment ; and they had an opportunity of carrying
" back with them a variety of neceffary articles.-^
" Thefe, 1 apprehend, were the real motives of all
*' that kind of afftfiance which we procured from the
*' country people"
What a horrid idea of human nature muft the
General have entertained when he drew thefe con-
dufions ! Would not a little charity have convinced
him, that men who were loyal '* from principle^
** from refentment, — from a recoUedtion of for-
" mer happinefs," and whofe adtions ftridtly
correfponded, were adluated by motives more
honourable and more virtuous, than that of ac
quiring a little hard money and a few neccfTaries ?
Can it be poflible that he could believe, that thie
honour of " principle," the powerful impulfes of
juft refentmerit for injuries fuftained, and a lively
fenfe of former " happinefs," of which they had
been wantonly deprived, were all effaced by fuch
paltry and tranfitory confiderations } Did he pafs
this fevere, this cruel judgment on the faithful
fubjedts of his Sovereign, and the tried friends of
his country, by his own feelings — the teft of his
own adtions ? Were the Loyalifts, whom the
General, after all the affiftance they had given
to him, has thus ungratefully traduced, to re
taliate, with how much more reafon might they
p fay,

( 26 )
fay. That he had facrificed his military fame, his
duty to his Sovereign and his fellow fubjedts, and
the intereft and fafety of his country, to the dirty
purpofes of a fadtion, whofe whofe condudt is
founded on private intereft and ambition !
Page 43. J '¦'¦The Author fays, they, did this- at
*' THE RISQUE OF THEIR LIVES, There was in
" fa£i THAT APPEARANCE; but _ I always sus-
.*' PS.CTZD that General Wafhington, through policy,
" connived at this kind of commerce."
The argument here refts upon the feeble fgp.
port of the General's " fufpicion," while he ac
knowledges that " appearance" was againft that
fufpicion. If appearance was againft it, upon
>vhat was his fufpicion founded ? It could not
be upon fadts ; for in that cafe his opinion could
not reft in fufpicion, In truth, the fadts were all
againft it; For what could induce Wafhjngton to
Jseep different pofts furrounding the Britifh lines,
and cpnftanc patroles, frequently coming within
fight of them, but to prevent a fupply of provi
fions ? Thefe patroles put to death, withouthe-
fitation, feveral perfons, for no other offence than
,that of fupplying the Britifh "troops. Some were
^ried by a court-martial, and received two hun
dred lafhes ; and others were branded by a hot
jron in the hand, with GH, and fent into the
Pritifh lines, as a mark of contempt of the Brir
tifh General. And yet all this is not fufficient to
|-?moye his " fufpicions" of the difloyalty of thefe
faithfu^

( 27 )
faithful people, nor to induce him to believe that
his enemy, who was befieging him, intended to
deprive him of the means of fubfifting his troops.
Ibid.] " The General is at a lofs to underftand
" what I mean by many thoufands of Loyalifts con'
" cealing themfelves in diftant provinces, and taking
*¦'¦ .refuge among the favages, to avoid entering into the
" war."
I did not mean, as he fufpedls, " the infurgents
*' of Carolina;" and if I had, I fhould have thought
that a General who had commanded his Majefty's
army, might have found a word more defcrip-
tive of a number of Loyalifts who had taken up
arms under the authority of his Majefty's Gover
nor, to fupport his government, than the word
in/urgent. However, the men alluded to were
thofe. who, when draughted from the militia of the
rebel States, rather than ferve in their army, fled
the provinces frpm whence they were draughted,
into others where they were not known. Many
took refuge among the Indians, and have fince
joined Colonel Butler and Captain Brant, and are
now ferving againft the rebels. This was a com
mon pradtice ; and it w.as partly owing to this
pradtice that Wafhington's continental army has
been fo fmall ever fince their defeat on Long IQand,
as not to amount, at any one time, to more than
10,000 men.
E 2 To

( 28 )
To my aflertion, " That many thoufands came
" over to the Britifli troops for protedtion," the
General anfwers.
Ibid.] " / aver, that at no time did men in
*' numbers come ever to the Britifh troops."
Here he does not venture to deny the fadt al
leged, yet he manifeftly intends to miflead the
reader. And to do this, he is obliged to add the
words, " at no time," and *' in numbers." Thus
he artfully attempts to avoid a fadt which cannot
be denied. I did not affert, that thoufands came
over " at one time," or " in numbers." The
General fufFered Wafhington to fuperintend his
lines at New York with fo much circumfpedtioHj^
as not to fuffer the Loyalifts to come in in num
bers; and when he went to Pennfylvania, the
people were ordered, by hi* declaration, to " re-
*' main peaceably at their Ufual places of abode."
But had the fadl been denied, it could be fup
ported by the number of refugees, perfecuted on
account of their loyalty, who came from time to
time into Philadelphia and New York, many of
whom are at this time embodied in corps in
his Majefty's fervice. And it appears from the
teftimony of Lord Cornwallis (p. 68), that, while
the Britifli army was at Trenton and Bordentown,
"three or four hundred of the inhabitants'*
came in every day for ten days (that is, while the
troops ftaid there), and received certificates for
their

( 29 )
their protedtion; and he might have faid with
truth, ' that before the taking of Trenton, not
lefs than feven thoufand had, in the fpace of three
>Vecks only, received thofe certificates. But thefe
certificates were of little ufe to the unhappy peo
ple; — all who were in or near the Britifh lines
were plundered, and the faith of the General,
pledged to the people by his proclamation, was
ihamefully violated.
Upon my aflfertion, That " the foot and caval-
" ry fent over to America, amounted to 52,815 ;
*' and of that number 40,874 were under the
** command of Sir William Howe," the General
obferves. Ibid.] " Mr. Galloway applied to me for per-
*• miffion to raife a troop of dragoons, which, he
" affured me, fhould be compofed of native Ameri'
*' cans. It turned out, that very few of the men
*' raifed were AwE-KiCAKS."
The General's memory has here failed in feveral
particulars. The warrant figned by himfelf
will prove it. Mr. Galloway applied for permif-
lion to raife a regiment. He only obtained one
for raifing a troop. That warrant is in the ftyle
and words of all the other warrants for raifing
American troops, under which natives of every
country, living in America, were teceived, with
out objedtion. The words, " native" Americans, or
any others of that import, are not in it. The
warrant

( 3© )
trarrant being his diredlion, he concluded,
that if he raifed faithful fubjedts of the
Crown, it would not be material what country
gave them birth. And, therefore, the firft ftep
he took was, to recommend to the General, for
the Captain's commiflion, a gentleman long refi-
dent in Bucks county, but born in Ireland. This
recommendation met with the General's approba
tion, without the leaft objedtion to the country.
Nor did Mr- Galloway, or the Captain, ever re
ceive the leaft intimation that the troopers fhould.
be only natives of America, until the corps was
more than full, and the men appeared to be.
muftered. After this, the Captain reported to
Mr. Galloway, that the officer who muftered therti
made this obje(ftion to fome ofthe men. Mr.,
Galloway referred Captain Hoveden to his war-,
rant. Upon which Mr. Galloway complained to
the officer of this, and other difficulties, which
had been thrown in the way to the raifing of this
troop ; and he heard nothing more of the ob
jedtion, until he faw it in the General's An
fwer. Nor is it true, that " very few of the
" men were Americans." There were more na
tives of America in that troop, than in any pther
cotps, of the fame number, hitherto raifed in that
country ; and but " few" who were not fo.
In refpedt .^to this troop, there was fomething,,
Angular and extraordinary in the General's
condudl. , Mr. Galloway having raifed it, ex-
I pedted

( '31 )
pedted it would have been mixed with the other
cavalry. But he found, tliat the General wifhed to
' triift him with the diredtion of its operations. This
gave bini fome furprife, as he was no military
man. But being "a Lawyer," as Sir William
Howe in derifion ftyles him, he perhaps had fome
vanity, and that vanity prompted him to render
fome fervice to his Country by his uninftrudled
endeavours. A number of reputable farmers,
and the fons of farmers, from the county of Bucks,
the place of his Summer's retirement, had come into
him. Thefe he embodied as volunteers, who
ferved the Crown until the evacuation of Phila
delphia, without pay or clothing. Of this troop
Mr. Galloway, with the General's permiffion, un
dertook to diredi the operations. The numerous
and important fervices they performed in a few
months, are to be feen in the Note *. To fthefe
fervices
. * With thefe two corps Mr. Galloway conftantJy harafled and
.diftrelTed the Rebels, and relieved the friends of Government
from the oppreffion of the Committee Men, Rebel Magiftrates,
aiid Colledorsi Df thefe they brought in numbers, fcouring
the whole country between Philadelphia and Trenton of all the
difaffefled. Waftiington, to relieve his half-naked men, who
were perifhing with cold in their uncomfortable huts, had feized
on and colleded at Newtown all the cloth in the county of
Bucks J and there, under a guard of 38 men, vvas making it up
for his army. Mr. Galloway fent out 24 of his troop, and 14
of his volunteers, to take it. This they performed in lefs than
^4 hours ; and after having floxmed, with fuch fkill and addiefs

( ,32 )
fervices it may be added, as a farther proof in fa
vour of this troop, if further proof can be want- in§,
as not to lofe a man, two rebel pofts, killed eight men, taken
a Major, feveral other Officers and privates, they returned with
thirty- two prifoners and all the cloth. In this excurfion the
volunteers marched on foot fixty miles.
Mr. Galloway next meditated an expedition againft Briflo!,
with 40 horfe and 50 of the volunteers; but receiving intelli
gence that upwards of 300 of the rebel troops had appeared
within five miles of the Britiih lines, and fearing that they
mtght'take fuch a poll as to enable them to cut oiF the retreat
of his party on their return ; he ordered Captain floveden to
take the route by Smithfield, where he fufpefled they wotild be
found ; and if there, to attack them while his men were frefli,
and not incumbered with prifoners. Sec. but if not, to proceed
to Briftol. The Rebels were at Smithfield, as hefufpefted. They
were attacked by lefs than half of their numbers.— They were
defeated and difperfed, twenty-three killed, and eight taken
prifoners. In a few days after, the fame numbers ofthe troop and refugees
were intended to be fent againft Briftol. But they had hitherto
fucceeded fo well, that the General did not chufe to truft them
alone any longer, and therefore fome Britiih horfe joined them.
Briftol was taken; but the American troop and volunteers were not
fufFered to fearchfor the Rebels, many of whom lay hid in dif
ferent houfes, and by that means efcaped. In the midil ofthe
bufinefs the troops were called off; and the bufinefs they were
fent to perform was not half performed, although there was no
enemy within 49 miles of the town they had taken.
Mr, Galloway having intelligence of eighty head of fat cattle,
yvhich were on the road to Wafhington's camp, was about to fend
out his tipop to take them, The General again added a very
few of the Britiih horfe, to take from Mr. Galloway the credit of
the enterprife, Tjie cattle were taken within a few mijes of
the Rebel camp.
Mr,

( 33 )
ing, that SirHenry Clinton was fo fully convinced
of its fidelity and gallantry, that they often at
tended him as his Body-guard. Page

"o"

Mr. Galloway next concerted a plan for taking Governor
Livingftori, and his whole Council and Aflembly then fitting at
Trenton^ with a number of others, the moft violent Rebels
in Jerfey. His intelligence was fo perfeft, that his fcheme
could not have failed. The whole Rebel force confifted only of
4-0 light horfe and 20 militia. — Thefe, unfufpicious of attack,
were every night off their guard. The friends to Government
in -Treijton were prepared to affiftt And Mr. Galloway pro-
pofed to execute this plan with his whole troop and his 80 vo
lunteers.' — The General at firft approved ofthe plan. — The day
was fixed. But here again he would unite with the party fonie
light infantry. To this Mr. Galloway had no right to objeft,
though totally unneceffary. Major Bruin was appointed to
command-the expedition. He called on Mr. Galloway, to con-
folt him upon the beft mode of carrying it into execution. Mr.
Galloway's fpies were now returned afecond time withthe moft
favourable intelligence, and he had given orders to his troop
and volunteers to hold themfelves in readinefs at the hour ap
pointed. But he had already brought in more than zoo prt/oneri,
And had done much mi/chief to the Rebels, and noiu offered to do
much more than itias thought prudent or proper. The General's
Aid de Camp came down to him, to inform him that the ex
pedition muft not be profecuted. Mr. Galloway knowing it to
be pradticable without any rifque, was furprifed at the liieffage,
and, perhaps improperly, urged to know the reafon. Tbe
anfwer was, that it was of no importance ; for that as the Ge
neral expefled a cartel for a general exchange of prifoners would
foon take place, the acquifition of the Go'vernor, Council, and
Affembly tf Neiu Jerfey would be of little ufe, as they would
be foon exchanged ; and yet they are truths which the reader
will fcarcely believe, that Governor Franklin, and many other
faithful fubjeifts of the Crown, had been at that time long im-
p prifoned

tc

( 3^4 )
Page 4^.] " The Author would here iniprefs the
*' Reader liiith an opinion, that, at the time or
My ARRIVAL At Staten Island, my army
amounted to 4.EfH'j^, and the rebel afmy to 18,000,
f' militia included."
The conclufion here drawn from my words,' I
may venture to affert, never was made by any
candid and fenfible reader. The words are inde
finite as to the time or times when the troops were
fent, and convey nothing more, than that all the
froops fent over amounted to 52,815, of which
prifoned by the Rebels ; and that the capture of the officers of
the legiflative and executive departments of a whole province,
would fo embarrafs its future exertions, that a military corps of
1000 men plight have reftored New Jerfey to the peace of the
Grown, and opened a communication with New York.
' However, from this lime the troop was taken from under
Mr. Galloway's (dijeilioo, and ordered into New Jerfey, to ope
rate in a thick wood. Sir William Er&ihe, whofe gallantry and
fervices, and whofe honeft wifhe sto ferve his country cannot be
too much apj^atrded, having formed an attachment to the troop,
came to Mr. Galfoway and iaformed him of the order— and de-
dared, that they would foon be cut to pieces in their operations
jn fo Woody a country — and further offwed to go to tiie Getierai
tt'ith Mr. Galloway, to prevail cm bim to fuperfede the order.
They both went — Sir William was only admitted, who foon re-
tiirned, and informed Mr. Gatloway that he could not fucceed.
Shortly after this, eight of the troop were furrouoded in a wood
by forty of Polafti's light dragoons. But thefe gallant men
refolved not to yieM, nor to be taken alive; and, excepting two
who were cut to pieces, and two who were wounded, fought
their way through their enemy. Thefe circumftaoces and
fervices are here recited, to fliew what kind of a troop it wa«
on which the General has thought proper tobeftow hiscenfure.
I troops

( 35 :)
troops General Howe had 40,874 under his com
mand. But what could he do ? He could not
deny the fadt; and it was too important an
evidence of his indolence and mifcondudt tp bs
pafled over in filence ; and therefore he refolves
to torture my general exprefCons to a particular
meaning, in order to divert the reader from re-
iiedting on the fuperiority of his force to that of
the rebels. Indeed, J have often occafion to ad
mire the like fkill and ingenuity in the courfc of
his Obfervations : for where he cannot fafely at
tack in front, he feldom fails to make ufe of ftra-
tagem to get round his opponent. What pity it
is ! What millions would have been faved to the
nation, what heavy difaflers to his country would
he have prevented, had he difcoyered equal fkill^
or the like ftratagem, in furrounding and attacking
his inferior and undifciplined enemy in America !
The' art here made ufe of will appear yet more
barefaced, vrhea the reader is reminded, that in
the Appendix to my Letters, I ftate his nurnbers
in ^Uguft 177^, when he, was at $taten Ifland, ^t
not more than 24,000 men. But he contends,
that I have exaggerated his numbers; for that
when he landed from Staten Ifland on Long Ifland,
he had only "20,121 rank and fle, of which 1677
*' were fick." To diminifh his real forccy he here
gives us -only the rank and file, omitting the nu
merous officers, from himfelf down to a drummer,
which generally amount, in every corps, to near
one fixth part of the whole. 1 am not a military
F 2 man;

( 3^ )
tnan ; my defign was to lay before my country
his real fofce, that they might form a juft judg
ment of his condudt. I have not therefore wrote
in a military dialedt; and if I had, few pf my
readers would have underftood me ; and could
I believe that I had mifreprefcnted his real force
in any one inftance, throiigh the want of that
knowledge, it would give me pain. But this I
have not done. His own returns laid before the
Houfe of Commons, in the laft year, will prove,
that he had at Staten IQand' 24,464 effedtives,
rank and file, and fit for duty ; and, in the whole,
26,980, officers not included, who, when added,
will amount to 3,1,625.
jbid.'j He finds much fault with my eftimate
of his real numbers ; and adds, " If I were to
*' follow the Author's mode of computation, when he
f fiates the number of men under my command, I
^'^ fhould fay, and from better authority, that Gen^-
'¦'¦¦' ral Wafhington had under his command in Ma^
*' 1776, in the feveral provinces, an army of 80,000
" men " and he refers to a return of the rebel
ftrength in May 1776, printed at New York.
The General does not lay' any ftrefs on this
Iham return. He knew its fallacy : It was a re
turn of rnen raifed, and intended to be raifed,
and which were never raifed, calculated to give
him a formidable idea of the rebel force ; and
being ridiculous in itfelf, it is produced to render
my eftimate of his own force ridiculous and falfe.
But to exp6fe his evafion of what he aoes not
venture

( 37 )
venture to detiy, I will give the reader his real
numbers from hisown returns. The firft column
-ihall contain the total effedtives rank and file ; the
fecond, the total army, officers included; the
.third, that of the American army; that every
unprejudiced and impartial reader may compare
the Britifh. force with that of the rebels. For,
after all our inquiries into the minute tranfac-
tions of any military command, the firft queftioji
¦of a man of fenfe will be. What was the refpec*
tive force and difcipline of the two jcontpnding
armies ?

, Total Effeaives,
^^ ' 'Rank and File.

Total Army,

Total

, Officers included.

Rebel Force.

Aug. 9. 24>247

29,308

18,000 *

Nov. 22. 26,989

3h75S

4,000

Pec. --

—

5,300 t

i'777-

¦

July 17. 30,049

35.047

8,000

Such was the ftate of the force under Sir "Williani
Howe's immediate command, .exclufive of the
garrifon at Rhode Ifland, which added, amounts.

* General Robertfpn fays, in his Examination,, the rebel
" force was only 16, 00c.
f See the General's Narrative, p. 8. Waftiington attacked
Colonel Rhal with his whole force, except Cadwallader's bri-
gade, which did not confift of 500 men ; and thofe were pre
vented, by the ice, from croffing the Delaware, and attacking
Bordentown, ai which place Colonel Doncp had left only 80
grenadiers. At this time the remains of Lee's corps had joined
Waftiington, who before had not zSco men, in

( 3« )
in the whole, to 40,874 ; and fuch the numbers
of his inferior, and truly contemptible, enemy,
notwitl^fiani^ing, as the General confeffes, " evc-
" ry cdmpuifory means*" was made ufe of to
increafe them j and yet he Ji^ffered that enemy,
lying in an unfortified poft, within twenty miles
of his quarters, to harafs and diftrefs his troops
from January to July, without taking a fingle ftep
to diflodge them.
The fame unjuftifiable indolence and mifcon
dudt attended his proceedings while in Philadel
phia. Here the General lay in his quarters all
the winter and fpring, until the month of June;
contenting himfelf with fending out occafiohal
parties to cover the loyalifts, who were continually
feeding the officers of his army with all the deli
cacies ¦ and luxuries which the country affbrdedt
To fupport this charge, nothing more will be ne
ceffary, than to lay before the public a few fadts
notorious in America, and to many gentlemen
pow in England.
Although the General, in page 60, afferts, that
his whole force at Philadelphia was no more than
13,799, rank and file, it does appear, by his own
returns, that he had, pn the 3d of Odtober, after
the battle of Brandywjne, 15,898 effedtives, rank
and file; total, rank and file, 17,752; and, when
the officers are added^ ao,68o. With this force,
* See his Letter to Lord George Germaine, February 1 2,
1777. Seealfj his Letter, March 5, 1778, a few

( 39 )
a few. men loft in the battle of Germantown ex-
cepted,:!.he went into winter-quarters in Phila
delphia, where he fayS it was " well accommo-
« dated." ' /
Wafhington, with about 9600 men, took up
his qaarteris at the Valley Forge, within twenty
miles of Pniladelphia. Having no houfes for his
troops, he was obliged to build uncorhfortablc
huts with round logs, filled in with clay, and
covered ^ith loofc ftraw and dirt, in fuch a man
ner as not to feeure themfrom the weatter. This
lituation the General, in his letter of the 5th of
March, defcribes in thefe words : *' The rebel
" army continues in the fame fituation as when I
*' had la^ the honour of writing to your Lordlhip,
•* hutted at Valley Forge, where their men fuffer
" exceedingly from the very inclement weather, which
*' has induced numbers to defert." The camp-
diforder raged among his men, which obliged him
to eft^blifh no lefs than eleven hofpitals ; and
many died, many deferted to their feveral pro
vinces, and near 3000 of them came over to the
Britifh army. From thefe circumftances, his
army was reduced, before the month of March,
to lefs than 4000 men ; and by far the greater
part of thefe were in a manner naked ; many"
without fhoes or ftockings, and but few, except
the Virgiuians, with the neceffary clothing*.
.* Mr. Galloway's Examination, p. 27, z8, 29, 30. His

( 40 )
Mis horfes were in a condition yet worfej they
were conftantly expofed to fhowers of rain, and
falls of fnow, both day and night ; many of them
died ; the reft were fo emaciated as to bd unfit for
labour ; and, in addition to this diftrefsful fitua-
tionj Wafhington had not in his camp, at any ond
time, one week's provifions either for man or horfe,
and fometimes his men were totally deftitute *.
Wafhington's camp was by no means difficult
of accefs ; far lefs fo than the pofts occupied by,
him at the Brandywine; and in one part of the
front the afcent was fcarcely perceptible, and his
rear was commanded by higher ground. His
ditches were not three feet in depth ; nor was there
a drummer in the Britifh army, who could not, with.
the utmoft eafe, leap over them ; and his defences
might have been battered down with fix- pounders.
This is not an exaggerated pidture of the 'rebel
army, nor of the weaknefs of its fituation. A
brief account of it I have given in my Letters,
page 87, which the General, in his Defence, has
not denied; indeed, he has thought it prudent to
take no notice of it, any more than of many of
the moft important charges contained in thofe
Ij^etters. Upon thefe fadts I leave the candour
dif the public to find, if it can be found, a reafon
why the General did not attack, or furround, and
k See a Letter, in the Appendix, from a Committee of Coii-
grefe appointed to encjuire into the ftate of Waihington'g
army. , take

C 41 )
take by fiege, Wafhington's whole army. His
numbers were greater than thofe of the rebels, who
furrounded and took a Britifh army, under Ge
neral Burgoyne, of 4000 veteran troops, in a
fituation not fo diftrefsful as that of Wafhing
ton. 1 Numerous are the inftances in which the Gene
ral has perverted my meaning to his own purpofes.
I have charged him with " declining to truft the
*' faithful and loyal fubjedts with arms, or to make
*' ufe of the well-affe£led force in the Colonies, to
*' affifi him in reducing, or in defending after reduced,
*' either cities oY provinces" In this charge I al
luded to his declining to embody the Loyalifts,
as a militia, in New York, New Jerfey, and
Philadelphia. In New York, the militia, which
he declined to embody, amounts to 5000 men. In
New Jerfey, upwards of fifty of the firft men in
the county of Monmouth, &c. came in to offer
their fervice in difarnrting the difaffedled, and to re-
ftore the prbvince to the peace of the Crown ; but
they could not procure accefs to the General, al-
though their wilhes were communicated to his Aid
de Camp. They returned to their refpedtive fa
milies, chagrined and difgufted at the hauteur of
the General ; fortie of them, notwithftanding, are
now at New York, under the protedtion of the
Britifli army, having abandoned their property,
hazarded their lives, and facrificed the happinefs
of theii" families. At Philadelphia, at leaft 3,500
G faithful

( 42 )
faithful militia mij^ht have been embodied in arms
for the defence of that city, while the army ope
rated againft Wafhington ; and had the General
at the fame time cordially invited the Loyalifts to
take up arms, as a militia, in their feveral coun
ties, under gentlemen in whom they had a confi
dence, for the particular purpofes of feizing on
and difarming thedifaffedted tb Government, and
defending their feveral diftrids, tfie whole pro
vince of Pennfylvania, and the eijtenfive peninfula
below, would have been reftored to the peace of
the Crown before the end of the campaign.
To parry this charge, the General afferts, page
56, " Many of my proclamations contained invita-
" tions to arms, and promifes of large encourage-
" ment." Where thefe proclamations are to be
found, he has not told us '; they never were put>-
lifhed in Pennfylvania, New York, or New Jer
fey ; and I verily believe they never we're written.
The proclamation -iffued in 1776, in New Jerfey,
contained nothing more than a promife of pardon
and protedtion to thofe who fhould come in and
take the oaths of allegiance ; tbat at the head of
Elk fefted only in promifing the people protedtion
from the " depredations of his army," and calling
pn the difaffedled ." to remain peaceably at" theii:
*' ufual places of abode." The General furely
eannot here mean the " many proclamations'* iffued
,withih his lines, inviting the people to enlift in the
regular Provincial fervice ? iThis cannot be > be
caufe.

( 43 )
caufe, to ufe his own wprds, it w,ould Jbe ," aquib-
" ble which would never have entered into the
*' ,hcad of an Englifli" nor of an American
*' lawyer."
Before I leave the laft-njentioned proclamation,
I cannot, in juftice to ;the charadler of Mr. Gallo
way, aypid faking (o.rn,e notice of a paragraph in
Page 56.J •" As this d^ecJaratio.n was calculated
" for the ,nie,rid,ian of Pennfylvania, of the people
*' of which province Mr. .Ga.Uoway profefTed an
" intimate kno^wledge^ / \cpnfidted him previoufiy
" upon it ; I franied it agreeably to his ideas j
" when written, it had Wx^ full approbation."
Here, I hope, tiie General's memory has .totally
failed him. The fatSs relating to this tranfadtioiji
are truly thefe. While the fleet lay at t,be Hook, pn
it? way to the Chefapeak, and not before, Captain
JM,ontrefp,r brought this declaration, in manufcrip.t^
fro,tn ,the,Gf-nera,!, to iVIr. Galjpway, with a reqgeft
that he would confider it. Upon the firft view, a
number pf objedtjons arofe ; he immediately com-
rnit;ted them to paper, fupported with his reafons.
Thefe he returned, with the declaration, to Cap
tain Mpntrefor, to be carried back to the Gene
ral. Upon Captain Montrefor's return, Mr. Gal
loway afkcd what the General f^id to his objec
tions. The anfwer was, that they were not ad
mitted ; for the declarations had been already printed
fiff at New Tork.
G % This

C 44 )
This is the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth. Captain Montrefor, and two other gen
tlemen, were privy to this tranfadt^on, whofe ho
nour, I have no doubt, will lead them to confirm
it. On this paragraph I fiiall leave ihe reader to
make his own comment, with only obferving, that
the General, in every inftance where he has taken
occafion to mention Mr. Galloway's condudt and
opinions, has been guilty of what charity would
lead me to hope are only failures of memory.
The Genera! labours hard, in his Narrative, to
vindicate his condudt in not fupporting theNorth-
ern army. Nor ought we to be furprifed at it, as
it was a negledt which ftrikes the mind on the firft
refledlion ; a blunder to which we owe all our pre
fent misfortunes. His arguments may be com-
prifed under three heads, ift. That he had no
exprefs orders to fupport it;, zd. That he had not
force fufficient; and 3d, That his Sotithern expe.^
dition was approved pf by the Secretary of State.
In reply to the firft argument, fhould we agree
to what he afferts, that the exprefs orders .to fup
port the Northern army were never received, yet
¦yve know that a letter from Lord George Germain,
of the ^d of IVlarch, 1777, came to his hands on
the 8 th of iVIay *. That in this letter he is in-
,formt:d, it was his Majefty's opinion, that " a warm
f See Letter of this date in the Parliamentary Regifter, 177,9.
V diverfiqh

( 45 )
*' diverfion fhould be made on the coafts of the
" Maflfachuffets ;" and that the " benefits" which
*' muft inevitably refult" from it, are pointed
out, viz. " That it will not only tend much to
*' impede the levies" for the Continental army,
but to the fecurity of our trade, and would " keep
*' the rebels at home," for the internal defence of
their own refpedtive difiriSts. A more wife, or a
more neceffary diverfion, to fave the Northern
army, could not have been devifed ; and had it
been performed at the time General Burgoyne
paffed from Ticonderoga towards Albany, it muft
have produced the effedts his iVIajefty wifely pre-
didted. Levies never were, nor can be made, in
the feene and buftle of war; and men will not
leave the defence pf their fire-fides, their prin
cipal fea-ports, and moft valuable cities, to fight
in a different province, and in'diftant woods, where
there is nothing to diefend.
This diverfion, therefore, had it been made,
muft either have drawn General Gates, with his
whole army, to the defence of the capital cities
on the fea-coaft, or at leaft have detained at home
more than one half of thofe men, which, by this
negledt, ¦were enabled to join his army ; and ih
that cafe the Northern army could not have failed
pf overcoming, with eafe, every poffible difficulty.
Put I will fuppofe that no fuch diverfion had
been diredted. The General could not but know»
that tl}p objeft of the two armies was the fame, and

( 46 )
and -that it was the immmediate bufinefs of both tp
form a jundtion. Was Jt npt then his duty tp
fee fo large and impowant a reinforcement in ^
ftate of fafety, at leaft, before he carried his arniy
to a place which deprived him of the power tp
fupport it ? However, it (eei^s, notwithfta;iding
his Majefty's diredtipns, and the weighty m-
portance pf the meafure, that the General and bi^
Noble Brother " confulted upon the expediency pf
*' the diverfion *," yet neither made it, nor took
any meafures to fppport the Northern expeditipnj
in cpnfequence of which, a Britifti army paffed
under the yoke of rebellipn.
I have hitherto reafpned uppn a fuppofition, th^t
the General had no exprefs ord.ers to co-pperat.e
with, and join theNorther^ Sirmy; and I truft, .thp
arguments Ihave advanced are fuffipient to prove,
that, in not doing it, he adted contrary to bis m.a-
nifeft duty. But, to ftrip him even of the fhado^
of an excufe, I will prove that he had thofe orders,
pr what fully atnounted to them.
On the ,25th of Septeipber, 1775, he received
Jjiis commiffion of Command.er in Chief f. On th.e
Qth pf Odlober he undertakes to propofe the plan
of his ftiture operations ; recommends the evacuji-
tion of Bofton, and that a bpdy of x 2,ooq men t^e
• Narrative, p, 12.
¦\ See his Letters to the Earl of Dartmouth, dated the jth
¦pf November, and 9th -of Odlober, ^¦^JS-
J employed

( 47 )
ehiployfed '• fforti New Ybrk, to 6pen the coffintM-
*' nictitioii with Canada in the firft inftance," and
that an arrtiy of Canadians and Indians frOitt Ca
nada fhould meet him ', and, that " the accom-
" plifhnientof the primary objedt for opening the
" cbnirHUHication, being obtained by the tpe ar-'
*' mies, thefe corps might take feparate routes
" into the proyinceof Maffachufet's Bay." And
in his fetter of the 2d of April, 1777, he points
but " the advantages that might arife by fecurlng
*' AlbMydnd the adjacent country,"
Sti-idtly Conformable to thefe ideas bf the Gene
ral, Government proceeded. His own army was re
inforced with numbers fO great, that it ftruck him
\vith utter amazement. Another arnfiy Was fornied»
and ordered to proceed froni Canad^ to join his
troops at Albany. On the 25th of March, the
Secretary of State trahfmitted to Sir Guy Carle-
ton, at Quebec, the plan of operations for both
armies ; in which hc is ordered " to detach Gfehe-
«* ral Burgoyne," ahd to diredt hithj " fo de-
** tached, to proceed with all poffible expedition
*' to Albany, afid put himfelf under the command of
« Sir William Howe;" and further adds, " with
" a view of quelling the rebellion as foon as pof-
" fible, it is become neceffary that, the mo^ fpeedy
*' junSiion of the two armies fhould b-eeffelkd." An
official copy of this letter was tranlmitted to Sir
"WilHam Howe for his information arid diredtion* and

( 48 )
and was received by him on the 5th of June< fijj
weeks before he failed on his wild and unfortunate
expedition to the Chefapeak. By thefe betters,, the
following truths are in full evidence : That the
plan of the Northern operations was the General's
own, and not the plan of Adminiftration : That
he received written orders to " effedt a fpeedy
*' jundtipn" of the two armies, and that that junc
tion was to be made at Albany. This, is fo plain*
that it would be an affront to the reader's under-
ftanding to fay more on thefubjedt. In vain will
the General plead, that he never, received his or
ders. For what end was the official copy of the
plan of operations fent to him ? Was it to anfwer
no purpofe ? Or was it to fignify his Majefty's
pleafure and orders refpedting thofe operations?
How idle ! how truly trifling, then, muft this part
of his Defence appear, when the junStion of the
two armies was not only conformable to. his own
plan, but clearly pointed out by reafon^ mihtary
duty, and by his Majefty's orders !
As to his fecpnd objedtion, that he had not force
fufficient, I need only remind my reader, that the
General had under his command, on the 17th of
July 1777, as appears by his own returns, 40,874
men, officers included. His Southern army con
fifted of 20,58 p ; the garrifon of Rhode Ifland re
quired only 2400, as he confeffes,. in bis fecrei
letter ofthe 2d April, 1777 j his remaining force was

( 49 )
Was •17,794- I" the fame letter, he ftaces as fuf
ficient for the defence of New York and New York
Ifland 3200, of Paulus Hook 300, of Staten Ifland_
1200 ; in the whole 4700. This number, dedudted
out of 17,794, will leave 13,094, befides 3000-
effedtives, of the provincial corps under General
Tryon. This will make the force under his com
mand, exclufive of his Southern army, and his ne
ceffary garrifons, 16,094. ¦ I will alfo fuppofe,
which is a very extravagant fuppofition, that every
fixth man was an invalid, and it will leave 13,412
pffedtives, whom he might have applied to the
fupport of the Northern army; but, not inclined
to fupport that army, he left ufelefs ^thoufands in
the garrifon of Rhode Ifland, and - carried with
him, in his wild circuitous voyage to the Chefa
peak, as many thoufands, equally unneceffary ;
for there was not the moft diftant profpedt that the
enemy could ever raiie an army, equal, in effec*
tive force, to io,coo veteran troops.
But further. He acknowledges,, page 61, that
he " left at New York about 8500 rank and file,
" fit for duty." I have fhewn, that he thought
4700 were competent to the defence of all his gar
rifons ; why then did he not order the remaining
3800 to make the diverfion on the coafts, of New
England, as had been diredted by his IVIajefty ? a
force abundantly more than fufficient, if properly
eondudted, to have detained the whole militia of
that country in the defence of their capital towns
H and

( so )
and valuable fea-ports, which muft have enabled
General Burgoyne to pafs without difficulty to
New York.
The third argument remains to be examined.
The General, in his Narrative, as well as in his
Obfervations, repeatedly declares rhat the Secretary
of State approved of his " expedition to Pcnnfyl-
" vania." This affertion is of the fame complex
ion with that of Mr. Galloway's approving of a
proclamation, at a time he had never heard of it.
The fadts are : In his letter on the 20th of Janu
ary, 1777, he propofes " to detach a corps only t&
** enter the .Delaware by fea, and the main body oi
*' the army to penetrate into Pennfylvania by way
*' "/ J^f^" This meafure was founded in the
fbundeft polity, and juftified by common fenfe;
becaufe, had it been purfued, Wafiaington, having
at that time only 8000 men, muft have fought, or
fled before him out of New Jerfey, over the Ik-
la ware. Wafliington's iafety depended on his
taking this route ; his military ftores and provi
fions were all on the other fide of the Delaware t
cut off from thefe effentials of war, he muft have
given up the conteft. Wafhingt^an once defcated,^^
or driven over the Delaware, the province of New
Jerfey might have been immediately reftored to
the speace of the Crown. Philadelphia, altoge
ther without defence by land, and very little better
by water, muft have immediately fajlen. A gar
rifon, more numerous than Wafliington's whofe
^ array,,

< 51 )
army, might have been left for its defence, and
10,000 men, at leaft, fpared to operate up the
North River, or on the New England coafts, in
favour of the Northern army. All this might have
been accompliflied with eafe by the latter end of
Auguft, although the campaign was not opened
until' the 1 2th of June; but had the General
commenced the operations on -the i2th of May,
the moft proper month in the whole year foir
military operations in that part of America, it
\ might have: been completed by the latter end of
July. This appearing evidently to be pradticable,
with the force under the General's command, every
candid and fenfible man muft applaud the council
which induced his Majefty to approve of the
plan for invading Pennfylvania, " by the way of
" Jerfey."
This approbation was communicated by Lord
George Germain, in his letter of the 3d of March 5
but before it could reach* the General, he had
altered this judicious plan for one truly ridiculous,
and ru-inous not only to the Northern army, but his
own operations ; a plan which muft neceffarily have
been attended with a great wafte of time, immenfe
expence, unneceffary rifque, and innumerable diffi-r
culties. In his letter of the 2d of April, he informs
the. Se^jretary of State, that, " irom the difficultief
*» afid delay that would attend tbe paffing the river
• He did not receive it till the Sth of May.
. \ H 2 " Delaware,

( 52 )
*' Delaware, by a march through Jerfey, I propofe
" to invade Pennfylvania hy fea ; and from this
" arrangement we muft probably abandon the Jer-
" feys, which, hy the former plan, y^ov\^ nQthz.-vt
" been the cafe."
Will the General affert, that the Minifter of
the American department ever approved of this
material^ this mifchievous change, in his plan ? Did
he ever approve of his abandoning New Jerfey,
his embarking on fhip-board his whole army, and
fubjedling them to all the rifques and dangers of
,the fea, without the leaft neceffity or reafon ?
The American Minifter is too wife, and too well
verfed in military fcience, to have approved of
a. plan pregnant with fuch folly and infatuation;
if he did, the General is called on to produce
fome proofs of that approbation.
This being the truth, the General will labour
in vain to throw the blame of his own military
abfurdities upon thefhoulders of others. The plan
was truly his own ; and it bears fo firong a re-
femblance of his other military operations, that
no one acquainted with them can poffibly doubt
it. For by this wretched projedt the three ftrOng
pofts cf Brunfwick, Bonumtown, and Amboy,
which had been fortified at an immenfe national
expence, were to be given up ; the province of
New Jerfey, yvhich had been fo lately reduced,
was to be abandoned to an enemy confifting of
lefs than one third of his own numbers; and a
Britifti

( 53 )
Britifli army, both cavalry and foot, was to be
embarked in the hot holds of fhips, in the hotteft
months of the year, to pafs into a ySt more fouth-
ern and fickly climate, and that too at a feafon
when contrary winds never yet failed to prevail.
All thefe difficulties, together with the dangers
and rifques of the ocean, were to be encountered
In preference to a march oi fifty-eight miles through
a fine open country, interfedted by a variety of
roads, and ftored with every neceffary for the ac
commodation of an army.
But it feems, " the difficulties and delays that
" would attend the paffage of the Delaware, and
" the want of fufficient means to pafs fo large a
*' river *," were the obftrudtions to his firft plan.
What will the reader fay, when he is informed,
that this fo large, and fo much dreaded, river is
ever, in the months of June, July, and Auguft,
fordable in a variety of places, between Trenton
and Coryel's Ferry, on the different roads to Phi
ladelphia ? and yet, if it was not fo, that it is
not, in many places, 300 yards wide ; that the
ground on the Jerfey fidecommands, in many parts,
that on the Pennfylvania fide, fo that our army
might have been perfedtly covered by cannon in its
paffage ; and that the General had prepared more
boats and pontoons, which he carried with him
to Brunfwick, than were neceffary for that pur-
* Narrative, p. 16. pofe.

( 54 )
pofe. Thus circumftanced, and thus prepared,
what would an Amherft, a Wolfe, or a Bouquet,
have thought bf difficulties fo truly infignificant !
As f have now before me Sir William Howe's
general plans of operation, I cannot avoid taking
notice of his change of opinion. As foon as he
was- appointed, his plan " was to open acommuni-
*' cation with Canada, in the firft inftance *." Soon
after, with much good fenfe, he refolves to profe-
cute the advantages he bad gained in New Jerfey,
and to go to Philadelphia by land\. This refolu-
tion fuddenly changes for a worfe, to go by fea ¦^.
We next fee him alter this refolution for one infi
nitely worfe ftill, and to be equalled by none, fave
that of going to Philadelphia by way of the Weft
Indies ; for he refolves to go to Philadelphia, by
" taking the courfeof the Chefapeak." And even in
this fourth refolution he does not continue long,
but changes it for his third, and again determines
to go up " the Delaware;" and that for a very good
reafon, " in order to be nearer New York §.''
And yet, after all this cpnfufion in opinion, we
have feen his moft judicious plan, approved of
* See his Letter of the 9th of O£lober, 1775.
\ See his Letter of the zoth of January, 1777.
J Sej his Letter of the 2d of April, 1777.
§ In the laft paragraph of his Letter, of 16th July, 1777, he
fdys, " I ptopqla going up the Delaware, in order to be nearer
" this place (New York) than I ftiould be by taking the courle
'¦ of Chefapealj Bay, luhich I once intended, and prefei'red tt
" that of the Dela<ivare>" by

( 55 )
by his Majefty, fet afide ; and another, founded
iolely on his own wild ideas, unapproved of by,
and uncommunicated and unknown co, any but his
Noble Brother and himfelf, and which involved the
operations of the campaign in cenfufion and ruin,
ultimately prOfecuted. He led his army, contrary
to his own declared opinion, that he ought to be
" near New York," round Cape Charles, and
wafted the beft feafon for military Operations, from
June to September, encountering difficulties and
dangers, which the plan approved of by his Ma
jefty muft infallibly have avoided. Such was
the ftrange and fatal verfatifity of the General's
councils and condutSl !
It would be endlefs to take notice of all the mif-
ftated and miftaken fadts, and the many difinge-
nuous arguments, adduced by the General in his
Vindication. I fhall, therefore, in future, content
myfelf with giving brief anfwers to many of them,
dwelling only on the groffer blunders in his condudt.
He takes much pains to vindicate himfelf againft
the charge of not opening the campaign before
the month of June. He begins with contradidt-
ing my affertion, in the Letters, that the rebel
fevies never could join the army before that
month; and avers, that their levies "joined early
" in the fpring." Now this was not the fadt;
and it will be eafy to convince the reader of its
impoffibility. The rebel army confifted of more
than three-fourths hiih and Scotch, and lefs than one-

( ,56 )
one-fourth native Americans *. The firft gene
rally came from the back parts of Pennfylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina;
the fecond, principally from tbe difaffedted New
England colonies ; fo that at leaft three- fourths of
the new levies had from two, to five and feven
hundred miles to march. The inclemency of the
feafon prevented them from fetting out from the
fouthward until the beginning of April, and later
from the northward ; and therefore they could not
join the army " early in the fpring f ." The time of
their jundtjon, a fmall part from the Middle Colo
nies excepted, was about the beginning of June;
before which time, however reduced thfe number
of the enemy might be, the General would never
begin his principal operations.
But he fays, " We had not forage in quarters ;
" nor could we have carried any quantities for effen-
" tial fervice."
If he had not forage in quarters, on what did
his horfes fubfift ? they were always in high order.
In his campaign of 1777, he might have com
manded all that Long Ifland, Rhode Ifland, and
* Mr. Galloway's Examination, p. 22.
-j- In his Letter of the 19th of April, he fays, " Their force
" has been ditninillied, during the courfe of the winter, by de-
" fertion. and by detachments to the back fettlements ;". but
he docs not fay a word of their receiving reii.forcements, which
a General, fo expert in apologies for his indolence, we may pre-
f ime, woiild have done^ had any joined the rebel army at thait
time; Staten

< 57 )
Stat€(n Jfland produced; and in that of 1778, had
he chofe to open it before he refigned his com
mand, all that the environs of Philadelphia af
forded, which was immenfe. And could he not
have carried a fortnight or three weeks fprage, or
fufficient to enable him to have attacked his enemy,
lying no more than a day's march from his quar
ters ? He had horfes and carriages fufficient, and
-niight have had more. Sir Jeffery Amherft car
ried the provifions for his army from Lancafter to
Montreal; General Forbes, from Lancafter to
Fort Pitt; and Colonel Bouquet, from Lancaf
ter, upwards of three hundred miles, to Mufkin
gum. But the true anfwer to all thefe weak apo
logies for his indolence, is, that the country was,
at all feafons of the year, plentifully ftored wijh
dry forage ; and that a fuperior army may procure
it, if the Commander of it choofes, from the fame
parts and places where it is daily obtained by the
inferior ; and more efpecially where the country is
generally difaffedted to that inferior army : befides,
it is well known to the people of that country,
that the green forage, with which it abounds, is
fufficiently grown to fupport cavalry, by the lat
ter end of April. In a country thus poffeffed of
dry and green forage, the General's horfes could
have run no rifque. But there was a magnanimity
which difcovered itfelf in all his condudt, and
which, if the real lovers of their country will not
commend, his friends, in the oppofition to Go-
I vernment.

( 58 )
Vernmenf, will fupport and applaud ! He fcorned
to imitate the rafh impetuoftty of men, who, too
deeply impreffed with the principles of honour,
and defire of fame, regard no difficulties; he
therefore would never purfue the enemy whom he
had defeated, nor attack him when unprepared;
hor would he open the campaign until the levies
Of his enemy were joined.
So much for the campaign in 1777. ^^^ "^^^
attempts to juftify his indolence in 1778. Here
he apprehends that " he need not fay much in his
" vindication, becaufe, vz^y early in April, he re-
" ceived his orders to return home."
The terms " very early" in April, are founded
in miftake. He did not receive a permiffion from
his Majefty to return, until the 14th of that
month * ; nor did he refign his command until the
24th of May, near fix weeks after. He conti
nued; during that time, fhamefully inadtive in his
winter quarters, notwithftanding, in the fame let
ter which conveyed the leave to refign, he was or
dered by his Majefty, " whilft he continued in
.*' command, to lay hold of every opportunity of
«»' putting an end to the rebellion, by a due exer-
,?' tion of the force under his orders." The only
jnovement of any confequcnce, during that fix
weeks, is not mentioned in his letters ; however,
as this exploit ought not to be concealed from
she public, I will relate it.
f See Parliamentary Regifter, 1779,
On

( S9 )
On the 19th of May, the Marquis de la Fayette,
with the main force of Wafhington's army, from
Valley Forge, croffed a bridge over the Schuylkill,
and took poft at Norrington. Intelligence of this
movement was immediately communicated to the
General. Pretending to fhew a defire to do fome-
thing before his departure, he marched out with a
large part of his army, in two columns, as if he
really intended to attack the enemy. The firft co
lumn, unperceived and unfufpedted, moved in a
circuit round the enemy's poft, and got perfedtly
in his rear, within fight of his corps, and confi-
derably nearer the bridge, over which only the
Marquis could poffibly return, while the other co
lumn advanced towards the enemy's front. Thus
completely entrapped, the Marquis gave up all as
loft ; he expedted his retreat would have been in-
ftantly cut off. Wafhington, defpairing of the
fafety of the flower of his army, immediately pre
pared to fly, with his remaining non-effedtives,
baggage, and artillery, to be drawn by a few
ftarved and emaciated horfes, towards the Sufque-
hannah ; and nothing was wanting but a fmall
fhare of military exertion, or, perhaps, inclina
tion, to take or deftroy the chief force of the rebel
army. But here again, as at Brunfwick, Trenr
ton, Hillfborough, Brandywine, and German
Town, the enemy was fuffered to make a yet more
fortunate efcape. The firft column, inftead of pufh-
jng towards the bridge, in a good road leading to
I z it

( ^o )
it on the right, and cutting off the enemy's re
treat, while the other fhould advance, and attacl^
in front, was marched to the left, in a route rnor?
diftaht from the bridge, and thus, inftead of in
tercepting the enemy, fell into his rear. The
other colutnn, .under the immediate comrpiand of
the General himfelf, leifurely advanced in, front,'
The paffage to the bridge was left Open ; and the
Marquis, having recovered from his panjc and
defpondency,-rnade good his retreat, without lof§j
and unmolefted.
The words " orders to rstUrn" are diflngenuous,
and evafive of the fadt. They convey the: idea*
f hat the General was, removed from his command
contfary. to his wifh ; when the truth is, that sS
foon as he had done ^-j lit(le good, .at^^as. much
mif chief as ptffihle-, as foon as he had depreffed
the fpirits of the Loyalifts, by his inacceffibility,
his injudicious appointments, his- negledt of theni
•when rifing in arms in his favour^ and the indif-
criminate plunder made by his army; as/foon a-S
be had revived, by his difgraceful attempts and re-j
' treats, that fpiritof rebellion which he.had fo late-ly
depreffed ; as foon as he had, by his manifeft breach
df military duty and the explicit orders of his So
vereign, facrificed a Britifh army ; as foon as he
had overcome the hefitation and reludtance of the
Houfe of Bourbon, and prevailed on it, by the
indolence of his operations, openly and avowedly
,to fupport the.rebellipn; I fay, as fpop^s'he had,
§ ¦'wTth

( 6i ;
with art and addr efs, brought this load of igno.^
miny on the Britifh arnis, and thefe accumulated
evils on his country, :and not before, }ie petulantly
infifted on his refignation.
The reafon affigned for his refignation is fo in
decent and -groundlefs, that I will give it to the
reader in his own words, " From the little
" ATTENTION, my Lord, given to my recom-
" mendations, fince the commencement of my
" command, I am led to hope that I may be re^
V lieyed from this very painful fervice, wherein J
V have not tbe good fortune to enjoy the neceffary
" confidence and fupport of my fuperiors, ^bui
" which, I conclude, will be extended, to Sir Henry
" Clint on,, my pr-efumptiiife fuceeffhr. . By th? retuxu
*f of thepacikety I humbly requeft I.niay- have his
*' M^"efty's permiffion to refign *." In what this
want pf , attention to bis recommendations con
fifted, is not mentioned. If we look into the cor-
refpondence between the Secretary of State and the
General, we fhall not find it there; for in that it
will appear,; that if the General recommended a
favourite to his Majefty, he was fure to receivj§
promotion ; and, to incite and oblige him, if ho?
nour conferred, and a fenfe of gratitude could
oblige him, to do his duty, the ordef of Knight*
hood was beftowed by his Sovereign on himfelfi
^nd when we confider his wanton and extravagant

¦*©"

• See' his Letter of the 28th of Oftober, 1778, to Lord
peor^e Germain, demand?

( 62 )
demands for more force, with the exertions made
by Government to gratify him, we fliall find, that
his complaint of a want " of the confidence and
** fupport of his fuperiors," was made without the
leaft foundation.
When the meafures for reducing the revolted
Colonies were refolved on, and the General was
appointed to the command, fuch was the difpofi-
tion of Government to gratify him in whatever he
fliould defire, that the Secretary of State declared,
•* the meafures of force fhould be the wifhes
" of the General." The General, who was then
in America, and had the ftate of the rebellion be
fore him, was the beft judge of the force which
would be competent to its fuppreffion; on his
judgment, therefore. Government relied, ahd,
inftead of ftinting,' furpaffed his wifhes. In his
letter * to the Secretary of State, after long and
mature deliberation, he only requires 19,000 men,
which, he fays, will be " adequate to an adlive
" offenfive campaign on the fide of New York
*« and Rhode Ifland." To combat this force, hei
*« apprehended the rebels would nPt have lefs than
*« 10,000 men on the fide of Rhode Ifland, and
« 20,000 men to adt againft General Carleton on
*« one hand, and the New York corps on the
«' other.'' Inftead of 19,000 men, he was fur-
pifhed with 31,476; and although he expedted to
• See his |jetter of the 26th of November, 1 775.

( 63 )
meet a force of 30,000 men, the whole rebel army
did not amount to 18,000. With the force now
fent, and which amounted to 1 1,000 men more
than he required, the General appears to be more
than faiisfied, and declares his " utter aftonifti-
" ment at the uncommon exertions" of Govern
ment; and yet, in his letter of the 25th of Sep
tember, 1776, after he had defeated his enemy,
and taken, killed, and difperfed more than half of
his force, he begins his extravagant requifitions ;
and, with a manifeft defign to diftrefs Govern
ment, he requires " ten line of battle fhips, with
" a number of fupernumerary feamen, for man-
" ning boats." Would any perfon fufpedt, that,
at this time, the Admiral had 65 fhips of war ;
13 carrying from 50 to 70 guns, 28 frigates, and
34 floops ; and that the whole naval force of Ame
rica was no more than three frigates and fix floops
of war ? To what ufe did the General mean to
apply the additional " ten fhips of the line," which
could not be performed by the force already under
his Brother's command ? Was it to batter down
the fortifications of the rebel ports and harbours ?
We know they had none. Was it to penetrate up
their fhoal and narrow rivers, when he had fb many
frigates, and floops of war, only proper fpr that
fervice ? Did he want them to defeat the truly
contemptible naval force of the enemy, when the
Admiral had upwards of 60 veffels of war under
his command ? It

( H ).
It will be as impoffible for us to conceive to
what ufe the General intended to apply the ^' fu-
*' pernumerary feamen." His Noble Brother had
not lefs than 12,000 mariners on board the fhipS
of war and tranfports then under bis command,
Surely, out of fo great a number, men fufficient
might be fpared to man his boats, at any time^
and upon any occafion ; and yet, notwithftanding
the unreafonablenefs of thefe demands, morefliips,
and of a better and more ufeful fize, than was
afk^, were fent over, viz. one fhip of 44 guns,
10 of 32, one of 28, and one of 8 gi,vns.
The General, page 41, acknowledges, that,
when Mr. Galloway came over to the army, in
December 1776 (which was on the firft day of that
month), " his great fucdeffes had intimidated the
*' leaders of the rebellion, and nearly induced a
*' general fubmiffion." And indeed this confef-
lion, however unwarily made, was ftridtly true ;
for further oppofition was univerfally defpaired pf
by all America, except a few defperate men in
Wafhington's army, and that army was reduced to
lefs than 3500 men. And yet at that very period,
viz. on the 30th of November, he* makes an addi
tional demand of 15,000 rank and file; and in his
letter of the 20th of January, this demand is in
creafed to 20,000; and he declares, that this
* See his Letters of tie joth of November, 1776, and the
zoth of January, 1777. number

( 65 )
number " would by no means exceed his wants;
" yet 15,000 will give us a fuperiority."
The reader will be as much at a lofs to cifco-
ver to what ufe the General would have applied
this additional 20,000 men, as he has been in re-.
fpedt to the ten (hips of the line. Both of thefe
demands, when his force Is confidered, will appear
equally extravagant and unneceffary. He had then,
as appears by his own returns, 31,476 men, offi
cers included, and the whole Continental force did
not amount to 3500 ; and yet, in compliance with
this extravagant and wanton requifition, fo far as
it was poffible to be complied with, 7800 troops
' were, with all expedition, fent over to him.
The General, it feems, did not make this ex-,
travagant demand without affigning a reafon for
it. Reafons, or what he thought would carry the
weight of reafons, were always at hand, when the
Minifter could receive no ftate of fadts but by the
packets under the General's command, and when
all letters from America were liable to his in-
fpedtion. Perhaps Government .never committed
a greater miftake, than that of fuffering the line
of intelligence, from countries where its fervants
are employed, to be taken out of the hands of the
confidential officer. It enables its own fervants to
mifreprefent the ftate of the country, the difpofi-
tion of the people, the numbers of the enemy,
and to put what glofs they pleafe on their own
K mifcondudt.

( 66 )
mifconduft, without a poffibility of detedtion;
and from thefe mifreprefentations it has often
happened, that men have met with applaufe, when,
in juftice, they fhould have received condemnation
and difgraee.
But the reafons affigned were groundkfs and
fomantic. In his letter of the 12th of February,
he informed the Secretary of State, that " the re-
*' bels have profpedts of bringing an army into the
•' field of more than 50,000 men. They are moft
'* fanguine in their expedtations, and, confcious
*' that their whole ftake depends upon the fuccefs
*' of the next campaign, ufe every compulfory
*' means to thofe who do not enter voluntarily into
?' their fervice;" and yet, notwithftanding all
this fanguinenefs of expedtation, and thefe " com-
'* pulfory means," we know, that, inftead of
** more than 50,000 men," they were not able to
bring into the field, when the General met their
force at Hillfborough, more than 8000 ; and even
at the Brandywine not more than i6,ooq, militia
included ; after he had, contrary to all pohcy,
given them two months to recruit their feeble
army by every poffible exertion.
It thus appears, that if the reinforcement fent
ftll fhort of the force required by the General, the
expedted reinforcement of the rebels, which was
the reafon affigned for that requifition, failed in a
much greater proportion ; more than one-half of
tlie force rctjuired was fent, and not more thanone-

( 67 )
Ofie- fifth of that of the rebels was raifed. The ac
count of the force flood thus in 1777: Britifh,.
40,874 veteran troops; rebel regular army at
Hillfborough, 8coo ; at Brandywine,, 11,000 ;
and, in the fpring 1778, at the Valley Forge, not
4C00 undifciplined troops. With what juftice»
then, can the General complain of his want of
force ? and how fhamelefs and bare-faced is his at
tempt to throw the blame of his own mifcondudt
on that Adminiftration, which has, by fuch " un-
*' common exertions," thus gratified him in his
extravagant requifitions !
Pages from 50 to. 59 are employed in attempt-
i^ng to prove that the people of America are almoft
Univerfally ddfioyal, and that he did every thing in his
power to. encourage them to take up arms, without
fuccefs. Here he afferts, that the "¦ only attempt" made
by a body of men, to affift in fuppreffing the
rebellion, was in North Carolina, in 1776. Did
the General never hear of two different bodies,
who took arms in favour of Government, at dif
ferent times, in the peninfula between the Dela
ware and Chefapeak f Did he never fee, or hear
of the proclamation iffued by the Congrefs, to
fupprefs them ? If he did not, all America faw it,
and the people of Britain may alfo fee if. Did he
never hear, that, in feveral counties above AL
bany, the Loyalifts, being by far the greater num
ber, prevented the difaffedted from joining Gates,
K 3 when

( 68 )
when going againft General Burgoyne ? This was
a fadt known to thoufands within his own lines.
Did he never hear of the numerous offers made to
Mr. Galloway, while the General was at Philadel
phia, by the gentlemen of many counties, to take
up arms, to difarm the difaffedled, and to reftore
their refpedtive diftridts to the peace ofthe crown?
He certainly did.
-" The people of Staten Ifland, he confeffes,
*' Cp^ge 50) teftified their4oyalty by all the means
*' in iheir power ;" and General Tryon, and fome
other gentlemen, " who had taken refuge on board
*' fhip, informed him of the loyal difpofidon of
*' the people of New York and New Jerfey, &c."
But it feems General Tryon, who had been many
years Governor of the province, and the other
gentlemen, who had lived long in New York,
were all miftaken.
In order to account for the abfurdity of his ex-
tenfive cantonments, he acknowledges, it was to
" cover the county of Monmouth, in which there
" are many loyal inhabitants." But here again the
General found himfelf mifinformed ; Governof
Tryon, and a number of other gentlemen of New
York, had before, as I have mentioned, deceived
him. And now General Skinner, whom he
warmly recommends to his Majefty's favour, who
AVas the Attorney-general of the province, and
from whom he muft, or ought to have taken his
information refpedting the people of Monmouth,
' was

( 69 )
was alfo miftaken. Thefe gentlemen, it feems,
knew little about the difpofitions of the people of
the country in which the moft of them were born,
and in which they had lived from their infancy ;
for, fays he, " many, very many of the people of
" Monmouth were taken in arms againft us, with
" my protedlions in their pockets." Had the
General faid fome, and but few, of the people of
N'ew Jerfey had adted in this manner, he would
have been much nearer to the fadl. Among the 6000
people who came in and took the oaths, ibine
were, it may be reafonably fuppofed, difaffedled ;
but even thefe, we ought to fuppofe, would have
kept their oaths, had not the proclamation been
Ihamefully violated on the part of the General.
The plunder was fo indifcriminate, and fo excef-
five, that men were robbed of their all ; and it
was thefe difaffedted men, made defperate by the
breach of public failh, and injuries which they had
fuftained, who were taken in arms, with his pro
tedlions in their pockets, and none others. Let
¦Britons, for a moment, fuppofe, that the military,
who were fent into the city of London to, protedl
their perfons and properties againft the violence of
the late mob, inftead cf affording them that pro
tedtion, had robbed their houfes, and polluted
their wives and daughters; would they have tamely
fubmitted to fuch outrages ? Would their hearts
have felt no difpofition to oppofe fuch enormous
wickednefs? Their fenfibility will anfwer thefe
queftions.

( 70 5
queftion^ Indeed it is impoffible for language tt*
defcribe the mifchiefs and difgraee which the want
of difcipline in the Britifh army, in this refpedlj
bro'ught on the fervice; and men who are ac
quainted with it, are furprifed that it had not pro
duced, what, from many circum.ftances, it is pro
bable was intended, an univerfal revolt of all the
Colonifts. As another inftance of the difloyalty of the
Aniericans, the General fays, " Several corps were
*' offered to be raifed, aad were accepted, in the
*' winter 1776, to confift of 6500 men; but in
" May 1778, the whole number amounted to only
*« 3609, including the brigades of Delancy and
*' Skinner ; a little more than half the promifed
*' complement.^" The gentlemen who offered to
raife thefe corps, expedted that the General- would
haveopened rhe field for recruiting. When they look
ed at his force, they faw it was pradlicable ; but
they were deceived by the indolence and mifcon
dudt of the General. Brigadier-general Skinner's
brigade was to have been raifed in New Jerfey.
Thisprovince theGeneral had ffiamefully given up.
Brigadier-general Delancy's corps was to have been
raifed in the province of New York, which he expedl^
ed would have been open to his recruiting parties.
But theGeneral contented himfelf withthe poffeffion
of Long Ifland, Staten Ifland, and the ifland of New
York ; and, moreover, fuffered his enemy, who
had not 6000 effedtive men, to harafs and: befiege
2 him

( 7^ )
him in his quarters, during the whole recruiting
feafon. When thefe fadts are candidly confidered,
together with the fmall number of Americans within
the Britifh lines, the man of fenfe, who will refledt
how few men in a fociety are willing to fubjedt
their perfons to the dangers of war, and to mihtary
difcipHne, willbefurprifed at the numbers enlifted
under fuch difadvantages, and within fo fmall a
cortipafs of territory ; and will confefs, that it is a
. Itrong proof of the loydlty of the people.
At Philadelphia, the General infinuates that he
had made the fame experiment on the loyalty of
, the people. " Mr. William Allen, a gentleman
*' who was fuppofed to have great family influence
*' in that province; Mr. Chalmers, much refpedled
" in the three lower counties on Delaware, and in
" Maryland; Mr. Clifton, the chief of the Roman
" Catholic perfuafion, of whom there were faid to
*' be many in Phikdelphia, as well as in the rebel
' " army, ferving againft their inclinations, were
*' appointed commandants of corps." And what
was the fuccefs of thefe efforts ? He tells us, •' they
" only amounted to 800 men, including three
*' troops of light dragoons, confifting of 13a
'* troopers."
All this is plaufible in appearance, /but falla
cious in reality. It was the duty of the General
to enquire after popular charadlers for thefe ap-
' pointments ; but he fought the moft unpopular.
Mr. Allen was a young gentleman, whofe family
influence

( 7.2 )
influence was confiderable among the Republican
party, before they fubverted the proprietary go
vernment, and threatened to feize on the propri
etary eftate ; but, after thefe circumftances took
place, that influence was loft : he had been' alfo a
colonel in the rebel fervice, in the Canada expedi
tion. I do not mention thefe circumftances to
prejudice Mr. Allen,, becaufe I now believe him,
from convidtion, to be a loyal fubjedt ; but yet,
a charadler thus circumftanced was not the per
fon under whom the General could, in reafon, ex-
pedl the Loyalifts would inlift. Mr. Chalniers, a
gentleman from Maryland, who came into the
Britifh army at Elk, though much refpedled in
, Maryland, was unconnedled, and without any in
fluence, in Philadelphia. Colonel Clifton, ifpof-
iible, had lefs influence, ejccept among the Ro
man Catholics ; and of thefe there vi'ere not 200
men capable of carrying a mufquet : befides, here,
as in New York, during the whole feafon for re
cruiting, he fuffered Wafl:iington's parties and de
tachments to furround his lines, and render it im
poffible to recruit in the country. Such were the
gentlemen appointed, and fuch the embarrafsments
under which the recruiting fervice laboured in Phi
ladelphia ; and yet the General acknowledges,
that, during his fhort ftay in that city, where he
found only 4482 males from 18 to 60 years of
age, of whoni near 1000 were Quakers, he raifed 974

( 7Z )
974 rank and file, and, officers included, upwards
of -iioo.
T^he General fays not.hing of Mn Galloway's
troop of Philadelphia light dragoons ; it did not
fuit his purpofe. Xhat very unpopular gentleman
offered to raife a regiment of horfe, but he could
procure a warrant for raifing a troop only. This
corps was expeditioufly raifed ; in two months
they were complete, and fo well difciplined as to
be reviewed by the General, and greatly applauded
,for their difcipline. jt is known in that country,
that his influence among the Loyalifts was fuch,
that he could have raifed a regiment in nearly the
fame time, notwithftandino- the embarraffments
under which the recruiting fervice then laboured.
But tlie General declined making ufe of Mr. Gal-
loway's influence in the recruiting fervice, and
preferred to it that of an unpopular country ta
vern-keeper, for whom he thought, his fervants in
the kitchen the moft proper company. This man
received a warrant to raife a troop, and now mixes
with gentlemen of rank in the army. Such were
the judicious appointments of the Commander in
Chief in Philadelphia 1
To the charge, that no ftep was taken by the
General to embody the friends of Government in
!New Jerfey, who were anxious and defirous to be
employed in difarming the difaffedled, and in de
fending the country when the army fliould proceed
in its other neceffary operations, he anfwers,
L Page

( 74 )
Page 53, J " / never heard of fhe anxiety and
" readinefs here expreffed."
If the General never heard of the anxiety and
readinefs here expreffed, it was becaufe he would
not. It is a fadl which I have mentioned before,
and will here again repeat, that upwards of fifty
gentlemen, of well-known principle and untainted
loyalty, fome of them from the difipyal county of
¦ Monmouth, came into the lines of Trenton, with
defign to offer their fervices in the before-mentioned
meafures ; but the General was inacccffible ; they
could not, after feveral days attendance, procure
an audience. Some of them returned home, cha
grined and difgufted, and others are now in New
York, taking refuge under the protedtion of the.
King's forces. But if the General had really the
• redudlion of the rebellion at heart, why did he not
fet up the King's ftandafd, and call on the Loyal
ifts of that country to affift him in arms ? Why
did he reft on his proclamation, with promifing
them protedtion, and then fuffering that promife to
be violated in thoufands of inftances I Did he expedl
that the Loyalifts would impertinently offer their
affiftance to a General who would not deign to afk
it, and who fuffered his troops to plunder the in
habitants, to a degree more exceffive than ever was
known, under a prudent General, in an enemy's
country ? Did he beheve, that, by fuch meafures,
he fliould attach even the well-difpofed to the caufe
he was engaged in ? Did he imagine that it was
poffible

C 75 )
poffible to execute his truft, in reducing a country
io extenfive, without making ufe of the well-af-
fedled force in it, and whilft he was purfuing the
moft effedtual meafures to turn that force againft
himfelf.? If he did, he adled upon principles con-
tradidled by common fenfe, and the pradtice of all
other Generals who ever deferved the applaufe
and rewards of their country..
In page 54, the General next attempts to prove
that the inhabitants of Philadelphia were not,
*' anxious to promote the King's fervice, even
" without carrying arms."
He tells us, that labourers were wanted, to con-
firu£i the redoubts at Philadelphia ; and he applied to
Mr. Galloway to procure them. He prefumes Mr.
Galloway exerted himfelf; and yet, " with all his
" affiduity, and the means made ufe of by the chief
" engineer" the whole number that could be pre-
vailed on to affift him, amounted each day, upon an
average, to no more than between 70' and 80.
This tranfadtion, like every other mentioned in
his Defence, is grofsly mifreprefented. Mr. Gal
loway was applied to, by the chief engineer, to
procure the labourers. Near one hundred were-
im mediately -procured. The wages offered were
8 di.per diem, and a fait ration ; but for thefe the
men would not labour. " The common wages in
the city were from 5 s. 6 d. to 6 s. fterling/>^r diem.
Beef was fold at 2 s. 6 d. ^ 3 s. per pound; mutton
at 2 s. <? 2 s. 6 d. cheefe at 3 s. and bread at a price
L 2 eo ually

( 76 )
equally high. The men had families to feedj^
The General was folicited to raife their wages, but
he obftinatfly and inhumanly refufefd ; the men
deferted their work, and the officers declared they
could not blame them. Very different was the
condudl of Lord Cornwallis, when he apphed. to
Mr. Galloway to repair the top long negledted
dykes of the Province Ifland. Mr. Galloway re-
colledling the former condudl of the Gene'ral, in
formed his Lordfliip, that he could not undertake ,
the bufinefs, unlefs the men were to receive rea-
fonable wages ; and that he fliould afk no more
than he had given for the like work in time of
peace, although the price of labour was rifen nearly
two-thirds more. His Lordfhip replied, the work
muft be done, and, without hefitation, affented
to the propofal. Near fifty men were immediately
procured, at a Spanifh dolhr per diem, a fait ra,
tion, and a pint of rum ; the latter, becaufe they
were obliged to work in water. The bufinefs was
done in fix days, much to his Lordffiip's declared
fatisfadtion ; and then, "^ and not till then, could
the chief engineer make any confiderable progrefs
in eredling the main battery againft Mud Ifland
fort. "In pages 59, 60, the General endeavours to extC'.'
puate the plunder, and other enormities committed by
the fgldiery in America. He afferts, that " there
*f never was lefs plunder, nor fewer enormities^ com-
l\ mitted by any army in the field ;" and intimates, that

in)
that the newfpapers in America, like thofe of other
countries, are the vehicles of invention and calumny.,
upon which thefe enormities are grounded,
I fincerely wifh, forthe credit of human nature,
as well as for the General's credit, that this repre-
fentation were juft; but all, and more than I have'
faid in my Letters to a Nobleman, refpedling in
difcriminate and exceffive plunder, is known to
thoufands within the Britifli lines, and tb a number
of gentlemen now in England ; ahd in refpedt to
the rapes, the fadl alledged does not depend on
the credit of newfpapers. A folemn enquiry was
made, and affidavits taken, by which it appears
that np lefs than twenty-three were committed in
one neighbourhood in New Jerfey ; fbriie of them
on riiarried wothen, in the prefence of their help-
lefs hufbands; and others on daughters, while the
unhappy parents, with unavailing teai-s and cries,
could only deplore the favage brutality. Thefe
affidavits are on record in America ; and printed
copies of them are now in London, Such were
the meafures purfued by the General, to reconcile
his Majefty's deluded fubjedts to his government,
and to encourage the Loyalifts to fupport the caufe
of their Sovereign !
In page 6i, the General adduces the evidence of
Major-general Grey, to prove that the Chefapeak ex
pedition occafioned " a powerful diversion im
«* favour of the northern army.'' How

( 78 )
How powerful this diverfion was, the world al
ready knows ; it loft the very army it was intended
to fave, if it can be poffible that fuch was the in
tent. But I will more particularly confider the
force of the Major-general's evidence, in fupport
of the fadl alledged by the Commander in Chief.
" I think" fays the Major-general, " aftronger
*' diverfion could not have been made, than that of
" drawing General Wa/hington, and the whole Con^
*' tinental army, near 300 miles off."
From this mode of expreffion, the reader may
poffibly apprehend that Wafhington was drawn
300 miles more diftant from the Northern army.
But the Major-general could not poffibly mean
this ; the fadl being, that Wafhington was only
drawn, except for a few days, from Quibble-
town to the Schuylkill, 50 miles more diftant;
and, to perform this truly ridiculous diverfion, he
carried his army, by fea, at leaft 700 miles, againft
trade-winds, and, as he confeffes himfelf, through
a " very difficult navigation *." The confe
qucnces were forefeen by every man of common,
refledlion. The carrying the main Bririfli force at
fo great a diftance from the Northern colonies, in-
fpired the rebels with new hopes and fpirits, and
contributed greatly to increafe their numbers, under
Gates, againft the Northern army. It wafted two
months of the campaign, deftroyed many, and
* See his Letter of the 30th of Auguft, 1777.
a rendered

( 79 )
rendered the remainder of the Britifli horfes totally
unfit for fervice ; and occafioned the deftrudlion of
a number of veffels and ftores, which, " it feends,'*
could not be removed from the head of Elk *.
But to fhew the folly of this extraordinary ma
noeuvre, I will candidly lay before the public a
true ftate of the Britiffi and rebel force at this con-
jundlure, and their refpedtive pofitions.
General Burgoyne was on h*s route from Ca
nada to Albany, where Sir William Howe was
ordered to form a jundtion of the two armies.
Wafliington was at Quibbletown, 200 miles
diftant from the place where the Northern army
muft meet the enemy, and where it was taken v
the General's force was at New York, 40 miles
nearer, and in a manner between the Northern
army and Wafhington.
Waffiington's army could not have paffed to
Albany by water; he had not fhipping nor craft;
nor could it have marched by land in lefs than a
fortnight, and that only by one road, leading
through a gap of the mountain. General Howe
had an immenfe fleet of men of war and tranfports,
fufficient to carry his whole force to Albany in
one week,
Wafliington, when at Qiiibbletown, lay about
nine miles from Brunfwick, with his front on the
Rariton, which, at that time, and in that place,
• Sir William Howe's Letter, Odober 10, 1777. was

( 8o )
was not fordable, and his rear was acceffiblc with
eafe. General Howe, at the fame time at Brunf
wick, inftead of marching to Hillfborough, on the
fouth fide of the Rariton, as if dreading his force,
might have paffed in a good road, on the north
fide, not more than 14 miles, and perfedtly en-
eompaffed his enemy.
Waffiington's army vvas compofed of new raifed
and undifciplined troops, commanded by inexpe
rienced officers ; they were a corps which had been
defeated in every adtion, ftrangers to vidtory, and
difpirited. Sir William Howe's army were Bri
tons and Germans, perfedlly difciplined, and com
manded by brave and experienced officers, who
had carried vidtory and conqueft with them where-
ever they had trod, whofe fpirit had been exalted
above the effedts of fear t)y numerous and recent
fucceffes. Waffiington commanded, by Sir William
Howe's, own exaggerated account, only 10,000
men ; and, by his own returns, it appears he had
under his immediate command, at New York,
,40,784; and when we look at his own diftribution
pf the force neceffary for his garrifons, we find
7100* fufficient for that purpofe; fo th^t 33,684
remained to be led againft his enemy.
Upon this ftate of fadts, it is natural to aflc the
, ^pllowing queftions :
* Sir William Howe's fecret Letter, ofthe 2d of April, 1777' Did

(( -Si )
.- pid Sir .WiLliam Howe imagine that he vy^as
itaki;gg the neceffary, ipeafures to fulfil his orders
to join the Northern army at Albany, by leading
his*own aTn;^y round Cape Charles, 350 miles mprp
diftant, from Albany than, he was &t New York ?, .
Did he really itpagine that leading Wafhington,
already 200 njjles from Saratoga, from Quib.ble-
-to.wn to the nelghbourhoadpf Philadelphia, could
|)QffibJy; t>ea4ivje|}&9n.of the feaft' iniportance tp
the Northern army? If W%fhingt,oii had intended
to have co^)perated with Gates againft the North
ern army, could Sir William -Ho we. think that h"^
fliould^reivent it by hi^igg his army in the ,qcean,
andbg^jhis qircuitpus route to the Chefapeak, going
600 miles from Sa^ratpga, and ferving ,Wafhing-
!lon-W|^tJiin aoq.piilesiof jt ? , j
Jf the General .^-^ally intended to prevent Wafh-
ingtpn from affifting Gates, why did he .not take
a poft between then? in New Jerfey, on the only
;-oa,d .and ,pafs ,tbro,ugh ;which Wafhington could
march? r ,. ; -
Jf the really intended to put an end-to thereb^lr
lion, I^y.defeating-themainaEmy in the field,: why
did he not .lead 25,000 men fiipm. Braafwick, on
the-npiri|i,fide of the .Rariton, and attack Waffiing
ton's., iiD,ooo men in his unfortified jsart^i? Or, if
W^ington had been fo fortifi,edi$nd /ftrong aS.to
rendit an aflfault in?p*oper, why didh&noti with
fnch,j.a fuperior force, furround, . and, by cutung
off his fupplies, with which be -was very fcantily
.. ^ " M fupplied.

( 8= )
fupplied^, ftarve him ? All thefe ' meafures were
pointed out by common fenfe. : The benefits which
would have accrued froth them were obvious to all,
and-of the greateft importance to the" fupprdffion
ofthe rebellion; while that which he purfued did
not^fford the-leaft profpedt of a fingle advantage
to the fervice, and befides was atteridedwithan im
menfe unneceffary expence, was pregnant with nu
merous difficulties, rifques, and dangers, arid pro
mifed the ruin of the campaign.
Major-general Grey, in his eviideffce, further
fays, " I do -not think there was any one objeM
" which would have tempted General Wafhing-
*' ton to rifque a general adtion fo much as the fear
'» of lofing the capital of Pennfylvania."
This I believe to be true: but, what dbes it avail
in the defence of the General's conduct ? Nothing.
It contains a full conderhnation of his Chefapeak
expedition. For Waffiington would have fought
between Hillftiorough and that city,'^from the fame
motive. He engaged Sir \iy illiam Howe's army
-at Brandywine for that reafon, and he WOuld have
done 'it in New Jei^fey. ^''-Why then did not Sir
William Howe, having his boats 'and^pontobns
-with him all prepared a:t Brunfwick, pafs his army
from-Jthat place to the Delaware ? If Wafliington
had cpmefrom his pretended fti-ong poft to attack
the Bfitife' army, he muft^have fought his enemy
upon' equal, if not difadvatitageous tirms,- as Sir
William Howe might have chofe his groqnd. If
he

( H )
he had re'triaihed in his camp, the city of Philidel-'
phia, and all his magazines of military and other
ftores, rrtuft have fallen without oppofition into the
General's hands. , < ¦
To the queftion, " Was there any probability
" of bringing the War to a termination that cam-
" paign, without forcing General Waffiington to
" a general- engagement?" the Major-general
anfweVs, " Certainly not."
¦ Here the General appears to be fertfiblfrof the
great importance of bringing' Waffiington to a
battle; Why then did he not take One rational
ftep to effedt this purpofe ? Was it poffible that he
could imagine, that his taking poft on the fouth
fide of the Rariton would bring an inferior en?my
down from his advantageous poft, acrofs an un-
fbrdabfe; river, to attack him ? Why did henot
march up on the fame fide. of the river on which
Wafliington lay, and .offer bim battle ? Wafh^
ibgtommuft have fought in a httle time, or ftai;vcd
bis army. Or, why did, he not make a fein^by
paffing towards Philadelphia? This -m.uft have
brought Waffiington from his poft, or he muft hav?
given up the " capital of Pennfylvania,";fbr which
the General .hirtifelf; believed he would fight.
purely any of thefe meafures we^e. preferable to the
unprpmjfing and unfortunate expedition round by
fea.tothe.hfad of Elk. . ...
M-'^dl not b^ thoughra digreffion, ffiould I here
^ive the re.adeca defcription (tf the great advan-
r: ' M 2 tagcs

t 84 }
tages which a fuperior »rn>y rnuft hav-e over an in
ferior, in their operations in- New Jerfey. The
province is bounded on the eaft and fouth by the,
North River, New, York Bay, and the Ocean ; on>
the ;Weft, by the Bay and River Delaware ; and
on the north, it runs into the uninhabited moun-
tainSj forrtiing a peninfula to the fbuth» The
Waters inelofing it on the; eaft-, fouth, and weff, are
not more than 50 miles diftant from each otJ?er,
and tijitil the, fnonth of June are never fordable;
nor even then,: except in theOelaware above Tren
ton. And there are • very , few ¦ countrfes to be
found, kfs difficult and better adapted for military
operations.: Whati then is. the cafe <^ an inferior
army in a country thus fituated, when a fuperior
force is properly le^ againft it ? If, it fhould march
to avoid- its enemy fouthward, it:runs into a fnare.
from whence, it cannot efcape. If it r turns to the
nor^; it muft combat every difficulty which raouai'
tains deftitiOte of provifions can affotdv'and if
he attempts either on the eaft or weft to efcape, hti
ittay' "be Attacked in'the moment of croffing a con*-
fiderable river. And yet the. General, by the in
dolence of his movements, althot^h he had his
truly conteri¥pt't1[^fe erfeniy in "this very country,
fuffered him to'irofe the^DeJarwaire' with his tfeav^
baggage and artilleiy in i-776-j and-in June 1777
fhamefully retreated before- hku-, fuffering him
conftantly to harafs thfe Brkifh rear frPni'iBrtohf-
wick to Amboy» And wh&t was yet more abfurd in

( 85 )
in miiittry policy, he left thi-s fcene of operations,
fo full of advantages to himfelf, and mifchievous
to his enemy, in order to draw him into a field
more extenfive, where none of them exifted.
The Major-general further fays, " With the
" force Sir William Hpwe had under his com-
" mand, I think, if General Waffiington had a
" wiffi, it was fpr him to have gone up the North
" River."
This is only matter of opinion, and altogether
ill-founded. Waffiington dreaded the army's paffing
up the North River. He knew too well the diffi
culties he muft have to encounter in following it.
He knew the Britifli army would be tranfported
with eafe, and in a fhort time, by water ; and that
his own muft march over mountains, and through
ravines and ftrong defiles ; and that he muft re
ceive his provifions from the fouthern Colonies."
And he alfo knew, that it would d.e|>rcfs the fpirits
of the eaftern militia, prevent theni in a good de
gree from joining Gates, and infallibly fave the
Northern army. Such being his fixed opinion 5
when it was fuggcfted to him that Sir William
Howe was gone to the Chefapeak, he would not
believe it, and contended that the meafure was too
abfurd to be poffible. Agreeably to this opinion he
adled. When Sir William Howe with the fleet
failed from the Hook fouthward, Wafliington
moved his army from Quibbletown northward^ in
order to be more conveniently fituated to follow the

( 86 )
the Britiffi General up the North River. He be
lieved the failing from the Hook to be a feinf^ and
expedted each day that he ffiould hear of the Ge
neral's return, and of his failing with his army
towards Albany. ' And as foon as he heard thait
the Britiffi fleet was at the Capes of Delaware, and'
not before, he marched fouthward ; but upon re
ceiving accounts that the fleet had again ftood out
to fea, ftill perfuaded that Sir William Howe could
not adt fo contrary to reafon and obvious policy,
as to go up the Chefapeak to Philadelphia, and
that he would yet go to the northward, he returned
tp his northern poft, which he did not leave
until it was perfedlly afcertained that tbe Britiffi
fleet was near the head of Elk. This condudt of
the rebel General agreed with his declared fenti-
ments, and proves the reverfe of the Major-general's
Opinion. Page 62.]' *' My reafon for going by fea fully
*' f^i forth in my Narrative, page \ 6."
The only reafons afffgned by the General to his
Sovereign, in hii "letters, were the difficulties he
fhould meet: with in crOffing " the Delaware. To
thefe I have already replied. Since that letter, he
as difcovered a number bf others, equally ill-
bunded; and for thefe I arh referred to the Nar
rative. Page 1 6. J " To have attacked Wafhington' in
" that firong poft (^ihbletown), I muft neceffarily
•-' have made a confiderable circuit of the country."
The

I

( »7 )
The utmoft diftanqe^pf this circuit would not
have "Exceeded fifteen piifes, about fix piles further
than to, Hillfborough. Neither Qyibblctown nor
Hillfborough is ten mifes^from Brunfwick ; fo that
this confiderable circuit of country might have been
performed in one day. A circuit which will bear no
comparifon, with the one he adopted in its ftead,
and which he took by fea and land, to fight Waffi
ington at Brandywine on ground equally ftrong..
Page 1 6.] *' I did not think it advifedble to
'^ lofe fo much time as muft have been ^employed in
*' ' thai march during the intenfe heat cf the feafon,"
'The time which would have beeri'loft in that
march could not have been more than ten hours;— -
the rinie wafted in his Chefapeak circuit was three
months. Ibid.]" " Exclufive of this confideration, our
" return mufi have been through an exhdufied coun-
*' try, where there was no poffibility of keeping up
"¦ the communication with Brunfwick"
'The reader, by this account, may be led to think
that Quibbletown is one hundred miles from
Brunfwick, when in fadl it is but ten at moft ;^-
and thecommunication might have been as eafily
kept up with Qiiibbletown,, as with Hillfbo
rough";— and befides, as Sir William Howe had
only 1 1, ooo men with him, he might have had as
many iroi^e to have fecured the communication if
he'had wanted them.
- In my Letters I have afferted, that " in the
« midft.of vidtory the ardour of his troops was fup."
" preffed;'^

(. as )
" preffed;" and the General fuppofes, paj^ 62,
*' that the author alludes to his cotidudl nda^ the
*' lines of Brooklyn, and introduces the evidence
** of Lord Cornwallis and Major-general Grey
** to difprove it." Htfe the Geineral is' miftaken.
I did not all\ide to his condudl at BrooTclyn, but at
the Brandywine, Gothen, and at Gerrtiantown.
Men bf the firft fepUtatioh for candour and inte
grity at New York declare, that this was alfo the
cafe at BropTclyn and the White 'Plains ; but, as I
have not treated bf the General's condudl at th'of?
places, I Ihall take no further notice of his
evidence. In the Letters, I have faid, " that at Brunf'wick,
*' JliOrd Cornwallis was upon the heels of the ene-
" my J the deftrudlion of a. bridge over the Rari-
" ton fayed them only for a few hours; their
*' further fecurity was owing to the orders recpived
*' by that nobleman to halt at Brunfwick."
To difprove thefe fadls, he again, page 65,
refers to the teftimony o( Earl Cornwallis. On
this teftimony I ffiall make no remarks; but cpnf
tent myfelf with only obferving, that thefadls I have
alledged are ratified not only by the ,\imvet{a\ re
port x)f the country, but by the General's own
letter of the zoth December 1776, written at the
time when the tranfadtipn happened, to give juft
information to his Sovereign, whom he ought not
to have deceived, and when the General did not
think of his Defence. And therefore I prefume^
6 the

( 89 )
the public will give full credit to it. The words
of the fetterare :
" In the Jerfeys, upon the approach of the van
" of Lord Cornwallis's corps to Brunfwick, by a
*' forced march on the firft inftant, the enemy
" -went off moft precipitately to Prince Town; and
*,' had they not prevented the paffage of the Rari-
*,' ton, by breaking a part of Brunfwick bridge, fo
" great was the confufton among them, that their
*' army muft inevitably have been cut to pieces."
" My firft defign extending no further than to get
** poffeffion of Eaft New Jerfey, Lord Cornwallis
" HAD ORDERS NOT TO ADVANCE BEYOND BrUNS-
*' WICK, WHICH OCCASIONED HIM TO DISCONTINUE
** HIS PURSUIT."
Here every fadl I have alledged, and which the
General has denied, ftands fully confeffed by himfelf;
and when it is known that the Rariton is fordable at
Brunfwick at every recefs of the tide, no man can
doubt.but the fpirit and adlivity of his Lordffiip
would have led him, had not his orders been — •
" not to advance beyond Brunfwick," to have pur
fued an enemy thus precipitately " flying," thus
ready to be cut " to pieces," and having fo '¦'¦difficuh"
a river to pafs as the Delaware.
The advantages which muft have been derived
from continuing the purfuit were fo critical, fo
momentous, and obvious, that we cannot fuppofe
that an Officer io adlive and enterprifing, and who
had purfyed his enemy more than 90 miles, re
ducing their^ numbers from 1 8,000 to 3000 men,
N would

( 9lo )
.would have difcontinued his purfuit at the moment'
that enemy had before him all the difficulties of ^
croffing a cbnflderable river.
Page 67.} Wafhington's force at this time (when'
hs was followed to Trenton) confifted of 6000 men,'
exclufive of Lee's corps of 4000 ; General Wafhington
loft' no tinte in croffing his artillery and heavy baggage
over the Delaware at Trenton, before we could move
from Brunfwick. He alfo croffed part of his troops,
keeping a corps on the eafi fide to obferve our motions.
This paragraph contains three miftakes ; one of
them, I truft, the General himfelf will confefs. He
here fays that Waffiington's force confifted of 6006'
meti. ' In his Narrative, page 8, he acknowledges
that force to be only 3000 when it attacked Co'-'
lonel Rhal at Trenton. Pie alfo. afferts that Lee's
corps confifted of 4000 men. In his letter* to
the Secretary of State, giving an account of Lee's
capture, which happened only a few days before,
he fays it confifted of 2000 men. Thefe con-
fradidlions in his opinions, at the time he was
writing to the Secretary of State, and when he is
making his defence before the Public, the reader
will be -at no lofs to account for. However, the
truth is, that Waffiington, by his own returns
made on the day before he croffed the Delaware,
had no more than 3300 ; and a number of thefe
deferted immediately after. Lee's corps did not
• See his Letter, dated Dec. zoth, 1776. amount

C 91 ) ^
amount to 1500 ; and on his capture, many of
them deferted ; fo that when Waffiington made h\i
great, and what many thought would be, his laft
effort to recover his defperate affairs, he could only
bring over againft Colonel Rhal aSco men, or
dering Cadwallader with his brigade of 500 men
to crofs the Delaware, and to attack Bordentown,
where only 80 Heffian grenadiers were left by
Colonel Donop. The ice in the Delaware prevented
this intended manoeuvre. And yet Sir William
Howe fuffered Waffiington with this army, then
the whole Continental force of America, to take
from him all Eaft and Weft Jerfey, except his
pofts on the Rariton, and that too at a time when
he confeffes in his Narrative, page 41, that his
" great fucceffes bad intimidated the leaders cf the
*' rebellion, and nearly induced a general fubmiffion."
Nor is it a fact, that " Waffiington loft no time
*' in croffing his artillery over the Delaware at
*' Trenton before we could move from Brunfwick."
Waffiington believed that the Britiffi General had no
defign of moving his army from Eaft to Weft New
Jerfey. Upon what Waffiington's belief was found
ed, I know not. But it is certain, that he adled as if
he was acquainted with the General's firft intendons.
That he had, if we may credit his own letters to Con-
orels now in Britain, copies of returns of the Britiffi
army, is a fadl. It is therefore highly probable, this
refolution might inadvertently tranfpire through the
fame channel. Poffefled with this belief, W afliing-
N a ton

( 92 )
ton did not leave Princeton until the Britiffi van
was within three miles of it. Nor had he pre
pared boats at Trenton to tranfport his army over
the Delaware. The fame boats which Lord Corn
wallis fays, in his teftimony, " he had hopes of
" finding at Coryel's Ferry," did not get down to
Trenton until late in the fame night that the
Britiffi army fiept at Princeton. And there
fore it was, that Waffiington did not begin to
tranfport his baggage and artillery over the Dela
ware, until twelve o'clock that night ; and could
not get his baggage and troops over, until a few
minutes before the arrival of the Britiffi army *,
which had loitered feventeen hours within
twelve miles of Trenton. For this confidence of
Waffiington in the indolence of the Britiffi Gene
ral, his principal officers who were not in his fecret ,
councils blamed him. And it was upon this oc
cafion that Weeden, a rebel General, wrote the
letter I have mentioned in page 48 of the Letters
to a Nobleman, declaring, " that General Howe
*' had a mortgage on Waffiington's army for fome
" time, but had not yet foreclofed it."
It is alfo a miftake, that Waffiington " croffed a
*' part of his troops over the Delaware, keeping a
• See Sir William Howe's Letter, zcth Dec. 1776. The
truth is, the laft rebel embarkation had not left the Jerfey fhore
when the Britiih van appeared in fight. And a Mr. Samuel Mor
ris, one of the rebel officers, whofe fervant was taken, made his
efcape on horfeback, becaufe he could not reach the laft boat.
'¦f corps

( 93 )
" corps on the eaft fide to obferve out motions ;"
no corps was croffed over until the morning of the
day on which the Britifli army took up their quar
ters at Trenton.
Page 66. J " The troops of the left column were
" not in their cantonments in the evening of the march
" to Princeton until dark, and thofe of the right cc-
*' lumn not till fome hours after dark."
How illufive is this ! I have afferted that the
army arrived at Princeton at four o'clock in
the afternoon. This fadl the General does not deny;
but to evade it, we are told, when the two columns
were fettled in their cantonments. How long it was
before the two columns were in their cantonments,
1 know not ; perhaps the fame indolence prevailed
in cantoning the army as in the other operations.
But that both the columns were Britiffi troops, per
fedlly relieved from fatigue by their ftay at Brunf
wick, and zealous for adlion, and either of them
fuperior in numbers to the flying and panic-ftruck
enemy, are truths that cannot be concealed or
evaded. And therefore it is evident, that they
eafily might have overtaken, in the courfe of fe
venteen hours, the enemy, who were within twelve
miles of their quarters, and that in the very adt of
croffing the Delaware ; that river, of which the
difficuhies in croffing have been fo magnified to
ferve another purpofe.
Page 67.] The caufe of not marching earlier the
following day was, that tbe enemy had broke do-vjn ths
3 bridge.

( 94 )
Bridge, which could not befooner repaired, and rendered
fit for the paffage of artillery.
This bridge was over a creek which an Engliffi
hunter would leap with eafe. It was within a mile
of the Britiffi head-quarters, its banks floping to
the water's edge with the gentleft declivity, and
fordable at the high-road, and in twenty other places
within half a mile of it. The bridge itfelf, which
was only ufed occafionally by the inhabitants on
heavy falls of rain, might have been repaired in
one hour, and at four o'clock in the morning as
well as ten o'clock in the day — there was nothing
to prevent it. There are people now in London
perfedlly acquainted with this formidable bridge
and creek.
Ibid.j To account for his not^ croffing the Dela
ware after his reduced and panic-firuck enemy, at a
time when he had brought the country nearly to a
?' general fubmiffion" he again refers to Lord Corn
wallis's evidence, who tells us, " as the Delaware was
" not fordable, and we could get no boats, itwascer-
" tainly impraSlieable."
That the Delaware could not have been paffed
at this time without boats or rafts, is true. But
the General muft tell us in his rejoinder, why he
did not conftrudt rafts or pontoons, which might
have been done in a few days with the materials in
Trenton *. This is a queftion to which the Public
• See Mr. Galloway's ExarainatloD, p. 42. has

( 95 >
has a right, and will expedl, a fatisfadlory, and
not an evafive anfwer ; efpecially as the croffing the
Delaware at this time was moft critical and mo
mentous, and muft have put an immediate end to
the rebellion.
At this time, the models of Government in the
rebel States were fcarcely formed, and their au-
thbrity by no means eftabliffied. Every member
of the rebel State of New Jerfey had fled out of
the province ; and the Congrefs themfelves, with
the utmoft precipitation, had alfo fied from Penn
fylvania into Maryland. A univerfal panic, with
a defire of immediate fubmiffion, then prevailed
throughout all North America. Waffiington's
army was reduced to 3000 men. The city of Phi
ladelphia was diftant no more than two days eafy
march ; it was intirely defencelefs ; 3000 Britiffi
might have been fpared tb have taken immediate
poffeffion of it ; while the other, and by far greater
part of the Britiffi army, might have been em
ployed in the final deftrudlion of the rebel force
and magazines. The Britiffi fleet, or fuch a part
of it as might be thought neceffary, with tranf
ports loaded with ftores and provifions for the
army, might have failed round in one week, and*
without a fingle obftrudtion *, have paffed up to
Philadelphia, which every circumftance demon-
* At this time Mud Ifland fort was not builf, thechevaux-de-
frize and chain were not made, nor were their fire- rafts or water-
guard in any kind of force, ftrated

( 96 )
ftrated to be the moft comfortable and moft pro
per quarters for the army in winter. Had this mea
fure, which plain common fenfe fo evidently dic
tated, been purfued, the reader will determine,
^ whether that country, which the General has in-
eauribufly confeffed, was, by the previous fucceffes
of the Britiffi arms, brought " nearly to a general
•' fubmiffion," would not have ended the rebellion,
. preferved the Northern army, prevented a war
with France and Spain, faved the millions which
have been eicpended, and preferved the nation
from thofe imminent dangers and diftreffes which
lately threatened the Independence of the Britiffi
nation: Page 68.] The General again adduces the tefti-.
mony of Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Ofborne, to
vindicate his conduct in having taken Trenton into the
chain of cantonments, and for pofting the Heffian
troops, with the i^id regiment, there and at Borden
town, under the command of Colonel Donop.
Here he attempts to evade the force of the
charge againft hini. I have not cenfured his con
dudl for " taking Trenton into his chain of can-
*' tonments." Seeing he would not crofs the De
laware, this was a prudent; and neceffary meafure.
It was neceffary to cover New Jerfey, which he
had then conquered, and might have been fecured,
had he taken one proper ftep for that purpofe.
There is not, therefore, a fentiment in the Letters
that can bear this meaning : I have only blamed him,

•( 97 0
him, imo,,io,T giving the coiii mand of his frontier
cantonments to foreigners, who did not under
ftand the language or policy pf the country ; and
2do, and principally, for leaving the weakeft com
mand, or feweft number of men, next to the main
force of the enemy, and the ftrongeft and greateft
command, where there was no enemy to fear.
The reader will here permit me to refer hirn tp
a perufal of Lord Cornwalhs's evidence, where he
will find, that no fadl, which his Lordffiip afferts,
tends to contradidl 'any of the charges in this para,-
graph ; all that he fays, relates to the covering of
Trent<)n, which certainly was judicious and ne
ceffary. But had his Lordffiip been confulted on
the quantum of force which ought to have been
left at Trenton, or upon the expedience or pro
priety of placing foreigners in the frontierppfts, I
ani confident he would have advifed againft either
of thofe meafures ; and had he been ajked by the
General, whether the greateft or weakeft force
ought to have been placed in the frontier canton
ments, he would, without any hefipation, have
advifed the greateft.
Page 6g.] Sir George Qfinori^e, whofe evidence
I have mentioned, tells us, that, after the misfor
tune of Trenton, Colonel Donop acquainted Mm, that
if Colonel Rhal had executed the orders he had deli
vered him from Sir William Howg^ which were, lo
ereSl redoubts at the pofi of Trenton., that his opinion
was., it would have been impoffible to have forced
O Rhal's

( 98 )
Rhal's brigade, before he could come to his afftfiance
from Bordentown.
If this was the declaration of Colonel Donop,
as we muft fuppofe, inafmuch as a gentleman of
Sir George Ofborne's eftabliflied credit has de
clared it, it can only convince us, when the real
fadls are known, of the impropriety and ill policy
of placing Heffian commanders in the advanced
and moft dangerous poft, with a command fo
weak, to oppofe the whole force of the enemy.
The truth is, that Colonel Donop, when Tren
ton v/as affaulted and taken, was drawn down to
Mount Holly, twelve miles diftant from Borden
town, and eighteen from Trenton, with his whole
corps, except 80 grenadiers, contrary to the in
formation and advice received from Mr. Galloway,
This gentleman told him, that the enemy's force
at Mount Holly, which he fuppofed, from the
information he had received from a number of the
difaffedted, who had grofsly impofed on him, to be
3000 men, were no more than 450, men and boys,
prevailed on to make a ffiow, and to draw him
from his poft, while Trenton was attacked. This
informa'tion the Colonel difregarded ; the confe
qucnce of which was, that Colonel Donop was not
at Bordentown, from whence he could fupport
Colonel Rhal ; and therefore Colonel Donop told
Sir George what was not a fadt, to apologife for
his own unmilitary condudt. But

( 99 )
But if the Colonel had received orders to diredi
Colonel Rhal to fortify Trenton, one would ima
gine the General had taken the fame precaution in
refpedt to Bordentown. And yet we know that
Colonel Donop adted the fame indifcreet and un-
bilitary part with Colonel Rhal, and indeed
worfe; for he left his poft, although equally ex
pofed to the enemy, who had boats to crofs their
whole force over, to the affault of either poft, then
unfortified. Waffiington was not unmindful of
thefe military blunders, and therefore fent his con
temptible body of new raifed militia, moft of them
boys, to draw Colonel Donop from his poft, while
he ffiould attack it, as well as Trenton ; and no
thing faved Bordentown, at the time Trenton was
taken, but the ice in the Delaware, which pre
vented a corps of 500 men, under Cadwallader,
from paffing that river.
Had Colonels Donop and Rhal received orders
from the General to fortify their refpedtive pofts, is
it credible that officers of their rank and experience
would have prcfumed to difobey them ? I ffiould
think not, when their own fafety and honour de
pended on their obedience. If Colonel Donop
had received fuch orders, it was his duty to have
feen them executed ; if he did not, why did not
the General call him to anfwer for fo great a breach
of duty .'' Why did he afterwards intruft a man,
who had tranfgreffed the military law in a point fo
O 2 imporcant.

( loo )
important, and which had brought difgraee and
ruin on the Britiffi fervice, with the important
command againft Red Bank ? But there are other
queftions, to which we may call on the General
for explicit anfwers. Were the orders to Colonel
Donop in writing, or not ? If they were in wriring,
why are they not produced ? If they were not, they
certainly ought to have been, in a matter of fo
much confequence. But farther. Why did not the
General fee that thofe redoubts were built, before
he withdrew his force from Trenton ? If they were
neceffary at all, they were immediately neceffary.
The affaults upon Trenton might have been made
the next day after the enemy had feft it, as well as
the eleventh. The General, with his whole army,
remained on the fpot, from the Sth to the 14th of
December * ; and in half of that tiriie the redoubts
at both pofts might have been completed, and rhe
fubfequent difgraccs and misfortunes, to the Bri
tiffi fervice, prevented. The General, therefore,
muft yet find a better apology for thofe two blun
ders ; of leaving his frontier pofts^ which were
the moft expofed, and in fight of the whole force
of the enemy, in a ftate altogether defencelefs,
and with the fmalleft number of troops of any
of his cantonments ; blunders that would difgraee
the weakeft officer in his army.
* See his Letter to Lord George Germain, of the zcth of
December, 1776. Ibid.]

( 101 )
Ibid.] Wafij ington, after Lee*s corps joined him,
had never lefs than 8000 men.
General Lee was taken, on the 12th of De
cember, by Colonel Harcourt, at the head of his
corps, near Trenton, on their way to join Waffi
ington. A fewdays after the fcattered remains of
that corps, not confifting of 700 men, joined
Wafliington, who, reinforced by that corps,
attacked Trenton ; and the General confeflfes, in
his Narrative, page 8, when he intends to throw
the blame on Colonel Rhal, for fuffering Trenton
to be taken, that " he was credibly informed, that
'' the numbers of the enemy did not exceed 3000 ;"
but in his Obfervations, when he has another pur
pofe in view, he afferts, ^that Wafliington had
never lefs than 8000 men, after the jundtion of
Lee's corps. The General did not recolfedl, at
the time he made ufe of this argument, that it
proves too much for his own reputation ; and that,
if it vindicates it in one cafe, it more ftrongly con
demns it in another. For if Waffiington's force
" was not lefs than 8000" men, when he left Tren
ton with only 1200, under Colonel Rhal, in a
ftate entirely unforrified, to oppofe that 8000, did
¦his military knowledge lead him to believe that
the poft of Trenton was fafe ? Did it juftify his
not feeing that poll in a ftate of defence, at leaft
for one day, before he left it; before he drew the
main Britiffi army from it ? I wifh fome reflec
tions, yet more to the GencraPs difadvantage than
thofs

( «02 )
thofe I have yet enumerated, may not obtrude
thetpfelves upon the mind of the candid enquirer
into his condudl. If there were 8coo men within
fight of the defencelefs poft of Trenton, did General
Howe intend to facrifice that poft to the wicked
defigns of a fadlion, combined againft the honour
of his Sovereign, and the happinefs of his coun
try ? Or ffiall we impute it to his ignorance in mi
litary fervice ?
But yet even this excufe his friend Major-ge
neral Grey will not fuffer us to admit. He de
clares, page g6, that the " divifion of the army,
*'" before the battle of Brandywine, was a mafierly
*' movement, deceived the enemy, and, brought on
*' an adtion with almoft certainty of fuccefs ;" we
cannot, therefore, impute fo grofs a blunder to
ignorance. The reader will afcribe it to another
caufe. I have afferted, in page 6 1 of my Letters, that
Waffiington was encamped at Quibbletown, about
nine miles from Brunfwick, with fewer than 6oob
undifciplined and badly appointed troops, which,
with a corps of .2000 men, under General Sulli
van at Prince Town, compofed his whole force.
To this the General anfwers.
Ibid.] From the intelligence I then had, and
which I have not fince had reafon to doubt, Wafhing
ton had not lefs than 10,000 men in his camp, on the
hill above ^ibblet'own.
The General ffiews no want of ingenuity in
ftating his own numbers, and thofe of his enemy. In

( 103 )
in treating of the former, he gives us only his ef
fedtive rank and file, exclufive of officers, an
important part of his force; but in fpeaking of
the rebel army, he always extends his ideas to its
whole force. This is artful, and ingenioufly
adapted to miflead men unacquainted with fuch
calculation. However, allowing him what he con
tends for, and fuppofing that he had *' ii,ooo
*' fighting men," and Waffiington 10,000, yet
the fbrrner were veteran troops, inured to vidtory,
• and eager for . adlion ; and the latter were new
raifed and undifciplined, and at leaft one-half
militia *. Was he afraid of attacking Waffiington
with fuch men ? If he was, why did he not add to
their numbers 11,000 more.'' His own returns
will prove, that the numbers then under his im
mediate command, were not lefs than 35,000.
Page 70.J His (Wafhington's) camp was to the
full as inacceffible in the rear as in the front, and an
attack upon his right fiank (from every account I
could get) would have been flill more hazardous.
" The furveyor of the county, who knew the
fpot on which Waffiington was encamped, was at
New York when the General proceeded toHillffio-
rough ; he was attending on the army to render
his fervices. He had drawn a chart of the roads
round Waffiington's camp; and he communicated
* It will occur to the Reader, that Lord Cornwallis, with
lefs' than 2000 veteran troops, has lately defeated, and totally
routed, 7000. Z ' his

( 104 )
his ideas to General Skinner, who had conftant
accefs to the General. He was ordered to hold
himfelf in readinefs to attend the army in Jerfey j
but he was left at New York, without any notice
of its movement to Hillfborough. Of thefe ^dts,
whenever called upon, he will make folemn affida
vit ; and further, that Waffiington's canip was ac
ceffiblc both in the river and on the right flank,
on higher and more commanding ground.
Ibid.] Wafhington was certainly induced to be
lieve that my intention was to attack him ; and had
be not been perfe£ily fatisfied with tbefinngth of his
pofi, be would not have remained fo long in it.
It was impoffible that Waffiington could con
ceive, from the movement ofthe Britiffi army, that
the General intended to attack him. It did not in
the leaft indicate fuch defign, but manifeftly the re
verfe; indeed, it rather difcovered a fear in theGe
neral, of an attack from the rebel army. Could
Waffiington, when General Howe, with all the ap
pearance of caution and fear, in his whole march
from Brunfwick to Hillfborough, and during his
ftay at that poft, kept the Rariton, an unfordabfe
river, between him and the poft of his enemy, a
fituation from which he could neither attack nor
be attacked, poffibly believe he intended to attack
him ? It was this unmilitary condudl which en
couraged Waffiington to remain in his camp, be
caufe he knew he was fafe while Sir William Howe
remained thus ppfl;ed. Had the General wiffied to

( 105 )
to have induced Waffiington to believe he intended
to Iwing on an adlion, there was one obvious and
infallible mode of doing it. A march of five or
fix miles would have carried the army to Waffi
ington's right flank or rear. It would then have
been pofted between Wafliington and all his re-
fources ; it would have cut him off from his ma
gazines of provifion, his military ftores, and his
boats, then lying fome within feventeen, and all
within thirty miles of the Britifli poft. In this
cafe, Waffiington muft have deferted his camp, or
ftarved ; and if he had moved, the General might
have attacked, or purfued him to his boats, to
which the Britifli army would have been many
niiles nearer than Washington, as he muft have
taken a confiderable circuit to have reached them,
and to have avoided an adtion, fuppofing it to
iiave been pradlicable. But inftcid of this ma
noeuvre, the General did not move his army to
wards the Delaware, far enough to induce a be
lief that he intended either to crofs ir, to get in
the enemy's rear, or to cut him oft" from his fup
plies. From p.ige 7 i to 96, tl-c General has ir.!rcd-jc:d
tc: ifftimcvy of Sir An J 'Tic S!:.:p: hL^minoud, to apo-
Icglzs fer n:.t gring :/p the Delaiv.irc, ivhri hc ar-
rkeJ ¦:"itb h:sf:.:r i:t the Crpcs cf that Bay.
It would be a tedious tafk, and little entertain-
in;^ to the render, ihould I travel through all the
miftakes conr.;:rn\l in this teftimonv, refpedling
P ' tlie

( io6 )
the numerous " flioals; and rapidity of the tides,**
in the Delaware ; the force of Waffiington af
Willmington ; the narrdwnefs of the channel at
Newcallle ; the difficulties of landing the troops,
and the great ftrength of the rebel Water-guard.
I will, therefore, content myfelf, becaufe I truft
the reader will be fatisfied, with a few brief and ge
neral obfervations on the whole. "The fhoals are
to be feen in Fiffier's chart of the Delaware. The
tide does not run two miles and an half in an hour.
As to the narrownefs of the channel at Newcaftle,,
every fkilful mariner, who has failed up the De
laware, knows, that from the Pea-patch below, to
Marcus Hook above, that town, a diftance of 20
miles, it is at leaft two miles in width. The ftrength
of Waffiingtpn, at Willmington, was perfedlly vi
fionary ; becaufe it is known he was not at that time
in Pennfylvania : And there are a number of gen
tlemen, now in London, who can prove that the fort
at Mild Ifland was in an unfiniffied and defencelefs
ftate, and poffeffed by 130 militia only; that the
watC! -guard was unprepared and unmanned, and
the chain not finiffied; and that there are a vari-
' cty of places between the Bite of Newdaftle and
Marcus Hook, perfedtly adapted to the landing
of an army with the utmoft eafe. Of this. Sir
Andrew, in his crofs examination, notwithftand- \
ing all the imaginary difficulties he had before
enumerated, makes a full confeffion; for, in page
87, he candidly declares, that he " never pre-r
" tended tp deny the pradlicability of landing an
I ^l army

( 107 )
** army in the Delaware." But^ to put this mat
ter beyond difpute, I need only remind the Pub
lic, that the fame fleet which Sir William Howe
has endeavoured to perfuade us would be in
danger from the difficulties in the navigation, and
the rebel force, by his own orders, ffiortly after,
when Waffiington had poffeffion of the country on
both fides, did fail up the fame river uninjured and
unmolefted, and in lefs than half the time it had
taken to fail up the Chefapeak, and Waffiington's
troops were in poffeffion qf both banks of the river,
when the water-guard was prepared, and in com
plete force.
Pages 104 and 1 05 are •partly employed in an at
tempt to prove there was no time loft infiopping the
hanks of Province Ifland, to enable the workmen tp
ereSl the batteries againfi Mud Ifiand.
To fupport the charge of negledt, I ffiall apply
to the General's own declarations; by "which it
will appear, that the city of Philadelphia was in
the General's poffeffion on the 26th of Septem
ber *, and that the batteries were opened againft
Mud Ifland on the 15th of November, exadlly
feven weeks after J. What were the carpenters
and working parties employed in during this time ?
We are told they were repairing the dykes, and
flopping out the tides. If the engineer employed
them in that lalaour, ^hen he had. liberty to pro-
* See Sir William Howe's Letter to Lord George Gerpjain,
pf the !Oth of Oi^obrr, 1777.
J See Obfervations, p. 105. P % cure

( io8 )
cure artifts, he was very abfurd. This bufinefs ii
a particular art, and to be performed only by ex
perienced men. Their wages are from 7 s. 6 d.
to 10 s, per diem, while the wages of an Upland
ditcher is only 2 s. ; and I have known a mafter.
ardft fent for from Virginia, and paid 150 I. per an-
Mm falary. Hence it was that the carpenters and
working parties, if they were employed 'in repair
ing the dykes, laboured in vain, in a bufinefs that
they knew nothing about ; but the truth is, they
were as fruitlefsly employed in mud and water, to
eredl the batteries. This occafioned the applica.
tion to Mr. Galloway, by Lord Cornwallis, who,
as is before mentioned, had them repaired in fix
days. The number of men employed by him,
were upwards of forty.
An attempt is made, in page 106, to vindicate
the Generjal's condudl, in not attacking the rebel
army at White Marffi. " / had, fays he, the beft
" intelligence that the enemy's poft was not affailable
*' in the rear."
The guides who attended the General in this -
truly ridiculous eji;pedition, and who lived from
their infancy oh the fpot, and many others, will
prove, on oath, that the ground in Waffiington's
rear commanded his camp; and it is not lefs true,
that he was prepared, at a moment's notice, of
the General's movement towards his rear, for
flight. His heavy baggage was fent off toward
Skippack, and his light was in readinefs for a pre
cipitate

( 109 )
cipitafSe movement. Men of undoubted reputa
tion, within his lines at the time, have confirmed
thefe fadls.
But the General here again calls to his aid the
teftimony of Major-general Grey, who fays, " I
** think an attack on the enemy, fo very ftrongly
" fituated as they were at White Marffi, would
^' have been highly imprudent." Did the Major-
general ever reconnoitre the rear of Waffiington's
camp ? Was he ever on, or near that ground ?
He does not affert it ; and the truth is, he never
was. May he not then have been miftaken in his
opinion ? He in the next page as pofitively afferts,
that the war was carried on, '* in the ftrongeft
J' country in the world, with almoft an unani-.
*' rnous people to defend it ;" and in both of thefe
opinions, there are now but few men who do not
know that he is grofsly miftaken.
I have faid, that the General " fupinely fuf-
*' fered himfelf to be furprifed at Germantown."
To difprove this charge, we are referred to Sir
George Oflsorne's teftimony; and, when we can
didly examine what he has faid on the fubjedt, we
ifind it rather fupports than difproves it. All
that Sir George has faid in favour of the General,
is, that he ordered him to move in front of the
line of infantry ; and told him, he " might expedl
?'the enemy at day- break." This

( no ¦)
This only proves, that the General had fomc
fufpicions of the enemy's defign ; but not that he
had, in confequence of that fufpicion, given the
neceffary' orders to the army, to prepare them for
receiving the enemy, and to prevent a furprife.
If he really believed he ffiould be attacked, he is
yet more culpable than I had imagined ; for it is
evident, from the teftimony of his own witnefs,
that no fuch orders were given. Four different
queftions were put to Sir George, in order to draw
frpm bim his opinion on the furprife ofthe army ;
all of which he declined to anfwer. If he did believe
the army was not furprifed, would not his honour,
and the juftice due to the General, have induced
him tb have declared his opinion ? And, as he de
clined ir, is there not what amounts to the ftrongeft
prefumption, that he could not deny it without
violating his honour and the truth ? But if the
¦General really gave the neceffary orders to the fe
veral officers of his army to prevent a furprife, all
his Aides de Camp, and his Secretary, were in
London during the examination of his witneffes
before the Committee of the Houfe of Commons,
why then did he not prove fuch orders by them ?
His honour, his mihtary charadler demanded it ;
and yet we find he has prudently avoided tp exa-.
mine them on the fubjedl.
In the Letters to a Nobleman, page 86 to 89,
I have faithfiilly defci'ibed the diftreffed fituation
of the rebel arniy at the Valley Forge, and charged

C III )
the General with a high ^breach of his duty to his
Sovereign, in not attacking or befieging it, and by
that means faving his country from all its fubfe
quent misfortunes. As this is a high charge, the
Public will excufe me if I repeat it at large, and
'then confider his anfwer.
" Here" (at the Valley Forge) « Waffiington
*' lay all the winter and fpring, encountering dif-
" ficulties which, language can fcarcely defcribe.
" His army labouring under bad appointments,
" almoft in every refpedt ; his troops in a manner
" naked, in the moft inclement feafon ofthe year,
*' having no fait provifions, and little fait to eat
" with their freffi ; often on ffiort allowance in re-
" fpedt to both ; rapidly wafting by ficknefs, that
" raged with extreme mortality in all his different
*• hofpitals, and without any of the capital medi-
" cines to relieve them. His army was likewife
" diminiffied by conftant defertions, in companies
*' from ten to fifty at a titne ; hence in three;
*' months his number was reduced to lefs than
*' 4000 nnen, who could not, with propriety, be
" called effedtives. t
" Waffiington's army continued in this weak
*' and dangerous ftate from December rill May;
" while the Britiffi troops, who had the beft ap-
*' pointments, and were in high health and f]pirits,
<' lay in Philadelphia, in a great meafure inadlive,
" fuffering the rebels to diftrefs the loyal inhabit-
« ants on every fide ofthe Britiffi lines, to deftroy
" their

( ii2 )
" their mills, feize their grain, their horfes, theif
'* cattle ; imprifon, whip, brand, and kill the
»' unhappy people, who, devoted to the caufe of
" their Sovereign, at every rifque, were daily fup-
" plying the army, navy, and loyal inhabitants
*' within the lines, with every neceffary and luxury
" that the country afforded."
To the charge thus made, with fo many cii^cumi
fiances precifely defined, the General, as upon many'.
other occafions, contents himfelf with making only
a general anfwer. He does not prefume to deny
one of the fadts I have afferted ; he does not deny
the defcription I have given of the weaknefs ofthe
enemy's camp, and of its lines and redoubts; of
its numbers of men ; of its truly diftreffed ftate;
arifing from the want of comfortable lodgings, of
provifions, and of clothing ; or of the conftant de
fertions, and extreme mortality raging among his
troops. All thefe fadls he gently glides over in
filence, and artfully refts his defence on the fol
lowing naked affertion : That
Page io6.] " The Author's plan of befieging
'^ the enemy at the Valley Forge, is in the higheft:
*' degree abfurd. Had I made a divifion of the
*' troops in the manner he propofes, I ffiould have
" expofed them to be beaten in detail."
Surely this cannot be deemed a fatisfadt<jry an
fwer to thofe numerous fadls, ffiould I fay nothing
in reply ; however, fatigued as I am with the dif-
agreeable tafk of refuting fo many pofitive affer-
tions.

( "3 )
tions, and fuch numerous mifreprefentations, I
eannot pafs it over in filehce. On my reader's ac
count, as well as my own, I will be brief. The
reader will fee, in the Appendix, a .genuine letter
from a Committee of Congrefs, appointed to ex
amine into the caufes of- -the diftreffed ftate of
Waffiington's army, and fitting at the Valley
-Forge at the time I have mentioned. It is figned
' FrancisDana, one of the Committee, in behalf of
the reft, diredled to the Prefrdentbf the Congrefs,
and indorfed in the hand-writing of Mr; Laurens,
the then Prefident, from v/hofe trunk, among
other interefting papers, it was taken'; the au
thenticity therefore cannot be difputed. From
, this letter, it will appear that I have been modeft
in my defcription of the diftreffes of Waffiington's
army ; I truft I have been fo in every other piece
iof informarion, which I have, from the beft of
. morives, given my country; and 1 cannot help
acknowledging, that I efteem it a fortunate event,
that I am- thus juftified in a particular which car^
ried with it a greater degree of improbability than
¦ any other that I have communicated to the public.'*
- Having perufed this letter, the reader will 're-
. coUedl, that the General had under his immediate
command near 20,000 veteran troops ; that his
enemy had not 3000 men, who could vyith pro-
. priety be called effedliyes ; .that thefe were in a
"manner "deftitute of almoft every neceffary; and
, thai be hi^d not horfes to carry off his cannon and
' ' ' Q military

( IH )
military .ftores. W^hat, then, could prevent theGe
neral from marching out with 5000 men, and at
tacking this enfeebled, fickly, and naked enemy, thus
deftitute of provifions ? Was he afraid that 5000
veteran Britons would be beaten " in detail" by fuch
ah enemy? Why, then, did he not take his whole army
(as there was at that time no other body of men
in arms on the whole continent of America), and
attack, or furround, and ftarve liim into a furren-
der, agreeably to the plan I have mentioned in the
Letters *? Could any thing be more pradlicable ?
Did not every fenfe of military duty, the recent
lofs of the Northern army, and the critical ftate of
affairs at that time in Europe, all urgently pr-efs
him to take this meafure ? Had this been done,
the honour of his country, ffiamefuUy loft at Sa
ratoga, would have been regained ; all the valu
able arullery, and military ftores of the continent,
¦would have fallen into his hands. The Congrefe,
feeing their whole force taken or difperfed, muft
have defponded of further oppofition ; all America
muft have fubmitted; and the Court of France
muft have feen the folly of its new alliance, and
receded from it; and thus the General might have
faved his country from all its prefent difficulties,
embarraffments, and diftreffes.
* See Letters to a Nobleman, p. 89, and the chart, (howrng
the pofition of the rebel army, aad of the polls propofed tobe
taken by the Britiih, If

( »i5 )
If thefe was not a want of inclination, why was
tiotthis done? The General cannot plead want of
perfedl knowledge of the defpondency and weak
ftrate of his enemy. If he wanted charts of Waffi-
ingtpn's quarters, and his redoubts and defences,
feveral of them were brought in to him by men of
credit, who took them on the fpot. If he wanted
intelligence of the ftate, pofition, or movements of
the army, he received it conftantly from officers,
and other perfons confidential in every department
pf the enenny'^ army ; befides his conftant intelli
gence from deferters, fpies, and the people of the
country, daily coming into his lines. In ffiort,
there was no movement, or other material circum
ftance that happened, but what the General was
foon acquainted with. The ftate and condition of
the rebel army was as much before him as before
Waffiington himfelf.
It has been problematical with many, what mo
tives could lead an officer, whofe reputation ftood
high in the opinion of his Sovereign and country,
into all this mifcondudl. The humane and cha
ritable impute it to his real ignorance in his own
prpfeffion. But thefe men have taken only a fu-
pefficial view of the General's adlipns. His plans
of the battle of Long Jfiand and Brandywine, are
irrefiftible prpofs that, when he intended to gain
an advantage over his enemy, or even to cut pff
his retreat, he poffeffed military judgment fuffici-
0^2 ent

( ii6 )
ent to infure it. At both of thefe places, he knew,
hat if he had been defeated he muft have loft his
army. Had his troops' been routed at Long Ifland,
he could not have efcapfed in boats to his ffiips,
when purfued by a vidtorious enemy. Thus cir
cumftanced, his military abilities were ekerted ;
nor would his manoeuvres have difgraced a gene-
ral bf the firft abilities; he turned his enemy's left
flank,- unfufpedted, by a circuitous route, ^nd
killed' and took prifoners one-third of his army.
At Brandywine, when he thought his fleet had
lefthim, and he had no fafety but in vidtory, his
. meafrffes were equally judicious;, he fuddenly,
and unperceived, hemmed in the whole rebfel-arm'y
between his two columns and impaffable waters.
In ffiortj he was never defeated, nor compelled to
' retreat ; a:nd always fucceeded- in every attack
he thought proper 'to make, as far as he chofe
to' fucceed ; knov.' ledge, thei"efore, could not
be wanting, whenever inclination called it into
adtion. There are others, and but few, who imagine
that the war was procraftinated from lucrative
views; But from this charge I readily acquit' the
General. His difpbfition is liberal ; and his par
ticular friends acknowledge, that the love of mo
ney is the leaft of 'all his paffions ; and therefore,
although he' fuffered his favourites, while he was
profufely wafting the wealth of the nation by his
inaSion and extravagant, demands, to colledt much
2 of

( 'I7-)
of it into their own cpffers, yet little of it found
its way into that pf the GeneraL '
There are others, who, having carefully examin
ed fhe conduct of the 'General in America, and com-'
pared it with the proceedings of a wicked faSiion in
Britain, are convinced that the defign Pf both was
the fame ; and that theGeneral, inftead of accept
ing the-Command with an intention to execute the
truft repofed in him, by his Sovereign and his coun
try, accepted \t- by tiie advice, .and with defign to
facilitate the wicked.. purpofes, of his confede
rates in' Britain. I fincerely wiffi there were no
ground for rfuch a conclufion.' Byt .there arecir-
cumftan-ces: fo ftrong,. and adtions which fpeak fo
loudly in. fupport of ir, that, when examined, they
will arhount to pofitive proof. Indeed, it is im
poffible to trace his condudl, by fair and juft ar
guments, from any other motive.
A private -letter from Mr. Samuel Kifk, of Not
tingham; one of the General's • conftjtuents and
colleagues in fadlion, with his anfwer, is before
the Public*. Mr. Kir.k cnarges him with a breach
of promife, in accepting of the command of the
forces about to be fent to America for fuppreffing
the rebellion; tells him of the.".confufion it had
'' made among his friends ;" gives his reafons
ao-ainft it; and concludes with faying, " I do not

* See the detail and conduft of the American war, and the
Appendix to this Reply. .;

( "8 )
¦* wiffi you- may fall, as many do, but I cannot fay
" 1 wifh fuccefs to. th^ under taking" To this con
fidential and truly feditiaus letter, the General re
turns an anfwcE as confidential. He tells Mr. Kirk,
that " he had flattered himfelf he had removed all
*' thofe prejudices be had eniertained againft bim ;"
*' that he had been highly complimented," upon his
accepting the command, by thofe who are *' averfe
*' to the meafures of Adminiftration ;" and " intreats
" him in particular to fufpend bis judgment, until
*' the event ffiould prove him unworthy of his fupf
«' port."
Thefe letters, which were not intended for t'he
Jjublic eye, furely furniffi us with a clue to tHjC
dark and heinous confpiracy of the fadtion, witwi
which the General was connedted. From them it'
appears, that, before thefe men had concerted their
plan of oppofition, he had pledged his honour to his
conftituents, that-he would not accept of a com
rnand which was to fupprefs the rebellion ; and that
notwithftanding, he was led by fome, we muft fup
pofe, powerful motive, to violate his promife.
What tbat motive was^ is likewife fufficiently
isvident. It was the. ad vice of the men wbo were
thus " averfe to the meafures af Adminiftrativn"
whofe *' compliments" he immediately received
on accepting the commiffion, whofe approbat.ioa
he pleads as an excufe to his friend for his breach
of prortiife, and of whofe public reputation he was
the conftant and careful guardian while in Ame rica.

( "9 )
rica *. And it further appears, that after he hajl
received his command, to remove the " prejudiced'
of his particular friend, who had declared "he.
•' could not wiffi him fuccefs" in fuppreffing the
rebellion, " to fufpend his judgment" -on the Ge
neral's condudl, " until the event ffiould prove him
" unworthy of his fupport." Upon thefe plain
• It is an anecdote as true as it is curious, that, ^yhen tjie
General was at Philadelphia, a Loyalift \y as about to publifti a
piece refleSing on the conduft of thCrlWinority in Parliament.
TheGeneral by fome means heard of it: upon which Mr. Gal
loway leceived the following billet from his Secretary:
" Captain M'Kenzie's compliments toMr. Galloway ; theGe
neral defires he will be pleafed to enquire into , the au^hqiity by
which Mr. Towne publilhes his Evening Poft, and to make any
regulations he thinks neceflary vo fupprefs political' pieces, which
may have an evil tendency, from either of the preffes, as it is
hinted, that (ome of thi^f amp are defigned for. publication."
Mr. Galloway, engaged, in other bufinefs, negleded to per
form the duty reconwnended by this billet, not knowing
the Immediate urgency nor the extreme importance of it :
and the piece was pubjiftied. The Secretary came down toMr.
Galloway, much vexed, and complained of the Piinter. The
Printer was fent for by the Secretary, and reprimaiided for^ thi*
heinous offence ; and the Author of the piece was told, that the
General would nor (v,Set fuch pieces to be published. This
anecdote, however trifling it may feero,, fully proves, that the
General held himfelf bound to preferve the condudl of the Op
pofition to his Sovereign's meafures, from the rude ftridtures, of
the Loyalifts within his lines ; and,, for that purpofe, even to m^ke
ufe df the power vefted in him by hjs Majefty ; although that yery
Oppofition was conftantly; hol,ding up to, the view ofthe people,
the condudl of the fervants, pf the Crown, and even of Majefty
itfelf, in terms the moft opprobrious and infulting. fadls

( i.^o )
. fadls the Public will determine, whether there is
not fatisfadlory proof of a relblution in the General
to co-operate with the defign of a Fadlion, whp
were averfe to that meafure, a defign as unconfti-
tutional as it was wicked; and which was nothing
lefs than to Vvreft from their Sovereign his confti-
tutional right to appoint his confidential and exe
cutive fervaPits (a right which, by the conflitution
of the Britiffi government, is as firmly eftabliffied
in the Crown, as that of eledting reprefentatives in
Parliament is fixed in the People) ; to compel him
to turn out the prefent Adminiftration ; and to put
bis own perfon, his family, and bis crown, into the
hands of thefe ccnfpiratcrs.
To accompliffi this defign, all their powers were
to be united and exerted. One great line of con
dudl was to be adopted ; Adminiftration was to be
proclaimed the authors of all the national misfor
tunes ; and their meafures, however honeft, wife,
or neceffary to the hbnour and fafety of the em
pire, were to be oppofed and obftrudled in parlia
ment, and the execution of them defeatejl, if
poffible. Men's adtions are the ftrongeft proof of their
fecret defigns. If we examine the condudl of the
Fadlion in Britain, we find that it has ftridtly cor
refponded with thefe pre-concerted meafures. The
American rebellion was an event, which thefe men
thought would furniffi them with all the means
neceffary to the accompliffiment of their defign.
They faw it would call for the exertions of Govern- menr^

( l-I )
r^.cr.t, and th.U thofe exertions would aJord a hrci
F.eld for oppofition. The real rebel, who wiiheJ to
overturn t/^e government, and the hurgrv patrlor,
whofe lull could only be fatisric^d by power and
place?, united therefore in foilerirg and fupporti.-^g
it. And, left the wifdora of the reb;! colonins
fhould fail in their plans, the meafures of feditioi
from time to tinie were ccnceit£v\ and tranfmitted,
by the Faftion in Britain, to their confederates in
America. " The non- importation agreement, the
*• union ofthe Colonies, and the meeting of a Con-
" grefs; a folemn league and covenant, u.nJeroat.h,
" not to purchafe the manufactures of Great Bri-
" tain, and to make an umted and ifr^i'^-.cihle fid-id
" aguiiift the Brit'fij GcvernmcKt," were all me.i-
fures which originated in Britain, and were adopted
i.n America.
Whilft thefe fecret intrigues againft the State
were carrying on with the ret>els in Americ:, the
meafr.rcs of Governmeat at home were loaded widi
the ivotl opprobrious epithets. The fteps whicli
were taken to fupport the dignity ar.d authority of
the Stare over the Colonies, were calied a " i-ud,
" f<".:nncus, and ruiwius jy/:c':;i ej pcliry." And
thofe which \v;re adopted to lubdue the mo:t un-
juftinabie and cbftinate rebellion, were ihied " an
" sxjufi i-'vj r-<4:neus tiar.' Ever)- cngi.-^e was
in n^ctioii, and every kd-.tious ionbbkr was em
ployed to poifon the minds of the people, and to
render the meafares of Adminiftration odious in the
eves of the nation, Thofe mifreprefc.Uitions and
R falfe-

( 122 )
falfehoods, which they thought would moft readilj^
captivate the vulgar, were induftrioufly propagated.
The preffes poured forth their pamphlets and oc-
cafional pieces, to ffiew the diftreffed ftate of the
kingdom, the decreafe of its inhabitants, the im
menfe debt and poverty of the nation, the want of
the refources pf war, the impoffibility of raifing
the neceffary aids, the lawfulnefs of American op
pofition, and the injuftice and cruelty of the war;,
which, it was boldly afferted, was intended, by the
councils in which their Sovereign immediately pre-
fides, to introduce defporic power in the Colonies,
Nor were thefe dodlrines confined to Pamphlets^
and News-papers, They were the conftant themes
of inflammatory declamations in both Houfes of
Parliament. Having, by thefe feditious meafures, raifed the
popular clamour againft Government, and pre
vailed on a confiderable part of the deluded peo
ple to fupport them ; having diftradled the councils
ofthe State, and induced them to treat with rebels,
and to offer to give up the moft effential right of
the fupreme authority, the right to tax thofe Colonies-
which it was bound to proteSi ; they advifed their
colleagues in fedition in America, to rejedl the
propofitions, as " unreafonable and infidious." Andc
thefe opprobrious epithists were tranfmitted from
Weftminfter to Philadelphia, and echoed back
from the Congrefs to Weftminfter again. And
afterwards, when, through their private intrigues,. they

( 123 ) .
they had facrificed the Northern Army, involved
their country in a war with France, thrown the
nation into a general defpondency, and compelled
Adminiftration to offer to the rebels terms of ac
commodation, little ffiort of independence itfelf;
their objedl not being as yet fecured, their ambi
tion ungratified, the loaves and fiffies unobtained,
and the firmnefs and virtue of their Sovereign not
yet conquered, they dreaded the profpedt of ac
commodation and peace with America ; and there
fore they advifed the leaders in rebellion to rejedl
even thofe terms; affuring them, that Adminiftra
tion could not fupport the war, and that they mufi
foon grant to them independence. How happy is it
for Britain, that thefe feditious men were miftaken,
and that the Congrefs purfued this fooliffi advice,
fooliffi in refpedt to the views of Congrefs, as well
as thofe of the Fadlion in Britain !
They weakly imagined, that his Majefty, alarm
ed at the profpedt of a war with France, and of the
lofs of America, would change his confidential fer
vants, and receive into his bofom thofe men who were
the fole authors of thofe diftreffes ; who, when in
office, by their feditious counfels, had laid the foun
dation of the rebellion, and, through its whole pro
grefs, had encouraged and fupported it ; who had
enjoyed the firft offices of the State; and whofe
honour, integrity, and abilities, when weighed in
the balance, had been found wanting ; men who
had avowedly oppofed every meafure which his
R 2 Majefty

( 124 )
Majefty had wifely projedled to fupport the autho-,
rity of the State, and the independence of th©
nation. But, finding that his Majefty met all the diftref
fes, which thefe confpirators had brought on their
country, with a virtuous firmnefs, which baffled
their expedtations, they determined to proceed to
yet more infolent and violent meafures. They re
folved, in their fecret cabals, to impeach his confii,
dential fervants, and by that means to wreft them
from his fervice. Such impeachments were> im
pudently and boldly threatened in the great coun
cil of the State. While they were thus bringing,
their plot to maturity in Britain ; while the natural
refources of their country were cried down, to the
great encouragement of our foreign enemies, and
a national defp.ondency in a manner effedled;
while the Fadlion was ftrenuoufly advifing, and zeal-
oufly contending, in both Houfes pf Parliament, for
withdrawing the troops from America, and at thp
fame time oppofing every meafure which was ne
ceffary for the recovery of the revolted Colonies ;
their arch-agent, the General, with honourable
fidelity (for, in fome men's opinion, there is honour
even among the confpirators againft the public
weal), was taking every ftep to procraftipate the
war ; to plunge the nation yet farther in debt,
and a more general defpondency ; and to render
Adminiftration more odious to the people. We
have fteOj that, although by his " great fucceffes** obtained

( 125 )
obtained in lefs than four months, by only one
half of his force, he " had nearly induced a ge-?
f neral fubmiffion" of the rebels ; yet, by his
indolence and inadtion, he procraftinated the war
during the fpace of fixteen months longer, and
left the rebellion in more fpirits than when he be
gan his operations. He fuffered his enemy, with
lefs than 3500 men, to reconquer a province which
he had lately reduced ; — he fuffered that enemy to
befiege his whole army in its quarters ; — he wan
tonly wafted the feafon of military operations,
giving his enemy time to recruit their reduced force.
By various meafures, he continually depreffed the
fpirit of loyalty, and always declined to avail
himfelf of its affiftance, He alternately funk and
revived the fpirit of rebellion, always taking care
not to reduce it. He oftep met his enfeebled
enemy, and as often, with his vaftly fuperior force,
retreated before it; and, with an una.ccountable
verfatility, adopted one plan after another, always
choofing that which was moft expenfive to the
nation, and ruinous to the fuccefs of his own opera
tions.. In addition to all this, with a ftridl confift-
ency of defign to wafte the public rnoney — to ren
der the nation tired of the American war, and
hopelefs of fuccefs, — and to multiply the difficulties
of Government in carrying it on ; we have feen
him, in proportion as his enemy's ftrength and
refources decreafed, conftantly increafe his wanton,
unneceffary^

( 126 )
unneceffary, and extravagant demands for more force^
until, conjundtly with his colleagues in fadlion at
home, he had laid the foundation of a war with
France and Spain. This done, he immediately
refigned. Nor did the General's noble Brother adt upon
different principles. The condudl of the Admiral
ftridtly correfponded with that of the General, in
procraftinating the war, and loading the nation
with unneceffary expence. With the terms in his
pocket, to accommodate the difference between
the two countries, he never communicated, but
withheld them from the people, left he ffiould
detach them from Congrefs, and weaken its in
fluence. With upwards of feventy ffiips of war,
twelve carrying from 50 to 70 guns, in the year
1776, he wanted, in addition, eleven ffiips of the
line, although, at that time, the whole naval
force of the rebels confifted of no more, than twa
frigates, and feven fmall fioops. And afterwards,
in 1777, with upwards of eighty veffels of war,
a number fufficient to line the whole rebel coaft,
in fight one of another; he fuffered the rebels to
carry on, from every port, not only coaft-wife,
but an open foreign trade, and to import all thofe
naval and military ftores, without which the re
bellion would not have been fupported during fix
months. He never looked into the defencelefs
rebel harbours, although there was nothing that
7 could

( 1^7 )
could obftrudl half a dozen frigates from feizing
and burning all. the trade in them. And further,
during his whole command, he fuffered a conftant
and open trade to be carried on with foreign na
tions, from Egg harbour, a defencelefs rebel port,i
within half a day's fail of his head-quarters.
In ffiort, it is impoffible to determine, whether
greater indolence in operations, greater excefs in
the demands of military or naval force, or more
numerous and evident proofs of a defign to pro-
craftinate the war, and to load the nation with an
immenfe, unneceffary debt, more ftrongly mark
the whole condudl ofthe General, or of his noble
Brother. The plan of the two Brothers was there
fore the fame ; and their plan was the plan of
the B adlion in Britain, to' create an univerfal dif-
content and confufion in the nation, and, by that
difcontent and confufion, to compel their Sove-
reign to deliver up the right of appointijig his own
fervants, and his royal authority, into their
own hands *.
That the Fadlion, or the General, incapable
of feeling for the diftreffes of their country, in
tended to involve it in a mifchief of fo great a
magnitude, whife it was embroiled in a war with
its Colonies, charity forbids me to determine ; al
though their infatiable lull for power, and thirft for
the emoluments of office, with the general tenor of
* See Letter to Lord Vifcount Howe, pubUfhed by
G. Wilkie. their

.( 128 )
their. condudt, would perhaps even juftify ftich a
decifion. However, this is evident, that, upon the
General's arrival in Britain, whh a large retinue of
his confidential friends, who werfe to be the vindi
cators of his ffiameful cdndudl in America; the
Fadtion received him in their arms, and boldly vin
dicated his condudt both in and out of the Senate.
Their force thus colledled, they conceived that
their plot was brought to its wiffied-for maturity.
They prepared for, and loudly threatened; im
peachments and the block. But, previous to this
meafure, the whole cenfure and odium of the mif-
carriages of the American war, of which they them.
feiyes had been the authors, were to be eaft on
the fervants of the Crown. To effedt this, anony
mous charges againft 'the General were carried
into Parliament, and his charadler was to be
vindicated in the great councils' of the State,
and, no where elfe. In vain did the officers of
Government, to whom he was alone accountable,
declare, that they had no accufations againft him.
Inftead of petitioning their Sovereign for a Court-
martial, the only proper- court by which he could
be fried) they inftituted an unprecedented examina
tion in the Houfe of Commons, under the pretence
of vindicating theGeneral, when their real defign
was to condemn the conduSi of Adminifir'ation, and
to prepare the way for their threatened impeach
ments.

In

( 129 )
In this examination, they hoped to run alorte.
For a time they did fo ; but at length their fecret
defign appearing evident,Adminiftration was called
on to vindicate the meafures of their Sovereign^
Many gentlemen of undoubted reputation, per
fedlly acquainted with the condudl of the war, and
the ftate of America, were fummoned to give evi
dence refpedting them. Of this the Fadlion was ap-
prifed. Only two witneffes were examined. But,
fuch was the credit and force of their evidence,
that the Fadtion ffirunk from the enquiry ; the great
council of the nation was (:onvinced, that the condudt
of Adminiftration, in refpedl to the American war,
ftood clearly juftified ; and the deep-laid plot of
the Fadlion was totally fruftrated.
Such has been the condudt of the men, who,^
in exadl imitation of their confederates in America^
have, by their fpecious and falfe clamours for liber
ty, been feducing their unwary and too credulous
country to the brink of ruin ! And fuch are
the evils, in which they have, by their cabals,
with unabating induftry, involved the nation !
When will Britons, the moft wealthy, the moft
free, and the moft happy people on earth,
difcern their own good I When will the voice of
wifdom teach them to fupport thofe meafures, and
that power, which alone can preferve their freedoni
and independence among nations ! When will they
ceafe to be the inftruments of fadlion, and the un
happy dupes of lawlefs ambition 1
S Time

( I30 )
Time has been, when the Princes on the throne
have paid no regard to law, and broke over the fa-
cred bounds of their happy conftitution ; when they
have deprived the worthieft men, without law,
of their perfonal liberty, and robbed the .people of
their property j and when they would have extend
ed the prerogative to the utmoft bounds of arbi
trary power. How different, at this day, is the
fituation of Britons ! They have a Sovereign on the
throne, into whofe heart a wiffi never yet entered
that interfered with the happinefs of his fubjedts;
who never yet received a farthing from his peopfe
without their confent ; who, inftead of attempting
to extend the prerogative, has, of his own accord,
given up a part of that prerogative to feeure the
rights of his people ;— a Sovereign, who, when the
diftreffes and neceffities arifing from their own folly
and fedudtion, lately compelled them to put un
limited confidence and power into his hands, to
fave the capital city of their kingdom from imme
diate deftrudlion, and the nation itfelf frorti ruin,
exercifed it with more than parental lenhy ; and,
having comphed with the wilhes of the virtuous
part of tbe nation, and faved . his country
from confufion and ruiri, inftantly, with a vir
tuous generofity, gave it up ; — a. Sovereign,
whofe heart-felt wiffi, if we may judge from the
whole tenor Of his condudt, is, to preferve their
conftitution of government inviolate, and to fup
port its independence, its digni^ and glory among
nations ;

( 131 )
nations ; to recover the loft dominions ofthe State ;
and to reduce his faithlefs and perfidious enemies
to juftice ; which there can be no doubt of hi? ef-
fedling, if not obftrudled by the folly of his people,
and the lawlefs and feditious views of a Fadtion?
who have too long diftradled his councils, and
prevented the exertions of his power. And
yet too many Britons, fafcinated by the fpecious
arts and delufive wiles of thofe political impoftors,
are conftantly giving them their fupport, in op
pofition to the truly patriot meafures of their
Sovereign ; facrificing their own happinefs at the
altar of lawlefs ambition, and precipitating the^
moft powerful and beautiful'fabric of civil liberty
remaining on the globe, to its final ruin.

S 2 A P P E N-

( ^33 )

APPENDIX.

No. I.
To Lieutenant General Sir William How£, K. B.
SIR,
HAVING, in the preceding ffieets, travelled
in much hafte through your laboured De
fence, permit me to pafs from the difagreeable^
though too often neceffary, office of an accufer, to
that of vindicating the accufed. I hoped, that, as a
gentleman, you would have followed, in your
Obfervations, the example I had fet you in my
Letters; in which, with as much delicacy of language
as truth would poffibly admit, I had confined
my ftridtures to your " profeffional condudl,"
without fuffering one fyllable of perfonal abufe, or
one hint at the defedls in your private moral cha
radler, however fair the mark, to efcape from my
pen. But in this hope, on your own account, I ani
forry to fay, I am difappointed. Confidering Mr.
Galloway as theAuthor of "Letters to aNobleman;"
and wiffiing, by defaming his perfonal charadter, to
Jeffen his credit j and that the jnipofitions on the
Public^

( 134 )
Pubhc, in your Defence, might more readily pafe
for truths ; you defert the field of decent and man.
ly argument, and take a mean refuge under the
abufe of his private reputation. A condudl of this
kind can need no comment ; it can have no weight
¦with a candid and fenfible Public j it is the
ufual pradtice of the guilty, and the common wea
pon made ufe of to wound the innocent.
You do not venture to accufe him of, although
you ftrongly infinuate his difloyalty : — You deny
his influence in the province he lived in : — You
boldly charge him with giving you falfe intelli
gence; and you meanly condefcend to boaft <rf your
liberality towards him. Now, although no man
can perceive what relation thefe matters can pof-
fijaly have to a vindication of your *' profeffio&al
" conduct," I ftall» on Mr. Galloway's account,
exaniine them.
To give a glofs to your infinuations relpe&ing
bis difloyalty, you fay : " This gentleman, in the
" beginning of the rebellion, was eledled a Mem-
*' ber of Congrefs." What, Sir, does this prove
to your purpofe ? It is well known to the Public,
that many gentlemen, who had before, and have
fince, given the moft demonftrative proofs of their-
loyalty, were eledled by thfr then conftitutional
Affemblies, and fent to the firft Congrefs, with
the moft laudable and loyal deigns,— to accom>>
modate the alarming contr^ycffy, to cftabliffi *
3 more

( H5 )
more permanent union between the two countries,,
and to ftop the rifing fedition. This was exgidlly
the circumftance of that gentleman, who refufed
the delegation on any other terms *. His Inftruc-
tions are long fince before the Public, and prove
the fa£l ; and it is known to many gentlemen now
in London, from Pennfylvania, that, while in
Congrefs, he faithfully purfued thofe Inftruc-
tionsf, uniformly exerring his influence and abi
lities to carry them into execution. That he,
boldly, and unawed by the dangers which threat
ened his perfon, in the tumults of riot and fac
tion which he was oppofing, reprobated and
condemned every meafure which tended to fedi
tion, and a feparation df the two countries.
That when he found he could not ftem tht torrent
of rebellion, he returned to the Affembly ; and
there again, as the ultimate meafure he could pur
fue, to fave the province he lived in, he refolutely
exerted his influence to induce them to difapprove
ofthe meafures of Congrefs, and totally to fecede
from all connexion with it. That having failed in
this meafure, on the queftion, by one vote only,
he was again eleAed a Member of the fecond Con
grefs, contrary to his own folemn and repeated
refufals to ferve. That he continued thus eledled
until long after that Congrefs met ; but as he did
• See Mr. Galloway's Examination, p. 47, .S;c.
•j- See Appendix to Letters to a Nobknsan. not

( 13^ )
not attend, another was eledled in his room. And
yet fuch was the earneft defire of the Congrefs to
obtain his influence and concurrence in their
meafures, that Dodlor Franklin came up to his
feat in ihe country, to which he had rerired, to
folicit his union with them, and offered to procure
his immediate re-eledlion ; all which he refolutely
refufed. And afterwards, that, although his life
was repeatedly threatened by the independent fac
tion, and while his friends trembled for his fafety,
he, unawed by his danger, condemned in his publi
cations the meafures of Congrefs, and charged them
with views of independence and treafon, at a time
when they publicly difavowed them. Could it be
poffible for the candour of the Public to afli for
further proof of this gentleman's uniform fidehty to
his Sovereign, and attachment to the legal confti
tution of his country; his having abandoned a very
valuable eftate, and facrificed the independent
happinefs of his family to thofe principles, muft
certainly be that proof.
But you further add, " When my Brother and
" I, in the charadler of his iVIajefty's Commif-
«' fioners for reftoring peace, publiffied zprocla-^
" mation of indemnity, for all thofe who had taken
" part in the rebellion, provided they ffiould fur-
*' render themfelves, and fubfcribe a declaratjion
" of allegiance within a limited time, Mr, Gal-
*' loway was among the firft who came over to us
" from Philadelphia ;" thus intimating tbat he
had

( 137 )
hsd takeft part in the rebellion, and came over to
you to take the benefit of the pardon offered by
tht proclamation. Now, Sir, although this is all
invention, I do not fufpedl it i.s your own. I wifli,
ror the fake of y6ur own charadter, to b; lieve it to
be that of yow venal defendant, whom you have
Jong fince amply rewarded for writing your Vin
dication J for you know you was not, where you
bi^lght to have been, with your army at Brunfwick,
when Mr. Galloway came over to it, but in New
York; and, ffiould I defccnd to follow your ex
ample, of attacking private reputation, I could,
perhaps, inform the Public what &7tfrmM/ led you
thither. However, as this is a praftice of which I
dilapproVe, I fhall not adopt it, although your
own conduct has juftified it. Bur, Sir, the real
truth Is — ^Your proclamatibn is dated 3bth ifJo-
VCmber, and was not publiffied within your own
lines at Brunfwick, in New Jericy, near 60 miles
difttmt from Philadelphia, from wMience you fay
Mr. Galloway came, until the day following;
and on this very day, early in the tribrhing, hc
was within your lines, with General VaugKah-, in
BfunlVick. Driven from his family, by an order
of the Con\-eniion at Philadelphia for the impri-
iSnment of his perfon, hc left Pennfylvania on the
a^th, two days before the date of your procla-
ri^ation, and eleven days before one of them was
fent to the pirb vince hc left ; for you may recoiled,
thai thofe proclanwtions were not lent to Pcnnfyl-
T vania

( 138 )
vania until after your arrival at Trenton, on the
Sth of December, when your Aid de Camp re-
quefted Mr. Galloway to fend fifty of them to Phi
ladelphia ; which he accordingly did, by a perfon
6n whom he could depend. I have mentioned
General Vaughan, who, I have ho doubt, will
recolfedl the time of iVIr. Galloway's coming into
Brunfwick, and that he was the firft who ffiewcd
to him the proclamation. Thus, Sir, you will
perceive into what a dilemma you have brought
yourfelf, by trufting to the invention of one who
was with you at New York, and could know no
thing abput the time when Mr. Galloway came
bver to your fines. But, if you really thought Mr.
Galloway " had taken part in the rebellion," why
did you afterwards appoint him to fo many places
of high truft and importance in his Majefty's fer
vice, giving him an opportunity daily to betray
it ? How can you account for a condudlj fo in-
confiftent with your manifeft duty, either to your
Sovereign or Country ?
You next meanly defcend to mention your libe
rality to Mr. Galloway. Mean, indeed, it will
appear, when that gentleman's fervices and facri-
fices are confidered, had it flowed from your pri
vate purfe ; and yet meaner ftill, when it is known
you paid it out of the public money. And how
much did this profufe liberality amount to ? No
more than 770 1, in which the wages of a clerk a,re
includeg.

( 139 )
included, by your own account, for ferviceS per
formed during 1 8 months.
And what were the fervices he performed ?
He adled as Superintendant of the Poljce, whicli
he digefted, regulated, and eftabliffied, at your
requeft. In this office was included the pre
fcrvation of the order, internal peace, and fafety
of the firft city in America. He ferved you as
Superintendant of the Port : an office eftabliffied
to receive an account of all thfe cargoes imported
for the ufe of your army, and the people within
your lines, and to prevent their being clandeftinely
carried to the enemy. He ferved you as Superin
tendant of the prohibited Articles. In this office
the utmoft care and attention was neceffary, to
prevent the enemy from being fupplied with them.
He a}fo fuperintended every avenue of your lines^
and nightly received the reports of perfons ap
pointed to attend them. He was conftantly erii-
ployed by you, from the time of your arrival at
the head of Elk, to the day Of your refigna
tion, in obtaining for you intelligence of the ftate
and movements of the enemy ; and gained, nipre
important and better intelligence for lefs than 500 1.
than you paid for at New York, as your friends
confeffed, upwards of 5000 1. He was often ap
plied to by the Commiffaries and Quarter-mafters,
for his advice and affiftance in procuring forage
and provifions for your army. He was incef*-
fantly called on to furniffi you with guides and
T 2 hor(eSi

( HO )
¦horfes for your parties, I^e raifed a troop of light
horfe, and embodied eighty loyal volunteers, who
ferved vyithout pay or clothing ; performing, un
der his own diredlion,, thofe many and uncom
mon fervices mentionec| in a preceding note. He
ajfo fyroifficd you with many maps, delineating
the roads for the march of your army ; and a
principal one, with all the roads between the
Delaware and the Sufquehannah, either drawn by
himfelf, or under hi^ immediate diredlion ; with
^.variety of other fervices, totally independent of
his public offices; which, had they been done by
your favourite officers, would have coft you ten
times the amount of the whole fum of your pro
fufe liberality to him. Such are the fer^^ices of
Mr. Galloway, which you have not had the honour
to mention- Ypur liberality, and thofe fervices,
are npvy before the Public, to whofe candid re-
ftedtions bpth are fubmitted. I ffiall only remark,
that, had you dealt out the public money, com
mitted to your charge, with the fame ceconomy to
your favourites, as you did to this gendeman, we
ffiould not have feen fo many American Nabobs
rolling in wealth, and luxurioufly living on the
fppil§ pf their country, as have lately returned
from America.
In refpedt to Mr. Galloway's popularity in the
provinces in which he had lived, it is too well af
certained by a variety of fadts too notorious to
be iffedled by your negarion ; but as the charge of

( 141 )
of his want of influence does not injure his private
and moral character, I ffiall fay no more on that
Aibjed. Of a very different nature is your next and laft-
charge. You fay. You " at firft paid attention to
" his opinions, and relied upon him for procuring
" you fecret intelligence; but you afterwards
*' found your confidence mifplaced ; his ideas you
*' difcovered to be vifionary ; and his intelligence
" was either iil-founded, or fo frequently exagge-
" rated, that it would not have been fafe to act
" upon it." If thefe affertions be truths, why
did you continue conftantly to employ him in the
line of intelligence, to the day of your refignation ?
Why was your Aid de Camp almoft daily coming
dov;n from you to him, defiring him to fend out
for intelligence ? Why did you not altogether rely
on your *' otherchannelsof fecretcommunicatioiir"
How unaccountable then muft it appear to men of
fenfe, that you ffiould be fo weak as to continue to
truft a perfon, whofe " ideas you had difcovered to
" be vifionary," and whofe " intelligence to be
" ill-founded, exaggerated," and falfe?
But you further add, " Having once detected
•' him in fen. ing me a piece of intelligence from a
" perfon, who afterwards, upon examination,
" gave a very differeflt account of the matter, I
" immediately changed the channel of fecret com-
" munication, and, in future, confidered Mr.
" Galloway as a nugatory informer." How dark and

( 142 )
and unmanly is this charge ! Againft charges fo
general, fo perfedlly undefined, and fo artfully
made, it is impoffible for the moft innocent per
fon to vindicate himfelf; for you have prudently
avoided either mentioning the perfon who '^ gave
*' a very different account of the matter," or the
matter itfelf. Can you believe, that this ftab in
the dark, at a private charadler, will not be con
demned by the candour and good fenfe of the Pub
lic ? It will foon. Sir, appear, that, to the laft
hour of your command, you entertained a high
opinion of Mr. Galloway's honour and probity.'
Did you at the time, or during your command in
America, give him the leaft hint of your fufpedl-
ing the intelligence he fent you ? Had you done
this, he would, in all probability, have convinced
you that he did not deferve your fufpicion, if, in
reality, you ever entertained one ; he might have
convinced you pf his having received the intelli-:
gence from the perfon who denied it, and that this
perfon had deceived you. This would not. Sir,
have been the only inftance in which you were de
ceived. One I will beg leave to remind you of,
in which your favours and confidence were totally
mifplaced. Mr. Willing, ahd his partner Mr.
Morris, had been, from the beginning of the re
bellion, the agents of the Congrefs for fupplying
their naval and military ftores. Their difaffedUon
to their Sovereign, and their rebellious principles,
were proved by a number of letter^, intercepted by
your

( H3 )
your Noble Brother ; and therefore Mr. Galloway
called oh iVlr. Willing in Philadelphia, by your
ekprefs Order, to take the oaths of allegiance ; and
although he refufed, yet he found fo much favour
in your fight, as to obtain a countermand of that
order, and a difpenfation from taking the, oath;
and even after this, you made him and his flour-
broker, Mr. Brown, your confidential negociators
with the Members of the Congrefs. The rebel
records will fupport this truth ; and further, that
both Mr. Willing and his notable broker deceived
and betrayed you.
However, dark and infidious as this charge is,
it is fortunate for Mr. Galloway, that there is
proof abundantly fufficient to convince the un
prejudiced, that all you have afferted refpedling
his difloyalty, his unpopularity, and deception, is
of recent invention, and had no exiftence in your
mind when you left America; it is proof which
you yourfelf will not deny the credit of, being no
lefs than the teftimony of Sir William Howe him
felf, under his own hand, and the feal of his
arms. Six days only before you left Philadelphia, im
preffed with the faithful fervices of Mr. Galloway,
you not only warmly recommended him to the at
tention of your fucceffor, but wrote to him the
.following letter :
SIR,

( 144 )
"SIR, Philadelpbiai May i8, 1778.
"THE falutary effcSis of the regulations in
the eftabliffiment of the police in this city, have
fo fully juftified my choice of the gentlemen in
whofe hands I placed the important trufi, that I
cannot, either as a public or private man, withhold
this teftimony of my fenfe of their fervices -, and I beg,
that, to the general refpe£i paid you, as an upright,
able magifirate^ and friend to the legal conftitution of
your country, I may be permitted the honour of
adding my particular affurance of the great perfonal
efieem with which I am, SIR,
Your moft obedient,
humble fervant, W. Howe."
Jofeph Galloway, Efquire,
Now, Sir, permit me to aflc : — Tf Mr. Galloway
was difioyal, how could you give him your tefti
mony that he was " a. friend to the legal conftitu-
*^ tion of his country ?" li he was unpopular, how
could he poflefs " the general refpe5i as an uprighf
" magifirate?" If he had deceived you, in giving
you falfe intelligence, why could you not very
juftly, " either as a public or private man, -withhold
" your fenfe of his fervices ?" And, if he w.is ««-
worthy of your confidence, how unworthy was it in
Sir William Plowe to give him particular affu-
ranees of his great perfonal efieem ? Thefe are pa
radoxes which we muft leave to be unfolded in
6 your

( 145 )
your next attempt to vindicate your condudl in the
¦;Amciicau war.
Such was your opinionof Mr.Galloway wlienyou
left America, and luch it continued to be for fome
time in England; for you was the firft gentleman,
your own and your Noble Brother's Secretaries ex
cepted, who paid him the honour of a vifit on his
arrival in London. Nor was it chani.;,cd the day
before his examination in the Houfe of Commons,
on the condudl of the American war; fur you
well remember, that, on that day, your Noble
Brother, who was pleading in your defence, and
therefore wc may prefume fpoke your fentiments,
delivered, when Mr. Galloway was prefent, an
high, though fulfome panegyric on his honour
and integrity. But how changeable and uncertain
are the good opinions of men ! Mr. Galloway
being examined, the film which had before in
verted his Lordffiip's optics, and reprefented Mr.
Galloway as a man of integrity, became fuddenly
removed ; and from that inftant, he ftood mcta-
morpholcd from an honourable man into " ^KKthc-
fpeare^s itpothicary* '" and now, by the fame ma
gical
• In hisT,ord(lii(>'s fpeech he declared, that hc h.nd the hiphell
opinion of Mr. Gslloway's " honour and probity; that vvhaicver
" he fhouid fay in the courff of his examination, his Lordfhip
" would believe to he iher.-'lult of his roal opinion; and that hc
" knew not whatljovernmi'nt h;ul done for him; hut whatever it
" might b(j, he vvas certain it muft fall ihort of Mi . G,illow\8y'-!
U •' ineiit."

( 146 )
gical influence, you have transformed him from U
man worthy of " general refpeSl as an upright
" magifirate," into one of no popularity ; from an
upright man, into a deceiver; and from a '* friend to
*' the legal conftitution Of his country," into a rebel.
November lo, 1780. THE AUTHOR.
" merit." The examination being clofed, and his Lordlbi])
finding that Mr. Galloway was not to be flattered out of his ve
racity, but that his anfwers charged his Lordfhip and his Brother
with much mifconduA in the American war, his Lordlhipim-
mediately tacked and reverfed his courfe, and with a malignity
of mind too ijfnoble for a perfon of his Lordffiip's rank and
charadler, concluded his abufive declamation with comparing
Mr. Galloway to Shakefpeare's apothecary, in Romeo and Ju
liet, afferting that " his poverty, and not his will, haii coh-
*' fented" to what he had faid in his examination.

No. II.
Copy of a Letter from Samuel Kirk, Grocery
in Nottingham, to General Howe.
S I R,
1 Cannot eafily defcribe the difcontent and
difappointment which appears among a very
great number of your conftituents here, on ac
count of your having accepted a command in the ex
pedition

( 147 )
pedition againfi our American brethren. From the
opinion I had of your integrity in general, I voted
for you at the late eledion, notwithftanding you
had, in fome recent inftances, adled contrary to my
fentiments. I took the liberty to tell you fo, and
alked you the following queftions, viz.
Whether you thought our whole army would
not be infufficient to conquer America ?
li you did not think the Minifiry had pufhed this
matter too far?
Whether, if you fhould be appointed to a command,
you would refufe ? And,
Whether you would vote fpr the repeal of the
four Adls of Parliament, which joa are now going
to enforce ?
If 1 am not miftaken, and I believe that you
will allow that I am not, you anfwered to every one
of thefe ^eries in the affirmative. This, out of
pure regard to your intereft here, I have m^de
known to numbers, who were in the fame ftate of
fufpenfe with myfelf, as to the propriety of our
condudl ac the eledlion ; and it has ferved to re
move, in a great meafure, the ill impreffions, by
which you yourfelf was very fenfibly affedled while
among us.
We are however aflured, that General Hov/e
is preparing to embark /or America to enforce the
A£is. Judge, if you can, the confufion this occafions
among your friends. The moft plaufible excufe
that is made among us, is, that the King fent for
you, and what could you do ?
U 2 Now

C 14^ )
Now I muft beg leave to fay, that I think you;
might' have adled the part of a great man, in refu^
fing to go againft this people on many accounts. , But
to fay nothing of politics, your Brother died there.
They have ffiewn their graritude to your name and"
family, by eredling a monument to him, who bled
in the caufe of freedom amongft them ; to him, who
dared to adi in oppofition to a Court, when his judg
ment informed him his oppofition was right ; and
yet he died a foldier. Our paffions were wrought
upon at theeledlion by the mention of his honour
ed name, in a paper, which you may perhaps re-'
member ; and may I not mention it to you, with a
wiffi that you may follow fo amiable, fo difinte
refted, fo revered a charadler ? I believe you have
not even an enemy, who would impute your refuf-,
ing to go, to want of courage ; nay, your courage
would be made more confpicuous by the refufal.
If you ffiould refolve, at all events, to go, 1 don't
¦^i^ you may fall, as many do; but I cannot fay I,
wifh fuccefs to the undertaking. Thefe, Sir, are the
fentiments of many here, as well as of
Notti'Agham, Your obedient fervant,
Feb. Io, i'775. Samuel Kirk,
General Howe to Mr. Kirk.
SIR,
T Have read your letter of the loth. With fo
much the greater degree of concern, as I had
flattered myfelf I had removed all thofe prejudices:
3 jff«

( 149 )
you had entertained againft me, when I had the plea
fure of being with you at the eledlion. The ran
cour and malice of thofe who were not my friends
at the eledlion, fill me with aftoniffiment at the-
inftance you menrion of their wiffies for my fall
in America.
My going thither was not my feeking. I was
ordered, and could not refufe, without incurring
the: odious name of backwardnefs to ferve my
country in diftrefs. — So contrary are men's opinions^
here, to fome with you, that, inftead of the grofiTeft
abufe, I have 'been moft highly complimented upon
the occafion, by thofe who are even averfe to the mea
fures of Adminiftration.
Every man's private feelings ought to give way
to the fervice of the Public at all times ; but par
ticularly, when of that delicate nature in which our
affairs ftand at prefent. Whatever opprobrious
names I may be called at Nottingham, I am en»
couraged to fay, that no fuch epithets will be put
on it in any other quarter. I intreat.jca in particular,
to fufpend your judgment in thofe matters, until
the event proves me unworthy of your fupport.
One word for America : You are deceived, if
you fuppofe there are not many loyal and peaceable
' fubjeSs in that country. I may fafely aflert, that
the infurgents are very few, in comparifon of the
whole people.
There are certainly thofe who do not agree to
9 taxarion from hence, but who do not wiffi to,
fever

( I50 )
fever themfelves from the fupremacy of this coun
try. This laft fet of men, I ffiould hope, by their
being relieved from tbe grievance, will moft readily
return to all due obedience to the laws.
With iiefpe^ to the few, who, I am told, defire
to feparate themfelves from the Mother Country, I
truft, when they find they are not fupported in
their frantic ideas by the more moderate, which I
have defcribed, they will, from fear of puniih-
tnent, fubfide to the laws.
With regard to trade, this country muft now fix
the foundation of its ftability with America, by
procuring a lafting obedience to our laws, without
¦which it can never arrive at that permanent^ fo
abfolutely requifite for the well-bieing of this em
pire. I am, SIR,
Your faithful and
^een Street, obedient Servant,
Feb. 21 i 1775. William Howe.
No. III.
A Letter from the Committee of Qmgrefs to
the Pfejidentt found among the Papers qf
Henry Laurens, Efq.
SIR, Camp at Valley Forge, Feb. 12, 1778.
WE had flattered ourfelves, that, before this
time, tbe pleafure of Congrefs would be
made known to us, refpedting the Quarter-mafter's department.

( 151 )
department. We fear our letter upon this fubjedl
has mifcarried, or the confiderarion of it yielded
to other bufinefs. You will therefore pardon us.
Sir, when we again folicit your attenrion to it, as
en objeSl of the laft importance ; on which not only
xhe future fuccefs of your arms, but the prefent ex
iftence of your army, immediately depend. The
influence of this office is fo diffi"ufive through every
part of your mihtary fyftem, that neither the wif
dom of arrangement, the fpirit of enterprife, or
¦favourable opportunity, will be of any avail, if this
great wheel in the machine ftops, or moves heavily.
We find ourfelves embarrafled in entering on this
fubjedl, left a bare recital of fadls ffiould carry an
imputation (which wc do not intend) on thofe
gentlemen who have lately condudled it. W"e are
fenfible, great and juft allowances are to be made
for the peculiarity of their frtuation, and we are
perhaps not fully acquainted with all their difficul
ties. It is our duty. Sir, to inform you it is not
our intention to cenfiire ; and be affiired, nothing
but a fenfe of the obligation we are under, to.poft-
pone all other confiderations to the public fafety,
could induce us to perform the unpfeafing taflc. —
We find. Sir, the property ofthe continent dif
perfed over the whole country ; not an encampment,
route of the army, or confiderable road, .but
abounds with waggons, left to the mercy of the
weather, and the will of the inhabitants ; large
quantity of intrenching tools have, in like manner, been

( 152 )
beeri left in various hands, under no other fecurity
that we can learn, than the honefty of thofe who
have them in poffeffion. Not lefs than 3000 fpades
and ffiavels, and the like number of tomahawks,
have been lately difcovered and colledled in the
vicinity of the camp, by an order from one ofthe
general officers. In the fame way, a quantity of
¦tents and tent cloth, after having lain a whole fum»
mer in a farmer's barn, and unknown to the officer
of the department, was lately difcovered, and
brought to camp by a fpecial order from the General.
— From thefe inftances, we prefume there may be
many other^ ftores yet unknown and uncolfedled,
which require immediate care and attention.
When, in compliance with the expedlatipns of
Congrefs, and the wiffies of the country, the army
was thrown into huts, inftead of retiring to more
diftant and convenient quarters, thii troops juftly
expedled every comfort which the furrounding
country could afford. Among thefe, a providential "
care in the article of ftraw, would probably have
faved the lives of many of your brave foldiers*
¦who have now paid the great debt of nature. Un
provided' with this, or materials to raife them from
¦ the cold and wet earth, fitknefs and mortality have
fpread through their quarters in an aftonifhing degree.
]\[otwithftanding the diligence of the phyficians and
furgeons, of whom we hear no complaint, the fick
and dead lift has increafed one-third in the laft week's
returns, which was one- third greater than the week
preceding j

C ^53 )
preceding ; and, from the prefent inclement weather j
will probably increafe in a much greater proportion. —
Nothing, Sir, can equal their fuffer ings, except the
patience and fortitude with which the faithful part
of the army endure them. Thofe of a dfferent cha-
raster defert in confiderable numbers.
We muft alfo obferve, that a number of the
troops .have now fome time been prepared for
ihoculatiOn; but the operation muft be delayed, for
want of this and other necefTaries within the pro
vince of this department. We need nor point
out the fatal confequcnces of this delay in forming
a new army, or the prefervation of this.  Almoft
every ^ay furniffies inftances of the fmall-pox in the
natural way. Hitherto fuch vigilance and care
has been ufed, that the contagion has not fpread j
but furely it is highly incumbent upon us, if poffi
ble, to annihilate the danger.
We need not point out the effedl this circum
ftance will have upon the new draughted troops,
if not carefully guarded ; they are too obvious to
heed enumeration. In conference with the Forage-
mafter on this fubjedl (which, though in appear
ance trivial, is really important), he acquainted
us, that, though out of his line, he would have
procured it, if waggons could have been furnifhed him
for that purpofe.
The want of horfes and waggons for the ordinary
as well as extraordinary occafions of the army, prelfes
upon us, if poffible, with equal force ; almoft every
X fpecies

( 154 )
fpecies of camp tranfportation is now performed
by men, who, without a murmur, patiently yoke them
felves to little carriages of their own making, or load
their wood and provifions on their backs. ¦''^Should the
enemy, encouraged by the growing weaknefs of your
troops, be led to make a fuccefsful impreffion uponyour
camp, your artillery would now undoubtedly fall into
their hands, for want of horfes to remove it.-^Biit
thefe are fmaller and tolerajble evils, ,wh.en com
pared with the imminent danger of your troops,
p'erifhing with famine, or difperfmg in fear ch of food.
The CommifiTaries, in addition- to their fupplies of
live cattle, which are precaripus, have found a
quantity of pork in New Jerfey, of which, hy a
failure of waggons, not one barrel has , reached the
camp. The orders were given for that purpofe' as early
as the 4Jh of January.— lr\ yefteTday's conference
with the General, he informed us, th^fome Bri
gades had been four days without meat ; and that even
the common foldier s had been at his quarters to' make
kndwn their wants. — At prefent. Sir, there is not
one gentleman of any rank in this department,
though the duties of the office require a conftant and
unremitted attention. In whatever view„ therefore,
the objedl prefents itfelf, we truft you wHl difcern,
that the moft eflTential inferefts are connedled with
it. The feafon of preparation for next campaign, is
paffing fwiftly away. Be aflured, Sir, that its
operations

( ^55 )
operations will be ineffeftual, either for offence or
protection, if an arrangement is not immediately
made, and the moft vigorous exertions ufed to pro
cure the neceffary fupplies.— Permit us to fay, that
a moment's time fhould not be loft in placing a man of
approved abilities and ext^five capacity at the
head of the department, who will reftore it to fome
degree of regularity and order; whofe provident
care will immediately relieve the prefent wants of
the army, and extend itfelf to thofe which muft be
fatisfied, before we can expedl vigour, enterprife, or
fuCcefs.-=-When your Co.mmittee refledl upon the
increafed difficulties of procuring waggons, horfes,
tents, and the numerous train of articles dependent
on this office, zvithout which your army cannot even
move; they feel the greateft anxiety, left the utmoft
fkill, diligence, and addrefs, will prove ineffectual to
fatisfy the growing demand. All other confiderations
vanifli before this objedl \ and -we moft earneftly
wiffi, Congrefs may be imprelfed in a proper de
gree with it^ neceffity and importance,
A report has reached us, that Col. Lutterlogh
is a candidate for the office of Quarter-mafter Ge
neral ; we have therefore been led to make fome
inquiry into his charadler and condudl. — We
fliould be far from doing injuftice to his abihties
and experience in a fubordinate line; but, exclufive
of the danger of entrufting fo confidential an office
to a ftranger, whofe attachment to this country
X 2 muft

( ^S6 )
muft be light and tranfient, and whofe intereft may
be fo eafily diftinguiffied frpm ours, we cannot find
that he pofleflfes talents or adlivity equal to this
important office. — We find, in the courfe of the
campaign, neceflary tools and ftores have often
been wanting ; important and feafonable move
ments of the arm.y delayed ; in fpme inftances,
wholly fruftrated ; and favourable opportunities
loft, through the deficiencies of this department.—
The rapid marches of our army, and unforefeen
difafters which attended it during the fummer fea
fon, partly claim fome allowances ; but that dif
order and confufion prevail through the depart
ment, which requires fome able hand to reform
and reduce it, is a certain and melancholy truth.
Unacquainted with the refolution of Congrefs
with refpedl to General Schuyler, we have hefitated
what further to propofe. Time is fo extremely pre
carious, that we are unwilling to lofe a fingle un
neceffary moment ; and have therefore beep in
duced to extend our views to the difapprobation of
this gentleman, and make fome provifion for that
event. A charadler has prefented itfelf, which, in
a great degree, meets pur approbation, judgment,
and wiflie^. — We have opened the fubjedl to him,
and it is now under his confideration. When we are
ac liberty, we' ffiall introduce him to your notice;
but delicacy forbids our doing it, until he has made
up his mind on the fubjedl, and given his confent
6 ,..¦•¦- ^^

, ( -^57 5
to the nomination.— rAnother gentleman of exten-*
five connexions, great adlivity, and comprehen-
five genius, but intirely in civil life, has alfo been
propofed. As he is at a diftance, we have not been
able to confult him ; and are reftrained, by fimilar
motives of delicacy, from making his charadler
and name a fubjedl of difcuffion, without his con
fent. By the tinie we are favoured with the determin
ation refpedling General Schuyler, and he ffiould
not be approved, we hope to be able to announce
both thefe gentlemen for your confideration.
We are, with the greateft regard and refpedl,
SIR,
Your moft obedient, and
very humble fervants,' '
(The Committee.)
Signed Fra. Dana.
'fo the, Prefident of Congrefs.

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