YALE UNIVERSITY
? L I B RA R,Y *

THE

Province aqd tfye States

A HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF LOUISIANA UNDER
FRANCE AND SPAIN, AND OF THE TERRITORIES
AND STATES OF THE UNITED STATES
FORMED THEREFROM

IN SEVEN VOLUMES
ILLUSTRATED WITH NUMEROUS MAPS AND PORTRAITS

Weston Arthur Goodspeed, LL. B.
Editor-in- Chief

VOL. II

Madison, Wis.
The Western Historical Association
1904.

Copyright, 1904,
by the
Western Historical Association
Madison, Wis.

Press of the Democrat Printing Co., Madison, Wis.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER I. pages
Navigation of the Mississippi, 1763-1783— Contentions over the
Ohio Valley — Results of the Treaty of Utrecht— Iroquois
Domains — French Plan a Chain of Forts— Changes Made by
Seven Years War— The Family Compact — France Crushed-
Spain's Losses — Louisiana Divided — Treaty of Fontainebleau
— Secret Cession of Louisiana — Extracts from Treaties —
English Accessions — Proclamation of King George — West
Florida — Revolutionary War — Proposition to Spain — Naviga
tion of the Mississippi — France Assists America — Spain
Reluctant — Intrigues — Negotiations — Spain Demands Exclu
sive Navigation of Mississippi — Congress Partly Yields, but
Finally Refuses — Fears of Spain — She Conquers West Flor
ida — Results of the Revolution  17-67

CHAPTER II.
Navigation of the Mississippi, 1783-1799 — Views of Aranda —
Spain Claims to the Alleghanies — Claim Denied by United
States — Negotiations — Spain Withdraws Claim — The Yazoo
Boundary — English Right to Navigate the Mississippi — The
Natchez District — Restrictions of Trade — Confiscation of
American Products — Western Settlers Roused — Wilkinson's
Schemes — Spanish Intrigues — American Contentions — Treaty
with Spain, 1795 — Boundary on Thirty-first Parallel — United
States to Navigate the Mississippi — Spain Holds Posts — Can
ada to Attack Louisiana — Struggle at Natchez — Western Peo
ple Intrigue — Bitterness of France and Spain  68-103

CHAPTER III.
Treaty of Retrocession, 1800 — The Early Attempts of France to
Secure Louisiana — She Claimed West Florida — The Claim
Denied by Spain — Napoleon's Efforts — Spain Delays Ratifica
tion of Retrocession — Louisiana Delivered to France — Text of

13 TABLE OF CONTENTS.
pages
Treaty of Retrocession — United States Opposes Retrocession
— Efforts to Keep France from Taking Possession — England
Desires Louisiana — Struggles of Mr. Livingston — He Offers
to. Buy Florida— Also Part of Louisiana — Napoleon's Designs
—Jefferson Threatens— French Troops to be Sent Over —
Congress Contemplates Taking Possession — Offers to Spain —
Cession to United States Settles' Differences  104-141
CHAPTER IV.
Interdiction of Deposits — Growth of Trade — Deposits at New
Orleans — Violations of Spanish Policy — French Influences
Ascendant — The Interdiction— .Western People Indignant —
Memorials — The Ross Resolutions in Congress — Question
Debated — Forcible Measures Contemplated — Trade with
Americans Forbidden — France Thought Responsible — Con
gress Acts — Secret Investigation — Napoleon's Designs — Spain
not Interested — The Intendant Exonerated — United States
Mistaken — Equivalent Establishment — France had an Object
— Spain Never Paid Damages  142-176
CHAPTER V.
Cession to the United States — War Certain Between France
and England — Livingston's Arguments — Napoleon's Outburst
to Lord Whitworth — France Fears America as Well as Eng
land — Whitworth's Version — Talleyrand's Tentative Offer —
Livingston Openly Threatens — France in a Dilemma — West
ern People Anxious and Determined — Navigation of the Mis- ,
sissippi Never to be Surrendered — Logic of the Situation —
France Pactically Forced to Sell — United States, Not Eng
land, Would Occupy Louisiana — Livingston Startled — Louisi
ana for Sale — Terms Agreed Upon — Momentous Events —
Napoleon's Eccentricities — Astonishment of the American
Envoys — Spain Protests — United States Takes Possession —
Text of the Treaties  177-226
CHAPTER VI.
Constitutionality of the Cession — Divergence of Opinion —
Jefferson's Views — Cession Ratified by the President — Con
gress to Act — The Question Debated — Vote in the Senate —
The Excuse for Opposition — East Hostile to West — Influence
of Politics — Federalists and Anti-Federalists — Questions of
Limits and Title — Proceedings in the House — Griswold's Res
olutions — The Western People — Vote in the House — Opposi
tion Disappears — Patriotism and Wisdom Triumph — Consti
tutionality Settled — Cession Accepted — Cost of the Province. 227-268

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 13
CHAPTER VII. PAGES
Florida and Texas Boundaries, 1803-1808 — West Florida not
Claimed at First — France's Title Thereto Not Good — Spain
Protests — Views of Officials — Struggle of the Envoys — Con
tentions of Spain and of the United States — Hostilities
Threatened — Attempts to Buy West Florida — District of
Mobile — Language of the Treaty Discussed — Talleyrand's Dic
tum — Retrocession Explained — Crozat's Patent — Negotiations
Inconclusive — Madison's Pons Asinorum — McMaster's View
— The Sabine Affair — Burr's Conspiracy — Official Communi
cation Suspended  269-317
CHAPTER VIII.
Florida and Texas Boundaries, 1808-1821 — Lawlessness in Florida
Province — Its Independence Established — United States
Takes Temporary Possession — Proceedings in Congress Rela
tive Thereto — England Questions the Right — United States to
Occupy East Florida — The. Monroe Doctrine — War of 1812 —
Congress Authorizes Possession — West Florida Attached to
Louisiana — War Ended — Spain Reopens Negotiations — Lim
its of Louisiana Purchase Again Discussed — Propositions
Submitted — Revolutionary Expeditions — Jackson's Opera
tions — Fairness of the United States — Agreement Finally
Reached — The Treaty of 1819— 'Florida and Texas Boundaries
Settled— Views of Henry Clay et. al.— Spain Ratifies  318-365
CHAPTER IX.
Northern Boundary — Rival Colonial Claims — Pope's Bull — The
Treaty of Utrecht— Forty-Ninth Parallel Assumed— Results
of the Seven Years War— Results of the Revolution — Source
of the Mississippi — Jay's Treaty — Navigation of the Missis
sippi — Lake of the Woods — Negotiations Unproductive —
United States Gains Louisiana — Claims Expanded — England
Obstinate — Influenced by Hudson's Bay Company— Fur Trade
Desired — Negotiations Suspended — Rebuke of British Inso
lence — Treaty of Ghent — Propositions Resumed — Unfounded
Demands of England — Forty-Ninth Parallel Finally Adopted
— England Gains — Treaty of 1818 — The Northwestern Bound
ary  366-4OS
CHAPTER X.
Eighth Article of the Cession — Its Meaning — Footing of the
Most Favored Nations — Contention of the French Minister —

14 TABLE OF CONTENTS.
pages
Reply of the United States — An Imperfect Sovereignty —
Negotiations Unavailing — Retaliatory and Countervailing Sys
tems — Indemnities Claimed. by Both Nations — Diplomacy of
Envoys — Mutual Concessions — Both Nations Abandon Claims
for Indemnities — France Granted Commercial Advantages —
Differences Settled  406-417
CHAPTER XL
Boundaries of Territories and States — Limits of the Louisiana
Purchase Undetermined — Its Boundaries Finally Fixed —
Territory of Orleans — Territory of Louisiana — State of
Louisiana — West Florida — Missouri — Arkansas — Texas — Utah
— Washington — Green County — The Platte Purchase — Iowa —
The Missouri and Iowa Boundary Dispute — Michigan — Wis
consin — Minnesota — Nebraska — Kansas — Colorado — Dakota —
Idaho — Montana — Wyoming — Oklahoma — Western Territory
— Indian Territory  418-482

Illustrations

Old Maps of Louisiana, 1703 and 1746
Old Maps of Louisiana, 1730 and 1733
Old Maps of Louisiana, 1718 and 1753
Old Maps of Louisiana, 1775 and 1820
Coxe's Map of Louisiana, lower part
Coxe's Map of Louisiana, upper part
Additions to the United States .
Iowa and Missouri Boundary Dispute

page 64
112 160
208256304 352
448

The Province and the States

CHAPTER I
The Navigation of the Mississippi River,
1763-1783

THE settled policy of jealousy and hostility between France
and Great Britain had more to do with the fate of Louisi
ana prior to the acquisition of that province by the United
States than any other cause. This hostility was first seriously
revealed in America when the formation of the Ohio Company
in England and the Atlantic colonies on or about the year 1749
and the grant to them of about six hundred thousand acres
in the rich valley of the Ohio, "The Beautiful River," threat
ened the western extension of the English American colo
nies into the valuable territory claimed by the government of
France. By treaty, England secured from the powerful Iro
quois domination over all their lands to the westward ; and as they
claimed to the Mississippi, particularly in the Ohio valley, Eng
land likewise claimed a westward extension to that river. The
English under the youthful George Washington took possession
of the present site of Pittsburg ; but were soon driven away by the
French who made preparations to resist any advancement of the
British to the westward of the Alleghany mountains. About
this time Benjamin Franklin conceived the plan of the federa
tion of all the Atlantic colonies for their mutual protection and
as a safeguard against French hostility ; but the plan was rejected
II— 2

18 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
by the English ministry on the ground that it would render the
colonies too strong for their probable subjection to the mother
country."* Early in 1755 war between France and England
seemed inevitable. To avoid the conflict, the French cabinet pro
posed the reciprocal evacuation of all the country between the
river Ohio and the Alleghany mountains; but the English gov
ernment refused to consider this proposition for a moment. They
claimed the whole country westward to the Wabash river at least
and demanded the destruction of all the French settlements in
the territory thus claimed. They further demanded the neutral
ity of the great lakes, the demolition of all the French forts at
Niagara and Lake Champlain, and the acknowledgment of British
rights both to the northward and westward. These demands were
deemed so extravagant by France that they were positively
refused, although it was easily perceived that England desired
war in order to secure Canada and although the French govern
ment, owing to the profligacy of the reign of Louis XV, desired
peace "at almost any price." f
The , occupation of the Mississippi valley by the English was
proposed to Queen Anne, and might have been accomplished as
the result of the second inter-colonial war; but apparently Eng
land at that time did not press her advantages in the direction of
securing the country to the west. The assembly of New York
had addressed the queen on the subject of the importance of the
Mississippi valley, but their address was apparently unheeded.
William Penri recommended that the colonial line should be
extended to the St. Lawrence on the north and beyond the Mis
sissippi on 'the west. But other considerations seem to have
influenced the English monarchs. At the conclusion of the
treaty of Utrecht, all of the great west was left to France. The
settlement on the Illinois and the Mississippi might have been
broken up by England as one of the legitimate results of this war,
wherein that country seemed all powerful despite the destruction
of the fleet of AdmiralWalker. The treaty left the vital inter
colonial questions unsettled. The domains of the Iroquois,
claimed by the English, were declared to extend westward to tlie
Mississippi and northward to the Ottawa river. But the French
settlements of the Mississippi valley were too strong an argument
for the English statesmen to overcome. France retained both
banks of the Mississippi.

* Secret Journals of Foreign Affairs, Congress.
t History of France: Michelet.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

19

Hostilities were formally initiated by the dispatch of General
Braddock and his forces to America in January, 1755. The
designs of France had been to confine the English colonies to the
territory eastward of the Alleghanies by a semi-circle of forts
extending from the mouth of the river St. Lawrence westward
through Canada, thence across the great lakes and on through the
Ohio and the Mississippi valleys down to New Orleans. But the
English were far from admitting the French exclusive claims to
the valley of the Ohio as far westward at least as the Wabash and
to the great lakes, and made preparations on a large scale to
attack the French at four quarters along the northern and west-
em borders. Thus was begun the "Seven Years War," which
ended with the treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762-3. The success
of the English in securing far more than they had demanded, was
due to that remarkable man, William Pitt. When the terms of
the treaty were being debated by the British parliament, he
declared they were far too lenient ; and although sick at the time
was carried to the chamber, where, for three hours, he fought the
treaty measures and declared that now was the time to despoil
France of every colony she possessed.*
However, before the conclusion of peace, the famous "Family
Compact" was signed at Paris on the 15th of August, 1761. This
was a close and strict alliance between the governments of France
and Spain, by which it was agreed that any Power that became
the enemy of one should also be the enemy of the other; that each
should guarantee the possessions of the other to be sustained by
the combined forces of the two countries ; that, as a first assist
ance, the one of the two powers from which it was demanded
should in three months place twelve ships and six frigates at the
disposal of the other, besides twenty-four thousand troops
if France should desire them and twelve thousand if Spain
should desire them; that the operations of the war should
be conducted by both in common or conjunction; that any peace
secured should be only in common ; that, in other words,
they should be allies in peace as well as in war; that at the
conclusion of peace, when negotiations for mutual settlement
were inaugurated, the advantages secured by one should be
balanced against the losses of the other; that the two monarchies
should act in peace and war as a unit or one power ; and that there
should be a complete confidence between them as to all alliances
and negotiations. f To this "Family Compact" was appended a

* Parliamentary Debates.
t Narrative and Critical History of America: Winsor.

20 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
separate agreement to the effect that Spain should declare war
against Great Britain May i, 1762, unless peace should have been
concluded prior to that date. As compensation for this action,
Spain was promised in any event to receive Minorca when peace
should be concluded. France and Spain, thus united, used every
possible inducement for Portugal to join the alliance, even to the
extent of threatened war and invasion, but to no avail. The corn-
act and the special agreement were both kept secret, though
England learned much of their import soon afterward.
In reality Spain entered the war late in 1761. She had scarcely
done so ere England began on every ocean and sea to prey upon
her rich galleons and to fling powerful forces against her valuable
colonial possessions. In the summer of 1762, Havana was cap
tured, by which Spain lost fifty million dollars' worth of property,
besides nine ships of the line. Panama, St. Domingo, Florida and
Louisiana were all seriously threatened, and doubtless would have
fallen to the possession of England had the war continued.*
Spain had" entered the war too late to be of any material assistance
to France, but just in season to suffer almost irreparable losses
herself. The preliminaries of peace were concluded in Septem
ber, 1762, but had been delayed for two months or more by the
obstinacy of the Marquis de Grimaldi. Had he not opposed some
of the peace measures at such an expense of time, the loss of Cuba
would have been avoided. In that event France would not have
been required under the mandates of the "Family Compact" to
cede Louisiana to Spain; because, inasmuch as Louisiana was
ceded to Spain to compensate her for the loss of Cuba, the neces
sity of such cession would not have arisen, had the Marquis de
Grimaldi not delayed the treaty until Havana had fallen before
the guns of the English. Thus the fate of Louisiana might have
been altogether different had it not been for the obstinacy of the
Marquis. However, as "one man's loss is another man's gain,"
the United States later profited immensely by the stubbornness' of
the Spaniard. It should likewise be borne in ,mind that if France
had not previously made the Wabash, Illinois and Wisconsin
valleys a dependency of Canada, the chances are that she would
not have been required to cede that territory to the English.f
The latter conquered Canada during the war, and had therefore
the right to demand all the dependencies of the province. But
had those dependencies been a part of Louisiana, they could not

* History of England: Adolphus.
t History of Canada: Smith.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 2 1
have made such a demand, and such territory would undoubtedly
have remained in the possession of the French or been ceded by
her to the Spanish. That eventuality also might have seriously
affected the transfer of Louisiana to the United States. Of such
small circumstances is the complex fabric of civilization woven.
The Seven Years war crushed and humiliated France to an
extraordinary degree. Her magnificent colonial domains in
America were torn from her grasp. England had acquired all
the country to the eastward of the Mississippi, a splendid conquest
upon which could be built a beautiful and powerful principality
for the English crown.* The historian Martin says of the results
of the war, "A French colony, full of promise, unscathed by the
sword of the enemy, the last relic of our continental empire in
America, was ceded like a flock of sheep. When this unhappy
agreement was made public, the cabinet of Versailles strove to
appease public opinion, deeply irritated, by insinuating in its semi
official justifications, that Louisiana was threatened with the same
fate as Canada and that it was abandoned only because it would
have been impossible long to keep it. The Louisianians did not
learn until the expiration of eighteen months, of the treaty that
denationalized them. Their governor, M. d'Abbadie, died of sor
row. The grief was universal." But the dismay of France was
occasioned by the strength and growth of Great Britain, her
ancient and implacable enemy. Another such a war and France
and Spain, it was seen, would become dependencies of the British
crown. If the will of Mr. Pitt had prevailed in the English
parliament when the terms of peace were discussed, both France
and Spain would have suffered far more than they did. It was a
lesson which the French people and the French ministry never
forgot, and resulted in the reorganization of every department o£
the government.
The preliminary convention of peace was held at Fontainebleau
on the 3d of November, 1762, on which occasion the Duke de
Choiseul on the part of France and the Marquis de Grimaldi on
the part of Spain, concluded the treaty by which Louisiana as
far east as the Iberville (Manshac) was ceded by France to
Spain.f In a preliminary treaty on the same day France and
Spain ceded all the territory possessed by them east of the Mis
sissippi and of the Iberville to Great Britain. This left the
island of New Orleans and the town of New Orleans attached to

*The Fall of New France: Hart.
t Senate Documents, 2d Session, 23d Congress.

22 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the territory west of the Mississippi. The cession of Louisiana
above mentioned by France to Spain was conditioned upon the
ratifications of the French and the Spanish sovereigns and was
kept secret. While Great Britain and other nations 'may have
been apprised of its nature, it was not printed in the United
States "until 1834, when it was obtained from the archives of
France by members of congress to be used in settling con
troversies over Florida lands in the courts of the United States.
However, it had been printed in England long before that date
and a few copies had found their way to America. This treaty
was ratified by the King' of Spain at San Lorenzo e^ Real
'November 13, 1762, and by the King of France at Versailles
November 23, 1762. The definitive treaty was signed by "the
ministers plenipotentiary of the two governments February io,
1763. It should be noted that the preliminary treaty between
Great Britain on one side and France and Spain on the other and
the secret preliminary treaty between France and Spain were both
signed at Fontainebleau on November 3, 1762. Previous to th;s
time Louisiana had been considered to embrace territory on both
sides of the Mississippi; but after this date the term "Louisiana"
referred only to the country west of that river though it embraced
the Island of New Orleans on the east side of the main channel.
As both of the preliminary treaties above mentioned- were signed
at the same city and on the same day it is clear that, after it had
been determined to cede all the country east of the Mississippi to
Great Britain, Spain was compensated for her secrifices with the
cession to her by France of the country west of the Mississippi,
or with Louisiana proper, as it was_afterward known.
Prior to these treaties, Louisiana in the possession of France
extended to the Perdido on the Gulf, and stretching northward
along the left bank of the Mississippi embraced a wide tract of
country to the eastward of that stream known as "the Illinois
Gountry" and finally joined Canada in the expanse of territory
covered by the great lakes. The eastern boundary of Louisiana
in the hands of France, except as to the Perdido* on the Gulf,
was undetermined. France claimed eastward on the upper Mis
sissippi to the Alleghany mountains, but the British colonies
claimed the Ohio valley and generally an extension westward to
the Wabash or in some instances to the Mississippi. As a dis
pute afterward arose over what was meant by the term
"Louisiana," it should be borne in mind that the Louisiana which
Spain received at the treaty of 1762, was not the Louisiana which
France possessed prior to that treaty, and that this double mean-

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 23
ing or application of the term occasioned much of the subsequent
dissension. The Louisiana received by Spain was bounded east
ward by the Mississippi, the Iberville and the lakes Maurepas
and Pontchartrain. The Louisiana possessed by France prior to
1762, was bounded on the Gulf to the eastward by the Perdido,
but farther northward the boundary was undetermined, though
in the "Illinois Country" it stretched far enough eastward to join
Canada, to which it was attached or appended. As a result of
the Seven Years War Spain lost the country known as Florida,
that is all east of the Perdido, to England, and also lost Minorca
which has been promised her by France, it having been captured
by the British navy.
The following paragraphs are extracts from the treaties of
1762 and 1763:*
"The Most Christian King (of France), being firmly resolved
to strengthen and perpetuate the bonds of tender amity which
unite him to his cousin, the Catholic King (of Spain), proposes
in consequence to act with his Catholic Majesty at all times and
in all circumstances in a perfect uniformity of principles for the
common glory of their house and the reciprocal interests of their
kingdoms. "With this view, his Most Christian Majesty, being fully sensi
ble of the sacrifices made by the Catholic King, in generously
uniting with him for the restoration of peace, desires on this
occasion to give him a proof of the strong interest which he
takes in satisfying him and affording advantages to his crown.
"The Most Christian King has accordingly authorized his min
ister, the Duke de Choiseul, to deliver to the Marquis de Grimaldi,
the ambassador of the Catholic King, in the most authentic form,
an act, whereby his Most Christian Majesty cedes in entire pos
session, purely and simply, without exception, to his Catholic
Majesty and his successors, in perpetuity, all the country known
under the name of Louisiana, as well as New Orleans and the
island in which that place stands."
The language used "all the country known under the name of
Louisiana" meant all of the province except what on the same day
was ceded by France to Great Britain. It could have meant
nothing else, because it was the understanding of the three powers
at the time that England should get all the territory east of. the
Mississippi except the island of New Orleans, and because Eng
land proceeded to take possession of that part of Louisiana which

* Senate Documents, 2d Session, 23d Congress.

24 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
was bounded on the west by the Mississippi and the Iberville.
Spain under the secret treaty took all of the remainder of
Louisiana which extended eastward to the Mississippi and the
Iberville (Manshac).
"Whereas, on the third day of the present month (November 3,
1762) the preliminaries of a peace were signed between the crowns
of Spain and France on the one part and those of England and
Portugal on the other, and the Most Christian King, my very dear
and well-beloved cousin, purely from the nobleness of his heart
and the love and friendship in which we live, thought proper to
dispose that the Marquis de Grimaldi, my ambassador extraor
dinary near his royal person, and the Duke De Choiseul, his
minister of state, should on the same day sign a convention by
which the crown of France ceded immediately to that of Spain
the country known by the name of Louisiana, together with New
Orleans and the island in which that city stands, and by which my
said ambassador agrees to the cession only conditionally sub spe
rati, as he is not furnished with orders to execute it absolutely :
"Therefore, in order to establish between the Spanish and
French nations the same spirit of union and friendship which
should subsist as they do in the hearts of their sovereigns, I,
therefore, take pleasure in accepting, as I da accept in proper
form, the said act of cession, promising also to accept those which
may hereafter be judged necessary for carrying it into entire and
formal execution and authorizing the said Marquis de Grimaldi
to treat, conclude and sign them. Given at San Lorenzo el Real
on the thirteenth of November, 1762."
"The King."*
"The said acceptation and ratification having been approved by
us, and regarded as a strong evidence of the friendship and good
will of our very dear and well-beloved cousin, the Catholic King,
we renew and confirm by these presents the cession of Louisiana
and of New Orleans, with the island in which that city stands,
promising immediately to conclude with our said brother and
cousin a convention in which the measures to be taken in concert
for executing and consummating this cession to our mutual satis
faction will be fixed by common accord. Given at Versailles on
the twenty-third day of the month of November, 1762." "Louis."

*Annual Register (English) : Vol. VI.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 25
"Sir: "Versailles, April 21, 1764."
The King has caused the necessary orders to be issued
for the surrender of the country of Louisiana, with New Orleans
and the island in which that city stands, into the hands of the
commissioner whom his Catholic Majesty may appoint to receive
them. I have sent the same papers to the Marquis de Ossum,
who will have the honor to present them to his Catholic Majesty.
Your Excellency will see that the King's orders are entirely con
formable with the acts signed in 1762, and that his Majesty has
caused some articles to be inserted, equally conducive to the tran
quillity of the country after it is in the possession of his Catholic
Majesty, and to the happiness of its inhabitants. I have the
honor to be, with great esteem, your Excellency's most humble
and obedient servant." "The Duke de Choiseul."
"TO THE CONDE DE FUENTES."
The following articles from those treaties explain themselves :
"Article VII. In order to reestablish peace on solid and
durable foundations, and to remove forever all subjects of dis
pute with regards to the limits of the British and French terri
tories on the continent of America, that for the future the confines
between the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, in that part of
the world, shall be fixed irrevocably by a line drawn along the
middle of the river Mississippi, from its source to the river Iber
ville, and from thence by a line drawn along the middle of this
river, and the lake Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea; and
for this purpose the most Christian King cedes, in full right, and
guarantees to his Britannic Majesty, the river and port of Mobile,
and everything which he possesses, or ought to possess on the
left side the river Mississippi, except the town of New Orleans
and the island in which it is situated, which shall remain to
France; provided that the river Mississippi shall be equally free
as well to the subjects of Great Britain as to those of France in
its whole breadth and length, from its source to the sea, and
expressly that part which , is between the said island of New
Orleans and the right bank of that river, as well as the passage
both in and out of its mouth. It is further stipulated that the
vessels belonging to the subjects of either nation shall not be
stopped, visited, or subjected' to the payment of any duty what
soever. The stipulations inserted in the IVth article in favor of
the inhabitants of Canada, shall also take place with regard to the
inhabitants of the countries ceded by this article."*

?Annual Register (English) : Vol. VI.

26 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
The stipulations referred to in the last sentence of this article
extended to the inhabitants of the territory ceded the right to pro
fess and exercise the Catholic religion and to remove from the
territory with their effects should they so desire.
"Article XX. In consequence of the restitution stipulated in
the preceding article (Article XIX concerning Havana, etc.), his
Catholic Majecty cedes and guarantees, in full right, to his Britan
nic Majesty, Florida, with Fort St. Augustine and the Bay of
Pensacola, as well as all that Spain possesses on the continent of
North America, to the east, or to the southeast of the river Mis
sissippi ; and in general everything that depends on the said coun
tries and lands, with the sovereignty, property, possession and all
right acquired by treaties or otherwise, which the Catholic King
and the crown of Spain have had till now over the said countries,
lands, places and other inhabitants; so that the Catholic King
cedes and makes over the whole to the said King and to the crown
of Great Britain, and that in the most ample manner and form."
"Article XXII. All the papers, letters, documents and archives
which were found in the countries, territories, towns, and places
that are restored, and those belonging to the countries ceded, shall
be respectively and bona fide delivered or furnished at the same
time, if possible, that possession is taken, or at latest four months
after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty in
whatever places the said papers or documents may be found."
"Article XXIII. All the countries and territories which may
have been conquered in whatsoever part of the world by the arms
of their Britannic and Most Faithful (Portugal) Majesties, as
well as by those of their Most Christian (France) and Most
Catholic (Spain) Majesties, which are not included in the present
treaty, either under the title of cessions, or under the title of
restitutions, shall be restored without difficulty and without requir
ing any compensation."
"Article XXIV. . . . It is agreed that the British and
French troops shall complete before the 15th of March next, all
that shall remain to be executed of the 12th and 13th articles of
the preliminaries, signed the 3d day of November last (1762),
with regard to the evacuation to be made in the empire or else
where. ._ . . Great Britain shall likewise, at the end of three
months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present
treaty, or sooner if it can be done, enter into the possession of the
river and port of the Mobile, and of all that is to form the limits
of the territory of Great Britain on the side of the river Missis
sippi as they are specified in the seventh article. . . The fort-

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

27

ress of the Havana with all that has been conquered in the island
of Cuba shall be restored three months after the exchange of the
ratifications of the present treaty, or sooner if it can be done;
and at the same time Great Britain shall enter into possession of
the country ceded by Spain according to the twentieth article."*
From Article VII above, it will be seen that France ceded the
river and port of Mobile to Great Britain, and therefore must
have possessed them prior to the cession. This cession confirms
the prior ownership by France of the country eastward to the
Psrdido. From article XX above, it will be seen that Spain ceded
to Great Britain the Bay of Pensacola and the country eastward to
St. Augustine. This cession still further confirms the fact that
the territory of Spain extended no farther westward than the
Perdido, and that the French Louisiana did extend eastward to
the Perdido. As Spain had engaged in the war merely to assist
France, and as in so doing had lost Florida, France compensated
her with what may be called "the Spanish Louisiana."
This treaty fixed the western limits of the Atlantic colonies in
the middle of the Mississipi the Iberville and the lakes Maurepas
and Pontchartrain. This was the first time the Mississippi was
made the boundary between the possessions of any two or more
nations. It was likewise the date when the province of Louisiana
as possessed by France was divided, all that portion eastward of
the Mississippi and the Iberville never afterward receiving the
appellation of "Louisiana." The English maps from this time
forward show the Atlantic colonies extended westward to the
Mississippi. England secured all the country to the east of the
Mississippi except the island of New Orleans. Particular atten
tion is called to the cession of the right to the free navigation of
the Mississippi from its source to the sea, particularly to that por
tion between the right bank of the river and the Island of New
Orleans. As will be seen, the right to this navigation was ceded
absolutely and without reservation from the source of the river to
the Gulf of Mexico. Within a short time after this cession, Great
Britain divided Florida into the two sections — East and West —
the latter being bounded on the west by lakes Pantchartrain and
Maurepas, the river Iberville and the river Mississippi as far north
as the thirty-first degree of north latitude. Thus it was that Eng
land created West Florida and extended it to the Mississippi. In
the organization of the territory thus secured by conquest, Great
Britain purposely omitted the upper Mississippi country, in order

* Annual Register (English) : Vol. VI.

28 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
not to give offense to the Indians there, who, no doubt, would
object to have their lands parceled out, subdivided and governed
without their consent and without payment therefor.
"The reader will observe, and possibly with some surprise,*
that in this distribution much the largest and perhaps the most
valuable part of our conquests does not fall into any of these gov
ernments : that the environs of the great lakes, the fine countries
on the whole course of the Ohio and Ouabache (Wabash), and
almost all that tract of Louisiana which lies in the hither branch
of the Mississippi, are none of them comprehended in the distribu
tion. The government of West Florida extends in no part much
above half a degree from the sea. Many reasons may be assigned
for this apparent omission. A consideration of the Indians was,
we presume, the principal, because it might have given a sensible
alarm! to that people if they had seen us formally cantoning out
their whole country into regular establishments."
In his proclamation of October 7, 1763, King George of Eng
land spoke of the western boundary of West Florida, "to the
westward by lake Pontchartrain, the lake Maurepas and the river
Mississippi."! The treaty of 1763 attached definitely the island
and town of New Orleans to the country west of the Mississippi,
and in all subsequent designation that assignment and boundary
were followed. The line was referred to at first as "the river
Iberville, the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain," and spoken
of as "one of the mouths of the Mississippi." Later it was
psoken of as "the bayou Manshac and th,e lakes Maurepas and
Pontchartrain." In early times, no doubt, a much greater volume
of water found its way through this outlet from the Mississippi
to the Gulf than in- later times ; and hence the Island of New
Orleans was usually spoken of as part of the country west of the
Mississippi. No other changes were made until the conclusion of the Revo
lutionary war; but as the right to navigate the Mississippi river
became one of the most serious questions of contention during
the progress of the war and as such contention shaped to a con
siderable extent the attitude of Spain and France, and perhaps
England, toward the United States and promised to affect the
welfare and destiny of Louisiana, the subject will be followed
closely in these pages.
The English board of trade, by recommendation dated March

* Annual Register English) : Vol. VI.
t Annual Register (English) : Vol. VI.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

29

23d, 1764, asked for a provision altering the boundary of West
Florida on the north from the thirty-first degree to the mouth of
the Yazoo river. The reason given for the recommendation was
the fact that a strong settlement had been made on the east side
of the Mississippi above the thirty-first degree, and the fact that
the bay and town of Mobile were presumed to be above that par
allel. In accordance with this recommendation, the English gov
ernment under date of June 6, 1764, extended the northern
boundary of West Florida up the Mississippi to the mouth of
the Yazoo river, thence eastward to the Apalachicola river. This
line was still the boundary in 1770, as shown by the following
mandate :*
"George the Third, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain,
France and Ireland King, defender of the faith and so forth, to
our trusty and well beloved Peter Chester, esquire, greeting :
"We, reposing especial trust and confidence in the prudence,
courage and loyalty of you, the said Peter Chester, of our especial
grace, certain knowledge and mere motion, have thought fit to
constitute and appoint you the said Peter Chester to be our cap
tain general and governor in chief in and over our province of
West Florida in America bounded to the southward by the Gulf
of Mexico, including all the islands within six leagues of the
coast, from the Apalachicola river to lake Pontchartrain ; to the
westward by the said lake and the Lake Maurepas and the river
Mississippi ; to the northward by a line drawn from the mouth of
the river Yasous where it unites with the Mississippi due east to
the river Apalachicola : and to the eastward by the said river."
Witness ourself at Westminster the 25th day of January, and
the tenth year of our reign (1770)."
"The King."
The loss to France in 1763 of Canada, Louisiana and all of
the Mississippi valley rendered possible the condition by which
the colonies were enabled to free themselves from Great Britain.
Had France retained possession, the colonies would certainly not
have secured the Mississippi valley, and would probably not have
secured their independence, even with their western boundaries in
the Alleghany mountains. They would not have had the assist
ance of France in their struggle. Her enormous losses in 1763,
kindled the resentment of France against Great Britain, from
which the colonies were benefited. The Bourbon family compact

* Annual Register (English) : Vol. VI.

30 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
and a unity of interests made Spain the ally of France. Even
before the commencement of the Revolution, France had begun
to advise and assist the colonies, and even to intimate to them, if
not plainly to promise, that she would sustain their revolt against
the mother country. But at this time the Mississippi country
was not taken into consideration except remotely, and the fear of
Spain of future danger from the English colonies was not yet
kindled. Every process that weakened England strengthened
France as well as Spain. The fate of Louisiana depended upon
the course pursued by France as well as upon that pursued by
Spain. By the act of the continental congress, approved December 30,
1776, the following proposition was made through the French
ambassador to the court of Spain : "That if His Catholic Majesty
will join with the United States in war against Great Britain, they
will assist in reducing to the possession of Spain the town and
harbor of Pensacola ; provided that the citizens and inhabitants of
the United States shall have the free and uninterrupted naviga
tion of the Mississippi and use of the harbor of Pensacola ; and
will, provided it be true that His Portuguese Majesty has insult
ingly expelled the vessels of these States from his ports, or hath
confiscated any such vessels, declare war against the said King,
if that mi ature will be agreeable to, and supported by, the courts
of France and Spain."* This act was one of the clauses in the
letter of ir !-tructions sent to the American commissioners in
Europe, in which a treaty was drawn up to be submitted to Spain
similar to the one prepared for submission to France. The latter
h;>d been pi eviously prepared September 17, 1776, in which was
the' following clause: "Should Spain be disinclined to our cause
from any apprehension of danger to his dominions in South Amer
ica you are empowered to give the strongest assurances that that
crown will receive no molestation from the United States in the
possession of these territories." These were the instructions given
to the minister to France before a special envoy was sent to the
court of Spain. From the above it will be observed that thus
early in its career the government of the United States clung to
the right of the navigation of the Mississippi and hence to the
extension to the states westward to that river.'
At the commencement of the revolution Spain saw that it was
to her interest as a guard against the encroachments of the inhab
itants of the colonies on her Louisiana possessions to encourage

* Diplomatic Correspondence: Secret Journals of Foreign Affairs, Congress.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 31
the disaffection of the colonies with the mother country ; accord
ingly she gave her moral support to the revolt, as well as one
million francs to be handed to the American commissioners.
Later, when it became clear that the issue was independence and
wide claims of territory, she regretted her previous course, but
was prevented fromi taking extreme action in favor of Great Brit
ain by the promises and entreaty of France and by the expectation
of gaining the Floridas. From possible future entanglements and
dangers with the colonies she sought first to free herself by media
tion with England. Late in 1778, Count de Florida Blanca pro
posed to Lord Grantham, the British prime minister, the follow
ing terms of a settlement with the colonies :*
"1. The absolute independence of the colonies.
"2. The preservation of Canada and Acadia by England.
"3. The cession of all of Florida to the colonies except what is
necessary for the protection of Spanish commerce in the Gulf of
Mexico." But "this proposition, made before Spain had begun to fear the
colonies, came to naught. In October, 1778, the Count de Ver-
gennes, in speaking of the free navigation of the Mississippi, mainr
tained there would be no difficulty over that queston when terms
of peace were discussed, and observed that he would be astonished
if Spain made any opposition to it. But it is clear that at this
time Spain had already conceived her plan for the rehabilitation
of her decaying monarchy by the conquest of the Gulf and the
possible establishment of a trans-Atlantic throne at New Orleans
or Mexico.
As early as 1777, it became the settled conviction of the nations
of Europe that the independence of the British American colonies
meant their eventual absorption of the valley of the Mississippi. §
In 1778 it was impressed upon France that without the help of the
Spanish navy success on the ocean against Great Britain was a
question of grave doubt. Therefore, France, for her own protec
tion, endeavored to allay the misgivings of Spain as to future
dissensions with the United States and to secure her active assist
ance against Great Britain and hence resulted the secret treaty of
1779 between France and Spain, rendered possible only by the
"Family Compact."! As the war progressed the United States
were given to understand by France that they could not make the

* Diplomatic Affairs, secret.
$ Dispatch of Luzerne to Vergennes.
tDebrell's Collection of Treaties.

32 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
surrender of the Mississippi by Spain one of the conditions of
peace ; but at the conclusion she endeavored to satisfy Spain with
the conditions, though the latter was made to suffer thereby. As
a matter of fact, much was left to the drift of events, the only
stipulation back of all negotiations being the independence of the
colonies, to which finality Spain was never reconciled.
On the 3d of June, 1776, Arthur Lee wrote to the committee
of Secret Correspondence of Congress, "The desire of the Court
of France to assist may be depended on; but they are yet timid
and the ministry unsettled. . . . Spain is more reserved, her
minister here an old woman, but assuredly when France moves
Spain will co-operate." At this time Spain and Portugal were
on the brink of war, the former being supported by France and
the latter by England. In order to gain the assistanace of Spain,
Beaumarchais, in September, 1776, advised the United States
to declare war against Portugal as well as against Great Britain.
Soon after an official copy of the Declaration of Independence
was received by Silas Deane, the American ambassador to France,
he prepared a plan to be used as a basis for an active alliance
between the United States and France and Spain. This plan
embraced the following points :
The independence of the United States should be recognized
by France and Spain,- and the young republic should be guaran
teed "the possession of all that part of the continent of North
America which by the last treaty of peace was ceded and con
firmed to the Crown of Great Britain (the treaty of 1763) ; the
United States should guarantee to France and Spain "all and
singular their possessions and claims in every other part of Amer
ica, whether north or south of the equator, and of the islands
possessed by them in the American seas; should France or Spain,
during the progress of the war, secure possession of the British
islands in the West Indies, the United States should agree to
assist in confirming such possession ; the three nations should sus
tain one another's rights to free commerce in the cod fishery on
the banks of Newfoundland, Cape Breton, etc. ; any British ship
found on the coasts of North or South America should "forever
hereafter" be considered as a lawful prize in peace or in war and
no British ship should ever be admitted into the ports of either
of the three countries during the present war; France and Spain
should send fleets to the American coasts to defend and protect
the commerce of the United States and the United States, in
return, should defend the French and Spanish possessions in
America ; "no peace or accommodation should be made with Great

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 33
Britain to the infringement or violation of any one of these
articles."* This plan was presented by Mr. Deane to the Count de Vergen-
nes, in his private capacity, as early as November 23, 1776; but
seems to have been thought too severe, as nothing further was
heard of the plan. When the Declaration of Independence was
made public in Paris, it created unbounded joy among the violent
enemies of Great Britain. The arrival of "Doctor" Franklin also
occasioned the most pleasurable anticipations, because it was seen
that his coming meant the rejection by the United States of the
overtures of Great Britain. In London the publication of the Dec
laration caused corresponding depression; it meant the end of
peace negotiations and war to the finish. Everything American
at Paris was prized and admired. Mr. Deane wrote on December
3 1776, "I must mention some trifles. The queen is fond of parade,
and I believe wishes a war, and is our friend. She loves riding
on horseback. Could you send me a Narrowhegansett horse or
two? The present might be money exceedingly well laid out.
Rittenhouse's orrery, or Arnold's collection of insects, a phaeton
of American make and a pair of bay horses, a few barrels of
apples, of walnuts, of butternuts, etc., would be great curiosities
here, where everything American is gazed at, and where the
American contest engages the attention of all ages, ranks and
sexes." In a letter of January 4, 1777, Doctor Franklin wrote to con
gress that the plan of the treaty with France had been laid before
the Count de Vergennes and that "by his advice we have had an
interview with the Spanish ambassador, Count de Aranda, who
seems well disposed towards us, and will forward copies of our
memorials to his court, which will act, he says, in perfect concert
with this." The American agents made a powerful appeal for
assistance and for an alliance with both France and Spain. Doc
tor Franklin wrote on January 17, "We are promised an answer
from this court as soon as they can know the determination of
Spain, with which they mean to act in perfect unanimity." On
February 2, the three American commissioners, Messrs. Franklin,
Deane and Lee, gave their personal pledge to the court of France
and Spain "that the United States shall not separately conclude
a peace, nor aid Great Britain against France or Spain, nor
intermit their best exertions against Great Britain during the
continuance of such war ; provided always that France and Spain

* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.
11-3

34

THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

do on their part enter into a similar stipulation with our States."
Early in February, the commissioners agreed among themselves
that it would be better for them to separate and reside in three
different countries, whereupon Mr. Lee started for Madrid and
later Mr. Deane for The Hague, while Mr. Franklin remained in
Paris. Mr. Lee was stopped by Spain, for prudential reasons,
before he reached Madrid. That court did. not deem it advisable
at that juncture to receive a minister from the United States, or
in a public capacity any other representative.
In March, 1777, the commissioners were instructed by congress
"that in case France and Spain will enter into the war, the United
States will assist the former in the conquest of the British sugar
islands and the latter in the conquest of Portugal, promising the
assistance of six frigates, manned, of not less than twenty-four
guns each, and provisions equal to two million dollars, America
desiring for her share only what Britain holds on the Continent."
Of this order, Franklin said, "It is a pleasure to find the things
ordered which we were doing without orders." Franklin sug
gested to Lee that, "It would be well to sound the court of Spain
on the subject of permitting our armed ships to bring prizes into
her ports and there dispose of them." Under date of April 7,
Doctor Franklin submitted to the Count de Aranda, Spanish am
bassador to France, the proposition contained in the resolution of
congress of December 30, 1776. (See supra.)
It is no doubt true that Mr. Deane while at Paris reflected the
sense and temper of the United States. Accordingly, when he
prepared his draft for the proposed treaty, he incorporated therein
the wishes of the United States that their territory, at the conclu
sion of peace, should extend westward to the Mississippi and the
Iberville, or in his own words should embrace "the possession of
all that part of the continent of North America which by the last
treaty of peace was ceded and confirmed to the Crown of Great
Britain." This meant all of the country eastward of the Missis
sippi and the Iberville including the two Floridas. Neither France
nor Spain at the time offered any objection to the territory thus
asked for by the American envoy. Neither did they on the other
hand state that the territory asked for would be conceded by them.
Mr. Deane's plan was abandoned because the conditons were not
yet ripe for its adoption. But there is no question that the plan
was the foundation of deep thought on the subject of the claims
which were sure to spring from the independence of the colonies.
It apprised both France and Spain of the territory wanted by the
United States. But the statesmen of Spain soon realized that it

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

35

would not be impracticable, while the colonies were in sore straits,
to secure the Floridas, one of which Spain had previously pos
sessed and both of which she again earnestly desired to gain,
principally in order to strengthen her commerce on the Gulf.
Inasmuch as she could not expect to gain them through the inde
pendence of the colonies, she assumed an attitude of austerity and
chilliness toward the United States, with an intimation that the
latter were claiming too much territory.
Under date of May i, 1777, Doctor Franklin wrote, J'The people
of this country (France) are almost unanimously in our favor.
The government has its reasons for postponing the war, but is
making daily the most diligent preparations wherein Spain goes
hand in hand." And on May 25 he wrote, "The interest of
France and Spain, in securing our friendship and commerce,
seems daily more and more generally understood here, and we
have no doubt of finally obtaining the establishment of that com
merce with all the formalities necessary."*
But in spite of the efforts of the commissioners considerable
time passed without the conclusion of a treaty with either France
or Spain. Mr. Lee wrote from Paris on December 8, 1777, "Our
joint dispatches will inform you of the forwardness in which
things are here towards the desired conclusion. In three weeks
we shall hear from Spain, and all will, I hope, be settled. The
late intelligence from America has staggered and confounded our
enemies as much as it has elated and decided our friends." On
December 18 the commissioners wrote, "the great news of Bur-
goyne's defeat and surrender apparently occasioned as much gen
eral joy in France as if it had been a victory of their own troops
over their own enemies, such is the universal, warm and sincere
good will and attachment to us and our cause in this nation."
This news gave the commissioners an excellent opportunity to
push their cause. The commissioners wrote, "M. Gerard, one of
the secretaries, came yesterday to inform us, by order of the
King, that after long and full consideration of our affairs and
propositions in council it was decided, and his Majesty was deter
mined, to acknowledge our independence and make a treaty with
us of amity and commerce ; that in this treaty no advantage would
be taken of our present situation to obtain terms from us which
otherwise would not be conyenient for us to agree to; . . .
that his Majesty was fixed in his determination not only to
acknowledge, but to support our independence by every means in

* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.

36 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
his power ; . . . that the only condition he should require and
rely on would be this : That we in no peace to be made with Eng
land should give up our independence and return to the obedience
of that government; that as soon as the courier returned from
Spain with the concurrences expected the affair would be pro
ceeded in and concluded ; that of this we might give the congress
the strongest assurances in our dispatches, only cautioning them
to keep the whole for the present a dead secret, as Spain had three
reasons for not immediately declaring : Her money fleet not yet
come home, her Brazil army and fleet the same, and her peace
with Portugal nor yet quite completed ; but these obstacles would
probably soon be removed." Finally the commissioners wrote, on
February 8, 1778, "We have now the great satisfaction of acquaint
ing you and the congress that the treaties with France are at
length completed and signed." And in referring to Spain they
said, "Spain being slow, there is a separate and secret clause, by
which she is to be received into the alliance upon requisition, and
there is no doubt of the event.* When we mention the good will
of this nation to our cause we may add that, of all Europe, which
having been offended by the pride and insolence of Britain,
wishes to see its power diminished; and all who have received
injuries from her are by one of the articles to be invited into our
alliance. The preparations for war are carried on with immense
activity and it is soon expected."
In the treaty of alliance between France and the thirteen colo
nies called the United States, concluded February 6, 1778, the fol
lowing article was adopted :f
"Article VIII. Neither of the two parties shall conclude
either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal con
sent of the other first obtained ; and they mutually engage not to
lay down their arms until the independence of the United States
shall have been formally or tacitly assured by the treaty or treaties
that shall terminate the war."
On the same date, a separate and secret article between France
and the United States reserved to the King of Spain the right to
accede to the treaty and to participate in its stipulations whenever
he should so desire, the language used being as follows :
"The Most Christian King (of France) declares, in consequence
of the intimate union which subsists between him and the King
of Spain, that in concluding with the United States of America

* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.
t Treaties of the United States.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. tf
this treaty of amity and commerce, and that of eventual and
defensive alliance, his Majesty hath intended, and intends, to
reserve expressly, as he reserves by this present separate and
secret act, to his said Catholic Majesty (the King of Spain) the
power of acceding to the said treaties, and to participate in their
stipulations at such time as he shall judge proper. It being well
understood, nevertheless that if any of the stipulations of the said
treaties are not agreeable to the King of Spain, his Catholic
Majesty may propose other conditions analagous to the principal
aim of the alliance and conformable to the rules of equity, reci
procity and friendship."
It was anticipated by the members of congress that, should the
colonies gain their independence, their western bounds would most
likely become the Mississippi river, because the dominions of Eng
land extended to that stream. It was proper and rational, there
fore, for the members of that body to discuss, even to eventualities,
the consequences and responsibilities of independence ; accord
ingly the proceedings of congress are filled with references to
and actions upon, the questions of navigating the Mississippi, the
western and southern boundaries, the possession of the Floridas,
etc. Some such reference was made, or action taken, during the
years 1777 and 1778, and in 1779, on March 17 and 24, August
5, and September 9.
In a communication dated Paris, February 10, Mr. Lee
informed congress of the reasons for the cautious policy of Spain
in postponing an alliance with the United States, which reasons
were stated to be substantially as above given by Doctor Franklin.
lie said, "When the treasure at sea arrives I have no doubt of
their according to the treaties signed here and joining in the war."
FTe also wrote, "I am given to understand that Spain will wish to
have the possession of Pensacola secured to her in the treaty. I
shall hope to receive the commands of congress upon that point
as soon as possible. Perhaps congress may think that circum
stances are materially changed since the passing the resolve on
this subject December 30, 1776, and that the Mississippi is likely
to be the only permanent boundary between the two people."
Everything seemed bright to the commissioners at this time, for
on February 28 they wrote, "Our States have now a solid support
for their liberty and independence in their alliance with France,
which will certainly be followed by that of Spain and the whole
house of Bourbon, and probably by that of Holland and tie
other I'o-wers of Europe, who are interested in the freedom of
commerce and in keeping down the power of Britain." Mr. Lee

38 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
said on this date, "The chief reason that induced Spain to tem
porize subsists still, except the war with Portugal, which is hap
pily concluded by her accession to the family compact," but he
also reported that three millions of livres, which had been prom
ised by Spain in addition to the sum previously loaned, was not
forthcoming and no reason had been assigned for the delay. He
also wrote on March 19, "It is altogether uncertain when it will
be convenient for Spain to accede to the alliance. . . . The
court of Spain will, I apprehend, make some difficulties about set
tling the dividing line between their possessions and those of the
United States. They wish to have the cession of Pensacola."
As a matter of fact it was, no doubt, that at this time the deter
mination of Spain was formed, to secure the Mississippi river com
merce and to avoid thereby future contentions with the United
States growing out of conflicting claims in that quarter. Mr.
Lee wrote from Chaillot, on March 17 that he "consulted the
Spanish ambassador whether it could be determined with any
degree of certainty how long it would be before the business I
am pledged for with his, court would require my presence. His
answer was that it was altogether uncertain."
The King of France, on March 28, apointed M. Gerard, secre
tary of his council of state, minister plenipotentiary to the United
States.* In his instructions to M. Gerard, the king stipulated that
considerations to be undertaken in favor of Sain would demand
all the dexterity of the minister. "He (M. Gerard) knows
that that power (Spain) has taken no part in the two treaties,
though she has not opposed them, and that up to the present time
she has said nothing of the conditions on which she may accede
to them in the future. However, we have reason to think that she
would desire to acquire the Floridas, a share of the fisheries of
the banks of Newfoundland, and Jamaica. . . The Floridas
enter into the plans of conquest of the Americans. It will there
fore be necessary to prepare them for the contingency of a sur
render of their claims. The King charges M. Gerard with this
in a particular manner, and his Majesty leaves entirely to his pru
dence the means to be employed to attain this object. ... ft
is only necessary to remind him that he must carefully avoid
speaking in the name of Spain; for his Catholic Majesty has as
yet said nothing relative to his intentions and views. Moreover,
M. Gerard knows the principal motives that make Spain desire
the Floridas. He will give such efficacy to them as is in his

* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

39

power, but if he cannot succeed in securing the whole territory, he
will strive at least to obtain Pensacola and such parts of the coasts
as are considered to be the most suited to the interests of the court
of Madrid. . . . The envoys of congress (in Paris) have
proposed to the King to enter into an engagement to favor the con
quest by the Americans of Canada, Nova Scotia and the Floridas,
and he has reason to think that congress has taken this project
to heart. But the King has considered that the possession of
those three countries, or at least of Canada, by England, will be
an element of disquiet and anxiety to the Americans, which will
make them feel the more the need they have of the alliance and the
friendship of the King, and which it is not his interest to remove."
From the above it will be seen that neither France nor Spain
pretended to have a conclusive claim to the Floridas. M. Gerard
was instructed that "if he cannot succeed in securing the whole
territory (the Floridas)," he should strive to gain Pensacola at
least, etc. The Floridas belonged to Great Britain and the ques
tion at once became paramount, to which nation should they pass
in case they were wrested from that power? Congress realized
their value to the United States and wanted them; Spain for the
same reasons in her interests desired them ; and France favored
the wishes of Spain. Their acquisition was thus an open ques
tion to be determined by subsequent- negotiations and maneu
vers. It soon became a mystery to Mr. Lee what had caused the
changed attitude of the Spanish authorities. The payment of
the additional money that had been promised was deferred; the
formation of an alliance with the United States on the basis of
the French treaty was postponed; and in March 1778, there was
clearly perceptible a steady coldness toward the Americans.
Unquestionably, the approaching and inevitable contention over
the spoils of the war in America was being comprehended and
anticipated by the Spanish ministry. Mr. Lee wrote on April 2,
"I have never been able to learn to what was owing the sudden
change in the favorable disposition of Jhe Spanish court during
my absence in Germany." On April 5 he wrote, "Having pressed
the matter of supplies with Spain, I received an answer yesterday
that endeavors would be used to send you succors through the
Havana. The present critical situation of that court renders them
averse to being more particular or to have applications made to
them, but I think they will not long remain under this embarrass
ment." Spain had, unquestionably, made her wants in America
known to France and the latter expected to secure them if not

40

THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

otherwise, through M. Gerard, in accordance with the instructions
of the French monarch. But all of this was, of course, unknown
to the American ministers, whose wishes to secure an alliance
with Spain were father to the thought. It is true that Mr. Lee
suspected that the Mississippi question had something to do with
the Spanish coldness, but of this he had no positive assurance.
Upon the reception of the French treaty in America, congress,
though ratifying it, expressed a wish to have the eleventh
and twelfth articles expunged wholly from the treaty, because of
contentions that might arise. This was finally agreed to by
France. Under date of May 18, 1778, Mr. Ralph Izard, who had been
appointed United States commissioner to the court of Tuscany,
wrote from Paris to Mr. Lee that, "The fifth article of the treaty
of alliance (with France) has given me a great deal of uneasiness,
as it seems to have been intended to exclude the United States of
America from possessing themselves of the two Floridas. The
article is as follows : 'If the United States should think fit to
attempt the reduction of the British power remaining in the
northern parts of America, or the islands of Bermudas, those
countries' or islands, in case of success, shall be confederated with
or dependent upon the said United States.' I had the honor of
stating my apprehensions to you and the other commissioners at
Passay on the 3d instant. Doctor Franklin did not think they
were well founded, nor that any such construction could possibly
be put upon the article. North America, he said, strictly speak
ing, comprised all parts of the continent north of the equator, and
the Floridas, being in the latitude of thirty degrees north, would
be comprehended within the meaning of the words 'northern
parts of America.' I thought it would be best to put it out of all
doubt, by getting that explanation of the words under the hands
of the French ministry, especially as they would at least admit of
dispute, and might in future produce disagreeable consequences.
Doctor Franklin said that congress had given some instructions
respecting the cession of part of Florida to Spain, and objected
to making any application on the subject to the French ministry,
as it might be taken ill, and added if my apprehensions were ever
so just, it was too late for any remedy in France, but that the
commissioner for the court of Madrid might guard any bad con
sequences in the treaty which he had to conclude with that court.
The resolution of congress of the 30th of December, 1776, to
which Doctor Franklin alluded, extends only to the town and har
bor of Pensacola, and circumstances are much changed in Amer-

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 41
ica since that resolution was made. It declares 'that if his Cath
olic Majesty will join with the United States in a war against
Great Britain, they will assist in reducing to the possession of
Spain the town and harbor of Pensacola.' Had Spain complied
with the request, had she stood forth our friend in the day of
distress, the offer made by congress might with propriety have
been claimed. She. did not declare war against Great Britain,
and I do not know that she has done anything yet to entitle her to
any great share of our gratitude. ... If the words were
meant to exclude the United States from the acquisition of the
Floridas, it must have been intended for the benefit of Spain,
and therefore the less likely was it to obtain any satisfaction from
that quarter. . . . The article expresses the intentions of
the framers of it very distinctly : 'If the United States should
think fit to attempt the reduction of,' not the northern parts of
America but 'the British power remaining in the northern parts
of America.' This power, without taking notice of an inconsider
able settlement on the Mosquito coast, or of Hudson Bay, may
be said to have extended from the most southern point of Florida
to the most northern part of Canada; and I am of opinion that
the United States will not be satisfied if any attempts are made
to circumscribe their possessions within narrower limits."*
He continued with astonishing insight to penetrate the real
intentions of the French ministry, as revealed in the instructions of
the king to M. Gerard. He seems to have been the only one to
construe properly the article in question and to perceive the
designs of France, unless, perhaps, the others, perceiving, thought
it wiser rather to take chances of the future as regards territory
than run the risk of incurring the suspicion or ill will of that
country. He went on to say, "The eighth article of the original
treaty approved of by congress in September, 1776, and trans
mitted by them to the commissioners at this court (Paris), not
only confirms me in this opinion, but throws great light upon the
intentions of the French ministry. It. is as follows : 'The most'
Christian King shall never invade, nor under any pretense attempt
to possess himself of, Labrador, New Britain, Nova Scotia,
Acadia, Florida, nor any of the countries, cities, or towns on the
continent of North America ; nor of any of the islands of New
foundland, Cape Breton, St. Johns, Anticosti, nor any other island
lying near to the said continent in the seas, or in any gulf, bay,
or river, it being the true intent and meaning of this treaty that

* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.

42 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the said United States shall have the sole, exclusive, undivided
and perpetual possession of all the countries, cities, and towns on
said continent, and of all island's near to it which now are, or
lately were, under the jurisdiction of, or subject to, the king or
crown of Great Britain, whenever they shall be united or confed
erated with the said United States.' These words admit of no
mistake; no hidden meaning is concealed under them, nor could
there be any possibility of contentions respecting the countries
therein described had they been inserted in the treaty. With all
due deference to Doctor Franklin, I cannot help declaring that I
am firmly persuaded that the court of France would not have sub
stituted the eighth article in the place of the above if they had not
had some designs contrary to the intentions of congress, so clearly
expressed in their ninth article."
He continued with a conclusion which, in the end, proved abso
lutely correct : "His most Christian Majesty, in the eleventh arti
cle of the treaty of alliance, does not guarantee generally to the
United States their possessions, and the additions or conquests
that their confederation may obtain during the war from any of
the dominions now or hereafter possessed by Great Britain in
North America, but stipulates that the guaranty shall only be con
formable to the fifth and sixth articles. The latter of these con
tains nothing but a renunciation on the part of France, of the
islands of the Bermudas, and of the whole continent of North
America. As France does not pretend to any claim upon the
Floridas, this renunciation can, in no respect, affect those Prov
inces. Spain, who was at the peace of 1763 obliged to cede them
to Great Britain, may be desirous of resuming them, and the fifth
article in the treaty of alliance seems to lay the foundation of
such a claim. Should that event ever take place it would prove
extremely prejudicial to the interests of the United States in gen
eral, but particularly to those of the South. Spain would, by
that means, have a direct communication with the Indians on our
frontier, and have it in her power to disturb our settlements when
ever she pleased. . . . Florida was never of any advantage
to Spain when in her possession, nor is it probable it ever would
be were it so again but it will be of the greatest importance to the
United States, on account of security, which in all negotiations
has been thought a sufficient reason for a claim, though no right
existed, which is not the case in the present instance. . . .
This is a matter of great consequence, but, however just mly appre
hensions may be on this point also, I fear it is now too late to
receive any satisfactory explanation respecting it at this court,

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 43
and we must again turn our eyes towards you for relief. If the
court of Madrid could be prevailed upon to guarantee the Floridas
and these islands also to the United States, you would render an
essential service to your country."
It will not answer to dismiss the criticisms of Messrs. Lee and
Izard of the treaty with France, with a declaration of the purity
and integrity of Doctor Franklin. Any misunderstanding
between the American envoys cannot affect the merits or demerits
of the treaty stiulpations. The criticisms of Mr. Izard, at least,
were remarkably acute and correct and his predictions were sub
stantially fulfilled. It is not improbable, therefore, that the French
ministry purposely left an opening, through which the Spanish
court might secure an advantage in the Floridas. This is well
substantiated by the strong instructions given M. Gerard by the
King of France in favor of gaining the Floridas, not for France,
but for Spain. France desired the co-operation of Spain in the
struggle which the French government and the Unitel States
were making against Great Britain, and hence it is not improb
able that she intentionally left an opening in the treaty in order
to pave the way to satisfy Spain and to secure her active alliance.
This conclusion in no wise reflects upon the purity and integrity
of Doctor Franklin, because the consideration of securing the
alliance with France outweighed all technicalities, and rightly so,
in the, mind of Doctor Franklin, and he would rather have
accepted an imperfect treaty than none at all.
In answer to Mr. Izard's letter Mr. Lee wrote, "The fifth arti
cle stood'originally thus : 'Si les Etats-Unis jugent a propos de
tenter la conquete de la Canada, de la Nouvelle-Ecosse, de Terre-
nueve St. Jean, et des Bermudas, ces conquetes encas de succes
appartiendront aux dits Etats-Unis.' Even this did not appear
to me adequate to the intentions of congress; I therefore pro
posed that it should be so extensive and explicit as was marked
out to us in the eighth article of the plan proposed by congress.
My colleagues did not agree with me, and I remember perfectly
Doctor Franklin's answer was that congress had receded from
those claims since by the concessions directed to be made to Spain.
I submitted mine to the opinion of my colleagues. I have already
asked the commands of congress relative to conceding anything
to Spain agreeably to the instructions of the 30th of December,
1776, which you mention, and you may be assured that I will
never subscribe the cession of one inch of what congress has
claimed in the eighth article of their plan without their express
orders. I shall make no observations respecting the degree of

44 THE PROVINCE AND. THE STATES.
gratitude to which Spain may be entitled, but the leaving of arti
cles so loose .as to occasion disputes, or making cessions which
may plant a thorn in the side of any of the United States, is not
the manner I should choose of showing it. How the fifth article
came changed so much from what it was at first I never could
learn." It would seem from the above that when the treaty was
made, Doctor Franklin was under the impression that congress
had receded from the instructions given in the act of congress of
December 30, 1776. His course in disregarding the criticism of
Mr. Lee of the fifth article of the treaty can be explained upon
no other ground, unless upon the one previously given of his
willingness to accept an imperfect or objectionable treaty rather
%han none at all.
On July 22, 1778, Doctor Franklin wrote, "The Spanish gal-
ieons, which have been impatiently expected, are at length hap
pily arrived. The fleet and army returning from Brazil is still
out, but supposed to be on her way homeward. When that and
the South Sea ships are arrived it will appear whether Spain's
accession to the treaty has been delayed for the reasons given, or
whether the reasons were only given to excuse the delay."* On
August 31, Mr. Lee wrote to the Committee of Foreign Affairs,
"It has been hinted to me that there will be two important sub
jects of negotiation with the Spanish court, upon which I beg to
have the orders of congress : Providing the Spanish navy with
masts at a stipulated and as reasonable price as possible; and the
cession of Florida, should it be conquered, to them. For this
they would stipulate, whenever peace is concluded to furnish the
funds for redeeming all or a great part of the paper." Mr. Izard
wrote on September 12, "The letters which Mr. Lee has lately
received from Spain leave not the least room to doubt what the
expectations of that court are respecting the Floridas. For my
own part, no such additional proof was necessary after having
compared the fifth article of the treaty of alliance with the eighth
article of the original treaty transmitted by congress. The con
duct of Spain has been full of ambiguity. Sne has been arming
with all possible diligence; and at the same time sent an ambas
sador to London, who has hitherto made use of no other language
but that of peace and mediation. . . . Should Spain be suf
fered to get possession of the Floridas, perpetual causes of quar
rel may be expected ; and therefore I hope the wisdom of congress
will guard against this evil." Mr. Lee wrote to the Committee

* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

45

of Foreign Affairs on October 19, "No movements yet on the part
of Spain. I have consulted Count de Vergennes on the propriety
of my taking any measures to bring that court to a decision. His
advice is in these words, 'My opinion is that you will act pru
dently to suspend the advances which you desire to make to that
court with the view of ascertaining its principles and resolutions
with regard to America.' "
For some reason Spain diligently sought to bring the war
between Great Britain and the United States to an end. There
was a steady communion between the leaders of those two coun
tries during the early stages of the war. It is not at all improb
able that Spain may have intimated at one time to the British
ministry that the relinquishment of the Floridas to the Spanish
government would effect an alliance between Spain and Great
Britain. But if so, such an intimation was disregarded by the
British, because they did not expect to lose the Floridas even
though they lost the colonies.*
In accordance with his instructions, M. Gerard, soon after
his arrival in Philadelphia, began to consider the welfare of Spain
in all negotiations in which the Floridas or the Mississippi ques
tion figured. In the instructions prepared in October, 1778, by
order of congress, for Doctor Franklin at Paris, much was
omitted that Mr. Morris (who wrote the instructions) had
intended should be inserted. It was omitted pursuant to opinions
expressed by M. Gerard, who gave congress to understand that
France did not care to encourage the conquest of Canada by the
United States. He also informed congress that "France would
be obliged to discountenance any agressions by the United States
upon Spain." Mr. Sparks gave the following summary of a dis
patch to M. Gerard to Count de Vergennes October 20, 1778 : f
"It seemed to him (Gerard) important for the United States to
give some surety to that Power (Spain) by fixing certain limits
which should not be passed. In answer to Mr. Morris' ques
tion as to the nature and extent of this surety, Mr. Gerard said
that the renunciation of any design upon Pensacola, Mobile and
St. Augustine, and even of the navigation of the Mississippi,
would perhaps be necessary to accomplish an object so important
to both parties and insure the confidence and friendship of Spain.
Mr. Morris replied that many of his colleagues thought it was
time to pass a "law de coercendo imperio; that to extend the terri-

* Narrative and Critical History of America: Winsor.
tJared Spark's Manuscripts: Harvard College.

46 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
tory of the United States farther to the south and west would be
rather to weaken than confirm the Union, and that the poverty and
vigor of the north were the best safeguards of the Republic. He
said these same persons considered it for the interest of the con
federation that the navigation of the Mississippi as high up as
the mouth of the Ohio should appertain exclusively to his Catholic
Majesty, because it would be the only means of retaining under
dependence to the Republic the mass of population which would
spring up between the Ohio and the lakes and in the western set
tlements of Virginia; that the inhabitants of these immense
regions, whether English or Americans, having an outlet down
the St. Lawrence on the one side and the Mississippi on the other,
would be in a condition to domineer over the power of the United
States, and even of Spain, and would in the end render them
selves independent. M. Gerard asked if this was the general
sense of congress, for he knew several members who thought the
navigation of the Mississippi should belong equally to the English
and the Americans. Mr. Morris answered that these topics had
not been agitated in such a manner as to come to any positive
result, but the prevalent feeling was that it would not be expedi
ent to extend dominion to the south, and he believed the persons
who wished to take possession of the Floridas had a scheme of
ceding them to Spain for a pecuniary consideration; and that
some of those at least who were bent on securing the navigation
of the Mississippi were interested in the new establishment in that
quarter." But according to Francis Wharton "there must have
been a misunderstanding as to the last point on the part of Gerard.
Whatever may have been Morris' own conviction of the impolicy
of a southwestern extension of the United States, it is not likely
that he would have charged those members who differed with him
with being governed by interest in the new 'establishments' in
the southwest."
Time continued to slip away without definite action concerning
an alliance on the part of Spain. M. Gerard assumed to be the
spokesman or agent for Spain, and through him communications
were had with the Spanish monarch. On February 9, 1779, he
informed congress that "the King of Spain, in order to put an
end to the tergiversations of England," had made known to that
power that he would undertake mediation between her and the
United States and that, "the King of Spain, by taking this pro
ceeding upon himself in a friendly manner, has shown a disposi
tion most favorable to the alliance (with the United States)."
He therefore asked that cong-ress should hasten to appoint some

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 47
person authorized to proceed to Madrid to consider the problems
likely to be presented during the negotiations. He also stated
that the King of France had suggested that "at a time in which
the United States are employed in fixing their political existence,
it seems to belong to their foresight to consider the sentiments of
the states as to the peace in relation to Spain." The committee
of congress appointed to consider the terms upon which peace
would be accepted, in pursuance of the mediation of Spain, pre
pared an elaborate report which was submitted to congress on
February 23, 1779, and after being read was ordered to lie on the
table until the next Thursday. The report was taken from the
table half a dozen times and very critically and fully considered.
This seems to have been an earnest and honest attempt on the part
of both France and Spain to establish peace between Great Britain
and the United States upon the basis of the independence of the
colonies. The delay of congress in preparing their ultimata
occasioned an earnest appeal from M. Gerard on March 17 to
hasten proceedings. Finally the following ultimata were agreed
to March 19:
"1. That the thirteen United States are bounded north by a
line to be drawn from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia along
the highlands which divided those rivers which empty themselves
into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic
ocean to the northesternmost head of Connecticut river; thence
down along the middle of that river to the forty-fifth degree of
north latitude ; thence due west in the latitude forty-five degrees
north from the equator to the northwesternmost side of the river
St. Lawrence or Cadaraqui ; thence straight to the south end of
Lake Nipissing, and thence straight to the sources of the river
Mississippi; west by a line to be drawn along the middle of the
river Mississippi from its source to where the said line shall
intersect the latitude thirty-one degrees north. South by a line
to be drawn due east from the termination of the last mentioned
line in the latitude thirty-one degrees north from the equator to
the middle of the river Apalachicola or Catahouche ; thence along
the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River; thence
straight to the head of St. Mary's river ; thence down along the
middle of St. Mary's river to the Atlantic ocean ; then east by a
line to be drawn along the middle of St. John's from its source
to its mouth in the Bay of Fundy, or by a line to be settled and
adjusted between that part of the State of Massachusetts Bay,
formerly called the Province of Maine, and the Colony of Nova
Scotia, agreeable to their respective rights, comprehending all

48 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
islands, within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the
United States and lying between lines to be drawn due east from
the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia
on the one part andJSast Florida on the other part shall, respec
tively, touch the Bay Gf Fundy and the Atlantic ocean : Provided,
that if the line to be drawn from the mouth of Lake Nipissing to
the head of the Mississippi can not be obtained without continuing
the war for that purpose, then that a line or lines may be drawn
more southerly, so as not to be southward of a line in latitude
forty-five degrees north.
"2. That every port and place within the United States, and
every island, harbor and road to them or any of them belonging,
be absolutely evacuated by the land and sea forces of his Britan
nic Majesty and yielded to the powers of the states to which they
respectively belong."*
On the 22d of March, a third resolution relative to the New
foundland fisheries was adopted; and two days later the fourth
resolution was rejected by a vote of 28 to 8, the latter being as
follows : "That the navigation of the river Mississippi be acknowl
edged and ratified absolutely free to the subjects of the United
States." The reason why so many voted against this resolution
was doubtless because they deemed it impolitic, in view of the
known attitude of both France and Spain against such claim, to
adopt in so formal a manner a resolution so broad, emphatic and
decisive. This action by congress was due to the solicitations of
the French minister, who desired to lay before Spain in definite
form the demands of the United States. Whether Spain would
form an alliance with the United States against Great Britain,
depended wholly on the concord likely to be -reached between
Spain and the United States on the questions of boundaries and
the navigation of the Mississippi.
Late in 1778 and early in 1779, M- Gerard, the French minister
to Philadelphia, endeavored to induce congress to agree to the
conditions required by the king of Spain, in order to secure his
active services as an ally against Great Britain. He assured the
Committee of Foreign Affairs of congress "that his King would
not prolong the war for a single day to secure to the United States
the possessions which they coveted." f At this time congress did
not ask for more than an extension of their western limits to the
Mississippi and the permanent right to navigate that river from
* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.
¦ ' t Spark's Manuscripts; Harvard College.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

49

its source to the sea. But M. Gerard informed them that in his
opinion the United States already had more territory than they
could easily administer, and expressed a hope that there would
never be more than thirteen states unless Canada became the
fourteenth. -In order to assist Spain, France, at the commence
ment of the Revolution, had asked her to recognize the inde
pendence of the United States, that she might have a basis for the
negotiations which should result from the war; but instead of
doing so she reserved such right in a special article attached to
the treaty between France and the United States. Spain sought
for the possession of the river and the port of Mobile, the acqui
sition of Pensacola, and all of the coast of Florida along the
Bahama channel. In order to favor Spain and curb the preten
sions of the United States the French minister supported the
demands of the former and was curt and severe in the endeavor
to effect his objects. In a formal interview with congress on
February 15, 1779, he announced that Spain put the price of
declaring war against Great Britain and of joining France and the
United States in the struggle at the possession of Pensacola and
the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, and declared that if
these conditions were not agreed to she might join England
instead of the United States. As it was vastly to the interests of
France to have Spain join against Great Britain, the course of the
French minister becomes clear in trying to satisfy Spain at the
expense of the United States. But the importance of navigating
the Mississippi was fully recognized this early by the members of
congress, and they did not readily agree to its relinquishment.
In a letter dated May 27, 1779, AL Gerard urged congress to
hasten action anew in regard to the concessions to Spain. "It is
only*by enabling the court of Spain to bring its mediation to its
critical and decisive point that it can be hoped that this power,
convinced of the injustice of the views and of the ambition of
England, will join the alliance, acknowledge the independence of
the LTnited States, and take an active part in the war. On the
contrary, by delaying, without communicating to the parties
interested the motives which induce them to it, the states will be
in danger of fatiguing this power, which keeps on foot the forces
of the whole monarchy, principally with a view to give respecta
bility to a mediation which appears to be neglected; they incur
the risk of cooling the good will of his Catholic Majesty, and per
haps of alienating him as much by delays as if resolutions con
trary to the system which he has appeared disposed to favor by
his mediation should give him lawful reasons for changing his
II-4

So THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
conduct. The alliance will thus be deprived of a decisive sup
port, which the goodness of its cause, the wisdom of its conduct
and the close union subsisting- between France and Spain seemed
to promise it. . The season is already so far advanced
that this same uncertainty, by destroying the hope of seeing Spain
declare herself during the course of the present campaign, leaves
France alone exposed to the efforts of the principal body of the
enemy's forces. The wisdom of congress and the faithful attach
ment which they show on every occasion is as conspicuous as it
is satisfactory to the alliance, and the respect which they have
always expressed for Spain, do not permit a doubt as to the atten
tion which they will be pleased to give to considerations of such
importance." This was an elaborate and round-about effort of the French
minister to secure the passage of strong resolutions of congress in
favor of Spain in order to win the immediate alliance of the lat
ter and thus engage her assistance to repel the early-expected
attack of a fresh and threatened expedition of the British. Of
course congress was aware that M. Gerard expected them to
make large concessions to Spain at this critical juncture, as much
to save the armies of France as those of the United States. On
the other hand, it was not deemed wise to concede immensely
valuable rights to Spain, when, with the assistance of France,
congress felt able to crush the British armies and the British
fleets. They did not, therefore, surrender everything Spain
desired in order to gain her active co-oeration in the war. In
the fall of 1779, M. Gerard was superceded by Chevalier de la
Luzerne, who continued the policy of the former. On June 21
Mr. Lee wrote, "I have the honor to inform congress that Spain
has declared against Great Britain and that their respective
ambassadors are recalled. A part of the Spanish fleet has joined
that of France, which' makes it outnumber that of England."*
Spain saw that, owing to the demands of the United States,
there was certain to be contentions between the two countries,
should the latter gain their independence. It was therefore out
of the question for her to form an alliance with the revolting col
onies, unless they should recede from their demands on the Mis
sissippi. But if she remained silent, the States would, with the
assistance of France, win their independence, and at the same time
probably secure by conquest the Floridas a'nd in consequence the
permanent and free navigation of the Mississippi. This would

D )'iai:i: ? i - pill: n ce, secret.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

5*

be their undoubted right could they accomplish it. To prevent
this result, Spain was forced to declare war against Great Britain.
She rightly concluded that while England was engaged with the
rebellious colonies, she could make a conquest of the Floridas
and thus be in possession of them and therefore the mouth of
the Mississippi upon the conclusion of peace. She would thus be
in a much better situation than if she joined the colonies. She
therefore declared war against England and concluded a secret
treaty April 12, 1779, with France, but did not secure by the lat
ter any advantages over the United States.
After a discussion lasting more than six months, congress
finally, on September 17, 1779, adopted the following resolution :*
"Whereas, By the treaties subsisting between his Most Christian
Majesty (of France) and the United States of America, a power
is reserved to his Catholic Majesty (of Spain) 'to accede to said
treaties and to participate in their stipulations at such times as he
shall judge proper,' " etc.
"And whereas, Should his Catholic Majesty accede to the said
treaties without any alteration, he must be under the necessity of
renouncing forever all claims to the possession of the Floridas, of
the utmost consequence to his kingdom, and more particularly to
his American dominions. In order, therefore, that nothing may
by wanting on the part of these States to further a treaty of
alliance and of amity and commerce with his Catholic Majesty,
consistent with the engagements of the said States and agreeable
to his most Christian Majesty, their ally,
"Resolved, That if his Catholic Majesty shall accede to the said
treaties, and in concurrence with France and the United States of
America, continue the present war with Great Britain for the pur
pose expressed in the treaties aforesaid, he shall not thereby be
precluded from securing to himself the Floridas. Oh the con
trary, if he shall obtain the Floridas from Great Britain, these
United States will guaranty the same to his Catholic Majesty:
provided always that the United States shall enjoy the free navi
gation of the river Mississippi into and from the sea.
"Resolved, That a committee be appointed to prepare instruc
tions conformable to the foregoing resolutions."
It will be noted in these resolutions how alluringly the bait of
the Floridas was presented, and how it was made to appear that
their acquisition by Spain depended on an alliance with the United
States. There can be no doubt that the reason why Spain did not

'Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.

52 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
conclude such a treaty with the colonies at the outset, as France
did, was because she was differently situated than France, and
her interests were likely to suffer by such an alliance. Accord
ingly, at the commencement of the Revolution, Spain only favored
a redress of grievances for the colonies. Her statesmen saw that
the proximity of the United States to Louisiana and the Spanish
West Indies, was a menace to the Spanish American possessions.
Spain had nothing to gain by an alliance with the United States,
unless the latter should renounce to her the Floridas which she
coveted; but she expected to gain them without such an alliance
while England was busy with her rebellious colonies. She
wisely concluded that, in any event, it was necessary for her
to move with extreme prudence and caution. She disliked Eng
land, was the firm friend of France, and wished to gain the friend
ship of the United States. She likewise thought that, should the
colonies fail to gain their independence, it would be to her advan
tage to remain in the good graces of England, her nearest neigh
bor in America. The people of New Orleans and of all the other
Louisiana colonies feared the encroachments of tlie Americans,
who had begun already to push their settlements into the valley
of the Ohio and to send their produce down the Mississippi to
New Orleans. This fear is all the more noteworthy by reason
of the exclusive policy of Spain in regard to the trade of her col
ony of Louisiana. As the war progressed it was developed that
her ambition was to gain the Floridas with a boundary as far
north as possible and the exclusive navigation of the river Mis
sissippi and that of the Gulf of Mexico. It was clearly developed
that the apprehensions of the Spanish sovereign of future dis
sensions, and perhaps wars, with the United States, the differ
ences in regard to American colonial boundaries, and the dis
agreement over the right to navigate the Mississippi river, were
the principal obstacles during the Revolution to a treaty between
Spain and the United States.
But the colonies, in their struggle, needed assistance — money,
soldiers, ships, munitions — and accordingly, in September, 1779,
appointed John Jay minister plenipotentiary to the court at Mad
rid, with powers of concluding a treaty with Spain similar to the
one concluded with France in 1778, or if that could not be accom
plished, to secure such assistance as was possible. He was spe
cially instructed with the above resolutions of congress of Sep
tember 17, 1779, and was further instructed September 25 as
follows : "You are particularly to endeavor to obtain some con
venient port or ports below the thirty-first degree of north lati-

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 53
tude on the river Mississippi for all merchant vessels' goods,
wares, and merchandises belonging to the inhabitants of these
States.' On October 13, 1779, a motion in congress to recede
from the claim of a free navigation of the Mississippi below the
thirty-first degree on condition that Spain would grant a free
port below such parallel of latitude was lost. On February 2,
1780, congress was informed by the French minister of state that
before Spain could be induced to treat with the United States,
the King of Spain desired the views of congress on "certain arti
cles which his Catholic Majesty deems of great importance to
the interests of his crown, and on which it is highly necessary that
the United States explain themselves with precision and with
such moderation as may consert with their essential rights." The
articles were as follows :*
"1. A precise and invariable western boundary to the United
States. 2. The exclusive navigation of the river Mississippi.
3. The possession of the Floridas. 4. The lands on the left or
eastern side of the river Mississippi."
In regard to the first article, Spain maintained that the United
States extended no farther westward than the line mentioned in
the proclamation of the King of England of October 7, 1763, — a
line extending approximately north and south a little west of the
Alleghany mountains, thus leaving all the country to the west
ward as far as the Mississippi river in the possession of the
Indians and hence subject to the colonization, conquest and set
tlement of any country. Taking into consideration this view of
the first article, the second was construed that, inasmuch as the
United States could claim no land abutting on the Mississippi,
they had no right to the free navigation of that river. In regard
to the" third article, it was argued that, as Spain would herself
wrest the Floridas from Great Britain during the war, every
source of dispute concerning them would thereby be removed.
Under the fourth article, it was contended that the Indian country
lying west of the line referred to in the proclamation mentioned
above and east of the Mississippi river was open to conquest from
Great Britian by the arms of Spain. This was the Spanish view
of the situation in February, 1780. She took the position that, as
Great Britain had1 omitted to include the country east of the
Mississippi and west of the line mentioned in the proclamation in
one of the governments she had organized out of the territory
secured from France by the treaty of 1763, she herself had left

* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.

54 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the country with the Indians; and that, therefore, Spain had as
much. right to enter it and take possession as had Great Britain.
Congress was thus informed by the French minister of state that
the above outline embraced the Spanish view of the situation in
America, and was requested to indicate the position which the
United States expected to assume. This would be necessary
before Spain was willing to consider the subject of a treaty with
congress. Mr. Jay, in replying to this inquiry, took the position that
France had possessed all the Indian country above mentioned
previous to 1763, having secured it by exploration and settlement
particularly at Detroit, and on the Wabash, Illinois and other
rivers and elsewhere; that Great Britain, by the treaty of 1763,
had obtained the country from France, with the western boundary
in the middle of the Mississippi river ; that, in order to retain the
friendship of the Indian inhabitants therein, she had purposely
excluded the country from any of her other American colonies;
and that she had reserved the country for future settlement, when
she should purchase the claims of the Indians residing therein.*
In support of this view he cited the treaty of 1763 and the
proclamation of the English King of October 7, 1763, of which
the following extracts will be sufficient to illustrate his argument :
"And whereas, It is just and reasonable and essential to our
interest, and the security of our colonies, that the several nations
or tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who live
under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the
possession of such parts of our dominions and territories as, not
having been ceded to, or purchased by us, are reserved to them
or any of them, as their hunting grounds."
"No governor or commander in chief of our other colonies or
plantations in America (meaning the English colonies along the
Atlantic and the Floridas) shall presume for the present, and
until our further pleasure be known, to grant, warrant or survey,
or pass patents for any lands beyond the heads or sources of any
of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic ocean from the west or
northwest; or upon any lands whatever which, not having ceded
to, or purchased by us, as aforesaid, are reserved to the said
Indians, or any of them. And we do further declare it to be our
royal will and pleasure, for the present, as aforesaid, to reserve
unto our sovereignty, protection and dominion, for the use of the

* Life of John Jay.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 55
said Indians, all the lands and territories not included within the
limits of our said three new governments ; as also all the land
and territories lying to the westward of the sources of the rivers
which fall into the sea from the west and northwest as aforesaid ;
and we do hereby strictly forbid, on pain of our displeasure, all
our loving subjects from making any purchases or settlements
whatever, or taking possession of any of the lands above reserved
without our especial leave and license for that purpose first
obtained." *
Mr. Jay maintained that the English title from France to the
country westward to the Mississippi was absolute, and that the
proclamation of tlie king proved that England did not relinquish
the country to the Indians, but on the contrary made ample pro
visions for their security, protection and government by excluding
settlers from the country, the appointment of agents to keep in
friendly communication with them, and otherwise. That being
true, the United States, taking their title from the British and
that title not having been previously questioned, was entitled to
the country westward to the middle of the Mississippi, and, there
fore, to the free navigation of that stream.
At this point of the discussion the whole subject was permitted
to remain quiet for a period ; and in the meantime Mr. Jay pressed
the consideration of a treaty with the United States. In April,
1780, the Count de Florida Blanca, representing Spa'n, pro
pounded a series of questions, under the insistence of Air. Jay,
concerning the civil and military strength of the United States,
their resources in remote particulars and ability to continue the
war, their power, should she need it, to assist Spain in case she
became their ally, the strength of their marine, etc.f These ques
tions were so searching that several members of congress took
umbrage and alarm and counseled the unwisdom of revealing so
minutely the military strength of the colonies. Mr. Jay, however,
answered them as fully as seemed consistent with safety and
dignity, stating, among other things, that the United States would
assist Spain in two ways : Either by fighting her enemies or by
advantages of commerce. He urged that, as Spain was already
at war with Great Britain, she should now unite with the United
States against the common enemy.
On May 11, 1780, the Count de Florida Blanca informed Mr.
Jay that there was but one obstacle from which he apprehended

* Annual Register (English) : Vol. VI.
t Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.

56 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
any great difficulty in agreeing to the terms of the proposed treaty
and that "arose from the pretentions of America to the navigation
of the Mississippi." He stated that, while congress had at first
claimed such right, they had afterward relinquished it, but had
again "made it an essential condition of the treaty." He observed
that the king of Spain "was firmly resolved in his mind" on the
questions of boundary and the navigation of the Mississippi, that
he was not likely to recede, though he desired to aid the Ameri
cans, and that he had recently taken steps to inform himself
fully in regard to the disputed points. Mr. Jay replied that
congress considered that several of the states were bounded on
the west by the Mississippi river, and were, therefore, interested
in its navigation, but were willing to regulate disputed questions
so as to make Spain secure. The count reiterated that he was
confident the king would not relinquish the navigation of the
Mississippi, and expressed the hope that some way around the
obstacle could be found.
On May 26, 1780, Mr. Jay wrote as follows to congress : "If
congress remain firm, as I have no reason to doubt, respecting the
Mississippi, I think Spain will finally be content with equitable
regulations, and I wish to know whether congress would consider
any regulations necessary to prevent contraband as inconsistent
with their ideas of free navigation." Spain was unfortunately
situated. She realized that, if the American colonies were able to
defend themselves against an army of eighty thousand troops sent
against them, they would not in the least fear Spain, should they
gain their independence; would, in short, be able to enforce any
claim they might make. They would be able to force their con
traband, or forbidden goods, into the Spanish American colonies —
into Louisiana — despite the exclusive policy of Spain and the
protests of the inhabitants of that province. The relinquishment
of the navigation right meant the absolute surrender of the Span
ish ambition to own the exclusive navigation of the Gulf of
Mexico and of the Mississippi and meant the consequent invasion
of contraband into New Orleans and every other settlement in
Louisiana to the crushing injury of Spanish commerce. The
inhabitants of New Orleans protested against such a possibility,
and the policy of Spain became emphatic never to surrender the
question of navigation. The Spanish policy was to exclude the
goods of all other nations from Louisiana, in order to give the
manufacturers of Spain the benefit of exclusive trade with that
colony. The navigation of the Mississippi by other nations, it
was manifest, would countervail the Spanish policy and flood

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

57

Louisiana with the cheap goods of other countries — with the unde
sirable goods of the United States. This could not be counte
nanced, and hence the exclusive navigation must remain with
Spain. This was the position of that country.
William Carmichael, American charge d'affairs at the court
of Madrid, wrote from St. Ildefonso, on August 22, 1780, to the
committee of foreign affairs of congress, that "the navigation of
the Mississippi appears to be the great, and if we can credit the
assertions of men in power, the sole obstacle" .to an agreement
concerning terms to be embodied in the proposed treaty. As a
matter of fact, Spain and the United States had little or nothing
in common. The latter wanted assistance, particularly of money ;
and the former wanted the exclusive navigation of the Missis
sippi. Neither seemed disposed to yield, so there was abundant
room for the diplomats to display their talents. To the Ameri
can requests for a loan, Spain replied that such demands should
be made on France, the ally of the United States, and the one
receiving all the benefits of their trade.
In a letter dated September 25, 1780, Mr. Carmichael said,
referring to a conversation that had taken place between Mr.
Jay and the Count de Florida Blanca, "In the course of this con
ference the Count de Florida Blanca asserted with warmth that
the king would never relinquish the navigation of the Mississippi,
and that the ministry regarded the exclusive right to it as the
principal advantage which Spain would obtain by the war. This
being the bar to the treaty, it seems not improbable that this
court (Spanish) will not be in a hurry to treat with us, but
rather trust to her interest in a general congress for peace to
obtain her favorite objects."
The following extract from a letter of October 3, 1780, from
Benjamin Franklin to Mr. Jay states the American position at that
date admirably : "If you are not so far private in Spain, continue,
however, the even good temper you have hitherto manifested.
Spain owes us nothing; therefore, whatever friendship she shows
us in lending money or furnishing clothes, etc., though not equal
to our wants and wishes, is, however, tant de gagne (so much
gain). Those who have begun to assist us are more likely to
continue than to decline, and we are still so much obliged as their
aid amounts to. But 1 hope and am confident that court will be
wiser than to take advantage of our distress and insist on our
making sacrifices by an agreement which the circumstances of
such distress would hereafter weaken, and the very proposition
can only give disgust at present. Poor as we are, yet as I know

58 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
we shall be rich, I would rather agree with them to buy, at a great
price, the whole of their right on the Mississippi than sell a drop
of its waters. A neighbor might as well ask me to sell my street
door."* That remarkable letter exhibits the intellectual precision of the
writer, the accuracy of his views, the breadth of his statesmanship,
the wisdom of his counsels, and the steadfast purpose of the Amer
ican leaders of the revolutionary period. It reveals the diplo
matic spirit to an astonishing degree, as well as the severity of the
straits under which the colonies continued their heroic struggles.
In October, 1780, congress instructed Mr. Jay to adhere to their
former instructions to him concerning the right to navigate the
Mississippi and, if it could be accomplished, to secure from Spain
an acknowledgment of that right; to explain that the Mississippi
was the western boundary of several of the states, and that the
United States, while connected with Great Britain, had been accus
tomed to the privilege of navigating that stream; and to assure
the Spanish court that the mutual use of the river would in no
wise jeopardize the interests or the peace of the Spanish American
colonies nor of Spain. He was further instructed that, if an
admission of the right of the United States to navigate the Mis
sissippi above the thirty-first degree and to have a port or ports
below that parallel could be secured, he might enter into such reg
ulations as would secure the Spanish colonies against American
contraband. He was told that it was of the utmost importance
to the United States, should Spain gain the Floridas, to possess
the right not only to navigate the Mississippi, but the rivers that
had their sources in the states and flowed south through the
Floridas into the Gulf, and to use every effort in his power to
gain such concessions. If he could secure these* rights, he was
instructed to guarantee the Floridas to Spain.
In November, 1780, Mr. Jay offered the following pungent
remarks to M. Gardoqui in answer to his offer to buy the navi
gation of the Mississippi : "I told him that object could not come
in question in a treaty for a loan of a hundred thousand pounds,
and Spain should consider that to render alliances permanent they
should be so formed as to render it the interest of both parties to
observe them; that the Americans, almost to a man, believed that
God Almighty had made that river a highway for the people of
the upper country to go to sea by ; that this country was extensive
and fertile; that the general, many officers, and others of dis-

* Life of Benjamin Franklin.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 59
tinction and influence in America were deeply interested in it;
that it would rapidly settle, and that the inhabitants would not
readily be convinced of the justice of being obliged either to live
without foreign commodities and lose the surplus of their pro
ductions or be obliged to transport both over rugged mountains
and through an immense wilderness to and from the sea, when
they daily saw a fine river flowing before their doors and offering
to save them all the trouble and expense and that without injury
to Spain."*
But AL Gardoqui replied lightly to this sonorous speech and
declared that the present generation would not want this naviga
tion and it should be left to future generations to manage their
own affairs. It was about this time, also, that the Count de
Florida Blanca informed Air. Jay that if Spain could not keep all
of the nations out of the Gulf of Mexico, she should admit all;
that the king would never relinquish the navigation of the Mis
sissippi and the Gulf; that the Spanish minister regarded this as
the principal object to be gained by Spain in the war; with that
gained he would not care if Spain- gained no other cession ; that
he considered it more important than the acquisition of Gibraltar ;
and that if they could not get it, it was a matter of indifference
whether the British possessed Mobile or not.
These remarks of the Count de Florida Blanca and the above
extracts from the letters both of Mr. Jay and Mr. Franklin reveal
the tension that existed between the two countries in regard to
the navigation of the Mississippi (and the Gulf of Mexico) by
Spain. The whole ambition of Spain during the later stages
of the war was to secure to herself the exclusive right to navigate
the Gulf ; hence she began war against England, not as tlie friend
of France, not as an ally of the United States, to secure the Flor
idas. Her possessions would then encircle the Gulf, and her right
to its exclusive navigation could be maintained by her colonial
policy of exclusion. But if she lost the exclusive navigation of
"the Mississippi, she likewise lost the exclusive navigation of the
Gulf, and, therefore, she bent every effort of diplomacy with the
United States and of war with Great Britain to gain her object.
She offered a large sum of money to the United States with the
hope that thev would yield. She advanced part of it and then
artfully withheld the balance, when the colonies were in their
sorest straits near the close of the long struggle, hoping their
necessities would induce them to surrender the coveted prize— 7

?Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.

60 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the navigation of the Mississippi. She professed the warmest
friendship for the colonies and meant it, but studiously gave them
no advantage that was not aimed at the accomplishment of her
object. Her ministers used every art and argument, and even
secured the earnest, active and moral support of the French court,
<and would have been successful, owing to the dire extremity of
the colonies, had not the colonial leaders seen that the navigation
of the Atississippi was absolutely essential to the growth and pros
perity of the upper Alississippi valley.
In his letter of November 6, 1780, to congress, Mr. Jay said:
"In my opinion we should endeavor to be as independent on the
charity of our friends as on the mercy of our enemies. Jacob
took advantage even of his brother's hunger, and extorted from
him a higher price than the value of the Mississippi even for a
single dinner. The way to be not in Esau's condition is to be pre
pared to meet with Jacob's." But the valiant talk of the colonial
leaders did not clothe the continental army, nor provide them
with necessary food, munitions and arms. The soldiers were in
rags, barefooted, unpaid, scantily provided with food, and in many
instances wholly destitute of medical stores. Russia and other
countries of Europe were endeavoring by mediation to restore
peace. England herself was extending tempting offers to induce
the rebels to lay down their arms. Many in the United States
were tired of the war, and were willing to concede almost any
thing to secure peace. The pressure brought to bear upon con-^
gress could scarcely be sustained by that body. In this mem
orable extremity they finally, on February 15, 1781, prepared and
adopted the following letter of instructions to Mr. Jay.
"Sir: Congress having since their instructions to you of the
29th September, 1779, and 4th October, 1780, relative to the claim
of the LTnited States to the free navigation of the river Missis
sippi and to a free port or ports below the thirty-first degree of
north latitude resumed the consideration of that subject; and
being desirous to manifest to all the world, and particularly to
his Catholic Majesty, the moderation of their views, the high
value they place on the friendship of his Catholic Majesty, and
their disposition to remove every reasonable obstacle to his acces
sion to the alliance subsisting between his most Christian Majesty
and these United States, in order to unite the more closely in
their measures and operations three powers who have so great a
unity of interest, arid thereby to compel the common enemy to a
speedy, just and honorable peace, have resolved and you are
hereby instructed, to recede from the instructions above referred

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 6 1
to, so far as they insist on the free navigation of that part of the
river Mississippi which lies below the thirty-first degree of north
latitude and on a free port or ports below the same, provided
such cession shall be unalterably insisted on by Spain, and pro
vided the free navigation of the said river above the said degree
of north latitude shall be acknowledged and guaranteed by his
Catholic Alajesty to the citizens of the United States in common
with his own subjects : It is the order of congress at the same
time that you exert every possible effort to obtain from his Cath
olic Majesty the use of the river aforesaid with a free port or ports
below the said thirty-first degree of north latitude for the citizens
of the United States under such regulations and restrictions only
as may be necessary safeguard against illicit commerce."*
This letter had been introduced by the representatives from
Virginia in pursuance of instructions from their constituents. A
motion made to defeat its adoption by congress was lost. New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia voted for its
adoption. Massachusetts voted against it, and Connecticut, New
York and North Carolina each deposited a split vote. It was thus
adoted. Air. Jay was much displeased with this action and said :
"I flatter myself that congress will never again attempt to form
an alliance on principles of equality in forma pauperis (as a poor
man). Before their ungenerous letter on our right to the Missis
sippi arrived, it was known in Europe, and the substance of my
last instructions on that head were not secret here before they
reached this side of the ocean."
He reported at this time that every act of congress was known
in Europe before he was officially apprised of its passage and
stated that his letters were opened in Spain and that many of them
never reached him. On April 25, 1781, he said in a letter to
congress : "There is more reason to suspect that the French
court were apprised of their contents (the letters addressed to
him) before they arrived, and to believe that the construction of
the treaty, by which the navigation of the Mississippi is supposed
to be comprehended in the guaranty, does not correspond with
their ideas on that subject. The court (at Madrid) continues
pertinaciously to insist on our ceding that navigation, nor will
they, as yet, listen to any middle course."
Spain perceived at this time that the States were almost certain
to gain their independence. She had practically taken possession

* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.

62 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
of the Floridas, had catured a few posts in the Upper Mississippi
country to the east of that river, had established herself at
Natchez, watched every act of congress, and waited as patiently
as a leopard at a deer lick for the states to yield the navigation of
the Mississippi. From Havana at first, and later from the Florida
and Louisiana ports, her troops made steady advances into the
British possessions above the thirty-first degree of north latitude.
She did everything in her power, with the sanction and support
of the Louisianians, to gain the Mississippi by her conquests on
its banks. Many of the Louisianians enlisted in her armies and
were the first to invade the country to the east of the Mississippi
and above the thirty-first degree of north latitude. She advanced
more money to the Americans under professions of earnest sym
pathy and friendship. Her ministers redoubled their efforts to
obtain through the arts of diplomacy the paramount object — the
navigation of the Alississippi. Her conquests in America above
the thirty-first degree of north latitude were designed to fasten
and strengthen her claims on the country to the east of the Mis
sissippi, as against the claims of the states when peace should
be proclaimed. Her ministers played with the necessities of the
colonies and their requests for money and munitions as a cat with
a mouse. Samuel Huntington, president of congress, in a letter dated
May 28, 1781, revealed to Mr. Jay the object of receding from the
claim to navigate the Mississippi. He said: "Congress have
little doubt that the great obstacle to your negotiations will be
removed, and that you will not only be able without further delay
to conclude the proposed alliance with his Catholic Majesty, but
that the liberality and friendly disposition manifested on the part
of the United States by such a cession will induce him to afford
them some substantial and effectual aid in the article of money."
The original articles of instruction to Mr. Jay were drafted by
M'r. Madison.* After the fall of Charleston the danger to the
colonies seemed so great and the aid of Spain seeriied so essential,
that congress had receded somewhat from the original instructions.
In addition to this, Air. Jay was given greater discretion in
regard to details; but this he did not relish, because, should he
make a mistake, he would suffer severe criticism regardless of his
honest intentions. He said in his letter to congress, May 19,
1781, "The cession of this navigation will, in my opinion, render
a future war v/ith Spain unavoidable, and I shall look upon my
subscribing to the one as fixing the certainty of the other."

* Narrative and Critical History of America: Winsor.

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 63
But time passed and Spain seemed no nearer accepting the
advantages under the revised instructions than she had been under
the former. Air. Jay informed the Spanish minister that the
United States could do no more and said : "Even if a desire of
gratifying his Alajesty (the King of Spain) should ever incline
congress to yield a point so essential to their interests yet it stiU
remained a question whether new delays and obstacles to a treaty
would not arise to postpone it." He complained to congress that
the United States assumed the attitude of a petitioner, and that,
accordingly, Spain treated her as such. He reiterated that the
modified instructions of February 15, 1781, should have been
secret. The Spanish statesmen came to the conclusion, by reason
of the suppliant attitude of the states, that another effort on their
part would secure the navigation of the Alississippi. Mr. Jay
could accordingly do nothing. He was told that the surrender of
the Mississippi absolute and without reservation would remove
the only bar to a treaty similar to that with France.
The modified proposition of February 15, 1781, was no addi
tional inducement to Spain to conclude the treaty. The right of
the United States to navigate the Upper Mississippi would prove
an entering wedge to the navigation of the whole river and the
Gulf." That advantage must never be conceded. Spain thus far
had received from the United States "nothing but good words and
fair assurances." The friendly disposition of Spain toward the
United States should influence congress to grant the navigation
of the Mississippi. The king regarded the navigation of that
river more important than the possession of Gibraltar ; all nations
must be excluded from the Alississippi and the Gulf; that was the
immemorial policy of Spain ; the king would never recede ; Amer
ica had done nothing to assist Spain ; the latter had refused tempt
ing offers from Great Britain to turn against the United States ;
the blindness of congress prevented the conclusion of a treaty;
the relinquishment of the Alississippi would remove the only bar
to the treaty. This was the position of Spain in the summer of
1781. Nothing short of the absolute relinquishment of the Mis
sissippi would satisfy Spain. This meant that the western
boundary of the United States would be established east of the
Mississippi, and Louisiana would accordingly embrace the whole
course of that noble stream. There were no railways then ; the
river was the only commercial carrier; it meant the enslavement
of the western country by Spain. So thought Mr. Jay ; so thought

* Remarks of the Spanish Minister of State.

64 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
congress. However, Air. Jay followed his instructions and sub
mitted the following proposition to the Spanish ministry :
"i. The United States shall relinquish to his Catholic Majesty,
and in future forbear to use, or attempt to use, the navigation of
the river Mississippi from the thirty-first degree of north lati
tude — that is, from the point where it leaves the United States —
down to the ocean.
"2. His Catholic Majesty shall guarantee to the United States
all their respective territories.
"3. The United States shall guarantee to his Catholic Majesty,
all his dominions in North America.
"4. Spain shall at once acknowledge the independence of
the United States, and so long as she continued to do so the first
article should be binding upon the United States.
"5. The King of Spain himself shall specify what goods
should be considered contraband in Louisiana."
In presenting this proposition Mr. Jay said, he "could conceive
of nothing in the power of congress to do which could more fully
evidence their disposition to gratify his Majesty than their having
offered to recede from their claim to the navigation of the Missis
sippi though the preservation of it was deemed of the highest
importance to their constituents." But the proposition fell far
short of what Spain desired and so no progress was made: On
October 3, 1781, Mr. Jay wrote to congress, "I think it is their
design (Spain's), therefore, to draw from us all such concessions
as our present distress and the hopes of aid may extort, and by
protracting negotiations about the treaty endeavor to avail them
selves of these concessions at a future clay when our inducements
to offer them shall have ceased. As this would evidently be
unjust, I think the limitation in question can give them no
offense." The limitation referred to was embraced in article four
above. The refusal or neglect of Spain to accept the modified
proposition spurred congress, April 30, 1782, to pass the follow
ing resolution :
"Resolved, That the minister plenipotentiary of the United
States at the court of Aladrid be informed that congress entirely
approves of his conduct as detailed in his letter of the 3d of Octo
ber last ; and that the limitation fixed by him to the proposed sur
render of the navigation of the Mississippi in particular corre
sponds with the views of congress ;.that they observe, not without
surprise and concern, that a proposition so liberal in itself, and
which removed the only avowed obstacle to a connection between
the United States and his Catholic Majesty, should not have pro-

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 65
duced greater effects on the counsel of the latter; that the surren
der of the navigation of the Mississippi was meant as the price
of the advantages promised of an early and intimate alliance with
the Spanish monarchy ; and that if this alliance is to be procrasti
nated till the conclusion of the war the reason of the sacrifice will
no longer exist ; and that as every day which the proposed treaty
is delayed detracts from the obligation and inducement of the
United States to adhere to their overture, it is the instruction of
congress that he urge to the ministry of his Catholic Majesty the
obligation it imposes on Spain to make the treaty the more liberal
on her part, and that in particular he use his endeavors to obtain
in consideration of such delay either an enlargement of her pecun
iary aid to the United States, a facilitating of the use of the Mis
sissippi to the citizens thereof or some peculiar indulgences in the
commerce of the Spanish colonies in America."*
In August, 1782, Mr. Jay, who was then in Paris, held an
important interview with the Count de Aranda, the Spanish
ambassador to France, on which occasion the latter asked what
the United States claimed as their boundaries. Mr. Jay replied,
down the river to the thirty-first degree of north latitude and
thence east over the old course to the ocean. Whereupon, the
count interposed the following objections : That the western
country had never belonged to," nor been claimed by, the ancient
colonies; that previous to 1763 it had belonged to France; that it
had then passed to Great Britain, but during the present war
Spain had won it by conquest, having established posts at Natchez
and at several places in the Upper Mississippi country; that if
Spain's right did not extend over all of that country, it was held
by the Indians ; and that, therefore, the western boundary of the
United States should be far east of the Mississippi. Later, he
indicated on a map such boundary "from a lake near the confines
of Georgia, but east of the Flint river to the confluence of the
Kanawha with the Ohio, thence round the shores of Lakes Erie
and Huron and thence round Lake Michigan and Lake Superior."
Both Mr. Jay and Mr. Franklin (who was present) insisted
that the Mississippi was the western boundary and that the United
States possessed the right to navigate that stream. They stated,
in effect, that this was the ultimatum of the United States. The
Count de Vergennes, French minister of state, expressed the opin
ion that the United States claimed too much. He maintained that
England herself, by the king's proclamation of October 7, 1763,

* Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.
11-5

66 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
had excluded the western country from her possessions when she
spoke of the country between the Mississippi and "the ancient
English establishments," meaning the Atlantic colonies. But
both Mr. Jay and Mr. Franklin asserted that the proclamation, as
a whole, would sustain no such contention. The Count de Ver
gennes further expressed his opinion that Spain could not claim
any country above Natchez; that the western boundary of the
United States should' be on a line up through Alabama to the
Cumberland river and down the same to the Ohio ; and that Spain
was entitled to the Mississippi river. This was one of many sim
ilar interviews between the statesmen of France, Spain and the
United States. The navigation of the Mississippi was the bone
of contention. The attempt of Spain to establish the boundary
far east of the Mississippi was only to give her a stronger claim
to that stream. The French court favored the claims of Spain.
At this point the discussion was temporarily postponed by the
conclusion of the preliminary articles of peace between the United
States and Great Britain.
The course of Spain is thus shown to have been vacillating and
selfish from beginning to end. At the commencement of the rev
olution there is nothing to show that she expected to gain any
accession of territory on the American continent as a result of
the war. The straits of the struggling colonies suggested to her
the opportunity to gain the Floridas either from the United States
or Grer Britain. She first endeavored to gain them from Great
Britair, but the latter would not relinquish them because she
expected to retain them. She then declared war against Britain
for the purpose of wresting the Floridas from the English crown,
but would not join the alliance of France and the United States
because she expected by maneuvering to gain the exclusive navi
gation of the Mississippi from the latter. Toward the close of
the war she was in possession of the Floridas, and had made every
effort to extend her claims eastward of the Mississippi in the
upper portion of the valley of that stream. She had taken pos
session of the Natchez, had sent troops to the Walnut Hills
(Vicksburg) and to the Chickasaw Bluffs (Memphis), had
strengthened with her colonists the French settlements in the
Illinois country, had taken possession of the country across the
Mississippi opposite the post of the Arkansas, and had captured
St. Joseph, Michigan, by an excursion in midwinter from St.
Louis. And she managed to do all this without incurring the
least opposition from the Americans. The latter, were too busily
engaged elsewhere to observe the encroachments of Spain upon

EARLY NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 67
their probable preserves. But the Spanish design was to render
as strong as possible her claims to the territory as far eastward
as the Alleghany mountains. This was her demand as early as
the year 1780. The concessions by congress, the practical sur
render of the navigation of the Mississippi, the yielding policy of
many of the American statesmen, particularly Mr. Morris, and
the desperate straits of the colonies, were coldly employed by
Spain to stretch her claims in America to the utmost. France,
in order to gain her assistance' in the struggle against Britain,
yielded to her solicitations to favor her claimis in America as
against the United States.

68 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

CHAPTER II

The Navigation of the Mississippi River,
1783-1799

AFTER having signed the treaty of Paris of 1783, the Span
ish minister, Count de Aranda, addressed a secret memoir
to the king, declaring his belief that the American colonies,
which had just secured' their independence from Great Britain
through the assistance of France and Spain, would some day
menace the Spanish-American possessions, and that both France
and Spain, in espousing the cause of the colonies, acted in oppo
sition to their best interests. He said:
"This federal republic is born a pigmy, if I may be allowed so
to express myself. It has required the support of two such pow
erful states as France and Spain to obtain its independence. The
day will come when she will be a giant, a colossus, formidable
even in these countries. She will forget the services she has
received from the two powers and will think only of her own
aggrandizement. The liberty of conscience,' the facility of estab
lishing a new population upon immense territories, together with
the advantages of a new government (meaning free), will attract
the agriculturalists and mechanics of all nations, for men ever run
after fortune; and in a few years we shall see the tyrannical
existence of this very colossus of which I speak. The first step
of this nation after it has become powerful, will be to take posses
sion of the Floridas in order to have command of the Gulf of
Mexico, and after having rendered difficult our commerce with
New Spain, she will aspire to the conquest of that vast empire,
which it will be impossible for us to defend against a formidable
power established on the same continent and in its. immediate
neighborhood. These fears are well founded ; they must be real-

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 69
ized in a few years if some greater revolution even more fatal does
not sooner take place in our Americas, f
He suggested, as the best means of averting this danger, that
Spain should surrender the Americas, retain Porto Rico and Cuba,
and establish three of the infantas, one to be king of Mexico, one
of Costa Firme and the other of Peru. The correctness of this
prediction seems almost unaccountable. Everything, and more,
which he predicted has come to pass. All the possessions of Spain
have in turn through one cause or another been swept away —
the Floridas, Mexico, Central America, Peru, Porto Rico and
Cuba. The young republic has become a colossus far higher than
even he dared to dream, and Spain has become correspondingly
a pigmy where once she strode with queenly dignity and power.
It is interesting to note his opinion that the colonies owed their
independence to the assistance of both France and Spain. The
inhabitants of the Great Republic take pride in the thought that
their ancestors, the colonists, achieved their independence princi
pally through their own courage and hardihood ; but it is the
opinion of many students of history that, had not France assisted
with both men and money, the rebels would have been conquered
and the leaders probably shot or hung. Indeed, it is probable
that, had France not previously agreed to assist the rebels, they
would not have inaugurated war to gain their independence.
The terms of the treaty of peace between Great Britain and
the United States at the conclusion of the revolution precipitated
anew the discussion over boundary rights and the navigation of
the Mississippi. The inhabitants of Louisiana were greatly con
cerned in this discussion, and from the start, as they had done
before, took deep interest in the outcome. The preliminary treaty
between the two countries was signed at Paris November 30,
1782, and in the caption it was stated that such treaty "is not to
be concluded until terms of a peace shall be agreed upon between
Great Britain and France and his Britannic Alajesty shall be
ready to conclude such treaty accordingly."* This proviso was
due to the agreement to that effect between France and the United
States in their treaty of February 6, 1778 (see supra). A prelim
inary treaty of peace having been agreed to at Versailles January
20, 1783, between France and Great Britain, the congress of the
United States was at liberty under this proviso to conclude and
ratify the definitive treaty with Great Britain which was accord
ingly done, on September 3, 1783.

t Diplomatic Correspondence, secret.
* Treaties of the United States.

70 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
At the date of signing the preliminary treaty of peace between
the United States and Great Britain, a separate article agreed upon
was as follows : "It is hereby understood and agreed that in case
Great Britain, at the conclusion of the present war, shall recover,
or be put in possession of, West Florida, the line of north bound
ary between the said Province and the United States' shall be a
line drawn from the mouth of the river Yassous (Yazoo) , where
it unites with the Mississippi, due east to the river Apalachicola." *
It was provided in the treaty that the southern boundary of
the United States should be "a line to be drawn due east from
the determination of the line last mentioned (in the middle of the
Mississippi river and at the northernmost part of the thirty-first
degree of north latitude), in the latitude of thirty-one degrees
north of the equator, to the middle of the river Apalachicola or.
Catahouche, thence along the middle thereof to its junction with
the Flint river; thence straight to the head of St. Mary's river;
and thence down along the middle of St. Mary's river to the
Atlantic ocean."
Article VIII of the definitive treaty was as follows: "The
navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean,
shall forever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain
and the citizens of the United States."
The treaty of January 20, 1783, between Spain and Great
Britain, not resulting in the acquisition of West Florida by the
latter, as she had hoped, rendered null and void the separate
article agreed upon between the United States and Great Britain
(see supra). At the conclusion of the revolution, Spain was in
possession of West Florida and Great Britain of East Florida. In
the preliminary articles of peace between those two countries it
was provided that, "His Britannic Majesty shall cede to his Cath
olic Majesty East Florida, and His Catholic Majesty shall keep
West Florida." But in the definitive treaty of September 3, 1783,
between those two countries the following language was used:
"His Britannic Majesty likewise cedes and guarantees, in full
right to his Catholic Majesty East Florida as also West Florida."
In neither the preliminary nor the definitive treaty between Spain
and Great Britain was anything said concerning the right to navi
gate the Mississippi or the boundary between the United States
and West Florida.
The ink had scarcely become dry on the treaties between Eng
land and the United States and France on one side and England

•Treaties of the United States.

¦LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 71
and Spain on the other, both concluded September 3, 1783, and
ratified January 14, 17S4, ere the question of navigating the Mis
sissippi and of the boundaries between Spain and the United
States came up for settlement. In a letter dated February 19,
1783, from the Marquis de Lafayette to the Count de Florida
Blanca, the former asked permission to lay before congress the fol
lowing as having been the language of a previous date between
the two: "With respect to the limits, his Catholic Majesty had
adopted those that are determined by the preliminaries of the
30th of November between the United States and the court of
London. The fear of raising an object of dissension is the only
objection the King has to the free navigation of the Mississippi."
To this the Count replied of February 22, as follows : "You have
perfectly well understood whatever I have had the honor to com
municate to you with respect to our disposition towards the United
States. I shall only add, that, although it is his Majesty's inten
tion to abide for the present by the limits established by the treaty
of the 30th of November, 1782, between the English and the
Americans, the King intends to inform himself particularly
whether it can be in any ways inconvenient or prejudicial to settle
"that affair amicably with the United States/' Later it was
declared that the marquis had misunderstood the court. No
doubt the marquis was correct in his recollection, but the views
of the Spanish ministry had undergone a great change.*
On the 3d of June, 1784, congress passed the following:
"Resolved, That the ministers plenipotentiary of the United
States, for negotiating commercial treaties with foreign powers,
be and they are hereby instructed, in any negotiations they may
enter upon with the court of Spain, not to relinquish or cede, in any
event whatsoever, the right of the citizens of these United States,
to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to
the ocean." f In a letter dated December 19, 1784, M. Marbois
charge d'affairs of France, communicated to congress the contents
of a letter from Francisco Rendon, a Spanish gentleman, who had
acted as charge for Spain, residing in Philadelphia, in which the
latter stated that the king of Spain "is persuaded that congress
will admit the justice of a claim, which is founded on all the rights
which an entire conquest and an uninterrupted possession can give
to any power; and that they (congress) will agree that the ces
sion of the navigation of the Mississippi, made by the King of

* Diplomatic Correspondence.
t Diplomatic Correspondence.

72

THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

Great Britain to the United States in the treaty of 1783, can have
no real force, unless the Catholic King, my master, to whom the
navigation of that river belongs, shall think proper to ratify it."
This letter from Mr. Rendon embraced the substance of instruc
tions to him from Don Joseph de Galvez, Spanish minister to the
department of the Indies, dated June 26, 1784, the following lan
guage being used : "Give the States and congress to understand
that they are not to expose to process and confiscation the vessels
which they destine to carry on commerce on the river Mississippi,
inasmuch as a treaty concluded between the United States and
England, in which the former ground their pretentions to the navi
gation of that river, could not fix limits in a territory which that
power did not possess, the two borders of the river being already
conquered and possessed by our arms the day the treaty was
made, namely, the 30th of November, 1782."
In response to the above communication, congress, on Decem
ber 15, 1784, passed the following resolution: "That congress
have a high confidence in the justice of his Catholic Majesty, and
rely that he will submit the mutual rights of Spain and the United
States of America to amicable discussion without adopting meas
ures which may prejudice those rights;" and on December 17, it
was further resolved, "That it is necessary a minister be com
missioned to represent the United States at the court of Madrid,
for the purpose of adjusting the interfering claims of the two
nations respecting the navigation of the Mississippi."* Spain
objected tothe assumption by which Great Britain and the United
States, in their treaty of 1783, provided for the navigation of the
river Mississippi (vide, supra, Article VIII). Hence the protests
above mentioned.
It was learned from Oliver Pollock, in a letter to Mr. Jay,
dated June 3,1785, (and previously intimated in his letter of Feb
ruary 10, 1785,) that General Galvez and Don Diego de Gar-
doqui, charge d'affairs to the United States on his way there,
had intimated in several conferences at Havana, the right of Spain
by reason of conquest, not only to the territorial limits claimed by
her, but to the exclusive right to navigate the Mississippi as well,
but were doubtful of the admissibility of her claim by the United
States. General Galvez stated at these conferences that the
Natchez settlement fell within the limits of Florida, and that,
therefore, Great Britain had no right to cede such region to the
United States, nor to grant the latter the right to navigate the
* Diplomatic Correspondence.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 73
Mississippi. He said that, after 1763, the inhabitants petitioned
Great Britain to be attached to West Florida, owing to the incon
venience of their having to attend to the seat of the Georgia gov
ernment; and that this petition had been granted and the limits
of West Florida fixed at the mouth of the river "Yassaw"
(Yazoo). He further maintained that Spain had strong claims
to the territory east of the Alississippi above the mouth of the
Yazoo; that Captain Don Baltazar Devillia (or de Villers), a
Spanish officer, had crossed the Mississippi river on November
22, 1780, at a place called the "English Arkensaws," about four
hundred miles above Natchez and had "buried under ground in
a tin box the colors of Spain as a symbol of his having taken pos
session of that part of the country for Spain."*
It was later maintained by Spain, that on the 2d of January,
1781, "a detachment of sixty-five militiamen and sixty Indians of
the nations Ottawa, Sotu and Pottawattomie, under the command
of Don Eugenio Pierre, a captain of militia, accompanied by Don
Carlos Tar j on, a sub-lieutenant of militia, by Don Louis Chevalier,
a man well versed in the language of the Indians, and by their
great chiefs Eletumo and Naquigen, marched from the town of
St. Louis of the Ilionese (Illinois), and possessed themselves of
the post of St. Joseph, which the English occupied, at two hun
dred and twenty leagues distance from that of the above men
tioned St. Louis," suffering intensely from cold and hunger and
exposed to attacks from savage Indians in the deep snow. The
commander, by seasonable precautions, prevented a large body
of Indians devoted to the British, from opposing the expedition.
"They made prisoners of the few English they found in it, the
others having perhaps retired in consequence of some prior notice.
Don Eugenio Pierre took possession in the name of the king, of
that place and its dependencies, and of the river of the Illinois;
in consequence whereof, the standard of His Majesty was there
displayed during the whole time. He took the English one and
delivered it on his arrival at St. Louis to Don Francisco Cruyat,
the commandant at that post. The destruction of the magazine
of provisions and goods which the English had there (the greater
part of which was divided among our Indians and those who lived
at St. Joseph, as had been offered them in case they did not
oppose our troops), was not the only advantage resulting from the
success of the expedition, for thereby it became impossible for the
English to execute their plan of attacking the fort at St. Louis

* American State Papers.

74 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
of the Illinois, and it also served to intimidate the savage
nation, and oblige them to propose to remain neutral which
they do at present. When you consider the ostensible object
of this expedition, the distance of it, the formalities with which
the place, the country, and the river were taken possession of in
the name of his Catholic Majesty, I am persuaded it will not be
necessary for me to swell this letter with remarks that would
occur to a reader of far less penetration than yourself."* These
conquests, together with the settlements of Natchez and, later, of
Walnut Hills (now Vicksburg),* and the Chickasaw Bluffs (now,
Memphis), were the grounds for the Spanish claim to the terri
tory east of the Mississippi and north of the thirty-first degree of
north latitude. Opposed to this claim was the conquest of the
western country by George Rogers Clark during the revolution.
To John Jay, a secretary to the United States of America for the
department of foreign affairs, were assigned the powers of con
cluding with Don Diego de Gardoqui, the encargado de negocios
of the king of Spain, "whatever articles, compacts and conven
tions may be necessary for establishing and fixing the boundaries
between the territories of the United States and those of his Cath
olic Majesty, and for promoting the general harmony and mutual
interests of the two nations." On August 25, 1785, this was
modified so as "particularly to stipulate the right of the United
States to their territorial bounds and the free navigation of the
Mississippi from the source to the ocean as established in the
treaties with Great Britain," and he was forbidden to sign any
treaty or compact until the same should have been previously
submitted to congress :f 1
On September 23, 1785, Mr. Gardoqui complained that in cer
tain domestic deliberations by the State of Georgia, the frontier
limits of that state had been extended over some of the territory
recently conquered by Spain from Great Britain and specified that
Thomas Green "clandestinely and with a considerable number
of families and slaves" had gone to the Spanish fort at Natchez,
that they had appointed Air. Green governor, but had been refused
recognition by the Spanish commandant there. Congress was
asked to remedy the difficulty. In response to this request, con
gress enacted "that although they conceive that they have an
undoubted right to all the territory within the limits specified in
the definitive articles of peace and friendship between the crown
•American State Papers.
t Proceedings of Congress.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 75
of Great Britain and these United States, yet they view with real
concern the unaccountable attempt of any individual of these
States" to disturb the peace between the two nations, and that the
delegates of the State of Georgia should disavow the appointment
of Thomas Green as governor. On February 25, 1786, John Jay
informed congress that a boat which had been sent down the Mis
sissippi by a Mr. A. Fowler, had been stopped at Natchez by the
Spaniards, and said "that there is good reason to believe that the
king of Spain is resolved, if possible, to exclude all nations from
the navigation of that part of the Mississippi which runs between
his territories." He further observed that if the United States
maintained the navigation of that river to their citizens, it would
have to be by arms or by treaty.
On May 25, 1786, Mr. Gardoqui formally asked that congress
should consider the respective claims of the two countries over
the western boundaries and to the navigation of the Mississippi.
He intimated that, by reason of the conquest of Captain de Vil-
lers in 1780, Spain claimed the country east of the Mississippi and
above Florida. The appointment of a commission to settle the
differences haying been suggested by Mr. Jay, congress "resolved,
that unless all questions relative to the boundaries of Florida shall
(as they hope will be the case) be settled by mutual agreement,
the United States will cheerfully consent, and be ready to refer the
same to the ultimate decision of three or more- impartial commis
sioners." Mr. Jay having been called before congress August 3,
1786, to communicate the progress of negotiations between him
self and Air. Gardoqui, informed that body that the questions of
territorial limits and of navigating the Mississippi were the only
two obstacles that divided them; that Spain was then holding the
territory she claimed and preventing American citizens from navi
gating the Mississippi; and that she was not likely to yield these
claims without war.*
On August 29, 1786, congress repealed their instructions of
August 25, 1785, to Mr. Jay, concerning the boundaries and the
navigation of the Mississippi. It having been shown that the
Spanish authorities down the Mississippi had stopped all Amer
icans from passing with their boat loads below Natchez, notably
in the cases of A. Fowler and Thomas Amis, both of whom had
lost their boats and loads, Mr. Jay made the following recom
mendation to congress : "It is well known that Spain will not
permit our people to navigate that part of the river which runs

• American State Papers.

76 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
through their countries, and such of them as make the experiment
must expect consequences similar to those which Amis experi
enced. Your secretary is convinced that the United States have
good right to navigate the river, from its source to and through
its mouth ; and unless an accommodation should take place, that
the dignity of the United States, and their duty to assert and
maintain their rights, will render it proper for them to present a
memorial and remonstrance to His Catholic Majesty, insisting on
their right, complaining of its being violated, and demanding in a
temperate, inoffensive, but, at the same time, in a firm and decided
manner, that his Majesty do cease in future, to hinder their citi
zens from freely navigating that river through the part of its
course in question. Your secretary is further of opinion, that in
case of refusal, it will be proper for the United States .to declare
war against Spain. There being no respectable middle way
between peace and war, it will be expedient to prepare without
delay for the one or the other."
It has been asserted that congress at this time actually passed
an act authorizing Mr. Jay to propose to the Spanish minister the
suspension of American comrherce on the Mississippi river for the
period of twenty-five years ; but there seems to be no record that
such an act was really passed. Congress deliberated on such a
bill for many months; and no doubt Air. Jay was instructed to
informally sound the Spanish minister on the subject. But the
refusal of the latter to entertain the proposition and the violent
outbreaks throughout the western country in opposition to such a
ruinous measure, so violent in fact as to threaten the stability of
the Union, were sufficient to prevent the actual passage of the bill.
In the meantime events of great import were transpiring in the
west. The extraordinary emigration into the Ohio valley imme
diately succeeding the revolution, had rendered an outlet for the
settlers' products down the Mississippi absolutely necessary; but
as this privilege was denied them and as it was reported that con
gress would likely agree that the navigation of that river should
be suspended for 'the period of twenty-five years, as had been seri
ously considered,* they inaugurated various movements calculated
to enforce their right to such free navigation, regardless of what
congress might think of their course. Gen. George Rogers Clark,
as a measure of retaliation against the Spaniards, and at the insti
gation of Great Britain, seized what Spanish property there was at
the post of St. Vincennes, having under his command the troops
•American State Papers.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 77
stationed there. Under his orders the same action was taken
against the Spaniards on the Illinois. He had also recruited a
considerable force of militia in the western country for the real
purpose of assisting Great Britain, but for the avowed purpose of
resisting Spanish pretentions and opening the Mississippi to the
western country. Thomas Green and others at the Falls of the
Ohio (Louisville), and in the State of Frankland (on the Cum
berland river), had likewise armed and organized a considerable
body of militia with the same object. One gentleman at the Falls
of the Ohio, on December 4, 1786, wrote to New England:*
"We can raise twenty thousand troops this side the Alleghany
and Appalachian mountains; and the annual increase of them by
emigration from other parts is from two to four thousand. We
have taken all the goods belonging to the Spanish merchants of
Post Vincennes and the Illinois, and are determined they shall not
trade up the river, provided they will not let us trade down it.
Preparations are now making here (if necessary) to drive the
Spaniards from their settlements at the mouth of the Mississippi.
In case we are not countenanced and succored by the United
States (if we need it) our allegiance will be thrown off, and
some other power applied to. Great Britain stands ready with
open arms to receive and support us. They have already offered
to open their resources for our supplies. When once reunited to
them "farewell, a long farewell, to all your boasted greatness."
The province of Canada and the inhabitants of these waters, of
themselves, in time, will be able to conquer you. You (meaning
the people east of the Alleghanies) are as ignorant of this country
as Great Britain was of America." He further said, "The late
commercial treaty with Spain (it was reported in the west that
such a treaty had been concluded) in shutting up, as it is said,
the navigation of the Mississippi, for the term of twenty-five
years, has given this western country a universal shock, and
struck its inhabitants with an amazement. To sell us and make us
vassals of the merciless Spaniards, is a grievance not to be borne."
And speaking of New Orleans he said, "We know by woeful
experience that it is in their power, when once we are there, to
take our produce at any price they please. Large quantities of
flour, tobacco, meal, etc., have been taken there the last summer
and mostly confiscated ; those who had permits from their gover
nor was obliged to sell at a price he was pleased to state or sub
ject themselves to lose the whole. Men of large property are

•American State Papers.

78 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
already ruined by their policy. The quantities of produce we now
have on hand are enormous. Flour and pork are now selling
here at twelve shillings the hundred, beef in proportion; any
quantities of Indian corn can be had at nine pence per bushel."
It was claimed in March, -1787, by John Sullivan, late in the
continental service, in. a letter to Mr. Gardoqui, that "from the
Natchez to the Kaskaskies, from Pittsburg to St. Mary's river, they
are prepared to pour forth with the greatest ease fifty thousand
veterans in arms in defense of their commercial rights throughout
the navigable rivers of the southern part of this empire. . . .
May it please your Excellency, the States of Georgia, Franklin
and Kentucky federated; the counties of Bourbon, etc., on the
Natchez, the settlements on Cumberland, Kaskaskies and the
Wabash; and the governments of Pittsburg, Westmoreland,
etc., abound with the seeds of war; nor will any obstruction from
New Orleans to the Balise impede the overwhelming inundation
preparing to pour down along the waters of the Mississippi into
the bay of Mexico. The torrent will be irresistible. . . . The
permission of congress will not be solicited on this occasion. In
congress this people are not represented." How true the boasts
of Mr. Sullivan were must be, to some extent, a matter of con
jecture. But it is certain that all of the western settlers were
determined to have the right of freely navigating the Missis
sippi, and were on the point of joining Great Britain in a war
against New Orleans, Natchez, etc., to gain it. While the actual
conditions were bad enough, the western people were particularly
incensed by the report that congress had relinquished the right
as above stated, to navigate the Mississippi for twenty-five years.
This course had been seriously and elaborately considered by
congress, but had been rejected.
Steps were promptly taken by congress to thwart any armed
movement against New Orleans or Natchez, and the western set
tlers were assured that their rights to navigate the Mississippi
would be protected. The following resolution was passed Sep
tember 16, 1788: "That the free navigation of the river Mis
sissippi is a clear and essential right of the United States, and that
the same ought to be considered and supported as such ; that the
said report (to relinquish the claim to navigate the Mississippi)
not being founded on fact, the delegates be at liberty to communi
cate all such circumstances as may be necessary to contradict the
same ; and that no further progress be made in the negotiations
with Spain by the secretary of foreign affairs but that the subject
to which they relate be referred to the federal government which is

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 79
to assemble in March next."* The proceedings over the adoption
of the Constitution of the United States postponed for some time
further consideration of the necessities of the western people.
The secretary of state, Mr. Jefferson, informed congress, on
December 22, 1791, that a commissioner of Spain had signified
that his king was willing to consider the question of the Amer
icans' right to navigate the Mississippi and their desire for a port
thereon. It was suggested that the negotiations be held at
Madrid.** President Washington appointed William Carmichael
and William Short commissioners plenipotentiary "for negoti
ating and concluding a convention or treaty concerning the navi
gation of the river Mississippi by the citizens of the United
States." This proceeding was ratified by congress. In March,
1792, the powers of the commissioners were extended so as to
embrace all the measures of a general treaty such as had been
previously discussed with Air. Gardoqui.
It should be noticed that, at his date, Spain no longer made
claims to the Upper Mississippi valley to the eastward of the
stream; but she still claimed and occupied Natchez and the post
at Walnut Hills (Vicksburg). The questions of boundary and
of navigation were still to be settled. As a measure of precaution
against any possible descent of the western settlers upon Natchez
or New Orleans, she had strengthened all her posts on the Mis
sissippi, having sent fifteen hundred soldiers to New Orleans
doubtless for that purpose. Mr. Jefferson said to Mr. Carmi
chael in a letter dated August 2, 1790, " I say nothing of the claims
of Spain to our territory north of the thirty-first degree and east
of the Mississippi ; they never merited the respect of an answer ;
and you know it has been admitted at Madrid that they were not to
be maintained." f Thus the contentions had settled down to the
questions of the northern boundary of West Florida and the navi
gation of the Mississippi. Spain did not dispute the right of the
United States to the left bank of the river above the true bound
ary. The settlement of these important questions was again post
poned by the wars in Europe.
In March, 1792, Mr. Jefferson prepared instructions for the
American commissioners, appointed to treat with Spain, from
which the following extracts explain themselves :
"The southern boundary of Georgia, the only one now in ques
tion, was established originally at the thirty-first degree of lati-

* Proceedings of Congress.
*• Writings of Thomas Jefferson.
t American State Papers.

80 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
tude from the Apalachicola westwardly, and the western bound
ary, originally the Pacific ocean, was, by the treaty of Paris,
reduced to the middle of the Mississippi. In the course of the
revolution we were joined by France as an ally, and by Spain
and Holland as associates ; having a common enemy, each sought
that common enemy wherever they could find him. France, on
our invitation, landed a large army within our territories, con
tinued it with us two years, and aided us in recovering sundry
places from the possession of the enemy. But she did not pre
tend to keep possession of the places rescued. Spain entered into
the remote western part of our territory, dislodged the common
enemy from several posts they held therein to the annoyance of
Spain; and perhaps thought it necessary to remain in some of
them, as the only means of preventing their return. We in like
manner dislodged them from several posts in the same western
territory, to-wit: Vincennes, Cahokia, Kaskaskia, etc., rescued
the inhabitants, and retained constantly afterwards both them and
the territory under our possession and government.* At the con
clusion of the war, Great Britain, on the 30th of November,
1782, by treaty acknowledged our independence and our boundary,
to-wit : the Mississippi to the west and the completion of the
thirty-first degree, etc., to the south. In her treaty with Spain,
concluded seven weeks afterward, to-wit: January 20, 1883, she
ceded to her the two Floridas, which had been defined in the
proclamation of 1763 and Minorca; and by the eighth article of
the treaty, Spain agreed to restore, without compensation, all the
territories conquered, by her and not included in the treaty, either
under the head of cessions or restitutions, that is to say all except
Minorca and the Floridas. According to this stipulation Spain
was expressly bound to have delivered up the possession she had
taken within the limits of Georgia, to Great Britain, if they were
conquests on Great Britain, who was to deliver them over to the
United States; or rather, she should have delivered them to the
United States themselves, as standing quoad hoc in the place of
Great Britain. And she was bound by natural right to deliver
them to the same United States on a much stronger ground, as
the real and only proprietors of those places which she had taken
possession of in a moment of danger, without having had any
cause of war with the United States, to whom they belonged, and
without having declared any; but on the contrary, conducting
herself in other respects as a friend and associate.

* American State Papers.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 8 1
"It is an established principle that conquest gives only an
inchoate right, which does not become perfect till confirmed by the
treaty of peace, and by a renunciation or abandonment by the
former proprietor. Had Great Britain been the former proprie
tor, she was so far from confirming to Spain the right to the terri
tory of Georgia, invaded by Spain, that she expressly relinquished
to the United States any right that might remain in her ; and after
ward completed that relinquishment by procuring and consoli
dating with it the agreement of Spain herself to restore such
territory without compensation. It is still more palpable that a
war existing between two nations, as Spain and Great Britain,
could give to neither the right to seize and appropriate the terri
tory of a third, which is even neutral, much less which is an asso
ciate in the war, as the United States were with Spain. On the
conclusion of the general peace the United States lost no time in
requiring from Spain an evacuation of their territory. This has
been hitherto delayed by means we need not explain to that court,
but which have been equally contrary to our right and to our
consent." And in regard to the secret article between the United
States and Great Britain, the commissioners were instructed to
put the case hypothetically, thus : "Suppose that the United
States, exhausted by a bloody and expensive war with Great
Britain, might have been willing to have purchased peace by
relinquishing, under a particular contingency, a small part of their
territory, it does not follow that the same United States, recruited
and better organized, must relinquish the same territory to Spain
without striking a blow."
The argument of Mr. Jefferson regarding the boundary between
West Florida and the United States rested upon three principal
grounds: i. The charter of Carolina to the lords proprietors in
1663 which fixed it on the thirty-first degree; 2. The proclama
tion of the British King in 1763-4 (see supra) ; 3. The treaties of
November 30, 1782, and September 3, 1783, "repeating and con
firming these ancient boundaries." His argument on the right of
the United States to navigate the Mississippi was based upon the
following grounds: 1. The treaty of Paris of 1763; 2. The
Revolution treaty 1782-3 ; 3. The law of nature and nations.*
He said :
"The war of 1755-1763 was carried on jointly by Great Britain
and the thirteen colonies, now the United States of America,
• American State Papers.
II— 6

82 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
against France and Spain. At the peace which was negotiated
by our common magistrate, a right was secured to the subjects of
Great Britain (the common designation of all those under his
government) to navigate the Mississippi in its whole breadth
and length, from its source to the sea, and expressly that part
which is between the island of New Orleans and the right bank
of the river, as well as the passage both in and out of its mouth ;
and that the vessels should not be stopped, visited, or subjected
to the payment of any duty whatsoever. These are the words of
the treaty, article VII. Florida was at the same time ceded by
Spain, and its extent westwardly was fixed to the lakes Pontchar
train and Maurepas and the river Mississippi ; and Spain received
soon after from France a cession of the island of New Orleans,
and all the country she held westward of the Alississippi, subject
of course to our right of navigating between that country and the
island previously granted to us by France. This right was not
parceled out to us in severalty, that is to say, to each the exclusive
navigation of so much of the. river as was adjacent to our several
shores — in which way it would have been useless to all— but it
was placed on that footing on which alone it could be worth any
thing, to-wit : As a right to all to navigate the whole length of the
river in common. The import of the terms and the reason of the
thing prove it was a right of common in the whole, and not a
several right to each of a particular part. To which may be added
the evidence of the stipulation itself, that we should navigate
between New Orleans and the western bank, which, being adja
cent to none of our states, could be held- by us only as a right of
common. Such was the nature of our right to navigate the Mis
sissippi, as far as established by the treaty of Paris.
"In the course of the Revolutionary war, in which the thirteen
colonies, Spain and France were opposed to Great Britain, Spain
took possession of several posts held by the British in Florida. It
is unnecessary to inquire whether the possession of half a dozen
posts scattered through a country of seven or eight hundred miles
in extent, could be considered as the possession and conquest of
that country. If it was, it gave but an inchoate right, as was
before explained, which could not be perfected but by the relin
quishment of the former possession at the close of the war ; but cer
tainly it could not be considered as a conquest. of the river, even
against Great Britain, since the possession of the shores, to-wit : of
the island of New Orleans on the one side, and Louisiana on the
other, having undergone no change, the right in the water would
remain the same, if considered only in relation to them; and if

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 83
considered as a distinct right, independent of the shores, then no
naval victories obtained by Spain over Great Britain in the course
of the war, gave her the color of conquest over any water which
the British fleet could enter. Still less can she be considered as
having conquered the river as against the United States, with
whom she was not at war. We had a common right of naviga
tion in the part of the river between Florida, the island of New
Orleans, and the western bank, and nothing which passed between
Spain and Great Britain, either during the war or at its conclusion,
could lessen that right. Accordingly, at the treaty of November,
1782, Great Britain confirmed the rights of the United States
to the navigation of the river, from its source to its mouth, and in
January, 1783, completed the right of Spain to the territory of
Florida, by an absolute relinquishment of all her rights in it.
This relinquishment could not include the navigation held by the
United States in their own right, because this right existed in
themselves only, and was not in Great Britain. If it added any
thing to the rights of Spain respecting the river between the east
ern and western banks, it could only be that portion of right which
Great Britain had retained to herself in the treaty with the United
States, held seven weeks before, to-wit, a right of using it in com
mon with the United States. So that as by the treaty of 1763,
the United States had obtaiaed a common right to navigate the
whole river from its source to its mouth, so by the treaty of 1782
that common right was confirmed to them by the only power
which could pretend claims against them, founded on the state
of war ; nor has that common right been transferred to Spain by
either conquest or cession."
But Mr. Jefferson regarded the strongest argument of the
United States to the right of navigating the Mississippi to rest
on the law of nature and nations, and proceeded to cite numerous
cases from Roman and more recent law. His position seems
unassailable so far as the questions of boundary and right to navi
gate the Mississippi are concerned.*
The views of Spain at this time regarding these questions are
contained in the letter of April 18, 1793, from William Car
michael and William Short to Mr. Jefferson. Mr. Gardoqui, the
commissioner on the part of Spain, according to the American
commissioners, "discovered evident signs of impatience under
this statement (the argument of Mr. Jefferson), and much sur
prise either feigned or real at it. He assured us that no con-

* American State Papers; Foreign Relations, Vol. I.

84 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
sideration whatever would ever induce his Majesty to acknowl
edge a right, in us to this navigation ; and he seemed to consider
our claim to the limits under the treaty with England as extrava
gant and unwarrantable ; regarding this treaty as an agreement
made between two people to dispose of the property of a third." *
He maintained substantially that the argument regarding
natural law was deserving of no attention, having never yet bound
a power further than suited its convenience; that the treaties
cited by Mr. Jefferson did not give the United States the right to
the navigation, because Spain was not a party thereto; that he
would never consent to advise His Majesty to acknowledge the
right of the United States to navigate the whole course of the
Mississippi ; that Spain was entitled by conquest to the territory
claimed; that as Spain had not acknowledged the independence
of the United States, she had a right to make those conquests;
that the statements of the Alarquis de Lafayette were misrepre
sentations ; that the questions of boundary and navigation were
much less important than the United States made them; that the
admission of foreigners into the Spanish colonial possessions was
an innovation ; that opening the navigation meant the smuggling
of goods into Louisiana through the states; that the people of
the Atlantic states were opposed to the navigation in order to
have the products of the West brought there; that the people of
the West regarded their adhesion to the Union as visionary; and
that the United States did not really want the limits and naviga
tion asked for.
Again there. was a delay, and in the meantime the discontent
grew in the West, the intrigues of Mr. Genet against Louisiana
were disclosed, and the contentions over the treatment of the
Indians by Spain and the United States were continued. The
American commissioners said on May 5, 1793, "A few ships of
the line would have more weight in securing peaceably the terri
torial rights of the United States and those with respect to the
Mississippi, than all the most unanswerable arguments and incon-
testible proofs that could be adduced in support thereof." The
European war was largely the cause of the delay, but the com
missioners of the two countries seemed no nearer together than
they had been ten years before.
On June 2, 1793, Mr. Jefferson wrote to Mr. Madison, "There
is, too, at this timie, a lowering disposition perceivable both in
England and Spain. The former keeps herself aloof and in a

•American State Papers : Foreign Relations, Vol. I.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 85
state of incommunication with us, except in the way of demand.
The latter had not begun auspiciously with C. and S. (Carmichael
and Short) at Madrid and has lately sent fifteen hundred men to
New Orleans and greatly strengthened her posts on the Missis
sippi." On the 23d of the same month he again wrote, "Spain is
unquestionably picking a quarrel with us ; a series of letters from
her commissioners here prove it. We are sending a courier to
Madrid. The inevitableness of war with the Creeks and the
probability, I might say certainty, of it with Spain (for there is
not one of us who doubts it), will certainly occasion your con
vocation, at what time I cannot exactly say, but you should be
prepared for this important change in the state of things."*
Even while Messrs. Carmichael and Short were endeavoring to
their utmost at Madrid to secure a treaty with Spain, that country
was extending her settlements into the disputed territory along
the Alississippi. On the contrary, the United States had pre
vented with a strong show of force the settlement of a large col
ony of Americans at the Walnut Hills -( Vicksburg) .
In June, 1793, the American commissioners informed Mr. Jef
ferson that Spain regarded the relinquishment of the limits and
the navigation "as a commencement of the loss of their American
commerce and territorial possessions." In June, 1793, Louisiana
having been deprived of its commerce with France by reason of
the war in Europe, Spain adopted an ordinance extending and
improving the commerce of that colony. In November, 1794,
President Washington nominated Thomas Pinckney as envoy
extraordinary to assist the American minister resident at Madrid
to negotiate the treaty with Spain. There was much uneasiness
in the western country in 1793 and 1794 under the attempts of
Mr. Genet to raise a force there to descend upon New Orleans.
Congress took effective steps to thwart any such movement, and
reassured the western settlers that negotiations looking to their
right to navigate the Mississippi were under way.f
On December 7, 1793, Messrs. Carmichael and' Short at Madrid
wrote to the Spanish minister, the Duke de la Alcudia, as follows :
"When your Excellency shall see from it that those limits were
established so long ago as the year 1763; that the acts by which
they were established and confirmed and pointed out, are law
ful and indisputable; in fine, are as precise and as valid as those
establishing the right of the United States to any other part of

* Writings of Thomas Jefferson.
t Proceedings of Congress.

86 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
their territory; and that Spain has no title whatever to produce,
no document of any kind giving even the color of a right to the
territory claimed within the limits of the United States ; we trust
your Excellency will think it just that that uncertainty shall no
longer remain. It cannot be unknown to your Excellency that
the difficulties which have been raised as to the rights of the
United States on the subject of limits and the navigation of the
Mississippi, have retarded the negotiations set on foot. After
all that had passed between the two countries relative thereto,
the United States were far from expecting these difficulties
would have existed at the opening of our negotiation. We have
hoped that time and a more accurate examination of the subject
would remove them. We now present the claims of the United
States in these subjects in such a form, exhibiting the titles from
which they are derived, that we hope they will appear rigorously
just."* Soon after the arrival of Mr. Pinckney in Spain in June, 1795,
he was informed that it was the wish of the Spanish monarch to
form a triple alliance between France, Spain and the United
States; but this proposition was diplomatically evaded. When
the Duke de la Alcudia was told that the United States, in the
pending negotiations, could not guarantee the Spanish posses
sions in America, he "appeared much mortified." Early in
August, 1795, immediately after the treaty between France and
Spain was concluded, the Spanish minister sent word to the Amer
ican commissioners that their business "should be very speedily
settled to their satisfaction, as His Majesty was determined to
sacrifice something of what he considered as his right to testify
his good will to the United States."* In the conferences Mr.
Pinckney argued that the suspension of the navigation of the
Mississippi from 1783 to J 795 had occasioned great loss to the
people in the western part of the United States, and that as a just
measure of compensation therefor Spain should now grant them a
depot at some convenient point clown the Mississippi, and men
tioned New Orleans as its location.
There is no way of knowing, except from the various docu
ments of that time, what Spain expected- to gain by her conten
tions over the limits and the navigation. Mr. Carmichael while
in Madrid reported that Spain at J:he conclusion of the revolu
tion expected to abide by the limits and navigation established by
the treaty of November 30, 1782, between Great Britain and the
•Diplomatic Correspondence.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 87
United States ; but that France had persuaded her to extend her
claims.* That statement is supported by the fact that France
sustained such claims of Spain from 1778, and earlier, even until
after the cession of Louisiana by France to the United States.
So far as can be learned from existing sources of information, no
stronger arguments were adduced by Spain in support of her con
tentions than here presented. The arguments of Mr. Jefferson
and of his successor, Mr. Randolph, and of Mr. Pinckney, the
envoy extraordinary of the United States, were never answered
by Spain. It was noted at the time by Mr. Pinckney that the con
cluding arguments of Air. Jefferson and himself were studiously,
yet artfully, evaded by the Spanish ministry. The American
position was absolutely sustained by the facts, so far as the west
ern and the southern boundaries and the navigation of the Mis
sissippi were concerned.
The long delayed treaty between Spain and the United States
was finally concluded October 27, 1795. The following extracts
therefrom explain themselves.
"Article II. To prevent all disputes on the subject of the
boundaries which separate the territories of the two high contract
ing parties, it is hereby declared and agreed as follows, to-wit:
The southern boundary of the United States, which divides
their territory from the Spanish colonies of East and West
Florida, shall be designated by a line beginning on the river Mis
sissippi, at the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of
latitude north of the equator, which from thence shall be drawn
due east to the middle of the river Apalachicola, or Catahouche,
thence along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint;
thence straight to the head of St. Mary's river, and thence down
the middle thereof to the Atlantic ocean.
"Article III. In order to .carry the preceding article into effect,
one commissioner and one surveyor shall be appointed by each of
the contracting parties, who shall meet at the Natchez, on the left
side of the Mississippi, before the expiration of six months from
the ratification bf this convention, and they shall proceed to run
and mark this boundary according to the stipulations of the said
article (Article II above). They shall make plats and keep
journals of their proceedings, which shall be considered as part of
this convention, and shall have the same force as if they were
inserted therein. And if on any account it shall be found neces
sary that the said commissioners and surveyors should be accom-

* Diplomatic Correspondence, Secret.

88 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
panied by .guards, they shall be furnished in equal proportions by
the commanding officer of His Alajesty's troops in the two
Floridas, and the commanding officer of the troops of the United
States in the southwestern territory, who shall act by common
consent and amicably, as well with respect to this point as to the
furnishing of provisions and instruments, and making every other
arrangement which may be necessary or useful for the execution
of this article.
"Article IV. It is likewise agreed that the western boundary of
the United States, which separates them from the Spanish col
ony of Louisiana, is in the middle of the channel or bed of the
river Mississippi, from the northern boundary of the said states
to the completion of the thirty-first degree of latitude north of the
equator. And his Catholic Majesty has likewise agreed that the
navigation of the said river, in its whole breadth from its source
to the ocean, shall be free only to his subjects and the citizens of
the United States, unless he should extend this privilege to the
subjects of other powers by special convention.
"Article XXII. . . . And in consequence of the stipula
tions contained in the IVth article, his Catholic Majesty will per
mit the citizens of the United States, for the space of three years
from this time, to deposit their merchandise and effects in the port
of New Orleans, and to export them from thence without paying
any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores ; and his
Majesty promises either to continue this permission, if he finds
during that time that it is not prejudicial to the interest of Spain,
or if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to
them on another part of the banks of the Mississippi an equiva
lent establishment.*
The conclusion of the treaty between Spain and the United
States in October, 1795, when it became known in the western
country, occasioned the most unbounded satisfaction. The feel
ings of relief, unless the situation of that day be well understood,
cannot be realized now. Immediately thereafter, the products of
the West sought the port of New Orleans, and the rivers became
joyful with the shouts of the elated boatmen. The newspapers
of the Atlantic cities were far from being enthusiastic over the
treaty, because it meant the loss to the East of nearly all of the
western trade.f Neither was the news relished at New Orleans,
whose people had so often been bandied about from one European
nation to another, because the aggressive commercial enterprise of

•Treaties of the United States.
t Pittsburg Gazette.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 89
the Americans, it was realized, foreshadowed their absorption of
the river traffic.
In 1797, the Spanish ministry presented strong protests against
many of the provisions of the treaty of 1794, concluded between
Great Britain and the United States, particularly in regard to the
specifications concerning contraband, to the violation of the mari
time principle that "free ships make free goods," and to the con
firmation of the article in the treaty of 1783, by which the United
States recognized the right of Great Britain to navigate the Mis
sissippi. The latter was particularly objectionable, because, in
the estimation of Spain, the United States had been guilty of
duplicity in the treaty of 1795, by which Spain was not only
humiliated, but was made to suffer serious injury. The "explan
atory articles" of May 4, 1796, between the United States and
Great Britain, were included in tlie protests. The Spanish view
was presented by Don Carlos de Yrujo, Spanish minister to
America, as follows :
"By the sixth article of the preliminary treaty made on the 3d
November, 1763, between France and Great Britain, and by the
definitive treaty signed on the 10th of February, 1763, it is stipu
lated that all that part of Louisiana situated on the east of tlie
Mississippi, excepting New Orleans and its dependencies, should
belong to Great Britain. By the 8th article of the provisional
treaty concluded between the United States of America and Great
Britain on the 30th of November, 1782, and the definitive treaty
signed on the 3d of September, 1783, it is stated, that the navi
gation of the Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall
forever remain and be free to the subjects of Great Britain and
the citizens of the United States. By the preliminary articles
of the treaty concluded between Spain and England, and the
definitive treaty signed on the 3d of September, 1783, Great
Britain ceded to Spain all East and West Florida, which two
provinces were the only territory that that nation had remain
ing in this part of the continent. In the 5th article, in which
this cession is stipulated, not a single word is said relative to the
navigation of the Mississippi, nor do the other articles say any
thing on the subject. When England signed these preliminary
articles with the United States of America in 1782, Great Britain
still held all the right to East and West Florida, because then
she had not ceded forever those provinces to Spain, as is proved
afterward by the treaty of 1783, and without the least mention
therein of the Mississippi. Therefore, England, having ceded
East and West Florida in 1783,' and not having reserved the

90

THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

right to the navigation of the Mississippi, of course lost it
entirely when she made Spain mistress of the two banks. The
only right which the United States had in the navigation of that
river was founded on the stipulations derived from England;
but having changed their political existence by the declaration
of their independence, and having by this act separated their
interests from those of Great Britain, the liberty of navigating
the Mississippi did not follow to the United States, but by a
special treaty which has just been concluded between Spain and
this country. So far good; how can the United States without
the consent of Spain, cede to England the right of navigating
the Mississippi which is granted only to themselves? And in
virtue of what privilege can the federal government give the
navigation of this river to a nation who has renounced all her
rights through the medium of solemn treaties, and who not
only does not hold a single port, but also does not possess a single
inch of land on its banks? This simple exposition, in conjunc
tion with the opinion of all jurists, that the navigation of rivers
naturally belongs to him who possesses the two banks, evidently
manifests the injury done to the rights of Spain in the 3d article
of the English treaty, and the explanatory article signed on the
4th of May, 1796."*'
Mr. Pickering, secretary of state, fully and conclusively
answers these points in his communication of May 17, 1797.
He pointed out that Spain and not the United States had, by
the treaty of 1795^ excluded Great Britain from the navigation
of the Mississippi, § and that Spain had been aware of the treaty
of 1794 between Great Britain and the United States before the
treaty of 1795 between Spain and the United States was con
cluded, and hence there should be no complaint now.
In May, 1797, the Baron de Carondelet, governor of the prov
ince of Louisiana, dispatched Thomas Power to the Upper Mis
sissippi country on an important mission in the interests of
Spain.t He had learned that the Americans contemplated
descending the river vvith troops to take possession of Natchez
and the Walnut Hills in conformity to the treaty of 1795; and
in order to prevent any clash of authority until the methods of
evacuation by Spain had been determined upon, and until it
should be learned whether the British expedition were likely to

•Diplomatic Correspondence.
§ This statement was correct. See the treaty.
t American State Papers.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

91

descend the Mississippi to attack New Orleans, Mr. Power was
required to secure, if possible, from General Wilkinson, the sus
pension of the march southward of the detachment under his
command. He was further instructed to thoroughly sound the
people of the Western States as to their designs against Louisi
ana, and in case it should be learned that a force of militia was
being raised for such service to lose no time in putting the com
mandant at the Chickasaw Bluffs in possession of such infor
mation. He was also told to investigate the sentiments of the
Western people as to their desire to separate themselves from
the Union, and to hold out every inducement for them to adopt
this course, relying upon the assistance of Spain in such a move
ment. Should such a sentiment be found to exist generally, they
were to be told that the posts at Chickasaw Bluffs, Walnut
Hills and Natchez were to be held by Spain for the mutual ben
efit of the Western people and the Spanish crown. The baron
said, "If a hundred thousand dollars distributed in Kentucky
could cause it to rise in insurrection, I am very certain that the
minister in the present circumstances would secrifice them with
pleasure, and you may without exposing yourself too much
promise them to those who enjoy the -confidence of the people,
with another equal sum to arm them in case of necessity and
twenty pieces of field artillery. You will arrive without danger
as bearer of a dispatch for the general where the army may be,
whose force, discipline and dispositions you will examine with
care; and you will endeavor to discover with your natural pene
tration the general's disposition. I doubt that a person of his
character would prefer through vanity the advantage of com
manding the army of the Atlantic States, to that of being the
founder, the liberator, in fine, the Washington of the Western
states; his part is as brilliant as it is easy; all eyes are drawn
towards, him; he possesses the confidence of his fellow-citizens
and of the Kentucky volunteers; at the slightest movement the
people will name him the general of the new republic; his repu
tation will raise an army for him and Spain as well as France
will furnish him the means of paying it. On taking Fort Massac
we will send him instantly arms and artillery, and Spain lim
iting herself to the possession of the forts of Natchez and
Walnut Hills as far as Fort Confederation, will cede to the
Western states all the eastern bank of the Ohio, which will form
a very extensive and powerful republic, connected by its situa
tion and by its interests with Spain. . . . Spain and France
are enraged at the connections of the United States with Eng-

92 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
land; the army is weak and devoted to Wilkinson; the threats
of congress authorize me to succor on the spot and openly the
Western states; . . . nothing more will consequently be
required but an instant of firmness and resolution to make the
people of the West perfectly happy. If they suffer this instant
to escape them, and if we should be forced to deliver up the
posts, Kentucky and Tennessee, surrounded by the said posts
and without communication with lower Louisiana, will ever
remain under the oppression of the Atlantic States."
This mission was performed with fidelity by Mr. Power, but
resulted in complete failure, as he himself stated upon his return.
He reported that General Wilkinson would not now entertain
the propositions of the Spanish authorities ; that the inhabitants
of the Western states, since the treaty of 1795, could not be
shaken in their allegiance to the Federal Union; and that the
army of the United States comprised about three thousand men."*
The concessions of the Spaniards at New Orleans to the set
tlers of the western country, particularly during the last decade
of the eighteenth century, were continued partly with the expec
tation that they would eventually separate themselves from the
Atlantic states and set up an independent government, in which
event, as the Mississippi was the aortic artery of their com
merce, they easily could be induced, in order to gain the per
manent right to navigate that stream, to attach themselves to
Louisiana.f In June, 1796, Baron de Carondelet issued orders
for strengthening the post at Fort St. Ferdinand at the Chicka
saw Bluffs (Memphis), and observed July 10 in a letter to the
commanding officer there, "for the evacuation of that important
post is not yet so certain as not to admit of doubt, at least so
long as the savages remain attached to us. Besides, it is proper
to keep in view that the neighboring states, that is to say, Ken
tucky and Tennessee, are interested that it (the post) should
remain in our power, for political reasons which cannot be
trusted to paper. You must, of consequence, keep them in those
sentiments, by treating their inhabitants, to whom the liberty
of the navigation is granted, with kindness and regard. Let
the friendship of the Chickasaws and the satisfaction of the
Americans who navigate the river be the basis of your con
duct." He said September 12, in a letter to the same officer,
"Should the court think proper, as may very well happen, not
* Statement of Mr. Power; American State Papers.
tSee numerous letters; American State Papers.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 93
to evacuate our posts on the Mississippi, I will dispatch a courier
to you in all haste;" in order that the fort there might be
repaired. He also promised, in such an event, to send reinforce
ments. He said, "You ought to make the latter (the inhabitants
of Kentucky and Tennessee) understand that their natural inter
est leading them to separate some day (un jour) from the Atlan
tic states, the occupation of our posts on the Mississippi by the
troops of the latter could not but be disastrous to them, since
they would cut off all communication between them and us, from
whom alone they could, in that case, hope to receive assistance."
In 1802, Daniel Clark, a prominent American resident of the
western country, informed the president of the United States,
that an agent from Kentucky had visited New Orleans, Natchez,
etc., late in 1795 and early in 1796 "to negotiate on the part of
that state, independent of the general government, for the navi
gation of the Mississippi, before the result of the treaty of 1795
was known."* In a letter dated June 17, 1796, Don Manuel
Gayoso wrote to Daniel Clark: "It is more than probable that
a separation of several states will take place, which will alter
the political existence of a power that could influence on the
balance of that of others ; therefore, Spain, being deprived of
that assistance, which could arise from her connection with the
Union, will alter her views. . . . There are other insur
mountable difficulties v/ith respect to the Indians, which render
impracticable the execution of the part concerning limits; there
fore, even when no change should happen in the United States,
the treaty (of 1795) will be reduced to the navigation of the
river." This meant that the Spanish would claim that the bound
ary of West Florida would be as high as the Yazoo, and that
the western country contemplated a separation from the Atlantic
states. In June, 1797, President Adams informed congress that the
running and marking of the boundary between West Florida
and the United States had been delayed by the Spanish officers
at Natchez and New Orleans who declared their intention of
maintaining the Spanish jurisdiction to the territory until the
meaning of the article in the treaty concerning the withdrawal
of the troops and the disposal of Spanish property should have
been settled.f At this time, according to Mr. Ellicott, the Amer
ican commissioner appointed to conduct the survey, the inhab-

• American State Papers.
t Messages and Papers of the Presidents.

94

THE PROVINCE -AND THE STATES.

itants of the Natchez district numbered nearly four thousand, and
nearly all desired to come under the jurisdiction of the United
States. The ostensible reasons for the Spanish retention of the Natchez
district are contained in Governor Gayoso's proclamations of
March, 1797, to the inhabitants, as follows : "His Majesty has
offered to support the rights of the inhabitants to the real prop
erty; and until that is ascertained, I am bound to keep posses
sion of this country, as likewise until we are sure the Indians
will be pacific," and later, "until the real property shall be secured
to the inhabitants . . . by an additional article to the late
treaty, and until that article is officially communicated to me,
I am bound to keep possession of the country." These procla
mations and the course of the Spanish officers in delaying the
evacuation greatly alarmed the American residents in the dis
trict. On the 31st of March, he gave as an additional reason
for the delay that it would be necessary for him to consult the
Spanish sovereign concerning the method to be adopted under
the treaty of evacuating the country, whether the buildings
were to be removed, demolished, or left standing, before he would
deliver the district to the Americans, and in the meantime he
should maintain order, protect the inhabitants and keep the
Indians in subjection. In July, 1797, he gave as a still further
reason for retaining possession and for strengthening the for
tifications "to guard against an attack by the British from Can
ada."* He notified Mr. Ellicott that Nogales (Walnut Hills)
in particular would be strengthened. The Spanish minister at
Washington had learned that an expedition of the English, the
enemies of Spain, was being organized on the great lakes for the
purpose Of moving against the Spanish posts of St. Louis and
New Madrid. He reported that the expedition was designed
to descend the Fox and the Wisconsin rivers, or the Illinois
river, thence down the Mississippi.
This information was sent to the Spanish authorities at New
Orleans and Natchez, and preparations were promptly made
there to strengthen every Spanish post in the Mississippi country.
Troops were sent to Natchez, Nogales, Chickasaw Bluffs, Arkan
sas, New Madrid, St. Louis (three hundred), and elsewhere, and
galleys armed with cannon were stationed at intervals in tha
Mississippi to beat back any expedition of the enemy that might
descend the river. It was correctly thought by the Spanish

•American State Papers.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 95
authorities that the act of the United States in permitting such
an expedition to be organized within its borders, and to march
through its country for the purpose of attacking a nation with
which it was at peace, furnished them sufficient grounds 'for
retaining the posts at Natchez and Nogales and of strengthen
ing those garrisons. It was learned later that, while rumors to
that effect had been circulated in some portions of Canada and
the United States, no positive steps were taken to organize such
an expedition. But this rumor and the uncertainty over the
details of the evacuation were sufficient to warrant, for the secu
rity of the Spanish possessions, the continued occupation by Spain
of the American posts of Natchez, Chickasaw Bluffs, and
Nogales. The uncertainty of the results of the war in Europe on
American affairs had much to do, also, with the delay. In the
supposed emergency, the Spanish authorities did not hesitate in
an attempt to gain the assistance of the Indians of the Upper
Mississippi valley. It was an important consideration for the
Spaniards throughout Louisiana, in fact it was their duty for
their own protection, to know whether they should under the
treaty of 1795, leave standing all the posts, forts, buildings,
earthworks, etc., which they had built and occupied, ready for
the Americans who seemed to be siding with the English, or
ready for the occupation of the British troops who should descend
the Mississippi. While it is true that the Spaniards were mis
taken in supposing the Americans would permit the British to
pass through their country to attack the Mississippi posts, they
acted for their own protection upon what they then considered
good grounds. And who will undertake to say that, had they
not taken prompt measures to repel such an attack, the rumor
might have swelled into actuality and the' expedition been dis
patched ere the United States could have prevented it? The
United States actually sent troops from the Ohio to Tennessee
to check the settlers from trespassing on the Indian lands, but
this was regarded by the Spanish as a covert movement against
their possessions.*
In his proclamation of June 14, 1797, Governor Gayoso inti
mated the possibility of a war with the United States. It was
rumored in New Orleans that a body of American troops, or
militia, might descend from the Tennessee or Cumberland river
and attack the Spanish posts. The basis of this rumor was
the letter written to a friend by William Blount from "Colonel

•Records of "the War Department.

96 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
King's Iron Works" on the Cumberland river April 21, 1797,
his language being as follows : "I believe, but am not quite
sure, that the plan then talked of will be attempted this fall,
and, if it is to be attempted, it will be in a much larger way
than then talked of; and if the Indians act their part, I have
no doubt but it will succeed. A man of consequence has gone
to England about the business, and if he makes arrangements
as he expects, I shall myself have a hand in the business, and
propably shall be at the head of the business on the part of the
British. You are, however, to understand, that it is yet not
quite certain that the plan will be attempted, and to do so will
require all your management; I say, will require all your man
agement, because you must take care, in whatever you say to
Rogers, or anybody else, not to let the plan be discovered by
Hawkins, Dinsmoor, Byers, or any other person in the interest
of the United States or Spain."* The letter continued in much
the same strain, guarded, but clear in the design of an attack
by the British on the Spanish posts. The letter revealed, also,
that the Indians were to be enlisted in the cause. It was plain
to the Spaniards that the American settlers on the Tennessee
and the Cumberland rivers were leagued with the British in the
proposed expedition. No other settlers of the west had suffered
so much from closing the navigation of the Mississippi as the
residents on those rivers. Many boat loads sent down the rivers
to New Orleans by them had been practically confiscated by the
Spanish, or been charged ruinous rates of toll. Under the
Spanish view that the Americans had no right to navigate the
Mississippi, they were justified in confiscating these loads, par
ticularly, as the Americans had been warned not to descend the
river. Even after the terms of the treaty of 1795 concerning
navigating the Mississippi had become known, the Spanish still
continued their exactions on the river commerce; and when it
was determined not to surrender the posts the previous rule of
prohibiting the navigation was revived and largely carried into
execution. This greatly increased the indignation of the Amer
icans. It may be said with truth that, at this time, Spain, like
France, was practically at war with the United States. Her
privateers of the ocean and the Gulf seized large numbers of
American vessels and confiscated their goods. This fact was
well known' and still further widened the breach.
Inasmuch as many of the inhabitants of Natchez were bit-

* American State Papers.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

97

terly hostile to the Spaniards, Governor Gayoso, in order to pre
vent organizations against him, directed in his proclamation
that all persons who might collect in bodies should be promptly
dispersed. The menaces of Mr. Ellicott and of Lieutenant
Pope contributed to the bitterness of the situation. It was the
view of Mr. Pickering, secretary of state, that the real reason
for the Spanish retention of the country was "the expectation
of an immediate rupture between France, the intimate ally of
Spain, and the United States." This was no doubt true, so that
Spain was justified in retaining the American posts, on this
ground alone, because a declaration of war by the United States
against France meant war against Spain as well. The posses
sion of these posts would give Spain immense advantage at the
commencement of such a war. She was, therefore, wise to retain
the posts, owing to the imminency of the danger; and she did
so with such plausibility, prudence and finesse, that the reten
tion was permitted by the United States far beyond the treaty
stipulations without serious results to herself, though a bloody
encounter at Natchez was narrowly averted.*
The continued retention of the posts and the strengthening
of the Spanish garrisons, gave the American officers great uneas
iness, because it was construed to mean that the Spanish would
not abide by the treaty of 1795 and surrender the navigation
of the Mississippi. In June, 1797, the residents made prepa
rations for hostilities. The alleged unjustifiable arrest of one
of their number, and his confinement in chains by the Spanish,
was the immediate spur to action. The residents armed them
selves, gathered in great numbers, organized companies and
elected officers, and sought to enlist the active co-operation of
Mr. Ellicott and Lieutenant Pope. Within a few hours Governor
Gayoso and the Spanish garrison were confined to the limits
,of the fort, while armed" and organized bands of citizens sur
rounded them in menacing attitude. Governor Gayoso requested
an interview with Mr. Ellicott and Lieutenant Pope, which was
granted. The former two were anxious to avoid hostilities, but
the latter declared that he would repel with force any attempt
to imprison American citizens, as Natchez was American terri-
tory.f Finally, a pacific proclamation was issued by Governor Gayoso
•American State Papers.
tEllicott's Journal.
11-7

98 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
to the following effect: That the citizens should disperse and
return to their homes; that no person should be molested on
account of his opinions ; that the citizens were mistaken in think
ing that war had been declared between Spain and the United
States; that no Indians had been called to assist Spain; that
the Spanish reinforcements to the Mississippi posts were for use
against an actual enemy only; that no interruptions should be
put to land or water communications; and that no corps, of mili
tia should be formed except in case of actual invasion, when
volunteers should be called for. The proclamation was unsat
isfactory to the citizens, who strenuously objected to its phraseol
ogy, and in many instances it was torn in pieces. It did not
produce the effect intended by Governor Gayoso, but rather
increased the gravity of the situation, until it seemed that hos
tilities were inevitable. The Spanish strengthened the fort in
every manner possible, and the companies of citizens were drilled
and fully organized.
At this critical stage another interview was held, at which
Governor Gayoso was informed that no terms would be accepted
that were not honorable to the citizens, who had felt their
strength and were not to be trifled with. The next day the resi
dents held an immense meeting, at which the following propo
sition was drafted, and later submitted to Governor Gayoso,
with the approval of Mr. Ellicott and Lieutenant Pope:
"i. The inhabitants of the district of Natchez, who, under
the belief and persuasion that they were citizens of the United
States, agreeably to the late treaty, have assembled and embodied
themselves, are not to be prosecuted or injured for their conduct
on that account, but to stand exonerated and acquitted. 2. The
inhabitants of the government aforesaid above the 31st degree
of north latitude, are not to be embodied as militia, or called
upon to aid in any military operation, except in case of an Indian
invasion, or for the suppression of riots during the present state
of uncertainty, owing to the late treaty between the United States
and His Catholic Majesty not being fully carried into effect.
3. The laws of Spain in the above district shall be continued,
and on all occasions be executed with mildness and moderation,
nor shall any of the inhabitants be transported as prisoners out
of this government on any pretext whatever; and notwithstand
ing the operation of the law aforesaid is hereby admitted, yet
the inhabitants shall be considered to be in an actual state of
neutrality during the continuance of their uncertainty, as men
tioned in the second proposition. 4. The committee aforesaid

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 99
do engage to recommend it to our constituents, and to the utmost
of our power endeavor to preserve the peace and promote the
due execution of justice."*
This proposition was acceded to by Governor Gayoso, and the
following proclamation by him, dated June 22, gave general
satisfaction and terminated the impending hostilities : "Whereas,
the threatening calamities to which the inhabitants of this dis
trict have been lately exposed, did awake the zeal of every indi
vidual, and rouse them to seek the most efficacious means of
re-establishing good order and that tranquillity which, for many
days, was lost; the good sense of a number of the inhabitants
dictated to them the necessity of a convention, in which they
chose persons of the most notorious probity and intelligence as
a committee to co-operate with us toward the re-establishment
of the public peace and tranquillity; and the members of the
said committee having met at Natchez, after due deliberations
and consultations, stated and presented us the following propo
sitions, in the terms and form here expressed, to-wit: (the
same as above) ; being always desirous of promoting the pub
lic good, we do join in the same sentiment with the commit
tee, by acceding to their propositions in the manner following
(repeated the propositions). This left the American citizens
free from molestation except for offense against the law, and
left Governor Gayoso in charge of the administration of affairs
and' in possession of the post. He thus attained his object of
practical authority and continued occupation.
The Spanish government did not seem disposed to hurry
matters, and the United States did not deem it expedient to use
force, so the troops of the former continued to hold the Amer
ican posts. The autumn of 1797 wore away and winter came
and still no move was made to evacuate. At length, on January
18, 1798, Mr. Ellicott received the following letter:*
"New Orleans, January 10, 1798.
"To Hon. Andrew Ellicott:
r'By a packet just arrived I have received orders from court
by which I am authorized and ordered to evacuate the forts
of Natchez and Nogales (Walnut Hills) in consequence thereof
by this express. I send the necessary orders to withdraw the
artillery and other military effects. As the gallies will not be
sufficient other vessels shall be sent from this (place) to com-

* Ellicott's Journal.

IOO THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
plete the operation with all possible speed. Please to furnish
Major Minor with the information I request that I may be
enabled to provide everything concerning the execution of the
boundary line between His Majesty's dominions and the terri
tory of the United States. It is with the greatest satisfaction
that I have the pleasure to announce to you this agreeable event,
as it justifies our disposition in complying with our engagements
as soon as political circumstances would justify it.
"Manuel Gayoso de Lemos."
The reception of this letter was so agreeable to Mr. Ellicott
that he lost no time in making it known to all the inhabitants,
particularly to those who had favored the American purposes
and' contentions. In his journal he said, "The disagreeable state
of suspense we had been in for almost a year relative to the fate
of the treaty was partly terminated by the following letter from
Governor Gayoso." However, he was too well acquainted with
the methods of the Spanish to believe that they would commence
the evacuation and the survey at once, and he was correct in
his conclusion. On January 31, Governor Gayoso wrote that
he would go to Natchez himself at once to assist in making the
necessary arrangements to run the boundary. No step having
been taken by the middle of February, Mr. Ellicott resolved to
begin the survey alone as soon as the Spanish troops should
be withdrawn. Finally, on the 9th of April he left Natchez
with his instruments and his workmen, and arrived at Clarks-
ville on the 10th, where he set up his clock and zenith sector.
He found that he was three miles and two hundred and ninety
perches too far north. He left Clarksville on the 24th and
reached Bayou Tunica on the 26th. Here he ascertained his
starting point in the middle of the Mississippi, as ' set down in
the treaty on the northernmost point of the thirty-first degree
of north latitude. On the 21st Major Minor and his laborers
and on the 26th Mr. Dunbar, the astronomer, arrived, all on the
part of the Spanish. On the 31st Governor Gayoso, accompanied
by several officers, arrived in the camp. He had heard of the
American movements without his co-operation arid had thought,
doubtless, that it was time for him to bestir himself. Having
examined the work of the Americans, he approved, the same
June 1st; but when requested by Mr. Ellicott to confirm it he
avoided doing so. Mr. Ellicott continued the survey, with very
little assistance from the Spaniard's. He reached Little Bayou
Sara on June 7th, and Big Bayou Sara on July 17th. He

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. ioi
arrived at Thompson's creek on October 27th and Pearl river
November 19th. They opened a strip sixty feet wide through
an almost impenetrable thicket, the Spaniards reluctantly assist
ing.* Governor Gayoso owned a large plantation at Natchez,
having previously secured it with the expectation that the
Natchez district would become a part of the Spanish dominions.
Being himself an ardent Spaniard, he saw with intense regret
the boundary line established about thirty-nine miles due south
of Natchez. Thomas Power, a Spaniard well known in the west
ern country for his participation in the secret acts of the Span
ish authorities to induce the western people to separate then>
selves from the Atlantic states and unite with the Spanish -Louisi
ana, was the commissioner for the survey on the part of Spain;
but he was more of a hindrance than an assistance to the Ameri
cans in the practical operations of the survey.
The Spanish authorities in New Orleans were at this time
exceedingly fearful of the Americans ; so much so that upon the
arrival of Gen. James Wilkinson about this time in the lower
country, Governor Gayoso armed and called out the militia and
made other defensive operations.* Mr. Ellicott wrote to the
authorities at Washington on November 8, 1798, that "the fears
and jealousies of the Spanish nation will certainly, in the course
of a few years, occasion the loss of all the country on this side
of the Mississippi to the crown of Spain." His prediction proved
singularly correct. They lost not only that territory, but ere
long were stripped of all their possessions in both of the Americas.
It was inevitable — was the logical result of the settled policy
of ignorance and exclusion of the Spanish government.
It was unquestionably the intention of the Spanish authori
ties of Louisiana, under the orders of the Spanish monarch, to
hold the American posts on the Mississippi, if possible, until
it should be determined whether France and the United States
were to become involved in war. Spain was at this time the pup
pet of the French republic. It was realized by France, under the
stimulus of the revolutionary government, that a protracted war
with England might give her the coveted opportunity to recap
ture Canada. It was also known to the French directory that
pressure brought to bear upon Spain would result in the retro
cession of Louisiana to France. But the Upper Mississippi
valley could not be secured, it was thought, without a war with
the United States. France held strong resentment against the

* Ellicott's Journal.

102 THE PROVINCE AND THE- STATES.
United States, because the latter had seemingly favored the com
merce of Great Britain rather than that of France. She who
had been the essential instrument which enabled the American
colonies to gain their independence, was now obliged not only
to suffer actual and serious injury to her commerce by the acts
of the United States, but to witness the ingratitude shown in
the favors granted to Great Britain, the former enemy of both.
Such was the view of France. When the war of 1793 burst
forth in all its fury, France grew still more bitter because the
United States would not consent to become her active ally against
Great Britain. The proceedings of Mr. Genet were instigated
by the French government; and when his course was checked
and his recall was requested, the resentment of France found
abundant fuel in privateering on American commerce and in
humiliating the American envoys. The similar acts of Spain
were due to French influence. While the war, begun in 1793,
between France and Great Britain continued, there was no like
lihood that the former would molest the United States; but
should she succeed in regaining Canada by conquering Great
Britain, Louisiana was certain to pass to her possession, and,
if she could browbeat or whip the United States, all the Upper
Mississippi valley would share the same lot. This was well
known to American statesmen, and, therefore, they preferred that
Louisiana should remain in the possession of Spain' rather than
pass to France. The latter was- a neighbor to be dreaded, while
Spain was weak and yielding.
But France could not crush Great Britain nor regain Canada
in the war of 1793, and her disappointment was reflected in her
treatment of the United States. Her privateers ravaged Ameri
can commerce until in 1797-98 war was imminent and seemed
inevitable. Spain was completely under the domination of France.
and the latter was no doubt responsible for the Spanish reten
tion of the American posts on the Mississippi.* An intima
tion even for their retention, from France to Spain, was all the
inducement needed. Either preferred the other to hold Louisi
ana rather than the United States. Their retention, in case of
a war between Spain and the United States, not only meant
immense early advantage to the former, but assured her of the
active and potential assistance of France. Therefore, the posts
were held until France had definitely decided to settle without

* Monroe's Memoirs.

LATER NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

103

a war her disputes with the United States. Spain, having
already ceded all of the country above the thirty-first degree
to the United States by the treaty of 1795, had no other motive
in retaining the American posts than to aid France. In fact,
having thus ceded the country, it was to her advantage, omit
ting the considerations of France, to surrender the posts and
thus retain the good will of her neighbor, the United States.
But the will of France prevailed, and the diplomacy of the
Louisiana authorities enabled Spain to retain, without war with
the United States, the entire Natchez district for about a year
and a half beyond the expiration of the treaty limits.

104 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

CHAPTER III

The Treaty of Retrocession, 1800

THE republic of France had scarcely become firmly estab
lished before the directory began to consider the question
of securing the retrocession of Louisiana from Spain.
The confidence with which France pursued this object indicates
that owing to some secret understanding at the date of the ces
sion of Louisiana to Spain in 1763, or at some subsequent date,
the latter was under obligations to retrocede the province to
the French government, either upon demand, or upon the ful
fillment of certain conditions or agreements. As early as 1794
the French ambassador to the court of Spain, Citizen Perignon,
was instructed to sound that government in regard to the retro
cession of Louisiana; and it was announced in the ambassador's
dispatches that Spain seemed to acquiesce in the demand, in
order to secure for the Duke of Parma, as France proposed,
an enlargement of his states in Italy.* It should be particu
larly noted that France demanded at this time West Florida
also, taking the position that, under Spain, Louisiana embraced
West Florida as it did previous to 1763 under France. But the
French government could not yet deliver the territory in Italy
desired, therefore negotiations were interrupted and delayed.
In 1797, Delacroix, the French minister on exterior relations,
wrote to General Bonaparte that "This treaty ought to have as
basis the cession of Louisiana and of West Florida to the repub
lic, upon the supposition that events permit the French govern
ment to procure for the Duke of Parma an augmentation of
territory, such as Romagna or any other part"! Accordingly,
* History of France : Wright.
t Napoleon Correspondence.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION.

I?5

full powers were sent to Mr. Perignon to conclude the treaty
on this basis ; but Spain was not satisfied with the assurance that
France could deliver the desired territory in Italy, and there
fore delayed reaching an agreement. In 1800 Mr. Berthier was
sent as an envoy extraordinary to Madrid to resume the nego
tiations, and was instructed by the consular government to
demand Louisiana and the two Floridas. But an agreement
with Spain on this basis could not be reached. The ambassador
said, in his dispatches of August 25, 1800, "The answer of the
king to the minister of foreign affairs of France was, that he
would perform the promise which he had given for the retro
cession of Louisiana, as it had been ceded by the treaty of 1763;
that he would never consent to cede the Floridas, and that he
was surprised that, after having yielded that which was so long
solicited, new demands should be made upon him."*
At the same time, he communicated that the Spanish minis
ter, Air. Urquijo, "allowed him to understand that, at a general
peace, the king might cede half of West Florida, situated
between the left bank of the Alississippi and the river Mobile."
France, at this date, was engaged in the war with England, and
Spain desired a general peace before ceding any part of Flor
ida. The king of Spain having thus signified his willingness,
agreeably to promise, to retrocede Louisiana to France, the trans
fer was secretly made October 1, 1800, while the war was still
in progress. After the treaty of Amiens, which was concluded
Alarch 25, 1802, the consular government instructed General
Beurnonville, French ambassador to Madrid, to effect the follow
ing objects: "The most important affair with which you will
occupy yourself is to facilitate this last delivery (of Louisiana),
which ought to take place before the end of the season, by obtain
ing from the Spanish government, that it give to the governor
of Louisiana, if not already done, specific orders to deliver it
to the captain general which the consul sends there 
The retrocession made by Spain only extends from the east of
the Mississippi, but the secretary of state, M. Urquijo, had given
hopes to General Bertrand, charge of this negotiation, and who
insisted on the cession of one of the Floridas, that at the gen
eral peace, he did not doubt that the king would consent to
cede all that part of the Floridas which extends to Mobile, if
the premier consul asked for it. The difficulties which Spain
afterward threw in the way of completing the cession of Louisi-

• Napoleon Correspondence.

106 THE- PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ana caused the French government to think, hitherto, that the
moment was not yet arrived to ask an extension of territory;
but peace has placed France in such a favorable position, that
it does not seem necessary to adjourn any longer the necessary
steps to obtain the aggrandizement with which the minister of
the king of Spain flattered the French charge d'affairs. The
part of Florida which you have to lay claim to, belonged to
France before the peace of 1763. It is evident she wishes to
reacquire this former possession where there are doubtless
a great number of French families". General Beurnonville
was given elaborate instructions and full powers to treat for
the possession of the two Floridas, and was authorized to cede
therefor the duchy of Parma. He took with him complete plans
for the treaty, prepared by Napoleon, one article reading as
follows :*
"Article IV. Spain, in compensation for the advantages
guaranteed to her by the present treaty, retrocedes to France
the river and port of Mobile, and the territory which belonged
to it before 1763, to the west of that river only, from the most
northern point of the thirty-first degree of north latitude to the
river of Iberville and the Gulf of Mexico. Further, she cedes
to France the other part of West Florida and all East Flor
ida, with the rivers, lakes, ports, bays, isles and straights, depend
ent on each several territory, and extending to the north into
the line of demarcation traced in Article II of the treaty of
friendship, of limits, and of navigation, concluded the 27th Octo
ber, 1795, between Llis Catholic Majesty and the United States
of America."
But despite the inducements and the pressure brought to bear
upon Spain, the French government was unable to obtain the
two Floridas, or any part of either. The efforts to secure them
were continued persistently for nearly a decade, first by the
French directory and then by the consular government; but,
as Spain was under no obligations to return them, though she
had promised to return Louisiana,f she refused to do so, even
though threatened by the first consul. There can be no doubt
that the consular government fully realized the vast importance
of possessing Louisiana, the two Floridas, the control of navi
gation on the Mississippi, and, therefore, to a pre-eminent degree,

* Senate Documents 56, 2d Session, 23d Congress.
t Spain seemed to have been under an agreement contained in a secret article of
the secret treaty of 1762. or of the "Family Compact" of 1761, to retrocede Louisi
ana to France upon conditions not wholly understood.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION.

107

the commercial supremacy of the Gulf. The old monarchy
of France had been rent asunder, the new citizens' government
was alert and ambitious, and cared nothing for the sacredness
of the "family compact" except as it enabled them to demand the
retrocession of Louisiana according to the promise of the Spanish
monarch, and to secure, if possible, by cajolery or threats, a part
or the whole of the two Floridas. Napoleon saw the golden
opportunity of establishing on the Gulf a magnificent empire of
the French people, with the beautiful capital at New Orleans, with
the commerce of the world on the Gulf under French tribute and
domination, and with a prodigious demand for all the products
of the French manufactories. It meant the enrichment and glori
fication of France far beyond anything yet conjectured or dreamed
of. It meant the practical enslavement of the Western states of
America, or the purchase by them of French condescension upon
terms wholly at the pleasure and under the dictum of France. It
meant the absolute exclusion of Great Britain from the Missis
sippi and from the Gulf and the ultimate loss of her West India
possessions. It meant the probable extension of Louisiana into
Mexico and perhaps into Central America. It was a splendid
conception — a magnificent dream of conquest, dominion and
power; but like many other dreams of empire during that vol
canic-period was short-sighted, illogical and impossible of execu
tion. The failure of France to comply with the stipulations contained
in the treaties with Spain concerning the retrocession of Louisiana,
caused the latter to withhold the orders for the delivery of the
machinery of government at New Orleans until the conditions
agreed upon had been wholly fulfilled. As soon as the consider
ations had passed, the Spanish monarch, at Barcelona, on October
15, 1802, issued the following royal order: "Whereas, I have
judged it proper to retrocede to the French republic the colony
and province of Louisiana, I command you, as soon as these pres
ents are exhibited to you by General Victor, or any other officer
duly authorized by said republic to receive the same, to put him in
possession of the colony of Louisiana and its dependencies,
together with the city and island of New Orleans, with the same
limits it has at present, which it had whilst it belonged to France,
and at the same time she ceded it to my royal crown, and as such
it ought to be found after the treaties successfully concluded
between my states and those of other powers, in order that hence
forth the same may belong to said republic, and that she may cause

108 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
it to be administered and governed by her own officers and gover
nors, as her own possession without any exception whatever."*
The Spanish commissioners, Manuel Salcedo and Sebastian
Calvo, appointed by the Spanish crown to deliver Louisiana to
the French authorities, issued the following proclamation to the
inhabitants of the Province :
"We make it known to all the vassals of the king, our master of
all classes and conditions whatsoever, that his Majesty has
resolved to make a retrocession of the Province of Louisiana, for
the mutual satisfaction of both powers ; and continuing to give the
same proofs of protection and affection which the inhabitants of
this province have always received, he has thought fit to settle
among other things certain points which we deem it our duty
publicly to make known, for the particular government and dis
position of all whom it may concern :
"His Majesty in considerations of the obligations imposed by
the treaties and wishing to avoid the differences which might
arise, has been pleased to resolve, that the delivery of the colony
and Island of New Orleans, which is to be made to General Victor,
or other officer lawfully authorized by the Government of the
French Republic, shall be made in the same manner that it was
ceded by France to his Majesty, by virtue of which the limits of
both shores of the River St. Louis or Mississippi shall remain as
irrevocably fixed by the seventh article of the definitive treaty of
peace, concluded at Paris on the ioth of February, 1763; and
consequently the settlements from the river Manshack or Iber
ville, to the line which divides the American territory from the
dominions of the King, shall remain in the possession of Spain
and annexed to West Florida." f
ACT OF DELIVERY OF THE PROVINCE OF LOUISIANA BY
SPAIN TO FRANCE.
"The undersigned, citizen Pierre Clement Laussat, Colonial
prefect, commissioner on the part of the French government, to
receive possession in the name of the French Republic of the
Colony or Province of Louisiana; from the hands of the officers
and other agents of His Catholic Majesty, agreeably to the full
powers which he has received, in the name of the French people,
from Citizen Bonaparte, First Consul, under date of the 17th

* History of France : Wright.
t American State Papers.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION.

109

Prairial year 11 (6th June, 1803), countersigned by Hugues
Maret, secretary of state, and by his excellency Decres, minister
of marine and of the colonies, and recently delivered in person
to the commissioners of his said Catholic Majesty, together with
the royal order, dated from Barcelona, 15th October, 1802.
"And the said commissioners of his Catholic Majesty, Don
Manuel de Salcedo, brigadier in the King's armies, military and
political governor of the provinces of Louisiana and West Flor
ida, inspector .of the veteran troops and militia of said provinces,
royal vice patron, sub-delegate, judge of the superintendence of
the post-office department, &c, and Don Sebastian Calvo de la
Fuerta y O'Farrell Marquis Casa Calvo, knight of the order of
St James, brigadier in the King's armies and colonel of the
infantry regiment of the Havana, appointed commissioner of his
Catholic Majesty, for the delivery of this Province to the French
Republic, according to the royal order of the 18th February, 1803 :
"Certify by these presents that on this eighth day of Fri-
maire, in the twelfth year of the French Republic and thirtieth
November, 1803, having assembled in the hall of the hotel of the
city of New Orleans, accompanied on either part by the chiefs
and officers of the armies of land and sea, the secular and eccle
siastical cabildo, the administration of finances of the King of
Spain, the civil administration, and by other distinguished persons
of their respective nations, said Citizen Laussat delivered to the
said commissioners of his Catholic Majesty the above mentioned
full powers from citizen Bonaparte, First Consul of the French
republic ; and immediately after the said. Manuel de Salcedo and
the Marquis of Casa Calvo declared that by virtue of, and in con
formity to, the terms of the order of the King of Spain, dated
from Barcelona the 15th of October, 1802, and countersigned by
Don Pedro Cervallos, first secretary and counsellor of state,
they from that moment did put the French commissioner, Citizen
Laussat, in possession of the Colony of Louisiana and its depend
encies, as also of the city and island of New Orleans, with tlie
same extent which they have on this day, and which they had
while in the hands of France when she ceded the same to the
royal crown of Spain, and such as they ought to have been since
the treaties successively concluded between the States of his Cath
olic Majesty and those of other Powers, in order that the same
may henceforth belong to the French Republic and be governed
and administered by its officers and governors, in such manner as
will best suit its interests ; and they have accordingly solemnly

no THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
delivered to him the keys of this place, declaring that they absolve
from the oath of fidelity to his said Majesty, all such inhabitants
as may choose to continue in the service of dependence of the
French Republic.
"And to the end that the same may forever hereafter appear
by this solemn act, the undersigned have signed these presents in
the French and Spanish languages, have hereto affixed their seals,
and caused the same to be countersigned by the secretaries of the
respective corrimissions, the day, month and year above written.
"Laussat."
"By the colonial prefect and commissioner on the part of the
French Government. "DaugEROT,
"Secretary of the Commission.
"Andres Lopez Armisto,
"So del Gobo. "Manuel de Salcedo,
"y de la Comm'on. "El Marquez de Casa Calvo."
Below is written :
"Deposited in the archives of the city hall of this commune,
New Orleans, the 6th Ariose, year 12 of the French Republic,
and 28th December, A. D. 1803." "Laussat."
"By the colonial prefect and commissioner on the part of the
French Government." ''DAUGEROT,
"Secretary of the Commission.
The following is in full the text of the treaty of retrocession,
concluded October 1, 1800, by which Louisiana was returned to
France, according to the promises of the king of Spain, contained
in a secret article of tlie secret treaty of 1762, by which Louisiana
passed to the crown of Spain. Though this secret treaty was
made public in the United States in 1834, the secret article of this
secret treaty seems never to have been printed or circulated in
this country. The double secrecy has thus proved an effectual
bar to publicity :*

•Treaties of the United States.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. m

PRELIMINARY AND SECRET TREATY BETWEEN THE FRENCH REPUB
LIC AND HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY, THE KING OF SPAIN, RELAT
ING TO THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS, THE
INFANT DUKE OF PARMA IN ITALY, AND TO THE RETROCESSION
OF LOUISIANA.
"His Catholic Majesty having always manifested the most anx
ious desire to procure for his Royal Highness, the Duke of Parma,
an aggrandizement which might place him on a footing corre
sponding with his dignity ; and the French Republic having long
since given to his Catholic Alajesty, the king of Spain, to under
stand the desire which they feel to recover possession of the colony
of Louisiana, both Governments having interchanged their views
upon these two subjects of common interest and circumstances
permitting them to enter into engagements in this particular
which, as far as it depends on them, may assure reciprocal satis
faction, have authorized for this purpose, that is to say, the French
Republic, the citizen Alexander Berthier, general-in-chief; and his
Catholic Majesty, Don Mariano Luis de Urquijo, chevalier of
the order of Charles III and of St. John of Jerusalem, counselor
of state, his envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary, near the
Batavian Republic, and his provisional first secretary of state;
who after having exchanged their powers have agreed, saving the
ratification, upon the following articles :
"Article i. The French Republic engages to procure for His
Royal Highness, the Infant Duke of Parma, an augmentation of
territory which shall raise the population of his estates to one mil
lion of inhabitants, with the title of king and all the rights
annexed to royal dignity; and to this effect the French repub
lic engages to obtain the consent of his Majesty, the Emperor and
King, and of the other states interested, so that His Royal High
ness, the Infant Duke of Parma, may, without opposition, enter
into possession of said territories at the time of the confirmation
of the peace between the French Republic and his Imperial
Majesty. "Article 2. The augmentation to be given to His Royal High
ness, the Duke of Parma, may consist of Tuscany, in case the
present negotiations of the Grench Government with His Impe
rial Majesty shall permit them to dispose of that country, or of
the three Roman ecclesiastical provinces, or any other continental
provinces of Italy that may form a rounded estate.
"Article 3. His Catholic Majesty promises and engages on his
part to retrocede to the French Republic, six months after the

112 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations herein
expressed in relation to His Royal Highness, the Duke of Parma,
the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that
it now has in the hands of Spain, and had while in the possession
of France, and such as it ought to be in conformity with the trea
ties subsequently concluded between Spain and other states.
"Article 4. His Catholic Majesty will give the necessary orders
for the occupation of Louisiana by France the moment the estates
designed for his aggrandizement shall be placed in the hands of
His Royal Highness, the Duke of Parma. The French may
according to its convenience defer the taking possession; and
when this is to be done the States directly or indirectly interested
shall agree upon the ulterior conditions which their common
interests and that of their inhabitants may demand.
"Article 5. His Catholic Majesty engages to deliver to the
French Republic in the ports of Spain in Europe, one month after
the execution of the stipulation with regard to the Duke of Farma,
six ships of war in good condition, of seventy-four guns, armed
and equipped, and in a state to receive the French crews and
supplies. "Article 6. The stipulations of the present treaty having no
prejudicial object, but on the contrary preserving untouched the
rights of every one, is not to be presumed they can excite the sus
picions of any power. But if the contrary should happen and
the result of their execution should be that the two estates are
attacked or threatened, both powers to engage to make common
cause as to repel aggression as also to take those conciliatory
measures proper to maintain peace with all their neighbors.
"Article 7. The obligations contained in the present treaty in
nothing annul those which are expressed in the treaty of alliance
signed at St. Ildefonso on the second Fructidor, year 4 (18th
August, 1796) ; on the contrary, they unite with new ties the
interests of the two Powers, and confirm the stipulations of the
treaty of alliance in all the cases in which they can be applied.
"Article 8. The ratifications of the present preliminary arti
cles shall be completed and exchanged in the period of one month,
or sooner if possible, counting from the date of the signing of the
present treaty.
"In faith of which we the undersigned ministers plenipotentiary
of the French Republic and of His Catholic Majesty by virtue of
our respective powers have signed the present preliminary arti
cles and have affixed our seals.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION.

H3

Done at St. Ildefonso the 9th Vendimaire, 9th year of the
French Republic (1st October, 1800).
"Alexander Berthier,
"AIariano Luis de Urquijo."
This was ratified by Bonaparte October 19, 1800, and attested
by Charles Alaurice. Talleyrand, minister of foreign relations, and
Hughes Alaret, secretary of state. It does not appear ever to
have been ratified on the document itself by the king of Spain.
By another treaty concluded March 21, 1801, by Lucien Bona
parte and the king of Spain, various other changes of territory
were made to meet the wants of both France and Spain. Article
6 of this treaty is as follows:
"Article 6. As this treaty has its origin in that concluded
between the First Consul and his Catholic Afajesty, by which the
King retrocedes to France the possession of Louisiana, the con
tracting parties agree to carry into effect the articles of that treaty ;
and that, while the difficulties with regard to them are in process
of arrangement, the present treaty shall not destroy the rights of
either party."
Late in March, 1801, it was rumored in Paris and London that
Louisiana and the Floridas had been ceded by Spain to France;
and soon afterward the same reports were swiftly circulated
throughout Louisiana and the United States. In a letter dated
London, Alarch 29, 1801, Rufus King, minister to England,
informed the secretary of state of the currency of the rumors in
Europe. He further said that the transfer had "in all probability"
been executed; that the cession embraced Louisiana and the two
Floridas ; that influential persons in France entertained the opin
ion that nature made the Alleghany mountains "a marked line of
separation between the people of the United States living upon
the two sides of the range of mountains which divides their ter
ritory;" and that he was "apprehensive that this cession is
intended to have, and may actually produce, effects injurious to
the union and consequent happiness of the people of the United
States."* He said in another letter dated June 1, that the Eng
lish ministry was greatly exorcised by the rumors, because they
realized that, should they be true, "the acquisition might enable
France to extend her influence, and perhaps her dominion up the
Mississippi, and through the lakes even to Canada ;" that France
would thus succeed in reversing the results of the "seven years'

* Diplomatic Correspondence.
II— 8

114

THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

war" (1755-63) ; and that the proximity of the Floridas to the
British West Indies "was strong reason why England must be
unwilling that the territory should pass under the dominion of
France." On June 9 Mr. Madison, secretary of state, requested Charles
Pinckney, minister to Spain, to learn all that was possible con
cerning the cession. He said, "The whole subject will deserve
and engage your early and vigilant inquiries and may require a
very delicate and circumspect management." He observed that
the motives of Spain were not obvious, while those of France
were; that, inasmuch as alarms had prevailed in France during
and since the late war of designs on the part of Great Britain to
wrest the mouth of the Mississippi from her, "she may have con
cluded a pre-occupancy of it by herself to be a necessary safeguard
against an event from which that nation would derive a double
advantage of strengthening her hold on the United States, and
of adding to her commerce a monopoly of the immense and fertile
region communicating with the sea through a single outlet ;" that
means should be found to divert France from securing Louisiana,
among which were "that the United States were not disposed to
enter, nor are in danger of being drawn, into partialities toward
Great Britain unjust or injurious to France; that our political and
commercial interests afford a sufficient guaranty against such a
state of things ; that without the co-operation of the United States
Great Britain is not likely to acquire any part of the Spanish pos
sessions on the Mississippi, and that the danger of collision
between the two republics was not a remote contingency "from
the conflicts in their regulations of a commerce involving the
peculiarities which distinguish that of the Mississippi."
These views, which Air. Aladison represented to be those of
the president, were also sent to Mr. Livingston, minister to
France. The -latter was instructed to use every argument avail
able to deter France from securing Louisiana, but if this could
not be done her good will was to be retained. In this event, he
was instructed, should the Floridas be included in the cession, to
secure their transfer to the United States if it could be done. He
said, "the great importance of West Florida to the United States
recommends to your patriotism the prudent use of every fair
consideration which may favor the attainment of the object."*
The treaty by which Louisiana passed to France was secret,
and though its substantial provisions became known to the world,

* Diplomatic Correspondence.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION.

"5

the first positive evidence to reach the United States was con
tained in a copy of the treaty of March 21, 1801, between Lucien
Bonaparte and the king of Spain, sent by Rufus King from Lon
don in November, 1801, to the secretary of state, in which it was
stated that "this treaty being in consequence of that already con
cluded between the First Consul and His Most Catholic Majesty,
by which the King cedes to France the possession of Louisiana,
the contracting parties agree to carry the said treaty into execu
tion and to arrange it in conformity to their respective rights."
As late as December 10, 1801, Mr. Livingston wrote that the
French minister of state had stated that "nothing had been con
cluded, or even resolved on, in that affair." However, Mr. Liv
ingston announced that he was satisfied for various reasons that
the cession had been really concluded. One day later he wrote,
"In addition to what I wrote you yesterday, I have only to men
tion, that I am more and more confirmed notwithstanding what I
there say of the minister's assurance, that Louisiana is a favorite
object andthat they will be willing to part with it on the condition
I mentioned. Speaking of the means of paying their debts to
one of their ministers yesterday, I hinted at this. His reply was,
'none but spendthrifts satisfy their debts by selling their lands,'
adding, however, after a pause, 'but it is not ours to give.'" A
few days later he wrote, that France was preparing a large arma
ment ostensibly for Hispaniola, but in reality for the occupation
and government of Louisiana. He -said, "That Spain has made
this cession (which contravenes all her former maxims of policy)
cannot be doubted, but she is no longer a free agent. ... It
puts Spain in a perpetual state of pupilage, since she must always
tremble for the safety of her colonies in case of rupture. To
avoid this evil, she must grant every commercial and political
advantage to France."
The French ministry continued to deny that Louisiana had been
retrpceded to France, even after the fact became known positively
to the public through secret or private sources. Unquestionably,
France expected vigorous opposition to the treaty from both
Great Britain and the United States ; therefore, she concealed it
as long as possible (the treaty not having been ratified yet by
the king of Spain), and in the meantime made extensive prepara
tions to send to New Orleans a large body of troops to take posses
sion and later a large colony to occupy the country. The secrecy
was partly due to a surmise that England, with whom France was
on the point of war again, intended to send a fleet to the mouth
of the Mississippi, and such a movement was really contemplated.

Ii6 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
France suspected that the United States had "an eye to the con
quest of her West India islands." Rufus King, at London, echo
ing the reports circulated in England, spoke of "the establishment
of this colony (Louisiana) as a darling object" of the first con
sul.* Mr. Livingston wrote from Paris February 6, 1802, "The
establishment (of the Louisiana colony) is disapproved by every
statesman here as one that will occasion a great waste of men
and money, excite enmities with us, and produce no possible advan
tage to the nation. But it is a scheme to which the First Consul
is extremely attached ; and it must, of course, be supported. You
will find by the enclosed note that I have pressed an explanation
on the subject, but I have received no answer. I have it, however,
through a friend, from the First Consul, that it is by no means
their intention to obstruct the navigation of the Mississippi, or
violate our treaty with Spain. General Bernadotte is understood
to be designated for the command and to have asked ten thousand
troops." St. Domingo, Guiana and other French colonial posses
sions, as well as Louisiana, were to be strengthened and pro
tected. On February 20, Mr. Livingston addressed a note to Mr. Tal
leyrand, French minister of exterior relations, requesting a
statement of the probable attitude of France on the question of
boundary, navigation and other rights secured to the United
States by the treaty with Spain, and gave as a reason for the
inquiry "the alarms of the people in the western part of the
United States over the reported future arrival of a large body of
French troops in their vicinity." He also asked whether East or
West Florida was included in the cession, but , Mr. Talleyrand
pleasantly evaded all of his questions. In his letters of March
10 and 24 M/r. Livingston said:
"The fact is they (the French) believe us to be certainly hos
tile to this measure, and they mean to take possession of it
(Louisiana) as early as possible and with as little notice to us as
they can. They are made to believe this is one of the most fertile
and important countries in the world; that they have a much
greater interest with the Indians than any other people; that
New Orleans must command the trade of our whole western
country ; and of course that they will have a leading interest in its
politics. It is a darling object with the First Consul, who sees in
it a means to gratify his friends and to dispose of his armies.
. I cannot help thinking that it would be advisable for the

* Diplomatic Correspondence.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 117
present congress to take measures for establishing the Natchez
or some other port and giving it such advantages as would bring
our vessels to it without touching at Orleans. I have but
one hope left as to defeating this cession. It consists in alarming
Spain and England. The Spanish minister is now absent, but I
have not failed to show, in the strongest light to the minister of
Britain the danger that will result to them from the extension of
the French possessions in Mexico and the probable loss of Can
ada if they are suffered to possess it. ... I believe such is
the state of things here (in France and such the desire for
peace, that Britain may force them to relinquish Louisiana, par
ticularly as the people here are far from desiring the establish
ment of any foreign colony which they consider as a weak point
and drain for the population and wealth. It is impossible to see
the extent of the power France will have in and over America.
As part of the territory of Spain, Louisiana has no precise bound
ary, so it is easy to foresee the fate of Mexico. Britain will
judge how far she is able to contend with France,- enriched by
the treasures of Spain. The boundary between Canada and
Louisiana is alike unsettled. The dispositions of a great part of
the natives of that country are friendly to France; her influence
over the Indian tribes has always been and will again be much
greater than that of the British, both from the disposition and
manners of her people and from the whole body of carriers in the
Indian trade being native Canadians and much the greater part
of them mongrel French. It is impossible to say what their influ
ence may be upon our western country in case of a controversy
with Great Britain, particularly if they keep the keys of it by
possessing the mouth of the Alississippi or invite their aid in the
plunder of Mexico."*
In his letter of April 24 Air. Livingston said, "It appears very
extraordinary that Air. Pinckney (minister to Spain) still sup
poses that the Floridas are not included in the cession and that he
has made an offer to purchase them. You may, however, be
fully assured that the Floridas are given to France, and that they
are at this moment fitting out an armament from here to take
possession. The number of troops designed for this object is
between five and seven thousand. They will shortly sail for New
Orleans unless the state of affairs in St. Domingo should change
their destination. It would be wise immediately to take measures
to enable the Natchez to rival Orleans. If congress make Natchez

?American State Papers.

Il8 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
a free port, and if the state of affairs in St. Domingo should.'
employ the troops designed for Louisiana, time will still be left for
gold to operate here."
Mr. Madison, secretary of state, in letters dated May ist,
reflected the uneasiness, perhaps anxiety, with which the cession
to France was regarded by the administration. He said, "We
are fully aware of the tendency of the reported cession of Louisi
ana to plant in our neighborhood troubles of different kinds, and
to prepare the way for very serious events. It has accordingly
been a primary object with the President to obviate such an event.
. The cession of Louisiana to France become daily more
and more a source of painful apprehensions." To Mr. Living
ston he said, "Since the receipt of your last communications, no
hope remains (of preventing the cession of Louisiana to France),
but from the accumulating difficulties of going through with the
undertaking and from the conviction you may be able to impress,
that it must have an instant and powerful effect in changing the
relations between France and the United States. The change
is obvious; and the more it can be developed in candid and
friendly appeals to the reflections of the French government, the
more it will urge it to revise and abandon the project. A mere
neighborhood could not be friendly to the harmony which both
countries have so much at interest in cherishing; but if a posses
sion of the mouth of the Mississippi is to be added to the other
causes of discord, the worst events are to be apprehended. You
will consequently spare no efforts that will consist with prudence
and dignity to lead the councils of France to proper views of this
subject and to an abandonment of her present purpose. You
will also pursue by prudenfmeans the inquiry into the extent of
the cession, particularly whether it includes the Floridas as well
as New Orleans, and endeavor to ascertain the price at which
these, if included in the cession, would be yielded to the United
States." In a letter dated April 18, 1802, President Jefferson wrote to
Air. Livingston, minister to France, that "The day that France
takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to
restrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the
union of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive
possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry
ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our
attention to a maritime force, for which our resources place us
on very high ground; and having formed and cemented together
a power which may render re-enforcement of her settlements here

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 119
impossible to France make the first cannon which shall be fired
in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she may have
made and for holding the two continents of America in sequestra
tion for the common purposes of the united British and American
nations."* On May 7, in response to a reuest of Mr. King for the views
of Great Britain on the uestion of the cession, Lord Hawkes-
bury replied, "With regard to the free navigation of the Missis
sippi, I conceive that it is perfectly clear, according to the law of
nations, that in the event of the district of Louisiana being ceded
to France, that country would come nto the possession of it sub
ject to all the engagements which appertained to it at the time of
the cession ; and that the French government could consequently
allege no colorable pretext for excluding His Majesty's (the King
of England) subjects, or the citizens of the United States, from
the navigation of the river Mississippi." * *
Previous to May 11, 1802, the yiews and intentions of Spain
concerning the cession were unknown to the United States, but on
that date Mr. Pinckney was requested to communicate all that
could be learned on the subject at Madrid. Mr. Madison said to
him, "What the intentions of Spain may be, we wait to learn
from you. Verbal information from inofficial sources has led us
to infer that she disowns the instrument of cession and will
rigorously oppose it. Should the cession actually fail from this
or any other cause, and Spain retain New Orleans and the Flor
idas, I repeat to you the wish of the President that every effort
and address be employed to obtain the arrangement by which the
territory on the east side of the Mississippi including New Orleans
may be ceded to the United States and the Mississippi made a
common boundary, with a common use of its navigation for them-
and Spain. . . . You may not only receive and transmit a
proposition of guaranty of her territory beyond the Mississippi,
as a condition of her ceding to the United States the territory
including New Orleans on this side, but in case it be necessary
may make the proposition yourself in the forms required by our
constitution.- You will infer from this enlargement of your
authority, how much importance is attached to the object in ques
tion, as securing a precious acquisition to the United States, as
well as a natural and quiet boundary with Spain." f

* Writings of Thomas Jefferson : Ford.
** Diplomatic Correspondence.
t Madison's Papers.

120 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Late in May, Mr. Livingston informed the secretary of state
that "Bernadotte is to command, Collot second in command, Adet
to be Prefect ; but the expedition is delayed till about Septem
ber, on account (as Talleyrand expressed himself to Bernadotte)
of some difficulty which had arisen from the different appre
hensions of France and Spain relative to the meaning of the
term Louisiana, which has been understood by France to include
the Floridas, but probably by Spain to have been confined to
the strict meaning of the term. This explains why I could never
get an answer to my questions relative to the extent of the ces
sions, and upon which the French government had probably no
doubt till we started it. This is my conjecture as to the cause
of the delay in starting the expedition.''^
Early in June, in answer to an inquiry of Mr. Livingston,
the Spanish minister to the French republic, J. Nicolay D'Azara,
said, "It appears certain that a treaty ceding Louisiana has been
concluded, but I am of the opinion that the Floridas are not
comprised in the cession." On July 30 Mr. Livingston wrote
to the secretary of state: "I have been applied to by one of
the ministers here (Paris) to know what we understand in Amer
ica by Louisiana. You can easily conceive my answer. I have
just received1 a letter from Mr. Graham, in which he communi
cates the Spanish minister's answer to Mr. Pinckney's applica
tion upon the same subject in these words : 'If the King should
think proper to cede Louisiana, he will take care that the inter
est of the United States shall not be affected by it.' It appears
also by the fifth article of the treaty of Madrid, March 21, 1801,
that the cession had been made of Louisiana generally. The
French, you know, have always extended it to South Carolina
and all the country on the Ohio. Since the possession of the
Floridas by Britain and the treaty of 1763, I think there can
be no doubt as to the precise meaning of the terms."
Under the urgent instructions of the state department, the
ministers to France and Spain exhausted every resource at their
command to prevent (as they hoped they could) the ratifica
tion of the cession treaty. Mr. Livingston, at Paris, became
so insistent that the French minister of state adopted the pol
icy of evasion; but the tactful American sought and secured
another channel to the ears of the first consul.* He prepared
lengthy memorials, embracing every conceivable argument

t American State Papers.
* Diplomatic Correspondence : See numerous letters.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 121
against the French possession of Louisiana, prepared particularly
to influence the judgment of the first consul, and managed
to have them) conveyed privately to Napoleon by Joseph Bona
parte, his brother. Yet, at the same time, he was informed at
every interview with the French statesman that the acquisition
of Louisiana was dear to the heart of Napoleon, who continued
his elaborate preparations to send large and expensive colonies
to the Alississippi and strong armaments to sustain them. Thus,
although the American minister succeeded in gaining the atten
tion of this wonderful man, he had to combat the unerring
judgment that placed a just valuation on the control of the Mis
sissippi and the ownership of the vast country to the westward.
The orders of Napoleon to send a large armament to Louisiana
were not designed merely as a show of force to prevent an
interference with the French occupation, but signalized his esti
mate of the value of the province. The troubles in St. Domingo
were merely an incident which demanded troops at the same
time. Of all the statesmen of that era, of whatever nationality,
Napoleon seems to have been the only one by whom Louisiana,
as a province, was placed first in importance. The Americans,
on the other hand, though striving to secure the Floridas, con
centrated all the fire of their efforts upon the retention and per
petuation of their right to navigate the Mississippi. If nothing
better could be secured, they were prepared to rest satisfied for
a time if France would merely confirm the American rights
stipulated in the treaty of 1795 with Spain. But the American
ministers were instructed to spare no efforts, even to the lavish
use of gold,* to secure the cession to the United States of West
Florida, which carried with it, through the ownership of the left
bank of the river, the right to navigate the Mississippi.
The arguments in the memorials of Mr. Livingston against
the wisdom of the French possession of Louisiana were extremely
clear, strong and convincing. Under the supposition that
France occupied the country, he endeavored to show the enor
mous expense involved, the riotous dissatisfaction of the citizens
of France, and the certainty of losing the province to Great
Britain in the end. Lie indicated the probable, perhaps unavoid
able contentions between France and the United States, should
the latter not be ceded New Orleans and West Florida. He
pointed out that Louisiana, in spite of any restraining acts of

* They were told to use a maximum of $2,000,000 to secure the cession of the
two Floridas .

122 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the United States government, was certain to be overrun with
the contraband of the western settlers. Familiar as he was
with the internal needs of France, knowing her weakness and
her straits since the recent desperate war with Great Britain,
and realizing and even predicting the political designs and the
thirst for empire of Napoleon, he pointedly asked, "Has France
such a superfluity of capital or people as will justify the estab
lishment of new colonies?" He cited St. Domingo to illustrate
the- point that the American colonies were an enormous burden
to the European nations — the squanderers of gold and the causes
of war.
Active preparations for the French occupation were continued.
In August, 1802, it was publicly known in Paris that the. army
intended for New Orleans aggregated three thousand men. But
the differences of opinion over the limits of the territory embraced
in the term Louisiana, occasioned protracted conferences between
the diplomats of France and Spain and necessitated delay.. Mr.
Livingston said. "I find all the old French' maps mark the
river Perdido as the boundary between Florida and Louisiana.
The difference relative to the Floridas is not settled.
Spain insists that they are not ceded, and I have certain infor
mation that two days ago the minister of marine wrote to the
minister of foreign affairs that without the Floridas there could
be no Louisiana. . . . Yesterday I made several propsi?
tions to the minister on the subject of Louisiana. He told me
frankly that every offer was premature, and that the French
government had determined to take possession first. ... I
have every reason to believe that the Floridas are not included.
They will for the present at least remain in the hands of
Spain. There never was a government in which less could be
done by negotiation than here. There is no people, no legis
lature, no counsellors. One man is everything. He seldom
asks advice and never hears it unasked. His ministers are mere
clerks, and his legislature and counsellors parade officers.
Though the sense of every reflecting mian is against this wild
expedition no one dares to tell him so. Were it not for the
uneasiness it excites at home, it would give me none; for I am
persuaded that the whole will end in a relinquishment of the
country (West Florida) and transfer of the capital (New
Orleans) to the United States. Their islands call for much more
than France can ever furnish."*

* Diplomatic Correspondence.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 123
On October 28, Air. Livingston wrote that the army destined
for Louisiana had met with a check, but that he could not learn
the reason, unless it was the partial non-fulfillment by France
of the considerations mentioned in the treaty of cession. He
gave an interesting account of his interviews with Joseph Bona
parte, saying among other things : "He told me that he would
receive with pleasure any communication I could make; but
as he would not wish to appear to interfere with the minister,
he begged that my communication might be informal and
unsigned — exactly what I wished, because I should act with
less danger of committing myself and of course with more free
dom. He added, "You must not, however, suppose my power
to serve you greater than it actually is; my brother is his own
counsellor but we are good brothers; he hears mie with pleas
ure, and as I have access to him at all times, I have an oppor
tunity of turning his attention to a particular subject that might
otherwise be passed over.' I then asked him whether he (Napo
leon) had read my notes on Louisiana. He told me he had,
and that he had conversed upon the subject with the first con
sul who, he found, had read them with attention, and that his
brother had told him that he had nothing more at heart than
to be upon the best terms with the United States. ... I
told him that the only cause of difference that might arise between
us being the debt and Louisiana, I conceived that both might
be happily and easily removed by making an exchange with
Spain, returning them Louisiana, retaining New Orleans and
giving the latter and the Floridas for our debt. He asked me
whether we should prefer the Floridas to Louisiana.* I told
him that there was no comparison in their value, but that we
had no wish to extend our boundary across the Mississippi, or
give color to the doubts that had been entertained of the mod
eration of our views, and that all we sought was security and
not extension of territory. He replied that he believed any new
cession on the part of Spain would be extremely difficult, inas-
- much as Spain had parted with Trinidad and Louisiana with
great reluctance."
On November 11, Mr. Livingston wrote that the difficulty over
the consideration for Louisiana had been settled, and that orders

* In asking this question, Joseph Bonaparte could not have meant by "Louisi
ana" the island of New Orleans only. He unquestionably meant the province, or
all of the country west of the Mississippi. Attention is called to the fact that this
was the first direct mention from any source of the transfer of the entire province
to the United States. As Joseph reflected the views of Napoleon, it seems clear
that the latter had already considered the possible c ession of all of Louisiana to
the United States.

124 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
had been issued for the expedition destined for Louisiana to
embark — two demi-brigades. Lie did not know that the reason
for the detention of the French fleet was the refusal of the
king of Spain to ratify the cession of Louisiana to France. He
further stated that the French government "will say nothing
on the question of our limits, or our right under the Spanish
treaty. . . . When asked what they meant to do as to our
right of entrepot, General Victor (the commander of the expe
dition) spoke of the treaty (between the United States and Spain
in 1795) as waste paper. . . . The sum voted for this
service is two million and a half of francs; as to the rest they
expect to compel the people to support the expenses of the gov
ernment, which will be very heavy, as the number of the offi
cers is great, ... so that the first act of the new gov
ernment will be the oppression of their people and of our
commerce. I believe you may add to this an early attempt to
corrupt our western people, and an early attempt upon the
Natchez, which they consider as the rival of New Orleans." On
the same date, Mr. Livingston insisted on an answer to his notes
concerning Louisiana and was told by the French minister "that
he was expressly instructed by the First Consul to give me the
most positive assurances that the treaties we had entered into
with Spain or them relative to Louisiana should be strictly
observed." President Jefferson, in his message to congress
December 15, 1802, said: "The cession of the Spanish prov
ince of Louisiana to France, which took place in the course of
the later war, will, if carried into effect, make a change in the
aspect of our foreign relations, which will doubtless have just
weight in any deliberations of the legislature connected with that
subject."* The treaty retroceding Louisiana to France was signed Octo
ber 1, 1800; but it was not ratified by the king of Spain until
October 15, 1802. Immediately after the latter date, the French
armament was fully organized and equipped. On October 16,
1802, the interdiction was promulgated at New Orleans, and
two months later the inhabitants were forbidden to trade in any
manner whatever with the Americans on the Mississippi. There
was nothing left to the latter but the fruitless right of sailing
up and down the river. When the king of Spain finally rati
fied the cession treaty, he exacted, at the suggestion of Godoy,

* Messages and Papers of the Presidents.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 125
that Louisiana should never be alienated,* but should be returned
to Spain in case the king of Etruria lost the power granted
to him by Napoleon for Louisiana. The projects of the first
consul for the colonization of Louisiana were not matured until
late in the year 1801, when the peace with Great Britain, which
arrived some months before the treaty, presented the opportunity
of strengthening his domains, preparatory for another possible
war. He at first demanded the entire Gulf coast from St. Marys
on the Atlantic to the mouth of the Rio Grande, and would prob
ably have obtained it all had it not been for Godby, who was
known as the Prince of Peace.
Mr. Jefferson had favored the revolution in France, admired
the revolutionary leaders, particularly Napoleon, and accord
ingly did not readily suspect the designs of that conqueror upon
Louisiana .and Florida. His party had blamed the Federalists
for the troubles with France in 1797-98; and so amid the clamor
he chose a neutral course until the truth could no longer be
denied. He then informed Napoleon that if France persisted
in taking possession of Louisiana, it would cost her a war that
would sweep her navy from the oceans. * * This threat was well
sustained, as before stated, by what he wrote about the same
time to Air. Livingston at Paris : "From the moment that France
takes New Orleans, we must marry ourselves to the British fleet
and nation." The imminency of the danger to be apprehended
from the French occupation of Louisiana- was realized by both
parties in America, but each had a different remedy for the dis
order. The course pursued by Mr. Jefferson was eminently
wise and statesmanlike, as subsequent events abundantly proved.
The American ministers to France and Spain, under the stim
ulus of the excitement at home, redoubled their efforts to effect
a satisfactory settlement of the Louisiana problems. Mr. Liv
ingston continued, through the kindness of Joseph Bonaparte,
to reach the ears of Napoleon with his elaborate and convincing
memorials. In December, 1802, he suggested in one of these
memorials the cession of West Florida, the island of New
Orleans, and all of Louisiana above the mouth of the river Arkan
sas to the United States; but the first consul seemed as immov
able as ever in his views regarding Louisiana. Mr. Talleyrand
said of him that he was entete (obstinate) with the project.

* This was a secret agreement, the article concerning which seems never to hav
been made public.
*' Writings of Thomas Jefferson ; Ford.
fFor the full text of these memorials, see American State Tapers.

126 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
The French expedition to Louisiana was still delayed, upon what
grounds it was wholly a matter of conjecture. The interdic
tion at New Orleans was not removed, the shipments of the
people of the western country, many of whom were not apprised
of the interdiction, were practically confiscated, and again the
forcible possession of New Orleans and the enforcement of the
right to navigate the Mississippi were openly and seriously
threatened. In February, 1803, Mr. Livingston wrote that the
Louisiana expedition was "ice-bound." At this time Messrs.
Monroe and Pinckney were instructed, in case a cession should
be obtained from Spain, to secure "an enlargement of our right
of deposit at New Orleans, the establishment of suitable deposits
at the mouths of the rivers passing from the United States
through the Floridas, as well as the free navigation of those
rivers by citizens of the United States."
As before stated, Mr. Livingston was successful, as early as
December, 1802, in securing the attentive perusal of his memo
rials by Napoleon. This unofficial course was wholly agreeable
to Mr. Livingston and to the Bonapartes. It committed neither,
while informing both of the views of each other. If the august
first consul was so wedded to the project of possessing and
colonizing Louisiana, what did he find in the memorials of Mr.
Livingston to interest him? The American used every argu
ment in his power to dissuade him from taking possession of
the province. He showed that Great Britain was certain to
capture the country during the first war between them. He
stated emphatically that the United States would maintain at
any cost their rights stipulated in the treaty of 1795 to the navi
gation of the Mississippi and to a port of deposit on that stream.
Every feature of the situation was critically examined and
turned to the disadvantage of France, should she take posses
sion of Louisiana. He argued for the cession of all of Louisiana
above the mouth of the Arkansas to the United States, and
explained how such a tract would serve as a protection to the
French colonies below from1 British attacks down the Missis
sippi from Canada, and that the cession of this tract and West
Florida would gain for France perpetual freedom of commerce
on the Mississippi and its tributaries and the eternal friendship
of the United States.
If the project of holding Louisiana was really dear to the
heart of Napoleon, it follows that he naturally would want to
learn everything in favor, and everything against, such reten
tion. The arguments of Mr. Livingston against the retention

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION.

127

suggested to the alert mind of Napoleon the arguments in favor
of it. Mr. Livingston, in speaking of the subject, wrote on
February 18, 1803 : "I can have a personal conference with
him when I choose, having made arrangements for that pur
pose; but I defer it for two reasons: First, I have never yet
had any specific instructions from you how to act or what to
offer, and to meet merely to talk of the justice of our claims
would be only to say ungracious truths and render a future con
ference more difficult; and second, because it is one of the traits
of his character when he has once fully avowed a sentiment not
easily to change it. I have, therefore, thought it best to address
myself officially to the minister, and unofficially to the only man
supposed to have any sort of influence over him. I have accord
ingly put into his hands some notes containing plain truth mixed
with that -species of personal attention which I know to be most
pleasing."* In his memorials, Mr. Livingston further endeavored to show
that France would gain little advantage from the possession of
the colony; that a successful attack by Great Britain could read
ily be made; that the loss of Louisiana meant also the loss of
the French West Indies; that this conquest by Great Britain
would give her the monopoly of the Gulf commerce; and that
an alliance with the United States would avert such a misfor
tune. He then proposed the relinquishment to the United States
of New Orleans and West Florida as far as the river Perdido
and the territory lying west of the Mississippi and north of the
mouth of the Arkansas. For this cession, he intimated that
the United States were willing to pay a considerable sum of
money. He further said: "These propositions, with certain
accompaniments, were well received, and were some days under
the First Consul's consideration, when it was thought a better
bargain might be made on the spot (at Washington)." It seems
that the first consul thought that by sending General Berna
dotte to America to treat on the subject, he might obtain a bet
ter bargain than that offered by Mr. Livingston. In fact, the
latter, not having been authorized, was unable to name the spe
cific sum of money which the United States was willing to pay.
As Napoleon needed money badly, the statement of the situa
tion by Air. Livingston had produced the desired effect, and
the former was in a pliant and affable mood. It is not improb
able to suppose that had Mr. Livingston, at this time, been fully

* Diplomatic Correspondence.

128 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
equipped with authority, he might have succeeded in securing
from! France and Spam respectively, New Orleans, West Flor
ida, and ali of Louisiana north of the mjouth of the Arkansas.
He said, "Aly plan is much relished by the person through whom
it was proposed."*
He continued on the same date : "I told you that Parma
would be offered for the Floridas, and that General Bournonville
was sent to negotiate the business. It was never doubted a
moment here that it would be effected; this I learned from Tal
leyrand and the Spanish ambassador. They (intimated) that
the treaty would be signed the day the King returned from
Barcelona; and their information accorded with that which Lord
Whitworth had received. I learn now from1 the Spanish ambas
sador that the thing has met with some difficulty, as he says,
not because of any aversion in the court to make the cession,
but of some difference between the Prince of Peace (Godoy)
and General Bournonville. I believe, however,. that this is not
the sole cause; but that Spain begins to see that, in receiving
Parma, she will receive nothing; as it will be rendered subser
vient to another arrangement, as I hinted in my last.
France is fully impressed with the nullity of her possession in
Louisiana unless she has some port in the Gulf. ... I pre
sume that she will, ultimately, find some way to cut the gor-
dian knot; and I cannot but sincerely wish that you may have
availed yourselves of the pretence Spain has given you to take
possession. It will be best to treat with the subject in our hands ;
but, at all events, tell me what to do if they should go into the
hands of France." He also stated that the armament destined
for Louisiana would be detained in Holland until the last of
March, and therefore could not reach New Orleans until June,
and added, "a precious interval, of which you may think it pru
dent to avail yourselves." f
On this date,, February 28, Mr. Livingston wrote that he had
represented to the French minister of state the determination
of the United States never to suffer their rights on the Missis
sippi to be impeded; but the minister had answered that the
United States must consider the purchase of the country as out
of the question, intimating that a sale was beneath the dignity
of France.
When once Mr. Livingston had secured the attention of Bona-

* The person to whom he refers was undoubtedly Joseph Bonaparte.
t Diplomatic Correspondence.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 129
parte and his ministers, he argued that France, by ceding the
territory asked for, would not only pay the debt due the United
States, but would place the colony of Louisiana, should she con
clude to retain it, in a much better situation than it would other
wise be. He said : "The United States have at present but two
possible causes of difference with France — the debt due to her
citizens and the possession of Louisiana." If France could pos
sess Pensacola and the other ports to the east, she would com
mand the Gulf. If in addition she possessed the free naviga
tion of the Mississippi and the territory west of that river and
south of the mouth of the Arkansas, she would have as large
a colony as she would ever need for her surplus products and
population. "Louisiana within these limits can support a popu
lation of fifteen millions of people." The United States spe
cially desired West Florida in order to gain the mouths of the
rivers running through the southern part of their territory.
The situation of New Orleans was very inferior; a much bet
ter one for a large city was on the opposite side of the river
at Fort Leon ; the impending rupture between France and Great
Britain would give the latter the occasion and the opportunity
of attacking Louisiana; the possession of West Florida and of
Louisiana above the Arkansas by the United States would place
a barrier between Canada and Louisana and would take the edgs
off the British desire to wrest Louisana from France ; the silence
of the French government concerning the rights of the United
States to the Mississippi and to an entrepot at New Orleans
was causing intense uneasiness among the citizens of the United
States; the act of the intendant at New Orleans was not justi
fied by any reasonable construction of the treaty of 1795 ; "the
United States will rather hazard their very existence than suf
fer the Mississippi to be shut against theml ; when the United
States made their first treaty with Great Britain in 1783, their
ministers were instructed, anxious as all were for peace on almost
any terms, to sign no treaty without securing the free naviga
tion of the Mississippi."
In a letter dated February 27, 1803, Mr. Livingston made a
direct and open appeal to the first consul. He reviewed all
the existing differences between France and the United States,
and disclosed the fact that "a spirit of resentment has been mani
fested from one end of the Union to the other, and nothing but
the interposition of the Spanish minister, the disavowal of
the act (of interdiction) by the governor of New Orleans, and
the extreme solicitude of the United States to avoid everything
II— 9

130 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
that might have a tendency to interrupt the existing harmony
could have prevented an immediate recurrence to
armjs." He said that "if nothing should be done before the
season of American shipment of produce down the Mississippi
arrived, "the government will be compelled to follow the impulse
of the people. And added, "should the agents of France, who
are to take possession of the colony, continue the regulations,
in the face of the treaty, which they may find established by
the Spanish Intendant, a fatal blow will be struck at the future
peace and harmony in both countries. ... As the moments
are precious, and the United States will suffer extremely in
their commerce, if the officers c£ France, who are directed to
take possession, should not be explicitly instructed to respect
the right of navigation and depot claimed by the United States,
I must earnestly solicit some treaty, explanatory of the terms
on which France has received the cession of Louisiana from Spain
and recognizing the rights of the United States."
It was evident that, at this time, France was jealous of the
amity existing between Great Britain and the Atlantic states;
and that she entertained the belief that the possession of Louisi
ana and the control of the Mississippi were the keys by which
the attachment of the western people to France might be secured
and their separation from the states to the east might in the
end be effected. Could the western people be drawn from the
Union to the side and assistance of France, the trade of the Mis
sissippi and hence the commercial supremacy of the Gulf, the
great desideratum, would be the undoubted result of such a
coalition. It was, therefore, the policy of France to develop
this sentiment in the western people with the hope and possi
bly the expectation, that such a proposition, after her armament
had arrived in New Orleans and taken possession, would tempt
the western people to effect such a separation from the Atlantic
states and such a union with French Louisiana.
The arguments and the diplomacy of Mr. Livingston did not
blind Napoleon as to the true value of Louisiana to the grow
ing and ambitious French republic. He knew that the posses
sion of Louisiana and the Floridas, could they be held against
other nations generally and -Great Britain in particular, meant
the absolute control of the commerce of the Mississippi and of
the Gulf. Pamphlets were circulated in France declaring the
province of Louisiana to be almost a paradise.* The possibili-

*The arguments of Mr. Livingston against the value of Louisiana, could not
avp linrl miipli wpio-tit witti "Mnnnlpnti

have had much weight with Napoleon.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 131
ties of immense future advantage to France by holding the
Louisiana country were freely discussed throughout the repub
lic, and found no lack of expounders and supporters among that
imaginative people. But Napoleon realized that without the
Floridas, the navigation of the Mississippi could not be controlled
by France. For this reason the consular government struggled
to add them to the French possessions. Every inducement
within the power of France was held attractively before the eyes
of Spain ; and there can be no doubt that, in the end, their pos
session would have passed to the French republic. The order
of interdiction at New Orleans was made at the instigation of
France, and was intended to test the temper of the western
people. A large force of French troops at New Orleans, it was
thought, would prevent any serious movement to open forcibly
the Mississippi to western trade, would check the threatened
advance of Great Britain upon New Orleans, and would result
in great advantage to French commerce and prestige.
In all of this maneuvering for power, the wants, wishes and
welfare of Spain were apparently wholly disregarded by the
French republic. Louisiana, "agreeably to promise," was relin
quished upon the mere asking. There was no doubt in the mind
of Napoleon that the two Floridas would be secured by pur
chase. But the United States, unaware of the exact relations
which chained Spain to France, instructed Mr. Pinckney to pur
chase the two Floridas from the former. In accordance with
these instructions, Mr. Pinckney wrote as follows to the Spanish
minister of state :
"I had the honor yesterday, to state to your excellency the
anxiety of our government on the subject of possessing the ter
ritory on the east side of the Mississippi. The importance of
this acquisition to them, for the purpose of securing to the citi
zens of one half of the United States the certain means of
exporting their products has been so fully explained to your
excellency in my letter written in March last and in subsequent
conversations, that I need not at this time go again into the
subject. Referring your excellency to them, I have now to say
that the government of the United States, from many circum
stances, as well as from the conduct of the intendant, feel them
selves every day more convinced of the necessity of their hav
ing a permanent establishment on the Mississippi, convenient
for the purposes of navigation and belonging solely to them.
To obtain this they have authorized me to say that, should his
Majesty be now inclined to sell to the United States his pos-

132 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
sessions on the east side of the Mississippi, or between that and
the river Mobile, agreeably to the propositions enclosed, the
United States will make to his Majesty, and I do now in their
namje make, the important offer of guarantying to him and his
successors his dominions beyond the Mississippi. It is with his
Majesty and his ministers to consider, for the reasons I had
the honor to state in our conversation of the last evening, the
immense importance of this offer to the Spanish crown, and to
reflect how far it may be in the power of any other nation to
make an offer so truly valuable and precious as this is to Spain —
one that the United States would never have made, but from
a conviction of the indispensable necessity of their possessing a
suitable establishment on this river and which this territory can
alone furnish."
The propositions to which he referred in this communication
were as follows:
"i. The United States will purchase the possessions of his
Catholic Majesty on the east side of the river Mississippi, for
which they will pay  dollars.*
"2. They will purchase these possessions, for which they will
pay  dollars; and, moreover, guaranty to his Majesty and
his successors his possessions beyond the Mississippi.
"3. They will purchase the country between the rivers Mis
sissippi and Mobile, belonging to his Majesty, and, also, places
of deposite near the mouths of the other rivers passing from
their territory into that of his Catholic Majesty, for which they
will pay  dollars, or enter into other obligations, which may
be thought equivalent to the acquirement.
"4. If none of these propositions can be acceded to, they will
then purchase certain tracts of country on the banks of the Mis
sissippi and the other rivers passing from their territory into
that of his Catholic Majesty, for which they will pay 
dollars, or enter into other obligations which may be thought
equivalent to the acquirement."!
It is not improbable that, had not the government of France
at that very date and for many years before been making every
effort to secure the cession of the Floridas and been employ
ing much stronger inducements and making much more allur
ing offers, the king of Spain would have been pleased to grant
to the United States, in accordance with this plea, a sufficient

* This sum was a maximum of $10,000,000.
t American State Papers.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 133
concession to have satisfied them. While it was known to the
American minister that France desired the Floridas, he knew
little of the intense pressure directed at the court of Spain by
the first consul and designed to accomplish that object. But
the offer of France was so much better than that of the United
States, and the enmity of France was so much more to be dreaded
by Spain, that the propositions of Mr. Pinckney, indefinite as
they necessarily had to be, possessed no special nor superior
attractions and were accordingly rejected. The following was
the reply of Don Pedro Cervallos, secretary of state of Spain,
April 7, 1802, to the above propositions of Mr. Pinckney :
"Sir: — rl have communicated to his Majesty the propositions
which your excellency made in the name of your government,
in your official letter of the 24th of March last, respecting the
cession of the two Floridas to the United States of America,
by sale. His Majesty having been made well acquainted with
everything advanced by your excellency in support of that idea,
has commanded me to inform you, in reply, that his Majesty
rejoices in every opportunity of strengthening the bonds of
friendship with the United States of America, but that the sub
ject in question being one of the utmost weight and importance,
merits great circumspection before it can be determined. With
regard to the request made by you in the same official letter
that a mercantile agent of the United States should be permitted
to reside at New Orleans, his Majesty does not accede to it,
as it is prohibited by our laws of the Indies; and from the just
consideration that, by making one example of that kind, the door
would be opened for like demands on the part of other nations."*
This letter was regarded by Mr. Pinckney as a diplomatic
rejection of his propositions; but as a matter of fact it may
not have been so intended by the government of Spain. It seems
more like a postponement of the American propositions. Spain
was between two fires — those of France and the United States.
The possession of Louisiana by France meant the terminaton
in that province of her colonial policy of exclusion, and hence
the idea of retaining the Floridas lost much of its glitter. Should
she for any reason not cede them to France, there was noth
ing to prevent her from transferring them to the United States
for a satisfactory consideration. She therefore temporized with
the American propositions until the demands of France had been
disposed of.

* Diplomatic Correspondence.

134 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
In a communication dated March 2, 1803, the American sec
retary of state submitted a plan to the special envoys of the
United States at Paris, Messrs. Livingston and Monroe, for the
adjustment of the difficulties between the two countries. The
following was the plan in full:*
"Article I. France cedes to the United States forever the ter
ritory east of the river Mississippi, comprehending the two Flor
idas, the island of New Orleans, and the islands lying to the
north and east of that channel of the said river which is com
monly called the South Pass, together with all. such other islands
as appertain to either West or East Florida; France reserving
to herself all her territory on the west side of the Mississippi.
"Article II. The boundary between the territory ceded and
reserved by France, shall be a continuation of that already defined
above the thirty-first degree of north latitude, viz: the middle
of the channel or bed of the river through the said South Pass
to the sea. The navigation of the river Mississippi in its whole
breadth from its source to the ocean, and in all its passages to
and from the same shall be equally free and common to citizens
of the United States and of the French republic.
"Article III. The vessels and citizens of the French repub
lic may exercise commerce to and at such places on their respect
ive shores below the said thirty-first degree of north latitude
as may be allowed for that use by the parties to their respective
citizens and vessels. And it is agreed that no other nation
shall be allowed to exercise commerce to or at the same or
any other place on either shore below the said thirty-first degree
of latitude. For the term of ten years, to be computed from
the exchange of the ratifications hereof, the citizens, vessels and
merchandise of the United States and of France shall be sub
ject to no other duties on their respective shores below the said
thirty-first degree of latitude, than are imposed on their own
citizens, vessels, and merchandises. No duty whatever shall,
after the expiration of ten years, be laid 'on articles the growth
or manufacture of the United States, or of the ceded territory,
exported through the Mississippi in French vessels; so long as
such articles so exported in vessels of the United States shall
be exempt from duty; nor shall French vessels exporting such
articles even afterward be subject to pay a higher duty than
vessels of the United States.
"Article IV. The citizens of France may, for the term of ten

?American State Papers.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 135
years, deposit their effects at New Orleans and at such other
places on the ceded shore of the Mississippi, as are allowed for
the commerce of the United States, without paying any other
duty than a fair price for the hire of stores.
"Article V. In the ports and commerce of West and East
Florida, France shall never be on a worse footing that the most
favored nation ; and for the term of ten years her vessels and
merchandise shall be subject therein to no higher duties than
are paid by those of the United States. Articles of the growth
or manufacture of the United States and of the ceded territory,
exported in French vessels from any port in the West or East
Florida, shall be exempt from duty as long as vessels of the
United States shall enjoy this exemption.
"Article VI. The United States, in consideration of the ces
sion of territory made by this treaty, shall pay to France 
millions of livres tournois, in the manner following, viz : They
shall pay  millions of livres tournois immediately on the
exchange of the ratifications hereof; they shall assume in such
order of priority as the Government of the United States may
approve the payment of claims which have been or may be
acknowledged- by the French republic to be due to American citi
zens, or so much thereof as, with the payment to be made on the
exchange of ratifications, will not exceed the sum of  ; and
in case a balance should remain due after such payment and
assumption, the same shall be paid at the end of one year from the
final liquidation of the claim hereby assumed, which shall be pay
able in three equal annual payments, the first of which is to take
place one year after the exchange of ratifications, or they shall
bear interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the dates
of such intended payments until they shall be discharged. All the
above mentioned payments shall be made at the treasury of the
United States and at the rate of one dollar and ten cents for every
six livres tournois.
"Article VII. To incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby
ceded territory with the citizens of the United States on an equal
footing, being a provision which cannot now be made, it is to
be expected, from the character and policy of the United States,
that such incorporation will take place without unnecessary delay.
In the meantime they shall be secure in their persons and prop
erty and in the free enjoyment of their religion."
Subjoined to this proposition were elaborate explanatory notes,
presenting the reason for every provision from the standpoint
of the United States. Much was left to the judgment and

136 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
discretion of the envoys. An interesting feature was the com
parative estimate placed upon the value of different portions of
the territory. The two Floridas were estimated at one-fourth
the value of the whole island of New Orleans; and East Flor
ida at one-half the value of West Florida. The envoys were
instructed to evade, if possible, any and every stipulation con
cerning guaranties of territory to France. If the cession of the
Floridas could not be obtained, they were instructed to secure,
in any event, the rights of deposit and of navigation. _ They
were also required' to effect some arrangement that would in
future obviate a repetition of such an unauthorized act as the
interdiction of the deposits at New Orleans by a subordinate
official. On February 19, 1803, M. Talleyrand returned the following
reply to the many memorials of Mr. Livingston regarding
Louisiana. The pretended transfer of the whole subject to the
United States was evidently a maneuver on the part of France
to postpone a definite answer as long as possible: "The First
Consul, always appreciating the motives which have induced
you to insist on an explanation of the new relations which ought
to exist between the two republics, has charged me to inform
you that, aware of the solicitude, perhaps premature, but in
reality natural and plausible, which the United States have
manifested in this discussion, has come to the determination to
send immediately to the United States a minister plenipotentiary,
who will communicate on every point the information necessary
to a final decision."* One reason why France desired delay
was disclosed in Mr. Livingston's note of March 12, when
he said : "With respect to a negotiation for Louisiana,- I think
nothing will be effected here. I have done everything I can
through the Spanish ambassador to obstruct the bargain for the
Floridas, and I have great hope that it will not be soon con
cluded. The ambassador tells me that the Consul often com
plains to him of the delay that business meets with; and while
Spain keeps the Floridas, Louisiana will be considered 'here as
an object of little moment, as they are absolutely without ports
on the Gulf. . . . Mr. Madison has never told me whether
he has received two little essays, calculated the one to raise our
importance in the views of this government as a naval power
and the other to disgust them with Louisiana, preparatory to
our future negotiations. They were both read with consider-

* Diplomatic Correspondence.

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION.

137

able attention by the First Consul, having had them translated
for that purpose." It thus was known to France that the pos
session of Louisiana without the Floridas would give them a
power barren of the immense results they confidently and rightly
conjectured would follow their additional occupancy of the Flor
idas. This was the principal reason why they wished to delay
giving a definite answer to the United States ; and in the mean
time they crowded forward their negotiations with Spain for
the Floridas.
But the French subterfuge to effect delay did not disconcert
nor deceive Mr. Livingston, who continued his notes and memo
rials to the French minister and the first eonsul. He said
on March 18: "You will see that, on the subject of New
Orleans, the answer to my letter is very unsatisfactory. I at
first intended to let the matter rest till Mr. Monroe arrived ; but
on reflection I dreaded the consequences of delay if France
should take possession and continue the policy of Spain; and
as the moment was critical and the time of Mr. Monroe's arrival
uncertain, I sent in the enclosed note, and am doing all that I
can to get a speedy and favora-ble answer." The "enclosed note"
referred to was the strongest and severest ever sent in by Mr.
Livingston. He had grown tired of the evasions and procras
tinations, and made up his mind to press matters to a finality,
if possible, before the arrival of Mr. Monroe. He said:*
"The First Consul has done me the honor through you to
inform me that he proposes to send a minister to the United
States, to acquire such information as he may deem necessary
previous to his taking . any measures relative to the situation
in which the acquisition of Louisiana will place France with
respect to the United States. If, sir, the question related to the
formation of a new treaty, I should find no objection to this
measure. On the contrary, I should readily acquiesce in it, as
that which would be best calculated to render the treaty mutually
advantageous. But, sir, it is not a new treaty for which we
now press, (though one mutually advantageous might be made,)
but the recognition of an old one, by which the United States
have acquired rights that no change in the circumstances of
the country obliges them to relinquish, and which they never
will relinquish but with their political existence. By their
treaty with Spain their right to the navigation of the Missis
sippi is recognized and a right of depot granted with a provis-

* American State Papers.

138 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES. .
ion on the part of the King of Spain to revoke this right if
within three years he found it prejudicial to his interests, in
which case he is to assign another equivalent establishment.
The King of Spain has never revoked that right; but after hav
ing made the experiment of its effects upon his interests - for
three years he has continued it. The United States have, by
this continuance, acquired a permanent and irrevocable right
to a depot at New Orleans ; nor can that right now be called
in question, either by Spain or 'by any other nation to whom
she may transfer her title. Even the assignment of another
equivalent establishment cannot at this day be forced upon the
United States without their consent. The time allowed to Spain
has passed, and she has preferred to have the depot at New
Orleans to placing it elsewhere; and I will venture to say that
in so doing she has acted wisely. For New Orleans derives its
whole value from its being the market for American produce
and their principal port of entry; and if this consideration was
important to Spain it is infinitely more so to France, the produce
of whose agriculture and manufactures will find a ready exchange
for the raw material of the United States. Under these cir
cumstances, at the very moment that Spain is about to relinquish
the possession of that country to France, she violates her treaty
without any apparent interest, and leaves the country with a
stain upon her character."
This sententious summary was followed by a vivid picture of
the situation of the western people, with the alternative before
them of having their crops rot on their hands or of having them
confiscated at New Orleans. The fact was forcibly called to
the attention of France that it was with the greatest difficulty
that the western people had been restrained by the government
of the United States from forcibly maintaining their rights on
'the Mississippi. The minister ended with a powerful appeal to
the first consul for an immediate admission of the rights of
the United States on the Mississippi as stipulated in the treaty
of 1795. According to Mr. Livingston, the appointment of Mr.
Alonroe as a special envoy was employed by France as a pre
text to delay still longer a definite answer to his notes. He
said on March 24, "The French minister told me that an answer
was prepared (to Mr. Livingston's notes), and that everything
should be arranged; and I have no doubt the answer contained all
those assurances which I have been so long soliciting. Unfortu
nately, dispatches arrived at that moment from Mr. Pichon,
informing them that the appointment of Mr. Monroe had tran-

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 139
quilized everything. Conceiving then that they might safely
wait his arrival, they determined to see whether the storm would
not blow over, in which case they will treat to more advantage.
They accordingly substituted for the first note, which as the min
ister told me arranged everything, the enclosed note which con
tains nothing." He added on the same date, "Florida is not yet
ceded, nor as I hope very likely to be so. The armament in Hol
land, designed for Louisiana, is stopped for the present in conse
quence of the state of things here."
Late in March and early in April Mr. Livingston sent many
strong notes, essays and letters to M. Talleyrand, even at the risk
of becoming importunate, urging the consideration and settlement
of the Louisiana questions ; and seemed to think, in his letter dated
April 11, that he had gained ground with all except the first
consul. As a matter of fact, he had, on the contrary, yet
unknown to himself, gained ground with the first consul, but not
with the French statesmen generally. He wrote, "I endeavored to
convince the Government that the United States would avail them
selves of the breach of the treaty (of 1795) to possess themselves
of New Orleans and the Floridas; that Great Britain would
never suffer Spain to grant the Floridas to France, even were she
so disposed, but would immediately seize upon them as soon as
the transfer was made; that, without the Floridas, Louisiana
would be indefensible, as it possesses not one port even for
frigates ; and I showed the effect of suffering that important coun
try to fall into the hands of the British, both as it affected our
country and the naval force of all Europe. These reasons, with
the probability of war (between France and Great Britain),
have had, I trust, the desired effect."*
During the last half of March and the first half of April, 1803,
both France and Great Britain continued active preparations for
war, and at the same time their respective ministers, in perfunc
tory communications, endeavored to stay the approaching storm.
The means of attack and defense were closely studied, and the
weaknesses of each were, so far as possible, strengthened or wholly
discarded. It was manifest to Bonaparte that the unquestionable
superiority of the English navy placed all of the French colonial
possessions in the severest jeopardy and rendered their loss to
France an almost certain result of the war. It was clear that to
hold Louisiana against the prowess of the English arms, meant
the despatch to New Orleans of a much larger armament than
was originally intended and a corresponding weakening of the

* American State Papers.

140 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
French continental battalions. While the relinquishment of
Louisiana was to be sincerely regretted, no other reasonable course
seemed open to France. If the province were returned to Spain,
little or no ready money would be realized. Its retention by
France meant its almost certain reduction and conquest .by Great
Britain. There was no other course: It must be sold at once
to the United States for as high a price as possible. This was
unquestionably the conclusion of Bonaparte and the logic of the
intricate and perilous situation. It is reasonable to conclude
therefore, that, if the prospect of inevitable war with England
was the cause of Bonaparte's decision to sell Louisiana to the
United States, the arguments and importunities of Mr. Livingston
disclosed the opportunity of disposing of it, before it was too late,
to the pecuniary advantage of France at a time when money was
of the first importance and delay was extremely dangerous.
It was seen by Bonaparte that when the war should once begin,
the United States, unless their claims under the treaty of 1795
were acknowledged by, France, would no doubt take advantage of
the opportunity to occupy New Orleans and the Floridas. The
western people, in fact, were on the point of taking such a course
at that moment regardless of the probable European war or the
protests of their government. Many of them thought that the
occupancy by France meant the extinguishment of their rights on
the Mississippi, and would be only too glad of the chance to take
the country at small cost while France was engaged elsewhere.
Unless the claims of the United States were speedily acknowl
edged, war with Great Britain meant war also with the United
States, and therefore the certain loss of Louisiana, probably to
the latter. But the acknowledgment of the claims of the United
States, and the failure to secure the Floridas from Spain, would
render the possession of Louisiana by France barren of the
important and immensely valuable results expected in the future.
Spain would not willingly surrender the Floridas; the United
States would in any event fight for their rights of navigation and
deposit. The only reasonable course left to France therefore was
to sell Louisiana to the United States.
But Bonaparte did not sell Louisiana until after all hope of
peace with Great Britain had been abandoned. It is doubtful
whether he came to the undeviating conclusion to sell it much
before the date of actual sale. Prizing it as he- did and build
ing high and. gilded hopes on it for the future, he delayed enter
taining the thought of sale until circumstances indicated the
wisdom, if not the necessity, of its immediate relinquishment. He

THE TREATY OF RETROCESSION. 141
then met with a storm of protest from nearly all around him,
even from his two brothers, Joseph and Lucien. But when once
his course was clear and his mind made up, he brooked no inter
ference and listened patiently to no remonstrance even from his
brothers. It is idle to invest him, as some writers do, with super
natural qualities. He was an ambitious, selfish, egotistical, dom
inant, alert and brilliant man, broad of comprehension, unerring
in the power to blend forces for the accomplishment of an object,
and endowed with a will and personality that commanded obedi
ence, if not homage. He made up his mind only upon strong
evidences, and tenaciously clung to his conclusions, knowing their
accuracy and their cost in mental acumen. But when a conclu
sion was proved to be wrong, or for any sufficient reason unten
able, the mental penetration that enabled him to see his error, also
pointed out to his judgment the means for its correction. It was
thus that, although Louisiana was dear to his heart, he made up
his mind to abandon it at the moment he saw the unwisdom of its
retention. That moment arrived when he abandoned the last
hope of peace. The transfer was made so speedily that the
American envoys were still dazed and astonished for days after
the treaty was signed. It was Napoleon's way — a profound yet
impetuous decisiveness that won him all his battles and his conse
quent imperishable fame.

142 THE PROVINCE 'AND THE STATES.

CHAPTER IV

The Interdiction of the Deposits, 1802

AFTER the danger of war with Spain in 1797 had blown over,
and the Spanish troops had evacuated Chickasaw Bluffs,
Walnut Hills and Natchez, and the survey of the thirty-first
parallel had settled all trouble in that quarter, the intercourse
between the French and Spanish inhabitant of Louisiana and West
Florida and the Americans from "up the river" grew pleasant,
great in extent and mutually profitable. The liberal stipulations
contained in the treaty of 1795, granting the United States a place
of deposit for produce and goods in New Orleans, were faithfully
carried out by the Spanish authorities. Under this desirable
order of affairs, the trade of New Orleans grew to an enormous
extent considering the sparcity of inhabitants, and the Ohio valley
quadrupled in population and prosperity. Flour, iron products,
grain, pork, beef, tobacco, cotton, etc., found temporary lodgment
in New Orleans before being sent to every quarter of the globe.
The enterprising Anglo-Saxon from "up the river" so conducted
his commercial transactions that he soon managed practically to
command the entire trade of that already famous port. What he
of the river did not succeed in securing, was largely monopolized
by the American vessels passing between New Orleans and the
cities of the Atlantic coast — Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York,
Boston, etc.
But this result was an innovation in the immemorial policy of
colonial exclusion of the Spanish government, and almost com
pletely obliterated certain revenues which were sacred to the
Spanish sovereign, by flooding all of Louisiana with the contra
band (forbidden) of the United States. This finality had been
anticipated and dreaded by the Spanish ministry. The proxim
ity of the Western states to Louisiana, the cheapness with which

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 143
the goods sent down the river could be produced, and the case
with which they could be placed in the hands of the Spanish con
sumer, enabled the industrious Americans to undersell Spain
throughout the whole of Louisiana. The people readily bought
from the American flatboats rather than from the Spanish vessels,
because the prices of the former for the same articles were lower
and usually the products were fresher and better. The Spanish
duty on contraband was easily evaded by smuggling; and on
staple articles, there being no duty, the Spanish producers were
again undersold, owing mainly to the astonishing fertility of the
American soil, and hence to the immense crops that were raised in
the Ohio valley. The result was to place in the pockets of the
Americans the revenues which had been dedicated from time
immemorial to the Spanish crown. Complaints in regard to this
state of things were made as early as 1798, and continued to
grow in volume and severity during the next two years.
In the spring of 1801 it became known in New Orleans that
Louisiana had been retroceded to France, after which the com
plaints largely ceased, because the Spanish crown demands for
revenues were no longer made or heard. Early in 1802 it became
known in New Orleans that French officials and troops were soon
to be sent to Louisiana to take formal possession of the posts,
properties and revenues. The reasons for hostility to the Amer
ican trade were thus removed by the transfer of ownership,
because the colonial policies of France and Spain were in many
respects essentially unlike. It was at once realized that the com
mercial policy of France would be a dominant factor in Louisiana
affairs, because France at this time was extremely pressed for
ready money and the resumption of war with England was a
probability of the near future. It was realized that the authority
of Spain over Louisiana had passed to the republic of France,
and that the citizens in that province would be required to con
tribute their share to the advancement of the French standard
under the guidance of the Great Napoleon. While, therefore,
Spanish authority in New Orleans had not yet been formally
relinquished to France, the sovereignty of the latter over the'future
destiny of the province was distinctly recognized and in many
things observed. Many of the citizens were French — probably
as many as were Spanish. Under the benign and righteous influ
ence of the "Family Compact" they had learned to dwell together
in unity; but the French had not forgotten Governor O'Reilly nor
the joys of living under the lilies of France. Such were ready to

I44 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
welcome the old glory of French military trappings, splendor and
heroics. -The scheme of Napoleon for colonizing Louisiana kindled the
liveliest sentiments of pleasure and pride in the breasts of the
French residents. The New France that was thus to be erected
west of the Mississippi, with New Orleans for its capital and
metropolis, was a theme to conjure by; and dreams of the grand
eur to be were not lacking among the romantic and emotional
inhabitants. The belief was freely and openly confessed at New
Orleans in 1801 and i8o2,~that the citizens of the western portion
of the United States, because it would be made immensely to their
advantage to do so, would voluntarily separate fromi the Atlantic
states and apply for admission to the new republic or empire
that was to be erected over the ashes of wigwams and the graves
of their savage possessors. Already the authority exercised in
the name of Spain was largely perfunctory ; and the star of Napo
leon, even in New Orleans in 1802, attained a purity and brilliancy
which it never acquired amid the intrigues and jealousies of the
Parisian consulate. The distance that lent enchantment to the
view hid from ear and eye the dreadful din and bloody pictures
of the European battlefields. Here the rhapsodical features shone
out like a" wiil-of-the^-wisp, but the fitful light brought peace and
content. French influences were already at work in Louisiana. The
name of Napoleon was on every tongue and every breeze. It was
well known at New Orleans that the government of the United
States was hostile to the French occupancy of the province, pri
marily because the ambition of Napoleon to found a new and
dazzling empire or republic in Louisiana indicated if it did not
portend the threatened division of the Union. President Jefferson
wrote to Paris that the possession of Louisiana by France meant
probable war between that country and the United States; in
which case Great Britain and the latter would join forces on land
and sea. To what extent this prediction would prove true became
a matter of much solicitude to Napoleon, who read with intense
interest the elaborate communications of Mr. Livingston, describ
ing the views of the United States, particularly those of the west-
em inhabitants, in regard to the acquisition of Louisiana by the
French republic. From Mr. Livingston it was learned by Napo
leon that the navigation of the Mississippi and the right of deposit
at New Orleans or some other suitable place, were prized so highly
by the western people and were so necessary to their prosperity,

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS.

i4S

that a war of extinction would be waged by them before they
would consent to their relinquishment. With this view of the
case, it is surely not necessary to state that Napoleon saw his
opportunity to strengthen wonderfully his American colonial
domain. He saw that above all things, should the New France
which he had projected be established, the acquisition of the
Western states was the most to be desired; because it meant the
absolute and exclusive domination of the Mississippi river by
France, the perfection of the Napoleonic colonial scheme in Amer
ica, and the certain removal of all future entanglements with the
United States. What, then, was the first thing that should be
done ? Plainly to ascertain the temper and sentiments of the peo
ple living between the Alleghany mountains and the Mississippi
river. How could that be accomplished? By obstructing their
commercial privileges at New Orleans, as had been done previ
ously by Spain prior to the treaty of 1795. And fortunately for
Napoleon, inasmuch as the province of Louisiana, though owned
by France, had not yet been delivered to her, the deposits of the
western people in New Orleans could be stopped at the instigation
of the Grench government and the wrath of the Americans be
diverted to Spain, which yet held outward possession. While it
is not certain that the French government issued such an order to
the intendant at New Orleans, the preponderance of evidence
implies that the interdiction of the deposits in October, 1802, was
occasioned by the indirect demand of some person high in author
ity in France. But however occasioned, the intendant issued the
following writ of interdiction:*
"As long as it was necessary to tolerate the commerce of neu
trals which is now abolished, it would have been prejudicial to the
province, had the Intendant, in compliance with his duty, pre
vented the deposit in this city, of the property of the Americans,
granted to them by the twenty-second article of the treay of
friendship, limits and navigation, of the 27th of October, 1795,
during the limited term of three years. With the publication of
the ratification of the treaty of Amiens, and the re-establishment
of the communication between the English and Spanish subjects,
that inconvenience has ceased. Considering that the twenty-
second article of the said treaty takes from me the power of con
tinuing the toleration which necessity required; since after the
fulfillment of the said term, this ministry can no longer consent to
* American State Papers.
II— IO

146 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
it without an express order of the King: therefore, and without
prejudice to the exportation of what has been admitted in proper
time, I order, that from this date, the privilege which the Amer
icans had of importing and depositing their merchandise and
effects in this capital, shall be interdicted : and, that the foregoing
may be publicly known, and that nobody may allege ignorance, I
order it to be published in the usual places, copies to be posted
up in the public sitioes; and that the necessary notice be given of
it to the officers of finance, the administrator of rents, and other-
wise,_as may be necessary. The present being given under my
hand, and countersigned by the underwritten notary of finance
pro tempore, in the office of Intendency of New Orleans, October
16, 1802. "Juan Ventura Morales,
"By order of the Intendant : "Pedro Pedesceaux."
When the news of the interdiction at New Orleans reached Mr.
Pinckney at Madrid, he protested vigorously, and was answered
that the Spanish government had issued no such order. He there
upon wrote to the Spanish minister of state the following letter :
"It is with particular pleasure I received from Your Excellency
the information that this order of the Intendant had been issued
by him without the knowledge of His Majesty or his Government,
and that orders should be immediately sent to New Orleans, to
the Intendant and proper authorities there, to regulate the com
merce and intercourse of the citizens of the United States in that
port by the treaty of 1795, and to place the same on the footing
it had been from the foundation of that treaty to the issuing of
the Intendant's order."
The issuance of the interdiction caused great excitement at all
the American settlements on the Mississippi and its branches to
their uttermost ramifications. W. C. C. Claiborne, governor
of Mississippi territory, in a letter dated October 28, 1802, asked
Manual de Salcedo, governor of the province of Louisiana,
"whether, since the deposit at New Orleans had been interdicted.
'an equivalent establishment' had been assigned at another place
on the Mississippi, according to treaty, for the deposit of American
merchandise and effects." Governor Garrard of Kentucky in a
letter to President Jefferson said. "The citizens of this state are
very much alarmed and agitated, as this measure of the Spanish
government will, (if not altered) at one blow, cut up the present
and future prosperity of their best interests by the roots." Mr.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS.

H7

Aladison wrote to Air. Pinckney on November 27, that "this pro
ceeding is so direct and palpable a violation of the treaty of 1795
that in candor it is to be imputed rather to the Intendant solely
than to instructions of his Government. The Spanish minister
takes pains to impress this belief. . . . But from whatever
source the measure may have proceeded, the President expects
that the Spanish Government will neither lose a moment in coun
termanding it, nor hesitate to repair every damage which may
result from it. You are aware of the sensibility of our western
citizens to such an occurrence. This sensibility is justified by
the interest they have at stake. The Alississippi is to them every
thing."* The legislature of Kentucky passed a memorial to con
gress, complaining of the act of the Spanish authorities. Meet
ings of indignant citizens were held at many places throughout
the west to protest against the act and ask for the removal of the
interdiction. The whole Alississippi situation, so far as it was known at that
date, was laid bare in congress in February, 1803, by a protracted
discussion which continued through several days. In the senate
the discussion was occasioned by resolutions introduced by Mr.
Ross of Pennsylvania. He took a strong position which meant
the forcible occupation of New Orleans and the maintenance of
American rights with militia and the regular army. Among
other things he said :f
"To the free navigation of that river we had an undoubted
right from nature, and from the position of our western country.
This right and the right of deposit in the Island of New Orleans
had been solemnly acknowledged and fixed by treaty in 1795.
That treaty had been in actual operation and execution for many
years ; and now without any pretense of abuse or violation on our
part, the officers of the Spanish Government deny the right, refuse
the place of deposit, and add the most offensive of all insults, by
forbidding us from landing on any part of their territory and shut
ting us out as a common nuisance. By whom has this outrage
been offered? By those who have constantly acknowledged our
right, and now tell us that they are no longer owners of the coun
try. They have given it away, and because they have no longer
a right themselves, therefore they turn us out who have an
undoubted right. Such an insult, such unprovoked malignity of
conduct, no nation but this would affect to mistake. And yet we
* American State Papers.
t Annals of Congress.

148 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
do not only hesitate as to the course which interest and honor call
us to pursue, but we bear it with patience, tameness and apparent
unconcern. . . . The calamity lights upon all those who live
upon the western waters — a half million cut off from market."
Continuing, he said, "Look at the memorial from the legislature
of the Mississippi territory now on your table :* that speaks a lan
guage and displays a spirit not to be mistaken. Their lives and
fortunes are pledged to support you. The same may with equal
truth be asserted of Kentucky, Tennessee and the western people
of Virginia and Pennsylvania. Is this a spirit to be repressed or
put asleep by negotiation ? If you suffer it to be extinguished,
can you recall it in the hour of distress when you want it? .. .
Suppose they (the western people) do go and do chase away
the present oppressors and in the end are overpowered and
defeated by a stronger foe than the present feeble possessors.
They will never return to you, for you cannot protect them.
They will make the best compromise they can with the Power
commanding the mouth of the river, who in effect has thereby the
command of their fortunes. Will such a bargain be of light or
trivial moment to the Atlantic States ? Bonaparte will then say to
you, my French West India colonies and those of my allies can be
supplied from my colony of Louisiana with flour, pork, beef, lum
ber and any other necessary. These articles can be carried by my
own ships, navigated by my own sailors. If you on the Atlantic
coast wish to trade with my colonies in those articles, you must
pay fifteen or twenty per cent of an impost. We want no further
supplies from you, and revenue to France must be the condition
of all future intercourse. What will you say to this ? It will be
vain to address your western brethren, and complain your com
merce is ruined, your revenue dwindles, and your condition is
desperate. They will reply that you came not to their assistance
when you might have saved them."
Having been interrupted in the course of his remarks,* He
resumed two days later and, among other things, said, "I have
urged the importance of our rights in the navigation of the Mis
sissippi, founded in nature and acknowledged by compact. This
is the great and only highway of commerce from the western
country to the ocean. The Spaniards after a long execution of
this treaty, have now flagrantly violated it and shut us out from
all intercourse and from the right of deposit : they have plundered

*This was a protest against the interdiction, and an intimation that Mississippi
territory was ready to assist in its abrogation.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS.

149

our citizens upon the ocean : carried our vessels into their ports
and condemned them without the semblance of a trial. Our sea
men have been cast into prison and our merchants ruined. Thus
assailed upon the ocean and upon the land by a long course of
oppression and hostility without provocation and without apology,
I know of but one course we can take which promises complete
redress of our wrongs. Experience has proved that the compact
is no security ; the Spaniards either cannot or will not observe
their treaty. If they are under the direction of a stronger Power
(France was referred to),* who will not permit them to adhere to
their stipulations, or if they of their own accord inflict these indig
nities under a belief that we dare not resent them, it is equally
incumbent upon us to act without farther delay. The aggressors
are heaping indignity upon you at your own door, at the very bor
ders of your territory, and tell you at the same time they have no
right to the country from whence they exclude you. If they act
thus without right, why not enforce yours by taking possession?
Will you submit to be taken by the neck and kicked out without
a struggle? Is there not spirit enough in the country to repel
and punish such unheard-of insolence? Is not the magnitude of
the interest at stake such as to warrant the most vigorous and
decisive course which can express public indignation? Go then,
take the guardianship of our rights upon yourselves, trust it no
longer to those who have so grossly abused the power they have
had over it; reinstate yourselves in the possession of that which
has been wrested from you and withheld by faithless men, who
confess themselves no longer the owners of the country over which
they are exercising these acts of injustice and outrage. Negotia
tion may perhaps, be wise; but this is the effectual measure to
support it. When it is seen that you have determined to support
your just demands with force, that you have already taken into
your hands an ample pledge for future security and good behavior,
your ambassador will be respected and attended to. But what
weight will his remonstrance have in any country of Europe,
when they hear of no military preparations to vindicate your pre
tensions, when they learn that you have been chased out of a pos
session confessedly your right, that you have been insultingly told,
Begone, you shall not buy, you shall not sell, you are such a nui
sance we will have no intercourse with you? ... It may be
said that the Executive is pursuing another and very different
course. The Executive will certainly pursue the course desig-
* This reference to France should be particularly noted.

150 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
nated by the legislature. To the congress has been confided the
power of deciding what shall be done in all cases of hostility by
foreign Powers. There can be no doubt that by the law of nature
and nations we are clearly authorized to employ force for our
redress in such a case as this; that we have a just right to take
such measures as will prevent a repetition of the mischief and
afford ample security for the future quiet enjoyment of the vio
lated right. If we leave it entirely to the Executive he can only
employ negotiation as being the sole means in his power. . . .
What will honorable gentlemen say on their return home to a peo
ple pressed by the heavy hand of this calamity when they inquire,
What has been done ? What are our hopes ? How long will the
obstruction continue? You answer: We have provided a rem
edy but it is secret (the debates and proceedings on this question
were kept secret by congress). We are not allowed to speak of
it there, much less here. It was only committed to confidential
men in whispers, with closed doors ; but by and by you will see it
operate like enchantment ; it is a sovereign balsam which will heal
your wounded honor ; it is a potent spell, or a kind of patent med
icine which will extinguish and forever put at rest the devouring
spirit which has desolated so many nations of Europe. .
This idle talk may amuse children. But the men of that country
will not be satisfied. They will tell you that they expected better
things of you, that their confidence has been misplaced, and will
not wait the operation of your newly invented drugs; they will
go and redress themselves. I say also let us go and redress our
selves ; you will have the whole nation with you. On no question
since the Declaration of Independence has the nation been so
unanimous as upon this. . . . As to myself or my friend no
agency is wished except that of uniting with you in rousing the
spirit and calling out the resources of the country, to protect itself
against serious aggression and the total suebjetion and loss of the
western country. If you act boldly and promptly, with perfect
unanimity, you will have no war, you will meet with no resistance.
If the Spaniards resist you in taking possession of what by treaty
they have acknowledged to be yours and what they now confess
does not belong to them, the war certainly begins with them.
Under all these circumstances, with these offers of support, can
gentlemen doubt, can they venture to cry, Peace, peace, when
there is no peace, but a sword? I entreat gentlemen to consider
my resolution with candor. My intentions are solely the attain
ment of an object the loss of which will destroy the country
where I reside and hazard the Union itself. If gentlemen think

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS.

151

the proposed means inadequate, I will agree to enlarge them with
cheerfulness; all I wish is that effectual means be voted and
employed in this golden moment, which if lost never will return."
He concluded by introducing the following resolution:*
' "Resolved, That the United States have an indisputable right
to the free navigation of the river Alississippi, and to a convenient
place of deposit for their produce and merchandise in the Island
of New Orleans ; that the late infraction of such, their unquestion
able right, is an aggression hostile to their honor and interest;
that it does not consort with the dignity or safety of this Union
to hold a right so important by a tenure so uncertain; that it
materially concerns such of the American citizens as dwell on the
western waters, and is essential to the union, strength and pros
perity of these States, that they obtain complete security for the
full and peaceable enjoyment of such their absolute right ; that
the President be authorized to take immediate possession of such
place or places in the said island, or the adjacent territories as he
may deem fit and convenient for the purposes aforesaid, and to
adopt such other measures for obtaining that complete security
as to him in his wisdom shall seem meet ; that he be authorized to
call into actual service any number of the militia of the States
of South Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, or of the
Mississippi Territory, which he may think proper, not exceeding
fifty thousand, and to employ them, together with the military and
naval forces of the Union, for effecting the objects above men
tioned; that the sum of five millions of dollars be appropriated
to the carrying into effect the foregoing resolutions, and that the
whole or any part of that sum be paid or applied, on warrants
drawn in pursuance of such directions as the President may from
time to time think proper to give to the Secretary of the Treas
ury." In spite of the secrecy enjoined upon the members of congress,
the substance of the proceedings became known generally through
out the country and occasioned all shades of opinion among the
partisans. The western people were highly pleased with the
resolutions of Mr. Ross. They, as well as the substance of his
speech, became known in every court of Europe, and did not a
little to apprise other nations that it was possible to go too far in
presuming that the United States would not defend its rights and
its sovereignty. The resolutions were employed to excellent
effect by Mr. Livingston in his negotiations with France to secure

* Annals of Congress.

152 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the cession of New Orleans, the Floridas, or portions of Louisiana
to the. United States. They were shown to Napoleon, Talleyrand
and others, and the point was made that the United States would
never relinquish its right to the navigation of the Mississippi but
"with their political existence." They were really the strongest
argument used by Mr. Livingston to convince the French govern
ment that the refusal to revoke the interdiction of the deposits
meant war with the United States.* But as his course was pre
cisely what Napoleon designed, and what probably had resulted
already from his indirect order to the intendant, the effect of the
resolutions and the speech of Mr. Ross must have been strong
with the first consul. He became satisfied that if the western
people would undoubtedly go to war to maintain their right to
the navigation of the Mississippi, they would not hesitate to sep
arate themselves from the Atlantic states and attach themselves
to New France^ (Louisiana) to gain that right, rather than enter
into a war with the powerful French republic in an attempt to
obtain the same object. Great Britain was pleased with the reso
lutions, because they indicated that the United States would oppose
the possession of the mouth of the Mississippi by France. Spain
would no doubt support any position which France might assume.
These were the flames lighted over the world by the resolutions.
Every power that had an interest, direct or indirect, in the owner
ship of the mouth of the Mississippi, reflected seriously on these
proceedings of congress.
During the progress of the debate on the resolutions of Mr.
Ross, there was read by Mr. White of Delaware the following
paper :f
"Advertisement. Under date of the 16th instant (December),
the Intendant General of these provinces tells me that the citizens
of the United States of America can have no commerce with Eis
Majesty's subjects — they only having the free navigation of the
river for the exportation of the fruits and produce of their estab
lishments to foreign countries, and the importation of what they
may want from them. As such I charge you so far as respects
you to be zealous and vigilant with particular care that the inhab
itants neither purchase or sell anything to the shipping, flat-
bottomed boats, barges, or any other smaller vessels that may go
along the river destined for the American possessions or pro-
• American State Papers.
t Annals of Congress.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 153
ceeding from them, that they shall be informed of it, for their due
compliance of the same."
"Baton Rouge, Dec. 22, 1802." "Carlos de Grandpre."
This order was commented on in the severest terms by many
of the senators. Mr. White said, "These are the orders that have
been issued by the Intendant General to every district of the
Spanish provinces, prohibiting the subjects of his Catholic
Majesty from having any commerce, dealing, intercourse or com
munion whatsoever with the citizens of the United States ; exclud
ing us from their shores for the distance of two hundred and
seventy miles ; treating us like a nation of pirates or a banditti of
robbers, who they feared to trust in their country. ... It
has been given out to the world that the Intendant General of
the Spanish provinces was responsible for this act ; that the Span
ish minister had issued orders for the speedy adjustment of these
difficulties. Gentlemen may find when too late that this is a mere
piece of diplomatic policy intended only to amuse them. If they
had taken the trouble they might have been informed that the
Spanish minister near this Government has no control at New
Orleans; that the Intendant General is like himself an immediate
officer of the Crown and responsible only there for his conduct.
If the Spanish minister has interfered, it could only have been
by the entreaties of men in power, as a mere mediator, to beg of
the Intendant General of New Orleans justice and peace on
behalf of the people of the United States. Are honorable gen
tlemen prepared to accept peace on such terms? And it seems
that even these supplicating advances are likely to avail us noth
ing. By accounts very lately received from New Orleans by a
private letter which I have seen since these resolutions were sub
mitted to the senate, the Intendant General has expressed much
displeasure at the interference of the Spanish minister, stating
that it was not within his duty or his province, and that he, the
Intendant, acted not under Spanish but French orders.* As to
the closing of the port of New Orleans against our citizens, the
man who can now doubt, after viewing all the accompanying cir
cumstances, that it was the deliberate act of the Spanish or French
Government, must have locked up his mind against truth and
conviction and be determined to discredit even the evidence of his
own senses. . . . If it should be said that this important
question will soon be found in other hands; that whenever we

* This statement should be particularly noted.

154 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
may have to negotiate on this subject, either in the cabinet or the
field, it will not be with His Catholic Majesty, but with the First
Consul ; not with a King, but with the King of Kings, I answer
that in these insults to our national dignity we at present know
no Power but Spain. Whatever agency Bonaparte may have had
in this business, he has been concealed from our view.* If is
Spain that has violated her plighted faith; it is Spain that has
trampled upon the dearest interests of the United States and she
alone is responsible to us for these outrages. . . . We should
now view her as our open enemy, as having declared war against
us, and do justice to ourselves. We can never have a permanent
place on our western waters, till we possess ourselves of New
Orleans and such other positions as may be necessary to give us
the complete and absolute command of the navigation of the Mis
sissippi. We have now such an opportunity of accomplishing this
important object as may not be presented again in centuries, and
every justification that could be wished for availing ourselves of
the opportunity. Spain has daredus to the trial and'now bids us
defiance. . . . Though not officially informed, we know that
the Spanish Provinces on the Mississippi have been ceded to the
French and that they will as soon as possible take possession of
them. What may we then expect? . . . We shall be hailed
by the vigilant and alert French grenadier, and in the defence
less garrison that would now surrender at our approach, we shall
see unfurled the standards that have waved triumphant in Italy,
surrounded by impregnable ramparts, and "defended by the disci
plined veterans of Egypt. . . . These observations are urged
upon the supposition that it is the power of the Government to
restrain the impetuosity of the western people and to prevent their
doing justice to themselves which by the by I beg to be under
stood as not believing, but expressly the contrary. They know
their own strength ; they know the feebleness of the enemy ; they
know the infinite importance of the stake; they feel the insults
and injuries they have received; they are now all alive on the sub
ject, and I believe will not submit even for the approaching sea
son to their present ruinous and humiliating situation. You
might as well pretend to dam up the mouth of the Mississippi, as
to expect they will be prevented from descending it. Without
the free use of the river and the necessary advantage of deposit
below our line, their fertile country is not worth possession;

* The belief that France was responsible for the interdiction was not a partisan
view; but was entertained by many men of both parties. .

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 155
these are rights not only guaranteed to them by treaty, but due
them from this Government, and they will enforce them, with or
without your authority. . . . Under your auspices and with
the promises of your protection, at the hazard of their lives, they
explored and settled a wilderness, the lonely desert they have trans
formed into cultivated fields. They are our fellow-citizens, our
friends and our brothers, and we are bound by every obligation of
, good faith and every sentiment of honor not to abandon them for
a moment. . . . Let Bonaparte once take possession of the
mouth of the Mississippi, and we shall have a war indeed ; noth
ing but the length of our swords and the best blood of our citi
zens will ever make it ours; his object is universal dominion;
and the hero of Italy, the military despot of France, a man whose
towering ambition bestrides the world, whose will is now the
law of nations, with fifty millions of people and the resources
of Europe at his commond, will be a foe not easily vanquished;
and I repeat, sir, only let him set his foot on that shore, let
him but plant a single standard there, and he will never yield
it but by inches to superior force. He knows well the value
of the position; he knows that it must become one of the first
in the world, and that it now offers higher temptation to a pow
erful, ambitious and intriguing people than any place on earth.
It is the only key to the immense regions watered by the Mis
sissippi and its tributary streams, to a country larger in extent
than all Europe, surpassed by no portion of the world in fer
tility of soil and most of it in climate a paradise. . . . Your
western people will see in Bonaparte, at their very doors, a pow
erful friend or a dangerous enemy; and should he, after obtain
ing complete control over the navigation of the Mississippi,
approach them, not in the menacing attitude of an enemy, but
under the specious garb of a protector and a friend; should he,
instead of embarrassing their commerce by any fiscal arrange
ments, invite them to the free navigation of the river, and give
them privileges of trade not heretofore enjoyed; should he,
instead of attempting to coerce them to his measures, contrary
to their wishes, send missionaries into their country to court and
intrigue with them, he may seduce their affection and thus
accomplish by address and cunning what even his force might
not be equal to. In this way, having operated upon their pas
sions, having enlisted in his service their hopes and their fears,
he may gain an undue ascendency over them. Should these
things be effected, what will be the consequences? ....
Whenever this period shall arrive, it will be the crisis of Amer-

156 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ican glory and must result, either in the political subjugation of
the Atlantic States, or in their separation from the western coun
try." In replying to these remarks, Mr. Breckenridge, of Kentucky,
said: "To induce us to depart from this proper, this safe, and
honorable course of proceeding, which is pursuing by the Presi
dent, the gentleman from Pennsylvania first and the gentleman
from Deleware again told you, that by such pacific measures
you will irritate the western people against you ; that they will
not be restrained by you, but will either invade the country
themselves, or withdraw from the Union and unite with those
who will give them what they want. Sir, I did not expect to
hear such language held on this floor. The gentleman from
Pennsylvania best knows the temper and views of the western
people he represents, but if he meant to extend the imputation
to the state ' I have the honor to represent, I utterly disclaim
it. The citizens of Kentucky value to highly their rights and
character to endanger the one or dishonor the other. They
deal not, sir, in insurrections. They hold in too sacred regard
their federal compact to sport with it. They were among the
first to, oppose violations of it, and will, I trust, be the last to
attempt its dissolution. The time, indeed, was when not only
irritation but disgust prevailed in that country; when instead
of sending fifty thousand men to seize on Orleans an attempt
was meditated and a solemn vote taken in congress to barter
away this right for twenty-five years.* But those times have
passed away. . . . But I beg to ask gentlemen who hold
such language, will the western people, admitting they were
to withdraw from the Union, be able to accomplish the object?
Could they alone go to war with France and Spain? Could
they hold Orleans, were they to take possession of it, without
the aid of the United States? Admitting they could hold it,
what security would they have for their commerce? A single
ship-of-the-line would be able completely to blockade that port.
See also the Havana, one of the safest and strongest of the
Spanish ports and so situated as to possess every advantage in
annoying our commerce. Are the gentlemen, therefore, really
serious when they endeavor to persuade us that the western peo
ple are in such a state of fury and mad impatience that they
will not wait even for a few months to see the fate of a nego
tiation, and if unsuccessful receive the aid of the whole nation,

* See Chapter II.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 157
but that they will madly run to the attack without a ship, with
out a single cannon, without magazines, without money, or
preparation of any kind ; and what is worse, without union among
themselves; and what is still worse, in face of the laws and
Constitution of their country? It is impossible 
Although I think it incumbent on us, for the reasons I have
stated, to try the effect of negotiation, yet, should that fail, I
think it incumbent on us also to be prepared for another resort.
I agree with gentlemen that such an important right should not
be held by a tenure so uncertain. The only difference between
us then is, what are the proper means to obtain this great end?
The course pursued by the President is, in my opinion, the only
true and dignified course. It is that and that only which will
certainly attain the object; and is the only one which will tend
to unite cordially all parts of the Union. But we ought to be
prepared, in case of a failure, instantly to redress ourselves. This
instead of having an evil, will in my opinion have a good effect
on the negotiation." He concluded by moving as an amendment
to the resolutions of Mr. Ross that all after the word "resolved"
be stricken out and the following be inserted in lieu thereof :*
"That the President of the United States be and he is' hereby
authorized whenever he shall judge it expedient, to require of
the Executives of the several States to take effectual measures
to arm and equip according to law and hold in readiness to march
at a moment's warning eighty thousand effective militia, officers
included; that the President may if he judge it expedient author
ize the Executives of the several States to accept as part of the
detachment aforesaid any corps of volunteers who shall con
tinue in service for such time not exceeding  months
and perform such services as shall be prescribed by law ; that
 dollars be appropriated for paying and subsisting such
part of the troops aforesaid whose actual service may be wanted
and for defraying such other expenses as during the recess of
Congress the President may deem necessary for the security of
the territory of the United , States ; that  dollars be appro
priated for erecting at such place or places on the Western waters
as the President may judge most proper one or more arsenals."
Mr. Clinton of New York made a powerful appeal in sup
port of the policy of the administration in resorting to negotia
tion instead 'of war to secure the revocation of the interdiction
at New Orleans. He showed conclusively the impracticability

?Annals of Congress.

158 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
of forcibly taking possession of New Orleans before every peace
ful resort had been exhausted. Not only was the plan chimer
ical, but it was exceedingly dangerous to the security of the
United States, because it would mean a gigantic war with both
France and Spain, with the eventual loss of Louisiana and the
probable dismemberment of the Union. He made light of the
threat of the western settlers to separate themselves from the
Atlantic states, and declared that upon the agitation of almost
every political difference since the formation of the government
some section had taken umbrage and threatened to withdraw
from the Union. He asserted that the most hazardous course
any section could pursue would be to separate themselves from
the Union ; and he did not believe the threats could be genuine
or in earnest. He showed the unsoundness of the statement of
Mr. Ross that the seizure of New Orleans would facilitate nego
tiation on the Mississippi question. He concluded with the dec
laration that the United States should exhaust every measure of
negotiation, but should be prepared for war as a last resort.
Mr. Dayton of New Jersey ridiculed many of the statements
of Mr. Clinton, and insited that the deplorable situation of the
western people could not be denied. He declared that nearly
half a million of fellow-citizens were wholly cut off from mar
ket, and asked if senators had any idea what that meant. He
read an article to show that three productions of the western
states, entered at New Orleans in 1801 (as taken from the cus
tom house books), amounted to about one million six hundred
thousand dollars;* they were cotton, tobacco and flour. He
showed further that nine or ten other staple products of the
West raised the grand total that passed through New Orleans
from that section to nearly four millions of dollars. It
was officially shown, he said, that from February 1st to June
10th, 1802, one hundred and fifty vessels of from one hundred
to three hundred tons had cleared from the New. Orleans cus
tom house, and that eighty more such vessels would be required
to carry off the produce yet in store; Tennessee had produced
one- fourth of this crop. He said: "Thus we see that property
amounting to four millions* annually exported in the first six
months of the year, is to be embargoed at the will of a foreign
Government, or the caprice of a Spanish Intendant; or, if per
mitted to pass at all, permitted under such restrictions and impo-

* Although these figures were disputed at the time, they seem to have been sub
stantially correct.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 159.
sitions as to take away all the profit of transportation and ren
der it scarcely worth the raising. What have we done to remove
the obstruction and redress the wrong? We have sent a min
ister itinerant from Paris to Aladrid and from Madrid to Paris
to negotiate upon this subject. There may be precedent for
this; there may be courtesy in the measure; but what are prece
dents? What are the forms of courtly politeness to an injured,
an outraged, a starving people? But is nothing due to the
dignity and honor of the nation most grossly insulted by the
act? Let them who will be the dupes of the artful, insidious
insinuation that it is an unauthorized act, an irregular proceed
ing of a subordinate officer of a Government which can punish
with banishment or instant death the smallest deviation from
duty. I do not believe the tale; I never believed it; and a late
official act must undeceive all whose minds are not shut to the
impressions of truth.* A late proclamation issued from Baton
Rouge, a Spanish port, one hundred and fifty miles above New
Orleans, prohibits all intercourse between Spaniards and Amer
icans. Our people descending the river in pursuit of lawful
commerce, are forbidden to buy an egg, or a mess of salt, or any
comfort of life, from the possessor of the banks in the long,
dreary distance of two hundred and seventy miles. Will the
gentlenjen call this, also, an unauthorized act of a Spanish
Intendant ?"
Mr. Cocke of Temiessee sustained the administration and
among other things said : "For my part I do not wish to assail
the territory or the rights of any nation nor to abuse their char
acters; but it is the more extraordinary when these gentlemen
while doing so tell us at the same time that it is France that
sets the Spaniards onf and that we are afraid to look the hero
of Italy and France in the face. Perhaps those who accuse us
thus of fear would be the first to hide their faces from real
danger. It is not boasting that makes the patriot or the man
of courage; it is coolness and resolution. We do not fear the
hero of Italy or any other hero, but we fear the effects of war,
of an unjust and rash war."
Mr. J. Mason of Massachusetts favored the adoption of the
Ross resolutions. He denied with much emphasis the jusEce

*If the interdiction was the sole act of the Intendant, by whom was the order
authorized that forbade the people of the province of Louisiana to trade with the
Americans on the Mississippi river? Surely not that of the Intendant. Do not,
then, the two acts disprove the statement that it was the unauthorized act of the
Intendant only; and prove that they were the deliberate orders of some power
high in authority— either of France or of Spain?
t He did not deny that France might have been responsible for the interdiction

l6o THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
of "dubbing them war resolutions." Having read them Ke
remarked: "Is this not true; do we not agree in this unani
mously; will any member of the senate Seny it? Is not our
right to the navigation of that river a natural and inviolable
right? What does it further say? That we have an unques
tionable right to the deposit at New Orleans; have we not that
right? It is further declared that this right is important; can
this be denied? Upon every principle of right and safety the
resolutions should be supported. ... I have no doubt that
this infraction of the treaty is the authorized act of either France
or Spain.* It is now from twelve to eighteen months since the
rumor of the cession of Louisiana has prevailed, and no authen
tic information on the subject has ever been furnished to the
people of the United States. How then are we to account for
this secrecy? If Spain determined to deprive us of a right,
would she inform us of it by message? No, she would -pursue
exactly the conduct she has done  The period at
which this infraction took place affords strong presumption of
the motive and design. It took place at the moment when the
French thought they had completely overcome the blacks and
restored the Island of St. Domingo to obedience ; they had deter
mined that the subjugation of that island should precede the
attempt upon Louisiana, and in the moment of their imaginary
triumph, they commenced their operations at New Orleans by
the suspension of our right.* As to the assertions that Louisiana
will be ceded or is ceded with a special regard to our limits,
I do not regard them ; they are evidently made only to lull us."
He argued .that taking possession in accordance with the reso
lutions was an act to regain our own property, and could not
be regarded as a war proceeding. The United States should
take possession of its own property, and afterward, if there was
anything to negotiate, it could be attended to better than before,
and in the meantime the western country would receive relief.
He did not fear war with both France and Spain, because Great
Britain, in that case, would assist the United States.
Mr. Wells of Delaware said on the following day: "Have
you not seen the letter of the Governor of New Orleans to the
Governor of the Mississippi territory? In this letter I learn that
the Governor comes out and acknowledges his co-operation with
the Intendant, justifies the breach of the treaty, and declares
that these instruments cease their binding force the moment it

*A majority of the members of Congress thought the same.

American Maps Vo).2..A/oJO„/JS3.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 161
suits the interest of either party to break through them. .
It has long been evident that the French have attached to these
territories upon our frontier an importance which of themselves
they do not bear and which can only be attributed to them on
account of their connection with our Southern and Western
States. If you treat, therefore, for an extension of your limits,
you will be disappointed. If you negotiate respecting the right
of deposit, and should succeed, you will obtain no better security
than that which has already been found ineffectual. For my
part, I am strongly impressed with an opinion that the First
Consul has a project in view deeply hostile to the prosperity
of our country. One great object of the French is to increase
their maritime strength. The position which they are about to
take in New Orleans will soon put them at our expense in pos
session of an immense carrying trade and reduce under their
influence the fairest portion of our empire. Perhaps I may be
asked, does the First Consul imagine that the people of the
United States will consent to see subjected to foreign domina
tion any part of their territory? This is an inquiry which Bona
parte has not been much in the habit of making. He knows the
extent of the means he possesses in this country. It is but a
few years since violent jealousies prevailed between the Atlantic
and the Western States. Fortunately, they have subsided; these
jealousies he will endeavor to rekindle. Possibly he may cal
culate Upon detaching the people on the seaboard from the sup
port of their brethren on the western waters.* He has already
succeeded in concealing the hand which guided the pen of the
Intendent at New Orleans. His troops are probably now
approaching our shores, and what means of precaution have you
adopted? . . . Had the advice of the honorable gentleman
near me (Mr. Morris) been listened to, when you were dis
banding your army, this crisis would not have happened. Had
you then posted at the Natchez, as he recommended, a thousand
soldiers, the navigation of the Mississippi would not now have
been interrupted. He told you what would happen, and his pre
diction has been literally fulfilled. There is but one fault I find
with these resolutions, which is, they do not go far enough.
If I could obtain a second, I would move an amendment
explicitly authorizing the taking possession of both the Floridas
as well as the island of New Orleans. . . . Let the French

* This was the reason given by many persons why France had probably author
ized the interdiction. II— II

162 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
be but once settled along our southern border and they will have
the whole of your Southern States at their mercy."
Mr. Wright of Maryland delivered a speech of unusual power
in support of the administration's policy of negotiation before
resorting to war measures. He did not deny the flagrancy of
the act of the intendant, but upheld the policy of peaceful nego
tiation already in progress under the direction of President Jef
ferson. There could be no two ways about it; redress should
be sought first and now through peaceful measures. That was
the custom) of all nations, and had been adopted thus far by.
the United States, particularly by General Washington, to whom
the opposition took such pains to refer. He denied the figures
of Mr. Dayton, and declared that the total exports for the year
1802 were only one million ninety-five thousand four hundred
twelve dollars instead of four millions.*
On the same day, Mr. Morris of Pennsylvania said : "It
behooves us, however, to consider well the spirit of the French
government, which in all its changes has never lost sight of this
object. The French minister, M. de Luzerne, when congress
was deliberating on the ultimata for peace (in 1783), obtained
a resolution that our ministers should, as to our western bound
ary, treat under the direction of France.f Our ministers dis
dained the condition and refused to obey. Their manly con
duct obtained for you the countries whose fate is now suspended
in your deliberations. Never, no never, has France lost sight
of Louisiana. Never for a moment has she been blind to its
importance. Those who, driven from her bosom into exile,
wandered about among us, have gathered and communicated
the fullest information. While they enjoyed your hospitality,
they probed your weakness, and meditated the means of con-
troling your conduct. . . . Had this transaction (the secret
treaty of San Ildefonso) been intended fairly, it would have
been told frankly. But it was secret because it was hostile. The
First Consul, in the moment of terminating his differences with
you, sought the means of future influence and control. He found
and secured a pivot for that immense lever, by which with potent
arm he means to subvert your civil and political institutions.
. What followed? An open and direct violation of the
treaty by a public officer of the Spanish government.^ •

* Mr. Wright was evidently wrong, because the official records show the exports
to have aggregated about the sum mentioned by Mr. Dayton .
t Diplomatic Correspondence, secret. J Annals of Congress.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 163
Bonaparte has placed himself at the head of the French republic
by deeds which cast a lustre on his name. In his splendid
career he must proceed. When he ceases to act he will cease
to reign'. Whenever in any plan he fails, that moment he falls.
He is condemned to magnificence."
In his concluding argument Mr. Ross said: "The Spaniards
delayed and evaded the execution (of the treaty of 1795) in
a very unjustifiable manner. But the administration of that day
did not rely upon negotiation alone; they ordered troops to the
Ohio, and had the Spaniards persisted in their refusal, those
troops would have acted decisively without any new application
to the court of Spain. They saw the approaching storm; tney
entered upon the execution of the treaty by running the line
and giving up the posts; and if the war office be examined.
gentlemen will find that our troops were then so disposed as
to fall down the river Mississippi and act with effect at any
moment. It was, well known to us that Spain did not act in
that business from the mere impulse of her own interests or
wishes. She was then and is still under the irresistible influ
ence of a powerful neighbor, with whom we at that time had
serious differences; she was urged and pushed forward by
France ;* for Spain until she became thus dependent upon France
has ranked high for her good faith, and in my opinion deserv
edly higher than any other court in Europe. . . . We come
now to consider the resolution offered as a substitute. It is
highly gratifying to find that gentlemen are at last inclined to
act — to do something like defending the rights of our country.
Is there any new shape given to this business by the proposed
substitute? We propose fifty thousand militia; they substitute
eighty thousand. To do what? Will gentlemen tell us the dif
ference. It is said ours are absolutely imperative ; if so, alter
them and give an unqualified discretion. We will agree to it.
My own opinion is, that they should be immediately acted upon.
If the majority wish for a bare discretionary power, I assent
to it. There is no difference except that one set of resolutions
puts greater power in the hands of the President than the other.
Are gentlemen on the other side afraid to trust the President?
Do they think he will abuse this power ? Will it hurt the nego
tiation? Instead of hurting it, our minister ought to carry this
act to Europe with him. He would then have more means, and*
more forcible arguments to urge in his negotiation."

* Note that the charge is openly made that France was not only responsible for
the interdiction, but for the refusal to surrender the posts in 1797.

164 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Many of the senators from whose speeches these extracts are
taken, were members of the minority party of congress — were
opposed to the Jeffersonian administration, and took an ultra
position to throw the responsibilities of inaction upon the
majority, or at least to stimulate and develop the "Mississippi
policy" of Mr. Jefferson. The friends of the administration in
the senate counseled conservatism and declared that the Presi
dent was doing all that should be done at that time to remove
the interdiction and to secure a continuance of the rights granted
by the treaty of 1795 ; that to descend with a force upon New
Orleans would be rash and would react upon the United States;
that the right to navigate the Mississippi had not been abro
gated, only the right to the deposit in New Orleans and the
privilege of trading with the Spanish people had been prohib
ited ; that there was no occasion for hostile proceedings, because,
in any event, the worse Spain had done was to fail assigning
an "equivalent establishment" for the deposits on the Missis
sippi; and that there was nothing to show that the act of inter
diction was other than, the unauthorized misapprehension of the
intendant. The resolutions of Mr. Ross were rejected by a vote
of fifteen to eleven — a strict party test. The resolutions of Mr.
Breckenridge were then adopted without a dissenting voice. All
who had favored the Ross resolutions, including Mr. Ross him
self, voted for the Breckenridge resolutions, (see supra for both
resolutions).* At the session of the house in January, 1803, a secret commit
tee, of which Mr. Nicholson of Maryland was chairman, was
appointed to investigate the Mississippi question and report upon
the desirability and expediency of acquiring New Orleans and
the Floridas.f The committee did not extend their investiga
tions beyond the immediate cause of complaint. Mr. Nichol
son said during the debate in October, 1803: "As one of the
committee, I am free to declare that I did not at that time enter
tain the most distant idea that the almost boundless tract of
country lying west of the Mississippi could be obtained by our
government on any terms, much less for the comparatively incon
siderable sum which we have agreed to pay for it. Had I then
offered an opinion on the subject, I should' have had no hesi
tation to say that the west bank of the Mississippi was almost
*The congressional debate naturally assumed apartisan hue, the friends of the
administration denying and the opposition affirming, the responsibility of France
or the interdiction. Of course, this was rendered possible by the lack of conclu-
ive knowledge on the subject.
S t Annals of Congress.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 165
incalculable in its value to the United States, if it was only
for the purpose of preventing any foreign nation from coloniz
ing it. If that country were thickly settled by a foreign nation,
the whole river Mississippi, from its source to the sea, must
have been guarded by a strong chain of military posts ; whereas
the wilderness itself will now present an almost insurmount
able barrier to any nation that may be inclined to disturb us
in that quarter." The committee considered the interdiction at
New Orleans with a view of having it revoked at the earliest
possible moment, and recommended measures which were deemed
likely to prevent a recurrence of the act in the future. Mr.
Nicholson said in October: "An inquiry of this kind naturally
led to a view of the situation of the western country generally,
and it was readily perceived that the same inconveniences
which had occurred in relation to the mouth of the Mississippi
might at some future period perhaps not very distant embar
rass the commerce of the whole Mississippi Territory, the west
ern part of Georgia and the eastern part of Tennessee. It was
seen that the produce of this valuable country must be carried
to the sea by means of the great rivers which rise in the Mis
sissippi Territory, but pass through East and West Florida
before they reach the Gulf of Mexicp; and the committee were
of opinion that these ought if possible to be secured by treaty."
They therefore made recommendations in accordance with their
findings. Their report, though made known to the members
of congress, was not published at that time. Mr. Randolph said
in October, 1803, "it had been thought inexpedient to publish
the report at that time," and moved that it be referred to a com
mittee to be published for the use of the members, but such
action was postponed. It was taken up later and published in
its proper place in the January proceedings. The committee
recommended the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas,
in order to get the free navigation of the southern rivers. They
concluded by recommending the adoption of the following reso
lution :
"Resolved, That the sum of two million dollars in addition
to the provision heretofore made, be appropriated to defray any
expenses which may be incurred in relation to the intercourse
between the United States and foreign nations, to be paid out
of any money that may be in the treasury, not otherwise appro
priated and to be applied under the direction of the President
of the United States, who if necessary is hereby authorized to

166 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
borrow the whole or any part thereof, an account whereof as soon
as may be shall be laid before, congress."
The action on the "Mississippi question," as it was called,
in the house was less protracted than in the senate, though the
sentiment was fully as strong for the maintenance of treaty
rights. The following resolution, introduced by Mr. Griswold
of Connecticut, was rejected:*
"Resolved, That the people of the United States are entitled
to the free navigation of the river Mississippi; that the naviga
tion of the river Mississippi has been obstructed by the regu
lations recently carried into effect at New Orleans; that ,the
right of freely navigating the river Mississippi ought never to
be abandoned by the United States ; that a committee be appointed
to inquire whether any, and, if any, what, legislative measures
are necessary to secure to the people of the United States the
free navigation of the river Mississippi."
The house of representatives, on January 7, passed the follow
ing act:
"Resolved, That this House receive, with great sensibility,
the information of a disposition in certain officers of the Span
ish government at New Orleans to obstruct the navigation of
the river Mississippi, as secured to the United States by the
most solemn stipulations. That, adhering to that humane and
wise policy which ought ever to characterize a free people, and
by which the United States have always professed to be gov
erned ; willing, at the same time, to ascribe this breach of com
pact to the unauthorized misconduct of certain individuals,
rather than to a want of good faith on. the part of His Catholic
Majesty; and relying with perfect confidence on the vigilance
and wisdom of the Executive, they will wait the issue of such
measures as that department of the government shall have pur
sued for asserting the rights and vindicating the injuries of the
United States ; holding it to be their duty, at the same , time,
to express their unalterable determination to maintain the bound
aries, and the rights of navigation and commerce through the
river Mississippi, as established by existing treaties."
Taking all the data presented in the house and senate into
consideration and weighing the arguments of the members,
there does not seem to be a reasonable doubt that Napoleon
expected to place in New Orleans a sufficient force, aided by
the militia there, to hold it against any probable attack of the

?Annals of Congress.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 167
western settlers or a British armament; to control the interdic
tion of the deposits; to obstruct the navigation of the Missis
sippi by the Americans below the thirty-first degree without the
payment of a heavy duty; to detach, if possible, the Western
states from the Eastern and make them a part of his Louisiana
domains; to secure the Floridas from Spain, by force if neces
sary; and to be then in a position to take Canada from Great
Britain and Mexico from Spain when he should so desire, and
later to conquer the Atlantic states, thus forming a magnificent
empire in the New World for the glory of France. The refusal
of the king of Spain, under the advice of the sagacious Godoy,
to sign the treaty of cession for two years saved New Orleans
from passing into the hands of France immediately after the
treaty of St. Ildefonso. During that entire period Napoleon
continued his demands or his entreaties, as seemed most likely
to be efficacious, to secure the ratification of the king and to
acquire by purchase the two Floridas as well. His threats were
adroitly evaded by Godoy, until at length he began the forma
tion of the armament destined for New Orleans, intending to
take possession without the ratification of the Spanish monarch,
in which case he would doubtless soon have likewise occupied
the Floridas, should the United States not have forestalled his
intentions by a prior possession.
Instinctively, the people of the United States associated the
cession of Louisiana to France and the interdiction of the depos
its. The latter seemed to them the beginning of troubles that
were sure to result from the former. The declaration of the
governor of Louisiana that the act was disapproved by him
was not believed, particularly, as he did nothing to remove the
interdiction. The ministers to France and Spain were instructed
to inform the authorities of those countries that the interdic
tion must be removed and the rights of the United States under
the treaty of 1795 be fully recognized. As Mr. Madison wrote
to Mr. Livingston under date of January 18, 1803 : "Such,
indeed, has been the impulse given to the public mind by these
events, that every branch of the government has felt the obli
gation of taking the measures most likely, not only to re-estab
lish our present rights, but to promote arrangements by which
they may be enlarged and more effectually secured." In order
the more surely to effect this result, the government sent James
Monroe on a mission extraordinary to assist Mr. Livingston
at Paris and Mr. Pinckney at Madrid to effect treaties with the
object of securing "a cession of New Orleans and the Floridas

168 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
to the United1 States, and consequently the establishment of the
Mississippi as the boundary between the United States and
Louisiana. In order to draw the French government into the
measure, a sum of money will mark part of our propositions,
to which will be added such regulations of the commerce of
that river, and of the others entering the Gulf of Mexico, as
ought to be satisfactory to France."*
An important statement made by Mr. Livingston concerning
the act of the intendant at New Orleans in interdicting the depos
its should be borne in mind: "I have examined the treaty;
there is no pretence for this construction of it; and as the right
has been regularly exercised till now, it will be generally believed
in the United States that this construction could only have been
suggested by a wish on the part of France to get rid of the
provisions of the treaty before she took possession."f When
all the circumstances are taken into consideration : — that Spain
by the treaty of 1795 had not only recognized the right of the
United States to the free navigation of the Mississippi, but had
granted the perpetual privilege of deposit, either at New Orleans
or some other "equivalent establishment" on the bank of the
Mississippi ; that this privilege had been continued without inter
ruption, to the advantage of Spain, from 1797 to 1802 ; that
the Spanish governor at New Orleans denied having given the
order of interdiction; that the Spanish ambassador at Washing
ton repudiated all knowledge of such an order; that the Span
ish minister of state at Madrid stated that neither the king
nor the ministry had directed any such action to be taken; that
the interdiction had not been ordered until France was on the
point of sending out an armament to take possession; that no
satisfaction to the urgent requests of the American ambassa
dor as to the attitude of France on the Louisiana questions was
rendered; that the French ministry stated that the cession of
the country asked for "was out of the question ;" that the project
of colonizing and strengthening Louisiana was "dear to the
heart of Napoleon;" that it was well known in New Orleans
that the province had been retroceded to France and would be
soon formally turned over to her; that the mere request of the
first consul was sufficient to cause the intendant to issue the
order; and that France was anxious to know what the United
States would do in case the stipulations of the treaty of 1795

?American State Papers.
t Thus even Mr. Livingston entertained the opinion that France was responsible
for the interdiction.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 169.
concerning the navigation of the Mississippi and the privilege
of deposit were abrogated — it is not necessary to go beyond the
consular government of France to learn where the order of
interdiction originated.
The authorities of the Spanish government at New Orleans
had little conception of the aggressive commercial spirit of the
Americans. And the government of Spain was even farther
removed from comprehending the resolution that would take
forcible possession of the mouth of the Mississippi for the sole
purpose of gaining a market. Barbe Marbois said: "Spain
thought that circumstances only required from her an easy sac
rifice. She consented in 1788 to cede the free navigation of the
Mississippi to the States, founded on the left bank of that river.
But she so little understood the spirit of those Republicans that
she had no hesitation in proposing as a condition of this grant
that it should only take effect in case they determined to form
an empire distinct from that of the Atlantic States." The
threats which preceded the Spanish refusal to permit the Amer
icans to navigate the Mississippi, did not betoken a spirit that
would either yield to the refusal or surrender allegiance to
the United States. The overtures of the Spanish authorities,
which had for their object the intention of dividing the Union,
were never seriously taken into consideration. The efforts
which were put forth were occasioned by malcontents, law-break
ers, and the uninformed. The threats themselves meant noth
ing more than to hasten the government of the United States
into some action that would afford effectual measures of relief.
The interdiction of the deposits was severely felt in New
Orleans, and roused even there storms of protest. The city was
soon in sore straits for provisions, in particular flour, and the
complaint became so great that the intendant himself was
obliged to modify his interdiction to the extent of admitting a
few of the staple necessities. As a matter of fact the procla
mation of interdiction only served to make clear that all exclu
sive and arbitrary barriers over commerce must give way to
human necessities. But this point should be noted : If the inter
diction was the act solely of the intendant, why did he not revoke
it when it was seen to be such a burden even to the inhabitants
themselves?* His proclamation of February 5, 1803, gave to
the people the relief demanded. But this was merely a slight
infraction of the edict, and not its revocation. In view of the
* Everything indicates that the Intendant was acting under the orders of a power
he dared not disobey.

170 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
hostility of the inhabitants themselves, occasioned by the hard
ships thus thrust upon them, it seems reasonable that the intend
ant must have been the instrument of some higher power.
After the lapse of the three years stipulated in the treaty,
the right of deposit in New Orleans was continued by tacit agree
ment until its revocation by the interdiction in October, 1802.
The report was promptly circulated throughout the western
country that the right to navigate the Mississippi had been pro
hibited, but this was not the fact. Spain had the right to pro
hibit the deposits in New Orleans and the right to forbid her
subjects to have any business dealings with the Americans. It
is true that she did not assign an "equivalent establishment"
on the Mississippi, but neither did the United States press "for
such a place, because the Americans did not want another
deposit; they wanted New Orleans. It was easy for the Amer
icans to use their wants as the basis of an incontestible right.
They therefore claimed about every right pertaining to the river ;
and they longed for a rupture that would give them ail they
desired, knowing full well that the feeble Spaniards would prove
no barrier to the sweep they should make were they to deter
mine to come down the river for the purpose of capturing New
Orleans. At one time steps were taken to make Natchez the
"equivalent establishment," but this was" given up finally as
impracticable. It was thought by many of the settlers that the
French government was back of the interdiction. Had not this
been .thought to be the probability and had not the settlers
thought that to take Louisiana from France was an altogether
different step than to take it from Spain, the chances are that
they would have taken possession of New Orleans early in 1803.
Mr. Martin, the historian, writes : "On the first of March
(1803), the King (of Spain) disapproved of the order of Mo
rales (the Intendant), prohibiting the introduction of deposit of
goods, wares and merchandise from the United States in the
port of New Orleans ; and ordered that the United States should
continue to enjoy their right of deposit in New Orleans, with
out prejudice of his to substitute some other spot on the banks
¦of the Mississippi." Late in May, 1803, the intendant revoked
the interdiction which he had ordered in the previous October.
It should be noted that this revocation was pronounced nearly
two months after Napoleon had made up his mind to sell the
province to the United States. Is it not reasonable to conclude
that as soon as he became satisfied the sale would be effected,
lie sent an order across the Atlantic to the intendant to remove

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 171
the interdiction in order to quiet the Americans? The order
of the king of Spain to the intendant was wholly perfunctory,
because he had issued A decree on the 15th of the previous
October directing the governor of Louisiana to turn the prov
ince over to France and was aware that his authority had prac
tically ceased in Louisiana. It must have been upon the order
of the French republic that the interdiction was removed.
That the intendant at New Orleans was acting under the
express request or direction of the French government, is proved
by the fact that, although the Spanish minister at Washington
and the Spanish secretary of state at Madrid, under the direc-r
tion of the king of Spain, had ordered the removal of the inter
diction, it was continued in force without interruption and with
increased exactions and severity. Air. Madison, secretary of
state, wrote to Mr. Pinckney under date of March 2, 1803, that
"our latest authentic information from New Orleans is of Janu
ary 20. At that date the edict of the Intendant against our
right of deposit had not been revoked, although the letters to
him and the Governor from the Spanish minister here had been
previously received. And it appears that the first outrage had
been followed by orders of the most rigid tenor against every
hospitable intercourse between our citizens navigating the river
and the Spanish inhabitants. This continuation of the obstruc
tion to our trade and the approach of the season for carrying
down the Mississippi the exports of the western country have
had the natural effect of increasing the western irritation and
emboldened the advocates for an immediate redress by arms.
Should the deposit not be restored in time for the
arrival of the Spring craft, a new crisis will occur, which it is
presumed that the Spanish government will have stimulated to
prevent by the very heavy claims of indemnification to which
it would be otherwise fairly subjected."*
In his letter of April 18, 1803, -to Messrs. Livingston and
Monroe, Mr. Madison said: "Our latest authentic information
from New Orleans is of the 25th February. At that date the
port had been opened for provisions carried down the Missis
sippi, subject to a duty of six per cent if consumed in the prov
ince and an additional duty if exported, with a restriction in
the latter case to Spanish bottoms and to the external ports per
mitted by Spain to her colonial trade (see infra). A second
letter written by the Spanish minister here has been received

* American State Papers.

172 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
by the Intendant but without effect. On the ioth of March
his interposition was repeated in a form which you will find,
by his translated communication to the department of state in-
one of the enclosed papers, was meant to be absolutely effectual.
You will find in the same paper the translation of a letter from
the French charge d'affairs here to the Governor of Louisiana
written with a co-operating view. A provisional letter to any
French agents who might have arrived had been previously
written by him, in consequence of a note from this department,
founded on a document published at New Orleans, showing that
orders had been given by the Spanish Government for the sur
render of the province to France; and he has of late addressed
a third letter on the subject to hte Prefect said to have arrived
at New Orleans. It does not appear, however, from any
accounts received, that Louisiana has yet changed hand's. What
the result of the several measures taken for restoring the righf
of deposit will be remains to be seen. . . . The silence of
the French Government to Air. Livingston's representation is a
very unfavorable indication  The letter from the
Marquis de Yrujo, of which you will find a translated copy in
the enclosed newspaper of this date, was received yesterday.
The letters to which it refers, as containing orders for the re-es
tablishment of our deposit at New Orleans, were immediately
forwarded. They will arrive in time, we hope, to mitigate con
siderably the losses from the misconduct of the Spanish Intend
ant; and they are the more acceptable as they are an evidence
of the respect in the government of Spain to our rights and our
friendship. From the allusion in this communication from the
Spanish minister to a future agreement between the two Gov
ernments on the subject of an equivalent deposit, it would seem
that the Spanish Government regards the cession to France as
either no longer in force or not soon to be carried into execu
tion. However this may be, it will not be allowed, any more
than the result of our remonstrance to Spain on the violation
of our rights, to slacken the negotiations for the greater secu
rity and the enlargement of these rights. Whether- the French
or the Spaniards or both are to be our neighbors, the consider
ations which led to the measures, taken with respect to these
important objects, still require that they should be pursued into
all the success that may be attainable."*
It seems that Mr. Madison had been misinformed, for on

?American State Papers.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 173
May 25 he wrote: "You were informed in my letters of the
1 8th and 20th of April that orders had been transmitted by the
Spanish Government for restoring the deposits. The answers
from New Orleans to the Spanish and French ministers here
show that their successive interpositions, including the peremp
tory one from the Marquis de Yrujo of the nth of March, were
all unavailing. The orders of the King of Spain will no doubt
be obeyed if they arrive before possession be given to the French
authority; nor is it presumable that in that event they would
be disregarded. Still it is possible that the French agents may
choose to wait for the French construction of the treaty before
they relinquish the ground taken by the Intendant; and the more
possible as the orders to the Intendant may contain no disavowal
of his construction of it. Under these circumstances it will be
incumbent on the French Government to hasten the orders neces
sary to guard against a prolongation of the evil and the very
serious consequences incident to it."
It should be borne in mind that in suppressing the deposits
at New Orleans, Spain, when held to blame, claimed the right
to do so.* She insisted that the privilege was a pure gratuity
revocable at her pleasure; that the right by the United States
to navigate the Mississippi had not been interfered with; that
it was for the United States and not Spain to procure another
place of deposit when New Orleans was refused them ; that the
inconsiderable losses to American citizens, by being forced
through their own want of foresight in not procuring another
place of deposit to load and unload in the middle of the river,
could not justly be attributed to Spain, who had done only what
she had a right to do, because the three years stipulated in the
treaty of 1795 had expired before the promulgation of the inter
diction; and that the injury to the royal revenue was ample
justification for the revocation of the deposits at New Orleans.
Why, it was asked in substance by the Spanish minister, did
not the United States ask for another "equivalent establishment"
on the Mississippi when the three years had expired, instead
of depending upon the sufferance of Spain in permitting greatly
to her loss the continuance of the deposits at New Orleans ? It

* If the interdiction was pursuant to the order of France, Spain would have taken
precisely the course she did, but would have taken an altogether different course
had she been acting of her own volition. France desiredthe abrogation of the
provisions concerning the deposits and the navigation of the Mississippi embraced
in the Spanish treaty of 1795 ; Spain did not, because she had willingly granted
them and had enjoyed them ever since; and besides, was wholly unconcerned,
because she was about to surrender the province to France.

174 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
was for the United States and not for Spain to take the initia
tive in securing another establishment. Why should the negli
gence of the United States, which brought them- loss, be made
to react upon Spain, who had committed no "offense? At the
expiration of the three years it was the duty of the United States,
in order to avoid precarious emergencies, to have sought for a
new stipulation that would have secured their deposits some
where. Had they done so they no doubt would have been accom
modated; but instead of seeking an "equivalent establishment"
they demanded the restoration of the deposits in New Orleans,
a demand to which they had no right. Under the treaty stipu
lations the "equivalent establishment" must be convenient to the
United States, and therefore had to be selected by them, but
with the co-operative assent of Spain. This assent had never
been refused by Spain ; she had only refused the privilege in New
Orleans. Had Spain, then, the right to suspend the deposits in
New Orleans before agreeing with the United States on another
"equivalent establishment?" Must Spain submit to the loss and
inconvenience of the deposits after the three years, because the
United States had neglected to provide an "equivalent establish
ment?" Or must Spain submit to the inconvenience after the
expiration of the three years until a convention could be called to
select an "equivalent establishment?" Or should the United
States suffer the inconvenience after the three years until another
place of deposit had been selected? This was the manner in
which the situation was presented by the Spanish ministry.* It
was then asked, why should Spain be held accountable for the
American losses from the suppression of the deposits? To say
the least, the United States had contributed to those loss.es by
taking no steps to procure "an equivalent establishment."
The fact that the orders of high Spanish officials for the revo
cation of the interdiction were wholly disregarded by the intend
ant, is conclusive proof that he considered himself beyond the
reach of the lash that invariably fell upon the backs of all
subordinates guilty of disobedience to the imperial mandates of
Spain. When to this observation is added the further fact that
Spain, which was on the eve of surrendering the province to
France, could have had no object of her own in prohibiting the
deposits, the responsibility of the French republic for the inter
diction cannot well be denied. It should be noted, also, that the

? It is not illogical nor unreasonable to suppose that these views of Spain were
offered to c arry into effect the wishes of France. See Diplomatic Correspondence.

THE INTERDICTION OF THE DEPOSITS. 175
first steps taken by the intendant to modify the severity of the
act, were succeeding the reception by him of the order to that
effect from the French charge d'affairs at Philadelphia. Here,
then, the intendant had the orders of both French and Spanish
officials high in authority to revoke the interdiction, but refused
fully to obey either, surely because he must have had in his pos
session an order from a much higher tribunal to justify a refusal
against such preponderating odds.
It was beyond the power of the government of Spain to order
the revocation of the interdiction at New Orleans, because she
had retroceded Louisiana to France. This was known to the
inhabitants of New Orleans. They knew that France alone had
the authority to order the intendant to remove that restriction.
This partly explains why the orders of Spain to the intendant
were not obeyed, and why the interdiction was continued until
orders had been received from France to restore the privilege.
The orders of Spain to the intendant to remove the interdiction
were only perfunctory measures resorted to to allay the wrath of
the Americans. Why were the orders of the government of
Spain unavailing? If the act of the intendant was not pursuant
to the direct or indirect orders of France, why did not the latter,
when she learned of the distress and indignation in America,
order the removal of the interdiction? The king of Spain had
ratified the treaty of St. Ildefonso in October, 1802, thus perfect
ing the ownership of the province by France; but the latter took
no steps to remedy the complaint, though well knowing that upon
her order alone would the intendant act. Was it not, as herein
stated, because Napoleon desired to breed dissatisfaction among
the people west of the Alleghanies with the view of their eventual
separation from the Atlantic states and their formal coalescence
with Louisiana for their own protection, prosperity and happi
ness? For many years after the province had passed to the possession
of the United States, the latter endeavored to obtain from the
Spanish government satisfaction for the damage done by the
interdiction of the deposits at New Orleans, but without suc
cess. In one way or another, Spain managed to evade any resti
tution therefor. Why? Was it not because she knew that the
order had been issued at the dictation of the French republic ? If
it had resulted from the order of France, it was very natural that
Spain should object strenuously to payment therefor. On the
contrary, inasmuch as Spain was usually prompt to pay her just

176 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
dues, would she not have settled this claim, instead of contesting
it to the last, and then in the end totally avoiding payment ? The
item was not settled until the treaty between Spain and the United
States in 1819, when in consideration of mutual renunciations,
the claim was finally dropped by the United States.

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 177

CHAPTER V

The Cession to the United States

THE treaty of Amiens, concluded March 25, 1802, between
France and Great Britain, was unsatisfactory to both
nations; and it was not strange, therefore, that hostilities
soon again made their appearance. During the autumn of 1802
and the succeeding winter, both nations seemed to be drifting
steadily and djrectly into the vortex of war. The possession of
Louisiana by France made its defense by that nation necessary, as
it also made its conquest and acquisition an object to Great Britain.
The transfer by Spain was secret, and although it soon leaked out,
several months of delay were gained by France, during which time
the preparations to occupy and defend it with troops were made.
Neither the sentiments of Spain, nor the distress of the western
settlers in the United States, figured with much importance in the
calculations of either France or Great Britain. On August 16,
1802, Mr. Livingston wrote from Paris to the secretary of state,
"There are obvious symptoms of ill humor between this country
and Britain, and I think it will not be long before they assume a
serious aspect. Good may arise out of this evil, if it should hap
pen." And he wrote on September 1, "The extreme hauteur of
this Government to all around them will not suffer peace to be
of long continuance. The French minister at Lisbon, it is said,
is coming home without taking leave. England is very sour.
. Helvetia is still in arms." He wrote on October 28,
"While the union between France and Russia subsists, the dis
contents which almost every nation in Europe feels at the extreme
loftiness of the first will be suppressed. But as fear and not
affection occasions the suppression, they are ready to break out
on the first favorable moment. Many think that moment not very
II— 12

178 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES-.
distant. . . . Britain is seriously dissatisfied, and indeed
has some reason to complain. . . . The prospect of a rupt
ure grows mlore serious. I can tell you with certainty that a
remonstrance in pretty strong terms has been presented by her
minister on the subject of the Consul's interference in the affairs
of Helvetia. How it will be received I know not; but think it
Would not have been made if it had not been the intention of
Britain to seek a quarrel." He said on February 18, 1803, "I
find that the sentiments of the two nations (France and Great
Britain), with respect to each other, have totally changed from
what they were a year ago ; they at present mortally hate each
other, and nothing but the want of allies keeps Britain from
breaking out."*
Through the friendly offices of Joseph Bonaparte, Mr. Living
ston, in one of his long memorials to the first consul about the
middle of February, 1803, made the following audacious observa
tions : "It cannot be doubted that the peace between France and
Britain has been too disadvantageous to the latter to be of long
duration. Strong symptoms of an approaching rupture have
already appeared; and the statesmen of both countries will begin
to examine the points of attack and defense, and the acquisitions
that afford the most permanent advantages. The Cape, Malta
and Egypt have already awakened" the cupidity of Great Britain.
Should she extend her views across the Atlantic (and what is to
limit them?) the cession of Louisiana to France offers her the
fairest pretence to invade that country either from Canada or by
the Atlantic. She felt no reluctance in leaving them to Spain ;
but she will not quietly see them in the hands of France. She
will strain every nerve to acquire them. By uniting them with
Canada and Nova Scotia she encircles the United States. .
If she should unite Louisiana and West Florida to her other
American possessions, no power in Europe will be able to oppose
her force." On the nth of March he said, "things every day
look more towards a rupture between this country and Britain,
and though the politicians think otherwise I believe a war not very
distant." In his letter of March 12, he communicated the follow
ing ominous occurrence:
"I broke off this part of my letter to attend Madame Bona
parte's drawing-room, where a circumstance happened of suffi
cient importance to merit your attention. . . . After the
First Consul had gone the circuit of one room, he turned to me

?American State Papers.

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 179
and made some of the common inquiries usual on these occasions.
He afterwards returned and entered into further conversation.
When he quitted me, he passed most of the other ministers merely
with a bow, went up to Lord Whitworth (the English minister),
and after the first civilities said : 'I find, my lord, your nation
want war again.' L. W. : 'No, sir, we are very desirous of
peace.' First Consul : 'You have just finished a war of fifteen
years.' L. W. : 'It is true, sir, and that war was fifteen years
too long.' Consul : 'But you want another war of fifteen years.'
L. W. : 'Pardon me, sir, we are very desirous of peace.' Consul :
'I must either have Malta or war.' L. W. : T am not prepared,
sir, to speak on that subject; and I can only assure you, citizen
First Consul, that we wish for peace.' The prefect of the palace
then came up to the Consul and informed him that there were
ladies in the next room and asked him to go in. He made no
reply, but bowing hastily to the company retired immediately to
his cabinet without entering the other room. Lord Whitworth
came up to me and repeated the conversation as I now give you.
I asked Lord Whitworth whether there were any pending nego
tiations relative to Malta. He told me that there were; that the
conduct of France having convinced them that they still had
views upon Egypt, and the guaranties to which they were entitled
with respect to Malta not having been executed, they thought
they could not surrender it with safety. But what brought on
the business today was a message from the King of Great Britain
to the Parliament on the 1st which has just been received here,
speaking with distrust of the armaments in the French ports, and
in fact preparing them for war. It is then highly probable that
a new rupture will take place, since it is hardly possible that the
First Consul would commit himself so publicly unless his determi
nation had been taken."*
The American minister to England, Rufus King, wrote to the
secretary of state on Alarch 17, that "war seems more and more
probable; indeed it appears to me inevitable. Holland will be
involved, and Spain and Portugal must obey the commands of
France." He announced that the day after the king's message
to parliament was communicated to the French government,
Bonaparte delivered to Lord Whitworth a paper practically
amounting to a declaration of war; and that the greatest activity
prevailed in the British military and naval departments. The
"paper" referred to was the ultimatum of France, from which she

?American State Papers.

180 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
could not retreat, and to which Great Britain could not accede
with honor. Thus, as early as the middle of March, war was
rendered absolutely inevitable. As this culmination of the jeal
ousies and hostilities through many months had a direct bearing
upon the fate of Louisiana, it has here been given considerable
space. Previous to this time, say the middle of March, 1803, there is
not a line to show that Bonaparte intended otherwise than to take
possession of Louisiana with the armament still assembled in
Holland. Indeed, in his "paper" to Lord Whitworth he said,
"The expedition preparing in the Dutch ports was, as all the
world knew, destined for America ; but in consequence of the mes
sage (of the King of England to Parliament), it had been recalled
and would not proceed. If the armament announced in the mes
sage be not satisfactorily explained, or if it take place France
Would march twenty thousand men into Holland. The forces
debarked in the ports of Holland would be reinforced and
assembled on the coast of Flanders. The French army will be
immediately put on a war establishment. England must not
expect, under the cover of an armament, to avoid the execution
of the treaty of Amiens." * As Great Britain did not retreat from
the declarations of the king's message, nor explain the meaning
of her armament, an immediate and radical change occurred in
all the involved policies of France.
As early as December 20, 1802, Lord Whitworth, the British
ambassador to France, wrote to his government that, "The First
Consul is determined to exert his utmost efforts, not only to sub
due St. Domingo, but to strengthen himself in Louisiana and the
Floridas; and so pressing are his insistances with the Court of
Spain for the possession of those two provinces that they will
inevitably be ceded to him in the course of the month of Jan
uary." f He wrote on February 7, 1803, that if St. Domingo
should be lost to France, Napoleon would no doubt turn his
whole attention to Louisiana and the Floridas. On February 28.
he wrote, "In the next place, the conduct of America, from whose
President everything subservient was expected, and by whom it is
now foreseen that every opposition will be made to the projects of
the French Government in that part of the world and that
so far from being able to gain quiet possession of the Floridas,
the settlement even of Louisiana may be considered as doubtful."

? American State Papers.
t Foreign Correspondence of England.

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 181
And again on March 17 he wrote, "The Americans, whose fears
never suffered them to doubt the professed destination of the
armaments in the Dutch ports, are now delivered from their appre
hensions. They are sanguine enough to hope that they shall hear
no more of the threatened exchange of the Floridas, or even of
the projects on Louisiana. It is certain that M. de Talleyrand
has given the American Alinister (Mr. Livingston) reason to
suppose that these projects will be deferred, and he trusts to the
chapter of accidents for the rest." From the statement above, it
will be seen that the British minister did not believe that the
French armament was destined for Louisiana. As shown in the
king's message to parliament, it was not doubted that the French
force in the Dutch ports was intended to be used against Eng
land. The account of his famous interview with Napoleon is given by
Lord Whitworth as follows : "He began by asking me if I had
any news from England. I told him that I had received letters
from Your Lordship (the English Prime Minister) two days ago.
He immediately said, 'So you are determined to go to war.' 'No,
Premier Consul,' I replied, 'we are too sensible of the advantages
of peace.' 'Nous avons,' said he, 'deja fait la guerre, pendant
quinze ans.' As he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed
only, 'C'en est deja trop.' 'Mais,' said he, 'vous voulez la faire
encore quinze annees, et vous m'y forcez.' I told him that was
very far from His Alajesty's intentions. He then proceeded to
Count Marcoff and the Chevalier Azzara, who were standing
together at a little distance from me, and said to them, 'Les
Anglais veulent la guerre, mais s'ils sont les premiers a tirer
l'epee, je serai le dernier a la remettre. lis ne respectent pas les
traites. II faut dorenavant les couvrir de crepe noir.' I suppose
he meant the treaties. He then went his round, and was thought
by all those to whom he addressed himself to betray great signs of
irritation. In a few minutes he came back to me, to my great
annoyance, and resumed the conversation, ii such it can be called,
by something personally civil to me. He then began again :
'Pour qudi des armements? centre qui des measures de precau
tion? Je n'ai pas un seul vaisseau de leigne dans les ports de
France, mais si vous voulez armer, j'armerai aussi; se vous voulez
vous battre, je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez peut-etre tuer la
France, mais jemais l'intimider.' 'On ne vondroit,' said I, 'ni
l'un ni l'autre. On vondroit vivre en bonne intelligence avec
elle.' Tl faut done respecter les traites,' replied he; 'malheur a
ceux qui ne respectent pas les traites. lis en serout responsibles

182 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
a toute I'Europe.' He was too agitated to make it advisable to
prolong the conversation. I therefore made no answer, and he
retired to his apartments repeating the last phrase. It is to be
remarked that all this passed loud enough to be overheard by two
hundred people who were present. I was fortunate enough not
to be betrayed into anything imprudent, or which could be mis
construed. I am persuaded that there was not a single person
who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the
total want of dignity as well as of decency on the occasion."*
On the 18th of March Mr. Livingston wrote, "We are here (at
Paris) all in a bustle, not knowing whether we are to have war or
peace. In England they expect war certainly. Here they are
very anxious to avoid it. . Peace will in no event last
long. I frankly confess that though I believe a war would be
extremely dangerous for Great Britain, yet I think her ruin
inevitable if France continues ten years at peace." In his letter
of March. 24th he said, "The question of war yet remains unde
termined. Here there is an earnest and sincere desire to avoid it,
as well in the government as the people." But Mr. Livingston
evidently did not take into consideration the views or ambitions of
the first consul, although he had written on September 1, 1802,
"one man is everything." f
The earliest premonitions of the important changes to come
were first observed by Mr. Livingston on April n, and presented
in his letter of that date to Mr. Madison. He said, "The affair
of New Orleans gave me two very- important strings to touch : I
endeavored to convince the government that the United States
would avail themselves of the breach of the treaty to possess them
selves of New Orleans and the Floridas ; that Britain would never
suffer Spain to grant the Floridas to France, even were she so
disposed, but would immediately seize upon them as soon as the
transfer was made ; that without the Floridas Louisiana would be
indefensible, as it possesses not one port even for frigates ; and T
showed the effect of suffering that important country to fall into
the hands of the British, both as it affected our country and the
naval force of all Europe. These reasons, with the probability
of war, have had, I trust, the desired effect. M. Talleyrand asked
me this day, when pressing the subject, whether we wished to
have the whole of Louisiana. I told him no; that our wishes
extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas ; that the policy, of

? Memoirs of Lord Whitworth.
t American State Papers.

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 183
France, however, should dictate (as I have shown in an official
note) to give us the country above the river Arkansas, in order
to place a barrier between them and Canada. He said that if
they gave New Orleans the rest would be of little value ; and that
he would wish to know 'what we would give for the whole.' I
told him it was a subject I had not thought oT; but that I sup
posed we should not object to twenty millions "(livres), provided
our citizens were paid. He told me that this was too low an offer,
and that he would be glad if I would reflect upon it and tell him
tomorrow. I told him that, as Mr. Monroe would be in town in
two days, I would delay my further offer until I had the pleasure
of introducing him. He said that he did not speak from author
ity, but that the idea had struck him. I have reason, however, to
think that this resolution was taken in council on Saturday. On
Friday I received Mr. Ross's motion (made in the United States
Senate for the adoption of his resolutions : see elsewhere) : I
immediately sent it to M. Talleyrand, with an informal note
expressive of my fears that it would be carried into effect; and
requesting that General Bernadotte (minister to be sent to Amer
ica) might not go till something effectual was done. I also trans
lated it, and gave it to General Bernadotte, and pressed upon him
the necessity of asking express instructions, in case he should find
the island (of New Orleans) in possession of the Americans. He
went immediately to Joseph Bonaparte. These I believe were
exciting causes to the train we are now in, and which I flatter
myself we shall be able on the arrival of Mr. Monroe to pursue to
effect. I think from every appearance that war is very near at
hand ; and under these circumstances I have endeavored to impress
the Government that not a momemt should be lost lest Britain
should anticipate us. I have used every exertion with the Span
ish ambassador and Lord Whitworth to prevent the transfer of
the Floridas; and wrote to Mr. Graham (at Madrid) in Mr.
Pinckney's absence, to give every attention to that object, and to
avail himself of the coolness which subsisted between the French
ambassador and the Prince of Peace (Godoy J. This has retarded
the negotiation ; and unless they get Florida, I have convinced
them Louisiana is worth little. I would rather have confined our
views to smaller objects; and I think that if we succeed, it would
be good policy to exchange the west bank ©f the Mississippi with
Spain for the Floridas, reserving New Orleans. Perhaps, how
ever, I am too sanguine in my expectations: we will not, there
fore, dispose of the skin till we have killed the bear."*
? American State Papers.

184 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
From this extract it will be seen how little Mr. Livingston com
prehended what was at that moment transpiring between the
French leaders. But no one could have forecast coming events,
although they cast their shadows before. He seemed in his let
ter of April 1 1 to think that his efforts were succeeding, and that
he was instrumental in retarding the negotiations at Madrid for
the cession of the Floridas to France between the French ambas
sador and Godoy. Notwithstanding that Talleyrand broached
the subject of the sale of all of Louisiana, Mr. Livingston did not
see, had no way of seeing, that its sale was practically tendered.
He had been instructed at the outset to use every endeavor to
prevent the transfer of Louisiana to France; and after the trans
fer was known to have been made had employed all his powers to
induce France to relinquish the province ; and when he found thaf
object out of the question had sought with arguments and threats,
under limited authority, to gain the recognition of substantial
advantages for America. Consequently, when Talleyrand asked
'him if he wished the whole of Louisiana, fie, nor dreaming what
was coming, answered "no," because the worthlessness of
Louisiana without the Floridas had been the burden of his own
arguments, and it would appear like stultification to show an
eagerness, under the circumstances, to possess the whole province.
It is no doubt true that the resolutions of Mr. Ross in the United
States senate, when presented to the French government with the
views of Mr. Livingston that they were likely to be carried into
effect and possession be taken of New Orleans by the Americans,
had much to do in hastening the negotiations of cession.
The United States, from the moment it was learned that France
had secured Louisiana, was intensely opposed to the transfer, and
this feeling grew in strength as time passed and the rapacity and
power of Napoleon were developed. The government soon
realized that war with France would almost certainly result from
the transfer, owing to Napoleon's policy of hostility to every
resistance to this ambition for dominion. The French govern
ment was told of this sentiment in the United States. It was
also informed at divers times and in various ways that the United
States would try to maintain, peaceably if possible, forcibly if
necessary, their rights on the Mississippi as stipulated in the Span
ish treaty of 1795. Every effort was made by Mr. Livingston to
secure from the French government an acknowledgment of the
rights of the United States on the Mississippi, but without avail.
Any commitment on that question was rigidly avoided by France.
Unquestionably, Napoleon, who expected until the last moment

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 185
to take possession of Louisiana and make it a powerful colony,
did not care to handicap his future arrangements and policy in
America with any questionable or unnecessary promises to the
United States. As his policy would most certainly have been to
close the Mississippi against the United States, and as the United
States would never have surrendered that right but "with their
political existence," as Mr. Livingston informed the French min
ister of state, the result would undoubtedly have been war. Of
course Napoleon realized that the United States alone would
prove no mean antagonist, and he was further well aware that in
case of such a war Great Britain and the United States would
join hands against him. Therefore, as he camje to see that war
with Great Britain was inevitable, he likewise realized that the
United States would not hesitate, while all the strength of France
was engaged to crush or hold in check her ancient enemy, to take
possession of the mouth of the Alississippi, with force if necessary.
It was not necessary to tell Napoleon that this could easily be done
by the United States, although such a finality was laid before
him. Owing, then, to the certainty of losing Louisiana to the
United States in case of a war with Great Britain, and to the
inevitableness of such a war, his only course was to get rid of
Louisiana before the commencement of hostilities. He could
return it to Spain, or could sell it to the United States. There
would be no immediate gain by returning it to Spain; he could
secure immediately from the United States a goodly sum. Hence
his determination to sell.
The United States, not knowing of the state of the negotia
tions at Paris, instructed Messrs. Livingston and Alonroe on
April 18, 1803, to press the French government for a settlement
of rights and claims. They were instructed that "If the French
Government, instead of friendly arrangements or views, should
be found to meditate hostilities, or to have formed projects which
will constrain the United States to resort to hostilities, such com
munications are then to be held with the British Government as
will sound its dispositions and invite its concurrence in the war.
Your own prudence will suggest that the communications be so
made, as, on one hand, not to precipitate France into hostile
operations, and, on the other, not to lead Great Britain from the
supposition that war depends on the choice of the United States,
and that their choice of war will depend on her participation in
it. If war is to be the result, it is manifestly desirable that it be
delayed until the certainty of this result can be known, and the
legislative and other provisions can be made here; and also of

186 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
great importance that the certainty should not be known to Great
Britain, who might take advantage of the posture of things to
press on the United States disagreeable conditions of her entering
into the war. . . . Notwithstanding the just repugnance of
this country to a coalition of any sort with the belligerent politics
of Europe, the advantages to be derived from the co-operation of
Great Britain in a war of the United States at this period against
France and her allies, are too obvious and too important to be
renounced. . . . The price which she may attach to her
co-operation cannot be foreseen, and therefore cannot be the sub
ject of full and precise instructions. It may be expected that she
will insist at least on a stipulation that neither of the parties shall
make peace or truce without the consent of the other ; and as sucR
an article cannot be deemed unreasonable and will secure us
against the possibility of her being detached in the course of the
war by seducing overtures from France, it will not be proper to
raise difficulties on that account. It may be useful, however, to
draw from her a definition as far as the case will admit of the
objects contemplated by her that whenever with ours they may be
attainable by peace, she may be duly pressed to listen to it*.
. On another point, it may be answered at once that Greal
Britain shall enjoy a free trade with all the ports to be acquired
by the United States on the terms allowed to the most favored
nations in the ports generally of the United States. If macle art
essential condition, you may admit that in the ports to be acquired
within the Mississippi, the trade of her subjects shall be on the
same footing for a term of about ten years with that of our own
citizens. . . . The anxiety which Great Britain has shown
to extend her dominion to the Mississippi, the uncertain extent
of her claims from north to south beyond the western limits of
the United States, and the attention she has paid to the northwest
coast of America, make it probable that she will connect witK a
war on this occasion a pretension to the acquisition of the country
on the west side of the Mississippi, understood to be ceded by
Spain to France, or at least of that portion of it lying between that
river and the Missouri. The evils involved in such an extension
of her possessions in our neighborhood and in such a hold on the
Mississippi, are obvious. The acquisition is the more objection
able as it would be extremely displeasing to our westerncitizens,
and as its evident bearing on South America might be expected
to arouse all the jealousies of France and Spain, and to prolong
the war on which the event would depend. Should this preten
sion, therefore, be pressed, it must be resisted as altogether

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 187
repugnant to the sentiments and to the sound policy of the United
States. ... A separate letter to you is enclosed, authoriz
ing you to enter into such communications and conferences with
British ministers as may possibly be required by the conduct of
France. The letter is mate a separate one, that it may be used
with the effect but without the formality of a commission. It is
hoped that sound calculations of interest as well as a sense of right
in the French Government, will prevent the necessity of using the
authority expressed in this letter. . . .If France should
avow or evince a determination to deny to the United States the
free navigation of the Mississippi, your consultations with Great
Britain may be held on the ground that war is inevitable. Should
the navigation not be disputed and the deposits alone be denied,
it will be prudent to adapt your consultations to the possibility
that congress may distinguish between the two cases and make a
question how far the latter right may call for an instant resort to
arms, or Eow far a procrastination of that remedy may be sug
gested and justified by the prospect of a more favorable con
juncture. . . . These instructions have thus far supposed
that Great Britain and France are at peace and that neither of
them intend at present to interrupt it."*
Thus it will be seen that the United States, whether they were
joined by Great Britain or not, intended to conduct war if neces
sary against France, to gain the rights claimed on the Mississippi.
Of course, an active alliance with Great Britain, if it could be,
secured without too severe a sacrifice, was a result earnestly to Be
desired. Should war commence between France and England,
the United States could no doubt either form an active alliance
with the latter or secure valuable concessions on the Mississippi,
upon liberal terms, from the former. War between France and
England, it was seen, could not result otherwise than to the vast
advantage of the United States. But the international compli
cations which had been heating with such intensity for so many
months, were now almost ready to boil over. The crisis was
reached, as is shown by the following letters to the state depart
ment from Mr. Livingston : "Paris, April 13, 1803, midnight.
"I have just come from the Minister of the Treasury. Our
conversation was so important, that I think it necessary to write
it, while the impressions are strong upon my mind ; and the rather,

?American State Papers.

188 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
as I fear that I shall not have the time to copy and send this let
ter, if I defer it till morning.
"By my letter of yesterday, you learned that the minister asked
me whether I would agree to purchase Louisiana, &c. ; on the 12th,
I called upon him to press this matter further. He then thought
proper to declare that his proposition was .only personal, but still
requested me to make an offer ; and, upon my declining to do so,
as I expected Mr. Monroe the next day, he shrugged up his
shoulders, and. changed the conversation. Not willing, however,
to lose sight of it, I told him I had been long endeavoring to bring
him to some point; but, unfortunately, without effect: that I
wished merely to have the negotiation opened by any proposition
on his part; and, with that view, had written him a note which
contained that request, grounded upon my apprehension of the
consequence of sending out General Bernadotte without enabling
him to say a treaty was begun. He told me he would answer my
note, but that he must do it evasively, because Louisiana was not
theirs. I smiled at this assertion, and told him that I had seen
the treaty recognizing it; that I knew the Consul had appointed
officers to govern the country; and that he had himself told me
that General Victor was to take possession ; that, in a note written
by the express order of the First Consul, he had told me that
General Bernadotte was to treat relative to it in the United States,
&c. He still persisted that they had it in contemplation to obtain
it, but had it not. I told him that I was very well pleased to
understand this from him, because, if so, we should not commit
ourselves with them in taking it from Spain, to whom, by his
account, is still belonged ; and that, as we had just cause of com
plaint against her, if Air. Monroe concurred in opinion with me,
we should negotiate no further on the subject, but advise our
Government to take possession. He seemed alarmed at the bold
ness of the measure, and told me he would answer my note, but
that it would be evasively. I told him I should receive with*
pleasure any communication from him, but that we were not dis
posed to trifle ; that the times were critical, and though I did not
know what instructions Mr. Monroe might bring, I was perfectly
satisfied that they would require a precise and prompt notice;
that I was very fearful, from the little progress I had made, that
my Government would consider me as a very indolent negotiator.
He laughed, and told me that he would give me a certificate that I
was the most importunate he had yet rnlet with.
"There was something so extraordinary in all this, that I did
not detail it to you till I found some clue to the labyrinth, which'

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 189
I have done, as you will find before I finish this letter; and the
rather, as I was almost certain that I could rely upon the intelli
gence I had received of the resolution to dispose of this country.
"This day Mr. Alonroe passed with me in examining my papers ;
and while he and several others were at dinner with me, I observed
the Alinister of the Treasury (Alarbois) walking in my garden.
I sent out Colonel Livingston to him ; he told him he would return
when we had dined. While we were taking coffee he came in;
and, after being some time in the room, we strolled into the next
room, when he told me he heard that I had been at his house two
days before, when he was at St. Cloud; that he thought I might
have something particular to say to him, and had taken the first
opportunity to call on me. I saw that this was meant as an open
ing to one of those free conversations which I had frequently had
with him. I accordingly began on the subject of the debt, and
related to him the extraordinary conduct of the minister, &c. He
told me that this led to something important, that had been curi
ously mentioned to him at St. Cloud ; but, as my house was full of
company, he thought I had better call upon him any time before
eleven that night. He went away, and a little after, when Mr.
Monroe took leave, I followed him. He told me that he wished
me to repeat what I had said relative to M. Talleyrand's request
ing a proposition from me as to the purchase of Louisiana. I
did so ; and concluded with the extreme absurdity of his evasions
of that day, and stated the consequence of any delay on this sub
ject, as it would enable Britain to take possession, who would
readily relinquish it to us. He said that this proceeded upon a
supposition of her making so successful a war as to be enaDlecT to
retain her conquests. I told him that it was probable that the"
same idea might suggest itself to the United States ; in which case,
it would be their interest to contribute to render her successful ;
and I asked whether it was prudent to throw us into her scale?
This led to long discussions of no moment to repeat. We re
turned to the point : he said, that what I had told him led him to
think that what the Consul had said to him on Sunday, at St.
Cloud, (the day on which, as I told him, the determination had
been taken to sell,) had more of earnest than he thought at the
time; that the Consul had asked him what news from England?
As he knew he read the papers attentively, he told him that he had
seen in the London papers the proposition for raising fifty thou
sand men to take New Orleans. The Consul said he had seen it
too, and had also seen that something was said about two millions
of dollars being disposed among the people about him„ to bribe

190 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
them, &c. ; and then left him. That afterwards, when walking in
the garden, the Consul came again to him, and spoke to him abou!
the troubles that were excited in America, and inquired how far I
was satisfied with his last note. Here some civil things were
introduced, for which I presume I am more indebted to the min
ister's politeness than to his veracity; so let them sleep. He
(Marbois) then took occasion to mention his sorrow that any
cause of difference should exist between our countries. The Con
sul told him, in reply, "Well, you have the charge of the Treasury ;
let them give you one hundred millions of Francs, and pay their
own claims, and take the whole country.' Seeing, by my looks,'
that I was surprised at so extravagant a demand, he added that
he considered the demand as exorbitant, and had told the First
Consul that the thing was impossible; that we had not the means
of raising that. The Consul told him we might borrow it. I
now plainly saw the whole business : first, the Consul was disposed
to sell ; next, he distrusted Talleyrand, on account of the business
of the supposed intention to bribe, and meant to put the negotia
tion into the hands of Marbois, whose character for integrity is
established. I told him that the United States were anxious to
preserve peace with France ; that, for that reason, they wished to
remove them to the west side of the Mississippi ; that we would be
perfectly satisfied with New Orleans and the Floridas, and had
no disposition to extend across the river; that, of course, we
would not give any great sum for the purchase ; that he was right
in his idea of the extreme exorbitancy of the demand, which
would not fall short of one hundred and twenty-five millions;
that, however, we would be ready to purchase, provided the sum
was reduced to reasonable limits. He then pressed me to name
the sum. I told him that this was not worth while, because,
as he only treated the inquiry as a matter of curiosity, any dec
larations of mine would have no effect. If a negotiation was
to be opened, we should (Mr. Monroe and myself) make the
offer after mature reflection. This compelled him to declare,
that, though he was not authorized expressly to make the inquiry
from me, yet, that, if I could mention any sum that came near
the mark, that could be accepted, he would communicate it to
the First Consul. I told him that we had no sort of authority
to a sum that bore any proportion to what he mentioned; but
that, as he himself considered the demand as too high, he would
oblige me by telling me what he thought would be reasonable.
He replied that, if we would name sixty millions, and take upon
us the American claims, to the amount of twenty more, he would

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES.

I9I

try how far this would be accepted. I told him that it was vain
to ask anything that was so greatly beyond our means; that
true policy would dictate to the First Consul not to press such
a demand; that he must know that it would render the pres
ent Government unpopular, and have a tendency, at the next
election, to throw the power into the hands of men who were
most hostile to a connection With France; and that this would
probably happen in the midst of a war. I asked him whether
the few millions acquired at this expense would not be too dearly
bought. He frankly confessed that he was of my sentiments;
but that he feared the Consul would not relax. I asked him
to press this argument upon him, together with the danger of
seeing the country pass into the hands of Britain. I told him
that he had seen the ardor of the Americans to take it by force,
and the difficulty with which they were restrained by the
prudence of the president; that he must easily see how much
the hands of the war party would be strengthened, when they
learned that France was upon the eve of a rupture with Eng
land. He admitted the weight of all this: 'But,' says he,
"you know the temper of a youthful conqueror; everything he
does is rapid as lightning; we have only to speak to him as an
opportunity presents itself, perhaps in a crowd, when he bears
no contradiction. When I am alone with him, I can speak
more freely, and he attends ; but this opportunity seldom hap
pens, and is always accidental. Try, then, if you cannot come
up to my mark. Consider the extent of the country, the exclu
sive navigation of the river, and the importance of having no
neighbors to dispute you, no war to dread.' I told him that
I considered all these as important considerations, but there was
a point beyond which we could not go, and that fell far short
of the sum he mentioned.
"I asked him, in case of a purchase, whether they would stipu
late that France would never possess the Floridas, and that she
would aid us to procure them, and relinquish all right that she
might have to them. He told me that she would go thus far.
I added, that I would now say nothing more on the subject,
but that I would converse with Mr. Monroe; and that I was
sure to find him disposed to do everything that was reasonable
or could be expected, to remove every cause of difference between
the two countries. That, however, if any negotiation should go
on, I would wish that the First Consul would depute somebody
to treat with us, who had more leisure than the Minister for
Foreign Affairs. I said this to see whether my conjectures

192 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
relative to him were well founded. He told me that as the
First Consul knew our personal friendship, he having several
times had occasion to speak of me and my family, and the prin
ciples that we held, he believed that there would be no difficulty,
when this negotiation was somewhat advanced, to have the man
agement of it put into his hands. . . . He earnestly pressed
me to make some proposition that was so near the First Consul's
as to admit his mentioning it to him. I told him that I would
consult Mr. Monroe, but that neither he nor I could accede to
his ideas on the subject. . : . ." "Paris, April 17, 1803.
"On the 14th I called upon Mr. Monroe, to present him to the
minister, who had, upon my application, fixed three o'clock that
day for his reception.
"On waiting upon the minister, we found M. Marbois there,
who told me that he had come to communicate to the minister
what had passed between us, and that he greatly regretted the
not being able to bring us to such an offer as he might men
tion to the First Consul. I told him that it was unnecessary
to repeat what would compel us to limit our offers to a much
more moderate sum, as I had already detailed them at large;
and he knew they exceeded our means. We were very gra
ciously received by the minister, whom I pressed to obtain as
early a day as possible for the reception of Mr. Monroe, as time
pressed, and we were anxious to conclude our business, for rea
sons arising out of the present disturbed state of America. He
told me he would speak to the First Consul that night on the
subject; and that he hoped some person would be appointed to
treat with us, even before Mr. Monroe was presented. After
a little general conversation, he took leave, in expectation that .
Mr. Monroe would be presented this day (Sunday), being a
day of reception ¦ for the civil officers of the Government. The
next day, Mr. Monroe and myself, after spending some time
in consultation, determined to offer fifty millions, including our
debts; we presumed it would be best only to mention forty in
the first instance. This I accordingly did, in a conference I had
on the 15th with M. Marbois. He expressed great sorrow that we
could not go beyond that sum, because he was sure that it would
not be accepted, and that perhaps the whole business would be
defeated, which he the more feared, as he had just received a
note from the minister, indicative of the Consul's not being
quite pleased that he had so greatly lowered his original propo-

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 193
sition. He said that he saw our situation, and he knew that
there was a point beyond which we could not go with safety
to ourselves or the President; but he wished us to advance to
that point. He said that he would, if I wished, go that very
day to St. Cloud, and let me know the result. I reminded him
of the Consul's promise to pay the debt. I placed in the strong
est light his personal obligation on this subject; and desired
him to urge it as an additional reason to conclude an agreement
which would facilitate the means of doing it. The morn
ing, which was yesterday, I again called to see him. He told
me that he had been to St. Cloud; that the Consul received
his proposition very coldly; and that I might consider the busi
ness as no longer in his hands, since he had given him no further
powers; that he had urged the Consul's promise relative to the
debt, which he admitted; but said, at the same time, he did
not think it had exceeded three millions, though my letter
expressly mentioned twenty. He expressed great sorrow upon
the occasion; and advised me to press M. Talleyrand to pre
sent Mr. Monroe the next day (that is, this day) ; that he hoped
that, if the Consul saw me, as he had a very particular esteem
for me, he would renew the subject with me himself.
"I went to Mr. Alonroe, and carried him to the minister, who
had not returned from St. Cloud; and afterward went again,
but could not see him. I dined with the Second Consul yes
terday; and in the evening M. Marbois came in. I took him
aside, and. asked him if any thing further had passed; he said
not; but, that as he was to go to St. Cloud the next day, it
was possible that the Consul might touch upon the subject again;
and that, if he did not, I might consider the plan as relinquished ;.
and that, if I had any further proposition to make, it would
be well to state it. I then told him, that on further conversa
tion with Mr. Monroe, we had resolved to go to the greatest
possible length, and that we would give fifty millions. He said'
he had very little hopes that any thing short of his propositions
would succeed; but that he would make the best use of the
arguments I had furnished him with, if an opportunity was
offered; and if nothing was done the next day, I might con
clude that the Consul had changed his sentiments; that, hav
ing given the kingdom of Etruria, whose revenues were twenty-
five millions, in exchange for this country, it was natural that
the First Consul should estimate it beyond its real value."*
?American State Papers.
II— 13

194 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
As is stated in the Memoirs of Lucien Bonaparte, Napoleon
had made up his mind as early as the 6th of April, 1803, to
sell Louisiana to the United States.* It is related there that
having told his brother Joseph of his intention, the latter vigor
ously opposed it and a quarrel resulted between the brothers.
Joseph immediately went to Lucien and told him of the inten
tion of Napoleon, the following being the language: "The
General means to give up Louisiana." To which Lucien replied,
"Bah, who'll buy it of him?" Joseph answered, "The Ameri
cans." Whereupon Lucien declared that the chambers would
not give their consent. Joseph replied that Napoleon intended
to get along without the consent of the chambers — meant to
carry it through regardless of the chambers. The two brothers,
Joseph and Lucien, -talked the matter over several hours, and
determined to oppose the sale of "Beautiful Louisiana." The
next morning, April 7th, by agreement Lucien called upon Napo
leon at the Tuileries, and found him engaged in taking his morn
ing bath. A little later Joseph called, and thus the three
brothers met in the bathroom, with Napoleon in the tub appar
ently greatly enjoying himself. Lucien had thought that Napo
leon would not dare to sell Louisiana without parliamentary
authority; and Joseph had thought he would dare to do so, but
would desist when told of the disasters sure to result to the
Bonaparte family from such a transaction. Neither of the broth
ers was wholly right. Joseph and Lucien hesitated for some
time to mention the proposed "sale of Louisiana, but finally did
and were met with the announcement that such was the inten
tion. Both declared their opposition to the sale. One complaint
led to another until the interview resulted in a violent quarrel,
in which the elder brother, Joseph, and Napoleon were the chief
actors. Complaints led to recriminations until the brothers
seemed on the point of a personal encounter. Finally Joseph
made some extremely exasperating charge against Napoleon,
whereupon the latter drenched him with water dashed from the
bathtub, which proceeding ended their dispute for the time. In
fact, as far as those, two were concerned, the question was settled.
The province would be sold. In subsequent interviews, Lucien
could not prevail upon Napoleon not to sell Louisiana. But
it must be observed that neither of the two brothers fully under
stood Napoleon's reason for selling. The Lucien memoirs show
that they did not consider the absolute necessity of selling before

?Mem *r Lucien Bonaparte; Harvard College Library.

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 195
the province should be captured either by the English or by
the Americans. In regard to results, they either did not under
stand the situation of France and Louisiana at the time, or were
kept in the dark on this particular point by Napoleon for pur
poses of his own. What the English might do or what the
Americans might do seemingly had not entered their heads ; buf
Napoelon knew the inevitable results; and history has since
shown that had he not taken the course he did and sold Louisiana
it would have been been taken possession of by the United States
at the first movement of the English to send a fleet across the
ocean for its conquest.
On the 10th of April, 1803, Easter Sunday, Napoleon called
Barbe Marbois and Alexandre Berthier in for a private consulta
tion regarding Louisiana. Both of these gentlemen were famil
iar with Louisiana and the United States, and he desired their
views concerning the alienation of the province. Mr. Marbois
favored the sale to the United States and stated his reasons there
for at great length, Napoleon listening attentively to all that
he said, and asking an occasional question. Mr. Berthier
opposed the sale and likewise presented his reasons at great
length, to all of which Napoleon listened just as intently.
Before they had made their statements he said : "I know the
full value of Louisiana, and I have been desirous of repairing
the fault of the French negotiator who abandoned it in 1763.
A few lines of a treaty have restored it to me, and I have scarcely
received it when I must expect to lose it. But if it escapes
from me, it shall one day cost dearer to those who oblige me
to strip myself of it than to those to whom I wish to deliver
it. The English have successively taken from France Canada,
Cape Breton, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and the richest por
tions of Asia. They are engaged in exciting troubles in St.
Domingo. They shall not have the Mississippi which they
covet. Louisiana is nothing in comparison with their conquests
in other parts of the globe, and yet the jealousy they feel at
the restoration of this colony to the sovereignty of France,
acquaints me with their wish to take possession of it, and it is
thus that they will begin the war. They have twenty ships of
war in the Gulf of Alexico; they sail over those seas as sover
eigns, whilst our affairs in St. Domingo have been growing
worse every day since the death of Leclerc. The conquest of
Louisiana would be easy, if they only took the trouble to make
the descent there. I have not a moment to lose in putting it
out of their reach. I know not whether they are not already

196 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
there. It is their usual course, and if I had been in their place,
I would not have waited. I wish, if there is still time, to take
from them any idea that they may have of ever possessing that
colony. I think of ceding it to the United States. I can
scarcely say I cede it to them,, for it is not yet in our posses
sion. If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies, I shall
only transmit an empty title , to those republicans, whose friend
ship I seek. They only ask of me one town in Louisiana, but
I already consider the colony as entirely lost, and it appears to
me that in the hands of this growing power, it will be more
useful to the policy and even to the commerce of France than
if I should attempt to keep it."*
The discussion was continued far into the night, and termi
nated without other statement from Napoleon than the above.
At daybreak the next morning Napoleon summoned Mr.
Marbois, who had favored the sale of Louisiana, and asked him
to read aloud the dispatches which had just beem- received from
London. The information they contained showed that in all
England naval and military preparations of every description
were in progress "with extraordinary rapidity." Napoleon was
intensely moved by tbe dispatches. He said: "The English
ask of me Lampedohso, which does not belong to me, and at
the same time wish to keep Malta for ten years. This island,
where military genius has exhausted all the means of defensive
fortification to an extent of which no one without seeing it can
form an idea, would be to them another Gibraltar. To leave
it to the English would be to give up to them the commerce
of the Levant, and to rob my southern provinces of it. They
wish to keep this possession and have me immediately vacate
Holland. Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season.
I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I will
cede; it is the whole colony without any reservation. I know
the price of what I abandon, and I have sufficiently proved the
importance that I attach to this province, since my first diplo
matic act with Spain had for its object the recovery of it. I
renounce it with the greatest regret. To attempt obstinately to
retain it would be folly. I direct you to negotiate this affair
with the envoys of the United States. Do not even await the
arrival of Mr. Monroe; have an interview this very day with
Mr. Livingston; but I require a great deal of money for this
war, and I would not like to commence it with new contributions.

?History of Louisiana; Barb£ Marbois.

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 197
For a hundred years France and Spain have been incurring
expenses for improvements in Louisiana, for which its trade
has never indemnified them. Large sums which will never be
returned to the treasury, have been lent to companies and agri
culturalists. The price of all these things is justly due to us.
If I should regulate my terms according to the value of these
vast regions to the United States, the indemnity would have no
limits. I will be moderate in consideration of the necessity in
which I am of making a sale. But keep this to yourself. I
want fifty millions (of livres), and for less than that sum I
will not treat. I would rather make a desperate attempt to keep
these fine countries. Tomorrow you shall have your full powers."*
At this point of the interview Mr. Marbois interposed some
observations in regard to whether the souls of the people in
Louisiana could be made the subject of contract and sale, where
upon he was interrupted by Napoleon, who said : "You are
giving me in all its perfection the ideology of the law of nature
and of nations. But I require money to make war on the rich
est nation of the world. Send your maxims to London. I am
sure they will be greatly admired there, and yet no great atten
tion is paid to them when the question is the occupation of the
finest regions of Asia." Continuing, he said: "Mr. Monroe
is on the point of arriving. To this minister going two thousand
leagues from his constituents, the President must have given,
after defining the object of his mission, secret instructions more
extensive than the ostensible authorization of Congress, for the
stipulation of the payments to be made. Neither this minister
nor his colleague is prepared for a decision which goes infinitely
beyond anything that they are about to ask of us. Begin by
making , them the overture without any subterfuge. You will
acquaint me, day by day, hour by hour, of your progress. The
cabinet of London is informed of the measures adopted at Wash
ington, but it can have no suspicion of those of which I am
now making. Observe the greatest secrecy, and recommend it
to the American ministers; they have not a less interest than
yourself in conforming to this counsel. You will correspond
with M. de Talleyrand who alone knows my intentions. If I
attended to his advice France would confine her ambition to the
left bank of the Rhine, and would only make war to protect our
weak states and to prevent any dismemberment of her posses
sions. But he also admits that the cession of Louisiana is not

?History of Louisiana; Barbe Marbois.

198 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
a dismemberment of France. Keep him informed of the prog
ress of this affair."
As before stated; the overtures were made, as suggested by
Napoleon, to Mr. Livingston before the arrival of Mr. Monroe;
but the latter, arriving the next day, was at once informed of
the situation of affairs. Amid the surprise and confusion neces
sarily kindled in the minds of both of the American envoys,
they still instantly perceived the importance and value of the
overtures and were not one whit behind in meeting them in the
spirit in which they were offered. The conferences were fre
quent and the deliberations rapid. There were three points to
be considered: 1. The cession of the province. 2. The price
to be paid for it. 3. The claimed indemnity for prizes and car
goes. It was at once revealed that the American envoys were
not clothed with sufficient powers to contract for the whole of
Louisiana. Such a contingency had not entered the minds of
the American government. At best they had only expected fo
get the island of New Orleans, or West Florida, or both. But
it was realized by all that it would be too late to await the arrival
of sufficient instructions from Philadelphia. In this emergency,
the Americans resolved to exceed their' instructions, accept the
cession, and take the chances of the ratifications of their actions
by the president and congress. The consent of the president
and the senate would be necessary for the ratification of the
treaty; but the house would have the disposal of the financial
measures necessary to pay for the province. Though not with
out misgivings as to the outcome at Philadelphia, the envoys
resolved to take the risk. Delay meant that England would be
in possession before three months should elapse. The Ameri
cans had brought with them the draft ot a treaty, but as the
whole aspect was changed by the French overtures, the draft
proposed by the latter was used as the basis. In fact, the draft
prepared by Napoleon himself, a copy of which may be found
herein, was the foundation of the negotiations. The first serious
obstacle encountered was in regard to. the limits of Louisiana.
The Americans asked for the customary guaranty of the prop
erty they were about to acquire by purchase; but were told by
the French* envoy that the limits of Louisiana had never been
fully and wholly defined ; that they-would have to take the prov
ince as France had received it from Spain in 1800. The treaty
of San Ildefonso was produced and carefully gone over, the lan
guage studied, and the chances were fully weighed. The Amer
icans saw that if every allowance was made for curtailment,

THE 'CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES.

199

they still would receive an immense and magnificent tract of
country, more than sufficient to satify all their future require
ments. The French envoy avoided committing himself on the
subject of limits, merely stating that the United States would
receive what had been retroceded to France.. However, in one of
the conferences he made the statement that although the Bishopric
of Louisiana had been extended to the Pacific ocean, the province
itself, concerning the rights of property and sovereignty, had
not thus been extended. In this connection M. Alarbois after
ward said: "If in appearing to be resigned to these general
terms (of the treaty of San Ildefonso) through necessity, the
American plenipotentiaries considered them really preferable to
more precise stipulations, it must be admitted that the event just
ified their foresight. The shores of the Western ocean were cer
tainly not included in the cession; but the United States are
already established there (this statement was made about the
year 1830)." Napoleon also said in this connection that "If an
obscurity did not already exist, it would perhaps be good pol
icy to put one there." M. Alarbois at first put the price of the
cession at one hundred millions of livres; but when the Amer
icans said this price was prohibitory he dropped to eighty millions.
The Americans finally yielded this figure upon the condition that
twenty millions of the eighty millions should be used to liqui
date the American claims. This was agreed to by M. Marbois.
It was agreed that the original drafts of the treaty should be
in the French language. The originals were completed on fhe
30th of April, there being three of them, but as they had to Be
copied, the signatures were not appended until the 3d of May*
It is a noteworthy and remarkable fact that the respective
envoys were greatly elated at the harmony of the proceedings
and the completion of the cession. All were impressed with the
momentous character of the negotiation. M. Marbois himself
afterward said : "A sentiment superior even to glory seemed to
animate the three ministers and never perhaps did negotiators
taste a purer joy." That is extremely strong language, and
betokens that they were in a state of spiritual ecstacy, so
impressed were they with the extraordinary nature of the act.
As soon as the treaties were signed, all spontaneously arose and
shook hands with intense feeling. Mr. Livingston, who had
labored so long and earnestly for the good of his country, said*":
"We have lived long, but this is the noblest work of our whole

? History of Louisiana; Barb6 Marbois.

200 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
lives. The treaty which we have just signed has not been
obtained by art or dictated by force ; equally advantageous to the
two contracting parties, it will change vast solitudes into flour
ishing districts. From! this day the United States take their
place among the powers of the first rank; the English lose ah"
exclusive influence in the affairs of America."
Napoleon* had followed the progress of the negotiations with*
all the interest and earnestness of his impetuous and decisive
nature, inspired as he was with intense regret at the loss of the
province and the imperative necessity of speedy action. He was
greatly pleased when the negotiations were fully completed;
but here the contradictory and inexplicable qualities of his nature
revealed themselves. He had himself set the price of the ces
sion at the minimum of fifty millions of livres. M. Marbois
afterward said of him at this point that "He learned that the
eighty millions had been agreed on; but that they were reduced
to sixty millions by the deduction stipulated to be previously
made for the settlement of the debt due by France to the Amer
icans. Then forgetting, or feigning to forget, the consent that
he had given, he said with vivacity, T would that these twenty
millions be paid into the treasury. Who has authorized you
(Marbois) to dispose of the money of the State? The rights
of the claimants cannot come before our owm' But when his
attention was called to his own figures of fifty millions for the
treasury and that really sixty millions were to be put there,
he said : Tt is true ; the negotiation does not leave me anything
to desire; sixty millions for an occupation that will not perhaps
last but a day. I would that France should enjoy this unex
pected capital, and that it may be employed in works beneficial
to her marine.' " Later Napoleon said : "This accession of ter
ritory strengthens forever the power of the United States; and
I have just given to England a maritime rival that will sooner
or later humble her pride."
To show that Napoleon was right as to the imminency of war
between France and England, it is only necessary to state that
the respective ministers of the two countries left for home on
the 17th of May, and that hostilities were begun by France on
the 22d of May by the capture of some English merchantmen,
and on the same day the treaty of cession was ratified By Napo
leon without waiting for the action of the United States. The
transfer was made none too soon.
The American envoys formally communicated to congress on
May 13 that they had concluded with France a treaty for the

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 201
whole of the province of Louisiana and gave their reasons to
justify them in thus exceeding their instructions. They stated
that the first consul at the outset had expressed the wish to
cede the whole and not a part ; and that as they proceeded with
the negotiation they found "that Mr. Marbois was absolutely
restricted to the disposition of the whole and that he would treat
for no less a portion."* This forced the Americans to con
sider the cession of the whole. They evidently were careful to
view so important an acquisition from every standpoint that was
likely to affect the United States, all of which was set forth
in their letter of Alay 13. They said: "By this acquisition,
which comprises within our limits this great river and all the
streams that empty into it from their sources to the ocean, the
apprehension of disasters is banished for ages from the United
States. We adjust by it the only remaining known cause of
variance with this very powerful nation (France) ; we antici
pate the discontent of the great rival of France, who would
probably have been wounded at any stipulation of a permanent
nature which favored the latter and which it would have been
difficult to avoid, had she retained the right bank. We cease
to have a motive of urgency at least for inclining to one Power
to avert the unjust pressure of another. We separate ourselves
in a great measure from the European world and its concerns,
especially its wars and intrigues. We make, in fine, a great
stride in real and substantial independence, the good effect
whereof will we trust be felt essentially and extensively in all
our foreign and domestic relations. Without exciting the appre
hensions of any Power, we take a more imposing attitude with
respect to all. The bond of our Union will be strengthened
and its movements become more harmonious by the increased
purity of interest which it will communicate to the several
parts which compose it. Louisiana was acquired of
Spain by France in exchange for Tuscany, which latter is settled
by treaty on the son-in-law of the King of Spain, with the title
of King of Etruria, and was estimated in the exchange in con
sideration of its revenue at one hundred millions of francs. The
First Consul thought he had made an advantageous bargain in
that exchange, as appears by the high idea which he entertained
of its value as shown on many occasions. Louisiana was the
territory which he promised in his proclamation at the peace as
an asylum to those who had become unfortunate by the revo-

? American State Papers.

202 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
lution, and which he spoke of as vast and fertile. When he
made up his mind to offer the cession of it to the United States,
it was contemplated to ask for it one hundred millions, exclusive
of the debts they owed to our citizens, which they proposed
we should pay, with a perpetual exemption from foreign
duties on the manufactures, productions and vessels of France
and Spain in the ports of the ceded territory. From that
demand, however, he receded under the deliberations of his own
cabinet; for the first proposition which M. Marbois made to us
was that we should pay eighty millions, sixty of which in cash,
the balance to our citizens, the whole in one year in Paris, with
a perpetual exemption from foreign duties as above. The modi
fication in the mode of payment, that is, by stock (for from
the quantum he never would depart) and the limitation of the
term of the duties to twelve years, with the proviso annexed
to it, which was introduced into the treaty with every other
change from his project, was the effect of negotiation and accom
modation, in which we experienced on his part and on that of
his government a promptitude and candor which were highly
grateful to us. Permit us to express an earnest wish
that the President and Senate may decide with the least pos
sible delay on the treaty and conventions which we have con
cluded and have the pleasure to transmit you. If it is the sense
of our Government to ratify them, the sooner that fact is known.
to this Government the better its effect will be."
Just before the news of the cession of Louisiana to the United
States reached the president, the attitude of Great Britain con
cerning that province and the Floridas became a matter of much
solicitude to the American authorities. The president had' been
informed that in case of a war between France and Great Brit
ain the latter would endeavor to take possession of New
Orleans. In such an event the question arose, How would such
possession affect the rights of the United States in that quar
ter? It was intimated by the British minister that the United
States might expect in that event better terms than they had
expected from either France or Spain. This intimation may
have been made in good faith, but it was also made no doubf
to gain the good will of the United States. It was intimated
also that the United States should make as little concession to
France as possible "on points disagreeable to Great Britain."
Mr. Madison instructed the American envoys to France that
should the question arise "how far in a state of war one of the
parties can of right convey territory to a neutral Power, aria*

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 203
thereby deprive its enemy of the chance of conquest incident
to war, especially when the conquest may have been actually
projected, it is thought proper to observe to you, first, That in
the present case the project of peaceable acquisition by the
United States originated prior to the war, and consequently
before a project of conquest could have existed; second, that
the right of a neutral to procure for itself by a bona fide trans
action property of any sort from a belligerent Power, ought not
to be frustrated by the chance that a rightful conquest thereof
might thereby be precluded."*
As soon as possible after the conclusion of the cession of Loui
siana to the United States, Messrs. Livingston and Monroe lost
no time in acquainting the president with all that had trans
pired. They likewise promptly informed Mr. King, the Ameri
can minister to Great Britain, of the cession, in order that the
latter might check any intended expedition of the British against
New Orleans. On May 7, Mr. King had written 'from London
that "in case of war (between France and England) it is the
purpose of this Government to send an expedition to occupy
New Orleans. If it be ceded to us (the United States) would
it not be expedient openly or confidentially to communicate tne
fact here? I have reason to be satisfied that it would prevent
the projected expedition." f This letter occasioned the prompt
action of Alessrs. Livingston and Monroe. They further told
Mr. King that he might inform the English government that
in framing the cession treaty care had been taken not to infringe
any of the rights of Great Britain to the navigation of the Mis
sissippi. On May 15, this information was conveyed by Mr.
King to the British ministry, who a little later told him that if
met the approbation of the king.
In a communication to Charles Pinckney dated, Aranjuez,
May 4, 1803, Mr. Cervallos, Spanish minister of state, said:
"ine system adopted by His Majesty not to disposses himself
of any portion of his States, deprives him of the pleasure of
assenting to the cessions which the United States wish to obtain
by purchase, as I have intimated for their information to the
Marquis of Casa Yrujo. By the retrocession made to France
of Louisiana, this Power regains the said province with the lin>
its it had, and saving the rights acquired by other Powers.
The United States can address themselves to the French Gov-

? American State Papers.
t Diplomatic Correspondence.

204 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ernment to negotiate the acquisition of. territories which may
suit their interest."* This was the first definite information
which Mr. Pinckney received from Spain to show that his efforts
to secure concessions on the Mississippi from that government
were wholly wasted ; for here was an absolute acknowledgement
that the province had passed to France, and here was the singu
lar observation that the United States must go to Paris to secure
the concessions desired on the Mississippi. The above state
ment of Mr. Ceryallos, without straining the natural meaning of
the language, may be construed to embrace the admission thai
West Florida was included in the retrocession of Louisiana to
France, because Mr. Pinckney had asked only for West Florida —
that for many months had been the sole and announced object
of his mission — and was now told, in answer to his importuni
ties, to go to France, to. whom Louisiana had been retroceded.
Why go to France after West Florida if the latter was not
included in the Louisiana retroceded? Was this not an inad
vertent admission by the Spanish minister that West Florida had
passed to France with the retrocession of Louisiana?
In a communication dated May 12, 1803, Mr. Livingston
expressed the opinion that, at the time Napoleon had read with
much attention his memorials sent to him through the favor
of his brother Joseph, "they had determined to let us have New
Orleans and the territory above the Arkansas in exchange for
certain commercial advantages, and that if they could have con
cluded with Spain, we should also have had West Florida."f
This may have been true, because about the same time the inter
diction at New Orleans was ordered revoked, and Mr. Livingston
was accorded far better treatment by the French minister
and the first consul. As early as the first of February, 1803,
something had occurred to change the attitude of the French
leaders toward the Americans. Mr. Livingston was shown
high privileges and distinguished personal considerations. He
was led to believe that his efforts would prove successful to a
reasonable degree in case the Floridas could be secured fronr
Spain by France. He soon became aware of the fact that the
first consul "had conceived an idea that by taking possession
of the country (Louisiana) he could more advantageously treat
with our Government;" and that "Mr. Talleyrand accordingly
told me several times, in general terms, that everything would

? This statement should be borne in mind.
t This is further proof that the interdiction was upon the order of France.

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES.

205

be arranged, but that they must first take possession." Mr.
Livingston further said : "What I believe principally drove them
to this measure was the promise which the First Consul had
hastily made me to pay our debt fully and promptly, and which
he found himself in no situation to fulfill and yet knew not how
to elude, -as I pressed it at every turn." The attitude of con
gress and the threatened rupture with Great Britain, Mr. Liv
ingston stated, contributed to the conclusions of the first consul
to sell Louisiana.
It was stated by Mr. Livingston on June 3, "that since the
ratification (of the cession treaty) we have had a great deal
of trouble with it, an opinion prevailing that we have made too
favorable a bargain. ... I must earnestly press you, if
you think the object important, to get the ratification as soon
as possible and to do all that on our part remains to be done.
During this transaction I have thought it improper to press any
other business that might excite the smallest irritation. How
happy, my dear sir, are we to have concluded a treaty which
will forever exclude us from the politics of this stormy quarter
of the globe. I hope that you will not let it totally pass through
your hands."
The importance of speedy action on the treaty was again called
to the attention of the president by Messrs. Livingston and
Monroe in a letter dated June 7. In order to prevent any pos
sible accident and to insure the prompt arrival of the treaty
papers in Washington, the American envoys sent the originals
and two copies by three different messengers. On July 14, the
one sent by Mr. Hughes was placed in the hands of President
Jefferson. Some misgivings having arisen in the minds of the
French authorities concerning the security of France as to the
payments to be made for Louisiana and the transfer of the prov
ince to the United States, efforts were made by M. Marbois,
at the instigation of the first consul, to correct any possible
misunderstanding. The American envoys were given to under
stand that the first consul considered the province worth from
three to four hundred millions of livres.* In other ways it was
intimated to them that they had made a splendid bargain for
themselves and that many Frenchmen were sorry of the ces
sion and would be pleased to learn that the treaty had not been
ratified by the United States. This alarmed the American envoys,
who in all of their letters of that date, urged congress and the
?American State Papers.

206 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
president to ratify the treaty and do it quickly. They wrote
June 7 : "We thought we could discern some symptoms of dis
content in the Government (of France) with the bargain it had
made. The letter from M. Marbois left no doubt on that head.
We are convinced that if the transaction was not complete, or
was within the reach of the Government, it would not take place
even on terms very different from those stipulated. There is
much reason to believe that this letter was written not solely for
the purpose of manifesting a sentiment of regret at what had
been done but to create difficulties and embarrass the transaction
in the execution of it. * * We learned from! the minister of
foreign affairs that the first consul considered the ratification as
under his control till the exchange took place, and that he might
annex to it such conditions as appeared to him to be proper ; that
he claimed every act stipulated on the part of the United States
to be performed strictly within the terms specified, or on failure
that the parties be restored to the state they were in if the treaties
were never made. We asked him what had created any doubt on
that point ; he said that the clause in the article of the convention
respecting the payment of sixty millions of francs to France,
which was made dependent on the delivery of possession of the
country to our commissary, might by accident or other causes
become nugatory; the Spaniards might not surrender it at once,
the British might take it, etc. We told him that these things
were contemplated by the parties when the treaties were made
and provided for; that we could not add a new article to trie
treaty or explain any one in it, since it must be explained by
itself only; that delays which proceeded from bad faith were
those only for which our Government was responsible; that such
as were unavoidable attached to them no blame and could not
affect the treaty. He replied that after the example of our Gov
ernment in the last treaty, the Consul might nevertheless annex
a condition to the ratification explanatory of his sense of it, which
he would do if we did not satisfy him either with respect to the
prompt manner in which the treaty would be executed by our
Government, or agree to expunge the terms in that convention
which respected taking possession of the territory. We aid not
fail to remark that the treaty must stand as it was to be adopted,
rejected or modified by the parties having the right to do the
same and not by us."
The American envoys thereupon gave the best assurance they
could of the good conduct of the United States, but at the same
time urged the authorities' in America to lose not a moment to

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES.

207

ratify the treaty. "It is our earnest wish and advice, if the
treaties are approved by the President, that he convene the Con
gress to provide the funds for an immediate compliance with
them. It is best to leave nothing to hazard. The surrender of
the posts ought to precede the creation of the fund ; but as there
will be no doubt on that point after taking the necessary meas
ures, we would consider it as done and act accordingly. If we
execute our part strictly within the terms specified, the transac
tion is at an end; there will be no obstacle from this quarter.
. . . We cannot too strongly impress an idea, if our conduct is
approved, of the most prompt execution of the stipulations to be
performed on our part and of a course of proceeding which
leaves nothing to chance, by giving any cause of complaint to this
Government." To protect itself the French government instructed
its minister at Washington that, on exchanging the ratifications
with the United States, he should declare such ratifications void,
unless the funds, etc., were created by congress in the term
stipulated. In a communication dated June 25, Mr. Livingston wrote: "I
hope that nothing will prevent your immediate ratification with
out altering a syllable of the terms. If you wish anything
changed, ratify unconditionally and set on foot a new negotia
tion. Be persuaded that France is sick of the bargain ; that
Spain is much dissatisfied, and that the slightest pretense will
lose you the treaty. Nothing has raised the reputation of our
country in Europe so high as the conduct of our Government
upon this occasion, both at home and abroad."* In answer to
a complaint from Mr. Livingston that Mr. Monroe had been
given greater powers than he, Mr. Madison wrote on July 29:
"The difference in the diplomatic titles given to Mr. Monroe from
that given to you and which you understood to have ranked him
above you, was the result merely of an error in the clerk who
copied the document, and which escaped attention when they
were signed. It was not the intention of the President that any
distinction of grade should be made between you." Mr. Living
ston was instructed to investigate thoroughly the question of
the boundaries of Louisiana.
The act of Messrs. Livingston and Monroe in securing the
cession of Louisiana, though wholly beyond their instructions and
authority, met the approval of the Jeffersonian administration
and generally of the people of the United States. It cannot be

* Diplomatic Correspondence.

208 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
said to have been the result of the good work of the envoys,
though the memorials of Mr. Livingston indicated to France a
would-be purchaser; nor was it brought about by the statesman
ship of Mr. Jefferson, though he possessed to an eminent degree
such qualities; neither -did the arrival of Mr. Monroe in Paris
have anything to do with fixing in the mind of the first consul
the determination to sell, because the conclusion to dispose of
the whole of the province instead of a part was unalterably
reached by Napoleon some days before the arrival of Mr. Mon
roe. The determination to sell resulted from the conclusion that
France was certain soon to lose the province either to England
or the United States. As between the two, France, of course,
had but one choice, even if the conditions had been the same or
similar, which they were not. It would pass to England as the
result of war, to the United States for a consideration. Its value
was known to Napoleon, but more was not asked, because the
chances were that the . American envoys would not pay more
without too long a wait, and because great haste was necessary to
forestall the British from taking possession of New Orleans.
Thus the acquisition of Louisiana by the United States was the
unexpected and extraordinary result of the international situation
in Europe.
The American envoys were informed by Mr. Madison that
their acts were approved by . the administration. He wrote :
"In concurring with the disposition of the French Government to
treat for the whole of Louisiana, although the western part of it
was not embraced by your powers, you were justified by the solid
reasons which you give for it ; and I am charged by the Presi
dent to express to you his entire approbation of your so doing.*
This approbation is in no respect precluded by the silence of
your commission and instructions. When these were made out
the object of the most sanguine was limited to the establishment
of the Mississippi as our boundary. It was not presumed that
more could be sought by the United States, either with a chance
of success or perhaps without being suspected of a greedy ambi
tion, than the island of New Orleans and the two Floridas, it
being little doubted that the latter was or would be compre
hended in the cession from Spain to France. To the acquisition
of New Orleans and the Floridas, the provision was therefore
accommodated. Nor was it to be supposed that in case the French
Government should be willing to part with more than the terri-

? American State Papers.

Oia Haps Showing the
Extent of Louisiana

$T*T£
NEW
MEXICO

B/3C/J)

NEW LEON

IOl'}0

Gulf of Me

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES.

209

tory on our side of the Alississippi, an arrangement with Spain
for restoring to her the territory on the other side, would not be
preferred to a sale of it to the United States. The effect of such
considerations was diminished by no information or just pre
sumptions whatever. . . In truth the communications in
general between Mr. Livingston and the French Government,
both of prior and subsequent date, manifested a repugnance to
our views of purchase, which left no expectation of any arrange
ment with France, by which an extensive acquisition was to be
made, unless in a favorable crisis, of which advantage should be
taken. Such was thought to be the crisis which gave birth to the
extraordinary commission in which you are joined. It consisted
of the state of things produced by the breach of our deposits at
New Orleans; the situation of the French islands, particularly
the important island of St. Domingo; the distress of the French
finances; the unsettled posture of Europe; the increasing jealousy
between Great Britain and France; and the known aversion of
the former to see the mouth of the Alississippi in the hands of
the latter. These considerations, it was hoped, might so far open
the eyes of France to her real interest, and her ears to the moni
tory truths which were conveyed to her through different chan
nels, as to reconcile her to the establishment of the Mississippi as
a natural boundary to the United States ; or at least to some con
cession which would justify our patiently waiting for a fuller
accomplishment of our wishes under auspicious events. The
crisis relied on has derived peculiar force from the rapidity with
which the complaints and questions between France and Great
Britain ripened toward a rupture ; and it is just ground for mutual
and general felicitation that it has issued under your zealous
exertions in the extensive acquisition beyond the Mississippi."
The following interesting letter was written by President Jef
ferson to John C. Breckenridge under date of August 12, 1803 :*
"The boundaries, which I deem not admitting question, are the
highlands on the western side of the Mississippi enclosing all its
waters, the Missouri of course, and terminating in the line drawn
from the northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods to the
nearest source of the Mississippi as lately settled between Great
Britain and the United States. We have some claims to extend
on the seacoast westwardly to the Rio Norte or Bravo, and better
to go eastwardly to the Rio Perdido between Mobile and Pensa-

? Writings of Thomas Jefferson : Ford.
II— 14

2io THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
cola, the ancient boundary of Louisiana. These claims will be a
subject of negotiation with Spain and if, as soon as she is at war,
we push them strongly with one hand, holding out a price in the
other, we shall certainly obtain the Floridas and all in good time.
In the meanwhile, without waiting for permission, we shall enter
into the exercise of the natural right we have always insisted on
with Spain, to-wit : That of a nation holding the upper part of
streams' having a right of innocent passage through them, to the
ocean. We shall prepare her to see us practice and she will not
oppose it by force. Objections are raised to the eastward (in the
New England States probably) against the vast extent of our
boundaries, and propositions are made to exchange Louisiana or
a part of it for the Floridas. But as I have said we shall get the
Floridas without, and I would not give one inch of the waters of
the Mississippi to any nation, because I see in a light very impor
tant to our peace the exclusive right to its navigation and the
admission of no nation into it, but as into the Potomac or Dela
ware with our consent and under our police. These Federalists
see in this acquisition the formation of a new confederacy,
embracing all the waters of the Mississippi on both sides of it,
and a separation of its eastern waters from us. These combina
tions depend on so many circumstances which we cannot forsee,
that I place little reliance on them. We have seldom seen neigh
borhood produce affection among nations. The reverse is almost
the universal truth. Besides, if it should became the great inter
est of those nations to separate from this, if their happiness
should depend on it so strongly as to induce them1 to go through
that convulsion, why should the Atlantic States dread it? But
especially why should we, their present inhabitants, take side in
such a question? When I view the Atlantic States, procuring
for those on the eastern waters -of the Mississippi friendly instead
of hostile neighbors on its western waters, I do not view it as an
Englishman would the procuring future blessings for the French
nation with whom he has no relations of blood or affection. The
future inhabitants of the Atlantic and Mississippi States will be
our sons. We leave them in distinct but bordering establish
ments. We think we see their happiness in their union and we
wish it. Events may prove it otherwise; and if they see their
interest in separation, why should we take side with out Atlantic
rather than our Mississippi descendants ? It is the elder and the
younger son differing. God bless them both and keep them in
anion, if it be for their good, but separate them if it be better."
It was at this time that Mr. Jefferson and other American states-

'THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 2II
men prepared drafts of an amendment to the constitution pro
viding for the admission of new states into the Union.
As soon as it became known to Spain that Napoleon had ceded
Louisiana to the United States, the French authorities encountered
serious remonstrances front the Spanish government. They
declared that the cession was a breach of faith ; that France had
solemnly agreed not to alienate the province (which was true) ;
and that they (Spain) would use every endeavor in their power
to obstruct the transfer. The Spanish minister at Paris was
instructed to prevent, if possible, the cession from being carried
into execution and was authorized to us "pecuniary arguments"
if they were likely to succeed.* The following communication
was sent to the American minister to Spain by the Spanish gov
ernment : "Palace, July 19, 1803.
"To the Alinister of the United States of America:
"Sir : His Majesty the King having given orders to his min
ister near the United States of America to make known to that
government the absolute nullity of the proceedings of France in
disposing of Louisiana, which she had formally and positively
engaged not to sell, I now communicate the same to you, in order
that you may submit it to your government, which will thus
receive it by distinct channels. At the same time, I must inform
you, in reply to the assurance given me by you at our last con
ference that France had also ceded West Florida, that the said
province never has at any time or by any title belonged to the
French." "I am &c Pedro Cervallos."*
The opposition of Spain to the cession of Louisiana to the
United States was communicated to the latter from Madrid by
Charles Pinckney on August 2, 1803, in the following words:
"He (Cervallos) then went on to converse with me on the sub
ject of the cession of Louisiana by the French to us, in which he
expressed an opinion so important and extraordinary that I made
a point of transmitting it to you by the post the next day by the
rout of Lisbon, and which I trust you will soon receive.f The
substance was this: That in the cession of Louisiana by Spain
to France, there was a secret article that France should never
part with Louisiana except to Spain; that if she (France) should

? History of France: Wright.
t American State Papers.

212 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ever wish to dispose of it, Spain should always have the right of
pre-emption ; from which he argued that France had not the right
to make such cession without the consent of Spain, and that he
was astonished our commissioners had not applied to their Gov
ernment to know the actual terms upon which France was to
receive Louisiana, and in fact to examine their title. I answered
him by saying that he could not be more astonished at their not
doing so than 1 was at his remark ; that he well knew Mr. Living
ston and myself had been applying for upwards of a year inces
santly to the Governments of France and Spain to know if Louisi
ana was ceded and upon what terms ; that for more than a year the
most guarded silence was observed by both and that at last when
Spain had answered and avowed the cession, not a word was men
tioned in his (Mr. Cervallos's) letter to me of any secret article;
that the letter only avowed the cession and that it had been made
subject to the conditions of our treaty; that I had transmitted this
to Mr. Livingston and Mr. Monroe ; and I asked whether after the
sight of this letter from him, acknowledging the cession, they
could for a moment doubt the perfect right of France to sell. I
then further asked him whether if Spain still continued in pos
session and our Government ratified the treaty there would be any
hesitation on the part of His Majesty to give us the possession:
to which he made no positive reply, nor could I bring him to do
so during the whole evening. I could easily discover in the
course of it that there exists at present mUch uneasiness on the
part of this court with, respect to the conduct of France in the
sale of Louisiana, and particularly in the opinion held by our com
missioners that it includes West Florida, which both Mr. Cerval
los and the Prince of Peace (Godoy) expressly deny."
The action of the Spanish minister at Washington was equally
emphatic and decisive. Mr. Madison wrote to Mr. Livingston on
October 6, "Mr. Pinckney (the American minister to Spain) will
doubtless have communicated to you his conversation with Mr.
Cervallos (the Spanish prime minister), in which the latter denied
the right of France to alienate Louisiana to the United States,
alleging a secret stipulation by France not to alienate.* Two
notes on the same subject have lately been presented here by the
Marquis de Yrujo. In the first dated September 4, he enters a
caveat against the right of France to alienate Louisiana, found
ing it on a declaration of the French ambassador at Madrid in
July, 1802, that France would never part with that territory ; and

? France seems to have deliberately violated this stipulation.

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 213
affirming that on no other condition Spain would have ceded it
to France. In the second note dated September 27, it is urged as
an additional objection to the treaty between the United States
and France, that the French Government had never completed
the title of France, having failed to procure the stipulated recog
nition of the King of Etruria from Russia and Great Britain,
which was a condition on which Spain agreed to cede the country
to France." Mr. Aladison presented conclusive arguments
against the tenability of the Spanish opposition. Among other
things he cited the reply of the Spanish prime minister to Mr.
Pinckney at Aladrid early in May that, "the entire province of
Louisiana, with the. limits it had when held by France, was retro
ceded to that Power, and that the United States might address
themselves to the French Government in order to negotiate the
acquisition of the territories which would suit their interest." He
stated that the United States should proceed to carry out the
provisions of the treaty. He further said, "The United States
have obtained by just and honorable means a clear title to a terri
tory too valuable in itself and too important to their tranquillity
and security not to be effectually maintained. And they count
on every positive concurrence on the part of the French Govern
ment which the occasion may demand from their friendship and
their good faith."
The Spanish opposition to the treaty was grounded on the fol
lowing principal reasons : 1 . That the French government had
contracted with the king of Spain the most solemn engagament
never to alienate the province ; 2. That the conditions under which
France secured Louisiana by the treaty of San Ildefonso had not
been fulfilled, and therefore France could not convey a good and
sufficient title. These objections were presented and argued by
El Marquis de Casa Yrujo, the Spanish ambassador at Washing
ton, in communications to the secretary of state. The latter sent
copies of the letters to the French ambassador at Washington,
and requested to hear from him on the subject. On the first
point above he replied that "the treaty of St. Ildefonso retrocedes
Louisiana in full sovereignty and without any limitation as to the
future domain of France. To operate a limitation so essential as
is that to which the Court of Madrid appeals, nothing less would
have been necessary, according to the nature of contracts in gen
eral and of treaties in particular, than a stipulation to this effect
inserted in the treaty itself.* A promise made fifteen months after
? Observe that the French ambassador did not deny the claim that his govern
ment had promised not to alienate Louisiana.

214 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the signature of this pact, and which might on one side have been
yielded to the solicitations of one of the contracting parties, and
on the other dictated by dispositions which might then exist in
the other party, but which ulterior circumstances might have
changed ; such a promise cannot create in favor of Spain a right
sufficient to enable her to charge with invalidity the transactions
which have contravened it. The contrary pretension would cer
tainly confound all the principles relative to the nature of obli
gations and would destroy the solemnity of treaties. These gen
eral reasonings would receive a new force from the circumstances
which are peculiar to different nations in relation to the subject
of pacts ; but the undersigned will not enter into the examination
of these circumstances, under the persuasion that general princi
ples sufficiently repel the pretensions of the Court of Madrid.
On the second point the objections of that court do not appear to
the undersigned to be better founded. It is known that the King
of Etruria was placed on the throne since the treaty of St. Ilde
fonso. We have a right to suppose that his Catholic Majesty was
satisfied from that period with the measures and efforts employed
by France to cause the title of this prince to be acknowledged by
the other nations. It is at least what might be. concluded from
facts within the knowledge of all the world. In the treaty of
Amiens, concluded on the 27th of March, 1802, Great Britain did
not acknowledge the King of Etruria. Notwithstanding the
silence of the court of London, on so solemn an occasion, that of
Madrid ordered in the month of October following the delivery of
the colony to France, as is proved by the royal cedula (a writing),
which the undersigned has received and exhibited to Mr. Madi
son; a cedula which as all the world knows was long ago for
warded to the Captain General of Louisiana, who sent the Mar
quis de Casa Calvo to New Orleans to superintend its execution.
To these conclusive observations the undersigned will add that
the court of Madrid might have been informed in the course of
the month of February last by its minister to the United States,
that the American Government was sending to Paris a minister
extraordinary in order to negotiate with the French Government
, the acquisition of New Orleans. If the court of Madrid had seen
in the object of this mission an injury offered to its rights, what
prevented it, after being thus early apprised, from informing
thereof the minister of the United States at Paris and the French
Government, and from interposing before the conclusion of the
treaty its intervention in a form adapted to suspend it? It does
not appear that that court has taken at Paris any steps of this

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 215
nature."* This was also in substance the reply of the secretary
of state to the communications of the Spanish ambassador.
The necessary laws for taking possession were no sooner
passed by congress in October, than steps were taken to put them
into execution. A joint and several commission was forwarded
to Gov. W. C. C. Claiborne and Gen. James Wilkinson author
izing them to receive possession of the province and to occupy it-
A separate commission was sent to Governor Claiborne as tem
porary governor. The contingency of forcible opposition from
Spain was taken into consideration, and a considerable force was
sent with the commissioners and another assembled at Natchez in
readiness for any emergency — five hundred mounted militia from
Tennessee being ordered to the latter place. They took with them
"such regular troops as had been assembled at Fort Adams from
the nearest posts and some militia of the Mississippi Territory."
To be in readiness for any emergency that might arise "a respect
able body of militia was ordered to be in readiness in the States of
Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee. No occasion however arose for
their services. The French officials in all respects supplemented
and supported the proceedings of the United States. There was
no indication whatever that Spain intended to use force to prevent
the transfer of the province to the United States.*
The messenger, M. Landais, sent from Washington to New
Orleans with the commission to M. Laussat to receive the province
from Spain and then turn it over to the United States, arrived
November 23, 1803. The messenger traversed the Indian coun
try, going by land instead of by water, to gain time. On the 30th
of November, M. Laussat, in his character of French commis
sioner, issued a proclamation, announcing to the inhabitants the
cession of the province to the United States. To be sure of no
mistake, all of the formalities were observed. On the same day
all the Spanish troops and militia were drawn up in front of the
city hall, and the inhabitants assembled to witness the proceed
ings, so important to them. In the council chamber three chairs
were provided, Governor Salcedo occupying the middle one.
Laussat handed him a copy of the royal decree of October 15,.
1802, by which the king of Spain ordered his representative in
Louisiana to deliver the colony to the French commissioner. At
the same time Laussat produced his own authority to take pos
session of Louisiana on behalf of France. When all were read
and pronounced satisfactory, Governor Salcedo left his chair and

?American State Papers.

216 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
delivered the keys of the city to Laussat. The Marquis Casa
Calvo announced that all Lousianians who did not wish to leave
Louisiana were from that moment absolved from future allegiance
to Spain. At a signal the cannon outside were fired, the Spanish
colors lowered, and the tri-color of France, after the lapse of
nearly a century and a quarter from the discovery by La Salle,
again announced the ascendency of the latter at the -mouth of the
Mississippi. France was again in possession.*
Twenty days later, or on December 20, 1803, the same proceed
ings were enacted between the French and the Americans. Gen
eral Wilkinson in command of the American troops established
his camp on the left bank of the river about half a league from
New Orleans on the 17th and 18th of the month. On the 20th,
by permission of Laussat, he entered New Orleans with his forces
to take part in the proceedings. The French officers, troops and
all the inhabitants as before assembled at the city hall. The
American commissioners, Claiborne and Wilkinson, were there
received by Laussat and the other French officials. The treaty
of cession was formally read, as were also the various powers of
the commissioners. Laussat said, "In conformity with the treaty,
I put the United States in possession of Louisiana and its depend
encies. The citizens and inhabitants who wish to remain here and
obey the laws are from this moment exonerated from the oath of
fidelity to the French Republic." The French flag was then
lowered, and the stars and stripes raised over the heads of the
multitude, amid the roar of the guns.* The fate of Louisiana was
finally settled; but who is there to measure the joys and griefs in
the hearts of the people who had borne so much.
While the proceedings at New Orleans were designed to trans
fer the whole province to the United States, it was deemed best
to observe the formalities of transfer in Upper Louisiana as well
as in that city. Accordingly, the necessary powers were trans
mitted to Major Amos Stoddard by the French minister at Wash
ington to receive on behalf of France Upper Louisiana from the
representative of Spain, which transfer was formally made on the
9th of March, 1804. The following day, March 10, he observed
the formality of turning it over to a representative of the United
States.f Mr. Martin, the historian of Louisiana, said that on the i8tli
of May, 1803, Governor Salcedo and Marquis Casa Calvo issued

?History of Louisiana: Martin.
Sketches Historical and Descriptive of Louisiana: Stoddard.

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 217
a proclamation to the effect "that the cession of the colony and
island of New Orleans should be on the same terms as that of
His Most Christian to His Catholic Majesty; and consequently
the limits on both sides of the river St. Louis or Mississippi should
continue as they remained by the fifth article of the definitive
treaty of peace concluded at Paris on the 10th of December, 1763 :
and accordingly the settlements from the bayou M'anshac as far
as the line which separated the dominions of Spain and those of
the United States should remain a part of the monarchy of Spain
and be annexed to the province of West Florida."
The opinion of Mr. Livingston as to the causes which induced
or determined the first consul to sell Louisiana to the United
States, if no doubt existed of its being unbiased, should be worth
more than that of any other American, owing to his unusual
powers of pentration, to his intimacy with the French leaders and
to his knowledge of French public affairs of that time. His
opinion was expressed in his letter of November 15, 1803, to
Mr. Madison, as follows : "The war (the one about to break
forth between France and England) doubtless had its effect upon
the First Consul ; but it is equally true that every person he con
sulted had long before been convinced, and even the Consul's
opinion shaken and I will venture to say by my means, of the little
advantage France would derive from the possession of that coun
try; and he had even, as I have before informed you, through
Joseph Bonaparte, given • me assurances that such arrangements
should be made as we should approve. The not selling was a
personal point of honor, particularly as he was bound by the
express stipulation of his treaty with Spain not to do so. Nor
until he found himself hampered by another personal considera
tion, to-wit: His promise to pay the American claims which I
had purposely published, could he bring himself to take the step
which the prospect of war and the spirited measures of our Gov
ernment, among which I number the special mission of Mr. Mon
roe, gave him the strongest apology for doing; particularly as in
case of war he had no other means of keeping his word with us.
On looking over the original instructions, of which Mr.
Monroe was the bearer, I find that we were authorized to give
fifty millions for New Orleans and the Floridas ; so that we could
without too an extraordinary assumption of powers, have gone to
the price they expected for Louisiana."*
As soon as the transfer to the United States was formally

* American State Papers.

218 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
accomplished, Governor Claiborne issued a proclamation recount
ing the circumstances of the transfer and declaring "that the
government heretofore exercised over the said province of
Louisiana, as well under the authority of Spain as of the French
Republic, has ceased and that of the United States of America is
established over the same; that the inhabitants thereof will be
incorporated in the Union of the United States and admitted as
soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal consti
tution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immuni
ties of citizens of the United States; that in the meantime they
shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their
liberty, property and the religion which they profess; that all
laws and municipal regulations which were in existence at the ces
sation of the late Government remain in full force; and that all
civil officers charged with their execution, except those whose
powers have been especially vested in me, and except also such
officers as have been entrusted with the collection of the revenue,
are continued in their functions during the pleasure of the Gover
nor for the time being, or until provision shall otherwise be made.
And I do hereby exhort and enjoin all the inhabitants and other
persons within the said province to be faithful and true in their
allegiance to the United States and obedient to the laws and
authorities of the same, under full assurance that their just rights
will be under the guardianship of the United States and will be
maintained from all force or violence from without or within."
(December 20, 1803.)*
The Spanish government receded from its opposition to the
transfer of Louisiana to the United States on the 10th of Feb
ruary, 1804, the Spanish Minister of State, Don Pedro Cervallos,
writing as follows to Charles Pinckney, American envoy to Spain :
"At the same time that the minister of His Majesty in the United
States is charged to inform the American Government respecting
the falsity of the rumor referred to, he has likewise orders to
declare to it that His Majesty has thought fit to renounce his
opposition to the alienation of Louisiana made by France, not
withstanding the solid reasons on which it is founded, thereby
giving a new proof of his benevolence and friendship towards the
United States." The Spanish minister at Philadelphia communi
cated the same information to Mr. Madison, secretary of state.

?American State Papers.

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 219
"Philadelphia, May 15, 1804.
"Sir: '.'The explanations which the Government of France has given
to his Catholic Majesty concerning the sale of Louisiana to the
United States and the amicable dispositions on the part of the
King my master towards these States, have determined him to
abandon the opposition which at a prior period and with the most
substantial motives he had manifested against the transaction. In
consequence, and by special order of his Majesty, I have the
pleasure to communicate to you his royal intentions on an affair
so important ; well persuaded that the American Government will
see in this conduct of the King my master a new proof of his
consideration for the United States and that they will correspond
with a true reciprocity with the sincere friendship of the King of
which he has given so many proofs."
"God preserve you many years
"The Marquis of Casa Yrujo." *
An agreement as to the terms of the sale of Louisiana to the
United States had no sooner been reached by the envoys of the
two republics than steps were taken to draw up the necessary
papers to that effect. Probably the most interesting of all these
documents is the first draft drawn by Napoleon of the treaty man
uscript, never published in the United States until a few years
ago, and obtained from the archives at Paris. The following is
the full text of the original draft thus drawn by Napoleon :*
"Paris, 3 Floreal, an 11 (April 23d, 1803).
"The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the
French people, and the President of the United States of Amer
ica, desiring to prevent all possible misunderstanding relating to
the topics mentioned in Articles II and V of the Agreement of
the 8th Vendemiaire, year 9 (October 1st, 1802), and wishing to
promote as far as possible the close and friendly relations which
at the time of the said Agreement were fortunately established
between the two states, have named as Ministers Plenipotentiary
Citizen Barbe Marbois, Minister of the Public Treasury (the
American names are omitted), who, after having exchanged their
credentials, have agreed on the following articles:
"Art. I. The French Republic yields and transmits to the
United States of America all the right which it has acquired over
?American State Papers.
? Correspondance de Napoleon Premier, publiee par ordre de L'Empereur Na
poleon III. (In the Library of the University of Wisconsin.)

220 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Louisiana through the treaty made with His Catholic Majesty,
the King of Spain, the 8th Vendemiaire, year 9 of the French
Republic ; and in consequence of said cession, Louisiana, its terri
tory, and the dependencies appertaining thereto, shall become part
of the American Union, and shall constitute in due course one or
several States according to the terms of the Constitution of the
United States.
"Art. II. The United States undertake to favor in a special
way the commerce and navigation of French citizens and of the
subjects of His Catholic Majesty, in the towns, harbors, roads,
seas, rivers, etc., of Louisiana, and to especially secure to them
by a privilege not in future to be granted to any other nation, the
perpetual right of deposit and navigation which was conceded to
the Americans by the Treaty of October 27th, 1795, between
Spain and the United States.
"Moreover, it is agreed that in the ports and towns of Louisiana,
French and Spanish commerce shall enjoy perfect freedom to
import goods. French and Spanish vessels and merchandise
shall never be subjected to any of the customs or dues which may
be imposed upon the commerce of other nations. They shall, in
the ports of Louisiana, be treated in all respects like French-
American merchandise coming from some other American port.
"Art. III. Three other places of commercial deposit shall be
accorded to France and Spain, on the right bank of the Missis
sippi, toward the mouth of the Red River and the mouths of the
Arkansas and Missouri, and two points on the left bank of the
Illinois River and toward the mouth of the Ohio. French mer
chants shall enjoy in these places all the advantages accorded to
Americans by the King of Spain, on the 27th of October, 1795.
It is also agreed that France may appoint in these places, as well
as at New Orleans, commercial agents, who, according to Article
X of the Agreement of the 8th Vendemiaire, year 9, shall enjoy
the usual rights and prerogatives of such officials.
"Art. IV. It is agreed that the obligations assumed by the Gov
ernment of the French Republic as respects the debt due to Ameri
can citizens, specified in Article V of the Agreement of the 8th
Vendemiaire, shall be held to be cancelled, and that the obligation
shall be regarded as transferred by the present treaty, to the Gov
ernment of the United States, which undertakes to satisfy every
claim which has been or may be addressed on that score to the
Government of the Republic — it being well understood that the
obligations contracted toward French citizens by the Government
of the United States, by virtue of the said article, remain

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 221
untouched, as well as the rights of French citizens to the payment
of debts due them.
"Art. V. Aside from the satisfaction of the claims specified in
the preceding article, the Government of the United States agrees
to pay to France the sum of one hundred million francs, in twelve
equal installments, the term for each installment to be twelve
months, and the payment of the first installment to be made a
month after the present date.
"The present convention shall be ratified in good and due form,
and the ratifications shall be exchanged within six months of the
date of the signatures of the Ministers Plenipotentiary, or sooner
if it is possible."
"Archives de Finance." "by order of the first consul."

TREATY FOR THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO THE UNITED STATES ;
"CONCLUDED APRIL 30, 1803 ; RATIFICATIONS EXCHANGED AT WASH
INGTON OCTOBER 21, 1803; PROCLAIMED OCTOBER 21, 1803.
"The President of the United States of America, and the First
Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people,
desiring to remove all source of misunderstanding relative to
objects of discussion mentioned in the second and fifth articles
of the convention of the 8th Vendemiaire, an 9 (30th September,
1800) relative to the rights claimed by the United States, in
virtue of the treaty concluded at Madrid, the 27th of October,
1795, between his Catholic Majesty and the said United States,
and willing to strengthen the union and friendship which at the
time of the said convention was happily re-established between
the two nations, have respectively named their Plenipotentiaries,
towit : the President of the United States, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate of the said States, Robert R. Living
ston, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, and James
Monroe, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of
the said States, near the Government of the French Republic;
and the First Consul, in the name of the French people, Citizen
Francis Barbe Marbois, Minister of the Public Treasury; who,
after having respectively exchanged their full powers, have agreed
to the following articles :
"Article I. Whereas by the article the third of the treaty con
cluded at St. Ildefonso, the 9th Vandemiaire, an 9 (1st October,
1800) between the First Consul of the French Republic and His
Catholic Majesty, it was agreed as follows: 'His Catholic

222 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Majesty promises 'and engages on his part, to cede to the French
Republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the
conditions and stipulations herein relative to His Royal Highness
the Duke of Parma, the colony or province of Louisiana, with the
same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had
when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the
treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other
States.' And whereas, in pursuance of the treaty, and particu
larly of the third article, the French Republic has an incontestible
title to the domain and to the possession of the said territory;
the First Consul of the. French Republic desiring to give to the
United States a strong proof of his friendship, doth hereby cede
to the said United States, in the name of the French Republic,
forever and in full sovereignty, the said territory, with all its
rights and appurtenances, as fully and in the same manner as they
nave been acquired by the French Republic, in virtue of the above-
mentioned treaty, concluded with His Catholic Majesty.
"Article II. In the cession made by the preceding article are
included the adjacent islands belonging to Louisiana, all public
lots and squares, vacant lands, and all public buildings, fortifica
tions, barracks and other edifices which are not private property.
The archives, papers and documents, relative to the domain and
sovereignty of Louisiana and its dependencies, will be' left in the
possession of the commissaries of the United States, and copies
will be afterwards given in due form to the magistrates and mu
nicipal officers of such of the said papers and documents as may
be necessary to them.
"Article III. The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be
incorporated in the LTnion of the United States, and admitted as
soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal con
stitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and
Immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean
time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoy
ment of their liberty, property and the religion which they pro'
fess. "Article IV. There shall be sent by the Government of France
a Commissary to Louisiana, to the end that he do every act neces
sary, as well to receive from the officers of His Catholic Majesty
the said country -and its dependencies, in the name of the French
Republic, if it has not been already done, as to transmit it in the
name of the French Republic to the Commissary or Agent of the
United States.
"Article V. Immediately after the ratification of the present

THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES.

223

treaty by the President of the United States, and in case that of
the First Consul shall have been previously obtained, the Com
missary of the French Republic shall remit all military posts of
New Orleans, and other parts of the ceded territory, to the Com
missary or Commissaries named by the President to take pos
session; the troops, whether of France or Spain, who may be
there, shall cease to occupy any military post -from the time of
taking possession, and shall be embarked as soon as possible, in
the course of three months, after the ratification of this treaty.
"Article VI. The United States promise to execute such
treaties and articles as may have been agreed between Spain and
the tribes and nations of Indians, until, by mutual consent of the
United States and the said tribes or nations, other suitable articles
shall have been agreed upon.
"Article Vn. As it is reciprocally advantageous to the com
merce of France and the United States to encourage the com
munication of both nations for a limited time in the country ceded
by the present treaty, until general arrangements relative to the
commerce of both nations may be agreed on ; it has been agreed
between the contracting parties that the French ships coming
directly from France or any of her colonies, loaded only with the
produce and manufactures of France or her said colonies; and
the ships of Spain coming directly from Spain or any of her
colonies, loaded only with the produce or manufactures of Spain
or her colonies, shall be admitted during the space of twelve
years in the port of New Orleans, and in all other legal ports of
entry within the ceded territory, in the same manner as the ships
of the United States coming directly from France or Spain, or
any of their colonies, without being subject to any other or greater
duty on merchandise, or other or greater tonnage than that paid
by the citizens of the United States.
During the space of time above mentioned, no other nation shall
have a right to the same privileges in the ports of the ceded terri
tory; the twelve years shall commence three months after it shall
have been notified at Paris to the French Government, if it shall
take place in the United States ; it is, however, well understood
that the object of the above article is to favor the. manufactures,
commerce, freight and navigation of France and of Spain, so far
as relates to the importations that the French and Spanish shall
make into the said ports of the United States, without in any sort
affecting the regulations that the United States may make con
cerning the exportation of the produce and merchandise of the

224 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
United States, or any right they may have to make such regula
tions. "Article VIII. In future and forever after the expiration of
the twelve years, the ships of France shall be treated upon the
footing of the most favoured nations in the ports above mentioned.
"Article IX. The particular convention signed this day by the
respective ministers, having for its object to provide for the pay
ment of debts due to the citizens of the United States by the
French Republic prior to the 30th Septr. 1800, (8th Vendemiaire,
an 9) is approved, and to have its execution in the same manner
as if it had been inserted in this present treaty; and it shall be
ratified in the same form and in the same time, so that the one
shall not be ratified distinct from the other.
Another particular convention signed at the same date as the
present treaty relative to a definitive rule between the contracting
parties is in the like manner approved,- and will be ratified in the
same form, and in the same time, and jointly.
"Article X. The present treaty shall be ratified in good and
due form and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the space of
six months after the date of the signature of the Ministers Pleni
potentiary, or sooner if possible.
"In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed
these articles in the' French and English languages; declaring
nevertheless that the present treaty was originally agreed to in
the French language; and have hereunto affixed their seals.
"Done at Paris, the tenth day of Floreal, in the eleventh year
of the French Republic, and the 30th of April, 1803.
"(seal) "Robt. R. Livingston.
(seal) "Jas- Monroe.
(seal)" "Barbe Marbois."

"convention for payment of sixty million of francs by the
united states; concluded April 30, 1803; ratifications
exchanged at washington october 21, 1803 j proclaimed
OCTOBER 21, 1803.
"The President of the United States of America and the First
Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people,
in consequence of the treaty of cession of Louisiana, which has
been signed this day, wishing to regulate definitively everything
which has relation to the said cession, have authorized to this
effect the Plenipotentiaries, that is to say : The President of the

- THE CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES. 225
United States has, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate of the said States, nominated for their Plenipotentiaries,
Robert R. Livingston, Alinister Plenipotentiary of the United
States, and James Monroe, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy
Extraordinary of the said United States, near the Government of
the French Republic ; and the First Consul of the French Republic,
in the name of the French people, has named as Plenipotentiary of
the said Republic, the citizen Francis Barbe Marbois; who, in
virtue of their full powers, which have been exchanged this day,
have agreed to the following articles :
"Article I. The Government of the United States engages to
pay to the French Government in the manner specified in the fol
lowing article, the sum of sixty millions of francs, independent
of the sum which shall be fixed by another convention for the
payment of the debts due by France to citizens of the United
States. "Article II. For the payment of the sum of sixty millions of
francs, mentioned in the preceding article, the United States shall
create a stock of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars, bearing an interest of six per cent, per annum, payable
half yearly in London, Amsterdam, or Paris, amounting by the
half year, to three hundred and thirty-seven thousand five hun
dred dollars, according to the proportions which shall be deter
mined by the French Government to be paid at either place; the
principal of the said stock to be re-imbursed at the Treasury of
the United States, in annual payments of not less than three mil
lions of dollars each, of which the first payment shall commence
fifteen years after the date of the exchange of ratifications : this
stock shall be transferred to the Government of France, or to such
person or persons as shall be authorized to receive it, in three
months at most after the exchange of the ratifications of this
treaty, and after Louisiana shall be taken possession of in the
name of the Government of the United States.
"It is further agreed, that if the French Government should
be desirous of disposing of the said stock to receive the capital in
Europe, at shorter terms, that its measures for that purpose shall
be taken so as to favor, in the greatest degree possible, the credit
of the United States, and to raise to the highest price the said
stock. "Article III. It is agreed that the dollars of the United States,
specified in the present convention, shall be fixed at five francs,
gjjjl or five liyres eight soux tournois.
11-15

226 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
"The present convention shall be ratified in good and due form,
and the ratification shall be exchanged in the space of six months
to date from this day, or sooner if possible.
"In faith of which, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed
the above articles, both in the French and English languages,
declaring, nevertheless, that the present treaty has been originally
agreed on and written in the French language ; to which they have
hereunto affixed their seals.
"Done at Paris the tenth of Floreal, eleventh year of the French
Republic, (30th April, 1803.)
"(seal) "Robt. R. Livingston.
(seal) "J as. Monroe.
(seal)" "Barbe Marbois."

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 227

CHAPTER VI

The Constitutionality of the Cession

THE unexpected acquisition of Louisiana occasioned unbounded
satisfaction in every section of the United States, except
certain portions of New England, which had never looked
with favor upon the Western country. Many there had rigidly
maintained that the original limits of the thirteen colonies should
not be enlarged, and that expansion westward meant future dis
satisfaction; disunion and war. In proof of this opinion, the
previous proceedings of the western people, either to separate
themselves from the Atlantic states, or to secure the uninter
rupted right to navigate the Mississippi, were cited with triumph
ant formality to clinch the argument. Others declared that the
Alleghanies were the natural barrier between the East and the
West, and that the geographical situation of the Western country
rendered the conclusion foregone that so vast an extent of terri
tory, with so many different interests, could not be maintained
under one sovereignty. But a large majority of the people, both
East and West, fully realized and proclaimed the value of the
acquisition. The administration of Mr. Jefferson was at once
confronted with the serious problem of complying with the terms
of the cession, which embraced the future formation of states
from the ceded territory and their final admission into the Union.
Immediately, the question of the constitutionality of the steps
necessary to be taken absorbed the attention of the president and
congress. It became at once apparent that the wide diversity of
opinion on that important subject might not only make it neces
sary to amend the constitution to meet the new conditions, but
might even prevent the ratification of the treaty of cession. This
difference of opinion was most pronounced in the two houses of

228 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
congress ; and the outcome was regarded with earnest concern by
all who favored the acquisition of the province upon almost any
terms that could be construed as constitutional, even though the
adoption of an amendment to that instrument should become,
necessary. However, as time passed, this difference in views
was shown to be more the result of partisanship than a belief that
the treaty should not be ratified, or that the constitution prohibited
the admission of new ¦ states into the Union. While, therefore,
the debates of congress reveal- pronounced views expressed in
vigorous language, the charges, counter-charges and arguments
also show that the opposition was directed more to the method of
precedure than to an attack upon the question itself.
As early as January, 1803, President Jefferson wrote to Mr.
Gallatin,* "You are right in my opinion as to Mr. L.'s proposi
tion ; there is no Constitutional difficulty as to the acquisition of
territory, and whether, when acquired, it may be taken into the
Union by the Constitution as it now stands, will become a ques
tion of expediency. I think it will be safer not to permit the
enlargement of the Union but by amendment of the Constitution."
These remarks were made in regard to the admission into the
Union of the Floridas or other territory which the government
then desired to secure.
In a communication dated August 25, 1803, President Jefferson
wrote to the secretary of state as follows : "I suppose Monroe
will touch on the limits of Louisiana only incidentally, inasmuch
as its extension to Perdido curtails Florida and renders it of less
worth. I have used my spare moments to investigate by the help
of my books here the subject of the limits of Louisiana. I am
satisfied our right to the Perdido is substantial and can be opposed
by a quibble on form only; and our right westwardly to the bay
of St. Bernard may be strongly maintained. . . . Further
reflection on the amendment to the Constitution necessary in the
case of Louisiana satisfies me it will be better to give general
powers with specified exceptions somewhat in the way stated
below;" and on September 7, 1803, he wrote to W. C. Nicholas
that he was "aware of the force of the observation you make on
the power given by the Constitution to Congress, to admit new
States into the Union, without restraining the subject to the terri
tory then constituting the United States. But when I consider
that the limits of the United States are precisely fixed by the
treaty of 1783, that the Constitution expressly declares itself to be

? Writings of Thomas Jefferson : Ford.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION.

229

made for the United States, I cannot help believing the intention
was to permit Congress to admit into the Union new States, which
should be formed out of the territory for which and under whose
authority alone, they were then acting. I do not believe it was
meant that they might receive England, Ireland, Holland, &c,
into it. Our peculiar security is in possession of a
written constitution. Let us not make it blank paper by con
struction. I say the same as to the opinion of those who con
sider the grant of the treaty making power boundless. If it is
then we have no Constitution. . . . Nothing is more likely
than that their (the governmental functions named in the Consti
tution) enumeration of powers is defective. This is the ordinary
case of all human works. Let us go on then perfecting it by
adding by way of amendment to the Constitution, those powers
which time and trial show are still wanting. ... I confess
I think it proper in the present case to set an example against
broad construction, by appealing for new power to the people. If
however our friends shall think differently, certainly I shall
acquiesce with satisfaction."*
On the 16th of July, 1803, President Jefferson issued a procla
mation for the convocation of congress on October 17, called
together earlier than the regular opening, for the special purpose
of considering, among other things, the cession of Louisiana by
France to the United States. In his message to that body on the
latter date, he reviewed the Louisiana question, describing the
interdiction of the deposits, its effects upon the United States, the
action taken by the administration for relief, the consequent revo
cation of the interdiction, the steps that had been taken to secure
and perpetuate American rights on the Mississippi, and the trans
fer of the whole of Louisiana to the United States. He said.
"With the wisdom of Congress it will rest to take those ulterior
measures which may be necessary for the immediate occupation
and temporary government of the country; for its incorporation
into our Union ; for rendering the change of government a bless
ing to our newly adopted brethren; for securing to them the
rights of conscience and of property ; for confirming to the Indian
inhabitants their occupancy and self-government, establishing
friendly and commercial relations with them ; and for ascertain
ing the geography of the country acquired." He further said,
"Propositions had therefore been authorized (by Congress) for
obtaining, on fair conditions, the sovereignty of New Orleans and

? Writings of Thomas Jefferson : Ford.

230 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
of other possessions in that quarter interesting to our quiet, to
such extent as was deemed practicable ; and the provisional appro
priation of two millions of dollars, to be applied and accounted
for by the President of the United States, intended as part of the
price, was considered as conveying the sanction of Congress to the
acquisition proposed." He continued, "The sum of fifty thousand
dollars appropriated by Congress for providing gunboats remains
unexpended. The favorable and peaceable turn of affairs on the
Mississippi tendered an immediate execution of that law unneces
sary. The same issue of events dispensed with a resort to the
appropriation of a million and a half of dollars, contemplated for
purposes which were effected by happier means." f
In another message four days later Mr. Jefferson said, "In my
communication to you of the 17th instant, I informed you that
conventions had been entered into with the government of France
for the cession of Lousiana to the United States. These, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, having now been ratified, and
my ratification exchanged for that of the First Consul of France
in due form, they are communicated to you for consideration in
your legislative capacity. You will observe that some important
conditions cannot be carried into execution but with the aid of the
legislature, and that time presses a decision on them without delay.
The ulterior provisions also, suggested in the same communica
tion, for the occupation and government of the country, will call
for early attention. Such information relative to its government
as time and distance have permitted me to obtain, will be ready
to be laid before you in a few days. But as permanent arrange
ments for this object may require time and deliberation, it is for
your consideration whether you will not forthwith make such
temporary provisions for the preservation, in the meanwhile, of
order and tranquillity in the country as the case may require."*
Both branches of congress immediately proceeded to act upon
the advice and recommendations of the president. Bills were
introduced authorizing the executive to take possession of Louisi
ana and to provide for the temporary government thereof; for
the creation of stock certificates to the amount of eleven million
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars to be employed in the pay
ment for that province, specifying how payments should be made ;
and for providing means to pay the claims of American citizens
against France, which had been assumed by the United States as
one of the conditions of cession.* In the senate, on Friday,
t Messages and Papers of the Presidents.
* Annals of Congress.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION.

231

October 21, Mr. Breckenridge gave notice that, on tomorrow, he
should ask leave to bring in a bill to enable the president to take
possession of Louisiana and for other purposes, and the next day
accordingly introduced such a bill, which was read'. It became
the basis of the act subsequently passed, the house making a few
light amendments thereto. On October 24, the bill "was read a
second time and referred to Messrs. Breckenridge, Dayton and
Baldwin to consider and report thereon." On the 25th the bill
was reported without amendments by this committee, and was
ordered to pass to a third reading. The next day, the 26th of
October, it was read the third time ; and upon the question being
put, Shall this bill pass? it was determined in the affirmative —
yeas 26, nays 6. The six senators who voted in the negative were
John Quincy Adams, James Hillhouse, Simeon Olcott, Timothy
Pickering, William Plumer and" Uriah Tracy, all of New Hamp
shire, Massachusetts and Connecticut. On the 29th, the bill was
returned by the house with amendments, to which the senate disa
greed, but later the same day receded from their disagreement and
accepted the amendments. Senate amendments to the house
amendments were rejected. Thus within the space of eight days
the bill was introduced and read in the senate three times on three
different days ; was considered, amended and passed by the house ;
was considered again by the senate with the house amendments
and saved from further change in the senate; and was then
passed by a handsome majority. An analysis of the negative
vote and of the speeches later made by the above named senators,
reveals the fact that their opposition was mainly influenced by the
remoteness of Louisiana, by their disinclination to any change in
the constitutional compact of the thirteen states, and by their
belief that the methods proposed required the delegation of specific
constitutional and exclusive rights of the senate or the house, to
the president. The debate in the senate on the Louisiana treaty
came up in considering the bill providing for the issuance of stock
to pay for the province.
By this act Louisiana was to be paid for in certificates of stock
amounting to eleven million two hundred and fifty thousand dol
lars, bearing six per cent interest, to be paid in installments from a
sinking fund created for that purpose. The certificates were to
be delivered to a representative of France within three months
after the ratification of the treaty and after Louisiana had been
formally delivered to the United States. On the same date an
act was approved to appropriate three million seven hundred and
fifty thousand dollars, thus making a total of fifteen million dol-

232 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
lars provided for, to be used in paying the American claims stip
ulated in the cession treaty. Both of these acts were approved
November io, 1803. In providing for the payment of these
amounts, and in paying the same, the United States was prompt
and punctilious, because it was desired that no cause whatever on
that score should be given to France to evade or renounce the
bargain. During the debate in the senate Mr. White, of Delaware, said,*
"It is now a well-known fact that Spain considers herself injured
by this treaty, and if it should be in her power to prevent it, will
not agree to the cession of New Orleans and Louisiana to the
United States. She considers herself absolved from her contract
with France, in consequence of the latter having neglected to
comply with certain stipulations in the treaty of San Ildefonso, to
be performed on her part, and of having violated her engagement
never to transfer this country into other hands. ... I have
no hesitation in saying that if, in acquiring this territory under
the treaty, we have to fire a single musket, to charge a bayonet, or
to lose a drop of blood, it will not be such a cession on the part of
France as" should justify to the people of this country the payment
of any, and much less so enormous a sum of money. What
would the case be, sir? It would be buying of France authority
to make war upon Spain; it would be giving the First Consul
fifteen millions of dollars to stand aloof until we can settle our
differences with His Catholic Majesty. ... I wish not to
be understood as predicting that the French will not cede to. us
the actual and quiet possession of the territory. I hope to God
they may, for possession of it we must have — I mean of New
Orleans and of such other positions on the Mississippi as may be
necessary to secure to us forever the complete and uninter
rupted navigation of that river. This I have ever been in favor
of; I think it essential to the peace of the United States and to
the prosperity of our western country. But as to Louisiana, this
new, immense, unbounded world, if it should ever be incorporated
into this Union, which I have no idea can be done but by altering
the constitution, I believe it will be the greatest curse that could
at present befall us; it may be productive of innumerable evils.
. We have already territory enough, and when I contem
plate the evils that may arise to these states from this intended
incorporation of Louisiana into the Union, I would rather see it
given to France, to Spain, or to any other nation on the earth,

? Annals of Congress.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 233
upon the mere condition that no citizen of the United States
should ever settle within its limits, than to see the territory sold
for an hundred millions of dollars and we retain the sovereignty.
But however dangerous the possession of Louisiana might prove
to us, I do not presume to say that the retention of it would not
have been very convenient to France, and we know that at the
time of the mission of Mr. Monroe, our administration had never
thought of the purchase of Louisiana, and that nothing short of
the fullest conviction on the part of the First Consul that he was
on the very eve of a war with England ; that this being the most
defenceless point of his possessions, if such they could be called,
was the one at which the British would first strike, and that it
must inevitably fall into their hands, could ever have induced his
pride and ambition to make the sale. He judged wisely that he
had better sell it for as much as he could get than lose it entirely.
And I do say that under existing circumstances, even supposing
that this extent of territory was a desirable acquisition, fifteen
millions of dollars was a most enormous sum to give."
Air. Wells of Delaware said, "The bill on your table gives to the
president this power (of paying for Louisiana). I am for our
retaining and exercising it ourselves. I may be asked, why not
delegate this power to the President? Sir, I answer by inquiring
why we should delegate it? To us it properly belongs; and
unless some advantage will be derived to the United States, it
shall not be transferred with my consent. Congress will be in
session at the time that the delivery of the ceded territory takes
place; and if we should then be satisfied that the French have
executed with fidelity that part of the treaty which is incumbent
upon them first to perform, I pledge myself to vote for the pay
ment of the purchase money. ... I am strongly impressed
with an opinion that even if possession is rendered to us, the ter
ritory will come into our hands without any title to justify our
holding it. Is there not on the face of this instrument itself some
mark of suspicion? You find in the treaty not a single word
relating to any substantial consideration to be paid by the United
States. . . . It is true you perceive in the ninth article of
the treaty a general reference to two conventions, signed at the
same time with the treaty, with respect to the payment of money
by the United States to France, and which we regard as the only
consideration for the territory ceded to us. . The con
vention here referred to is said to be 'relative to a definitive rule
between the contracting parties.' Why these dark, obscure and
unintelligible expressions? Is a consideration a 'definitive rule?'

234 THE PROVINCE AND. THE STATES.
The first article speaks of the cession as being made 'from a desire
to give to the United States a strong proof of the friendship of
the First Consul, and when you turn to the convention, which is
said to establish the 'definitive rule' you find a provision binding
the United States to the payment of money to the French Repub
lic, but not a word is said about its being the consideration of the
cession. Suspicion hangs over the whole of this business."
In reply to the remarks of Senators White and Wells, Mr.
Jackson, of Georgia, said, "But the honorable gentleman (Mr.
Wells) has said that the French have no title, and having no title
herself, we can derive none from her. Is, not, I ask, the King of
Spain's proclamation, declaring the cession of Louisiana to
France, and his orders to his governor and officers to deliver it
to France a title? Do nations give any other? I believe the
honorable gentleman can find no solitary instance of feoffment
or conveyance between states. The treaty of San Ildefonso was
the groundwork of the cession, and whatever might have been
the terms to be performed by France, the King of Spain's procla
mation and orders have declared to all the world that they were
complied with. The honorable gentleman, however, insists that
there is no consideration expressed in the treaty, and therefore it
must be void; if he will but look attentively at the ninth article,
I ami persuaded he will perceive one: the conventions are made
part of the treaty ; they are declared to have execution in the same
manner as if they had been inserted in the treaty; they are to be
ratified in the same form and in the same time, so that the one
shall not be distinct from the other. What inference can possibly
be drawn, but that the payments to be made by them were full
consideration for Louisiana. . . I do not believe that
Spain will venture war with the United States. I believe she
dare not : if she does she will pay the cost. The Floridas will be
immediately ours ; they will almost take themselves. The inhab
itants pant for the blessings of your equal and wise government;
they ardently long to become a part of the United States."
Mr. Pickering, of Massachusetts, said, "I never doubted the
right of the United States to acquire new territory, either by pur
chase or by conquest, and to govern the territory so acquired as a
dependent province ; and in this way might Louisiana have become
a territory of the United States, and have received a form of gov
ernment infinitely preferable to that to which its inhabitants are
now subject. ... By the treaty of San Ildefonso France
acquired a right to demand an actual cession of the territory, pro
vided she fulfilled all the conditions on which Spain promised to

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 235
icede. But we know Spain declares that those conditions have
not been fully performed ; and by her remonstrances warns the
United States not to touch Louisiana. Now we, standing (as
some gentlemen have expressed themselves) in the shoes of
France, can have only the same right relative to the subject in
question. We can ask of Spain an actual cession or a confirma
tion of the claim we have purchased of the French Republic, pro
vided we will and can fulfill the conditions of the treaty of San
Ildefonso; and what are these conditions? We cannot tell. I
believe our executive knew not what they were ; and I believe too
that even our envoys who negotiated the treaty for Louisiana
were alike uninformed. I believe that they never saw (for they
had not intimated that they had ever seen) any other part of the
treaty of San Ildefonso than what is recited in the first article
of our treaty with France; and this defect has not been supplied
by any guaranty of the territory on the part of France. She
had not stipulated, nor is under any obligation, to procure the
assent of Spain, as a confirmation of the cession to the United
States. Such is the nature of our title to Louisiana.
Another honorable gentleman has entertained us with an account
of the animating address of the French Prefect to the inhabitants
of Louisiana, the largest portion of whom are French ; and of the
cordiality with which they received and echoed in their answer the
sentiments of the Prefect. But what were the feelings and con
duct of the Spanish officers on seeing these French proceedings ?
I have heard from an honorable gentleman in my eye (Mr. Day
ton of New Jersey), that they sent for the printer and forbade
all further promulgation of the address and answer on pain of his
being sent to the dungeon or to the mines for life. Thus tenacious
was Spain in her right to Louisiana, and thus severe in her prohi
bition of whatever might disparage her title. . . . It is like
wise supposed that the Spanish officers in Louisiana will not dare
to refuse obedience to that order (to deliver the province to
France) ; and one gentleman has expressed his opinion, in case
such refusal should happen, that the American troops whom the
President should send thither would be justified in compelling
them to obey. But what if a subsequent royal order had been
issued requiring those officers not to deliver up Louisiana to'
France, or to the United States ? We have some reason to think
that such is the fact ; and resistance I presume was apprehended.
Why else all this parade of war? Why had the President been
authorized to employ the army and navy of the United States and
to call forth any portion of eighty thousand militia ? . . . I

236 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
"believe that this whole transaction has purposely been wrapped in
obscurity by the French government. The boundary of Louisi
ana, for instance, on the side of Florida was, in the treaty, really
tuiintelligible, and yet nothing is easier to define. Tlie French
government, however, would find no difficulty in the construction.
An honorable gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Dayton) has
informed us that the French Prefect at New Orleans told him
that as soon as General Victor should arrive with the French
troops he should extend Louisiana far into West Florida."
Mr. Dayton in his 'speech remarked, "When I said that there
existed an essential difference between the French and Spanish
officers at New Orleans as to the. real boundaries of the province
of Louisiana, I did not mean to insinuate that this disagreement
extended so far as an opposition to the French taking possession.
It was a question of limits only, varying however so much in
extent as would have produced a serious altercation between those
two countries although closely allied. The Spanish governor had
taken it upon himself to proclaim that the province lately ceded
and about to be given over to France would be confined on the
east of the Mississippi to the river Iberville and the lakes Maure- .
pas and Pontchartrain or in other words to the island of New
Orleans ; but the French Prefect on the contrary declared that he
neither had nor would give his assent to the establishment of those
limits, which would be regarded no longer than until the arrival
of their troops."*
Mr. Taylor, of Virginia, sustained the bill and discussed two
features of the question: 1st, the constitutionality of the United
States to acquire territory; and 2d, the treaty stipulation of the
admission of a new state into the Union. He said, "Before the
confederation, each State in the Union possessed a right, as
attached to sovereignty, of acquiring territory, by war, purchase,
¦or treaty. This right must be either still possessed, or forbidden
both to each State and to the General Government, or transferred
to the General Government. It is not possessed by the States
separately, because war and compacts with foreign powers' and
with each other are prohibited to a separate State; and no other
means of acquiring territory exist. By depriving every State of
the means of exercising the right of acquiring territory, the con
stitution has deprived each separate State of the right itself.
Neither the means nor the right of acquiring territory are for
bidden to the United States ; on the contrary, in the fourth article

?Annals of Congress.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 237
of the constitution, congress is empowered 'to dispose of and reg
ulate the territory belonging to the United States.' This rec
ognizes the right of the United States to hold territory. The
means of acquiring territory consist of war and compact ; both
are expressly surrendered to Congress and forbidden to the sev
eral States ; and no right in a separate State to hold territory with
out its limit is recognized by the Constitution, nor any mode
of effecting it possible, consistent with it. The means of acquir
ing and the right of holding territory, being both given to the
United States and prohibited to each State, it follows that these
attributes of sovereignty once held by each State are thus trans
ferred to the United States ; and that if the means of acquir
ing and the right of holding are equivalent to the right of
acquiring territory, then this right merged from the separate
States to the United States, as indispensably annexed to the
treaty-making power and the power of making war; or indeed
is literally given to the General Government by the Constitu
tion. . . . The third article declares that 'the inhabitants
of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the
United States.' And these words are said to require the terri
tory to be erected into a State. This they do not express, and the
words are literally satisfied by incorporating them into the Union
as a territory and not as a State. The Constitution recognizes
and the practice warrants an incorporation of a Territory and its
inhabitants into the Union without admitting either as a State:
And this construction of the first member of the article is neces
sary to shield its two other members from a charge of surplus
age and even absurdity. For if the words 'the inhabitants of
the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the
United States' intended that Louisiana and its inhabitants should
become a State in the Union of States, there existed no reason
for proceeding to stipulate that these same inhabitants should
be made citizens as soon as possible according to the principles
of the Federal Constitution. Their admission into the Union of
States would have made them citizens of the United States. Is
it not then absurd to suppose that the first member of this third
article, intended to admit Louisiana into the Union as a State,
which would instantly entitle the inhabitants to the benefit of
the articles of the Constitution declaring that 'the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the federal States,' and yet to have gone on to stipu
late for citizenship under the limitation 'as soon as possible
according to the principles of the Federal Constitution' after it

238 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
had been bestowed without limitation ? Again : the concluding
member of the article is to bestow 'protection in the meantime;'
incorporating this stipulation and the stipulation for citizenship
with the construction which accuses the treaty of unconstitution
ality, the article 'altogether must be understood thus : The inhab
itants of the ceded territory shall be taken into the Union of
States, which will instantly give them all the rights of citizen
ship, after which they shall be made citizens as soon as possible;
and after they are taken into the Union, of States,' they shall
be protected in the interim1 between becoming a' State in the
Union and being made citizens in their liberty, property and
religion." Mr. Tracy, of Connecticut, opposed the bill. He said, "The
paragraph in the Constitution which says that new States may
"be admitted by Congress into this Union,' has been quoted to
justify this treaty. To this two answers may be given, either
of which is conclusive in my favor. First, if Congress have the
power collectively of admitting Louisiana, it cannot be vested
in the President and Senate alone. Second, Congress have no
power to admit new foreign States into the Union, without the
consent of the old partners. The article of the Constitution, if
any person will take the trouble to examine it, refers to domes
tic States only, and not at all to foreign States; and it is unrea
sonable to suppose that Congress should, by a majority only
admit new foreign States, and swallow up by it the old part
ners, when two-thirds of all the members are made requisite for
the least alteration in the Constitution. The words of the Con
stitution are completely satisfied by a construction which shall
include only the admission of domestic States, who were all
parties to the Revolutionary war and to the compact; and the
spirit of the association seems to embrace no other. . .
The seventh article admits for twelve years the ships of France
and Spain into the ceded territory free of foreign duty — this
is giving a commercial preference to those ports over the other
ports of the United States ; because it is well known that a duty
of forty-four cents on tonnage and ten per cent on duties is
paid by all foreign ships or vessels in all the ports of the United
States. If it be said, we must repeal those laws and then the
preference will cease, the answer is that this seventh article
gives the exclusive right of entering the ports of Louisiana to
the ships of France and Spain, and if our discriminating duties
were repealed this day the preference would be given to the ports
of the United States against those of Louisiana, so that the pref-

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 239
erence by any regulation of commerce or revenue which the
Constitution expressly prohibits from being given to the ports
of one State over those of another, would be given by this treaty
in violation of the Constitution. I acknowledge if Louisiana
is not admitted into the Union and if there is no promise to
admit her, then this part of our argument will not apply. .
I shall be asked, sir, what can be done? To this question I have
two answers : One is, that nothing unconstitutional can or
ought to be done ; and if it be ever so desirable that we acquire
foreign States and the navigation of the Mississippi, etc., no
excuse can be formed for violating the Constitution ; and if all
those desirable effects cannot take place without violating it,
they must be given up. But another and more satisfactory
answer can be given. I have no doubt but we can obtain terri
tory either by conquest or compact and hold it, even all Loui
siana and a thousand times more, if you please, without violating
the Constitution. We can hold territory ; but to admit the inhab
itants into the Union to make citizens of them and States, by
treaty, we cannot constitutionally do; and no subsequent act of
legislation or even ordinary amendment to our constitution can
legalize such measures. If done at all they must be done by
universal consent of all the States or partners to our political
association. And this universal consent I am positive can never
be obtained to such a pernicious measure as the admission of
Louisiana, of a world, and such a world, into our Union."
Mr. Breckenridge of Kentucky spoke eloquently in favor of
the bill and said among other things that "The so much scouted
process of negotiation was persisted in (for the acquirement
of rights on the Mississippi), and instead of restoring the right
of deposit and securing more effectually for the future our right
to navigate the Mississippi, the Mississippi itself was acquired
and everything which appertained to it. I did suppose that
those gentlemen who at the last session so strongly urged war
measures for the attainment of this object, upon an avowal that
it was too important to trust to the tardy and less effectual
process of negotiation, would have stood foremost in carrying
the treaty into effect, and that the peaceful mode by which it
was acquired would not lessen with them the importance of the
acquisition. ... If my opinion were of any consequence,
I should be free to declare that this transaction from its com
mencement to its close, not only as to the mode in which it was
pursued, but as to the object achieved, is one of the most splen
did which the annals of any nation can produce. To acquire an-

240 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
empire of perhaps half the extent of the one we possessed, from
the most powerful and warlike nation on earth without bloodshed,
without the oppression of a single individual, without in the least
embarrassing the ordinary operations of your finances, and all
this through the peaceful forms of negotiation, and in despite,
too, of the opposition of a considerable portion of the commu
nity, is an achievement of which the archives of the predeces
sors at least of those now in office, cannot furnish a parallel.
. Why not acquire territory on the west, as well as on
the east side of the Alississippi? Is the Goddess of Liberty
restrained by water courses? Is she governed by geographical
limits? Is her dominion on this continent confined to the east
side of the Mississippi ? So far from believing the doctrine that
a Republic ought to be confined within narrow limits, I believe
on the contrary that the more extensive its dominion the more
safe and more durable it will be. In proportion to the number
of hands you intrust the precious blessings of a free government
to, in the same proportion do you multiply the chances for their
preservation. I entertain, therefore, no fears for the Confeder
acy on account of its extent. The American people too well
know the art of governing and of being governed to become
the victims of party factions or of domestic tyranny. They not
only understand the true theory of a free government, but as
well understand a much rarer thing, the true art of practicing
it. It is evident, as this country had passed out of
the hands of Spain, that whether it remained with France, or
should be acquired by England, its population would have been
attempted. Such is the policy of all nations but Spain. From
whence would that population come? Certainly not from
Europe. It would come almost exclusively from the United
States. The question then would simply be, Is the Confeder
acy more in danger from Louisiana when colonized by American
people under American jurisdiction than when populated by
Americans under the control of some foreign, powerful and rival
nation? Or, in other words, whether it would be safer for the
United States to populate this country when and how she pleased,
or permit some foreign nation to do it at her expense? .
The gentlemen admit, if I do understand them, that the acqui
sition of a part, at least, of this country is essential to the United
States and must be made. That this acquisition must extend
to the soil; and to use the words of their resolutions last ses
sion, 'that it is not consistent with the dignity of the Union
to hold a right so important by a tenure so uncertain.' How,

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 241
I ask, is this 'certain tenure' to be acquired but by conquest or
a purchase of the soil? Did not gentlemen intend when they
urged its seizure that the United States, if successful, should
hold it in absolute sovereignty? Were any Constitutional diffi
culties then in the way? And will they now be so good as to
point out that part of the Constitution which authorizes us to
acquire territory by conquest," but forbids us to acquire it by
treaty? . . . Have the gentlemen who intend to vote
against this measure well weighed the state of things which will
result in case they should be successful in their opposition? Is
not the national honor pledged to procure this right? What
course do gentlemen mean to pursue, to attain it? Or do they
mean to abandon near a million of your western citizens to ruin
and despair? If you reject this treaty, with what face can you
open another negotiation? What President would venture
another mission, or what minister could be prevailed on to be
made the instrument of another negotiation? You adopt the
treaty, direct possession to be taken of the country, and then
refuse to pay for it! What palliation can we offer to our west
ern citizens for a conduct like this ?"
Mr. Cocke, of Tennessee, represented the sentiments of the
Western settlers when he said, "What must we think of gentlemen
in whom this sudden change has taken place and who now exclaim
against the passage of this bill, when we recollect that last winter
they were ready to storm the Spanish garrisons, and who then
promised by their valor to secure us a free trade down the Mis
sissippi and to make New Orleans and the Floridas their own?
Did the Constitution then for a barrier against them? They
have not only voted against the treaty that secures to us more than
they could have contemplated by their arms and their valor, but
they have also voted against the law for carrying the objects of
that treaty into effect after the treaty has been ratified and the
exchange of ratifications taken place in due form!; and now we
hear those warlike spirits expressing their fears that the western
country will soon become too powerful for the East, and that a
separation must inevitably take place between us. I ask gentle
men the ground on which they build their fears? It cannot be
that we have paid less respect to the laws of the Union than any
other portion of our fellow citizens ; or have we in any instance
shown less regard for our Government or its honest administra
tion. Is it then that gentlemen had determined in their own
minds to treat us with such marked indifference or injustice as
II— 16

242 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
should rouse us to just resentment? When that shall be the
case, I agree with my friend from Kentucky, that there is a point
beyond which we cannot go. Let not gentlemen be alarmed at the
acquisition of Louisiana, this New World as they please to call it,
and which they seem at so great a loss to know what to do with.
I hope gentlemen will excuse me if I again repeat a
desire to know the extent of their objects when they so loudly
clamored for war. Were I as suspicious as themselves I might
readily indulge a belief from the present state of things, that they
wished to check the rising growth of the Western people by
getting them into a war, make them a handsome bow and leave
them to fight their battles. But happily our treaty secures against
all such apprehensions. . . . And I again assure gentlemen
that I am not among those who believe that France, Spain or even
the British government would govern the Western country more
to our interest than we do; nor do I credit a doctrine so absurd
as to believe the people of the Western country will abandon their
interest and prostitute their honor to create dangers so imminent
as the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) seems to
apprehend, and who is so fearful of the day in which the Western
people shall give laws to the Union ; but if ever it should so hap
pen, I hope they will be at least as just and salutary as they were
when this honorable gentleman and his friends formed the politi
cal majority in this House."
The remarks of Mr. Adams, of Massachusetts, voiced perhaps
better than those of any other speaker the real sentiments and
opinions of the senators. He said, "For my own part I am free to
confess that the third article and more especially the seventh, con
tain engagements placing us in a dilemma, from which I see no
possible mode of extricating ourselves but by an amendment, or
rather an addition to the Constitution. The gentleman from Con
necticut (Mr. Tracy) both on a former occasion and in this day's
debate, appears to me to have shown this to demonstration. But
what is this more than saying, that the President and Senate
bound the nation to engagements which require the cooperation of
more extensive powers than theirs to carry them into execution?
Nothing is more common in the negotiations between nation and
nation than for a minister to agree to and sign articles beyond the
extent of his powers. This is what your ministers in the very
case before you have confessedly done. It is well known that
their powers did not authorize them to conclude this treaty; but
they acted for the benefit of their country, and this house by a
large majority has advised to the ratification of their proceedings.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 243
Suppose then not only that the ministers who signed, but the Pres
ident and Senate who ratified this compact, have exceeded their
powers. Suppose that the other House of Congress who have
given their assent by passing this and other bills for the fulfillment
of the obligations it imposes on us, have exceeded their powers.
Nay, suppose even that the majority of States competent to amend
the Constitution in other cases, could not amend it in this without
exceeding their powers — and this is the extremest point to which
any gentleman on this floor has extended his scruples — suppose
all this and there still remains in the country a power competent
to adopt and sanction every part of our engagements and to carry
them into -execution. For notwithstanding the objections and
apprehensions of many individuals, of many wise, able and excel
lent men in various parts of the Union, yet such is the public favor
attending the transaction which commenced by the negotiation of
this treaty and which I hope will terminate in our full, undis
turbed and undisputed possession of the ceded territory, that I
firmly believe if an amendment to the Constitution amply suffi
cient for the accomplishment of everything for which we have con
tracted shall be proposed as I think it ought, it will be adopted by
the Legislature of every State in the Union."
The bill providing for the issuance of stock to be used in pay
ing for Louisiana passed the senate — yeas 26, nays 5, those voting
in the negative being James Hillhouse, Timothy Pickering, Uriah
Tracy, William H. Wells and Samuel White, the latter two of
Delaware. Senators Adams, Olcott and Plumer, who had voted
against the bill authorizing the president to take possession of
Louisiana, voted in favor of this bill. The following is the text
of the act in full, authorizing the president to take possession of
Louisiana, as passed by the senate with the house amendments :*
"An Act to enable the President of the United States to take
possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States,
by the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April last, and
for the temporary government thereof.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the
President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to
take possession of, and to occupy the territories ceded by France
to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the
thirtieth day of April last, between the two nations, and that he
may for that purpose, and in order to maintain in the said terri-

? Annals of Congress.

244 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
tories the authority of the United States, employ any part of the
army or navy of the United States, and of the force authorized
by an act passed the third day of March last, entitled An Act
directing a detachment from the militia of the United States, and
for erecting certain arsenals, which he may deem necessary ; and
so much of the sum appropriated by the said act as may be
necessary, is hereby appropriated for the purpose of carrying this
act into effect ; to be applied under the direction of the President
of the United States.
"Sec. 2. And be ii further enacted, That until the expiration
of the present session of Congress, unless provision for the tem
porary government of the said territories be sooner made by Con
gress, all the military, civil and judicial powers exercised by the
officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in
such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner,
as the President of the United States shall direct, for maintaining
and protecting the inhabitants of Louisiana in the free enjoyment
of their liberty, property and religion."
"Approved, October 31, 1803."
In order to understand the attitude of the senators toward these
bills, a consideration of previous political occurrences will be
necessary. Near the close of Washington's administration two
'parties were, developed — the Federalists led by Adams, Hamilton,
and others, and the Republicans, of whom Jefferson was. the
leader. In 1798, when war with both France and Spain seemed
inevitable, the Federalists were charged by the Republicans with
the responsibility of the dangerous and deplorable state of affairs.
This charge, of course, was unfounded, because it was well known
that the anger of France was kindled by what she considered the
violation of the treaty of 1778 in the refusal of the United States to
encourage her in her war against Great Britain and in preventing
her from sending out privateers to prey on British commerce from
the ports of America, both of which stipulations, the French min
ister argued, were incumbent upon the -United States to perform
under that treaty. In retaliation for this unfounded charge, the
Federalists, when the interdiction of the deposits at New Orleans
was promulgated and the western country thrown into an uproar,
demanded the forcible occupation of that city and the lower Mis
sissippi ; and when their demands were rejected by congress they
endeavored to cast the responsibility for the distress upon the
administration. But the policy of negotiation instead of war pre
vailed, and finally the interdiction was revoked. When France

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION.

245

ceded Louisiana to the United States, the men who had previously
advocated taking forcible possession of New Orleans, were the
ones to oppose the necessary proceedings under the stipulations
of the cession treaty to place the province under American control.
Very few, if any in earnest, opposed the acquirement of Louisiana ;
the opposition was, in almost every instance, based upon other
grounds. It was a political maneuver against proceedings ema
nating from the majority party and the administration, and not
an attempt to prevent the acquirement of Louisiana. In addition,
individual senators, particularly of the New England states,
entertained lukewarm sentiments toward the western section of
the country, through mistaken notions, and notably toward the
unexplored and almost wholly unknown wilderness of Louisiana
and its Spanish, French and mixed inhabitants. Jefferson himself
was a strict constructionist of the constitution, but changed his
views in order to secure Louisiana and thus add a magnificent
domain to the territory of the United States. This expansion
applied to the constitution has since been several times repeated,
to the advantage, credit and glory of the country.
The policy of Jefferson and of the Republicans was to limit
instead of to extend the powers of the general government. The
Republicans had their origin mainly during the second term of
Washington when centralization went so far as to threaten the
assumption of other governmental functions by the president.
Thus intrenched, the Federalists surrendered vast privileges to
Great Britain, thus kindling the jealousy and hostility of both
France and Spain. The election of Jefferson to the presidency
was a protest against the concentration of so much power in the
hands of the president. The Republicans favored a strict con
struction of the constitution ; the Federalists the reverse. When
the Louisiana question came up for immediate settlement, the
leaders of the administration saw that they must either abandon
their policy of strict construction or adopt an amendment to the
constitution. Both eventualities were hurriedly yet amply con
sidered. While the necessary amendment would undoubtedly
carry, it would consume too much time. It was necessary to make
the greatest haste for two reasons : 1 . France might get sick of
the bargain and back out; 2. England might take possession of
New Orleans. In this extremity, be it said to the undying credit
of the American statesmen, partisanship was sunk out of sight,
and the broad and accurate foresight of seventy-six, which saw
only the prosperity and glory of the republic, dictated the correct
course to be pursued. The partisan disappeared and the states-

246 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
man rose triumphant. The magnificent province was promptly
accepted. But it should be noted that, in the senate debates, the
Federalists were the strict constructionists, while the Republicans
ridiculed their views.
The proceedings in the house on the Louisiana treaty were
interesting and memorable. On October 17, the president's mes
sage was received, read and referred to the committee of the whole
house on the state of the Union. The president's second message
(see supra for a summary of both messages) was received, read
and referred to the same committee on Saturday, October 22,
with an order for its consideration the following Monday. On
that date the following resolution was introduced by Roger Gris-
wold of Connecticut, the leader of the opposition in the house :*
"Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested
to cause to be laid before this House a copy of the treaty between
the French Republic and Spain, of the first of October, one thou
sand eight hundred, together with a copy of the deed' of cession
from Spain, executed in pursuance of the same treaty, convey
ing Louisiana to France (if any such deed exists) ; also copies
of such correspondence between the Government of the United
{States and the Government or minister of Spain (if any such
correspondence has taken place) , as will show the assent or dissent
of Spain to the purchase of Louisiana by the United States;
together with copies of such other documents as may be in the
department of State, or any other department of this Government,
tending to ascertain whether the United States have, in fact,
acquired any title to the province of Louisiana by the treaties with
France, of the thirtieth of April, one thousand eight hundred and
three." In support of his resolution, Mr. Griswold offered the following
remarks: "In the treaty between Spain and France (October 1,
1800) the former stipulated to cede to the latter, upon certain con
ditions, the province of Louisiana. The treaty between the United
States and the French Government does not ascertain whether
these terms have been complied with by France, or whether the
cession has been actually made by Spain to France. All that
appears is a promise made by Spain to cede. If the terms stipu
lated by France have not been complied with, and Spain has not
delivered the province to France, then it results that France has
no title, and of a consequence that the United States has acquired
no title from France. If this be correct, the consequence will be

? Annals of Congress.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 247
that we have acquired no new territory or new subjects, and that
it is perfectly idle to spend the time in passing laws for possessing
the territory and governing the people. This point not being
ascertained by the language of the treaty, it may be important to
obtain documents that may satisfy the House whether the United
States have acquired either new territory or new subjects. In
the treaty lately concluded with France, the treaty between France
and Spain is referred to ; only a part of it is copied. The treaty
referred to must be a public treaty. In the nature of things it
must be the title-deed for the province of Louisiana. The Gov
ernment must have a copy of it. As there is but a part recited,
it is evidently imperfect. It becomes therefore necessary to be
furnished with the whole, in order to ascertain the conditions
relative to the Duke of Parma; it also becomes necessary to get
the deed of cession ; for the promise to cede is no cession. This
deed of cession, it is to be presumed, is in the possession of the
government. It is also important to know under what circum
stances Louisiana is to be taken possession of, and whether with
the consent of Spain, as she is still possessed of it. If it is to be
taken possession of with her consent, the possession will be peace
able and one kind of provision will be necessary ; but if it is to be
taken possession of in opposition to Spain, a different provision
may be necessary. I believe it will be admitted that, by the express
terms of the treaty, the United States has neither acquired new
territory nor new subjects. I therefore consider it my duty, before
the House goes into a consideration of the resolutions laid on the
table, to submit this resolution."
In answering these remarks, Air. Randolph said, "The treaty
which we are now called upon to sanction, has been hailed by the
acclamation of the nation. It is not difficult to foresee, from the
opinions manifested in every quarter, that it will receive the
cordial approbation of a triumphant majority of this House. If
such be the general opinion — if we are not barely satisfied with
the terms of this treaty, but lost in astonishment at the all-impor
tant benefits which we have so cheaply acquired, to what purpose
do we ask information respecting the details of the negotiation?
Has any one ventured to hint disapprobation of the conduct of the
Ministers who have effected this negotiation? Has any one
insinuated that our interests have been betrayed? If then we are
satisfied as to the terms of this treaty and with the conduct of our
Ministers abroad, let us pass the laws necessary for carrying it
into effect. To refuse — to delay upon the plea now offered is to
jeopardize the best interests of the Union. Shall we take excep-

248 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
tion to our own title? Shall we refuse the offered possession?
Shall this refusal proceed from those who so lately affirmed that
we ought to pursue this very object at every national hazard? I
should rather suppose the eagerness of gentlemen would be ready
to outstrip the forms of law in making themselves masters of this
country, than that now when it is offered to our grasp, they should
display an unwillingness or at least an indifference for that which
so lately was all-important to them. After the message which the
President has sent us, to demand if indeed we have acquired any
new subjects, as the gentleman expresses it, which renders the
exercise of our legislative functions necessary, would be nothing
less than a mockery of him, of this solemn business and of our
selves. Cautionary provisions may be introduced into the laws
for securing us against every hazard, although from the nature of
our stipulations we are exposed to none. We retain in our own
hands the consideration money even after we have possession.
If I could for a moment believe that even a minority, respectable
as to numbers, required any other evidence of the fact of our
having acquired new territory and people to govern than the
extract from the treaty which has just been read, I would readily
concur with the gentleman from Connecticut in asking of the
executive whether indeed we have a new accession of territory
and of citizens, or as the gentleman has been pleased' to express
himself, subjects to govern. I hope the resolution will not be
agreed to."
Mr. Goddard of Connecticut spoke in favor of the resolution
and said, "There is no evidence that France has an incontestible
title to Louisiana. If in virtue of this treaty we purchase a prom
ise on the part of his Catholic Majesty to cede, and not an incon
testible title, I will ask if the promise constitutes a title? This
and this only is the language of the treaty of October i, 1800. If
this is the case, is it not proper to inquire whether there are other
acts by which Spain has ceded Louisiana to France? Such acts
may exist. ^ Certain stipulations were made by France to Spain
on which the cession depended. Do we not then wish to know
whether these stipulations have been fulfilled and whether they
are binding, or whether Spain has waived them? Are there in
existence any documents to that effect? It has been hinted that
such documents exist in the newspapers ; but are we, in an affair
of this magnitude, to be referred to the dictum of a newspaper?
I apprehend that this is a novel mode of legislation. What is the
Commissary to be sent by the Government of France to Louisiana
to do? He is in the first instance to receive the province from

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. ¦ 249
Spain. Can he transmit it to the United States before he receives
it from Spain ? We require to know, if Spain refuses to* deliver
Louisiana to France, can France transmit it to us ? We desire to
know whether there is any prospect of a refusal on the part of
Spain. Suppose we shall receive the colony from France, under
the dictation of the First Consul to Spain, without experiencing
any opposition from her. May not the time arrive, on a revolu
tion in the affairs of Europe, when she will Inquire by what title
we hold it? Is it not proper then for us to obtain papers, by
which our title may be fully understood?"
Mr. Thatcher, of Massachusetts, said, "The first article of the
Louisiana treaty goes to say that Spain may have altered the
boundaries of that province differently from what they were when
France before possessed it. And for what we know she has done
so. Hence the importance of seeing the papers asked for. If
we obtain the bare possession, it is one thing ; the legal possession
is another thing. It is one thing to govern the colony with a
corps of civilians, and another and a different thing to govern It
with an army. The President may perhaps have considered it a
good bargain to obtain, for the payment of fifteen millions, the
mere quit-claim of France to the province. At any rate it is
proper that we should act with our eyes open ; and therefore the
importance of having a copy of the treaty entered into between
the Governments of Spain and France, or evidence that Spain has
acquiesced in the cession to the United States."
The resolution was opposed by Mr. Nicholson, of Maryland,
who said, "I agree with gentlemen that if a majority of the House
entertain any doubt as to the validity of the title we have acquired,
they ought to call for papers; and I have no doubt, if there is any
dissatisfaction, they will call. I should have no objection to vote
for the resolution if it was confined to proper objects, not indeed
to satisfy myself, for I am already fully satisfied, but to satisfy
other gentlemen ; to satisfy the American people that the insinua
tions thrown out about the title are totally without foundation.
The resolution in its present shape, however, is highly improper;
it looks to extrinsic circumstances and contemplates an inquiry
into subjects totally unconnected with the treaty with France.
What has Spain to do in this business ? Gentlemen ask if she has
acquiesced in our purchase and call for her correspondence with
our Government. What is the acquiescence of Spain to us? If
the House is satisfied from the information laid on the table, that
Spain has ceded Louisiana to France, and that France has since
ceded it to the United States, what more do they require? Are

250 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
we not an independent nation? Have we not a right to make
treaties for ourselves without asking leave of Spain ? What is it
to us whether she acquiesces or not? She is no party to the
treaty of cession; she has no claim to the ceded territory. Are
we to pause till Spain thinks proper to consent, or are we to
inquire whether like a cross child she has thrown away her rattle
and cries for it afterward ? The treaty itself and the conventions
attached to it, furnish all the necessary information. Louisiana
is ceded to the United States with the same boundaries that it had
before been ceded with by Spain to France; and France has
obliged herself to send a- commissary to New Orleans to receive
the possession from Spain and to transfer it to us. For this the
United States are to pay fifteen millions of dollars to the French
Government. But how and when ? Not immediately ; not till we
have actually acquired the possession. And if France shall fail
to put us into actual possession, the United States are not bound
to pay a single dollar. So that the call for papers can be of no
possible use. I shall have no objection to have the treaty of
San Ildefonso laid before the House, if it is in the possession of
the Executive. In all probability, however, this is not the case,
as it is known to be a secret treaty on other subjects of great
importance between France and Spain. If there are any other
papers which can give gentlemen more information, I have no
objection either that these shall be laid before them for their
satisfaction. One very important paper, I know from high
authority, is certainly in existence and possibly may be in the
power of the Executive. This is a formal order, under the royal
signature of Spain, commanding the Spanish officers at New
Orleans to deliver the province to the French Prefect, which I
consider equal perhaps superior to any deed of cession ; for it is
equal to an express recognition on the part of Spain that France
has performed all the conditions referred to in the Treaty of
St. Ildefonso. It is an acknowledgment that Spain has no fur
ther claims upon Louisiana and will show that any interference on
her part ought to have no influence on the American Government.
To call for the correspondence between Spain and the United
States, if there is any such, I shall not assent to, as it can be of
no possible importance."
The resolution was also opposed by Mr. Mitchill, of New York.
Among other pertinent things he said, "The gentleman from Con
necticut (Mr. Griswold) says that the cession expressed in the
treaty, is no cession at all but a mere pretence. He says that our
title is derived from France, who has no title whatever 'to Louisi-

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 251
ana, and of course can convey none to the United States. I differ
in opinion entirely with that gentleman. The treaty contains
internal evidence enough for me to act upon. And it is accom
panied with extrinsic events and circumstances of great publicity.
The united evidence of these we cannot resist without rejecting
all human testimony and sinking into absolute scepticism.
In the treaty of St. Ildefonso Spain promises to cede;
but the stipulation is accompanied with a condition which, as
alleged by the mover of the resolution, has never been performed.
This condition, though not expressed at large in the first article,
is well understood to be the establishment of the Duke of Parma
in the full and entire possession of Tuscany, and the making him
a monarch under the title of the King of Etruria. This has been
done in the face of all Europe. And the deliberations in the Diet
of Ratisbon, concerning German indemnities, shows that the
Prince, who was turned out of that country to make room for a
younger member of the blood royal of Spain, was one of those
who suffered a loss of dominion and revenue when Italy was
borne down by the victorious arms of France. I urge upon the
attention of the House, that France has put the Duke of Parma
on the throne of Etruria, and has thereby acquired a title to
Louisiana, This was the consideration of price with which the
American province was purchased from Spain. But the right of
France to Louisiana does not rest here — it is not a nudum pac
tum — so far from it, effective measures have been adopted to
carry it into operation by adding possession to right. A com
missioner has been sent to New Orleans on the part of the French
Republic to receive the province of Louisiana from Spain. He
is required to do every act necessary, as well to receive from the
officers of his Catholic Alajesty the said country and its
dependencies, if it has not been already done, as to transmit it in
the name of the French Republic to the commissary or agent of
the United States. . . . An objection has been raised on
the ground of the uncertainty of the limits of Louisiana. I do
not feel the force of this. I know perfectly well that uncertainty
overhangs the subject; but this will be dissipated by degrees as
the unknown regions shall be visited and described. We may
then proceed to adjust the limits in a manner similar to that we
have repeatedly adopted with respect to the present territory of
the United States. . . . The operation of the resolution if
adopted will certainly be to procrastinate and embarrass; and I
do not discern what good will be wrought at this time by agree
ing to it. There is an additional reason and that a very weighty

252 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
one for refusing the motion at this time. By the treaty it must
'be ratified in good and due form and the ratifications exchanged
within six months after execution.' The date of this deed of ces
sion is the 30th of April last ; and consequently the limited time
will expire on the 30th of the current month. A doubt has been
expressed by some gentlemen for whose judgment I entertain the
greatest respect whether the ratification will be consummated in
'good and due form,' unless the declaration and act of this House
shall follow up the determination of the President and Senate.
It will, therefore, be better to proceed without delay to comply
with all the prerequisites." He therefore moved a postponement
of the resolution to the 30th of the following May.
The motion to postpone the resolution of Mr. Griswold led to
a long discussion, during which many arguments, pro and con,
were advanced on the Louisiana question. M'r. Griswold con
tinued, "By the first article of the treaty of St. Ildefonso it appears
that Spain promised to cede Louisiana to France on certain stipu
lations. She promises to cede. Gentlemen cannot mistake the
import of the language; it is a promise and not a cession. Will
it be said that France acquired any title by this promise? This
cannot be contended ; the treaty does not declare whether the terms
stipulated by France have been complied with, or whether the
cession was actually made. The terms of the treaty are 'whereas
in pursuance of the treaty and particularly of the third article
the French Republic has an incontestible title,' etc. Will gentle
men say that this assertion on the part of France gives her a
title ? It gives her no title. An assertion by France cannot affect
Spain." Mr. Randolph, in answering this argument, did not. controvert
it; but showed at length the utter lack of wisdom of placing
technicalities in the way of such an important acquisition. He
said, "How are we to reconcile this reluctant caution to the doc
trine of forcible possession so lately inculcated by gentlemen?
At one time it was necessary to possess ourselves of the key of
the Mississippi on any terms and in any way. There was no
waiting to examine into the title of other nations or scarcely into
our own. The Mississippi must be had at every hazard and in
any mode. Now that it is offered us, gentlemen can devise no
mode of gettting it. They are so embarrassed with forms, which
sometime past were held as nothing, that the value of the Mis
sissippi, which was held as everything, has sunk in their estima
tion. That Mississippi, for whose acquisition the nafion was to
be precipitated at once into war, is now of so little consequence

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 253
that the mjost trivial form outweighs it in their estimation. I had
expected to see those gentlemen foremost in zeal for taking pos
session of the country in question, and so far from throwing
impediments in the way, that in case Spain manifested any opposi
tion to the step, they would have been the first to originate meas
ures for compelling her assent. This would have been con
sistent." The motion to postpone was withdrawn and the house pro
ceeded to vote upon the resolution in sections. On the first mem
ber, "Resolved, That the President of the United States be
requested to cause to be laid before this House a copy of the
treaty between the French Republic and Spain, of the 1st of
October, 1800," the house divided, the ayes being 59 and the
noes 59; whereupon the speaker declared himself in the affirm
ative and the member was carried. All the other members of Mr.
Griswold's resolution were rejected. Mr. -Nicholson had moved
to amend the second member by adding, "Together with a copy
of any instrument in possession of the Executive, showing that the
Spanish government has ordered the province of Louisiana to be
delivered to the Commissary or other agent of the French Gov
ernment," and this amendment was agreed to. But the resolu
tion as amended was then voted upon and lost — yeas 57, nays 59.*
The rejection of the resolution merely showed that the friends of
the administration were unwilling to embarrass the executive in
measures to confirm the treaty and carry it into effect.
On the 25th the house resolved itself into a committee of the
whole to consider the messages of the president, and under the
following resolution, which had been previously moved, proceeded
to a consideration of the Louisiana treaty: "Resolved, That pro
vision ought to be made for carrying into effect the treaty and
convention concluded at Paris on the 30th of April, 1803, between
the United States of America and the French Republic."* Mr.
Gaylord Griswold of New York said that he found in the third
article of the Louisiana treaty "a compact between the French
Government and that of the United States to admit to citizenship
persons out of the jurisdiction of the United States as it now is,
and to admit territory out of the United States to be incorporated
into the Union. I do not find in the Constitution such a power
vested in the President and Senate. If such a power be not
expressly vested, it must be reserved to the people. It was not
consistent with the spirit of the Constitution that territory other

?Annals of Congress.

254 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
than that attached to the United States at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution should be admitted ; because at that time the
persons who formed the Constitution of the United States had a
particular respect to the then subsisting territory. They carried
their ideas to the time when there might be an extended popula
tion; but they did not carry them forward to the time when an
addition might be made to the Union of a territory equal to the
whole United States, which additional territory might overbalance
the existing territory, and thereby the rights of the present citi
zens of the United States be swallowed up and lost. Such a
measure could not be consistent either with the spirit or the
genius of the government. . . . But if the right of extend
ing our territory be given by the Constitution, its exercise is vested
in the Legislative branches of the Government. In the third sec
tion of the fourth article, of the Constitution it is said, 'New States
may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.'" Congress may
admit new States, but according to my construction of this article,
are confined to the territory belonging to the United States at the
formation of the Constitution — to the territory then within the.
United States. Existing territory not within the limits of any
particular States may be incorporated into the Union. I contend,
therefore, that the power to incorporate new territory did not
exist ; and that if it did exist it belonged to the Legislature and not
the Executive to incorporate it in the Union. If this is the case it
is the duty of the House to resist the usurped power exercised by
the Executive."
In reply Mr. Randolph said, "I understand the gentleman from
New York as denying that there exists in the United States as
such a capacity to acquire territory ; that by the Constitution they
are restricted to the limits which existed at the time of its adop
tion. If this position be correct, it undeniable follows "that those
limits must have been accurately defined and generally known at
the time when the Government took effect. Either they have been
particularly described in the constitutional compact, or are referred
to as settled beyond dispute and universally acknowledged. But
this is not the fact in either case. The Constitution not only does
not describe any particular boundary beyond which the United
States could not extend, but our boundary was unsettled on our
northeastern, southern and northwestern frontier at the time of
its adoption. . . . That the Constitution should tie us down
to particular limits without expressing those limits ; that we should
be restrained to the then boundaries of the United States when if
is in proof to the committee that no such bounds existed or do now

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 255
exist, was altogether incomprehensible and inadmissible. For if
the Constitution meant the practical limits of the United States,
the extent of country which we then possessed — our recent acqui
sitions on the side of Canada and the Natchez can not be defended.
My position is not only maintainable by the reason of the Consti
tution, but by the practice under it. Congress have expressed in
their own acts a solemn recognition of the principle that the
United States in their Federative capacity may acquire and have
acquired territory; namely, the territory in dispute between
Georgia and Florida. . . . No gentleman will deny the
right of the President to initiate business here by message recom
mending particular subjects to our attention. If the Government
of the United States possess the Constitutional power to acquire
territory from foreign States, the Executive as the organ by which
we communicate with such States must be the prime agent in
negotiating such an acquisition. Conceding then that the power
of confirming this act and annexing to the United States the terri
tory thus acquired ultimately rests with congress, where has been
the invasion of the privileges of that body? Does not the Presi
dent of the United States submit this subject to Congress for their
sanction? Does he not recognize the principle, which I trust we
will never give up, that no treaty is binding until we pass the laws
for executing it — that the powers conferred by the Constitution on
Congress cannot be modified or abridged by any treaty whatever —
that the subjects of which they have cognizance cannot in any way
be taken out of their jurisdiction? In this procedure nothing is
to be seen but a respect on the part of the Executive for our rights ;
a recognition of a discretion on our part to accord or refuse our
sanction. Where then is the violation of our rights? As to the
initiative in a matter like this, it necessarily devolves on the
Executive. . . . Let us suppose that our negotiations for
our rights on the Mississippi, instead of its present happy issue,
had terminated in a refusal of justice. I believe there would in
that event have been but one sentiment in this House and in this
nation. We should have appealed to arms, and if fortune had
only been as impartial as our cause was just, we should have
possessed ourselves of at least a part of the territory in question.
Does any one dream of denying our right to the forcible posses
sion of New Orleans if necessary to secure the navigation of the
Mississippi? Can a nation acquire by force that which she can
not acquire by treaty ? Must not the eventual right to the country
possessed by conquest be confirmed by treaty ? And is it not idle
to contend that so long as we employ force we may occupy the

256 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
country but no longer — that we cannot retain it by convention.
Now as to the expediency of the measure. What is
the state of our trade in relation to the ceded territory? But a
short time a'go who would have asked more than to be put on an
equal footing with the possessors of that country ? We now, have
the sovereignty of it and only stipulate that (for twelve years)
France and Spain shall be admitted, not on an equal footing with
us, but that their vessels laden with their own produce, not other
wise, shall pay no higher duties than our own. At the expiration
of that period we can give a decided preponderance to our trade
by discriminating duties. Will the hardy and enterprising New
Englander shrink from a competition with France and Spain on
these terms? Cannot the discriminating duties be still enforced
by the existing regulations in respect to imports from New
Orleans to other parts of the United States ? So far from a clog
on our commerce, does not this treaty unfetter the Mississippi
trade and give us a preference over all other nations except the
case of the French and Spanish vessels, laden with the produce of
their respective countries, and there we are on a footing with
them." Continuing, Mr. Randolph said, "As long ago as the year 1673
the inhabitants of the French province of Canada explored the
country on the Mississippi. A few years afterward (1685)
La Salle with emigrants from old France, made a settlement on the
Bay of St. Bernard, and at the close of the 17th century, previous
to the existence of Pensacola, another French settlement was
made by the Governor DTberville at Mobile and on the island of
Dauphin or Massacre at the mouth of that bay. In 1712 a short
time previous to the treaty of Utrecht, Louis XIV described the
extent of the colony of Louisiana (by the settlements) in his grant'
of its exclusive commerce to Crozat. Three years subsequent to
this the Spanish establishment at Pensacola was formed, as well
as the settlements on the Adaes on the river Mexicana. After
various conflicting efforts on both sides, the bay and river Per
dido was established (from the peace of 1719) as the boundary
between the French province of Louisiana on the one side and
the Spanish province of Florida on the other, this river being
nearly equi-distant between Mobile and Pensacola. Near the close
of the war between England and France, rendered memorable for
the unexampled success with which it was conducted by that
unrivaled statesman, the great Lord Chatham, Spain became a
party on the side of France. The loss of the Havana and other
important dependencies, was the immediate consequence. In

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 257
1762 France, by a secret treaty of contemporaneous date with-
the preliminary treaty of peace, relinquished Louisiana to Spain,
as an indemnity for her losses, sustained by advocating the
cause of France. By the definitive treaty of 1763, France
ceded to England all that part of Louisiana which lies east of
the Mississippi except the island of New Orleans — the rest of the
province to Spain. It is to be observed that although osten
sibly France ceded this country to England, virtually the cession
was on the part of Spain, because France was no longer inter
ested in the business, but as the friend of Spain (having pre
viously relinquished the whole to her) and because in 1783
restitution was made by England, not to France, but to Spain.
England having acquired this portion of Louisiana, together with
the Spanish province of Florida, annexed to the former that
part of Florida which lies west of the Aapalachicola and east
of the Perdido, thereby forming the province of West Florida.
It is only in English geography and during this period, from
1763 to 1783, that such a country as West Florida is known.
For Spain, having acquired both the Floridas in 1783, re-an
nexed to Louisiana the country west of the Perdido subject to
rhe government of New Orleans, and established the ancient
boundaries of Florida, the country between the Perdido and
Apalachicola being subject to the Governor of St. Augustine.
By the treaty of St. Ildefonso, Spain ceded to France the prov
ince of Louisiana with the same extent that it now has in the
hands of Spain' : viz., to the Perdido, 'and that it had when
France possessed it,' to the Perdido, and 'such as it should be
after treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other
powers:' that is, saving to the United States the country given
up by the treaty of San Lorenzo. We have succeeded to all the
right of France. If the navigation of the Mississippi alone were
of sufficient importance to justify war, surely what we have now
gained by this treaty will be acknowledged to be inestimably valu
able."* Messrs. J. Lewis and Griffin of Virginia regarded the treaty
as unconstitutional in the respect that ^Congress possessed no
power to give a commercial preference to one State over
another; and if the ships of France and Spain are permitted
to enter New Orleans on terms more advantageous than they
are permitted to enter other ports of the United States, it is
a palpable violation of the Constitution." Mr. Griffin also
?Annals of Congress.
II— 17

258 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
observed that "the constitution says, 'Congress shall have power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations.' Who are Congress ?
The Senate and House of Representatives. If, then, the Presi
dent and Senate make a treaty for the regulation of commerce,
they infringe the Constitution by doing that which Congress alone
can do." Both gentlemen asked to be set right if they were
wrong in their conclusions. Mr. Griffin further said, "I do fear
that though this land is represented as flowing with milk and
honey, it will prove a cemetery for the bodies of our citizens."
An eloquent speech made in favor of the treaty was delivered
by Mr. Purviance of North Carolina. He said: "I am clearly
and decidedly in favor of the resolution on your table, premis
ing the appropriations for carrying the treaty between France
and this country into effect. . . . It is true I am, and
always have been, opposed to the general tenor of the present
administration. It has not appeared to me to possess that bold,
commanding aspect, that erect and resolute front, which ought
to be assumed by the Executive of a free people, when claiming
satisfaction for wrong sustained. It has not shown that strong,
muscular, athletic shape, which is calculated to intimidate
aggression, or which is enabled to resist it ; nor do I think that
it has manifested that firm, dignified, manly tone of virtue and
of spirit which, resting on the love of a free people, and con
scious of their strength, can ask for the prompt, direct and
unequivocal satisfaction to which it is entitled, and being denied
can take it. . It has to my mind somewhat resembled
a militia subaltern, who in time of war directed his men not
to fire on the enemy lest the enemy might fire again. Under
such an administration, I have thought that it would be better
to have the ceded territory on any terms than not to have it
at all. . . . Yes, thank God! We have now a treaty,
signed by themselves, in which they have voluntarily passed away
the only means of annoyance which they possessed (meaning
France). But I do not thank the honorable gentleman who is
at the head of our Executive. . At the time this negotiation was
commenced, there could not be the smallest hope of its being
carried into effect. The French consul had obtained it perhaps
for the express purpose of carrying into effect his favorite scheme
of universal domination; it might give him the chance of injur
ing the British, controlling the Spaniards, and dismembering
America. Compared with these objects a handful of bank stock
was of no more consequence to him than a handful of sand.
His fleet and army were ready to sail, and his colonial prefect

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 259
had already arrived. But mark! The King of Great Britain,
who at this crisis I take to have been by far the most able nego
tiator we had, declares war. The scene is now changed. That
which France had refused to our intercessions, she was now
compelled to grant from mere necessity. A state of warfare
took place about the last of March, and the treaty was signed
soon afterwards. As long as I retain the small stock of under
standing which it has pleased God to give me, I shall never
be induced to believe that it was owing in the smallest degree
to the efficacy of diplomatic representation. The mind of that
great man (Napoleon) is not made of such soft materials as
to receive an impression from the collision of very gentle hands.
No, sir; had it not been for this happy coincidence
of circumstances, the personal solicitations of our ministers would
have been regarded with as listless an ear as if they had been
whispered across the ocean. . . If, then, the claim which
has been transferred (Louisiana) should be invested with any
latent embarrassment; if the court of Madrid has already sig
nified any hostility to this treaty, in consequence of the non-per
formance of the stipulations contained in that of St. Ildefonso
respecting the recognition of the late King of Etruria; if our
possession should be opposed, or our right of property here
after contested, let the President look to it. He only will become
responsible for every drop of American blood which may be
drawn in such a contest, as he ought to have communicated any
information to this effect which he possessed, in order that our
discretion might be regulated accordingly. As no such obstacles
have been made known to us by the President, I will suppose
that none such do exist, and I will therefore vote for the treaty."
Mr. Claiborne of Virginia declared his firm belief in the con
stitutionality and the expediency of the treaty. Mr. Sanford
of North Carolina expressed similar views. Mr. Thatcher of
Massachusetts opposed the treaty on constitutional grounds. He
maintained that power not expressly delegated by the states was
still held by them; that power to admit states to the Union was
not granted to the president even admitting that it had been
granted to congress ; that it was not correct to state that con
gress had already practiced the principle of admitting territory;
that the preference given to Frnch and Spanish vessels by the
treaty could not be considered part of the purchase price, because
Louisiana was bought from France alone, whereas preference
was given to the vessels of both France and • Spain ; that the
power contended for by the administration party implied the

260 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
power of alienating other parts of the United States, as Maine
to Great Britain; and that to say the question was a leading,
not a constitutional one was misleading, because all departments
of the government, including president and senate, were bound
by the constitution. Mr. Randolph corrected by stating that
he had said "the preference of our ships over foreign ships was
a legal regulation ; and that therefore those gentlemen who were
so tender with regard to the Constitution might have it in their
power entirely to get rid of the Constitutional difficulty, by tak
ing off from the ships of France and Spain such duties as were
higher than the duties paid by American vessels. When I say
this I speak for them and not for myself; nor shall I move to
take off these heavy duties, as I do not feel the force of the
Constitutional objections urged by gentlemen. The article of the
treaty so often quoted shows that no preference is given to one
port over another."
Mr. Smilie of Pennsylvania considered the "right of annexing
territory incidental to all governments. If I am correct in this
opinion, such a power is vested in some department of govern
ment in the United States. That it is not vested in the States
is clear, as they are expressly divested of the right. They are
by the Constitution expressly divested of the right of forming
treaties and making war. It can then reside in the general Gov
ernment only. It is a position that cannot be denied, that all
societies possess the right of self protection. . . . The
treaty says we are obliged to admit the inhabitants according
to the principles of the Constitution. Suppose these principles
forbid their admission; then we are not obliged to admit them.
This follows as an absolute consequence from the premises."
Mr. Crowninshield of Massachusetts said: "Feeling as I do
that we have acquired this country at a cheap price, that it is
a necessary barrier in the southern and western quarters of the
Union, that it offers immense advantages to us as an agricult
ural and commercial nation, I am highly in favor of the acqui
sition." Mr. Griswold of Connecticut argued at considerable length
against the treaty, although he said, "I do not personally feel any
particular hostility to it." He presented objections both of con
stitutionality and expediency with greater power than any other
representative, and said that "until those doubts were cleared
up he should feel compelled to vote against carrying the treaty
into execution." Among many important things which he said
was the following: "It is clear that it was intended to incor-

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 261
porate the inhabitants of the ceded territory into the Union by
the treaty itself, or to pledge the faith of the nation that such
an incorporation should take place within a reasonable time-
It is proper, therefore, to consider the question with a reference
to both constructions. It is in my opinion scarcely possible for
any gentleman on this floor to advance an opinion that the
President and Senate may add to the members of the Union by
treaty whenever they please, or, in the words of this treaty, may
'incorporate in the Union of the United States' a foreign nation
who from interest or ambition may wish to become a member
of our Government. Such a power would be directly repug
nant to the original compact between the States, and a violation
of the principles on which that compact was formed. It has
been already well observed that the Union of the States was
formed on the principles of a copartnership, and it would be
absurd to suppose that the agents of the parties who have been
appointed to execute the business of the compact in behalf of
the principals, could admit a new partner without the. consent
of the parties themselves. And yet if the first construction is
assumed, such must be the case under this Constitution, and the
President and Senate may admit at will any foreign nation into
this copartnership without the 'consent of the States. The Gov
ernment of this country is formed by a union of States, and
the people have declared that the Constitution was established
'to form a more perfect union of the United States.' The United
States here mentioned cannot be mistaken. They were the
States then in existence, and such other new States as should
be formed, within the then limits of the Union, conformably to
the provisions of the Constitution. Every measure, therefore,
which tends to infringe the perfect union of the States herein
described, is a violation of the first sentiment expressed in the
constitution. The incorporation of a foreign nation into the
Union, so far from tending to preserve the Union, is a direct
inroad upon it; it destroys the perfect union contemplated
between the original parties by interposing an alien and a stranger
to share the powers of Government with them. The Govern
ment, of the United States was not formed for the purpose of
distributing its principles and advantages to foreign nations.
It was" formed with the sole view of securing those blessings
to ourselves and our posterity. It follows from these principles
that no power can reside in any public functionary to contract
any engagement, or to pursue any measure which shall change
the Union of the States. Nor was it necessary that any restrict-

262 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ive clause should have been inserted in the Constitution to
restrain the public agents from exercising these extraordinary
powers, because the restriction grows out of the nature of the
Government. The President with the advice of the Senate has
undoubtedly the right to form treaties, but in exercising these
powers he cannot barter away the Constitution or the rights of
particular States. It is easy to conceive that it must have been
considered very important by the original parties to the consti
tution, that the limits of the United States should not be extended.
The Government having been formed by a union of States, it
is supposable that the fear of an undue or preponderating influ
ence in certain parts of this Union must have great weight in
the minds of those who might apprehend that such an influence
might ultimately injure the interests of the States to which they
belonged; and although they might consent to become parties
to the Union as it was then formed, it is highly probable that
they would never have consented to such a connection if a new
world was to be thrown into the scale to weigh down the influence
which they might otherwise possess in the national councils.
From this view of the subject, I have been persuaded that the
framers of the Constitution never intended that a power should
reside in the President and Senate to form a treaty by which
a foreign nation and people shall be incorporated in the Union,
and that this treaty so far as it stipulates for such an incorpo
ration is void.
"A new territory and new subjects may undoubtedly be
obtained by conquest and by purchase; but neither the conquest
nor the purchase can incorporate them into the Union. They
must remain in the condition of colonies arid be governed accord
ingly. The objection to the third article is not that the prov
ince of Louisiana could not have been purchased, but that neither
this nor any other foreign nation can be incorporated into the
Union by treaty or by a law ; and as this country has been ceded
to the United States only under the condition of an incorpora
tion, it results that if the condition is unconstitutional or impos
sible the cession itself falls to the ground. . . . The gen
tleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has said that the dis
criminating duties of impost and tonnage are not a constitutional
but a statute regulation. This is undoubtedly true, but it must
be recollected that the statutes are in force, and so long as they
remain unrepealed, the preference is given to the ports on the
Mississippi and the uniformity of duties is violated; and it can
not most assurdly be correct to violate a principle of the Con-

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 263
stitution for a day under the expectation of curing the violation
by a legislative interference. . . . The ships of France and
Spain are to be admitted into New Orleans on the same terms
with our own ships. The discriminating duty, therefore, in
respect to them in that port is virtually repealed. But we obtain
no repeal of the countervailing duties in French and Spanish
ports. The consequence must be that while we are laboring
under all the embarrassment of extra duties in their ports, they
are liberated from every embarrassment in ours. The effect is
easy to be seen : the whole trade from the mouth of the Mis
sissippi to the French and Spanish colonies and probably to their
European possessions, must ultimately be carried on in French
and Spanish bottoms, to the entire exclusion of American ships.
Nor will the injury stop here ; both France and Spain will doubt
less prefer procuring their supplies from the United States in
their own ships, and while they hold the monopoly of the trade
at the mouth of the Alississippi they will be able to draw from
that point an abundant supply of flour and other articles of
produce, to the great prejudice if not to the ruin of the trade
from the Atlantic ports to the French and Spanish colonies."
One of the strongest arguments in favor of the resolution
before the house was delivered by Mr. Nicholson of Maryland.
He reviewed every feature of the proposed acquisition, and
emphasized every argument in its favor. Among other things,
he said: "Whether the United States as a sovereign and inde
pendent empire has a right to acquire territory is one question ;
but whether they can admit that territory into the Union upon
an equal footing with the other States is a question of a very
different nature. . . . Had I been asked anywhere but in
this House whether a sovereign nation had a right to acquire
new territory, I should have thought the question an absurd
one. It appears to me too plain and undeniable to admit of
demonstration. Is it necessary to resort to ancient authorities
to establish a position which is proved by the conduct pursued
by all nations from the earliest periods of the world and which
arises- from the very nature of society? Can it be doubted
that when a State is attacked it has the right to assail its enemy
in turn and weaken the aggressor by dispossessing him of a
part of his territory? Surely the opinions of all writers both
ancient and modern and the examples of all nations in all ages,
can leave no reason to doubt on this subject. But, sir, on this
as on most other occasions, we are told that the Constitution
stares us in the face, and that this treaty cannot be carried into

264 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
effect without violating the Constitution. If, indeed, this sacred
instrument forbids the acquisition of territory by the United
States, I will most readily admit that we ought to stop here.
Let the Constitution, however, be examined, let the principles
on which it was formed be taken into view, and it will be found
that instead bf forbidding, the Constitution recognizes the author
ity to acquire territory. . . . The right to declare war is
given to Congress ; the right to make treaties, to the President
and Senate. Conquest and purchase alone are the means by
which nations acquire territory. The one can only be effected
by war, the other by treaty, and when the States divested them
selves of these powers and gave them to the general Govern
ment, they gave at the same time the right to acquire territory
which they themselves originally had. The right must exist
somewhere. It is essential to independent sovereignty. The
tenth section of the first article of the Constitution expressly
prohibits the States from entering into treaties or levying war
and even from forming any compact or agreement with another
State or a foreign Power without the consent of Congress. All
the rights which the States originally enjoyed are either reserved
to the States or are vested in the General Governmnt. If they
once had the power individually to acquire territory and this
is now prohibited to them by the Constitution, it follows of course
that the power is vested in the United States. The gentleman
from Connecticut (Mr. Griswold) admits that during the last
session he was an advocate for very vigorous measures. By vig
orous measures he means war. Will he deny that it was his
wish to seize upon New Orleans by force? Will he deny that
this and this alone was the reason why his friends and himself
did not unite with us in the measures then adopted for the pur
pose of acquiring this country? If the gentleman's object was
war, if his measure was conquest, did he mean that we should
drive all the inhabitants of the island into the Gulf of Mexico
and afterwards retire into our own limits? If he then thought
that after conquering New Orleans we should have a right to
hold it, surely it will not now be denied that we can hold it
after having obtained it by peaceable measures.
Where one party violates an article in a treaty, the other has the
right to declare the whole void, because the violation is a breach
of faith and is a voluntary act. But where some of the stipu
lations of a treaty are impossible to be performed or cannot be
fulfilled consistently with the engagements of an antecedent
treaty with a third Power, these are of course void, but other

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 265
parts will stand good. . . . If it shall finally be determined
that Congress cannot admit the ceded territory into the Union
as a State, yet the other parts of the treaty with France will
standgood. If this was the intention of our Ministers (which
perhaps may be doubted), they seem to have guarded against
the event of a refusal either by Congress or by the people. For
it is declared expressly that until the inhabitants can be incor
porated into the Union and can be admitted to all the privileges
of citizenship, they shall be protected in the enjoyment of their
civil and religious rights."
Messrs. Rodney of Delaware and Alitchill of New York spoke
in favor of the resolution. The former said: "How are these
people to be admitted? According to the principles of the Fed
eral Constitution. Is it an open violation of any part of the Con
stitution. No; an express reservation is made by those who
formed the treaty that they must be admitted under the Consti
tution. Now, if admitted agreeably to the Constitution it can
not be said to be in violation of it; and if not in violation of it
the fears of gentlemen are groundless." Air. Alitchill said : "We
are constantly in the practice of receiving territory by cession
from the red men of the West, the aborigines of our country.
The very treaty mentioned in the President's message with the
Kaskaskia Indians whereby we have acquired a large extent of
land, would according to this doctrine be unconstitional ; and so
would all the treaties with the numerous tribes of the natives on
our frontiers. . . . Suppose for a moment that our present
limits were full of people, would it be unconstitutional to purchase
additional territory for them to settle upon? Must the hive
always contain its present numbers and no swarm ever go forth?
By the third article (of the treaty) it is stipulated that
the inhabitants of Louisiana shall hereafter be made citizens ;
ergo they are not made citizens of the United States by mere
operation of treaty. In confirmation of this construction, I will
mention the second article of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and his Britannic Majesty
concluded in 1794. It is therein stipulated that all British sub
jects who shall continue within the evacuated posts and precincts,
should be considered if they remained there longer than one year
to have abandoned all allegiance to the crown of Britain and to
have made their election to become citizens of the United States ;
after which by taking the oath of allegiance they became instantly
by act of treaty and by force of statute citizens of the United
States. I therefore consider the point already adjudged, when

266 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the treaty of 1794 was decided on, that without an act of Congress
aliens can be converted into citizens by the provisions of a treaty
duly ratified by the President and Senate. In the treaty respect
ing Louisiana there is happily no cause for alarm. This power
of making citizens has not been exercised by the President and
Senate, but a future day may be used by Congress. ... By
the treaty there is no preference given to one State over another
in any commercial regulations. The port of New Orleans is not
a part of any State in the Union. The abolition of the discrimi
nating duties in favor of the two European nations is confined
absolutely to the ports of Louisiana. They have no preference in
the ports of any of the States. Nor is there given to one an
advantage over the other. In right construction these indul
gences are in fact a part of the purchase money ; and on account
of this valuable consideration, Congress will have less money to
appropriate and the nation thereby be saved from several mil
lions additional debt."
Mr. Randolph concluded the argument on the resolution with
a concise and general summary of all the points advanced for and
against the treaty. It had been shown, he contended, that every
consideration of expediency demanded not only the adoption of
the resolution but the acceptance of the treaty. But it must be
admitted that the debate did not develop a specific right inherent
in the constitution to admit a state into the Union from foreign ter
ritory acquired. On the other hand, the spirit of definite consti
tutional provisions clearly implied such a right Therefore, the
debate developed immensely preponderating advantages in favor
of the treaty, with no specific constitutional prohibition against
the admission of such a state. It should be said, however, that
the latter point was not exhaustively discussed at this debate,
because it was not properly embraced in the resolution under dis
cussion. The committee of the whole arose, the house proper resumed
the consideration of business, and the chairman of the committee
reported the following resolutions :*
"Resolved, That provisions ought to be made for carrying into
effect the treaty and conventions concluded at Paris, on the
thirtieth of April, one thousand eight hundred and three, between
the United States of America and the French Republic.
"Resolved, That so much of the Message of the President of
the twenty-first instant, as relates to the establishment of a Pro-

* Annals of Congress.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CESSION. 267
visional Government over the territory acquired by the United
States, in virtue of the treaty and conventions. lately negotiated
with the French Republic, be referred to a select committee ; and
that they report by bill or otherwise.
"Resolved, That so much of the aforesaid conventions as
relates to the payment by the United States of sixty millions of
francs to the French Republic and to the payment by the United
States of debts due by France to citizens of the United States, be
referred to the committee of Ways and Means."
The first resolution was carried by yeas 90, nays 25. The sec
ond was amended by an insertion of the words "occupation and"
before the word "establishment," and was then agreed to. The
third was adopted. These acts of the house may be construed as
a full acceptance of the cession of Louisiana on the terms stipu
lated in the treaty, and subsequent debates were merely intended
to clear up the details of right and procedure.
On October 27, the house in committee of the whole considered
the senate bill to enable the president to take possession of the
territory ceded by France to the United States April 30, 1803, and
for other purposes (see the bill supra). Air. Griswold of Con
necticut moved to strike out the whole second section, and
explained that he made the motion in order "to obtain an explana
tion respecting the nature and extent of the delegated power."
This led to a spirited discussion, in which many members joined,
of the power thus to be delegated to the president, several con
tending that the section was unconstitutional and others that it
was not. The motion to strike out was defeated by ayes 30. In
order to cure faults which the majority party themselves con
sidered might be justly held against the bill, Mr. Randolph moved
an amendment to the second section by adding at the close the
words, "for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of Louisi
ana in the full enjoyment of their liberty, property and religion."
As this limited the powers delegated to the president, it was
agreed to without division. On the 28th the bill came back from
the senate where the house amendments had been accepted, and
was voted upon with the result of 89 yeas and 23 nays. This
made it a law so far as congress was concerned, one of the most
important ever passed by the law-making branch of the govern
ment. It cannot be doubted, when the congressional debate is
carefully read and analyzed, that the bill met the approval of
almost every member of congress, even of those who, during the
discussion, urged strong objections to the methods proposed for
accepting the treaty. Nearly all at heart were willing to take

268 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the remote chances of infringing the constitution in order to
settle permanently the Mississippi question and to secure the
splendid domain beyond that river.
The bill for carrying into effect the convention of April 30,
1803, between the United States and France passed the house —
yeas 85, nays 7. This bill was amended by the senate, but the
amendments were agreed to by the house on November 7. The
act providing for the payment of the claims of American citizens
against France was approved by congress November 12. Two
other acts, one allowing drawbacks of duties on goods exported
to New Orleans, and another laying and collecting duties on
imports and tonnage within Louisiana, were passed at this ses
sion of congress. It may be proper to add at this point that the
total cost to the United States of the Louisiana purchase up to
June 30, 1880, including principal, interest, claims, debts, etc.,
reached the grand aggregate of twenty-seven million two hundred
and sixty-seven thousand six hundred and twenty-one dollars arid
ninety-eight cents.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 269

CHAPTER VII

The Florida and the Texas Boundaries,
1803-1808

WHEN the United States commissioners received from the
French commissioner, Peter Clement Laussat, the
province of Louisiana on December 20, 1803, they were
under orders to refrain from laying any claim to West Florida.*
It had been learned that at the time the province was transferred
by Spain to France a few weeks before, nothing denoting the
limits or the boundaries transpired. The French authorities were
not ordered, when they thus secured Louisiana from Spain, to
claim any portion of the Floridas. M. Laussat, who had been
the French commissioner to receive the province from Spain and
later to transfer it to the United States, stated positively that no
part of the Floridas was included within the eastern boundary
and that although France had strenuously insisted on an exten
sion of Louisiana to the Mobile river, their demands were peremp
torily refused by Spain. After the treaty of San Ildefonso the
consular government had used every argument within their power
to stretch the eastern boundary of the province to the Perdido,
but Spain had persistently refused to concede the claim, largely
through the influence of the acute Godoy. Had France possessed
the least claim to an eastward extension beyond the Iberville, the
first consul, when he secured the retrocession of Louisiana in
1800 and when he so intensely desired the acquisition of the
Floridas, would scarcely have failed to get part at least of West
Florida, having as he did such influence and prestige with the
Spanish court. Being unable to show a right to such a claim,

?American State Papers.

270 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
though having the promise of the Spanish monarch to retrocede
Louisiana, he was forced to be content with the eastern limits,
at the river Iberville. Had he kept Louisiana, he undoubtedly
would have brought pressure enough to bear later on the Spanish
government to secure West Florida at least, by purchase or other
equivalent. The inability of France to show a just claim to ter
ritory east of the Iberville and the positive stand of the Spanish
that Louisiana extended no farther eastward, were the principal
circumstance which induced the United States to forego for a
while laying any claim to a portion of West Florida. They
realized the immediate importance of gaining possession of
Louisiana before anything should transpire to prevent the acces
sion, and trusted to negotiation afterward to effect the relin
quishment of West Florida by Spain. Many of the brightest,
clearest-sighted and most honorable of the American statesmen
believed the United States possessed a valid claim to the terri
tory eastward to the Perdido. The citizens generally desired
very much to possess the Florid'as; and accordingly, the transfer
of Louisiana to the United States had no sooner been effected
than the Americans in the vicinity of New Orleans and Natchez
began openly to claim the country to the Perdido. In a short
time these claims became so annoying to the Spanish at New
Orleans, that the following communications passed between the
commissioners of France and Spain still in that city :
"New Orleans, March 31, 1804.'.'
"To the Colonial Prefect and Commissioner of the French
Republic :
"Sir : I should be guilty of a great dereliction from my duty
and from the necessities imposed by the confidence of the King
my master when he gave me my commission, if, while you are
preparing for your voyage, and terminating the operations in
which I was also destined to bear a part, I should neglect to com
municate to you, in the name of the King, that Spain cannot with
indifference regard the exorbitant propositions which the United
States are beginning to set forth, with regard to the limits, both
to the east and the west, of the province of Louisiana. The
limits on the east are established by solemn treaties, and for that
very reason are absolutely unquestionable; it however appears
that France herself is supporting the establishment of those on the
west at the mouth of the river Bravo (Rio Grande). I cannot,
therefore, refrain from entering my most solemn protest against
any operations or intentions of establishing the limits beyond the

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES.

271

river Sabine, until his Majesty shall have resolved upon some
measure with regard to the subject; as such a proceeding would
be prejudicial to the .interests of Spain, and would tend to dis
member a considerable portion of the internal provinces of Mexico
to the great damage of the dominions of his Majesty and of his
subjects. And in order that this may forever be public, I
beseech you, sir, to inform your government of it, in order that
the limits may be settled truly, which now appears undetermined,
and the operations of tracing them may be begun upon the bases
already acknowledged by France when she formally possessed
the province of Louisiana."
"May God preserve you many years,
"The Marquis de Casa Calvo."*
"New Orleans, 12 of Germinal, Year 12.
(2d of April, 1804).
"To the Marquis de Casa Calvo,
"Brigadier of the Armies of Spain,
"and Commissioner of his Catholic Majesty:
"Sir : I will faithfully submit to my government the declara
tion in the form of a protest, which you placed in my hands by
your letter of the 10th of Germinal of the present year (March 31,
1804), respecting the limits which should be established for
Louisiana, according to the treaty of restoration and of cession, in
execution of which I here represent the French people, by com
mission from the First Consul. I have the honor to salute you,
sir, with the greatest consideration." "Laussat."
At the time of the transfer of Louisiana to the United
States, the French commissioner, M. Laussat, while positive that
the eastern boundary did not extend beyond the river Iberville,
was equally positive that the southwestern boundary, did extend
to the Rio Bravo or Del Norte. Mr. Livingston, in his letter
dated May 20, 1803, states that at first he thought that the Flori
das extended westward to the river Iberville. "The moment I
saw the words of the treaty of Madrid I had no doubt but it
included all the country that France possessed by the name of
Louisiana previous to their cession to Spain, except what had been
conveyed by subsequent treaties. I accordingly insisted with
M. Marbois at the time we negotiated that this would be con-

* American State Papers.

272 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
sidered as within our purchase. He neither assented nor denied,
but said that all they received from Spain was intended to be
conveyed to us. That my construction was right is fairly to be
inferred from the words of the treaties, and from a comment upon
them contained in the Spanish minister's letter to Mr. Pinckney,
in which he expressly says that France had recovered Louisiana
as it formerly belonged to her, saving the rights of other Powers.
This leaves no doubt upon the subject of the intention of the con
tracting parties. Now, it is well known that Louisiana as
possessed by France was bounded by the river Perdido and that
Mobile was the metropolis. For the facts relative to this I refer
you to Raynal and to his maps. I have also seen maps here which
put the matter out of dispute. I called this morning upon
M. Marbois for a further explanation on this subject, and to
remind him of his having told me that Mobile made a part of the
cession. He told me that he had no precise idea on the subject,
but that he knew it to be an historical fact, and that on that only
he had formed his opinion. I asked him what orders had been
given to the Prefect who was to take possession, or what orders
had been given by Spain as to the boundary in ceding it? He
assured me that he did not know; but that he would make the
inquiry and let me know. At four o'clock I called for Mr.
Monroe to take him to the minister of foreign affairs, but he was
prevented from accompanying me. I asked the minister what
were the east bounds of the territory ceded to us? He said he
did not know; we must take it as they had received it. I asked
him how Spain meant to give them possession ? He said, accord
ing to the words of the treaty. But what did you mean to take ?
I do not know. Then you mean that we shall construe it our
own way? I can give you no direction; you have made a noble
bargain for yourselves, and I suppose you will make the most
of it."
As soon as the province had been turned over to the American
commissioners, the troops under General Wilkinson were placed
in the redoubts surrounding the city for want of better quarters.
This was a severe hardship, of which he entered strenuous com
plaint. On January 16, 1804, he wrote, "We did not until this
day receive the orders of the French and Spanish commissioners
for the delivery of the posts in Upper Louisiana." As late as
March, 1804, he reported that the Spanish troops were still in
New Orleans, in possession of the magazine and storehouses,
while the American troops were required to pay for their accom
modations. He reported that his patience was nearly exhausted.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES.

273

Late in March a detail of Spanish guards was mounted in New
Orleans, of which General Wilkinson said, "but you must not
believe that this singular spectacle is permitted by my consent."
On the 25th of April he wrote, "I have the satisfaction to inform
you that about three hundred Spanish troops embarked for Pensa
cola on the 8th instant, but I am informed that twelve or fifteen
officers and between sixty and one hundred men will continue in
this city. They have delivered up the barracks, but occupy the
hospital and several detached buildings. The Prefect made his
conge (farewell) to our commissioners on the 12th instant, but is
still in town exercising his prefectorial and commissarial func
tions." On April 25th he wrote: "The Prefect of France
embarked on the 21st instant. Yesterday the comtmissioners of
the United States took leave of the commissioners of Spain and
I numbered twenty-five Spanish officers at the audience. On
July 14 he wrote that the powder magazine had been delivered
to him. On October 30th Governor Claiborne notified the sec
retary of war that six hundred Spanish troops had arrived at
Pensacola ; that Mobile and" Baton Rouge were to be strength
ened ; that a Spanish brigadier-general had arrived at San Anto
nio, and a fort had been erected on Trinity river.
The Spanish troops not having left New Orleans by August,
1805, Governor Claiborne complained to the secretary of state
and said : "You no doubt will be surprised to find so many
foreign officers in this city; the fact is, sir, they are wedded to
Louisiana and necessity alone will induce them to depart. I
have repeatedly by letter and verbally informed the Marquis
(Casa Calvo) that the continuance in this territory of so many
Spanish officers so long beyond the right occasion for it, was
not seen with approbation, and urged their departure. The
Marquis has as often assured me of his disposition to comply
with my wishes." Late in August, 1805, it was reported in
New Orleans that Louisiana had been transferred by the United
States to Spain. The Marquis Casa Calvo told Governor Clai
borne, in answer to questions of the latter, that the Spanish min
ister of state had communicated to him the failure of the
negotiations of Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney at Madrid and
had stated that the desire of the court of Spain was to make
"the Mississippi river the boundary, and in time it was expected
that that object would be attained."* By this was meant that

? This statement should be borne in mind.
II— 18

274 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Spain expected ultimately to secure Louisiana in return for the
cession of the Floridas to the United States. Governor Clai
borne said, "The prospect of a retrocession of the west bank
of the Mississippi now is and has always been the theme of
the Spanish officers who remain in this territory, and many
citizens seem to view it as an event likely to happen — an impres
sion which I greatly regret, since it tends to lessen their con
fidence in the American Government and to cherish a Spanish
party among us. I most desire to see every Spanish officer
removed from the ceded territory. There certainly must be a
power somewhere vested to cause to be executed the clause in the
treaty which directs 'the Spanish forces to be withdrawn (within
three months) from the ceded territory,' and I should indeed be
pleased to Have it hinted to me that in my character as commis
sioned or Governor, I could on this occasion take (if necessary)
compulsory measures."
Governor Claiborne wrote on October 24: "I have certain
information of the arrival at Pensacola of four Hundred troops
from Havana and that a much larger number is daily expected.
I also learn from, a source entitled to credit that three hundred
men are ordered from Pensacola to Baton Rouge, and that
eight hundred Spanish troops have lately been posted on the
frontier of the province of Texas. It is a fact known to me
that a Spanish agent has contracted with a merchant of this
city. for the delivery at the town of Mobile of four thousand
barrels of flour, and that this same agent not being able to effect
a contract for the delivery of four thousand pair of shoes at
Mobile has purchased a quantity, of leather. . . . It is
my intention to require of Governor Folch an explanation of the
object of these military movements. . . . I am inclined
to think that the Spanish agents calculate on a speedy rupture
and are making all the preparations which their means permit
to commence the war in this quarter to advantage. New Orleans
would unquestionably be the first object of attack, and with a
view to its security I should be pleased to see Fort St. John
repaired and put in a state of defense; that fort commands the
mouth of the Bayou St. John, and if strengthened would pre
sent a great impediment to the passage of troops from Pensacola
and Mobile by the way of the lakes to this city."*
The strengthening at this time of all the Spanish ports along
the Gulf and the delay of the Spanish troops to evacuate the

? American State Papers.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES.

275

posts of the ceded territory, were due to the fact that the inhab
itants there did not believe that the cession would be carried
into effect, and did believe that the province would be retro
ceded to Spain.* Therefore, the warlike proceedings of the
Spanish authorities in Havana, Louisiana and the Floridas were
in anticipation of such retrocession, and were probably not in
¦obedience to orders from the Spanish court. No doubt the prob
able eventuality of serious trouble with the United States had
something to do in causing these military preparations. As a
matter of fact, the attitude of the United States in claiming
West Florida in face of the declaration of both France and Spain
that it was not included in the cession of Louisiana, was regarded
by the latter as an act of hostility  as an intention to occupy
and hold that province. In this view Spain was only partly
right. While many believed that Louisiana extended to the
Perdido, no forcible occupation of the province would have
resulted from the refusal of Spain to accede to the idea. The
LTnited States would have paid Spain for its possession. But
had any other country attempted to wrest it from Spain, the
United States would not have hesitated to occupy it, and after
ward would have settled with Spain for the invasion.
It was unquestionably the design of the Spanish government
to secure from the United States the cession of all the country
west of the Mississippi and probably the island of New Orleans
in addition (because the latter had always been considered as
a part of the territory to the westward) as a consideration for
the cession by Spain of the two Floridas. This fact is shown
in the statements of the Marquis de Casa Calvo and Pedro Cer
vallos, the Spanish prime minister, and is further evidenced
by the claims of the Spanish envoy in subsequent negotiations.
It was to the interest, therefore, of the Spanish pretensions that
the Floridas should be made to seem as valuable as possible,
and to be owned wholly and exclusively by Spain. On the other
hand, the American statesmen, although they made strong
arguments and presented demands of great breadth and ampli
tude, were at all times doubtful of the righteousness of their
claims to the Perdido, but not of their claims to territory beyond
the Sabine. The chances are that had the United States relin
quished all claim to West Florida, a much greater extension to
the westward would have been secured. France would prob
ably have supported the United States in this contention, and

?History of Louisiana: Martin.

276 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
thus rendered the acquisition easier. As it was, France, not
having been able to convince Spain that West Florida was
embraced in the treaty of St. Ildefonso, could not in turn be
induced to admit that the cession to the United States embraced
the country eastward to the Perdido. But the United States
wanted the Floridas at that time far more than it wanted the
country west of the Sabine; and therefore, in subsequent nego
tiations the policy of the government as to Texas was yielding,
but as to the Floridas was obstinate as death. In pursuit of
the Floridas, congress, early in 1804, having extended the reve
nue district of the United States over Mobile, the president
issued the following proclamation :
"Whereas, by an act of Congress, authority has been given to
the President of the United States, whenever he shall deem it
expedient, to erect the shores, waters and inlets of the bay and
river of Mobile and of the other rivers, creeks, inlets and bays
emptying into the Gulf of Mexico east of said river Mobile
and west thereof to the Pascaguola inclusive, into a separate
district for the collection of duties on imposts and tonnage, and
to establish such place within the same as he shall deem expe
dient to be the port of entry and delivery for such district; and
to designate such other places within the same district not exceed
ing two to be port of delivery only :
"Now know ye, That I, Thomas Jefferson, President of the
United States, do hereby decide that all the above mentioned
shores, waters, inlets, creeks and rivers, lying within the bounda
ries of the United States, shall constitute and form a separate
district to be denominated 'the district of Mobile;' and do also
designate Fort Stoddert within the district aforesaid to be the
port of entry and delivery for the said district." f
The language used in the act of congress which extended the
revenue district over the bay and town of Mobile was as fol
lows: "That from and after the first day of August next
(1804), the town of Mobile shall be, and the same is hereby
established the sole port of entry for the district, including the
shores, waters and inlets of the bay and river Mobile, and of
the other rivers, creeks, inlets and bays emptying into the Gulf
of Mexico east of the said river Mobile and west thereof to the
eastern boundary of the State of Louisiana."*
The Spanish ambassador, Marquis de Casa Yrujo, on Octo
ber 13, 1804, presented the following request to the secretary
t Messages and Papers of the Presidents.
? Annals of Congress.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 277
of state: "The Government of the United States will suppress
or modify, as I proposed to you in one of my letters in the
month of March past, the eleventh section of the act of Con
gress of the 24th of February last, . . . or if it should
be more agreeable to this government, it will declare to me in
writing through you, that by the said eleventh section of the
beforementioned act, it had not intended to offer an insult to
His Catholic Majesty, nor any. aggression upon the rights of
his sovereignty, and that the Executive, as the true interpreter
of the said law, shall declare that the object or intention of
what is contained in the said section is and ought to be only
applicable to the territory of the United States, and not to the
country belonging to and in the actual possession of His Catho
lic Majesty; it being well understood that until the commission
destined to the demarcation of limits shall have decided by com
mon consent that the territory claimed by the United States
did not belong to His Majesty but to the said States, they nor
the President authorizing them shall make no change in it nor
publish laws nor establish custom-houses nor any other species
of regulations in said territory; but on the contrary that they
shall leave things in statu quo, as they were before the resolu
tion of Congress complained of. Moreover, there shall be given
the corresponding notoriety to this act of ratification on the part
of the United States in a mode that without in any manner com
promising its dignity may prove that satisfactory explanations
were given on this point to His Catholic Majesty."*
At this remarkable request Mr. Madison expressed much sur
prise and said : "I am now charged to enclose for his (the King
of Spain) information the executive act of the President, founded
on and of a nature equally public with the act of Congress afore
said, by which it will be seen that in expounding and apply
ing the latter there is the most exact conformity to the assurance
given in the letter of March the 19th, that the operation of the
eleventh section would take place within the acknowledged
limits of the United States and would not be extended beyond
them, until .it should be rendered expedient by friendly eluci
dation and adjustments with the Spanish Government. In order
to hasten those, a special mission to Madrid was some time since
provided for; and if the destined minister extraordinary has
not already repaired thither, the instructions which will now
be repeated, if no unfavorable considerations present themselves,

? American State Papers.

278 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
may be expected soon to have that effect. In the meantime,
the President concurs with the Spanish Government in the expe
diency of leaving things in statu quo. And he persuades him
self that it will be deemed equally expedient on both sides to
give to this precaution its full effect by a mlutual forbearance
to increase unnecessarily either within or on the borders of ter
ritories the limits of which remain to be adjusted, military pro
visions of any kind, which by exciting jealousies on one side
or the other, may have tendencies equally disagreeable to both."
When the news was received in Spain that congress had passed
the act extending the revenue district of the United States over
the bay of Mobile, the Spanish minister of state asked for a
copy of such act and requested an explanation from the Amer
ican ambassador. Air. Pinckney replied, June 1, that he had
not himself yet received a copy of the act, and that in regard
to the cession he had informed the Spanish government as soon
as he received the news of the transfer of Louisiana that the
American envoys at Paris had informed him "that they con
sidered a great part of West Florida, so called by the English,
as included. Such letter could not have been written to me
officially by them without their having been so informed by the
French plenipotentiary and Government. The price paid is a
proof of the territory being considered as extremely extensive."
But the Spanish minister emphatically requested the "revoca
tion of the part of the act of the Congress of the said States,
approved on the 24th February last, which has manifestly vio
lated the rights of the sovereignty of His Majesty, by empower
ing the President to exercise authority and establishing custom
houses within a territory which belongs to the crown of Spain.
His Majesty being, as he is, persuaded that through a mistake
only could there have been introduced into the said act the
expressions which assail the rights of his sovereignty, does not
doubt that the United States will give in relation to said act
those explanations which may be most conformable to the jus
tice he claims and the most conciliating and respectful to the
rights of his crown." This was one of three indispensable con
ditions required by the Spanish government, so stated Mr. Cer
vallos, before the treaty to indemnify American citizens for losses
from Spanish privateers could be concluded.
This letter in the nature of an ultimatum, in which it was
deemed unjustifiable demands were made upon the United States,
brought forth the following sharp reply from Mr. Pinckney:
"I wish your Excellency to say whether I am to understand your

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 279
letter in this sense : That if the second condition which respects
the suppression of the claims for French spoliations within the
Spanish territory, and the third, the repeal of the law passed
by Congress in February, are not agreed to, His Majesty will
not ratify the convention (of August 11, 1802),
I wish to have your excellency's answer as quickly as possible,
as on Thursday I send a courier with circular letters to all our
consuls in the ports of Spain stating to them the critical situa
tion of things between Spain and the United States, the proba
bility of a speedy and serious misunderstanding, and directing
them to give notice thereof to all our citizens, advising them
so to arrange and prepare their affairs as to be able to move
off within the time limited by the treaty, should things end
as I now expect. I am also preparing the same information for
the commander of our squadron in the Mediterranean for his
own notice and government and that of all the American mer
chant vessels he' may meet. I confess after the style of your
excellency's letter of the 31st of May on the subject of the late
law of Congress and the manner in which you annex to the
ratification of a convention you yourself had signed, the humili
ating conditions of our Government's previously suppressing a
claim of great magnitude and which they consider as a point
of national honor, and also of repealing an act lately passed
with all the deliberation and solemnities prescribed by our con
stitution, I see little hope of an amicable accommodation; par
ticularly when I tell you that in my last two despatches lately
received I am charged by my Government to repeat to your excel
lency that not one shilling of the property claimed by the citi
zens of the United States from Spain for French spoliations
within the ports and territories or on the coasts of Spain, has
ever been relinquished to or paid or provided for by France in
any mode or even claimed from her."*
But the Spanish minister sent a mollifying answer, saying
among other things "when I presented to you the motives there
were for desiring to add in the ratification two or three circum
stances which do not alter the substance of the convention (of
August 11, 1802,) nor take anything from its object, it is not
possible to comprehend the motive for your breaking out in the
decisions, not to say threats, contained in your said letter, nor
why you should proceed as you say you will to instruct the con
suls and commandants of the vessels of your nation to give notice

?Diplomatic Correspondence.

280 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
of the critical situation of affairs between Spain and the United
States, with an anticipation certainly not called for by the spirit
of conciliation which you say animates you. . . . The sec
ond condition which you consider indecorous and humiliating for
the United States, appears to me to be quite the contrary. His
Majesty is persuaded that the intention of Congress has not been
to usurp the rights of his sovereignty. He has not nor does he
demand the revocation of the act, nor of its provisions, which
relate to the internal regulation of the country, but a satisfactory
explanation of the clauses of the eleventh section, which, impinge
the rights of the crown of Spain." He ended the letter by stating
that inasmuch as Mr. Pinckney had determined to terminate
"every ulterior explanation relative to the convention, and not
being able to persuade himself (the King) that the Government of
the United States has authorized the part which you have thought
proper to take, has resolved to despatch an extraordinary courier
to the United States and by this means to make that Government
acquainted with the state of the negotiations."
This reply left Mr. Pinckney no option but to return to the
United States as he had threatened ; this he did, but before going
he prepared a long communication to the Spanish government
justifying himself and explaining the reasons for his course.
His principal reason for insisting on a settlement of the American
claims, was owing to the apparent intention of the court of Spain
to postpone them or to make it appear, unjustifiably, that they had
already been paid by France under the conventions of the 30th
of April, 1803, at the same timie and under the same conditions
that the American individual claims against France were paid.
He also strongly objected to the language used in the minister's
(Cervallos's) letter of May 31st, and said, "In this letter you
plainly call the act of Congress of which you speak an outrage and
an insult to His Alajesty's sovereignty, endeavoring to smooth
it over by saying you hoped the President and Congress were not
aware of what they did, adding thereby the reproach of precipi
tancy as well as ignorance of tHeir rights an duties ; and conclud
ing with saying in very direct terms that such a law lessens their
good name — language that a monarch may hold to his vassels,
or a country to one which she has humbled, but which to the
unbroken spirit of the United States will not certainly be very
pleasing." But there is no doubt that Mr. Pinckney was too
hasty and precipitate, although, to be sure, the annoying delays
were extremely irritating and humiliating.
By act approved February 26, 1803, congress 'enacted "that a

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 281
sum of $2,000,000 in addition to the provision heretofore made,
be and the same is hereby appropriated for the purpose of defray
ing any extraordinary expense which may be incurred in the
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, to be
paid out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated,
and to be applied under the direction of the President of the
United States, who shall cause an account of the expenditure
thereof to be laid before Congress as soon as may be." The
president was authorized to borrow this sum. While the lan
guage of this act was general, it was well understood that the
amount was to be employed in securing the cession of the Flor
idas. Indeed there seems to be no doubt that the envoys at
Paris were afterward authorized to use as high as ten million
dollars to secure the Floridas from France should the latter main
tain that they were included in the treaty of St. Ildefonso. Other
wise they were authorized to employ that sum as a maximum to
induce Spain to cede them to the United States. At this time
the report was circulated in Paris that M. Talleyrand had been
offered a large sum in the nature of a bribe to be paid him in the
event of his success in assisting the United States to obtain the
cession of the two Floridas. There is no doubt that owing to
this report, he lost caste with Napoleon.
Messrs. Livingston and Monroe wrote under date of June 7,
1803, "We are happy to have it in our power to assure you that
on a thorough examination of the subject, we consider it uncon
trovertible that West Florida is comprised in the cession of
Louisiana. West Florida was a part of Louisiana when it was
in the hands of France and it was not in her hands in any other
situation. The transfer of the whole was on the same day, the
3d of November, 1762, that being the day of the secret conven
tion between France and Spain, and of the preliminary articles of
the treaty of the 10th of February, 1763, between those Powers
and Great Britain. The treaty of 1783 between Britain and Spain
by which the Floridas were ceded to the latter, put Louisiana in
her hands in the same state it was in the .hands of France ; and
the remaining or third member of the article in the treaty of
St. Ildefonso between France and Spain, under which we claim,
by referring to that of 1783 (as to that between Spain and the
United States of 1795), and of course in the above character, only
tends to confirm this doctrine. We consider ourselves so strongly
founded in this conclusion, that we are of opinion the United
States should act on it in all the measures relative to Louisiana
in the same manner as if West Florida was comprised within the

282 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
island of New Orleans ; or lay to the west of the river Iberville
and to the lakes through which its waters pass to the ocean.
Hence the acquisition becomes of proportionably greater value to
the United States."
In the instructions of the United States July 29, 1803, to Mr.
Monroe, minister extraordinary to the court of Spain, it was
stated that "It is thought proper to observe to you that although
Louisiana may in some respects be more important that the Flori
das and has more than exhausted the funds allotted for the pur
chase of the latter, the acquisition of the Floridas is still to be pur
sued, especially as the crisis must be favorable to it. .
Should no bargain be made on the subject of the Floridas, our
claims of every sort are to be kept in force. If it be impossible
to bring Spain to a cession of the whole of the two Floridas, a
trial is to be made for obtaining either or any important part of
either. The part of West Florida adjoining the territories now
'ours and including the principal rivers falling into the gulf, will
be particularly important and convenient. It is not improbable
that Spain in treating on a cession of the Floridas, may propose
an exchange of them for Louisiana beyond the Mississippi, or
may make a serious point of some particular boundary to that
territory. Such an exchange is inadmissible. . . . We are
the less disposed also to make sacrifices to obtain the Floridas,
because their position and the manifest course of events guaranty
an early and reasonable acquisition of them. . . . Perhaps
the intercommunications with the Spanish Government on this
subject with other opportunities at Madrid, may enable you to
collect useful information and proofs of the fixed limits or of the
want of fixed limits to Western Louisiana. Your inquiries may
also be directed to the question, whether any and how much of
what passes for West Florida be fairly included in 'the territory
ceded to us by France."
Mr. Madison wrote to Mr. Livingston at Paris on July 29,
1803, "The boundaries of Louisiana seem to be so _ imperfectly
understood and are of so much importance, that the President
wishes them to be investigated whenever information Is likely. to
be obtained. You will be pleased to attend particularly to this
object as it relates to the Spanish possessions both on the west
and on the east side of the Mississippi. The proofs countenanc
ing our claim to a part of West Florida, may be of immediate use
in the negotiations which are to take place at Madrid." He like
wise wrote on October 6, "The rightful limits of Louisiana are
under investigation. It seems undeniable from the present state

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 283
of the evidence, that it extends eastwardly as far at least as the
river Perdido; and there is little doubt that we shall make good
both a western and a northern extent highly satisfactory to us."
In the letter dated July 29, 1803, Air. Madison communicated to
Mr. Pinckney at Madrid that "the Floridas are not included in
the treaty (ceding Louisiana to the United States), being it
appears still held by Spain. . . . As the indemnifications
claimed from Spain are to be incorporated in the overtures for the
Floridas, it will be advisable to leave them, although within your
ordinary functions, for the joint negotiations of yourself and Mr.
Monroe." The position taken by both France and Spain that the
Louisiana ceded to the United States extended no farther east
ward than the Iberville, wholly disarmed at first the claim after
ward made by the United States to the Perdido. Mr. Madison
himself, who afterward became the champion of the extension,
did not at first pretend tp claim eastward of the Iberville; but
even while instructing the envoys to Spain to secure the cession
of both of the Floridas, he suggested in the same letters that it
would be advisable for them to examine whether the United
States had any right to a portion of West Florida. A little later
he made the strongest argument of any American for the exten
sion. But he weakened his case very greatly at the start by not
promptly claiming West Florida, for his instructions to the envoys
show that the latter approached both Spain and France in an
attitude of supplication to secure the cession of the two Floridas,
thus conveying the inference that they did not claim the owner
ship of eitHer, but were there for the purpose of purchasing one
or both of them. Admissions to this effect were made by Mr.
Monroe to the French court, and of course promptly communi
cated to Madrid by the latter. But Mr. Monroe was not to blame
for this course, because he was simply following the instructions
of the state department.
In the instructions given April 15, 1804, by the department of
state to the envoys at Madrid, it was required that they should
secure an acknowledgment and confirmation "to the United
States the cession of Louisiana in an extent eastwardly to tlie
river Perdido," and the cession of "all the territory remaining to
her (Spain) between the Mississippi, the Atlantic and the Gulf
of Mexico, together with all the islands annexed thereto, either
whilst the Floridas belonged to Great Britain or after they became
provinces of Spain. Or if the article be unattainable in that form,
Spain shall cede to the United States forever all the territory,
with the islands belonging thereto, which remain to her between

284 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the Mississippi, the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico; and the
envoys were authorized to pay a maximum of ten million dollars
therefor." It was explained that the first article was preferable
because it recognized the right of the United- States to the ter
ritory between the Mississippi and the Perdido, which right was
deemed to be well founded. But principally was it preferable
"because it is known that a great proportion of the most valuable
lands between the Mississippi and the Perdido have been granted
by Spanish officers since the cession was made by Spain (to
France) . These illicit speculations cannot otherwise be frustrated
than by considering the territory as included in the cession made by
Spain and thereby making void all Spanish grants of subsequent
date. It is represented that these grants have been extended, not
only to citizens of the United States, but to others whose interest
now lies in supporting the claim of Spain to that part of Louisiana,
in opposition to that of the United States. It is conjectured that
M. Laussat himlself has entered into these speculations, and that
he felt their influence in the declaration made confidently to our
commissioners at New Orleans that no part of West Florida
was included in Louisiana." They were also instructed, in order
to quiet Spain and give her no present cause of complaint, to
exclude wholly from settlement for a term of years by the inhabit
ants of both Spain and the United States, the territory with the
following limits: "By a limits consisting on one side of the
river Sabine or Mexicano from the sea to its source; thence a
straight line to the confluence of the rivers Osages and Missouri ;
and by a limit on the other side consisting of the river Colorado
(or some other river emptying into the bay of St. Bernard), from
its mouth to its source; thence a straight line to the most south-
westwardly source of the Red river, with such deflections how
ever as will head all the waters of that river; thence along the
ridge of the highlands which divide the waters belonging to the
Missouri and the Mississippi from those belonging to the Rio
Bravo to the latitude of the northernmost source of that river;
and thence a meridian to the northern boundary of Louisiana."
Reasonable inducements were to be offered to inhabitants already
within those limits to remove therefrom, whether of Spain or of
the United States. The inhabitants of both countries were left
free to mingle with the Indian tribes within the limits. Certain
garrisons were to be erected and maintained therein in order to
hold the Indians in subjection. After a term of years to be
agreed upon the true boundary of western Louisiana was to be
determined by a joint commission or convention. But it was

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 285
stipulated that "if Spain should inflexibly refuse to cede the ter
ritory eastward of the Perdido no money is to be stipulated. If
she should refuse also to relinquish the territory westward of
that river, no arrangement is to be made with respect to the ter
ritory westward of the Alississippi ; and you will limit your nego
tiations to the claim of redress for the cases of spoliation above
described. If Spain should yield on the subject of the territory
westward of the Perdido, and particularly if a comprehensive
provision for the claims should be combined therewith, you may
admit an arrangement westward of the Mississippi on the prin
ciple of that proposed, with modifications however, if attainable,
varying the degree of concession on the part of the United States
according to tHe degree in which Spain may concur in a satis
factory provision for the cases of the territory westward of the
Perdido and of the claims of indemnification. The United States
having sustained a very extensive though indefinite loss by the
unlawful suspension of their right of deposite at New Orleans,
and the Spanish Government having admitted the injury by
restoring the deposite, it will be fair to avail yourself of this claim
in your negotiations, and to let Spain understand that if no
accommodation should result from them it will remain in force
against her. . . . No final cession is to be made to Spain of
any part of the territory on this side of the Rio Bravo, but in
the event of a cession to the United States of the territory east
of the Perdido, and in that event in case of absolute necessity
only and to an extent that will not deprive the United States of
any of the waters running into the Missouri of the Mississippi or
of the other waters emptying into the Gulf of Mexico between the
Mississippi and the river Colorado emptying into the bay of
St. Bernard." As will be seen from the above, the envoys were
told to modify their claims on the Texas border in the same pro
portion as Spain should grant the requirements of the United
States between the Mississippi and the Perdido.
Inasmuch as both France and Spain agreed that the Louisiana
retroceded to France and thence ceded to the United States did
not extend eastward of the Mississippi and the Iberville, only the
posts west of that line were turned over to France first and then
to the United States. Air. Madison said, "With respect to the
posts in West Florida, orders for the delivery were neither
offered to, nor demanded by, our commissioners. No instructions
have, in fact, been ever given then to make the demand. This
silence on the part of the Executive was deemed eligible : First,
because it was foreseen that the demand would not only be

286 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
rejected by the Spanish authority of New Orleans, which had in
an official publication, limited the cession westwardly by the Mis
sissippi and the island of New Orleans, but it was apprehended
as has turned out that the French commissioner might not be
ready to support the demand, and might even be disposed to sec
ond the Spanish opposition to it: Second, because in the latter
of these three cases a serious check would be given to our title,
and in either of them a premature dilemma would result between
an overt submission to the refusal and a resort to force : Third,
because mere silence would be no bar to a plea at any time that a
delivery of a part, particularly of the seat of Government, was a
virtual delivery of the whole: whilst in the meantime we could
ascertain the views and claim the interposition of the French Gov
ernment and avail ourselves of that and any other favorable cir
cumstances for effecting an amicable adjustment of the question
with the Government of Spain. In this state of things it was
deemed proper by Congress, in making the regulations necessary
for the collection of revenue in the ceded territory and guarding
against the new danger of smuggling into the United States
through the channels opened by it, to include a provision for the
case of West Florida by vesting in the President a power which
his discretion might accommodate to events. This provision is
contained in the act which has been pending in Congress for many
weeks." He further states that when the act became known to
the Spanish ambassador he became very angry, but was answered
with the declaration that "we considered all of West Florida
westward of the Perdido as clearly ours by the treaty of April 30,
1803, and that of St. Ildefonso. . . . The territory ceded to
the United States is described in the words following : 'The col
ony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now
has in the hands of Spain, that it had when France possessed it,
and such as it ought to be, according to the treaties subsequently
passed between Spain and other States.' In expounding this
three-fold description, the' different forms used must be so under
stood as to give a meaning to each description, and to make the
meaning of each coincide with that of the others.
"The first form of description is a reference to the extent which
Louisiana now has in the hands of Spain. What is that extent
as determined by its eastern limits ? It is not denied that the Per
dido was once the eastern limit of Louisiana. It is not denied
that the territory now possessed by Spain extends to the river
Perdido. The river Perdido, we say then, is the limit to the
eastern extent of Louisiana ceded to the United States. This

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 287
construction gives an obvious and pertinent meaning to the
term "now' and to the expression 'in the hands of Spain,' which
can be found in no other construction. For a considerable time
previous to the treaty of peace in 1783 between Great Britain and
Spain, Louisiana as in the hands of Spain was limited eastwardly
by the Alississippi, the Iberville, etc. The term 'now' fixes its
extent as enlarged by that treaty, in contradistinction to the more
limited extent in which Spain held it prior to that treaty. Again,
the expression 'in the hands of Spain' fixes the same extent;
because the expression cannot relate to the extent which Spain
by her internal regulations may have given to a particular district
under the name of Louisiana; but evidently to the extent in
which it was known to other nations, particularly to the nation in
treaty with her, and in which it was relatively to other nations in
her hands and not in the hands of any other nation. It would
be absurd to consider the expression 'in the hands of Spain' as
relating not to others, but to herself and to her own regulations ;
for the territory of Louisiana in her hands must be equally so
and be the same whether formed into one or twenty districts, or
by whatever name or names it may be called by herself.
"The next form of description refers to the extent which
Louisiana had when possessed by France. What is this extent?
It will be admitted that for the whole period prior to the division
of Louisiana between Spain and Great Britain in 1762-3, or at
least from the adjustment of boundary between France and
Spain in 1719 to that event, Louisiana extended in the possession
of France to the river Perdido. Had the meaning then, of the
first description been less determinate and had France been in
possession of Louisiana at any time with less extent than to the
Perdido, a reference to this primitive and long continued extent
would be more natural and probable than to any other. But it
happens that France never possessed Louisiana with less extent
than to the Perdido; because on the same day that she ceded a
part to Spain, the residue was ceded to Great Britain; and con
sequently as long as she possessed Louisiana at all she possessed
it entire, that is in its extent to the Perdido.
"The third and last description of Louisiana may be considered
as auxiliary to the two others and is conclusive as an argument
for comprehending within the cession of Spain territory eastward
of the Mississippi and the Iberville and for extending the ces
sion to the river Perdido. The only treaties between Spain and
other nations that affect the extent of Louisiana as being subse
quent to the possession of it by France, are first the treaty in 1783:

288 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
between Spain and Great Britain, and secondly the treaty of 1795
between Spain and the United States. The last of these treaties
affects the extent of Louisiana as in the hands of Spain by defin
ing the northern boundary of that part of it which lies east of the
Mississippi and the Iberville ; and the first affects the extent of
Louisiana by including in the cession from Great Britain to Spain
the territory between that river and the Perdido; and by giving
to Louisiana in consequence of that reunion of the eastern and
western part the same extent eastwardly in the hands of Spain
as it had when France possessed it. Louisiana then as it ought
to be according to treaties of Spain subsequently to the possession
by France, is limited by the line of demarcation settled with the
United States and forming a northern boundary, and is extended
to the river Perdido as its eastern boundary. This is not only
the plain and necessary construction of the words, but is the only
construction that can give a meaning to them. For they are
without meaning on the supposition that Louisiana as in the
hands of Spain, is limited by the Mississippi and the Iberville,
since neither the one nor the other of those treaties have any
relation to Louisiana that can affect its extent, but through their
relation to the limits of that part of it which lies eastward of the
Mississippi and the Iberville. Including this part therefore as
we contend within the extent of Louisiana and a meaning is
given to both as pertinent as it is important. Exclude this part
as Spain contends from .Louisiana, and no treaties exist to wHich
the reference is applicable. ... In fine the construction
which we maintain gives to every part of the description of the
territory ceded to the United States a meaning clear in itself and
in harmony with every other part and is no less conformable to
facts than it is founded on the ordinary use and analogy of the
expressions. The construction urged by Spain gives on the con
trary a meaning to the first description which is inconsistent with
the very terms of it; it prefers in the second a meaning that is
impossible or absurd, and it takes from the last all meaning what
ever. In confirmation of the meaning which extends Louisiana
' to the river Perdido, it may be regarded as most consistent with
the object of the First Consul in the cession obtained by him from
Spain. Every appearance, every circumstance, pronounces this
to have been to give luster to his administration and to gratify a
natural pride in his nation, and by re-annexing to his domain
possessions which had without any sufficient considerations been
severed from it ; and which being in the hands of Spain it was in
the power of Spain to restore. .

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 289
"It only remains to take notice of the argument derived from a
criticism on the term 'retrocede' by which the cession- from Spain
to France is expressed. The literal meaning of this term is said
to be that Spain gives back to France what she received from
France; and that as she received from France no more than the
territory west of the Mississippi and the Iberville, that and no
more could be given back by Spain. Without denying that such
a meaning if uncontrolled by other terms would have been prop
erly expressed by the term 'retrocede' it is sufficient and more
than sufficient to observe first that with respect to France the
literal meaning is satisfied; France receiving back what she had
before alienated; .secondly that with respect to Spain not only
the greater part of Louisiana had been confessedly received by
her from France and consequently was literally ceded back by
Spain as well as ceded back to France; but with respect to the
part in question Spain might not unfairly be considered as ceding
back to France what France had ceded to her; inasmuch as the
cession of it to Great Britain was made for the benefit of Spain to
whom on that account Cuba was restored. The effect was pre
cisely the same as if France had in form made the cession to Spain
and Spain had assigned it over to Great Britain ; and the cession
may the more aptly be considered as passing through Spain, as
Spain herself was a party to the treaty by which it was conveyed to
Great Britain. In this point of view not only France received back
what she had ceded, but Spain ceded back what she had received,
and the etymology even of the term 'retrocede' is satisned. This
view of the case is the more substantially just as the territory in
question passed from France to Great Britain for the account of
Spain, but passed from Great Britain into the hands of Spain in
1783 in consequence of a war to which Spain had contributed but
little compared with France and in terminating which so favorably
in this article for Spain, France had doubtless a preponderating
influence. Thirdly, that if a course of proceeding might have
existed to which the term 'retrocede' would be more literally
applicable, it may be equally said that there is no other particular
terms which would be more applicable to the whole proceeding as
it did exist. Fourthly that if this were not the case a nice criti
cism on the etymology of a single term can be allowed no weight
against a conclusion drawn from the clear meaning of every other
term and from the whole context." *
?American State Papers.
II— 19

290 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Further views having been obtained with respect to the inte
rior of Louisiana the department of state, on July 8, 1804, sent
additional instructions. The envoys were told that the president
was "not a little averse to the occlusion for a very long period
of a very wide space of territory westward of the Mississippi,
and equally so to a perpetual relinquishment of any territory
whatever eastward of the Rio Bravo. If this river could be
made the limit to the Spanish settlements and the Rio Colo
rado the limit to which those of the United States may be
extended; and if a line northwest or west from the source of
whatever river may be taken for the limit of our settlements
could be substituted for the ultimatum line running from the
source of the Sabine to the junction of the Osages with the Mis
souri, and thence northward parallel with the Mississippi, the
interval to be unsettled for a term of years would be defined
in a manner perfectly satisfactory. . . . It is to be under
stood that a perpetual relinquishment of the territory between
the Rio Bravo and Colorado is not to be made, nor the sum of
ten million dollars paid without the entire cession of the Flori
das, nor any money paid in consideration of the acknowledgment
by Spain of our title to the territory between the -Iberville and
the Perdido, . . . nor that Spain or the United States shall
during the negotiation strengthen their situation in the territory
between the Iberville and the Perdido, and that the navigation
of the Mobile shall not be interrupted."
It having been learned by the department of state that Mr.
Pinckney had left Madrid, Mr. Monroe was directed on October
26, 1804, to repair to that city to open negotiations anew with
Spain. The previous instructions were repeated, and he was
told that "in case the Spanish Government shall refuse to cede
the territory eastward of the Perdido and shall require as indis
pensable to an acknowledgment of our title to the territory west
ward of that river an acknowledgment on our part that in
ultimately establishing the western boundary of Louisiana, the
pretensions of the United States shall not go beyond the pro
posed western limit to the interval of desert, to-wit: the river
Colorado, a line thence to the source of Red river, thence along
the highlands, etc., you are authorized after reasonable endeavors
otherwise to effect your object to acquiesce in the acknowledg
ment so required."
In order to secure the definite views of France in regard to
the boundary of Louisiana, Mr. Monroe, on November 8, 1804,
while on his way to Aladrid addressed a letter to M. Talley-

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 291
rand requesting a statement of the French interpretation of the
language used in the treaties of 1762, 1800, 1801 and 1803. In
presenting the request, he said : "It is not stipulated that Spain
should cede to France that portion of Louisiana only which she
had received from France, or that West Florida should be
excepted from the cession. It is, on the contrary, stipulated that
she shall cede it such as it was when France possessed it; that
is, such as it was before it was dismembered by the cessions
afterward made to Spain by Great Britain ; that she should cede
it with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain;
that is, entire, which it became by the treaty of 1783, whereby
West Florida was ceded by Great Britain to Spain; such as it
is according to subsequent treaties between Spain and other
powers." Mr. Monroe presented his request in the form of a
powerful argument in support of the American claims.
M. Talleyrand wholly disagreed with his contentions, saying
among other things: "France, in giving up Louisiana to the
United States, transferred to them all the rights over that col
ony which she had acquired from Spain; she could not nor
did she wish to cede any other; and that no room might be
left for doubt in this respect she repeated in her treaty of 30th
of April, 1803, the literal expressions of the treaty of St. Ilde
fonso, by which she had acquired that colony two years before.
Now it was stipulated in her treaty of the year 1801 that the
acquisition of Louisiana by France was a retrocession; that is
to say, that Spain restored to France what she had received from
her in 1762. At that period she had received the territory
bounded on the east by the Mississippi, the river Iberville, the
lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain; the same day France ceded
to England by the preliminaries of peace all the territory to
the eastward. Of this Spain had received no part and could
therefore give back none to France. All the territory lying to
the eastward of the Mississippi and the river Iberville and
south of the thirty-second degree of north latitude, bears the
name of Florida. It has been constantly designated in that way
during the time that Spain held it; it bears the same name in
the treaties of limits between Spain and the United States; and
in different notes of Mr. Livingston of a later date than the
treaty of retrocession, in which the name of Louisiana is given
to the territory on the west side of the Mississippi; of Florida
to that on the east of it. According to this designation thus
consecrated by time and even prior to the period when Spain
began to possess the whole territory between the thirty-first

292 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
degree, the Mississippi and the sea, this country ought in good
faith and justice to be distinguished from Louisiana. Your
excellency knows that before the preliminaries of 1762 confirmed
by the treaty of 1763, the French possessions situated near the
Mississippi extended as far from the east of this river towards
the Ohio and the Illinois as in the quarters of Mobile; and you
must think it as unnatural after all the changes of sovereignty
which that part of America has undergone to give the name
of Louisiana to the district of Mobile, as to the territory • more
to the north on the same bank of the river which formerly
belonged to France. . . . It was under this impression that
the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries negotiated' and it was
under this impression that I have since had occasion to give
the necessary explanations when a project was formed to take
possession of it. I have laid before His Imperial Majesty the
negotiations of Madrid which preceded the treaty of 1801, and
His Majesty is convinced that during the whole course of these
negotiations the Spanish Government has constantly refused to
cede any part of the Floridas even from the Mississippi to the
Mobile. His Imperial Majesty (Bonaparte) has moreover
authorized me to declare to you that at the beginning of the
year 11, General Bournonville was charged to open a new
negotiation with Spain for the acquisition of the Floridas. This
project which has not been followed by any treaty is an evident
proof that France had not acquired- by the treaty retroceding
Louisiana the country east of the Mississippi."*
It was further stated by M. Talleyrand that Bonaparte "saw
with pain the United States commence their differences with
Spain in an unusual manner, and conduct themselves toward the
Floridas by acts of violence, which not being founded on right
could have no other effect, but to injure its lawful owners. Such
an aggression gave the more surprise to His Majesty, because
the United States seemed in this measure to avail themselves
of their treaty with France as an authority for their proceed
ings." Gen. John Armstrong, minister at Paris, in an effort
to secure the views of France on the questions, wrote as fol
lows : "On the subject of indemnity for the suspended right
of deposit (professing to know nothing of the ground on which
the interruption had been given), they (the French Government)
would offer no opinion. On that of reparation for spoliations
committed on our commerce by Frenchmen within the territory

?American State Papers.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 293
of His Catholic Majesty (Spain), they were equally prompt
and decisive, declaring that our claim having nothing of solidity
in it must be abandoned. With regard to boundary, we have,
they said, already given an opinion and see no cause to change
it. To the question, what would be the course of this Govern
ment in the event of a rupture between us and Spain? they
answered, we can neither doubt nor hesitate; we must take part
with Spain : and our note of 30th Frimaire was intended to
communicate and impress this idea."
Pursuant to their instructions, Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney,
under date of January 28, 1805, presented to Don Pedro Cer
vallos at Aranjuez, a- proposition for the settlement of the diffi
culties between Spain and the United States. They called atten
tion to the fact that the losses inflicted on American citizens
by the suppression of the right of deposit at New Orleans had
never been adjusted; that it was important that the boundary
between Louisiana and the territory of Spain in the southwest
should soon be determined ; that the eastern boundary between
Louisiana and Florida was yet unacknowledged; that the said
boundaries were "the river Perdido on the east and the Rio
Bravo to the west;" that the facts and principles to sustain this
conclusion were clear and absolute; that the United States had
forborne to press for an adjustment from motives of fairness
and accommodation ; and that the interests of both governments
now demanded that these questions should be settled without
further unnecessary delay. They therefore submitted a project
of a convention between the two countries, and embraced therein
their claims to the territory above mentioned, and recommended
the appointment of a commission to settle the questions in dis
pute. In reply to this communication the Spanish minister sig
nified his willingness to take steps to settle the existing differ
ences. Both sides then began the presentation of their argu
ments in support of their respective claims. The Americans
argued in lines mentioned in the previous pages of this volume.
The Spanish minister stated among other things that Spanish
citizens held unadjusted claims against the United States; that
the act of congress in extending the revenue district over the
Mobile country and the further proceedings to take possession
of West Florida, were unjust to Spain and calculated to involve
the two countries in serious difficulties; that West Florida to
the Mississippi and the Iberville were owned by Spain, because,
not Having been received from France in 1762, they were not
and could not have been retroceded to France in 1800; that

294 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the French government had already satisfied the United States
for damages done by her privateers in Spanish ports by the
conventions of April 30, 1803; that the establishment of the
port of entry at Fort Stoddert as suggested by the United States
did not remove the objection to the act of congress complained
of, because the vessels of the United States would have to trav
erse the waters of Spain to reach such fort, but that the just
complaints as to the act would be waived for the time being;
and that the Spanish government could not agree to the terms
suggested by the American envoys regarding claims alleged to
be due them from Spain for damages done by French privateers
in the ports of Spain. As it was seen by the Americans that
Spain would not yield on the latter point, they dropped it and
proceeded to discuss the remaining questions in dispute. They
asked for an answer on the question of the reclamations on
account of the interdiction at New Orleans and on that of the
boundaries. To these queries the Spanish minister returned the following
sweeping reply February 16: "To determine whether Spain is
or is not responsible for the damages which your excellencies sup
pose to have been sustained by the citizens of the United States
by the suppression of the deposits at New Orleans in consequence
of the edict of the Intendant of that city, it is necessary to examine
what are those damages and from whence they have arisen.
Such suspension did not interrupt, nor was it the intention to
interrupt, the free navigation of the Mississippi; consequently
these pretended injuries are reduced to this small point, that for a
short time the vessels loaded in the stream instead of taking in
their cargoes at the wharfs. This obstruction will appear still
less when we consider that during a great part of the time that
the deposit was suspended it was in the middle of the winter when
the exportation of produce from the western parts of the United
States by the Mississippi is very inconsiderable. If the erroneous
opinions which were formed in the United States upon the occur
rences at New Orleans ; if the complaints published in the papers
of your country, as false as they were repeated, that the naviga
tion of the Mississippi was interrupted; if the virulent writings
by which the public mind was heated, and which led to compromrt
the American Government and tarnish the good name of Spain,
were causes that the inhabitants of the western territory of the
United States could not form a correct idea of what passed at
New Orleans; and if in this uncertainty they were disappointed
in the extraction of their produce, or suffered other inconveni-

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 295
ences, they ought to attribute the same to internal causes, which
originated in their own country, such as the writings before men
tioned, filled with inflammatory falsehoods, the violence of
enthusiastic partisans, and other occurrences, which on those
occasions served to conceal the truth. The Government of Spain,
so far from being responsible for the prejudices occasioned by these
errors and erroneous ideas, ought in justice to complain of the
irregular conduct pursued by various writers and other individuals
of the United States, which was adopted to exasperate and mis
lead the public opinion, and went to divulge sentiments the most
ignominious and absurdities the most false against the Govern
ment of His Majesty and his accredited good faith. Estimate
the damages which may have arisen to the citizens of the United
States by their erroneous conception of what took place at New
Orleans, and they will be found to be no other than the trifling
inconvenience before mentioned, of their ships loading in a situa
tion not so commodious — an inconvenience for which the Govern
ment of Spain is not responsible (neither ought it to be), and
which does not in any manner merit to be mentioned, more espe
cially when it is considered that those who experienced it had
been enjoying the right of deposit for four years more than was
stipulated in the treaty, and this notwithstanding the great
prejudice it occasioned to His Majesty's revenue, by making New
Orleans the center of a most scandalous contraband trade, the
profits of which it is not improbable but that some of those indi
viduals have in part received, who now suppose themselves
injured by said trifling inconvenience. After four years more
than the treaty expressed, to-wit — three years, making in all
seven years, the Intendant thought that it was his duty no longer
to permit a deposit which gave an opportunity for carrying on a
fraudulent commerce, prejudicial to tHe interests of His Majesty,
for which he was accountable; he thought it was necessary that
New Orleans should no longer be the place pf deposit on account
of those inconveniences, and in consequence prohibited the same.
. The Intendant ought to have asked instructions from
his Government. . . . What in strict justice was the
deposite at New Orleans? A generous and gratuitous conces
sion of the King my Alaster for three years. It is true that His
Majesty agreed to continue the favor of the deposite, if it should
be found that no inconvenience resulted from it, and of this no
person was a better judge than His Majesty and his agent in that
colony. . . . But this is not intended to support the edict
of the Intendant; His Majesty has disapproved the act. . .

296 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Most certainly the Intendant had a right to prohibit the deposite,
and consequently the Government of Spain cannot be responsible
on this point ; and this reflection acquires a double weight, if we
consider the trifling inconvenience occasioned by the true effect
of the said edict of its short duration, and on the other hand die
serious damages which the King's revenue has experienced by the
continuance of the deposite for four years over and above the
term stipulated in the treaty." In a subsequent communication
Mr. Cervallos defined the boundaries between Spain and the
United States on the west as follows :
"It would be very easy to make it appear that the most exag
gerated claims of France never had the extent which your excel
lencies wish to give to Louisiana on this (west) side. But even
if they should have had such claims, or France positively should
have tried to include, under the name of Louisiana, the territories
which His Catholic Majesty possessed, what right or claim could
be founded in a document which Spain never has recognized, nor
does recognize, and which never could prejudice in any manner
her acquired rights ? The answer of Spain on this occasion is as
simple as just: That, if Louis XIV, or the Government of
France exceeded its powers in granting territories or rights over
territories which were not their own, or that Spain claimed pos
session of, or property in, that grant ought to be considered as
null as far as it extended over these territories, and that it flowed,
without doubt, from the total ignorance which prevailed in those
days with respect to the geography of the territories situated at a
little distance to the west of the Mississippi, and of the establish
ments of the Spaniards in those parts. More ancient, and proved
by repeated acts of possession, than the aforesaid patent of
Louis XIV, is the royal order of the 12th November, 1692, already
cited, by which His Catholic Majesty ordered them to make new
expeditions to the Texas ; and the same are the other authentic
acts and establishments of the Spaniards in that quarter. The
limits between Louisiana and the Texas have been always known,
even when the French possessed Louisiana. Near the beginning
of the last century, the venerable Alan jet, of the order of St. Fran
cisco, founded, in the province of Texas, towards the confines of
Louisiana, different missions, among them that of Necogdoches.,
And a few years after he wrote, and it was generally known in
the writings of those times, that the province of Texas, or New
Philippines, had its boundaries about the middle of the Gulf, of
Mexico to Poncenes, the Rio Grande, and to the East Louisiana.
Depending on Louisiana, we find upon the Colorado (Red) which

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES.

297

discharges into the Mississippi, the post of Natchitoches, which
the French took from Spain. But, at seven leagues from this,
you will find the aforementioned post of Nuestra Senora de Los
Adaes, belonging to the province of Texas ; and it is undoubted
that the Baron de Riperda, being Governor General of this
province, and successor of Don Angal de- Manos, appeared to
have made treaties and conventions with the Indians of the same
province of Texas, stipulation that the Spaniards might make
among them such establishments as they pleased acknowledging
from that time as depending on the province of Texas, the Indians
Stydes, Nacogdoches, Assenares, Nobedacuis, Vidais, Ozquires,
Malayes, Ocuanes, Tancques, and Apaches. To the year 1770,
there always was in the fort of the Adaes, from the time of its
establishment, a competent number of Spanish soldiers, and the
same in that of Ozquisaz et St. Saba; and it was not until the
year 1773 that the Lieutenant Don Josef Gonzales evacuated the
post of Adaes, whose garrison was no longer necessary, as Spain
possessed Louisiana.
"It follows, therefore, that the boundary between the provinces
of Texas and Louisiana ought to be by a line which, beginning at
the Gulf of Alexico, between the river Caricut, or Cascassia, and
the Armenta, or Alarmentoa, should go to the north, passing
between the Adaes and Natchitoches, until it cuts the Red river.
And as from this point the limits which ought to be established on
the northern side are doubtful and little known, it appears indis
pensable to refer them to the prudent investigation of commis
sioners to be named by both parties, in order that they, viewing
the territory, and having with them the documents and dates that
will be given them, rectifying what ought to be rectified, and
furnishing the necessary light to both Governments, upon limits
which have never been fixed or determined with exactness, may
thus enable them to fix the demarcation completely conformable to
the wishes of both."
In claiming the extension of Louisiana westward to the Rio
Bravo or Grande the American envoys, Messrs. Monroe and
Pinckney, were at a disadvantage, because their arguments were
required to be based on those of France, and the arguments of
the latter were largely unknown. Nevertheless, they made a
strong showing, as was expected from two such powerful logi
cians. They placed themselves, so to speak, in "the shoes of
France, and used the arguments that France would most likely
have used had she not parted with Louisiana. They stated that
the Mississippi had been explored and claimed for France by

298 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
¦Sieurs Joliet, Marquette, La Salle and Father Hennepin from
1673 to z682 ; that La Salle with two hundred and forty persons
in 1685 had formed a settlement and erected a fort on the Bay of
St. Bernard; that this extension was recognized in the letters
patent to Anthony Crozat in 1712 by Louis XIV of France, show
ing that he claimed the country to that bay by reason of this dis
covery and settlement, in fact claimed the country westward to
Old Mexico and New Mexico and that the country as far as the
Rio del Norte had been explored in 1713-14 by Sieur D'St. Denis,
a Frenchman. As La Salle's settlement was made on the west
bank of the Colorado, the Americans claimed all the country
watered by that river. The grant of Louis XIV to Crozat was
stated by them to be the principal basis of their claims. Numer
ous authorities were cited by them in support of their contentions.
Many geographers had published maps showing the extension of
Louisiana to the Rio Bravo or Grande; these authorities were
named. They made light of the claims of Spain founded on the
missions established among the Indians, and showed that many
of the settlements claimed had been abandoned. But it was also
shown that the French settlement on the Bay of St. Bernard had
been abandoned, and that beyond Natchitoches the French had
few if any settlements.
The language used by Louis XIV in the patent of Louisiana
granted at Fontainebleau, September 14, 1712, to Anthony Crozat,
was as follows: "The care we have always had to procure the,
welfare and advantage of our subjects having induced us
. to seek all possible opportunities of enlarging and
extending the trade of our American colonies, we did in the year
1683 give our orders to undertake a discovery of the countries
and lands which are situated in the northern part of America
between New France and New Mexico ; and the Sieur de la Salle,
to whom we committed the enterprise, having had success enough
to confirm a belief that a communication might be settled from
New France to the Gulf of Mexico by means of large rivers ; this
obliged us immediately after the peace of Ryswick, to give orders
for establishing a colony there and maintaining a garrison, which
has kept and preserved the possession we had taken in the very
year, 1683, of the lands, coasts and islands which are situated in
the Gulf of Mexico between Carolina on the east and Old and
New Mexico on the west. But a new war having broke out
shortly after, there was no possibility till now of reaping from
that colony the advantages that might have been expected from
thence. . . . And whereas, upon the information we have

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 299
received concerning the dispositions and situation of the said
countries known at present by the name of the Province of
Louisiana, we are of opinion that there may be established therein
a considerable commerce, ... we have resolved to grant
the commerce of the country of Louisiana to the Sieur Anthony
Crozat. . . . For these reasons, . . . we by these
presents signed by our hand have appointed and do appoint the
said Sieur Crozat to carry on a trade in all the lands possessed
by us and bounded by New Mexico and by the lands of the
English of Carolina, all the establishments, ports, havens, rivers
and principally the port and haven of the Isle Dauphine hereto
fore called Massacre; the river of St. Louis heretofore called
Mississippi from the edge of the sea as far as the Illinois, together
with the river St. Phillip heretofore called the Missouri and of
St. Jerome heretofore called Ouabache, with all the countries,
territories and lakes within land and the rivers which fall directly
or indirectly into that part of the river St. Louis. Our pleasure
is that all the aforesaid lands, countries, streams, rivers and
islands be and remain comprised under the name of the Govern
ment of Louisiana, which shall be dependent upon the General
Government of New France, to which it is subordinate ; and fur
ther that all the lands which we possess from the Illinois be
united ... to the General Government of New France
and become part thereof, . . ."*
The authority of D'St. Denis is shown in the following letter:
"We, Antoine de la Motte Cadillac, Seigneur of Davaguet and
Monderet, Governor of Dauphin Island, Fort Louis, Biloxi, and
of the country and province of Louisiana, do hereby authorize
the Sieur D'St. Denis and the twenty-four Canadians of his party,
to take with him any number of Indians, whom he thinks neces
sary, to the Red River, or wherever else he may choose to go,
in search of the mission of the Recollet, Father Francisco Hidalgo,
agreeably to the letter written by him, on the 17th of April, 171 1,
for the purpose of buying horses and cattle for the colony and
province of Louisiana ; and we request all whom it may concern,
to suffer the said Sieur D'St. Denis and his party to pass without
impediment. In faith whereof, we have signed this, and seal it
with the seal of our arms, and have caused it to be countersigned
by our secretary, at Fort Louis, Louisiana, this 12th of Septem
ber, 1713."!

? Narrative and Critical History of America: Winsor.
t Annals of Congress.

300 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Don Pedro Cervallos in his note of February 24, 1805, to the
American envoys said, "The first thing which calls our attention
in explaining the said article is the expression retrocede, and
which also serves to denominate the treaty of St. Ildefonso, called
the treaty of retrocession. The sense of this expression is
obvious; it cannot be misinterpreted or confounded; its meaning
is evidently this : That His Catholic Majesty returns to France
the territory which he (France) had received from her (Spain).
Now let us examine if France put Spain into possession of the
territory which occasions the present discussion. It is without
doubt that by the treaty of 1763, it was agreed that the separation
between France and England of their possessions in that quarter,
should be by a line through the middle of the rivers Mississippi
and Iberville and the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the
sea ; consequently France ceded to England the river and port of
Mobile, as well as all her other possessions on the east of the
Mississippi, the island and city of New Orleans excepted. From
that time this territory formed a part of the possessions of the
English under the name of West Florida, and France lost all
claim and title to it. Thus it became an English possession ; and
during' the war of 1779 Spain conquered from England all that
the latter possessed by the title of West Florida; and in the
definitive treaty of 1803 (1783), England ceded to Spain under a
guaranty both Floridas. It is then seen that the title by which
Spain holds possession of West Florida was acquired by the right
of conquest and also by the cession made by England under the
treaty of 1783. From that time the title of Spain to that territory
is entirely independent of France and of the cession of Louisiana
made by her; and consequently Spain could not give back to
France what she did not receive from her. It is said in the third
article that His Majesty retrocedes Louisiana 'with the same
extent of territory which it now has in the hands of Spain.' This
expression confirms most explicitly the right which Spain preserves
over the said territory to the east of the Mississippi ; because it is
well known that Spain possesses West Florida, not as Louisiana but
as Florida. This is confirmed by the title of the Governors of
Havana — Captain Generals of the two Floridas; and the treaty of
1795 where we read the following conclusive words, 'that the
southern limits of the United States, which separate them from the
Spanish colonies of East and West Florida,' etc. . . . It is
clear that if in the treaty of St. Ildefonso it had been wished to
include West Florida, it would have been expressly mentioned by
the name which authenticated it and under which it is generally

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 30I
known : for it would have been ridiculous to have given the name
of Louisiana to that territory because it had once formed a part
of that province, as much so as it would be at present to call the
State of Ohio Louisiana. . . . The second clause, 'and
which it had when France possessed it,' alludes only to the man
ner in which France possessed it in 1763 when she delivered it to
Spain ; for if any other sense is given to it that expression cannot
be consistent with the anterior which says, 'with the same extent
which it now has in the hands of Spain,' for if in the second
clause a greater extent should be given to Louisiana than that
which it had in the hands of Spain, how could it be 'with the
same extent it had in the hands of Spain? . . . The third
clause is still more decisive, 'such as it ought to be according to
subsequent treaties between Spain and other Powers.' The
treaties here alluded to are not nor can be others than those of
1783 between Spain and England, and 1795 between Spain and
the United States. By the first His Majesty acquired the terri
tory east of the Mississippi under the name of West Florida, and
consequently to be 'as it ought to be' since the treaty of 1793
(1783) is with the exclusion of a territory acquired at that period
and with a name so different. By the second His Majesty per
mitted the deposite and fixed the limits between Louisiana, the
Floridas and the United States 'to be as they ought to be' after
the treaty of 1795, is with the exclusion of France to the rights of
the United States in this treaty. And thus as the treaty of St.
Ildefonso could not affect the rights which the United States
acquired by that of 1795, so neither did it affect nor could it
affect the rights acquired by His Catholic Majesty by the treaty
of 1783 with England. The celebrated geographer of the United
States, Mr. Ellicott, appointed to run the line of division between
the said States and the Spanish provinces, in his work published
in 1803, says, Tt does not appear by the cession of Louisiana to
the United States we obtain the whole of both sides of the Mis
sissippi, for . it will be seen that the island of New
Orleans, which lies on the east side of the Mississippi only extends
north of Manshak, from thence northerly along the east side of
the river to the southern boundary of tHe United States, is still
held by His Catholic Majesty as a part of West Florida.' He
again says, 'the important and safe Harbors in both the Floridas
still remain in the possession of His Catholic Majesty.' .
The treaty of retrocession of 1800 was a contract between Spain
and France, and consequently it was for France to have repre
sented in case she had not received all the territories expressed in

302 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
that stipulation. And it is certain that the Prefect Laussat,
charged to carry the treaty into' effect, being perfectly instructed
in it, and being possessed with the intentions of his Government,
has expressed himself satisfied with the manner in which it was
carried into effect, without his having been put into possession of
the territory in question."
On the 12th of May, 1805, the Americans submitted the follow
ing proposition to the Spanish court : "That upon condition that
His Catholic Majesty will cede to the United States all of his
possessions eastward of the Mississippi and arbitrate the claims
of the citizens of each Power according to the deferred treaty of
August 11, 1802, we will make the Colorado the boundary
between Louisiana and Spain. . . . We will relinquish the
claims to spoliations which were committed by the French within
the jurisdiction of Spain in the course of the last war, .
and we will also relinquish all claim to compensation for the
injuries which were received by the suppression of the deposit at
New Orleans."
In reply to this proposition, Mr. Cervallos said that he could
not see anything therein to induce Spain to accept ; that "although
His Majesty has the power to bargain for the Floridas as owner
of them, and also has the right if he pleases to ratify the conven-.
tions of August 11, 1802, which is suspended for the reason your
excellencies know, there are wanting equal right and power in
the United States to make the cession your excellencies mention.
The United States have no right to demand of Spain compensation
for damages occasioned by the French privateers, neither have
they to the claim for injuries by the suppression of the deposit
at New Orleans. And as to the claim to fix the limit of Louisiana
at the Rio Bravo, from which flows the assertion that the fixing
it at the Colorado is to be considered as a cession, it is equally
necessary for me to observe to your excellencies that the Spanish
Government has made it appear and is equally ready to show more
and more by the most irrefragable proof that the limit which sepa
rates Louisiana and the Spanish possessions is a line which, begin- •
ning in the Gulf of Mexico between the river Caracut or Carcase
and the Armienta or Marmentao, ascends toward the north between
the Adais and Natchitoches until it cuts the Red river; and as
from this point they are doubtful and little known the limits
which ought to be marked on the northern side appear to be proper
subjects for reference to the prudential investigations of com
missioners of limits to be named by both parties. ... It
cannot be concealed that, as a consequence of the propositions you

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 303
have made in your note pf the 12th, Spain would cede to the
United States, not only the territories which indisputably belong
to her to tlie east of the Mississippi, that is the two Floridas, but
also others equally her own in the interior province of New Spain
without receiving anything in return but the renunciation of a
right which she does not acknowledge in the United States, which
is to reclaim for the damages arising from the suspension of the
deposite and for those occasioned by the French privateers on the
coast and in the ports of Spain during the last war."
This positive refusal of the Spanish government to accede to
the American propositions or to concur in the views of the Amer
ican envoys, terminated the negotiations which Mr. Monroe had
been specially sent to Aladrid to conduct in conjunction with Mr.
Pinckney. They returned a brief answer May 18, 1805, to the
letter of Air. Cervallos, in which they said, "We consider the
negotiation concluded, and have therefore only to remark that
we shall hasten to communicate the result to our Government,
who will not fail to bestow on it the attention which is due to a
concern of such high importance to the United States." Mr.
Monroe asked for his passports, in order to repair to London, to
which post he had been assigned, as soon as the Spanish negotia
tions should be ended. In their report to the department of state,
the envoys said, "We experienced on the part of Spain neither a
spirit of candor nor conciliation in the management of the busi
ness nor of accommodation in the conditions. In this latter point
it has disclaimed our right in every question on which it was pos
sible that a difference of opinion could exist; it has pushed the
pretentions of Spain to the most extravagant extent in each ; and
insisted finally in a tone not a little imperious that those exag
gerated pretensions should be the standard by which the subsist
ing differences and their future relations should be regulated."
During the negotiations to effect a settlement with Spain, the
department of state informed Mr. Alonroe on May 23, 1805, that
"it appears that France has arranged herself on the side of Spain
in such a manner that Spain will neither be disposed nor be per
mitted to bend to our claims either with respect to West Florida
or the French spoliations. What part France may take in rela
tion to the western boundary of Louisiana seems not to have been
disclosed. From the silence on that point in Talleyrand's note
of November 8th in answer to yours, in which the claim of the
United States to the Rio Bravo is expressly asserted, and from
the confidential acknowledgment of that boundary by M. Laussat
to Governor Claiborne and General Wilkinson, it might be

304 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
expected that on this important point France would side with us
against Spain." But it was realized that, owing to pending
events, no reliance could be placed on France to substantiate the
American claims. Spain seemed wholly averse to any conces
sions and France seemed more than willing to support her. With
this view of the situation Mr. AladisPn wrote, "The alternative
presented by this event is that of war, or a state of things guard
ing against war for the present and leaving- in vigor our claims
to be hereafter effectuated. Against war if to be safely and hon
orably avoided the considerations are obvious and powerful."
Two essential articles were to be insisted upon: "That Spain
should not strengthen her armaments within the disputed limits,
and that she should not obstruct the free navigation of the Mobile
and other rivers passing from the United States through the
Floridas to American vessels."
Thus the views of both countries were presented with the
strongest possible arguments, during which time the diplomats
exhibited surprising skill in the art of expression, presentation,
attack and defense. Severe and apparently traducing statements
by one were countered by mollifying observations of the other;
thrust was followed either by parry or by dodging. The argu
ments advanced in subsequent stages of the diplomatic contest did
not vary materially from those already given ; but they were vastly
elaborated and extended. The instructions to the American
envoys required them to secure West Florida under the claim to
Louisiana if possible, which meant if they could out-argue or out-
maneuver the Spanish ministry. They therefore sought every
pretense that favored the acquisition of West Florida as a part of
Louisiana. On the other hand, the Spanish ministry adroitly
evaded the snares prepared by the Americans, and held vigorously
against the spoliation claims, the deposit indemnifications and the
boundaries demanded by the envoys of the United States.
In an note written by Gen. John Armstrong in a pamphlet
entitled a "Review of Adams's Eulogium upon James Monroe,"
occurs the following statement: "Mr. Adams asserts that much
ability was shown in this abortive negotiation by Mr. Monroe and
his colleague, Mr. Pinckney. Does he forget, or had he over
looked, the admission to be found in Mr. Monroe's preliminary
letter to Talleyrand, 'that we had bought from France only what
France had bought from Spain ?' By this admission the question
became one, not of construction, but of fact. It was no longer
what the terms of the treaty of St. Ildefonso would warrant us in
demanding, but how those terms were understood by the parties

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 305
to that instrument. Spain denied that she had ceded West
Florida to France, and France denied that she had either sold, or
intended to sell to us, more than she had bought from Spain.
Such was the Pons Asinorum* which stopped the progress of Mr.
Monroe and his colleague at Madrid. By the way, the construc
tion given to the treaty of St. Ildefonso, on which the United
States so long and pertinaciously relied and which Mr. Madison's
ingenuity made so plausible, was a suggestion of Mr. Livingston's,
submitted by him to his Government and adopted by it, but to
which Mr. Madison for some time refused his assent. See Mr.
Livingston's official correspondence with Mr. Madison in the
spring of 1803."
When stripped of all unnecessary verbiage, the important points
in the controversy over the eastern boundary of Louisiana nar
rowed down to, 1st, the meaning and intended application of the
term "retrocession;" and, 2d, the. Louisiana that was intended to
be conveyed by the retrocession of 1800 to France and of 1803 to
the United States, or in other words, the Louisiana as held by
France prior to 1762, or as held by Spain subsequent to 1762, the
latter with or without West Florida attached. The heading of
the treaty of St. Ildefonso concluded October 1, 1800, is in French
as follows : "Traite preliminaire et secret entre la republique
Francaise at Sa Alajeste Catholique, touchant l'agrandissement
de Son Altesse Royale le Due de Parma, en Italie, et la retrocession
de la Louisiane ;" and in the third article the word "retrocede" is
employed. In many translations of this treaty the word "restore"
is used, as being the nearest equivalent of the word "retrocede."
Some translators employ the words "recede" and "recession."
The admitted meaning in the original was, to give back what had
been previously received. West Florida was never received by
Spain from France; consequently it was contended by both
France and Spain that the treaty of retrocession of October 1,
1800, gave back only the Louisiana which Spain had received
from France in 1762 and which extended no farther eastward
than the Mississippi and the Iberville. West Florida was secured
to Spain by conquest, from Great Britain in 1783. After 1783,
upon which date Spain secured West Florida from Great Brit
ain, it was not attached to Louisiana but remained a separate
province; consequently, never after 1762 was West Florida a
part of Louisiana. If, then, the Louisiana conveyed by Spain

?A Latin expression meaning an ass's bridge or a help to dull pupils.
II—20

306 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
to France in 1800 and by France to the United States in 1803,
embraced West Florida, the conveyance must have meant
the Louisiana as it existed in the possession of France
prior to 1762. In the treaty of St. Ildefonso the Louisiana con
veyed was "in .the same extent which it now has under the
dominion of Spain and of other States," and in the treaty
conveying the province to the United States the language
was, "with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain,
and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should
be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain
and other States." Under the language of the treaty of St. Ilde
fonso, the Louisiana referred to could have been no other than
the one extending no farther to the eastward than the Missis
sippi and the Iberville, because that was the limits of "now."
The same is true under the first of the three clauses above in
the treaty of 1803. The second clause, "with the same extent
that it had when France possessed it," is conformable, because
France possessed it from 1800 to 1803 no farther than the
Iberville. The last of the three clauses above is conformable
to the Spanish-French contention. So that neither of the clauses
disfavors the claim that Louisiana extended no farther east
ward than the Mississippi and- the Iberville. Thus all of the
leading points seem to favor the Spanish construction. It should
be said that although the American envoys presented strong
and adroit arguments, they never succeeded in conclusively
answering the position of the Spanish ministry, backed with
emphasis by the opinions of the French government. The
strength of this position was fully recognized by the United
States ; and by reason of the fact that the people very much wanted
West Florida, and as the "wish is father to the thought," the
judgment of many was guided by their wants and accordingly
they thought they had a right to the possession of West Florida.
It was easy to look on the popular side — the one favoring the
United States. It was hard to see anything in favor of the
Spaniards, whom, nearly everybody disliked.
The views of Spain and of the United States are well stated
by the historian McMaster, who says : "Spain in 1-783 received
the two Floridas from England, never having received either
of them from France. When, therefore, in 1800, by the secret
treaty of San Ildefonso, Spain bound herself to return Louisiana
to France, she bound herself to give back what France had given
her in 1762 and not what England had given her in 1783." In
regard to the views of Jefferson and Madison he said, first

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 307
stating their position : "Spain in 1800 owned West Florida.
West Florida was once a part of Louisiana. Spain in 1800 receded
Louisiana to France. She therefore receded West Florida.
Had such reasoning been applied to a real estate transaction in
private life, the folly would have been at once apparent. The
treaty of 1800 was a treaty of retrocession. Spain then gave
back to France what France had given to her in 1762, and noth
ing more nor less. In 1762 Spain did not own West Florida.
She could not, therefore, in 1800 have receded it to France."*
As a matter of fact, it required the skill of such men as Jeffer
son and Madison to make a case of any moment whatever in
favor of the contention that Louisiana included West Florida.
Although it does not seem that Spain deliberately closed all
negotiations, and although it seems clear that she simply insisted
on not yielding any of her rights to the American envoys, the
United States viewed the matter in an altogether different
light. The most that can be said is that the negotiators were
so far apart in their views and so unwilling to yield any mate
rial claim, that the Americans were as much to blame as the
Spaniards that an adjustment of the differences could not at
that time be effected. Early in 1806, it was determined by the
president:f "1st, That the manner in which the negotiations
at Madrid had been closed by Spain forbade any application
whatever to her for a renewal of them; 2d, That the case should
be presented to Congress for such provision as it might be
thought to require on their part; 3d, That in the meantime you
(Gen. John Armstrong, minister to France) should be charged
to place before the. French Government the necessity to which
Spain, by refusing to concur in a diplomatic adjustment of her
controversies with the United States, had reduced the latter of
seeking justice by those ulterior measures which the occasion
called for." General Armstrong was told to reach Spain with
the views and intentions of the United States through the medium
of the French government. At the same time he was sent the
draft of a treaty to be concluded with Spain, which embraced the
claims of the United States already mentioned herein. He was told
that the French government should be informed that the United
States would make no open overtures to Spain ; that the rejection
by Spain of the special overtures lately concluded, "followed
by her military and menacing indications within and near the

? History of the People of the United States : McMaster.
t American State Papers.

308 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
controverted territories, the United States, though ready to meet
Spain in negotiation under the auspices of a common friend,
do not consider it belonging to them to court a further negotiation
in any form; that consequently the steps necessary on the part
of Spain must be the result either of her own reflections, or
of the prudent counsel which France may undertake to give
her;" that the methods of accomplishing this object must be
left to the sound discretion of General Armstrong; that France
should be made to see that an amicable adjustment of the dif
ferences between Spain and the United States would be much
more preferable to Napoleon than a resort to arms; that the
United States were bent on an early settlement of those differ
ences ; and that in this favorable crisis matters should be pressed
within reasonable limits. The objects were to secure West
Florida certainly, either as already ceded to the United States
as a part of Louisiana or otherwise, to purchase East Florida,
to -obtain the indemnities claimed, and to establish the bound
ary between Louisiana and Texas on the Colorado, or farther
westward if possible. It was stipulated that, as a last resort,
the Sabine might be fixed as the western boundary of Louisi
ana. It was also provided: "ist, That the sum to be made
payable to Spain for her cession is not to exceed five millions
of dollars ; 2d, That as little as possible and in no event more
than two millions are to be paid prior to the delivery of pos
session or the ratification; 3d, That as ample a provision as
possible be made for indemnities, . . . which claim is not
less than four millions of dollars ; 4th, That the agreement be
made to cover cases where both French and Spanish subjects
are the wrong-doers, &c."
It was difficult for the United States to see what object Spain
had in rejecting the offers of the American envoys. Mr. Madi
son wrote, May 25, 1807, to Mr. Bowdoin, that "the conduct
of Spain is not easily explained. Several causes have probably
united in producing her obstinate repugnance to meet our rea
sonable overtures; perhaps the most powerful may have been a
calculation that she would have in any event the support of one
or the other of the two great rivals of Europe; and that her
dexterity would be able to connect her with whichever of them
should ultimately be ascendant. It would seem to be impossible,
however, that a crisis can be much longer procrastinated. The
obstructions which are thrown in the way of the trade through
the Mobile, and even the use of the river by the United States

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 309
for public purposes, are kindling a flame which will not be very
manageable." Under date of July 15, 1807, Mr. Madispn wrote to Messrs.
Armstrong and Bovvdoin that, owing to very recent hostile and
flagrant acts of Great Britain in American waters, war with that
country seemed like to break forth at any moment; that inas
much as such a war would require large sums of money, it
was thought imperative that, if an agreement to pay to Spain
the sum stipulated for the Floridas had not been concluded,
negotiations for their purchase should for the time being be sus
pended; that if such agreement had been concluded, a re-modi
fication of the terms of payment should be sought; that should
war occur between the United States and Great Britain, the
latter might proceed to occupy the Floridas, to the injury both
of Spain and the United States; and that "should Spain still
obstinately persist in rejecting or retarding an arrangement con
cerning the Floridas, she must at least see the necessity of
hastening a satisfactory one on other subjects, particularly in
the case of the Mobile, for the free use of which, by the United
States, orders ought to be sent without a moment's delay."
In his message to congress of December 6, 1805, President
Jefferson reviewed the relations existing between Spain and the
United States.* He stated that a convention (of August 11,
1802) had been entered into by the ministers of the two coun
tries; that it had been agreed that spoliations committed by
Spanish subjects should be paid for; that those committed by
French vessels in the ports of Spain should remain for further
discussion ; that before such convention had been ratified, "the
transfer of Louisiana by France to the United States took place,
an event as unexpected as disagreeable to Spain;" that "From
that moment she seemed to change her conduct and dispositions
toward us;" that she had at first protested against the right of
France to alienate the province, but soon retracted and confirmed
the right; that she had then taken great offense "at the act of
Congress establishing a collection district on the Mobile although
by an authentic declaration immediately made, it was expressly
confined to our acknowledged limits, and she now refused to
ratify the convention signed by her own minister under the
eye of his sovereign, unless we should consent to alterations
of its terms, which would have affected our claims against her
for the spoliations by French subjects carried into Spanish

? Messages and Papers of the Presidents .

310 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ports;" that Mr. Monroe had been sent on a special mission
to Madrid to effect the desired objects; that his mission had
resulted in total failure; that no satisfaction had been given as
to the boundaries of Louisiana; that Spain seemed determined
to advance on the American possessions on the Texas and the
Florida borders; that he had instructed the American officers
there to protect our citizens and patrol the frontier; that the
Spanish officers at New Orleans were "required to depart with
out further delay;" and that the conduct of France was equally
as bad. He concluded by referring the subject to the consider
ation and settlement of congress, intimating that as the depart
ment of state had been unable to secure the rights of the United
States, it was the province of congress to devise means to effect
such security.
In the house of representatives, Mr. Randolph, from the com
mittee to whom were referred the message and its accompany
ing papers, reported that "The committee have beheld with just
indignation the hostile, spirit manifested by the Court of Madrid
toward the United States in withholding the ratification of its,
convention with us," unless with unallowable alterations in its
terms; "the piratical depredations upon our fair commerce; the
obstruction of the navigation of the Mobile ; the refusal to agree
to a fair adjustment of the boundaries of Louisiana;" and the
invasion of the undisputed territory of the United States. He
declared that though there was ample cause for a formal dec
laration of war, the citizens loved peace and would not resort
to war except as a last resort; that the heavy indebtedness of
the United States would render a war extremely oppressive;
that when that debt should have been paid, "then and not till
then may we bid defiance to the world. The present moment
is peculiarly auspicious for this great and desirable work. Now,
if ever, the national debt is to be paid by such financial arrange
ments as will accelerate its extinction by reaping the rich har
vest of neutralty and thus providing for that diminution of
revenue which experience teaches us to expect on the general
pacification of Europe. And the .committee indulge a hope that
in the changed aspect of affairs in that quarter, Spain will find
motives for a just fulfillment of her stipulations with us and
an amicable settlement of limits upon terms not more beneficial
to the United States than advantageous to herself.
But whilst the committee perceive in the general uproar of
Europe a state of things peculiarly favorable to the peaceable
pursuit of our best interests, they are neither insensible to the

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 31 1
indignity which has been offered on the part of Spain nor unwill
ing to repel similar outrage."
An impartial review of the relations of Spain and the United
States of that time leads to the conclusion that the former did
not merit the severe restrictions of Mr. Jefferson. In regard
to the French spoliations, Spain had the opinions of a half dozen
of the best lawyers in the United States that she was not liable,
and in addition had the positive statement of France that they
had been paid by the latter under the Louisiana cession
treaty. She, therefore, on the face of the situation, felt her
self justified in refusing to accede to the demands of the United
States. In regard to the Floridas, it was clear then and has
been proved since, that the United States had no conclusive
claim to any portion of the western province. With respect to
the boundary between Louisiana and Texas, Spain had much
the better claim as far eastward as the Sabine, if not farther,
by reason of numerous permanent settlements, unless it may
have been to a small territory in the vicinity of Yattasse. She
was justified in extending her domains as far as her righteous
claims would allow.
Alarming letters were received in 1805 from Natchitoches by
the American authorities of the serious state of affairs there
and farther to the westward.* In August, Captain Turner
wrote from there that "our neighbors still keep up that sort
of conduct towards us, which a state of war alone would justify.
Every person who goes from here is strictly examined and
searched, and all letters found in their possession are broken
open and perused with an expectation of finding them big with
treason, stratagems and crimes." On October 15 he wrote:
"The Spaniards are undoubtedly meditating mischief in this
quarter; their emissaries have been at work among the Indians
and negroes. The night before last, nine of the latter ran off
for Nacogdoches." It was clearly an attempt on the part of
the Spaniards to win the negroes and the Indians to their side
in what was considered a pending war between the United
States and Spain. Captain Turner wrote October 15: "The
whole district is in the most alarming state, and inevitable ruin
to it and perhaps all Louisiana must be the consequence, unless
prompt measures are taken to stop the infamous proceedings
of the infernal Spaniards. The object of the Spaniards seemed
to be to induce all the Indians and negroes to move across the

? American State Papers.

3 1 2 THE PROVINCE AND THE ST A TES.
Sabine river to the western side, to be in readiness for a war
against the Americans. The news was received that at many
posts on the western side of the Sabine, the Spaniards were recon
structing old forts and building new ones; that the Spaniards
intended to march eastward and finally take New Orleans.
Nearly all of the posts in what is now Texas were strengthened,
and in every way it was manifest that the preliminary work of
war was in progress.
In a message dated March 19, 1806, the president informed
congress that the Spanish authorities had invaded the territory
in dispute between the two countries, and were building new
posts and making new settlements; that he had ordered the
troops of the United States in the southwest to require (with
force if necessary) the Spaniards to remain on the west side
of the Sabine river; that the inhabitants of the United States
were requested to confine themselves on the east side of that
river, "which by delivery of its principal post, Natchitoches, was
understood to have been itself delivered up by Spain, and at
the same time to permit no adverse post to be taken nor armed
men to remain within it (the country east of the Sabine)." In
accordance with the orders of the war department, Major Porter,
American commander at Natchitoches, having learned that a
detachment of Spanish troops had established themselves east
of the Sabine, dispatched Capt. E. D. Turner with a force of
sixty men to remove the Spaniards beyond that river and to
patrol that region to see that no further attempts were made
to occupy the territory thus claimed. Twenty Spanish troops
were found between the Sabine and the Adais and forced much
against their inclinations to depart beyond the Sabine and told
not to return under any circumstances.
This proceeding of the American forces was promptly resented
by the Spanish authorities in that region, who threw a consid
erable force of troops across the Sabine and established a camp,
with the apparent intention of remaining. This force was com
manded by Col. Simon de Herrera.* Early in August their
withdrawal was demanded by Col. T. H. Cushing, stationed af
Natchitoches, on the ground that the country was claimed by
the United States, that the two countries were at peace, and
that, inasmuch as negotiations were then pending to settle the
ownership of the country, an advance of Spanish troops into
the disputed country could not be tolerated by the United

* American State Papers.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 313
States. Colonel Herrera politely replied that the country was
owned by Spain, and that therefore it was deemed right for
the Spanish troops to occupy the same. He trusted that no
trouble would be the result of the rightful acts of Spain. Gov
ernor Claiborne also wrote at length to the Spanish commander
that his removal to the western side of the Sabine was required
and absolutely necessary. Again Colonel Herrera replied from
the "Spanish Camp," arguing mildly at considerable length, of
the rights of Spain to the territory and in justification of cer
tain acts complained of and of his course generally. Again
Governor Claiborne answered his arguments and demanded his
removal. Finally specific orders from Washington were received
to the effect "that the actual quiet possession of the country
by the United States east of the river Sabine, ought and will
be considered as fully within the limits of the country surren
dered to the United States on taking possession of this place
(Natchitoches) ; and therefore any attempt on the part of His
Catholic Alajesty's officers to disturb the existing state of things
by endeavoring to occupy any new post east of the Sabine, or
westward or northward of the former boundaries of what has been
called West Florida, must be considered by the Government of
the United States as an actual invasion of their territorial rights,
and will be resisted accordingly."
Whereupon, Gen. James Wilkinson, with headquarters at
Natchitoches, in a strong yet pleasant communication to the
Spanish commander, demanded the removal of the Spanish
forces, declaring among other things that, "My sense of the
high respect which is due from one old soldier to another pro
hibits the idea of menace; but as our honor forbids stratagem
or deception before our swords have been drawn, I owe it to
my own fame and to the national character to warn you that
the ultimate decision of the competent authority has been taken ;
and that my orders are absolute and my determination fixed
to assert and, under God, to sustain the jurisdiction of the
United States to the Sabine river against any force which may
be opposed to me. Retire then, sir, I conjure you, the troops
of your command from the ground in controversy and spare
the effusion of human blood, without prejudicing your own
honor or the substantial interest of His Majesty, your Royal
master." But the Spanish commander at Nacogdoches, Col.
Antonio Cordero, sent a temporizing reply, and continued to hold
his position. To match the policy of the Spaniards, General
Wilkinson, early in October, advanced fiis command near to the

314 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Spanish camp, sending wod beforehand that he meditated no
immediate act of hostility toward the Spanish forces.
It was afterward learned that Don Antonio Cordero, the
Spanish governor of the province of Texas, had marched from
the vicinity of San Antonio with six hundred regulars, a con
siderable body of militia and Indians, and large droves of horses,
mules and cattle. He stopped on the Trinity river, where he
was joined by the forces of Don Simon Llerrera, the com
mandant of Monteray in the province of New Leon, who was
sent with reinforcements by Don Nemesio Salcedo, captain gen
eral of the internal provinces. Cordero immediately sent large
reinforcements to Nacogdoches. Later he proceeded to the
Sabine and threw part of his command across that river. In the
negotiations which followed, it was agreed that the Spanish
should retire beyond the Sabine and the Americans should not
advance beyond the Arroyo Hondo; and that both commands
should await the settlement of the boundary by the negotiations
then pending between the two countries. The Spanish comi-
mander was informed that the quiet possession of the country
east of the Sabine should be insisted on, and that any attempt
of the Spanish to occupy the country to the eastward of the
Sabine would be regarded as an act of invasion.
The historian, Martin, says : "On the bayou des Lauriers
(Laurel Creek), six miles southwest by south from the town of
Natchitoches on Red River, and fifteen miles from the Adayes,
where the road to Nacogdoches crosses the bayou, the French
had placed leaden plates on a tree on each side of the road",
with an inscription expressing that the spot was the boundary
between the French and Spanish dominions, without indicating
the continuance of the line on either side. Similar plates were
also fixed at Yattassees, a village of the Nadoca Indians, fifty
leagues northwest of Natchitoches. The boundary line from
bayou des Lauriers to the sea was never run, and each freely
claimed much more than the other was willing to allow. The
Spaniards contended that the line was to be run due south, in
which case it would strike the sea near the river Curcosson (Cal
casieu?)."* It was about this time that Lieut. Zebulon M. Pike was sent by
the government to explore the headwaters of the Red and the
Arkansas rivers, but getting too far to the westward he was cap
tured by the Spanish, taken to Santa Fe, and later to Chihuahua,

?History of Louisiana: Martin.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 315
where all his papers were taken from him, and he was sent back
to Natchitoches.* The Spanish claimed all the territory at the
head of the rivers Red and Arkansas, but this was denied by the
Americans. When captured, however, he was on one of the
western branches of the Rio del Norte, a manifest invasion of
Spanish territory. It was at this time, also, that General Wilkin
son became fully apprised of the designs of Aaron Burr if he had
not been before. He made immediate preparations to strengthen
all points on the Mississippi and in Louisiana that would most
likely feel the first blows should such an expedition be sent down
the river. The effects in New Orleans reached the proportions
of a panic. Several prominent men there became more or less
identified with Burr's plans without knowing of their real signifi
cance. The dissipation of the gaudy dreams of Burr in smoke,
soon quieted the commotion down the river.
The conspiracy of Aaron Burr in 1806-7 was made possible by,
and grew from, the presumed bitterness of the western people for
the Spanish of Louisiana, their feelings of resentment toward the
people of the Atlantic states, and the immunity offered against
interference among the scattered settlements of the west.*
Undoubtedly, the whisky insurrection of western Pennsylvania
further indicated to the mind of Aaron Burr that, if the western
people could be provided with competent leadership, and be con
vinced of probable success, they would join such a movement. It
was developed that he had two distinct objects : 1. To separate
the west from the east by the Alleghany mountains ; 2. To seize
New Orleans, plunder the bank there, provide his forces with
arms and military stores and undertake the conquest of Mexico.
It may be said that he had a third object, which he used as a blind
to deceive the officers of the government and secure followers:
"The settlement of a pretended purchase of a tract of country on
the Washita, claimed by Baron Bastrop." His protestations of
honorable intentions and his ability and prominence won many to
his side, but as soon as his real purpose was revealed they one by
one left him until adventurers and boys were almost his only fol
lowers. He misjudged the character of the western people, and
believed they were bound to separate themselves from the Atlantic
states. There had been a time when the west might have joined
such a man and such a movement. They would not have done it
because they loved the East less, but because they loved their
rights to navigate the Mississippi more. But now things were
? American State Papers.

316 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
vastly different : their rights to the sea were undisputed, and their
estrangement from the East had been bridged by the cession of
Louisiana. So that Colonel Burr could find no sufficient follow
ing for such a movement. The western people did not wish to
see the Union dismembered. His principal design was to unite
all of the country west of the Alleghanies and east of the Rocky
mountains into one splendid empire, the capital and metropolis
of which should be New Orleans.
When his designs for a western empire dissolved in mist and
dreams, he promptly turned his attention to the conquest of Mex
ico. He could not return to the Atlantic states, where he was
practically ostracised and persistently excoriated for the killing of
Alexander Hamilton. He therefore sought for a home and a
country, and while doing so thought that his deserts merited his
becoming the monarch of the kingdom he should set up in the land
of the Montezumas. He made preparations at the falls of the
Ohio (Louisville) — building boats, collecting stores and recruit
ing a motley company of border ruffians and adventurers, but was
checked by the governors of Ohio and Kentucky, under orders
from the government; and when he finally departed down the
rivers late in 1806 his fleet, which he had boasted would carry an
army of from seven thousand to twelve thousand men, consisted of
ten boats and about one hundred restless and disaffected persons,
very few of whom were aware of his real intentions. He was
arrested in Mississippi territory, and his trial for treason and other
high crimes and misdemeanors is well known to historans. At one
time New Orleans, Natchez, and, in fact, all of the lower country
were in a panic, the reports conveying the startling information that
a large army was descending the rivers to capture the whole coun
try. Cowles Mead, secretary to the acting secretary of state of Mis
sissippi territory, in a letter to the secretary of war, under date of
January 19, 1807, said, "Thus, sir, this mighty alarm, with all its
exaggerations, has eventuated in nine boats and one hundred men,
and the major part of these are boys, or young men just from
school. Many of their depositions have been taken .
but they bespeak ignorance of the views or designs of the colonel.
I believe them really ignorant and deluded." The only effect the
movement had on Louisiana was to frighten the people and thus
oblige the authorities to call out the militia to repel the expected
and dreaded army of invaders.
After the year 1808 all official communication between Spain
and the United States ceased, principally by reason of the
stupendous war raging in Europe. The former was soon

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 317
involved in the struggle, and her very existence was seriously
threatened by the ambition of France. She not only took no
steps to continue the negotiations for a settlement of the differ
ences with the United States, but left the two Floridas almost
wholly to shift for themselves. They thus became filled with
adventurers and law-breakers, were soon a source of intense
annoyance to the United States, and in the end involved the
border in a bloody Indian war. The lawlessness in West Florida
became so rampant that the people themselves finally took mat
ters into their own hands and established their independence.

318 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

CHAPTER VIII

The Florida and the Texas Boundaries,
1808-1821

OFFICIAL communication between Spain and the United
States was not resumed until Napoleon had been crushed
at Waterloo and the former Spanish monarchy had been
restored. But in the meantime, important events had occurred in
the two Floridas and in the other Spanish American possessions.
During the bondage of Spain to Napoleon, the Floridas, left to
themselves, had become the prey of adventurers and factions,
until their occupation by the United States seemed absolutely
necessary to prevent their becoming a menace to the lives and
property of all the citizens of the latter living within a hundred
miles of the border. The lawlessness in all the gulf ports became
so great, that piracy gained a dangerous foothold in several places
so as seriously to threaten all commercial intercourse on the gulf.
It was learned a little later that the pirates and persons little bet
ter than pirates could muster one thousand fighting men at Galves
ton Island. At New Orleans there congregated all the elements
opposed in any way to the government of Spain ; and from that
city many of the movements, despite the proclamation of the presi
dent* to terminate the evil, found either a complete or a partial
encouragement and equipment to invest and occupy the Spanish
American provinces, including the Floridas. Aside from this
.proclamation and earnest effort's of the government to check all
hostile movements against Spain, nothing was done by congress
until the people established an independent government in West

* See Messages and Papers of the Presidents.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 319
Florida and until it became evident that Great Britain would
probably take possession of one or both of the provinces. What
followed is shown in subsequent pages.
"A DECLARATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF
WEST FLORIDA IX CONVENTION ASSEMBLED.
"It Is known to the world with how much fidelity the good
people of this territory have professed and maintained allegiance
to their legitimate sovereign while any hope remained of receiving
from him protection for their property and lives. Without making
any unnecessary innovation in the established principles of the
Government, we had voluntarily adopted certain regulation in con
cert with our First Alagistrate for the express purpose of preserv
ing this territory and showing our attachment to the Government
which had heretofore protected us. This compact which was
entered into with good faith on our part, will forever remain an
honorable testimony of our upright intentions and inviolable fidel
ity to our King and parent country, while so much as a shadow
of legitimate authority remained to be exercised over us. We
sought only a speedy remedy for such evils as seemed to endanger
our existence and prosperity, and were encouraged by our Gover
nor with solemn promises of assistance and co-operation. But
those measures which were intended for our preservation he has
endeavored to pervert into an engine of destruction by encourag
ing in the most perfidious manner the violation of ordinances
sanctioned and established by himself as the law of the land.
Being thus left without any hope of protection from the mother
country, betrayed by a Alagistrate whose duty it was to have pro
vided for the safety and tranquillity of the people and Govern
ment committed to his charge and exposed to all the evils of a
state of anarchy which we have so long endeavored to avert, it
becomes our duty to provide for our own security as a free and
independent State, absolved from all allegiance to a Government
which no longer protects us.
"We, therefore, the representatives aforesaid, appealing to the
Supreme Ruler of the world for the rectitude of our intentions,
do solemnly publish and declare the several districts composing
this territory of West Florida to be a free and independent State;
and that they have a right to institute for themselves such form of
Government as they may think conducive to their safety and hap
piness; to fprm treaties; to establish commerce; to provide for
their common defence; and to do all acts which may of right be

320 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
done by a sovereign and independent nation; at the same time
declaring all acts within the said territory of West Florida after
this date, by any tribunal or authorities not deriving their powers
from the people, agreeably to the provisions established by this
convention, to be null and void; and calling upon all foreign
nations to respect this our declaration, acknowledging our inde
pendence, and giving us such aid as may be consistent with the
laws and usages of nations. This declaration, made in convention
at the town of Baton Rouge on the 26th day of September, 1810,
we the representatives in the name aforesaid and on behalf of our
constituents, do hereby solemnly pledge ourselves to support with
our lives and fortunes."
"By order of the Convention : "John Rhea, President.
Andrew Steele, Secretary."*
After thus adopting their declaration of independence, the fol
lowing communication was sent the same day to the governor of
Mississippi territory, David Holmes : "We, the delegates of the
people of this State, have the honor to enclose to you an official
copy of their act of independence, requesting that it may be forth
with transmitted by you to the President of the United States,
with the expression of their most confident and ardent hope that
it may accord with the policy of the Government, as it does with
the safety arid happiness of the people of the United States, to
take the present Government and people of this State under their
immediate and special protection as an integral and inalienable
portion of the United States." Governor Holmes was requested
by the president of this convention to transmit the following com
munication to the secretary of state at Washington :
"That the commonwealth of Florida might be immediately
acknowledged and protected by the Government of the United
States as an integral part of the American Union; that owing to
their weak and unprotected situation they desired such an
acknowledgment without delay, in the absence of which, for their
own support, they would be obliged "to look to some foreign
Government." In order to procure such protection they offered
the following considerations : 1st, The Government of the
United States, in their instructions to the envoys extraordinary at
Paris in March, 1806, authorized the purchase of East Florida,
directing them at the same time to engage France to intercede
with the cabinet of Spain to relinquish any claim to the territory

? American State Papers.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 321
which now forms this commonwealth. 2d, In all diplomatic
correspondence with American ministers abroad the Government
of the United States have spoken of West Florida as a part of the
Louisiana cession. They have legislated for the country as a
part of their own territory, and have deferred to take possession of
it in expectation that Spain might be induced to relinquish her
claim by amicable negotiation. 3d, The American Government
has already refused to accredit any minister from the Spanish
Junta, which body was certainly more legally organized as the
representative of the sovereignty than that now called the regency
of Spain. Therefore, the United States cannot but regard any
force or authority emanating from them with an intention to sub
jugate us, as they would an invasion of their territory by a foreign
enemy. 4th, The Emperor of France has invited the Spanish
Americans to declare their independence rather than remain in
subjection to the old Spanish Government : therefore an acknowl
edgment of our independence by the United States could not be
complained of by France or involve the American Government in
any contest with that Power. 5th, Neither can it afford any
just cause of complaint to Great Britain, although she be the ally
of Spain, that the United States should acknowledge and support
our independence, as this measure was necessary to save the
country from falling into the hands of the French exiles from the
island of Cuba, and other partisans of Bonaparte who are the
eternal enemies of Great Britain."
It was then stated that should the United States return a favor
able reply to this request, it must be upon the agreement that
West Florida should be admitted in due time to the federal Union
either as an independent state, or as a territory of the United
States, or "to be united with one of the neighboring territories or
a part of one of them in such manner as to form a State." A
preference was expressed to be annexed to the island of New
Orleans, should the latter course be pursued by the United States.
Other requests were made concerning lands, embargo and non-
intercourse laws, moneys arising from the sale of lands, the par
don of deserters, and a loan of one hundred thousand dollars from
the United States.
This proceeding on the part of the people of West Florida to
form an independent government from territory which was
claimed by the United States, was in its nature revolutionary, not
withstanding that the convention requested an immediate annex
ation to the federal government. It was therefore impossible for
II — 21

322 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the president to recognize as lawful the acts of the convention,
because by so doing he would expose the government either to
the absurdity of sanctioning the revolt of a portion of the United
States and of approving its" proceedings of independence and of
subsequent application for admission into the Union of which
they were already a part, or to the necessity of admitting that the
people of West Florida, being subjects of Spain, had the right to
declare their independence from Spain, owing to wrongs and inse
curity, and had the right to form a separate government and apply
for admission into the federal Union. As it was out of the ques
tion for the United'States to renounce their claims to West Florida,
the president was under the necessity of disregarding the acts of
the convention, yet at the same time was also under the necessity
of immediately taking possession of that province, or see it remain
independent or become a part of some foreign power. He there
fore promptly issued the following proclamation :*
"A PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA.
"Whereas the territory south of the Mississippi Territory and
eastward of the river Mississippi and extending to the river Per
dido, of which possession was not delivered to the United States
in pursuance of the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of
April, 1803, has at all times, as is well known, been considered and
claimed by them as being within the colony of Louisiana conveyed
by said treaty in the same extent that it had in the hands of Spain
and that it had when France originally possessed it: And,
whereas, the acquiescence of the United States to the temporary .
continuance of the said territory under the Spanish authority was
not the result of any distrust of their title, as has been particularly
evinced by the general tenor of their laws and by the distinction
made in the application of those laws betweeh that territory and
foreign countries, but ,was occasioned by their conciliatory views
and by a confidence in the justice of their cause and in the suc
cess of candid discussion and amicable negotiation with a just
and friendly Power: And, whereas, a satisfactory adjustment,
too long delayed without the fault of the United States, has for
some time been entirely suspended by events over which they
had no control : And, whereas, a crisis has at length arrived sub
versive of the order of things under the Spanish authorities,

?American State Papers.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 323
whereby a failure of the United States to take the said territory
into its possession may lead to events ultimately contravening the
views of both parties, whilst in the meantime the tranquillity and
security of our adjoining territories are endangered and new facil
ities given to violaters of our revenue and commercial laws and
of those prohibiting the introduction of slaves : Considering,
moreover, that under these peculiar and imperative circumstances
a forbearance on the part of the United States to occupy the ter
ritory in question and thereby guard against the confusion and
contingencies which threaten it, might be construed into a dere
liction of their title or an insensibility to the importance of the
stake: Considering that in the hands of the United States it
will not cease to be a subject of fair and friendly negotiation and
adjustment: Considering, finally, that "the acts of Congress,
though contemplating a present possession by a foreign authority,
have contemplated also an eventual possession of the said terri
tory by the United States and are accordingly so framed as in that
case to extend in their operation to the same :
"Now be it known, that I, James Aladison, President of "the
United States of America, in pursuance of these weighty and
urgent considerations, have deemed it right and requisite that
possession should be taken of the said territory in the name and
behalf of the United States. William C. C. Claiborne, Governor
of the Orleans Territory, of which the said territory is to be taken
as part, will accordingly proceed to execute the same and to exer
cise over the said territory the authorities and functions legally
appertaining- to his office. And the good people inhabiting the
same are invited and enjoined to pay due respect to him in that
character, to be obedient to the laws, to maintain order, to cherish
harmony and in every manner to conduct themselves as peace
able citizens, under full assurance that they will be protected in
the enjoyment of their liberty, property and religion."
"Washington, October 27, 1810."
This proclamation was immediately followed by an order from
the department of state to Gov. W. C. C. Claiborne of Orleans
territory, under date of October 27, 1810, to take possession of
West Florida "in the name and in behalf of the United States;"
to print in English, French and Spanish the president's proclama
tion above and circulate it throughout the territory; to act with
his forces in conjunction with Governor Holmes of Alississippi
Territory; to organize the militia of West Florida after taking
possession; to prescribe the bounds of parishes, establish parish

324 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
courts, maintain order under the laws of Orleans Territory,
afford security to the inhabitants, "and to place them as far as
may be on the same footing with the inhabitants of the other dis
tricts under your authority." It was ordered that, should the
Americans encounter opposing forces, the troops on the Missis
sippi would assist in the execution of the order of occupation. In
addition the militia of Orleans and Mississippi territories were to
be drawn upon by the two governors in case of necessity. Gov
ernor Claiborne was directed to transmit copies of the president's
proclamation to the several governors of the neighboring Span
ish provinces, and to draw for reasonable and necessary expenses
upon the United States government in any amount not exceeding
twenty thousand dollars. In conclusion Governor Claiborne was
told that "from the confidence which the President justly has in
your judgment and discretion, he is persuaded that in the exe
cution of this trust, as delicate as it is important, your deportment
will be temperate and conciliatory. Such a line of conduct
towards the inhabitants is prescribed as well by policy as by
justice." In a communication of the state department to Governor Holmes
of Mississippi Territory, dated November 15, 1810, it was stated
that "the right of the United States to the territory of West
Florida as far as the river Perdido was fairly acquired by purchase
and has been formally ratified by treaty. The delivery of pos
session has indeed been deferred, and the procrastination has been
heretofore acquiesced in by this Government from a hope patiently
indulged that amicable negotiation would accomplish the equitable
purpose of the United States. But this delay which proceeded
only from the forbearance of the United States to enforce a
legitimate and well-known claim, could not impair the legality of
their title; nor could any change in the internal state of things
without their sanction howsoever brought about vary their right.
It remains as perfect of course as it was before the interposition
of the convention. And the people of West Florida must not for
a moment be misled by the expectation that the United States will
surrender for their exclusive benefit what had been purchased
with the treasure and for the benefit of the whole. The vacant
land of this territory, thrown into common stock with all the
other vacant land of the Union, will be a property in common for
the national uses of all the people of the United States. The
community of interests upon which this Government invariably
acts, the liberal policy which it has uniformly displayed towards
the people of the territories (a part of which policy has ever been

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 325
a just regard to honest settlers), will nevertheless be a sufficient
pledge to the inhabitants of West Florida for the early and con
tinued attention of the Federal Legislature to their situation and
their wants. . . . You will, however, keep in mind that the
President cannot recognize in the convention of West Florida any
independent authority whatever to propose or to form a compact
with the United States."*
The Spanish governor of West Florida, Vicente Folch,
addressed a letter under date of December 2, to the secretary of
state, complaining in severe terms of the acts of the party under
the command of Reuben Kemper, of the proceedings of the inhab
itants of Baton Rouge in taking possession of other districts of
the province, and of the general disturbance prevailing. He
stated that he had "decided on delivering this province to the
United States under an equitable capitulation, provided I do not
receive succor from the Havana or Vera Cruz during the present
month, or that his Excellency the Alarquis of Someruelos (on
whom I depend) should not have opened directly a negotiation on
this point. The incomprehensible abandonment in which I see
myself and the afflicted situation in which this province sees itself
reduced not only authorize me but force me to have recourse to
this determination, the only one to save it from the ruin which
threatens it. The United States are also authorized to accept it.
. The United States who profess the exercise of equity
cannot exempt themselves from taking part with the party
unjustly oppressed. In this belief I recur to its Executive,
through the medium of your excellency, supplicating him that he
will be pleased to send orders to the commandant of Fort Stod-
dert, that he should assist me with the troops which he has under
his orders for the purpose of forcing the party under the com
mand of Reuben Kemper to retire within the limits of the district
of Baton Rouge, intimating to him that if in future he should
repeat his incursions in the district of Mobile and Pensacola, the
troops of the United States, joined to the Spanish troops, will
use force to keep them back. These districts have the more
reason to expect from the rectitude of the United States the
assistance which I ask, as the party which Kemper commands has
been recruited, armed and provisioned within the limits of their
sovereignty. At the same time, if my proposition is accepted,
orders may be given authorizing some person to treat with me
for regulating the evacuation of the province and what ought to

? American State Papers.

326 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
precede it." He also wrote to the same effect to Col. John
McKee, commander of Fort Stoddert, and revealed therein his
great concern to treat with the United States for the evacuation
of the province. At the same time he admitted his inability to
cope successfully with the situation."
On December 5, 1810, President Madison sent to congress the
following communication: "Among the events growing out of
the State of the Spanish monarchy, our attention was imperiously
attracted to the change, developing itself -in that portion of West
Florida, which, though of right appertaining to the United States,
had remained in the possession of Spain, awaiting the result of
negotiations for its actual delivery to them. The Spanish author
ity was subverted, and a situation produced, exposing the country
to ulterior events, which might essentialy affect the rights and
welfare of the Union. In such a conjecture, I did not delay the
interposition required for the occupancy of the territory west of
the river Perdido, to which the title of the United States extends,
and to which the laws, provided for the Territory of Orleans, are
applicable. With this view, the proclamation, of which a copy is
laid before you, was confided to the Governor of that territory,
to be carried into effect. The legality and necessity of the course
pursued, assure me of the favorable light in which it will present
itself to the Legislature ; and of the promptitude with which they
will supply whatever provisions may be due to the essential rights
and equitable interests of the people thus brought into the bosom
of the American family."* But congress did not act with the
promptitude expected by the president. - In fact it was more than
a year before any positive order concerning the Floridas was made
by congress.
In the senate of the United States, on the 18th of December,
1810, Mr. Giles of Virginia, chairman of the special committee
appointed for that purpose, reported a bill, from which the fol
lowing is an extract : "That the Territory of Orleans, as described
by an act, passed the 26th day of March, 1804, entitled, 'An act
erecting Louisiana into two territories, and providing for the
temporary government thereof,' shall be deemed, and is hereby
declared, to extend to the river Perdido; and to include all that
territory south of the Mississippi Territory, and eastward of the
river Mississippi, to the said' river Perdido, according to the
provisions of the treaty, concluded at Paris, between the United
States and France, on the 30th of April, 1803." On December 21,

? Messages and Papers of the Presidents.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 327
a. motion by Mr. Lloyd, of Alassachusetts, to refer the bill to a
committee "with instructions to report their opinion on the title
of the Luited States to the territory in question and the grounds
on which that opinion may be founded," was lost, yeas 5. nays 17.
A motion to postpone the consideration of the bill was negatived.
Air. Horsey, of Delaware, moved, "that the President of the
United States be requested to cause to be laid before the Senate,
all the documents, papers, or other evidences in his possession,
relating to the title of the' United States to the territory south of
the Alississippi Territory, and eastward of the river Mississippi
to the river Perdido and to the boundaries of the said territory,"
but the motion was lost, yeas 7, nays 13. It was evident that a
majority of the senators at this time were determined to support
the bill to extend the territory of Orleans over West Florida as
far as the Perdido, and were not willing to be thwarted nor
delayed in this intention.
Undoubtedly, the president had expected to be supported by
congress in thus taking possession and holding West Florida, and
the bill before the senate was designed to sanction his proceed
ings. A long and interesting debate succeeded the attempts to
postpone the bill, or otherwise defeat its object; but as the subject
at odds was the right of the United States to West Florida as a
part of Louisiana, and as the arguments on that subject have been
given before in these pages, they will not be repeated. The
friends of the administration argued that as the territory was
embraced in the cession of Louisiana, the president had the right
to occupy and hold it. The opposition maintained that the United
States did not possess a good title to West Florida, and the con
clusion was summed up by Air. Horsey in the following lan
guage: "Upon the whole, sir, I have not been able to discover
the shadow of authority, on the ground of which the President
issued this proclamation (to occupy West Florida). He has
recited none, amidst all his recitals, and none appears to me but
his own mere will and pleasure. The act I therefore cannot view
in any other light than an unwarranted assumption of power and
a violation of the. Constitution." But this was not the view of a
majority of the senators, unless it may be conceded that, having
such views, they were determined to prevent Great Britain from
taking possession of West Florida, and to make the most of the
claims under which the United States declared its right to occupy
that province. Later it was seen to be unnecessary and probably
imprudent for congress to make any formal declaration in regard
to West Florida. It was thought best to leave the president in

328 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
possession of the province under the claim that the United
States had the right to occupy that territory by the cession of
Louisiana. The bill for the admission of Louisiana to statehood became a
storm center at this time. At first the boundaries were defined as
follows: "Beginning at the mouth of the river Sabine, thence
by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river, including
all islands, to the thirty-second degree of latitude, thence due
north to the northernmost part of the thirty-third degree of north
latitude; thence along the said parallel of latitude to the river
Mississippi; thence down the said river to the southern bound
ary of the Mississippi Territory ; thence along the said boundary
line to Pearl river; thence down the western bank of the said
river to Lake Borgne; thence along the middle of said lake to
the Gulf of Mexico; thence bounded by the said gulf to the place
of beginning; . . . Provided, however, that the Govern
ment of the United States hereby retains the power of alter
ing, in any manner it may hereafter deem proper, the limits of
all that portion of the said described territory which lies east
of the river Mississippi and the island of New Orleans." This
language was amended and otherwise changed many times by
congress, until finally all reference to the territory east of the
Mississippi, excepting the island of New Orleans, was omitted
from the bill. This omission in no way prejudiced the claims
of the United States to West Florida.
Thus the bill to extend the territory of Louisiana eastward
to the Perdido was merged into the one to admit that province
into the Union, and finally the provision to embrace West Flor
ida therein was wholly omitted, without prejudicing the rights
of the United States. This was expert juggling, or, to use the
language of diplomacy, profound and prudent statesmanship;
because, while accomplishing the occupancy, no cause was given
either Spain or Great Britain to declare war, those nations at
that time being ~ allies. But the proceedings in congress were
long, erratic, brilliant, and on the whole wise and dignified.
The bill to extend the territory of Orleans over West Florida
was first read in the senate in secret session January 7, 181 1;
a motion to print the bill for the use of the senate was lost,
yeas 14, nays 16. Another motion to print one copy for the
use of each senator and to adopt necessary means to keep the
proceedings secret was lost, yeas 7, nays 23. At first the lan
guage of the bill was emphatic — that West Florida should be
attached to the territory of Orleans. Later, that design was

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 329
dropped, the territory was admitted without West Florida, and
the bill was so altered as to permit the president under certain
contingencies to occupy the latter. In fact, this bill was alto
gether different from the original.
Under date of December 15, the British minister at Washing
ton, "without presuming to discuss the validity of the title of
the United States to West Florida," expressed his deep regret
in seeing "that part of the President's message to Congress in
which the determination of this Government to take possession
of West Florida is avowed." He asked, "May it not be asked
why that province could not have been as fairly a subject of nego
tiation and adjustment in the hands of the Spaniards, who pos
sess the actual sovereignty there, as in the hands of the Ameri
cans, who to obtain possession must begin by committing
an act of hostility towards Spain. But it may be said that the
Spanish forces in Mexico, in Cuba, or in Pensacola, are unequal
to quell the rebellious association of a band of desperadoes who
are known here (at Washington) by the contemptuous appel
lation of land-jobbers. . . . The act, consequently, of send
ing, a force to West Florida to secure by arms what was before
a subject of friendly negotiation, cannot, I much fear, under any
palliation be considered as other than as an act of open hostil
ity against Spain." He was therefore "induced to request in
answer such explanation on the subject as will at once convince
His Majesty's Government (England's) of the pacific disposi
tion of the United States towards His Majesty's allies, the Span
iards." Air. Smith, secretary of state, replied "that although it
is sufficiently evident from the face of the documents before the
public that no hostile or unfriendly purpose is entertained
towards Spain, the only Power known to the United States in
the transaction, yet our functionary at London has been enabled
to give to your Government whatever explanations may comport
with the frankness and the spirit of conciliation which have been
invariably manifested on the part of the United States."*
It was provided in the bill admitting Louisiana as a state,
passed by congress in January, 181 1, "That said state shall be
composed of all that part of the territory or country ceded under
the name of Louisiana, by the treaty made at Paris on the
thirtieth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and three,
between the United States and France, now contained within the
limits of the Territory of Orleans, except that part lying east of
?American State Papers.

330 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the river Iberville and a line to be drawn along the middle of the
lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the ocean." In using this
language and in making this provision, congress did not disclaim
its right to the possession of West Florida, but simply honored
the pretension of Spain, and postponed the settlement of mutual
rights to some future day. During all the period when Spain was
helpless in the grasp of Napoleon, this was the course invariably
pursued by the United States. While in every way taking pains
to make clear and public the claims of the United States, no
hostile act against Spain was countenanced. Even the sending of
troops into the Floridas was done as well to protect the interests
of Spain as of those of the United States.
In January, 1811, President Madison communicated to congress
that, inasmuch as a recent order of the British government had
contemplated taking possession of that portion of West Florida
claimed by the United States, and inasmuch as no information on
that score had been sent to the United States by Great Britain
that such occupation was contemplated, "I recommend to the con
sideration of Congress the seasonableness of a declaration that
the United States could not see, without serious inquietude, any
part of a neighboring territory, in which they have in different
respects so deep and so just a concern," pass from the hands of
Spain into those of any other foreign Power. I recommend to
their consideration also the expediency of authorizing the
Executive to take temporary possession of any part or parts of
the said territory, in pursuance of arrangements which may be
desired by the Spanish authorities, and for making provision for
the government of the same during such possession. The wisdom
of Congress will at the same time determine how far it may be
expedient to provide for the event of a subversion of the Spanish
authorities within the territory in question and an apprehended
occupancy thereof by any other foreign Power." *
In response to this communication, an act of congress approved
January 15, 181 1, to the following effect was passed. "That the
President of the United States be and he is hereby authorized to
take possession of and occupy all or any part of the territory lying
east of the river Perdido and south of the State of Georgia and
the Mississippi Territory, in case an arrangement has been, or.
shall be made with the local authority of the said territory for
delivering up the possession of the same, or any part thereof to
the United States, or in the event of an attempt to occupy the said

?Messages and Papers of the Presidents.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 331
territory or any part thereof by any foreign Government ; and he
may for the purpose of taking possession and occupying the ter
ritory aforesaid and in order to maintain there the authority of
the United States, employ any part of the army and navy of the
United States which he may deem necessary."* The sum
of one hundred thousand dollars was appropriated to pay
the expenses of this movement, to be used at the discretion of
the president. Should such territory be occupied as above pro
vided, he was empowered to form a temporary government therein
and to appoint the necessary officers. By ah act approved
March 3, 181 1, it was provided that the above act should not be
printed nor published until the end of the next session of congress.
In compliance with the provisions of this act, the president on
January 26, 181 1, appointed Gen. George Alatthews and Col.
John AlcKee commissioners to repair "with all possible expedi
tion" to the Floridas and when there to be governed in their pro -
ceedings by the condition of affairs. "Should you find Governor
Folk or the local authority existing there inclined to surrender in
an amicable manner the possession of the remaining portion or
portions of West Florida now held by him in the name of the
Spanish monarchy, you are to accept in behalf of the United
States the abdication of his or of the other existing authority and
the jurisdiction of the country over which it extends. And
should a stipulation be insisted on for the re-delivery of the coun
try at a future period, you may engage for such re-delivery to the
lawful sovereign." The commissioners were authorized to guar
antee all the civil rights of the inhabitants, and generally to take
control of affairs, all subject to a future settlement with Spain.
"Should you discover an inclination in the Governor of East
Florida or in the existing local authority amicably to surrender
that province into the possession of the United States, you are to
accept it on the same terms that are prescribed by these instruc
tions in relation to West Florida. And in case of the actual
appearance of any attempt to take possession by a foreign
Power, you will pursue the same effective measures for the
occupation of the territory and for the exclusion of the foreign
force as you are directed to pursue with respect to the country
west of the Perdido, forming at this time the extent of Governor
Folk's jurisdiction. But should the arrangement contemplated
by the statute not be made, and should there be room to entertain
a suspicion of an existing design in any foreign Power to occup-"-
? Annals of Congress.

332 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the country in question, you are to keep yourselves on the alert,
and on the first undoubted manifestation of the approach of a
force for that purpose, you will exercise with promptness and
vigor the powers with which you are invested by the President
to pre-occupy by force the territory to the entire exclusion of any
armament that may be advancing to take the possession of it.
If in the execution of any part of these instructions you
should need the aid of a military force, the same will be afforded
you upon your application to the commanding officer of the troops
of the United States on that station, or to the commanding officer
of the nearest post, in virtue of orders which have been issued
from the War Department. ... If Governor Folk should
unexpectedly require and pertinaciously insist that the stipula
tions for the re-delivery of the territory should also include that
portion of the country which is situated west of the river Perdido,
you are in yielding to such demand only to use general words
that may by implication comprehend that portion of country; but
at the same time you are expressly to provide that such stipulation
shall not in any wav impair or affect the right or title of the
United States to the same."*
In the subsequent steps taken by General Matthews, he
exceeded his authority and employed force in occupying portions
of East Florida, much to the annoyance of the government. As a
consequence, his authority was revoked and Gov. D. B. Mitchell of
Georgia was appointed in his stead to carry into effect the provi
sions of the congressional acts. He was directed to restore to
Spain Amelia island and other portions of East Florida taken by
General Matthews. In May he was instructed that, inasmuch as
the act of congress "made it the duty of the President to prevent
the occupation of East Florida by any foreign Power, it follows
•that you are authorized to consider the entrance or attempt to.
enter especially under existing circumstances of British troops of
any description as the case contemplated by the law and to use
the proper means to defeat it."
Early in July, 1811, Mr. Foster, the British minister at Wash
ington, requested a further explanation of the "measures pur
sued by the United States for the military occupation of West
Florida.' He referred to the act of congress concerning that
province and the proceedings of the president, and declared that
they were "so many direct and positive proofs that the Govern
ment of America is prepared to subject the province of West
Florida to the authority of the United States." He observed that
England "is still willing to hope that the American Government

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 333
has not been urged to this step by ambitious motives or by a
desire of foreign conquest and territorial aggrandizement," and
concluded with the statement that he was "commanded in the
event of its appearing on my arrival in this city that the United
States still persevere by menaces and actual demonstration to
claim the military occupation of West Florida notwithstanding
the remonstrances of His Alajesty's charge des affaires and the
manifest injustice of the act, to present to you the solemn protest
of His Royal Highness in the name and on the behalf of His
Majesty against an attempt so contrary to every principle of pub
lic justice, faith and national honor and so injurious to the alliance
subsisting between His Alajesty and the Spanish nation."*
Air. Alonroe replied that "although the President cannot admit
the right of Great Britain to interfere in any question relating to
that province (West Florida), he is willing to explain in a
friendly manner the consideration which induced the United
States to take the step complained of." He briefly reviewed the
situation existing between the United States and Spain: That
the latter had refused to settle or negotiate the claims for indemni
ties from; spoliations and for damages from the suppression of
the deposits at New Orleans ; that while this refusal would alone .
have been sufficient cause for war and while any European
country would have made it the pretext for war, the United
States had sought for peaceable methods of settlement until the
positive refusal of Spain to negotiate had forced the government
to consider other means of securing satisfaction ; that above and
beyond all this the United States had an undoubted right to West
Florida, having secured it as a part of Louisiana ; that their for
bearance in not taking possession in 1803 did not waive their
right to the province; that while well grounded in their right they
had recognized the claims of Spain and had pressed for a settle
ment through friendly negotiation, but had been repulsed by
Spain, who refused to consider the just claims of the United
States; that now Spain had neglected the province and it had
fallen into serious disorder ; that even yet the United States took
no advantage ; that the inhabitants the last year, desiring protec
tion and security had taken the government into their own hands ;
and that the United States in this emergency and in order to pro
tect their rights had authorized the proceedings to take possession
of the province." He concluded with the statement, "By this
event the United States have acquired no new title to West

?American State Papers.

334 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Florida. They wanted none. In adjusting hereafter all the
other points which remain to be adjusted with Spain and which
it is proposed to make the subject of amicable negotiation as soon
as the Government of Spain shall be settled, her claim to this ter
ritory may also be brought into view and receive all the attention
which is due to it."
Early in September, 1811, Mr. Foster wrote again, demanding
to know by what right the United States presumed to adopt
measures to invade and take possession of East Florida. He
called attention to the fact that Governor Matthews of Georgia
was at that moment within the boundaries of East Florida, under
orders of the president, and was endeavoring to treat with the
inhabitants for the peaceable delivery of the province to the
United States. He therefore considered it his duty "to lose no
time in calling upon you for an explanation of the alarming
steps Which Governor Matthews is stated to be taking for sub
verting the Spanish authority in that country, requesting to be
informed by you upon what authority he can be acting and what
measures have been taken to put a stop to his proceedings."
Mr. Monroe calmly replied, repeating the grievances of the
United States against Spain, and showing that the government
had just cause to declare war, or to take possession of Spanish
territory to recoup them for the indemnities and damages so often
demanded and as often refused or avoided. He said, "The
United States have considered the Government of Spain indebted
to them a greater sum for the injuries above stated, than the
province of East Florida can by any fair standard between the
parties be estimated at. They have looked to this province for
their indemnity and with the greater reason because the Govern
ment of Spain itself has countenanced it (he referred to the fact
that at one time Spain was on the point of selling East Florida
to the United States for a monetary consideration). That the
United States have suffered their just claims to remain so long
unsatisfied is a new and strong proof of their moderation as it
is of their respect for the disordered condition of that Power.
There is a period however beyond which those claims ought not
to be neglected." It had become plainly evident to the United
States that Great Britain seriously meditated taking possession of
East Florida, either for herself or on behalf of Spain. Many
occurrences pointed strongly to that conclusion. Under no cir
cumstances could such a finality be permitted. Accordingly, Mr.
Monroe, in order to show the attitude of the United States on the
question of such an occupancy by Great Britain, made the follow-

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 335
ing plain avowal to the British minister: "Under these circum
stances it would be equally unjust and dishonorable in the United
States to suffer East Florida to pass into the possession of any
other Power. Unjust, because they would thereby lose the only
indemnity within their reach for injuries which ought long since
to have been redressed. Dishonorable, because in permitting
another Power to wrest from them that indemnity, their inactiv
ity and acquiescence could only be imputed to unworthy motives.
Situated as East Florida is, cut off from the othier possessions of
Spain, and surrounded in a great measure by the territory of the
United States and having also an important bearing on their com
merce, no other Power could think of taking possession of it with
other than hostile views to them. Nor could any other Power
take possession of it without endangering their prosperity and
best interests. The United States have not been ignorant or inat
tentive to what has been agitated in Europe at different periods
since the commencement of the present war, in regard to the
Spanish provinces in this hemisphere ; nor have they been unmind
ful of the consequences into which the disorders of Spain might
lead in regard to the provinces in question without due care to
prevent it. They have been persuaded that remissness on their
part might invite the danger if it had not already done it, which
it is so much their interest and desire to prevent. Deeply
impressed with these considerations and anxious while they
acquitted themselves to the just claims of their constituents to
preserve friendship with other Powers, the subject was brought
before Congress at its last session, when an act was passed author-
. izing the Executive to accept possession of East Florida from the
local authorities, or to take it against the attempt of a foreign
Power to occupy it, holding it in either case subject to future and
friendly negotiation. This act therefore evinces the just and
-amicable views by which the United States have been governed
towards Spain in the measure authorized by it."*
Succeeding the unauthorized acts and .proceedings of Governor
Matthews in East Florida, the people who had joined his cause
revolted from the authority and jurisdiction of Spain, established
a temporary government "to avoid confusion," took possession of
the country and finally passed an act authorizing their commis
sioners to surrender the province to the United States. Inasmuch
as they had been assured that the proceedings of Governor
Matthews were authorized by the United States, "the whole plant-
? American State Papers.

336 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ing interest declared themselves free" of Spain, and asked for
admission into the Union ; but the States refused to recognize the
revolutionists or to accept their so-called cession. Such a recog
nition would have been equivalent to a declaration of war against
Spain. On the other hand, the United States quietly stimulated
the sentiments of the revolutionists, stipulated for their protection,
and otherwise prepared to take possession should Great Britain
undertake to occupy the province.
Soon after the declaration of war against Great Britain in 1812,
a bill authorizing the president to occupy all that part of West
Florida not already in the possession of the United States and all
of East Florida, passed the house of representatives, but was
rejected by the senate.* As one of the objects of such bill was to
prevent the British or any other foreign country from taking
possession of the Floridas, and as it did not seem then that such
were the immediate intentions of that of any other country, it was
thought wiser by many to wait until some definite movement in
that direction should appear. It was also argued that if the
British had not landed in East Florida, the American forces there
should be withdrawn; or on the other hand if the British had
landed any troops in that province, the American forces should
occupy and hold East Florida as well as West Florida. It will
be noticed that the act of January 15, 181 1, did not authorize the
president to occupy East Florida, unless certain arrangements
could be made with the inhabitants for gaining possession, or
unless an attempt should be made to occupy it by some foreign
power. This made it necessary to disavow the proceedings of
Governor Matthews, but it also permitted the president to enter
East Florida for the purpose of conducting negotiations with the
view cf getting possession, and such course was pursued with con
siderable force and all that was intended was accomplished,
namely, the obstruction of any attempt to occupy the territory by
Great Britain.
In a resolution adopted December 22, 1812, the United States
senate requested the president to lay before that body such infor
mation as he had secured of the intentions of the enemy (Great
Britain) to take possession of East Florida, of the disposition of
the people there to be received under the protection of the United
States, of any recent negotiations with Spain looking to a settle
ment of the differences between the two countries, of any pro
ceedings of the people of East Florida to have that province ceded

?Annals of Congress.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 337
to the United States or for its surrender to or occupancy by the
United States, and of the relations subsisting between the two
countries respecting East Florida.* In response to this request
the senate was informed of the condition of affairs. In both
house and senate the project of taking possession of East Florida
began to be discussed with intense sincerity and the proceedings of
January resulted. A similar request to the above was made by
the senate January 18, 1813, and met with such response that soon
afterward the enactment to take possession of East Florida under
certain contingencies was deemed premature, and the project to
take possession in any event was considered and discussed with
out resulting in any definite action.
After war had actually begun between Great Britain and the
United States and the powerful navy of the latter had blockaded
the Atlantic and the gulf ports and had even landed troops in
some of the towns, congress did no longer delay an act to occupy
West Florida and establish the government therein, when it
seemed certain that, unless such course was taken, England was
sure to take possession of the province. Congress did not yet
feel justified in taking possession in a similar fashion of East
Florida, though the American forces remained in and around that
territory, prepared to repel any advance or occupancy of that
province by England or any other foreign Power. By the act
of February 12, 1813, it was provided "that the President be
and he is hereby authorized to occupy and hold all that tract of
country called West Florida which fies west of the river Perdido
and now in possession of the United States."f The president was
authorized to use the army and navy for this purpose; and the
sum of twenty thousand dollars was appropriated to defray the
expenses. The act of January 15, 181 1, had authorized the presi
dent to occupy West Florida, providing peaceable possession could
be obtained from the inhabitants. Under this act portions of the
province had been occupied; but a considerable portion still
remained in the possession of the Spanish authorities, who refused
to deliver the posts occupied by them. The act of February 12,
1813, authorized the president to take possession of the remainder
of the province regardless of the remonstrances of Spain. This
act was deemed imperative by reason of the manifest intention of
Great Britain to occupy the Gulf ports of the province; or in
other words to occupy territory claimed by the United States.

* Senate Documents.
t Annals of Congress.
11—22

338 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
No other events of great importance in relation to the Floridas
occurred until the termination of the war with Great Britain.
The United States remained in possession of West Florida, but
had removed the troops from East Florida, as there was no longer
any excuse to occupy- that province. Order had been restored,
the law-breakers had been shot, arrested or driven off, and the
fierce savages had been reduced to subjection.
In his proclamation dated September i, 1815, President Mad
ison said, "Whereas, information has been received that sundry
persons, citizens of the United States, or residents within the
same, and especially within the State of Louisiana, are conspiring
together to begin and set on foot, provide and prepare the means
for a military expedition or enterprise against the dominions of
Spain; . . . and for this purpose they are collecting arms,
military stores, provisions, vessels and other means, and deceiving
and seducing honest and well meaning citizens to engage in their
unlawful enterprises, or organizing, officering and arming them
selves for the same; ... I have therefore thought fit to
issue this my proclamation warning and enjoining all faithful
citizens ... to withdraw from the same without delay, and
commanding all persons whatsoever engaged or concerned in the
same to cease all further proceedings therein as they will answer
the contrary at their peril." * He directed that all civil and mili
tary officers should be vigilant in seizing and preventing such
persons from effecting such unlawful object.
After the year 1808 and until the year 181 5, Spain, knowing her
inability to maintain her authority in West Florida, had acquiesced
in their occupation by the United States, being assured as she was
by the latter that her rights would be fully respected and secured
by subsequent negotiations between the two countries. However,
on the 30th of December, 1815, Chevalier Luis de Onis, minister
of Spain recently appointed to the United States, communicated
to the authorities at Washington that, inasmuch as the diplomatic
relations between the two countries had been restored, the terri
tories of both nations should be put in the same state as they
were when the official relations had been suspended in 1808 ; that
"the part of West Florida which the United States took possession
of during the glorious insurrection of Spain and have retained
until this day, should be restored to His Catholic Majesty;" that
the United States should at once prevent the formation of expe
ditions of all kinds within their borders against the Spanish pos-

? Messages and Papers of the Presidents.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES.

339

sessions in the southwest; and that the United States should in
no manner recognize the insurrectionary movements of the Span
ish American provinces. He said, "The prompt interposition of
the President would be a new proof that he is determined to put
an end to the incalculable extortions and injuries which Spain
has suffered for the space of seven years from the gang of
adventurers who have assailed her from the bosom of this repub
lic, and would be, finally, a sure preliminary to the removal of
all the difficulties which may present themselves in the negotia
tions which ought to terminate all the pending discussions between
the two Governments and to fix forever between them a perpetual
and solid friendship. . . . The President cannot but have
seen with sensibility as well, the total want of effect of his procla
mation of the lenient measures which he had adopted against these
criminals who boast of recognizing no law, subordination or moral
principle, as the protection and support which they have received
and do receive from the authorities at New Orleans contrary to
his express orders."
In his reply to this communication Mr. Monroe briefly reviewed
all the suspended relations between the two countries. He stated
that inasmuch as the United States claimed within the limits of
Louisiana the country on the coast from the river Perdido to the
Rio Grande, the United States could as well demand from Spain
the surrender of all that territory, as the latter could demand the
surrender of the Floridas, as a preliminary to subsequent negotia
tions. The negotiations could be entered upon with the United
States in possession as well as with Spain in possession. He
said: "The United States took no measure to indemnify them
selves for losses and injuries ; none to guard against the occu
pancy of the Spanish territory by the British forces in the late
war, or to occupy the territory to which the United States con
sidered their title good, except in the instance of West Florida;
and in that instance under circumstances which made their
interposition as much an act of accommodation to the Spanish
authority there as of security to themselves. They have also
prohibited their citizens from taking any part in the war, and
the inhabitants of the colonies and other foreigners connected
with them from recruiting men in the United States for that
purpose." After citing all the derelictions of Spain, he observed :
"The conduct of your Government would have justified if it
did not invite the most decisive measures on the part of the
United States. The refusal to make reparation for preceding
injuries or to surrender any portion of the territory in the pos-

340

THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

session of Spain to which they considered their title undisputable
or to accept fair and liberal propositions for the accommodation
of these differences or to make a proposition of any kind for
the purpose, left the United States perfectly free to pursue such
course as in their judgment a just regard to the honor, rights
and interests of the nation might dictate. In the condition of
Spain there was nothing to excite apprehension of the conse
quences, whatever might be the course decided on.
The friendly policy which the United States have since pur
sued is the more conspicuous from the consideration that your
Government has inflexibly maintained the unjust and hostile
attitude which it then assumed, and has even added new inju
ries and insults to those of which I have already complained.
I refer in this latter remark to the breaches of the neutrality of
Spain, which her Government permitted, if it did not authorize,
by British troops and British agents in Florida, and through
that province with the Creeks and other tribes of Indians in the
late war with Great Britain, to the great injury of the United
States." On the question of West Florida, Mr. de Onis presented the
arguments previously mentioned herein upon which Spain relied
to justify her claim to all of the two Floridas, and Mr. Monroe
urged the position which had been assumed by the United States.
The Spanish minister dwelt at length on the word "retroces
sion," arguing that as Spain had not received either of the Flor
idas from France, she therefore could not retrocede it to her.
Mr. Monroe made light of the word and said, "As to the word
'retrocession,' it is evident that it was not the' intention of the par
ties that it should have any effect whatever on the extent of the
territory ceded. The import of this term is too vague and the
term itself was used in a manner too casual to admit such an
inference, even had there been nothing else in the treaty between
Spain and France of 1800 to show that the construction you con
tend for is altogether inconsistent with the manifest intention
of the parties. The import of this term would in my opinion
be satisfied if the whole province had passed in the first instance
from France to Great Britain and been conveyed afterwards by
Great Britain to Spain and by Spain back again to France. In
regard to France, this last conveyance would have been a 'retro
cession,' as, by it the territory would have been ceded back to
her. It was very natural therefore that this term should be
used, being applicable in the most limited sense in which it can
be taken to at least nineteen-twentieths of the province and in a

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 341
qualified sense to the whole." Air. de Onis said, "Be the inter-
•pretation which may be wished to be given to the treaty of
'retrocession' of Louisiana made between France and Spain what
it may, the two Floridas can never be directly nor indirectly
included in it: 1st, because these provinces being in the legiti
mate possession of England from the year 1763 to the year 1783,
France could not cede them to Spain by the treaty of 1764 — nor
Spain retrocede them to France, not having received them from
her, unless there should have been an article on this point, in
which express and direct mention was made of the cession ; and
2nd, because the two contracting parties (Spain and France)
have declared in the most solemn manner, the former that she
did not cede to France any part of the Floridas — the latter that
she had not acquired them by the treaty of St. Ildefonso or of
retrocession of 1800, nor had had the least intention to set up a
claim to them. . . . The country to which you allude,
extending to the Rio Bravo or del Norte, has been under the
dominion of Spain, not only before and since France ceded Loui
siana to His Alajesty by the treaty of 1764, but from the time of
the discovery and conquest of Mexico, without ever haying passed
by treaty to any other nation."
Mr. Alonroe's argument, intentionally prepared to avoid arti
fice, was extremely clear, strong and convincing. The expres
sion "with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain"
would not have been used, would not have been necessary, had
the Louisiana which was ceded extended no farther eastward
than the Iberville. The expression must have meant to include
West Florida, because that province was "now" embraced in the
civil government of Louisiana. The statement "that it had when
France possessed it" must have meant prior to 1763 when it
extended to the Perdido, because France had never possessed it
farther to the westward than that river. The expression "such
as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between
Spain and other states," he argued, could have been used for no
other purpose than to exclude that portion of Louisiana above
the thirty-first degree of north latitude, which had passed in 1783
to the United States, but which prior to 1763 had belonged to
France as a part of Louisiana. Mr. Monroe declared there had
never been a treaty in 1764 as claimed by Mr. de Onis. It seems
that so far as the language was concerned the claims of the two
countries were about equally balanced. The expressions above
seem to favor the- United States, but the term "retrocession"

?American State Papers.

342 . THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
unquestionably favors the Spanish contention. However, it was
proper that each side should present its strongest points, and this
was accordingly done. In this manifest obscurity, the intentions
of the parties to the retrocession were the determinating factors.
Both France and Spain denied that any part of the Floridas was
included in the Louisiana retroceded. While the strength of this
position was recognized in the United States, there was nothing
to prevent the government from pressing its claims to the utmost
and employing every honorable art and argument to acquire West
Florida at least, because its possession meant so much in the
interests of order and security. It could mean nothing else, also,
than that East Florida would eventually follow the same course.
Nor was there anything to prevent the United States from press
ing to the utmost its claims to the territory extending westward
to the Rio Grande, when by means of such persistence better
terms were likely to be secured thereby from Spain. The nego
tiations terminated in a diplomatic contest in which the United
States had considerably the advantage by reason of proximity to
the territory in dispute and the possession of a considerable por
tion of the Floridas. Neither is it improbable that Spain, realiz
ing this fact and the further consideration that the claims of the
United States were undoubtedly about as strong as her own,
came to the unwilling conclusion, by reason of the firmness and
persistence of Mr. Monroe, that unless she yielded much of what
the United States claimed, the latter might be inclined to take all
that was wanted without permission, leaving to the crown of
Spain a course that was then to her wholly impracticable — the
necessity of waging war against the United States.
After the negotiations had progressed thus far, Mr. de Onis
informed the secretary of state that he did not possess full powers
to treat, whereupon George W. Erving was appointed special
envoy to the court of Aladrid to conclude a treaty with the Span
ish government. The latter upon opening negotiations at
Madrid, was informed that full powers had lately been sent to
Mr. de Onis at Washington. Accordingly, communications were
resumed between Mr. Monroe and Air. de Oriis. The former
stated that, having understood from the latter that he "would
not agree to an arrangement by which Spain should cede her
claims to territory eastward of the Mississippi unless the United
States ceded their claims to all the territory westward of that
river, and that even then your agreement would be restricted to
a recommendation to your Government to adopt an arrangement
to that effect, it is deemed unnecessary to make you any further
proposition or to prolong the negotiation on the subject of lim-

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 343
its. I have now to request that you will have the goodness to
inform me whether you are willing to enter into a convention
to provide compensation for spoliations and for the injury result
ing to the United States from the suppression of the deposit at
New Orleans?"*
Again there seemed to be an obstruction to the proceedings, as
it not only became evident that Air. de Onis was not fully
empowered to treat, but the Spanish secretary of state submitted
to Mr. Erving a "project of conditions or articles of agreement"
on the 17th of August, 1817, which the latter stated he could not
officially consider, because the Spanish minister himself had trans
ferred the negotiations to Washington. This "project of con
ditions" embraced the following points: That all questions of
indemnification down to the present time should be settled ; that
this settlement should be effected by a commission appointed from
other nations than Spain or the United States; that the said
commission should decide on the damages resulting from the
suppression of the deposits at New Orleans in 1802-3, "provided
it is not desired to attribute to such suspension the prejudices
produced by false rumors of a suspension in the navigation of
the Mississippi, which never existed, and the rumors of an early
rupture, which some bad intentioned persons delighted to propa
gate at that time in the territory of the United States, for the
bad effects and prejudices resulting from such false rumors can
only be attributed to the authors of them ; that the king of Spain
"obliges himself to employ his efforts in union with the United
States to reclaim and cause to be restored to the legitimate pro
prietors the value of the vessels and goods which were taken from
them, provided that these reclamations have not been extin
guished by the said convention of 1800, as France has assured
the Government of Spain in its repeated communications ; that
His Catholic Majesty, master of Florida, East and West, in all
the extension in which he received them from England by the
treaty of 1783, and which they had in possession of Great Brit
ain before said treaty, will be willing for his part to cede them
with the same extention to the United States of America, in full
property and perpetual sovereignty, provided that the United
States are equally disposed on their part to cede in the same form
to His Catholic Alajesty that part of Louisiana which is situated
to the west of the Mississippi, and is the territory which lies
between said river and the well-known limit which now sepa
rates and has separated Louisiana when France possessed it

?American State Papers.

344 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
before the year 1764, and even before the death of the King of
Spain, Charles IL, from the Spanish' province called Texas; so
that after these reciprocal cessions are verified, the course of the
river Mississippi from its source to where it discharges into the
sea, will be the only limit of the dominions of His Catholic
Majesty and those of the United States," excepting that the chan
nel Lafourche- should be the dividing line at the mouth of the
Mississippi ; that owing to the provisions embraced in the treaty
of Utrecht to the effect that Spain should never dispose of the
Florida's without the consent of England, it would be necessary,
should the United States desire the acquisition of those provinces,
to secure the permission of that power; and that piracies and
insurrections against each nation should be suppressed within the
limits and authority of the other.
While stating that he had not the authority to treat fully on
the lines proposed, Mr. Erving nevertheless proceeded to discuss "
unofficially the "project of conditions" submitted by Don Jose
Pizarro. After showing the unfairness of the propositions, he
stated that they would prove wholly inadmissible to the United •
States. Mr. Pizarro announced that he would at once dispatch
full authority to Mr. de Onis at Washington to settle all ques
tions in dispute ; whereupon Mr. de Onis and Mr. Adams began
anew negotiations to terminate the difficulties. It was now
December, 1817. Mr. de Onis entered at once into an elaborate
historical account of the growth of the Spanish provinces in the
southern part of North America, contending that the possessions
of Spain extended eastward to the Mississippi. He produced
strong evidence that the Spanish settlements had been made east
ward of the Sabine river, notably at Adaes, a short distance
west of Natchitoches and that all of the country west of that
river had been occupied for from one hundred to two hundred
years by the missionaries and settlers of Spain. Considering that
the Spanish settlements east of the river Sabine would about off
set the French settlements west of the Sabine and southwest of
the upper course of Red river, justice indicated that those streams
should be the demarcation between Louisiana and the Spanish
province of Texas. While Mr. de Onis argued for an exten
sion of the Spanish dominions eastward to the Mississippi, he
succeeded in showing little or no right to any territory east of
the Sabine and north of Rio Roxo, or Red river. On the other
hand, the French claims to the territory west of the Sabine were
equally weak and unsound. Thus the river Sabine and the upper
Red river were approximately the just and plain boundary
between Louisana and Texas. It only remained to fix the exact

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 345
line. Mr. de Onis did not insist on the extension of the Span
ish possessions to the Mississippi, because subsequent treaties and
negotiations, he said, had placed the boundary farther to the
west. To his long and numerous letters, Air. Adams replied
briefly that the subject had been so often discussed, particularly
in the years 1804-6, nothing new could be learned thereby; he
therefore submitted, on January 16, 1818, the following "arrange
ment" for the settlement of the difficulties between the two coun
tries :*
"1. Spain to cede all her claims to territory eastward of the
Mississippi. "2. The Colorado from its mouth to its source and from thence
to the northern limits of Louisiana, to be the western boundary ;
or to leave that boundary unsettled for future arrangement.
"3. The claims of indemnities for spoliations, whether Span
ish or French, within Spanish jurisdiction, and for the suppres
sion of the deposits at New Orleans, to be arbitrated and settled
by commissioners in the manner agreed upon in the unratified
convention of 1802.
"4. The lands in East Florida and in West Florida to the
Perdido to be made answerable for the amount of the indemni
ties which may be awarded by the commissioners under this arbi
tration ; with an option to the United States to take the lands and
pay the debts, or to sell the lands for the payment of the debts,
distributing the amount received equally according to the amount
of their respective liquidated claims among the claimants. No
grant of land subsequent to the nth of August to be valid.
"5. Spain to be exonerated from the payment of the debts or
any part of them."
In presenting this "arrangement," Mr. Adams called the atten
tion of Air. de Onis to the necessity of coming to some agreement
at once, owing to the importance of deciding immediately whether
Spain or the United States was to be held responsible for the
expense of suppressing the incursions and insurrections along the
boundary between Louisiana and Texas. He said: "Spain
cannot expect that the United States should employ their forces
for the defense of her territories, or to rescue them for her exclu
sive advantage from the adventurers who are projecting and
in the act of executing expeditions against them from the ter
ritories without the jurisdiction of the United States. Neither
can the United States permit that the adjoining territories of

?American State Papers.

346 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Spain should be misused by others for purposes of annoyance
to them."
This "arrangement" was not satisfactory to Mr. de Onis, who
presented the following counter proposition:
"i. The dividing line between Louisiana and the Spanish pos
sessions to be established in one of the branches of the Missis
sippi, either that of Lafourche or of the Atchafalaya, following
the course of that river to its source. Or if this should be inad
missible, the western line to be established from the sea at a
point between the rivers Carcassa and the Mermento or Mermen-
tao, running thence by Arroyo Hondo till it crosses the Colorado
of Natchitoches between that post and Adaes, thence northward
to a point to be fixed and laid down by commissioners respect
ively appointed for that purpose. Spain to cede the two Floridas
to the United States in full and complete sovereignty.
"2. The question of indemnities to be settled by a commission.
"3. Spain to unite with the United States in an endeavor to
secure from France a settlement for the spoliations claimed.
"4. The United States to engage to prevent the insurrections
along the boundary iri-the southwest."
This proposition was the inducement for Mr. Adams- to write
the strongest and lengthiest communication yet prepared in sup
port of the contentions of the United States. He reviewed in
detail all the facts of the early settlement by both France and
Spain and replied to every argument that had been presented to
sustain the Spanish claims. He was very careful to make no
assertion which he did not support with documentary or other
evidence. He ended with the following statement: "With
regard to those parts of the province of Louisiana which have
been incorporated within the state of that name, it is time that
the discussion should cease. Forming part of the territory of
a sovereign and independent State of this Union, to dispose of
them is not within the competency of the Executive Government
of the United States, nor will the discussion be hereafter con
tinued. But if you have proposals to make to which it is possible
for the Government of the United States to listen with a pros
pect of bringing them to any practicable conclusion, I am author
ized to receive them and to conclude with you a treaty for the
adjustment of all the differences between the two nations upon
terms which may be satisfactory to both."
In his message to congress of December 2, 1817, President Mon
roe stated that the relations with Spain were the same as they
were under his predecessor ; that it had evidently been the policy
of Spain to keep the negotiations concerning boundaries, etc., sus-

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 347
pended, to which the United States had acquiesced "from an
amicable disposition towards Spain and in the expectation that
her Government would from a sense of justice finally accede to
such an arrangement as would be equal between the parties. A
disposition has been lately shown by the Spanish Government to
move in the negotiation, which has been met by this Govern
ment." He stated that lately an expedition from the revolting
Spanish American colonies had undertaken to occupy portions of
East Florida, and that "as this province lies eastward of the
Mississippi and is bounded by the United States and the ocean
on every side, and has been a subject of negotiation with the
Government of Spain as an indemnity for losses by spoliation
or in exchange for territory of equal value westward of the Mis
sissippi (a fact well known to the world), it excited surprise
that any countenance should be given to this measure by any of
the (Spanish) colonies." He also communicated that a similar
establishment had been made on Galveston island within terri
tory contended to be a part of the United States under the treaty
of 1803 ceding Louisiana, and that orders had been issued for
the suppression of both movements or expeditions. The design
of the revolting colonies was to occupy both of the Floridas and
form an independent government. As this design was an
intended infringement of the rights of the United States, in
West Florida, at least, the revolutionists were dispersed and driven
from those provinces. In his message, the president, in order to
justify his course in repelling the revolutionists, stated that he
had proceeded under the act of congress of January 15, 181 1,
which authorized him "to prevent the province of East Florida
from passing into the hands of any foreign Power. It does not
appear that among these itinerant establishers of republics and
distributers of Florida lands there is a single individual inhab
itant of the country where the republic was to be constituted and
whose lands were to be thus bestowed. The project was, there
fore, an attempt to occupy that territory by a foreign Power."
In his message of January 13, 1818, he said : "In repelling these
adventurers from these posts it was not intended to make any
conquest from Spain or to injure in any degree the cause of the
colonies. Care will be taken that no part of the territory con
templated by the law of 181 1 shall be occupied by a foreign Gov
ernment of any kind, or that injuries of the nature of those
complained of shall be repeated; but this it is expected will be
provided for with every other interest in a spirit of amity in the
negotiation now depending with the Government of Spain."*
? Messages and Papers of the Presidents.

348 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
In March 1818, the president communicated to congress, that,
inasmuch as the government of Spain had been unable, in accord
ance with the treaty of 1795, to keep the Indians within the
boundaries of the Floridas from making repeated incursions into
the territory of the United States, troops had been sent against
theml, but that "orders had been given to the general in com
mand not to enter Florida unless it be in pursuit of the enemy,
and in that case to respect the Spanish authority wherever it
was maintained; and that he would be instructed to withdraw
his forces from the province as soon as he shall have reduced
that tribe to order and secured our fellow citizens in that quar
ter by satisfactory arrangements against its unprovoked and
savage hostilities in future." He further said in November, 1818,
that although the convention of 1802 had at length been ratified
by Spain, no arrangement had been entered into to settle the ques
tion of boundaries. "Throughout the whole of the Floridas to
which the Spanish title extends, the Government of Spain has
scarcely been felt. Its authority has been confined almost exclu
sively to the walls of Pensacola and St. Augustine, within which
only small garrisons have been maintained. Adventurers from
every country, fugitives from justice, and absconding slaves have
found an asylum there. Several tribes of Indians, strong in
the number of their warriors, remarkable- for their ferocity, and
whose settlements extend to our limits, inhabit those provinces.
These different hordes of people, connected together and disre- •
garding on the one side the authority of Spain, and protected
on the other by an imaginary line which separates Florida from
the United States, have violated our laws prohibiting the intro
duction of slaves, have practised various frauds on our revenue,
and committed every kind of outrage on our peaceable citizens,
which their proximity to us enabled them to perpetrate. .
In authorizing Major General Jackson to enter Florida in pur
suit of the Seminoles, care was taken not to encroach on the
rights of Spain. I regret to have to add that in executing this
order, facts were disclosed respecting the conduct of the officers
of Spain in authority there, in encouraging the war, furnish
ing munitions of war and other supplies to carry it on and in
other acts not less marked, which evinced their participation in
the hostile purposes of that combination and justified the confi
dence with which it inspired the savages that by those officers
they would be protected. ... An order was in consequence
issued to the general in command there to deliver the posts —
Pensacola, unconditionally, to any person duly authorized to
receive it, and St. Marks, which is in the heart of the Indian

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 349
country, on the arrival of a competent force to defend it against
those savages and their associates. In entering Florida to sup
press this combination, no idea was entertained of hostility to
Spain ; and however justifiable the commanding general was, in
consequence of the misconduct of the Spanish officers in enter
ing S. Alarks and Pensacola, to terminate it by proving to the
savages and their associates that they should not be protected
even there, yet the amicable relations existing between the United
States and Spain could not be altered by that act alone. By order
ing the restitution of the posts, those relations were preserved.
By this measure so promptly taken, due respect was shown to
the Government of Spain. . . . If the embarrassments of
Spain prevented her from making an indemnity to our citizens
for so long a time from her treasury for their losses by spoliation
and otherwise, it was always in her power to have provided it by
the cession of this territory. Of this her Government has been
repeatedly apprised. . . . There is nevertheless a limit
beyond which this spirit of amity and forbearance can in no
instance be justified."*
Pending the negotiations between Air. de Onis and Air. Adams,
the movement of General Jackson into the Floridas in pursuit of
the Seminoles occurred. This met with a storm of protest from
the Spanish minister who said, "General Jackson with the Ameri
can forces under his command has not only violated the Spanish
territory under the pretext of pursuing and chastising the Semi
nole Indians, but he has taken possession by force of arms of the
fort and bay of St. Alark, driven the Spanish garrison from those
places, and sent them as prisoners to Pensacola, the capital of
West Florida. Not satisfied with this enormous outrage, he
marched against the latter place, and has by open rupture and
bloodshed violated the peace existing between Spain and the
United States. He demanded the surrender of Pensacola as if
war had been declared between the two nations ; and on the
refusal of the Spanish governor to surrender or deliver up the
place, the American commander, availing himself of his superior
force, attacked it and bombarded the castle of Barrancas, whither
the Governor had retired with his small garrison and such of the
inhabitants as chose to follow him. Having surrounded that
fortress, he gave orders for the assault and carried it. The Gov
ernor and all his people were made prisoners of war." This com
plaint was made on July 8, 181 8, and was followed by others in
still stronger language, coupled with the demand for the restitu-

? American State Papers.

35o THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
tion of the posts taken thus by the United States forces. As soon
as the object of the expedition was accomplished, the president
gave orders for the surrender of the places taken. This act
completely disproved the views of Mr. de Onis that the pursuit
of the Seminoles was but a pretext for the occupation and con
quest of the Floridas by the United States. Upon receipt of the
information that orders had been issued for the restoration of the
forts and towns to Spain and for the evacuation of the province
by the American troops, Mr. de Onis expressed the liveliest satis
faction, and signified his anxiety to hasten the pending negotia
tions between the two countries. During the period under which
the expedition of General Jackson was conducted, and in response
to the complaint of the Spanish minister, Mr. Adams explained
to him fully the reasons for the course pursued by the Americans ;
but with extraordinary fatuity he could not see any justification
for such course, nor believe that the United States meditated other
than the most hostile intentions toward the possessions of Spain.*
The equitable and righteous act of evacuation greatly softened the
asperity and irritability of Mr. de Onis, and made him! much more
pliable and reasonable in the pending negotiations.
While the negotiations were proceeding as fast as possible in
the United States, communication looking to a settlement of the
differences between the two countries was being held between Mr.
Erving and Jose Pizarro at Madrid. They likewise reiterated the
old arguments and endeavored to reach some definite arrangement.
While thus engaged the American minister learned that the Span
ish government was granting large tracts of land in the Floridas
to prominent subjects or favorites of the crown, whereupon he lost
no time in acquainting the authorities at Washington with such
facts, managing to secure and send copies of the grants.
The convention of August n, 1802, between Spain and the
United States, which was ratified by the latter January 9, 1804,
but not by the former until July 9, 1818, provided for the appoint
ment of a board of commissioners to meet at Madrid to settle the
mutual claims of the two countries. While provision was thus
made for the settlemlent of the claims of American citizens for
damages resulting from the suppression of the deposits at New
Orleans in 1802-3, none was made by this convention for the
adjustment of disputed boundaries.
In a communication dated October 24, 1818, Mr. de Onis sub
mitted the following propositions to the secretary of state: That
the United States should disavow the invasion of the Floridas by

?American State Papers.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 351
the troops under General Jackson and restore the places that had
been captured ; that Spain should cede the Floridas to the United
States; but that all grants of land therein to the present time
should not be invalidated; that the boundary between Louisiana
and Texas should "begin on the Gulf of Alexico between the rivers
Mermento and Calcasieu, following the Arroyo Hondo between
the Adaes and Natchitoches, crossing the Red river at the thirty-
second degree of latitude and ninety-third of longitude from Lon
don according to Melish's map, and thence running directly
north, crossing the Arkansas, the White and the Osage rivers, till
it strikes the Missouri, and then following the middle of that river
to its source, so that the territory on the right bank of the said
river will belong to Spain and that on the left bank to the United
States. The navigation as well of the Alissouri as of the Missis
sippi and Mermento shall remain free to the subjects of both
parties." *
In replying to this proposition in a communication dated Octo
ber 31, 1818, Air. Adams said, "The right of the United States to
the river Mississippi and all the waters flowing into it, and to all
the territories watered by them, remains as entire and unshaken by
anything now adduced by you as by anything which had ever
preceded it in the discussion between the two Governments. It
is established beyond the power of further controversy ; nor could
it answer any useful purpose to reproduce proofs which have
already more than once been shown, and which remaining unim
paired must henceforth be considered by the United States as not
susceptible of refutation." Air. de Onis was told that the gov
ernment had already given orders for the restoration of the places
taken by General Jackson, but that the demand concerning land
grants could not be acceded to by the United States, nor could
the boundary between Texas and Louisiana proposed by Mr.
de Onis be accepted. Air. Adams then proposed the following
boundary and stated that "I am authorized to assure you that it
is to be considered as the final offer on the part of the United
States:"* "Beginning at the mouth of the river Sabine on the Gulf of
Alexico; following the course of said river to the thirty-second
degree of latitude; the eastern bank and all the islands in said
river to belong to the United States and the western bank to
Spain; thence due north to the northernmost part of the thirty-
third degree of north latitude and until it strikes the Rio Roxo or
Red river ; thence following the course of said river to its source

?American State Papers.

352 THE PROVINCE AND' THE STATES.
touching the chain of the Snow mountains in latitude thirty-seven
degrees twenty-five minutes north, longitude one hundred and six
degrees fifteen minutes west or thereabouts as marked on Melish's
map ; thence to the summit of the said mountains and following
the chain of the same to the forty-first parallel of latitude ; thence
following the said parallel of latitude forty-one degrees to the
South Sea. The northern bank of the said Red river and all the
islands therein to belong to the United States and the southern
bank of the same to Spain."
He further stipulated that both countries should renounce all
claims for injuries or damages, and that all land grants in the
Floridas subsequent to 1802 should be null and void. However,
the amount of the claims to be assumed by the United States was
not to exceed five millions of dollars. He concluded by saying,
"The President is deeply penetrated with the conviction that fur
ther protracted discussion of the points at issue between our Gov
ernments cannot terminate in a manner satisfactory to them.
From your answer to this letter he must conclude whether a final
adjustment of all our differences is now to be accomplished, or
whether all hope of such a desirable result is on the part of the
United States to be abandoned."
The reply of Mr. de Onis showed that the two parties were get
ting closer together in their negotiations. While claiming that
Spain was thus making great sacrifices out of her wish to retain
the friendship of the United States, he was willing to accede to
the river Sabine as the western boundary of Louisiana "on con
dition that the same line proposed by you shall run due north from
the point where it crosses the Rio Roxo (Red river) till it strikes
the Missouri, and extend thence along the middle of the latter
to its source, leaving to Spain the territory lying to the right and
to the United States the territory lying to the left of the same."
He stated that he was unauthorized to negotiate on the proposed
extension of Louisiana to the Pacific ocean ; that the northwestern
boundary should remain open for future negotiation; that "if it
should be proposed only to draw the line from the point mentioned
on the Red river (Rio Roxo) somewhat obliquely (con alguna
oblicuidad) to the westward of the right line due north, which I
offer as the boundary of the two countries, I shall not hesitate to
take upon myself the arrangement of this point, it being always
understood that the proposed line shall strike the Missouri ;" and
that he would be willing to agree that all grants of land since Jan
uary 24 last in the Floridas should be null and void.
To this letter Mr. Adams replied under date of November 30,
that, inasmuch as the former propositions of the United States

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 353
concerning the western boundary were final, and inasmuch as Mr.
de Onis had stated that he was unauthorized to agree on the Rio
Roxo or the forty-first parallel of latitude as such boundary, "the
President deems it useless to pursue any further the attempt at an
adjustment of this object by the present negotiation. I am there
fore directed to state to you that the offer of a line for the
western boundary, made to you in my last letter, is no longer
obligatory upon this Government." He therefore stated that he
was ready to continue the discussion of other points of difference,
and proceeded with an argument to justify the United States in
pursuing the Seminoles and robbers into the Floridas and the
necessity of the steps taken by General Jackson.
No answer was given to this communication until December 12,
1818, when Mr. de Onis wrote a somewhat lengthly argument
in support of the position he had taken, and mildly criticized the
course pursued by the United States in exacting so much from
Spain. He insisted that Spain was thus making very great sac
rifices in order to prove her good will for the United States;
but he did not in this letter present other or modified proposi
tions. However, on January 11, 1819, he wrote briefly, stating
that he had "just received a courier extraordinary- of my Gov
ernment with dispatches by which I am authorized to give a
greater extent to the proposals which I made to you for adjust
ing and terminating amicably all the subjects in dispute between
the two Powers." He therefore asked to have the negotiations
renewed. He wrote again January 16, and said that he was
authorized to extend the northwestern boundary up the Missouri
river to its source, thence to the headwaters of the Columbia, and
thence down the same to the Pacific. Mr. Adams replied that
this proposition was not acceptable, and that the government
would do nothing but repeat the proposition made on the 31st
of October last. Mr. de Onis then proposed the following line:
"Beginning at the mouth of the river Sabine on the Gulf of
Mexico; following the course of said river to the thirty-second
degree of latitude, the eastern bank and all the islands in the
river to belong to the United States and the western bank to
Spain; thence due north to the northernmost part of the thirty-
third degree of north latitude and until it strikes the Rio Roxo
or Red river; thence by said river to the northernmost point of
the bend between longitude one hundred and one degrees
and one hundred and two degrees ; thence by the shortest line to
the southernmost point of the bend of the river Arkansas between
the same degrees of longitude one hundred and one and one hun-
II-23

354 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
dred and two ; thence following the course of the river Arkansas
to its source in latitude forty-one degrees north ; thence following
the same parallel of latitude forty-one degrees to the South Sea.
. If the source of the Arkansas river should fall south or
north of latitude forty-one degrees, then the line from the- said
source shall run due north or south, as the case may be, till it meets
the said parallel of latitude, and thence as aforesaid to the South
Sea; the navigation of the said rivers shall belong exclusively
to the United States forever." A few days later, or on Febru
ary 9, he changed this proposition so that the line should extend
westward on the Rio Roxo to the one hundred degree of longitude
and thirty-three and one-fourth degrees of latitude, where it crosses
that river; "thence by a line due north by the said one hundred
degree of longitude from London, according to Melish's map, till
it enters the river Arkansas ; thence along the middle of the Arkan
sas to the forty-second degree of latitude; thence a line shall be
drawn to the westward by the same parallel of latitude to the
source of the river San Clemente, or Multnomah, follow
ing the course of that river to the forty-third degree of latitude ;
and thence by a line due west to the Pacific Ocean."* Both
Floridas by his proposition were to be ceded to the United States ;
and both countries were to renounce all claims against each other,
for damages, injuries, etc.
On February 13, Mr. Adams presented the following counter
proposition : "The boundary line between the two countries west
of the Mssissippi shall begin on the Gulf of Mexico at the mouth
of the river Sabine in the sea ; continuing north along the west
ern bank of that river to the thirty-second degree of latitude ;
thence by a line due north to the degree of latitude where it
strikes the Rio Roxo of Natchitoches, or Red River ; thence fol
lowing the course of the Rio Roxo westward to the degree of
longitude one hundred and two west from London and twenty-
five from Washington; then crossing the said Red River and
running thence by a line due north to the river Arkansas ; thence
following the course of the southern bank of the Arkansas to its
source in latitude forty-one degrees north; and thence by the
parallel of latitude to the South" Sea." If the source of the
Arkansas was north or south of forty-one degrees, a straight line
due north or south was to be run thereto. The other propositions
were the same as proposed by Mr. de Onis.
In the final discussion, in which, owing to the indisposition
of Mr. de Onis, Mr. Hyde de Neuville took part, the Spanish

?American State Papers.

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 355
envoys asked that the boundary be fixed in the middle of the
rivers named, but the United States insisted that the line should
be on the western bank, though stipulating that the navigation
of the streams should be open to the vessels of both countries.
The United States agreed to the proposition of Spain that the
line should extend no farther westward than the one hundredth
degree of longitude on the Red river, and also agreed to the
forty-second degree of latitude instead of the forty-third for
the extension to the Pacific ocean. The reason given for the
objection of the Spanish minister to the extension of the line
so far up the Red river, was that it carried the limits of the
LTnited States too near Santa Fe, the capital of New Mexico,
a Spanish province. The following is the full text of several of
the articles embraced in the ratified treaty :*
"Article III. The boundary line between the two countries
west of the Alississippi shall begin on the Gulf of Mexico at the
mouth of the river Sabine, in the sea, continuing north along the
western bank of that river, to the thirty-second degree of lati
tude ; thence, by a line due north, to the degree of latitude where
it strikes the Rio Roxo of Natchitoches, or Red River; thence
following the course of the Rio Roxo westward, to the degree
of longitude one hundred west from London and twenty-three
from Washington; then, crossing the said Red River, and run
ning thence, by a line due north, to the river Arkansas ; thence
following the course of the southern bank of the Arkansas, to
its source, in latitude forty-two degrees north ; and thence, by that
parallel of latitude, to the South Sea. The whole being as laid
down in Alelish's map of the United States, published at Phila
delphia, improved to the first of January, 1818. But if the
source of the Arkansas river shall be found to fall north or south
of latitude forty-two degrees, then the line shall run from the said
source due south or north, as the case may be, till it meets the
said parallel of latitude forty-two, and thence, along the said par
allel, to the South Sea : All the islands in the Sabine and the said
Red and Arkansas rivers, throughout the course thus described, to
belong to the United States ; but the use of the waters, and the
navigation of the Sabine to the sea, and of the said rivers Roxo
and Arkansas, throughout the extent of the said boundary, on
their respective banks, shall be common to the respective inhab
itants of both nations.
"The two high contracting parties agree to cede and renounce
all their rights, claims and pretentions, to the territories

? Treaties of the United States.

356 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
described by the said line, that is to say: The United States
hereby cede to his Catholic Majesty, and renounce forever, all
their rights, claims and pretensions, to the territories lying west
and south of the above described line; and, in like manner, his
Catholic Majesty ceded to the United States all his rights, claims
and pretensions to any territories east and north of the said line,
and for himself, his heirs and successors, renounces all claim to
the said territories forever."
"Article II. His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States
in full property and sovereignty, all the territories which belong
to him, situated to the eastward of the Mississippi, known by
the name of East and West Florida. The adjacent islands
dependent on said provinces, all public lots and squares, vacant
lands, public edifices, fortifications, barracks, and other buildings,
which are not private property, archives and documents which
relate directly to the property and sovereignty of said provinces,
are included in this article. The said archives and documents
shall be left in the possession of the commissioners or officers of
the United States duly authorized to receive them."
It was further provided "that Spanish vessels coming laden
only with productions of Spanish growth or manufacture directly
from the ports of Spain or of her colonies, shall be admitted for
the term of twelve years to the ports of Pensacola and St. Augus
tine in the Floridas, without paying other or higher duties on
their cargoes or of tonnage than will be paid by the vessels of the
United States." And in article IX, the United States made the
following renunciation : "To all claims of indemnities on account
of the suspension of the right of deposit at New Orleans in 1802."
It was provided that commissioners and surveyors should be
appointed to fix' the boundaries definitely within one year from
the date of ratifying the treaty; that the ceded territory should
in due course of time be admitted into the Union ; that grants
of land by the king of Spain in the Floridas after the 24th of
January, 1818, should be null and void ; that grants by his Cath-
lic majesty previous to that date "shall be ratified and confirmed
to the persons in possession of the lands to the same extent that
the same grants would be valid "if the territories had remained
under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty. But the owners
in possession of such lands who by reason of the recent circum
stances of the Spanish nation arid the revolutions in Europe have
been prevented from fulfilling all the conditions of their grants,
shall complete them within the terms limited in the same respect
ively from the date of this treaty, in default of which the said
grants shall be null and void ;" that the United States should sat-

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 357
isfy its own citizens for claims against Spain to the extent of five
millions of dollars, the claims to be settled by a commission.
Mr. de Onis objected to. the stipulation limiting to five millions
of dollars the amount to be paid by the United States on account
of damages claimed by American citizens, on the ground that the
territories ceded were worth four or five times that amount ; but
in the end it was allowed to remain. The treaty was concluded
February 22, ratified by the senate February 24, and by the
president February 25, 1819.
By an act approved Alarch 3, 1819, congress enacted "That the
President of the United States be and he is hereby authorized to
take possession of and occupy the territories of East and West
Florida, and the appendages and appurtenances thereof; and to
remove and transport the officers and soldiers of the King of
Spain being there to the Havana, agreeably to the stipulation of
a treaty between the United States and Spain, executed at Wash
ington on the 22d day of February in the year 18 19, providing
for the cession of said territory to the United States ; and he may
for these purposes and in order to maintain in said territories
the authority of the United States, employ any part of the army
and navy of the United States and the militia of any State or
territory which he may deem necessary." The president was
authorized to establish a temporary government therein, and the
sum of twenty thousand dollars was appropriated to defray the
necessary expenses. This enactment closed with the following
paragraph : "That this act shall take effect and be in force when
ever the aforesaid treaty providing for the cession of said terri
tories to the United States shall have been ratified by the King
of Spain, and the ratifications exchanged, and the King of Spain
shall be ready to surrender said territory to the United States
according to the provisions of said treaty."* This clause rendered
the act inoperative until after the ratification of the Spanish mon
arch on October 24, 1820. On the 3d of March, 1821, the clause
above concerning the occupancy by the United States and the
removal of the Spanish troops was re-enacted by congress.
The king of Spain did not ratify the treaty within the six
months stipulated, nor for a considerable time after the expira
tion of that limit. Serious objections were found to the details
of the several articles of the treaty. Spain desired an explana
tion of "an imputed system of hostility on the part of citizens
of the United States against the subjects and dominions of Spain,
and to obtain new stipulations against these alleged injuries as

?Annals of Congress.

358 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the condition on which the treaty should be ratified." These
explanations were courteously given by the United States. She
also insisted as a condition of the ratification "that the United
States should abandon the right to recognize the revolutionary-
colonies in South America or to form other relations with them,"
which demand was positively refused by the United States. On.
the other hand, the United States insisted that certain grants of
land, embracing nearly all of West Florida and much of East
Florida, should be absolutely null and void. In the meantime,
Spain held possession of the Floridas. Early in 1820 Air. de Onis,
owing to ill health, was recalled, and was succeeded by Gen. Don
Francisco Dionisio Vives, who insisted on further explanations
before the treaty would be ratified by Spain. There is no doubt
that much assistance was furnished by citizens of the United
States to the revolting colonies of Mexico and South America.
This was well known at New Orleans, which seemed to be the
principal point from which hostile expeditions were dispatched.
Spain therefore rightfully demanded that some provision should
be adopted by the United States to prevent such hostile proceed
ings against a friendly power. After giving what he considered .
full explanations to the demands of Spain, Mr. Adams, who had
become tired of the delay, wrote to General Vives as follows :
"But it is proper to apprise you that, if this offer be not accepted,
the United States, besides being entitled to resume all the rights,
claims and pretensions which they had renounced by the treaty,
can no longer consent to relinquish their claims of indemnity and
those of their citizens from Spain for all the injuries which they
have suffered and are suffering by the delay of His Catholic
Majesty to ratify the treaty. The amount of claims of the citi
zens of the United States which existed at the time when the
treaty was signed far exceeded that which the United States con
sented to accept as indemnity. Their right of territory was and
yet is to the Rio del Norte. I am instructed to declare that if
any further delay to the ratification by His Catholic Majesty of
the treaty should occur, the United States could not hereafter
accept either of five millions of dollars for the indemnities due
to their citizens by Spain, nor of the Sabine for the boundary
between the United States and the Spanish territories." But this
threat did not seem to disconcert General Vives in the least, for
he proceeded coolly to discuss the differences. Finally, a com
mittee of the house of representatives submitted a bill "to author
ize the President of the United States to take possession of East
and West Florida and establish a temporary government therein."
The committee also stated that inasmuch as the crown lands in

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 359
the two Floridas would probably be insufficient to pay the indem
nities due the citizens of the United States, the latter would be
under the necessity of looking to the dominions of Spain to the
westward to supply the deficiency. Finally, on the 24th of Octo
ber, 1820, the treaty was duly ratified by the Spanish monarch.
The senate again ratified it February 19, 1821.
In the month of April, 1820, previous to the ratification, Henry
Clay, who favored heroic measures in regard to the Floridas, and
particularly in regard to the treatment of Spain, introduced into
the house the following resolution : "Resolved, That the Consti
tution of the LTnited States vests in Congress the power to dis
pose of the territory belonging to them, and that no treaty pur
porting to alienate any portion thereof is valid without the
concurrence of Congress ; that the equivalent proposed to be given
by Spain to the United States in the treaty concluded between
them on the 22d of February, 1819, for that part of Louisiana
lying west of the Sabine was inadequate; and that it would be
inexpedient to make a transfer thereof to any foreign Power or
renew the aforesaid treaty."*
Mr. Clay, who favored the occupation of West Florida by the
United States said, in support of his resolution: "In the peace
of 1783 Great Britain surrendered the country (West Florida)
to Spain, who for the first time came into the actual possession
of it. She re-annexed it to the residue of Louisiana; extended
the jurisdiction of that Government to it, and subjected the Gov
ernors or commandants of the districts of Baton Rouge, Feliciana,
Alobile and Pensacola to the authority of the Governor of Loui
siana residing at New Orleans ; whereas the Governor of East
Florida was placed wholly without his control and was made
amenable directly to the Governor of the Havana. I have been
credibly informed that all the concessions or grants of land made
in West Florida under the authority of Spain, run in the name
of the government of Louisiana. . . . West Florida, then,
not only as France has held it, but as it was in the hands of
Spain, made a part of the province of Louisiana, as much so
as the jurisdiction or district of Baton Rouge constituted a part
of West Florida. . . . France in 1762 transferred Louisi
ana west of the Alississippi to Spain, and at the same time con
veyed the eastern portion of it, exclusive of New Orleans, to
Great Britain. Twenty-one years after, that is, in 1783, Great
Britain ceded her part to Spain, who thus became possessed of
the entire province — one portion by direct cession from France,

?Annals of Congress.

360 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
and the residue by indirect cession. Spain then held the whole
of Louisiana under France and in virtue of the title of Franc.e.
The whole moved or passed from France to her. When, there
fore, in this state of things, she says in the treaty of St. Ilde
fonso that she retrocedes the province to France, can a doubt
exist that she parts with and gives back to France the entire
colony? To preclude the possibility of such a doubt, she added
that she restored it, not in a mutilated condition, but in that
precise condition in which France had, and she herself, possessed
it. By the act of the" 24th of February, 1804, for
laying duties on goods imported into the ceded territories, the
President is empowered whenever he deems it expedient, to erect
the bay and river Mobile, &c, into a separate district and to estab
lish therein a port of entry and delivery. By this same act the
Orleans Territory is laid off and its boundaries are so defined
as to comprehend West Florida. . . . Never could a more
propitious moment present itself for the exercise of the discre
tionary power placed in the President of the United States, and
had he failed to embrace it he would have been criminally inat
tentive to the dearest interests of this country. It cannot be too
often repeated, that if Cuba on the one hand and Florida on the
other, are in the possession of a foreign maritime Power, the
immense country belonging to the United States, watered by
streams discharging themselves into the Gulf of Mexico — that is,
one-third, nay, more than two-thirds of the United States, com
prehending Louisiana, is placed at the mercy of that Power.
The possession of Florida is a guarantee absolutely necessary
to the enjoyment of the navigation of those streams.
It is conceived as ungenerous that we should at this moment,
when Spain is encompassed and pressed on all sides by the
immense power of her enemy, occupy West Florida. Shall we
sit by, passive spectators, and witness the interesting transactions
in that country — transactions which tend to jeopardize in the most
imminent degree our rights without interference? Are you pre
pared to see a foreign Power seize what belongs to us? I have
heard in the most credible manner that about the period when the
President took his measures in relation to that country, the agents
of a foreign Power were intriguing with the people there to induce
them to come under his dominion. Whether this be the fact or
not, it cannot be doubted that if you neglect the present auspi
cious moment — if you reject the proffered boon, some other nation
profiting by your errors, will seize the occasion to get a fatal
footing in your southern frontier. I have no hesitation in
saying that if a parent country will not or cannot maintain its

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 361
authority in a colony adjacent to us, and there exists in it a
state of misrule and disorder menacing our peace, and if, more
over, such colony by passing into the hands of any other Power
would become dangerous to the integrity of the Union and mani
festly tend to the subversion of our laws, we have a right upon
eternal principles of self-preservation to lay hold of it. This
principle alone, independent of any title, would warrant our occu
pation of West Florida. But it is not necessary to resort to it,
our title being in my judgment incontestably good.
But if Great Britain persists in a denial of justice to us, or if
she avails herself of the occupation of West Florida to commence
war upon us, I trust and hope that all hearts will unite in a bold
and vigorous vindication of our rights. ... I am not
in favor of cherishing the passion of conquest. But I must
be permitted to conclude by declaring my hope to see ere long
the new United States (if you will allow me the expression),
embracing not only the old thirteen States, but the entire country
east of the Alississippi, including East Florida, and some of the
territories to the north of us also."
Senator Pope of Kentucky said: "Before 1762-3 Louisiana
extended east to the river Perdido. France and "Spain by the
treaty of 1719 established this boundary between Florida now
called East Florida and Louisiana. . . . Thus France prior
to 1762-3 claimed the river Perdido as their eastern limit, nor
does this fact appear to have been contested by the British min
ister. . . . The cession of West Louisiana v/ith the island
of New Orleans to Spain and of East Louisiana, since called West
Florida to Great Britain, were made at the same time in the year
1762-3. It is, however, well known that France made the ces
sion to Great Britain at the instance and for the benefit of Spain,
to enable her with the cession of Florida, now called East Flor
ida, to obtain a restitution of Cuba. The whole of Louisiana
not conquered by Great Britain, may with propriety be said to
have been given up or ceded to Spain. By the treaty of 1803,
we acquired Louisiana as fully and in the same manner as it had
been acquired by France from Spain in virtue of the Treaty of
St. Ildefonso, of the first of October, 1800. . . I do not,
however, think it difficult to account for the conduct of Spain,
My conjecture is that France, after she had sold Louisiana to
the United States and received the price stipulated, secretly
advised Spain not to surrender it, having at that time formed
the project which she is now attempting to execute of acquiring
the whole Spanish empire. Her interest was, therefore, identified
with that of Spain, and she was no doubt willing to unite with

362 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Spain in giving the most limited construction to the cession to
the United States. . . . Why should our sympathies be
awakened in favor of Spain ? What claim has the Spanish Gov
ernment upon our moderation and forbearance ? What has been
her conduct? From the moment we became an independent
nation, she has been intriguing to separate the Western country
from the Atlantic States. She has made at different periods and
as late as the year 1797, in violation of her treaty of 1795 with
this country, direct propositions to the Western people to secede
from the Union ; and, to accomplish her object, at least attempted
the use of means the most corrupt. ... If the French arms
shall be successful in Spain, of which I believe few entertain much
doubt, and the Junta shall be driven from Old Spain to any of
the colonies, their political character must cease and they can
no longer claim the exercise on any jurisdiction or sovereignty
over the colonies. The colonies are not bound together by any
political bond unconnected with the mother country ; they are sub
ject to the mother country, but the moment she is conquered they
are at liberty to provide for themselves; unless, indeed, the
Emperor of France or King Joseph can claim them. France in
an official expose and King Joseph by proclamation have declared
their willingness that the colonies should become independent,
provided they do not connect themselves with Great Britain. If
France, therefore, shall conquer the country, which is probable,
we are fully authorized by her public declaration to the world to
acquire with the consent of the inhabitants not only West but East
Florida, Cuba or any other province we shall deem it expedient
to connect with the United States."
The views of Mr. Clay and Mr. Pope were combatted by Mr.
Horsey of Delaware, who said : "I cannot admit that France has
acquired a legitimate title to the crown and colonies of Spain.
. Was not the royal family decoyed by artifice from Mad
rid to Bayonne? Was not the old Monarch compelled to resign
his crown to Ferdinand the Seventh, and was not that Prince a
prisoner of Bonaparte, and while in this conditon and, for
aught we know, the bayonet at his breast or the cup to his lips,
constrained to resign his crown to the Emperor of France ?" Sir,
what sort of title is this ? Upon the eternal principles of justice,
upon the principles of common" law and common sense, an instru
ment thus obtained is not obligatory on the party executing it.
But have the people of Spain acquiesced? No, sir, the instant
publicity was given to the transaction, they became indignant and
with one voice rose resolved to resist this usurpation. To this
hour they have not submitted. But the gentleman has said that

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 363
Spain is no longer able to hold Florida ; that foreign emissaries
will take it if the United States do not, and that it may be law
fully taken by the United States on the ground of the law of occu
pancy; but to obtain a title in this way the country must be
vacant, uninhabited and not claimed by another proprietor, which
is not the case with West Florida. ... It appears that in
1764 when the whole of Louisiana with the island and town
of New Orleans was delivered to Spain, Great Britain was in
the peaceable possession of all the country on the east of the Mis
sissippi; that with respect to Florida particularly Great Britain
was in possession, and nobody dreamed at that time that Flor
ida, either East or West, was any part of Louisiana. Had it
been so considered, under the orders of the French King to
deliver the whole of the province to Spain, undoubtedly Florida
would have been delivered. . . . The Treaty of St. Ilde
fonso of 1800 is a mere treaty of retrocession. The translation
purports to be a treaty of cession, it is true, but acknowledged
on all sides to be erroneous. The original treaty was in the
French language, and it is by that we are to be governed. The
expression in the original is, 'Sa Majeste Catholique promit et
s'engage, de son cote, a. retroceder a la Republique Francaise,' &c.
A retroceder, signifying to retrocede, to restore, or, to use a term
familiar in the State I have the honor to represent, reconvey
the colony of Louisiana to France as it was when France con
veyed it to Spain. The honorable gentleman from Kentucky
(Mr. Pope), pressed by his argument, could only get round
by alleging that the original treaty between France and Spain
was dated in 1761, prior to the settlement of the line and the ces
sions to Great Britain. But unfortunately, he could not produce
one title of authentic evidence to establish his position.
It is said that when France ceded Louisiana to Spain in 1762, the
country exended on the west of the river Sabine, and that prior
to the treaty of 1800 detached from Louisiana the territory south
of the waters emptying into the Red river and erected it into a
new province under the name of the Province of Texas. Sir,
the operations on the Sabine are memorable. It is well known
how mysteriously they were suspended by an arrangement in
1806, by which it was agreed that the Spaniards should not cross
the Sabine and that the Americans should not extend their
settlements as far as that river. And for this purpose, to prevent
collisions until the difference should be settled, instructions were
given that no surveys should be made west of a meridian passing
by Natchitoches. . . . When possession was originally
delivered by France to Spain, Florida was not delivered or con-

364 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
sidered any part of the cession. When Louisiana was restored
to France, Florida was not delivered. When the province was
delivered to the United States, Florida was not comprehended.
Indeed the Government then treated the country west of the
Mississippi, including the town and island of New Orleans, as
the whole of Louisiana, by receiving it and paying the purchase
money, which by the terms of the treaty they were not bound to
do, and which by the Act of Congress creating the Louisiana
stock they were not authorized to do, till after full and entire
possession had been delivered."
Many minor questions of importance with which these volumes
are not concerned were settled by the treaty of 1819 between
Spain and the United States. The object of this and the previous
chapter has been to follow the steps taken by the two governments
in establishing the Florida and the Texas boundaries. No person
of this day can correctly assert that the Louisiana ceded to the
United States was bounded on the southwest by the Rio Grande,
or the Colorado, or the Sabine. The truth is, the boundary was
undetermined. When it is declared that the claims of the United
States to the country westward to the Rio Grande or the Colorado
were better than those of Spain, that is another question. It then
becomes a question of fact to be determined by evidences. All the
evidences in existence were duly considered at the time, and the
boundary was established on the Sabine. In securing an exten
sion on the north to the Pacific ocean, the United States was ceded
territory to which at the time of obtaining Louisiana it laid no
claim. This had been no part of the Louisiana ceded by France
and retroceded by Spain and finally acquired by the United States
in 1803. No claim had been made to territory westward of the
Mississippi watershed. Therefore, the country west of the
mountains, so far as Spain owned it, was ceded by that Govern
ment in 1819 to the United States. But Great Britain claimed a
part of it, and it therefore took another treaty to finally settle the
ownership. There was no necessity for a treaty with any nation to warrant
the United States in claiming as the western boundary of Louisi
ana north of the forty-second degree of latitude, the highlands
separating the Upper -Missouri valley from the river basins
descending to the Pacific. That claim was never disputed until
the Spanish commissioner in 1818-19 attempted to locate such
boundary farther to the eastward as hereinbefore narrated. This
contention by Spain was wholly unfounded, because no sound evi
dence was ever produced to disprove the justice of the claim that
Louisiana in the northwest extended to the height of land beyond

THE FLORIDA AND TEXAS BOUNDARIES. 365
the sources of the Missouri. But the treaty of 1819 with Spain,
may for all that, be said to have settled definitely this line, par
ticularly its southern point where the forty-second parallel inter
sected the principal chain of the Rocky mountains. And in the
same manner, it may be said that the northern point was definitely
settled by the treaty with England in 1818, when the forty-ninth
parallel from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky or Stony moun
tains was agreed on as the northern boundary of the United States.

366 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

CHAPTER IX

The Northern Boundary

UNDER the liberal charters granted by the kings of England
to the early navigators who discovered the Atlantic coast
claims were at first made to extensions of territory west
ward to the Pacific ocean, or the South Sea as it was then gener
ally called. The practice of making such claims was common
to every colony on the Atlantic seaboard; and the claims were
usually extended westward along parallels of latitude correspond
ing to the northern and southern limits of each colony.*
This was the custom of the English, but not that of the French
nor the Spanish. Nor had the pope previously paid any atten
tion to such parallels in his famous bull which divided the whole
of the western hemisphere between Spain and Portugal. The •
practice of both France and Spain was to take formal possession
of the mouth of a river, and then in consequence claim the entire
basin of that stream. As is well known, the custom of the Eng
lish in making such claims encountered vigorous opposition when
attempts were made to extend their limits westward of the Alle
ghany mountains. It was then that the practices of colonial expan
sion which had been adopted by France and Great Britain resulted
in distinct and bloody conflict and in an aggravation of the
ancient jealously and hostility, with which each of those countries
regarded the other.
Still, these parallels continued to be important factors in the
settlement of disputes over questions of boundary throughout
the interior of the continent, even after the colonial period had
ended. France presented the first serious obstruction to the Eng
lish pretensions by extending Canada to the westward over the

? History of the United States: Bancroft.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 367
valley of the St. Lawrence river, including the Great Lakes, to the
Mississippi river. Thence, by expanding her dominions southward
to the Gulf of Mexico, she completely checked the progress of the
English colonies to the westward, at least as far to the westward
as the Mississippi. This result was premeditated by the French,
who expressly designed to obstruct the territorial growth of
the English American colonies.* At first it seemed that the Eng
lish were thus prevented from rightfully extending their limits
to the westward of the Alleghanies ; but later it became apparent
that they had the better right to the upper Ohio valley at least.
In consequence of the rival claims, the conflict at Fort Duquesne,
the present site of Pittsburg, formed one of the momentous pre
liminaries to the bloody "Seven Years War."
During the early stages of the dispute over American territory,
Great Britain did not claim sovereignty of the country much if any
to the westward of the Wabash river. Her claims were mainly
confined, and rightfully so, to the tract of country embraced by the
upper branches of the river Ohio. The French for many years
previous, possessed settlements at Vincennes, on the Illinois river,
at Kaskaskia, and elsewhere, which were not disputed by the Eng
lish colonies ; but there was nothing, in the judgment of the Eng
lish, whose colonial policy of expansion differed so essentially
from that of the French, to prevent their occupancy of the upper
Ohio valley, disclaiming as they did the right of France to the
ownership of the whole valley of the Mississippi (including the
upper Ohio) by simply taking possession of the mouth of that
river and in reality not occupying with setlements immense tracts
of country on its upper sources. Such pretensions by the French
were therefore emphatically denied by the English, and in conse
quence contests of the bitterest character were resorted to by those
nations to settle the question of ownership of the upper Ohio
valley. Aside from this valley, the French had cemented their
right to the remainder of the country to the westward of the Alle
ghanies by the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht, concluded
April 11, 1713 ; and at that period it must be admitted that France
had the better right to the territory extending from the Alle
ghanies to .the Wabash river ; but they slept on their rights and
made very little effort to form settlements in that great expanse
of country. Later, the English gained footholds therein by form
ing settlements, which the French soon attempted to dislodge or
destroy. One of the articles of the treaty of Utrecht provided that the
?History of New France: Shea.

368 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
English possessions on Hudson bay, captured by France during
the war, should be restored, the following being the language
used :* "The said Most Christian King shall restore to the King
dom and Queen of Great Britain, to be possessed in full right for
ever, the bay and straits of Hudson, together with all lands, seas,
seacoasts, rivers and places situate on the said bay and straits
and which belong thereunto, no tracts of land being excepted,
which are at present possessed by the subjects of France." The
French duplicate of the provision was worded as follows:
"Quant aux limites entre la Baie de Hudson et les lieux apparte-
nans a la France, on est convenu reciproquement qu'ie sera
nomme incressamment des Commissaires, qui les determineront
dans le terme d'un an ; . . . les memes Commissaires auront
le pouvoir de regler pareillement les limites entre les autres col
onies Franchises et Britainuques dans ce pays-la." This treaty
left France in possession of her territory on the St. Lawrence and
the Mississippi rivers, and left England in possession of her terri
tories on Hudson bay and along the Atlantic coast south of the
Gulf of St. Lawrence. In addition she acquired Novo Scotia and
Newfoundland as a result of the war. In Article X of this treaty
the following language was used : "But it is agreed on both sides
to determine within a year by Commissaries to be forthwith named
by each party, the limits which are to be fixed between the said
bay of Hudson and the places appertaining to the French ; which
limits both the British and French subjects shall be wholly forbid
to pass over or thereby to go to each other by sea or by land. The
same Commissaries shall also have orders to describe and settle in
like manner the boundaries between the other British and French
colonies in those parts." The Latin duplicate read as follows :
"Ex utraque antem parte consensum est de Funbus, inter dictum
Sunum de Hudson, a loca ad Gallos spectantia statuendis, per
Commissarios, utriuque quantocius nominandos, inter annum
decernere; quos quidem Limites Subditis tam Brittanicis quam
Gallicis pertransire, aut alterntros sive Mari sive Terra adire,
prohibitum omnino erit. Lisdem quoque Commissariis in Man-
datis erit datum, ut Limites paritir inter alias Britannicas Gal-
licasque Colonias iis in Oris describant, statuantque." It was the,
intention of both parties to the treaty, as shown by the language
above, that the boundary between the Hudson bay country and
Canada should be the highlands separating the waters flowing
into Hudson bay from those flowing into the St. Lawrence river.
This line approximately, at the date of the treaty, was assumed

? Chalmers' Collection of Treaties.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 369
to be about the forty-ninth degree of north latitude, though vary
ing much from that parallel on the Atlantic coast. In accordance
with the provisions of the treaty, commissioners were appointed
by each power to ascertain within the specified time the bound
aries between the possessions of the two countries in America.
They met on the Atlantic coast and, having agreed as a starting
point on a cape or promontory in latitude fifty-eight degrees thirty
minutes north, proceeded thence southwest to Lake Mistasin,
thence still farther southwest until the parallel of forty-nine
degrees was intersected, and thence west along that line indefi
nitely. When the whole territory passed to Great Britain as a result
of the "Seven Years War," it was not necessary longer to con
sider such line for any purpose; but after the Revolution, when
the rights of the United States began to figure, the old boundary
between the Hudson bay settlements and Canada was revived to
show the intentions of the parties and to show that the English
possessions had extended southward to the forty-ninth degree of
latitude. If such had been the intentions, the northern boundary
of Canada would, of course, have been, the forty-ninth parallel,
and its extension to the westward would have been bounded on
the north by the same line. By parity of reasoning, other things
being equal, it was argued that the line should be continued west
ward to the Pacific in an extension to that ocean of the domains of
the United States and Great Britain. This would have been the
logical result of the English policy of colonial expansion, had not
other countries secured a foothold on the Pacific coast and had
it not been necessary to take other considerations into account.
Spain, Great Britain and the United States acquired separate and
independent claims generally to the Pacific coast where the forty-
ninth parallel intersected the shore line and to other places above
and below that point, with or without good grounds. It should
be noted that in the contentions with Great Britain the westward
extension on parallels of latitude cut much more of a figure than
they did in the negotiations with Spain, the reason therefor being
that France had based her claims to the whole basin of the Mis
sissippi' on the encompassing watershed regardless of parallels of
latitude or meridians.
It was reasoned that if Canada was bounded on the north by
the forty-ninth degree of latitude after the treaty of Utrecht, that
parallel must have been its boundary when acquired by Great
Britain in 1762-3 and was the northern boundary of the United
States from the Lake of the Woods due westward to the Missis-
-II— 24

37° THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
sippi when the latter secured their independence. This was the
argument before the peace commission in 1782-3. Later, this
assumed boundary on the forty-ninth parallel, abandoned wholly
from 1762-3 to 1782-3, regarded with apparent unconcern from
1783 to 1800, became the suggested parallel that should separate
the British from the American possessions. However, had it not
been for one consideration, the United States would never have
been able to claim in 1782-3 farther north than the forty-ninth
parallel or even that far. That consideration was the right under
the Louisiana purchase to all of the territory watered by the
Missouri and its branches. This would have thrown the bound
ary near the Rocky mountains "north of the forty-ninth parallel.
But the treaty of 1782-3 settled the question by carrying the
northern boundary in the northwest up to the "northwesternmost
point of the Lake of the Woods." Had it not been for the stipu
lations of this treaty, the chances are that the United States west
of Lake Superior would have been bounded on the north by the
forty-fifth parallel, the boundary mentioned in the grant to Crozat
in 1 712. Succeeding the Revolution, had the United States insisted
on an extension westward from the "northwesternmost point of
the Lake of the Woods," as they had an undoubted right to do,
a large strip of land now possessed by Canada would have fallen
to the United States. But it must also be borne in mind that the
boundary mentioned in the treaty of Utrecht and the natural
water-way extending from Lake Superior to the Lake of the
Woods, were the conclusive factors by which the United States
could claim so high as that lake in the peace deliberations of.
1782-3. At that time the latitude and longitude of the Lake of
the Woods were unknown, but the lake was supposed to be inter
sected by the forty-ninth parallel.
In the provisional articles of peace of November 30, 1782 and
in the definitive treaty of September 3, 1783, part of Article II
was made to read as follows, reference being had to the line
bounding the United States on the northwest : "Thence through
Lake Superior northward of the isles Royal and Philippeaux to the
Long Lake; thence through the middle of said Long Lake and
the water communication between it and the Lake of the Woods
to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through the said lake to
the most northwestern point thereof, and from thence on a due
west course to the river Mississippi ; thence by a line to be drawn
along the middle of said river Mississippi until it shall intersect
the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of north latitude."
Article VIII of this treaty, as stated elsewhere, granted Great
Britain the right to navigate the Mississippi from its source to

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 371
the sea, because it was then thought that the Mississippi extended
as far to the north as the northernmost point of the Lake of the
Woods and to the westward of such point, thus giving that nation
territory on its banks. This was in accordance with the opinion
expressed then and argued afterward by the United States, that
the laws of nature and of nations gave any country which pos
sessed territory on any part of the banks of a river the right to
navigate such river from its source to the sea. It is clear
from the above article that the commissioners who negotiated the
peace of 1783 thought that the Mississippi lay to the westward of
the Lake of the Woods — that is, that its sources were located at a
degree of latitude as far north as the northwesternmost point of
that lake. Therefore, their clear intention was to extend the
northern boundary of the United States westward along the
parallel which intersected the northwesternmost point of the lake.
Under date of August 6, 1794, John Jay, minister of the United
States to Great Britain, presented the following proposition to
Lord Grenville:* "Whereas, the boundaries of the United
States, as delineated in the said treaty of peace (1783), and
every article in the said treaty contained, are hereby recognized,
ratified and forever confirmed; . . . and whereas, it is
doubtful whether the river Mississippi extends so far to the north
ward as to be intersected by the west line from the Lake of the
Woods, which is mentioned in the said treaty, it is agreed that
the actual extent of the said river to the northward shall be
explored and ascertained by commissioners for that purpose, to
be appointed and authorized as follows, viz : It is agreed that if,
from the report of the said commissioners, it shall appear that the
said river does not extend so far to the northward as to be inter
sected by the west line aforesaid, by reason whereof the bound
ary lines of he United States in that quarter would not close, then
and forthwith thereupon such a closing line shall be established
as shall be adjudged and determined to be most consistent with
the true intent and meaning of the said treaty by commissioners
to be appointed and authorized in the manner prescribed in other
articles herein." To this communication Lord Grenville returned
the following counter proposition: "That whereas it is now
understood that the riveriMississippi would at no point thereof, be
intersected by such westward line as is described in the said
treaty; and whereas it was stipulated by the said treaty that the
navigation of the Mississippi should be free to both parties, it
is agreed that the boundary line shall run in the manner described

* American State Papers.

372 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
by the treaty from the Lake Huron to the northward of the Isle
Philippeaux in Lake Superior ; and that from thence the said line
shall proceed to the bottom of West Bay in the said lake; and
from thence in a due west course to the river of the Red Lake or
eastern branch of the Mississippi and down the said branch
to the main river of the Mississippi; and that as well
on the said branch as on [  or  through Lake Supe
rior; and from thence to the water communication between the
said lake and the Lake of the Woods to the point where the said
water communication shall be intersected by a line running due
north from the mouth of the river St. Croix, which falls into the
Mississippi below the Falls of St. Anthony, and that the boundary
line shall proceed from such point of intersection in a due south
erly course along the said line to the Mississippi, and that as well
on the said water communication as on] every part of the Missis
sippi where the same bounds the territory of the United States, the
navigation shall be free to both parties, and his majesty's sub
jects shall always be admitted to enter freely into the bays, ports
and creeks on the American side and to land and dwell there for
the purposes of their commerce; and for greater certainty the
undersigned ministers have annexed to each of the copies of this
treaty a copy of the map made use of by them with the bound
aries marked thereon agreeably to this article; and the bound
aries of the United States as fixed by the said treaty of peace and
by this treaty, together with all the other articles of the said treaty
are hereby recognized, ratified and forever confirmed." The
matter within the brackets of this proposition was an alternative
offer presented for the consideration of Mr. Jay. It should be -
noted that these propositions of the British minister differed vastly
from the manifest intention of the parties to the treaty of 1783.
Mr. Jay returned an answer to the effect that if the provisions
of the treaty of 1783 could not be carried out in toto they should
be so far as possible by closing over the shortest and most reason
able path or line the. gap between the northwesternmost point of
the Lake of the Woods and the source of the main branch of the
Mississippi ; that such source had not yet been ascertained ; that
the only sources of that river governing the deliberations of the
convention were wholly a matter of conjecture; that a joint sur
vey should be made for determining the best mode of closing the
gap in the line ; that "neither Great Britain nor the United States
ought to cede or to acquire any territory further than what such
closing line might possibly render unavoidable ;" that neither
country should be content "with delusive conjectures and prob
abilities, when absolute certainty could easily be had ;" that if a

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 373
line drawn westward of the Lake of the Woods could not inter
sect the Mississippi, other and reasonable measures should be
taken to close the lines in that quarter ; that there was nothing in
the treaty of 1783 to show that the line which should reach the
Mississippi must do so at some navigable point ; that the undoubted
intention had been to intersect the Alississippi at some point far
above the Falls of St. Anthony which obstructed navigation ; that
the parties did not know, could not have known, whether the line
to be drawn due west from the Lake of the Woods would inter
sect the Mississippi at a navigable point or not ; that the stipulation
in the treaty of 1783 concerning the navigation of the Mississippi,
was an after-thought which gave rise to the eighth article; that
there had been no thought concerning navigable water; that no
stipulation was asked for nor introduced regarding facilities for
the navigation of the river from the British dominions on the
north ; and that the propositions of Great Britain contemplated the
cession by the United States of more than thirty thousand square
miles of territory no matter which of them was accepted.
Lord Grenville replied that the language of the treaty of 1783
stipulated the line should be drawn from the Lake of the Woods
due west to the Alississippi; that as such a line could not be
drawn, no stipulation concerning such line could be fixed or bind
ing; that in establishing a new boundary it was as reasonable to
suppose that Great Britain would be required to cede territory as
the United States would be to do so ; that in all settlements of the
boundary the right of Great Britain to navigate the Alississippi
should be borne in mind ; that as the navigation of the Alississippi
had been provided for in the treaty of 1783, it must have been the
intention of the parties that Great Britain should possess land
upon its banks; that if after a survey the line of 1783 could be
drawn, it should be made the boundary; that there could be no
objection to the appointment of commissioners to determine the
boundary, provided the rights of Great Britain to the navigation
of the Alississippi were duly considered; and that no objection
occurred to making a survey save that of delay.
.The ministers were thus far apart in their respective demands,
with almost every argument in favor of the claims of the United
States. One proposition of the British minister ran the line
directly north from the mouth of the river St. Croix till it inter
sected Rainy Lake and thence down the water courses to Lake
Superior, leaving the present site of St. Paul and Minneapolis
outside of the limits of the United States. The other approxi
mately ran the line westward from the present Ashland, Wis.,
in about the direction of Aitkin, Minn., until it should

374 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
intersect "Red Lake river or Lahontan's Mississippi" some dis
tance south of Red lake, leaving the present site of Duluth north
of the line. Under the former line, the American minister esti
mated that the United States would relinquish thirty-two thou
sand four hundred square miles, and under the latter thirty-five
thousand five hundred and seventy-five square miles. The
British contentions had no ground to stand on; whereupon Lord
Grenville, trusting that time and skillful negotiation in the future
would deal more kindly with the desires of Great Britain, agreed
with Mr. Jay that before concluding the boundary the necessary
survey should be made. However, particular attention is called
to the extravagance of the British demands and pretensions. This
attitude, so early taken in the controversy, became even more
pronounced and unjustifiable as time passed and as the rights of
the United States improved with the acquisition of Louisiana and
the Spanish claims on the Pacific coast.
However, in the treaty of November 19, 1794, usually called
"Jay's Treaty," it was stated in Article III that* "the river Mis
sissippi shall, according to the treaty of peace, be entirely open to
both parties : and it is further agreed that all the ports and places
on its eastern side, to whichsoever of the parties belonging, may
freely be resorted to and used by both parties in as ample a man
ner as any of the Atlantic ports or places of the United States or
any of the ports or places of His Alajesty in Great Britain." It
was this provision to which Spain took serious and emphatic
objection the following year, on the ground that the United States
had no right to presume to cede to England freedom to navigate
the Mississippi south of the thirty-first degree of latitude, because
it did not own. either of the banks south of that parallel. The
following article was embraced in Jay's Treaty :*
"Article IV. Whereas, it is uncertain whether the river Alis
sissippi extends so far to the northward as to be intersected by
a line to be drawn due west from the Lake of the Woods in the
manner mentioned in the treaty of peace between His Majesty-
and the United States, it is agreed that measures shall be taken
in concert between His Majesty's Government in America and the
Government of the United States for making a joint survey of
the said river from one degree of latitude below the falls of St.
Anthony to the principal source or sources of said river and the
parts adjacent thereto ; and that if on the result of such survey it
should appear that the said river would not be intersected by such
a line as above mentioned, the two parties will thereupon proceed

?American State Papers.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 375
by amicable negotiation to regulate the boundary line in that
quarter as well as all other points to be adjusted between the
said parties according to justice and mutual convenience and in
conformity to the intent of the said treaty."
The joint survey thus provided for was never carried into effect.
It was a subject which did not press for adjustment at that time,
and was permitted to lie dormant under the excitement of more
important events at home and abroad. When the survey was
finally made it was ascertained that the northwesternmost point of
the Lake of the Woods was in latitude forty-nine degrees and
thirty-seven minutes north of the equator. The United States
should have insisted on this parallel for its westward extension to
the Pacific ocean, because this point was fully countenanced by the
treaty of 1783, and not disputed until the commissioners of the
United States themselves proposed the demarcation of the forty-
ninth parallel. The establishment of the forty-ninth parallel by
the commissioners appointed under the treaty of Utrecht, was even
declared at the time of the cession of Louisiana to the United
States to be involved in considerable doubt. Of course, the
United States did not anticipate the acquirement of Louisiana, and
previous to the cession felt safe as to its boundaries, which were
defined by the treaty of 1783. This will probably account for the
lack of interest shown by the Americans prior to the cession. A
few degrees more or less in the sharp angle at the Lake of the
Woods would cut no serious figure; but when Louisiana was
acquired the United States should at once have sent a competent
surveyor to fix the northwesternmost point of that lake, and then
have demanded that the boundary westward should be on the
parallel of that point. The unconcern before the cession may be
excusable, but that afterward admits of no extenuation.
In June, 1802, Mr. Madison, secretary of state, instructed
Rufus King, minister to Great Britain, to again open negotiations
for the settlement of the northwestern boundary question.* He
said, "The description supposes that a line running due west from
that point (the northwesternmost point of the Lake of the Woods),
would intersect the Mississippi. It is now well understood that
the highest source of the Mississippi is south of the Lake of the
Woods; consequently that a line due west from its most north
western point would not touch any part of that river. To remedy
this error it may be agreed that the boundary of the United States
in that quarter, shall be a line running from that source of the
Mississippi which is nearest to the Lake of the Woods, and strik-

* American State Papers.

376 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ing it westwardly as a tangent, and from the point touched, along
the watermark of the lake, to its most northwestern point, at which
it will meet the line running through the lake." The question
having been opened in London by Christopher Gore, charge of
the United States, he wrote as follows to the secretary of state
under date of October 6, 1802: "On the part of the boundary
which is to connect the northwest point of the Lake of the Woods
with the Mississippi, Lord Hawkesbury observed that it was evi
dently the intention of the treaty of peace that both nations should
have access to and enjoy the free use of that river; and he doubt
less meant that this access should be to each nation through their
own territories. He remarked that commissions, which I had
proposed for ascertaining the relation of the Lake of the Woods
and the Mississippi, if any doubt remained on this head, and run
ning the line between these two waters according to your proposal,
might establish such a boundary as would secure to each nation
this object. To the remark I made no reply, other than by observ
ing that the line suggested was what naturally seemed to be
demanded by just interpretation, where such a mistake had hap
pened as was herein supposed; but this I did, however, chiefly
with a view of not assenting to his proposal and in a manner rather
declining than courting the discussion. It will probably be per
sisted in ; and I much doubt if this Government will be inclined to
adjust any boundary in this quarter that has not the right desired
for its basis." Lord Hawkesbury further said that it had been
the intention of. the parties to the treaty of 1783 to open the Mis
sissippi freely to the vessels of both countries, and further inti
mated that such result should now be the intent of the same
parties. The design of the British minister' was thus easily fath
omed by Mr. Gore.
In September, 1802, the latter submitted the plans of the
United States to Lord Hawkesbury, to the following effect:*
That as the second article of the treaty of 1783 supposed that a
line drawn due west from the northwesternmost point of the
Lake of the Woods would intersect the Mississippi, and as the
highest source of the Mississippi is south of said point and such
line could not thus intersect it, some provision should be made
to settle the discrepancy and be incorporated in the pending
treaty in accordance with the fourth article of the treaty of 1794.
Mr. Gore suggested that it was "consistent with justice and the
mutual convenience of the parties to establish the boundary of
the United States in this quarter, by a line running from that

* Diplomatic Correspondence.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 377
source of the Mississippi which is nearest to the Lake of the
Woods, and striking it westwardly as a tangent, and from the
point touched, along the watermark of the lake, to its most north
western point at which it will meet the line running through
the lake." He further suggested that the appointment of com
missioners should be provided for in the convention.
Previous to this event, the latitude and longitude of various
points in the western country, among which was the Lake of
the Woods, had been ascertained for the Northwestern Fur Com
pany by its astronomer, Mr. Thomson ; but these were the figures
of a private company and should not have formed the only basis
for the arguments and calculations of the United States. A
report of this survey* was contained in a work issued to describe
the discoveries of McKenzie's voyage or expedition. It placed
the Lake of the Woods in latitude forty-nine degrees thirty-seven
minutes north) and longitude ninety-four degrees thirty-one
minutes west; the northwesternmost branch of the source of the
Mississippi was placed at latitude forty-seven degrees thirty-eight
minutes north, and longitude ninety-five degrees six minutes west.
These figures were obtained in the spring of 1798. The commis
sioners of the United States had no figures of their own as to
the location of these points, and were obliged to rely on those
above mentioned.
In commenting upon what Mr. Gore stated Lord Hawkesbury
had said as above narrated, Mr. Madison wrote as follows under
date of December 16, 1802, to Mr. King:f "By the communi
cation of the 6th day of October, received from Air. Gore, it
appears that the proposition for adjusting the boundary in the
•northwest corner of the United States is not relished by the Brit
ish Government. The proposition was considered by the Presi
dent as a liberal one, inasmuch as the more obvious remedy for
the error of the treaty would have been by a line running due
north from the most northern source of the Mississippi and inter
secting the line running due west from the Lake of the Woods ;
and inasmuch as the branch leading the nearest the Lake of
the Woods may not be the largest or most navigable one, and
may consequently favor the wish of the British Government to
have access to the latter. The proposition for these reasons
would not have been made but for a desire to take advan
tage of the present friendly dispositions of the parties for the
purpose of closing all questions of boundary between them. As

? History of the Fur Trade: McKenzie.
t American State Papers.

378 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
it is not probable, however, that the settlement of this particular
boundary will for some time be material, and as the adjustment
proposed is not viewed by the British Government in the same
light as by the President, it is thought proper that it should not
for the present be pursued." He suggested that in the mean
time provision should be made for surveys to ascertain the rights
of the respective parties. It will thus be seen that Great Brit
ain, having learned as early as 1798 that the source of the Alis
sissippi was far south of the Lake of the Woods, and being
impressed with the importance to her of the privilege of freely
navigating the Mississippi, which had been granted her by the
treaty of 1783, and confirmed by the treaty of 1794, clung at first
to the idea of a boundary line running westward from the west
ern point of Lake Superior till it intersected the Mississippi, the
object of the British ministry being to secure a foothold on the
bank of that river by throwing its upper sources within English
limits, in which case their rights to navigate the Mississippi would
not be disputed by the United States. When this demand was
justly refused by the latter, the British representatives persisted
in requiring, as their right under the treaties of 1783 and 1794,
freedom to navigate the Mississippi, regardless of where the
northwestern boundary should be established. This was asking
for more than their right, and for more than the parties to the
treaty of 1783 had contemplated, because the latter had proceeded
on the supposition that the sources of the Mississippi were within
the British possessions. When they were found not to be so,
but were really found to be many miles within the American
territory, the right of Great Britain to navigate that stream was
rendered an absolute nullity by every construction and every law.
Neither party at this time had the least idea that Louisiana was
soon to pass to the possession of the United States. The lan
guage used in the treaty of 1783, and the manifest intention of
the parties at that time, were the sole bases employed for settling
the respective rights of the two countries.
In a communication dated May 13, 1803, Mr. King wrote from
London to the secretary of state that "the source of the Missis
sippi nearest to the Lake of the Woods, according to McKenzie's
report will be found about twenty-nine miles to the westward
of any part of that lake, which is represented to be nearly cir
cular. Hence, a direct line between the northwesternmost part
of this lake and the nearest source of the Mississippi, which is
preferred by this Government, has appeared to me equally advan
tageous with the lines we had preferred." After a long period

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. $79
of negotiation by the envoys of the two countries, the following
article was finally agreed upon and incorporated in the treaty
formulated by the convention of May 12, 1803 :*
"Article V. Whereas, it is uncertain whether the river Mis
sissippi extends so far to the northward as to be intersected by
a line drawn due west from the Lake of the Woods, in the man
ner mentioned in the treaty of peace (1783) between His Majesty
and the United States, it is agreed that instead of the said line,
the boundary of the United States in this quarter shall and is
hereby declared to be the shortest line which can be drawn between
the northwesternpoint of the Lake of the Woods and the nearest
source of the river Mississippi ; and for the purpose of ascer
taining and determining the northwest point of the Lake of the
Woods and the source of the river Mississippi that may be near
est to the said northwest point, as well as for the purpose of run
ning and marking the said boundary line between the same,
three commissioners upon the demand of either Government shall
be appointed and authorized, upon their oaths, to act; and their
compensation and expenses shall be ascertained and paid and
vacancies supplied in the manner provided in respect to the com
missioners mentioned in the preceding articles ; and the decisions
and proceedings of the said commissioners or of a majority of
them made and had pursuant to this convention shall be final
and conclusive."
In a communication dated January 31, 1804, Mr. Madison
wrote to Mr. Livingston: "The northern boundary (of Loui
siana) we have reason to believe was settled between France
and Great Britain by commissioners appointed under the treaty
of Utrecht, who separated the British and French territories west
of the Lake of the Woods by the forty-ninth degree of latitude. In
support of our just claims in all these cases, it is proper that
no time should be lost in collecting the best proofs which can
be obtained. This important object has already been recom
mended generally to your attention. It is particularly desirable
that you should procure an authenticated copy of the commer
cial charter granted by Louis XIV. to Crozat in 1712, which gives
an outline to Louisiana favorable to our claims, at the same time
that it is an evidence of the highest and most unexceptionable
authority. A copy of this charter is annexed to the English
translation of Joutel's journal of La Salle's last voyage, the
French original not containing it. A record of the charter doubt
less exists in the archives of the French Government ; and it may
?Treaties of the United States.

380 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
be expected that an attested copy will not be refused to you. It
is not improbable that the charter or other documents relating
to the Mississippi project a few years after, may afford some light
and be attainable from the same source. The proceedings of the
commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht will merit particular
research, as they promise not only a favorable northern bound
ary, but as they will decide an important event involved in a con
vention of limits now depending between the United States and
Great Britain. To these may be added whatever other documents
may occur to your recollection or research, including maps, &c.
If the secret treaty of Parisin 1762-3 between France and Spain,
and an entire copy of that of St. lidefonso in 1800 can be obtained,
they may also be useful. An authentication of the precise date
at least of the former is very important."*
The acquisition of Louisiana by the United States so altered
the rights of the latter, that the senate, on February 9, 1804, deter
mined to ratify the convention of May 12, 1803, with article V,
above set forth, wholly excluded, which was accordingly done.f
This action was partly due to the contents of the following let
ter from Mr. King, dated New York, December 9, 1803 : "The
draft of the convention with Great Britain respecting boundaries,
having been settled in previous conferences, was drawn up and
sent by me to Lord Hawkesbury on the nth of April; on the
12th of May the convention was* signed without the alteration
of a word of the original draft; and on the 15th of May the
letter of Messrs. Livingston and Monroe (a copy of which was
annexed to my No. 100), announcing the treaty of cession with
France, was received and communicated by me to Lord Hawkes
bury. At. the date of the signature of the convention with Great
Britain, I had no knowledge of the treaty with France; and
have reason to be satisfied that Lord Hawkesbury was equally
uninformed pf it. It results that the convention with Great Brit
ain was concluded without any reference whatever to the treaty
of cession with France." The report of the senate committee on
the subject was as follows: "That from the information they
have obtained, they are satisfied that the said treaty was drawn
up by Mr. King three weeks before the signature of the treaty
with the French Republic of the 30th of April and signed by
Lord Hawkesbury without alteration of a word ; and that it had,
in the intention of our minister, no reference whatever to the.
said treaty with the French Republic, inasmuch as he had no

?American State Papers.
t Senate Documents.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 381
knowledge of its existence. But not having the means of ascer
taining the precise northern limits of Louisiana as ceded to the
United States, the committee can give no opinion whether the
line to be drawn' by virtue of the third (fifth) article of said
treaty with Great Britain would interfere with the said northern
limits of Louisiana or not."
The rights of the United States thus became so improved by
the acquisition of Louisiana, that the stipulations concerning the
northern boundary in the treaty of May 12, 1803, could not
in fairness be agreed to by the government. The reasons were
given in detail in the paper delivered to Lord Harrowby by the
American minister on September 5, 1804, wherein it was stated
that "after the treaty of 1783, and at the time' the convention
in contemplation was entered into, the territory which Great
Britain held westward of the Lake of the Woods, was bounded
south by the forty-ninth degree of north latitude ; that which lay
between the Lake of the Woods and the Mississippi southward
of that parallel belonged to the United States; and that which
lay to the west of the Alississippi to Spain. It being, however,
understood by more recent discoveries or observations that the
source of the Alississippi did not extend so high north as had
been supposed, and Great Britain having shown a desire to have
the boundary of the United States modified in such manner as
to strike that river, an article to that effect was inserted in the
late convention; but in so doing it was not the intention of the
American minister or of the British minister to do more than sim
ply to define the American boundary. It was not contemplated
by either of them that America should convey to Great Britain
any right to the territory lying westward of that line, since not
a foot of it belonged to her ; it was intended to leave it to Great
Britain to settle the point as to such territory, or such portion
of it as she might want, with Spain, or rather with France, to
whom it then belonged. At this period, however, certain meas
ures respecting the Mississippi and movements in that quarter
(interdiction of the deposits at New Orleans) took place which
seemed to menace the great interests of America that were
dependent on that river. These excited a sensibility, acute and
universal, of which in equal degree her history furnishes but
few examples. They led to a discussion which terminated in a
treaty with France, by which that Power ceded to the United
States the whole of Louisiana as she had received it from Spain.
This treaty took place on the 30th of April, 1803, twelve days
only before the convention between Great Britain and the United
States was signed, and some days before the adoption of such

382 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
treaty was known to the plenipotentiaries who negotiated and
signed the convention. Under such circumstances, it is impos
sible that any right which the United States derived under that
treaty could be conveyed by this convention to Great Britain, or
that the ministers who formed the convention could have con
templated such an effect by it. Thus the stipulation which is
contained in the fifth article of the convention has become by
the cession made by the treaty perfectly nugatory ; for as Great
Britain holds no territory southward of the forty-ninth degree of
north latitude and the United States the whole of it, the line pro
posed by that .article would run through a country which now
belongs exclusively to the latter."
The cession of Louisiana to the United States had no sooner
become known in America than it was seen that a boundary
wholly different from the one that had been contemplated and
one much, more favorable to the United States would have to
be established. At this point the first serious mistake by the
United States was made. The treaty of 1783, confirmed by that
of 1794, carried the northern boundary up to the northwestern
most point of the Lake of the Wobds, from which a due west
erly line was to be drawn to the Mississippi. This had been the
undoubted intention of the parties, and should have been the line
insisted on in the extension westward by reason of the acqui
sition of Louisiana as far at least as the Rocky mountains. But
the United States could not rightfully claim through Louisiana
an extension beyond the Rocky mountains, because the Louisiana
held by France prior to 1763 and from 1800 to 1803, and the
Louisiana held by Spain from 1762 to 1800, were at no time
claimed to extend beyond that chain of mountains, or farther
than the sources of the branches of the Mississippi. Thus the
United States, whether it acquired the one Louisiana or the other,
"had no claim by reason of the acquisition of Louisiana to any
territory beyond the Rockies. But the attitude of England in
regard to the boundary question seemed to change wholly by the
improved interests of the United States, as will be shown in sub
sequent pages.
All important matters having been duly considered in Lon
don by the ministers of the two countries, it was mutually decided
to postpone further negotiations until after the return of Mr.
Monroe from the court of Spain. But after such return, ques
tions of much greater weight, as, for instance, the course of
Great Britain in impressing men from American vessels,
engrossed the attention of the ministry, and the question of the
northwestern boundary, while occasionally brought forward, was

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 383
permitted to languish. Although a treaty of amity, commerce
and navigation between the two countries was concluded on
December 31, 1806, nothing therein was agreed upon by the
commissioners concerning the northern boundaries. However, it
was mutually agreed at the time to take up that important con
troversy in a separate convention at no distant day. This was
done in 1807. Much opposition to the American plans was at
once encountered "from the prejudices, supposed interests and
mistaken views of many persons, an explanation of some of
which will be found in an idle paper written by Lord Selkirk."*
The American commissioners proposed the following line: "It is
agreed that a line drawn due north or south (as the case may
require) from the most northwesterly point of the Lake of the
Woods, until it shall intersect the forty-ninth parallel of north
latitude, and from the point of such intersection, due west along
and with the said parallel, shall be the dividing line between
His Majesty's territories and those of the United States to the
westward of the said lake; and that the said line to and along
and with the said parallel shall form the southern boundary of
His Majesty's said territories and the northern boundary of the
said territories of the United States: provided, that nothing in
the present article shall be construed to extend to the north
west coast of America or to the territories belonging to or
claimed by either party on the continent of America to the west
ward of the Stony mountains." The British commissioners were
willing to run the line as follows : "It is agreed that a line drawn
due north or south (as the case may require) from the most
northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods until it shall inter
sect the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, and from the point
of such intersection due west along and with the said parallel,
shall be the dividing line between His Majesty's territories and
those of the United States to the westward of the said lake as
far as their said respective territories extend in that quarter ; and
that the said line shall to that extent form the southern bound
ary of His Majesty's said territories and the northern boundary
of the said territories of the United States : provided, that noth
ing in the present article shall be construed to extend to the north
west coast of America or to the territories belonging to or claimed
by either party on the continent of America to the westward of
the Stony mountains."
The above two articles, as explanatory provisions, accompa
nied the project of the proposed supplementary treaty of April,

?American State Papers.

384 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
1807. The article finally agreed upon by both parties was as
follows : "It is agreed that a line drawn due west from the Lake
of the Woods along the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude
shall be the line of demarcation (division line) between His Maj
esty's territories and those of the United States to the westward
of the said lake, as far as the territories of the United States
extend in that quarter ; and that the said line shall, to that extent,
form the southern boundary of His Majesty's said territories and
the northern boundary of the said territories of tbe United States ;
provided, that nothing in the present article shall be construed
to extend to the northwest coast of America or to the territo
ries belonging to or claimed by either party on the continent of
America to the westward of the Stony mountains." The Ameri
cans objected to the words, "as far as the territories of the United
States extend in that quarter." They wrote to Mr. Madison
that "It appeared to us that by these words a great portion of
the subject was in danger of being set at large; that the pro
vision would perhaps do no more than establish between the par
ties the commencement of the line, and might of course leave
it open to Great Britain to found a claim hereafter to any part
of the tract of country to the westward of that commencement,
upon the notions of occupancy or conquest, which you will find
stated by Lord Selkirk in the paper above mentioned, or upon
some future purchase from Spain, as intimated by others. We
therefore proposed to omit the words in question altogether, which
the concluding proviso appeared to render wholly unnecessary,
even upon the ideas of the British commissioners. This was not
agreed to; but it was said there would be no objection to give
to this part of the description a character of reciprocity, so as
to make it read, "as far as their said respective territories extend
in that quarter." Why the language "as far as their said respect
ive territories extend in that quarter," since the British commis
sioners themselves proposed it, was not used in the project,
instead of in an explanatory article, is hard to comprehend.
However, whether that expression or "as far as the territories
of the United States extend in that quarter" was used, the Ameri
can commissioners knew that the concluding proviso limited both
countries, so far as the treaty was concerned, to the line east
ward of the Stony mountains. That and the accompanying
articles explained the intention of the parties. But this treaty
was not concluded.
In November, 1806, when commenting on the claims of the
United States to the northern boundary west of the Mississippi,

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 385
Mr. Gallatin said:* "The boundary fixed by the treaty of
Utrecht might be and probably was intended for Canada rather
than for Louisiana ; and Crozat 's charter expressly limits the last
province to the forty-fifth degree of latitude." He therefore
advised the president against a "commitment respecting the
northern boundary of either Louisiana or the United States." It
follows that had the United States relied upon the Crozat char
ter when settling the northern boundary west of the Alississippi,
the line would undoubtedly have been fixed on the forty-fifth
parallel. To offset this serious objection, the American com
missioners argued that long after the grant to Crozat, Louisiana
had been extended in all directions. However, the strongest argu
ment for the United States in support of their contention for the
forty-ninth parallel westward of the Mississippi to the Rocky
mountains, was the boundary fixed by the treaty of Utrecht and
the line established up the water courses to the Lake of the Woods
in 1782-83.
It was mainly due to the influence of the Hudson's Bay Com
pany that the British government fought so long over the bound
ary between Canada and the United States.f It was granted
extensive and valuable privileges of trade and commerce on Hud
son bay and the tributary rivers, and at first the country was
called "Rupert's Land." Their privileges to the westward were
very much enlarged when they undertook to send an expedition
to explore the northwestern coast of America with the hope of
finding a passage to the South Sea. They were made as secure
in the possession of the country as if they had been granted
territory in "the manor of East Greenwich in Kent." The only
payment required for the grant by the king was the annual assess
ment of "two elks and two black beavers." The company became
very strong and rich. They finally merged with the Northwest
ern Fur Company, which had been formed when it was learned
of the wealth awaiting such an enterprise. After the Revolution,
they expanded all over the northwest, and threatened the Span
ish settlements in California and the American settlements on
the Oregon, or Columbia river. Possessing the 'exclusive right
to trade with the Indians of the northwest they became intensely
interested in the settlement of the boundary that should sepa
rate their fields of profit from the territory of the United States.
They brought great pressure to bear upon the mother country,
with the result that the English commissioners to settle the bound-

? Writings of Albert Gallatin.
t History of Canada: Kingsford.
11-25

386 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ary were extremely tenacious of every foot of territory, even
though their claims were far weaker than those of the United
States. After the failure in 1807 to settle the boundary dispute,
no further action was taken by either government, owing to the
general war in Europe and to the war between Great Britain and
the United States, until 1814.
In the draft of the original protocol looking to the termination
of the War of 1812, the American commissioners requested that
there should be a revision of the boundary line between the ter
ritories of the United States and those of Great Britain adjoin
ing them in North America, to which the British commissioners
agreed.* This was in August, 1814. The latter also requested
that the line from Lake Superior to the Mississippi should be
revised. When asked if they did not mean from the Lake of
the Woods to the Mississippi, they replied that they meant from
Lake Superior to that river. To this the American commission
ers properly replied that "under the alleged purpose of opening
a direct communication between two of the British provinces in
America, the British Government require a cession of territory
forming a part of one of the States of the American Union, and
they propose without purpose specifically alleged to draw the
boundary line westward not from the Lake of the Woods as it
now is, but from Lake Superior. It must be perfectly immate
rial to the United States whether the object of the British Gov
ernment in demanding the dismemberment of the United States,
is to acquire territory as such or for purposes less liable in the eyes
of the world to be ascribed to the desire of aggrandizement
Whatever the motive may be and with whatever consistency views
of conquest may be disclaimed, while demanding for herself or
for the Indians a cession of territory more extensive than the
whole island of Great Britain, the duty marked out for the under
signed (the American commissioners) is the same. They have
no authority to cede any part of the territory of the United States,
and to no stipulation to that effect will they subscribe. The
conditions proposed by Great Britain . . . are above all
dishonorable to the United States, in demanding from them to
abandon territory and a portion of their citizens ; to admit a for
eign interference in their domestic concerns, and to cease to exer
cise their natural rights on their own shores and in their own
waters. A treaty concluded on such terms would be but an
armistice. . . . It is with deep regret that the undersigned
have seen that other views are entertained by the British Gov-

? American State Papers.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 387
eminent, and that new and unexpected pretensions are raised,
which if persisted in must oppose an insuperable obstacle to a
pacification. It is not necessary to refer such demands to the
American Government for its instruction. They will only be a
fit subject of deliberation when it becomes necessary to decide
upon the expediency of an absolute surrender of national inde
pendence." This stinging rebuke, so amply merited by the
unblushing effrontery of the British commissioners, was another
intimation, in addition to the declaration of war in 1812, that
the time had come for all European governments to cease regard
ing the United States as unwilling'or unable to defend their rights
as to territory and sovereignty. The only inexplicable feature in
the diplomatic negotiations of that time is the yielding attitude
of the American commissioners as regards the northern and
northwestern boundaries.
Finally on the 10th of November, 1814, the American com
missioners submitted, in a "projet of a treaty of peace," the fol
lowing proposition to the British commissioners :* "Article VIII.
It is agreed that a line drawn due north or south (as the case
may be) from the most northwestern point of the Lake of the
Woods, until it shall intersect the forty-ninth parallel of north
latitude, and from the point of such intersection due west along
and with the said parallel, shall be the dividing line between
His Alajesty's territories and those of the United States to the
westward of the said lake, as far as the said respective territo
ries extend in that quarter, and that the said line shall to that
extent form the southern boundary of His Majesty's said ter
ritories and the northern boundary of the said territories of the
United States : provided, that nothing in the present article shall
be construed to extend to the northwest coast of America, or
to the territories belonging to, or claimed by, either party on
the continent of America to the westward of the Stony mount
ains." The British plenipotentiaries submitted the following
counter "projet:" "It is agreed that a line drawn due west from
the Lake of the Woods, along forty-ninth parallel of north lati
tude, shall be the line of demarcation between His Britannic Maj
esty's territories and those of the United States to the westward
of the said lake, so far as the territories of the United States
extend in that quarter, and the said line shall to that extent form
the southern boundary of His Britannic Majesty's territories and
the northern boundary of the territories of the United States.
It being always distinctly understood that nothing in the pres-

? American State Papers.

388 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ent article shall be construed to extend to the northwest coast
of America, or to territories belonging to, or claimed by, either
party on the continent of America westward of the Stony mount
ains (and it is further agreed the subjects of "His Britannic
Majesty shall at all times have access, from His Britannic Maj
esty's territories, by land or inland navigation into the aforesaid
territories of the United States to the river Mississippi, with their
goods, effects and merchandise, and that His Britannic Majesty's
subjects shall have and enjoy the free navigation of the said
river)." Of course, the latter proposition was so audacious, not
to say insolent, and so different from what had just been talked
of, that the intentions of the British envoys were revealed, either
to carry their point, or to suspend negotiations wholly on the
boundary question. Such suspension was finally agreed to by
the commissioners of both governments. Thus the two countries
were very far apart in their respective demands. The concilia
tory and yielding attitude of the American commissioners was
turned to the advantage of the adroit Englishmen, who amplified
their demands in accordance with the submissive policy of the
Americans. The indefiniteness of the boundary between the
possessions of Great Britain and the United States, enabled the
former during the War of 1812 to gain important footholds on
American territory along the border, which advantages she
claimed as conquests after the war. But the United States insisted
on the restoration of the statu quo, which demand was finally
acceded to by Great Britain. Although the proposed article con
cerning the boundary west of the Lake of the Woods was omitted
from the treaty of December 24, 18 14, the following article was
agreed to and incorporated in that instrument:*
"Article VII. It is further agreed that the said two last men
tioned commissioners, after they shall have executed the duties
assigned them by the preceding article, shall be and they are
hereby authorized upon their oaths impartially to fix and deter
mine according to the true intent of the said treaty of peace
of 1783 that part of the boundary between the dominions of the
two Powers which extends from the water communication
between Lake Huron and Lake Superior to the most northwest
ern point of the Lake of the Woods, to decide to which of the
two parties the several islands lying in the lakes, water commu
nications and rivers forming the said boundary do respectively
belong in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of
peace of 1783, and to cause such parts of the said boundary as

? Treaties of the United States.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 389
require it to be surveyed and marked. The said commissioners
shall by a report or declaration under their hands and seals desig
nate the boundary aforesaid, state their decision on the points
thus referred to them, and particularize the latitude and longitude
of the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods, and
of such other part of the said boundary as" they may deem proper ;
and both parties agree to consider such designation and decision
as final and conclusive."
Under the stipulations of the treaty of Ghent the boundary
between Great Britain and the United States from the Atlantic
ocean to the river Mississippi was divided into four parts, the
fourth division extending from Lake Superior to the most north
westerly point of the Lake of the Woods. The two commission
ers appointed for the survey of the fourth division met, explored
the line assigned to them, but could not agree. Air. Porter of
New York was the commissioner on the part of the United
States to determine the boundary from Lake Superior to the
northwesternmost point of the Lake of the Woods. The disa
greement of the commissioners was in keeping with the disa
greements between the two countries. The British were
extremely grasping and exacting, but it cannot be said, whatever
else may be asserted, that the United States demanded more
than fairness and justice required. The proposition they sub
mitted in 1814, was practically the same as they had submitted
in 1807. But Great Britain made new and unfounded demands.
They had the assurance to demand the military jurisdiction and
control of the Great Lakes, and an acknowledgment of their per
petual right to the navigation of the Alississippi. These being
concessons of great value belonging partly to the United States, the
latter felt fully justified in demanding compensation therefor;
when, therefore, they requested as a consideration, additional
rights to the fisheries at the mouth of the St. Lawrence river,
they encountered an emphatic refusal. Evidently England was
using her utmost endeavors to drain and bleed the country to
the utmost, regardless of right or justice. But there is no doubt
that the British commissioners were acting under orders to favor
as much as possible Hudson's Bay Company.
In all mentions of the Lake of the Woods in connection with
the northern boundary, the northwesternmost point of the same
is nearly always referred to ; but the forty-ninth parallel crosses
that lake nearly on the southwesternmost point. One mistake
made by the United States was in ever referring to the forty-
ninth parallel at all, or in failing to send a surveyor or astrono
mer to ascertain the exact latitude of the northwesternmost point

39°

THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

of the Lake of the Woods before referring to that parallel. Had
the United States displayed the same unfounded greed as Great
Britain, the line would have been established in accordance with
the partisan slogan of later times, "fifty-four forty of fight." Any
person, by looking at a large map of the United States, will per
ceive a small wedge extending up into the Lake of the Woods.
This should be regarded as a perpetual reminder of the wrong
done to this country by the want of foresight of the American
statesmen of that period. In an hour of weakness, desiring to
gain the good will of the British government, they had previously
incautiously mentioned the forty-ninth parallel as having been
established by the treaty of Utrecht (which establishment has
been emphatically disputed) and were, in consequence of this
statement, held to that line by the astute British ministry.
Upon a renewal of negotiations for the settlement of the bound
ary in 1818, the British government showed great earnestness
to have the question adjusted; so much so, in fact, as to kindle
the suspicions of the Americans that they had some ulterior
designs for their own aggrandizement. On July 28, 1818, Mr.
Adams wrote to Messrs. Gallatin and Rush as follows :* "From
the earnestness with which the British Government now return
to the object of fixing this boundary, there is reason to believe
that they have some other purpose connected with it which they
do not avow, but which in their estimation gives it an impor
tance not belonging to it considered in itself. An attempt was
at first made by them at the negotiation of Ghent (1814) to
draw the boundary line from Lake Superior to the Mississippi.
But, as they afterward not. only abandoned that pretension, but
gave up even the pretension to an article renewing their right
to the navigation of the Mississippi, it was to have been expected
that they would thenceforth have considered this western bound
ary of no importance to them. The new pretension, however,
of disputing our title to the settlement at the mouth of the
Columbia river, either indicates a design on their part to encroach,
by new establishments of their own, upon the forty-ninth par
allel of latitude, south of which they can have no valid claim
upon this continent; or it manifests a jealousy of the United
States — a desire to check the progress of our settlements, of which
it might have been supposed that experience would before this
day have relieved them. Their projects for the line, both in the
negotiation of Messrs. Alonroe and Pinckney in 1806 and at
Ghent in 1814, were to make the forty-ninth parallel of latitude,

?American State Papers.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 391
from the Lake of the Woods, west, as far as the territories of the
United States extend in that direction, with a caveat against its
extension to the South Sea or beyond the Stony mountains ; upon
which two observations are to be made : First, that it is uncer
tain whether any part of the Lake of the Woods is in latitude
forty-nine; and, Second, that they always affected to apply the
indefinite limit of extension 'as far as the territories extend' to
the territories of the United States and not to those of Great Brit
ain, leaving a nest-egg for future pretensions on their part south
of latitude forty-nine. The counter-projects for the line on our
part, therefore, at both of those negotiations, were, from the
northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods, the point already
fixed and undisputed, a line due north or south, as the case may
be, to the forty-ninth parallel of latitude, and thence along that
parallel due west as far as the territories of both parties extend
in that direction, and adopting the caveat against extension to
the Pacific or beyond the Stony mountains."
This statement was made to the American commissioners for
their information in the pending negotiations. The first con
ference leading to the convention of 181 8 was held on August
27. On September 17th, the Americans submitted the follow
ing proposition for the boundary line : "It is agreed that a line
drawn due north or south, as the case may require, from the
most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods, until it shall
intersect the forty-ninth parallel of latitude, and from the point
of such intersection due west along and with the said parallel,
shall be the line of demarcation between the territories of the
United States and those of His Britannic Majesty to the west
ward of the said lake; and that the said line shall form the
northern boundary of the said territories of the United States
and the southern boundary of His Britannic Majesty's said ter
ritories from the said lake to the Pacific ocean; it being dis
tinctly understood that with "respect to the territories situated on
the northwest coast of America or westward of the Stony mount
ains, the two high contracting parties intend hereby to define the
extent of their respective claims so far only as relates to the two
parties and without reference to the claims of any other nation.
. The navigation of the rivers that fall into the Pacific
ocean and which may be intersected by the line of demarcation
aforesaid, shall, from the sources of such branches as may be
thus intersected, to the ocean, remain free and open to the citi
zens of the United States and to the subjects of Great Britain.
But both parties reserve to themselves the power of regulating,
each within their respective territories, the right to the naviga-

392 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
tion of the rivers that fall either into the Gulf of Mexico or into
Hudson bay."*
The counter-project of the British commissioners agreed to
the forty-ninth parallel westward as far as the Stony mountains,
but beyond that barrier that the country between the forty-fifth
and the forty-ninth degrees "shall be free and open to the sub
jects and citizens of the two States respectively for the purposes
of trade and commerce." They further stipulated that neither
country should attempt to exercise sovereignty between those
parallels, nor waive any of its rights within the same. They also
requested the following privilege: "It is further agreed that
the subjects of His Britannic Majesty shall have and enjoy the
free navigation of the Mississippi from its source to the ocean,
and shall at all times have free access to such places as may be
selected for that purpose, in His Britannic Majesty^ territories,
to the river Mississippi, with their goods, wares and merchan
dise, the importation of which into the United States shall not
be entirely prohibited, on the payment of the same duties as
would be payable on the importation of the same article into
the Atlantic ports of the United States." The Americans replied
that they were "not authorized to agree to any condition that
would bring the British in contact with the Mississippi," and that
"the right to the navigation of that river could only be derived
from the treaty of 1783." They further disagreed with the prop
osition for a neutral zone from the forty-fifth to the forty-ninth
degrees of latitude westward of the Stony mountains. The first
break was made by the British in agreeing to the omission of
their article respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, which
was done on October 13th, 181 8. They also withdrew their
request for a neutral zone, but reiterated their proposal that the
westward extension of the line on the forty-ninth parallel should
end at the Stony mountains. They stipulated that the country
beyond that point should be and remain free and open to the
citizens and subjects of the two powers, leaving the period of
such free commerce in that quarter undefined. The Americans
practically agreed to this proposition, except that it was proposed
that the period should be limited to ten years. This brought the
commissioners so near together that the following agreement was
finally reached and incorporated into the treaty of October 20,
i8i8:f "Article II. It is agreed that a line drawn from the most

?American State Papers.
t Treaties of the United States.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY.

393

northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods, along the forty-
ninth parallel of north latitude, or if the said point shall not be
in the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, then that a line
drawn from the said point due north or south as the case may
be, until the said line shall intersect the said parallel of north
latitude ; and from the point of such intersection, due west along
and with the said parallel, shall be the line of demarcation between
the territories of the United States and those of His Britannic
Majesty, and that the said line shall form the northern bound
ary of the said territories of the United States and the southern
boundary of the territories of His Britannic Alajesty from the
Lake of the Woods to the Stony mountains.
"Article III. It is agreed that any country that may be
claimed by either party on the northwest coast of America west
ward of the Stony mountains, shall, together with its harbors,
bays and creeks, and the navigation of all rivers within the same,
be free and open for the term of ten years from the date of the
signature of the present convention, to the vessels, citizens and
subjects of the two Powers ; it being well understood that this
agreement is not to be construed to the prejudice of any claim
which either of the two high contracting parties may have to
any part of the said country, nor shall it be taken to affect the
claims of any other Power or State to any part of the said coun
try ; the only object of the high contracting parties in that respect
being to prevent disputes and differences amongst themselves."
The provision of the treaty of 1818 that the country west of
the Stony or Rocky mountains should remain free and open
to the inhabitants of Great Britain and the United States for
the space of ten years, was a serious mistake of the American
commissioners, because that entire section was immediately over
run by the trappers of Hudson's Bay Company, who stripped the
streams of their immensely valuable supplies of beaver, otter and
other furs. Alillions of dollars' worth of these furs were taken
by the agents of that company from territory which unquestion
ably belonged to the United States. It was reported by an
American trader at St. Louis who conducted trapping operations
in the West, that in two seasons, in territory afterward falling
to the United States and on one stream only, beyond the Rocky
mountains, more than six hundred thousand dollars' worth of
valuable furs were taken by Hudson's Bay Company.* And all
of this was unwittingly surrendered to the government that had
unhesitatingly preyed upon the American colonies from the com-

? American State Papers.

394 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
mencement and had forced them into revolution to secure their
natural and political rights.
The most remarkable feature in connection with the negotia
tions with Great Britain over the northern and northwestern
boundaries is the unfairness of the propositions of her commis
sioners and the tenacity with which they clung to claims with
out any foundation in justice. England crushed the colonies until
they were forced to rebel ; her next step was to secure the admis
sion of English goods free of duty; she then brazenly demanded
and exercised the right of search and of impressment, until
thousands of American citizens were forced into her army or
navy or shut up in prison ; she next agreed to correct these abuses
without any intention of doing so, nor did she, until after the
United States had been goaded into war to maintain their rights
and their self respect.
But her next action was one of the crudest blows ever struck
the United States: During the War of 1812 the United States,
thrown upon their own resources, had established many facto
ries for the manufacture of cloth, iron, and many other prod
ucts; but the moment peace was secured a treaty of trade and
commerce between the two countries was effected, by which the
United States was immediately flooded with the immense quan
tities of goods (that had lain on English shelves while the war
lasted) at so low a price that every factory that had started
up in this country was crushed to death. The panic, the first
of any consequence in the United States, lasted from 181 5 until
1 82 1, and was so sweeping and complete in effect that those who
passed through that period never forgot it until they reached
the grave. As an instance may be cited the effects at Pittsburg,
where at the close of the War of 1 812 the manufactures amounted
to nearly three millions of dollars, mostly composed of iron prod
ucts of all kinds, from seventy-five to one hundred establish-
lishments. All these, with scarcely an exception, were com
pletely crushed, and idle factories were to be seen on every
hand. It was largely through the instrumentality of a Pittsburg
man, Mr. Baldwin, that the country was enabled to recover speed
ily from the results of this distressing period. Every act of Eng
land up to this time had thus been directed to her advantage at the
unrighteous and galling expense of the United States. She pur
sued the same course to the end in regard to "the northern and
northwestern boundaries, and succeeded in wresting from the
United States millions of dollars worth of property. Had Spain
stood in the shoes of England during the progress of that con-

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 395
troversy, the commissioners of the United States would not have
been so considerate, not to say humble and subservient.
The attitude of the United States toward Spain over the Floridas
and the southwestern Louisiana boundary questions, was alto
gether different from that toward England over the northern and
the northwestern boundary questions. Why ? Was it not because
nothing was to be feared from Spain, while something like the
stab of a knife was to be feared from Great Britain ? But please
observe herein to what a ruinous extent the unmitigated audacity
of the British government enabled her to almost everlastingly
outwit and bleed the United States. The policy of Great Britain
over the northwestern boundary question was from the start to
delay the establishment of a definite line in order to strip the
disputed territory of its valuable furs. But none of the Ameri
can commissioners ever seemed to comprehend this manifest Brit
ish design; no more than did the American statesmen who per
mitted the influx of English goods at the close of the war of 1812
upon the payment of so little duty as to amount to nothing. The
political system, or perhaps the commercial system, adopted by
the United States for the first thirty-five years of its existence,
retarded the proper and natural progress of the country nearly a
quarter of a century-. It was carried to such an extent that many
citizens thought the United States could not get along without
the products of the English factories. This idea was nurtured
and fostered by English agents, sent to this country to persuade
the congress and the people of the brotherly and sanctified inten
tions of the British ministry. But observe how the boundary
question was dallied and procrastinated, and how easily the Amer
ican commissioners were influenced by the views of Great Britain.
The northern boundary of the United States beyond the Rocky
mountains, has nothing to do with the Louisiana purchase except
from association. The treaty of 1818 settled the boundary west
ward to the Rocky mountains, which was as far as the purchase
extended. But an outline of the negotiations subsequently con
ducted to settle the line from the Rockies to the Pacific, owing to
its association and its importance to the United States, will be
briefly stated hereafter. Negotiations to fix that line were
resumed in 1823. Again the United States entered the negotia
tions with vastly improved rights. The treaty of 1819 with
Spain had given them all the claims of that country on the
Pacific coast north of the forty-second parallel of latitude. In
this respect, at least, England had been outwitted by the United
States, which first by acquiring Louisiana and then by securing
the rights of Spain on the coast above the forty-second degree, had

396 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
vastly amplified their rightful claims. The negotiations, there
fore, were resumed with great confidence by the commissioners of
the United. States.
In the protocol of the eleventh conference of the American and
British plenipotentiaries, April i, 1824, it is stated that the Ameri
can representative Mr. Rush* "opened the subject of territorial
claims on the northwest coast of America westward of the Rocky
mountains. It having been understood that the pretensions which
had been put forward by the cabinet of St. Petersburg, respecting
its jurisdiction in that quarter, was to be matter of separate dis
cussion between the respective parties, he observed that, notwith
standing this circumstance, and although the convention of Octo
ber, 1818, one article of which contained a temporary regulation
with respect to the above mentioned claims, had still four years
to continue, his Government was of opinion that the present was
not an unsuitable moment for attempting a settlement of the
boundary on the northwest coast of America westward of the
Rocky mountains, and he therefore proceeded to explain the
nature of the claims which his Government thought itself entitled
to advance." On the following day, Mr. Rush resumed his
remarks,' and closed with the presentation of the following prop
osition :*
"Whereas, by the third article of the convention between the
United States and his Britannic Majesty, signed at London on the
20th of October, 181 8, it was agreed that any country that might
be claimed by either party on the northwest coast of America,
"westward of the Stony mountains, should, together with its har
bors, bays and creeks, and the navigation of all rivers within the
same, be free and open for the term of ten years from the date of
the said convention, to the vessels, citizens and subjects of the two
Powers ; it having been understood that such agreement was not
to be construed to the prejudice of any claim which either of the
parties might have to any part of the said country, or taken to
affect the claims of any other Power, but only to prevent dis
putes and differences between the parties themselves ; and whereas,
It is desirable that the provisions of the said article should be con
tinued for a longer term than as therein specified : It is therefore
agreed by the high contracting parties that the same shall con
tinue in force for the full term of ten years from the signature of
the present convention. The high contracting parties further
agree that during the like term no settlement shall be made on the
northwest coast of America, or on any of the islands thereunto

?American State Papers.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 397
adjoining by citizens of the United States north of the fifty-first
degree of north latitude, or by British subjects either south of the
said fifty-first degree or north of the fifty-fifth degree of north
latitude." This proposition was made in consequence of the
requests of the British commissioners at previous conferences, and
not because delay was desired by the United States. The Amer
icans hesitated over bringing matters to a crisis, and yielded to the
request for delay.
Their extremely liberal proposition was not answered by the
British representatives until the conference of June 29th, when
it was unjustifiably declined, "because it would substantially
have the effect of limiting the claims of their Government to a
degree inconsistent as they thought with the credit and just
interests of the nation." The importance of a settlement was
acknowledged, "whereupon the British plenipotentiaries stated in
general terms that they were ready either to agree on a boundary-
line to be drawn due west from the Rocky mountains along the
forty-ninth parallel of latitude to the northeasternmost branch of
the Columbia or Oregon river and thence down the middle of
that river to the ocean, or to leave the third article of the conven
tion of 1818 to its natural course. The American plenipotentiary
declared his utter inability to accede to this boundary ; but, finding
that the line offered in his former proposal was considered wholly
inadmissible by the British plenipotentiaries, said that in the hope
of adjusting the question he would so far vary his former line
to the south as to consent that it should be the forty-ninth instead
of the fifty-first degree of north latitude." Air. Rush further
stated that inasmuch as the United States claimed the whole
country watered by the Columbia river, and inasmuch as Spain
possessed all the remaining country on the American continent to
the south, "he was instructed to insist on the principle that no
part of the American continent was henceforth to be open to
colonization from Europe." In answer to this statement which
has since became famous as the "Monroe Doctrine," the British
representatives "asserted in utter denial of the above principle that
they considered the unoccupied parts of America just as much
open as heretofore to colonization by Great Britain as well as by
other European Powers, and that the United States would have
no right whatever to take umbrage at the establishment of new
colonies from Europe in any such part of the American continent."
They added "that they felt themselves more particularly called
upon to express their distinct denial of the principle and claims
thus set forth by the American plenipotentiary, as his claim
respecting the territory watered by the river Columbia and its

398 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
tributary streams, besides being essentially objectionable in its
general bearing, had the effect of interfering directly with the
actual rights of Great Britain, derived from use, occupancy and
settlement." The skill with which the British commissioners con
cealed their real, designs deserves to be particularly noted. They
desired to gain a foothold below the forty-ninth degree and to
have that foothold recognized by the United States. Failing in
that they desired the strip of country from the forty-second to
the forty-ninth degrees to remain free and open to their agents.
And these demands were made in the face of an utter absence of
valid claims on their part to any substantial part of the Pacific
coast. At the twenty-third conference on July 13th, the British repre
sentatives presented a counter proposition to the effect "that the
third article of the convention of 1818 should cease; that the
boundary line between the territories claimed by his Britannic
majesty and those claimed by the United States, to the west in
both cases of the Rocky mountains, shall be drawn due west along
the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude to the point where that
parallel strikes the great northeasternmost branch of the Oregon
or Columbia river, marked in the maps as McGillivray's river,
thence down along the middle of the Oregon or Columbia to its
junction with the Pacific ocean ;" that the channel should be for
ever free to the inhabitants of both countries ; and that no settle
ments should be formed by the Americans north of that line nor
by Britons south of that line. Of course, the Americans refused
to accept this proposition. During the discussions, the claims of
each party were rigidly scrutinized. Incidentally the question
arose as to whether the acquisition of Louisiana by the United
States conferred any rightful claim to territory to the westward of
the Rocky mountains.
The argument of the British commissioners against the right of
the United States to claim an extension of the province of Louisi
ana westward to the Pacific, was laid before the American com
missioners in 1826 in the following language: "1. The United
States cannot claim under their treaty with Spain any greater right
than Spain then had ; and as the Nootka convention has no refer
ence to the discoveries of either party and is unlimited in its dura
tion, they cannot resort to any Spanish discovery in support of
their presumed title to any part of the country. 2. As at the time
of concluding the Nootka convention Louisiana belonged to
Spain and she made no exception to the provisions of that con
vention on account of any presumed boundaries of that province
having been established by former treaties with Great Britain or

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 399
of right extending to the Pacific, the United States cannot claim
any territory on that ocean as owners of Louisiana, either as a
natural extension of its boundaries westwardly, or as implied
from the designation of the boundary line (the forty-ninth parallel
of latitude) settled between Louisiana and Canada on the one
part and the British possessions of Hudson's bay on the other part
by the commissioners appointed in pursuance of the treaty of
Utrecht. 3. This convention (the Nootka) must be considered
generally as having become an international law, at least for the
Pacific; superseded the claims ascribed to mere prior discovery;
set aside the exclusive pretensions of Spain to the northwest part
of the American continent and opened it to the commerce and
settlements of all countries whatever, including the United States.
4. Actual occupancy and regard to mutual convenience are there
fore the only bases of any arrangement for the establishment of a
boundary for the partition between the onfy Powers having settle
ments or laying claims thereto of a country which was heretofore
held in common."
The claims of the Americans were set forth by Mr. Gallatin to
the following effect: "1. The United States claimed a natural
extension of their territory to the Pacific ocean, on the ground of
contiguity and population, which gave them a better right to the
adjacent unoccupied land than could be set up by any other
nation. This was strengthened by the doctrine admitted to its
fullest extent by Great Britain, as appeared by all her charters,
extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean, to colonies estab
lished then only on the borders of the Atlantic. How much more
natural and stronger the claim, when made by a nation whose
population extended to the central parts of the continent, and
whose dominions were by all acknowledged to extend to the Stony
mountains. If the principle assumed by Great Britain from 1580
to 1732, as related to Atlantic colonies, was correct, she could not
deny its application to the United States now owners of Louisiana.
The boundary line agreed on by the commissioners appointed in
pursuance of the treaty of Utrecht (the forty-ninth parallel of
latitude), though falling short of what might be claimed by the
United States on other grounds, was offered by them and must
at all events be binding on Great Britain. That line was indefi
nite ; it had already been confirmed to the Stony mountains ; there
was no reason why it should not be continued as far as the claims
of both parties extended. In point of fact the occupancy on which
Great Britain principally relied, was solely owing to that west
wardly extension of their trading settlements of Hudson's bay

400 THE PROVINCE AND THE ST A TES.
and its waters. 2. In right of their own discoveries, viz: the
mouth of Columbia river by Captain Gray, and the complete
exploration of the river from its most westerly sources to its
mouth, before any of its branches had been explored by the
British. The United States has a right to claim against Great
Britain and every other nation the whole territory drained by that
river and its various branches, together with a certain portion of
~the coast north and south of the mouth of the river. In this also
we were supported by the established usages amongst nations, and
as adopted by Great Britain in various instances (and amongst
others in her charter to the Hudson's Bay Company, which charter
extends to all the territory watered by the rivers emptying into
the bay). 3. By virtue of their treaty with Spain, the United
States claimed all which Spain might have lawfully claimed north
of forty-two degrees of latitude, either as derived from Spanish
discoveries or by virtue of rights of sovereignty acknowledged,
by other nations and by Great Britain particularly."*
In commenting on the attitude of Great Britain, Mr. Gallatin
wrote that "It must always be kept in mind that Great Britain
insists that the whole country west of the Stony mountains is a
vacant territory, to which no nation has any exclusive right, which
is open to all -and to which a title may be acquired and can only
be acquired by actual occupancy and settlement." The English
commissioners, therefore, desired that the country should remain
common or neutral ground for the term of fifteen years longer,
without any weakening of the rights of either nation. This
request was undoubtedly made at the instance of the Hudson's Bay
Company, who desired an unrestricted and unlimited intercourse
with the western Indians as far south as possible. This claim was
not admitted by the Americans, the strength of whose pretensions
lay' in their own discoveries and those of Spain, which they had
acquired. They insisted on an extension of the boundary along
the forty-ninth parallel to the Pacific ocean.
The United States claimed exclusive sovereignty over the coun
try from the forty-second to the forty-ninth degree of north lati
tude. The British commissioners sought to gain a foothold here
by securing from the United States the practical relinquishment
of its exclusive claims in permitting the country to remain "free
and open" for the term of fifteen years to the citizens or subjects
of both nations. But although the Americans finally agreed to a
ten year clause, they luckily did not yield their claim to the

?Writings of Albert Gallatin.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 401
exclusive sovereignty of that tract of countr)-. The one object
in here presenting these counter claims, is to show whether the
United States, under the Louisiana purchase, had any rightful-
claims beyond the Rocky mountains. The British commissioners
said, "The right derived from the cession of Louisiana to the
United States, is founded on the assumption that that province, its
boundaries never having been exactly defined longitudinally, may
fairly be asserted to extend westward across the Rocky mountains
to the shore of the Pacific. ... If the title of Spain by
first discovery, or the title of France as the original possessor of
Louisiana, be valid, then must one or the other of those Kingdoms
have been the lawful possessor of that territory at the moment
when the United States claim to have discovered it. If on the
other hand the Americans were the first discoverers, there is
necessarily an end of the Spanish claim; and if priority of dis
covery constitutes the title that of France falls equally to the
ground. . . . The third ground of claim of the United
States rests on the right supposed to be derived from the cession
to them of Louisiana by France. In arguing this branch of the
question it will not be necessary to examine in detail the very
dubious point of the assumed extent of that province, since by
the treaty between France and Spain of 1763 the whole of that
territory, defined or undefined, real or ideal, was ceded by France
to Spain and consequently belonged to Spain not only in 1790
when the convention of Nootka was signed between Great Britain
and Spain, but also subsequently in 1793, the period of Gray's dis
covery of the mouth of the Columbia. If then Louisiana embraced
the country West of the Rocky mountains to the south of the
forty-ninth parallel of latitude, it must have embraced the Colum
bia itself, which that parallel intersects ; and consequently Gray's
discovery must have been made in a country avowedly already
appropriated to Spain, and if so appropriated necessarily included
with all other Spanish possessions and claims in that quarter in
the stipulations of the Nootka convention. Even if it could be
shown, therefore, that the district west of the Rocky mountains
was within the boundaries of Louisiana, that circumstance would
in no way assist the claims of the United States. To expose the
futility of the attempt to include that district within those bound
aries, it is only necessary to refer to the original grant of Louisi
ana made to De Crozat by Louis XIV shortly after its discovery
by La Salle. That province is therein expressly described as 'the
country drained by the waters emptying directly or indirectly into
the Mississippi.' Now unless it can be shown that any of the
II—26

402 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
tributaries of the Mississippi cross the Rocky mountains from
west to east, it is difficult to conceive how any part of Louisiana
can be found to the west of that ridge."*
This argument was combatted by Mr. Gallatin, who among
other things said',f "Crozat's grant was not for the whole of the
province of Louisiana, as it was afterwards extended by France
herself and as it is now held by the United States. It. was bounded
in that grant of 1712 by Carolina to the east, by New Mexico to
the west, and on the north by the Illinois, which were then part of
Canada. The most northerly branches of the Mississippi embraced
in the grant were the Ohio, at that time called Wabash by the
French, and the Missouri, the true course of which was not known
at that time, and the sources of which were not supposed to extend
north of the forty-second parallel of latitude. No territory on the
west of the Mississippi was intended to be included in the grant
north of that parallel; and as New Mexico which bounded it on
the west was understood to extend even farther north, it was
impossible that any territory should have been included west of the
sources of the rivers emptying into the Mississippi. All the ter
ritory north of the forty-second parallel of latitude claimed by
France was included at that time not in Louisiana, but in the
Government of New France, as Canada was then called; and by
referring to the most authentic French maps, it will be seen that
New France was made to extend over the territory drained or
supposed to be drained by rivers emptying into the South Seas.
The claim to a westwardly extension to those seas was thus early
asserted as a part not of Louisiana but of New France. The
King has reserved to himself in Crozat's grant the right of enlarg
ing the Government of Louisiana. This was done by an ordon-
nance dated in the year 171 7, which annexed the Illinois to it, and
from that time the province extended as far as the most northern
limit of the French possessions in North America and thereby
west of Canada or New France. The settlement of that northern
limit still further strengthens the claim of the United States to the
territory west of the Rocky mountains. The limits between the
northerly possessions of Great Britain in North America and those
of France in the same quarter, namely, Canada and Louisiana,
were determined by commissioners appointed in pursuance of the
treaty of Utrecht. From the coast of Labrador to a certan point
north of Lake Superior, those limits were fixed according to cer
tain metes and bounds, and from that point the line of demarca-
? American State Papers. . ...j
t Writings of Albert Gallatin. v." .;

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 403
tion was agreed to extend indefinitely due west along the forty-
ninth parallel of north latitude. It was in conformity with that
arrangement that the United States did claim that parallel as the
northern boundary of Louisiana. It has been accordingly thus
settled as far as the Stony mountains by the convention of 18 18
between the United States and Great Britain; and no adequate
reason can be given why the same boundary should not be con
tinued as far as the claims of the two countries extend — that is to
say as far as the Pacific ocean. This argument is not weakened by
the fact that the British settlements west of the Stony mountains
are solely due to the extension of those previously formed on the
waters emptying into Hudson bay. And it is from respect to a
demarcation considered as binding on the parties, that the United
States had consented to confine their claim to the forty-ninth par
allel of latitude, namely, to a territory of the same breadth as
Louisiana east of the Stony mountains, although as founded on
prior discoveries that claim would have extended much farther
north." In a letter dated June 19, 1826, Air. Clay said to Mr. Gallatin,*
"It is not conceivable that Great Britain has or can make out even
a colorable title to any portion of the northwest coast. If she had
any claim prior to the treaty of 1763, it was renounced by that
treaty, according to which the Mississippi was fixed as the western
limit of her territories on this continent. If she acquired any title
subsequent to that epoch we have yet to learn how and by what
means it was obtained. The settlement at Nootka Sound in 1788
cannot be admitted to have conferred any ; but if it did that settle
ment was north of the line to which we are now willing to agree.
By the renunciation and transfer contained in the treaty with
Spain of 1819, our right extended to the sixtieth degree of north
latitude. By our treaty with Russia of April, 1824, it has been
agreed to limit it to the fifty-fourth degree. . . . As by the
convention of 1818 the forty-ninth parallel has been agreed to be
the line of boundary between the territories of the United States
and Great Britain east of the Stony mountains, there would seem
to arise from that stipulation a strong consideration for the exten
sion of the line along the same parallel west of them to the Pacific
ocean. In bringing themselves to consent to this boundary the
Government of the United States feel that they are animated by a
spirit of concession and compromise which they persuade them
selves that of Great Britain cannot but recognize and ought not to
hesitate in reciprocating. You are then authorized to propose the
?American State Papers.

404 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
annulment of the third article of the convention of 1818, and the
extension of the line on the parallel of forty-nine from the eastern
side of the Stony mountains where it now terminates, to the Pacific
ocean as the permanent boundary between the territories of the
two Powers in that quarter. This is our ultimatum and you may
so announce it. We can consent to no other line more favorable
to Great Britain." Mr. Clay at this time was secretary of state,
and Mr. Gallatin was minister to Great Britain. The negotiations
at this time resulted in the adoption of the following articles,
which were incorporated in the treaty of August 6, 1827 :*
"Article I. All the provisions of the third article of the con
vention concluded between the United States of America and His
Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland on the 20th of
October, 1818, shall be and they are hereby further indefinitely
extended and continued in force in the same manner as if all the
provisions of the said article were herein specifically recited.
"Article II. It shall be competent, however, to either of the
contracting parties, in case either should think fit, at any time
after the 20th of October, 1828, on giving due notice of twelve
months to the other contracting party, to annul and abrogate this
convention and it shall in such case be accordingly entirely
annulled and abrogated after the expiration of the said term of
notice. "Article III. Nothing contained in this convention, or in the
third article of the convention of the 20th of October, 1818, hereby
continued in force, shall be construed to impair or in any manner
affect the claims which either of the contracting parties may have
to any part of the country westward of the Stony or Rocky moun
tains." Thus these articles postponed indefinitely the settlement of the
line beyond the Rocky mountains. In 1842 it was mutually
determined to again take up the question in the hope that a settle
ment could be attained, but definite results were delayed by the
action of Hundson's Bay Company, who were reaping immense
fortunes from such delay. Finally, the two countries in 1846
agreed practically that the boundary line should extend westward
of the Rocky mountains along the parallel of forty-nine degrees,
except that all of Vancouver's island should belong to Great
Britain. But the treaty establishing this line was not ratified,
owing to disputes over the small islands between the main land
and Vancouver's island; and the controversy was renewed and
continued for the space of twenty years, with intermissions for the

?Treaties of the United States.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. 405
apparent purpose of getting fresh breath for a still further pro
longation of the agony. It was not until 1872 that the emperor
of Germany rendered the final decision in the celebrated case,
and extended the line through the Canal de Haro, as the United
States from the start had demanded as their right. The president
of the United States, in his next message, exultingly declared that
for the first time in its history the country was free from bound
ary disputes. Inasmuch as he soon afterward issued a proclama
tion for national thanksgiving and prayer, it may safely be con
cluded that he thought the people had something to be thankful
for in the amicable settlement of this ancient controversy.

406 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

CHAPTER X

The Meaning of the Eighth Article
THE interpretation of the 8th article of the treaty of 1803
between France and the United States became a serious
question in 1817, when Baron Hyde de Neuville, envoy
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of France, dispatched
a note of inquiry and protest to Mr. Adams, secretary of state,
claiming the infraction of treaty stipulations on the part of the
United States. The statements of several .masters of French ves
sels had been received by him he declared "affirming that French
vessels are not treated, in the ports of Louisiana, upon the
footing of the most favored nations; upon investigation, it not
only appears that such is actually the case, but the undersigned
has even found that several protests have been lodged in vain
against this manifest infraction."* The French minister, in this
note of December 15, 1817, courteously asked for .a reparation of
the injury.
Mr. Adams in his reply to this note, under date of December 23,
181 7, stated that the vessels of France were treated in the ports
of Louisiana on the footing of the most favored nations ; that no
other foreign nation enjoyed gratuitous advantage there which
was not also enjoyed by the French; that in consideration that the
vessels of the United States should be admitted to English ports
upon payment of the same duty as English vessels, the latter were
permitted to enter the ports of Louisiana upon payment of the
same duty as American vessels ; and that this privilege was thus
paid for by the English. The secretary thus continued :
"The 8th article of, the Treaty of Cession stipulates that the
ships of France shall be treated upon the footing of the most

?American State Papers.

THE MEANING OF THE EIGHTH ARTICLE. 407
favored nations in the ports of the ceded territory ; but it does not
say, and cannot be understood to mean, that France shall enjoy
as a free gift that which is conceded to other nations for a full
equivalent. "It is obvious that if French vessels should be admitted into
the ports of Louisiana upon payment of the same duties as the
vessels of the United States, they would be treated, not upon the
footing of the most favored nation, according to the article in
question, but upon a footing more favored than any other nation,
since other nations, with the exception of England, pay higher
tonnage duties, and the exemption of English vessels is not a
free gift, but a purchase, at a fair and equal price."
The secretary continued by saying that a more extensive con
struction of the aritcle in question was inconsistent with the con
stitution of the United States, and that the articles of the treaty
were incompatible with a different construction, since one of them
purported to cede the territory to the United States "in full sov
ereignty," and another declared that its inhabitants "shall be
incorporated in the union of the United States, and be admitted
as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal con
stitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and
immunities of citizens of the United States."
The secretary concluded his note as follows : "The under
signed is happy to be authorized to add, that the government of
the United States is willing to extend to France, not only in the
ports of Louisiana, but in those of all the United States, eyery
advantage enjoyed by the vessels of Great Britain, upon the fair
and just equivalent of reciprocity; and that in the meantime the
vessels of France shall be treated in all the ports of the United
States, including Louisiana, on the footing of the most favored
nation, enjoying gratuitously every favor indulged gratuitously
to others, and every conditional favor upon the reciprocation of
the same to vessels of the United States in France."*
But this construction of the articles in question, and of the
treaty as a whole was not satisfactory to the French minister,
who proceeded to give it an entirely different direction. He
said : "I shall, in the first place, have the honor to observe, that
France asks not for a free gift; she claims the enjoyment of a
right, which it is not even necessary for her to acquire, since it
proceeds from herself, being a right which, when she consented
to dispose of Louisiana, she had power to reserve for the interest
of her trade, and the actual reservation of which is established,

?American State Papers.

408 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
not implicitly, but in the most precise and formal terms, by the
8th article of the Louisiana treaty. France, I repeat it, asks no
free gift, since the territory ceded is the equivalent already by her
for all the clauses, changes and conditions, executed, or which
remain to be fulfilled, by the United States ; and which, prin
cipally, consist in the 7th and 8th articles of the treaty and first
of the convention."
The arguments presented by the French minister in support of
his construction of the treaty stipulations were artfully drawn
and persistently urged. With ready skill he shifted his claims as
a study of the articles in question widened his horizon. Many
associated questions were brought into the discussion, and several
years elapsed before the controversy was concluded.
He argued that "if the 8th article of the Louisiana Treaty had
no other object but that of securing to France a conditional
advantage in the ports of Louisiana, the terms usually employed
in other treaties would" have been employed here also, instead of
so precise a stipulation of an unconditional and perpetual advan
tage in favor of France," that "in all the treaties between France
and the United States, the condition of reciprocity is positively
mentioned ;" that as one of the objects of the treaty was to remove
all sources of misunderstanding, why was reciprocity not stipu
lated ? ; that the positive refusal of the house of representatives in
1801 to ratify a convention with France founded on reciprocity
of advantage, could not be reconciled with the silence of the same
house in 1803 respecting this unconditional and unlimited favor
secured to France ; that the only natural inference was that in
1801 the question was on a convention or treaty of amity and
commerce, while in 1803 the question was one of sale or cession,
an altogether different question governed by different principles
and consequences; that the negotiators of the treaty of 1801 could
not have forgotten to mention that the citizens of the two nations
should be treated reciprocally each in the ports of the other upon
the footing of the most favored nations, since this principle of
reciprocity was in almost every instance the sine qua non of pre
ceding commercial conventions ; and that the negotiators of the
treaty of 1803 knew they were not commissioned to settle the
commercial • interests of the two nations, but were authorized
merely to make a contract of sale or cession, which was subject
to certain and invariable rules of construction and interpretation.
He insisted that the contention of the American secretary that,
if the French interpretation were to obtain, the cession to the
United States was that of an imperfect sovereignty, was answered
by his admission that such a sovereignty really would have been

THE MEANING OF THE EIGHTH ARTICLE. 409
so ceded whenever British vessels should enjoy in the ports of
Louisiana any gratuitous favor, since French vessels, under the
stipulations, must be granted the same favor, thus giving the lat
ter nation the right, by virtue of the treaty, of privileges which
the American minister now claimed would mean the grant to the
United States of an imperfect sovereignty; that if the United
States had the right to grant gratuitous favors to other nations,
such favors must also extend to France in the territory ceded;
that if such favor was denied to France under a plea of a cession
of imperfect sovereignty, no gratuitous favor could be granted
to any other nation; that when congress made Louisiana a state
in 1 81 2, before the expiration of the twelve years mentioned in
article 7, and while three of the twelve years were yet to run, it
was reasoned that such a fulfillment of the conditions of the ces
sion was not incompatible with the exercise of the full and
absolute rights of sovereignty ; that when France ceded Louisiana
and ceased to be the sovereign of the country it did not cease to
hold property therein, since it reserved such property from the
cession; that France claimed only the enjoyment of what is her
property, in no way an infringement of the sovereignty of the
United States.
He demanded that French vessels, under the 8th article, should
be treated without restriction upon the footing of the most fav
ored nations in the ceded ports, regardless of whether such treat
ment was in consequence of a gratuitous or a conditional con
cession; that French vessels are not so treated in the ports of
Louisiana, the vessels of Great Britain being at the present time
the most favored; that to demand an equivalent from France
because England was required to pay or grant one "would, in a
measure, be requiring her to purchase what is already her own
property, and obliging her to pay twice for the same thing;" and
that he (the French minister) hoped he should be able soon to
inform his court "that the President has been pleased to issue
such orders as will cure in future the execution of the 8th article
of the Louisiana Treaty, and the immediate reimbursement of
the duties which have been unjustifiably levied to this day."*
After this elaborate exchange of views, without reaching any
conclusive action, the question was permitted to languish for about
two years, with an occasional reference thereto, each nation main
taining the justness of its claims and pursuing its previous course.
The United States, on the 15th of May, 1820, passed a law levy
ing a heavier tonnage upon French ships than upon those of any
?American State Papers.

4IO THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
other nation. This course was adopted as a measure of retalia
tion against a similar course pursued by the government of France
toward American ships. So irregular and injurious had become
the action of each nation toward the other, that a temporary con
vention was called in 1822 to settle certain important matters of
trade, but these regulations were merely temporary — were limited
to the period of two years.
It should be noted in this connection that the heavy tonnage
duties levied by each nation against the other had the effect of
reducing to a nullity the maritime trade between the two coun
tries. In the meantime, the American government, which held
heavy claims against France for damages to individuals, steadily
pressed for a settlement ; but was adroitly avoided by the French
diplomats who desired a settlement of the Louisiana cession inter
pretation conjointly with the settlement of the claims of Ameri-'
can individuals. The American minister did not refuse to settle
the two conjointly, but did insist that the settlement of one had
nothing to do with that of the other, and that if the United States
were required to admit the French construction of the 8th article
before the individual claims were paid, it meant an indefinite post
ponement of '".e ends of justice. This state of affairs became so
annoying to the American government that Mr. Adams, in a let
ter to Mr. Gallatin August 24, 1820, said,
"It is sincerely hoped by the President, that this counteracting
and countervailing system will give way to the disposition for
an amicable arrangement, in a conciliatory spirit, and with a view
to the interests of both parties. The temper which has been mani
fested in France, not only on this occasion, but in relation to all
the just claims of citizens of the United States upon the French
government, could not possibly terminate without coming to a
crisis; and, at the same time that a positive rejection of the most
indisputable demands of our citizens for indemnity was returned
for answer to every note which you presented in their behalf,
upon the untenable pretense, that the government of the Bourbons
cannot be responsible for the outrages of its immediate predeces
sors, claims equally untenable were advanced and reiterated with
the most tenacious perseverance, of privileges, contrary to our
constitution, in the ports of the Louisiana founded on an inad
missible construction of an article in the treaty for the cession of
Louisiana. "If the construction contended for of that article by France were
even correct, how can the present government claim any advan
tage from a compact made with Napoleon, after an explicit decla
ration, that they hold themselves absolved from all obligations of

THE MEANING OF THE EIGHTH ARTICLE. 411
indemnities due to the United States and their citizens for his
acts? I mention this now, because Mr. Roth (Charge d'Affairs
of France at Washington) informs me that he has directed the
French consul at New Orleans to protest against the execution of
the act of the 15th of May, 1820, specially in the ports of Louisi
ana. . . . The pretense is, that by the 8th article of the
Louisiana Treaty, French vessels are to be forever treated in that
province on the footing of the most favored nation ; and, on the
strength of this, they claim to be admitted there paying no
higher duties than English vessels. Our answer is, that English
vessels pay there no higher or other duties than our own — not by
favor, but by bargain. England gives us an equivalent for this
privilege ; and a merchant might as well claim of another, on the
score of equal favor, that he should give a bag of cotton or a
hogshead of tobacco to him, because he had sold the same article
to a third, as France can claim as a gratuitous favor to her that
which has been granted for valuable consideration to Great
Britain. The claim to which we admit that France is entitled
under that article, is to the same privilege enjoyed by England,
upon allowing the same equivalent. That is completely and
exclusively our treatment of the most favored nation, and to
that we are not only willing, but desirous of admitting France.
But even to that she can have no pretense, while she refuses to
be responsible for the deeds of Napoleon. If she claims the ben
efit of his treaties, she must recognize the obligations of his
duties and discharge them."*
Under date of September 19, 1820, Mr. Gallatin communi
cated to Mr. Adams that in a conversation which he, had had
on the 12th inst. with Mr. Pasquier, the latter stated that the
French government "considered the discussion of the 8th article
of the treaty of April 30, 1803, as inseparable from that of the
discriminating duties, since France claimed under that article an
exemption in Louisiana from the new American tonnage duty,
and generally from all those to the payment of which any other
nation was not liable;" that he (Mr. Gallatin) had expressed
his conviction that the government of the United States would
certainly consider the construction of the article, for which France
contended, as altogether inadmissible ; and that the discussion of
the eighth article with Baron de Neuville would be useless, since
it was evident that he (Mr. Gallatin) could not, without special
instructions, accede to the construction assumed by France.
Baron de Neuville informed Mr. Gallatin that he considered

?American State Papers.

412 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
it susceptible of proof that the essential compensation made to
France for Louisiana was the condition stipulated in the eighth
article of the treaty — was, in -fact, the real price paid for Loui
siana, and that the sum of money paid was but an accessory;
that if the eighth article was inconsistent with the constitution
of the United States to such a degree as to render it out of the
question to comply with its provisions, the United States should
make some other concession or compensation acceptable to
France. In reply, Mr. Gallatin declared that "in every case, the vessels
of the nation which France now considered more favored than
her own, were put in all the ports of the United States, includ
ing those of Louisiana, on the same footing as American ves
sels, on the express and reciprocal condition that the American
vessels should, in the ports of that nation, be treated on the same
footing as indigenous vessels. He insisted that what France
claimed was, to enjoy the privilege without fulfilling the con
dition on which it was granted, that her vessels should be treated,
in Louisiana, on the same footing as American vessels, while
Amercan vessels coming from Louisiana should, in her ports,
continue to be subject to any discriminating duties she might
be pleased to impose. She asked, in fact, to be treated not as
favorably, but more favorably, than the nations she called most
favored. The stipulation to place a country on the footing of
the most favored nations necessarily meant, that, if a privilege
was granted to a third nation for an equivalent, that equivalent
must be given by the country which claimed the same privilege
by virtue of such "stipulation."
He further argued that the treaty to which Baron de Neuville
referred in his former argument was that of February 6, 1778,
by the second article of which "it is agreed that neither of the
contracting parties shall grant any particular favor to other
nations, in respect of commerce and navigation which shall not
become common to the other party who shall enjoy the same
favor gratuitously, if the concession was gratuitous, or on allow
ing the same compensation, if the concession was conditional;"
that the latter words were inserted for greater caution to define
what was meant by the stipulation — were mere surplusage,
could be omitted without affecting the meaning, and had conse
quently been omitted in subsequent treaties. In answer to Baron
de Neuville's objection that the article, under the American con
struction, would be of no value to France, Mr. Gallatin stated
that it would fulfill its avowed object, which was to enable France
to trade at all times in New Orleans on terms not more, but as

THE MEANING OF THE EIGHTH ARTICLE. 413
advantageous, as any other nation — that it was a privilege which
could be denied any other nation, but could not be denied France.*
Under date of October 19, 1820, and October 23, 1820, Mr.
Gallatin wrote to Air. Adams that in his opinion the French
government had insisted on settling the Louisiana treaty con
struction and the question of discriminating duties together, more
with the hope that the United States would make some other
important concession than to force an acceptance of their con
struction of article 8; and that, as the new tonnage duty of the
United States exceeded that of France, which it was designed
to countervail, there might be some foundation to the French
distinction between the old discriminating, and the new tonnage,
duty of the United States.
On February 23, 1821, Baron de Neuville reopened the ques
tion by requesting from Air. Adams a reply to his last note
regarding the construction of the 8th article. He stated that
should the United States agree to the French construction, the
controversy would end.; "but if, after- a thorough investigation,
the United States shall still adhere to a contrary opinion, you
will think with me, sir, that it is material to both parties to know
how far they disagree on this very important article of the
treaty." He concluded by declaring that all France wanted was
her rights under the provisions of the treaty, and that it appeared
to him "that the negotiators on either part had but one and the
same object, in inserting the 7th and 8th articles, which express
intention was to secure forever to French vessels in the ports
of the ceded territory, a real advantage over those of all other
nations." It will be observed from this extract that, while the
French minister presented even a broader claim than he had
previously done, in construing the article to mean that the ves
sels of France should have a real advantage over those of all
other nations, he had receded from his positive position, and was
willing to learn "how far" the two parties to the controversy dis
agreed. The tone of the French diplomats became more conciliatory.
Mr. Gallatin, in March, 182 1, informed the state department
that a Frenchman high in authority had suggested, as a means
of settling the controversy, a prolongation of the privileges
granted to the French government, for the period of twelve years,
as a substitute for the claim of perpetual advantage; and that
another gentleman, equally high and influential, referred to the
necessity, on the part of the United States, of granting some con-

? Writings of Albert Gallatin.

414 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
cession that would enable the French diplomats to descend becom
ingly without abandoning totally the ground they had taken.
The whole question was again discussed in all its bearings,
and all the previous arguments, together with many additional
ones, were introduced with great force by each side. Mr. Adams
dwelt with much stress on the point that the other countries
had granted reciprocity as an equivalent for the privilege of
trading in American ports on the same footing as American ves
sels, but that France had failed or refused to grant such equiva
lent, and as a consequence countervailing duties had been passed
by both governments. To this the French minister replied that
France had reserved as a vested right, from the cession, to be
treated in the ports of Louisiana upon the footing of the most
favored nations unconditionally and without further compensa
tion on her part. Mr. Adams declared that the 7th and 8th
articles could not have been the Spanish equivalent, because
the equivalents were framed in two separate conventions of the
same date, and that the articles showed on their face that they
formed no port of-the equivalent.* Baron de Neuville answered
that "no nation can acquire by treaty or commercial convention,
in the ports of Louisiana alone, the advantage which France
enjoys there by special title — by virtue of a bargain and sale."
Mr. Adams pointed out that should the French construction pre
vail, the United States would be forever debarred from con
tracting with any other country than France — would practically
abdicate to France the control of American sovereignty through
out all the states, and asked if the American negotiators could
possibly have had in view any such result.f The baron replied
that neither what the American negotiators intended, nor the
question of American constitutionality concerned France, but
what the articles actually meant on their face, was the question
at odds. Mr. Adams insisted that the articles could not by any
reasonable construction be made to mean what the French gov
ernment demanded, and that no "implication could be more vio
lent and unnatural than that, by a stipulation to treat the ships
of France on the footing of those of. the most favored nations
in the ports of Louisiana, the United States had disbarred them
selves forever from purchasing a commercial advantage from
any other nation, without granting it gratuitously to France."
But the French minister persisted in his contention that France
owed, and could owe, no reciprocity, because the privilege

? Life of J. Q. Adams.
t American State Papers.

THE MEANING OF THE EIGHTH ARTICLE. 415
reserved was one of the equivalents of the bargain, and that the
intention of the negotiators in these particulars could admit of
no doubt.
Many subsidiary points were brought into the controversy, but
cut no important figure. The discussion was again permitted to
languish until October, 1821, when Baron de Neuville insisted
either on a compliance with the French construction, or on a
compromise on lines already proposed, but no further action
seems to have been taken at that time. The American minister
realized that delay would likely accomplish what diplomacy failed
to effect.
In a conference with Mr. Gallatin at Paris in September, 1822,
Jh. de Villile, minister of finance, charged ad interim with the
portfolio of foreign affairs, expressed a wish to have all the
claims of the two nations mutually settled, at one convention
called for the purpose. Air.- Gallatin objected to connecting the
Louisiana construction question with the claims for individual
indemnity, and indicated that the two were wholly distinct, and
that the settlement of the latter should not be made dependent
upon the settlement of the former. Later he wrote to Mr. Adams
that the French intentionally blended the two questions with-
the evident design of defeating or postponing the payment of the
individual claims. He stated that the French apparently
intended to make their claims under their construction of the
Louisiana treaty offset the American claims for spoliations on
their trade. But the French insisted that all the claims must
be settled at one and the same time in a consular convention
called for that purpose. In the course of these interviews, Mr.
Gallatin went so far as to inform the Duke of Montmorency
that the attitude of the French government in insisting on con
necting the settlement of the two subjects "would be considered
in the United States as an attempt to avoid altogether the pay
ment of the indemnities due to our citizens."* Again, in Feb
ruary, 1823, in a letter to Viscount de Chateaubriand, he
reviewed the whole question, and stated that there could not be
the least expectation that the United States would alter their
view or acquiesce in the French construction, and declared that
the refusal of France to settle the American claims, unless the
construction question was settled at the same time, was incon
sistent with the demands of justice and meant that France
intended the indefinite postponement of the payment of Ameri
can claims. Thus, apparently, the deadlock was stronger than
?Writings of Albert Gallatin.

416 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
ever. Both governments dropped the subject, hoping that time
would give them the advantages contended for.
As time passed, the commercial affairs between the two coun
tries became more strained, complicated and embarrassing. The
acts of congress of May 15, 1820, and the ordinance of July 26,
1820, together with previous enactments, practically drove French
trading vessels from the American ports. The tariff law of the
United States which went into operation January 1, 1829, still
further increased the difficulties of commerce; but seems to have
been the straw which broke the camel's back, for two years later
the contentions which had lasted for more than a quarter of a
century were amicably settled.
In the convention between the two countries, which was con
cluded July 4, 1 83 1, and ratified February 2, 1832, the differences
dividing the two countries were concluded to the apparent satis
faction of both governments. By the following article of the
treaty adopted at this convention, the question of construction
of the 8th article of the Louisiana cession treaty of 1803 was
settled for all time :*
"Article VII. The wines of France, from and after the
exchange of the ratifications of the present convention, shall be
admitted to consumption in the States of the Union at duties
which shall not exceed the following rates, by the gallon (such
as it is used at present for wines in the United States), to-wit:
Six cents for red wines in casks ; ten cents for white wines in
casks ; and twenty-two cents for wines of all sorts in bottles.
The proportion existing between the duties on French wines thus
reduced, and the general rates of the tariff which went into oper
ation the first of January, 1829, shall be maintained, in case the
government of the United States should think proper to dimin
ish those general rates in a new tariff. In consideration of this
stipulation, which shall be binding on the United States for ten
years, the French government abandons the reclamations which
it had formed in relation to the 8th article of the treaty of ces
sion of Louisiana. It engages, moreover, to establish on the
long staple cottons of the United States, which, after the
exchange of the ratifications of the present convention, shall be
brought directly thence to France by the vessels of the United
States, or by French vessels, the same duties as on short staple
cottons." It should be stated that this convention provided for the settle
ment of the claims of American citizens against France and of

? Treaties of the United States.

THE MEANING OF THE EIGHTH ARTICLE. 417
those of French citizens against the United States. It was
agreed that France should pay to American citizens twenty-five
million francs, and the United States should pay to French citi
zens one million five hundred thousand francs. Thus, in the
end, the American individual claims and the construction of the
8th article of the Louisiana treaty were settled at the same time,
as France had insisted at the outset. Although the French dip
lomats were compelled to recede from their construction of the
8th article, and from their reclamations under that article, they
secured for ten years immense advantages in a reduction of
tariff duties. There can be no doubt that the construction put
upon the 8th article by France was not justified by the language
of that article. What her ministers expected to accomplish by
the contention, is a matter of pure speculation. What they
received was more than they merited under the treaty of 1803.
n— 27

418 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.

CHAPTER XI

Boundaries of the Territories and States

WHEN the province of Louisiana was purchased by the
United States in 1803, every boundary of the acquisi
tion was. undetermined, save the one on the Gulf of
Mexico and the one extending in the middle of the Mississippi
river from its source to the thirty-first degree of north latitude,
a few miles south of Natchez, Miss. Perhaps, also, it may
be correctly said tha t on the northwest the line was defi
nitely established -in that particular chain of the Rocky mount
ains which separated the waters of the Missouri river from those
which flowed westward into the Pacific ocean. But the latter
line was really undetermined, having never been definitely
located and surveyed, and perhaps never seen or explored. All
the other boundaries of the province had never been located nor
agreed upon. The one in the middle of the Mississippi river
north of the thirty-first • degree of north latitude was definitely
established at the peace of 1782-3 at the close of the Revolu
tionary war. As it afterward transpired that the source of the
Mississippi was much south of the Lake of the Woods, the
boundary of the Louisiana Purchase between those two points
was likewise undetermined.
After the treaty of 1782-3 which terminaten the Revolution,
the line in the middle of the Mississippi from the source of that
river to the thirty-first degree of north latitude, referred to in
that treaty, was disputed by Spain, who claimed farther to the
eastward than the Mississippi by reason of conquests made dur
ing that war, notably at Natchez, Walnut Hills (Vicksburg),
Chickasaw Bluffs (Memphis), opposite the post at the mouth
of the Arkansas river, and at St. Joseph, Mich. But this

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 419
claim was emphatically rejected by the United States, and in
the end, before the transfer of Louisiana to this country, this line
was made the eastern boundary of the province from the source
of the Mississippi to the thirty-first degree of north latitude.
Thus, as narrated elsewhere, the boundaries of Louisiana on
the east, from the thirty-first degree to the Gulf ; on the west,
from the Gulf northwest to the British possessions; and
on the north, from the western boundary, wherever it should be,
to the northwest corner of the United States, were undetermined
and yet remained to be adjusted. The treaty of 1818 with Great
Britain settled the northern boundary, and the treaty of 1819
with Spain settled the two boundaries from the thirty-first degree
in the Mississippi to the Gulf on the east, and from the Sabine
to the forty-second degree of north latitude on the west. The
western boundary from the forty-second to the forty-ninth
degree, was never seriously disputed, or was wholly settled by
the treaties with Spain and Great Britain above mentioned. But
it must be observed, that the United States had a perfect title,
under the claims of France, to all the territory on the west of
the Mississippi drained by its tributaries, and that in permitting
Spain to have the country drained by the southern branches of
Red river, by the sources of the same river and by the sources
of the Arkansas river, it relinquished a just claim to a tract of
territory large enough to form a state. As is well known, this
relinquishment was compensated for to the satisfaction of the
United States by the extension of Louisiana to the Sabine and
by Spanish concessions in West Florida. The United States at
this time wanted both banks of the Mississippi at its mouth, and
was willing to sacrifice a portion of its claims farther to the
west. That the upper Red river and the upper Arkansas river
countries were surrendered to Spain for the purpose of gaining
advantages east of the Sabine and in West Florida, will not be
disputed after the diplomatic correspondence between Spain and
the United States from 1803 to 1821 is read. Such was the evi
dent intention of the two countries.
As soon as it was decided by congress to accept the cession of
Louisiana, steps were taken for the exploration, subdivision and
government of the province. By act approved March 26, 1804,
the purchase was separated into two divisions, as follows : "That
all that portion of country ceded by France to the United States
under the name of Louisiana, which lies south of the Missis
sippi Territory and of an east and west line to commence on the
Mississippi river at the thirty-third degree of north latitude and
to extend west to the western boundary of the said cession, shall

420 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
constitute a Territory of the United States under the name of
the Territory of Orleans. . . . The residue of the Prov
ince of Louisiana ceded to the United States shall be called the
District of Louisiana, etc." It was provided that this act should
take effect October i, 1804. A governor was at once appointed
for the Territory of Orleans, but the District of Louisiana was
placed under the executive authority of the governor of Indiana
Territory, who was empowered to subdivide the District into
subdistricts. Thus the Territory of Orleans embraced the pres
ent state of Louisiana and no more, unless it be contended that
at that time the province extended to the westward of the Sabine.
On the other hand, the District of Louisiana embraced all of
the present Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Nebraska, Indian Territory, and parts of Minnesota,
Kansas, Oklahoma Territory, Colorado, Wyoming and Montana.
In the United States senate, it was moved November 28, 1803,
"That a committee of  members be appointed to prepare a
form or forms of government for the Territory of Louisiana."
"The members of this committee were appointed December 5, and
were Messrs. Breckenridge (chairman), Wright, Jackson, Bald
win and Adams. In the original draft of the bill to divide the
-province into the Territory of Orleans and the District of Loui
siana, the following language was used concerning the latter:
¦"The residue of the Province of Louisiana ceded to the United
States, shall remain under the same name and form of govern
ment as heretofore, save only that the executive and judicial
powers exercised by the former government of the province shall
now be transferred to a Governor to be appointed by the Presi
dent of the United States." Upon the final passage of the bill
in the senate, the vote stood, ayes 20, nays 5, the latter being
Messrs. Olcott and Plumer of New Hampshire, Hillhouse of
Connecticut, Adams of Massachusetts, and Stone of North Caro
lina. In the house the vote stood, yeas 66, nays 21.
By the act of March 2, 1805, congress provided that when the
white inhabitants of the Territory of Orleans should aggregate
•60,000, it might be admitted into the Union as an independent
state; but it was "Provided, however, that Congress shall be at
liberty, at any time prior to the admission of the inhabitants of
the said Territory to the right of a separate State, to alter the
boundaries thereof as they may judge proper: except only, that
no alteration shall be made which shall procrastinate the period
for the admisrion of the inhabitants thereof to the rights of a
State Government according to the provision of this act." It
was at this time that great efforts were made to secure the admis-

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 42 1
sion of Louisiana (Orleans Territory) into the Union, but all
such attempts failed, owing mainly to the lack of the necessary
population and to the belief in the eastern part of the United
States that it was a matter of wisdom to keep the Territory
in a subordinate condition until the inhabitants had learned still
more of the duties and requirements of American citizenship.
The act of Alarch 3, 1805, provided "That all that part of the
country ceded by France to the United States under the gen
eral name of Louisiana, which by an act of the last session of
Congress was erected into a separate district to be called the Dis
trict of Louisiana, (Missouri), shall henceforth be known
and designated by the name and title of the Territory of Loui
siana ;" and it was provided that the act should be in force from
and after July 4, 1805. The principal argument employed by
the inhabitants of Louisiana for admission to statehood, was that
the language of the treaty required their admission "as soon as
possible," and not at the will of congress or the president.
Immediate admission was their right under the cession treaty.
In the house of representatives, in 1804, Mr. Moore intro
duced a resolution instructing the committee of commerce and
manufactures to inquire into the expediency of authorizing the
president to employ persons to explore such part of the Prov
ince of Louisiana as he may deem proper. He said : "The Gov
ernment were not in possession of a good geographical descrip
tion of Louisiana, which it was very desirable that they should
possess, inasmuch as its limits were not completely designated
in the articles of cession, and as the time might not perhaps be
distant when its boundaries may be a subject of negotiation
between the former owners of the province and the United
States." The resolution was agreed to. The immediate result
of this resolution was the Lewis and Clark expedition. It was
the beginning and the basis of the many subsequent explorations
and surveys of the territory of the Louisiana Purchase.
On the 3d of December, 1804, Mr. Nicholson presented in
the house a memorial from the inhabitants of the province of
Louisiana, signed by two thousand heads of families, making
several requests, among which was the following: "They there
fore pray an alteration of the law so far as to allow them to be
their own legislators, not dividing the Territory into two gov
ernments, and not prohibiting the importation of slaves."
Another of a similar import was presented in January, 1805.
The prayer of the memorialists was disregarded, because it was
argued that the sooner the people of Louisiana became familiar
with the laws and customs of the United States, the sooner their

422 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
admission to the Union would be permissible. It was desired
that all the people of the country should be homogeneous in pur
suits, habits and occupations, which could not be effected if the
people of any portion were permitted to have different laws and
institutions. The bill for the division of the province into two territories
limited the Territory of Orleans east of the Mississippi river to
the country claimed by the United States south of Mississippi
Territory, or, in other words, to such portion of West Florida
as should fall to the United States in subsequent negotiations
with Spain. The language of the bill did not commit the United
States to a positive declaration that its territory extended to the
eastward of the Mississippi; but simply left such a construction
open as a basis for its claims that the Louisiana ceded by France
did extend to the Perdido. The southern boundary of Alissis
sippi Territory had been established by act of congress of April 7,
1798, as follows: "That all that tract of country bounded on
the west by the Mississippi, on the north by a line to be drawn
due east from the mouth of the Yazoo to the Chattahoochie
river ; on the east by the river Chattahoochie ; and on the south
by the thirty-first degree of north latitude, shall be and hereby
is constituted one district to be called the Mississippi Territory."
Thus the Territory of Orleans was bounded on the north by
the thirty-third parallel west of the Mississippi (its present bound
ary) ; and by the thirty-first parallel east of the Mississippi, should
West Florida be ascertained to be a part of the cession by France.
In March, 1810, the house of representatives and the legisla
tive council of the Territory of Orleans presented a petition pray
ing for admission into the Union, although "our territory, though
vast, cannot admit of any large increase of population. Nearly
all the lands conveniently situated are occupied ; immense swamps
cover a great proportion of the remaining part of the country,
and such uninhabited lands as are cultivable are chiefly to be
found towards the limits of our territory." This bill was pre
pared and read in the senate for the first time on April 9, 1810.
It passed the senate April 27, 1810, by the following vote: yeas
15, nays 8. When the bill came up in the house, a motion to
postpone it indefinitely was lost, yeas 28, nays 78. In the house
bill the following language was employed in regard to the limits
of the proposed new state : "That said State shall be composed
of all that part of the territory or country ceded under the name
of Louisiana by the treaty made at Paris April 30, 1803, between
the United States and France, now contained within the limits
of the Territory of Orleans, except that part lying east of the

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 423
river Iberville and a line to be drawn along the middle of the
Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the ocean." With this
description, the bill passed the house by 77 yeas and 36 nays.
Mr. Tait, senator from Georgia, and chairman of the commit
tee to whom the bill was referred, reported the following bound
ary: "Beginning at the mouth of the river Sabine, thence by
a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river, including
all islands, to the thirty-second degree of latitude; thence due
north to the northernmost part of the thirty-third degree of
north latitude; thence along the said parallel of latitude to the
Mississippi river; thence down the said river to the southern
boundary of the Alississippi Territory; thence along the said
boundary line to Pearl river; thence down the western bank of
the said river to Lake Borgne; thence along the middle of said
lake to the Gulf of Mexico, thence bounded by the said Gulf to
the place of beginning; . . . Provided, however, That the
Government of the United States hereby retains the power of
altering, in any manner it may hereafter deem proper, the limits
of all that portion of the said described territory which lies east
of the river Mississippi and the island of New Orleans." Under
this bill a portion of West Florida was to be positively attached to
Louisiana. This action was proposed before the United States
had decided to occupy a portion of West Florida, and before the
inhabitants had set up a separate government. It likewise
proposed to extend Louisiana to the Sabine before that river had
been settled upon as the boundary between Louisiana and Texas.
Numerous amendments in regards to the boundaries of the pro
posed new state were offered to the bill. Finally, the follow
ing limits were approved February 20, 181 1 : "Beginning at the
mouth of the river Sabine, thence by a line to be drawn along
the middle of the said river, including all islands, to the thirty-
second degree of north latitude; thence due north to the north
ernmost part of the thirty-third degree of north latitude ; thence
along said parallel of latitude to the river Mississippi ; thence
down the said river to the river Iberville ; and from thence along
the middle of the said river and lakes Maurepas and Pontchar
train to the Gulf of Mexico; thence bounded by the said Gulf
to the place of beginning." It will be observed that congress
thus definitely fixed the middle of the Sabine and the thirty-sec
ond meridian for the western boundary of the State of Louisi
ana, regardless of the fact that the line of demarcation between
Texas and Louisiana had not been settled by the two govern
ments — Spain and the United States. But this course was taken
upon grounds that could not be overturned — that the Louisiana

424 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
purchase extended to the westward as far as that river and that
meridian. There was no danger in mentioning that limits for
the boundary of the new state. But it was different in regard
to West Florida. Congress was not so sure in respect to that
province. It was, therefore, thought wise to omit embracing
that territory in the State of Louisiana for the present. There
was considerable manipulation of the question of limits in both
branches of congress. At first the bill to admit Louisiana to
statehood was made to embrace positively a portion of the ter
ritory east of the Mississippi. This point was considered in the
senate in secret session and the bill was read for the first time
on January 7, 181 1. Many of the senators opposed the secrecy
of the deliberations, but were voted down. There was ample
justification for secrecy, because the United States was on the
point of declaring war against Great Britain, and the president
had already given orders for the occupation of West Florida,
which might mean war also with Spain. In fact the extension
of the limits of Louisiana over West Florida, it was realized,
would be abundant cause for a declaration of war from Spain.
This was no doubt the principal reason why the act to admit
Louisiana did not contain a clause extending the limits to Pearl
river at least or to the Perdido at most.
When the bill to admit Louisiana with West Florida or a
portion of it came up -in the senate, a motion to print it for the
use of the senators was lost, yeas 14, nays 16. Another motion
to print one copy for each senator, coupled with strict measures
of secrecy, was also voted down, yeas 7, nays 23. The act of
April 8, 1 81 2, admitted Louisiana to statehood and was to be
in force from and after April 30, 1812. All of the State of
Louisiana thus formed and the residue of the Territory of
Orleans, were constituted one district for judicial and other pur
poses. The latter clause was framed for the purpose of extend
ing the jurisdiction of the United States over the whole or a
portion of West Florida and over the territory claimed by the
government west of the Sabine, should future negotiation extend
the limits beyond that stream. Finally, by act approved April
14, 1812, congress ordered that, should the legislature of Loui
siana consent, the following tract of country be made a part of
Louisiana: "Beginning at the junction of the Iberville with
the river Mississippi; thence along the middle of the Iberville,
the river Amite and the Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to
the eastern mouth of the Pearl river ; thence up the eastern branch
of Pearl river to the thirty-first degree of north latitude; thence
along the said degree of latitude to the river Mississippi; thence

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 425
down the said river to the place of beginning." This was a
positive step by congress, before the right of the United States
to that territory had been adjusted with Spain; but was abun
dantly justified by the circumstances. In fact, the territory had
already, under the direction of the president, been occupied by
the United States, and this act was designed to sustain such
proceedings. The order of the president to occupy the western
portion of West Florida and this act of congress, were much
more the result of the determination of the government to pos
sess the territory than of the belief that it formed a part of the
cession of Louisiana. But the United States was fully justi
fied in its course by the remissness of Spain and the danger that
the territory, to which the government had strong claims, would
be occupied by Great Britain to the serious injury of this coun
try. By act of June 4, 1812, the title "Louisiana Territory"
was changed to "Missouri Territory," the same to take effect
from and after the first Monday of December, 1812.
Under date of August 4, 1812, the Louisiana assembly passed
the following resolution : "That, whereas, the Senate and House
of representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, by an act entitled, 'An act to enlarge the limits of
the State of Louisiana,' have provided, that in case the Legisla
ture of the State of Louisiana shall consent thereto, all that
tract of country comprehended within the following bounds,
to-wit : Beginning at the junction of the Iberville with the river
Mississippi ; thence along the middle of the Iberville, the river
Amit and of the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the mouth
of Pearl river ; thence up the eastern branch of Pearl river to
the thirty-first degree of north latitude; thence along the said
degree of latitude to the river Mississippi ; thence down the said
river to the place of beginning, shall become and form a part
of the said State of Louisiana, and be subject to the constitu
tion and laws thereof in the same manner and for all intents and
purposes, as if it had been included within the original bound
aries of said State. Be it therefore, resolved, and it is hereby
resolved, that the Senate and House of Representatives of the
State of Louisiana, in general assembly convened, do approve of
and consent to the enlargements of the limits of the said State
of Louisiana, in manner as provided by the above in part recited
act of Congress, hereby declaring that the same shall forever
be and remain a part of the State of Louisiana."
Under act of July 5, 1848, it was stated, "That this Congress
consents that the Legislature of the State of Texas may extend
her eastern boundary so as to include within her limits one-half

426 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
of Sabine Pass, one-half of Sabine Lake, also one-half- of Sabine
river, from its mouth as far north as the thirty-second degree
of north latitude." This act was rendered necessary by the fact
that under the treaty of 1819 between Spain and the United
States, the western boundary of Louisiana was fixed on the west
ern bank of the Sabine river and lake, and included all the islands
in both. As waterways then were all important, Texas, when
she was admitted, or soon afterward, requested that her eastern
boundaries might be extended so as to include the western half
of the river and the lake.
The assembly of Missouri Territory, by act of December 31,
1813, created Arkansas county with the following boundaries:
^'That all that part of the Territory (of Missouri) bounded
north by the south line bf the county of- New Madrid ; east by
the main channel of the Mississippi river; south by the thirty-
third degree of north latitude or northern boundary line of the
State of Louisiana; westwardly by the western boundary line
of the Osage purchase and by a line to commence upon the
river Arkansas where the boundary line of the Osage purchase
intersects the same ; thence in a direct line to the main source
of the Wachita; thence south to the northern boundary line of
the State of Louisiana or thirty-third degree of north latitude,
shall compose a county and be called and known by the name
of the County of Arkansas." A considerable portion of what
is now Arkansas was not embraced in this county. Its western
"boundary thus fixed was then the Indian line. But this was the.
foundation upon which was later built the State of Arkansas.
By act approved March 2, 1819, the following provision was
made by congress: "That from and after the fourth day of
July next, all that part of the Territory of Missouri which lies
south of a line beginning on the Mississippi river at thirty-six
¦degrees north latitude, running thence to the river St. Francois,
thence up the same to thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north
latitude; thence west to the western territorial boundary line,
shall for the purposes of a territorial government constitute a .
separate territory and be called the Arkansas Territory." There
does not appear to have been any contest over the formation of
this new territory. Missouri Territory, to which that tract of
country had belonged, made no protest. It meant eventually
for the South an additional slave state, and the consequent
increased representation in congress from that section of the
Union. The enemies of slavery, offered no opposition, because
they knew they would have an opportunity to fight that insti
tution when application should be made for the admission of

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 427
Arkansas into the Union. The western boundary was thus left
indefinite in the description of the territorial limits, and was
nearly on the line of the old Arkansas county, because the Indian
title to what is not western Arkansas had not yet been extin
guished. The Territory was intended to embrace all the coun
try east of the Indian lines.
By act approved May 26, 1824, the western boundary line of
Arkansas was fixed definitely as follows: "That the western
boundary line of the Territory of Arkansas shall begin at a
point forty miles west of the southwest corner of the State of
Missouri and run south to the right bank of Red river, and thence
down the river and with the Mexican boundary to the line of
the State of Louisiana, any law heretofore made to the contrary
notwithstanding." The sum of two thousand dollars was appro
priated to defray the expense of marking this line.
Immediately thereafter the legislature of that Territory divided
the strip into counties and the settlers imagined themselves
secure in their homes. In 1828, the government, in opposition
to the protests of the territorial government of Arkansas, ceded
this strip to the Cherokee Indians, and the western boundary of the
Territory was brought back and placed where it had been before
the act of 1825. After it was thus returned to the Indians, the
settlers were required to vacate their farms, which proceeding
visited great hardship upon them. In February, 1835, a bill
for their relief was introduced in congress. Mr. Vinton, of
Ohio, went into the history of the circumstances of the case and
remonstrated against rewarding, with a donation of one hun
dred and sixty acres (as had been proposed), men whose only
merit was having trespassed on the public land, and refused to
leave what they had seized until compelled by military force. The
settlers had located on lands belonging to the government before
the same had been thrown into market.
By special act approved May 19, 1828, the president was
authorized to conjoin with the officers of Louisiana and Arkansas
Territory in running the boundary line between them, beginning
in the Mississippi on the thirty-third degree of north latitude,
thence west to a point where a due north line on the forty-
second meridian, crossing the Sabine river, should intersect the
same. The boundary line between Arkansas and Missouri, which
had been surveyed pursuant to act of congress, was approved
by Arkansas December 23, 1846, and by Alissouri February 16,
1847, and was confirmed by the United States February 15, 1848.
In 1834, bills were presented to enable the Territories of Mich
igan and Arkansas to draft constitutions and form governments

428 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
with the view to their admission into the Union. It had become
recognized as the custom to admit two states at the same time —
one from the North and one from the South, the intention being
to keep the representation of the two parties in congress in the
same proportion. With this idea in view, when a motion was
made in the United States senate to table the resolution to admit
Arkansas, the bill to admit Alichigan was dropped by general
acquiescence. The following is from the senate proceedings of
May 12, 1834: "The Senate resumed, as in committee of the
whole, the bill to authorize the people of the Territory of Arkan
sas to form a constitution and State Government, and for the
admission of such State into the Union upon an equal footing
with the original States in all respects whatsoever ; and on motion
of Mr. Ewing (of Ohio) that it be laid on the table: yeas 22,.
nays 20." It was a close party vote, the Democracy voting for
the tabling of the resolution. The following is from the sen
ate proceedings "of March 22, 1836: "Mr. Buchanan, from the
select committee to whom was referred the memorial of the Ter
ritory of Arkansas, on the subject, reported a bill to provide
for the admission of Arkansas into the States of the Union,
which was read and ordered to a second reading." The bill was
again considered April 3, 1836. "On motion of Mr. White, of
Tennessee, the bill was so amended as to provide more effectu
ally against any difficulties as to the boundary with the west
ern Cherokees." After some debate, the bill was ordered
engrossed for a third reading.
On April 4th the bill came up for a third reading. The yeas
and nays were ordered, and the various features of the bill were
discussed. Among other things, Mr. Benton, of Missouri, said:,
"It is worthy of notice that on the presentation of these two
great questions (the admission of Michigan and Arkansas), those
gentlemen who had charge of them were so slightly affected
by the exertions that had been made to disturb and ulcerate the
public mind on the subject of slavery, as to put them in the
hands of Senators who might be supposed to entertain opinions
on that subject different from those held by the States whose
interests they were charged with. Thus, the people of Arkansas
had put their application into the hands of a gentleman rep
resenting a non-slaveholding State; and the people of Michigan
had put their application into the hands of a Senator (himself)
coming from a State where the institutions of slavery existed."
But his conclusion that the agitation of the slavery question had
died out was wholly wrong, as shown by subsequent events.
The reason that the subject of slavery was not discussed upon

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 429
the admission of Arkansas was because both parties considered
the question to have been settled by the Alissouri compromise
of 1820. Several of the senators opposed the admission of both
Michigan and Arkansas on the ground that their proceedings
in preparing constitutions, forming state governments, and
demanding admission into the Union, without the previous con
sent of congress, were irregular and revolutionary. On the final
passage of the bill the vote stood : yeas 31, nays 6, the latter being
Messrs. Clay, Knight, Porter, Prentiss, Robbins and Swift. The
boundaries of the new state were as follows : "Beginning in the
middle of the main channel of the Alississippi river, on the par
allel of thirty-six degrees of north latitude ; running from thence
west with the said parallel of latitude to the St. Francis river;
thence up the middle of the main channel of said river to the
parallel of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north; from thence
west to the southwest corner of the State of Missouri ; and from
thence to be bounded on the west to the north bank of Red river
bv the 'lines described in the first article of the treaty made between
theUnited States and the Cherokee nation of Indians, west of
the Mississippi, on the 26th day of May, 1828 ;' and to be bounded
on the south side by Red river and the Mexican boundary line,
to the northwest corner of the State of Louisiana; thence east
with the Louisiana State line to the middle of the main channel
of the Mississippi river ; thence up the middle of the main chan
nel of the said river to the thirty-sixth degree of north latitude,
the point of beginning."
Article I of the treaty of May 26, 1828, between the Cherokee
Indians and the United States, was as follows: "The western
boundary of Arkansas shall be, and the same is hereby denned,
viz : A line shall be run, commencing on Red river at the point
where the eastern Choctaw line strikes said river and run due
north with said line to the river Arkansas, thence in a direct line
to the southwest corner of Missouri." The Choctaw line referred
to above had been defined January 20, 1825, as follows : "Begin
ning on the Arkansas river one hundred spaces east of Fort Smith
and running thence due south to Red river; it being understood
that this line shall constitute and remain the permanent bound
ary between the United States and the Choctaws." In the con
stitution of the state and in subsequent statutes the boundaries
have been variously described, but do not vary as to territory.
The constitution of 1836 gave the western boundary as fol
lows: "thence to be bounded on the west to the north bank of
Red river, as by acts of Congress and treaties heretofore defin
ing the western limits of the Territory of Arkansas." The con-

430 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
stitution of 1864 specified the following boundaries: "Thence to
be bounded on the west to the north bank of Red river as by acts
of Congress and the treaties heretofore defining the western lim
its of the Territory of Arkansas." These descriptions meant
the boundary as it is at present. The constitutions of 1868 and
1874 did not vary the limits.
By resolution of February 11, 1824, the house of representatives
asked the secretary of war, John C. Calhoun, whether the western
boundary of Arkansas Territory had been surveyed as provided
in the act of March 3, 1823. Mr, Calhoun replied that "the line
referred to by the resolution of the House has not been run.
Shortly after the termination of the last session of Congress, Gen.
Thomas Hinds, of Mississippi and Mr. William Woodward, of
the Arkansas Territory, were appointed commissioners to hold a
treaty with the Choctaw Indians for the purpose of carrying into
effect the provisions of the act abovementioned : and communica
tions were addressed to them by this Department, notifying them
of their appointment and enclosing instructions for their govern
ment.. The communication for General Hinds (who was directed
to make the principal arrangement for the treaty), it appears
never reached him, owing to some failure of the mails, or other
cause, unknown to this Department ; that for Mr. Woodward was
received by him, of which, however, this Department has only
been apprised since the meeting of Congress. Owing to these
causes, the proposed treaty with the Choctaws was not held ; and
consequently the line which depended on the arrangement to be
made by the treaty could not be run."
On the 30th of December, 1834, Mr. Sevier, delegate from the
Territory of Arkansas, introduced in the house the following:
"Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested
(if not deemed incompatible with the public interests) to negoti
ate with Spain for her right and title to the country lying between
the Sabine and Red rivers in Arkansas Territory." In support
of this resolution, he said in part, "There is a considerable tract
of country lying north of the Sabine and south of Red river, upon
which many of our citizens have resided for years ; a country of
which we have had the undisturbed possession and over which
we still exercise jurisdiction, that will in all probability, be lost
to us forever, if the boundary line designated by the treaty of
1 819 between this Government and Spain should be permanently
established. I believe Spain to be the rightful owner of this
tract of country; and of that Government I presume we can
obtain it for a mere trifle. It is true, Mexico claims this country,-
but I ask what evidence has she of her title ? Has she purchased

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 431
it? Has she conquered it? . . . Mexico never revolution
ized the country north of the Sabine ; she never marched a soldier
into it ; nor has she ever given a dollar for it. Our citizens have
held the undisturbed possession of this country from 1806 down
to the present day. It is true we ceded it to Spain in 1819 for
which she gave us the Floridas. Has Spain ever parted with
her right acquired by that treaty?" He continued to the same
effect, showing that the Mexican revolutionists had neither con
quered, taken possession of, nor bought that tract of country from
Spain, and therefore it was still the property nf the latter and
should at once be bought by the United States But no action
seems to have been taken upon his suggestion.
Mr. Adams, on June 6, 1836, presented in the house of repre
sentatives twenty-two memorials and remonstrances to the admis
sion of Arkansas into the Union, from Massachusetts, Pennsyl
vania and Ohio, on the ground of the proposed establishment of
slavery in the new state. Mr. Vinton, of Ohio, moved the follow
ing amendment to an act supplementary to an act for the admis
sion of the State of Arkansas into the Union, etc. : "That the 8th
section of an ordinance passed by the convention of delegates at
Little Rock, assembled for the purpose of making a constitution
for the State of Arkansas, which is in the following words : 'All
that section of country lying west of the western boundary of the
State of Arkansas, which was formerly part of the Territory of
Arkansas, under the provisions of an act of Congress, approved
the 26th day of May, 1824, entitled, "An act to fix the western
boundary of the Territory of Arkansas," and which was ceded by
the United States to the Cherokee and Choctaw Indians, when
ever the Indian title shall be extinguished to the same, shall be
attached to, and form a part of, the State of Arkansas; and
when the said Indian title shall be extinguished, the western
boundary of the said state shall be in accordance with the pro
visions of the said act of Congress,' be, and the same is hereby,
rejected." The reason for this motion was stated to be the
impropriety, while just ceding in perpetuity the territory to the
Indians, of providing for its eventual absorption by the United
States. This motion was not adopted, but other equivalent .
changes were made which satisfied the objector.
The act of March 3, 1875, provided "that the boundary line
between the State of Arkansas and the Indian country, as orig
inally surveyed and marked, and upon which the lines of the sur
veys of the public lands in the State of Arkansas were closed, be,
and the same is hereby, declared to be the permanent boundary
line between the said State of Arkansas and the Indian country."

432 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Section 2 provided that the line should be retraced and re-marked,
"and if the original line, when retraced, shall be found to differ
in any respect from what the boundary line would be if run in
accordance with the provisions of the treaties establishing the east
ern boundary line of the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations, then
the surveyors shall note such variations and compute the area of
the land which in that case would be taken from the State of
Arkansas or the Indian country, as the case may be, and the Sec
retary of the Interior shall also cause any monuments set up in
any former survey indicating any line at variance with the survey-
provided for in this act to be obliterated."
In February, 1879, the commissioner of public lands reported
that the boundary between Arkansas and the Indian territory,
which had been declared by the act of March 3, 1875, to be the
permanent line "varied materially from the boundary described
in the treaty with the Choctaws of January 20, 1825, and with the
Cherokees of May 6, 1828." It had been found that the line run
by the old surveyors between Arkansas and the Indian country
from a point "one hundred paces east of Fort Smith" diverged
considerably to the west of a due south line, and as a consequence
had located the boundary too far to the westward, to the injury
of the Indians. The commissioner reported that there had thus
been two thousand five hundred and thirty-nine and fifty-four one
hundredths acres taken wrongfully from the Cherokees, and one
hundred and thirty-seven thousand five hundred and twelve one
hundredths acres wrongfully taken from the Choctaws, or a total
of one hundred and forty thousand and thirty-nine and sixty-six
one hundredths from the two nations. An examination of the
sales for this tract showed that only one hundred and thirty-four
thousand one hundred and forty-seven and eighty-nine one hun
dredths acres had been disposed of, leaving considerable of a dis
crepancy. It was recommended that the Indians should be paid
for the land thus wrongfully taken by the government.
On the 29th of December, 1834, Mr. Bynum, of North Carolina,
introduced in the house the following: "That the Executive be
requested to be caused to be laid before this House, as soon as
practicable, such information in relation to the relative positions
of the province of Texas, one of the United Province of the
Republic of Mexico, and the Government of the United States of
North America, as may be in possession of either of the depart
ments, not deemed incompatible with the interests of either of the
two Governments ; also what progress has been made in distin
guishing the boundary lines between this Government and the
Republic of Mexico which were to be run in conformity with the

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 433
stipulations made and entered into between the Government of
Spain and that of the United States, as ratified by the latter in
Congress on the 22d of February, 1819. Also, whether any sub
sequent relations have been entered into between the commis
sioners of this and the Government of Alexico, to carry into exe
cution the conditions of the above mentioned stipulations posterior
to the recognition of the latter Government as an independent
republic." The republic of Texas, by act of December 19, 1836, declared
its boundaries to be as follows: "Beginning at the mouth of the
Sabine river and running west along the Gulf of Mexico three
leagues from land to the mouth of the Rio Grande, thence up the
principal stream of said river to its source, thence due north to
the forty-second degree of north latitude, thence along the bound
ary line as defined in the treaty between the United States and
Spain to the beginning." It should be observed that by the treaty
of January 12, 1828, between the United States of America and
theUnited Alexican States the limits between the two countries
were also declared to be the same as those established in 1819
between Spain and the United States.
During the debate on the recognition of Texas in the senate in
May, 1836, Mr. Walker, of Alississippi, said, "Look at the maps
and observe the extraordinary corners and angles of our present
boundary — that boundary, by the treaty of 1819, by which Texas
was sacrificed ; by which the valley of Mississippi was dismem
bered; by which the great territories of the Mississippi, the
Arkansas for hundreds of miles, and the Red river for a thousand
miles were virtually surrendered to Spain ; by which the right to
navigate the Mississippi was in fact ceded to Spain and a foreign
Power placed on Red river within three days of New Orleans ; a
treaty by which the most valuable territory and the most important
harbors on the Gulf of Mexico were given up, an enemy placed
within/ a few hours sail of New Orleans, and the command of the
Gulf abandoned; a treaty by which five or six States (in the
prospective) were torn from the banner of the American Union."
There can be no doubt that many citizens of the United States
looked upon the relinquishment of the upper Red river and the
upper Arkansas river countries as an unwarranted loss to the
United States. Those rivers from their mouths to their sources
belonged to the Mississippi river basin, to which France had an
undisputed title before the surrender of Louisiana to Spain in
1762-3. The retrocession of 1800 did not change these bounds.
They passed to the United States in 1803. But an extension of
II—28

434 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the limits of the United States to the sources of the Red and
the Arkansas rivers would carry the western boundary to within
a few miles of Santa Fe, the capital of the Spanish province of
New Mexico. The Spanish ambassador protested against such
a proceeding, and his argument was used against him when he
demanded the extension of Texas to the eastward of the Sabine,
because it would place the eastern boundary of Texas, then a
province of Mexico, within a few miles of New Orleans. But it
was a time of mutual concessions and sacrifices. The United
States, in order to gain at the Sabine and in West Florida, sacri
ficed the upper Red river and the upper Arkansas river countries.
But Mr. Walker was right as regards the title of the United
States to that upper country. It belonged to the United States
from 1803 to 1 819.
On the 17th of May, 1836, Mr. Adams, of Massachusetts, intro
duced the following in the house: "Resolved, That the Presi
dent of the United States be requested to communicate to this
House, if not incompatible with the public interest, copies of any
overture made since the third of March, 1829, by his authority to
the Government of the United Mexican States for the acquisition
by the United States of any portion of the territory of Mexico ;
and copies of all correspondence between the two Governments
relating thereto, and upon any question of boundary existing
between the United States and Mexico."
A convention was concluded between the United States and the
government of Texas in April, 1838, one of the provisions of
which specified that the boundary between the two countries
should be marked and defined. Congress by act approved Jan
uary 11, 1839, provided for the appointment of surveyor, com
missioner and clerk, and appropriated the sum of ten thousand
dollars to defray the expenses on the part of the United States.
When Texas was annexed to the United States in 1845, there
was secured, in addition to its present territory, all of New Mex
ico east of the Rio Grande, the public land strip, the present south
western corner of Kansas, a large irregular strip extending
entirely across the middle of Colorado, and a tract nearly square
in the southern part of Wyoming. It was seen by congress that
the bounds of Texas as a whole were too large for one state,
whereupon congress required the cession to the United States of
all that part of Texas north of the parallel of thirty-six degrees
and thirty minutes of north latitude as a condition precedent
before the admission would be agreed to. The question of
slavery was also considered in this requirement. Texas was
conceded the right to form as many as four states out of her

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 435
remaining territory. It was afterward claimed that the agree
ment for the formation of these four states was made before that
portion of Texas north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes was
cut off, and that therefore, she was entitled to form but three
states out of her remaining territory. This seems to have been
the fact, although the two transactions were made about the same
time. The following act was passed by congress September 9, 1850 :
"That the following propositions shall be, and the same hereby
are, offered to the State of Texas, which, when agreed to by that
State, in an act passed by the general assembly, shall be binding
and obligatory upon the United States and upon the said State of
Texas: Provided, The said agreement by the said general
assembly shall be given on or before the first day of December,
1850 : First. The State of Texas will agree that her boundary on
the north shall commence at the point at which the meridian of
one hundred degrees west from Greenwich is intersected by the
parallel of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude ; thence
on the said parallel of thirty-second degree of north latitude to the
Rio Bravo del Norte, and thence with the channel of said river to
the Gulf of Mexico. Second. The State of Texas cedes to the
United States all her claim to territory exterior to the limits and
boundaries which she agrees to establish by the first article of this
agreement. . . . Third. The United States in considera
tion of said establishment of boundaries, cession of claim to terri
tory, and relinquishment of claims, will pay to the State of Texas
the sum of ten million dollars in a stock bearing five per cent
interest and redeemable at the end of fourteen years, the interest
payable half yearly at the Treasury of the United States."
The same act (of September 9, 1850) established the boundary
of the Territory of New Mexico, as follows: "Beginning at a
point on the Colorado river where the boundary line with the
Republic of Alexico crosses the same ; thence eastwardly with said
boundary line to the Rio Grande; thence following the main
channel of said river to the parallel of the thirty-second degree of
north latitude ; thence east with said degree to its intersection with
the one hundred and third degree of longitude west from Green
wich ; thence north with said degree of longitude to the parallel of
thirty-eight degrees of north latitude ; thence west with said parallel
to the summit of the Sierra Madre ; thence south with the crest of
said mountains to the thirty-seventh parallel of north latitude;*

? This strip between the thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth parallels of latitude
and the one.hundred and third meridian and the Sierra Madres became known
later as "The Notch."

436 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
thence, west with said parallel to its intersection with the boundary
line of the State of California ; thence with said boundary line to the
place of beginning." This act was suspended in its operation until
the boundary between the United States and Texas had been estab
lished. It required a proclamation of the president to be put in
force. The same act also gave the following boundary to the
Territory of Utah: "That all that part of the territory of the
United States included within the following limits, to-wit:
Bounded on the west by the State of California; on the north by
the Territory of Oregon; on the east by the summit of the
Rocky mountains, and on the south by the thirty-seventh parallel
of north latitude, be, and the same is hereby, created into a
temporary Government by the name of the Territory of Utah."
Trie Territory of Washington was formed March 2, 1853, with
the following boundaries : "That from and after the passage of
this act, all that portion of Oregon Territory lying and being south
of the forty-ninth degree of north latitude and north of the mid
dle of the main channel of the Columbia river, from its mouth
to where the forty-sixth degree of north latitude crosses said river
near Fort Wallawalla; thence with said forty-sixth degree of
latitude to the summit of the Rocky mountains, be organized into
and constituted a temporary Government by the name of the Ter
ritory of Washington." The government reserved the right to
manage the Indians and their lands. It was made to embrace the
northern part of the present State of Idaho.
By the act of June 5, 1858, congress made provision for the
survey of so much of the boundary line "between Texas and the
United States," as the expression was then current, as lay on or
west of the one hundredth meridian west from Greenwich. This
line extended north on that meridian from Red river to the
parallel of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude ; thence
west along that parallel/ in accordance with the special agreement
with Texas, to the one hundred and third meridian west. from
Greenwich; thence south on that meridian to the thirty-second
parallel of north latitude ; and thence west on that parallel to the
Rio Grande. On February 8, i860, the general assembly of
Texas created Greer county with the following boundaries :
"Beginning at the confluence of Red river and Prairie Dog river,
thence running up Red river passing the mouth of South Fork
and following Main or North Red river to its intersection with
the twenty-third degree of west longitude from Washington (the
same as one hundred degrees west from Greenwich) ; thence due
south across Salt Fork and to Prairie Dog river, and thence fol
lowing that .river to the place of beginning." In this manner

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 437
Texas claimed and took possession of a tract of country embracing
more than one million of acres, which was in dispute between
that state and the United States. It lies between the two upper
and main forks of Red river, with the town of Mangum near
the center. In 1882 Senator Maxey, of Texas, introduced a bill
in congress providing for the appointment of a commission to
consider the unsettled boundary question between his state and
the government. The bill passed the senate, but a similar bill
in the house was reported on adversely, and a joint commission
was provided for to locate the true boundary in accordance with
the treaty of 1819 between Spain and the United States. The
objection to the house bill was that it claimed the territory in dis
pute as belonging to Texas. It defined the following boundaries
between Texas and Indian Territory : "Beginning at the south
east corner of said Indian Territory in the middle of Red river;
thence up said river to the junction of the Prairie Dog Town and
North Forks of said river; thence up the middle of said North
Fork to the one hundredth meridian west from Greenwich
(twenty-third west from Washington) ; thence crossing said
North Fork by a line due north to the northeast corner of said
State of Texas as now established." The commissioners were
unable to settle the true boundary, and the question was determ
ined by suit brought in the supreme court of the United States for
that purpose. The court held that the intention of Spain and the
United States in the convention of 1819 in regard to the boundary
must control, and that Melish's map referred to in the treaty
must be considered a part of the agreement. But when the entire
instrument (the treaty) was considered as a whole, it was shown
to have been the evident intention to have commissioners and sur
veyors at a later date fix and mark the one hundredth meridian
west from Greenwich, and not to be guided and governed by the
one hundredth meridian as laid down on Melish's map, which
was located many miles to the eastward of the true one hundredth
meridian west from Greenwich. It was shown to have been the
intention that" the astronomical one hundredth meridian and not
the Melish one hundredth meridian should be the boundary line.
It was also shown that the North Fork relied on by Texas to meet
the conditions of the boundary description, was not the main nor
the larger fork; that the main branch was Prairie Dog Town
river; "that the act of Congress of February 24, 1879, creating
the northern judicial district of Texas, was to be construed as
plac^ Greer county in that district for judicial purposes only,
and not as ceding to Texas the territory embraced in that county ;"
and that "the territory east of the one hundredth meridian of

438 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
west longitude, west and south of the river now known as the
North Fork of Red river, and north of a line following westward,
as prescribed by the treaty of 1819 between the United States and
Spain, the course and along the south bank, both of Red river
and the river now known as Prairie Dog Town Fork, or Salt
Fork of Red river until such line meets the one hundredth meri
dian of west longitude — which territory is sometimes called
Greer county — constiutes no part of the territory properly included
within or rightfully belonging to Texas at the time of the admis
sion of that State into the Union, and is not within the limits nor
under the jurisdiction of that State, but is subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States of America." This settled the
long disputed question. In May, 1896, this tract of country was
made Greer county, of Oklahoma, with Mangum as the county
seat. The case was argued in the supreme court in October,
1895, and decided March 16, 1896.
The act of June 5, 1858, authorized the president to have sur
veyed and marked the boundary lines between the United States
and Texas, and the sum of eighty thousand dollars was appro
priated to defray the expense. The line to be surveyed was as
follows : "Beginning at the point where the one hundred degree
of longitude west from Greenwich crosses Red river, and running
thence north to the point where said one hundred degree of longi
tude intersects the parallel of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes
north latitude; and thence west with the said parallel of thirty-
six degrees thirty minutes north latitude to the point where it
intersects the one hundred and third degree of longitude west
from Greenwich; and thence south with the said one hundred
and third degree of longitude to the thirty-second parallel of north
latitude; and thence west with the said thirty-second degree of
north latitude to the Rio Grande." On June 2, 1856, President
Pierce issued his proclamation defining the boundary between the
United States and Mexico to be as follows : Up the Rio Grande
to the parallel of thirty-one degrees forty-seven minutes north lati
tude ; thence due west one hundred miles ; thence south to the
parallel of thirty-one degrees and twenty minutes north latitude ;
thence west to the one hundred and eleventh meridian west from
Greenwich ; thence to the western coast. The act of July 8, 1856,
authorized the president to have surveyed the southern boundary
of Kansas from the Missouri to the New Mexico lines, and the
sum of thirty-five thousand four hundred dollars was appropriated
for the necessary expenses by the act of August 16, 1856. Under
date of February 2, 1848, Mexico ceded California to the United
States an acquisition second in importance only to the Louisiana

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 439
purchase itself. The State of Texas, having agreed to the condi
tions imposed by congress before its admission to the Union, was
declared by act of December 29, 1845, to be one of the United
States of America. The proclamation of the president of Decem
ber 13, 1850, declared that as Texas by an act of November 25,
1850, had accepted the boundaries denned by the United States
in the act of September 9, 1850, such boundary was in full force
and effect thereafter. By the act of September 30, 1850, the
sum of six hundred dollars was appropriated to defray the
expense of running the boundary line between Minnesota and
Wisconsin. The famous fight in congress over the admission of Missouri
into the Union, was only less momentous than the rebellion itself
which occurred forty years later. But that discussion, which was
based upon slavery, has no place in this chapter. It is only
necessary to notice the question of limits, and the proceedings
leading up to their selection and settlement. On December 22,
1819, a bill was introduced in the senate, granting to the citizens
of Alaine the right to form a state government. On December
29, Senator Smith, of South Carolina, presented a lengthy memo
rial (really the second thus presented) from the inhabitants of
Alissouri Territory praying for admission into the Union. In
previous ominous proceedings, it had become manifest to all, that
slavery in Alissouri, when that territory should apply for admis
sion into the Union, would be opposed by many of the northern
senators. It was therefore determined by the senators from the
south to make the admission of Alaine contingent upon the admis
sion of Missouri with the institution of slavery granted; and
accordingly, on January 3, 1820, Senator Barbour, of Virginia,
when the Alaine bill again came up for consideration, moved a
postponement of the bill, and gave notice that later he should
introduce the following motion: "That the bill entitled, 'A bill
declaring the consent of Congress to the admission of the State
of Maine into the Union,' be committed to the committee on the
Judiciary, with instructions so to amend it as to authorize the
people of Alissouri to establish a State Government and to admit
such State into the Union upon an equal footing with the original
States in all respects whatever." This motion precipitated the
discussion which resulted in the "Alissouri Compromise."
The boundaries mentioned in the memorial of 1819 were as fol
lows : "Beginning at a point in the middle on the main channel
of the Mississippi river at the thirty-sixth degree of north lati
tude, and running thence in a direct line to the mouth of the
Big Black river (a branch of White river) ; thence up the main

440 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
branch of White river in the middle of the main channel thereof
to where the parallel of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes
north latitude crosses the same ; thence with that parallel of lati
tude due west to a point from which a due north line will cross
the Missouri river at the mouth of Wolf river ;* thence due north
to a point due west of the mouth of- Rock river; thence due east
to the middle of the main channel of the river Mississippi opposite
the mouth of Rock river, and thence down the river Mississippi
in the middle of the main channel thereof to the place of begin
ning." As will be noticed, the memorial asked for a much larger
tract of country than was finally embraced within the state limits.
Had the request of the petitioners been granted, they would have
received three tiers of counties along the southern boundary of
Iowa and a strip more than a county wide along the eastern side
of Kansas. During the long discussion which followed, over the
admission of Missouri, the limits mentioned in the memorial were
considerably cut down. Mr. Burrill, of Rhode Island, in a
speech on the bill said that the allegation contained in the memo
rial that the territory contained a population of one hundred
thousand persons was written (in 1818) before the Territory of
Arkansas had been set off from Missouri Territory, -and he
desired to know the actual population within the proposed limits.
He said, "And with respect to the boundaries of the new State
(Missouri) I am desirous of more definite information. Certain
limits are indeed proposed by the committee in their report, but
by a certain bill which has been laid on our desks by mistake, it
appears that certain other boundaries have been thought of ; and
I wish to know the cause of this variation in the boundaries.
Who was it that marked out the immense district of country pro
posed to be included in the new State? Who has given these
metes and bounds ? I do not know, and I question whether even
the committee which reported it can inform the Senate. These
boundaries are not described and marked out in the document on
which the bill was professedly founded. The boundaries pro
posed in the amendmentf before the Senate, I believe, embrace
a less extent of territory than those proposed in the memorial,
but enough has been said to_show that the Senate is without the
necessary information to enable them to act understandingly."
In referring to the Missouri compromise many years afterward,

? Wolf river rises in Brown County, Kansas, and flows northeasterly through
Doniphan county into the Missouri river.
t The bill before the senate at this time was one that had been considered in
1818, but had been amended in several important particulars, among which was a
decided curtailment of the limits asked for.

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 441
Mr. Benton said in the United States senate that the bill had all
the weight and sanctity of an amendment to the constitution.
There is no doubt that had not both factions — slavery and anti-
slavery — yielded a portion of what they wanted at this time, the
southern states would have withdrawn from the Union. It was
a sacred compromise, rigidly adhered to for the sake of the Union
for many years, but was finally repealed by the Kansas-Nebraska
bill. By act approved May 26, 1824, congress appropriated the
sum of one thousand five hundred dollars to complete the payment
for surveying the south boundary of Missouri and its west bound
ary south of the Missouri river.
The boundaries of the State of Alissouri finally agreed upon
were as follows: "Beginning in the middle of the Mississippi
river on the parallel of thirty-six degrees of north latitude ; thence
west along that parallel of latitude to the St. Francois river;
thence up and following the course of that river in the middle of
the main channel thereof to the parallel of latitude of thirty-six
degrees thirty minutes; thence west along the same to a point
where the said parallel is intersected by a meridian line passing
through the middle of the mouth of the Kansas river where the
same empties into the Missouri river ; thence from the point afore
said north along the said meridian line to the intersection of the
parallel of latitude which passes through the rapids of the river
Des Moines, making the said line to correspond with the Indian
boundary line; thence east from the point of intersection last
aforesaid along the said parallel of latitude to the middle of the
channel of the main fork of the said river Des Moines; thence
down and along. the middle of the main channel of the said river
Des Moines to the mouth of the same where it empties into the
Mississippi river ; thence due east to the middle of the main chan
nel of the Mississippi river ; thence down and following the course
of the Mississippi river in the middle of the main channel thereof
to the place of beginning." The admission of the state was con
ditioned upon the ratification of these boundaries. The act further
provided that slavery, except in the State of Missouri, should be
forever prohibited in all territory north of the parallel of thirty-six
degrees thirty minutes north latitude in territory that had been
ceded to the United States by France.
Soon after Missouri was admitted into the Union, the project of
attaching what afterward became known as the "Platte Purchase"
to that state was persistently urged by the citizens. But it was
many years before the Indian title could be extinguished; and,
in the meantime, congress, having been petitioned to that effect
several times, passed the following enactment June 7, 1836:

442 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
"Be it enacted, etc., That when the Indian title to all the lands
lying between the State of Alissouri and the Missouri river shall
be extinguished, the jurisdiction over said land shall be hereby
ceded to the State of Alissouri, and the western boundary of said
State shall be then extended to the Alissouri river, reserving to the
United States the original right of soil in said lands and of dispos
ing of the same : Provided, That this act shall not take effect until
the President shall by proclamation declare that the Indian title
to said lands has been extinguished ; nor shall it take effect until
the State of Missouri shall have assented to the provisions of this
act." Provision was made for the survey of the boundary line between
Missouri and Iowa Territory by the congressional act of June 17,
1844. It was stipulated that each should appoint a commissioner,
and they too should select a third, who must not be a resident
of either state or territory. The line which they should mark
out and establish must be conclusive, but it was further conditioned
that the act should not go into effect until Missouri should have
assented to the same.
By treaty with the Osage Indians in 1808, the United States
secured the greater part of what is now the State of Missouri
north of the Missouri river. But the War of 1812 delayed the
survey of this tract. In 181 5 the treaty was renewed and con
firmed, and John C. Sullivan was sent to survey, define and mark
the boundaries of the purchase. He started in the middle of the
Missouri river at the mouth of the Kansas river and ran due
north one hundred miles. There he planted a post. He then
ran an east line to the Des Moines river — due east as he thought,
but through some mistake, a little north of east, thus throwing the
eastern extremity of the line too far to the north. When the
people of Missouri applied first in 1818 for admission into the
Union, they spoke for the following boundaries: "The bound
aries which they solicit for the future State, they believe to be'
the most reasonable and proper that can be devised. The south
ern limits will be an extension of the line that divides Virginia
and North Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky. The northern will
correspond nearly with the north limits of the Territory of Illi
nois, and with the Indian boundary line near the mouth of the
river Des Moines. A front of three and a half degrees upon the
Mississippi will be left to the south, to form the Territory of
Arkansas, with the river Arkansas traversing its center. A front
of three and a half degrees more, upon a medium depth of two
hundred miles, with the Missouri river in the center, will form
the State of Missouri. Another front of equal extent, embracing

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 443
the great river St. Pierre, will remain above to form another state
at some future day. The boundaries as solicited will include all
the country to the north and west to which the Indian title has
been extinguished. They will include the body of the popula
tion." As will be observed, they mentioned for their northern
boundary a line corresponding with "the Indian boundary line
near the mouth of -the river Des Moines," evidently meaning the
line run by Mr. Sullivan. Before the Territory of Iowa was
formed, or as early as 1837, the contest over the northern bound
ary of Missouri originated between the government of the United
States and the State of Alissouri. As early as 1831, Missouri had
petitioned (as shown above) for the tract of country which
became known as the "Platte Purchase." As soon as the Indian
title thereto was extinguished, the president by proclamation
Alarch 28, 1837, declared that tract to be a part of the State of
Missouri. When Iowa was admitted into the Union in 1846, she began
immediately to make her surveys based upon the northern bound
ary of Missouri, which was the southern boundary of Iowa.
Immediately, Iowa and Alissouri came in conflict. When the
latter had been admitted in 1821, her northern boundary was
spoken of as passing "through the rapids of the river Des Moines,
making the same line to correspond with the Indian boundary
line." It was over this description that the difficulty arose, or
rather continued, because the same dispute had originated
between the government and the State of Missouri, and Iowa
merely stepped into the shoes of the government so far as this con
tention was concerned. Alissouri maintained that the rapids
spoken of were in the Des Moines river at the big bend, and
therefore that her northern boundary should be about ten miles
farther to the north than the Sullivan line. Iowa maintained that
the Sullivan line was the correct one, if it had been run correctly
by Mr. Sullivan. She asked to have that correction made ; that
is, while the northwestern point of the line as run by Mr. Sulli
van should remain the same, the line should be about two miles
farther to the south at its eastern extremity than the Sullivan line,
thus giving to Iowa a triangular strip two miles wide at the
eastern end and tapering to a point at the northwestern corner of
Missouri. As Iowa and Missouri were unable to settle the dis
pute, they agreed to refer it, as previously stated, to the supreme
court of the United States; whereupon Missouri filed her bill
against Iowa, claiming a strip about ten miles wide along the
northern border, and Iowa filed a cross-bill claiming the triangular
strip afore-mentioned. In the examination of witnesses, they

444 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
were about equally divided as to what were "the rapids of the
river Des Moines." Several maintained that the rapids meant
were in the Mississippi near, and just above, the mouth of the
river Des Moines. Others declared that there were several rapids
in the river Des Moines which answered the description. How
ever, the result showed that there were no rapids strictly so called
in the Des Moines proper, but only several small ripples which
could not have been meant. As the contention of Missouri was
based almost wholly on this point, her claims thus fell to the
ground. It was shown that more than fifteen Indian treaties
previously made had referred to the Sullivan line as -the correct
boundary of Missouri on the north, and that in none had that
state objected to them on that score. In -the formation of her
own land districts she had recognized that line as her northern
boundary. It was shown, also, that when the Territory of Iowa
was formed in 1838, the Sullivan line had been laid down as her
southern boundary without protest from either Iowa or Mis
souri. Again, when the State of Iowa was erected, that line had
been set down as her southern boundary, again without protest
from either Iowa or Missouri. During the territorial government
of Iowa, a period of nearly ten years, counties had been laid off
with that line as a base. In 1836, Missouri had ordered a sur
vey made of her northern boundary, and a line called "Brown
line" about ten miles north of the Sullivan line had been run,
and during the territorial period of Iowa this strip was in dis
pute. The Brown line ran to the rapids in the river Des Moines
at the big bend. The final decree of the supreme court was to
the effect that as the contention of Missouri was based upon the
term "rapids of the Des Moines river," and as there were no such
rapids properly speaking, her claim to the Brown line could not
be maintained ; and that as both the United States government and
the Territory of Iowa had recognized the Sullivan line from 1820
to 1846 in numerous treaties and otherwise, the latter was
estopped from claiming the triangular strip to the southward of
the Sullivan line. The latter line was, therefore, confirmed and
ordered re-surveyed; particularly was it ordered to relocate and
re-mark the northwestern corner, from which the commissioners
were also to run a line due west to the Missouri river to fix the
northern boundary of the Platte purchase. Joseph C. Brown and
Henry B. Hendershot were appointed commissioners on behalf
of Missouri and Iowa respectively, but the former dying, Robert
W. Wells was appointed in his place. This ended the contro
versy. In the supreme court, the case was entitled "Missouri vs.
Iowa," and may be found in 7 Howard, 660. The resurvey of

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 445
the Sullivan line and the survey of the line from the northwest
corner of Missouri, as established by Air. Sullivan, to the Mis
souri river, cost the sum of eleven thousand and forty-two dol
lars and sixty-eight cents.
At the time Alissouri was admitted to the Union, the future as
to railroads was, of course, unknown. It was thought that the
prosperity of commerce in the "sovereign states'' west of the Mis
sissippi would have to depend upon the rivers traversing them.
Thus in the memorial of the people of Missouri, Arkansas was to
be traversed by the river Arkansas, Alissouri by the Missouri, and
one state north of the latter by the river St. Pierre. But con
gress did not wholly agree to this division, and accordingly
placed the northern boundary of Missouri far enough south to
provide for the formation of two states above the latter:
Iowa traversed by the Des Moines river, and Alinnesota by the
St. Peter's and the upper Mississippi rivers. Thus the prime
consideration in the formation of these states was the advantages
afforded by the Alississippi on the east and the large river that
should traverse each. After the formation of the State of Mis
souri, all the country west of the Mississippi river and north of
that state continued to be called Missouri Territory until 1834,
when it was attached to Alichigan Territory. There seems to
have been no formal act of congress applying the name "Mis
souri Territory" to this tract of country during that period. It
simply was referred to as such. The western boundaries were
indefinite, but the northern line was /the demarcation between the
United States and Canada.
By act approved June 28, 1834, all that tract of country bounded
on the east by the Mississippi river, south by Missouri and by a
line drawn due west from the northwest corner of Missouri,
southwest and west by the Missouri river and White Earth river,
and on the north by the northern boundary of the United States,
was attached for executive purposes to Michigan Territory. On
this tract of territory it was estimated that at the time there were
from five thousand to eight thousand people. It embraced all of
Iowa and part of North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota.
All this tract was practically without government, having been
previously left to shift for itself. It is said that in this tract as
late as 1820 might have been seen a justice of the peace holding a
commission signed by the sovereign of France or Spain.
By act approved April 20, 1836, congress provided for the for
mation of Wisconsin Territory : "That from and after the third
day of July next the country included within the following
boundaries shall constitute a separate territory, for the purposes

446 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
of temporary government, by the. name of Wisconsin, that is to
say: Bounded on the east by a line drawn from the northeast
corner of the State of Illinois through the middle of Lake Michi
gan to a point in the middle of said lake and opposite the main
channel of Green Bay, and through said channel and Green Bay
to the mouth of the Menomonee river; thence through the mid
dle of the main channel of said river to that head of said river
nearest to the Lake of the Desert; thence in a direct line to the
middle of said lake ; thence through the middle of the main chan
nel of the Montreal river to its mouth; thence with a direct line
across Lake Superior to where the territorial line of the United
States last touches said lake northwest ; thence on the north with
the said territorial line of the White Earth river;* on the west
by a line from the said boundary line following down the middle
of the main channel of White Earth river to the Missouri river,
and down the middle of the main channel of the Missouri river
to a point due west from the northwest corner of the State of
Missouri ; and on the south from said point due east to the north
west corner of the State of Missouri ; and thence with the bound
aries of the States of Missouri and Illinois as already fixed by
acts of Congress. And after the third day of June next all
power and authority of the Government of Michigan in and over
the territory hereby constituted shall cease." From the above
it will be seen that the large tract of country to the west of the
Mississippi was not attached to the Territory of Wisconsin, but
was made a part of it. In the act of July 2, 1836, the following
language was used : "That the tracts of land in the Territory of
Wisconsin, including the towns of Fort Madison and Burling
ton in the county of Des Moines ; Belleview, Du Buque and Peru
in the county of Du Buque ; and Mineral Point in the county of
Iowa shall be laid off into town lots, streets, avenues, public
squares, outlots," etc. Here the language shows that the towns
named were in the Territory of Wisconsin, not attached to , it.
The act of June 28, 1834, did not make this section of country a
part of the Territory of Michigan, it merely attached it to that
territory for executive purposes. The act of June 12, 1838, stipu
lated "that for the sale of the public lands in that part of the ter
ritory of Wisconsin situated west of the river Mississippi, two
land districts are hereby created," the Des Moines, with land
office at Burlington; and the DuBuque, with land office at
DuBuque. Thus the whole of Iowa, and parts of Minnesota,
North Dakota, and South Dakota constituted a part of the

* This river is in the northern part of North Dakota.

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 447
Territory of Wisconsin, and were not merely attached to it for
purposes of government.
Under, date of June 12, 1838, congress divided the Territory
of Wisconsin, and set off therefrom the Territory of Iowa. The
following were the proceedings : "That from and after the
third day of July next all that part of the present Territory of
Wisconsin which lies west of the Alississippi river and west of
a line drawn due north from the headwaters or sources of the
Mississippi to the Territorial line, shall, for the purposes of tem
porary government, be and constitute a separate territorial gov
ernment by the name of Iowa." Six days later, congress author
ized the president to have surveyed the southern boundary line
of Iowa under the following section: "That the said boundary
line shall be run or surveyed, ascertained and marked in all
respects according to, and in pursuance of, the provisions of the
following acts, wherein the said boundary line is defined and
described, to-wit: An act of Congress of March 6, 1820,
entitled, 'An act to authorize the people of Missouri Territory
to form a constitution and State Government,' etc. ; and an act
of June 7, 1836, entitled, 'An act to extend the western bound
ary of the State of Alissouri to the Missouri river.' " Under
this act, three commissioners were to be appointed, one each by
the United States, the State of Missouri, and the Territory of
Iowa. In case but One or neither of the others should appoint
the necessary commissioner, the one appointed by the president
was to proceed alone to survey the line. Iowa Territory, as
thus constituted, embraced all of the present Iowa, all of Min
nesota west of the Alississippi and all of the Dakotas east of
the White Earth and the Missouri rivers.
Congress provided under date of Alarch 3, 1839, "That the
middle or center of the main channel of the river Mississippi
shall be deemed and is hereby declared to be the eastern bound
ary line of the Territory of Iowa, so far or to such extent as
the said Territory is bounded eastwardly by or upon said river;
Provided, however, That the said Territory of Iowa shall have
concurrent jurisdiction upon the said Alississippi river with any
other conterminous State or Territory so far or to such extent
as the said river shall form a common boundary between the
aforesaid Territory of Iowa and any other such conterminous
State or Territory."
On February 12, 1840, a memorial from the inhabitants of
the Territory of Florida was presented in congress praying for
admission into the Union. In the debate on the bill, Mr. Sevier,
of Arkansas, said "he would tell Senators openly and aboveboard

448 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
when the question of admission came up, he would not vote for
the admission of any free State, without admitting at the same
time a slave State. When Iowa came in, East -Florida must
come in ; and when Wisconsin came in, another slave State must
come in. This was the course pursued in the case of Alichigan
and Arkansas, and this vyas the course that would be pursued in
future. It was the only course which would preserve the bal
ance of power and protect the interests of the slave States on this
floor, which was their last refuge. He had no concealment on
the subject and disdained to be beating about the bush."
The rule of congress to admit a northern and a southern state
at the same time was followed when Iowa was permitted to
enter the Union. Iowa and Florida were admitted by the act
of March 3, 1845. The boundary of the former was fixed as
follows : "Beginning at the mouth of the Des Moines river, in
the middle of the Mississippi, thence by the middle of the chan
nel of that river to a parallel of latitude passing through the
mouth of the Mankato or Blue Earth "river ; thence west along
the said parallel of latitude to a point where it is intersected by
a meridian line seventeen degrees and thirty minutes west of
the meridian of Washington City, thence due south to the
northern boundary line of the State of Missouri ; thence east
wardly following that boundary to the point at which the same
intersects the Des Moines river ; thence by the middle of the chan
nel of that river to the place of beginning." These limits gave
to the Territory two tiers of counties along the southern bound
ary of the present Minnesota to the parallel of seventeen degrees
thirty minutes west longitude, but cut off much of the western
part of the present Iowa, the western boundary of Iowa Terri
tory being a line north and south across the state not far from
the cities of Jefferson and Greenfield. Under the act of 1845,
the boundaries of the proposed state were so restricted by con-
grss, that the inhabitants voted a majority against admission.
They demanded a westward extension to the Missouri river,
which was granted to them the following year.
Congress provided under date of August 4, 1846, "that the
following shall be, and they are hereby declared to be, the bound
aries of the State of Iowa, in lieu of those prescribed by the
second section of the act of the third of March, 1845, entitled,
'An act for the admission of the States of Iowa and Florida into
the Union,' viz : Beginning in the middle of the main channel
of the Mississippi river, at a point due east of the middle of
the mouth of the main channel of the Des Moines river; thence
up the middle of the main channel of the said Des Moines river

MftP
BOUNDARY OF MISSOURI V IOW/J.
it.t"-

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 449
to a point on said river where the northern boundary line of the
State of Missouri as established by the Constitution of that State,
adopted June 12, 1820, crosses the said middle of the main chan
nel of the said Des Aloines river; thence westwardly along the
said northern boundary line of the State of Missouri, as estab
lished at the time aforesaid, until an extension of said line inter
sect the middle of the main channel of the Missouri river ; thence
up the middle of the main channel of the said Missouri river
to a point opposite the middle of the main channel of the Big
Sioux river according to Nicollet's map, thence up the main chan
nel of the said Big Sioux river according to said map until it
is intersected by the parallel of forty-three degrees thirty min
utes north latitude; thence east along said parallel of forty-
three degrees thirty minutes until said parallel intersect the
middle of the main channel of the Alississippi river ; thence down
the middle of the main channel of said Mississippi river to the
place of beginning."
"Section II. That the question which has heretofore been the
subject matter of controversy and dispute between the State of
Missouri and the Territory of Iowa, respecting the precise loca
tion of the northern boundary line of the State of Missouri, shall
be, and the same is hereby, referred to the Supreme Court of
the United States for adjudication and settlement, in accordance
with the act of the Legislature of Missouri approved March 25,
1845, an<i the memorial of the Council and House of Represent
atives of the Territory of the Iowa, approved January 17, 1846,
by which both parties have agreed to 'the commencement and
speedy determination of such suit as may be necessary to pro
cure a final decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
upon the true location of the northern boundary of that State;""
and the said supreme court is hereby invested with all the power
and authority necessary to the performance of the duty imposed
by this section."
In December, 1855, Senator Jones, of Iowa, introduced a bill
in the United States senate authorizing an extension of the west
ern boundary of Iowa to the Missouri river. In August, 1856,
a bill of similar import was introduced in the house. Had either
of these bills become a law, what is now the southern part of
South Dakota, would have been attached to Iowa; but neither
became a law. The attempt was repeated in 1858, when Mr. Cur
tis introduced a bill in the house having the same import. These
bills appear to 'have met their fate in the voiceless tomb of the
committee rooms.
n— 29

450 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Provision for the survey of the boundary line between the state
of Michigan and the Territory of Wisconsin was made by con
gress under date of July 12, 1838. The act of August
12, 1848, appropriated a sum not to exceed fifty thousand dol
lars for the survey of the boundary line between the United
States and Mexico. The act of August 14, 1848, made all of
the territory of the United States west of the Rocky mountains
and north of the forty-second parallel of north latitude, the Ter
ritory of Oregon. The act of March 3, 1849, authorized the
surveyor general of Wisconsin and Iowa, under the direction of
the commissioner of the general land office, to cause the north
ern boundary line of the state of Iowa to be run and marked.
The act of September 30, 1850, appropriated the sum of fifteen
thousand dollars to defray this expense.
In the United States senate, on December 4, 1848, two bills
were introduced: One for the formation of the Territory of
Minnesota, and one for the formation of the Territory of
Nebraska. Strong objection was shown by the southern sena
tors to the boundaries defined in the bill for the formation of
the Territory of Minnesota. Mr. Butler, of South Carolina,
said: "There will be embraced in the Territory of Minnesota
about twenty thousand square miles of land that was covered
by the ordinance of 1787 and formed a part of what was com
monly called the Northwest Territory, out of which five States
were to be created. The separation of this tract and the for
mation of an additional State is, to my apprehension, not only a
^violation of good faith, but a violation of the positive provisions
of that ordinance." Mr. King, of Alabama, said: "I think the
remarks of my honorable friend from South Carolina in regard
to having yielded so large a portion of the territory originally
belonging to that section of the country from which five States
were to be made, and five only, for the purpose of forming a
new and additional State, is an evidence of the liberality of that
section of the country in which I live." Mr. Dodge, of Iowa,
said : "As to this matter of boundary, I will state that Wiscon
sin would have gladly retained all that portion of the territory
embraced in the ordinance of 1787 which was at first assigned to
her. That portion of her territory was not set off because it
was the choice of her people, but because the Congress of the
United States dismembered her territory and curtailed her limits."
The southern senators argued that as the ordinance of 1787 had
provided for the formation of five states only out of the North
west Territory, and as five had already been formed, to-wit:
Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois and Wisconsin, it was unfair

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 451
to the South for the North to use still another large tract of that
territory as a basis for the formation of another free state. How
ever, notwithstanding the objections, the bill was permitted to
pass the senate on Alarch 3, 1849. This was the. senate bill with
the house amendments.
The Territory of Alinnesota was formed pursuant to act -of
congress of March 3, 1849, the boundaries being as follows:
"That from and after the passage of this act, all that part of
the territory of the United States which lies within the following
limits, to-wit: Beginning in the Alississippi river at the point
where the line of forty-three degrees and thirty minutes of north
latitude crosses the same; thence running due west on said line,
which is the northern boundary of the State of Iowa, to the
northwest corner of the said State of Iowa ; thence southerly along
the western boundary of said State to the point where said
boundary strikes the Alissouri river ; thence up the middle of the
main channel of the Missouri river to the mouth of the White
Earth river; thence up the middle of the main channel of the
White Earth river to the boundary line between the possessions
of the United States and Great Britain; thense east and south
of east along the boundary line between the possessions of the
United States and Great Britain to Lake Superior; thence in
a straight line to the northernmost point of the State of Wis
consin in Lake Superior; thence along the western boundary
line of said State of Wisconsin to the Mississippi river ; thence
down the main channel of said river to the place of beginning;
be, and the same is, hereby erected into a temporary government
by the name of the Territory of Minnesota : Provided, That noth
ing in this act contained shall be construed to inhibit the Gov
ernment of the United States from dividing said Territory into
two or more territories in such manner and at such times as
Congress shall deem convenient and proper, or from attaching
any portion of said Territory to any other State or Territory of
the United States." The tract of country embraced in the Ter
ritory of Minnesota comprised all of the present Minnesota and
all of the Dakotas east of the White Earth and the Alissouri
rivers. The eastern boundary of Minnesota Territory had been
established when the state of Wisconsin was created. It was
part of the western boundary of the latter, and was the same
as the present boundary. It was so well defined that mention of
it was omitted from the act creating Minnesota Territory.
On December 24, 1856, Air. Rice, delegate from the Territory
of Minnesota, introduced a bill in the house providing for the
admission of that territory into the Union as a state. The com-

452 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
mittee on territories, of which Mr. Grow, of Pennsylvania, was
chairman, reported a substitute bill which gave the proposed
state the following boundaries : "Beginning at the point in the
main channel of the Red River of the North where the bound
ary line between the United States and the British possessions
crosses the same; thence up the main channel of said river to
that of the Bois des Sioux river; thence (up) the main chan
nel of said river to Lake Travers; thence up the center of the
lake to the southern extremity thereof; thence in a direct line
to the head of the Big Stone Lake ; thence through its center to
its outlet; thence by a due south line to the north line of the
State of Iowa; thence east along the northern boundary of said
State to the main channel of the Mississippi river ; thence up
the main channel of said river and following the boundary line
of the State of Wisconsin until the same intersects the St. Louis
river; thence down said river to and through Lake Superior on
the boundary line of Wisconsin and Michigan until it intersects
the dividing line between the United States and the British pos
sessions ; thence up Pigeon river and following said dividing line
to the place of beginning." Mr. Grow said: "A portion of
the Territory of Minnesota is divided by this bill, north and south
by Red river, the whole length of that river, thence following
the Big Stone Lake to its outlet — the head of the Big Stone
Lake and Lake Travers being connected by water — thence by
a line due south to the boundary line of Iowa. All the territory
east of that line is to be formed into a State, making seventy thou
sand square miles,, and leaving west of these boundaries now in
the Territory of Minnesota about ninety thousand square miles,
which, if the people of Minnesota shall adopt a State constitution,
will be left to be organized under the name of Dakotah, as a proper
name of Indian derivation. The general provisions of the bill
(the substitute) are the same as those contained in the bill of
the old form."
These changes in the proposed boundaries of the new state were
immediately challenged by several members from the south.
One of them read to Mr. Grow the following extract from the
Ordinance of 1787: "That there shall be formed in said Ter
ritory not less than three nor more than five States ; and the
boundaries of the States, as soon as Virginia shall alter her
act of cession and consent to the same, shall become fixed and
established as follows, to-wit: The western State in the said
Territory shall be bounded by the Mississippi, the Ohio and the
Wabash rivers; a direct line drawn from the Wabash and Post
Vincennes due north to the territorial line between the United

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 453
States and Canada; and by the said territorial line to the Lake
of the Woods," etc., describing two other states (Ohio and Indi
ana) : "Provided, however, and it is further understood and
declared that the boundaries of these three States shall be sub
ject so far to be altered that if Congress shall hereafter find it
expedient they shall have authority to form one or two States
in that part of the said Territory which lies north of an east
and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extremity
of Lake Alichigan." Air. Phelps, of Missouri, said: "These
five States, the entire number authorized by the Ordinance of
1787, are already organized ; and now the gentleman, or the Com
mittee on Territories, propose to embrace within the limits of
another State, a portion of territory which it was stipulated by
those who framed that ordinance, should be embraced in one
of these five States." Mr. Grow replied : "What does the gen
tleman from Missouri propose to do with that part of the Ter
ritory which is left outside of the limits of the proposed State?
Would he let it stand forever in an unorganized condition? Is
that what the gentleman proposes? Or should it be organized
into a separate State, so as to make six States out of the North
West Territory ? Will the gentleman trample down his own prop
osition?- Five States have been formed out of the North West
Territory, as required by the Ordinance of 1787, and no one
proposes to make any more, but only to take a gore of land left
outside of all the organized States and incorporate it with other
territory never under the Ordinance of 1787, which of itself would
make a large State. How, then, is the Ordinance of 1787 vio
lated ? It comes with a bad grace from a member of this House
from the State of Missouri to raise such a question here today,
when the Platte country was taken from the Ordinance of 1820
and included within the limits of that State. It comes with a
bad grace from a gentleman coming from a State which has
trampled upon the sacredness of compacts to come here and com
plain that we take from under the Ordinance of 1787 a little
strip of territory which was left outside the limits of all organ
ized States. And now, because it is to be included within an
organized State, it -is, forsooth, a great breach of compact."
There immediately succeeded a sharp running debate, in which
all features of the bill were discussed. A motion to lay the bill
on the table was rejected. The Rice bill had fixed the bound
aries as follows: From the British line up the Red River of
the North to Lake Travers thence through the center of the
same to its southern extremity, thence to the junction of Kam-
peskee Lake with the Big Sioux river, thence down the main

454 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
channel of that stream to the northwest corner of Iowa. The
opposition in the house was not persistent, and tlh bill finally
passed by the vote of 97 yeas and 75 nays.
When the bill came up in the senate, Mr. Jones, of Iowa, offered
the following amendment: "Provided, That the convention to
form the constitution for said State shall submit to the people
whether the foregoing boundaries shall be adopted, or whether
the State shall embrace all that portion of the present Territory
which lies south of the forty-sixth degree of north latitude." Con
tinuing, he said, "I am informed that the Legislature of Min
nesota by a vote of 24 or 25 to 10 or 11 in the assembly, and
in the Council by a vote of 11 to 4, have petitioned Congress
not to adopt a north and south boundary. I believe that the
boundary proposed by me would best accommodate the great
mass of the people, but I shall vote for the bill whether my
amendment be adopted or not. I think is due to the people of
the Territory that their Legislature should be consulted on this
subject. It is a subject on which they have desired to be heard ;
and I therefore offer the amendment as requested by citizens of
the Territory. The amendment will divide the Territory about
equally into two parts. It consists of one hundred and seventy-
one thousand square miles. The line which I propose, the forty-
sixth degree of north latitude, will divide it about equally into
two parts."
Mr. Thompson said: "The part thus cut off is to constitute
the suggested future State of Superior." Mr. Butler, of South
Carolina, said: "To allow any people to say what boundary
they will take, is really a liberty which I cannot exactly per
mit. I would not allow one of my sons to take all my land
on his mere saying that he wanted it. (Laughter.) I think
that is an extravagant proposition beyond anything I know of.
Besides, by the celebrated Ordinance of 1787, so much insisted
on, the North West Territory was to be divided into five States.
Now you are going to make seven or eight, according to the
mode in which this division is to be made." Mr. Douglas "of
Illinois said: "The Senator from South Carolina, having deliv
ered my speech, I have not a word to say." Mr. Jones of Iowa
answered : "According to the boundaries now prescribed by the
bill before us, the delegate from the Territory the other dav
admitted that the new State would embrace about ninety thousand
square miles. I restrict them by my amendment to one half of one
hundred and seventy-one thousand. I desire that the people of the
future State shall have the right to say, not how much land they
will have, or how they will have it, but whether they shall be

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 455
divided by an east and west, or a north and south line, and not to
give them one inch more or less according to their wishes." Mr.
Butler replied : "I see very distinctly what it is. Instead of provid
ing for one child, the Senator from Iowa wishes to provide for
two." Mr. Douglas said : "I can never yield the position that Con
gress must reserve to itself the right to prescribe the boundaries
of new States." Air. Jones replied: 'You are doing it in this
bill." Air. Douglas: "No, sir." The Jones amendment was
rejected. The final vote in the senate on the bill was 47 yeas
and 1 nay, the latter being Air. Thompson of Kentucky.
The people of Alinnesota were authorized to form a constitu
tion and a state government by act of congress approved Febru
ary 26, 1857, the following being the boundaries settled upon:
"Beginning at the point in the center of the main channel of the
Red River of the North where the boundary line between the
United States and the British possessions crosses the same;
thence up the main channel of said river to that of the Bois des
Sioux river; thence (up) the main channel of said river to Lake
Travers ; thence up the center of said lake to the southern extrem
ity thereof ; thence in a direct line to the head of Big Stone Lake ;
thence through its center to its outlet; thence by a due south line
to the north line of the State of Iowa; thence east along the
northern boundary of the said State to the main channel of the
Mississippi river; thence up the main channel of said river and
following the boundary line of the State of Wisconsin until the
same intersects the St. Louis river; thence down said river to
and through Lake Superior on the boundary line of Wisconsin
and Michigan, until it intersects the dividing line between the
United States and the British possessions ; thence up Pigeon river
and following said dividing line to the place of beginning." The
state of Minnesota was formally admitted to the Union by act
approved May 11, 1858.
The bill for the formation of Nebraska Territory, introduced
in the United States senate December 4, 1848, was pioneer work,
and nothing of importance resulted. Another bill for the forma
tion of this Territory was presented in the house during the ses
sion of 1852-3, and after passing through the usual order was
voted upon February 10, with 98 yeas and 43 nays. It went to
the senate, and a motion by Senator Douglas to take it from
the table for consideration was lost, 20 yeas, 25 nays. The fol
lowing day he made another motion to the same effect, but with
the same result. The boundaries set forth in this bill embraced
all of the immense tract of country west of Missouri, Iowa and
Minnesota, north of the Indian Territory to the British posses-

456 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
sions, and westward to the Rocky mountains. In fact, it
embraced a strip one-half of a degree wide along the northern
border of Indian Territory, Oklahoma and New Mexico as far
as the mountains. In the bill were provisions for the subdi
vision of this large tract of territory at a later date. The prin
cipal argument in support of the bill was that, as settlers were
locating in that territory and needed protection, and as such set
tlements were of great importance along the overland routes to
the Pacific coast, they should be given the protection afforded by
a territorial form of government. Up to this time nothing had
been said concerning such a territory as Kansas.
On the 5th of December, 1853, Senator Dodge, of Iowa, gave
notice in the senate that later he should introduce a bill "to
organize a territorial government for the Territory of Nebraska."
The boundaries of the proposed Territory were to be "included
between the summit of the Rocky mountains on the west, the
States of Missouri and Iowa on the east, the parallel of forty-
three degrees thirty minutes north latitude on the north, and the
Territory of New Mexico and the parallel of thirty-six degrees
thirty minutes north latitude on the south." The committee on
Territories returned the bill with a substitute defining the bound
aries as follows : "Beginning at the southwest corner of the
State of Missouri; thence running west on the line of thirty-
six degrees thirty minutes north latitude until it intersects the
one hundred and third meridian of longitude west from Green
wich ; thence north on that meridian until it intersects the thirty-
eighth parallel of north latitude ; thence west on the said par
allel of latitude to the summit of the Rocky mountains ; thence
northward along and upon the summit of said range of mount
ains to the. (forty-ninth parallel of latitude; thence eastward to
the)* western boundary of the Territory of Minnesota (White
Earth river) ; thence southward on and with said boundary to
the Missouri river; thence down the center of the main channel
of said river to the State of Missouri ; thence south on and with
the western boundary of said State to the place of beginning."
These boundaries not proving satisfactory to the committee, the
following were finally placed in the bill : "That all that part of
the territory of the United States included within the following
limits, except such portions thereof as are hereinafter expressly
exempted from the operations of this act, to-wit: Beginning at
a point in the Missouri river where the fortieth parallel of north

? The matter in parenthesis seems to have been omitted from the congressional
description.

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 457
latitude crosses the same ; thence west on said parallel to the
summit of the highlands separating the waters flowing into the
Green river or Colorado of the West from the waters flowing
into the Great Basin ; thence northward on the said highlands
to the summit of the Rocky mountains ; thence on said summit
northward to the (forty-ninth parallel of north latitude; thence
east on said parallel to the)* western boundary of the Territory
of Minnesota; thence southward on said boundary to the Mis
souri river; thence down the main channel of said river to the
place of beginning, be, and the same is hereby created into a tem
porary government by the name of the Territory of Nebraska."
In the same substitute the following provision was made: "All
that part of the Territory of the United States included within
the following limits, except such portions thereof as are here
inafter expressly exempted from the operations of this act,
to-wit: Beginning at a point on the western boundary of the
State of Missouri, where the thirty-seventh parallel of north lati
tude crosses the 'same; thence west on said parallel to the east
ern boundary of New Mexico ; thence north on said boundary
to latitude thirty-eight ; thence following said boundary westward
to the summit of the highlands dividing the waters flowing into
the Colorado of the West, or Green river, from the waters flow
ing into the Great Basin; thence northward on said summit to
the fortieth parallel of latitude; thence east on said parallel to
the western boundary of the State of Missouri ; thence south
with the western boundary of said State to the place of begin
ning, be, and the same is hereby, created into a temporary gov
ernment by the name of the Territory of Kansas."
It will be observed at this juncture that this was the first
time Kansas began to figure in the history of the country. It
should also be borne in mind that this date witnessed the first
plans for making all the country west of Alissouri and Iowa
slave territory, should the inhabitants so decide. The plan to
form two territories instead of one out of that vast tract and
to leave the question of slavery to the inhabitants themselves,
was the direct outgrowth in the committee rooms of congress
of the numerous petitions which had recently been received by
that body. The pro-slavery partisans decided to make an effort
to nationalize that institution, and in their deliberations hit upon
the plausible scheme to leave the question of slavery to the people
themselves. It will be seen that Kansas Territory was not made
to include the strip along the northern border of what is now

?Omitted from the congressional description.

458 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Indian and Oklahoma Territories, the evident intention being to
leave the Indian lands undivided. If the question of slavery
was to be left to the inhabitants throughout all the western
country, it did not matter, it was realized, whether the parallel
of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes was observed or not. So the
Territories of Kansas and Nebraska were pushed northward half
a degree, leaving abundant room south of Kansas and north
of Texas for the aborigines. The plans of the pro-slavery leaders
in congress were fathomed by the anti-slavery wing, and imme
diately every step was hotly contested. These reasons for the
change were given, as shown by the following extract:
"On January 23, 1854, Mr. Douglas, of Illinois, in the United
States senate, stated that the attention of the Committee on Ter
ritories had been called by the chairman of the Committee on
Indian Affairs to the fact that the line thirty-six degrees thirty
minutes north latitude would divide the Cherokee country;
whereas, by taking the parallel of thirty-seven degrees of north
latitude as the southern boundary of Kansas _tlie line would run
between the Cherokees and the Osages; and that the Committee
had, therefore, concluded to vary the . southern boundary so as
not to divide the Cherokee nation, by the terms of the bill."*
Mr. English, of Indiana, afterward candidate for vice-president
of the United States on the ticket with General Hancock, corn-
batted the previously proposed boundaries of Kansas Territory.
He said: "In the first place, I object to the boundaries pro
posed. The country to be organized into territories, as gentle
men are aware, lies, in the main, adjacent to and west of the
States of Missouri and Iowa, and extends westwardly to the
Territories of Utah, Oregon and perhaps Washington. Now,
what are the natural boundaries of these proposed Territories?
I design speaking more particularly to the Territory of Kansas,
which is the lower and more southern pf the two Territories, and
the one in which slavery will exist, if it exists in either. Now,
of course, all will say that the eastern boundary of the proposed
Territory of Kansas should be the present boundary of the State
of Missouri ; and I think it is equally clear that the western bound
ary of the proposed Territory of Kansas should be the present
boundary of Utah Territory. And I think that this will appear
in a much stronger light when we come to consider the nature
of the existing boundary of Utah. Sir, what is it? We find
it established by law. We find that it is the crest or summit of
the Rocky mountains; a boundary, sir, which no man can mis-

? Senate Reports, First Session, Fiftieth Congress.

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 459
take; a boundary erected by the hand of the Almighty, that all
men can understand it. I say, sir, that this is the natural bound
ary which should be assigned to that Territory, and I think that
this House will be surprised to know that it is not the bound
ary proposed by the bill now under consideration. The framers
of this bill propose extending the Territory of Kansas not only
from the State of Alissouri westward to the Rocky mountains —
a distance of perhaps eight hundred miles — a distance equal to
the width of the great States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois — not
only to take it to the summit of the Rocky mountains — but to
take it beyond and run it down to the region of the Great Salt
Lake, so as to include about one-third of the Territory of Utah.
To that I am opposed. ... I think that gentlemen will
be satisfied, when they have examined the map, that the plan
proposed of incorporating the territory west of the Rocky mount
ains and east of the Rocky mountains in the same territory is
injudicious. There is no community of interest between the
people on each side, and but little intercourse, nor can there be.
They have but little intercourse with each other, and ought not
to be placed in the same territory. I have no particular love
for the Alormons, nor for their peculiar institutions ; and I know
that there is much prejudice existing against that people, and
perhaps justly so, in parts of Illinois and Alissouri. Yet I am
not willing to carry these prejudices to the extent of extending
the boundary of this new territory, already too large, so as to
include a large portion of Utah."
In answering Mr. English, Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, chair
man of the committee reporting the bill, said: "There are rea
sons so manifest and so potent in favor of the boundaries which
the committee have determined upon, that no man here can
resist them when stated. . . . One reason why this bound
ary is extended to another territory placed inside of it is this,
that every man residing in that portion of the territory taken
from the Territory of Utah, comes here and asks this Govern
ment to take them from under the power under which they are
now placed. Bridger, who has lived here thirty years, emigrated
to that Territory in 1823, established trading posts in the mount
ains, built up in the waste and howling wilderness a home for
himself and family, was finally driven from the possession of
that property by the hands of the power of that Government,
and is now here in this city. For one, I desire to yield to the
application made by this man and those placed in similar circum
stances, when they ask to be placed under a different govern
ment. . . . The lawless hand that characterizes these peo-

,46o THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
pie ought not to be encouraged and promoted by this Govern
ment, and fo.r one, I am not for doing so. It is a sufficient rea
son, I have no doubt, when I have stated to the House the rea
sons which have influenced the committee of the two Houses to
change this territorial boundary, and it is a sufficient .reply to
all that has been said about it. . One grand object for
establishing territorial government there now is to cover that-
line of travel which is pursuing its way to the Pacific oceari,
affording protection to the interests that lie along that road of
travel. It strikes me that the interests of the emigrants, as they
go towards the Pacific ocean, are identical with those of the
Territories through which they must pass, and there cannot be
any antagonism between them, I think. There may be antag
onism between rival routes, but between settlements lying along
the same route of travel there must be sympathy and the same
interest. The gentleman is mistaken about another thing, that
we have established an ideal boundary — that we have passed
over the natural boundary and established a mere ideal one. The
boundary proposed in this bill is as good a one as can be fixed."
Immediately succeeding the remarks of Mr. Richardson, there
followed a sharp parliamentary contest, during which Mr. Eng
lish (of the committee of Territories) asked the consent of the
house to make a minority report. After severe contention, this
privilege was .granted. He thereupon asked to have the proposed -
boundaries of Kansas Territory changed as follows: "Amend
the section defining the boundary of Kansas so as to make the
eastern boundary of Utah, viz., 'The summit of the Rocky mount
ains,' the western boundary of Kansas." Upon motion of Mr.
English, his report (which was not strictly a minority report)
was referred to the committee on Territories.
During the debate, and before the committee had brought in
the bill for the erection of two territories, Mr. Chase, of Ohio,
moved to amend the first substitute (providing -for the forma
tion of Nebraska Territory alone) by striking out of the first
section all after the word "Nebraska" and inserting the follow
ing: "That all that part of the United States included within
the following limits, except such portions thereof as are herein
after expressly exempted from the operations of this act, to-wit:
Beginning at the southwest corner of the State of Missouri,
thence running west on the line of thirty-six degrees thirty min
utes of north latitude until it intersects the one hundred and third
meridian of longitude west from Greenwich ; thence north on
that meridian until it intersects the thirty-eighth parallel of north
latitude; thence west on said parallel of latitude to the summit

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 461
of the Rocky mountains ; thence northward and along upon the
summit of said Rocky mountains to the (forty-ninth parallel of
latitude; thence east to the)* western boundary of the Territory
of Minnesota White Earth river; thence southward on and with
said boundary to the Missouri river; thence down the said river
to the State of Alissouri; thence south on and with the west
ern boundary of said State to the place of beginning, be, and
the same is hereby, created a temporary government by the name
of the Territory of Nebraska." After a protracted and fiery
debate, the yeas and nays were called for on the Chase amend
ment, with the following result: yeas 8, nays 34. Mr. Dodge,
of Iowa, moved to amend so that the proposed boundaries would
not interfere with the then present limits of Utah Territory ; car
ried. The bill as amended went to a third reading, by yeas 29,
nays 12. On the final passage of the bill in the senate, the vote
stood: yets 37, nays 14, though others voted later by unanimous
consent. The title decided upon was, "A bill to organize the
Territories of Nebraska and Kansas."
Mr. Giddings, of Ohio, in a speech on the Kansas-Nebraska
bill, said: "I lay it down that the French nation claimed title
(to the province of Louisiana) solely by that rule or law among
nations which gives to the government making, the discovery of
an important river the country drained by its waters. By that
rule and by no other was Louisiana bounded. The Rocky mount
ains, which bounded the tributaries of the Mississippi, was the
western boundary of Louisiana as understood by the French
nation, as understood by the American nation, as understood by
Congress, as understood by all our statesmen down to a very
recent period. This is my view of the matter. I know it to
"have been so understood by leading men of that day. In the
word of the treaty ceding Louisiana to us, there was no room
for misapprehension or misunderstanding of the boundaries. It
was Louisiana as held by France previous to her ceding it to
Spain. It is, therefore, under the original title of France that
we hold that country, bounded as it was while in her possession.
Such was the title which we received, and which was held for
something like sixteen years. We held the entire country drained
by the southern tributaries of the Arkansas, as well as that
drained by its northern tributaries. The Middle Park, to which
allusion has been made at the other end of the capitol, empties
its waters into the Colorado, and not into the Mississippi ; and
we had no more title to the Middle Park under the Louisiana Pur-

? Omitted from the congressional description.

462 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
chase than we had to California or Oregon. I intend to say:
the dividing ridge between the Colorado and the waters of the
Arkansas was the boundary of that purchase. Now, in 1819,
when the negotiation of the treaty with Spain was entered into —
some sixteen years subsequent to the treaty with France, by
which we obtained this territory — Spain owned the whole coun
try adjacent on the southwest, and then by the treaty with Spain,
the boundary between that country and ours was defined and
established without following the lines of the 'Louisiana Pur
chase.' In that treaty we surrendered to Spain the whole of the
country watered by, the southern tributaries of the Arkansas,
which empty their waters into that river west of the hundredth
degree of longitude. That country, which constituted a part of
the Louisiana purchase, was given to Spain, and the boundary
was established on the Arkansas river, instead of on the south
ern divide which separates its tributaries from those streams
which run south. Following the Arkansas to its source, the
line agreed upon runs thence due north until it strikes the forty-
second degree of north latitude, thus giving to us that tract which
Fremont describes as the Middle Park, whose waters empty into
the Colorado. This tract had belonged to Spain until the rati
fication of our treaty in 182 1. It constituted no part of Loui
siana, and did not belong to us when the Missouri compromise
was adopted; and of course could never have been subjected to
that compromise, which was confined to the territory ceded to
us by France. The Middle Park was held by Spain by force
of the same principle which France held Louisiana — by discov
ery — claiming the whole country watered by the tributaries of
their streams, among which was the Colorado."* In the bill
finally agreed upon in 1854, the following boundaries were given
to Kansas and Nebraska:
"That all that part of the Territory of the United States
included within the following limts, except such portions thereof
as are hereinafter expressly exempted from the operations of
this act, to-wit: Beginning at a point on the western boundary
of the State of Missouri where the thirty-seventh parallel of north
latitude crosses the same; thence west on said parallel to the
eastern boundary of New Alexico; thence north on said bound
ary to latitude thirty-eight ; thence following said boundary west
ward to the east boundary of the Territory of Utah on the
summit of the Rocky mountains ; thence northward on said sunv

? This statement should'be noted, That the United States from 1803 to 1819 pos
sessed the Upper Arkansas country, but not the middle Park; and after 1819 it
possessed the latter but not the former.

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 463
mit to the fortieth parallel of latitude; thence east on said par
allel to the western boundary of the State of Missouri ; thence
south with the western boundary of said State to the place of
beginning, be, and the same is hereby, created into a temporary
Government by the name of the Territory of Kansas : Provided,
That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to inhibit
the Government of the United States from dividing said Ter
ritory into two or more Territories in such manner and at such
times" as Congress shall deem convenient and proper, or from
attaching any portion of said territory to any other State or
Territory of the United States : Provided further, That nothing
in this act contained shall be construed to impair the rights of
person or property now pertaining to the Indians in said Ter
ritory, so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by
treaty between the United States and such Indians ; or to include
any territory which by treaty with any Indian tribe is not with
out the consent of said tribe to be included within the territorial
limits or jurisdiction of any State or Territory ; but all such ter
ritory shall be excepted out of the boundaries and constitute no
part of the Territory of Kansas until said tribe shall signify their
assent to the President of the United States to be included within
the said Territory of Kansas, or to affect the authority of the
Government of the United States to make any regulation respect
ing such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights, by treaty,
law, or otherwise, which it would have been competent to the
Government to make if this act had never passed."
"That all that part of the territory of the United States included
within the following limits, except such portions thereof as are
hereinafter expressly exempted from the operations of this act,
to-wit: Beginning at a point on the Missouri river where the
fortieth parallel of north latitude crosses the same; thence west
on said parallel to the east boundary of the Territory of Utah
on the summit of the Rocky mountains; thence on said summit
northward to the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, thence
east on said parallel to the western boundary of the Territory
of Minnesota; thence southward on said boundary to the Mis
souri river; thence down the main channel of said river to the
place of beginning, be, and the same is hereby created into a tem
porary Government by the name of the Territory of Nebraska."
The same provisions as were attached to the admission of Kan
sas were also attached to the admission of Nebraska.
Beginning in 1855 and continuing until 1861, the people of
the Territory of Kansas made annual and continuous efforts to
secure admission into the Union under various pretexts and

464 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
organizations. No change was asked in the territorial bound
aries. But in the minds of congress, other obstacles were suffi
cient to warrant the rejection of the demands from all sources,
and hence it was not until 1861, after the southern members had
resigned from congress, that the state was admitted. On Janu
ary 28, 1861, Mr. Grow, of Pennsylvania, said: "It is now five
years almost since a bill first passed for the admission of Kan
sas into the Union." It was deemed an opportune time, and
accordingly Kansas was given the privileges of statehood.
The people of Nebraska Territory were enabled by the act of
congress approved April 19, 1864, to form a constitution and
state government, the following-being the wording of the con
gressional enactment: "That the inhabitants of that portion of
the Territory of Nebraska included in the boundary hereafter
designated," etc.,- etc. "Commencing at a point formed by the
intersection of the western boundary of the State of Missouri
with the fortieth degree of north latitude; extending thence due
west along said fortieth degree of north latitude to a point formed -
by its intersection with the twenty-fifth degree of longitude west
from Washington, thence north along said twenty-fifth degree
of longitude to a point formed by its intersection with the forty-
first degree of north latitude; thence west along said forty-first
degree of north latitude to a point formed by its intersection wi^h
the twenty-seventh degree of longitude west from Washington ;
thence north along said twenty-seventh degree of west longitude
to a point formed by its intersection with the forty-third degree
of north latitude ; thence east along said forty-third degree, of
north latitude to the Keya Paha river; thence down the middle
of the channel of said river with its meanderings to its junction
with the Niobrara river; thence down the middle of the chan
nel of said Niobrara river and following the meanderings thereof
to its junction with the Missouri river ; thence down, the middle
of the channel of said Missouri river and following the meander
ings thereof to the place of beginning." This act admitting
Nebraska into the Union was vetoed by President Johnson, and
was passed by both senate and house over his veto, but was made
inoperative until certain conditions had been fulfilled. The proc
lamation of March 1, 1867, completed its admission into the
Union. The act of July 20, 1868, appropriated the sum of four thou
sand eight hundred dollars for the survey of the boundary line
between Nebraska and Colorado Territory, "and that portion of
the western boundary of the State of Nebraska embraced between

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 465
the forty-first and forty-third degrees of north latitude," estimated
at three hundred and twenty miles.
The act of April 28, 1870, provided, "That so soon as the
State of Nebraska through her Legislature has given her con
sent thereto, the center of the main channel of the Missouri river
shall be the boundary line between the State of Nebraska and
the Territory of Dakota between the following points," to-wit:
Commencing at a point in the center of said main channel north
of the west line of section twenty-four, in township twenty-nine
north, range eight east, of the Sixth Principal meridian, and
running along the same to a point west of the most northerly
portion of fractional section 17, of township twenty-nine north,
range nine east, of said meridian, in the State of Nebraska,
as meandered and shown by the plats and surveys of said sections
originally made and now on file in the general land office."
By the act of March 28, 1882, congress provided "that the
northern boundary of the State of Nebraska shall be, and hereby
is, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, extended so
as to include all that portion of the Territory of Dakota lying
south of the forty-third parallel of north latitude and east of
the Keya Paha river and west of the main channel of the Mis
souri river ;• and when the Indian title to the lands thus described
shall be extinguished, the jurisdiction over such lands shall be,
and hereby is, ceded to the State of Nebraska and subject to
all the conditions and limitations provided in the act of Con
gress admitting Nebraska into the Union; and the northern
boundary of the State shall be extended to said forty-third par
allel as fully and effectually as if said lands had been included
in the boundaries of said State at the time of its admission to
the Union; reserving to the United States the original right of
soil in said lands and of disposing of the same : Provided, That
this act, so far as jurisdiction is concerned, shall not take effect
until the President shall, by proclamation, declare that the Indian
title to said lands has been extinguished, nor shall it take effect
until the State of Nebraska shall have assented to the provisions
of this act; and if the State of Nebraska shall not by an act of
its Legislature consent to the provisions of this act within two
years next after the passage hereof, this act shall cease and be of
no effect."
The boundary line between the United States and California
was ordered to be run by act of congress approved May 26, i860,
and the sum of fifty-five thousand dollars was appropriated to
defray the necessary expense. The line was defined as follows :
II—30

466 ' THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
"Commencing at the point of intersection of the forty-second
degree of north latitude with the one hundred and twentieth
degree of longitude west from Greenwich, and running south on
the line of said one hundred and twentieth degree of west longi
tude until it intersects the thirty-ninth degree of north latitude;
thence running in a straight line in a southeasterly direction to
the river Colorado at a point where it intersects the thirty-fifth
degree of north latitude."
During the period of the Civil war,, it was very easy for any
territory having such an ambition, to become a state ; or for any
tract of country having a few inhabitants to become a territory.
The historic struggles over the admission of states during the
slave era, were not forgotten; and the North, having absolute
control of both congress and the government, lost no time, after
the bombardment of Fort Sumter, in providing for the erection
of some half dozen territories and states. The old policy had
been to permit the territory to become a suppliant for statehood —
to require the citizens to call a convention, adopt a constitution,
elect the necessary officers as an evidence of their preparation,
fitness and desire for state government, and then pray, often amid
bitter wailings for many years, for admission into the glorious
Union. The long wait made the prize all the more eagerly sought
for and all the more cherished after being secured. The high
attainment of becoming a star on "Old Glory," was thus designed
to be made worthy of prayer and humility by any state. But
during the Civil war all was changed. The territories were not
even asked if they had enmasse adopted constitutions and had
knocked for admission. The door was opened to all without
knocking. There was no telling how soon the southern sena
tors would be back again to close the door against all states save
those sanctioning the institution of slavery. It was necessary,
therefore, not only to make hay while the sun shone, but also
in the night. It was a proud time for the American eagle.
The inhabitants of what is now Colorado prepared eight large
memorials to congress, which were read in both house and sen
ate in February, i860, praying that they might have a territo
rial government, and asked that the territory proposed should
have the following boundaries : "Commencing at a point where
the thirty-seventh degree of north latitude crosses the one hun
dred and second degree of west longitude, and running north
on said meridian to the forty-third degree of north latitude, thence
west on said parallel to the one hundred and tenth degree of
west longitude ; thence south on said meridian to the thirty-seventh
degree of north latitude, thence east on said parallel to the place

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 467
of beginning." No name for the proposed territory was men
tioned in the memorials.
On April 3, i860, Mr. Green, from the committee on Terri
tories, introduced in the United States senate a bill for the for
mation of the Territory of Idaho, but a little later the name was
changed to Colorado. It came up again the next session, and pro
posed taking off of the Territory of Utah a small tract and attach
ing it to the new territory, but this change was not agreed to.
All of New Mexico above the thirty-seventh parallel, called the
"notch," was attached to Colorado Territory. During the dis
cussion, Senator Douglas, of Illinois, said: "In the first place,
I object to the boundary named in the bill. This boundary cuts
off a large portion of New Alexico and annexes it to the new
Territory of Colorado. The portion thus cut off is New Mexico
territory and formerly belonged to the Republic of Mexico. The
land. titles are derived from that Government: the inhabitants
are mostly Mexicans ; they are governed by Alexican laws and
usages. I see no reason why they should be separated.
By the laws of New Mexico, that is slave territory. This is
detaching that portion of slave territory, . . . and attach
ing it to the new Territory of Colorado. . . . The substi
tute "which I have prepared makes the territorial boundary
conform to the existing boundary." Mr. Green, of Missouri,
in answering, said: "On the subject of the proposed southern
boundary of this Territory, cutting off a portion of New Mex
ico, I must be permitted to make this remark: That I thought
it ought not to be cut off ; but at the same time I was compelled
to say that I thought so simply from my desire to please the dele
gate from that Territory, and that the proper division of the
Territory required it to be cut off. It does not cut off five inhab
itants, according to my opinion, and not a single nigger."
(Laughter.) The boundaries prescribed for the Territory of Colorado, as
set forth in the act of congress approved February 28, 1861,
were as follows: "Commencing on the thirty-seventh parallel
of north latitude where the twenty-fifth meridian of longitude
west from Washington crosses the same ; thence north on said
meridian to the forty-first parallel of north latitude ; thence along
said parallel west to the thirty-second meridian of longitude west
from Washington ; thence south on said meridian to the north
line of New Mexico; thence along the thirty-seventh parallel of
north latitude to the place of beginning." It was stipulated that
the Indian lands within these boundaries should be exempted
from the control of the Territory; that the government reserved

468 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
the right to change the boundaries of the Territory should such
proceeding be necessary for future purposes.
The inhabitants of Colorado, by act of March 21, 1864, were
enabled to form a constitution and state government preparatory
for admission into the Union, and given the following territorial
limits: "Commencing at a point formed by the intersection of
the thirty-seventh degree of north latitude with the twenty-fifth
degree of longitude west from Washington ; extending thence due
west along said thirty-seventh degree of north latitude to a point
formed by its intersection with the thirty-second degree of longi
tude west from Washington, thence due north along said thirty-
second degree of north latitude to a point formed by its inter
section with the forty-first degree of north -latitude; thence due
east along said forty-first degree of north latitude to a point
formed by its intersection with the twenty-fifth degree of longi
tude west from Washington ; thence due south along said twenty-
fifth degree of west longitude" to the place -of beginning. Not
withstanding that the boundaries of the state were made precisely
the same as those of the territory, the following language was
used in the act of March 21, 1864: "That the inhabitants of
that portion of the Territory of Colorado included in the bound
aries hereinafter designated, be, and they are hereby, authorized
to form for themselves out of said Territory, a State government,
with the name aforesaid." This language would seem to signify
that a portion of the territory was left outside of the state limits ;
but such was not the fact. But the inhabitants did not take
advantage of this permission to form a state government, for
reasons beyond the province of this chapter.
The act of March, 3, 1875, enabled the people of the Territory
of Colorado to form a constitution and state government and to
be admitted to the Union. The boundaries were established as
follows: "Commencing on the thirty-seventh parallel of north
latitude where the twenty-fifth meridian of longitude west from
Washington crosses the same; thence north on said meridian to
the forty-first parallel of north latitude ; thence along said parallel
west to the thirty-second meridian of longitude west from Wash
ington ; thence south on said meridian to the thirty-seventh parallel
of north latitude; thence along said thirty-seventh parallel of
north latitude to the place of beginning."
The act of March 2, 1861, created Dakota Territory with
bounds as follows: "That all that part of the territory of the
United States included within the following limits, namely:
Commencing at a point in the main channel of the Red River of
the North where the forty-ninth degree of north latitude crosses

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 469
the same ; thence up the main channel of the same and along the
boundary of the State of Alinnesota to Big Stone Lake ; thence
along the boundary line of the said State of Alinnesota to the
Iowa line; thence along the boundary line of the State of Iowa
to the point of intersection between the Big Sioux and Missouri
rivers ; thence up. the Alissouri river and along the boundary line
of the Territory of Nebraska to the mouth of the Niobrara or
Running water river ; thence following up the same in the middle
of the main channel thereof to the mouth of the Keha Paha or
Turtle Hill river ; thence up said river to the forty-third parallel
of north latitude ; thence due west to the present boundary of the
Territory of Washington; thence along the boundary line of
Washington Territory to the forty-ninth degree of north latitude ;
thence east along said forty-ninth degree of north latitude to the
place of beginning, be, and the same is hereby, organized into a
temporary government by the name of the Territory of Dakota."
In the same act was the following change: "That the river in
said Territory (Dakota) heretofore known as the River aux
Jacques or James river shall hereafter be called the Dakota river."
The Indian lands within the boundaries of the territory were.
excluded from the operations of the act; and the government
reserved the right to subdivide the territory or attach portions
of it to other territories. It was also provided in the same act
"That until Congress shall otherwise direct, that portion of the
Territories of Utah and Washington between the forty-first and
the forty-third degree of north latitude and east of the thirty-third
meridian of longitude west from Washington shall be and is
hereby incorporated into and made a part of the Territory of
Nebraska." Dakota Territory thus formed embraced all of the
present North and South Dakotas, and portions of Wyoming and
Montana. The act of May 26, 1864, made the provision "That until Con
gress shall otherwise direct, all that part of the Territory of
Idaho included within the following boundaries, towit: Com
mencing at a point formed by the intersection of the thirty-third
degree of longitude west from Washington with the forty-first
degree of north latitude ; thence along said thirty-third degree of
longitude to the crest of the Rocky mountains ; thence northward
along the said crest of the Rocky mountains to its intersection with
the forty-fourth degree and thirty minutes of north latitude;
thence westward along said forty-fourth degree and thirty minutes
north latitude to the thirty-fourth degree of longitude west from
Washington; thence northward along said thirty-fourth degree
of longitude to its intersection with the forty-fifth degree of north

470 ' THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
latitude; thence eastward along said forty-fifth degree of north
latitude to its intersection with the twenty-seventh degree of longi
tude west from Washington ; thence south along said twenty-
seventh degree of longitude west from Washington to the forty -
first degree of north latitude; thence west along said forty-first
degree of north latitude to the place of beginning, shall be and is
hereby incorporated temporarily into and made part of the Ter
ritory of Dakota." The tract thus attached to the Territory of
Dakota embraced nearly all of the present State of Wyoming.
An act of February 17, 1873, provided "That all that portion
of Dakota Territory lying west of the one hundred and eleventh
meridian of longitude, which, by an erroneous definition of the
boundaries of said Territory by a former act of Congress, remains
detached and distant from Dakota proper some two hundred
miles, be, and the same is hereby, attached to the adjoining Terri
tory of Alontana." Congress was under the impression that a
mistake had been made, but all of the territory was found to
have been accounted for, and hence the act was inoperative.
As early as 1871 the legislature of Dakota Territory passed a
resolution praying for a division of the territorial limits. This
was repeated in 1872, 1874 and 1877. It protested in 1879
against a certain division. In February, 1872, the committee on
territories reported favorably a bill for the erection of Pembina
Territory north of the forty-sixth parallel of latitude. They
made the same recommendation in 1874. In 1878 it was proposed
in the senate to form a territory with the following limits : From
the forty-third to the forty-ninth degrees of north latitude, and
from the twenty-third to the twenty-eighth degrees of longitude
west from Washington. This tract embraced the eastern parts
of Wyoming and Montana and the western parts of the two
Dakotas, with the Black Hills country as the center. In 1881
the senate committee reported favorably on the formation of
Pembina Territory on the north and Dakota Territory on the
south. Early in the eighties a majority report of the committee
was favorable for the formation of one state of all of the two
Dakotas, but the minority reported adversely. At this time also
the project of naming the northern portion "Lincoln Territory"
was set afoot. A little later the plan which finally triumphed —
that of forming two governments of the territory, and calling the
northern portion North Dakota and the southern South Dakota —
was projected. In 1885 a bill for the erection of a territory from
all of the Dakotas west of the Missouri river was introduced in
congress. In 1885 Mr. Springer, of Illinois, introduced a bill
enabling the Territories of Dakota, Montana, Washington and

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 471
New Mexico to form state governments. In the early memorials
and bills the dividing line was usually placed on the forty-sixth
parallel, but later, the petitioners asked to have it located on the
seventh standard parallel, which was situated about five miles to
the southward of the forty-sixth parallel. The reason given for
the retention of the Indian term "Dakota" for the two divisions
was because all the inhabitants had become attached to the name
and desired the two divisions to be named North Dakota and South
Dakota. In 1881 the legislature of Dakota Territory adopted a
memorial, praying for a division of the territory into three sec
tions, each to be given a separate government. It passed the
house by one majority and the council by six majority. It seemed
to be the determination of the inhabitants of Dakota Territory
either to form two states out of its territory or to retain its terri
torial form of government. There was no question as to limits,
except as to whether the forty-sixth parallel of north latitude or
the seventh standard parallel should be the dividing line. The lat
ter was finally decided upon, because the surveys had been based
on that line. The statehood question was again agitated in
1885-7, but without definite result.
On the 22d of February, 1889, congress passed an act for the
division of Dakota Territory into two states and for enabling the
people of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Washing
ton to form constitutions and state governments and to be admit
ted to the Union on an equal footing with the other states.
Dakota Territory was divided as follows : "The area comprising
the Territory of Dakota shall, for the purposes of this act, be
divided on the line of the seventh standard parallel produced due
west to the western boundary of said Territory."
By proclamation of President Harrison November 8, 1889,
Montana Territory, having complied with all the usual condi
tions and requirements, was declared to be one of the states of
the Union. On November 2, 1889, both North and South Dakota
were proclaimed to be states. No change was made in the bound
aries of Dakota Territory in the formation of the two states.
The territory was merely divided on the seventh standard parallel
of latitude. The State of Alontana was given the same bound
aries as the Territory of Montana. By act of September 25, 1890,
the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars was appropriated to defray
the expense of making the survey of the line between North and
South Dakota. The act of August 5, 1892, appropriated twenty
thousand dollars to survey and mark the boundary line between
the States of Nebraska and South Dakota west of the Missouri
river. In 1894 the sum of five hundred dollars was appropriated

472 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
for retracing part of the boundary between the States of Louisi
ana and Arkansas and the State of Texas. The act of April 23,
1897, appropriated the sum of seven thousand six hundred and
fifty dollars for the survey of certain portions of the boundary line
between Montana and Idaho.. By act of July 24, 1897, congress
consented to the compact between South Dakota and Nebraska,
whereby the boundary line between those two states was slightly
changed. This was opposite Dixon county, Neb., and Clay
county, S. D. "For the resurvey and reestablishment on
the line of the thirty-seventh parallel of north latitude of the
boundary line between the State of Colorado and the Territories
of New Mexico and Oklahoma, which is coincident with said
parallel between the twenty-fifth and thirty-second degrees of
west longitude from Washington," a calculated distance of three
hundred eighty-seven and one-eighth miles, the sum of thirty-one
thousand five hundred dollars was appropriated by act of July 1,
1902. On January 15, 1864, Mr. Ramsey, of Minnesota, introduced a
bill for a change of boundary between Wisconsin and Minnesota,
but the committee reported adversely on the project. In 1870
Senator Howard, of Michigan, introduced a bill for the division
of the State of Texas and the formation therefrom of three states
to be named Texas, Jefferson and Matagorda. In 1878 a bill
was introduced to attach the Black Hills country of Dakota to
Wyoming. In 1886 a bill provided for the annexation of a part
of Idaho to Montana.
The Territory of Idaho was created by act of March 3, 1863,
with the following limits : "Beginning at a point in the middle
channel of the Snake river where the northern boundary of Ore
gon intersects the same; thence following said channel of Snake
river to a point opposite the mouth of the Kooskooskia or Clear
Water river ; thence due north to the forty-ninth parallel of north
latitude ; thence east along said parallel to the twenty-seventh
degree of longitude west of Washington ; thence south along said
degree of longitude to the northern boundary of Colorado Terri
tory; thence west along said boundary to the thirty-third degree
of longitude west of Washington ; thence north along said degree
to the forty-second parallel of latitude; thence west along said
parallel to the eastern boundary of the State of Oregon; thence
north along said boundary to the place of beginning." It was
thus made to embrace all of the present Idaho, all of Montana,
and all of Wyoming except the southwest corner. It was
restricted to its present boundaries when Montana and Wyoming
were erected.

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 473
By the act of July 3, 1890, the eastern boundary of Idaho
Territory was established as follows: "Beginning at the inter
section of the thirty-ninth meridian with the boundary line between
the United States and the British possessions ; then following said
meridian south until it reaches the summit of the Bitter Root
mountains; thence southeastward along the crest of the Bitter
Root mountain range and the continental divide until it intersects
the meridian of thirty-four degrees of longitude ; thence south
ward on this meridian to the forty-second parallel of latitude ;
thence west on this parallel of latitude to its intersection with a
meridian drawn through the mouth of the Owyhee river ; thence
down the mid-channel of the Snake river to the mouth of the
Clear Water river ; and thence north on the meridian which passes
through the mouth of the Clear Water to the boundary line
between the United States and the British possessions, and east
on said boundary line to the place of beginning." This gave it
the boundaries it has since possessed.
Congress by act of May 26, 1864, provided a temporary govern
ment for a new territory having the following limits : "That all
that part of the territory of the United States included within the
limits, towit : Commencing at a point formed by the intersection
of the twenty-seventh degree of longitude west from Washing
ton with the forty-fifth degree of north latitude ; thence due west
on said forty-fifth degree of latitude to a point formed by its
intersection with the thirty-fourth degree of longitude west from
Washington ; thence due south along said thirty- fourth degree of
longitude to its intersection with the forty-fourth degree thirty
minutes of north latitude ; thence due west along said forty- fourth
degree and thirty minutes of north latitude to a point formed by
its intersection with the crest of the Rocky mountains ; thence
following the crest of the Rocky mountains northward till its
intersection with the Bitter Root mountains; thence northward
along the crest of said Bitter Root mountains to its intersection
with the thirty-ninth degree of longitude west from Washington ;
thence along said thirty-ninth degree of west longitude northward
to the boundary line of the British possessions ; thence eastward
along said boundary line to the twenty-seventh degree of longitude
west from Washington; thence southward along said twenty-
seventh degree of longitude to the place of beginning, be, and
the same is hereby, created into a temporary government by the
name of the Territory of Montana." The Indians within these
limits were excluded from territorial management; and the right
to change the boundaries, or to attach portions to other territories,

474 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
was reserved by the government. This was the same as its pres
ent boundaries.
In June, 1868, a bill for the formation of the Territory of
Wyoming was introduced in the United States senate. The name
of this territory was at first "Lincoln," but after long discussion,
and without disparagement to the "Great Emancipator," it was
finally determined to cling to the custom of naming the states with
some Indian designation. The name "Wyoming" came directly
from a town of that name in Pennsylvania, and indirectly from
the Indians. During the consideration of this bill, Mr. Yates,
of Illinois, said, "Dakota Territory which comprises almost all
the proposed Territory of Lincoln (Wyoming), is composed of
two immense areas almost distinct from each other; more dis
tinct than the territories of Wisconsin and Illinois, or Missouri
and Iowa, for the latter states join each other contiguously in
their whole breadth, while the two divisions of Dakota only
touch each other for about one-quarter of the extent of the Ter
ritory, north and south, for only about two degrees on the one hun
dred and fourth meridian of west longitude. The eastern division
is nearly four hundred miles square, extending from latitude
forty three degrees north to latitude forty-nine degrees north, and
from longitude ninety-six and some minutes west to longitude one
hundred and four west. In this area and near the eastern bound
ary is Yankton, the capital of the territory. The other area extends
from latitude forty-one degrees north to latitude forty-five degrees
north, and from longitude one hundred and four degrees west to
longitude one hundred and eleven degrees west, being three hun
dred and fifty miles long and three hundred wide, and out of this
latter area it is proposed to constitute the Territory of Lincoln."
He stated that the bill detached a small portion of the Territory
of Utah, and attached it to the proposed Territory of Wyoming,
upon the tract being Fort Bridger. It also took a strip from
Idaho and attached it to Wyoming Territory.
The boundaries defined in the Wyoming bill saw many changes.
The territory had to be cut wholly from surrounding territories,
and various objections were introduced. The language in the
original bill was as follows : "That the territory now known as
Dakota lying west of the one hundred and fourth degree of west
longitude, be, and the same is hereby, organized into a temporary
government by the name of the Territory of Wyoming." It
was moved to amend this boundary by striking out this language
and inserting the following: "That the territory of the United
States described as follows : Commencing at the intersection of
the twenty-seventh meridian of west longitude from Washington

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 475;
with the forty-fifth degree of north latitude, and running thence
west to the thirty-fourth meridian of west longitude, thence south
to the forty-first degree of north latitude, thence east to the twenty-
seventh meridian of west longitude, and thence north to the place
of beginning, be and the same is hereby, organized into a tem
porary government by the name of the Territory of Wyoming."
Provision for a territorial government was definitely made for
the Territory of Wyoming by act of congress approved July 25,
1868, the following being the boundaries : "That all that part
of the United States described as follows: Commencing at the
intersection of the twenty-seventh meridian of longitude west from
Washington with the forty-fifth degree of north latitude and
running thence west to the thirty-fourth meridian of west longi
tude; thence south to the forty-first degree of north latitude;
thence east to the twenty-seventh meridian of west longitude ; and
thence north to the place of beginning, be, and the same is hereby,
organized into a temporary government by the name of the Ter
ritory of Wyoming." The government reserved the usual rights
to manage the Indians, and to divide the territory or attach por
tions of it to other territories. The Territory of Wyoming was
carved out of the limits of Dakota Territory, and the laws of the
latter were to remain in force until repealed by those of the new
territory. The enabling act was to be in full force and effect from
and after the time when the necessary officers should be appointed
and be duly qualified. The boundaries have since been the same,
except slight changes at the reservations.
The act of July 10, 1890, provided for the admission of the
State of Wyoming into the Union, and gave it the following
boundaries : "That the said state shall consist of all the territory
included within the following boundaries, towit : Commencing at
the intersection of the twenty-seventh meridian of longitude west
from Washington with the forty-fifth degree of north latitude, and
running thence west to the thirty-fourth meridian of west longi
tude; thence south to the forty-first degree of north latitude;
thence east to the twenty-seventh meridian of west longitude ; and
thence. north to the place of beginning: Provided, That nothing
in this act contained shall repeal or affect any act of Congress
relating to the Yellowstone National Park, or the reservation of
the Park as now defined, or as may be hereafter defined or
extended, or the power of the United States over it."
By the act of March 19, 1872, the president was authorized to
cooperate with Great Britain in the appointment of a joint com
mission for determining the boundary line between the United
States and the British possessions between the Lake of the Woods

.476 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
and the Rocky mountains in accordance with the plans prepared
by Gen. A. A. Humphreys, chief of government engineers. The
sum of fifty thousand dollars was appropriated to meet this
expense. The act of March 3, 1873, appropriated thirteen thou
sand eight hundred fifty dollars for the survey of the western
boundary of the Territory of Wyoming, estimated a distance of
two hundred seventy-seven .miles ; and the sum of two thousand
four hundred dollars for the survey of the southern boundary of
Colorado between the twenty-fifth and the twenty-sixth meridi
ans, estimated sixty miles in length. The act of June 10, 1872, ap
propriated the sum of twenty-two thousand two hundred dollars
for the survey of the southern boundary of Wyoming, an estimated
distance of three hundred seventy miles ; also appropriated eight
thousand four hundred dollars for the survey of the two hun
dred ten miles of the western boundary of Kansas; also the sum
of eight thousand eight hundred dollars for the survey of the
northern boundary of Nebraska, a distance of about two hundred
twenty miles; also the sum of ninety-eight thousand dollars to
complete the survey of the boundary of the Indian country
between the ninety-sixth and the ninety-eighth meridians of west
longitude, i. e., west from Greenwich. For the survey of the
boundary between the United States and the British possessions
from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky mountains pursuant
to the act of Alarch 19, 1872, there was appropriated by the act
of June 11, 1874, the sum of one hundred fifty thousand dollars
to be immediately available from and after the passage of the act.
There was appropriated by congress in 1877 the sum of jeven
thousand dollars for the survey of the eastern boundary of Wyo
ming, an estimated distance of one hundred and thirty-nine miles ;
for retracting the boundary line between Arkansas and Indian
Territory, estimated one hundred and ninety miles, the sum of
nine thousand nine hundred dollars. Of the fifty thousand dol
lars appropriated for the survey of the international line from the
Lake of the Woods to the Rocky mountains, there was an unex
pended balance of fifteen thousand nine hundred ninety-two dol
lars and thirty-six cents. Colorado was proclaimed a state
by President Grant on August 1, 1876, and has since been called
the "Centennial State." For the survey and marking of the
boundary line between Colorado and Utah Territory, congress
appropriated in 1878 the sum of fifteen thousand dollars; and the
following year appropriated twenty thousand dollars for the sur
vey of the northern boundary of Wyoming, being the forty-fifth
parallel of latitude between the twenty-seventh and the thirty-

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 477
fourth meridians of west longitude. A convention to relocate the
boundary between Mexico and the United States west of the Rio
Grande was concluded July 29, 1882. This line had been estab
lished by the treaties of February 2, 1848, and December 30, 1853.
To complete the survey of the boundary between the territories
of Dakota and Montana, an estimated distance of two hundred
and eighty miles, there was appropriated in 1885 the sum of eight
thousand four hundred dollars ; and on the same date for remark
ing the boundary between the State of Colorado and Utah
Territory, a distance of about two hundred ten miles, the sum of
six thousand three hundred dollars. A convention touching the
international boundary line between the United States and Mex
ico where it follows the bed .of the Rio Grande and the Rio Colo
rado, was concluded at Washington November 12, 1884, and
proclaimed September 14, 1886.
The people of Oklahoma, by the act of May 2, 1890, were author
ized to form a temporary government to be called the Territory
of Oklahoma and were given the following boundaries: "That
all that portion of the United States now known -as the Indian
- territory, except so much of the same as is actually occupied by the
five civilized tribes, and the Indian tribes within the Quapaw
Indian Agency, and except the unoccupied part of the Cherokee
Outlet, together with that portion of the United States known as
the Public Land Strip, is hereby erected into a temporary govern
ment by the name of the Territory of Oklahoma. The portion
of the Indian territory included in said Territory of Oklahoma is
bounded by a line drawn as follows: Commencing at a point
where the ninety-eighth meridian crosses the Red river ; thence by
said meridian to the point where it crosses the Canadian river;
thence along said river to the west line of the Seminole country ;
thence along said line to the north fork of the Canadian river;
thence down said river to the west line of the Creek country;
thence along said line to the northwest corner of the Creek coun
try; thence along the north line of the Creek country to the
ninety-sixth meridian ; thence northward by said meridian to the
southern boundary line of Kansas ; thence west along said line
to the Arkansas river; thence down said river to the north line
of the land occupied by the Ponca tribe of Indians, from which
point the line runs so as to include all the lands occupied by the
Ponca, Tonkawa, Otoe and Missouri, and the Pawnee tribes of
Indians, until it strikes the south line of the Cherokee Outlet,
which it follows westward to the east line of the State of Texas ;
thence by the boundary line of the State of Texas to the point of

.478 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
beginning; the Public Land Strip, which is included in the said
Territory of Oklahoma, is bounded east by the one hundredth
meridian, south by Texas, west by New Mexico and north by
-Colorado and Kansas. Whenever the interests of the Cherokee
Indians in the land known as the Cherokee Outlet shall have been
extinguished and the President shall make proclamation thereof,
said outlet shall thereupon and without further legislation, become
a part of the Territory of Oklahoma. Any other lands within the
Indian territory not embraced within these boundaries shall here
after become a part of the Territory of Oklahoma, whenever the
Indian nation or tribe owning such lands shall signify to the
United States in legal manner its assent that such lands shall so
become a part of said Territory of Oklahoma, and the President
.shall thereupon make proclamation to that effect. Congress may
at any time hereafter change the boundaries of said territory, or
attach any portion of the same to any other state or territory of
the United States without the consent of the inhabitants of the
Territory hereby created." The Indians within the boundaries of
Oklahoma Territory were to remain under the control and pro
tection of the government. For judicial purposes, such part of
the Cherokee Outlet as was not thus embraced within the Ter
ritory of Oklahoma was attached to the latter. In the creative
act, it was further said, "That inasmuch as there is a controversy
"between the United States and the States of Texas as to the owner
ship of what is known as Greer county, it is hereby expressly
provided that this act shall not be construed to apply to said
Greer county until the title to the same has been adjudicated and
determined to be in the United States ;" and the attorney general
was authorized to commence and prosecute a suit against the
State of Texas for "the tract of land lying between the North
Fork and South Fork of the Red river where the Indian territory
and the State of Texas adjoin, east of the one hundredth degree
of longitude, and claimed by the State of Texas as within its
boundary and a part of its land and designated on its map as
Greer county."* It will be observed that the public land strip
was thus made a part of the Territory of Oklahoma, but the
Cherokee Outlet was not thus disposed of yet.
The project of forming an exclusive Indian territory seems
first to have been thought of soon after the transfer of the tribes
to the country set apart for them west of the Mississippi river,
or about that time. Mr. Barbour, secretary of war, recommended

? See elsewhere in this chapter for an account of the settlement of this conten
tion.

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 479
as early as 1826 the information of a territorial govermnent over
the Indian country in the west, and the committee of Indian affairs
reported a bill to that effect, but the project advanced no farther at
that time. In 1829, Mr. Eaton, secretary of war, said, "I beg
leave to suggest for your consideration if an Indian Territory,
without the range of western States or Territories, might not be
advantageously created." In 1834 the committee of Indian
affairs reported a bill for the formation of such a territory, and
congress accordingly created and defined Western territory (see
elsewhere). The committee even went so far as to ask that should
such a territory be formed, it would be well to admit it as a state
"when their advancement in civilization would warrant." In
1836 another bill, giving boundaries coincident with the present
territory and Oklahoma and Kansas was introduced in congress.
During the twenty-seventh congress, Mr. Spencer, secretary of
war, said "The plan of something like a territorial government for
the Indians has been suggested. The object is worthy of the most
deliberate consideration of all who take an interest in the fate of
this helpless race." In 1845-6 the American Mission asso
ciation recommended the formation of such an independent
Indian territory, and in response the congressional committee
reported a bill defining the boundaries of the Indian territory
about as above stated, but this project failed. During all this
time the principal argument against the erection of an independ
ent territory, was because the United States was bound not to
do so by the stipulations contained in the various treaties with
the Indians ; which statement was founded on absolute fact.
Several of the Indian nations, particularly the Choctaws, had
made great advancement in the arts of civilization; but in all
cases they protested against the erection of an independent Indian
territory. The bill reported in 1845-6 defined the following
boundaries : "Bounded on the east by Arkansas and Missouri as
far north as the south bank of the Missouri river; on the north
east by the south bank of the said Missouri river to the mouth of
the river Platte ; on the north by the south bank of the said river
Platte to where its north branch crosses the forty-second degree
of north latitude nearest to the twenty-eighth degree of longitude
west from Washington; and by a line upon said latitude to the
Mexican possessions; and bounded west and south by the said
Mexican possessions, shall constitute a territory to be called the
Indian Territory."
The same boundaries were defined in a bill introduced in 1848.
After this the subject seems to have slept until 1871, when a bill
was again introduced in the senate, for the formation of Indian

480 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
Territory. The boundaries were made to embrace about all of
the present territories of the Indians and Oklahoma. When the
subject came up again in 1875 the Cherokee Indians entered a
most vigorous protest, as did also the Osages and other tribes
interested. At this time a bill was pending in the house for the
erection of a territory out of the whole of the then Indian country,
to be called Oklahoma. It was argued in congress that because
many of the Indians had fought against the government during the
rebellion, the tribes in Indian Territory had forfeited their rights
to remain in their own tribal state, as had been guaranteed in
previous treaties, and that, therefore, the territory should be
placed within a government under the jurisdiction of the United
States. The report of the congressional committee reads "All
were declared to have forfeited the protection of the Government
their right to their soil and of self government. One of the con
ditions offered them and insisted upon was a provision authoriz
ing the establishment of a territorial form of government by
Congress over them. This proposition was strenuously resisted
by the delegations of the Cherokees, Choctaws, Creeks, Chicka-
saws and Seminoles then in Washington City. So earnest were
the commissioners on the part of the United States to force this
provision upon them that the then commissioner of Indian Affairs
did not hesitate, to arrogate to himself the unprecedented
authority to depose John Ross, who was and had been for nearly
forty years chief of the Cherokee Nation, and who had fur
nished more men for the Union army according to popula
tion than any State in the Union."* The committee recom
mended, for these and other reasons, that the bill be rejected.
In 1877 another bill of similar import for the formation of
Oklahoma Territory was considered by congress. The proposed
territory was bounded north by Kansas and Colorado, south by
Texas, east by Missouri and Arkansas, and west by Texas and
New Mexico Territory. In 1879 a similar bill was again con
sidered. In 1886 the same bill was made to embrace all of the
present Oklahoma, Indian Territory and the public land strip,
but the Indians were specially excepted from the operations of
the act. At all times the Indians protested vigorously against
being included in the territorial government proposed. In 1888
the plan was changed. - It was proposed that the Territory of
Oklahoma should embrace all of the country west of the five
abovementioned civilized tribes, to include the public land strip,
but not to include Greer county. On the public land strip were

?Reports of Committees, Second session. Forty-third Congress.

TERRITORIAL AND STATE BOUNDARIES. 481
many settlers, who had without authority taken farms there and
had named the country the "Territory of Cimarron."
As early as 1896 the project of admitting Oklahoma to state
hood was considered by congress. The boundaries have since
been variously defined. A- large following demanded the east
ward extension of the proposed state so as to embrace all of
Indian Territory. This was strenuously resisted by the Indians
themselves and generally by the congress and the sentiment of the
people, who desired that the United States should keep its time-
honored faith with the redmen. The question is now pending
in congress.
In the same act which created the Territory of Oklahoma
(May 2, 1890) Indian Territory was formed with the following
boundaries: "That all that part of the United States which is
bounded on the north by the State of Kansas, on the east by the
States of Arkansas and Missouri, on the south by the State of
Texas, and on the west and north by the Territory of Oklahoma
(as defined in the first section of this act) , shall, for the purposes
of this act, be known as Indian Territory." The tract of country
occupied by the Indians, and known as Indian Territory, had no
independent government, temporary or otherwise, prior to this
enactment. It was spoken of as Indian Territory with a capital
T even in the public documents, which would signify that it had
been granted a temporary government, but such was not the
fact until the passage of the above act. In referring to it as
"Indian territory," nothing more was meant than that it was ter
ritory or a tract of country owned or occupied by the Indians.
This statement is also true concerning all of the territory west of
the Mississippi and north of Missouri after 1821 and prior to
1834. Even Western Territory, created in 1834, was a general
term signifying western Indian lands. The western country was
often called Missouri Territory with a big T, but had no organi
zation as such. It was not even attached to any of the organized
territories or states during that period except for certain judicial
proceedings. As it had very few settlers and as it was mostly
occupied by the Indian tribes, from whom the territory had not
yet been purchased, it was left to shift for itself usually under a
native governor and under Indian laws. At first the policy of
the government was to take no action concerning the territory
until the Indian title thereto had been extinguished. Later, the
policy prevailed to embrace all the tribes within the bounds of
new territories, but to exclude them from the operations of the
territorial governments. In the case of Indian Territory, the
II— 31

482 THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES.
natives themselves were conceded their own government, as above
shown. The Cherokee tribe of Indians, having signified their assent to
the sale of the Cherokee Outlet, an agreement to that effect was
reached December 19, 1891, by which the sum of two hundred and
ninety-five thousand seven hundred and thirty-six dollars was
appropriated for immediate use, and the secretary of the interior
was authorized to contract to pay eight million three hundred
thousand dollars in addition, or so much of the same as was
necessary for the following tract of country known as the "Chero
kee Outlet :" "Bounded on the west by the one hundredth degree
of west longitude; on the north by the State of Kansas; on the
east by the ninety-sixth degree of west longitude, and on the
south by the Creek nation, the Territory of Oklahoma and the
Cheyenne and Arapahoe Reservation, created or defined by Execu
tive order dated August 10, 1869." It was provided that the
proclamation of the president should open this tract to settlement.
Though persistently urged by many advocates, recent attempts by
congress to form either two states of Oklahoma and Indian Ter
ritories with their present boundaries, or one state of both with
the outer boundaries of each have failed.