major general
Andrew Atkinson Humphreys
United States Volunteers
AT
FREDERICKSBURG, VA., DECEMBER 13th, 1862
AND
FARMVILLE, VA., APRIL 7th, 1865
BY
HENRY H. HUMPHREYS

iPrcsa of
R. R. McCABE & CO.
Chicago.

Copyright, iSg6, by
HENRY H. HUMPHREYS,
Fort Sheridan, Illinois.

ANDREW ATKINSON HUMPHREYS,
SCHOLAR, SAVANT AND SOLDIER. A MAN TO BE LOVED,
ADMIRED AND FEARED. KIND, COURTEOUS
TO AND CONSIDERATE OF ALL
MEN.

lprefatoti2.

SOME explanation is due to those who will read these pages
why the writer has written of one, who, though well
known in his oflScial capacity as an expert, is to many
Americans comparatively unknown. Although untoward cir
cumstances have prevented its appearance before, it at last
takes form. It arose from some reflections cast (by the author
of the History of the 2d Corps, Army of the Potomac) upon
General Humphreys' Official Report of the part taken by the
Division commanded by him at the Battle of Fredericksburg,
Virginia, December 13, 1862. All correspondence with those
having knowledge of the subject, was, in every case, submitted
to the Historian of the 2d Corps. It is assumed that General
Humphreys' abilities as a soldier would best be illustrated by
their display on the field of battle, when in command of troops.
Fredericksburg was his first opportunity, and it is deemed
fitting to bring forward in connection with thaty his last one
also, at Farmville, Virginia, April 7, 1865.
General Humphreys saw service as Chief of Topographical
Engineers, Army of the Potomac, from March, 1862, until
August of same year, under General G. B. McClellan. He
was then given command of a Division of Pennsylvania Volun
teers. This command was mustered out in May, 1863. He
was then assigned to the command of a Division of the 3d
Corps, formerly General Hooker's. He commanded this Divi-
5

6 PREFATORY.
sion at Gettysburg with consummate ability, and exhibited on
that field the same characteristics which were so conspicu
ously displayed at Fredericksburg, Virginia.
On July 8, 1863, he accepted the position of Chief of Staff
to General G. G. Meade, Commanding Army of the Potomac,
which position he held until relieved at his own request. Gen
eral Humphreys was, by direction of the President of the
United States, then assigned to the 2d Corps, in November,
1864. He commanded this gallant Corps until it was mustered
out of service, in June, 1865. Subsequently he resumed study
of the intricate -problems of his profession as an Engineer,
which had been interfered with by the war. At his request
he was retired from active duty on June 30, 1879, and died at
a ripe age at his home in Washington City, D. C. , December
27, 1883.
The writer leaves it to those who read this paper to draw
their own conclusion, feeling there can be but one deduction
drawn from its perusal, and that the result, when reached, will
redound to the credit of Andrew Atkinson Humphreys. The
task of the writer has been attended by many difficulties. It
is admitted that, by reason of kinship, he may not have been
wholly free from bias. To what extent he has been successful
in keeping all feeling in subjection, the reader will judge.
The writer makes no pretense at literary effort and accepts
responsibility for all statements.

jfrebericksburg, IDitGinia,
DECEMBER 13TH, 1862.

" PRINCIPIA, NON HOMINES."

DURING the last days of the year 1883, the writer was
called to Washington City by the death of General
Humphreys. Whilst there he received a communica
tion from General Francis A. Walker, Historian of the 2d
Corps, Army of the Potomac, requesting a copy of General
Humphreys' Official Report of the part taken in it by the
division which he commanded at the battle of Fredericksburg,
Virginia. The report was furnished, and afterwards a copy of
the work upon which General Walker had been engaged was
received. The writer naturally turned to that part devoted to
the battle of Fredericksburg, and found therein certain adverse
reflections or comments upon Humphreys' Division in that
bloody engagement. One of these comments or aspersions is
found on page 186 of the history and reads:
"It is very likely true that among the thousands a few
may have called out to Allabach's and Tyler's men that it was
useless to go forward, but their own situation on that field
swept by fire, is proof enough that such men were very few, if,
indeed, the story is not the tale of some colonel or captain to
excuse the breaking of his own command. ' '
It would have been far better when writing of past events
to have left out all controversies and consigned them to
oblivion. But since General Walker has seen fit to notice
them he must assume all responsibility for their correctness,
and must stand or fall by them. His history probably has
been widely read, for he occupies a high position in the world
7

8 Major General A. A. Humphreys,
of letters, and wields no small influence in the realms of
thought. A story like the above after adoption and circulation by
a gentleman of credit is hard to disprove, but, the writer
observes, such flings as the above lead a careful and thoughtful
reader to suspect the ' ' history ' ' in these matters in dispute
savors somewhat of romance. The writer is of a generous
nature and believes all men are actuated by honesty of purpose.
This standard he has set up for his guidance in all dealings
with mankind, and this without reflecting upon General
Walker, and acting in accordance with this motive, he wrote
requesting these comments be removed, giving reasons for such
request and his version of what he had seen and heard during
that action. The writer did not retain a copy of his letter, but
the reply of General Walker will show in terms its purport.

[copy] Boston, December 24, 1886.
My Dear Colonel Humphreys: — Many thanks for your letter of
the 14th instant. Your statement that you personally heard some of the
men lying on the ground at Fredericksburg, try to dissuade men of Gen
eral Humphreys' Division from going forward against the stone wall,
is conclusive on that point. This may have occurred at the spot where
you were, without being at all general. I say in my History, " it is very
likely true, that among these thousands, a few may have called out to
Allabach's and Tyler's men that it was useless to go forward," etc.
There is therefore no necessary antagonism between us on that sub
ject. I do not understand your statement that "General Humphreys
never in his official papers places anything there that is not known to
him personally. ' ' I confess that my own experience and observation as
a Staff Officer, do not allow me to comprehend how a Commanding
Officer could possibly report in adequate detail the operations of a Corps,
a Division, a Brigade or a Regiment even, without putting down a great
deal which he did not personally see, and for the truth of which he
would be obliged to depend on the testimony or reports of his Staff and
his subordinates, although the good commander will always subject such
testimony and reports to a. severe scrutiny, and will sift all statements

AT Fredericksburg, Virginia. 9
carefully, before incorporating any matter in his own official report
which did not fall within his personal observation.
As to the question whether any men of Humphreys' Division went
nearer the stone wall than did men of the 2d Corps, it is not likely we
shall come to an agreement. You have your opinion formed from your
own observation of Humphreys' charges, in which you participated as I
can personally testify, with great gallantry. I was at one time not fifty
yards from yovir Staff and was struck with admiration at the heroic brav
ery of the General and his young friends. The fact that at the time the
2d Brigade, Humphreys' Divisioii, reached its most advanced position
there were then no troops further to the front at the point where you per
sonally were, is, however,' not evidence that there may not have been
troops two (2) hours or more presumably, or that other troops may not
have advanced nearer to the stone wall at some other point of the Con
federate line. My opinion was formed from a personal observation of
the fight from the moment French's skirmishers went forward until the
last shot was fired after dark, confirmed by the testimony of scores of
Commanding and Staff Officers. I have no doubt as to the truth of my
representation but I cannot claim that those who think otherwise shall
yield their opinion to mine. I fear we must agree to disagree on this
point. Respectfully yours.

(Signed), FRANCIS A. WALKER.

Colonel H. H. Humphreys,
U. S. A.

Men have rarely enjoyed such close relationship with Hum
phreys as the writer. No one knew this man's moods and
tenses, mode of action, or thought, better than his son, who was
with him at home, in his office, and in the field. General
Walker's failure to appreciate what has been stated of Hum
phreys (see Walker's letter), was therefore from lack of associa
tion. Association affords opportunity for concise judgment of
character. We then see the foibles and virtues possessed of by
the individuals, who, under simple or complex environments,
emit light or remain in darkness. We readily perceive gener
osity, fear, envy, courage, and the ability to master the problem
or problems set before us, or the reverse. Association is

IO Major General A. A. Humphreys,
therefore the micrometer, by which we correctly measure and
value the many characteristics which makes man great or
small. Association is the crucible which reduces the baser
qualities to a film, and cognizes the nobler ones, pure and
undefiled. Judgment of character, based upon sources of in
formation other than association, is liable, nay sure to be
warped, dwarfed or distorted, simply from the lack of oppor
tunities for proper observation.
Humphreys relied upon what he himself saw, and wrote
accordingly. Nothing escaped his analytical brain. But
Humphreys was upon the actual field. Undaunted by the
horrible sights then present, or the groans and shrieks of the
wounded ; unheeding the sharp whistles of the bullets as they
speeded on to their billets, or the crash of bursting shells; he,
¦calm, 'deliberate, with those grey ej'es missing nothing, erect in
saddle, gave orders forthe two charges, in person superintended
their formation, and personally led them against the stone wall.
No wonder the Brigades were defeated in their two attempts to
carry the wall (led on by one who thoroughly impersonated the
God of War). When retiring from off this bloody field, one of
them (a brigade) caught up from the lips of their commander
the words of the song "I will be fat and greasy still," and
repeated it in thundering tones as they moved off the ground
with orderly step. (See testimony of the Confederate General
Ransom. ' ' Antietam and Fredericksburg. ' ' )
As to what his division did he could speak from absolute
knowledge and personal contact with the troops engaged.
This was his line of conduct throughout the war, either as a
staff officer, chief of staff, or commander of troops. In all
-cases he was ever to the front, and as near to the enemy as the
nearest troops. The accomplishments of General Humphreys
as a soldier and commander of troops engaged in warfare has
frequently been commented upon by officers of high rank in
the army with which he served. Their opinions are well
known. Furthermore, all commended and recognized him as
a man of superior attainments, and well fitted for any emerg
ency requiring the display of the peculiar qualities with which

AT Fredericksburg, Virginia. ir
he was gifted. Those who do not wish to accept this as a
truth are referred for confirmation to a work edited by Dr.
Fred. Humphreys, of New York City, or by communicating
with Major General J. Watts De Peyster, of that city, or at
Tivoli, New York State, his county seat.
In the work of General Longstreet, recently published, it is
noticed in writing of the charges of Humphreys' Division, he
uses the adjective "desperate." When relating what was seen
of the other charges of that day preceding those of Humphreys,
this essential word does not appear in its qualifying sense.
¦General Walker defends his work, claiming authority to write
for those of whom it is his duty or right to speak of. Surely
he does not deny it to me; I come properly to mine by inherit
ance, and his is either by request, vote or detail. With the
writer there is no juggling with words.
On page 187, same work, the author of the " History of
the 2d Corps," speaks of Humphreys' "superb leadership,"
and remarks, "and yet there was something in the way that
studious, scholarly officer of engineers, led his troops, especi
ally the brigade of Tyler, up against the stone wall, which
filled all beholders with admiration."
It is suspected this "superb" rhetorical display, this
sugar-coated pill, was put in there to appease or soothe the
feelings of those, who, reading this work (General Walker's
History), have ever denied there was on that blood-stained
field, any officer who was or could be the peer of Humphreys.
The writer will gladly admit, on presentation by General
Walker, any officer as the peer of Humphreys, who behaved
as Humphreys did, and under like conditions and circum
stances, and by this is meant an exact counterpart in all its
details. The writer challenges comparison.
Having succeeded in obtaining from General Walker a
partial correction, to be made in all future editions of his work
(see his letter), the writer has from that time forward, been
collecting evidence to adduce other troops than those of the
2d Corps, went nearer the stone wall that day. He now pre
sents his side.

12 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
[copy.]
We, the undersigned Officers of the first and second Brigades, 3d
Division, 5th Army Corps, when on the battlefield of Fredericksburg,
December 13, 1862, after reaching our farthest point forward, upon
making the charge upon the stone wall at foot of Mayre's Heights, recol
lect that the ground between our front line and foot of stone wall was not
encumbered by the bodies of soldiers lying thereon, either dead or
wounded, and it is our belief that we, as a unit, went nearer to that stone
wall (on that day) than any other troops.
(Signed), Edward Jay AllEn,
Colonel 155 Pa. Vols.
(Signed), P. H. Allabach,
Colonel 131 Pa. Vols., Commanding 2d
Brigade, 3d Division, 5th Corps.
(Signed), Henry H. Humphreys,
Captain 15th Infantry, U. S. A., late
ist Lieut. ii2th Reg't, Penn. Vols.,
A. D. C. to General Humphreys, who
was present on the field and saw with
his own eyes, being near General
Humphreys, jvho was in advance
some ten yards of the line of troops
commanded by General Humphreys.
(Signed), B. F. Kiefer,
' Captain Company "H," 131st Reg't
Penn. Vols., late 2d Brigade, 3d
Division, 5th Army Corps, Sunbury,
Penn.

[copy.]
We, the undersigned officers of the ist and 2d Brigades, 3d Division,
5th Army Corps, when on the battlefield of Fredericksburg, December
13, 1862, and making the charge upon the stone wall, led by General A.
A. Humphreys in person, while passing over the troops of the 2d Corps
lying on the ground, heard the following expressions used by them to
us: "Don't go forward, it is useless, you will be killed," or words to
same effect, and saw the men, who, lying on the ground, put forth their
hands, catching hold of our men by the trousers, blouses, canteens, and
haversacks. (Signed), R. W. PaTTEN,
Major, 131st Reg't Penn. Vols.

AT Fredericksburg, Virginia. 13
(Signed), C. S. Marks,
Private, Company "D," 131st Penn. Vols.
I was so close to the stone wall that
there was not a dead body on the field
in front of me. I was wounded about
twilight within about eighty feet of the
wall.
(Signed), W. H. Felix,
Private, Company "K," 131st Penn. Vols.
The above is correct. / was there.
(Signed), W. H. Kitting,
Private, Company "K," 131st Pa. Vols.
I was wounded near the stone fence.
(Signed), Lieut. Daniel B. Weber,
Company "K," 131st Pa. Vols.
(Signed), Gabrial Carpenter,
Company
(Signed), H. R. Kornig,
Company "D," 131st.
(Signed), Rob'T H. Junkins,
Col. Guard, Company "K," 131st Reg't
Pa. Vols.
(Signed), Peter Laudunstagor,
Company "K," 131st Reg't Pa. Vols.
(Signed), Geo. Meyers,
Company "K," 131st Reg't Pa. Vols.

[copy.]
Lewistown, Mifflin Co., Pa., March 4th, i88y.
My Dear Colonel: I have gotten some of the privates to sign the
enclosed statements. All the men that have signed it are men of stand
ing in this community and their testimony is of the very highest
character. You can attach this letter to the statement.
Very respectfully,
(Signed), ROBERT W. PATTEN,
Major 131st Penn. Vols.

[extract.] Washington, D. C, June 25, i88y.
My Dear Major: " I find with them, as with me, a great reluct
ance to reflect upon the men of the 2d Corps, although your printed

14 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
statement, enclosed, is perfectly correct. The expressions used were not
only as you state, but also the cry ' halt ' was made so vigorously that the
155th actually did halt and drop dpwn." Yours truly,
P. H. ALLABACH.

Colonel H. H. Humphreys, U. S. A.
Fort Buford, D. T.
My Dear Colonel: In the brochure concerning your father at
Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg, Va., in 1862, recently printed for
private distribution, and copies of which were, of course, sent by me to
Generals Couch and Walker, I did not care to do more than indicate
what appeared to me to be weakness and fallacy in the special argument
attempted by General Walker against the reports of General Hum
phreys. Probably, however, it would have been better had I gone one
step further. In view of the evidence, there cannot, I think, be any
candid doubt as to the correctness and the moderation of General
Humphreys' reports of the effect of the prostrate 2d Corps Ifne upon
his charges. Neither do I think that his statement that our division
reached the point of honor nearest to the stone wall will be doubted by
disinterested minds, in view of the arguments adduced by General
Walker. What insurance company would ever pay out a dollar on such
a general and indefinite identification as that presented as conclusive by
General Walker, even if the evidence were proffered by George Wash
ington himself? But, even if the identification claimed was complete
and positive, and every name could be given it would not be absolute
proof that no one had advanced beyond where the bodies were found.
There is seldom wanting aid to help a wounded, dying, or dead comrade
at least part way to the rear. L'Audace is not always or necessarily
fatal. Witness your father, pre-eminently, and Colonels Allabach,
Clarke, Gregory, Allen, O'Brien, Rowe, yourself, and many others on
that day. It needs not to cite instances from Cressy or Malplaquet, from
Leuthen or Jena, from Balaclava or Gettysburg, or from any other field.
But General Walker has set the matter at rest, though not exactly as.
he had evidently intended. On page 173 of 2d Corps History he says:
" Caldwell's men gain the farthest point to which any of our troops
have advanced; a few of them, joined by some choice spirits of Kimball,
Zook and Meagher, actuaUy push their way through the few gaps that
have been torn by dying hands in the last fence, and, a mere handful,
struggle on to take the stone wall held by its four ranks of defenders.
When the dead of that bloody field were buried, all the way from the
last fence, which no regiment or coinpany ever passed in line, up to
within twenty and even fifteen yards of the stone wall, lay soldiers of
those four brigades."

AT Fredericksburg, Virginia. 15
My impression is that, if General Walker had examined the Official
Records a little more : carefully, he would have modified this statement
which, of course, definitely ' and undeniably fixes the advance of the
2d Corps troops at the last fence. On pages 440 and 441, Vol. XXI,
O. R., you will find the report of Lieut. Col. David W. Rowe, One
hundred and twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers. Colonel Rowe saysr
"The One hundred and twenty -sixth formed behind the One hundred
and thirty-fourth, and in the charge followed that regiment 
Colonel Elder led, on horseback  The line advanced, in as good
order as the mud would permit, at double quick, until they unexpectedly
came upon a line of men lying on the ground, who, by gestures and
words, endeavored to warn them back. This, and the difficulty of pass
ing over these men, created some confusion in the ranks, which was.
increased by the necessity of pulling down, or scrambling over two
fences to the right of the birick house,, which stood in front of the rebel
battery,  Colonel Elder, who had dismounted on account of the
fences, fell, wounded in the thigh, just as the regiment reached its-
farthest place in advance  He was leading his horse in front of
his own regiment, and close to the first line, when he fell."
You will note of course, that the line of this regiment was disordered
by "pulling down or scrambling over" the two fences, and that Colonel
Elder, after dismounting at the fences, was leading (not holding) his
horse in front of his regiment, having advanced beyond the fences, and
was in rear of the first line which was, of course, still farther advanced,
and between him and the stone wall. Now, in view of General Walker's.
statement that " Caldwell men gain the farthest point to which any of our
troops have advanced," and that — to his knowledge of course — "no
regiment or company ever passed in line ' ' the last fence, it seems to me
that this report of Colonel Rowe is conclusive, and fully bears out the
report of Colonel Edward O'Brien, commanding the One hundred and
thirty-fourth Penn. Vols. (Official Records, Vol. XXI, p. 443) which
formed the "first line" referred to by Colonel Rowe. Colonel O'Brien
says: "Although the attack was unsuccessful, my regiment reached a
point nearer the enemy's works than any other, as our dead lying close by,.
fully show."
Colonel Edgar M. Gregory, commanding the Ninety-first Penn. Vols.
and in the second line of the brigade formation — in rear of the One Hun
dred and twenty-ninth regiment, and on the left of the brick house —
states in his report (O. R. Vol. XXI, p. -439), that "The advance contin
ued beyond the brick house, about 30 or 40 yards, when we retired," and,
if I remember correctly, you,, yourself were a witness to the fact that
Colonel Gregory's horse was shot from under him, and that he, himself
was wounded when in front of the then dismantled fence. The reports
from the 2d Brigade are not definite as to points reached by that

i6 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
command, but we know ihat they passed beyond all fences in their way.
I do not see what further evidence is needed. Gallant Corps as it was,
the 2d Corps troops cannot be allowed to hold the laurels won by our
green nine months Division of the 5th Army Corps.
Very truly yours,
(Signed), CARSWELL McCLELLAN.
2i8 Virginia Avenue,
St. Paul, Minn.,
Decem.ber 6, 1886.

Boston, January gth, 1889.
Captain H. H. Humphreys,
15th Infantry, Fort Buford.
Dear Sir:— Your letter of October 21st, with enclosures, was duly
received, and I immediately set about a reply to it; but the very great
labors connected with preparing my eulogy on General Sheridan rendered
it impossible to take the time for certain correspondence which I desired
to have before answering your letter. No sooner was the eulogy on
Sheridan delivered than I was obliged to prepare my address as President
of the American Economic Association, in Philadelphia, from which I
have but this week returned.
I regret that there should have been so much delay in replying to
your communication; yet there is, after all, not much to be said concern
ing its subject matter.
I never asserted that no man of the 2d Corps called out to the
troops of Humphreys' Division, on the 13th of December, 1862, that it
was useless to go forward against the stone wall. What I did say was as
follows: "It is very likely true that among those thousands, a few may
have called out to Allabach's and Tyler's men that it was useless to go
forward; but their own situation, ou that plain, swept by fire, is proof
enough that such men were very few, if indeed, the story is not the tale
of some colonel or captain to excuse the breaking of his own command. ' '
Shortly after the issue of my work you wrote me that you yourself had
heard these expressions on the occasion in question, and that you would
collect further testimony on the subject.
To this I replied that your assurance was sufficient, and that my
publishers would be instructed to omit the last twenty-one words in
future editions.
The remainder of the sentence quoted above I see no reason to
change. The opinion expressed therein is entirely compatible with the
statement of officers and men of the 131st Penn., which you enclose in
your letter. All of these might have possibly heard the same outcry
from a single individual, though, if each of them had heard a different

AT Fredericksburg, Virginia. 17
member of the 2d Corps say the same thing, my remark would still be
true, so far as this body of testimony goes. A dozen, or, for that matter,
a hundred, would be "very few" among the thousands of officers and
men of the 2d Corps who lay on the ground before the stone wall, that
bloody afternoon.
But, after all, it is a matter of very little consequence whether more
or fewer of the men of the 2d Corps did use such expressions as you
have cited. The essential question is whether the charge of Humphreys'
Division failed because of the presence of Couch's troops, or because of
the four ranks of veteran riflemen who, in the words of your honored
father, made the stone wall " a sheet of flame that enveloped the head
and flanks of the column." To me, certainly, it would appear more
creditable to the discipline and courage of Humphreys' men to attribute
their failure to the latter than the former cause; and, since to assign the
former cause is to reflect upon a body of troops for whom it is my duty
to speak, and who, as I believe, were never surpassed in loyal and heroic
devotion by any corps ever mustered upon the face of the earth, I must
take the liberty to retain and repeat my belief that Humphreys' Division
failed to carry the Confederate position for the same reason which had
defeated the supreme efforts of the magnificent divisions of French,
Hancock and Howard.
One thing remains to be said on this point. General Humphreys
knew of the presence of the troops of the 2d Corps upon the ground
over which he was to charge before his advance had been ordered; yet
he did not, as I am informed by General Couch, intimate any desire that
they should be withdrawn. This appears to me to have constituted an
acceptance of the situation which should preclude any adverse reflec
tions, in the interest of Humphreys' Division, upon the gallant men who
were lying upon that blood-stained ground, at an instant peril of the life
of every one of them and at the actual sacrifice of the lives of hundreds.
2d. As to the remaining question, whether the men of Humphreys'
Division went that day nearer to the stone wall than the men of the
2d Corps, you must excuse me for saying that the evidence you present
does not, in my humble opinion, create even a presumption in favor of
your position.
In the first place the question is not, whether on the immediate lines
of Allabach's or Tyler's advance, the troops of the 2d Corps went
nearer the stone wall than those brigades did. The ground over which
the divisions of French, Hancock and Howard charged, first or last, was
far wider than that covered by the charges of Allabach and Tyler. It
might, therefore, be true that no troops went further forward than the
latter brigades upon their own ground, and yet it might be true that at
other ;^oints some of the men of the 2d Corps went even nearer still to
the stone wall.

1 8 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
In the second place, the evidence offered to prove that no troops had
gone in advance of Allabach's and Tyler's men, along their lines of
advance is altogether inconclusive. It is proverbially hard to prove a
negative; yet the only testimony offered in this case is that of certain
officers and men who did not see any dead bodies over the ground over
which they advanced in the latter part of their charge. Had these
witnesses gone upon a peaceful field, searching undisturbed for dead
bodies their report might have been of some value on the subject. In
the case, however, of men rushing forward in all the fury and excite
ment of a most desperate charge, against a hostile position which was
one sheet of flame from end to end, a failure to note the presence of dead
bodies, had they lain there in considerable numbers, would have been
the most natural thing in the world. When men's attention is strongly
fixed in a certain direction, almo.st anything else may occur without their
noticing it. This is the entire secret of the art of the sleight-of-hand
performer. In the presence of a thousand persons he will do things
which not one of them observes, because he has first concentrated their
attention and fixed it upon something else. I have myself rode for
hours in the midst of a bloody battle without seeing a man fall from the
ranks, or a body lying upon the ground, simply because my attention
was fixed upon the general movements in progress and my faculties
utterly engrossed by important duties. If this might be the case in a
protracted action, during portions of which the hostile lines were at a
considerable distance from each other, how much more might it be true
of any soldier, even the bravest and the coolest, during such a furious
rush as that which was so gallantly but ineffectually made by Humphreys'
Brigades on the afternoon of the 13th of December.
3d. So much for the negative testimony on the subject. The
positive evidence stands in this way. Neither General Humphreys nor
yourself nor any officer or soldier of that division, so far as it appears by
the records, witnessed any one of the charges made by the 2d Corps
against the stone wall. On the other hand, thousands of officers aud
men witnessed alike the charges of Humphreys' Division and those made
from the divisions of French, Hancock and Howard. I have yet to learn
of a single person who enjoyed those opportunities who holds with you.
Such is my case. This is all I have to say on the subject. If your
mind is not satisfied, I do not see but what we shall have to agree to dis
agree regarding this matter as men have to do respecting many other
points, in this and every other war in human history. I venture respect
fully to suggest, however, that the least effectual way of exalting the honor
of any one body of gallant troops is through disparaging others, which
have proven, through two score of desperate battles, their claim to con
sideration and respect. Whatever may be written, I, for one, entertain
no fear that any intelligent and disinterested American will believe the

AT Fredericksburg, Virginia. 19
divisions of French, Hancock and Howard to have been inferior in
courage, discipline and efficiency to the gallant regiments that composed
the brigades of Allabach and Tyler.
I will only ask that should you feel it your duty to publish anything
on this subject you will do me the great courtesy and favor to call my
attention thereto. Respectfully yours,
(Signed), FRANCIS A. WALKER.

i6i5 21ST Street,
Washington, D. C, April 16, i8go.
General F. a. Walker,
Boston, Mass.
Dear Sir: — Your letter of January 5th, 1889, it is believed was
acknowledged soon after its receipt. From that time on the published
official reports of those engaged on both sides in the battle of Fredericks
burg have been consulted, the battleground visited and carefully gone
over, memory refreshed by conversation with individuals of both sides,
who gave and received blows in that memorable action. You are right in
stating "The essential question is whether the charge of Humphreys'
Division failed because of the presence of Couchs' troops, or because of
the four ranks of veteran riflemen who, in the words of your honored
father made the stone wall a sheet of flame that enveloped the head and
flanks of the column." In reply, I submit the reflections, as you style
my communication to you, came first from yourself and not from me.
Far be it I should detract one iota from the noble deeds performed by the
2d Corps, whose actions have been written in blood.
It is to you I address myself who, dwelling on the deeds of this noble
band, have been led to believe such sayings essentially as follows, we got
to within 25 and 20 yards of the stone wall, no troops went farther to the
front than we, and accepting them without contradiction, have overlooked U,^
the claims of others equally as brave, I will not say braver.
How can I remain silent when such assertions coming from one hold
ing the position you do, carries with it for a class of persons a weight who,
allowing others to do their thinking, fail to search for themselves.
The 3d Division, 5th Corps, were green troops, never before under
fire as a Division. Such troops led by a gallant General go farther than
veterans. They do not know the peril of their position, neither has the
value of a cross fire of artillery, accentuated by that of infantry terrors
for them; onward they press after their leader. History contains many
examples of such deeds. It is needless to refer to them.

20 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
As to the removal of Couchs' troops who, occupying the ground, were
an impediment to a successful home thrust by the 3d Division, 5th'
Corps, permit me to remark it was essential to the success of the attack
to be delivered by this Division, that the ground should have been cleared
of all retarders.
The orders under which General Humphreys acted, did not permit
making a survey of the ground over which the charges was made, neither
did time permit of his so doing. Had circumstances permitted such
survey, General Humphreys would have demanded as of primary import
ance to the success of his charges, the removal from the ground of all
troops then occupying that portion over which the division moved.
Possibly had time permitted for granting such a demand, it would not have
been complied with by General Couch, who, fearing such a withdrawal
would cause the Confederate troops to leave their position, and deliver a
counter stroke, forgot Union troops posted to right and left could and
would have poured on them a flanking fire; granting such a contingency
to have taken place it would have given us the victory. The Confederate
troops knew full well the value of their position.
A few more meh (relatively speaking) , would have been killed and
wounded in the withdrawal; what did that matter, if by so doing the
stone wall was carried, as it would have been by the green division of the
5th Corps led by General Humphreys. The demand "the carrying of
the stonewall before dark" was imperative, the response well known.
Let me be understood; General Humphreys was not aware, did not know
when orders were received by him to make this charge, of the ground
being encumbered by troops, neither did his order permit him of doing
aught but form and charge. General Couch had been on the ground a
long time, knew another charge was to be made, and should have assisted
by all means in his power to render this attack a success. What did he
do? All entreaties on the part of the men of the 3d Division, 5th Corps,
to those of the 2d Corps lying on the ground to rise and go forward with
them, were of no avail. Had they done so, the stone wall would have
been carried, and this success shared by both commands. I believe one
Officer of the 2d Corps, seeing this advantage, called on his men to
go forward, set the example, but they remained immovable.
Your second reply begs the question as to nearness of the men of
2d Corps to the stone wall. Your history of same asserts for them that
fact. A careful reading of the Rebellion records, confirms my opinion,
the 3d Division, 5th Corps, was formed in rear of ground held by Cald
well, Zook, and others of the 2d Corps. Muskets were rung unloaded,
bayonets fixed, and the Division charged over them. Wherein does the
Clio of this war make mention of such small things, their very nature
showing grim determination, wherein does she speak of a division led by
its commander into the jaws of death. Sir, the North, the whole army

AT Fredericksburg, Virginia. 21
moved with admiration by this act of heroism, rang with applause. It is
unparalleled, unprecedented, unexcelled, and to this day stands a shining
example of what one man can do, has done; a man so modest, so
generous, so careful of the feelings of others, never speaking of himself.
Thus we have narrowed somewhat the front, and bring the Division
on the same ground held by the gentlemen who claim no troops passed
beyond their lines or approached nearer the stone wall.
I bring this forward to prove my assertions, and here I stand not
alone, no men dead or wounded belonging to the 2d Corps were seen by
me lying on the ground in front of the line of the 3d Division, 5th Corps,
when at its farthest point forward.
General Humphreys and myself, mounted, were in front of this
line. To this day this ground, bare of men, has remained indelibly fixed
on my mind, as I, with others at that time, occupied a point of vantage
not enjoyed by others, save those whom I accompanied. Your reference
to the sleight-of-hand performer is very true of jugglery, but incom
patible with our present subject.
To your third reply. The official report of Brigadier General B.
Kershaw, commanding troops of Confederate Army at stone wall, states:
"At 5 P. M., the most formidable column of attack was formed, some few,
chiefly officers, got within thirty yards or less of the stone wall."
Major-General L. McLaws, Confederate Army, commanding at same
place, official report, states as follows: "At about 4:30 P.M. the enemy
in the meanwhile formed a strong column of attack, and advancing
under cover of the artillery fire, came forward along our whole front in
the most determined manner."
You will not deny these officers being good judges of what they saw
and described. They witnessed all the charges made upon their position
by the 2d Corps, yet nowhere do they employ such emphatic language
when speaking of previous charges on their position, except of the last
one, that delivered by General Humphreys. An officer, then holding
high* rank in the Confederate Army, occupying a position from which
a good view was obtained of the ground struggled over, gives as his
decided opinion, the troops of the 3d division, 5th Corps, advanced
farther and nearer the stone wall than any other. At no late date I trust
to submit for your information a copy of the letter embodying his views.
General de Trobriand, in his four years with the Army of the
Potomac, states: " The head of General Humphreys' column reached a
point about fifteen or twenty paces from the stone wall."
I quote from Major General de Peyster, of New York City, one well
versed in all matters pertaining to this war: " The experienced French
General of Brigade, V. de Chanel, in reporting to the Emperor Napoleon
III., remarks as follows of Humphreys at Fredericksburg " : ' These poor
*The writer was mistaken as to the rank.

22 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
fellows disheartened by several charges, and thinking perhaps as well of
their liberation so near at hand, have laid down and continued deaf to
the threats, as well as to the entreaties of their Commander. Then
Humphreys dismounted and accompanied by his son, a youth of sixteen,
who never left his 'father's side, advanced slowly toward the enemy.
The Pennsylvanians, shamed by this example, started to their feet and
rushed to the attack. The first surge up the slippery slope was made by
French, 3d Division, 2d Corps, with a boldness and backbone that
carried his first line to within thirty or forty paces of the never to be
forgotten Ha! Ha! stone wall. The second surge forward was made by
Hancock, ist Division, 2d Corps. It broke within twenty-five paces of
the stone wall. As to Humphreys' Division. As it was, despite his
utmost endeavors, in which two horses were shot under him, and another
badly wounded, he could not get his division across that stone wall,
indeed not nearer than fifteen or twenty paces to it. Although they
reached the point nearest to it which had been obtained they were com
pelled to retire.' "
"His division, like the third breaker upon the beach, left traces of
blood and wrecks, a few paces farther on and nearer to the enemy Va&rx
the preceding two, lingered longer, strove harder to maintain itself so
far and to accomplish the impossible."
Again I quote from the same authority: " Indeed so near was he
to carrying the wall and heights that the enemy were actually moving
their guns out of the batteries, and on the right they were beginning to
quit the wall. ' '
See letter of Humphreys to WiUiam Swinton, May loth, 1886: "A
gentleman of this city, Mr. Kirby, ' The boy scout,' with whom I have
conversed, gives, as his opinion, based upon what survivors of the Con
federate Army (some residents of Fredericksburg, Va.) have said to him.
They (the Confederates) concede to Humphreys the nearest approach to
the stone wall."
It is inferred, the " History of the 2d Corps ' ' strengthens its case upon
what was said by an officer of that corps who went over under a flag of
truce with detail to bury the dead. It has been affirmed by Martha
Stevens, since dead (in front of whose house General Cobb, commanding
at stone wall, was mortally wounded), in language nearly as follows:
"The field was blue in color before the Union troops left; next morning
it was white." Here the dead lay for some days before burial, stripped
of all clothing and exposed to the vicissitudes of climate. How was
recognition effected when everything tending towards that had been
removed? Were the bodies of the Union soldiers, then lying there, so
well known to the detail, that the changes wrought upon their features
by weather made no difference? I doubt it. The Maltese Cross, the

AT Fredericksburg, Virginia. 23
Trefoil, and other symbols marking the several corps, were of subsequent
origin to this action, excepting in one division (Kearney) the red
diamond of the 3d Corps.
Still further, when the brigade of Allabach (2d of 3d Division, 5th
Corps) was broken by the fire from the stone wall, many men of this
command ran forward to this house (Martha Stevens) and remained
there until night fall. This house is less than twenty yards from the
stone wall by actual measurement.
Colonel Allabach, commanding 2d Brigade, 3d Division, 5th Corps,
official report is as foUows: " My troops reached within twelve yards of
the stone wall." This officer is a veteran of two wars.
Your "History of 2d Corps " claims the last fence, official reports of
officers commanding regiments in 3d Division, 5th Corps, state: The
line advanced in as good order as the mud would permit at double quick,
until they unexpectedly came upon a line of men lying on the ground,
who by gestures and words endeavored to keep them back. This, and
the difficulty of passing over the men created some confusion in the
ranks, which was increased by the necessity of pulling down and
scramblmg over ttt/o fences." These fences were to the right and front
of brick house standing in the field, used as a hospital. It is there yet.
Lastly, were General Humphreys living, he would have pointed out
wherein you were wrong, and on his statements you would have
corrected the errors committed. Due regard for those whose lips are
sealed by death, coupled with admiration for the green division, has
called forth this letter.
With these official statements, coupled with my own recollections,
the extracts and statements from others, together with the official report
of General Humphreys, I claim for the 3d Division, 5th Corps, the
nearest approach to the stone wall, and shall so maintain, reserving to
myself the right to publish as you have done, my views on this disputed
matter. Thanking you for the correction to be made in any future edition of
the " History of the 2d Corps." I am, Sir, respectfully,
(Signed), HENRY H. HUMPHREYS,
Captain 15th Infantry, U. S. A.

Washington, D. C, June 16, i8gi.
Dear Capt. Humphreys:— Pardon my delay in not replying to
your letter until to-day.
My recollection of the battle of Fredericksburg, in which I was an
humble participant, is as follows:

24 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
The Richmond Fayette Artillery (a six gun battery), of which I was
an officer, was attached to General McLaws' Division during the fall and
winter of 1862, and which was one of the first divisions to reach the hills
in rear of Fredericksburg, on or about the 17th of November, 1862. I
believe about one day ahead of the Federal troops. On the nth day of
December, 1862, we were placed in position in General Lee's line of
battle, near the telegraph road, on a commanding hill which overlooked
the whole town and the plains below and along the Rappahannock river;
we were also in close proximity to Marye's Heights. Generals Lee and
Longstreet, with their Staffs occupied a position near our battery to watch
the progress of the battle. Our guns were intended to rake the fields
and the old sunken railroad cut in our front. On our left and down in
front of Marye's HiU ran the telegraph road; this road was about four
feet below the level of the land on the side near the town, while on the
other side arose Marye's Heights, a splendid natural fortification for any
body of troops to resist the ad%'ance of an approaching enemy. In this
sunken road were placed General Tom Cobb's and one other Brigade of
McLaws' Division.
On this day, nth of December, 1862,. the town of Fredericksburg
was shelled, driving out all the inhabitants. On December 15, 1862, the
great battle was fought; from our position we could plainly see the whole
line of battle. I saw the three grand but desperate and unsuccessful
assaults that were made upon the sunken road in front and at the foot of
Marye's Heights. The first attack was made just after the repulse of
General Franklin on our right, and which, I believe, was General
French's Division, after a fierce struggle over many obstacles this divi
sion retreated with heavy loss. The second charge was made almost
immediately after the repulse of the first; the troops in this charge were
of General Hancock's Division. Both of these assaults were made more
to our left and immediately in front of Marye's Heights, and in conse
quence were farther from our position, so that we took little or no part
in these two assaults.
The third or last assault was made near sunset and came closer and
nearer to our works than the first two. The troops in this charge were
of Gen. A. A. Humphreys' Division; they were handled in a most mas
terly manner and were pressed forward with vigor and determination to
capture the works at the foot of Marye's Heights and the telegraph road;
as the troops of this last assault emerged from the railroad cut and formed
line for the charge our guns opened upon them with good effect, but wdth
this galUng and disastrous fire in their front they came forward in a rush,
nearly reaching the telegraph road and the walks under the hill; it was
with difficulty that Cobb's and Cook's Brigades could hold their positions
during this assault.

AT Fredericksburg, Virginia. 25
General Humphreys' Division was repulsed with heavy loss, perhaps
more so than the other two divisions from the fact that he pressed his
troops closer and harder in the attack. We lost many valuable officers
and men in the assault.
I do not hesitate to say that if General Humphreys' Division had
attacked our line a little more to our right (your left) he would undoubt
edly have avoided a, greater portion of the sunken road and the fire from
our batteries on Marye's Heights, and no doubt would have captured a
part of the telegraph road, there being but two brigades behind the stone
wall, but it would not have been possible for any body of troops to have
gone any farther, no matter how brave they may have been, or how
skillfully handled. A day or two after the battle I went out with the flag
of truce between the lines to see about burying the dead, but more especi
ally to find the body of Captain King, who was^on General McLaws' Staff,
'and was killed during the last assault. I saw the dead as they had fallen
in these charges, and while I do not wish to detract anything from the
hard fought but bloody battle in which they had been repulsed, yet, I
must in justice say that the dead bodies that I saw close to our works
belonged to General Humphreys' Division.
I have written this letter hastily and without much thought,
endeavoring to give you my recollection in as brief a form as possible
(without referring to documents) of what occurred at the Battle of
Fredericksburg, December 15, 1862.
Very truly yours,
(Signed), ROB'T I. FLEMING.

Ibumpbte^s* Cbatge at flDar^e's
Ibetobte.
THE circumstances of Humphreys' assault deserves fuller
mention that I have made, for the charge was marked by
a gallantry unsurpassed by anything in the history of the
war. General Palfrey in his admirable monograph on Fred
ericksburg (in Scribner' s ' ' Campaigns of the Civil War' ' series)
says: — " Some of the very best fighting that was done at
Fredericksburg was done by the 3d Division of the 5th Corps.
The Division was commanded by General Humphreys, who
was probably the best Officer in the Army of the Potomac
that day. He was a thoroughly educated soldier, possessed of
a quick eye and a clear head, and a man of fiery energy. That
the fighting his division did was so good was due to him.
I venture to extract from a private letter from General
Humphreys to the present writer dated May 10, 1866, the
following particulars, which give an even more vivid picture of
his assault than is found in his official report:
"I had just reached the edge of the town facing Marye's
Heights with my division, when, at the earnest request of
General Couch, I was authorized or ordered to support his
troops in front of the stone wall, who, he said, were nearly out
of ammunition and would, if not supported, be forced back.
' ' This was a very great mistake. Had the enemy come out
from the stone wall, we should have carried the position. I
moved forward at once with my division down the hill and
-across the ditch or canal, formed the leading brigade in the
ravine beyond the ditch about three or four hundred yards
from the stone wall and advanced in line of battle to where
Couch's men were lying behind a small fold in the ground
about one hundred and fifty yards or less from the stone
27

28 Major-General A. A. Humphreys'
wall, the existence of which I knew nothing of until I got
there. I saw at once that there was nothing to be done but
to try the bayonet, which I attempted with this brigade, but
could not carry the wall chiefly because my troops were
thrown into disorder by the men lying, several ranks deep,
behind the little fold in the ground I have already men
tioned. I had ordered my other brigade to form in the same
ravine as it came up, and move up to me, and now rode back
towards it. It was at this time I found the artillery Hooker
had put on the edge of the ravine, just in the very ground my
troops must pass over. I was obliged to go to every gun myself
to put a stop to their firing.* I then led forward my other
brigade, which was thrown into confusion by the masses of men
lying down at the place I have already mentioned, the Uttle fold
in the ground. I had cautioned my troops about these men,
and told them not to mind them, but to run over them. But
the brigade was thrown into an unwieldy mass in going over
or through them, and the officers and men were mixed up
so that the former lost all control of the latter. Notwithstand
ing this, the impetus with which they were moving carried them
close up to the wall, t the right being actually on it, and the left
nearer to the wall than any other troops had reached, when
some firing began in the column or mass, which halted and
turned slowly back. One minute more and we should have
been over the wall, which I am confident I should have carried
but for the disorder occasioned by the troops lying down whom
I was sent to support. If they had been withdrawn before I
moved forward a different result would have followed. I
tried to get them up to make them charge with me, but could
not stir them. I stopped their firing, however. . Every officer
of my Staff but one was dismounted, and his horse was badly
wounded. Four of my Staff were wounded. I lost two
horses. So near was I to carrying the wall and heights
that the enemy were actually moving the guns out of the
*In the book from which I copy this letter there is a foot note at this place, whidh
however, I have not copied, as it is rather long and seems to be unimportant.
fOn the printed page from which I copy this, there is no comma in this sentence
until this place. I have copied throughout the punctuation ofthe printed page.

Charge at Marye's Heights. 29
batteries, and near our right they were beginning to quit
the wall. It was getting to be dark when the charge was
over. It was when I was returning to lead my last brigade
to the charge that I received messages for the first time
from General Hooker and from General Butterfield saying
that General Burnside said the heights must be taken before
night. I sent them word I had tried the bayonet with one
brigade, and was now going to try it with the other.
General Hooker and General Butterfield had returned from
General Burnside while I was occupied with my leading brigade
and the former mistook the charge of the second brigade for
the charge of my division, hence the error of his testimony.
I went over the ground on my march to Washington in May of
last year, and found that the distances were even less than
those I gave in my official report of the part taken in the battle
by my division. The first brigade that charged was commanded
by Colonel Allabach. The second was commanded by Brigadier
General E. B. Tyler."
Copied from William Swinton's "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac."
(Scribner's, 1882). Appendix, page 633. (Signed), H. E. B.
Received at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, March 8, 1894. (Signed), Henry H.
Humphreys, U. S. A.

1018 I2TH STREET,
N. W., Washington, D. C,
March 17th, 1896.
Captain Henry H. Humphreys,
U. S. Army,
Fort Sheridan Illinois.
Dear Sir: Business matters have prevented me from replying to
your letter of February 20th, 1896, until now.
In answer to your question in relation to the dead in front of Mayre's
Heights at the Battle of Fredericksburg, Va., on December 13th, 1862,
you ask: " How you determined that fact, or in other words, how you
recognized the dead nearest to our (your) works were those of General
Humphreys' Division," will state that by conversing with the wounded
found on the field of battle in front of Mayre's Heights when I went out
•with the flag of truce, etc., and was informed by them that they belonged
to General Humphreys' Division, and as was quite natural w^ talked

30 Major-General A. A. Humphreys'
with wounded of other commands in order to find out what troops made
the charges, etc. I notice one error in my letter to you of June l6th,
1891, that of the date December 15th, 1862, should have been December-
13th, 1862. The battles were fought December nth, 12th and 13th, 1862,
according to my recollection. Very truly yours,
(Signed), ROB'T I. FLEMING.

Some opinions well known to General Walker, expressed
by officers of the Army of the Potomac of the abilities pos
sessed by Andrew Atkinson Humphreys.
Campaigns of tbe Civil Mar.
(SCRIBNER'S.)
CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.
pages 174 AND 175
' ' Humphreys was ordered to move his left wing back to
form a new oblique line to the ridge in connection with
Birney' s Division" and again, " but now he was obliged, while
executing this difficult manoeuvre of a change of front to rear,
to contend with Barksdale' s brigade of Mclyaws' Division on
his left at the Peach Orchard and enfilading batteries there
also, while his entire front was called upon to repel a most
determined assault from Anderson's Division which hitherto
had not been engaged and which now pressed with great force
on his right which still clung to the road."
' ' Humphrej'S received orders to give up his advanced posi
tion and fall back to the ridge itself. There he turned at
bay." " Humphreys' was followed up by the Brigades of Wilcox,
Perry and Wright, about the best fighting material in the
rebel army."
Those who have been required to execute such an evolu
tion know well what it is and how hard to perform, especiall}^
under fire. The division were seasoned troops and worked it
out to perfection, loosing heavily, some two thousand men.

Charge at Marye's Heights. 31
Same Series.
ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.
PAGE 126
As TO Love of Fighting.
' ' With officers and men it was the same. They did not
like fighting. Sheridan, Hancock, Humphreys, Kearney,
Custer, Barlow, and such as they were exceptions, but the rule
was otherwise. ' ' PAGE 170
"Some of the very best fighting that was done at Fred
ericksburg was done by the 3d Division of the 5th Corps. This
division was commanded by General Humphreys, who was
probably the best officer in the Army of the Potomac that day.
He was a thoroughly educated soldier, possessed of a quick
eye and a clear head, and a man of fiery energy. That the
fighting his division did was so good was due to him."
' ' As soon as Humphreys had ascertained the nature of the
enemy's position, which the urgency of the case had put out
of his power to do before arriving with his men, he became
satisfied that his fire could have little effect upon them, and he
perceived that the only mode of attacking him successfully was
with the bayonet. ' '
" Having learned from experience (his first charge) what a
serious obstacle they would encounter from the presence of the
mass of men lying behind the natural embankment in front, he
directed them to disregard these men entirely and pass over
them." The scene which followed was most singular, and it is
well to describe it in General Humphreys' own words:
"As the brigades reached the masses of men referred to
every effort was made by the latter to prevent our advance.
They called to our men not to go forward and some attempted
to prevent by force their doing so. The effect upon my com
mand was what I apprehended, the line was somewhat dis
ordered, and in part was forced to form into a column, but still

32 Major-General A. A. Humphreys'
advanced rapidly. The fire of the enemy's musketry and
artillery, furious as it was before, now became still hotter.
The stone wall was a sheet of flame that enveloped the head
and flanks of the column. Officers and men were falling
rapidly and the head of the column was at length brought to a
stand when close up to the wall. Up to this time not a shot
had been fired by the column, but now some firing began, it
lasted but a minute, when in spite of all our efforts, the column
turned and began to retire slowly."
The Confederate General Ransom is stated to have
reported as follows: "This last desperate and maddened
attack met the same fate which had befallen those which had
preceded and his troops were sent actually howling (singing!)
back to their beaten comrades in the town."
Same Series.
PENINSULAR. Page 22.
' ' One of the best military authorities we have now living.
General A. A. Humphreys, late Chief of Engineers, former
Chief of Staff to General Meade, late Commander of the 2d
Corps in front of Richmond, was in favor of this movement."
" Urbana route." And again (page 154): " General McClel
lan had given orders for placing the troops before they had
all arrived upon the spot, and had assigned position to Porter's
Corps and Couch's Division of Keys, the other corps as they
came on the ground were put in position by General A. A.
Humphreys, who had examined the ground thoroughly the
day before. ' ' GRANT VERSUS THE RECORD.
PAGE 128.
' ' When General Andrew A. Humphreys decided that an
assault by the 5th Army Corps could not succeed, few experi
enced military men would wish to disregard his judgment, and
small reason was left for criticism of defeated effort. ' '

Charge at Marye's Heights. 33
COMTE DE PARIS. CIVIL WAR.
PAGE 595, VOLUME II.
Writing ofthe charges on Marye's Hill, at Fredericksburg,
by the Divisions of French, Hancock, Howard, also Hum
phreys, uses the following language as to the charges of the
latter's Division: " They rushed forward with such eagerness
that they nearly reached the foot of the wall " (stone). This
historian fails to record such language for the divisions of the
2d Corps. In this particular. General Walker's History exalting the
2d Corps above all others, is another example of the old say
ing: "The page killed the boar, [but the king obtained the
glory." — Quinton Durward.

peterebutG, Dirglnla,
APRIL 2D, 1865.

FIDUS ET AUDAX.'

IT is not the purpose of this paper to detail at length how the
Armies of the Potomac and James obtained and held the
position from which their final assault was delivered upon
the Confederate lines at Petersburg, Virginia, on the 2d of
April, 1865, and their capture. The positions held by the
several armies confronting each other will be described in
general terms, for most, if not all of you, are acquainted with
the topography of that country, and what was done by both
sides to cover themselves by means of earthworks, and render
all approach, if not impossible and impracticable, at least
dangerous and difficult, except at a heavy expense of life and
limb. The works erected for the protection of the city
(Petersburg), from the Appomattox to "Battery No. 10,"
had been carried by the Union troops on June 17th and i8th,
1864, the Confederates retiring to the hills in rear, and there
upon erecting new lines of defense, which are held, until
carried, and Petersburg evacuated April 2d, 1865. Their
lines of defense were prolonged to meet all subsequent exten
sions of ours to our left, whereby we hoped to cut off from
them some of their lines of subsistence, namely, The Weldon
and South Side Railroad, compel evacuation or surrender.
Whenever these extensions took place both sides seized upon the
natural features of the ground, converting them to their benefit,
first by felling all trees in their front for some distance out,
dropping the tops outward, thereby making it almost impossible
for any line of troops to get through, introducing near their
35

36 Major-General A. A. Humphreys'
inner sides several lines of wire which ran in and out and
through the branches, damming up Hatcher's run in many
places, rendering it non-fordable, placing in front of their rifle
pits several lines of "Abattis," there again using wire; pro
tecting all natural crossings of the run by dams and bridge
heads, in fact all measures used were calculated to hinder and
prolong the staj^ of the attacking troops in their front, and
while so exposed inflicting upon them heavy losses. These
lines ran through woods, up and down hills, crossed open
places, small streams, with first, nothing but the rough rifle
pit. These in time are improved, becoming regular intrench
ments. The ground held by the Armies of the Potomac and
James began near the Appomattox river, and extending to the
left, ended about one mile west of Purges' Mill (which was
upon Boydtown plank road), aline, according to recollection,
something like twenty miles in length, if not more. The Con
federate lines naturally followed this extension. These works
were not held by a continuous line of troops, but in and upon
them were constructed many enclosed forts with garrisons,
mutually supporting each other by their fire. By these means
the armies were enabled to cut loose from their lines and meet
each other on new fields but with less numbers.
On the 2d of April, 1865, the positions of the corps of the
Armies of the Potomac and James, were as follows: Com
mencing on right, first the 9th Corps, then the 6th, the Army
of the James, then the 2d Corps, which held the extreme left
of the Army of the Potomac. Beyond this, with an interval
of some four miles, more or less, was Sheridan at Five Forks
with his Cavalry and the 5th Corps. How the Confederate
Corps were placed behind their line is not definitely known
to the writer, hence their positions are not given.
To arrive at some idea of the strength of the Armies of the
Potomac and James and its opponent the Army of Northern
Virginia, research must be had of the most reliable data.
Unfortunately, the Rebellion Records for the year 1865 have
not reached those for whom they are intended, and the writer
has beeri compelled to resort to such works (written by the

AT Petersburg, Virginia. 37
principal actors in that struggle as are now in the hands of
almost everyone, who has taken, or still takes, interest in the
late war. By reference to the Morning Reports of the Army
of the Potomac, of March 31st, 1865, we find its strength to be:
Officers and enlisted men of all arms of the service, 74,871
men, with 243 guns; of the cavalry under Sheridan, 13,820;
of the Army of the James under Ord, 22,714 men, with 56
guns; a total of 111,405 of all arms, with 299 guns (field and
siege. )
Facing Richmond and Bermuda Hundreds was the 25th
Corps, with an effective force of 13,630 men and 56 guns.
Of the strength of the army of Northern Virginia, we find by
consulting their Morning Reports of February 20th, 1865 (the
only report so far known), to be of all arms, 55,500 men. Lee's
army was divided into three parts; first, that defending Rich
mond and Bermuda Hundreds about 10,000; that confronting
the Armies of the Potomac and the James, say 35,000; lastly,
those defeated by Sheridan at Five Forks, about 10,000. The
Armies of the Potomac and James naturally had assumed three
grand sub-divisions, that facing Richmond, whose strength
has been stated, while Sheridan's Cavalry had meanwhile been
strengthened by the addition of the 5th Corps, bringing its
effective force to 30,893 men with 36 guns. While the Army
of Potomac had lost by this addition to Sheridan, it gained that
of the Army of the James, bringing its total effective force to
80,512 officers and men, facing Petersburg.
By 8 a.m. on April 2d, 1865, the Confederate outer-lines,
defending Petersburg, had been carried from one end to the
other, and Lee is busily fighting with what is left to him of
his army until nightfall, when he will evacuate Petersburg and
Richmond, concentrate at the "Amelia Court House," march
from thence on Danville, N. C, unite with Johnson, beat back
Sherman, who is pushing northward to assist Grant in his
attack on Petersburg and Richmond., During the day Lee
perfected his plan of retreat, and at nightfall his army crosses
to the left bank of the Appomattox river by means of a
pontoon bridge, the Pocahontas and R. R. bridge. That part

38 Major-General A. A. Humphreys'
of his army defeated by Sheridan at Five Forks retreats by a
road called the River road, up the Appomattox river on its
right bank. Of the army which crossed by the pontoon bridge
and others, Longstreet leads with Field Division, Heth's and
Wilcox's Division of Hill's Corps, marching by the River road
left bank, up the Appomattox, intending to cross this stream
at Bevel's Bridge, but finding it out of order uses the pontoon
bridge laid at Goodes' Bridge. Gordon follows the Hickory
road, crossing the river at Goodes' Bridge, follows Long-
street. Mahones' Division passing through Chesterfield Court
House, used the bridge at Goodes', follows Gordon. Ewell's
command composed of Kershaw's and Custis Lee's Divisions,
crosses the James river at and below Richmond; takes the
Genito road, followed by Geary's Cavalry as rear guard, and
crosses the Appomattox by the Danville R. R. bridge. The
Armies of the Potomac and James slept quietly the night of
April 2d, 1865, inside of the lines captured by them that day,
intending on the next morning, April 3d, 1865, to assault the
inner works, which at nightfall of that day still defended
Petersburg, but on awakening find their prey had escaped.
Purisuit is immediately given, our cavaly overtaking the Con
federate rear guard, near Namozine Church, which was
defeated. At Deep Creek another engagement near dark took
place. Here our cavalry halted with the 2d, 5th and 6th
Corps well closed up. Let us turn back to the force defeated
at Five Forks by Sheridan, and those by the 2d Corps, which
I have stated retreated by the River road, south bank of the
Appomattox river, on April 2d, 1865. This force fell back
from Sheridan and the 2d Corps, by way of the Ford and
Clayborne roads, to Sutherland Station, on the South Side Rail
road, where it made a stand for some time, until driven from
the field by General Miles, commanding the ist Division 2d
Corps. This division (Miles) returned by Sheridan on the
morning of April 2d, 1865, was on its way back to the 2d
Corps, but turned down the Clayborne road (under orders of
the commander of the 2d Corps) and struck the enemy at the
beforementioned station. This division was followed by the

AT Petersburg, Virginia. 39
other two divisions of the 2d Corps on the same road, but
before Miles' first engagement were deflected towards Peters
burg, the Lieutenant-General intending this part of the field
for Sheridan's exclusive use (see ".Personal Memoirs of
Lieut. -General P. H. Sheridan," page 173, Vol. 2). During
April 3d, nothing was accomplished by the Cavalry and the 5th
Corps, except the rear guard fights at Namozine Church and
Deep Creek, Virginia. Precept No. i, with two others, which
follow naturally on the application of the first, governed
Napoleon in all his campaigns, is here lost sight of. Sheridan's
Cavalry with the 5th Corps, together with the 2d Corps, in
all 52,060 men and many guns, are more than a match for the
enemy probably not over 10,000 strong? Had General Grant
permitted the 2d Corps to follow and engage the enemy at
Sutherland Station Sheridan would probably have closed in on
their right flank and rear. Not one would have been left to
retreat up the River road on the south bank of the Appo
mattox. Precept No. i reads: "Engage your masses with
the fractions of the enemy's forces, or your large fractions
with his small ones." We have now reached a point where,
had ' ' the three precepts ' ' been applied, there would have been
no Appomattox, and the surrender of Lee would have taken
place sooner. A glance at the map reveals two rivers, the
James and the Appomattox, which unite but a few miles below
Petersburg, Va. It was well known to Grant Lee, would push
south as fast as possible. To prevent this a strong column of
troops, say those under Sheridan, to which could have been
added the 2d Corps, in all 52,060 men (leaving with Grant at
Petersburg, 57,200 men to carry on the siege) , should have been
organized, with orders to push up the Appomattox on the 2d
of April, 1865, as fast as possible, and hold all probable and
possible crossings of the river. The points which would have
been held, in all probabihty, had this column been formed,
would undoubtedly have been those used by the Confederate
troops in their retreat, besides, this column would have cut off
from Lee his only road by which suppUes could reach him,
namely, the Richmond and Danville R. R. This operation

40 Major-General a. a. Humphreys.
would have cooped Lee between two rivers with no means of
living, except upon the county and that almost exhausted, and
forced him to fight a battle under disadvantageous circum
stances, forming front to a flank. This manoeuvre is in accord
ance with Precept No 2, "Always operate upon interior lines";
and with Precept No. 3, " Operate as far as possible upon the
communications of the enemy without exposing your own."

iReflections.

Have the heavy blows, administered by Lee, on the Army
of the Potomac, from the Wilderness, 1864, and including Din
widdie Court House, 1865, made some impression on General
Grant. Our forces, collectively speaking. Cavalry, 5th and
2d Corps, had the preponderance of numbers and held the
shortest line to the various crossings of the Appomattox above
Petersburg. From Petersburg by the North River road to
Goodes' Bridge, it is about 35 miles, by the South River
road, from Sutherland Station to the same point, it is about
25 miles. Grant must have been aware of the topography of
the country, by means of his spies, and his stay at City Point,
Va., from June 19th, 1864, up to and including April 2d, 1865.
Much information must have been gathered of the topography
of the country, fording of streams, the means of crossing the
Appomattox river, their distance each from the other and from
Petersburg, Virginia.

JFatmville, IDfuointa,
APRIL 7TH, 1865.

AMICUS PLATO, AMICUS SOCRATES, SED MAQIS
AMICUS VERITAS."

WE resume our narrative of last year, having on April 3d,
1865, left the opposing forces (Union and Confederate)
on the right bank of the Appomattox river, at Deep
Creek, whilst the balance of Lee's Army is marching forward
to Amelia Court House, concentrating there. General Grant
in his memoirs, volume 2, page 466, states, "we had now no
other objective than the Confederate Armies and I was anxious
to close the thing up at once. ' '
This language of the Lieutenant General carries great
weight and will be referred to later on. It is now advanced,
and attention called to its purport and it should not be for
gotten. It will be brought to your attention, when a part of the
Army of the Potomac and that of Northern Virginia, Com
manded by General Lee, face each other at Farmville as we
style that fight, or the so-called encounter at Cumberland
Church of the Confederates.
Sheridan pushes forward on the 4th of April 1865, arriving
at Jetersville, Va., late that afternoon, with the Cavalry of
Crook's and most of his own mounted troops. He intrenches
at once, but sends out to his left and front, some cavalry, with
directions to ascertain, if possible, the disposition of Lee's
forces, what points are held and what roads are occupied, what
are or will be his intentions; presuming he (Lee) still holds to
his original plan of uniting with Johnston in North Carolina.
41

42 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
The 2d and 6th Corps follow upon the same route as that
used by the Cavalry and 5th Corps, but were impeded by our
Cavalry coming from our right flank.
This arm having precedence, the two Corps give way to
them. The Corps also are required to furnish large working
parties to repair the roads, as they were nearly impassable , for
wagons. At one o'clock a. m. of the 5th of April, 1865, the
march was resumed by the 2d and 6th Corps, but proceeding only
a short distance forward, were again delayed by the Cavalry,
coming in from our right, on their way to Jetersville, and it
was not till near 3 p. m. of that day that the 2d Corps began
to arrive at Jetersville, followed by the 6th Corps. Our In
fantry are placed in the following positions, the 6th Corps on
the right of the 5th Corps, the 2d on the left of the 5th Corps,
which latter Corps held the centre. All faced north, or in
the direction of Amelia Court House, where was then Lee's
Army. Here Lee was concentrating, but this concentration was not
effected until some time in the afternoon of April 5th, 1865.
Lee expected by a well conducted night march westward, to
get so far in advance, that he might reach Lyncburgh by pass
ing through Deatonsville, Rice's Station and Farmville, and
possibly might reach Danville (see page 376, "Virginia Cam
paigns, 1864-65"). His Army at nightfall began its retreat,
by roads passing to our left flank and rear — Longstreet reach
ing Rice's Station at sunrise April 6th, 1865, where he waited
(2 for the coming up of the rest of the Confederate forces — Ewell
was at Amelia Springs about 8 a. m. of April 6th, 1865 —
Gordon's Corps was the rear guard.
The Confederate wagon trains pushed forward on their right
flank on roads which were covered by their forces. All were
to cross Sailor's creek, at or near Perkinson Mills, near its
mouth in the Appomattox River. The Confederate troops
were to cross this stream (Sailor's creek) two or three miles
further up and on the road to Rice's Station, and all bridges
which had been used by them were then to be destroyed, as
well as the one at Amelia Springs. A part of Sheridan's

AT Farmville, Virginia. 43
mounted force, during the 4th and 5th of April, 1865, struck
the Danville railroad between Burkes Station and Jetersville,
and then moved upon the latter place, arriving there April 5th,
1865. The 5th Corps marched direct on Jetersville. Davies'
Brigade of Crook's Division of Cavalry made a reconnaissance
to Paines Cross Roads, about five iniles north of Amelia
Springs, to ascertain if Lee was making any attempt to escape
by that flank.
On the morning of the 6th of April, 1865, the Army of the
Potomac, with deploying intervals, moved towards Amelia
Court House for the purpose of engaging Lee's force if still
there. At 8:30 a.m. of this day, when about four miles out, a
strong column of the Confederates was discovered by the 2d
Corps moving westward on the north bank of Flat creek.
The Corps was halted, dispositions were made for attack, and
this information (discovery of the enemy) immediately com
municated to General Meade. A short time before this dis
covery of the 2d Corps, General Meade's signal officers
discovered the enemy's trains several miles distant moving
westward and escorted by cavalry. General Griffin, at HiU's
Shop, received undoubted information Lee had left Amelia
Court House, moving west. At 9:30 a.m., same day. General
Meade's signal officers reported an infantry column, some three
or four miles distant, moving in a north-westerly direction, and
again another column, some six or seven miles distant, both
moving quickly. All this information left no doubt General
Lee had during the night been passing to our left and rear.
Upon the receipt of this information General Meade at once
faced his army to the rear (ours) and directed the 2d Corps to
move on DeatonviUe, the 5th Corps to move to the right of the
2d and through PainsviUe, the 6th Corps through JetersviUe
and take position on the left of the 2d Corps. A brigade of
the 2d Corps at once forded Flat creek, the water reaching
nearly to their armpits. This stream is not less than 100 feet
wide. Bridges were built in short time (material being handy)
for the passage of the Corps with its artillery and ambulances.
"A sharp running fight commenced af once with Gordon's

44 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
Corps, which was continued over a distance of fourteen (14)
miles, during which several partially-intrenched positions were
carried. The country was broken, consisting of woods with
dense undergrowth and swamps, alternating with open fields,
through and over which the line of battle followed closely on
the skirmish line with a rapidity and good order that is
believed to be unexampled. Artillery moved with the skirmish
line. (See page 379, " Virginia Campaigns, 1864-65.")
Histories have been searched to discover if a corps of 20,000
men or less have ever before executed such a manoeuvre, but I
have failed to find anything which approaches it. All text
books instruct in the pursuit of a rear guard, the pursuer loses
time in changing from the order of march to the order of
battle. The pursued then draws off and resumes the march.
The pursuer must then change from the order of battle to that
of march. This is obligatory. Here is an advance on what is
taught. No soldier will be guided by these rules, unless he be
pedantic. The true commander will change his formation for
pursuit to suit himself, adapting himself to the topography of
the country.
. The result of this relentless chase gave the Confederates no
rest and jammed their rear guard (and A good one too) up, and
into the forces which they were endeavoring to protect; and
the result of this energetic action on the part of this soldier was
to assist materially in the subsequent capture of a large Con
federate force at Sailor's Creek that afternoon.
Has any one ever heard of artillery being on the skiri^iish
line before this? The Germans advocate the use of artillery
well advanced. They are students in all things and lead the
world. But who before ever heard of artillery on the skirmish
line until this example i^ brought to your notice ?
Anderson halted some time in the morning at the forks of
the road near J. Hott's house. The right-hand road leads to
Perkinsen Mills, some three or four miles down Sailor's Creek,
the left-hand road leads direct to Rice's Station.
General Sheridan, early on the 6th of April, directed Crook
to move to Deatonsville; Merritt to follow. About midday

AT Farmville, Virginia. 45
Crook made a da,sh at the trains Anderson was guarding but
was repulsed. Merritt joining Crook soon after this repulse,
a second attempt was made upon them, but Anderson being
reinforced by Ewell, whose troops were then arriving, this
second attempt was defeated. When the head of Gordon's
Corps reached Hotts, Anderson crossed Sailor's Creek, followed
by Ewell, and line of battle was fornied across the Rice Station
road. The command partially intrenched. Gordon after the
passage of the main trains of Lee's army, which moved on and
down the right-hand fork, followed after them to Perkinsen' s
mills, the 2d Corps close upon him. When General Hum
phreys arrived at the aforementioned forks of the road he per
ceived Ewell's troops, or part of them, forming line of battle
along the north side of Sailor's Creek. He was aware Sheridan
was close upon Ewell, but "not aware Anderson's command
was across that road on the crest beyond Ewell," and seeing
the whole of the 6th Corps near at hand he continued his pur
suit of Gordon's Corps on the right hand forks down Sailor's
Creek. "This running fight with Gordon's Corps continued
for three miles further, the road for many miles being strewn
with tents, camp equipage, baggage, battery forges, limbers
and wagons. The last attempted stand was near Perkinsen' s
Mills (Sailor's Creek) when just before dark a short, sharp
conflict gave us many flags, three guns, several hundred
prisoners, and a large part of the main trains of Lee's Army,
which were huddled together in a confused mass at the cross
ing of the creek. Gordon attempted to form on the high
ground on the opposite side of the creek, but fell back quickly
from it as our troops crossed. Darkness put a stop to the'
pursuit until next morning, for the country and roads were
unknown to us. Gordon reached High Bridge that night.
(Seepage 381, "Virginia Campaigns, 1864-65.") " The 5th
Corps, right of the Army of the Potomac, moved on the Paine-
ville road to Ligonton Ferry, a distance of thirty-two (32)
miles, but encountered none of the Confederate forces." (See
page 382, " Virginia Campaigns, 1864-1865.")
' ' General Ord being notified on the 6th of April that Lee

46 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
was apparently moving towards Burke's Junction at first pre
pared to meet him there, but subsequently, with a view of
intercepting him, moved along the Lynchburg R. R., and
after marching some eight (8) or ten (lo) miles came upon
Longstreet intrenched at Rice's Station. It was night before
his troops were in position." (See page 381, "Virginia Cam
paigns, 1864-65.") Longstreet remained all day at this place
waiting for Anderson, Ewell and Gordon to unite with him.
The troops of these gentlemen were covering their trains, but
notwithstanding their united efforts the greater part of them
(the trains) were destroyed or captured. Had Lee cut down
his transportation, reserving only a sufficient number to carry
ammunition, very Uttle baggage and hospital stores, and his
ambulances, and abandoning the rest he undoubtedly would
have succeeded in his undertaking, eluded the- pursuing army
and joined Johnston, but by his holding on to them he clogged
his marches. All his movements were subservient to their
protection, and they eventually compelled the surrender of his
army. The captures of the 2d Corps this day amounted to thirteen
(13) flags, four (4) guns, and seventeen hundred (1700)
prisoners, without counting the killed and wounded, which
must have been considerable. On the night of the 6th of
April, General Longstreet moved to Farmville, crossed the
Appomattox early on the morning of April 7th, and moved out
on the road to Lynchburg. Rations for the army of Northern
Virginia were here distributed. General Gordon crossed to the
north bank of the Appomattox river at High Bridge. He used
also, near the former, a wagon road bridge. General Ord
finding the enemy had left their position in his front followed
on to Farmville. General Sheridan sent General Merritt's
cavalry towards Prince Edward Court House to intercept any
movement of the enemy towards Danville, and Crook was
ordered to Farmville. The 5th Corps moved to Prince Edward
Court House, the 2d and 6th Corps took up the direct pursuit
of the enemy, the latter Corps moving to Farmville following
General Ord. The 2d Corps resumed the pursuit at 5:30 a. m.,.

at Farmville, Virginia. 47
April 7th, 1865, by roads nearest the river, foUowing those
which appeared to have been in use by the Confederates, and
came upon them at High Bridge just as they blew up a bridge
head on the south bank of the river. The enemy had set
fire to the railroad bridge on the North side and attempted to
burn the. wagon bridge, but General Barlow's Division, leading
that day, were too quick for them and this bridge was saved to
us. Had it been burnt, we should have been unable to cross,
the river being non-fordable. Four spans of the railroad
bridge were burnt, the rest saved by the exertion of some men
of the 2d Corps, the pioneers of the corps. Whilst this body
of men were engaged in saving the bridge a lively fight was in
progress beneath them, the Confederates endeavoring to drive
off our men and burn the wagon bridge, and we to drive them
away and prevent the accomplishment of their object. Our
efforts to this end were successful and the 2d Corps crossed.
The brick piers of the railroad bridge, some twenty in number,
are sixty feet high.
Mahone's Division, Confederate, moved off in a north
westerly direction, and> Gordon moved up the river along the
railroad bed in the direction of Farmville. The 2d Corps
(two divisions) marched on the road mentioned as running in a
northwesterly direction, which road intersects the stage road,
four miles north of FarmviUe — Mahone used this road. The
division sent up the railroad bed, on nearing Farmville, finds
this town still' held by the enemy in strong force. They had
set fire to the bridges and were covering a wagon train on the
north bank of the river running to Lynchburg. Here Barlow's
Division (2d Corps) caused the Confederates by his disposi
tions to burn 150 wagons to prevent them from faUing into his
hands, which they otherwise would. Our troops concentrated
about FarmvUle that day but were prevented from crossing the
river as it was not fordable there for infantry, besides no
pontoon train was then available. The two divisions of the
2d Corps arrived near the stage road about i p. m. and came in
contact with the enemy, who opened with artillery. Disposi
tion was at once made for an attack. A heavy skirmish Une

48 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
was pressed forward at once for the purpose of developing his
position. " From prisoners taken it was found Lee's whole army was
present in a strong position, covering the Stage and Plank
roads, which position was sufficiently intrenched for cover —
artillery was in place." (See page 388, " Virginia Campaigns,
1864-65.") The heavy skirmish line was pressed against
General Lee and an attack threatened by the two divisions,
and an unsuccessful attack was made to take General Lee in
flank. The division which had marched against Farmville by
the railroad bed was sent for, and General Meade informed;
Lee with what was left of his army, probably 18,000 strong,
had been come up with. General Meade on the receipt of this
information directed General Gibbon with the 24th Corps, and
General Wright with the 6th Corps, both of which were at or
near Farmville, to cross the river and attack Lee in rear, whilst
the 2d Corps attacked in front.
The position occupied by General Lee, at Farmville, re
sembles that held by us at Gettysburg, "in petto." All that
was required to carry it was that it should be punched. But
this punching does not take place, for the reason neither
General Meade nor the Commander of the 2d Corps were
aware that there was no available pontoon bridge. Here was
the " objective " so ardently desired by General Grant, and the
opportunity offered to his anxiety, " to close the thing up at
once." Lee's army had been brought to bay and by a so-
called "laggard." The troops, excepting one corps (that
engaged) are too widely scattered to permit of rapid concentra
tion at the one point, and are principally engaged in marching
on parallel roads south of those in use by the enemy, to prevent
his moving down into North Carolina, besides, I venture to
say the coming up with the enemy that day at Farmville was
not on the calendar, and in consequence our combinations were
upset. The tactics used by us in the pursuit of Lee resemble
those of the summer of 1864. No provision is made whereby
rivers can be crossed. What if the pontoon bridge train had
been at Farmville when troops arrived there, a., bridge con-

at Farmville, Virginia. 49
structed and troops crossed? Farmville would have been
written and Appomattox unknown.
Some firing being heard in the direction of FarmviUe,
which was thought to be the 6th Corps advancing, the left
flank of the 2d Corps was shortened and the right flank
extended, with a view of enveloping Lee's left flank. An
attack was delivered on our part but repulsed with heavy loss.
The firing heard proceeded from a part of General Crook's
cavalry, which had forded the river. This force was defeated
with the loss of many killed and wounded and prisoners.
General Crook was recalled and directed to move to Prospect
Station on the Lynchburg Railroad, ten or twelve mUes from
FarmviUe. This was reached about midnight.
Pardon me if I, Uke Badeau, who, when some orders were
given for the execution of a movement by the Army of the
Potomac, remarks "after percolating through the brains of
the several commanders one would fail to recognize them, as
all strength and decision had vanished, died of inanition. ' ' Yet
it is strange the news of Lee's army held fast at Farmville,
Va., during the day of April 7th, 1865, if peradventure the
news suffered the same attenuation going up which he (Badeau)
claims had befallen these mentioned beforehand going down,
this, if true, yet retained sufficient vitaUty, when reaching
Sheridan at Prince Edward Court House, for him to see what
was to be gained by such an unfortunate mishap as befell Lee's
army on that day.* General Griffin reported at 7:30 p. m. , of
April 7th, 1865, when he arrived at Prince Edward Court
House the rear of the cavalry was then leaving the town.
This place by map is distant from Farmville some six miles,
and from Appomattox Station about 24 miles. (See R. R. ,
page 628, Vol. 46.)
As to the kind of fighting by the 2d Corps that day the
following is quoted from McGowen, South Carolina Brigade.
(See foot note page 390, " Virginia Campaigns, 1864-65.")
' ' The enemy seems to be ubiquitous. We were instructed
*But see pages i88 and 189, Vol. II., of "Gen. P. H. Sheridan Memoirs," and
pages 396 and 397 " Virginia Campaign, 1864-65."
4

50 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
to be prepared to fight on either flank; on our right flank
firing was pretty steadily kept up, in our front a regular battle
was going on. Mahone's Division was engaged and a portion
of Field's. The firing increased in rapidity and extent until
three sides were at once set upon by the enemy. I never was
so bewildered as on this occasion."
In Volume II. , "Memoirs of General Grant," page 476,
speaking of the enemy who burnt the railroad bridge at High
Bridge, April 7th, 1865, we find him saying, "Humphreys forced
his way across with some loss, and followed Lee to the inter
section of the road, crossing at Farmville with the one from
Petersburg. Here Lee held a position, which was very strong
naturally, besides being intrenched. Humphreys was alone
confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous
position. He put on a bold face however, and assaulted with
some loss, but was not assaulted in return."
And again on page 478, same volume, speaking of April
7th, 1865: "Sheridan and Ord were pushing through away
to the south (and Humphreys confronting Lee as before
stated). After having gone into bivouack at Prince Edward
Court House, Sheridan learning that seven (7) trains of pro
visions and forage were at Appomattox determined to start at
once and capture them, and a forced march was necessary to
get there before Lee's army could secure them."
From the "Virginia Campaign, 1864-65," page 391, I
quote: "By the detention until night at this place (Farm
ville) General Lee lost invaluable time, which he could not
regain by night marching; lost the supplies awaiting him at
Appomattox Station, and gave time to Sheridan with his
cavalry, and Ord with the 5th and 24th Corps, to put them
selves across his path at Appomattox Court House.
"If no infantry had crossed the Appomattox on the 7th, of
April he could have reached New Store that night, Appomat
tox Station on the afternoon of the Sth of April, 1865, obtained
rations there and moved that evening towards Lynchburg. A
march the next day, the 9th of April, would have brought him
to Lynchburg. Ord's two (2) infantry corps did not reach

at Farmville, Virginia. 5I
Appomattox Court House until 10 o'clock on the morning of
the 9th April, 1865."
Let us turn to the other side (Confederate) and see what
their views are regarding the events of this day, April 7th,
1865. On pages 386 and 387, "Great Commander Series,"
General Lee by his nephew, Fitzhugh Lee, says:
" The once great army of Northern Virginia, was now com
posed of two (2) small corps of infantry, and the cavalry
corps, resumed the march towards Lynchburg on the Stage
road, but after going four miles stopped and was formed into
line of battle in a well chosen position, to give the trains time
to get through. It was attacked by two divisions of Hum-
phre3's' 2d Corps, which had been long hanging on its rear,
but repulsed them. Mahone handled Miles roughly. Had
Lee not stopped to fight he could have reached Appomattox
Station the afternoon of the 8th April, obtained rations, and
moved that evening to Lynchburg. The delay allowed
Sheridan, with two divisions of Cavalry, followed by Ord's
Infantry and 5th Corps, marching by Prince Edward Court
House to reach Appomattox Station on the evening of the 8th
of April, where he captured trains with Lee's suppUes and
obstructed his march. Ord's Infantry did not arrive in front
of Appomattox Court House until 10 a. m. of the 9th of April,
1865." The 2d and 6th Corps resumed the direct pursuit at 5:30
A. m. on the morning of the Sth, and that night went into
camp three (3) miles in rear of Longstreet — a march of twenty-
six miles for that day.
As to the operations performed by the 2d Corps, on April
6th, 1865, we find on page 600, Vol. 46, R. R., the following
despatch from the Commander of the 2d Corps, which reads:
7-30 p. M. Headquarters 2d Corps, April 6th, 186^.
To Brevet Major-General A. S. Webb,
Chief of Staff.
Our last fight just before dark, at Sailor's Creek, gave us two (2)
guns, three (3) flags and considerable number of prisoners, two hundred
(200) wagons, seventy ambulances, with mules and horses to about one

52 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
half of the wagons and ambulances. There are between thirty (30) and
fifty (50) wagons, in addition, abandoned and destroyed along the road,
some battery wagons, forges and limbers. I have already reported to
you the capture of one ( i ) gun, two (2) flags and some prisoners, and the
fact that the road, for over two (2) miles, is strewn with baggage, cooking
utensils, some ammunition, and materials of all kinds.
The wagons are in a great mass across the approach to the bridge,
and will take some time to clear it.
(Signed), A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Major-General, Commanding.
And on page 596, same Vol. of R. R., is found the follow
ing despatch from Major-General Meade, Commanding the
Army of the Potomac:
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
April 6th, 1&65, 10 p. m.
Received 3:20 A. M., April 7th, 1865.
To Lieutenant-General Grant.
*****«¦***
The 6th Corps came up with the enemy about 4 P. M., in conjunction
with the 2d Corps on the right, and the Cavalry on the left. Attacked
and routed the enemy, captured many prisoners; among them Lieut.
General Ewell, General Custis Lee. I transmit despatches both from
General Humphreys and General Wright, which in justice to these dis
tinguished officers and the gallant corps they commanded, I beg may be
sent to the War Department for immediate publication.
(Signed), G. G. MEADE,
Major-General, Commanding.
Your attention is called to this request of General Meade
for the immediate publication of what had been accomplished
by the 2d and 6th Corps on April 6th, 1865; and I crave your
indulgence to the following: This despatch and the preceding
one need to be read together, for on them and a subsequent
letter to be introduced later on, hangs the whole story.
On page 624, same volume, R. R., you will find the
following:
Headquarters 2d Army Corps,
April 7th, i86s, 3:20 p. m.
To Brevet Major-General Webb,
Chief of Staff.
We have Heth, Mahone, and I believe the rest of Lee's Army, here
in my front, moving towards Lynchburg. They are intrenched in a too

AT Farmville, Virginia. 53
strong position for me to attack them in front, and their flanks extend
further than mine. They are extending their flank to my right. I have
sent for Bariow but I do not know at what time he will be up. I have
just seen a despatch dated 1:20 p.m., saying that Farmville is in our pos
session, that the cavalry were moving throngh it.
(Signed), A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Major-General, Commanding.
This despatch and one other, it is believed written later in
the day, or rather evening, confirmed more in detail the
information conveyed in the despatch of 3:20 p.m. of April
7th, 1865, were suppressed, and it is assumed, in fact believed,
these despatches were not published to the North when it was
informed of what had been done by others.
Three letters from General Grant to General Lee, and the
replies thereto from General Lee passed through the picket
lines of the 2d corps. The first one from Grant, brought by
General Seth Williams, A.G., Army of the Potomac, was sent
through our lines about 6 or 7 p. m., April 7th, and General
Lee's reply was delivered to us within one hour. (See appen
dix "M" "Virginia Campaigns, 1S64-65," pages 439 and
440.) When General Lee sought, on April 9th, 1865, an interview
with General Grant with a view of surrendering his army, this
letter of General Lee's marked No. 6 in the correspondence,
passed through our Unes, 2d Corps, but General Grant had
then left the route pursued by the 2d Corps, and had gone over
to that of Sheridan^and Ord's. (See appendix " M " as before
referred to. ) The telegraph was freely used, keeping the North
fuUy advised of the success which attended the Army of the
Potomac in this campaign. A despatch from the Honorable
Secretary of War, E. M. Stanton, mentioned Sheridan's name
only, and the inference naturaUy drawn from it by the public
was the generals of the Army of the Potomac were ' ' lag
gards. ' ' Webster defines the word ' ' laggard ' ' to mean ' ' slow,
sluggish and awkward, one who lags or loiters." The writer
whilst hunting for evidence on which to base an application
for membership to the Societies of the ' ' Sons of the American
Revolution" and that of "Colonial Wars," came across.

54 Major-General A. A. Humphreys,
eighteen months ago, a letter which is printed in a volume
edited by Dr. Fred Humphreys, of New York City, called
"The Humphreys' Family." It will be found on page 1005,
and reads: " You would not think that I had lost interest in
the subject of your letter had you heard me talk to some
Pbiladelphians about the pursuit of Lee. I learned only this
summer of the effect of Stanton's telegram of the 6th or 7th
of April, giving the whole credit of overtaking and attacking
Lee on the 6th of April to Sheridan. There they said in
Philadelphia (I am told) the generals of the Army of Potomac
are laggards, it requires Sheridan and Grant to overtake Lee.
What an outrage on Wright and myself that telegram was.
We, laggards.' The impression thus made on the public, in
this moment of success, has never been effaced; it remains to
this day. To you, I am indebted, my dear General, for the
first presentation of the subject to the public that will tend to
efface this impression." This letter is dated September 29th,
1872. Here is the despatch referred to:
War Department, Washington, D. C,
April 7th, 1865, 10:00 a.m.
Major-General Dix, New York.
General Sheridan attacked and routed Lee's Army yesterday, cap
tured Generals Ewell, Kershaw, Barton, Corse and many other general
officers, several thousand prisoners and a large number of cannon, and
expects to force Lee to surrender all that is left of his army. Details
will be given speedily as possible but the telegraph is working badly.
(Signed), EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
I have in this sketch dwelt somewhat on the doings of the
2d Corps; have detailed the several manceuvres of the forces
which were pursuing Lee. I beUeve I have in this done nothing
to disparage the glory gained by other troops in this memorable
campaign. Men are judged of either by their actions or speech or by
what they have written, or by what is written of them by
another as their views. Surely the reproachful word ' ' lag
gard," as applied to these distinguished soldiers, could not

AT Farmville, Virginia. 55
with justice be affixed to either Generals Humphreys or
Wright, in view of what has been accomplished by them and
their corps.
The despatch of the then Honorable Secretary of War must-
have been written either under a false impression, derived from
the despatches read by him, or else all the facts had not been
laid before him; or else there had been a wilful suppres,sion of
the news by some one.
Yet this ugly fact remains, the despatches referred to were
at that time suppressed, as also one other, giving more in
detail Lee's force and position at Cumberland Church or
Farmville. General Grant knew where Lee's army was and what
troops of his were nearest to Lee, and in consequence of this
proximity used the 2d Corps as a means of communicating
with Lee, yet one of the so-called "laggards " commands the
only troops near enough to permit of such correspondence.
General Grant further recognizes one of the so-styled ' ' lag
gards ' ' as occupying all day, in front of General Lee, ' ' a very
hazardous position." A peculiar condition of affairs for one
who has been called a ' ' laggard. ' ' Generally this style of
man is found well to.the rear and out of danger, yel he is
there in front and holds on with a grip which cannot be shaken
off. It is needless for me to refer further to the detention of Lee
at Farmville, whereby Sheridan in his brilliant operations has
placed himself across Lee's line of retreat, and captured his
supplies; for the cause of this detention has been, I think,
established beyond a doubt by what has already been placed
before you; but least I have not done so, to your satisfaction,
I beg leave to call your attention to the following:
In a work entitled ' ' Some Federal and Confederate Com
manders," on pages 94, 95 and 96, will be found the following:
' ' Following the narration of General Walker in the ' ' History
of the 2d Army Corps, ' ' it may fairly be contended that Hum
phreys compelled Lee to lose time at Farmville Heights, which
he could not regain by night marches, kept him from obtaining

56 Major-General a. A. Humphreys.
the much needed supplies waiting for him at Appomattox
Station and gave to Sheridan and Ord the opportunity to put
themselves across his path at Appomattox Court House. It is
worthy of note that General Grant's first note to Lee, demand
ing the surrender of his army was delivered from Humphreys
front, about half-past 7 p. m. , on the 7tli of April, and that
Lee returned his answer within an hour by the same route.
' ' Generals Grant, Ord, and Wright rested that night at
Farmville, about eight miles in rear of Humphreys' position.
"The end came next day, Humphreys' foot Cavalry was in
at the death. His unerring instinct for the chase, his terrible
persistency and aggressive temper, together with the astound
ing celerity of his movements had enabled him to outstrip
everything but the cavalry, and to keep fully abreast even
with that.
" If Sheridan was the hero of the cavalry, in this splendid
operation, Humphreys was beyond all doubt the hero of the
infantry. Certain it is that, like the impatient runner in the
Olympian games he would never have merited the lash for
starting up too soon, nor like the laggard, have failed to
deserve his crown by being left at the beginning of the race. ' '
It is also pertinent to this subject to remark (this officer
who had been styled by the public a ' ' laggard ' ' ) received
from the hands of the party (who had written this unfortunate
telegram) one of the best gifts at the disposal of the nation,
that of Chief of Engineers U. S. Army, and this commission
bears date August Sth, 1866.

Supplemental.

Headquarters, Corps op Engineers,
United States Army,
Washington, D. C, December 29th, 1883.
General Orders, No. io.
Again the painful duty devolves upon the Brigadier-General Com
manding of announcing to the Corps of Engineers, the death of a
brother officer.
Brigadier-General Andrew A. Humphreys, Corps of Engineers
(retired). Brevet Major-General, United States Army, died in this city on
December 27, 1883.
General Humphreys was graduated from the Military Academy and
promoted to the rank of Brevet Second Lieutenant, Second Artillery,
July I, 1831. He served in garrison at Fort Moultrie, S. C, in 1831; on
temporary duty at the United States Military Academy, in 1832; in the
Cherokee Nation, 1832-33; at Augusta Arsenal, Ga., and Fort Marion,
Fla., 1833-34; on topographical duty, making surveys in West Florida
and at Cape Cod, Mass., 1834-35; and in the Florida War against the
Seminole Indians in 1836; being engaged in the action of Oloklikaha,
March 31, 1836, and action near Micanopy, June 9, 1836. On September
30, 1836, he resigned his commission as an officer of the United States
Army, and during the years 1836-38, as Civil Engineer, assisted the late
General Hartman Bache on the plans of Brandywine Shoal Lighthouse
and Crow Shoal Breakwater, Delaware Bay. Upon the re-organization of
the Corps of Topographical Engineers in 1838, General Humphreys was
re-appointed in the army with the rank of first lieutenant in that corps.
He served in charge of the works for the improvement of Chicago
Harbor, Ills.; as assistant topographical engineer of survey of Oswego
Harbor defenses, N. Y., and in charge of survey of Whitehall Harbor,
N. Y., in 1839; as assistant in the Topographical Bureau, at Washington,
D. C, 1840-41; in the Florida War, 1842; on construction of bridge at
Washington, D. C, 1842; as assistant in Topographical Bureau at Wash
ington, D. C, 1842-43-44; as assistant in charge of the Coast Survey
Office, at Washington, D. C, 1844-49; and on surveys in the field 1849-50.
He was engaged in making a topograpliic and hydrographic survey
of the Delta of the Mississippi River with a view to its protection from
57

58 Major-General A. A. Humphreys.
inundation, and deepening the channels at its mouth, 1850-51, continuing
in general charge of the work and preparing his able and voluminous
report thereon, till 1861 ; in Europe examining means for protecting Delta
rivers from inundation, 1853-54; in general charge, under the War De
partment, of the office duties at Washington, D. C. ; connected with the
explorations and surveys for railroads from the Mississippi River to the
Pacific Ocean, and geographical explorations west of the Mississippi
River, 1854-61; as member of the Lighthouse Board, 1856-62; of the
Board "to revise programme of instruction at the United States Military
Academy, and of the Commission created by Act of Congress to examine
into the organization, system of discipline, and course of instruction
at the United States Military Academy, i860."
He served during the rebellion of the seceding States, 1861-66, on
the staff of Major-General McClellan, General in Chief, at Washington,
D. C, December 1861, to March 1862; in the Virginia Peninsula cam
paign, as chief topographical engineer. Army of the Potomac, March to
August, 1862; being engaged in the siege of Yorktown, April 5-May 4,
1862; battle of Williamsburg, May 6, 1862; in movements and operations
before Richmond and to the James River, May- June, 1862; and battle of
Malvern Hill, July i, 1862.
Appointed brigadier-general. United States Volunteers, April 28,
1862, he was placed in command of a division of new troops at Washing
ton, D. C, September, 1862, and served in the Maryland campaign (Army
of the Potomac), September-November, 1862, being engaged in covering
Frederick Maryland, September 16, 1862; pursuit of enemy from Antie
tam, September 18, 1862; reconnaissance in Shenandoah Valley, October
16-17, 1862, and march to Falmouth, Va., October-November, 1862; in
the Rappahannock campaign (Army of the Potomac), December, 1862-
June 1863, being engaged in the battle of Fredericksburg, December 13,
1862, and battle of Chancellorsville, May 2-4, 1863; in the Pennsylvania
campaign (Army of the Potomac), June-July, 1863, being engaged in the
battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863.
He was appointed Major-General of Volunteers, July 8, 1863, and
served as chief of staff to Major General Meade, commanding Army of
the Potomac, from that date until November, 25, 1864, being engaged in
the action of Manassas Gap, July 23, 1863; the Rapidan operations,
October-November, 1863, including the actions of October 12 and Nov
ember 7, 1863, on the Rappahannock, and Combat at Bristoe Station,
October 14, 1863; operations of Mine Run, November 29-December 3d,
1863; action of the Rapidan, February 6, 1864; battle of the Wilderness,
May 5-6, 1864; battles around Spottsylvania, May 9-20, 1864; battles of
North Anna, May 23-26; Tolopotomy, May 28-30; Cold Harbor, June 1-3,
1864; assaults at Petersburg, June 16-18, and July 30 (mine), 1864;
battles of Weldon Railroad, August 18-25, 1864; action of Peeble's

Supplemental. 59
Farm, September 30, 1864, and action of Boydton Plankroad, October
27, 1864; in command of 2d Army Corps, November 25, 1864, to June
27. 1865, being engaged in the siege -of Petersburg till its fall, April
3> 1865, including the action of Hatcher's Run, February 4-6, 1865, and
the almost daily attacks on the enemy's works, March 24, to April 3, 1865,
and pursuit of General Lee's Rebel Army (including the several actions of
the 2d Corps April 6, 1865, terminating at Sailor's Creek, and actions
Sfi ^^^ ^""^g^ ^ind FarmviUe, April 7, 1865), till its surrender, April 9,
1865, at Appomattox Court House, and in command of District of Pennsyl
vania m Middle Department, July 28-December 9, 1865.
From December 9, 1865, to August 8, 1866, he was in charge of the
examination of the Mississippi Levees. On August 8, 1866, he was
appointed to the command of the Corps of Engineers, with the rank of
Brigadier-General, and Chief of Engineers, serving in this capacity until
his retirement from active service at his own request on June 30, 1879.
He served as member of the Lighthouse Board, February 20, 1870, to
January 1874; of commission to examine into canal routes across the
isthmus connecting North and South America, 1872-1877; of Board on
Washington and Georgetown Harbor improvements, i872-'73; of Revising
Board of Bulkhead and Pier Line of Brooklyn from May, 1872, to June,
1879, of Staten Island from August, 1878, to June, 1879, and of Hudson
River (Troy to Hudson) , June 1877, to June, 1879; of Board for survey
of Baltimore Harbor and adjacent waters from May, 1876, to June, 1879;
of Washington Monument Commission from January, 1877, to June, 1879;
of Advisory Board to Massachusetts Harbor Commissioners from January,
1877, to June 1879; and of Examining Board of Moline Water Power
Coinpany contracts, April-June, 1877.
General Humphreys was promoted to the grade of Major, Corps of
Topographical Engineers, United States Army, August 6, 1861; additional
Aide-de-camp, with the rank of Colonel, March 5, 1862; Brigadier-General
of Volunteers, April 28, 1862; Lieutenant-Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
United States Army, March 3, 1863; Major-General, United States Vol
unteers, July 8, 1863, and Brigadier-General, and Chief of Engineers,
United States Army, August 8, 1866.
He received the brevets of Colonel, United States Army, for gallant
and meritorious services in the battle of Fredericksburg, Va. , of Brigadier-
General, United States Army, for gallant and meritorious services in the
battle of Gettysburg, Pa., and of Major-General, United States Army, for
gallant and meritorious services in the battle of Sailor's Creek, Va.
In the civil duties appertaining to his profession he was as eminent as
in his military duties in the field. He was a member of the American
Philosophical Society, of Philadelphia, Pa., and of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, of Boston, Mass.; a corporator of the National

6o Major-General A. A. Humphreys.
Academy of Science; and honorary member of the Imperial Royal Geolog
ical Institute of Vienna, and of the Royal Institute of Science and Art of
Lombardy, Milan, Italy; and corresponding member of the Geographical
Society of Paris, and of the Austrian Society of Engineer Architects.
Noble in all the attributes of manhood, interesting as an author, able
and scientific as an engineer, brave and resolute as a soldier, courteous
and considerate in his relations with his associates, the Corps of Engineers
to-day mourns the death of one who stood in the front rank of the ablest
and best of its officers.
No words of the Chief of Engineers can add to his well-earned fame
orthe distinction that attaches to his name; these are, and ever will remain
a part of the history of the Corps and of the service.
As a testimonial of respect for the deceased, the officers of the Corps
of Engineers will wear the usual badge of mourning for thirty days.
By command of Brigadier-General Wright.
(Signed), John M. Wilson,
Major of Engineers,
Brevet-Colonel, U. S. A.
[note.]
Degree of LL.D., conferred by Harvard College, July 15, 1868.
Honorary Member, Italian Geographical Society, 1880.
Corresponding Member, Maryland Historical Society, December lo^
1877. Member of the Hungarian Society of Engineers, January, 1885.

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